In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 18-1936

ANNE O’BOYLE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

REAL TIME RESOLUTIONS, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 17-C-0957 — Lynn Adelman, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED OCTOBER 24, 2018 — DECIDED DECEMBER 7, 2018

____________________

Before BAUER, MANION, and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge. Anne O’Boyle claimed a debtcollection letter sent by Real Time Resolutions, Inc. (“RTR”)

violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The letter 

stated that important information was on the back of its first 

page, but the required validation notice was on the front of its 

second page. The district court dismissed for failure to state a 

claim and denied leave to amend the complaint. O’Boyle 

appeals. We affirm.
2 No. 18-1936

I. Facts

At all times germane, O’Boyle was a “consumer” under 

the FDCPA, residing in Wisconsin. RTR attempted to collect 

an alleged personal credit card debt from her. RTR mailed her 

a debt-collection letter consisting of two sheets of paper. This 

was the first letter RTR sent to her about this debt.

The front side of the first sheet displays RTR’s header and 

the date of the letter: “04/07/2017.” Below that is information 

regarding the creditor and balance. “Dear ANNE O’BOYLE,” 

the letter begins, “You are hereby notified that the collection 

duties associated with the above referenced account, that is 

the right to collect payments from you, are being transferred 

from NORDSTROM FSB to REAL TIME RESOLUTIONS, 

INC. (‘RTR’) effective 04/06/2017.”

Framed in a box just below the middle of this page is a 

paragraph warning O’Boyle that RTR is a debt collector, this 

“is an attempt to collect a debt, and any information obtained 

will be used for that purpose.”

Immediately below that box is another box directing 

O’Boyle to see the reverse of the first sheet: “Please see the 

back of this page for additional important information 

regarding this account.” Next come some addresses. Finally, 

the bottom of the page (twice) shows the pagination: “1 of 2.”

The back of the first page begins with these sentences in 

bold: “THE FOLLOWING NOTICES APPLY TO THE 

RESIDENTS OF THE FOLLOWING STATES, AS NOTED. 

THIS LIST IS NOT A COMPLETE LIST OF RIGHTS 

CONSUMERS MAY HAVE UNDER STATE AND 

FEDERAL LAW.” Then comes information about ten States. 

Wisconsin occupies the penultimate slot with only a banal 
No. 18-1936 3

notice about the collection agency’s licensing. The back of the 

first page does not include any pagination.

The front of the second page begins like the front of the 

first, with RTR’s header and the date. Then, as the first 

paragraph on the second page, comes the FDCPA-required 

validation notice:

Unless you notify this office within 30 days after 

receiving this notice that you dispute the 

validity of this debt or any portion thereof, this 

office will assume this debt is valid. If you notify 

this office in writing within 30 days of receiving 

this notice, this office will obtain verification of 

the debt or obtain a copy of a judgment if 

applicable and mail you a copy of such 

verification or judgment. If you make a written 

request to this office within 30 days after 

receiving this notice, this office will provide you 

with the name and address of the original 

creditor, if different from the current creditor. 

We are required under various state laws to 

notify consumers of certain rights.

This text is clear, prominent, and readily readable. The font is 

normal in shape and size—essentially the same font as most 

of the letter. O’Boyle does not claim any problem regarding 

the font or regarding the language itself in this paragraph.

Then come addresses for correspondence and payments, 

a phone number, some parting caveats, and the closing:

“Sincerely, REAL TIME RESOLUTIONS, INC.” And the 

bottom (twice) shows the pagination: “2 of 2.” The back of the 

second sheet is blank, so far as the record reflects.
4 No. 18-1936

In sum, the validation notice is not on either side of the 

first sheet. The front of this sheet directs the reader to “the 

back of this page for additional important information” but 

that “additional important information” does not include the 

notice. Instead, the notice is at the second sheet’s front top.

