Appendix D

FERC Staff’s Responses to Maine State Planning 

Office Safety Advisory Report
D-1 FERC Responses to Maine State Planning Office Safety Advisory Report

TABLE D-1

FERC Staff’s Responses to concerns Presented in the

Maine State Planning Office Safety Advisory Report for the Downeast LNG Project

Topic: The Kind and Use of the Facility

Issue Response

FERC should require the applicant to identify and provide technical justification

for the highest wind speed used for the analysis and the design of the marine 

terminal and onshore structures.

Addressed in Section 4.12.2, Front-End Engineering Design Review. The Downeast LNG terminal 

would be designed to withstand a sustained wind velocity of 150 mph per the requirements of49 CFR

193.2067 unless approved for lesser wind speeds by the PHMSA Administrator.

FERC should evaluate the use of tankers up to 165,000 cubic meters that may 

supply the facility as conducted during the ship simulation study at Marine Safety 

International (MSI), Newport, Rhode Island in July 2006. The evaluation should 

include analysis of the loads on the mooring system from the effects of passing 

vessel traffic and high winds.

Downeast states that it would design the mooring system and unloading platform according to U.S.

regulations and international industry standards applicable to the import of liquefied petroleum gases, 

indicating that this design would accommodate carriers with capacities of 70,000 m3 to 165,000 m3

. In

addition, Downeast states that it would use the International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Import

Terminals (ISGOTT) as a key safety document. Breasting dolphins would be designed to resist 

breasting forces in accordance with Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) guidelines 

and mooring dolphins would likewise follow OCIMF publications including Mooring Equipment

Guidelines and Prediction of Wind Loads on Large Liquefied Gas Carriers.

The applicant states that it may seek to expand the project in the future.

1 

Although Downeast LNG does not anticipate the need for additional storage tanks, 

the expansion would involve the additional of high pressure pumps and vaporizers. 

The applicant further states that certain engineering elements associated with the

expansion have been incorporated into the front end engineering design for the

facility. FERC should evaluate the impact to safety and security due to any 

engineering modifications to the facility to accommodate possible future

expansion. FERC should examine whether any of these modifications would result 

in changes to thermal exclusion zones and vapor dispersion zones.

Addressed in Section 4.12.2, Front-End Engineering Design Review, and Section 4.12.4, Siting

Requirements – Thermal and Dispersion Exclusion Zones. FERC staff performed their analysis on the 

facilities described in the current application. The addition of equipment or modifications that would

increase storage capacity or sendout rate would require Downeast to file an amendment for review and 

approval by FERC. At that time, staff would analyze any proposed facilities in the amendment to

ensure that they do not diminish the safety and reliability of the facility and that they comply with

current regulations with regard to exclusion zones and other siting requirements.

Topic: Existing and Projected Population and Demographic Characteristics of Washington County Area

Issue Response

FERC needs to clearly identify all impacted areas associated with the project 

which include areas utilized during the vessel transit (in and out of Head Harbour 

Passage and Western Passage), unloading of the vessel (or vessels) at the Pier 

(Passamaquoddy Bay), transfer of LNG from the pier to the storage facility in

Robbinston, and transfer of natural gas from the sendout pipeline to the M&NE 

pipeline interconnection. FERC’s identification of impacted areas should include 

assessment of the potential for secondary hazards from intentional and 

unintentional events such as building fires, forest fires, and evacuations. 

Identification and discussion of environmental impacts associated with the operation of the LNG 

terminal and the sendout pipeline, including the potential safety impacts from an ignited or unignited 

LNG spill are addressed in the EIS. The action area for the FERC’s EIS follows the definition in 50 

CFR 402.02 as “all areas to be affected directly or indirectly by the Federal action and not merely the 

immediate area involved in the action.” Specifically, the action area considered includes the vessel 

transit paths for all vessel traffic associated with the project, including the waterway from the terminal 

out to the limit of the territorial seas [12 nm]), the terminal pier and surrounding waters. For potential 

safety impacts, this includes all associated hazard zones, as defined by the Coast Guard and based

 1 Application under sections 3(a) and 7(c) of the Natural Gas Act for the Downeast LNG Import Terminal and Pipeline Project, December 22, 2006. Docket Nos. CP07-52; CP07-53-000; CP07-54-000; and CP07-55-000. 

Resource Report 13, Engineering and Design Material, page 40, section 13.1.15, Future Plans.
D-2 FERC Responses to Maine State Planning Office Safety Advisory Report

TABLE D-1

FERC Staff’s Responses to concerns Presented in the

Maine State Planning Office Safety Advisory Report for the Downeast LNG Project

Issue Response

upon criteria developed by Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) in the report entitled Guidance on 

Risk Analysis and Safety Implications of a Large Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Spill over Water 

(2004 Sandia Report). The onshore action area considered in the EIS includes the LNG terminal 

facilities and the entire 29-mile-long sendout pipeline route. The impacts assessed in the EIS include 

the direct, indirect, and cumulative project effects under the following primary topic areas: 

alternatives; geology; soils and sediments; water use and quality; wetlands; vegetation; wildlife; 

aquatic resources; threatened, endangered, and special status species; land use, recreation, and visual 

resources; socioeconomics; transportation and traffic; cultural resources; air quality and noise; 

reliability and safety; and cumulative impacts.

Secondary impacts such as the spread of fires away from initially affected zones are not specifically 

addressed, but may be addressed during the development of the Emergency Response Plan (ERP) 

which is required by Section 311 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 15 U.S.C § 717b-1(e), and which 

must be approved by the FERC and accepted by the U.S. Coast Guard. It should also be noted that 

Section 4.12.6 includes a recommendation that Downeast coordinate the development of the ERP with 

state/provincial, tribal, county, and local emergency planning groups during which an appropriate 

response to secondary hazards may be discussed and included. 

Impacted areas should not be defined strictly at the boundary of 5KW/m2 thermal 

radiation flux criterion. FERC should conduct analysis defining the boundaries

meeting the 1.5KW/m2 thermal radiation flux for thermal radiation hazards 

evaluated for the vessel transit, LNG transfer, and storage facility. The State is 

considering extending the emergency alert and notification to at least the 

1.5KW/m2 thermal radiation flux boundary.

For the onshore facility, the 5 kW/m2 thermal radiation flux is used to evaluate the siting of the LNG 

facilities in accordance with 49 CFR 193 and the NFPA 59A standard for LNG facilities. The use of 5 

kW/m2 was re-affirmed for use at U.S. regulated facilities by the DOT in 2010. The Coast Guard also 

uses 5 kW/m2 when evaluating radiant heat hazards along the waterway. Other regulations and codes, 

including those by EPA, NFPA, and the Canadian Standards Association (CSA), also specify the use 

of 5 kW/m2 when evaluating radiant heat hazards for other hazardous facilities. The 5kW/m2 radiant 

heat level would produce second degree burns within approximately 30 seconds, assuming no 

shielding from the pool fire. These radiant heat levels are discussed in Section 4.12 and in the Coast 

Guards’ Waterway Suitability Report (Appendix B). Other considerations based on lower thermal 

radiation levels, such as those proposed here by the State, would be more appropriate to be addressed 

during the development of the ERP. Radiation flux levels and the corresponding Zones of Concern 

along the vessel transit are assessed in detail in the 2004 Sandia Report, the conclusions of which have 

been implemented in the Coast Guards’ Waterway Suitability Report (attached as Appendix B) and are 

discussed in Sections 4.7 and 4.12. It should be noted that while Zone 2 corresponds to a 5 KW/m2

thermal radiation level, Zone 3 extends farther to the vapor cloud dispersion distance to the LFL from 

a worst case unignited release. In this zone, impacts to people and property could be significant if the 

vapor cloud reaches an ignition source and burns back to the source.
D-3 FERC Responses to Maine State Planning Office Safety Advisory Report

TABLE D-1

FERC Staff’s Responses to concerns Presented in the

Maine State Planning Office Safety Advisory Report for the Downeast LNG Project

Issue Response

FERC should identify existing and planned land uses within the 1.5KW/m2

thermal radiation flux of impacted areas during vessel transit, vessel berthing and

unloading, and transfer of natural gas and LNG to the storage facility, and along 

the sendout pipeline. Sensitive receptors, including but not limited to schools, 

hospitals, nursing homes, businesses, and residences, should be identified within

this area. In addition, FERC should evaluate whether any affected communities

meet the definition of an environmental justice population.

In our draft EIS, the sections on each resource area contained a discussion of the potential impact of an 

LNG spill, ignited or unignited, occurring along the waterway for LNG marine traffic to assist the 

Coast Guard in fulfilling its NEPA obligations related to the issuance of the LOR. Since issuance of 

the draft EIS, the Coast Guard has determined that the LOR is not a federal action and that the agency 

has no NEPA obligations which need to be addressed by the FERC EIS. As a result, we have removed 

the discussion on environmental resources that may be present in the Coast Guard’s Zones of Concern. 

The discussion regarding the Zones of Concern considered by the Coast Guard in its determination on 

the type and frequency of LNG marine traffic associated with this proposed project is described in 

section 4.12.7.

In section 4.7 of the EIS, we describe land uses along the entire 16.6 nautical miles that LNG vessels

would travel to the LNG terminal. In addition, we examine existing and planned residences and other 

structures at the terminal site and along the entire sendout pipeline route. LNG marine traffic would

pass by developed areas in Eastport, Maine and St. Andrews, New Brunswick, as well as Moose

Island, Deer Island, Campobello Island, and scattered seasonal and permanent residences along the

route. The impact to these areas during normal operation is primarily a visual impact.

For the onshore facility, the 5 kW/m2 thermal radiation flux is used in accordance with Federal code 

49 CFR 193 and the NFPA 59A standard for LNG facilities. Other considerations based on lower 

thermal radiation levels, such as those proposed here by the State, may be addressed during the 

development of the ERP (see response to previous comment). There are no public lands or other 

designated federal, state, or local recreation areas located on or within 0.25 mile of the LNG terminal

site. The nearest residences to the proposed LNG terminal are located along U.S. Route 1 across from 

the LNG terminal site. During operation, the primary impact on those residences would be visual.

Regarding the proposed pipeline, DOT Minimum Federal Safety Standards in 49 CFR 192 defines 

area classifications, based on population density in the vicinity of the pipeline, and specifies more 

rigorous safety requirements for populated areas. These are addressed in detail in Section 4.12.10 

Pipeline Safety Standards.

Most of the land affected by the construction and operation of the sendout pipeline would be forest 

land (20.7 miles or 69.6 percent). Developed land constitutes only 2.0 miles or 6.6 percent of the 

route. Downeast has filed site specific construction plans to minimize impacts on nearby residences. 

Based on Downeast’s communications, neither Robbinston nor the surrounding communities are 

planning residential or commercial/business developments or subdivisions that would be crossed or 

within 0.25 mile of the sendout pipeline.

We specifically address environmental justice in section 4.8.6 of the EIS. We conclude that Pleasant 

Point Reservation, the Town of Perry, and Alexander, Baring Plantation, and Pembroke Communities 

could be defined as environmental justice communities. There would be no disproportionate adverse 

environmental and human health impacts on these communities. Rather, the proposed project would 

result in a substantial economic benefit to the neighboring environmental justice communities through 

increased job opportunities, income, and tax revenues. 
D-4 FERC Responses to Maine State Planning Office Safety Advisory Report

TABLE D-1

FERC Staff’s Responses to concerns Presented in the

Maine State Planning Office Safety Advisory Report for the Downeast LNG Project

Issue Response

Using worst case meteorological conditions, hazard assessments by FERC should

include worst case scenarios for the LNG vessel(s), the LNG transfer system, and

onshore storage and regasification facilities that could result from intentional acts, 

human error, earthquakes, and equipment failure. The FERC should assess

hazards and risks including but not limited to: (1) an LNG spill or release resulting 

from a collision with other vessels that transit along the same route beginning at 

Head Harbour passage and continue to the Western Passage into Passamaquoddy 

Bay, using minimum and maximum size LNG vessels; and (2) the full range of 

credible intentional acts affecting an LNG vessel and associated marine structures 

as identified in consultation with the Maine Department of Public Safety and the 

Maine Marine Patrol. In addition, the scenarios and impact analyses should 

include: (1) an on-water rapid phase transition flameless explosion; (2)

instantaneous LNG pool fire and the impact of the tides in the area; (3) fire from

LNG flammable vapor clouds and the potential of secondary fires such as

buildings and forests; (4) potential danger of asphyxiation from LNG vapor clouds; 

and (5) freezing impacts to humans, natural resources, and equipment in the

immediate vicinity of the LNG release.

Section 4.12 discusses the Federal regulations in 49 CFR 193 and NFPA 59A for thermal radiation 

and vapor dispersion calculations, including required worst case meteorological conditions selected in 

accordance with 49 CFR 193. Section 4.12 also discusses the worst case design spills for siting based 

on a risk-based design spill methodology reviewed by DOT PHMSA. For LNG vessel and related 

impacts, the Coast Guard used the guidance contained in the 2004 and 2008 Sandia Reports, which

takes into account credible worst case intentional and unintentional events for carriers with capacities 

up to 265,000 m3. 

The impacts of rapid phase transitions (RPT), asphyxiation, and freezing are discussed in Section

4.12.1, LNG Hazards. Section 4.12 of the EIS addresses the public safety impact along the route for 

LNG marine traffic, including impacts from both an ignited or unignited LNG marine spill.

FERC should justify the meteorological conditions and the source of the data to

support all air dispersion modeling. Conditions used to calculate worst case 

scenarios should be explained and justified. A sensitivity analysis should also be 

performed to identify the uncertainty in the calculations. FERC should explain

how the frequent fog in the area impacts the air dispersion modeling and the

thermal radiation flux boundaries.

Section 4.12 discusses the Federal regulations in 49 CFR 193 and NFPA 59A for thermal radiation 

and vapor dispersion calculations, including required worst case meteorological conditions selected in 

accordance with 49 CFR 193. Title 49 CFR Part 193.2059 requires that dispersion conditions are a 

combination of those which result in longer predicted downwind dispersion distances than other

weather conditions at the site at least 90 percent of the time or as an alternative where the model used 

gives longer distances at lower wind speeds, an Atmospheric Stability (Pasquill Class) F, wind speed =

4.5 miles per hour (2.01 meters/sec). Wind sensitivity analyses were also conducted within this criteria 

to determine the worst case wind direction and speed. The use of worst case scenarios within the 90% 

criteria precludes the need for uncertainty calculations. Fog is a function of the relative humidity, 

which is taken into account in the dispersion and radiant heat modeling. Fog generally occurs when 

the relative humidity is near 100%, which would increase convective heat transfer and reduce vapor 

dispersion distances and would decrease radiant heat distances through absorption.
D-5 FERC Responses to Maine State Planning Office Safety Advisory Report

TABLE D-1

FERC Staff’s Responses to concerns Presented in the

Maine State Planning Office Safety Advisory Report for the Downeast LNG Project

Issue Response

FERC should explain if the results of the Sandia National Laboratories Guidance

on Risk Analysis and Safety Implications of a Large Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)

Spill Over Water are applicable to the 165,000 cubic meter tanker size for this 

project.

This is addressed in Section 4.12. In 2008, the DOE released another study by Sandia National

Laboratories, entitled Breach and Safety Analysis of Spills Over Water from Large Liquefied Natural 

Gas Carriers, May 2008 (2008 Sandia Report). The 2008 Sandia Report assesses the scale of possible

hazards for newer LNG vessels with capacities up to 265,000 m3. Using the same methodology as the

2004 Sandia Report, it concludes that thermal hazard distances are only 7 - 8 percent greater than 

current vessels carrying 148,000 m3 of LNG, due primarily to the slightly greater height of LNG above

the waterline. The 2008 Sandia Report also notes that the general design of the larger vessels is 

similar to current designs and, hence, for near-shore facilities the calculated breach size for intentional

scenarios remains the same. Overall, the 2008 Sandia Report maintains the same impact zones as with

the smaller vessels that were analyzed in the 2004 Sandia Report. In 2012, DOE released another 

report based on work of Sandia that examined large scale experimental spills of LNG onto water and 

evaluated the potential for cascading damage affecting the potential hazard distances in the original 

2004 and 2008 Sandia reports. The new data and report concluded that the hazard distances to the 

public from large LNG pool fires would be smaller than previously reported by 2 to 7 percent. FERC 

staff also examined the effect of altering the LNGFIRE3 model to incorporate Sandia’s 

recommendations regarding LNG pool fire modeling over water and on data provided by the largest 

LNG pool fire tests on land (Gaz de France Montoir tests) or water (Phoenix tests).2

 Our conclusions 

were that LNGFIRE3, as currently prescribed by 49 CFR 193, is appropriate for modeling thermal 

radiation from LNG pool fires on land and is suitable for use in siting on-shore LNG facilities.

The analysis of the source term associated with a potential perpetrated or

accidental release from a LNG tanker should include a range of release rates 

including full release of all contents to loss of the smallest tank, as well as release 

rates ranging from five to sixty minutes.

LNG hazards and spills are addressed in sections 4.12, which discusses hazard distances associated 

with a LNG spill over water. The release scenarios are based on credible accidental and intentional 

releases of varying hole sizes. The hole sizes were based on the Sandia studies of 2004, 2008, and 

2012. The Sandia studies conducted extensive analyses of intentional and accidental events using 

finite element analysis techniques and it constitutes to date the most conclusive study of the potential 

damage that can occur to LNG tankers.

Topic: Existing and Proposed Land Use Near the Location

Issue Response

FERC should examine whether this project will impact homeowner values, 

businesses, and homeowner insurance cost during construction and operation. 

FERC should determine if the project is consistent (from vessel transit to the 

interconnection of the Maritimes and Northeast Pipeline) with the impacted towns’ 

comprehensive land use plans and zoning requirements. FERC should discuss the 

extent of the legal liability for losses due to LNG spills. There are preliminary 

permit applications pending before FERC for development of tidal energy 

electrical generation facilities in the vicinity of the project. See table below. 

highest potential for efficient tidal power development.

Property values, insurance rates, and zoning are addressed in Section 4.8.2 and 4.7.4 of the EIS. We

conclude that construction and operation of the Downeast LNG project would have no significant 

adverse impacts on property values in the surrounding area, nor increase insurance rates. The effect of 

a pipeline easement on property values would be negotiated between Downeast and affected 

landowners during the easement acquisition process. Downeast has also agreed to compensate 

residential property owners whose property abuts the project boundary, is located immediately across 

U.S. Route 1 from the terminal site, or is on the north shoreline of Mill Cove and faces the shoreline 

portion of the terminal site. Property owners would receive a one-time impact fee of $25,000 or would 

be compensated for the reduced market value of properties that were sold.

 2 “Recommended Parameters for Solid Flame Models for Land Based Liquefied Natural Gas Spills,” Issued January 23, 2013 in Docket AD13-4-000 (eLibrary Accession Number: 20130123-4002).
D-6 FERC Responses to Maine State Planning Office Safety Advisory Report

TABLE D-1

FERC Staff’s Responses to concerns Presented in the

Maine State Planning Office Safety Advisory Report for the Downeast LNG Project

Issue Response

Assurance that proposed development meets state land use and environmental 

standards and other related natural resources protection requirements is a primary

means by which the State ensures that “state and local safety considerations” as 

concern existing land uses, as well as features of the natural environment, are 

adequately addressed. Accordingly, FERC should continue its efforts to work 

cooperatively with the State to ensure that state land use, environmental and 

natural resource protection standards and related issues and concerns are duly 

addressed.

Downeast received a land use permit from the Robbinston Planning Board (Robbinston

Comprehensive Plan 1996) on February 16, 2006 under its Shoreland Zoning Ordinance, and a 

Conditional Land Use Permit. The waterway for LNG marine traffic, although partially located within

Maine’s coastal zone, is not subject to the Mandatory Shoreland Zoning Act. For the sendout pipeline, 

Downeast intends to apply for all state permit requirements that comprise the Maine Coastal Zone

Management Program (CZMP) in the after issuance of the final EIS. The sendout pipeline would be

exempt from the City of Calais Shoreland Zoning Ordinance. A determination that the project is 

consistent with the Maine CZMP must be received prior to construction of the LNG terminal and 

pipeline.

Major permits, approvals, and consultations required for the Downeast LNG Project are identified in 

section 1.2 of the EIS. The FERC encourages cooperation between applicants and state and local

authorities. We also note that the Maine CZMP enforces various state and local environmental laws,

regulations, standards and criteria as the state’s coastal policies. FERC would require Downeast to 

receive a determination of consistency with Maine’s CZMP for construction and operation of the

proposed facility and associated vessel operations, prior to construction.

A report developed by the Electric Power Research Institute3 identifies sites in this 

area among the places in Maine with FERC should assess in the DEIS whether and 

how the project would affect development of tidal power at the sites for which 

preliminary FERC permits have been requested and other potential sites, if 

applicable, due to LNG vessel transit and other pertinent project elements. In

addition, FERC should assess whether and how proposed or potential tidal power 

development in this region may be affected by the safety and security issues

presented by the Downeast LNG project, singly or in combination with the

proposed Quoddy Bay LNG project.

Project impacts on tidal energy electric generation facilities are examined in section 4.7.3 of the EIS. 

Based on information provided by the tidal energy companies, the top of the turbine units would be

below the maximum depth of any commercial vessel transiting during low tide. Since the LNG

vessels would be transiting the Western Passage at slack high tide, the turbines would be considerably

below the LNG vessel hull. In addition, LNG spills would have no impact on the turbines due to their 

depth in the water. Similarly, since the only equipment on the surface is a conduit connecting the

turbines to the local electric transmission grid, no impacts for an accidental LNG spill is anticipated.

FERC should determine the impact of operations from the Downeast LNG project 

coupled with the operations of the proposed Quoddy Bay LNG project on tourism

activities (including those of our Canadian neighbors), cruise ships frequenting

Eastport, recreational use of the waters, and commercial fishing. Operations with 

potential impact should include vessel traffic, security requirements, vessel

berthing, and oil or LNG spills (minor or major).

In section 4.13 of the EIS, we assess cumulative impacts of the Downeast LNG project when

superimposed on or added to other proposals in the region. In October 2008, the Commission 

dismissed Quoddy Bay’s application; therefore, the Quoddy Bay LNG Project was not included in our 

cumulative impacts discussion. In section 4.7.3 of the EIS, we specifically address project effects on 

public, recreation, and special land uses. We conclude that the additional vessel traffic with moving

safety and security zones could impact commercial and recreational boating during the arrival,

unloading, and departure of the LNG vessels. However, as stated in the WSR, an LNG vessel 

traveling at an estimated speed of 10 knots would only take 18 minutes to pass by any given point. 

 3 http://www.epri.com/oceanenergy/attachments/streamenergy/reports/Tidal_003_ME_Site_Survey_Report_REV_1.pdf
D-7 FERC Responses to Maine State Planning Office Safety Advisory Report

TABLE D-1

FERC Staff’s Responses to concerns Presented in the

Maine State Planning Office Safety Advisory Report for the Downeast LNG Project

Given the limited amount of LNG vessel traffic, the implementation of vessel traffic management 

practices recommended by the Coast Guard in the WSR, the advance notice to United States and

Canadian authorities from the LNG vessels transiting the area, and the limited time that nearby marine 

traffic could be interrupted, impacts to commercial and recreational marine activity would be 

insignificant. To prevent and minimize impacts associated with accidental spills or releases, LNG

vessels would comply with federal regulations related to fuel handling and spills in offshore areas.

Topic: Natural and Physical Aspects of the Location

Issue Response

FERC should evaluate the effect of the mechanical force of the tidal waters on the 

pier, moorings, and other marine facilities, with justification that the design is 

adequate within an acceptable margin of safety.

As discussed in a previous comment, Downeast states that it would design the mooring system and

unloading platform according to U.S. regulations and international industry standards applicable to the

import of liquefied petroleum gases, including the International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and 

Import Terminals (ISGOTT), and the Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF)

guidelines. Staff agrees that the use of such standards would provide for a safe design that considers

the effects of marine phenomena common to many national and international platforms and terminals, 

including wind, tide, and the hydrodynamic effects of passing ships.

There are many environmentally significant areas, in both Maine and Canada,

along the vessel transit route. FERC should identify these locations and state how 

they will be protected from intentional and unintentional accident scenarios of the 

LNG tanker vessel.

A further concern is how the construction and operation of a LNG import facility 

will impact both the natural resources of the area and those people whose

livelihoods depend upon those natural resources. A significant number of people

in the Downeast Maine rely on natural resources-based occupations for their

livelihood. The project’s economic impact should be examined not only from the 

perspective of a release from the facility, but also from the perspective of its 

potential effects on areas that generally provide the resources needed to support 

natural resources-based occupations that would be lost or diminished due to

establishment of security zones around a LNG facility or other project-related

effects. These occupations will include fisheries (lobster, scallop, sea urchin, 

herring, and ground fish), aquaculture, clamming, marine worm digging, wreath

making, firewood harvest, blueberry harvest and other unidentified natural 

resources. FERC should address these considerations in the DEIS.

For every major resource area discussed in the EIS, we provide analysis specific to potential impacts

along the LNG vessel transit route. 

Based on the extensive operational experience of LNG shipping, the structural design of an LNG

vessel, and the operational controls imposed by the Coast Guard and the local pilots, we conclude the 

likelihood of a cargo containment failure and subsequent LNG spill from a vessel casualty (i.e., 

collision, grounding, or allision) is extremely remote. If the project were to move forward, we

recommended that Downeast receive written authorization form the Director of OEP before 

commencement of service would be granted. Such authorization would only be granted following a 

determination by the Coast Guard, under its authorities under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act, the 

Magnuson Act, the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, and the Safety and Accountability 

For Every Port Act, that appropriate measures to ensure the safety and security of the facility and the 

waterway have been put into place by Downeast or other appropriate parties.

Direct and indirect socioeconomic impacts of the Downeast LNG project are addressed in detail in

section 4.8.2 of the EIS. Operation of the Downeast LNG facilities would result in regular LNG 

marine traffic in the Bay of Fundy, Grand Manan Channel, Western Passage, and Passamaquoddy

Bay. Downeast estimates approximately 60 vessels per year. Given the limited amount of LNG vessel 

traffic, the implementation of vessel traffic management practices by the Coast Guard, the advance

notice to United States and Canadian authorities from the LNG vessels transiting the area, and the 

limited time that nearby marine traffic could be interrupted, impacts to commercial and recreational

marine activity would be insignificant. The project area would benefit from the proposed project, as it 

would provide small increases in population to an area that has declined in population over past

decades, improved employment and training opportunities for local residents, increased personal 

income, and an improved tax base with increases in local revenues.
D-8 FERC Responses to Maine State Planning Office Safety Advisory Report

TABLE D-1

FERC Staff’s Responses to concerns Presented in the

Maine State Planning Office Safety Advisory Report for the Downeast LNG Project

Issue Response

In addition, the Town of Robbinston and Downeast have finalized a “Host Community Benefits

Agreement” that outlines a number of commitments being sponsored by Downeast in the event the 

project is developed, including a community development fund. Under the Host Community Benefits

Agreement, Downeast has agreed to compensate owners of any affected business in the town that was 

in operation as of July 11, 2005, and that is determined by an independent arbitrator to have been

adversely impacted solely by the construction and operation of the project.

There is very limited fishing in the pier area that would be affected. Downeast has negotiated an

agreement with the one potentially affected weir owner to compensate for the losses resulting from the 

operations of the LNG facilities. During operation, shoreline fishing and clamming from the 

immediate vicinity of the LNG terminal site may be prohibited based on the safety and security 

provisions at the facility that could be established by the Coast Guard. Any prohibition of shoreline

fishing or clamming in the immediate vicinity of the project’s pier abutment with the shore is not 

anticipated to be a significant adverse impact. Downeast would continue to consult with the Cobscook

Bay Fishermen’s Association, the Fundy North Fishermen’s Association, and other sources to develop

a comprehensive compensation plan to address any potential loss of fishing equipment or income as a

result of unavoidable impacts by Downeast LNG vessels. We recommended that, prior to operation of 

the Downeast LNG terminal, Downeast file the final Fishermen Communication, Coordination and 

Compensation Plan with the Secretary.

Topic: Emergency Response Capabilities Near the Facility

Issue Response

The State proposes that the applicant cooperate with the Maine Emergency 

Management Agency to conduct a systematic assessment designed to identify the 

safety hazards and estimated risk levels, and to evaluate necessary response and 

mitigation measures. During the FERC licensing process participants in the 

assessment should include a broad cross- section of local safety, security, and 

emergency officials and personnel. The assessment should be conducted in a

workshop setting facilitated by a consultant having expertise in this topic. The goal 

of this approach is to build a common understanding of the requirements for

response to an emergency. These requirements would include resources, 

communications, cooperative agreements, and other measures to assure an 

effective plan. This workshop would also identify the fiscal impact on state and

local governments and other entities for services required to protect public safety.

Section 4.12, Emergency Response and Evacuation Planning, recommends Downeast should develop

an ERP (including evacuation) and coordinate procedures with the Coast Guard; state/provincial,

tribal, county, and local emergency planning groups; fire departments; state and local law 

enforcement; and appropriate federal agencies. The specific consultations proposed here by the State

may be conducted during development of the ERP.
D-9 FERC Responses to Maine State Planning Office Safety Advisory Report

TABLE D-1

FERC Staff’s Responses to concerns Presented in the

Maine State Planning Office Safety Advisory Report for the Downeast LNG Project

Issue Response

Any and all additional safety and security infrastructure, equipment and services 

identified provided by the state and local governments must be funded in full by

the applicant. In its project authorization and certificate, if issued, FERC should 

detail the specific funding requirements and obligations of the applicant and 

ensure that these requirements and obligations are adequate to ensure that the

applicant, not the State or local communities, will fully bear the safety and security 

related costs of the project. The cost of this workshop would be fully funded by 

the applicant.

Section 3A(e) of the Natural Gas Act (as amended by the Energy Policy Act of 2005) specifies that the 

ERP shall include a Cost-Sharing Plan that contains a description of any direct cost reimbursements 

the applicants agree to provide to any tribal, state, and local agencies with responsibility for security 

and safety at the LNG terminal and in proximity to LNG vessels that serve the facility. The FERC has 

recommended that the ERP should include a Cost-Sharing Plan identifying the mechanisms for

funding all project specific security/emergency management costs that would be imposed on state and 

local agencies. In addition to the funding of direct transit-related security/emergency management 

costs, this comprehensive plan should include funding mechanisms for the capital costs associated

with any necessary security/emergency management equipment and personnel base.

FERC will require the assistance of the appropriate federal agency to consult with

the Canadian government on safety and security matters. The DEIS should identify 

this cooperation with the Canadian government as a requirement for the 

Emergency Plan to be submitted by the developer of the LNG facility.

Development of an ERP is required by Section 311 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005. The ERP would 

need to be approved by the Commission and accepted by the Coast Guard to enable a comprehensive

and coordinated response to an LNG emergency. The ERP would be developed through a transparent, 

public process that actively involves the multiple stakeholders. If the project were to move forward, 

we recommended that the ERP include coordination with multiple stakeholders, including provincial 

entities. Whether Canadian agencies will wish to be involved are issues yet to be determined.

However, Downeast LNG must be able to adequately demonstrate that an effective security regime has

been established during the Canadian portion of the vessel’s planned route prior to a loaded LNG 

vessel being allowed to transit to the facility.

Topic: Need to Encourage Remote Siting

Issue Response

FERC should assess in the DEIS whether emergency services are available in the 

area to respond to a Mass Casualty Incident (MCI). In doing so FERC should

define the worst case scenarios and determine if the emergency health services are 

available. If FERC finds that the present state and local capacity to respond to a 

MCI is inadequate, FERC should state the emergency services that would be 

considered adequate, with justification.

The availability of emergency services is addressed in EIS Section 4.12and Appendix B, Coast 

Guard’s WSR. The emergency services necessary to respond to a MCI should be considered in the 

development of the ERP and Cost-Sharing Plan.