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i 

86–965 2014

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–75] 

PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S 

COUNTERSPACE PROGRAM AND 

THE IMPLICATIONS FOR 

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MEETING JOINTLY WITH

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND 

PROJECTION FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JANUARY 28, 2014 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

STEVE KITAY, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Counsel 

ERIC SMITH, Clerk 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota 

PAUL COOK, California 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

DAVID SIENICKI, Professional Staff Member 

DOUG BUSH, Professional Staff Member 

NICHOLAS RODMAN, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2014 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, January 28, 2014, People’s Republic of China’s Counterspace Program and the Implications for U.S. National Security ..................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, January 28, 2014 ..................................................................................... 19 

TUESDAY, JANUARY 28, 2014 

PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S COUNTERSPACE PROGRAM AND 

THE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces .................................................. 1 

WITNESSES 

Butterworth, Dr. Robert L., President, Aries Analytics, Inc. ............................... 3 

Krepon, Michael, Cofounder and Senior Associate, The Stimson Center ........... 5 

Tellis, Dr. Ashley J., Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International 

Peace ..................................................................................................................... 2 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Butterworth, Dr. Robert L. .............................................................................. 41 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 23 

Krepon, Michael ................................................................................................ 48 

McIntyre, Hon. Mike, a Representative from North Carolina, Ranking 

Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces .................... 26 

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces ..................................................................... 25 

Tellis, Dr. Ashley J. .......................................................................................... 28 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Carson ........................................................................................................ 64 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 59 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 61 

(1) 

PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S COUNTERSPACE PROGRAM AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL 

SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED

SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, 

MEETING JOINTLY WITH THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON

SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES, Washington, DC, 

Tuesday, January 28, 2014. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 3:29 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. FORBES. We want to welcome our witnesses and everyone to 

this joint hearing on the People’s Republic of China’s counterspace 

program and the implications for U.S. national security. 

Unfortunately, we have some votes that are coming up, so we 

have got a little bit of a time squeeze. Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member McIntyre both agreed that we will all waive our opening statements. Anyone who has an opening statement, feel free to 

submit it for the record. It will be entered into the record. 

[The prepared statements of Mr. Forbes, Mr. Rogers, and Mr. 

McIntyre can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 23.] 

Mr. FORBES. The other thing is we are going to, unless there is 

an objection, reduce the time for our questions to 3 minutes each, 

because we want every Member to be able to get their questions 

in. Because, unfortunately, tonight, with the State of Union and 

all, we don’t have a lot of back time after we get these votes called. 

We are delighted today to have with us three very distinguished 

witnesses who are experts in this area. We appreciate so much 

your willingness to be here with us. 

The first witness we have is Dr. Ashley J. Tellis, and Dr. Tellis 

is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International 

Peace. 

Dr. Tellis, thank you so much for being with us. 

We also have Dr. Robert L. Butterworth, who is the president of 

Aries Analytics, Inc. Do not shake his hand; he says he has a cold. 

And we are going to say ‘‘cold,’’ but we have something, you know, 

that is there. But he has been very thoughtful in not giving that 

to us. 

And Dr. Michael Krepon, the cofounder of the Stimson Center. 
2 

And to each of you three gentlemen, we thank you for being here. 

On behalf of Chairman Rogers, myself, Mr. McIntyre, Mr. Cooper, 

we thank you for giving us your time and expertise. 

And now we would like to ask you if you could take 3 to 5 minutes to give us whatever statements you have. Your written statements, of course, will be part of the record, and we have read those 

already. 

And, Dr. Tellis, are we going to start with you, or have you predetermined that? 

Dr. TELLIS. Yes. 

Mr. FORBES. Then, Dr. Tellis, we would love to have you start 

off for us. 

STATEMENT OF DR. ASHLEY J. TELLIS, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, 

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 

Dr. TELLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Rogers, Chairman Forbes, the distinguished ranking 

members, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to present today on China’s counterspace programs. 

In the interest of time, I am going to keep my comments extremely brief. I want to make five basic points for your consideration. 

The first point is that the current and the evolving counterspace 

threat posed by China to U.S. military operations in the Asia-Pacific theater and outside is extremely serious. And the threat ranks 

on par with the dangers posed by Chinese offensive cyber operations to the United States more generally. That is the first point. 

The second point is that the diversity and the complexity of China’s counterspace programs make them particularly problematic, 

because they span the gamut all the way from direct-ascent and coorbital ASAT [anti-satellite] programs, which receive enormous attention, to equally challenging threats like electronic warfare intended to paralyze U.S. satellite communications, which actually 

get very little attention, to more recondite dangers, such as directed-energy weapons and radiofrequency weapons and computer 

network attack capabilities, which are rather hard to understand. 

So it is the complexity and the diversity of these threats that magnify the challenges faced by the United States. 

The third point I want to make is that these dangers are acute 

because the U.S. space systems which are the targets of China’s activities are simultaneously extraordinarily vulnerable and extraordinarily valuable at the same time. 

The fourth point is that the incentives that drive China to pursue its counterspace programs are strong and will only intensify 

over time for the simple reason that China views itself as being in 

a geopolitical competition with the United States and believes that 

it must prepare itself for a possible conflict with a superior U.S. 

military. Given this perception, Chinese military planners are 

deeply focused on neutralizing American space capabilities because 

of their belief that such neutralization is essential to whittle down 

the information dominance on which the United States military depends on for its success. 

The fifth and last point is a more controversial one, but I think 

I should make it. Given China’s incentives and the reasons why it 
3 

is pursuing a counterspace program, I do not believe Beijing can 

be dissuaded from moving in a different direction through armscontrol agreements. 

The only way to persuade China that its counterspace programs 

will not deliver the returns that it seeks, if there is any way at all, 

is for the United States to ensure that its military forces can operate successfully despite China’s investments in counterspace. This 

will require, at the very least, diverse new kinds of investments, 

which are essential for the United States to protect its success in 

power projection operations that will be necessary in the years to 

come. 

Let me end on that note, and thank you for your attention. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Tellis can be found in the Appendix on page 28.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you so much, Dr. Tellis. 

Dr. Butterworth. 

STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT L. BUTTERWORTH, PRESIDENT, 

ARIES ANALYTICS, INC. 

Dr. BUTTERWORTH. Chairman Forbes, Chairman Rogers, Ranking 

Member McIntyre, Ranking Member Cooper, distinguished members of the committees, thank you very much for convening this 

hearing. 

The topic is terribly important, the facts of the matter at hand 

are debated, and the consequences of the approaches open to us are 

neither clear nor guaranteed. We need a lot more attention to this 

problem to help shape our judgments about the way ahead. 

China is a large, growing, militarily and economically strong assertive power. It has gone to war to expand its control over contiguous regions at least four times since the Korean war. It might 

well have done so again in its recent disputes with Vietnam, Korea, 

Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan except that its demands now 

involve a region of national security interest to the United States 

and U.S. allies. China is not yet ready for a military confrontation 

with the United States. 

If things go well, that confrontation may never occur, but China 

does seem determined to prepare for one as it seeks to exert unilateral authority over an ever-expanding neighborhood. 

A bellwether here is China’s experimentation with counterspace 

operations. If China can deprive the United States of reliable and 

timely space support, our force movements will be slower and less 

coordinated, our longer-range weapons less responsive and less accurate, our tactical operations in general less focused and more 

costly, and our global awareness more myopic and less timely. 

China’s most notorious counterspace experiment involved a direct-ascent hit-to-kill technology—that was in January of 2007— 

but it is surely looking at other approaches, too, as Dr. Tellis just 

mentioned, including other kinetic-energy weapons, lasers, 

jammers, cyber tools to attack data and command and control systems. For the near term, at least, I think it will probably favor systems to achieve mission kill by attacking U.S. satellites directly, either from orbit or from the ground. 

China will also want to know what U.S. satellites to kill in order 

to achieve the desired degradation in U.S. military capabilities. I 
4 

expect that targeting is a problem, and possibly the problem, that 

will be addressed using the sort of capabilities for precision orbital 

and proximity operations that China demonstrated starting a few 

months ago. 

Such operations could help China characterize the U.S. space architecture and perhaps place sensors close to U.S. satellites that 

could provide clues about the how, what, and when of the satellites 

being used for military operations. If true, then we should expect 

to see more extensive examination and operational probes in the 

future. 

So China still has some distance to go before it can be confident 

in a confrontation, but so does the United States. There are things 

we can do to protect some satellites against some threats: We can 

try to complicate China’s targeting problems by exploiting deficiencies in its ability to detect and track potential targets. We can 

further harden satellite subsystems to resist thermal and electronic 

attacks. And we might find ways to engage and defeat an 

attacker’s weapons before they engage our satellites. 

But China’s counterspace activities presents a broader challenge. 

