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iii

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

COUNTERING RADICALIZATION 

AND RECRUITMENT TO AL-QAEDA:

FIGHTING THE WAR OF DEEDS

Paul Kamolnick

June 2014

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iv

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ISBN 1-58487-621-2
v

FOREWORD

Twenty-five years after al-Qaeda’s founding, 

countering al-Qaeda radicalization and recruitment 

remains a key U.S. Government (USG) strategic objective. Al-Qaeda proclaims itself the true Islamic 

vanguard seeking to overthrow alleged anti-Muslim 

apostate governments throughout the Arab Muslim 

world. Conducting spectacular, carefully orchestrated anti-Western mass casualty terrorist attacks 

as a component of a broader pan-Sunni Islamist insurgent strategy, al-Qaeda deftly employs insidious 

propaganda. This propaganda creates Manichean 

alternatives—“The Crusader-Zionist War Against Islam” versus “The Vanguard Defender of the Muslim 

Umma”—that have not been decisively discredited 

despite a barrenness in fact. An underground of selfradicalizing individuals and small cliques incited by 

al-Qaeda agitation propaganda now also occupies the 

attention of the intelligence and criminal justice sectors of virtually every Western nation. 

USG officials charged with counterterrorist messaging have yet to effectively counter al-Qaeda’s information warfare. The reasons for this, and a proposed 

methodology for rectifying it, are the core themes of 

Dr. Paul Kamolnick’s monograph. First, he argues that 

we have failed as a nation to realize fully that deeds 

are the most potent communication. Second, that 

many of our policies, actions, and deeds incite anger, 

moral indignation, outrage, and even hate in regions 

of the Arab and Muslim world most vulnerable to our 

nation’s least palatable foreign and military policies. 

This failure to view the world through Arab and Muslim eyes, Kamolnick asserts, has enabled al-Qaeda’s 

sophisticated insurgent propaganda to successfully 
rationalize a violent strategy to assault what it alleges 

are those apostate pillars enabling Western hegemony 

in its Crusader War against a besieged and oppressed 

Muslim faith. Third, Kamolnick provides a highly 

critical review of several official reports and analyses 

proposing various remedial messaging strategies to 

“Sell America to a Westernized secular elite.” It is unlikely, he argues, that U.S. credibility in the Arab and 

Muslim world can be enhanced through diplomatic 

spin, empty platitudes, vague pronouncements, or 

in his words, “putting lipstick on pigs.” This strategy 

he claims, whether disingenuous or simply unimaginative, has failed and will to continue do so. 

The USG’s substantial credibility deficit is the 

proximate cause enabling al-Qaeda’s information 

warfare advantage. Kamolnick’s counterintuitive 

conclusion, however, is that, while the USG does 

maintain certain questionable alliances, exhibit a penchant for regime stability, and maintain a strategy of 

forward deployment in defense of vital energy corridors—succinctly summarized by him as “oil, Israel, 

and autocracy”—al-Qaeda can produce no evidence 

that the USG in deeds, policies, or actions is a religious 

Crusader bent on extirpating Islam. Indeed, authoritative polling suggests substantial majorities in the Arab 

and Muslim world highly rank many core American 

values and distinguish between overall favorable attitudes toward America and Americans, and often 

vehement opposition to certain American foreign and 

military policies. Moreover, highly reputed militant 

Islamists are on record stating that U.S. strategic interests do not preclude seeking and finding common 

ground on a range of key issues of great concern to the 

Islamic world. 

vi
argument deserves the serious attention of USG personnel tasked with conceptualizing and executing an 

effective information warfare strategy to counter this 

lethal adversary.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

viii
vii

Having made the case for taking USG deeds seriously, Kamolnick shifts to proposing and outlining 

a methodology for leveraging the power of deeds 

against al-Qaeda. He first offers a conceptualization 

of adversary propaganda as a component of what he 

calls the insurgent “terrorist quadrangle” comprising political objectives, terrorist propaganda, terrorist 

actions, and strategic objectives. He then provides a 

detailed outline of those core themes and messages 

which, if systematically organized in a coherent sustained information counteroffensive, undermine alQaeda’s case for employing terroristic violence. Key 

to this campaign is that al-Qaeda’s own deeds serve 

as the most damning evidence of its actual status as a 

criminal terrorist organization waging a self-declared 

offensive war to impose its will through terror on 

all—Muslim and non-Muslim—who disagree. Specifically, al-Qaeda’s perfidious methods, terroristic modus operandi, and responsibility for besmirching the 

Islamic Call, prove that it forsakes the shari’a of lawful jihad and is guilty of the commission of major sins 

in Islam; undermines Islamic and Muslim interests; 

and that its signature methods of coercion, force, and 

fear deny the rightful autonomy of persons—Muslim 

and non-Muslim—to exercise essential political and 

civil rights. 

Why a War of Deeds conceived in the manner 

Kamolnick suggests has not been operationalized in 

official USG strategy is puzzling. If he is right, it certainly does appear that al-Qaeda’s center of gravity as 

self-proclaimed vanguard and defender of a besieged 

Umma is vulnerable to frontal assault by the powers of reason, fact, and the evidence of deeds. This 

monograph provides much food for thought. Though 

provocative and in places possibly controversial, its 
ix

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

PAUL KAMOLNICK is full professor of sociology in 

the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, East 

Tennessee State University, USA. He teaches courses 

in classical and contemporary social theory, and the 

sociology of global terrorism. His primary research 

focus is developing theory and methods for countering radicalization and recruitment to Al-Qaeda Senior 

Leadership Endorsed (AQSLE) Anti-American terrorism. He is the author of Delegitimizing Al-Qaeda: A 

Jihad-Realist Approach (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 2012), and 

has published counterterrorism-related articles and 

reviews in Terrorism and Political Violence, Studies in 

Conflict and Terrorism, Perspectives on Terrorism, and 

the Small Wars Journal. Dr. Kamolnick holds a Ph.D. 

from Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida.

xi

SUMMARY

Disrupting, dismantling, and ultimately defeating al-Qaeda-based, affiliated, and inspired terrorism 

is the declared policy of the U.S. Government (USG). 

Despite noteworthy success in attacking the al-Qaeda 

(AQ) terrorist network and securing the homeland 

from terrorist attack, the United States has yet to execute an effective methodology for countering radicalization and recruitment to AQ. This monograph 

proposes a distinct War of Deeds methodology for 

accomplishing this. 

A War of Deeds is to be fought on two interrelated 

fronts: changing deeds and challenging deeds. Changing deeds requires a frank examination and possible 

reorienting of those present-day USG foreign, military, 

and diplomatic policies that diminish USG credibility 

and potentially enhance the resonance of AQ’s terrorist propaganda in the Muslim world. It also requires a 

frank examination of existing USG information operations that in the opinion of the present writer fail to 

adequately address the present U.S. credibility deficit 

and whose proposals too often amount to unpersuasive marketing endeavors pitched to a highly selective 

Westernized audience. 

Challenging deeds involves systematically, comprehensively, and forcefully countering AQ’s terrorist propaganda, fabrications, and disinformation with 

verifiable facts. First, I undertake a careful analysis 

of the nature and function of propaganda in terrorist operations. I demonstrate the vital importance of 

AQ propaganda through the use of a proposed analytic construct—a “terrorist quadrangle”—linking political objectives, terrorist propaganda, terrorist acts, 

and strategic objectives; characterize the critical role 
and function of counterpropaganda in information 

warfare; and contrast counterpropaganda, as here 

defined, with current definitions of psychological 

operations (PSYOP) or military information support 

operations (MISO).

Next, I offer a comprehensive interpretation of 

influence operations, and a broadened conception of 

the nature of contemporary war and warfare. Here 

departing from the conventional seven instruments 

of national power captured by the Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence 

and Law Enforcement (DIMEFIL) or Military, Information/Intelligence, Diplomatic, Legal, Infrastructure, Finance, and Economic (MIDLIFE) acronyms, 

I advance a new acronym, DICEFILM (Diplomatic, 

Informational, Cyber, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, Legal, Military), which explicitly incorporates 

the cyber dimension of warfare, increasing to eight 

the instruments of national power. After providing 

this broadened conception of influence operations, 

contemporary warfare, and instruments of national 

power, I outline and illustrate the War of Deeds methodology for countering AQ’s messengers, media, and 

message; and demonstrate how this methodology 

may be used to counter the two “great lies” authorizing AQ’s terrorist modus operandi, i.e., that the USG 

is an implacable foe and declared enemy of Islam and 

the greater Muslim world (“The Crusader”), and that 

al-Qaeda is fighting a purely defensive jihad on behalf 

of the oppressed worldwide Muslim faith community 

(“The Defender”). 

Following a brief conclusion, select strategic considerations are examined with focus especially on the 

potential suitability, acceptability, and risks accompanying a proposed War of Deeds.

xii
1

COUNTERING RADICALIZATION AND

RECRUITMENT TO AL-QAEDA:

FIGHTING THE WAR OF DEEDS

In the propaganda pioneered by al-Qaeda, terrorism is 

merely self-defense against a perceived American war 

on Islam. There has been no more stark statement of 

this belief than the courtroom declarations of Mr. Faisal Shahzad as he pleaded guilty and was sentenced 

to life without parole for the failed bombing in Times 

Square, New York. Calling himself a ‘Muslim soldier,’ 

Mr. Shahzad denounced the wars in Afghanistan and 

Iraq and drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen. The 

drones, he said, ‘kill women, children, they kill everybody. . . . It’s a war, and in war, they kill people,’ he 

added. ‘They’re killing all Muslims.’1

 Scott Shane

 April 2013

We will continue to make it clear that the United States 

is not—and never will be—at war with Islam. We 

will focus on al-Qaeda’s ability to project its message 

across a range of media, challenge the legitimacy and 

accuracy of the assertions and behavior it advances, 

and promote a greater understanding of U.S. policies 

and actions and an alternative to al-Qaeda’s vision. 

We also will seek to amplify positive and influential 

messages that undermine the legitimacy of al-Qaeda’s 

and its actions and contest its worldview. In some cases, we may convey our ideas and messages through 

person-to-person engagement, other times through 

the power of social media, and in every case through 

the message of our deeds.2

 Barack H. Obama

 President of the United States

 June 2011
2

The arrest or death of existing terrorists will be only 

a short-term success if al-Qaeda continues to recruit, 

indoctrinate, and train new members successfully. The 

U.S. Government must therefore determine how it can 

dissuade new recruits from joining al-Qaeda, as well 

as discourage individuals from providing the terrorist 

organization financial and other support.3

 Kim Cragin and Scott Gerwehr

 2005

INTRODUCTION

In a previous monograph, the author proposed a 

distinct “jihad realist” approach for countering radicalization and recruitment to al-Qaeda (AQ).4

 It was 

argued that the military jihad is, and remains, a binding religious imperative for militant Islamists; a classical Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh al-jihad) regulates the 

waging of this military jihad; AQ’s anti-American 

mass casualty terrorism substantially violates this jurisprudence; and that this orthodox classical Sunnite 

fiqh al-jihad can, and should, be leveraged to delegitimize AQ: especially among that sliver of recruits for 

whom upholding the shari’a is paramount, and the 

avoidance of major sins is a moral imperative. 

The present monograph proposes a “War of 

Deeds” to supplement the author’s jihad-realist approach. Its intended target audience comprises many 

different types of morally outraged potential recruits 

influenced by AQ’s terrorist propaganda that (self-)

radicalize and (self-) recruit to “homegrown” and 

“home-based” terrorism or foreign theaters of conflict. 

This War of Deeds is to be fought on two interrelated 

fronts: changing deeds and challenging deeds. 

Changing deeds requires a frank examination and 

possible reorienting of those present-day U.S. Govern-
3

ment (USG) foreign, military, and diplomatic policies 

that diminish USG credibility in the Muslim world, 

and also potentially enhance the resonance of AQ’s 

terrorist propaganda. 

Challenging deeds involves systematically, comprehensively, and forcefully countering AQ’s terrorist propaganda, fabrications, and disinformation with 

verifiable facts. 

A key premise of the present monograph is that, 

despite recognition that USG policies and actions are 

key drivers of attitudes and perceptions in the wider 

Muslim world, this recognition of deeds as communication has yet to inform sufficiently present terrorist countermessaging strategy. To put it another 

way, if what we do matters far more than what we 

say, or what we say about what we do; if policies and 

actions speak far louder than words; if actions, not 

platitudes, signify definitive proof of one’s motives; 

then, this premise is neither fully acknowledged nor 

systematically exploited in USG information warfare 

designed to counter and delegitimize AQ’s terrorist 

propaganda. 

That the USG need not be beyond moral reproach 

or innocent of superpower capacities, interests, or 

behaviors, is a second, albeit counterintuitive, premise, anchoring the present argument. Ironically, this 

makes a systematic War of Deeds a more productive 

and candid endeavor. How so? USG veracity, credibility, and not moral perfection of motives or deeds 

is key. The USG’s dirtiest laundry discloses at worst

that it engages in superpower realpolitik, privileges 

specific alliances, and defends what it perceives to be 

its vital strategic interests in an imperfect world using 

imperfect means. Evidence does not support a case 

however, even remotely, that the USG is leading or 
4

fomenting a Crusader alliance against Islam. Yes, one 

can discover evidence for genuine tractable clashes of 

interests, intra-civilizational fault lines over religion 

and state, and even inter-civilizational dialogue and 

conflict; however, again, there is no credible evidence

of a Crusader War against Islam or any systematic 

animus directed against Islam or Muslims in general. 

I have said nothing of the USG’s cleaner laundry, and 

there is much of it. I have said nothing of AQ’s dirtiest 

laundry, and there is much of that, described in appropriate context as the argument unfolds. A detailed 

outline of the argument follows. 

First, data is reviewed confirming AQ’s continuing resilience, and also noting progress, or lack thereof, toward accomplishing declared USG policy and 

its three key strategic objectives outlined in the 9/11 

Commission Report (2004). Second, it is asserted that 

USG policies, deeds, and actions are communication, 

that they affect message resonance in the Arab and 

Muslim world, and the two key fronts in a proposed 

War of Deeds are identified: changing deeds, and 

challenging deeds. 

Third, a detailed examination of the first front, 

changing deeds, is provided. I first examine select efforts in USG public diplomacy and their relative failure to put “lipstick on pigs.” I assess the unique challenges and opportunities arising from current USG 

foreign and military policies. Then I assert the vital 

importance of AQ tactical propaganda in relation to 

this author’s proposed analytic construct—a “terrorist quadrangle”— linking political objectives, terrorist propaganda, terrorist acts, and strategic objectives; 

characterize the critical role and function of counterpropaganda in information warfare. Finally, I contrast 

counterpropaganda as here defined, with current definitions of psychological operations (PSYOP).
5

In the remainder of the monograph, I outline, 

describe, and defend key elements comprising the 

second front: challenging deeds in a USG counterpropaganda counteroffensive against AQ. I begin by 

proposing a comprehensive interpretation of influence 

operations, and a broadened conception of the nature 

of contemporary war and warfare. Second, departing 

from the conventional seven instruments of national 

power captured by the Diplomatic, Information, 

Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence and Law 

Enforcement (DIMEFIL) or Military, Information/Intelligence, Diplomatic, Legal, Infrastructure, Finance, 

and Economic (MIDLIFE) acronyms, I advance a new 

acronym, DICEFILM (Diplomatic, Informational, 

Cyber, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, Legal, Military) which explicitly incorporates the cyber dimension of warfare, increasing to eight the instruments of 

national power. 

Third, after providing this broadened conception 

of influence operations, contemporary warfare, and 

instruments of national power, I assert the primacy of 

a War of Deeds for challenging AQ’s terrorist propaganda. I outline and illustrate the War of Deeds methodology for countering AQ’s messengers, media, and 

message. I demonstrate how this methodology may 

be used to counter the two “great lies” authorizing 

AQ’s terrorist modus operandi, i.e., that the USG is an 

implacable foe and declared enemy of Islam and the 

greater Muslim world (“The Crusader”); and that AQ 

is fighting a purely defensive jihad on behalf of the 

oppressed worldwide Muslim faith community (“The 

Defender”). In conclusion, I summarize the main 

themes of the previous argument and offer concrete 

suggestions for strategists tasked with countering 

radicalization and recruitment to AQ. 
6

AL QAEDA: AN EVOLVING THREAT, POLICY, 

AND STRATEGY

Despite declared USG policy to disrupt, dismantle, 

and ultimately defeat AQ,5

 AQ and its affiliates, allies, 

and those motivated and inspired by its vision, continue to pose a significant threat to American citizens 

and U.S. national security. A decade of sanguine declarations and commentary predicting AQ’s decline, 

demise, or even strategic defeat6 have been repeatedly upstaged by this resilient and highly adaptive 

enemy, and more “bearish” assessments have proven 

more reliable.7 AQ’s persistence as a lethal global 

threat—despite the May 2, 2011, killing of Osama bin 

Laden 8—and the August 2013 USG closure of nearly 

two dozen U.S. embassy compounds and worldwide 

travel alert,9

 furnish additional evidence for this bearish view. In addition, AQ, either directly or more 

generally through tactical allies, affiliates, or terrorist 

acts carried out in its name is associated with a lethal 

swath of global terrorist incidents. In 2011, 11 of the 

top 20 most active terrorist groups were linked to AQ. 

Together, those groups carried out over 780 attacks, 

resulting in 3,000 deaths and more than 4,600 wounded. Further, four of the five most lethal attacks were 

linked to an AQ-linked group (AQ in the Arabian Peninsula [AQAP], Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, al-Shabaab, 

and AQ in Iraq).10 In 2012, six of the top 10 terrorist 

perpetrator groups worldwide had at least limited association with AQ’s global insurgent terrorist modus 

operandi, conducting 1,470 terrorist attacks, which resulted in 4,938 deaths.11

Recent reports documenting how AQ’s encrypted 

cyber communication facilitates transnational terrorist logistics and organization further evidences the 
7

adaptive capacities of this lethal adversary.12 Finally, 

USG recognition of the evolving AQ threat ensures 

that strategists will be tasked with developing effective methods for countering this resilient foe. 13

THREE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES 

The seminal 9/11 Commission Report (2004) identifies three key strategic objectives for a comprehensive 

counter-AQ strategy: (1) attacking terrorists and their 

organizations; (2) preventing the continued growth of 

Islamist terrorism; and, (3) protecting against and preparing for terrorist attacks.14 Progress on two of these 

three strategic objectives, attacking terrorists and their 

organizations and protecting against and preparing 

for terrorist attacks, has certainly contributed to preventing successful mass-casualty terrorist attacks on 

the scale of September 11, 2001 (9/11). 

Attacking Terrorists and Their Organizations. 

Defeating the AQ terrorist entity necessitates systematically attacking, degrading, and ultimately destroying its means of sustaining itself as an ongoing 

organizational enterprise. Military, diplomatic, financial, legal, and intelligence instruments of national 

power have been deployed to great effect to accomplish the following: identify and prioritize sanctuary 

denial, actual or potential, in free states, failing states, 

and remote regions; attack terrorists and their organizations via identification, disruption, capture, and 

kill; attack elements required for complex international terrorist operation, including time, space, the ability 

to plan, and presence of a functional command structure; constrain the opportunity and space to recruit, 
8

train, and select operatives; attack and deny logistics 

networks; deny access to weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD) elements; disrupt reliable communication; 

and, eliminate the ability and opportunity for pretesting planning.15

National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Director Matthew Olsen directly references these elements 

when, in congressional testimony, he delineated accomplishments against AQ during the period under 

review (August 2011-2012): 

[W]e have made significant progress in the fight 

against terrorism. Our nation has placed relentless 

pressure on al-Qa’ida’s leadership. We have denied 

the group safe havens, resources, and the ability to 

plan and train. Following the death last year of Usama 

bin Ladin, several of his top lieutenants have been 

eliminated. The leaders that remain lack experience 

and are under siege. They have limited ability to recruit and communicate with other operatives. In short, 

the intelligence picture shows that al-Qa’ida core is a 

shadow of its former self, and the overall threat from 

al-Qa’ida in Pakistan is diminished. Further, the government has disrupted terrorist attacks in the United 

States and abroad. Our intelligence officers have 

worked diligently to identify and stop terrorist plots 

before they are executed. And we have investigated 

and prosecuting [sic] individuals who have sought to 

carry out and supported [sic] terrorist operations.16

James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence 

(DNI), also references this strategic objective when he 

states in reference to “core AQ”: “Senior personnel 

losses in 2012, amplifying losses and setbacks since 

2008, have degraded core AQ to a point that the group 

is probably unable to carry out complex, large-scale 

attacks in the West.” He continues, however, 
9

The group has essentially the same strategic goals 

since its initial declaration of war against the United 

States in 1996, and to the extent that the group endures, its leaders will not abandon the aspiration to 

attack inside the United States.17

Finally, in his May 23, 2013, National Defense 

University (NDU) speech, “The Future of our Fight 

Against Terrorism,” outlining and defending his proposed counter-terrorist policy and strategy states specifically in relation to targeting terrorists, President 

Barack Obama stated: 

After I took office, we stepped up the war against al 

Qaeda, but also sought to change its course. We relentlessly targeted al Qaeda’s leadership. Today, 

Osama bin Laden is dead, and so are most of his top 

lieutenants. There have been no large-scale attacks on 

the United States, and our homeland is more secure. 

Today, the core of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan is on a path to defeat. Their remaining operatives 

spend more time thinking about their own safety than 

plotting against us. They did not direct the attacks in 

Benghazi or Boston. They have not carried out a successful attack on our homeland since 9/11.18

The USG Policy of Targeted Killing of High Value Targets (HVTs) Using Armed Unmanned Aerial 

Vehicles (UAVs, or “Drones”). Apprehending, arresting, and incarcerating AQ terrorists has been pursued,19 and Special Forces raids carried out to find, 

fix, and finish specific targets, including on May 2, 

2011, AQ emir Osama bin Laden. Undoubtedly, the 

targeted killing of HVTs using UAVs or “drones” has 

been the dominant tactic of choice to disrupt, disman-
10

tle, and defeat AQ. After describing the Abbottabad, 

Pakistan raid leading to the killing of Osama bin Laden, President Obama forthrightly stated his rationale 

for a policy of targeted killing:

It is . . . not possible for America to simply deploy a 

team of Special Forces to capture every terrorist. And 

even when such an approach may be possible, there 

are places where it would pose profound risks to our 

troops and local civilians– where a terrorist compound 

cannot be breached without triggering a firefight with 

surrounding tribal communities that pose no threat 

to us, or when putting U.S. boots on the ground may 

trigger a major international crisis. . . . To put it another way, our operation in Pakistan against Osama 

bin Laden cannot be the norm. The risks in that case 

were immense; the likelihood of capture, although 

our preference, was remote given the certainty of resistance; the fact that we did not find ourselves confronted with civilian casualties, or embroiled in an 

extended firefight, was a testament to the meticulous 

planning and professionalism of our Special Forces—

but also depended on some luck. . . . And even then, 

the cost to our relationship with Pakistan—and the 

backlash among the Pakistani public over encroachment on their territory—was so severe that we are 

just now beginning to rebuild this important partnership. . . . It is in this context that the United States has 

taken lethal, targeted action against al Qaeda and its 

associated forces, including with remotely piloted aircraft commonly referred to as drones.20

Evidence in support of the suitability/efficacy of 

drones for finding, fixing, and finishing terrorist HVTs 

is compelling,21 as is their lawfulness as a tool of war.22

This likely explains recent trends in the expansion of 

drone bases whether used primarily for surveillance, 

lethal targeting, or both,23 as well as more recent official pronouncements.24
11

The following evidence corroborates this assertion. The drone campaign largely focused on the 

North and South Waziristan regions in Pakistan has 

devastated key AQ-based leadership and operatives, 

and key anti-USG forces attacking USG and Coalition 

International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF). Between 2004 and November 29, 2013, 353 strikes had 

been conducted, with 342 taking place since January 

2008, with the number of casualties as follows: in 2006 

(122), 2007 (73), 2008 (286), 2009 (463), 2010 (801), 2011 

(405), 2012 (300), and 2013 (119 as of November 29, 

2013). Of those 353 strikes, 72 percent have hit targets 

in North Waziristan, and 24 percent have hit targets in 

South Waziristan. The number of Taliban/AQ leaders killed in the territories of various Taliban factions 

from 2004-13 include the territory of Abu Kasha al 

Iraqi (12), The Haqqani Network (14), Mullah Nazir 

(9), Mehsud (7), Hafiz Gul Bahadar (6), Faqir Mohammed (2), and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (1).25 The New 

America Foundation records the following totals for 

the 2004 to November 21, 2013, time frame: total drone 

strikes at 369; total numbers killed at 2,077-3,424, and 

the total number of militants killed at 1,620-2,783.26

More telling, however, is the data for HVTs removed from the field of battle. The total numbers include 1 in 2004, 2 in 2005, 2 in 2006, 0 in 2007, 19 in 

2008, 18 in 2009, 20 in 2010, 9 in 2011, 13 in 2012, and 

19 as of November 23, 2013.27 Consider the following 

select examples: 

• Senior-level clerics and ideologues: Abu Yahya 

al Libi,28 Kahlid bin Abdul Rahman al Husainan, Mansur al Shami;
12

• Trainers: Abu Saif al Jaziri, Abdullah Hamas 

al Filistini, Abu Musa al Masri, Abu Rashid, 

Muhammaed Ilyas Kuwaiti, Muhammad Sajid 

Yamani;

• Commanders: Abu Laith al Libi, Khalid Habib, 

Abdullah Said al Libi, Hazrat Omar, Khan Mohammed, Sheikh Yasin al Kuwaiti;

• Financiers: Mustafa Abu Yazid and Abu Zaid 

al Iraqi; 

• Bomb makers and explosives experts, including 

WMD: Abu Hamza and Abu Khabab al Masri; 

• Faciliators: Abdullah Azzam al Saudi; 

• Intelligence chiefs: Abu Ubaydah Abdullah al 

Adam; 

• External operations senior operatives or chiefs 

to West and other regions: Abu Sulayman Jazairi, Abu Jihad al Masri, Osama al Kini, Saleh al 

Somali, Sadam Hussein al Hussami, Osama bin 

Ali bin Abdullah bin Damjan al Dawasari, Abu 

Hafs al Shahri, Aslam Awan; 

• Suicide operations chiefs: Wali Mohammed; 

• High-level leaders: Hakimullah Mehsud, Baitullah Mehsud, Tahir Yuldashev, Sheikh Fateh 

al Masri, Jan Baz Zadran, Mullah Sangeen 

Zadran, Abd al Rahman al Yemeni, Abu Miqdad al Masri, Badr Mansoor, Abu Usamn Adil, 

Abu Yahya al Libi, Mullah Nazir, Attah Ullah 

Rafy Khan, and Waliur Rehman.29

Of extreme value has been the removal of AQ’s 

operatives who have previously become global 

managers: 

• Abu Faraj al Libi, from 2001 until capture in 

Pakistan in May 2005; 
13

• Mustafa Abu al Yazid, (aka: Sheikh Saeed), 

2005 until death by drone strike in May 2010; 

• Atiyah Abd al Rahman, 2010 until death by 

drone strike August 22, 2011; and 

• Abu Yahya al Libi, 2011 until death by drone 

strike June 2012.30

Seven key AQ leaders were killed by drone strikes in 

Pakistan subsequent to the May 2, 2011, Special Forces 

operation that led to the killing of AQ emir Osama 

bin Laden: 

• Abu Yahya al-Libi; 

• Ilyas Kashmiri (head of AQ’s military and 

member of external operations council);

• Atiyah abd al Rahman (bin Laden’s former 

chief of staff and Zawahiri’s previous deputy); 

• Abu Miqdad al Masri (a member of AQ’s Shura 

Majlis also involved in external operations);

• Badr Mansoor (AQ leader in Pakistan and 

key link to the Taliban and Pakistani jihadist 

groups); 

• Aslam Awan (deputy to the leader of AQ external operations); and, 

• Abu Hafs al Shahri (senior AQ leader and operations chief for Pakistan).

The role of drones in attacking AQ’s lethal affiliate, the Yemeni-based AQAP, is similarly telling. The 

number of U.S. airstrikes in Yemen climbed from under five per year from 2002-10 to 10 in 2011, 42 in 2012, 

and 24 as of December 9, 2013. The number of AQAP 

casualties was 81 in 2011, 193 in 2012, and 97 as of 

December 9, 2013.31
14

The USG-targeted killing of American-born Yemeni Anwar al-Awlaki, senior AQAP leader, propagandist, and religious figure, in a drone strike in Yemen on 

September 30, 2011, is one of the more notable strategic 

successes of the ongoing drone campaign in Yemen. 

Killed in Marib in the Province of Jawf, Awlaki was 

considered, “Al Qaeda’s greatest English-language 

propagandist and one of its top operational planners.”32 Awlaki’s deadly reach is especially evident in 

the plots he helped plan and persons he inspired to 

attack in the United States. According to Peter Bergen:

24 ‘homegrown’ violent jihadist extremists in the 

United States who have been indicted or convicted of 

terrorism or have been killed while engaged in violent 

jihad since 2001 read Awlaki’s propaganda or maintained contact with him.33

Some of the most notorious of those inspired by 

Awlaki to perpetrate or attempt to perpetrate the 

mass-killing of Americans, include: 

• Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan, MD, age 39,

Army psychiatrist, recently convicted and sentenced to death on April 15, 2013, for the November 5, 2009, shooting and murder at Fort 

Hood, TX, of 13 soldiers, and wounding 31.

• Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, age 25, who pled

guilty to eight charges, including attempted 

murder and terrorism, for the December 25, 

2009, failed “underwear” bombing aimed at 

downing Northwest Airlines Flight 253 carrying 279 passengers and 11 crew members as it 

approached Detroit, MI.34

• Zachary Adam Chesser (aka Abu Talha alAmerikee) age 25, sentenced February 24, 2011, 

to serve 25 years in federal prison for three 

felony charges: providing material support to 
15

terrorists, communicating threats, and soliciting others to commit violence.35

• Najibullah Zazi, for the September 2009 attempted suicide attack in New York’s subway 

system.

• Pakistani-American Faisal Shahzad, age 35, for

the failed May 1, 2010, vehicle-born improvised 

explosive device (VIED) deployed in Times 

Square, New York, now serving a mandatory 

life sentence for his guilty plea on 10 felony 

counts.

• Carlos Leon Bledsoe (aka, Abdulhakim Muhammad), for the June 1, 2009, drive-by shooting and killing of a soldier outside a Little Rock, 

AR, military recruiting station, now serving a 

life sentence.36

• Dhokhar (age 19), and Tamerlan Tsarnaev (age

26), for having denotated two pressure cooker 

bombs during the Boston marathon, killing 

four (two females, aged 29 and 23; an 8-year old 

boy; and an MIT police officer, Sean A. Collier, 

killed three days after the bombing), and injuring 264 others, many seriously and requiring 

amputation, including the serious wounding of 

a Transit Police officer.

The present drone policy has disrupted a Mumbaistyle mass casualty terror attack directed at Britain, 

France, and Germany37 as well as efforts to acquire 

and operationalize WMD.38 It has also disrupted the 

best of the terrorist bomb makers39 and those senior 

operational leaders enganged in transmitting terror 

craft to other affiliates.40 Finally, this drone policy has 

also disrupted long sought after chief facilitators, couriers, and operatives such as Mustafa Hajji Muham-
16

mad Khan (aka: Hassan Ghul).41 It also likely presumes 

that the security of confinement and imprisonment 

in many nations is unpredictable,42 and that, while 

highly desirable and necessary, existing “Rewards for 

Justice”43 bounties placed on HVTs cannot supplant a 

surer way to find, fix, and finish declared enemies. 

Many crucial HVTs are still at large and are certainly of intense interest to USG counterterrorism (CT) 

operators. For example: 

• Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri,44 present AQ emir and 

life-long violent Islamist; 

• Nasir Abdul Karim al-Wuhayshi, current emir 

of AQAP and now general manager and second in command in AQ;

• Khalid al-Habib, responsible for AQ operations 

in Afghanistan and northern Pakistan; 

• Adnan el Shukrijumah and Saif al-Adel highlevel AQ senior leaders;

• Mustafa Hamid, father-in-law of Saif al-Adel; 

• Shaikh Said al-Sharif;

• Abu Mohammad al-Masri; 

• Anas al-Libi; 

• Matiur Rehman, a Pakistani militant and AQ 

planning chief; 

• Abu Khalil al-Madani, senior AQ operative; 

and, 

• Adam Gadahn, senior AQ communications 

and media official.

Also of intense value is Abdelmalek Droukdel (aka: 

Abu Musab Abdelwadoud), leader of al-Qaeda in the 

Islamic Magreb (AQIM), whose violent pedigree runs 

deep, his having joined the Algerian Islamic Group 

(GIA) in 1995, a splinter group, becoming a member of 

the GIA splinter group the Salafi Group for Preaching 
17

and Combat (GSPC) in 1998—whose formal subordination to AQ was announced in 2003—to becoming 

the emir of the GSPC in mid-2004, and after 2006 joining forces with AQ and in January 2007, changing its 

name to AQIM. Others include:

• Sirajuddin Haqqani, head of the Haqqani 

network;45 and,

• Ibrahim Sulaiman al Rubaish, AQAP’s 

mufti and a former Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, 

detainee.46

Protection Against and Preparation for 

Terrorist Attacks.

