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The

Letort Papers

	 In the early 18th century, James Letort, an explorer and fur

trader, was instrumental in opening up the Cumberland Valley to

settlement. By 1752, there was a garrison on Letort Creek at what

is today Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. In those days, Carlisle

Barracks lay at the western edge of the American colonies. It was a

bastion for the protection of settlers and a departure point for further

exploration. Today, as was the case over two centuries ago, Carlisle

Barracks, as the home of the U.S. Army War College, is a place of

transition and transformation.

	 In the same spirit of bold curiosity that compelled the men and

women who, like Letort, settled the American West, the Strategic

Studies Institute (SSI) presents The Letort Papers. This series allows

SSI to publish papers, retrospectives, speeches, or essays of interest

to the defense academic community which may not correspond with

our mainstream policy-oriented publications.

	 If you think you may have a subject amenable to publication in our

Letort Paper series, or if you wish to comment on a particular paper,

please contact Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II, Director of Research,

U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 122 Forbes Ave,

Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. The phone number is (717) 245-4058; e-mail

address is antulio.echevarria@us.army.mil. We look forward to hearing

from you.
Letort Paper

REFORMING MILITARY COMMAND 

ARRANGEMENTS:

THE CASE OF THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT JOINT 

TASK FORCE

Henrik Bliddal

March 2011

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do 

not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications 

enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them 

to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for 

public release; distribution is unlimited.

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This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copyrighted.
ii

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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should 

be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. 

*****

Too many people to name have helped the author in one way

or another, but he especially wishes to thank the following individuals and institutions: the Royal Danish Defence College’s 

Institute for Strategy (under whose auspices the thesis, on which 

this monograph is based, was written); my interview partners; 

the staffs at the Jimmy Carter Library, the Library of Congress, 

the National Archives and Record Administration, the National 

Defense University and the National Security Archives; Ashwan 

Reddy; Frank L. Jones; Andrew Ludwig; Ingeborg Nørregaard; 

Ferdinand Kjærulff; Magnus Hjortdal; Mathias Lydholm Rasmussen; Bjarke Hauerslev Larsen; Jonathan Harder; Henrik 

Østergaard Breitenbauch; Andrea Pretis; René Rieger; Matthias 

Rockel; and Anders Wivel.

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ISBN 1-58487-481-3
iii

FOREWORD

Our national security system is the tool box with 

which we navigate an ever-changing international environment: It turns our overall capabilities into active 

assets, protects us against the threats of an anarchic 

international system and makes it possible to exploit 

its opportunities. Today, however, the system is arguably in dire need of reform. As Secretary of Defense 

Robert Gates recently argued, “The problem is not 

that past and present administrations have failed to 

recognize and clearly define national interests, but

rather that the evolution of the security environment 

has consistently outpaced the ability of U.S. government institutions and approaches to adapt.”1

Unfortunately, much remains in the dark about 

how the organizations that safeguard our national 

security are reformed as international circumstances 

change. In this monograph, Mr. Henrik Bliddal sheds 

some light on this question by examining a crucial 

historical case of military reform: the establishment of 

the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF)—the 

direct predecessor of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM). 

The monograph demonstrates how the U.S. military adapted to the emerging security challenges in 

the Persian Gulf in the late 1970s by recasting military command arrangements. The RDJTF—although 

only an interim solution on the way to Central Command—was one of the components of President Jimmy Carter’s Persian Gulf Security Framework, which 

marked a critical strategic reorientation towards the 

region as a vital battleground in the global competition with the Soviet Union. Based upon original inter-
views with key civilians and military officers as well as 

extensive archival research—including the analysis of 

material only recently declassified—this monograph 

is the most complete account of the establishment of 

the RDJTF thus far.

Going beyond mere history, Mr. Bliddal also suggests how national security reforms can be understood more generally. In this way, he lays out some 

of the challenges that we face today with effectively 

restructuring our security and defense establishment. 

Especially in these times of fiscal restraint, a better 

grasp of institutional reform is very much needed. 

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to present 

this thorough study of a historic case that can teach us 

lessons pertaining to our problems today.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

ENDNOTE - FOREWORD

1. Robert Gates as quoted in “Gates Disputes Blue-Ribbon 

Panel’s Criticism of QDR Report,” Inside the Navy, August 8, 2010, 

available from InsideDefense.com.

iv
v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

HENRIK BLIDDAL is the Director of the Science 

and Technology Committee at the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) Parliamentary Assembly in Brussels, Belgium. He is also co-editor with Peter Wilson and Casper Sylvest of the book, Classics of 

International Relations (forthcoming 2012). Mr. Bliddal 

has earlier worked as the editor of the Danish peer-reviewed, social science journal, Politik, and has written 

a case study on the U.S. intervention in Liberia in 2003 

for the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), 

which will be published as part of a collection of case 

studies in a volume edited jointly by the PNSR and 

the Strategic Studies Institute (forthcoming 2010/11). 

Mr. Bliddal holds an M.Sc. in political science from the 

University of Copenhagen, Denmark.
vi

SUMMARY

After the Shah of Iran was deposed and the Soviet 

Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the United States 

began to craft a new Persian Gulf Security Framework 

(PGSF). Consisting of military, diplomatic, economic, 

and covert steps, it signified a historic strategic reorientation towards the Persian Gulf. This paper examines an integral part of the PGSF: the creation of the 

Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF). As the 

first real tool for U.S. power projection in the area, and 

the immediate precursor to today’s Central Command 

(CENTCOM), the RDJTF has indeed left an important 

mark on the U.S. approach to the Persian Gulf. This 

paper is the fullest account of its creation thus far.

The RDJTF is both an example of forward strategic 

thinking as well as one of organizational resistance and 

competing understandings of the international environment. In Jimmy Carter’s first year as President, the 

administration recognized an acute weakness in U.S. 

power projection capabilities and consequently mandated the creation of a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). 

However, for almost 2 years, nothing happened because the U.S. military services were not interested in 

such an RDF. Differences at the senior level about how 

to react to Soviet actions in the Persian Gulf provided 

additional cover for the military to ignore the RDF. 

Only the fall of the Iranian regime in early 1979 put the 

RDF back on the agenda. However, the military was 

soon locked into an interservice quarrel that pitted 

the Army against the Marine Corps. A compromise 

was adopted in October 1979 that established a semiautonomous RDJTF to be led by a Marine commander 

under an Army superior and with a global role, but an 
vii

initial focus on the Persian Gulf. At the same time, key 

figures on the National Security Council staff started 

advocating for a separate unified command for Southwest Asia. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 

they were able to push harder for this objective, but 

gridlock in the military services was now joined by a 

struggle for control between the Marine commander 

of the RDJTF and his Army superior. Even though the 

costs of delayed RDF implementation became clear, 

when a serious Soviet military threat to Iran emerged 

in the summer of 1980, the Carter administration was 

still not able to establish a unified command, which 

had to wait until President Ronald Reagan’s terms in 

office. 

Today, policy advocates are calling for wide-ranging changes in the way the United States is organized 

to meet the threats of a new security environment. In 

this light, the case of the RDJTF takes on additional 

significance, since it represents a major adjustment 

in a changing international environment. For despite 

all the advocacy and activity, still too little is known 

about the difficulties that so often plague reform processes. This paper therefore turns to the past to recognize some of the challenges ahead. Thus, even though 

the national security system has changed greatly over 

the past 30 years, this paper ends with the suggestion that the underlying mechanics of reform have 

not changed and lays out a model for understanding 

national security reforms. It is argued that efforts at 

national security system reform are caught between 

two logics: Policymakers push to adapt to shifting 

international conditions, but national security organizations continually strive for greater autonomy in the 

national security system and bigger shares of the budget. These two logics are most often at odds, thus pro-
ducing sub-optimal results. Further studies of the reform processes are therefore essential. It is not enough 

to know how best to rearrange the system, which is 

a very difficult task in itself. Equally important, the 

organizational hurdles for reform must be analyzed 

much more closely. Only then will the United States 

be able to take real steps to improve its institutional 

capacity to deal with the challenges of the 21st century.

viii
1

REFORMING MILITARY COMMAND 

ARRANGEMENTS:

THE CASE OF THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT JOINT 

TASK FORCE

LONG-TERM STRATEGIC THINKING MEETS 

ORGANIZATIONAL POLITICS1

In the Middle East, [the Soviets] are in possibly the 

weakest position since they entered the area in 1956.2

— National Security Advisor

Zbigniew Brzezinski, 

 February 26, 1977

Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any 

outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region 

will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of 

the United States of America, and such an assault will 

be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.3

 [The Carter Doctrine]

— President Jimmy Carter,

 January 23, 1980

It is a long way between Zbigniew Brzezinski’s assessment of the Soviet position in the Middle East and 

the Carter Doctrine formulated by President Carter a 

month after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Over 

the course of Carter’s presidency (1977-81), fundamental changes occurred on the international stage. 

After Richard Nixon had moved the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union towards 

détente, the Carter administration was faced with an 

ever more assertive Soviet regime. The changing tide 

was nowhere more evident than in the “arc of crisis”4

that stretched from the Horn of Africa through the 
2

Arabian Peninsula to Pakistan. By 1979, the U.S. security framework for this region was indeed in ruins, 

as the fall of the Shah in Iran and the Soviet invasion 

of Afghanistan had destroyed the local equilibrium, 

and the world soon witnessed renewed and intense 

competition between the two superpowers.

The steps taken after Ayatollah Khomeini seized 

power in Tehran and the Soviets marched into Kabul 

have been described as an “important and far-reaching 

redirection of U.S. geopolitical strategy.”5

 To rebuild 

the U.S. position in the region, the Carter administration introduced a new Persian Gulf Security Framework (PGSF), consisting of a number of military, diplomatic, economic, and covert steps. 

This paper examines an integral part of the PGSF: 

the creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force 

(RDJTF), the immediate precursor to today’s United 

States Central Command (CENTCOM). It examines 

the origins of the RDJTF in much greater detail than 

previous studies6 and contrasts the generally negative, but often superficial, view of President Carter’s 

national security politics with the realities in the administration (which, granted, were frequently ill-communicated to the U.S. public).7

The importance of the PGSF and the RDJTF, as 

pieces of Cold War history, should not be underestimated. The late General William E. Odom, Brzezinski’s 

military assistant under Carter and later Director of 

the National Security Agency, has argued in an article 

on the RDJTF that the development of the PGSF “was 

critical to the success of Operations DESERT SHIELD 

and DESERT STORM in 1990-1991, the toppling of the 

Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2001-2002, the 

U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, and many smaller operations in the 1980s and 1990s.”8

 The Carter years thus 
3

introduced a “switch in U.S. priorities, away from 

the Northeast Asian and European theatre[s] and in 

favour of the Persian Gulf region”9—a switch that is 

arguably still ongoing. In his article, Odom concedes 

that he was not able to tell the full story of the RDJTF, 

but he hoped to “inspire some scholar to undertake a 

full account in the future.”10 Historical examination is 

never complete, but this paper aspires to be the fullest account yet, resting on original research in U.S. archives and interviews with participants in the policy 

processes at the time.11

However, more than just a history of the origins 

of CENTCOM and the beginning of a deeper strategic involvement with the Persian Gulf region,12 the 

story of the RDJTF as an example of organizational 

reform in the U.S. military tells an all-too-familiar 

tale: long-term strategic thinking meeting parochial 

service interests in the pre-Goldwater-Nichols era.13

It is in this light that the case of the RDJTF takes on 

added significance today. In the wake of the terrorist 

attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), vocal calls for 

changes in the national security apparatus have once 

again emerged, arguing that the U.S. national security 

system is in dire need of adapting to a changing threat 

environment. Some reforms have taken place, but it is 

clear that there is still a long way to go in reforming 

the U.S. national security establishment.

The final report of the 9/11 Commission concluded that the failures in the lead-up to the attacks were 

“symptoms of the government’s broader inability to 

adapt how it manages problems to the new challenges 

of the twenty-first century.”14 In a recent large-scale 

review of the U.S. national security system, the conclusions were similar: The Guiding Coalition of the 

Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), which 
4

included such luminaries as General James L. Jones, 

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and Brent Scowcroft, warned that 

“the national security system of the United States 

is increasingly misaligned with a rapidly changing 

global security environment.”15 They go on to suggest that “the United States simply cannot afford the 

failure rate that the current national security system is 

not only prone but virtually guaranteed to cause” and 

that, in the absence of further reforms, “even the wisest men and women upon whom we come to depend 

are doomed to see their most solid policyunderstandings crumble into the dust of failure.”16

Interestingly, despite all the advocacy and policy 

activity, still far too little is known about the obstacles that have plagued reforms over the years.17 If the 

United States is to successfully rearrange its national 

security organizations, the underlying mechanics of 

reforms have to be more fully understood. One way 

to better understand the processes of reform is to turn 

to the past to recognize the challenges ahead. This paper therefore ends with a suggestion on how reform 

processes can be understood more generally. It argues 

that, while the context of reforms will change, the core 

logic of reform does not. It is thus hoped that this paper can shed some light on national security reform 

processes to point to better solutions in the future. For 

even the best policy advice will fail if one does not 

know how to favorably shape the process and implement the reform decisions.

THE STONY ROAD TOWARDS THE RDJTF

The analysis of the RDJTF falls into five parts. First, 

the context of the incoming Carter administration is 

provided by briefly reviewing U.S. strategy in the Per-
5

sian Gulf between World War II and 1977. Second, the 

period from the inauguration of President Carter until 

the fall of the Shah of Iran is examined. Third, the time 

between the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is analyzed. Fourth, the crucial 

period between the invasion and President Reagan’s 

inauguration, including an account of the Soviet military threat to Iran and the Persian Gulf as a whole, is 

scrutinized. Fifth, an epilogue is offered that briefly 

explains the way to the creation of CENTCOM.

THE LEGACY: U.S. STRATEGY IN THE PERSIAN 

GULF BEFORE 1977

Before analyzing the Carter administration’s engagement with the Persian Gulf, it is helpful to understand the policies and military command arrangements that the new administration inherited. The 

Nixon and Gerald Ford years had bestowed upon 

President Carter a low-profile military strategy towards the Persian Gulf. In fact, the Middle East had 

never commanded the same attention as Europe and 

Northeast Asia in U.S. grand strategy before Carter’s 

election: The United States had no formal treaty relationships in the Middle East, and little in-depth military planning and presence existed.18

Traditionally, the United Kingdom (UK) had provided a security umbrella for the Middle East. However, after World War II and especially after the Suez 

Crisis of 1956, it increasingly withdrew from the region. U.S. strategic interaction with the area has thus 

been described as compensating for the waning British 

presence. In 1957, in reaction to fears that the Union 

of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) would intervene 

on Egypt’s behalf in the Suez Canal Crisis, the Eisen-
6

hower Doctrine was formulated, which promised economic and military assistance for states in the region 

against Soviet intrusions.19 President Eisenhower also 

focused on the stability of the so-called Northern Tier 

states (Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan) by supporting 

the UK-led Baghdad Pact (later renamed the Central 

Treaty Organization after Iraq dropped out) and by 

signing security agreements with Turkey, Iran, and 

Pakistan in 1959.

In 1971, the UK practically disengaged from the 

region when it withdrew its military forces from all 

its bases that were “east-of-Suez,” most importantly 

from Yemen, the states on the Persian Gulf, Malaysia, 

and Singapore. Unsurprisingly, the USSR tried to fill 

the ensuing power vacuum by, for example, signing a 

friendship treaty with Iraq in 1972.20 President Nixon 

responded by drawing on his own 3-year-old Nixon 

Doctrine, which emphasized that U.S. allies had to 

rely on self-defense first, if they wanted to be covered 

by the U.S. security umbrella.21 Thus, the United States 

conceived of the so-called Twin Pillar strategy, which 

centered on Iran and Saudi Arabia as its primary allies 

in the Gulf. This reflected, in the words of the State 

Department, “the assumption that regional dynamics 

were, in large measure, adequate to deal with local 

problems.”22

In terms of military command arrangements, the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) decided to create a Middle 

East Command in 1956, but the State Department objected, and nothing ever came of it.23 Thus, shifting arrangements for the Middle East prevailed until 1963, 

when the Congo civil war prompted the United States 

to assign the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and 

Southern Asia to the newly-created Strike Command 

(STRICOM), which was charged with reinforcing oth-
7

er commands and carrying out certain contingency 

operations. Under Nixon, however, budget cuts and 

increasing aversion to Vietnam-like interventions led 

to divestment of STRICOM’s area responsibilities and 

a name change to Readiness Command (REDCOM). 

By 1977, responsibility for the Persian Gulf region was 

therefore split between European Command (EUCOM) on land and Pacific Command (PACOM) on 

sea.

In sum, President Carter inherited a strategy towards the Persian Gulf that relied on the capabilities 

of regional allies to preserve U.S. interests and a military command arrangement that split the region between EUCOM and PACOM.

FROM CARTER’S INAUGURATION TO THE 

FALL OF THE SHAH

Détente and the Persian Gulf in 1977.

From the outset, the Carter administration followed a strategy that would reestablish U.S.-Soviet 

détente and stabilize the military equilibrium between 

the two superpowers. Carter also introduced a number of new, “idealist” foreign policy goals, such as restraint on arms sales in order to reduce military competition. In the Persian Gulf region, it was thought that 

the Twin Pillars strategy and the countries it primarily 

rested on, Iran and Saudi Arabia, were stable, and that 

political trends were adverse to Soviet interests.

President Carter had entered office at a difficult 

juncture in U.S. history. As the country struggled in 

the aftermath of the Vietnam War and the Watergate 

scandal, the President was confronted with a multitude of difficult issues. After a year in office, the Na-
8

tional Security Council (NSC) staff looked back upon 

the rather poor inheritance they felt President Ford 

had left them in 1977: 

Our allies were uneasy about our constancy, our will 

and our ability to lead. Our adversaries were openly 

speculating about the political consequences of “the 

general crisis of capitalism.” The Third World was 

generally hostile or disappointed. The American public distrusted our policies and deplored the apparent 

lack of moral content in our actions and goals.24 

The President and his advisors believed that they 

were faced with a similar situation as that which faced 

President Harry S. Truman in the wake of World War 

II. A redirection of U.S. foreign policy was necessary, 

and nothing less than a new international system, increasingly involving all states, was the ultimate goal. 

Carter distinctively broadened U.S. foreign policy 

goals in opposition to the Nixon/Henry Kissinger approach. Ten policy objectives topped Carter’s foreign 

policy list, when he entered office:

1. Stronger ties with Western Europe, Japan and 

other advanced democracies.

2. Development of a worldwide net of bilateral cooperation with emerging regional powers.

3. Improved North-South relations.

4. Development of a more comprehensive and reciprocal détente with the USSR.

5. Normalization of the U.S.-Chinese relationship.

6. A comprehensive Middle Eastern settlement.

7. Progressive change in Africa.

8. Disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation.

9. Increasing focus on human rights.

10. Restoration of strong U.S. and North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) defense postures.
9

Indicative of reorienting U.S. foreign policy towards issues other than the U.S.-USSR relationship 

was the fact that the USSR was not even mentioned in 

his inaugural speech.25 This, of course, did not mean 

that the USSR was not still of central concern. On the 

contrary, the U.S.-Soviet relationship would soon and 

quite forcefully come back on the agenda.

At the beginning, Carter’s National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, was hopeful that a meaningful détente with the USSR could be reestablished after 

it had been strained in recent years. A month after the 

inauguration, he argued that “Brezhnev has made a 

personal and public commitment to reestablishing the 

‘detente’ policy.”26 After the election, the USSR, in his 

view, wanted to show “that detente could be set back 

but not fundamentally altered.”27

Already in the summer of 1977, Brzezinski saw 

some clouds on the horizon, however, especially regarding the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks.28 Nevertheless, William Hyland, an NSC staffer on the 

USSR and East Europe desk, argued in a June 1977 

memorandum forwarded to Carter that “too much of 

the current analysis focuses on the transitory, while 

disregarding the permanent problems confronting the 

USSR.” He came to the conclusion that “many of the 

permanent factors seem to point to an eventual turn in 

Soviet policy back toward something resembling ‘détente’.”29 A couple of weeks later, however, Brzezinski wrote the President that “your first period of true 

testing in international affairs is now upon us”—not 

least in the U.S.-USSR relationship.30 When 1977 drew 

to a close, the State Department ended on a rather upbeat note, however, writing that “the Soviets have on 

a whole been rather forthcoming,” while still noting 

“potentially disruptive developments.”31
The United States was also optimistic regarding 

the Persian Gulf. Historically, Russia had had an interest in obtaining access to the Persian Gulf, but there 

was “little direct evidence” that the USSR was “actively pursuing that goal.”32 In fact, the USSR had not 

been able to capitalize on the British withdrawal from 

“east-of-Suez,” as its treaty with Iraq had been the 

only significant gain, and relations with most states 

had worsened (even with Iraq).33 More importantly, 

it had suffered a severe loss with the expulsion from 

Egypt in 1972. In December 1976, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had thus assessed that trends 

were clearly detrimental to Soviet interests in the 

Gulf/Peninsula region. Nevertheless, the USSR could 

bide its time, since opportunities could quickly present themselves. Furthermore, because of its energy 

independence, it possessed no vital interests in the region. Consequently, in the eyes of the CIA, the USSR 

had the (mostly negative) goal of depriving the West 

of influence, leading to an expectation of a lower level 

of effort and less inclination to risk confrontation with 

the United States.

Carter’s promise of a more moral and humane foreign policy also played a role regarding the Persian 

Gulf. One goal was “to limit the world’s armaments 

to those necessary for each nation’s own domestic safety.”34 A policy of unilateral restraint on arms 

transfers was therefore soon joined with U.S.-Soviet 

negotiations under the banner of the Conventional 

Arms Transfer and Indian Ocean talks.35 Whereas the 

former sought to reduce global arms transfers, the latter were meant to stabilize U.S.-Soviet regional competition. After all, the military balance in the region 

seemed to favor the United States.36 The USSR, after 

some hesitation, made an initial commitment to these 

10
11

two initiatives, but states in the Persian Gulf increasingly began to doubt U.S. commitment to the region as 

a consequence.37

An Early Strategy Review and the Need for Rapid 

Deployment Forces.

As in most administrations, Carter initiated a 

thorough review of U.S. national strategy early on.38

On February 18, 1977, he signed Presidential Review 

Memorandum (PRM) 10, which directed that “a comprehensive examination be made of overall U.S. national strategy and capabilities.”39 PRM-10 had two 

components: a Military Force Posture Review and a 

Comprehensive Net Assessment.40 While the former 

dealt with global military strategies, the latter was 

a dynamic review and looked at “past, present, and 

probable future trends in the evolution of the principal 

capabilities” between the eastern and western bloc.41

The Comprehensive Net Assessment concluded 

that a rough overall equivalence existed in conventional military capabilities and an essential equivalence in nuclear forces.42 Crucially, however, while 

the United States was significantly ahead and likely 

to remain so in all nonmilitary aspects of power, future trends in every military category were adverse.43

In regional terms, the outlook was difficult in Europe; 

equilibrium had developed in Northeast Asia; and the 

Persian Gulf “had become vital to the West and also 

vulnerable to the combination of internal fragility and 

growing Soviet power projection into the region.”44

The Gulf was still not on par with Europe and Northeast Asia in importance, but it was clear to the Carter 

administration that it had become much more central 

to global geopolitics.
12

Soviet power projection capabilities had become 

of critical concern, according to the Comprehensive 

Net Assessment. In this respect, the Persian Gulf was 

especially worrisome because the two superpowers 

had “about equal ability to project forces” into the region.45 Since the Comprehensive Net Assessment also 

judged that “the Soviets would now be more prone 

to use military power for political ends,” the need for 

increased capabilities to respond to global contingencies was clear. It was thus agreed that forces for crisis management and local wars should be added on 

top of those required for a NATO-Warsaw Pact war.46

The most relevant areas for such a highly responsive, 

global strike force were the Middle East, the Persian 

Gulf and Korea.

Rapid deployment was particularly important in 

the Gulf because Iran had been identified as the most 

likely locale for a Soviet-induced crisis confrontation. 

Summarizing the relevant study paper, Brzezinski 

told Carter:

The paper identifies Iran as the “one contiguous nonsatellite state” that could be the “possible site for a 

Soviet-initiated [crisis confrontation].” It meets the 

criteria which Soviet leaders and planners might use if 

they were consciously attempting to expand their influence through the political use of military force and 

wished to confront the U.S. with a situation in which 

it would suffer a diplomatic humiliation if it made 

no response or would risk military defeat if it made a 

military response.47

A requirement for the development of a rapid 

deployment force (RDF) was thus written into Presidential Directive (PD) 18 (“U.S. National Strategy”) 

that resulted from the PRM-10 process: “[T]he United 
13

States will maintain a deployment force of light divisions with strategic mobility independent of overseas 

bases and logistical support, which includes moderate 

naval and tactical air forces, and limited land combat 

forces.”48

It should be noted here that the RDF requirement 

should not be seen as the beginning of a new overall strategy in the Gulf. It is better understood as a 

planned military tool that was supposed to bolster 

regional strategies, such as the Twin Pillar strategy. 

Indeed, after PRM-10/PD-18 had been issued, it was 

the negative trends in Europe that commanded the 

administration’s attention for the most part. Furthermore, in Odom’s view, the RDF largely slipped into 

PD-18 because no one seriously cared about it other 

than a number of NSC staffers (in particular Odom 

himself and Samuel Huntington, who was an NSC 

staffer on national security planning at the time): 

Although only a few agency participants supported 

the RDF proposal, others did not seriously object to 

including it in PD-18. Locked into their daily routines 

and worried mainly about current problems, the skeptics probably viewed it as largely academic and not 

worth a quarrel.49

The PD-18 process also revealed the first differences of opinion in the administration about its strategy 

towards the Persian Gulf. Most policymakers wanted 

to deal with the Persian Gulf via détente and arms control efforts, but some, particularly on the NSC staff, 

were very concerned with the Soviet military buildup 

and the region’s criticality to the United States.50 At the 

time of PD-18, the former side prevailed, and most of 

the strategic attention was devoted to détente, Europe, 

the Egyptian-Israeli peace process, and China.51 Wil-
14

liam Quandt, an NSC staffer for the Middle East and 

North Africa at the time, did not sense “that there was 

any strong sentiment that [the United States] needed 

a significant upgrading of military capabilities in the 

Gulf.”52

Soviet Actions from the Horn of Africa to 

Afghanistan.

The first 2 years of the Carter presidency were 

busy ones: rebuilding détente, reinvigorating NATO, 

moving towards closer ties with China, resolution of 

the Panama Canal issue, crafting an Egyptian-Israeli 

peace, reformulation of nuclear strategy, and the infusion of human rights concerns into global politics. It is 

thus not surprising that the United States relied on its 

friends, Iran and Saudi Arabia, to safeguard its interests in the Persian Gulf region. Soon, however, Soviet 

actions made it unavoidable to take a closer look at 

regional security.

It was a conflict in the Horn of Africa that revealed 

profound differences within the administration on its 

regional security policy. Traditionally a U.S. client, a 

revolutionary government in Ethiopia had recently 

moved closer to the USSR. When it decided to expel 

most U.S. personnel, the Soviet Union found itself in 

the position of being the patron of both Ethiopia and 

Somalia, with which it had long entertained close ties. 

In the summer of 1977, however, Siad Barré, Somalia’s 

heavy-handed dictator, decided to invade Ethiopia’s 

Ogaden region, which Somalia had claimed for a long 

time. After Soviet-led negotiations failed to produce a 

settlement, the USSR dropped Somalia as a client and 

instead undertook a massive military airlift in support 

of Ethiopia (and Cuban forces). Somalia consequently 
15

sought closer contacts with the United States. As an 

Ethiopian intrusion loomed large, the United States 

thus faced a severe dilemma: Could it afford to acquiesce in the Soviet show of force, be left without any 

allies in the Horn, and lose standing with Somalia’s 

Arab and Iranian backers, or should the United States 

support an aggressor and violate its new policies on 

arms sales and human rights?

The issue came to a head in a meeting on February 

22, 1978, where it was discussed whether to send an 

aircraft carrier to deter an Ethiopian intrusion. Brzezinski advocated it; Secretary of State Cyrus Vance 

emphatically opposed it; and, ultimately, Secretary 

of Defense Harold Brown could not see much value 

in it, either. Brzezinski argued that a carrier would be 

“a confidence building measure” to assure the local 

states of U.S. presence and will, as well as its determination to protect arms flows and to provide protection 

against the USSR.53 He feared the consequences of an 

Ethiopian invasion because it “would contribute to 

uncertainty and destabilization in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran.” States would feel “that if they are in 

a contest, they should not get caught relying on the 

United States.” Vance strongly disagreed and “hated 

to see Somalia characterized as a friend we are letting down.” He instead argued that the United States 

should keep its forces out, even if Ethiopia crossed the 

border, and seek a political solution (possibly followed 

by arms sales). Otherwise, the United States would be 

playing a bluff that it could not carry through. Brown 

shared Brzezinski’s concerns and argued that the United States could not “let the Soviets fish in troubled waters.” However, he was skeptical of the military merits 

of sending a carrier, even though he was inclined to 

support it, if the Iranians or Saudi sent troops to So-
16

malia. In the end, he did not take Brzezinski’s side, 

since he saw failure as too likely, which would have 

had serious repercussions, as it would have reduced 

the credibility of U.S. task forces in the future. After 

the meeting, the President did not support the move 

either.54

This episode would prove important since it demonstrated the very different views on Soviet behavior 

in the Third World and the strategic importance of assuring allies in the Persian Gulf. Brzezinski attributed 

this split over policy to different views of détente in 

the administration. One view, close to his own, asserted that the Soviets had “stomped all over the code 

of détente.”55 Others argued that recent Soviet actions 

had to be considered case by case, and they were, in 

general, “acting on traditional lines and essentially reacting to U.S. steps.”

Brzezinski, however, continued to contend that the 

USSR had violated the jointly agreed rules of détente 

with their actions in Ethiopia, Yemen, and Afghanistan. After a coup in South Yemen, he pointed to the 

vulnerability of U.S. allies in the Gulf, as he saw the 

balance in the region shifting: 

[T]he Soviets, having installed their crew in Kabul 

[The USSR had already supported a coup in Afghanistan earlier that year], having attempted the same in 

Baghdad, with Addis in their pocket, have now added 

another link in the ever-tighter chain encircling the 

moderate Arabs.

Some tentative discussions on regional security 

occurred during the remainder of 1978, but they remained rather vague and without much direction.56

Most, especially in the State Department, remained unconvinced that a comprehensive security framework 

could be created for the region. For example, a State 
17

Department paper questioned whether the region was 

amenable “to support a unique regional concept and 

the consequent application of a consistent single U.S. 

strategy” and whether regional states would “support 

a dramatic U.S. military or political response.”57 In an 

argument that the Department would later take up 

again, it saw a danger that U.S. actions in the region 

could indeed be counterproductive, driving Arab 

states away from, rather than toward, the U.S. security 

umbrella.

The fact that the Iranian regime was not yet seen at 

grave risk of collapse very likely contributed to a missing focus on the region. For example, on November 3, 

1978, Brzezinski still told the President: “Good news! 

According to a CIA assessment, issued in August, Iran 

is not in a revolutionary or even a ‘pre-revolutionary’ 

situation.”58 More remarkably, only 2 months before 

the Shah left Iran, the U.S. ambassador for the first 

time raised the possibility of his downfall.59 

At the policymaking level, Brzezinski and some 

NSC staffers stood alone in their dour view of the region. In a tragic case of foresight, Brzezinski probably 

wrote his most famous memo on December 2, 1978.60

He warned of an emerging “arc of crisis”—stretching 

“from Chittagona (Bangladesh) through Islamabad 

to Aden”—where the United States was most vulnerable. He indeed saw “the beginning of a major crisis.” 

Since friendly states in the region felt that the United 

States would not or could not “offer effective political 

and military protection,” Soviet-friendly groups were 

free to exploit the political vacuum. This led him to the 

following conclusion:

[T]he West as a whole may be faced with a challenge 

of historic proportions. A shift in Iranian/Saudi orientation would have a direct impact on [U.S.-European-
18

Japanese] cohesion, and it would induce in time more 

“neutralist” attitudes on the part of some of our key allies. In a sentence, it would mean a fundamental shift 

in the global structure of power.

The events in 1977/1978 showed that the administration was split on whether the regional military balance in the Persian Gulf was shifting at all, whether it 

was worth risking the global strategy of détente, and 

whether increased military presence would assure or 

alienate friends. The events in Iran would soon force 

the United States to define its regional balancing strategy much more clearly than it had in the past, but the 

policy differences would only partially disappear. Before the consequences of the Iranian Revolution can be 

addressed, the organizational response to the PD-18 

requirement to establish an RDF must be considered, 

however.

Organizational Disinterest in the Rapid 

Deployment Force.

In 1977-78, implementing the RDF requirement of 

PD-18 was arguably at the bottom of the agenda in the 

Department of Defense (DoD) and the military. No 

organization saw any benefits to be gained by taking 

up the issue: There was virtually no money allotted 

for the task; other requirements weighed heavily on 

the military; a latent resistance to look at command 

arrangements existed; and no real pressure from the 

political level was forthcoming.

Indeed, in the declassified material that was available for this paper, there is but one brief mention of 

the implementation of the RDF in connection with a 

JCS Limited Contingency Study for a Petroleum Sup-
19

ply Vulnerability Assessment. However, even this 

study looked only at what type of capabilities were 

needed for contingencies in the Persian Gulf region.61

This arguably seems far from an actual implementation effort. Yet, the absence of discussion on the RDF 

requirement speaks volumes, as there were no real incentives to tackle it. 

