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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

LARRY SAMUELS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 627 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 5, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal 

Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0006041-2015

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

LARRY SAMUELS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 628 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 5, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal 

Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0005275-2016

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED: MAY 7, 2021

Appellant, Larry Samuels, appeals from the judgments of sentence 

imposed following a stipulated bench trial in two underlying court of common 

pleas matters. Each appeal has been given a separate Superior Court docket 

number: 627 EDA 2020, corresponding to CP-46-CR-0006041-2015, and 628 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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EDA 2020, corresponding to CP-46-CR-0005275-2016. The appeals include 

identical issues and briefs, and a single trial court opinion disposed of both 

matters. As such, we sua sponte consolidate these matters pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 513 and address them concurrently. 

The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history, as 

follows:

Appellant . . . appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgment of 

sentence imposed on June 5, 2018, following a stipulated bench 

trial, at the conclusion of which he was convicted of numerous 

counts of burglary–overnight accommodation, person present and 

theft by unlawful taking or disposition, one count of criminal 

attempt and multiple counts of criminal mischief.[1] These

convictions arose from [Appellant’s] commission of a string of 

overnight residential burglaries spanning Montgomery, Bucks, . . .

Chester, Delaware, and Philadelphia Counties. On appeal, 

[Appellant] challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, and 

raises challenges to trial counsel’s stewardship.

A two-day suppression hearing was held on February 12, 

2018 and on February 27, 2018. Subsequently, this [c]ourt issued 

its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and a Supplemental 

Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law on March 20, 2018 and 

on April 3, 2018, respectively. Suppression was denied.

On June 1, 2018, [Appellant] proceeded to a stipulated nonjury trial where [Appellant] stipulated to the facts as set forth by 

the Commonwealth[:]

Since July of 2014, there was a joint task force 

investigation involving multiple police departments in 

Montgomery, Bucks, Delaware, and Chester 

[C]ounties . . . and the City of Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania. 

The affiant, Jim McClelland, is a member of that task 

force and was involved in the investigation of over 100 

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1

 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3502(a)(ii), 3921(a), 901(a), and 3304, respectively. 
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residential burglaries with similar modus operandi, 

which were identified spanning through Montgomery, 

Philadelphia, Bucks, Delaware and Chester 

[C]ounties. The investigation was focused on an 

unusual and very specific style of crime patter[n] of 

overnight, occupied residential burglaries that all 

occurred within walking distance of SEPTA Regional 

Rail Line stations. Typically, several houses were 

burglarized each night in a close proximity in the same 

time frame. Typically, the homes were entered by 

either unlocked windows or doors; sometimes screens 

were cut, that being the only sign of any forced entry. 

The items that were typically taken were cash, Apple 

electronic devices, laptops, cell phones[,] and purses. 

The actor would frequently eat [or] take food from the 

homes’ refrigerators and discard the drink containers 

outside. The purses were usually rummaged through 

and discarded in neighboring yards and driveways 

after being emptied of cash and other non-traceable 

valuables. Credit cards were not taken from the 

homes or from the purses that were recovered in the 

yards. Car keys were taken from the homes, and cars 

stolen in several cases.

One of the main targets of the burglar in this series of 

burglaries appeared to be Apple products, such as 

iPhones, iPads and laptops.

Apple has [an] application available for its devices 

which allows the owner of a device to search for its 

current location through the Internet. A common 

location was developed from several Apple items 

taken during these burglaries, which would be the 

1800 block of Hart Lane in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

On June 11, 2015, a surveillance camera was installed 

on a telephone pole at Jasper Street and Hart Lane to 

provide[] recorded video surveillance.

(Stipulated Bench Trial, 6/1/18 pp. 18-22) [Appellant] was 

developed as a suspect, which led police to search 1840 Hart Lane 

pursuant to a warrant. The homeowner and sole occupant of that 

address, Tony Nguyen, consented to a search of his cell phone. 

[Appellant] was arrested at his residence located at 2715 West 
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Glenwood Avenue in Philadelphia. A search warrant was obtained 

for that location. Additional search warrants were obtained for 

cellular call records and cell tower details for [Appellant’s] cell 

phones and for the physical contents of the cell phone found in his 

residence. The results of these searches revealed a pattern for

[Appellant’s] phone being in the immediate vicinity during the 

overnight hours of the residential burglaries. The Commonwealth 

went on to detail about 80 attempted and completed burglaries 

committed by [Appellant]. At the conclusion of the stipulated 

bench trial, [Appellant] was found guilty of the aforementioned 

charges.

On June 5, 2018, [Appellant] was sentenced to an aggregate 

term of 15 to 30 years’ imprisonment. A timely appeal was filed. 

The Pennsylvania Superior Court quashed the direct appeal 

pursuant to Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018).

Subsequently, [Appellant] filed a pro se PCRA petition on 

July 1, 2019. Counsel was appointed and filed an Amended PCRA 

petition seeking the restoration of [Appellant’s] direct appeal 

rights. On February 10, 2020, by agreement of the 

Commonwealth, an order was entered restoring [Appellant’s]

direct appeal rights.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/19/20, at 1–4 (some record references omitted).

Appellant raises the following issues for appellate review:

1. Was the Judge’s decision that [Appellant] did not have 

an expectation of privacy at 1840 Hart Lane, Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania in error?

2. Was the Judge’s decision that the search warrant for 

1840 Hart Lane was sufficient, despite relying on stale information 

and lacked probable cause, in error?

3. Was it an error for the Judge not to suppress the 

evidence from both 1840 Hart Lane, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 

and 2715 West Glenwood Avenue, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 

despite deliberately or recklessly including false information?

4. Did the Judge improperly allow testimony outside of the 

four corners of the warrant for 1840 Hart Lane by accepting 

testimony from Detective [Steven] Fink regarding Robert Green 
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and the subject of a July 19, 2015 security camera from the 1800 

Hart Lane pole?

5. Did the Judge improperly allow testimony outside of the 

four corners of the warrant for 2715 West Glenwood Avenue by 

accepting the affiant’s explanation that writing “[Appellant] was 

arrested outside of 2715 Glenwood Avenue” was a mistake, when 

in fact [Appellant] was arrested inside 2715 Glenwood Avenue and 

the affiant failed to inform this to the issuing authority?

6. Was [Appellant] denied effective assistance of counsel in 

that Trial Counsel failed to properly impeach Detectives [Ronald] 

Cupo and [James] McClelland’s credibility, testimony, false 

statements omissions and information they asserted and provided 

in the search warrants for 1840 Hart Lane and 2715 West 

Glenwood Avenue, as well as, the July 23, 2015 arrest warrant for 

[Appellant] by missing impeachment opportunities and such 

actions prejudiced [Appellant]?

7. Was [Appellant] denied effective assistance of counsel in 

that Trial Counsel failed to file an omnibus pretrial motion to 

suppress the arrest warrant for [Appellant] and the evidence 

resulting from the arrest warrant because it contained materially 

false statements and it was made with reckless disregard for the

truth and therefore it was legally insufficient to allow police to

seize [Appellant] and his property and such actions prejudiced 

[Appellant]?

8. Was [Appellant] denied effective assistance of Counsel 

in that Trial Counsel failed to request sequestration of the 

Commonwealth witnesses at the Suppression Hearing and any 

subsequent contested hearing, when witnesses testified regarding 

information they either provided or supplied in the search 

warrants for 1840 Hart Lane and/or 2715 Glenwood Avenue 

because they contained numerous material falsehoods and 

information from law enforcement that was changed by another 

officer and all were made with at least reckless disregard for the 

truth and such actions prejudiced [Appellant]?

9. Was [Appellant] denied effective assistance of counsel in 

that Trial counsel failed to properly investigate the case and call 

potential witnesses that will show that Detective Cupo and 

McClelland acted with reckless disregard and perjuri[ous] conduct 
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and that [Appellant] had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 

the premises at 1840 Hart Lane?