Protecting and preparing the U.S. homeland 

against terrorist attacks is a second key objective of 

current strategy.47 The following chief elements were 

identified by the 9/11 Commission as essential to this 

objective: 

• prohibiting terrorist travel; 

• acquiring and deploying biometric screening 

systems; 

• enhancing border security and immigration 

law enforcement; 

• enhancing aviation and transportation security; 

creating a layered security system; 

• setting priorities for national preparedness; 

• ensuring that command, control, and communications are intact and operative following a 

terrorist attack; 

• enhancing private sector preparedness; and,

• ensuring that American’s civil liberties are 

protected.48
18

Several key agencies are tasked with contributing 

to the success of this strategic objective, especially the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and several 

intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Multiple 

official reports identify the above tasks as essential to 

homeland defense and protection from terrorist attack.49 Accomplishments and the agencies involved 

are identified by NCTC Director Matthew Olsen: 

The government has disrupted terrorist attacks in the 

United States and abroad. Our intelligence officers 

have worked diligently to identify and stop terrorist 

plots before they are executed. And we have investigated and prosecuted individuals who have sought to 

carry out and support terrorist operations. In addition, 

we have continued to build an enduring counterterrorism framework—including institutions like NCTC 

and DHS [Department of Homeland Security]—dedicated to analyzing and sharing terrorism information 

across the government and to the mission of detecting 

and preventing terrorist attacks against our citizens 

and interests around the world. The credit for these 

successes belongs to the men and women in our military, law enforcement and intelligence communities.50

President Obama, in his May 2013 NDU speech, 

identifies these same accomplishments while also stating that his approach will abide by differing “rule of 

law” standards than his White House predecessor, ”. . . 

we strengthened our defenses—hardening targets, 

tightening transportation security, and giving law enforcement new tools to prevent terror.”51 A generally 

laudatory report issued September 2011 finds that 10 

years after 9/11, of the 15 recommendations made by 

the 2004 9/11 Commission Report directed at protecting 

against and preparing for terrorist attacks, nine have 

been fulfilled:
19

• terrorist travel

• border security

• international cooperation on border security

• transportation security

• improved aviation security

• safeguard privacy of information

• executive branch department to ensure civil 

liberties/security tradeoff legally enforced

• objective risk assessment determines allocation 

of homeland security assistance

• private sector preparedness

Seven recommendations required improvement or 

remain unfulfilled:

• biometric entry-exit

• secure identification

• better passenger explosive screening

• justification of executive privilege

• entitlement to civil liberties

• incident command system adoption

• radio spectrum sharing.52

Data on terrorist incidents in the United States, 

intelligence disruption of terrorist plots, legal actions 

against terrorist plotters, and official response to the 

April 15, 2013, Boston marathon terror attack largely 

also corroborate the considerable successes in pursuit 

of this strategic objective.53 It is important to note, 

finally, these tasks essential to strategic objective #3 

are the primary responsibility of the Department of 

Justice, DHS, (created in 2002; combines 22 existing 

federal agencies, workforce of 230,000, and budget exceeding $50 billion), the NCTC, and the Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).54
20

Preventing the Continued Growth of 

Islamist Terrorism. 

Compared with the previous two strategic objectives above, preventing the continued growth of Islamist terrorism has proven the most challenging.55

Indeed, during the past 4 years, challenges on this 

front have emerged as a source of official reports, 

commentary, concern, and perplexity. A seemingly 

battered and bruised AQ, reeling from 5 years of 

ramped up drone attacks and 12 years of post-9/11 

USG CT policy and national vigilance, has somehow 

managed to solicit and elicit the participation of hundreds, if not thousands, of persons radicalized by its 

propaganda and recruited to any number of terrorist 

plots. Debate at present among CT analysts and policymakers concerns not whether new recruits are making themselves available for terrorist acts, but how to 

conceptualize this phenomenon, and what strategies 

are required to combat it. 

Official pronouncements of this emergent phenomenon are legion. Let us first consider a few of the 

more prominent official USG accounts. The Bipartisan 

Commission charged with evaluating the implementation of the 2004 Commission’s recommendations 10 

years after 9/11 asserts: 

Although Osama bin Laden is dead, al Qaeda is not; it 

is a network, not a hierarchy. Over a period of years, 

al Qaeda has been very adaptive and resilient. . . . Al 

Qaeda’s capabilities to implement large-scale attacks 

are less formidable than they were ten years ago, but 

al Qaeda and its affiliates continue to have the intent 

and reach to kill dozens, or even hundreds, of Americans in a single attack. Al Qaeda has been marked by 

rapid decentralization. The most significant threats 
21

to American national security come from affiliates of 

core al Qaeda . . . [al-Awlaki and AQAP; South Asia]; 

. . . failing or failed states such as Yemen and Somalia. . . . al Qaeda’s strategy of ‘diversification’—attacks 

mounted by a wide variety of perpetrators of different 

national and ethnic backgrounds that cannot easily be 

‘profiled’ as threats. . . . Most troubling, we have seen 

a pattern of increasing terrorist recruitment of American citizens and residents to act as ‘lone wolves’. Today, we know that Americans are playing increasingly 

prominent roles in al Qaeda’s movement. MuslimAmerican youth are being recruited in Somali communities in Minneapolis and Portland, Oregon, in some 

respects moving the front lines to the interior of our 

country. . . . Alarmingly, we have discovered that individuals in the U.S. are engaging in ‘self-radicalization’. 

This process is often influenced by blogs and other 

online content advocating violent Islamist extremism. 

While there are methods to monitor some of this activity, it is simply impossible to know the inner thinking 

of every at-risk person. Thus, self-radicalization poses 

a serious emerging threat in the U.S.56

A similar characterization of this emergent phenomenon is described in the 2011 National Strategy for 

Counterterrorism (NSCT). For example: 

[I]n recent years the source of the threat to the United 

States and its allies has shifted in part toward the periphery—to groups affiliated with but separate from 

the core group in Pakistan and Afghanistan. This also 

includes deliberate efforts by al-Qa’ida to inspire individuals within the United States to conduct attacks on 

their own.57

The broadened definition of an “adherent” in this 

NSCT also evidences this shift: adherent is defined as 
22

[i]ndividuals who have formed collaborative relationships with, act on behalf of, or are otherwise inspired 

to take action in furtherance of the goals of al-Qa’ida—

the organization and the ideology—including by engaging in violence regardless of whether such violence is targeted at the United States, its citizens, or its 

interests.58

A litany of similar warnings is sounded at 

various places. 

Although its brutal tactics and mass murder of Muslims have undermined its appeal, al-Qa’ida has had 

some success in rallying individuals and other militant groups to its cause. Where its ideology does resonate, the United States faces an evolving threat from 

groups and individuals that accept al-Qa’ida’s agenda 

whether through formal alliance, loose affiliation, or 

mere inspiration. . . . Adherence to al-Qa’ida’s ideology may not require allegiance to al-Qa’ida, the organization. Individuals who sympathize with or actively 

support al-Qa’ida may be inspired to violence and can 

pose an ongoing threat, even if they have little or no 

formal contact with al-Qa’ida. Global communications 

and connectivity place al-Qa’ida’s calls for violence 

and instructions for carrying it out within easy reach 

of millions. Precisely because its leadership is under 

such pressure in Afghanistan and Pakistan, al-Qa’ida 

has increasingly sought to inspire others to commit 

attacks in its name. Those who in the past have attempted attacks in the United States have come from 

a wide range of backgrounds and origins, including 

U.S. citizens and individuals with varying degrees of 

overseas connections and affinities.59

[We] must retain a focus on addressing the near-term 

challenge of preventing those individuals already on 

the brink from embracing al-Qa’ida ideology and resorting to violence.60
23

. . . [P]lots directed and planned from overseas are not 

the only sort of terrorist threat we face. Individuals inspired by but not directly connected to al-Qa’ida have 

engaged in terrorism in the U.S. Homeland. Others are 

likely to follow their example, and so we must remain 

vigilant.61

Europe also faces a threat from individuals radicalized 

by al-Qa’ida ideology to carry out violence despite 

their lack of formal affiliation with or operational direction from al-Qa’ida or its affiliates.62

The 21st century venue for sharing information and 

ideas is global, and al-Qa’ida, its affiliates and its 

adherents attempt to leverage the worldwide reach 

of media and communications systems to their advantage. . . . In the global information environment, 

al-Qa’ida adherents who promote or attempt to commit violence domestically are influenced by al-Qa’ida 

ideology and messaging that originates overseas, and 

those who attempt terror overseas often cite domestic 

U.S. events or policies. At the same time, people—including those targeted by al-Qa’ida propaganda—live 

in a local context and are affected by local issues, media, and concerns.”63

It is clear that al-Qa’ida the organization has been 

degraded and out of weakness, called on individuals who know the group only through its ideology to 

carry out violence in its name. . . . And even as the 

core of al-Qa’ida in Pakistan and Afghanistan continues to be dismantled through systematic CT actions, 

we have expanded our focus in this Strategy to articulate the specific approaches we must take to counter 

al-Qa’ida affiliates and adherents on the periphery, be 

they established affiliated groups in Yemen or Somalia 

or individual adherents in the Homeland who may be 

mobilized to violence in al-Qa’ida’s name. . . . As some 

threats have been diminished, others have emerged, 
24

and—correspondingly—as some of our approach remain constant, so have others evolved.64

NCTC Director Olsen, after having cited great 

progress along strategic objectives one and three,65

similarly remarks:66

While these gains are real and enduring, al-Qa’ida, 

its affiliates and adherents around the world—as well 

as other terrorist organizations—continue to pose 

a significant threat to our country. This threat is resilient, adaptive, and persistent. More than a decade 

after the September 11th attacks, we remain at war 

with al-Qa’ida, and we face an evolving threat from 

its affiliates and adherents. . . . Indeed, the threats we 

face have become more diverse. As al-Qa’ida core 

leadership struggles to remain relevant, the group has 

turned to its affiliates and adherents to carry out attacks and to advance its ideology. The group remains 

committed to striking Western targets, including the 

United States . . . compel[ling] operational planners 

to place a greater emphasis on smaller, simpler plots 

that are easier to carry out . . . Since Bin Laden’s death, 

multiple al-Qa’ida leaders have publicly endorsed the 

concept of individual acts of violence . . . .

Homegrown violent extremists (HVEs), including 

those inspired by al-Qa’ida’s ideology, continue to 

pose a threat to the United States. HVEs inspired by alQa’ida are almost certainly entering a period of transition as US-based violent extremists adjust to the deaths 

and disruption of influential English-language figures 

who helped al-Qa’ida’s ideas resonate with some in 

the U.S. Now deceased AQAP members Anwar alAulaqi and Samir Khan were probably best positioned 

to create propaganda specifically for an American audience and mobilize HVEs. Their propaganda remains 

easily accessible online and will likely continue to 

inspire HVE violence. The growth of online English-
25

language extremist content during the last three years 

[2009-2012] has fostered a shared identity—but not 

necessarily operational collaboration—among HVEs. 

Plots disrupted during the past year were unrelated 

operationally, but may demonstrate a common cause 

rallying independent violent extremists to plot against 

the US. Lone actors or insular groups pose the most 

serious HVE threat to the homeland. HVEs could view 

lone offender attacks as a model for future plots in the 

United States and overseas. The perceived success 

of previous lone offender attacks combined with alQa’ida and AQAP’s propaganda promoting individual acts of terrorism is raising the profile of this tactic”67

In recent Congressional testimony, DNI Clapper 

proposes a nearly identical assessment when he asserts that “[t]errorist threats are in a transition period 

as the global jihadist movement becomes increasingly 

decentralized” and comprises the following actors 

of deepest concern to the USG.68 Core AQ will continue its targeting of the United States as noted above, 

but one now must consider the following delineating and disaggregation of the contemporary threat 

landscape. AQAP’s continued attempt to hit the U.S. 

homeland but also adjust its own techniques, tactics, 

and procedures in relation to more local objectives; 

AQ-inspired HVEs which he estimates “will continue to be involved in fewer than 10 domestic plots 

per year” and will be motivated to engage in violent 

action by global jihadist propaganda, including English-language material, such as AQAP’s Inspire magazine; events in the United States or abroad perceived 

to be threatening to Muslims; the perceived success 

of other HVE plots, such as the November 2009 attack at Fort Hood, TX, and March 2012 attacks by an 

AQ-inspired extremist in Toulouse, France; and their 

own grievances.
26

In a discussion of the “global jihadist threat overseas” including “affiliates, allies, and sympathizers,” 

Clapper states that despite AQ’s complete absence in 

fomenting the “Arab Spring,” it presents “opportunities for established affiliates, aspiring groups, and 

like-minded individuals to conduct attacks against 

US interests”; that the Arab Spring will also increase 

the likelihood of diminished state capacities that 

will facilitate: 

weakened or diminished counterterrorism capabilities, border control mechanisms, internal security priorities, and other shortcomings in these countries—

[that] combined with anti-US grievances or triggering 

events—will sustain the threats to US interests 

throughout the region.69

The President’s 2013 NDU speech makes repeated 

reference to the evolving threat environment now 

confronting U.S. CT policy and strategy. Referencing 

“core AQ” and “regional affiliates” in Africa, Yemen, 

Somalia, and Iraq in terms identical to NCTC Director 

Olsen and DNI Clapper, Obama explicitly identifies 

the rise of home-based and home-grown radicalization and recruitment to terror70: 

Finally, we face a real threat from radicalized individuals here in the United States. Whether it’s a shooter at 

a Sikh Temple in Wisconsin; a plane flying into a building in Texas; or the extremists who killed 168 people at 

the Federal Building in Oklahoma City—America has 

confronted many forms of violent extremism in our 

time. Deranged or alienated individuals—often U.S. 

citizens or legal residents—can do enormous damage, 

particularly when inspired by larger notions of violent 

jihad. That pull towards extremism appears to have 

led to the shooting at Fort Hood, and the bombing of 

the Boston Marathon. . . .71
27

A recent report72 to the United Nations (UN) Security Council by a team responsible for reporting on 

the implementation and success of sanctions pursuant 

to Resolution 2083 (2012) concerning AQ, associated 

individuals, and entities similarly finds: 

• that the AQ threat continues to diversify, with 

the evolution of a range of loosely linked affiliates and the rise of autonomously radicalized individuals and cells drawing on AQ’s 

ideology. While the threat posed by AQ as a 

global terrorist organization has declined, the 

threat posed by its affiliates and infectious 

ideas persists.73

• Three developments point to the continuing 

evolution of the threat. First, terrorist propaganda on the Internet continues to grow in 

sophistication and reach, and is contributing 

to the problem of self-radicalization. Second, 

the recent attacks in Boston, London, and Paris 

point to the persistent challenge of acts of expressive terrorist violence committed by individuals or small groups. Troublingly, these 

may draw on autonomous attack plans rather 

than the specific leadership tasking of either 

AQ or affiliates.74 Third, the continuing civil 

war in the Syrian Arab Republic has seen the 

emergence of a strong AQ in Iraq . . . attracting 

hundreds of recruits from outside the Syrian 

Arab Republic.75

• AQ and its affiliates have shown themselves 

to be adept communicators, using marketing 

and propaganda to cultivate supporters and 

incite attacks.76
28

Finally, academic analysts Schweitzer and Mendelbaum make several keen observations on AQ’s recent prospects, despite being damaged over the past 

decade by a global anti-terrorist regime. “[T]he leaders of al-Qaeda and its affiliates,” they assert, “chose 

to adopt the Arab Spring in order to turn it into an 

Islamic Spring.” By exploiting toppled regimes, forming opportunistic tactical alliances, wreaking chaos, 

fomenting ungovernability, taking advantage of security lapses, and streaming in foreign fighters, it may be 

the case that: 

al-Zawahiri’s vision of establishing a caliphate and restoring Islam’s lost glory seems imaginary, [however], 

it is likely that al-Qaeda, by means of its affiliates and 

perhaps also on its own, will try to renew its efforts 

to carry out a grand terrorist campaign, as it did in 

the past, following the withdrawal of the United States 

and NATO from Afghanistan.77

Daily headlines and the increased probabilities associated with terrorist action arising in a less centralized fashion and involving persons more recently recruited to a so-called jihadist path typify larger swaths 

of contemporary life. It is one thing to be treated to 

high level reports, analyses, policies, pronouncements, and findings, and another to assemble the 

raw data centering on individual persons whose acts 

or potential acts lead them to find the very publicity 

they seek. 

We earlier listed some of Awlaki’s most prominent 

terrorist recruits—Major Nidal Malik Hassan, Dzohar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev, Zachary Adam Chesser, 

Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, Shahzad Faisal, and 

Carlos Leon Bledsoe. Let us now consider the briefest 

sampling of others whose names have graced headlines in recent years: 
29

• Bangladeshi Quazi Mohammed Rezwanul Ahsan Nafis, 21, arrested in a sting operation involving a fake 1,000-pound VIED bomb.78

• Jose Pimentel, a 27 year-old Muslim convert

of Hispanic origin; a follower of Awlaki, constructed the bombs based on Inspire’s “Make a 

Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom.”79

• Naser Abdo, 21, a professed conscientious objector based on his Muslim beliefs: 

found in a motel room three miles from Fort 

Hood’s main gate with a handgun, an article 

titled “Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your 

Mom” from AQAP’s English-language Inspire

magazine and the ingredients for an explosive 

device, including gunpowder, shrapnel, and 

pressure cookers. . . . Abdo told investigators 

he planned to construct two bombs in his motel 

room using gunpowder and shrapnel packed 

into pressure cookers and then detonate 

the explosives at a restaurant frequented by 

soldiers. . . . On his way out of the courtroom he 

yelled “Iraq 2006!” and the name of Abeer Qassim al-Janabi, a 14-year-old Iraqi girl who was 

raped that year before she and her family were 

killed. Five current or former soldiers went to 

prison, one for a life term, for their roles in that 

attack. He also shouted the name of Hasan, 

an Army major and psychiatrist charged with 

killing 13 people at Fort Hood.80

• Mohammed Mahmood Alessa, 20 (born in

the United States and of Palestinian descent), 

and Carlos Eduardo Almonte, 26 (naturalized 

citizen born in Dominican Republic), arrested 

before boarding separate flights for Egypt and 

then to Somalia, June 5, 2010, for planning an 
30

assassination to outdo Major Nidal Malik Hassan. “He’s not better than me. I’ll do twice what 

he did,” Alessa allegedly said in undercover 

recordings by New York Police Department 

undercover officers.81

• Rezwan Ferdaus, 27, studied physics at Northeastern University in Boston, his family resident in Ashland, MA, an upscale suburb west 

of Boston, “admitted to planning to blow up 

the Pentagon and the United States Capitol using remote-controlled planes laden with explosives”; sentenced to 17 years in prison.82

• Adel Daoud, an 18-year-old suburban Chicago

man arrested for attempting to detonate what 

he thought was a car bomb outside a Chicago 

bar. . . . [He] had been under surveillance for 

months, and in multiple conversations with 

agents expressed a desire to kill on a mass scale 

as revenge for what he believed was the persecution of Muslims by the United States.83

• Walli Mujahidh, 34, was one of two men who

planned to storm the Military Entrance Processing Station south of downtown Seattle with 

machine guns and grenades in retaliation for 

U.S. military actions in Afghanistan. Enlistees 

are screened and processed at the station. The 

other conspirator Abu Khalid Abdul-Latif, also 

known as Joseph Anthony Davis, was sentenced to 18 years in prison last month. The 

pair, both U.S. citizens, were arrested in June 

2011 and pleaded guilty of the attempted murder of officers and agents of the United States 

and conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction. Grenades are treated as weapons of 

mass destruction under U.S. federal law.84
31

• Gufran Ahmed Kauser Mohammed, a 30-yearold naturalized U.S. citizen born in India, and 

Mohamed Hussein Said, a 25-year-old Kenyan, 

were “accused of having used Western Union 

to wire a total of $96,000 to an al Qaeda affiliate, 

al-Nusra Front . . . and al Shabaab” in Somalia. 

The money was to help Said in getting fighters 

out of Africa and into Syria. The men have also 

been accused of recruiting or trying to recruit 

individuals overseas to join rebels linked to 

al-Qaeda.85

Residents of various European countries also awaken 

to similar headlines. Consider for example:

• Seven suspects between 22 and 32 years of age,

all described as British residents, arrested in an 

anti-terror operation.86

• Three Muslim immigrants to Norway were arrested for a terrorist plot; a Uighur from China, 

an Iraqi Kurd, and an Uzbek, had ties to operatives of AQ in the tribal areas of Pakistan, 

all members of the Turkistan Islamic Party, a 

Uighur separatist group based largely in the 

lawless Pakistani tribal area of Waziristan.87

• Three men, born in Britain of Pakistani origin,

were found guilty of the 2006 conspiracy to attack seven transatlantic airliners bound for the 

United States and Canada with liquid bombs. 

In all, 10 men faced charges in the case that involved three separate criminal trials; all but two 

were convicted. . . . Scotland Yard, describing its 

effort as the most elaborate terrorism investigation it has ever mounted, said the costs of the 

police operations alone amounted to nearly $40 

million. The case involved the deployment of 29 
32

separate surveillance teams during the months 

the plotters were under observation and was 

said to have been the most costly investigation 

in the force’s history. . . . The bombs the plotters prepared for the attacks, consisting of liquid explosive inserted by syringes into plastic 

soft-drink bottles, led to tight new restrictions 

on the liquids and creams passengers can take 

onto flights. . . . Prosecutors at the trials said the 

plot, if successful, would have caused deaths 

on a scale comparable to the 9/11 attacks, and 

most of the potential toll of 1,500 to 2,000 victims were likely to have been Americans. . .88

• Taimor Abdulwahab al-Abdaly, 28, a disaffected Iraqi Swede, detonated two bombs, killing 

only himself. A Swedish citizen, he had been 

living in Britain for the past 10 years.89

• Raed Jaser, 35, born in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to Palestinian parents but not a 

UAE citizen, was living in Toronto at the time 

of his arrest, and Tunisian-born, Chiheb Esseghaier, 30, both arrested in plot to derail a Via 

passenger train running between New York 

City and Montreal. Charged with conspiring 

to carry out an attack and murder people in 

association with a terrorist group, they could 

face life in prison if convicted. . . . A few weeks 

after Esseghaier and Jaser were arrested, FBI 

officials arrested a Tunisian man in New York 

who they said was linked to the Via rail terror 

plot. Ahmed Abassi was charged with trying to 

stay in the United States illegally to build a cell 

for international acts of terror. Prosecutors said 

Abassi had radicalized Esseghaier. The indictment charges Abassi with two counts of lying 
33

on applications for a green card and work visa. 

Each count carries a maximum term of 25 years 

in prison upon conviction.90

• Zahid Iqba, Mohammaed Sharfaraz Ahmed, 

Umar Arshad, and Syed Farhan Hussain, between 22 and 31 years of age, were jailed in 

Britain on Thursday for discussing terrorist 

attacks, including plans to blow up an army 

reserve center using a bomb-laden toy car. 

They downloaded files containing instructions for the attack, bought survival equipment 

and collected money for terrorist purposes. 

The men were recorded discussing sending a 

remote-controlled toy car carrying a homemade bomb under the gates of an army reservist center and speaking of using instructions in 

an AQ manual to make an improvised explosive device. Iqbal and Ahmed were jailed for 16 

years and 3 months, while Arshad received a 

sentence of 6 years and 9 months. Hussain was 

jailed for 5 years and 3 months.91

• Irfan Naseer, Irfan Khalid, and Ashik Ali

planned to detonate up to eight rucksack bombs 

in a suicide attack or set off timber bombs in 

crowded areas. . . . Prosecutor Altman said the 

plot was “on a scale potentially greater” than 

the July 7, 2005, bombings that killed 52 people on London’s underground train and bus 

networks and that “the defendants were inspired to commit terrorism by the anti-Western 

sermons of U.S.-born radical cleric Anwar alAwlaki.”92

• Michael Adebolajo, 28, born in Britain to a 

Christian family that moved to Britain from Nigeria, who converted to Islam at approximately 

age 16, after the 9/11 attacks, and Michael Ade-
34

bowale, 22 born in Nigeria and immigrated to 

Britain as a child, brutally murdered Lee Rigby, aged 25, an infantryman in the Royal Fusiliers, and drummer who performed ceremonial guard duties at Buckingham Palace, while 

Rigby was walking near a military barracks in 

south London. He was first rammed by a car 

and then hacked to death by these two knifewielding—meat cleaver and kitchen-knife—

assailants, one of the men shouted “Allahu Akbar,” or “God is great,” as the attack proceeded. 

A man who appeared to be in his 20s or early 

30s held a cleaver in one of his bloodied hands. 

He offered what seemed to be a political message before the police arrived. “I apologize that 

women had to see this today, but in our lands 

women have to see the same thing,“ he said. 

“You people will never be safe. Remove your 

governments! They don’t care about you.” He 

then referred to what appeared to be a motive for the attack, saying it was carried out, 

“Because of what’s going on in our own countries.” Britain has suffered more than any other 

country in Northern Europe from Islamic terrorist plots in recent years, and it has worked 

assiduously to prevent more. Security officials have said that at any given time they are 

tracking hundreds of young men in extremist 

networks.93

The phenomenon of radicalization and recruitment 

to various emergent non-U.S. conflict zones before and 

after the Arab Spring is another noteworthy development.94 Again, a nonrandom sample of various recent 

news accounts may be perused in support.95
35

MESSAGE RESONANCE AND U.S. CREDIBILITY 

IN THE MUSLIM WORLD: USG DEEDS, 

ACTIONS, AND POLICIES AS 

COMMUNICATION 

A voluminous literature exists analyzing, evaluating, and proposing policies to counter (self-) radicalization and (self-) recruitment to AQ-based, affiliated, 

associated, or inspired terrorist attacks. A panoply of 

psychological and sociological variables is proposed 

as predictors of terrorist actions. These include: being male, aged 16-44, occupationally marginalized, 

religiously intolerant or a new religious convert, exhibiting an unstable or crisis-prone social identity, 

personally maladaptive, and possessing a lack of psychosocial resilience.96 However, as Sageman points 

out, though these states and traits are undoubtedly 

significant and at least partially descriptive of persons 

who engage in terrorist acts,97 tens or hundreds of millions of persons worldwide exhibit these same states 

and traits who do not engage in terrorist behaviors. 

More problematic for purely compensatory theories 

of terrorist behavior, the vast majority does not exhibit any abnormal psychological or psychosocial traits, 

and many lead relatively successful lives, both materially and relationally.

Moreover, psychologically normal affective bases 

underpinning terrorist motivation—anger, moral indignation, moral outrage, or at its outermost limit, categorical hate—sufficiently explain why many terrorist 

recruits self-deploy as human bombs and killers. Revenge and retribution for perceived wrongs committed against Muslims is cited as justification, again and 

again, exceeding by a huge factor excuses or justifications made in the name of Islam or shari’a, let alone 
36

the jurisprudence governing the fighting of jihad (fiqh 

al-jihad.98 Rather, it is because these persons perceive 

that the West generally and the United States in particular is at war with Islam—oppressing, aggressing, 

humiliating, murdering, and exploiting Muslims—

that terrorist acts are, in their minds, morally justified. 

Finally, this empathy and moral indignation are considerably enabled by both a real or vicarious identification as “fictive kin” of the worldwide Islamic umma 

or faith community, and an actual kinship among 

diasporic populations.99

If one excepts abnormal psychological traits among 

select lone-wolf terrorists, then countering radicalization and recruitment to AQ terrorism requires that one 

abandon the hunt for the “terrorist mind” and take up 

the task of countering the (mis-) perception that the 

United States is an aggressive, oppressive, and exploitative power truly at war with and inexorably hostile

to Islam. This task entails engaging three key psychological variables—perception (cognition), affect (emotions), and behavior (volition)—causally related in the 

following manner: Changing perception from one of 

oppression, to one of fairness and fair dealing ordinarily diminishes one’s sense of moral indignation and 

outrage. This diminished moral outrage ordinarily 

eliminates the desire to seek retributive justice, and 

in extreme cases, violent revenge. Finally, the dissolution of a desire for violent revenge against one or one’s 

(real or fictive) kinsman’s perceived oppressors greatly reduces the likelihood one will be self-recruited to 

engage in terrorist acts.100

If the United States is at war with Islam and Muslims worldwide, it stands to reason that one must attack and confront the American foe. It would not be 

an act of cowardice, but one of courage, to do so. It 
37

would involve sacrificing possibly one’s life, estate, 

and friends and family; for some, exiting a life of relative security, privilege, and opportunity. But the defense of the defenseless against a perceived predatory 

power requires that one leave this life behind, and that 

after this life, Allah’s favor will more than make up for 

the fears, tears, and disrupted lives that this sacrificial death entails. These affective variables—revenge, 

moral outrage, retribution, payback, defense of one’s 

religion, and defense of one’s people—I believe, must 

be fully understood and combated at the level they 

require.101

* * * * *

In the remainder of this monograph, a distinct 

method is proposed for countering the perception that 

the United States is at war with Islam, the moral outrage it inspires, and the terrorist response it too often 

enjoins. I shall call this method “a War of Deeds” or 

“counterpropaganda of the deed.” The latter phrase, 

analytically compelling and a time-honored military 

art, may nevertheless be tainted by the negative attributes associated with the term “propaganda.” The 

former War of Deeds avoids the stigma of “propaganda” and offers the twin benefit of contrast to a “war of 

ideas” approach, the problems of which will be identified at appropriate points. Further, by emphasizing 

deeds, actions, and USG policies, rather than words, 

intentions, and promises, we shift the primary battleground to one of countering enemy propaganda with 

facts and evidence that I believe can, if deftly crafted 

in a systematic, sustained campaign, eviscerate AQ’s 

fabrications and lies. This proposed War of Deeds is offered as a distinct, realistic, and credible approach for 
38

neutralizing, combating, and ultimately obliterating 

the affective outrage propelling recruits to place their 

lives at the service of AQ’s terrorist modus operandi. 

It is to be fought on two fronts, “changing deeds” and 

“challenging deeds.” 

Changing deeds, the first front, enhances the resonance of the USG message in the Arab and Muslim 

world through actively fostering policies that reinforce, amplify, and increase the probable success of 

the second front—challenging AQ’s disinformation, 

fabrications, lies, and distortions. 

Changing deeds requires that the USG honestly 

examine the actual impact of U.S. foreign and military 

policy in the greater Muslim world. It is imperative 

that the USG make the case in deeds, actions, and 

official policies, not intentions or promises, that the 

United States is not at war with Islam or Muslims, and 

is indeed a formidable power whose interests, values, 

and ultimate objectives are not inimical to Islam and 

the Islamic faith, the Islamic Call and Muslim interests. It is not perfection, but the proven absence of 

enmity or active pursuit of policies, deeds, or actions 

designed to denude and destroy Islam, or predatory 

waging of war against a weak and defenseless umma, 

that must be proved. 

Challenging deeds, the second front, requires that 

the USG successfully refute AQ’s propaganda, disinformation, fabrications, and distortions regarding the 

practical consequences of U.S. deeds, policies, and actions, and of AQ’s own, in the Muslim world. 

These two interrelated tasks have a common objective: persuasively proving in deeds, actions, policies, 

and actual behaviors that the USG is not at war with 

Muslims and Islam. That this must be proven and 

not taken for granted; that this not be seen as an ex-
39

ercise akin to combating holocaust denial or the 9/11 

“truthers” is essential. It is not essential that the United States be innocent of superpower motives, actions, 

intentions, or behaviors; nor that, there is no national 

dirty laundry, past or present, to discuss. What is essential is that we prove that these actions do not signify any type of ongoing, systematic enmity directed 

at Islam, Muslims, or the Arab World in particular. 

We must prove this even though USG actions may on 

occasion signify other potentially unsavory interests 

and alliances, as well as many potentially and actually 

beneficent means and ends. In short, what must be 

proved, through the evidence of deeds and not intentions, promises, or attempts at spin, is that the United 

States is not now and has never been at war with Islam 

and does not actively desire nor require its negation. 

Furthermore, the USG must prove it is innocent of all 

charges of intentionally targeting, harming, or fostering aggression against or oppression of Muslims on 

account of faith or works. 

CHANGING DEEDS AND ENHANCING 

MESSAGE RESONANCE 

Changing deeds is key to enhancing message resonance and is the necessary first front in a sustained 

campaign to counter radicalization and recruitment 

to AQ-inspired terrorism. This premise rests on three 

propositions. First, there is widespread recognition 

among officials charged with enhancing U.S. credibility, that deeds, actions, and policies are persuasive 

communication. As we will soon see, official attempts 

to obscure this simple fact through public diplomacy 

or strategic communication are doomed to fail. Second, considerable literature comprised of official USG 
40

policies and reports from government oversight bodies, academics, and think tanks concludes that opposition to American foreign and military policies, and not

to Americans or American values per se, are key drivers of anti-American animus and the proximate cause 

for declining U.S. credibility and standing in the Arab 

and Muslim world. Third, despite anti-American animus motivated by opposition to U.S. foreign and military policies, however, no objective evidence exists of 

any officially-sanctioned USG “Crusader” war being 

waged against Islam as a religious faith, or Muslim 

adherents to that faith. Let us examine these in turn.

The Limits of Public Diplomacy and Strategic 

Communication: Or, the “Lipstick on Pigs” 

Problem.102

The Information Operations Primer defines “Strategic Communication” as “the orchestration of actions, 

words, and images to achieve cognitive effects in support of policy and military objectives.”103 Though all 

communicative elements are important, U.S. Army 

information operations specialists most especially 

view actions to be as effective and successful strategic communication. Actions “speak for themselves” 

and signify the assurance of intentions and values far 

more than promises and platitudes. Though primarily written with specific military operations in mind, 

the following assertion can easily be generalized to 

human actions: 

[S]enior officials point out that strategic communication is ’80% actions, and 20% words.’ Specifically, how 

military operations are conducted affects the information environment by impacting perceptions, attitudes 

and beliefs . . . [and] . . . how military operations are 
41

conducted or policy is implemented is also a key component of strategic communication, since actions send 

very loud and clear messages.104

The primacy of actions is also evident in a criticism 

of the concept “strategic communications” by retired 

admiral Michael Mullen, former chairman of Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. In opposition to a “marketing model 

of countering Taliban propaganda being promoted 

by the Rendon Group,” Mullen reportedly refuses 

to even use the phrase strategic communication and 

insists simply on providing “information and context 

about military operations.” He declares: 

I really do not like the term at all. It confuses 

people. . . . It means all things to all people. It’s way 

overused and overrated. I literally try never to use the 

term. We communicate as much if not more by our actions. 

I have become particularly concerned at a time that 

resources are so precious. It has become a thing unto 

itself. It is taking resources from the fight. I don’t have 

time for it. (emphasis added).105

Actions are deemed key to the more general concept of information operations as well. The purpose of 

information operations is: 

. . . to influence the behavior of target decision-makers 

while simultaneously defending friendly decisionmakers from being influenced by an adversary’s use 

of information. This is no different from the exercise 

of the other forms of national power. In this instance 

the means is information, but the resulting outcome is 

the same.106

The key role of actions among forms of influence, 

however, is well noted: 
42

[P]ersonal interactions are perhaps the most important means a target audience can be influenced. In the 

context of persuasive influence, these interactions can 

range from compulsion and coercion on one end of 

the spectrum to cooperation and collaboration on the 

other. . . . Regardless of how a message is transmitted, 

the credibility of our messages and messengers is key 

to the effectiveness of our influence efforts. We must 

recognize that we lose credibility when the implied messages of our actions do not match the messages of our covert 

communications. If these messages are not coordinated 

during the IO planning process, our credibility and effectiveness suffer (emphasis added).107

Other agencies also recognize the role of deeds in 

general, as well as the vital role of deeds in diagnosing 

and diminishing the present U.S. credibility gap in the 

Arab and Muslim world. However, unlike the matterof-fact role ascribed to actions above, this explicit recognition of the importance of deeds frequently gets 

dialed down and packaged in strategies far less bold 

than demanded. Minimizing the importance of deeds 

shows a failure of imagination or an unwillingness to 

fully consider the implications of one’s premises at 

best. At worst, charges of inconsistency, incoherence 

or even duplicity may be leveled. Some examples of 

this behavior and its results follow.

Let us first consider one of the earliest examples 

of this schizoid character. It actually calls for putting 

“lipstick on a pig” in order to make what are undesirable policies appear something other than they 

are. Just over a month after 9/11, Richard Holbrooke, 

then-ambassador to the UN, issued one of the earliest alarms to policymakers and the public of our apparently inexplicable failure to counter what then 

appeared to be the unstoppable juggernaut of Osama 
43

bin Laden’s propaganda. Consider the following 

assertion:

Call it public diplomacy, or public affairs, or psychological warfare, or—if you really want to be blunt—

propaganda. But whatever it is called, defining what 

this war is really about in the minds of 1 billion Muslims in the world will be of decisive and historic importance. Yet every expert in Islam, every analyst of 

what is happening in the Muslim world, agrees that 

Osama bin Laden has gained the initial advantage in 

this struggle by arguing that this is a war against Islam, rather than, as President Bush correctly says, a 

war against terrorism. At first glance, this seems incredible: How could a mass murderer who publicly 

praised the terrorists of Sept. 11 be winning the hearts 

and minds of anyone? How can a man in a cave out 

communicate the world’s leading communications 

society?108

To what, then, does Holbrooke attribute this U.S. 

failure in public diplomacy and strategic communication? “Part of Bin Laden’s success lies in his shrewd 

mix of modern media technologies and medieval symbols,” Holbrooke declares, “. . . [a]nother factor is his 

exploitation of the seething resentment of Arabs toward U.S. support for Israel.” Remarkably, Holbrooke 

then declares each of these elements as “largely outside our control.”109

Bin Laden’s message is out of our control because 

he “controls his own message,” and as for the second, 

Holbrooke asserts, “we cannot reward terrorism by 

reducing our support for Israel.” But one might ask 

at this point, isn’t it crucial, at the very least, to forthrightly recognize that perceptions of the United States 

as backer and facilitator of a continuing occupation 

and humiliation of Palestinian aspirations underpin 
44

anti-American animus, and not a hatred of America or 

Americans, let alone American values? In fact, could 

not the case be made here that it is precisely the unwillingness to extend these cherished American values of liberty, self-determination, and social justice 

to the case of the Israel-Palestinian confrontation, or 

continuing support for repressive autocratic governments—one that profoundly undermines credibility throughout the Arab and Muslim world, as well 

as many other quarters—that is the elephant in the 

room? Or, to conclude that it is American hypocrisy, 

not American ideals and values that underpins the 

U.S. credibility problem and facilitates resonance of 

Osama bin Laden’s terrorist propaganda?110

Instead, Holbrooke offers an unconvincing or, at 

worst, an incoherent retort. His first move is to cast 

USG policy against AQ as an ideological war, a socalled “battle of ideas,” rather than one based in policies, actions, and deeds. His second tack is to recognize the importance of actions, but in terms that belie 

the logic of his own admission that a “seething resentment” in the Arab Muslim world must be addressed. 

Let us consider each in turn. 

What should concern us most urgently are the apparent failure of our own message and the inadequacy of 

our messengers. If we fail to convince Muslims that 

this is not a war against Islam but a war against terrorism, if bin Laden succeeds in defining the struggle 

in his own terms, then he will have succeeded in his 

goal—even if, as I confidently believe will be the case, 

he is tracked down and ultimately eliminated. . . . The 

battle of ideas therefore is as important as any other aspect of 

the struggle we are now engaged in. It must be won. To fix 

this problem we must address both the message and 

the messengers (emphasis added).111
45

While important steps, such as “visiting the Islamic Center in DC” and “meetings with leading 

Muslims and Arab Americans,” were immediately 

taken in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 (9/11), 

Holbrooke stated afterwards that things have “gone 

downhill.” He believes the missed opportunities that 

could have prevented this about-face involve the following: failure to open a dialogue with “key Muslim 

intellectuals” over an errant and murderous misuse of 

the Qur’an, failure to publicize the fact that hundreds 

of Muslims were also murdered in the terrorist attack 

on the 9/11, the failure to prove to Muslim women 

that they would be sent back to a stone age should Bin 

Laden triumph, and finally, the failure “to find credible Arabic-speaking Muslims to speak the truth about 

bin Laden.” 

It is undoubtedly true that leveraging the jurisprudence of lawful jihad, identifying the terrorist 

violations of that law, and specifying the major sins 

committed is an important tactic, one that the present 

writer advocates.112 However, it is insufficient since 

only a sliver of potential recruits is apprised of this 

jurisprudence, and likely bound to it. Also, what does 

Holbrooke mean by “the truth of Bin Laden”? Who 

are these “credible Arab-speaking Muslims” who 

shall speak such a “truth”? For Holbrooke, it is simply 

inexplicable why the United States could or should be 

losing this propaganda war: certainly there is someone who can say something that can undermine the 

legitimacy of this man who speaks from a cave! Missing here, is any discussion of actions, deeds, and USG 

policies examined from the point of view of those who 

may see themselves as potential victims and seek to 

become agents seeking retribution, even if the method 

of terror amounts to a morally reprehensible and mur-
46

derous tactic. But Holbrooke believes, it seems, to even 

raise the question of policy is to “reward terrorism.” 

Holbrooke concludes his clarion call by identifying 

the “messengers” required to arrest the decline in, rectify, and fortify U.S. credibility. Actually, the only discussion of messengers he offers had already occurred 

when Holbrooke invoked “credible Arab-speaking 

Muslims,” as possible ambassadors who will speak 

to the purity of America’s intentions and ideals. He 

deems these possible ambassadors as “key Muslim 

intellectuals,” or “leading Muslims and Arab Americans.” Here, he actually discusses the media required, 

and more specifically, the agencies required, to mobilize to confront the bin Laden virus. What he suggests 

is the need for a full-blown national propaganda effort 

along the lines of World War II and the Cold War. 

A similar special office is essential now. It must be run 

from the White House, the only place in Washington 

that can coordinate—by which I mean direct—public 

affairs activities of State, Defense, Justice, CIA, AID 

and others toward the Muslim world. More resources 

will be required; special broadcasting systems dedicated to this cause must be created, not for Afghanistan, but for the entire Muslim world, including Muslims in non-Arab countries such as India and China, 

and for that matter, Western Europe, where the terror 

networks are deeply embedded. . . . This must be a 

sustained effort separate from, but closely allied to, 

the war on terrorism. In fact, it will last longer than 

the war itself and would, if successful, have other

benefits. . . . We cannot afford to lose; and if we do, a 

permanent struggle will lead to a permanent crisis—

just what bin Laden and his supporters want.113

Holbrooke’s opinion editorial, penned just 1 

month after the 9/11 attacks, presumes that a “battle 

of ideas” must be fought contrasting an un-Islamic, 
47

murderous, diabolical bin Laden seeking the enslavement of Muslim women and the resurrection of a medieval caliphate, with America’s true values, virtues, 

and ideals. “If only they truly knew what we truly 

stand for!” he seems to declare. “If only we could tell 

the true story of our commitment to human rights, democracy, social justice, and liberty for all! How can a 

man in a cave out communicate the world’s leading 

communications society?” he asked.114

Could he, with deep reflection, have answered that 

it is not about communicating with high-sounding 

words or wrapping oneself in glorious ideals. Instead, 

it is about what we do, not about what we say about 

what we do. It is about how deeds, policies, and actions communicate. It is about the experiences of those 

who live with the consequences of these policies. It is, 

in short, very much about the perception of virtually 

unconditional support for Israel’s continuing occupation; of the politics of oil reserves; and the autocrats 

and monarchs of the Gulf. It is about USG policy 

and moral outrage. It is about credibility, in fact and 

in deed, not about the failure of the world’s greatest 

superpower to discover the philosopher’s stone revealing the secret message, messengers, and media, 

required to refute bin Laden. It is the “lipstick on pigs 

problem,” in other words. It is not about ideas, or a 

“battle of ideas”; it is about deeds, and a War of Deeds. 

Approximately 3 years after 9/11 and the inauguration of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), 1 year 

after the U.S. overthrow of Saddam Hussein and military occupation of Iraq, and 4 years into the second 

Palestinian intifada, another promising yet highly 

compromised beginning is in evidence in an early 

official effort to diagnose what appeared to be an 

abject failure of U.S. public diplomacy and strategic 
48

communication.115 A careful reading reveals a surprisingly candid analysis of how U.S. policies contribute 

to this collapse in U.S. credibility.116 It is a prescient 

analysis of the rise and power of nonviolent political Islamists, and yet, like Holbrooke, its response is 

paltry and targets a narrow band of cherry-picked 

pro-Western secular elites. This response never once 

considers revisiting U.S. policy priorities to see how 

they might affect those vast majorities whose opinions 

are registered in plummeting opinion polls.117 Let us 

briefly consider this scathing review of U.S. policies, 

clear recognition of an ascendant nonviolent political 

Islam, and impoverished suggested remedies. 

By late-2003, virtually every major opinion poll 

throughout the Arab and Muslim world was registering its lowest ever favorable ratings of the United 

States. Without question, U.S. credibility was in 

free fall.118 The predominant finding of this report is 

unequivocal:

Muslims do not ‘hate our freedom,’ but rather, they 

hate our policies. The overwhelming majority [in 

opinion polls] voice their objections to what they see 

as one-sided support in favor or Israel and against Palestinian rights, and the long-standing, even increasing 

support for what Muslims collectively see as tyrannies, 

most notably in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Pakistan, 

and the Gulf states. . . . Thus the critical problem in 

American public diplomacy directed toward the Muslim World is not one of ‘dissemination of information,’ or even one of crafting and delivering the ‘right’ 

message. Rather, it is a fundamental problem of 

credibility. . . .119
49

In another remarkably frank admission, the study 

authors assert:

The United States finds itself in the strategically awkward—and potentially dangerous—situation of being 

the longstanding prop and alliance partner of these 

authoritarian regimes. Without the U.S. these regimes 

would not survive. Thus the U.S. has strongly taken 

sides in a desperate struggle that is both broadly cast 

for all Muslims and country-specific. This is the larger 

strategic context, and it is acutely uncomfortable: U.S. 

policies and actions are increasingly seen by the overwhelming majority of Muslims as a threat to the survival of Islam itself.120

The report also betrays a very clear-headed analysis of Islamism distinguishing violent revolutionary 

Islamism from nonviolent reformist Islamisms, each 

with a similar short-term strategic objective: 

If there is one overarching goal they [Islamists] share, 

it is the overthrow of what Islamists call the ‘apostate’ 

regimes: the tyrannies of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Jordan, and the Gulf states. They are the main 

target of the broader Islamist movement, as well as the 

actual fighter groups.121 

A prescient analysis is offered of the role that these 

reformists are likely to play and their closer proximity 

to the aspirations and approved methods for achieving them supported by an even larger majority.

[I]t is even more interesting to track the relative weight 

of the non-Jihadi Islamists, also called “moderate’ or 

“New Islamists,’ because their professed vision of Islamic Restoration is non-violent, tolerant, and relatively pluralistic. It can be argued that the New Islamists 

are in fact the true center of gravity in the Muslim 
50

World today, in that they have the most authority to 

make change, and draw on the highest levels of sympathy form less-active, but receptive and supportive 

Arab majorities. In this construct the Jihadis are seen 

as perhaps necessary to make change begin and thus 

become eventually inevitable, but the radicals do not 

appeal to the majority of Muslims in terms of practical 

change if and when the old regimes finally collapse.122

One would expect such candid analysis of the U.S. 

strategic predicament in the Muslim world could and 

should lead to a broader debate over policies, priorities, the consequences experienced by the vast masses 

and the Islamist currents circulating among those 

masses. Instead, we are treated to the following strategic recommendation. On the one hand, a “revolutionary” strategy requiring the USG should massively 

inflate the resources dedicated to U.S. communication 

efforts, including huge expansion in budgets, positions, authority, and a centralized executive-level focus.123 On the other hand, we should exclusively target 

and selectively build-up U.S.-friendly agents. 

The U.S. Government should target those who support, or are likely to support, our views based on 

their own culture, traditions and attitudes about such 

things as personal control, choice and change. Private 

sector best practices define this as the ‘hard support’ 

and ‘soft support’ in a marketplace and they are not 

only the likeliest to move in the U.S. Government’s 

direction, but they’re also the likeliest to move others. 

Both their behavior and viral communications form 

the most powerful and credible medium for attitudinal change. Specifically, for example, we believe the 

most ‘movable’ targets will be the so-called secularists of the Muslim world: Business people, scientists, 

non-religious educators, politicians or public administrators, musicians, artists, poets, writers, journalists, 

actors and their audiences and admirers.124
51

The report suggests “state of the art practices” derived from advertising, marketing, and political campaigns to accomplish these goals, while assiduously 

avoiding any further discussion of those policies it 

correctly ascertained were the most significant impediments to U.S. credibility. Nothing is said regarding the grave strategic predicament facing the United 

States as the final backer and guarantor of regimes 

deemed tyrannical, autocratic, and undemocratic, or 

as a state opposed to the legitimate aspirations of Palestinians. Instead this report insists that a secular elite 

will assist us in lipstick sales, all along knowing and 

actually having described in this Report the pigs for 

which it is destined.

Several USG documents or high-level analyses 

throughout the decade exhibit similar failures to boldly rethink U.S. policies and their relation to U.S. credibility in the Arab and Muslim world. In the June 2007 

U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic 

Communication issued by the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs,125 we learn of the 

importance of the diplomacy of deeds,126 the importance of counterpropaganda, the necessity of countering AQ disinformation and propaganda in cyberspace 

through further expanding the mission of the existing 

State Department Digital Outreach Team (DOT), and 

the necessity for a new Counterterrorist Communications Center.127 Yet, this diplomacy of deeds is reduced 

to displays of U.S. humanitarianism during times of 

disaster, famine, or poverty relief, which, in itself, is 

insufficient for quelling a deeper animus rooted in 

our chosen friends, strategic partners, and allies in 

the region. 
52

Unlike the unvarnished 2004 Defense Science 

Board discussion of the deeper policy roots of the 

U.S. decline in credibility, this report obliterates this 

dimension entirely. Again, unlike the 2004 report, it 

presumes a “Good Muslim/Bad Muslim dichotomy” 

which entirely fails to understand the fissures that exist within Islam over AQ’s means and ends. Like the 

2004 report, however, it entirely neglects potential Islamist and conservative allies and reduces the choices 

to either “mainstream” voices that espouse and embrace secular liberal democracy, or AQ presented as 

a caricatured death cult. AQ is presented without 

sufficient understanding of the broader phenomenon 

of Sunni militancy, and the potential of its reformist 

variants as a form of political Islam not necessarily 

inimical to U.S. core values and vital interests in the 

region.128 There is not a single mention of Israel-Palestine, oil, or autocracy. Offering a compelling list of 

messaging themes, and correctly defending the necessity of systematic counterpropaganda and leveraging 

AQ’s violations of the shari’a and commission of major sins, one easily concludes that genuine grievances 

are likely to be assuaged by words, and symbolic humanitarian gestures. 

A second Defense Science Task Force report on 

strategic communication issued in 2008 is a queer 

creature, combining elements of its 2004 incisiveness 

with what appears to be a continuing flight from its 

implications.129 A promising beginning is made when 

it states:

[W]e have changed our thinking in important ways. 

This report reflects our heightened appreciation that 

success in strategic communication depends on . . . 

deep comprehension of the identities, attitudes, cultures, interests, and motives of others . . . awareness 
53

by leaders and practitioners that what we do matters 

more than what we say. (p. x; emphasis in original).

So what shall our responses be to the documented 

rise throughout the decade of anti-Americanism?130

The Report’s authors provide global survey data indicating extremely negative attitudes toward the U.S. 

occupation of Iraq, increasing support among Muslim 

and Arab societies for use of suicide attacks in Iraq 

and especially in the Palestinian territories. One is 

then treated to the following underwhelming correlations: between tsunami relief in Indonesia and improved attitudes toward Americans, but not American 

policies; and, an even weaker correlation between U.S. 

earthquake relief in Pakistan, and Pakistani attitudes 

toward Americans or American policies. It is not just 

that the correlations are weak, but that perceptions 

of U.S. policies remain unchanged, despite gratitude 

and improved attitudes toward the American public. 

Symbolic and life-saving humanitarian gestures as

communication is certainly welcome, and necessary. 

But the same persons who welcome such assistance 

do not, as a result, abandon deep and abiding attachments and commitments to their sisters and brothers 

perceived to be suffering under varying forms of occupation, oppression, and tyranny. 

In a section entitled “Implications for Strategic 

Communication,” another promising beginning is 

made when the authors assert: “Disseminating information and ‘getting the message right’ are not top priorities. Trust, credibility, actions, legitimacy, and reputations are critical to success.”131 Rather than identify 

concretely what policies and actions may lead to trust, 

credibility, actions, legitimacy, and reputations however, the report then strangely references the need for 

messaging and various types of messengers.
54

Many federal, state, and local nongovernmental, corporate, and individual enterprises originating in the 

United States are involved in strategic communication 

with foreign audiences. While there is no single enterprise performing the role of program leader, each 

program relies on many essential contributions from 

beyond the domain of its central team to accomplish 

its goals.

In the above statement, there is not a single mention of any actions, deeds, or policies whatsoever. In a 

final flourish of suggested actions, in a section entitled 

“Personal Interactions as Compelling Messages,” the 

following are suggested as vital to improving U.S. 

credibility throughout the Muslim and Arabic world: 

the Fulbright scholarship program, foreign student 

exchange programs, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) programs, the Peace Corps, lifesaving outreach, and military to military exchanges.132

It is hard to understand why “American Foreign 

and Military Policy in the Arab and Muslim World” 

are not included as having compelling messages. It 

is as if we cannot understand how someone can like 

you, but still not like what you are doing or have 

done; that one cannot believe that others really do 

not like how we treat (or they perceive how we treat) 

members of their brethren, despite the fact that, as a 

people and idea, America is viewed sympathetically. 

What we do, not who we are—not how nice, how 

generous, how good-hearted, how well-intentioned, 

how lofty our ideals and commitments to actualizing human potentials; our actions, deeds, and policies—is what is most troublesome and unenviable to 

these souls. 

After a decade’s struggle to conceptualize and 

execute a successful public diplomacy and strategic 
55

communication, Congress, via The Duncan Hunter 

National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal 2009, 

required that the President submit “a comprehensive 

interagency strategy for public diplomacy and strategic communication.” Between 2010-12, the President’s 

initial proposal, a Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) report on that proposal, and an updated presidential proposal, were published.133 A decade’s debate 

and trial-and-error had further refined the strategic 

communications conceptual landscape; continued to 

identify the critical importance of policies, actions, 

and deeds; though yet again, one is left to feel that the 

proposed remedies fall far short of those required to 

refute, counter, and decimate AQ’s propaganda. 

The objective of strategic communication is clear: 

“sustaining global legitimacy and supporting our 

policy aims.”134 How shall this be done? Two distinct 

methods are advocated: more carefully aligning what 

we say and what we do (words and deeds); and being 

deliberate and engaged with the audiences we seek to 

influence.135 These two components comprise the very 

definition of strategic communication: 

(a) the synchronization of words and deeds and how 

they will be perceived by selected audiences, as well 

as (b) programs and activities deliberately aimed at 

communicating and engaging with intended audiences, including those implemented by public affairs, 

public diplomacy, and information operations professionals (emphases added).136

As conceived then, the problem of strategic communication is primarily one of failed execution, or 

flawed organization and implementation—a failure to 

synchronize, a failure to deliberately engage—and not

the problematic nature of present-day U.S. foreign and 
56

military policies as communication. Or, so it appears. 

So let us examine what is meant by “synchronization” 

and “strategy for synchronization.”137

The following characterization is offered.138 Synchronization requires:

• Coordinating words and deeds, including the active consideration of how our actions and policies 

will be interpreted by public audiences as an organic part of decisionmaking.

• The recognition that what we do is often

more important than what we say because actions have communicative value and send 

messages.

• Fostering a culture of communication that values this type of synchronization and encourages 

decision-makers to take the communicative value 

of actions into account during their decisionmaking. The most senior levels of government must 

advocate and implement a culture of communication that is reinforced through mechanisms and 

processes.

This declared necessity of word-deed synchronization or word-deed consistency requires a “strategy for 

synchronization” which combines several declaratory 

sentences with suggested methods and means.139

• A key lesson we have learned is that actions beyond those managed by the communications community have communicative value and impact. 

Every action that the United States Government 

takes sends a message . . .

• Importance of identifying, evaluating, and coordinating the communicative value of actions 

as a proactive and organic part of planning and 

decisionmaking . . .

• Ensure strategic goals and messages are well

understood at all levels . . .

• Raise awareness about the communicative impact of decisions and actions [and] . . . empha-
57

size the importance of considering such impacts 

proactively . . .

• Ensure that forums exist for deliberating these

impacts on high-priority issues and coordinating actions with deliberate communication and 

engagement.

The second base of strategic communication, “deliberate communication and engagement,” is characterized as follows:

• A wide range of [USG] programs and activities 

deliberately focused on understanding, engaging, 

informing, influencing, and communicating with 

people through public affairs, public diplomacy, 

information operations, and other efforts.

• . . . Coordination mechanisms and processes to

improve the United States Government’s ability 

to deliberatively communicate and engage with 

intended audiences.

The “Strategy for Deliberate Communication and 

Engagement”140 is comprised of the following:

• Programs and activities focused on communicating and engaging with the public need to be strategic and long-term, not just reactive and tactical.

• [F]ocus on articulating what the United States is for, 

not just what we are against. For example, our efforts 

to communicate and engage with Muslim communities 

around the world must be defined primarily by a focus 

on mutual respect and mutual interest, even as we continue to counter violent extremism by focusing on discrediting and delegitimizing violent extremist networks 

and ideology. (emphases added)

• Deliberate communication also helps establish

the strategic messages against which our actions 

are often judged by the public, and deliberate engagement helps identify how our actions are being 

interpreted and perceived.
58

• It is vital that the United States is not focused solely on one-way communication, which is why we 

have consciously emphasized the importance of 

‘engagement’—connecting with, listening to, and 

building long-term relationships with key stakeholders.141

Excepting the italicized bulleted point above—the 

single instance referred to of genuinely substantive interests and policies—the document is an ode to methodology emphasizing the essential need to orchestrate 

carefully words and actions, and make sure through 

deliberate engagement this synchronicity may be further enhanced to advance U.S. policies. But, one may 

ask, which policies? Let us reproduce this italicized 

text and examine it, line by line.

[F]ocus on articulating what the United States is for, 

not just what we are against. Is not the most telling 

proof of what a country is really “for” reflected in its 

policies, which, in turn, reflect vital interests, and ultimately core values? What we are “for” would then 

translate into the concrete commitments we have 

made, with blood and treasure, to uphold certain sets 

of social and political relationships, and not others. 

What we are “for” is what we promote and defend in 

domestic policies and in foreign and military policies, 

diplomatic policies and cultural policies. Is not “what 

we are for” to be judged based on actions, deeds done, 

commitments upheld, interests pursued? Or is “what 

we are for” a reference to the values we claim to uphold, the beliefs we maintain, the intentions we aspire 

to realize? The vagueness of the phrase “what we are 

for” serves to remove the harder edge of governments, 

peoples, militaries, security forces, police, prisons, and 

states of banishment or permission to live, from view. 

The same may be asked of its opposite, “what we 
59

are against.” We are against oppression? Then what 

of crushing dictatorships? We value freedom? Then 

what of imprisoned activists? We value self-determination? Then what about banishment from the political process? In the end, when the bodies and money 

are counted that “stand for” and “stand against” realities in the world, what should one determine “we are 

for” and “we are against.” This is the very opposite of 

vague phraseology. 

[O]ur efforts to communicate and engage with Muslim 

communities around the world must be defined primarily 

by a focus on mutual respect and mutual interest, even 

as we continue to counter violent extremism by focusing 

on discrediting and delegitimizing violent extremist networks and ideology. So, we are for “mutual respect” and 

“mutual interest.” But in concrete, substantive, policy 

terms, what does “mutual respect” and “mutual interest” look like? Respect is demonstrated in actions, 

policies, and deeds, and quite evident when one believes their humanity, and that of their kinsmen, has 

been treated in a dignified, honorable, and deserving 

manner. Respect is earned when one is on the side of 

actively opposing indignities, ignoble deeds, undeserved oppression, and humiliation. Mutual interests 

exist when one reciprocates and exchanges a good for 

a good, and when a common set of ultimate principles unite even persons otherwise quite different, to 

recognize, cooperate, and identify. Liberty, opportunity, self-determination, sovereignty, dignity, family, 

development, peace, security, hope, health, wealth, 

wisdom . . . one can imagine any number of mutual 

interests that could be shared. But we must get far 

more concrete, and take into account whether present 

U.S. policies, based in specific alliances and a certain 

regime of stability, contain within themselves definite 
60

limits that prohibit, in practice, the kind of respect and 

mutuality presumed above. If, in fact, a condition of 

authoritarian denial of rights and freedoms is logically predicated on the United States as guarantor or 

underwriter, what am I—an Arab, a Muslim, a man—

to conclude about the mutuality of our respect, and 

our interests?

“But I truly do care about you! I believe deeply in 

the sanctity of life, liberty, and opportunity!” To which 

a sober response might be: 

But the proof is in your policies, your deeds, and your 

actions my friend. It is in your alliances, allies, and interests; it is in what you do, not what you say, or say 

about what you do. Israel, oil, and autocracy, is what 

I see. And it is I who pays that price, despite the nobility of the values you profess, and despite the very 

often generous spirit of your people who birthed the 

concepts I so seek for myself.

Not an insane retort to our baffled strategic communicator, not at all.

The vital significance of U.S. foreign and military 

policy as a driver of Muslim attitudes and opinions, 

and not some generic opposition to Americans or 

American values per se, is also evident in other independent analyses of and commentaries on U.S. strategic communication and public diplomacy. Only a 

brief selection from a vast literature is presented below.142 An important 2003 report143 by the Center for 

the Study of the American Presidency, in analyzing 

the nature of the present U.S. credibility problem in 

the Muslim world, is explicit: This hostility is especially relevant to perceived U.S. support for Israel’s unjust policies toward the Palestinians,144 but it extends 

well beyond.
61

[N]egative Muslim attitudes toward the United States 

are not based on a general dislike of all things American or on a broader anti-Western outlook; nor are 

they derived from a clash of values brought about 

by globalization and modernization. Rather, as with 

anti-American sentiment among many non-Muslims, 

the principle source is aversion to U.S. policies. . . . 

[S]kepticism about the U.S role in promoting democracy in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East is accompanied by a widespread belief that, while the United 

States voices support for democratization abroad, 

it supports autocratic regimes and helps ensure that 

democracy is denied to many Arabs and Muslims. Despite the broad support for democracy and civil rights 

in most Muslim countries, large numbers of Muslims 

believe they lack such basic liberties as fair elections, 

impartial judicial systems, freedom of the media from 

government censorship, and freedom to criticize their 

governments. The perception that America supports 

many authoritarian governments, at least indirectly, 

assists them in the suppression of these rights, especially in the Middle East, fuels anger at the United 

States, and its policies (bold in original).145 

Of the four major weaknesses evident in current 

public diplomacy efforts to combat anti-Americanism 

and the U.S. credibility deficit—U.S. policy, too little 

funds, sparse media, and a trickle of U.S. messaging 

swamped by a torrent of anti-U.S. messaging—it is 

U.S. policy which is regarded as decisive:

[T]he (often enormous) impact of U.S. policies easily overwhelms the effects of policy advocacy and 

other aspects of public diplomacy. The role that U.S. 

actions abroad, and increasingly at home, play in the 

formation of public attitudes overseas is far larger 

than that of U.S. communications with foreign audiences. Public diplomacy has little effect when weighed 

against American policies that are perceived by for-
62

eign audiences to have negative impacts on human 

rights, the local economy, or domestic politics (bold 

in original).146

A 2003 Report examining public diplomacy, evidencing the key role of policy yet limiting itself to a highly 

circumscribed mandate, asserts: 

We fully acknowledge that public diplomacy is only 

part of the picture. Surveys indicate that much of the 

resentment toward America stems from real conflicts 

and displeasure with policies, including those involving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and Iraq. But our 

mandate is clearly limited to issues of public diplomacy, where we believe a significant new effort is 

required.147

Concluding Thoughts: Formidable Challenges,

Formidable Opportunities.

Four conclusions—three obvious, and one counterintuitive—are warranted by the above analysis. 

Let us consider the three compelling conclusions first. 

Though communication involves many potential modalities—words, symbols, and images for example—

policies, are also communication and as communication, USG policies are regarded by many analysts 

and experts and critics alike as the most persuasive 

signifier of genuine motives, intentions, values, and 

interests. 

Second, it is reasonable to conclude that opposition to specific U.S. foreign and military policies 

deemed unjust, undemocratic, and insensitive to human suffering and human rights—most especially 

U.S. policies privileging Israel, oil, and autocracy, at 

the expense of Palestine148 and broader democratic 

aspirations—not opposition to American values and 
63

ideals, is a primary driver of anti-Americanism in the 

Arab and Muslim world. Though a small selection of 

reports and analyses was reviewed, a vast literature 

corroborating this conclusion exists.149 What we do in, 

for, and to the Arab and Muslim world—not our values or who we are as a people—fuel moral outrage. 

Indeed one may argue that it is precisely because 

we all share the same values—that all people should 

enjoy freedom and fairness rather than be subject to 

tyranny and torture—that U.S. policies perceived as 

underwriting or at least tolerating tyranny and torture 

are the root cause of this moral outrage.150

Third, U.S. policies that undermine U.S. credibility 

and inspire moral outrage serve to undermine other 

forms of communication, often designated “strategic 

communication” and “public diplomacy.” Analysts 

correctly conclude that no amount of lipstick can be 

put on these pigs that can successfully overwhelm 

the matter-of-fact experiences and perceptions of vast 

masses that associate U.S. interests with the subversion of self-determination and social justice in the Arab 

and Muslim world. If a picture is worth a thousand 

words, how do actions, let alone a systematic policy 

maintained over years, convey this? If communication 

is 80 percent action and 20 percent words and if there 

is massive divergence between those words and actions, it is no wonder that USG public diplomacy and 

strategic communication have faltered so badly in the 

past decade. 

One might conclude from the above that the U.S. 

disadvantage owing to policy commitments is so severe, even crippling, that the attempt to undermine 

radicalization and recruitment to the AQ terrorist enterprise and vision is a lost cause. But, a surprisingly 

opposite counterintuitive inference actually recom-
64

mends itself. What has been proven is that current 

U.S. policies undermine U.S. credibility and inspire 

moral outrage, and undermine message resonance. 

What has not been proven is that official USG policies 

furnish evidence of any sort of a specifically anti-Muslim animus, let alone a systematic war against Islam 

as a religious faith, or against Muslim adherents of 

that faith. There is, in short, nothing in the evidence 

above that proves the United States is a “Crusader” 

at war with Islam, or that U.S. interests, policies, and 

values, require that Islam—even in its robust form as 

an emboldened political Islam that views religion as 

a matter very much for the public sphere including 

law, culture, society, and state—be warred against. 

What has been proved above is that American 

policies are at war with American ideals—that our 

policy and our democratic social justice rhetoric negate one another. American claims to believe in values widely admired throughout the Arab and Muslim 

world are seen as hollow professions by a hypocritical 

and compromised superpower whose genuine commitments are evident in its role as ultimate guarantor 

and military protector of an illegal Israeli occupation 

and usurpation of Palestinian aspirations, unhindered 

access to major oil reserves, and the regimes that are 

supported that make both possible, i.e., conservative 

and counter-revolutionary autocrats and monarchs, 

many of whom imprison and banish their democratic—religious or secular—opposition. Still, this is not a 

war against Islam, but a prejudice in favor of a regime 

of stability guaranteeing a particular status quo in the 

Occupied Territories and Middle East energy corridors. It is not, then, an abandonment of a war against 

Islam that is required: quite the contrary. It is simply 

a rectification of existing policies to bring them into 

alignment with deeply held American ideals. 
65

It is this credibility gap between professed aspirations and self-evident policies that has been the USG’s 

Achilles heel. It undermines all other U.S. efforts to 

persuade the Muslim world we harbor no enmity.

It also furnishes the raw materials from which AQ 

draws its sophisticated terrorist propaganda. As will 

be shown later, it is AQ’s offensive war against all 

persons—whether autocratic regimes, American civilians or military, or any Muslim who does not embrace 

AQ’s specific modus operandi—that has been successfully represented as a defensive war against the enemies of Allah, Islam, and the broader faith community 

(umma). How is it that AQ—an offensive revolutionary, insurgent, terroristic Islamist movement combining transnational objectives with pragmatic strategic 

doctrine—has successfully disabled the world’s only 

superpower from defending itself against the charge 

that the United States is an implacable foe of Islam; 

upholds an anti-Muslim status quo; subjects Muslims 

to barbaric and inhumane treatment throughout the 

world; and launches wars of occupation, subjugation, 

and humiliation? To return to Holbrooke’s perplexity, 

but shorn of his unwillingness or inability to seriously 

examine the moral outrage inspired by USG policies: 

“How could a mass murderer who publicly praised the 

terrorists of Sept. 11 be winning the hearts and minds 

of anyone? How can a man in a cave out communicate 

the world’s leading communications society?”151

The second front in the War of Deeds then requires 

challenging AQ’s terroristic propaganda using actual 

deeds—those of the USG and those of AQ—to determine in fact, that AQ’s case may be undermined by a 

careful review of the evidence. It is to that task that we 

now turn.
66

CHALLENGING DEEDS: COUNTERING 

AL-QAEDA’S TERRORIST PROPAGANDA

Most, though not all, of the terrorism we face is fueled 

by a common ideology—a belief by some that Islam is 

in conflict with the United States, and the West, and 

that violence against Western targets, including civilians, is justified in pursuit of a larger cause. Of course, 

this ideology is based on a lie, for the United States is 

not at war with Islam; and this ideology is rejected by 

the vast majority of Muslims, who are the most frequent victims of terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, this 

ideology persists, and in an age in which ideas and 

images can travel the globe in an instant, our response 

to terrorism cannot depend on military or law enforcement alone. We need all elements of national power to 

win the battle of wills and ideas.152

The Vital Function of Propaganda in AQ’s 

Anti-American Terrorism.

Propaganda is a key method designed to influence the perception, morale, and will of various target 

populations. According to the official Department of 

Defense (DoD) definition, propaganda is “[a]ny form 

of adversary communication, especially of a biased or 

misleading nature, designed to influence the opinions, 

emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group, in order 

to benefit the sponsor, directly or indirectly.”153 What 

is key for our purposes is not that this is adversarial 

communication, or that it is a form of influence operations, but that AQ’s propaganda is dishonest, deceitful, deliberately distorted disinformation designed to 

incite, inspire, agitate, and shape profoundly erroneous perceptions about USG intentions and actions 

vis-à-vis Islam and the Muslim world. That the USG 

suffers from a profound credibility crisis based in un-
67

popular USG policies and actions is disadvantageous 

enough; consider, then, how this credibility deficit 

facilitates the work of skilled terrorist propagandists.

