NUMBER 13-17-00323-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG 

PABLO ERNESTO VILLARREAL JR., Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

 

On appeal from the 377th District Court

of Victoria County, Texas.

OPINION

Before Justices Rodriguez, Contreras, and Benavides 

Opinion by Justice Rodriguez

By three issues, appellant Pablo Ernesto Villarreal Jr. appeals the denial of his 

motion to suppress. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Villarreal was arrested and charged with manufacture or delivery of cocaine in an 

amount of 400 grams or more, a felony of the first degree with a minimum term of fifteen 
2

years. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112(f) (West, Westlaw through 2017 

1st C.S.). The charge stemmed from a traffic stop that occurred on Saturday, April 13, 

2013. Villarreal moved to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the stop.

At the suppression hearing, Officer Shannon Jones testified that on the date of the 

traffic stop, he received a report from U.S. Border Patrol that a possible narcotics courier 

was coming through the area. According to Jones, the truck had been flagged by a 

license plate reader at a border patrol checkpoint. Jones recalled that the report included 

“vehicle identification,” its probable routes, and possibly some license plate information. 

He relayed this information to other officers including Trooper Wayne Cipriani.

According to Cipriani, the vehicle was described as a blue truck tractor with a 

“Freight Movers” company logo on the side, pulling a flatbed trailer. Cipriani saw a 

similar blue semi with a flatbed trailer at a gas station in Victoria, Texas. He and his 

partner decided to park a short distance away and wait for the truck to leave the gas 

station. When the truck left, Cipriani followed. Cipriani testified that as the truck 

approached a stop sign, it came to a halt five or six feet over the stop line, and he detained

the driver for this traffic infraction. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 544.010(c) (West, 

Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). The driver of the truck was Villarreal.

At the suppression hearing, Villarreal challenged the validity of the initial stop. 

The State introduced photographs of the stop sign showing that, as of 2015, the stop line 

was barely visible on the pavement, with only a few traces of white paint remaining. 

However, Cipriani testified that on the day of the traffic stop in 2013, the stop line was 

clearly visible on the ground and that Villarreal’s truck was stopped far beyond it. The 
3

State also called Michael Walsh, a traffic engineer for the Texas Department of 

Transportation, who explained that heavy traffic can wear away a stop line over time.

Cipriani testified that once he initiated the stop, he saw that the logo on the side of 

the truck matched the one described in the border patrol report. Cipriani asked Villarreal 

to step out of the vehicle and began questioning him about his trip and his truck. The 

patrol car’s dashcam captured their conversation. Villarreal explained that he had come 

from Mission, Texas early that morning. In response to Cipriani’s questions, Villarreal 

stated that he was leasing the trailer from a friend, but he was going to Houston to drop 

it off because he did not want to pay for it anymore, and that his wife had made 

arrangements to buy another trailer. When Cipriani asked why Villarreal was not hauling 

any cargo, Villarreal responded that he had not worked for the past five days because his 

hauling tarps had been stolen the week before and he could not find a load to carry.

Cipriani asked to see Villarreal’s log book, and Villarreal obliged. The log book 

confirmed that Villarreal had not worked in five days. Cipriani asked Villarreal whether 

he had any guns, knives, or needles, which Villarreal denied. Cipriani frisked Villarreal 

and took his cell phone, which he placed in the cab of Villarreal’s truck as he inspected 

the vehicle. Cipriani testified that, during the inspection, he noticed the smell of fresh 

paint emanating from the vehicle. When Cipriani questioned Villarreal about the smell 

of paint, Villarreal explained that he had the truck’s frame and hitch painted when he 

purchased the vehicle months earlier. Still, Cipriani viewed the smell of fresh paint as 

suspicious; he associated the smell of fresh paint with hidden compartments which had 

been recently painted so “law enforcement can’t see that there has been recent tooling 

or fabrication done to the vehicle or trailer.”
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Roughly ten minutes into the stop, Cipriani told Villarreal that he would issue him 

a warning for failure to stop at the stop sign. He then radioed dispatch to request a check 

on Villarreal’s border crossings. While waiting for the results of the crossing check, 

Cipriani questioned Villarreal about his truck, his plans, his trucking business, and his 

arrest record. Cipriani’s radio request soon came back negative for border crossings.

