NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

JAVIER RAMON PORTILLO-DIAZ, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

DAVID C. SHINN; CENTURION MEDICAL, Respondents/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 21-0551

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. LC2021-000164-001

The Honorable Danielle J. Viola, Judge

AFFIRMED

APPEARANCES

Javier Ramon Portillo-Diaz, Florence

Petitioner/Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the decision of the court, in which 

Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Chief Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

FILED 6-7-2022
PORTILLO-DIAZ v. SHINN/CENTURION

Decision of the Court

2

W I L L I A M S, Judge:

¶1 Javier Ramon Portillo-Diaz appeals from the superior court’s

order declining special action jurisdiction. For the following reasons, we

affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Portillo-Diaz is an inmate at the Arizona Department of 

Corrections (“ADC”). In June 2021, he filed a petition for special action in 

the superior court seeking relief against ADC Director David C. Shinn and 

Centurion Medical (“Centurion”) claiming he was medically

“misdiagnosed.” More specifically, Portillo-Diaz requested that the 

superior court order ADC to have another cardiologist evaluate him 

because he disagreed with Centurion’s medical diagnoses. In the 

alternative, Portillo-Diaz asked the court to order his release from ADC so 

he could obtain treatment on his own or to schedule an order to show cause 

hearing to address whether his medical issues were being properly treated. 

¶3 In August 2021, the superior court issued a minute entry 

declining to exercise special action jurisdiction because “[c]laims for 

inadequate medical care while in custody can be addressed in a 

conventional civil lawsuit” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

¶4 Portillo-Diaz timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under

Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶5 The superior court has original jurisdiction to issue 

extraordinary writs against state officers. Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 18; see also

Ariz. Corp. Comm’n v. Superior Court, 107 Ariz. 24, 26 (1971). Relief by 

extraordinary writ is available only through special action, and the court’s 

decision to accept jurisdiction is highly discretionary. Forty-Seventh 

Legislature. v. Napolitano, 213 Ariz. 482, 485, ¶¶ 10-11 (2006). Such 

jurisdiction is reserved for “extraordinary circumstances.” State ex rel. 

Romley v. Fields, 201 Ariz. 321, 323, ¶ 4 (App. 2001). 

¶6 Because the superior court declined jurisdiction, our review 

is limited to assessing whether the court abused its discretion in doing so. 

See Bilagody v. Thorneycroft, 125 Ariz. 88, 92 (App. 1979); Stapert v. Ariz. Bd. 

Of Psych. Exam’rs, 210 Ariz. 177, 182, ¶ 22 (App. 2005). A court abuses its 

discretion when the record does not contain substantial support for its 

decision. Files v. Bernal, 200 Ariz. 64, 65, ¶ 2 (App. 2001).
PORTILLO-DIAZ v. SHINN/CENTURION

Decision of the Court

3

¶7 Portillo-Diaz argues the court erred in declining special action 

jurisdiction because a claim under § 1983 “is never plain, simple nor speedy 

for a prisoner.” Though it may not necessarily be “simple,” the superior 

court was correct that claims for inadequate medical care while in custody

can be addressed in a conventional civil lawsuit, including under § 1983. 

See Zuck v. State, 159 Ariz. 37, 42 (App. 1988) (noting that an inmate alleging 

delay in receiving medication and treatment could pursue a conventional 

civil claim under § 1983); Gunter v. State, 153 Ariz. 386, 387 (App. 1987) 

(“Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs may . . . 

give[] rise to a cause of action under . . . § 1983.”). And despite

Portillo-Diaz’s contention that a § 1983 claim is not speedy because such a 

claim is time consuming and his condition is “dire,” “[a] remedy does not 

become inadequate merely because more time would transpire by pursuing 

a conventional action.” Neary v. Frantz, 141 Ariz. 171, 177 (App. 1984).

Finally, based upon our review of the medical records Portillo-Diaz 

provided to the superior court, we cannot say the court abused its discretion 

in concluding Portillo-Diaz had an adequate remedy otherwise available to 

him under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On this record, Portillo-Diaz has shown no 

error.

CONCLUSION

¶8 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.