United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 08-3144

___________

Daniel Doyle; Anne Doyle, *

*

Plaintiffs/Appellees, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of Nebraska. 

Leland Graske, *

*

Defendant/Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

Jason R. Haynes; Caribe Inflatables *

USA, Inc.; Kirk Marine, *

*

Third Party Defendants. *

*

* 

___________

Submitted: April 16, 2009

Filed: September 2, 2009

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, HANSEN and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

Daniel Doyle suffered injuries while he was a passenger on a boat owned and

operated by Leland Graske. Doyle brought an action in Nebraska state court, claiming
that Graske was negligent in his operation of the boat. Graske removed the case to

federal district court, invoking admiralty jurisdiction. The district court, sitting

without a jury, found that Doyle’s injuries were caused by Graske’s negligence, and

awarded compensatory damages to Doyle, as well as loss-of-consortium damages to

his wife, Anne. We affirm the district court’s judgment in favor of Daniel Doyle, but

reverse its award of loss-of-consortium damages to Anne Doyle.

I.

On October 31, 2003, Graske and two friends, Daniel Doyle and Robert Van

Hook, decided to go fishing in the waters off the coast of Grand Cayman Island, where

Graske owned a vacation home. The three set out on Graske’s inflatable boat at

around 10:30 a.m. The boat was fourteen feet long, with a seventy-horsepower engine

and room for six passengers. It featured two seats at the stern (or rear), two more at

midship, and a cushion for two passengers at the bow (or forward end). Both seats at

the stern faced forward and included backrests. The stern seat on the starboard side

(i.e., the right side while looking forward) was known as the “helm seat” because of

its position opposite the boat’s steering wheel, located on a console at midship. The

forward side of the console functioned as a backrest for the starboard midship seat. 

The other midship seat (on the port, or left, side) and the bow cushion seats did not

have backrests, and passengers sitting on the latter had to ride facing the rear. An

inflatable tube formed most of the boat’s hull, and there were hand straps along the

top of the tube for passengers sitting at midship or in the bow.

From the helm seat, Graske steered the boat slowly through the no-wake zone

– a zone extending two hundred yards from shore in which boats are prohibited from

traveling above five miles per hour. When the boat was past the zone, Graske said,

“Here we go,” or words to that effect, and began accelerating. As the boat came on

plane – that is, reached a speed at which its hull was no longer displacing the water,

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but skimming across it – a nylock nut came loose from the boat’s steering system,

causing the system to malfunction and the boat to turn abruptly and sharply to the left.

Despite the sudden turn, Graske was able to maintain his position behind the

steering wheel. Van Hook, who was sitting on one of the midship seats, managed to

remain on the boat as well. Doyle, however, was thrown overboard. Accounts differ

concerning where Doyle was located when he was ejected. According to Graske,

Doyle was sitting on the inflatable tube, with his feet between the starboard midship

and bow seats, and with at least one hand on a hand strap. According to Van Hook,

Doyle was seated on the bow cushion (having moved there from the tube), and was

not holding any hand strap. Doyle himself cannot remember.

Wherever he was sitting, Doyle was thrown into the water, and as the boat

continued turning counterclockwise, it struck him in the back and on the head. Graske

immediately put the boat in neutral. Doyle was some distance from the boat, injured

but conscious. Graske brought the boat closer to Doyle, and Van Hook grabbed hold

of him, eventually pulling him onto the inflatable tube.

Graske guided the boat to shore. From there, Doyle was transported to a local

hospital and then transferred to medical facilities in the United States. Doctors

diagnosed him with a flail chest, his respiration hindered by multiple rib fractures. 

Because of difficulties breathing, Doyle suffered permanent brain injury while

hospitalized.

Doyle brought an action against Graske in Nebraska state court, claiming

negligence in Graske’s operation of the boat. Graske removed the case to federal

district court, invoking admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). He sought

to implead several third-party defendants, including a mechanic who repaired and

reassembled the boat’s steering system just days before the accident. Graske,

however, was unable to establish personal jurisdiction over the third-party defendants,

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and his claims were ultimately dismissed without prejudice. Doyle filed an amended

complaint, adding his wife, Anne, as a plaintiff.

