Department of Homeland Security
 

Transportation Security Administration’s
 Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques 


(REDACTED) 


OIG-13-91 May 2013
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security

Transportation Security Administration 

Anne L. Richards 

Assistant Inspector General for Audits 

 Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov 

MAY 29 2013 

MEMORANDUM FOR: 	 John P. Sanders 

Assistant Administrator 

Office of Security Capabilities 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: 	 Transportation Security Administration’s Screening of 

Passengers by Observation Techniques 

Attached for your action is our final report, Transportation Security Administration’s 

Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques. We incorporated the formal comments 

from the Transportation Security Administration in the final report. 

The report contains six recommendations aimed at improving the Screening of Passengers 

by Observation Techniques program. Your office concurred with all recommendations. 

Based on information provided in your response to the draft report, we consider the 

recommendations resolved and open. Once your office has fully implemented the 

recommendations, please submit a formal closeout letter to us within 30 days so that we 

may close the recommendations. The memorandum should be accompanied by evidence 

of completion of agreed-upon corrective actions and of the disposition of any monetary 

amounts. 

Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we are providing copies 

of our report to appropriate congressional committees with oversight and appropriation 

responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will post a redacted version 

of the report on our website. 

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact John E. McCoy II, Deputy 

Assistant Inspector General for Audits, at (202) 254-4100. 

Attachment 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security

Table of Contents 

Executive Summary ............................................................................................................ 1 


Background ........................................................................................................................ 2 


Results of Audit .................................................................................................................. 4 


Performance Management .................................................................................... 6 


Training .................................................................................................................. 8 


Outreach and Engagement .................................................................................... 9 


Financial Accountability ....................................................................................... 10 


BDO Selection, Allocation, and Performance ...................................................... 11 


Recommendations ............................................................................................... 12 


Management Comments and OIG Analysis ......................................................... 13
 

Appendixes 

Appendix A: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology ........................................... 16
 

Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report .............................. 19
 

Appendix C: SPOT Referral Process ................................................................... 29 


Appendix D: SPOT Situation Report (SitRep) Dashboard – All Airports ............ 30 


Appendix E: GAO Status of SPOT Recommendations ....................................... 31
 

Appendix F: Training Tasks Analysis for SPOT Program – Executive Summary 34
 

Appendix G: Major Contributors to This Report ............................................... 36 


Appendix H: Report Distribution ....................................................................... 37 


Abbreviations 

BDO Behavior Detection Officer 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

FY fiscal year 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

LEO law enforcement officer 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

PMIS Performance Measurement Information System 

S&T Science and Technology (Directorate) 

SPOT Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques 

TSA Transportation Security Administration 

TSO Transportation Security Officer 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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Executive Summary 

We audited the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Screening of Passengers 

by Observation Techniques program. The program’s intent is to screen passengers by 

observing their behavior in order to detect potential high-risk travelers. This program 

uses Behavior Detection Officers to detect passenger behaviors that may be indicative 

of stress, fear, or deception. Congressman Bennie Thompson requested an audit of 

TSA’s Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques program to determine its 

effectiveness, efficiency, and economy as a security screening protocol at airports. The 

audit objective was to determine whether TSA’s Screening of Passengers by Observation 

Techniques program is structured to ensure that passengers at U.S. airports are 

screened in an objective and cost-effective manner to identify potential terrorists. 

Since the Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques program began in fiscal 

year 2007, data provided by TSA indicate that the program has expended an estimated 

$878 million and has more than 2,800 full-time equivalent positions, as of September 

30, 2012. However, TSA has not implemented a strategic plan to ensure the program’s 

success. For example, TSA did not (1) assess the effectiveness of the Screening of 

Passengers by Observation Techniques program, (2) have a comprehensive training 

program, (3) ensure outreach to its partners, or (4) have a financial plan. As a result, 

TSA cannot ensure that passengers at United States airports are screened objectively, 

show that the program is cost-effective, or reasonably justify the program’s expansion. 

In fiscal year 2012, TSA’s Behavior Detection and Analysis Division developed a draft 

strategic plan that includes a statement of mission, goals, and objectives. However, the 

plan had not been approved and implemented at the time of our review. 

We made six recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the Screening of 

Passengers by Observation Techniques program. TSA concurred with all 

recommendations. 

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Background 

According to TSA, it conducts passenger and baggage screening for approximately 

1.8 million passengers daily at more than 450 TSA-regulated U.S. airports. TSA officials 

stated that TSA developed and implemented behavior detection as a layer of security 

(see Figure 1) in response to the Implementing the Recommendations of the 911 

Commission Act of 2007. The program emphasizes objective behavior observation and 

analysis techniques to identify potentially high-risk individuals who are engaged in some 

form of deception and fear discovery.1

 According to TSA, the Passenger Assessment 

Screening System was based on the behavior assessment concept used by Israeli 

security forces. 

Figure 1. Layers of U.S. Aviation Security 

Source: TSA 

In 2002, Boston's Logan Airport and the Massachusetts State Police/Port Authority 

piloted the Passenger Assessment Screening System. In 2003, TSA developed the 

Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program with assistance 

from the Massachusetts State Police. TSA began operational testing at Logan Airport in 

Boston, Massachusetts, and later expanded its testing at two other New England 

airports. According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), in fiscal year 

1

 The Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques Standard Operating Procedure establishes 

procedures and standards for the uniform screening of individuals. 

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Department of Homeland Security 

(FY) 2007, TSA implemented SPOT, and was authorized 644 Behavior Detection Officers 

(BDOs) for deployment to 42 airports. According to TSA, as of FY 2012, more than 3,000 

BDOs were authorized for deployment to 176 U.S. airports. TSA’s Behavior Detection 

and Analysis Division is responsible for developing strategic plans and program guidance 

for the SPOT program. 

BDOs, working in pairs, primarily 

conduct SPOT at airport screening 

checkpoints by having brief verbal 

exchanges with passengers waiting in 

line, while observing passengers’ 

behaviors. A BDO identifies passengers 

for additional screening based on an 

evaluation system of identified 

behaviors, which may require a referral 

to law enforcement. A law 

enforcement officer (LEO) may assess 

the situation by interacting or engaging 

the passenger to determine if law 

enforcement intervention is necessary 

(see Appendix C for more details on the 

SPOT referral process). Passengers 

whose observed behaviors are not 

resolved during the referral process may 

not be permitted to board an aircraft. 

TSA BDOs are required to document all relevant information regarding each passenger 

referral in a referral report and the Performance Measurement Information System 

(PMIS). However, the SPOT Standard Operating Procedure prohibits the collection of 

personally identifiable information in the referral report or PMIS. Reports on the results 

of SPOT operations, such as the SPOT Situation Report Dashboard – All Airports (see 

Appendix D for an example of this report) are generated from the data entered into 

PMIS. According to TSA, SPOT referrals made from October 2011 through September 

2012 resulted in 199 arrests (shown in Figure 2). The reasons for arrests included 

outstanding warrants, suspected drugs, and illegal aliens. 

Source: Aram Boghosian, The Boston Globe 

A TSA BDO speaking with an airline traveler. BDOs 

often converse with passengers to detect clues 

regarding suspicious or deceptive behavior from 

travelers before they go through metal detectors. 

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657,000,000 Passenger Throughput FY 2012* 199 Arrests 2,214 LEO Referrals 37,370 SPOT Referral Records

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Figure 2. SPOT Referrals and Arrests, October 2011 through September 2012 

Source: TSA data2 

* Passenger throughput estimated at more than 450 airports, of which 176 use SPOT. 

The SPOT program was concentrated at large TSA regulated airports.3 According to TSA, 

the insufficient coverage at smaller airports left a gap in TSA’s additional layers of 

security.4 In FY 2012, the program was expanded to smaller airports to increase the 

number of passengers potentially screened by BDOs as they enter the air transportation 

system. 

In May 2010, GAO reported deficiencies in the SPOT program and made 11 

recommendations; see Appendix E for further details about these recommendations.5 

In addition, the SPOT program has come under scrutiny from Congress and the media. 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security, U.S. House of Representatives, requested that the Office of Inspector General 

(OIG) conduct an audit of TS!’s SPOT program to determine its effectiveness, efficiency, 

and economy as a security screening protocol at airports. 

Results of Audit 

Since the SPOT program began in FY 2007, data provided by TSA indicate that the 

program has expended an estimated $878 million and has more than 2,800 full time 

equivalent positions as of September 30, 2012. See Figure 3 for data on SPOT program 

2 This information is based on TS!’s SPOT Situation Report Dashboard – All Airports, which may be
 

incomplete and inaccurate due to errors identified in the PMIS.
 3 TSA classifies its regulated U.S. airports into one of five categories—X, I, II, III, and IV. Category X airports 

generally have the largest number of passengers boarding planes and category IV airports have the least.
 4 Behavior Analysis Capability Risk Based Allocation Methodology Phase I: Draft Report, July 2012. 