First, no real funding was set aside for an RDF. As 

a reason for the lack of efforts to establish the RDF, a 

DoD paper would later argue that “most of the programmatic decisions” for the budget for Fiscal Year 

1979 (October 1, 1978-September 30, 1979) had already 

been made before PD-18 was signed.62 Without funding, Odom argues, DoD “lacked the resources to create [an RDF], having experienced a 38 percent decline 

in its budget since 1968.”63

Second, the highest defense priorities in the wake 

of PD-18 were nuclear modernization programs and 

NATO reinvigoration. Taking up the RDF challenge 

would have created an additional burden on the DoD 

and the Services. As Njølstad argues, “it went without saying that it would be difficult, if not impossible, 

to maintain a credible forward defence posture in 

Europe and build a rapid deployment capability in 

other regions at the same time.”64 Robert Murray, who 

was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and later Undersecretary of 

the Navy under President Carter, points in the same 

direction: 

A lot of our attention and devotion . . . —in the budget—was to that shifting of the strategy from a ‘nuclear-first’ to a ‘conventional-first’ strategy [in Europe], 

which required a lot of effort on the part of the European Command [which was also in charge of the Persian Gulf countries] and so forth.65
20

Third, as the RDF was supposed to be a joint venture between the military Services, it is highly likely 

that none of them cared much about implementing it. 

In fact, there is no reason to believe that the intense 

organizational struggles between the Services that 

would take place, when the administration pushed for 

implementation later would not have taken place in 

1977 or 1978 as well.

Fourth, there was—in Odom’s words—“no real 

sponsor outside the NSC for an increased security effort for the Persian Gulf,”66 i.e., there was no pressure 

from the senior policy level. Along these lines, Brown 

suggests “that part of the reason that there was not a 

rapid implementation of PD-18 was that the specific 

contingencies seemed remote.”67 Indeed, Odom would 

later tell Brzezinski:

Convinced that they would demilitarize the Indian 

Ocean, the [International Security Affairs] staff in Defense had no time or enthusiasm for the RDF. They got 

lots of encouragement from State and no discouragement from NSC regional and security clusters.68

The State Department, as Odom argues, “tended 

to view any larger U.S. military presence as provocative to radical political groups throughout the Arab 

world” and was thus not very interested in the RDF.69

With a lot to lose and nothing to gain for the DoD, 

the State Department, and the military Services, it is 

not surprising that no one took up the RDF challenge 

before the Iranian Revolution compelled the administration to again think about basic U.S. strategy in the 

Persian Gulf and to push for a change. Even though 

negative trends regarding power projection capabilities led to the requirement to establish an RDF, in the 

absence of consensus at the top, and with a political 

focus on other foreign and security priorities, such 
21

as normalizing the U.S.-China relationship, the road 

to the Camp David Accords, or the reinvigoration of 

NATO, the RDF could be safely ignored by the DoD 

and the military, which saw no incentives to tackle it.

FROM THE FALL OF THE SHAH TO THE 

INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN

First Steps towards a New Regional Security 

Framework.

When the Shah of Iran had to go into exile, an 

important U.S. ally was removed from the regional 

equation in the Gulf. This spawned renewed strategic thinking. The DoD began to slowly come around 

to NSC staff preferences, which started isolating the 

State Department. Brzezinski was the first to press for 

an increased regional commitment, development of a 

regional geopolitical dialogue and enhanced military 

presence.70 In February 1979, Brown was sent on the 

first trip by a U.S. Secretary of Defense to Egypt, Saudi 

Arabia, and Jordan. He “did assure them—and had 

the agreement of the President to be able to assure 

them—that we were prepared to defend them.”71 Soon, 

according to Odom, the Conventional Arms Transfer 

and Indian Ocean talks “were no longer in the foreground,” and the improvement of military presence 

“had become a legitimate step.”72

On February 28, 1979, the NSC staffer Fritz Ermarth was arguably the first to put the new situation 

into an overall strategic picture with his paper, “Consultative Security Framework for the Middle East,”73

which would serve as a reference point for Brzezinski 

in the coming months. He argued that the future of 

regional states, especially of U.S. allies, had become 

“uncertain and threatening.” They lacked “confidence 
22

in the direction of U.S. policy and in the willingness 

of the United States to use its power in behalf of their 

security.” He therefore recommended the creation of 

a new security framework that would neither be “a 

formal alliance system” nor “simply another name 

for bilateral cooperation on security issues.” Instead 

regional allies should realize common interests and 

cooperate on security issues. Crucially, he also called 

for an “East-of-Suez Command entity of some kind, 

located in the United States but equipped to move.”

The differing approaches towards U.S. strategy 

vis-à-vis the USSR were revealed again, however, 

when Brzezinski sent out Comprehensive Net Assessment 1978, a follow-up to PRM-10, on March 30, 

1979.74 It maintained that the overall conclusions of 

PRM-10 were still valid, but noted Soviet gains in the 

Persian Gulf, Middle East and Africa, an improving 

European balance, and a continuing negative trend in 

Soviet power projection capabilities. While Brown reacted positively, the State Department took issue with 

the study, arguing that the “appraisals of strategic and 

power projection trends are too somber [and] the positive NATO trends may be somewhat overstated.”75

A turning point came at a meeting on May 11.76 All 

participants agreed that the Saudis had “lost confidence in the United States’ ability to help them manage their security problems.” In order to reverse that 

perception, a number of military options were to be 

studied, including an enhancement of naval presence, 

pre-positioning of military equipment in the area, and 

increases in rapid deployment capabilities.

After the meeting, the DoD increasingly engaged 

in broader strategic thinking.77 The next critical steps 

came at two meetings on June 21 and 22. Before the 

meetings, Ermarth judged that they “could be among 
23

the most significant of this Administration.”78 He felt 

that the United States was “now getting down to hard 

military business.”

The State Department, the Central Intelligence 

Agency (CIA), and DoD all prepared papers on U.S. 

regional strategy for these meetings. Only the DoD 

paper and a preparatory JCS study have thus far been 

declassified, but the direction of the other papers can 

be derived from NSC staff comments. In the eyes of 

two NSC staffers critical of the paper, the State Department contribution was inconclusive; it provided 

“little basis for decision,” failed to address fundamental questions, and was “aimed at discounting the need 

for increases in U.S. permanent military presence.”79

Instead, it argued that the Egyptian-Israeli peace process needed to “continue to have the highest priority 

in U.S. regional policy.” Even though the State Department and CIA seemed to be open to some increase 

in U.S. presence, the staffers noted that the papers 

“clearly go to great lengths . . . to stress the penalties of 

adverse local reaction and the case for great moderation.” Here, as in the episode in the Ethiopian-Somali 

war, the State Department called attention to the possibility that increasing U.S. capabilities might indeed 

be detrimental to U.S. policies: Regional states, feeling the pressure of internal opposition, could distance 

themselves from the United States, thus undermining 

the value of increased U.S. presence.

In contrast, the JCS and DoD papers clearly pointed 

towards the need for more military presence. On the 

whole, the JCS recommended enhanced involvement, 

greater assertiveness, and a coherent regional strategy, while still emphasizing the need for local states to 

“bear the burden of their own security.”80 They argued 

that “the trends in both the strategic nuclear and con-
24

ventional measures of military power have encouraged the Soviet leaders to continue their probes and 

to press more forcefully in areas beyond the relatively 

secure barriers in Europe and Asia.” The development 

of a comprehensive strategy was seen as a long-term 

process, but short-term steps had to be taken as well—

even at the risk of degrading U.S. defense posture in 

Europe or the Pacific, showing how serious the JCS 

took the shifts in the balance. A direct intervention in 

Iran by the Soviets was already seen as a grave danger, but was “unlikely short of a world war scenario.” 

It was improbable that NATO allies would redirect 

resources to the Gulf, they argued. Thus, the United 

States had to “develop the capability to project a multidivisional force from [the continental United States], 

supported by air and naval forces”—in other words, 

an RDF. An indicator of the unwillingness to look at 

the accompanying command arrangements of such a 

force is the fact that the suggestion to “[a]nalyze the 

present U.S. command and control structure for the 

area to see if modification is required” was buried 

deep in the paper.

The DoD paper continued along the same lines. It 

defined U.S. goals in the region as (a) continued U.S. 

and allied access to oil, (b) the security of Israel and (c) 

minimization of Soviet influence.81 The fundamental 

questions were thus to what degree support for selfdefense and/or U.S. military presence and capability 

in the region had to be increased. Crucially, in light of 

later realities, the paper assessed that regional crises 

would have long lead times and that the USSR would 

not move through Iran if it wanted to meddle in the 

Gulf. This led to the judgment that “the United States 

could surge more capable ground, naval, and tactical 

air forces than the Soviets to the Persian Gulf in the 
25

first thirty days of a conflict”—an assumption that had 

to be substantially revised barely a year later.

In the actual meeting, according to Odom, the State 

Department “made as strong an argument as possible 

against the increased military presence” and “went so 

far as to argue that an increased U.S. presence would 

look to Moscow as a new and different balance.”82

Nevertheless, Brzezinski and Brown were on the 

same page at the meeting, and Brzezinski was able to 

bring the President aboard afterwards. It was therefore decided to increase the naval U.S. Middle East 

Force (MIDEASTFOR) in Bahrain from three to five 

or six combat vessels and to deploy four combatant 

elements to the region annually. These meetings thus 

marked the point, when the majority of senior policymakers had switched from reluctance to a willingness 

to strengthen military capabilities in the region, with 

the State Department increasingly relegated to the 

sidelines.

From the Concept of a Rapid Deployment Force to 

the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.

On June 22, 1979, Brown ordered the JCS to revise 

the command plan to implement the RDF requirement, marking the beginning of an intense interservice quarrel, which primarily pitted the Army against 

the Marine Corps. The JCS and the Services were not 

thrilled: Assigning and redistributing command responsibilities can always disturb the delicate balance 

of generals between the Services, especially in the 

days prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Christopher 

Shoemaker, who was a staffer at the Office for International Security Affairs and from October 1979 Assistant to Odom on the NSC staff, argues that: “There are 
26

few documents more sacred than the UCP [the Unified Command Plan]. It involves four-star billets and 

therefore it is very, very contentious in the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff. So, [there is] always a significant reluctance to 

. . . ‘open up’ the UCP.”83 Furthermore, David Aaron, 

who was the Deputy National Security Advisor at the 

time, recalls that at the time, “the services simply felt 

that they had standing requirements and priorities 

that they had to continue to meet and that this was 

kind of a side show. . . . [T]hey were reluctant to turn 

around and give high priority to something like this 

under those circumstances.”84 Faced with the pressure to implement the RDF requirement, however, the 

Services naturally calculated what their preferred outcome would be.85

The Army’s position, shared by the Air Force and 

General David Jones, Chairman of the JCS (CJCS) 

(who later came around to the Navy/Marine position), was to assign the Middle East, Africa, and South 

Asia to REDCOM for most normal operations.86 Since 

EUCOM had performed well in the Middle East, it 

should retain control over security assistance programs and minor contingency operations. However, 

they argued that existing NATO commitments meant 

that major contingencies would be better handled 

by REDCOM. The Marines and the Navy, however, 

wanted to create an RDJTF “administratively within 

REDCOM, but with operational autonomy to plan, exercise, and deploy to the Persian Gulf region.” Operational control would then pass to EUCOM or PACOM 

once deployed. Strengthening REDCOM by assigning 

area responsibilities would have been advantageous 

for the Army, as it was headed by an Army general—

and so was EUCOM. As Robert Murray notes, “[T]he 

Army probably liked Readiness Command because 
27

it was a command that was always led by an Army 

officer.”87 In putting this forward, the Army arguably 

wanted to strengthen one of the commands led by 

an Army general without taking core responsibilities 

away from EUCOM.

In August 1979, the Army appointed a Commander in Chief (CINC), REDCOM, with strong views on 

the command’s role: General Volney Warner saw his 

mandate as remedying the weakness of U.S. power 

projection by regaining area responsibilities for his 

new command, which its predecessor STRICOM had 

lost at the beginning of the decade. He wanted to “take 

Readiness Command and walk it backwards to get it 

into a position where it actually became again Strike 

Command, given the . . . Russian new-found ability to 

do rapid deployment of their own.”88 A predicament 

for the U.S. military was that it “had large parts of the 

globe for which no unified commander was responsible—that fell directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” 

He adds that, “[j]ust because there’s nobody there it’s 

no reason to ignore it because . . . that’s where you 

have your problem.” For him, STRICOM “had been 

born 30 years too soon,” and the United States “needed 

Strike Command as a legitimate, all-Service command 

. . . rather than Readiness Command whose missions 

[were] limited to training the forces and had no area 

responsibility.”

The Marines and the Navy thought differently 

about the RDF requirement: They did not want to see 

a new constellation that would take away from their 

core tasks. Hence, the Marines and the Navy did not 

like the idea of a STRICOM-like structure. As Warner 

notes, “STRICOM was anathema to the Navy and the 

Marine Corps. They didn’t want to hear about it.” Assignment of the Persian Gulf region to REDCOM was 
28

unacceptable to them. More fundamentally, the quarrel was about the fear that a strengthened REDCOM 

would intrude into what the Marines saw as part of 

their core tasks: rapid deployment. In Warner’s view, 

these discussions were “still a spill-over from World 

War II” because, in a sense, there already existed two 

rapid deployment forces: 18th Airborne Corps delivered by the Air Force, and the Marine Corps delivered 

by the Navy. From his perspective at the time, “the 

Marines were very concerned [about] creating [the 

RDJTF] underneath an Army commander . . . which 

would more or less anoint that command with what 

they presumed to be their previous role.” In other 

words, “they were really worried about losing their 

predominance as the . . . expeditionary force.” Indeed, 

when STRICOM first had gained area responsibilities in 1962-63, General David Shoup, Commandant 

of the Marine Corps, had feared that it would lead to 

the creation of a “world-wide General Purpose Forces 

Command.”89 A November 1979 briefing sheet for 

Jones noted that the Navy and the Marines “did not 

agree that a distinct entity identified as ‘The Rapid 

Deployment Force’ should be established,” and they 

“objected to [the] implicit requirement that all Services assign forces to the JTF [Joint Task Force].”90 Also, 

the Marines wanted to link “RDJTF composition . . . to 

a specific region or contingency.”

The Navy had its own separate reasons for supporting the Marine Corps position. They felt that they 

were already operationally deployed to the area, and 

therefore there was no need to submit their forces to 

a joint undertaking, especially in merely providing 

strategic lift. Warner argues that “the Chief of Naval 

Operations was the only one of the Chiefs who had 

an operational responsibility for the Navy. So, it was 
29

very difficult to bring them on board, since they didn’t 

want to be brought on board.”91

In sum, the service quarrel revolved largely around 

the rivalry over organizational responsibilities, which 

put the Army and the Marine Corps at odds. As Warner argues, it “came up against the issue of the expeditionary force, the amphibious nature of the Marine 

Corps, and the roles-and-missions issue. . . . And all of 

those Service interests were extremely difficult to sort 

out.” 

The NSC staff entered the discussion on July 9, 

1979, when Brzezinski asked Brown to submit an update on the RDF.92 The NSC staff—Odom in particular—soon emerged as strong advocates of a unified 

command as part of a new security framework for the 

Persian Gulf. Odom saw a unified command as “a major ‘next step’,”93 as a unified command would not just 

mean “bureaucratic re-shuffling.” Anticipating strong 

reactions in the military, he noted that the people, 

“who know the significance of the UCP, will express 

very pro and very con views, depending on where 

they sit in Defense.” He told Brzezinski that changing 

the UCP was under consideration in some parts of the 

DoD, but it was unlikely to make its way to the policy 

level unless Brzezinski asked for it. 

In fact, Odom had always wondered why the 

U.S. commands “. . . operations in the Persian Gulf 

and Middle East through Stuttgart and Brussels, i.e., 

through SACEUR [the Supreme Allied Commander 

Europe] and his U.S. staff at EUCOM, [a staff which] 

focus[es] primarily on the Warsaw Pact and Northern 

Europe.”94 He argued that a unified command would 

increase U.S. capabilities in the region, as “such an organizational change would put you and the President 

in a better position to coordinate the agencies’ efforts 
30

in the region, and most important, it increases our operational capabilities for the future.” A unified command would underline renewed regional commitment 

because it would be able to project forces and build up 

local defenses. Also, it would provide a regional focus, 

as the United States tended, “through State and CIA, 

to look at the Persian Gulf region country-by-country, 

embassy-by-embassy.” Odom thus suggested that 

they could “start with a JTF commanded by a major 

general, a modest arrangement, and let it evolve into 

a ‘Unified Command’ requiring a change in the UCP. 

Or we could start with a Unified Command located in 

the United States but very thin and austere in staff and 

capabilities.” 

He judged that they were up against major interests. He argued that General Jones would not like it 

because it would take away power from his office 

(which probably overstated the Chairman’s stakes in 

the issue).95 Misperceiving service interests, he argued 

that the Service chiefs would favor it strongly, especially the Army and the Navy ones.96 The State Department would oppose it because it might 

take the actions away from the embassies and the 

State country desks. It tends to force a strategic view 

of our policy and capabilities much broader than ‘diplomacy’ on a bilateral basis. Defense and CIA will be 

seen as ‘taking over’ what is justly State’s territory. 

The CIA, he judged, would ultimately go along.

He could not predict Secretary Brown’s position, as he 

probably did “not have one and will not until forced to 

have one.” However, when Odom first recommended 

a unified command two other NSC staffers opposed it 

and Brzezinski put it aside for the time being.97 Odom 

remained steadfast, however, and kept pushing the is-
31

sue because he believed that it was “the best thing we 

can do to cope with the uncertainties of the future in 

the region.”98

When Brown sent Brzezinski a response to the 

memo of July 9, “the President noted that he did not 

see that much progress has been made.”99 Brzezinski 

forwarded this to Brown in another memo and asked 

for a more in-depth report. According to Odom, it was 

these two NSC staff requests that “caused the first real 

interest in doing something about building new capabilities for the Persian Gulf Region” in the DoD.

In Brown’s next and more in-depth memorandum 

on August 16, he argued that modest progress regarding the RDF had been made.100 However, a report accompanying Brown’s reply noted that “it takes several 

years to institute programs and bring them to fruition” 

and went on to say that the steps taken in response 

to the RDF requirement since August 1977 were “just 

now beginning to take effect, and most of our work 

is before us.” Thus, any contingency that would have 

required heavy forces could only be resolved “by 

impinging on our planned capability to reinforce 

NATO.” When Brzezinski forwarded Brown’s report 

to the President, Brzezinski highlighted the need for 

clearly defined goals in the Persian Gulf.101 He would 

therefore “begin a dialogue with Harold to first, better 

define such a framework, and then, to refine the forces 

appropriate to our strategy.”

After the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was stormed in 

November of 1979, Odom again weighed in and underlined that a unified command would increase U.S. 

military capabilities.102 He was disappointed by the 

progress, however. While Brzezinski had “generated 

very great pressure within Defense to do something 

about it,” he was “impressed, thus far, by the failure 
32

of Defense to take advantage of the RDF for improving our doctrine and general purpose force structure.” 

It was “a chance to solve a number of strategic lift issues” and “an opportunity to force the Army and the 

Marines to become more effective.” He also argued 

that the Gulf had become the “forward edge of the 

battle area,” making a unified command a necessity.103

While he saw the JCS dragging their feet, the DoD had 

begun to consider the issue, but he did not believe that 

“we will get movement unless you [Brzezinski] and 

Harold Brown take the lead.”104

In these delicate discussions, the DoD was caught 

between the Services on the one hand and the NSC 

staff on the other. They thus sought a compromise solution. Nevertheless, the political level in the DoD did 

have an idea that the RDJTF would only be an initial 

step on the way to a unified command. Brown thus 

argues that “there’s always an argument about command arrangements. And what we came up with was 

a compromise, really—recognizing that things would 

evolve.”105 He also recalls that “I think I always had 

the intention that it would become a separate command.”106 Murray argues similarly that they were 

trying to get things moving fast to put something together “within the reasonably near term that would 

actually be able to work and that could actually start 

work.”107 Shoemaker indeed argues that Murray, under whom he worked at the time, wanted “to have 

some organization—some command—that owned up 

and was responsible for the region,” but he “could 

not get a senior consensus. So the next best thing 

was to establish a joint task force.”108 For Murray, the 

RDJTF under REDCOM in Florida was thus a logical 

first step “because that was the only place that actually had facilities and communications equipment.”109
33

Brown concurs: “You had a substantial command in 

Readiness Command, and it therefore made a certain 

amount of sense to attach the Rapid Deployment Joint 

Task Force to it.” A command in the Gulf was out of 

the question because of local sensitivities, but giving 

REDCOM area responsibilities directly was not a good 

idea, either. As Murray notes, “They didn’t have any 

expertise or any useful local knowledge that would 

make them valuable. Moreover, they had a high single-service orientation. So, we invented the RDJTF.”110

In the end, Brown decided on the compromise 

RDJTF solution along the lines of Marine/Navy preferences: a subordinate command under REDCOM 

with substantial autonomy and an initial focus on 

the Persian Gulf.111 He instructed the CJCS to set up 

a US-based JTF “to plan, train, and exercise and to be 

prepared to deploy and employ, designated forces of 

the RDF as directed to respond to worldwide contingencies.”112 Thus, on November 29, the JCS created the 

RDJTF under REDCOM’s operational command. In 

December, they appointed as the first Commander, 

RDJTF (COMRDJTF), Marine General P. X. Kelley, 

who would later become Commandant of the Marine 

Corps under President Reagan. It was to become fully 

operational on March 1, 1980. 

Maybe surprisingly, given Odom’s earlier judgment, the State Department remained rather passive 

in the RDF discussion. However, since the RDF had 

already been mandated in PD-18, it was arguably 

more about implementation at this point. Nevertheless, the State Department as a whole did not like the 

idea of strengthening command arrangements for the 

Persian Gulf. As Brown notes, “The State Department 

people, I think, didn’t like the whole idea because . . . 

they tended to see military capability as an alternative 

to diplomacy.”113 Shoemaker concurs, 
34

Now, the State middle-grade—by middle-grade, I really mean Assistant Secretary-level down—were not 

in favor of [a unified command] because they felt it 

represented a militarization of the region and that our 

goals and objectives could be better achieved through 

diplomatic means.114

However, the middle-level officials could not get 

back-up against strengthening command arrangements from the Secretaries of State, Cyrus Vance and 

later Edmund Muskie.115 In Shoemaker’s judgment,

Vance and then Muskie really didn’t have strong 

views either way. Vance recognized the importance 

of it, but also recognized that his ability to shape the 

Defense Department’s Unified Command Plan was 

virtually nil. When Muskie came in, he didn’t really 

know the background or issues.116

Thus, “the fact that neither Secretary was particularly willing or eager to lead into what was clearly a 

very contentious issue in the Defense Department essentially took State out of play.” Nevertheless, Brown 

recalls that “I think their attitude was part of the reason that we didn’t make a big thing . . . a bigger thing 

of this—that we, in particular, didn’t try to put substantial forces into the region.”117

In sum, caught between an interservice quarrel 

and an NSC staff pressing for a unified command, the 

DoD opted for a compromise solution to get things 

moving. This compromise, however, would soon create unintended consequences.
35

FROM THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN TO 

REAGAN’S INAUGURATION

Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf Security 

Framework.

When the USSR intervened on Christmas of 1979 

with about 80,000 soldiers to prop up its allies in Kabul, 

it presented a major shift in the balance in the Persian 

Gulf region. It was “an extremely grave challenge” in 

Brzezinski’s eyes: “If the Soviets succeed in Afghanistan, and if Pakistan acquiesces, the age-long dream of 

Moscow to have direct access to the Indian Ocean will 

have been fulfilled.”118 The Soviet action posed “a test 

involving ultimately the balance of power between 

East and West.”119 To deter similar Soviet actions in 

the future, Brzezinski believed that a long-term commitment was required which demanded, inter alia, 

strategic modernization, increased defense spending, 

improvements in NATO, and implementation of the 

RDF requirement. Western Europe, East Asia, and the 

Persian Gulf had now become “interdependent central strategic zones.”

The Soviet invasion served as the galvanizing 

event for Brzezinski and the NSC staff to redesign U.S. 

strategic policy and create the Persian Gulf Security 

Framework (PGSF), ultimately put to paper in PD-63 

on January 15, 1981.120 However, the path towards the 

PGSF was like “pulling teeth:”121 The policy differences were still there, and the State Department, in particular, continued to fight many of the proposed steps. 

In the end, the NSC staff was successful in convincing the DoD and in sidelining the State Department’s 

objections by taking advantage of crisis management 

mechanisms, presidential back-up in crucial situa-
36

tions, clear strategic goals and a seemingly ad hoc implementation scheme.122 The NSC staff was thus able 

to bypass “the second and third levels in State and 

Defense,” achieving a sharp and rapid turn-around 

in U.S. policy. The creation of the PGSF, which consisted of a number of military, diplomatic, economic 

and intelligence actions, cannot be dealt with in detail 

here (for an overview, see Figure 1).123 In the context 

of this paper, it is important to note, however, that the 

struggle for a unified command was a major part of 

the effort.

Days before the invasion, David Aaron had received a JCS update on the RDF.124 Little had happened 

since Brown’s last report of August 16, 1979. The problematic issues were still the right force composition, 

the fact that many forces were committed to NATO 

and the RDF at the same time, shortcomings in readiness levels, and the final command arrangements. One 

factor for the slow implementation, which the JCS emphasized, was that the RDF requirement was new and 

that it would take “at least 5 years . . . to break the RDF 

logistic logjam.” On command arrangements, Aaron 

noted that the RDJTF had been approved, but that it 

had not been resolved who would command it and 

who would have operational control over it once deployed. While acknowledging the validity of some of 

the JCS arguments, Aaron still recommended that the 

NSC staff “should keep the heat on Harold to ensure 

that Defense makes these difficult bureaucratic decisions soon, so they can get the ‘chair-shuffling’ behind 

them and get on with the harder task of formulating 

specific military objectives and plans for the region.” 
37

Figure 1. Overview of the Persian Gulf Security 

Framework.

Commenting on Aaron’s memo, Odom noted that 

Brown had instructed the JCS to look into the UCP 

to possibly establish a unified command, but that 

they had “dodged successfully.”125 He did not see the 

RDJTF as a permanent solution, as its location in FlorPERSIAN GULF SECURITY FRAMEWORK

Military Component

•	 Enhancement of U.S. force capabilities

•	 Development of RDF

•	 Modernization and expansion of strategic air-and sealift

•	 Regional base access

•	 Overbuilding of regional facilities

•	 Prepositioning supplies in the Indian Ocean

•	 Exercises in the region

•	 Increased military presence

•	 Effective command arrangements

•	 Improvement of local defense capabilities

Foreign Policy Component

•	 Progress in the Middle East Peace Process

•	 Improved security relations with Turkey and Pakistan

•	 Increased security assistance to Saudi Arabia and other friendly Gulf States

•	 Improved ties with Somalia, Djibouti and (if possible) Ethiopia

•	 Increased access and overflight rights to the Persian Gulf

•	 Prevention of pro-Soviet, radicalized or fragmented Iran

Economic Component

•	 Improved oil policy

•	 Increased Western economic assistance to the region

•	 Increased Saudi and other Gulf states’ cooperation in financing of regional

security needs

•	 Improved economic stability in the region

Intelligence Component

•	 Development of an effective, regionally integrated intelligence program
38

ida did “little to help” the United States in the Gulf. 

However, he also saw that Brown and Jones were 

caught between Service interests: Jones “will suffer 

enormous pressures if he tries to push through a unified command change. Brown also would anger senior 

military figures in the Services if he forced the UCP 

change.” They were therefore “understandably reluctant to create this internal discontent if they can avoid 

it.” Consequently, he recommended that the NSC staff 

“take the ‘heat’ for them by getting the President to 

send a directive that it be done.”

Odom would repeatedly make these arguments 

during the remainder of the year. Soon, Brzezinski and 

the President (in principle) adopted this position as 

well. Consequently, on January 25, Brzezinski asked 

Brown to take another look at the command plan.126

Ultimately, however, the Services beat the NSC staff 

on the issue—a “critical defeat” in Odom’s eyes.127 Just 

when the DoD started coming around to the objectives of the framework and the State Department “had 

been brought around, or rendered unable to block the 

effort, . . . the military was just beginning to build opposition, much more significant and effective.” 

Whither the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force?

In late January, Brzezinski asked Brown to reopen 

the command plan for the Persian Gulf, and service 

squabbles broke out once again.128 However, the 

RDJTF compromise had unintentionally created another layer of interests in the military. The vague formulation of the arrangements enabled both General 

Kelley, COMRDJTF, and his superior, General Warner, CINC, Readiness Command (CINCRED), to claim 

control of the RDJTF. 
39

Responding to the renewed pressure, the Marines wanted to let the RDJTF become operational as 

planned before considering any changes at all. The 

Army, however, wanted to create both a new unified 

command and to keep the RDJTF with a reinforced 

global mission for undesignated areas. Warner himself, doubting that he could handle more than limited 

contingency operations, recommended strengthening 

REDCOM and the RDJTF. The JCS as a whole suggested a solution in line with Marine preferences: The 

RDJTF should come into action as planned, but once 

deployed, Kelley should become CINC for a unified 

command in order to avoid organizational complications. Adjusting this recommendation, Secretary 

Brown informed the President via Aaron on February 5 that the RDJTF would become a subordinate of 

REDCOM in peacetime, but that in case of deployment 

the RDJTF would come under the control of EUCOM, 

PACOM or directly under the National Command 

Authority (NCA), i.e., the President and the Secretary 

of Defense.129 Still, Brown would also analyze the need 

for a separate command in the coming months, according to Aaron. The RDJTF thus became operational 

as planned on March 1. 

This did not spell the end of the struggle over 

command arrangements, however. While the NSC 

staff was pushing for a unified command from above, 

Warner and Kelley were locked into an argument over 

who, ultimately, had control of the RDJTF. The DoD 

had created the command with substantial autonomy 

in mind, but Warner argued that the fact that he held 

operational control meant that he should be responsible for planning, training, exercises, and interfacing 

with the political level. Kelley was of the opposite 

view.
40

The strained relationship between Warner and 

Kelley was seen as highly personal from the outside, 

but both deny this. Indeed, organizational interests 

made this conflict almost unavoidable. Given the 

vague formulation of command arrangements for the 

RDJTF, both generals had the opportunity to vie for 

control of the command. In a way, the RDJTF went 

from something that nobody in the military really 

wanted to something that everyone was interested in 

getting a piece of. 

Both men had assumed their new jobs with the 

goal of making the best out of what they perceived as 

their respective mandates. As Warner notes, “I would 

argue, when I went there I knew what I wanted to do 

and I [had] been doing it before and it seemed to all 

make sense to me. And I think the same was pretty 

well true with Kelley.”130

Kelley was intended to be a rather autonomous 

commander by the DoD, but understandably Warner 

did not want to give up control, since his objective 

was trying to strengthen REDCOM. As Murray remembers, “He’s trying to make something of his command. And this is a thorn in his side.”131 Brown argues 

similarly: 

Well, it was inevitable that there would be friction, . . .

as there always is with a subordinate command. Because a senior commander doesn’t like the idea that 

one of his subordinates has a direct...could have a 

direct channel. And Kelley, being a gung-ho Marine, 

was quite willing to try to go around the Readiness 

Command—and succeeded...enough... He succeeded 

enough—I’m sure—to annoy Warner, without [chuckle] getting everything he wanted.132
41

Furthermore, the Service agendas were superimposed on the REDCOM/RDJTF clash as well, since 

neither man was free of service interests. As Warner 

argues, “we were both trying to preserve our own 

service interest, as we came together as a joint headquarters.”133 In other words, “Kelley can’t offend the 

Commandant of the Marine Corps. I can’t offend the 

Chairman or the Chief of Staff of the Army.”

After the first command post exercise of the RDJTF 

from April 10-15, 1980, an RDJTF staff paper summed 

up the differences between Warner and Kelley.134 It 

noted that command arrangements “specifically task 

COMRDJTF with the responsibility to plan for rapid 

deployment forces operations” in the Persian Gulf 

region. Kelley therefore argued that it was “his specific responsibility to accomplish these plans.” Warner 

countered that he had the operational command, and 

that it therefore was “ultimately a [REDCOM] responsibility to accomplish that planning.” This issue was 

complicated even more by the fact that REDCOM was 

prohibited from having area responsibilities under the 

UCP.

As a result of these differences, Warner protested 

to Brown about the unclear chain of command. On the 

one hand, Kelley was under Warner’s “operational 

command for planning, joint training, and exercises.” 

On the other hand, Kelley was tasked “with specific responsibilities outside the jurisdiction of [CINCRED].” 

In a memo sent to Brown on April 21,135 Warner thus 

sought confirmation that “all pre-deployment missions (planning and exercises) and allocations (personnel and dollars) assigned to COMRDJTF are through 

and subject to [CINCRED].” 

Another bone of contention was the Washington 

Liaison Office, an RDJTF office established to interface 
42

with the policy level in the capital. Murray emphasizes the significance that he attributed to the office:

I was very keen that [Kelley] should have the Washington office because the policy action happens in 

Washington . . .—not in Florida. And if you’re not in 

touch with what’s going on in the policy world you’re 

missing a dimension. . . . So if we wanted him to be 

well-clued in and be in the bull’s eye of the policy 

world then he had to have sharp ears and have some 

folks up here who were paying attention to what was 

going on.136

Warner understandably did not like this arrangement at all, since it provided ample opportunity to bypass his desk. He recalls that “I would find out things 

had been decided and happened that went directly 

down to the other end of the runway, which didn’t 

please me a hell of a lot. Having been in charge, I like 

the chain of command.”137 In a comment to the JCS on 

proposed changes to RDJTF arrangements, Warner 

argued that he was barred “from most essential taskings and in my ability to direct the [Headquarters of 

the] RDJTF to do anything other than what has been 

directed by JCS or [the NCA].” 138

Equally understandably, Kelley liked the Washington Liaison Office and wanted to keep it.139 He also 

wanted to avoid increased control by Warner, since “a 

total subjugation of the RDJTF under REDCOM could 

transmit a ‘signal’ that the stature and importance 

of the RDJTF are already on the wane—only three 

months after activation.” Hence he suggested that 

if we desire to transmit a strong and positive signal of 

our intentions and resolve in the Middle East/Persian 

Gulf, it should not be obfuscated in a conventional bureaucratic hierarchy—it must be highly visible, with 

sufficient clarity for all to see!
43

On May 6, not long after—in Odom’s words—

“General Warner’s devastating reclama to the JCS and 

Harold Brown” and the failed rescue of the U.S. hostages in Iran, Odom suggested a way to proceed on the 

RDJTF.140 He argued that the first RDJTF exercise, the 

rescue mission, and some of Kelley’s instructions indicated “confusion, misunderstandings, and inadequacies on the command arrangements.” He thus wanted 

Brzezinski “to strike quickly,” because time was running out “to get either the operational advantages or 

the political advantages of the command change.” 

