alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 29.1333 Instrument systems. For systems that operate the required flight instruments which are located at each pilot's station, the following apply: ( a ) For pneumatic systems, only the required flight instruments for the first pilot may be connected to that operating system.
( b ) The equipment, systems, and installations must be designed so that one display of the information essential to the safety of flight which is provided by the flight instruments remains available to a pilot, without additional crewmember action, after any single failure or combination of failures that are not shown to be extremely improbable.
( c ) Additional instruments, systems, or equipment may not be connected to the operating system for a second pilot unless provisions are made to ensure the continued normal functioning of the required flight instruments in the event of any malfunction of the additional instruments, systems, or equipment which is not shown to be extremely improbable.
[Amdt. 29-24, 49 FR 44439, Nov. 6, 1984, as amended by Amdt. 29-59, 88 FR 8740, Feb. 10, 2023]
#### In the Matter of the Estate of Emma C. Rueff, Deceased. State Tax Commission, Appellant; Willis M. Staubus, as Ancillary Administrator of the Estate of Emma C. Rueff, Deceased, Respondent.

Argued January 7, 1937;

decided March 9, 1937.

*Seth T. Cole*and *Mortimer M. Kassell*for appellant.

*Clarence W. Archibold*for respondent.

Appeal dismissed, with costs. A constitutional question is not solely presented. The case could have been, and was, decided upon the construction of a statute. (Civ. Prac. Act, § 588, subd. 1.) No opinion.

Concur: Crane, Ch. J., O’Brien, Htjbbs, Lotjghban and Rippey, _ JJ. Taking no part: Lehman and Finch, JJ.
§ 29.777 Cockpit controls. Cockpit controls must be— ( a ) Located to provide convenient operation and to prevent confusion and inadvertent operation; and
( b ) Located and arranged with respect to the pilot's seats so that there is full and unrestricted movement of each control without interference from the cockpit structure or the pilot's clothing when pilots from 5′2′′ to 6′0′′ in height are seated.
#### MANSON v ULLMAN

Case No. 90-231AP

Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Dade County

April 8, 1991

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Pamela Beckman, Esquire, for appellant.

Bill Ullman, pro se.

Before ROBINSON, MUIR, DEAN, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

MUIR, J.

This case is an attorney-client dispute over fees in a criminal proceeding that concluded successfully with the client’s acceptance into a pretrial diversion program.

*47The attorney sued in county court for the balance of his claim of $2500.00 for fees after the client refused to pay more than an initial payment of $1500.00. The trial court found no agreement between the parties and awarded the attorney an additional fee of $829.50 (including costs) based on the theory of quantum merit and calculated at a rate of $225.00 per hour.

The client appealed the final judgment for $829.50 to the circuit court.

The question on appeal is whether the trial court erred in awarding additional fees based on quantum merit.

The attorney noted in argument on appeal that attorneys’ fees in criminal cases are generally “flat” fees rather than billed hourly.

There was no written agreement between the parties and the only written evidence of any fee discussions was on the client’s check, indicating the payment was “through arraignment 2/7/90.” The attorney testified at trial that he simply warned the client that additional fees would be due as the case developed.

The record indicates that at least a week before 2/7/90, the date on the $1500.00 check, the client discharged the attorney.

Although the written notation on the client’s check, accepted and deposited by the attorney, is somewhat ambiguous, the ambiguity in this case should be resolved in favor of the client. See *Reid v Johnson,*106 So.2d 624 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958).

We therefore REVERSE the trial court’s final judgment awarding additional fees.

REVERSED.

ROBINSON and DEAN, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 31.2

                        CERTIFICATION

I, Craig D. Stratton, certify that:

1.    I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q  of
Allstates WorldCargo,    Inc.;

2.    Based  on my knowledge, this report does not contain any  untrue
statement  of  a  material  fact or omit  to  state  a  material  fact
necessary  to  make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect  to
the period covered by this report;

3.    Based  on  my  knowledge, the financial  statements,  and  other
financial information included in this report, fairly present  in  all
material  respects the financial condition, results of operations  and
cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented  in
this report;

4.     The  registrant's  other  certifying  officer(s)  and   I   are
responsible  for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls  and
procedures  (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e))
for the registrant and have:

  (a)  Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
       disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our
       supervision,  to  ensure  that  material information relating to
       the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is
       made  known to us by others within those  entities, particularly
       during  the  period  in  which  this  report  is  being prepared;

  (b)  Evaluated  the  effectiveness  of  the  registrant's disclosure
       controls and procedures and presented in this report our
       conclusions  about the effectiveness of the  disclosure controls
       and procedures, as of the end of the period covered  by this
       report based on such evaluation; and

  (c)  Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal
       control  over financial reporting that occurred  during the
       registrant's   most   recent  fiscal  quarter  (the registrant's
       fourth  fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that
       has  materially  affected, or is reasonably likely to materially
       affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5.     The  registrant's  other  certifying  officer(s)  and  I   have
disclosed,  based  on our most recent evaluation of  internal  control
over  financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the  audit
committee   of  the  registrant's  board  of  directors  (or   persons
performing the equivalent functions):

  (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design
      or   operation  of  internal  control  over  financial reporting
      which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the
      registrant's ability to record, process, summarize  and report
      financial information; and

  (b) Any  fraud,  whether  or not material,  that  involves management or
      other employees who have a significant role in the
      registrant's internal control over financial reporting.


August 14, 2007

/s/ Craig D. Stratton
Chief Financial Officer and
Chief Accounting Officer
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 98-7495

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus WILLIAM PARKER, Defendant - Appellant.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Frank W. Bullock, Jr., Chief District Judge. (CR-90-159, CA-97-1339-1) Submitted: December 17, 1998 Decided: January 11, 1999 Before WILKINS, NIEMEYER, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. William Parker, Appellant Pro Se. Paul Alexander Weinman, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: William Parker seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998) as untimely filed. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. See United States v. Parker , No. CR-90-159; CA-97-1339-1 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 29, 1998). We deny Parker’s motion for appointment of counsel. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Exhibit 99.2

    GENERAL ELECTRIC CAPITAL SERVICES, INC. AND CONSOLIDATED AFFILIATES

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of General Electric Capital Services,
Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 29, 2002 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
I, James A. Parke, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

          (1)  The Report fully complies with the  requirements of section 13(a)
               or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

          (2)  The information  contained in the Report fairly presents,  in all
               material  respects,   the  financial   condition  and  result  of
               operations of the Company.



/s/ James A. Parke
-----------------------
James A. Parke
Executive Vice President and
Chief Financial Officer
July 31, 2002
EXHIBIT 32.2





SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION

CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER



I, David O. Cole, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the periodic report, to which this Statement is attached, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the information contained in the periodic report to which this Statement is attached, fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the registrant.



A signed original of this written statement has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the SEC upon request.







Date:  October 12, 2007

By:/s/ David O. Cole

David O. Cole

Chief Financial Officer
§ 249.4 Photographic copies. ( a ) Any record may be transferred to nonerasable microfilm (including microfiche, computer output microfilm, and aperture cards) at any time. Records so maintained on microfilm shall satisfy the minimum requirements listed in paragraphs (b) through (f) of this section.
( b ) The microfilm shall be of a quality that can be easily read and that can be reproduced in paper similar in size to an original without loss of clarity or detail during the periods the records are required to be retained in §§ 249.20 and 249.21.
( c ) Microfilm records shall be indexed and retained in such a manner as will render them readily accessible, and the company shall have facilities available to locate, identify and read the microfilm and reproduce in paper form. Authorized representatives of the DOT shall be given immediate access to these facilities upon request.
( d ) Any significant characteristic, feature, or other attribute which microfilm will not preserve shall be clearly indicated at the beginning of each roll of film or series of microfilm records if applicable to all records on the roll or series, or on the individual record, as appropriate.
( e ) The printed side of printed forms need not be microfilmed for each record if nothing has been added to the printed matter common to all such forms, but an identified specimen of the form shall be on the film for reference.
( f ) Each roll of film or series of microfilm records shall include a microfilm of a certificate stating that the photographs are direct and facsimile reproductions of the original records and they have been made in accordance with prescribed regulations. Such a certificate shall be executed by a person having personal knowledge of these facts. Where the microfilm is computer output, the microfilm certificate shall state that the information is complete and accurate.
[ER-1214, 46 FR 25415, May 6, 1981, as amended at 60 FR 66725, Dec. 26, 1995]
§ 1262.204 When an application may be filed. ( a ) An application may be filed whenever the applicant has prevailed in the proceeding or in a significant and discrete substantive portion of the proceeding, but in no case later than 30 days after the Agency's final disposition of the proceeding.
( b ) If review or reconsideration is sought or taken of a decision as to which an applicant believes it has prevailed, proceedings for the award of fees shall be stayed pending final disposition of the underlying controversy.
( c ) For purposes of this rule, final disposition means the latter of: ( 1 ) The date on which the last “initial decision”, in a bifurcated proceeding, or other recommended disposition of the merits (both as to liability and amount, if applicable) of the proceeding, by an adjudicative officer or intermediate reviewer, becomes administratively final;
( 2 ) The date on which an order is issued disposing of any petitions for reconsideration;
( 3 ) If no petition for reconsideration is filed, the last date on which such a petition could have been filed; or
( 4 ) The date of a final order or any other final resolution of the proceeding, such as a settlement or a voluntary dismissal, which is not subject to a petition for reconsideration.
#### Rudy Lauro, Respondent, v Terrence L. Bradley, Defendant, and Alfred S. Petty, Individually and Doing Business as Heritage Group, Also Known as Heritage Group Auction Service, Appellant.

[697 NYS2d 882]

—Order unanimously affirmed without costs. Memorandum: Plaintiff obtained a money judgment against defendant Alfred S. Petty in a civil action and sought to recover the amount of the judgment by issuing an execution upon James and Susan Nobles, the mortgagors of real property sold to them by Petty and his wife. The execution was on the monthly payments made to Petty and his wife, who held the mortgage as joint tenants. In compliance with the execution, the Nobles thereafter made their mortgage payments to the Sheriff. When the 90-day period for the execution expired, plaintiff moved to extend the expiration date, and Petty cross-moved to vacate the execution. Supreme Court extended the expiration date on the execution, but limited the execution to one half of the monthly mortgage payments. Petty appeals, contending that his wife furnished the consideration for the purchase of and improvements to the real property, and thus his creditor cannot obtain the proceeds from that property. We affirm.

When Petty and his wife took title to the real property as joint owners, there was an implied gift on the part of the spouse who furnished the consideration *(see, Secrist v Secrist,*284 App Div 331, 334, *affd*308 NY 750; *Ratkovitch v Ratkovitch,*49 AD2d 890, 891). When Petty and his wife executed and delivered the deed to the Nobles, Petty and his wife had equal ownership in the consideration given for the deed, i.e., the mortgage *(see, Matter of Blumenthal,*236 NY 448, 454; *Secrist v Secrist, supra,*at 334). As a judgment creditor, plaintiff is thus entitled to Petty’s one-half interest in the monthly mortgage payments. (Appeal from Order of Supreme Court, *912Onondaga County, Major, J. — Execution.) Present — Pine, J. P., Hayes, Pigott, Jr., Scudder and Callahan, JJ.
§ 31.1 Applicability. ( a ) This part prescribes airworthiness standards for the issue of type certificates and changes to those certificates, for manned free balloons.
( b ) Each person who applies under Part 21 for such a certificate or change must show compliance with the applicable requirements of this part.
( c ) For purposes of this part— ( 1 ) A captive gas balloon is a balloon that derives its lift from a captive lighter-than-air gas;
( 2 ) A hot air balloon is a balloon that derives its lift from heated air;
( 3 ) The envelope is the enclosure in which the lifting means is contained;
( 4 ) The basket is the container, suspended beneath the envelope, for the balloon occupants;
( 5 ) The trapeze is a harness or is a seat consisting of a horizontal bar or platform suspended beneath the envelope for the balloon occupants; and
( 6 ) The design maximum weight is the maximum total weight of the balloon, less the lifting gas or air.
[Doc. No. 1437, 29 FR 8258, July 1, 1964, as amended by Amdt. 31-3, 41 FR 55474, Dec. 20, 1976]
§ 382.99 What agreements must carriers have with the airports they serve? ( a ) As a carrier, you must negotiate in good faith with the airport operator of each U.S. airport described in § 382.95(b) to ensure the provision of lifts for boarding and deplaning where level-entry loading bridges are not available.
( b ) You must have a written, signed agreement with the airport operator allocating responsibility for meeting the boarding and deplaning assistance requirements of this subpart between or among the parties. For foreign carriers, with respect to all covered aircraft, this requirement becomes effective May 13, 2010.
( c ) For foreign carriers, the agreement with a U.S. airport must provide that all actions necessary to ensure accessible boarding and deplaning for passengers with a disability are completed as soon as practicable, but no later than May 13, 2011.
( d ) Under the agreement, you may, as a carrier, require that passengers wishing to receive boarding and deplaning assistance requiring the use of a lift for a flight check in for the flight one hour before the standard check-in time for the flight. If the passenger checks in after this time, you must nonetheless provide the boarding and deplaning assistance by lift if you can do so by making a reasonable effort, without delaying the flight.
( e ) The agreement must ensure that all lifts and other accessibility equipment are maintained in proper working condition.
( f ) All carriers and airport operators involved are jointly and severally responsible for the timely and complete implementation of the agreement.
( g ) You must make a copy of this agreement available, on request, to representatives of the Department of Transportation.
[Doc. No. DOT-OST-2004-19482, 73 FR 27665, May 13, 2008, as amended at 74 FR 11471, Mar. 18, 2009]
IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-17-00003-CV