5 U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-10-763, Efforts to Validate TSA's Passenger Screening
 

Behavior Detection Program Underway, but Opportunities Exist To Strengthen Validation and Address
 

Operational Challenges, May 2010.
 

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growth. However, TSA has not implemented a strategic plan to ensure the program’s 

success. 

An agency’s strategic plan is a valuable tool for communicating a common vision to 

managers, employees, partners, Congress, and the public. Above all, it should be used 

to align resources and guide decision making to accomplish priorities and improve 

outcomes. TSA did not (1) assess the effectiveness of the SPOT program, (2) have a 

comprehensive training program, (3) ensure outreach to its partners, or (4) have a 

financial plan. As a result, TSA cannot ensure that passengers at U.S. airports are 

screened objectively, show that the program is cost-effective, or reasonably justify the 

program’s expansion. In FY 2012, TSA’s Behavior Detection and Analysis Division 

developed a draft strategic plan that includes a statement of mission, goals, and 

objectives. However, the plan had not been approved and implemented at the time of 

our review. 

Figure 3. SPOT Program Growth (Estimated expenditures in millions) 

BDOs BDOs 

2,895 BDOs 2,806 

BDOs 2,710 

2,569 

BDOs 

1,227 

BDOs 

589 

FY 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 

Airports with 

SPOT 42 160 161 162 162 176 

Estimated 

expenditures $20M $81M $173M $203M $196M $205M 

Expenditure data provided by TSA (unaudited) 

Source: OIG analysis of TSA data 

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Department of Homeland Security 

Performance Management 


TSA cannot accurately assess the effectiveness or evaluate the progress of the 

SPOT program. The program does not have a finalized strategic plan that 

identifies the mission, goals, and objectives needed to develop a system of 

performance measures. Even though program operations and referral results 

are recorded in the PMIS, the referral data captured are incomplete and 

inaccurate. Unreliable PMIS data cannot be used to measure performance or 

produce an accurate account of SPOT activity. As a result, TSA cannot 

demonstrate that BDOs are screening passengers in a uniform manner to 

identify potentially high-risk individuals. Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) Circular A-11 emphasizes that an agency’s strategic plan should define its 

missions, goals, and the means by which it will measure its progress. Specifically, 

strategic plans should— 

Specify the outcomes that the agency wants to accomplish; 

Ensure that each strategic goal is supported by performance goals or 

measures; and 

Ensure that performance goals set priorities and targets, and track 

progress in achieving the goals. 

Performance Measures 

TSA had not developed performance measures for the SPOT program. The 

program’s Standard Operating Procedure indicates that its purpose is to identify 

high-risk individuals who may pose a threat to transportation security. The 

program collects data from referral reports that provide measurable outputs of 

specific activities. However, these outputs do not provide a measure of program 

effectiveness, because TSA has not established why these outputs support 

desired outcomes. For example, TSA documents the identification of prohibited 

items, undeclared currency, and illegal aliens, but the SPOT program has not 

defined how these outputs support achieving the SPOT program goals. As a 

result, TSA cannot assess the SPOT program’s success without relative outcomeoriented performance measures. In August 2012, TSA provided its draft Behavior 

Detection and Analysis Division Performance Metrics Plan. This plan is intended 

to identify current gaps in performance metrics collection, proposed metrics 

solutions, and resource requirements for the next 3 years. The plan had not 

been approved and implemented at the time of our review. 

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Data Collection 

Although program operations and outputs from referrals are recorded in the 


PMIS, the referral data captured are not always complete or accurate. BDO 


managers are required to review and approve all SPOT referral reports entered 


into PMIS, but the internal controls over data entry were ineffective. For 


example, PMIS will automatically bypass manager review of a referral report 


after 72 hours. There were insufficient data entry quality assurance measures 


beyond a BDO manager review. Of the 15 airports tested, 1,420 of the 18,152 


(8 percent) referral reports recorded in FY 2012 bypassed management review. 


Five of the airports had more than 15 percent of the referral reports bypass 


management review. Only 1 of the 15 airports tested had 100 percent 


management review of referral reports recorded in PMIS. 


BDOs are required to document information regarding each referral, including 


the reason(s) for a referral, the BDOs involved, and the resolution. However,
 

passenger-specific data are prohibited from being recorded. 


We assessed more than 110,000 referral records in PMIS from April 1, 2009,
 

through September 30, 2012. Of those records—
 

7,019 did not identify the primary or secondary BDO; 


1,194 did not meet the criteria for a referral;
 

442 were referral records that were deleted; and 


143 did not contain a code for the airport where the referral was made.
 

Additionally, we identified duplicate records and one record that contained 


personally identifiable information. 


Incomplete and inaccurate PMIS SPOT referral data may have been used to 


present program results to TSA senior leadership and oversight officials to
 

illustrate the results of the SPOT program (see Appendix D for FY 2012 PMIS 


SPOT referral data). For example, 4 months after providing our audit team with 


PMIS data, the SPOT program office identified and corrected errors in the 


database before providing similar data to our investigators, who were 


conducting a separate investigation. We were not informed that the original 


data we received had been changed. SPOT program officials said they corrected 


errors in the level of LEO involvement and deleted duplicate records. 


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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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Training
 

TSA has not developed a training strategy that addresses the goals and 

objectives of the SPOT program. For example, BDO formal training, such as 

refresher training, is not consistently provided. Additionally, there is no 

formalized process to evaluate BDO instructors, who provide the only formal 

classroom training to BDOs, in the Performance Accountability and Standards 

System. 6 According to GAO, a well-designed training program should be linked 

to the agency’s goals and to the organizational, occupational, and individual skills 

and competencies needed for the agency to effectively perform.7

 As a result, 

TSA cannot ensure that training contributes to the uniform screening of 

passengers. 

Formal Training 

TSA does not consistently offer formal refresher training to BDOs. Beginning in 

May 2006, all BDOs were required to attend the SPOT Basic Training course for 

BDO certification. TSA’s training task analysis emphasized the importance of 

recurring training when it reported: 

...observation skills are among the perishable variety. They need to be 

constantly honed and refocused on some regular basis. Observation is 

the single most important task in the entire SPOT Program....but little 

training is provided to address its importance, and there is virtually no 

measurement of the skill in the current testing program.8 

TSA did not start providing refresher training for currently certified BDOs until 

May 2011. The 3-day refresher training consists of a review of SPOT Standard 

Operating Procedure requirements and addresses deficiencies in prior basic 

training courses. TSA determined that BDOs were not receiving training on 37 of 

the 63 (approximately 59 percent) required job tasks in the original versions of 

the basic training course (see Appendix F for SPOT program training task analysis 

executive summary). 

6

 The Performance Accountability and Standards System is a pay-for-performance management system 

that promotes and sustains a culture of high performance and accountability. It is designed to ensure that 

employees know what they need to do to accomplish their work successfully and to help TSA accomplish 

its mission through the use of a pay-for-performance system. 

7

 U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO-04-546G, Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic Training 

and Development Efforts in the Federal Government, March 2004. 8

 Transportation Security Administration, Training Task Analysis for the Screening of Passengers by 

Observation Techniques Program, December 16, 2011. 

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BDOs with a year or more of experience are eligible to complete TSA’s refresher 

training. According to TSA, 713 of the approximately 2,200 eligible BDOs 

(approximately 32 percent) have received refresher training in the past 2 years. 

Of the 101 BDOs interviewed, 88 were eligible to receive the refresher training. 

Of the 88 eligible BDOs, 65 (approximately 74 percent) have not received the 

training. The SPOT program office reported that because of training staffing 

constraints, they needed to prioritize the training of new BDOs before 

conducting refresher training. As a result, BDOs who have not received the 

refresher training may be operating at varying levels of proficiency. 

Instructors 

BDO instructors provide the only formal classroom training to BDOs. During July 

2012, TSA provided training to BDO instructors and tested them on their teaching 

abilities. TSA identified six BDO instructors who did not have the instructor 

knowledge, skills, or abilities to instruct BDO classes. TSA provided remedial 

instruction to those instructors in order for them to become qualified to teach. 

However, TSA does not evaluate BDO instructors on their instructional abilities in 

their Performance Accountability and Standards System. Additionally, TSA does 

not have a program to provide recurrent training to BDO instructors. Therefore, 

the program office cannot ensure that BDOs are effectively and consistently 

trained. 

Outreach and Engagement 

The relationship between BDOs and local LEOs needs to be improved. TSA 

incorporated law enforcement response as an integral part of the SPOT program. 

However, the SPOT program office has not ensured that airports effectively 

engage local law enforcement. BDOs and local LEOs at the airports contacted 

said that there was insufficient understanding of the roles and responsibilities 

that each had relative to the SPOT program. For example, LEOs at seven airports 

contacted said that they had not received clear information about BDO duties 

and why referrals from BDOs warranted law enforcement response. Conversely, 

BDOs expressed concerns about the consistency of LEOs’ responses to referrals. 