However, Odom was still too optimistic about 

establishing a separate command. Commenting on 

progress on the Persian Gulf Security Framework on 

May 12, he complained that the United States was “essentially blocked in many of the security framework 

endeavors for lack of an independent command for 

the region.”141 He had learned “that things are far 

more confused and complex than even I had suspected.” Not only did REDCOM and the RDJTF want to 

plan for the Persian Gulf, but EUCOM and PACOM 

had entered the discussions as well, arguing that the 

RDJTF should be made a subordinate command under either one of them.142 Odom still saw a unified 

command as the linchpin for a new U.S. strategy in 

the Gulf:

Unless the President orders Brown and Jones to establish a separate regional unified command for the 

Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, we are going nowhere 

on deployments, exercises, and contingency planning, 

not to mention the management of ‘local defense’ and 

[Foreign Military Sales] in a fashion to our advantage.143

On July 25, the JCS sent another proposal for changes to Brown.144 They argued that “there is a need to 
44

focus the mission of the RDJTF exclusively on [Southwest Asian] contingencies” and that Warner should 

maintain operational command over the RDJTF “for 

all predeployment planning, training, exercises, and 

preparation for employment.” The Marines, however, 

dissented and wanted the RDJTF to be “a separate and 

distinct planning element directly under the JCS.” The 

JCS recommendations were adopted, and Warner thus 

strengthened his position.145

However, the belated implementation of the RDF 

requirement and the continuing squabbles would become a liability in 1980, as Carter had vowed in his 

State of the Union Address to repel any meddling by 

the Soviets in the Gulf.

The Soviet Military Threat in the Gulf.

While the senior policymaking level was trying 

to devise and implement a new strategy for the Gulf, 

intelligence reports were making the administration 

increasingly anxious that the USSR could exploit the 

power vacuum in the region and would press on from 

their newly-won position in Afghanistan. Consequently, the wide gap between the commitment made 

in the Carter Doctrine and the actual military capabilities in the region was revealed: The United States 

would have been unable to defend Iran. In a sense, the 

United States was punished for acting too late on the 

RDF. While this dire situation provided further thrust 

in the NSC staff for a unified command, it was still not 

successful in overcoming the organizational interests 

in the end. The whole episode of the Soviet military 

threat to Iran can unfortunately not be told here (see 

Figure 2).146 Here, it is important to show that the inability to deal with a possible invasion of Iran dem-
45

onstrated the risks incurred by delayed implementation of the RDF requirement. It has to be kept in mind, 

however, that even a perfect implementation process 

would only have improved the situation slightly—the 

loss of Iran as an ally was simply too momentous and 

unanticipated.147

SOVIET MILITARY THREAT TO IRAN

Christmas 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

January 1980 First unusual Soviet activities in the Transcaucasus and North Caucasus

January 15, 1980 First CIA paper on Soviet intentions regarding Iran

January 23, 1980 State of the Union Address (Carter Doctrine)

January 29, 1980 Second CIA paper on Soviet intentions

regarding Iran

April 1980 Advancing, but still low-cost preparatory

measures in the Transcaucasus

August 8, 1980 Third CIA paper on Soviet intentions regarding Iran

Mid-August U.S. gains intelligence on Soviet exercise in

the Transcaucasus

August 22, 1980 Senior discussion on whether a Soviet invasion could occur within the next year (CIA

and State Department papers)

September 2, 1980 Senior discussion on U.S. military options in

Iran/Persian Gulf (JCS paper)

•	 Preparation of intelligence briefings for

NATO and regional allies tasked

•	 Working group established for MuskieGromyko meeting (talking points and

nonpaper)

•	 DoD tasked to further review possible

defense actions and horizontal escalation

September 5, 1980 Senior discussion on non-paper for MuskieGromyko meeting

Figure 2. Timeline of the Soviet Military 

Threat to Iran. 
46

Figure 2. Timeline of the Soviet Military 

Threat to Iran. (Cont.)

In early 1980, the CIA did not doubt that the USSR 

wanted to improve its regional influence, but it also 

considered it unlikely “that the Soviet occupation of 

Afghanistan will turn out to have been a dress rehearsal for an impending gala performance in Iran.”148

However, throughout the spring, the United States received intelligence of mobilization exercises and other 

unusual activities by Soviet forces in the Transcaucasus bordering Northwest Iran, which “further heightened concerns that the Soviets may have aggressive 

intentions toward that country.” Still, the CIA did not 

see activities that indicated impending invasion and 

cautioned that the USSR most likely recognized that an 

“attempt to seize the entire country would run a high 

risk of direct confrontation with the United States.”149

September 12, 1980 NSC meeting

•	 West Germany, France, and the UK

to be approached (and talking points

revised accordingly)

•	 DoD tasked to continue to plan and prepare military steps regarding horizontal

escalation and defensive operations in

Iran

•	 NATO, Asian and regional allies to be

briefed

September 22, 1980 Iraq attacks Iran

September 25, 1980 Muskie-Gromyko meeting at United Nations

General Assembly

November 11, 1980 DoD paper on military implications of IraqIran war on defensive plans for Iran

December 12, 1980 NSC meeting on PD-62 and PD-63

January 15, 1980 PD-62 (“Modifications in U.S. National

Strategy”) and PD-63 (“Persian Gulf Security

Framework”) issued
47

Further intelligence data of advancing preparatory 

measures prompted an alternative intelligence interpretation in a CIA study on August 8, however. The 

normal view was still “that the Soviets are planning in 

a routine way for unexpected contingencies,” but the 

study examined the possibility “that the Soviets have 

embarked on a course of action which may portend an 

invasion of Iran.” The CIA thus argued that “Soviet resort to its evolving military option against Iran would 

represent a move undertaken in the confidence that 

a worthy opportunity was at hand, one that affected 

overall Soviet concerns enough to justify potentially 

high cost and substantial risk.” 

Consequently, the next meeting on the PGSF revolved around the question of “whether a Soviet attack toward the Gulf could materialize within the next 

year.”150 The CIA noted that the USSR was “taking 

steps to strengthen the ability of its forces to invade 

Iran, should Soviet leaders so decide,” but also that 

“the Soviets have not made a decision to invade Iran. 

At least during the next several months.”151 A low-risk 

opportunity and a U.S. military intervention were 

judged to be the most likely precipitating factors for a 

Soviet invasion. The CIA, the DoD, and the State Department seemed to suggest that the odds for a Soviet 

attack were one in 10 or 20, but one unknown pessimist on the NSC staff saw them closer to one in three 

or five.152

In mid-August, the United States gained access to 

Soviet exercise data from the Transcaucasus through 

intelligence channels. In Warner’s words, this “caused 

a great deal of excitement all over the Washington 

area, as to whether or not [the Soviets] were serious 

and might close down the Strait [of Hormuz] and 

make a move on the Middle East.”153 Much remains 
48

classified, but the basic elements of the crisis can be 

gathered from subsequent discussions. Jones argued 

that “the planned operations were not for limited territorial control such as would be characteristic of an 

intervention to quiet down a chaotic or destabilized 

Iran, but rather it seems that the Soviets have a master plan for seizing the oil-bearing region.”154 He even 

suggested that weather conditions could encourage 

invasion in the fall of 1980. According to him, the exercise consisted of three phases: “Phase I, occupation 

of northwest Iran (2-3 weeks); Phase II, consolidation 

and logistics buildup (3-4 weeks); and Phase III, operations to the south through Iran and Iraq to capture 

the oil-bearing regions of the Arabian peninsula (5-6 

weeks).” Brzezinski judged that “the politically logical 

sequence is to do Phase I, hope that the United States 

would not take any effective military response, expect 

that if we do not it will lead to a demoralization of Iran 

which will, in turn, facilitate Phase II and Phase III.” 

In other words, they judged that the United States was 

in serious trouble. 

To recall the Carter Doctrine, the United States 

had committed itself to the defense of the Persian Gulf 

against outside aggression: An assault on the Gulf 

would “be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”155 The problem was that the United 

States did not yet have the capabilities and command 

arrangements in place to make good on that promise. 

Even before the August exercise, it had become 

clear that the United States could not defend Iran 

against a full-scale Soviet assault.156 Two other options 

were seen as more promising, but still risky: defense 

of Iranian oil fields in the south and a broader Persian 

Gulf strategy that would primarily defend Saudi oil. 

The JCS were subsequently tasked to prepare a paper 
49

on these military options.157 The simple conclusion 

was that the United States “cannot win any confrontation with the Soviets in the region if the Soviets are not 

deterred from using their large conventional advantage.”158 Odom believed that the JCS were “deeply disturbed.” However, he pointed out that “[t]his kind of 

showdown was inevitable. We have been driving toward it since last summer and your memos to Brown 

on the RDF.”159

The still classified JCS paper confirmed the grim 

situation: “Currently deployed and rapidly deployable U.S. forces now available are judged to have very 

limited, but still not zero deterrent value.”160 The overall assessment of the military situation was this: 

At present, were the Soviets to begin mobilizing forces 

to invade Iran, the United States could use the approximately one month of warning to close on the Persian 

Gulf 1 [and] 1/3 divisions, 3 carrier battle groups . . ., 

and about 7 tactical fighter squadrons . . . , all with very 

lean support. In the same time, Soviets could close on 

Iran some 16-20 fully manned divisions and some 450 

combat aircraft, enough to advance to the Gulf.161

Consequently, Jones underlined that none of the 

three proposed military options “can stop a Soviet 

invasion of the 16-20 divisions,” and that the United 

States could not “defend Iran on any line today against 

a determined Soviet attack.”162 The question then 

became how to deter a Soviet invasion, while being 

unable to defend Iran if deterrence failed. The senior 

policymakers on the SCC came to this dire conclusion:

In spreading the conflict geographically, i.e. ‘horizontal escalation’ as opposed to ‘vertical escalation’ with 

nuclear weapons, it was agreed that the Soviets have 
50

nothing abroad that we could take which equals in 

importance to them what Iran and the oil producing 

regions in the Gulf are to the United States and its allies.163

The President would therefore later judge that the 

Soviets were “sure that they can prevail militarily unless the United States uses nuclear weapons,” and he 

saw “no way for a Soviet invasion of Iran to not become a worldwide confrontation.”164 His senior Advisors had agreed earlier that “if the Soviets succeeded 

in the Persian Gulf region, Western Europe’s freedom 

from the Soviet Union would be lost.”165

Making the whole issue even more complicated 

was the danger of the United States itself triggering a 

Soviet invasion. As the State Department had already 

pointed out, deterrence via credible threats and preparatory military steps was “in tension with a coequal 

objective of not precipitating the very military action 

which we seek to deter.”166

At the center of U.S. efforts to make clear to the 

Soviets that the United States would respond militarily to an invasion was a meeting between Edmund 

Muskie and the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko at the United Nations (UN). At the meeting on 

September 25, a non-paper, over which heated debates 

between senior policymakers took place, was given to 

Gromyko. It stated that “[a]ny military attempt to gain 

control of the Persian Gulf area, including specifically 

Soviet military action in Iran, could lead to a direct 

military confrontation with the U.S.”167 No declassified 

documents are available yet that describe the Soviet 

reaction to this move.168 It is fortunate that the Soviets 

did not choose to invade Iran, given the fact that the 

United States would have been faced with the fateful 
51

decision whether to accept defeat or employ tactical 

nuclear weapons against Soviet troops, a scenario that 

could have precipitated a very dangerous spiral of escalation.

While the situation eventually led to PD-62 and PD63 to strengthen the U.S. position vis-à-vis the USSR, 

the NSC staff could still not get the President or the 

Secretary of Defense to mandate a unified command 

for the Persian Gulf. Shoemaker describes the impact 

of the Soviet threat on command arrangements: 

From the White House perspective, it got Brzezinski 

to say to Odom: We have got to get on with this now. 

Over in the Pentagon, it was more complex because 

it certainly elevated the importance of the RDJTF, but 

it also reinforced the squabbling going on and sometimes you can get things done quietly that you can’t 

get done, when the spotlight is on that particular area. 

So, it’s not altogether surprising that even though intuitively you would say that ‘Boy, this must have really got them fired up to solve the problem.’ In reality, 

it got everybody fired up and in some ways intensified 

the problem.169

The question remains, of course, why the President 

did not use his formal authority to order the establishment of a unified command. Here, Shoemaker argues 

that Carter: 

was very willing to listen to views. He was much less 

willing to make contentious decisions that perhaps 

in his heart he did not necessarily believe in—I don’t 

know if that’s true. . . . He was not at all convinced that 

military power was the way to address problems in the 

region. And we took this to him. And he would consistently say ‘Well, let’s see if we can’t get the Joint Chiefs 

aboard.’ and ‘No, I’m not ready to make that mandate 

yet.’ And then by the time November rolled around. . . .
52

Actually by the time October rolled around, it was apparent that there wasn’t going to be a second term. He 

sort of gave up.170

This episode shows that the United States was 

punished for not taking seriously the establishment 

of an RDF that had already been mandated in 1977. 

Still, we have to keep in mind that even prompt RDF 

implementation would not have made up for the loss 

of Iran. Also, it would not have prevented the two 

events that changed the balance of power in the region 

fundamentally. As Secretary Brown asks rhetorically, 

“Would it have prevented the Iranian revolution? No. 

Would it have changed Soviet behavior, prevented 

them from invading Afghanistan? I don’t see how.”171

EPILOGUE: THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 

AND CENTRAL COMMAND

By the end of the Carter administration, a fundamental shift in U.S. strategy towards the Persian Gulf 

had occurred, but the wish of the NSC staff to create 

a unified command was left unfulfilled. On February 

11, 1981, General Odom—now the Assistant Chief of 

Staff for Intelligence in the Army—sent a memo to 

Reagan’s National Security Advisor, Richard Allen, 

where he described the process that led to the Persian 

Gulf Security Framework.172 While he traced its beginnings to PRM-10, he also recounted the difficulties 

that the NSC faced in shifting policy priorities in the 

early years: 

The combination of the PD-13 arms transfer policy, 

Indian Oceans Arms Talks, non-proliferation and improper application of the human rights policy, intersected in the Persian Gulf region in a most unfavor-
53

able fashion for U.S. interests. We fought a three-year 

battle to de-emphasize those policies in that region 

and to face up to the military security requirements 

there. Events in November and December 1979 reduced State’s resistance—as well as that of the military services—and we began an integrated approach 

to building a security framework.173

He emphasized that the new administration 

should not veer from its course. Taking it apart would 

only make sense “if you intend to abandon the region 

and beat a strategic retreat.” Regarding a unified command, he argued that the President should take the 

lead: 

Our own military command and control for the region 

is in shambles, and the JCS is institutionally incapable 

of improving it. The inter-service quarrels, particularly on the ‘Unified Command Plan,’ are paralyzing. 

The big ones will not be settled without direct orders 

from the President which are delivered in unambiguous words.174

Regarding a unified command, Shoemaker, who 

continued on the NSC staff for another 1 1⁄2 years, recounts that the early months of the new administration were “a perfect time for a message that says: ‘Mr. 

President, this is something that the Carter administration just couldn’t get done because it was too weak 

and too inept and this [is] the kind of thing the American people expect of a strong President’.”175 He was 

charged with reviewing Carter’s PDs, and his memo 

on PD-63 reached the President. In his words, Reagan 

“signed on early to the idea of a unified command. For 

him, it was almost a no-brainer.”

Thus, on April 24, 1981, the new Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, told the JCS “to submit a 
54

plan for transformation of the RDJTF within three to 

five years or less into a ‘separate unified command’.”176

After a brief review, they came up with a plan of transitioning into a unified command on January 1, 1983. 

Despite the early commitment, however, the road to 

CENTCOM was still rocky and included a last-minute 

Navy/Marine attempt “to divert the RDJTF from its 

transition to a unified command.” This story cannot 

be told here, but has to wait until more documents on 

Reagan’s approach to the Persian Gulf become available.

CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES

This paper has examined the story of the RDJTF 

as an important element in the U.S. strategic turn towards the Persian Gulf that continues to this day. As 

the direct precursor of CENTCOM, focusing a new 

command on the Persian Gulf was the beginning of 

a more in-depth and strategic engagement with this 

crucial region of global energy and security politics. 