Cipriani testified that he found it suspicious that Villarreal was not carrying any 

cargo, because Villarreal would be losing money by taking the time and expense of driving 

to Houston and staying overnight without a load, and because the local economy was 

doing well at that time, so loads should have been available. Cipriani also felt it was 

irregular that Villarreal had not worked for the past five days, and he questioned 

Villarreal’s account of how his tarps were stolen, saying that Villarreal’s story did not add 

up: 

As far as when he said he had got his tarps stolen, in his logbook it showed 

he had been off duty for the past five days. When he told me that he had 

got his tarps stolen, he had mentioned that it got stolen in Houston, which 

sort of contradicted what his logbook had said. His logbook showed that 

he was off—off duty that last week. It really didn’t make sense to me. So 

I believed at that point that he was—he was lying about even having his 

tarps stolen from him. 

Cipriani further explained that he found Villarreal to be unusually nervous.

Cipriani described Villarreal as shaking and fidgety, and he could “actually see that carotid 

artery is pulsating.” He explained that “you wouldn’t typically see that in somebody who 

is not highly nervous.” Cipriani also felt it was unusual that Villarreal’s nervousness didn’t 

subside once he was told he would be receiving a warning. Finally, Cipriani testified that 

he found it suspicious that Villarreal answered questions without hesitation and with ease, 

which he believed to be an indication of a “rehearsed story.” 
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Roughly twenty minutes into the stop, Cipriani again asked whether Villarreal had 

any guns, knives, or needles. Villarreal responded that he did not. Cipriani asked 

whether he had any insulin, prescription medications, or “large amounts of drugs.” 

Villarreal denied that he had anything of that sort in his vehicle. Cipriani then asked 

Villarreal whether he had “large amounts of heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine, nothing 

like that, nothing illegal with you? Never been in trouble for anything like that?” 

Villarreal denied this as well. Finally, Cipriani asked, “Do you give me and my partner 

consent to search and make sure there’s nothing illegal on that trailer, nothing like that?” 

Villarreal responded, “Yes sir.” Cipriani escorted Villarreal into a field on the side of the 

highway where Villarreal watched as Cipriani and his partner searched the vehicle.

Cipriani used a drill to disassemble the interior of the truck’s cab. He testified that 

some of the interior had been freshly painted.

At some point during the search, Cipriani discovered two long, hidden metal boxes 

that had been riveted to the bottom of the truck, just below the cab’s floor. He testified 

that the boxes appeared to be freshly painted and did not have any external openings. 

He knew from inspecting similar vehicles that these boxes were not part of the factory 

specifications, but must have been an after-market modification, the likes of which he had 

never seen. He testified that he observed that the boxes were splattered with mud in a 

sideways and forward pattern, as if “mud was being slung forward,” which was 

inconsistent with how mud spatter from the road should be. He also stated that these 

boxes would have likely been blocked from mud spatter entirely due to their location 

above the fuel tank and the wheel well, so the presence of any mud on the boxes was an 

anomaly. Cipriani testified that the long boxes “looked like the perfect size” for holding 
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several kilograms of drugs. Roughly an hour and forty minutes into the traffic stop, 

Cipriani drilled “a little hole” in one box and inserted a scope through the hole. He 

discovered several bundles of drugs. Villarreal was arrested. In all, the boxes 

contained twenty-seven kilogram-sized bundles of cocaine, which Cipriani testified had a 

value of about five million dollars.

Following the hearing, the trial court denied suppression and issued the following 

findings of fact: 

1. That the Trooper Cipriani testified truthfully and his testimony was 

credible;

2. That there existed, at the time of the stop, adequate articulated facts 

for a prudent officer to believe the defendant violated Section 

544.010;

3. That there existed adequate corroboration of the anonymous tipster, 

at the time of the stop, so that the totality of that information 

represented adequate articulated facts for a prudent officer to 

suspect the defendant of engaging in criminal activity;

4. That the defendant voluntarily gave consent to search his truck and 

belongings without limitations or withdrawal;

5. That there existed justification for prolonging the detention. 

Villarreal pleaded guilty and was sentenced to fifty years’ confinement. Villarreal 

appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a trial judge’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated 

standard of review. Weems v. State, 493 S.W.3d 574, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). 

First, we afford almost total deference to a trial judge’s determination of historical facts. 

Id. The judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of witnesses’ credibility and the weight to 
7

be given their testimony. Id. Second, we review a judge’s application of the law to the 

facts de novo. Id. We will sustain the judge’s ruling if the record reasonably supports 

that ruling and is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. Id. The question 

of whether a specific search or seizure is “reasonable” is a question of substantive Fourth 

Amendment law that is subject to de novo review. Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 62 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

III. VALIDITY OF THE INITIAL STOP

By his first issue, Villarreal disputes Cipriani’s basis to conduct the traffic stop. 

Villarreal argues that the transportation code requires the stop line to be clearly marked 

in order for a traffic violation to occur. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 544.010(c). He 

contends that because the remnants of a stop line were barely visible, if at all, Cipriani 

could not have reasonably believed that a traffic offense had occurred.

A. Applicable Law

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S.

CONST. amend. IV. Fourth Amendment reasonableness is measured in objective terms 

by examining the totality of the circumstances; it eschews bright-line rules, instead 

emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the inquiry. Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 63. It requires 

a balance between the public interest served and the individual’s right to be free from 

arbitrary detentions and intrusions. Id.

A court assays the reasonableness of a traffic stop under a two-prong test. Id. 

(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). A court must first decide whether the stop was 

justified at its inception by a valid basis in reasonable suspicion. Id. A police officer has 

reasonable suspicion to detain if he has specific, articulable facts that, combined with 
8

rational inferences from those facts, would lead him reasonably to conclude that the 

person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Furr v. State, 

499 S.W.3d 872, 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). In assessing reasonable suspicion, we 

employ an objective standard that disregards any subjective intent of the officer making 

the stop and looks solely to whether an objective basis for the stop exists under the totality 

of the circumstances. Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2011). Reasonable suspicion demands “a lesser quantum or quality of information” than 

the probable cause which would justify an arrest. Id. at 916. “It is enough to satisfy the 

lesser standard of reasonable suspicion that the information is sufficiently detailed and 

reliable . . . to suggest that something of an apparently criminal nature is brewing.” Wade 

v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661, 668 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

B. Analysis

By his first issue, Villarreal challenges the officers’ reasonable suspicion to initiate 

the traffic stop. A person commits a misdemeanor offense if the person fails to perform 

an act required by the transportation code’s “Rules of the Road.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE 

ANN. § 542.301 (West, Westlaw though 2017 1st C.S.). Under the Rules of the Road, 

the operator of a vehicle approaching an intersection with a stop sign shall stop “as 

provided by Subsection (c).” Id. § 544.010(a). Subsection (c) provides that in “the 

absence of a crosswalk, the operator shall stop at a clearly marked stop line.” Id.

§ 544.010(c) (emphasis added). Cipriani stopped Villarreal for violating this rule.

Villarreal contends that the evidence presented by the State shows that the stop 

line was not “clearly marked,” and therefore no traffic violation could have occurred. See 
9

id. As support, he emphasizes certain photographs dated from 2015 which depict a 

barely visible stop line, with only a few rough strips of white paint visible on the ground.

However, Cipriani testified that at the time of the traffic stop in 2013, the stop line 

was clearly visible on the road. The court also heard testimony that heavy usage can 

cause a stop line to disintegrate over time, which explains why the stop line might have 

appeared different in 2015 than it did in 2013.

By its ruling, the trial court found that the stop line was clearly marked in 2013.

See Wade, 422 S.W.3d at 668; Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 916. We afford almost 

total deference to this finding on appeal. See Weems, 493 S.W.3d at 577. Deferring to 

the trial court’s finding that the stop line was adequately marked in 2013, we conclude

that Villarreal committed a traffic offense by crossing it before stopping, see TEX. TRANSP.

CODE ANN. § 544.010(c), and that this traffic violation justified Cipriani’s decision to initiate 

a traffic stop under the first prong of Terry. See Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 63.

We overrule Villarreal’s first issue.

IV. VALIDITY OF THE CONTINUED DETENTION

By his second issue, Villarreal contends that his protracted detention violates the 

second prong of Terry. Villarreal acknowledges that approximately twenty minutes into 

the stop, he gave consent to search his vehicle. However, he submits that before he 

gave consent, the detention had already been unlawfully prolonged beyond the 

conclusion of its legitimate purposes.

A. Applicable Law

The second prong of Terry asks whether the search and seizure was reasonably 

related, in scope, to the circumstances that justified the stop in the first place. Kothe, 
10

152 S.W.3d at 63. A detention may last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the 

purpose of the stop. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983); Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 

63. “The propriety of the stop’s duration is judged by assessing whether the police 

diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to dispel or confirm their 

suspicions quickly.” Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en 

banc). Reasonable suspicion is not a carte blanche for a prolonged detention and 

investigation. Matthews v. State, 431 S.W.3d 596, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). But the 

temporary detention may continue for a reasonable period of time until the officers have 

confirmed or dispelled their suspicion of criminal activity. Id.

The United States Supreme Court has rejected rigid time limitations on 

investigative detentions, instead asking “whether the police diligently pursued a means of 

investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time 

it was necessary to detain the defendant.” Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 64; see United States 

v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985) (refusing to establish a bright-line rule that twenty 

minutes was too long for Terry stop). During a traffic stop the officer may request certain 

information from a driver, such as the driver’s license, vehicle registration, and proof of 

insurance, and run a computer check on that information. Lerma v. State, 543 S.W.3d 

184, 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). An officer is also permitted to ask drivers and 

passengers about matters unrelated to the purpose of the stop, so long as the questioning 

does not measurably extend the duration of the stop. Id. 

Once a computer check is completed, and the officer knows that the driver has a 

current valid driver’s license, no outstanding warrants, and the car is not stolen, the traffic 

stop investigation is fully resolved. Id. at 191. However, if an officer develops additional 
11

reasonable suspicion that the driver or an occupant of the vehicle is involved in criminal

activity, the officer may continue questioning the individual regardless of whether the 

official tasks of the traffic stop have come to an end. Id.

B. Analysis

Cipriani initially stopped Villarreal for a minor traffic violation. Within the first 

minutes of the encounter, however, Cipriani took note of multiple suspicious 

circumstances indicating criminal activity that extended far beyond a traffic violation. 

These circumstances included:

• an investigating agency’s report that a vehicle matching the truck’s exact 

description had been flagged at a border patrol checkpoint for possible 

involvement in narcotics trafficking;

• Villarreal’s unusual nervousness;

• Villarreal’s seemingly rehearsed story;

• the fact that Villarreal had not had any cargo in nearly a week, but had 

nonetheless recently departed in the dead of night from a location near the 

border, heading northward without any cargo;

• the smell of fresh paint emanating from the vehicle, which Cipriani knew to 

be an indication of hidden compartments and drug trafficking.

Thus, within the first minutes of the stop, Cipriani had several facts within his objective 

grasp that justified further investigation into the nature of Villarreal’s trip. See 

Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 914.

To that end, Cipriani diligently pursued the permissible lines of inquiry. He probed 

Villarreal about his trip, asking about his origin, destination, purpose, and other relevant 
12

details. While waiting for dispatch to retrieve a report on Villarreal’s border crossings, he 

asked about Villarreal’s lack of cargo. To verify his answers, Cipriani spent time 

consulting Villarreal’s logbooks, which the officer had a right to do. See Kersey v. Wilson, 

69 S.W.3d 794, 798 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (citing 49 C.F.R. 

§ 395.8(k)(2)). Cipriani quickly frisked Villarreal and inspected the vehicle for safety 

violations, stating that he anticipated giving Villarreal a warning. Cipriani then directly 

asked Villarreal about his arrest record and any criminal activity he may have been 

involved in, such as drug trafficking. Within twenty minutes, he had obtained Villarreal’s 

consent to search his vehicle to check for possible narcotics. We therefore find no merit 

in Villarreal’s complaint about Cipriani’s investigation, which was diligent and 

proportionate to the suspicious circumstances before him. See Kothe, 152 S.W.3d at 

64.

We overrule Villarreal’s second issue.

V. SCOPE OF CONSENT

By his third issue, Villarreal protests that the search of his vehicle exceeded the 

scope of his consent. Villarreal contends that his consent did not authorize officers to 

dismantle the vehicle’s interior or to drill holes in the vehicle.

A search conducted pursuant to consent is one of the well-settled exceptions to 

the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 331 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2000). However, not all consents are the same, and no consent is 

irrevocable. United States v. $304,980.00 in U.S. Currency, 732 F.3d 812, 819 (7th Cir. 

2013) (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 252 (1991)). “The standard for measuring 

the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’ 
13

reasonableness—what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the 

exchange between the officer and the suspect?” Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251; State v. 

Weaver, 349 S.W.3d 521, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). In other words, courts review the 

totality of the circumstances of a particular police-citizen interaction from the point of view 

of the objectively reasonable person, without regard for the subjective thoughts or intents 

of either the officer or the citizen. Meekins v. State, 340 S.W.3d 454, 459 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2011).

To determine whether the search exceeded the scope of Villarreal’s consent, 

several factors shape our analysis: (1) the scope of the consent given, as defined by the 

object of the search; (2) whether the search inflicts physical damage on the vehicle or its 

contents; (3) whether the suspect places any limitation on his consent; (4) whether the 

suspect objects to the search; and (5) the legitimate utility of the compartment or container 

invaded. United States v. Gonzalez-Badillo, 693 Fed. Appx. 312, 314–15 (5th Cir. 2017), 

cert. denied, 138 S.Ct. 1282 (2018); United States v. Saucedo, 688 F.3d 863, 867 (7th 

Cir. 2012) (utility).

A. Disclosure of the Object of the Search and the Extent of Physical Damage

First, the scope of consent is generally defined by its expressed object. Jimeno,

500 U.S. at 251; Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 450 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). If the 

officer first makes clear that illicit drugs are the object of the search, a reasonable person 

would know that the suspect has consented to “more than a cursory view of the vehicle,” 

United States v. Gregoire, 425 F.3d 872, 880–81 (10th Cir. 2005), for “[c]ontraband goods 

rarely are strewn across the trunk or floor of a [vehicle].” Saucedo, 688 F.3d at 866; see 

United States v. Alcantar, 271 F.3d 731, 738 (8th Cir. 2001) (“[W]hen the police receive 
14

consent to search for items that can be hidden in different parts of a car, searching those 

areas is ‘objectively reasonable.’”). Two federal circuits have upheld the use of drills or 

screwdrivers to break into hidden vehicle compartments based, in part, on the fact that 

officers made clear that contraband was the express object of the search. See Gregoire, 

425 F.3d at 880–81; United States v. Martel-Martines, 988 F.2d 855, 858 & n.3 (8th Cir. 

1993). Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has held that consent was not exceeded where an 

officer ripped a false sole off a shoe, in part because the officer disclosed that he was 

looking for large quantities of drugs, followed by the suspect’s consent. See GonzalezBadillo, 693 Fed. Appx. at 315.

But without any disclosure that the object of the search is contraband, a reasonable 

person could not interpret a general statement of consent to search a vehicle to include 

the intentional infliction of damage to the vehicle or the property contained within it. 

United States v. Ibarra, 965 F.2d 1354, 1358 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (plurality op.) 

(quoting United States v. Strickland, 902 F.2d 937, 941–42 (11th Cir. 1990)); United 

States v. Osage, 235 F.3d 518, 520 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Torres, 32 

F.3d 225, 231–32 (7th Cir. 1994)) (“We agree that ‘general permission to search does not 

include permission to inflict intentional damage to the places or things to be searched.’”). 

Although an individual consenting to a general vehicle search should expect that search 

to be thorough, he need not anticipate that the search will involve the destruction of his 

vehicle, its parts, or contents. Ibarra, 965 F.2d at 1358.

Based on these considerations, this Court has held that when an officer “[n]ever 

indicated the object of the search to appellee” and instead simply obtained consent to 

“look inside and look around” the detainee’s vehicle, this generalized consent did not 
15

convey permission to enter the truck with tools to break open hidden compartments. 

State v. Gonzalez, No. 13-02-355-CR, 2004 WL 1698326, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus 

Christi July 29, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Similarly, 

another Texas court has held that a suspect’s permission for an officer to have “a look in 

his car,” without more, would not authorize police to break into a concealed compartment 

that was welded into the wheel well. Cardenas v. State, 857 S.W.2d 707, 711 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. ref’d). 

Here, however, Cipriani made clear that the object of his search was “large 

amounts of heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine . . . .” See id.; Gonzalez, 2004 WL 

1698326, at *3. Villarreal then agreed to the search. Villarreal thus consented to a 

more incisive search than that which was justified by the vague grant of consent in 

Gonzalez and Cardenas. Instead, Villarreal’s broad consent to search for large amounts 

of contraband favors the conclusion that the officers did not exceed the permissible scope 

of Villarreal’s consent. See Gonzalez-Badillo, 693 Fed. Appx. at 315; Gregoire, 425 F.3d 

at 880–81; Martel-Martines, 988 F.2d at 858 & n.3.

B. Suspect’s Express Limitation or Objection to Scope of Search

“[C]ourts can look at the defendant’s conduct to help determine the scope of a 

consensual search.” Gonzalez-Badillo, 693 Fed. Appx. at 315. It is well established 

that a criminal suspect may limit the scope of consent to a search, but the burden is on 

him to do so. United States v. Thurman, 889 F.3d 356, 367–68 (7th Cir. 2018); see 

Weaver, 349 S.W.3d at 526.

Moreover, if there is evidence that a defendant is in a position to object to the 

search, a failure to object to the breadth of the search is properly considered an indication 
16

that the search was within the scope of the initial consent. See Gonzalez-Badillo, 693 

Fed. Appx. at 315; United States v. Jones, 356 F.3d 529, 534 (4th Cir. 2004); MartelMartines, 988 F.2d at 858 (“At the garage, he watched in silence as the officers examined 

the truck on a hoist, lowered it, and prepared to puncture the sheetmetal that covered the 

secret compartment.”). A person’s silence in the face of an officer’s further actions may 

imply consent to that further action. Weaver, 349 S.W.3d at 526.

Here, it is undisputed that Villarreal placed no limitations on the scope of the 

search. There was evidence that Villarreal watched the entirety of the search from a 

distance of forty paces. Villarreal’s relative proximity to the officers put him in a position 

to object to the scope of the search, yet even as an hour passed, he did not object to 

Cipriani’s actions. Villarreal’s failure to place limitations or object is at least some 

indication that the officers did not exceed the scope of his consent. See GonzalezBadillo, 693 Fed. Appx. at 315.

C. Utility of the Compartment Invaded

Finally, some courts have considered whether the container or compartment 

invaded is legitimately part of the vehicle or whether it has any usefulness other than to 

conceal contraband. In Cardenas, police observed a compartment that was welded into 

the wheel well of the suspect’s automobile. 857 S.W.2d at 709. The court approved 

officers’ use of tools to break the weld and access this compartment as within the scope 

of the suspect’s written consent to search the vehicle, in part because the compartment 

had no legitimate use as part of the vehicle. Id. at 712. Breaking into the compartment, 

the court reasoned, did no damage to “the basic structural assembly” of the vehicle. Id. 
17

Instead, the welded compartment was merely an “artificial barrier to a standard 

compartment of the car, the tire well.” Id.

Similarly, in Saucedo, the Seventh Circuit found it significant that the hidden 

compartment invaded was not a “functional part of the tractor.” 688 F.3d at 867. 

Instead, “the compartment had no function other than to conceal drugs . . . .” Id. This 

was compared to a door panel, the destruction of which would impair the “legitimate 

function” of the vehicle. Id.

Here, the two boxes in which the drugs were discovered were riveted to the bottom 

of the vehicle, concealed between the cab and the wheels. The boxes were freshly 

painted, artfully splattered with mud, and sealed from all sides. They were not part of 

factory specifications. Rather, the boxes were add-ons with no apparent utility except to 

help Villarreal covertly transport a large amount of drugs. When Cipriani drilled a small 

hole into one of the false compartments, he did little or no damage to the authentic form 

of the vehicle itself. This, too, favors the conclusion that Cipriani did not exceed the 

legitimate scope of Villarreal’s consent.

D. Summary

Villarreal gave Cipriani blanket permission to search the vehicle for large amounts 

of drugs, which provided Cipriani with authority to thoroughly search the vehicle. See 

Gonzalez-Badillo, 693 Fed. Appx. at 315. Villarreal placed no limitations on the scope 

of his consent and never objected to the search, even as he watched Cipriani explore 

various parts of the vehicle for over an hour. See Thurman, 889 F.3d at 367–68. During 

the search, Cipriani happened upon the hidden, completely sealed boxes affixed to the 

bottom of the cab, which had no apparent utility other than to conceal contraband. See
18

Saucedo, 688 F.3d at 867. He drilled into these false attachments, doing little or no 

damage to the vehicle itself. See Cardenas, 857 S.W.2d at 712. Based the totality of 

these circumstances, see Meekins, 340 S.W.3d at 459, the trial court correctly concluded 

that Cipriani did not exceed the scope of Villarreal’s consent. See Weems, 493 S.W.3d 

at 577.

We overrule Villarreal’s third issue.

VI. CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ

Justice

Publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the 27th

day of December, 2018.