That is precisely the present conundrum facing those 

charged with strategic communication and public 

diplomacy, and it explains our continuing failure to 

undermine AQ’s propaganda juggernaut. It also explains how it is that thousands of persons are being 

mobilized worldwide to target what they are being 

told is an implacably evil enemy of Allah that must be 

neutralized by any means necessary.

The Terrorist Quadrangle: The Role and Function 

of Terrorist Propaganda as Communication.154

AQ’s terrorist propaganda is usefully conceptualized as a distinct element of a quadrangle linking political object, propaganda, terrorist attack, and strategic objectives. (See Figure 1.) 

Though top-down versus bottom-up processes of 

radicalization are differentially emphasized by analysts as key to AQ’s overall modus operandi,155 it is 

this writers’ belief that top-down, bottom-up, and 

interactive dynamics are all in play. Top-down dimensions include: AQ’s global media front, sophisticated propaganda mission, assets dedicated to inciting, catalyzing, mobilizing, educating and training; 

its conspiratorial cellular structure operating within 

both hostile environments and more friendly radical milieus to identify, target, and recruit potential 

operators; and, control of sanctuaries (including virtual sanctuaries in cyberspace) permitting training in 

terrorist techniques, tactics, and methods. Bottom-up 

dimensions comprise processes of self-radicalization, self-recruitment, and the ever more common
68

 

Figure 1. AQ’s Terrorist Quadrangle: 

Relations of Political Object, Terrorist Propaganda, 

Terror Attacks, and Strategic Objective(s). 

phenomenon of isolated individuals and small groups 

of acquaintances, friends, or family self-mobilizing 

once they have been incited or inspired through 

moral outrage and energized by various social-psychological processes to actively seek out AQ’s network.156 This monograph assumes that both processes 

operate in highly complex ways and their interaction must always be kept in mind when formulating 

concrete strategy. 

AQ’s terrorist propaganda is especially relevant to 

processes of home-based, home-grown (self-) radicalization and (self-) recruitment to AQ’s terrorist modus 

Terrorist

Propaganda

(“Defending Islamic Umma 

Against Crusader War”) 

Strategic Objective(s)

1. Increase Al-Qaeda and 

Associated Movements (AQAM) 

(Incite, aggregate)

2. Undermine Enemies

Terrorist Attack

(Propaganda of the Deed)

(“Defending Allah’s Religion, Striking 

Terror into Allah’s Enemies, Paradise for 

Martyrs”; “Exposing hypocrites, apostates, 

puppets.”) 

Political Object(s)

1. Overthrow regimes

2. Implement strict shari’a

3. Reorder sovereignty

4. Caliphal rulership

5. Base for Offensive Jihad
69

operandi. Consider, for example, relations between 

tactical terrorist propaganda, fabricated agitational 

and inciteful disinformation and the three key psychosocial variables identified earlier; perception, affect, and behavior. In this case, terrorist propaganda 

is the proximate cause of a distorted perception of 

USG policies, moral indignation and outrage, and 

(self-) radicalization and (self-) recruitment to terror. 

Successful AQ tactical propaganda feeds and nourishes behavioral radicalization by bringing to a white 

heat feelings of moral outrage based in a perception 

that the United States is the chief architect and arbiter of an oppressive, unjust power structure crushing 

their Muslim and sisters. This moral outrage is based 

on perceptions of social injustice that increase one’s 

susceptibility to accepting the premise that the United States is an implacable enemy of Islam presently 

engaged in a systematic war against the worldwide 

Muslim umma; and, that terrorist actions are legitimately directed against the USG, its interests, and its 

allies. This premise is both amplified and reinforced 

by the USG credibility crisis, based in a gulf between 

U.S. ideals and actions. Opposition to U.S. policies includes engaging in activities and finding outlets for 

securing retribution and justice such as joining ongoing AQ campaigns and finding opportunities to die a 

shahid (martyr). Persons embarking on this path conceive their actions as justified self-defense and not 

unjustified criminal murder. They believe they are 

assisting the oppressed and aggrieved, and fulfilling 

the general religious obligation within Islam for ablebodied, capable, and knowledgeable persons to assist 

in whatever ways possible and legal to lift the burdens of injustice and oppression from the shoulders 

of those presently in the clutches of their anti-Muslim 

oppressors. 
70

The Critical Function of Counterpropaganda 

in Countering Insurgent Terrorism.

Deliberate and effective counterpropaganda is 

deemed essential by analysts and expert practitioners 

when the USG’s very credibility is at stake. It is also 

used to counter and deflate the agitation, incitement, 

and mobilization function of propaganda in the AQ 

terrorist quadrangle.157 Unfortunately, despite this 

admittedly critical role, recent changes in the official 

DoD lexicon have obscured the precise conception 

and definition of this task. As earlier defined, propaganda is deemed something only adversaries do 

and is by nature disinformative. It is designed to use 

fabrications, manipulations, and techniques of influence, to gain advantages for one’s own interests at the 

expense of rationally conceived objective truth. Given 

this negative function, how, then, can counterpropaganda be conceived?

 PSYOP, recently renamed Military Information 

Support Operations (MISO), was until recently the 

official name given by the DoD to the activity most 

resembling what one would imagine to be USG-based 

propaganda.158 A most terse definition is offered by 

U.S. Army Special Operations: “The mission of PSYOP 

is to influence the behavior of foreign TA’s [target audiences] to support U.S. national objectives.”159 This 

is not significantly different from the definition of 

propaganda cited above: 

[a]ny form of adversary communication, especially 

of a biased or misleading nature, designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of 

any group, in order to benefit the sponsor, directly or 

indirectly.
71

 Let us now juxtapose the older, fuller PSYOP definition with its MISO replacement term.

[PSYOP]: Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, 

and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, 

organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose 

of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce 

foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives.160

[MISO]: Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, 

and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, 

organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner 

favorable to the originator’s objectives.161

How Counterpropaganda Differs from Propaganda 

or PSYOP.

The function of propaganda, PSYOP or MISO, 

when stripped of euphemistic labels and spin, is to 

manipulate target audiences using known psychological techniques so that one’s own interests are more 

likely to be realized. It is part of the broader art and 

science of influence operations, and deemed a vital dimension of warfare to the extent that attacking enemy 

morale, will, attitudes, perceptions, and emotions, is 

a key means of influencing an adversary’s behavior. 

Counterpropaganda as I conceive it, however, does 

not involve countering adversary propaganda with 

one’s own. Counterpropaganda is the refutation of fiction by fact, not the opposing of one fiction to another.

In this monograph, counterpropaganda denotes 

the logical and factual refutation of an adversary’s 
72

propaganda, where propaganda is identical to fabrication; disinformation; and deceitful, distorted, 

and dishonest communication. This refutation must 

be truthful, verifiable, credible, and subject to proof 

based on tests of external reliability performed by objective observers. Its chief objective in the war against 

AQ is first, to factually assess and evaluate the USG’s 

and AQ’s actual deeds in relation to the Arab and Islamic worlds; and then, on the basis of such, formulate 

deliberate counter-AQ information warfare strategy. 

Conceived in this manner, counterpropaganda’s 

nearest relative is countering adversarial disinformation, or “counterdisinformation.” This latter term fails 

to signify that it is propaganda, and specifically terrorist propaganda, rather than information, that is at 

issue in the terrorist quadrangle. Disinformation may 

be a subset of terrorist tasks, but the unique properties of propaganda are not conveyed by the sanitized 

term “information” any more than the term “Military 

Information Support Operations” accurately conveys 

its PSYOP function as military propaganda in support 

of national objectives.162

ELEMENTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE 

USG COUNTERPROPAGANDA 

COUNTEROFFENSIVE 

In what follows, the chief elements of a counterpropaganda counteroffensive against AQ are outlined. Beginning with a discussion and conception of 

influence operations, contemporary war and warfare, 

and the instruments of national power, attention is 

then turned to the key tasks required of the two fronts 

in the War of Deeds. 
73

Influence Operations, Contemporary 

War, and Warfare. 

Influence Operations. 

Counterpropaganda must first be conceptualized in relation to a broader concept of contemporary 

war, warfare, and influence operations. Influence operations are those whose ultimate goal is to influence 

behavior in a manner favorable to its sponsor.163 Influence operations address the full range of potential 

variables, including traditional kinetic means, that 

affect motivation, attitudes, beliefs, and ultimately 

behaviors. 

Contemporary War and Warfare.

Influence is the chief objective of newer conceptions of war and warfare achieved via a vast terrain of 

social, technological, cultural, political, financial, and 

psychological methods and means. Today’s battlefield 

is not militarized and kinetic, but can be broadened to 

include a virtually inexhaustible and unrestricted mass 

of energy to be deployed in the service of policy.164 In 

relation to this concept of war and warfare, a recent 

author suggests the utility of discarding “conceptions 

of war and warfare that include only the traditional 

kinetic sense and instead think about forms of conflict 

that do not take lives or cause damage.”165 Consider, 

for example, the following conception: 

What is significant is that all of these warfighting 

means, along with their corresponding applications, 

that have entered, are entering, or will enter, the ranks 

of warfighting means in the service of war, have al-
74

ready begun to quietly change the view of warfare 

held by all of mankind. Faced with a nearly infinitely diverse array of options to choose from, why do 

people want to enmesh themselves in a web of their 

own making and select and use means of warfare that 

are limited to the realm of force of arms and military 

power? Methods that are not characterized by the use 

of the force of arms, nor even by the presence of casualties and bloodshed, are just as likely to facilitate 

the successful realization of the war’s goals, if not 

more so. As a matter of course, this prospect has led 

to revision of the statement that ‘war is politics with 

bloodshed’ [Clausewitz, Mao] and in turn has also led 

to a change in the hitherto set view that warfare prosecuted through force of arms is the ultimate means of 

resolving conflict [Clausewitz, also p. 7, 36]. Clearly, it 

is precisely the means employed that has enlarged the 

concept of warfare. Moreover, the enlargement of the 

concept of warfare has, in turn, resulted in an enlargement of the realm of war-related activities. . . . Any war 

that breaks out tomorrow or further down the road 

will be characterized by warfare in the broad sense—

a cocktail mixture of warfare prosecuted through 

the force of arms and warfare that is prosecuted by 

means other than the force of arms. The goal of this 

kind of warfare will encompass more than merely ‘using means that involve the force of arms to force the 

enemy to accept one’s own will’ [Clausewitz]. Rather, 

the goal should be ‘to use all means whatsoever—

means that involve the force of arms and means that 

do not involve the force of arms, means that involve 

military power and means that do not involve military 

power, means that entail casualties and means that do 

not entail casualties—to force the enemy to serve one’s 

interests’.166
75

From M, to Diplomatic, Informational, Military, 

and Economic (DIME), to DIMEFIL, to DICEFILM: 

On the Eight Instruments of National Power. 

A counterpropaganda campaign directed against 

AQ must also take into account the full range of elements and instruments of national power brought to 

bear on those three chief variables enabling terrorist 

actions: subjective motivation, subjective and objective capability, and objective opportunity. These eight 

major instruments of national power—diplomatic, 

informational, cyber, economic, financial, intelligence, 

legal, military—arrayed against these three variables 

are presented in Figure 2. 

Figure 2. Elements of a

Comprehensive USG Counterpropaganda 

Counteroffensive to Combat Radicalization 

and Recruitment to AQ Terrorism.

 Combating the Three Bases Enabling Terrorist Behavior

Reduce Motivation Reduce Ability/Capacity Reduce Opportunity 

MESSAGE

MESSENGER 

MEDIA 

DIPLOMATIC INFORMATIONAL CYBER ECONOMIC 

FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE LEGAL MILITARY 

Counter AQ messaging through systematic 

counter-propaganda in word, and deed. USG 

policies enhance and reinforce resonance 

Counter AQ messengers through HVT, discrediting and 

delegitimizing, credible alternative messengers 

Counter AQ media through targeted removal, infiltration, 

delegitimation, credible alternative media

“The United States is NOT

and has NEVER been at war 

with Islam. This is proven by 

our words, deeds, and 

actions.” 

“Al Qaeda’s terrorism violates 

Islamic law, is responsible for 

major sins, undermines Muslim 

interests, and uses murder, 

force, and fear to impose its will 

on others.” 

Counter AQ messaging through systematic 

counterpropaganda in word, and deed. USG 

policies enhance and reinforce resonance
76

As one can see in Figure 2, inclusion of the cyber 

(C) domain extends the principal instruments of national power beyond their originally-conceptualized 

four (DIME), and more recent extension to seven by 

adding the financial, intelligence, and legal domains 

(DIMEFIL or MIDLIFE),167 to eight in order to fully 

capture the means employed in the digital revolution 

manifest in cyberspace.168 Well attested in recent doctrine and analyses,169 and obviously central to the domain of countering AQ propaganda, this essential element of national power must now be given its proper 

recognition.170

Countering AQ Propaganda: 

The Primacy of the War of Deeds.

Next, I briefly describe the two key fronts in a 

War of Deeds designed to counter AQ terrorist propaganda. By deftly organizing a sustained War of 

Deeds and, as a result, eviscerating AQ’s credibility, 

the nexus between terrorist propaganda and terrorist 

acts (see Figure 1) is severed. Ideally, this means that 

an effectively sustained USG campaign can cripple 

and render impotent AQ’s capacity to incite moral 

outrage, radicalize, and earn new recruits as so-called 

vanguard of a besieged.

The premise of a War of Deeds is that defeating 

AQ does not require mimicking enemy tactics through 

manipulation of evidence, spin, tricks or deceptive 

arts of any sort. Instead it requires the confident deployment of human reason and martialing of genuine evidence that can in the long run triumph over 

fabrications, propaganda, disinformation, and AQ’s 

violent offensive war against all who disagree with its 

political objectives, especially its terrorist modus ope-
77

randi. Veracity and credibility rather than perfection 

of USG deeds is key to a War of Deeds. An objective, 

factual investigation of U.S. actions will not confirm 

any kind of Crusader war against Islam. Reason and 

evidence, duly combined, will reveal tractable clashes 

of interests; intracivilizational fault lines over religion 

and state; intercivilizational dialogue and conflict 

over core conceptions, and even potential intercivilizational conflicts, and even occasional clashes. It will 

not confirm, even remotely, however, a Crusader war 

against Islam. Undoubtedly some elements within 

U.S. society do seek a neo-Crusader agenda. This includes a Christian Zionist, Zionist, and neo-conservative political coalition which denies the policy roots 

of anti-U.S. animus. Instead it argues exclusively for 

war-footing against a supposedly ignoble Islamic or jihadist enemy found in virtually all guises—including 

the bogeyman of the Muslim Brotherhood. Undoubtedly, this extremely powerful political coalition functions within the United States to prejudice policies and 

foreign relations.171 Despite this, however, no rational 

analysis of USG policies, deeds, and actions confirms 

that it is official or unofficial USG policy to wage war 

on Islam, Muslims, or the Arab Muslim world. 

Countering AQ Messengers and Media.

A counterpropaganda counteroffensive along the 

lines of the War of Deeds suggested here has as its 

chief goal using three key elements—the media, messengers, and messages—to undermine motivation via 

incitement to moral outrage, and thereby radicalization and recruitment to AQ terrorism. Let us begin 

with the latter two first. As Figure 2 describes, countering AQ propaganda requires countering AQ’s mes-
78

sengers. The specific methods, tactics, techniques, and 

procedures (TTPs) specific to this objective include: 

eliminating AQ propagandists through deliberate 

targeting in ongoing HVT campaigns (e.g., Anwar alAwlaki and Abu Yahya al-Libi); infiltrating AQ oriented internet chat rooms and fora with the objective 

of discrediting and delegitimizing AQ’s messengers 

by countering disinformation, exploiting contradictions, and exposing fallacies; using the weapons of 

ridicule, satire, and character assassination to destroy 

messenger credibility;172 finally, attempts to recruit alternative messengers whose bona fide credibility may 

be leveraged to further damage AQ’s jihadist brand.173

Second, AQ media must be countered, using such 

methods and TTPs as targeted removal, infiltration, 

delegitimation of AQ media and sources, and legitimizing alternative credible media sources that effectively challenge AQ’s propagandistic assertions. 

Countering AQ’s Two Greatest Lies Using a 

War of Deeds.

Destroying AQ’s messengers and media, and enhancing U.S. media and messenger credibility is necessary, but insufficient. The knock-out blow, I believe, 

results when the USG overtly, directly, and effectively 

challenges and refutes AQ’s most essential messages

in a War of Deeds. As Figure 3 indicates, there are two 

vital “great lies” that AQ starkly juxtaposes—“The 

U.S. Crusader” and “The Islamic Defender”—that 

must be countered effectively in this War of Deeds. 

To refute these great lies requires two countermessages. Message 1: “The United States is NOT and has 

NEVER been at war with Islam. This is proven by our 

words, deeds, actions, and policies.” Message 2: “The 
79

Al-Qaeda terrorist entity is a violent criminal enterprise that violates Islamic law, is responsible for major 

sins, undermines Muslim interests, and uses murder, 

force, and fear to impose its will on others.” Each 

message, when combined in a sustained campaign, 

counters these great lies using concrete facts, actual 

policies, actions, and deeds associated with the USG 

and AQ. To facilitate this task, let us juxtapose AQ’s 

two greatest lies (propaganda) and the USG messages 

(counterpropaganda) required to refute them:

Figure 3. Method for Refuting AQ’s Big Lies. 

Method for Refuting AQs Big Lie #1.

AQ’s first big lie—The U.S. Crusader War against 

Islam—rests on five fabrications alleged as matters of 

indisputed empirical fact, which have been central to 

its earliest declarations of war in 1996 and 1998, justifying the killing of Americans, civilian and military, and 

repeatedly throughout subsequent communiques.174

Each of these fabrications may be treated as premises, 

and AQ’s first big lie as the alleged conclusion. 

AQ Great Lie #1:

The United States is engaged in a 

Crusader-Zionist war against Islam 

and the Muslim world.

USG Refutation of Great Lie #1:

The United States is NOT and has 

NEVER been at war with Islam. This 

is proven by our words, actions, 

deeds, and policies.

AQ Great Lie #2:

AQ is fighting a defensive jihad to 

protect the Muslim umma and Islam 

from an offensive Crusader-Zionist 

War.

USG Refutation of Great Lie #2:

The AQ criminal terrorist enterprise 

violates Islamic law, commits major 

sins, undermines Muslim interests, 

and uses murder, force, and fear to 

impose its will on others.
80

Premise 1: The Murderer of Muslim Millions. The 

United States is directly or indirectly responsible for 

the murder of millions of Muslim men, women, and 

children.

Premise 2: The Apostate Installer-Defender. The 

United States rules directly or indirectly through antiMuslim apostate governments it installs, maintains, 

and defends throughout the Muslim world. 

Premise 3: The Imperialist-Exploiter. The United 

States maintains a purely imperialist, exploitative, 

and predatory relationship to Middle East oil supplies 

and is pillaging the wealth of the Muslim world. 

Premise 4: The Aggressive Permanent Occupier. U.S.-

led military operations in Afghanistan, and earlier 

Iraq, and at present throughout the Muslim world, 

are militant offensive wars motivated by a desire to 

destroy Islam, permanently occupy Muslim lands, 

or rule indirectly through anti-Muslim apostate 

governments.

Premise 5: The U.S.-Zionist Plot to Create Israel to 

Divide and Destroy the Umma. The state of Israel was 

created as part of a Western colonial plot to establish a 

Crusader-Zionist beachhead at the center of the Muslim world to divide, weaken, and eventually uproot 

Islam from Palestine and the greater Middle East. 

Steadfast U.S. support for Israel is motivated primarily by that anti-Muslim colonial intention.

These five fabrications have gone essentially unchallenged to the present day. Whether refuting them 

is considered the equivalent of refuting holocaust deniers or 9/11 truthers, or flat-earthers, or martialing 

facts has lost out to the so-called “battle of ideas,” not 

taking these as deadly serious in the context of the 

USG credibility deficit, over the course of a decade, 
81

has permitted fictions to become living legends with 

predictably deadly consequences.175 If one chooses, 

one can also use concepts derived from framing theory176 to perceive these five fabrications as alleged 

empirical nodes supporting AQ’s anti-American 

“injustice frame.” By effectively countering these 

fabrications, one obliterates the supporting tissue of 

this injustice frame that inspires moral outrage and 

animates recruits. 

It is not a far stretch to see how an angry, newlyinspired, morally-outraged young recruit could be led 

through the lens of AQ’s sophisticated propaganda to 

see present U.S. policy commitments as motivated primarily by anti-Muslim animus. Instead of privileging 

access to oil reserves, the United States is a pillagerexploiter (Premise 3). Instead of a very powerful lobby 

in defense of Israel’s security and expansion, which 

in effect, permits an illegal occupation, settlement, 

and continuing humiliation of the Palestinian people 

to persist, the United States has an ultimate divide 

and conquer strategy (Premise 5). Instead of a policy 

that privileges conservative, stability-promoting antidemocratic autocrats and monarchs, the United States 

is an apostate installer-defender (Premise 2). 

Objective, factual, historical evidence is all that is 

required to refute AQ’s five fabrications (premises) and 

first big lie (conclusion). A sound argument consists of 

true and relevant premises from which a conclusion 

necessarily follows. It will be essential that such facts 

are considered credible, thus requiring credible messengers and media, for their legitimacy. 

While U.S. analysts are certainly capable of discovering, arranging, and communicating such facts, 

a curiously powerful messenger and source of credibility should also be leveraged: committed Islamists 
82

whose militant bona fides are unassailable, but who 

offer decisive evidence refuting AQ’s fabricated propagandistic history of U.S. involvement in the Arab 

and Muslim world. Consider the following realistic 

rather than propagandistic account provided by leaders of the Egyptian Islamic Group (Al Gama’a al-Islamiyya)—opposed on grounds of principle, legality, 

and pragmatics to AQ’s terroristic modus operandi—

of U.S. core strategic interests and their implications 

for U.S. relations with the Islamic world.

The conception that America is waging a Crusade 

against Muslims is not true. . . . in the worst of cases 

[one can say that] at times there have been American 

policies that have had a religious dimension in opposing some—and not all—of the Islamic world’s causes. 

[The fact that this is not a Crusade] explains America’s positive stand in support of the Afghani mujahideen in their fight against the Soviet occupation, and 

[America’s] positive stand [against] the ethnic cleansing operation against the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the province of Kosovo. Likewise, 

the conception that America aimed to bring down the 

Taliban regime in Afghanistan and could not have 

been deterred from doing so is not true. Reality attests 

to the fact that America attempted to come to terms 

with the Taliban regime in order to realize common 

strategic goals . . . and these attempts to come to an 

understanding ran up against the Al-Qaeda organization’s actions, which were launched from Afghanistan 

and targeted America, and which the Taliban authorities did not restrain.177 . . . America at that time was 

looking for new strategies for a new century, and if the 

Front [i.e., Al-Qaeda] and other interpreters of Islam 

had adopted serious Islamic strategy that would have 

given consideration to American interests together 

with Islamic interests, this would have prevented the 

continuation of this war or [at least] would have kept 

it from taking on a comprehensive nature.178
83

An earlier work authored by this same organization deeply critical of AQ179 provides an even broader, 

in-depth account and rendering of key U.S. objectives 

vis-à-vis the Muslim world.

In this chapter, the leaders of the Egyptian Al-Jama’ah 

Al-Islamiyah review and assess strategy on the issues 

of the Muslim world in an attempt to answer several 

important questions necessitated by current world 

events: Did U.S. strategy target the Muslim world or 

not? Are we in a state of self-defense that allows AlQaida to do what it wants? The authors argue that 

Al-Qaida’s interpretation of U.S. strategy is not accurate but is characterized, as they say, with unfairness. 

The authors say that any observer of U.S. strategy will 

find that the prime mover of this strategy is interests 

and not the religious factor. This explains many major events in which the United States appeared to be 

supportive of some Islamic issues, such as support for 

the Afghan jihad in 1979 against the Soviet presence. 

The leaders of Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyya divide this 

U.S. strategy into three phases. The first starts with the 

end of the First World War in 1945 [sic] until the end 

of the Cold War in December 1991 with the collapse 

of the Soviet Union. The second phase begins in 1991 

until the [1998] proclamation of the World Front to 

Combat the Jews and the Crusaders [by AQ] and the 

start of operations against the United States. The third 

phase stretches from 11 September 2001 events to [the 

present] date. At the end of their evaluation of the 

U.S. strategy, the authors conclude that Al-Qa’ida’s 

strategy was one of the most important factors that 

hastened the formulation of this U.S. strategy that is 

negative toward the Muslim world.180

Method for Refuting AQs Big Lie #2.

The War of Deeds is especially appropriate for 

refuting AQ’s propaganda that it is the vanguard
84

fighting a defensive war against a Crusader-Zionist 

alliance. The five premises similarly service this conclusion; exposing the fabricated nature of those premises suffices then, to render this conclusion invalid. 

Whereas the previous task requires refuting lies

that radically impugn USG credibility, the task here 

is confirming facts that impugn AQ’s credibility. Because AQ fights in the name of Islam and defends its 

actions in terms of a strict, classical interpretation of 

the shari’a regulating the lawful waging of the jihad, 

radically impugning AQ’s credibility means exposing 

not only its empirical fabrications, but its legal-moral 

violations, i.e., sinfulness. 

Jurisprudence and Fiqh al-Jihad. 

Far from fighting a defensive jihad against Crusaders, AQ is in fact a criminal terrorist enterprise 

that is guilty of egregious violations of Islamic law, 

including the commission of major sins such as: intentional homicide, deemed unpardonable on the Day of 

Judgment; imprudent sacrificing of Muslim interests 

throughout the world; and violating generally expected norms of humane conduct by using murder, force, 

and fear to impose its will on others. Let us consider 

each in turn.

The jihad of the sword (jihad bis saif)181 is strictly 

regulated by classical sources of orthodox religious 

authority. AQ claims to uphold faithfully the classical shari’a of lawful jihad by strictly adhering to the 

path of al salaf al salih (the path followed by the “righteous” ancestors). These earliest companions of and 

successors to Prophet Muhammad furnish for genuine salafists the normative ideal of righteous intention 

and conduct, including the conduct of jihad. AQ also 
85

claims to strictly abide by an established body of law 

(fiqh) transmitted by classical religious scholar-jurists 

prescribing and regulating jihad fi sabil Allah (jihad in 

the path of Allah). The most damaging case against 

AQ arises when these shari’a sources are marshaled 

to persuasively demonstrate that absolutely forbidden (haram) violations have been perpetrated. Should 

AQ’s terroristic modus operandi demonstrate discontinuity, innovation, and forbidden acts that contradict 

Prophet Muhammad’s “sunna”—though marketed in 

AQ apologetics as the “salafi-jihadi” path—its violation of the classical jihad would be proven, and its legitimacy impaled.182

Devastating cases against AQ’s violations of fiqh 

al-jihad exist, and should be fully leveraged to prove 

that AQ is guilty of murderous jihadism and has in 

fact innovated a doctrine of “killing in masse” predicated on engaging in many legally/morally forbidden acts. Among these forbidden acts are: the killing 

of several categories of person—Muslim and nonMuslim—whose blood, reputation, and property are 

strictly protected under Islamic law; violation of the 

shari’a regulating the use of human shields in combat; violation of the law of retribution or lex talionis; 

violation of laws forbidding treachery and the breaking of covenants; and killing persons on the basis of 

nationality.183

Prudence and Muslim Interests.

Prudential critiques are also key to obliterating 

AQ’s propaganda, which asserts it fights on behalf 

of Muslims and is essential to the defense of Islamic 

lands and power. To the contrary, AQ’s murderous 

jihadism is responsible for a host of consequences. 
86

What follows is a short list. AQ has caused the fall of 

the Taliban regime. It has besmirched a great faith, Islam, by equating it in the minds of a broader public 

with barbaric terror. AQ’s actions have created greater 

support for a securitized environment that has placed 

Muslims, and others, in a far more precarious position 

vis-à-vis the free exercise of civil liberties, than previously. AQ has de-legitimized the broader Islamist 

resurgence in the minds of a broader public seeking 

along with other actors, to democratically contest 

existing unpopular, autocratic regimes. Fiqh al-jihad

requires that the decision to wage the jihad of the 

sword take into account the probability of success, the 

relative benefits and costs to Islam of the choice to use 

force, and takes full advantage of many other permissible and recommendable means that may be used to 

spread the worship and Word of Allah.184

Ethics and Human Morality. 

AQ’s use of murder, force, and fear—the essence 

of its modus operandi as a criminal terrorist organization—denies human individuals, Muslim and 

non-Muslim, the right to choose alternative paths 

and means for realizing aspirations in the contemporary world. Terror as a fear-generating tool designed 

to instill dread in order to attain power over others 

undermines the fundamental sense of personal security: a security without which the exercise of freedom and liberty is not possible.185 AQ is, at its root, 

in permanent war with any and all Muslims and 

non-Muslims, who dissent from its path of murderous 

jihadism. 

Despite opposition to USG policies, overwhelming 

majorities of Muslim and non-Muslim alike view ter-
87

rorism as a morally reprehensible means for achieving 

power over others. They view nonviolent, democratic 

means as a superior means of fighting for one’s rights 

and freedoms, as well as for selecting representatives 

who are replaceable and accountable to the governed. 

These overwhelming majorities do not view democracy as a substitute religion involving a worshipful 

relation or replacement of an Almighty by man. Rather, they view democracy as the most effective means 

of ensuring that man, as a morally challenged being 

fraught with vices and temptations and desires, be 

subject to accountable laws and governments, and not 

the tyranny of an unchosen dictator, or self-appointed 

vanguard. The “take away” message for the USG of 

this most American of ideals—self-determination under an elected and accountable government under 

law—seems obvious. “Better relations with Arab societies as a whole,” Jamal Amay of Princeton’s Department of Politics, recently asserts:186

will require reconsidering U.S. policies that ignore the 

preferences of ordinary citizens, such as continuing to 

back authoritarian regimes, increasing drone attacks 

in the region, and supporting the ongoing Israeli occupation of the West Bank. A carefully constructed 

foreign policy will have to take into account the preferences of millions of Arabs across the region. . . . 

There is no evidence of some deep and durable Arab 

hatred of the United States. . . . [C]itizens across the 

region recognize that there is much to gain from closer 

ties to the United States. A carefully designed U.S. 

foreign policy should ensure that the United States’ 

geostrategic plans incorporate, rather than alienate, 

those citizens.187

The “take away” message for AQ is also clear. AQ’s 

insurgent terror is now, and into an indefinite but 
88

certain future, in irreconcilable conflict with this vast 

majority’s sense of decency, morality, and its chosen 

path forward. Imploding from within, and marginalized from without, AQ shall in time meet the fate—

oblivion—of every known terrorist enterprise. Having 

wreaked havoc now for nearly a quarter century, it is 

well time for those possessed of facts, to fight AQ’s 

fabrications. The time for a determined, systematic 

counterpropaganda counteroffensive fought along 

the lines suggested above, has arrived. 

IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGY

Ways, Means, and Ends.

Strategy entails that one specify the way in which 

means are used to accomplish ends.

188 The end specified in in this monograph is the second strategic objective outlined in the 9/11 Commission Report: countering 

radicalization and recruitment to AQ. The way is the 

concept or method for achieving that strategic objective. In this case, I am suggesting that U.S. strategists 

use a unique way/methodology: Fighting the War of 

Deeds. This methodology emphasizes the communicative nature, function, and value of policies, deeds, 

and actions as drivers of anti-Americanism in the 

Arab and Muslim world. This method is offered as a 

distinct supplement, complement, or most likely substitute, for what I deem a mostly ill-advised effort to 

craft persuasive messaging using public diplomacy, 

strategic communication, or other persuasive arts that 

do not begin with and leverage the power of deeds. 

The means suggested involve all eight instruments of national power described above. If policy 

is communication, each of these instruments must 
89

function in harmony to undermine AQ’s two greatest 

lies. A range of agencies and personnel are focused 

on countering radicalization and recruitment to AQ, 

and “means” therefore applies to all organizational, 

financial, and personnel-based resources that must be 

deployed to realize this objective. 

Strategic Validity.

The validity of a strategy requires that it accomplish its desired strategic effect (suitability), is backed 

by sufficient resources (sustainability), and is deemed 

legitimate, relative to costs and benefits, among relevant publics (acceptability). Assuming resource sufficiency, I here address the first and third elements. 

Suitability. The analysis above confirms the resounding emphasis—across a range of experts, literature, reports, and political orientations—of the critical 

significance of deeds as communication. The methodology of Fighting the War of Deeds is therefore grounded in known facts and experience regarding the variety of modes available in persuasive communication, 

and the suitability/efficacy of deeds as chief among 

them. The War of Deeds is especially suited for the 

present propaganda-rich environment in which countering radicalization and recruitment to AQ among 

morally indignant, home-based and home-grown terrorist self-starters has become critical. The overriding 

emphasis on perceptions of U.S. injustice toward the 

Muslim world among this population requires that 

policies speak loudly and powerfully enough to quell 

doubts and undermine AQ’s viral reach. 

Acceptability. The War of Deeds is likely to meet 

resistance among certain sub-populations who consider themselves beneficiaries of present U.S. foreign 
90

and military policy in the Arab and Muslim world. It is 

also likely to meet resistance among a broader American populace who may believe that carefully examining U.S. foreign and military policy, and perceptions 

of that policy amount to “rewarding” terrorism. It will 

require a determined effort to prove that, in fact, one 

may develop new understandings without sanctioning terrorism or AQ’s murderous jihadism, as a legitimate means of addressing existing injustices. Taking 

the initiative to clarify and define present policies and 

their implications for future relations with the Arab 

and Muslim world is highly advisable; fighting an illdefined “war of ideas” as a reaction to AQ’s bloody 

provocations and perfidious methods, is not.

Strategic Risks.

Strategic risk must consider the probable consequences of success and failure of a given strategy. It 

asks the question: Given this unique strategy, and in 

the context of this strategic environment, what strategic effects are likely to be created by the implementation of this strategy? Many other questions must also 

be raised: How will this strategy affect the present 

equilibrium among actors? What potential unintended effects, and second- and third-order effects, exist? 

CONCLUSION

I will close this monograph on a note of genuine 

humility and state that I must leave to genuine strategists the careful, methodical evaluation of these potential risks arising from vigorously fighting a War of 

Deeds as proposed here. It is my firm conviction that 

the United States of America is—owing to its youthful 
91

18th century provenance and pioneering role as creator, defender, and promoter of democratic ideals—

on the right side of history, while AQ faces inexorable 

implosion and marginalization and an inevitable demise. Its global ambitions, murderous methods, and 

arrogant pretensions condemn it to wreaking havoc 

and parasitizing chaos. I firmly believe that the long 

process of reconstructing states, legitimacy, and 

boundaries now unfolding throughout the fermenting 

Arab and Muslim world naturally benefits the United 

States, and we, them. We are both, we are all, aspiring to realize, and not negate, functioning, productive, sociopolitical, socioeconomic, and sociocultural 

orders. For those reasons, it seems to me that the risk 

of not acting boldly to proclaim an enduring alliance 

with this emergent order and its Sunni majority is 

far greater than the risks we face, as nation after nation deposes its autocrats and dictators and possibly 

also its monarchs. Must we, having failed to develop 

a post-autocratic, post-Cold War vision, vacillate between embracing the autocrats who guarantee shortterm regime stability and the democrats—Muslim 

and secular—who seek to dethrone them? I believe 

a natural, long-term alliance and dialogue of civilizations is in the making and that possibly the greatest risk of all is failing to understand that the older 

algorithm—oil, Israel, and autocracy—does not give 

way to a fuller conception. One, in short, that does not 

require lipstick.

ENDNOTES 

1. Scott Shane, “Suspects With Foot in 2 Worlds, Perhaps 

Echoing Plots of Past,” The New York Times, April 2013, available 

from www.nytimes.com/2013/04/21/us/boston-suspects-confusedidentities-and-conflicting-loyalties.html?pagewar.
92

2. President of the United States, National Strategy for 

Counterterrorism, June 2011, p. 17.

3. Kim Cragin and Scott Gerwehr, Dissuading Terror: Strategic Influence and the Struggle Against Terrorism, Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND, 2005, p. iii.

4. Paul Kamolnick, Delegitimizing Al-Qaeda: A Jihad-Realist Approach, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 

College, March 2012.

5. Office of the President, National Security Strategy, Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010, pp. 4, 19-22, available 

from www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer?national_

security?strategy.pdf; Office of the President, National Strategy for 

Countering Terrorism, Washington, DC: The White House, June 

2011, pp. 1, 3, available from www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/

counterterrorism_strategy.pdf; United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington, DC: United 

States Institute of Peace, February 2010, pp. v, 6, 15, available from

www.defense.gov/qdr/QDR%20as%20of%2026JAN10%200700.pdf; 

Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America’s National Security Needs in the 21st Century, Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, 

Corrected Advance Copy, 2010, Washington, DC: United States 

Institute of Peace, p. 26; U.S. Department of Defense, Sustaining 

U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, Washington, DC: Department of Defense (DoD), January 2012, p. 4, 

available from www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.

pdf; President Barack Obama, “The Future of our Fight Against 

Terrorism,” Speech at National Defense University, Washington, 

DC, May 23, 2013, esp. pp. 1-2, available from www.guardian.co.uk/

world/2013/may/23/obama-drones-guantanamo-speech-text/print. 

6. See for example, Peter Bergen, “Time to declare victory: al 

Qaeda is defeated,” June 27, 2012, available from security.blogs.cnn.

com; Peter Bergen, The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict between 

America and Al-Qaeda, London, UK: Free Press, 2011, esp. Chap. 

12, “Al-Qaeda 2.0 (pp. 197-213) and Chap. 20, “The Long Hunt” 

(pp. 335-351); Peter Bergen, “From Benghazi to Boston: the state 

of the jihad,” available from www.cnn.com; Peter Bergen, “Bush’s 
93

war on terror is over,” May 26, 2013, available from www.cnn.com. 

In this latter piece Bergen argues for a “whack a mole” approach 

to al-Qaeda (AQ) affiliates, asserts that “big Al Qaeda” is on its 

way out, and that though deradicalization remains an important 

task, it is time to end this “longest war,” and U.S. Government 

(USG) attempts to define this as a task of global reach under the 

auspices of an unending authorization, and using illicit methods. 

See also Stephanie Gaskell, “Al Qaeda on ‘Life Support’,” July 16, 

2013, available from www.defenseone.com/threats/2013/07/al-qaedalife-support/66809; Fawaz A. Gerges, The Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda, 

London, UK, and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, esp. 

pp. 189-192, 200-202; Michael G. Vickers, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, “The Evolution of Al-Qaeda and Associated Movements,” Transcript prepared from Audio File Entitled 

“110913-opening-panel-with-Vickers [Being at Audio Counter 

04:31:32-4:46:57], in Joseph J. Simons, Adjunct, CRC, “Ten Years 

Later: Insights on al-Qaeda’s Past and Future through Captured 

Records: A Conference Report,” January 27, 2012; Army Sgt. 1st 

Class Tyrone C. Marshall, Jr., “Military Has Crushed al-Qaida 

Since 9/11, Official Says,” February 8, 2012, available from www.

defense.gov; Kenneth Ross, “The war against al-Qaeda is over,” The 

Washington Post, August 2, 2013.

7. See for example, Frud Bezhan, “The Rise of Al-Qaeda 2.0,” 

July 24, 2013, available from www.theatlantic.com/international/

archive/2013/07/the-rise-of-al-qaeda-20/278059; Max Boot, “Al-Qaeda’s Resurgence,” Commentary, October 11, 2012, available from 

www.commentarymagazine.com/2012/10/11/al-qaedas-resurgence/; 

Martha Crenshaw, “Assessing the Al-Qa’ida Threat to the United 

States,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 3, No. 1, January 2010, pp. 6-9; Brian 

Michael Jenkins, “Is the War on Terror Over? Not Yet,” Santa 

Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, April 30, 2012; Peter Bergen and Bruce Hoffman, “Assessing the Terrorist Threat,” Report 

of the National Security Preparedness Group, September 10, 2012; 

Seth G. Jones, “Re-Examining the Al Qa’ida Threat to the United 

States,” Testimony presented before the House Foreign Affairs 

Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and 

Trade, “Global al Qaeda: Affiliates, Objectives, and Future Challenges,” July 18, 2013; Seth G. Jones, “Resurgence of al Qaeda,” 

Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, October 16, 2013; Seth 

G. Jones, “Al Qaeda is Far From Defeated,” The Wall Street Journal, April 29, 2012; Seth G. Jones, “Think Again: Al Qaeda,” Foreign Policy, April 23, 2012, available from www.foreignpolicy.com/
94

articles/2012/04/23/think_again_al_qaeda; Seth G. Jones, “Difficult 

Questions on Today’s Terrorist Threat,” Santa Monica, CA: The 

RAND Corporation, October 22, 2012, available from www.rand.

org/commentary/2012/10/22/RAND.html; Thomas Joscelyn, “Global 

al Qaeda: Affiliates, objectives, and future challenges,” Long War 

Journal, July 18, 2013, available from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/07/global_al_qaeda_affi-print.php; Anna Mulrine, “Al 

Qaeda growing, but less focused on US, study finds,” Christian 

Science Monitor, July 22, 2013, available from www.csmonitor.com; 

David Gartenstein-Ross, “Reports of Al Qaeda’s Death Have Been 

Greatly Exaggerated,” Foreign Policy, October 3, 2012, available 

from www.foreignpolicy.com; Con Coughlin, “The war isn’t over 

yet,” London Sunday Telegraph, August 4, 2013, available from 

www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-qaeda/10222159/This-warisnt-over-yet.html; Juan Zarate and Thomas Sanderson, “Terrorism’s shifting face,” The Washington Post, August 5, 2013, op-ed, 

available from www.washingtonpost.com; Editorial Board, “Wishful thinking on the war on terror,” The Washington Post, August 

5, 2013, available from www.washingtonpost.com; Bill Roggio, “Al 

Qaeda isn’t dead, FBI director says,” Long War Journal, August 23, 

2013, available from www.longwarjournal.org. FBI Director Robert 

Mueller is quoted: “We are seeing dialogue between core Al Qaeda and the affiliates. . . . As countries are going through the Arab 

Spring that will, territorially, present a substantial threat down 

the road.” Asked if AQ was dead, Mueller responded in one 

word: “No.” 

Bruce Hoffman most recently defends an agnostic but deeply 

concerned perspective (“Al Qaeda’s Uncertain Future,” Studies in 

Conflict & Terrorism, 2013, Vol. 36, pp. 635-653). In opposition to “a 

recent State Department analysis” that AQ is “on a path of decline 

that will be difficult to reverse” and that this “general assessment 

also reflects the views of many prominent American pundits, academicians, and analysts,” Hoffman argues for: 

a more cautious, even agnostic, approach. Although one 

cannot deny the vast inroads made against Core Al-Qaeda 

in recent years as a result of the developments described 

above, this article nonetheless argues that the long-established nucleus of the Al-Qaeda organization has proven 

itself to be as resilient as it is formidable. For more than a 

decade, it has withstood arguably the greatest international 

onslaught directed against a terrorist organization in history. 
95

Further, it has consistently shown itself capable of adapting 

and adjusting to even the most consequential countermeasures directed against it, having, despite all odds, survived 

for nearly a quarter century.636

Further (p. 641): 

the Al Qaeda Core’s demise is neither ordained nor imminent—at least based on the publicly available evidence. 

Rather, one can make a reasonable argument that Core Al 

Qaeda has . . . well-established sanctuary in Pakistan . . . a 

deeper bench than has often been posited . . . a defined and 

articulated strategy for the future it is presumably still pursuing . . . a highly capable leader in al-Zawahiri . . . [and] . . . 

a well-honed, long established dexterity that enables it to be 

as opportunistic as it has been instrumental, that is capable 

of identifying and exploiting whatever new opportunities 

for expansion and consolidation may present themselves. 

After citing numerous trends and concluding ,“[n]one of the 

above is pre-ordained, much less certain,” Hoffman argues for 

another potential negative trajectory: “It is equally likely,” he 

states (p. 648):

that Core Al Qaeda will continue to degenerate and eventually devolve into nothing more than a postmodern movement, with a set of loose ideas and ideologies. It would 

continue to pose a terrorist threat, but a far weaker, more 

sporadic and perhaps less consequential one. The future of 

the Al Qaeda Core depends not only on whether they can 

find a new cause—such as Syria today, like Iraq in 2003—

but also, fundamentally, whether they can learn from past 

experiences and avoid the mistakes that previously undermined their struggle through self-inflicted wounds. 

Powerful as Hoffman’s argument is, and despite its solidity as an 

analysis of potential variables and drivers, this piece continues, 

mostly implicitly, an ongoing polemic with Marc Sageman over 

Sageman’s thesis of the “leaderless jihad” and “bunch of guys” 

theory of emergent self-radicalization (see for example, p. 638; 

note 20; p. 649; p. 646) which likely explains the fact that Hoffman 

does not discuss the emergence of radicalization, self-radicalization, propaganda, counterpropaganda, or the present USG drone 
96

policy. Recent high-level intelligence community assessments 

view emergent cyberspace-based threats (internet-related attacks, 

espionage, and theft) as eclipsing the threat of an AQ-based mass 

casualty terrorist attack on U.S. soil; however, AQ-based, affiliated, and inspired terrorist attacks are still viewed as presenting major, persistent, highly complex, and varied threats across 

a variety of regions, including the American homeland. See for 

example: Greg Miller, “FBI director warns of cyberattacks; other 

security chiefs say terrorism threat has altered,” The Washington 

Post, November 14, 2013, available from www.washingtonpost.com/

world/national-security; Timothy M. Phelps, “Officials say terrorist threat on U.S. soil is declining,” Los Angeles Times, November 

14, 2013, available from www.latimes.com/world/worldnow. See 

also U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism,” 

Fact Sheet, Washington DC: Office of the Spokesperson, May 30, 

2013, available from www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/05/210103.htm, 

for further discussion of the consequences of attrition on AQ’s 

centralized leadership and the emergence of geographically dispersed, decentralized, and relatively autonomous AQ-related terrorist acts from January 1, 2012, to December 31, 2012. 

8. Consider, for example, the following telling contrast between former (1997-2005) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 

special agent Ali H. Soufan, who interrogated AQ detainees at the 

U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo, Cuba (GITMO), and elsewhere; 

and Richard C. Clarke, former deputy national security advisor 

for counterterrorism. See Ali H. Soufan, “The End of the Jihadist 

Dream,” New York Times, op-ed, May 3, 2011, p. A19: 

[I]t won’t take long for Al Qaeda to begin wishing that Bin 

Laden wasn’t dead. He not only was the embodiment of Al 

Qaeda’s ideology, but also was central to the group’s fundraising and recruiting successes. Without him, Al Qaeda 

will find itself short on cash—and members. . . . [N]o one 

in the organization can come close to filling that void. Bin 

Laden’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who will probably try 

to take over, is a divisive figure. His personality and leadership style alienate many, he lacks Bin Laden’s charisma and 

connections and his Egyptian nationality is a major mark 

against him.

Richard C. Clarke, “Bin Laden’s Dead. Al Qaeda’s Not,” New York 

Times, op-ed, May 3, 2011, p. A19, in stark contrast, asserts: 
97

[E]ven before Bin Laden’s death, analysts had begun to argue that Al Qaeda was rapidly becoming irrelevant. With 

Bin Laden’s death, it is even more tempting to think that the 

era of Al Qaeda is over. But such rejoicing would be premature. To many Islamists ideologues, the Arab Spring simply 

represents the removal of obstacles that stood in the way of 

establishing the caliphate. Their goal has not changed, nor 

has their willingness to use terrorism. . . . The more significant threat . . . will come from Al Qaeda’s local affiliates. Bin 

Laden and his deputies designed Al Qaeda as a network of 

affiliated groups that could operate largely independently 

to attack America, Europe and secular governments in the 

Middle East in order to establish fundamentalist regimes. 

Once in place, the network no longer needed Bin Laden and, 

in fact, has been proceeding with minimal direction from 

him for several years. . . . Islamist extremists will not be 

stopped by the elimination of Al Qaeda’s leader or even by 

the eradication of Al Qaeda itself. They will continue their 

struggle, refusing to renounce violence or accept more democratic, less corrupt regimes as a substitute for the caliphate.

For commentary following bin Laden’s death evidencing this divide, see for example, those asserting inevitable or likely post-bin 

Laden demise, Fouad Ajami, “Osama Bin Laden, Weak Horse,” 

The Wall Street Journal, op-ed, May 3, 2001, available from online.

wsj.com; Camille Tawil, “Bin Laden’s death deals severe blow to 

al-Qaeda,” March 5, 2011, available from www.magharebia.com, or 

post-bin Laden resilience, e.g., Eric Schmitt, “Ex-Counterterrorism Aide Warns Against Complacency on Al Qaeda,” The New 

York Times, July 28, 2011; Tabassum Zakaria, “U.S. attack still significant al Qaeda goal: official,” Reuters, July 26, 2011, available 

from www.reuters.com. 

9. For select press on the embassy closings and worldwide 

travel alert, see Josh Hicks, “Chambliss: Threats ‘very reminiscent 

of what we saw pre-9/11’,” The Washington Post, August 4, 2013; 

Ahmed al-Haj and Krain Laub, “Tighter security at some US missions over al-Qaida,” Associated Press, August 4, 2013; Martha 

Raddatz and Jonathan Karl, “Senior U.S. Official: Intercepted Al 

Qaeda Communications Indicate Planned Attack ‘Big,’ ‘Strategically Significant’,” ABC News, August 4, 2013; Thomas Joscelyn, 

“US Closes Diplomatic Facilities in Response to al Qaeda Threat,” 
98

Long War Journal, 2013; Press, “US Embassies in 4 African Countries Also Closed,” The New York Times, August 5, 2013, available 

from www.nytimes.com/aponline/2013/08/05; “US Orders Evacuation of Embassy in Yemen,” VOA News, August 6, 2013, available 

from www.voanews.com/articleprintview/1724146.html; Eric Schmitt 

and Mark Mazzetti, “Qaeda Leader’s Edict to Yemen Affiliate Is 

Said to Prompt Alert,” The New York Times, August 6, 2013, available from www.nytimes.com/2013/08/06; Ellen Nakashima and 

Anne Gearan, “Al-Qaeda leader Zawahiri is said to have ordered 

terrorist attack; U.S. citizens urged to leave Yemen,” The Washington Post, August 5, 2013, available from www.washingtonpost.

com; Mohammed Ghobari, “U.S. citizens in Yemen urged to leave 

immediately,” Chicago Tribune, August 6, 2013, available from 

www.chicagotribune.com. For commentary over whether the embassy closures evidenced an overreaction of the USG, especially 

in relation to fears resulting from the political fallout of the earlier Libyan embassy attack in Benghazi or a genuinely resilient 

and adaptive enemy, see Oren Dorell, “Al-Qaeda on the run? No 

way, say experts,” USA Today, August 6, 2013, available from 

www.usatoday.com; Lara Jakes, “As al-Qaida grows, leaders remain a global threat,” Associated Press, August 8, 2013, available 

from www.sfgate.com, “Far from being on the brink of collapse, 

al-Qaida’s core leadership remains a potent threat—and one that 

experts say has encouraged he error network’s spread into more 

countries today than it was operating in immediately after 9/11”; 

Marc A. Thiessen, “’Core al-Qaeda’ is not defeated,” The Washington Post, August 7, 2013, available from www.washingtonpost.com/

opinions; “UN Experts Say Al-Qaida Affiliates Remain a Threat,” 

Associated Press, August 7, 2013, available from www.nytimes.

com; Ken Dilanian, “Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula at center 

of U.S. cross hairs,” Los Angeles Times, August 7, 2013, available 

from www.latimes.com; Carla Babb, “US Concerned about Al-Qaida’s Yemen Branch,” VOA News, August 7, 2013, available from 

www.voanews.com; Jeffrey Goldberg, “Warning to Americans: 

Be Afraid, Very Afraid,” August 4, 2013, available from www.

bloomberg.com; Clint Watts, “Al Qaeda Plots, NSA Intercepts & the 

Era of Terrorism Competition,” Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy 

Research Institute (FPRI), August 5, 2013, available from www.

fpri.org/print/1766; BBC News, Middle East, “International press 

blame US for embassy closures,” August 5, 2013, available from 

www.bbc.co.uk; Eugene Robinson, “The al-Qaeda menace the U.S. 

helped to create,” The Washington Post, August 5, 2013, available 
99

from www.washingtonpost.com/opinions; The Editorial Board, “Terrorism and the Embassies,” The New York Times, August 5, 2013, 

available from www.nytimes.com/2013/08/06/opinion; Juan Zarate 

and Thomas Sanderson, “Terrorism’s shifting face,” The Washington Post, August 5, 2013, available from www.washingtonpost.com/

opinions; Editorial Board, “Wishful thinking on the war on terror,” 

The Washington Post, August 5, 2013, available from www.washingtonpost.com/opinions; Dan Robinson, “White House Defends 

Progress Against al-Qaida, Affiliates,” Voice of America, August 

5, 2013, available from www.voanews.com/articleprintview/1723104.

html; Kent Klein, “Obama: Al-Qaida Core ‘On Its Way to Defeat’,” 

VOA News, August 7, 2013, available from www.voanews.com.

10. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), “New data reveals AQ-linked 

groups among most active terrorist groups in the world,” College 

Park, MD, University of Maryland, October 16, 2012, available 

at www.start.umd.edu/news/new-data-reveals-al-qaida-linked-groupsamong-most-active-terrorist-groups-world. It should be noted that 

this START data combines data across groups that considerably 

differ in degree of formal subordination and global ambition. 

Some of these groups should be viewed as predominantly local 

or regional terrorist actors with more tenuous tactical cooperation 

but no formal subordination through an oath of loyalty to AQ 

emir Ayman al-Zawahiri or formal strategic alignment (e.g., Taliban, Boko Haram, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, and the Abu Sayyaf 

Group), whereas others are much more strategically aligned and 

formally subordinate (al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula [AQAP]; 

al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb [AQIM]; Islamic State of Iraq [ISI]; 

Haqqani Network; al-Shabaab). Further, this data precedes the 

rise of additional affiliates and associates during the Arab Spring 

including major local, regional, and globalist actors in Northern 

and Western Africa, Syria, and the Sinai Peninsula. 

11. START, “Annex of Statistical Information,” Country Reports on Terrorism 2012, May 2013, available from www.state.

gov/documents/organization/210288.pdf. This 2012 worldwide terrorist incident data further corroborates the role of more looselyaligned affiliates and predominantly regional Islamist insurgent 

terrorist organizations. For example, of these six organizations, 

the Afghanistan-based Taliban and Boko Haram alone are responsible for 889 terrorist acts and 2,974 deaths, together account-
100

ing for 60 percent of terrorist attacks and 60 percent of deaths. 

For a brief account of the diversified nature of the present threat 

posed by these regional actors, see also U.S. Department of State, 

Country Reports on Terrorism Fact Sheet, Washington DC: Office of 

the Spokesperson, May 2013, available from www.state.gov/r/pa/

prs/ps/2013/05/210103.htm. For the full report, see United States 

Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, Washington, 

DC: Bureau of Counterterrorism, May 2013, available from www.

state.gov/documents/organization/210204.pdf. 

12. See for example, Adam Goldman, “Terrorists turn to 

online chat rooms to evade U.S.,” Japan Times, August 15, 2013, 

available from www.legalnews.com/detroit/1379327. Thomas Joscelyn, “CNN on al Qaeda’s ‘encrypted messaging system’,” Long 

War Journal, August 9, 2013, available from www.longwarjournal.

org; Thomas Joscelyn and Bill Roggio, “Analysis: Recent embassy 

closures triggered by Zawahiri communications with multiple 

subordinates,” Long War Journal, August 9, 2013, available from 

www.longwarjournal.org; Barbara Starr, “Details emerge about talk 

between al Qaeda leaders,” August 9, 2013, available from security.blogs.cnn.com/2013/08/09; Paul Cruickshank and Tim Lister, “Al 

Qaeda calling?” August 8, 2013, available from security.blogs.cnn.

com/2013/08/08. See also Yotam Rosner, Aviad Mendelbaum, Sean 

London, and Yoram Schweitzer, “Backdoor Plots: The Darknet as 

a Field for Terrorism,” INSS Insight No. 464, September 10, 2013, 

available from www.inss.org.il. Recent reporting suggests, however, that the U.S. intelligence community, particularly the National 

Security Agency, have developed an astonishingly powerful array of techniques for infiltrating and exploiting AQ’s communications networks (see for example, Greg Miller, Julie Tate, and Barton Gellman, “Documents reveal NSA’s extensive involvement in 

targeted killing program,” The Washington Post, October 16, 2013, 

available from www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security. 

13. Office of the President of the United States, Empowering 

Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, 

Washington, DC: The White House, August 3, 2013, pp. 1-2; Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security 

Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland, Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, February 2010, 

pp. 21-23, available from www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/qhsr_report.

pdf; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Department of Home-
101

land Security Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2012-2016, Washington, 

DC: Department of Homeland Security, February 2012, pp. 3-4, 

available from www.dhs.gov/strategic-plan-fiscal-years-fy-2012-2016; 

Office of the President of the United States, National Strategy for 

Counterterrorism, Washington, DC: The White House, June 2011, 

pp. 1-4; The Honorable Matthew G. Olsen, Director, National 

Counterterrorism Center, “Hearing before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Understanding the Threat Landscape, 

Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, July 25, 2012, 

esp. pp. 1-4; James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, 

Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, Washington, DC: House Permanent Select 

Committee on Intelligence, April 11, 2013, pp. 3-5; Obama, “The 

Future of our Fight Against Terrorism.”

14. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 

United States, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 

Attacks Upon the United States (aka: The 9/11 Commission Report), 

New York: W. W. Norton, 2004, Chap. 12, “What to do? A Global 

Strategy,” pp. 361-398.

15. See 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 365-374.

16. The Honorable Matthew G. Olsen, Director, National 

Counterterrorism Center, “Hearing before the House Committee 

on Homeland Security, Understanding the Threat Landscape,” 

Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, July 25, 2012, 

esp. pp. 1-4.

17. Clapper, Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, pp. 3-5.

18. Obama, “The Future of our Fight Against Terrorism.” 

19. Select examples of high value detainees include Khalid 

Sheikh Mohammad (KSM), captured March 2003 in Pakistan; incarcerated in GITMO; Abu Faraj al Libi, captured May 2005, incarcerated in GITMO; Ramzi Bin al-Shihb, captured September 

2002, incarcerated in GITMO; Umar Patek, the 2002 Bali nightclub 

bomber mastermind, captured by Pakistani forces, January 2011; 

Younis al-Mauritani, captured by Pakistani forces, September 

2011; Hambali (aka: Riduan Isamuddin), captured in a joint U.S.-
102

Thai operation in Thailand, August 2003; al Rahim al Nashiri, 

the head of AQ in the Persian Gulf, and mastermind of USS Cole

bombing, captured November 2002, incarcerated in GITMO; Ali 

al Aziz Ali KSM’s nephew and chief deputy, captured in 2003, 

incarcerated in GITMO; Walid bin Attash, captured March 2003, 

incarcerated in GITMO; and Nazih Abdul Hamed al Ruqai (aka: 

Abu Anas al-Libi), under indictment on October 5, 2013, for the 

1998 East African embassy bombings, and, since shortly after 

9/11, wanted by the FBI with a $5 million dollar bounty offered 

for his capture. See Thomas Joscelyn, “’Core’ al Qaeda member 

captured in Libya,” Long War Journal, 2013, available from www.

longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/10/core_al_qaeda_member.php. For 

the hybrid legal process involving both the military and civilian justice systems, i.e., preserving the opportunity and right to 

rendition and interrogation under military jurisdiction of al-Libi 

for the purposes of intelligence collection, but also under conditions that ensures due process in a U.S. federal district court, see 

“Obama Praises Capture of African Embassies Bombing Suspect,” 

VOA News, October 8, 2013; Benjamin Weiser and Eric Schmitt, 

“U.S. Said to Hold Qaeda Suspect on Navy Ship,” The New York 

Times, October 6, 2013; Charlie Savage and Benjamin Weiser, 

“How the U.S. Is Interrogating a Qaeda Suspect,” The New York 

Times, October 7, 2013; Ernesto Londono, “Capture of bombing 

suspect in Libya represents rare ‘rendition’ by U.S. military,” The 

Washington Post, October 6, 2013, available from www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security; Ken Dilanian and David S. Cloud, 

“U.S. raids on Al Qaeda operatives show shift away from drone 

strikes,” Los Angeles Times, October 6, 2013, available from www.

latimes.com/world; Benjamin Weiser, “Captured in Libya, 1998 

Bombing Suspect Pleads Not Guilty in a Manhattan Court,” The 

New York Times, October 15, 2013.

20. Obama, “The Future of our Fight Against Terrorism.” 

21. The present discussion is limited to presenting these data 

in support of the thesis of efficaciousness. Other key variables, 

feasibility and acceptability/perceived legitimacy are not directly 

addressed, but will be discussed as appropriate when considering 

strategic recommendations. For the rationale supporting the hunting of leadership targets in terrorist organizations, see Graham 

H. Turbiville, Jr., Hunting Leadership Targets in Counterinsurgency 

and Counterterrorist Operations: Selected Perspectives and Experience, 
103

JSOU Report 07-6, Hurlburt Field, FL, The JSOU Press, June 2007, 

available from jsoupublic.socom.mil; George A. Crawford, Manhunting: Counter-Network Organization in Irregular Warfare, JSOU 

Report 09-7, Hurlburt Field, FL, September 2009, available from 

jsoupublic.socom.mil. For the origin of the covert drone program 

in Pakistan, see Brian Glyn Williams, “The CIA’s Covert Predator 

Drone War in Pakistan, 2004-2010: The History of an Assassination Campaign,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 33, 2010, 

pp. 871-892; Mark Mazzetti, “A Secret Deal on Drones, Sealed in 

Blood,” The New York Times, April 6, 2013, available from www.

nytimes.com; Jonathan S. Landay, “CIA collaborated with Pakistan spy agency in drone war,” Stars and Stripes, April 9, 2013, 

available from www.stripes.com; Greg Miller and Bob Woodward, 

“Secret memos reveal explicit nature of U.S., Pakistan agreement 

on drones,” The Washington Post, October 24, 2013, available from 

www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security; “Secret memos 

‘show Pakistan endorsed drone strikes’,” BBC News, October 

24, 2013, available from nationaluasi.com/dru/secret-memos-showsakistan-endorsed-us-drone-strikes-102413. For the drones as official USG policy, see Micah Zenko, “The Long Third War: No 

matter who wins in November, America should get ready for 

10 more years of drones,” Foreign Policy, October 30, 2012, available from www.foreignpolicy.com; Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, “Washington’s Phantom War: The Effects of the U.S. 

Drone Program in Pakistan,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2011, 

Vol. 90, No. 4, pp. 12-18; Jo Becker and Scott Shane, “Secret ‘Kill 

List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will,” The New York 

Times, May 29, 2012, available from www.nytimes.com; Mark Mazzetti, , “The Drone Zone,” The New York Times, July 6, 2012, available from www.nytimes.com; David Ignatius, “An embassy asks, 

Drones or diplomacy?” The Washington Post op-ed, June 20, 2012, 

available from www.washingtonpost.com; Luis Ramirez, “Drones 

Revolutionize US Warfare,” VOA News, June 9, 2012, available 

from www.voanews.com; Scott Shane, “Targeted Killing Comes to 

Define War on Terror,” The New York Times, April 7, 2013, available from www.nytimes.com; Pat Reber, “Reports: US drone command to shift from CIA to military,” Stars and Stripes, March 21, 

2013, available from www.stripes.com; Ken Dilanian, “CIA’s covert 

drone program might shift further to Pentagon,” Stars and Stripes, 

February 17, 2013, available from www.stripes.com; Gordon Lubold 

and Shane Harris, “Exclusive: The CIA, Not the Pentagon, Will 

Keep Running Obama’s Drone War,” Foreign Policy, November 7, 
104

2013, available from droneswatch.org/2013/11/06/exclusive-the-cianot-the-pentagon-will-keep-running-obamas-drone-war/. Greg Miller, 

“CIA remains behind most drone strikes, despite effort to shift 

campaign to Defense,” The Washington Post, November 25, 2013, 

available from www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/; 

Reuters, “Kerry Says Obama Has Timeline to End U.S. Drone 

Strikes in Pakistan,” The New York Times, August 1, 2013; Cora 

Currier, “6 Months After Obama Promise to Divulge More on 

Drones, Here’s What We Still Don’t Know,” November, 5, 2013.

Some assert that, while undeniably successful as a tactic, 

drones may be self-defeating as strategy since it is deemed morally outrageous and unacceptable by many and may serve instead 

to replenish ranks even faster due to radicalization and recruitment (see e.g., Arie Kruglanski and Anna C. Sheveland, “Paradoxes of Counterterrorism,” November 27, 2012, available from 

nationalinterest.org). These authors state: “[T]he most effective 

tactical tool in the fight against terrorism turns out to be a major 

hindrance to U.S. strategic objectives, causing Washington to be 

hoist by its own petard.” See Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Why Drones 

Fail: When Tactics Drive Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92, No. 

4, July/August 2013, pp. 44-54. Others assert that the drone policy does, in fact, contribute to sound strategy, and that its costs, 

while undeniable, do not outweigh its benefits. For a defense 

of the present policy, see Daniel Byman, “Why Drones Work: 

The Case for Washington’s Weapon of Choice,” Foreign Affairs,

Vol. 92, No. 4, July/August 2013, pp. 32-43; Carla Babb, “Drone 

Strikes Key as Terror Threat Keeps US Embassies Closed,” VOA 

News, August 7, 2013, available from www.voanews.com; Patrick 

B. Johnson, “Drone Strikes Keep Pressure on al-Qaida,” Santa 

Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, August 18, 2012, available 

from www.rand.org/commentary/2012/08/18/PJ.html; Mark Hosenball, “Scaled-back Pakistan drone strikes reflect success: U.S. official,” Reuters, April 13, 2013, available from www.reuters.com; 

Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, (Op-Ed: Drones are Making a Difference 

in Yemen,” March 13, 2013, available from www.strategicstudies

inistitute.army.mil) states: “At least in the case of Yemen, drones 

appear to have been stunningly successful in achieving goals 

that support the U.S. and Yemeni national interests by helping 

to defeat the radical group al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.” 

Michael W. Lewis, “The case for drone strikes: they remain the 

best option for denying Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters havens in 

Pakistan,” op-ed, Los Angeles Times, February 5, 2013, available 
105

from articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/05/opinion/la-oe-lewis-defendingdrones-20130205; Michael W. Lewis, “Drones: Actually the Most 

Humane Form of Warfare Ever,” The Atlantic, August 21, 2013; 

Mark Bowden, “The Killing Machines: How to Think about 

Drones,” The Atlantic, September 2013; George Will, “A case for 

targeted killings,” The Washington Post, op-ed, December 7, 2012, 

available from www.washingtonpost.com; Mark R. Jacobson, “Five 

myths about Obama’s drone war,” The Washington Post, February 8, 2013, available from www.washingtonpost.com; Shehzad H. 

Qazi, “Four Myths about Drone Strikes,” The Diplomat, June 9, 

2012, available from the-diplomat.com. See also James Igoe Walsh, 

The Effectiveness of Drone Strikes in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism Campaigns, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 

Army War College, September 2013, for a measured, strategically 

nuanced, regionally specific analysis which, among other findings, recommends that drones be considered merely one tactic 

embodied in broader policies addressing the phenomenon of failing and failed states, the complexity of intra-insurgent alliances, 

and the actual evidence associating the use of drones with declining insurgent violence. Finally, recent emphases by the Afghan 

Taliban and AQAP on USG drone policy is telling, since, at the 

very least, effort is expended attempting to delegitimize and undermine support for their use. See for example, Bill Roggio, “Afghan Taliban say drone strikes are proof the US is a ‘paper tiger’,” 

Long War Journal, December 9, 2013, available from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/12; Hunzala, “Report: A reflection on the 

American Drone War Strategy,” Shahamat, November 25, 2013, 

available from shahamat-english.com/index.php/articles; Bill Roggio, 

“AQAP says assault on Yemen’s Defense Ministry targeted US 

drone operations,” Long War Journal, December 6, 2013, available 

from www.longwarjournal.org.

Consider also the contrasting positions over whether genuine widespread opposition to this policy exists and is substantial 

enough to call the policy into question. See e.g., Sharon Behn, 

“Study: US Should Re-Evaluate Pakistan Drone Strikes,” VOA 

News, September 26, 2012, available from www.voanews.com; Reuters, “Obama Victory Infuriates Pakistani Drone Victims,” The 

New York Times, November 8, 2012, available from www.nytimes.

com; Toshio Suzuki, “Study shows widespread global opposition to US drone strikes,” Stars and Stripes, June 13, 2012, available from www.stripes.com; Henry Ridgwell, “US Drone Strikes 

Under Scrutiny,” VOA News, April 9, 2013, available from www.
106

voanews.com; Nic Robertson, “In Swat Valley, U.S. drone strikes 

radicalizing a new generation,” CNN News, April 15, 2013, available from www.cnn.com/2013/04/14/world/asia/pakistan-swat-valleyschool/index.html; Reuters, “Obama Victory Infuriates Pakistani 

Drone Victims,” The New York Times, November 8, 2012, available 

from www.nytimes.com; Toshio Suzuki, “Study shows widespread 

global opposition to US drone strikes,” Stars and Stripes, June 13 

2012, available from www.stripes.com. Or, to the contrary, that in 

general opposition to drones is highly variable and, in fact, mostly 

muted, assuming unintended civilian noncombatant deaths are 

kept to the barest minimum, among those most directly victimized by AQ and its allies and affiliates. See e.g., Greg Miller, “In 

interview, Yemeni president acknowledges approving U.S. drone 

strikes,” The Washington Post, September 29, 2012, available from 

www.washingtonpost.com; C. Christine Fair, Karl C. Kaltenthaler 

and William J. Miller, “You Say Pakistanis All hate the Drone 

War? Prove It,” The Atlantic, January 2013, available from www.

theatlantic.com; Hasnain Kazim, “Pakistani CIA Informant: ‘Drone 

Attacks are the Right Thing to Do’,” Spiegel, December 4, 2013, 

available from www.spiegel.de/international/zeitgeist.

22. See Department of Justice White Paper, “Lawfulness of a 

Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior 

Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida or An Associated Force,” February 4, 2013, available from msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/

news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf, for the lawfulness under U.S. 

and international law of targeting an American national who has 

joined AQ or its associated forces. The following legal findings 

are key: a lethal operation in a foreign nation would be consistent 

with international legal principles of sovereignty and neutrality 

if it were conducted, for example, with the consent of the host 

nation’s government or after a determination that the host nation is unable or unwilling to suppress the threat posed by the 

individual targeted pp. 1-2. “The United States is currently in a 

non-international armed conflict with al-Qa’ida and its associated 

forces (See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 628-31, 2006), holding that a conflict between a nation and a transnational nonstate 

actor occurring outside the nation’s territory is an armed conflict ‘not of an international character’ (quoting Common Article 

3 of the Geneva Conventions) because it is not a ‘clash between 

nations’ (p. 3). The primary basis for authority exists in inherent 

Presidential authority, the constitutional responsibility to protect 
107

the country, the inherent right of the United States to national 

self-defense under international law, Congress’s authorization of 

the use of all necessary and appropriate military force against this 

enemy, and the existence of an armed conflict with al-Qa’ida under international law are legal grounds for using force against an 

American citizen who is a senior operational leader of al Qa’ida 

or an associated force. Where an associated force as defined in 

footnote 1 refers to a “co-belligerent” under the laws of war are 

met, specifically, (1) an informed high-level official of the U.S. 

Government has determined that the targeted individual poses 

an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States; (2) 

capture is infeasible, and the United States continues to monitor 

whether capture becomes feasible; and (3) the operation would 

be conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of war 

principles (p. 1, 6). Additionally, the fact that “such an operation 

would not violate certain criminal provisions prohibiting the 

killing of U.S. nationals outside the United States; nor would it 

constitute either a commission of a war crime or an assassination 

prohibited by Executive Order 12333” (p. 2); that “the four fundamental law-of-war principles governing the use of force: necessity, distinction, proportionality, and humanity (the avoidance of 

unnecessary suffering)” are observed (p. 8). Finally, that this does 

not “violate the prohibitions against treachery and perfidy, which 

address a breach of confidence by the assailant” (p. 8). See also 

John Yoo, “Assassination or Targeted Killings after 9/11,” 56 N.Y. 

L. Sch. L. Rev. 57 (2011), available from scholarship.law.berkely.edu/

facpubs/1215, for an excellent discussion of policy; legality (especially the distinction between political assassination in peacetime 

versus targeted killing and its limits in wartime); its legality in 

constitutional, congressional, and statutory law, and the laws of 

war; and finally, its soundness as a tactic in an asymmetric war 

with an AQ terrorist enemy organized as a decentralized freescale terrorist network parasitizing the Western legal and social 

order. See also David G. Savage, “Obama adviser who decried 

‘war on terror’ now defends drones,” Stars and Stripes, January 5, 

2013, available from www.stripes.com. This describes Harold Hongju Koh’s (dean of Yale and State Department’s legal adviser in 

first Obama administration) acceptance and defense of the current 

policy. See also James Jay Carafano, “Say What You Want About 

Drones—They’re Perfectly Legal,” The Atlantic, August 2013, 

available from www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/08/

say-what-you-want-about-drones-theyre-perfectly-legal/278740/.
108

23. See for example, Michael R. Gordon and Eric Schmitt, 

“U.S. Officials Propose Sharing Drone Surveillance Data with Algerians,” The New York Times, February 26, 2013, available from 

www.nytimes.com; Tara Kelly, “France ‘to buy US drones’,” July 

4, 2013, available from www.france24.com; Mark Mazzetti, “C.I.A. 

Building Base for Strikes in Yemen,” The New York Times, June 

14, 2011, available from www.nytimes.com; Reuters, “Yemen Asks 

US for Drones to Fight Al-Qaida,” VOA News, August 22, 2013, 

available from www.voanews.com/1735074.html; Bill Roggio, “US 

Reapers flying from Ethiopia,” Long War Journal, October 27, 2011, 

available from www.longwarjournal.org; Craig Whitlock, “U.S. 

troops arrive in Niger to set up drone base,” The Washington Post, 

February 22, 2013, available from www.washingtonpost.com; Craig 

Whitlock, “Drone base in Niger gives U.S. a strategic foothold 

in West Africa,” The Washington Post March 21, 2013, available 

from www.washingtonpost.com; VOA News, “Report: US Building 

Drone Bases in Africa, Arabian Peninsula,” September 21, 2011, 

available from www.voanews.com; Greg Miller, “Secret drone bases: Avoiding past mistakes,” The Washington Post, September 21, 

2011, available from www.washingtonpost.com/blogs. 

24. The recent use of conditional language by Secretary of 

State John Kerry regarding the USG drone policy in Pakistan is 

telling. Asked when the drone program will end, Secretary Kerry replies: “I think the program will end as we have eliminated 

most of the threat and continue to eliminate it. . . . The president 

has a very real timeline, and we hope it’s going to be very, very 

soon.” (emphasis added). See also Mark Mazzetti and Mark 

Landler, “Despite Administration Promises, Few Signs of Change 

in Drone Wars,” The New York Times, August 2, 2013, available 

from www.nytimes.com. Also, despite some press reports indicating a major shift in drone policy (e.g., Charlie Savage and Peter 

Baker, “Obama, in a Shift, to Limit Targets of Drone Strikes,” 

The New York Times, May 22, 2013, available from www.nytimes.

com; Michael O’Hanlon, “Obama Speech Nails It On Drone 

Strikes,” May 24, 2013, available from www.realclearpolitics.com/

articles/2013/05/24/obama_speech_nails_it_on_drone_strikes_118541.

html. Peter Baker, “Pivoting from a War Footing, Obama Acts to 

Curtail Drones,” The New York Times, May 23, 2013, available from 

www.nytimes.com), others discern that a careful defense and rationale were outlined in the President’s major foreign policy speech 
109

delivered at the National Defense University, Washington, DC, 

on May 23, 2013, that focused on suitability and moral legitimacy, 

and not a proposed reduction or demotion of its role in combating 

the AQ terrorist entity (e.g., BBC News, U.S. and Canada, “Barack 

Obama defends ‘just war’ using drones,” May 24, 2013, available 

from www.bbc.co.uk; Mark Mazzetti, “Analysis of Key Points from 

Obama’s Speech on Drones,” May 23, 2013, available from thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com).

25. Bill Roggio and Alexander Mayer, “Charting the data for 

US airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004-2013,” Long War Journal, November 

29, 2013.

26. New America Foundation, “The Drone War in Pakistan,” 

November 21, 2013, available from natsec.newamerica.net/drones/

pakistan/analysis.

27. Bill Roggio and Alexander Mayer, “Senior al Qaeda and 

Taliban leaders killed in US airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004-2013,” 

Long War Journal, November 23, 2013, available from www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes-hvts.php.

28. At the time of his death on June 4, 2012, Yahya al-Libi 

was one of AQ’s most formidable figures. (See Bill Roggio, “Abu 

Yahya al Libi killed in latest drone strike, US officials say,” Long 

War Journal, June 5, 2012, available from www.longwarjournal.org/

archives/2012/06/abu_yahya_al_libi_ru.php). He had become, Roggio states, “one of al Qaeda’s most prolific propagandists” and 

between 2006-10 had “appeared in more AQ propaganda tapes 

than any other member of the terror group, including bin Laden 

and Zawahiri” and had “stepped into the role of chief of staff for 

Ayman al Zawahiri after Osama bin Laden was killed by U.S. 

special operations forces in Abbottabad, Pakistan, in May 2011.” 

Having been “deputy to Atiyah abd al Rahman,” al-Libi was 

“elevated to second in command after Atiyah’s death in a drone 

strike.”

29. Roggio and Mayer, “Senior al Qaeda and Taliban leaders 

killed in US airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004-2013.” 

30. Thomas Joscelyn and Bill Roggio, “AQAP’s emir also 

serves as al Qaeda’s general manager,” Long War Journal, August 

6, 2013. 
110

31. Bill Roggio and Bob Barry, “Charting the data for US 

air strikes in Yemen, 2002-2013,” Long War Journal, December 9, 

2013, available from www.longwarjournal/org/multimedia/Yemen/

code/Yemen-strike.php. Interested readers should note that these 

figures are constantly updated, and this author is limited by the 

data available at the time of writing. Each day’s headlines promise fresh data. For example, beyond the data reported above, one 

should add Al Khidr al Ja’dani (overall commander for AQAP 

in Abyan province, killed in a July 30, 2013, drone strike (see Bill 

Roggio, “Local AQAP commander reported killed in recent US 

drone strike,” Long War Journal, August 3, 2013, available from 

www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/08/local_aqap_commanderprint.php.) Also, such headlines as these recommends constant 

updating of overall casualty estimates: 

The US launched its third drone strike in Yemen in the past 

5 days, killing five al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula operatives in an area of eastern Yemen that is said to be under 

control of the terrorist group. . . . No senior al Qaeda operatives or leaders are reported to have been killed at this time. 

The identities of the Al Qaeda operatives who were killed 

have not been disclosed. . . . Hadramount is the ancestral 

home of Osama bin Laden’s family, and the province has 

become an AQAP bastion over the past several years.

 See Bill Roggio, “US drones kill 5 AQAP operatives in Yemen,” 

Long War Journal, August 1, 2013, available from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/08/us_drones_kill_5_aqa_1.php.

32. According to press accounts (see Lara Kasinof, Mark Mazzetti, and Alan Cowell, “U.S.-Born Qaeda Leader Killed in Yemen,” The New York Times, September 30, 2011. This this U.S. born 

Yemeni was “associated with many plots in the United States 

and elsewhere after individuals planning violence were drawn to 

his engaging lectures broadcast over the internet.” Awlaki had 

“taken to the Internet with stirring battle cries directed at young 

Muslims,” beseeching them by declaring “Many of your scholars 

are standing between you and your duty of jihad.” Since December 2009, other top leaders of AQAP have been targeted—including Abu Basir al Wuhayshi, the group’s leader; Abu Hurayrah 

Qasim al Ramyi, its military commander; and Ibrahim Sulei-
111

man al Rubaish, its top sharia official. Said Ali al Shihri, AQAP’s 

deputy commander, died late-2012 due to drone-related injuries 

sustained November 28, 2012 (see Mark Mazzetti, “No. 2 Leader 

of Al Qaeda in Yemen is Killed,” The New York Times, January 

24, 2013. 

33. Peter Bergen and David Sterman, “Falling under the spell 

of a slain terrorist,” CNN News, June 28, 2013, available from 

www.cnn.com/2013/06/28/opinion/bergen-awlaki-influence. Bill Roggio, “Yemen claims cleric Anwar al Awlaki ‘killed’ in airstrike,” 

Long War Journal, September 30, 2011, available from www.

longwarjournal.org/. Roggio reports of Awlaki during 2010 and before his killing (“US-born cleric Awlaki ‘proud’ to have taught 

al Qaeda operatives,” Long War Journal, April 27, 2010, available 

from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/04/usborn_cleric_awlaki-print.php) that Awlaki was a spiritual advisor to 9/11 hijackers 

Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid Almihdhar; that another 9/11 hijacker Hani Hanjour attended his sermons; and that Ramzi Binalshib, 

the primary intermediary between Osama bin Laden and 9/11 

mastermind Khaled Sheikh Muhammad, had Awlaki’s phone 

number discovered at his residence. According to Roggio: 

Awlaki has become a prominent cyber-jihadist. Combining 

his ability to communicate in English with his charisma with 

young, radical Muslims and his presence on the Web, Awlaki has developed a large following. He gives numerous 

lectures and speeches via the Internet and teleconferences. 

U.S. law enforcement agencies and intelligence services consider Awlaki to be a prime recruiter for al-Qaeda as well as a 

provider of the needed religious justifications, or fatwas, for 

jihadis to carry out attacks.

See also Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, “Anwar al-‘Awlaqi’s 

Disciples: Three Case Studies,” CT Sentinel, Vol. 4, Issue 7, July 

2011, pp. 6-9; Rajib and Tehzeeb Karim, February 2010 conviction 

for attempted attack on British Airways; Faisal Shahzad, May 

2010 attempt to detonate a car bomb in New York City’s Times 

Square; and “Terror plot shows cleric’s reach,” USA Today, November 22, 2011, available from www.usatoday.com/. 

34. See Michael Muskal, “’Underwear bomber’ pleads guilty 

in airline plot,” Los Angeles Times, October 13, 2011, available 
112

from www.latimes.com; Peter Finn, “Attempted bomber of Detroitbound plane gets life in prison,” The Washington Post, February 16, 

2012, available from www.washingtonpost.com.

35. See Majority and Minority Staff, Senate Committee on 

Homeland and Security and Governmental Affairs, Washington, 

DC: U.S. Senate, Zachary Chesser: A Case Study in Online Islamist 

Radicalization and Its Meaning for the Threat of Homegrown Terrorism, February 2012; also see Tara Bahrampour, “Internet helped 

Muslim covert from Northern Virginia embrace extremism at 

warp speed,” The Washington Post, November 2, 2010, available 

from www.washingtonpost.com.

36. James Dao, “Man Claims Terror Ties in Little Rock Shooting,” The New York Times, January 22, 2010.

37. Bill Rogio and Lisa Sundquist, “European terror plot begins to unravel,” Long War Journal, September 29, 2010, available 

from www.longwarjournal.org; Thomas Joscelyn and Bill Roggio, 

“Osama bin Laden ordered Mumbai-style attacks in Europe,” 

Long War Journal, October 1, 2010, available from www.longwarjournal.org.

38. Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, “Qaeda Trying to Harness 

Toxin For Bombs, U.S. Officials Fear,” The New York Times, August 

12, 2011, available from www.nytimes.com, report on AQAP’s attempt to concoct, deploy, and explode a ricin-based explosive. Ricin, derived from very large quantities of castor beans, is required 

“to produce ricin, a white, powdery toxin that is so deadly that 

just a speck can kill if it is inhaled or reaches the bloodstream.” 

AQAP’s specific goal is to “secretly concoct batches of the poison, 

pack them around small explosives, and then try to explode them 

in contained spaces, like a shopping mall, an airport, or a subway 

station.”

39. Josh Meyer, “This Man Would Like to Turn Anyone’s 

Clothes into a Bomb,” The Atlantic, August 2013, available from 

www.theatlantic.com. This report profiles AQAP’s Ibrahim Hassan 

al Asiri, the terror group’s top bomb maker “who has designed 

devices that are said to be undetectable by traditional screening 

methods.” 
113

40. Bill Roggio, “Wuhayshi imparted lessons of AQAP operations in Yemen to AQIM,” The Long War Journal, August 12, 2013, 

available from www.longwarjournal.org.

41. Killed October 1, 2012, while traveling in a vehicle in 

the Mir Ali area of North Waziristan, Ghul divulged the name 

of Osama bin Laden’s key courier, Abu Ahmed al Kuwaiti, during coercive Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) -led interrogation. 

This was instrumental in ultimately locating the Abbottabad compound. Turned over to Pakistan in 2006, he was released 1 year 

later, and from that date, played a pivotal role in reestablishing 

AQ’s Pakistani network. See Bill Roggio, “Senior al Qaeda leader 

and former US detainee killed in drone strike in 2012,” October 

17, 2013, available from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/10.

42. Raheem Salman and Ned Parker, “The Great Escape: How 

al Qaeda broke hundreds of bad guys out of the world’s most 

notorious jail—and what it means for America,” Foreign Policy, 

August 5, 2013, available from www.foreignpolicy.com.

43. Mohammad Ghobari reports, for example (“U.S. citizens 

in Yemen urged to leave immediately,” Chicago Tribune, August 

6, 2013, available from www.chicagotribune.com), that 25 senior AQ 

militants are being sought by Yemeni security forces each with a 5 

million Yemeni riyal ($23,000U.S.) bounty on each for information 

leading to their capture. 

44. Ayman al-Zawahiri (see Adam Goldman and Kathy Gannon, Associated Press, “CIA has come close to getting bin Laden 

deputy,” Washington Times, December 1, 2010, available from 

www.washingtontimes.com) has escaped several operations including a CIA attempted abduction in Pakistan in 2003, an attempted 

bombing in Pakistan in 2004, and a U.S. missile strike in 2006. 

45. Sirajuddin Haqqani, operations commander of the Haqqani Network, apparently escaped a drone strike that killed three 

Haqqani commanders just 11 days after his brother Nasiruddin Haqanni, the group’s main financier and son to the group’s 

founder, Mawlawi Jalaluddin Haqqani, was killed in an unsolved 

drive-by shooting in Rawalpindi, Pakistan. See Bill Roggio, “US 

drone strike kills 3 Haqqani commanders in Pakistan’s Hangu 

district,” Long War Journal, November 21, 2013, available from 
114

www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/11; BBC News, “Nasiruddin Haqqani: Senior militant shot dead in Pakistan,” November 

11, 2013.

46. See BBC, South Asia, “Al-Qaeda’s remaining leaders,” 

available from www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11489337; “AlQaida’s most wanted,” March 9, 2013, available from news.msn.

com/world/al-qaidas-most-wanted; Bill Roggio, “US kills 4 AQAP 

operatives in Yemen drone strike,” Long War Journal, August 6, 

2013, available from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/08/us_

kills_6_aqap_oper-print.php. 

47. Relative success for this third strategic objective arises 

from the USG identifying and emphasizing those variables over 

which it has a degree of control. Conducting a terrorist attack 

requires three key ingredients: ability, opportunity, and motive. 

Ability, i.e., what might be termed “terrorcraft,” involves the acquisition of skills, capacities, and training. Opportunity requires 

access to finances, sanctuary, weaponry, communication, travel, 

and ultimately, targets. Least controllable and predictable is the 

realm of motives, grievances, and psychological drivers. George 

Quester, some years ago in the final semi-dissenting essay in a 

text focusing on motive and morality (see “Eliminating the Terrorist Opportunity,” David C. Rapoport and Yonah Alexander, 

eds., The Morality of Terrorism: Religious and Secular Justifications, 

New York: Pergamon Press, 1982, pp. 325-346) provides the rationale for such a focus on controlling opportunity (p. 325):

Some portions of the phenomenon of terrorism are clearly 

explained by the frustrations and injustices of our society 

and by the sociology or psychology of the individuals then 

driven to enlist in terrorist groups. Other portions of terrorist activity stem from technological or social changes which 

make terrorist attacks easier or harder. . . . [It is m]y contention that opportunity plays an underrated role here, while 

the values and grievances of the rebel have disproportionate 

attention. . . . [T]he working premise, regardless of whatever 

causes terrorism, is that opportunities provided by technological change are more manipulable and controllable than 

the plane of value preferences; it will be easier to lock up 

the boarding areas of airports than to change the feelings of 

the would-be skyjacker, or to attend to his grievances which 

are sometimes quite bizzare. Moreover, whatever the cur-
115

rent significance of personal motivation or physical opportunity in the explanation or control of terrorism, the trend 

over time may have to be toward the control of opportunity, 

as some very significant and dangerous avenues of attack 

are opening by which the terrorists can make his mark on 

society. 

48. The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 383-398. 

49. See for example, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 

Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland, February 2010, available from www.

dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/qhsr_report.pdf. This first-ever Quadrennial 

Homeland Security Review (QHSR), pursuant to the Implementing 

Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, covers “threats 

presented and the framework for our strategic response” (p. iii), 

and covers five key missions: 1) Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security (three goals: prevent terrorist attacks; prevent 

unauthorized use of Chemical, Biological. Radiological, Nuclear 

(CBRN) materials and capabilities; manage risks to critical infrastructure, key leadership, and events); 2) Securing and Managing 

Our Borders (three goals: effectively control U.S. air, land, and 

sea borders; safeguard lawful trade and travel; disrupt and dismantle transnational criminal organizations); 3) Enforcing and 

Administering Our Immigration Laws (two goals: strengthen and 

effectively administer the immigration system; prevent unlawful immigration); 4) Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace (two 

goals: create a safe, secure, and resilient cyber environment; promote cybersecurity knowledge and innovation); and 5) Ensuring 

Resilience to Disasters (4 goals: mitigate hazards, enhance preparedness, ensure effective emergency response, rapidly recover) 

(p. i); references two key documents, the National Infrastructure 

Protection Plan (NIPP) and the National Response Framework (NRF) 

(p. A-1). In “Appendix A: Roles and Responsibilities across the 

Homeland Security Enterprise,” one finds a description of virtually every level of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and organization (i.e., 

federal, state, local, tribal, county, private sector, multinational 

corporations, national voluntary organizations active in disaster 

relief (NVOAD), NGOs, Communities, Individuals and Families, 

including all emergency support functions (ESF) and ESF coordinators based on the National Response Framework (p. A-9), and 

all sector-specific agencies and the critical infrastructure and key 
116

resource sectors they are charged with defending; for example, 

the Department of Energy (Energy), the DoD (Defense Industrial Base), Department of the Interior (National Monuments and 

Icons), as outlined in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 

which (p. A10). The QHSR Process (see Appendix B) is mandated 

by “Section 2401 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 

9/11 Commission Act of 2007, [which] amends Title VII of the 

Homeland Security Act of 2002 to require the Secretary of Homeland Security to conduct a Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) every 4 years beginning in 2009” (p. B-1). See also 

Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-8, Subject: National Preparedness, 

Washington, DC: The White House, March 30, 2011, available 

from www.dhs.gov/presidential-policy-directive-8-national-preparedness; and Jared T. Brown, Analyst in Emergency Management and 

Homeland Security Policy, Presidential Policy Directive 8 and the National Preparedness System: Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service (CRS), 7-5700, Washington, DC: 21 

October 2011, available from www.crs.gov. See also Department of 

Homeland Security Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2012-2016, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, February 2012, 

available from www.dhs.gov/strategic-plan-fiscal-years-fy-2012-2016, 

for description of five key missions: “secure our country from terrorist threats and enhance security; secure our borders; enforce 

our Nation’s immigration laws; secure cyberspace; and build resilience to disasters” (p. i); a vision statement—“A homeland that 

is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards”; 

departmental mission: 

We will lead efforts to achieve a safe, secure, and resilient 

homeland. We will counter terrorism and enhance our security; secure and manage our borders; enforce and administer 

our immigration laws; protect cyber networks and critical 

infrastructure; and ensure resilience from disasters. We will 

accomplish these missions while providing essential support to national and economic security and maturing and 

strengthening both the Department of Homeland Security 

and the homeland security enterprise (p. 2); 

and finally, its several mission goals and objectives.

50. The Honorable Matthew G. Olsen, Director, National 

Counterterrorism Center, Hearing before the House Committee on 
117

Homeland Security, Understanding the Threat Landscape, Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, July 25, 2012, esp. pp. 1-4.

51. Obama, “The Future of our Fight Against Terrorism.”

52. National Security Preparedness Group, Tenth Anniversary 

Report Card: The Status of the 9/11 Commission Recommendations, 

Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Center, September 2011, available from www.bipartisanpolicy.org/library/report/tenth-anniversaryreport-card-status-911-commission-recommendations; Cheryl Pellerin, “Officials: Defense-Intelligence Integration Strongest Since 

9/11,” Armed Forces Press Service, September 8, 2011, available 

from www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=65279. Of these, 

several apply directly to this third strategic objective: the need for 

a unified incident command system to disaster response, radio 

spectrum and interoperability, deficiencies in the present passenger screening system, the need to standardize secure identification across states, develop better methods of identification, and 

develop uniform coalition standards for terrorist detention.

53. See “Homegrown Terrorism Cases, 2001-2013,” Database 

compiled on plots, persons involved, and method of prevention, 

by the New America Foundation and Syracuse University’s Maxwell School of Public Policy, including cases involving homegrown jihadist and non-jihadist terrorism in the United States 

since the 9/11 attacks; J. P. Bjelopera, American Jihadist Terrorism: 

Combating a Complex Threat, CRS Report for Congress, CRS 7-5700, 

Washington, DC: CRS, January 23, 2013.

54. Thirteen additional recommendations of the 2004 9/11 

Commission Report deal with measures required to reorganize the 

federal government to achieve unity across a number of domains: 

unity of effort to bridge the foreign-domestic divide, unity of effort across the intelligence community, unity of effort in information sharing, and unity of effort in Congress. Of those, the vast 

majority are deemed sufficient. Establishment of the National 

Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is key to remedying the foreign/domestic divide; unity across the intelligence communities 

provided by a CIA emphasis on human intelligence, language, 

culture, and diversity; and, DOD in charge of paramilitary operations, within the United States Special Operations Command 

(USSCOM); and, the overall budget allocation for intelligence be-
118

ing declassified; unity of information sharing promoted through 

the sharing of intelligence, and creation of a trusted information 

network for major national security institutions; unity of effort in 

Congress promoted by quicker national security appointments 

through new election cycles; and the organization of America’s 

defenses to include that the FBI’s national security focus and expertise is developed and enhanced, that DoD’s oversight of U.S. 

Northern Command (NORTHCOM) is regularly assessed, and 

that Department of Homeland Security (DHS) oversight exists 

to assess and determine protection of critical infrastructure and 

the readiness of government response. Those few key areas in the 

realm of government organization still requiring improvement as 

of September 2011 include: need to create the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), several recommendations directed at the U.S. Congress’s process and organization (i.e., to fix 

the present dysfunctionality of those several major congressional 

committees charged with intelligence and counterterrorism [CT]), 

and need to create a single overall committee charged with oversight and review of homeland security.

55. For its original formulation as strategic objective, see 9/11 

Commission Report, pp. 374-383.

56. Tenth Anniversary Report Card, p. 7. Also, at p. 20: “Today, 

our country is undoubtedly safer and more secure than it was a 

decade ago. We have damaged the enemy, but the ideology of 

violent Islamist extremism is alive and attracting new adherents, 

including right here in our own country.”

57. National Strategy for Counterterrorism, p. 1.

58. Ibid., p. 3.

59. Ibid., p. 4.

60. Ibid., p. 10.

61. Ibid., p. 11.

62. Ibid., p. 15.

63. Ibid., p. 17.
119

64. Ibid., p. 19. For the importance of disaggregating the present AQ threat in those terms referred to above, see also Brian Michael Jenkins, “Getting the Threat Right,” Santa Monica, CA: The 

RAND Corporation; Walter Pincus, “Sorting the terrorists,” The 

Washington Post, December 12, 2012, available from www.

washingtonpost.com.

65. Olsen cites as evidence the systematic degrading of Pakistan AQ leadership and operational capabilities; the May 2, 2011, 

death of Osama bin Laden; the August 2011 death of ‘Atiyah ‘Abd 

al-Rahman; the June 2012 killing of Abu Yahya al-Libi; other leaders driven underground and focused on security and survival and 

not terrorist plotting; and the fact that the London 2005 bombing 

was the last successful operation carried out by AQ in the West.

66. The Honorable Matthew G. Olsen, Director, National 

Counterterrorism Center, Hearing before the House Committee on 

Homeland Security, Understanding the Threat Landscape, Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, July 25, 2012, p. 1.

67. Ibid., pp. 2-6.

68. See Clapper, Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, pp. 3-6, 10.

69. Clapper further discusses AQ in Iraq, the al-Nusrah Front, 

Al-Shabaab, AQIM, Boko Haram, and the Lashkar i-Taybah in 

Pakistan as predominantly regional terrorist organizations that 

nevertheless have potentially regional ambitions that further 

threaten U.S. interests. 

70. In reference to these affiliates, Obama states: 

While we are vigilant for signs that these groups may pose 

a transnational threat, most are focused on operating in the 

countries and regions where they are based . That means we 

will face more localized threats like those we saw in Benghazi, or at the BP oil facility in Algeria, in which local operatives—in loose affiliation with regional networks—launch 

periodic attacks against Western diplomats, companies, and 

other soft targets, or resort to kidnapping and other criminal 

enterprises to fund their operations.
120

71. Obama, “The Future of our Fight Against Terrorism.

72. Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, 

“Fourteenth Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2083 (2012) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities,” New 

York: UN Security Council, S/2013/467, August 2, 2013, available from www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/467. 

See also Associated Press, “UN Experts Say Al-Qaida Affiliates 

Remain a Threat,” The New York Times, August 7, 2013, available 

from www.nytimes.com.

73. Ibid., p. 5.

74. According to the New America Foundation and Maxwell School for Public Policy Report (see homegrown.newamerica.

net), between September 11, 2001, and June 17, 2013, 212 of 390 

persons indicted on terrorism-related charges or killed before an 

indictment could be handed down can be classified as “jihadist” 

terrorists, “and they subscribe broadly to the ideology of Osama 

bin Laden’s al-Qaeda.” The report lists 46 separate plots directed 

at the United States, and three directed outside the United States 

during that period. 

75. Ibid., p. 6.

76. Ibid., p. 10.

77. Yoram Schweitzer and Aviad Mendelbaum, “AlQaeda: Vanquished or Strengthened?” INSS Insight, No. 

456, August 13, 2013, available from www.inss.org.il/index.

aspx?id=4538&articleid=5428.

78. Associated Press, “Man held in plot to blow up Federal 

Reserve,” Johnson City Press, October 18, 2012, pp. 1A, 6A.

79. Wes Bruer, “Terror plot foiled in NYC,” Long War Journal, 

November 21, 2011, available from www.longwarjournal.org.

80. Jamie Stengle, “Soldier shouts Hasan’s name at hearing,” 

Johnson City Press, July 30, 2011, p. 2A.
121

81. “Mass Shooting Threat Alleged,” Army Times, June 21, 

2010, p. 10.

82. Jess Bidgood, “Massachusetts Man Gets 17 Years in Terrorist Plot,” The New York Times, November 2, 2012.

83. Michael Schwirz and Marc Santora, “Man is Accused of 

Jihadist Plot to Bomb a Bar in Chicago,” The New York Times, September 15, 2012. 

84. Reuters, “Second Man Gets 17 Years for Seattle Military 

Attack Plot,” The New York Times, April 8, 2013.

85. Reuters, “Two Men Charged in Miami with Financing Foreign Terrorist Groups,” The New York Times, August 15, 2013.

86. Associated Press, “UK Police Arrest 7 in Anti-Terror Operations,” The New York Times, September 19, 2011, available from 

www.nytimes.com.

87. Scott Shane and Eric Schmitt, “Norway Announces Three 

Arrests in Terrorist Plot,” The New York Times, July 8, 2010, available from www.nytimes.com. 

88. John F. Burns, “3 Britons Convicted of Plot to Blow Up 

Airliners,” The New York Times, July 8, 2010.

89. Selah Hennessy, “Stockholm Bomber ‘Radicalized in Britain’,” VOA News, December 3, 2010, available from www.voanews.

com/english/news/europe/Stockholm-Bomber-Radicalized-in-Britain-111797954.html; Ravi Somaiya, “Swedish Bombing Suspect’s 

Drift to Extremism,” The New York Times, December 13, 2010. 

90. Associated Press, “Canada Terror Suspect: Lawyer Must 

Use ‘Holy Book’,” Stars and Stripes, May 23, 2013.

91. Associated Press, “4 UK men jailed for discussing acts of 

terrorism,” Stars and Stripes, April 18, 2013.

92. “Trial Begins for 3 British Islamists Accused of Bomb Plot,” 

VOA News, October 22, 2012, available from www.voanews.com.
122

93. John F. Burns, “’Barbaric Attack’ in London Prompts Meeting on Terror,” The New York Times, May 22, 2013. See also Martin Robinson, “UK: Suspects in Woolwich Murder Case Part of 

‘Powerful Web of Islamic Radicals’,” May 27, 2013, available from 

www.opensource.gov; Christopher Scheuermann, “Lessons from 

Woolwich: The Danger’s of Britain’s Islamist Underground,” 

Spiegel, May 27, 2013, available from www.spiegel.de/international/

europe. The suspects are quoted as saying: 

’The only reason we have done this is because Muslims are 

dying every day’Adebolajo shouts into the camera, adding: 

‘The British soldier is an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.’; 

To which the reported asks: ‘How can it be that two young 

men who grew up in the UK could come to feel such hate?’

94. While this “foreign fighter” phenomenon has deep roots 

in the classical doctrine of defensive jihad, it also has shallower 

roots likely watered by an opportunistic AQ seeking to funnel 

fighters into the ranks of AQ’s own violent cadre. It appears that 

the present Arab Spring tumult has led strategically to an AQ refocusing on the “near enemy,” i.e., privileging the attacking of 

those forces thought to promote or tolerate infidelity or apostasy,

that are geographically nearest, rather than the more distant “far 

enemy” ultimate enabler, the United States and the West generally. For important analyses of the foreign fighter phenomenon, 

globalized insurgency, and the return of the near enemy in AQ 

strategy, see Thomas Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign 

Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 3, Winter 2010/2011, pp. 53-94; Thomas Hegghammer, “The Foreign Fighter Phenomenon: Islam and Transnational Militancy,” Policy Brief, Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center 

for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 

February 2011, available from belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/20713/foreign_fighter_phenomenon.html; Michael P. Noonan, 

ed., The Foreign Fighters: Problem, Recent Trends and Case Studies: 

Selected Essays, Philadelphia, PA: FPRI, April 2011, available from 

www.fpri.org; Clint Watts, “Foreign Fighters: How Are They Being Recruited? Two Imperfect Recruitment Models,” Small Wars 

Journal, June 22, 2008, available from smallwarsjournal.com/blog/

journal/docs-temp/69-watts.pdf?q=mag/docs-temp/69-watts.pdf; Clint 

Watts, “Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan: What Foreign Fighter 

Data Reveals about the Future of Terrorism,” Small Wars Journal, 
123

April 17, 2008, available from smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/

docs-temp/49-watts.pdf?q=mag/docs-temp/49-watts.pdf; Clint Watts, 

“What If There is No Al-Qaeda? Preparing for Future Terrorism,” 

Philadelphia, PA: FPRI, E-Notes, July 2012, available from www.

fpri.org/articles/2012/07/what-if-there-no-al-qaeda-preparing-futureterrorism. For the phenomenon of “glocalization,” see especially 

Christoph Reuter, “Terror Retooled: Al-Qaida Thinks Globally 

But Acts Locally,” Spiegel, August 13, 2013, available from www.

spiegel.de/international/world.