II. Procedural Posture

O’Boyle sued RTR for violating the FDCPA. She filed a 

class action complaint alleging a single count: RTR’s letter 

misleads the unsophisticated consumer by telling him that 

important information is on the back, but instead providing 

the validation notice on the front of the second page, thereby 

“overshadowing” the consumer’s rights under 15 U.S.C. § 

1692g(b) and failing to communicate the FDCPA rights 

effectively. She argues RTR’s letter misdirects consumers 

away from the validation notice. She argues the misdirection 

falsely represents that this notice is unimportant, and 

overshadows the disclosure of dispute rights, in violation of 

15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(10), 1692g, and 1692g(b). The court 

never certified the proposed class. Instead, the court granted 

RTR’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, denied O’Boyle’s Rule 

59(e) motion to reconsider, and declined to give O’Boyle leave 

to amend her complaint. She appeals.

III. Analysis

A. Dismissal

1. Standards

We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for failure 

to state a claim, accepting O’Boyle’s factual allegations as true 

and drawing all permissible inferences in her favor. West Bend 

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schumacher, 844 F.3d 670, 675 (7th Cir. 2016). 

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, 
No. 18-1936 5

O’Boyle must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 570 (2007). Whether a debt-collection letter is confusing 

is generally a fact question that, if well pleaded, survives a 

Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Zemeckis v. Glob. Credit & Collection 

Corp., 679 F.3d 632, 636 (7th Cir. 2012). But if it is “apparent 

from a reading of the letter that not even a significant fraction 

of the population would be misled by it,” then plaintiff fails 

to state a claim and dismissal is appropriate. Id. (citing Taylor 

v. Cavalry Inv., 365 F.3d 572, 574 (7th Cir. 2004)).

2. FDCPA

Here is what the FDCPA says: “A debt collector may not 

use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or 

means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 

U.S.C. § 1692e.

Section 1692e(10) prohibits a debt collector from using 

“any false representation or deceptive means to collect or 

attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information 

concerning a consumer.” Id. § 1692e(10).

Section 1692g requires debt collectors to notify consumers 

of their validation rights:

(a) Notice of debt; contents

Within five days after the initial communication 

with a consumer in connection with the 

collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, 

unless the following information is contained in 

the initial communication or the consumer has 

paid the debt, send the consumer a written 

notice containing—
6 No. 18-1936

(1) the amount of the debt;

(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is 

owed;

(3) a statement that unless the consumer, within 

thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes 

the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, 

the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt 

collector;

(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the 

debt collector in writing within the thirty-day 

period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is 

disputed, the debt collector will obtain 

verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment 

against the consumer and a copy of such 

verification or judgment will be mailed to the 

consumer by the debt collector; and

(5) a statement that, upon the consumer’s 

written request within the thirty-day period, the 

debt collector will provide the consumer with 

the name and address of the original creditor, if 

different from the current creditor.

(b) Disputed debts

... Any collection activities and communication 

during the 30-day period may not overshadow 

or be inconsistent with the disclosure of the 

consumer’s right to dispute the debt or request 

the name and address of the original creditor.

Id. § 1692g.
No. 18-1936 7

Here is what the FDCPA does not say. The FDCPA does 

not say a debt collector must put the validation notice on the 

first page of a letter. Nor does the FDCPA say the first page of 

a debt-collection letter must point to the validation notice if it 

is not on the first page. Nor does the FDCPA say a debt 

collector must tell a consumer the validation notice is 

important. Nor does the FDCPA say a debt collector may not 

tell a consumer that other information is important.

Rather, the statute in general terms forbids a debt collector 

from using “any false, deceptive, or misleading 

representation or means in connection with the collection of 

any debt.” Id. § 1692e. The statute requires a debt collector to 

give the consumer the validation notice. Id. § 1692g. The 

statute forbids a debt collector from overshadowing the 

disclosure and from engaging in communication inconsistent 

with the disclosure. Id. § 1692g(b). “Overshadowing” means 

obscuring, Muha v. Encore Receivable Mgmt., 558 F.3d 623, 629 

(7th Cir. 2009), or confusing, Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 500 

(7th Cir. 1997). “Overshadowing” can be literal, Olson v. Risk 

Mgmt. Alts., 366 F.3d 509, 512 (7th Cir. 2004); Bartlett, 128 F.3d 

at 500 (fine print, faint print, or confusing typeface), or 

metaphorical.1

Although the word “confusing” does not appear in the 

applicable statutory text, we have interpreted the FDCPA to 

prohibit confusing presentations: “The validation notice 

required by the FDCPA must be presented in a nonconfusing 

 1 Congress amended § 1692g(b) in 2006 to add “overshadow.” But as 

we noted in Zemeckis, this amendment codified a rule courts had already 

instituted. 679 F.3d at 635 n.1. So cases decided before the 2006 

amendments continue to illuminate “overshadow.”
8 No. 18-1936

manner.” Sims v. GC Servs., 445 F.3d 959, 963 (7th Cir. 2006) 

(citing Bartlett, 128 F.3d at 500). A debt collector must present 

the notice “clearly enough that the recipient is likely to 

understand it.” See Chuway v. Nat’l Action Fin. Servs., 362 F.3d 

944, 948 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Bartlett, 128 F.3d at 500–01).

3. Unsophisticated consumer

The controlling standard for determining whether this 

letter violates the FDCPA as claimed is the “unsophisticated 

consumer.” Dunbar v. Kohn Law Firm, 896 F.3d 762, 764 (7th 

Cir. 2018). The hypothetical unsophisticated consumer is 

uninformed, naïve, and trusting, but has rudimentary 

knowledge about the financial world. Boucher v. Fin. Sys. of 

Green Bay, 880 F.3d 362, 366 (7th Cir. 2018). Though not fully 

wise (the very root of “unsophisticated”) he is wise enough to 

read collection letters with added care. Id. He is reasonably 

intelligent and can make basic logical deductions and 

inferences. Id. Stew in ridiculous circular logic he does not, 

because he is “reasonable.” St. John v. Cach, LLC, 822 F.3d 388, 

390 (7th Cir. 2016). He is not the village idiot or a “dimwit.” 

Wahl v. Midland Credit Mgmt., 556 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2009). 

We rejected the “least sophisticated consumer” standard 

chartered by other circuits. Gammon v. GC Servs., 27 F.3d 1254, 

1257 (7th Cir. 1994) (“It strikes us [as] virtually impossible to 

analyze a debt collection letter based on the reasonable 

interpretations of the least sophisticated consumer.”)

Instead, we ask whether someone of modest education 

and limited commercial savvy would likely be deceived by 

the letter. Dunbar, 896 F.3d at 764. We reject bizarre, 

idiosyncratic interpretations. Id. at 765. We ask whether the 

letter “could well confuse a substantial number of recipients.” 

Taylor, 365 F.3d at 575. Under this standard, a letter might be 
No. 18-1936 9

literally true, but still misleading or confusing. Dunbar, 896 

F.3d at 765. Or a letter might be technically false, but not 

misleading or confusing. Evans v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., 

889 F.3d 337, 349 (7th Cir. 2018). This standard is objective; 

whether the letter actually misled, deceived, or confused 

O’Boyle herself is not dispositive. Lox v. CDA, Ltd., 689 F.3d 

818, 826 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he unsophisticated consumer test 

is ‘an objective one’ ... meaning that it is unimportant whether 

the individual that actually received a violative letter was 

misled or deceived.”). Also, whether RTR intended to 

mislead, deceive, or confuse is not dispositive.

4. Discussion

O’Boyle argues the district court erred in holding RTR did 

not overshadow the validation notice by referring her to 

“important information” on “the back of this page” but

providing the validation notice on a separate sheet instead. 

We disagree with O’Boyle. As a matter of law, RTR did not 

overshadow the validation notice by putting it on page two 

when page one refers to “important information” on its back, 

but there gives various notices other than the validation 

notice. To the contrary, the validation notice appears in clear, 

readily readable font near the top of page two. Even an 

unsophisticated consumer—maybe especially one—can be 

expected to read page two of a two-page collection letter.

Even if seeing the reference to “important information” on 

the back of page one, flipping there, and scanning it imposes 

a speed bump before the validation notice, it is only a slight 

speed bump, not a road barrier. After all, the reverse of page 

one begins by saying it is not a complete list of all rights 

consumers might have under federal law. And the top of page 

two immediately presents the required validation notice.
10 No. 18-1936

O’Boyle’s briefing sometimes makes it seem RTR’s 

validation notice arrived as a separate, random, easily lost 

insert. Not so. The notice appears at the top of page two, 

which looks for all the world like a continuation of the letter 

because it is a continuation of the letter. It bears a signature 

block for RTR. It includes the pagination “2 of 2.” It is 

reasonable and fair to expect an unsophisticated consumer to 

read the second page of a debt-collection letter and see this 

notice. The district court correctly concluded a consumer 

reading RTR’s letter with “added care” would “undoubtedly 

see and comprehend the validation notice.” (Order, No. 17-C0957, DE 16 at 5.) A consumer who reads the front page, 

follows the direction to see the reverse side, and scans 

through that side all the way down to the pedestrian 

Wisconsin-specific notice toward the bottom is sophisticated 

enough to see and understand the validation notice toward 

the top of page two of two. Or as the district court put it, “a 

consumer who reads the front and back of the first page of a 

short letter and then completely disregards the second page 

has not read the letter with care.” (Id.) 

O’Boyle attempts to show RTR violated a bright-line rule. 

She claims this Court “has indicated” an initial collection 

letter lacking the validation notice on the first page must 

clearly and unambiguously direct the consumer to the 

validation notice’s location. She cites Zemeckis, 679 F.3d at 637, 

and Sims, 445 F.3d at 964, for this supposed rule. If this were 

the rule, then O’Boyle would win. But it is not the rule, and 

neither case she cites established such a rule.

In Sims, two consumers each received a dunning letter. At 

the “bottom of the front page” came this warning: “‘NOTICE: 

SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR IMPORTANT CONSUMER 
No. 18-1936 11

INFORMATION.’” Sims, 445 F.3d at 961. The validation 

notice came “on the reverse side of the demand letters” in 

gray ink. Id. We affirmed summary judgment for defendants, 

concluding: “Though the validation notice text on the back is 

more difficult to read than the text on the front, it is 

adequately readable and noticeable when combined with the 

attention called to it on the front of the letter.” Id. at 964. But 

we stopped far short of declaring a bright-line rule that 

collection letters lacking the validation notice on the first page 

must clearly and unambiguously direct consumers to the 

validation notice’s location, despite O’Boyle’s contention.

In Zemeckis, we faced a nearly identical issue. A debt 

collector sent a dunning letter to a consumer. The front of the 

letter warned, in all capital letters, that the consumer should 

“‘see [the] reverse side for important information.’” Zemeckis, 

679 F.3d at 637 (alteration in Zemeckis). The validation notice 

was “on the back of the letter.” Id. We upheld dismissal for 

failure to state a claim, concluding that “locating the 

validation notice on the back of the letter, while undesireable, 

does not engender confusion sufficient to state a claim under 

the FDCPA.” Id. But again, we did not come close to 

establishing any sort of bright-line rule that collection letters 

lacking the validation notice on the first page must direct 

consumers to the validation notice’s location.

O’Boyle has not pointed us to anything in the FDCPA, the 

Supreme Court’s decisions, or our decisions establishing the 

bright-line rule she proffers. Nor could we find any such rule. 

This is probably because even an unsophisticated consumer—

maybe especially one—can be expected to read this entire 

collection letter, including page two. See Boucher, 880 F.3d at 

366 (“The unsophisticated consumer is ... wise enough to 
12 No. 18-1936

read collection notices with added care ... .”). Indeed, at some 

point, multiple warnings on the front of a two-sheet letter 

about where to flip and what is important would themselves 

confuse and overshadow, and might push the text onto a 

fourth side. Cf. Moss v. Trane U.S., No. 13-cv-42-bbc, 2016 WL 

916435, at *7 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (In the product-liability context: 

“Perversely, the confusion associated with multiple, 

potentially inconsistent, warnings might cause more harm 

than having too few warnings.”).

The validation notice in this case is arguably more 

prominent than those we held sufficient in Sims and Zemeckis. 