IN RE CAROLYN BARNES

Original Proceeding

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Relator Carolyn Barnes’s petition for writ of mandamus is denied. Recently 

amended Rule of Civil Procedure 145 governs a party’s claim that the party is unable to 

afford costs for preparation of the appellate record. TEX. R. APP. P. 20.1 cmt.; see TEX. R.

CIV. P. 145 (effective Sept. 1, 2016).

Accordingly, Relator’s motion for emergency stay is dismissed as moot.

REX D. DAVIS

Justice
In re Barnes Page 2

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and 

Justice Scoggins

Petition denied; motion denied

Opinion delivered and filed January 11, 2017

[OT06]
#### CROSS v STATE OF FLORIDA

Case No. 89-2523

Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Hillsborough County

January 3, 1991

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Daniel Kirkwood, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

Allison Leehan Allman, Assistant State Attorney, for appellee.

OPINION OF THE COURT

SUSAN C. BUCKLEW, Circuit Judge.

The Appellant was convicted of Driving Under the Influence by a *31jury. The Appellant argues the conviction should be reversed because the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the Defendant’s confession that she was the driver of the automobile, prior to proof of the corpus delicti of the offense of Driving Under the Influence. The trial court is hereby aflirmed.

The evidence in the instant case was sufficient for the trial court to conclude that the state made a prima facie showing of a corpus delicti, the car was driven by somebody and the driver was under the influence of alcohol to the extent normal faculties were impaired, prior to the admission of the defendant’s confession that she was the driver of the automobile.

However, even if the trial court had erred by allowing the defendant’s confession that she was the driver of the car into evidence before the corpus delicti of the crime was proven, such error can be and was cured by the introduction of additional, independent evidence after the confession, which proves the corpus delicti. *Jones v State,*360 So.2d 1293 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), *McIntosh v State,*532 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). In the instant case, following the confession, the officer testified that the defendant performed sobriety tests after being told why she was being asked to do them. Additionally, the officer testified that when he got inside the car to move it, he had to move the seat back and that the witness, Huskamp, (who claimed to be the driver at trial), was at least his height or taller. Finally there was testimony, without objection, that at Central Breath Testing, the Defendant stated “I work three jobs. I get drunk once, just once a week and I get busted.” Such evidence when combined with the evidence introduced by the state prior to the admission of the confession by the defendant that she was the driver cures any error that might have existed by the premature admission of the confession before proof of a corpus delicti.

The trial court is affirmed.

DONE and ORDERED in Hillsborough County, Florida, this 3rd day of January, 1991.
#### Cathy A. Ripton, Individually and as Parent and Natural Guardian of Shane M. Russell, an Infant, Respondent, v Jane Gracie et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants.

[698 NYS2d 208]

—Order unanimously affirmed without costs. Memorandum: Supreme Court properly denied the motions of defendants Jane Gracie and Beverly Dries for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against them. Plaintiff Cathy A. Ripton’s 14-year-old son was injured while operating a moped owned by Dries that collided with a motor vehicle driven by Gracie. With respect to Dries, the complaint alleges the negligent entrustment of a dangerous instrument. Dries failed to establish as a matter of law that the moped is not a dangerous instrument *(see, Alessi v Alessi,*103 AD2d 1023, 1023-1024), and there is a further issue of fact whether she was, or should have been, aware of its use by her children’s friends *(see, Paladino v Isasi,*123 AD2d 379, 381). With respect to Gracie, the complaint alleges the negligent operation of a motor vehicle, and there is a triable issue of fact whether the emergency doctrine applies *(see, Rivera v New York City Tr. Auth.,*77 NY2d 322, 327, *rearg denied*77 NY2d 990). (Appeals from Order of Supreme Court, Genesee County, Dillon, J. — Summary Judgment.) Present — Pine, J. P., Lawton, Hayes, Wisner and Scudder, JJ.