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Transportation Security Administration's Deployment 


and Use of Advanced Imaging Technology 


OIG-13-120 September 2013
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security

 Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov 

SEP 16 2013 

MEMORANDUM FOR: 	 John W. Halinski 

Deputy Administrator 

Transportation Security Administration 

FROM: 	Anne L. Richards 

Assistant Inspector General for Audits 

SUBJECT: 	 Transportation Security Administration’s Deployment and Use 

of Advanced Imaging Technology 

Attached for your information is our final report, Transportation Security Administration’s 

Deployment and Use of Advanced Imaging Technology. We incorporated the formal 

comments from the Transportation Security Administration in the final report. 

The report contains two recommendations aimed at improving the deployment and use of 

advanced imaging technology. Your office concurred with both recommendations. 

However, TSA’s response did not include steps to implement the recommendations. As 

prescribed by the Department of Homeland Security Directive 077-01, Follow-Up and 

Resolutions for Office of Inspector General Report Recommendations, within 90 days of the 

date of this memorandum, please provide our office with a written response that includes 

your (1) agreement or disagreement, (2) corrective action plan, and (3) target completion 

date for each recommendation. Also, please include responsible parties and any other 

supporting documentation necessary to inform us about the current status of the 

recommendation. 

Please email a signed PDF copy of all responses and closeout requests to 

OIGAuditsFollowup@oig.dhs.gov. Until your response to the recommendations is received 

and evaluated, the recommendations will be considered open and unresolved. 

Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we will provide copies of 

our report to appropriate congressional committees with oversight and appropriation 

responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will post the report on our 

website for public dissemination. 

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Mark Bell, Deputy Assistant 

Inspector General for Audits, at (202) 254-4100. 

Attachment 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Table of Contents 

Executive Summary ............................................................................................................ 1 

Background ........................................................................................................................ 2 

Results of Audit ................................................................................................................... 4 

Strategic Deployment Planning .............................................................................. 4 


Data Reliability ........................................................................................................ 6 


Recommendations .................................................................................................. 9 


Management Comments and OIG Analysis ............................................................ 9 


 


Appendixes

Appendix A: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology ............................................ 11 

Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report ............................... 13 

Appendix C: Major Contributors to This Report ................................................ 16 

Appendix D: Report Distribution ........................................................................ 17 

Abbreviations

AIT advanced imaging technology 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

GAGAS generally accepted government auditing standards 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

PMIS Performance Measurement Information System 

TSA Transportation Security Administration 

TSO Transportation Security Officer

www.oig.dhs.gov OIG-13-120
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Executive Summary

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) secures the nation’s airports and screens 

commercial airline passengers and baggage. It uses advanced imaging technology to screen 

passengers for metallic and nonmetallic threats, including weapons, explosives, and other 

concealed objects, without physical contact. 

TSA began deploying advanced imaging technology in 2007 and accelerated its deployment 

after the attempted airplane bombing on December 25, 2009. In 2012, Representative John 

Mica requested that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector 

General (OIG) conduct an audit to determine whether TSA is effectively deploying advanced 

imaging technology and is fully utilizing the equipment at airports. 

TSA created and followed deployment schedules. However, it did not develop a 

comprehensive deployment strategy to ensure all advanced imaging technology units 

were effectively deployed and fully used for screening passengers. This condition 

existed because TSA did not— 

•	 Have a policy or process requiring program offices to prepare strategic 

deployment plans for new technology that align with the overall goals of the 

Passenger Screening Program, and 

•	 Have adequate internal controls to ensure accurate data on advanced 

imaging technology utilization. 

Without a documented, approved, comprehensive plan and accurate data on the use of 

advanced imaging technology, TSA continued to use walkthrough metal detectors, 

which are unable to identify non-metallic objects, to screen the majority of passengers; 

therefore not taking advantage of the advanced imaging technology’s security benefits. 

Additionally, TSA may have used resources inefficiently to purchase and deploy 

underused advanced imaging technology units. 

We made two recommendations to improve the effectiveness of how TSA deploys and 

measures the use of advanced imaging technology. TSA concurred with both 

recommendations. 

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Department of Homeland Security 

Background 

TSA was created to strengthen the security of the nation’s transportation systems and 

ensure the freedom of movement for people and commerce. TSA is responsible for 

conducting checkpoint screening operations at federalized airports. Its mission is to 

conduct screening operations in a manner that maximizes passenger throughput and 

threat detection while alleviating privacy concerns. Within TSA, the Passenger 

Screening Program is responsible for providing technology to screen passengers and 

carry-on baggage at airport security checkpoints. 

Historically, TSA used walkthrough metal detectors to Types of AIT

screen passengers at airport security checkpoints. As 	 Millimeter wave technology uses 

electromagnetic waves to create the the threat to transportation security evolved, TSA same generic image for all needed a screening technology to detect nonmetallic passengers. 

threats. Advanced imaging technology (AIT) screens 

Backscatter technology projects passengers for metallic and nonmetallic threats, low-level X-ray beams over the body including weapons, explosives, and other concealed to create a reflection of the body

objects, without physical contact. TSA began displayed on the monitor. 

deploying AIT in 2007 and accelerated its deployment Source: TSA. after the attempted airplane bombing on December 

25, 2009.1 

TSA deployed AIT with millimeter wave and backscatter technologies. Both types of AIT 

create an image of a passenger’s body that identifies items not readily visible. Initial AIT 

units required a Transportation Security Officer (TSO) to review and interpret the 

images, generating privacy concerns among travelers and members of Congress. 

Figure 1: AIT with Automated Target Recognition In 2011, TSA added automatic 

target recognition software to the 

millimeter wave AIT. Automatic 

target recognition software 

addresses privacy concerns by 

interpreting images and displaying 

the results on a generic figure, as 

shown in figure 1. The FAAf

ModernizationfandfReformfActfoff

2012 mandated that, beginning Source:ffL3fCommunications.

1

 Northwest Airlines flight 253 was the target of a failed Al-Qaeda bombing attempt. 

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Department of Homeland Security 

June 2012, TSA shall ensure AIT used for passenger screening is equipped with 

automatic recognition software. The TSA Administrator issued a waiver extending the 

deadline to June 1, 2013. 

As of January 2013, TSA had purchased 997 AIT units at a total cost of approximately 

$150 million. Table 1 provides a summary of the total cost of all AIT units purchased. 

 Table 1: Cost of AIT Units Purchased 

Type Unit Cost Cost of AITs by 

Type 

No. of AIT Units 

Purchased 

Millimeter Wave AIT $148,200 $110,557,200 746 

Backscatter AIT $159,584 40,055,584 251 

Total $150,612,784 997 

Source:fOIGfanalysisfoffTSAfdata.f

In January 2013, TSA decided to remove all backscatter AIT units from airports because 

these units would not meet the June 2013 deadline to comply with the FAAf

ModernizationfandfReformfActfoff2012. This affected 251 units purchased for 

approximately $40 million. 

TSA uses passenger throughput data entered into the Performance Measurement 

Information System (PMIS) to measure the use of AIT. TSA extracts data from PMIS to 

provide throughput information to airport Federal Security Directors and TSA leadership 

to assist in managing operations. TSOs manually collect and enter passenger checkpoint 

throughput data (such as AIT and walkthrough metal detector throughput) into PMIS. 

TSA has not performed a reliability assessment on AIT throughput data recorded in 

PMIS. 

Representative John Mica, Chairman, Subcommittee on Government Operations, 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform requested this audit in January 2012. 

Representative Mica expressed concern about TSA purchasing and deploying AIT units 

that it is not using at the airports. 2

 This report responds to his request. Our objective, 

scope, and methodology are provided in appendix A. 

2

 Representative Mica requested this audit during the last congressional term where he served as 

Chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 3 OIG-13-120
 
 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Results of Audit

TSA created and followed deployment schedules showing the order in which airports 

would receive AIT units. However, it did not develop a comprehensive deployment 

strategy to ensure all AIT units were effectively deployed and fully used for screening 

passengers. This condition existed because TSA did not— 

•	 Have a policy or process requiring program offices to prepare strategic 

deployment plans for new technology that align with the overall goals of the 

Passenger Screening Program, and 

•	 Have adequate internal controls to ensure accurate data on AIT utilization. 

Without a documented, approved, comprehensive plan and accurate data on the use of 

advanced imaging technology, TSA continued to use walkthrough metal detectors, 

which are unable to identify non-metallic objects, to screen the majority of passengers; 

therefore not taking advantage of the advanced imaging technology’s security benefits. 

Additionally, TSA may have used resources inefficiently to purchase and deploy 

underused AIT units. 

Strategic Deployment Planning 

TSA did not develop a strategic deployment planning document to address the 

introduction and use of AIT to screen passengers at airports. Rather than 

develop a comprehensive strategic deployment plan, TSA created documents 

and schedules with short term goals based on institutional knowledge to deploy 

AIT. Documents that TSA provided contained inconsistent information or were 

not signed by senior leadership, creating doubt as to whether the documents 

were ever approved. In addition, TSA did not have a policy or process requiring 

program offices to document strategic deployment plans for new technology 

that align with the goals of the Passenger Screening Program. Without a 

documented, approved, comprehensive strategic deployment plan to address 

short- and long-term goals, TSA may have inefficiently used resources to 

purchase and deploy underused AIT units. 

Deployment Planning Documents 

TSA created and followed deployment schedules and documents identifying 

short term goals, but did not develop a comprehensive strategic deployment 

plan. A strategic deployment plan would provide TSA a baseline to respond to 

and plan for evolving threats, goals, and priorities. TSA and DHS do not have 

specific policies or procedures for developing or documenting deployment plans. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

An effective strategic deployment plan should include the purpose and 

description, identify necessary tasks, define roles and responsibilities, identify 

logistics requirements, document site selection methodology and deployment 

schedule, and outline disposal plans. 

TSA created deployment schedules that documented the order in which airports 

would receive AIT units. TSA based the deployment schedules on the following 

three priorities: 

• High threat airports with available Transportation Security Officers, 

• AIT pilot locations, and 

• Highest threat airports. 

TSA also considered airport size and available space, but not as a separate factor. 

TSA measured the airport’s screening area dimensions (i.e., ceiling height, lane 

width) to ensure AIT units could fit the space before including an airport on the 

deployment schedule. These documents did not show how or to what extent 

TSA aligned AIT deployment with the overall goals of the Passenger Screening 

Program. 

Additionally, TSA deployed AIT using information contained in various 

documents that were fragmented and developed independently from one 

another. Some documents contained inconsistent information and were 

unsigned and undated, and provided no evidence of TSA’s senior leadership 

approval. TSA had difficulty providing historical information as well. TSA could 

not provide strategic deployment planning documents created before 2010; yet 

the component deployed an AIT unit at the Phoenix Sky Harbor International 

Airport in 2007. Strategic planning is important for a successful deployment of 

screening technology. Without a comprehensive, strategic deployment plan and 

a process for approving changes to the plan, TSA decision makers do not have a 

systematic approach to maximizing technology advances for reducing current 

and evolving threats. Moreover, the absence of a comprehensive strategy to 

deploy AIT units may lead to underused AIT units at airports, possibly 

inefficiently using resources to purchase and deploy underused AIT units, and 

reducing the security benefits of AIT by continuing to use walkthrough metal 

detectors to screen passengers. 

Actions Taken During the Audit 

TSA officials recognized the benefits of developing and maintaining a strategic 

deployment plan for its passenger screening equipment and began drafting a 

comprehensive deployment strategy in July 2012. TSA drafted two separate 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

documents—one to provide a historical record of AIT deployment; the second to 

provide a deployment strategy for all Passenger Screening Program equipment. 

As of April 2013, the documents were still in draft. A comprehensive, strategic 

deployment plan defining deployment goals may eliminate or minimize 

problems in future equipment deployments. 

Data Reliability 

TSA did not have adequate internal controls to ensure accurate data on AIT use. 

We assessed PMIS data in accordance with the Government Accountability 

Office's guidance, Assessing the Reliability of Computer-Processed Data. 

3 We 

could not determine the reliability of PMIS data used to report AIT use 

because—

PMIS application and quality controls were not sufficient to identify 

and correct potential errors; 

Airports discarded original source documents, preventing us from 

reconciling the information; and 

PMIS and airport source documents during limited validation testing 

for a 10-day timeframe for five category X airports were inconsistent.4 

PMIS Application Controls 

PMIS application controls did not ensure airports reported accurate passenger 

throughput data to TSA headquarters. The Government Accountability Office 

defines application controls as internal controls incorporated directly into 

computer applications to help ensure the validity, completeness, accuracy, and 

confidentiality of transactions. Application controls include processing controls, 

data input, and system access. 

PMIS may identify passenger throughput entries that exceed hourly thresholds 

for a check lane, but it does not prevent the system from accepting incorrect 

entries. TSA designates upper limits for passenger check lane throughput, and 

PMIS notifies a reviewer when an entry exceeds the limit. PMIS does not 

indicate which lane, hour, or screening equipment exceeded the limit. TSA 

attempted to demonstrate the review process, but could not determine which 

entry exceeded the limit. In this case, a reviewer may approve a submission 

without correcting potential errors. Furthermore, TSA cannot be certain that 

3 Assessing the Reliability of Computer-Processed Data, GAO-09-680G, July 2009, www.gao.gov. 4 TSA classifies its regulated U.S. airports into one of five categories—X, I, II, III, and IV. Category X airports 

generally have the largest number of passengers boarding planes, and category IV airports have the least. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

inaccurate submissions are thoroughly reviewed because PMIS automatically 

accepts submissions within 48 hours. 

PMIS does not have system access controls that prevent unauthorized or 

accidental changes. In one instance, we identified a checkpoint where PMIS 

showed AIT throughput that was more than double the total customer 

throughput at that checkpoint (figure 2). TSA officials explained that a change in 

PMIS settings resulted in recording inaccurate AIT throughput. 

Figure 2: Error on AIT Utilization Report for a Category X Airport 

Source:fTSA.f

PMIS Quality Controls 

TSA’s quality controls for PMIS did not ensure airports submit accurate data to 

TSA headquarters for reporting the number of passengers screened by AIT. 

Controls are essential for an agency to achieve effective and efficient program 

results and safeguard the integrity of their programs. Quality controls include 

complying with approved policies and procedures, approving and reviewing data, 

and verifying and reconciling information. 

Although TSA has guidance documenting responsibilities for PMIS data entry and 

review, that guidance does not include procedures for capturing and validating 

AIT data. TSA’s guidance includes the PMISfWebfUserfGuide and the Officefoff

SecurityfOperationsfFieldfGuide:fImprovingfSecurityfEffectivenessfbyfOptimizingf

UtilizationfoffAdvancedfImagingfTechnology. These documents define PMIS data 

fields, identify fields requiring data entry, and provide examples of TSA reports 

on AIT. 

TSA did not develop standard procedures or guidance to instruct airports on 

recording or entering data into PMIS. For example, the five airports visited used 

different datasheet logs to record AIT throughput. Additionally, these airports 

did not have a documented procedure for validating AIT throughput data prior to 

entering the information into PMIS. Without specific procedures on data 

validation, TSA cannot verify that data entered into PMIS are accurate and 

reliable. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 7 OIG-13-120
 
 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

TSA is unable to assess PMIS data accuracy because it does not require airports 

to maintain source documents for AIT throughput data. Four of the five airports 

visited could not immediately provide documentation to validate PMIS data. 

One airport maintained the original records at each checkpoint for 30 days and 

then transferred those records to an off-site storage facility. Airport personnel 

were not able to provide the files quickly when requested because the records 

were not organized. TSA confirmed it has not tested the accuracy of AIT data in 

PMIS; instead, it relies on staff experience with throughput data to identify 

problems with the data. 

Airports’ manual processes for recording and entering AIT throughput in PMIS 

may lead to inaccurate information and do not provide an audit trail to validate 

data accuracy. As illustrated in figure 3, TSOs record passenger throughput using 

pen and paper, calculate the hourly throughput, and enter the information into 

PMIS. 

Figure 3: Manual Process to Capture Hourly AIT Throughput

TSO manually 

calculates each 

hour’s AIT 

throughput AIT counter 

increases 

with each 

passenger 

screened 

TSO enters AIT 

throughput data into 

PMIS 

TSO 

manually 

records 

hourly AIT 

count 

Source:fOIGfanalysisfoffTSAfairportfprocess.

We tested a sample of PMIS data for a 10-day period at five category X airports 

to evaluate data reliability. We were not able to develop a systematic test 

approach because there were no standard procedures and requirements for the 

airports to maintain manual records. However, based on this limited testing, we 

identified the following problems during our data reliability review: 

•	 AIT throughput data recorded in PMIS were different than the source 

document. 

•	 AIT throughput data on the source document were not recorded in PMIS. 

•	 The starting AIT count was different from the previous day’s ending AIT 

count. 

•	 AIT throughput source documentation was missing. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Without documented procedures standardizing the process to capture AIT 

throughput and stronger controls to validate AIT data, TSA cannot ensure data in 

PMIS are accurate and complete. Without reliable throughput data for AIT, TSA 

decision makers cannot ensure the optimal use of its machines, cannot measure 

the effectiveness of the technology, and cannot implement improvements in 

efficiencies. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Deputy Administrator, Transportation Security 

Administration: 

Recommendation #1:

Develop and approve a single, comprehensive deployment strategy that 

addresses short- and long-term goals for screening equipment. 

Recommendation #2: 

Develop and implement a disciplined system of internal controls from data entry 

to reporting to ensure PMIS data integrity. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

TSA provided comments to the draft of this report. According to its response, 

TSA agreed with our recommendations. A summary of the responses and our 

analysis follows. We included a copy of the management comments in their 

entirety in appendix B. 

In its comments, TSA asserted it created an Executive Steering Committee that 

met weekly to discuss deployment goals and progress; technology development 

and operational reliability; operator hiring and training progress; operational 

metrics; Congressional, stakeholder, and international engagements; and 

opportunities for continuous improvement. However, the results of the steering 

committee’s decisions were not developed into a written baseline to respond to 

and plan for evolving threats, goals, and priorities. TSA acknowledged the 

recommendations will help it develop a greater focus on documenting its shortand long-term strategies and improve internal controls relative to data used to 

influence or inform those strategies. 

Response to Recommendation #1: TSA concurred. TSA launched an effort to 

develop and approve updated deployment strategies that address short- and 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

long-term goals. The deployment strategies will include Risk Based Security 

goals and a methodology for assessing the impact of unplanned events. 

OIG Analysis: While TSA’s actions are responsive to the recommendation, TSA 

did not provide sufficient detail or a target date for completion of its deployment 

strategy documents. This recommendation is unresolved and will remain open 

until TSA provides its approved comprehensive deployment strategy. 

Response to Recommendation #2: TSA concurred. TSA agreed that its system 

can benefit from establishing standard processes and procedures for collecting, 

calculating, and entering AIT and walkthrough metal detector passenger 

throughput, as well as developing auditing mechanisms to ensure the processes 

are followed and TSA can identify and correct incorrect data. TSA noted it was 

able to both increase the number of AIT deployed and reallocate millimeter 

wave units to mitigate the removal of backscatter units without degradation in 

the percent of passengers screened. In addition, TSA asserted PMIS has 

demonstrated the ability to provide data on AIT utilization. 

OIG Analysis: TSA’s response to this recommendation does not fully address 

the intent of the recommendation. Although TSA acknowledged the benefit of 

establishing standard processes and developing auditing mechanisms for AIT and 

walkthrough metal detector throughput, the component did not provide specific 

actions it will take to address the recommendation. The recommendation is 

unresolved and will remain open until TSA develops and implements internal 

controls to ensure PMIS data integrity. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix A 

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was 

established by the HomelandfSecurityfActfoff2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment 

to the InspectorfGeneralfActfoff1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and 

special reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, 

efficiency, and effectiveness within the Department. 

In response to a congressional request, we audited TSA’s deployment and use of AIT. 

Our audit objective was to determine whether TSA ensured AIT units are being 

effectively deployed to and fully used in airports. We conducted this audit in response 

to a request by Representative John Mica, Chairman, Subcommittee on Government 

Operations, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. Representative Mica 

questioned whether TSA was wasting taxpayer dollars by purchasing and deploying AIT 

units that were not being used. 

We reviewed Federal regulations, departmental guidance, and agency procedures for 

AIT deployment and use, as well as best practices for equipment deployment and data 

reliability. We reviewed acquisition, deployment, and contract documentation for AIT. 

We also reviewed TSA guidance on PMIS. 

We interviewed TSA headquarters staff responsible for the acquisition, deployment, and 

use of AIT in the following offices: the Office of Security Capabilities, Office of Security 

Operations, and the Office of Acquisition. In addition, we interviewed TSA staff 

responsible for the use of AIT and observed AIT operations at five airports—Chicago 

O’Hare International Airport, John F. Kennedy International Airport, Lambert-St. Louis 

International Airport, Newark Liberty International Airport, and Seattle-Tacoma 

International Airport. 

To identify AIT throughput, we extracted PMIS data from TSA headquarters’ reporting 

system to review passenger throughput data from August 1, 2011, through 

July 31, 2012. We used IDEA software to review the PMIS data for exceptions to TSA’s 

standard throughput rates and to summarize overall AIT usage at TSA’s 28 category X 

airports. 

We tested the accuracy of passenger throughput data we extracted from PMIS and 

concluded the data were of undetermined reliability. We tested PMIS application 

controls by evaluating data against TSA’s standard throughput thresholds and identified 

instances where values exceeded those limits. 

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Department of Homeland Security 

We could not validate PMIS for our proposed timeframe of August 1, 2011, through July 

31, 2012, because airports did not retain the records. We requested that the five 

airports visited maintain and provide source documents for a 10-day period from 

December 1, 2012, to December 10, 2012. One airport did not comply with the original 

request so its time period was from January 19, 2013, to January 28, 2013. Our review 

identified inconsistencies between PMIS and the airports’ original source documents. 

We conducted this performance audit between May 2012 and May 2013 pursuant to 

the InspectorfGeneralfActfoff1978, as amended, and according to generally accepted 

government auditing standards (GAGAS), except that we identified an impairment to 

our independence in appearance. During this audit, it came to our attention that a 

family member of a senior OIG official was employed by an entity associated with this 

audit. To resolve this issue, we employed safeguards to protect the work from the 

threat to our independence in appearance. Our safeguards included re-evaluating the 

evidence supporting our findings and conclusions. In our opinion, the impairment to 

our independence in appearance did not affect the findings and conclusions developed 

during this audit. 

GAGAS requires that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our 

audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based upon our audit objective, and that the impairment to 

our independence in appearance did not affect this evidence or any findings and 

conclusions. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

U.S. Dep~~rtmeal of Homoload Stcllrily 

70 I Sou Ill 12th Street 

Arting10n. VA 20598-6021 

Transl?ortation t" Secunty 

AOO 1 ..5 2013 "~· ,.r:>· Adntin.istration 

INFORMATION 

MEMORANDUM FOR: Anne L. Richards 

Assistant Inspector General for Audits 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

FROM: JohnS. Administrator Pistole ~~~ Transportation urity Administration 

SUBJECT: Transportation Security Administration 's Deployment and Use of 

Advanced Imaging Technology - For Official Use Only OJG 

Project No. 12-/37-AUD-TSA. 

This memorandum constitutes the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) response to 

the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) draft report 

entitled, Transportation Security Administration's Deployment and Use of Advanced Imaging 

Technology - For Official Use Only O!G Project No. 12-1 37-A UD-TSA. 

Background 

The report identifies measures that can be taken by TSA to enhance its deployment and use of 

Advanced Imaging Technology (AJT). TSA begin deploying AIT in 2007 and accelerated its 

deployment after the attempted airplane bombing on December 25, 2009. In 2012, 

Representative John Mica requested that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

Office of Inspector General (OIG) conduct an audit to determine whether TSA is effectively 

deploying AIT and is fully utilizing the equipment at airports. 

Discussion 

In 2007, TSA conducted a limited acquisition of eight low-rate initial production (LRIP) AITs to 

detemline the applicability of such technology in the checkpoint environment. Based on the 

success of that initial testing, an additional3S units were purcbased in 2008 and fielded in the 

secondary position (post-Walk-Through Metal Detector (WTMD) and for secondary screening 

only) at approximately 19 airports. In 2009, six of the original units were re-configured to the 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

2 

primary position (co-located with WTMD) to test the feasibility and performance of AIT as a 

primary screening device. Through data collection efforts during several extended field and 

laboratory tests, it was determined that AIT would be successful in the primary position for the 

detection of metallic and non-metallic threats. 

After the attempted airplane bombing on December 25, 2009, TSA modified screening 

procedures to improve the ability to detect explosives hidden in sensitive areas of the body and 

accelerated AIT deployment. These strategies were intended to improve TSA' s ability to detect 

non-metallic explosives and to increase the use of technology to detect threats concealed on the 

body in a way that mitigated the need for physical screening procedures. Over the following 

3 years, TSA successfully deployed close to I ,000 AIT machines across the system; hiring and 

training operators, collaborating with internal and external stakeholders to socialize the new 

security posture, and attending to customer service impacts by a multitude of outreach events and 

awareness campaigns. 

To affect this amount of change in such a short period of time, TSA stood up an Executive 

Steering Committee that met weekly to discuss the items below and ensure immediate attention 

to any element of the deployment that presented a risk to the schedule or the efficacy of the 

effort. 

• Deployment goals and progress; 

• Technology development, operational reliability; 

• Operator hiring and training progress; 

• Operational metrics (AIT Throughput, AIT Utilization, Passenger Opt-Outs, etc.); 

• Congressional Engagements; 

• Stakeholder Engagements (media, passenger services outlets, industry partners, etc.); 

• International Engagements; and 

• Opportunities for continuous improvement on all fronts 

The recommendations in the OIG's report will help TSA to continue developing a greater focus 

on documenting short- and long-term strategies as well as improving our internal controls 

relative to data that is used to influence or inform those strategies. 

TSA concurs with the recommendations provided by OIG and has already taken steps to address 

the recommendations. What follows are TSA's specific responses to the recommendations 

contained in the OIG report. 

Recommendation #1: Develop and approve a single, comprehensive deployment strategy that 

addresses short and long-term goals for screening equipment. 

TSA concurs. TSA has already launched the effort to develop and approve updated deployment 

strategies that address short- and long-term goals. These strategies will include the impact of 

recent and upcoming Risk Based Security goals as well as provide methodology for assessing 

impact of unplanned events, such as security-related incidents. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

3 

Rcc mm nd~t tion #2: Develop and implement a disciplined system of internal controls from 

data entry to reporting to ens w e PM IS d41a integrity. 

TSA concurs. We agree with the recommendation for improving our internal controls for the 

manual collection, calculation, and data entry of passenger volumes utilizing AIT and WTMD 

equipment. We agree that the system can benefit from establishing standard processes and 

procedures for these activities as well as developing auditing mechanisms to ensure they are 

followed and that incorrect data can be identified and corrected expeditiously. 

GA0-09-680G "Assessing Data Reliability" defmes risk as "the likelihood that using data of 

questionable reliability could have substantial negative consequences on the decisions of 

policymak.ers and others." Given that authoritative definition, the Office of Security Operations 

stipulates that TSA was able to increase the total number of deployed AlT to just under I 000 

units and increased AIT utilization from about 400,000 passengers per day to over l ,000,000 

passengers per day. Using PMIS data in early 2013, TSA was also able to strategically reallocate 

129 millimeter wave units to mitigate the required removal of the remaining 171 backscatter 

(non-Automated Target Recognition enabled) units without degradation in percent of passengers 

screened. The PMIS application bas demonstrated the ability to provide data on AIT utilization. 

We realize there is always room for improvement to ensure we are collecting the most accurate 

data possible. 

In summary, we concur with the OIG's recommendation. TSA will continue to build on our 

ability to provide the most accurate data on AIT utilization by working with others internally and 

externally to improve our internal controls for the manual collection, calculation, and data entry 

of passenger volumes utilizing our AIT and WTMD equipment. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 15 OIG-13-120
 
 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix C 

Major Contributors to This Report 

Linda Howard, Director 

Christine Haynes, Audit Manager 

Tiffany Bellinger, Auditor 

Karen Gardner, Auditor 

David Lu, Program Analyst 

Tessa May-Fraser, Program Analyst 

Matthew Noll, Program Analyst 

Kevin Dolloson, Communications Analyst 

Ralleisha Dean, Independent Report Referencer 

www.oig.dhs.gov 16 OIG-13-120
 
 

 

 

 

 

 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix D 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

Acting Chief Privacy Officer 

Transportation Security Administration

Administrator 

TSA Audit Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate 

www.oig.dhs.gov 17 OIG-13-120
 
 

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES 

To obtain additional copies of this document, please call us at (202) 254-4100, fax your 

request to (202) 254-4305, or e-mail your request to our Office of Inspector General 

(OIG) Office of Public Affairs at: DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov. 

For additional information, visit our website at: www.oig.dhs.gov, or follow us on Twitter 

at: @dhsoig. 

OIG HOTLINE 

To expedite the reporting of alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any 

other kinds of criminal or noncriminal misconduct relative to Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) programs and operations, please visit our website at www.oig.dhs.gov 

and click on the red tab titled "Hotline" to report. You will be directed to complete and 

submit an automated DHS OIG Investigative Referral Submission Form. Submission 

through our website ensures that your complaint will be promptly received and 

reviewed by DHS OIG. 

Should you be unable to access our website, you may submit your complaint in writing 

to: 

Department of Homeland Security 


Office of Inspector General, Mail Stop 0305 


Attention: Office of Investigations Hotline 


245 Murray Drive, SW 


Washington, DC 20528-0305 


You may also call 1(800) 323-8603 or fax the complaint directly to us at 

(202) 254-4297. 

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.