www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 283 1 

Nearly 3 years since the start of the Syrian civil war, no clear winner 

is in sight. Assassinations and defections of civilian and military 

loyalists close to President Bashar al-Asad, rebel success in parts 

of Aleppo and other key towns, and the spread of violence to Damascus itself suggest that the regime is losing ground to its opposition. The tenacity of 

government forces in retaking territory lost to rebel factions, such as the key 

town of Qusayr, and attacks on Turkish and Lebanese military targets indicate, however, that the regime can win because of superior military equipment, 

especially airpower and missiles, and help from Iran and Hizballah. No one is 

prepared to confidently predict when the regime will collapse or if its opponents can win. At this point several assessments seem clear:

◆ The Syrian opposition will continue to reject any compromise that 

keeps Asad in power and imposes a transitional government that includes 

loyalists of the current Baathist regime. While a compromise could ensure 

continuity of government and a degree of institutional stability, it will almost certainly lead to protracted unrest and reprisals, especially if regime 

appointees and loyalists remain in control of the police and internal security 

services.

◆ How Asad goes matters. He could be removed by coup, assassination, or an arranged exile. Whether by external or internal means, building 

a compromise transitional government after Asad will be complicated by 

three factors: disarray in the Syrian opposition, disagreement among United 

Nations (UN) Security Council members, and an intransigent sitting government. Asad was quick to accept Russia’s proposal on securing chemical 

weapons but may not be so accommodating should Russia or Iran propose 

his removal.

Next Steps in Syria

by Judith S. Yaphe

Strategic Forum

National Defense University

About the Author

Dr. Judith S. Yaphe is a Distinguished 

Research Fellow in the Center for 

Strategic Research, Institute for 

National Strategic Studies, at the 

National Defense University.

Key Points

◆ Syria has been in a state of sectarian civil war since early 2011. The 

conflict has spread to its neighbors in Iraq and Lebanon and, if 

left unchecked, could destabilize 

Turkey, Jordan, and a much wider 

swath of the Middle East region.

◆ Regardless of whether President 

Bashar al-Asad survives or fails, 

resolution of the civil war poses 

especially difficult problems for 

U.S. strategic planning at a time 

when the Obama administration 

is trying to focus on the pivot 

to Asia rather than the constant 

crises in the Middle East.

◆ The Syrian crisis risks redefining 

the traditional balance of power 

in the region as well as relations 

between the United States, regional friends, and Russia. Russia’s 

proposal that Syria cooperate 

with United Nations restrictions 

on its chemical weapons and the 

unease expressed by Iran’s new 

president over Syria’s possible use 

of chemical weapons have raised 

speculation that the Syrian crisis 

could be resolved without U.S. 

military intervention.

December 2013

Center for Strate

gic R

eSEARCH
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◆ U.S. ambivalence has neither helped to shore up 

opposition to the Asad regime nor quelled the violence. 

While most observers acknowledge the complexity of 

the situation on the ground, Syria’s civil war is spreading sectarian and ethnic fighting and instability to its 

neighbors. Religious and ethnic extremists are attacking 

each other as well as regime targets. Sunni and Shia extremists may be few in number, but they are able to draw 

on financial support from similarly minded individuals 

in Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and the Persian Gulf, 

according to a Council on Foreign Relations study and 

interviews with regional experts.1

 Kurdish nationalists in 

Syria and Iraq focus more on anti-Turkish operations, 

which the Asad regime encourages. Extremists could 

grow in size and strength as the violence continues or if 

the United States intervenes. Fighting Asad or foreign 

military intervention will draw attention and give them 

legitimacy, whether religious or ethnic based.

It Matters How Asad Is Removed

How regime change occurs in Syria is as important as what replaces the current regime. Asad could be 

removed by civil war or assassination, by a military or 

party coup, or by an arrangement brokered by foreign 

powers in consultation with regional partners and with 

the Syrian regime and/or opposition factions. Most 

Syrians and Syria watchers expect there will be a degree 

of continuity in which elements of the regime play a 

role in whatever replaces the current government. This 

consensus on continuity reflects in part an important 

lesson learned from the inability of the Shia-dominated government in Iraq to win national backing and the 

highly diverse population in Syria, where Alawi, Kurds, 

Christians, and other minorities all seek parity with the 

Sunni Arab majority.

The Yemen Option: A Negotiated Exit. Similar to 

the plan negotiated by the Gulf Cooperation Council 

(GCC) that removed Ali Abdallah Salih in Yemen, Russia and Iran would negotiate an amnesty and safe exit 

for Asad and his immediate family. Officials of the old 

regime would assume a prominent role in the transitional 

government, which would be led by a “credible” regime 

figure with limited authority.

This option has several flaws. First, Russia claims to 

be interested in an international conference to include 

pro- and anti-regime factions, but it also continues to insist that an externally imposed solution is unacceptable. 

Moscow at one point hinted that it could support Syria 

rather than Asad, a significant shift, but it is unclear if 

Vladimir Putin’s Syria strategy assumes Asad remains in 

power. It is also not clear that Russia could deliver Asad 

should the international community agree on a negotiated outcome that does not include him. It does seem 

certain, however, that the Syrian opposition would not 

accommodate a solution that includes amnesty for Asad 

and inclusion of Baathist loyalists in the new government. Asad’s opponents may lack unity and clarity of 

purpose, but they do agree on two points: rejection of 

any compromise with the old regime and exclusion of 

Baathist loyalists in a transitional authority.