There, the letters carried the notices on their backs. But here, 

the notice comes toward the top of the front of the letter’s 

second page. In any event, the letter here objectively did not 

overshadow the validation notice or otherwise engender 

confusion or misunderstandings about it as alleged. O’Boyle 

claims RTR buried the validation notice. If so, the notice is an 

incorrupt corpse in an above-ground glass casket.

As for whether RTR implied the validation notice is 

unimportant by calling other information important, RTR has 

not implied this. The notice has a prominent place in the letter. 

The reference on the front of page one to its back is not a 

reference to “the only important information,” but is 

explicitly a reference to “additional important information.” 

And the back of page one leads with the warning that it is not 

a complete list of rights. Besides, the FDCPA does not require 

a debt collector to tell the consumer the validation notice is 

important. The FDCPA merely requires a debt collector to 

provide the validation notice in a manner that is not false, 

deceptive, misleading, confusing, overshadowed, or 

inconsistent.
No. 18-1936 13

It is apparent from reading the letter that not even a 

significant fraction of the population would be misled by it as 

claimed. We therefore conclude the district court properly 

dismissed O’Boyle’s complaint.

B. Amendment

1. Denial of leave to amend

When it dismissed the complaint, the district court also 

entered judgment without allowing O’Boyle to amend her 

complaint. O’Boyle filed a post-judgment motion seeking 

leave to amend to add new facts and theories supporting her 

original claim and to add entirely new claims. The proposed 

amendments (as presented in the post-judgment briefing 

below and in the appellate briefing) bleed across the line 

distinguishing the old claim from the proposed new claims.

The district court entered an order explaining it dismissed

the complaint and entered judgment without allowing an 

opportunity to amend because any amendment would be 

futile. Amending would be futile, the court reasoned, because 

the dismissal was due to the failure of O’Boyle’s legal theory, 

not any failure to plead facts necessary to support that theory.

The court turned to the new allegations in the post-trial 

motion and treated them as attempts to assert new claims. The 

court noted O’Boyle was trying to assert these new claims 

based on parts of the letter she had not previously challenged, 

and was trying to change her original legal theory. But the 

court determined O’Boyle had shown no good reason for 

waiting so long to assert these new claims, which were based 

on the same letter she attached to her original complaint and 

which did not rely on new legal authority. She had no excuse 

for waiting so long. The court concluded that allowing 
14 No. 18-1936

amendment following O’Boyle’s post-dismissal motion 

would cause undue delay, which would unfairly prejudice 

RTR and waste the court’s time and effort.

2. Standards

O’Boyle argues the court erred in denying her leave to 

amend her complaint. Generally, “a plaintiff whose original 

complaint has been dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) should be 

given at least one opportunity to try to amend her complaint 

before the entire action is dismissed.” Runnion v. Girl Scouts of 

Greater Chicago, 786 F.3d 510 at 519 (7th Cir. 2015). Rule 

15(a)(2) provides that after the period for amendment as a 

matter of course expires, the court should “freely give leave 

when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).

We generally review denial of leave to amend for abuse of 

discretion. Huon v. Denton, 841 F.3d 733, 745 (7th Cir. 2016); 

Runnion, 786 F.3d at 524. When plaintiff has had no prior 

chance to amend, our review for abuse of discretion becomes 

more rigorous. Runnion, 786 F.3d at 519. But when reviewing 

the denial of leave to amend based on futility, we apply de 

novo the legal-sufficiency standard of Rule 12(b)(6) to 

determine if the proposed amended complaint fails to state a 

claim. Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 

900 F.3d 521, 525 (7th Cir. 2018); Runnion, 786 F.3d at 524. 

“Unless it is certain from the face of the complaint that any 

amendment would be futile or otherwise unwarranted, the 

district court should grant leave to amend after granting a 

motion to dismiss.” Barry Aviation v. Land O’Lakes Mun. 

Airport Comm’n, 377 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2004).
No. 18-1936 15

3. Original claim

As noted, the court concluded that amending to try to save 

the original complaint would have been futile. We review this 

decision de novo, considering O’Boyle’s arguments below, 

echoed on appeal. We agree with the district court. Applying 

Rule 12(b)(6)’s legal-sufficiency standard, we conclude none 

of the proposed amendments would push O’Boyle’s original 

claim across the threshold of plausibility.

O’Boyle offers a litany of proposed amendments she 

argues would support her original claim, including: 1) the 

first page is so confusing it would intimidate the debtor into 

paying; 2) this confusion overshadows the validation notice 

and can be independently false, deceptive, or misleading; 3) 

the letter is false and misleading; and 4) RTR “violated the 

FDCPA simply by providing its phone number without 

adequately advising the unsophisticated consumer that she 

must dispute the debt in writing to require the debt collector 

to verify the debt.”2 She also proposes additional 

amendments to raise new claims, and seems to argue these

amendments would also support her original claim.

But no proposed amendment pushes O’Boyle’s original 

claim into the realm of plausibility. The original claim is that 

the letter misleads the unsophisticated consumer by telling 

him important information is on the back but instead putting 

 2 O’Boyle raised this phone-number problem below, but she did not 

specifically raise it on appeal until oral arguments. Therefore she forfeited 

it. To compound the problem, she was not clear whether she intended this 

new proposed allegation only to support her original claim or whether she 

intended this new allegation also to be a separate claim. But even without 

forfeiture, the denial of leave to add this allegation would survive de novo

review and abuse-of-discretion review.
16 No. 18-1936

the validation notice on the front of the second page, thereby 

overshadowing the validation notice and violating the 

FDCPA. But even accepting all O’Boyle’s factual allegations 

(original and proposed) as true and drawing all permissible 

inferences in her favor, the original claim still fails. The letter 

in no way actually alleged or proposed to be alleged 

overshadows the notice or causes confusion about the dispute 

rights under the unsophisticated consumer standard.

4. Proposed new claims

O’Boyle also offers a host of proposed amendments that 

would raise new, additional claims based on the same letter. 

The court denied leave to add these claims on the grounds of 

undue delay and prejudice. We rigorously review this 

decision for abuse of discretion.

As the court noted, O’Boyle sought leave to amend to 

assert new claims based on parts of the letter she did not 

challenge either in her original complaint or in her brief 

opposing the motion to dismiss. O’Boyle did not seek leave to 

amend her complaint in response to the motion to dismiss. 

She did not inform the court in her brief opposing the motion 

to dismiss that she intended to raise new factual allegations 

to support her original claim or that she intended to raise 

altogether new claims. She first requested leave to amend in 

her post-judgment motion. She offered no good reason below 

for waiting until then, and she offers no good reason on 

appeal. Nowhere does she argue she did not discover the 

factual or legal basis for her new claims until after dismissal. 

Neither the letter nor the letter of the law materially changed. 

The court was within its discretion in finding undue delay.
No. 18-1936 17

The court turned to an analysis of prejudice. If O’Boyle 

had sought leave to bring new claims and theories in response 

to the motion to dismiss, the court noted, it could have 

granted her leave and denied the motion to dismiss as moot, 

thereby saving RTR the expense of filing a reply in support of 

its motion and sparing the judicial resources spent deciding 

the motion. The court acknowledged RTR likely would have 

filed a new motion to dismiss attacking the amended 

complaint, but observed that the parties and the court in that 

event could have addressed all claims and theories in a single, 

efficient round. The court noted allowing O’Boyle to present 

her claims “in piecemeal fashion” would force the court to 

attend to this case twice over several months and relearn basic 

facts and legal principles. It would force the court to write two 

opinions resolving motions to dismiss instead of one. The 

court allowed that a good reason for delay might justify the 

prejudice, but noted O’Boyle offered no reason at all. The 

court was within its discretion in finding prejudice.

In sum, none of O’Boyle’s proposed amendments, 

construed broadly and in her favor, push the original claim 

into the realm of plausibility. Therefore, denial of leave to 

amend to bolster the original claim was properly grounded 

on futility. And the district court was within its discretion in 

denying O’Boyle leave to amend her complaint to raise new 

claims, given undue delay and unfair prejudice.

IV. Conclusion

We AFFIRM dismissal and denial of leave to amend.