NUMBER 13-21-00020-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG 

 

CARRIE M. LEO, Appellant,

v.

TYLER C. THOMAS AND 

NICHOLAS STACEY, Appellees.

 

On appeal from the 444th District Court 

of Cameron County, Texas.

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Hinojosa, Tijerina, and Silva

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Tijerina

Pro se appellant Carrie M. Leo appeals the trial court’s order dismissing her causes 

of action with prejudice and awarding sanctions against her in the amount of $10,000. We 

affirm.
2

I. BACKGROUND

On April 14, 2017, Leo entered into an agreement with appellees Tyler C. Thomas 

and Nicholas Stacey to house three of Leo’s animals while Leo tended to personal 

matters. On August 22, 2017, Leo sued appellees in New York asserting “breach of 

chattel bailment, conversion, fiduciary breaching duty, fraudulent concealment by 

fiduciary, negligence, harm by way of defamatory injury to reputation, injurious falsehood, 

libel and slander.” She also sought compensatory and exemplary damages.

On February 6, 2020, Leo filed an original petition in Cameron County against 

appellees asserting breach of contract, fraud, civil conspiracy, defamation, domestication 

of a foreign order, and violations of wildlife conservation laws. She sought compensatory 

and exemplary damages.

On July 9, 2020, the New York district court granted appellees’ summary judgment 

motion and dismissed Leo’s case in its entirety.

In Cameron County, appellees filed a special appearance challenging the trial 

court’s jurisdiction, asserting that Leo lives in New York, her causes of action arose in 

New York and had been adjudicated and dismissed, and appellees did not have 

continuous and systematic contacts in Texas. Additionally, appellees filed a motion to 

dismiss stating that Leo was forum shopping by asserting the same causes of action in 

Texas that had been dismissed in New York. Lastly, appellees filed a motion to transfer 

venue to New York and an original answer generally denying Leo’s claims.

On January 5, 2021, the trial court granted appellees’ motion to dismiss Leo’s 

causes of action and dismissed Leo’s causes of action with prejudice. The trial court 
3

further assessed sanctions in the amount of $10,000. This appeal followed.

II. DISMISSAL

By her first issue, Leo argues the trial court erred in dismissing her causes of action 

with prejudice. Specifically, she states that she “sought to have a Texas District Court 

assist in efforts to enforce an otherwise valid judicial order” from New York. She asserts 

“[t]here is not much of a difference or distinction in family/domestic relations cases when 

the parties are governed by the State that originated the action, yet a former spouse has 

moved to another State and believes that is enough to frustrate lawful compliance.” We 

construe her argument as being that the Texas trial court has jurisdiction over this case 

that originated in a foreign state and can enforce a foreign order.

Leo does not, however, cite to legal authority or provide a substantive analysis of 

this issue in her complaint. See Martinez v. El Paso County, 218 S.W.3d 841, 844 (Tex. 

App.—El Paso 2007, pet. struck) (providing that the failure to cite legal authority or provide 

substantive analysis of the legal issue results in waiver of the complaint); see also 

Vafaiyan v. State, No. 13-18-00352-CV, 2019 WL 3820418, at *5 n.2 (Tex. App.—Corpus 

Christi–Edinburg Aug. 15, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (providing that “[p]ro se litigants are 

held to the same standards as licensed attorneys and must comply with all applicable 

rules of procedure”). An appellant’s brief must concisely state all issues or points 

presented for review and contain a clear and concise argument, including appropriate 

citations to authority and the record. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(h), (i). This requirement is not 

satisfied by “merely uttering brief conclusory statements, unsupported by legal citations.”

Sweed v. City of El Paso, 195 S.W.3d 784, 786 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2006, no pet.). “Bare 
4

assertions of error without argument or authority waive error.” In re J.A.M.R., 303 S.W.3d 

422, 425 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.); Canton–Carter v. Baylor Coll. of Med., 271 

S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (stating that the 

appellate briefing requirements are not satisfied by merely uttering brief, conclusory 

statements unsupported by legal citations or substantive analysis). Because Leo has 

waived her complaint for our review due to inadequate briefing, we overrule her first issue.

III. SANCTIONS

By her second issue, Leo asserts the trial court abused its discretion by assessing 

sanctions against her because it failed to comply with Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 13.

See TEX. R. CIV. P. 13 (setting out the rules and procedures that a trial court must follow 

to impose sanctions on a party).

A. Applicable Law

Sanctions may only be imposed for good cause under Rule 13, “the particulars of 

which must be stated in the sanctions order.” Id.; Rudisell v. Paquette, 89 S.W.3d 233, 

237 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2002, no pet.). The trial court’s Rule 13 

sanctions order must identify the specific acts or omissions on which the court based the 

sanctions. Jimenez v. Transwestern Prop. Co., 999 S.W.2d 125, 130 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.). A court must also include a statement of good cause 

in the Rule 13 sanctions order. See Tarrant Restoration v. TX Arlington Oaks Apts., Ltd., 

225 S.W.3d 721, 733 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. dism’d w.o.j.).

B. Discussion

The New York court dismissed Leo’s case in its entirety. Thus, Leo attempted to 
5

enforce a foreign judgment that did not exist. Here, the trial court’s judgment recites the 

following: “Sanctions, pursuant to [Rule 13 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure], are 

assessed against [Leo] in the amount of $10,000.00 to [appellees]. Carrie Leo shall pay 

Tyler Thomas $5[,]000.00 within 45 days of this Judgment. Carrie Leo shall pay Nicholas 

Stacey $5,000.00 within 45 days of this Judgment.”

1 The trial court did not detail the 

specifics justifying its imposition of sanctions. Yet, a trial court’s failure to do so constitutes 

an abuse of discretion only if the sanctioned party brought the omission to the attention 

of the trial court. See Campos v. Ysleta Gen. Hosp., Inc., 879 S.W.2d 67, 70 (Tex. App.—

El Paso 1994, writ denied) (providing that the complaining party may waive particularity 

requirement of Rule 13 if they fail to timely make a complaint). Here, Leo did not object 

to the trial court’s failure to explain its ruling in its final judgment. See id. An appellant 

waives her right to complain of a trial court’s failure to specify the grounds for its sanctions 

order if the appellant did not first bring the omission to the trial court’s attention. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 33.1; Birnbaum v. Law Offs. of G. David Westfall, P.C., 120 S.W.3d 470, 475–

76 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. denied) (finding that although the trial court erroneously 

omitted detailed explanation of its basis for Rule 13 sanctions, appellant waived error by 

not calling it to the trial court’s attention). Because Leo failed to make the trial court aware 

of the omission, she has waived any complaint on that basis. We overrule her second 

issue.2

1 According to appellees, Leo was costing them thousands of dollars in legal bills for a frivolous 

lawsuit that had been adjudicated in New York.

2 We dismiss Leo’s pending motion before us requesting clarification as moot.
6

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

JAIME TIJERINA

Justice

Delivered and filed on the

3rd day of March, 2022.