Appellant’s Brief at 4–7.

We observe at the outset that Appellant’s issues six through nine, 

alleging ineffectiveness of trial counsel, are not reviewable on direct appeal. 

See Commonwealth v. Britt, 83 A.3d 198, 203–204 (Pa. Super. 2013)

(“absent either good cause or exceptional circumstances and a waiver of PCRA 

review, ineffective assistance of counsel claims must await collateral review”). 

The facts of this case do not fall within either category of issues, nor has 

Appellant waived PCRA review. See Appellant’s Brief at 32 (“Appellant 

reserves his right to raise these [ineffectiveness] issues upon collateral 

review.”). Therefore, we will not review Appellant’s issues related to trial 

counsel’s stewardship and turn to his remaining arguments.

Appellant first challenges the trial court’s conclusion that he did not have 

a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises located at 1840 Hart Lane. 

The principles governing our review are as follows:

Our analysis begins with the presumption that where a motion to 

suppress has been filed, the burden is on the Commonwealth to 

establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged 

evidence is admissible. If the trial court denies the motion, we 

must determine whether the record supports the trial court’s 

factual findings and whether the legal conclusions drawn

therefrom are free from error. In so doing, we may consider only

the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence for

the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context

of the record as a whole. Where the record supports the findings

of the suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may

reverse only if the court erred in reaching its legal conclusions

based upon the facts.
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Commonwealth v. Bowmaster, 101 A.3d 789, 792 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(citation omitted). Furthermore, “[i]t is within the suppression court’s sole 

province as factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to 

be given their testimony.” Commonwealth v. Elmobdy, 823 A.2d 180, 183 

(Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted). The suppression court is also entitled 

“to believe all, part or none of the evidence presented.” Commonwealth v. 

Galendez, 27 A.3d 1042, 1046 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quotation omitted).

A defendant moving to suppress evidence has the 

preliminary burden of establishing standing and a legitimate

expectation of privacy. Standing requires a defendant to 

demonstrate one of the following: (1) his presence on the 

premises at the time of the search and seizure; (2) a possessory 

interest in the evidence improperly seized; (3) that the offense 

charged includes as an essential element the element of 

possession; or (4) a proprietary or possessory interest in the 

searched premises. A defendant must separately establish a 

legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched or thing 

seized. Whether [a] defendant has a legitimate expectation of 

privacy is a component of the merits analysis of the suppression 

motion. 

Commonwealth v. Burton, 973 A.2d 428, 435 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc). 

The determination of whether defendant has met this burden is made upon 

evaluation of the evidence presented by the Commonwealth and the 

defendant. Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 14 A.3d 907, 910 (Pa. Super. 

2011). 

Instantly, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with the possessory 

offense of receiving stolen property. Thus, Appellant had “automatic 

standing” to bring a suppression motion before the court. See 
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Commonwealth v. Enimpah, 106 A.3d 695, 698 (Pa. 2014) (quotation 

omitted) (“[I]t is well settled that a defendant charged with a possessory 

offense in this Commonwealth has ‘automatic standing’ because the charge 

itself alleges an interest sufficient to support a claim under Article I, § 8.”).

In order to prevail on a suppression motion, however, a defendant is required 

to separately demonstrate a personal privacy interest in the area searched or 

effects seized, and support that such interest was “actual, societally 

sanctioned as reasonable, and justifiable.” Commonwealth v. Bostick, 958 

A.2d 543, 551 (Pa. Super. 2008) (quoting Commonwealth v. Peterson, 636 

A.2d 615, 617 (Pa. 2008)). “[I]f the evidence of the Commonwealth, the 

party with the burden of production, shows the defendant lacked such a 

privacy interest,” the Commonwealth “need prove no more.” Enimpah, 106 

A.3d at 701–702. 

The trial court concluded that Appellant did not have a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in 1840 Hart Lane, reasoning:

At that time of the [suppression] hearing Mr. [Anthony] Nguyen 

resided in the state prison system. He had previously resided at 

1840 Hart Lane. Mr. Nguyen testified that [Appellant] resided

there, and he knew [Appellant] had another residence. He 

testified that he did not consent to the police looking at his phone. 

This testimony was not accurate and not worthy of belief on these 

points.

Mr. Nguyen testified on cross-examination that at the time 

of the warrant he knew that [Appellant] had a second apartment. 

He remembered giving the police a statement on September 18, 

2015, which he signed.

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Detective McClelland testified as a rebuttal witness on behalf 

of the Commonwealth. Detective McClelland had been the one who 

spoke with Mr. Nguyen in July of 2015. Mr. Nguyen told him that 

[Appellant] did live with him for a period of time, earlier in the 

year. He indicated that Mr. Nguyen didn’t remember the exact 

date.

* * *

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania outlined the following 

factors when determining whether a defendant has a legitimate 

expectation of privacy in another person’s home:

(1) Possession of a key to the premises;

(2) Having unlimited access to the premises;

(3) Storing of clothing or other possessions on the

premises;

(4) Involvement in illegal activities conducted on the

premises;

(5) Ability to exclude other persons from the 

premises;

and

(6) Expression of a subjective expectation of privacy 

in the premises.

Bostick at 553 (quoting Commonwealth v. Govens, 632 A.2d 

1316, 1319 (Pa. Super. 1993) (citations omitted)).

Specifically, a defendant who is more than a “casual visitor”

to another’s residence “must demonstrate a significant and 

current interest in the searched premises in order to establish an 

expectation of privacy.” Id. at 552-553.

In this case, this [c]ourt initially determined that [Appellant] 

had standing to bring this motion to suppress. However, 

[Appellant] lacked a privacy interest in the residence at 1840 

[H]art Lane. He did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 

in these premises. This [c]ourt based this on the fact that
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[Appellant] did not live at 1840 Hart Lane. In fact, he had another 

residence at 2715 West Glenwood Avenue in Philadelphia. There 

was no evidence he actually possessed the key; although there 

was some evidence that he did have access to entry. There was 

no evidence that he stored clothing or any possessions there. It 

may be inferred that he was involved in illegal activity with 

Mr. Nguyen, who did live there. There was no evidence 

whatsoever that he had any ability to exclude any person from 

that premises, and he did not demonstrate any subject 

expectation of privacy in the premises. Based on these factors, 

this [c]ourt concluded that [Appellant] did not have a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in the search in the premises of 1840 Hart 

Lane. Accordingly, [Appellant] lacked the authority to challenge 

search warrant for 1840 Hart Lane.

The only evidence presented by [Appellant] that he lived at 

1840 Hart Lane, was through the testimony of Mr. Nguyen, which 

was not credited by this [c]ourt. Rather, the credible testimony 

of Detective McClelland who testified that when he spoke to 

Mr. Nguyen around the time of the search warrant, Mr. Nguyen 

told him that [Appellant] had not been living there, and that it was 

for some time. Accordingly, [Appellant] was unable to show that 

he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 1840 Hart Lane 

premises.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/19/20, at 17–22 (record references omitted).

Appellant contends, however, that he did have a privacy interest in 1840 

Hart Lane:

[I]t was not disputed that at some point, [Appellant] had 

resided at 1840 Hart Lane. The owner Anthony Nguyen testified 

that [Appellant] paid rent and stayed in a room in the back of the 

house. Mr. Nguyen testified that [Appellant] lived there, but had 

moved out when Nguyen’s parents complained about [Appellant’s] 

use of marijuana. Nguyen further testified that even after being 

asked to leave, [Appellant] lived at least part-time at 1840 Hart 

Lane because Nguyen was on house arrest and [Appellant] was 

able to help him with errands.

The Commonwealth witnesses never dispute that 

[Appellant] resided at 1840 Hart Lane at some point in time. 

