RENDERED: AUGUST 28, 2020; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2019-CA-001618-ME

CHRISTINE ANN HALL APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT

v. HONORABLE DEBORAH DEWEESE, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 12-CI-504007

LAURA KATHRYN HALL

AND CORY MATTHEW PYLES APPELLEES

OPINION

VACATING AND REMANDING

**   **  **

BEFORE: COMBS, GOODWINE, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.

COMBS, JUDGE: This case involves a dispute over custody of a child between 

the child’s aunt and her natural parents. Christine Hall, the aunt, had shared joint

custody of V.L.K.H. with Laura Hall and Cory Pyles, the child’s natural parents. 

Christine now appeals an order of the Jefferson Family Court modifying its 

previous custody order and granting sole custody to Laura Hall and Cory Pyles and 
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not granting any visitation for Christine. After our review of the record and the 

applicable law, we vacate and remand for further proceedings.

V.L.K.H. was born in 2007. The Cabinet for Health and Family 

Services intervened immediately, and the child was placed in the care of her 

maternal aunt, Christine Hall. Christine qualified as the child’s de facto custodian

and was awarded permanent custody by court order entered prior to 2012. 

In 2016, Laura Hall filed a motion to modify the award of custody to 

Christine. After a hearing, the family court observed that “communication and 

cooperation between the parties is uncommonly, admirably, good.” By order 

entered on October 28, 2016, the court modified the custody order and granted 

joint custody of the child to Christine and to Laura and Cory. The parties were 

awarded equal parenting time. Because they cohabit, the parenting time awarded 

to Laura and Cory is shared between them. 

As time passed, Cory and Laura became dissatisfied with the 

parenting-time schedule. In May 2018, Cory filed a motion to modify the parties’

timesharing. The motion was set for a hearing to be conducted on June 12, 2019. 

On that date, Laura orally joined Cory’s motion. 

At the hearing, Cory explained that he and Laura also permitted 

Christine to exercise physical custody of C.H. (their younger child and the sibling 

of V.L.K.H.) whenever V.L.K.H. was in Christine’s care. Cory indicated that they 
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sent C.H. to Christine so that the siblings could grow up together. However, he 

complained that he and Laura were not given input with respect to the scheduling 

of their parenting time with V.L.K.H. and that Christine dictated their timesharing 

according to her work schedule as a registered nurse. Although he described one

incident where Christine was observed to be “severely” inebriated at a wedding

reception, Cory testified that he had no other concern for the well-being of the 

children while they were in her care. Cory testified that he had sole custody of his 

son and that he “want[ed] his daughter back.” He felt that it was in the child’s best 

interests to be in the sole custody of her natural parents and that he did not want 

Christine to exercise joint custody with respect to V.L.K.H. 

During cross-examination, Cory admitted that V.L.K.H. was 

completely integrated into Christine’s family and that he routinely deferred to 

Laura and Christine with respect to all decisions concerning the child. He denied 

that he was motivated to seek the termination of Christine’s custodial rights in an 

effort to avoid reimbursing the Commonwealth for kinship care benefits paid to 

Christine by the state. 

Upon her examination, Laura testified that she and Christine had 

worked together for years to determine which school V.L.K.H. would attend, when 

doctor visits would be scheduled, and when each party would exercise parenting

time. However, she complained that she did not want to be the babysitter to her 
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own children and that she had agreed to join Cory’s motion in order to support 

him. Laura indicated that she believed that her sister had helped by caring for 

V.L.K.H. while she (Laura) had been incapacitated by drug abuse, but that now she 

and Cory wanted sole custody of V.L.K.H. 

Laura admitted that the child loved Christine “more than anything” 

and that Christine’s work schedule was a great luxury for the children because she

was available to them twenty-four hours a day following her three-day work week. 

With respect to the wedding reception incident, Laura indicated that Christine 

appeared intoxicated but admitted that her children had not been in any danger. 

Laura acknowledged that she had never disagreed with Christine’s decisions with 

respect to V.L.K.H.’s extraordinary healthcare needs1and that she and Christine 

had devised a schedule by which she (Laura) and Cory enjoyed parenting time for 

approximately fifteen days each month. Laura indicated that if she and Cory were 

awarded sole custody of V.L.K.H., they could expect help with childcare from 

their families while they worked. 

