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[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4499 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 4499

To establish an interagency COVID-19 misinformation and disinformation 
                  task force, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             August 6, 2020

 Mr. Peters (for himself, Ms. Klobuchar, and Mr. Reed) introduced the 
 following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on 
               Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To establish an interagency COVID-19 misinformation and disinformation 
                  task force, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``COVID-19 Misinformation and 
Disinformation Task Force Act of 2020''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) People in the United States rely on information from 
        mass media, social media, and digital media to make decisions 
        about all aspects of social and economic life.
            (2) Ensuring that people in the United States are provided 
        accurate information to make informed decisions during a public 
        health crisis is of the utmost importance.
            (3) In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, people in the 
        United States are spending more time online than ever before 
        and this increase has been coupled with a rise of 
        misinformation that impacts the daily lives of people in the 
        United States, including misinformation about the virus, public 
        health, our democracy, and the government's response.
            (4) Globally, the proliferation of inaccurate health 
        information surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic has led the World 
        Health Organization to label this problem an ``infodemic''.
            (5) In addition to health-related misinformation, 
        intelligence officials and diplomats of the United States have 
        warned that China and Russia are exploiting this global crisis 
        to wage disinformation campaigns that seek to sow doubts about 
        the United States response to the crisis, undermine faith and 
        trust in United States Government institutions, and deflect 
        attention from China and Russia's inability to adequately and 
        transparently respond to issues associated with the pandemic.
            (6) In February 2020, Assistant Secretary of State Philip 
        Reeker warned, ``Russia's intent is to sow discord and 
        undermine U.S. institutions and alliances from within, 
        including through covert and coercive malign influence 
        campaigns. By spreading disinformation about the coronavirus, 
        Russian malign actors are once again choosing to threaten 
        public safety by distracting from the global health 
        response.''.
            (7) One prominent incident occurred in March when text 
        messages sent to people in the United States and amplified on 
        social media posts falsely claimed the Federal Government would 
        lock down the entire country due to the pandemic. Intelligence 
        officials of the United States reportedly assessed that Chinese 
        operatives helped amplify the false messages. The prolific 
        nature of this disinformation campaign required the National 
        Security Council to issue a denial.
            (8) In May 2020, the Global Engagement Center of the 
        Department of State assessed that China was coordinating with 
        Russia to manipulate social media platforms to spread 
        disinformation about the pandemic.
            (9) In July 2020, a newly declassified United States 
        intelligence assessment concluded that Russian intelligence 
        agencies and actors are spreading disinformation related to the 
        pandemic and United States officials reported that from late 
        May to early July, approximately 150 articles on the pandemic 
        were published as a result of such efforts.
            (10) Since the beginning of the pandemic, American social 
        media companies have banned hundreds of user accounts linked to 
        coordinated influence operations by Russia, China, and Iran, 
        which were engaged in ``coordinated political issues'' related 
        to the coronavirus.
            (11) European Union officials have also warned about 
        disinformation from China and Russia aimed at dividing European 
        society, undermining the public perception about the European 
        Union's response to the pandemic, all while misleading and 
        bolstering the public perception regarding China and Russia's 
        response to the pandemic.
            (12) The bipartisan report of the Cyberspace Solarium 
        Commission concluded that--
                    (A) the United States Government should promote 
                digital literacy, civics education, and public 
                awareness to build societal resilience to foreign 
                malign cyber-enabled information operations; and
                    (B) a sustainable solution to fighting 
                misinformation and disinformation will require 
                equipping people in the United States with the media 
                and digital literacy necessary to recognize 
                untrustworthy online content.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

     It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) in the face of this threat, it is vital that the United 
        States has a coordinated understanding and response to fighting 
        misinformation and disinformation surrounding COVID-19;
            (2) in order to protect the health and well-being of people 
        in the United States and protect the democracy and government 
        of the United States from foreign interference, it is essential 
        that the United States have a whole-of-government approach to 
        responding and combating the spread of misinformation and the 
        sowing of disinformation related to COVID-19;
            (3) information literacy, including media and digital 
        literacy, are essential to protecting the national security of 
        the United States from a new form of warfare, disinformation 
        campaigns; and
            (4) only by improving information literacy, including media 
        and digital literacy, among people in the United States can 
        Congress work to strengthen the resilience of the people of the 
        United States against these attacks and by extension improve 
        our national security and protect the integrity of our 
        democratic institutions.

SEC. 4. COVID-19 MISINFORMATION AND DISINFORMATION COORDINATION TASK 
              FORCE.

