AFRICA SECURITY BRIEF

A P U B L I C AT I O N O F T H E A F R I C A C E N T E R F O R S T R AT E G I C S T U D I E S

N O . 2 8 / M AY 2 0 1 4

1

Wildlife Poaching: Africa’s Surging 

Trafficking Threat

By Bradley Anderson and Johan Jooste

u Spikes in the prices of ivory and rhino horn have propelled an escalation in killings of African elephants 

and rhinoceroses. Without urgent corrective measures, extinction of these populations is likely.

u This is not just a wildlife poaching problem but part of a global illicit trafficking network that is 

empowering violent groups and co-opting some elements of Africa’s security sector.

u An immediate bolstering of Africa’s wildlife ranger network is needed to slow the pace of elephant and 

rhino killings and buy time. Addressing this threat over the longer term will require dramatically reducing 

the demand for these animal parts, especially within Asian markets. H I G H L I G H T S

A booming black market trade worth hundreds of 

millions of dollars is fueling corruption in Africa’s ports, 

customs offices, and security forces as well as providing 

new revenues for insurgent groups and criminal networks 

across the continent. Rather than narcotics, small arms, 

or other commonly trafficked goods, however, it is recordbreaking numbers of poached elephants and rhinoceroses 

that are driving this cycle of exploitation and instability. 

Poaching is not a new problem in Africa. Its dramatic acceleration since the late 2000s, however, has 

significantly altered its implications. By some estimates, 

the number of African elephants killed annually since 

2007 has more than doubled to over 30,000.1 The trend 

crossed a chilling threshold in 2010 as the rate of killings 

surpassed that at which elephants breed, indicating that 

significant net population declines have begun. Rhino 

poaching has also skyrocketed. Illegal killings in southern 

Africa from 2000 to 2007 were rare, frequently fewer than 

10 a year. An explosion in poaching rates commenced 

in 2008. By 2013, 1,004 rhinos were poached in South 

Africa alone. 

Soaring global prices for ivory and rhino horn are 

driving this poaching frenzy. In 2003, high-quality ivory 

sold for roughly $200 per kilogram. The same amount 

could fetch $2,500-$3,000 on the black market in 2013. 

The escalation in prices for rhino horn has been even 

more dramatic. Whereas a kilogram of rhino horn cost 

around $800 in the 1990s, it is now more valuable than 

gold. Some reports pegged the price of rhino horn in 

2013 at $65,000 per kilogram. Thus, the horns from the 

I condemn poaching and condemn those who entice young people to go hunting, because the game they kill is not for 

them.... It is at the behest of the powerful.... There is someone who makes a lot of money (from hunting), but those who 

die are often young people who innocently do it thinking that it makes life easy, it makes easy money, but they lose their lives.

—Joaquim Chissano, former President of Mozambique and Founder of the 

Joaquim Chissano Foundation Wildlife Preservation Initiative in Mozambique 
Bradley Anderson is the Regional Manager in the East 

Africa office of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies. 

Johan Jooste is the Commanding Officer for Special 

Projects in the South African National Parks service 

and retired as a Major General from the South African 

National Defence Force. 

2

in Cameroon. Seleka, the rebel militia that toppled the 

government in the Central African Republic in early 2013 

and whose brutal treatment of the population triggered 

communal clashes across the country, reportedly poached 

elephants in the country’s reserves. The Somali Islamist 

militant group al Shabaab has also earned hundreds of 

thousands of dollars, if not more, from encouraging villages in Kenya to poach ivory, which is then trafficked 

out of Somali ports.3

Meanwhile, the trade in rhino horn has spawned 

new links between notorious Asian and Eastern European 

organized crime networks and those in Africa. The use 

of high-powered weaponry and advanced tactical gear by 

some poachers suggests how capable, well-funded, and 

dangerous these groups are. Scores of wildlife rangers in 

the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Kenya, 

and elsewhere are killed annually. During one incident 

in Chad in 2012 an entire squad of wildlife rangers were 

ambushed and killed by poachers. 

The profits from wildlife trafficking have also fueled 

corruption, weakening and co-opting critical state institutions such as the police and military. In South Africa, 

evidence has linked former members of elite police and 

military units to rhino horn trafficking.4 In the DRC, 

scientists and park officials reported that Ugandan soldiers 

killed at least 22 elephants and retrieved more than $1 

million worth of ivory during one cross-border sweep in 

March 2012.5 Other reports have implicated soldiers and 

units from the armed forces of the DRC, South Sudan, 

and Sudan. Wildlife trafficking’s high profits and low risk 

could fuel a sense of impunity within Africa’s security 

sector that further jeopardizes professionalism and triggers 

a range of other illegal and abusive activities. 

