II 

116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 4499 

To establish an interagency COVID–19 misinformation and disinformation 

task force, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

AUGUST 6, 2020 

Mr. PETERS (for himself, Ms. KLOBUCHAR, and Mr. REED) introduced the 

following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

A BILL 

To establish an interagency COVID–19 misinformation and 

disinformation task force, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘COVID–19 Misin5 formation and Disinformation Task Force Act of 2020’’. 

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

7 Congress finds the following: 

8 (1) People in the United States rely on infor9 mation from mass media, social media, and digital 


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1 media to make decisions about all aspects of social 

2 and economic life. 

3 (2) Ensuring that people in the United States 

4 are provided accurate information to make informed 

5 decisions during a public health crisis is of the ut6 most importance. 

7 (3) In the midst of the COVID–19 pandemic, 

8 people in the United States are spending more time 

9 online than ever before and this increase has been 

10 coupled with a rise of misinformation that impacts 

11 the daily lives of people in the United States, includ12 ing misinformation about the virus, public health, 

13 our democracy, and the government’s response. 

14 (4) Globally, the proliferation of inaccurate 

15 health information surrounding the COVID–19 pan16 demic has led the World Health Organization to 

17 label this problem an ‘‘infodemic’’. 

18 (5) In addition to health-related misinforma19 tion, intelligence officials and diplomats of the 

20 United States have warned that China and Russia 

21 are exploiting this global crisis to wage 

22 disinformation campaigns that seek to sow doubts 

23 about the United States response to the crisis, un24 dermine faith and trust in United States Govern25 ment institutions, and deflect attention from China 


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1 and Russia’s inability to adequately and trans2 parently respond to issues associated with the pan3 demic. 

4 (6) In February 2020, Assistant Secretary of 

5 State Philip Reeker warned, ‘‘Russia’s intent is to 

6 sow discord and undermine U.S. institutions and al7 liances from within, including through covert and co8 ercive malign influence campaigns. By spreading 

9 disinformation about the coronavirus, Russian ma10 lign actors are once again choosing to threaten pub11 lic safety by distracting from the global health re12 sponse.’’. 

13 (7) One prominent incident occurred in March 

14 when text messages sent to people in the United 

15 States and amplified on social media posts falsely 

16 claimed the Federal Government would lock down 

17 the entire country due to the pandemic. Intelligence 

18 officials of the United States reportedly assessed 

19 that Chinese operatives helped amplify the false 

20 messages. The prolific nature of this disinformation 

21 campaign required the National Security Council to 

22 issue a denial. 

23 (8) In May 2020, the Global Engagement Cen24 ter of the Department of State assessed that China 

25 was coordinating with Russia to manipulate social 


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1 media platforms to spread disinformation about the 

2 pandemic. 

3 (9) In July 2020, a newly declassified United 

4 States intelligence assessment concluded that Rus5 sian intelligence agencies and actors are spreading 

6 disinformation related to the pandemic and United 

7 States officials reported that from late May to early 

8 July, approximately 150 articles on the pandemic 

9 were published as a result of such efforts. 

10 (10) Since the beginning of the pandemic, 

11 American social media companies have banned hun12 dreds of user accounts linked to coordinated influ13 ence operations by Russia, China, and Iran, which 

14 were engaged in ‘‘coordinated political issues’’ re15 lated to the coronavirus. 

16 (11) European Union officials have also warned 

17 about disinformation from China and Russia aimed 

18 at dividing European society, undermining the public 

19 perception about the European Union’s response to 

20 the pandemic, all while misleading and bolstering the 

21 public perception regarding China and Russia’s re22 sponse to the pandemic. 

23 (12) The bipartisan report of the Cyberspace 

24 Solarium Commission concluded that— 


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1 (A) the United States Government should 

2 promote digital literacy, civics education, and 

3 public awareness to build societal resilience to 

4 foreign malign cyber-enabled information oper5 ations; and 

6 (B) a sustainable solution to fighting mis7 information and disinformation will require 

8 equipping people in the United States with the 

9 media and digital literacy necessary to recog10 nize untrustworthy online content. 

11 SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

12 It is the sense of Congress that— 

13 (1) in the face of this threat, it is vital that the 

14 United States has a coordinated understanding and 

15 response to fighting misinformation and 

16 disinformation surrounding COVID–19; 

17 (2) in order to protect the health and well-being 

18 of people in the United States and protect the de19 mocracy and government of the United States from 

20 foreign interference, it is essential that the United 

21 States have a whole-of-government approach to re22 sponding and combating the spread of misinforma23 tion and the sowing of disinformation related to 

24 COVID–19; 


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1 (3) information literacy, including media and 

2 digital literacy, are essential to protecting the na3 tional security of the United States from a new form 

4 of warfare, disinformation campaigns; and 

5 (4) only by improving information literacy, in6 cluding media and digital literacy, among people in 

7 the United States can Congress work to strengthen 

8 the resilience of the people of the United States 

9 against these attacks and by extension improve our 

10 national security and protect the integrity of our 

11 democratic institutions. 

12 SEC. 4. COVID–19 MISINFORMATION AND DISINFORMATION 

13 COORDINATION TASK FORCE. 

14 (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

15 (1) AGENCY.—The term ‘‘Agency’’ means the 

16 Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency of 

17 the Department of Homeland Security. 

18 (2) COVID–19 MISINFORMATION AND

19 DISINFORMATION.—The term ‘‘COVID–19 misin20 formation and disinformation’’ means publicly avail21 able COVID–19 related information, independent of 

22 the origin of the information, that is inconsistent 

23 with— 

24 (A) information regarding official govern25 ment actions related to COVID–19; 


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1 (B) official government information re2 garding how to acquire COVID–19 testing; or 

3 (C) other official government health guide4 lines related to COVID–19. 

5 (3) DIRECTOR.—The term ‘‘Director’’ means 

6 the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 

7 Security Agency. 

8 (4) INFORMATION LITERACY.—The term ‘‘infor9 mation literacy’’, which includes digital literacy and 

10 media literacy, means having skills in— 

11 (A) research and information fluency, 

12 which includes the ability to find, retrieve, and 

13 interpret information and evaluate the com14 prehensiveness, relevance, credibility, authority, 

15 and accuracy of information; 

16 (B) critical thinking and problem solving; 

17 (C) technology and digital tool operations 

18 and concepts; 

19 (D) concepts of representation and stereo20 typing; 

21 (E) understanding explicit and implicit 

22 messages; 

23 (F) understanding values and points of 

24 view that are included and excluded in content; 


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1 (G) understanding how content may influ2 ence ideas and behaviors; 

3 (H) understanding the importance of ob4 taining information from multiple sources and 

5 evaluating sources for quality; 

6 (I) understanding how information on dig7 ital platforms can be altered through algo8 rithms, editing, and augmented reality; 

9 (J) using and creating media in civically 

10 and socially responsible ways; 

11 (K) reflecting on how the use of media and 

12 technology may affect private and public life; 

13 (L) making educated decisions based on 

14 information obtained from sources and content; 

15 and 

16 (M) applying subparagraphs (A) through 

17 (L) across various content, including to spoken 

18 and broadcast words and videos, printed mate19 rials, media, digital content, data, and images. 

20 (5) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term 

21 ‘‘intelligence community’’ means an element of the 

22 intelligence community specified or designated under 

23 section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 

24 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)). 


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1 (6) RELEVANT CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT2 TEES.—The term ‘‘relevant congressional commit3 tees’’ means any Committee of Congress with juris4 diction over the agencies represented on the task 

5 force. 

6 (7) TASK FORCE.—The term ‘‘task force’’ 

7 means the interagency COVID–19 misinformation 

8 and disinformation coordination task force estab9 lished under subsection (b). 

10 (b) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established a Fed11 eral interagency COVID–19 misinformation and 

12 disinformation coordination task force, which shall be led 

13 by the Director, or by the designee of the Director. 

14 (c) REPRESENTATIVES.— 

15 (1) IN GENERAL.—The task force shall be com16 prised of not less than 1 representative from each of 

17 the following: 

18 (A) The Agency. 

