UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-1482

JOSEPH KAUFFMAN,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

PARK PLACE HOSPITALITY GROUP, d/b/a Holiday Inn; RIVERVIEW 

HOSPITALITY LLC,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Charleston. Margaret B. Seymour, District 

Judge. (2:09-cv-01399-MBS)

Submitted: February 21, 2012 Decided: March 8, 2012

Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Neil A. Morris, ARCHER & GREINER, P.C., Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania, for Appellant. Amanda Morgan Blundy, J. Bennett 

Crites, III, MCANGUS GOUDELOCK & COURIE, LLC, Charleston, South 

Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Joseph Kauffman appeals the district court’s orders 

granting Appellees’ motion in limine and motion for summary 

judgment on Kauffman’s negligence claim. Kauffman suffered a 

shoulder injury when he fell walking down a ramp at a Holiday 

Inn owned by Riverview Hospitality LLC and managed by Park Place 

Hospitality Group. On appeal, Kauffman argues that the district 

court erred in granting Appellees’ motion to exclude an 

architect’s testimony and in granting Appellees’ motion for 

summary judgment. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

We review de novo a district court’s order granting 

summary judgment, viewing the facts and drawing reasonable 

inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 380 (4th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 398 (2011). Summary judgment 

shall be granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A district court should grant 

summary judgment unless a “reasonable jury could return a 

verdict for the nonmoving party” on the evidence presented. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

Under South Carolina law, “[a] cause of action for 

negligence requires: (1) the existence of a duty on the part of 

the defendant to protect the plaintiff; (2) the failure of the 
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defendant to discharge the duty; [and] (3) injury to the

plaintiff resulting from the defendant’s failure to perform.” 

S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 346 

S.E.2d 324, 325 (S.C. 1986). A property owner has a duty to 

exercise reasonable care for the safety of an invitee, who 

enters the property at the express or implied invitation of the 

owner. Sims v. Giles, 541 S.E.2d 857, 861-63 (S.C. Ct. App. 

2001). Because we conclude that the 1955 International Building 

Code was the code applicable to the Holiday Inn at the time of 

Kauffman’s fall, that code did not require handrail extensions, 

and Kauffman did not show that Appellees otherwise had a duty to 

alter the ramp’s handrail, we hold that the district court did 

not err in finding that Appellees did not breach their duty to 

exercise reasonable care for Kauffman’s safety.

We review a district court’s evidentiary decisions for 

abuse of discretion. United States v. Johnson, 617 F.3d 286, 

292 (4th Cir. 2010). To be qualified as an expert pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Evidence 702, a witness “must have specialized 

knowledge that will assist the trier of fact, and the knowledge, 

skill, experience, training and education that qualifies [him]

on the subject of [his] testimony.” Id. at 294. Expert 

testimony is admissible if it will assist the trier of fact and 

(1) is “based on sufficient facts or data,” (2) is “the product 

of reliable principles and methods,” and (3) the principles and 
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methods have been applied reliably to the facts of the case. 

Fed. R. Evid. 702; see PBM Products, LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co., 

639 F.3d 111, 123 (4th Cir. 2011). “The competency and 

qualifications required of expert witnesses is a matter 

committed to the broad discretion of the trial judge.” Ludlow 

Corp. v. Textile Rubber & Chem. Co., 636 F.2d 1057, 1060 (5th 

Cir. 1981). 

We conclude that Kauffman’s proffered expert did not 

evince specialized knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 

education in the application of the building codes for which 

Kauffman intended to introduce his testimony. Accordingly, we 

hold that the district court did not abuse its broad discretion 

in granting Appellees’ motion in limine.

We therefore affirm the district court’s orders. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED