i i i i i i



### MEM ORA ND UM OP INION No . 0 4- 08 -0 02 03 -C R EX P ARTE ANDRES ROBERTO CANO F ro m th e County

Court a t L aw N o. 6, B e xar

County , T e xas Trial Court No. 852082 Honora ble Ray Olivarri , J udg e Presiding Opinion by : Sandee B ry an Mar ion , J ustice Sitt ing: Alma L . L ópez , Chief J ustice

Sandee B ry an Mar ion, J ustice Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice Deliver ed and F iled: October 8, 2008 AFF I RMED A j ur y fo un d d e fe nd ant, An dr e s Ro be rt o Ca no , g uil ty of the mis de me ano r of fe ns e of a ssa ult ag ainst another motorist and a ssessed punishment at 180 day s in Bexar Count y J ail, probate d for twelve months, a

nd a $350.00 fine. On J anuar y 11, 2006, this c ourt aff irmed t h e t ri al co urt’s judgme nt, and th e Court of Criminal Appeals later ref used def endant’ s petition for discre tionary revie w. Se e Can o v . S

tate , No. 04-05-00092- CR, 2006 W L47042 (Tex. App.—San Antonio J an. 11, 2006, pet. re f’d) (mem. op., not desig nated f or publication). This appeal ar ises from the tria l court’s de nial of def

endant’ s post-conviction application for writ of ha beas c orpus. We aff

irm.04
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- 2- STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW We reviewa tria l court’s de cision to gr ant or de ny the re lief re quested on a

writ of habe as corpus unde r an a

buse of discr etion standard. Ex parte Cummins , 1 6 9 S. W. 3 d 5 2 , 7 5 5 ( T e x. Ap p. —F or

t Wor th 2 00 5, no pe t.)
. I n re vie wi ng the tr ia l court ’s de c isi on , we re vie w the re c or d in the light most favor able to the trial court’s ruling
. Ex parte Pe terson, 1 1 7 S. W. 3 d 8 0 4 , 8 1 9 ( T e x. Crim. App. 2003), ov e rru le d in part on oth e r g ro un ds by Ex pa rteLe wis , 2 1 9 S. W. 3 d

3 3 5 , 3 7 1 ( T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ); Arreola v. State, 207 S.W .3d 387, 391 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). We pay

almost total defer ence to the trial court’ s determin at i o n o f h i storical fa cts that are supported by

the re cord, e specia lly

when the tr ial court’s f

act f indings a re ba sed on an evaluation of
cr edibi lity

and deme anor. Peterson, 11 7 S. W.3 d at 81 9; Arre ola , 2 0 7 S
. W
. 3 d a t 3 9 1
. Th is de fe re nti a l r e vie w a

pp lie s e ve n w he n “ no wi tne sse s te sti fy and a ll o f t he e viden ce is su

bmi tte d in written af fidavits.” Ex

pa rteW he e le r, 203 S.W .3d 317, 325-26 (Te x . Crim. App. 2006). ENTITL EMENT TO AN EVIDENTI ARY HEARING Def endant filed his a

pplication for writ of habe as cor pus pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Pr oc e dure art ic le 11 .0 72 , w hic h e sta bli sh e s th e p r o c e d

u r e s f o r a n a pp lic a tio n in

a “ mis de me ano r c a se i nw h i c h t h e a

p p l i c an ts e e k s r e l i e f

f r o m ano r d e r

o r j u d g m e n to f

c o n v i c t i o no r d e r i n g c o m mun ity supervision.” T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 11.072, §1 (Ve rnon 2005). I n his f ir s t i s s u e on
a pp e a l, d e fe nd ant r e lie s o n s e ve ra l op ini on s f ro m th e Tex as Court

of Cr imi na l App e a ls f

or his argument that the trial court was required to conduct an evidentiar y hear ing on his a

pplication, and its failure to do so was error. Def endant’ s relianc e on these cases is misplaced be cause these c ases inv olv e d a

pp lic a tio ns fo r w ri ts o f h a

be a s c or pu s f ile d p ur su ant t o Co de of

Cr imi na l Pr oc e dure art ic le 11.07, which esta

blishes the proce dures f

or an application “in which the applicant seeks r elief f rom04
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- 3- a fe lony judgm en t i m p o s i n g a pena lty other than de ath.” T EX . C ODE . C R IM . P R OC . art. 11.07, § 1 (Ve rnon Supp. 2008). Nothing in

