alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 99.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Hometown Auto Retailers, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-K for the period ending December 31, 2002 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Charles F. Schwartz, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, that:

      1.    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      2.    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and result of operations
            of the Company.


March 24, 2003                          /s/ Charles F. Schwartz
                                        ----------------------------------------
                                        Charles F. Schwartz
                                        Chief Financial Officer
Exhibit
                32.2





**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
      SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**





In
      connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Capital Bank Corporation
      (the “Company”) for the period ended March 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities
      and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, A. Christine
      Baker, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
      Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
      of
      2002, to my knowledge that:





The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




/s/ *A. Christine Baker*


A.
      Christine Baker


Chief
      Financial Officer


May
      10, 2007




This
      Certification is being furnished solely to accompany the Report pursuant to
      18
      U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
      Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed “filed” by the Company for purposes of
      Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and shall not
      be
      incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company under the Securities
      Act of 1933, as amended, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended,
      whether made before or after the date of this Report, irrespective of any
      general incorporation language contained in such filing.





A
      signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to the Company and will be retained
      by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its
      staff upon request.
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.2
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  (1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and
 (2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
  By:
    
    /s/ Anthony P. DeaseyAnthony P. DeaseyChief Financial Officer
(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
#### § 372.27 Name of operator.

It shall be an express condition upon the exercise of the exemption herein granted and the operating authorizations issued hereunder, that the charter operator concerned, in holding out to the public and performing air transportation services, shall do so only in a name the use of which is authorized under the provisions of part 215 of this chapter.
#### Skenandoa Rayon Corporation, Respondent, *v.*Halifax Fire Insurance Company, Appellant.

(Argued June 1, 1936;

decided July 8, 1936.)

*458
      *William Otis Badger*for appellant.

*Harry E. Wareham*and *Frank L. Ward*for respondent.

Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Crane, Ch. J., Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs, Crouch, Loughran and Finch, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 9

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                      15,502,539
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                       1,786,000
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                            14,570,000
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                 48,355,758
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                       1,882,929
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                         1,859,291
<LOANS>                                    181,782,437
<ALLOWANCE>                                  2,648,111
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             284,828,859
<DEPOSITS>                                 257,270,953
<SHORT-TERM>                                         0
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                          3,323,007
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                    13,747,003
<OTHER-SE>                                  10,487,896
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>              24,234,899
<INTEREST-LOAN>                              8,083,938
<INTEREST-INVEST>                            1,636,778
<INTEREST-OTHER>                               428,778
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                            10,149,494
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                           3,670,945
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           3,670,945
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                        6,478,549
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                  315,000
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                              5,901,462
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,864,669
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                   1,864,669
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,233,356
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .52
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .51
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    8.11
<LOANS-NON>                                  1,026,400
<LOANS-PAST>                                   150,000
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                             2,431,117
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                   74,269
<RECOVERIES>                                   172,275
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                            2,648,111
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                         2,648,111
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0


</TABLE>
#### WILLIS *v.*DUN, ADMINISTRATOR, &c.

Work by a child for his parent — implied assumpsit — witness—legatee—will.

A claim against a testator’s estate for labor, is not cut off by the will bequeathing the claimant a legacy, unless it purports to be in view of such claim, and has been accepted.

A legatee of a residuum is not a competent witness for the estate.

A will containing a devise to the plaintiff, but is silent as to its being in lieu of the plaintiff’s demand, is not admissible to do away his right.

A child may work for his father as an hireling, and recover for his pay.

*134If a child, after adult, continue in his father’s family, working without stipulation for pay, and gets his subsistence in the family, the law will not imply a promise to pay. A son in such case, cannot, when he is disappointed in his father’s will, recover, for the service was gratuitous when rendered.

Assumpsit, for work, &c. Plea non assumpsit.

The case made in proof, was of work done by the plaintiff, after he came of age, but before he was married, for his father, in his lifetime, and also for other work done after he was married and had a separate family.

The defendant called R. Willis, a son of the testator, and one of the legatees of the estate.

It was objected to him, that he was interested and incompetent.

*Nichols*and *Cowen,*for the plaintiff.

*Hubbard,*contra.

By the Court.

The witness is directly interested. If the plaintiff recover, whatever is the amount, it lessens the fund to be distributed to the witness — if he fail, the sum is increased — he cannot be sworn.

The defendant then offered in evidence, the will of the father, in which a legacy of several hundred dollars is left *to the*plaintiff. This was objected to.

By the Court. We do not see how the will can be used. The legacy does not purport to be a compensation for labor, and it has not been paid over to the plaintiff. The evidence is rejected.

Wright, J.

to the jury. If the plaintiff worked for his father while living at home, in the way children commonly do, without agreement for pay, whatever may have been his own calculations of favor from his father’s will, he has no legal right, if disappointed, to turn round and make that a work for hire, which when done was gratuitous. The law implies a promise to pay for labor when one does it for another, though there is no special agreement; but that presumption does not hold when a child, though adult, makes his home with his parent, works for him, and gets his subsistence from the family: *ante*89. A son may labor for his father as an hireling, and be entitled to payas one. You will take all the circumstances of this case into view, and if you find the plaintiff has labored for the defendant for hire, you will find a verdict for him for so much as the services were reasonably worth, deducting what he received while the work was in progress, if any thing.

Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, for three hundred and forty dollars,-'
§ 382.127 What procedures apply to stowage of battery-powered mobility aids? ( a ) Whenever baggage compartment size and aircraft airworthiness considerations do not prohibit doing so, you must, as a carrier, accept a passenger's battery-powered wheelchair or other similar mobility device, including the battery, as checked baggage, consistent with the requirements of 49 CFR 175.10(a)(15) and (16) and the provisions of paragraphs (b) through (f) of this section.
( b ) You may require that passengers with a disability wishing to have battery-powered wheelchairs or other similar mobility devices transported on a flight check in one hour before the check-in time for the general public. If the passenger checks in after this time, you must nonetheless carry the wheelchair or other similar mobility device if you can do so by making a reasonable effort, without delaying the flight.
( c ) If the battery on the passenger's wheelchair or other similar mobility device has been labeled by the manufacturer as non-spillable as provided in 49 CFR 173.159(d)(2), or if a battery-powered wheelchair with a spillable battery can be loaded, stored, secured and unloaded in an upright position, you must not require the battery to be removed and separately packaged. Notwithstanding this requirement, you must remove and package separately any battery that is inadequately secured to a wheelchair or, for a spillable battery, is contained in a wheelchair that cannot be loaded, stowed, secured and unloaded in an upright position, in accordance with 49 CFR 175.10(a)(15) and (16). A damaged or leaking battery should not be transported.
( d ) When it is necessary to detach the battery from the wheelchair, you must, upon request, provide packaging for the battery meeting the requirements of 49 CFR 175.10(a)(15) and (16) and package the battery. You may refuse to use packaging materials or devices other than those you normally use for this purpose.
( e ) You must not disconnect the battery on wheelchairs or other mobility devices equipped with a non-spillable battery completely enclosed within a case or compartment integral to the design of the device unless an FAA or PHMSA safety regulation, or an applicable foreign safety regulation having mandatory legal effect, requires you to do so.
( f ) You must not drain batteries.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1

               CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
               ---------------------------------------------------

We hereby consent to the incorporation of our report, dated May 16, 2003,
included in this Form 10-KSB in the previously filed Registration Statements of
Legend Mobile, Inc. (formerly PTN Media, Inc.) and subsidiaries on Form S-8
(File No. 333-80771 and 333-63174) and on Form S-3 (File No. 333-51600 and
333-64328)

/s/ Stonefield Josephson, Inc.
------------------------------
STONEFIELD JOSEPHSON, INC.
Santa Monica, California
May 20, 2003
180914 ORDER RE AMP EXT VERSION SEPTEMBER 14, 2018 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

In re:

THE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND 

MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO,

as representative of

THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, et 

al.,

Debtors.1

PROMESA

Title III

No. 17 BK 3283-LTS

(Jointly Administered)

This Order shall be filed in Case 

No. 17-BK-3283-LTS, Case No. 

17-BK-4780-LTS, and Case No. 

17-BK-3567-LTS.

ORDER EXTENDING DEADLINES UNDER ORDER FURTHER 

EXTENDING DEADLINES REGARDING HEARING REQUEST 

AND REPLY FILED BY THE AUTONOMOUS MUNICIPALITY OF PONCE

The Court has received and reviewed the Third Urgent Consented Motion for 

Extension of Deadlines (Docket Entry No. 3934 in Case No. 17-3283, the “Motion”2). The 

Motion requests further extension of certain deadlines set by the Court in the Order Further 

Extending Deadlines Regarding Hearing Request and Reply Filed by the Autonomous 

Municipality of Ponce (Docket Entry No. 3806 in Case No. 17-3283, the “Scheduling Order”3).

 

1 The Debtors in these Title III Cases, along with each Debtor’s respective Title III case 

number and the last four (4) digits of each Debtor’s federal tax identification number, as 

applicable, are the (i) Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (Bankruptcy Case No. 17 BK 3283-

LTS) (Last Four Digits of Federal Tax ID: 3481); (ii) Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing 

Corporation (“COFINA”) (Bankruptcy Case No. 17 BK 3284-LTS) (Last Four Digits of 

Federal Tax ID: 8474); (iii) Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (“HTA”) 

(Bankruptcy Case No. 17 BK 3567-LTS) (Last Four Digits of Federal Tax ID: 3808); (iv) 

Employees Retirement System of the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 

(“ERS”) (Bankruptcy Case No. 17 BK 3566-LTS) (Last Four Digits of Federal Tax ID: 

9686); and (v) Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (“PREPA”) (Bankruptcy Case No. 17 

BK 4780-LTS) (Last Four Digits of Federal Tax ID: 3747).