Detective James McClelland testified that Nguyen told him that 
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[Appellant] had been living with him at 1840 Hart Lane at a time 

earlier in the year 2015. McClelland also testified that Nguyen 

said [Appellant] had moved out earlier that year. While 

McClelland’s testimony is contradictory to Nguyen’s testimony, it 

is noteworthy that McClelland remembers this conversation from 

approximately 30 months prior to Trial and this specific 

information is never recorded on any notes or reports prior to 

Trial. This information also does not appear in the written 

statement taken from Nguyen contemporaneously.

[T]he evidence used to obtain search warrants for 1840 Hart 

Lane see [Appellant] using the property like a true owner. 

Detective Fink testifie[d] that [Appellant] was seen resting on the 

steps in front of 1840 Hart Lane and that [Appellant] was seen 

walking down the sidewalk and turning as if to enter 1840 Hart 

Lane. [Appellant] was seen riding a bike to 1840 Hart Lane, 

opening the door and entering on his own and taking the bike in 

with him. It was testified to that [Appellant] did not have to wait 

for someone to let him in.

[Finally], keys for 1840 Hart Lane were never found, but the

same can be said about keys for 2715 West Glenwood Avenue, 

which were never found either.

Appellant’s Brief at 21–22.

We agree with the trial court that Appellant did not have a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in the search of 1840 Hart Lane. First, Appellant places 

undue emphasis on the fact that he earlier resided at that residence. It is

undisputed that Appellant lived at a different address when the search warrant 

was executed at 1840 Hart Lane. See N.T. (Suppression), 2/12/18, at 19 (the 

address attached to Appellant’s driver’s license was “in the City of 

Philadelphia . . . Glenwood”); Id. at 57–58 (Detective Fink’s research 

disclosed that Appellant’s name was not associated with 1840 Hart Lane); N.T. 
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(Suppression), 2/27/18, at 4 (Mr. Nyugen confirmed that Appellant had 

another residence). 

Second, the trial court appropriately placed greater weight on the

testimony of Detective McClelland, and discredited Mr. Nguyen’s testimony 

regarding Appellant’s comings and goings at 1840 Hart Lane. 

Detective McClelland stated that Mr. Nguyen told him in July 2015 that 

Appellant lived with him for a period of time, but had moved out prior to the 

execution of the search warrant. N.T. (Suppression), 2/27/18, at 16. 

Mr. Nguyen’s testimony was extremely vague as to dates and other specifics 

regarding Appellant’s residency at 1840 Hart Lane, however Mr. Nyugen 

admitted that his parents banished Appellant from the premises because they 

disapproved of Appellant’s lifestyle. Id. at 4–5. “The suppression court has 

sole authority to assess the credibility of the witnesses and is entitled to 

believe all, part or none of the evidence presented.” Commonwealth v. 

Simmen, 58 A.3d 811, 817 (Pa. Super. 2012) (quotation omitted). We will 

not disturb the trial court’s credibility findings on appeal. Id. 

Third, Appellant asserts that the camera pole footage showing him 

sitting on the steps on 1840 Hart Lane and, on one occasion, entering the 

premises with his bicycle without assistance, indicates that he had unfettered 

access to the property. On this point the trial court conceded that the camera 

footage demonstrated that Appellant appeared to have some access to the 

property and also allowed for an inference that Appellant and Mr. Nguyen may 
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have conducted illegal activity on the premises. Nonetheless, by weighing the 

other Bostick factors, i.e., Appellant did not have a key to the premises,2 did 

not store clothing or any possessions there, had no ability to exclude any 

person from that premises, and did not establish any subject expectation of 

privacy in the premises, the trial court determined that Appellant did not 

demonstrate any reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises. We 

conclude that the trial court correctly balanced the Bostick factors in 

assessing Appellant’s authority to challenge the search warrant for 1840 Hart 

Lane. Accordingly, there was no error in its legal conclusion that Appellant

lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy for that property. 