article 11.072, applicable to writs arising from misdemea nor ca ses, re quires a tr ial court to conduc t a h ea ri n g on a wr it of habea s corpus be fore rende ring its decision on the relief soug ht. See E

x parte Cummins , 169 S. W
. 3 d at 7 5 7
. Although se ction 6(b) of article 11.072 ind ic a te s tha t in makin g its de te rm inatio n the tr ia l c ourt may or de r a he ari ng , it

do e s n ot re qu irethe trial court do so. See T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . a rt . 1 1. 07 2, § 6 (b ). I n a dd iti on , n oth ingin a rt ic le 11.072 prohibits the trial court from considering evidenc e filed with the application o r w i t h the State’s re sponse. See id. art. 11.072. Sec tion 7 of article 11
. 0 7 2 re fe rs to the trial court’ s
c on sid e ratio n of “d oc ume nts a tta c he d to the a pp lic a tio n, ” a lbe it in d e te rm ini ngif the a pp lic a tio n is fr ivo lou s, “ bu t th a t la

ngua g e c omb ine d w iththe pe rm iss ive langua g e fo un d in sec tio n 6 le a ds us to conclude that the leg islature did not intend to prohibit the trial court f rom consider ing suc h evidenc e without a hear ing.” Ex parte Cummins , 1 69 S.W. 3d a t 75 7; see id. T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 11.072, §§ 6, 7. Def endant f iled his application on or about July 25, 2007
. On Fe b ru ary

5, 2008, the trial court sig ned an or der “ conclud[ing] that th e a ll e g ations of ineff ective a ssistance of c ounsel containe d in the [application ] cr ea t e a n ece ssity for a hear ing, but that the matter is capa ble of re solution by means of a

n aff idavit . . . .” Acc ording ly , the trial cour t ordere d defe ndant’s trial counsel to file an aff idavit, and serve a copy

on defe ndant, explaining (1) the measur es take n to inve s tigate def endant’ s
case ; (2) the measure s taken to inve stigate State witnesses, eff orts to inter act and inform de fenda nt of i s s u es p rior to trial, and e ffor ts to subpoena witnesses; (3) whether an Interna l Affa irs file wa s subpoened or

reque sted and whe t h er counsel be lieved the infor mation contained in the f ile to be04
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- 4- rele vant at the time of tria l; (4) whethe r any derog atory

comments wer e made a g ainst defe ndant’s interest duringopening and closing arguments; and (5) whether a m otion for new tr ial was filed, a nd wh e the r d e fe nd ant w a s in fo rm e d a bo ut t he pr oc e ss and his ri g hts . Co un se l f ile d th e a ff

ida vit sometime in late Fe bruar y or ea rly Marc h 2008, and the tr i al court signed its orde r deny ing the application on Mar ch 13, 2008. T h er ef o re , i t is appare nt from the re cord that the trial court
co n s i d er ed def

endant’ s application, over fifty pag es of e x hibits attached to the a pplication, and
couns el ’s affidavit. Accor dingly , we c onclude the tr ial court did not err by not conducting an
e vid e nti ary

he ari ngon

de fe nd ant’ s a

pp lic a tio n f

or wr it o f h a

be a s c or pu s. DI S CL O S UR E O F BRA DY MATERIAL Following defe ndant’s ar rest for ass ault, the B exar County Sheriff’ s Offic e conduc ted an I nt e r n a l A f f a i r s I n v e s t i g a t i o ni n t o w h e t h e r t h e ar r e s t i n g o f

f i c e r s u s e d

e xc e s s i v e f

o r c e a g a i ns t defe ndant. In his second issue, def enda n t asserts the tria l court improper ly denied his application for wr it of habea s corpus be cause the State wrong fully withheld evidenc e fr om the investigation (“the I A file” ) in violation of Brady v. M aryland , 83 S. Ct . 1194 (1963). Under Brady , the State is require d to provide a de fenda nt with ex culpatory

materia l or

other evidenc e fa

vorable to his defense
. Thomas v. State, 841 S.W .3d 399, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Howeve r, Bradydoes not apply to evidence known or available to the de fense
. See H ayes v . State, 85 S.W. 3d

80 9, 81 5 ( Te x . Crim . App . 2 00 2) ; Ba dil lo v . S tate , 2 5 5 S. W. 3 d

1 2 5 , 1 3 2 ( T e x. App.—San Antonio 2008, no pet.). I n the affidavit filed by defe ndant’s trial c ounsel, counsel state s defe ndant aske d her to retrie ve the I A fil e but she “had no rea son to believe the [I A] file contained any information that [she] had not alre ady rec eived throug h [defendant] or the police re ports . . . [and she] had no rea son to believe the [I A] file would be re levant or r eve al any new infor

mation.”04
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- 5- B e c a us e the I A f

ile wa s k no wn and a va ila ble to t he de fe ns e , th e State did

no t vi olat e it s du ty

to disclose under Brady
. Se e J ac k so n v . S tate , 552 S.W .3d 798, 804 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (no Brady violation because evidenc e wa s available to defe ndant had he taken a dvantag e of his own subpoe na). Also under Brady , a def

endant must show that the undisclosed e vidence is mate rial, i.e. , there is a reasonable probability that had the evidenc e been di sclosed, the outcome of the t rial would have been dif fer ent. Ha mp ton v . S

tate , 86 S.W .3d 603, 612 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). I n its findings of fac t and conc lusions of l aw, the trial court determined that “the streng th of t he exculpatory evidenc e was not g reater than the evidenc e supporting a convic tion, and there fore , not material to this case .” Acc ording to defe ndant, the IA file c ontained witness stateme nts and information that would have impeache d the testimony of the a rre sting off

icer s. Assuming the e vidence in the I A file wa s admissible at defe ndant’s cr iminal trial , we co nclude the tr ial court did not err in concluding the
e vid e nc e wa s n ot m a te ri a l to de fe nd ant’ s pr os e c uti on . Th e te sti mony of the wi tne sse s c on ta ine d in the I A f ile wa s d ir e c te d to the c on du c t of the of fi c e rs wh o all ege dly

us e d e xce ssi ve fo rc e a g a ins t defe ndant when the y

arr ested him. Howe ver , t h es e o ffice rs did not witness the beg inning of the alterc ation betwee n defe ndant and the c omplainant. There fore , defe ndant did not carr y his burden of per suasion as to materia lity by establishing a

rea sonable likelihood of a dif fer ent outcome. IN EF F EC TIV E A SSIST AN CE OF TR IA L C OU NSE L I n h is thir d is su e , d e f

e nd a nt c on te nd s th e tr ia l c ourt

imp ro pe rl y

de nie d h is a

pp lic a tio n f

or wr it of habe as cor

pus beca use he r ece ived ineff

ective a ssistance fr om his trial counsel ba sed on a numbe r of complaints about her alleg edly defic ient perf

ormanc e. To pre vail on this complaint, defenda nt had the bur den to prove by a pre pondera

nce of t h e evide nce that: (1) counse l’s perf ormanc e wa s defic ient, i.e. , her assistance fell below an objective standa rd of r easona

bleness; and ( 2) def

endant04
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- 6- was pre judiced, i.e. , a rea sonable probability exis ts that but for counsel’s unpr ofessional e rror s, the result of the proce eding would have be en diffe rent. See Strickland v. W ashington, 104 S. Ct . 2052, 20 64 (1 98 4) ; Tho mp so n v . S tate , 9 S.W .3d 808, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). An appe llate cour t looks to the totalit y

of the repre sentation and the particula r circumstance s of ea ch ca se in eva luating the ef fec tiveness of c ounsel. Thompson , 9 S.W .3d at 813
. There is a strong presumption that counsel’s c onduct fe ll within t he wide r ang e of r ea s o n ab le profe ssional assistance. Id. To defe at the pre sumption of reasona ble profe ssional assistance, a ny alleg ation o f ineff

ectivene ss must be firmly founded in the r ecor d, and the re co rd must affirmatively demonstrate the alleg ed ineffe ctiveness. Id. A. Inv e st iga ti on an d in terv iew of w it n ess es, p ol ice of

f ice rs, an d in tera cti on w it h d ef en d ant I n his first three c omplaints, defe ndant contends counsel was ineffe ctive because she did not adequately

investigate, she did not interview the complainant or the police off icer s, and she did not
a de qu a te ly

int e ra c t w ithhim . Alawy e r’ s d uty to a ssi st a de fe nd ant inc lud e s the du ty to c on su lt w ith the def endant. Ro be rts on v . S

tate , 187 S.W
. 3 d 4 7 5 , 4 8 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). A criminal defe nse lawy er a lso has a duty to make an inde pendent investig ation of the fa cts of a c as e, which includes see king out a

nd interviewingpotential witnesses. Ex parte W elborn, 785 S.W .3d 391, 393 ( T e x. C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 0 ) ; s ee a l s o Cantu v. State, 99 3 S. W.3 d 7 12 , 7 18 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio 1999, pet. re f’d) . A bre ach of the duty to investigate may result in a findingof ineff ective a ssistance “whe re the result is th at any viable def

ense a vailable to the a ccuse d is not advance d.” Ex pa rte Y barra, 629 S.W .3d 943, 946 (Tex
. C ri m . App. 1982). “ I n any ineffe ctiveness c ase, a

particula r de c isi on no t to inv e sti g a te mus t be dir e c tly a sse sse d f

or re a so na ble ne ss i n a ll the cir cum sta nc e s, applying a

heavy measure of def

ere nce to c ounsel’s judg ments.” Strickland, 104 S. Ct . at 2066.04
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- 7- Consequently , we will sustain an appellant’s challeng e only if the consequence of t he alleg ed fa ilure to i nv e sti g a te is that th e on ly via ble de fe ns e a va ila

ble to t he accused

is n ot a dv anc e d, and

the re is
a re asonable probability

that, but for counse l’s fai l u re t o advanc e the de fense , the re sult of the proce eding would have be en diffe rent. Cantu, 993 S.W .3d at 718. I n trial counsel’ s aff

idavit, she stated she r eviewe d the file maintaine d by defe ndant’s prior attorney , revie wed a

nd adopted the motions filed by this attorney , attempted to c ontact “eve ry known lay witness listed on the police re port,” went to the location of the off ense, pe rsonally

took severa l photogr aphs of the loc ati on, revie wed a ll police repor ts, and relied on a ll information supplied by defe ndant. Counsel stated she did not contac t the complainant “[t]o avoid potential tamper ing issues [and she] onl y

speak[s] t o complainants if they first contac t [ her] office .” Counsel also stated it was he r “ e xpe ri e nc e th at po lic e of fi c e rs are no t op e n to pr e -t ri a l in te rv ie ws wi th d e fe ns e a tto rn e y s. Th e re fo re , [sh e do e s] no t us ua lly sp e a k to the of fi c e rs pr e tr ia l.” As to h e r c on ta c t w ithde fe nd ant, counsel stated she spoke with him over the telephone many times; a s trial g rew closer, the y spoke “seve ral times a

bout a varie ty of things” ; the y revie wed all rele vant issues prior to tr ial ; and defe ndant ag ree d with their defe nse strate g y . On appe al, def

endant doe s not argue that the only viable def

ense a vailable to h i m was not advanc ed. Nothing in the rec ord indicate s potential defe nses wer e pr eclude d or that a more extensive investigation would have made any differ ence in defe ndant’s defense. The poli ce of fice rs def endant complains counsel did not interviewdid not witness the beg inning of th e al t er ca tion between de fe nd ant a

nd the c omp la ina

nt. Al tho ug h c ouns e l ha d a du ty to i nv e sti g a te and

int e rv ie w w itn e sse s, her f ailure to intervie w t h e compl ainant, standingalone, is not sufficie nt to rise to the level of inef f e c ti v e a s s is ta

n c e o f c o u n s e l. T h e r e f

o r e , w e c o n c lu d e th e tr ia l c o u rt d id n o t e r r in c o n c lu d ing04
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- 8- that defe ndant “f

ailed to over come the pr esumption that counsel’s conduc t throug hout trial was
rea sonable.” B. M ot ion to Qua sh Th e inf or matio n f ile d a g a in s t

d e f e n d a nt a l l e g e d h e “ k n o w i n g l y and re c kle ssl y

c a us e [d] bo dil y injury to [ complainant] BY STRI KI NG THE COMPL AI

NANT WI T H T HE HAND OF THE DEF ENDAN T . . . .” On a ppeal, de fenda

n t complains trial counse l was ineff ective be cause she failed to qua sh the information on the g rounds that it did not specify the manner

in which he wa s
rec kless, wher e the c omplainant was struc k, or how the c omplainant was phy sically harme d. The suff iciency of an indict m en t o r i n fo rmation is a question of law. Sta te v . M off , 154 S.W .3d 599, 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). A cha rg ing instrument must be specific enoug h to inform the ac cused of

the nature of the a ccus at i o n aga i n s t him so that he may prepa re a defe nse. Id. “Wheneve r re cklessness . . . e nters into or is a par t or eleme n t o f any

