Department of Homeland Security
 

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FEMA’s Initial Response in New York to 


Hurricane Sandy
 

OIG-13-124 September 2013
 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

SEP 2 6 2013 

M EMORANDUM FOR: Joseph L. Nimmich 

Associate Administrator, Response and Recovery 

Federal Em ge y Mana ment Agency 

FROM : 

Assistan ector General 

Office of Emergency Management Oversight 

SUBJECT: FEMA's Initial Response in New York to Hurricane Sandy 

Attached for your information is our final letter report, FEMA's Initial Response in New 

York to Hurricane Sandy. 

We audited the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) initial response to 

Hurricane Sandy in New York from November 2012 to May 2013. We discussed the 

results of this audit with FEMA officials during the course of the audit and provided a 

discussion draft report to them on May 14, 2013. The report contains no 

recommendations. 

Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we will provide 

copies of our report to appropriate congressional committees with oversight and 

appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will post 

the report on our website for public dissemination. 

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact David Kimble, Director, 

Eastern Regional Office, Office of Emergency Management Oversight, at (404) 832-6702.. 

Attachment 
 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

Background 

Hurricane Sandy made landfall on October 29, 2012 as a post-tropical cyclone just south 

of Atlantic City, New Jersey. The storm was the second largest Atlantic hurricane on 

record, with a diameter of tropical storm force winds spanning more than 900 miles. 

The storm affected one of the most densely populated areas in the northeastern United 

States, resulting in loss of life, major flooding, structural damage to real property, and 

loss of power throughout the region. 

The President declared an emergency on October 28, 2012, and declared a major 

disaster on October 30, 2012 for Individual Assistance and Public Assistance in seven 

counties in New York. A major snowstorm occurred 9 days later, causing additional 

damage and power outages. FEMA is providing 90 percent Federal funding for this 

disaster with the exception of 100 percent Federal funding for 15 days after Hurricane 

Sandy struck for emergency power restoration and emergency public transportation. 

The RobertfT.fStaffordfDisasterfRelieffandfEmergencyfAct (§401), requires that all 

requests for a Presidential declaration that a major disaster exists shall be made by the 

Governor of the affected State. The Governor makes a request through the regional 

FEMA office. Based on the Governor's request, the President may declare that a major 

disaster or emergency exists, thus activating an array of Federal programs to assist in 

the response and recovery effort. 

Results of Audit 

FEMA provided an effective and efficient response to the damages caused by Hurricane 

Sandy. In its response, FEMA proactively prepared for Hurricane Sandy, overcame 

operational and staffing challenges, overcame resource shortfalls, used a variety of 

sourcing mechanisms, and effectively coordinated response activities. As of 

April 2, 2013, FEMA had— 

•	 Obligated $459 million in mission assignments to 39 Federal agencies to support 

FEMA and the State of New York with resources, such as emergency medical 

personnel and assistance with debris clearance and power restoration; 

•	 Registered more than 270,000 Individual Assistance applicants; and 

• Obligated more than $806 million for Public Assistance. 

In evaluating FEMA’s initial response to this disaster, we focused on answering the 

following questions: 

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 Department of Homeland Security 

1. What activities did FEMA perform before the major disaster declaration? 

2. What were the most pressing challenges FEMA faced in this disaster? 

3. What were the most significant resource shortfalls? 

4. How did FEMA make disaster sourcing decisions? 

5. How well did FEMA coordinate its activities? 

FEMA Proactively Prepared for Hurricane Sandy 

FEMA effectively coordinated activities in New York before the President’s major 

disaster declaration. On October 26, 2012, FEMA Region II began coordinating predeployment activities with the State. After the Emergency Declaration on 

October 28, 2012, FEMA moved quickly to mobilize an Incident Management Assistance 

Team, set up the Initial Operating Facility, and respond to requests for initial assistance 

and needed supplies using internal resources and mission assignments.1

Incident Management Assistance Team: Because of Hurricane Sandy’s effect on New 

York City, New York, FEMA Region II relocated its Regional Response Coordination 

Center from its New York City offices to Earle Naval Weapons Station, New Jersey. The 

Regional Response Coordination Center location contained the Federal Emergency 

Support Function partners for Region II, which covers both New Jersey and New York. 

FEMA’s Federal Coordinating Officer and FEMA Region II personnel deployed to 

Brooklyn, New York to coordinate with the Incident Management Assistance Team.2

The team supports the initial establishment of a unified command and provides 

situational awareness for Federal and State decision-makers crucial to determining the 

level and type of immediate Federal support required. FEMA first deployed the Incident 

Management Assistance Team to Brooklyn, New York to establish the Initial Operating 

Facility. 

Initial Operating Facility: FEMA operated the Initial Operating Facility from the Brooklyn 

Bridge Marriott in Brooklyn, New York. The facility supported the initial establishment 

of a unified command and provided situational awareness for Federal and State 

1

 Incident Management Assistance Teams are full-time, rapid-response teams with dedicated staff able to 

deploy within 2 hours and arrive at an incident within 12 hours to support the local incident commander. 

2 The role of Federal Coordinating Officers in disaster operations is to make an initial appraisal of the 

types of relief most urgently needed, establish field offices, coordinate the administration of relief, and 

take such other actions necessary to assist local citizens and public officials in promptly obtaining the 

assistance to which they are entitled.

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 Department of Homeland Security 

decision-makers crucial to determining the level and type of immediate Federal support 

required. The FEMA staff at the Initial Operating Facility transitioned to the Joint Field 

Office. 

Initial Assistance and Needed Supplies: FEMA used the logistics process and prenegotiated plans for supplies it previously set up in the event of disasters in New York. 

For Hurricane Sandy, FEMA deployed trailer loads of water, meals, cots, blankets, 

toddler and medical kits, and generators. FEMA deployed the trailers to three 

neighboring areas: Republic Field in Long Island, New York; Floyd Bennett Field in 

Brooklyn, New York; and Lakehurst Naval Air Station, New Jersey. Additionally, FEMA 

tasked other Federal agencies to support the Federal response with mission 

assignments.3 FEMA used mission assignments to mobilize Federal personnel to the 

FEMA Initial Operating Facility before the hurricane’s landfall. 

FEMA Successfully Overcame Operational and Staffing Challenges 

FEMA performed well at managing the response and recovery challenges of Hurricane 

Sandy. During the first 30 days, the most pressing challenges included (1) obtaining 

housing for the thousands of people the hurricane displaced, especially given the high 

population density in the New York City area, and (2) obtaining experienced disaster 

staff. 

Obtaining Housing for Displaced Survivors: As the response and recovery effort 

progressed, FEMA realized that, because the hurricane affected the most populated 

area in the nation, providing shelter would be a major concern. Traditional sheltering 

options were not necessarily possible or practicable. The New York City area lacked 

open space to place temporary housing units, and the holiday season limited hotel 

availability. Further, the hurricane occurred late in the hurricane season, and winter 

weather had arrived. To help solve this problem, FEMA implemented the Sheltering and 

Temporary Essential Power Pilot Program (STEP), which allows residents to return to 

their homes and shelter in place as they complete permanent repairs. 

Experienced FEMA Staff: FEMA’s Joint Field Office managers overcame initial concerns 

about their ability to obtain experienced staff early in the disaster. FEMA managers said 

that they could no longer request personnel by name through the Automated 

Deployment Database system, which precludes their ability to request staff they know 

to be qualified. To resolve these concerns, FEMA implemented the FEMA Qualification 

3

 FEMA issues mission assignments to direct other Federal agencies and DHS components to complete 

specified tasks in response to a Presidentially-declared emergency or major disaster.

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 Department of Homeland Security 

System to capture staff skill sets, enabling the Agency to identify and deploy qualified 

staff to disasters more quickly. The FEMA Qualification System establishes the process 

for qualification and certification of the FEMA incident workforce through experience, 

training, and demonstrated performance. The system requires formal certifications for 

FEMA employees who work in certain incident management and support positions. 

Qualification and certification processes provide consistent standards for every field 

position at FEMA while also adding credibility to the entire emergency management 

profession. By establishing qualification standards that are consistent across the 

Agency, the FEMA Qualification System helps to ensure that FEMA employees have the

knowledge, skills, and experience to perform in their incident management and incident 

support positions.

FEMA Overcame Resource Shortfalls

FEMA successfully obtained and managed resources needed for this disaster. FEMA 

officials said their most significant resource shortfall was obtaining qualified, 

experienced Federal personnel to support the response and recovery effort. 

Qualified Staff: As discussed previously, FEMA officials were initially concerned about 

obtaining qualified, experienced staff to support the timely delivery of disaster services. 

In addition to using the FEMA Qualification System to resolve this concern, the Federal 

Coordinating Officer and FEMA Region II officials coordinated with the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS), FEMA Headquarters, and other FEMA regions to quickly 

deploy the Surge Capacity Force, full-time FEMA employees, and FEMA reservists to the 

Joint Field Office. Obtaining and managing these resources efficiently allowed FEMA to 

overcome potential shortfalls in qualified staffing. 

Surge Capacity Force: A cadre of skilled and trained Federal personnel known as the 

Surge Capacity Force augmented the initial surge of FEMA staff responding to Hurricane 

Sandy. FEMA uses the Surge Capacity Force when its list of Tier 1 employees is 

exhausted. When Hurricane Sandy made landfall, the Secretary of DHS activated the 

DHS Surge Capacity Force at the request of the FEMA Administrator. The Post-Katrina 

Emergency Management Reform Act directs DHS to create the Surge Capacity Force 

with volunteers from other Federal agencies. FEMA worked with the leadership of 

several other DHS components and, as of November 1, 2012, deployed about 

1,700 volunteers from a roster of 2,142 volunteers that participating components made 

available to support the Hurricane Sandy response.

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

FEMA Relied on a Variety of Methods for Disaster Sourcing Decisions

FEMA made effective sourcing decisions for this disaster. The primary sourcing methods 

for Hurricane Sandy included mission assignments; requisitions for supplies, equipment, 

services, and personnel; and acquisitions. FEMA also requested the Emergency 

Management Assistance Compact.4

Mission Assignments: As of April 2, 2013, FEMA had obligated $459 million in mission 

assignments to 39 Federal agencies to support FEMA and the State of New York with 

resources, such as emergency medical personnel, assistance with debris clearance, and 

power restoration. In its response to Hurricane Sandy, FEMA used three types of 

mission assignments: 

1.	 Federal Operations Support—FEMA requests another Federal agency to assist in 

disaster response. FEMA pays all costs; 

2.	 Technical Assistance—FEMA provides technical expertise to States. FEMA pays 

all costs; and 

3.	 Direct Federal Assistance—States request this type of mission assignment when 

they do not have the resources to provide specific types of disaster assistance. 

States pay a share of the costs. 

FEMA provided New York with 34 Direct Federal Assistance mission assignments valued 

at $306 million. Direct Federal Assistance mission assignments are a particularly

effective sourcing method because they require completion within 60 days of the 

emergency or disaster declaration. FEMA experienced some delays in obtaining New 

York officials’ signatures on Direct Federal Assistance mission assignments. According to 

New York Joint Field Office staff, these delays occurred because the person authorized 

to approve mission assignments had left the State emergency management agency. 

Ultimately, New York officials signed all Direct Federal Assistance mission assignments. 

The DHS Office of Inspector General published a report with a recommendation aimed 

at improving the mission assignment process, thus addressing monetary risks associated 

with delays in the approval process.5

Requisitions for Supplies, Equipment, Services, and Personnel: New York Joint Field 

Office finance staff members reviewed the justification for all requisitions for supplies, 

4

 The Emergency Management Assistance Compact offers assistance during governor-declared states of 

emergency through a responsive, straightforward system that allows States to send personnel, 

equipment, and commodities to help disaster relief efforts in other States. 

5 ThefStatefoffNewfYorkfNeedsfTofSignfMissionfAssignmentsfMorefQuickly, OIG-13-85, April 30, 2013.

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 Department of Homeland Security 

equipment, services, and personnel. They also confirmed that FEMA charged the 

correct account from the Disaster Relief Fund. 

Acquisitions: FEMA Headquarters awarded contracts and blanket purchase agreements 

for this disaster. The majority of the contracts supported the Regional Recovery 

Command Center operations. At the time of our fieldwork, the Joint Field Office 

employed five contracting officers, one contract specialist, and one procurement 

specialist. Before the Joint Field Office assumed operational responsibility, FEMA 

entered into 43 advance contracts, of which 2 were with small local vendors. At the 

time of our fieldwork, the Joint Field Office’s acquisition group had awarded 

41 additional contracts totaling $3.9 million, of which 31 were local awards totaling 

$2.6 million.

Emergency Management Assistance Compact: According to FEMA officials, Emergency 

Management Assistance Compacts are an excellent and relatively inexpensive option 

that enables one State to help another when the disaster exceeds the State’s ability to 

recover. For this disaster, FEMA requested the Emergency Management Assistance 

Compact. Within a week of the disaster, 27 States deployed 1,956 personnel to aid the 

affected areas. For example, law enforcement teams provided security, while National 

Guard units assisted with staging and delivery of food and water. Other areas of 

support included (1) law enforcement strike teams, incident management teams, and 

emergency operations center personnel to assist with planning, logistics, and operations 

and (2) Emergency Advance Teams to assist affected areas through interstate 

coordination of mutual aid assistance. 

FEMA Coordinated its Activities Effectively

During its response to Hurricane Sandy, FEMA coordinated its major activities with other 

Federal agencies and State officials effectively. These activities included (1) establishing 

and supplying staging and mobilization sites, (2) responding to temporary housing 

needs, (3) tracking and monitoring mission assignments, and (4) obtaining appropriate 

staffing.

Federal Staging Areas: The FEMA Logistics Management Directorate in Washington, DC, 

activated the Federal staging areas at McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, a U.S. military installation 

in Burlington and Ocean Counties, New Jersey. FEMA also deployed staging teams that 

arrived before Sandy made landfall. The staging areas received commodities and 

equipped personnel before area assignments. Operating under a joint effort, the 

staging teams handled response needs of both New York and New Jersey. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

Coordination with State Officials to Resolve Temporary Housing Needs: As discussed 

previously, FEMA responded to temporary housing needs by using its newly 

implemented Sheltering and Temporary Essential Power Pilot Program. FEMA worked 

closely with State of New York officials to implement that program. FEMA and State 

officials also worked closely in implementing the State’s Rapid Repairs program. New 

York’s Rapid Repairs program hired contractors to make emergency repairs for 

approved residential property owners. The emergency repairs allowed residents to stay 

in their homes so they could complete permanent repairs. Emergency repairs include 

the restoration of heat, power and hot water, and temporary exterior repairs to protect 

a home from further damages. The collaborative use of these programs removed some 

of the pressure on a housing system that was stressed before the storm and that now 

faced the housing needs of tens of thousands of displaced survivors. 

Tracking and Monitoring Mission Assignments: FEMA’s Request Action Tracking System 

helped staff monitor and coordinate mission assignments FEMA issued from different 

locations to avoid duplication and ensure delivery of requested items. The Request 

Action Tracking System is a fully functional, web-based tool that tracks Action Request 

Forms from initiation/acceptance through completion. Users can download reports and 

email them to other stakeholders to provide updates for easy sharing with State or 

other Federal agencies. 

Coordination with Other Federal Agencies to Obtain Staffing: FEMA worked closely with 

other Federal agencies to obtain staffing needed to respond to this disaster. We 

observed cohesive, hard working teams fully committed to accomplishing the mission 

they were charged to complete. As discussed previously, the Federal Coordinating 

Officer and FEMA Region II officials coordinated with DHS, FEMA Headquarters, and

other FEMA regions to quickly deploy the Surge Capacity Force. Additionally, for this 

disaster, FEMA used the services of young Americans who belong to FEMA Corps. FEMA 

Corps is an innovative partnership between FEMA and the Corporation for National and 

Community Service, which established a devoted unit of 1,600 service corps members 

within AmeriCorps National Civilian Community Corps solely devoted to disaster 

preparedness, response, and recovery.6

 FEMA personnel expressed that the FEMA 

Corps is a win all around—benefiting communities and individuals affected by disasters, 

disaster response organizations, public servants, and American taxpayers. 

6

 The Corporation for National and Community Service is a Federal agency. In addition to AmeriCorps, it 

operates Senior Corps, the Social Innovation Fund, the Volunteer Generation Fund, and other volunteer 

groups.

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

Conclusion

FEMA performed well in its initial response to Hurricane Sandy in New York. FEMA 

proactively deployed staff to the Regional Response Coordination Center and the Joint 

Field Office. The ability to draw upon the Surge Capacity Force and the FEMA Corps 

helped facilitate FEMA’s fast and effective response to the disaster. FEMA prepared 

well for this disaster, overcame operational and staffing challenges, quickly resolved 

resource shortfalls, made efficient disaster sourcing decisions, and coordinated its 

activities effectively with State and local officials. 

Recommendations 

We are not making any recommendations. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

FEMA concurs with the report and its conclusion. 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix A 

Objective, Scope, and Methodology 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was 

established by the HomelandfSecurityfActfoff2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment 

to the InspectorfGeneralfActfoff1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and 

special reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, 

efficiency, and effectiveness within the Department. 

The objective of this audit was to determine whether FEMA’s response to Hurricane 

Sandy in New York was effective and efficient, and to evaluate FEMA’s actions, 

resources, and authorities according to Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines in 

effect at the time of our fieldwork. To accomplish our objective, we focused on 

answering the following questions: 

1.	 What activities did FEMA perform before the major disaster declaration? 

2.	 What were the most pressing challenges FEMA faced in this disaster? 

3.	 What were the most significant resource shortfalls? 

4.	 How did FEMA make disaster sourcing decisions? 

5.	 How well did FEMA coordinate its activities? 

We interviewed FEMA Region II officials and FEMA Disaster Assistance Employees; 

reviewed FEMA Situation Reports and Incident Action Plans; observed operations at 

FEMA’s Joint Field office in Queens, New York; and performed other procedures 

considered necessary to accomplish our objective. We did not assess the adequacy of 

FEMA’s internal controls applicable to disaster response because it was not necessary to 

accomplish our audit objective.

We also observed operations at the following sites in New York: 

•	 Disaster Recovery Centers in Far Rockaway, Breezy Point, and Staten Island, New 

York. 

•	 FEMA/State Applicant Briefings in Manhattan and Suffolk County, New York. 

•	 Damage sites in Roxbury and Staten Island, New York. 

We conducted this performance audit between November 2012 and May 2013, 

pursuant to the InspectorfGeneralfActfoff1978, as amended, and according to generally 

accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and 

perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our audit objectives. We believe that 

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 Department of Homeland Security 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based upon our audit objectives.

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix B 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security

Acting Secretary 

Chief Financial Officer 

Under Secretary for Management 

Acting Chief Privacy Officer 

Audit Liaison 

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Administrator 

Chief Counsel

Chief of Staff 

Chief Financial Officer 

Deputy Associate Administrator, Response and Recovery

Director, Risk Management and Compliance 

Federal Coordinating Officer, FEMA Disaster Number 4085-DR-NY 

Regional Administrator, FEMA Region II 

Audit Liaison, FEMA (Job Code 13-121-EMO-FEMA (c)) 

Audit Liaison, FEMA Region II 

Office of Management and Budget

Chief, Homeland Security Branch

DHS OIG Budget Examiner

Congress

Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security 

House Committee on Homeland Security 

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

Grantee

Director, New York State Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services 

State

New York Office of the State Comptroller 

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 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

 Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix C 

Major Contributors to this Report 

C. David Kimble, Director 

William Johnson, Supervisory Auditor 

Oscar Andino, Senior Auditor 

Richard Kotecki, Senior Auditor 

Nadine Ramjohn, Senior Auditor 

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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES 

To obtain additional copies of this document, please call us at (202) 254-4100, fax your 

request to (202) 254-4305, or e-mail your request to our Office of Inspector General 

(OIG) Office of Public Affairs at: DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov. 

For additional information, visit our website at: www.oig.dhs.gov, or follow us on Twitter 

at: @dhsoig. 

OIG HOTLINE 

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other kinds of criminal or noncriminal misconduct relative to Department of Homeland 

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reviewed by DHS OIG. 

Should you be unable to access our website, you may submit your complaint in writing 

to: 

Department of Homeland Security 


Office of Inspector General, Mail Stop 0305 


Attention: Office of Investigations Hotline 


245 Murray Drive, SW 


Washington, DC 20528-0305 


You may also call 1(800) 323-8603 or fax the complaint directly to us at 

(202) 254-4297. 

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.