19 (B) The Global Engagement Center of the 

20 Department of State. 

21 (C) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

22 (D) The intelligence community. 

23 (E) The Centers for Disease Control and 

24 Prevention. 


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1 (F) The Federal Emergency Management 

2 Agency. 

3 (G) The Department of Health and 

4 Human Services. 

5 (H) The National Institutes of Health. 

6 (I) The Food and Drug Administration. 

7 (J) The Department of the Treasury. 

8 (K) The Small Business Administration. 

9 (L) The Federal Trade Commission. 

10 (M) The Department of Education. 

11 (N) The Federal Communications Commis12 sion. 

13 (O) Not less than 1 agency, such as the 

14 Office of Minority Health or the Office of Rural 

15 Health Policy of the Department of Health and 

16 Human Services or the Office of Equal Rights 

17 of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, 

18 that regularly engages with— 

19 (i) racial or ethnic minority commu20 nities; 

21 (ii) rural communities; and 

22 (iii) other underserved populations, in23 cluding communities without widespread 

24 access to the internet. 


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1 (P) Any other department or agency as de2 termined necessary by the Director. 

3 (2) REPRESENTATION OF UNDERSERVED COM4 MUNITIES.—The task force membership requirement 

5 described in paragraph (1)(O) shall be satisfied by 

6 multiple agencies if there is not 1 agency that regu7 larly engages all 3 communities described in clauses 

8 (i) through (iii) of such paragraph. 

9 (d) ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES.—The functions 

10 of the task force shall be— 

11 (1) coordinating the analysis of COVID–19 

12 misinformation and disinformation by agencies 

13 across the Federal Government; 

14 (2) developing integrated analyses of COVID– 

15 19 misinformation and disinformation in a manner 

16 that protects individual privacy and civil liberties, 

17 using information from agency representatives de18 scribed in subsection (c) in accordance with sub19 sections (e) and (f); 

20 (3) coordinating the dissemination to Federal 

21 agencies and the White House Coronavirus Task 

22 Force, or any successor thereto, of— 

23 (A) analyses developed by individual agen24 cies in accordance with paragraph (1); and 


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1 (B) integrated analyses developed in ac2 cordance with paragraph (2); and 

3 (4) developing, in consultation with the Director 

4 of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 

5 the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the 

6 Secretary of Education, the Director of the Institute 

7 of Museum and Library Services, and any non-gov8 ernmental civil society, privacy, media-literacy, or 

9 other public interest entity determined appropriate 

10 by the Director, or a designee, and disseminating in11 formation literacy, including digital literacy and 

12 media literacy, and information resilience public 

13 awareness campaigns relating to pandemics. 

14 (e) AUTHORITIES.— 

15 (1) IN GENERAL.— 

16 (A) LIMITATION ON ADDITIONAL AUTHOR17 ITY.—The task force shall have no additional 

18 authority to scan, collect, or otherwise use so19 cial media or other publicly available informa20 tion in excess of any authority of each partici21 pating agency in effect on the day before the 

22 date of enactment of this Act. 

23 (B) REQUIREMENT.—The task force shall 

24 ensure that any actions taken pursuant to this 

25 section are consistent with other applicable limiVerDate Sep 11 2014 19:16 Aug 26, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S4499.IS S4499

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1 tations, including applicable limitations on the 

2 collection, retention, dissemination, and proc3 essing of intelligence, under Federal law, in4 cluding court orders and Executive orders, and 

5 any relevant agency guidelines or procedures. 

6 (C) ACTIVITIES.—The task force shall en7 sure that activities undertaken pursuant to this 

8 section are conducted consistent with protec9 tions under the Constitution of the United 

10 States. 

11 (D) PROHIBITION.—The task force may 

12 not directly collect information or maintain in13 formation about a United States person solely 

14 for the purpose of monitoring activities pro15 tected by the First Amendment of the Constitu16 tion or the lawful exercise of other rights se17 cured by the Constitution or laws of the United 

18 States. 

19 (2) SPECIFIC AGENCY AUTHORITY.—The au20 thority of a specific agency represented on the task 

21 force shall supersede the authority of the task force. 