offe nse, or it is char g ed that the ac cused a cted r eckle ssly . . . in the commission of an offe nse, [the in fo rm at i o n ] i n order to be
su ffi cie nt in a

ny su c h c a se mus t a lle g e , w ithre a so na ble c e rt a int

y , th e a c t or

a c ts r e lie d u

po n to constitute rec klessness . . ., and in no event shall it be sufficient to alleg e merely that the ac cused, in committi ng the offe nse, ac ted re cklessly or with criminal neglig ence .” T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art. 21.15 (Vernon 1989). We conclude the information her e suff iciently alleg ed the a ct re lied upon to c onstitut e rec klessness: that defe ndant struck the c omplainant with his hand. Se e Sta te v . R og e rs , 21 4 S. W.3 d 6 44 , 648 (T e x. Ap p. —E a stl and 20 06 , pe t. re f’ d) (i nf or matio n suf

fi c ie ntl y a lle g e d a c ts State re lie d u

po n to c on sti tut e re c kle ssn e ss, inc lud ing “ pu sh ing the bo dy of [co mpl a ina nt] wi th [h is] ha nd ” ); Arro

y o v . S tate , 64 S.W .3d 81, 83-84 (T ex . App.—S an Antonio 2001) (inf ormation sufficie ntly

alleg ed ac t State relied upon to c onstitut e rec klessness: “striking the said complaina nt04
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- 9- with the head of

[defendant]”), judgment vacate d and remande d on other grounds , 117 S.W .3d 795 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 03 ). Th e re fo re , tr ia l c ouns e l wa s not ine ff e c tiv e fo r fa ili ng to fi le a

mot ion to quash the infor

mation. Accor dingly , the t rial court did not err in concluding that defe ndant “f ailed to overc ome the pre sumption t hat counse l’s conduct throug hout trial was re asonable .” C. Subpo e na I A fil e Def endant contends trial counsel was ineffe ctive beca use she did not subpoena

the I A file. I n view of the trial court’s f inding that the e vidence contained in the IA file wa s not “materia l,” and based on c ounsel’s statements in her aff idavit as set forth above, we cannot conclude that counsel’s decision not to subpoena the fi l e wa s “outside the wide r ang e of pr ofessionally competent assistance .” Robertson , 187 S.W .3d at 483. Acc ording ly , the trial court did not err in c oncluding that defe ndant “f

ailed to over come the pr esumption that counsel’s conduc t throug hout trial was
rea sonable.” D. Statem ents m ade durin g openin g and closi ng argum ents Def endant contends counsel “uttere d sever al statements aff irming her concur

renc e with the State’s per spectives.” For example, de fenda nt c omplains c ounsel asked, “ What drives two g rown men to act the w ay

[t he prose cutor] just descr ibed i n less than a minute, I ag ree , it was road ra g e.” Def endant a lso c omplains c ounsel stated both he and the complainant “ wer e both doing things on that highw ay

they shouldn’t have been doing.” D efe ndant contends c ounsel misstated the law whe n she told the jury the “key is g oing to be who rea lly took the first punch.” Final l y , d efe ndant complains that, in closing a rg uments, counsel al l u d ed t o his “faults.” Mor e spec ifically , counsel
s t a t e d , “ S o m e b o dy h a d t o g e t ar r e s t e d
. A n d

I s u b m i tt o yo ut h a tu n f

o rt u n a t e l y t h a ts o m e b o dy, despite his faults or doing whateve r t hey wer e doing on Hig hway 90, was [ defe ndant].” Defe ndant04
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- 10- a lso c omp la ins that in he r cl os ing argume nts , co un se l “g a ve pe rs on a l val idi ty to [the po lic e of fi c e r’ s] lawlessness by vouching for [ him] ” when she st ated, “We had one office r . . . who di d his job. He followed his proc edure s. And I ’m not questioning him. I respe ct hi m and I respe ct that uniform.” F ina lly , de fe nd ant co mpl a ins of c ouns e l’ s sta te me nts that bo th m e n w e re “ do ingwr on g ,” and bo th
wer e “e qually

responsible.” I n her a ffidavit, trial counsel stated defe ndant ag ree d with he r trial strateg y and that he play ed an active role in his defe nse. As to t he alleg edly derog atory

comments, counsel state d “we ag ree d that b o th me n h an d le d th e s it u a ti o n b a d ly , b u t th a t it d id n o t r is e to a c r im in a l a c t o n th e p art of [defendant] ... and if any

thing, the two wer e guilty of m utual combat, not criminal assault.” Counsel
a lso state d s he be lie ve d ju ro rs “ do no t take we ll t o b e [sic ] d isr e sp e c tf ul to me n in

blu e and g e ne ra lly appre ciate w hen a defe nse attorney acknow ledg es t he officer ’s t oug h job.” I t is appare nt from the
rec ord and f

rom counsel’ s aff

idavit that the defe nse strate g y was to por tray both the complainant and the def endant a s having acte d inappropriately o n t h e d ay

of the a ssault and to show the jury , as counsel phrase d it dur ing her opening rema rks, that “[t] here was too much testosterone on H ighw ay 90 that da y . . . .” On a pp e a l de fe nd ant d oe s n ot c on te nd he dis a g re e d w iththi s st

rate g y , a nd on thi s
rec ord we conclude the trial court did not err in c oncluding that defe ndant “fa iled to overc ome the presumption that counsel’s c onduct throug hout trial was re asonable .” E. Motion for new trial; inform ing d efendan t of hi s app ellate r ights De fe nd ant c omp la ins c ouns e l wa s ine ff e c tiv e be c a

us e sh e did

no t f ile a mot ion fo r n e w tri a l. He a ls o a ll e g e s c o u n s e l w a s r e qu ir e d to f il e a mo ti o n f

o r n e w tr ia l o r a n o ti c e o f appea l. I n her
a ff ida vit , c ouns e l state d sh e e xpla ine d va ri ou s op tio ns a va ila

ble to de fe nd ant, inc ludi ng po ssi ble g ro un ds fo r a

ne w tri a l or

an a pp e a l. H ow e ve r, sh e a lso inf or me d d e fe nd ant s he wa s n ot c omf or ta ble04
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- 11- handling appea ls and she re commended def en d ant obtain appe llate counse l. Trial counse l subsequentl y

w ithdrew fr om repre sentation, and a ppellate c ounsel was a

ppointed and a timely

notice of appe al was f

iled. On appe al, def

endant doe s not indicate what gr ound s s h o u ld have be en ra ised in a motion for new trial. “In the absenc e of proof of pre judice, we cannot hold that the tria l attorney ’s fa ilure to file a motion for new trial
. . . was ineffe ctive assistance of counse l.” Br y an t v . S tate , 974 S.W .3d 39 5, 40 0 ( Te x. Ap p. —Sa

n A nto nio 19 98 , p e t. re f’ d) (n oti ng , “[a ]bse nt fr om the re c or d is any le g a lly competent e vidence that such filing s were prudent.” ). Ther efor e, we conclude the trial court did not
err in concluding that defe ndant “f ailed to ove rcome the presumption that counsel’ s conduct throug hout trial was re asonable .”

IN EF F EC TIV E A SSIST AN CE OF AP P ELLA TE C OU NSE L Def endant’ s court-a

ppointed appel la

te c o u n s e l f il e d a n An de rs brief on his be half. De fenda nt filed a pr o s e brief. On appea l, de fenda nt c ontends appellate counsel was ineffe ctive bec ause f iling the An de rs brief resulted in “ a complete lac k of advoc acy ,” and c ounsel overlooke d various er rors in the rec ord. A pa

nel of this court re viewed a ll br iefs and the re cord a nd deter mined the appe al was without merit. S

e e Ca no , 2006 WL 47042, at *1. B eca use a pa nel of this court ha s alrea dy deter mined “nothing in t h e re co rd . . . ar g uably supports the appe al,” see id. , we c annot conc lude appellate counsel wa s ineffe ctive. TR IA L C OU RT ’S FINDI NGS De fe nd ant’ s f

ina l c omp la int

on a pp e a l is that th e tr ial c ourt ’s fi nd ing s are “ c le arl y
e rr on e ou s. ” Ho we ve r, de fe nd ant d oe s no t ind ic ate the sp e c if ic fi nd ing s a

bo ut whic h h e c omp la ins ; the re fo re , h is b ro a dly -w or de d c omp la int is n ot s uf fi c ie ntl y sp e c if ic to p re se rv e thi s is su e fo r a pp e a l.04
- 08
- 00 20 3- CR

- 12- CO NC LU SION We o ve rr ule de fe nd ant’ s is su e s a

nd a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt.

Sandee B ry an Mar ion, J ustice DO NO T PU B L I SH