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FEMA's Initial Response in 


New Jersey to Hurricane Sandy 


OIG-13-117 September 2013
 
Federal Monagemen

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ergency Managemen

V' ~ OFFICE (W INSPECTOR GENERAL Department of Homeland Security 

Washin&ton, rx.; 20528! W\\-w.oig.db:..g<>\· 

SEP 6 2013 

MEMORANDUM FOR: Joseph L. Nimmich 

Associate Administrator, Response and Recovery 

E t Agency 

FROM: 

t Oversight 

SUBJECT: FEMA's Initial Response in New Jersey to Hurricane Sandy 

FEMA Disaster Number 4086-DR-NJ 

Audit Report Number OIG-13-117 

Attached for your information is our final report, FEMA's Initial Response in New Jersey 

to Hurricane Sandy. 

Our office evaluated the Federal Emergency Management Agency's {FEMA) initial 

response to Hurricane Sandy in New Jersey from early November to mid-December 

2012. We discussed the results of this audit with FEMA officials during the course of the 

audit and provided a discussion draft report to them on July 10, 2013. The report does 

not contain any recommendat ions; therefore, you do not need to provide our office 

with a written response. 

Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we will provide 

copies of our report to appropriate congressional committees with oversight and 

appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will post 

the report on our website for public dissemination. 

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Kaye McTighe, Director, 

Office of Emergency Management Oversight, at (202) 254-4100. 

Attachment 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

BACKGROUND 

After tearing through the Caribbean, Hurricane Sandy (Sandy) struck the United States 

near Atlantic City, New Jersey, on October 29, 2012. Sandy’s landfall coincided with a 

full moon, which caused the storm surge to rise an additional 20 percent. All told, Sandy 

is one of the most costly natural disasters to hit the United States, affecting 24 States 

and causing an estimated $71 billion in damage. 

In the past 5 years, New Jersey has had 11 declared disasters. The Public Assistance 

damage estimate for the 10 non-Sandy disasters combined is less than the estimate for 

Sandy’s damage to New Jersey. 

Table 1. Declared Disasters in New Jersey for the Past 5 Years1

Date 

Disaster 

Number Incident Name 

Public Assistance 

Estimate 

12/22/2009 1867 Tropical Depression Ida $ 18,521,136 

2/5/2010 1873 Snowstorm 13,693,177 

3/23/2010 1889 Severe Winter Storm 13,770,410 

4/2/2010 1897 Severe Storms 30,742,406 

2/4/2011 1954 Severe Winter Storm 50,662,081 

8/31/2011 4021 Hurricane Irene 114,025,106 

9/15/2011 4033 Severe Storms 4,151,240 

10/14/2011 4039 Remnants of Lee 694,739 

11/30/2011 4048 Severe Storm 2,037,007 

7/19/2012 4070 Severe Storm and Winds 1,255,744

 $249,553,046

10/30/2012 4086 Sandy (estimate as of 6/25/13) $1,179,985,150

Source: FEMA 

As the Sandy recovery phase continues, the New Jersey Public Assistance damage 

estimates could continue to rise as FEMA and the State identify additional damage. In 

late June 2013, FEMA estimated that the damage eligible for FEMA funding through 

Public Assistance grants totaled close to $1.2 billion. This amount represented almost 

5 times the combined estimated damage of the previous 10 declared disasters. 

 

 1

 Disaster information from FEMA’s website, accessed August 15, 2013. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

RESULTS OF AUDIT 

FEMA provided an effective and efficient response to the damages caused by Hurricane 

Sandy. In its response, FEMA proactively prepared for Sandy, overcame staffing and 

operational challenges, overcame staff management issues, used a variety of sourcing 

mechanisms, and effectively coordinated response activities by working with key State 

and Federal organizations. As of May 20, 2013, 7 months after landfall, FEMA—

•	 Responded to 261,506 people who contacted them for help or information; 

•	 Completed 126,416 home inspections; 

•	 Obligated $396 million for Individual Assistance; and 

•	 Obligated $341.5 million for Public Assistance (about 29 percent of the 

June 2013 total estimate for Public Assistance).
 

FEMA provided 100 percent Federal funding for emergency power restoration and 

emergency public transportation assistance until 11:59 p.m. on November 14, 2012. For 

all other response and recovery costs, FEMA will provide 90 percent Federal funding. 

In evaluating FEMA’s initial response to this disaster, we focused on answering the 

following questions:

1.	 What activities did FEMA perform before the major disaster declaration? 

2.	 What were the most pressing challenges FEMA is facing in this disaster? 

3.	 What were the most significant resource shortfalls? 

4.	 How did FEMA make disaster sourcing decisions? 

5.	 How well did FEMA coordinate its activities? 

1. FEMA Proactively Prepared for Sandy

In anticipation of Hurricane Sandy becoming a major disaster, President Obama signed 

an Emergency Declaration on October 28, 2012, establishing a 12-day incident period 

beginning Friday, October 26 and ending Thursday, November 8, 2012. After the 

Emergency Declaration, FEMA moved quickly to mobilize an Incident Management 

Action Team, set up the Initial Operating Facility, and respond to requests for initial 

assistance and needed supplies using internal resources and mission assignments.2

The emergency declaration allowed FEMA to begin pre-positioning water, commodities, 

generators, and personnel before the disaster declaration. Under the emergency 

2

 Incident Management Action Teams are full-time, rapid-response teams able to deploy within 2 hours 

and arrive at an incident within 12 hours to support the local incident commander.

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

declaration, FEMA mission assigned the pre-positioning medical personnel and 

equipment to triage, screen, treat, and stabilize patients in the immediate aftermath of 

Sandy to the Department of Health and Human Services. On October 30, the President 

declared a major disaster for eight counties in New Jersey for individual assistance, 

debris removal, and emergency protective measures. FEMA later amended the disaster 

declaration to include the entire State for Individual Assistance, Public Assistance, and 

Hazard Mitigation. 

Incident Management Action Team: Because of Sandy’s effect on New York City, New 

York, FEMA Region II relocated its Regional Response Coordination Center from its New 

York City offices to Earle, New Jersey. The Regional Response Coordination Center 

location contained the Federal Emergency Support Function partners for Region II, 

which covers both New Jersey and New York. FEMA deployed the Federal Coordinating 

Officer and an Incident Management Action Team to establish the Initial Operating 

Facility in Ewing, New Jersey.3

Initial Operating Facility: New Jersey’s Fusion Center provided the Initial Operating 

Facility support for FEMA’s disaster response process.4 The teams support the initial 

establishment of a unified command and provide situational awareness for Federal and 

State decision-makers crucial to determining the level and type of immediate Federal 

support required. The FEMA staff at the initial operating facility transitioned to the Joint 

Field Office.

Federal Staging Areas: The FEMA Logistics Management Directorate in Washington, DC, 

activated the Federal staging areas at McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, a U.S. military installation 

in Burlington County, New Jersey. FEMA also deployed staging teams that arrived 

before Sandy made landfall. The staging areas received commodities and equipped 

personnel before area assignments. Operating under a joint effort, the staging teams in 

New Jersey handled New York’s response as well. 

3

 The role of Federal Coordinating Officers in disaster operations is to manage Federal resources during a 

disaster. They help FEMA accomplish its core missions of saving lives, preventing suffering, protecting 

property, and conducting recovery operations. Their primary mission is to coordinate the timely delivery 

of Federal assistance to State and local governments, individual victims, and the private sector.

4

 The New Jersey Fusion Center is a State facility that, with support from Federal partners, provides 

resources, expertise, and information with the goal of maximizing their ability to detect, prevent, 

investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity.

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

2. FEMA Overcame Staffing and Operational Challenges

New Jersey officials said that FEMA performed well in managing the challenges Sandy 

presented. During the first 30 days, FEMA met the most pressing challenges of 

establishing the Joint Field Office, and, according to several senior FEMA personnel, 

maintaining the effective working relationship with New Jersey. 

Establishment of the Joint Field Office: FEMA secured, via lease, a vacant three-story 

building in Lincroft, New Jersey, to accommodate the personnel needed for a disaster of

this magnitude. At the time the General Services Administration (GSA) obtained the

building, plans included accommodating the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers long term. 

However, as the disaster response turned to recovery, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

no longer needed the space. The building required extensive repairs to the heating, 

ventilation, and air conditioning systems to be fully functional. In addition, FEMA 

installed more than 100 miles of computer network cable to establish FEMA network 

connectivity. 

Relationship with the State of New Jersey: Currently, FEMA maintains an effective 

working relationship with State officials; however, one of the challenges will be to 

maintain this relationship throughout the disaster recovery process. Given the amount 

of damage the State experienced, the recovery period for Sandy will be longer than any 

of the State’s previous disasters. FEMA personnel who worked at the start of the 

disaster will go home, as new individuals arrive to replace them. State personnel will 

also rotate in and out of the Joint Field Office. Such staff changes can affect the 

relationship between FEMA and the State over time because individuals differ in how 

they interact with others. Several long-time FEMA personnel said that New Jersey was 

among the most responsive and cooperative States that they had ever worked with 

during the response phase of a disaster. One FEMA official attributed this positive

relationship to the fact that New Jersey’s Office of Emergency Management is located 

within New Jersey’s State Police, and is staffed with police officers. In that official’s 

opinion, because the New Jersey Office of Emergency Management has a hierarchal 

structure, principles such as discipline, integrity, and a cooperative spirit fit well with 

FEMA’s structured approach to disaster response. 

3. FEMA Overcame Staffing and Staff Management Issues

FEMA’s management of resources (e.g., personnel, facilities, equipment, supplies) was a 

key component of this disaster. To ensure an adequate response, this process required 

FEMA personnel to be flexible and receptive to the ongoing changes of this disaster. 

FEMA personnel did an efficient and effective job of organizing and managing resources 

given the magnitude of Sandy. FEMA officials said that the most significant resource 

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 Department of Homeland Security 

shortfalls included (1) obtaining qualified personnel within a reasonable amount of time 

to sustain the daily program operational requirements of the disaster, and (2) the new 

time and reporting system for FEMA payroll. 

Qualified Staff: FEMA officials were concerned with the number of misclassified 

personnel being sent to this disaster under the new FEMA Qualification System. FEMA 

intended the qualification system to categorize FEMA reservists by job titles to provide 

the best possible customer service to survivors and communities. However, a number 

of FEMA officials said that this system “somewhat” hampered the disaster recovery

process because the FEMA position descriptions did not always properly align to the 

personnel’s skill sets. This shortcoming prevented some reservists who qualified under 

multiple job titles from being listed under the proper titles. FEMA leadership had to 

scramble at the Joint Field Office to find qualified people to handle some tasks, and to 

move misclassified staff into positions for which they were classified. FEMA officials 

overcame obstacles from employee misclassifications to ensure the timely delivery of 

disaster response and recovery services. 

Time and Reporting System for Payroll: FEMA officials at the Joint Field Office said that 

FEMA Headquarters established a new time and reporting system at the time of this 

event, as part of a paperless initiative. FEMA implemented the system in phases for this 

disaster beginning with FEMA’s Finance and Administrative Section and its Office of 

External Affairs. FEMA’s New Jersey Joint Field Office officials said that the new system 

reduced the level of oversight, and encouraged supervisors to sign-off on timesheets 

without properly verifying hours worked. According to Joint Field Office staff, the new 

timekeeping system was confusing, and timekeepers expressed concern that employees 

sometimes claimed hours they had not worked. Consequently, this reduced oversight 

delayed the normal operations of FEMA’s timekeeping staff, as they tried to ensure the 

accuracy of the hours employees claimed. 

4. FEMA Used a Variety of Sourcing Mechanisms

FEMA obtained goods and services needed in the disaster response using several 

different vehicles. The primary sourcing decisions for Sandy involved the following 

areas: mission assignments, logistics supply chain management, supply and equipment 

requests, acquisitions, and the Emergency Management Assistance Compact. 