Upon her examination, Christine testified that neither Laura nor Cory 

had ever voiced any objection to the arranged timesharing schedule nor had they 

indicated that they did not want her to exercise custodial rights to the child. She 

 

1 V.L.K.H. is described in the briefs as requiring care for extraordinary medical needs. The court 

order of October 24, 2016, recites that she suffers from “a rare disorder which renders her 

medically fragile.” 
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testified that she had never attempted to restrict Laura’s and Cory’s time with 

V.L.K.H. or to cut them out of any decisions concerning her healthcare, school 

issues, or any other matter. Christine indicated that she and Laura consistently 

attended physician appointments and school conferences together because Cory’s 

work schedule prevented him from participating. While she acknowledged that 

she had no legal obligation to care for C.H., Christine explained that she had taken 

care of him for the last eight years out of sheer affection for him and to 

accommodate the desire of Laura and Cory for the siblings to be raised together. 

She observed that there had been no substantial change of any sort since the court’s 

award of joint custody in 2016. 

In an order entered on August 29, 2019, the family court modified its 

prior custody award to grant sole custody of V.L.K.H. to Laura and Cory. It found 

that “sharing custody between the parties is causing significant friction.” The court 

observed that Christine and Laura “appeared to have a comfortable working 

relationship.” But it found that “[Cory] plainly feels cut out of the decisionmaking process for V.L.K.H. and it is clear his discomfort is impacting the 

relationships of all involved.” The court noted that Laura supported Cory’s request 

for a change of custody. 
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In its conclusions of law, the court explained that the provisions of 

KRS2 403.340 authorize modification of a custody order only where a change of 

circumstances makes a revision necessary to serve the best interests of the child. 

The court noted that it “is not concerned that either household seriously endangers 

V.L.K.H.’s physical, mental, moral, or emotional health.” Instead, it concluded 

that the “key questions” are “whether it is in the best interest of the child to grant 

[Cory’s] motion, and whether the harm of a changed environment is outweighed by 

its advantages.” The court addressed these questions as follows:

Both natural parents wish return of V.L.K.H., while 

[Christine] wishes to maintain the status quo. The 

child’s wishes were not presented to the Court. The 

child has a close relationship with all three of her 

caregivers, as well as a close relationship with [C.H.]. 

[Christine] feels a parental responsibility for V.L.K.H. 

and wishes to retain the legal status that has placed her in 

that role for so many years, while [Laura and Cory] wish 

to put their substance abuse issues behind them and form 

the nuclear family that they have worked for. V.L.K.H.

would not be removed from her school, and she is 

adjusted to living in the home of her natural parents. 

None of the parties are [sic] alleged to have impactful 

mental health problems. [Cory] testified to some fairly

severe intestinal health issues but is evidently recovered 

and does not suffer from impaired functioning. There 

have been no allegations of domestic violence or abuse. 

V.L.K.H. has clearly been cared for and nurtured by 

[Christine] for a substantial amount of her life. For a 

period of time this was because her natural parents were 

incapable of caring for her. Since they became capable, 

[Laura and Cory] recognized the value of the care 

 

2 Kentucky Revised Statutes. 
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provided by [Christine] and the significant relationship 

formed between her and V.L.K.H.

. . . .

Ultimately, the Court believes the harm of returning full 

custody to [Laura and Cory] is outweighed by the 

benefit. This decision was a close one. All parties are 

appropriate and loving caregivers. The Court believes, 

however, that the friction between V.L.K.H.’s natural 

parents and [Christine] will continue to increase without 

a change in custody. It is in V.L.K.H.’s best interest to 

take the pressure of cooperation off and hopefully reduce 

the conflict between the parties. 

(Emphasis added.) Christine, who had been primary caregiver to this medically

fragile child since birth, was totally divested of her custodial rights. She was 

awarded no visitation. 

