1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

N o

. 116,954

In the Matter of J.O.

SYLLABUS BY THE COUR T

1.
K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 22

- 2401a (2) generally authorizes law enforcement officers employed by a city to act within the city's limits, on property ow ned by or under the
control of the city, and "in any other place when a request for assistance has been made by law enforcement officers from that place or when in fresh pursuit of a person."

2.
U nder the " request for assistance " excep tion in K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 22

- 2401a(2)(b), city law enforcement officers cannot exercise police powers outside the boundaries of their own city unless they have received a request for assistance from the law enforcement officers of the other place. Mere acquiescence or accept ance of assistance by the officers of the invaded jurisdiction after notification by the invading officers does not
constitute a request for assistance under K.S.A. 2017 Sup p. 22

- 2401a(2)(b).

3

. The Legislature adopted K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 22

- 2 401a's statutory limitations on the jurisdiction of city law enforcement officers to protect the local autonomy of neighboring cities and counties, rather than to create an individual right.

4

. Generally, the remedy of suppression is unavailable if law enforcem ent officers
conduct a search in violation of state statute only an d the statute violated does not vest a2

defendant with an individual right, the statute violated does not contemplate exclusion of evidence as a remedy, and the violation results in no cogni zable injury to a d efendant's substantial righ ts.

5

. In general, appellate courts review a district court's factual findings relating to a motion to suppress for substantial competence evidence

— evidence that is relevant, substantive, and furnishes a subs tantial basis in fact from which the issues can reasonably
be resolved . A ppellate courts do not reweigh evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, or resolve conflicts in evidence and instead give great deference to the factual findings of
the district court , including when a district court draw s reasonable factual inferences from
the evidence.

6

. Suppression of evidence is a deterrent measure, not a personal right. So courts restrict its application to those situations that effectively advance its remedial purpose.

R eview of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed October 27,
2017

. Appeal from Johnson D istrict C ourt; T HOMAS E. F OSTER , judge

. Opinion filed July 27 , 20 18

. Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed. Judgment of the district court is
affirmed.

Jean Ann Uvodich , of Olathe , argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.

Andrew J. Jennings , assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Stephen M. Howe , district

at torney , and Derek Schmidt , attorney general, were with him on the brief s for appellee.3

The opinion of the court was delivered by

L UCKERT , J

. : K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 22

- 2401a (2) authorizes law enforcement officers employed by a city to act within th e city 's limits, on property owned by or under the
control of the city, and "in any other place when a request for assistance has been made by law enforcement officers from that place or when in fresh pursuit of a person." Here,
the district court held the Prairie Village Police Department (PVPD) violated this statute when it orchestrated two controlled buys from J.O. , a juvenile, at her residence in
Shawnee

. The district court also found the PVPD committed willful and recurrent violations of the statute, in part b ecause the buys occurred after this court held the PVPD
had violated the statute in circumstances similar to this case

. See State v. Vrabel , 301 Kan. 797, 347 P.3d 201 (2015)

.

On appeal, the parties do not dispute the district court's conclusion that the PVPD
violated K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 22

- 2 401a (at least once) or its finding s that th e PVPD
officers acted willful ly and that the PVPD had repeatedly violated the statute

. Instead , the parties focus on whether the district court should have suppressed the evide nce. We reject
J.O. 's request for an order of suppression because (1) the district court took other action to deter future violations of the statute, (2) J.O. does not allege a constitutional violation or otherwise state a cognizable in jury to her substantial rights
, and (3) K.S.A. 2017 Supp.
22

- 2 401a does not vest J.O. with an individual right

.

F ACTS AND P ROCEDURAL H ISTORY

The district court made the following detailed factual findings:

" At around 8:00 a.m. on August 24, 2 015, a confidential i nformant ('CI' ) advised
Officer Travis Gray of the Prai rie Village Police Department ('PVPD' ) that [J.O.] had marijuana wax for sale in Shawnee, Kansas. At Gray's request, the CI arranged to buy4

drugs from [J.O.] in Shawnee at 3:00 p.m. later that day. At around 2:15 p.m., prior to the buy, Gray contacted Sergeant Brent Griffin of the Shawne e Police Department ('SPD') to

' see if they could assist us in the buy that we had set up. ' Griffin notified Gray that the SPD had no personnel available to assist PVPD with the controlled buy.

" Around 3:00 p.m. the CI met [J.O.] in Shawnee and purchased marijuana wax
from [J.O.] . Officer Gray surveilled the transaction and later received the marijuana wax
from the CI . SPD officers were not present at the bu y location and did not provide

a ssistance to Gray. The PVPD officers did not make contact with [J.O.] on the day of the controlled buy.

" On September 15, 2015, the CI advised Detective Patrick Mahoney of the
PVPD that [J.O.] had marijuana for sale. The CI indicated that he could purchase marijuana from [J.O.] the following day at [J.O.] 's residence, which is located in
Shawnee. At Mahoney's request, the CI arranged for the controlled buy to be conducted the following day at 3 :00 p.m.

" The next day, Mahoney contacted Detective Thomas Hayselden of the SPD to notify him of the anticipated transaction with the CI and [J.O.] in Shawnee. Hayselden
informed Mahoney that the SPD was unable to assist in the controlled buy due to lac k of

manpower.

" At around 2:50 p.m., at an undisclosed location in Shawnee, Mahoney and one
other Prairie Village officer gave the CI $60 in cash from their ' control buy fund ' and
wired the CI with audio equipment. The PVPD officers then followed the CI to [J.O.] 's
residence in Shawnee. Mahoney testified that Hayse l den and SPD Officer Skinner were in an unmarked area listening to the transaction over a confidential informant scanner, whereas Hayselden testified the SPD officers were not present and provid ed no
assistance.

" The PVPD officers surveilled the CI enter [J.O.] 's residence and listened as the
CI paid for and [J.O.] furnished the marijuana. After leaving [J.O.] 's residence, the CI5

met with the PVPD officers and gave them the purchased marijuana. The PVPD officers
did not attempt to contact [J.O.] on the day of the controlled buy.

" On January 20, 2016, the State charged [J.O.] with two charges of distribution
of marijuana, in violation of K.S.A. 21

- 5705(a)(4) and two charges of use of a
communic ation facility to sell a controlled substance, in violation of K.S.A. 21

- 5707. [J.O.] filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained from the controlled buys. At evidentiary hearings on the motion to suppress, the State put on testimonial evidence
from S ergeant Gray, Sergeant Griffin, Detective Mahoney, and Detective Hayselden to support its position that the PVPD had jurisdiction to conduct the controlled drug buys in
Shawnee.

" Officer Mahoney explained that sometime prior to the controlled drug buys with [J.O.] , the CI was arrested by SPD and wished to work off his charges by being an
informant for SPD. SPD turned over the CI to PVPD with the understanding that the CI
would be used to target illegal drug sales in Shawnee. PVPD knew the CI was a Shawne e resident and that his only drug targets were in Sh awnee. After turning over the CI to PVPD, SPD had no involvement with the CI . Detective Hayselden testified that SPD had no knowledge of the investigation regarding [J.O.] . Mahoney testified that there wa s no evidence [J.O.] was selling drugs in Prairie Village or targeting Prairie Village. PVPD used the CI to target Shawnee because, as Mahoney explained [,] ' just because the problem is in Shawnee does not mean it will stay in Shawnee.'"

Based on these fi ndings, the district court determined the PVPD officers exceeded

t heir authority under K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 22

- 2401a when surveilling the two drug buys in
Shawnee

. Turning to whether J.O.'s request for suppression would be appropriate given those violations, the district court noted J.O. had a "voluntary encounter with the CI" and
had not been searched or seized by o fficers

. Thus suppression could no t occur by operation of the federal exclusionary rule that protects against violations of the Fourth
Amendment t o the United States Constitution o r by operation o f Kansas' statutory6

exclusionary rule, K.S.A. 22

- 3216, because both apply only when a search or seizure has
occurred.

The district court then discussed this court's ruling in Vrabel , 301 Kan. 797,
another case in which the PVPD exceeded its authority under the statute by arranging a drug buy outside Prairie Village. In Vrabel , this court decided not to suppress the evidence of a drug buy, although it left open the possibility in futu re cases where officers willfully and repeatedly violated the statute. 301 Kan. at 813

- 14. T h e district court expressed its hesitancy to suppress the evidence given the outcome in Vrabel and because
the decision "did not declare or authorize or set forth a ny specific circumstances in which
the trial [or district] court could apply the exclusionary consequence." But the d istrict

c ourt announced it would advise "the Prairie Village police officers of their Fifth Amendment privilege against self

- incrimination if they are called to testify in future proceedings pertaining to this matter."

J.O

. ap pealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing the district court should have suppressed the evidence because it had found the PVPD willfully and repeatedly violated
K.S.A. 20 16 Supp. 22

- 2401a. In re J.O. , No. 1 16,954 , 201 7 WL 4848252, at *2 (Kan. App. 201 7 ) (unpublished opinion). The Court of Appeals panel noted that the State had

no t cross

- appealed these findings, leaving only one question : whether the district court erred in failing to suppress the evidence. 201 7 WL 4848252, at *3 ("If an appellee fails to
file a cross

- appeal, any challenge to an adverse ruling is not properly before the appellate

court. " ). The panel also noted the varying interpretations of Vrabel being presented to it : The district court did not believe it had authority under Vrabel to suppress the evidence even in the face of recurrent and willful violations of the statute, J.O. argued Vrabel gave that authority, and the State argued a district court could suppress evidence only if a defendant makes a search or seizure claim and argues the officers willfully and repeatedly engaged in unlawful conduct.7

Resolving these various viewpoints, the Court of Appeals panel conclu ded: " The most straightforward reading of Vrabel is that the exclusionary rule is generally not appropriate for violations of K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22

- 2401a, but the court left open the possibility that the exclusionary rule could be applied in the case of wi llful and recurrent
violations." 201 7 WL 4848252, at *6. The panel then noted that " the ultimate purpose of the exclusionary rule is deterrence, " and it concluded suppression would "likely not serve as a deterrent." 201 7 WL 4848252, at *6. It reasoned that the PVPD seemed to be engaged in Vrabel

- like conduct at the first buy from J.O., but the State had dismissed charges related to that buy. At the second buy, " the PVPD seems to have made at least a nominal effort to comply with the stat ute , " and the buy "a ppears to have been in compliance with the statute." 201 7 WL 4848252, at *6. For support, the panel cited our
decision in State v. Robinson , 303 Kan. 11, 123, 363 P.3d 875 (2015), disapproved of on other grounds by State v. Cheever , 306 Kan. 760, 402 P.3d 1126 (2017).

J.O. petitioned this court to review the panel's decision, which we granted.

A NALYSIS

Before us, as in the district court and the Court of Appeals, J.O. asserts the district
court should have suppress ed the evidence of the drug buys. She does not argue she
suffered a constitutional violation or any particularized harm. Instead
, she focuses on the repetitive and willful conduct that we cautioned against in Vrabel

. She does not discuss
our decision in Ro binson , which the panel had cited in support of its decision. B ut she argues the Court of Appeals erred because it weighed evidence relating to the illegality of the second buy and made a determination the P V PD complied with the statute

— a conclusion contra ry to the findings of the district court.8

To discuss these ar guments, we segment our analysis into three parts: (1) A
discussion of Vrabel and Robinson , which inform our analysis ; (2) a consideration of whether the Court of Appeals panel reweighed evide nce in reaching its conclusion the second buy substantially con formed to K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 22

- 2401a; and (3) an analysis
of whether suppression was warranted

.

1. Vrabel and Robinson

In Vrabel , the district court suppressed evidence obtained during a controlled b u y set up by a CI working with the PVPD. The CI and Carl Vrabel agreed to meet at a grocery store parking lot in Leawood, a location the PVPD often used for drug buys even though it was outside the territorial limits of Prairie Village

. The Vra bel court rejected the
State's arguments that the PVPD had complied with K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22

- 2401a

. Vrabel
, 3 01 Kan. at 807

- 08. In doing so, the Vrabel decision concluded the territorial limits applied to the exercise of all powers of law enforcement offi cers, not just when they conducted a search or a seizure. 301 Kan. 797, Syl. ¶ 4 . In addition, it clarified which law enforcement agency had to initiate the request for assistance :

" To exercise their powers as law enforcement officers in a place outside the
boundaries of their own city pursuant to the ' request for assistance ' excep tion under K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22

- 2401a(2)(b), the city officers must have received a request for assistance from the law enforcement officers of the other place. Mere acquiescen ce or acceptance of assistance by the officers of the invaded jurisdiction after notification by the invading officers does not constitute a request for assistance under K.S.A. 2014 Sup p. 22

- 2401a(2)(b). " 301 Kan. 797, Syl. ¶ 5.

The Vrabel decision turned to a discussion of remedy and noted that this court had
affirmed suppression of evidence based on a violation of K.S.A. 22

- 2401a in State v.
Sodders , 255 Kan. 79, 872 P.2d 736 (1994) . But the Vrabel court found Sodders9

distinguishable becau se Sodders involved a search . In contrast, no search or seizure
occurred when the CI and Vrabel met in the parking lot . 301 Kan. at 8 09

- 10. Because of
this factual distinction the Vrabel court determined Sodders was also legally distinct
because K.S.A. 22

- 3216 provides for the suppression of evidence obtained through an unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful search or seizure

. See State v. Gray , 306 Kan. 1287, 1297, 403 P.3d 1220 (2017) (recognizing K.S.A. 22

- 3216 provided for suppression remedy for violati ons of K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22

- 4606 [ d ] and 22

- 4609). But the statute did not apply in Vrabel because the PVPD did not conduct a search or seizure. Vrabel , 301
Kan. at 810

- 11

.

The Vrabel decision then discussed whether there would b e any other basis for suppressing evidence obtained in violation of K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22

- 2401a. Amicus
curiae had presented a "mildly seductive" rationale for doing so

— the " rationale of maintaining the integrity of the judicial process by refusing to justify and condone tainted
evidence ." Vrabel , 301 Kan. at 812 . Support for this rationale came from State v. Pattioay, 78 Hawai i 455, 896 P.2d 911 (1995) , which had recognized courts' "' inherent supervisory power over criminal prosecutions to ensure that evidence illegally obtained by government officials or their agents is not utilized in the administration of crimi nal justic e through the courts.' 78 Hawai i at 468

. " Vrabel
, 301 Kan. at 812.

In considering that rationale, t he Vrabel court looked to the p urpose of K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22

- 2 401a. The court held :

" [T] he statutory limitations on the jurisdiction of city officers was put in place to protect the local autonomy of neighboring cities and counties, rather than to create an individual right, assuring that a person could only be caught breaking the law by an officer of the jurisdiction within which the crime was being committed." 301 Kan. at 813.10

The court also c oncluded the argument that the L egislature had intended to " create an individual right to be free from apprehension by an officer from outside the jurisdiction is belied by the exceptions incorpo rated into K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22

- 2401a, which provide for ample lawful opportunities for such an apprehension to occur. " 301 Kan. at 813.

Ultimately, the Vrabel court held that " the suppression of any evidence obtained during a city officer's unauthorized exercise of police power outside the officer's employing city

— other than a s earch or seizure

— will generally not be required. "
301 Kan. at 813

- 14. The Vrabel court added th at its conclusion found reinforcement in the fact the defendant had suffered no prejudice simply because the PVPD rather than the
Leawood police department had arranged the buy. But the court issued a caution that

serves a s the basis for J.O.'s motion : " L ike our sister State to the West: '" [T]his court
cannot sanction willful and recurrent violations of the law " and .

. . future violations " may trigger applicatio n of the [exclusionary] rule."' People v. Martinez, 898 P.2d 28, 33 (Colo. 1995) (quoting Peop le v. Wolf, 635 P.2d 213, 217 [Colo. 1981] ). " 301 Kan. at 814.

In Robinson , 303 Kan. at 118

- 22, t his court revisited the availability of a suppression remedy for a violation of 22

- 2401 a . There, John E. Robinson challenged the Lenexa Police Department's warrantless searches of trash from his house in Olathe. We distinguished Vrabel because a search had occurred and thus suppression became an available remedy under Kansas' suppression statute , K.S.A. 22

- 3216(1). We noted, however, that the Kansas statute m erely allow s for suppression
, it does not compel it. 303
Kan. at 121.

We then engaged in a two

- part analysis: (1) Did the L egislature intend to create individual rights or remedies under K.S.A. 22

- 2401a? and (2) Did the11

defendant suffer an injury to substantial rights? As to the first question, w e reviewed the statutory purpose of K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22

- 2401a and reiterated our conclusion in
Vrabel

— the Legislature designed the statute "to protect local autonomy, not to create individual rights." 303 Kan . at 122. As to the s econd questions , we noted that Robinson could not "reasonably claim he suffered injury to any substantial right based on the fact that [Lenexa Police Department] officers, rather than Olathe police, conducted the
otherwise lawful trash pulls." 303 Kan. at 122.

We left open the possibility of suppressi ng evidence as a remedy for violations of
state law. But we stated : "[W]here a search is conducted in violation of state statute only
and the statute violated does not vest defendant with an individual right, does not contemplate exclusion of evidence as a remedy, and the violation results in no cognizable injury to defendant's substantial rights, su ch a remedy is unavailable." 303 Kan. at 122.
We did not in Robinson revisit our discussion of our inherent supervisory authority when
faced with recurrent and willful violations of a statute

.

While the Court of Appeals applied these cases, J.O. argues it erred by reweighing the evidence. We next turn to that argument.

2. Reweighed Evidence

Mor e specifically, J.O. argues the Court of Appeals reweighed evidence on its way to concluding the second buy substan tially complied with K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 22

- 2401a. This argument depends, in part, on the standard of appellate review for considering a
distri ct court's ruling on a motion to suppress. In general, appellate courts review a district court's factual findings on a motion to suppress for substantial competent evidence and its legal conclusions de novo

. Robinson , 303 Kan. at 110, 118. Substantial

com petent evidence is evidence that is relevant, substantive, and "furnishes a substantial12

basis in fact from which the issues can reasonably be resolved." State v. Sharp , 289 Kan. 72, 88, 210 P.3d 590 (2009).

When assessing whether substantial competent evi dence supports the district court's findings of fact, a ppellate courts do not "reweigh evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, or resolve conflicts in evidence" and instead "give[] great deference to the factual findings of the district court." Stat e v. Talkington , 301 Kan. 453, 461 , 345 P.3d
258 (2015 ). District courts are "entitled to draw reasonable factual inferences from the evidence which [appellate courts] are not permitted to dispute by an inappropriate use of
de novo review." Sharp , 289 Kan. at 91

Consistent with these principles, the Court of Appeals first noted i t was bound by the district court's factual finding that the PVPD engaged in willful and recurrent
violations because the State failed to cross

- appeal. J.O. , 2017 WL 4848252, at *6

. The
district court had found that Vrabel was published on April 24, 2015, and involv ed the
PVPD

. In J.O. , t he PVPD made the two controlled buys four and five months after
Vrabel 's publication. The district court found the PVPD could and should h ave been aware of the decision, making t he two controlled buys willful and recurrent violations.

Despite those findings, the panel mitigated the legal effect of the district court's conclusion by limiting its analysis to the September controlled buy bec ause that was the only charge the State pursued. T he panel then relied on the testimony of Mahoney (PVPD) and Hayselden (S PD ) , noting both had " testified that Hayselden had asked for Mahoney's assistance in completing the controlled buy. " 2017 WL 4848252, at *6. This
conclusion ignores an important requirement: A request for assistance must originate in the host jurisdiction , i.e.
, the jurisdiction in which the law enforcement powers are to be13

exercised

. Here, that means Shawnee must have initiated the request, not merely acquiesced in a proposal that originated outside the boundaries of Shawnee. See K.S.A.
2017 Supp. 22

- 2401 a (2)(b) (permitting extraterritorial exercise outside an officer's jurisdiction "when a request for assistance has been made by law enforcement officer s from that place "); see also Robinson , 303 Kan. at 12 3

- 2 4; Vrabel , 301 Kan. at 806.

Hayselden testified that Mahoney called him to inform him that a " drug investigation had led towards our city [of Shawnee] , and he was wondering if we were able to handle it, and at that time, we are not due to other investigations we had going on. So I requested his assistance to complete his investigation that started in his city

. " (Emphasis added.) Another of Hayselden's responses on cross

- exam inat ion emphasizes the point that the investigation did not originate in Shawnee:

" Q: And when you were contacted and notified of it, you went ahead and told Prairie Village to handle it since they had set it up?

"A: No, that is not correct. We were aske d if we were able to continue an investigation involving a drug buy and we were not able to due to manpower and caseload." (Emphasis added.)

Hayselden's testimony establishes there was no request for a ssistance originated in
Shawnee and thus no complianc e with the statutory requirements. The panel erred in its analysis, and this error underlies its conclusion s that the second buy "appears to have
been in compliance with the statute" and that "application of the exclusionary rule here would likely not serv e as a deterrent." J.O. , 2017 WL 4848252, at *6.

The district court, on the other hand, compar ed the phone exchange between the
officers to the communication Vrabel had held to be an insufficient request for assista nce under K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22

- 2 401a . T he distri ct court's factual findings are supported by14

substantial competent evidence
, and it reached its legal conclusion by proper ly appl y i ng established Kansas law. See Vrabel , 301 Kan. 797 , Syl. ¶ 5.

3. The District Court Did Not Err

.

We thus conclude th at the PVPD violated K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 22

- 2401a when it conducted both buys. And , like the district court , we are troubled by the PVPD officers' continued extraterritorial exercise of their police powers . As we stated in Vrabel : " If the
officers were ac ting as private citizens, i.e., were not exercising their police powers, then they were aiding and abetting the commiss ion of a drug felony in Leawood." 301 Kan. at
803. Consistent with that conclusion, the district court implemented its own warning by
adv ising it would remind testifying PVPD officers of their privilege against self

incrimination , as guar anteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

As this court has observed , suppression of evidence " is a deterr ent measure, " not a personal right. State v. Pettay , 299 Kan. 763, 769, 326 P.3d 1039 (2014). " Therefore, its application is '" restricted to those situations in which its remedial purpose is effectively
advanced

. "' [Citation omitted.]" 299 Kan. at 769.

Here, J .O. has not explained why suppression can be justified given the district
court's remedial measure of warning the officers they should assert their Fifth Amendment rights . We suspect this warnin g serves as a greater deterrent than an order of suppression would . M oreover, a s we noted in Vrabel and Robinson , K.S.A. 2014 Supp.
22

- 2401a protects local autonomy; it does not create an individual right. Vrabel , 301 Kan.

at 813; Robinson , 303 Kan. at 122. And, like the defendants in those cases, J.O. cannot reasonably cla im she suffered injury to any substantial right based on the fact a PVPD
officer , rather than a Shawnee officer, set up the controlled buys.15

Under these circumstance, and i n light of the district court 's strong warning , we hold the district court did not err when it decided not to suppress the evidence.

Affirmed.