NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CESAR GARRIDO SANDOVAL,

Petitioner,

v.

ROBERT M. WILKINSON , Acting Attorney General,

Respondent. No. 18

- 71427

Agency No. A209

- 820

- 325

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 1, 2021 * *
Honolulu, Hawaii

Before: CLIFTON, R. NELSON, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Cesar Garrido Sandoval petitions for review of the decisions of

the I mmigration J udge (“IJ”) and Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)

(collectively, “ A gency”) den ying his claim for protection under the Convention

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

with out oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

FEB 4 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APP EALS2

Against Torture (“CAT”). 1 Because the BIA incorporated the IJ’s decision without

additi onal reasoning, we “review the IJ’s decision to the extent incorporated.”

Medina

- Lara v. Holder , 771 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2014). Under the

“extremely deferential” substantial evidence review, the court must uphold the

factual findings of the BIA “ un less any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled

to conclude to the contrary.” Lianhua Jiang v. Holder , 754 F.3d 733, 738 (9th Cir.

2014) ( citation omitted ). We deny the petition

.

To support his claim for CAT protection, Petitioner must show he w ould

“more likely than not” face future torture if he were removed to Guatemala

. See

Singh v. Whitaker , 914 F.3d 654, 663 (9th Cir. 2019). The record does not compel

finding a conclusion c ontrary to the Agency’s that Petitioner failed to meet his

burden to show he would be tortured if removed. See id.

In 20 04, t he Cabral and Lemus brothers threatened to kill Petitioner and his

mother if Petitioner le ft his place of employment. Before Petitioner quit, another

worker was found dead in a trash can. When Petitioner expressed his desire to

leave his job, the Cabral and Lemus brothers again threatened Petitioner and his

mother and then stabbed Petitioner in the abdomen

. After quitting, however,

Petitioner relocated within Guatemala and lived in the country for over a year

1 Petitioner waived review of the denial of his asylum and withholding of

removal claims because he failed to sufficiently raise either issue in his Opening

Brief. See Koerner v. Grigas , 328 F.3d 1039, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003).3

without further harm or contact from the brothers

. At the time of the IJ’s decision,

Petitioner’s mother ha d been able to relocate and remain safely in Guatemala for

over twelve years without harm or contact from the brothers. When considering

“all evidence bearing on the likelihood of future torture .

. . including. . . p ast

torture [and the ] possibility of safe relocation,” 2 the record does not compel a

conclusion different than that of the Agency. See Barajas

- Romero v. Lynch , 846

F.3d 351, 364 (9th Cir. 2017) ; Lianhua Jiang , 754 F.3d at 738 (citation omitted)

.

PETITION DENIED

.

2 Petitioner argues on appeal that the Agency improperly placed a burden on him to show that it was impossible to relocate within Guatemala, contravening our holding in Maldonado v. Lynch that a petitioner has no such burden. 786 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2015). However, Maldonado does not preclude the Agency from considering the possibility of relocation in its analysis. Id. at 1163

– 64 (“[8 C.F.R.] § 12 08.16(c)(3) provides that, if such evidence [of the possibility of relocation] is relevant, it must be considered in assessing whether it is more likely than not that the petitioner would be tortured if removed.” (emphasis added)). Here, the Agency proper ly considered Petitioner’s possibility of relocation based on his mother’s successful relocation, and in doing so it did not place a burden on Petitioner to prove impossibility of relocation.