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STRATEGIC

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War 

College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related to 

national security and military strategy with emphasis on geostrategic analysis.

The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct strategic 

studies that develop policy recommendations on:

• Strategy, planning, and policy for joint and combined 

 employment of military forces;

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having strategic implications for the Army, the Department of Defense, and the larger national security community.

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The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the 

Army to address strategic and other issues in support of Army participation in national security policy formulation.
SSI Monograph

CIVILIAN SKILLS FOR AFRICAN 

MILITARY OFFICERS

TO RESOLVE THE INFRASTRUCTURE,

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,

AND STABILITY CRISIS IN SUB-SAHARAN 

AFRICA

Diane E. Chido

March 2011

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do 

not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications 

enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them 

to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues.This report is cleared for 

public release; distribution is unlimited.

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This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copyrighted.
ii

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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should 

be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. 

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Special thanks are extended to my very able research assistant, Lieutenant Katherine Porter, who finished at the top of the 

U.S. 2010 ROTC class. Any errors or omissions are the sole responsibility of the author.

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ISBN 1-58487-480-5
iii

FOREWORD

In the United States, we often think of the military 

as an alternative to college, as a professional training 

ground, for a wide variety of skills that may include 

computer science, electronics, cooking, or medicine. 

We have comprehensive job placement and support 

programs for separating service members. Our military training includes discipline, teaming concepts, 

and a respect for civil society, traits expected to remain with a military member for life.

Through U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) 

partnership programs in Sub-Saharan Africa, many 

officers are currently benefitting from military-to-military training opportunities to learn aspects of military 

science and other basic training. A small number of officers will gain valuable skills they can use throughout 

their military careers or even in civilian life. 

Ms. Diane Chido argues that if our own military 

service members on separation or retirement faced return to their hometowns with uncertain pension payments and no transferable skills, along with a sudden 

loss of purpose and prestige, our country would not 

be as stable as it is. Remove our consistent training in 

discipline, respect for civilian authority, and loyalty to 

the national structure, and we have a greater chance of 

instability. If we add a complete lack of energy, telecommunications, and transportation infrastructure to 

support even basic economic development, we have a 

situation resembling that of many ethnically divided 

African countries, with no employment opportunities 

in the civilian sphere and where the rule of law exists 

only for some.
iv

Retirement-age military officers have historically 

engaged in coups in numerous African countries, and 

frequently civil wars reignite, even with robust disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) 

programs. If these experienced officers, accustomed to 

leading and doing, are given the skills to manage construction projects and the knowledge to design and 

build power stations, dams, bridges, and roads, and 

if noncommissioned officers are trained to run and 

maintain these projects once built; those who pledged 

to serve their country in uniform could continue to 

do so with pride and purpose while wearing mufti. 

Infrastructure development and enhanced economic 

opportunity would no longer be entirely reliant on expensive foreign aid and experts. Above all, the threat 

of destabilization would be reduced.

 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute
v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

DIANE E. CHIDO is an adjunct professor of intelligence studies at the Mercyhurst College Institute for 

Intelligence Studies. She also serves as a faculty advisor for student researchers on numerous Department 

of Defense contracts with the Center for Intelligence 

Research, Analysis, and Training. She is the President 

of DC Analytics, a research and analysis firm formed 

in October 2008. She is currently subcontracted as a 

cultural awareness expert on the Horn of Africa, assisting in creating training materials for U.S. troops. 

She has over 15 years of experience in research with 

the International Monetary Fund and with the Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Program. Ms. Chido 

publishes widely on intelligence analysis, ethnic conflict, and international security topics. She completed 

the U.S. Army Culture Center’s train-the-trainer 

course on Cultural Awareness in the Horn of Africa 

and holds a Graduate Certificate in Russian/East European Studies, a BA in international studies and Russian studies, an MA in Russian language, and an MS 

in applied intelligence analysis.

vii

SUMMARY

United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) has 

pledged to work toward stability in Africa through 

enhanced partnerships with African countries, mainly 

through military-to-military training. This is likely 

to be highly beneficial to serving officers in African 

military institutions. However, military training alone 

does not prepare those officers for separation from 

service and an uncertain future in societies that do not 

pay pensions on time, if at all, and that do not offer 

economic opportunities in general, but especially not 

to those without needed skills.

USAFRICOM is at a unique point in its engagement with the continent as it develops programs and 

adjusts its approach. This is the optimum time to create 

a holistic framework in which to focus on training and 

to give these officers sustainable skills in engineering 

and other technical fields as part of the military curriculum. Such skills are urgently needed to construct 

and maintain the national infrastructures now lacking 

in Africa. Such infrastructures are essential if Africa 

is to move into the new economy. Moreover, such an 

effort will ultimately provide opportunities for retired 

service members to continue to contribute to building 

the societies they once served to protect.

1

CIVILIAN SKILLS FOR AFRICAN 

MILITARY OFFICERS

TO RESOLVE THE INFRASTRUCTURE,

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,

AND STABILITY CRISIS IN SUB-SAHARAN 

AFRICA

PROBLEMS OF STABILITY IN SUB-SAHARAN 

AFRICA 

Quintius [Cincinnatus] laid down his dictatorship on 

the sixteenth day, having received it for six months.1

Livy

Like Cincinnatus, who peacefully returned to his 

family farm at the end of his agreed term as Roman 

military dictator, retiring American military officers 

typically look forward to promising second careers. 

These may be in the private sector, either as contractors to the military or consultants in various capacities, or by entering a field in which they were trained 

while in the service, such as accounting, engineering, 

information management, or medicine. 

If these individuals faced simply heading back to 

their hometowns with uncertain pension payments 

and no transferable skills, could we assume that such 

a dire decline in their fortunes, along with a sudden 

loss of prestige and purpose, would not adversely affect American social stability? It might not, because so 

much of our military training emphasizes discipline 

and loyalty to the nation. Would that be enough, 

though?

A common characteristic of Sub-Saharan Africa is 

lack of economic opportunity. This lack underpins its 
2

history of instability, which is particularly pervasive in 

post-conflict societies. Such societies tend repeatedly 

to descend into conflict when economic interests begin 

to collide. Lieutenant Colonel Clarence Bouchat’s January 2010 Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publication, 

Security and Stability in Africa: A Development Approach, 

provides “a primer for military and government staff 

members who may be unfamiliar with Africa but are 

assigned duties that involve participation in African 

affairs.” Bouchat’s paper “lays a foundation as to how 

and why the U.S. Government, and especially the 

military, might become involved in improving African economic development and political governance 

in order to attain security and stability.” 

Bouchat also explains that, 

Economic activities are the most central of all human 

endeavors. Although rich in human and geographic 

diversity, Africa has fallen behind the rest of the world 

in its economic development, adversely impacting 

African aspirations. . . . [E]conomic development and 

good governance need to be the basis of security and 

stability in Africa, and why both should be a main focus for U.S. military engagement on the continent.2

The only part of Bouchat’s argument with which 

one might find fault regards whether good governance should be a primary focus for U.S. military 

engagement. While economic development through 

targeted education under the direction of the U.S. military is a likely gateway to good governance, the military should not engage in expensive and commonly 

unsuccessful anti-corruption programs currently and 

historically imposed on the nations of Sub-Saharan 

Africa.

We must look at Africa without our Western filter in order to understand it from a cultural and his-
3

torical perspective. Today’s nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other institutions gnash their 

teeth in frustration with corrupt African regimes. But 

transparency and the Western concept of good governance may not be the immediate priorities we think 

they should be. Perhaps these Western concepts and 

mechanisms must develop out of economic necessity 

and an indigenous desire within the construct of more 

robust economic systems that serve broader elements 

of society. 

The Western view is that good governance and 

transparency are required before sustainable economic development can exist. However, it is more likely 

that training for the development of tangible assets 

within these countries will cause economic development to occur organically as people use those assets in 

ways intended or even unanticipated--such as using 

a poorly placed but newly paved road to dry tobacco 

leaves--to build up their own economic positions. Respect for property rights, contracts, and the rule of law 

developed in Western Europe over a period of centuries. Similarly, only when people gain economic success and interests worth protecting can they gradually 

evolve into a base that compels national governments 

to be responsive to their constituencies, thus imposing 

good governance from below.

On a continent so rich in mineral and oil resources, 

one of the vital missing elements of economic success 

is infrastructure. From the colonial powers’ exploiting the region since the 17th century, to the Chinese 

seeking oil there in the 1970s, to the West’s ravenous 

search for minerals today, roads and rails were built 

from the mine or the well to the port. These innovations were strictly for economic exploitation rather 

than as in Western Europe, connecting people inter-
4

nally, which likely would have prevented many of the 

post-independence battles over power and resources 

that still occur today.

Richard Dowden notes in his book, Africa: Altered 

States, Ordinary Miracles (2009): 

Africa’s economies were twisted to serve Europe’s 

needs. With the missionaries and colonial governors 

came the destruction of Africa’s political systems, its 

culture, its dignity and self-worth. The brutal but brief 

conquest of Africa, particularly south of the Sahara, 

left it somehow stranded between tradition and Western modernity. . . . In Africa the European powers had 

been strong enough to destroy or subdue traditional 

African political systems but did not stay long enough 

to create new ones.3

In this conflict-prone region, national disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs do not go far enough in providing vocational 

training for former military or paramilitary members. 

Despite the best efforts of well-meaning civil society 

and rule-of-law training, the overriding factor that 

emerges in keeping African ex-combatants from returning to the battlefield is jobs (individual and group 

post-traumatic therapy could greatly assist as well). 

But training for jobs is missing within African military establishments for those who will one day retire. 

Without jobs, they may otherwise resort to coups to 

maintain their status quo.

Therefore, rather than continuing to spend so much 

on post-conflict peacekeeping and nation rebuilding, 

focusing on creating opportunities and training programs leading to lucrative and status-maintaining civilian careers for serving African officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) is more likely to enhance 
5

the economic underpinnings of stability throughout 

the region. A number of African countries have military academies, but the vast majority of these teach 

only military sciences, not engineering or computer 

science, unlike, for example, West Point in the United 

States. When African officers and NCOs retire, all they 

know is soldiering. 

Botswana is known in the region for its stability 

and relative economic opportunities. It is difficult not 

to connect this happy status with the fact that the 

majority of serving officers in the Botswana Defence 

Forces have completed U.S.-sponsored International 

Military Education and Training (IMET), billed as “a 

low cost, key funding component of U.S. security assistance.” In addition to traditional military training, 

IMET graduates also receive instruction in “aviation 

safety . . . and [repair of] aircraft structure, fire control 

systems, avionics flight systems, and radio repair.”4

Expanding on the IMET concept by establishing a 

single training facility in Africa would enable the U.S. 

military to provide engineering training to selected officers and NCOs. This could make an already low-cost 

program even less expensive as the early cohorts provide the trainers. Provision of engineering, telecommunications, and other valuable skills transferrable 

to the civilian economy would improve the discipline 

and loyalty of national service officers and NCOs. Use 

of this ready labor force to create a sustainable, functional infrastructure is also likely to attract needed 

private foreign investment. 

Graduates will provide local expertise for infrastructure development, putting the tools in place for 

purely African solutions, without foreign entities 

determining the direction development should take. 

The African stakeholders themselves, in the form of 
6

governments, business interests, indigenous NGOs, 

and private investors, will identify the most pressing 

needs, develop the plans, create the supporting industries, and engage proactively in creating a future for 

Africa, without resorting to welfare state dependency 

resulting from aid-addicted budgets and corrupt regimes. 

The Importance of Infrastructure to African 

Development.

According to a 2008 World Bank study, the lack of 

infrastructure in African nations diminishes business 

productivity by 40 percent. The largest infrastructure 

deficit is the inability to develop power and industrial 

sectors.5 Once these fundamental gaps are filled, other 

aspects of African infrastructure can be expected to 

improve. 

In conjunction with underdeveloped power industries, Africa writ large also lacks a unified road 

and rail infrastructure, which paralyzes its macro 

economies and divides the citizenry. However, at 

the regional and individual country level, the lack of 

physical infrastructure is also preventing growth and 

foreign investment needed to advance power and industrial sectors, and is ultimately limiting economic 

opportunity at the micro level, which leads to further 

instability. 

As noted by Terry Dunmire, Corporate Council on 

Africa’s (CCA) host to the U.S.-Africa Infrastructure 

Conference in Washington, DC, in July 2007: 

Infrastructure and its effectiveness and stability are 

the key skeletal structures on which the economies [of 

Africa] depend. It is the transportation systems that 

permit the goods and service to move effectively to 
7

and from the markets; it is the telecommunications 

and IT [information technology] infrastructure that 

link the Continent with the rest of the world; it is the 

logistical systems that deliver products for all aspects 

of daily life; it is the electrical and power systems that 

make it run—in short, it is the efficiency and sufficiency of infrastructure that [are] essential to continued 

economic development in Africa.6

With regard to the value of using military resources to aid in infrastructure development, Adam Hochschild tells us in King Leopold’s Ghost that even in the 

Congo in 1889: 

[A]lmost all of Leopold’s [Leopold II, King of the Belgians] agents in the Congo were officers on extended 

leave from the Belgian or other European armies. Staff 

in place and tools in hand, Leopold set out to build 

the infrastructure necessary to exploit his colony. A 

rudimentary Congo transportation system was the 

first item on his agenda, without it, the territory’s 

riches, whatever they might turn out to be, could not 

be brought to the sea except on foot.7

But while Leopold wisely used military resources 

to build infrastructure, the infrastructure built was 

for the wrong purpose. Unfortunately, Leopold’s 

scheme produced a prime example of much of the existing infrastructure across Sub-Saharan Africa. With 

very few exceptions, roads and railways, many of 

which have not seen significant improvements since 

the late 19th century, were built from mine to port, 

or merely served as a conduit for moving riches from 

the exploited colony to the mother country in Europe. 

They were not planned to move later commerce or to 

connect communities internally. This early pattern has 

perpetuated the divisive nature of tribalism and re-
8

gionalism that so often degenerate into violent clashes 

to obtain economic potential for one’s own, mainly in 

the form of land, natural resources, and labor.

This pattern is still being pursued with the majority of transportation and mining infrastructure rapidly built today by Chinese engineers in regions with 

valuable mineral and oil resources. It serves only the 

industries in which the Chinese firms have an interest, 

doing little to interconnect other commercial sectors 

and communities. In addition, indigenous jobs are 

not created by these projects, since the contracts go 

to Chinese firms that use their own labor resources.8

Therefore, such infrastructural investments are unlikely to lead to long-term economic growth, either at 

the macro level for the country at large, or at the micro 

level for the benefit of individual African workers. 

SUPPORT FOR INFRASTRUCTURE 

DEVELOPMENT AS KEY TO STABILITY

In the past, U.S. policymakers have tended to behave as patrons, treating each African country on a 

case-by-case basis by attempting to develop ties with 

individual leaders—using incentives such as food or 

other humanitarian or financial assistance and providing military training exercises and materiel. However, 

the United States has increasingly recognized Africa 

as the next front in the battle against radical Islam and 

as a strategic theater demanding a counterbalance 

against rising Chinese influence in the region. Thus, 

for America to provide practical education that can 

support African economic development is a logical 

approach. 
9

The mandate of the newly established U.S. Africa 

Command (AFRICOM), requiring joint efforts of the 

U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of State (DoS), is to enhance the development of 

professional, transparent, democratic, and appropriately tasked military institutions in African partner 

countries. It is instructive to note that U.S. policymakers, as well as Africans, have supported infrastructure 

as a key to this development. The AFRICOM 2009 

Posture Statement notes the lack of infrastructure as a 

major factor “hindering states’ efforts to develop in an 

ever-globalizing international environment.”9

AFRICOM Commander General William “Kip” 

Ward’s Commander’s Intent 2010 statement notes that: 

[O]ur national interests lie in a stable continent of Africa. This means that Africans live in the relative peace 

of a stable environment, are governed effectively, and 

enjoy a degree of economic and social advancement. 

An Africa whereby African populations are able to 

provide for themselves, contribute to global economic 

development, and allow access to markets in free, fair, 

and competitive ways, is good for America and for 

the world. . . . We will build partner security capacity 

in areas such as support and special staff capabilities, 

the African non-commissioned officer corps, and military/dual use infrastructures. . . . 10

Prior to his appointment as AFRICOM Commander, General Ward declared in a November 14, 2007, 

interview on The Charlie Rose Show that he sees American forces in Africa “as facilitators, as trainers, as examples, as models, as forces for helping Africans be 

better prepared to increase their capacity to do their 

work.”11

Before he even began his assignment as AFRICOM 

commander, Ward already knew what needed to be 

done. The Sub-Saharan region as a whole has not fully 
10

recovered from the shock of colonialism and the sudden onslaught of independence. Understanding this 

region as a body in the throes of post-traumatic stress, 

as opposed to a lagging developmental headache, provides us a better perspective for treating it in a holistic 

manner appropriate to its ills. 

In a 2007 article entitled “Horizons of Hope,” Ward 

discussed his experiences in three post-conflict operational environments, Somalia (1992), Bosnia (2000), 

and Palestine (2005):

The United States and the international community 

must take the initiative to influence and rectify postconflict situations before they become new fronts in 

the war on terror. . . . Unlike war plans that direct 

our own activities to achieve an objective, road maps 

recommend activities of the supported nation. Thus, 

they provide war-torn nations with plans and a direction that they themselves should embark upon. . . . 

The more situation-dependent implementation phase 

follows with the deliberate efforts to stabilize, reconstruct, and rebuild the country, concluding with the 

transition to an effective and stable society [which 

secures] the critical surviving infrastructure such as 

power grids, transportation networks, farmland, manufacturing, and other elements vital to the early reconstruction of the economy. . . . At the end of the implementation phase, the nation’s economy is sufficiently 

self-sustaining that it can seek any further economic 

assistance on its own through standard international 

channels.12

By following Ward’s own prescription, his Command can implement the U.S. Military Academy model as the road map for providing substantial and useful education to African military officers and NCOs, 

thus offering entire societies the opportunity to tap 

into their own structures and human resources to de-
11

velop the tangible linkages necessary for sustained 

economic growth and a healthy body politic.

DoD Directive 3000.05, U.S. Department of Defense, 

Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and 

Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations (November 2005), establishes that it is DoD policy to “continue to support 

the development, implementation, and operations of 

civil-military teams and related efforts aimed at unity 

of effort in: rebuilding basic infrastructure; developing local governance structures; fostering security, 

economic stability, and development; and building 

indigenous capacity for such tasks.”13

In their January 2010 Strategic Studies Institute 

(SSI) monograph, Security Sector Reform: A Case Study 

Approach to Transition and Capacity Building, Sarah Meharg and Aleisha Arnusch argue that stability requires 

a level of economic development that provides opportunities for the rising majority of currently idle and 

uneducated youth in Sub-Saharan African countries 

to participate in constructive activities. They further 

note that the U.S. Government’s security sector reform 

(SSR) agenda is aligned with the goals of its partners, 

including:

[M]embers of the OECD [Organisation for Economic 

Co-Operation and Development] view development 

and security as inextricably linked. . . . Security in all 

its dimensions is fundamental to reducing poverty, 

protecting human rights, and achieving UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).”14

The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Africa 

Infrastructure Fact Sheet states that “Poor infrastructure 

is an obstacle to private sector investment on the African continent, significantly driving up the cost of doing business, limiting new opportunities, and stunting 

economic growth.15
12

Additionally, research has shown strong links between improved infrastructure and poverty reduction, 

particularly in the areas of income, education, and 

health. As a result, the vast majority of countries eligible for Millennium Challenge Corporation funding 

have requested assistance in addressing local infrastructure needs. Among other initiatives, MCC projects include improvements to roads, bridges, energy 

facilities, water services, industries, and schools.16

Since the focus of this monograph is on Sub-Saharan Africa, it is appropriate to note what African 

leaders themselves have determined to be the critical 

infrastructure needs for economic development. This 

is clearly laid out in the New Partnership for Africa’s 

Development (NEPAD) Strategic Framework, adopted at the 37th Summit of the Organisation for African 

Unity (OAU) in July 2001 as a program to create an 

integrated socioeconomic development framework 

for Africa. NEPAD’s October 2001 report offers an initial road map that Ward said is so important for constructing or reconstructing these societies, including, 

“roads, highways, airports, seaports, railways, waterways, and telecommunications facilities.”17

Western Aid Unsustainable Without Local Skills.

A recent New York Times article referred to the 

Ethiopian village of Koraro as “an important testing 

ground for the Millennium Village Project (MVP), an 

experiment in global development strategy spearheaded by economist Jeffrey Sachs.” This case underscores 

the need to create the indigenous human capital that 

Africa needs to develop. “I think the sustainability of 

the project is a real problem,” notes Robert Chase, a 

World Bank Economist and Human Development 
13

Sector Leader in Ethiopia. “How you’re going to pull 

out and expect the economic growth to continue is not 

immediately clear to me.” 

The article noted that others

question the team’s ability to scale the project up to 

the hundreds of millions of people stuck in extreme 

poverty, cringing at the additional billions of dollars 

that would need to be spent and the army of welltrained, highly-educated managers that would need 

to be identified.

 It further notes that 

one MVP employee who has worked at multiple Millennium Villages (and wished to remain anonymous) 

said that the local project coordinators—people with 

significant development experience and ties to the 

region—are few and far between. Finding similarlyqualified people to liaise with every single village 

throughout the poverty-stricken world, he believes, is 

a long shot.18

Stella Kagwanja, a Kenyan woman from the Kamba tribe, said recently at a U.S. Army Culture Center 

event, “You know, Africans have a collective culture, 

once you teach something to one person, you have 

taught a whole village, because they will go home and 

teach everyone what they have learned.” Kagwanja 

went on to say that: 

Everyone worries about all this tribalism. This is not 

an important issue in reality, because if the Kamba 

or the Luo see the Kikuyu doing something or having something like a new road or a power station in 

their lands, they will work to make sure they have one 

too. This is also the beauty of building infrastructure, 

who cares if the Kikuyu are getting all the funding 
14

now for new roads, for instance, once the roads are 

there, everyone can use them, not only the Kikuyu or 

whomever built them. Once they are there, everybody 

benefits.19

As noted in a recent Philadelphia Enquirer article, 

“The Joint Chiefs Chairman, Admiral Mike Mullen, 

travelled to the opening of one of the Central Asia 

Institute’s (CAI’s) Afghan schools, and later told an 

American Legion convention: ‘We cannot capture 

hearts and minds. We must engage them; we must listen to them’.”20

U.S. civilian officials have been slower to grasp the 

need to confer more with locals and find it harder to 

do because of security considerations. CAI Director 

Greg Mortenson says if they did sit down with shuras (councils of local elders), they would understand 

that what Afghans want most is training, whether in 

regular schools, or vocational or agricultural courses. 

Rather than use big contractors, he says, we must 

teach the Afghans themselves to do the job.21

The same can clearly be said of Africans individually, and of the Sub-Saharan region generally, that is 

otherwise likely to become prey to extremist ideologies. Such training in this region, even in its genesis, is 

likely to head off many of the problems that U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) is now fighting to contain 

and eliminate. Why not train in-country for the skills 

needed? Why have to scour Western universities, as 

is currently happening, for qualified engineers, project managers, and development experts at prohibitive 

costs, when they could be found among African military officers and NCOs seeking a useful transition to 

civilian life?
15

AFRICAN MILITARIES: SUPPORTERS OR 

DESTABILIZERS?

Meharg and Arnusch assert that: 

Peace spoilers are a source of risk during peace and 

stability operations, in particular to SSR activities. 

Spoilers are nonstate actors that can be individual 

leaders as well as organizations that believe the stability emerging from intervention threatens their 

power, worldview, cultural identities, and interests, 

and therefore they will use techniques to undermine 

attempts to achieve stable outcomes.22

In Sub-Saharan Africa, historical precedent requires this list of spoilers to be expanded to include 

serving members of national military organizations, 

who undermine stability by installing spoiler leaders 

as in Zimbabwe; and members who choose to participate in military coups and insurgencies, as in Nigeria, 

Somalia, and elsewhere.

William Tordoff in his book, Government and Politics in Africa, includes an entire chapter on the causes 

of military coups: 

a. Factionalism: including tribalism, elitism, regionalism, and the cultural mandate that, once in 

power of any kind, it is your responsibility to ensure 

that your group monopolizes the economic trough. 

