AUGMENTING OUR INFLUENCE:

ALLIANCE REVITALIZATION AND

PARTNER DEVELOPMENT

John R. Deni

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AUGMENTING OUR INFLUENCE:

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John R. Deni

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ISBN 1-58487-615-8
v

CONTENTS

Foreword .....................................................................vii

Capstone to Alliances Panel ........................................1 

John R. Deni

1. Pursuing U.S. Strategic Interests in the

 Asia-Pacific: Pivoting Away 

 from Disorder? .........................................................9

William T. Tow 

2. Military Soft Power in the 21st Century:

 Military Exchanges and Partner 

 Development ..........................................................53

Carol Atkinson

3. Rebalancing and the Role of Allies 

 and Partners: Europe, NATO, and the 

 Future of American Landpower ..........................69 

Sean Kay 

About the Contributors ........................................... 117

vii

FOREWORD

The United States prefers to fight in coalitions, and 

has made this clear in both word and deed. Most of the 

key American national security or defense strategies, 

such as the Quadrennial Defense Review report or the 

National Security Strategy, of the last decade or more 

note this fact. In practice, the United States worked 

diligently and tirelessly to construct and maintain coalitions of the willing in both Iraq and Afghanistan. 

American political and military leaders did this—and 

will continue to do this for future conflicts—because 

coalition allies provide both political legitimacy at 

home and abroad for broad national security policies 

and specific military operations, and because coalition 

partners help to shoulder security burdens.

For these reasons, it seemed appropriate and necessary to address the role that allies play today and 

might continue to play in American national security 

formulation and implementation during an era of 

change for the U.S. military, and for the U.S. Army in 

particular. That was the task given to a panel of experts convened by the U.S. Army War College at the 

24th Annual Strategy Conference in April 2013 in Carlisle, PA. Organized and chaired by Dr. John R. Deni 

of the Strategic Studies Institute, the panel—consisting of Dr. William Tow of the Australian National 

University, Dr. Carol Atkinson of the University of 

Southern California, and Dr. Sean Kay of Ohio Wesleyan University—addressed the importance of allied 

and partner contributions to current and future national security challenges and the most effective and 

efficient ways for the United States to leverage those 

contributions in the pursuit of common interests. 
The chapters in this edited volume are based upon 

the presentations of those experts at the Strategy 

Conference, and the Strategic Studies Institute is 

pleased to offer them as part of the ongoing discussion over the future of the U.S. Army in American 

national security.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

viii
1

CAPSTONE TO ALLIANCES PANEL

John R. Deni

During the many years of America’s involvement 

in Afghanistan, allied contributions from across the 

globe have been extraordinarily valuable. Admittedly, the use of caveats by some contributing partners 

created challenges. Occasionally, the military performance of some allies left something to be desired, at 

least as perceived by some.1

Nonetheless, from at least two perspectives, allied contributions were vitally important. First, from 

a political perspective, allied participation provided 

political legitimacy for both U.S. domestic and international audiences. Allied participation also allowed 

the United States to share the political risks with others. Particularly as the conflict there dragged on year 

after year, having international partners strengthened 

legitimacy claims and cushioned what might have 

been a more precipitous drop in public support for 

ongoing operations.

Second, from an operational perspective, every 

pair of allied boots in Afghanistan represented a pair 

that the United States itself did not need to deploy. 

Counterinsurgency doctrine, which the United States 

and its allies pursued in Afghanistan particularly since 

the 2009 surge of forces there, demanded a large troop 

presence on the ground. In order to reach the troop 

levels necessary, the United States turned to its allies, 

and eventually allied troops comprised about onethird of the total foreign troop presence in Afghanistan. The United States may have had the capacity to 

meet this need itself, but it would have required asking for even greater sacrifice from American Soldiers 
2

and their families at a time when Army leaders were 

routinely characterizing the service as “stretched.” 

During the height of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. Army had already reached a one-to-one 

ratio between the duration of each combat tour and 

the amount of time spent at home station with family and for training. Hence, and given the size of the 

all-volunteer U.S. military at that time, to generate 

additional combat brigades for rotation into Iraq and 

Afghanistan would have required dropping below the 

one-to-one ratio by shortening time at home station 

or lengthening combat tours. Moreover, an increase in 

the number of American troops in Afghanistan at any 

given time would have substantially increased the 

costs of operations there.

There is a sense, though, that the war in Afghanistan, as well as the one in Iraq, have together served to 

almost exhaust the United States as well as its allies.2

Evidence for this—at least in terms of political exhaustion—has been seen most recently in the 2013 debate 

over whether to use military force against Syria in 

the wake of the Assad government’s use of chemical 

weapons against civilians. Despite strong arguments 

made by the Barack Obama administration officials 

in favor of upholding the global norm against using 

chemical weapons, and hence justifying an attack on 

Assad’s forces and infrastructure, there was and is 

a strong bias against military engagement in distant 

lands, especially when vital national security interests 

are not immediately at risk.

Added to this apparent shift in willingness to engage in coalition military operations is the potential 

decline—or at least the perceived decline—in Western 

military capabilities. A decade of expensive, distant 

military operations, plus more recent defense budget 
3

austerity in the United States and among most U.S. allies, have combined to sap acquisition efforts over the 

last several years, as well as compel major force structure cuts. The result is that some question not simply 

whether U.S. allies will a play a significant role in any 

America-led coalition in the near future—which is 

largely a political question—but, if so, how they will 

do so, given structural reductions.3

Nevertheless, the United States has made it abundantly clear over the last decade or more, including as 

recently as the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, 

that it prefers to wield military force in a coalition context and that it will look first to its allies in Europe as 

the security partners of choice. For example, the 2010 

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report noted that, 

“Whenever possible, the United States will use force 

in an internationally sanctioned coalition with allies, 

international and regional organizations, and likeminded nations committed to these common principles.”4

 Elsewhere, the report argues that the United 

States has, “. . . an enduring need to build future 

coalitions.”5

 The more recent 2012 Defense Strategic 

Guidance made a similar point: “U.S. forces will 

plan to operate whenever possible with allied and 

coalition forces.”6

 With regard to the importance of 

Europe, that document noted, “Europe is our principal partner in seeking global and economic security, 

and will remain so for the foreseeable future.”7

But it is not simply Europe where America finds 

some of its closest, most capable allies. Australia, 

South Korea, and Japan each maintain significant military capabilities, although with limited power projection platforms and varying degrees of international 

ambition. Regardless, Australia has been an important, non-European force provider in both Iraq and 
4

Afghanistan, while Japan and South Korea offered 

smaller but important medical and reconstruction assistance. Additionally, aside from combat operations 

all three countries are likely to continue to partner 

with the United States to build security and stability throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Japan, in 

particular, has shown a strong interest in building security ties through peacetime engagement across the 

region, and Australia has agreed to host U.S. Marines 

on a rotational basis in Darwin.

Washington is hence confronted with the question 

of whether, when, and how to collaborate with and leverage the remaining capabilities of critical allies and 

other partners in the post-International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) environment. This was among the 

central questions before a panel entitled, “Augmenting Our Influence: Alliance Revitalization and Partner 

Development,” during the U.S. Army War College’s 

Annual Strategy Conference in April 2013. Three expert panelists—Dr. William Tow of Australian National University, Dr. Sean Kay of Ohio Wesleyan 

University, and Dr. Carol Atkinson of the University 

of Southern California—were each asked to consider 

the aforementioned issues, as well as to address how 

the United States should balance the need to maintain 

traditional alliances and partnerships in Europe as it 

places more emphasis on the Indo-Asia-Pacific and 

what Landpower’s role might be in identifying, developing, or maintaining those relationships.

Dr. Tow’s presentation, “Pursuing U.S. Strategic 

Interests in the Asia-Pacific: Pivoting Away From Disorder?” assessed the utility of the rebalancing strategy, the role of allies in that strategy, and the degree 

to which Landpower might form a critical implementing element. Tow found that most of America’s allies 
5

and key partners in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region have 

welcomed Washington’s rebalancing, but, at the same 

time, most are reluctant to embrace it too openly and 

aggressively. Doing so, argued Tow, could place those 

countries in an awkward position vis-à-vis China, 

which has become the most important trading partner for many countries in the region, displacing the 

United States in the process. In sum, while reaching 

for Washington’s outstretched hand, few countries in 

the region want to be placed in the position of having 

to choose between the United States and China. Meanwhile, China views the rebalance skeptically at best, 

and as a potentially hostile policy of containment at 

worst. Trying to manage Chinese perceptions, while 

engaging traditional allies and new partners, will be 

among Washington’s chief challenges in the coming 

years. The role of Landpower in all of this, argued 

Tow, may be severely limited thanks to sequestration 

and defense austerity, relegating most of the military 

components of the rebalance to the Air Force and 

the Navy.

One area where Landpower may play a critically 

important role though, even under conditions of austerity, is in terms of security cooperation, and especially combined education. Dr. Atkinson made just 

this argument in her presentation, “Military Soft Power in the 21st Century: Military Exchanges and Partner 

Development,” in which she posited that the ability to 

co-opt, persuade, and influence the thinking of others 

ultimately supports international peace and stability. 

U.S.-hosted military educational exchange programs 

provide a vitally important means of building individual relationships that form the basis for bilateral 

and multilateral partnerships among the militaries 

of different countries. Atkinson cited data that indi-
6

cates the officers who come to study at U.S. military 

educational institutions are likely to reach positions 

of power in their home countries, and that most of 

the officers return home with positive impressions of 

the United States. Hence American Landpower—and 

especially Landpower schoolhouses—plays an important role in facilitating not simply the transfer of doctrinal or factual information, but also the development 

of positive, beneficial relationships that help to shape 

the security environment.

Whether or not the United States is employing 

Landpower in a strategically coherent fashion in Europe specifically was the subject of Dr. Kay’s presentation, entitled “Rebalancing and the Role of Allies and 

Partners: Europe, NATO, and the Future of American 

Landpower.” Kay argued that cuts to U.S. Army forces in Europe make sense, but only in the context of 

a carefully thought out strategy. In his view, failure 

to align military cuts with strategic goals risks further 

erosion of the transatlantic security architecture and 

misses an opportunity to gain more operational capacity from America’s allies and partners. If Washington can properly incentivize its European allies—for 

example, by further reducing its presence in Europe 

and by allowing a European to hold the top military 

position in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO)—it may yet succeed in spurring its allies to 

invest in increased crisis management and expeditionary capabilities. American Landpower, facing a challenging era of defense austerity in the coming years, 

can play a supporting role in this regard.

These three compelling presentations were based 

upon the chapters that follow in this edited volume. 

Together, they provide important insights for considering whether and how the United States will wield 
7

Landpower in coordination with, and in support of, its 

allies and partners around the world in the advancement of common security interests. The answers to 

such questions are vital to the U.S. Army specifically, 

and the United States more broadly, as it contemplates 

the role of Landpower in a post-Afghanistan era characterized by decreasing defense budgets and contracting end strength.

ENDNOTES - CAPSTONE

1. Jason Motlagh, “For U.S. Troops in Afghanistan, Coalition 

Forces are Mixed Blessing,” Time, December 8, 2010.

2. See, for example, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Strategic Vision: 

America and the Crisis of Global Power, New York: Basic Books, 2012.

3. See Stephen J. Flanagan et al., A Diminishing Transatlantic 

Partnership? The Impact of the Financial Crisis on European Defense 

and Foreign Assistance Capabilities, Washington, DC: Center for 

Strategic and International Studies, 2011.

4. U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 

2010, p. 10.

5. Ibid., p. 74.

6. U.S. Department of Defense, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 2012, p. 4.

7. Ibid., pp. 2-3.

9

CHAPTER 1

PURSUING U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS 

IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC:

PIVOTING AWAY FROM DISORDER?

William T. Tow

America’s role as an unrivaled global hegemon 

may well be ending. There is little consensus in the 

United States or abroad, however, on what type of international order or disorder is replacing it, or how 

Washington and its allies should respond. Yet the 

stakes for realizing success in future U.S. and allied 

grand strategic policy in what is becoming a more 

complicated and diffuse geopolitical environment 

could not be greater, and the challenges impeding 

such success are no less daunting. An “apolar world” 

following a relative U.S. decline in world power could 

result in international anarchy, precipitate regional 

conflicts, intensify ethno-religious strife, and reverse 

the positive effects of globalization. If these outcomes 

are not avoided, the Eurasian land mass, which has 

dominated modern international relations and orderbuilding for centuries, could slip into what Niall Ferguson has characterized as a “New Dark Age.”1

No development more embodies the challenge to 

U.S. primacy than the rise of the People’s Republic of 

China (PRC). Optimists such as Zbigniew Brzezinski 

and former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd anticipate that China and the United States can and will 

co-exist as “giants, but not hegemons.” They argue 

that both America’s capacity for self-renewal as an Atlantic and Pacific power and China’s need to couple its 

economic growth with more sophisticated social and 
10

political adjustments in Chinese society will invariably drive the two countries toward effective mutual 

engagement.2 Pessimists point to both China’s assertive nationalism and its historical patterns of power 

politics leading to mistrust and balancing behavior 

among great powers as evidence that any such modus 

vivendi is a remote prospect.3

Recent fiscal constraints notwithstanding, evidence is growing that the more pessimistic view about 

China’s interests and intentions relative to America’s 

own is gaining traction. In late-2011, U.S. President 

Barack Obama announced that the United States 

would respond to the PRC’s growing military power 

by adopting a posture of “re-balancing” or, as it has 

become more commonly labeled, a “pivot strategy” 

in the Asia-Pacific region.4

 This new posture was introduced as a comprehensive American response to 

intensifying geopolitical change in the Asia-Pacific region by ensuring that the U.S. strategic presence there 

would be substantial and enduring despite U.S. and 

the world’s ongoing financial crises. To support this 

objective, the United States would increase the Pacific 

component of its total international naval deployment 

power from 50 percent to approximately 60 percent by 

2020. It would expand rotational deployments of U.S. 

Marines to Australia as one part of a more concerted 

effort to pursue greater regional force projection capabilities. It would pursue free trade in the region via 

the promotion of a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 

initiative. It would become more engaged in Asia’s 

multilateral security and diplomacy politics. The U.S. 

Department of Defense (DoD) justified Obama’s initiative when it released a Strategic Guidance statement 

in January 2012. This document underscored that:
11

U.S. economic and security interests are inextricably 

linked to developments in the arc extending from the 

Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean 

region and South Asia, creating a mix of evolving challenges and opportunities. Accordingly, while the U.S. 

military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the AsiaPacific region.5

Although China was clearly the major catalyst for 

its adoption, the pivot strategy has actually been represented by its architects as more of a demonstration 

of U.S. resolve for remaining a key politico-strategic 

force in the Asia-Pacific rather than targeting any potential rival. They even insist that, if properly implemented, the pivot could facilitate the finding of common ground with China and underwrite cooperative 

relations with that country where the two countries’ 

interests converge. America’s rebalancing initiative is 

thus intended, as the President’s national security advisor observed in late-2012, to be a strategy for embracing Sino-American cooperation whenever possible, 

while acknowledging that Sino-American differences 

will inevitably occur over some issues.6

 This remains 

the case, they insist, despite the pivot strategy’s critics 

insistence (both in Asia and the West) that it merely 

reflects the latest American efforts to revive the Cold 

War by targeting China as an inevitable American adversary and to pursue a hegemonic strategy to reinforce Washington’s desire for the Pacific to remain “an 

American lake.”7

More concrete policy questions about the pivot 

strategy than those entwined in zero-sum logic have 

since emerged, along with questions regarding the 

implications for American Landpower. It is true that 

most U.S. regional allies and partners have generally 
12

welcomed the American re-balancing initiative as a 

potential counterweight for what they view as intensifying Chinese nationalism and geopolitical assertiveness.8

 Yet, they simultaneously worry that Washington will insist that they be too open in criticizing or 

confronting the Chinese on sensitive regional security 

issues. China, unsurprisingly, has been more skeptical—with various analysts in that country often arguing that the U.S. pivot strategy is merely an updated 

version of the Cold War containment strategy directed 

against China. Official Chinese government statements have been relatively restrained while “nonauthoritative” commentary from retired military officers, media or think tanks has been more hostile.9

Some key policy challenges and patterns are 

emerging that should provide a basis for determining how useful and relevant U.S. re-balancing strategy will be and whether and how U.S. Landpower 

might be an effective tool in achieving that strategy. 

Two such challenges will be discussed here: (1) how to 

facilitate U.S. overarching policy interests in the AsiaPacific relating to the pivot strategy; and (2) how to 

link those interests to America’s overall geopolitical 

interests directed toward Eurasia, with emphasis on 

how U.S. and allied strategy, military deployments, 

and Landpower capabilities could be affected in an 

era of increasing austerity. A viable regional/global 

U.S. strategy nexus, successfully prioritizing and earmarking U.S. strategic resources within Eurasia, will 

become increasingly challenging during a time of intensifying and painful fiscal constraints. 
13

THE PIVOT STRATEGY AND 

U.S. GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS

Separated from Asia and Europe by two vast oceans 

and blessed with more navigable internal waterways 

and connecting arable land than any other country, 

the United States has been and remains the world’s 

unrivaled maritime power. Its fundamental security 

has been underwritten by the projection of sufficient 

naval (and air) power to control the ocean approaches 

to North America, to protect its international maritime supply lines and, when required, to dominate 

critical Eurasian confluences and chokepoints through 

the waging of successful expeditionary warfare.10 The 

U.S. Marines were created to protect U.S. naval elements against raids by hostile parties and to carry out 

similar operations against selected adversaries during naval operations. The U.S. Army was originally 

formed to defend the long U.S. eastern coastline, and 

operate in the country’s expanding western frontiers. 

Both of these services later expanded their missions 

to include both large-scale conventional fighting in 

overseas combat areas and counterinsurgency operations.11 They did so, however, to supplement the 

predominantly U.S. offshore power projection strategies underwritten by naval capabilities and later by 

airpower to ensure security of the North American 

homeland (and, by extension via the Monroe Doctrine, 

the Western Hemisphere) and to preserve U.S. global 

commercial interests through ensuring American control of the world’s oceans. 

Over the past 7 decades, Washington has expanded upon these two missions by adding a third: the prevention of any Eurasian continental power emerging 

in ways that could challenge U.S. global primacy. Rus-
14

sia and China are often nominated as the most likely 

such peer competitors. However, Russia’s inability to 

overcome a poor climate that limits its agricultural 

production and distribution infrastructure, and the 

permeability of its geographic boundaries, constrain 

its power. China’s interminable social problems have 

combined with a lack of maritime assets and reach 

to render it thus far unlikely to match or overtake its 

American rival over the short term. The United States, 

by contrast, has been able to deploy its Landpower 

in ways to contain the Soviet bloc from expanding 

throughout all of Europe during the Cold War. It has 

stationed a sufficiently effective combination of land 

and offshore assets in East Asia to prevent China from 

projecting its strategic assets beyond its own peripheries and into the broader central/eastern Pacific.12

The Barack Obama administration’s adoption of 

the pivot strategy merely confirmed what was already 

obvious to all: The Asia-Pacific or broader “IndoPacific” region is emerging as an increasingly critical 

element of contemporary international relations and 

therefore as a key component in American global strategy. “Core” American interests are clearly embedded 

in the pivot strategy initiative. These include: defending the U.S. homeland from emerging regional threats 

(i.e., long-range Chinese and burgeoning North Korean nuclear weapons systems); preventing great power 

wars (such as between China and Japan) that could 

spill over to undermine U.S. strategic and economic 

viability; maintaining allied security; preventing or 

at least containing the spread of weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD); ensuring an open and liberal international trading system; and advancing democracy 

or political liberalization throughout the Asia-Pacific 

region and internationally.13
15

In March 2011, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for 

East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt M. Campbell reiterated a five-pronged approach the administration 

has embraced to protect these interests. Geopolitical 

components of this approach include: (1) deepening 

and modernizing U.S. bilateral security alliances in 

the region; (2) broadening U.S. engagement with other 

“regional strategic partners” such as Indonesia, India, 

New Zealand, and Singapore; (3) pursuing a “predictable, stable, and comprehensive” Sino-American relationship; (4) ensuring meaningful U.S. participation in 

the region’s emerging multilateral security architecture; and (5) sustaining a “confident and aggressive” 

U.S. trade and economic strategy. Campbell linked 

soft power policy components such as promoting 

democratic values, human rights, and the rule of law 

in the region to these five “hard power” components.14

The pivot strategy, as it evolved throughout late-2011 

and 2012, was designed to project and sustain U.S. 

influence in an Asian region that has intermittently 

questioned the American will to consistently do so 

over time.

To what extent have these five components underlying the success of the pivot strategy been successfully realized? To date, the record has been mixed. For 

example, U.S. budget cuts resulting from sequestration and other austerity measures, coupled with other 

strategic and diplomatic factors, have complicated 

U.S. strategy. In terms of “Landpower” capabilities, 

for example, plans to reduce the U.S. Army’s active 

duty strength from 570,000 to 490,000 clearly affect 

the United States’ ability to conduct large-scale operations. Yet, in 2011, the U.S. defense budget remained 

nearly twice as large as the next nine countries combined ($739.3 billion versus $486.54 billion) and was 
16

sustained at parity levels with Cold War defense 

spending.15 It is evident, however, that the Obama 

administration has attempted to combine military capabilities with the broader diplomatic and economic 

measures required to realize the pivot strategy’s 

basic objectives.

Modernizing Bilateral Security Alliances.

Washington’s “modernization” of relations with 

its bilateral allies has been marked by a series of 

countervailing trends. Japan—often characterized as 

the “lynchpin” of U.S. strategy and force presence in 

Asia—remains home for approximately 38,000 U.S. 

military personnel (including 2,000 Army, 18,000 

Marine, 6,000 Navy, and 12,000 Air Force personnel), 

43,000 military dependents, and 5,000 U.S. DoD civilian employees. Shaped and updated by intermittently 

changing Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation and Japan’s National Defense Program Outline, 

the U.S. Forces Japan mission is to develop plans for 

the defense of Japan and “if contingencies arise, to 

assume operational control of assigned and attached 

U.S. forces for the execution of those plans.”16 The 

recent shift in Japan’s defense posture toward developing a more “dynamic deterrence” strategy to facilitate that country’s ability to respond to a wider array 

of contingencies, and to work more closely with the 

United States and other possible defense partners, has 

been welcomed in Washington.17 So, too, has the willingness of Japan’s Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) 

and its Central Readiness Force to upgrade its training 

with U.S. Army Japan in the aftermath of the March 

2011 Tohuku earthquake to enhance force mobility, 

command and control, and other operational capa-
17

bilities for both conventional military contingencies 

and broader security missions such as disaster relief.18

Intra-alliance tensions, however, are fueled by the 

long-standing resistance of substantial portions of the 

Okinawan populace to the U.S. military presence and 

operations on that island and, more recently, by intensified U.S. concerns over the Japanese Prime Minister 

Shinzo Abe government’s assertive nationalism applied toward its differences with China over territorial 

issues in the East China Sea. 

U.S.-South Korean security ties warmed noticeably 

during President Lee Myung-bak’s administration 

(2008-12), and there is no evidence this will change 

under his successor, Park Geun-hye. Since her ascension to office in early 2013, for example, there has been 

a slight increase in U.S. Landpower deployed in the 

Republic of Korea (ROK) (up from 28,000 to 30,000 

U.S. forces), more intense and diverse military exercises between the two countries’ military components 

(including the first large-scale river crossing training 

in more than a decade) and the deployment of the 

U.S. Army’s 23rd chemical battalion (also capable of 

operating in nuclear and biological warfare environments) to a base north of Seoul. More broadly, there 

is nearly unanimous support for the U.S.-South Korea 

alliance in the latter country (80-95 percent according 

to recent polling) as the North Korean nuclear threat 

intensifies. However, a strong majority of South Koreans—62 percent—regard Japan as a threat to their 

country.19 South Korea’s wartime memories and ongoing territorial disputes with Japan, undercut American 

desires for greater intra-allied collaboration in Northeast Asia. South Korean reluctance to assume wartime 

command of allied forces by 2015, the evolving nature 

of U.S. extended deterrence guarantees in the region 
18

as North Korea develops its nuclear capabilities, and 

Seoul’s concern that it may be distancing itself too 

much from China as its major trading partner and as 

a moderating force vis-à-vis North Korea, are other 

sources of future stress between the United States and 

its South Korean ally.20

President Obama’s initial address outlining how 

the United States would execute the pivot strategy 

was delivered in Australia. That ally’s assent to host 

rotational deployments of U.S. Marines constitutes a 

core element in the strategy’s implementation. So, too, 

does the recent participation of Royal Australian Air 

Force personnel in training exercises with U.S. and 

Japanese counterparts in Guam, the 3-month embedding of an Australian Perry-class frigate in Yokosuka, 

Japan, to patrol as part of the USS George Washington

Carrier Strike Group, and Australia’s hosting of exercise Southern Jackaroo in May 2013—the first ground 

exercise involving the three countries held in that 

country. As in the case of South Korea, a large majority of Australians (74 percent) supported the President’s initiative. Those who did not cited prospects of 

China punishing Australia by diverting its substantial 

trade away from it or of Australia getting caught between its American security ally and its increasingly 

dominant Chinese trading partner in a future SinoAmerican confrontation.21 Australian policymakers 

understand that, apart from the shared values which 

underscore Australia’s relations with the United 

States, their country could not possibly establish the 

scope and depth of security ties with the PRC that it 

has developed over the past century with the United 

States. They also know that the pivot strategy highlights Australia’s importance to the United States as 

an ally which can project substantial and positive in-
19

fluence throughout Southeast Asia—an area where 

China has recently made a major effort to gain strategic leverage at U.S. expense. As Peter Jennings, director of one of Australia’s most respected think tanks on 

defense policy recently observed:

While in the past Australia’s geography made it too 

remote to be useful other than as a location for intelligence collection, Darwin in the north and the port 

facilities of HMAS Stirling in Western Australia now 

offer the means for the United States to sustain a more 

substantial presence in Southeast Asia and the Indian 

Ocean.22

The Philippines and Thailand remain Washington’s two formal security allies in Southeast Asia, yet 

both have oscillated between embracing and distancing themselves from U.S. power. The so-called global 

war on terror launched in the aftermath of September 

11, 2001 (9/11) was a catalyst for the warming of these 

two bilateral alliances after both the Philippines and 

Thailand had distanced themselves from the United 

States during the 1990s. Filipino nationalism—leading to the U.S. departure from its basing operations 

in that country—and Thai propensities to “bend with 

the wind” toward aligning more with the perceived 

rising regional power (China), had worked to render 

uncertain the context and future of the two countries’ 

mutual defense treaties with the United States. During 

the years immediately following al-Qaeda’s attacks on 

American soil, however, Filipino and Thai policymakers worked with their U.S. counterparts to combat 

jihadist forces throughout Southeast Asia—the designated “second front” where the forces of international 

terrorism had made serious inroads. The containment of the extremist Abu Sayyaf terrorist group on 
20

the island of Basilan during 2002-03 and the capture 

of Hambali, a top al-Qaeda operative, near Bangkok 

in August 2003 were illustrative. However, such collaboration generated robust criticism within both the 

Philippines and Thailand. Filipino critics argued, for 

instance, that the presence of U.S. forces in such joint 

exercises and operations such as Balikatan conducted 

in Mindanao was unconstitutional and could only aggravate the Muslim population in the southern Philippines.23 Nevertheless, U.S. officials have negotiated 

an accelerated schedule of joint training exercises including a more extensive rotational presence of U.S. 

forces in the country and the U.S.-Philippines Mutual 

Defense Treaty has been formally reaffirmed.24 The 

latest Balikatan exercise conducted in April 2013 was 

particularly noteworthy in emphasizing Landpower 

projection capabilities. U.S. Army spokesmen underscored the training objective as developing the Armed 

Forces of the Philippines’ rapid deployment capability to deploy forces anywhere in the Philippines archipelago over 4 days (within a projected time frame 

of 6 years) and to conduct “a full spectrum of combat 

operations.”25

Many Thais have regarded the United States more 

skeptically since the 1997 Asian financial crisis when, 

from Thailand’s perspective, Washington failed to assist a reeling Thai economy. China offered Thailand 

modest economic assistance, restrained from devaluing the renminbi which would have damaged the Thai 

baht even more severely, and surpassed the United 

States as Thailand’s second largest trading partner in 

2007. In 2010, Thailand declared a strategic partnership 

with China. This contrasted to the U.S. application of 

sanctions against Thailand following the latter country’s military coup in 2006; Thai politicians’ criticism 
21

of perceived U.S. intervention in their country’s domestic politics as a self-appointed mediator in clashes 

between the Thai “red-shirt” and “yellow-shirt” factions following Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s 

exile; and Thailand’s refusal of a U.S. request to use 

the U-Tapao base for atmospheric studies that was 

viewed by many Thais as a cover for U.S. military operations.26 President Obama’s November 2012 visit to 

Thailand was, however, received favorably and a new 

“joint vision statement” was signed by U.S. Secretary 

of Defense Leon Panetta 3 days earlier. Nevertheless, 

the extent to which the latest U.S.-Thailand reaffirmation of their bilateral security ties reflects actual substance over cosmetics remains to be determined.

Broadening Regional Partnerships. 

Widening the network of U.S. security ties to include other appropriate security partners as part of the 

Obama administration’s pivot strategy entails a different set of challenges. Unlike its more formal bilateral 

relationships with well-established and concrete instrumentalities for negotiation and management that 

exist to adjudicate intra-alliance interests and differences, the U.S. security ties with informal partners are 

usually less concrete and based on collaboration over 

specific issue-areas. 

Three such partners currently are notable as pivot 

strategy collaborators. India, New Zealand, and Singapore are able to contribute to the security of U.S. 

global interests in tangible ways. India was designated by the January 2012 U.S. DoD Strategic Guidance

statement, for example, as a “regional economic anchor and provider of security in the broader Indian 

Ocean region.”27 It has developed limited interoper-
22

ability, through the Malabar joint military exercises, 

with U.S. naval units and through mutual disaster 

relief efforts. The U.S. Army and its Indian counterpart are scheduled to hold a joint military exercise 

highlighting amphibious operations in southern India 

during September-October 2013.28 It sustains a healthy 

arms procurement relationship with U.S. defense 

manufacturers.29

The United States explicitly signaled that it considered New Zealand to have become a part of its regional 

re-balancing strategy when U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton signed the Wellington Declaration when 

visiting that city in 2010. This development was, from 

Washington’s perspective, a logical geopolitical response to China’s increasingly active role in the South 

Pacific. There was an acknowledgement by both sides 

that the two countries’ disagreement over the role in 

the region of nuclear armed or capable ships and aircraft could be finessed in the interest of reconstituting 

better strategic relations.30 Landpower coordination 

has recently been upgraded, with the New Zealand 

Defence Force (NZDF) conducting a joint exercise—

Alam Hafa—in New Zealand’s North Island with U.S. 

Army and Marine Corp and Australian Army counterparts in May 2013, focusing on peacekeeping and 

counterinsurgency scenarios. Although Alam Hafa has 

been conducted by the NZDF with Australian contingents since 1998, U.S. participation has been secured 

only during the past 4-5 years.31

In July 2005, the United States signed a Strategic Framework Agreement for a Closer Cooperation 

Partnership in Defense and Security with Singapore. 

While the terms of the agreement were not publicly 

disclosed, it is thought that it strengthened already existing arrangements for U.S. ships and combat aircraft 
23

to access that city-state’s military facilities and authorized greater levels of defense technology sharing.32

The Singapore Army and the U.S. Pacific Command 

(USPACOM) have well-developed relations through 

professional exchanges and such military exercises as 

Lightning Strike and Tiger Balm that rotate between 

Singapore and Hawaii and which focus on urban operations and on training in counter-improvised explosive device operations.33

The history of security relations between the United States and these informal partners has not always 

been smooth, and current differences still provide 

an element of caution in their management. India remains a self-declared nonaligned power and is still at 

odds with Washington over various diplomatic and 

military issues. These include legislation over the liability of nuclear accidents in India precluding American companies from fully participating in India’s civilian nuclear development, lagging defense trade in 

recent years, and problems in reaching consensus on 

various foundational agreements for strengthening 

defense ties.34 To date, the China factor appears to be 

insufficiently compelling to project Indo-U.S. strategic relations into truly more comprehensive levels of 

cooperation. 

Caution also conditions New Zealand/U.S. relations, notwithstanding Wellington’s recent joint declarations with the United States on improved bilateral 

security ties. It has adopted a much softer line toward 

the PRC on various issues than those in Washington 

concerned with China’s rising power would find acceptable. It has entered into a tripartite agreement 

with China and the Cook Islands to render aid for improving the water quality in that small Pacific island 

nation. It has insisted that China be allowed to enter 
24

the TPP agreement as a means of avoiding Beijing’s 

isolation or the forging of a regional containment posture against it. New Zealand has explored strengthening a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 

(RCEP) initiative with the Association of Southeast 

Asian Nations Plus Three (ASEAN + 3), Australia, and 

India—a framework that excludes the United States 

and other non-Asian members of the TPP.35 Moreover, 

it remains solidly committed to its anti-nuclear posture 

which still impedes a full return to pre-1986 defense 

relations with the United States before New Zealand’s 

de facto abrogation from the Australia, New Zealand, 

United States (ANZUS) alliance. 

As another highly developed but small state, Singapore remains sensitive to the need for maintaining 

a balance in its relations between China, its Malay 

neighbors, and external powers such as the United 

States. Accordingly, as a small city-state with a 78 percent Chinese population, Singapore is unlikely to ever 

directly oppose China in a future regional conflict, 

and this may partially explain why it declined a 2003 

offer by Washington to be granted a Major Non-North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Ally status (an 

offer that the Philippines and Thailand accepted).36

Relevant in all three cases discussed here is the improbability that the U.S. Congress would ever ratify a 

formal bilateral defense treaty with another country 

some 7 decades into the post-World War II era, leaving 

successive presidential administrations to pursue security ties through more informal arrangements such 

as memoranda of understandings or “coalitions of the 

willing” forged in response to specific issue-areas.
25

The Pivot Strategy and Stable Sino-American 

Relations.

The most important determinant of the pivot strategy’s ultimate success is the extent to which China can 

accept Washington’s assurances that a permanent U.S. 

presence and influence in the Asia-Pacific has broader 

and positive diplomatic and economic ramifications 

than merely reinforcing military strategy and alliances. That acceptance, in turn, will be predicated on 

China’s ability to convince its regional neighbors that 

their uncertainties about a China-dominated region 

are unwarranted, and that a China growing strong 

will play to their own national interests over the long 

term.37 A positive outcome to this process means that 

China and the United States could conceivably work 

together toward defusing regional security dilemmas 

and flashpoints. Skeptics insist that:

[I]t would not be easy for Obama to explain to the 

Chinese people that America’s military repositioning 

in the Asia-Pacific is not meant to contain China—because countering China is exactly the aim of America’s 

pivot toward Asia. Any serious suggestions to the contrary are either strategically blind or downright disingenuous.38

Several test cases for how effectively China and 

the United States can work together to stabilize regional stability are emerging. North Korean nuclear 

developments constitute the most urgent crisis. War 

avoidance will require delicate coordination between 

Beijing and Washington to avert another conflict on 

the Korean peninsula and, if war does break out, containing such a contingency from spilling over to affect 

Japan and the rest of Northeast Asia. Both China and 
26

the United States have strong interests in avoiding a 

renewed Korean conflict. China’s domestic imperative for pursuing sustained economic development 

and domestic political reform uninterrupted by external conflicts is becoming increasingly apparent. This 

is true notwithstanding powerful factions within the 

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) clamoring to support 

North Korea as a means of advancing Chinese nationalism. Exhausted from its involvement in two protracted conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq and from its 

role of leading the global war on terror, a financially 

drained America is hardly prepared to wage another 

large-scale military operation in Korea. 

At first glance, North Korea’s Landpower is formidable, given its million-plus person army, numbers 

of tanks, aircraft, and ships, and its vast array of artillery capable of decimating Seoul. It fields the world’s 

fourth largest army (behind China, the United States, 

and India) comprising approximately 5 percent of the 

country’s population (1.2 million out of 24 million). 

Yet, its true capabilities for sustaining any invasion 

it may initiate against South Korea below the threshold of introducing WMD remain dubious. Most of its 

conventional weapons systems are clearly outdated. It 

has lacked the fuel, training, and money to underwrite 

viable defense modernization programs, opting to 

divert scarce resources into its nuclear programs—it 

concentrates on building such asymmetric capabilities 

as information warfare, ballistic missiles, long-range 

artillery, special-operations forces, and WMD.39 It adheres, unfortunately however, to a military posture 

featuring a high level of politico-military risk. The alleged North Korean torpedoing of the South Korean 

corvette Cheonan and the shelling of the South Korean 

island of Yeonpyeong in March and November 2010, 

respectively, are illustrative. 
27

An assessment offered by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) almost a decade ago 

still seems relevant in describing the current force 

balance on the peninsula. U.S. military contingents 

stationed in South Korea—now numbering around 

28,500 military personnel—along with approximately 

650,000 active-duty South Korean troops could withstand a North Korean conventional military invasion. 

But pre-emptive strikes against North Korea of the 

type that now seem to increasingly be shaping South 

Korea’s defense posture would be fraught with steep 

risks including the prospect of escalation to a wider 

conflict. These risks include possible Chinese military intervention on North Korea’s behalf (a formal 

security treaty originating in 1961 is still technically 

in force), and North Korea’s introduction of WMD to 

inflict maximum damage against Seoul, South Korea’s 

other urban areas and more distant targets in Japan 

and Guam. “In essence,” the IISS has hopefully concluded, “the military standoff that marked the end of 

the Korean War prevails.”40

Confronted with very real prospects of a destructive military conflict on the peninsula that would lead 

to widespread regional instability, the United States 

and China have little choice but to engage in and coordinate painfully difficult regional and international 

diplomacy to convince Pyongyang to opt for the negotiating table over military confrontation. A key aspect 

of such diplomacy, however, will be China’s propensity not to follow through in enforcing those sanctions 

against North Korea it has agreed to support in the 

United Nations (UN), and its role in pressuring the 

North to return to the Six Party Talks or other negotiations intended to denuclearize the Korean peninsula. 

As one analyst has correctly observed, “China, if it re-
28

ally wants to become a global leader, needs to pass 

this very critical litmus test.”41

Sino-Japanese tensions over the Senkaku/Diaoyu 

Islands in the East China Sea have recently emerged 

as the other Northeast Asian flashpoint that could escalate out of control if not carefully managed. This territorial dispute escalated in September 2012 when the 

Japanese government purchased three of the main islands from their private (Japanese) owner in response 

to pressures by the nationalist governor of Tokyo to 

buy them if it declined to do so. The purchase offended China, which had long claimed ownership of this 

territory. It led to tense maneuvers between Chinese 

and Japanese air and naval units patrolling the area. 

The United States has acknowledged that its alliance 

commitments to Japan include defending its forces if 

they are attacked while defending Japan’s administration of the islands. Washington has been equally clear, 

however, in resisting what many observers view to be 

the Abe government’s excessively nationalist tendencies to challenge China’s sovereign claims of Senkaku/

Diaoyu.42 Those claims reflect what China deems as 

its core interest in restoring its greatness by annexing 

what it regards as “lost territories.” While hardly inclined to abandon Japan in the event China were to 

initiate overt military action to resolve this crisis in its 

favor, the United States equally wishes to avoid being 

entrapped into waging war over a Japanese ally’s territorial dispute that falls short of constituting one of 

its own fundamental strategic interests. 

This same posture has long shaped Washington’s 

position toward territorial disputes in the South China Sea. China’s claims for sovereign control over the 

Spratly Islands have positioned it at odds with rival 

claims by various ASEAN members. The United States 
29

insists that the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 

allows it to conduct military exercises and operations 

in exclusive economic zones without coastal state notice or consent. China insists that such activities violate 

its domestic and international law. Future maritime 

incidents occurring directly between the United States 

and Chinese navies or resulting from China challenging the Philippines (a formal U.S. ally) in the contested territory could escalate into crises that would 

be increasingly hard to defuse.43 Unlike the Cold War 

when the Soviet Union and the United States negotiated a series of confidence-building measures such 

as accidents-at-sea agreements, no commensurate 

dialogue mechanisms currently exist for Asia-Pacific 

maritime contingencies or locales. Effective initiatives 

are urgently required to clarify both when U.S. forces 

may be introduced to safeguard American interests 

in maintaining innocent passage through these waters—constituting one of the world’s major trading 

lifelines—and to clarify the extent and limits of U.S. 

obligations to allies.

The United States and Multilateral Security in Asia.

Several forms of Asian multilateralism relate to 

the pivot strategy and overall U.S. strategic interests. 

Interactions involving regional navies engaging in 

joint exercises, confidence-building dialogues, and 

ship visits constitute a familiar kind of regional multilateralism that dovetails into the pivot strategy’s 

broader vision of military diplomacy. As Assistant 

Secretary Campbell recently observed in a speech delivered in Sydney, the United States and China must 

become more instrumental in establishing rules of the 

road that would apply to future incidents or crises in 

ways designed to avoid conflict escalation. They must 
30

engage in such norm-building, however, as part of a 

multilateral process, involving ASEAN members and 

other relevant parties, and addressing such complex 

emerging issues as climate change and cyber security. 

Developing and strengthening habits of communication and predictability in response to widely observed 

norms often can be best facilitated within multilateral 

regional and international settings.44 China’s recent 

involvement in drawing up a sanctions package targeted toward its nominal ally, North Korea, within 

the UN Security Council framework is graphically 

illustrative. 

Sustaining momentum for multilateral security 

initiatives will not be easy. China still harbors suspicions toward various multilateral military exercises 

that it regards as largely designed to contain its rising power. Chinese analysts have been especially 

critical of such exercises as the annual Cobra Gold 

multinational exercises co-hosted by Thailand and 

the United States and involving Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia, which have territorial disputes 

with China. One Chinese naval expert has complained 

that while China has sent observers to Cobra Gold 

since 2002, the invitation for so many rival claimants 

to participate points to an American desire to generate bargaining chips that could be applied against 

China in the region over time. China, it is asserted, 

should host its own multilateral military exercises to 

counterbalance this perceived U.S. strategy.45 China 

has also opposed many regional countries’ preference 

for pursuing inclusive versions of multilateralism as 

represented by the East Asia Summit, which includes 

the United States as a member, preferring more Asiancentric models such as the ASEAN+3 configuration, 

which emerged in the aftermath of the 1997-98 Asian 

financial crisis. 
31

Beijing’s exclusivist orientation contradicts what 

many U.S. analysts believe to be a critical need for 

policy collaboration and resource sharing in the aftermath of a major regional crisis, such as a renewed Korean conflict. The U.S. Army War College’s respected 

analyst Steven Metz has speculated that if such a war 

began “with out-of-the-blue North Korean missile 

strikes, China could conceivably even contribute to a 

multilateral operation to remove the Kim regime.”46

Bruce Bennett and Jennifer Lind’s recent assessment of 

a government collapse in North Korea either through 

military defeat or internal implosion anticipates that 

complex military operations entailing postwar stabilization and humanitarian relief would be far-reaching 

in terms of global impact and potentially catastrophic 

implications:

Perhaps the greatest danger is that countries will send 

their militaries in without coordination to stabilize 

the area or to secure the WMD. The specter of Chinese forces racing south while U.S. and South Korean 

troops race north is terrifying given the experience 

of the Korean War, a climate of suspicion among the 

three countries, and the risk of escalation to the nuclear level.47

Regional Trade and the Pivot Strategy.

The pivot strategy’s three major themes—security, 

economy, and democracy—are intended to reinforce 

each other. It was therefore hardly coincidental that 

President Obama underscored the strategy’s economic dimension by hosting the annual Asia-Pacific 

Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Honolulu in 

November 2011 just prior to highlighting the strategy’s military and normative components in his speech 
32

to the Australian Parliament that same month. At the 

APEC meeting, Obama promoted the TPP, insisting 

that this initiative was gaining momentum. For it to 

acquire enduring significance, however, the TPP will 

need to fulfil a “mutually agreed prosperity” posture 

entailing Chinese participation on the basis of SinoAmerican economic interdependence. China would 

also need to recognize the legitimacy of the U.S. historic commercial and trading roles in the Asia-Pacific 

and the need for the region’s smaller countries to “rebalance asymmetries” in their bilateral trade with China via TPP affiliation.48 To date, however, Beijing has 

viewed the TPP as a hostile American effort to instill 

a containment policy through stealth that is directed 

toward China. Analysis provided by Xinhua, for 

example, observed that:

The TPP, which pointedly excludes China, is widely 

seen as a thinly-disguised counterweight to free trade 

blocs in the region involving China and other Asian 

countries. In rare tough rhetoric, Obama also pointed 

a finger at China for not playing by the rules in trade 

and economic relations, pledging to ‘continue to speak 

out and bring action’ on issues such as currency and 

intellectual property rights.49

At an ASEAN summit in November 2012, China 

reaffirmed ASEAN+3 as its preferred vehicle for regional economic management. It begrudgingly accepted a twist to economic institution-building—complementing ASEAN+3 with a new regional grouping, 

the RCEP, initially comprised of ASEAN+3 members, 

India, Australia and New Zealand. RCEP’s membership formula is inclusive (the United States and other 

states would be free to join once the organization’s 

rules and infrastructure were in place). RCEP does not 
33

require the same degree of economic liberalization as 

does the TPP (in the areas of labor rights protection, 

environmental standards, reformed state-owned enterprises, intellectual property, and so on), affording 

China greater leeway to pursue bilateral trade and 

investment ties with its neighbors and distancing it 

from the imperatives for domestic economic and (by 

implication) political reform. Japan’s recent interest in 

TPP affiliation, moreover, has obvious geo-economic 

implications for China. Embroiled in a major territorial dispute with Japan and apprehensive over what 

it perceives as the intensification of Japanese nationalism, China is less likely to view the TPP and RCEP 

as convergent paths to the same objective—a massive 

free-trade zone in Asia—than as competitive designs 

for organizing future Asian economic interaction.50

Promoting U.S. (and democratic allied) trading 

interests effectively relies on the U.S. ability to sustain regional influence and maintain a viable forward 

force presence in the Asia-Pacific. Such attributes 

provide necessary levels of breathing space needed 

to allow the complex process of regional economic 

organization to evolve and mature. U.S. military assets can be applied to a wide variety of traditional 

and nontraditional security contingencies that are 

relevant to preserving economic stability. The use of 

USPACOM augmentation teams to facilitate constructive regional engagement in humanitarian and disaster relief missions, for example, underscores U.S. use 

of Army, Marine Corps, and other military personnel 

to complement diplomatic and economic approaches 

for realizing and sustaining regional stabilization.51
34

RELATING THE PIVOT TO U.S. “EURASIAN” 

STRATEGY

A key question emanating from Washington’s renewed strategic focus on Asia is how the pivot strategy will affect U.S. willingness and ability to maintain 

alliances and partnerships in Europe. The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance statement acknowledged that 

the world’s changing strategic landscape meant that 

the U.S. military posture toward Europe must evolve 

by adopting a “Smart Defense” approach to future 

Eurasian contingencies.52 At the 49th Annual Munich 

Security conference convened in February 2013, Vice 

President Joe Biden nevertheless maintained that 

Europe remained the “cornerstone and catalyst for 

America’s engagement with the world.”53 U.S. Deputy 

Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter emphasized U.S. 

determination to implement: 

approaches related to and aligned with the NATO 

Response Force concept of a highly ready and technologically advanced multinational force made up of 

land, air, maritime and special operations forces components that can quickly deploy.

In this context, Carter insisted the new U.S. defense 

strategy of rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region is: 

not a rebalancing away from Europe because our interests are enduring here . . . . Europe is a source and 

not a consumer of security in today’s world . . . and 

we look . . . to rebalance with Europe, not away from 

Europe.54

Citing President Obama’s 2012 Defense Strategic 

Guidance as the operative framework, he stated that 
35

the United States would work with its European allies 

to research, acquire, and deploy cutting-edge technologies in such areas as special operations, intelligence, 

surveillance, reconnaissance, space, and cyberspace.

Despite this upbeat assessment and the relatively 

positive outcomes of recent NATO military operations in Libya, it remains unclear to what extent U.S. 

European allies will provide the levels of support that 

the 2012 U.S. Defense Strategic Guidance anticipated. 

In June 2011, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 

castigated America’s NATO partners over “shortages 

in military spending and political will” and warned 

that the alliance faced a “dim, if not dismal future” 

if the European member-states failed to increase their 

defense expenditures and responsibilities relative to 

U.S. spending and commitments.55 Currently, NATO 

Europe spends on average about 1.6 percent gross 

domestic product (GDP) on defense (with Britain, 

France, and Germany comprising the vast bulk of this 

outlay—all other European members account for just 

7.5 percent) and prospects are dim that this trend soon 

will be reversed.56 That even the larger NATO allies 

would expend their resources to support the U.S. pivot strategy in Asia is even more remote, with at least 

some European policymakers reportedly aggrieved 

when the Obama administration first announced 

the Guidance initiative.57 They have demonstrated 

much concern about the loss of sovereign control of 

military strategy and defense industrial jobs that the 

strategy implies. 

Facing increased budgetary strain, U.S. policymakers have likewise adjusted U.S. force deployments in 

the NATO theater. Until recently, 88,000 of the 160,000 

U.S. military personnel stationed overseas were deployed in Europe, while over half of all 50 U.S. bases 
36

located overseas (28) were on that continent. Recent 

studies by the RAND Corporation and the Congressional Budget Office estimated that ongoing U.S. Air 

Force and U.S. Army operations in Europe each cost 

around $1.7 billion annually.58 The Obama administration has announced European theater force cuts 

of 11,000 personnel. These cuts will leave just under 

70,000 U.S. military personnel in Europe, with initial 

reductions of basing operations in Germany and more 

such cuts on the way.59 The United States has also delayed plans to deploy missile defense systems in Poland and Romania, and funding initially earmarked 

for that initiative will be directed to pay for ground 

based interceptor (GBI) systems to be deployed in 

Alaska. The latter is intended to defend against future 

North Korean and Iranian offensive missile systems 

capable of hitting U.S. targets.60

If the U.S. budget sequestration process evolves 

without resolution, U.S. power projection capabilities across Eurasia, along with traditional alliance 

objectives and missions, will clearly be affected. In 

the aftermath of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, U.S. 

Landpower capabilities are particularly susceptible to 

budget reviews and requisite spending reductions.61

These will not, however, be without restraint unless 

the United States decides that it will no longer be a 

global military power. Forward force deployments in 

Eurasia remain too cost-effective and geopolitically 

symbolic for that outcome to be acceptable to U.S. 

force planners. The American force presence in Europe directly supports U.S. strategic objectives in the 

Middle East, Afghanistan, and other extra-European 

or “out-of-area” theaters of operation. The U.S. Army’s 

21st Theater Sustainment Command operating out of 

Kaiserslautern, Germany, for example, provides criti-
37

cal logistical support for the U.S. Central Command 

which coordinates American military operations in 

the Middle East, Africa, and Central Asia. Over the 

past decade, around 75,000 U.S. Army Europe soldiers 

have deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan.62

Growing budgetary constraints, however, render 

both the geographic prioritization of American military resources and the conduct of efficient joint force 

operations inevitable. The pivot strategy anticipates 

that the greatest potential threats to U.S. national 

security interests will be state-centric challenges in 

Asia and extremist jihadist organizations in the Middle East, with strong prospects that the two types of 

threats could become increasingly linked over the next 

2 decades. The U.S. Army has adopted The Army Capstone Concept (ACC) to ensure that it will fit seamlessly 

into the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 

2020 designed to meet these two threats.63 The ACC 

anticipates and justifies the Army’s conversion from a 

force designed to fight and win two major wars simultaneously, to one that is expeditionary and does many 

things well. It assumes that most Army forces will be 

based in the United States but will deploy to overseas 

crises points when required.64 The U.S. Army will need 

to be effective in an Asia-Pacific environment where 

seven of the world’s 10 largest armies are operating 

in a highly dynamic and increasingly prosperous milieu, and in a Middle East where evolving democratic 

change relates directly to the democratization objectives that the pivot strategy is designed to promote. It 

must also adjust to allies’ potential economic limitations in a prolonged global financial crisis. The NATO 

Smart Defense approach is just as applicable in a fluid 

Asia-Pacific strategic environment as it is to Europe.
38

Yet, there are clear anomalies between force planning and resource capabilities as underscored by 

shortfalls in both NATO’s Smart Defense efforts and 

by USPACOM’s Theater Campaign Plan (TCP). The 

TCP has recently been adjusted to operate on both an 

annual and 5-year basis in response to unanticipated 

military developments and to prospects of greater budget constraints. In testimony delivered to the House 

Armed Services Committee in March 2013, the Commander, USPACOM, warned that such constraints 

would impact negatively on USPACOM’s ability to 

sustain lift capabilities so critical to a forward force 

presence and to engage systematically with regional 

allies and partners with respect to intensifying strategic risks.65 A recent independent study conducted 

by the Center for Strategic and International Studies 

(CSIS) concluded that: 

There is a long history of inadequate resourcing for 

Combatant Command needs at the pre-conflict level 

of plans. Current processes to address that historical 

disconnect (such as the Integrated Priority Lists) are 

overwhelmed by other programmatic demands with 

higher dollar volumes.66

This problem will only intensify in a sequestration environment. More efficient country-level and 

regional-level force planning will need to be achieved 

between USPACOM and U.S. allies and partners. In 

regard to Landpower operating in USPACOM, the 

CSIS study recommends that the recent reassigning 

of I Corps and the 25th Infantry Divison from worldwide service rotation to permanent affiliation with 

USPACOM and the concentration of the III Marine Expeditionary Force on Pacific contingencies could well 

lead to greater efficiencies in joint training with allied 
39

forces and to more effective deployment patterns underpinning U.S. regional deterrence and defense strategies.67 A test of such effectiveness would be to what 

extent current regional flashpoints can be contained 

from escalating into all-out conflicts that could tax 

American political will and material resources beyond 

acceptable risk.

CONCLUSION

Several overarching policy trends, as well as some 

specific implications for American Landpower, emerge 

from this analysis. Although re-balancing reflects a 

growing American recognition of Asia’s seminal importance in the 21st century, it does not constitute a 

new U.S. grand strategy commensurate to the containment posture adopted during the Cold War. It instead 

represents a tactical effort to integrate military, economic, and diplomatic elements of U.S. policy into a 

broadly-based effort to reaffirm the U.S. presence and 

influence in the Pacific. The question remains, to what 

extent has that approach been understood by, and is 

acceptable to, the region’s key players—most notably 

China. Most of America’s traditional allies and many 

other regional countries have welcomed the pivot 

strategy as a geopolitical necessity to balance rising 

Chinese geopolitical clout. They have been restrained 

in endorsing it too openly lest their own increasingly 

substantial trading and politico-security relations with 

Beijing be compromised. China itself “is in no mood to 

support any U.S. pretensions to being the only, indispensable honest broker in the region.”68 Instead, it is 

pursuing its own vision of a regional order through 

strongly contesting its territorial claims in the East and 

South China Seas, opposing vigorously what it sees as 
40

intensifying Japanese nationalism, lending only qualified support to American-led efforts to contain North 

Korea, and following a longer-term blueprint for penetrating eventually the “first-island chain”—an arc of 

archipelagos stretching from East Asia’s continental 

mainland coast to include Japan, Taiwan, the northern 

Philipppines, Borneo, and the Malay Peninsula—in 

ways required to preclude traditional U.S. dominance 

in maritime East Asia. Without a gradual modification 

in Chinese ambitions and behavior, and in the absence 

of an highly nuanced U.S. diplomatic strategy combining a successful mix of engagement and cooperation with Beijing when Sino-American interests converge and a consistently firm and convincing posture 

of competition when they do not, the pivot strategy 

may ultimately be remembered as a catalyst for a new 

Cold War in Asia.

A second policy concern confronting the pivot 

strategy is whether regional security allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific will continue to support Washington’s traditional bilateral security networks and 

the centrality of U.S. force capabilities as the primary 

means for sustaining an acceptable balance of power 

in that region. Although the Obama administration 

has explored multilateral security politics more extensively than its counterparts, it also views the bilateral 

security network as the core element of its regional 

security strategy. This remains true, notwithstanding 

rebalancing’s professed emphasis on greater outsidebilateral alliance security partnerships. Examples of 

this preference include: (1) Washington’s recent upgrading of rotational arrangements with Australia 

and Singapore; (2) ongoing U.S. negotiations with 

Japan over future basing arrangements in Okinawa, 

while simultaneously acknowledging responsibili-
41

ties to defend Japan if it is attacked while defending 

its administrative control over the Senkaku/Diaoyu 

Islands area; (3) U.S. conditioning of South Korea’s 

military to achieve an eventual transition of wartime 

command responsibilities in the event of renewed 

fighting on the Korean peninsula; and, (4) its careful 

calibration of policy responses to the Philippines’ demands. All underscore the emphasis on the respective 

bilateral alliances. 

Some plurilateral arrangements involving U.S. 

coordination with two allies simultaneously on various issues have been formed. The Trilateral Strategic 

Dialogue, involving Australia, Japan, and the United 

States, is one such arrangement. The Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group was another. In neither 

case, however, has the initial momentum prompting 

the formation of such mechanisms been sustained. At 

the multilateral level, U.S. policymakers have identified specific crises such as an implosion of the North 

Korean regime where multilateral planning and cooperation could be applicable to restoring regional 

stability. These, however, are contingent on gaining 

intra-regional—and, above all, Chinese—consent. 

For its own reasons, China actually appears to 

share the U.S. traditional skepticism about the value 

of multilateral security groupings as instruments for 

generating viable regional collective security arrangements that will simultaneously observe and safeguard 

great power interests. As a realist strategy oriented 

toward the balancing of regional power, the pivot 

strategy offers little in the way of guidelines for overcoming multilateralism’s perceived weaknesses as an 

organizing principle for regional order-building.

U.S. and allied policy planners must overcome 

increasingly severe financial constraints on the pivot 
42

strategy. Not overcoming these constraints would effectively nullify the strategy. Such nullification would 

directly relate to how Landpower can fit and function 

in an increasingly fluid international power structure. It could require the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine 

Corp to make significant adjustments—and perhaps 

some major concessions—in the interest of fulfilling 

the “Joint Force 2020 Vision” outlined in the January 

2012 Defense Strategic Guidance statement. That may 

entail those services reverting back to roles more in 

line with their long history, while relegating the pivot 

strategy’s implementation largely to the U.S. Navy 

and Air Force and to U.S. Pacific allies. “Tomorrow’s 

Army” may be charged with the defense of America 

and its allies safety by safeguarding the key Eurasian 

approaches and the island chains contiguous to U.S. 

territory. It could do so only by maintaining and refining a judicious combination of home-based and forward deployed combat elements, and by developing 

the requisite technologies needed for the United States 

to maintain its strategic edge over any power inclined 

to challenge America’s key interests and values.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. Niall Ferguson, “A World Without Power,” Foreign 

Policy, July 1, 2004, available from www.foreignpolicy.com/

articles/2004/07/01/a_world_without_power?page=0,3&wp_login_redirect=0. 

2. Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Giants, But Not Hegemons,” International Herald Tribune, February 14, 2013; Kevin Rudd, “Beyond 

the Pivot: A New Roadmap for U.S.-Chinese Relations,” Foreign 

Affairs, Vol. 92, No. 2, 2013, pp. 9-15.

3. Renowned American realist Stephen Walt reported in January 2013 that, at a conference of leading Chinese and American 
43

thinkers on grand strategy convening in Beijing, there was a prevailing view that China and the United States would experience 

intense conflicts of interest in pursuing their respective grand 

strategies. Simply stated, China wants U.S. military power and 

economic influence marginalized, if not totally eliminated, in Asia 

in a manner reminiscent of the U.S. pursuit of the Monroe Doctrine

in the 19th century, while America anticipates the need to retain 

U.S. power in Asia to preclude the Chinese domination of that 

continent. See Stephen Walt, “What I Told the Chinese,” Foreign 

Policy, February 17, 2013, available from walt.foreignpolicy.com/

posts/2013/01/18/what_i_told_the_chinese. The classic version of this 

perspective remains John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power 

Politics, New York: Norton, 2001.

4. Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Obama 

to the Australian Parliament,” Washington, DC: The White House, 

November 17, 2011, available from www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament.

5. U.S. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense, Washington, DC: U.S. 

Government Printing Office (USGPO), January 2012, p. 2. Emphasis in the original document.

6. Thomas E. Donilon, as cited by Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Work 

with China, Don’t Contain It,” New York Times, January 25, 2013, 

available from www.nytimes.com/2013/01/26/opinion/work-with-china-dont-contain-it.html?

7. A recent series presented by a Washington, DC, liberal 

think tank—the Foreign Policy Institute—in its Foreign Policy in 

Focus (FPIF) forum sharply criticizes the rationales and questions 

the feasibility of the strategy. Among other selections, see Joseph 

Gerson, “Reinforcing Washington’s Asia-Pacific Hegemony,” 

FPIF, September 13, 2012, available from www.fpif.org/articles/reinforcing_washingtons_asia-pacific_hegemony; Richard Javad Heydarian, “Raising the Stakes in Asia,” FPIF, October 25, 2012, available from www.fpif.org/articles/raising_the_stakes_in_asia; Conn 

Hallinan, “Four More Years: The Asia Pivot,” FPIF, December 26, 

2012, available from www.fpif.org/articles/four_more_years_the_asia_

pivot; and Winslow Wheeler, “Powering the Pacific ‘Pivot,’ with 

Leon and Chuck,” FPIF, January 23, 2013, available from www.fpif.

org/articles/powering_the_pacific_pivot_with_leon_and_chuck.
44

8. Craig Whitlock, “Philippines may allow greater U.S. military presence in reaction to China’s rise,” New York Times, January 26, 2012; Peter Drysdale, “America’s Pivot to Asia and Asian 

Akrasia,” East Asia Forum, November 26, 2012; Mark Thomson, 

“Australia’s Response to U.S. Re-engagement in Asia: A Tale of 

Two Pivots,” East-West CenterVimeo, September 25, 2012, available from www.eastwestcenter.org/node/33780.

9. Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Leadership and Elite Responses to the U.S. Pacific Pivot,” China Leadership Monitor, No. 

38, August 6, 2012, available from www.hoover.org/publications/

china-leadership-monitor/9426.

10. “The Geopolitics of the United States, Part I: The Inevitable Empire,” Stratfor Global Intelligence, May 28, 2012, available 

from www.stratfor.com/analysis/geopolitics-united-states-part-1-inevitable-empire.

11. Steven Metz, “Strategic Horizons: Does America Need 

Two Armies?” World Politics Review, January 9, 2013, available 

from www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12612/strategic-horizonsdoes-america-need-two-armies.

12. “The Geopolitics of the United States, Part 2: American 

Identity and the Threats of Tomorrow,” Stratfor Global Intelligence, 

May 28, 2012, available from www.stratfor.com/analysis/geopoliticsunited-states-part-2-inevitable-empire. However, Metz observes that, 

with the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Army became more expeditionary in response to the need to achieve quick deployments 

of decisive force and successful counterinsurgency campaigns 

rather than predominantly to undertake large-scale protracted 

war-fighting. See Metz, “Strategic Horizons: Does America Need 

Two Armies?”

13. Richard Fontaine and Kristin M. Lord, “Introduction: 

Debating America’s Future,” Richard Fontaine and Kristin M. 

Lord, eds., America’s Path: Grand Strategy for the Next Administration, Washington, DC: Center for a New American Century, May 

2012, p. 8.
45

14. Assistant Secretary Kurt M. Campbell, Bureau of East 

Asian and Pacific Affairs, Testimony before the House Committee 

of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, U.S. 

Department of State, Washington, DC, March 31, 2011, available 

from www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2011/03/159450.htm.

15. Dana H. Allin and Erik Jones, Weary Policeman: American 

Power In An Age of Austerity, International Institute for Strategic 

Studies, Oxford, UK: Routledge, 2012, pp. 167-168.

16. U.S. Forces Japan, Official Military Website, available 

from www.usfj.mil/.

17. National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, East Asian 

Strategic Review 2011, Japan Times, Tokyo, Japan, 2011, pp. 252-256.

18. The recent Yama Sakura (December 2012) and Deployment Exercise (DEPEX—April 2013) maneuvers underscored 

the strengthening of logistical coordination between the GSDF 

and U.S. Army. See Kirk Spitzer, “U.S. Army to Asia: ‘We’re 

Back’,” Time, December 7, 2012, available from nation.time.

com/2012/12/07/u-s-army-to-asia-were-back/; and “U.S. Army and 

Japan hold first ever deployment exercise,” TX (Terminal X), April 

30, 2013, available from www.terminalx.org/2013/04/us-army-japanhold-first-ever-depex.html. 

19. See Shaun Tandon, “Strong US, S. Korea Support for Alliance: Polls,” October 15, 2012, available from www.google.com/

hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5i7vGA2claNhtEoHEO20YOqQt0jw

w?docId=CNG.9c8ff903f2483b2a6a044cdbcbaf225b.941; and Richard Weitz, “Global Insights: Obama-Lee Partnership Solidifies 

U.S.-South Korea Ties,” World Politics Review, October 30, 2012, 

available from www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12459/globalinsights-obama-lee-partnership-solidifies-u-s-south-korea-ties. 

20. South Korean analyst Chaesun Chung has recently 

observed that: 

From a South Korean perspective, the long process of muddling through to find opportunities for strategic cooperation is 

very painful. Caught between the two countries [the U.S. and 

China], South Korea will suffer not only from an all-out confrontation but also from small, procedural disagreements based 
46

on strategic mistrust. More problematic for Seoul, as well as for 

many of the relatively weak countries neighboring China, is its 

lack of influence on the trajectory of U.S.-China relations.

Chaesun Chung, “U.S. Strategic Rebalancing to Asia: South Korea’s Perspective,” Asia Policy, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2013, p. 15.

21. Hugh White, “Caught in a Bind That Threatens An Asian 

War Nobody Wants,” Sydney Morning Herald, December 26, 2012; 

and Rowan Callick, “Former PM Malcom Fraser’s Speech on 

China and US Puts Him Out On ‘The Fringe’,” The Australian, 

September 27, 2012.

22. Peter Jennings, “The U.S. Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific: 

An Australian Perspective,” AsiaPolicy, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2013, p. 42.

23. Charmaine G. Misalucha, “Southeast Asia-U.S. Relations: 

Hegemony or Hierarchy?” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 33, 

No. 2, 2011, p. 241.

24. “U.S. Military To Boost Philippines Presence; China Tells 

Army To Be Prepared,” Reuters, December 12, 2012; “U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s Visit to the Philippines,” Asia 

Society (Australia), September 4, 2012, available from asiasociety.

org/australia/us-secretary-state-hillary-clinton%E2%80%99s-visitphilippines.

25. Staff Sergeant Christopher McCullough, “US, Philippines 

partner for Exercise Balikatan,” May 3, 2013, available from www.

army.mil/article/102588/US__Philippines_partner_for_Exercise_

Balikatan_2013/.

26. Sasiwan Chingchit, “After Obama’s Visit: The U.S.-Thailand Alliance and China,” Asia Pacific Bulletin (East-West Center), 

No. 189, December 4, 2012, available from www.eastwestcenter.org/

sites/default/files/private/apb189.pdf.

27. U.S. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, p. 2.

28. “Armies of India and US to hold wargames in September-October 2013,” TX, May 25, 2013, available from www.terminalx.org/2013/05/armies-of-india-us-to-hold-wargames-in-sept-oct2013.html.
47

29. Ajaya Kumar Das, India-U.S. Maritime Partnership: Time to 

Move Forward, RSIS Policy Brief, Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School 

of International Studies, August 2012, pp. 4, 7.

30. Robert Ayson, “Choosing Ahead of Time? Australia, New 

Zealand and the US-China Contest in Asia,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 34, No. 3, 2012, pp. 345-347.

31. “NZDF, Australia and US Conduct Exercise Alam Hafa 

2013,” army-technology.com, May 10, 2013, available from www.army-technology.com/news/newsnzdf-australia-and-us-conduct-exercisealam-halfa-2013; and Bruce Vaughn, New Zealand: Background and 

Bilateral Relations with the United States, CRS 7-5700, Washington, 

DC: USGPO, May 27, 2011, pp. 9-10.

32. Tim Huxley, “Singapore and the US: Not Quite Allies,” 

The Strategist (Australian Strategic Policy Institute Blog), July 

2012, available from www.aspistrategist.org.au/author/tim-huxley/.

33. Sergeant Robert M. England, “Hawaii Soldiers welcome 

Singapore Army, prepare for Tiger Balm 2012,” www.army.mil, 

July 11, 2012, available from www.army.mil/article/83359/Hawaii_

Soldiers_welcome_Singapore_Army__prepare_for_Tiger_Balm_2012/.

34. Das, India-U.S. Maritime Partnership, pp. 3-4; “India and 

America: Less than Allies, More Than Friends,” Economist, June 

16, 2012, available from www.economist.com/node/21556935.

35. Gary Hawke, “Is New Zealand Trapped in the Anglosphere?” East Asia Forum, January 18, 2013, available from www.

eastasiaforum.org/2013/01/18/new-zealand-stayed-insular-in-2012/.

36. Huxley.

37. Rudd.

38. Brendan P. O’Reilly, “Pivot Could Cost Obama, Asia 

Dearly,” Asia Times Online, January 30, 2013, available from www.

atimes.com/atimes/China/OA30Ad01.html.

39. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2011, Oxford, UK: Routledge, 2011, p. 206.
48

40. IISS, North Korea’s Weapons Programs: A Net Assessment,

January 21, 2004, available from www.iiss.org/publications/strategicdossiers/north-korean-dossier/.

41. Interview with Jung-Hoon Lee, former South Korean 

national security adviser and Professor of International Relations, Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea, Radio Australia, March 

11, 2013, available from www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/

radio/program/connect-asia/north-korea-threatens-war-over-un-sanctions/1099812.

42. See Yoshihide Soeya, “How Can Japan Navigate the Senkaku Dispute and China’s Rise?” East Asia Forum, March 10, 2013, 

available from www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/03/10/how-can-japannavigate-the-senkaku-dispute-and-chinas-rise/.

43. Bonnie S. Glaser, “Armed Clash in the South China Sea,” 

Council on Foreign Relations Contingency Memorandum No. 14, April 

2012, available from www.cfr.org/east-asia/armed-clash-south-chinasea/p27883.

44. Kurt Campbell, “Alliance 21 Emerging Asia Address: The 

United States, China and Australia,” Customs House, Sydney, 

Australia, March 14, 2013, available from alliance21.org.au/events/

Kurt-Campbell-Address. Also see Rory Medcalf, “Can Military Diplomacy Keep the Peace in 2013?” The Diplomat, January 5, 2013, 

available from thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/01/05/can-military-diplomacy-keep-the-peace-in-2013/. 

45. Citing comments by Beijing naval expert Li Jie, “Experts 

say drills stir up disputes,” Stratrisks, February 8, 2012, available 

from stratrisks.com/geostrat/3924. Also see “Repressing China: Multilateral Exercise Cobra Gold Takes On a New Look,” Stratrisks, 

February 13, 2013, available from stratrisks.com/geostrat/10795.

46. Steven Metz, “Strategic Horizons: Thinking the Unthinkable on a Second Korean War,” World Politics Review, March 13, 

2013, available from www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12786/

strategic-horizons-thinking-the-unthinkable-on-a-second-korean-war.
49

47. Bruce W. Bennett and Jennifer Lind, “The Collapse of 

North Korea: Military Missions and Requirements,” International 

Security, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2011, p. 85.

48. Patrick Mendis, “How Washington’s Asia Pivot and the 

TPP Can Benefit Sino-American Relations,” East Asia Forum, 

March 6, 2013, available from www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/03/06/

how-washingtons-asia-pivot-and-the-tpp-can-benefit-sino-americanrelations/.

49. Zhi Linfei and Ran Wei, “Yearender: Obama Administration’s Pivot Strategy Sows More Seeds of Suspicion Than Cooperation,” Xinhua, December 23, 2011, available from news.xinhuanet.

com/english/indepth/2011-12/23/c_131323762.htm.

50. Donald Emmerson, “Challenging ASEAN: The American 

Pivot in Southeast Asia,” East Asia Forum, January 13, 2013, available from www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/01/13/challenging-asean-theamerican-pivot-in-southeast-asia/.

51. See, for example, Donna Miles, “Pacom Exercise Program 

Integrates Disaster Response Preparation,” Defense.gov News, September 5, 2012, available from www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.

aspx?id=117750.

52. U.S. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, p. 3.

53. Jim Garamone, “Europe Remains Cornerstone Of U.S. 

Engagement, Biden Says,” U.S. Army Europe, February 5, 2013, 

available from www.eur.army.mil/news/2013/20130205_Biden_

Munich.html.

54. Cheryrl Pellerin, “Partners Essential in Strategic Transition, Carter Says,” Defense.gov, February 2, 2013, available from 

www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119180.

55. Thom Shanker, “Defense Secretary Warns NATO of ‘Dim’ 

Future,” New York Times, June 10, 2011. 
50

56. Doug Bandow, “The Continent Without a Military,” The 

National Interest, February 25, 2013, available from nationalinterest.

org/commentary/the-continent-without-military-8152?page=1.

57. Anna Mulrine, “In Pentagon’s ‘Pivot’ Toward Asia, Has 

Europe Been Forgotten?” Christian Science Monitor, November 

2012.

58. Cited by Adam Grissom, “The United States,” Clara Marina O’Donnell, ed., The Implications of Military Spending Cuts for 

NATO’s Largest Members, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 

July 2012, p. 26.

59. Ibid., p. 25. 

60. “U.S. Axes Europe Missile Defence Interceptor,” news 

com.au, March 16, 2013, available from www.news.com.au/breaking-news/world/us-axes-europe-missile-defence-interceptor/story-e6frfkui-1226598768407.

61. Thomas P. M. Barnett notes that the U.S. Army and Marine Corps were the primary beneficiaries of “supplemental” U.S. 

defense expenditures in the post 9/11 era, while the Navy and 

Air Force allocation of the total defense budget declined by several percentage points. Accordingly, “[i]ncluding two land wars 

that enlarged his two armies—the Army and Marine Corps—the 

president can reduce their superexpensive manpower.” Thomas P. M. Barnett, “Think Again: The Pentagon,” Foreign Policy, 

March/April 2013, available from www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/04/the_pentagon?page=0,1.

62. Luke Coffey, “Keeping America Safe: Why U.S. Bases in 

Europe Remain Vital,” Heritage Foundation Special Report # 111, 

Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, July 11, 2012, available 

from www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/07/keeping-americasafe-why-us-bases-in-europe-remain-vital.

63. Department of the Army, U.S. Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-0, The U.S. Army Capstone Concept, Washington, DC: USGPO, December 19, 2012, pp. 4-5.

64. Ibid., p. 5.
51

65. “Statement of Admiral Samuel J. Locklear, U.S. Navy, 

Commander, U.S. Pacific Command on U.S. Pacific Command 

Posture,” Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC, March 5, 2013, available from www.pacom.

mil/documents/pdf/20130305-hasc-adm-locklear-posture-statement.pdf. 

66. David Berteau and Michael J. Green, Co-Directors, U.S. 

Force Posture Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region: An Independent Assessment, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, August 2012, p. 90.

67. Ibid., pp. 92-93; “Statement of Admiral Samuel J. Locklear,” pp. 30-31.

68. Peter Lee, “US Learns Hard Lessons Of ‘Asia Pivot’,” Asia 

Times Online, October 27, 2012, available from www.atimes.com/

atimes/China/NJ27Ad01.html.

53

CHAPTER 2

MILITARY SOFT POWER IN THE 21ST CENTURY:

MILITARY EXCHANGES AND PARTNER 

DEVELOPMENT

Carol Atkinson

In the 21st century, success in the conduct of military missions will depend more than ever on the effective integration of hard and soft power, or what has 

been called smart power. For the U.S. Armed Forces, 

military smart power entails the integrated use of 

military capabilities with the ability to co-opt, persuade, and influence the thinking of others. Much has 

been written on the harder aspects of military power; 

in contrast, this article will focus on its softer side, or 

what might be called military soft power.

1

One important and effective strategy to build military soft power is through the military educational 

exchange programs hosted by U.S. war and staff colleges. These programs help the United States to build 

partnerships with potential coalition nations that enhance not only U.S. national security but also international peace and stability. The exchanges help the 

United States to extend its influence or military soft 

power through international networks of military 

professionals. This chapter will examine the importance of these exchanges. First, the chapter lays out 

some broad ideas about the nature of military power, 

specifically how we might think about military soft 

power. Second, the chapter will focus on the important role that educational exchanges sponsored by the 

U.S. military play in building military soft power and 

how the United States might improve its capabilities 
54

to do this. However, before delving more deeply into 

theory, it would be instructive to begin with what 

happened in one of the greatest empires in world history, the Mongols under Genghis Khan. The methods 

used by the Mongols to conquer and administer their 

empire illustrate several important lessons about the 

nature of power that remain relevant for us today. 

In the 13th century, the warriors of Genghis Khan 

swept across Asia, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe, easily defeating the armies they encountered. At 

the time of Genghis Khan’s reign, the Mongol army 

consisted of only around 100,000 warriors from a total Mongol population of 700,000 to one million.2

 The 

Mongol’s empire, however, would eventually extend 

from Korea to Eastern Europe, encompassing modern 

day China, Russia, and Iran. With so few men, brute 

force coercion could never have won the empire, nor 

held it together. 

In order to hold their empire together, the Mongols needed to co-opt and incorporate other nations 

to become partners in the administration and defense 

of the empire. In so doing, the accomplishments of 

the Mongols were staggering. Within their empire, 

the Mongol rulers built political institutions based on 

promotion by merit rather than aristocratic birth; established the world’s largest free trade zone; created 

an international legal regime that established rule of 

law that applied equally to commoners and rulers; 

abolished torture; encouraged religious freedom and 

toleration; established a regular census; introduced a 

universal alphabet; began universal education for all 

children; introduced paper currency; established a 

transcontinental postal service; and created what we 

recognize today as the modern states of Russia and 

China.3

 In thinking about the many institutions built 
55

by the Mongols to administer and manage their empire, parallels to U.S. accomplishments in both Europe 

and Asia after World War II come to mind.

The list of accomplishments of the Mongol empire 

might be surprising to many people. The reason that 

the achievements of the Pax Mongolica are not well 

known is because western histories have focused on 

the brutal aspects of the empire in Europe rather than 

its many accomplishments from Persia to China.4

Contrary to Western histories that have focused almost exclusively on the hard power aspects of Mongol rule, the Mongols were able to build the largest 

empire in human history and administer it because of 

their synergistic use of both hard and soft power, or 

what Joseph Nye has called smart power.5 In advice 

that still rings true today, Genghis Khan told his sons: 

“Conquering an army is not the same as conquering a 

nation. You may conquer an army with superior tactics and men, but you can conquer a nation only by 

conquering the hearts of the people.”6

But what exactly are hard power and soft power—

and how can we distinguish between them? Hard 

power is the ability to get others to act contrary to 

their own desires and preferences usually through the 

use of threats and incentives. So, for example, while 

a country’s leaders might prefer to rule their people 

through autocratic means, the United States might use 

military threats or economic sanctions to coerce autocratic leaders to improve their human rights practices 

or to permit greater freedoms for their people. In the 

use of military hard power, the dictators’ preferences 

to rule autocratically have not been changed; only 

their behavior has changed. In the starkest cases, such 

as Iraq, military hard power can be used to impose a 

new system of government. 
56

Soft power, on the other hand, is the ability to 

change someone’s values, beliefs, and preferences. 

The successful use of soft power results in a change 

in preferences that subsequently affects behavior. 

Because the person’s beliefs and preferences were altered, it is very unlikely he would revert to his old 

behavior because that behavior was based on preferences that he no longer holds. Soft power is the co-option of others through agenda setting, persuasion, and 

attraction.7

 Unlike the use of hard power, the recipient 

of the effects of soft power may not even be aware of 

what is happening.8

 Soft power can be built through 

the actions of government agents; for example, by 

pursuing public diplomacy strategies that engage foreign publics.9

 These diplomatic actions include holding town meetings, giving interviews, organizing outreach programs, sponsoring international exchanges, 

and managing virtual communications.10 Soft power 

can also be gained through what Nye called structural 

effects, meaning setting an example that others wish 

to emulate—in short to serve as the “shining city on 

the hill.”11 Merging these two mechanisms, we can 

also think about how a country’s soft power can be 

built by nongovernmental agents through the transmission of a country’s popular culture in the form of 

movies, music, fashion, food, and even video games. 

In sum, a country exerts soft power on others through 

its culture, values, and policies. Soft power accrues to 

the entity whose culture is pleasing to others; whose 

values are attractive and consistently practiced; and 

whose policies are seen as inclusive and legitimate.12

Military soft power might be an odd concept to 

some people, because soft power is usually ascribed to 

diplomatic efforts conducted by the U.S. State Department. The U.S. military, on the other hand, is usually 
57

associated with hard power. However, the U.S. military is in a position to wield a tremendous amount of 

soft power because its culture, values, and policies are 

held in high esteem both within the United States and 

within the armed forces of many countries around 

the world.13

The U.S. Armed Forces are certainly a lot bigger 

than the Mongol army, but a similar situation faces 

the United States today as was faced by the Mongol 

rulers. The difficulties of relying too much on hard 

power were illustrated in the early years of the recent U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, 

several trends in international politics make the use 

of hard power, especially, military hard power, problematic for the United States. First, there has been a 

tremendous increase in the number of democratic 

governments worldwide. Today, there are over four 

times as many democracies in the world as there are 

dictatorships.14 If we take the democratic peace theory15 to heart, this also means that there are far fewer 

situations where the United States would choose to 

use its military hard power to resolve a dispute. Second, since the end of the Cold War, there has been a 

dramatic decline in major armed conflict both in terms 

of the number of countries affected and in terms of 

total magnitude; both interstate warfare and civil 

warfare have declined substantially.16 Third, scholars 

such as John Mueller have argued that warfare as we 

knew it in the 20th century as a battle between disciplined military forces will be replaced by policing 

wars. The function of U.S. armed forces will be to put 

terrorists, thugs, and criminals that have become too 

powerful for police forces, back into their place. According to Mueller, the new policing wars will never 

eliminate the threat but only subdue it to a tolerable 
58

level.17 Thus, there will always be policing activities to 

contend with.

Within this international context, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has identified declining U.S. 

budgets, a shift in U.S. strategic emphasis to AsiaPacific, and a broadening focus on policing types 

of activities as key trends that the U.S. Army of the 

early 21st century will need to consider.18 The 2012 

DoD Strategic Guidance is quite clear in defining the 

primary missions of the U.S. Armed Forces: counterterrorism and irregular warfare; deter and defeat aggression; project power despite anti-access/area denial challenges; counter weapons of mass destruction; 

operate effectively in cyberspace and space; maintain 

a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent; defend 

the homeland and provide support of civil authorities; 

provide a stabilizing presence; conduct stability and 

counterinsurgency operations; and conduct humanitarian, disaster relief, and other operations.19 Most 

of these missions would be difficult to accomplish 

through the use of hard power only. For noncombat 

missions, military soft power assets are likely to be key 

such as in working with partner nations to provide a 

stabilizing presence. Military soft power can also enhance the ability of the United States and its partner 

nations when the use of coercive military force might 

be necessary such as in missions to project power and 

to conduct counter-terrorism operations.

Partner nations will play an important role as the 

U.S. military transitions to address these priorities. 

U.S. Army Chief of Staff Raymond Odierno has emphasized that, “as we shift away from active involvement in major combat operations, we will increasingly 

emphasize activities aimed at deepening out relationships with partners.”20 The 2012 Defense Strategic 
59

Guidance also reminded us that building partnerships 

remains important for sharing the costs and responsibilities of global leadership.21 The emphasis on partnerships is certainly evident in a rather astounding doctrinal change for the U.S. Air Force that now considers 

“building partnerships” a core mission, equivalent to 

its foundational mission of gaining and maintaining 

air superiority. Thus, in the emerging international 

politics of the 21st century, building and sustaining 

partnerships will be a key task for military leaders. 

Partnerships rely on soft power, and it behooves all of 

us to think about how we as strategists, policymakers, 

and practitioners might build military soft power as a 

complement to military hard power and an important 

source of influence in its own right. 

One way to build soft power is through exchange 

programs. Centuries ago, Genghis Khan recognized 

the importance of exchanges as a way to build his own 

warriors’ expertise and knowledge. The Mongols organized and patronized exchanges of personnel in order to build more effective ruling institutions as well 

as to further commerce and bring wealth and knowledge to their people.22 Indeed, military personnel exchanges were important and extensively conducted 

within the Mongol empire between its eastern reaches 

in what is now China with its western reaches in what 

is now Iran, the Middle East, and Europe. German 

artillerymen and soldiers from Greece, Russia, Scandinavia, Arabia, and Persia could be found in the eastern reaches of the Mongol empire; whereas Uighur, 

Kitan, Tibetan, and Chinese soldiers were exchanged 

into the western areas of the empire.23 Each brought 

their expertise and experience to their new units.

One very important way the U.S. military builds 

soft power is through U.S.-hosted military education-
60

al exchange programs.24 Successive U.S. secretaries of 

state have all heralded student exchange programs as 

a powerful source of soft power.25 Military exchange 

programs at U.S. war and staff colleges are very influential because they impact people who are likely 

to be in elite leadership positions within their countries. For the United States, the goal of the military exchanges is multi-faceted. Certainly, they help to build 

relationships with other militaries that can improve 

the effectiveness of multinational operations. Just as 

important, the exchanges serve as a source of information for international participants about military 

topics as well as about the United States, its people, 

and its values. Likewise, the international participants 

bring new perspectives to share with their U.S. counterparts. When the exchange officers’ experiences in 

the United States are positive, the exchanges help the 

United States to extend its influence through soft rather than hard power. 

The International Military Education and Training program (IMET) is the U.S. military’s premier exchange program. It is funded by the State Department, 

but run by the DoD. IMET programs are extensive 

and varied; they are also relatively inexpensive. On 

an annual basis, IMET funds about 7,000 foreign military and civilian personnel from about 140 countries

to receive training in more than 4,000 formal courses 

at approximately 150 U.S. military schools and installations for a total cost of around $97 million dollars26

or about 0.2 percent of the State Department budget. 

IMET funds many of the international officers who 

attend the courses at U.S. war and staff colleges. The 

presence of foreign military officers at U.S. elite military schools, its war and staff colleges, is substantial. 

Approximately 10-20 percent of the student bodies at 
61

U.S. war and staff colleges are international officers. 

The U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College 

(CGSC) has the longest running program, hosting international officers since 1894.27 As of 2012, more than 

7,300 foreign military officers had graduated from the 

CGSC. Of these, more than half had obtained the rank 

of general, and 250 officers from 69 different countries 

had become heads of their militaries or heads of state. 

Of these, 28 international graduates of the CGSC have 

become heads of states.28 In 2005, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a former military 

officer and 1991 graduate of the CGSC, became the 

first sitting head of state to be inducted into the CGSC 

alumni hall of fame. Yudhoyono was widely credited 

with bringing peaceful democratic transition to his 

country. At the more senior level, the U.S. Army War 

College (USAWC) graduated its first international 

students in 1978. Since those early years, the number 

of international fellows has steadily increased. It is impressive to note that 18 international alumni from this 

one school alone are currently serving as army or defense chief in their countries—Germany, Korea, India, 

Canada, Denmark, Uganda, Norway, Egypt, Italy, 

Philippines, Lithuania, New Zealand, Oman, Australia, Hungary, Estonia, Georgia, and the Netherlands.29

Approximately, 10 percent of all international alumni 

of the USAWC become army or defense chiefs in their 

respective countries.30

U.S.-hosted military exchanges at U.S. war and staff 

colleges are important venues where military officers 

from different countries build social and professional 

networks. The friendships and professional contacts 

between foreign officers studying in the United States 

and their U.S. counterparts help to improve the ability 

of the U.S. military to work with allied nations as well 
62

as potential coalition partners. In addition, these personal and professional military networks can support 

the development of democratic norms and practices 

in countries where these institutions are underdeveloped. As anthropologist Margaret Mead pointed 

out: “Democratic procedures are not something that 

people have, like automobiles or hot-dog stands or a 

way of building roads”—it is a way of behaving and 

an attitude of mind that must be nurtured by society.31

Hosting military personnel from less than democratic 

countries is one important way to build the knowledge and experience necessary for people to build and 

sustain democratic institutions and practices.

Building military soft power is a process that takes 

place over numerous years, even decades, during 

which both the beliefs of individuals and the ideas 

espoused by their military communities are mutually 

constituted through multiple interactions. This makes 

the study of soft power difficult, as results are not immediate and are difficult to measure. Nevertheless, 

results do occur as is evident by the many anecdotes 

told by U.S. officers and their international colleagues 

about their continuing friendships and interactions 

that occur in the years following their graduation 

from a U.S. war or staff college. 

Systematic empirical measurement of the longterm impact of military-to-military exchanges is difficult, but not impossible. Data indicate that the officers 

who come to school in the United States are likely to 

reach positions of power in their home countries. As 

already noted, there are hundreds of graduates who 

have highly influential military and political positions. In response to my surveys of the U.S. military 

institution graduating classes in 2010, 80 percent of 

the international officers said that they were returning 
63

to jobs with more responsibility after their year abroad 

in the United States.32 Sixty-five percent of them knew 

of previous graduates in their home country who now 

held “very important military jobs.”33 This is significant, because it means that there are cohorts of military officers in countries around the world who spent 

a year abroad in the United States, who likely have 

fond memories of those times and the friends they 

made. These graduates know each other, and keep in 

contact with their military colleagues abroad. When 

asked to reflect upon the most important thing they 

learned about the United States during their time at 

a U.S. war or staff college, international participants 

identify aspects of how Americans think and act, how 

U.S. democracy works, and different aspects about U.S. 

lifestyles and culture rather than information about 

U.S. military operations, doctrine, or strategy. Thus, 

an important function of war and staff colleges is not 

necessarily imparting factual historical or doctrinal 

information, but rather providing the environment in 

terms of cultural, social, and personal interactions that 

builds social networks and positive perceptions of the 

United States. Indeed, the international exchanges do 

just that. The international officers identify that the 

best aspects of America are (in order to precedence): 

1) the U.S. people and U.S. culture, 2) governance and 

rule of law in the United States, 3) freedom, 4) democracy, and 5) opportunities.34 This is not to say that all 

impressions are positive. When asked what the United 

States should improve, the international officers identified (in order to precedence): 1) U.S. knowledge of 

the rest of the world, 2) U.S. respect for other cultures, 

and 3) U.S. foreign relations.35 Much like exchange 

students the world over, most of the officers return 

home with positive impressions of the United States 
64

and hope to remain in contact with their classmates 

from the United States and other countries. 

These findings suggest at least two important policy implications. First, military educational exchanges 

are an important tool of U.S. diplomatic engagement. 

As former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton argued: 

“[T]he durability of the United States’ partnerships 

abroad will depend on the attitudes of the people as 

well as the policies of their governments.”36 It is not 

wise to use these programs in a carrot-and-stick manner. In fact, denying school slots as a punishment for 

bad behavior, such as a nation’s human rights abuses, 

undermines the ability of the United States to extend 

its influence within the political and military hierarchies of those countries, and in the longer term change 

this bad behavior by changing the preferences of the 

leadership, rather than just temporarily changing their 

outward behavior through force or pressure. Second, 

providing financial support so that officers can bring 

their families with them is a very important way that 

the United States could build a tremendous amount 

of good will for a relatively trivial amount of money. 

Already, most of the officers bring their spouses and 

families with them on their exchange program, but 

some cannot afford to do so. These officers are likely 

to come from regions of the world in which the United States would like to extend its soft power: Central 

Asia and Africa. 

Within military circles, exchange programs such as 

those discussed previously and the attendant benefits 

of the social networks that they build are generally 

well known. However, outside of the military, there 

is considerably less knowledge about the existence of 

these programs and their importance not only to U.S. 

national security, but also to international security in 
65

the 21st century. Military exchange students are much 

like exchange participants the world over—they generally return home with warm feelings toward their 

host nation and the people that they met. They share 

their experiences with friends and family, and they 

hope to remain in contact with the people they met 

during their exchange program. Through these programs, the United States can build its influence over 

the longer term. At the same time, much like the Mongol warriors, U.S. officers can learn new ways of doing things and new perspectives that enhance the U.S. 

ability to work with partner nations and, when necessary, use its hard power assets.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. Carol Atkinson, Military Soft Power, book manuscript, 2013.

2. Jack Weatherford, Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World, New York: Three Rivers Press, 2004, p. xviii; Thomas 

T. Allsen, Culture and Conquest in Mongol Eurasia, Cambridge, UK: 

Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 5.

3. Weatherford.

4. Allsen, p. 5. It has only been since the discovery and translation of the Secret History of the Mongols in the 20th century that a 

more balanced historical narrative has begun to emerge.

5. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Future of Power, New York: Public

Affairs, 2011, pp. 22-23.

6. As retold in Weatherford, p. 125.

7. Nye, The Future of Power, p. 16.

8. Ibid., p. 14.

9. Ibid., p. 17.
66

10. Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Leading Through Civilian 

Power: Redefining American Diplomacy and Development,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 6, 2010, pp. 13-24.

11. Nye, The Future of Power, p. 17.

12. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft 

Power,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 4, 2009, p. 161.

13. U.S. citizens have consistently rated the U.S. military as 

the U.S. institution in which they have the most confidence. For 

example, see the Harris Poll, “Current Confidence in Leaders of 

Institutions,” Harris Poll #44, May 21, 2012. The poll is available 

from www.harrisinteractive.com. In this 2012 poll, 55 percent of people expressed a “great deal” of confidence in U.S. military leaders. 

Comparable figures were 27 percent for the Supreme Court, 23 

percent for organized religion, 22 percent for the White House, 11 

percent for the press, and 6 percent for Congress. 

14. As of late 2011, the Polity IV Project rated 95 countries 

as full democracies and only 22 countries as full autocracies. See 

Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole, Global Report 2011: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility, Vienna, VA: Center for Systemic Peace, 2011. Their report is available from www.systemicpeace.org/GlobalReport2011.pdf.

15. The democratic peace theory holds that democracies 

rarely, if ever, engage in armed disputes with each other.

16. Marshall and Cole, pp. 3-4.

17. John Mueller, The Remnants of War, Ithaca, NY: Cornell 

University Press, 2004.

18. Raymond Odierno, “The Army in a Time of Transition,” 

Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 3, 2012, pp. 7-11; U.S. Department 

of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 

21st Century Defense, Washington, DC, Department of Defense, 

January, 2012.

19. U.S. Department of Defense, pp. 4-6.
67

20. Odierno, p. 11.

21. U.S. Department of Defense, p. 3.

22. Allsen, pp. 193-199. 

23. Allsen, p. 6. 

24. Carol Atkinson, “Does Soft Power Matter? A Comparative Analysis of Student Exchange Programs, 1980-2006,” Foreign 

Policy Analysis, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2010, pp. 1-22; Carol Atkinson, “Constructivist Implications of Material Power: Military Engagement 

and the Socialization of States, 1972-2000,” International Studies 

Quarterly, Vol. 50, No. 3, pp. 509- 537.

25. John Kerry, “Secretary of State Kerry Highlights Exchange 

Programs in First Official Speech,” Address to the University of 

Virginia, February 20, 2013; Clinton, pp. 13-24; Condoleezza Rice, 

“Remarks at the U.S. University Presidents Summit on International Education Dinner,” Washington, DC, January 5, 2006.

26. U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State, 

Foreign Military Training, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011, Joint Report 

to Congress, Vol. I, Washington, DC: Department of Defense and 

Department of State, 2011, p. II-2.

27. John Reichley, International Officers: A Century of Participation at the United States Army Command and General Staff College, 

Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff 

College, 1994.

28. Harry Sarles, “CGSC inducts new International Hall of 

Fame members,” www.army.mil, April 25, 2013, available from 

www.army.mil/article/101944/CGSC_inducts_new_International_

Hall_of_Fame_members/.

29. John Burbank, “German, Dutch Army Chiefs Inducted 

into Hall of Fame,” The Torch, Spring 2013, p. 25.

30. Ibid., p. 25.
68

31. Margaret Mead, And Keep Your Powder Dry: An Anthropologist Looks At America, New York: William Morrow and Company, 

1942, p. 20.

32. Atkinson, Military Soft Power.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Clinton, p. 16.
69

CHAPTER 3

REBALANCING AND THE ROLE OF ALLIES 

AND PARTNERS: EUROPE, NATO, 

AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN LANDPOWER

Sean Kay

. . . we don’t need to send tens of thousands of our 

sons and daughters abroad, or occupy other nations. 

Instead, we will need to help countries like Yemen, 

Libya, and Somalia provide for their own security, 

and help allies who take the fight to terrorists, as we 

have in Mali.

 President Barack Obama,

 State of the Union Address,

 February 2013.

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

Dramatic cuts in overseas Landpower presence in 

Europe can combine smart strategy with budget priorities that can incentivize allies and partners to better 

coordinate for their own security provision. If done 

well with a clear plan, then a much larger realignment 

of American forces out of Europe will allow for either 

cost savings by decommissioning elements, or protecting against a hollow force in key areas of the world, 

driven by deepening budget cuts to the U.S. Army and 

other land forces. Europe is the proper place to save 

money and realign resources toward areas of greater 

priority for overseas deployments. Geopolitical, budgetary, and political trends are leading to major U.S. 

land forces reductions in Europe. Missing, however, is 

a strategic rationale. By limiting America’s role in the 
70

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to collective defense and working with allies and partners to 

enable them to engage in European area military operations without the United States, a new transatlantic 

security architecture can be achieved. Combined with 

a new prioritization of transatlantic trade, the U.S.-

European alliance can be made more durable and 

relevant to contemporary challenges. Failure to align 

military cuts with strategic goals risks further erosion 

of the transatlantic security architecture and misses an 

opportunity to gain more operational capacity from 

America’s allies and partners.

GLOBAL SECURITY AND STRATEGIC 

REBALANCING OF LANDPOWER

The global security environment of the early 21st 

century offers a window for the United States to change 

incentives and promote better integrated capabilities 

among allies and partners. By 2010, the United States 

based over 160,000 peacetime personnel overseas. 

Over half of that deployment was in Europe.1

 The risk 

of general war in Europe, however, is lower than at 

any point in contemporary history. While there are 

peripheral challenges near to the European area, these 

can and should be handled by America’s European 

allies and partners working within NATO. The drawdown from Cold War levels of several hundred thousand American land forces in Europe over the last 20 

years has, however, not prompted allies and partners 

to offset capabilities to pursue independent action. 

Additionally, the United States no longer needs Europe as an essential perch to project military power for 

global security interests as it did in the 1990-91 Persian 

Gulf crisis. Meanwhile, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 
71

have taken a toll on policymakers and public attitudes 

about future land wars. As former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said to a West Point audience in 

early 2011: 

In my opinion, any future defense secretary who 

advises the president to again send a big American 

land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa 

should have his head examined. . . . As the prospects 

for another head-on clash of large mechanized land 

armies seem less likely, the Army will be increasingly 

challenged to justify the number, size, and cost of its 

heavy formations.2

While the conditions are not good for a departure 

of American capabilities from the Persian Gulf, the 

need to bolster them, shift focus toward Asia, and 

save money provide a rationale for removing almost 

all U.S. land forces presence from Europe.3

As President Barack Obama suggested in his February 2013 State of the Union address, fighting terrorists and other asymmetrical threats does not require 

tens of thousands of troops deployed to foreign lands. 

Moreover, emerging security challenges such as 

population and demographic pressures, democracy 

and human rights, transnational diseases, environmental and energy security, and cyber security are 

not amenable to large military solutions.4 The January 2012 U.S. Department of Defense Planning Guidance established a framework for rethinking the role 

of land forces to gain more integrative capacity from 

America’s allies and partners. Especially important 

was a focus on Europe which stated that: “In keeping 

with this evolving strategic landscape, our posture in 

Europe must also evolve.” The document added that: 

“Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-
72

cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our 

security objectives.”5 This language was a significant 

shift from the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 

report, which called for maintaining 400,000 military 

personnel either forward-stationed or rotationally deployed to “help sustain U.S. capacity for global reach 

and power protection.” The 2010 QDR did call for a 

“new architecture of cooperation, one that generates 

opportunities for the U.S. to work together with allies 

and partners on shared regional and global security 

opportunities and challenges.” It declared that the 

United States will “continue to develop its defense 

posture to enhance other states’ abilities to solve global security problems.”6

 Thus a conceptual approach 

for rebalancing relations between allies and partners 

is in place—even if the main driver of the difference 

between 2010 and 2012 was the economy. However, 

the expectation that allies might fill in gaps has not 

been met. This risks producing a hollow alliance with 

over-ambitious goals and insufficient focus on core 

security priorities.7

The current driver of American thinking on overseas land forces presence is the budget and long-term 

debt exacerbated by a near doubling of defense spending between 2001 and 2012. The then over $14 trillion 

debt was identified by former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen as a national security 

threat which increased U.S. vulnerabilities. The 2013 

automatic spending cuts loomed heavy on the U.S. 

Armed Forces—imposing decisions that would be better guided by strategic prioritization. By early-2013, 

the Army indicated it would be cutting up to 30 percent of its operations and maintenance budget, warning that all commands should “slow spending now 
73

and plan for the worst.”8 The 2013 automatic spending cuts also included the potential furlough of up 

to 800,000 defense civilians engaged in critical functions of intelligence, logistics, contracting, and health 

care.9

 The impact of congressional gridlock put at risk 

Army readiness accounts by $17-19 billion, according 

to Army Chief of Staff General Ray Odierno.10 These 

cuts were painful, but were also a result of the defense 

budget having gotten larger than was necessary, given 

the evolving nature of global security requirements.11

Cuts would impact readiness if the existing strategy 

remained in place. However, if alternative strategic 

options exist that include less reliance on permanent 

overseas deployments, then readiness need not suffer as much. The question of “ready to do what” remains unanswered. If the mission is scaled back and 

allies and partners are more capable of providing for 

their own security, then fewer U.S. forces are needed, 

and those remaining can be sustained at appropriate 

readiness levels.

The case for new strategic priorities is supported 

by U.S. domestic public opinion trends. The 2012 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations survey showed 

that 71 percent of the American public felt that recent 

experiences in wars should make the United States 

more cautious about using military force to deal with 

rogue states.12 While only 38 percent want the United 

States to stay out of world affairs altogether, this was 

the highest measure of isolationist sentiment since 

World War II (52 percent of those surveyed between 

the ages of 18 to 29 agreed with this sentiment). Most 

Americans—56 percent—believe the United States 

should prioritize working through the United Nations (UN) even when it means not always getting the 

preferred outcome. Only 7 percent of the American 
74

public disagreed with the “lead from behind” model 

in the 2011 Libya war. On Afghanistan, only 17 percent supported leaving American combat forces there 

after 2014, and 54 percent opposed long-term basing. Overall, 68 percent of the American public support cutting defense spending, while only 32 percent 

believe it should be left unchanged. As to American 

treaty-based allies, only South Korea receives strong 

support, 60 percent, for long-term basing. By a split of 

50-49 percent, Americans oppose defending Israel if it 

were to be attacked by a neighbor; by a split of 56-41 

percent, Americans oppose defending South Korea if 

it is attacked; and by a split of 69-28 percent, Americans oppose defending Taiwan against an attack from 

China. Strong majorities support direct diplomatic 

talks with Iran and North Korea—67 and 69 percent, 

respectively.

Global trends, budget realities, and public opinion 

combine to provide for a climate that has the United 

States seeking “more” from allies and partners. Missing, however, has been a clear plan to achieve this outcome. Instead, U.S. policy has perpetuated a strategy 

that, at best, tolerates and, at worst, encourages, freeriding on American military power. The time is right 

to add strategy and a plan to the emerging trends 

that are driving American thinking on Landpower. 

Landpower is the important priority for deployment 

realignments because American air and naval forces 

can work in conjunction with local ground forces 

when needed, while ground forces can be held in reserve and rotational in their training. There are, however, obstacles that must be surmounted if the United 

States is to rely more on its allies and partners as an 

entire transatlantic strategic, political, and operational 

culture must change.
75

STRUCTURAL OBSTACLES TO 

BURDENSHARING: THE COSTS OF PRIMACY

During and after the Cold War, America pursued a strategy that sustained primacy among allies 

and, while demanding more contributions, worked 

to prevent independent European efforts.13 Unequal 

burden sharing was tolerable for the United States in 

exchange for American say over European security 

and a benefit to allies who allocated resources toward 

economic priorities. The forward presence of American Landpower in Germany (and Japan) reassured 

neighbors as Europe progressed away from World 

War II images into a peaceful society, while deterring 

the Soviet Union.14 This was not, however, envisioned 

by early Cold War strategic planners as a permanent state of affairs. George Kennan (the architect of 

“containment”) warned during the negotiations that 

created NATO: 

Instead of the ability to divest ourselves gradually of 

the basic responsibility for the security of Western Europe, we will get a legal perpetuation of that responsibility. In the long-run, such a legalistic structure must 

crack up on the rocks of reality; for a divided Europe 

is not permanently viable, and the political will of the 

U.S. people is not sufficient to enable us to support 

Western Europe indefinitely as a military appendage.15

Yet, during the Cold War, on average the United 

States spent about 6.5 percent of its gross domestic 

product (GDP) on defense, while the European allies spent about 3 percent (lower if one excludes 

high-spending Greece and Turkey). Today, while the 

United States has sustained higher percentages of defense spending, the European averages have cascad-
76

ed. As Barry Posen observes, while the United States 

now spends about 4.6 percent of its GDP on defense, 

the Europeans are spending collectively 1.6 percent 

(mainly on salaries and personnel support—a dilemma increasingly also affecting the United States—not 

hard capabilities that might complement American 

power in a crisis). Posen writes that: 

With their high per capita GDPs, these allies can afford 

to devote more money to their militaries, and yet they 

have no incentive to do so. And while the U.S. government considers draconian cuts in social spending to 

restore the United States’ fiscal health, it continues to 

subsidize the security of Germany and Japan. This is 

welfare for the rich.16

NATO illustrates how these structural constraints 

make it difficult to achieve more spending by allies 

and partners to offset U.S. costs and deliver better 

capabilities. Even during the dangerous days of the 

Cold War, domestic pressures rose in the United States 

about the cost and lack of operational burden sharing among the European allies in NATO.17 As Senator 

Mike Mansfield stated in an effort to advance legislation to rebalance NATO: 

The commitment by all Members of the North Atlantic 

Treaty is based upon the full cooperation of all Treaty 

partners in contributing materials and men on a fair 

and equitable basis, but such contributions have not 

been forthcoming from all the Members . . . the present 

policy of maintaining large contingents of U.S. forces 

and their dependents . . . also contributes further to the 

fiscal and monetary problems of the U.S.18

Rather than rebalance this dynamic after the Cold 

War, new missions ran apace of the will of the mem-
77

bers to provide sufficient capabilities. By taking on 

both more members and missions without first aligning goals and means, the alliance was challenged with 

a disconnect among incentives that exacerbated burden sharing imbalances between the United States 

and its NATO allies.19 Programs like the Partnership 

for Peace and eventual membership in NATO provided politically eager new members, but few advances 

in capabilities. Moreover, once new members joined 

NATO, their incentives to reform and increase capabilities to be contributors to, and not consumers of, 

security, declined.20 NATO was, in fact, on course to 

becoming politically unmanageable, militarily dysfunctional, and strategically unable to adapt to new 

security and economic requirements.

Relative to America’s and Europe’s global position, 

the European allies and partners have contributed 

significant levels of troops, for example into Afghanistan where 90 percent of the (up to 40,000) non-U.S. 

troops serving there in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) were European. Europeans also 

provide a high percentage of UN peacekeeping forces 

around the world. Still, the ability to assume the burden of leadership by European allies and partners is 

in steady decline. American officials and NATO secretary generals have called on the allies to invest more in 

capabilities, and NATO ministers have made repeated 

commitments to increase defense investments.21 These 

goals have persistently fallen short because European 

national interests were not commensurate with changes in the incentive structure of reliance on American 

power. Operationally, NATO proved effective in Bosnia in 1995 as a means of peace enforcement following 

the Dayton Accords. The initial force there consisted 

of 60,000 troops, half of which were American and 
78

half made up of allies and partners.22 Over time, the 

United States was able to hand over lead responsibility in Bosnia to forces organized by European allies, so 

that by 2013, Europe provided 90 percent of all forces 

for peacekeeping operations (there and in Kosovo). 

But as additive missions grew more intensive and 

further afield, the capacity to organize effective coalitions became increasingly difficult, and gaps between 

American and allied will and capacity widened. 

The 1999 Kosovo war exposed major problems 

with force projection and a disconnect between strategy and allied and partner land forces. According to 

NATO commander Admiral James O. Ellis, in Kosovo 

NATO conducted a “war by committee” which negatively affected “every aspect of planning and execution” as it led to incremental war instead of decisive 

action. This had negative effects on Joint Task Force 

activation, staff composition, facilities, command and 

control, logistics and execution, component staffing, 

and target selection.23 The United States was unwilling to share information on key strategic assets like 

F-117s, B2s, and cruise missiles, and the allies could 

not agree on planning for a ground threat to make air 

power more effective. This experience led the United 

States to avoid the alliance in the early years of the 

Afghanistan war following the terrorist attacks of September 2001. NATO assumed command of Afghan 

operations in 2005, but land forces became problematic in terms of strategy and tactics. Allied and partner 

contributions were insufficient, often the wrong kinds 

of forces, lacked full capacity for army and police 

training, and were hindered by “caveats” restricting 

allied deployments and undermining unity of command. Essential combat forces and related supporting 

material—airlift, strategic intelligence, satellite sur-
79

veillance, unmanned air vehicles, troop carrying helicopters, attack helicopters, and experienced special 

operations forces—were primarily American during 

the war.

In 2011, Libya was a major turning point as the 

United States sought to “lead from behind”—supporting a NATO intervention, but with allied countries 

out front. Allies were able to fly (in total) 75 percent of 

all combat air operations and 100 percent of maritime 

operations. Yet, only a handful of NATO members 

provided forces while capable allies and partners, especially Germany, provided no forces for the operation. Among the contributing allies (France and Britain, with support from Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 

and Norway), NATO could not operate basic airlift, 

precision-guided weaponry, and sustainable air operations and, like in Kosovo, no ground force was 

contemplated. American forces were essential to the 

early phases of the campaign which required attacking Libyan air defenses so allied and partner aircraft 

could fly unhindered. A month into the Libya campaign, the United States was flying about 25 percent 

of air activity over Libya—mainly intelligence, jamming, and refueling operations.24 Britain used almost 

20 percent of its cruise missile stockpiles in the first 3 

weeks of the war.25 NATO members could not agree 

why they were bombing, with official policy being to 

provide humanitarian relief—but the actual mission 

was regime change.

This operational imbalance in NATO has reached 

its apex at the moment America increasingly wishes to 

hand over the lead to its allies and partners, yet they 

are concurrently either unwilling or ill-equipped to 

do so. Just on air transport alone, the U.S.-European 

ratio within NATO was, by 2011, 285-16 for long-
80

range heavy transport and 632-205 for medium range 

deployments.26 The United States provides for 75 percent of total NATO spending—though when considering direct outlays for European security concerns, 

this figure changes, relative to direct NATO budgets 

of which the United States pays 25 percent (high for 

a single ally), with 75 percent of those costs paid by 

other NATO members collectively. Direct costs of 

maintaining the troop presence in Europe is relatively 

low—in the low billions of dollars—and it would likely cost more to relocate U.S. troops out of Europe in 

the near term than to sustain them.27 Larger costs are 

hidden in the inability of allies to operate in multinational and joint force projection contingencies without 

the United States and its costly defense procurement. 

Some allies, like Germany, would have to double defense spending to reach NATO’s official goal of 2 percent of GDP. With Germany, the challenge is mainly 

how it spends money as it has 200,000 troops but 

only about 9,000 available for overseas deployment.28

Meanwhile, for example, Britain faces major delays in 

deploying its aircraft carrier fleet and is having continued debate over its Trident nuclear arsenal; Spain 

finds maintaining its aircraft carrier to be costly; Denmark has eliminated its submarine program; and the 

Dutch eliminated their tanks.29

The dynamic of overpromising NATO’s reach 

while undersupplying allied and partner capacities 

creates what Barry Posen refers to as a “moral hazard.” Allies and partners might erroneously think that 

the United States will be there to defend them if they 

get into trouble. Posen notes, for example, regarding 

the war between Russia and (U.S. partner) Georgia 

in 2008: 
81

. . . Georgia acted far too adventurously given its size, 

proximity to Russia, and distance from any plausible 

source of military help. . . . This needless war ironically made Russia look tough and the United States 

unreliable.30

Thus in August 2008, the Polish Prime Minister 

said regarding the general reluctance in NATO to secure Georgia against what Warsaw’s politicians saw 

as Russian neo-imperialist threats: “Poland and the 

Poles do not want to be in alliances in which assistance comes at some point later—it is no good when 

assistance comes to dead people.”31

Europe is capable of providing for its defense and 

peripheral crisis management. It is a region with two 

nuclear powers (Britain and France) and has over two 

million people collectively in uniform. America’s European allies spend considerably on defense, collectively second only to the United States in global terms. 

Moreover, Europeans have fought and spilled blood 

alongside American troops, especially in Afghanistan. American soldiers repeatedly relate stories of 

the fighting will of allies and partners. Still, others collectively refer to the NATO acronym for the Afghan 

force—ISAF—as “I Saw Americans Fight.” Overall, 

only a few allies provide most of that spending—the 

United Kingdom (UK), France, Germany, Italy, and 

Spain. While the United States spends 31 percent of 

its defense budget on investment, the European allies 

spend 22 percent, which is widening a transatlantic 

capabilities gap. Much of that European spending is 

duplicative due to national defense industrial priorities.32 In 2013, France sent 2,400 ground troops in an 

intervention into the African country of Mali to combat radical Islamic militias with links to al-Qaeda. The 
82

French force was small, but the remaining total European contribution was just 450 people, for a post-crisis 

training mission. As Daniel Keohane writes: “Many 

Europeans send soldiers on peacekeeping missions, 

but as we saw it in Libya, as we see in Mali, not so many 

countries are willing to do real shooting, or fighting, 

or bombing.”33 Some French officials preferred to act 

as the lead force without the constraints of allies, despite having returned to the NATO military command 

structure in 2009. As French Colonel Michel Goya said 

in January 2013: “We have more freedom of action if 

we do it alone than if we go through NATO procedures. It would be even worse at the EU level. If we do 

it alone, it’s more efficient in military terms.”34

France is able, at least on paper, to deploy up to 

30,000 troops on force projection operations. It, however, could not do the Mali operation alone and had 

little choice but to turn to Washington for staging, 

airlift, intelligence, and other logistical operations. 

Britain also contributed airlift for French troops and 

equipment, surveillance aircraft, and 400 soldiers in 

noncombat roles.35 This absence of European capacity underscored high costs to the United States, even 

when an ally tried to lead. For example, the C-17 cargo 

planes, which the United States contributed to move 

French troops and equipment, cost about $225 million per plane to procure. This costs the United States 

about $4.5 billion in terms of new planes and existing maintenance of procurements, and about $12,000 

per hour to fly. Personnel costs run about $385,000 per 

service member associated with each plane, which 

grow higher with training costs for pilots not counting retirement and other associated long-term costs.36

Since 2008, the United States has developed a multinational heavy airlift operation based in Hungary, the 
83

C-17 Heavy Airlift Wing, which integrates a range of 

new NATO allies and partners like Sweden and Finland, and operating costs are shared in maintaining 

three C-17s. This is a small operation, with only 150 

personnel required, but depends on American equipment (which has its base in the U.S. Air Mobility Command). Since 2009, this wing has flown more than 500 

missions, transported more than 29,000 passengers, 

and delivered more than 22,000 tons of equipment and 

supplies—mostly to support operations in Afghanistan.37 Still, while this is a model of effective multilateral cooperation on airlift, it is small and could not 

operate without costly American procurement and 

logistical support.

Gates told a 2011 Brussels meeting that NATO 

faced a “dim, if not dismal, future” and that: 

there will be a dwindling appetite and patience in 

the U.S. Congress—and in the American body politic 

writ large—to expend increasingly precious funds 

on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to 

devote the necessary resources or make the necessary 

changes to be serious and capable partners in their 

own defense.

Gates added that some allies are “apparently willing and eager for American taxpayers to assume the 

growing security burden left by reductions in European defense budgets.”38 Gates’ successor, Leon Panetta, 

echoed this warning in October 2011, stating that: “We 

need to use this moment to make the case for the need 

to invest in this alliance, to ensure it remains relevant 

to the security challenges of the future.”39 By 2013, 

a dangerous nexus of shifting priorities converged, 

summarized by Judy Dempsey: “The United States 

won’t lead in Europe and its neighborhood anymore, 
84

and the European powers are not ready to act in concert to take collective responsibility.”40 This perspective was echoed by outgoing Secretary of Defense 

Leon Panetta, who said in February 2013 that: 

There’s no question that in the current budget environment, with deep cuts in European defense spending 

and the kind of political gridlock that we are seeing in 

the United States right now with regards to our own 

budget, [it] is putting at risk our ability to effectively 

act together. . . . I do fear that the alliance will soon 

be—if it is not already—stretched too thin.41

Nevertheless, mired in the Eurozone crisis and 

with even greater calls for austerity-driven budget cuts 

across Europe, little action appeared likely to change 

the transatlantic dynamic. Thus the columnist George 

Will asked incoming Secretary of Defense Chuck 

Hagel in January 2013 to explain of NATO: 

What is its purpose now? Given that U.S. military 

spending is three times larger than the combined 

spending of NATO’s other 27 members, is it not obvious that those nations feel no threat? . . . Might fewer 

than 54,000 U.S. forces in Germany suffice to defend 

that country, or Western Europe, from whatever threat 

they are there to deter?42

THE CASE FOR REBALANCING NATO

The case for rebalancing NATO via major cuts in 

America’s land forces presence in Europe is strong. 

This is especially true because the operating assumption that American troop cuts will lead to more spending from the allies and partners in Europe is not viable. Writing in 2012, Dr. John Deni notes significant 

U.S. troop withdrawals:
85

From a high point of over a quarter-million Solders in 

Europe at the height of the Cold War, the U.S. Army 

has drawn down to roughly 42,000 Soldiers today. . . .

Plans announced in early 2012 call for further cuts 

between now and 2014, when two of the four remaining U.S. brigade combat teams in Europe will activate, 

bringing the total down to roughly 29,000 Soldiers by 

2014.43

Yet, these withdrawals have not led to any notable increases in European contributions.

The European allies do not see threats that require 

increasing defense spending—even among new allies to the East who have closer memories of historical Russian aggression. NATO Europe overall defense 

spending fell by 3.7 percent a year between 2008 and 

2010, by 2.6 percent in 2011, and by 1.54 percent in 

2012.44. The allies in Europe are amenable to peripheral operations—like Libya—if assisted by the United 

States. Moreover, the gap in defense spending is also 

exacerbated by the dramatic increases in U.S. spending 

since 2001. The fundamental problem is structural, in 

that allies and partners in Europe are not incentivized 

to better pool resources to act independently from the 

United States. 

Until the United States announces a plan for rebalancing NATO, the relative incentives for allies to 

better coordinate resources will remain unchanged. 

Almost a year after pronouncements of new capabilities cooperation at the May 2012 NATO Summit in 

Chicago, a report from the German Foreign Ministry 

indicated that, within NATO: “It has not been possible to achieve any consensus in core areas.”45 Part of 

the problem relates to concerns about Germany itself, 

which is increasingly seen by other allies as unreliable 
86

for undertaking force projection missions in a crisis. 

At the same time, what is described crucially as a “culture of military restraint” in Germany might also be 

seen as “mission accomplished” in terms of the original missions of NATO—the Russians are out, the Germans are down, so why then, are the Americans kept 

“in”? Ultimately, as German defense analyst Rainer 

Arnold puts it: “Everyone is doing his own thing without taking the others into account.”46 While Russia 

remains a concern to some NATO allies, its mobilization timelines are significantly distant for any serious 

conventional threat requiring Article 5 commitments 

in NATO. Russia could seek to exert influence among 

allies that might affect strategic alignments—but that 

is already happening, for example, with gas flows and 

energy dependence, and has little to do with American troop deployments in Europe. This is a strategic 

vulnerability, but one that reinforces the point that 

many emerging security challenges are not amenable 

to forward deployed Landpower and thus require 

new operational frameworks.

By 2013, total U.S. forces assigned to Europe included 80,000 military personnel in 28 main operating 

bases—including 35,000 Soldiers, 25,000 Airmen and 

women, 10,000 Sailors and Marines, with about 64,000 

assigned to U.S. European Command (EUCOM) operations. These are supported by an additional 16,000 

civilians and contractors. Total costs of housing and 

operational support between 2006 and 2009 was $17 

billion.47 The United States is engaged in an ongoing 

drawdown of land forces in Europe.48 By 2014, the 

170th Brigade Combat Team in Baumholder, Germany, and the 172nd Brigade Combat Team based 

in Grafenwoehr, Germany, will be inactivated. The 

Army’s V Corps Headquarters, based in Heidelberg, 
87

Germany, will not return to Europe after their deployment in Afghanistan ends. Meanwhile, the Air Force 

A-10 squadron based in Spangdahalem Air Base in 

Germany and the 603rd Air Control squadron at Aviano Air Base in Italy will return to the United States. 

These closures or redeployments will save an estimated $2 billion over 10 years. Consolidation of other bases will allow for savings for support infrastructure of 

an additional $112 million.49 Additional realignments 

were announced in February 2013 with members of 

the Europe-based 173rd Brigade Combat Team being 

realigned out of Germany into Italy, including the 

173rd’s Special Troops Battalion and its Support Battalion. These moves allow the United States to close 

bases in Bamberg and Schweinfurt, Germany.50 The 

United States will maintain logistical and equipment 

support in Europe for a rotational brigade combat 

team committed to the NATO Response Force.

 According to EUCOM, the U.S. Department of 

Defense (DoD) is engaged in a “theater-wide capacity analysis as part of a comprehensive consolidation 

of its overseas infrastructure in light of these force 

posture changes. . . . The result could be further infrastructure adjustments.”51 According to Lieutenant 

General Mark Hertling, this will limit American ability to train with allies in that “we are going to have to 

reduce our partnerships.”52 This assumption is valid 

if one assumes that America needs large numbers of 

forces interacting with allies and partners. It is not 

the case, however, if America’s goal is to play a small 

advisory role in helping allies and partners to better 

coordinate on their own. By 2013, American military 

commanders in Europe felt that a total of 30,000 U.S. 

land forces, enhanced via rotations and new commitments to NATO’s Response Force, would be adequate 
88

for sustaining the existing mission. However, the mission itself has not been reviewed. Thus, there is no inherent logic that said the proper number was 30,000, 

15,000, 3-5,000 or even zero.

Meanwhile, Congress is signaling growing political support for deeper cuts in U.S. land forces presence in Europe. In March 2013, Senator Bob Corker 

(ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee) said: “[O]ur NATO allies are not carrying 

their weight, forcing American service members and 

taxpayers to bear the heaviest burden in NATO-led 

missions.”53 While it did not survive in the U.S. Senate, the House of Representatives passed (226-196) a 

resolution in December 2012 calling for the removal 

of all permanent American troops from Europe. The 

House language noted: 

Congress finds that, because defense spending among 

European NATO countries fell 12 percent since 2008, 

from $314 billion to $275 billion, so that currently only 

four out of the 28 NATO allies of the United States are 

spending the widely agreed-to standard of 2 percent 

of their GDP on defense, the United States must look 

to more wisely allocate scarce resources to provide for 

the national defense. 54

The House recommended that rotational Army 

deployments would be: 

sufficient to permit the United States to satisfy the 

commitments undertaken by the United States pursuant to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty . . . (and) 

address the current security environment in Europe 

and contribute to peace and stability in Europe.55

Even rotational deployments might prove difficult, with just one combat battalion regularly rotat-
89

ing through Europe (for NATO’s response force) on 

a regular basis, as the Pentagon Spokesman George 

Little said in February 2013 that we are “talking about 

the prospect of not being able to engage in rotational 

deployments in Europe” due to budget cuts.56 Thus 

there is momentum for hosting exercises with allies 

and partners in the United States, rather than Europe. 

Annually, the United States and its European allies 

and partners carry out dozens of multinational training exercises involving 42 countries and 50,000 U.S., 

allied, and partner forces in Europe. This helps allies 

and partners better work alongside American forces, 

for example, in Afghanistan. However, there is no reason that capable allies cannot pool funding to support 

the costs of holding exercises in the United States. In 

fact, by realigning the exercise rotations by allies and 

partners to the United States, it can better prepare allies for mobilization and force projection outside the 

European area while gaining interoperability exposure to American capabilities. Additionally, the allies 

and partners in NATO have gained impressive operational experience in Afghanistan—from which they 

can now play a major role in training future generations of European forces.

In the last two major wars America has fought, 

Afghanistan and Iraq, EUCOM’s primary role has 

been as a support mechanism for mobilizations managed by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), even 

for a NATO labeled coalition, which suggests it can 

be further realigned in a new command structure 

reform. Currently, EUCOM consists of 64,000 joint 

forces deployed in the European area located across 

21 major bases. EUCOM has as its core mission to 

ensure a strong NATO alliance, preserve recently developed allied and partner capability and interoper-
90

ability, and to maintain regional stability and security. 

Strategically, the presence of EUCOM as a forward 

deployed regional command perpetuates the structural dependence of allies and partners on the United 

States for power projection, decreases incentives for 

allied and partner defense investment and coordination, and perpetuates Europe’s dependency on the 

United States for regional stability and security. Many 

activities highlighted by EUCOM in its annual report 

to Congress do not require a heavy permanent presence of American troops to achieve (such as with exercises involving joint command operations for cyber 

defense). Other elements do require the showing of 

presence, such as rotational naval exercises in the Baltic Sea and Black Sea conducted by U.S. Naval Forces 

Europe and including the U.S. Marine Corps Black Sea 

Rotational Force (which is based in the United States). 

Thus, elements of EUCOM, such as the Air Command 

at Ramstein, Germany; the Special Operations headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany; and the U.S. Sixth Fleet 

based in Naples, Italy, remain important. Unclear in 

this mix, however, is why the command headquarters 

is required to remain forward deployed and could 

not, instead be reduced in size and relocated to the 

United States. Key command elements, like the Joint 

Multinational Training Command (JMTC) can assume 

significant responsibility for engaging with allies and 

partners to put them in the lead role for future European area security operations. 

EUCOM’s existing posture is based on forces, footprints, and relationships. Yet the current number of 

American forces and the size of the large U.S. footprint perpetuate inefficient operational burden sharing relationships that do not benefit the United States. 

The case for relocating this forward command, per-
91

haps integrating it into the existing NATO strategic 

command (Allied Command Transformation) in Norfolk, Virginia, is strong. Meanwhile, Allied Command 

Operations, at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers 

Europe in Belgium, could be gradually handed over 

to European NATO allies for lead responsibility on 

an agreed timeline, to include a European Supreme 

Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR).57

The European continent continues to have a geographic role supporting Persian Gulf contingencies 

via the NATO ballistic missile defense shield. Permanent basing to support this system can become 

the most visible U.S. commitment to Article 5 NATO 

planning in the existing threat environment. The command architectures for maritime missile defense elements would remain with the overall command being 

deployed at Ramstein, Germany. The NATO missile 

defense plan adapts multiple phases of deployment 

building on capable and tested theater-based systems 

via the Aegis model in southeastern Europe. These 

systems require enabling, operational, and commandbased American troop deployments, supported by 

the stationing of four Aegis destroyers in Spain and 

radar facilities in Turkey. This will not, however, require large personnel numbers—just 500 planned for 

the command base in Ramstein, Germany. Ramstein, 

meanwhile, remains an important air force operations 

hub for global communications and operations and 

for medical facilities, while also providing a symbolic 

commitment to collective defense.

Europe is not as geographically crucial for supporting conventional Persian Gulf contingencies today as in previous decades. The United States, via 

CENTCOM, sustains a network of command headquarters, pre-positioning of troops and equipment, 
92

and exercising of significant deployment capacity. 

CENTCOM does require logistical access to European 

bases, airlift, and refueling of heavy transport coming from the United States. However, the argument 

for a large presence of American troops available to 

deploy out of Europe is not as salient as it was in the 

1990s. In the first Persian Gulf War (1990-91), logistical necessity required drawing American land forces 

heavily out of Europe. This is no longer the case, given 

existing Gulf deployments and the ability to negotiate ad-hoc transit rights via key European countries. 

Indeed, non-NATO country Ireland (via Shannon Airport) became a critical transport hub through which 

hundreds of thousands of U.S. forces transited.58 The 

newly created Africa Command, based in Stuttgart, 

Germany, showed that during the 2012 Benghazi crisis in Libya, response times out of Europe were insufficient for emergency deployments and that, at least 

for crisis deployments, more theater-oriented basing was likely needed. As Army General David M. 

Rodriguez asserts: “The recent crisis in North Africa 

demonstrates the volatility of the African security environment,” adding that the Africa Command needs 

drones, surveillance aircraft, and satellite imagery, 

and the command currently gets only half of its stated 

needs for North Africa and only 7 percent of total requirements for the continent.59 Globally, the increased 

requirements to support the declared “pivot” toward 

Asia require additional offsetting savings and equipment reallocations.

In the Persian Gulf area of operations, the United 

States maintains a significant footprint which, in a 

crisis, can be reinforced from the United States. The 

13,000 American troops now based in Kuwait reduce 

the geographical value that land forces in Europe 
93

have played in past Gulf contingencies. These new 

circumstances bolster the case for cutting land forces allocated to EUCOM to liberate funds to support 

reassurance efforts among allies and partners in the 

Persian Gulf (with 13,000 troops already planned for 

regular stationing in Kuwait). Redeploying too many 

resources to build up Persian Gulf contingencies can 

have the unintended effect of exacerbating tensions 

with Iran and undermining diplomatic engagement, 

thus having over-the-horizon deployment capacity is 

important. Too much American presence can make 

allies and partners in the Persian Gulf nervous. For 

example, among the 20 states from the region that 

participated in an early 2013 headquarters and live 

air, sea, and land drill for interdiction of vessels with 

illicit weapons on the high seas, most refused to officially confirm their involvement.60 In February 2013, 

the DoD announced it would reduce from two to one 

the aircraft carrier strike groups that patrol the region 

to save money—about $10 billion a year. According to 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin 

Dempsey, “This is the first adjustment of what will be, 

I think, a series of adjustments across the services as 

we try to preserve our readiness for as long as possible.”61 Existing Persian Gulf capacity is sufficient 

for mobilization of U.S. troops into the region. Rather 

than needing Europe for relocating troops, the case is 

strong for reallocating resources and seeing Europe 

more in the context of a logistical hub for transportation from the United States as needed and as a fallback location should basing options in the Persian 

Gulf change.

Repeated warnings to European allies and partners 

to do more on capabilities go unheard because the European allies lack incentives to follow suit. They do 
94

not feel threatened, they correctly conclude that their 

major security challenges are economic, and they are 

comfortable knowing that, in a crisis, the United States 

can be called on for enabling forces. As Kori Schake argues: “That Europeans don’t have these ‘enablers’ in 

sufficient supply is their fault. They choose to spend 

their money differently, predictably reducing military 

prowess and increasing the risk of failure.” Schake argues that the Mali crisis, where Washington took time 

deciding whether to support France with transport 

and other capabilities, was not the right moment to 

make this change. 

The Obama Doctrine depends critically on others stepping forward and undertaking the work we are stepping back from. There will be fewer allies willing to 

do that if we continue to be stingy with our help and 

generous with our criticism.62

The United States has nonetheless failed to adjust 

to this basic dynamic of national interests and political 

economy so as to avoid continued European dependency on the United States for the conduct of military 

operations. NATO officials have not helped advance 

this understanding by failing to see the economic crisis as the primary security problem in Europe. For example, in January 2013, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen inverted the nature of security 

problems, saying: 

Of course, governments must reduce deficits and borrowing. . . . You can’t be safe if you’re broke. But . . . 

we have to invest to keep our societies safe. Because 

security threats won’t go away while we focus on fixing our economies.63
95

Similarly, in a February 2012 testimony before 

Congress, (reinforced in March 2013) Supreme Allied Commander (and EUCOM commander) Admiral 

James Stavridis said that the most important reason to 

keep U.S. troops in Europe is the economic basis of the 

transatlantic relationship, noting that the “European 

economy is still about 25 percent of the world’s GDP 

about the same size as that of the United States.”64 In 

fact, the security threat that most requires fixing is the 

economy. Unnecessary and duplicative spending on 

military power in Europe during a major economic crisis is part of the problem, not the solution. One might 

argue that more European defense spending could 

create more jobs and adjust for the negative impact 

of austerity, but this is not an argument that will sell 

among European publics and political leaders. Thus, 

aligning goals toward pooling existing resources and 

long-term defense planning is both incentivized by 

the Eurozone crisis and also the most realistic longterm policy option.

GEOSPACIAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR 

SHAPING LAND FORCES COOPERATION

The United States has a historic opportunity to embark on new and vigorous leadership in the transatlantic relationship that can help to reverse NATO’s decline and make it viable for the 21st century by creating 

new incentives to get better capacity among allies and 

partners. Further American land forces reductions are 

needed, should have a clearly stated strategic premise, 

and happen on an agreed timeline. Meanwhile, other 

elements of the U.S.-European relationship—especially trade—should take a new priority. If, in a time 

of lasting peace and no over-the-horizon conventional 
96

threats, America cannot hand over lead responsibility to allies and partners in Europe, then where in the 

world can it? There are serious challenges associated 

with such a shift. In particular, how would the existing NATO command structure be realigned to reflect 

a European-forward NATO? Would the United States 

hold a veto authority over European-only style operations—or would a new consensus rule be needed? 

Would the withdrawal of nearly all U.S. land forces 

from Europe raise the costs of ad-hoc transit routes 

to other regions of the world should their land and 

airspace in Europe be needed? Would a withdrawal of 

U.S. leadership from non-Article 5 operations lead to a 

simultaneous withdrawal for Europeans, concluding 

that if the United States will not do it, they too will 

not? Would Article 5 have continued credibility at a 

moment the allies in NATO are not ready or, rather 

than incentivize integration, reinforce more nationalization in defense capabilities? These are significant 

questions, but none is insurmountable with effective 

American leadership that works to make NATO more 

durable as a basis for allies and partners to assume lead 

roles. American planners cannot know with certainty 

that a new approach to realignment within NATO will 

produce optimal outcomes. They can, however, know 

for certain that the decades-old existing approach has 

not produced such outcomes. Some places, such as 

Kosovo, show us what is possible. Today the United 

Staates maintains just 10 percent of total NATO mission forces there (Kosovo Forces [KFOR])—a relative 

percentage goal that could be a target for all non-Article 5 contingencies involving U.S. troops. 

NATO has an enduring function in advancing 

America’s security interests. America should thus 

play an appropriate role in it. NATO’s institutional 
97

architectures are important for planning and enhancing logistics and interoperability goals for peace operations and, if necessary, coalition warfare. Today 

there are over 41 nonallied NATO partners from all 

over the world. In fact, between capable allies and 

partners, upwards of 68 nations, come together to 

study NATO standards, tactics, techniques and procedures, doctrine, and operational concepts.65 This will 

be especially true as allies and partners return from 

Afghanistan with advanced experience in headquarters coordination, staffing, and operational doctrine 

drawing on, and feeding back into, NATO. NATO, 

however, does not, by necessity, need current levels 

of American land forces to sustain and grow itself as 

a global hub for military planning and information 

sharing. Moreover, the European nations have both 

current and latent capability to integrate and coordinate resources effectively if their interests are incentivized to do so.

There is virtually no foreseeable probability of a 

dramatic renationalization of European defense policies, given deep multilateral military cooperation in 

NATO and economic integration in the European 

Union (EU). Britain and France have developed joint 

operational concepts as have France and Germany, 

and Germany and Poland for military cooperation—

among just a few major examples. Poland has gained 

confidence in its dealings with Russia since consolidating its position in Central Europe via NATO membership.66 Moreover, a new view toward Germany is 

prevailing, according to Foreign Minister Radislaw 

Sikorski who in November 2011 called Germany Europe’s “indispensable nation” and declared that: 

I demand of Germany that, for your sake and ours, you 

help the Eurozone survive and prosper. You know full 
98

well that nobody else can do it. I will probably be the 

first Polish foreign minister in history to say so, but 

here it is: I fear German power less than I am beginning to fear German inactivity.67

Meanwhile, Poland and France have increased 

their engagement, sparked by a realization in Warsaw 

that the United States is shifting out of Europe, and 

that it must push the EU to do a better job of filling 

the gap.68 Given the structural depths of the Eurozone 

crisis, the United States should not want Europe to 

spend more on defense.69 The challenge is thus how to 

get Europe to spend in ways that complement American security interests. But, overall, America can enjoy 

the outcome of a successful grand strategy—a Europe 

that is united, whole, and free, and where traditional 

security dilemmas are alleviated.

The ongoing European economic crisis is pushing the United States and its European allies to think 

hard about how to pool existing military resources.70

Following yet another spending appeal from a NATO 

secretary general in early 2013, Danish Defense Minister Nick Haekkerup was asked if there was any 

commitment to increase defense investments once the 

economy improves. He replied, “No, there isn’t. . . .”71

Small states are making major cuts, for example, 

through 2015, Lithuania cut defense spending by 36 

percent from 2010. The average medium-sized NATO 

countries will cut defense spending by 10-15 percent, 

and the larger allies will cut defense spending by 

about 8 percent.72 However, as James Stacey notes: 

[T]he shared fiscal austerity has set into motion a host 

of European efforts to pool their defense capabilities—

what the Europeans call pooling and sharing and what 

NATO refers to as smart defense, or more specifically 

getting more with less.73
99

Some allies are cutting entire systems; the Dutch 

are cutting their tank force and transferring the savings to contribute to NATO’s new missile defense system.74 Overall, the allies are cutting expenditures and 

will be for some time, but this also means that now is 

an opportune moment for them to realize the national 

interest in defense consolidation to achieve common 

security objectives. Meanwhile, allies like France 

which have sought leadership in Europe should be 

encouraged—even if it means increased reliance on 

European models, rather than American, of equipment acquisition. It is a good development, for example, that France has plans for the purchase of A400M 

transport planes being built by Airbus with the first 

three of 50 scheduled to arrive in 2013.75

Ultimately, large European countries pooling substantial capabilities are what will be necessary for 

Europe to take on major missions like a Libya-style 

air campaign and a Balkans-style peace support operation. Some of this is happening when, for example, in 2010 Britain and France announced they will 

integrate their military capabilities bilaterally and at 

a level of depth that was never achieved during the 

Cold War. This includes creating a joint expeditionary 

force, planned shared use of aircraft carriers (which 

has proven difficult due to interoperability differences 

with landing craft), and combined efforts on nuclear 

weapons safety and effectiveness including unprecedented information sharing on nuclear programs. 

This bilateral arrangement goes into considerable detail on sharing programs on parts, maintenance, and 

training for crews of military transport aircraft, independent of reliance on those of the United States. They 

also planned cooperation on drone planes and a range 

of technologies for nuclear submarines and military 
100

satellites.76 In announcing the agreement with France, 

British Prime Minister David Cameron said that this 

would save “millions of pounds” as part of a larger 

dynamic of cutting Britain’s defense spending. He 

added: “It’s about defending our national interest. It 

is about practical, hard-headed cooperation between 

two sovereign countries.” Cameron added that this 

kind of arrangement should be welcome in Washington because: “They’d like us to have the biggest bang 

for our buck that we possibly can.”77

NATO “smart defense” initiatives only number 

about 30 to date, and most are American-led, not allied incentivized. Much larger concepts that bring in 

large country European forces integrating the smart 

defense with the EU’s “pooling” concept building 

around large national contributions, such as British 

and French cooperation growing to include Germany 

and Poland, could be a major building block.78 A symbolic movement in this direction came in 2012 when, 

in drafting a new French White Paper on defense planning (which noted the need for more effort in Europe 

given the shift of American priorities toward Asia), 

Paris included in the drafting commission the British 

ambassador to France and chair of the Munich Security Conference and former German ambassador to the 

United States Wolfgang Ischinger.79 Still, bridging the 

commitment to sovereignty in defense procurement 

and national military infrastructures will be difficult, 

as America was the glue that held the alliance together 

for decades. While the EU has developed battlegroups 

for crisis deployment, they are small elements and 

demonstrate (as does the NATO Response Force) the 

difficulty of relying on integrated multinational forces 

that are too small. If one element drops out, the entire force structure can collapse, creating major op-
101

erational inefficiencies. The EU has also failed in its 

ambition to create a 60,000 man strong response force. 

Thus, large-end European-based efforts are necessary 

to assume responsibility for European allies and partners’ share of rebalancing the transatlantic relationship. As highly respected NATO historian Lawrence 

Kaplan puts it: “If Germany could be induced to the 

budding Anglo-French military collaboration (assuming it is not ephemeral), Europe’s role could be more 

credible.”80

In November 2012, British Defense Minister Philip 

Hammond reviewed the experience of Libya, stating that it had “shone a bright light on relative military and political capabilities in terms of who ‘could 

but wouldn’t’ and who ‘would but couldn’t’.” He 

added that: 

The bottom line is that Europe, as a whole, needs to 

do more, at a time when the reality is that, across the 

continent, aggregate defense expenditure is certain to 

fall in the short term and, at best, recover slowly in the 

medium term. . . . So the challenge is stark: if we can’t 

spend more, we must do things differently—maximizing the capability we can collectively squeeze out of 

the resources we have, increasing inter-operability, 

closing capability gaps through joint working and 

greater specialization.81

Or, as German defense analyst Constanze Stellzenmuelle puts it: “Nobody needs 27 air forces and 

27 navies. . . .We’re all broke.”82 Britain is signaling 

confidence in the strategic environment by announcing in March 2013 that in the next 6 years, it will have 

withdrawn all of its troops permanently stationed in 

Germany. According to Philip Hammond: 
102

The return of the British Army from Germany marks 

the end of an era, and I want to put on record the huge 

debt of gratitude we owe to the German Government 

and the German people for the support, both moral 

and material, they have shown our Armed Forces over 

more than 6 decades.83

There is thus little logic that America should keep 

land forces in Germany if the British are not. As heavy 

American armor units with little operational utility 

are leaving Europe, it could be useful for the United 

States to keep one infantry and armored cavalry combat brigade in Germany mainly as a symbolic gesture. 

However, if the collective defense threat-level is low 

enough for just one, it is hard to justify. 

In April 2013, Europe became American “tank 

free” for the first time since World War II as its final 

heavy armor capabilities were withdrawn, a strong 

indicator that American military planners do not see 

conventional Article 5 threats to the NATO area even 

remotely over the horizon. Moreover, if it is the case 

that land forces remain a visable and important signal of national or multinational commitments, even 

without the United States, the European allies collectively maintain large numbers of tanks. Land forces 

have been, and remain, important in the European 

operational context for non-Article 5 operations. Every major war fought through NATO—from Bosnia 

to Libya—was decided by facts on the ground. But, in 

each of these situations, it also was not American land 

forces that were decisive. Rather, it was a combination 

of American and allied air power and partner forces in 

support of ground troops that determined outcomes. 

From the Croat-Muslim alliance in Bosnia to the Kosovo Liberation Army in Kosovo to anti-Qaddafi forces 

rallying in Libya, land forces remained critical. But 

they did not need to be Americans.
103

RECOMMENDATIONS

In March 2013, the DoD announced it was launching a new strategy review to “examine the choices 

that underlie the Department of Defense’s strategy, 

force posture, investments, and institutional management—including all past assumptions, systems, 

and practices.”84 In keeping with this examination a 

new set of American-led policy initiatives can offer 

a new strategic vision for a realigned transatlantic 

relationship:

• Limit America’s primary role in NATO to Article 5, 

collective defense missions. This means, given the 

lack of conventional military threats to Europe, 

placing America’s land forces contributions in 

strategic reserve, hedging against unforeseen 

changes in the existing security environment or 

shocks to the international system which require 

mobilization through NATO. In the contemporary threat environment, this means removing 

nearly all permanently based U.S. Soldiers in 

Europe, with the exception of those needed for 

European ballistic missile defense and limited 

command headquarters staff contributions and 

training. America could, as needed, contribute to European-led non-Article 5 operations, 

as happened in Libya and Mali, but limited to 

an outcome similar to contemporary Kosovo 

where America’s operational engagement is no 

more than 10 percent of the total, and the goal 

is eventually zero.

• Achieve NATO consensus that the European allies, acting through NATO, would develop an integrated capacity to conduct a Balkans-style peace 

support operation and a Libya style war without the 
104

United States. Such an outcome would require 

a 3-5 year period of planning and development 

between the United States and its allies. The 

stated goal would be that primary responsibility for security provision around Europe will 

be that of the European allies. This also means 

ceding more say to lead allies on the strategic 

outcomes of crisis management. This would 

not mean that in cases where high American interests are at stake, the United States would not 

participate. Moreover, it would also not signal 

to the allies that they are completely on their 

own. Via a clear timeline and a managed process that, as in Mali, signals that America will 

be available if backstopping is required, the ties 

that bind the United States and its allies can be 

sustained but within a new European-led operational context.

• Move EUCOM to the United States and Make a 

European SACEUR for non-Article 5 Missions. 

The United States should remain in the NATO 

integrated military command and continue its 

presence in NATO military committees and 

planning processes. But there is little logic to 

suggest the expense of keeping EUCOM via the 

headquarters presence in Germany, especially 

when two wars in the last decade were run out 

of CENTCOM in Florida aided by its forward 

presence for command and control. The basing of the command of NATO’s missile defense 

shield alongside America’s European air command in Ramstein, Germany, and the 6th Fleet 

headquarters in Naples, Italy, can sustain the 

on-the-ground presence of a major operational 

theater command in Europe, and at lower lev-
105

els should Europeans better coordinate their 

capabilities. Meanwhile, there is no reason that 

the SACEUR should not be a European commander when assigned to non-Article 5 operations, while an American commander would 

retain authority for Article 5 contingency planning, exercising, and operations.

• Sustain the “Smart Defense” initiative by prioritizing European defense industrial foundations. The 

NATO plans to continue to develop “Smart Defense” as pooling capabilities can and should 

drive operational concepts both for Europeanled operations and, where possible and appropriate, prioritize European-based acquisition 

projects and U.S.-European Union (European 

Defense Agency) joint projects. Meanwhile, allies will need to move away from heavy personnel costs and more mobile forces operating 

in multilateral environments. “Smart Defense” 

initiatives will need to incorporate large-end 

force integration concepts for sustainable operations absent the United States.

• Plan regular rotation of allied and partner training 

exercises in the United States and Europe. Regular command, staff and live action training can 

occur in American facilities while Americans 

rotate training through Europe on a periodic 

schedule. NATO’s core institutional attributes, 

in particular its headquarters in Brussels and 

the military headquarters in Mons, Belgium, 

can be re-envisioned for operational activities 

among allies and partners as a hub for European and global information-sharing and planning funded and operated by European NATO 

members and partners. Make the combat bri-
106

gade allocated to the NATO response force a 

reserve allocation, so that the response force is 

capable of standing up on its own without U.S. 

involvement. Meanwhile, low-staffing but high 

impact operational activities such as information sharing over emerging threats like energy 

security and cyber security are important for 

sustaining transatlantic security cooperation 

without requiring a heavy and costly U.S. land 

presence.

• Pivot back to Europe—via a U.S.-EU free trade 

agreement. A new free trade agreement will 

deepen the ties that bind America and Europe 

on issues that matter most—economic stability 

and growth. By renewing the economic aspects 

of the transatlantic relationship, the United 

States and Europe will show that a realigned 

NATO does not mean reduction in the fundamentals of the mutual ties that bind the Atlantic 

community of nations. More broadly, the political foundations of the transatlantic relations—a 

community of democratic values linked across 

the Atlantic—would be reinforced, while less 

pressure is put on the military aspect of the 

broader strategic relationship.

This is a unique opportunity for President Barack 

Obama and the European leaders to embark on a 

historic renewal of the transatlantic relationship by 

completing a founding vision of NATO—a Europe 

that is capable of assuming responsibility for its 

own security.
107

CONCLUSION

A frequent argument against a near complete 

withdrawal of American permanent land forces from 

Europe is that, if the American footprint is not there, 

the successes in Europe since World War II may unravel. In reality, there is more than sufficient capacity 

and time to manage such geostrategic fluctuations, as 

improbable as they are. In fact, this argument ignores 

these very successes in American strategic positioning 

toward Europe since 1945. It ignores the deep integration of the European economies, and in particular their 

capacity if properly incentivized, to pool capabilities 

that can act alone or complement American power 

in the world. The case for the status quo ignores the 

fact that at the most dangerous moment for NATO, 

the earliest years of the Cold War when hundreds of 

thousands of Soviet troops remained perched in Eastern Europe and could have advanced into the West, 

they were deterred. They were deterred, not by land 

forces from 1949-50, but deterred by the political commitment America made to European security. That 

commitment, at its most dangerous moment, had no 

forward deployed land forces, it had no integrated 

military plans, it had no NATO headquarters, and no 

secretary general. It was, as the Porgy and Bess song 

played at the NATO treaty signing ceremony in 1949 

said, “Plenty of Nothin.” It is time for America to 

make clear to its European friends that it is their moment to lead, and the United States will help them. If 

there is any place in the world that America can hand 

over lead responsibility to allies and partners for security management, it is in Europe, and the time is now.
108

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. See Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense, “Department of Defense Base Structure Report: Fiscal Year 2011 Baseline,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), 2010.

2. Thom Shanker, “Warning Against Wars Like Iraq and 

Afghanistan,” New York Times, February 25, 2011.

3. For an overview of European force reductions and planned 

reductions to date, see Andrew Feickert, “Army Drawdown and 

Restructuring: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 7-5700, Washington, DC: Congressional 

Research Service, March 5, 2013. Also see Michelle Tan, “Leaving 

Europe Behind,” Army Times, April 1, 2013.

4. For further detail, see Sean Kay, Global Security in the Twenty-first Century: The Quest for Power and the Search for Peace, 2nd 

Ed., Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2011.

5. U.S. Department of Defense, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” Washington, DC: 

DoD, 2012, p. 3, available from www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf.

6. Ibid.

7. See Hans Binnendijk, “A Leaner NATO Needs a Tighter Focus,” New York Times, February 3, 2012. Advocates of a sustained 

land forces presence in Europe note that NATO had already cut 

personnel at its headquarters in Europe by 67 percent in the last 

decade, and by over 80 percent since the end of the Cold War.

8. Lance M. Bacon, “Belt-tightening Orders,” Army Times, 

January 28, 2013.

9. Ibid. 

10. Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Odierno: Army Faces $17B Readiness Cuts; CH-47 MYP At Risk,” AOL Defense, January 24, 2013.
109

11. See, for example, Admiral Gary Roughead, U.S. Navy 

(Ret.) and Kori Schake, “National Defense in a Time of Change,” 

Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, February 2013.

12. Survey data references are from the 2012 Chicago Council 

Survey, available at www.thechicagocouncil.org/files/Surveys/2012/

files/Studies_Publications/POS/Survey2012/2012.aspx.

13. See Sean Kay, NATO and the Future of European Security, 

Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998.

14. For a detailed argument on the benefits of American primacy, see Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World 

Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American 

Primacy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008.

15. “Memorandum of the Director of the Policy Planning 

Staff, November 29, 1948,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 

1948, pp. 283-289.

16. Barry Posen, “Pull Back: The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92, No. 1, January/February 

2013, p. 121. For an alternative argument, see Stephen G. Brooks, 

G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wolforth, “Don’t Come Home, 

America,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3, Winter 2012/13, 

pp. 7-51. The authors warn that a premature departure from 

Europe by the United States might lead to (p.35): 

A Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats 

that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., 

a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which the U.S. leaders might 

want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence 

of outside rising powers.

17. See Stanley R. Sloan, Permanent Alliance: The Transatlantic Bargain from Truman to Obama, New York: Bloomsbury 

Academic, 2010.
110

18. United States Senate, “United States Troops in Europe: 

Hearings Before the Combined Subcommittee of Foreign Relations and Arms Services Committee on the Subject of United 

States Troops in Europe,” 90th Cong., 1st Sess., Washington, DC: 

U.S. Senate, April 26 and May 3, 1967.

19. Joseph Lepgold, “NATO’s Collective Action Problem,” International Security, Vol. 13, No. 1, Summer 1998, p. 79.

20. See Sean Kay, “What Went Wrong with NATO?” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 1, April 2005, 

pp. 69-83.

21. See, for example, “Summit Declaration on Defense Capabilities: Towards NATO Forces 2020,” NATO, Chicago Summit, 

May 2012, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_

texts_87594.htm?mode=pressrelease. This declaration was notable 

for the amount of attention and encouragement that NATO gave 

to advanced development of European Union capabilities, something that the United States had previously endorsed only so long 

as there was no duplication or undermining of NATO.

22. See Kay, NATO and the Future.

23. Admiral James O. Ellis, U.S. Navy, “A View from the 

Top,” briefings slides provided to the author by U.S. Department 

of Defense, Fall 1999.

24. Karen De Young and Greg Jaffe, “NATO Runs Short on 

Some Munitions in Libya,” Washington Post, April 15, 2011.

25. Thomas Harding, “Libya: Navy Running Short of Tomahawk Missiles,” The Telegraph, March 23, 2011.

26. International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military 

Balance: 2011, London, UK: Routledge, 2011, pp. 38-39.

27. Clara Marina O’Donnell, ed., The Implications of Military 

Spending Cuts for NATO’s Largest Members, Washington, DC: The 

Brookings Institution, July 2012.
111

28. Paul Ames, “Europe’s Army,” Global Post, January 

27, 2013.

29. Tomas Valasek, “NATO Ponders Austerity and U.S. 

‘Pivot’,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military 

Balance: 2013, London: Routledge, 2013, p. 95, available from centreforeuropeanreform.blogspot.com/2012/05/nato-ponders-austerityand-us-pivot.html. In 2012, Spain cut its peacekeeping presence in 

Lebanon by 50 percent, saw increased discussion of an accelerated 

withdrawal from Afghanistan, and announced a delay in accepting delivery of 15 Typhoon aircraft initially contracted to be delivered between 2012 and 2013. Delays in purchase of other systems, 

including AM400M transport aircraft, were being considered. 

30. Posen, p. 122.

31. Thomas Shanker and Nicholas Kulish, “Russia Lashes Out 

on Missile Deal,” New York Times, August 15, 2008.

32. Judy Dempsey, “How Much Are Americans Willing to 

Spend to Defend Europe?” International Herald Tribune, January 

7, 2013.

33. Ames.

34. Andrew Rettman, “French Colonel: France Better Off 

Alone in Mali,” EUObserver.com, January 13, 2013.

35. Peter Dominiczak, “More than 300 British Troops Will Be 

Sent to Africa,” The Telegraph, January 29, 2013.

36. This data is compiled by Phillip Carter, “The French Connection,” Foreign Policy.com, January 23, 2013.

37. Major Rich Kromurek, “Airlift Airmen Build Multinational Partnerships,” Military.com, November 2, 2012.

38. Thom Shanker, “Defense Secretary Warns NATO of ‘Dim 

Future’,” New York Times, June 10, 2011.

39. Stephen Erlanger, “Panetta Urges Europe to Spend More 

on NATO or Risk a Hollowed Out Alliance,” New York Times, 

October 5, 2011.
112

40. Judy Dempsey, “Mali and Europe’s Hard Power,” January 

25, 2013, available from carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope.

41. Adrian Croft, “Defense Cuts Jeopardize NATO’s Effectiveness, Panetta Warns,” Reuters, February 22, 2013.

42. George Will, “Some Questions for Hagel?” Washington 

Post, January 17, 2013.

43. John R. Deni, The Future of American Landpower: Does Forward Presence Still Matter?: The Case of the Army in Europe, Carlisle, 

PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012, p. 2.

44. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military 

Balance: 2013, pp. 93-94.

45. Matthias Gebauer et al., “European Obstruction: NATO 

Reforms Moving at ‘Snail’s Pace’,” Speigel Online, February 

25, 2013.

46. Gebauer, et al.

47. Lance M. Bacon, “Exiting Europe,” Army Times, February 

4, 2013. 

48. For full details on cuts, base re-alignments, and timelines, 

see U.S. Department of Defense News Release, “DOD Announces 

U.S. Army in Europe Force Structure Changes,” Washington, DC: 

DoD, March 1, 2013.

49. Bacon, “Exiting Europe.”

50. “Thousands of Soldiers to Leave Europe,” Army Times, 

March 1, 2013.

51. John Vandiver, “Pentagon Lays Out Significant Cut to U.S. 

Forces in Europe,” Stars and Stripes, February 16, 2012.

52. Ibid. Overall, the U.S. European Command has cut more 

than 200 billets in management headquarters and an additional 

150 from its intelligence directorate, and by 2012 had implemented a 15 percent decrease in personnel and budgets.
113

53. “Corker Agrees with Admiral Stavridis on Need for 

NATO Allies to Meet Commitments on Defense Spending,” The 

Chattanoogan, March 16, 2013.

54. Lance M. Bacon, “Lawmakers Opt Against European Pullout, for Now,” Army Times, February 3, 2013.

55. Ibid.

56. Gopal Ratnam, “NATO Readiness May be Hurt by U.S. 

Cuts, Official Says,” Bloomberg, February 20, 2013.

57. For an early case on realigning the SACEUR position in 

Europe, see Charles Barry, Sean Kay, and Joshua Spero, “Completing the Transatlantic Bargain: The United States and European Security,” Current History, Vol. 100, No. 644, March 2001, 

pp. 129-136. 

58. See Sean Kay, Celtic Revival? The Rise, Fall, and Renewal of 

Global Ireland, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2011. Also 

see Ben Tonra et al., Irish Foreign Policy, London, UK: Gill and 

Macmillan, 2012.

59. General David M. Rodriguez, Statement before the Senate 

Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, February 2013.

60. Thom Shanker, “U.S. and Allies Conduct Drills in Persian 

Gulf, Signal to Iran,” New York Times, February 7, 2013.

61. Joshua Stewart and Sam Fellman, “Pentagon: U.S. Navy 

Carrier Fleet Cut to One in Gulf,” Defense News, February 6, 2012.

62. Kori Schake, “The U.S. in Mali: Sniping from Behind?” 

Foreign Policy.com, January 23, 2013.

63. Adrian Croft, “Mali Shows Europe Must Work to Plug Defense Gaps: NATO,” Reuters, January 31, 2013.

64. “Transcript: General Ham, Admiral Stavridis Testify 

Before House Armed Services Committee,” Washington, DC,

February 29, 2012.
114

65. The author is grateful for the off-the-record comments 

by a retired long-serving NATO expert currently consulting for 

the DoD.

66. See Joshua Spero, Bridging the European Divide: Middle 

Power Politics and Regional Security Dilemmas, Lanham, MD: 

Rowman and Littlefield, 2004.

67. “Sikorski: German Inaction Scarier than Germans in 

Action,” The Economist, November 29, 2011.

68. Judy Dempsey, “Poland and France Move Toward a Europe Less Dependent on U.S.,” New York Times, March 18, 2013.

69. For details on the seriousness of the Eurozone crisis for 

American stability, see Simon Johnson and Peter Boone, “The End 

of the Eurozone: A Survivor’s Guide,” available from www.huffingtonpost.com/simon-johnson/euro-collapse_b_1549444.html.

70. For details, see O’Donnell et al.

71. Naftali Bendavid and Adam Entous, “NATO Plea Gains 

Little Traction,” Wall Street Journal, February 21, 2013.

72. Peter Grier, “NATO’s Wobble,” Air Force Magazine, 

February 2013, available from www.airforce-magazine.com/

MagazineArchive/Pages/2013/February%202013/0213nato.aspx.

73. Jeffrey Stacey, “The Era of Austerity or the Era 

of Intervention?” available from www.whiteoliphaunt.com

/duckofminerva/2013/02/the-era-of-austerity-or-the-era-ofintervention.html.

74. Grier.

75. Ames, “Europe’s Army.”

76. John F. Burns, “British Military Expands Links to French 

Allies,” New York Times, November 2, 2010.

77. Ibid.
115

78. The European Union has developed a “pooling and sharing” initiative which in 2011 identified 11 areas for joint capacity in important infrastructure categories like satellite communication. Additional areas include helicopter and pilot training, 

air-to-air refueling, and munitions. See International Institute for 

Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: 2013, p. 91.

79. Ibid., p. 97. The draft White Paper indicated a growing 

need for a true European defense-industrial base for procurement 

based on competitive advantage and better coordination of research and development and European-level funding for defense 

investment.

80. Correspondence with Professor Lawrence S. Kaplan via 

email, March 2013.

81. Charlie Cooper, “Hammond: Europe Must Stop Relying 

on America,” The Independent, November 2, 2012.

82. Michael Birnbaum, “Cuts in European Defense Budgets 

Raise Concerns for U.S., NATO,” Washington Post, February 

15, 2011.

83. “British Troops To Leave Germany by 2019,” Defense 

News, March 5, 2013. The British will remove 11,000 troops back 

to the UK by 2016 and then all remaining 4,500 troops will depart 

Germany by 2019. This will cost the British government about 1 

billion pounds to build housing for returning troops to be based 

in the UK and about 800 million pounds to be spent on infrastructure and base refurbishment.

84. “DoD Reviewing Strategy in Wake of Budget Cuts,” Defense News, March 18, 2013.

117

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

CAROL ATKINSON is a Professor of the Practice of 

International Relations at the University of Southern 

California. In 2005, Dr. Atkinson completed a distinguished 26-year career in the U.S. Air Force. While in 

the military, she served in a wide range of operational 

assignments in the fields of intelligence, targeting, and 

combat assessment. During the fall of 2013 she was 

a Fulbright Senior Research Scholar at the G. S. Rakovski National Defense Academy in Sofia, Bulgaria. 

Dr. Atkinson’s research focuses on how the United 

States extends its influence or “soft power” worldwide 

through military educational exchange programs 

hosted by U.S. elite military schools, its war and staff 

colleges. She recently completed a book on this topic 

called Military Soft Power: Public Diplomacy Through 

Military Educational Exchanges that will be available 

from Rowman & Littlefield in the spring of 2014. Dr. 

Atkinson teaches courses on U.S. national security, international politics, soft power, warfare and emerging 

threats, and the role of ideas, norms, and identity in 

international security. She is a graduate of the United 

States Air Force Academy, and holds a Ph.D. in political science from Duke University.

JOHN R. DENI joined the Strategic Studies Institute in 

November 2011 as a Research Professor of Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) 

Security Studies. He previously worked for 8 years as 

a political advisor for senior U.S. military commanders in Europe. Prior to that, he spent 2 years as a strategic planner specializing in the military-to-military relationship between the United States and its European 

allies. While working for the U.S. military in Europe, 
118

Dr. Deni was also an adjunct lecturer at Heidelberg 

University’s Institute for Political Science. There, he 

taught graduate and undergraduate courses on U.S. 

foreign and security policy, North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO), European security, and alliance theory and practice. Before working in Germany, 

he spent 7 years in Washington, DC, as a consultant 

specializing in national security issues for the U.S. 

Departments of Defense, Energy, and State and has 

spoken at conferences and symposia throughout Europe and North America. Dr. Deni is the author most 

recently of the book, Alliance Management and Maintenance: Restructuring NATO for the 21st Century, as well 

as several journal articles. He has published op-eds in 

major newspapers such as the Los Angeles Times and 

the Baltimore Sun. Dr. Deni completed his undergraduate degree in history and international relations at the 

College of William & Mary and holds an M.A. in U.S. 

foreign policy at American University in Washington, 

DC, and a Ph.D. in international affairs from George 

Washington University. 

SEAN KAY is Robson Professor of Politics and Government and Chair, International Studies at Ohio 

Wesleyan University. He is an Associate of the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at the 

Ohio State University, and a fellow in foreign policy 

and national security at the Eisenhower Institute in 

Washington, DC. He previously taught at Dartmouth 

College as visiting professor and was a research fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at 

the National Defense University in Washington, DC. 

He is a frequent speaker and media commentator on 

American foreign and national security policy, with 

a focus on Europe and NATO. Dr. Kay is the author 
119

or co-editor of six books, including NATO and the 

Future of European Security and Global Security in the 

Twenty-first Century: The Quest for Power and the Search 

for Peace. His current book project focuses on contemporary strategic choices for American foreign and defense policy. Dr. Kay holds a B.A. and an M.A. from 

Kent State University, an M.A. from the Free University of Brussels, and a Ph.D. from the University of 

Massachusetts.

WILLIAM T. TOW is Professor and Head of the Department of International Relations in the School of 

International, Political and Strategic Studies (IPS), 

College of Asia & Pacific at the Australian National 

University (ANU). He directs the ANU’s security 

component of the Australian Research Council’s Centre for Excellence in Policing and Security. He has also 

co-managed the ANU’s project on cross-comparing 

bilateral and multilateral security approaches in the 

Asia-Pacific as part of the MacArthur Foundation’s 

Asian Security Initiative (MASI). He has served on the 

Foreign Affairs Council of Australia’s Department of 

Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), and the Board of 

Directors for the Australian-American Fulbright Commission. Dr. Tow has authored or edited 20 volumes 

or monographs and over 100 journal articles or book 

chapters on various aspects of Asian security relations and alliance politics. His books have become 

standard sources for analysts and students working 

on security issues in the Asia-Pacific. He was Editor 

for the Australian Journal of International Affairs. He is 

series co-editor for the Routledge Security in the Asia 

Pacific Series.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III

Commandant

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STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

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Ms. Rita A. Rummel

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