To meet it, we need to know how to integrate space control into 

plans and preparations for the joint fight more broadly. Changes in 

our space order of battle, whether they come about through defensive movements on our part or attacks by an enemy or random 

mishap, can immediately alter the effectiveness of our terrestrial 

forces. 

We need to make sure that command and control is unified and 

timely. We need experiments, demonstrations, and exercises that 

more realistically test our forces’ abilities to detect, attribute, and 

respond to attacks on our space systems. We need to develop, execute, and repeatedly test plans for operations, particularly for 

power projection, when space is contested. 

We need to better coordinate the planning and developing of 

space defenses. We need to assess the cost-effectiveness of selected 

alternatives to space support. And I hope that we can further integrate space into the joint fight by coupling space programs more 

closely with other force-development activities. 

The perspective offered here, what I am talking about, is that the 

United States and China are in a long-term military competition 

which includes significant effort in space. This competition is not 

a policy of momentary advantage or a transient appeal, and it creates a core issue of national security between China and the 

United States. It is about and will require real capabilities. Finding 

ways to negate the U.S. military space advantage is a compelling 

strategic requirement for China. It won’t be moderated by proselytizing space norms or deterrence by demarche or a code of conduct 

for good guys in space. 

None of this is meant to suggest that war with China is inevitable. It does suggest that a good way to help China join and 

strengthen the international order is to be prepared to maintain 

American principles militarily, including in space. 

Thanks for your attention. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Butterworth can be found in the 

Appendix on page 41.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Dr. Butterworth. 
5 

Mr. Krepon. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL KREPON, COFOUNDER AND SENIOR 

ASSOCIATE, THE STIMSON CENTER 

Mr. KREPON. Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Krepon, you might need to pull that microphone 

as close as you can. It doesn’t pick up very well. 

Mr. KREPON. Chairman Rogers, Chairman Forbes, Ranking Minority Members McIntyre, Cooper, members of this committee, I 

have a huge sense of de ́ja` vu sitting here, because I was a staffer 

for a member of this committee when the leadership was Mr. 

He ́bert, Mr. Rivers, and Mr. Price, who are looking down on us 

now. 

And back then, the issue was the Soviet space challenge, and it 

was very severe. And a lot of the capabilities that China is testing, 

evaluating, improving aren’t new. Those capabilities existed back 

then, as well. And we had, as you well know, an intense nuclear 

competition with Moscow, an intense space race with Moscow. We 

had crises. We competed for ideological and geopolitical advantage. 

It was a fierce competition. 

And yet the worst fears of warfare in space were not realized; 

warfare, terrestrial and on the seas, were not realized. How did we 

succeed back then in deterring a determined and highly capable 

adversary, and are there any takeaways for us now? 

I think there are several reasons why we avoided warfare in 

space back then. One was that we couldn’t firewall it away from 

warfare in other domains. The prospect of uncontrolled escalation 

was in front of us and in front of Moscow. Number two, the capabilities in space were so vulnerable that if somebody wanted to 

start shooting up there, we could both be extremely harmed. And, 

also, military capabilities that we had invested in and the Soviets 

invested in for other purposes could be repurposed for use in space 

warfare. 

Now, all of these conditions are true today also, but we can’t depend on them to prevent China from doing things that are extremely harmful to us. So we can’t rely on these existing conditions 

to defend ourselves. We need a strategy to deal with very real 

threats to assets that are very meaningful to our Armed Forces and 

to our economic security. 

So what do we do? One thing we can do is to increase the resilience of our space assets. We can do this to help deter or foil some 

kinds of attacks, even though our satellites will remain vulnerable 

to a determined attacker willing to suffer the consequences. 

What else can we do? We can deter or dissuade through 

disaggregation, to the extent that we have the resources to do so. 

Deterrence of attack is increased by complicating the plans of the 

attacker. 

What else can we do? Space situational awareness. The extent to 

which we can deter depends on how much we know ahead of time. 

And if the committee underfunds space situational awareness, then 

our deterrence capabilities can be diminished even if we are doing 

the other things right. 

What else can we do? We can retain the capability to respond in 

ways of our choosing if somebody messes with our space assets or 
6 

the infrastructure for our space assets. We have these capabilities 

today. They are actually greater today than they were during the 

cold war. 

Now, do we need specific types of weapons that are dedicated to 

the mission of destroying, damaging, disrupting satellites? Do we 

need dedicated, online, ready-to-respond-quickly types of capability, 

like we do in the nuclear arena? In my view, there is so much latent capability to do this now, we don’t need dedicated—certain 

types of dedicated capability. 

I don’t think we need the capability that messes space up for us 

as well as for the other guy. So capability that creates mutating debris fields, which are indiscriminate and long-lasting in their effects, it doesn’t matter if it is your satellite, my satellite, somebody 

else’s satellite, I don’t think we need that. But we have the capability if we need to. 

Diplomacy. You know, I think one of the lessons a lot of people 

learned during the cold war was that deterrence is stronger when 

it is backed up by diplomacy. Now, we can’t do treaties in space, 

but we can do, I think, a code of conduct that makes rules and establishes rules of responsible, as opposed to irresponsible, behavior. 

Without rules, there are no rule-breakers. I think norms can serve 

our interests. 

So I am suggesting to you, Mr. Chairman, or Mr. Chairmen, a 

multilayered approach to deal with a very serious problem. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Krepon can be found in the Appendix on page 48.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Krepon. 

Just to let you know and the people in this room, one of the interesting things about the Armed Services Committee, we are probably the most bipartisan subcommittee in Congress. The two ranking members and both Mr. Rogers and I have enormous respect for 

each other. And our Members here are all looking to find a solution, as opposed to just driving things politically. 

I appreciate you coming here today and outlining what you think 

we should do. And in my 3 minutes, I just want to basically suggest—I think there are three questions we have to ask: One, what 

exactly is the vulnerabilities that we have? Number two, what is 

the magnitude of that problem? And, number three, what can we 

do to fix it? Because part of what we do with these hearings is try 

to take a message to our other Members to let them understand 

exactly what we are looking at. 

Dr. Tellis, you gave us an excellent five-point presentation. Your 

first one is very concerning to me because you indicated that you 

view the problem as extremely serious and on par with the cyber 

problems. And most of us have some feel for how serious the cyber 

threat is from China today. 

The question I would ask to all three of you is, assume this happens. Give us your picture of the vulnerabilities that we have and 

then what exactly it would do to us from a capability point of view. 

And, if you can, give us what specificity you can give us, as opposed 

to just globally, you know, hitting in there. 

Dr. Tellis, do you mind starting off with that? And then I would 

love to have each one of you weigh in. 
7 

Dr. TELLIS. I think there are two capabilities that the Chinese 

have invested in which pose specific kinds of threats. 

The kinetic kill capabilities obviously have a specific effect on 

low-Earth-orbit satellites. And, obviously, the key satellites there 

that matter are electro-optical surveillance satellites, which are 

most at risk because you can interfere with their operations not 

simply through kinetic kill but through laser dazzling and so on 

and so forth. So even if you don’t get hard kills that contribute to 

the debris that Mr. Krepon has correctly identified is a serious 

challenge, you can interfere with their operation through directedenergy devices, which China has been pursuing for the last several 

years. 

The second issue which I think bears on the magnitude-of-vulnerability question, which I am concerned about, has to do with 

U.S. communications satellites, because China has made enormous 

investments in jamming. And there are a class of U.S. communication satellites which are protected, which are going to be more impervious to the Chinese capabilities that are coming on line, but 

much of our warfighting efficiency depends on being able to use 

commercial satellites and other kinds of military satellites which 

are unprotected. 

And I think if we lose the capacity embodied in those unprotected assets, then, of necessity, the burdens that would shift to our 

protected communications would be extremely high. And I haven’t 

done the operations research to prove this, but my suspicion is that 

if we lose unprotected communications, the protected satellites that 

we have do not have the throughput to be able to sustain the kind 

of data requirements that would be necessary for success in conventional operations. 

So those would be at least two areas that I would focus on right 

away when one thinks about the vulnerability of our systems. 

Mr. FORBES. Dr. Butterworth, if you could briefly tell us what 

you think the assessment would be of how it would impact our capabilities. 

Dr. BUTTERWORTH. If I can figure out the button. There, I think 

that did it. Good. Thanks so much. 

Mr. Chairman, it is a bit difficult to answer. It is easy enough 

to point to specific vulnerabilities and to try to identify the consequences of the loss of particular satellites or satellite functions. 

But I think my view on this is that we need to have a broader perspective and try to understand how space support is integrated into 

the joint fight. We haven’t done a very good job of that. 