Following a bench trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of the

Doyles. Applying general maritime law, the court found that Graske was negligent

in his operation of the boat, and that Graske’s negligence was a proximate and

substantial cause of Doyle’s injuries. It also determined that Doyle’s own negligence

contributed to his injuries, because he should have been more aware of the dangers

around him. The court apportioned ninety percent of the fault for Doyle’s injuries to

Graske and potential tortfeasors, including the mechanic, and the remaining ten

percent to Doyle himself. Taking account of Doyle’s comparative negligence, the

court awarded $3,238,153 in compensatory damages to Doyle. It also awarded

$750,000 in damages for loss of consortium to Anne, but that amount did not reflect

any proportional reduction for Doyle’s comparative fault. Graske appeals.

II.

Graske first challenges the district court’s finding that he was negligent in the

operation of the boat. Because negligence in admiralty is a factual determination, we

may not set aside the district court’s finding unless it is clearly erroneous. McAllister

v. United States, 348 U.S. 19, 20 (1954). “A finding is clearly erroneous when

although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is

left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id.

(internal quotations omitted).

Under general maritime law, a boat owner owes a duty of reasonable care to

passengers lawfully aboard his boat. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale

Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630 (1959). The district court found that Graske

breached this duty by bringing the boat on plane while Doyle was seated in “a position

of danger.” The court acknowledged that according to Graske, Doyle was sitting on

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the tube when the accident occurred, whereas according to Van Hook, Doyle was

sitting on the bow cushion. But the court determined that this difference of opinion

was immaterial, because “both the tube and the bow cushion seat are positions of

danger while accelerating a small watercraft on the open ocean.” Given that Doyle

was sitting at either one position or the other, the court reasoned that Graske should

have known that it was unsafe to accelerate. Accordingly, the court concluded that

by bringing the boat on plane, Graske failed to exercise reasonable care for Doyle’s

safety, and was thus negligent in his operation of the boat.1

Graske does not dispute that his actions were negligent if Doyle was sitting on

the tube. Indeed, various boating experts testified at trial that sitting on the tube was

unsafe while the boat was planing, and there was no testimony to the contrary. Graske

focuses instead on the district court’s finding that his operation of the boat was

negligent if Doyle was sitting on the bow cushion. Graske argues that this finding is

clearly erroneous. We disagree.

At trial, Michael Sampsel, a mechanical and marine engineer, testified that the

bow cushion was an unsafe position while the boat was on plane. Sampsel noted that

the cushion was naturally subject to greater motion at higher speeds, given its location

in the boat’s bow. According to Sampsel, however, the cushion’s design did not

account for such increased motion. Quite the opposite, he explained, the cushion’s

short height – just 13.5 inches above the deck – meant that passengers would be sitting

in an unusual posture, with their knees higher than normal. He also noted that the lack

of thigh restraints or backrests meant that passengers would be prone to sliding across

the cushion. Sampsel acknowledged the presence of nearby hand straps, but

1

Graske contends that the district court abused its discretion by failing to make

a specific finding of fact as to where Doyle was sitting when the accident occurred. 

Because Doyle’s exact seating position is not an ultimate fact necessary to reach a

decision, we reject Graske’s contention. See Allied Van Lines, Inc. v. Small Bus.

Admin., 667 F.2d 751, 753 (8th Cir. 1982).

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maintained that they were meant for use in lifting the boat, not for use by passengers. 

In Sampsel’s opinion, therefore, the bow cushion’s location and design rendered the

seat unsafe while the boat was on plane, and Graske violated safe boating practices if

he proceeded to accelerate with Doyle sitting there.

The testimony of two other experts was not inconsistent with Sampsel’s

conclusion. Paul Larson, a marine surveyor and investigator, testified that when the

boat was planing, a seat at midship was “a better and safer position” than one in the

bow. He did not rule out the possibility that if Doyle was seated on the bow cushion

when the accident occurred, then Graske’s operation of the boat was negligent. 

According to Larson, whether Graske failed to exercise reasonable care would depend

on the circumstances. Herbert Angell, a boating law administrator for the State of

Nebraska, took a similar position. Like Larson, Angell testified that whether it was

negligent to allow Doyle to sit on the bow cushion would depend on how fast the boat

was traveling and other environmental conditions.

The only expert witness who stated categorically that sitting in the bow was

safe at planing speed was Robert MacNeill, a boat manufacturing consultant. The

district court noted, however, that MacNeill’s expertise was in designing yachts, not

small recreational vessels. The court therefore declined to credit MacNeill’s

testimony regarding the safe operation of Graske’s fourteen-foot boat. Giving due

deference to the district court’s determination of credibility, we cannot say that its

refusal to accept MacNeill’s testimony was unreasonable.

