RUSSIA AFTER PUTIN

Richard J. Krickus

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Carlisle Barracks, PA and

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Strategic Studies Institute

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U.S. Army War College Press

RUSSIA AFTER PUTIN

Richard J. Krickus

May 2014

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v

FOREWORD

As the United States reassesses relations with Russia and develops doctrine that addresses a turbulent 

security environment, Dr. Richard J. Krickus addresses a brace of pivotal questions that have a bearing on 

the future of Vladimir Putin and his Power Vertical. 

Are Putin’s days numbered as many Russian watchers 

predict and what will Russia look like after he leaves 

the Kremlin? Toward this end, Krickus assesses four 

plausible scenarios. They include first, Status Quo, 

depicting the major geo-political features of Russia 

today; second, Stalin Lite that embraces most of the 

characteristics of a police state; third, The Western 

Path to Development that reflects pluralistic phenomenon associated with a “normal” European country; 

and fourth, Russia in Chaos, an outcome that anticipates the virtual disintegration of Russia as we know 

it today.

The plausibility of these scenarios varies with a 

move toward Stalin Lite most likely—some would 

argue that we are already there—a pluralistic Russia 

less so, and a Russia consumed in chaos least likely. In 

his assessment of all four outcomes, Dr. Krickus considers their domestic and international implications 

and dwells specifically upon what bearing they might 

have upon the capacity of the United States and Russia to collaborate in meeting common security problems: coping with international terrorism; stemming 

the proliferation of weapons of mass destructrion; 

and resolving violent internal struggles that have profound regional and international implications like the 

Syrian Civil War.

Dr. Krickus concludes that, in spite of many obstacles, the leadership in Washington and Moscow 
must find ways to address security threats of this nature even as the United States rebalances toward Asia. 

Moreover, he agrees with prominent statesmen like 

Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger that ultimately, Russia must be integrated into a Euro-Atlantic 

security system.

The unexpected turbulent events of September 

2013 that have resulted in a United Nations resolution 

compelling Syria to surrender its chemical weapons 

and to restart the Geneva negotiations to find a diplomatic resolution to the Syrian crisis offers evidence 

that a partnership, even if limited and fragile, is plausible. A major consideration of the U.S. national security establishment must be how to operationalize the 

partnership. 

For all intents and purposes, the United States and 

Russia now have taken responsibility for resolving the 

Syrian crisis and in the process have reached a new 

chapter in the reset of relations. If they succeed in 

finding a diplomatic solution to it, further cooperation 

on other shared security concerns will follow. If not, 

they will take a turn for the worse.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

vi
vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

RICHARD J. KRICKUS is a Distinguished Professor Emeritus at the University of Mary Washington 

and has held the Oppenheimer Chair for Warfighting 

Strategy at the U.S. Marine Corps University. Previously, he cofounded The National Center for Urban 

Ethnic Affairs in Washington, DC, and in the early1970s began conducting research on the Union of 

Soviet Socialist Republics’ “nationalities question.” 

In this connection, he began to write about popular 

unrest among the people of Lithuania. In 1990, Sajudis, the Lithuanian popular front movement, invited 

him to serve as an international monitor for the first 

democratic election conducted in Soviet Lithuania. 

Dr. Krickus has offered testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and has lectured at the U.S. 

Foreign Service Institute, the Polish Foreign Ministry, 

the European Commission, and other domestic and 

foreign venues on the Soviet Union/Russia, the Baltic 

countries, NATO, and Kaliningrad. He has published 

widely on these issues for academic and policy-oriented journals as well as various newspapers, including 

The Washington Post, The Chicago Sun-Times, the Los 

Angeles Times, and The Wall Street Journal Europe. For 

8 years, Dr. Krickus wrote a column on world affairs 

for Lietuvos Rytas, Lithuania’s leading national daily. 

He has appeared as a commentator on Soviet-Russian 

affairs on U.S. radio and television on numerous occasions. He is the author of a number of books, including: 

Pursuing the American Dream; The Superpowers in Crisis; 

Showdown: The Lithuanian Rebellion and the Break-Up of 

the Soviet Empire; The Kaliningrad Question; Iron Troikas: 

The New Threat from the East; Medvedev’s Plan: Giving 

Russia a Voice but Not a Veto in a New European Secu-
viii

rity System; and The Afghanistan Question and the Reset 

in U.S.-Russian Relations. Dr. Krickus holds a B.A. in 

government from the College of William and Mary, 

an M.A. in international affairs from the University 

of Massachusetts, and a Ph.D. in comparative politics 

from Georgetown University.
ix

SUMMARY

Note: This research was completed in the fall of 2013, which 

was obviously prior to the recent crisis in Crimea and Ukraine.

In 1999, after Boris Yeltsin appointed Vladimir Putin Prime Minister, the former Russian Secret Service 

(KGB) agent pledged to create a powerful state at home 

capable of projecting Russia’s influence abroad. He 

spoke favorably about democracy but soon indicated 

by his actions that political authority would be concentrated in his hands alone, although he surrounded 

himself with a medley of supporters: members of the 

security services and military—collectively known 

as the Siloviki—business tycoons, high-level government officials, and members of criminal organizations. The state’s resurrection—what became known 

as the Power Vertical—was made possible largely 

through surging gas and oil revenues and Putin’s 

tight hold over the reins of power. The revenues that 

they produced, in turn, expanded the urban middle 

class, and provided jobs for those working in Sovietera enterprises and entitlements for retirees. In return, 

Putin enjoyed unprecedented approval in the eyes of 

most Russians, therefore, after serving two terms as 

president, he felt comfortable passing the job off to his 

young assistant—Dmitry Medvedev.

But in the winter of 2011-12, massive public demonstrations in Moscow and St. Petersburg revealed that 

the nation’s urban middle class—the university education privileged cosmopolitans—was disenchanted 

with his rule. They were joined by a small number 

of communists, nationalists, and other opponents of 

his Power Vertical. Staunch supporters who lived in 

the hinterland and occupied the lower rungs of the 
x

socio-economic ladder, the provincials, were also getting restive. Even some members of Putin’s own team 

deserted him; for example, his former economic Czar, 

Alexei Kudrin, resigned rather than support the dramatic increase in the defense budget and was joined 

by some oligarchs and celebrities. 

This medley of opponents accused Putin of rigging the 2011 Duma elections and his own re-election 

in 2012. To make matters worse, it was forecasted 

that Russia’s hydrocarbon production would decline, 

while outmoded enterprises would prove incapable 

of surviving global competition. Henceforth, revenues would neither sustain social services nor an 

expanding defense budget, so both Putin’s domestic 

and foreign policy agenda was in peril. It was only a 

matter of time before his reign expired along with the 

Power Vertical.

But soon after Putin began his third term, analysts 

claimed that predictions of his imminent demise were 

premature. In spite of a slippage in the polls, he remained the most popular politician in Russia, while 

his opponents were divided, demoralized, and leaderless. Measures he took to silence them—including 

restrictions on public demonstrations and the arrest 

of opposition leaders—convinced many middle class 

protestors that they had been too hasty in openly demanding his ouster. In an attempt to secure the provincials support, Putin exploited anti-Americanism 

sentiment that resonated among millions of Russians 

and portrayed his democratic detractors as agents of 

foreign governments.

On the international front, Putin has reasserted 

Russia’s influence throughout the space of the former Soviet Union. He has done so with mixed results; 

for example, he has exploited Russia’s energy assets 
xi

to hamper Armenia and Ukraine in their Westward 

drive, but his alternative Economic Union has stalled.

As the United States reassesses relations with Russia and develops a strategic doctrine that addresses a 

turbulent international security environment, a brace 

of pivotal question remains to be answered: What is 

in store for Putin's future and for the fate of the Power Vertical? What do the answers to these questions 

mean for U.S.-Russian relations?

The purpose of this monograph is to address all 

of these questions and provide conclusions and recommendations to help U.S. policymakers provide 

appropriate answers to them. To accomplish this ambitious undertaking, two sets of scenarios will be considered. The first set is benign and include “The Status 

Quo” and “The Western Path to Development.” The 

second set is malignant and includes what has been 

called, “Stalin Lite” and what amounts to a worst case 

scenario, “Russia in Chaos.”

In looking at the first set of benign scenarios, the 

following observations are pertinent:

Status Quo: A broad range of economic and political circumstances support the notion that in spite of a 

multitude of challenges, the Power Vertical will persist even beyond Vladimir Putin’s tenure. It is against 

this backdrop that a rebalance in U.S.-Russian relations will be evaluated.

The Western Path to Development: A faltering 

economy, pressure from progressives in the Kremlin, a revitalized “democracy movement,” and disgruntled business oligarchs and grassroots upheaval 

in the provinces will ultimately produce a more open 

political system and law-based society. Under these 

circumstances, Russia’s integration into the EuroAtlantic community is plausible.
xii

In addressing the second set of malignant scenarios, the following observations are pertinent:

Stalin Lite: In keeping with the crackdown that began soon after Putin was elected in 2012, a host of opposition figures were arrested, a number of oligarchs 

fled the country, new restraints were imposed upon 

the media and nongovernmental organizations, and 

members of the inner circle whose loyalty was suspect 

were removed from office. Under these circumstances, 

the prospects for a rebalance in U.S.-Russian relations 

are slim.

Russia in Chaos: Here, there is a collapse in the 

Power Vertical along with a dramatic economic decline, and Russia appears to be following the path of 

the former Soviet Union. This outcome may be less 

plausible than any of the above, but should it materialize, it will have significant and dangerous implications for international stability in general and U.S. 

international interests in particular. In sum, what happens next in Russia will have profound consequences 

for the security of the United States and its allies. Russia remains the largest country in the world; most of 

the earth’s population and resources are found near 

it; and it is the only power that has the capacity to destroy the United States in a nuclear strike.

Russia must remain a U.S. major concern as American policymakers address two pivotal security challenges: a rebooting of the Euro-Atlantic security system that may ultimately include Russia, and an Asian 

Pivot that acknowledges that Russia is a major player 

in the Far East. While some analysts claim that clashing values necessitate a pause in relations, U.S.-Russian leaders must work toward a peaceful resolution 

of the crises in Syria, Iran, and North Korea. 
xiii

The unexpected turbulent events of September 

2013 that have resulted in a United Nations resolution 

compelling Syria to surrender its chemical weapons 

and restart in Geneva, Switzerland, to find a diplomatic resolution to the Syrian crisis offers evidence 

that a partnership, even if limited and fragile, is plausible. A major consideration of the U.S. national security establishment must be how to operationalize such 

a partnership.

For all intents and purposes, the United States and 

Russia now have taken responsibility for resolving the 

Syrian civil war and in the process have reached a new 

chapter in the reset of their relations. If they succeed in 

finding a diplomatic solution to the Syrian situation, 

further cooperation on other security matters will follow. If not, they will take a turn for the worse.

1

RUSSIA AFTER PUTIN

Note: This research was completed in the fall of 2013, which 

was obviously prior to the recent crisis in Crimea and Ukraine.

INTRODUCTION

In the winter of 2011-12, Russians expressed their 

outrage with Vladimir Putin in massive, unprecedented street protests. At one point, about 100,000 

Muscovites braved the brutal cold and demanded his 

ouster and the demise of his system of rule known as 

the Power Vertical: a regime marked by personal rule 

and relationships. 

A small number of trusted figures around Mr. Putin, 

perhaps twenty to thirty people, make the key decisions. At the very top is an even tighter inner circle of 

about half a dozen individuals, all with close ties to 

Putin, who have worked together for twenty years, beginning in St. Petersburg and continuing in Moscow. 

Real decision making power resides inside the inner 

circle; while Russia’s formal political institutions have 

to varying degrees been emasculated.1

One of the most prominent organizers, Alexey Navalny, a blogger of renown, stunned government officials when he proclaimed that the throng was large: 

enough . . . to seize the Kremlin and the White House 

now, but we won’t as we are peaceful people, but 

sooner or later we will take back what is rightfully 

ours.2

Similar displays of public anger, albeit in smaller 

numbers, erupted in St. Petersburg and other cities 

and via TV and the Internet, mesmerized a global 
2

audience of billions. Even hard-edged pundits pondered whether they were witnessing a Russian version of the Arab Spring and the forced exit of autocratic rulers. Cowed by Czars and Soviet dictators for 

centuries, Russians were now about to cast out their 

tormentors.

This historic outburst had its roots in the September 2011 announcement that Putin would run for a 

third term as president and not Dmitry Medvedev, 

who was an open advocate of government transparency and pluralism. Putin’s proclamation abruptly 

demonstrated that Medvedev was a mere puppet responding to the tugs of his master. More bad news 

arrived that December when it was revealed that the 

parliamentary elections had been rigged. This was in 

keeping with Putin’s penchant for “overkill” since his 

United Russia would have swept the field even if the 

elections were fair, but when his personal power was 

at risk, he did not take chances.

The demonstrations uplifted the spirits of the 

Russians who yearned to live in a truly democratic society, and many of the protesters concluded that they 

did not need Medvedev to accomplish that cherished 

objective. They could achieve it through bottom-up reform. Putin’s newly assertive opposition consisted of 

a medley of individuals and interests. Those most visible included middle class urbanites, cosmopolitans 

who had college degrees, ate sushi, and took foreign 

vacations—the very people Putin needed to restore 

the state, to diversify the economy and to transform 

Russia into a modern society. Clearly, this generation 

was not spooked by the same show of force that had 

intimidated their parents. They were not afraid! They 

were joined in smaller numbers by a motley crew of 

communists and nationalists that included some of 
3

the most prominent new and assertive leaders like Navalny, who gained national notoriety via his blog and 

campaigns to fight corruption, and Sergei Udaltsov, 

a leftist provocateur who proclaimed that he and his 

supporters favored the immediate ouster of Putin and 

his ilk. The bold behavior of these two men indicated 

that something truly significant was abroad in Russia.3

Sharing platforms with these two firebrands were 

liberals with familiar names like Boris Nemstov and 

Gregory Yavlinsky, both of whom had served in past 

governments. But in addition to these “old-timers” 

and disgruntled middle class protesters, members of 

Putin’s team like Alexei Kudrin—a former finance 

minister—joined them in a turbulent protest on Moscow’s Sakharov Square. He had parted with Putin 

over a decision to sustain a bloated defense budget 

at the expense of other public programs. He was accompanied by former Putin staffers and one time 

admirers, for example, Kseniya Sobchak, a huge TV 

celebrity and daughter of Putin’s old boss, Anatoly 

Sobchak, a one-time St. Petersburg Mayor. Obviously 

ignoring the fate of the imprisoned Mikhail Khodorkovsky, some of the country’s richest men, for example, Mikhail Prochorov, joined the protestors. Some 

pundits believed that like leaders of the “opposition” 

parties in the Duma, he was a Kremlin stooge, a stageprop Putin could cite to burnish his democratic credentials. That said, the cosmopolitan activists were 

receiving economic aid from some oligarchs—people 

who had learned how to cover their backside or who 

believed that change was inevitable. 

Although demonstrations in Moscow and St. Petersburg captured the attention of the international 

media, Putin remained the county’s most popular 

politician. His stock, however, was in decline even 
4

among loyal followers in the vast Russian hinterland. 

Unlike the cosmopolitans, these people, the provincials, did not enjoy much formal education, fancy foreign culinary treats, nor vacations abroad. At the same 

time, they abhorred Western values and resented being lectured by Russia’s critics. On the contrary, they 

were outspoken anti-Americans who remained tethered to old Soviet enterprises or were retirees living in 

the desolate hinterland surviving on government entitlements. For them, Putin was the iconic strongman 

that their ancestors celebrated throughout history—a 

tough protector of Mother Russia. At the same time, 

he could take credit for a vast improvement in conditions for tens of millions of Russians. Consequently, 

they had given him their unqualified support during 

his first two terms as president. By 2012, many now 

associated his rule with economic inequality, corruption, lawlessness, and little or no improvement in 

public services. But, as of yet, they were not prepared 

to openly support Putin’s opponents.

While the road ahead was shrouded in mist, 

Kremlin-watchers predicted a sea change in Russian 

politics. Many doubted that Putin would survive his 

third term, and their analysis rested largely upon the 

expectation that he would be upended by the same 

economic pitfalls that toppled his Soviet predecessors: most specifically, a decline in gas and oil output, 

deflated prices for those commodities, and the failure 

of the Kremlin to provide the country with a Plan 

B. That is the failure to diversify a one-legged petro 

economy and to create economic activity in a variety 

of areas that allowed Russia to compete in the brutal 

global market. As gas and oil revenues plunged, Putin 

could no longer meet the promises that he made to his 

base—the provincials—and provide them with jobs, 
5

pensions, and social welfare services, while meeting 

the demands of the military-industrial complex. He 

promised the generals and present-day replicas of 

the Red Managers a spike in the defense budget even 

though they wanted to maintain large and expensive 

general purpose forces—presumably to match American military power—that clear-headed defense analysts deemed irrational and dangerous. 

Calls for his removal were sustained by pandemic 

corruption and other forms of lawless behavior and 

growing resentment that a handful of oligarchs and 

members of pro-Putin clans were living in luxury 

while the average Russian was struggling to make 

ends meet. In addition to surging popular disgruntlement, there were signs of discontent among Putin’s associates who relied upon his protection but were worried about their economic welfare. Like their Soviet 

counterparts a generation ago, they could not ignore 

the alarming observation that privileged members 

of society—including “their kids”—were among the 

demonstrators. Many younger members of the ruling 

elite believed there was trouble ahead if the problems 

that had ignited unprecedented protest were ignored. 

Some concluded that it was prudent to join the future 

rulers that were emerging from the gathering storm 

and not oppose them.

But there was a two-fold problem with this prognosis. First, the demonstrators soon left the streets, 

many even before Putin launched a crackdown on 

public protests, and accused their leaders of criminal 

behavior. They were not only divided by culture and 

ideology, they had no single leader to rally them, nor 

did they have a viable political program or any firm 

idea about how they were going to press forward in 

an organized fashion. Then Putin passed a medley of 
6

laws that portrayed any recipient of assistance from 

abroad a “foreign agent,” expelled the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) for peddling subversion in Russia, redefined the meaning of traitorous behavior, and 

took other measures to silence the pesky protestors. 

By the end of the year, foreign journalists reported 

that many of the younger members of the middle class 

got the message and, like their parents, “They, too, 

are afraid.”

A second problem was that those who predicted 

the Power Vertical’s demise found themselves tonguetied when asked a pertinent question: “What would 

replace it?” In the words of several highly respected 

Russian analysts, “That Russia is in crisis is becoming 

apparent. What are less apparent are the exact nature 

and the stakes and options involved.”4

This monograph is an attempt to answer the question: “After Putin and the Power Vertical, what next?” 

Given the prevailing inattention to the “Russian 

Question” among the American foreign policy community, Russia’s fate has been treated as a sideshow 

in Washington. There has been some discussion in the 

White House about the prospects for a “re-balance” 

in American-Russian relations that would address issues that concern both countries, but the Congress, the 

media, and the public has shown little interest in the 

enterprise. For most Americans, what happens in Russia is of little consequence and for members of Congress and the national security community, the most 

compelling challenges are unfolding in Asia. In addition to the reckless comments and threatening behavior of the nuclear-armed leadership in North Korea, 

China has been throwing its weight around in much 

of Asia, prompting many analysts to see trouble ahead 

with Beijing. 
7

To minimize the Russian Question is unwarranted 

and could be dangerous. Only Russia can destroy the 

United States in a nuclear strike, holds a valued veto at 

the United Nations (UN) and covers a vast area of the 

world where much of the earth’s population and resources can be found. Furthermore, a truculent uncooperative Russia may obstruct U.S. foreign policy priorities. What happens next in Russia, then, is of great 

consequence for the global security environment and 

therefore of paramount concern to the United States.

Toward this end, two sets of scenarios resting on a 

medley of analysis, facts, trends and projections will 

be assessed as far as the mid-2020s. The first set is benign and includes “The Status Quo” and a “Western 

Path to Development.” The second set is malignant 

and includes what has been called, “Stalin Lite,” i.e., 

a return to a limited police state at home and revisionism abroad. It also includes what amounts to a 

worst case scenario, “Russia in Chaos,” where central authority is weak, the economy is dysfunctional, 

violence widespread, and de facto fiefdoms based on 

ethnic, ideological, regional, and religious divisions 

proliferate. Under these turbulent and unpredictable 

circumstances, all of Eurasia is at risk but the primary 

focus will be upon American-Russian relations.

In looking at the set of benign outcomes, the following observations are pertinent. 

The Status Quo: In spite of a multitude of challenges—economic, political and social—the Power 

Vertical prevails with or without Vladimir Putin’s 

stewardship. The relationship between the West and 

Russia remains problematic, although there are notably areas of cooperation. 

The Western Path to Development: Under 

mounting pressure from progressive members of his 
8

team and business oligarchs, as well as a revitalized 

“democracy movement” and discontent among the 

provincials, Putin reluctantly retreats and paves the 

way for a more open political system and law-based 

society. Prospects for close relations with the West improve dramatically and make possible the integration 

of an enlarged Europe, including Russia. 

In addressing the second set of malignant scenarios, the following observations are pertinent.

Stalin Lite: In keeping with the crackdown that 

began soon after Putin was elected in 2012, a host of 

opposition figures are arrested, a number of oligarchs 

flee the country, new restraints are imposed upon the 

media, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and 

members of the inner circle whose loyalty is suspect 

are removed from office. Intercommunal violence is on 

the rise throughout Russia, not only in the North Caucasus. Simultaneously, under the influence of Slavic 

ultra-nationalists, the Kremlin lashes out at Azerbaijan, the Baltics, Georgia, and Ukraine. “East-West relations” take on the aspects of a “new cold war,” but the 

Kremlin overlords acknowledge that the correlation 

of forces favors the West, and it is foolhardy to risk a 

military confrontation with the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) or its member states. In short, 

they adhere to “red lines” that they will not cross.

Russia in Chaos: A multitude of rival factions divide the Kremlin overlords, while disparate ethnic, 

religious and regional actors dominate a host of fiefdoms that challenge Moscow’s authority. Meanwhile, 

the military and police have become dysfunctional and 

their members demoralized. In some cases, they have 

joined the disparate armed groups that are responsible 

for widespread violence. Under these circumstances, 

Russia may fragment in much the same fashion that 

the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) did. 
9

Russian-watchers deem this outcome implausible but 

should it materialize, it will have monumental and 

dangerous implications for international stability and 

force U.S. strategists to take another look at Russia. In 

contrast to the Stalin Lite scenario, the major players—

out of design or happenstance—are prepared to take 

risks and actions that may foster violent conflicts with 

Russia’s neighbors and Western allies in the former 

Soviet space.

Each of the scenarios will be considered to determine their impact upon Russia and the countries that 

are adjacent to it in Eurasia—although the major focus 

will be upon Europe. The implications for U.S.-Russian relations will receive special attention in each of 

the four scenarios.

Pertinent questions that need to be answered 

include the following:

• Why will Russia continue to be a major concern 

of the American foreign policy community?

• What are the prospects for fruitful cooperation between the United States and Russia on a 

range of critical international problems?

• What issues at present are most favorable to cooperation between the two countries?

• Why, since 2007, has Putin concluded that the 

United States can no longer dictate to Russia 

but must treat it like an equal, and what impact 

will his crackdown have upon the prospects for 

fruitful cooperation with the Barack Obama administration?

• What are the domestic U.S. barriers to a re-engagement with Russia?

• In looking at the four scenarios under scrutiny, what are their significance for stability 

in Europe and harmonious American-Russian 

relations?
10

• How does China influence the prospects for 

 positive American-Russian relations?

• Why must the United States seek a partnership 

with Russia on addressing crises like Syria, 

Iran and North Korea and not embrace a pause 

in relations as some analysts recommend?

 

THE STATUS QUO

The Domestic Prospect.

By the close of 2012, analysts predicting Putin’s 

demise were having second thoughts. His popularity 

was slumping, but he still enjoyed a 60 percent favorability rating in the polls. Democratic leaders everywhere would characterize such staunch support as a 

“ruling mandate.” The principle reason for this reassessment was that in face of his crackdown, most protestors returned to the comfort of their homes. Wags 

in Moscow proclaimed, “They forgot about revolution 

and went shopping!”

There was much about Putin’s meteoric rise that 

baffled Kremlin-watchers. He was born and educated 

in Leningrad and, after graduating with a law degree, 

he entered the KGB. He served for 4 years in the East 

German city of Dresden where, according to his biographers, one of his major duties was to monitor the activities of those German comrades who clashed with 

Eric Honecker, the reactionary leader who earned 

Moscow’s enmity for resisting the liberal reforms that 

Gorbachev had championed in the USSR and urged 

Moscow’s satellites to follow. Was Putin working 

with the dissidents in a Kremlin orchestrated plot to 

dump Honecker? If so, he might have been a much 
11

more substantial member of the KGB than his resume 

otherwise indicated.

In 1990 he returned to his hometown, and in 3 

years, he hopscotched from being an aide to St. Petersburg’s Mayor Sobchak, his former law professor, 

to much bigger things in Moscow. After Sobchak had 

lost his bid for re-election, Putin went to work in the 

President’s office; was appointed head of the FSB (the 

new name for the KGB); became deputy prime minister; and served as acting prime minister before he 

replaced Yeltsin as president.

It appears that Putin, while in St. Petersburg, had 

developed the capacity to serve as an interlocutor between the government and the new business oligarchs 

that had become powerful players in political as well 

as economic affairs in the midst of post-Soviet turmoil. 

Presumably, one of the reasons why he was selected 

to replace Yeltsin was to make sure that the oligarchs 

did not break the arrangement that the Kremlin had 

made with them: “Take whatever you could get your 

hands on in the economic realm but do not meddle in 

the political realm.”5

After his third successful run for the presidency, 

Putin adopted new laws and procedures that intimidated his opponents—curtailing public protests by 

making it more difficult to conduct them legally, by 

denying NGO activists access to foreign funding, 

by redefining the word “traitorous,” and by censoring bloggers, to name several of them. Even the 

toothless Duma attracted his attention; for example, 

Gennadi V. Gudkov, a rare member of the parliament who challenged the government, was removed 

from office on the ground that he had engaged in 

“criminal behavior.”6

In March, the residencies of Navalny, Sobchak, 

and several other protest leaders were stormed and 
12

their contents rifled. Criminal charges were leveled 

against Navalny and the leftist fire-brand Sergei 

Udaltsov, clearly a prologue for worse things to come. 

Furthermore, one of the latter’s associates, Leonid 

Razvozzhayev, who fled to Kiev to avoid arrest, was 

kidnapped and returned to a Russian prison. He had 

arranged a transit to Israel with a Jewish agency but, 

while taking a break in his meeting with its representatives, he was snatched by Russian agents and taken 

home where he was accused of visa irregularities. 

Shaken by the crackdown, most protestors vacated the streets and resorted to less provocative enterprises, while their titular leaders vainly searched for 

a new strategy. Like the architects of the Arab Spring, 

they turned to the Internet and formed a Coordinating Council of 45 activists. Navalny, who had gained 

notoriety by claiming Putin’s United Russia was “the 

party of thieves and crooks,” was chosen its leader. 

It included representatives from all factions, although 

the cosmopolitans predominated. Their purpose was 

to remove Putin from power but, when asked how 

they intended to accomplish that daunting objective, 

their answers were vague. 

Nonetheless many foreign observers were sanguine about their prospects. After all, the Arab Spring 

had demonstrated the capacity of grassroots protesters to shape political events with the help of the new 

information technology that was available to ordinary 

citizens. Putin controlled the media, but because he 

did not use computers and dismissed the power of cell 

phones and social networking, he was operating in the 

dark surrounded by “yes men.” Granted it would take 

time, but the handwriting was on the wall; the days of 

the Power Vertical were numbered.7

Some Russian commentators were less optimistic, 

citing overwhelming evidence that the reformers had 
13

failed to live up to expectations. Navalny was characterized as a windbag whose nationalistic affiliations 

unsettled the democrats; the Council was denigrated 

as a Potemkin-like fraud; and there was ample evidence that the reformers were demoralized. Meanwhile, Putin continued his crackdown and, while it 

did not silence the likes of Navalny and Udaltsov, it 

intimidated ordinary disgruntled members of the urban middle class. They had little stomach for a confrontation with Putin’s security services. Holding 

well-paying jobs and having access to the good life 

that had been denied their parents, not many of them 

were prepared to take risks. Yes, they were unhappy 

with the government, but if the average Russian did 

not butt heads with the authorities, they left you alone 

and your private affairs were your own business. 

What other Russian generation could make a similar 

statement? 

Putin’s harsh policies were accompanied by a 

populist campaign as he appeared before audiences of 

workers to commiserate with them. He even met with 

members of motorcycle gangs that celebrated Russian 

chauvinism and vehemently attacked non-Russians. 

They did so with special zeal in the case of Muslims. 

Moreover, while sophisticated Muscovites lamented 

the jail sentence for two young women who belonged 

to the Pussy Riot rock group that had conducted a 

bizarre display of contempt for Putin in Moscow’s 

Church of the Redeemer, most ordinary folk applauded the punishment.

Putin displayed a unique gift for exploiting the 

wide cultural chasm that separated the cosmopolitans 

and the provincials through his populist rhetoric and 

widely circulated visuals: his stalking wild animals, 

searching for archeological treasure in ocean depths, 
14

and flying in flimsy aircraft guiding migratory birds 

to a safe refuge. He often performed these feats shirtless or in macho sports togs. Critics made fun of such 

displays, but Putin knew that “simple” folk liked it 

when their leaders acted and talked tough. Millions of 

Russians still recalled with approval his threat to kill 

Chechen terrorists in their outdoor “shit-houses.”

They also were delighted by his attacks on American officials interfering in Russia’s domestic affairs. 

Days after arriving in Moscow, the new American 

Ambassador, Michael McFaul—a Stanford University professor and one of the major proponents of the 

reset—was stalked by a TV crew, sending a message 

from the Kremlin that his mission in Moscow was not 

going to be pleasant. Also, Putin named Secretary of 

State Hillary Clinton a “foreign provocateur” bent on 

achieving regime change in Russia. Such claims resonated among ordinary folk and so did accusations that 

the reformers were nothing less than “foreign agents” 

who were seeking the government’s overthrow. Even 

some Russians who scoffed at such tactics were disturbed by what they deemed American efforts to humiliate Russia. In his public appearances, Putin often 

reminded onlookers that the Americans were not in 

a position to preach to anyone. How could they do 

so when the 2000 presidential election was stolen; or 

demonize Russia for corruption when the global financial crisis orchestrated by Wall Street represented 

the most massive act of corruption ever? And human 

rights—well, every day the evidence was overwhelming that the Americans in their endless wars were the 

major perpetrators of such abhorrent practices, and 

what about the U.S. prison population—said to be the 

largest in the world?

By year’s end, Kremlin-watchers concluded that 

predictions of Putin’s imminent political demise were 
15

baseless. On the contrary, not only would he survive 

until 2018, his health willing, he might ride a third 

term into the 2020s. Yes, there were many reasons for 

complaints, but no one could deny Russians were living better than ever, could travel abroad, and they did 

not have to worry about clumsy government intrusions into their daily lives. Putin gave them a psychological jolt by once again making them proud of their 

country. In sum, since Putin was in charge, things had 

changed for the better. All one had to do was reflect 

on recent history.

In the aftermath of the USSR’s disintegration, 

“Russia’s gross domestic product [GDP] contracted 

by as much as 35-45 percent.”8 In contrast to the Soviet Union’s last year, living standards collapsed by 

46 percent and, after its demise, Russia was stricken 

by a budget deficit and a ruble devaluation that devastated personal wealth. It was no surprise, then, that 

voters expressed little enthusiasm for Boris Yeltsin, 

who eagerly embraced foreign inspired economic 

bromides—e.g., the “shock therapy” that was associated with American free market radicals. The aging 

and sickly Yeltsin’s incompetence was compounded 

by his complicity in the “great robbery” that he tolerated—nay participated in—with a small group of 

grasping oligarchs. It resulted in a colossal heist of 

national wealth, pandemic corruption, and economic 

hard times for just about everybody except the new 

Nomenklatura.

“Then, as if by magic, everything seemed to begin changing in 1999.”9

 Henceforth the nation’s GDP 

grew by an annual rate of 7 percent, incomes soared 

for many, the budget deficit plunged, and Russia 

settled its foreign debt obligations. On the political 

front, Putin, who was named Prime Minister, was un-
16

abashed in his pledge to the Russian people that he 

would end their long, dark period of humiliation. Toward that end, he launched a second war in Chechnya 

and crushed the “bandits” there and adopted tough 

new measures to silence troublemakers, including the 

most “assertive” oligarchs. The incarceration of Lukoil’s president, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, earned Putin 

enmity outside of Russia but applause within it. In 

Putin’s mind, and that of a majority of Russians, there 

was a direct correlation between stability—authoritarianism—and prosperity. “Russia was back!”

Nonetheless, upon his 2012 return to the Presidential Palace, Putin had reason to look toward a third 

term with trepidation. He agreed that his Achilles heel 

was the “petro-state” where an entire nation rested on 

a one-legged economy. He, too, endorsed the notion 

of economic diversification but that entailed a real war 

on corruption, a truly functional legal system, and other liberal measures that threaten the privileges of his 

most powerful supporters. That meant taking on the 

muscular collection of former security officers, military commanders, economic warlords, and criminal 

elements that embraced the status quo. It had made 

them rich and influential, and they saw no reason to 

scrap it.

At the same time, abundant gas and oil profits in 

the early-21st century were barriers to change just as 

they were during the Soviet era. In the last years of its 

existence, the Soviet Union’s hydrocarbon revenues 

surged, and this windfall allowed the geriatric leadership to avoid one of the specters that haunted most of 

them: the Soviet system’s implosion. Convinced that 

oil and gas revenues would continue to flow, changes 

in either the economic or political system were unnecessary. There was a sufficient supply of rubles to 
17

fund both the Warfare and Welfare State, or so they 

reasoned, until hydrocarbon production faltered and 

Mikhail Gorbachev was forced to acknowledge that 

the USSR could not afford both “guns and butter.” 

This all deteriorated during Yeltsin’s 10 years in 

the Kremlin, but soon after Putin was appointed prime 

minister, he counted on high energy prices to keep the 

generals happy and through government transfers to 

meet the needs of ordinary folk. Furthermore, Russia’s economic boom opened avenues of prosperity to 

an expanding educated middle class. Life improved 

as well for millions of other Russians who did not enjoy much formal education as they found jobs in construction, service industries, and other occupations 

not directly tied to the energy boom. As the hard times 

of the Yeltsin era were left behind them, the people 

embraced the “Putin era.”10

But he hit a bump when the economic crisis of 2008 

demonstrated how vulnerable Russia remained in the 

face of dramatic changes in the global economy. Alexei Kudrin, who served as finance minister from 2000 

to 2011, observed that Russia’s problems were a direct result of its dependence upon hydrocarbon rents. 

“The oil industry” no longer was “a locomotive for the 

economy” but had “become a brake.” This had been 

the fate of any country that depended upon a single 

commodity for prosperity. At the same time, economists predicted the output of energy assets would decline after 2020.11 If Russia was to become a modern 

society capable of competing in the global economy, 

it had to find wealth-producing opportunities other 

than living on rents derived from natural resources. 

That meant resurrecting industry, expanding the service sector, and investing in roads, air fields, and a 

multitude of other infrastructure improvements. In his 
18

public remarks, Putin spoke in favor of diversification, 

but he was reluctant to take the measures necessary to 

accomplish that daunting objective. On the contrary, 

his actions seemed to be in keeping with those in the 

military-industrial complex that saw massive defense 

spending as a force multiplier for the economy. Putin 

was by far the most powerful man in Russia, but he 

could not altogether ignore the disparate clans that 

had the capacity to challenge him.

Analysts focusing on declining gas and oil rents, 

however, had ignored a more positive picture: Russia still had abundant hydrocarbon wealth, and the 

older energy fields were profitable if new techniques 

were adopted. The large Western oil companies were 

ready to provide the capital required to modernize 

the depleted wells in western Siberia. What is more, 

access to oil and gas fields in the Arctic were so attractive that foreign entrepreneurs would gladly invest in 

them as well. 

Kremlin officials believed that prices would firm up 

as the global economy rebounded in 2013. In a pinch, 

Putin could rely upon his ace in the hole: the world’s 

third largest stockpile of hard currency. Should hydrocarbon revenues stall, Putin presumed that he had the 

cash to meet the complaints of those in the hinterland 

who expressed fears about their salaries and pensions. 

Many remained silent because they accepted the Kremlin line that “Yes, we are facing hard times but so are 

the Europeans who not only are struggling to save the 

Euro but to salvage the EU [European Union] itself.” 

Then, too, Russians throughout history had demonstrated they had a higher tolerance for pain than their 

spoiled fellow Europeans. Consequently, Greeks and 

Spaniards might be more inclined to press for regime 

change than ordinary Russians. Even the arrogant 
19

Americans were having trouble addressing their gargantuan debt crisis and economic inequality there was 

unprecedented. The U.S. media was percolating with 

reports that the “American Dream” was beyond the 

grasp of a growing number of U.S. citizens. 

In Russia, by contrast, economic diversification 

was taking place. One of Russia’s unheralded economic assets included a large pool of almost 150 million customers who craved the living standards of a 

consumer economy that had long flourished in Europe 

and the United States. Foreign investors were more 

than happy to invest in an authoritarian “European” 

country just as they had done so for decades in the 

world’s most populated Asian autocracy—China. At 

the same time, there were some positive signs on the 

demographic front; deaths still exceeded births, but 

migrants from many parts of the former USSR were 

entering Russia in steady numbers. It was reported 

that most of the workers building the Sochi Olympic 

venue were from Central Asia. If this trend was sustained, it was good news for both Russia and those 

who courted its consumers.

What’s more, Russia could claim with justification that it was on the road to diversification as rents 

from oil and gas capitalized jobs in industry, construction, and the service sector. Reports from Nizhny 

Novgorod indicated in late-2012 that GM would invest over $1 billion in upgrading Russian auto plants. 

Foreign car sales were increasing at a rapid pace, and 

it was projected that Russia would surpass Germany 

as Europe’s largest car market. GM and other foreign 

automakers were also establishing joint ventures with 

Russian manufacturers such as Avtovaz. While economists focused on China and India as the leading BRIC 
20

(Brazil, Russia, India, and China) countries when it 

came to cars, Russia was in the lead. 

There are now 250 cars for every 1,000 people in Russia, which places the country about midway between 

emerging markets in Asia and developed markets in 

Europe. By comparison, India has 11 cars for every 

1,000 people; China 49, . . .”12

Of course, there were frequent expressions of discontent with the Power Vertical from the hinterland; 

corruption along with pervasive lawlessness in business was one of the most serious threats to Putin and 

his camp. But as long as there was sufficient revenue 

to meet their basic needs, the provincials would not 

take to the streets in large numbers. Simultaneously, 

by granting the local economic and political elites 

some concessions—such as a greater voice in matters 

that affected their regions and a modest uptick in revenues from Moscow—they would not transform their 

harsh rhetoric and threats to bolt from the federation 

into resolute action. 

“Bandits” continued to wage a low-level insurgency in the North Caucasus, but efforts on the part of 

foreign jihadists to exploit Islamic discontent in Russia 

had only achieved marginal results. Fears about Muslims and other minorities supporting independence 

movements had not materialized to any significant 

degree as the ethnic minority leadership calculated 

that the risks of leaving Russia were greater than the 

rewards of remaining within its boundaries. At the 

same time, the disparate Islamic factions were at odds 

with each other much as Sunni and Shiite were in 

other parts of the Umma and nationalistic rivalry was 

added to the mix.
21

The International Prospect.

In 2007, Putin reversed a course of cooperation 

with President George W. Bush when at the annual security affairs conference in Munich, Germany, he announced the end of the American unipolar moment; 

henceforth his partner in Washington had to treat 

him as an equal—not a supplicant—if Bush hoped 

to work with him. By this time, Putin was not optimistic because he concluded that while Russia made 

a number of concessions in the area of nuclear arms 

control, Bush responded by scrapping the Cold War 

anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty and by proclaiming 

plans for an anti-missile system in Europe. For Putin, 

that was it; henceforth, he would only engage with his 

counterparts in Washington if they gave him something in return for his concessions. He also acted as if 

the Americans needed him more then he needed them.

Analysts in Washington retorted that by any measuring stick, Russia was not a military equal to the 

United States, and Putin’s international ambitions 

were out of sync with his nation’s capabilities. Yes, it 

had a nuclear arsenal only second to the United States, 

a veto at the UN, and controlled massive territory to 

shape global affairs. Consequently, it could make life 

difficult for the West as it had in the case of Syria, 

but in any assessment of the “correlation of forces” 

between the United States and Russia, all one had to 

do was to Google “population,” “GDP,” and other 

data that compared the two, and the United States 

enjoyed an enormous advantage in shaping world affairs. Add the population, GDP, and other measures 

of power of Washington’s allies in Europe and Asia, 

and the “West’s” advantage was even more gargantuan. In a word, such musings indicated why Russia 
22

was of little interest to most members of Congress 

and their constituents. What really concerned them 

was the looming presence of China, not another failed 

European empire.

Looking at Russia’s foreign policy priorities from 

Putin’s perspective, however, one can reach a conclusion more favorable to him. He knows Russia will 

never enjoy the power that the Soviet leaders did, and 

this may explain why he gave Medvedev the American and European portfolios. He has no intention of 

taking on the West in a serious showdown because 

his most urgent foreign policy goal is regional, not international—although the region in question, the former Soviet space, is massive. Specifically, he wants to 

re-integrate former Soviet entities back into Russia’s 

clutches and to deny the West the capacity to integrate 

them into the EU and NATO. Using this measuring 

stick, Putin’s foreign policy agenda shows promise as 

many analysts in Eastern Europe remind their American counterparts. 

Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, the countries 

of most immediate concern to the foreign ministry, 

may challenge Putin at times, but in the final analysis, he has significant influence over all three of them. 

While Belarus and Kazakhstan are deemed important 

to Moscow, control over Ukraine is a must for Russia. Without control of Ukraine, any effort on Russia’s 

part to throw its weight around in Eurasia is placed in 

peril. Ukraine no longer expresses interest in NATO, 

although Moscow is not happy about its attraction 

to the EU. Russian analysts, of course, have reason 

to conclude that just as infighting among the democrats in Ukraine paved the way for the election of a 

pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych, those in 

control of Kiev today will fail in their bid for EU mem-
23

bership as a consequence of their own ineptitude and 

political ambitions.

Simultaneously, Georgia remains committed to 

NATO membership but since the Five-Day War, the 

major European powers, and the United States as 

well, have retreated from a campaign to find a place 

for it in the alliance. It is with this observation in mind, 

that the Russians can claim that, while foreign observers have dwelt upon their army’s difficulties and 

shortfalls in waging the 2008 war, in the final analysis, 

they won it.

Officials in the Russian foreign ministry also can 

take comfort in the fact that they dominate the TransDniester and Armenia and have significant influence 

in Moldova. What is more, through its powerful business interests, Russia has the means to influence the 

cultural, economic and political affairs of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and some East European countries 

that were former Soviet satellites. 