95. See, for examples, Anne Barnard and Eric Schmitt, “As 

Foreign Fighters Flood Syria, Fears of a New Extremist Haven,” 

The New York Times, August 8, 2013, available from www.nytimes.

com; Thomas Hegghammer, “Syria’s Foreign Fighters,” Foreign 

Policy, December 9, 2013, available from mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.

com/posts/2013/12/09/syrias_foreign_fighers; BBC News, “Hundreds 

of Britons fighting in Syria—MI5 Chief,” November 7, 2013; Greg 

Miller, “U.S. charges 14 with giving support to Somali insurgent 

group,” The Washington Post, August 6, 2010, available from www.

washingtonpost.com; Bill Roggio, “American who fought for Al 

Nusrah Front arrested in US,” Long War Journal, March 29, 2013, 

available from www.longwarjournal.org (the individual involved, 

Harroun, was known in Syria as “the American” and was a former American soldier); Bill Roggio, “American passport found at 

al Qaeda base in northern Syria,” Long War Journal, July 23, 2013, 

available from www.longwarjournal.org (the passport belonged 

to ‘Amir Farouk Ibrahim, born in Pennsylvania on October 30, 

1989; the passport was issued March 6, 2012); Bill Roggio, “American Shabab fighter urges Muslims to join the ‘fronts’ of jihad,” 

Long War Journal, February 27, 2013, available from www.longwar

journal.com, (the “American, who is identified as Abu Ahmed al 

Amriki, is seen on a videotape that was produced by Shabaab’s 

media arm and posted on jihadist Internet forums. . . . Abu Ahmed 

implores Muslims to leave their lives of comfort and wage jihad in 

Somalia, Mali, Afghanistan, Iraq, or the ‘Islamic Maghreb’—North 

Africa”). See also Clint Watts, “Radicalization in the U.S. Beyond 

al Qaeda: Treating the disease of disconnection,” Philadelphia, 

PA: FPRI, August 2012, available from www.fpri.org; Waqar Gillani and Sabrina Tavernise, “5 Americans Sentenced to 10 Years 

in Pakistani Prison,” The New York Times, June 25, 2010, p. A4: 

“The five men, all in their 20s and all from Virginia, are believed 

by Pakistani and American law enforcement officials to have trav-
124

eled to Pakistan in December to join the fight against American 

forces in Afghanistan”; Scott Shane and Eric Schmitt, “One Drone 

Victim’s Trail from Raleigh to Pakistan,” The New York Times, May 

22, 2013; Jude Kenan Mohammad, at 18 under influence of Daniel 

Patrick Boyd—“charged in 2009 as ringleader of a group of North 

Carolina residents who had vowed to carry out violent jihad both 

in the United States and overseas”—was killed in a drone strike 

in South Waziristan at age 23 on November 16, 2011. He was the 

fourth American to die in a drone strike, the other three were Anwar al-Awlaki, specifically targeted, but Samir Khan, “another 

young man from Raleigh who had joined the Qaeda branch in 

Yemen . . . [and] Awlaki’s 16-year-old son, Abdulrahman, killed 

2 weeks later; and Mr. Mohammad.” Mohammed was killed in 

a “signature strike,” i.e., a strike carried out on the basis of a signature, an activity indicative of terrorist-related activity but not 

provide the identification of the specific perpetrators involved.

96. For a comprehensive recent review of this vast literature, see Dr. Alex P. Schmid, “Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, 

Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature 

Review,” ICCT Research Paper, International Centre for CounterTerrorism—The Hague, The Czech Republic, March 2013, available from www.icct.nl. 

97. Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terrorist Networks in the 

Twenty-First Century, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009, Chap. 1.

98. Ibid., pp. viii, 154-156.

99. See Scott Atran, “Genesis of Suicide Terrorism,” Science, 

2003, p. 1537; Ann Speckhard, Beatrice Jacuch, and Valentijn Vanrompay, “Taking on the Persona of a Suicide Bomber: a Thought 

Experiment,” Perspectives on Terrorism, May 2012, Vol. 6, No. 2, 

p. 58; Robert A. Pape and James A. Feldman, Cutting the Fuse: The 

Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It, Chicago, 

IL: University of Chicago Press, pp. 58-60; Hegghammer, “Syria’s 

Foreign Fighters.” 

100. See Albert Bandura, “Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement,” Walter Reich, ed., Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Distributed by Johns Hopkins University Press, 
125

Baltimore, MD, and London, UK: pp. 161-191, for how having on 

the basis of fabrication, disinformation, and terrorist propaganda 

reconstrued one’s actions as morally based, and one’s moral indignation fully justified, normal human beings are able to kill. For 

additional adumbrations of this argument, see Albert Bandura, 

Claudio Barbaranelli, Gian Vittorio Caprara, and Concetta Pastorelli, “Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of 

Moral Agency,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1996; 

Albert Bandura, “Selective Moral Disengagement in the Exercise 

of Moral Agency,” Journal of Moral Education, 2002, Vol. 31, No. 

2, pp. 101-119; Michael J. Osofsky, Albert Bandura, and Philip G. 

Zimbardo, “The Role of Moral Disengagement in the Execution 

Process,” Law and Human Behavior, 2005, Vol 29, No. 4, pp. 371-

393. See also Ann Speckhard et al., “Taking on the Persona of a 

Suicide Bomber: a Thought Experiment,” Perspectives in Terrorism, 

May 2012, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 51-73, for a very interesting, though 

low-power, study examining the relationship between propaganda, moral outrage, and the willingness to kill. 

101. For the importance of affective variables, particularly anger/moral outrage, as relevant to the process of radicalization, see 

Stephen K. Rice, “Emotions and terrorism research: A case for a 

social-psychological agenda,” Journal of Criminal Justice, 2009, Vol. 

37, pp. 248-255; David Wright-Neville and Debra Smith, “Political 

rage: terrorism and the politics of emotion,” Global Change, Peace 

& Security, 2009, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 85-98. For the notion that revenge-seeking based on moral indignation is most likely a human 

universal, see Brian Knutson, “Sweet Revenge?” Science, August 

27, 2004, Vol. 305, pp. 1246-1247.

102. This well-known Southern U.S. colloquialism shall serve 

us well. A pig, regardless of how beautifully painted with the most 

embellished of tones (read: rhetoric, spin, misrepresentation), remains after all, a pig. I apologize beforehand to my Muslim and 

Jewish compatriots for whom this animal signifies extreme ritual 

impurity, and request only deference to a highly useful notion 

that so quickly cuts through hypocritical muck. 

103. Primer/Fundamentals of Information Operations, November 

2009, AY10 Ed., Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, p. 9. A fuller 

re-bureaucratized definition is also provided in Ibid., p. 9:
126

[F]ocused United States Government processes and efforts 

to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, 

strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advance 

national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs, and actions 

synchronized with other elements of national power.

104. Ibid., p. 13; See also Michael Egner, “Social Science Foundations for Strategic Communications in the Global War on Terrorism,” Paul K. Davis and Kim Cragin, eds., Social Science for 

Counterterrorism: putting the pieces together, Santa Monica, CA: The 

RAND Corporation, p. 354.

Ultimately, actions speak louder than words, and good 

communication can only partially mitigate the effects of an 

unpopular policy or action. Indeed, it is paradoxically when 

words are needed the most—during a crisis or when the 

credibility of a messenger is on the line—that the effectiveness of mere ‘spin’ drops even further.

See also pp. 344-348. 

105. “Pentagon propaganda plan is source of controversy,” 

available from usatoday30.usatoday.com/NEWS/usaedition. 

106. Information Operations Primer, p. 1. IO includes 13 distinct 

capabilities: five core (PSYOP, Military Deception, Operations Security, Electronic Warfare, Computer Network Operations), five 

supporting (Information Assurance, Physical Security, Physical 

attack, Counterintelligence, and Combat Camera), and three related (Public Affairs, Civil-Military Operations, and Defense Support to Public Diplomacy). Ibid., pp. 4-6.

107. Ibid., p. 7. For other definitions of strategic communications, see www.au.af.mil/info-ops/strategic.htm; “United States 

Strategic Communication,” available from en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

United_States_Strategic_Communication; “Strategic Communication,” DoD definition, Joint Publication 5-0, available from www.

dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/s/18179.html; U.S. Joint Forces 

Command, Joint Warfighting Center, Commander’s Handbook for 

Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy, Version, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, June 24, 2010.
127

108. Richard Holbrooke, “Get the Message Out,” The 

Washington Post, op-ed, October 28 2011, available from www.

washingtonpost.com. 

109. Ibid.

110. A similar unwillingness to question publically U.S. policies vis–à-vis the Israel-Palestine confrontation and its possible 

role in undercutting U.S. credibility and elevating that of bin Laden was displayed in the 9/11 Commission Report, p. 174. According 

to the follow-up volume by Committee co-chairs Thomas A. Kean 

and Lee H. Hamilton in describing the Commission’s inside-story, this was the result of a “compromise.” See Thomas A. Kean 

and Lee H. Hamilton, Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 

9/11 Commission, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006, pp. 284-285. 

They state: 

We did, however, have some disagreement over foreign 

policy issues. Much of it revolved around the question of Al 

Qaeda’s motivation. For instance, Lee felt that there had to 

be an acknowledgment that a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was vital to America’s long-term relationship 

with the Islamic world, and that the presence of American 

forces in the Middle East was a major motivating factor in 

al Qaeda’s actions. . . . This was sensitive ground. Commissioners who argued that al Qaeda was motivated primarily 

by religious ideology—and not by opposition to American 

policies—rejected mentioning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 

in the report. In their view, listing U.S. support for Israel as 

a root cause of Al Qaeda’s opposition to the United States 

indicated that the United States should reassess that policy. 

To Lee, though, it was not a question of altering support for 

Israel but of merely stating a fact that the Israeli-Palestinian 

conflict was central to the relations between the Islamic 

world and the United States—and to Bin Ladin’s ideology 

and the support he gained throughout the Islamic world for 

his jihad against America.

Moreover, the 9/11 Commission Report does acknowledge, at least 

with respect to Khalid Sheik Muhammad (KSM), this motivation: 

[Ramzi] Yousef’s instant notoriety as the mastermind of the 

1993 World Trade Center bombing inspired KSM to become 
128

involved in planning attacks against the United States. By 

his own account, KSM’s animus toward the United States 

stemmed not from his experiences there as a student, but 

rather from his violent disagreement with U.S. foreign policy favoring Israel.

The willingness not to put lipstick on pigs vis-à-vis U.S. foreign 

policies in the Arab and Muslim world is evident in a remarkable 

memo by Jude Wanniski (“The Mind of a Terrorist,” available 

from www.wnd.com/2001/09/10813). This eerily prescient 1998 letter was originally sent to then-Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), on the 

occasion of the sentencing of 1993 World Trade Center bombing 

mastermind Ramzi Yousef. It was later forwarded as a memo on 

September 12, 2001, at 1 a.m. to then Vice President Dick Cheyney. 

111. Ibid.

112. Kamolnick, Delegitimizing Al-Qaeda; Paul Kamolnick, 

“Al Qaeda’s Sharia Crisis: Sayyid Imam and the Jurisprudence of 

Lawful Military Jihad,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 2013, Vol. 

36, pp. 394-318; Paul Kamolnick, “The Egyptian Islamic Group’s 

Critique of Al Qaeda’s Interpretation of Jihad,” Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 7, No. 5, 2013, pp. 93-110.

113. Holbrooke, “Get the Message Out.”

114. In contrast to Holbrooke’s puzzlement, consider Abdelwahab al-Affendi’s incisive observation: “When the country 

which commands unchallenged hegemony in both the technology and the art of communication appears unable to get its message across, it can only be a symptom of a deeper concern.” See 

Abdelwahab el-Affendi, “The Conquest of Muslim Hearts and 

Minds? Perspectives on U.S. Reform and Public Diplomacy Strategies, September 1, 2005, p. iv, available from www.brookings.edu/

research/papers/2005/09/islamicworld-el-affendi.

115. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Report of the Defense Science 

Board Task Force, Washington, DC: DoD, September 2004, Strategic Communication, available from www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/

ADA428770.pdf. An earlier study (see Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Report 
129

of the Defense Science Board Task Force, Managed Information Dissemination, Washington, DC: DoD, October 2001, available from 

www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod/dsb_managed_info_dissem.pdf) 

did not discuss terrorism or AQ, or radical Islam’s ascendency 

and potential challenge to U.S. vital interests. Its primary objective was to examine short-comings in U.S. information operations 

during contingency operations in Darfur, Haiti, Iraq, but especially the Balkan conflicts. 

116. Defense Science Board Task Force, September 2004, 

Strategic Communication, esp. pp. 14-18, 33-47, 84.

117. For a comprehensive examination of this public opinion, see Steven Kull, Feeling Betrayed: The Roots of Muslim Anger at 

America, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2011.

118. Ibid. 

119. Defense Science Board Task Force, September 2004, 

Strategic Communication, p. 40.

120. Ibid., p. 35.

121. Ibid.

122. Ibid., p. 43.

123. Ibid., p. 61.

124. Ibid., p. 51.

125. Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public 

Affairs, Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy Policy 

Coordinating Committee (PCC), U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, Washington, DC: U.S. 

Department of State, June 2007, available from www.au.af.mil/au/

awc/awcgate/state/natstrat_strat_comm.pdf.

126. Ibid., esp, pp. 7, 12-13.

127. Ibid., pp. 8, 10, 17, 31, 32.
130

128. See, for example, Jon Armajani, Modern Islamist Movements: History, Religion, and Politics, Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 

2012; Mohammed Ayoob, The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion 

and Politics in the Muslim World, Ann Arbor, MI: The University 

of Michigan Press, 2008; Noah Feldman, After Jihad: America and 

the Struggle for Islamic Democracy, New York, Farrar, Straus, and 

Giroux, 2003; Noah Feldman, The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State, 

Princeton, NJ, and Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press, 2008; 

Ahmad S. Moussalli, The Islamic Quest for Democracy, Pluralism, 

and Human Rights, Gainesville, FL: University Presses of Florida, 

2001; Abdullah Ahmed An-Na’im, Islam and the Secular State: 

Negotiating the Future of Shari’a, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 

University Press, 2008.

129. Office of the Secretary of Under Secretary for Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, Washington, DC: 

DoD, January 2008, available from www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/

dod/dsb_strategic_comm_jan08.pdf. See also in the same document, 

“Appendix E. Government and Independent Organization Studies of Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy, September 2001-October 2007,” for a listing of 36 reports, 14 by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), authored over this period. 

130. Ibid., esp. Chap. 3, pp. 29-37. 

131. Ibid., p. 39. 

132. Ibid., p. 81.

133. See Office of the President of the United States, National 

Framework for Strategic Communication, 2010, Washington, DC: 

The White House, available from www.fas.org/man/eprint/pubdip.

pdf; GAO-12-612R Strategic Communication, Washington, DC: U.S. 

Government Accountability Office (GAO), May 2012, available 

from www.gao.gov/assets/600/591123.pdf; Office of the President 

of the United States, Update to Congress on National Framework 

for Strategic Communication, Washington, DC: The White House, 

2012, available from www.hsdl.org/?view&did=704809.

134. Office of the President of the United States, National 

Framework for Strategic Communication, p. 1.
131

135. Ibid.

136. Office of the President of the United States, National 

Framework for Strategic Communication, p. 2. It is interesting to note 

how diminished this conception is in relation to the far more robust conception of strategic communication, and of its potential 

modalities and instruments of national power, in the Information 

Operations Primer. On p. 9, strategic communication is defined as: 

focused United States Government processes and efforts to 

understand and engage key audiences in order to create, 

strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advance 

national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs, and actions 

synchronized with other elements of national power. . . . 

Parsing this rather bureaucratic definition to its essentials, 

strategic communication is the orchestration of actions, 

words, and images to achieve cognitive effects in support of 

policy and military objectives; 

Strategic communication is simply a way to affect perceptions, attitudes and behaviors of key audiences in support 

of objectives. Certainly communications means are very 

important in ultimately achieving those desired information effects. But how military operations are conducted or 

policy is implemented is also a key component of strategic 

communication, since actions send very loud and clear messages (p. 13).

137. Ibid., pp. 2-3.

138. Ibid., p. 2.

139. Ibid., p. 3.

140. Ibid., pp. 3-4.

141. The remainder of this document deals with the organizational implications of this proposal and discusses the many USG 

agencies charged with various dimensions of influence operations and information operations, including: the Senior Director 

for Global Engagement (SDGE) in Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications (DNSA/SC), Department of 

State, Department of Defense, Broadcasting Board of Governors 
132

responsible for “non-military, international broadcasting sponsored by the United States Government” (p. 11); U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID), Intelligence Community, 

NCTC (The Global Engagement Group, Directorate of Strategic 

Operational Planning at NCTC). 

142. Office of the Secretary of Under Secretary for Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication. 

143. Phyllis D’Hoop, ed., An Initiative: Strengthening U.S.-

Muslim Communications, Washington, DC: Center for the Study of 

the American Presidency, July 2003.

144. Ibid., pp. 4-5.

145. Ibid., p. 5.

146. Ibid., p. 12. See also especially, “Principal Sources of AntiAmericanism in the Muslim World,” pp. 102-122, a powerful but 

representative comment of which is the following in reference 

to the need to encourage representative governance in Muslim 

countries (p. 114): 

If U.S. policies toward the Palestinian issue are the most 

important reason for resentment of the United States, the 

second reason is the anger and the frustration over our support for autocratic regimes in the region. I [Dr. Masmoudi, 

President, The Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy] think this is a big reason. I also think that it is very 

closely related to the Palestinian-Israeli issue, the reason 

being we are seen as hypocrites. While we have talk about 

human rights, democracy and freedom, in the Arab world, 

we have, in fact, been supporting autocratic regimes that 

are not representative, not elected and not accountable to 

anybody.

147. Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for 

the Arab and Muslim World, Changing Minds, Winning Peace: 

A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab 

& Muslim World, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 

October 1, 2003, p. 9, available from www.state.gov/documents/

organization/2488s.pdf. The unenviable Machiavellianism required 

to “sell” such policies seems the task of this particular advisory 
133

group. For example, on one hand, they state, “We must also confront the contradiction that troubles believers in democracy and 

liberalization. They see official U.S. diplomacy as frequently buttressing governments hostile to freedom and prosperity.” So what 

is the role of public diplomacy in such a situation, one might ask? 

The answer (p. 18) is:

Public diplomacy gives the United States the opportunity 

to supplement the support of such regimes—often a policy 

necessity—with broader, long-term promotion of universal 

values and economic, political, and social reforms that directly support public aspirations.

See pp. 19-24 also, for what to this author are similarly contradictory and unconvincing attempts to espouse and defend values 

that are directly undermined by present policy commitments. Another similarly unconvincing set of reports admits on one hand 

the importance of policy, yet seeks on the other to “put lipstick on 

pigs” through effective communications. It states:

Although this paper does not tackle the U.S. foreign and 

domestic policy issues that drive global and Islamic world 

public perceptions of America, it does acknowledge that our 

policies are central determinants of global views. Nonetheless, how we communicate, including methods and our posture of humility—or lack thereof—remains a central part of 

how we tackle the problems of public diplomacy and it is 

these methods that this paper will examine.

See Hady Amr, The Need to Communicate: How to Improve U.S. 

Public Diplomacy with the Islamic World, Analysis Paper #6, Washington, DC: The Saban Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution, January 2004, p. 8. See also Hady Amr and P. W. 

Singer, Restoring America’s Good Name: Improving Strategic Communications with the Islamic World, Washington, DC: The Brookings 

Institution, August 2006, available from www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2006/09/middleeast-amr; Hady Amr and P. W. Singer, 

Engaging the Muslim World: A Communication Strategy to Win the 

War of Ideas, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, April 

2007. For an outstanding, insightful, starkly contrasting approach 

supporting a transformation in U.S. policies toward support for 

the democratic and reformist Islamist forces rather than efforts to 

mask present contradictions pitting pro-authoritarian or author-
134

itarian-tolerant policy and democratic rhetoric, see Abdelwahab 

el-Affendi, The Conquest of Muslim Hearts and Minds? Perspectives 

on U.S. Reform and Public Diplomacy Strategies, Washington, DC: 

The Brookings Institution, September 1, 2005, available from 

www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2005/09/islamicworld-el-affendi. 

For example, el-Affendi, remarks (p. 2): “The link between Islamism and terrorism is at best contingent. The problem, in fact, 

relates more to widespread anti-Americanism based on some U.S. 

policies or popular perceptions of them.” In reference to the present crisis of U.S. credibility and public diplomacy (p. 2): 

The starting point of this process [reforming US public diplomacy] is the recognition of the dysfunctional role, lack 

of legitimacy, and unrepresentativeness that characterizes 

the state as a structure in much of the Muslim world. This 

condition is demonstrated by the primacy of the U.S. public 

diplomacy campaign, which is directed toward the general 

Muslim public, rather than the governments in the Muslim 

world. This indicates the existence of a moral and institutional vacuum at the heart of the region’s political landscape.

See also “A Credibility Problem,” pp. 7-10.

148. The Arab-Israel confrontation, and more specific Palestinian struggle for national rights and against occupation, is one 

of the most significant historical sources of modern terrorism. See 

Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Historian, “Historical Background: Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1961-2003: A Brief Chronology,” Washington, DC: Department of State, 2013, available 

from www.fas.org/irp/threat/terror_chron.html; Judith Colp Rubin 

and Caroline Taillandier, “Appendix: Chronology of Middle EastConnected Terrorism Against Americans [c. 1961-2001],” Barry 

Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin, eds., Anti-American Terrorism and 

the Middle East: A Documentary History, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 351-366. 

149. Further confidence in this conclusion arises from the 

fact that it is by no means a radical opinion maintained by an unhinged fringe of the political left or right. Rather, this conclusion 

is arrived at by persons with varying sorts of commitments and 

institutional affiliation, e.g., Arab and Muslim academics, nonArab and non-Muslim academics and analysts, U.S. military and 

intelligence analysts, and persons of varying political ideologi-
135

cal orientations. For a very brief but indicative sampling beyond 

those already summarized, see Mustapha Kamel Al-Sayyid, The 

Other Face of the Islamist Movement, Working Papers, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Global Policy Forum, Washington, 

DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, No. 23, January 2003, esp. pp. 26-27, available from www.carnegieendowment.

org/files/wp33.pdf; Said Amir Arjomand, “Can Rational Analysis 

Break a Taboo: A Middle Eastern Perspective,” Eric Hershberg 

and Kevin W. Moore, Critical Views of September 11: Analyses from 

Around the World, New York, Social Science Research Council, 

The New Press, pp. 162-176; Robert Art and Louise Richardson, 

eds., Democracy and Counterterrorism: lessons from the past, “Conclusion,” Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 

esp. pp. 592-596; Bari Atwan, The Secret History of al Qaeda, Updated edition, Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2008 (orig. 2006), esp. pp. 294-298; Martha Crenshaw, 

“Why America? The Globalization of Civil War,” Current History, 

December 2001, pp. 425-432; Robert Fisk, “Our Actions in the 

Middle East are What is Endangering Our Security,” The Independent, November 6, 2010, available from www.commondreams.org/

view/2010/11/06-2?print; Graham E. Fuller, “The Future of Political Islam,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2002, available from www.

foreignaffairs.com/print/57806; Fawaz A. Gerges, America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests, Cambridge, UK, 

and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999; Simon Haddad and Hilal Khashan, “Islam and Terrorism: Lebanese Muslim 

Views on September 11,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 46, No. 

6, December 2002, pp. 812-828; Muhammad Haniff Bin Hassan, 

“Key Considerations in Counterideological Work against Terrorist Ideology,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 29, 2006, 

esp. pp. 548-549; Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, Without 

Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2006, esp. pp. 284-285; Michael B. Meyer, Major, 

USAF, America’s Credibility at Stake: Arab Perceptions of US Foreign 

Policy, A Research Report Submitted to Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements, Maxwell Air Force Base, 

AL: Air and Staff Command College, Air University, March 19, 

2002; Mahmood Mamdani, “Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: A Political Perspective on Culture and Terrorism,” Eric Hershberg and 

Kevin W. Moore, Critical Views of September 11, pp. 44-60; Major 

Roy P. Matur, USAF, Influencing Transnational Terrorist Organizations: Using Influence Nets to Prioritize Factors, June 2005, Graduate 
136

Research Project in Partial Fulfillment for the Degree of Masters of 

Operational Sciences, AFIT/GOS/ENS/05-06, Wright-Patterson 

Air Force Base, OH: Air University, Department of the Air Force, 

Air Force Institute of Technology, esp. pp. iv, 16-31, available 

from www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/afit/fatur_influences_terrorists.

pdf; Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Recent U.S. Thinking About Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 2010, Vol. 

22, esp. 647; Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Logic of Suicide Terrorism, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005; Robert Pape 

and J. Feldman, Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Suicide Terrorism 

and How to Stop It, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2010; 

PEW Global Attitudes Project, December 19 2001; Marc Sageman, 

Leaderless Jihad: Terrorist networks in the 21st Century, Philadelphia, 

PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009, esp. p. 35-36; Brent 

J. Talbot and Michael B. Meyer, View from the East: Arab Perceptions of United States Presence and Policy, Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) Occassional Paper No. 48, USAF Academy, 

CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, February 2003; 

Sherifa Zuhur, Precision in the Global War on Terror: Inciting Muslims Through the War of Ideas, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 2008, available from www.

StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil, esp. p. 118. 

150. See also Kamolnick, Delegitimizing Al-Qaeda, note 72, pp. 

59-64 (Simon Reeve, The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden, and the future of terrorism, Boston, MA: Northeastern University 

Press, 1999, “Appendix Three: A letter from Ramzi Yousef and the 

other conspirators in the World Trade Center bombing, published 

as received by The New York Times 4 days after the February 1993 

explosion,” pp. 274-275): “Ramzi Yousef, mastermind of the 1993 

World Trade Center plot, as well as others, including the initial 

planning of the ‘Planes Operation’—who had earlier failed in an 

attempt to bomb the Israeli embassy in Bangkok, Thailand, and 

whose initial New York targets were not the World Trade Center 

but targeting Jewish neighborhoods in Crown Heights and Williamsburg— had this to say as a final statement following his conviction for that crime:

We are, the fifth battalion in the Liberation Army, declare 

our responsibility for the explosion on the mentioned 

building. This action was done in response for the American political, economical and military support to Israel the 
137

state of terrorism and to the rest of the dictator countries in 

the region.

Our demands:

Stop all military, economical, and political aids [sic] to Israel.

All diplomatic relations with Israel must stop.

Not to interfere with any of the Middle East countries [sic] 

interior affairs.

. . . The terrorism that Israel practices (which is supported 

by America) must be faced with a similar one. The dictatorship and terrorism (also supported by America) that some 

countries are practicing against their own people must also 

be faced with terrorism.

The American people must know, that their civilians

who got killed are not better than those who are getting 

killed by the American weapons and support.

The American people are responsible for the actions of

their government and they must question all of the crimes 

that their government is committing against other people. 

Or they – Americans – will be the targets of our operations 

that could diminish them.

We invite all of the people from all countries and all of

the revolutionaries in the world to participate in this action 

with us to accomplish our just goals.

‘IF THEN ANYONE TRANSGRESSES THE PROHIBITION AGAINST YOU TRANSGRESS YE LIKEWISE 

AGAINST HIM. . . . 

 Al-Farbek Al-Rokn,

 Abu Bakr Al-Makee 

CNN, in its write-up of the final verdict, represented facts 

by stating: “After 3 days of deliberation in November, a federal 

jury convicted Yousef and Eyad Ismoil on murder and conspiracy 

charges for their roles in a plot by Islamic extremists to topple the 

trade centers two 110-story [sic] towers to punish the United States 

for its support of Israel,” available from articles.cnn.com/1998-01-

08/us/980108 yousef 1 trade-center-bombing-yousef-and-eyad-ismoilconviction-S=PM:US. Finally, at least one of the East Africa Embassy bombers made his motives known in published transcripts 

of the case (See United States of America v. Usama bin Laden, et al., 

S(7) 98 Cr. 1023, United States District Court, Southern District of 

New York, New York, N.Y., October 18, 2001, Sentencing hearing, 

available from fl1.findlaw.com/news/findlaw.com/cnn/docs/binladen/
138

usbinldn101801.) El Hage’s complicity in the attacks was proved, 

but based on his testimony one learns that policy, not shari’a, primarily motivated him; also, that the killing of innocent human beings—something he apparently did not know would happen—is 

absolutely unacceptable under Islamic law. The defendants, Wadih El Hage, Mohamed Sadeek Odeh, Mohamed Rashed Daoud 

Al-‘Owhali, and Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, all received life 

without parole: Odeh’s views (see p. 112) are referred to by Judge 

Leonard B. Sand when he states as their motives, “Mr. Odeh’s 

opposition to United States’ support of Israel, financially, politically and militarily, [and] presence of the United States military 

in the holy lands of Saudi Arabia, [and] the Persian Gulf and the 

Horn of Africa . . .” At p. 113, Judge Sands states: “The attack may 

have been intended to attack American foreign policy, but the victims were innocent people. . . .” At pp. 115-116, the distinction 

is made between support of al-Qaeda’s military goals and deep 

regret at loss of innocent civilian life. Odeh’s attorney, Anthony L. 

Ricco, states: 

He is now prepared to face the sentence that the court must 

impose here. He is very much aware of the substantial human loss that occurred here. He is not oblivious to the fact 

that many people were injured and many people died here 

who were innocent. He acknowledged that very early on 

in the case when he was interrogated. He has always expressed that. He does not have remorse, your Honor, about 

his participation in Al Qaeda. That’s a difference in his 

mind. . . . Mohamed Odeh has always stated that he was not 

a part of the execution of the bombing. He continues in that 

position today, but that does not mean, your Honor, that 

he is a person who is oblivious to the great loss of human 

life and the great injury that was inflicted upon people here 

(pp. 115-116).

El-Hage, a second defendant, addressed the Court before his sentencing with a very revealing, fundamentalist narrative, but one 

that appears to recognize the enormity of killing innocents and 

indeed one that exhibits moral revulsion. His view of the United 

States is positive from a Muslim perspective: he repeatedly refers 

to the United States as a land where Islam can be freely spread 

and practiced (“Others chose to migrate to other countries, such 

as the U.S., where they can spread the message of Islam freely 

and in the same time support their brothers and sisters who are 
139

continuing their efforts to apply God’s rules in the Islamic countries,” p. 139); also: “Islam became the fastest growing religion in 

the U.S., as it is in the whole world, all praise be to God first, and 

to the tolerant, open society here” (p. 139); also: 

Now, even though the Islamic system and way of life is for 

the best of all humanity [sic], devout Muslims, as I believe, 

are not asking to apply it here in the U.S., where Muslims 

are less than 7 million. They are a minority. The fact is that 

they want to apply it in the Islamic countries where the majority are Muslims. But in those countries, today’s selfish, 

arrogant and self-deceited kings, presidents and rulers want 

to apply their own self-invented rules . . . [T]o make the long 

story short [sic], by the 20th century, the rulers started to 

neglect the Koranic laws, substituting them with manmade 

[sic] laws. The result is what we see today. Muslim nations 

are the weakest, poorest and most miserable. That is why, 

in my opinion, we find devout, committed Muslims, individuals and groups, working actively to reimplement God’s 

rules and guidance (pp. 137-138). 

As for moral revulsion: “[D]evout Muslims, . . even in time of 

conflict, they should not exceed certain limits, harming innocent 

people or noncombatant ones. This is very stressed upon [sic] in 

the Koran and the teachings of the prophet Muhammad, peace 

be upon him, who even prohibited destroying crops, animals or 

property at time of war” (p. 139); and again: 

When the bombings happened in Africa in ’98, my opinion 

was that that action was extreme and not in accordance with 

the beliefs that I learned. I made my opinion clear well before I was arrested or charged. Today, my opinion is still the 

same towards what happened in Africa and what happened 

here last month (September 11, 2001 [9/11]. The killing of 

innocent people and noncombatant is radical, extreme and 

cannot be tolerated by any religion, principles, beliefs or values. Today I can stand here and say that I did not participate 

or support any extreme conduct or any act that violates my 

beliefs as a devout Muslim...(pp. 141-142). 

El-Hage, at pp. 142-143, identifies “many American policies 

towards Muslim countries [that] are wrong” including the alleged 

“over one million child [sic] and thousands of innocent people” 
140

affected by the embargo on Iraq; “the unconditional support of 

the American government to the Israeli government that is killing innocent Palestinians, taking their land, expelling them and 

destroying their homes” (p. 142); the effect on deeply religious 

Muslims of “having non-Muslim troops on the land of Muslims’ 

holiest sites, its negative impact on Muslim masses around the 

world and specifically those on the Arabian Peninsula” (p. 142). 

He goes on to also say though: 

Such policies, in my opinion, are wrong and end up breeding 

unjustified extremism. . . . Many Muslims and non-Muslims 

have expressed the same views. That includes the American 

Muslim community, which I am a member of, which is free 

to voice its criticism to the American policy [sic] but without 

committing or supporting any extreme acts (pp. 142-143). 

In his defense, he also states: “I am still the person who avoids 

radical solutions and acts, as I did in the past” (p. 145). (El-Hage 

had at that time no prior record of any violent or illegal activity.) 

151. Holbrooke, “Get the Message Out.”

152. Obama, “The Future of our Fight Against Terrorism.”

153. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary 

of Military and Associated Terms, November 8, 2010, As Amended 

Through 15 April 2012, Washington, DC: DoD; from JP 3-13-2.

154. A very insightful analysis of a triangular structure that 

links violence or the threat of violence, mass communication, and 

feelings of chronic fear (terror), can be found in Alex P. Schmid, 

“The Response Problem as a Definition Problem,” Terrorism and 

Political Violence, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 7-13, especially p. 10, Figure 

1, “The Triangle of Insurgent Terrorism” (original source: A. P. 

Schmid and J. de Graaf, Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982, 

p. 176); and Alex P. Schmid, “Frameworks for Conceptualizing 

Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 16, No. 2, Summer 

2004, pp. 197-221, esp. “Terrorism as/and Communication,” pp. 