Mission Assignments: FEMA used mission assignments as an integral part of New 

Jersey’s response to Sandy. FEMA assigned missions to 29 agencies with an estimated 

cost, as of January 1, 2013, of $185 million, the majority of which were to the following 

four agencies: 

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 Department of Homeland Security 

Table 2. FEMA’s Top Four Mission Assigned Agencies 

Agency Missions Total Estimated Cost 

(Millions)

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 22 $ 66.2

Department of Defense 15 52.1

Department of Energy 6 14.5

Department of Health and Human Services 8 14.8

Total 51 $147.6 

Appendix B contains a complete list of mission assigned agencies. 

FEMA’s Enterprise Coordination and Approval Processing System tracked the mission

assignments and their amendments. This system provided support to initiate, track, and 

expedite the process of providing direct aid and technical assistance from other Federal 

agencies and States. 

Emergency Management Assistance Compacts: FEMA considers Emergency 

Management Assistance Compacts to be an effective and relatively inexpensive option 

that enables one State to help another when the magnitude of a disaster exceeds the

State’s capacity to respond. For this disaster, New Jersey requested and received 

extensive assistance. Twenty States and the District of Columbia provided this type of 

assistance in the form of law enforcement personnel, ambulance and emergency 

medical service teams, and other support. After the emergency period, 36 Public 

Assistance coordinators from other States assisted with the large volume of opening 

conferences for Public Assistance grant recipients. 

Contracting: FEMA initiated contracts from its Headquarters, as well as at the Joint Field 

Office. Before this disaster, FEMA developed Disaster Acquisition Response Teams. 

FEMA located a Disaster Acquisition Response Team, which consisted of several 

contracting officers and support staff at the Joint Field Office. As needs arose, this team 

initiated contracts in the field or tapped into pre-existing FEMA contracts. The General 

Services Administration (GSA) also located contracting officers at the Joint Field Office. 

Through mission assignments, these contracting officers also contracted for goods and 

services, using pre-existing GSA contracts. 

5. FEMA Effectively Coordinated Response Activities

FEMA officials effectively coordinated a rapid deployment and recovery initiative in 

response to Sandy through the partnership of key State and Federal organizations. 

Ensuring the maximization of resources, FEMA officials hosted numerous meetings that 

helped to solidify, identify, and leverage shortfalls throughout the recovery process. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

These activities included (1) coordinating with State officials, (2) identifying and 

responding to temporary housing requests, (3) tracking and monitoring mission 

assignments, and (4) aligning and categorizing proper staffing measures. 

State Coordination: FEMA officials worked with the New Jersey Office of Emergency 

Management to support the disaster response and recovery operations. At the State’s 

request, FEMA delivered food, water, blankets, and generators across the affected 

region. FEMA operations and logistics experts worked side-by-side with State 

emergency managers to ensure the use of all Federal resources in this disaster. The 

State responded to FEMA’s actions in obtaining Federal resources by signing mission 

assignments in a timely manner. FEMA and the State also worked together to minimize 

the duplication of benefits. 

Before the disaster, the State established the disaster recovery centers for FEMA staff. 

FEMA officials said this approach played a major role in the response and recovery 

process.5

 Typically, FEMA has to find disaster recovery centers, sign rental agreements, 

and get them ready for occupation. FEMA officials said its staff was able to move in to 

New Jersey’s prewired locations almost immediately and begin responding to the

disaster days earlier than is the case in the typical disaster. 

Temporary Housing Requests: FEMA’s Individual Assistance Division coordinated the 

response measures for temporary housing needs. The Individual Assistance Division 

synchronized its response and recovery efforts with State and local governments by 

identifying additional and unmet housing needs. This response included programs such 

as Transitional Shelter Assistance, Financial Assistance (also known as “Temporary 

Housing”) and FEMA’s Sheltering and Temporary Essential Power Pilot Program in five 

New Jersey counties. In this program, homeowners applied through their municipalities 

for eligible repair work on residences, including electrical meter repairs, shelter 

essential measures, and rapid temporary exterior repairs. This program allowed 

residents to return to their homes while they completed permanent home repairs. 

Local municipal governments, in coordination with FEMA, administered and contracted 

work for expenses up to $10,000. In addition, New Jersey worked closely with FEMA to 

explore other housing alternatives for displaced residents. 

5

A Disaster Recovery Center is a facility where applicants may go for information about FEMA or other 

disaster assistance programs, such as small business loans, administered by the Small Business 

Administration. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

CONCLUSION 

FEMA performed well in its response to Hurricane Sandy in the State of New Jersey. 

FEMA normally requires several days to deploy and position staff to the areas for 

disaster response. In this instance, FEMA had facilities and staff readily available in New 

Jersey when Sandy made landfall. FEMA’s access to these resources allowed a fast and 

effective response. FEMA prepared well for this disaster, faced challenges with 

innovative solutions, quickly resolved resource shortfalls, made efficient disaster 

sourcing decisions, overcame obstacles, and coordinated its activities effectively with 

State and local officials. All disasters generate unexpected issues, but the FEMA disaster 

team was able to adjust and adapt to fulfill its mission efficiently and effectively.

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix A 

Objective, Scope, and Methodology 

The objective of this audit was to determine whether FEMA’s response to Hurricane 

Sandy in New Jersey was effective and efficient, and to evaluate FEMA’s actions, 

resources, and authorities according to Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines in 

effect at the time of our fieldwork. 

We interviewed FEMA Region II officials, FEMA Incident Management Action Team 

members, FEMA Disaster Assistance Employees, and the State of New Jersey Office of 

Emergency Management officials; reviewed FEMA Situation Reports and Incident Action 

Plan reports; observed operations at FEMA’s Joint Field office in Lincroft, New Jersey; 

and performed other procedures considered necessary to accomplish our objective. We 

did not assess the adequacy of the agency’s internal controls applicable to disaster 

response because it was not necessary to accomplish our audit objective. 

We also observed operations at the following sites in the State of New Jersey: 

• FEMA’s Regional Response Coordination Center in Earle 

• FEMA’s Joint Field Office in Lincroft 

• FEMA/State Applicant Briefing in Trenton

• Damage sites in Monmouth County. 

We conducted this performance audit between November 2012 and March 2013, 

pursuant to the InspectorfGeneralfActfoff1978, as amended, and according to generally 

accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and 

perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based upon our audit objectives. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix B 

Agencies Mission Assigned for Hurricane Sandy in New Jersey 

Corporation for National and Community Services 

Department of Agriculture 

U.S. Forest Service 

Department of Commerce 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

Department of Defense 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Department of Education 

Department of Energy 

Department of Health and Human Services

Department of Homeland Security 

Customs and Border Protection 

U.S. Coast Guard 

Federal Protective Service 

Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate 

Department of Housing and Urban Development

Department of the Interior 

U.S. Geological Survey 

Department of Justice 

Department of Labor

Occupational Safety and Health Administration 

Department of Transportation 

Department of the Treasury 

Environmental Protection Agency

Federal Communications Commission

General Services Administration

Tennessee Valley Authority 

U.S. Postal Service 

 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix C 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security

Secretary 

Chief Financial Officer 

Under Secretary for Management 

Audit Liaison, DHS 

Acting Chief Privacy Officer 

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Administrator 

Chief of Staff 

Chief Financial Officer 

Chief Counsel

Deputy Associate Administrator, Response and Recovery

Director, Risk Management and Compliance 

Federal Coordinating Officer, Lincroft Joint Field Office 

Acting Regional Administrator, FEMA Region II 

Audit Liaison, FEMA Region II 

Audit Liaison, FEMA (Job Code 13-121-EMO-FEMA (b)) 

Office of Management and Budget

Chief, Homeland Security Branch

DHS OIG Budget Examiner

Congress

Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security 

House Committee on Homeland Security 

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

www.oig.dhs.gov 12 OIG-13-117 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

Grantee

Director, New Jersey Office of Emergency Management

State

New Jersey State Auditor 

New Jersey Office of the State Comptroller 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix D 

Major Contributors to this Report 

Kaye McTighe, Director 

Trudi Powell, Supervisory Auditor 

James Miller, Senior Auditor 

Ayana Henry, Analyst 

www.oig.dhs.gov 14 OIG-13-117 
 

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at: @dhsoig. 

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