J-S67024-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JEFFREY DONALD PETERSON

Appellant No. 538 WDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order March 4, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-20-MD-0000925-1992

BEFORE: DONOHUE, J., MUNDY, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED JANUARY 30, 2015

Appellant, Jeffrey Donald Peterson, appeals from the March 4, 2014 

order dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we determine 

Appellant’s PCRA petition is untimely and affirm.

We summarize the pertinent procedural history of this case as follows. 

Appellant was charged on October 16, 1992, with two counts of criminal 

homicide-first-degree murder and one count of burglary in connection with 

the September 28, 1992 shooting of two victims.1 Appellant was found at 

the scene with a self-inflicted gunshot wound to the head. The 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2501 and 3502(a), respectively.
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Commonwealth subsequently provided notice it would seek the death 

penalty. On September 16, 1993, Appellant entered a plea of guilty to two 

counts of first-degree murder in exchange for the Commonwealth entering a 

nolle prosse on the burglary charge and withdrawing its intention to seek the 

death penalty. See N.T., 9/16/93, at 2. On November 3, 1993, the trial 

court sentenced Appellant to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment. 

Appellant did not file any post-sentence motion or a direct appeal.

On January 17, 1997, Appellant filed a counseled PCRA petition. The 

trial court described what then ensued. 

On July 16, 1997 [the PCRA court] entered a 

Memorandum and Order which was docketed of 

record on July 17, 1997.

The Order stated that the Court Administrator 

was directed to schedule an evidentiary hearing and 

the record indicates that a copy was provided to the 

Court Administrator. For some unknown reason that 

evidentiary hearing was never scheduled and that 

failure was not brought to the attention of the [PCRA 

court] by [Appellant’s] counsel or anyone else until 

[Appellant] sent a letter to the Clerk of Courts dated 

September 24, 2012 and docketed on October 2, 

2012.

A copy of that letter was provided to the [PCRA 

judge] and upon reviewing it, the [PCRA court] noted 

that there was reference to a pending PCRA before 

the [PCRA court].

That caused the [PCRA judge] to review this 

matter and a determination was made that the 

evidentiary hearing had never been set. Therefore 

[the PCRA court] entered an Order on October 11, 

2012 with an attached Memorandum directing that 

the evidentiary hearing be scheduled.
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The Court Administrator did so on October 16, 

2012 and after various requests for continuances, 

the hearing was conducted over a two day period, 

finishing on August 28, 2013.

PCRA Court Opinion, 3/4/14, at 2.

In his PCRA petition and at the PCRA hearing, Appellant, citing his 

head injury, challenged his competency in 1993 to enter a voluntary, 

intelligent, and knowing guilty plea and challenged the effectiveness of his 

plea counsel for permitting the plea to be entered when he was incompetent. 

Id. at 2. On March 4, 2014, the PCRA court issued a memorandum and 

order denying relief on Appellant’s PCRA petition, based on its merits. On 

April 2, 2014, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.2

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for our review.

May a trial court rely on anecdotal lay testimony to 

find that [Appellant] who entered a guilty plea with 

an unhealed anatomical injury to his brain was 

nevertheless competent to enter such plea when 

uncontested medical evidence from a clinical and 

forensic neuropsychiatrist established that the 

destruction of large portions of the frontal lobes of 

[Appellant’s] brain critical to his ability to reason and 

to make decisions rendered him incompetent at the 

time he entered his plea?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

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2 Appellant and the PCRA court have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 1925. The PCRA court references its March 4, 2014 

memorandum as containing the reasons for its disposition.
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When asked to review a challenge to a PCRA court’s denial of relief on 

a PCRA petition, we are mindful of the following. “On appeal from the denial 

of PCRA relief, our standard and scope of review is limited to determining 

whether the PCRA court’s findings are supported by the record and without 

legal error.” Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 65 A.3d 339, 345 (Pa. 2013) 

(citation omitted), cert. denied, Edmiston v. Pennsylvania, 134 S. Ct. 639 

(2013). “[Our] scope of review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court 

and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

prevailing party at the PCRA court level.” Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 

A.3d 121, 131 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted). “The PCRA court’s credibility 

determinations, when supported by the record, are binding on this Court.” 

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 259 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted). 

“However, this Court applies a de novo standard of review to the PCRA 

court’s legal conclusions.” Id.

In order to be eligible for PCRA relief, a petitioner must plead and 

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or sentence 

arose from one or more of the errors listed at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2). 

These issues must be neither previously litigated nor waived. 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9543(a)(3). 