We note, however, that as the national supply increases, the dipping into the till diminishes.

b. Ideology: radicalism among the ruling elite or 

military elite. When there is constructive work to be 

had and done, and enough to go around, the attraction of radicalism is reduced. 

c. Threat to military corporate interests. Further 

educating and professionalizing the military officer 

and NCO corps is likely to create a mirroring effect 
16

by later expanding the new middle class that will ultimately ensure that the rulers are responsible to the 

taxpaying electorate, thus increasing stability and 

accountability in all facets of society. Secure pay and 

benefits for military retirees and those in active service 

will reinforce this beneficial effect.

d. Personal Issues. Providing opportunities for exmilitary in the civilian sector diminishes turf battles 

and the need to protect one’s own interests at the expense of society.23

Providing widespread economic opportunity 

within society, especially for army officers and NCOs 

when they separate from service, is likely to diminish 

greatly the pressures of these underlying causes.

As Nigeria has been the most coup-prone and corrupt of the region’s states since independence, it is not 

surprising that it has a poor record of caring for its 

retired military. At the very least, ensuring retirement 

payments should be a priority. In December 2009, the 

new Chairman of the Military Pensions Board (MPB), 

Brigadier General BVT Kwaji, reported on the military 

pension plan in place by law since 2004. He found that 

the Pension Reform Act had not improved the problem of irregular pay for military retirees.24

A 2009 allAfrica article praised Kwaji’s efforts to 

improve the situation, stating, “Before his arrival, it 

was almost seen as a luxury to extend pension and 

gratuity to retired and discharged members of the 

country’s military force, who had put their lives on 

the line to defend the land.”25 Encouraging those currently serving to pursue education that would provide economic opportunity upon separation is likely 

to prevent additional military coups and improve Nigeria’s poor infrastructure, thus removing some of the 
17

financial burden on the state, which has thus far failed 

to provide its pledged support.

Some countries in the region are making military 

education a priority and striving to use it as a resource 

to grow their economic opportunities across society. 

Botswana and Somaliland, for example, are focused 

on the value of education, seeing the military as an important component of stability. Nigeria is a negative 

example, demonstrating how not to invest effectively 

in infrastructure.

Botswana: “What Africa Might Have Become.”

Botswana has not experienced violence, nor has it 

required DDR programs. It is commonly held up as the 

prime example of what can go right in Sub-Saharan Africa. It must be noted that although there is a minority 

population of Bushmen who still live in the traditional 

mode, they do not directly interact with the majority 

Botswana population, which is largely homogeneous 

and a strong factor in the country’s stability. Botswana 

is an example of the effective use of an African military to safeguard national infrastructure. In his book, 

Africa: Altered States, Ordinary Miracles (2009), Richard Dowden notes, “Botswana’s elected government 

spent the money [from diamond revenues] on giving 

its people improved education and health and better 

roads and water. Visiting Botswana makes you realize 

what all of Africa might have become.”26

The Botswana Defence Forces (BDF) are often 

hailed as a model professional military, with 30 officers a year participating in U.S. Army IMET training.27 Analysts have described the BDF as having high 

standards of discipline, an emphasis on education, 

and competent leadership at all levels. Reflecting 
18

awareness of the need for an effective selection and 

admissions policy for U.S.-sponsored training efforts, 

the BDF starts “with good human material. It is very 

selective in recruitment of its personnel and education 

plays a key role in personnel selection and career progression.”28

The BDF sends many officers to study in South 

Africa and overseas, with a Jane’s estimate in 2004 

that “75% of BDF officers above the rank of major are 

graduates of U.S. military schools.” According to Dan 

Henk’s interview in the same year with Lieutenant 

Colonel P. T. F. Sharp, BDF Director of Career Development and Training: 

The minimum educational qualification for an officer 

candidate is a Cambridge A-level “first class pass” and 

half of the officer candidates selected for BDF service 

have university degrees. Enlisted recruits must at a 

minimum possess a Cambridge O-level certification. 

Many of the successful enlisted applicants have additional trade school or apprenticeship training as well.29

In 2007, Henk detailed the effectiveness of the BDF 

as an instrument of positive growth in his book, The 

Botswana Defence Force in the Struggle for an African 

Environment, which highlights the state’s use of its 

Army. Such uses include safeguarding the country’s 

unique but vulnerable wildlife. By ensuring Botswana’s status as a stable and secure nation in the region, 

the army helps the country to remain a safari tourist 

destination. The economic benefits of that industry are 

considerable, accounting for 12 percent of the gross 

domestic product (GDP) in 2008.30
19

Somaliland: Opting Out of Civil War by Building 

Capacity.

Somaliland is a republic within Somalia, having 

declared its independence from British rule in 1960 

but eventually agreeing to a partnership with Puntland and Somalia. However, once violence overtook 

those regions in 1991, the Somaliland Congress voted 

to reinstate its independent status. Since that time, 

despite the fact that no country has recognized its secession, it has managed to maintain relative security 

and stability, even prosecuting 15 pirates that Somaliland’s own Navy had caught in its territorial waters in 

December 2009.31

Interestingly, this unrecognized, poverty-stricken 

republic managed to create the Berbera Maritime 

College in 2005. This college, claiming to follow International Maritime Bureau (IMB) standards, is the 

training ground for the Somaliland Navy, with over 

100 officers specifically trained to fight pirates off the 

450 mile-long Somaliland coast. The idea of forming a 

robust Somali Coast Guard both to prevent piracy and 

to provide jobs for former pirates willing to forsake 

their current profession has been proposed by a number of international organizations and individuals, but 

rather than waiting for the world to act on the idea, 

Somaliland has gotten to work on its own.

The College’s business plan notes that despite the 

fishing industry’s potential as an economic driver, it 

contributes less than 1 percent to the nation’s gross 

national product (GNP). This is due to the “lack of adequate fishing equipment, on-shore facilities, skilled 

personnel, commercial organisation, public policy, 

and cultural orientation.” The college claims to be 

the first in the country to address these issues, aim-
20

ing to take a leading role “in the development of the 

national marine economy by providing professional 

and vocational skill training programs for secondary 

school [drop-outs], fishermen as well as ship and port 

operators.” It also aims to become a prominent marine 

research and resource center, which will undertake 

studies on marine resources, the environment, and 

commercial development.32

The course curriculum includes a full offering of 

science and mathematics courses, as well as English 

language and courses focused on port maintenance, 

the fishing industry, and marine ecology as promised. 

Although its website indicates a long “wish list” of 

materials, equipment, and even instructors needed, 

this is a critical effort to provide vocational training 

within both the civilian and military contexts so as to 

develop the knowledge and infrastructure for a sustainable economic sector. Without international recognition, Somaliland is ineligible for international aid; 

therefore, it is attempting to use education and its own 

Navy to develop expertise and infrastructure to take 

advantage of existing resources for development.

Nigeria: What NOT to Do.

The Niger Delta Development Commission 

(NDDC) was established in 2000, in recognition of 

the marginalization and environmental degradation 

caused since the 1950s in the Delta and the increasingly poor conditions of those living there as oil profits are siphoned off in Nigeria’s rampant corruption. 

In an attempt to end the violence in the region, the 

NDDC has initiated a number of localized infrastructure projects, including electrification, canals, roads, 

bridges, water systems, schools, and hospitals. The 
21

NDDC notes that its “[s]kills acquisition program is 

designed to train youths in vocational skills in various trades such as pipefitting, welding, automobile 

and river craft repairs, electrical/electronics. . . . The 

rationale is to create more jobs for youths with a view 

to making them self-reliant.” The latest NDDC data 

show that a total of 6,070 youths have benefited from 

the skills-acquisition program. A survey conducted by 

the Commission showed that most of the beneficiaries 

are either “self-employed or gainfully employed in 

private institutions.”33

This is progress of a sort, but it is notable that so 

few have been trained and that these students are 

self-employed when they could be building the infrastructure the program has mandated as its goal. As 

recently as February 18, 2010, the Nigerian House of 

Representatives passed a bill recommending that “all 

operators and alliance partners . . . maintain a bidding 

process for acquiring goods and services which shall 

give full and fair opportunity to Nigerian indigenous 

contractors and companies.” The bill further states that 

“qualified Nigerians shall be given first consideration 

for training and employment in work programmes for 

which the plan was submitted.”34 This bill was passed 

nearly 10 years after the NDDC Act went into effect. 

Most egregiously, the lawmakers only belatedly (2009) 

recognized that “operators should train Nigerians in 

the areas Nigerians were not [qualified for] in oil and 

gas contracts due to lack of requisite experience and 

qualification.”35

An October 2009 BBC report on the progress of 

Nigeria’s current demobilization of Movement for the 

Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) militants 

notes: 
22

Until now, they have lived in militant camps, carrying out kidnappings, blowing up oil pipelines and 

stealing massive amounts of crude oil. What happens 

to these men now is crucial to the future of the Delta. 

