NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO R.C. 

No. 1 CA-JV 24-0008 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County 

No. P1300JD202200021 

The Honorable Anna C. Young, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Robert D. Rosanelli Attorney at Law, Phoenix 

By Robert D. Rosanelli 

Counsel for Appellant Father 

Law Office of Florence M. Bruemmer PC, Anthem 

By Florence M. Bruemmer 

Counsel for Appellant Mother 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson 

By Dawn Rachelle Williams 

Counsel for Appellee DCS

Myers & Associates PLLC, Scottsdale 

By Jamie N. Myers 

Counsel for Appellee Child 

Law Offices of Stacie B. Robb PLLC, Prescott 

By Stacie B. Robb 

Counsel for Appellee Child Guardian

FILED 06-18-2024
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO R.C. 

Decision of the Court 

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined. 

C A T L E T T, Judge: 

¶1 Patricia V. (“Mother”) and Robert C. (“Father”) (together, 

“the Parents”) appeal the juvenile court’s termination of their parental 

rights as to R.C. (“Child”). Because the record sufficiently supports the 

juvenile court’s findings, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 Mother and Father are Child’s parents. The Department of 

Child Safety (“DCS”) took custody of Child because the Parents lived in a 

tent and Mother exposed Child to marijuana while pregnant. In May 2022, 

the Parents pled no contest to DCS’s dependency petition. The juvenile 

court found Child dependent because the Parents had neglected Child’s 

basic needs and their own mental health. 

¶3 A psychologist evaluated Mother and diagnosed her with 

post-traumatic stress disorder, unspecified personality disorder with 

borderline and anti-social traits, stimulant-use disorder 

(methamphetamine type substance), and an unspecified cannabis-related 

disorder. The psychologist expressed concern about Mother’s “attitudes 

and behaviors, including failure to conform to social norms with respect to 

lawful behaviors and a history of consistent irresponsibility.” The 

psychologist acknowledged Mother had “a number of personal strengths,” 

but he was “very guarded” that she could safely parent in the future. The 

psychologist recommended Mother receive mental health services, therapy, 

drug and alcohol testing, parenting services, and other support, including 

transportation and housing resources. 

¶4 The same psychologist evaluated Father and diagnosed him 

with unspecified neurocognitive disorder, unspecified bipolar and related 

disorder, stimulant-use disorder (methamphetamine), unspecified 

personality disorder with mixed traits, and unspecified cannabis-related 

disorder. The psychologist warned that Father’s traits “can lead to acute 

harm” and/or “impairment over longer periods of time[.]” The 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO R.C. 

Decision of the Court 

3 

psychologist recommended that Father receive drug and alcohol testing, 

mental health services, therapy, substance abuse treatment, anger 

management services, parenting classes, and other support, including 

transportation and community resources. 

¶5 DCS provided the Parents with psychological evaluations, 

mental health services, drug testing, parenting services, therapy, and anger 

management services. On five occasions during the dependency 

proceedings, DCS requested that the juvenile court find that DCS was 

making reasonable efforts to finalize permanency. Neither of the Parents 

objected to DCS’s requests, although on one occasion, Father sought 

clarification about obtaining transportation. The juvenile court repeatedly 

found that DCS was making reasonable efforts. 

¶6 The Parents provided DCS and the court with updates on 

their housing situation. When they started doing so, the Parents lived in a 

recreational vehicle. In August 2022, they informed DCS they had obtained 

a generator and a transmission-rebuild kit. In September 2022, they 

informed the court they may have found a place to park their vehicle where 

they would have water and electricity. However, in January 2023, they 

informed the court they no longer had a place to park. In May 2023, the 

Parents claimed that the vehicle was connected to utilities and the court, in 

a minute entry, documented that housing was “stable.” The court ordered 

DCS to conduct a walkthrough within two weeks of being informed the 

Parents were ready for an inspection. The Parents never provided that 

notification. 