In short, throughout the 1990s and early-2000s 

Moscow devoted much of its foreign policy energy 

and funds to transforming its former Soviet empire 

into a sphere of influence.13

Once many of the targeted countries gained EU 

and NATO membership, this campaign fell short, but 

Russian interests play an important part in their politics, economy, and media. Ambitious young businessmen in Eastern Europe are once again finding it useful 

to speak Russian and profitable to court Russian companies that control banks, media outlets, and most energy enterprises. The political elite in all of these countries cannot be unmindful of their large neighbor to 

the east, especially as the EU wrestles with persistent 

economic problems and Euro-Skeptics gain electoral 

support among their disgruntled populations.
24

Former Soviet entities that now belong to the EU 

can rely upon its assistance, but the EU is not always 

forthcoming. For years, powerful business interests—

especially but not exclusively in Germany—resented 

the ability of the new members to influence profitable deals with Russia; as yet, the EU has failed to 

develop a truly comprehensive energy security policy 

to protect them from the power of Gazprom; Brussels, Belgium also has turned its back on Moscow’s 

capacity to influence internal economic and political 

affairs through deals that local entrepreneurs “cannot afford to refuse.” Today, preoccupation with the 

debt and Euro crisis has compelled some EU members to placate the Russians on their own, and logic 

dictates that in the process they must make concessions favorable to what in Soviet days they called their 

“elder brother.”14

In looking toward Putin’s foreign policy priorities, 

he is pursuing several important interrelated goals:

• Deny former Soviet Republics in the near 

abroad the opportunity to follow the Baltic Republics into NATO and the EU; Belarus, Georgia, and Ukraine in particular.

• Instead, incorporate them, as well as the Central Asia states, into economic and security 

systems dominated by Moscow—e.g., Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and 

a new Eurasian Economic Union.

• Join China in a grand strategy to present the 

Americans with a firewall in every part of 

Eurasia, and do the same in denying Washington successful attempts to achieve regime 

change throughout Eurasia and the Greater 

Middle East. Of course, Moscow will avoid 

any effort on Beijing’s part to treat Russia like a 

junior partner.
25

• Cooperate with the West in some areas of common concern: nuclear proliferation, Islamic terrorism, and other threats to both camps. But in 

contrast to Yeltsin, Putin will demand compensation in return: e.g., have a voice in the American anti-missile system in Europe and provide 

Russia with a voice in efforts to address the 

crises in Iran and Syria. With Pakistan on the 

verge of civil war, the Americans may lean 

more heavily upon the Northern Distribution 

Network in their exit from Afghanistan than 

the perilous southern route through Pakistan.15

This scenario is the “most plausible” since it represents current circumstances and may endure even 

if Putin is no longer in charge. Some may question 

using the word “benign” to describe it since Putin is 

doing things deserving of a more negative connotation. But in defense of this designation, civil society is 

alive in Russia, although under assault. There are independent newspapers, and radio and TV outlets that 

consistently criticize Putin and his associates. And, of 

course, there is the Internet that not only reaches the 

educated through English language material but increasingly in Russian. The Kremlin has taken steps to 

neutralize it, but it continues to flourish. From time to 

time, the Kremlin and Putin’s policies are subjectively 

scrutinized by media that is under the control of the 

ruling class.

The status quo may persist essentially unchanged 

for years but there are signs that it may presage the 

second most likely outcome: Stalin Lite that is deserving of the “malignant” designation. But before 

looking at it, what about the other “benign” scenario, 

that is, The Western Path to Development? It will be 

discussed next.
26

THE WESTERN PATH TO DEVELOPMENT

The Domestic Prospect.

This outcome rests upon the conventional wisdom 

among Kremlin-watchers that the collapse of Russia’s 

“one-legged” petro-economy and a surge in grassroots opposition to the Power Vertical are preconditions for Russia adopting a Western path to development—a free market economy, democratic polity, and 

pluralistic social system. Consider, therefore, the following train of events.

As a result of technological breakthroughs, the 

United States surges ahead of Russia as the world’s 

leading exporter of natural gas and sells it for a price 

Gazprom cannot match. At the same time, by harvesting its enormous sand tar deposits, Canada provides 

petroleum on the global market at prices that Russian 

oil companies cannot match. In sum, North America’s energy windfall undercuts the financial base 

of the hardliners in the Kremlin and opens the door 

for those who advocate a Western path to Russia’s 

development.

During much of Putin’s reign, Gazprom, the country’s largest business enterprise accounted for almost 

10 percent of Russia’s GDP, 500,000 jobs, and 20 percent of the state’s budget. But in the last quarter of 

2012, its profits plunged 50 percent as “customers 

slashed orders and negotiated price discounts (China, 

for one) worth $4 billion in 2012 alone. . . . ”16 Under 

these circumstances, the company and the Russian 

government lost the capacity to dictate terms to its customers and neighboring governments. Oil rents also 

declined, and that trend had a profound impact upon 

Russia’s budget since profits depended upon selling a 
27

barrel for about $115. Unfortunately, the world market settled upon a price far lower than that figure. 

There was additional bad news for the reactionaries that depended upon energy wealth to dominate Russia: the long-expected drive to diversify the 

economy stalled as many investors—domestic and 

foreign—concluded that Russia remained a corrupt, 

lawless, dysfunctional society. Money could be made 

there but only at grave risk as many foreign firms adhered to rules that their Kremlin-connected Russian 

counterparts brazenly ignored. Among the oligarchs 

and their confederates, profits from energy represented easy pickings, while a truly energetic drive toward 

economic diversification would involve real entrepreneurial skills and uncertain profits. Even more unsettling, the subsequent shift in commerce would create 

new centers of influence that the oligarchs could not 

control; naturally, they balked at diversification for 

this reason alone. 

Putin spoke incessantly about finding new areas 

of economic activity, lest Russia end up like other 

“petro-states” that ultimately faced economic doom 

when their gas and oil revenues slumped. But facts 

on the ground did not support his rhetoric. Russia’s 

failure to diversify was exemplified by the following 

observation: 

Rapacious officeholders have reinforced the country’s 

dependence on the oil industry by strangling independent enterprise. Small businesses employing fewer 

than 100 people make up less than 7 percent of Russia’s economy as compared with Poland, for example, 

where they make up fully 50 percent.17

By design or happenstance, giant enterprises absorbed smaller firms and reduced, not enlarged, the 

number of businesses in Russia.
28

As a larger number of Russians from all walks 

of life became victims of economic decline, displays 

of political unrest surged and gave rise to new alliances that did not escape the attention of the more 

clear-headed in the government and associated clans. 

With revenues in a free-fall, the Kremlin found it exceedingly difficult to subsidize jobs and entitlements, 

and efforts to fight corruption took a back seat to the 

power elite’s survival. This fed widespread expressions of discontent at the grassroots—including the 

hinterland where Putin had always been popular—

and gave regional elites a political base among the disgruntled provincials. For years, regional stakeholders 

had pressed Moscow for a larger share of revenues 

and a greater voice in their own political affairs, but 

to no avail. Simultaneously, their constituents relied 

upon the federal government for their economic security. But as the center proved unwilling or incapable 

of providing jobs and safety nets to protect Russia’s 

most vulnerable citizens, working people looked toward provincial elites for protection. 

In Siberia, voices demanding outright breaks with 

the rest of Russia became more resonant. The federal bureaucrats, thousands of miles away, exploited 

wealth extracted from Siberian land, but its residents 

received crumbs in return. Local economic and political elites henceforth struck deals with their Asian 

neighbors and, in the process, found economic alternatives to Moscow. As a consequence, they kept much 

of the wealth that was produced in Russia’s Far East. 

Elsewhere, minority communities acted in a similar 

fashion and ethnic communal pride served as a force 

multiplier in clashes with their “Russian masters.” 

The jihadists in the North Caucasus attracted new recruits, and in many places they enjoyed de facto, if not 
29

de jure, independence. Here was further evidence that 

the hardliners in the Kremlin were incapable of keeping Russia whole.

The task of providing the military with funds to 

procure new weapon systems and to improve the quality of life for the troops and their families became even 

more daunting. Despite shrinking numbers, it became 

difficult to arm and train the troops; consequently, 

morale among enlisted men and officers plunged, 

causing grave concern about their loyalty. Defense 

tycoons objected to cuts in the military budget, and 

their disgruntled workers frequently did so through 

violent protest—occupying factories, blocking bridges 

and tunnels and halting auto and train traffic.

In addition to the revival of massive street demonstrations, the democrats were busy building a new 

movement that favored a Western, pluralistic world 

view. The 2011-12 demonstrations represented the 

“tip of the iceberg,” but below it loomed a gathering 

force of grassroots power. Even after the cosmopolitans spurned massive street protests, they continued 

to organize and expand civil society through the Internet. Working in the most promising sectors of the 

economy, a growing legion of Russians—including 

young people who attended school, worked, and vacationed in Europe and the United States—was creating a counterculture and a narrative that aped the 

values and worldview integral to Western pluralism. 

NGOs that provided the underpinning for volunteerism swept the country. Attempts to deny them 

foreign funding had a minimal impact upon their 

operations as they turned to domestic alternatives to 

expand a social network of like-minded people. While 

the State was moving toward the autocratic right, the 

most consequential members of society were lurching 
30

toward the democratic left. As one Russian Internet 

portal manager noted, “. . . formations of a new sort 

are being created within” the larger civil society. As 

the Arab Spring demonstrated, the Internet made it 

possible for democracy to flourish even in societies 

that were not democratic. The government controlled 

TV and adhered to an information strategy that rested upon the old Soviet formula of deceit, deception, 

and disinformation, but through the Web and “smart 

phones” millions of Russians had access to the truth 

and, in turn, through social networking passed it onto 

friends, neighbors, and other Web users. The Internet 

was a game changer upon which the Russian democrats were banking to lead their country down the 

road to an open, law-based society. It was estimated 

that by 2014 close to 70 percent of the country’s adults 

would have Internet access. What is more, “Russia’s 

largest Internet portals” had “already caught up with 

several federal television channels” in terms of users. 

The Kremlin, therefore, conceded that the Internet 

had become the major instrument of citizen “selforganization.”18 As a consequence, there was a spike 

in the arrest of bloggers and censorship of them. But 

that campaign fizzled when security agents pointed 

out that it was helping the democrats in their recruitment drive, while economists warned that attempts 

to neutralize the Internet would harm the economy at 

the very time it was experiencing mounting problems. 

It was through the Internet, moreover, that thousands of Russians in the diaspora contributed to the 

growth of civil society back home. Here, again, popular pro-democratic uprisings in the Arab world came 

to mind. As one Russian analyst noted: 
31

the participation of immigrants from Arab countries 

who were in Europe had an impact on the online agitation during the ‘Arab Spring’ and on the coverage of 

these events in the West. Immigrant bloggers created 

a sort of bridge that brought Western values and standards to their compatriots, who had no other opportunity to learn about democracy and human rights.19

Much the same thing was happening in Russia, 

and as the authorities lost their nerve, the dissidents 

became bolder and more relentless in demanding 

democratic reforms.

At the same time as the cosmopolitans ditched 

their Moscow-centric mindset, they discovered a large 

pool of talented and courageous leaders living outside the large cities who could articulate the dreams 

and grievances of their neighbors—if provided with 

the means to do so. This insight prompted the urban 

activists to collaborate with provincial leaders, and 

together they crafted alliances that the Kremlin could 

not ignore. Modest financial, legal, and organizational 

assistance enabled grassroots activists in the hinterland to construct community organizations that recruited people who previously had remained outside 

of politics. It was this specter that prompted Kremlin 

propagandists in 2012 to complain that Lithuania was 

providing venues for Western experts to train Russian 

agitators in the art of community organizing.

As was true of the Arab Spring, the young computer savvy generation and the growing legion of Russians in the diaspora introduced their elders to this 

new world of independent information. Of course, 

many of Russia’s new rich vacationed in the West, had 

homes there, and favored American and European 

banks to protect their cash assets. They took comfort 

in the thought that should things get dicey for them at 
32

home, they could find refuge in London or Manhattan. If they chose exile, they would have to live in societies where the rule of law prevailed, but that was not 

a serious deterrent since many of them had learned 

how to use their wealth to protect their interests. They 

did so by buying the best legal talent in London or 

most politically wired public relations (PR) firms on K 

Street. American investigative reporters or enterprising analysts who uncovered malfeasance on the part 

of a Russian energy giant, for example, were silenced 

by a mere letter of warning from a powerful law firm 

in one of the Western capitals since they rarely had 

the financial heft to take on the oligarchs. Were Russia to become a truly pluralistic country, its new rich 

would have to take risks, but inaction would produce 

an even more uncertain future for them.

As more Kremlin insiders concluded their fate 

was tethered to the nation’s best and brightest and 

disgruntled elements that were demanding change, 

Putin demonstrated his pragmatism and appointed 

Alexei Kudrin as Prime Minister. This surprised some 

Kremlin watchers since Kudrin openly denigrated 

some of Putin’s most cherished policies. “I’m against 

the constant anti-Western rhetoric,” he told a Spiegel 

interviewer, “even if it’s only intended for domestic ears. It’s detrimental to the modernization of our 

economy, and of course it doesn’t help make Moscow 

a global financial center.” And in spite of the crackdown, he observed that while there were no longer 

massive street demonstrations, “A new active civil 

society has developed.”20

Henceforth, policies associated with economic and 

political revisionists were adopted: they included a 

stable ruble; checks on inflation; protecting property 

rights and contracts; fighting corruption; and reduc-
33

ing the country’s defense budget. They also provided 

for free elections, the formation of opposition political parties, an independent media, effective anti-corruption measures and other major features prevalent 

in a law-based democratic polity. As these changes 

took place, domestic and foreign entrepreneurs began to invest in Russia while expanding existing 

joint ventures.

In sum, this pivot toward pluralism contributed 

to the appearance of a vibrant and expanding civil 

society, spearheaded by a pro-democracy movement 

that prompted even skeptics to conclude that Russia was on the road to pluralism. It did not appear 

overnight and encountered stiff crosswinds, but it 

took root over time because the Western path to development was the only one that provided change 

without bloodshed.

The International Prospect.

Several international developments helped reconfigure power relationships within Russia. In the aftermath of the USSR’s demise, Putin had cited economic 

turmoil in the West to chastise rivals who championed 

American economic bromides. After all, the “bad 

years” of the 1990s were a product of Yeltsin’s slavishly listening to American free market radicals that 

resulted in the 1998 crash. It, in turn, prompted a soft 

coup a year later when the Siloviki compelled Yeltsin 

to name Putin as his Prime Minister. 

The George W. Bush administration demonstrated 

that American capitalism was corrupt and had fostered gross economic inequality and the worst international economic crisis since the Great Depression. It 

was responsible for a debt crisis that would plague the 
34

American economy for a decade or more. Obama saw 

the economic challenge somewhat differently, but he, 

too, championed the free market and accommodated 

Wall Street before he turned to the ills of Main Street.

Europe’s debt crisis, likewise, demonstrated the 

flaws of the EU and was responsible for unprecedented 

joblessness, declining public revenues, and plunging 

profits. Eventually economic stagnation would doom 

the “European project” and empower Euro-skeptics 

who demanded their nations break with the EU altogether. David Cameron, the United Kingdom’s (UK) 

Prime Minister, was not the only European leader that 

harbored profound reservations about EU membership. At the same time, the new members from the 

East received a proportionately smaller share of development funds than the larger ones—so much for 

economic equality. Here again was further evidence 

that the Western model of development was outmoded and if Russia followed it, the outcome would 

be perilous.

Meanwhile, the world’s most robust economy was 

thriving under the direction of men in Beijing that 

shared much in common with Putin regarding the 

“shortfalls” of Western-style democracy and capitalism. China enjoyed double-digit rates of growth for a 

quarter century, and its economy would soon be larger than its American counterpart. For many Russians 

who had reservations about liberal economic doctrine, 

the Chinese offered an alternative that many inside 

the Kremlin favored.

But as Russia encountered rough economic seas, 

a number of global developments occurred that challenged this condemnation of the West. For example, 

with a rebound in the American economy and expectations that by 2020 the United States would be-
35

come energy independent, the campaign to denigrate 

the American modernization model lost credibility. 

Abundant energy in North America produced an upswing in manufacturing and a surge in other sectors 

resulting in dramatic job growth, escalating wages and 

plunging public debt. In spite of a protracted partisan 

dust-up over the debt crisis, investors worldwide once 

again saw the U.S. as a safe profit-making center.21

Although the European recovery took longer, the creation of a true union with a strong central authority 

and associated economic institutions fostered a spike 

in economic activity throughout Europe. The process 

was painful, but the turnaround was predictable; after 

all, pundits proclaiming Europe’s inevitable decline 

forgot that the EU was in competition with China and 

the United States for the title of “the world’s largest 

economy.” Under these circumstances, Russia’s economic oligarchs and political leaders alike sought 

closer association with their European brethren. 

This pivot was bolstered as the Chinese model lost 

its luster. The long-anticipated showdown between its 

energetic and expanding middle class and the communist Mandarins had commenced. Joined by a number 

of wealthy entrepreneurs and some revisionists in the 

Communist Party, they demanded a voice in political 

affairs that the leadership was not prepared to provide. To make matters worse, several hundred million 

displaced peasants who had entered the cities no longer were prepared to accept low wages and abysmal 

working conditions in silence. Numerous people had 

lost their jobs to low-wage workers elsewhere in Africa, Asia, and Central America, and their plight was 

another source of concern for the troubled communist 

leadership. 
36

Ordinary citizens were especially outraged that 

the promises made by the new leaders in 2012 under 

the stewardship of Xi Jinping fell far short of their 

goals. In a growing number of instances, small entrepreneurs shuttered their enterprises and took to the 

streets to protest their corrupt leaders. Under these 

circumstances, violent protests became commonplace. 

They were given added weight by reports of desertions among the police and even in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Foreign intelligence services indicated that the communist leadership ultimately had 

to give ground to demands among the middle class 

for real political influence, but many hardliners would 

not do so without a fight. In anticipation of that showdown, some analysts conjured up the prospects of 

mass revolt or a coup among the ruling elite.22 These 

developments had a profound impact upon Russian 

fans of “the Chinese miracle.” With growing unrest 

in China and the prospects of serious violent confrontation there, Russian hardliners lost a major rationale 

for their claim that the Western road to modernization 

was an economic dead end and a source of political 

instability.

Of course, globalization was the most consequential international development for Russia, but it was 

a two-edged sword. It had enhanced the life of the 

Power Vertical by producing a steady demand for energy exports, but it exposed the economy to disruptive international forces. With a dramatic uptick in 

alternative sources of gas and oil as exemplified by 

technological breakthroughs in North America, Russia faced stiff competition for its customers. This resulted in protracted economic difficulties that made 

it impossible for Moscow to intimidate its neighbors 

by playing the energy card. At the same time, without 
37

huge profit margins, the costs of corruption became 

even more difficult to ignore.

The democrats urged the Kremlin to take note. In 

the 21st century, no country could rely upon its own 

resources or policies to foster economic prosperity. 

Even the richest ones had to abide by the dictates of 

the marketplace and the rules of the international economic regimes that had emerged in the closing years 

of the 20th century. At the same time, there was reason for optimism; Russia possessed a vast storehouse 

of hydrocarbon wealth, arable land, clean water, and 

abundant minerals and timber. Its immense territory 

also served as an expanding crossroads of trade and 

transportation throughout Eurasia. What was missing 

was a modern polity that mobilized the masses behind 

a national campaign that enabled Russia to actualize 

its immense potential. In a word, a democratic, lawbased polity would enhance the government’s capacity to exploit all of these assets with the people’s active 

support. Conversely, a march back toward autocracy 

was a dead end.

Here, then, was a road that promised prosperity 

and a foundation upon which a strong state rested. It 

would provide Russia with the opportunity to conduct its foreign relations from a position of strength, 

while at the same time exploit soft power as a useful 

diplomatic asset. Putin had been relentless in his campaign to enhance soft power, but he failed to realize 

that it and autocracy are mutually exclusive phenomenon. Clear-headed members of Russia’s ruling elite 

realized that Moscow could not force its neighbors to 

surrender their sovereignty and suffer under Russian 

rule the way they did under the USSR. But Putin was 

right in that many of the countries identified with the 

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) remain 
38

attracted to the Russian language, Russian culture, 

and shared experiences that preceded the Soviet Empire. But he failed to acknowledge that Russia did not 

have to force itself upon its neighbors but rather let 

nature run its course, the same way that the Mexicans 

and Canadians came to grips with American power.23

On the other hand, a liberal Russia would have a 

significant and benign impact upon neighboring countries. In face of expanding Russian democracy, there 

would be a marked improvement in U.S.-Russian 

relations, making security cooperation on a range of 

matters plausible. For example, this could be an agreement covering the deployment of the American antimissile system in Europe; curbing the proliferation of 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD); upgrading the 

New Start Treaty; resolving crises through the UN like 

those pertaining to Syria and Iran; stabilizing a postU.S. 2014 Afghanistan; and moving toward Russia’s 

membership in a new Euro-Atlantic security system. 

Arguably this “best case” scenario does not represent the forecast of most Russian-watchers, but there 

is justification for it. A growing number of economic 

and political elites are now openly displaying reservations about the Power Vertical’s capacity to survive. 

Similar conclusions prompted the Polish communists 

and later their Russian comrades to throw in the towel 

and not crush their opponents in a military Armageddon. The pivotal actors among the ruling class have 

not, as yet, made a decision about their next move. But 

as the younger generation gains access to economic 

and political centers of power, it is likely that a critical 

mass of the population will conclude that the status 

quo is unsustainable.

In spite of ominous trends, civil society is alive 

in Russia, and the cosmopolitans still feel comfort-
39

able attacking Putin and his colleagues. This is why 

Russia’s democratic activists brush aside the present 

“dark days” and claim that real politics has taken root 

in their country and eventually those responsible for 

it will gain power as Russia retreats from autocracy. 

Many of Russia’s most influential people, including 

some associated with the Power Vertical, are convinced that a more democratic political system will 

better enable Russia to actualize its huge economic 

potential. Should Russia move in this direction, the 

prospects for a rebalance in U.S.-Russian relations will 

improve dramatically, and that outcome will have a 

positive aspect upon an international system that faces multiple sources of instability and turbulence.