Already there have been street protests in Yenagoa, in 

Bayelsa State, by youths angry at not receiving money 

they had been promised in return for dumping guns. 

The government says it will take these young men and 

re-train them—sponsoring them through education 

to learn new skills or trades. But if the promises of a 

better future are broken, it is likely they will return to 

violence.36

The Nigerian authorities are only beginning the 

process of interviewing these young men at transitional centers to determine what kind of training they 

want and need. The next questions include who will 

provide and fund the program, and will society accept them in their chosen trades if they actually obtain 

the promised education? Bonny Gaeei, a young leader 

who induced the 260 former MEND members under 

his command to turn in their weapons, said, “I trust 

them, I must trust them. They, the government, they 

have every power. Let them do as they say. If they 

don’t? Then, I will bust pipelines again. That is the 

truth.”37

Nigeria has the capacity to make good on these 

promises with its proven oil reserves and the many 

jobs this industry should have been providing for Nigerians since the 1950s. However, the government has 

succumbed to the “Dutch Disease,” that is, failing to 

develop the industry as a national asset for economic 

growth, but rather as a cash cow for elites. Today, only 

a small percentage of those employed in Nigeria’s oil 

and gas industry are Nigerian. 
23

Augustine Ikelegbe described the negative effects 

of the mismanagement of oil revenues in the Delta in 

a 2006 African and Asian Studies article, noting that the 

economy of conflict has destroyed the traditional cohesive culture and replaced it with new values. These 

new values only help private interests, and lead to 

disrespect for elders and traditional systems. Ikelegbe 

says that they have also created a “macho, might is 

right, cultist and violent culture. Productive labor has 

been disdained in the context of cheap oil fallouts and 

handouts.”38

There is a widespread understanding that DDR, 

including a universal appreciation for education as a 

basis for economic growth, is an important aspect of 

post-conflict civil-society building. However, implementation tends to be the sticking point. 

In the popular book Three Cups of Tea (2006), there 

is a poignant scene between the author, Greg Mortenson, and an Afghan warlord, Sadhar Khan. Mortenson 

notes that Khan routinely collected “tolls” from opium traffickers crossing his fiefdom and used the funds 

to help his people in Baharak, Northern Afghanistan, 

by building a huge bazaar and extending loans to his 

men to set up lucrative shops once they laid down 

their arms. Khan commented to Mortenson that all 

the stones they saw in the valley below the roof of 

the building on which they stood represented Khan’s 

fallen soldiers, his mujahedeen, and asked Mortenson 

to turn all these stones into schools as a monument to 

their sacrifice.39

A 2007 UNDP report assessing the effectiveness of 

DDR programs in Africa asserts, “[O]f those emerging 

states that have relapsed into conflict since the end of 

the cold war, the failure of DDR has contributed, either 

directly or indirectly, to the outbreak of approximate-
24

ly 60% of these armed conflicts.”40 The common factor 

in all these experiences is the clear understanding that 

one-time payoffs, individual therapy, and civil society 

training are not enough to dissuade potential spoilers 

from causing further instability. 

The critical factor for success is providing skills 

training that can ensure viable employment in infrastructure creation and maintenance for individual and 

societal development. While the training may be provided by foreign entities, the participants self-select 

for the skill-sets most appropriate to the domestic 

economy, matching those needed for building the infrastructure that will lead to sustainable overall economic development. In Nigeria, the focus would initially be on professions associated with the oil and gas 

industry; in Liberia, the timber industry; and so on.

In the final phase of post-conflict DDR, reintegration, only the very basic aspects of education are addressed in most cases, as noted by Massimo Fusato 

in a 2003 article describing the processes and requirements of successful DDR: 

Economic integration is the final requirement for a 

DDR program to be successful and sustainable in the 

long term. The goal of economic reintegration efforts 

is to provide ex-combatants with financial independence through employment. . . . Common economic 

integration programs include education and professional training, public employment, encouragement 

of private initiative through skills development and 

microcredit support, and access to land.41

Only the most cursory attention to education 

and professional training is made in most cases, and 

Fusato notes that cash payments in place of training 

tend to be favored for ex-combatants. However, their 
25

effectiveness has not been proven as a long-term strategy. As stated by Mr. Francis Kai-Kai, who headed 

Sierra Leone’s national DDR committee, “You don’t 

just focus on men and weapons, but on their futures 

as well.”42

As attested by a review of a number of African 

DDR cases, vocational training emerges as the greatest single indicator of success. However, rather than 

rewarding combatants who have destabilized central 

governments, this review advocates rewarding those 

in the national military who are currently serving to 

support and maintain central government stability. 

The primary participants should be those who have 

done their duty and deserve the skills needed to 

achieve success when they separate. At that time, they 

are able to combine those infrastructure-developing 

skills with the discipline and desire to continue to 

serve their nation.

The point of this monograph is not necessarily to 

suggest that the intent of training African officers and 

NCOs as engineers while they are in the military is for 

them to perform that duty while in the service. But a 

case might be made, in some instances, for creating a 

separate serving corps for infrastructure development 

along the lines of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, as 

Botswana has done. 

EDUCATION AND TRAINING MODELS FOR 

AFRICAN MILITARY ACADEMIES

The need in Sub-Saharan Africa is for trained engineers of various types to spearhead infrastructure 

development as civilian actors, whether employed 

by their own civil administrations or local or international NGOs, or in private practice with local capital 
26

or through foreign direct investment. Engineering 

training is not needed only in African militaries, but 

the military provides the necessary structure and the 

discipline for developing this capacity. Moreover, 

it is an arena in which U.S. partnership is uniquely 

suited. The added benefit of improving civil-military 

relations as a result of visible infrastructure projects is 

likely to further enhance stability in the region.

Except for South Africa, the Botswanan, Kenyan, 

and Tanzanian militaries have the most advanced 

military academies in Sub-Saharan Africa and provide 

training for their own and for other African countries’ 

service personnel. However, based on these nations’ 

institutions, it is evident that the current model of 

military academies in Africa is that of a liberal arts 

education with a focus on humanities. While this approach is understandable, given the current role of 

African militaries in peacekeeping and humanitarian 

missions, it likely does little to benefit post-military 

careers or to create the skills needed for national economic development.43

The lack of infrastructure development in Africa is 

not strictly a military problem; however, the model of 

the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers (CoE) and the U.S. 

armed services engineering components indicates that 

having the military involved in infrastructure development and maintenance is likely an efficient strategy. 

There are myriad historical examples of critical 

infrastructure development, both domestic and overseas, where these U.S. military-engineering organizations have participated. More specifically, U.S. Army 

CoE, as part of the Military Civic Action (MCA), operated in Africa from 1985 to 1995, working to build 

up civil capabilities. The goal of the program was to 

demonstrate to African militaries the usefulness of 
27

building facilities for civilians as a method to improve 

civil-military relations and civil-military trust.44

The program was extremely successful in improving civil opinion of the military; however, U.S. engineers provided all the technical expertise. The United 

States supplied all of the technical engineering assistance in project evaluation, planning, and cost estimates; site surveys; logistical advice; implementation 

oversight; and a limited amount of equipment procurement, materials, and spare parts.45 Consequently, 

once each individual project was complete, the host 

nation was left with no residual capability to duplicate its success. 

While the majority of U.S. Army CoE personnel 

are not military officers, the leader of the organization 

is, and the organization has a clear military affiliation 

and atmosphere.46 Additionally, the United States has 

built an engineering component into each of its services with many certified engineers serving as junior 

and senior officers. 

This capability is not only combat effective; it also 

provides vital skills, training, and educational opportunities to individual officers once their military service is complete. According to a 1999 report, the U.S. 

military and government employed over 110,000 engineers combined, whereas the private sector employed 

1.3 million. However, engineers employed in the private sector tended to be older by 4 years on average, 

and private sector employers tend to favor applicants 

with proven job experience gained through military 

engineering service.47

The importance of engineering and technical skills 

to the U.S. military is evident in the curriculum of the 

U.S. military service academies, particularly West 
28

Point. Every cadet attending the academy must take a 

minimum of four math, two chemistry, two information technology, two physics, and three engineering 

courses as part of the basic curriculum.

Additionally, cadets can choose to major in one of 

only three tracks: engineering, science, or humanities. 

According to West Point’s own data, approximately 

45 percent of students choose to focus on engineering or science. Within the engineering program, the 

Academy offers six specific accredited programs: 

civil engineering, electrical engineering, engineering 

management, environmental engineering, mechanical 

engineering, and systems engineering.48 In addition to 

West Point, the other service academies have similarly 

strong engineering and science traditions.49

In contrast, African militaries and military academies lack the engineering education and training 

available to U.S. officers. The Kenyan military academy, for example, does not offer any engineering 

programs, and the only relevant courses offered are 

in basic mathematics and computer use. However, the 

Kenyan Army Electrical and Mechanical Engineering specialty is similar to the engineering Military 

Occupation Specialty in the U.S. Army. The Kenyan 

Air Force does offer engineering programs and degree opportunities to future officers that are likely to 

be of an extremely high caliber.50 However, it is still 

the only service with an engineering training capability, which is used only in narrowly operational roles 

within the military and is compartmentalized within 

the air force.51

While it is likely that a transition to a science and 

technology focused military academy system based 

on the U.S. West Point model would greatly benefit 

African militaries, the Chinese model of officer place-
29

ment in civil service and infrastructure development 

projects is also a possible model to increase civil-military stability in Africa. If a Kenyan officer retires prior 

to the age of 55, he or she must remain in a reserve 

capacity.52 In contrast, officers who retire at any age 

from the Chinese military are funneled into civil service. Over the last 60 years, the Chinese government 

estimates that over 4 million former officers have been 

assigned jobs working on civil service projects building Chinese infrastructure in both rural and urban areas.53

The Chinese model thus instills a lifelong dedication to and investment in the country by its military 

officers (we must admit that opportunities for some 

usurpation of state resources serve as an additional incentive), making it unlikely that officers would want to 

undermine the country’s stability. This principle was 

underscored by Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping’s 

statement that officers “carry on a good tradition in 

the army, maintain loyalty to the party, and continue 

working for the country’s development and stability.”54 By applying the Chinese model in conjunction 

with a well-trained engineering corps, African governments would be able to build capacity in former 

officers to develop the infrastructure of the nation, 

foster continued loyalty to the nation, and remove an 

incentive to participate in coups or other destabilizing 

activities. 

In conjunction with the improvement of officer 

education and placement, it is highly likely that the 

development of a job-placement program for enlisted 

soldiers and NCOs would greatly improve civil-military relations. In conjunction with the data from other 

cases noted above, from 1992 to 1995, Uganda conducted a large demobilization. However, there were 

clear failures to provide post-military workshops, a 
30

drought coincidentally created unexpected agricultural strains, housing and residency issues arose for 

displaced veterans, and all but the most conspicuously qualified veterans lacked marketable skills and thus 

money to live. Accordingly, the general public became 

fearful of the veterans’ presence in society.55

For correcting these problems, a 2001 monograph 

by the South African-based Institute for Security Studies recommends that prior to any demobilization, governments plan for transition by the following steps: 

(1) create social networks to help integrate and transition soldiers back into civilian society; (2) provide 

them with information and training; (3) alert domestic 

firms of the skills soldiers offer to private industry; (4) 

provide vouchers for technical training; (5) encourage 

involvement in civil service; and (6) create systems to 

monitor veterans. These recommendations mirror the 

U.S. Army Program for Youth Success (PaYS) system, 

which is designed to provide an all-source resource 

center for job placement and career training for Cadets 

and enlisted personnel as well as a source for finding 

qualified applicants for private industry positions.56

A 2007 Bureau of Labor Statistics article, “Military 

Training for Civilian Careers,” in Occupational Outlook 

Quarterly, points out that the unemployment rate for 

veterans tends to be lower than that of the general U.S. 

labor force. In August 2005, the unemployment rate 

was 3.6 percent for veterans and 4.9 percent overall. 

The article continues: 

The military trains you to be technically proficient in 

whatever occupation you are assigned. But you’ll also 

learn teamwork, perseverance, leadership, and other 

skills widely applicable in the civilian workforce. In 

fact, some employers looking for workers with specific 

qualifications . . . often seek out former military personnel.
31

Most armed-services jobs have a direct civilian counterpart. If you learn how to repair and maintain vehicles, for example, you might later use these skills as 

a mechanic in the civilian world. . . . And if you learn 

to maintain military computer systems, you might 

find civilian work as a computer specialist. In the military, you’ll earn career credentials. You’ll also have a 

chance to further your education while you serve--and 

afterward.57

The economic climate of 2008-2010 has not been as 

kind to American veterans returning from Afghanistan and Iraq as it was in 2005. However, developing 

an African-based training program could employ a 

number of currently displaced veterans with the requisite health and skills.

THE MILITARY ACADEMY MODEL AND ITS 

APPLICABILITY TO AFRICA

Developing U.S.-style military academies in SubSaharan Africa to educate military officers and NCOs 

who might otherwise engage in destructive or destabilizing activities due to a lack of economic opportunity, is a long-term stabilization effort. Providing 

such positive opportunities for economic and status 

advancement is critical within the context of a basic 

and widespread lack of lucrative post-retirement employment opportunity, particularly in post-conflict 

DDR situations. 

To enhance stability in Sub-Saharan Africa, military officers need to be given incentives to remain 

loyal, professional, and disciplined. As the Nigerian 

case illustrates, retiree payments are not always reliable, a situation made worse by loss of status when 
32

one leaves the military. Therefore, instituting a civilian career path for current and future officers and 

NCOs, as Botswana, China, the United States, and 

many other professional military organizations have 

done, is likely to have a salutary effect. 

It is clear that a lack of education and infrastructure 

underlie the low level of economic development that 

leads to poverty and violence in Sub-Saharan Africa. 

The greatest hindrance to building the infrastructure 

Africa needs for economic development and stability—whether it is for transportation, communication, 

power generation, or water sanitation and irrigation—is not only lack of material resources, but lack of 

human capital. This region lacks the massive numbers 

of engineers and project managers needed to plan, design, develop, implement, and maintain the projects 

most critical to national and regional development. 

Development professionals like to talk about African solutions for African problems. Without the 

requisite education, however, it is nearly impossible 

for Africans to develop or implement optimum solutions to the continent’s problems. Since its inception 

in October 2008, AFRICOM has provided valuable 

military-to-military training to a number of African 

partners. However, a long-term strategy should focus 

on creating a holistic approach to professionalizing 

military service as a part of members’ lives and as an 

avenue to greater economic development efforts upon 

separation from the service. 

The larger objective of building a critical mass of 

skills necessary for designing, building, and maintaining essential infrastructure must include the intermediate objective of creating a train-the-trainer 

curriculum lending itself to the ultimate development 

of a cadre of African instructors who can continually 
33

reassess the requirements and conduct the training of 

future skilled African military officers and NCOs. 

U.S.-style military academies offer the best venue. 

Such academies are highly likely to engender a cycle 

of professional services and opportunity development 

to stem the current brain drain leading educated and 

ambitious African civilians to abandon their own land 

for opportunities abroad. Such an academy initiative 

is also likely to provide educational and advancement opportunities to former service members, thus 

discouraging them from seeking less constructive employment pathways for themselves at the expense of 

the larger society.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION

How to develop curricula, staffing, and an admissions program for professional-skills military academies in Sub-Saharan Africa is beyond the scope of 

this monograph. However, some recommendations 

can be made based on the current body of research 

and an appreciation of African conditions. The first 

recommendation is to create an initial pair of state-ofthe-art academies, one for officers and one for NCOs. 

The second recommendation is to train cadets (and 

later officers) to become engineers in such specialties 

as energy, electrical, industrial, hydro, mechanical, 

mining, and petrochemical. The third recommendation relates to NCOs, who are the subject matter experts and teachers of junior enlisted service members. 

They must be taught leadership and managerial skills, 

as well as mechanical; bridge, airport and port facility 

management; power station maintenance; and water 

irrigation, reclamation, or sanitation plant-building 

and maintenance skills. Their academies must ensure 
34

that these skills are developed. The specific skill-set 

targets for both schools should be dictated by partnerled needs assessments.

The location of these two academies should be determined in discussion with partner nations, but consideration could be given to placing the officer training academy in Botswana in recognition of its good 

governance and maintenance of a high standard of 

military discipline. The new Botswana Defence Command College is projected to be completed at Glen 

Valley by the end of 2011, which may serendipitously 

offer an initial location for hosting parts of the program. Once that institution is operational, the academy could move into the college’s present (interim) 

location, which opened in January 2008 near the capital, Gabarone.58

Similarly, after negotiation with U.S. partners, the 

NCO Academy could be placed in Tanzania as an 

incentive to ward off rising Islamic extremist influence and to further support Tanzania in its struggle 

to reform its armed forces along Western lines, from 

the traditional socialist structure it now bears. The 

country has not fought a war since its 1979 invasion of 

Uganda and is thus not battle-ready. It would therefore be unable to defend itself or respond to any emergencies caused by militant Islamists. Tanzania is not 

radicalized, merely weak, and a strong show of U.S. 

support for developing the Tanzanian military with 

a defensive orientation is a particular opportunity for 

AFRICOM to display the partnership aspect of its mission.59

 As telecommunications infrastructure expands in 

the region, a longer-term plan should include locations for distance education to supplement hands-on 

training so as to increase enrollment and reduce staffing and overall costs. 
35

The arbitrary division of African territory that took 

place under colonialism forcibly separated historical 

lands, tribes, and even families into artificial “nations” 

that have not entirely taken hold in Sub-Saharan Africa in the post-colonial period. To overcome the issues of tribalism and to prevent preferential treatment 

of some tribes over others in developing the human 

capital needed to build critical infrastructure across 

the region, we should consider creating the academies 

under the auspices of the Southern African Development Community. 

An SSI study by Dr. Steven Metz, Refining American 

Strategy in Africa (2000), observes that African culture 

places a “great value” on collective action, and that 

“the most tangible gains have come from building on 

existing structures.”60 A great shortcoming of Western 

policy in Africa and elsewhere throughout modern 

history is an assumption that we are working with a 

blank slate upon which we can impose our own plans 

and methods, thus failing to recognize the significance 

of existing cultural values, beliefs, behaviors, and 

norms. Working within this preexisting framework 

can reduce friction and enhance collaboration and acceptance of new concepts and processes. The existing 

and emerging cooperative structures within the African Union and subregional organizations provide a 

viable platform upon which to provide assistance toward needed reforms.

This approach should be considered within the 

context of inviting active South African participation 

in curriculum development and staffing, so as not to 

appear to be attempting to usurp the influential role 

this country currently plays as a regional military 

training center. South Africa is also likely to have the 

human resources to cut down on the number of U.S. 
36

and European faculty needed from the outset. The approach is likely to have the added benefit of enhancing 

U.S.-South African relations within a partnership for 

regional success, rather than a patronage relationship.

As Metz has observed, “The African security environment may be the most complex on earth, with a 

sometimes bewildering array of actors, shifting affiliations, and unique characteristics.”61 All of these factors 

are potentially destabilizing and must be first understood, then accommodated, when designing engagement strategy. The personalization of power requires 

long-term U.S. strategic engagement, rather than the 

historical norm of providing short-term support to 

particular rulers as they fit into the scheme du jour 

of U.S. or European national interest. However, Metz 

further notes that African leaders have recognized 

that “the region’s internal conflicts are extraordinarily 

complex and often expensive in both blood and money.”62 Mutual understanding of this fact is likely to be 

an excellent basis for positive engagement.

Determining the training programs most optimal 

for sustained development in the region is a critical 

part of the planning of the two academies, and must 

be conducted with input from local authorities and 

experts, who can ensure that the skills training meets 

the most critical skills requirements. Too often Western assistance is directed toward programs that appear logical in Washington or Brussels, but have little 

relevance to the situation on the ground in Africa. 

By the same token, the goal of the recommended 

program is to create a local pool of trained engineers 

and skilled laborers who can accomplish the infrastructure design and development tasks required 

most for sustained economic development and growth 

in the region over the long term. It is critical that the 

program keep in sight that singular goal—avoiding 
37

any so-called “mission creep” toward such secondary 

goals as establishing transparency in government, or 

ending corruption, or any other ultimately desirable 

outcome. Though desirable, these goals must come 

later as by-products of sustained and widespread economic opportunity and growth. 

The author, a former member of International 

Monetary Fund mission teams, arrived at these conclusions through extensive research on the current 

U.S. military training that is intended to prepare service members for civilian occupations; on DDR programs; on U.S. and African convictions on the critical 

need for infrastructure creation as the key to sustainable economic development; and on their conclusions 

as to what has gone right and wrong in Africa toward 

achieving these goals in the decades since independence. 

When considering planning for a military-to-military training program that will diminish the likelihood 

of a military coup or further instability in the target 

country, the recommendations set forth in Dr. Donovan Chau’s SSI Monograph, U.S. Counterterrorism in 

Sub-Saharan Africa: Understanding Costs, Cultures, and 

Conflicts (2008), are clearly valid:

[T]he USG [U.S. Government] [should] think longterm continually, build meaningful relationships in 

SSA [Sub-Saharan Africa], move counterterrorism beyond DoD-centric operations, and, most importantly, 

educate future analysts, officers, and policymakers 

about the African continent. What should be borne in 

mind throughout, and is often lost in the U.S. policymaking process, is that foreign governments and peoples do not often view the world according to Western 

liberal values, attitudes, and beliefs. This is as true in 

counterterrorism as it is in any other strategic issue. 63
38

Ensuring equitable admission to the academies in 

terms of merit, as opposed to tribal or other forms of 

patronage, is the purview of those tasked to set up the 

schools and not within the scope of this monograph. 

However, ensuring meritorious matriculation of the 

best and brightest students most likely to succeed in 

their studies is paramount in achieving the success of 

this initiative. 

The United States can assist in designing methods to identify the up-and-coming leaders who may 

be only on the periphery now. They will become the 

new generation of African leaders with a fresh perspective—those who may have spent time abroad, 

those who understand that the rule of law and the development of a stable middle class have longer-term 

benefits for the security of all, and those who reject 

the traditional corrupt practices that have bankrupted 

most African countries. 

As Philip Neikerk has cogently argued: 

Africa’s hope for leadership is a younger generation 

that for now remains on the margins. The sooner a 

new wave of leaders is able to exert power and moral 

direction, the better placed the continent will be to mediate its own problems and ward off outside interference. Until then, the dinosaurs rule.64

ENDNOTES

1. Project Gutenberg’s The History of Rome, Books 01 to 08, by 

Titus Livius, D. Spillan, A.M. M.D., trans. and annotated, London, 

UK: Henry G. Bohn, 1853, p. 194, para. 29, available from www.

gutenberg.org/files/19725/19725-h/19725-h.htm.

2. Clarence J. Bouchat, Security And Stability In Africa: A Development Approach, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 

Army War College, 2010, p. vii, available from www.strategic

studiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=964.
39

3. Richard Dowden, Africa: Altered States, Ordinary Miracles, 

New York: Public Affairs, 2009, pp. 55-56.

4. International Military Education and Training (IMET) page, 

Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) web site, July 21, 

2010, available from www.dsca.mil/home/international_military_

education_training.htm.

5. Vivien Foster, “Overhauling the Engine of Growth: Infrastructure in Africa,” Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD), 

Washington, DC: World Bank, September 2008, available from 

siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFR:ICA/Resources/AICD_exedc_

summ_9-30-08a.pdf.

6. Erik Arnetz, Interview with Terry Dunmire, the Director of 

Business Development of DynCorp International (DI), while Dunmire hosted the Building On Stability—The U.S.-Africa Infrastructure Conference in Washington, DC, on July 28, 2007, published in 

Africa Journal, available from craigeisele.wordpress.com/2007/09/02/

building-on-stability-the-us-africa-infrastructure-conference/; Derek 

Reveron, “Africa Command: Security and Stability, Not Oil or 

Confrontation,” Council for Emerging National Security Affairs 

(CENSA) Notes, February 2007, available from www.censa.net/

AfricaCommand_DReveron.pdf.

7. Adam Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, 

Torture, and Heroism in Colonial Africa, New York: First Mariner 

Books, 1999, pp. 90-91.

8. Eugene Bawelle, “China-Africa relations, any benefits?” Modern Ghana: Business and Finance, available from www.

modernghana.com/news/254412/1/china-africa-relations-any-benefits.

html.

9. “United States Africa Command Posture Statement 

2009,” March 2009, available from www.africom.mil/getArticle.

asp?art=4133&lang=0.

10. General William “Kip” Ward, “United States Africa Command Commander’s Intent 2010,” available from www.africom.

mil/pdfFiles/Commander%27s%20Intent%20January%202010.pdf.
40

11. Interview with General William “Kip” Ward by Charlie 

Rose, The Charlie Rose Show, November 17, 2007, available from 

www.charlierose.com/view/interview/8779.

12. See www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i45/12.pdf.

13. “Stability Operations,” U.S. Department of Defense Instruction Number 3000.05, Washington, DC: Department of State, September 16, 2009, available from www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/

pdf/300005p.pdf.

14. Sarah Meharg and Aleisha Arnusch, Security Sector Reform: A Case Study Approach to Transition and Capacity Building, 

Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

2010, available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/

display.cfm?pubID=960.

15. “MCC Infrastructure Programs in African Countries,” Millennium Challenge Corporation Fact Sheet, April 8, 

2008, available from www.mcc.gov/documents/press/factsheet-040808-

africa-infrastructure.pdf.

16. Ibid.

17. New Partnership for Africa’s Development, October 2001, pp. 

22-23, available from www.nepad.org/images/framework.pdf.

18. Nicholas D. Kristof, “Kararo: The Sustainability Factor,” 

New York Times: On the Ground, January 27, 2010, available from 

kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/27/koraro-the-sustainability-factor/.

19. Stella Kagwanja, Kenyan native and former USAID subcontractor in Nairobi now residing in Sierra Vista, AZ, conversation with author, February 21, 2010.

20. Ibid.

21. Trudy Rubin, “Worldview: A Surge in Schools,” The Philadelphia Inquirer, January 17, 2010, available from: www.philly.com/

inquirer/columnists/trudy_rubin/20100117_Worldview_A_surge_in_

schools.html. 
41

22. Meharg and Arnusch.

23. William Tordoff, Government and Politics in Africa, Fourth 

Ed., Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2002, pp. 168-195.

24. Yochuku Ofoka Yobolisa, “Nigeria: Pensions—Hanging Fate of Retired Military Personnel,” allAfrica.com, December 23, 2009, available from allafrica.com/stories/200912240111.

html?page=2.

25. Ibid.

26. Richard Dowden, Africa: Altered States, Ordinary Miracles, 

New York: Public Affairs, 2009, p. 53.

27. “Jane’s World Armies: Botswana,” Jane’s Information 

Group, updated December 2, 2009, available by subscription only.

28. Dan Henk, “The Botswana Defence Force: Evolution of 

a Professional African Military,” African Security Review, Vol. 13, 

No. 4, 2004, available from www.iss.co.za/pubs/asr/13No4/EHenk.

htm; 

29. Ibid.

30. Dan Henk, The Botswana Defence Force in the Struggle for an 

African Environment, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007; U.S. 

Department of State Background Note: Botswana, updated December 2009, available from www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1830.htm.

31. “Pirates Given 15 Year Jail Term In Somaliland Regional 

Court,” Somaliland Government News Site, Hargiesa, Somaliland, February 17, 2010, available at www.somalilandgov.com/.

32. “Berbera College Business Plan,” Hargeisa, Somaliland, 

available from www.berberacollege.com/index.php?id=95&parent_

id=86&lname=Business%20Plan.

33. Niger Delta Development Commission Website, Skills Acquisition page, available from nddc.gov.ng/?page=program&id=2. 

34. “Berbera College Business Plan.”
42

35. Festus Owete, “Reps pass bill to promote Nigerian participation in oil industry,” Next News (Nigerian and African News), 

October 23, 2009 available from 234next.com/csp/cms/sites/Next/

Home/5473137-146/Reps_pass_bill_to_promote_Nigerian.csp.

36. Caroline Duffield, “Will amnesty bring peace to Niger 

Delta?” BBC News Africa, October 5, 2009, available from news.bbc.

co.uk/2/hi/africa/8291336.stm.

37. Ibid.

38. Augustine Ikelegbe, “The Economy of Conflict in the Oil 

Rich Niger Delta Region of Nigeria,” African and Asian Studies, 

Vol.5, No. 1, 2006, p. 49.

39. Greg Mortenson and David Oliver Relin, Three Cups of Tea: 

One Man's Mission to Promote Peace...One School at a Time, New 

York: Penguin Books, 2006. 

40. Robert Muggah, “Comparing DDR and Durable Solutions: Some Lessons from Ethiopia,” Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, Issue 39, June 2008, available from www.odihpn.org/report.

asp?id=2913. 

41. Massimo Fusato, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and 

Reintegration of Ex-Combatants,” Beyond Intractability Knowledge 

Base Essay Series, July 2003, available from www.beyondintractability.org/essay/demobilization/.

42. Ernest Harsch, “Reintegration of Ex-combatants: When 

War Ends; Transforming Africa’s Fighters into Builders,” Vol. 19, 

No. 3, October 2005, p. 1, available from www.un.org/ecosocdev/

geninfo/afrec/vol19no3/193combatant.html.

43. See www.mod.go.ke/?page_link=kma.

44. “Historical Vignette 121: Corps Construction in Sub-Saharan Africa,” U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Website, available 

from www.usace.army.mil/History/hv/Pages/121-AfricaCivicAction.

aspx.

45. Ibid.
43

46. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Commanding General 

Organizational Chart on U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Website, available from www.usace.army.mil/about/HQORG/Pages/

CECGCommandingGeneral.aspx. 

47. Ibid. 

48. Ibid. 

49. “Academics” page, Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Academy, 

available from www.usna.edu/academics.htm; “Academics” Page, 

Boulder, CO: U.S. Air Force Academy, available from www.usafa.

af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=9410.

50. Samwel Kumba, “Bust-up with leaders a blessing for exKAF soldier,” Daily Nation, January 22, 2010, available from 

www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/847690/-/vpemu8/-/index.html;

“Kenya Armed Forces Technical College” page of the Kenyan Air 

Force Website, available from www.mod.go.ke/Kafsite/Kaftec.htm.

51. “Contemporary Army Operational Activities” page of the 

Kenyan Army Website, available from www.mod.go.ke/Armysite/

currentoperations.htm.

52. “Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - Central Africa,” 

Armed Forces: Kenya, November 10, 2009, available by subscription only. 

53. “China Addresses Employment of Discharged Military 

Officers,” People’s Daily Online (news organ of the Central Committee), June 2009, in English, available from english.peopledaily.

com.cn/90001/90776/90785/6670274.html; “The Great Global Officer Shortage,” August 29, 2009, Strategy Page, online military 

affairs article aggregator, available from www.strategypage.com/

htmw/htatrit/20090829.aspx.

54. “China Addresses Employment of Discharged Military 

Officers,” People’s Daily Online, June 2009, in English, available 

from english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90785/6670274.html. 

55. Dr. Garth Shelton and The Wits University Peace Studies Group, “Case Study Demobilisation in Uganda,” Demobilisation and its Aftermath: A Profile of South Africa’s Demobilised Military 
44

Personnel, Monograph No 59, Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for 

Security Studies (ISS) August 2001, available from www.issafrica.

org/Pubs/Monographs/No59/Chap3.html.

56. Ibid.

57. “Military Training for Civilian Careers,” Occupational Outlook Quarterly, Washington, DC: Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 

2007, available from www.bls.gov/opub/ooq/2007/spring/art02.pdf.

58. “Jane’s World Armies: Botswana,” Jane’s Information 

Group, updated December 2, 2009, available by subscription only.

59. “Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - Central Africa,” 

Armed Forces: Kenya, July 14, 2009, available by subscription only. 

60. Dr. Steven Metz, Refining American Strategy in Africa, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 1, 2000, available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.

mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=199.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Dr. Donovan C. Chau, U.S. Counterterrorism in Sub-Saharan 

Africa: Understanding Costs, Cultures, and Conflicts, Carlisle, PA: 

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, August 27, 

2008, available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/

display.cfm?pubID=821.

64. Phillip Van Neikerk, “Africa’s Leadership Vacuum,” 

Current History, May 2009, pp. 232-234, available from EBSO Host, 

ejscontent.ebsco.com.ezproxy.mercyhurst.edu/ContentServer.aspx?

target=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.currenthistory.com%2Fpdf_org_

files%2F108_718_232.pdf.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Gregg F. Martin

Commandant

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STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

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