This last section first briefly summarizes the developments that led to the creation of the RDJTF under Carter. Then, the argument is made that, while the RDJTF 

episode is a historical case, the underlying challenges 

of adapting the U.S. national security apparatus to the 

geostrategic environment have not changed. The paper thus suggests how national security reforms can 

be understood more generally and calls for further 

case studies. It concludes with a brief assessment of 

the national security system today and offers some 

perspectives going forward.
55

THE CARTER YEARS AND MILITARY 

COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE 

PERSIAN GULF

The story of changing command arrangements for 

the Persian Gulf during the Carter administration falls 

into three phases. First, soon after Carter’s inauguration and as a result of the Comprehensive Net Assessment, the administration recognized major negative 

trends in the global military balance between the Eastern and Western blocs. One of these developing imbalances was a comparative weakness of U.S. power 

projection capabilities, especially in the Persian Gulf 

and Northeast Asia. Consequently, already in 1977, 

President Carter mandated the establishment of an 

RDF. However, even though the regional balance was 

already shifting—to the detriment of the United States 

and its friends—the DoD and the military Services saw 

no gains to be made in establishing such a force and, 

for all intents and purposes, avoided dealing with it. 

In addition, a split at the policymaking level over how 

to react to Soviet actions in the Horn of Africa, Yemen, 

and Afghanistan, as well as the administration’s focus 

on other foreign policy and defense issues, provided 

additional cover for the military to ignore the RDF.

Second, with the exit of the Shah of Iran in early 

1979, the United States lost a key ally in the Persian 

Gulf, and its regional strategy was in shambles. This 

led to the first steps towards a new security framework in the Gulf, and the NSC staff pushed for the 

RDF. Under pressure to come up with a solution, the 

military became locked into an intense interservice 

quarrel that pitted the Army, which saw an opportunity to strengthen one of its weaker commands—REDCOM—against the Marine Corps, which saw the RDF 
56

as an intrusion into its core task of deploying troops 

worldwide on short notice. With the DoD lodged between the NSC staff (and thus by implication the President) and the military Services, it devised the RDJTF 

as a compromise to push things forward. Meanwhile, 

the NSC staff, with General Odom at the forefront, began to develop a great interest in setting up a unified 

command.

Third, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 

in late 1979, the military balance in the Gulf further 

turned against the United States as Soviet troops drew 

much closer to the region’s center of gravity. The NSC 

staff, again mostly under Odom’s guidance, devised 

the PGSF in response. Among its proposed elements 

was the establishment of a unified command. With 

all eyes on the region, Service interests entered the 

process again, however, and were joined by another 

layer of interests, since the RDJTF compromise had 

produced an unanticipated struggle over control between its commander and his superior, CINCRED. 

While the costs of failing to set up the RDF earlier became clear, when a serious Soviet military threat to 

Iran emerged in the summer of 1980, neither the DoD 

nor the President intervened in this gridlock and no 

unified command was established in the last year of 

Carter’s presidency. Thus, the creation of CENTCOM 

had to wait until President Reagan took office.

A HISTORIC CASE, ENDURING CHALLENGES

This paper is concerned with a historic case of reshuffling military command arrangements. Since the 

military and the national security apparatus have 

changed so substantially since the days of President 

Carter, one could argue that it is hardly worthwhile 
57

to examine the RDJTF in light of today’s challenges 

to the system of national security in the United States. 

This view is mistaken. 

It is true that the military and the whole national 

security system look very different today than they did 

30 years ago. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, for 

example, fundamentally changed the organization of 

the DoD and the military Services by inter alia clarifying chains of command and strengthening incentives 

to think more jointly about national security. However, the argument here is that the underlying logic 

of national security reform efforts has not changed, 

and will in fact not change, at least in its fundamental 

dynamics.

In a perfect world, the United States would perceive or even anticipate new developments on the 

world stage correctly and reform its organizations accordingly. Unfortunately, the history of U.S. national 

security does not support this.177 In fact, this should 

not come as much of a surprise, for national security 

reform processes can arguably be thought of as being 

subjected to two logics that often—if not always—are 

at odds.178 On the one hand, policymakers responsible 

for foreign and security policy at the top of the administration should be able to perceive changes in the 

international security environment that would undermine the effectiveness of a certain organizational setup. 

These officials should therefore pursue organizational 

reforms to remedy this. After all, these policymakers—whether it be the President himself, his National 

Security Advisor, or any other principal—can tap into 

all of the privileged information that the U.S. Government is privy to. For no one else is better “equipped to 

perceive systemic constraints and deduce the national 

interest.”179
58

On the other hand, however, decisionmakers at 

the top are almost never omnipotent masters who can 

reorganize the national security system at their will: 

In reform processes, they meet bureaucratic players 

who also have a vast interest in shaping or, indeed, 

disrupting reforms, and who are the ones having to 

implement them. Such bureaucrats180 are representatives of organizations that are to a large degree organizations like any other: They covet increased autonomy 

from their political superiors and seek larger shares of 

the budget.181 In other words, they pursue the particular interest of their respective organizations (and not 

surprisingly, they most often are convinced that more 

autonomy and money for their organization is the best 

option to advance the national interest). For an overview of these two logics at work, see Figure 3 below.

Figure 3. The Policy Process on National Security 

Organization Reforms.
59

Pursuing an organization’s interest is also made 

easier by the fact that it proves tricky for senior policymakers to recognize how to respond to changes at 

the international level. In fact, the imperatives of the 

international system are rather murky and difficult to 

read: Misperception is always a possibility, and even 

if a threat or opportunity is identified correctly, it is 

sometimes not clear what the optimal response should 

be. 

Bureaucrats not only have the incentives to pursue organizational interests—after all, “Promotion to 

higher rungs is dependent on years of demonstrated, 

distinguished devotion to a service’s mission”182—but 

they also have the means to do so because of:

• asymmetrical expertise and information,

• the ability to shape the implementation process,

• the ability of drawing on support from outside 

the administration,

• the ability to portray themselves as apolitical 

and neutral,

• the ability to play for time, and

• knowledge of their core tasks that have to be 

protected.

Organizational theory has identified actions that 

organizations normally pursue or avoid in order to 

increase—or at least preserve—their autonomy and 

relative shares of the budget: 

• They pursue policies that are most likely to 

make them more important in the future.

• They seek to protect those capabilities that are 

crucial for carrying out what they perceive as 

their core tasks.
60

• They resist efforts that could weaken the importance of their core tasks or their ability to 

carry them out.

• They try to rid themselves of tasks they deem 

nonessential.

Of course, an administration is not totally helpless 

against seemingly all-powerful bureaucrats: It can 

reward or punish organizations by increasing or reducing their autonomy or budgetary shares, and most 

importantly, it has the formal and legitimate authority 

to tell them what to do. However, these instruments of 

persuasion tend to be much blunter than they might 

seem, drain the political capital of an administration, 

and distract from other policy issues.

Seen in this light, the story of the RDJTF becomes 

much clearer. First, the changes in the international 

security environment, in particular in the Persian 

Gulf, led the Carter administration, first and foremost 

Brzezinski and Odom, to press for a reform of military arrangements to deal with these new challenges. 

The decision to establish the RDF was thus made in 

recognition of negative trends in power projection capabilities. The (delayed) implementation, in the form 

of the RDJTF, was also driven by further events in the 

region. 

Second, organizational interests in the military 

delayed and shaped the implementation of the RDF 

requirement. The military Services ignored the RDF 

for about 2 years because no one saw benefits for 

themselves in tackling the issue. When the political 

level demanded more action in the wake of the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 

the Services tried to shape the RDJTF compromise 

according to their organizational interests, now that 

they could no longer pursue the status quo.
61

Third, possibly reflecting a mix between organizational interests and misperception of the international 

security environment, the policy differences at the 

top about how to react to Soviet assertiveness in the 

Persian Gulf shows that it often is not clear what the 

necessary organizational changes should look like, 

even if changes at the international level are indeed 

recognized.

Put in these terms, the case of the RDJTF does not 

look exceptional to those who are familiar with reforms of the U.S. national security system. But much 

remains to be understood before reforms can be carried out efficiently.

WHERE WE ARE TODAY: THE STATE OF THE 

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM

The development of the RDJTF under President 

Carter provides an example of the difficulties of organizational change in the U.S. national security system. 

It has been argued that the underlying logic of reforms has not changed: Organizational politics is still 

the same as it ever was, as organizations pursue their 

particular interests—sometimes overlapping with the 

national interest, oftentimes not.

This paper started by suggesting that the U.S. national security system is at a crossroads: The current 

system, which still rests on the National Security Act 

of 1947, has not been altered in a way that makes it 

institutionally capable of tackling the challenges of today and tomorrow. The PNSR’s report, Forging a New 

Shield—probably the most comprehensive study on 

the U.S. national security system to date—argues that 

“[t]he legacy structures and processes of a national security system that is now more than 60 years old no 
62

longer help American leaders to formulate coherent 

national strategy.”183 The United States generally puts 

great trust in the ability of individual leaders to prevail over institutional barriers, but it seems that even 

the brightest leaders can no longer consistently overcome these challenges. The key problems, according 

to the report, are:

• “The system is grossly imbalanced. It supports 

strong departmental capabilities at the expense 

of integrating mechanisms.”

• “Resources allocated to departments and agencies are shaped by their narrowly defined core 

mandates rather than broader national missions.”

• “The need for presidential integration to compensate for the systemic inability to adequately 

integrate or resource missions overly centralizes issue management and overburdens the 

White House.”

• “A burdened White House cannot manage the 

national security system as a whole to be agile 

and collaborative at any time, but it is particularly vulnerable to breakdown during the protracted transition periods between administrations.”

• “Congress provides resources and conducts 

oversight in ways that reinforce the first four 

problems and make improving performance 

extremely difficult.”

On this background, the report identifies the fundamental shortcoming of the system: “[P]arochial departmental and agency interests, reinforced by Congress, paralyze interagency cooperation even as the 

variety, speed, and complexity of emerging security 
63

issues prevent the White House from effectively controlling the system.” The report provides a large and 

detailed package of reforms to remedy these deficiencies. However, if reform processes really are lodged 

between two often competing logics, as this paper has 

argued and the analysis of the RDJTF supports—with 

senior policy makers pursuing the national interest 

and organizational players pursuing organizational 

interests—then altering the national security system 

in such a fundamental way as the PNSR advocates will 

be exceptionally hard. The case of the RDJTF shows 

that the same problems that hinder coherent analysis, planning, and implementation of policies184 also 

create enormous barriers for coherent analysis, planning, and implementation of organizational reform. 

Indeed, changing an organization’s structure is probably even harder than changing policies: To change 

foreign and security policies means changing what 

an organization does; to change organizational structures mean changing what it is. Hence, the incentives 

for bureaucrats to shape or even obstruct reforms are 

that much greater.

That being said, organizational change for the better is not impossible. In a sense, while not perfect, the 

passing of the Goldwater-Nichols Act has been an example that stands out, as it made up for decades of 

organizational inertia in the military. Also, the recent 

creation of U.S. Africa Command—as a response to 

lessons learned in how the United States deals with the 

African continent, disappointing interagency coordination, and the new security challenges of a post-Cold 

War and post-9/11 world—appears to offer a positive 

example, regardless of the dismal start-up phase.185

However, even in this case, it has been alleged that 

the DoD set up the new command as a way to expand 
64

its reach over U.S. Africa policy. Reportedly, the State 

Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have been dissatisfied with what 

they see as overreach of the military and the DoD and 

a possible militarization of U.S. policy on the continent.186 Thus, it appears that organizational politics is 

here to stay. Therefore, we must invest much more 

time and effort into the study of how national security reform processes unfold, in order to gain lessons 

on how to structure the processes rightly and get a 

result that more closely reflects the national interest, 

instead of being the result of organizational bargaining. Ultimately, changes must take place throughout 

the U.S. national security apparatus, but this is much 

easier said than done. It will indeed be very difficult 

to get the national security system to change, but it 

must happen. Certainly, U.S. administrations are not 

powerless in reform processes, but they need a better understanding to get what they want and what the 

security of the nation requires.

ENDNOTES

1. This paper is based upon the author’s M.Sc. thesis in Political Science at the University of Copenhagen, Denmark, entitled 

Reforming National Security Organizations: US Military Command 

Arrangements for the Persian Gulf, 1977-1981, and written under the 

auspices of the Royal Danish Defence College. It can be obtained 

directly from the author (Henrik.Bliddal@gmx.net) or from the Royal Danish Library, Copenhagen, Denmark. 

2. Brzezinski to Carter, February 26, 1977, Memorandum, 

NSC Weekly Report No. 2, Jimmy Carter Library (hereafter: JCL), 

Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Weekly Reports, Box 41, “Weekly 

Reports 1-15” folder.
65

3. Jimmy Carter, “State of the Union Address 1980,” January 

23, 1980, available from www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/

speeches/su80jec.phtml. 

4. The “arc of crisis” was a term coined by Brzezinski in December 1978 in response to the troubles on the horizon in the region.

5. Olav Njølstad, “Shifting Priorities: The Persian Gulf in US 

Strategic Planning in the Carter Years,” Cold War History, Vol. 4, 

No. 3, 2004, p. 22.

6. The two most recent—and best—articles on the RDJTF are 

Njølstad, “Shifting Priorities,”and William E. Odom, “The Cold 

War Origins of the U.S. Central Command,” Journal of Cold War 

Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2006.

7. For a recent exchange between Walter Russell Mead, Carter, and Brzezinski, see Walter Russell Mead, “The Carter Syndrome,” Foreign Policy, January/February 2010; and Jimmy Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Walter Russell Mead, “Presidential 

Debate,” Foreign Policy, March/April 2010.

8. Odom, “The Cold War Origins of the U.S. Central Command,” p. 53.

9. Njolstad, p. 21.

10. Odom, “The Cold War Origins of the U.S. Central Command,” p. 53.

11. Research was conducted at the Headquarters of Central 

Command, Jimmy Carter Library, Library of Congress, National 

Archives and Record Administration, National Defense University, and National Security Archives. Interviews were conducted 

with Harold Brown, Zbigniew Brzezinski, David Aaron, Volney 

Warner, P. X. Kelley, William Quandt, Robert Murray, and Christopher Shoemaker.

12. The definition of this region was a matter of some debate 

at the time. Ultimately, the region came to include Afghanistan, 

Bahrain, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Kenya, 
66

Kuwait, North Yemen, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Yemen, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Other 

terms used are the Middle East, Southwest Asia, or the Indian 

Ocean region. To avoid confusion, the term Persian Gulf region is 

used for this broad region, as it was the most common. When the 

Middle East is used, it denotes the even broader region, including 

the North African states and the Levant.

13. Indeed, the RDJTF episode could be seen as an important 

part of the story of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, as it was General 

David Jones in his role as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

who was the first top military official to break ranks on the need 

for military reorganization. See James R. Locher III, Victory On The 

Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies The Pentagon, College 

Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2004, pp. 33ff.

14. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, “The 9/11 Commission Report,” July 22, 2004, available 

from www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf, p. 353.

15. Project on National Security Reform, “Forging a New 

Shield, Executive Summary,” November 2008, available from 

www.pnsr.org/data/files/pnsr%20forging_exec%20summary_12-2-08.

pdf. It should be noted that this author has contributed a case study 

to the report, Henrik Bliddal, “The U.S. Intervention in Liberia in 

2003,” in a jointly edited volume by the Project on National Security Reform and the Strategic Studies Institute, forthcoming 2011.

16. “Forging a New Shield,” p. iii.

17. Indeed, Amy B. Zegart’s, Flawed by Design: The Evolution 

of the CIA, JCS, and NSC, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 

1999; and William T. Schrader’s The Rules of the Game: A New Historical Institutionalist Analysis of U.S. Defense Reorganization, Ph.D. 

Thesis, Temple University, 2006, are the only two theoretical studies of how U.S. national security organizations evolve over time. 

William W. Newmann’s, Managing National Security Policy: The 

President and the Process, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh 

Press, 2003, tackles similar issues, but with a focus on the President’s national security processes.
67

18. Dore Gold, America, the Gulf, and Israel: Centcom (Central 

Command) and Emerging US Regional Security Policies in the Mideast, 

Jerusalem, Israel, and Boulder, CO: Jerusalem Post and Westview 

Press, 1988. The United States, however, did join the Central Treaty Organization in 1959 as an associate member. If not otherwise 

noted, this paragraph and the next are based on the same source.

19. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “A Message to Congress, the 

Eisenhower Doctrine on the Middle East,” Paul Halsall, ed., The 

Internet Modern History Sourcebook, January 5, 1957, available from 

www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1957eisenhowerdoctrine.html.

20. Steven A. Yetiv, The Absence of Grand Strategy: The United 

States in the Persian Gulf, 1972-2005, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008, p. 30.

21. In Nixon’s own words, “in cases involving other types 

of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance 

when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But 

we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.” 

See Richard M. Nixon, “Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam,” November 3, 1969, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/

ws/index.php?pid=2303.

22. State Department, Undated Draft Paper, “Instabilities in 

Southwest Asia—Options for the U.S.,” attached to Kreisberg to 

Ames, Thornton, Murray, Maresca, Memorandum, Southwest 

Asia Security Paper, JCL, NLC-24-103-5-1-5. 

23. Ronald H. Cole, Walter S. Poole, James F. Schnabel, Robert 

J. Watson, and Willard J. Webb, The History of the Unified Command 

Plan, 1946-1999, Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2003, p. 14-43. If not otherwise noted, this paragraph is based on the same source.

24. Brzezinski to Carter, January 13, 1978, Memorandum, 

NSC Weekly Report No. 42, JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, 

Weekly Reports, Box 41, “Weekly Reports 42-52” folder. If not 

otherwise noted, this paragraph and the next three are based on 

the same source.
68

25. Jimmy Carter, “Inaugural Address of President Jimmy 

Carter,” January 20, 1977, available from www.jimmycarterlibrary.

org/documents/speeches/inaugadd.phtml.

26. Brzezinski to Carter, February 26, 1977, Memorandum, 

NSC Weekly Report No. 2, CL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, 

Weekly Reports, Box 41 , “Weekly Reports 1-15” folder. If not otherwise noted, the quotations and references in this paragraph are 

based on the same source.

27. Ibid.

28. Brzezinski to Carter, June 3, 1977, Memorandum, NSC 

Weekly Report No. 15, JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Weekly 

Reports, Box 41, “Weekly Reports 1-15” folder. If not otherwise 

noted, the quotations and references in this paragraph are based 

on the same source.

29. Brzezinski to Carter, June 24, 1977, Memorandum, NSC 

Weekly Report No. 18, JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Weekly 

Reports, Box 41, “Weekly Reports 16-30” folder. This memorandum contained Hyland’s opinion piece, quoted here and in the 

previous sentence.

30. Brzezinski to Carter, July 8, 1977, Memorandum, NSC 

Weekly Report No. 20, JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Weekly 

Reports, Box 41, “Weekly Reports 16-30” folder.

31. Brzezinski to Carter, December 9, 1977, Memorandum, 

NSC Weekly Report No. 39, JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, 

Weekly Reports, Box 41, “Weekly Reports 31-41” folder.

32. State Department, “Instabilities in Southwest Asia.”

33. CIA, December 1976, Research Study, “The Soviets in 

the Persian Gulf/Arabian Peninsula—Assets and Prospects,” attached to Deputy Director, Office of Regional and Political Analysis, February 10, 1977, Memorandum, Untitled, NLC-25-87-5-1-3. 

If not otherwise noted, the quotations and references in this paragraph are based on the same source.
69

34. Carter, “Inaugural Address of President Jimmy Carter.”

35. PD-13 demanded unilateral restraint on arms transfers, 

“Presidential Directive 13, Conventional Arms Transfer Policy,” 

May 13, 1977, available from www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/pddirectives/pd13.pdf. For the Conventional Arms Transfer 

Talks, see, for example, “Summary of Conclusions of Special Coordination Committee Meeting, US-USSR Conventional Arms 

Transfer,” May 24, 1978, JCL, NLC-33-12-3-1-8. For the Indian 

Ocean Talks, see, for example, the Department of Defense (DoD), 

Undated, Untitled Paper, JCL, NLC-25-78-1-2-6.

36. State Department, Undated Preparatory Paper, for a meeting with the People’s Republic of China, “Middle East Issues,” 

JCL, NLC-4-38-7-2-7.

37. William Odom, January 13, 1981, Paper, “Persian Gulf 

Security Framework,” Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, 

William E. Odom Papers, National Security Affairs Military Assistant, 1977-1981, Box 8, National Security Council, 1980, November-December folder. This is an essay for Brzezinski by Odom 

that lays out the policy processes surrounding the Persian Gulf 

Security Framework. It has been used to fill the gaps, whenever 

the original documents were not yet available and when it provides Odom’s own arguments. See also Odom, “The Cold War 

Origins of the U.S. Central Command,” pp. 55f.

38. Brzezinski to Carter, March 25, 1977, Memorandum, NSC 

Weekly Report No. 6, JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Weekly 

Reports, Box 41, “Weekly Reports 1-15” folder.

39. Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-10, February 18, 

1977, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, William E. Odom 

Papers, Formerly Classified, 1977-1982, Box 36, “Presidential Directives Regarding Defense Policy Development,” Washington, 

DC: White House, 1977-1982, folder 1 of 2 folders.

40. The Final Report on the Military Force Posture Review 

has been declassified, and is attached to “Presidential Review 

Memorandum 10, Comprehensive Net Assessment and Military 

Force Posture Review,” February 18, 1977, available from www.

jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/prmemorandums/prm10.pdf. The 
70

documents of the Comparative Net Assessment, however, have 

not been released yet.

41. NSC, Undated Terms of Reference, PRM/NSC-10, Comprehensive Net Assessment and Military Force Posture Review, 

attached to Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-10, February 18, 1977, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, William E. 

Odom Papers, Formerly Classified, 1977-1982, Box 36, “Presidential Directives Regarding Defense Policy Development,” White 

House, 1977-1982, folder 1 of 2 folders.

42. Summary of Conclusions of Special Coordination Committee Meeting, PRM/NSC-10 Comprehensive Net Assessment, 

July 7, 1977, JCL, NLC-33-11-3-1-9.

43. Ibid.; and Odom, December 24, 1980, Paper, PRM-10/PD18 Chapter, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, William E. 

Odom Papers, National Security Affairs Military Assistant, 1977-

1981, Box 8, “National Security Council, 1980, November-December” folder. The latter source is an essay for Brzezinski by Odom 

that lays out the policy processes surrounding PRM-10/PD-18. It 

has been used to fill the gaps, whenever the original documents 

were not yet available and when it provides Odom’s own arguments.

44. Odom, December 24, 1980, Paper, PRM-10/PD-18.

45. Summary of Conclusions of Special Coordination Committee Meeting, PRM/NSC-10 Comprehensive Net Assessment, 

July 7, 1977, JCL, NLC-33-11-3-1-9. If not otherwise noted, the 

quotations and references in this paragraph are based on the same 

source.

46. Thomson and Utgoff to Brzezinski, July 6, 1977, Memorandum, PRC Meeting on PRM-10—Friday, July 8, 1977, at 10:00 

A.M., JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Subject File, Box 24, 

“PRC—22: 7/8/77” folder.

47. Brzezinski to Carter, November 27, 1978, Memorandum, 

“Information Items,” JCL, NLC-2-15-2-1-0.
71

48. “Presidential Directive 18, US National Strategy,” August 

26, 1977, available from www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/pddirectives/pd18.pdf. 

49. Odom, “The Cold War Origins of the U.S. Central Command,” p. 59.

50. Odom, December 24, 1980, Paper, PRM-10/PD-18 Chapter. See also Odom, January 13, 1981, Paper, “Persian Gulf Security Framework.”

51. Brzezinski to Carter, January 13, 1978, Memorandum, 

“NSC Weekly Report No. 42.”

52. Interview with William Quandt, May 11, 2009.

53. Minutes of Special Coordination Meeting, “The Horn of 

Africa,” February 22, 1978, JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, 

Geographic File, Box 11, “Ethiopia-Somalia,” 4/77-2/22/78 folder. If not otherwise noted, the quotations and references in this 

paragraph are based on the same source.

54. “Presidential Directive 32, US Policy toward the Horn of 

Africa,” February 24, 1978, available from www.jimmycarterlibrary.

org/documents/pddirectives/pd32.pdf.

55. Brzezinski to Carter, June 30, 1978, Memorandum, NSC 

Weekly Report No. 65, JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Weekly 

Reports, Box 41, “Weekly Reports 61-71” folder. If not otherwise 

noted, the quotations and references in this paragraph and the 

next are based on the same source.

56. For example, on July 27, a meeting on Southwest Asia 

was held, Summary of Conclusions of Policy Review Committee 

Meeting, South and West Asia, July 27, 1978, JCL, NLC-15-3-5-5-2, 

which led to a State Department study on regional security. See 

also Summary of Conclusions of Presidential Review Committee 

Meeting, PRC on Pakistan—Summary of Conclusions, November 

30, 1978, JCL, NLC-25-122-9-14-5.

57. State Department, “Instabilities in Southwest Asia.”
72

58. Brzezinski to Carter, November 3, 1978, Memorandum, 

NSC Weekly Report No. 78, JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, 

Weekly Reports, Box 42, “Weekly Reports 71-81” folder.

59. Sullivan, November 9, 1978, Cable Tehran, “Thinking the 

Unthinkable,” 11039, Digital National Security Archive, Iran Revolution, IR01711.

60. Brzezinski to Carter, December 2, 1978, Memorandum, 

NSC Weekly Report No. 81, JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, 

Weekly Reports, Box 42, “Weekly Reports 71-81” folder. If not 

otherwise noted, the quotations and references in this paragraph 

and the next are based on the same source.

61. Minutes of Special Coordination Committee Meeting, “Petroleum Supply Vulnerability Assessment,” March 24, 1978, JCL, 

NLC-31-48-4-9-2.

62. DoD, Undated, Paper, “US Capability to Respond to Limited Contingencies,” attached to Brown to Brzezinski, August 16, 

1979, Memorandum, “US Capability to Respond to Limited Contingencies,” JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Geographic File, 

Box 15, “Southwest Asia-Persian Gulf, 2/79-12/79” folder.

63. Odom, “The Cold War Origins of the U.S. Central Command,” p. 58.

64. Njolstad, p. 28.

65. Interview with Robert Murray, May 21, 2009.

66. Odom, January 13, 1981, Paper, “Persian Gulf Security 

Framework.” 

67. Interview with Dr. Harold Brown, May 25, 2009.

68. Odom to Brzezinski, January 7, 1980, Memorandum, 

“Progress on the RDF,” attached to Hunter to Odom, January 18, 

1980, SCC on Thursday: Action Items, JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski 

Collection, Subject File, Box 32, “Meetings SCC 254” folder.

69. Odom, “The Cold War Origins of the U.S. Central Command,” p. 58.
73

70. Odom, January 13, 1981, Paper, “Persian Gulf Security 

Framework.” If not otherwise noted, the quotations and references in this paragraph are based on the same source.

71. Interview with Dr. Harold Brown, May 25, 2009.

72. Odom, January 13, 1981, Paper, “Persian Gulf Security 

Framework.” 

73. Fritz Ermarth, February 28, 1979, Paper, “Consultative Security Framework for the Middle East,” JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski 

Collection, Geographic File, Box 15, “Southwest Asia-Persian Gulf, 

2/79-12/79” folder. If not otherwise noted, the quotations and 

references in this paragraph are based on the same source.

74. NSC, Undated, “Comprehensive Net Assessment 1978: 

Overview,” attachment to Brzezinski to Carter, March 30, 1979, 

Memorandum, “NSC Weekly Report No. 92,” JCL, Zbigniew 

Brzezinski Collection, Weekly Reports, Box 42, “Weekly Reports 91-

101” folder. If not otherwise noted, the quotations and references 

in this paragraph are based on the same source.

75. Tarnoff to Brzezinski, May 1, 1979, Memorandum, “Comprehensive Net Assessment 1978,” CNA-78, JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Alpha Channel, Box 20, “Alpha Channel, 5/79-

8/79” folder.

76. “Summary of Conclusions of Special Coordination Committee Meeting,” Middle East Security Issues, May 11, 1979, JCL, 

NLC-25-97-2-5-1. If not otherwise noted, the quotations and references in this paragraph are based on the same source.

77. Odom, January 13, 1981, Paper, “Persian Gulf Security 

Framework.”

78. Ermarth to Brzezinski, June 20, 1979, Memorandum, “Further Points on Middle East PRCs,” JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Subject File, Box 25, “Meetings: PRC 112, 6/21/79” folder. If 

not otherwise noted, the quotations and references in this paragraph are based on the same source.
74

79. Ermarth and Sick to Brzezinski, June 19, 1979, Memorandum, “PRCs on Middle East/Persian Gulf,” JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Geographic File, Box 15, “Southwest Asia-Persian 

Gulf, 2/79-12/79” folder. If not otherwise noted, the quotations 

and references in this paragraph are based on the same source.

80. JCS, Undated and Untitled Paper, attached to Dalton to 

Brown, May 10, 1979, Memorandum, “US Strategy and Defense 

Policy for the Middle East and the Persian Gulf,” JCL, NLC-20-24-

2-1-0. If not otherwise noted, the quotations and references in this 

paragraph are based on the same source.

81. DoD, Undated Paper, “Military Presence in the Middle 

East/Persian Gulf,” attached to Dodson to Mondale, Muskie, 

Brown, Duncan, O’Donovan, Askew, Earle, Jones, and Turner, 

June 18, 1979, Memorandum, “Agenda and Papers for PRC Meeting,” JCL, NLC-20-24-2-1-0. If not otherwise noted, the quotations 

and references in this paragraph are based on the same source.

82. Odom, January 13, 1981, Paper, “Persian Gulf Security 

Framework.” If not otherwise noted, the quotations and references in this paragraph are based on the same source.

83. Interview with Dr. Christopher Shoemaker, September 3, 

2009.

84. Interview with Ambassador David Aaron, June 12, 2009.

85. Interview with Robert Murray, May 21, 2009.

86. Cole et al., p. 56ff. If not otherwise noted, the quotations 

and references in this paragraph are based on the same source.

87. Interview with Robert Murray, May 21, 2009.

88. Interview with General Volney Warner, May 20 and 27, 

2009. If not otherwise noted, the quotations and references in this 

paragraph and the next are based on the same source.

89. Quoted in Cole et al., p. 31.
75

90. JCS, prepared by Green, November 6, 1979, Briefing Sheet 

for the Chairman, JCS, on a Report to Be Considered at the JCS 

Meeting, November 7, 1979, JCS 2147/627, “Identification of 

Forces for the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force,” Library of 

Congress, Manuscript Division, William E. Odom Papers, Formerly 

Classified, 1977-1982, Box 36, “Presidential Directives Regarding 

Defense Policy Development, Joint Chiefs of Staff Papers, 1980-

1981, folder 1 of 3 folders. If not otherwise noted, the quotations 

and references in this paragraph are based on the same source.

91. Interview with Warner, May 20 and 27, 2009. If not otherwise noted, the quotations and references in this paragraph are 

based on the same source.

92. Brzezinski to Brown, July 9, 1979, Memorandum, “Persian 

Gulf Contingency Forces,” JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, 

Geographic File, Box 15, “Southwest Asia-Persian Gulf, 2/79-

12/79” folder.

93. Odom to Brzezinski, July 24, 1979, Memorandum, “Middle East/Persian Gulf Command Structure,” Library of Congress, 

Manuscript Division, William E. Odom Papers, Formerly Classified, 1977-1982, Box 36, “Presidential Directives Regarding Defense Policy Development,” Washington, DC: White House, 1977-

1982, folder 2 of 2 folders. If not otherwise noted, the quotations 

and references in this paragraph and the next are based on the 

same source.

94. Underlined in original.

95. This seems not to have been an issue in JCS debates. 

96. Odom to Brzezinski, July 24, 1979, Memorandum, “Middle 

East/Persian Gulf Command Structure.” If not otherwise noted, 

the quotations and references in this paragraph are based on the 

same source.

97. Odom, January 13, 1981, “Persian Gulf Security Framework.”

98. Odom to Brzezinski, July 30, 1979, Memorandum, “Foreign Policy Priorities for the Remainder of the Term,” Library of 

Congress, Washington DC, Manuscript Division, William E. Odom 
76

Papers, Formerly Classified, 1977-1982, Box 36, “Presidential Directives Regarding Defense Policy Development,” Washington, 

DC: White House, 1977-1982, folder 2 of 2 folders.

99. Odom, January 13, 1981, “Persian Gulf Security Framework.” If not otherwise noted, the quotations and references in 

this paragraph are based on the same source.

100. DoD, Undated Paper, “US Capability to Respond to Limited Contingencies.” If not otherwise noted, the quotations and 

references in this paragraph are based on the same source.

101. Brzezinski to Carter, Undated Memorandum, “US Capability to Respond to Limited Contingencies,” JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Geographic File, Box 15, “Southwest Asia-Persian 

Gulf,” 2/79-12/79 folder. If not otherwise noted, the quotations 

and references in this paragraph are based on the same source.

102. Odom to Brzezinski, November 5, 1979, Memorandum, 

“Defense Policy: Directions and Priorities,” Library of Congress, 

Washington DC, Manuscript Division, William E. Odom Papers, 

Formerly Classified, 1977-1982, Box 36, “Presidential Directives 

Regarding Defense Policy Development,” Washington, DC: 

White House, 1977-1982, folder 2 of 2 folders. If not otherwise 

noted, the quotations and references in this paragraph are based 

on the same source.

103. Odom to Brzezinski, November 28, 1979, Memorandum, 

“Strategy for the Persian Gulf in 1980,” Library of Congress, 

Washington DC, Manuscript Division, William E. Odom Papers, 

Formerly Classified, 1977-1982, Box 36, “Presidential Directives 

regarding Defense Policy Development,” White House, 1977-

1982, folder 2 of 2 folders.

104. Ibid.

105. Interview with Dr. Harold Brown, May 25, 2009. If not 

otherwise noted, the quotations and references in this paragraph 

are based on the same source.

