Department of Homeland Security
 

Homeland Security Information Network 


Improvements and Challenges 


OIG-13-98 June 2013
 
 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

 Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

June 13, 2013 

MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard Chávez 

Director 

Office of Operations Coordination and Planning 

FROM: Frank Deffer 

Office of Assistant Inspector General 

Information Technology Audits

 

SUBJECT: Homeland Security Information Network Improvements 

and Challenges 

Attached for your information is our final report, Homeland Security Information 

Network Improvements and Challenges. We incorporated the formal comments from 

the Director, Office of Operations Coordination and Planning in the final report. 

The report contains three recommendations aimed at improving the Homeland Security 

Information Network. Your office concurred with all three recommendations. As 

prescribed by the Department of Homeland Security Directive 077-01, Follow-Up and 

Resolutions for Office of Inspector General Report Recommendations, within 90 days of 

the date of this memorandum, please provide our office with a written response that 

includes your (1) agreement or disagreement, (2) corrective action plan, and (3) target 

completion date for each recommendation. Also, please include responsible parties and 

any other supporting documentation necessary to inform us about the current status of 

the recommendation. Until your response is received and evaluated, the 

recommendations will be considered open and unresolved. 

Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we are providing 

copies of our report to appropriate congressional committees with oversight and 

appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will post 

the report on our website for public dissemination. 

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Richard Harsche, Director, 

Information Management Division, at (202) 254-5448. 

Attachment 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table of Contents 

Executive Summary............................................................................................................. 1

Background ......................................................................................................................... 2

Results of Audit................................................................................................................... 5

HSIN Planning and Governance Progress ............................................................... 5

HSIN Release 3 Schedule Challenges .................................................................... 10

System Use............................................................................................................ 13

Recommendations ................................................................................................ 20

Management Comment and OIG Analysis............................................................ 21

Appendixes 

Appendix A: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology ............................................ 23 

Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report ............................... 25 

Appendix C: Major Contributors to This Report ................................................ 27 

Appendix D: Report Distribution........................................................................ 28 

Abbreviations 

CIO Chief Information Officer 

COI Community of Interest 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

HSIN Homeland Security Information Network 

HSIN NextGen Next Generation of the Homeland Security Information Network 

I&A Office of Intelligence and Analysis 

IT information technology 

JRIES Joint Regional Information Exchange System 

NOC National Operations Center 

OCIO Office of the Chief Information Officer 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

OPS Office of Operations Coordination and Planning 

SLIC State and Local Intelligence Community 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Executive Summary 

The Homeland Security Information Network is a secure, unclassified Internet portal 

that enables information sharing and collaboration across the homeland security

enterprise. In 2006 and 2008, we reported on challenges that the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) faced to define the system’s role, meet user requirements, 

provide user support, and increase system use. We conducted a followup audit of this 

system to determine the progress made and the system’s effectiveness in supporting 

information sharing among select stakeholders. Appendix A describes the present 

audit’s scope and methodology. 

Since 2008, DHS has made progress in addressing the planning and governance issues 

we identified. Specifically, system program management performed an analysis of 

alternatives, revalidated stakeholder requirements, and developed other strategies to 

realign the program to address system challenges and concerns. Formalized governance 

processes established and supported by a new policy office contributed to these 

accomplishments. These efforts allowed the program to meet Office of Management 

and Budget requirements for program improvement, as well as acquisition review 

gateway criteria for the development of a new system release. 

Still, system program management has faced challenges implementing the new system 

release on schedule. Migration from the legacy system to the new platform has been 

delayed because of contracting and technical challenges. As a result, there is increased 

risk that schedule delays will lead to additional costs. Further, delays have caused some 

user communities to pursue other solutions for their information sharing needs. 

Although certain communities were using the system to share information successfully, 

the system was not routinely or widely used to share information throughout the 

homeland security enterprise. Specifically, the number of system account holders 

remained limited, and the extent to which those account holders were using the system 

was also constrained because of challenges with system content and performance. As a 

result, the system had not fully met its objective to support effective information 

sharing among homeland security partners. 

We are recommending that the Director of Operations Coordination and Planning 

develop a plan to increase DHS components’ adoption of the system, address current 

system performance issues through the planned system upgrade, and develop a plan to 

improve communication and collaboration with State and local stakeholders to expand 

exposure to HSIN and the capabilities that the system can provide. The Director 

concurred with the report recommendations. 

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Department of Homeland Security 

Background 

ThefHomelandfSecurityfActfoff2002fassigned DHS responsibility to coordinate the 

Federal Government’s homeland security communications with State and local 

government authorities, the private sector, and the public.1

 In support of this 

responsibility, the Department developed and continues to manage the Homeland 

Security Information Network (HSIN), a secure, unclassified Internet portal that enables 

these various stakeholders to collaborate and share homeland security information. 

The HSIN mission is to provide homeland security stakeholders with effective and 

efficient collaboration tools for decision making, secure access to data, and accurate, 

timely information sharing and situational awareness. To achieve this mission, HSIN 

provides a shared place for users to collaborate securely with features such as Connect 

(a Web conference tool) and Jabber (a chat tool). In addition, HSIN provides a 

document library for the distribution of homeland security reports and information. As 

the designated information sharing portal for DHS, HSIN also serves as the principal 

platform for interoperability with other DHS information sharing portals or for 

consolidation of such portals. 

HSIN is organized into information sharing groups called Communities of Interest (COIs). 

There were more than 1,300 COIs supporting homeland security missions; State, Federal 

agency, and private sectors; and task force, event, or incident needs. HSIN users belong 

to and share information with the COIs that pertain to their particular mission needs, 

including several nationwide COIs that are intended to support core aspects of the 

homeland security mission, such as: 

•	 HSIN Critical Sectors – Used by private sector, State and local governments, and 

Federal stakeholders to support coordination and collaboration across all 18 

critical infrastructure and key resource sectors.

•	 HSIN Emergency Management – Used by emergency and incident management 

experts nationwide from all levels of government to respond to both manmade 

and natural disasters. 