Instantly, our review of the certified record reveals an issue of the 

timeliness of Appellant’s PCRA petition. “Even where neither party nor the 

PCRA court have addressed the matter, it is well-settled that we may raise it 
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sua sponte since a question of timeliness implicates the jurisdiction of our 

Court.” Commonwealth v. Gandy, 38 A.3d 899, 902 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted), appeal denied, 49 A.3d 442 

(Pa. 2012). “Because these timeliness requirements are mandatory and 

jurisdictional in nature, no court may properly disregard or alter them in 

order to reach the merits of the claims raised in a PCRA petition that is filed 

in an untimely manner.” Commonwealth v. Lopez, 51 A.3d 195, 196 (Pa. 

2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The PCRA “confers 

no authority upon this Court to fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the 

PCRA time-bar[.]” Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 983 (Pa. 2011) 

(citation omitted). This is to “accord finality to the collateral review 

process.” Id. 

Under the 1995 amendment to the PCRA, 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9545 was added and imposes a one-year 

time restriction within which a defendant must file a 

PCRA petition. However, there is an exception to 

§ 9545 for a first PCRA petition filed by a defendant 

whose judgment of sentence became final prior to 

the 1995 amendments as long as the first PCRA 

petition is filed by January 16, 1997. 

Commonwealth v. Fenati, 561 Pa. 106, 748 A.2d 

205 (2000); see also Commonwealth v. Daniels,

600 Pa. 1, 963 A.2d 409, 415 (2009). 

Commmonwealth v. Weatherill, 24 A.3d 435, 436 (Pa. Super. 2011) 

(emphasis added), appeal denied, 63 A.3d 777 (Pa. 2013). “It is well settled 

that [a]ny and all PCRA petitions must be filed [in a timely manner] unless 

one of three statutory exceptions applies.” Commonwealth v. Garcia, 23 
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A.3d 1059, 1061-1062 (Pa. Super 2011) (internal quotation marks, citation, 

appeal denied, 38 A.3d 823 (Pa. 2012). “We have repeatedly stated it is the 

appellant’s burden to allege and prove that one of the timeliness exceptions 

applies. Whether Appellant has carried his burden is a threshold inquiry 

prior to considering the merits of any claim.” Edmiston, supra at 

346 (citation omitted).

The Act provides for the following possible exceptions to the timeliness 

requirement.

§ 9545. Jurisdiction and proceedings

...

(b) Time for filing petition.—

(1) Any petition under this subchapter, 

including a second or subsequent petition, shall be 

[timely] filed ... unless the petition alleges and the 

petitioner proves that: 

(i) the failure to raise the claim 

previously was the result of interference by 

government officials with the presentation of 

the claim in violation of the Constitution or 

laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution 

or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is 

predicated were unknown to the petitioner and 

could not have been ascertained by the 

exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional 

right that was recognized by the Supreme 

Court of the United States or the Supreme 

Court of Pennsylvania after the time period 
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provided in this section and has been held by 

that court to apply retroactively. 

(2) Any petition invoking an exception 

provided in paragraph (1) shall be filed within 60 

days of the date the claim could have been 

presented. 

...

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b).

In the instant case, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on 

December 3, 1993, 30 days from the date of imposition of sentence, and in 

the absence of further appeal to our Supreme Court. See Pa.R.A.P. 901. 

Because that date preceded the effective date of the amendments to Section 

9545 of the PCRA, imposing a one-year filing time limit, Appellant’s PCRA 

petition was due on or before January 16, 1997. See Weatherill, supra. 

Appellant’s petition was filed one day late on January 17, 1997. 

Notwithstanding the short delay in filing, we are without authority to 

countenance an exception to the clear time limitations, outside the act itself. 

See Watts, supra. It was therefore necessary for Appellant to plead and 

prove facts that demonstrate his claim falls within one of the statutory 

exceptions to the time bar. This, Appellant has failed to do. Accordingly, 

we are constrained to conclude that Appellant’s PCRA petition is untimely 

and that the PCRA court and this Court lack jurisdiction to address its merits. 

See Lopez, supra. We therefore, affirm the PCRA court’s March 4, 2014 
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order denying relief on Appellant’s PCRA petition, albeit on alternative 

grounds.3 

Order affirmed.

Judge Donohue joins the memorandum.

Justice Fitzgerald concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/30/2015

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3 See Commonwealth v. McKeever, 947 A.2d 782, 786 n.4 (Pa. Super. 

2008) (noting appellate courts are “empowered to affirm [the PCRA court’s] 

decision on any ground without regard to the ground relied upon by [the 

PCRA court] itself”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).