In light of the record as a whole, we conclude that substantial evidence supports

the district court’s conclusion that Graske breached a duty of reasonable care if Doyle

was seated on the bow cushion when the boat came on plane. The definitive

testimony of Sampsel, and the fact-dependent opinions of two other experts, provided

sufficient basis for the court to find that the bow cushion was a position of danger

under the circumstances, such that Graske should have known not to accelerate while

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Doyle was seated there. Given that the only other position where Doyle could have

been located was on the tube – a position Graske does not dispute would have been

unsafe – we hold that the district court’s finding of negligence in Graske’s operation

of the boat is not clearly erroneous.

III.

Graske next challenges the district court’s determination that his negligent

operation of the boat was a proximate and substantial cause of Doyle’s injuries. Issues

of proximate causation in admiralty “involve application of law to fact, which is left

to the factfinder, subject to limited review.” Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S.

830, 840-41 (1996). We may not disturb the district court’s determination unless it

is clearly erroneous. Am. Home Assurance Co. v. L & L Marine Serv., Inc., 875 F.2d

1351, 1354 (8th Cir. 1989).

Graske invokes the doctrine of superseding cause, arguing that the negligent

repair of the boat’s steering system superseded his negligent operation of the boat,

thereby relieving him of liability for Doyle’s injuries. The allegedly negligent repair

of the boat, however, could not have been a superseding cause of Doyle’s injuries. 

The doctrine of superseding cause applies “where the defendant’s negligence in fact

substantially contributed to the plaintiff’s injury, but the injury was actually brought

about by a later cause of independent origin that was not foreseeable.” Sofec, 517

U.S. at 837 (emphasis added) (internal quotation omitted). Here, the allegedly

negligent repair of the boat occurred before Graske’s negligence, and thus could not

have superseded it. Accordingly, the doctrine of superseding cause is of no avail to

Graske.

Graske also invokes the doctrine of inevitable accident, arguing that Doyle’s

injuries would have occurred as a result of the failure of the boat’s steering system,

regardless of whether Graske’s operation of the boat was negligent. We doubt that the

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doctrine of inevitable accident applies outside the context of collision liability, where

it may be raised as an affirmative defense by vessels accused of causing collisions. 

See The Louisiana, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 164, 173 (1865); Grant Gilmore & Charles L.

Black, Jr., The Law of Admiralty § 7-2, at 486-88 (2d ed. 1975). But even assuming

that the doctrine does apply in this general context, it would not apply in this case. An

accident cannot be said to have been inevitable if it could have been prevented by

“human skill and precaution, and a proper display of nautical skill.” The Louisiana,

70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 173. The district court did not clearly err in finding that Doyle’s

injuries could have been prevented if Graske had exercised reasonable care by waiting

to accelerate until Doyle was seated at midship or the stern. After all, Graske and Van

Hook were riding in those areas when the boat suddenly turned, and both were able

to avoid harm. Doyle’s injuries were therefore not the inevitable consequence of the

malfunctioning of the boat’s steering system. The district court’s finding that

Graske’s negligence was a proximate and substantial cause of Doyle’s injuries is not

clearly erroneous.

IV.

Finally, Graske challenges the district court’s award of loss-of-consortium

damages to Doyle’s wife, Anne. “Loss of consortium” refers to “loss of the benefits

that one spouse is entitled to receive from the other, including companionship,

cooperation, aid, affection, and sexual relations.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1031 (9th

ed. 2009). In the context of marriage, the terms “loss of consortium” and “loss of

society” are used interchangeably. In re Midland Enters., Inc., 886 F.2d 812, 816 n.4

(6th Cir. 1989). Graske contends that general maritime law does not allow recovery

for loss of consortium by the spouse of a nonseafarer negligently injured beyond the

territorial waters of the United States. A “nonseafarer” is someone, like Doyle, who

is neither a seaman covered by the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, nor a longshore or

harbor worker covered by the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33

U.S.C. § 901 et seq. See Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 205

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n.2 (1996). We review de novo the question whether general maritime law allows

recovery for loss of consortium. See In re Am. Milling Co., 409 F.3d 1005, 1013 (8th

Cir. 2005).2

The Supreme Court’s most recent guidance on how to approach this sort of

problem came in Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 129 S. Ct. 2561 (2009). There,

the Court considered “whether an injured seaman may recover punitive damages for

his employer’s willful failure to pay maintenance and cure.” Id. at 2565. The Court

began its analysis by reviewing the history of punitive damages under the common

law generally and federal maritime law specifically. Based on that review, the Court

determined that “punitive damages have long been available at common law,” and that

“the common-law tradition of punitive damages extends to maritime claims.” Id. at

2569. The Court reasoned that because “there is no evidence that claims for

maintenance and cure were excluded from this general admiralty rule,” the only

question remaining was whether the rule had been abrogated by Congress’s enactment

of the Jones Act, which provided seamen a statutory cause of action for negligence. 

Id. The Court concluded that the rule had survived the Jones Act, because the Act did

not address either maintenance and cure or its remedy. Id. at 2572. Because Congress

had not altered the traditional understanding regarding the availability of punitive

damages in admiralty, the Court held that “such damages for the willful and wanton

disregard of the maintenance and cure obligation should remain available in the

appropriate case as a matter of general maritime law.” Id. at 2575.

Applying the Townsend approach here, we conclude that there is no wellestablished admiralty rule, as there is with respect to punitive damages, authorizing

2

The Doyles contend that Graske waived his argument that loss-of-consortium

damages are unavailable under general maritime law by raising it for the first time in

a post-verdict motion. In ruling on that motion, however, the district court considered

and rejected Graske’s argument on the merits. The issue is a purely legal one, and we

proceed to consider it.

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loss-of-consortium damages as a general matter. In 1963, the question whether

maritime law allowed recovery of loss-of-consortium damages by the wife of a

longshoreman negligently injured in state territorial waters was “presented for the first

time in a federal Court of Appeals.” Igneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, 323

F.2d 257, 258 (2d Cir. 1963). In an opinion by Judge Friendly, the Second Circuit

noted that common-law authorities regarding a wife’s recovery for loss of consortium

were “conflicting,” id. at 265, and that there were no maritime cases pertaining to the

issue except for two district court decisions denying such recovery. Id. at 265-66. 

Against this backdrop, the court rejected the wife’s loss-of-consortium claim. Id. at

267.

Loss-of-consortium damages were not definitively recognized under general

maritime law in any context until 1974, when the Supreme Court held in Sea-Land

Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974), that a wife could recover such damages

for the wrongful death of her husband, a longshoreman killed in state territorial

waters. Six years later, in American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274 (1980),

the Court extended Gaudet to personal injury actions, holding that “general maritime

law authorizes the wife of a harbor worker injured nonfatally aboard a vessel in state

territorial waters to maintain an action for damages for the loss of her husband’s

society.” Id. at 276 (plurality opinion); see id. at 286 (Powell, J., concurring in

judgment). The plurality in Alvez explained in its discussion of the Second Circuit

decision in Igneri that although “the principles of maritime law prevalent in 1963

militated against, rather than supported, the creation of a right to recover for loss of

society,” id. at 280, Gaudet had since provided “the conclusive decisional recognition

of a right to recover for loss of society that Igneri found lacking.” Id. at 280-81.

The short history of loss-of-consortium damages in admiralty consists almost

entirely of the Supreme Court’s relatively recent decisions in Gaudet and Alvez. 

Given the narrow holdings of those decisions, general maritime law on loss-ofconsortium damages remains an area marked by few settled principles. Thus, unlike

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the Court in Townsend, which was not asked to “change maritime law in its operation

as an admiralty court,” we cannot simply apply a preexisting general rule left

unaltered by Congress. 129 S. Ct. at 2574 n.11.

The Court in Alvez recognized a right to recover loss-of-consortium damages

for nonfatal injuries to a spouse in the territorial waters of the United States, but Doyle

was injured nonfatally beyond such waters, off the coast of Grand Cayman Island. 

Whether someone in the position of Doyle’s wife may recover loss-of-consortium

damages is an open question in this circuit. Because we are confronted with an issue

of first impression, we must continue the development of general maritime law “in the

manner of a common law court.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2619

(2008); see Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 360-61 (1959).

In exercising this authority, we heed the policy choices made by Congress. 