In denying Christine’s subsequent motion to alter, amend, or vacate,

the family court rejected her contention that the parties’ testimony did not support 

a finding that there had been a substantial change of circumstances or that the best 

interests of the child would be adversely affected by any “friction” (as yet nonexistent) between the parties. The court explained that Laura and Cory were not 

“somehow obligate[d] to coordinate schedules and decisions [with Christine] for 

the remainder of V.L.K.H.’s childhood.” It concluded that under the 

circumstances, Christine’s custodial status had simply “expired” and that it was in 

the child’s best interests to grant sole custody to her natural parents. This appeal 

followed. 
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The family court is vested with broad discretion in matters concerning 

custody and visitation. As the fact-finder, it alone has the prerogative of weighing 

and evaluating the credibility of witnesses and the reliability of evidence. B.C. v.

B.T., 182 S.W.3d 213, 219 (Ky. App. 2005). As an appellate court, our review is 

carefully circumscribed. We may disturb a family court’s decisions only where its 

rulings are arbitrary or unsupported by the law. See Coffman v. Rankin, 260 

S.W.3d 767, 770 (Ky. 2008). 

On appeal, Christine argues that the family court erred in modifying 

its prior custody award. She contends that there was no evidence to support the 

conclusion that the child’s best interests are served by effectively terminating her 

custodial rights. Nor was there a change in circumstances. We agree. 

Christine claims that the family court’s decision to grant Laura and 

Cory sole custody of the child appeared to be “a reward for the natural parents 

remaining sober.” She contends that nothing whatsoever had changed between the 

2016 hearing granting the parties joint custody and the 2018 proceedings granting 

sole custody to Laura and Cory. She highlights the court’s references to the wishes 

of Cory and Laura “to put their substance abuse issues behind them and form the 

nuclear family that they have worked for.” 

 KRS 403.340(3) provides that:

the court shall not modify a prior custody decree unless

after hearing it finds, upon the basis of facts that have 
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arisen since the prior decree or that were unknown to the 

court at the time of entry of the prior decree, that a 

change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or 

his custodian, and that the modification is necessary to 

serve the best interests of the child.

(Emphasis added.)

When determining if a change has occurred and whether a 

modification of custody is in the best interests of the child, the court is directed to 

consider the following factors set forth in that same statute:

(a) Whether the custodian agrees to the modification;

(b) Whether the child has been integrated into the family 

of the petitioner with consent of the custodian;

(c) The factors set forth in KRS 403.270(2) to determine 

the best interests of the child;

(d) Whether the child’s present environment endangers 

seriously his physical, mental, moral, or emotional 

health;

(e) Whether the harm likely to be caused by a change of 

environment is outweighed by its advantages to him; and

(f) Whether the custodian has placed the child with a de 

facto custodian.

KRS 403.270(2) provides that the court “shall determine custody in 

accordance with the best interests of the child and equal consideration shall be 

given to each parent . . . .” There is a presumption that joint custody and equally 

shared parenting time are in the best interest of the child. Id. “If a deviation from 
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equal parenting time is warranted, the court shall construct a parenting time 

schedule which maximizes the time each parent . . . has with the child and is 

consistent with ensuring the child’s welfare.” Id.

We agree with Christine that the reasoning of the family court 

indicates an impermissible and unwarranted preference for Cory and Laura. The 

biological relationship between V.L.K.H. and her natural parents -- in and of itself

-- is not a factor to be considered when determining custody with respect to 

Christine versus Laura and Cory. When the Commonwealth was required to 

intervene for the child’s protection at the time of her birth, Laura and Cory ceded 

their rights as natural parents to raise and control V.L.K.H. Christine became the 

child’s de facto custodian and was eventually named her permanent custodian by 

the court. Laura and Cory clearly lost their superior rights to custody of V.L.K.H.

The family court considered many of the relevant statutory factors 

enumerated in the provisions of KRS 403.270. It considered the interaction and 

interrelationship of the child with Christine, Laura, and Cory, and the younger 

brother, C.H.; V.L.K.H.’s adjustment and continuing proximity to her homes, 

school, and community; the mental and physical health of all the individuals 

involved; and the motivation of each of the parties. The family court referred to 

the fact that Christine had cared for and nurtured V.L.K.H. since her birth and 

mentioned the inability of Laura and Cory to do either for a substantial period of 
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V.LK.H.’s childhood. Nonetheless, it found the final factor enumerated in the 

provisions of KRS 403.270(2) to be “key to [its] decision.” KRS 403.270(2)(k) 

directs the court to consider the “likelihood a party will allow the child frequent, 

meaningful, and continuing contact with the other parent . . . .” The court wrote as 

follows: 

Although this Court is returning custody of V.L.K.H. to 

her biological parents, it recognizes the length, breadth, 

and depth of her relationship with [Christine]. 