106. His emphasis.

107. Interview with Robert Murray, May 21, 2009.
77

108. Interview with Dr. Christopher Shoemaker, September 

3, 2009.

109. Interview with Robert Murray, May 21, 2009.

110. Ibid.

111. REDCOM to Lawson and Shutler, Undated Fact Sheet, 

“Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force,” RDJTF, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, William E. Odom Papers, Formerly 

Classified, 1977-1982, Box 36, “Presidential Directives Regarding 

Defense Policy Development, Joint Chiefs of Staff Papers, 1980-

1981, folder 3 of 3 folders. If not otherwise noted, the quotations 

and references in this paragraph are based on the same source.

112. JCS, prepared by Green, November 6, 1979, Briefing 

Sheet for the Chairman, JCS, on a Report to Be Considered at the 

JCS Meeting, 7 November 1979, JCS 2147/627, “Identification of 

Forces for the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force,” Library of 

Congress, Manuscript Division, William E. Odom Papers, Formerly 

Classified, 1977-1982, Box 36, “Presidential Directives Regarding 

Defense Policy Development,” Joint Chiefs of Staff Papers, 1980-

1981, folder 1 of 3 folders.

113. Interview with Dr. Harold Brown, May 25, 2009.

114. Interview with Dr. Christopher Shoemaker, September 

3, 2009.

115. Vance resigned after the failed rescue mission to free the 

American hostages in Tehran on April 24, 1980.

116. Interview with Dr. Christopher Shoemaker, September 3, 

2009. If not otherwise noted, the quotations and references in this 

paragraph and the next are based on the same source.

117. Interview with Dr. Harold Brown, May 25, 2009.

118. Brzezinski to Carter, December 26, 1979, Memorandum, 

“Reflections on Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan,” JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Geographic File, Box 17, “Southwest 

Asia-Persian Gulf-Afghanistan,” 12/26/79-1/4/80 folder.
78

119. Brzezinski to Carter, January 9, 1980, Memorandum, “A 

Long-term Strategy for Coping with the Consequence of the Soviet Action in Afghanistan,” JCL, NLC-33-6-2-8-9. If not otherwise 

noted, the quotations and references in this paragraph are based 

on the same source.

120. “Presidential Directive 63, “Persian Gulf Security Framework.”

121. Brzezinski to Carter, May 16, 1980, Memorandum, NSC 

Weekly Report No. 141, JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Weekly Reports, Box 42, “Weekly Reports 136-150” folder.

122. Odom, January 13, 1981, Paper, “Persian Gulf Security 

Framework.” If not otherwise noted, the quotations and references in this paragraph are based on the same source.

123. For more, see Njolstad; Odom, “The Cold War Origins 

of the U.S. Central Command”; and Frank L. Jones, “Brzezinski’s 

Forge: Fashioning the Carter Doctrine’s Military Instrument,” paper prepared for the Gulf and the Globe 2009 Conference at the 

Center for Middle East and Islamic Studies, U.S. Naval Academy, 

Annapolis, MD, January 29, 2009.

124 . Aaron to Brzezinski, December 27, 1979, Memorandum, 

“JCS Briefing on the RDF,” attached to Hunter to Odom, January 

18, 1980, SCC on Thursday: Action Items, JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski 

Collection, Subject File, Box 32, “Meetings SCC 254” folder. If not 

otherwise noted, the quotations and references in this paragraph 

are based on the same source.

125. Odom to Brzezinski, January 7, 1980, Memorandum, 

“Progress on the RDF.” If not otherwise noted, the quotations and 

references in this paragraph are based on the same source.

126. Brzezinski to Brown, January 25, 1980, Memorandum, 

“Strategic Review of our Unified Command Structure,” attached 

to Hunter to Odom, January 18, 1980, SCC on Thursday: Action 

Items, JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Subject File, Box 32, 

“Meetings SCC 254” folder.
79

127. Odom, January 13, 1981, Paper, “Persian Gulf Security 

Framework.” If not otherwise noted, the quotations and references in this paragraph are based on the same source.

128. Cole et al., p. 58ff.

129. Aaron to Carter, February 5, 1980, Memorandum, Daily 

Report, JCL, NLC-1-14-1-10-3.

130. Interview with Warner, May 20 and 27, 2009. If not otherwise noted, the quotations and references in this paragraph and 

the next are based on the same source.

131. Interview with Robert Murray, May 21, 2009. Emphasis 

in the original.

132. Interview with Dr. Harold Brown, May 25, 2009.

133. Interview with Warner, May 20 and 27, 2009. If not otherwise noted, the quotations and references in this paragraph are 

based on the same source.

134. RDJTF, Washington Liaison Office, April 17, 1980, Untitled Paper, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Manuscript 

Division, William E. Odom Papers, Formerly Classified, 1977-1982, 

Box 36, “Presidential Directives Regarding Defense Policy Development,” Joint Chiefs of Staff Papers, 1980-1981, folder 1 of 3 folders. If not otherwise noted, the quotations and references in this 

paragraph and the next are based on the same source.

135. Warner via the JCS to Brown, April 21, 1980, Memorandum, “USREDCOM/RDJTF Planning and Command Relationships,” Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, William E. 

Odom Papers, Formerly Classified, 1977-1982, Box 36, “Presidential 

Directives Regarding Defense Policy Development,” Joint Chiefs 

of Staff Papers, 1980-1981, folder 1 of 3 folders. If not otherwise 

noted, the quotations and references in this paragraph are based 

on the same source.

136. Interview with Robert Murray, May 21, 2009.

137. Interview with Warner, May 20 and 27, 2009.
80

138. Warner, July 21, 1980, Cable, “Comments on JCS-proposed Revision of RDJTF TOR [Terms of Reference],” Library of 

Congress, Manuscript Division, William E. Odom Papers, Formerly 

Classified, 1977-1982, Box 36, “Presidential Directives Regarding 

Defense Policy Development,” Joint Chiefs of Staff Papers, 1980-

1981, folder 1 of 3 folders. In the original, the words are all capitalized.

139. Kelley to Warner, June 6, 1980, Memorandum, “Comments on REDCOM Proposed Changes to the RDJTF Terms of 

Reference,” attached to Kelley to Christoph, June 6, 1980, Untitled Handwritten Note, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, William E. Odom Papers, Formerly Classified, 1977-1982, Box 

36, “Presidential Directives Regarding Defense Policy Development,” Joint Chiefs of Staff Papers, 1980-1981, folder 1 of 3 folders. If not otherwise noted, the quotations and references in this 

paragraph are based on the same source. 

140. Odom to Brzezinski, May 6, 1980, Memorandum, “Persian Gulf Security Framework: Loose Ends,” JCL, NLC-12-28-

11-12-3. If not otherwise noted, the quotations and references in 

this paragraph are based on the same source. Interestingly, this 

is one of the only times that the failed hostage rescue mission (or 

indeed the hostage crisis, in general) is mentioned in connection 

with command arrangements. Odom provides a reason for this 

in 2006: The Holloway Report, which revealed that command arrangements were a major flaw of the operation, “was not completed until several months afterward and thus was not available 

in time to induce President Carter to direct the creation of a new 

regional command.” Odom, “The Cold War Origins of the U.S. 

Central Command,” p. 74.”

141. Odom to Brzezinski, May 12, 1980, Memorandum, “Middle East/Persian Gulf Command Arrangements,” Library of Congress, Washington DC, Manuscript Division, William E. Odom 

Papers, Formerly Classified, 1977-1982, Box 36, Presidential Directives Regarding Defense Policy Development, White House, 1977-

1982, folder 2 of 2 folders. If not otherwise noted, the quotations 

and references in this paragraph are based on the same source.

142. Furthermore, the Army’s Forces Command, the Air 

Force’s Tactical Air Command and the Navy (as force providers 
81

to the RDJTF) insisted that they would determine the components 

of the RDJTF. This meant that REDCOM and the RDJTF were “beholden to them for troops and equipment.” See also Cole et al., p. 

59.

143. Odom to Brzezinski, May 12, 1980, Memorandum, “Middle East/Persian Gulf Command Arrangements.” 

144. Jones to Brown, July 25, 1980, Memorandum, “Rapid 

Deployment Joint Task Force: Clarification of Mission and Command Relationship,” Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, 

William E. Odom Papers, Formerly Classified, 1977-1982, Box 36, 

“Presidential Directives Regarding Defense Policy Development,” Joint Chiefs of Staff Papers, 1980-1981, folder 1 of 3 folders. If not otherwise noted, the quotations and references in this 

paragraph are based on the same source.

145. Warner to USREDCOM/JDA and RDJTF, July 30, 1980, 

Memorandum, “Command and Staff Relationships,” Library of 

Congress, Manuscript Division, William E. Odom Papers, Formerly 

Classified, 1977-1982, Box 36, “Presidential Directives Regarding 

Defense Policy Development,” Joint Chiefs of Staff Papers, 1980-

1981, folder 1 of 3 folders.

146. The author is currently working on a paper with a more 

in-depth account of this crisis. In said paper, the military situation will be central and the heated internal discussions on policy 

responses secondary.

147. The United States itself is partially responsible for the 

failure to anticipate the Iranian Revolution. For a view from an 

NSC staffer in the Carter administration who worked on Iran, see 

Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America’s Tragic Encounter with Iran, 1st 

Ed., New York, NY: Random House, 1985.

148. CIA, Undated Memorandum, “Soviet Union and Southwest Asia,” attached to Turner to Carter, Mondale, Vance, Brown 

and Brzezinski, January 15, 1980, Memorandum, Untitled, JCL, 

NLC-23-57-12-1-0.

149. CIA, Paper, “Soviet Capabilities and Options for Intervention in Iran,” attached to Turner to Carter, Mondale, Vance, 
82

Brown, Brzezinski, and Jones, February 29, 1980, Memorandum, 

Untitled, NLC-25-43-6-6-5.

150. DoD, Undated Paper, “Military Presence in the Middle 

East/Persian Gulf, Dodson to Mondale, Muskie, Brown, McIntyre, Jones, and Turner, August 13, 1980, Memorandum, “Agenda for Security Framework SCC-XV,” JCL, NLC-17-22-15-2-1.

151. CIA, Undated and Untitled Discussion Paper, attached 

to Dodson to Mondale, Muskie, Brown, McIntyre, Jones, and 

Turner, August 21, 1980, Memorandum, “Discussion Papers for 

Security Framework,” JCL, NLC-31-123-6-11-3. If not otherwise 

noted, the quotations and references in this paragraph are based 

on the same source.

152. Unknown Sender, August 22, 1980, Memorandum, 

“USSR/Iran,” JCL, NLC-31-11-9-10-5.

153. Interview with Warner, May 20 and 27, 2009.

154. Summary of Conclusions of National Security Council 

Meeting, “Soviet Military Threat to Iran,” September 12, 1980, 

JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Geographic File, Box 16, 

“Southwest Asia-Persian Gulf,” 9/80 folder. If not otherwise noted, the quotations and references in this paragraph are based on 

the same source.

155. Carter, “State of the Union Address 1980.” 

156. Summary of Conclusions of Special Coordination Meeting, “Follow-up on Security Framework in the Persian Gulf—XV,” 

August 22, 1980, JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Geographic 

File, Box 16, “Southwest Asia-Persian Gulf,” 8/80 folder. If not 

otherwise noted, the quotations and references in this paragraph 

are based on the same source.

157. According to Odom, this led to a “marathon review and 

soul-searching process,” as the paper received a level of attention 

not seen “since the Vietnam War, and probably not even then.” 

Odom to Brzezinski, August 29, 1980, Memorandum, “Soviet [redacted] and the JCS Paper on Strategy Options,” JCL, NLC-12-45-

8-8-3.”
83

158. Ibid.

159. Ibid.

160. Unknown Sender, August 22, 1980, Memorandum, 

“USSR/Iran.” 

161. Ibid.

162. Summary of Conclusions of Special Coordination Meeting, “Follow-up on Security Framework in the Persian Gulf—

XVI,” September 2, 1980, JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Geographic File, Box 16, “Southwest Asia-Persian Gulf,” 9/80 folder. 

If not otherwise noted, the quotations and references in this paragraph and the next are based on the same source.

163. Ibid.

164. Summary of Conclusions of National Security Council 

Meeting, “Soviet Military Threat to Iran,” September 12, 1980, 

JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Geographic File, Box 16, 

“Southwest Asia-Persian Gulf,” 9/80 folder.

165. Summary of Conclusions of Special Coordination Meeting, “Follow-up on Security Framework in the Persian Gulf—

XVI.”

166. State Department, August 21, 1980, Discussion Paper, 

“Accelerated Diplomatic Strategy,” attached to Dodson to Mondale, Muskie, Brown, McIntyre, Jones, and Turner.

167. Undated non-paper for Muskie-Gromyko reference Iran 

& Persian Gulf area, attached to Muskie to Carter, September 13, 

1980, Memorandum, “UN Meeting with Gromyko,” JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Alpha Channel, Box 20, “Alpha Channel, Miscellaneous,” 9/80-10/80 folder.

168. Also, it is not yet clear how the Iraqi invasion of Iran 

on September 22, 1980, affected this situation. Brzezinski, for one, 

saw a unique opportunity to consolidate the U.S. security position 

in the region, as U.S. allies would depend more upon U.S. help. 
84

Brzezinski to Carter, October 3, 1980, Memorandum, ”NSC Weekly Report No. 156,” JCL, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Weekly Reports, Box 42, “Weekly Reports 151-161” folder. In the military’s 

judgment, it did not significantly affect U.S. defense plans for 

Iran. DoD, November 14, 1980, Draft Paper, “Implications of IranIraq Conflict on US Defense Strategy for the PG/SWA Region,” 

LOC, Manuscript Division, William E. Odom Papers, Formerly 

Classified, 1977-1982, Box 36, “Presidential Directives Regarding 

Defense Policy Development,” Joint Chiefs of Staff Papers, 1980-

1981, folder 3 of 3 folders.

169. Interview with Dr. Christopher Shoemaker, September 

3, 2009. 

170. Ibid.

171. Interview with Dr. Harold Brown, May 25, 2009.

172. Odom to Allen, February 11, 1981, Memorandum, “Persian Gulf Security Framework,” Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Manuscript Division, William E. Odom Papers, Formerly 

Classified, 1977-1982, Box 36, “Presidential Directives regarding 

Defense Policy Development,” White House, 1977-1982, folder 2 

of 2 folders. 

173. Ibid.

174. Ibid.

175. Interview with Dr. Christopher Shoemaker, September 3, 

2009. If not otherwise noted, the quotations and references in this 

paragraph are based on the same source.

176. Cole et al., p. 63ff. If not otherwise noted, the quotations 

and references in this paragraph are based on the same source.

177. See Zegart; and Schrader.

178. The theoretical argument behind this claim is laid out in 

the author’s M.Sc. thesis. See note 1 for details.
85

179. Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell, and Norrin M. 

Ripsman, “Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy,” in Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey 

W. Taliaferro, eds., Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 25. 

180. In the following, the term “bureaucrat” covers all those 

officials in national security organizations, such as the Department of Defense, below the explicitly political level (for example 

the Secretary of Defense). It is not used in any pejorative sense, as 

is sometimes the case in common speech.

181. See, for example, B. Guy Peters, The Politics of Bureaucracy, 4th Ed., New York: Longman Publishers, 1995, p. 217; and 

Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Interpretation, Evanston, IL: Row, 1957, p. 121.

182. Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd Ed., New York: Longman, 1999, p. 168.

183. Project on National Security Reform, “Forging a New 

Shield,” pp. i-vi. If not otherwise noted, the quotations and references in this paragraph and the next three are based on the same 

source.

184. Ibid.,p. 83.

185. See, for example, James J. F. Forest and Rebecca Crispin, 

“AFRICOM: Troubled Infancy, Promising Future,” Contemporary 

Security Policy, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2009, p. 6.

186. For a commentary by three former USAID administrators, see J. Brian Atwood, M. Peter McPherson, and Andrew 

Natsios, “Arrested Development: Making Foreign Aid a More Effective Tool,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 6, 2008.
86

ACRONYMS

CENTCOM Central Command

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CINC Commander in Chief

CINCRED Commander in Chief, Readiness 

Command

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff

COMRDJTF Commander, Rapid Deployment 

Joint Task Force

DoD Department of Defense

EUCOM European Command

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JTF Joint Task Force

MIDEASTFOR Middle East Force

NCA National Command Authority

NSC National Security Council

PACOM Pacific Command

PD Presidential Directive

PGSF Persian Gulf Security Framework

PNSR Project on National Security 

Reform

PRM Presidential Review 

Memorandum

RDF Rapid Deployment Force

RDJTF Rapid Deployment Joint Task 

Force
87

REDCOM Readiness Command

SACEUR Supreme Allied 

 Commander, Europe

STRICOM Strike Command

UCP Unified Command Plan

UK United Kingdom of Great Britain 

and Northern Ireland

U.S. United States of America

USSR Union of Socialist Soviet Republics
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Gregg F. Martin

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

Author

Mr. Henrik Bliddal

Director of Publications

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil