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i 

94–229 2016

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–27] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING 

ON

FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET REQUEST FOR 

ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 24, 2015 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Vice Chair 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska 

PETE AGUILAR, California 

DREW WALTER, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Counsel 

ERIC SMITH, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces ............................................................................ 2 

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Klotz, Lt Gen Frank G., USAF (Ret.), Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration .............................................................................................. 3 

Roberson, Jessie H., Vice Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board . 5 

Whitney, Mark, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environmental 

Management, U.S. Department of Energy ......................................................... 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Klotz, Lt Gen Frank G. .................................................................................... 25 

Roberson, Jessie H. .......................................................................................... 50 

Rogers, Hon. Mike ............................................................................................ 23 

Whitney, Mark .................................................................................................. 40 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

DNFSB Action Plan for Organizational Culture Change ............................. 69 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Cooper ........................................................................................................ 88 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 90 

Mr. Larsen ........................................................................................................ 89 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 75 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 91 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET REQUEST FOR ATOMIC 

ENERGY DEFENSE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 24, 2015. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:32 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. ROGERS. Good afternoon. The Subcommittee on Strategic 

Forces will come to order. I want to welcome you to our hearing 

on the President’s fiscal year 2016 budget request for atomic energy defense activities at the Department of Energy. 

I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. We know 

how much work goes into preparing for these hearings, and we 

thank you for putting that time and energy into this endeavor. I 

want to welcome our guests. We have Lieutenant General Frank 

Klotz, Administrator of National Security Administration—National Nuclear Security [NNSA], a little difference; Mark Whitney, 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management [EM], U.S. Department of Energy; and Ms. Jessie Hill Roberson, Vice Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 

[DNFSB]. 

General Klotz, you have a few very able folks in support of you 

today and I want to recognize them: Dr. Don Cook, Ms. Anne Harrington, and Admiral John Richardson. If any of our members have 

questions directly for them later in the hearing, we will ensure that 

they can step up to the table and answer those as needed. 

Before I hand the floor over to the ranking member, let me briefly highlight just a few key issues for today’s hearing. First, let’s be 

clear on the Nation’s defense priorities. Last November, thenSecretary of Defense Chuck Hagel said this: ‘‘Our nuclear deterrent 

plays a critical role in assuring U.S. national security and it is 

DOD’S highest priority mission. No other capability we have is 

more important.’’ This is the correct priority, but we must remember that fulfilling the nuclear deterrence mission is the shared responsibility of both DOD [Department of Defense] and DOE [Department of Energy]. It is the people, programs, and infrastructure 

at NNSA’s nuclear enterprise that provides our Nation with that 

deterrent. 
2 

The subcommittee will take a detailed look at NNSA’s budget request and scrub it hard to ensure it is meeting the military’s priorities. In the fiscal environment we are facing, we must prioritize 

the core mission of the agency while finding efficiencies that can 

be directly applied to that mission. 

This is a strong budget request for NNSA, but I fear it may have 

only kicked the hardest choices over to Congress. And we must 

hear from our witnesses about how devastating sequestration, or 

Budget Control Act, funding levels would be on DOE’s defense programs in both NNSA and Environmental Management. Allowing 

sequestration to hit us again in fiscal year 2016 would be like designing a nuclear hand grenade—just about the dumbest thing we 

could do. 

Moving to governance and management of DOE and NNSA, we 

have received a report of the Mies/Augustine Advisory Panel, and 

I look forward to receiving General Klotz’s response to that report. 

I agree with a lot of what the advisory panel recommended, but not 

all of it. General, I know there is much you and I agree on in this 

area as well. I hope to explore your thoughts on where we can work 

together to fix the longstanding problems related to governance 

and management. We have to get on top of these problems if the 

NNSA is going to be successful in the long-term. Leadership and 

accountability will be the key to this. 

Let me end on a bright note. This year, the B61 life extension 

program continues to execute on time and on budget. General, 

please tell the whole NNSA team to keep up the good work. This 

is an important step in rebuilding trust and confidence with Congress and the American people and our allies. 

Thank you again to our witnesses. I look forward to the discussion. With that, let me turn it over to my friend and colleague from 

Tennessee, the ranking member, Mr. Cooper, for any opening statement he may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the Appendix on page 23.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

TENNESSEE, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I, too, welcome 

the witnesses, and it is a pleasure to work with you on these issues 

of vital importance to our national security. As you noted, no weapons are more important or more dangerous than these, and we 

need to make sure that we are doing the best we possibly can to 

keep them safe, secure, and reliable. I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. With that, we will ask each of our witnesses to make an opening statement, and your full statement will 

be submitted for the record. I would ask you to summarize it in 3 

minutes. And without objection, we will accept those for the record. 

The witness order will be first General Klotz, then Mr. Whitney, 

and then Ms. Roberson. So, General Klotz, you are recognized for 

3 minutes to summarize your opening statement. 
3 

STATEMENT OF LT GEN FRANK G. KLOTZ, USAF (RET.), ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

General KLOTZ. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and 

members of the subcommittee, I thank you for the opportunity to 

present the President’s fiscal year 2016 budget request for the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration. I 

am pleased to be joined by Mark Whitney and Vice Chairman Jessie Roberson, who you have already introduced. 

We value this committee’s leadership in national security as well 

as its robust and abiding support for the mission and the people 

of the NNSA. On a personal note, I have benefited enormously 

from the insight and guidance you have so generously and graciously shared over the past 12 months. 

Our budget request, which comprises more than 40 percent of 

DOE’s budget, is $12.6 billion. This is an increase of $1.2 billion, 

or 10.2 percent over the fiscal year 2015 enacted level. The funding 

is extraordinarily important to NNSA’s missions to maintain a 

safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapon stockpile; to prevent, 

counter, and respond to the threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; and to support the capability of our nuclear-powered Navy to project power and protect American and allied interests around the world. 

By supporting growth in each of our four appropriations accounts, this budget represents the commitment by the administration to NNSA’s vital and enduring missions and to NNSA’s role in 

ensuring a strong national defense. This mission is accomplished 

through the hard work and innovative spirit of a highly talented 

workforce committed to public service. To provide them the tools 

they need to carry out their complex and challenging tasks, both 

now and in the future, we must continue to modernize our scientific, technical, and engineering capabilities and infrastructure. 

In doing so, we are mindful of our obligation to continually improve our business practices and to be responsible stewards of the 

resources that Congress and the American people have entrusted 

to us. 

For all of these missions, NNSA will continue to drive improvement in acquisition and project management practices and policies 

as well as Federal oversight over the enterprise. These missions 

are just a handful of the critical national security work that this 

budget funds; however, the looming possibility of sequestration is 

a major threat to NNSA’s missions. In developing the budget, 

NNSA was directed to request the funds we need to accomplish the 

missions we have been tasked to do. The fiscal year 2016 budget 

request reflects this. 

Another round of sequestration caps would most certainly have 

devastating impacts on important programs and projects, to include 

pushing them further out into the future or canceling them altogether. However you slice it, sequestration would adversely and severely affect our capabilities and our capacity to maintain a safe, 

secure, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile, and to reduce nuclear dangers both at home and abroad. 
4 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cooper, I look forward to discussing these and other issues with you in more detail during the 

question and answer. 

[The prepared statement of General Klotz can be found in the 

Appendix on page 25.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, General. 

Mr. Whitney, you are recognized for 3 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MARK WHITNEY, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Mr. WHITNEY. Good afternoon, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to be 

here today to represent the Department of Energy’s Office of Environmental Management, and to discuss the positive program 

achievements to date and what we plan to accomplish under the 

President’s fiscal year 2016 budget request. Our request for $5.818 billion will allow the EM program to continue to make safe cleanup of the environmental legacy a priority, 

a legacy that was brought about from five decades of nuclear weapons development and government-sponsored nuclear energy research. The request includes $5.055 billion for defense environmental cleanup activities; an additional $472 million for the defense contribution to the Uranium Enrichment Decontamination 

and Decommissioning Fund; a total of $542 million for the Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning Fund 

cleanup activities; and $220 million for non-defense environmental 

cleanup activities. 

We continue to make significant cleanup progress. We have produced nearly 4,000 canisters of vitrified high-level waste at Savannah River Site in South Carolina, converting it to a solid glass form 

suitable for long-term storage or permanent disposal. This is about 

half the sludge in the Savannah River Site tanks. 

At Hanford, we have completed the bulk of the river corridor 

cleanup project, including more than 500 facilities and 1,000 remediation sites. 

The fiscal year 2016 budget request will allow us to continue to 

make significant progress in our ongoing cleanup priorities of liquid 

tank waste treatment, and recovery of the Waste Isolation Pilot 

Plant [WIPP]. For example, the Idaho National Laboratory, the request supports operations of the Integrative Waste Treatment Unit. 

It also covers and supports cleaning and grouting activities to support closing of the final four tanks there. It also supports high-level 

waste tank progress at the Savannah River Site, including producing 130 canisters of vitrified waste derived from tanks and processed through the Defense Waste Processing Facility. 

The 2016 request will allow us to expedite tank waste treatment 

at the Office of River Protection in Hanford through the direct-feed 

low-activity waste approach, and this allows us to continue designing the low-activity waste treatment system, and continuing construction of the low-activity waste facility, the analytical laboratory, and balance of the facilities at the Waste Treatment Plant. 

The 2016 request also provides funding in accordance with the 

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant recovery plan. There are many sites 
5 

around the EM complex, of course, that depend on the WIPP facility and that have transuranic waste at its plant for disposal. 

So that resumption of operations at WIPP is a priority for us, 

and we will resume waste emplacement activities in 2016. The request also completes major facility clean-out and demolition 

projects, including the Plutonium Finishing Plant at Hanford. 

In closing, I am honored to be here today representing the Office 

of Environmental Management. We are committed to achieving our 

mission, and will continue to apply innovative environmental cleanup strategies to complete work safely and efficiently, thereby demonstrating value to the American taxpayer. 

Thank you, and I would be pleased to answer any questions that 

you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Whitney can be found in the Appendix on page 40.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Whitney. 

Ms. Roberson, you are recognized for 3 minutes to summarize 

your opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF JESSIE H. ROBERSON, VICE CHAIRMAN, 

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD 

Ms. ROBERSON. Thank you, Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Cooper, and other members of the subcommittee. I am the Vice 

Chairman of the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board, and I 

would like to acknowledge the other two members sitting directly 

behind me, Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Santos. 

Last year’s radioactive release at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 

demonstrated the significant impact likely to result from a radiological incident at any DOE defense nuclear facility. Waste disposal 

operations have already been shut down for over 13 months. This 

has impacted cleanup activities across DOE’s entire defense nuclear complex, and illustrates that even activities judged to be relatively low risk can still have major safety consequences and large 

impacts on DOE’s ability to accomplish its mission when radioactive materials are involved. 

The board is the only agency that provides independent safety 

oversight of DOE’s defense nuclear facilities. The board’s budget is 

devoted to maintaining and supporting an expert staff of engineers 

and scientists, nearly all of whom have advanced technical degrees, 

to support us in accomplishing our highly specialized work. 

The President’s budget request for fiscal year 2016 includes 

$29.15 million in new budget authority for the board. It will support a planned staff of 125 personnel. This level of staffing is needed to provide sufficient independent safety oversight of DOE’s defense nuclear complex, given the pace and scope of DOE’s activities. 

The board provides safety oversight of a multitude of operations 

critical to national defense. These operations include assembly and 

disassembly of nuclear weapons, fabrication of plutonium pits and 

weapons components, production and recycling of tritium, nuclear 

criticality experiments, sub-critical experiments, and a host of activities to address the radioactive legacy resulting from 70 years of 

nuclear weapons operations. 

The board supports and closely oversees DOE and NNSA’s efforts 

to develop new defense nuclear facilities that integrate safety into 
6 

their design at the very earliest stages. The delays in NNSA’s programs to modernize its uranium and plutonium capabilities require 

the board to provide continued safety oversight of ongoing defense 

programs work, and aging nuclear facilities that do not meet modern safety standards. 

Given the age and condition of many of DOE’s defense nuclear 

facilities, the board is placing particular emphasis on emergency 

preparedness and accident response capabilities across the complex. 

Let me add in closing that the board and DOE together have 

built a constructive working relationship. All board members, myself, Mr. Sullivan, and Mr. Santos, understand that a safe nuclear 

security enterprise is our priority. 

That concludes my statement. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Roberson can be found in the Appendix on page 50.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank you. Thank you all for those opening statements. I will start with questioning now. I will recognize myself for 

the first round of questions. 

General Klotz, you have a unique perspective to offer this committee on an issue we focused on for some time: governance and 

management at DOE and NNSA. As the first commander of the Air 

Force Global Strike Command, you were one of NNSA’s primary 

customers for nuclear weapons work, and now as Administrator, 

you are in charge of the NNSA. Given your background and experience, I fear that if you can’t fix these problems, nobody can. 

And let me be clear. I firmly believe that getting NNSA’s governance and management on track for the long-term must be one of 

your core duties. 

You owe us a report right now on your views of the Mies/Augustine Advisory Panel’s recommendations. As I said in my opening remarks, I agree with a lot of their recommendations, but certainly 

not all of them. 

So tell me, what are your views that you can share with us today 

on what that report is going to tell us? 

General KLOTZ. I thank you, Chairman. And let me say that I 

take your charge very seriously that the governance and management of NNSA is, indeed, one of our top priorities, as we move forward. 

As far as the Augustine/Mies Panel is concerned, we have stated 

publicly that we appreciate the hard and long work that the members of the panel put in in giving some very thoughtful consideration to the issues that face NNSA and the entire nuclear security 

enterprise in terms of its governance and its management, and we 

appreciate the counsel that they have given in terms of their recommendation. 

As we look across the broad 19 overarching recommendations, 

and 63 sub-recommendations, we find, like you, we are in agreement with most of them. And, in fact, many of the things that they 

have suggested, for instance, in the area of tightening up program 

management, instilling more rigor and discipline in project management, in cost estimation, in the relationship between NNSA and 

the military services and the relationship between NNSA and its 

laboratories and production plants across the country are things 
7 

that under Secretary Moniz’s leadership and under the leadership 

team that is currently now in place at NNSA, we have been working very, very hard on. 

So we take that as, to some extent, validation, justification for 

a number of things that we have already moved out very smartly 

on and are continuing to develop as we move forward. 

So I look forward to finishing off the report. I expect some time 

in the next 3 to 4 weeks, we will be able to deliver it up here, and 

I look forward to the opportunity to discussing the specific comments that we have in greater detail with you and other members 

of the committee. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Many of the Mies/Augustine recommendations align with similar efforts this committee has undertaken in 

the past: reducing transactional oversight, clarifying roles and responsibilities, and improving cost estimation and program management. And although we try to help, many of these problems are not 

fixable by Congress, but Congress can and will continue to provide 

guidance, direction, and momentum. 

So, General, how can this committee help you address those 

issues? 

General KLOTZ. Well, first of all, I think you have taken the first 

most important step, and that is to express your interest, your concern in the governance and management of the NNSA. 

It is so very important for those individuals, those men and 

women who work within our enterprise, to know that the senior 

leadership of this government in both the executive branch and the 

legislative branch understand the importance of the enduring mission which those people perform and care about its safe and successful execution. 

So, again, as we come forward with this report, we will have 

some specific comments on the recommendations in there that we 

can discuss with you in terms of the way ahead. 

Mr. ROGERS. The third area I want to ask about is accountability. As a part of our effort to reform DOE and NNSA, we have 

spent a lot of time in this committee seeking accountability from 

major failures, the break-in at Y–12, the stunning failure of design 

and oversight with the UPF [Uranium Processing Facility] that 

wasted at least half a billion dollars of taxpayers’ money, and the 

decades of wasted effort with CMRR [Chemistry and Metallurgy 

Research Replacement facility]. The list is long. 

General, these failures were before your time as the Administrator, but are you aware that not a single Federal official was terminated after these disasters? Several retired and were moved to 

other jobs, but not one was fired. 

So, General Klotz, can you assure this committee that you will 

hold Federal employees and contractors fully accountable for failures of this magnitude? This committee would like to see a message sent. 

General KLOTZ. Yes, sir, we will. And I think one of the things 

that we have worked very hard on is to restore good order and discipline and a rigorous approach to both security and to program 

and project management in the past several months, and we are 

beginning to see some of the results of our effort in that way. And 

we will not shrink from holding either Federal officials or the man-
8 

agement and operating [M&O] contractors accountable for their 

performance in both—when they do well, to recognize that and to 

congratulate them, as you already have in your opening statement. 

By the same token, when they fall short of our standards, to make 

sure that we communicate to them to that. 

I think a review of the most recent cycle of fee determination 

shows that we will take tough action when what we expect from 

our people and our M&O contractors do not meet our expectations. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. I thank you. And I will now recognize the 

ranking member for any questions he may have. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Continuing the chairman’s theme, let us talk about the WIPP disaster. Hundreds of millions of dollars to remediate, a year or more of delays, ripple 

throughout the entire nuclear establishment. Who has been held 

accountable in the WIPP disaster? 

Mr. WHITNEY. Thank you, Congressman Cooper. Yes, the—and 

as the general pointed out, you know, a lot of times the accountability is not as visible, sometimes it is very visible, but we are 

very focused on holding our folks accountable. 

The general pointed out fee determinations. And I think you will 

see with one of the parties that was responsible for the WIPP incident, they were held accountable in that fee determination area. 

We are very focused on recovering the operations and resuming 

operations of that facility. Sir, as you pointed out, it is critical to 

the cleanup program. We are making significant progress under 

fairly difficult circumstances. The team there at WIPP, both the 

Federal side and the contractors, have done significant amount of 

work, and we are focused on resuming operations in 2016. 

Mr. COOPER. So some time in the calendar year of 2016 we will 

see a resumption? 

Mr. WHITNEY. Yes, sir. We issued a recovery plan in September, 

September 30 of this past year, and it calls for us to resume operations by the end of the first quarter of calendar year 2016, and 

that is currently our plan. There are a few things that will be coming out fairly soon, and that is the Technical Assessment Team report on what exactly happened, looking at the drum where we had 

the incident, as well as the Accident Investigation Board final report. There will be corrective actions that will come out of that. 

The Secretary has stated that our goal is the end of March 2016 

for resuming operations, but we will only do so when we are confident that it is safe to do so. So we are focused on that, but we 

still have the end of March 2016 as our goal. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COOPER. Well, that is the timeline. How much, though, is it 

estimated to cost? 

Mr. WHITNEY. The cost, we don’t know exactly how much the cost 

will be, because a lot of it will depend on the permanent ventilation 

system and exhaust shaft. We have begun to request that money, 

as you know. Right now the range for that project, because of the 

stage of the project, it is pre-Critical Decision 1, and so we are 

going through the alternatives analysis. As we further narrow the 

design down, we will get a better sense of the total cost, but right 

now, the range for that project is $77 million to $309 million. I 

think later this year we will have a better estimate of the cost of 
9 

that, of that project, and that will really be the large portion of 

WIPP recovery costs. 

Mr. COOPER. And this will all be overseen by Ms. Roberson and 

the Defense Nuclear Safety Board? 

Ms. ROBERSON. Yes, sir, Mr. Cooper. We are providing oversight 

to the project, and we too have looked at—I mean, we are just over 

100 people, so we tend to prioritize, but we have placed additional 

emphasis on our oversight investment for this project. 

Mr. COOPER. So back to Mr. Whitney. If the price tag is between 

$70 million and $300 million, how much is the contractor going to 

be held responsible for? 

Mr. WHITNEY. The contractor also has a fee determination very 

soon, and so we will be looking at this, of course. There have been 

a couple of actions that we have already taken with respect to the 

contract and the fee called conditional payment of fee actions, 

which have reduced the amount that they are able to earn significantly. I believe within the next several weeks, the final fee determination will be made and made public. 

Mr. COOPER. So, then, that will be publicly available, that information? 

Mr. WHITNEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COOPER. General Klotz, you seem to be doing a good job running an alphabet soup of an agency. There are many challenges, 

but as Chairman Rogers said, if anybody can do it, you are supposed to be the man. We appreciate when you bring in projects on 

time and under budget. That is great. I know you have a lot on 

your plate, both with life extension programs and with construction 

projects. 

So we on this committee want to help you with the full range of 

your responsibilities, including your nonproliferation duties and the 

management of change that you made to include counterterrorism 

in that, that you are assured that that will give us better ability 

to deter anyone who might be thinking of a nuclear incident in this 

country and better opportunity to not only prevent that from happening, but to identify the wrongdoers and take prompt action to 

protect the American people. 

General KLOTZ. Yes, sir. The change that we made was, in a 

sense, how we view the problem of dealing with nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, both at home and abroad in a very, 

very general sense. 

You mentioned alphabet soup. Up until we made this change, we 

had a lot of different programs that were created in the aftermath 

of the fall of the Soviet Union, and the work that we did there 

under the Nunn-Lugar initiatives and other Cooperative Threat 

Reduction activities. And a couple of years ago, Ms. Harrington, 

who is sitting behind me, started an over-the-horizon look at positioning our efforts in this area for the longer term to deal with an 

increasingly complex and increasingly dangerous world. 

Our thought in approaching this is that we should think of this 

issue from start to finish, from cradle to grave as a continuum of 

activities that run from protect against the spread of special nuclear materials that would fall in the hands of would be 

proliferators and terrorists; and then if that fails, be able to 
10 

counter that, and then if that fails, be able to respond to any nuclear radiological incident. 

So it is a continuum of activities. In fact, just yesterday we released the first-ever comprehensive report on the full range of activities that fall within this particular mission space. So we see 

that as a compendium, as a companion volume to the Stockpile 

Stewardship and Management Plan, which we produced for some 

number of years now that describes in detail what we do in the 

area of weapons activities. 

Mr. COOPER. May I suggest that your duties in this regard are 

the single-most important function of government, and the only 

thing the public will care about if there were to be a nuclear incident. And I think most of the so-called experts predicted that there 

would be one within 10 years of 9/11, and thank God that hasn’t 

happened, but as the clock ticks, we have to be increasingly vigilant. So we need to make sure that you are doing everything possible, and that we are doing everything possible to make sure this 

never happens in this country. 

If you need anything, anything, call on us. And I know that all 

of your budget categories are going up, at least if the President’s 

request is adhered to. And I could not agree with you more that 

we need to get rid of sequestration, but this has got to be job one 

for the country. 

I see that Admiral Richardson is behind you. I don’t want to stop 

my questioning without noting that Naval Reactors over many 

years seems to have done an exceptional job of keeping up with its 

duties, so I hope that your fine example will spread. If you do have 

dirty laundry, at least you have kept it more hid than the other 

services. I hope it is just a lack of dirty laundry. But, you know, 

the tradition that Naval Reactors seems to have had is a truly remarkable one, so I hope you can continue that. 

I have no more questions at this time, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank the ranking member. Chair now recognizes 

the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Bridenstine, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for 

the distinguished panel being here today and testifying. 

General, I think it was last year we got a report from Secretary 

of Defense Hagel indicating that our requirements for our nuclear 

capacity was 50 to 80 plutonium pits per year. Is that still the requirement? 

General KLOTZ. That is the objective which we are working for 

as part of a comprehensive plutonium strategy. 

Many, many years ago, when we had the facility at Rocky Flats 

in California, we had the ability to produce thousands of nuclear 

weapon pits each year. Of course, that was at the height of the 

Cold War, when our stockpile was much, much larger than it is 

today. That facility was shut down. We moved—or tried to demonstrate the ability to develop pits, manufacture pits, fabricate pits 

at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. And we are 

going through a sustained process of recreating the ability to 

produce a smaller number of pits per year, ultimately up to 50 to 

80 per year, in order to support life extension programs that we see 

coming in the 2020 to 2030 timeframe as we move there. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So is the administration’s policy 50 to 80 pits? 
11 

General KLOTZ. That is what the Department of Defense and the 

Department of Energy have agreed to, the Nuclear Weapons Council, which passes judgment on these issues. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. In the fiscal year 2015 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] signed by the President, section 3112 included a sense of Congress that ‘‘Timelines for creating certain capacities for production of plutonium pits and other nuclear weapons 

components must be driven by the requirements to hedge against 

technical and geopolitical risk, and not solely by the needs of life 

extension programs.’’ 

Do you agree with that? 

General KLOTZ. I agree with that. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. The administration has, since 2010, the 2010 

Nuclear Posture Review, articulated a policy that it wants to develop a ‘‘responsive nuclear infrastructure.’’ 

Can you share with us what that means? 

General KLOTZ. Well, in fact, sir, what we were just talking 

about is a good example of a responsive infrastructure. If you have 

the capability to fabricate pits, if you have the capability to fabricate other nuclear and non-nuclear components in a modern, efficient, and agile production system, then you can adjust what your 

requirements are to deal with any technical challenges that may 

arise through the aging of a particular warhead, or any significant 

changes in the political military environment. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Do you believe we currently have a responsive 

nuclear posture? 

General KLOTZ. We are pretty agile and we are pretty flexible, 

but we could be certainly more so. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. The life extension program for the W80 nuclear warhead for the long-range standoff [LRSO] cruise missile is 

accelerated by 2 years in this year’s budget request, which is a 

good thing. It now aligns with NNSA’s program with the statutory 

requirement in the fiscal year 2015 NDAA that you produce the 

first warhead in this program by 2025. Where does the W80 warhead and the larger LRSO missile rank in the Nuclear Weapons 

Council’s priority list? 

General KLOTZ. It is right up there. It is one of the life extension 

programs we are going with. I wouldn’t rank it any higher or any 

lower. It is a top priority. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Will it happen in fiscal year 2015? I guess, will 

you commit that in fiscal year 2015, fiscal year 2016 we will see 

movements for the next steps in this program? 

General KLOTZ. We have already had some fairly significant 

movements in the W80, we call it the W80–4 life extension program [LEP], which will be the warhead that the Nuclear Weapons 

Council agreed would be the one we would field with the Air 

Force’s long-range standoff capability. We are moving towards—— 

Dr. Cook. 6.2 on July 1. 

General KLOTZ. So later this year we will take the next step in 

that process. So this is something which we take very, very seriously. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. What would be the impact if Congress significantly cut this program or canceled it altogether? 
12 

General KLOTZ. Well, that is a very good question, and thank you 

for asking it. I think it goes without saying that any significant 

cuts to this particular program, or a general sequestration across 

the board would adversely affect all of our programs in one way or 

the other. 

Now, whether it would—if you had a general cut, we would have 

to engage in discussions with Department of Defense. As the chairman said in his opening statement, they essentially, you know, are 

the customers for what we deliver in the way of a warhead, so we 

would want to make sure that we were synced up with whatever 

adjustment they had to make for delivery systems. It would not 

make sense for us to deliver a warhead if there wasn’t a delivery 

system ready for it and vice versa. So that would be something that 

we would have to work out collaboratively through the Nuclear 

Weapons Council process. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Well, let’s hope that doesn’t happen. 

I will yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank the gentleman. Chair now recognizes the 

gentleman from California, Mr. Garamendi, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, gentlemen, 

thank you for your work. 

Just to continue following up on the previous questions, it looks like we are somewhere north of $17 billion for the W80–4 nuclear 

warhead LEP program, and the cruise missile that goes with it. 

You have accelerated this discussion by, I think, an incomplete answer. Why was the 2-year acceleration required? 

General KLOTZ. The acceleration, moving it up 2 years from 2027 

to 2025 for the first production unit was taken largely at the request of the Department of Defense, U.S. Strategic Command, and 

the Air Force for an early delivery of the capability which the longrange standoff system represents. 

As Admiral Haney, the commander of U.S. Strategic Command, 

has said in open testimony, basically it reflects two concerns: One 

is the increasing sophistication of air defenses around the world; 

and the second is some concerns about the aging of the missile, 

that is the current air-launched cruise missile. 

So they felt it was prudent from a military requirements point 

of view to move that up. And we support them on that. And, in 

fact, perhaps more detail than is needed, but it actually fits in 

very, very nicely with our work schedule and it will allow us to 

have sort of a smoother approach to how we do the life extension 

programs over an extended period of time. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay. Not okay, but thank you for the information. We were talking about responsive infrastructure before, 50 to 

80 pits required. And at what cost? The infrastructure; not for the 

pits, but for the infrastructure? 

General KLOTZ. I would have to get you—I could take that and 

get you the full cost of the plutonium strategy out through all the 

years. For the coming year, what we are asking for us in fiscal year 

2015, Congress enacted 335—I am sorry, 35.7 for the plutonium 

strategy and replacement of the chemical, metallurgical laboratory 

at Los Alamos. That is going up to 1.55 as our budget request for 

2016. As we continue to—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. With a B? 
13 

General KLOTZ. I am sorry? 

Mr. GARAMENDI. $1.55 billion? 

General KLOTZ. Million. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Million. Okay. And that is the next investment 

on, we don’t know the—you don’t have the total cost of the facility? 

General KLOTZ. We do have. We can get you that number. I don’t 

have it. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. You don’t have it with you. 

General KLOTZ. If I could carry numbers around in my head, I 

would have stayed a math major instead of becoming a poli sci 

major. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well, I am pleased that you chose the career 

you have. The 50 to 80 pits is to actually produce that number of 

pits? 

General KLOTZ. It is to show the capacity to produce that number 

of pits, is what—as we understand—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. The assumption is at some point we would need 

to produce at least 50 to 80 pits? 

General KLOTZ. That is the assumption, yes, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And it is based on what assumption? What is 

the—— 

General KLOTZ. The assumption it is based on as we move into 

a life extension program that would affect the W78, which is a warhead used on the U.S. Air Force’s intercontinental ballistic missile 

and would also be our first interoperable warhead [IW], that we 

would need to be able to produce pits for that. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What do you mean ‘‘interoperable’’? 

General KLOTZ. Perhaps maybe I will let Dr. Cook describe this 

since he came here and we have an open mike for him. 

Mr. COOK. Happy to do that. By ‘‘interoperable,’’ which is part of 

the three-plus-two strategy, it is an agreed Nuclear Weapon Council strategy to move eventually to three interoperable ballistic missile systems. That brings down, in the long haul, some of the technical hedge that we carry to provide a backup against technical 

failure for what we have, and more importantly, as weapons age. 

Specifically, it means the ability to have a common nuclear explosive package fit into each of the large air shells, one for the Air 

Force, which is the Mark 21; one for the Navy, which is the Mark 

5, to do the adjustment and all of the balancing required for flight 

characteristics with the non-nuclear components. And we pursued 

this year after year. It is well beyond the stage of conceptual. 

Within the last 12 months, we believe that we have proven, to 

the best extent on paper that this is possible, and now we will 

begin maturing the technologies in order to resume the schedule. 

As the Administrator said, there was a 5-year delay in IW–1, in 

other testimony, and some money is shown in the fiscal 2020 year 

budget to resume that work. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I am out of time, Mr. Chairman, but I want to 

get into that in much more detail. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. We will have another round. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And I will come back. Thank you. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from 

Colorado, Mr. Lamborn, for 5 minutes. 
14 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank all for being 

here. Thank you for your service to our country. And I am just 

going to jump right in, General Klotz. You have talked about the 

responsive infrastructure and you have been asked about that. Isn’t 

that lacking, because there is a key uranium facility and a key plutonium facility that need to be planned and built, and we are not 

doing that? 

General KLOTZ. We could take—we are working on both of those, 

and we can take them separately. On the plutonium side, as I indicated earlier in an earlier response, we had the capability at one 

time at Rocky Flats in Colorado to produce literally thousands of 

pits per year for a much larger stockpile than we now have. We no 

longer have that kind of capacity, and we foresee a need in the future for being able to produce a greater number of pits than we can 

do on basically a handful a year now at Los Alamos. So we are 

building up that capability. 

What has changed from the past is, at one time we were looking 

at constructing one large facility to replace an aging facility where 

we did analytical chemistry and material characterization related 

to plutonium at Los Alamos, and now we have adopted a more 

modular approach, re-purposing some existing facilities, moving 

equipment around, and beginning the process of design for some 

external modules, which will allow us to increase the capacity of 

space that we have. So that is underway. We have got money in 

the budget, we have an ask and a request for that. 

Mr. LAMBORN. How far away is that from being done? 

General KLOTZ. What is the expectation? 

Mr. COOK. You are looking at—the expectation for the plutonium 

is to have most of the capabilities in for the first part of the strategy by 2020, and for the second part by about 2025. We will execute a buildup, in a rational way for capability at 10, 20, and 30 

pits per annum and 24, 25, and 26. We will achieve the capability 

with plutonium and demonstrate at the 50 to 80 level in 2030 that 

capability. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, I am very concerned, because this and the 

uranium facility were part of what was promised by the administration to get the Senate to ratify the New START [Strategic Arms 

Reduction] Treaty. And when I see that elements of this are 15 

years away, up to 15 years away, I am just really concerned that 

the administration hasn’t been keeping its end of the bargain. That 

is, frankly, what my concern is. 

General KLOTZ. If I could shift to uranium, since you asked about 

that, our principal facility for doing that is the Y–12 facility in Oak 

Ridge, Tennessee, and there we do have the capacity to conduct 

uranium operations. Our concern, however, is if much of the work 

is done in a facility, we call it 9212, which is decades old, is really 

showing signs of wear and tear, and we are concerned obviously 

about the safety not only of our operations there, but more importantly, the people, the employees. 

Mr. LAMBORN. And how far away is that from being—— 

General KLOTZ. Again, we have changed our approach from doing 

a big-box approach where you put everything into one box, and, 

therefore, every square foot costs as much as the most expensive 

requirement driven by security and safety, to having a distributed, 
15 

segregated approach where we segregate activities by hazard and 

security category. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Lastly, I want to address Admiral Richardson. If you could come up to the empty mike, that would be great. 

And by the way, I know the chairman recently led a congressional 

delegation [CODEL] to Idaho, and you were there and hosted us at 

the Naval Reactors. General Klotz, you were there, and I really appreciate that. I think we all got a lot out of that. 

And since that visit, I have gone to a local firm in my district, 

Cogitic. A couple of brothers are getting a business. It is amazingly 

capable in producing parts for nuclear submarines, like the valves, 

the ball valves and things like that. So it is just amazing all that 

goes into the nuclear enterprise from start to finish. But real 

quick—oh, gosh. I have run out of time. 

Mr. ROGERS. Go ahead. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. I will just ask this question. And thank 

you, Mr. Chairman, I have to run to the floor on what they are discussing right now, but my question is this: On low-enriched uranium, there are some who talk about, well, that can be used as a 

substitute for highly enriched uranium. Is there really any promising future to a military capability for low-enriched uranium? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Sir, thank you very much for your kind 

words and thank you for the question. We do produce a report to 

Congress about the feasibility of using low-enriched uranium. I 

have a copy of that report here which I submitted in January of 

2014. And with the current state of technology right now, if we 

were to substitute low-enriched uranium, it would only be even 

technically considered for an aircraft carrier application. 

And, because of the reduced energy in the low-enriched uranium, 

with the current technology, we would introduce another refueling 

event in the life of that carrier. That refueling event would come 

at a cost of about a billion dollars and would remove that carrier 

from being at sea while it comes into the shipyard to do that refueling operation as well. 

We have done some recent exploratory work, and, you know, the 

potential exists that we could develop an advanced fuel system that 

might increase uranium loading and make low-enriched uranium 

possible while still meeting, you know, some very rigorous performance requirements for naval reactors on nuclear-powered warships. 

By no means is success assured by that. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Admiral, I am going to have to run, but—— 

Admiral RICHARDSON. All right. 

Mr. LAMBORN [continuing]. Do you see a current military benefit 

to using low-enriched uranium today? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. From a pure military standpoint, no, sir. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you very much. Thank you all for 

being here and for your service. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

Now let’s talk about NNSA on deferred maintenance. I and several other members of this subcommittee have had the opportunity 

to visit Y–12, the labs, the Naval Reactors facility in Idaho with 

you, General Klotz and Admiral Richardson, and other parts of the 

NNSA enterprise. 
16 

At each stop, I ask for the ugly tour to see some of the massive 

backlog of deferred maintenance at all of these decrepit facilities, 

and we saw a lot of ugly. I am putting some slides up on the monitors of the recent roof collapse at the lithium facility at Y–12. A 

huge chunk of concrete fell into an operational work area. We are 

lucky no one was hurt or killed. We have also got some pictures 

from Pantex, which has many areas in equally as bad shape. 

Because all of these places are inside secure facilities, I don’t 

think the American people are aware of just how bad these buildings have gotten. We have got weeds growing up out the floors of 

work areas at Pantex; $14 million diagnostic equipment covered 

with tarps because of the lab roof leaks; duct tape, which I like 

duct tape, don’t get me wrong, duct tape and plastic around pipes 

carrying radioactive solutions. 

General, you and Secretary Moniz have sought to arrest the 

growth of the deferred maintenance backlog at NNSA. That is 

laudable, and I know you will have this committee’s full support, 

but you haven’t requested enough money to actually reduce the 

backlog. What more could you be doing if provided additional funding? 

General KLOTZ. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you 

for you and the committee’s leadership on this issue. You are absolutely right. We face a tremendous challenge. More than 40 percent 

of NNSA’s facilities—more than half of NNSA’s facilities are over 

40 years old. Thirty percent of them date back to the Manhattan 

Project, that’s World War II. And our deferred maintenance figures 

have risen to nearly $3.7 billion, and without arresting that, would 

continue to grow. 

You rightly pointed out that Secretary Moniz has declared that 

we will arrest the rise of deferred maintenance across the entire 

DOE enterprise, not just at NNSA. 

We do have some success stories in the past couple of years. This 

past year, 2014, we moved into a brand-new facility at Kansas 

City, moving out of a World War II-era factory, aircraft engine factory, into a brand-new state-of-the-art facility, which we attained 

through a lease with the General Services Administration, GSA, 

with a private developer. In the process, we have reduced our footprint from roughly 3 million square feet to half that, and reduced 

our operating costs by $100 million a year. 

And in Pantex, we have completed construction, along with the 

help of U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, of a High Explosives Pressing Facility and begun the process of certifying. So we are making 

inroads. 

But what I have observed, both in the NNSA and in my previous 

career in the Air Force, is, when dollars are constrained, the first 

dollar goes to the pointy edge of the spear, or goes to the mission 

program; the next dollar goes for the next mission of priority. And 

it is only after you have been able to expense those particular requirements do we pay attention to the infrastructure. 

Well, quite frankly, we have deferred that too long and the bill 

has come due, and we need to take some extraordinary measures: 

One, to fund these, but also to think of new and creative ways in 

which we can deliver facilities for our people to work in. 
17 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you, offhand, have a total number it would take 

to remedy these deferred maintenance issues? 

General KLOTZ. Well, right now our backlog right now is $3.7 billion to do maintenance. Now, we continue to chip away at that, and 

I think we are getting smarter, or at least more analytical in our 

approach. We have adopted two processes recently, which the Department of Defense uses to grade the condition of its facilities and 

to set the priorities, and I think that rigor and discipline will help 

us refine those numbers even more so. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. All right, General. You owe us a plan for two 

or more public-private partnerships you wish to pursue to get 

workers out of old, dilapidated buildings and into modern facilities. 

Do you see these kind of alternative finance agreements as beneficial to your efforts to get out of these old facilities faster? 

General KLOTZ. We do. And as I said, we have had several successes. Two facilities, at Y–12, at Oak Ridge were built in that way. 

The Kansas City plant has been built in that way. And we will be 

bringing some additional ideas to you of ways in which we can get 

people out of facilities, particularly the one at Pantex, into modern, 

more efficient buildings. 

This is important not only for conduct of operations, it is also extraordinarily important, in my view, for the recruitment and retention of the highest caliber people out of our technical schools and 

out of our graduate schools, because given the opportunity to go 

work in a facility which would use their scientific, technical, and 

engineering skills that is brand-new and modern, like many high 

tech firms are able to offer, or something that is, as you described 

it, dilapidated, it is a tough sell for recruiting and retaining people 

into this enterprise. 

Mr. ROGERS. Yeah. I have been to those facilities, and I have 

shared this with you and I will share with the panel and the guests 

here. These people that we have working are very well-educated. 

They have options. And, first of all, I am amazed that we are able 

to—and it says a lot about their patriotism, and their belief in how 

important their work is that they suffer these intolerable conditions. When you see somebody with these educational credentials 

working in some of the circumstances we just put up on the board, 

it is just—it is indefensible. 

Ms. Roberson, I will talk to you about deferred maintenance. 

Ms. ROBERSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. What are the safety impacts of NNSA’s deteriorating infrastructure and the $3.6 billion backlog of deterred maintenance you just heard General Klotz reference? And is all of this 

decrepit infrastructure becoming a safety hazard? 

Ms. ROBERSON. Mr. Chairman, the consequences are, as I stated 

in my opening statement, the questionable reliability of safety controls and the health of your safety management programs. So we 

have really been focusing our oversight, both for NNSA and EM, 

because EM also has aging facilities too, really focusing on the reliability of their safety controls, the health of their safety management programs, criticality safety, radiological safety, fire protection, and also on emergency management, which, at the end of the 

day, must really be healthy to ensure you can respond to anything 

before it becomes something more than a small incident. 
18 

Mr. ROGERS. What is your view of NNSA’s plan to remain in 

these facilities for decades to come? 

Ms. ROBERSON. Well, we think that newer facilities that meet 

modern safety standards would be important, I think the board’s 

been consistent in saying that in the recent years. We also think 

that Environmental Management should continue to get out of facilities that are decrepit, you know, undo them before they undo 

themselves. And so I think the board has been consistent in staying supportive of NNSA’s efforts to, you know, establish, whether 

it is big box or modular, whatever they choose, but to establish infrastructure for the workers and to ensure protection of the public 

that meet modern safety standards. 

Mr. ROGERS. Has DNSFB provided NNSA with a prioritized list 

of the safety concerns that you have about these facilities? 

Ms. ROBERSON. I don’t know if we have provided them a 

prioritized list. We certainly give them lists. We have the opportunity to discuss the things that we are seeing that we think are 

a high priority from a safety perspective on a routine basis. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Thank you. 

The chair now recognizes the ranking member for any additional 

questions he may have. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will just withhold until 

the classified session. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. With that, we have just got a couple of items 

we need to discuss for the record in classified, secure session with 

General Klotz. So with that, we will recess this for about 5 minutes 

to walk to the SCIF [Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility], and then we will reconvene. 

[Whereupon, at 4:32 p.m., the committee proceeded in closed session.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 24, 2015 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. General Klotz, the B61–12 and W76–1 life extension programs are 

both well underway at this point. Please give us a status update on these programs. 

Are you confident they will finish on time and on budget? 

General KLOTZ. The B61–12 is in Phase 6.3 (Development Engineering). The B61– 

12 Life Extension Program (LEP) completed more than 20 B61–12 LEP system-level 

joint, ground, and aircraft integration tests using functional developmental hardware. The first integration B61–12 LEP bomb assembly and tail kit assembly test 

was completed with aircraft platform interfaces, and the B61–12 will complete the 

first joint flight test in 2015. The primary future milestones will be to obtain Phase 

6.4 (Production Engineering) approval in FY 2016; to obtain Phase 6.5 (First Production Unit) approval in FY 2019; and to complete the first production unit no 

later than March 2020. The B61–12 LEP is on schedule and within budget for a 

first production unit in FY 2020. The W76–1 is in Phase 6.6 (Full Scale Production). 

Last year, the W76–1 program achieved a major milestone by completing 50 percent 

of the planned warhead production. Our primary objectives in FY 2015, which are 

progressing as planned, are to: achieve annual refurbished warhead production 

rates; deliver refurbished warheads on schedule to the Navy for deployment; and 

produce and deliver joint test assemblies (JTA) for surveillance flight tests. In fact, 

NNSA has been successful in already completing half of the total planned warhead 

delivery quantities to the Navy for the year within the first third of the fiscal year. 

We are currently on schedule to complete the remaining FY 2015 warhead production and deliveries to the Navy, which should be accomplished within our current 

funding allocations. If the requested funding is received, we are confident the program can remain on schedule for completion of production in FY 2019. 

Mr. ROGERS. What are the major risks to these programs executing successfully? 

Are they technical? Or are they in getting the funding needed to execute? 

General KLOTZ. The major risks to successful execution of W76–1 LEP production 

and B61–12 LEP engineering development are a combination of technical and funding risks which adversely affect the execution of warhead production and delivery 

schedules. In addition, other risks of primary concern to the W76–1 LEP are singlepoint failures associated with aging infrastructure (facilities and production equipment) within the nuclear weapons complex. We continue to reduce these risks by 

replacing aging infrastructure and by maintaining margin to delivery requirements. 

Funding requested for these two programs in FY 2016 FYNSP continues their current progress. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Klotz, are you confident the uranium facility in Tennessee 

and the plutonium facility in New Mexico will each be successfully built on the 

timelines and budgets NNSA has laid out in the FY16 budget request? Can you assure this committee that these critical facilities will be built on-time and on-schedule? 

General KLOTZ. NNSA is confident that we will successfully deliver CMRR and 

UPF after we complete our designs and establish performance baselines for these 

projects. Over the past four years, NNSA has focused on putting the right policies, 

principles, people, processes, procedures, and partnerships in place to implement the 

Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) Circular A–11 for Capital Acquisition 

Projects, Department of Energy Order 413.3B on project management and the Secretary’s January 2015 enhanced project management policies. In 2013, GAO narrowed the focus of its High Risk list for NNSA to contracts and projects with a Total 

Project Cost greater than $750 million as a result of the improvements NNSA is 

making in its contract and project management. NNSA is confident that the same 

policies and processes are scalable to the Major System Acquisition projects, such 

as CMRR and UPF. 

On both projects, NNSA is in the process of developing a high quality credible estimates utilizing NNSA’s policies and procedures and GAO’s best practices. Once 

these complex first-of-a-kind nuclear projects achieve 90% design maturity, NNSA 

will establish cost and schedule baselines that we are confident we can achieve. 

Mr. ROGERS. What are the major risks to successfully completing these projects? 

General KLOTZ. Major risks to completion are: 
76 

• Escalation on commodities and equipment procurements; • Inability to attract and retain nuclear qualified workers at assumed labor rates 

with the possible resurgence of industrial and nuclear construction; • Availability of vendors qualified to produce materials and equipment to meet 

current nuclear construction standards (NQA–1); • Changes to project requirements, codes, and standards; • Delays in authorizations to start construction activities consistent with the proposed execution approach. 

Mr. ROGERS. What happens if NNSA does not successfully complete these projects 

on the timelines laid out? What risks to safety and to NNSA’s mission does this 

incur? 

General KLOTZ. The UPF project in Tennessee is vital to modernization efforts at 

Y–12, allowing the NNSA to cease enriched uranium (EU) programmatic operations 

in Building 9212 no later than FY 2025. The NNSA is committed to ceasing these 

operations and is executing a strategy to deliver the critical UPF project while making additional program investments at the Y–12 Plant. These additional program investments allow the most hazardous operations in Building 9212 to be stopped prior 

to FY 2025, reducing the safety risks and program risks immediately upon doing 

so. Failure to deliver the UPF project by FY 2025 would result in a major delay 

in ceasing casting, special oxide production and salvage and accountability operations from Building 9212. 

The execution of Radiological Laboratory Utility Office Building (RLUOB) Equipment Installation Phase 2 (REI2) and PF–4 Equipment Installation (PEI) is critical 

to maintaining continuity in our analytical chemistry (AC) and materials characterization (MC) capabilities. Failure to complete these activities on the projected schedule may impact our ability to cease programmatic operations in the Chemistry and 

Metallurgy Research (CMR) facility in 2019, and would likely impact our ability to 

provide the AC and MC capabilities needed to support pit production and other plutonium activities at Los Alamos National Laboratory. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Klotz, do you believe your Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation 

programs align with the highest nuclear risks around the world? How do you 

prioritize NNSA’s nonproliferation funding and direct it to the highest priority 

risks? Do you rely on intelligence community assessments of those risks? 

General KLOTZ. Previously, each program office under the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) appropriation has applied rigorous internal risk assessment and 

prioritization approaches (including Intelligence Community assessments) to inform, 

develop, and provide the foundation for its fiscal year funding request. Although significant program-level coordination continues, the realignment of the Nuclear 

Counterterrorism and Incident Response (NCTIR) Program under the DNN appropriation, the reorganization of the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, and 

the standup of NNSA’s new Cost Estimating and Program Evaluation Office will 

now provide NNSA with a more integrated structure for program planning, budgeting, and evaluation as well as cross-program prioritization. 

NNSA participates in whole-of-government policy and program coordination processes to ensure that NNSA activities are aligned and integrated with broad U.S. national priorities and capabilities. NNSA, working particularly with the Departments 

of State and Defense, has been central to U.S. efforts to develop and implement domestic and international programs and strategies to meet the enduring and evolving 

challenges to the global nuclear security environment. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Klotz, counterintelligence and cybersecurity threats to 

NNSA and its facilities are increasing in quantity and sophistication. Can you assure us NNSA can defend against all of these threats and prevent the escape of sensitive information? 

General KLOTZ. The current cyber defense model deployed by NNSA Headquarters, laboratories and plants has provided the necessary protection of NNSA information and information assets without any major compromises to date. However, 

it is important to note that with the increase in the number of threats and threat 

actors to the Nuclear Security Enterprise the current model will not remain effective or efficient without changes to the protection capabilities currently in place. 

These changes not only include replacement, upgrades, and/or enhancement to the 

technical infrastructure, but also an increase in the number, type, and skill level 

of the personnel required to protect these environments. 

We use a risk-based approach to evaluate tools/program/software/hardware and 

their potential impact to our security environment. This security approach implements a defense-in-depth strategy to deter, detect, respond, and recover. These tools 

include firewalls, malware detection, intrusion prevention systems, and anti-virus 

systems on desktop workstations; custom tools and applications; and Commercial 

Off-the-Shelf (COTS) products within DOE/NNSA that were developed by the plants 
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and labs across the Nuclear Security Enterprise (NSE). We constantly evaluate new 

tools that can enhance our current capabilities. The current threat environment requires our cyber defenses to be effective 100% of the time while our adversaries only 

have to succeed once to inflict major harm to our systems and networks. I am confident that our current cyber defense program is deterring the threats we face today, 

and we will implement the tools necessary to maintain security as threats evolve. 

Mr. ROGERS. Are NNSA’s management and operating contractors able to meet 

their requirements on cybersecurity and counterintelligence? 

General KLOTZ. Management and operating (M&O) contractors implement the 

current Risk Management Framework (RMF) approach. Implementation of the RMF 

is a signed agreement between the M&O Director and the NNSA Field Office Manager, regarding how the site will deploy cyber defenses to protect the information 

and information assets within the funding model for the site. Under the current 

Risk Management Framework, the security framework is signed off on by the federal site lead for cybersecurity. Once the federal lead has signed off on the framework the M&O has the authority to operate the system within the standards of the 

framework. If the M&O is required to implement a standard which is not within 

the current agreement, the M&O must go back to the federal lead for agreement 

before implementation of the new standard or requirement. 

Mr. ROGERS. Please update us on the status of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 

in New Mexico subsequent to the events early last year that caused a radiation release and shutdown of the facility’s underground operations. How long do you expect 

the shutdown to last? 

General KLOTZ and Mr. WHITNEY. The Department’s target for initial resumption 

of waste emplacement at WIPP is the first quarter of calendar year 2016. The safety 

envelope for the facility continues to be analyzed and DOE will only resume operations when it is safe to do so. 

Mr. ROGERS. How is the shutdown at WIPP sending ripple effects across the 

NNSA and DOE–EM complex? 

General KLOTZ and Mr. WHITNEY. The current plan for recovery of the WIPP is 

to begin initial disposal operation in 2016 and resume full operations in the 2018 

timeframe, but DOE will only resume operations when it is safe to do so. Active 

transuranic (TRU) waste generators other than Los Alamos National Laboratory 

(Idaho, Oak Ridge and Argonne National Laboratory) are continuing characterization and certification activities and are providing interim storage of TRU waste for 

eventual shipment to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). TRU waste generator 

sites have storage capacity for certified waste ready for WIPP disposal through at 

least fiscal year 2016. 

Mr. ROGERS. How is NNSA holding the people and organizations responsible for 

this incident accountable? 

General KLOTZ and Mr. WHITNEY. As required, the Office of Environmental Management), NNSA, Carlsbad Field Office, Nuclear Waste Partnership, LLC (the WIPP 

management and operations contractor), and LANL will develop corrective actions 

to address the issues identified in the accident investigation report for the WIPP 

radiological event. Based on information identified to date, the following actions 

have been taken to ensure accountability for the event. 

• Since the WIPP event, LANL has performed extensive scientific reviews, 

changed leadership in the Environmental Programs Directorate, completed an 

external root cause analysis and is currently performing an extent of condition 

review. LANL will evaluate its ongoing recovery efforts and will ensure corrective actions to address issues in the report are integrated with its overall recovery efforts. 

• The November 14, 2014 EM Transition Plan documented a decision to remove 

EM-funded program work from the LANL contract and require future legacy environmental cleanup work at Los Alamos performed by a separately competed 

EM contract. 

• The November 14, 2014 EM Transition Plan for Los Alamos also focuses on 

streamlining and clarifying roles and responsibilities between EM and NNSA. 

Consistent with this plan, the EM Los Alamos Field Office was stood up on 

March 22, 2014 to manage the EM-funded program work. 

• Enhanced oversight by the Carlsbad Field Office and EM HQ will occur prior 

to the resumption of repackaging of TRU waste at LANL, and as the normal 

course of business at LANL and other sites in the future, e.g., the Certification 

Program will focus additional oversight efforts on understanding and validating 

upstream waste processing. Enhanced DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste 

Management oversight is being planned. 

• NNSA Los Alamos Field Office has hired or is in the process of hiring key staff 

positions to enhance its oversight capability. Such positions include the Senior 
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Safety Technical Advisor (on board as of March 8, 2015), an Assistant Manager 

for Operations, a Deputy Assistant Manager for Operations, a temporary Deputy Manager with a strong safety background (on board in a few weeks), Safety 

Basis Specialists and Facility Representatives. 

• NWP finalized its contractor recovery team in the spring of 2014, shortly after 

the event. Changes included a new Project Manager and Deputy Project Manager (who also serves as the Recovery Manager). Other new managers hired by 

NWP: Deputy Recovery Manager, Environmental Safety and Health manager, 

nuclear safety leader, maintenance manager, radiological manager, emergency 

manager, procedures and training manager, deputy operations manager, and 

deputy engineering manager. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Klotz, what are your top priorities for Naval Reactors (NR) 

for FY16? 

General KLOTZ. All of Naval Reactors’ budget supports the safe and effective operation of the nuclear-powered Fleet, today and tomorrow. Naval Reactors’ funding requests can be directly linked to this single, over-arching priority of supporting the 

safe and effective operation of the nuclear-powered fleet. In FY16, this entails effective oversight of the operation and maintenance of 96 reactors in 71 submarines, 

10 aircraft carriers, and 4 training and research reactors. This priority will be met 

in the most effective and judicious way possible. The main components that support 

today’s operating fleet are Naval Reactors Operations and Infrastructure (NOI), 

Naval Reactors Development (NRD), Program Direction and Construction. The remainder of the budget, primarily OHIO-Class Replacement Reactor Systems Development, S8G Prototype Refueling and the Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization 

Project, supports tomorrow’s fleet. In FY16, the OHIO-Class Replacement project 

will continue life of the ship reactor core manufacturing development activities and 

detailed design of reactor plant heavy equipment to support FY19 GFE procurement. The S8G Prototype Refueling will continue construction of the Radiological 

Work and Storage Building and preparations for the FY18 refueling. The Spent Fuel 

Handling Recapitalization Project will continue required development, fuel design, 

and will issue an Environmental Impact Statement. 

Mr. ROGERS. Is NR’s budget aligned with that of the larger Navy? 

General KLOTZ. Yes. We work closely every day with our partners in the Navy 

to ensure that we are aligned with the mission, performance requirements and 

schedules. 

Mr. ROGERS. What happens if this program gets out of alignment with Navy programs like the OHIO-class Replacement program? 

General KLOTZ. Naval Reactors’ Department of Energy and Navy efforts are directed at supporting this schedule, including development of the propulsion plant 

design to support procurement of long-lead components in FY19 to support a construction start in FY21 and ship delivery in FY28. After completing ship operational 

testing, the first OHIO-Class Replacement must be on strategic patrol by 2031 to 

meet STRATCOM force level requirements. Given that the first OHIO-Class Replacement submarine, a ship twice the size of the VIRGINIA-Class submarine, is 

planned to be constructed within the same span of time; this schedule is aggressive 

and requires close coupling of Department of Energy and Department of Navy activities to ensure on time ship delivery. The design and construction of OHIO-Class 

Replacement is a complex effort that requires extensive coordination between not 

only Naval Reactors and the Navy’s Shipbuilders, but also the Navy’s Strategic Systems Programs that are responsible for the missile systems and the British Navy, 

who will use the Common Missile Compartment design in their upcoming SSBNs. 

Because they each depend so heavily on each other, these four design efforts must 

be synchronized, in close collaboration to retire risk early and minimize estimated 

construction costs. 

Given the criticality of Naval Reactors’ Department of Energy activities to Navy 

priorities and mission, funding cuts to Naval Reactors’ DOE budget can adversely 

impact strategic objectives and plans, especially ship design and construction and 

nuclear operator training. 

Mr. ROGERS. What has been the effect of the budget cuts Naval Reactors has received over the past four or five years? 

General KLOTZ. Over the past six years, Congress reduced Naval Reactors’ funding by more than $600M below the Budget requests. These reduced funding levels 

have substantially impacted plans to recapitalize the spent fuel handling infrastructure, advanced technology development, and maintenance on prototype reactors, facilities and infrastructure. These functional areas are foundational to the Program 

and support Naval Reactors’ ability to sustain the current nuclear-powered fleet and 

develop the future fleet. The following are specific examples of these impacts: 
79 

• Recapitalization of the naval nuclear spent fuel handling capability has been delayed by over five years. This delay has increased the project cost by more than 

$400M. As well, to manage the delay without affecting aircraft carrier schedules, the Navy will have to procure additional, otherwise unnecessary spent fuel 

shipping containers at a cost of approximately $500M. Because of the aging condition of the current facility, these delays also increase the risk that the current 

capabilities fail and we are unable to support the Navy’s refueling schedule or 

conduct the research required to resolve important technical issues in the operating fleet. Therefore, additional investment has been required to maintain 

these aging facilities. • Advanced technology development has been drastically reduced. Today, it is possible to design a life-of-ship core for the OHIO-Class Replacement, saving the 

Nation over $40B, because of technology development efforts conducted over the 

last four decades. Other leaps in stealth and operational technologies give our 

ships an enormous advantage over our adversaries. With current funding levels, 

there will be insufficient reactor technology developed in time for use in the 

next classification of nuclear powered ships to make advances such as this 

achieved for the OHIO-Class Replacement. Therefore, this work must be restored in order to maintain tactical superiority over our adversaries of the future and to attract and maintain the crucial engineering and scientific talent 

needed to successfully complete the mission at current levels. • Maintenance and replacement of the Program’s aging laboratory facilities and 

infrastructure has been delayed. Many of these facilities date from the dawn of 

the atomic age and are vital to support the nuclear-powered Fleet. In total, over 

40 General Plant Projects and 4 Major Construction Projects have been delayed 

or canceled. In addition, funding reductions have resulted in the deferral of critical infrastructure maintenance resulting in significant failures and restriction 

of Naval Reactors’ ability to manage the impact of emergent work as the existing infrastructure continues to age. Examples include: 

• Bettis High Power Transformer (Failed in 2014) • Bettis Acoustic Testing Generator (Failures over 2009 to 2011) • NRF Storm Drain System (Failed in 2014) • NRF Prototype Facilities (Roof failed in 2014) • KAPL Water Main (Repeated Failures since 2004, approx. 3–4 per year) • Bettis Spring Water Intercept System (Failed in 2011 and 2013) • Bettis Materials Evaluation Laboratory (Legacy Radioactive Contamination) 

Mr. ROGERS. General Klotz, what happens to NNSA’s programs if you are hit with 

sequestration in FY16? Will you still be able to deliver on DOD’s top priorities, including life extension programs, nuclear infrastructure modernization, and Naval 

Reactors programs? 

General KLOTZ. The 2016 Budget proposes to reverse sequestration, paid for with 

a balanced mix of commonsense spending cuts and tax loophole closers, while also 

proposing additional deficit reduction that would put debt on a downward path as 

a share of the economy. The President has made clear that he will not accept a 

budget that reverses our progress by locking in sequestration going forward. Locking in sequestration would bring real defense and non-defense funding to the lowest 

levels in a decade. It would damage our national security, ultimately resulting in 

a military that is too small and equipment that is too old to fully implement the 

defense strategy. It would also damage our economy, preventing us from making 

pro-growth investments. As the President has stated, he will not accept a budget 

that severs the vital link between our national and economic security, both of which 

are important to the Nation’s safety, international standing, and long-term prosperity. 

Mr. ROGERS. In FY13, DOD was given the chance to protect certain programs 

from sequestration. It chose to protect ongoing operations in Central Command and 

sustainment and operation of U.S. nuclear forces. Given a choice under a potential 

sequestration in FY16, as Administrator what NNSA programs would you choose to 

protect? 

General KLOTZ. The 2016 Budget proposes to reverse sequestration, paid for with 

a balanced mix of commonsense spending cuts and tax loophole closers, while also 

proposing additional deficit reduction that would put debt on a downward path as 

a share of the economy. The President has made clear that he will not accept a 

budget that reverses our progress by locking in sequestration going forward. Locking in sequestration would bring real defense and non-defense funding to the lowest 

levels in a decade. It would damage our national security, ultimately resulting in 

a military that is too small and equipment that is too old to fully implement the 

defense strategy. It would also damage our economy, preventing us from making 

pro-growth investments. As the President has stated, he will not accept a budget 
80 

that severs the vital link between our national and economic security, both of which 

are important to the Nation’s safety, international standing, and long-term prosperity. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Klotz, this committee has focused on ensuring we get maximum value for every dollar. We’ve included language in several previous NDAA’s 

encouraging NNSA to go find efficiencies and cost savings that we can apply directly 

to NNSA’s mission. Specifically, what efficiencies are you striving for in FY15? What 

efficiencies are you proposing to chase in your FY16 budget request? 

General KLOTZ. NNSA is continuously looking for ways to improve use of resources to support its missions. During the past few years, NNSA worked with DOE 

to streamline DOE orders and directives to eliminate duplication, incentivize cost 

savings in management and operating contracts, make use of contract vehicles that 

appropriately share cost risk between the government and the contractor, and encourage NNSA plants and laboratories to more efficiently use resources. 

Together, NNSA and its NNSA’s M&O contractors are committed to making the 

National Nuclear Security Enterprise a model for efficient business operations. 

Large scale efforts undertaken by NNSA recently to drive down operating costs include the relocation of the Kansas City Plant to a more modern facility, the competition of the Pantex and Y–12 plants as a combined contract, and more efficient approaches to replacement of aging uranium and plutonium facilities. The award of 

the combined Pantex and Y–12 plants resulted in immediate cost savings that will 

continue to save in fiscal year (FY) 2015 and beyond. For example, the government 

realized an immediate savings of roughly $80 million in decreased award fee; money 

that was redirected to national security missions. Efficient business operations 

across the enterprise are critical to achieving the NNSA mission. 

On November 20, 2014, NNSA initiated an annual efficiencies review as an internal tool to drive continuous improvement in managing infrastructure. NNSA laboratories, plants, and federal Field Office Managers were directed to identify specific 

plans to pursue efficiencies for the current fiscal year and record achievements from 

the previous one. NNSA also sought input on oversight and governance changes 

that could enhance productivity. 

NNSA laboratories, plants, and federal Field Office Managers are in the process 

of sharing efficiency ideas from this effort and addressing suggestions from the labs 

and plants on changes NNSA can make to further efficiencies. NNSA also sponsored 

a day-long workshop with all of the NNSA labs, plants, and field offices at the end 

of May. The group will establish a framework of common definitions and best practices to enable an enterprise-wide approach which can be repeated year to year. 

NNSA is committed to continuous improvement and driving more efficient operations. The identified efficiencies for FY 2014 covered a broad range of business operations. These included reducing the costs of goods and services, making major 

mission operations such as those at the National Ignition Facility more efficient, 

better managing the growing costs of employee benefit programs, and reducing key 

subcontracting costs. Efficiencies of this type will be critical to meeting FY 2016 

mission. 

Finally, the FY 2014 budget request identified $320 million in efficiencies that 

would be obtained in executing the FY 2014 budget, and Section 3114 of the FY 

2014 NDAA directed the identification of about half, or $139.5 million, in efficiencies 

during FY 2014. As reported in its May 214 Notification of NNSA Efficiencies, 

NNSA identified $80 million of these efficiencies. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Klotz, one of the big recommendations coming out of the Y– 

12 security incident in 2012 was that roles and responsibilities for security were not 

clear at NNSA or its contractors. What specific action have you taken since taking 

the helm a year ago to clarify roles, responsibilities, authority, and accountability 

for each person at NNSA? Have you updated any NNSA directives? Spelled them 

out in policy guidance? 

General KLOTZ. Prior to my appointment, my predecessor issued a memorandum 

(dated 5 December, 2014) which made fundamental changes to the Office of the Associate Administrator for Defense Nuclear Security/Chief, Defense Nuclear Security 

(NA–70), by moving and consolidating the lines of operational authority, accountability, and line management. That reorganization transferred to NA–70 the mission 

and functions of security operations from NA–00–30 as well as the budget activity 

from NA–00–50 (within the Office of the Associate Administrator for Infrastructure 

and Operations). We are currently in the process of publishing a supplemental directive that will further delineate responsibilities for oversight of our security programs. 

During my first year as NNSA Administrator, I have made it my priority to select 

and staff key senior leadership positions with seasoned leaders, possessing extensive 

nuclear security experience. I’ve firmed up our Office of Defense Nuclear Security 
81 

senior leadership by hiring career security managers, with a proven track record in 

leading organizations to success, for the following positions: Chief of Defense Nuclear Security (CDNS), Deputy CDNS and Director of Security Operations and Programmatic Planning. 

This full complement of Senior Executive Service managers provides much needed 

continuity and stability to our Enterprise Field Offices in the area of security. The 

addition of my Principal Deputy Administrator in July 2014, is also having a positive impact on security decisions as we move forward. 

A new M&O contractor has been selected since the 2012 Y–12 security incident. 

Consolidated Nuclear Security (CNS) began operating our Pantex and Y–12 sites on 

1 July 2014. They are bringing a fresh perspective to site operations, which include 

all aspects of security operations. It also places all security operations are under one 

contract. That was not the case in 2012 when the incident occurred. Shortly after 

CNS began operations, the DOE Office of Enterprise Assessments conducted an assessment at Y–12. The report regarding the inspection, conducted in August of 2014, 

states: ‘‘significant progress has been made in correcting many of the deficiencies 

identified during the 2012 inspection.’’ 

Based on the inspection results, the DOE Departmental Internal Control and 

Audit Review Council, comprised of senior members of DOE leadership, recommended downgrading the Y–12 security issue from a material weakness to a reportable condition. The CDNS will continue to monitor the implementation of corrective actions at the site until they are closed. 

Lastly, our Federal team has taken a more direct and active role in contractor 

oversight. Several teams comprised of subject matter experts from our Headquarters 

and across NNSA have provided assessments of Y–12 security operations. Examples 

include one team focused on nuisance and false alarm analysis and a team that recently assessed physical security system maintenance, operations and management. 

These assessments resulted in recommendations focused on continuously improving 

operations at Y–12. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Klotz, DNFSB sent you a recommendation on concerns with 

DOE/NNSA’s emergency management and response. What is your organization 

doing to improve in this area? 

General KLOTZ. The Department of Energy (DOE) is committed to achieving an 

end state of an improved Emergency Management Enterprise, and more specifically, 

improving emergency preparedness and emergency response capabilities across its 

defense nuclear facilities. DOE/NNSA will implement actions to prioritize improvements related to the DNFSB report findings and DOE’s self-assessed need for improvements. The Department has developed an Implementation Plan containing initiatives that address all three aspects of Readiness Assurance at defense nuclear facilities: improve the management and oversight process, improve the corrective actions process, and reinvigorate a reporting process that shares successes and opportunities with DOE leadership. In addition, the Department will revise and restructure its Emergency Management Order, DOE Order 151.1C, Comprehensive Emergency Management System. The restructured Order will bring ease of application 

and consistency to emergency management programs. It will also be flexible enough 

to provide comprehensive guidance for users to respond to incidents ranging from 

local, single facility events, to multiple facility regional events. 

In addition to developing the Implementation Plan, DOE/NNSA has been working 

to improve emergency management. This included required evaluation reviews of 

emergency response for severe accidents and/or events that could have widespread 

impact at all DOE facilities, including defense nuclear facilities. These reviews have 

resulted in activities to expand plans for severe event scenarios at defense nuclear 

facilities. Also, additional training for responders was conducted at many of the defense nuclear facilities and a series of discussion-based tabletop exercises was performed to verify severe event procedures, interfaces and resources for multi-facility 

events, offsite asset resources and priorities, and critical decision-making. This 

training was followed by full-scale exercises at ten defense nuclear facilities, to formally test their capabilities for responding to severe events. 

Other examples of emergency management program improvements across the defense nuclear complex included: 

Severe event related improvements 

• Sandia—Conducted a Self-Assessment of Severe Natural Phenomena Events 

(NPE) that identified issues related to habitability and back-up power; corrective actions were developed and are being implemented and tracked. 

• Livermore—Improved the habitability of the site’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC) with the replacement of four high-efficiency gas absorption (HEGA) 

filters. 
82 

• Livermore—Established a Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) 

Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) program to support its Emergency Response Organization (ERO) and the site population after a disaster/severe event. 

• Nevada—Implemented fully functional primary and alternate facilities for both 

the Operations Command Center and the Emergency Operations Center. 

• Idaho—Conducted a severe Natural Phenomena Event (NPE) exercise that 

identified issues related to habitability and back-up power; corrective actions 

were developed and are being implemented and monitored. 

Training and drill improvements 

• Sandia—Revised training procedures to include annual performance testing to 

demonstrate competency. Conducted self-assessment and identified an issue in 

training record documentation. 

• Nevada—Drill and Exercise Program is integrated with the issues management 

processes and incorporates exercise After Action Report findings into an issue, 

which is assigned to a Responsible Manager. 

Exercise improvements 

• Sandia—Severe event exercise scheduled for July 2015 to verify corrective actions implemented from FY 2014 Severe Event Exercise are effective. 

• Livermore—Conducted four exercises in FY 2014 in response to a NPE (e.g., 

earthquake) to demonstrate ability to respond to simultaneous events at multiple hazardous facilities. 

• SRS—SRNS-Tritium facility developed and conducted a tornado drill with all of 

the shifts affecting multiple facilities and all non-essential personnel. 

• West Valley Demonstration Project—Conducted an exercise to test and validate 

the effectiveness of the Emergency Response Organization, Technical Support 

Center, Incident Command, Joint Information Center and field support. 

Readiness assurance improvements 

• Sandia—Conducted Self-Assessments to identify issues with Corrective Action 

implementation. 

• Livermore—Established an Accountability Disaster Call Center to improve communications with the field during a major earthquake or other disaster event 

and to provide prioritized damage assessment information to the Fire Branch 

Disaster Dispatch Center. 

• Savannah River Site—DOE issued a formal letter to SRNS directing a comprehensive, independent review of all of the emergency management elements 

to address concern about a decline in the emergency management program. 

• Nevada—Emergency Management program has qualified and experienced staff 

in developing/facilitating Root Cause Analysis to address the root issue and the 

extent of condition. 

• Emergency Operations is developing a process to track findings/deficiencies 

identified during site assessments. Each finding will have a Corrective Action 

Plan (CAP) and will be tracked to closure. Over time, the CAPs will produce 

trending data that will indicate where the Office of Environmental Management 

should shift the focus of site assessments and surveys. EM will periodically reexamine the effectiveness of closed CAPs after implementation of the corrective 

action(s). 

• Sandia—Identified an issue that resources are not adequate to implement an 

effective readiness assurance program, then submitted and received approval 

for a Full Time Equivalent (FTE)/Funding request for a Program Administration Team Lead. 

DOE Headquarters undertook several initiatives over the past year to address 

emergency management issues across its full range of responsibilities, which also 

enhance our capabilities to respond to emergencies at defense nuclear facilities. 

DOE established an Energy Incident Management Council (EIMC), chaired by the 

Deputy Secretary, to increase cooperation and coordination across the Department 

to prepare for, mitigate, respond to, and recover from emergencies. DOE’s ongoing 

project to revitalize the Headquarters Emergency Management Team (EMT includes 

rewriting the HQ Emergency Plan and implementing procedures; conducting job 

task analyses and developing position specific training for EMT members; and retraining EMT members on these new procedures. Plans for testing this expanded 

capability include frequent testing of the EMT in response to a variety of emergency 

response scenarios such as: 

• nuclear weapons accident, 

• radiological release, 

• hazardous chemical spill, and 

• severe event damage to DOE defense nuclear facilities. 
83 

DOE’s working relationship with its Federal interagency partners was improved 

during 2014 through a series of exercises, most notably the annual multi-agency nuclear weapons accident exercise, 2014 NUWAIX, for which DOE was the lead planning agency. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Klotz, I and several members of this subcommittee joined 

you and Admiral Richardson on a trip to the Naval Reactors Facility in Idaho last 

month. What goes on at this facility and why does the budget request include funding for recapitalization of the Spent Fuel Handling facility out there? 

General KLOTZ. The Expended Core Facility (ECF) at the Naval Reactors Facility 

in Idaho is the only facility in the country capable of receiving, examining and packaging spent Naval nuclear fuel. 

The budget request includes funding the Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization 

Project (SFHP) at the Naval Reactors Facility which will provide a new facility to 

replace the more than 55-year old ECF for receipt, preparation, and packaging of 

naval spent nuclear fuel for secure dry storage. Although the Expended Core Facility continues to be maintained and operated in a safe and environmentally responsible manner, it no longer efficiently supports the nuclear fleet. Further, increasing 

sustainment efforts and required infrastructure upgrades pose a substantial risk to 

Expended Core Facility operations and production workflow, thereby challenging 

Naval Reactors’ ability to support the Navy’s nuclear-powered fleet refueling and 

defueling schedules. An interruption to these refueling and defueling schedules 

would adversely affect the operational availability of the nuclear fleet. If this interruption were to extend over long periods, the ability to sustain fleet operations 

would be impacted, ultimately resulting in significant decrement to the Navy’s responsiveness and agility to fulfill military missions worldwide. 

Mr. ROGERS. Absent this funding, will costs increase in the long-term for either 

NNSA or the Navy? 

General KLOTZ. The main risk of further cost increases to the Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project is a lack of funding stability. One could expect cost 

increases if the project is not funded sufficiently to meet the current schedule. Further delays to the project would also incur costs for additional spent fuel shipping 

containers that would be borne by the Navy. 

The original Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project plan included a project duration of 10 years and a total project cost estimate of $1.249B. Due to funding 

restrictions since FY12, the project has been extended nearly six years, resulting in 

a project cost increase of approximately $400M. The increased cost resulted from escalation due to these delays and inefficiencies and rework associated with the unstable funding environment, which has required de-staffing and re-staffing of the 

project multiple times. Further, the estimated total project cost of the Spent Fuel 

Handling Recapitalization Project does not account for the additional M–290 shipping containers that the Navy will need to procure for temporary storage of naval 

spent nuclear fuel until the new spent fuel handling facility becomes operational. 

Procurement of these additional shipping containers is only necessary because the 

project has been delayed, as discussed above. To support aircraft carrier refueling 

schedules, the Navy will need to procure these containers at a total cost of approximately $500M. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Klotz, how is NNSA supporting next year’s Nuclear Security 

Summit in Chicago? What initiatives are being proposed for discussion at the Summit and what is NNSA doing to advance them? 

General KLOTZ. NNSA is carrying out activities across many of its program areas 

in support of the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process. NNSA has designated a 

Senior Coordinator who acts as a liaison for the Department of Energy (DOE) to 

the White House on all Summit issues. The coordinator facilitates DOE input to the 

NSS planning process, including in drafting NSS Action Plans to sustain the work 

of Summit participants through institutions and initiatives like the International 

Atomic Energy Agency, United Nations, Interpol, the Global Initiative to Combat 

Nuclear Terrorism, and the G7 Global Partnership. 

In advance of the 2016 NSS, NNSA also plays a leading role in the development 

of a range of specific country and regional plans. These action plans will propose 

how to accelerate the completion of existing Summit deliverables and on how to 

identify specific opportunities for new Summit deliverables, including actions we can 

take bi- or multilaterally to secure, reduce and eliminate nuclear and radiological 

materials. NNSA will continue to implement and complete commitments from the 

2010, 2012, and 2014 Summits, including minimizing highly enriched uranium and 

plutonium, detecting nuclear smuggling, strengthening strategic trade controls, and 

increasing security of nuclear and radiological materials. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Klotz, please provide us a description of accountability actions taken towards contractors and Federal employees with responsibility for major 
84 

recent failures, such as the UPF design, the WIPP event, and the Y–12 security incident. How were they penalized? Were any terminated from employment? Did any 

of these contractors or Federal employees receive bonuses subsequent to those failures? 

General KLOTZ. [NNSA has declined to provide a written response.] 

Mr. ROGERS. General Klotz, Naval Reactors has taken significant funding reductions to its technical base in recent years. What is the technical base, why is it important, and what are the impacts of cuts to NR’s base operations? 

General KLOTZ. The Base solely supports Naval Reactors’ responsibilities that allows for a safe and reliable operation of the nuclear fleet. It contains Naval Reactors 

Operations and Infrastructure (NOI), Naval Reactors Development (NRD), and Program Direction (PD). It includes resources to meet the goals and operational demands of today’s fleet, to develop tomorrow’s fleet, to support environmental stewardship, and to procure and construct the required tools and infrastructure that facilitate Naval Reactors’ mission. Naval Reactors executes these responsibilities by 

management and regulation of an enterprise that includes over 7,000 highly-skilled 

personnel at Department of Energy laboratories and prime contractors, a specialized 

domestic nuclear power industrial base of 28 principal suppliers, 110 secondary suppliers with about 25,000 personnel, more than 64,000 workers at the nation’s six 

nuclear-capable shipyards, and over 16,000 trained nuclear operators. This team collaborates with experts at other DOE National laboratories where there are opportunities for mutual gain. No other single organization in the U.S. currently integrates 

the research, design, construction, operation, life-cycle support, and disposal functions to successfully deliver an enduring nuclear power capability. 

The highest priority for Naval Reactors is uncompromising and timely support for 

safe nuclear fleet operation. In FY 2016, $935 million funds the Base and supports 

the 96 operating reactors at sea on ships and at our training and research sites. 

The talented men and women, along with the equipment and facilities upon which 

they depend, stand ready and are called upon 24 hours per day, 365 days per year 

to advance the mission and respond to emergent fleet needs for assistance. The 

teams at Naval Reactors’ four Program sites—the Bettis Laboratory in Pittsburgh, 

the Knolls Laboratory and Kesselring Site in greater Albany, and our spent nuclear 

fuel facilities in Idaho—perform the research and development, analysis, engineering and testing needed to support today’s fleet and to develop future nuclear-powered warships. The teams in the Base provide tremendous value to the nation. 

Among the many examples of the work they do includes: 

• Adding more than 21 years of operational life across 14 LOS ANGELES-Class 

attack submarines. 

• Avoiding 14 years of lost aircraft carrier operational time and ensuring no impact to the deployment plan. 

Over the past six years, Congress reduced Naval Reactors’ funding by more than 

$600M. These reduced funding levels have substantially impacted plans to recapitalize the spent fuel handling infrastructure, advanced technology development, and 

maintenance on prototype reactors, facilities and infrastructure. These functional 

areas are foundational to the Program and support Naval Reactors’ ability to sustain the current nuclear-powered fleet and develop the future fleet. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Whitney, please explain the Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D) Fund. Why is $472 million being requested for the 

Federal Government’s portion of this fund when the reauthorization for collection 

of the nuclear power industry’s portion has not been passed? 

Mr. WHITNEY. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct) established the Uranium 

Enrichment (UE) D&D fund to provide resources for the cleanup activities. Under 

the EPAct, both the Government and domestic private utilities were required to contribute to the fund, with the Government providing roughly two thirds of the funding and the utilities providing the remaining one third. 

Both the Government and private utilities have completed their contributions into 

the fund as required by the EPAct. However, as of the end of fiscal year (FY) 2014, 

the total UE D&D cleanup costs are expected to exceed the balance of the fund by 

2022 if no additional contributions are received. As such, the Administration is seeking reauthorization of both Government and utility contributions beginning in FY 

2016. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Whitney, is EM on track to meet its regulatory and compliance 

agreements for FY15? What about for FY16 and beyond? 

Mr. WHITNEY. We are on track to meet our FY15 and FY16 milestone commitments. Beyond FY16, the Department’s ability to fulfill its milestone requirements 

is difficult to forecast as it is dependent upon the completion of pre-cursor activities 

and the assumptions upon which work plans are based. 
85 

To the extent milestones are delayed, DOE will follow the provisions in its cleanup agreements for making notifications and working with federal and State regulators regarding schedule adjustments if necessary. 

Mr. ROGERS. Ms. Roberson, DNFSB sent a letter to DOE last year recommending 

improvements to DOE’s emergency response programs. What are the specific concerns you outlined in that recommendation? What specific steps would DNFSB like 

to see taken by DOE to improve in this area? 

Ms. ROBERSON. 1) The DNFSB (Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board) identified concerns with specific requirements in the Department of Energy’s (DOE) emergency management directive as well as the implementation of the requirements at 

various DOE sites with defense nuclear facilities. Based on these concerns, the 

DNFSB believes that DOE has not comprehensively and consistently demonstrated 

its ability to adequately protect workers and the public in the event of an emergency. These concerns focus on DOE’s role as a regulator. 

2) The DNFSB identified the following specific deficiencies that we believe DOE 

needs to address: 

a. Standardize and improve the DOE criteria and review approach to confirm that 

all sites with defense nuclear facilities: • Have a robust emergency response infrastructure that is survivable, habitable, 

and maintained to function during emergencies, including severe events that 

can impact multiple facilities and potentially overwhelm emergency response resources. • Have a training and drill program that ensures that emergency response personnel are fully competent in accordance with the expectations delineated in 

DOE’s directive and associated guidance. • Are conducting exercises that fully demonstrate their emergency response is capable of responding to scenarios that challenge existing capability, including response during severe events. • Are identifying deficiencies with emergency preparedness and response, conducting causal analysis, developing and implementing effective corrective actions to address these deficiencies, and evaluating the effectiveness of the corrective actions. • Have an effective Readiness Assurance Program consistent with DOE’s requirements. 

b. Update its emergency management directive (DOE Order 151.1C, Comprehensive Emergency Management System) to address: • Severe events, including requirements that address hazards assessments and 

exercises, and ‘‘beyond design basis’’ operational and natural phenomena events. • Reliability and habitability of emergency response facilities and support equipment. • Criteria for training and drills, including requirements that address facility conduct of operations drill programs and the interface with emergency response organization team drills. 

• Criteria for exercises to ensure that they are an adequate demonstration of proficiency. 

• Vulnerabilities identified during independent assessments. 

We received DOE’s Implementation Plan for this Recommendation on April 24, 

2015. Our staff is reviewing the Implementation Plan to determine the adequacy of 

DOE’s proposed activities to address the deficiencies identified in the Recommendation. The staff was engaged with their DOE counterparts during the development 

of the plan and provided comments. During the execution of the Implementation 

Plan, the Board’s staff will work closely with DOE to provide appropriate actionable 

suggestions regarding implementation of activities in the plan. 

The technical supporting document for Recommendation 2014–1 identified examples of deficiencies with site-level emergency preparedness and response. These include: 

‘‘Some sites do not have a 5-year plan for exercises that involves all of the hazards 

and accidents at their facilities with EPHAs [Emergency Planning Hazards Assessment]. In addition, some sites do not exercise all of their facilities with EPHAs and 

all of their response elements on an annual basis.’’ DOE Order 151.1C requires sites 

to demonstrate response capabilities by executing emergency exercises. In order to 

meet this requirement, sites such as Pantex and Sandia National Laboratories 

should be executing a variety of exercises to demonstrate response capability to the 

spectrum of possible hazards at each facility, as well as providing adequate training 

and drills to develop and maintain this capability. 

‘‘Planning and implementing recovery actions are typically not demonstrated in 

detail during the normal scope of annual emergency exercises at DOE sites [such 

as the Savannah River Site and the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant], or in follow-on ex-
86 

ercises.’’ DOE Order 151.1C also requires sites to demonstrate recovery capability. 

The ability to conduct initial recovery actions, including how to map a transition 

from emergency to recovery to normal operations, should be practiced frequently 

enough that site leadership can effectively conduct this activity when real-life operational emergencies occur. 

‘‘. . . [M]any of the emergency response facilities may not be habitable in the 

aftermath of a hazardous or radiological material release event, or survivable in the 

aftermath of a severe natural phenomena event. These facilities were not designed 

to survive an earthquake, and many do not have ventilation systems that will filter 

radiological and toxicological materials. Examples of such facilities include the 

Emergency Control Center (ECC), the Technical Support Center (TSC), and the fire 

house at Y–12; the EOC [Emergency Operations Center] at the Hanford Site; the 

EOC and alternate EOC, the Department Operations Centers, and the Emergency 

Communications Center at LLNL [Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory]; and 

the EOC and Central Monitoring Room at WIPP [Waste Isolation Pilot Plant].’’ DOE 

Order 151.1C does not include explicit requirements concerning emergency facility 

habitability; other agencies, such as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, do provide 

such requirements. The DNFSB Recommendation identifies the need to update the 

directive to address this gap. ‘‘Members of the Board’s staff also observed problems 

with systems used to support emergency communications and notifications. For example, the staff observed problems with the systems used to notify workers and visitors about an emergency and protective actions that are to be taken, such as was 

observed recently at WIPP during the underground truck fire.’’ DOE Order 151.1C 

provides requirements for emergency notification systems at DOE sites, including 

notification to the site workers and off-site notification to the public. However, guidance to implement this requirement is deficient. Sites must develop clear criteria 

for when to continue operations when notification systems are degraded or failed, 

including compensatory measures that are tested and effective to ensure workers receive notification that an operational emergency is occurring and the necessary protective actions to take. Robust, survivable, and tested notification systems installed 

in and around facilities at sites such as the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, the Savannah River Site, the Hanford Site, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory are 

a necessary first step to address this concern. 

Mr. ROGERS. Ms. Roberson, is the DNFSB preparing an implementation plan to 

address the recommendations and corrective actions within the LMI study on 

DNFSB’s workforce and culture? When will this plan be complete? 

Ms. ROBERSON. The DNFSB has prepared an informal action plan to address the 

recommendations and corrective actions within the LMI study. For example, all 

DNFSB executives and Board Members are working with an executive coach to develop better communication techniques and enhance leadership effectiveness. Regular staff meetings are being held at both the agency and office level to provide increased opportunities for employee feedback and participation. The full action plan 

for organizational culture change is attached. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 69.] 

In addition, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the Inspector General 

(OIG) recently completed a Culture Climate Survey of the DNFSB staff. The response rate exceeded 70%, and the OIG will be briefing the results to the DNFSB 

management and staff on May 21st. I anticipate additional actions will be planned 

as a result of that additional feedback. 

Mr. ROGERS. Ms. Roberson, does DNFSB intend to review NNSA’s large list of deferred maintenance projects for safety risks? Would DNFSB be willing to provide 

NNSA its views on prioritizing this list with regards to safety risk? 

Ms. ROBERSON. The DNFSB has evaluated deferred maintenance documentation 

and databases during site-specific maintenance reviews and generally found the 

management of safety risk to be acceptable. (NNSA’s list of deferred maintenance 

is housed in the Department of Energy’s Facilities Information Management System 

[FIMS].) The majority of the deferred maintenance had a relatively low impact on 

nuclear safety and was being worked as resource availability permitted. The management and operating contractors at each site commonly make it a high priority 

to minimize deferred preventive maintenance of safety class and safety significant 

structures, systems, and components (SSC) that are credited to perform safety-related functions in the Documented Safety Analyses for nuclear facilities. The 

DNFSB will continue to review maintenance programs at NNSA sites, including assessments of deferred maintenance, to ensure SSCs critical to preserving the safety 

of nuclear operations are appropriately managed. 

It should be noted, however, that the overall NNSA deferred maintenance backlog 

of $3.6B includes many non-defense nuclear facilities and associated infrastructure 

exceeding 60 years of service that have little or no bearing on the safety of nuclear 
87 

operations. Many of the items in NNSA’s deferred maintenance database are roofs, 

office air conditioning systems, shop utilities, and the like. At some sites these types 

of deferred maintenance vastly surpass corrective maintenance backlogs or deferred 

preventive maintenance on nuclear safety-related SSCs and processing equipment. 

Nevertheless, infrastructure risk in a non-defense nuclear facility can pose a nuclear 

safety risk under the right circumstances. For example, a major fire in a non-defense nuclear facility could threaten a nearby defense nuclear facility. In such a 

case, we would expect the credited fire suppression systems in the defense nuclear 

facility to provide for the adequate protection of the public and workers from radiological consequences. Clearly, though, it would be preferable to avoid a major fire 

in the first place. 

To help prevent degradation of the nuclear facility safety posture, equipment owners or system engineers at the sites are typically expected to provide technical input 

during the decision process for deferring maintenance of safety SSCs. For example, 

if preventive maintenance activities for safety SSCs will exceed defined schedules, 

it is necessary to obtain a deferral evaluation and approval or make a determination 

of compensatory measures to be implemented. 

DOE Order 430.1B, Real Property Asset Management, requires DOE/NNSA sites 

to annually use condition assessment data to determine and report the deferred 

maintenance information in FIMS. The site contractor must maintain FIMS data 

and records, which are DOE’s corporate real property inventory database for all 

buildings and other structures and facilities. Although, it is expected to be difficult 

to evaluate comparative risk among the NNSA sites, the DNFSB has requested 

FIMS database information relevant to deferred maintenance at defense nuclear facilities. In addition to reviewing the FIMS data in an attempt to identify any potential safety risks related to deferred maintenance, the DNFSB will continue to execute site-specific maintenance reviews. Any safety concerns related to the 

prioritization of deferred maintenance will be brought to the attention of responsible 

NNSA management. 

The Board’s response to Question 21 [which follows] provides additional details 

on deferred maintenance. 

Mr. ROGERS. Ms. Roberson, what are the safety impacts of NNSA’s deteriorating 

infrastructure and $3.6 billion backlog of deferred maintenance? NNSA officials 

have said that ‘‘infrastructure risk becomes safety risk.’’ Do you agree? [Question 

#21, for cross-reference.] 

Ms. ROBERSON. The DNFSB agrees that infrastructure risk can become safety 

risk. It should be noted, however, that the overall NNSA deferred maintenance 

backlog of $3.6B includes non-defense nuclear facilities and infrastructure that have 

little or no bearing on the safety of nuclear operations. Many of the items in NNSA’s 

deferred maintenance database are roofs, office air conditioning systems, shop utilities, and the like. At some sites these types of deferred maintenance vastly exceed 

corrective maintenance backlogs or deferred preventive maintenance on nuclear 

safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSC) and processing equipment. 

Nevertheless, infrastructure risk in a non-defense nuclear facility can pose a nuclear 

safety risk under the right circumstances. For example, a major fire in a non-defense nuclear facility could threaten a nearby defense nuclear facility. In such a 

case, we would expect the credited fire suppression systems in the defense nuclear 

facility to provide for the adequate protection of the public and workers from radiological consequences. Clearly, though, it would be preferable to avoid a major fire 

in the first place. 

Safe performance of work includes allotting adequate resources to system and 

equipment maintenance, maintaining up-to-date configuration control, and making 

necessary upgrades to support system infrastructure. A lesson learned from the recent Waste Isolation Pilot Plant events is that degraded and out of service safetyrelated equipment must not be accepted and tolerated. Deficient and poorly maintained safety-related infrastructure, including credited safety SSCs that support nuclear activities, can pose safety risks to the public and workers, and can jeopardize 

NNSA’s ability to accomplish mission-related work. 

Infrastructure is defined in DOE Order 430.1B, Real Property Asset Management, 

as ‘‘All real property, installed equipment, and related real property that is not solely supporting a single program mission at a multi-program site or that is not programmatic real property at a single program site.’’ DOE Order 430.1B defines deferred maintenance as ‘‘maintenance that was not performed when it should have 

been or was scheduled to be and which, therefore, is put off or delayed for a future 

period.’’ Maintenance activities are expected to be scheduled and performed within 

established intervals; preventive maintenance should be waived or deferred only 

with approval by an appropriate authority that considers the significance of the SSC 
88 

and the length of delay. Further, any deferral of planned tasks should have a technical basis. 

The number and severity of risks increases when the amount of deferred preventive maintenance and corrective maintenance backlog rises. Each nuclear facility 

has a Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and accompanying Technical Safety Requirements which set forth the preventive maintenance and surveillance requirements for the safety class and safety significant SSCs credited by the DSA to prevent or mitigate hazardous accident scenarios. The implementation of these maintenance and surveillance requirements is key to ensuring the SSCs will reliably perform their credited safety functions on an on-going basis. As such, completion of the 

maintenance and surveillance requirements is carefully controlled or, if not achievable, compensatory measures are implemented or the associated operations are shut 

down until the required maintenance or surveillance is complete. 

Deferred maintenance associated with safety-related SSCs credited in DSAs is of 

paramount concern to the Board. Maintenance on other safety-related programmatic 

and infrastructure equipment is also important to maintaining the safety envelope 

of defense nuclear facilities. Preventive and corrective maintenance should only be 

deferred if sufficient technical justification exists to do so. 

The DNFSB has identified preventive maintenance deferrals at NNSA/DOE sites 

whose justifications were less than adequate. For example, preventive maintenance 

has been deferred because parts were not ordered, or because materials or craft resources to support the work were not available. Similarly, the DNFSB has seen 

cases where preventive maintenance schedules were modified based on business decisions. The maintenance deferral process must ensure adequate reviews are carried 

out to understand the possible impact of not performing a maintenance task on 

schedule, applicable compensatory measures are instituted to manage those risks, 

and understanding and acceptance of any added risks are documented. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER 

Mr. COOPER. General Klotz, what are the long-term goals and challenges for 

DNN, and what initiatives are you leading that will ensure we are well-postured 

to address the proliferation threats that might emerge in a decade? Are there opportunities to further improve and invest in verification and detection technology? 

General KLOTZ. Because of its world leadership in scientific and technical expertise and programmatic capabilities in the nuclear security arena, DOE, mostly 

through the NNSA, plays a central U.S. Government role in pursuing U.S. nuclear 

security goals. NNSA makes full use of all the resources at its disposal to fulfill its 

nonproliferation and counterterrorism missions by: 

• Developing and implementing policy and technical solutions to eliminate proliferation-sensitive materials and limit or prevent the spread of materials, technology, and expertise related to nuclear and radiological weapons and programs 

around the world. 

• Providing expertise, practical tools, and technically informed policy recommendations required to advance U.S. nuclear counterterrorism and 

counterproliferation objectives. 

• Maintaining essential components of the U.S. capability to respond to nuclear 

or radiological crises and manage the consequences (domestically or internationally) of civilian radiation exposure resulting from a nuclear or radiological incident, especially those involving terrorism. 

To pursue these U.S. nuclear security goals within this enduring and evolving nuclear threat environment, the NNSA program strategy is to organize its nuclear 

nonproliferation and counterterrorism actions into three primary areas that cover 

the nuclear threat spectrum: 

• Prevent non-state actors and additional countries from developing nuclear 

weapons or acquiring weapons-usable nuclear materials, equipment, technology, 

and expertise; and prevent non-state actors from acquiring radiological materials for a radiological threat device. 

• Counter the efforts of both proliferant states and non-state actors to steal, acquire, develop, disseminate, transport, or deliver the materials, expertise, or 

components necessary for a nuclear or radiological threat device or the devices 

themselves. 

• Respond to nuclear or radiological terrorist acts, or accidental/unintentional incidents, by searching for and rendering safe threat devices, components, and/ 

or radiological and nuclear materials, and by conducting consequence management actions following an event to save lives, protect property and the environment, and enable the provision of emergency services. 
89 

Mr. COOPER. General Klotz, how does DOE plan to afford the $30 billion or more 

that will be required to construct and operate MOX? Should NNSA re-baseline the 

MOX project in FY16? 

General KLOTZ. The Administration remains firmly committed to disposing of surplus weapon-grade plutonium. The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, directed that construction on the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MOX) project continue and that cost studies and technology alternative studies be conducted. The Department of Energy requested Aerospace Corporation, a 

federally funded research and development center, to assess and validate the analysis of options for disposing of 34 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium mandated 

by Congress. The assessment and validation is expected to be completed in late FY 

2015. This independent validation will inform the final policy decision on what disposition path the United States Government will adopt in compliance with the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement. Once a final decision is made, a 

rebaseline of the MOX project would be required and could take approximately 18– 

24 months to complete. 

Mr. COOPER. General Klotz, is it worth an effort to assess whether it would be 

feasible to use low enriched uranium (LEU) (instead of highly enriched uranium) 

in naval reactor fuel to the next generation of aircraft carriers? 

General KLOTZ. It is feasible but is not practical or cost effective with our current 

technology. Today, using LEU would increase the amount of refuelings required, 

which has the follow-on effect of requiring additional ships to meet the same military requirements. Theoretically, advances in technology could partially recover the 

loss in core-life from that which we have today in our HEU cores, but we would 

need a significant R&D effort to develop those technologies. Further effort would 

then be required to design the LEU reactor plant and other associated systems before we would be ready to build an LEU powered ship. 

Mr. COOPER. Would there be any benefit to assessing the potential for LEU in 

naval fuel, such as nonproliferation or security benefits even if there might not be 

any driving military benefits? 

General KLOTZ. If we could develop the technology to the point where we use exclusively LEU, it would ultimately have a non-proliferation benefit because we 

would no longer require HEU for naval nuclear propulsion. 

Security costs would also be reduced, as HEU facilities have greater requirements, but we would still require a substantial security presence in terms of physical infrastructure and manpower. 

Mr. COOPER. Would this help sustain the necessary R&D funding and capability 

for Naval Reactors? 

General KLOTZ. Developing the technologies required to use LEU in our plants 

would be a substantial, multi-year research effort that works at the cutting edge of 

nuclear science. Advanced fuel development would sustain one area of unique expertise that the Naval Reactors Program relies upon to deal with the day-to-day issues 

involved in naval reactor design, construction, operation, and disposal, which require a detailed understanding of naval fuel. Naval fuel performance knowledge is 

unique and exists only within the Naval Reactor Program. Advanced fuel development attracts talent and maintains our knowledge base. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN 

Mr. LARSEN. General Klotz, what are the risks of NNSA modernization plan, including executing 4–5 concurrent life-extension programs and overseeing major construction projects at Y–12 and Los Alamos National Laboratory in the 2020s? 

General KLOTZ. NNSA has developed long term modernization efforts for the nuclear security enterprise described in the FY 2016 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan. Modernization efforts for warheads through approved Life Extension 

Programs face a number of risks. First, the ability to certify designs that include 

new or updated material combinations or surety features is a challenge for life extension programs in the absence of underground testing. To address this challenge, 

the national security laboratories have improved their fundamental understanding 

of physics package interactions through numerous enhanced physics experiments, 

greater computing power, and advanced simulations. Second, NNSA must mature 

technologies and components to transform the stockpile over the next twenty years. 

Technology maturation enables development and delivery of design-to-manufacturing capabilities to meeting current and future nuclear weapons needs for the Nation’s stockpile. NNSA uses the Component Maturation Framework, which is a portfolio management tool used to integrate preliminary scope, proposed technology and 

manufacturing readiness levels, and planning estimates, to inform decisions on com-
90 

ponent development, technology maturation and timely insertion. NNSA is establishing plans to mature technologies sufficiently in advance of planned insertion 

points to cost-effectively minimize risk. Third, although the president’s budget fully 

funds these activities, cuts due to sequestration can put them at risk. 

For major construction projects, NNSA is committed to delivering its capital asset 

projects on budget and schedule. Over the past four years, NNSA has focused on 

putting the right policies, principles, people, processes, procedures, and partnerships 

in place to implement the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) Circular A– 

11 for Capital Acquisition Projects, Department of Energy Order 413.3B on project 

management, and the Secretary’s January 2015 enhanced project management policies. In 2013, GAO narrowed the focus of its High Risk list for NNSA to contracts 

and projects with a Total Project Cost greater than $750 million as a result of the 

improvements NNSA has been making in its contract and project management. 

NNSA is confident that the same policies and processes for projects less than $750 

million are scalable to the major system acquisition projects at Los Alamos National 

Laboratory and Y–12. 

Following are risks to NNSA’s portfolio of construction projects: 

• Escalation on commodities and equipment procurements 

• Difficulties attracting and retaining nuclear qualified workers at assumed labor 

rates 

• Availability of vendors qualified to produce materials and equipment to meet 

current nuclear construction standards (NQA–1) 

• Changes to project requirements, codes, and standards Delays in authorizations 

to start construction activities 

Mr. LARSEN. Do you have the expertise and management in place to lower the 

risk of schedule slips and cost increases? Are you confident NNSA can execute this 

plan? 

General KLOTZ. NNSA has the expertise and management processes in place to 

effectively plan and execute planned weapon system modernization activities. NNSA 

has established an office (NA–19) to focus on weapon system modernization. To control costs, earned value management practices are being implemented for every 

weapon system acquisition. The NNSA weapons workload has grown over the last 

several years to include 3 life extension programs and one major weapon system alteration, and each of these programs requires trained and qualified federal managers and selected subject matter experts. NNSA has developed staffing plans that 

will, over time and with Congressional support, align federal resources required to 

execute our assigned program of work. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

Mr. GARAMENDI. General Klotz, is there a plan for retiring B83 and W76–0? What 

is the timeline? 

General KLOTZ. Both the B83 and W76–0 are planned to be retired once confidence is gained in the B61–12 and W76–1 Life Extension Programs (LEPs), respectively. Specific planned retirement dates can be provided in a classified response. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. General Klotz, there is some concern that the second-line of defense funding for fixed portal monitors at ports may not provide the best value for 

the funding. Do you agree? Why or why not? 

General KLOTZ. The fixed radiation portal monitors deployed by NNSA’s Nuclear 

Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) Program (formerly known as the Second Line of Defense) are a critical element of the U.S. Government’s layered approach to countering the threat of illicit trafficking. NSDD provides international 

partners with a suite of tools, including fixed, mobile and handheld detection equipment, training, and technical support to enhance their capabilities to detect, deter 

and interdict the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials. Before deploying equipment, NSDD considers a wide range of factors, including trafficking 

pathways, deployment environments, and partner capabilities in order to determine 

the most appropriate mix of equipment to counter the threat of smuggling in a particular country or region. 

NSDD’s fixed portal monitors work in concert with mobile detection systems to 

provide partners with multiple tools to prevent nuclear smuggling. Given the consequences of a nuclear or radiological device incident, it is imperative that all available tools be brought to bear to create a robust and layered defense against nuclear 

smuggling. 

Regarding the capabilities of the fixed portal monitors, they are effective in detecting some special nuclear materials as well as radiological materials that could be 

used in a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or radiological exposure device (RED). 
91 

Further, fixed portal monitors have detected materials of concern in the past. More 

detail on specific interdiction cases, as well as portal monitor capabilities, can be 

provided in a classified setting. Fixed portal monitors also help deter trafficking by 

complicating potential smugglers’ task, forcing them to use alternate means that increase the probability of detection. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. General Klotz, what is the impact of Russia withdrawing from 

cooperation with the United States on securing and removing fissile material in 

Russia? What are the alternatives to ensure these materials are not stolen or diverted? 

General KLOTZ. Material protection, control and accounting (MPC&A) cooperation 

with key non-Rosatom sites and organizations is continuing under the Multilateral 

Nuclear and Environmental Programme in the Russian Federation (MNEPR) framework agreement, as is cooperation at a limited number of Rosatom sites and organizations. However, Rosatom informed us last December that existing cooperation 

would cease with most Rosatom nuclear sites and organizations as of the end of 

2014. 

Existing work will continue in the near future to complete security upgrades and 

sustainability work directly with a subset of Rosatom and non-Rosatom sites. The 

Russian decision to scale back cooperation has accelerated the shift from assistance 

to technical engagement on key foundational elements of modern and effective security. Given that Russia maintains the largest holdings of weapons-usable material, 

DOE/NNSA will continue to seek engagement on nuclear material security best 

practices with Russian sites and organizations. This includes topics such as training, regulatory development and inspections, and transportation security. 

DOE/NNSA also expects to continue cooperation with Russia and third parties, including the repatriation of Russian-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU). 

DOE/NNSA will also work to maintain nuclear security relationships with neighboring countries, offering continued training and training-center support to also 

maintain regional capabilities. We will continue to help strengthen border and port 

security programs with partner countries around Russia, to enable detection and 

interdiction of any trafficked nuclear material, including consideration of additional 

measures that would be prudent to pursue. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. The President’s budget request clearly supports Uranium enrichment technology. In your opinion, do you find that maintaining the American Centrifuge capability is important? 

General KLOTZ. A reliable supply of enriched uranium is required to meet U.S. 

national security requirements. Any enrichment technology used to meet these requirements, should the interagency determine that such technology is the best way 

forward, must be U.S. origin. Enriched uranium provided via foreign technology, 

even if located in the U.S., may not be used for national security purposes due to 

international peaceful-use assurances. The President’s budget request maintains the 

operability of the centrifuge technology at the pilot plant in Piketon, OH, and the 

development and test facility in the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP) Building K–1600. Maintaining these near-term domestic-origin technologies that could 

produce low enriched uranium unencumbered by peaceful-use restrictions is important while U.S. Interagency Policy Committee develops the best path forward to 

meet our national security requirements for enriched uranium. 

Mr. TURNER. Additionally, do you agree that with further development and deployment of U.S. Uranium enrichment technology will help meet future security 

needs? 

General KLOTZ. A domestic uranium enrichment capability would meet national 

security and nonproliferation missions that require unobligated low-enriched uranium (LEU) for commercial light water reactors involved in tritium production, high 

assay LEU for research reactors, and eventually highly enriched uranium (HEU) for 

Naval Reactors. The Department will provide a report to Congress in the near future that will inform discussions regarding the path forward for meeting the nation’s needs for unencumbered enriched uranium. 

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