    (a) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Agency.--The term ``Agency'' means the Cybersecurity 
        and Infrastructure Security Agency of the Department of 
        Homeland Security.
            (2) COVID-19 misinformation and disinformation.--The term 
        ``COVID-19 misinformation and disinformation'' means publicly 
        available COVID-19 related information, independent of the 
        origin of the information, that is inconsistent with--
                    (A) information regarding official government 
                actions related to COVID-19;
                    (B) official government information regarding how 
                to acquire COVID-19 testing; or
                    (C) other official government health guidelines 
                related to COVID-19.
            (3) Director.--The term ``Director'' means the Director of 
        the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.
            (4) Information literacy.--The term ``information 
        literacy'', which includes digital literacy and media literacy, 
        means having skills in--
                    (A) research and information fluency, which 
                includes the ability to find, retrieve, and interpret 
                information and evaluate the comprehensiveness, 
                relevance, credibility, authority, and accuracy of 
                information;
                    (B) critical thinking and problem solving;
                    (C) technology and digital tool operations and 
                concepts;
                    (D) concepts of representation and stereotyping;
                    (E) understanding explicit and implicit messages;
                    (F) understanding values and points of view that 
                are included and excluded in content;
                    (G) understanding how content may influence ideas 
                and behaviors;
                    (H) understanding the importance of obtaining 
                information from multiple sources and evaluating 
                sources for quality;
                    (I) understanding how information on digital 
                platforms can be altered through algorithms, editing, 
                and augmented reality;
                    (J) using and creating media in civically and 
                socially responsible ways;
                    (K) reflecting on how the use of media and 
                technology may affect private and public life;
                    (L) making educated decisions based on information 
                obtained from sources and content; and
                    (M) applying subparagraphs (A) through (L) across 
                various content, including to spoken and broadcast 
                words and videos, printed materials, media, digital 
                content, data, and images.
            (5) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
        community'' means an element of the intelligence community 
        specified or designated under section 3(4) of the National 
        Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).
            (6) Relevant congressional committees.--The term ``relevant 
        congressional committees'' means any Committee of Congress with 
        jurisdiction over the agencies represented on the task force.
            (7) Task force.--The term ``task force'' means the 
        interagency COVID-19 misinformation and disinformation 
        coordination task force established under subsection (b).
    (b) Establishment.--There is established a Federal interagency 
COVID-19 misinformation and disinformation coordination task force, 
which shall be led by the Director, or by the designee of the Director.
    (c) Representatives.--
            (1) In general.--The task force shall be comprised of not 
        less than 1 representative from each of the following:
                    (A) The Agency.
                    (B) The Global Engagement Center of the Department 
                of State.
                    (C) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
                    (D) The intelligence community.
                    (E) The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
                    (F) The Federal Emergency Management Agency.
                    (G) The Department of Health and Human Services.
                    (H) The National Institutes of Health.
                    (I) The Food and Drug Administration.
                    (J) The Department of the Treasury.
                    (K) The Small Business Administration.
                    (L) The Federal Trade Commission.
                    (M) The Department of Education.
                    (N) The Federal Communications Commission.
                    (O) Not less than 1 agency, such as the Office of 
                Minority Health or the Office of Rural Health Policy of 
                the Department of Health and Human Services or the 
                Office of Equal Rights of the Federal Emergency 
                Management Agency, that regularly engages with--
                            (i) racial or ethnic minority communities;
                            (ii) rural communities; and
                            (iii) other underserved populations, 
                        including communities without widespread access 
                        to the internet.
                    (P) Any other department or agency as determined 
                necessary by the Director.
            (2) Representation of underserved communities.--The task 
        force membership requirement described in paragraph (1)(O) 
        shall be satisfied by multiple agencies if there is not 1 
        agency that regularly engages all 3 communities described in 
        clauses (i) through (iii) of such paragraph.
    (d) Roles and Responsibilities.--The functions of the task force 
shall be--
            (1) coordinating the analysis of COVID-19 misinformation 
        and disinformation by agencies across the Federal Government;
            (2) developing integrated analyses of COVID-19 
        misinformation and disinformation in a manner that protects 
        individual privacy and civil liberties, using information from 
        agency representatives described in subsection (c) in 
        accordance with subsections (e) and (f);
            (3) coordinating the dissemination to Federal agencies and 
        the White House Coronavirus Task Force, or any successor 
        thereto, of--
                    (A) analyses developed by individual agencies in 
                accordance with paragraph (1); and
                    (B) integrated analyses developed in accordance 
                with paragraph (2); and
            (4) developing, in consultation with the Director of the 
        Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Secretary of 
        Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Education, the 
        Director of the Institute of Museum and Library Services, and 
        any non-governmental civil society, privacy, media-literacy, or 
        other public interest entity determined appropriate by the 
        Director, or a designee, and disseminating information 
        literacy, including digital literacy and media literacy, and 
        information resilience public awareness campaigns relating to 
        pandemics.
    (e) Authorities.--
            (1) In general.--
                    (A) Limitation on additional authority.--The task 
                force shall have no additional authority to scan, 
                collect, or otherwise use social media or other 
                publicly available information in excess of any 
                authority of each participating agency in effect on the 
                day before the date of enactment of this Act.
                    (B) Requirement.--The task force shall ensure that 
                any actions taken pursuant to this section are 
                consistent with other applicable limitations, including 
                applicable limitations on the collection, retention, 
                dissemination, and processing of intelligence, under 
                Federal law, including court orders and Executive 
                orders, and any relevant agency guidelines or 
                procedures.
                    (C) Activities.--The task force shall ensure that 
                activities undertaken pursuant to this section are 
                conducted consistent with protections under the 
                Constitution of the United States.
                    (D) Prohibition.--The task force may not directly 
                collect information or maintain information about a 
                United States person solely for the purpose of 
                monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment 
                of the Constitution or the lawful exercise of other 
                rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the 
                United States.
            (2) Specific agency authority.--The authority of a specific 
        agency represented on the task force shall supersede the 
        authority of the task force.
    (f) Narrow Tailoring; Documentation of Purpose.--The task force 
shall--
            (1) ensure that the activities of the task force advance a 
        compelling Government interest related to COVID-19 
        misinformation and disinformation;
            (2) ensure that the activities of the task force are 
        narrowly tailored to advance that interest while minimizing 
        impacts on speech and expression that is not COVID-19 
        misinformation and disinformation; and
            (3) create procedures and internal policies that document 
        the implications of this subsection.
    (g) Participation.--
            (1) In general.--The head of each agency represented on the 
        task force and each representative participating in the task 
        force under subsection (c) shall assist and provide information 
        and analysis to the task force, consistent with applicable law 
        and the respective authority of the agency, as may be necessary 
        to carry out the functions of the task force.
            (2) Expenses.--Each agency represented on the task force 
        shall be responsible for the expenses of the agency in 
        participating on the task force.
    (h) Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight.--The Privacy Officer of 
the Department of Homeland Security and the Officer for Civil Rights 
and Civil Liberties of the Department of Homeland Security, in 
consultation with the Privacy Officer of the Agency, shall ensure the 
activities of the task force protect individual privacy and civil 
liberties and are conducted consistent with fair information practice 
principles and civil liberties protection guidance.
    (i) Congressional Briefings.--Not later than 30 days after the date 
on which the task force first convenes, and every 30 days thereafter 
until the date described in subsection (l), the Director shall provide 
to the relevant congressional committees--
            (1) a briefing on the privacy and civil liberties oversight 
        performed under subsection (h);
            (2) a copy of the procedures and internal processes created 
        under subsection (f)(3); and
            (3) a briefing, to the greatest extent practicable in an 
        unclassified form, on the analyses developed by the task force 
        under subsection (d)(2).
    (j) Public Report.--Not less than 60 days after the date on which 
the task force first convenes, and every 30 days after until the date 
described in subsection (l), the Director shall publish on a publicly 
accessible website a report summarizing the analyses developed by the 
task force under subsection (d)(2), including--
            (1) analysis methodologies;
            (2) data utilized in the analysis, including any specific 
        examples that can be made public;
            (3) analysis results;
            (4) analysis conclusions; and
            (5) any other information determined necessary by the 
        Director.
    (k) Requirement.--Not later than 30 days after the date of 
enactment of this Act, the Director shall establish and convene the 
task force.
    (l) Sunset.--This section shall cease to have effect on the later 
of--
            (1) the date that is 1 year after the date of enactment of 
        this Act; or
            (2) the date that is 60 days after the date on which the 
        national emergency declared by the President under the National 
        Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) with respect to COVID-
        19 terminates.

SEC. 5. COORDINATED MESSAGING.

    (a) Public Communications Requirement.--Any public communications 
by an agency participating in the task force established under section 
4(b) related to the analysis coordinated or performed by the task force 
shall be disseminated directly to the public, including through the use 
of--
            (1) coronavirus.gov, or any successor thereto; and
            (2) mechanisms to be determined by the Agency that 
        specifically focus on ethnic and racial minority, rural, and 
        other underserved populations, including communities without 
        widespread internet access, including local news organizations, 
        local radio organizations, and other non-digital media 
        organizations.
    (b) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to limit the authorities for communication and open exchange 
of data, findings, and information resulting from scientific research, 
analysis, or other types of scientific and technical activities 
conducted by Federal employees or contractors that are in effect on the 
day before the date of enactment of this Act.
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