Finally, it is unlikely that Syria’s neighbors most 

invested in the country’s transition—particularly Turkey and Saudi Arabia—would accept a narrow Yemenstyle transition. These countries support the opposition 

because they prefer a broader strategic realignment that 

replaces a pro-Iran Shia or Alawite regime with a Sunni 

majority government that looks to Ankara or Riyadh 

for partnership. The Yemen solution removed Salih but 

left his family in power and granted him immunity. It 

was a bargain made by and for elites—not the people. 

The Syrian opposition is less likely to accept half-measures negotiated by a few Syrian elites and their international backers.

The Egypt Option: Removal by Coup. This option 

assumes there is a point at which key insiders decide 

that the leader’s survival is more of a liability than an 

asset, the examples being the Egyptian army’s removal 

of President Hosni Mubarak and his successor Mohammed Morsi. In a Syrian version of this scenario, 

senior leaders remain in power and Russia and Iran 

quickly assert their influence through them to restrict 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 283 3 

the scope of change. They calculate that the higher the 

level of continuity from the old regime to a transitional 

authority, the greater the chance that they will remain 

influential. A coup, however, may produce less continuity and greater change than anticipated. Asad’s successor will be under pressure from many sides to respond 

to broader opposition concerns and to begin a process 

of internal negotiation to end the crisis. He will also 

have to consolidate his base of support and establish his 

party’s legitimacy, which could mean opening opportunities for some actors, including pro-U.S. or Syrian 

opposition supporters, and closing them for others.

The Lebanon Option: Ongoing Proxy War for Sectarian Solidarity. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and other Gulf states 

are providing money and arms to the Syrian opposition 

to fight Asad and Iranian-backed elements. This kind of 

involvement is a high-stakes gamble for the six GCC 

countries, which usually shun direct military engagement. They also tend to prefer the stability of a government dominated by a single strong-man military figure 

rather than the uncertainty of a democratically shaped 

Islamist government, which may not share their religious or political values. Nonetheless, support for one set 

of strategies has never prohibited these countries from 

switching tactics when their strategy fails to work. The 

sectarian nature of the conflict and the proxy war that 

characterizes Saudi and Iranian competition in Syria will 

ultimately perpetuate a long-term low-intensity conflict 

as Syrians compete for political power and foreign support along sectarian and ethnic lines similar to those that 

divide Lebanon.

Iraq since 2003 offers us grim images of what could 

go wrong in Syria if and when the government collapses. 

Disbanding the entire Baathist infrastructure and the 

military could have dire consequences in reestablishing 

a semblance of security and stability under a transitional 

government. Iran’s ability to stir up local unrest using surrogate militias and other assets in Iraq should serve as a 

warning of what it could do in Syria if Asad’s regime falls. 

Syria may not be Iraq, but a post-Asad Syria will not receive the same kind of intense scrutiny as post-Saddam 

Iraq did under American occupation. No matter how 

Asad departs, a key question remains: who or what will 

protect Syrian citizens, especially its ethnic and religious 

minorities, once the state’s institutions collapse?

What Do the Neighbors Want?

Syria’s neighbors—Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, and Saudi 

Arabia as well as Iran—all see risk in what is happening 

in Syria whether the Asad regime survives or falls. The 

nature of the risk runs from the spillover effect of military confrontation, refugee flows, and expanded sectarian 

warfare to loss of leverage over key domestic and regional 

security interests.

Iran: Preserving Influence, Fighting Isolation.

The Asad regime’s survival has been a top national 

security priority for Iran. Syria has been the Islamic 

Republic’s strongest regional ally since the 1979 Iranian revolution. Tehran has provided Damascus with 

weapons, money, logistics support, and strategic advice 

on dealing with domestic opponents while stonewalling international critics. Syria is important to Iran for 

geostrategic reasons: it is a key Arab and Muslim ally 

in a region that rejects non-Arab and non-Sunni influence; it provides Iran with a platform to support 

Hizballah, Palestinian extremists, and disaffected 

Lebanese Christians; and it enables Iran to challenge 

Israel as a frontline state and disrupt efforts at IsraeliArab rapprochement. Under former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, support for the embattled Asad 

and his Alawite-dominated regime was also a symbol 

of national pride and revolutionary Islamic leadership 

in the face of American and Western interests.

Iran’s leaders have preferred the civil war as an acceptable risk to full-scale regime change in Damascus. 

Some Iran scholars believe that Tehran will use every asset in its arsenal to save Asad, including support for him 

against foreign military intervention.2

 Press sources document the presence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 

Corps (IRGC) from the Quds Force fighting with Syrian and Hizballah forces in northern and western Syria.3

Other experts believe Iran’s leaders are more pragmatic; 
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they could accept an alternative to Asad and may even 

be willing to accede to a transitional government should 

he be removed by coup, a negotiated settlement, or even 

outside intervention.4

 Iran would insist on an interim 

government that included Alawite and other elements 

friendly to Iran and recognition of Tehran as participants 

in any post-Asad negotiations. It would also insist that 

change in regime not include fundamental changes in 

Syria’s security and military forces, with which Iran is 

closely linked.

Enter President Hasan Ruhani. He has made clear 

Iranians’ distaste for Asad’s repression of his people, especially his use of chemical weapons, and hinted that the 

Syrian leader may not be an essential element of Iran’s 

Syrian strategy.5

 In a speech in mid-September to commanders of the IRGC, Ruhani welcomed a possible deal 

between Washington and Moscow to reduce Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile and warned the IRGC, with units 

fighting openly in Syria, not to get involved in politics.6

Iran does not want to see a Saudi “victory” in Syria 

or elsewhere in the region, but efforts to improve relations with the Arab states have failed. Egypt under the 

military transitional authorities and Morsi have been unwilling to improve ties, open the Suez Canal to permit 

passage by Iranian warships, or allow Iran access to Gaza. 

Iran has also tried to expand its ties to political allies in 

Lebanon, offering reconstruction and development assistance as well as military aid to Christian and Sunni 

communities.

The consequences for Iran should Asad’s regime 

fall will be significant externally and unpredictable. 

Iran’s standing in the Arab world had already been undermined by its denial of the Arab Spring’s Arab and 

secular origins. The Islamic Republic could become more 

isolated and less able to intimidate its neighbors. It will 

be more difficult to transfer money and weapons to Hizballah or retaliate against Israel. Iranian leaders before 

Ruhani’s election were also worried that their increasingly unpopular support for Asad could rekindle domestic support for the Green Revolution protest movement 

of 2009. Foreign military intervention in Syria, however, 

could also create opportunities for Iran to minimize its 

losses and even expand its regional influence.

Iraq: Managing the Syrian Crisis. The conflict in 

Syria presents a major dilemma for Iraq based on inextricably linked sociopolitical, tribal, ethnic, religious, and 

security-based ties. Many Iraqis have family, clan, and 

tribal connections in Syria overlaid with longstanding religious, trade, and smuggling interests. After the collapse 

of Saddam’s regime, Syrian authorities allegedly facilitated the transit of armed Sunni Islamist extremists, including al Qaeda operatives and renegade Iraqi Baathists, 

across the border to fuel instability in Iraq.7

 Press sources 

indicate that this “rat-line” has been reversed as the civil 

war in Syria expands, with al Qaeda in Mesopotamia and 

militia elements loyal to Iran, Muqtada al-Sadr, or Sunni 

tribal leaders now sending arms and fighters into Syria to 

fight for the Asad regime or against it.8

These linkages complicate Baghdad’s policy on 

Syria and Asad. Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, who 

spent long years of exile in Iran and Syria, has voiced 

support for Asad, advised him to accept political reforms 

to end the crisis, and offered to mediate between Asad 

and his opponents. In a press interview in late February, 

he warned that a victory for rebels in the Syrian civil war 

would create a new extremist haven and destabilize the 

wider Middle East, sparking sectarian wars in his own 

country and in Lebanon. Maliki stated:

If the world does not agree to support a peaceful 

solution through dialogue . . . then I see no light at 

the end of the tunnel. Neither the opposition nor the 

regime can finish each other off. The most dangerous 

thing in this process is that if the opposition is 

victorious, there will be a civil war in Lebanon, 

divisions in Jordan and a sectarian war in Iraq.9

The issue for most Iraqis is national interest, not 

sectarian identity. Maliki and most Iraqis see themselves as Iraqis and Arabs first. They criticize the Asad 

regime’s brutality, Baathist origins, and lack of accountability. Their greater worry, however, is that Asad could 

be replaced by a Muslim Brotherhood–dominated gov-
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 283 5 

ernment encouraged by Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar and eager to destabilize neighborhood regimes that 

are Sunni or insufficiently Shia.

Iraq remains too divided by sectarian politics and 

weakened by its own security challenges to fend off Iranian pressure to support its Syrian client. Over time, 

however, this calculation may change. Maliki will need 

to weigh carefully the costs of supporting Iran in Syria 

against the costs to Iraqi security should Asad’s regime 

fail. Iran will place a much higher value on a compliant 

government in Baghdad if Asad falls and Iraq becomes 

Iran’s new strategic depth against the United States, Israel, and Western influence in the Middle East. This could 

have serious security and economic consequences as 

Baghdad struggles to assert greater power under a centralized government, expand oil production and exports, 

and strengthen its military capabilities.

Sectarianism as a Unif ier and Divider. The Arab 

Spring permitted long-suppressed grievances among 

religious and ethnic groups to come to light. Sunni 

and Shia, Muslim and Christian, religious and secular, Arab and Kurd were all initially part of the new 

discourse in Cairo’s Tahrir Square and in Baghdad. 

Muslim Brotherhood parties and more extremist 

Salafi elements soon replaced the secular-minded 

moderates of the Arab Spring in Egypt, Tunisia, and 

Libya and began to play a significant role in the opposition to Asad. The initial political success of President Morsi, the Brotherhood, and more radical Salafi 

elements in Egypt warned Syria’s Arab neighbors of 

what Syria without Asad could become. Morsi appointed Brotherhood members to senior government 

posts, supported a constitution reflecting the Brotherhood’s agenda, and asserted his control over parliament and the supreme court. For many Egyptians, he 

clearly favored sectarian values and interests over a 

nationalist or democratic model. Would he insist on 

rigid enforcement of shariah law? Would he protect 

the rights of all citizens, including minorities? Would 

his party concede power if it lost the next election? 

Morsi was soon under siege from the military, which 

he had purged after his election, and from Salafis, who 

warned that harder-line, anti-democratic elements 

would come to power. The military’s removal of Morsi 

was a dangerous moment in Egyptian politics, but it 

was also a warning to the neighborhood of the future 

under sectarian rule.

Most experts familiar with Arab political history 

and popular culture discount the idea of a resurgent panArab or pan-Sunni nationalism linking Muslim Brotherhood or other Salafi parties that have come to power 

or have a significant presence in Turkey, Syria, Egypt, 

Jordan, and the Maghreb. They note the differences in 

national identity, interests, culture, religious custom, and 

ambivalence regarding total Islamist control of state institutions and political culture. But the issue lies as well 

with foreign intervention. Much of the responsibility or 

blame for the Islamist parties’ success in Egypt and Syria 

is credited to Saudi Arabia and Qatar, who sheltered 

Brotherhood members during their long years of exile 

from Syria and Egypt. Responsibility for their lack of 

cooperation is also placed with Riyadh and Doha. Brotherhood and Salafi loyalists have long been at odds, with 

Qatar backing Brotherhood affiliates and the Saudis favoring more extremist Salafi groups. Iran as a Shia state 

is seen as sectarian, encouraging Shia communities in 

Arab Gulf states to demand a share of power and threatening their Arab rulers for denying it.

GCC Support Is a Mixed Blessing. Saudi Arabia and 

the smaller GCC states are autocracies whose political, 

social, and foreign policy behavior is shaped by traditional conservative tribal and religious values. Their reaction to the Arab Spring and the conflict in Syria reflects 

these interests and values. They worry that Islamists in 

Syria will encourage domestic critics to demand greater 

political participation and social change. The GCC states 

find their best defense in their oil wealth and the ability 

it gives them to buy off unhappy citizens with promises 

of more jobs, higher wages, better housing, and subsidies whether they are needed or not. Their wealth, along 

with citizen acceptance of a benevolent autocracy, allows 

the ruling families to ignore demands for accountability, 
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greater popular participation in governance, and a more 

open economy.

The GCC has no uniform political or security policies and foreign relations are tailored mostly to statespecific interests rather than GCC concerns. They do, 

however, share a common threat perception: all feel 

threatened by the Shia political takeover in Iraq, the civil 

war in Syria, and Iran’s looming shadow as a militant state 

whose aggressive regional stance includes using sectarian 

polarization to spark domestic unrest in their countries. 

The Gulf states actively confront Iranian interests in the 

region through careful monitoring of Iranian activities 

(especially those centered on recruitment efforts and operational planning), security cooperation, and the specter 

of sectarianism, which is intended to rally popular support and paint opponents and critics as disloyal.

Gulf aid in Syria has gone to a number of factions 

fighting the Asad regime. There is no set standard for 

how the GCC states choose whom to support and whom 

to ignore in the conflict. They probably know little about 

their clients or their reliability. It is not enough to be 

a pious Muslim and loyal to conservative Sunni principles. GCC support for proxies to challenge Iran’s allies 

in Syria has proved difficult to confine to those who are 

trustworthy as proxies or who follow a patron’s policies.

The GCC monarchies are playing a complex game 

in which their influence and ultimate survival are at 

stake. Yet in all of them few people outside the ruling 

families and dominant sect are in charge of decisionmaking on foreign or security policy, and any radical 

reorientation of policy or institutions that could affect 

family interests is not to be tolerated. During the events 

marking the Arab Spring, all of the GCC countries experienced some degree of unrest, and Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) deployed 

GCC military units to Bahrain to “protect infrastructure” and prevent any threat to destabilize the government. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE provided direct military support against the Qadhafi regime and 

urged North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

forces to remove him.

The red line for the GCC states is unrest on the 

Peninsula itself, in Bahrain or Yemen, but not civil war in 

Syria. GCC leaders blame Iran for all the unrest in the 

Gulf, including Bahrain, and they pledge money to many 

states to keep them “secure.” Their funding of the proxy 

war with Iran in Syria does not increase the likelihood 

of military conflict between Sunni Arab states and Iran. 

They were quick to congratulate Ruhani on his election 

to the Iranian presidency in June and to recognize and 

reward the Egyptian military’s removal of Morsi and the 

Brotherhood from public office.

What Do Russia and China Want?

When the Syrian crisis began, U.S. and European 

policymakers assumed that armed intervention would 

lead to fragmentation and civil war. Moscow argued 

this as well. Its support has been critical in helping Asad 

hang onto power and many now assume that the longer 

the Asad regime holds on, the more likely it is that he 

will survive. What does Russia want? Moscow might be 

satisfied with a negotiated outcome that would include 

it, Iran, and possibly China in talks similar to those held 

in Bonn that produced the Karzai government in Afghanistan. Some even see this as a way to resolve broader 

issues, including drawing Iran into a process that could 

then be linked to progress on nuclear issues. It is doubtful that this “Grand Bazaar”–style approach could resolve Syria’s woes quickly or satisfactorily, nor is it likely 

to convince Moscow or Beijing to come to the table. 

The Russians would like to delay a resolution in Syria to 

maintain as much continuity as possible between old and 

new governments and to preserve Russian interests and 

influence. Moscow wants to remain Syria’s great power 

ally, but a prolonged proxy war could divide the country 

and limit Russia’s overall influence there.

Similarly, China opposes foreign military intervention in principle but is not likely to do anything to prevent it. China has little economic or strategic interest in 

Syria. It opposes the use of military force and a declaration of no-fly zones and safe havens for rebels as happened in Libya. China will back Russia in expectation 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 283 7 

that Russia will support it on matters that are important 

to China.

The question of whose interests must be satisfied or 

sacrificed is a primary one. Is it important to offer Russia, 

China, and Iran inclusion in the process of determining 

the post-Asad transition? What is the price to be paid 

for offering them inclusion? Would Syrians, the Gulf 

Arabs, and Turkey find this kind of bargain acceptable 

or useful? The cost to U.S. interests could prove too high 

for a bargain that could not be kept. Finally, what happens if the timetable on the ground in Syria outpaces the 

slowness of the international negotiating process? Time 

may not be on the side of international mediation or engagement. As the crisis continues, Russia could become 

increasingly irrelevant. It could use its veto in the UN, 

but events on the ground and not in New York will determine what happens in Syria.

What Could Go Wrong?

What could change these assumptions? What are 

we missing? Several questions need to be addressed.

Do Tribes Matter? Tribes—membership in them, 

loyalty to them—define political identity and reality in 

many areas of the Middle East. States observe the geographic boundaries laid out nearly 100 years ago, but several large tribal confederations include constituent parts 

living and trading in countries that are occasionally antagonistic.10 These tribes have complex ties to influential 

families and political leaders that cross borders and histories. According to press reports and interviews with Iraqi 

political leaders, Sunni Arab tribes of western Iraq support 

the Syrian uprising in hopes of ending Iranian influence 

in Syria and Iraq, returning Syria to Sunni leadership and 

boosting their leverage with Baghdad. Others may be assisting the Asad regime in return for favors from Damascus during the Iraqi surge of 2005–2007.

Tribal constituencies are essential for Asad as well, 

especially those in eastern Syria and areas south of Damascus. They may be as much as 20 percent of Syria’s population; they are armed (guns, not tanks), have loyal followers, and are situated in the heart of Syria’s hydrocarbon 

infrastructure. Syria’s tribes are governed by a consultative 

and hierarchical process, but once a decision is made, it is 

definitive. Both Saddam and the Asads gave the tribes autonomy in exchange for support, but Bashar al-Asad does 

not have as substantial a tribal presence as his father had. 

Military intelligence monitors the tribes but may not be 

able to contain them. Their influence in Syria and Iraq and 

the flow of arms to them will probably grow as security 

conditions worsen and government control weakens.

Does the Baath Party or Another Political Ideology 

Matter? Probably not. Neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia is 

thinking in strictly ideological or sectarian terms. For the 

Saudis and other Gulf Arabs, stability takes precedence 

over democracy as a desirable endstate. They offered 

Egypt’s military financial assistance soon after Mubarak 

and Morsi were removed by the military in hopes that 

authoritarian rule would secure the stability that eluded 

political parties, even Islamist ones. Iran under Ahmadinejad wanted to deny victory in Syria to the Saudis and 

their U.S. backers. Ruhani, however, has put a high priority on rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, 

which could be impeded by Iran’s current policy on Syria.

What Do the Kurds Want? Kurds in Turkey, Syria, and 

Iran watched enviously as Iraq’s Kurds made significant 

gains in getting external protection and ultimately acquiring status as a self-governing province within the new 

Iraqi state. Kurdish unity is a powerful rallying cry, but 

the Kurds of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria speak different 

dialects, follow different leaders, and often set opposing 

priorities for themselves and other Kurdish factions.

Syrian Kurds belong primarily to either the Kurdish 

National Council (KNC) or the Democratic Union Party 

(Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, or PYD), a branch of the antiTurkish Kurdish Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, or PKK) that is based in northern Iraq and operates 

primarily against Turkish targets. More than one-third of 

the PKK is Syrian Kurdish. Few Syrian Kurds have joined 

the Arab opposition to Asad, although a Syrian Kurd was 

named president of the exile Syrian National Council in 

2012 in an effort by the predominantly Arab Sunni opposition to more actively include them. The Kurds give 
8 SF No. 283 www.ndu.edu/inss

many reasons for ignoring anti-Asad movements. They 

reject political groups that are by definition Arab and they 

distrust the Muslim Brotherhood, which dominates the 

opposition movement, for its Turkish links. The PYD/

PKK uses the Asad regime to sustain its radical Kurdish 

nationalist agenda and anti-Turkish operations. The Asad 

government, in turn, encourages—and arms—several 

Kurdish extremist factions to destabilize Turkey and undermine the Syrian opposition.

Syrian Kurdish political demands can be seen on a 

spectrum from assimilation into a new Syrian state to 

self-rule or outright independence. The KNC has said it 

is interested in federalism and political decentralization, 

which suggests an autonomous Kurdish government to 

apply wherever a Kurd is. More inclusively, this would 

suggest the confessional style of politics in Lebanon, but 

hardline Kurdish independents may seek the ethnogeographic division of Iraq. Regardless, Syria’s Kurds seem 

unwilling or unable to articulate how their vision for a 

new state would work in practice. They will probably 

reject any post-Asad settlement or transitional government in which Turkey has been involved, but they have 

few alternatives. Encouraged by Ankara, Iraq’s Kurdish 

leader Masud Barzani has tried to woo Syria’s Kurds into 

cooperation, but he has had little success in part because 

of his ties to Turkey and in part because of his own ambitions to gamble for an independent Kurdish state.

Syria’s Kurds are unlikely to play a significant role in 

ending or rescuing Asad’s regime, but they are armed and 

dangerous and could pose a major challenge to a postAsad government. Whatever their ambitions or hopes, 

Turkey will oppose any moves by Syria’s Kurds to acquire 

any form of self-rule. Syrian Kurdish factions signed an 

accord in 2012 at the encouragement of Iraqi Kurdish 

leaders to unify as a means of better attaining Kurdish 

autonomy in Syria. Despite that, it is unlikely that the 

PKK/PYD will take orders from Barzani or the KNC. 

Internal power struggles within Syrian Kurdish groups 

are likely to continue within Syria’s political vacuum.

Should We Worry about Hizballah or al Qaeda? Hizballah is directly involved in military operations inside 

Syria in defense of the Asad regime according to press 

accounts and its leader Hassan Nasrallah.11 Hizballah 

shifted from a low-profile, high-deniability strategy to 

high-profile engagement when the Syrian military was 

unable to hold off rebel advances. Nasrallah’s statement 

acknowledged for the first time that the organization’s 

military wing was fighting on behalf of Asad in Syria. In 

a virtual declaration of war on al Qaeda and other Sunni 

extremist factions, Nasrallah warned, “If Syria falls, the 

Palestinian cause will be lost,” and, he predicted, Israel 

then will enter Lebanon.

Hizballah is a critical component of Iran’s deterrent posture. Preserving Asad is extremely important, 

but without assistance from Tehran and Moscow, Hizballah probably can do little more to protect him. The 

costs would be high and their resources are limited. 

Some experts believe that threats of attack from Israel 

keep Hizballah from trying to remove advanced weapons or technology from Syria, but no one interviewed 

would guess the level of fear required to keep Hizballah 

from smuggling weapons into or out of Syria or the 

degree of its loyalty to Iran should it be ordered to do 

so. One military expert said Hizballah’s leaders view 

the possession of chemical weapons more as a hazard 

or burden than an asset. He believes Iran would have 

to direct them to get involved with nonconventional 

weapons. If Hizballah were to do so and if Israel were 

to retaliate, then the expert warned, the violence would 

be hard to contain. “The Syrian crisis,” he stated, “would 

almost be an afterthought.”

Sunni extremist factions, such as al Qaeda, are a 

small part of the Syrian opposition movement. They 

operate from bases in Lebanon and Iraq with fighters 

and weapons crossing into Syria and Syria launching 

retaliatory attacks on their sites in Lebanon. Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia was once encouraged by Asad to 

cross into Iraq to launch attacks aimed at destabilizing 

the country after the collapse of Saddam’s government; 

now it is re-entering Syria to attack government targets. Leaders of the Syrian extremist Jabhat al-Nusra 

and the Iraqi-based al Qaeda announced earlier this 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 283 9 

year that they would unite efforts, but al Qaeda leader 

Shaykh Zawahiri and al-Nusra denied this. Al Qaeda 

and Jabhat al-Nusra’s presence remains relatively small 

and they must compete with other factions for resources. This could change if violence escalates, if al Qaeda 

leaders in Iraq or Yemen see an opportunity to establish 

a base in ungoverned space in Syria, or if foreign forces 

intervene in Syria.

Does Asad Have an Exit Strategy? Bashar al-Asad is 

described as moody, unpredictable, irrational, and Janusfaced. One scholar stated, “He will say one thing in the 

morning and another in the afternoon.” Asad himself 

said in his interview with PBS’s Charlie Rose that casualties, referring to 100,000 dead in the civil war, are 

irrelevant in a war that is total. Some believe the breakup 

of Syria is inevitable and that Asad and Alawi allies will 

eventually retreat to the Syrian coast, possibly to Latakia, 

an area dominated by Alawis between the coast and the 

Bekaa Valley in Lebanon.

Similarly, little is known about the probable fate of 

Alawis and other prominent Syrians supporting Asad 

should he retreat or be removed. The Alawite minority 

comprises about 10 percent of the country and is the 

heart of Asad’s support base. They govern the provinces 

and control his military-security services. Many are politically radicalized, extremely loyal, and have access to 

Syria’s nonconventional weapons systems. They are also 

probably worried about their fate should the Asad regime fall and a Sunni-dominated government take over. 

Some Alawis might hope for amnesty under a successor 

regime, but many probably would suspect this as a ploy 

and join the Shabiha elements used by the regime in 

local battles to initiate a bloody post-Asad insurgency.

What if a desperate Asad, looking for a way to retaliate or divert attention away from his internal woes, 

attacks Israel or Jordan as a last gasp? What if Asad decides to attack refugee safe havens in Jordan, Lebanon, or 

Turkey? Are Palestinians in Jordan and Syria tools that 

Asad could use to threaten Israel and Jordan? No one 

knows at what point the Syrian leader may feel the need 

to resort to extreme measures, but his strategy is survival. 

He does not appear to have an exit strategy other than 

winning through military confrontation.

Conclusion and Recommendations

An expert on Syria described the country as “the 

most begrudging society in the Middle East. It is not 

like any of its neighbors, with the possible exception of 

Iraq. It is a minority regime in a country of minorities.” 

Solutions that recall Syria’s colonial era or an elite-level 

deal with foreign powers, which allows the Asad regime 

a role in a transitional authority, probably would not last, 

he concluded: “Even if you break off a chunk of the regime, you need the people to agree to it or else they will 

not leave the street. If we have a negotiated exit, who 

steps in? It’s nothing like Yemen; you can’t get around the 

sectarian nature of the regime.”

It is difficult to conclude from a few interviews and 

assessments that a simple, straight-forward negotiated 

settlement of Syria’s political crisis is possible in the 

short term. Nor is there much evidence to suggest that 

Syria’s diverse ethnic and religious communities will be 

able to resolve their differences and successfully manage a 

post-Asad transitional government. As military confrontations continue, many of these communities are growing increasingly isolated and desperate. Collapse of the 

regime could magnify the risk of retaliation and blood 

feuds, tribal warfare, and, as in Iraq, insurgencies fueled 

by religious or ethnic extremists who are well-armed and 

ill-disciplined.

Nevertheless, a possible solution may lie in a settlement negotiated and monitored by an international consortium under UN or Arab League monitors that establishes a ruling coalition. This ruling coalition could include 

bureaucrats and technocrats from the Baathist regime, 

members of the exiled Syrian opposition movement, and 

most significantly a cross-section of prominent Syrian civilian and military leaders willing to work together in a 

transitional administration. This may preserve institutional integrity and a functional national command authority, 

but the prospect of a peaceful transition along these lines 

is doubtful. Like Russia and Iraq after revolution, exiles are 
10 SF No. 283 www.ndu.edu/inss

unlikely to be welcomed back to run the country. Moreover, the opposition groups thus far appear incapable of 

overcoming individual differences and internecine rivalries 

to establish a unified position. This bodes poorly for their 

ability to govern the country. Iraq’s post-Saddam governments survived to a great extent because of the American 

occupation, but even Americans’ obsession with the rule 

of law and proportional representation could not prevent 

the rise of militias and insurgency. There seems to be even 

less international consensus on or in Syria than there was 

in Iraq. Syria’s neighbors are looking to the United States 

and the other NATO countries to lead in removing Asad, 

but no one appears to have the will or courage to assume 

responsibility.

A Syrian expert who worked on The Day After Asad 

Project for the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) 

believes the regime is a broader group than just the Asad 

family and that institutional frameworks, such as the security apparatus, the military, the justice sector, and police forces will survive the removal of the regime. A key 

challenge will be figuring out what elements of the regime could play a productive role. For other Syria watchers, the key is not the institutional framework but its 

control by the same elements that ran it under Asad and 

are complicit in his regime’s repressive measures. Syria 

has long been governed most intimately by multiple 

branches of the security services, which report directly 

to the Asad family and are complicit in the regime’s actions. Should these elements remain, large swaths of Syrian society may reject the entire government, extending 

the country’s instability into the postconflict rebuilding 

process. Will lessons from Iraq or the recommendations 

from the USIP study be sufficient to prevent civil war or 

ethnic cleansing by armed Syrian militias? Probably not.

What to do about Syria is an especially difficult issue 

for the United States at a time when U.S. forces are withdrawing from the region and the Obama administration is 

looking to pivot attention toward Asia. President Obama’s 

recent pledge of military aid may be sufficient to create a 

pause in the fighting while both sides reassess their ability 

to continue the war or seek a cease-fire, but it is not likely 

to resolve the basic conflict or bring peace. It is unlikely to 

weaken either side’s resolve to change the regime or save 

it. Most experts interviewed believed that “these things inside Syria are going to happen regardless, but if we continue 

doing nothing, many trends will continue to get worse.” If 

Asad leaves power or stays in a nominal role, a large part of 

society will remain close to his regime, especially among the 

Alawite community, whose members fear Sunni retribution. 

Their fight for survival will continue, one scholar observed: 

“After forty years of ruling the country, the Alawites will not 

be content with walking away. It will be messy.”

The U.S. delay in delivering military aid to the Syrian opposition has probably cost it some leverage in the 

region, especially with governments seeing Asad’s survival 

as a direct threat to their security. Countries with Muslim Brotherhood members in positions of influence need 

foreign aid and trade to survive, but their willingness to 

accept American support or loans from international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund or 

World Bank will be tempered by their need to show independence of great powers and refusal to accede to reforms 

or end subsidies often required by foreign borrowing. They 

will watch the situation in Egypt most closely to see if 

the Brotherhood can regain power despite efforts to break 

it,12 if the military turns power over to civilian authority 

and allows free and fair elections, and if the United States 

and wealthy Arab donors continue to back the military 

and exert influence on political succession. Whatever happens in Egypt and Syria, the United States will be held 

responsible. Our victory in Iraq did not ensure a compliant succession or a smooth transition to democratic rule 

or national reconciliation, both necessary if there is to be 

hope for an end to sectarian war.

The options for the end of Asad laid out in the beginning of this paper remain the most likely ones. A 

negotiated exit and settlement may be the most preferable option for the United States and the international 

community, but the most likely one is some version of 

the Arab option: a prolonged civil war, whether by proxy 

or not, fought on sectarian and/or ethnic terms with the 

patron/sponsor having little influence over the outcome.
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 283 11 

Despite its announcement of limited engagement in 

Syria in support of the opposition, U.S. policy remains 

unclear and undeclared to many observers. Does America’s new-found concern for containing Syria’s chemical 

weapons and promises of military aid to the opposition 

promise greater engagement if Asad’s forces stabilize 

the battlefront, retake more territory, cross another red 

line, and rout the Free Syrian Army (FSA)? Or is the 

U.S. goal to give the FSA just enough support to level 

the playing field to the point where both sides opt for a 

cease-fire and negotiations? If so, the United States may 

be creating a quagmire in which more, not less, military support and involvement becomes inevitable as the 

fighting spreads further into Lebanon and Iraq and possibly threatens Israel as well.

Several specific recommendations for U.S. engagement are in order:

◆ Be clear on goals. If the goal is a military victory, 

then further support to include advanced equipment 

may become necessary, but the danger will be that the 

United States slips into backing a full-blown war. If the 

goal is to equalize the battlefield and bring both sides to 

negotiations, then the level of military and financial aid 

must be carefully calibrated to maintain a balance. This, 

however, requires cooperation from Asad’s backers, Russia and Iran, and would come at a cost to U.S. interests.

◆ Decide if the benefits of a broader strategy outweigh a purely Syrian strategy. Trading Russian and 

Iranian cooperation on Syria for compromise on nonSyrian issues may not be worth the cost of ending the 

Syrian crisis. Be prepared for this strategy to fail because 

of Syrian resentment of what will be seen as neocolonial intervention in their internal affairs and because the 

Russians lack the influence to deliver the deal.

◆ Promote the Syrian Opposition Coalition13 and its 

military partner, the FSA, and insist they form a government in exile or, if practical, on liberated Syrian territory. 

Syrians may spurn efforts by exiles to return and join the 

transitional government, but they need the talent, money 

and expertise of the exile community. Syrians from inside 

and outside the country need to be seen participating in 

their liberation and implementing transitional justice 

measures to protect civil society and as a way to create a 

watchdog on the other side’s postwar behavior.

◆ Urge the international community to support an 

interim government and monitor domestic compliance 

with international norms of protection to civilians. The 

Arab League, Organization of the Islamic Conference, 

and European Union (EU) should support an armed 

UN peacekeeping mission that would offer assurances 

of protection to all Syrians, including Alawis and minorities, in a post-Asad Syria. This force would protect 

the transitional government and offer amnesty to regime supporters, excluding those responsible for crimes 

against the Syrian people. The benefit for Syrians is no 

retaliation for past crimes, except for crimes against humanity. Terms would include arrest and trial for violators.

◆ Continue humanitarian aid to Syrian refugees. The 

aid could extend to the establishment of safe haven zones 

inside Syria and might require a no-fly, no-drive zone 

similar to the protection afforded the Kurds in northern 

Iraq in 1991. U.S. efforts would be strengthened, but not 

assured, if backed by the UN, Arab League, and EU. The 

risk would be that extended support to Syrian opposition bases inside Syria would be used by the opposition 

to bring more international military forces directly into 

the fighting.

◆ Reach out to Asad’s domestic support base. Fear 

of retribution may outweigh fear of sanctions for Sunni 

Arab, Christian, and other minorities, but the United 

States needs to convince them it is too costly to keep 

siding with Asad. Syrians may be more encouraged to 

defect if the U.S. military were engaged in operations 

and they believed Moscow and Washington were willing 

to guarantee postconflict security.

◆ Make clear U.S. and international intolerance for 

religious and political extremism and terrorism. Also 

make clear that efforts by terrorist organizations such as 

al Qaeda to cross borders to disrupt or destabilize any 

country are unacceptable.
12 SF No. 283 www.ndu.edu/inss

With red lines comes responsibility for monitoring 

and punishing infractions. Great attention and sympathy 

are focused on the fate of innocent civilians, but Asad 

clearly links collateral damage to retribution.14 Syrians 

may be reluctant to break with the regime, but the point 

is to make it more dangerous and costly to support the 

regime than break with it.

The current political turmoil in Turkey and Egypt is 

not likely to have much effect on Asad or the Syrian civil 

war. The election of Hasan Ruhani, a cleric, former diplomat and nuclear negotiator, to the presidency in Iran, 

however, could present an opportunity to change the 

course of the civil war. Tehran’s support for Asad has raised 

questions among Iranians, including some officials, who 

not only see Asad as a dictator but also believe his opponents are “dominated by extremist groups with frightening 

agendas.” He cautions that “Syria is a matter of national 

security and that’s why the president can’t solely manage it. 

It has to be discussed with the supreme leader, the Revolutionary Guards and the National Security Council.”

Notes 1 Jonathan Masters, “Al-Qaeda in Iraq (a.k.a. Islamic State in 

Iraq and Greater Syria,” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, 

October 2013, available at <www.cfr.org/Iraq/al-qaeda-iraq-k-islamic-state-iraq-greater-syria/p14811>.

2 Professor Mohsen Milani (University of South Florida), interview by author, July 2012 and June 2013.

3 See Dexter Filkins, “The Shadow Commander,” The New 

Yorker, September 30, 2013, available at <www.newyorker.com/

reporting/2013/09/30/130930fa_fact_filkins?printable=true&c>; see 

also Farnaz Fassihi, Jay Solomon, and Sam Dagher, “Iranians Dial Up 

Presence in Syria,” The Wall Street Journal, September 15, 2013, A1, 

available at <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788732386

4604579067382861808984.html>.

4 Iranian scholars, interview by author, February and September 

2012.

5 Cited by Deutsche Presse-Agentur, September 16, 2013, but 

not seen in any other press report.

6 Jason Rezaian, “Iranian leader responds to Syria weapons deal,” 

The Washington Post, September 17, 2013, A20; “Stay out of politics, 

Rowhani tells Iran Revolutionary Guards,” Arab News, September 17, 

2013.

7 After a car bombing in Baghdad in 2006, Iraqi Prime Minister 

Nouri al-Maliki claimed Syria had trained al Qaeda and other foreign 

fighters before sending them to Iraq. In 2009, Baghdad and Damascus 

recalled their ambassadors after the government of Iraq accused Syria 

of sheltering Iraqis responsible for bomb attacks. See “Syria and Iraq,” 

GlobalSecurity.org, October 10, 2013, available at <www.globalsecurity.

org/military/world/syria/forrel-iraq.htm>.

8 See Jessica Stern, “Iraq: Where Terrorists Go to School,” 

The New York Times, March 19, 2013, available at <www.nytimes.

com/2013/03/20/opinion/iraq-a-school-for-terrorists>; and Masters.

9 “Iraq Prime Minister warns of Syria Crisis Spillover,” AlJazeera, February 20, 2013, available at <www.aljazeera.com/news/

middleeast/2013/02/201322812730766202.html>. See also Ned 

Parker and Raheem Salman, “Notes from the Underground: The Rise 

of Nouri al-Maliki,” World Policy Journal, Spring 2013.

10 The Shammar, a tribal confederation of several million in 

Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, and Jordan, are primarily Sunni but include 

Shia components as well.

11 Anne Barnard, “In Syrian Victory, Hezbollah Risks Broader 

Fight,” The New York Times, June 6, 2013, A1; Karl Vick, “The Fall 

of al-Qusayr: Capture of Strategic Syrian Town Marks a New 

Phase in the War,” Time.com, June 5, 2013, available at <world.time.

com/2013/06/05/the-fall-of-qusayr-capture-of-strategic-syriantown>.

12 By mid-September, the successor government under General 

al-Sisi had arrested many of the Brotherhood’s and banned the organization. Morsi himself is under arrest and may be tried for crimes 

allegedly stemming from his 2011 imprisonment. Mubarak is under 

house arrest but may be retried.

13 The exact title of the Syrian Opposition Coalition is the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, which 

was created from the Syrian National Coalition.

14 Bashar al-Asad, interview by Charlie Rose, PBS Newshour, September 8, 2013, available at <www.pbs.org/newshour/

rundown/2013/09/Asad-tells-pbs-charlie-rose-syria-prepared-toretaliate-if-hit.html>.

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