2 The Motion was also filed at Docket Entry No. 507 in Case No. 17-3567 and Docket 

Entry No. 961 in Case No. 17-4780.

3 The Scheduling Order was also entered at Docket Entry No. 491 in Case No. 17-3567 

and Docket Entry No. 943 in Case No. 17-4780.

Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:3935 Filed:09/14/18 Entered:09/14/18 17:11:13 Desc: Main

Document Page 1 of 2
180914 ORDER RE AMP EXT VERSION SEPTEMBER 14, 2018 2

The deadline for the parties to meet and confer and file the joint status report (as 

described more fully in the Scheduling Order) shall be extended to September 25, 2018 at 5:00 

p.m. (Atlantic Standard Time).

This Order resolves Docket Entry No. 3934 in Case No. 17-3283, Docket Entry 

No. 507 in Case No. 17-3567, and Docket Entry No. 961 in Case No. 17-4780.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 14, 2018

 /s/ Laura Taylor Swain 

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN

United States District Judge

Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:3935 Filed:09/14/18 Entered:09/14/18 17:11:13 Desc: Main

Document Page 2 of 2
Exhibit 99.1

CERTIFICATIONPursuant to Section 1350 of
Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code

I certify that, to the best of my knowledge, the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended
September 30, 2002 (the 10-Q) of GEO Specialty Chemicals, Inc. (GEO) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and that the information contained in the 10-Q fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of GEO as of the dates and for the periods covered by the 10-Q.

|                        | GEO Specialty Chemicals, Inc.        
|----------------------- | -------------------------------------
|                        |                                      
|Date: November 12, 2002 | By: /s/ George P. Ahearn             
|                        |                                      
|                        | George P. Ahearn                     
|                        |                                      
|                        | President and Chief Executive Officer
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 07-1868

MICHAEL L. PACK, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus MARTIN O’MALLEY, Mayor, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Benson Everett Legg, Chief District Judge. (1:05-cv-03081-BEL) Submitted: December 14, 2007 Decided: December 28, 2007 Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Michael L. Pack, Appellant Pro Se. James R. Benjamin, Jr., BALTIMORE CITY LAW DEPARTMENT, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.- 2 - PER CURIAM: Michael L. Pack seeks to appeal the district court’s order and correspondence informing him the Appellee filed a motion to dismiss and granting the motion to dismiss. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed. Parties are accorded thirty days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). This appeal pe riod is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr. , 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson , 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960)). The district court’s order was entered on the docket on February 16, 2007. The notice of appeal was filed on August 30, 2007. Because Pack failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
# Official Journal L 254/2017

| | ISSN 1977-0677 |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | L 254 |
| | |
| English edition | Legislation | Volume 6030 September 2017 |

ISSN 1977-0677

Official Journal

of the European Union

L 254

English edition

Legislation

Volume 6030 September 2017

---

| Contents | | I   Legislative acts | page |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | | REGULATIONS |
| | * | Regulation (EU) 2017/1566 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2017 on the introduction of temporary autonomous trade measures for Ukraine supplementing the trade concessions available under the Association Agreement | 1 |

Contents

I   Legislative acts

page

REGULATIONS

*

Regulation (EU) 2017/1566 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2017 on the introduction of temporary autonomous trade measures for Ukraine supplementing the trade concessions available under the Association Agreement

1

| EN | Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.
  The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk. |
| --- | --- |

EN

Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.

The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-7233

RONNIE D. SUGGS,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

CHARLES M. CONDON, Attorney General of the

State of South Carolina,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Charleston. Dennis W. Shedd, District Judge.

(CA-00-1041-2-19)

Submitted: October 26, 2000 Decided: November 2, 2000

Before WIDENER, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ronnie D. Suggs, Appellant Pro Se. Donald John Zelenka, Chief

Deputy Attorney General, William Edgar Salter, III, OFFICE OF THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Columbia, South Carolina, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Ronnie D. Suggs appeals the district court’s order denying his

petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 2000),

as untimely filed. We have reviewed the record, the district

court’s opinion accepting the magistrate judge’s recommendation,

and Suggs’ informal brief. Because Suggs failed to challenge on

appeal the basis for the district court’s ruling, he has not preserved any issue for our review. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b). Accordingly, we deny Suggs’ motion for appointment of counsel, deny a

certificate of appealability, and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. See Suggs v. Condon, No. CA-00-1041-

2-19 (D.S.C. Aug. 8, 2000). We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

DISMISSED
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED APRIL 29, 2015

NO. 03-15-00205-CV

Carlos A. Gonzalez, Appellant

v.

Brooke Randel, Appellee

APPEAL FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF TRAVIS COUNTY

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE ROSE, JUSTICES GOODWIN AND FIELD

DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION -- OPINION BY JUSTICE GOODWIN

This is an appeal from an order signed by the trial court on March 4, 2015. Having reviewed the 

record, it appears that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal. Therefore, the Court 

dismisses the appeal for want of jurisdiction. The appellant shall pay all costs relating to this 

appeal, both in this Court and the court below.