In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-21-00439-CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 325th District Court

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court No. 325-687468-20

Before Kerr, Wallach, and Walker, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr

IN THE INTEREST OF J.M., A CHILD
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

V.M. (Mother) appeals from the trial court’s order terminating her parental 

rights to her son J.M. (James)

1 and awarding permanent managing conservatorship of 

him to the Department of Family and Protective Services.2 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 

§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (R), (b)(2). We will affirm.

Mother’s appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief asserting that Mother’s

appeal is frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 

1400 (1967); see also In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d 774, 776–77 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, 

order) (holding that Anders procedures apply in parental-rights-termination cases), disp. 

on merits, No. 2-01-349-CV, 2003 WL 2006583, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 

1, 2003, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.). The brief meets Anders’s requirements by 

presenting a professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating why there are no 

arguable grounds to be advanced on appeal. Mother’s counsel has certified to us that 

he provided Mother with a copy of the Anders brief and informed her of her rights to 

request and to review the appellate record,

3 to file a pro se response in this court, and 

1

We use aliases to identify the parties. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d); 

Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).

2

The trial court also terminated James’s father’s parental rights, but James’s 

father has not appealed.

3

To that end, Mother’s counsel also certified to us that he explained to Mother

the process of obtaining the appellate record; furnished her with a motion for pro se 

access to the record, which lacked only Mother’s signature and the date; and provided 

her with our mailing address and the motion’s filing deadline.
3

to seek review from the Texas Supreme Court. We also informed Mother that her 

appointed appellate counsel had filed an Anders brief and gave her an opportunity to 

examine the appellate record and to file a pro se response to the Anders brief. Mother

did not file a response,4 and the Department of Family and Protective Services has

declined to file a response.

In assessing the correctness of a compliant Anders brief’s conclusion that an 

appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights is frivolous, we must 

independently examine the appellate record to determine if any arguable grounds for 

appeal exist.5 In re C.J., No. 02-18-00219-CV, 2018 WL 4496240, at *1 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth Sept. 20, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 

503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.—

4

Mother did not respond to our letter notifying her of the Anders brief and 

giving her a chance to examine the record and to file a pro se response. But the day 

before this case was set for submission, we received a letter from Mother requesting a 

copy of the Anders brief and an opportunity to respond. On May 4, 2022, we granted 

Mother’s request, gave her 14 days to file a pro se response, and provided her with 

copies of the Anders brief and the appellate record. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.2(b), 38.6(d).

We informed her that we would grant no extensions. See Tex. R. Jud. Admin. 6.2(a), 

reprinted in Tex. Gov’t Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. F app. We cautioned Mother that if she 

did not file a response, we would assume that she did not intend to file one, and we 

would consider the appeal without it. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.2(b), 38.6(d). More than 

fourteen days have passed, and we have received no response.

5

In the course of our independent review of the record, we contacted the court

reporter to ensure that we had transcripts of all pretrial hearings and asked that he 

prepare any missing transcripts. He provided us with an eight-page continuancehearing transcript, which we have reviewed along with the clerk’s record and the trial 

transcript. We remind Mother’s court-appointed counsel of his duty to review the 

entire record when assessing whether an appeal is frivolous.
4

Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). We also consider the Anders brief itself and any pro se 

response. In re K.M., No. 02-18-00073-CV, 2018 WL 3288591, at *10 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth July 5, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 

408–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding).

We have carefully reviewed counsel’s brief and the appellate record. Finding 

nothing in the record that could arguably support an appeal, we agree with counsel 

that Mother’s appeal is frivolous and without merit. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 

824, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); In re D.D., 279 S.W.3d 849, 850 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

2009, pet. denied). We thus affirm the trial court’s order terminating Mother’s parental 

rights to James. Mother’s counsel remains appointed through proceedings in the 

supreme court unless otherwise relieved.6 See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27–28 (Tex. 

2016) (order).

/s/ Elizabeth Kerr

Elizabeth Kerr

Justice

Delivered: June 6, 2022

6

Mother’s counsel noted in his brief that he would move to withdraw as 

appellate counsel in the supreme court.