alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 420.65 Separation distance requirements for handling division 1.1 and 1.3 explosives. ( a ) *Quantity.* For each explosive hazard facility, a launch site operator must determine the total quantity of division 1.1 and 1.3 explosives as follows: ( 1 ) A launch site operator must determine the maximum total quantity of division 1.1 and 1.3 explosives by class and division, in accordance with 49 CFR part 173, Subpart C, to be located in each explosive hazard facility where division 1.1 and 1.3 explosives will be handled.
( 2 ) When division 1.1 and 1.3 explosives are located in the same explosive hazard facility, the total quantity of explosive must be treated as division 1.1 for determining separation distances; or, a launch site operator may add the net explosive weight of the division 1.3 items to the net explosive weight of division 1.1 items to determine the total quantity of explosives.
( b ) *Separation of division 1.1 and 1.3 explosives and determination of distances.* A launch site operator must separate each explosive hazard facility where division 1.1 and 1.3 explosives are handled from all other explosive hazard facilities, all public traffic routes, and each public area, including the launch site boundary, by a distance no less than that provided for each quantity and explosive division in appendix E of this part as follows: ( 1 ) For division 1.1 explosives, the launch site operator must use tables E-1, E-2, and E-3 of appendix E of this part to determine the distance to each public area and public traffic route, and to determine each intraline distance.
( 2 ) For division 1.3 explosives, the launch site operator must use table E-4 of appendix E of this part to determine the distance to each public area and public traffic route, and to determine each intraline distance.
( c ) *Separation distance by weight and table.* A launch site operator must: ( 1 ) Employ no less than the public area distance, calculated under paragraph (b) of this section, to separate an explosive hazard facility from each public area, including the launch site boundary.
( 2 ) Employ no less than an intraline distance to separate an explosive hazard facility from all other explosive hazard facilities used by a single customer. For explosive hazard facilities used by different customers a launch site operator must use the greater public area distance to separate the facilities from each other.
( 3 ) Separate each public area containing any member of the public in the open by a distance equal to −1133.9 + [389 *ln(NEW)], where the NEW is greater than 450 pounds and less than 501,500 pounds.
( d ) *NEW Quantities that Fall between Table Entries.* A launch site operator must, when determining a separation distance for NEW quantities that fall between table entries, use the equation provided by tables E-1, E-3, or E-4 of appendix E of this part.
( e ) *Calculating Maximum Permissible NEW Given a Distance. A launch site operator must, when determining* a permissible quantity of explosives, calculate maximum permissible NEW using the equation of tables E-1, E-3, or E-4 of appendix E of this part.
[Doc. No. FAA-2011-0105, 77 FR 55114, Sept. 7, 2012]
<Page>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

       In connection with the Annual Report of 24/7 Real Media, Inc. (the
"COMPANY") on Form 10-K/A for the period ending December 31, 2001 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "REPORT"), I,
Norman M. Blashka, EVP and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

              (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and

              (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.



                                           /s/ Norman M. Blashka
                                           -------------------------------
                                           Norman M. Blashka
                                           EVP and Chief Financial Officer
                                           (principal financial and
                                           accounting officer)



                                           January 24, 2003
Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:24735-3 Filed:07/13/23 Entered:07/13/23 18:55:46 Desc:

Exhibit Exhibit 3 - Receipt of Proof of Claim Page 1 of 1
§ 372.2 Definitions. As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires: *Charter* means overseas military personnel charter.
*Charter operator* means overseas military personnel charter operator.
*Charter participant* means a member of the overseas military personnel charter group.
*Charter price* means the total amount of money paid by the charter participant to the charter operator for air transportation.
*Immediate family* means only the following persons: the spouse, children, parents, parents of the spouse, children of the parents, and children of the parents of the spouse of ( 1 ) military personnel on active duty with the United States Armed Forces (including Coast Guard) stationed outside the contiguous states of the United States and the District of Columbia, and
( 2 ) civilian employees of the Department of Defense who are citizens of the United States and are stationed in a foreign country, or in a U.S. territory or possession, where U.S. military personnel are stationed.
*Overseas military personnel charter* means a charter, either one-way or round-trip, limited to military personnel on active duty with the U.S. Armed Forces (including the Coast Guard), stationed outside the 48 contiguous States of the United States and the District of Columbia, and/or civilian employees of the Department of Defense who are citizens of the United States and are stationed in a foreign country, or in a U.S. territory or possession, where such U.S. military personnel are stationed, and/or the immediate families of the foregoing persons, where the following conditions are met: ( a ) All military personnel and civilian employees of the Department of Defense participating in the charter are on official furlough, leave, pass, or other authorized absence from duty, and
( b ) the transportation is between a place in the 48 contiguous States of the United States or the District of Columbia and a place in Alaska, Hawaii, or a territory or possession of the United States, or a foreign country in which military personnel of the United States are stationed: *Provided, however,* That nothing contained herein shall preclude an overseas military personnel charter operator from utilizing any unused space on an aircraft chartered by it pursuant to this part for the transportation, on a free or reduced-rate basis, of such charter operator's employees, directors, and officers, and the parents and immediate families of such persons, subject to the provisions of part 223 of this chapter.
*Overseas military personnel charter operator* means any citizen of the United States, as defined in section 40102(a)(15) of 49 U.S.C. Subtitle VII authorized hereunder to engage in the formation of overseas military personnel charter groups and who complies with the provisions of this part.
*Person* means any individual, firm, association, partnership, or corporation.
[SPR-54, 37 FR 11163, June 3, 1972, as amended by SPR-69, 38 FR 14164, May 30, 1973; SPR-109, 41 FR 35158, Aug. 20, 1976; 60 FR 43529, Aug. 22, 1995; Doc. No. DOT-OST-2014-0140, 84 FR 15938, Apr. 16, 2019]
#### The People of the State of New York, Appellant, *v.*Samuel Shafer, Respondent.

Argued December 1, 1936;

decided December 31, 1936.

*Daniel J. O’Mara, District Attorney (Harry L. Rosenthal*of counsel), for appellant.

*Jacob Ark*and *John M. Keating*for respondent.

Judgment affirmed; no opinion:

Concur: Lehman, O’Brien, Crouch and Loughran, JJ. Dissenting: Crane, Ch. J., Hubbs and Finch, JJ.
#### Gilbert and others *vs.*Corbin & Foster.

"Where a cognovit is given in a cause in which there are several plaintiffs, and *before*the entry of the judgment thereon, one of the *plaintiffs*dies, the judgment may be entered *in the namea of the original parlies*at any time within *two terms*after the giving of the cognovit.

It is not necessary in such case to obtain the previous leave of the court to enter the judgment.

A cognovit was given in *February*last, and in *May*judgment was entered thereon in the names of the original parties. “In *March*preceding, *one*of the plaintiffs died, but his death was not known to the plaintiffs’ attorney at the time of the entry of the judgment. The defendants move to set aside the judgment and subsequent proceedings for irregularity, because the death of the party was not suggested on the record. ,

*By the Court,*

Bronson, J.

[601] This case is provided for by the fourth section of the statute concerning the abatement of suits by death: which declares that “ after a verdict shall be rendered in any action, and after a plea of confession in any suit brought, if either party die before judgment be actually entered thereon, *the court*may, within two terms after such verdict or plea, enter final judgment in the names of the original parties.” (2 *R. S.*387, § 4.) The judgment was entered at the first term after the death of Mr. Walker, and the statute expressly authorized it to be done “ in the names of the original parties.” The former statute on this subject was copied from the act 17 *Cur.*2, *ch.*8 ; and although it did not provide how the judgment should be entered, the practice under it was to perfect the judgment as though the party were alive. (1 *R. L.*144, § 5. 2 *Tidd.*966. 1 *Salk.*401.)

Although the words are that *the court*may enter judgment, the provision was made for the benefit of the parties; and I think no motion for leave to proceed was necessary. It is not a case where the court could be required to exercise its discretion; and a motion would have occasioned useless expense, as well as unnecessary delay. The plaintiffs were regular. Motion denied.
#### ZAPF v A ACTION AUTOMOTIVE RELIABLE TRANSMISSION, INC.

Case No. 90-239AP (County Court Case No. 90-13688-SP05)

Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Dade County

November 15, 1991

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Richard L. Zapf, Esquire, pro se.

Randolph Quentin Ferguson, Esquire, for appellee.

Before GREENBAUM, KORNBLUM, TENDRICH, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

KORNBLUM, J.

Appellant delivered his automobile to the Appellee to fix the transmission.

*57When the repairs were completed, the Appellant paid for the work but refused to sign a work authorization or an estimate.

When Appellee refused to deliver the vehicle, the Appellant filed his complaint in Pre-Judgment Replevin pursuant to Chapter 78, F.S. Thereafter by amendment, Appellant sought damages for the loss of use of the vehicle.

A Writ Of Replevin was issued and the vehicle was seized and returned to the Appellant. The Appellee took no action to recover the vehicle under the statute.

Thereafter at Pre-Trial Conference, the Court granted Appellee’s Motion To Dismiss, finding that Appellant was not entitled to damages for the loss of use of his vehicle in a Replevin Action. This finding is erroneous. See § 78.18 F.S. This Appeal is from the Order Dismissing The Claim For Damages.

It is urged by Appellee that the Court in dismissing the Claim found that the damages claimed by Appellant were too speculative. We have searched the record and have found no such determination.

Appellee further argues that Appellant has misconceived his remedy; that he should have sought relief under Chapter 559, F.S., where by posting a bond the Appellant could have obtained the immediate release of his vehicle.

We agree that Appellant should have proceeded under Chapter 559 F.S., but that was not Appellant’s exclusive remedy.

The Appellant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine if he sustained any damage in the loss of use of his vehicle, but since he was obliged to mitigate his damages, they should be limited to the loss suffered for the period of time between the Appellee’s refusal to deliver the vehicle and the time the Appellant could have reasonably furnished a bond under Chapter 559 F.S.

Reversed and Remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

TENDRICH and GREENBAUM, JJ., concur.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1177 

CA 16-00010 

PRESENT: CARNI, J.P., LINDLEY, DEJOSEPH, CURRAN, AND TROUTMAN, JJ. 

 

BARBARA TULLY, ALSO KNOWN AS BARBARA BIELLE, 

PLAINTIFF, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

TRANSITOWN SOUTH ASSOCIATES, LLC, TRANSITOWN 

PLAZA ASSOCIATES, LLC, GIAN PROPERTIES, LLC, 

AND GIAN PROPERTIES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,

DEFENDANTS. 

--------------------------------------------------- 

TRANSITOWN SOUTH ASSOCIATES, LLC, TRANSITOWN 

PLAZA ASSOCIATES, LLC, GIAN PROPERTIES, LLC, 

AND GIAN PROPERTIES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 

THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS,

V

 

TIGER STRIPE, LLC, THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

 

KENNEY SHELTON LIPTAK NOWAK LLP, BUFFALO (RICHARD T. SARAF OF

COUNSEL), FOR THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

SUGARMAN LAW FIRM, LLP, BUFFALO (MICHAEL RIEHLER OF COUNSEL), FOR

THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Donna M.

Siwek, J.), entered October 8, 2015. The order, insofar as appealed

from, granted that part of the motion of defendants-third-party

plaintiffs seeking an order requiring third-party defendant to defend

and indemnify them and pay their attorneys’ fees.

It is hereby ORDERED that the order insofar as appealed from is

unanimously reversed on the law without costs, and that part of the

motion of defendants-third-party plaintiffs seeking an order requiring

third-party defendant to defend and indemnify them and pay their

attorneys’ fees is denied. 

Memorandum: Third-party defendant, Tiger Stripe, LLC (Tiger

Stripe), appeals from an order that, inter alia, granted in part the

motion of defendants-third-party plaintiffs (defendants) for summary

judgment and ordered Tiger Stripe to defend and indemnify defendants

and pay their attorneys’ fees. Tiger Stripe contends that defendants

failed to establish as a matter of law that they are entitled to

contractual indemnification. We agree. The snow-removal services
-2- 1177 

CA 16-00010 

contract required Tiger Stripe to indemnify defendants against claims

“arising out of or resulting from performance of services under [the]

Contract,” including claims attributable to bodily injury “caused in

whole or in part by acts or omissions” of Tiger Stripe. Inasmuch as

there are issues of fact concerning the alleged culpability of Tiger

Stripe, we conclude that Supreme Court erred in granting that part of

the motion (see Johnson v Wal-Mart, 125 AD3d 1468, 1469; Pieri v

Forest City Enters., 238 AD2d 911, 913). 

Entered: December 23, 2016 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
Exhibit 24.1



                              KEYSPAN CORPORATION

                                POWER OF ATTORNEY



     WHEREAS,  KeySpan  Corporation,  a New York  corporation  (the  "Company"),
intends to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, an Annual Report on Form 10-K as prescribed by
said Commission  pursuant to said Act and the rules and regulations  promulgated
thereunder.

     NOW,  THEREFORE,  in my capacity as a director of the Company,  I do hereby
appoint GERALD LUTERMAN, JOHN J. BISHAR, JR. and MICHAEL J. TAUNTON, and each of
them  severally,  as my  attorneys-in-fact  with power to execute in my name and
place, and in my capacity as a director of KeySpan Corporation, said Report, any
amendment  to said  Report  and  any  other  documents  required  in  connection
therewith, and to file the same with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have executed this power of attorney this 22nd day of
February, 2006.





                                                     /s/Andrea S. Christensen
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Northwest Biotherapeutics, Inc. ("the
Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2003, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof ("the Report"), I, Alton
L. Boynton, President (Principal Executive Officer) of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

                                        /s/ Alton L. Boynton
                                        _____________________________________
                                        Alton L. Boynton
                                        President (Principal Executive Officer)
                                        August 13, 2003

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and forwarded to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

                                       29
#### JAMES v STATE OF FLORIDA

Case No. 91-103-AC (Lower Court Case No. 90-7114-MM-A-41)

Fifth Judicial Circuit, Marion County

June 5, 1991

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Charles R. Holloman, Esquire, for appellant.

Brad King, State Attorney, for appellee.

Before McNEAL, BOOTH, SINGELTARY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM.

The trial court granted a Motion in Limine excluding appellant’s *78driving record upon a stipulation between the state and defense that appellant’s driver’s license was revoked. The only issue was whether appellant was driving. The order was violated by a state’s witness. Both the witness and the prosecutor should have known that the testimony would have been objectionable even without a motion in limine.

Nevertheless, based on the record before us, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by denying appellant’s motion for mistrial. Therefore, the decision is AFFIRMED. McNEAL, R., BOOTH, J., SINGELTARY, G., concur.
[No. 20085-0-III.

Division Three.

October 31, 2002.]

#### The State of Washington, *Appellant,*v. David Martin Andrew, *Respondent.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Okanogan County, No. 00-1-00184-1, John E. Bridges, J., entered March 20, 2001. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Kurtz, J., concurred in by Kato, A.C.J., and Sweeney, J.
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

LUCIUS U. AKUCHIE,

 Appellant,

v.

HUNTERS GREEN HOMEOWNERS 

ASSOCIATION,

 Appellee.

'

'

'

'

'

'

No. 08-21-00073-CV

Appeal from the

240th Judicial District Court 

of Fort Bend County, Texas 

(TC#17-DCV-241422) 

J U D G M E N T

The Court has considered this cause on the record and concludes the appeal should be 

dismissed for want of prosecution. We therefore dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution. We 

further order Appellant to pay all costs of this appeal and that this decision be certified below for 

observance.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 25TH DAY OF JULY, 2023.

LISA J. SOTO, Justice

Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox, and Soto, JJ.
#### Brown *vs.*Burdick.

Where a motion is made by a defendant to set aside an execution on the ground that the judgment was *paid*and satisfied before the issuing of the execution, and a receipt in full is produced ; and the plaintiff comes in and answers that there was *fraud*in obtaining the receipt, the motion will be suspended until the next special term, when the plaintiff will be required • to move for leave to issue the execution, the defendant to have leave to answer, and the costs of the defendant’s motion will abide the costs of the motion on the part of the plaintiff.

The defendant moved to set aside an execution, on the ground of its *payment*before execution issued, and produced a receipt in full, given by the plaintiff, who alleged that the receipt had been obtained by *fraud.*The court were at first inclined to disregard on this motion the plaintiff’s allegations, but, after consideration, directed the motion to lie over until the next special term, so that a cross-motion might be made by the plaintiff for leave to proceed on the execution, the defendant having liberty to answer. The costs of the present motion to abide *the*event of the plaintiff’s motion.
Editorial Note on Part 45
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 45 appear at 74 FR 53394, Oct. 16, 2009.

§ 45.27 Location of marks; nonfixed-wing aircraft. ( a ) *Rotorcraft.* Each operator of a rotorcraft must display on that rotorcraft horizontally on both surfaces of the cabin, fuselage, boom, or tail the marks required by § 45.23.
( b ) *Airships.* Each operator of an airship must display on that airship the marks required by § 45.23, horizontally on— ( 1 ) The upper surface of the right horizontal stabilizer and on the under surface of the left horizontal stabilizer with the top of the marks toward the leading edge of each stabilizer; and
( 2 ) Each side of the bottom half of the vertical stabilizer.
( c ) *Spherical balloons.* Each operator of a spherical balloon must display the marks required by § 45.23 in two places diametrically opposite and near the maximum horizontal circumference of that balloon.
( d ) *Nonspherical balloons.* Each operator of a nonspherical balloon must display the marks required by § 45.23 on each side of the balloon near its maximum cross section and immediately above either the rigging band or the points of attachment of the basket or cabin suspension cables.
( e ) *Powered parachutes and weight-shift-control aircraft.* Each operator of a powered parachute or a weight-shift-control aircraft must display the marks required by §§ 45.23 and 45.29(b)(2) of this part. The marks must be displayed in two diametrically opposite positions on the fuselage, a structural member, or a component of the aircraft and must be visible from the side of the aircraft.
[Doc. No. 2047, 29 FR 3223, Mar. 11, 1964, as amended by Amdt. 45-15, 48 FR 11392, Mar. 17, 1983; Amdt. 45-24, 69 FR 44863, July 27, 2004; Amdt. 45-25, 72 FR 52469, Sept. 14, 2007]
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

UNITED STATES

v.

Airman First Class KURT J. PALMIERI

United States Air Force

ACM S32326

14 June 2016

Sentence adjudged 18 May 2015 by S P CM convened at Ramstein Air Base,

Germany . Military Judge: Christopher Leavey (sitting alone).

Approved S entence: Bad

- conduct discharge, confinement for 45 days

, forfeitures of $31.00 pay per month for 3 months, and reduction to E

- 1

.

Appellate Counsel for the Appellant: Lieutenant Colonel Joy L. Primoli and

Major Lauren A Shure.

Appellate Counsel for the United States: Gerald R. Bruce, Esquire

.

Before

ALLRED, MITCHELL, and MAYBERRY

Appellate Military Judges

This opinion is issued as an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as precedent

under Rule of Practice and Procedure 18.4

.



### PER CURIAM :

The approved findings and sentence are correct in law and fact, and no error

materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of the appellant occ urred. Article 66(c),

UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c); United States v. Reed , 54 M.J. 37, 41 (C.A.A.F. 2000).

Accordingly, the approved findings and sentence are AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT

LEAH M. CALAHAN

Clerk of the Court