[Cite as State v. Tingler, 2018-Ohio-1542.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 OTTAWA COUNTY 

State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. OT-17-024 

 

 Appellee Trial Court No. 2014-CR-044 

v. 

Charles Tingler DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: April 20, 2018 

* * * * * 

 Charles L. Tingler, pro se. 

* * * * * 

 PIETRYKOWSKI, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Charles Tingler, appeals pro se from the August 30, 2017 

judgment of the Ottawa County Court of Common Pleas denying his motion for a new 

judgment entry. The appeal was placed on the accelerated docket. 

{¶ 2} Appellant was convicted in May 2015 to two counts of inducing panic and 

one count of aggravated menacing. He was sentenced to a total of four years of 
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imprisonment. Appellant filed several motions for judicial release pursuant to R.C. 

2929.20. In a nunc pro tunc judgment entry journalized November 10, 2016, the Ottawa 

County Court of Common Pleas granted appellant judicial release and placed him on 

community control. On April 10, 2017, appellant was charged with violating the terms of 

his community control. In a June 30, 2017 journal entry, the trial court found appellant 

guilty of violating the terms and conditions of his community control and re-imposed his 

remaining four-year prison term. Appellant did not appeal that judgment. On 

September 20, 2017, appellant filed a motion requesting that the June 30, 2017 judgment 

be re-entered to reinstate appellant’s time for appeal. The trial court denied the motion 

on August 30, 2017. Appellant filed an accelerated appeal from this journal entry. 

{¶ 3} First, we note that appellant has failed to comply with the appellate rules in 

several respects. He argues that we should afford him reasonable leeway in the 

construction of his brief. 

{¶ 4} Two principles are at issue in this regard. First, pro se litigants are bound by 

the same rules and procedures as litigants with retained counsel. State v. Church, 5th 

Dist. Stark No. 2017CA00216, 2018-Ohio-368, ¶ 11 (citation omitted). Second, courts 

generally prefer to determine cases on their merits rather than procedural technicalities. 

Mitchell v. Holzer Med. Ctr., 4th Dist. Gallia No. 16CA20, 2017-Ohio-8244, ¶ 7. To 

balance the two principles, courts make some reasonable allowances for the pro se 

litigant. CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Bumphus, 197 Ohio App.3d 68, 2011-Ohio-4858, 966 

N.E.2d 278, ¶ 31 (6th Dist.). However, there is a limit to those allowances and the court 
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cannot become counsel for the litigant. In re T.C.K., 4th Dist. Washington No. 13CA3, 

2013-Ohio-3583, ¶ 7. 

{¶ 5} In the case before us, appellant did not set forth assignments of error, 

specifically argue how the court erred, or make references to the record where the error 

can be found. App.R. 12(A)(2), 16(A)(3) and (7); Smith v. Flesher, 12 Ohio St.2d 107, 

110, 233 N.E.2d 137 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus, superseded by statute on 

other grounds as stated in Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Astorhurst Land Co., 18 Ohio 

St.3d 268, 272, 480 N.E.2d 794 (1985). Without specific assignments of error, we have 

nothing to review. 

{¶ 6} Second, if we can, we will glean from the brief a “cognizable assignment of 

error.” In re T.C.K. In this case, it is clear that appellant argues the trial court did not 

comply with R.C. 2929.20(J) when it granted his motion for judicial release. However, 

that issue is unrelated to the judgment appealed. Appellant filed an appeal from the 

journal entry denying his motion to have the trial court “re-enter” a journal entry (the 

entry finding him guilty of violating the terms and conditions of his community control 

and re-imposing the remainder of his original sentence). Therefore, the only issue we can 

address on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying this motion. 

{¶ 7} Third, even if we consider whether the trial court erred in rendering its 

decision, it is clear as a matter of law that it did not. A trial court has no jurisdiction to 

“re-enter” a prior journal entry in order to enable a party to perfect an appeal. Once a 

judgment satisfies the requirements Crim.R. 32(C), it becomes a final judgment. State v. 
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Gilbert, 143 Ohio St.3d 150, 2014-Ohio-4562, 35 N.E.3d 493, ¶ 8. The trial court is not, 

“‘[a]bsent statutory authority, * * * empowered to modify a criminal sentence by 

reconsidering its own final judgment.’” Id., quoting State v. Carlisle, 131 Ohio St. 3d 

127, 2011-Ohio-6553, 961 N.E.2d 671, ¶ 1. “[F]inality creates ‘certainty in the law and 

public confidence in the system’s ability to resolve disputes.’” Id. (citations omitted). 

Thus, the trial court in this case had no authority to re-journalize the final order of 

June 30, 2017, and we find no merit to appellant’s appeal. 

{¶ 8} Having found that the trial court did not commit error prejudicial to 

appellant and that substantial justice has been done, the judgment of the Ottawa County 

Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal 

pursuant to App.R. 24. 

Judgment affirmed. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. 

See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4. 

Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. _______________________________ 

JUDGE 

James D. Jensen, J. 

_______________________________ 

Christine E. Mayle, P.J. JUDGE 

CONCUR. 

_______________________________ 

JUDGE 

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of 

Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported 

version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: 

http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.