The Euro-Atlantic community can only help Russia achieve a democratic outcome on the margins, but 

it must find ways to work with the current leadership. The collapse of European communism was not 

a consequence of a hands-off policy but a by-product 

of internal forces and Western interaction with the 

communist Nomenklatura. Before Russia moves with 

purpose towards pluralism—and it will not happen 

overnight but step-by-step and will suffer some setbacks—it is likely to be preceded by a period of repression that exceeds the present status quo. This interregnum may be necessary since the coming of age of a 

new generation is one of the major preconditions for a 

pluralist Russia to take root. It is imperative then that 

the West maintain, nay dramatically increases, faceto-face interaction with ordinary Russians through 

cultural, educational and athletic events in addition to 

formal diplomatic and military-to-military channels. 
40

STALIN LITE

The Domestic Aspect.

Putin was re-elected president in 2012 and the remaining Technocrats in the Kremlin were replaced 

by Siloviki hardliners. Russian-watchers claimed that 

henceforth, Putin would share power with them. They 

had endorsed his crackdown but claimed that he had 

not gone far enough in his war against “Russia’s” 

enemies. As the economy faltered, they became even 

more critical of his stewardship and reasoned that 

he was incapable of effectively managing it. Claiming the country was facing a “national emergency,” 

the new government adopted a system of rule that 

some observers labeled Stalin Lite—that is a quasipolice state.24

In truth, the major culprit was a steep free-fall in 

hydrocarbon revenues. Since they accounted for half 

of the state’s income, the government was forced to 

slash salaries, pensions, and other public transfers. As 

an array of social service programs were cut, a rising 

tide of discontent erupted among a broad cross section 

of society. The rich and the privileged middle class—

as was true in many Western countries—continued to 

enjoy security in face of growing economic inequality, 

occupied pockets of prosperity and enjoyed political 

clout that even the ruling elite could not ignore. But 

the rest of society saw a plunge in living standards. 

The most destitute were the 21st- century Lumpernprolitariat—victims of globalization and automation—

who no longer possessed skills relevant to the modern 

world and could not survive on wages common in 

Africa, Asia, and parts of Latin America. Eventually, 

their anger spilled out into the streets in the form of 
41

strikes and violent actions that alarmed the Kremlin. 

In some instances, the police joined the protestors 

in demanding higher wages and better benefits of 

their own. 

As the defense budget suffered considerable hits, 

the Kremlin was alarmed by protests from the armed 

forces and civilian members of the military-industrial 

complex. Under these circumstances, many Siloviki 

concluded that Putin had lost his grip and something 

dramatic had to be done to stabilize the situation. In 

what some observers depicted as a return to a “command economy,” the government tightened control 

of business, financial, and commercial practices. The 

priority was no longer growth or vain attempts at 

economic diversification but stability and control. 

Foreign critics said by returning to a police state, the 

Siloviki were living in a fantasy world as these odious 

measures would only make things worse.

Meanwhile, on the political front, liberals, some 

leftists, and anti-Kremlin nationalists were being arrested and imprisoned in expanding numbers, while 

others who had not reached an accommodation with 

the Kremlin chose exile or refuge in silence. Some 

observers predicted that repression would backfire; 

the people were no longer afraid and would respond 

in massive protests. The authorities responsible for 

this new more odious crackdown were simply out of 

touch with the mood of the country. Kremlin officials 

responded that it was the Western-oriented democrats 

who lived in a bubble of their own. They had been so 

seduced by pronouncements on the part of the Western media—“Putin’s days are numbered” and “the 

people are no longer afraid”—that they ignored recent 

historical lessons to the contrary. Repression works! 

Recall in effect Stalin’s remark: “[E]liminate the agita-
42

tor, and the problem goes away.” Conversely, it was 

the failure of the hardliners in the Communist Party of 

the Soviet Union (CPSU) to destroy Perestroika in its 

crib that set in motion a stream of events that culminated in the Soviet Empire’s implosion. The Siloviki 

in the 21st century would not make the same mistake.

Perhaps Putin’s days were numbered but not 

those of his compatriots who were quarterbacking 

the crackdown. Furthermore, the malcontents that 

brazenly took to the streets earlier now were cowed 

into silence. Like their parents and grandparents, they 

were duly afraid of the mailed fist. The problem had 

been that Putin had been too timid in deploying it, but 

those now in charge would not make the same mistake. Long anticipated pesky opponents like Navalny 

and Udalstov were put in jail on trumped-up criminal charges. They were joined by hundreds of other 

leading opposition figures, and courageous journalists were being killed in a new round of assassinations 

that presumably were being conducted by members 

of organized crime or government agents—frequently, it was impossible to differentiate between the two. 

Most ordinary folk in Russia accepted these measures 

without comment. 

Ethnic Russians in particular did so because they 

feared the violence that had reached new levels of 

mayhem in the North Caucasus would spread into 

Russia proper. In the aftermath of Assad’s fall in Syria, Russian security officials discovered that many citizens from the North Caucasus that had fought in Syria 

now were helping indigenous jihadists create a Caucasus Caliphate, and they were being joined by foreign terrorists as well. When the newly emboldened 

Kremlin rulers embarked upon a campaign to crush 

the insurgencies in the North Caucasus, they were applauded by most ethnic Russians. 
43

More and more insurgents had embraced the Green 

of Islam. As was the case of earlier military operations, 

this one resulted in wholesale human rights violations 

and heavy civilian casualties. In justification, the authorities reminded the public that in addition to the 

violence that these terrorist conducted in their own 

region, they were responsible for bombing trains and 

buildings in Russia proper—including Moscow and 

St. Petersburg.

Earlier, Putin had responded to this unrest by 

adopting a modest form of nation building—but the 

funds earmarked for that endeavor in Chechnya, 

Dagestan, Ingushetia, and other entities in the region 

did not help the people who needed assistance. As 

Navalny had claimed, much of the money was stolen 

by local mobsters and their Russian confederates. 

The violent upheaval in southern Russia, however, 

gave rise to a new development: the creation of Slavicnationalist “fighting groups.” The expanding Islamic 

jihad facilitated the resurrection of Cossacks in areas 

near the Volga and other places where Russians and 

Muslims lived in close proximity to one another. But 

now paramilitary organizations, with help from local 

police and military units, were flourishing and uniting 

around an anti-Islamic agenda. Intercommunal enmity had been fed by the Kremlin’s campaign to fold 

ethnic political entities into larger ones to minimize 

the influence of non-Russian groups. But it backfired 

and gave ethnic separatists ammunition to take on 

Russian chauvinism. Along a parallel path, the Kremlin bankrolled indigenous leaders—most notably the 

Chechen Ramzan Kadyrov—to enlist their support 

in the struggle against the jihadists. They did so with 

relentless brutality and in fact served as a recruiting 

tool for the jihadists and other insurgents operating in 

minority communities in many parts of Russia.
44

This scenario had its origins in the split that first attracted international attention in the fall of 2011 when 

Putin took back the presidency and left Medvedev 

twisting in the wind. A year later, after the younger 

man was pilloried in anonymous videos—among 

other things for supporting the UN resolution that 

condoned the Libyan bombing campaign conducted 

by NATO—pundits reported the end of the “tandem.” 

Kremlin insiders claimed Putin was convinced that 

Medvedev had betrayed him by collaborating with 

the very Technocrats and middle class liberals that 

were subverting the Power Vertical.25

At the same time, Putin claimed the Technocrats 

were collaborating with foreign (read American) 

agents who were seeking to subvert Russia. This was 

an attempt to reclaim the support of those provincials 

that had expressed doubt about Putin’s capacity to 

rule in their behalf. His penchant for scapegoating 

was not new; he did the same thing after the Beslan 

School massacre in North Ossetia when he linked the 

Chechen insurgents—responsible for the outrage—to 

unnamed foreign enemies. They were not only bent 

on undermining Putin but destroying “Russia itself.”26

Here, then, was an attempt on Putin’s part to 

purge from his team anyone who did not demonstrate 

unqualified loyalty to him, while at the same time 

striving to regain the trust of those ordinary folk that 

remained tethered to Soviet-style enterprises or who 

lived by sufferance of State entitlements. He hoped to 

achieve this two-part objective by creating a new popular front movement that replaced what remained of 

the Power Vertical with a new regime that enhanced 

his capacity to rule. Toward this end, he promoted an 

ultra-nationalist Slavic narrative that celebrated Russia’s magnificent past exploits. The campaign began 
45

on December 12, 2012, when he delivered a state of 

the nation address at the resplendent St. George Hall 

in the Grand Kremlin Palace. “Putin barely mentioned 

the outside world,” but said that Russians needed “to 

turn inward” and:

look to patriotism, not Westernism; to solidarity, not 

individualism; to spirituality, not consumerism and 

moral decay. He touted Russia’s historic roots and traditional values as the basis for its future trajectory.27

Democracy was the only political choice for Russia, 

but it rested on “the power of the Russian people with 

their own traditions of self-rule and not the fulfillment 

of standards imposed on us from the outside.”28 To 

protect his political flank, he was banking on deeply 

rooted cultural values, historical experiences, and religious impulses associated with Slavic ultra-nationalism, the Orthodox Church, and centuries of imperial 

rule that elevated all ethnic Russians. He reasoned the 

Russian people would embrace the existential imperatives of community, not the abstractions of reason that 

enthralled the urban liberals. Earlier, Putin neither 

encouraged the nationalists nor vilified the country’s 

large Muslim population, but in one of his first public 

events at the Presidential Palace in 2012, he appeared 

in a photo-op with a Russian heavy metal motorcycle 

gang that celebrated the Russian Orthodox faith. In 

their lyrics, they attacked Muslims in the most brutal terms imaginable.29 Moreover, while the Moscow 

intelligentsia excoriated him for endorsing the Pussy 

Riot rock group’s 2-year jail sentence, polls indicated 

that most Russians favored it. From the perspective 

of the ultra-nationalists with whom the Siloviki had 

found common cause, the only problem was that Putin did not go far enough in “putting the minorities in 

their place.” 
46

But they also cited Putin’s temerity in not crushing 

the Russian regional elites that had established virtual 

independent fiefdoms from Vladivostok in the Far 

East to Kaliningrad in the Far West. In Siberia, political leaders in conjunction with local business interests 

were snubbing federal authorities, and some members 

of the regional police and military units were actively 

collaborating with them. Simultaneously, Omon-type 

units were being deployed in border regions where 

the population was vulnerable to foreign influences. 

In this connection, Kaliningrad, the Western most 

oblast that is surrounded by Lithuania and Poland, 

was considered by security operatives uniquely sensitive to “outside provocation.”30

Finally, the government turned to the cosmopolitans and their most powerful weapon, the Internet. In 

conjunction with “smart phones,” it was an unrivalled 

recruiting tool that enabled them to disseminate their 

“subversive” pro-Western narrative throughout Russia. As a consequence, a nationwide campaign to 

“purge” the Internet was undertaken: it involved censorship, the closing of portals, and the arrest of bloggers. The number accused of political crimes tripled 

from 2011 to 2012. The campaign silenced many of 

them, while others fled the country or disconnected 

their computers.31 The newest campaign would take 

even more draconian measures to emasculate the 

Internet and associated technology such as “smart 

phones.”

Even so, tens of thousands of Russians that lived 

in the diaspora—in tech savvy localities like Silicon 

Valley, California, and Fairfax, Virginia, as well as 

throughout Europe—conducted a “truth telling” campaign to counteract the Kremlin’s disinformation blitz. 

Their ability to communicate in Russian was of special 
47

concern to the Siloviki because most ordinary folk in 

Russia were not fluent in English. It was with similar 

concerns in mind that the authorities turned toward 

foreign affairs with even greater zeal than did Putin. 

It was a blogger in Spain—Dr. Z—who revealed that 

Vladimir Pekhtin, a Duma representative, had property in Miami, Florida, that eventually led to his ouster 

from that body.32 In turn, his fate gave impetus to Putin’s decision to order government officials to return 

all of their foreign assets to Russia. In doing so, Putin 

could anticipate alienating many of the same people 

who had been his most steadfast supporters.

The International Prospect.

Under these circumstances, prospects for a re-balance in U.S.-Russia relations were hobbled. While realists urged President Obama to cooperate with Russia on matters of mutual concern—fighting terrorism, 

curbing the proliferation of WMD, etc.—anti-Russian 

sentiment soared among members of Congress and 

human rights activists. White House political advisers 

and policymakers were at odds over this matter, since 

the former argued that the domestic political costs of 

any effort to cooperate with Moscow exceeded the anticipated international benefits.

What had been called a “crackdown on steroids” 

produced much the same reaction in European capitals. Berlin and Moscow had enjoyed a “special relationship” for years so that members of Germany’s 

Social Democratic Party and Christian Democratic 

Party alike had kept silent in face of the most odious 

behavior emanating from Russia. This largely reflected the power of the German business community that 

relied upon Russia for energy and in return saw it as 
48

a customer hungry for German products. But ever 

since Chancellor Angela Merkel scolded Putin for his 

human rights violations in late-2012, the relationship 

cooled considerably. The rest of Europe pretty much 

reacted the same way to developments in Russia. As 

the Europeans depended less upon Russia’s energy, 

animosity toward the Kremlin prompted some seasoned observers to proclaim a new cold war was in 

the works.33

Moscow’s aggressive behavior toward the countries occupying the former Soviet space was another 

source of concern in the West. Efforts to reintegrate—or 

what former Secretary Clinton called “re-Sovietize”—

Belarus and Ukraine were dramatically accelerated 

by Moscow. Minsk and Kiev, wracked by economic 

problems and political turmoil, could not refuse Russian orders to snub the West. They needed the Russians more than the other way around, and here was 

evidence of the Putin Doctrine at work. In addition 

to maintaining its superpower nuclear status, Russia 

sought “regional hegemony” that involved “political, 

economic, military, and cultural reintegration of the 

former Soviet bloc.” An important element here was 

the campaign to enforce “Finlandization” upon the 

countries formerly tied to the USSR.34 They could conduct their domestic affairs any way they wished, but 

their foreign relations had to conform to the dictates of 

the Russian foreign ministry.

Russian-Georgian relations took a turn for the 

worse, and some observers talked openly about a replay of the Five-Day War. Russian officials claimed 

that Georgians once closely aligned with Saakashvili were now actively supporting jihadists in Russia. 

His replacement, Bidzina Ivanishvili, tried to placate 

the Russians, but his courting NATO membership 
49

was cited by officials in Moscow as evidence of his 

“double-dealing.”

Even though Ukrainian government favored close 

relations with Moscow and its leadership and people 

alike rejected NATO membership, the Kremlin was 

not happy about Kiev’s bid for EU membership. As 

a consequence of the Siloviki victory, the Kremlin demanded Kiev not deviate from the policies that were 

favored in Moscow.

Officials in Baku likewise claimed that Russian provocateurs were encouraging the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh to provoke new violent confrontations 

with the pro-American Azeri government. Since Russia supported the Armenians and Turkey supported 

the Azeris, this frozen conflict threatened to do serious harm to relations between Moscow and Istanbul. 

At the same time, there were many influential voices 

in Moscow that saw closer relations with Tehran as 

a counterpoint to the American-Turkish campaign to 

compromise Russia’s interests in its “own back yard.”

Imperialistic utterances from Moscow prompted 

expressions of alarm throughout the “near abroad.” 

Kremlin security agents became bolder in fomenting political discord in all of them, while Moscow 

exploited its economic assets to subvert members of 

the local business community and media.35 After all, 

the Siloviki claimed the Lithuanians were conducting 

workshops to help provocateurs undermine Russia’s 

government. Along with Poland, it was a base for Belorussians who were plotting regime change in their 

old homeland. In response, Lithuanian authorities 

lobbied Brussels and Washington to reaffirm NATO’s 

Article Five obligations and bolster defenses throughout Eastern Europe.
50

In this frigid environment, the perceived linkage between Russia’s internal problems and the U.S. 

campaign to promote regime change encouraged the 

Kremlin to obstruct American foreign policy priorities—like those favoring radical change in the Greater 

Middle East. Therefore Moscow demonstrated special 

sensitivity when the Americans sought international 

justification to intimidate the Mullahs in Tehran. The 

military cited America’s “aggressive and subversive” 

foreign initiatives to justify a dramatic hike in defense spending. Their civilian masters needed no encouragement when the campaign to sustain Russia’s 

nuclear strike force was mentioned. Money was tight, 

but Russia’s very survival depended upon its nuclear 

deterrent. Likewise, it was unconscionable to deny 

funding for general purpose forces. The army, air, and 

naval arms all had to be upgraded to the point where 

foreign enemies could not assume a military strike 

against Russia would go unpunished. 

Thinking along these lines was an asset to those 

hawks in the Kremlin who looked upon heavy defense spending as an economic force multiplier. In a 

word, the road to a growing diversified economy. Of 

course, this bogus notion was popular among the Soviet Nomenklatura, and the technocrats warned that it 

would do grave harm to Russia’s economy in the 21st 

century the same way it did to the Soviet economy in 

the 20th century. Earlier, Putin had been warned that 

his rearmament drive that amounted to “$700 billion 

over a decade without first developing a security and 

defense strategy that” was “aligned with 21st-century 

realities” was a major blunder.36 At the same time, the 

army’s drive for heavy defense spending rested on 

the principle of deterrence, not domination. In event 

of another Georgian war, the West—including the 
51

Americans—would have to think twice about providing reckless provocateurs like Saakashvili with weapons. Russia did not welcome a military confrontation 

with NATO, but it wanted to make any aggressor pay 

a price so heavy that it would avoid a confrontation 

with Russian forces in the first place—not to defeat 

them in a conventional war.

Of course, intemperate accusations from Russian 

officials prompted expressions of outrage in Washington and gave rise to demands in Congress for the 

United States to re-deploy U.S. air, ground, and naval 

units in Eastern Europe. Many in the American media 

and think tanks openly proclaimed the onset of a “new 

cold war.” Whatever measures the White House took, 

any hope of cooperating with Russia on security matters were dashed. EU officials and their counterparts 

in Europe’s major capitals likewise expressed alarm 

about Russia’s quick-march back toward Stalinist-like 

policies. 

The crackdown and scapegoating, however, only 

contributed to Russia’s dysfunctional image, resulting 

in a massive pullback in capital on the part of both 

domestic and international investors. Predictably, this 

reaction plunged the economy into a deeper morass. 

To compensate, revenues originally earmarked for social welfare programs were redirected toward a burgeoning defense budget.

As fears about a serious insurgency soared, the 

Kremlin leadership became even more sensitive to 

“efforts on the part of foreign enemies” to exploit the 

situation. Officials in various government think-tanks 

produced papers providing “evidence” that U.S. 

“black services” were supporting the jihadists just as 

they did in subverting Assad in Syria and Mubarak in 

Egypt. Under these circumstances, it was ludicrous to 

prattle about a rebalance of U.S.-Russian relations.
52

Nonetheless, the overlords in the Kremlin were 

acute enough to realize that the correlation of forces 

favored the West and not the hobbled resurrected Russian state in any military showdown. Tough rhetoric 

aside, they neither had the means nor the will to act 

upon their threats to engage their neighbors in violent 

confrontations. That said, many analysts feared that 

the hawks in Moscow might mistakenly believe that 

they knew where the red lines were—lines that they 

would never cross lest they provoke a violent clash 

with their neighbors and their Western protectors.

There was also a contentious debate raging in Russia’s defense establishment about joining the PLA in 

a truly effective security relationship. Some argued 

against this option since it would mean Russia would 

serve as the junior partner. But others noted that Russia’s nuclear strike force would make it at the very least 

an equal partner in the enterprise. This was especially 

the case when the generals in the PLA considered 

that serious discussions were taking place in defense 

circles in Seoul, South Korea, and Tokyo, Japan, about 

South Korea and Japan building their own nuclear 

arsenals since they could no longer depend upon the 

American deterrent. With Russia’s nuclear arsenal as 

a force multiplier, the PLA would have a formidable 

counterweight in Beijing’s protracted competition 

with the Americans.

Whatever the prospects for a Chinese-Russian security arrangement, proponents of a re-balance in relations with Russia had to answer a compelling question: How could any American administration find 

avenues of security cooperation with Moscow in this 

toxic environment?
53

RUSSIA IN CHAOS: THE WORST 

CASE SCENARIO

The Domestic Prospect.

Kremlin-watchers agree that the days of the Power 

Vertical and Putin’s rule are numbered, and Russian 

society is about to face significant internal political 

disruptions.37 The people running things in Russia, 

however, appear to be ill-prepared to deal with them. 

Likewise, the last time Russia faced a “formidable 

challenge to its great power ambitions” was about 3 

centuries ago. In the end, Russia survived this “time of 

troubles” and actually expanded its empire. But this 

time, Russian-watchers predict the Kremlin leadership will prove incapable of imposing its will upon 

Russia’s foreign rivals and, worse yet, may face a new 

internal crisis that results in a fate similar to that of 

the USSR.

In the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s breakup, 

many leaders, Putin among them, feared Russia might 

go the way of Yugoslavia and fragment into a number of parts. But today, few foreign analysts believe 

Russia will break apart or experience widespread violence bordering on civil war. Many deem talk of this 

nature as simply foolhardy. Leonid Radzikhovsky is 

one of them; he dismisses predictions of Russia’s disintegration implausible since most of its residents are 

ethnic Russians who represent about 70 percent of the 

population, and they recoil at the idea that Russia will 

be the subject of Balkanization à la Yugoslavia. Most 

minority ethnic groups or political enterprises like Tatarstan cannot function as viable economic and political entities without Russian help. Those that reside on 

borders with foreign countries such as China cannot 
54

rely upon Beijing’s help in breaking free of Russian 

rule. On the contrary, like their rival in Washington, 

the leadership in Beijing has little stomach for Russia’s 

fragmentation. It would have exceedingly ominous 

consequence for the United States and China alike as 

the shock waves it promulgated would destabilize a 

world already in a state of disorder and existential 

peril. Also, any attempt to openly encourage Russians 

to turn against their own leaders would be foolhardy, 

given Russia’s massive WMD arsenal.38

American analysts who deem serious internal strife 

and political chaos in Russia implausible, however, 

must consider all possible outcomes, especially those 

that have the potential of profoundly changing the international security picture. Currently, analysts worry 

about jihadists securing WMD in Syria and Pakistan 

that could be used against neighboring countries or 

even the United States. But neither possesses the vast 

arsenal of biological weapons, chemical agents, and 

nuclear weapons, along with sophisticated delivery 

systems, that Russia does. Fears about Russia cascading into chaos then justify serious study, even if most 

analysts believe it implausible. Recall how few members of the American security community believed an 

attack akin to September 11, 2001 (9/11) was plausible? Also remember that the vast majority of American security analysts failed to anticipate the breakup 

of the Soviet Empire. 

Soon after Gorbachev became General Secretary of 

the CPSU in 1985, national security experts in Washington rallied around four perspectives:

1. The Soviet Leviathan. With the publication of 

George F. Kennan’s historic Sources of Soviet Conduct

in 1947, the major concern of U.S. strategists rested 

on the fear that the Warsaw Pact would overrun the 
55

NATO defenders—even if they did not resort to tactical nuclear weapons as was their intention. Subsequently, realists argued that what happened within 

the USSR was of little consequence, what mattered 

most was its capacity to project its power internationally. Moreover, even conceding it confronted serious 

economic, ethnic, and political problems, the notion 

that the Soviet Empire would be brought down as a 

result of “internal contradictions” was unthinkable. 

The analysts who eventually became known as the 

neo-conservatives, and deemed Richard Nixon’s policy of détente disastrous, were of the same opinion. 

The Kremlin overlords enjoyed a monopoly of power—the Red Army, KGB, and militia—so they would 

have little difficulty crushing the dissidents. 

In failing to anticipate the Soviet Union’s collapse, both camps committed a monumental intellectual error. They were not alone; prominent American 

statesmen like Henry Kissinger deemed the USSR’s 

disintegration a fantasy and only a minority of his 

colleagues—most notably Zbigniew Brzezinski—believed otherwise. Jimmy Carter’s former national 

security chief was among the minority that correctly 

predicted that the “nationalities question” was the 

USSR’s Achilles heel. Gorbachev forgot that and lost 

an empire.39

2. Hardliners Would Replace Gorbachev. By 1991, as 

Perestroika exacerbated the very problems it was designed to resolve, the George H. W. Bush administration feared Gorbachev would be replaced by hardliners who favored a reaffirmation of Stalinist policies and 

not liberal reforms. In an attempt to save Gorbachev—

and, in effect, the Soviet Empire—President George 

H. W. Bush flew to Kiev where he pleaded with the 
56

Ukrainians not to leave “Gorbie” in a lurch and join a 

new truncated union that was under discussion. This 

desertion of what Ronald Reagan had championed 

under the rubric “rollback” prompted William Safire 

of The New York Times to characterize Bush’s words 

as the “Chicken-Kiev” speech.40 Bush was credited for 

not humiliating Gorbachev’s successors but had he 

anticipated the USSR’s collapse, perhaps Washington would have been better prepared to deal with the 

aftermath of this staggering historical event—specifically, taking steps to eventually integrate Russia into a 

post-Cold War European security system.

3. An Impotent Russia Tethered To The West. A more 

benign view of post-Soviet Russia prevailed in Washington after the collapse of Soviet imperialism in Eastern Europe, the free-fall in the Red Army’s capabilities, 

the subsequent dramatic decline in population and 

territory and profound economic difficulties that culminated in the 1998 crash.41 In a word, Russia was no 

longer an existential threat even though it possessed 

a massive nuclear arsenal. Programs like the NunnLugar initiative helped ameliorate the misuse of the 

Soviet nuclear arsenal and, more recently, so did the 

New Start Treaty. Furthermore, Russia’s leaders were 

preoccupied with the daunting task of rebuilding a 

country riven by a host of serious internal challenges. 

After cooperating with Russia in some areas, the 

George H. Bush administration alarmed the Kremlin 

by scrapping the ABM Treaty—and, following Bill 

Clinton’s example, expanded NATO eastward; subsequently, relations between both countries cooled. In 

2009, Obama forged a reset in relations that resulted in 

the New Start Treaty and expansion of the Northern 

Distribution Network that was vital to the American 
57

military campaign in Afghanistan, but by 2012, the 

reset was deemed moribund. Indeed, a year earlier, 

Russia was only mentioned briefly in the Joint Chiefs 

National Military Strategy document. 

We seek to co-operate with Russia on counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, space, and ballistic missile 

defense, and welcome it playing a more active role in 

preserving security and stability in Asia.42

Russian commentators complained that Russia 

was mentioned as a sub-text to the principle American 

preoccupation—Asia.

During his first term as president and in spite of 

his tough rhetoric, Putin believed Russia’s fate rested 

upon a harmonious relationship with the Americans. 

By 2007, Putin changed his tune when he proclaimed 

at Munich that the “unipolar moment”—i.e., when the 

Americans dictated to the world—was over. Henceforth, Russia had to be treated like an equal, not a 

supplicant, but he reasoned the prospects for fruitful cooperation were slim, so he passed the Western 

portfolio over to his young sidekick, Medvedev. In 

focusing on Putin’s remarks, however, many observers overlook two pertinent observations: first, in that 

same address, Putin indicated that he wanted to work 

with Bush in stemming the proliferation of nuclear 

weapons; and second, in Russia’s 2012 foreign policy 

concept a working relationship with the West is acknowledged as a priority.43

4. The Breakup of the Soviet Empire and Armageddon. 

In 1993, as the last Russian trucks rumbled through 

the streets of old town Vilnius, Lithuania, one displayed a sign with four ominous words: “WE WILL 
58

BE BACK!” This prospect was not ignored by Lithuania’s leaders who feared that in the near future a 

return of Russian tanks was a real prospect. Many 

of their neighbors harbored the same nightmare, but 

some observers deemed this scenario less likely than 

a more existential threat. Russia would implode much 

as the Soviet Empire did, only this time with violent 

outbreaks throughout the country, and the subsequent 

turbulence would spread to the Baltic democracies 

since many revanchists in Moscow claimed all three 

were part of Russia’s patrimony. 

This fourth perspective represented a minority 

view and did not receive the attention that it deserved. 

Yet there were a number of reasons why Russia could 

follow the Soviet example:

• The daunting challenge of succession was unresolved; 

• The centrifugal forces of ethnic separatism was 

a real prospect as the insurgencies in the North 

Caucasus flourished and the Muslims that represented almost 20 percent of the population 

became disgruntled with Russian rule; 

• The military was demoralized and in disarray 

as enlisted men and many officers and their 

families lived in squalor; 

• The criminal organizations that thrived under 

the USSR now openly operated in collusion 

with the Siloviki and the oligarchs; and, 

• The vast majority of ordinary people were as 

powerless as they were during Soviet rule. 

And, of course, the man who was president, Boris 

Yeltsin, was an aging drunk with chronic heart disease who was incapable of managing the economy. 

Under these circumstances, there was a real prospect 
59

that Russia would implode, and it almost did on several occasions.

In October 1993, after President Yeltsin disbanded 

the Parliament, Vice-President Alexander Rutskoi led 

the fight against this “abuse of power.” He had the 

support of communists and nationalists, but the Army 

surrounded the White House with tanks and fired 

upon the rebels, forcing them to surrender. The tank 

commanders decided to do so after several days of 

hesitation and only after Yeltsin mobilized the citizens 

of Moscow in opposing Rutskoi and his supporters. 

Given the president’s grassroots support, any units 

that were prepared to side with the Vice-President ran 

the risk of a violent outbreak that could consume the 

entire country. According to official reports, 146 people were killed and 1,000 wounded during the conflict. But the bloodletting could have been far worse 

and the outcome truly disastrous. 

Later, Yeltsin’s selection of the Siloviki’s favorite 

for Prime Minister—Vladimir Putin—was a result of 

a silent coup. Had Yeltsin refused to bend to pressure 

from the military and security services, no one knows 

what the outcome would have been but something 

akin to a military putsch could not be discounted. 

Fast forward to the present and as a consequence of 

events and policies that were highlighted in the Stalin 

Lite scenario, Russia lapses into chaos. The major catalyst is an economic downturn as hydrocarbon rents 

nosedive and other sectors of the economy stagnate 

while domestic and foreign investors flee the country. 

Henceforth, the Kremlin cannot provide workers “living wages,” while those in the old Soviet-style industries face the blight of unemployment. The plight of 

pensioners, and those individuals who rely upon government entitlements, result in unprecedented eco-
60

nomic hardship and spawn massive protests among 

the provincials.

The picture becomes even darker when the Kremlin is informed that the “demographic time bomb” 

that demographers earlier had speculated about had 

become a reality. Russian women were having babies 

in ever smaller numbers, while the working-age population was shrinking. The estimate that Russia would 

lose 26 million productive citizens by 2050 appeared 

to be on target.

Meanwhile, the flow of funds to the military and 

security services had become problematic, and orders 

for new weapons and equipment were cancelled. As 

the supply of 18-year-old recruits slumped, it became ever more difficult to recruit capable soldiers. 

Under these circumstances, some members of the officer corps seek salvation in alliances with economic 

warlords, criminal gangs, and ultra-nationalist organizations that have mushroomed in the face of economic hardship, social upheaval, and a dysfunctional 

political system.

At the same time, the Kremlin leadership is incapable of dealing with events since the clans are at 

war with one another, and at times the conflict has 

resulted in violent clashes between them. Without Putin, the oligarchs and other powerful players in Russian society no longer have a referee to establish and 

enforce rules that rationalize business deals—with 

the predictable outcome being chaos. Moreover, the 

perpetual struggle between the elites in the center and 

those in the provinces has taken on a new intensity as 

regional business and political leaders in the hinterland now operate like independent entities. The flow 

of commodities and resources from the provinces no 

longer can be taken for granted by the overlords in 
61

Moscow. It was with this fear in mind that in 2004 Putin adopted policies that denied local constituents the 

opportunity to choose their governors.

To make matters worse, there is an uptick in the 

quantity and quality of armed insurgencies being 

waged within Russia. They are not only limited to the 

North Caucasus where religious fanaticism has replaced nationalistic impulses as the motivating force 

for violence. Armed groups that appear in minority 

communities have facilitated the formation of Cossack 

fighting units and like-minded ultra-Slavic nationalist 

entities that are supported by nervous members of the 

Kremlin elite. 

As these developments unfold, the White House 

national security team calls a special session after receiving the following terse message from the American 

Ambassador in Moscow: “The ruling elite are badly 

divided. Expect Armageddon!” In return, he receives 

the following response from the White House: “Who 

is in charge?” and “Are the WMD safe?”

One observation that has a bearing on both questions is that while the people in charge under Stalin 

Lite embarked upon aggressive rhetoric and at times 

took measures that made their neighbors nervous, 

they judiciously honored Red Lines. They were not 

foolish enough to engage in confrontations that would 

lead to a military showdown with NATO. 

But the motley collection of warlords, ethnic insurgent leaders, mafia crime bosses, and those heading 

regional fiefdoms often ignored Red Lines or proved 

incapable of controlling their fractious followers. 

Even more alarming, since the military’s command 

structure collapsed, American intelligence doubted 

the authorities could deny insurgents access to the 

vast inventory of nuclear weapons, tactical as well 
62

as strategic ones—along with delivery systems—not 

to mention the lethal arsenal of biological agents and 

chemical weapons that Russia possesses. Even if the 

WMD were safe, the availability of a vast storehouse 

of conventional arms would provide undisciplined 

armed factions with the firepower to wage civil war. 

The International Prospect.

The Eurasian Economic Union’s disintegration was 

a cruel blow for the Kremlin. It was designed to snatch 

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, and Ukraine 

from the clutches of the EU’s Eastern Partnership program by offering alternative trade and commercial opportunities that Brussels dangled before them. Putin 

first embarked upon the venture with his sights set on 

Belarus and Kazakhstan since both depended upon 

Russia’s energy and pipelines and sought access to a 

market of 143 million people. But not far into his term, 

Putin used his formidable economic clout to force 

Ukraine and Moldova into the Union. It provided the 

Kremlin with a geo-political architecture consistent 

with Russia’s campaign to project its power throughout most of the former Soviet space—priority number 

one of the 2012 foreign policy concept. 

According to American analysts, a week after Putin proclaimed that he would run for the presidency 

in 2012, he: 

. . . announced his desire for Russia to again lead a 

multinational bloc of tightly bound, former Soviet 

Republics. But major obstacles stand in the way of 

Putin’s project, and the prospects of a new Eurasian 

Union emerging any time soon in the former Soviet 

space are small.44
63

Given mounting economic problems within all of 

the member states and pandemic corruption, lawlessness and Russia’s contempt for the junior partners, the 

Union unraveled. It represented a major economic setback for the Siloviki and their business associates and 

precipitated a bitter and at times violent struggle to 

secure control of a shrinking pie. It also undermined 

the Kremlin’s campaign to thrust Russia before the 

world again as a major international force.

In the Ukraine, a country the size of France with a 

population of 46 million, the leadership was divided, 

and turbulence originating in Russia ignited a violent 

confrontation between its warring factions. At the 

same time, there were clashes between well-armed 

ethnic Russians and Ukrainian nationalists in many 

places, and in the Crimea what remained of the Tatar 

population attacked Russian naval units. At the same 

time, criminal clans representing disparate ethnic 

communities were involved in violent confrontations 

that fed the flames of discord throughout the country. 

In the case of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenka resorted to even more violent means to crush democratic activists and to intimidate ordinary citizens. In contrast to the past, this campaign of brutal suppression 

prompted a backlash, and the violence threatened to 

spill over into Lithuania and Poland.

In Russia’s Far East, foreign revanchists were encouraging Russian and minority elites to break with 

Moscow and enjoy de facto, if not de jure, independence. In short, predictions that Russia would someday lose control of territory “East of the Urals” were 

no longer delusional. 

A Russia on the verge of collapse prompted some 

in Beijing to consider how China might exploit its 

neighbor’s time of troubles. Some intelligence ana-
64

lysts in the West concluded that, while China coveted 

this prized territory, the PLA was not unmindful of 

Yeltsin’s remark that, while Russia’s “nuclear-tipped 

rockets were rusty, they worked.” While the Russians 

were preoccupied with their own internal problems, 

the Chinese set their sights on Central Asia where 

they helped puppets of Beijing crush their political 

opponents. That was no easy task since jihadists in 

all five countries, encouraged by Russia’s preoccupation with its own internal challenges, were conducting 

insurgencies with the expectation of victory and the 

creation of a single Central Asian Caliphate.

To complicate the security picture, sectarian violence erupted in many cities which attracted non-Russian migrants from many parts of the former Soviet 

Union. In Moscow, ethnic Russians clashed with Muslim migrants from the Caucasus and Central Asia. 

Consequently, jihadist leaders concluded that the time 

was ripe to create an Islamist Caliphate within Russia’s borders; that is, one that far exceeded in ambition 

like-minded efforts that already operated there.

In addition to providing arms, ammunition, and 

money to indigenous jihadists, fighters from throughout the Greater Middle East were now infiltrating into 

Russia in significant numbers. At the same time, they 

were responsible for a frenzy of bombings and assassinations in major Russian cities and destroyed vital 

economic targets like pipelines, pumping stations, rail 

tracks, and power networks. 

The Russian military—whose ranks were filled 

with disgruntled enlisted and officer personnel—were 

incapable of stabilizing the situation. They lacked sufficient communications equipment, vehicles, appropriate aircraft, and weapon systems to suppress the 

insurgents. In a growing number of instances, the in-
65

surgents employed tactics that bled American forces 

in Iraq and Afghanistan and, when necessary, found 

safe havens in neighboring Islamic countries. It was 

obvious that they hoped to provoke violent confrontations between Russian and Western units in areas of 

the former Soviet space just as their compatriots had 

successfully done in setting off Sunnis and Shiites in 

the Greater Middle East. 

In conclusion, a Russia stricken by the collapse of 

central authority, resulting in de facto, if not de jure, 

fragmentation of the regime along with other dislocations may constitute the least plausible scenario 

but should it materialize, the consequences for the 

international order will be monumental. Stricken by 

a power vacuum, something approaching anarchism 

cannot be discounted along with the proliferation of 

ethnic, religious, regional, and economic fiefdoms that 

replace centralized authority in Russia. The new lines 

of authority, then, are horizontal, not vertical. This is 

one of the major features of the turmoil that has appeared throughout the greater Middle East, and much 

the same thing could happen in Russia. For this reason 

alone, U.S. planners must pay serious attention to it. 

Since this scenario is deemed unthinkable, a number 

of controversial questions regarding Russian relations 

have not been part of public discourse, but they deserve our attention: 

• Were this scenario to materialize, how would 

the United States and its NATO allies respond 

to this colossal event? In considering intervention, we might consider the mistakes that we 

made in the Greater Middle East: namely, the 

jihadist threat was only a part of a far larger 

historical development—a civil war within Islam that could only be resolved by the 1.3 bil-
66

lion members of the Islamic Umma, not by outsiders. The lesson: let the Russians resolve their 

own crises.45

• Arguably, the most compelling rational for intervention is prompted by the question: 

• Could the United States stand by and allow jihadist fanatics, irrational ultra-nationalists, and 

undisciplined nonstate actors secure control of 

Russia’s massive nuclear arsenal and associated 

chemical and biological weapons—not to mention its vast arsenal of conventional weapons?

• How would the West respond to requests from 

Russian authorities that they required outside 

help to prevent their WMD from falling into 

the “wrong hands?” Would it choose sides in 

the hope of producing an outcome favorable to 

the victory of pluralist interests or would it—

fearing a disastrous entanglement—remain as 

an interested but hesitant bystander?

• How would the United States respond to intrusions on the part of foreign agents or countries 

seeking to seize control of Russia’s WMD or 

parts of its territory? Would it respond unilaterally or through NATO or the UN? Is it plausible to include China in such an enterprise and 

if not, what role might Beijing play in this unthinkable event?
67

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Final Word on Putin and the Power Vertical.

Some analysts would argue that Russia has left behind the Status Quo scenario, and that Putin’s crackdown justifies the claim that the Stalin Lite alternative better represents conditions in Russia today. The 

evidence is mounting that there are bad days ahead 

for Russia’s one-legged economy as profits for gas 

and oil along with commodity prices are problematic. 

Without a steady supply of revenues, Putin can neither meet the promises he has made to workers and 

pensioners nor to members of the military industrial 

complex. Efforts to diversify the economy have produced limited results, and Putin has no plans in place 

to address the myriad roadblocks to a law-based free 

market economy. Prospects for economic growth will 

slip even further as both domestic and foreign investors, hounded by corruption and lawlessness, withdraw money from Russia.

Putin is attempting to reconfigure his political 

base by turning to the church, Slavic nationalism, and 

a celebration of Mother Russia, but most analysts believe that ultimately he will fail to stabilize a society in 

turmoil. He may adopt even harsher repressive measures to silence the democrats, purge his inner circle, 

and craft a new political order. But as the Siloviki and 

clans lose confidence in him, he will be neutralized or 

removed from power. 

That said, Putin’s demise may be years in the future. While the Power Vertical can survive without 

him, the Siloviki surge further toward the autocratic 

right, banking the regime’s survival upon Russian 
68

nationalism, the church, and a successful campaign 

to portray the cosmopolitans as agents of the United 

States and carriers of alien values. A climate of fear 

among them, and pervasive apathy among the provincials, will allow the hardliners to survive for 

some time. 

Russian-watchers mention a number of people 

who are likely successors of Putin: Deputy Prime 

Minister Dmitry Rogozin; Sergei Ivanov, the Kremlin 

Chief of Staff; Sergey Shoigu, the Defense Minister; 

and Igor Sechin, the head of Rosneft. It is noteworthy 

that Sechin has been called the “second most powerful man in Russia.” He has worked closely with his 

“boss” ever since the St. Petersburg days and now is 

the chief executive officer for the oil giant, Rosneft. After Khorokovsky was sent to prison, Yukos was folded into Rosneft and as a consequence of buying out 

British Petroleum’s oil investments, the firm became 

the largest oil company in Russia. At 50, Sechin, who 

served as a KGB operative in Africa, is seen as a man 

on the move; a crafty operator that popularized the 

notion that Russia would not take the Western road to 

development but rather one consistent with its unique 

history, culture, and immense size. Most recently, 

Mayor Sergei Sobyanin has been touted as a likely future president, many Russians noting that Yeltsin took 

that road to power decades ago.

Whoever replaces Putin, his successor is likely to 

falter for much the same reason that Gorbachev did 

a generation ago if the successor attempts to manage 

the emerging crisis within the prevailing political and 

economic order and not acknowledge that it has to be 

scrapped in favor of pluralistic economic and political 

institutions that are in keeping with the 21st century. 

The best and brightest in Russia favor a Western road 
69

to development, and, while they may be neutralized 

at present, ultimately they will be successful in moving Russia toward the European norm of governance.

The campaign to stabilize Russia through a police 

state will ultimately fail as it fosters a split among the 

power elite, the resurrection of the democratic movement, and massive expressions of disgruntlement on 

the part of ordinary Russians. But here is a pathway to 

either the “best” or the “worst” case scenarios. In the 

first case, the reactionaries are swept from power and 

Russia takes The Western Path to Development. 

Of course, the Siloviki’s failure to stabilize the 

country may precipitate a second outcome where the 

center does not hold and Russia is consumed with violent outbreaks and balkanization as disparate regional 

elites create de facto sovereign fiefdoms—in a word, it 

is stricken by all infirmities associated with the Russia 

in Chaos scenario.

As the U.S. Government considers the plausibility of a rebalance in relations with Russia, it behooves 

American strategists to pay serious attention to all of 

these outcomes. In particular, they cannot discount a 

replay of the events that led to the breakup of the Soviet Empire in 1991, only this time with an even more 

daunting outcome. This is not the most likely scenario, 

but it is certainly the most perilous one.

Russia Must Remain a Central Preoccupation 

of U.S. Foreign Policy.

Russia remains vital to U.S. national security for a 

variety of reasons:

• It alone has the capacity to destroy the United 

States in a nuclear war; it has 1,499 deployed 

warheads and 491 deployed delivery systems. 
70

By contrast, China only has 50 intercontinental ballistic missiles that can reach the United 

States.46 Russia’s nuclear arsenal—tactical and 

strategic—and a massive inventory of chemical 

agents and biologic weapons constitute a prize 

for rogue states and terrorists of all stripes.

• Russia occupies the largest land mass of any 

state. Within and adjacent to its borders, where 

more than half of the world’s population resides, there lies a vast supply of the earth’s 

resources, including large amounts of hydrocarbon and a system of pipelines that deliver 

them to consumers in Europe and Asia. It has 

an enormous amount of minerals, critical metals, and fresh water, not to mention access to 

the Arctic’s treasure trove of natural resources.

• Russia has made an impressive contribution to 

world culture, and today it is home for millions 

of highly educated and technologically gifted 

citizens. Their enterprise and talent will eventually set Russia on a firm path to modernization 

and enable it once again to become a significant 

force in world affairs.

• Russia has a UN veto, and, through a host of 

other international organizations and international experts, it has the means to influence 

events worldwide. It has been active in projecting its power in the former Soviet space, and 

this is the basis for Secretary Clinton’s claim 

that Putin wants to “re-Sovietize the region” 

through “the guise of regional cooperation.”47 A 

democratic, prosperous and stable Russia will 

have a positive impact upon all of the countries 

that once were associated with the USSR.
71

• Arguably, the prospect of stabilizing Eurasia 

and much of the Greater Middle East without 

Russia’s cooperation is well-nigh impossible.

• Russia is an Asian power, and American analysts cannot ignore it in the Asian Pivot. Were 

it to join China in a military alliance, the consequence for U.S. security would be immense. 

Conversely, harmonious Chinese-Russian-U.S. 

relations would enhance the international community’s capacity to exploit untapped resources and promote the peace in the Far East.

The Long-Term Goal of a Re-Balance In Relations: 

Russia’s Integration into the Euro-Atlantic 

Community.

After the Soviet Union imploded, the West’s biggest mistake was not integrating Russia into a range 

of Euro-Atlantic institutions. After the Warsaw Treaty 

Organization had vanished, NATO’s number one priority was to offer membership to former Soviet Satellites and Republics that wanted to join the alliance. 

At this juncture, the prospect of including Russia in 

this historical campaign was simply too daunting to 

contemplate.

Russian analysts claimed Yeltsin’s biggest mistake 

was to ape the West and not to follow a path consistent with Russian history and culture. In response, 

Stephen Kotkin has observed they, “. . . seem not to 

have noticed that, for the most part, Russia did just 

that.” In absence of modern democratic political institutions, such as “a strong judiciary to enforce the rule 

of law, property rights and the accountability of officials,” Russia’s plight was largely of its own making.48
72

In 1997, the NATO-Russian Joint Council was created to provide Russia with a voice in Euro-Atlantic 

security affairs, and similar measures followed without any substantive outcome.49 After Bush scrapped 

the Cold War era ABM Treaty, Putin concluded that 

the window of cooperation was closing quickly, although he allowed Medvedev to explore a new relationship with the West. In 2008, Medvedev proposed a 

European security system that would include Russia, 

but it was ignored by the West and Putin was not enthusiastic about the proposal, either. 

With the onset of the Obama administration, both 

sides agreed upon a reset in relations that led to the 

New Start Treaty and expansion of the Northern 

Distribution Network (NDN). But Putin concluded 

that Obama was as reluctant as Bush to provide Russia with a real voice in the proposed East European 

anti-missile system, and he persisted in Washington’s campaign to achieve regime change in Russia. 

Henceforth Putin embarked upon his anti-NGO drive, 

ousted USIA, shut down American radio projects, and 

nullified the Nunn-Lugar initiative. He also accelerated his efforts to re-integrate Belarus, Moldova, and 

Ukraine into Russia’s orbit, and to convince Georgia 

that the price for joining the West would prove more 

costly than the benefits involved. He adopted an attitude that the Americans needed him more than he 

needed them.

Putin did not lose sleep over the reset’s demise 

since he reasoned the United States was in retreat internationally, while its political system was dysfunctional and the economic prospects for Obama’s second 

term were problematic. American military might was 

second to none, but the Pentagon was discombobulated after a series of setbacks in the Greater Middle 
73

East. While lecturing Russia on military reform, the 

Americans were indifferent to a stunning revelation: 

The world’s only superpower could not decisively 

defeat opponents only armed with assault rifles and 

homemade bombs. In private, even U.S. analysts anticipated the fragmentation of both Iraq and Afghanistan and feared al-Qaeda-like jihadists would exploit 

the Syrian civil war to expand their outreach in the 

Islamic world.50

Was it any wonder that the American public complained about a huge defense budget? The Pentagon 

was now operating in a strange new world where it 

had to fight for its budget in earnest. Even Republicans with their eyes on the White House in 2016, like 

Kentucky Senator Rand Paul, openly disparaged a 

“militaristic” approach to foreign policy. Prominent 

defense analysts that had consulted with the Department of Defense (DoD) for decades joined the chorus 

of detractors. One wrote: 

It is time to abandon the United States’ hegemonic 

strategy and replace it with one of restraint. . . . It 

would mean removing large numbers of U.S. troops 

from forward bases, and creating incentives for allies 

to provide for their own security.51

While Putin took comfort in declining American 

power, he resented U.S. efforts to foster regime change 

in much of the world, including Russia. As a former 

American ambassador to Ukraine opined: 

. . . his comments suggest he does not see the upheavals that swept countries such as Georgia, Ukraine, Tunisia or Egypt as manifestations of popular discontent 

but instead believes they were inspired, funded and 

directed by Washington. This may seem like a para-
74

noiac view, but Mr. Putin has made so many allusions 

to it that it is hard to conclude that he does not believe 

it.”52

Today foreign policy experts within the Capital 

Beltway are preoccupied with Asia and are divided 

over the wisdom of striving for a re-balance in relations with Russia but this is not necessarily the view 

of the Obama administration. At the 2013 Munich Security Conference, Vice-President Joseph Biden said 

President Obama is convinced that “Europe is the cornerstone of our engagement with the rest of the world” 

and “the catalyst for our global cooperation. Europe 

is America’s largest economic partner, to the tune of 

over $600 billion” and that relationship sustains jobs 

on both sides of the Atlantic. Anne-Marie Slaughter, a 

former Obama State Department official has observed, 

“Together, Europe and the U.S. account for more than 

50% of global GDP, have the largest military force in 

the world by many multiples, and control a growing 

proportion of global energy reserves.”53

Conversely, should the EU fragment, the implications for U.S. security are monumental, and even assuming that does not happen, U.S. planners cannot 

ignore the impact that Europe’s protracted economic 

difficulties will have upon NATO. Washington is 

pressing its European allies to sustain the level of defense spending that they have pledged to uphold, but 

few have and most of them will not honor that pledge 

until the economic crisis in Europe is over. That may 

take years. 

Take, for example, the case of France. It has one of 

Europe’s most seasoned and capable military establishments—one that had demonstrated in Libya and Mali 

that it is prepared to deploy boots on the ground and 
75

not just “talk the talk.” But hampered by slow growth 

and surging unemployment, it broke its pledge to the 

EU to hold its budget deficit to 3 percent; by the spring 

of 2013, it was about 3.7 percent. France has a military 

force of 228,000, but economic constraints will compel 

it to cut military personnel by 10,000, to reduce its rapid deployment force by 15,000, and to scrap its plans 

to construct a second aircraft carrier, as a consequence 

of a declining equipment budget.54 In the meantime, 

what does this mean for NATO and for U.S. defense 

planning in Europe? Recall that after the Europeans 

stumbled in the former Yugoslavia, the United States 

was compelled to intervene to end the “Balkan Wars” 

that had resulted in 200,000 deaths. Had the United 

States been out of the picture in 2008, it is conceivable 

that the Russians would have snubbed the Europeans 

and marched onto Tbilisi, Georgia, where a puppet 

Russian government would have been installed.

Then, too, if the European project is stricken by 

serious internal political disputes—in addition to economic stagnation—what would this mean for U.S.-

Russian relations? There is no easy answer to these 

questions, but one thing is clear: One does not have 

to be an alarmist to predict that the plight of the EU 

project and the Eurozone could culminate in serious 

geo-political instability on the continent. Furthermore, 

neither the Russian nor the Western side can unilaterally resolve outstanding security problems in Europe; 

they must cooperate to stabilize the continent in spite 

of their clashing interests and values just as great powers have done over the past several centuries.

Zbigniew Brzezinski believes the Asian Pivot is 

justified, but he insists that we must reaffirm our ties 

to Europe and that endeavor is senseless without Russia’s participation. As this monograph has demon-
76

strated, the greatest challenges to the peace in Europe 

are associated with dislocations associated with the 

collapse of European communism. As long as Russia remains outside of the major Euro-Atlantic security complex, Europe will be unstable, and that holds 

double should the EU and Russia suffer serious deterioration simultaneously. As the United States makes 

readjustments in the character and scope of its security community, it must think in terms of partnerships 

and joint ventures.55

To find a place in a Western security system, Russia must meet a host of requirements that justify this 

daunting undertaking; for example, reforms in the 

military that are germane to Russia’s security challenges and consistent with a pluralistic society. In this 

connection, consider the following:

• A volunteer force must be established that 

replaces one served by draftees. There are a 

number of arguments against a military that 

depends largely upon conscripts. Among other 

drawbacks, 1 year is not sufficient time for recruits to acquire the skills required to operate a 

hi-tech force.

• An army that relies heavily upon mass mobilization of reservists and huge general purpose 

forces must be scrapped in favor of one with 

a smaller, more mobile force that is operable 

with air and naval units. As the Five-Day War 

indicated, even more important than weapons, 

Russia’s military desperately needs to upgrade 

its command, control, communications, and information network.

• Much of the savings that will occur with a 

drawdown to a total of 700,000 soldiers can be 

used to attract quality personnel and provide 
77

a professional force and their families with decent pay and housing so that they can live in 

dignity.

• With a lighter, more mobile, hi-tech force, 

Russia can address its most likely threats. For 

example, in “. . . the Caucasus region and the 

regions adjacent to the Russian-Kazakh and 

Russian-Chinese borders, and also along the 

border with North Korea.”56 It can move in this 

“revolutionary” direction secure in the knowledge that it retains its ace in the hole—the 

world’s second largest nuclear strike force.

• A smaller military will provide noncommissioned officers and general officers with access 

to educational opportunities that better enable 

them to cope with a complicated global environment traumatized by turbulence.

• All of this rests upon a democratic political 

system whose leaders adhere to a policy of 

transparency.

At present, hardliners in the military-industrial 

complex oppose most of these items and continue 

to favor a military more in keeping with one following the Soviet model. If Russia goes down this road, 

vast sums of money will be spent on a force structure 

that has been overtaken by global events. More rational members of the defense establishment, however, 

may prevail and adopt reforms more in keeping with 

the prevailing strategic environment. This outcome 

depends upon the Russian people and their leaders, 

but in the meantime, there are a host of security issues 

that offer U.S.-Russian cooperation and can serve as 

confidence-building measures.
78

Before discussing them, one final observation 

bearing on any Western effort to create a new security 

system in the Euro-Atlantic community, with Russian 

participation, must be stressed. Any effort must rest 

on a set of firm principles. Among others, no member 

will claim special spheres of influence; all countries 

will be free to choose their security preferences; and 

the United States and major West European countries 

must reassure former Soviet entities in Central and 

Eastern Europe that they will continue to receive protection under Article Five of the Rome Treaty.

The Short Term Prospects For a Re-Balance 

in U.S.-Russian Relations.

Officials in both Moscow and Washington have 

discarded the word “reset,” and it appears that the 

word “re-balance” has taken its place. Presumably 

this reformulation entails cautious ad hoc cooperation 

and reciprocal concessions. The following represents 

an agenda for such cooperation.

Moving Beyond the New Start Treaty.

As President Obama began his second term in office, the world was stunned by news that North Korea 

had detonated a nuclear weapon with greater punch 

than previous tests suggested. That revelation and 

Iran’s bid for a nuclear arsenal underscored why it is 

in the national interest of America and Russia to keep 

the “nuclear genie in the bottle.” 

But there appear to be differences of opinion in 

the Kremlin. Specifically, Russian defense analysts 

reject Obama’s long-term goal—articulated in 2009 

in Prague, Czech Republic—that ultimately nuclear 
79

weapons must be eliminated. Some argue to the contrary and favor procurement of new advanced nuclear 

weapons and more sophisticated ICBMs not only to 

checkmate the West, but China as well. It remains to 

be seen whether their policies prevail since the costs 

involved are significant, and they cannot ignore the 

devastating price that the Soviets paid during the 

Cold War to keep pace with the United States. 

Moving forward with the New Start agreement 

is a complicated endeavor, but one thing is clear: To 

maintain the U.S. and Russian nuclear forces on a 

Cold War footing is both nonsensical and dangerous. 

It is irrational, since neither side has any intention of 

launching a nuclear strike against the other one, and 

perilous because with nuclear weapons on an alert 

status in keeping with Cold War tensions, they may be 

launched inadvertently as a consequence of a horrible 

mistake or technological glitch. 

Finding a Solution to the Anti-Missile Defense 

Conundrum.

Putin is convinced that the United States is committed to a very dangerous proposition: absolute security. Recall that Soviet strategists feared President 

Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative was designed to 

nullify a Soviet second strike, and some Russian defense analysts see the U.S. ballistic missile defense activity in this light today. They have focused on “Phase 

4 of the missile defense program in Europe, which 

envisions the deployment of advanced SM-3 Block IIB 

interceptors in Poland by 2022.”57 Moscow scoffs at 

the notion that this project is designed for Iranian, not 

Russian, ICBMs, nor do Russian analysts take comfort 

in claims that the United States is no threat to them. 
80

In their defense, they can cite a prominent American 

student of deterrence who has observed, “In contrast 

to the Cold War, it is now hard to make the case that 

Russia is more a threat to NATO than the reverse.”58

But demands that Russia be provided with a treaty 

and not a political agreement that promises the United 

States will not target its nuclear strike force is asking too much of Obama. That is one red line that no 

American President can cross at this time. Should an 

agreement take place, one wonders whether Russia 

will scrap its threat to build up its strategic offensive 

capabilities to counter the American missile system. It 

may be a bogus threat, but if it is acted upon, it would 

create another barrier to cooperation and produce a 

disastrous economic outcome for Russia.

High level discussion among U.S. and Russian officials in the spring of 2013 indicated that both sides believed the prospects for an agreement had improved, 

and, with two scheduled talks between Obama and 

Putin that year, there was hope that at long last a deal 

might be in the works. By the summer’s end, most 

analysts took a much less optimistic view.59

Working toward a Successful U.S. Exit from Afghanistan.

From the outset of military operations in Afghanistan, Russia provided intelligence, equipment, and air 

and land corridors that enabled U.S. forces to project 

power in that country. Even more significant, Russia, through its good offices, encouraged the fighters 

aligned with the Northern Alliance to provide the 

bulk of the boots on the ground in deposing the Taliban and defeating al-Qaeda in the 2003 war.

Russia has played a pivotal role in providing the 

U.S. and ISAF units with a supply route—the NDN—
81

that has proven to be crucial. At one point, it was the 

only land route available when the Pakistanis closed 

the Karachi to Afghanistan corridor in protests over 

drone strikes and other U.S. operations in their country. The NDN corridor will prove critical once the allied troops exit Afghanistan to comply with the 2014 

deadline. They will take 70,000 vehicles and 120,000 

shipping containers with them, and it is expected that 

a considerable part of this massive shipment will pass 

through the NDN. Of course, it is conceivable that the 

route through Pakistan will be closed, and all of the 

material will have to take the northern route.60

Beyond that date, Russia will play a critical role 

when it and other stakeholders—China, India, Iran, 

Pakistan, and the United States—provide funding to 

pacify and develop a post-American Afghanistan.61

Moscow fears drug dealers, jihadists, and criminal 

gangs will use Afghanistan as a pathway into Central 

Asia and eventually Russia, so it has incentives that 

exceed those in Washington to remain engaged in this 

turbulent region. Conversely, this troubled area is far 

from the United States and, in reducing its profile in 

the Greater Middle East, it is a candidate for exclusion.

Addressing Europe’s Troubled Neighborhood.

Countries once part of the Soviet Union represent 

a host of different categories. For the most part, those 

in Eastern Europe are success stories. Some, like the 

Baltic democracies, are members of the EU or NATO 

or both, and they are politically stable and show 

considerable economic promise. Others have taken 

backward steps, like Hungary, which is displaying 

autocratic tendencies, or Bulgaria and Romania that 

are experiencing serious economic difficulties. Then 
82

there are “unaffiliated” countries that are unstable 

and potential flashpoints of East-West conflict. Georgia is mentioned in this connection along with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine. In 

addition to the friction associated with the Five-Day 

War—and failure to resolve it and the fate of Abkhazia and South Ossetia—Azerbaijan and Armenia are 

on the brink of another war over Nagorno-Karabakh 

that could involve Turkey, which supports the former, 

and Russia, which supports the latter. At the same 

time, Lukashenka’s dictatorship in Belarus is a source 

of friction with Lithuania and Poland, while disputes 

between ethnic Russians and Ukrainian nationalists represent a division that has potential for serious 

turbulence in Ukraine.

To prevent these latent violent conflicts from becoming manifest, Cold War protocols like the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) and Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe Treaty 

(OSCE) must be replaced by arms control and crisis 

management mechanisms that reflect the current 

strategic environment.

Syria and Iran.

The outcome of the Syrian Civil War will profoundly shape U.S.-Russian relations; as of 2013 and 

against the backdrop of chemical weapons use, the 

picture looked grim. Kremlin officials cited it as the 

latest example of Washington’s obsession with regime 

change and evidence that the Obama administration 

had ignored lessons from Iraq. According to Sergei 

Karaganov, a leading foreign policy expert close to the 

Kremlin, “The invasion of Iraq was doomed from the 

outset. . . .” Moreover:
83

Intervention in a pre-feudal society under the banner 

of spreading democracy was an idea so insane that 

conspiracy theorists were not alone in attempting to 

find some covert intentions behind it.62

More recently, things went from bad to worse 

when the “West up-ended dictatorships in Tunisia, 

Libya and Egypt.”63

For Putin, Assad is a loyal ally, a good customer 

for Russia’s military hardware, and at Tartus, Syria 

has provided the Russian Navy with its only Mediterranean base. Diplomacy, not war, is the only solution 

to the conflict, but Washington has chosen the latter 

option. It will end badly for all concerned. Consider 

Obama’s reluctance to intervene militarily—he fears 

jihadists close to al-Qaeda will be the beneficiaries, 

and officials in the Kremlin are of the same opinion. 

In turn, American commentators have portrayed 

Putin’s unstinting support for the Syrian dictator as irrational since Assad’s “days are numbered.” Putin has 

been impervious to the warning that his propping up 

of Assad has alienated Sunnis who represent about 85 

percent of the world’s Muslims. Looking at Syria from 

the perspective of Russia’s long-term interest, Putin 

has adopted a posture that he will someday regret. 

The Sunnis will not forget that he not only provided 

Assad with weapons and diplomatic cover, he also 

worked with the Shiite Mullahs in Tehran to help an 

evil dictator wage a war against his own people that 

by June of 2013 amounted to 100,000 deaths.

Russian officials retort that those urging U.S. military intervention are the irrational ones and clearly 

victims of the American disease: “hubris.” As the 

2-year war has demonstrated, the jihadists may be the 

most likely winners, not Assad’s moderate opponents. 
84

With his downfall, al-Qaeda will secure another base 

to conduct its evil business in a region both strategically important to Russia and America. Furthermore, 

fanatical jihadists are certain to look beyond Syria as 

such and hope to precipitate a sectarian war throughout the region. For its part, Moscow can expect some 

of the Chechens, Ingush, Dagestanis, and Ossetians 

fighting Assad’s force in Syria to join their counterparts in the North Caucasus and to carry jihad into 

Russia proper.64

It is imperative that the United States, Russia, the 

Arab League, the EU, and the UN prepare for the final 

act in the Syrian crisis before, and not after, it occurs. 

All have a vested interest in planning for a post-Assad 

government that includes a broad cross section of 

Syrian society, including some members of the military and government—with whom Moscow enjoys a 

close relationship—and the country’s minorities. To 

wait until the fighting stops may be too late, for by 

then sectarian hatred will obviate any judicious outcome, and the resulting mayhem is likely to impose 

severe strains upon the leadership in Washington 

and Moscow.

Like Syria, the outcome of the Iranian crisis can 

have profound implications for a re-balance. Its resolution would significantly improve the prospects for 

cooperation on a host of other issues. A military confrontation can be avoided if Tehran shutters the Fordo 

enrichment plant and pledges not to enrich its uranium stockpile beyond 20 percent, excepting for a small 

amount to be devoted to medical purposes. In turn, 

sanctions that Iran is enduring would end. 

Today, evidence of discord within Iranian ruling 

circles revolve around whether or not to strike a deal 

with the international community. The bite of sanc-
85

tions is a major incentive and so is the prospect of a 

war. Then, too, should Assad be ousted from power, 

one of Iran’s major allies would vanish and provide 

further support for the pragmatists who argue that 

international trends are not favorable to Iran and 

the Mullahs must make a deal with the international 

community. 

With the election of Hassan Rouhani as president 

in the summer of 2013, some observers in Iran and the 

West believed him when he said that he was prepared 

to negotiate a settlement to the “nuclear crisis” with 

the international community. Others remained doubtful that he could do so, given the capacity of the hardliners in Tehran to subvert him.

U.S.-Russian cooperation in resolving the Iranian 

crisis would help stabilize the Arab-Iranian Middle 

East and do the same thing for a post-U.S. Afghanistan. Of greatest significance, it would avoid a war 

that, whatever the outcome, will not serve U.S. national security interests. Also, Iran along with Russia, 

China, India, and Pakistan are all stakeholders whose 

cooperation is essential if Afghanistan is to escape a 

civil war similar to the one that resulted after the Soviets left the country in the late-1980s. Although the Iranians have supported the Taliban to make mischief for 

Washington, they have no love for Sunni jihadists that 

are tormenting their Hazara-Shiite brothers in that 

country. Furthermore, a Taliban victory would guarantee a hostile Afghanistan on their eastern border. 

To take this train of events even further, resolution of 

the Iranian crisis would ameliorate Iranian-Saudi enmity and reduce fears of the “Iranian revolution” in 

other Sunni countries. It might also promote a peaceful outcome to the Israeli-Palestinian crisis and help 

stabilize Lebanon. 
86

There are many analysts who reject any effort to 

acknowledge Iran as a major player, given the Mullahs’ horrible human rights record and Iran’s aggressive behavior in the vital Gulf Region.65 But in 

today’s turbulent global environment, no country has 

sufficient power to achieve its goals unilaterally and 

that necessitates partnerships with other countries, 

including those with different value systems. Curiously, the same observers that deem it realistic to engage China somehow draw a line when it comes to 

Tehran. Strict adherence to this double standard does 

not serve the vital interests of the United States. That 

said, the hardliners in Iran may prevail, and their success does not bode well for cooperation with them on 

security matters. 

Cooperation in the Arctic and Northeast Asia.

Even under strained relations, the United States 

and allies with Arctic territory should cooperate with 

Russia in exploiting the vast resources that exist there 

and in Northeast Asia. It is imperative that they develop ground rules for development and settle points 

of friction before major campaigns are conducted by 

the member countries to exploit the untapped wealth 

that exists in this area of the world.

Don’t Forget Russia Is an Asian Power.

Russia’s Far East holds a vast storehouse of gas, oil, 

timber, minerals, water, and expanding trade routes.

But it is thinly populated, so it needs outside help to 

develop resource-rich Siberia. This means close cooperation with China, Japan, and South Korea since 

they are major players in Northeast Asia and repre-
87

sent over 20 percent of global GDP. Here, then, is the 

answer to the question that has beguiled Russia’s rulers for centuries: “How to develop its vast area east of 

Lake Baykal that only is home for 6 percent of Russia’s 

population?”66 Given its proximity, size, economic 

heft, and shared communist patrimony, China will 

play a special role in this enterprise.

The two giants share a 3,600-kilometers-long border, and trade between them amounted to $83 billion 

in 2012; that figure will get larger over time. China relies heavily upon Russia’s hydrocarbon wealth, and 

that relationship will continue even as other sources 

of gas and oil become available. China possesses the 

financial resources to fund a host of investments in 

Russia and to capitalize joint ventures critical to both 

countries. It has arranged a $30 billon dollar loan for 

Rosneft and will be repaid with oil. 

“Russia is on a course to send an unprecedented 

25 percent of its crude exports to eastern markets by 

2015.”67 It will be facilitated by expansion of the East 

Siberian-Pacific Ocean pipeline (ESPO). Presently, disputes over prices have obstructed a truly comprehensive strategic energy relationship, but there are signs 

that a breakthrough is in the cards.

Like their colleagues in Moscow, the Chinese believe the Americans are bent on regime change in China. PLA commanders see the United States as a threat 

and resent Washington’s siding with Beijing’s rivals in 

Asia—Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam—

over possessions in the East and South China Sea and 

consulting with them on security cooperation. In response, they have subverted U.S. attempts to punish 

Syria and Iran through UN resolutions. 

China has expressed misgivings about Washington’s plans to upgrade its anti-missile capability in the 
88

Far East to address the threat from North Korea. Likewise, the PLA leadership is wary of the Americans’ 

Asian Pivot, for they see it as part of Washington’s 

campaign to secure permanent bases in Central Asia 

and to feed fears of Chinese hegemony among countries throughout the Far East.68

These factors and a show of autocratic solidarity 

may explain why Russia was the first country that Xi 

Jinping visited as China’s new president. In a written statement upon arriving in Moscow, Xi indicated 

“China will make developing relations with Russia a 

priority in its foreign policy orientation.”69

But while Putin talks about strategic cooperation 

with China, Russian defense analysts have cause to be 

worried. Given China’s economic and demographic 

advantages, Russia may have to accept the role of 

junior partner in the relationship in spite of its vast 

advantage in nuclear weapons. Likewise, it is troubling to the Russian military that, while less than 10 

million Russian citizens reside in the country’s empty 

Far Eastern provinces, 120 million enterprising Chinese, who are anxious to gain access to Siberia’s vast 

wealth, live to the south of them. Moscow has not been 

happy about Beijing’s exploiting its economic heft to 

elbow aside Russia in the five Central Asian countries 

that formerly were Soviet Republics. Simultaneously, 

funding for the PLA has been significantly upgraded, 

and, while it has conducted maneuvers with Russian 

troops, both sides maintain a high state of military 

readiness along their common border. 

Western defense analysts eagerly share these observations with their Russian counterparts to underscore their claim that Russia has no reason to fear the 

United States but ample cause to be nervous about the 

awakened giant to its south. Russian officials dismiss 
89

the warning that they face a yellow invasion. What is 

more, the Chinese economic miracle is helping Russia 

develop its Far Eastern territories via capital, trade, 

and parallel infrastructure programs—namely highways, rail lines, and power grids in less developed 

parts of Northeast Asia. In the meantime, China and 

Russia hope to nullify America’s global influence by 

working with the BRIC countries, although the Brazilians and the Indians may not cooperate—this is especially true of New Delhi since it still sees China as its 

most serious competitor for influence in East Asia. 

Also, there is a serious barrier to Sino-Russo cooperation in the foreign policy realm: China deems a 

stable relationship with the United States as its principle foreign policy objective. That conviction provides 

a window of opportunity for Washington to improve 

relations with Beijing and to provide a pathway for a 

triangular partnership between America, China, and 

Russia. But there is a major roadblock to this initiative: 

The Mandarins in Beijing are convinced that, the U.S. 

hegemon aside, China’s major security problem is internal, not external. Managing world affairs is not one 

of China’s priorities, and this explains why it often 

abstains in the Security Council rather than vote for 

or against a measure that excites other members of the 

Council. It also explains why gaining access to foreign 

markets is a priority. Economic, and not geo-political 

factors then, are conceivably the basis for China’s new 

assertive territorial claims in the South China Sea. 

No matter what the motive, Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines are now responding with 

hostility to China’s aggressive foreign policy initiatives and threats. Its highly publicized cyber attacks 

upon U.S. interests certainly have damaged its reputation among the American public.
90

Still, China has joined the United States and Russia in the most sweeping attempt to sanction Pyongyang for its recent nuclear weapons test and for selling 

nuclear weapons grade material to third parties. The 

leadership in Beijing displayed anger when their Korean cousins nullified the 60-year-old peace treaty that 

ended the Korean conflict. The Western media also 

highlighted the comments of Deng Yuwen, a deputy 

editor of the Communist Party publication, when he 

wrote in the Financial Times, “Beijing should give up 

on Pyongyang and press for the reunification of the 

Korean Peninsula.”70

The sanctions upon Kim Jung-Un’s government 

will have an economic and diplomatic impact if they 

are fully implemented by China. That caveat is noteworthy since China watchers observe that the Chinese 

leadership has not been twisting the young dictator’s 

arms lest they produce their worst fear: the collapse 

of the communist regime in Pyongyang. In addition 

to the flight of millions of North Korean immigrants 

into China, it would have to live with a unified Korea 

allied with the United States. For PLA commanders, 

reunification is unthinkable, and the same holds true 

for their civilian masters since soon after Yuwen’s oped was published, he was fired. 

Nonetheless, should Un remain in power, the Chinese leaders must fear his reckless behavior will provoke two disturbing outcomes: First, since the February 12, 2013, detonation of an upgraded North Korean 

nuclear weapon, there has been a dramatic spike in 

the number of South Koreans, about 65 percent, who 

believe the time has come for them to develop their 

own nuclear strike force. In addition to the threat 

from the North, many Korean commentators believe 

that the U.S. pledge to provide their country with a 
91

nuclear umbrella is no longer credible, so they must 

build their own nuclear deterrent, or, at the very least, 

the Americans must return the nuclear weapons that 

they withdrew from South Korea in 1991. 

Second, those in Tokyo who have been lobbying 

for a constitutional revision that would allow Japan 

to secure its own nuclear arsenal are now receiving 

a more congenial reception. Chinese strategists must 

conclude therefore that, if Washington dissuades 

Japan from taking this provocative action, in compensation the United States will have to upgrade its military presence dramatically in and around the Korean 

Peninsula.

In response to mounting concern about North Korea, high level American and Chinese officials have 

been conducting talks—including communications 

between both presidents—to reduce both provocative words and actions on the part of the United States 

and North Korea. In June 2013, President Obama and 

President Xi Jinping met in the Californian desert to 

discuss the future of U.S.-China relations. No concrete 

agreements were reached, but both presidents clearly 

indicated that, in spite of outstanding areas of dispute, 

they agreed it was in the vital interest of both countries to stop the slide in relations. That said, neither 

man seemed to have any idea about how that goal 

could be achieved, given Beijing’s concern about the 

Asian pivot and Washington’s concern about China’s 

aggressive posture toward its neighbors—some of 

whom are U.S. allies.71

The prospects for more harmonious relations between China and the United States received a body 

blow several weeks later when it was revealed by 

an American contractor working for the intelligence 

community that Washington had monitored com-
92

munications from China with special intent. To make 

matters worse, the young man in question, Edward 

Snowden, originally sought refuge in Hong Kong, 

which he threatened to use as a base to disseminate 

top secret material collected by the National Security 

Agency. He then fled to Moscow in transit to a safe 

harbor somewhere in the world, and that incident 

provided a further chill to American-Russian relations. At the same time, many foreign policy analysts 

predicted that this affair would bring both Russia and 

China closer together in the face of the “American” 

threat to their security.

In assessing the relationship between China, Russia, and the United States, the following questions 

are pertinent: What are the prospects for a close SinoRussian security condominium? Is a U.S.-Russian security relationship possible? What are the chances for 

a triangular relationship that promotes the security 

interests of all three parties? One thing is clear on all 

of these matters: the nature of American-Russian relations could have an impact upon the future of Washington’s Asian pivot. In considering the pivot, then, 

the U.S. defense community must include Russia in 

their assessments of the security environment in Asia.

Now Is Not the Time for a Pause.

The Syrian crisis provides overwhelming evidence 

that there is no justification for a pause in attempts 

to sustain U.S.-Russian security cooperation. Even if 

efforts to negotiate a settlement to the crisis fail and 

prospects for cooperation take a nosedive in the short 

run, in the long run, both Obama and Putin recognize 

that they must remain engaged.
93

Of course, the road ahead will be difficult. Ever 

since Putin’s crackdown and the Magnitsky-Litvinov 

imbroglio—the U.S. law that punishes Russian human 

rights violators in the first case and the Russian law 

in response that denies Americans the right to adopt 

Russian orphans in the second one—some in Washington have recommended a pause in U.S.-Russian 

relations. They claim that in this frigid environment, 

fruitful cooperation is a nonstarter, but they should 

recall that the golden era of arms control occurred in 

the midst of the Cold War and at a time when the Soviet Union was called “the evil empire.” In 1987, the 

author of these words, Ronald Reagan, negotiated the 

elimination of an entire category of rockets through 

the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty 

with Mikhail Gorbachev. It was facilitated over a period of years by the interaction of mid-level diplomats 

and the cooperation of military representatives on 

both sides. This interaction promoted confidence and 

trust and resulted in a number of arms control agreements that served U.S. security.

Convinced that Russia has no choice but to engage 

the West, Putin appears ready to reaffirm cooperation with Obama on an ad hoc basis, although he will 

prove to be a difficult partner since he is preoccupied 

with consolidating his power at home and sees value 

in taking a hard line with Washington in that enterprise. At the same time, Putin understands that it is 

neither in his interest nor that of Russia to turn his 

back on the world’s only superpower. He also knows 

that many of those in the United States that are bitter 

political opponents of Obama favor confrontational 

relations with Moscow. In sum, he has 3 years to reach 

an accommodation with the United States.
94

From the American perspective, cooperating with 

Russia on security matters is one step in many that 

some U.S. statesmen hope will secure Russia’s cooperation in addressing common security problems—

the proliferation of WMD, the radical jihadist threat, 

and many other issues. Also, U.S. proponents of the 

reset—or whatever is the current terminology—hope 

that ultimately it will lead to a security partnership 

between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community. Of 

course, it will be a long-term effort, and it will take 

patience to accomplish. It certainly will be sidetracked 

by intervening events but, if fruitful, it will enhance 

U.S. security by establishing a more stable foothold in 

Europe and provide a foundation upon which Washington’s Asian pivot will rest. 

The Boston Marathon bombings have given a 

positive boast to the prospects for more extensive 

American-Russian cooperation in joint anti-terrorist 

operations. In the immediate aftermath of that tragedy, many Russian officials welcomed comments from 

American analysts and diplomats regarding insurgencies in the North Caucasus. Perhaps even more significant, many ordinary Americans for the first time were 

informed that the Russians were helping the United 

States in the fight against Islamic jihadists—the very 

same people responsible for 9/11. In sum, there is a 

basis for the claim that U.S.-Russian cooperation in 

fighting terrorism is plausible.

This does not mean ignoring human rights violations in Russia, but it means treating the regime there 

the same way Washington treats the Chinese ruling 

elite. U.S. and Russian leaders must not waste time 

but work toward a peaceful resolution of the crises in 

Syria, Iran, and North Korea. Not to do so is to run 

the risk of watching latent disasters become manifest 
95

calamities that will do grave harm to the security of 

their respective countries.

The uncertain outcome of the Syrian civil war has 

the potential to sabotage even a limited security relationship, but proponents of this initiative cite a meeting of the minds on an important matter: preventing 

the Syrian crisis from morphing into a horrendous regional disaster. Russian commentators, for example, 

have taken comfort in the belief that Putin’s arguments are having some impact upon Western analysts 

and statesmen.

As Pavel Baev states: 

What adds credibility to the Russian leadership’s case, 

at least in their own eyes, is the supposition that only 

violent chaos and state failure can follow the collapse 

of the al-Assad regime. Every month of the civil war 

makes this more plausible. As the internecine fighting escalates, the rebel groups and factions inevitably 

grow more radicalized. . .,72

and this development has caused expressions of concern in Israel since it “must take into account the prospect of an Islamic state emerging in Syria.”73 In sum, 

Putin clearly relishes the notion that the Americans 

have had to concede that his claim that the international campaign to dump Assad may produce a worse 

outcome than Assad’s ouster is designed to prevent. 

At the same time, Russian analysts believes that the 

Americans simply do not understand the complexities 

of conflicting forces that prevail in the Greater Middle 

East. In short, they are victims of a major intellectual 

error. Putin may be kidding himself when he brushes 

aside the claim that his support for the Syrian dictator 

will cause him problems among the largely Sunni Islamic community. The same may be said for his disre-
96

garding the fact that a disaster in Syria will potentially 

do far greater harm to Russia’s security than it will do 

to the United States.

Preparing for the Unexpected.

As American and Russian leaders struggle to find 

avenues of cooperation, history instructs them to “expect the unexpected.” The Strategic Arms Limitations 

Treaty (SALT) II was aborted by President Carter in 

1980 as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 

Some observers have mentioned this incident in pondering what role the Winter Olympics might play 

in U.S.-Russian relations. They will be conducted in 

the Russian Black Sea city of Sochi in February 2014. 

Open discussion of this matter surfaced when the fate 

of Snowden was being considered. The United States 

demanded that he be returned from the Russian airport where he was seeking temporary asylum to face 

charges that he leaked classified National Security 

Council (NSC) documents. Russia’s refusal to comply prompted expressions of outrage at both ends of 

Pennsylvania Avenue. Although a lonely voice, Senator Lindsey Graham, the Republican from South Carolina, demanded the United States boycott the games in 

retaliation.

However, Graham identified something that Putin 

highly values. The Kremlin has invested $51 billion to 

construct a massive Winter Olympic Games complex 

in Sochi. Project costs may far exceed that amount since 

criminal gangs and corrupt officials are having a royal 

feast filching funds from the enterprise. Entire neighborhoods are being bulldozed while their residents 

are desperately searching for new shelter and a large 

number of workers from the impoverished Central 
97

Asian Republics are being paid abysmally low wages 

to fill construction jobs. Putin has embarked upon this 

expensive project with one major goal in mind: to improve Russia’s international image and to proclaim 

that it will no longer take a back seat to anyone.

His crusade, however, is not trouble-free. Sochi 

sits in the midst of the turbulent Caucasus, home for 

many disgruntled minorities. Circassian nationalists 

claim Sochi as part of their ancient homeland—a territory that their ancestors occupied until the early-19th 

century when they were expelled by Russian invaders. 

Like other nations in the North Caucasus seeking independence from Moscow, they may exploit the publicity surrounding Sochi to publicize their demands 

globally. Some of them, like Russia’s most wanted 

terrorist—Doku Umarov—have already threatened 

violence to publicize their jihadist war with Russia. 

Presumably, this would include suicide bombings and 

attacks on public officials and security units, and even 

the athletes may become targets. Kremlin officials believe they have things under control, but they may be 

badly mistaken. Whatever the challenges facing them, 

how could the insurgents forgo a once-in-a-lifetime 

opportunity to make their plight known to the world 

in a bold terrorist strike? Of course, the global publicity spawned by the awful bombings in Boston is likely 

to encourage copycats to produce similar mayhem at 

the Sochi Olympics.

Putin’s repressive crackdown may encourage liberal Russians out of desperation to seek new ways 

to respond to his wholesale attack upon their human 

rights. Some gay rights activists, for example, may 

endorse a campaign to boycott the Olympics. It is unlikely that athletic organizations from the participating countries, their governments, and their financial 
98

sponsors will condone a boycott and withdraw as 

many did during the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow. 

President Obama has indicated that, while he finds 

the anti-gay campaign in Russia repugnant, he does 

not favor a boycott. But under existing circumstances, 

the threat resonates, given the dramatic technological 

changes that have occurred since 1980 in the information arena. In this instance, the Internet and social 

media make an unprecedented international political 

protest possible. There are thousands of people within 

Russia, and Russians in the diaspora, along with human rights activists in the West, who have the capacity to undertake a campaign of this nature. Also, unlike 

the North Caucasus insurgents, the Russian dissidents 

are not vulnerable to the charge that “they are nothing 

more than terrorists.”

Even if the campaign fails to sabotage the games, it 

offers dissidents an international event around which 

they can publicize the plight of Russian democrats 

and do grave damage to Putin’s quest to improve 

Russia’s image globally. Likewise, Putin’s crackdown 

could become a problem for Washington, as it has the 

capacity to facilitate an anti-Kremlin backlash that 

could make cooperation with the Russian government 

a truly costly political enterprise for the American 

government.

EPILOGUE

The Navalny Question.

By the fall of 2013, Putin-watchers concluded that 

Russia was already on the road to Stalin Lite. Many 

also believed that one could gain a glimpse of Russia’s future by assessing the fate of Navalny. About a 
99

week after the Boston massacre, Navalny was tried for 

embezzling $500,000 from a timber company in Kirov. 

The charge was fabricated and driven by political considerations that emanated from Moscow since local 

authorities found no basis for it. By this time, the tall, 

blond, 37-year-old blogger was no longer a mystery 

man, since publicity surrounding his brave confrontation with the Kremlin had earned him the respect of a 

growing number of Russians. They admired his courage, shared his anger about corruption, and enjoyed 

his tart humor directed at the Kremlin. His nationalistic proclivities and common touch had the potential 

of attracting provincials to him. Two years previously, 

he had a name recognition of 6 percent, but by the 

spring of 2013, it had escalated to 47 percent.74

In a short period of time, he had emerged as a 

political opponent of consequence, and his political 

ambitions earned him the respect and enmity of the 

Kremlin overlords. As a result, he anticipated that he 

would be charged with a crime, found guilty, and, 

even if he escaped a prison sentence, his being a felon 

would deny him the opportunity to run for public office. On July 18, he was found guilty and received a 

5-year prison sentence along with a large fine. But the 

very next day, he was released and was free until his 

appeal was considered. Some Russian watchers assumed that the Kremlin leadership was behind this 

move out of anticipation of a planned street protest 

to be conducted the following weekend. Others indicated that his release was further proof that the Putin 

team had been divided over how best to address the 

Navalny question. Some feared that if he was harshly 

treated, he would become a martyr. Others wanted to 

crush him since there were doubts about the ability of 

associates to continue the fight while he was in prison. 
100

Among some prominent foreign commentators, the 

incident underscored a gathering consensus: Navalny 

had become the most effective spokesman for the anti-Putin opposition, and he had the unique personal 

qualifications to lead a growing army of disgruntled 

Russians in a truly significant political movement. 

Unlike many of his cohorts, Navalny did not flee 

Russia but remained there prepared to continue his 

fight in prison with the help of his comely and articulate wife, Julia. He has stated repeatedly that the power and capacity of the Kremlin overlords had been 

grossly exaggerated. “The people who work in business at a high enough level can tell you that there’s no 

machine at all.” They may be able to “destroy a single 

person,” like Khodorkovsky or himself. But they cannot do so “against a huge number of people, there’s 

no machine. It’s a ragtag group of crooks and unified 

under the portrait of Putin.” 

In a blog the day before he travelled to Kirov to 

attend his trial, he wrote: “Enough whining and being scared. It’s time to organize and get to work.” 

Then after comments on freedom and human rights 

he continued: 

All of these years, I’ve been learning alongside of you 

how to organize even in conditions of a state propaganda machine, intimidation, and a lack of money. . . .

There is no one but you. There is no one who cares 

about what’s going on in the country more than you. 

There are no magic volunteers who will show up and 

do the work for you. . . .”75

An intense crowd of supporters greeted him at the 

Moscow train station the day after he was found guilty. 

His return was covered via the Internet, including visual segments; even the Kremlin-dominated TV gave 
101

him coverage. Since then, Russian-watchers have concluded that he is the real deal, a man capable of leading a popular anti-Kremlin movement, even though 

he is someone who faces a jail sentence. He told the 

gathering that, in effect, they had demonstrated that 

there was no reason to fear the Kremlin’s wrath, and 

they were responsible for his release.

Some pundits had a different perspective, claiming 

that Navalny’s help was required to give legitimacy 

to the anticipated re-election of the acting Mayor of 

Moscow, Sergei Sobyanin. It was assumed that Navalny would run for that office and lose the race but 

in the process demonstrate that, even in a fair fight, 

the Kremlin-backed candidate would win. The young 

blogger pledged to achieve a victory for the people—

his election—but the odds makers deemed that a remote prospect. 

On September 9, the Kremlin was shocked by the 

election results: Sobyanin allegedly received 51 percent of the vote so he was re-elected without a run-off. 

But official results indicated that Navalny got almost 

one-third of the votes cast even though he did not have 

access to TV and was denied other assets to which the 

Mayor was privy. What is more, Navalny claimed that 

the election was fabricated, and Sobyanin did not obtain the votes required to claim a first round victory. 

The blogger attracted an army of young people—

“Generation Navalny”—to his campaign, “. . . the 

thousands of young people who came of age after the 

Soviet collapse and who yearn for a more inclusive 

politics.” They conducted a ground campaign that 

Russians had never witnessed in their history. They 

“pounded the pavement, knocked on doors, passed 

out leaflets, manned phone lines, and organized online for the charismatic opposition leader.”76
102

Navalny threatened to organize his followers in 

street protests, but whatever does take place, analysts 

have spent considerable time pondering the future of 

his movement. Did his followers have the resolve and 

political acumen to fill his shoes if he went to prison? 

Could they expand their power base? Could Navalny 

continue the fight from prison? Has his success inspired members of the establishment to consider an 

alliance with him? There are rumors that he has secret 

talks with some pragmatic Kremlin insiders; are they 

true, and, if so, what do they mean?

Although uncertain of the answers, a growing 

number of analysts both within and outside of Russia are convinced that Navalny’s challenge is further 

evidence that Putin’s future is in grave doubt. Indeed, 

some have concluded that even some of his closest associates now have reservations about his capacity to 

cope with his political opponents.

Whatever Navalvy’s fate, as indicated earlier, the 

turbulence associated with the Power Vertical could 

conceivably produce two compelling outcomes. First, 

Putin’s repressive measures justify the claim that he 

is creating a police state where the authorities intrude 

upon both the private and public space of the Russian 

people. Or second, pragmatists in the Kremlin like 

Sobyanin and Shoigu join forces with the new politicians as exemplified by Navalny, and together they 

take the measures necessary to set Russia on a slow 

road to pluralism.

Or perhaps there is a third outcome; Putin’s worse 

fears are realized as Russia disintegrates after it 

proves incapable of addressing its cascading cultural, 

economic, and political problems. U.S. planners must 

pay serious attention to all of these questions, given 

Russia’s large imprint on the international stage.
103

Syria and U.S.-Russian Relations.

On September 10, President Obama delivered a 

much anticipated speech on why he was prepared to 

punish the Syrian regime for using poison gas against 

its own people. But he stunned the nation when he 

said that he would delay taking military action. As a 

consequence of back-channel deliberations, a peaceful 

resolution of the crisis was at hand. It was called the 

“Russian Plan” and proposed that Syria surrender its 

poison gas to UN weapons inspectors for their ultimate destruction. Within a week, a number of equally 

unexpected developments occurred in rapid order:

• Putin scolded Obama in a New York Times opinion editorial for celebrating American exceptionalism. But in other remarks, Putin indicated that he trusted Obama to honor any peace 

initiative.

• John Kerry and Lavrov met in Geneva to begin 

talks about how to destroy Syria’s gas arsenal.

• Assad gave impetus to their “framework agreement” by sending a letter to the UN asserting 

that Syria would sign the Chemical Weapons 

Convention.

• American and Russian diplomats established 

the basis for a diplomatic solution to the Syrian Civil War through the Geneva-2 peace 

initiative.

Critics who scoffed at the Russian Plan were 

shocked by these revelations and even more so when 

the United States accepted Moscow’s demands that 

Washington not insert language in the UN resolution 

that condoned the use of force if Syria violated the 

agreement. Some pundits suggested that Putin had 
104

outmaneuvered Obama since the Russian Plan was a 

rouse designed to buy time for Assad.

Seasoned foreign policy analysts, however, indicated that Putin was genuinely concerned about 

Syria’s toxic weapons because he feared they might 

be secured by jihadists who would use them in the 

North Caucasus. They also found reason to acknowledge that the Kremlin was justified in pressing the 

Americans on the legitimate question: “What would 

happen after Assad was removed from power?” Moscow feared Syria would collapse much like Qaddafi’s 

Libya had but with even far worse consequences for 

the region.

Western leaders rightfully scolded Putin and Lavrov for suggesting that the rebels in Syria, and not 

Assad’s forces, were responsible for the gas attacks 

that the weapons inspectors confirmed. Such claims 

in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary 

were absurd, and they diminished Putin’s campaign 

to burnish his image as an international leader of 

consequence. At the same time, the international 

community applauded his diplomatic efforts and, in 

turn, enhanced his image at home. Indeed, the role he 

played in finding a nonviolent resolution of the Syrian 

crisis indicated that Russia was once again an international actor that could no longer be ignored. Russia 

was back! Just what that would mean for Putin over 

the long term, however, remained unclear. After all, 

Russia’s most serious security problems were internal, 

not external.

Finally, what did this week of tumultuous events 

mean for a) U.S.-Russia relations and b) the U.S. national security community? In the first instance, recall 

that after the June G-8 Summit in Ireland, pundits in 

Washington claimed U.S.-Russian relations had hit an 
105

insurmountable firewall. The time had come to bury 

the “reset corpse,” and any effort to revive it was 

foolhardy. But one can make the contrary case; joint 

efforts to resolve the Syrian Civil War suggested a 

dramatic new chapter in the reset was about to begin. 

The steps already undertaken obligated both sides to 

continue their collaboration. That said, the road ahead 

was rocky and uncertain. For example, what was to be 

done about the al-Qaeda fighters in Syria? 

For its part, the U.S. national security community 

must consider a number of outcomes: a Syria without 

Assad but under the control of a broad but weak coalition of leaders; a country fragmented into several 

parts; and a Syria where jihadists are the most dominant military force. In response to these outcomes, 

U.S. defense analysts must assess what role American 

forces would play in a multilateral campaign to eliminate them and to stabilize Syria. Direct U.S. military 

involvement might be a bridge too far, but clearly 

American military assets would be required to achieve 

a successful international campaign. 

It is premature to make any firm predictions about 

the fate of Geneva-2, U.S.-Russian efforts to crush the 

al-Qaeda groups in Syria, and the broader issue of security cooperation on their part. It is evident, however, 

that in spite of the many obstacles to cooperation, it is 

in the U.S. national interest to work with Russia where 

possible and address shared security concerns.

ENDNOTES

1. For an excellent political biography of Putin and the events 

surrounding his rise to power, see Fiona Hill and Clifford G. Gaddy, Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin, Washington, DC: Brookings 

Institution Press, 2013, p. 5. For a brief but insightful assessment 

of Russia today, see Dmitri Trenin et. al., The Russian Awakening, 

Moscow, Russia: Carnegie Moscow Center, November 2012.
106

2. Ben Judah, “Has the Russian opposition lost its 

way?”opendemocracy.net, November 27, 2012.

3. It is noteworthy that Russian-watchers agreed that something of significance was abroad in Russia and this included commentators close to the Kremlin.

4. In their assessment of Russia’s future, Maria Lipman and 

Nikolay Petrov describe one likely outcome as “Russia on the 

way to a resurgent dictatorship—‘Stalin Lite’.” See Maria Lipman 

and Nikolay Petrov, “Conclusions,” Maria Lipman and Nikolay 

Petrov, eds., Russia in 2020, Washington, DC: Carnegie for International Peace, 2011, p. 603.

5. For a discussion of Putin’s years in Dresden, see Hill and 

Gaddy, pp. 118-123.

6. See Joe Nocera, “The New Russian Mob,” The New York 

Times, March 28, 2013.

7. For an excellent assessment of growing opposition to Putin 

that also provides insight into reasons why many Russians continue to support him, see Mikhail Dmitriev and Daniel Treisman, 

“The Other Russia: Discontent Grows in the Hinterlands,” Foreign 

Affairs, September-October, 2012, pp. 59-86.

8. Kirill Rogov, “The ‘third cycle’: Is Russia Headed Back to 

the Future,” Lipman and Petrov, eds., p. 125.

9. Ibid, p. 126.

10. There is ample evidence to explain Putin’s popularity 

when one consults dramatic increases in wages. Over the past 

“decade before the global financial crisis, real household incomes 

rose by 140 percent.” See Dmitriev and Treisman, p. 66.

11. “In 2002, the newly privatized oil companies—like Yukos and Sibneft—accounted for over 81 percent of Russian oil 

output.” To keep the oil and gas revenues flowing, Putin struck 

deals with foreign oil companies and Western investors. But the 

international financial crisis struck Russia, and by 2009, its GDP 

declined by 7.8 percent. See Thane Gustafson, “Putin’s Petroleum 

Problem,” Foreign Affairs, November-December, 2012, p. 88.
107

12. Andrew E. Kramer, “Russia’s Desire for Cars Grow, and 

Foreign Makers Take Notice,” The New York Times, December 

12, 2012.

13. Jana Kobzova and Tomas Valasek, “Putin Redux: Foreign 

Policy under Russia’s Comeback President,” Kurt Voker and Ieva 

Kupce, eds., Nordic-Baltic-American Cooperation: Shaping the US 

European Agenda, Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2012, p. 10.

14. For a cogent discussion of Russia’s energy strategy, see 

Keith Smith, “Unconventional Gas and European Security: Politics and Foreign Policy of Frocking in Europe,” Washington, DC: 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2012.

15. In searching for the origins of Russian autocracy and imperialism, Robert D. Kaplan has provided a simple one-word 

answer: Geography. Putin is simply a “run-of-the-mill,” Russian 

dictator...”whose cynical neo-imperialism are the wages of a 

deep, deep geographical insecurity.” He is just the latest in a long 

line of men and women who have ruled Russia with a mailed 

fist because “Putin looks out in Europe and sees what the tsars 

and commissars saw before...a history of invasion against Russia by the Swedes, the Poles, the French, the Germans, the Lithuanians, etc. and therefore, just like the communist rulers before 

him, he wants buffer states.” Interview: Robert D. Kaplan on How 

Geography Affects the Fate of Nations,” RFE/RL.org, September 

11, 2012.

16. Owen Matthews, “The End of Putinomics,” Newsweek.com, 

December 30, 2012.

17. Ibid.

18. Paul Goble, “Russian Government Now Views internet as 

Main Threat to its Position,” Window on Eurasia, February 5, 2013. 

It is also noteworthy that through “crowd funding,”—a practice 

perfected by the two Obama presidential campaigns—democratic 

activists secured funding from ordinary people not the traditional 

“fat cats.” For example, see Alexey Sidorenko, “Society and the 

State on the Internet: a Call for Change,” in Lipman and Petrov, 

eds., p. 586.
108

19. Peter Pomerantsev, “2012, the year the Kremlin lost control of the script,” Opendemocracy.net, December 28, 2012.

20. “Former Russian Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin: ‘We 

have to Take a Chance with More Democracy’,” Der Spiegel, 

January 23, 2013.

21. For an analysis of why the West will rebound, see Roger C. Altman, “Why America and Europe Will Emerge Stronger from the Financial Crisis,” Foreign Affairs, January-February 

2013, pp. 8-13.

22. For a discussion of China’s future, see Foreign Affairs, January-February, 2013.

23. One of the most perceptive observers of Russia today has 

observed: 

The effectiveness of Russian soft power in the CIS could also 

be improved through Russian media and Russian Internet 

becoming acknowledged as the most reliable source of information and vehicles for the dissemination of new ideas 

across the entire expanse of the FSU. . . .

Needless to say, the war on the Internet and independent media 

outlets presently underway in Russia does grave harm to Putin’s 

soft-power campaign. Dmitry Trenin, “Russia’s Relations with 

the CIS Countries: Outlook for 2020,” Valdai Discussion Club, 

April 2, 2013.

24. For example, see Lipman and Petrov, “Conclusions,”

 pp. 593-614.

25. Will Englund, “Russia’s ‘Tandem’ No Longer in Sync,” 

The Washington Post, February 24, 2013.

26. Leon Aron, “The Putin Doctrine,” foreignaffairs.com, March 

9, 2013, p. 2.

27. Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy, “Dealing with the Real Putin,” The New York Times, February 4, 2013.
109

28. Putin Address to the Federal Assembly, December 12, 

2012, p. 10.

29. In an example of their uplifting lyrics, it was proclaimed: 

“We are being assaulted by the seed of the Mongol Horde, Attacked by the yoke of the infidels. But the sky of the Slavs boils in 

our veins.”

30. For a discussion of Kaliningrad and the question of its legal status, see Richard J. Krickus, The Kaliningrad Question, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002. For remarks bearing on 

Siberia, see Paul Goble, “Despite Moscow’s promises, Russia’s 

Far East Remains ‘More Dead than Alive’ Experts Say,” Window 

on Eurasia, December 2, 2012. He notes that “within a radius of 

1,000 kilometers of Vladivostok, there live 300 million people, five 

times more than live within the same radius of Moscow.” Moreover, the economic output of this area is three times larger than 

all of Russia.

31. Lyudmila Alexandrova, “With Internet gaining wide influence in Russia, authorities seek to step up control over it,” ItarTass World Service, February 4, 2013.

32. Brian Whitmore, “The Kremlin’s New Deal,” RFE/RL.org, 

March 13, 2013.

33. Stephen F. Cohen, “How Obama can avert a new Cold 

War,” The Washington Post, February 14, 2013.

34. Aron.

35. Putin, in his response to claims that he was attempting to 

“re-Sovietize” many of the USSR’s former appendages, said that 

the former Soviet Republics enjoy a “common language, similar 

mindsets, as well as interconnected transportation and energy infrastructure as natural factors pushing Russian-led integration in 

the post-Soviet space.” It is no different in this respect than the 

EU’s integration of countries with similar common bonds. Dumitru Minzarari, “Russia is Building Diplomatic and Military Tools 

to Prevent Western Resistance to its Eurasian Union,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, December 11, 2012.
110

36. Thomas Graham, “Russia and the World,” Lipman and 

Petrov, eds., p. 14.

37. See, for example, Brian Whitmore, “Vladimir the Weak,” 

RFE/RL.org, March 20, 2013. Paul Goble, “Having Released ‘Obscurantism genie,’ Putin Could Lose Control over It, Gontmakher 

Says,” Window on Eurasia, February 19, 2013. Hill and Gaddy observe that one of the reasons Putin is so obsessed with the “general idea of unity and unifying” is that he sees it as an “anti-dote 

to collapse and disintegration.” See Putin, p. 58.

38. Leonid Radzikhovsky, “Beware the apocalypse,” Russia 

beyond the Headlines, July 8, 2011.

39. As far back as the early-1960s, Brzezinski cited economic, 

political, and social problems in the Soviet Union that would ultimately lead to its demise. In this connection, see “The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration,” in his The Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics, New York: Columbia University 

Press, 1960, pp. 1-24.

40. See Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Superpower Illusions, New Haven, 

CT: Yale University Press, 2010, p. 87.

41. Graham, “Russia and the World,” p. 10.

42. Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the 

United States of America, Washington, DC: Office of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, 2011, p. 13.

43. “Russia updates its Foreign Policy Concept,” Russia beyond 

the Headlines/Rossiyskaya Gazeta, February 25, 2013.

44. For a pessimistic appraisal of the Eurasian Union, see 

Richard Weitz, “Global Insight: Dim Prospects for Putin’s Eurasian Union,” World Politics Review, October 11, 2011.

45. Whatever the sources, an imploded Russia will far exceed 

the security threat—“Global Terrorism”—that has preoccupied 

the U.S. military since 9/11. It has the potential of producing a 

geo-political disruption even more far reaching in scope and 

magnitude. For more on the civil war within Islam, see Richard 
111

Krickus, “It Is a Civil War within Islam Not Global Terrorism,” 

e-International Relations, June 12, 2012.

46. Walter Pincus, “To Cut the Deficit, Cut the Nuclear Arsenal.” The Washington Post, December 13, 2012.

47. Kathy Lally, “Ties between U.S., Russia Sour,” The Washington Post, January 14, 2013.

48. Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse 

1970-2000, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 164-165. 

For an assessment more critical of the United States, see Stephen 

F. Cohen, Soviet Fates And Lost Alternatives: From Stalinism To The 

Cold War, New York: Columbia University Press, 2009.

49. For a discussion of efforts to provide Russia with a voice 

in European security, see Richard J. Krickus, “Russia in NATO: 

Thinking about the Unthinkable,” Copenhager, Denmark: Danish 

Institute of International Affairs, 2002.

50. During the 10th anniversary of the Iraq war, there was 

an avalanche of articles that reassessed the war. For an American and Arab view on the event, respectively, see John A. Nagl, 

“What America Learned in Iraq,” and Ahmad Saadawi, “A Decade Of Despair,” both in the The New York Times, March 20, 2013.

51. Barry Pozen, “The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy,” 

Foreign Affairs, January-February 2013, p. 118.

52. Steven Pifer, “The Future Course of the U.S.-Russia Relationship,” Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, March 21, 

2012, p. 4.

53. Anne-Marie Slaughter, “The Coming American Century, 

the ISN Blog,” March 11, 2013. Of course, a rebalance in U.S.-EU 

relations is complicated by Europe’s ongoing economic crisis. The 

collapse of the financial system in Cyprus is just the latest example of the EU’s precarious existence. The stock of Euro-Skeptics 

is on the rise while supporters of a “united Europe” are suffering 

at the ballot box, and separatist movements are attracting supporters in Scotland, Catalonia and parts of France and Italy, while 

parties with a racist agenda are ascendant in societies with large 

Islamic and African populations.
112

54. See Steven Erlanger, “Grim Economics Shape France’s 

Military Spending,” The New York Times, April 30, 2013.

55. Video: Zbigniew Brzezinski: Lessons from a Life in Strategy, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 20, 2013.

56. Alexander Golts, “The Armed Forces in 2020: Modern or 

Soviet?” in Lipman and Petrov, eds., p. 380.

57. Robert Coalson, “Explainer: What’s New In U.S. Missile 

Defense Plans?” RFE/RL.org, March 18, 2013.

58. Richard K. Betts, “The Lost Logic of Deterrence,” Foreign 

Affairs, March-April, 2013, p. 90. This may be a minority view 

among American defense analysts, but many who may reject it 

believe it is prudent to include Russia in the anti-missile project.

59. Will Englund, “Obama letter to Putin: Sign of a thaw?” The 

Washington Post, April 16, 2013.

60. Andrew E. Kramer, “Rumors about Uzbekistan Leaders’ 

Health Set Off Succession Debate,” The New York Times, April 7, 

2013. For a discussion of this matter, see Richard J. Krickus, The 

Afghanistan Question and the Reset in U.S.-Russian Relations, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2011.

61. Krickus, The Afghanistan Question.

62. Fyodor Lukyanov, “Russia’s Place in the World of Unintended Consequence, or Murphy’s Law and Order,” in Lipman, 

ed., p. 85. At one point, Putin said that he was “not concerned 

with the fate of Assad’s regime,” and that statement appeared to 

have dealt a body blow to the tyrant. But later, he aborted efforts 

through the UN Security Council to force out Assad and continued to supply him with arms. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov 

also displayed a state of confusion on Syria but later lambasted 

the rebels for refusing to negotiate a peace with Assad. See John 

Warrick and Colum Lynch, “Assad Said To Be Afraid, Isolated As 

Rule Fades,” The Washington Post, December 29, 2013.
113

63. Ibid.

64. See Paul Goble, “Moscow Must Prepare for Syria-Type 

War in the North Caucasus, Former MVD Officer Says,” Window 

on Eurasia, April 4, 2013.

65. For background to U.S.-Iranian relations, see Trita Parsi, 

Treacherous Alliance, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007.

66. Thomas Graham, “Do U.S.-Russian Relations Have a Future in Northeast Asia?” Johnson’s Russia List, December 4, 2012.

67. Jake Rudnitsky, “Putin Pipeline to Send 25% of Russia’s 

Oil Exports East,” Bloomberg, March 7, 2013.

68. See Simon Saradzhyan, “Russia Needs to Develop Eastern 

Provinces as China Rises,” Ria Novosti, March 5, 2013; and David 

M. Herszenhorn and Chris Buckley, “China’s Leader Argues for 

Closer Ties With Russia,” The New York Times, March 23, 2013.

69. David M. Herszenhorn and Chris Buckley, “China’s New 

Leader, Visiting Russia, Promotes Nation’s Economic and Military Ties,” The New York Times, March 22, 2013.

70. Martin Fackler and Choe Sang-Hun, “As North Korea 

Blusters, South Flirts With Talk of Nuclear Arms,” The New York 

Times, March 11, 2013.

71. For a brief but cogent analysis of the Obama-Xi summit, 

see Robert A. Manning, “Beijing and Washington Share Indeterminate Future,” The National Interest, June 13, 2013.

72. Pavel K. Baev, “Not Everything is wrong with Russia’s 

Syria Strategy,” PONARS Eurasia, April 26, 2013.

73. Ibid.

74. “Justice in Russia: The Navalny Affair,” Economist.com, 

April 20, 2013.
114

75. Julia Ioffe, “The Most Dangerous Blogger in the World: 

How Alexseu Navalny changed Russian politics,” The New 

Republic online, July 18, 2013, pp. 9-11.

76. Tom Balmforth, “Generation N: How Navalny Shook Up 

Politics With His Army Of Volunteers,” RFE/RL.org, September 

9, 2013.
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