“Admiralty is not created in a vacuum; legislation has always served as an important

source of both common law and admiralty principles.” Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.,

498 U.S. 19, 24 (1990). Where there is no recognized claim under general maritime

law, as there was in Townsend, an admiralty court should look to legislative

enactments governing closely related claims for policy guidance. Id. at 27. After

reviewing the relevant policy pronouncements by Congress, we conclude that

allowing recovery for loss of consortium here would give rise to two serious

disparities between general maritime law and legislative policies. These anomalies

counsel against recognizing a right to recovery.

First, the spouses of those injured nonfatally beyond state territorial waters

would be treated differently than the spouses of those injured fatally. Congress

enacted the Death on the High Seas Act (“DOHSA”), 46 U.S.C. § 30301 et seq., to

provide a remedy in admiralty for wrongful deaths occurring more than three miles

from the shore of the United States. Id. § 30302. Under DOHSA, a decedent’s

survivors may recover only for pecuniary loss; damages for loss of society are not

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available. Id. § 30303. The Supreme Court has held that DOHSA provides the

exclusive measure of damages in wrongful-death actions arising beyond the three-mile

limit. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 623 (1978). Accordingly, the

spouses of those injured fatally beyond that limit have no claim to loss-of-consortium

damages. To allow recovery of such damages by the spouses of those injured

nonfatally in the same waters would thus give rise to a significant anomaly. Indeed,

the Court confronted just such a disparity in Alvez, and extended the holding of

Gaudet to avoid it. Five Justices agreed that “there is no apparent reason to

differentiate between fatal and nonfatal injuries in authorizing the recovery of

damages for loss of society.” Alvez, 446 U.S. at 281 (plurality opinion); see id. at 286

(Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (“Since I see no rational basis for drawing a

distinction between fatal and nonfatal injuries, I join in the judgment of the Court.”). 

Alvez rejected a disparity between fatal and nonfatal injuries within territorial waters,

and there is no reason to think that a disparity of that kind beyond such waters is more

acceptable.

Second, if the spouses of injured nonseafarers like Doyle could recover loss-ofconsortium damages on claims of negligence, then their rights under general maritime

law would be greater than the rights of the spouses of injured seamen under the Jones

Act. Although the Jones Act provides an action in negligence for injury to seamen,

it does not authorize recovery by the seaman’s spouse for loss of consortium. See

Miles, 498 U.S. at 32. It would be odd if the relief available to the spouse of a

nonseafarer were more expansive than that which Congress has afforded the spouse

of a seaman. After all, the principles of maritime law have always included “a special

solicitude for the welfare of seamen and their families.” Id. at 36; see also Moragne

v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 387 (1970) (noting the development under

maritime law of “a special solicitude for the welfare of those men who undertook to

venture upon hazardous and unpredictable sea voyages”). There is no reason to

believe that Congress meant to place the spouses of injured seamen in a worse

position than the spouses of injured nonseafarers. Cf. Igneri, 323 F.2d at 267 (“We

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can think of no reason why Congress, having ruled out a maritime claim against the

ship for loss of consortium by the spouse of a negligently injured seaman, would wish

the courts to construct one for the spouse of a negligently injured stevedore.”).

Given the value of uniformity recognized in Miles, 498 U.S. at 33, we agree

with the Fifth and Ninth Circuits that general maritime law does not allow recovery

of loss-of-consortium damages by the spouses of nonseafarers negligently injured

beyond the territorial waters of the United States. See Chan v. Soc’y Expeditions, Inc.,

39 F.3d 1398, 1408 (9th Cir. 1994); Nichols v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 17 F.3d

119, 122-23 (5th Cir. 1994). It may be argued in reply that this holding creates an

anomaly of its own. Under the rule we establish here, Anne Doyle may not recover

loss-of-consortium damages, because her husband was negligently injured in waters

beyond our nation’s territorial sea. But under the rule set forth in Alvez (assuming that

rule is not limited to the wives of harbor workers), she would have been able to

recover for loss of consortium if the accident had occurred within territorial waters. 

This kind of disparity, however, already exists in maritime law: Loss-of-consortium

damages are available under Gaudet when a wrongful death occurs in territorial

waters, but not under Higginbotham and DOHSA when the death occurs on the “high

seas.” See Higginbotham, 436 U.S. at 624 & n.20. We therefore conclude that our

holding best coincides with the congressional policies reflected in DOHSA and the

Jones Act, as well as the Supreme Court’s development of general maritime law.

* * *

For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed in part and

reversed in part.

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