•	 HSIN Federal Operations – Used by the DHS National Operations Center (NOC) 

and other Federal agencies for situational awareness and event response. The 

NOC uses this community to provide a variety of written deliverables, including 

analysis of ongoing situations, threat analysis, and more. 

1 HomelandfSecurityfActfoff2002, Public Law 107-296.

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•	 HSIN Law Enforcement – Used by Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement 

agencies to coordinate and implement information-driven and risk-based 

prevention, protection, response, and recovery efforts with respect to all threats 

and all hazards during both routine and emergent operations. 

•	 HSIN State and Local Intelligence Community (SLIC) – Used by intelligence 

officers and analysts from the Law Enforcement, Homeland Security, and 

Intelligence Communities to meet, avert, or respond to current, emerging, and 

future threats related to homeland security. 

HSIN is the only Federal portal that provides information sharing among DHS and its 

Federal, State, local, territorial, tribal, international, and private sector partners across 

the full spectrum of the homeland security mission. It allows these diverse communities 

to work together to perform investigations, identify terrorist activities, respond to areas 

affected by natural disasters, and provide coordination during recovery operations. 

HSIN History

HSIN has evolved significantly since it was initially developed nearly a decade ago. It

began as a Defense Intelligence Agency–sponsored initiative called the Joint Regional 

Information Exchange System (JRIES). JRIES was designed to facilitate the exchange of 

suspicious activity reports, register events potentially related to terrorist activity, and 

foster real-time intelligence and law enforcement collaboration in a secure environment 

across Federal, State, and local jurisdictions. The Defense Intelligence Agency 

transferred JRIES to DHS in September 2003 because the domestic nature of the 

program fit better under the newly formed DHS. 

Under DHS, program management sought to expand the scope of the system. In 

February 2004, the DHS Secretary renamed JRIES as HSIN in order to reflect this broader 

scope, and designated HSIN as the Department’s secure, unclassified sharing and 

collaboration platform. Further, in January 2006, the DHS Secretary designated HSIN 

the primary system for operational information sharing and collaboration with the 

Department and with its homeland security partners, and required all components to 

use HSIN. 

In June 2006, we reported that DHS had not defined HSIN’s relationship to existing 

systems, obtained and addressed user requirements, provided adequate user guidance, 

or developed performance measures for HSIN.2

 These system planning and 

2 HomelandfSecurityfInformationfNetworkfCouldfSupportfInformationfSharingfMorefEffectively, OIG-06-38, 

June 2006.

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

implementation issues limited HSIN’s ability to support State and local information 

sharing. 

In February 2008, HSIN management announced that it planned to upgrade the HSIN 

platform. This upgrade, referred to as the Next Generation of HSIN (HSIN NextGen),

included plans to change software platforms, enhance security, add capabilities, and 

provide a new look and feel for users. HSIN NextGen was initially scheduled to be 

completed by September 2009. The upgrade, however, did not meet deployment 

timelines and performance expectations. 

In October 2008, we reported that DHS continued to face challenges defining user 

requirements, defining the information sharing process, and providing adequate user 

support.3

 In addition, nationwide information sharing using HSIN remained limited, and 

performance measures to track or assess information sharing using HSIN had not been 

developed. 

In May 2010, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) designated the HSIN 

program as high-risk, halted all system development, and conducted a review to 

determine whether the program would continue to receive Federal funding. At the 

conclusion of the review, OMB determined that HSIN was a viable program, but OMB 

established conditions relating to system user growth, portal consolidation, and 

interoperability targets that the HSIN program needed to meet going forward. 

In July 2010, the DHS Office of Operations Coordination and Planning (OPS) and the DHS 

Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) signed a memorandum of agreement that 

transferred operational control of the HSIN program to the DHS OCIO while OPS 

maintained administrative control. The DHS OCIO initiated a series of program 

assessments to identify the right approach for upgrading the HSIN platform to meet the 

needs of the Department and its mission partners. This analysis concluded that the best 

approach was not HSIN NextGen, which involved transitioning to an entirely new 

software platform. Rather, the analysis concluded that upgrading the legacy HSIN 

platform based on Microsoft SharePoint software with augmented security was the best 

path forward. This approach was called HSIN Release 3. The NextGen approach was 

decommissioned in July 2011, and HSIN Release 3 development began in October 2011. 

The transition to HSIN Release 3 was scheduled to be completed by May 2013. Figure 1 

provides a timeline of HSIN’s evolution and major events since its transfer to DHS. 

3 DHS’fEffortsftofImprovefthefHomelandfSecurityfInformationfNetwork, OIG-09-07, October 2008.

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Department of Homeland Security 

Figure 1. HSIN Timeline

Results of Audit 

HSIN Planning and Governance Progress 

HSIN program management has made progress in addressing the planning and 

governance issues we identified in 2008. Management performed an analysis of 

alternatives, revalidated stakeholder requirements, and developed other 

strategies to realign the HSIN program to address system challenges and 

concerns. In addition, program management completed key planning 

documents such as the Concept of Operations, Business Case, and Segment 

Architecture to guide and define the new direction for HSIN. Formalized

governance processes and increased high-level support and staffing following 

the HSIN program transfer to the DHS OCIO in July 2010 contributed to these 

accomplishments. As a result, the HSIN program met OMB requirements for 

program improvement, as well as acquisition review gateway criteria for HSIN 

Release 3 development. 

Plans and Strategies Revised 

HSIN program management revised its plans and strategies to better meet 

program goals. Federal law and departmental guidance require effective 

planning to ensure the success of information technology (IT) development 

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Department of Homeland Security 

efforts.4 To meet planning requirements, program personnel analyzed 

alternative technical solutions to identify the best approach for an upgrade to 

the HSIN platform. The analysis compared the HSIN NextGen platform, the 

legacy HSIN platform, and the platform that hosted the Homeland Security SLIC.5

The analysis indicated that the legacy HSIN platform with upgraded software and 

enhanced security would be the best alternative because it met the highest 

percentage of user requirements with the least complicated migration path, and 

had lower life cycle and administrative costs. The HSIN Release 3 approach, as it 

was named, was presented to and received support from homeland security 

mission leadership across the Department and was approved by the DHS Chief 

Information Officer (CIO) in October 2010. 

HSIN program management conducted numerous other planning activities to 

redirect the program and support the HSIN Release 3 approach. Specifically, 

HSIN program personnel worked with stakeholders to revalidate system 

requirements. This initiative defined core requirements for migration to HSIN 

Release 3. HSIN program personnel also conducted a technical assessment to 

determine the feasibility of updating the platform to Microsoft SharePoint 2010, 

reusing existing hardware and software, implementing enhanced user security 

features, and establishing the implementation timeline. Further, HSIN program 

personnel developed a knowledge management strategy to improve information 

sharing across COIs within HSIN Release 3 to avoid information sharing 

stovepipes that had been a challenge. Program personnel summarized these 

activities in an overall HSIN Improvement Plan. 

HSIN Release 3 Development Planning Activities Completed 

HSIN program personnel completed additional planning activities and documents 

to support the HSIN Release 3 development process. Specifically, HSIN program 

personnel completed a business case in January 2011 that provided justification 

for the new direction of HSIN, an analysis of the current and proposed future 

states of HSIN, and the HSIN master schedule and development approach. HSIN 

program personnel also completed a combined Mission Needs 

Statement/Operational Requirements Document/Concept of Operations in May 

2012. This document defined the major use scenarios for HSIN, identified the 

major capability gaps that hindered the system’s effectiveness, and defined how 

4

 Public Law No. 104-106, Division E, February 10, 1996. The law, initially titled the Informationf
 

TechnologyfManagementfReformfActfoff1996, was subsequently renamed the Clinger�CohenfActfoff1996f
 

in P. L. 104-208, September 30, 1996. DHS AD 102-01, Interim Version 2.0, AcquisitionfDirective, 

Instruction Appendix B, September 21, 2010. 5

 The Homeland Security SLIC was managed by DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) and hosted
 

independently from HSIN on a separate platform. It has since migrated to HSIN and become HSIN SLIC. 

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Department of Homeland Security 

HSIN Release 3 would resolve these gaps once fully implemented. For example, 

this document identified six capability gaps that HSIN Release 3 would address, 

including the ability to improve search and retrieval of content using 

standardized content tagging terms. 

In addition, the DHS OCIO completed the DHS Sensitive but Unclassified Portal 

Interoperability Segment Architecture and Transition Plan in January 2011. This 

architecture provided the basis for consolidating DHS component portals onto 

HSIN. In addition, this architecture established the basis for interoperability with 

other Federal Sensitive but Unclassified portals such as the Department of 

Justice’s Regional Information Sharing Systems Network, the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation’s Law Enforcement Online, and the Director of National 

Intelligence’s Intelink-U system. 

HSIN program personnel also completed an acquisition plan for HSIN Release 3 in 

July 2012. The plan described the new agile development approach and 

methodologies to be used for HSIN Release 3.6 The plan also described how the 

program would tailor its agile approach to meet DHS system life-cycle 

requirements. This approach was intended to avoid the type of schedule 

overruns that hindered the HSIN NextGen initiative. The plan identified major 

milestones and target dates for the acquisition process. 

Governance Processes Established 

HSIN program management established several entities to provide formal 

governance processes for system development and operations. The primary 

entity for HSIN governance is the Executive Steering Committee. The mission of

the committee is to provide effective oversight and guidance to the HSIN 

program. The committee is led by high-level officials with the Director of OPS

and the Principal Deputy Undersecretary for the Office of Intelligence and

Analysis (I&A) serving as co-chairs, and the DHS CIO serving as a voting member. 

It meets every month, at a minimum, to discuss the cost, schedule, and 

performance of the program. It also reports to Department-level information 

sharing governance bodies such as the Information Sharing Coordinating Council 

and the Information Sharing and Safeguarding Governance Board. 

In addition, HSIN program management established the HSIN User Working 

Group to manage stakeholder requirements better. Begun in April 2011, the 

group was composed of more than 200 core HSIN users from multiple 

6

 Agile development is a group of software development methods based on an iterative and incremental 

approach. It promotes adaptive planning, and encourages rapid and flexible response to change.

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Department of Homeland Security 

stakeholder communities. Members participated in monthly meetings to guide 

development and implementation of HSIN. The group played a critical role in 

advising program management of the feasibility and potential of system 

upgrades and soliciting user comments. At a high level, the group has ensured 

that the HSIN program has collaborated with stakeholders and system experts to 

develop and validate the upgraded information sharing platform to meet users’ 

needs. 

Additional governance entities have played a role in HSIN development but have 

been in transition. The HSIN program management created the Mission 

Operators Committee in 2009 to ensure that DHS components could provide 

input into HSIN policy and to prioritize and review requirements. However, HSIN 

leadership determined that it would be more effective to dissolve the Mission 

Operators Committee and add key members of the committee to the Executive 

Steering Committee. In addition, the HSIN program management created the 

HSIN Advisory Committee in 2007 to provide independent advice from nonFederal stakeholder groups. The HSIN Advisory Committee, however, has been 

inactive for more than a year and a half since the Secretary initiated a 

Department-wide review of all Federal advisory committees. This governance 

body, which ensures that non-Federal partners have a voice in HSIN 

development and operations, will be reactivated upon completion of the review. 

Figure 2 lists the major HSIN governance entities. 

Figure 2. HSIN Governance Entities

To support these governance processes further, HSIN program management 

established the HSIN Policy Office in January 2012 to ensure transparency and 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

accountability. The mission of the HSIN Policy Office is to ensure that the HSIN 

program obtains the trust of its stakeholders and governance bodies through the 

development of effective HSIN policy. The office has developed extensive user 

policies, ensured program compliance with privacy and paperwork reduction 

laws, and updated policies associated with HSIN governance bodies. It also 

defined the decision processes for the bodies governing HSIN to ensure 

consistent and effective management. 

Department-Level Leadership and Increased Staffing 

HSIN program management was able to reorient a high-risk program and 

develop a strategy and plans for HSIN Release 3 implementation in part because 

of the HSIN program realignment from DHS OPS to the DHS OCIO. The DHS OCIO 

was better positioned than DHS OPS to integrate information sharing, 

interoperability, portal consolidation, enterprise architecture, and knowledge 

management into the overall HSIN strategy. The move also demonstrated DHS’ 

commitment to the program and its future. In addition, the DHS OCIO and OPS 

increased HSIN program staffing levels following the management shift. In 2010, 

when the DHS OCIO assumed HSIN management responsibility, five full-time 

government employees supported the HSIN program. By 2012, the number of 

staff had increased to 23. 

Program Oversight Requirements Met 

As a result of the formal planning and governance processes, the HSIN program 

has met OMB program oversight requirements. Specifically, OMB concluded in 

November 2010 that HSIN was a viable government program that should 

continue. HSIN program personnel were also making considerable progress with 

the implementation of the HSIN OMB improvement plan. Specifically, program 

management had completed five of eight conditions and demonstrated progress 

on the remaining three. 

The HSIN program has also met departmental acquisition oversight requirements 

timely. In August 2012, the HSIN program received approval from the DHS 

Investment Review Board for the first two phases of the system engineering lifecycle process: the solution engineering and planning phases. Further, the Under 

Secretary for Management granted provisional approval for the next major 

program review and delegated the review process to the HSIN Executive Steering 

Committee because of the program’s success in the first reviews. 

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Department of Homeland Security 

HSIN Release 3 Schedule Challenges 

DHS has faced numerous challenges implementing HSIN Release 3 on schedule. 

Specifically, migration from the legacy HSIN system to the new HSIN Release 3 

platform has been delayed because of contracting and technical obstacles. As a 

result, there is increased risk that schedule delays will lead to additional costs to 

maintain the legacy HSIN past the contract expiration in May 2013. Further, user 

frustration with delays has caused some user communities to pursue other 

solutions for their information sharing needs. 

User Migration Delay

Migration to the HSIN Release 3 platform was planned in four waves. During 

each wave, a distinct group of COIs and users were to be migrated to HSIN 

Release 3. Migration of the first wave of users was scheduled to begin in August 

2012 but actually began in November 2012, after a 4-month delay. Consequently, 

the migration schedule for the remaining three waves has been compressed in 

order to meet the May 2013 completion deadline, when the contract for the 

legacy HSIN environment expires and the system will no longer be supported. 

The migration that was planned over a 9-month period must now be completed 

in just 5 months. As of January 2013, Wave 1 was considered completed, but it 

had been scaled back to include only 8 COIs instead of the 15 originally included, 

and only 50 users instead of 300. Figure 3 shows the planned and revised 

migration schedule. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Figure 3. Delay in HSIN Release 3 Migration Schedule 

Data Center and Technical Obstacles to Migration 

HSIN Release 3 migration was behind schedule in part because of delays 

establishing the environments for system implementation at the DHS Data 

Center 2, located in Clarksville, Virginia.7

 Specifically, the award of the contract 

for establishing the environments needed to develop, test, and put the HSIN 

Release 3 system into production was delayed by 4 months. For the DHS data 

center to support HSIN Release 3, a new provision had to be added to the data 

center contract to address the unique software and security requirements of the 

system, which took time to work through. This delay reduced the time available 

to prepare these environments for system development activities from 6 months 

to just 2 months. 

Once the contract was awarded, configuration of the environments took longer 

than anticipated because of technical issues. A contract was awarded for system 

development activities required for HSIN Release 3, including setting up the 

Identity and Access Management solution. The Identity and Access 

7

 An environment is an operating system, program, or integrated suite of programs that provides all the 

facilities necessary for a particular application. 

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Department of Homeland Security 

Management tool was intended to improve the security of HSIN by requiring 

identity verification when new users register and two-factor authentication for 

logging onto the system.8

 Implementing the Identity and Access Management 

solution, however, was more technically complex than initially anticipated. The 

initial contract was awarded with the assumption that the Sun Microsystems’ 

Identity and Access Management solution would be used. However, program 

management had to switch to using the Oracle Identity and Access Management 

solution after Oracle acquired Sun.9

The change to the Oracle solution caused unforeseen technical complications 

with integration between SharePoint and Oracle. Additional integration 

development was required, including a small amount of custom development to 

capture initial registration information in a user-friendly manner. In addition, 

the contractor had difficulty obtaining personnel with the skills required for the 

Oracle solution.

As a result of these technical challenges, the production environment was not 

completed until July 2012, only a month before migration was initially scheduled 

to begin. The time needed for system testing then pushed back the user

migration schedule. Program personnel had planned to perform user 

acceptance testing during the development process. The environments needed 

for system testing, however, were not complete until after the initial 

development work was done. Program management did not consider HSIN 

Release 3 ready for user migration until November 2012, almost 4 months later 

than planned.

Impact of Delayed Implementation

As a result of HSIN Release 3 delays, there is increased risk that migration will 

not be completed by the May 2013 deadline to shut down the HSIN legacy 

environment. HSIN program management indicated that they may be able to 

extend the contract to maintain the HSIN legacy environment for 1 month 

without incurring additional costs. After that time, the program will incur 

additional operations and maintenance costs estimated at $480,000 per month. 

Furthermore, delayed implementation of HSIN Release 3 has led some user 

communities to pursue other solutions for their information sharing needs. HSIN 

users have been promised a more secure and intuitive HSIN solution since 

8

 Two-factor authentication requires the user to enter a user name and password as the first step for 

logging on and to receive and enter a soft token as the second step.
 9

 Sun Microsystems was acquired by Oracle Corporation in January 2010.
 

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Department of Homeland Security 

February 2008, when HSIN NextGen was first proposed. Therefore, significant 

pressure remains on the program to deliver a solution that meets user 

expectations timely. One State has used DHS grant funds to build its own 

SharePoint site in anticipation that HSIN Release 3 will not deliver information 

sharing capabilities timely. 

System Use 

Although certain COIs within HSIN have used the system to share information 

successfully, HSIN is still not routinely or widely used to share information across 

the homeland security enterprise. Specifically, State-level COIs have been 

successful for some States where HSIN outreach personnel have effectively 

promoted system use. In addition, some nationwide COIs, including HSIN Critical 

Sectors and HSIN Emergency Management, have developed a modest size user 

base. As a result, these COIs have demonstrated how HSIN can support 

information sharing within their communities. However, HSIN is not routinely or 

widely used to share information across the homeland security enterprise. 

Despite areas of success, system use overall remains limited because of 

numerous challenges with system content and performance. As a result, HSIN 

has not fully met its mission of supporting information sharing across the 

homeland security enterprise, despite a significant investment in the system 

over the past decade.

State-Level Communities of Interest 

HSIN has been used effectively by some States that have set up a State-level COI. 

All 50 States, as well as the District of Columbia, the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, 

and Guam, have HSIN COIs. Some States have developed robust State-level 

communities with a defined role in information sharing within that State. For 

example, Louisiana has several State-level portals with an estimated 1,000 user 

accounts. Oregon has an estimated 1,200 account holders, with more than 800 

accounts within its State law enforcement portal. Georgia has more than 1,200 

users on its State HSIN communities, with approximately 700 private sector users. 

Not all States, however, have developed robust State-level communities on 

HSIN. The HSIN program did not track the number of account holders for each 

State COI, so the extent of State-level COI use on HSIN could not be accurately 

quantified. The HSIN program periodically reported on the combined number of 

State, local, and tribal users, as well as HSIN SLIC users. As of the end of May 

2012, there were approximately 9,600 active State, local, and tribal users, 

including an estimated 2,200 HSIN SLIC users. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

States in which HSIN provided the most value were often those served by an 

HSIN mission advocate who effectively promoted system use. HSIN mission 

advocates were deployed to regions throughout the country to work with 

stakeholders to expand their knowledge of the system and adapt HSIN to meet 

their specific needs. Personnel we met with from the States that had robust 

HSIN State-level portals credited the mission advocate they worked with for their 

success. For example, personnel from one State said that prior to the 

involvement of a mission advocate, HSIN was used in a limited way as a 

document repository. Subsequently, personnel from this State have worked 

with their mission advocate to integrate HSIN into their business processes, 

including the processes for managing special events and working with the State’s 

terrorism liaison officers. 

States that have implemented robust State-level HSIN communities have 

demonstrated how HSIN can effectively support information sharing. For 

example, in the Gulf Coast, HSIN was used for the lead-up and response to 

Hurricane Isaac in 2012. During this event, HSIN tools such as Connect and 

Jabber were used to communicate with and train emergency responders. HSIN 

was also used to provide timely information to local hospitals, fire departments, 

and law enforcement agencies. 

In addition, the Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center used HSIN as a 

platform for a new tracking system, known as i-Track, for information on criminal 

leads. The i-Track system is housed within the Georgia law enforcement COI on 

HSIN, which allows it to function as a secure, Web-based solution accessible via 

any computer or smart phone with an Internet connection. Using HSIN for iTrack provided the ability to quickly add new users and to allow multiple people 

to view and update leads at the same time. 

Critical Sectors and Emergency Management Communities of Interest 

Certain nationwide COIs were being used to share information with a moderate 

number of system users. For example, HSIN Critical Sectors was the largest 

nationwide COI, with 13,300 users as of November 2012.10 HSIN Emergency 

Management was the second largest nationwide COI, with 11,200 active users as 

of November 2012. 

10 The November 2012 total user number did not exclude inactive users. A May 2012 HSIN program 

report indicated approximately 14,000 total HSIN Critical Sector users; however, about 25 percent of 

these accounts were inactive. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

These COIs achieved a moderate size because their COI leadership had taken 

steps to build user content and leverage collaborative tools such as Connect. For 

example, in fiscal year 2012 HSIN Critical Sectors hosted 1,408 Web conferences 

using Connect, with a total of 29,000 participants. HSIN Critical Sectors also 

reported approximately 550,000 page views in September 2012. In addition, 

during Hurricane Sandy, HSIN Emergency Management enabled multiple 

jurisdictions with incompatible emergency management systems to 

communicate with each other during the disaster response. 

Incident Response and Special Events 

HSIN has also been used effectively for large-scale and cross-State special events. 

For example, in 2010, the United States Coast Guard deployed HSIN as the main 

system for unclassified information sharing for thousands of personnel during 

the response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. HSIN provided response 

personnel from across the country access to daily briefings, reports, alerts, 

message board postings, and more. 

Additionally, HSIN served as the primary intelligence threat and security 

information exchange system during the United States Olympic track and field 

trials in Eugene, Oregon, from June 21 through July 1, 2012. The trials featured 

more than 1,000 elite athletes and thousands of staff, media, spectators, and 

supporters. Users at the Federal, State, and local-level used HSIN to share 

information and communicate during the trials. HSIN was used for the twicedaily briefings, monitoring and manipulation of security cameras, and 

intelligence log maintenance. Agencies also employed HSIN to exchange safety 

plans, credentialing guidelines, traffic control plans, and emergency response 

plans. 

Limited Overall System Use 

Despite success within certain communities, HSIN has not been used to share 

information widely across the homeland security enterprise. Specifically, the 

number of HSIN account holders remained limited, and the extent to which 

those account holders were actively using the system was also limited. As of the 

end of October 2012, HSIN had 35,560 active account holders nationwide.11

Although system planning documents identify the potential for HSIN to grow to 

more than 300,000 users in the long term, system growth since 2007 has been 

modest, from 25,511 accounts in 2007 to 35,560 accounts in 2012. In 2006, 

11 Active account holders are defined as having logged onto the system at least once over the period of a 

year.

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

HSIN program management identified a metric of increasing user accounts by 

5,000 accounts annually, with a goal of reaching 55,000 accounts by fiscal year 

2012. This goal has not been achieved. Further, OMB required HSIN to reach 

130,000 active users by 2015. To achieve this goal would require an 

unprecedented growth rate over the next 3 years. Figure 4 shows the number of 

accounts from 2007 to 2012 and OMB’s growth target for 2015. 

Figure 4. Total HSIN Accounts from 2007 to 2012 and OMB 2015 Target 

It has also been a challenge for HSIN to maintain active account holders. In 

February 2010, HSIN program personnel disabled all accounts that had been 

inactive for more than a year as part of a user cleanup initiative to enhance 

system security and cost effectiveness. As a result, the number of HSIN accounts 

dropped from 44,846 to 19,150, a loss of 25,696 accounts, which amounted to 

57 percent of all accounts. In May 2012, HSIN program personnel began to 

regularly track account activity and found that only 34,225 of the 45,489 

accounts were active.

Further, the level of use of HSIN as measured by how often account holders 

logged onto the system was low. Figure 5 shows logon rates of 4 percent daily, 

12 percent weekly, 28 percent monthly, and 49 percent over a 90-day period. 

Conversely, more than half of HSIN account holders did not log on to HSIN over a 

90-day period. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Figure 5. Frequency of User Logon12

System Content 

According to State and local personnel we interviewed, HSIN use remained 

limited in part because the system content was not useful.13 Specifically, several 

State and local HSIN users said that HSIN did not provide sufficient access to 

information from DHS components such as the Transportation Security 

Administration, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement. Although the NOC posted some component information 

to HSIN in summary documents, DHS component use of HSIN was limited. State 

and local personnel said that access to DHS component databases and 

intelligence reports would make HSIN uniquely valuable. Several State and local 

personnel said that they did not see a reason to use HSIN if DHS was not actively 

using and contributing to the system. 

To improve DHS component buy-in and use of HSIN, program management has 

sought to identify other information sharing portals owned and operated by DHS 

components that could be moved onto HSIN. Seven DHS component portals 

have already been moved onto HSIN, and another 10 have been identified for 

future consolidation. For example, the National Protection and Programs 

Directorate moved three of its portals onto HSIN, including its Fire Services 

portal with 3,700 users. Several portals targeted for future consolidation have a 

large number of users, such as the Coast Guard HomePort portal with 

12 Daily, weekly, and monthly logon frequency is based on the average from January 2012 to the end of 

October 2012. The 90-day logon frequency is based on the average from May 2012, when the HSIN 

program started tracking this information, to the end of October 2012. 13 The HSIN program is responsible for the system platform; however, each COI is responsible for the 

content available to system users. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

approximately 25,000 users. The portal consolidation plan identifies 

approximately 63,000 DHS users that would be added to HSIN when the 

consolidation is completed. 

In addition, personnel rely on systems other than HSIN to obtain information. 

There were numerous other information sharing systems that State and local 

users were more accustomed to, or found easier to use to obtain law 

enforcement, critical infrastructure, and emergency management information. 

For example, in 2006 we reported that the relationship of HSIN to existing 

Federal law enforcement information sharing systems, such as the Regional 

Information Sharing Systems Network and Law Enforcement Online, was not 

clearly defined. HSIN program management has pursued, but not achieved, a 

common logon capability with those systems since our 2006 report. As a result, 

the HSIN Law Enforcement COI has remained small, with approximately 2,000 

active users. Several HSIN Law Enforcement users said that they only log on to 

HSIN in order to keep their account active. 

Similarly, critical infrastructure protection personnel obtained information from 

other sources that provided the same kind of information as HSIN. Specifically, 

private sector personnel we spoke with said that HSIN Critical Sectors and the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation’s InfraGard system have similar information. 

InfraGard is intended to share information between the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation and its private sector partners. Further, at one location, private 

sector personnel said that a State-level critical infrastructure information email 

list service also provided them with much of the same information they received 

on HSIN and InfraGard. 

State and local personnel have also relied on the DHS intelligence officers 

deployed to their respective fusion centers to obtain information rather than on 

HSIN. Specifically, fusion center personnel we spoke to said that if they needed 

to request information from DHS, they asked the DHS intelligence officer 

deployed to their fusion center. Similarly, if they needed to receive critical 

information from DHS, they relied on their intelligence office to share that 

information with them. Further, DHS intelligence officers said that they often 

did not use HSIN and instead relied on their points of contact within DHS for 

information. Consequently, HSIN SLIC, which is intended to be the COI for 

sharing intelligence information between DHS and State and local intelligence 

personnel, remained small, with approximately 2,200 active users. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

System Usability 

HSIN use was also limited in part because account holders did not find the

system user-friendly. Specifically, numerous system users we spoke with said 

that they could not easily locate information on HSIN. For example, users found 

browsing through the folders in the document library confusing and unhelpful 

for discovering new information that might be useful to them. Users said that 

old content was not archived, so a folder in the document library that looked 

relevant might not in fact be relevant because it contained old information. One 

user said that while browsing for information on chemical security, he found a 

folder that contained documents that were 4 years old. 

In addition, users said that they could not easily find information on HSIN using 

the search functionality. Search results often did not contain the specific

documents that users were looking for, which they had previously seen on HSIN. 

For example, one user tried to find an ecoterrorism document 6 months after it 

was initially posted, and had to go through folders document by document to 

find the specific document. Users also said that search results contained too 

many documents to look through that were not relevant to the search. For 

example, one user said that a search for a particular document returned 400 

results, 350 of which referred to the same product. 

The large number of HSIN COIs also sometimes made it difficult for users to find 

and share information. There were more than 1,300 COIs as of October 2012, 

making it difficult for users to know if they had access to the right COIs, or if 

there were other useful COIs that they did not know about. System users in one 

State said that they find it easier to call their points of contact in other States for 

information requests because of the large number of COIs. These users, 

however, said that this process makes them concerned that they might miss 

information, which could lead to an inability to “connect the dots” in a serious 

situation. Further, system users could not post information to multiple COIs at 

once; instead, users had to post information to each COI separately. System 

users we met with said that they did not have the time to post information 

multiple times, resulting in information being shared less broadly. HSIN program 

management had developed a plan to reduce the number of COIs and enable 

users to post documents to multiple COIs as part of the HSIN Release 3 upgrade. 

Until these changes are implemented, however, finding and sharing information 

across COIs on HSIN remains difficult at times. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Communication

The HSIN program has made progress communicating the role of the system to 

State and local personnel through the use of mission advocates; however, cuts to 

the mission advocate program threaten this progress. In 2006, we reported that 

the HSIN program had not clearly communicated the role of HSIN to State and 

local personnel, resulting in limited system buy-in. In 2008, we reported that 

limited resources continued to hinder communication and coordination with 

system stakeholders, resulting in ongoing challenges in meeting information 

sharing requirements. Since these reports, HSIN program management has 

deployed mission advocates to improve communication with system 

stakeholders and build the user community. Although mission advocates have 

demonstrated success building State-level COIs in some regions, the mission 

advocate program had been cut significantly, from 22 mission advocates to 8, 

because of budget constraints. This reduction in the number of mission 

advocates will likely have a direct effect on the support provided to field users 

and undermine a critical element for growing the user community. 

Conclusion

HSIN’s mission to facilitate information sharing across the homeland security 

enterprise has not been fully achieved. Some HSIN COIs were being used to 

share information; however, the overall size of the user community and the level 

of system use indicated that further progress was needed. DHS has invested an 

estimated $231 million in HSIN over 9 years but has not yet achieved the 

information sharing capability envisioned. HSIN program management has 

implemented plans and strategies to reorient HSIN through the HSIN Release 3 

upgrade that may, once completed, improve HSIN. Information sharing with 

homeland security partners across Federal, State, local, tribal, and the private 

sector is a critical DHS mission, and the HSIN system could be a critical tool for 

supporting this mission if implemented effectively.

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Director of Operations Coordination and Planning work 

with the Information Sharing and Safeguarding Governance Board and affiliated 

DHS components to:

Recommendation #1: Develop and implement a plan to increase DHS 

components’ adoption of HSIN as their Sensitive but Unclassified information 

sharing portal. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Recommendation #2: Identify and develop a plan to meet user requirements for 

effective content organization, reliable search functionality, and efficient 

organization of COIs in HSIN Release 3. 

We recommend that the Director of Operations Coordination and Planning work 

with the Undersecretary of Intelligence and Analysis to: 

Recommendation #3: Develop and implement a plan to improve 

communication and collaboration with State and local stakeholders to expand 

exposure to HSIN and the capabilities the system can provide. 

Management Comment and OIG Analysis 

We obtained written comments on a draft of this report from the Director of the 

Office of Operations Coordination and Planning. We have included a copy of 

these comments in their entirety in appendix B. 

In the comments, the Director concurred with our recommendations and 

provided details on steps being taken to address specific findings and 

recommendations in the report. We have reviewed management’s comments 

and provided an evaluation of the issues described in the comments below. 

These recommendations are considered open and unresolved until we receive 

and evaluate the Director’s corrective action plans.

In response to recommendation one, the Director concurred and indicated that 

the HSIN program has made incremental progress on user adoption and portal 

consolidation since the Secretary designated HSIN as the Department’s Sensitive 

but Unclassified information sharing portal in 2006. The Director also indicated 

that partnering with the Information Sharing and Safeguarding Governance 

Board will allow the program to garner much needed support to achieve the user 

adoption and portal consolidation goals of the Department. Finally, the Director 

stated that the HSIN program will work with the Information Sharing and 

Safeguarding Governance Board and the Information Sharing Coordinating 

Council to develop and implement a plan to promote greater adoption of HSIN 

as the Department’s target Sensitive but Unclassified portal. We recognize this 

action as a positive step toward addressing this recommendation and look 

forward to learning more about continued progress in the future. 

Responding to recommendation two, the Director concurred and stated that the 

HSIN program continues to develop and implement plans for meeting user 

requirements around effective content organization, reliable search 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

functionality, and efficient organization of COIs in HSIN Release 3. The Director 

also indicated that the program plans to deliver increased search functionality 

and improved content organization in FY 2014. Further, the Director stated that 

the program will leverage the Information Sharing and Safeguarding Governance 

Board and the HSIN Executive Steering Committee to validate user requirements 

gathered by the HSIN program and verified by the HSIN User Working Group. 

We believe that such efforts are good steps toward addressing our 

recommendation and look forward to learning more about continued progress in 

this regard. 

In response to recommendation three, the Director concurred and said that the 

HSIN program will work with the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, 

as well as other DHS offices, as appropriate, to develop and implement 

communications plans that will increase the use of HSIN and expand exposure to 

HSIN and its capabilities. We recognize this action as a positive step toward 

addressing this recommendation. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 22 OIG-13-98
 
 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix A 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

The DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established by the HomelandfSecurityfActf

off2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the InspectorfGeneralfActfoff1978. This 

is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special reports prepared as part of our 

oversight responsibilities to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness within the 

Department. 

As part of our ongoing responsibilities to assess the efficiency, effectiveness, and 

economy of departmental programs and operations, we conducted an audit to 

determine the effectiveness of HSIN in supporting information sharing among select

stakeholders as well as progress made with HSIN since our October 2008 report, DHS’f

EffortsftofImprovefthefHomelandfSecurityfInformationfNetworkf(OIG�09�07). 

We researched and reviewed Federal laws, Department management and acquisition 

directives, and other executive guidance related to IT systems, planning, management, 

and governance. We reviewed recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) and OIG 

reports to determine prior challenges, findings, and recommendations. Additionally, we 

searched the Internet to obtain and review documents and news articles pertaining to 

HSIN and information sharing. Furthermore, we evaluated documents that DHS OPS 

provided in July 2009 on activities to address and close our October 2008 report 

recommendations. We also obtained access to select HSIN COIs to view information 

sharing via the system. Using this information; we designed a data collection approach 

consisting of focused interviews, documentation analysis, site visits, and HSIN system 

demonstrations to conduct our followup review. 

We conducted our audit fieldwork from August to November 2012 at HSIN Program 

Office headquarters in Washington, DC. We met with key Department officials 

responsible for HSIN’s planning, implementation, program management, and 

governance to obtain information on the progress made to resolve challenges identified 

in our prior reports, assess the current status of information sharing among select HSIN 

stakeholders, and determine challenges to the planning and implementation of the HSIN 

system. These officials included members of the DHS OCIO, OPS, I&A, and other 

components. Additionally, we met with members of the HSIN Executive Steering 

Committee, mission advocates, and leaders of stakeholder communities. 

We also met with stakeholders at the following fusion centers: Sacramento, California; 

Salem, Oregon; Atlanta, Georgia; Tallahassee, Florida; Phoenix, Arizona; Austin, Texas; 

and Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Additionally, we met with United States Coast Guard 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

stakeholders in New Orleans, Louisiana, and emergency management stakeholders in 

Austin, Texas, and Gleneden Beach, Oregon. 

At field locations, we met with fusion center directors, intelligence analysts and officers, 

security specialists, antiterrorism coordinators, private sector stakeholders, tribal 

stakeholders, HSIN administrators, and other HSIN users to understand HSIN user 

requirements and system use in the field. We discussed legacy HSIN and the extent to 

which it meets mission information sharing needs, user involvement, communication 

with headquarters, and the upcoming implementation of HSIN Release 3. We also 

discussed the use of HSIN during special events and major HSIN success stories. Where 

possible, we obtained documentation to support the information provided during the 

meetings. 

We conducted this performance audit between August 2012 and January 2013 pursuant 

to the InspectorfGeneralfActfoff1978, as amended, and according to generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our

findings and conclusions based upon our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our 

audit objectives. 

The principal OIG points of contact for this audit are Frank Deffer, Assistant Inspector 

General for Information Technology Audits, and Richard Harsche, Director of Information

Management. Major OIG contributors to the audit are identified in appendix C. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 24 OIG-13-98
 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

Office ofOperalions Coordination 

arrd Planning 

U.S. Department of Homeland ~urlty 

Washington. DC 20528 

Homeland 

Security 

MAY 1 7 2013 

MEMORANDUM FOR: Charles K. Edwards 

Acting Inspector t:?rJ1

FROM: rr , 

Richard Chavez ~ Director, Office of Opera s g::;ination and Planning 

SUBJECT: DHS Office of Inspector General Draft Report: ·'Homeland 

Security Information Network Improvements and Challenges" 

Purpose 

The Office of Operations Coordination and Planning (OPS) appreciates the work of the Office of 

Inspector General (OIG) in conducting this review ofthe l lomeland Security Lnformation 

Network (HSIN). Below are responses to each of the recommendations. 

Discussion 

OIG Recommendation #1: We recommend that the DHS Director of Operations Coordination 

and Planning work with the Information Sharing and Safeguarding Governance Board and 

affiliated Components to: Develop ru1d implement a plan to increase DHS components' adoption 

of II SIN as their Sensitive but Unclassified information sharing portaL 

OPS Response: Concur. The Secretary of Homeland Security identified HSIN as the 

Department's Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU) information sharing portal in 2006, and since 

then. the program has made incremental progress on user adoption and portaJ consolidation. 

Partnering with the Information Sharing and Safeguarding Governance Board (ISSGB) will 

allow the program to garner much needed support to continue to achieve the user adoption and 

portal consolidation goals of the Department. The HSIN program will work with the ISSGB and 

its subordinate council, the Information Sharing Coordinating Council (TSCC), to develop and 

implement a plan to promote greater adoption of HSIN as the Department's target SBU portal. 

OIG Recommendation #12 : We recommend that the DHS Director of Operations Coordination 

and Planning work with the Information Sharing and Safeguarding Governance Board and 

affiliated Components to: Identify and develop a plan to meet user requirements for effective 

content organization, reliable search functionality, and efficient organization of COls in HSIN 

Release 3. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 25 OIG-13-98
 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

OP Response: Concur. The I lSTN program continues to develop and implement plans for 

meeting user requirements around effective content organization. reliable search functionality, 

and efficient organization of Communities of Interest (COls) in HSll\ Release 3 (R3). Currently. 

the HSIN program is migrating users to a new release of the platform called HSIN R3 which has 

a much better organizational structure designed for more efficient information sharing. The 

program is currently working to deliver increased search functionality and improved content 

organization in Fiscal Year 14. The program wiU leverage the ISSGB and the HSIN Executive 

Steering Committee to validate that the plans mee t the user requirements ga~ cred by the li S IN 

program and verified by the II rN User Working Group. 

OIG Recommendation #3: We recommend tha t the DHS Director of Operations Coordination 

and Planning work with the Undersecretary of intelligence and Analysis-to: Develop and 

implement a plan to improve communication and collaboration with tate and local stakeholders 

to expand exposure to HSIN and the capabilities the system can provide. 

U.t'S Response: Concur. llle HSrN program will work with the Undersecretary of Intelligence 

and Analysis, and, as appropriate, other DHS offices with State and local equities, to develop and 

implement communications plans that will increase the use of HSIN and expand exposure to 

HSIN and its capabilities. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 26 OIG-13-98
 
 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix C 

Major Contributors to This Report 

Richard Harsche, Division Director 

Steven Staats, Auditor Manager 

Erin Dunham, Auditor 

Anna Hamlin, Auditor 

Kevin Mullinix, Referencer

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix D 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

Under Secretary, Office of Intelligence and Analysis 

Chief Information Officer, DHS Office of the Chief Information Officer 

OIG Liaison, Office of Operations Planning and Coordination

OIG Liaison, Office of Intelligence and Analysis 

OIG Liaison, Office of the Chief Information Officer 

Director of Local Affairs, Office of Intergovernmental Affairs 

Acting Chief Privacy Officer 

Office of Management and Budget

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner

Congress

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate 

www.oig.dhs.gov 28 OIG-13-98
 
 

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at: @dhsoig. 

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Should you be unable to access our website, you may submit your complaint in writing 

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