United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 21-1368

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Protégé Biomedical, LLC

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Duff & Phelps Securities, LLC, and Philip I. Smith

 Defendants - Appellees

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota

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Submitted: October 20, 2021

Filed: April 4, 2022

[Unpublished]

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Before GRUENDER, ERICKSON, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM. 

Sometimes the unexpected happens in corporate deals. When looking for a 

buyer for its business, Protégé Biomedical asked Duff & Phelps Securities for help. 

But rather than looking to complete the deal, the prospective buyer allegedly stole 

some of Protégé’s trade secrets, which led the company to sue Duff & Phelps and 
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one of its employees, Philip Smith, for damages. The district court1 dismissed the 

case, and we affirm.

I. 

Once it received approval from the Food and Drug Administration for one of 

its medical products, Protégé hoped to sell its business. But it needed help finding 

a buyer, so it turned to Duff & Phelps. The terms of the agreement were simple. In 

exchange for trying to find a buyer, Duff & Phelps received immunity from certain 

types of claims, its employees were largely shielded from individual liability, and it 

owed no fiduciary duties to Protégé. And all of these terms, as the parties’ contract 

made clear, were subject to New York law.

Within months, one of Protégé’s competitors, Z-Medica, emerged as a 

potential buyer. Z-Medica’s point person was Doug Schillinger, who sat on the 

company’s board of directors. Smith had Schillinger sign a nondisclosure 

agreement, which Protégé thought would bind Z-Medica too.

Based on that assumption, Protégé participated in a conference call to discuss 

the potential deal with Z-Medica. At the outset of the call, one of Protégé’s coowners mentioned the nondisclosure agreement and explained that it was the reason 

why the parties could speak freely about Protégé’s nonpublic information. 

Unfortunately for Protégé, Z-Medica was not operating under the same 

assumption. In its view, Schillinger had signed the nondisclosure agreement in his 

personal capacity, not as Z-Medica’s representative. So after the call was over, ZMedica used the information it had learned to create its own competing product. 

1

The Honorable John R. Tunheim, Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the District of Minnesota.
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Harmed by this turn of events, Protégé first sued Z-Medica. After Z-Medica 

settled, Protégé turned its attention to Duff & Phelps and Smith, whom it sued in 

state court. Duff & Phelps removed the case to federal court on the ground that 

Smith, the only nondiverse defendant, had been fraudulently joined. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1446. The case made it no further than a motion to dismiss. In the district court’s 

view, Protégé had not alleged a plausible claim for relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(6).

II. 

Before getting to the merits, we need to decide whether this case belongs in 

federal court. Generally, in a case like this one, the joinder of a nondiverse party 

like Smith would mean that there is no federal jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 

(giving federal courts jurisdiction over cases involving complete diversity of 

citizenship and an amount-in-controversy over $75,000). But here the district court 

held that Smith had been “fraudulently joined.” Filla v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 336 F.3d 

806, 809 (8th Cir. 2003).

Fraudulent joinder occurs when “there is no reasonable basis in fact and law 

for the claim[s] brought” against the nondiverse defendant. Wivell v. Wells Fargo 

Bank, N.A., 773 F.3d 887, 893 (8th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted). The 

breach-of-contract claim falls into that category because Smith himself was never a 

party to a contract with Protégé. See Mencher v. Weiss, 114 N.E.2d 177, 179 (N.Y. 

1953).2

 The same goes for the unlawful-practice-of-law claim, because Smith, who 

2

In New York, an agent like Smith is not “personally bound [to a contract] 

unless there is clear and explicit evidence of the agent’s intention to . . . []add his 

personal liability [to] that of his principal.” Savoy Record Co. v. Cardinal Export 

Corp., 203 N.E.2d 206, 207 (N.Y. 1964) (quoting Mencher, 114 N.E.2d at 179). The 

parties’ contract establishes exactly the opposite here: the obligations were “solely 

corporate,” and no Duff & Phelps employee was “subject[] to any liability.” So 
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is not a lawyer, never gave legal advice to Protégé. See Gardner v. Conway, 48 

N.W.2d 788, 796–97 (Minn. 1951). Meanwhile, the contract itself immunizes Smith 

from a breach-of-professional services claim, which is based in negligence. See 

Hydro Inv., Inc. v. Trafalgar Power Inc., 227 F.3d 8, 15 (2d Cir. 2000) (applying 

New York law). And finally, the remaining claims—for breach-of-fiduciary and 

principal-agent duties—fail because neither Smith nor Duff & Phelps ever served as 

Protégé’s fiduciary. Spinelli v. Nat’l Football League, 903 F.3d 185, 207 (2d Cir. 

2018) (applying New York law); see Meese v. Miller, 436 N.Y.S.2d 496, 499 (N.Y. 

App. Div. 1981). In short, without a viable claim against Smith,3 the case can remain 

in federal court. 

III. 

Only the claims against Duff & Phelps remain. The district court dismissed 

them all for failure to state a claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Protégé’s primary claim is for breach of contract. According to the complaint, 

Duff & Phelps breached the parties’ contract when it failed to prevent Protégé from 

disclosing its own proprietary information during the call. The problem, however, 

is that the only contractual duties that Protégé identifies are those that make Duff &

Protégé had “no reasonable basis in fact and law” to sue Smith for breach of contract. 

Wivell, 773 F.3d at 893 (quotation marks omitted).

3

No writ of mandamus is available because Protégé has other adequate legal 

remedies. See Madison Equities, Inc. v. Crockarell, 889 N.W.2d 568, 571 (Minn. 

2017). And the declaratory-judgment claim is derivative, so to the extent the other 

claims lack a reasonable basis, it does too. See Whitney v. Guys, Inc., 700 F.3d 1118, 

1121 (8th Cir. 2012).
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Phelps responsible for its own conduct: “keep[ing] confidential all nonpublic

information” and “not disclos[ing]” anything to “third parties.”4

Protégé’s remaining claims meet a similar fate. Protégé’s unlawful-practiceof-law claim fails because, like Smith, Duff & Phelps never gave legal advice. See

Gardner, 48 N.W.2d at 796. Nor was it a fiduciary, which takes care of both the 

breach-of-fiduciary-duty and breach-of-principal-agent-duty claims. See Spinelli, 

903 F.3d at 207; Meese, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 499. And we need not consider any other 

claims because Protégé’s brief largely ignores them. See Chay-Velasquez v.

Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 751, 756 (8th Cir. 2004) (requiring “meaningful argument” to 

preserve a point on appeal).

IV. 

We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court.

ERICKSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I agree that the terms of Protégé’s engagement agreement with Duff & Phelps 

are straightforward and that New York law governs this dispute. I disagree with the 

4

Even if Duff & Phelps was grossly negligent in performing the contract, as 

Protégé claims, it would make no difference. As New York courts have held, 

“claims based on negligent or grossly negligent performance of a contract are not 

cognizable.” City of N.Y. v. 611 W. 152nd St., Inc., 710 N.Y.S.2d 36, 38 (N.Y. App. 

Div. 2000); see also Megaris Furs, Inc. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 568 N.Y.S.2d 581, 

583 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (“[N]egligent performance of the contract[] [is] a cause 

of action which simply does not exist.”). And the allegations in the complaint do 

not rise to the level of gross negligence anyway, which involve “outrageous acts of 

folly,” not reasonable mistakes of fact. Hartford Ins. Co. v. Holmes Prot. Grp., 673 

N.Y.S.2d 132, 133 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (noting that conduct “is not gross[ly] 

negligen[t]” unless it “evince[d] a reckless disregard for the rights of others or 

smack[ed] of intentional wrongdoing” (quotation marks omitted)). 
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majority’s conclusion that Phil Smith was fraudulently joined, that Protégé has failed 

to allege a plausible claim for relief against Duff & Phelps, or that the 

indemnification provision immunizes Duff & Phelps from all potential liability 

arising in this case.

Duff & Phelps, a multinational consultancy firm based in New York, agreed 

to do more than merely keep nonpublic information it learned about Protégé’s 

business confidential. It agreed to perform a number of tasks for Protégé in exchange 

for a nonrefundable transaction fee equal to 3% of the aggregate value of all cash, 

securities, and other property paid to Protégé in the event of a sale of the business, 

but in no event less than $700,000. Compl., Ex. B, ¶ 5. Duff & Phelps estimated 

the sale of Protégé’s business could fetch at least $23 million. Relevant to the claims 

here, Duff & Phelps agreed to contact potential purchasers approved by Protégé and 

provide the potential purchaser, under a non-disclosure agreement, with confidential 

information about the business Protégé sought to sell. Compl., Exh. B, ¶ 1(c). Phil 

Smith (Managing Director of the Healthcare Mergers and Acquisitions Department 

in the Minneapolis, Minnesota office) signed the agreement on December 1, 2017, 

on behalf of Duff & Phelps. Id. at p. 6. 

Consistent with his obligations under the agreement, Smith undertook the 

responsibility of getting the signatures for a potential buyer on a non-disclosure 

agreement, which had been approved by Protégé and its counsel. Like the 

engagement agreement, Smith signed the non-disclosure agreement for “Project 

Falcon” (an internal reference for Protégé) on behalf of Duff & Phelps. Compl., 

Exh. D, p. 5. Doug Schillinger accepted the terms on behalf of DW Healthcare 

Partners. Id. Curiously, Smith left the line on the non-disclosure agreement marked 

“Buyer” completely blank. Id. at p. 1. Even though the potential buyer was not 

identified and the only signatory on the form for the potential buyer was identified 

as DW Healthcare Partners, Smith’s supervisor informed Protégé in writing that they 

“have a signed non-disclosure agreement in place with DW Healthcare/Zmedica and 

they would like to have a call.” Compl., Exh. F. Given the litigation that has 
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followed, it is indisputable that Smith/Duff & Phelps’ efforts to obtain a nondisclosure agreement with Z-Medica were deficient and Duff & Phelps’

representation to Protégé that there was a non-disclosure agreement in place with ZMedica was inaccurate. In fact, there was a judicial determination, at the motion to 

dismiss stage, finding Z-Medica was not bound by the non-disclosure agreement 

Duff & Phelps obtained under the terms of the engagement agreement. See Protégé 

Biomedical, LLC v. Z-Medica, LLC, 394 F.Supp.3d 924, 937-38 (D. Minn. 2019). 

Smith, acting on behalf of Duff & Phelps, signed both the engagement 

agreement and the non-disclosure agreement at issue. He assumed responsibility for 

obtaining the non-disclosure agreement with Z-Medica. As a case proceeds, it is not 

uncommon for an employer to attempt to shift responsibility or advance defenses or 

positions adverse to its bad-acting or negligent employee. In my experience as a 

lawyer and judge, it is prudent, not fraudulent, to name as a defendant the employer 

and the employee whose conduct has been called into question, particularly when 

the employee is the signatory to the parties’ agreements. With no fraudulent joinder 

of Smith, jurisdiction properly lies in state court. 

If federal jurisdiction is proper, I would reverse the dismissal of the breach of 

contract, negligence, and professional malpractice claims because the complaint is 

well-pleaded under New York law as to these claims. While the complaint is no 

model of clarity, Protégé has alleged it was assured prior to its decision to disclose 

confidential information about its business that there was a non-disclosure 

agreement with Z-Medica. At the telephone conference arranged by Duff & Phelps, 

two Z-Medica representatives; Schillinger; and representatives from Duff & Phelps 

remained silent when Protégé’s owner announced that he was willing to discuss 

confidential business information “[s]ince we’re all under an NDA.” Protégé has 

alleged that it would not have disclosed its confidential information but-for Duff & 

Phelps’ representations that there was a non-disclosure agreement with Z-Medica. 

The majority’s acceptance of Duff & Phelps’ attempt to escape responsibility on the 
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ground that it was Protégé, not Duff & Phelps, who disclosed its own confidential

information to Z-Medica misses the crux of Protégé’s claims. 

In the engagement agreement, Duff & Phelps accepted the responsibility of

obtaining a non-disclosure agreement that would preserve the confidentiality of 

Protégé’s trade secrets. After this agreement was signed and when Smith thought 

someone from DW Healthcare Partners had independently reached out to his client 

Protégé, Smith contacted Schillinger to make sure they had “a clear path forward.” 

Compl., Exh. E, p. 2; see Compl., Exh. D, p. 4. DW Healthcare Partners understood 

that it would “have to go through Duff and Phelps to learn more” about Protégé. 

Compl. Exh. E, p. 1.

Once Duff & Phelps undertook the duty to obtain the non-disclosure 

agreement, Duff & Phelps, as an entity providing professional services, assumed a 

duty to act with reasonable care and diligence. While the majority makes short work 

of each of Protégé’s claims, New York expressly recognizes that “a legal duty 

independent of contractual obligations may be imposed by law as an incident to the 

parties’ relationship and that several types of defendants—including professionals—

can be held liable in tort for failure to exercise reasonable care, irrespective of their 

contractual duties.” Dormitory Auth. v. Samson Constr. Co., 94 N.E.3d 456, 460 

(N.Y. 2018) (cleaned up). “In these instances, it is policy, not the parties’ contract, 

that gives rise to a duty of due care.” Sommer v. Fed. Signal Corp., 593 N.E.2d 

1365, 1369 (N.Y. 1992). 

Protégé alleged, as the majority notes, a professional malpractice claim. In a 

malpractice claim, a defendant is “held to the level of skill and care used by others 

in the community who practice the same profession.” Reis v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., 

18 N.E.3d 383, 387 (N.Y. 2014). This standard stands in contrast to a typical 

negligence claim where a jury “must compare the defendant’s conduct to that of a 

reasonable person under like circumstances.” Id. Even though the difference 
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between these standards might be subtle, it is important to apply the correct standard 

to the distinct claims. Id. at 388. 

While it is undisputed that Protégé’s counsel was actively involved in 

formulating the terms for an acceptable non-disclosure agreement, there is no 

indication that Duff & Phelps provided the partially completed non-disclosure 

agreement to Protégé prior to facilitating the meeting that allowed Z-Medica to 

obtain and steal Protégé’s trade secrets. Thus, Protégé could not have decided for 

itself or with the assistance of counsel whether the non-disclosure agreement bound 

Z-Medica. The undisputed information in the record before us is that Protégé relied 

exclusively on the terms of the engagement agreement in conjunction with the 

express statements, representations, and expertise of Duff & Phelps, and no one else. 

I have doubts about whether a reasonable person, let alone a business that 

holds itself out as having expertise as financial advisors to multimillion dollar 

transactions, could have reasonably believed that Z-Medica was bound by a 

confidentiality agreement in which Z-Medica was neither identified nor a signator. 

Nonetheless, at a minimum, the majority’s characterization of the alleged blunders 

by Duff & Phelps as “reasonable mistakes” necessarily gives rise to questions for 

the ultimate finder of fact to decide. See Havas v. Victory Paper Stock Co., Inc., 

402 N.E.2d 1136, 1139-40 (N.Y. 1980) (“It was particularly appropriate to leave 

th[e] issue [of negligence] to the jury, not only because of the idiosyncratic nature 

of most tort cases, or because there was room for a difference in view as to whether 

[the defendant’s] conduct in the particular circumstances of this case did or did not 

evidence a lack of due care, but, perhaps above all, because, in the determination of 

issues revolving about the reasonableness of conduct, the values inherent in the jury 

system are rightfully believed an important instrument in the adjudicative process.”) 

The court’s role at this stage is limited to determining the sufficiency of the 

allegations, not claim resolution. In exchange for at least $700,000, the engagement 

agreement on its face obligated Duff & Phelps to do more than, as the majority finds, 
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personally keep confidential all nonpublic information and not disclose anything to 

third parties. Moreover, as a policy, separate and distinct from any contractual 

obligation, New York law requires professionals to exercise reasonable skill and 

care. The failure to do so can give rise to a tort claim. In my view, Protégé has 

alleged sufficient facts to satisfy the plausibility standard for its breach of contract, 

negligence, and professional malpractice claims. Of course, Protégé cannot doublerecover for its losses, but New York allows for the pursuit of both types of claims—

contract and tort—when there is an independent duty that may exist beyond 

contractual duties.

 

The majority references the existence of a broad indemnification agreement, 

which it finds immunizes Smith from liability. The indemnification provisions 

consist of 21⁄2 pages attached to the engagement agreement as Schedule A. While 

the indemnification provisions require Protégé to indemnify Duff & Phelps for 

nearly all imaginable claims or losses related to its services, it does not definitely 

absolve Duff & Phelps from all potential liability under the undisputed facts of this 

case. The provisions provide:

A. Indemnification. To the fullest extent lawful, the Company 

will promptly, upon demand, indemnify and hold harmless Duff & 

Phelps Securities, LLC and their affiliates (collectively, “D&P”), and 

each director, officer, employee, agent, member and controlling person 

of D&P (any or all of the foregoing hereinafter referred to as an 

“Indemnified Person”), from and against all losses, claims, damages, 

expenses (including reasonable fees and disbursements of counsel and 

accountants), costs (including, without limitation, expenses, fees and 

disbursement and time charges related to giving testimony or furnishing 

documents in response to a subpoena or otherwise) and liabilities (joint 

or several), (collectively, “Losses”), resulting directly or indirectly 

from any threatened or pending investigation, action, claim, proceeding 

or dispute, including securityholder actions (whether or not D&P or any

other Indemnified Person is a potential or actual named party or 

witness) (collectively, a “Claim”), which (1) are related to or arise out 

of any untrue statement or alleged untrue statement of a material fact 
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contained in any oral or written information provided to D&P or any 

other person by the Company or used by the Company in connection 

with the transaction contemplated by the engagement letter or any 

omission or alleged omission by the Company to state therein a material 

fact necessary to make the statements therein, in light of the

circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (2) are 

otherwise related to or arise out of D&P’s engagement, role, activities 

or the performance or nonperformance of professional services on the 

Company’s behalf. The Company will not be responsible, however, for 

any Losses pursuant to clause (2) of the preceding sentence which are 

judicially determined to have resulted primarily and directly from the 

willful misconduct or gross negligence of any Indemnified Person 

seeking indemnification hereunder or related to a breach by D&P of 

this Agreement; but pending any such judicial determination, the 

indemnification and reimbursement obligations of the Company 

hereunder shall continue to apply. The Company also agrees that 

neither D&P nor any Indemnified Person shall have any liability to 

the Company, its owners, parents, creditors or securityholders for 

or in connection with its engagement, except such liability for 

Losses incurred by the Company which are judicially determined 

to have resulted primarily and directly from D&P’s or such 

Indemnified Person’s willful misconduct or gross negligence or 

related to a breach by D&P of this Agreement. For purposes of the 

foregoing, “judicially determined” shall mean determined by a court of 

competent jurisdiction.

Compl., Exh. B, p. 7 (emphasis added). The narrow areas excepted involve willful 

misconduct, gross negligence, and breach of contract by Duff & Phelps. 

New York has a public policy rule that prohibits parties from insulating 

themselves from damages caused by grossly negligent conduct. Matter of Part 60 

Put-Back Litig., 165 N.E.3d 180, 184, 186 (N.Y. 2020). Parties are allowed, 

however, to contractually limit remedies that do not immunize the breaching party 

from all liability for its conduct. Id. In other words, “a total immunity clause is bad; 

a limitation provision, if reasonable, is not.” Id. at 187 (cleaned up). 
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This is so because public policy will not permit a party who engages “in 

conduct that smacks of intentional wrongdoing or evinces reckless disregard for the 

rights of others . . . to escape all liability for its misconduct.” Id. at 188. “[B]ecause 

the law looks with disfavor upon agreements intended to absolve a party from the 

consequences of its wrongdoing, a release which purports to excuse a party from 

responsibility from misconduct is subject to the closest of judicial scrutiny.” Golden 

Pac. Bancorp v. F.D.I.C., 273 F.3d 509, 515 (2d Cir. 2001) (analyzing New York 

law) (cleaned up). 

I recognize that competing against this policy is another public policy—the 

freedom of contract. Id. Under New York law, “[w]hen the clause limiting liability 

is negotiated at arm’s length by sophisticated parties, provides for more than nominal 

damages, and does not wholly exculpate the breaching party, the rationales 

underlying the gross negligence public policy exception fail to overcome the public 

policy in favor of freedom of contract” when “the only causes of action raised in the 

complaint sound in breach of contract.” Id. 

 

As noted earlier, I believe Protégé has sufficiently pleaded causes of action 

for not only breach of contract but also negligence and professional malpractice. 

Whether it was Duff & Phelps’ conduct that caused Protégé to unwittingly disclose 

its confidential business information to an entity not bound by a confidentiality 

agreement amounts to gross negligence, ordinary negligence, reckless indifference, 

or no claim at all is for the fact finder to determine. See Sommer, 593 N.E.2d at 

1371 (“Whether this indeed is a case of simple mistake or reckless indifference is 

for a jury to determine.”); Internationale Nederlanden (U.S.) Cap. Corp. v. Bankders 

Tr. Co., 689 N.Y.S.2d 455, 460 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (quoting Food Pageant, Inc. 

v. Consol. Edison Co., 429 N.E.2d 738, 740 (N.Y. 1981)) (“Where the inquiry is to 

the existence or nonexistence of gross negligence, the ultimate standard of care is 

different [from ordinary negligence], but the question nevertheless remains a matter 

for jury determination.”). 
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For these reasons, I would reverse the dismissal of the breach of contract, 

negligence, and professional malpractice claims. 

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