1

AFRICA SECURITY BRIEF

Boko Haram’s Evolving Threat

BY J. PETER PHAM

A PUBLICATION OF THE AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

◆ The Nigerian militant Islamist group Boko Haram has grown increasingly virulent since late 2010, 

reflecting a major transformation in its capacity, tactics, and ideology.

◆ There are indications of expanding links between Boko Haram and international Islamist terrorist organizations.

◆ Support for Boko Haram among some of northern Nigeria’s marginalized Muslim communities suggests 

that security actions alone will be insufficient to quell the instability.

HIGHLIGHTS

NO. 20 / APRIL 2012

as the continent’s most populous country, instability 

there has significant global implications.

BOKO HARAM IN CONTEXT

Boko Haram first received widespread attention for the armed attacks that it launched against 

police stations and other public buildings in the 

towns of Geidam and Kanamma in Nigeria’s northeastern Yobe State in late December 2003. However, 

the emergence of the militant sect cannot be understood without reference to the social, religious, 

economic, and political milieu of northern Nigeria. 

While murky, some accounts link the group’s origins 

back to the Maitatsine1 uprisings of the early 1980s, 

which left thousands dead and cut a path of destruction across five northern Nigerian states.

The Maitatsine movement took its name from an 

Islamic preacher, Muhammadu Marwa, who moved 

from his native Cameroon to northern Nigeria around 

The reemergence of the Nigerian militant Islamist group Boko Haram is cause for significant 

concern. Since late 2010, the organization has been 

responsible for a brutal campaign of attacks targeting public officials and institutions and, increasingly, 

ordinary men, women, and children, wreaking havoc 

across northern Nigeria. At least 550 people were 

killed in 115 separate attacks in 2011, a grisly toll 

that has been accelerating. Meanwhile, Boko Haram’s rhetoric and tactics indicate that the organization has expanded its reach well beyond its original 

base in northeastern Nigeria. Indeed, it may be evolving into a transnational threat with links to other terrorist groups and violent extremists in North, West, 

and East Africa.

The group thus constitutes a wider threat to the 

political, economic, and security interests in Africa. 

Given that Nigeria is Africa’s biggest oil exporter (it 

holds the world’s 10th largest proven reserves) as well 
2

1945. His polemical sermons, aimed at both religious 

and political authorities, earned Marwa the sobriquet 

“Maitatsine” (in Hausa, “he who curses”), as well as 

the ire of British colonial authorities who had him 

deported. Maitatsine eventually returned to Nigeria 

sometime after its independence and, by the early 

1970s, had gathered a large and increasingly militant 

following, the Yan Tatsine (“followers of Maitatsine”), 

of youths, unemployed migrants, and others who felt 

that the official Islamic hierarchy was unresponsive to 

their needs. Maitatsine was killed by security forces 

during a December 1980 insurrection in Kano, but his 

followers rose up again in 1982, 1984, and 1985.

Both Yan Tatsine and Boko Haram can be described as fanatical sects whose beliefs are not held 

by the majority of Nigerian Muslims. In their denunciation of Western civilization, both also came 

to reject the legitimacy of the secular Nigerian state, 

invariably described as dagut (“evil”) and unworthy of 

allegiance, and ended up waging war against it in an 

effort to replace it with a “purified” Islamic regime. In 

both cases, police were unable to quell the outbreak 

of violence, and military forces had to be deployed. 

The passage of time between the two movements has 

been marked by persistent corruption and relatively 

few improvements in the socioeconomic conditions 

of northern Nigeria, leaving many communities in 

the North with the perception that they are falling further behind their counterparts in the (mostly 

Christian) South.2 This has heightened the receptivity of Boko Haram’s message promising a radical 

transformation of Nigerian society.

The name Boko Haram is itself derived from 

the combination of the Hausa word for book (as 

in “book learning”), boko, and the Arabic term 

haram, which designates those things which are 

ungodly or sinful. Thus “Boko Haram” is not only 

the group’s common name, but also its slogan to 

the effect that “Western education (and such product that arises from it) is sacrilege.” The group’s 

founder, Mohammed Yusuf, once described the cosmological view that resulted from such an ideology 

in a 2009 interview with the BBC: “Western-style 

education is mixed with issues that run contrary 

to our beliefs in Islam. Like rain. We believe it is a 

creation of God rather than an evaporation caused 

by the sun that condenses and becomes rain. Like 

saying the world is a sphere. If it runs contrary to 

the teachings of Allah, we reject it. We also reject 

the theory of Darwinism.”3

The introduction of Islamic law (shari’a) in the 

12 northern Nigerian states since 1999 (see map) 

was deemed insufficient by Yusuf and his followers, 

who argued that the country’s ruling class as a whole 

was marred by corruption and even Muslim northern 

leaders were irredeemably tainted by “Western-style” 

ambitions. Their envisaged “pure” shari’a state would 

ostensibly be both more transparent and just than 

the existing order. That the group has little regard 

for the country’s traditional Muslim hierarchy was 

underscored in early 2012 when its spokesman, Abu 

Qaqa, threatened attacks on the historic seat of the 

Nigerian caliphate in an open letter to the Sultan of 

Sokoto, Muhammadu Sa’ad Abubakar III.

After its initial 2003 attacks were repelled, Boko 

Haram followers regrouped at a base in Yobe State on 

the border with Niger, which they dubbed “Afghanistan” after hoisting the Taliban flag over the encampment, although they had no links with their Afghan 

counterparts. Subsequently, the group was given the 

name the Nigerian Taliban by “the local people who 

despised the philosophy and teachings of the sect.”4

Nevertheless, its number gradually increased as students from various local universities and technical 

institutes withdrew from school and joined the group 

for Koranic instruction. By mid-2004, Boko Haram 

had gathered enough strength to attack a few police 

stations in neighboring Borno State, killing several 

policemen and stealing arms and ammunition. The 

police counterattacked and killed two dozen members. 

This set the pattern for the next few years, with Boko 

Haram carrying out occasional assaults on police, who 

Dr. J. Peter Pham is Director of the Michael S. Ansari 

Africa Center at the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC.

“Boko Haram can be described 

as a fanatical sect whose beliefs 

are not held by the majority of 

Nigerian Muslims”
3

responded with raids and arrests. Overall, however, 

this period was characterized by an unofficial truce between the group and Nigerian authorities. Yusuf was 

even able to establish a mosque and school in Borno 

State’s capital, Maiduguri.

The relative calm ended on July 26, 2009, when 

a security raid on a Boko Haram hideout in Bauchi 

State led to reprisal attacks on police and 5 days 

of subsequent rioting, which spread across Bauchi, 

Kano, Yobe, and Borno. In response, security forces 

besieged and stormed the group’s mosque compound 

in Maiduguri. The violence finally petered out after 

Yusuf was captured, beaten, interrogated, and finally 

shot—supposedly while attempting to escape—but 

not before more than 700 people were killed and numerous public buildings, including government offices, police stations, schools, mosques, and churches, 

were destroyed. With most of its leaders as well as 

several prominent financial backers dead—including 

Alhaji Buji Foi, a former commissioner for religious 

affairs in Borno State—the group receded from public 

attention and a number of analysts argued that it was 

hopelessly fractured, if not altogether finished.

ESCALATION SINCE 2010

Far from being dead, however, the group underwent a dramatic transformation. In retrospect, the 

first sign of this was a June 14, 2010, Al Jazeera interview with Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud (also known 

as Abdelmalek Droukdel), the emir of al Qaeda in 

the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The head of al Qaeda’s North African franchise stated that his group 

would provide Boko Haram with weapons, training, 

and other support in order to expand its own reach 

into Sub-Saharan Africa not only to gain “strategic 

depth,” but also to “defend Muslims in Nigeria and 

stop the advance of a minority of Crusaders.”5 At the 

time, this claim was widely dismissed, both because 
4

Droukdel was known for outsized ambitions and he 

was having difficulties with the more dynamic southern commanders within AQIM.6

Shortly afterward, Mohammed Yusuf’s former 

deputy, Abubakar bin Muhammad Shekau, who was 

thought to have been killed during the 2009 uprising, surfaced in a video that might be described as 

“classic al Qaeda.” Wearing a headdress and framed 

by an AK-47 and a stack of religious books, Shekau 

proclaimed himself the new head of Boko Haram 

and promised vengeance: “Do not think jihad is 

over. Rather jihad has just begun.”7 Significantly, 

he threatened attacks not only against the Nigerian 

state, but also against “outposts of Western culture.” 

In a published manifesto, Shekau linked the jihad 

being fought by Boko Haram with jihadist efforts 

globally, especially that of “the soldiers of Allah in 

the Islamic State of Iraq.”

Two months later, on September 7, 2010, Boko 

Haram fighters dramatically broke into a federal prison in Bauchi State and freed more than 100 of their 

fellow members who had been awaiting trial since 

the previous year’s uprising. In the process of the assault, involving bombs and automatic weapons, the 

militants also let out more than 750 other prisoners 

and scattered leaflets warning of further violence.

The latter was not long delayed. On Christmas 

Eve 2010, the group set off a string of seven improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Jos, Plateau State. 

The bombings, which targeted the town’s Christian communities, left 80 dead and scores of others 

wounded. The group subsequently carried out a number of other attacks—mainly small IEDs thrown from 

moving vehicles or planted near targets in Maiduguri 

and Bauchi—aimed primarily at candidates in the 

2011 elections that it had denounced.

The elections, considered by Islamist hardliners 

to be a forbidden “innovation” (bid’ah) imposed by 

the West, were already contentious in that a significant number of Muslims, especially in the Northeast, 

deeply resented the candidacy of President Goodluck 

Jonathan, a southern Christian who had succeeded 

President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, a northern Muslim, 

after the latter’s unexpected death in 2010. The decision by Jonathan to seek a full term in his own right 

upset the informal compact within the ruling People’s 

Democratic Party whereby the presidency alternated 

every 8 years between Christians, who dominate the 

southern part of the country, and Muslims who dominate the North.

Meanwhile, Boko Haram continued to target 

Muslim figures who opposed it. The mounting toll of 

victims included the brother of the Shehu of Borno, 

the traditional ruler of the Kanuri people of northeastern Nigeria, southeastern Niger, western Chad, 

and northern Cameroon; Ibrahim Ahmad Abdullahi 

Bolori, a prominent Maiduguri cleric who had criticized Boko Haram; and Ibrahim Birkuti, a cleric in 

southern Borno State who was also well known for 

his criticisms of the sect.

On June 16, 2011, Boko Haram demonstrated 

a significant and ominous tactical and operational 

upgrade in its capabilities when it launched a suicide 

attack using a vehicle-borne IED. Believed to be the 

first suicide attack in Nigeria, the operation targeted 

the Inspector General of the Nigerian Police Force, 

whose convoy the terrorist followed into the police 

headquarters compound in the federal capital of Abuja. Security was able to detain the suspect vehicle, 

but the explosion nevertheless killed two bystanders 

and was large enough to destroy several dozen police 

vehicles parked nearby. In fact, the incident showed 

that far from being a spent force, Boko Haram had 

adopted one of the deadliest instruments in the jihadist arsenal and had demonstrated that it was now 

capable of carrying out attacks far from its usual areas 

of operation.

Interestingly, just 2 days before the attack in 

Abuja, Boko Haram had issued a statement in which 

it boasted ominously for the first time of ties to jihadists in Somalia: “Very soon, we will wage jihad . . . our 

jihadists have arrived in Nigeria from Somalia where 

they received real training on warfare from our brethren who made that country ungovernable.”8

Two months later, on August 26—after having spent the interim carrying out more than a half 

dozen smaller attacks on government officials, establishments that serve alcohol, and churches—Boko 

Haram carried out another major attack, sending a 

suicide bomber with an explosives-laden car into the 

United Nations (UN) offices in Abuja. Twenty-five 

people were killed and at least 80 were wounded. This 
5

“[AQIM] has never hidden its 

ambition to bring in Nigerian 

Islamists in order to exploit 

tensions between Nigerian 

Muslims and Christians”

attack, the first by the group against an international 

target, as well as the video it subsequently released 

of the bomber offering praise to slain al Qaeda leader 

Osama bin Laden and referring to the UN as a “forum 

of all global evil,”9 put it squarely in the ranks of terrorists who have specifically targeted UN agencies in 

Afghanistan, Iraq, and Algeria.

After the attack on the UN, there was little let 

up in the violence, which has included a number 

of complex operations, including the November 4, 

2011, assault on Damaturu, capital of Yobe State, 

which involved suicide attacks on various police 

stations followed by the massacre in the Christian 

quarter of the city of 150 people; the Christmas 

morning bombing outside the Catholic church in 

Madalla, near Abuja, which killed at least 32 as they 

exited Mass, and 4 other explosions elsewhere; and 

the coordinated January 20, 2012, attacks in Kano, 

Nigeria’s second-largest metropolis and the Muslim 

North’s economic, political, and cultural hub, which 

left more than 185 people dead. The attacks in Damaturu and Madalla are consistent with the ultimatum 

that the group has issued demanding Christians leave 

northern Nigeria.

While Boko Haram’s declared political objective of replacing the Nigerian state with an Islamic 

polity ruled by shari’a is understood, little is actually 

known about the group’s current leaders or members. 

It seems to enjoy a degree of support in northeastern Nigeria—especially the states of Borno, Yobe, 

Gombe, and Bauchi. Nonetheless, analysts estimate 

active militants to number in the low hundreds, with 

perhaps as many as a few thousand supporters engaged to varying degrees.

While Abubakar Shekau has asserted his leadership and evidently proven successful in achieving 

a sufficient level of organization to maintain a punishing pace of coordinated attacks, the organization 

is still comprised of a composite of different actors, 

ranging from Islamist militants to disaffected citizens 

to opportunistic criminals and hooligans, including 

some who have been encouraged by politicians keen 

on exploiting the ensuing violence and instability 

to advance their own political agendas. Perversely, 

both the government and militants have found it 

convenient to ascribe to Boko Haram as much of 

the disorder in northern Nigeria as possible. An exception was the killing of two European hostages in 

March 2012 following a failed rescue operation by 

British and Nigerian forces that Boko Haram may 

have thought could draw in a major outside power, an 

outcome which the militants clearly wanted to avoid.

BOKO HARAM’S FOREIGN CONNECTIONS

While one should be cautious about asserting 

connections between different terrorist organizations 

and other militant groups in the absence of credible 

evidence, one should also be wary of arbitrary distinctions and classifications that do little justice to more 

fluid realities. 

That being said, there are some tantalizing linkages between Boko Haram and other militant movements. The former has clearly absorbed the signature 

tactic of some of the latter: the use of vehicle-borne 

IEDs in repeated attacks against high-profile public 

targets, resulting in a spectacular increase in casualties, 

especially in cases where the bombs are deployed in 

near-simultaneous or otherwise coordinated attacks. At 

the very least, the existence of suicide attacks indicates 

some level of foreign influence since such episodes had 

been practically unknown in Africa until recent years 

when they became a part of AQIM’s repertoire.

AQIM itself has had a discrete number of Nigerian recruits since the Algerian Groupe Salafiste pour 

la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC, or the Salafist 

Group for Preaching and Combat) was rebranded as 

al Qaeda’s franchise in the region, a fact Abdelmalek 

Droukdel acknowledged in 2008 when he gave an 

extensive interview to the New York Times.

10 And the 

group has never hidden its ambition to bring in Nigerian Islamists in order to exploit tensions between 

Nigerian Muslims and Christians.

It is noteworthy, in fact, that both AQIM and 

Boko Haram leaders have issued statements complimenting each other and pledging mutual support. 
6

Tellingly, AQIM has permitted the Nigerian group 

to employ its media operation, al Andalus.

Furthermore, there is the question of the role 

currently being played within Boko Haram by 

the Chadian-born Mamman Nur, formerly third 

highest-ranking figure in Boko Haram’s leadership 

behind Mohammed Yusuf and Abubakar Shekau. 

In the aftermath of the government crackdown 

in 2009, Nur is believed to have gone to Somalia, 

where he and his followers trained in al Shabaab 

camps and forged links with transnational jihadist networks. He returned to Nigeria in early 2011 

and is alleged by Nigerian authorities, who placed a 

25 million naira ($175,000) bounty on his head, to 

have masterminded the attack on the UN building 

in Abuja. Certainly Boko Haram spokesmen have 

boasted of their ties with militants in Somalia, links 

that have been confirmed by African Union forces 

in that country.11

One should also keep in mind that the successful establishment or acquisition of an active 

affiliate in Sub-Saharan Africa has been a goal of al 

Qaeda for some time.12 In June 2006, for example, 

Sada al-Jihad (Echo of Jihad), the magazine published by what was then al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, 

published a lengthy article by Abu Azzam al-Ansari entitled “Al-Qaeda is Moving to Africa.” The 

author was quite upfront about the jihadist agenda 

for Africa: “There is no doubt that al-Qaeda and 

the holy warriors appreciate the significance of the 

African regions for the military campaigns against 

the Crusaders. Many people sense that this continent has not yet found its proper and expected role 

and the next stages of the conflict will see Africa 

as the battlefield.”

As important as the operational links between 

Boko Haram and Islamist militant groups outside 

Nigeria are the rhetorical connections. Abubakar 

Shekau has increasingly drawn on narratives used 

by other violent Islamist movements. In fact, the 

conflation of local and global grievances has been 

an important milestone in the evolution of other 

militant groups—including the GSPC before it 

was transformed into AQIM—providing the organizations’ leaders with a platform whereupon 

to seek support and legitimacy above and beyond 

the confines of the struggle they had hitherto 

been engaged.13

CONFRONTING BOKO HARAM

Given the varied economic, social, and ideological appeal that Boko Haram has within certain 

communities in northern Nigeria, a sustained and 

comprehensive strategy is required to respond to the 

security challenge the group poses.

Invest in better information and analysis. Despite the importance of Nigeria and the significance 

of the challenge it faces, what is actually known and 

reported is amazingly limited. Some of the analysis 

can, at best, be described as wishful thinking—such 

as the frequently reported, but never confirmed, divisions within Boko Haram between followers of 

the slain Mohammed Yusuf who wanted to focus on 

the transformation of Nigeria into their version of a 

shari’a-compliant state and those who believe that 

the state must first be brought down. Moreover, the 

Nigerian federal and state governments need to do 

more to build relationships with one another and 

with the local communities in which Boko Haram 

operates if they are to acquire the type of actionable 

intelligence needed to prevent future attacks.

Encourage the Nigerian government to deal 

forthrightly with the threat. Over the years, the 

somewhat lackadaisical attitude that senior Nigerian 

officials have taken toward Boko Haram has been 

perplexing given that the group has made no secret 

of its goal of bringing down the Nigerian state itself. 

Yet the late President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua left for 

a state visit to Brazil right in the middle of the 2009 

uprising and, only upon his return, set up a commission of inquiry. Worse still have been instances of 

actual complicity with the militants. Among those 

who have been arrested and charged with assisting 

Boko Haram is a sitting federal senator from the 

“the government must also better 

address the many legitimate 

grievances that have rendered 

meaningful segments of the 

population in the North amenable 

to the militant group’s message”
7

ruling Peoples Democratic Party, Mohammed Ali 

Ndume of Borno State. President Goodluck Jonathan has even acknowledged that the militants have 

sympathizers or enablers throughout the government: 

“some of them are in the executive arm of government, some of them are in the parliamentary/legislative arm of government, while some of them are even 

in the judiciary.”14

In any event, the escalating scale of the attacks 

seems to have shaken the Nigerian government out 

of any complacency. President Jonathan has moved 

aggressively both to offer the possibility of negotiations and threaten the rigorous application of force. 

This political will needs to be reinforced in messaging 

at all levels from the country’s partners. 

Address legitimate grievances. At the same 

time, confronting Boko Haram will require that 

the government carefully measure its response. 

Ham-fisted security operations such as the “Operation Flush” security sweeps in the northern part 

of the country have succeeded in little except to 

further inflame public opinion against the government. The government must also better address 

the many legitimate grievances that have rendered 

meaningful segments of the population in the 

North amenable to the militant group’s message of 

overturning the status quo in Nigeria. Frustrations 

with living conditions are keenly felt in northern 

Nigeria, where the proportion of the population 

living below the poverty level is between two and 

three times the rate in the South. Dramatic action 

is needed to end corruption, build a more inclusive 

government, alleviate poverty and lack of access to 

health care, expand access to education, and create 

a transportation, utilities, and communications infrastructure capable of sustaining economic growth 

for Nigeria’s 170 million people.

Prioritize specialized training for Nigerian 

security forces. Undoubtedly, the Nigerian security forces, both military and police, could use 

some assistance in the fight against Boko Haram. 

However, the need is less a matter of personnel 

and equipment than training, especially in intelligence and investigations. Due caution should be 

exercised to maintain the lightest possible international footprint lest this support itself become an 

issue that militants can exploit. That being said, 

tailored efforts can help Nigerian forces strengthen 

their civil-military affairs capabilities to facilitate 

interactions between military forces and civilians, 

especially in the North.

Strengthen regional cooperation and the capacity of neighboring countries. Boko Haram has used 

Nigeria’s porous borders and the limited capacities 

of neighboring countries to its advantage. A January 

2012 report by the United Nations noted that Boko 

Haram members received training in Mali the previous summer and that seven were arrested in Niger 

with names and contact details of AQIM militants.15

Regional efforts, such as the U.S.-sponsored TransSahara Counterterrorism Partnership that supports 

small mobile training teams, civil-military engagements, and development programming should be 

adapted to include areas in which Boko Haram has 

thrived. Greater cooperation and intelligence-sharing 

between states in the region need to be encouraged 

and facilitated by international partners.

CONCLUSION

The fact that Boko Haram has not only survived 

the harsh reprisals of 2009 but has also since been 

able to expand both the reach and scope of its operations ought to be a wakeup call to both the Nigerian 

government and international community. The suicide bombings targeting symbols of Nigerian state 

authority and international engagement represent 

a major advance in Boko Haram’s capabilities and 

a significant shift in its message. The effect not only 

discredited the efforts of Nigerian officials to trivialize 

the group as an insignificant localized problem but 

also called into question the assumptions of security 

analysts abroad who have long minimized the risks 

violent Islamists posed to Nigeria.

The upsurge in attacks in Nigeria, when coupled with developments elsewhere in the Sahel, are 

a vivid reminder that extremism and violence cannot 

easily be contained by arbitrary divisions, whether 

on maps or in analytical frameworks. Consequently, 

the emergence of Boko Haram and its burgeoning 

capacity for violence ought to be recognized as both 

a national and transnational problem—and addressed 

as such.
8

AFRICA CENTER FOR 

STRATEGIC STUDIES

Director: Ambassador William 

M. Bellamy (Ret.)

National Defense University

300 Fifth Avenue, Building 21

Fort Lesley J. McNair

Washington, DC 20319-5066

Phone: + 1 202-685-7300

Web site: www.africacenter.org

AFRICA CENTER 

REGIONAL OFFICE 

IN DAKAR

Deputy Regional Manager: 

Claude Toze 

Phone: 221 33 869 61 60

Email: TozeC@ndu.edu

AFRICA CENTER 

REGIONAL OFFICE 

IN ADDIS ABABA

Regional Manager:

Brad Anderson

Phone: 251 11 517 4000 

Email: AndersonBG@state.gov

AFRICA SECURITY BRIEFS

Editor: Joseph Siegle, Ph.D.

Phone: + 1 202-685-6808

Email: Sieglej@ndu.edu

The Africa Security Briefs series presents research and analysis 

by ACSS experts and outside scholars with the aim of advancing 

understanding of African security issues. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 

U.S. Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. For more information on ACSS, visit the Web site at 

http://www.africacenter.org.

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perspectives to U.S. policymakers.

AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

http://www.africacenter.org

ISSN 2164-4039

NOTES

1

 Elizabeth Isichei, “The Maitatsine Risings in Nigeria 1980–

1985: A Revolt[ed] of the Disinherited,” Journal of Religion in Africa

17, no. 5 (October 1987).

2

 John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (Lanham, 

MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011).

3

 Joe Boyle, “Nigeria’s ‘Taliban’ Enigma,” BBC, July 31, 2009.

4

 Freedom C. Onuoha, “The Islamist Challenge: Nigeria’s 

Boko Haram Crisis Explained,” African Security Review 19, no. 1 

(2010), 55.

5

 “Al Qaida Makes Move on Troubled Nigeria,” UPI, June 

17, 2010. 

6

 J. Peter Pham, “Foreign Influences and Shifting Horizons: 

The Ongoing Evolution of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” 

Orbis 55, no. 2 (Spring 2011). J. Peter Pham, “The Dangerous 

‘Pragmatism’ of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” Journal of the 

Middle East and Africa 2, no. 1 (January–June 2011).

7

 Nick Tattersall and William Maclean, “Nigerian Sect Leader Praises al Qaeda, Warns U.S.,” Reuters, July 13, 2010. 

8

 “Nigerian Islamists Vow ‘Fiercer’ Attacks,” AFP, June 15, 

2011. 

9

 “Nigeria UN bomb: Video of ‘Boko Haram Bomber’ Released,” BBC, September 18, 2011.

10 “An Interview with Abdelmalek Droukdel,” The New York 

Times, July 1, 2008, available at <www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/

world/africa/01transcript-droukdal.html>. 

11 Interview with Senior Officer, African Union Mission in 

Somalia (AMISOM), Mogadishu, December 6, 2011.

12 J. Peter Pham, “Next Front? Evolving U.S.-African Strategic Relations in the ‘War on Terrorism’ and Beyond,” Comparative 

Strategy 26, no. 1 (2007).

13 Jean-Luc Marret, “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: A 

‘Glocal’ Organization,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31, no. 6 

(June 2008). Jean-Pierre Filiu, “The Local and Global Jihad of 

al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb,” Middle East Journal 63, no. 2 

(Spring 2009).

14 “Nigeria’s Goodluck Jonathan: Officials Back Boko Haram,” BBC, January 8, 2012. 

15 Adam Nossiter, “In Nigeria: A Deadly Group’s Rage Has 

Local Roots,” The New York Times, February 26, 2012.