While the depth of this new trafficking surge can 

only be estimated, it is no longer solely a conservation 

issue. With dozens of African countries affected by the 

growing demand for these products, wildlife trafficking 

has quickly grown into a serious regional threat.

THE POACHING CHALLENGE: THE CASE 

OF KRUGER NATIONAL PARK

South Africa is home to more than 70 percent of the 

world’s rhinos, including 90 percent of Africa’s 20,000 

white rhinos and 40 percent of the extremely rare black 

1,004 rhinos killed in South Africa may be worth $440 

million. Such inflated prices, which exceed the value of 

cocaine and heroin in some countries, are overwhelming an already endangered species. The trend has even 

prompted a crime spree at some museums and auction 

houses with exhibits containing ivory or horn. 

The proliferating number of middle- and upperclass consumers in Asia is the primary reason for the 

jump in prices. Typically valued as decoration, whether 

as carved jewelry or artwork or as mounted busts, ivory 

and horn have become a sought-after symbol of stature 

and wealth. In surveys of middle-class Chinese professionals, 87 percent associated ivory with “prestige” and 

84 percent intended to purchase some.2

Another driver of the demand for rhino horn in 

Asia is the belief that it has powerful medicinal properties, including that it cures cancer. While such myths 

help explain the boom, consumers are surely overpaying. 

Rhino horn is just a fibrous protein called keratin, an 

inert substance that is similar in composition to human 

fingernails and hair. 

Some of the consequences of wildlife trafficking are 

straightforward. It poses a severe threat to conservation 

and biodiversity in general. Poaching has led to the near 

extinction of some subspecies, including the disappearance 

of rhinos in Mozambique in 2012. Safaris and tourism 

are huge foreign currency earners for African countries, 

including over $1 billion annually for Kenya. These revenues will be severely affected as visitors encounter not 

only fewer animals but more criminality in game parks 

and reserves. Poaching also threatens these deeply rooted 

African icons. 

Less understood is that the boom in wildlife trafficking poses substantial security threats. Various militia 

groups and criminal networks have been drawn to the 

illegal wildlife trade’s huge profits. Escapees from the 

Lord’s Resistance Army report that the group is trading 

ivory with Arab businessmen and officers from the Sudanese military for cash, food, guns, and medical supplies. 

Militants from Sudan have been blamed for incidents in 

which hundreds of elephants were killed in game parks 

“the boom in wildlife trafficking poses 

substantial security threats”
3

rhino. The majority of these animals reside in South 

Africa’s Kruger National Park (KNP). At some 2 million hectares, KNP is about the size of Israel. It shares 

a 356-kilometer border with Mozambique’s Lebombo 

Mountains. 

Patrolling and monitoring this region is costly and 

difficult during even the best of times. Now, however, 

the park, and many like it across Africa, is being flooded 

by growing numbers of armed poachers. Many of these 

poachers have little training. Yet a substantial number 

work in sophisticated formations to evade detection and 

more effectively hunt their prey. Some are armed with 

automatic rifles and operate at night. Regardless of their 

sophistication, the sheer numbers are enough to overwhelm wildlife management agencies and ranger teams, 

even in comparatively well-resourced South Africa. In 

2013, 86 poachers were arrested and 47 died during clashes 

with South African authorities just in KNP.

The support and complicity of some local communities, whether as poaching recruits or simply by ignoring illegal hunting activities, further complicates anti-poaching 

efforts. Surveys conducted in towns near Kruger found that 

16 percent of respondents knew poachers living within 

their communities. Most respondents viewed poaching as a 

threat and 68 percent said they would be willing to identify 

offenders if they could be protected and poachers were 

jailed. However, fear of reprisals prompted many, even 

community leaders, to remain silent. Some respondents 

believed that police and rangers were directly involved 

in poaching.6 Similar dynamics are unfolding in Africa’s 

other poaching hotspots. 

In 2012, South Africa’s Department of Environmental Affairs increased the number of deployed rangers in 

Kruger from 500 to 650. Command-and-control structures 

were streamlined and specialist units commissioned to 

analyze intelligence to increase response times against 

more mobile and sophisticated poachers. Expanded air 

services, canine capabilities, and several night operation 

enhancements have also helped. Collaboration with the 

South African Army, Air Force, and police has similarly 

been improved and institutionalized. Community programs have been launched to educate and foster local 

cooperation. 

Significant challenges remain to reverse poaching 

trends, but these initial efforts are bearing fruit. While 

poaching numbers at Kruger have continued to rise, the 

pace is 22 percent lower than had been projected. There 

has also been a doubling in the annual number of poachers arrested. 

Meanwhile, joint cross-border projects with Mozambican authorities are being devised, as are efforts to 

mitigate the appeal of rhino horns by coloring, removing, or otherwise altering them in ways that complicate 

smuggling (while doing no harm to the animals). Such 

initiatives represent a new anti-poaching approach meant 

to supplement classic ranger units with technology, locallevel engagement, and collaboration at the interagency 

and international levels.

THE TRAFFICKING CHALLENGE

Most poachers are not smugglers. Once ivory or rhino 

horn leaves Africa’s parks and reserves it is usually sold 

or transferred to criminal networks. These brokers and 

middlemen move the materials across borders and launder 

associated revenues. In many ways, these activities are 

very similar to drug, mineral, or arms trafficking. In fact, 

the high prices of ivory and rhino horn attract specialists from these transnational organized crime networks. 

Earnings can vary, but a poacher might receive just 

$600 for an ivory tusk or a rhino horn. The trafficker, 

meanwhile, will reap a substantially higher proportion of 

the $3,000-per-kilogram price for ivory and $65,000-perkilogram price for rhino horn in Asia, particularly if they 

are able to resell these goods close to the final retail transaction. 

Traffickers must concoct a way to conceal ivory 

or horn shipments, usually within a consignment of legitimate goods through a front company to some export 

destination, often by shipping container and sometimes 

by air freight or commercial travel. Customs or other 

officials may be bribed to approve or certify transactions 

and paperwork. Based on seizure rates, Mombasa and Dar 

es Salaam appear to be primary points of departure from 

Africa, but traffickers use indirect routes or vary their 

points of exit and re-entry to avoid detection (see maps).

Very few mid-level and high-level traffickers have 

been caught. The vast majority of arrests are of low-level 

poachers. One of the few central figures to have been 

convicted is a Thai trafficker named Chumlong Lemtongthai, who worked for businesses in Thailand and 

Laos and made frequent and long visits to South Africa. 

Lemtongthai was able to poach and traffic dozens of rhino 

horns out of South Africa. In fact, he was cleverly exploiting loopholes in hunting regulations to operate far more 

openly than many other poachers. Lemtongthai employed 

groups of Thai prostitutes, some working in Johannesburg 

and others flown in from Asia, to obtain licenses in South 
4

MALAYSIA

THAILAND

CHINA

VIETNAM

HONG

KONG

PHILIPPINES

Large scale ivory seizures

KENYA

SOUTH 

AFRICA

TANZANIA

Origin area

Transit area

Source: TRAFFIC, 2013

Note: These figures reflect known large-scale ivory trade flows. The same 

seizure may have passed through or been directed to several of the above 

countries and is captured accordingly. Thus, these figures do not represent 

discrete values, but rather reflect the relative importance of these countries 

and territories in the movement of ivory between Africa and Asia.

Ivory siezed 

per year

Tonnes

13

7

3

1

2009 2010 2011

Destination country

Transit country

Country of departure

ALGERIA LIBYA

MOROCCO

Western Sahara EGYPT

SUDAN CHAD

NIGER

MAURITANIA MALI

NIGERIA

DEMOCRATIC 

REPUBLIC OF CONGO 

ANGOLA

NAMIBIA

SOUTH AFRICA

BOTSWANA

ZIMBABWE

MOZAMBIQUE

TANZANIA

KENYA

SOMALIA

MADAGASCAR

ETHIOPIA SOMALILAND

ERITREA

SOUTH 

SUDAN CENTRAL 

AFRICAN 

REPUBLIC

CONGO

GABON

CAMEROON

EQ. GUINEA

BENIN

TOGO

GHANA

IVORY COAST

BURKINA FASO

SENEGAL

GUINEA

SIERRA LEONE

LIBERIA

GUINEA BISSAU GAMBIA

UGANDA

RWANDA

BURUNDI

DJIBOUTI

MALAWI ZAMBIA

LESOTHO SWAZILAND

To Singapore via Dubai

To South East Asia & China

To Europe and USA

To South East Asia & China

To South East Asia & China

To South East Asia & China

Beitbridge

Durban

Beira

Lusaka

Lubumbashi

Nairobi

Lilongwe

Dar es Salaam

Zanzibar

Pemba

Maputo

Mombasa

Cape Town

Khartoum

QATAR DUBAI

Cairo

LagosDouala

Luanda

Kinshasa Ivory smuggling hotspots

Major transit point or area

Major domestic market

African elephant range

Exit point, by air

Exit point, by sea

Land route

Main shipping route

Other shipping route

Ivory smuggling routes

Other shipping ports

Known

Possible

Illegal ivory trafficking routes

Sources: CITES, COP14 Proposal 6, 2007; Wasser, S., K., et al., Using DNA to 

track the origin of the largest ivory seizure since the 1989 trade ban, 

PNAS, 2007; Environment Investigation Agency (EIA), How China’s illegal 

ivory trade is causing a 21st century African elephant disaster, 2007; 

UNODC, Promoting health, security and justice, 2010; personal 

communication with Dr Christian Nelleman, GRID-Arendal, 2012.

Source: Riccardo Pravettoni, GRID-Arendal.

Africa that permit an individual to hunt one rhino a 

year. In reality, Lemtongthai’s network of hunters then 

killed dozens of rhinos using the permits. To ensure the 

hunts did not attract attention, Lemtongthai provided 

kickbacks to some parks and provincial officials as well as 

private reserve and game park owners in South Africa.7

Lemtongthai usually handled his numerous payouts 

by repeated cash withdrawals from casino ATM machines 

or by wire transfers from a Bangkok bank account. He 

then altered the official paperwork to redirect rhino horn 

shipments to his businesses in Southeast Asia rather than 

to the registered addresses of the supposed hunters (the 

prostitutes).8 In November 2012, Lemtongthai pled guilty 

to charges of violating South African customs regulations 

and illegally hunting protected species. Charges of money 

laundering were withdrawn, as were all charges against 

three South Africans and two Asians accused alongside 

Lemtongthai. Lemtongthai’s boss in Laos, Vixay Keovasang, has not been charged and allegedly continues 

trafficking wildlife, though in November 2013 the United 

States announced a $1 million reward for information on 

his activities. Reports indicate Keovasang benefits from 

extensive protection from Laotian government officials.9

Corruption is an issue elsewhere as well. The founding 

head of the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) has alleged 

that powerful individuals profiting from poaching have 

co-opted senior KWS officials. Officials from Tanzania’s 

Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism have been 

dismissed for involvement in wildlife trafficking. Even 

the secretary general of Tanzania’s ruling Chama Cha 

Mapinduzi political party had to fend off accusations that 

he owned a stake in a shipping agent involved in ivory 

trafficking.10

In general, trafficking networks continue to operate 

with minimal fear of consequences. In many frontline 

countries such as Gabon and Mozambique, wildlife crimes 

are minor offences covered by relatively small fines. Some 

countries, such as Zimbabwe, have laws against poaching 

but not trafficking, essentially giving a free pass to the 

brokers and top-level criminals who facilitate the bulk 

of the trade. 

The content of wildlife laws is only part of the problem. Enforcement of even relatively lenient penalties has 

been spotty across Africa. In a review of nearly 750 cases 

involving wildlife crimes in Kenya from 2008 through 

2013, an independent Kenyan conservation group found 

that files were lost or misplaced in 70 percent of cases, 

due partly to poor management but also likely a sign of 

tampering and corruption. Among the 224 offenders for 

which there were records of conviction, just 8 went to jail 

while the vast majority paid small fines. In many cases, 

charges associated with organized crime, money laundering, or firearms offenses were applicable, though prosecutors rarely invoked them. Incidents of major seizures of 

wildlife goods in the port of Mombasa or in the town 

of Wajir near the Somali border were never pursued.11

Starting in 2014 new laws in Kenya instituted stiffer 

penalties for wildlife trafficking. Soon after, a Chinese 

national was convicted of smuggling 3.4 kilograms of ivory 

and ordered to pay a $233,000 fine or serve a sentence 

of 7 years in prison. Other countries, including Gabon, 

Mozambique, and Tanzania, are also drafting more severe 
5

penalties. However, effective deterrence will require not 

just harsher statutory punishments but also systematic 

application of the law. 

SECURING AFRICA’S WILDLIFE

Stemming the upsurge in demand. While the market for illegal wildlife goods is global, including in the 

United States and Europe, it is the growing numbers of 

middle- and upper-class consumers in Asia that have 

fed the exponential jump in prices for ivory and horn. 

So long as the trade remains so lucrative, some poachers 

and traffickers will inevitably attempt to exploit Africa’s 

wildlife treasures. Addressing the wildlife trafficking challenge, therefore, is ultimately about shrinking demand. 

Many Asian consumers simply have a weak understanding of where ivory originates or its legality. In 

previous surveys, 70 percent of Chinese respondents were 

not aware that tusks mainly come from dead elephants.12

Consumer views of the rhino horn trade appear to be 

similarly under-informed.13 Few Chinese understand 

the role that criminal networks play in supplying these 

products.14 Asian demand for ivory, moreover, also seems 

to be highly influenced by government policies and pronouncements. About 60 percent of surveyed Chinese 

consumers said that recommendations from government 

leaders to avoid ivory or outright bans would sufficiently 

persuade them to avoid ivory purchases. Nearly 40 percent 

indicated that their consumption was affected by a sense 

of remorse when they learned that elephants are killed 

to source ivory. 

To fundamentally reshape the demand for illicit 

ivory and rhino horn, a high-profile public education 

and awareness-raising campaign in Asia is needed. Experience suggests significant impacts can be realized. High 

demand for shark fin soup across Asia has been dramatically lowered through effective social marketing. With the 

right combination of high-profile campaigners, resonant 

messaging, and consistent engagement, the same success 

might be achieved in the ivory and rhino horn markets.

More attention also needs to be paid to Asian governments that have been slow to address the problem. 

In China, for example, government officials have openly 

called for an expansion of the licit market for ivory.15

Such a position ignores the need to rein in demand and 

the incentives that are driving destabilizing poaching and 

organized crime activities in Africa. Asian governments 

should support a ban on ivory sales and more actively 

discourage their citizens from buying ivory and rhino 

products. This would also be a service to the many Asian 

buyers who are wasting thousands or tens of thousands 

of dollars on these wildlife products for their bunk medicinal properties.

Strengthening the frontlines. While curbing the 

wildlife trafficking trade is dependent on reshaping demand, investing in frontline actors is critical for slowing 

the devastation of Africa’s rhino and elephant populations—buying valuable time. Most African states already 

benefit from dedicated and experienced wildlife ranger 

corps. However, the exponential increase in poachers, 

particularly sophisticated and well-armed ones, calls for 

reforms and better resources. As in Kruger National Park 

in South Africa, the command-and-control structure of 

these ranger corps will need to be revised to allow for 

rapid relay of information to a central command post 

that can quickly reposition and redirect units as needed. 

New equipment will also be vital to enhance 

the mobility and domain awareness of rangers. Small 

planes, helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles have 

achieved positive results at reserves in Chad, Kenya, 

and South Africa. Information technology can provide 

further advantages. One reserve in Kenya installed 

triggers on fences and embedded trackers in elephants 

to alert rangers’ mobile phones by text message when 

security perimeters were tampered with or when animals 

were behaving abnormally. Technology will also be 

crucial to the extensive recordkeeping necessary to 

analyze ranger deployments, poaching patterns, and 

biometric and forensic data on wildlife remains. 

However, technology should not eclipse the need 

for well-trained and well-resourced rangers. No number 

of helicopters or advanced gadgetry can top the effectiveness of a ranger who knows the bush, can spot the easily 

overlooked signs of intruders, can operate for days or 

weeks without resupply, and is willing to put himself or 

herself in harm’s way. New highly trained units in South 

Africa and Mozambique provide models that could be 

replicated elsewhere on the continent.

Community engagement. African communities located near Africa’s parks and reserves live in the thick of 

the escalating poaching crisis and will be key to its reduction. Through effective engagement and support, these 

communities can work to dissuade youth from poaching 

and provide crucial intelligence on illicit activities. 

In Namibia, for instance, community engagement 

has spared the country from the skyrocketing levels of 

poaching seen elsewhere. When poaching incidents do 

occur, shared information and tipoffs lead to speedy arrests 
6

and prosecutions.16 Critical to Namibia’s success has been 

the institutionalized collaboration between scientists, 

local communities, the tourism sector, and relevant government agencies. Through several conservation trusts, 

scientists worked for years with traditional leaders during the 1980s to impart a deeper understanding of the 

negative consequences of poaching. Realizing the threat 

to biodiversity posed by excessive hunting, local leaders 

then helped identify community game guards, selecting locally respected and honest individuals, who were 

trained to monitor animals and liaise with communities to identify perpetrators when poached animals were 

discovered. Communities and local leaders were central 

to many conservation and land-use decisions. Leaders 

would attend court during the prosecution of suspected 

poachers, help devise locations for livestock grazing and 

legal hunting, and work with some tourism operators to 

generate income and jobs.17 “Community conservancies” now operate in a fifth of Namibia’s land area, and 

the conservation and tourism benefits have been clear. 

There were fewer than 300 black rhinos in Namibia in 

1980, but their numbers have recovered to more than 

1,700. Elephant numbers have nearly tripled to 20,000. 

Similar community engagement initiatives should 

be a top priority for other African wildlife management 

agencies. At the very least, governments should avoid the 

inevitable anger and resistance from local communities 

generated by aggressive “shoot-to-kill” army deployments, 

which often lack the technical expertise demanded in 

anti-poaching efforts. In Tanzania, anti-poaching and 

army units were given wide latitude during emergency 

deployments in 2013. Soon after, killings, rapes, and severe 

abuses were reported and the initiative was ended early.18

Strengthening investigations and prosecutions. 

Africa’s wildlife crisis is not just a poaching challenge 

but involves sophisticated criminal networks employing 

advanced trafficking techniques. Stemming this organized 

crime component of the illegal wildlife trade will require 

law enforcement and prosecutorial measures adept at 

combating illicit networks. 

Stronger institutional exchanges with wildlife management agencies should be established so that police and 

customs officers are familiarized with wildlife products and 

are on the lookout for tell-tale signs of suspect shipments. 

The careful collection of forensic evidence from seizures 

at seaports and airports is also critical to linking illegal 

shipments to broader criminal networks and achieving 

eventual prosecutions.19 In late 2010 the International 

Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime (ICCWC) 

was established to facilitate such linkages and training 

in advanced techniques. For instance, the ICCWC conducted field training for officers from several African and 

Asian countries on the population and use of a database of 

rhino DNA. This database and similar ones for elephant 

DNA are critical to mapping trafficking patterns and the 

dismantlement of transnational networks. 

Criminal investigative units should be targeting 

wildlife trafficking networks to identify the senior leaders 

who often orchestrate the most extensive illegal activity 

but tend to be removed from on-the-ground poaching 

and smuggling. This will require closer examination of 

the businesses and financial transactions that facilitate 

wildlife trafficking. As such, cooperation with revenue 

authorities, corporate registries, and property registries 

will need to be improved, and databases with this information should be modernized and made more easily 

accessible. Financial intelligence units will be critical 

to “following the money” that is laundered for wildlife 

transactions. Fortunately, the detailed “Wildlife and Forest Crime Analytic Toolkit” developed jointly by the 

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and several top wildlife nongovernmental groups lays out the 

investigative techniques and interministerial cooperation needed to combat wildlife trafficking. Establishing 

interagency taskforces, moreover, would reinforce the 

priority of mounting determined countermeasures that 

encompass multiple ministerial authorities.

Strengthening penalties for wildlife offenses are also 

vital to combating the illicit trade. Fines for wildlife 

crimes should at the very least exceed the value of the 

wildlife products seized from offenders. Likewise, bail 

should not be an option for individuals involved in large 

seizures, since they are likely to have the means to pay 

and the incentive to disappear. Given the economic 

and security implications of the growing illegal wildlife 

trade, offenders should face significant prison sentences 

and judges should avoid thinking of wildlife crimes as 

petty offenses. 

The implementation of new penalties will also require more training and resources for judges, prosecutors, police, and wildlife authorities. With escalating 

prices for ivory and rhino horn, courts are likely to see 

a high volume of wildlife-related cases. As in some drug 

“trafficking networks continue 

to operate with minimal fear of 

consequences”
7

or corruption cases, special procedures and fast-track 

courts may be needed to ensure speedy trials that do not 

end in dismissals due to delays or technicalities. Police 

and prosecutors should also think more broadly about 

the crimes involved in poaching and wildlife trafficking and apply laws against economic crimes, organized 

crime, firearms offenses, and other relevant charges. The 

strategic use of plea bargains and leniency against lowlevel offenders could also be used to build cases against 

higher-level financiers and brokers. 

Unfortunately, the growing levels of corruption associated with the lucrative wildlife trade are seriously 

compromising efforts to fight it. State institutions charged 

with combating armed groups and organized crime, including elements of militaries, police, customs bureaus, 

and even some politicians, have been implicated in wildlife trafficking. African statesmen and political leaders 

need to bring attention to this co-optation and institute 

appropriate oversight measures to prevent it. Internal 

affairs offices in African security services should be instructed to investigate wildlife trafficking. Whistleblowing 

opportunities and protections should be enhanced. A new 

secure online initiative that links whistleblowers with 

investigative journalists called WildLeaks (www.wildleaks.org/) launched in February 2014 may demonstrate 

how technology can create more opportunities to safely 

shine a light on the corruption that facilitates wildlife 

trafficking. The wildlife trade also needs to be on the 

agenda of anti-corruption commissions, where asset and 

financial disclosures of state officials should be reviewed 

for connections to potential trafficking activities. 

The Central and West Africa Wildlife Law Enforcement Network demonstrates how local nongovernmental 

organizations (NGOs) can provide a constructive boost 

against wildlife trafficking and related corruption. The 

network was launched by the Last Great Ape Organization (LAGA), a Cameroonian wildlife NGO, and now 

includes affiliates and partners operating in the Central African Republic, Gabon, Guinea, the Republic of 

Congo, and Togo. These groups regularly track wildlife 

trafficking patterns, cooperate with authorities on specific 

investigations, shadow prosecutions, and engage with 

government ministries to reform policies and improve 

implementation. Fighting corruption is a key priority of 

the network, and it relies on broad interagency coalitions 

and closely tracks cases from investigation through sentencing to reduce the ability for corrupt officials to quietly 

disrupt procedures. In operation for over a decade, the 

network has assisted in hundreds of wildlife prosecutions.

Due to its expanding influence and consistent effectiveness, the government of Cameroon includes LAGA 

as part of its delegation to meetings of the Convention on 

the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 

Fauna and Flora (CITES). Other governments and wildlife 

NGOs in Africa could similarly collaborate to expand the 

resources available to combat trafficking and limit the 

use of corruption as a means to facilitate wildlife crime.

Stronger regional and international cooperation. 

African governments will also need to work collaboratively to pool resources, share information, and align 

diplomatic efforts. Several nations have already begun 

working together to shore up ranger deficiencies. Gabon has deployed its comparatively advanced wildlife 

ranger units to the Central African Republic to address 

cross-border poaching. Mozambique and South Africa 

are likewise collaborating to develop new advanced units 

and strengthen cross-border cooperation. Institutionalized 

cooperation and information-sharing among African and 

Asian law enforcement and customs bureaus are equally 

important. 

African governments can also work together to avoid 

past missteps that helped fuel the recent surge in demand 

for ivory and rhino horn. Through CITES, which governs 

legal wildlife transactions, four African governments were 

permitted a one-time sale of 102 tons of ivory that had 

been stockpiled from elephants that died naturally. The 

four auctions to traders from China and Japan in 2008 for 

$15 million has frequently been described as the trigger 

for a subsequent surge in demand that notched up prices, 

which, in turn, drew various organized crime groups and 

militants to poaching and trafficking.20 

In the run up to the next CITES conference in 

2016, South Africa is exploring a proposal for a one-time 

sale of 18 tons of stockpiled rhino horn, the proceeds 

from which it promises to earmark for conservation. Any 

benefits from the sale will likely be overshadowed by a 

spike in demand that will drive even more poachers and 

criminals into South Africa’s game parks. Recognizing 

such a risk, four African states (Botswana, Chad, Gabon, 

and Tanzania) vowed in February 2014 to forgo any future 

sales of stockpiled ivory. Notably, Botswana was involved 

in the fateful 2008 ivory sale. 

“growing levels of corruption 

associated with the lucrative wildlife 

trade are seriously compromising 

efforts to fight it”
8

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) supports United States 

foreign and security policies by strengthening the strategic capacity 

of African states to identifiy and resolve security challenges in ways 

that promote civil-military cooperation, respect for democratic 

values, and safeguard human rights. Toward these aims, ACSS is 

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The Africa Security Briefs series presents research and analysis 

by ACSS experts and outside scholars with the aim of advancing 

understanding of African security issues. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of ACSS, 

the U.S. Department of Defense or any other agency of the U.S. 

Government.

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AFRICA CENTER FOR 

STRATEGIC STUDIES

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ISSN 2164-4047 (print)

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CONCLUSION

Based on current trends, Africa faces a not too distant future absent some of its most unique and recognizable natural heritage—elephants and rhinoceroses. This 

outcome is the direct result of rising global demand for 

“prestige products” and the predatory behavior of organized 

crime groups seeking lucrative profits. Wildlife trafficking 

is no longer just a conservation problem but has metastasized to a security problem. Together with international 

governmental and nongovernmental partners, African 

states need to act more urgently to implement a strategy 

to slow and eventually reverse this fast-moving threat—

and protect their natural resources for future generations.

NOTES 

1 UNEP, CITES, IUCN, and TRAFFIC, Elephants in the Dust: 

The African Elephant Crisis (Norway: GRID-Arendal, 2013), 32-33. 

“Tracking Poached Ivory,” Center for Conservation Biology at the 

University of Washington, available at <http://conservationbiology.

uw.edu/research-programs/tracking-poached-ivory/>.

2 John Bredar, “The Ivory Trade: Thinking Like a Businessman to 

Stop the Business,” National Geographic, February 26, 2013, available 

at <http://newswatch.nationalgeographic.com/2013/02/26/the-ivorytrade-thinking-like-a-businessman-to-stop-the-business/>.

3 Marina Ratchford, Beth Allgood, and Paul Todd, Criminal 

Nature: The Global Security Implications of the Illegal Wildlife Trade 

(Washington, DC: International Fund for Animal Welfare, 2013), 

12-14.

4 Darren Taylor, “New Breed of Poacher Decimates African 

Rhino,” Voice of America, January 20, 2012.

5 Ratchford et al., 14.

6 Mandi Smallhorne, “Think Local to Save Rhino,” Mail & 

Guardian, November 1, 2013.

7 Fiona Macleod, “Poachers, Prostitutes and Profit,” Mail & 

Guardian, July 22, 2011.

8 Julian Rademeyer, Killing for Profit: Exposing the Illegal Rhino 

Horn Trade (Cape Town: Random House Struik, 2012).

9 Julian Rademeyer, “Rhino Butchers Caught on Film at North 

West Game Farm,” Mail & Guardian, November 9, 2012.

10 “Kinana Refutes Ivory Trafficking Claims Made by Opposition 

MPs,” The Guardian, May 8, 2013, available at <http://www.ippmedia.

com/frontend/?l=54430>.

11 Paula Kahumbu, Levi Byamukama, Jackson Mbuthia, and 

Ofir Drori, Scoping Study on the Prosecution of Wildlife Related Crimes in 

Kenyan Courts, January 2008 to June 2013 (Nairobi: Wildlife Direct, 

2014). 

12 Per Liljas, “The Ivory Trade Is Out of Control, and China 

Needs to Do More to Stop It,” Time, November 1, 2013, available at 

<http://world.time.com/2013/11/01/the-ivory-trade-is-out-of-controland-china-needs-to-do-more-to-stop-it/>.

13 “Rhino Horn Demand,” WildAid, 2012, available at <http://www.wildaid.org/sites/default/files/resources/

WEBReportRhinoHornDemand2014.pdf>.

14 Impact Evaluation on Ivory Trade in China, IFAW PSA: ‘Mom, I 

Have Teeth’, Rapid Asia Flash Report (China: International Federation 

for Animal Welfare, May 2013).

15 Dan Levin, “From Elephants’ Mouths, an Illicit Trail to 

China,” The New York Times, March 1, 2013.

16 Brigitte Weidlich, “Namibia Offers Model to Tackle 

Poaching,” South African Press Agency/Agence-France Presse, January 

26, 2013, available at <http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/namibia-offersmodel-to-tackle-poaching-1.1459098>.

17 Garth Owen-Smith, A Brief History of the Conservation and 

Origin of the Concession Areas in the Former Damaraland (Windhoek: 

Integrated Rural Development and Nature Conservation, 

November 2002), available at <http://www.irdnc.org.na/download/

Concessions%20in%20Kunene.pdf>. Daisy Carrington, “How 

Namibia Turned Poachers into Gamekeepers and Saved Rare 

Wildlife,” CNN, October 23, 2012, available at <http://www.cnn.

com/2012/10/23/world/africa/namibia-eye-on-conservation/>. 

18 Kizito Makoye, “Anti-Poaching Operation Spreads Terror in 

Tanzania,” Inter Press Service, January 6, 2014.

19 Interview with Justin Gosling, independent wildlife crime 

consultant, February 21, 2014.

20 Bryan Christy, “China Ivory Prosecution: A Success Exposes 

Fundamental Failure,” National Geographic, May 30, 2013, available 

at <http://newswatch.nationalgeographic.com/2013/05/30/china-ivoryprosecution-a-success-exposes-fundamental-failure/>.