22 (f) NARROW TAILORING; DOCUMENTATION OF PUR23 POSE.—The task force shall— 


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1 (1) ensure that the activities of the task force 

2 advance a compelling Government interest related to 

3 COVID–19 misinformation and disinformation; 

4 (2) ensure that the activities of the task force 

5 are narrowly tailored to advance that interest while 

6 minimizing impacts on speech and expression that is 

7 not COVID–19 misinformation and disinformation; 

8 and 

9 (3) create procedures and internal policies that 

10 document the implications of this subsection. 

11 (g) PARTICIPATION.— 

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—The head of each agency 

13 represented on the task force and each representa14 tive participating in the task force under subsection 

15 (c) shall assist and provide information and analysis 

16 to the task force, consistent with applicable law and 

17 the respective authority of the agency, as may be 

18 necessary to carry out the functions of the task 

19 force. 

20 (2) EXPENSES.—Each agency represented on 

21 the task force shall be responsible for the expenses 

22 of the agency in participating on the task force. 

23 (h) PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT.— 

24 The Privacy Officer of the Department of Homeland Secu25 rity and the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 


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1 of the Department of Homeland Security, in consultation 

2 with the Privacy Officer of the Agency, shall ensure the 

3 activities of the task force protect individual privacy and 

4 civil liberties and are conducted consistent with fair infor5 mation practice principles and civil liberties protection 

6 guidance. 

7 (i) CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFINGS.—Not later than 30 

8 days after the date on which the task force first convenes, 

9 and every 30 days thereafter until the date described in 

10 subsection (l), the Director shall provide to the relevant 

11 congressional committees— 

12 (1) a briefing on the privacy and civil liberties 

13 oversight performed under subsection (h); 

14 (2) a copy of the procedures and internal proc15 esses created under subsection (f)(3); and 

16 (3) a briefing, to the greatest extent practicable 

17 in an unclassified form, on the analyses developed by 

18 the task force under subsection (d)(2). 

19 (j) PUBLIC REPORT.—Not less than 60 days after 

20 the date on which the task force first convenes, and every 

21 30 days after until the date described in subsection (l), 

22 the Director shall publish on a publicly accessible website 

23 a report summarizing the analyses developed by the task 

24 force under subsection (d)(2), including— 

25 (1) analysis methodologies; 


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1 (2) data utilized in the analysis, including any 

2 specific examples that can be made public; 

3 (3) analysis results; 

4 (4) analysis conclusions; and 

5 (5) any other information determined necessary 

6 by the Director. 

7 (k) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 30 days after the 

8 date of enactment of this Act, the Director shall establish 

9 and convene the task force. 

10 (l) SUNSET.—This section shall cease to have effect 

11 on the later of— 

12 (1) the date that is 1 year after the date of en13 actment of this Act; or 

14 (2) the date that is 60 days after the date on 

15 which the national emergency declared by the Presi16 dent under the National Emergencies Act (50 

17 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) with respect to COVID–19 ter18 minates. 

19 SEC. 5. COORDINATED MESSAGING. 

20 (a) PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENT.—Any 

21 public communications by an agency participating in the 

22 task force established under section 4(b) related to the 

23 analysis coordinated or performed by the task force shall 

24 be disseminated directly to the public, including through 

25 the use of— 


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1 (1) coronavirus.gov, or any successor thereto; 

2 and 

3 (2) mechanisms to be determined by the Agency 

4 that specifically focus on ethnic and racial minority, 

5 rural, and other underserved populations, including 

6 communities without widespread internet access, in7 cluding local news organizations, local radio organi8 zations, and other non-digital media organizations. 

9 (b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this sec10 tion shall be construed to limit the authorities for commu11 nication and open exchange of data, findings, and infor12 mation resulting from scientific research, analysis, or 

13 other types of scientific and technical activities conducted 

14 by Federal employees or contractors that are in effect on 

15 the day before the date of enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


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