IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-0007

Filed November 8, 2023

IN THE INTEREST OF L.D.,

Minor Child,

S.F., Mother,

Petitioner-Appellee,

S.D., Father,

Respondent-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Joseph Seidlin, Judge.

A father appeals the private termination of his parental rights. AFFIRMED.

Karen A. Taylor of Taylor Law Offices, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant 

father.

Gary E. Hill and Hannah T. Hirl of Family Law Solutions of Iowa LLC, Des 

Moines, for appellee mother.

Penny B. Reimer of Reimer Mediation & Law, PLLC, Cumming, attorney 

and guardian ad litem for minor child.

Considered by Bower, C.J., and Buller and Langholz, JJ.
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LANGHOLZ, Judge.

A father appeals from the termination of his parental rights to his daughter.1 

The daughter’s mother petitioned for termination under Iowa Code chapter 600A 

when he sought to reestablish a relationship with his daughter after eight years 

without any direct contact. He now argues the mother failed to prove a statutory 

ground for termination or that termination is in the best interests of the child. While 

we join the district court in commending the father for his admirable efforts to turn 

his life around, that does not affect the proper result here. The mother proved a 

ground for termination—that the father abandoned the child as defined by Iowa 

Code section 600A.8(3)—and termination of his parental rights is in the child’s best 

interests. We thus affirm. 

I.

The daughter was born in 2011 while her father was in prison. He eventually 

returned home and lived with his daughter and her mother for most of the 

daughter’s first three years of life—when not in prison or jail. Throughout their time 

together, the father was physically and emotionally abusive to the mother. And 

then in May 2014, the mother applied for—and after a hearing, the district court 

issued—a civil domestic-abuse protective order against the father. She did so after 

an incident when the father strangled and punched her in front of their daughter—

and she had to lock herself and their daughter in her bedroom to protect 

themselves. This was the last time the father saw or talked to his daughter.

1 We avoid the use of names to respect the parties’ privacy because this opinion—

unlike the district court’s order—is public. Compare Iowa Code § 600.16A (2022)

with Iowa Code §§ 602.4301(2), 602.5110.
3

The father spent much of the rest of his daughter’s life incarcerated—though 

the record is unclear on the precise frequency and duration of the incarceration. 

He also continued to abuse alcohol up to his last conviction of operating while 

intoxicated in March 2020 in Minnesota. Since 2014, the father has not provided 

any financial support for his daughter. 

The father made a handful of attempts to contact his daughter in writing. 

But none of his letters or cards reached her. He also sent one Facebook message 

to the mother in 2016, but the mother did not reply. And he may have sent one gift 

through the prison’s Angel Tree program in 2015. Yet he never called to speak 

with his daughter or her mother or tried to visit in person when he was not 

incarcerated—even though the mother and daughter had not moved from the 

same home in which they had all lived.

Upon his most recent release in April 2022, the father reached out by 

Facebook again asking to reestablish contact with his daughter. The mother 

replied that his daughter did not “want anything to do with” him. He then sought 

custody and visitation rights for his daughter. But even so, he has still not offered 

any financial support. In response, the mother petitioned for termination of his 

parental rights. She sought to terminate the father’s parental rights on the ground 

of abandonment under Iowa Code section 600A.8(3).

After a bench trial in November 2022, the district court terminated the 

father’s parental rights. The court held that the father had abandoned his daughter 

under section 600A.8(3) after finding that for at least eight years, he had not 

financially supported the daughter, had “not visited the child at all, let alone monthly 

during times that he has been able,” had “not communicated with the child at all, 
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let alone regularly during times when he has been unable to visit the child,” and 

had “not lived with the child at any time.” 

The court also decided that termination of the father’s parental rights was in 

the daughter’s best interests. The court reasoned: 

Here, the record is clear that again, since at least 2014, [the 

father] has not in any way assumed the duties encompassed by the 

role of being a parent. He has not contributed anything financially 

for the benefit of the child. Subjectively, his interest in the child may 

be real, but objectively he has shown no more than half-hearted 

interest in her, and has demonstrated no real or genuine effort to 

establish communication with her. He clearly has not maintained any 

place of importance in [the child’s] life. The child does not remember 

him, nor is she interested in a relationship with him. His filing a 

Petition for custody and visitation eight years after his last contact 

with the child is simply too little, too late.

The court respects and admires [the father] for the steps he 

has taken to reverse the course of his life. In the time it took for that 

to happen, however, [the child’s] life has gone on. Over two-thirds 

of [the child’s] life has been lived since [the father] last played any 

role in it. 

This timely appeal followed.

II.

Private termination proceedings under Iowa Code chapter 600A are 

reviewed de novo. In re G.A., 826 N.W.2d 125, 127 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012). “We 

give weight to the juvenile court’s factual findings, especially when considering the 

credibility of witnesses, but we are not bound by them.” In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 

737, 745 (Iowa 2011). Our prime concern is the best interests of the child, but the 

parents’ interests “shall be given due consideration.” Iowa Code § 600A.1(1); see 

also In re R.K.B., 572 N.W.2d 600, 601 (Iowa 1998).