Appellant’s next three issues concern the legality of the search warrant 

for 1840 Hart Lane. In addition to alleging that the warrants relied on stale 

information and included false statements, Appellant contends that the trial 

court improperly allowed testimony outside the four corners of the warrants

during the suppression hearing. Appellant’s Brief at 4–5. The trial court did 

not address the merits of these arguments because Appellant “did not possess 

an expectation of privacy in that residence and lacked legal authority to 

challenge the search warrant[s].” Trial Court Opinion, 5/19/20, at 23–25. 

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2 Appellant’s contention that the evidence that he did not have a key to 1840 

Hart Lane was not significant because a key also was not discovered for 2715 

West Glenwood Avenue does not merit further scrutiny. Appellant’s 

expectation of privacy in 1840 Hart Lane is unrelated to his expectation of 

privacy in 2715 West Glenwood Avenue.
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The trial court correctly declined review of these issues. See Enimpah, 106 

A.3d 701-702 (“[I]f the evidence of the Commonwealth, the party with the 

burden of production, shows the defendant lacked such a privacy interest,” 

the Commonwealth “need prove no more.”). 

Appellant’s final reviewable issue concerns the search warrant for 2715 

West Glenwood Avenue. Appellant avers that the trial court erred when it 

accepted testimony outside the four corners of the warrant that Detective 

Cupo arrested Appellant outside of 2715 West Glenwood Avenue when, in fact, 

Appellant was arrested inside the premises. Appellant’s Brief at 30. Appellant 

asserts that Detective Cupo’s inability to explain the discrepancy indicates that 

the detective “either intentionally misled the issuing authority or acted in 

reckless disregard of the truth when completing the affidavit of probable 

cause.” Id. at 31.

The trial court resolved this issue, as follows:

In Pennsylvania . . . at a suppression hearing, a defendant 

can go beyond the four corners of the search warrant and attack 

the affiant’s veracity. “Where a police officer makes a knowing 

misstatement of material fact in [an affidavit in support of an 

application for a search warrant], the warrant is invalid and any 

evidence obtained pursuant to that warrant is inadmissible.”

Commonwealth v. Minoske, 441 A.2d 414, 418 (Pa. 1982).

Misstatements of fact will invalidate a search and require 

suppression only if they are deliberate and material. 

Commonwealth v. Tucker, 384 A.2d 938, 944 (Pa. Super. 1978). 

“A material fact is one without which probable cause [forJ search 

would not exist.” Commonwealth v. Clark, 602 A.2d 1323, 1326 

(Pa. Super. 1992). “In deciding whether a misstatement is

material, the test is not whether the statement strengthens the 

application for the search warrant, but rather whether it is essential 
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to it.” Commonwealth v. Cameron, 445 Pa. Super. 165, 171, 664 

A.2d 1364, 1367 (1995).

In this case, [Appellant] challenged the 2715 West Glenwood 

Avenue search warrant, arguing that it lacked probable cause at 

the time the issuing authority signed the warrant, and now argues 

that this [c]ourt should have not considered the detective’s 

suppression testimony to supplement the warrant in determining 

whether probable cause existed. 

In this case, based upon the credible testimony of Detective 

Cupo, this [c]ourt did not reweigh the probable cause 

determination made by the issuing authority; rather, this [c]ourt 

was weighing whether Detective Cupo made an intentional 

material misstatement of fact which could invalidate the warrant. 

This [c]ourt ultimately determined that there was no intentional 

material misstatement of fact. The mistake was unintentional; 

therefore, this [c]ourt determined that the warrant would be 

upheld.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/19/20, at 26–27 (record references omitted). 

Based on the evidence presented to it, the trial court concluded that 

Detective Cupo did not deliberately misstate the fact in question, and it is not 

our province to disturb that finding. See Simmen, 58 A.3d at 817 (“The 

suppression court has sole authority to assess the credibility of the witnesses 

and is entitled to believe all, part or none of the evidence presented.”). As 

such, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s request to suppress the 

evidence seized as the result of the execution of the search warrant at 

2715 West Glenwood Avenue.

Judgments of sentence affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/7/21