We have tended to assume that there would be things from the 

space that would simply be available. I remember when I was running a project for General Cartwright years ago on foreign 

counterspace and so on, we would look at the annexes in PACOM 

[Pacific Command], for example, and the annex for space for their 

war plans was, ‘‘We assume space works.’’ Now, it is not that way 

anyway; there is a much, much bigger annex these days. But that 

is the kind of approach that I think still exists throughout our 

work on this problem. So I would urge that we try to understand 

the integrated effect of fighting and not having the space systems 

and also alternative ways to get around it. 
8 

Second, just very briefly, we need to know an awful lot more not 

just about what is up there but what happens to our stuff. That 

can take a very long time. And I assume you will be digging into 

that in a subsequent hearing. 

And then, finally, we need to integrate all the different command 

and control communications functions that Ashley, among others, 

was just talking about. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Krepon. 

Mr. KREPON. Mr. Chairman, in my view, the greatest current 

vulnerability is a debris vulnerability. 

So, in 1985, the United States carried out a kinetic-energy ASAT 

test. Fourteen years later, a piece of debris from that test came 

within 1 mile of the newly launched International Space Station. 

The debris problem has been magnified by some very, very large 

number, particularly after the Chinese ASAT test, but not just that 

ASAT test. There have been breakups of rocket bodies; there have 

been collisions. The debris problem is enormous. And we move the 

Space Station, on average, once a year to try and get out of the way 

of a piece of debris. 

So the more a nation depends on space, the more vulnerable it 

becomes, just because of the debris problem—not even talking 

about Chinese counterspace capabilities. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Warning satellites do a great job of helping us to keep an eye on 

enemies for not only our national security but our allies’. I wondered, though, do you believe—is it your opinion that we have been 

clear to our adversaries on the risk they would incur by interfering 

with those satellites? 

And I would start with you, Dr. Tellis. 

Dr. TELLIS. I think we have tried to address the problem through 

indirection. 

Mr. ROGERS. We haven’t been direct enough? 

Dr. TELLIS. I believe that is the case. 

Mr. ROGERS. How about you, Dr. Butterworth? 

Dr. BUTTERWORTH. Well, we have—as you well understand, 

Chairman, we have a problem that we don’t want to be—— 

Mr. FORBES. Dr. Butterworth, hit that little button again. I know 

it is—— 

Dr. BUTTERWORTH. Thank you very much. I need to be trained 

frequently. 

It is a difficult problem, as I know you gentlemen understand, 

that we don’t want to be pointing out specific targets and specific 

vulnerabilities. So I agree that, yes, we have been sort of general 

in saying, ‘‘Right, space is an important part of our military capabilities,’’ without being terribly precise. 

Mr. ROGERS. But do you think that we have explained to them 

there are consequences for messing with our satellites? 

Dr. BUTTERWORTH. Sir, there is no doubt in my mind that they 

understand that very well—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. 
9 

Dr. BUTTERWORTH [continuing]. That if they do something to our 

satellites, that means war. And I can’t imagine why they would do 

something to a satellite if they weren’t—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Krepon. 

Mr. KREPON. Mr. Chairman, both President George W. Bush and 

President Obama have the same declaratory policy with respect to 

attacks on our space assets. I think declaratory policy—if you mess 

with our satellites, you are messing with our vital national security 

interests—that is an important piece. We have got that piece. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you think we have been clear on that? 

Mr. KREPON. I think declaratory policy can’t be a one-off. It 

needs to be repeated. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, let me ask this: Do you all believe that if our 

satellites were interfered with, that we have the capability to rapidly discern that and attribute who is disturbing the satellites? 

Mr. KREPON. Proper retribution depends on attribution. And 

there are issues with respect to attribution. 

Mr. ROGERS. Explain. 

Mr. KREPON. Inferences could be drawn, but one of the reasons 

why I mentioned funding for space situational awareness to you is 

that that will help with attribution. 

There are two kinds of challengers to us in space: One are actually little guys, and one are major powers. And, actually, most of 

the interference so far has been from the little guys, and the interference that they are most interested in is interfering with broadcast satellites. 

Mr. ROGERS. Right. 

Mr. KREPON. So our planning and strategies to respond, I think, 

depends on the category of adversary. But it all begins with attribution. 

Mr. ROGERS. All right. 

Dr. Butterworth or Dr. Tellis, do either of you think that we are 

short in our ability to attribute interference? Or do you think we 

are covered on that? 

Dr. BUTTERWORTH. Sir, I think we are not just short, I think we 

are absent. Even if you are just talking about interference with 

communications satellites or something, it can take weeks and 

weeks and weeks to try to find out where that is coming from and 

then to try to find out who is actually doing it. 

I urge the committee in different sessions to ask people, you 

know, how long would it take us to know that something had happened to one of our satellites. 

Dr. TELLIS. I would make two points on that. 

It depends on the kind of interference, and it depends on the context. There is some kind of interference that is palpable and manifest which is easier to attribute, and there are other kinds of interference, particularly electronic interference, that are harder to nail 

down. So that is point number one. 

Point number two is, if the interference occurs in peacetime, 

where everything else is as is, it might be easier to attribute. But 

if it occurs in the context of a crisis or in war, when other systems 

are stressed greatly, I think the point that Dr. Butterworth made 

about the difficulties of attribution will only get magnified. 
10 

And, unfortunately, that is when attribution matters most. It is 

when other systems are stressed and it has a direct impact on your 

capability to prosecute military operations that we might pay the 

highest costs in our inability to attribute quickly. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. McIntyre. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Tellis, on page 2 of your testimony, you say that one of the 

concerns is China has steadily expanded its capability to mount 

discrete physical attacks on installations integral to the spaceground segment. 

What is an example of that, how you could have a discrete physical attack on a ground segment? 

Dr. TELLIS. By ‘‘discrete,’’ I meant individual attacks as opposed 

to all-out attacks. And a specific example would be China’s increasingly precise ballistic missile force that allows them to actually target sites as small as individual buildings at great distance without 

using the total force to achieve those effects. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Okay. Thank you. Thank you for clarifying that. 

Dr. Butterworth, the last several years, we have seen China develop the ability to shoot down a satellite, perform new types of 

satellite maneuvers, and get closer to launching a new heavy-lift 

rocket. 

When you look at this, what do you believe are the risks, when 

we talk about layering, as has been explained by Mr. Krepon, if we 

continue to rely on our legacy systems? Because I think the problem we have got here is our budget issues and knowing what to 

do, and unfortunately we know that too often military space programs are targeted for cuts. 

And so the question is, how much can we rely on legacy programs and how much is new development that we need to do in 

order to provide the kind of multilayered protection that we would 

need? 

Dr. BUTTERWORTH. Sir, I don’t know any happy answer to that. 

It is going to take just a hell of a lot of money. We are going to 

have to start considering space as part of the joint fight, as part 

of the theater of operations, and that is going to require new systems. 

I can’t think of another way out of it. There is no silver bullet, 

there is no one thing that we can do, there is no specially orbiting 

laser, X-ray, nuclear pump device that will provide the defenses 

that we need. We are going to have to take it from design as part 

of the joint operating forces. 

Is that responsive to your question? 

Mr. MCINTYRE. That helps. 

I don’t know, since you used the term ‘‘multilayered defense,’’ Mr. 

Krepon, if you would like to respond to that. 

Mr. KREPON. The Stimson Center, where I work, put out a publication on how to tackle this problem of vulnerability and deterrence. And we had people writing from different points of view; we 

don’t agree on some things. But every single one of these multilayered pieces we all agreed on. 

Now, the diplomacy piece is the most contentious, and I know 

that many of you have your doubts. But I disagree with Bob about 
11 

whether China is clear about the consequences of messing with our 

satellites. 

We came to this understanding with Moscow during the cold 

war, but there was a whole lot more conversation between Washington and Moscow on strategic issues and space and nuclear than 

there is today between Washington and Beijing. So I am in favor 

of the diplomacy piece, too. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. What do you believe is the nearest-term challenge with regard to our counterdefensive capability? 

Mr. KREPON. You know, there are some vulnerabilities that we 

just can’t escape, Mr. McIntyre. We can compensate for vulnerability as best we can, as budgets allow, but the vulnerability will 

continue to be there in space, and we can’t talk ourselves out of 

that reality. 

Satellites are immensely important, but they can be found, and 

major powers have the capability to mess with them. We certainly 

do have the capability to mess with the satellites of adversaries. 

They have it for us. 

So how do we manage vulnerability as best we can? That is my 

view. That is the question. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Yeah. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Cooper. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Krepon, I think it bears repeating that you said pretty directly that we had more communication during the cold war between America and the Soviet Union than we have today between 

America and China regarding space issues. That is a pretty startling realization. And that doesn’t necessarily mean diplomacy, but 

communication, because there are many ways that information can 

be given back and forth. 

So that would seem to be a startling risk factor in terms of both 

nations trying to behave in a rational fashion. Because the theory 

of mutually assured deterrence and the theory of most deterrence 

is that both actors understand each other’s motivations. So I would 

think that would be an area for clarification. 

Mr. KREPON. One of the problems we had with the Soviet Union 

early on was that the military had an outsized stake on national 

security issues. And I remember—I am showing my age, but when 

the strategic arms limitation talks began and our diplomats started 

talking about Soviet strategic forces, the military pulled our diplomats aside and said, you know, our diplomats are not cleared to 

hear this. Well, we got through that. 

I think there is also dysfunction in China between the political 

leadership and the military. I don’t see them meshing as well as 

I would like, particularly with respect to space. 

So I think one of the potential gains in having more conversations is having military and civil leaders in China sitting down 

with our folks to talk about what our red lines are. 

Mr. COOPER. Mr. Krepon, from a historical perspective, it is kind 

of amazing that—you know, Sputnik was such a long time ago; it 

is almost amazing that these other nations have taken so long to 

even begin to catch up. Because it has been many decades. 
12 

And these are high-class problems in the military sense, in the 

sense that you are not talking about civilian casualties, necessarily, 

here if a space asset is hit by debris or—you know, these are replaceable gizmos. 

And, also, our military budget is completely within our discretion. And we represent a country with a per capita income of, what, 

$48,000 a person versus China with a per capita income of, what, 

$1,000 a person. And we are worried about maintaining our technological edge? You know, there shouldn’t be that much of a concern 

if we want to do it. It is a question of will, not of means. 

Mr. KREPON. Mr. Cooper, our capabilities to mess with somebody 

else’s satellites have never been greater. And, unlike nuclear deterrence, we don’t really need to be in your face about it. So we don’t 

test new devices, we don’t flight-test ASAT missiles, we don’t 

deploy at high levels of readiness the way we do, or did, on the 

nuclear. 

So the deterrence in space is largely inferred; it is not demonstrated in the same way. I think we still are able to get our 

points across with this latent or inferred capability: If you mess 

with us, the consequences could be immense, and they are of our 

choosing. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Conaway, is recognized for 3 

minutes. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for coming. 

Mr. Krepon, you piqued my interest when you talked about, we 

need rules for space. Most rule-based systems—and I am a CPA 

[certified public accountant] by profession—are only as good as the 

enforcement process. Who would enforce those rules against the 

Chinese? 

Mr. KREPON. Sir, we have rules of the road with respect to our 

navies, air forces, and ground forces operating in close proximity 

with Russia. These agreements exist. They do not have enforcement mechanisms. The nuclear arms reduction treaties that we 

have do not have enforcement mechanisms. The Non-Proliferation 

Treaty comes closest through concerted efforts at sanctions. 

But we are talking not only about a rules-based system but a 

self-interested-based system, a national-interested-based system. 

So we—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. But don’t we wind up just—I hear that and understand it. But some would argue that we have deluded ourselves 

in a lot of areas thinking bad guys or folks on the other side are 

as honest as we are, or we try to be. And so I hear that. 

All three of you talked about hardening our existing fleet of satellites. What timeframe is that? How many years are you talking 

about, actually getting that accomplished? 

Mr. KREPON. Sir, if you are talking about weight, weight gain for 

satellites, that is a very hard thing. So we tend to—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. Or protecting whatever you are trying to do to put 

self-defense mechanisms on them. You can’t do those in space. This 

is a replace-the-entire-fleet issue, right? 
13 

Mr. KREPON. I think, given the sunk costs, we are thinking 

about, or I think about incremental—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. 

Mr. KREPON [continuing]. Gains over time. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Which orbits are most at risk? Every satellite up 

there, or just the ones in low Earth orbit? 

Dr. BUTTERWORTH. Sir, I think the Chinese have recently demonstrated a high-altitude, direct-ascent ASAT capable of reaching 

GEO [geostationary orbit]. And they have certainly demonstrated 

the ability to be able to launch and deploy small items of considerable interest that are very difficult to track, and they can do that 

at a variety of altitudes, as well. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. 

Thank you all. I appreciate your comments this afternoon. 

I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Langevin is recognized for 3 minutes. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. I appreciate 

your testimony. I think it is a very important discussion. 

Obviously, ensuring information dominance provided by our satellites is a difficult but absolutely critical topic. And I certainly, 

again, appreciate the committee’s focus on this issue. 

So I would like to—I would note that, given the proliferation of 

certain capabilities, this conversation certainly has relevance far 

beyond China. But I would like to focus on, for a minute, nonkinetic weapons, particularly high-energy lasers. Obviously, such 

weapons come with a variety of effects on a platform as complex 

as a satellite. 

And what I want to know is, do we currently have the breadth 

of knowledge to characterize the full range of those effects across 

the spectrum of possible power levels and beam qualities? 

Dr. BUTTERWORTH. I do not believe that we do have that information at present, sir. 

We did some very small experiments a while ago, in the nineties, 

with the MSTI 5 satellite, and we cooked it as it came over New 

Mexico, I think it was, out of the Albuquerque range and were able 

to see how some of those effects were measured and what they 

might be. 

But in terms of being able to really characterize the impact on 

us, I don’t think so. I think we are still at the stage of putting 

warnings on the satellites that they are being lased, but I am not 

quite sure that we see clearly the effects. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. 

Anybody else care to comment? 

Okay. Well, given the well-known vulnerabilities of satellites, the 

number of technologies that are able to threaten these platforms, 

is there an understood tiering of importance? For example, is there 

a particular importance attached to jamming or dazzling particular 

satellites? 

Dr. TELLIS. There seems to be a trend, at least in the Chinese 

literature after 2007, after the 2007 test, that China ought to look 

at means other than simply kinetic attacks. Because I think one of 

the things that both shocked and surprised them was the inter-
14 

national revulsion about the debris problem that was magnified as 

a result of that test. 

And so certainly in recent years there has been a clear, I don’t 

want to say a ‘‘shift,’’ but there has been an increase in the emphasis that China has placed essentially on soft kills or mission kills. 

Because it allows them to achieve their operational aims without 

contributing to destruction, physical destruction, of satellites, 

which obviously magnifies the debris problem, which affects them, 

as well. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. And before my time runs out, how dependent is 

China’s military and economically on U.S. systems such as GPS? 

And how long can we expect that dependence to persist, given current levels of investment in systems such as Beidou, if I am pronouncing that right? 

Dr. BUTTERWORTH. I think Beidou is just about to finish up. 

Isn’t that right, Dr. Tellis? 

Yeah. So it should be just complete. 

What I suspect the Chinese are going to find, however, is that 

its performance is not up to that of the GPS system. And so they 

will very likely like to depend on the GPS system as long as possible, as well as using Beidou and trying to sell its appeal. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Byrne is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you. 

I have one question, really following up on Mr. Cooper’s question. 

And I am new, so this may be something that is so elementary that 

you are going to have to answer a very elementary question. 

But you hear about the wealth or the productivity of China being 

so much less than the United States per capita and that they are 

spending so much less than we are on national defense. How in the 

world are they matching us in space in this sort of technology? Are 

they focusing a disproportionate share of their resources on that? 

Are we not focusing enough of our resources on it? How could a 

country like that come close to the United States of America? 

Mr. KREPON. For an elementary question, it is a very difficult 

one. 

It drives me nuts to read the trade literature about how much 

we put into space. And I think we are shortchanging space across 

the board, in my view. 

Bear in mind that it has taken China four decades to catch up 

with us in terms of—and they haven’t caught up with us yet—in 

terms of space exploration. They are still behind us, in my judgment, across the board. 

But they are working hard, and they are taking shortcuts. So is 

this worrisome? In my view, it is. And resources can’t solve the 

problem, but I don’t think you can begin to solve the problem without more resources on our end. 

Mr. BYRNE. I know I have just a little bit of time. I just want 

to make sure I get down to this. What should we be doing that we 

are not doing to stay significantly ahead of the Chinese? 

Mr. KREPON. Here I am going to provoke Ashley and Bob. 

I think that on the counterspace side, I think we are doing a fair 

amount. The thing that sticks in my craw has to do more with the 
15 

exploration piece. And, you know, it would be—we are having trouble building satellites on time and on budget. We are getting a little bit better, but we are handicapping ourselves so much by the 

way we do things, our procurement policies. We are just not on 

time, on budget. 

Dr. TELLIS. Could I take a crack at answering that in a direct 

way? 

I think we have two weaknesses. Our space systems are too concentrated in their capability and they are too few, which means 

that any loss of even a single system has a disproportionate effect 

on our capacity. 

We have done this for both technological and economic reasons. 

If you move to an alternative architecture of smaller satellites, 

more flexible, more distributed capabilities, it is going to be more 

costly, but the upside is that we will have greater resilience and 

greater ability to compensate for losses. 

The second weakness that we have is that we have a very poor 

reconstitution capacity. If we lose some of these space systems in 

a war, it is going to take a long time before we can get replacements up there. And that is everything from a lack of spares, in 

terms of the space systems themselves, all the way to a long timeline with respect to launch. 

So we have simply not configured our capacities on the principle 

that these assets are at risk. And that is the point I think that Dr. 

Butterworth was making, that we have simply been content to assume that we will have these capabilities no matter what. 

If we begin to shift that premise and think about these capabilities as essentially nonavailable in some circumstances, I think we 

would begin to think of our investments in space in a very different 

way. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

And we saved the clean-up spot for the distinguished gentleman 

from the great State of Mississippi, Mr. Palazzo. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Space situational awareness is an issue that influences every 

space asset beyond those of national security space. The animation 

showing the creation of debris from the 2007 China ASAT test or 

the 2009 Iridium-Cosmos collision are dramatic depictions of the 

consequence of the laws of motion in our space environment. 

I suspect most people in the room today are familiar with the recent hit movie ‘‘Gravity.’’ I think the movie did everyone here a 

service by bringing to light the reality of the precarious situation 

of space operations in our orbitable environment. It is obvious that 

the consequences of a conflict in space could be devastating to nearly all space-faring nations. 

So, with that, I would like to get the witnesses’ thoughts on the 

priority of space situational awareness [SSA] for U.S. space security. And, also, is the United States Air Force Space Command the 

proper entity into which we should expand a greater SSA responsibility? And if not the Space Command, then who? 

And we will start with Dr. Tellis. 

Dr. TELLIS. I think space situational awareness is the foundation 

for any kind of defensive counterspace that the U.S. has to invest 

in. 
16 

I accept the point that Mr. Krepon made in principle, that we 

don’t need to overinvest in offensive counterspace because we have 

latent capabilities to do that if required under conditions of 

extremis. 

But if we have to do serious defensive counterspace, the challenge of being able to attribute where the threats are coming from, 

what the nature of the threat is all takes on an entirely different 

coloration. And we certainly have to put resources first and foremost into space situational awareness, because nothing else with 

respect to defensive counterspace is going to work if you don’t have 

adequate situational awareness. So that is point number one. 

Point number two, I think my view is that Air Force Space Command is the logical place in which this should reside because the 

Air Force maintains the largest catalogue of space objects out 

there. It has the resources, both terrestrial and space-borne, to 

maintain this capability. And I think starting from scratch or moving it to a different organization at this point would involve probably more trouble than it is worth. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Dr. Butterworth. 

Dr. BUTTERWORTH. Yes, sir, I would concur with what Dr. Tellis 

was saying, with a couple of qualifications. 

One is that I think we should emphasize space situational awareness from orbit. And some of those orbits should be very high so 

that we are looking down. There may be an effort to try to make 

things difficult to detect. Nothing is equally difficult to detect from 

all angles. We should have all angles from which we could survey 

what is out there in space. 

Secondly, with regard to the Air Force’s capabilities, I would note 

that the record of the JMS [JSpOC Mission System] out there, or 

the JSpOC [Joint Space Operations Center], is not overwhelmingly 

impressive. And so I hope we can do a lot better with that soon. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you. 

Mr. KREPON. Sir, I would like to put a bug in your ear about 

space traffic management, because situational awareness goes 

hand-in-hand with traffic management. One of the reasons why we 

want situational awareness is to get early warning, but it is also 

to avoid collisions with debris or, heck, another satellite. 

So we haven’t really thought hard about space traffic management. How do we do that? Who does it? How does it work? Capabilities are so disproportionate. We are the best. But how do we 

convey messages? How do we develop patterns of safe traffic in 

space? We are behind the eight ball on this one. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you. 

Mr. FORBES. And, gentlemen, we once again thank you for being 

here. 

I thank my good friend, Mike Rogers, for allowing us to join and 

have this joint hearing. 

As I told you earlier today, we want to give you 60 seconds or 

so for any wrap-up that you have of something that you think you 

need to clarify or that we left out. Because it is not just important, 

this hearing, but it is important, the record we are building of this 

hearing, to be used later. 

Dr. Tellis, if you don’t mind, we will start back with you because 

you had the first opening remarks. 
17 

Dr. TELLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to make one point, which Mr. Krepon referred to, because I think it is important. 

I am not as sanguine about the idea that we will have a collaborative solution or even an equilibrium solution with respect to 

counterspace where China is concerned in a way that we had with 

the Soviet Union during the cold war. And there is a very important reason for that, and it goes beyond diplomacy. 

There was no asymmetric dependence on space at the height of 

the cold war. Both the Soviets and the United States, certainly in 

the latter half of the cold war, came to depend on space almost 

equally for the success of their military operations. And, therefore, 

Soviet incentives to engage in counterspace activities of the kind 

that the Chinese are contemplating were much smaller. 

China’s dependence on space is not as significant as the U.S. dependence on space. And it is that delta independence that gives 

China much greater freedom of action than we recognize. It is 

something to keep in mind. 

There is a second point. During the old cold war days, the Soviets had the conventional advantage. And, therefore, if conflict 

broke out, they could have been content prosecuting their operational aims through the use of conventional forces alone because 

that was their strong suit. 

The Chinese see themselves as not having that kind of a conventional advantage. And, therefore, the incentives they have to attack 

us asymmetrically, to attack our space assets, to attack our information architecture, and so on and so forth is much greater. 

And so I think we need to be sensitive to the differences that 

exist in the U.S.-China case compared to the U.S.-Soviet case, 

which makes the burden on the objective of protecting our space 

assets even more. 

Thank you. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Dr. Tellis. 

Dr. Butterworth. 

Dr. BUTTERWORTH. Thank you, Chairman. And thank you again 

for having this excellent hearing. 

I will endorse almost everything that my colleague to my right 

here said, except for the part about the Soviet Union. Even they 

didn’t use space in the way that we have. Nobody does it like we 

do. We showed the world first in Desert Storm the integration of 

space assets into tactical operations, and we have gone way beyond 

what we could do then in the ensuing 25 years, or almost 25 years. 

Nobody else has tried to do that. They may use it for strategic 

reconnaissance, they may use it for selected communications, and 

so on, but not integrated into warfare the way that we have. 

And so, to try to understand the relationship with China in 

terms of parallelism or symmetry—that is, you know, that we can 

shoot their satellites and they can shoot ours—misses the point 

that they don’t use space in the way that we do, nor, as I mentioned, did the Soviet Union. 

And so when I talk about trying to take into account the joint 

fight perspective, that is the most important part of it, is to understand that they are looking at space with very different eyes, just 

as Dr. Tellis was just suggesting. 
18 

Thank you again. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Dr. Butterworth. 

Dr. Krepon. 

Mr. KREPON. Mr. Chairman, China’s vulnerability in space is 

growing every year—every year. And the question that you are exploring here, for which I thank you, is, how do we leverage this to 

influence Beijing’s national calculus? And I don’t feel comfortable 

that we understand Beijing’s national calculus enough. So I would 

like more conversations, U.S.-China, on this. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. 

Gentlemen, thank you all. 

Thank all of our Members for being here. 

Mr. Rogers, thank you. 

And, with that, we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

JANUARY 28, 2014 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JANUARY 28, 2014 

(59) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. FORBES. The U.S. has changed its attitudes to the Space Code of Conduct over 

the last several years: from opposition or benign neglect to a stated willingness to 

engage in conversations. Has the space environment changed for the better that 

U.S. participation is warranted? Will the Space Code of Conduct deliver on what is 

our principal objective: a space environment free of threats to our U.S. national security? 

Dr. TELLIS. The Space Code of Conduct cannot—and will not—deliver on the principal U.S. objective of preserving a space environment free of threats to U.S. space 

systems. The U.S. attitude to the Code of Conduct has indeed varied over the years, 

but that is more because of differences in attitudes between different administrations in Washington and not because the Code itself has become more effective in 

protecting American interests. The Code must be understood for what it is: it is a 

confidence-building measure at best. It will not prevent states from developing 

counterspace programs nor can it prevent any state from mounting counterspace operations against the United States during a crisis or in war. The Code, therefore, 

cannot eliminate the most serious dangers to U.S. space systems. If successful, the 

best the Code can do is to restrain states from engaging in kinetic anti-satellite 

tests that are debris-generating in peacetime: while this would be an important 

achievement, it is more likely that any such restraint—if it materializes—would 

ensue because it advances the national interests of the various spacefaring powers 

rather than because of their formal adherence to the Code per se. In any event, the 

issue of whether the United States should be an adherent to the Code must be assessed on whether the Code in its totality advances U.S. space interests. Even the 

most current version of the Code does not unambiguously advance that objective yet. 

Consequently, the United States should stay involved in the discussions on the 

Code, but not commit to adhering to it just yet. 

Mr. FORBES. How aggressive is China pursuing counterspace technology that 

would put at risk the open and peaceful use of space? What insight do we have into 

their intent for developing such technology? What motivates them, and what would 

de-motivate them in this pursuit? 

Dr. TELLIS. China today has the most aggressive counterspace program of any 

state in the international system. The principal target of this counterspace program 

is, first and foremost, the United States. The motivations animating the Chinese 

counterspace program are simple: China views the possibility of a conflict with the 

United States as serious, and is preparing a variety of military capabilities to deal 

with that contingency. It has a healthy appreciation of U.S. military superiority and 

seeks ways to mitigate America’s operational advantages across the board. China’s 

counterspace program is part and parcel of this effort. Given China’s larger geopolitical interests, there is no way to induce Beijing to forego its counterspace investments. Consequently, the United States must ensure that no matter what China’s counterspace capabilities may be, U.S. military operations can nonetheless be 

successfully prosecuted in every scenario of relevance to American interests. 

Mr. FORBES. The U.S. has changed its attitudes to the Space Code of Conduct over 

the last several years: from opposition or benign neglect to a stated willingness to 

engage in conversations. Has the space environment changed for the better that 

U.S. participation is warranted? Will the Space Code of Conduct deliver on what is 

our principal objective: a space environment free of threats to our U.S. national security? 

Dr. BUTTERWORTH. The space environment has not changed for the better, and 

the Code will not help reduce space threats to our national security. Chinese military space R&D and deployments are particularly vigorous and clearly aimed at degrading the effectiveness of U.S. national security systems. 

The most effective measures toward keeping space safe and secure for the benefit 

of all continue to be led by the United States, working through United Nations committees, alliances, and bilateral agreements, and providing conjunction analysis and 

collision warnings pro bono to government and commercial space operators around 

the world. 
60 

The Space Code of Conduct offers no practical support for the United States’ efforts and could prove diplomatically troublesome. The Code is silent about important 

definitions and any procedures for monitoring, verification, and sanctions; it calls for 

sharing information about national security strategies and programs; it calls for 

complying with and promoting a treaty the U.S. Senate refused to ratify; and as an 

excuse for the dangerous deficiencies in its drafting, it declares that it is not legally 

binding. 

And in any event, the Code would address less than half of the world’s orbital 

launch activity. Three of the countries on record as opposing the Code (Russia, 

China, and India) accounted for 48 of the 78 successful space launches to orbit in 

2013. 

Mr. FORBES. How aggressive is China pursuing counterspace technology that 

would put at risk the open and peaceful use of space? What insight do we have into 

their intent for developing such technology? What motivates them, and what would 

de-motivate them in this pursuit? 

Dr. BUTTERWORTH. China’s counterspace programs are energetic and diverse because they are critical to China’s hopes for being able to challenge U.S. interests 

militarily. China clearly appreciates the significance of space systems to U.S. military power projection and so is driven to develop effective counterspace capabilities. 

Most recently in the South and East China Seas, China has been using implied military threats to assert unilateral prerogatives in areas of concern to the U.S. and its 

allies and partners. China cannot be de-motivated in this pursuit so long as it continues to use military threats to change international norms, practices, and procedures. 

Mr. FORBES. The U.S. has changed its attitudes to the Space Code of Conduct over 

the last several years: from opposition or benign neglect to a stated willingness to 

engage in conversations. Has the space environment changed for the better that 

U.S. participation is warranted? Will the Space Code of Conduct deliver on what is 

our principal objective: a space environment free of threats to our U.S. national security? 

Mr. KREPON. The George W. Bush was not enthusiastic about an international 

code of conduct for space-faring nations. It placed a high priority on freedom of action and wished to avoid any diplomatic undertakings in this domain. This view became harder to sustain after the PLA’s 2007 ‘‘hit-to-kill’’ ASAT test, which produced 

the worst man-made debris consequences since the Space Age began. After this test, 

some rethinking appeared warranted about rules of the road to set norms of responsible behavior in space—especially regarding ASAT tests that produce mutating, 

long-lasting debris fields. 

Presidential candidate Barack Obama held a positive view about a properly crafted code of conduct for space-faring nations, but his administration moved very deliberately on this initiative. Other issues had a higher priority, and the executive 

branch and the Pentagon undertook lengthy reviews on how a properly crafted code 

of conduct might affect U.S. national and economic security. After these reviews 

were completed, the administration announced that it could support a properly 

crafted code of conduct. The administration has been very involved in the drafting 

process led by the European Union. But this process is also going slowly. Progress 

has been made, but three key hold-outs remain: China, Russia, and India. 

In my view, the space environment will become more hostile to spacecraft and 

human spaceflight as long as the potential for debris proliferation is greater than 

the potential for debris mitigation. Debris is lethal and does not respect the nationality of spacecraft or manned spaceflight. We face the real potential that some heavily trafficked orbits could become dead zones as a result on debris hits with pinball effects, just as some locations at sea are dead fishery zones. A code of conduct 

for space could help prevent this outcome by establishing a norm against ‘‘hit-tokill’’ ASAT tests. 

Backers of a space code of conduct can’t promise ‘‘a space environment free of 

threats to our U.S. national security.’’ Even with a well-designed code, U.S. satellites will continue to be vulnerable requiring, as I testified, multi-layered deterrence whether or not this diplomatic initiative succeeds. 

Mr. FORBES. How aggressive is China pursuing counterspace technology that 

would put at risk the open and peaceful use of space? What insight do we have into 

their intent for developing such technology? What motivates them, and what would 

de-motivate them in this pursuit? 

Mr. KREPON. According to published reports, the PLA is testing capabilities and 

practicing techniques that could be applied against satellites. These capabilities are 

not unique to China; all major space-faring nations, including the United States, can 

be expected to possess them. When any country tests such capabilities, others might 

infer hostile intent, or preparations to be ready to employ these techniques in the 
61 

event of authorization to engage in warfare. Or they might serve deterrent purposes. 

Or these practices might suggest, in China’s case, a perceived need to play catchup ball. I am not a China scholar, so I am not well versed enough to hazard a guess 

about which of these possible motivations, or which combination of motivations, applies. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. How does the U.S. deter China from entering a conflict in space? 

Dr. TELLIS. The best way for the United States to deter China from expanding 

a conflict to space would be to invest in maintaining all the necessary warfighting 

capabilities that (i) promise to inflict greater pain on China than would be suffered 

by the United States in any space war; and (ii) permit the U.S. military to secure 

its operational objectives terrestrially despite any counterspace operations that may 

be mounted by China. In other words, the best deterrence strategy is one where the 

United States clearly demonstrates that it has both the capability and the willingness to run any space-relevant offence-defense arms race provoked by China—and 

win. 

Mr. ROGERS. What are the national security implications if our military lost access to space capabilities in a conflict with the People’s Republic of China? Beyond 

national security, if a system such as Global Positioning System (GPS) was threatened, what would be the potential economic and civil impact on the United States? 

Dr. TELLIS. I think it would be safe to say—as a first cut—that the loss of U.S. 

space capabilities to China in a conflict would be simply catastrophic to the United 

States. There is no other national military that relies on space for its operational 

effectiveness as much as the U.S. military. Nor is there any other society that relies 

on space for its economic wellbeing as much as the United States. The loss of U.S. 

access to space for both military and civilian endeavors would, therefore, be calamitous. Given this fact, it is unfortunate that we still do not have a comprehensive 

understanding of what exactly would entail operationally if the U.S. military were 

to lose access to space in a conflict with China. I believe that assessments of this 

kind are just beginning and it will probably be a while before they are complete. 

Mr. ROGERS. What steps is China taking to increase their Space Situational 

Awareness (SSA)? What are the risks of this, and what role will their SSA ability 

play in their counterspace systems? 

Dr. TELLIS. China is beginning to build the foundations for a comprehensive Space 

Situational Awareness (SSA) capability. In recent years, Beijing has embarked on 

a variety of technical investments to detect and track orbital bodies passing over 

China through the use of specialized optical telescopes and theodolites, laser satellite-tracking devices such as rangefinders, large phased-array radars, various 

ground- and space-based signals intelligence systems, and radars associated with 

surface-to-air missile systems, all of which are capable of searching, acquiring, 

tracking and classifying objects of interest to Chinese strategic planners. China has 

also sought to collaborate with various international research organizations, particularly in Europe and Asia, to identify U.S. space systems that are not identified in 

the open space catalogs maintained by NASA and the U.S. Air Force Space Command. 

The objectives of these activities, in the first instance, consist of denying the 

United States the targeting data that would enable it to interdict China’s landbased strategic nuclear platforms and key elements of its conventional forces. Accurate information about U.S. and third-party space reconnaissance assets and overflight patterns is sought in order to permit Chinese commanders to issue the appropriate notifications to their field components in regard to movement and dispersal 

operations, which are timed to occur outside the window of observation. The Chinese 

quest for more accurate SSA, however, is equally driven in the final instance by 

their desire to nullify American space systems, either kinetically or through soft 

kills or through informational denial operations: all these objectives require Beijing 

to first know the capabilities of the U.S. space platforms it seeks to defeat, their 

orbital parameters and their spatial relationship to other orbiting bodies. The ultimate aim of China’s SSA investments, therefore, is to underwrite its larger 

counterspace ambitions. 

Mr. ROGERS. Over the past several years, there has been much discussion on an 

international agreement for a Space Code of Conduct, to establish ‘‘norms and confidence-building-measures’’ according to its advocates. Do you think the Chinese will 

sign up to this sort of agreement? And if they do, do you think they will stop their 

counterspace program because of the agreement? 
62 

Dr. TELLIS. It is not clear right now whether China will sign on to any Space Code 

of Conduct, although Beijing has agreed recently—after many years of opposition— 

to join in discussions of a Code. Even if China were to adhere to any future Code 

of Conduct, it will not terminate its counterspace programs, which are driven by 

strategic necessities that transcend the requirements of public diplomacy. 

Mr. ROGERS. Please describe the leadership of the Chinese space program, and the 

relationship between the military and civilian elements. What are the risks of U.S. 

cooperation with China’s civil space program? Please describe the extent of efforts 

by the Chinese to illegally acquire U.S. technology. 

Dr. TELLIS. It must be remembered that China’s space program is a remarkably 

integrated effort. Unlike the United States, for example, where a significant divide 

exists between civilian and military space activities, and where diversity, heterogeneity, and atomistic competition are the norm in both realms, civilian and military space programs in China are not only centrally directed but are also mutually 

reinforcing by design. Although specific activities in the Chinese space program may 

be biased towards civilian or defense applications, the entire enterprise, strictly 

speaking, is a strategic program with no firewalls whatsoever between the civilian 

and the military. This ‘‘unity-in-difference,’’ centered on the primacy of military considerations which suffuse even the scientific, domestic, and commercial elements of 

the space effort, is protected at the programmatic level by the organizational structure of the Chinese system. China’s State Council oversees the Ministry of Industry 

and Information Technology, the State Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, and the Ministry of Science and Technology, which through different lines of control oversee the research academies and the defense industry 

groupings that produce the various technologies for either the People’s Liberation 

Army (through the General Armaments Department (GAD)) or the various ministries that use space products and services. The links between military and civilian 

space are, therefore, far more robust than often appear in organizational charts. 

In this context, the China National Space Administration, which is sometimes depicted as China’s National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), is essentially a civilian front for international cooperation and a liaison between the military and Chinese defense industry. The military interests of the Chinese state in 

the space program are thus affirmatively protected, even though Chinese policymakers rarely, if ever, own up to the military dimensions of their space endeavors. 

As Kevin Pollpeter summarized it succinctly, ‘‘China’s space program is inherently 

military in nature . . . Indeed, China’s space program is a military-civilian joint venture in which the military develops and operates its satellites and runs its infrastructure, including China’s launch sites and satellite operations center.’’ The policy 

consequence of this fact, from an American perspective, is that any collaboration 

with China’s ‘‘civilian’’ space program inevitably ends up aiding its military. 

Mr. ROGERS. How does the U.S. deter China from entering a conflict in space? 

Dr. BUTTERWORTH. For China, conflict with the U.S. in space is about military 

advantage on earth. Space systems are plainly an integral and crucial element of 

American military power, especially projection power, which is why China is working hard at counterspace capabilities. But for the same reason, the U.S. response 

to an attack on its space systems would not be limited to counterattacks in space 

but would reasonably include targeting facilities that housed, enabled, or facilitated 

the counterspace attacks. That is, the importance of space support to U.S. military 

operations is both why China would attack in space and why the conflict could not 

be confined to space. 

Consequently, to deter China from a conflict in space is to deter China from a 

terrestrial conflict with the U.S., a calculation that includes assessments of American projection power, regional military balances, alliances, partnerships, and other 

‘‘whole of government’’ considerations. The United States wants to help China become a constructive partner in the community of nations, but doing so apparently 

will first require denying China any benefits from bullying its neighbors. 

Mr. ROGERS. What are the national security implications if our military lost access to space capabilities in a conflict with the People’s Republic of China? Beyond 

national security, if a system such as Global Positioning System (GPS) was threatened, what would be the potential economic and civil impact on the United States? 

Dr. BUTTERWORTH. Bluntly, if we lose space we do not play. Space provides the 

warp and weft of the highly integrated forces we bring to the joint fight. Without 

space, the battle team unravels, and the separate threads more easily broken. 

The economic and civil effects of a loss of GPS on the U.S. are also incalculable, 

primarily because of the widespread dependence on the timing signal. Navigation 

is important but probably accounts for about one-seventh of the usage of GPS. 

Broader losses would come from the loss of timing for the internet, for commercial 
63 

transactions, for digital communications, and many other elements of our infrastructure. 

Mr. ROGERS. What steps is China taking to increase their Space Situational 

Awareness (SSA)? What are the risks of this, and what role will their SSA ability 

play in their counterspace systems? 

Dr. BUTTERWORTH. China is developing and conducting on-orbit demonstrations of 

satellites and satellite control techniques that can be used for an intelligence preparation of the space battlefield. China evidently hopes to gain substantial insight into 

the U.S. ‘‘space order of battle’’ by using sensors to detect and track satellites from 

various positions in orbit, and by using close proximity operations to refine estimates of the function and purpose of satellites in orbit. The results could provide 

China a guide to which U.S. satellites to attack, when, and in what fashion to best 

complicate different phases of U.S. terrestrial operations. 

Mr. ROGERS. Over the past several years, there has been much discussion on an 

international agreement for a Space Code of Conduct, to establish ‘‘norms and confidence-building-measures’’ according to its advocates. Do you think the Chinese will 

sign up to this sort of agreement? And if they do, do you think they will stop their 

counterspace program because of the agreement? 

Dr. BUTTERWORTH. China has repeatedly said that it is opposed to the European/ 

Space Code of Conduct because China wants an international agreement about 

weapons in space, while the Code focuses on debris (for which adequate international fora have been in operation for several years). 

China has proposed negotiating an agreement that would prohibit placing weapons in space but has insisted that such an agreement would not prohibit groundbased anti-satellite weapons. 

China’s counterspace program is rooted in China’s determination to achieve sufficient military power to be able to win a regional military confrontation with the 

United States. China will not stop its counterspace program unless it turns to established diplomatic procedures for resolving disputes peacefully and abandons its military bullying. 

Mr. ROGERS. Please describe the leadership of the Chinese space program, and the 

relationship between the military and civilian elements. What are the risks of U.S. 

cooperation with China’s civil space program? Please describe the extent of efforts 

by the Chinese to illegally acquire U.S. technology. 

Dr. BUTTERWORTH. Detailed insights into leadership of the Chinese space program 

and the relationship between the military and civilian elements can be provided by 

China experts such as Dean Cheng, and they can certainly help the U.S. understand 

some of the background of Chinese actions. But regardless of whether an event resulted from military arrogance or civilian impotence, the Chinese government must 

be held responsible for its actions. 

Chinese efforts to acquire U.S. technology illegally include the traditional panoply 

of technical means together with extensive contacts with Americans in various 

meetings and circumstances. One area of worry for space operations is ensuring the 

integrity and security of components and subsystems, including computer chips. 

Mr. ROGERS. How does the U.S. deter China from entering a conflict in space? 

Mr. KREPON. As noted in my testimony, by a multilayered approach that includes 

the ability to cause significant harm to a potential attacker, whether in space or 

elsewhere; by having space situational awareness so as to learn as quickly as possible about potential attacks and to determine the perpetrator; by disaggregating 

and diversifying our capabilities in space; and by increasing protective measures for 

satellites when they are cost-effective at the margin. 

Mr. ROGERS. What are the national security implications if our military lost access to space capabilities in a conflict with the People’s Republic of China? Beyond 

national security, if a system such as Global Positioning System (GPS) was threatened, what would be the potential economic and civil impact on the United States? 

Mr. KREPON. This scenario—what some have characterized as a ‘‘space Pearl Harbor’’—would place the United States at a profound disadvantage, unless the United 

States retained the ability and will to retaliate in ways that also placed China at 

a similar or worse disadvantage. I would expect this to be the case. 

Mr. ROGERS. What steps is China taking to increase their Space Situational 

Awareness (SSA)? What are the risks of this, and what role will their SSA ability 

play in their counterspace systems? 

Mr. KREPON. China’s space situational awareness lags well behind that of the 

United States. Indeed, I believe that the United States has provided conjunction 

warnings to China when one of its satellites or space missions might be imperiled 

by debris that we can track better than they—including debris generated by the 

PLA’s 2007 ASAT test. The asymmetry of SSA capabilities would place China at a 

disadvantage in the event of warfare in space, and would pose the question to Chi-
64 

na’s leadership of whether limited or all-out counter-space attacks would be worth 

the risk. Improved U.S. space situational awareness would reinforce deterrence 

against surprise attacks. 

Mr. ROGERS. Over the past several years, there has been much discussion on an 

international agreement for a Space Code of Conduct, to establish ‘‘norms and confidence-building-measures’’ according to its advocates. Do you think the Chinese will 

sign up to this sort of agreement? And if they do, do you think they will stop their 

counterspace program because of the agreement? 

Mr. KREPON. The Chinese leadership’s position is evolving. Initially, Beijing and 

Moscow rejected a code of conduct, insisting on an unverifiable and ambitious treaty 

to ban some kinds of space warfare, but not the counter-space capabilities they are 

developing. Last fall, Beijing and Moscow endorsed in principle the notion of a code 

of conduct, but not the draft code developed by the European Union. Beijing and 

Moscow have agreed that some types of transparency and confidence-building measures could have utility, and they have enumerated a number of useful measures 

that could be incorporated into an international code of conduct They have also stated that a code of conduct should be an interim step to an ambitious treaty that, 

in my view, is unlikely to be negotiated. 

The realization of a properly crafted space code of conduct will depend on several 

conditions, including the acceptance by China and Russia of pragmatic and useful 

‘‘rules of the road’’ for space—including consultative measures and the end of ASAT 

testing that causes long-lived space debris. 

A code of conduct would not stop the development of counter-space capabilities, 

because such capabilities reside in technologies that could have peaceful as well as 

malign purposes. Consequently, whether or not an international space code of conduct is finalized, I do not foresee the United States getting out of the counter-space 

business. Nor would it be wise to do so. 

Mr. ROGERS. Please describe the leadership of the Chinese space program, and the 

relationship between the military and civilian elements. What are the risks of U.S. 

cooperation with China’s civil space program? Please describe the extent of efforts 

by the Chinese to illegally acquire U.S. technology. 

Mr. KREPON. A subsidiary reason why I support negotiations on an international 

space code of conduct is to learn more about civil-military relations in China as they 

apply to space. I know very little about how well Chinese leaders have familiarized 

themselves with the PLA’s plans or understand the consequences of their military’s 

doctrine, test practices and exercises. I presume that the PLA briefed the Party 

leadership about its counter-space programs prior to the 2007 ASAT test that endangered over 200 satellites and manned space programs—including their own. But 

I don’t know whether the Party leadership received a detailed preview of the 2007 

test, and whether they knew enough to ask about the debris consequences of this 

test. I do know that the Foreign Ministry remained silent for two weeks after this 

ASAT test. 

The advent of an international code of conduct for responsible space-faring nations 

could prompt more internal and international consultations on these matters. 

As for civil space cooperation with China, the risks of possible technology loss 

have to weighed against potential gains from cooperation. I recall that there was 

considerable anxiety to the Nixon administration’s 1972 agreement with the Soviet 

Union to a docking mission for the Apollo and Soyuz spacecraft. In retrospect, these 

anxieties proved to be unwarranted. Cooperation between Washington and Moscow 

in space continues on a daily basis on the International Space Station—despite 

many other difficulties the United States faces with Russia. 

I am a supporter of exploring ways for the United States to cooperate with China 

in space, without compromising sensitive technologies. I believe that the Congressional prohibition of bilateral engagements between NASA and its Chinese counterpart is unwise. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARSON 

Mr. CARSON. How quickly are we able to reconstitute capabilities like GPS or communications networks if one or more of our satellites was destroyed or otherwise 

taken offline? In your opinion, are additional investments necessary to increase this 

pace? If so, which investments? 

Dr. TELLIS. In general, the U.S. capability to reconstitute its space-based communications satellites and the GPS system is a function of their orbital altitudes, the 

character of an adversary attack, and the availability of ready spares and rapid 

launch capabilities in the United States. A more careful modeling of these factors 

is essential before your question can be answered satisfactorily. In general, however, 
65 

I would say the following: One, the United States must move with alacrity to develop a rapid launch capability, which we still don’t have. There are several new 

private sector solutions that are innovative and possible cheaper, which ought to be 

investigated. Two, we need to reassess the need and the number of satellites spares 

for high priority operations, and to provide the budgetary support for maintaining 

the requisite spares inventory. Three, the most likely threats to our space systems 

will be less kinetic destruction and more suppression of links that transmit their 

data; dealing with this challenge is more complicated because its requires multiple 

and distributed solutions. 

Mr. CARSON. Can you describe how increased transparency into counterspace capabilities has impacted the perception of hosting military payloads among commercial satellite operators? What steps can we take to reassure concerned commercial 

operators of the safety of their satellites? Additionally, what can we do to expand 

hosted payload opportunities? 

Dr. TELLIS. As far as I can tell, most commercial satellite operators still operate 

on the presumption that space will continue to remain a protected sanctuary, at 

least as far as commercial systems are concerned. They are more concerned about 

congestion, debris, and peacetime management of space assets than military interference per se. Obviously, this will change over time, particularly if countries like 

China and Russia demonstrate a willingness to interfere with commercial systems. 

The dangers to commercial systems, however, pose new challenges to space deterrence. One approach to these dangers would be for the United States to adopt a 

clear declaratory policy that treats threats to space systems owned and operated by 

U.S. commercial entities similarly to those facing U.S. military systems. Another important complement will require expanding U.S. space situational awareness capabilities to encompass critical U.S.-owned and operated commercial satellites as well. 

Solutions of this sort will be essential as commercial space systems increasingly 

support U.S. defense operations. 

Mr. CARSON. How quickly are we able to reconstitute capabilities like GPS or communications networks if one or more of our satellites was destroyed or otherwise 

taken offline? In your opinion, are additional investments necessary to increase this 

pace? If so, which investments? 

Dr. BUTTERWORTH. The GPS constellation includes some satellites that can be 

used as on-orbit spares, and so reconstitution can be quick if not too many satellites 

are taken offline. In my opinion, it would be prudent to invest in a backup terrestrial system (e-loran) to ensure continuity of the timing signal, vital to so many operations in our infrastructure. 

Communications networks can be reorganized fairly quickly in most cases of military need, but doing so would be done based on priority and the overall capacity 

of the network would be reduced if one of our satellites were destroyed or taken offline. The U.S. military has always needed more communications capacity for its operations. One idea to provide surge communications for regional military operations 

involves launching perhaps six small satellites with UHF payloads into an appropriately angled molniya orbits. Additional options will become available as the national security community moves further toward data-centric approaches to communicating information. 

Mr. CARSON. Can you describe how increased transparency into counterspace capabilities has impacted the perception of hosting military payloads among commercial satellite operators? What steps can we take to reassure concerned commercial 

operators of the safety of their satellites? Additionally, what can we do to expand 

hosted payload opportunities? 

Dr. BUTTERWORTH. While hosting military payloads might draw hostile attention 

to a commercial satellite, I have not seen serious concern by commercial operators 

about becoming a target for counterspace threats. For now, at least, the industry 

seems eager to offer hosting services for military communications systems that 

might be involved in ‘‘disaggregation.’’ 

The primary difficulty with attracting more hosts for military payloads is the incompatibility between the government’s acquisition process and the commercial operator’s business-driven schedule. The opportunities for hosted payloads will expand, I think, if the Defense Department can provide its payloads to the commercial 

operator with the agreed technical interfaces and within the commercial operators’ 

production-to-launch schedule (say, 30 months). 

Mr. CARSON. How quickly are we able to reconstitute capabilities like GPS or communications networks if one or more of our satellites was destroyed or otherwise 

taken offline? In your opinion, are additional investments necessary to increase this 

pace? If so, which investments? 

Mr. KREPON. U.S. launch capabilities are diversifying, which is a very positive development. However, certain satellites are harder to replace than others, and my 
66 

sense is that the United States cannot depend on prompt reconstitution in some, 

if not most cases. I suspect these conditions also apply elsewhere. I think that everyone on our panel of witnesses has reached the conclusion that, because essential satellites are also vulnerable, resilient, disaggregated capabilities make more sense 

than relying on very few, highly capable satellites. If disaggregation results in some 

loss of high-end capability, I would still advocate disaggregation. 

Mr. CARSON. Can you describe how increased transparency into counterspace capabilities has impacted the perception of hosting military payloads among commercial satellite operators? What steps can we take to reassure concerned commercial 

operators of the safety of their satellites? Additionally, what can we do to expand 

hosted payload opportunities? 

Mr. KREPON. I am inclined to support hosted payloads because they would result 

in disaggregation, thereby helping to offset counter-space capabilities. I view this as 

a cost-effective step that can complicate the plans of a potential attacker, thereby 

reinforcing deterrence. That said, hosted payloads could still be vulnerable payloads. 

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