The moving party in a chapter 600A action must satisfy a two-step analysis 

by clear and convincing evidence: (1) proving one of the grounds for ordering 
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termination of parental rights under section 600A.8, and (2) showing that 

termination is in the best interests of the child. In re Q.G., 911 N.W.2d 761, 770 

(Iowa 2018).

The district court relied on the statutory ground of abandonment under 

section 600A.8(3). For a child who is at least six months old—like the daughter 

here—that section provides that “a parent is deemed to have abandoned the child 

unless the parent maintains substantial and continuous or repeated contact with 

the child.” Iowa Code § 600A.8(3)(b). That required contact must be 

“demonstrated by contribution toward support of the child of a reasonable amount, 

according to the parent’s means” and by any one of three means of contact: 

(1) visiting at least monthly; (2) communicating regularly when unable to visit; or 

(3) “[o]penly living with” and “holding himself or herself out to be the parent of the 

child” during a six-month period in the year before the termination hearing. Iowa 

Code § 600A.8(3)(b)(1)–(3); see also id. § 600A.2(20) (defining “[t]o abandon a 

minor child”). A parent’s subjective intent “does not preclude a determination that 

the parent has abandoned the child.” Id. § 600A.8(3)(c).

The father has been incarcerated on and off for most of the child’s life. Over 

eight years, the father made no attempts to visit and only a handful of attempts to 

communicate with his daughter. Since 2014, he has not financially supported her. 

The father “cannot use his incarceration as a justification for his lack of relationship 

with the child.” In re M.M.S., 502 N.W.2d 4, 8 (Iowa 1993). The father’s limited

contacts must be viewed in the light that total desertion is not required for a 

showing of abandonment. See id. Our courts “do not hold or suggest that 

termination is a necessary result of conviction of a crime and resulting 
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imprisonment.” Id. But the father cannot use his incarceration as an explanation 

for his lack of relationship with the child, especially since there were times that he 

was not in prison or jail. 

The father is correct that a parent’s persistent interference with the other 

parent’s attempts at substantial and continuous or repeated contact may defeat a 

claim of abandonment. See, e.g., In re R.G., No. 21-1744, 2022 WL 2160691, at 

*4 (Iowa Ct. App. June 15, 2022). But a parent can only persistently interfere when 

persistent attempts at contact have been made. The record here shows a failure 

by the father to make a connection with the child from 2014 to April 2022. As she 

testified, the mother never had the chance to block the father from communicating 

with the child during these eight years because he never tried to contact the child. 

This lengthy period of minimal contact rises to the level of abandonment and 

cannot be salvaged by his belated requests for contact in 2022. On our de novo 

review, we conclude that the mother has proved the statutory ground of 

abandonment under section 600A.8(3) by clear and convincing evidence. See In 

re K.L., No. 22-1037, 2023 WL 2396366, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2023) 

(finding that the father abandoned his child after long periods of incarceration and 

a failure to visit or communicate with the child).

Turning to the second step of the analysis, we also agree that termination 

of the father’s parental rights is in the best interests of his daughter. In considering 

the best interests of the child, we apply section 600A.1, which directs the court to 

decide “whether a parent has affirmatively assumed the duties of a parent.” Iowa 

Code § 600A.1(2); see also In re B.H.A., 938 N.W.2d 227, 232 (Iowa 2020). In 

making this decision, we consider—among other factors—“the fulfillment of 
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financial obligations, demonstration of continued interest in the child, 

demonstration of a genuine effort to maintain communication with the child, and 

demonstration of the establishment and maintenance of a place of importance in 

the child’s life.” Iowa Code § 600A.1(2). We “give primary consideration to the 

child’s safety” and the best placement to encourage their long-term nurturing and 

growth. B.H.A., 938 N.W.2d at 232 (citing Iowa Code § 232.116(2)). We likewise 

consider “the child’s emotional and psychological health and the closeness of the 

parent–child bond.” Id. (citing Iowa Code § 232.116(2), (3)(c)). 

The father focuses his best-interests-of-the-child argument on his 

rehabilitation efforts, such as attending a substance-abuse boot camp, weekly 

meetings for his alcohol abuse, and parenting classes. Because of turning his life 

around, he believes that he may provide many years of benefit to his daughter. 

We—like the district court—commend the growth the father made in addressing 

his alcohol abuse. But he has scarcely embraced “the duties encompassed by the 

role of being a parent.” Iowa Code § 600A.1(2). True, he recently filed an action 

to establish custody. But as the district court found, this is “too little, too late.” For 

eight years he did not make a sincere effort to contact his daughter or maintain an 

important place in her life. And the record shows no ongoing parent–child bond.

The daughter’s guardian ad litem observed: 

[The daughter] does not know [her father]. The fact this child is so 

untroubled by the lack of involvement by [the father] in her life says 

a lot about her need for him, and that she is adequately supported 

and cared for by those around her at present. . . . [The daughter] 

views other relatives and family friends as the supportive people she 

needs in life.
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The daughter is well-adjusted and succeeding in her life without the father. 

She is emotionally and financially supported by her mother. The interests of the 

child will be best served by the termination of the father’s parental rights. See In 

re B.L.A., 357 N.W.2d 20, 23 (Iowa 1984). We affirm the decision of the district 

court.

AFFIRMED.