[Christine] was a lifeboat for this child on seas made 

stormy by the actions of her parents. Without the love, 

care, and hard work of [Christine], V.L.K.H.’s life would 

be very different. The relationship they have is 

significant, and it is a life-long bond. [Laura and Cory] 

should be aware of this fact, and they should treat that 

bond with the respect it deserves. Although this Court is 

returning full custody, it expects that [Christine] will 

remain an incredibly significant part of V.L.K.H.’s life,

and will see her regularly. 

 Under the circumstances, we are not persuaded that this factor could 

have been regarded as “key” to the family court’s custody decision. The parties 

agreed that the parenting time arrangements had been discussed between Christine 

and Laura each month for years; that Cory had elected to take a hands-off 

approach; and that neither Laura nor Cory had raised an objection with Christine as 

to the timesharing schedule. There simply does not appear to be an indication that 

any party would be any more or less likely to allow the child “frequent, 

meaningful, and continuing contact with the other parent.” Significantly, the court 
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expressed its wish for Christine’s continued involvement in merely precatory 

language without mandating visitation for her with the child. The best interests of 

the child were clearly disregarded -- if not severely jeopardized -- by suddenly 

severing her relationship from her beloved aunt. 

Similarly, we are not persuaded that the family court’s modification of 

the joint custody award was properly based upon an assumed development of 

“friction” between the parties. The family court concluded that the “harm of 

returning full custody to [Laura and Cory] was outweighed by the benefit.” The 

benefit to V.L.K.H. was attributed to a presumed reduction in “the conflict 

between the parties.” However, beyond Cory’s “resentment over having to 

accommodate [Christine’s] work schedule” and his “discomfort” at feeling left out 

of decision-making, there does not appear to be any conflict between or among the 

parties. In fact, the family court expressly noted that Laura and Christine 

continued to enjoy “a comfortable working relationship.” Furthermore, it 

acknowledged that “[Christine] works 12-hour shifts as a nurse – from 7:00 a.m. to 

7:00 p.m.” and that “requiring her to care for V.L.K.H. [and C.H.] on days she 

works would pose severe logistical difficulties and significant childcare costs.” 

 As the Supreme Court of Kentucky has observed, “[w]hile we have no 

doubt of the greater likelihood of successful joint custody when a cooperative spirit 

prevails, we do not regard it as a condition precedent.” Squires v. Squires, 854 
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S.W.2d 765, 768 (Ky. 1993). To do so, the Court opined, “would permit a party 

who opposes joint custody to dictate the result by his or her own belligerence . . . .” 

Id. It concluded that requiring goodwill between the parties prior to an award of 

joint custody “would have the effect of virtually writing it out of the law.” Id. at 

769.

We cannot uphold the family court’s decision to modify the joint 

custody award based on a speculative assumption that a lack of cooperation 

between the parties will develop into “friction” where there is no evidence of a real 

disagreement among them. This reasoning is simply insufficient to warrant or to

justify a modification. 

Therefore, we VACATE the order of the Jefferson Family Court and 

REMAND this case for further consideration. Upon remand, the family court is

directed to reassess its modification decision keeping in mind that under the 

circumstances of this case, Laura and Cory do not have superior rights to custody

solely by virtue of their status as biological parents and that the provisions of KRS

403.340(6) require that where a court orders a modification of a child custody 

decision, there shall be a presumption that it is in the best interests of the child for 

the parents/custodians to share joint custody.

ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:

Thomas V. Haile 

Louisville, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE LAURA 

KATHRYN HALL:

Bryan Gowin

Louisville, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE CORY 

MATTHEW PYLES:

John M. Mayer, Jr.

Clarksville, Indiana