BDOs said that local LEOs did not consistently respond to referrals or engage 

referred passengers. TSA data show that LEOs did not respond to approximately 

2 percent of the referrals between October 2011 and September 2012.9 

Additionally, TSA data indicate that LEOs did not question approximately 

13 percent of referred passengers during that same period. 

9 This information is based on PMIS data, which may be incomplete and inaccurate because of errors 

identified. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Of the 15 airports we contacted, 3 had locally developed LEO outreach activities. 

At the airports using outreach activities, BDOs and LEOs reported more 

consistent and effective working relationships. The success of the program may 

be affected if BDOs and LEOs do not collaborate effectively. 

Financial Accountability 

The SPOT program’s financial plan does not include priorities, goals, objectives, 

or financial performance measures. According to the SPOT program office, the 

program was allocated more than $1 billion between FYs 2007 and 2012. The 

data provided by TSA indicate that the program expended an estimated 

$878 million for the program office and SPOT personnel. OMB Circular A-11 

describes budget formulation, development, and execution requirements that 

include needs analysis and budget development, budget execution, and 

expenditures tracking. Budget control is an integral part of an entity’s planning, 

implementing, reviewing, and accountability for stewardship of government 

resources and achieving effective results.10 Because the SPOT program did not 

have a financial plan that included priorities, goals, objectives, or measures, TSA 

cannot (1) show that SPOT was cost-effective, (2) identify opportunities for 

improvement, or (3) justify the program’s expansion. 

Prior to FY 2012, the SPOT program office did not fully determine priorities for 

future spending or develop an itemized forecast of future funding and 

expenditures. Performance information was not used to assess the effectiveness 

of program activities to develop budget priorities. According to program 

officials, the program's historical funding was the basis for spending estimates. 

Beginning in FY 2012, the Behavior Detection and Analysis Division developed 

spend plans that identified project funding requirements. According to the 

FY 2013 draft spend plan, the objective of the spend process is to collect, 

identify, and document funding requirements for the budget year with a 5-year 

forecast. However, the spend plans did not include a comprehensive accounting 

of SPOT funding requirements, such as BDO costs and training. 

Resources 

BDOs at 12 airports contacted were used for activities not associated with their 

primary behavior detection duties. For example, nine airports have used BDOs 

as periodic travel document checkers to review passenger boarding passes and 

identification at screening checkpoints. The SPOT Standard Operating Procedure 

10 U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government, November 1999. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

allows airports to divert BDOs to travel document checks during times of peak 

passenger traffic or other urgent circumstances. Additionally, one airport used 

BDOs to augment travel document checkers in order to identify passengers 

selected for additional screening. Airport officials explained that they used BDOs 

because Transportation Security Officer (TSO) travel document checkers were 

not identifying passengers who needed additional screening. SPOT program 

officials did not analyze airports’ use of BDOs for activities not associated with 

behavior detection duties to evaluate program performance and financial 

impact. By diverting BDOs from their behavior detection duties, TSA may be 

decreasing the effectiveness of a defined layer of security and are not using BDO 

staff as intended. 

BDO Selection, Allocation, and Performance 

The SPOT program needs to ensure that it has an effective process to identify 

and address challenges that may affect the success of the program. 

TSA senior airport officials at airports contacted raised concerns regarding 

selection, allocation, and performance of BDOs. These issues may directly affect 

the success of the SPOT program. Additionally, TSOs are the only source of 

candidates for BDO positions. Limiting BDO recruitment may not provide the 

program with the highest-quality candidates. 

TSA officials at the airports contacted said that they did not understand how 

BDOs are allocated to airports. Federal Security Directors at the airports 

contacted were unsure whether resources were allocated to airports solely 

based on the number of passengers boarding planes; or if airport layout, queuing 

design, and scheduling constraints were also considered. Without a clear 

understanding of allocation methods and the opportunity to provide input on 

BDO allocation, TSA officials at airports may find resources limited to the point 

where the expected benefits of this security layer may not be realized. 

TSA does not use an evaluation period to determine whether new BDOs can 

effectively perform behavior detection and analysis duties. TSA also does not 

have a process to move BDOs back to their TSO positions without penalty. This 

may result in a workforce with some BDOs not able to perform their duties 

effectively. 

Conclusion 

Strategic planning is the keystone to a successful program. Because OMB 

Circular A-11 guidance identifies requirements for agency strategic planning, it 

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would be prudent for agency programs to follow these same principles to help 

ensure program success and contribute to the agency’s mission. Without the 

implementation of a SPOT strategic plan that contains key elements, TSA cannot 

ensure that passengers at U.S. airports are screened in an objective manner, 

show that the program is cost-effective, or reasonably justify the program’s 

expansion to ensure that threats to aviation security are effectively prevented.11 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Assistant Administrator, Office of Security Capabilities: 

Recommendation #1: 

Develop and implement a comprehensive strategic plan for the SPOT program 

that includes— 

Mission, goals, objectives, and a system to measure performance; 

A training strategy that addresses the goals and objectives of the SPOT 

program; 

A plan to identify external partners integral to program success, such as 

law enforcement agencies, and take steps to ensure that effective 

relationships are established; and 

A financial plan that includes identification of priorities, goals, objectives, 

and measures; needs analysis; budget formulation and execution; and 

expenditure tracking. 

Recommendation #2: 

Develop and implement controls to ensure completeness, accuracy, 

authorization, and validity of referral data entered into the Performance 

Measurement Information System. 

Recommendation #3: 

Develop and implement a plan that provides recurrent training to BDO 

instructors and BDOs. 

11 The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires agencies to develop a strategic plan for 

program activities that contains (1) a comprehensive mission statement, (2) general goals and objectives, 

(3) how goals and objectives are to be achieved, (4) how performance plan goals relate to the general 

goals and objectives in the strategic plan, (5) external factors that could significantly impact achievement 

of the general goals and objectives, and (6) a description of the program evaluations used in establishing 

or revising general goals and objectives, with a schedule for future program evaluations. 

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Recommendation #4: 

Develop and implement a plan to assess BDO instructor performance in required 

core competencies on a regular basis. 

Recommendation #5: 

Monitor and track the use of BDOs for non-SPOT related duties to ensure BDOs 

are used in a cost-effective manner and in accordance with the mission of the 

SPOT program. 

Recommendation #6: 

Develop and implement a process for identifying and addressing issues that may 

directly affect the success of the SPOT program such as the selection, allocation, 

and performance of BDOs. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

TSA provided comments to this draft report and a copy of the response in its 

entirety is included in Appendix B. TSA also provided technical comments, which 

we incorporated as appropriate. 

According to its response to the draft report, TSA agreed with our 

recommendations for improvements to the SPOT program. Below are TSA’s 

responses to each recommendation and our analysis. 

TSA Response to Recommendation #1: TSA concurred with the recommendation; 

however, it disagreed with our assessment that it had not implemented a 

strategic plan to ensure the SPOT program’s success, or that it had not 

developed performance measures for the program. 

According to TSA’s response, it is in the process of updating its strategic plan to 

reflect the organization’s recent realignment. The strategic plan will elaborate 

on the Behavior Detection and Analysis Program’s efforts to work with external 

partners such as law enforcement. Additionally, TSA will execute a BDO training 

strategy elaborating on many of the efforts that are currently under way. Finally, 

the Behavior Detection and Analysis Program will continue to produce a yearly 

spend-plan that identifies goals, objectives, budget formulation and execution, 

and expenditure tracking. 

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OIG Analysis: Our report recognizes that TSA had a draft strategic plan and 

performance metrics plan. However, these documents were not approved or 

fully implemented at the time of our review. 

TSA’s planned and current actions are consistent with the intent of the 

recommendation. This recommendation is resolved, but will remain open until 

TSA provides its updated strategic plan for our review and has demonstrated 

progress in implementing the plan. 

TSA Response to Recommendation #2: TSA concurred with the recommendation 

and said that in December 2012, it completed an audit of all SPOT referrals data 

entered into PMIS between March 2010 and August 2012. Additionally, 

mandatory guidance was provided to airports in order to correct technical and 

administrative errors. TSA officials stated that the entire audit and remediation 

process will be completed by July 2013. 

TSA has two information technology initiatives under way to enhance the 

accuracy and validity of SPOT data. The first initiative, which is scheduled to be 

implemented in May 2013, will include turning off the ability for SPOT referral 

reports to automatically bypass manager review after 72 hours. The second 

initiative creates a new SPOT database that will be more flexible, reduce data 

entry requirements, and have extensive analytical capabilities. The design and 

development phases for the new SPOT database will be completed over the next 

12 months. 

OIG Analysis: TSA’s planned and current actions are consistent with the intent 

of the recommendation. This recommendation is resolved, but will remain open 

until OIG— 

Analyzes the results of the PMIS data audit;
 

Reviews the guidance provided to the airport in order to correct technical 


and administrative errors; and
 

Verifies progress with implementing the information technology initiatives. 


TSA Response to Recommendation #3: TSA concurred with the recommendation. 


According to TSA’s response, it has developed and implemented a plan to 


provide recurrent training for BDO instructors and refresher training for the BDO 


workforce. 


OIG Analysis: TSA’s planned and current actions are consistent with the intent 

of the recommendation. This recommendation is resolved, but will remain open 

until TSA provides the training plan for the BDO and BDO instructors, and 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

evidence of its implementation. 

TSA Response to Recommendation #4: TSA concurred with the recommendation. 

According to TSA’s response, it is going to update its National Training Team 

Guide for Instructors and Federal Security Directors in May 2013. The update 

will include a plan to regularly assess BDO instructor performance in core 

competencies. 

OIG Analysis: TSA’s planned and current actions are consistent with the intent 

of the recommendation. This recommendation is resolved, but will remain open 

until TSA provides the updated National Training Team Guide for Instructors and 

Federal Security Directors and evidence of its implementation. 

TSA Response to Recommendation #5: TSA concurred with the recommendation. 

According to TSA’s response, it is working on two major initiatives to monitor 

and track the use of BDOs to ensure that they are used in a cost-effective 

manner and in accordance with the mission of the SPOT program. TSA will begin 

a nationwide rollout of a BDO Efficiency and Accountability Metrics Database in 

May 2013. 

OIG Analysis: TSA’s planned and current actions are consistent with the intent 

of the recommendation. This recommendation is resolved, but will remain open 

until TSA provides evidence that the BDO Efficiency and Accountability Metrics 

Database and Program Compliance Assessment initiatives have been 

implemented. 

TSA Response to Recommendation #6: TSA concurred with the recommendation. 

According to TSA’s response, it has developed and implemented a number of 

processes for BDOs and BDO managers to provide feedback, suggestions, and 

concerns to the Behavior Detection and Analysis Program office. Within the next 

90 days, TSA plans to capture its communications processes in a BDO 

Communication Plan, which will include an annual survey. 

OIG Analysis: TSA’s planned and current actions are consistent with the intent 

of the recommendation. This recommendation is resolved, but will remain open 

until TSA provides its BDO Communications Plan and evidence of its 

implementation. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix A 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was 

established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment 

to the Inspector General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and 

special reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, 

efficiency, and effectiveness within the Department. 

The audit objective was to determine whether TSA’s SPOT program is structured to 

ensure that passengers at U.S. airports are screened in an objective and cost-effective 

manner to identify potential terrorists. Our original audit objective was to determine 

the extent to which TSA's SPOT program was screening passengers at U.S. airports in an 

objective and cost-effective manner to identify potential terrorism and/or criminal 

activity. However, we could not determine the extent to which the SPOT program is 

operating in an objective and cost-effective manner because the program does not have 

the necessary structure in place to base our assessment. 

To accomplish this objective, we reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and appropriations. 

We also reviewed program policies, procedures, and other documentation, including 

versions of a draft SPOT strategic plan, Standard Operating Procedure guidance, and 

basic training curriculum. We attended the basic SPOT training course given to BDOs to 

gain an overall understanding of the fundamentals of behavior analysis and how it could 

be applied. Additionally, we reviewed other agency’s audit reports relevant to the SPOT 

program. 

According to OMB Circular No. A-11, Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the 

Budget, July 2010, an agency’s strategic plan is a valuable tool for communicating a 

vision for the future to managers, employees, delivery partners, suppliers, Congress, and 

the public. We analyzed whether the SPOT program office incorporated the 

characteristics of an effective strategic plan, including (1) a comprehensive mission 

statement, (2) general goals and objectives, (3) how goals and objectives are to be 

achieved, (4) how performance plan goals relate to the general goals and objectives in 

the strategic plan, (5) external factors that could significantly impact achievement of the 

general goals and objectives, and (6) a description of the program evaluations used in 

establishing or revising general goals and objectives, with a schedule for future program 

evaluations. 

We judgmentally selected 15 airports that use the SPOT program (see Table 2). We 

chose these airports by taking into account the following criteria: 

Number of referrals at each airport for the previous calendar year 

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Department of Homeland Security 

Airport category 

Allocation of BDOs 

Ratios of BDOs, number of passengers boarding planes, and SPOT referrals 

Top 10 high-risk airports from DHS’s Current Airports Threat Assessment list 

Physical location (Northeast, Southwest, Central, Pacific Coast) 

We interviewed more than 300 officials at U.S. airports, TSA Headquarters, and external 

agencies. The airport interviews included Federal Security Directors, Assistant Federal 

Security Directors, BDO program coordinators, BDO managers, BDOs, SPOT instructors, 

coordination center personnel, and LEOs. Headquarters interviews included program 

office officials, training division personnel, privacy counsel, SPOT budget officials, 

database administrators, and allocation and scheduling personnel. In addition, we 

interviewed officials from DHS’ Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate, U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection, United States Secret Service, and TSA Federal Air Marshal 

Service. Interviews were also conducted with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and 

Israel’s El Al Airlines security. 

We obtained and analyzed the PMIS SPOT referral data for April 2009 through 

September 2012. We conducted analysis using IDEA Data Analysis Software to assess 

the accuracy and completeness of referral information collected. Because of insufficient 

internal controls over PMIS data, we did not rely on the data to form conclusions on 

performance of the SPOT program. 

We obtained and analyzed financial information received from the SPOT program office, 

including the pay, compensation, and benefit data it sourced from the National Finance 

Center. We did not test the expenditure data provided by the program office for 

completeness or accuracy, because financial data for the program from FYs 2007 to 

2012 was not readily available. 

This audit did not include work to determine the extent to which the SPOT program is 

based on valid scientific principles for use as an effective layer of aviation security in the 

United States. Additionally, on November 9, 2012, TSA announced that it ratified a 

collective bargaining agreement with the American Federation of Government 

Employees. The agreement will cover approximately 44,000 TSA employees and took 

effect on December 9, 2012. Since the audit was concluded in October 2012, the effect 

of the collective bargaining agreement on the SPOT program was not assessed. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Table 2. Airport Sample Selection
 

Airport Category BDO 

Allocation 

Referrals from 

Jan. 2011 to 

April 201212 

Los Angeles International Airport, 

Los Angeles, CA* X 3,587 

San Francisco International Airport, 

San Francisco, CA X 398 

Orlando International Airport, Orlando, FL X 6,981 

Tampa International Airport, Tampa, FL I 1,375 

Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International 

Airport, Atlanta, GA X 601 

Chicago Midway International Airport, 

Chicago, IL I 440 

Chicago O’Hare International Airport, 

Chicago, IL* X 730 

General Edward Lawrence Logan 

International Airport, Boston, MA* X 2,885 

Thurgood Marshall, Baltimore/ Washington 

International Airport, Baltimore, MD* X 769 

Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County 

Airport, Detroit, MI* X 1,251 

Kansas City International Airport, 

Kansas City, MO I 108 

John F. Kennedy International Airport, 

New York, NY* X 5,293 

La Guardia Airport, New York, NY X 1,618 

William P. Hobby Airport, Houston, TX I 256 

George Bush Intercontinental/ 

Houston Airport, Houston, TX X 675 

Source: OIG analysis of TSA data 


*Six of the airports in our sample were on TSA’s 2010 list of top 10 high-risk airports.
 

We conducted this performance audit between April and October 2012 pursuant to the 

Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based upon our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our 

audit objectives. 

12 This information is based on TSA’s PMIS, which may be incomplete and inaccurate because of errors 

identified. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

 

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

us. D. pnlrne .. 1 o f Ilomcl ... d Sc.:urily 

601 So~lh lJlh SI,.,." 

A,lm:lI011. VA 2U5'l1l:1 

Transportation 

Security MAY - 32GB Administration 

lNFORMA nON 

MEMORANDUM FOR, Anne L. Richards 

Assistant Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland 

q/ Security (DHS) John S. p;stolet 

Administrator 

Transportation, mity Administration 

SUBJECL Rt::Sponse to Dran Report. Transportation Security 

Administration 's Screening of Passengers by Observation 

Techniques (OIG 12-1-l1-AUD-TSAj 

This memorandum constitutes the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) response to 

the DHS Office ufInspector General (DIG) draft report, Tramportalion Securily 

Administration 's Screening of Passengers by Observation Te chniques, March. 2013. 

Background 

Congressman Bennie Thompsun requested an audit ofTSA 's Scn::ening of Passengers by 

Observation Techniques (SPOT) program to determine its effectiveness, efficiency, and 

economy as a security screening protocol at airports. The aud it objective was to determine 

whether TSA's SPOT program is structured to ensure that passengers at U.S. airports are 

screened in an objective and cost-effective manner to identify potential terrorists. OIG 

conducted its audit from April to October of 20 12. and interviewed more Than 300 officials at 

U.S. airports, TSA headquarters, and external agencies. 

DIG provided T SA with six recommendations fo r action, all of which TSA concurs with, 

including implementing a strate gic plan. The DIG concluded that without the implementation of 

a strategic plan that contains key elements, including mission, goal, and Objectives needed to 

develop a system of perf om lance metrics, "TSA cannot ensure that passengers at U.S. airports 

are screened in an objective manner, show that the program is cost-effective, or reasonably 

justify the program's expansion to ensure that threats to aviation security are etlectively 

prevented." 

During the audit, TSA provided the OIG with a draft Behavior Detection and Analysis Strategic 

Plan. which included a mission statement, vision statement, goals, and objectives already under 

development. TSA has since finalized this plan (finalized December 2, 2012). TSA also 

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2 

provided the OIG with a draft Perfonnance Me trics Plan (finalized November 20 12) which 

establishes the architecture for validated melrics to measure the SPOT program and Behavior 

Detection Officer (BOO) perfonnancc. Finally, TSA provided the 010 with a draft return on 

investment study (finalized December 20 12). and Program Spend Plans from fiscal years (FY) 

20 11, 2012, and 20 13. Of note, TSA provided DIG with approved final documents on December 

5, 2012. These reports detail project descriptions, justifications and impact if nol funded along 

with a breakdown of Program Operations and Management costs. 

These documents collectively provide the strategic and financial roadmap for the Behavior 

Detection and Analysis Program (BDAP). While the OIO's report acknowledges the existence 

and submission of these draft plans, TSA would have liked the OIG to acknowledge that TSA 

had begun preparing these documents prior to its audit. Additionally, TSA believes that it has 

more fully implemented the plans than is described in OIG's report and that no significant 

concerns remain unaddressed. 

Discussion 

Earlier this year, consistent with TSA's intelligence·drivcn and risk-based strategy, the TSA 

Deputy Administrator approved the realignment of BOAP, excluding the research and 

development function. from the Office of Security Capabilities (OSC) to the Office of Security 

Operations (OSO). Placing the operational component of BOAP in OSO aligns behavior 

detecti on and analysis with other real-time threat assessmen t operations. 

The BOAP now has four functional areas: \) strategic planning and policy development; 2) 

training and workforce engagement; 3) compliance and standardization; and 4) analysis and 

metrics. Working in tandem with OSC and the Office of Training and Workforce Engagement 

(OTWE), BOAP focuses on five stratcgic areas: 

1. Integrate Behavior Detection into Risk-Based Security Initiatives: Continue to 

integrate the behavior detection capability into risk-based security. and study the impact 

that behavior detection and analysis has on the overall effectiveness and effi ciency of the 

transportation security system. 

2. Develop Data Management Protocols and Robust Analytical Capabilities: Coliect, 

organize, validate, and make data accessible to enable improved decision-making 

regarding BOO allocation, pilots. procedures, and daily operations. 

3. Implement Quality Assurance Oversight Measures: Implement a multifaceted quality 

assurance program for TSA behavior detection and analysis initiatives to ensure 

consistent and standard practices, including airport operation evaluations, current 

training/testing, and data entry/management. 

4. Research, DeveJop9 and Validate New and Existing Beha,rior Analysis Capabilities: 

Continue to build the scientific foundation for behavior detection and analysis while 

refining current capabilities. Leverage existing and emerging best practices used by other 

domestic and international behavior detection programs as well as law enforcement, 

defense, and intelligence agencies. 

5. Execute Multifaceted Internal and External Communications Plans: Work with 

Federal. state, local and international law enforcement, and civil rights groups to build 

public support and leverage best practices. Engage with the TSA workforce to explain 

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Department of Homeland Security 

 

3 

why behavior detection and ana1ysis is a critical layer to the transportation security 

system. 

This framt:work is consist!:nl with TSA's larger focus on risk-based security, workforce 

engagement and organizational efficiency. and the OSO strategic plan for 2013-2015. 

TSA had begun, and in some cases has completed, aU of the recommendations cited by tile 010 

in this report: 

• Strat£gic Planning and Performance Measurement: TSA finalized a strategic plan 

and performance measurement plan and began implementing many of the objectives in 

these framework documents. 

• Data Accuracy: TSA implemented controls to ensure completeness, accuracy, 

authorization. and validity of referral data entered into the Perfonnance Management 

Information System. 

• Training: TSA implemented a plan to provide recurrent/refresher training to all BOOs 

and BOO instmctors, and developed a plan to assess UDO instructor performance in 

required core competencies on a regular basis. 

• Monitor and Evaluate BDO Attivity: TSA developed, and implemented an automated 

tool to help evaluate airports' use of BOO resources. 

• Employee Engagement: TSA implemented processes for identifying and addressing 

issues raised by the workforce that may directly affect the success of the SPOT program. 

Conclusion 

TSA believes that passengers at U.S. airports arc screened by BDOs in an objective manner; 

SPOT is effective and has been validated and determined to identify substantially more high-risk 

travelers than a random screening protocol ;land the program is executed in an eflicient manner. 

TSA recognizes the important issucs set forth in this rcport. TSA apprcciates OlO's efforts to 

identify areas needing improvement with the SPOT program and will continue to implement 

~IG's recommendations, if not already fully implemented. 

> SPOT n:jcm>/ I'C,xm Va/idatir:", $tudyfinDl rqKHf: VoillltW$/-<l. Washington. DC: American Institute.'! for Rcsc8fch. Cost>&an. T. E .. 

Mid:..",,"". 7 .. f., Tftyl or. T S . Sawyer. K , M)·ers. T L . &. Toplltz, M. (20] 1). 

www.oig.dhs.gov 21 OIG-13-91
 

 

U.S. Department orRomeland Security 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 

RespoDse to OIG Dran Report 

Transportation Security Administration's Screening 0/ Passengers by Observation TechniquesSensitive Security In/ormation, March,2013. 

Recommendation .1: Develop and implement a comprehensive strlltegic plan for the SPOT 

Program tbat includes J) mission, goab, objectives, and. system to measure performance; 

2) a training slrategy tbat addresses tbe goals aod objectives of tbe SPOT programj (3) a 

plan to identify external partners integral to program success, such as law enforcement 

agencies, and take steps to ensure that effedive relationships are established; and (4) a 

financial plan that includes identification of priorities, goals, objectives, and measures; 

needs DDalysis; budget formulation and execution; and expenditure tracking. 

TSA concurs. While TSA agrees with this recommendation. it disagrees with the statements in 

the report that "TSA has not implemented a strategic plan to ensure the program's success," nor 

developed performance measures for the program. Although in drBft fonn until December 2012, 

the Program operated under the strategic plan and began implementing many of the strategic 

objectives, including developing a performance metrics plnn and continuing to analyze the 

effectiveness of behavior detection and analysis. 

Consistent with Office of Manngeme.nt and Budget (OMB) Cin:u1ar A-1I, the SPOT Strategic 

Plan defines its mission, goals, objectives, and actions that the Program win take to realize goals 

and monitor progress. In fact, in November 20 12, the Program published and immediately began 

implementing the Behavior Detection and Analysis Division Performance Metrics Plan outlining 

the Progrwn's approach to developing a comprehensive system for effectively measuring SPOT 

performance. Specifically, the perfonnance metrics plan identifies current gaps in perfomlance 

metrics collection., initiatives to address metrics gaps. and resource requirements for the next 3 

year.;. The plan includes a set of performance metrics that allow for continuous performance 

tracking and evaluation, including: 

• Perfonnance measures for selecting. hiring. and training BOOs; 

• Perfonnance measures for evaluating individual BOO performance and effectiveness; 

and 

• Perfonnance metrics for evaluating program effectiveness as a whole. including which 

behaviors lead to a high probability of a BOO encountering and detecting high-risk 

passengers. 

The Program is in the process ofupdatillg the strategic plan to refl ect the organization's recent 

realignment. The Plan will elaborate on the Program's efforts to work with external partners 

such as law enforcement, which the TSA already does on a consistent basis. Additionally, TSA 

will execute a BOO training strategy elaborating on many of the efforts that are currently 

underway. Finally. the Program will continue to produce a yearly spend-plan that identifies 

goals, objecti,,'es. budget formu lation and execution, and expenditure tracking. In swn. all of the 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

 

2 

components of a comprehensive strategic plan are in place with efforts underway to acrueve full 

implementation. 

TSA fmalized a strategic plan and perfonnance measurement plan and began implementing 

many of the objecti ves in these framework documents. Therefore. TSA requests that OIG 

consider this recommendation implemented and closed. 

Recommendation 2: Develop and implemcot controls to ensure completeness, accuracy, 

autborization, and validity of referral data entered into the Performance Measurement 

InformatioD System. 

TSA concurs. The Perfonnance Measurement lnfonnation System (PMIS) records SPOT 

operational data. The system captures infannation including arrests and the surrender of 

prohibited items. The Program has taken measures to ensure the completeness, accuracy. and 

validity of SPOT data already submitted into PMIS and developed further contn>ls within the 

system to prevent future errors. 

In December 2012, the Program completed a data audit of all SPOT referrals enten::d into PMIS 

between March 2010 and August 2012. The Program provided mandatory guidance that airports 

correct tectullcal and adminiSlrBtive errors by amending the PMIS records through a comparison 

with the hard copy referral sheets that are maintained locally. Corrections are documented in 

spreadsheets noting that the PMIS record was changed, when appropriate, or that there was a 

reason why the report was filled out with those fields and thus did not constitute an error. The 

entire audit and remediation process wm be final ized by May 2013, for all but five airports, the 

last of which will be completed by July 2013. The Program will continue large-scale data audits 

to ensure the validity and accuracy of SPOT referral data. Additional ly. the Program created a 

report for SPOT Transportation Security Managers (STSM) giving them the ability to locally 

monitor and correct errors on a regular basis. 

The Program also has two significant Infonnation Technology initiatives underway to enhance 

tbeaccuracy and validity of SPOT data. The first initiative, to be implemented in the beginning 

of May 2013, modifies the current SPOT module, including turning oHthe 72-hour autopromote function and adding drop down menus and check boxes to capture SPOT referral data. 

It also includes additional required fields and business rules 10 ensure more accurate and 

complete reporting. This initiative will facilitate data integrity in the field and ensure that all 

entries into PMIS have been reviewed and approved by an STSM for quality assurance. aDOs 

and STSMs were trained on this new form the week or April 22-26, 2013, via Adobe Connect 

sessions, conferences calls, and guidance documents provided on the STSM iShare site. 

The second initiative creates a new SPOT database that will be morc flexible, reduce data entry 

requirements to the fuJicst extent possible, and have extensive anaJyticaJ capabilities, including 

better trend analysis of indicators resulting in detection ofa high risk passenger (system 

requirement phase completed March 2013; design and development phases will be completed 

ovcrthe next 12 months). 

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3 

These system modifications provide the necessary controls to ensure completeness, accuracy. 

proper authorization. and validity of the referTlll data entered into the PMIS system. Therefore, 

TSA requests that OIG consider this recommendation implemented and closed. 

Recommendation 3: Develop and implement a plan that provides recurrent tuining to 

DDO instrudon and BDOs. 

TSA coneun. TSA has developed and implemented a plan to provide recurrent training for 

BOO instructors and refresher training for the 800 workforce. At the same time, TSA has 

added o.ddilionaJ Online Leaming Center (OLC) requirements specificaHy foc BOOs. 

RDO Instructors: All National Training Team (NTr) instructors. including those currently 

assigned to the NlT. wiU altend an academy where they will be t8Ught and evaJuated on leaching 

techniques. Specifically. they will receive the Office of Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal 

Service Instructor Development Course. They will also receive training on the technicaJ content 

ofcowses that the NIT teaches including BOO SPOT Basic Training and BOO Refresher 

Training. They are further required to complete Train-the-Trniner (T3) training for the courses 

they will be teaching. Graduates of the NIT Academy deploy as members of the NTf for a 6-

month period during which they shadow qualified instructors and undergo a mentoring process. 

At any point in the process, instructors failing to meet standards are removed from the qualified 

list of those who can instruct BOO courses. The Office or Training and Workforce Engagement 

(OTWE) and BOAP will collabomte on providing instructors with recurrent training andlor 

guidance if curriculum content changes. 

8DOs: Refresher Training is integral to an effeclive training program because work conditions 

and policies change over time. Additional or updated training ensures that the program's 

mission continues to be accomplished effectively. ~uring calendar year (CY) 2011, 232 BOOs 

attended 12 Refresher Training classes; while in 2012, 481 SOOs attended 24 Refresher Training 

classes. SOAP has realigned NTT resources for calendar year 2013 to ensure that aU e ligible 

BDOsl complete Refresher Training by the end of Decembcr 2013. To that end, from February 

11 through March 9. 2013, NIT members conducted 12 refresher elasses for 388 BOOs from 10 

airports. In April 2013, an additional 177 BOOs will be trained during 8 refresher classes. Thus, 

by the end of April 2013, 1,278 of the approximately 2,020 eligible BOOs will have received 

refresher training. Planning is ongoing to conduct an additional 30 refresher classcs during the 

remainder orey 2013 to provide training to all eligible BOOs who have not yet received 

refresher training. TSA recognizes that ongoing training on a frequent basis is criticw to 

maintaining and enhancing skills learned during BOO SPOT Basic Training. Each year, the 

Program Office will provide a gap analysis to OTWE identifying perfonnance factors and. future 

objectives whieh OTWE will use 10 update the prior yeM's Refresher Training. The Program 

will frequently provide the updated t:raining ensuring that BOOs maintain essential skiUs. 

Additionally, to assist local airports, in January 2013, 80AP launched a series of training 

scenarios for STSMs. These scenarios help STSMs engage with their employees, assist BOOs in 

reviewing critical procedures, and apply critieal thinking as a leam. Further, OTWE will add 

five new OLC courses to the BOO learning plan during calendar year20 13, and will update two 

! BOOs are elicibie to receive Refresher Training after 4 months. 

FFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

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Department of Homeland Security 

 

4 

current OLe courses. These OLe courses focus on criticaJ skills in the areas of report writing, 

property searches, Walk the Line procedures, and Causal Conversation techniques. OTWE has 

also begun updating the SPOT Basic and SPOT Refresher Training courses, incorporating 

Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) updates, enhanced instructor notes and instructor best 

practices with an estimated completion date no later than August 2013. 

The completed and planned refresher training for BOO instructors and BOOs is comprehensive. 

11lerefore. TSA requests that DIG consider this recommendation implemented and closed. 

Recommendation 4: Develop and implement a pla n to DaJeSS BOO instructor performaDce 

in required core compe.eocl('!1 on a regular basis. 

TSA concurs. On April 2, 2009, the BDAP published B National Training Team (NTf) Guide 

for Instructors and Federal Security Directors (FSD), This training guide provided day-to-day 

operational guidance for members of the NlT. Since this guide did not address the certification 

and recertification ofinslructors, the Program will issue a new version in May 2013. It will 

include a plan to regularly assess BOO instructor perfonnWlce in core competencies. The May 

2013 Handbook will provide the following guidelines: 

• All instructors will be evaluated annually in accordance with OTWE's Quality Assurance 

(QA) and Compliance Program OSO-OIT/QACP-SOP-0512012 and must receive a QA 

evaluation with a "Meets Expectations" or bener rating. The QA assessment will be 

conducted during delivery of approved technical training courses in the program area in 

which the instructor is qualified to teach. If a QA evaluation rating below "Meets 

Expectations" is received, remediation and re-evaluation will be required. Instructors 

will be allowed a total of three anempls to achieve the "Meets Expectations" rating level. 

The third failure will result in the de-certification of the instructor and removal from the 

NIT. This is consistent with other TSA instruction programs and evaluation processes. 

• Every quarter, all instructors assigned to the NTI will be provided feedback on their 

instructional skills. For classroom instructors, the feedback will align with the 

Transportation Officer Perfonnancc System for BOOs. During a BOO Basic Training 

mission, the designated Team Lead will complete a DHS Employee Perfonnance Plan 

and Appraisal Form (EPPA) for BOOs for each instructor assigned to the mission. The 

Team Lead will provide feedback to the instructors along with a signed copy of the 

EPPA. The Team Lead will then provide a copy or the EPPA to BDAP. which BDAP 

will in turn provide to the instructor's Airport of Record (AOR). 

• For Team Leads, the feedback will align with the Lead's Employee Perfonnance 

Management Progrnm (EPMP). STSMs assigned to the NTI shall provide the BOAP 

with a copy of their current EPMP fonn. For the quarterly feedback. 8 representative of 

the BDAP will observe the STSM during an NTT mission and, using appropriate 

competencies from the EPMP. provide feedback to the STSM along with a signed copy 

of the EPMP. The EPMP wiU also be provided to the STSM's AOR These processes 

are consistent with how employees are evaluated when they are part of TSA National 

Deployment Force. 

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FFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

5 

TSA has developed and implemented a plan to assess BOO instructor performance. Therefore, 

TSA requests that OIG consider this recommendation implemented and closed. 

Recommendation S: Monitol'" Ilnd track the use of nOD~S POT related duties to tAIUN: 

BDOs are used in • cost-effective manner and in accordance with the mission of the SPOT 

program. 

TSA concurs. The Program is working on two major initiatives aimed at monitoring and 

tracking the use of BOOs to ensure that they are used in a cost-effective manner and in 

accordance with the mission of the SPOT program. These initiatives take into account that FSDs 

must retain the discretion 10 employ BDOs to meet a specific security threat or need. The 

initiatives are as foUows: 

BDO Efficiency and Accountability Merrks (BEAM) Dalabase: BEAM provides airport 

management and TSA with a standll1dized tool to track and analyze BOO daily operational data, 

including BOO locations and time spent performing duties. The system streamlines the current 

methods of collecting this data. which varies by each airport. More accurate and complete data 

will allow for increased standardization of the program and improved analysis of the use of the 

behavior detection capability at airports nationwide. In October 2012, TSA began evaluating the 

tool at select airpOrts refining the system requirements. In May 2013, the Program begins a 

nationwide rollout of BEAM, which will include further pilots. incorporation ofupdatesllessons 

learned. and procedures mandating airports' use of the system. 

BEAM data will be closely monitored by BDAP providing information that was previously not 

readily available on use of BDOs. Using data from BEAM. TSA will analyze how to deploy 

BOO assets as part of the larger TSA security system. including, but not limited to, whether 

BOO deployment is maximized for operational effectiveness during peak travel times. Through 

8ll8lySls, the Program will gain insight to how BOOs are being regularly utilized, specifically 

how often they are performing duties outside of the scope of SPOT duties. The Program will 

work with other parts ofOSO to conduct a cost-benefit analysis on whether these duties provide 

a meaningful addition to TSA's security system and are best carried out by a BOO. The Program 

will regularly report findings to FSDs, Regional Directors (RD), and other OSO leadership, as 

appropriate and needed. 

Program Compliance Assessment Vuhs: ]n 2012, BDAP created the Program Compliance 

Assessment (PCA) team to assess compliance with the SPOT SOP through observation and 

participation in each airport's operation. In addition to SOP compliance, PeAs identify how 

airports are using BOOs via site visits and then validate these observations through BEAM. 

In light of this comprehensive monitoring and tracking plan through BEAM and PCA visits, 

TSA requests that OIG consider this recommendation implemented and closed. 

Recommendation 6: Develop and impl m~Dt a proccss for idcntifying aDd addressing 

issues that may directly affect the success of the SPOT program such ai, tbe sclection, 

allocation and performance of BOOs. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 26 OIG-13-91
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

 

6 

TSA CODeUn. TSA has developed and implemented the following processes for BOOs and 

STSMs to provide feedback, suggestions and concems to SOAP: 

• TSA IdeaFaciory: On April2S, 2007, TSA launched the JdeaFactory, a Web-based tool 

that gives more than 50,000 field and headquarters personnel, including BOOs, a voice to 

communicate improvement ideas. IdeaFactory empowers TSA employees to develop. 

promote, and improve innovative ideas for programs, processes, and technologies without 

being mtered through the entire TSA community. Pwticipants submit ideas, provide 

comments on how to improve new concepts, and endorse ideas, which they believe. 

should be recommended for implementation. 

• BDO Discussion Board Blog: All SODs have access to the SPOT iShare site, which 

includes a discussion board or Blog where they can provide ideas and thoughts. 

• Hi-Weekly Best Practices Conference Calls: In November 2012, SOAP began biweekly conference calls with airports providing them with an opportunity to exchange 

best practices, raise concerns, and reinforce key programmatic procedures and policies. 

• SPOT Mailbox: BOAP operates an email box for all BOOs to ask questions, make 

observations or solicit clW'ificlltion on policies and procedures. The email box provides 

BOOs and STSM with an avenue to clarify policy, recommend new initiatives, and 

acknowledge BOOs' work.. The Program aims 10 respond to each email within one week 

and also provides a weekly summtU')' of all policy and procedures questions Md answers 

to all STSMs. This information is shared with employees through airport Shift Briefs. 

• Best Practices iSbare Site: In January 2013, TSA launched a Best Practices iShare site, 

which builds upon the success of the biweekly best practices conference calls. At 

I! airports nationwide, FSDs, SPOT Coordinators" Managers, and BOOs have put 

innovation to work by creating tools that improve their operations. The goal of this site is 

to tum local good ideas into national best practices. 

• Bi-Weekly Sbift Brief: BOAP provides a Shift BrieflO STSMs highlighting BOO work, 

including incidents that demonstrate adherence to proper procedures and effective 

outcomes, including, but not limited to, law enforcement intervention. 1be Brief also 

discusses new initiatives and provides exercises and talking points for Managers on 

critical topics. 

• Weekly Frequently Alked Questioru: Frequently Asked Questions are sent out to 

BOO Managers each week via the distribution list summW'izing procedural questions 

posed to BDAP over the previous week. 

• WeekJy Dashboa rd : A weekly dashboard is provided to FSDs and field leadership, 

which captures operational metrics from the previous week and includes updates on 

programmatic initiatives. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 27 OIG-13-91
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

 

7 

• M onthly Pmg.-am Calls: Monthly calls are conducted to provide FSDs, SPOT 

Coordinators. and STSMs with updates and notification of upcoming initiatives and 

changes. 

• PCA Visits: PCA methodology will serve as a process for identifying and addressing 

issues that may directly affect the success of the SPOT program. Under the PCA 

Program. peA Teams comprised ofhigh perfonning. speciatly·l'mincd BOOs will 

observe and assess SPOT operations at airport.!! on an annual basis, with the goal of 

promoting the consistent application of SPOT policies and procedures. The PCA 

Assessments will produce objoctive, quantitative data that will facilitate the analysis., 

identification. and tracking of operational issues and deficiencies that may require further 

exploration and, potentiaUy, corrective action. Following peA visits.. airports wilJ 

receive a structured report that analyzes tbe results oflhe PCA Team's observations and 

identifies any required remediation plans. Additionally. these reports will be available to 

RDs, OSO Division Directors. the 080 Assistant Administrator and others. as necessary. 

The peAs will a.Jso serve as 80 additionaJ mechanism for BOOs and STSMs to provide 

the BOAP feedback and obtain guidance on SPOT policies and procedures. In the future, 

BOAP anticipates that airports wiU self-assess using the PCA criteria which will not only 

standardize and improve the quality of self-evaluations, but also further enhance BDAP's 

and. airports' ability to identify issues that may affect the success of the SPOT program. 

These efforts and others, including adding an annual BDO survey will be captured in a BOO 

Communication Plan to be completed within the next 90 days. As pan ofTSA's process of 

u.fXIating its strategic plan for the SPOT program. TSA wilt review current selection, allocation, 

and perfonnance criteria to delennine if changes are warranted. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 28 OIG-13-91
 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix C 

SPOT Referral Process 

Establish environmental baseline 

Assess behavior cues and 

appearance factors 

Perform Walk the Line 

Immediate LEO 

notification required? 

Is individual exhibiting 

SPOT behaviors 

entering screening 

process? 

Select the individual for SPOT 

referral screening 

Does the individual 

meet the criteria for 

LEO notification? 

Notify LEO 

SPOT referral 

Complete referral report 

No 

Yes 

No 

Yes 

No No 

Yes 

Yes 

Allow individual to proceed 

LEO referral 

Complete incident report 

Complete referral report 

Complete TISS database entry 

See Note 1 

See Note 2 

Source: TSA 

Note 1: BDOs initiate brief verbal exchanges with passengers waiting in line, while observing passengers’ 


behaviors. 


Note 2: The SPOT program assigns point values to specific passenger behaviors and appearances. 


Passengers exhibiting behaviors that exceed the SPOT numerical threshold 
 are referred for 

SPOT referral screening. The SPOT referral screening includes a search of the passenger, the passenger’s 

personal property, and a review of the passenger’s identification and travel documents. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 29 OIG-13-91 
ERAL PECTOR GEN

y 

S OFFICE OF IN

Department of Homeland Securit

Appendix D SPOT Situational Report (SitRep) Dashboard – All Airports 

Source: TSA Note: The information reported in TSA’s Dashboard may be inaccurate and incomplete because of errors identified in 

the PMIS data. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 30 OIG-13-91 
 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix E
 

GAO Status of SPOT Recommendations (as of 4/10/2013)
 

(Source: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-763, GAO official website) 

Efforts Validate TSA's Passenger Screening Behavior Detection Program Underway, but 

Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Validation and Address Operational Challenges, 

GAO-10-763, May 20, 2010 

Recommendation: To help ensure that SPOT is based on valid scientific principles that 

can be effectively applied in an airport environment, the Secretary of Homeland Security 

should convene an independent panel of experts to review the methodology of the DHS 

Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate study on the SPOT program to determine 

whether the study's methodology is sufficiently comprehensive to validate the SPOT 

program. This assessment should include appropriate input from other federal agencies 

with expertise in behavior detection and relevant subject matter experts. Status: 

Closed – Implemented 

Recommendation: If research determines that the SPOT program has a scientifically 

validated basis for using behavior detection for counterterrorism purposes in the airport 

environment, then the TSA Administrator should conduct a comprehensive risk 

assessment to include threat, vulnerability, and consequence of airports nationwide to 

determine the effective deployment of SPOT if TSA's ongoing Aviation Modal Risk 

Assessment lacks this information. Status: Open 

Recommendation: If research determines that the SPOT program has a scientifically 

validated basis for using behavior detection for counterterrorism purposes in the airport 

environment, then the TSA Administrator should perform a cost-benefit analysis of the 

SPOT program, including a comparison of the SPOT program with other security 

screening programs, such as random screening, or already existing security measures. 

Status: Open 

Recommendation: If research determines that the SPOT program has a scientifically 

validated basis for using behavior detection for counterterrorism purposes in the airport 

environment, then the TSA Administrator should revise and implement the SPOT 

strategic plan by incorporating risk assessment information, identifying cost and 

resources, linking it to other related TSA strategic documents, describing how SPOT is 

integrated and implemented with TSA's other layers of aviation security, and providing 

guidance on how to effectively link the roles, responsibilities, and capabilities of federal, 

state, and local officials providing program support. Status: Open 

www.oig.dhs.gov 31 OIG-13-91 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Recommendation: If research determines that the SPOT program has a scientifically 

validated basis for using behavior detection for counterterrorism purposes in the airport 

environment, then the TSA Administrator should study the feasibility of using airport 

checkpoint-surveillance video recordings of individuals transiting checkpoints who were 

later charged with or pleaded guilty to terrorism-related offenses to enhance 

understanding of terrorist behaviors in the airport checkpoint environment. Status: 

Closed – Implemented 

Recommendation: Concurrent with the DHS S&T Directorate study of SPOT, and an 

independent panel assessment of the soundness of the methodology of the S&T study, 

to ensure the program's effective implementation, and to provide additional assurance 

that TSA utilizes available resources to support the goals of deterring, detecting, and 

preventing security threats to the aviation system, the TSA Administrator should provide 

guidance in the SPOT Standard Operating Procedures or other TSA directive to Behavior 

Detection Officers (BDOs), or other TSA personnel, on inputting data into the 

Transportation Information Sharing System and set milestones and a time frame for 

deploying Transportation Information Sharing System access to SPOT airports so that 

TSA and intelligence community entities have information from all SPOT Law 

Enforcement Officer (LEO) referrals readily available to assist in "connecting the dots" 

and identifying potential terror plots. Status: Closed – Implemented 

Recommendation: Concurrent with the DHS S&T Directorate study of SPOT, and an 

independent panel assessment of the soundness of the methodology of the S&T study, 

to ensure the program's effective implementation, and to provide additional assurance 

that TSA utilizes available resources to support the goals of deterring, detecting, and 

preventing security threats to the aviation system, the TSA Administrator should 

implement the steps called for in the TSA Office of Security Operations Business plan to 

develop a standardized process for allowing BDOs or other designated airport officials to 

send information to TSA's Transportation Security Operations Center about passengers 

whose behavior indicates that they may pose a threat to security, and provide guidance 

on how designated TSA officials are to receive information back from the 

Transportation Security Operations Center. Status: Closed – Implemented 

Recommendation: Concurrent with the DHS S&T Directorate study of SPOT, and an 

independent panel assessment of the soundness of the methodology of the S&T study, 

to ensure the program's effective implementation, and to provide additional assurance 

that TSA utilizes available resources to support the goals of deterring, detecting, and 

preventing security threats to the aviation system, the TSA Administrator should direct 

the TSA Transportation Security Operations Center to utilize all of the law enforcement 

and intelligence databases available to it when running passenger names, for 

passengers who have risen to the level of a LEO referral. Status: Closed – Implemented 

www.oig.dhs.gov 32 OIG-13-91 
 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Recommendation: Concurrent with the DHS S&T Directorate study of SPOT, and an 

independent panel assessment of the soundness of the methodology of the S&T study, 

to ensure the program's effective implementation, and to better measure the 

effectiveness of the program and evaluate the performance of BDOs, the TSA 

Administrator should establish a plan that includes objectives, milestones, and time 

frames to develop outcome-oriented performance measures to help refine the current 

methods used by Behavior Detection Officers for identifying individuals who may pose a 

risk to the aviation system. Status: Closed – Implemented 

Recommendation: Concurrent with the DHS S&T Directorate study of SPOT, and an 

independent panel assessment of the soundness of the methodology of the S&T study, 

to ensure the program's effective implementation, and to better measure the 

effectiveness of the program and evaluate the performance of BDOs, the TSA 

Administrator should establish controls to help ensure completeness, accuracy, 

authorization, and validity of data collected during SPOT screening. Status: Closed – 

Implemented 

Recommendation: Concurrent with the DHS S&T Directorate study of SPOT, and an 

independent panel assessment of the soundness of the methodology of the S&T study, 

to ensure the program's effective implementation, and to help ensure that TSA provides 

BDOs with the knowledge and skills needed to perform their duties, the TSA 

Administrator should establish time frames and milestones for its plan to systematically 

conduct evaluations of the SPOT training program on a periodic basis. Status: Closed – 

Implemented 

www.oig.dhs.gov 33 OIG-13-91 
 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix F 

Training Task Analysis for SPOT Program – Executive Summary 

www.oig.dhs.gov 34 OIG-13-91 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

 

SENSITIVESECURlTY INFORMATION 

Training Task Analysis for Ihe Screening of Passengers hy Observalion Techniques (SPOT) 

1. Executive Summary 

Following the results of the previously submitted Job Task Analysis (ITA) and Difficulty, Importance, 

and Frequency (DIF) Analysis, the current sequel to the Transportation Security Administration 's (TSA) 

Screening of Passengers by Observation Technique (SPO]) Program's effort at improving and upcL'lting 

the current training of Behavior Detection Officers (800) has included expert insights of national trainers 

and Subject Maller Experts (SwlE) during two workshops that took place in FebnJary and March, 2011. 

The SMEs were involved in the functional and hi erarchi cal analyses of the JTA tasks as pan of an overall 

task validati on effort . 

The results of the validation process and hierarchical and functional analyses a) identified the trainable 

tasks from the original 110 ITA tasks, bringing the total to 63 trainable tasks; b) grouped the trainable 

tasks into five categori es; and c) identifi ed a sali ent group of communicati on tasks with three 

subcategori es of communi cation types, depending on the pUl1)Ose and target of communication. 

With the results of the vari ous analyses thai collected direct input from nati onal SPOT SMEs and TSA 

national trainers, the need for a maj or overhaul of the entire SPOT Program training is evi dent. It is 

necessary to ensure that the training is current and relevant to emerging threats, both in tenns of its 

content as well as in terms of context; that is, the focus of the training delivery system should be shifted to 

exchange, interaction, and facilitation modes rather than the lecture-based foumbtional infonnation. 

Since May 2011, TSA has rolled out an interim training program that addresses some of the deficiencies 

of its prior training program. As a result, all tasks currently ha ve some degree of coverage in the training 

materials, which is a signifi cant improvement over the previous version. From the 63 tasks, 37 (59%) of 

the tasks were not covered in training matclials pri or to the rol1-out of the Interim Basic Training. 

The following calculation of the combinations of behavior, stress, and deception fa ctors illustrates the 

complexity of the BOO's observation tasks. The officers are trained to look for behavioral cl usters. By the 

time BOOs make a decision to call a Law Enforcement Officer (LEO), they may encounter any of 63,321 

possibl e combinations offactors, yielding the threshold value of~ prior to making any 

decision, a BDO may encounter l SI combinations offactors that~and 941 combinati ons of 

factors yielding The which calls for SPOT RefelTal but does not involve an LEO 

notification, can be any of 19,079 combinations offa ctors. 

Newly identifi ed tasks and groups of tasks have emerged as a result of the Job Task Analysis and 

subsequent reviews during the current Training Task Analysis (TT A) effort. In addition, a new subset of 

tasks has been identified that fa lls under the umbrella of communication tasks and comprises 33 tasks 

(52%). That subset is not addressed in the current training as a separate group of communicati on tasks. 

Within just the past year, the SPOT program has undergone dynami c changes. In spite of this, th e 

program needs to be fUl1her refined and aligned with the findings, as discussed in Seclion 6. 

WARNING: This record cCN1\ains Sensitive Security inf(KlT1aliOll that is controlled under 49 CfR parts 15 and 1520. No part of this record may 

be disclosrd to ptrsons without a ·'need 10 know'·. as ddined in 49 CFR parts 15 and 1520. excc"t wilh the written permissiCN1 of the 

Aoininistnl1or of th e Transportation Security A~niniSl.rntion. Of the SecrcllllY ofTransportatiCN1. Unauthorized rel ease may result in civil penalty 

or other action. For U.S. Government agencies. public disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and4!> CFR parts 15 and t520 . Page Page 5 

www.oig.dhs.gov 35 OIG-13-91
 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix G 

Major Contributors to This Report 

Donald Bumgardner, Director 

Robert Greene, Audit Manager 

Edwin Soto, Auditor-in-Charge 

Jacque Bear, Program Analyst 

Priscilla Cast, Program Analyst 

Melissa Estrella, Program Analyst 

Tia Jackson, Program Analyst 

Kevin Dolloson, Communications Analyst 

Katrina Bynes, Independent Referencer 

www.oig.dhs.gov 36 OIG-13-91 
 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix H 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

Acting Chief Privacy Officer 

Transportation Security Administration 

Administrator 

Transportation Security Administration Audit Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, House Committee on Homeland Security 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate 

www.oig.dhs.gov 37 OIG-13-91 
 

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