¶7 During visitations, the case aid reported that the Parents 

smelled of marijuana or cigarettes. DCS initially described Child as healthy, 

but Child was later diagnosed with pneumonia and eventually had to be 

placed on a feeding tube. 

¶8 In June 2023, Mother self-reported to her therapist that she 

had bipolar symptoms and mania, and that she loses track of time when 

one of her other personalities “takes over,” although she felt “a little better” 

than the previous year. In July 2023, Father pled guilty to aggravated 

driving while under the influence of methamphetamine. In August 2023, 

DCS petitioned to terminate the Parents’ rights. 

¶9 At the termination hearing, DCS described the Parents’ 

participation in services as inconsistent. DCS stated Mother completed 

parenting classes and substance abuse treatment but did not complete all 

drug testing and routinely tested positive for THC. Despite participating 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO R.C. 

Decision of the Court 

4 

in anger management counseling, Mother continued to escalate problems. 

DCS also informed the court that a service intended to help teach Mother 

adult skills was initially closed because she “misus[ed] the time and 

resources for the provider.” 

¶10 DCS stated Father did not complete substance abuse 

treatment or maintain sobriety. In addition to missing some tests, he tested 

positive for THC and methamphetamine. DCS testified that he did not 

consistently participate in therapy, which prevented him from participating 

in anger management services, and he did not engage in parenting classes 

until after the termination petition, when he was in prison. 

¶11 DCS testified to having “many discussions” with the Parents 

about housing. The Parents were unemployed and each received 

approximately $900 a month in social security benefits. Father admitted to 

having conversations with DCS about housing options but did not follow 

up after initially being told all spots were full. Father also admitted that it 

was difficult to get into certain housing programs because he was on 

probation for disorderly conduct with a weapon. 

¶12 Mother testified she was paying for three storage facilities, in 

a monthly amount approximately the same as it would cost for a shared 

living space. But she refused to live in a shared space with another woman 

because Father was not permitted. Mother testified that, at the time of the 

hearing, the Parents’ recreational vehicle had water leaks, potentially had 

black mold but had not been checked, and was not connected to water, 

power, or sewer services. Father testified he thought he could get housing 

within two months because he would have more opportunities after being 

released from prison.

¶13 Mother did not know all of Child’s medical needs, stating she 

had been “asking since the beginning of this case.” She was unaware of the 

frequency or general timeframe of Child’s medical appointments. She did 

not know how many times a day Child needed to be fed. But Mother 

acknowledged she had a notebook the Child’s foster placement provided 

that included updates and details about Child’s medical providers. Despite 

knowing Child’s breathing was impacted, Mother admitted that she 

continued to smoke because of stress, but said she would quit smoking if 

Child was returned to her custody. In addition to smoking cigarettes, she 

vaped marijuana. 

¶14 The psychologist who originally diagnosed Mother testified 

that he downgraded his view of her mental health from “very guarded to 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO R.C. 

Decision of the Court 

5 

poor” based on the passage of time and lack of progress. He explained that 

the difficulty the Parents had in providing for their own needs would apply 

to parenting and create additional concerns about managing Child’s 

medical needs. The psychologist testified there were no additional services 

that would prevent termination. 

¶15 DCS stated that Child’s foster home was an adoptive 

placement and termination would allow Child to remain with those who 

understand his medical needs. 

¶16 The court found that DCS proved by clear and convincing 

evidence that the Parents’ rights should be terminated due to an inability to 

discharge parental responsibilities because of mental illness and because 

Child had been in an out-of-home placement for fifteen months. See A.R.S. 

§ 8-533(B)(3) and (B)(8). The court commented that “these cases are not 

about whether or not the parents love their children . . . . It comes down to 

. . . the grounds for termination . . . and then . . . [C]hild’s best interest.” 

¶17 The court found Mother was “unable to meet the basic 

parenting standards for [Child]” or demonstrate an ability to “meet her 

own needs.” The court found there were “reasonable grounds to believe 

that [the Parents’ mental illness] will continue for a prolonged 

indeterminate period.” The court concluded that DCS provided the Parents 

with a “multitude of services” but, after fifteen months, they were unable 

to find suitable housing. The court determined DCS demonstrated by a 

preponderance of the evidence that termination would be in Child’s best 

interests because it would further the plan of adoption and provide 

permanency and stability. 

¶18 Mother and Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. 

See A.R.S. § 8-235(A). 

DISCUSSION 

¶19 The Parents argue they were not provided sufficient 

reunification services. Mother also argues there was insufficient evidence 

to terminate her rights on either of the statutory grounds the court relied on 

and that termination was not in Child’s best interests. Father does not 

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the statutory grounds 

for termination or the court’s best interests finding. 

¶20 “Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children as 

they see fit, but that right is not without limitation.” Minh T. v. Ariz. Dep’t 

of Econ. Sec., 202 Ariz. 76, 79 ¶ 14 (App. 2001). Before terminating a parent’s 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO R.C. 

Decision of the Court 

6 

rights, the juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence that 

at least one of the grounds in A.R.S. § 8-533(B) exists and must find by a 

preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the child’s best 

interests. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288 ¶ 41 (2005); Michael J. v. 

Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249 ¶ 12 (2000). We will “affirm a 

termination order unless the juvenile court abuses its discretion or the 

court’s findings are not supported by reasonable evidence.” Timothy B. v. 

Dep’t of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 470, 474 ¶ 14 (2022). We will accept the 

juvenile court’s factual findings if supported by reasonable evidence and 

inferences. Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, ___ ¶ 30 (2023). 

We will not disturb the juvenile court’s conclusions for insufficient 

evidence unless no one could reasonably find the evidence to be sufficient. 

Id. at ___ ¶ 31. 

I. Reunification Services 

¶21 The Parents argue that DCS did not provide sufficient 

reunification services because they were not provided with a housing 

subsidy. A parent who does not contemporaneously object to reunification 

services cannot later challenge that finding on appeal. See Shawanee S. v. 

Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 178–79 ¶ 16 (App. 2014); Bennigno R. 

v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 233 Ariz. 345, 349 ¶ 19 (App. 2013). Here, the 

juvenile court considered five motions requesting confirmation that DCS 

was making reasonable efforts to finalize permanency. The court found on 

each of those five occasions that DCS had made reasonable efforts. See

Shawanee S., 234 Ariz. at 179 ¶ 17. Neither of the Parents objected to any of 

the five motions nor requested a housing subsidy in response. See id.; 

Bennigno R., 233 Ariz. at 349 ¶ 19. Thus, the Parents waived their deficient 

services argument. 

¶22 Notwithstanding waiver, the record contains sufficient 

evidence that DCS made reasonable and diligent efforts to address the 

Parents’ housing situation. See Bennigno R., 233 Ariz. at 350 ¶ 20. The 

juvenile court must “consider the totality of the circumstances when 

determining whether DCS has made diligent efforts.” Donald W. v. Dep’t of 

Child Safety, 247 Ariz. 9, 23 ¶ 49 (App. 2019). DCS is required to provide a 

parent with “the time and opportunity to participate in programs designed 

to help her become an effective parent.” Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994). But DCS is not “required to provide 

every conceivable service[.]” Id.

¶23 DCS testified that it had “many discussions” with the Parents 

about housing, and the Parents implied during their testimony that they 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO R.C. 

Decision of the Court 

7 

had such conversations. The Parents made choices that impacted their 

ability to afford housing or limited available housing options. For example, 

Mother admitted that she rented multiple storage units costing $400 per 

month and spent $200 per month on marijuana, which reduced the amount 

of funds available to obtain stable housing. She also testified that she

refused to move into a shared living space because she would have to share 

the room with another woman, where Father was not permitted. The 

Parents were asked to leave a recreational vehicle park due to noise 

complaints about their arguing. And Father admitted that certain housing 

programs would not accept the Parents because he was on probation for 

disorderly conduct with a weapon.

¶24 Prior to the termination hearing, the Parents told DCS and the 

court that their recreational vehicle would be ready to meet Child’s needs. 

They informed the court that they had (1) a place to park that would 

provide water and electricity, (2) obtained a generator and a transmission 

rebuild kit, and (3) connected their recreational vehicle to utilities. The 

Parents informed the court that the recreational vehicle was “stable” and 

would soon be ready for an inspection. In response, the court ordered DCS 

to inspect the vehicle when the Parents were ready. The Parents never 

requested an inspection. 

¶25 The court found that DCS provided Mother and Father with 

a “multitude of services.” DCS provided the Parents with psychological 

evaluations, mental health services, drug testing, parenting services, 

therapy, and anger management. A psychologist confirmed, however, that 

there were no additional services to offer either of the Parents to prevent 

termination. Reasonable evidence supports the court’s conclusion that DCS 

provided the Parents with diligent reunification services. See Brionna J., 255 

Ariz. at ___ ¶ 30. 

II. Mental Illness 

¶26 Mother argues the court erred in terminating her parental 

rights under the mental illness ground because she claims the hearing 

testimony focused on her drug use, finances, and hygiene. To terminate a 

parent’s rights due to mental illness, DCS is required to prove a parent was 

“unable to discharge parental responsibilities because of mental illness . . . 

and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the condition will continue 

for a prolonged indeterminate period.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3). 

¶27 Mother downplays the evidence about her mental health 

struggles. A psychologist diagnosed her with post-traumatic stress 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO R.C. 

Decision of the Court 

8 

disorder, unspecified personality disorder with borderline and anti-social 

traits, stimulant-use disorder (methamphetamine type substance), and 

unspecified cannabis-related disorder. The record also reflects that she 

reported having bipolar symptoms and mania and losing track of time 

when one of her other personalities “takes over.” The psychologist was 

concerned about her “attitudes and behaviors, including failure to conform 

to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors and a history of consistent 

irresponsibility.” By the time of the termination hearing, the psychologist 

had downgraded Mother’s mental health status from “very guarded to 

poor” based on her lack of progress. 

¶28 The psychologist explained that Mother’s difficulty in 

managing her needs would result in an inability to manage Child’s needs. 

Mother’s testimony supports that concern—she was unaware of Child’s 

medical needs, his medical appointments, and his feeding schedule. 

Mother admitted that she continued to smoke because of stress, even after 

Child had severe breathing complications. 

¶29 The record contains reasonable evidence supporting the 

mental illness ground for termination. See Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at ___ ¶ 30. 

We therefore need not address the other statutory ground for termination 

the juvenile court found. Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 

373, 376–77 ¶ 14 (App. 2010). 

III. Best Interests 

¶30 Finally, Mother argues the court erred in making a best 

interests finding by not considering the “type of parenting bond” she has 

with Child. Termination is in a child’s best interests if DCS proves by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the child will benefit from, or be 

harmed without, termination. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 

150 ¶ 13 (2018). The juvenile court must consider the totality of 

circumstances at the time of termination. Id. at 150–51 ¶ 13. 

¶31 “It is well established in state-initiated cases that the child’s 

prospective adoption is a benefit that can support a best-interests finding.” 

Id. (quoting Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz 1, 4 ¶ 16 (2016)). DCS 

testified that Child had an adoptive placement who would support his 

medical needs. The court determined termination would be in Child’s best 

interests because it would further the plan of adoption and provide 

“permanency and stability.” Reasonable evidence supports the court’s 

finding that termination was in Child’s best interests. 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO R.C. 

Decision of the Court 

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CONCLUSION 

¶32 We affirm the termination of Mother and Father’s parental 

rights as to Child.