205-210. The key role of mass media in transmitting terrorist signals explains how “deeds themselves,” if propagated like waves 

beyond their initial victims to the ultimate target, is the focus here. 
141

It is this mediated function then that permits terror to function 

as tactic and political strategy. See also Thomas Perry Thornton, 

“Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation,” Harry Eckstein, ed., 

Internal War: Problems and Approaches, New York, The Free Press, 

1964, pp. 71-99; Ronald D. Crelinsten, “Analysing Terrorism and 

Counter-Terrorism: A Communication Model,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 2002, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 77-122; Andrew H. Kydd 

and Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” International 

Security, 2006, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 49-80; Ariel Merari, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 

1993, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 213-251. For the original formulations of 

the notion “propaganda of the deed,” see John Most, “Advice for 

Terrorists,” (orig. in Freiheit, September 13, 1884), “Action as Propaganda,” Walter Laqueur and Yohah Alexander, eds., The Terrorism Reader, New York: Meridian, pp. 100-108, especially Part 

III, “Action as Propaganda,” pp. 105-106. 

155. A recent “controversy” involving Bruce Hoffman and 

Marc Sageman led, in my opinion, to a false dichotomy; that 

radicalization and recruitment is either exclusively top-down 

(Hoffman) or exclusively via the emergence of self-radicalizers 

and home-based and home-grown persons primarily initially 

morally outraged by AQ propaganda or personal or vicarious 

identification with other’s humiliation and suffering. For these 

overly-polarized positions, see Bruce Hoffman, “The Myth of 

Grass-Roots Terrorism: Why Osama bin Laden Still Matters,” Review Essay, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2008; “The Leaderless Jihad’s Leader: Why Osama Bin Laden Mattered,” Foreign Affairs, 

May 13, 2011, available from www.foreignaffairs.com/print/67785; 

Bruce Hoffman, “A Counterterrorism Strategy for the Obama 

Administration,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 2009, Vol. 21, 

pp. 359-377. In Hoffman’s more recent writings, however, one 

encounters a more diversified enemy that accommodates varying relations between core, affiliated, and inspired. See, e.g., 

Peter Bergen, Bruce Hoffman, and Katherine Tiedemann, “Assessing the Jihadist Terrorist Threat to America and American Interests,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 2011, Vol. 34, pp. 65-101; 

and Bruce Hoffman, “Al Qaeda’s Uncertain Future,” Studies in 

Conflict and Terrorism, 2013, Vol. 36, pp. 635-653. For Sageman’s 

position, see Marc Sageman, “Response to Hoffman’s Review Essay ‘The Myth of Grassroots Terrorism’”; Marc Sageman, “Confronting al-Qaeda: Understanding the Threat in Afghanistan and 
142

Beyond,” Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 

Washington, DC, October 7, 2009, available from www.foreign.

senate.gov/hearings/confronting-al-Qaeda-understanding-the-threatin-afghanistan-and-beyond; reprinted in Perspectives on Terrorism, 

December 2009, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 4-25; Rick Maze, “Researcher: 

Most terrorist plots have no al-Qaida link,” Army Times, October 

19, 2009, p. 14; Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 

Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004; Marc 

Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First 

Century, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009. 

156. Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, pp. viii, 3, 11, 13, 22, 24, 25, 

143-146.

157. See, for examples, Colonel G. L. Lamborn, USAR 

(Ret.), “Jihad of the Pen: A Practioners Guide to Conducting 

Effective Influence Operations in an Insurgency,” Small Wars 

Journal, February 2010, 122 pp., esp. pp. 67-72, available from

www.smallwarsjournal.com; Christian Clai and Major Marc Romanych, USA (Retired), “Counterpropaganda: An Important Capability for Joint Forces,” IO Sphere, Fall 2005, pp. 11-13; Michael 

Egner, “Social Science Foundations for Strategic Communications 

in the Global War on Terrorism,” Paul Davis and Kim Cragin, 

eds., Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together, 

Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2009, Chap. 9, pp. 

323-365, esp. pp. 327-330; Colonel W. C. Garrison, “Information 

Operations and Counter-Propaganda: Making a Weapon of Public Affairs,” Strategy Research Project, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army 

War College, March 17, 1999; Cori E. Dauber, “The TRUTH is out 

there: Responding to Insurgent Disinformation and Deception 

Operations,” Military Review, January-February 2009, pp. 13-24; 

Todd Leventhal, Iraqi Propaganda and Disinformation During the 

Gulf War: Lessons for the Future, The Emirates Occasional Papers, 

No. 36, Abu Dhabi, UAE: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1999; Droukje Demant and Beatrice De Graaf, 

“How to Counter Radical Narratives: Dutch Deradicalization 

Policy in the Case of Moluccan and Islamic Radicals,” Studies in 

Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 33, 2010, pp. 408-428; Beatrice de Graaf, 

“Counter-Narratives and the Unrehearsed Stories Counter-Terrorists Unwittingly Produce,” Perspectives on Terrorism, August 

2009, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 5-11; Larisa Breton and Adam Pearson, 

“Contextual Truth-Telling to Counter Extremist-Supportive Mes-
143

saging Online: The Wikileaks ‘Collateral Murder’ Case Study, 

Small Wars Journal, November 6, 2010, available from www.smallwarsjournal.com; Nancy Snow, “Public Diplomacy and Propaganda: Rethinking Diplomacy in the Age of Persuasion,” December 4, 

2012; See also Leonard W. Doob, “Goebbels’ Principles of Propaganda,” The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 3, Autumn 1950, 

pp. 419-442, esp. p. 441, for the critical observation that no matter 

how masterful the propagandist, facts can be very troublesome 

things. Doob states, for example: 

Goebbels clearly recognized his own propaganda impotency in six situations. The basic drives of sex and hunger were 

not appreciably affected by propaganda. Air raids brought 

the problems ranging from discomfort to death which could 

not be gainsaid. Propaganda could not significantly increase 

industrial production. The religious impulses of many Germans and by peoples of the occupied countries required 

forceful action, not clever words. Finally, Germany’s unfavorable military situation became an undeniable fact. When 

propaganda and censorship could not be effective, Goebbels 

advocated action or, in one of his official positions . . . he 

himself produced the action. Diversionary propaganda he 

considered second-best.

158. The terms “Psychological Operations” and “PSYOPS” 

are entirely deleted from JP 1-02. 

159. Field Manual (FM) 3-05.130, Army Special Operations Forces 

Unconventional Warfare, Washington, DC: DoD, September 2008, 

p. 4-14, para 4-74. 

160. Information Operations Primer, p. 4. 

161. JP 3-13.2.

162. This essential function and its potential evacuation or 

confusion in the term, Military Information Support Operations 

and its acronym MISO led to spirited debate among PSYOP personnel. See, for example, Alfred Paddock, Jr., “PSYOP: On a Complete Change in Organization, Practice, and Doctrine,” Small Wars 

Journal, June 2010; Alfred E. Paddock, “Legitimizing Army Psychological Operations,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 56, 1st Quarter, 2010, pp. 89-93; See Lawrence Dietz, “MISO: Is it Soup Yet?” 
144

available from psyopregiment.blogspot.com/2010/06/miso-is-it-soupyet.html and its many replies; “Psyop expert discusses military 

information support operations,” Washington, DC: The Institute 

of World Politics, March 9, 2011, available from www.iwp.edu/

news_publications/detail/psyop-expert-discusses-military-informationsupport-operations; Kevin Maurer, “Psychological Operations are 

now Military Information Support Operations,” Associated Press, 

July 2, 2010, available from publicintelligence.net/psychological-operations-are-now-military-information-support-operations/; and more 

generally, from www.psywarrior.com.

163. See, for example, Kelton Rhoads, Introduction to Influence, 

1997-2012, Working Psychology, available from www.workingpsychology.com; Eric V. Larson, Richard E. Darilek, Daniel Gibran, 

Brian Nichiporuk, Amy Richardson, Lowell H. Schwartz, and 

Cathryn Q. Thurston, Foundations of Effective Influence Operations: 

A Framework for Enhancing Army Capabilities, Santa Monica, CA: 

The RAND Corporation, 2009, esp. p. xiii, 1-7, for influence operations broadly and counterpropaganda, and p. 6, for critical 

significance of actions; Lieutenant Colonel Susan L. Gough, “The 

Evolution of Strategic Influence,” Strategy Research Project, April 

7, 2003, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, p.1, for definition of 

strategic influence, and pp. 8, 9, 29, esp. 30-37, for role of counterpropaganda; Kim Cragin and Scott Gerwehr, Dissuading Terror: 

Strategic Influence and the Struggle Against Terrorism, Santa Monica, 

CA: The RAND Corporation, 2005; Paul K. Davis, Simple Models 

to Explore Deterrence and More General Influence in the War with alQaeda, Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2010; Alex S. 

Wilner, “Deterring the Undeterrable: Coercion, Denial, and Delegitimation in Counterterrorism,” Amos Perlmutter Prize Essay, 

The Journal of Strategic Studies, February 2011, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 

3-37; Dr. Lee Rowland and Commander Steve Tatham, RN, “Strategic Communication & Influence Operations: Do We Really Get 

‘It’?,” www.smallwarsjournal.com, August 3, 2010; “Influence Operations,” Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, Cyberspace 

& Information Study Center, available from www.au.af.mil/infoops/influence.htm; Major Roy P. Fatur, USAF, “Influencing Transnational Terrorist Organizations: Using Influence Nets to Prioritize Factors,” June 2005, Graduate Research Project, Maxwell Air 

Force Base, AL: Air University, Air Force Institute of Technology.
145

164. See Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, 

Beijing, China: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999, esp. pp. 51-56, and 191-194, for conceptions of methods 

and means, and their infinite combinations, extending well beyond those traditionally conceived; Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Partial translation. 

165. Cheng Hang Teo, Major, Republic of Singapore Air 

Force, The Acme of Skill: Nonkinetic Warfare, Wright Flyer Paper 

No. 30, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Command and Staff College, May 2008, p. 1.

166. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, esp. 

pp. 56-57; See also esp. pp. 7, 12, 50-57, 56-57, 115, endnotes #27-

#29, pp. 112-113; 117, 119-120, 128-129, 168-69, 180-181, 216, and 

221. See also Major Michael J. Good, USA, Chinese National Strategy of Total War, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, Air 

Force Institute of Technology, June 2008, in partial fulfillment for 

the Degree of Master of Science in Cyber Warfare, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, see esp. pp. 3-12 on doctrine of total 

war—war across all domains and battlefields from Sun Tzu, Mao, 

Deng Xiaoping, and others; pp. 13-33, esp. p. 28 for battlefields/

conduct of total war; pp. 34-48, Cyber Space in the Total War; 

and, Conclusions, pp. 49-53, available from handle.dtic.mil/100.2/

ADA487635. See also James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, in recent Congressional testimony, states: 

This year [2013], in both content and organization, . . . illustrates how quickly and radically the world—and our threat 

environment—are changing. The environment is demanding reevaluations of the way we do business, expanding 

our analytic envelope, and altering the vocabulary of intelligence. Threats are more diverse, interconnected, and viral 

than at any time in history. Attacks, which might involve 

cyber and financial weapons, can be deniable and unattributable. Destruction can be invisible, latent, and progressive 

(see also esp. pp. 1-3, analyzing the cyber domain).

Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC.
146

167. See, for example, Field Manual (FM) 3-05.130, Army Special Forces Unconventional Warfare, September 2008, Washington, 

DC: Department of the Army, pp. 2-1 to 2-11, available from www.

us.army.mil. See also Colonel Jack D. Kem (Retired), “Understanding the operational environment: the expansion of DIME,”Military 

Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB), April-June 2007, Vol. 33, 

No. 2, pp. 49-53, for a history of the coinage of DIME, DIMEFIL 

(or MIDLIFE), and uneven adoption of the latter in various relatively recent publications. 

168. Even and Siman-Tov, conceptualize cyberspace thusly: 

The term ‘cyberspace’ defines a phenomenon that emerged 

with the invention of the telegraph in 1844, which involves 

taking advantage of the electromagnetic field for human 

needs by means of technology. An essential turning point 

in the development of cyberspace was the invention of the 

numerical computer in 1949. Other milestones include: the 

linking of communications networks with computers and 

machines, which began in the 1970s; mass use of the internet 

and personal computers since the mid-1990s; and in the past 

decade, the comprehensive integration between computer 

systems and various communications systems and machines (such as in industry, transportation, and other fields), 

the mass use of handheld cellular devices, the flourishing of 

social networks on the internet, and more. All of these have 

profoundly influenced society and the economy. Information technologies and cyberspace are rapidly changing the 

nature of the modern battlefield as well.

Cyber Warfare: Concepts and Strategic Trends, Memorandum 117, 

Tel Aviv, Israel: INSS, May 2012, p. 9, available from www.inss.

org.il. 

169. For example, for select press reporting existence of a cyber warfare doctrine, see Max Fisher, “Leaked documents hint 

at Obama’s emerging cyberwar doctrine,” The Washington Post, 

June 7, 2013, available from www.washingtonpost.com/blogs; Robert O’Harrow, Jr., and Barton Gellman, “Secret cyber directive 

calls for ability to attack without warning,” The Washington Post, 

June 7, 2013, available from www.washingtonpost.com; Cheryl Pellerin, “Cybercom Builds Teams for Offense, Defense in Cyberspace,” Washington, DC: DoD, March 12, 2013, available from 
147

www.defense.gov; Ellen Nakashima, “Pentagon creating teams to 

launch cyberattacks as threat grows,” The Washington Post, March 

12, 2013, available from www.washingtonpost.com; Jim Garamone, 

“Clapper Places Cyber at Top of Transnational Threat List,” 

Washington, DC: DoD, March 12, 2013, available from www.defense.gov; Dave Tolikar, “At Nellis AFB, teaching the shadowy 

art of cyber warfare,” Stars & Stripes, available from www.stripes.

com; Jim Garamone, “NSA Chief: Cyber World Presents Opportunities, Challenges,” Washington, DC: DoD, available from www.

defense.gov. For select reports and analyses on various dimensions 

of cyberspace as a warfare domain, see Department of Defense 

Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, Washington, DC: DoD, July 

2011, available from www.defense.gov/news/d20110714cyber.pdf; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Cyber Power, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy 

School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, May 

2010, available from belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu_files/cyber_power.

pdf; Jon Brickey, Jacob Cox, John Nelson, and Gregory Conti, “The 

Case for Cyber,” Small Wars Journal, available from smallwarsjournal.com/print/13223; Gary D. Brown and Owen W. Tullos, “On the 

Spectrum of Cyberspace Operations,” Small Wars Journal, available from smallwarsjournal.com/print/13595; Michael N. Schmitt, 

“International Law in Cyberspace: The Koh Speech and Tallinn 

Manual Juxtaposed,” Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 54, 

December 2012, pp. 13-37; “The Tallin Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare,” Tallinn, Estonia: NATO 

Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, available from 

www.ccdcoe.org/249.html.

170. A possible mnemonic device is suggested in the following ordering and pronunciation of this eight-fold concept: DICEFILM (pronounced, “Dicey Film”).

171. See, for example, John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. 

Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, New York, Farrar, 

Straus and Giroux, 2007.

172. This methodology is presently pursued by the Center for 

Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC), subordinate 

to the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs 

but, in fact, an interagency enterprise involving key elements of 

the national security and intelligence communities. A brief summation of its activities is provided by Jo Becker and Scott Shane, 
148

“Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will,” 

The New York Times, in which the authors report: “a sophisticated, 

interagency war room at the State Department to counter the jihadi narrative on an hour-by-hour basis, posting messages and 

video online and providing talking points to embassies.” Consisting primarily of a re-purposed digital engagement team initially 

tasked to the State Department’s Bureau of Counterterrorism, 

their mission is to enter terrorist venues, and comprised of a small 

pool of personnel fluent in Arabic, Farsi, Urdu, and Somali, seek 

to undermine AQ propaganda. For USG policy and enabling legislation, see USAID, Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), Washington, 

DC, 2010, Chap. 2, Adapting to the Diplomatic Landscape of the 

21st Century, III. Engaging Beyond the State, 1. Public Diplomacy, 

Shape the Narrative, Expand and strengthen people-to-people relationships, (p. 62) Counter violent extremism, “Creating a Center for Counterterrorism Communications,” available from www.

state.gov/s/dmr/qddr/; Office of the President of the United States, 

Executive Order # 13584, Developing an Integrated Strategic Counterterrorism Communications Initiative and Establishing a Temporary 

Organization to Support Certain Government-Wide Communications 

Activities Directed Abroad, Washington, DC: The White House, 

September 9, 2011; Office of the President of the United States, Update to Congress on National Framework for Strategic Communication, 

Washington, DC: The White House, 2012, available from www.

hsdl.org/?view&did=704809, in which the President defines the 

Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications’ (CSCC’s) 

three foci: “confronting al-Qa’ida rhetoric through direct digital 

engagement . . . providing tools for United States Government 

communicators; and working with specific U.S. Embassies’ country teams to develop plans for engagement at the local level” (pp. 

6-7); U.S. Department of State, “Center for Strategic Communications,” Washington, DC: Department of State, available from 

www.state.gov/r/cscc/; Richard LeBaron, “The State Department’s 

Role in Countering Violent Extremism,” Prepared Remarks [only 

a portion of the forum that was on the record], Policy Focus 119, 

Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 

November 18, 2011; Richard LeBaron, “Public Diplomacy as an Instrument of Counterterrorism: A Progress Report,” Speech, President’s Round Table, Diplomatic and Consular Officers Retired 

(DACOR), Washington, DC, DACOR Bacon House, June 20, 2012; 

“Communicating with Terror: A Briefing and Discussion with the 
149

Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications,” Atlantic Council; “Ambassador Alberto Fernandez Appointed Coordinator of the CSCC, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 

March 26, 2012; U. S. House of Representatives, Hearing Before 

the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade of 

the Committee on Foreign Affairs, The State Department’s Center 

for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications: Mission, Operations 

and Impact, Washington, DC: House of Representatives, 112th 

Cong., Second Sess., Serial No. 112-164, August 2, 2012, available 

from www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/; Ambassador Alberto M. Fernandez, Statement of Ambassador Alberto M. Fernandez, Coordinator 

for the Center of Strategic Counterterrorism Communications before the 

House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation 

and Trade, Washington, DC: August 2, 2012; For press accounts 

and commentary, see “State, SOCOM Partner to Counter Cyberterrorism,” Stony Brook, NY: The Simons Center, June 6, 2012, 

available from thesimonscenter.org/state-socom-partner-to-countercyberterrorism/; Philip Palin, “Text, subtext, and terrorism,” Homeland Security Watch, July 15, 2011; Helle C. Dale, “WebMemo,” No. 

3348, August 31, 2011, “Congress Must Set High Bar for White 

House Strategic Communications Plan,” available from report.

heritage.org/wm3348; Philip Ewing, Dod Buzz, “U.S. rolls out new 

counter-terror comms plan,” September 9, 2011, available from 

www.dodbuzz.com/2011/09/09/u-s-rolls-out-new-counter-terror-comms-plan/; Helle Dale, “U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy: Sticks and 

Carrots,” Washington, DC: The Heritage Organization, September 15, 2011; Shaun Waterman, “Social networks used to counter al Qaeda: Team tries to impede jihadi recruiters,” Washington 

Times, October 5, 2011, available from www.washingtontimes.com/

news/2011/oct/5/social-networks-used-to-counter-al-qaeda; Camille 

Elhassani, “US state department fights al-Qaeda in cyberspace,” 

May 25, 2012, available from blogs.aljazeera.com/blog/Americas/usstate-department-fights-al-qaeda-cyberspace; Vivian Wagner, “US Cybercounterterrorism Team Takes on al-Qaida,” TechNewsWorld, 

May 29, 2012, available from www.technewsworld.com/story/75238.

html; Judith McHale and Richard LeBaron, “Digitally dissuading 

tomorrow’s terrorists,” available from dyn.politico.com. The CSCC, 

though interagency, coordinates and is in direct communication 

with the Counter Terrorism Bureau in the Department of State 

(previously the Counter Terrorism Office, and Coordinator for 

Counter Terrorism). See Organization of the Bureau of Counterterrorism, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Wash-
150

ington, DC: U.S. Department of State, available from www.state.

gov/j/ct/about/index.htm; Daniel Benjamin, Coordinator, Office of 

the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Al-Qaida after Bin Laden,” Remarks at the Jamestown Conference at the National Press 

Club, Jamestown, VA, December 8, 2011, available from www.

state.gov/j/ct/rls/rm/2011/178499.htm; Daniel Benjamin, Coordinator, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Countering 

Violent Extremism,” Remarks at the Near East/South Asia Center 

for Strategic Studies (NESA), Washington, DC: Near East/South 

Asia Center for Strategic Studies, January 25, 2012, available from 

www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/rm/2012/182716.htm; Daniel Benjamin, Coordinator, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “The 

State Department’s Bureau of Counterterrorism: Budget, Programs, and Policies,” Testimony before House Foreign Affairs 

Committeee Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and 

Trade,” Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representations, April 

18, 2012, available from www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/rm/2012/188815.

htm; Daniel Benjamin, Coordinator, Bureau of Counterterrorism, 

“Global Counterterrorism: A Progress Report,” Remarks, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, December 18, 2012, available 

from www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/rm/2012/202179.htm.

173. For a brief discussion identifying these three bases of a 

counteroffensive, see Omar Ashour, “Online De-Radicalization? 

Countering Violent Extremist Narratives: Message, Messenger, 

and Media Strategy,” Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 4, No. 6, December 2010, pp. 15-19.

174. For Osama bin Ladin’s tactical propaganda during the 

1994-2004 period, see especially, FBIS Report, Compilation of Usama bin Ladin Statements, 1994-January 2004, January 2004, available from www.fas.org/irp/world/para/ubl-fbis.pdf. For a recent 

compilation that includes the above source but covers the time 

frame 1991-2009 and also includes Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri’s propaganda, see Donald Holbrook, “Al-Qaeda Communiques by 

Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri: A Chronology,” Alex P. Schmid, The 

Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, London, UK, and New 

York: Routledge, 2011/2013, “Appendix 4.3,” pp. 280-293.

175. For a very insightful analysis of this process of fabrications becoming signifiers and legends, and the means of preventing that, see Beatrice de Graaf, “Counter-Narratives and the 
151

Unrehearsed Stories Counter-Terrorists Unwittingly Produce,” 

Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 3, No. 2, August 2009, pp. 5-11; 

Froukje Demant and Beatrice De Graaf, “How to Counter Radical 

Narratives: Dutch Deradicalization Policy in the Case of Moluccan and Islamic Radicals,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 33, 

2010, pp. 408-428.

176. See, for example, Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, 

“Framing Processes and Social Movements,” Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 26, 2000, pp. 611-639.

177. This very accurately describes U.S. attempts, repeated 

over many years both in public (i.e., the UN Security Council, 

UN General Assembly), or in private communiques among State 

Department embassy and intelligence officials, to prevent Osama 

Bin Laden from using Taliban-controlled territory to issue declarations of war against America and Americans; train terrorists 

targeting the U.S. homeland; and after the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the issuing of a federal indictment 

(United States v. Usama bin Laden et al., S(2) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS) 

(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 1998) to avoid extradition to the United States 

to face the criminal justice system. See, for example, the following 

UN Security Council Resolutions (S.C. Res. 1189 (1998), August 

13, 1998; S.C. Res. 1193 (1998), August 28, 1998; S.C. Res.s 1214 

(1998), December 8, 1998; S/1999/1021, October 4, 1999: “Letter 

dated 1 October 1999 from the Deputy Permanent Representative 

of the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed 

to the Secretary-General” S.C. Res. 1267 (1999), October 15 1999). 

These contain explicit references to the Taliban as facilitating the 

AQ terrorist sanctuary. There was unanimity on every resolution 

listed above except for a single vote involving two abstentions. 

Additional pre-9/11 resolutions include: S.C. Res. 1333 (2000), 

December 19, 2000; S/2001/511, May 22, 2001, which includes 

[1] “Letter dated 21 May from Secretary-General addressed to the 

President of the Security Council.” [Re: Committee of Experts to 

report on how arms embargo and terrorist training camp closure 

would be monitored and enforced.] and, [2] “Letter dated May 

18, 2001, from the Chairman of the Committee of Experts on Afghanistan appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1333 

(2000) addressed to the Secretary-General,” whose “Enclosure” is: 

“Report of the Committee of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Resolution 1333 (2000), para. 15 (a), regarding monitoring of 
152

the arms embargo against the Taliban and the closure of terrorist training camps in the Taliban-held areas of Afghanistan”; and 

S.C. Res. 1363 (2001), July 30, 2001, the last pre-9/11 attempt to 

have the Taliban extradite bin Laden, eliminate terrorist sanctuary, and end the flow of materials, weapons, and monies to AQ. 

Further corroboration of the extensive efforts to which the USG 

went during the period 1994-2001 to negotiate secretly with highlevel Taliban for extradition of Osama bin Laden and elimination 

of terrorist sanctuaries, may be found at The National Security 

Archive, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv. Here are two notable examples from among dozens of documents. Following the 

USG launching of cruise missiles against Khost in Afghanistan 

and Khartoum, Sudan in response to Bin Laden’s bombing of the 

East African Embassies, on August 22, 1998, Mullah Omar called 

a State Department official. (See www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/

NSAEBB134/Doc%202.pdf.) The subject heading of this document: 

“Afghanistan: Taliban’s Mullah Omar’s 8/22 Contact with State 

Department.” A Summary of the 4-page Cable is furnished (capitalization in original): 

TALIBAN SUPREME LEADER MULLAH OMAR TOLD 

A STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL IN WASHINGTON 

THAT THE TALIBAN WAS OPEN TO THE SUGGESTION OF ESTABLISHING A VEHICLE FOR SECURE 

COMMUNICATION WITH USG OFFICIALS, POSSIBLY 

THROUGH AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD. WHILE OMAR 

PARROTED SOME OF BIN LADEN’S HARD-LINE VIEWS, 

HE LISTENED TO U.S. ARGUMENTS ON THE REASONS 

FOR U.S. ATTACKS IN AFGHANISTAN AND SUDAN 

AND THE REASONS WHY BIN LADEN’S CONTINUED 

ACTIVITIES WERE NOT IN THE INTEREST OF THE 

AFGHAN PEOPLE. OMAR WARNED THAT THE U.S. 

STRIKES WOULD PROVE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE AND 

AROUSE ANTI-AMERICAN FEELINGS IN THE ISLAMIC 

WORLD. WHILE HE WAS IN NO WAY THREATENING, 

HE CLAIMED THE STRIKES COULD SPARK MORE TERRORIST ATTACKS. HE ASKED FOR EVIDENCE OF BIN 

LADEN’S INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORIST ACTIONS. 

END SUMMARY. 

Though the above cable asserts that plenty of evidence exists of bin Laden’s terrorist activities, a follow-up cable on August 

23, 1998, see www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB134/Doc
153

%203.pdf, which provides the extensive, explicit case listing this 

evidence, as well as other talking points to be used in follow-up 

communication. The Subject of this embassy cable dated August 

23, 1998, “Message to the Taliban on Bin Laden,” is summarized 

in its first paragraph: 

FOLLOWING UP ON TELEPHONE CONVERSATION 

WITH TALIBAN LEADER MULLAH OMAR (REFTEL) 

WHICH INDICATED AN APPARENT OPENNESS FOR 

DIALOGUE, POST IS INSTRUCTED TO ENGAGE WITH 

AN AUTHORITATIVE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE TALIBAN TO EXPEL SAUDI TERRORIST OSAMA BIN LADEN 

SO THAT HE CAN BE PROPERLY BROUGHT TO JUSTICE 

FOR HIS TERRORIST ACTS. THE APPARENT READINESS 

OF THE TALIBAN FOR SERIOUS DIALOGUE NEEDS TO 

BE PROBED, WITH THE REALIZATION THAT IT COULD 

TURN OUT TO BE A PLOY FOR RECOGNITION OR OTHER BENEFITS OR A DEVICE TO STALL FOR TIME.

 For the legality of the U.S. use of force after 9/11 in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, see Authorization for Use of Military 

Force (AUMF), Public Law No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224, 2001; The UN 

Charter, which according to Schmitt (Michael N. Schmitt, Counter-Terrorism and the Use of Force in International Law, The Marshall 

Center Papers, No. 5. Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany: The 

George Marshall Center, 2002, pp. iv + 98), “The Charter in limiting state behavior—Article 2(4)—also empowers states to defend 

themselves, and this defense is not restricted to defense against 

state actors (see esp. Article 39, and Article 51).” Was it legal? 

Schmitt states: “No voices were raised [in the UN Council] claiming that either the customary right of self-defense or Article 51 

was limited to the context of State actions” (p. 27). Also consider: 

NATO’s invocation of Article V requiring collective self-defense, 

the actions of most states, and the fact that “in no case, was there 

any suggestion that the right was dependent on identifying a 

State as the attacker” (Ibid.), and that post-October 7 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions “went so far as to urge 

member States to ‘root out terrorism, in keeping with the Charter 

of the United Nations’” (p.27; see S.C. Res. 1378 (Nov. 14, 2002); 

S.C. Res. 1386 (Dec. 20, 2001; S.C. Res. 1390 (January 16, 2002); See 

also S.C. Res. 1368 (September 12, 2001), S.C. Res. 1373 (September 28, 2001), and S.C. Res. 1377 (November 12, 2001).
154

178. Above excerpts are translated from their Arabic book, 

Islam and the Laws of War, which appeared in serial form in the 

newspaper, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London, UK), August-September 

2006; Translated and exerpted in MEMRI, “Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya vs. Al-Qaeda,” available from www.memri.org/report/en/

print1887.htm. 

179. This paraphrase of Isam al-Din Dirbalah, Istratijiyat wa 

Tafjirat al-Qa’ida: al-Akhta wa al-Akhtar (The al-Qa’ida Organization’s 

Strategy and Bombings: Mistakes and Rulings), Cairo, Egypt: Maktabat al-Turath al-Islami, 2003, appears in Abd-al-Latif al-Minawi, 

“Part 1 of Book Review: Egyptian Islamist Leaders Fault Al-Qaida’s Strategy,” available from www.opensource.gov; Original Arabic publication in Al-Sharq al-Awsat, Internet Version, January, 

11, 2004. 

180. See Ibid., for a more expansive discussion of these three 

phases, presenting very illuminating insights into the Islamic 

Group’s nuanced and objective analysis of U.S. vital interests and 

policies. With respect to U.S. policies toward Israel and Arab and 

Muslim issues, it states: 

We should not disregard the role of the fundamentalist 

Christian right in the United States that began to grow and 

influence the internal and external trends of the Administration. An alliance emerged between the Jewish lobby and the 

fundamentalist Christian right. The influence of this alliance 

focused on the Arab-Israeli conflict and found a pretext to 

meddle in the internal affairs of various countries, especially Muslim countries, under the slogan of ‘backing the 

persecuted minorities in the world’. 

The importance of the Islamic Group’s rejection of conspiracy 

theories for explaining the present predicament confronting the 

Arab and Muslim world is also telling. They state

 The conspiracy theory truly means leaving one’s [free] will 

so that only the will of the CIA and the Mossad prevail. Then 

we blame our mistakes and apathy on the United States, the 

Israeli conspiracy, and other states, as if we had no role in 

everything that happened in this world.
155

(See Najih Ibrahim, Egyptian Group shura council member’s 

submitted conference paper, translated and reported in “Egypt: 

Statement by Leading Islamic Group Figure Says No-Violence 

Initiative Strong,” available from www.opensource.gov, original in 

Arabic, Al-Misri Al-Yawm, Cairo, July 2, 2007.)

181. Jihad—striving/struggling in the path of Allah to raise 

Allah’s Word supreme—is classically understood to take five 

forms: jihad of the heart/soul, designed to cleanse one of impure 

intentions and thoughts (jihad bil nafs/qalb), jihad of the tongue 

(jihad bil lisan), jihad of the pen/knowledge (jihad bil qalam/ilm), 

jihad of the hand, i.e., commanding the good and forbidding the 

bad through bodily reward and punishment (jihad bil yad), and 

the most potentially life-threatening and therefore most regulated 

of all, the jihad of the sword (jihad bis saif).

182. The words we use to describe AQ’s actions are key to 

their legal and moral status in Islam. For an important contribution to leveraging Islamic law and morality to further marginalize 

and criminalize AQ, see “Words that Work and Words that Don’t: 

A Guide for Counterterrorism Communication,” Vol. 2, No. 10, 

McLean, VA: National Counter Terrorism Center, Counterterrorism Communications Center, March 14, 2008, p. 14, available 

from www.investigativeproject.org/documents/misc/127.pdf; Office 

for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, Terminology to Define the Terrorists: Recommendations from American Muslims, Washington, DC: 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, January 2008, available 

from www.dhs.gov/terminology-define-terrorists-recommendationsamerican-muslims. The words we use to describe our “war” against 

the AQ terrorist entity are also telling. For a remarkably wise and 

prescient, early post-9/11 reflection by a noted military historian and theorist, see Michael Howard, Comment: “What’s in a 

Name?: How to Fight Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2002 (based on a London lecture given October 30, 2001), 

available from www.foreignaffairs.com/print/57615.

183. See Kamolnick, Delegitimizing Al-Qaeda; Paul Kamolnick, 

“Al Qaeda’s Sharia Crisis: Sayyid Imam and the Jurisprudence 

of Lawful Military Jihad” (for former Al Qaeda shari’a guide, 

Sayyid Imam’s comprehensive fiqh-based critique of AQ’s doctrine of ‘killing in masse’); and Kamolnick, “The Egyptian Islamic 

Group’s Critique of Al Qaeda’s Interpretation of Jihad.” 
156

184. Ibid.

185. For an examination of several key moral objections to terrorism, particularly its parasitic nature as a form of moral freeriding, see Paul Kamolnick, “Defending Liberal Democracy in an 

Age of Terror,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 2012, Vol. 24, esp. 

pp. 148-157.

186. Amaney A. Jamal, “It’s Not Who We Are, It’s What We 

Do,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92, No. 5, September/October 2013, 

pp. 152-154.

187. Ibid. p. 154.

188. See especially Harry R. Yarger, Strategic Theory for the 

21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 2006, 

available from www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil; H. Richard 

Yarger, “Toward a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the U.S. 

Army War College Strategy Model,” J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., 

ed., U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Vol. 

I: Theory of War and Strategy, 5th Ed., Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 2012, pp. 45-51; Appendix I, “Guidelines for Strategy Formulation,” pp. 413-418, J. 

Boone Bartholomees, Jr., ed., U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Vol. II: National Security Policy and Strategy, 

5th Ed., Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 

College, June 2012; Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., “Chap. 13: Toward an 

Understanding of Military Strategy,” J. R. Cerami and J. F. Holcomb, Jr., eds., U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy, Carlisle, 

PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 

2001. pp. 179-185.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Author

Dr. Paul Kamolnick

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil