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85–898 PDF 2014

COAST GUARD MISSION EXECUTION: HOW IS 

THE COAST GUARD MEETING ITS MISSION 

GOALS? 

(113–44) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

DECEMBER 11, 2013 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

Available online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/ 

committee.action?chamber=house&committee=transportation 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee, 

Vice Chair 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

ERIC A. ‘‘RICK’’ CRAWFORD, Arkansas 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

BOB GIBBS, Ohio 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

RICHARD L. HANNA, New York 

DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida 

STEVE SOUTHERLAND, II, Florida 

JEFF DENHAM, California 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

STEVE DAINES, Montana 

TOM RICE, South Carolina 

MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma 

ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois 

MARK SANFORD, South Carolina 

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

JANICE HAHN, California 

RICHARD M. NOLAN, Minnesota 

ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York 

ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

STEVE SOUTHERLAND, II, Florida, 

Vice Chair 

TOM RICE, South Carolina 

TREY RADEL, Florida 

MARK SANFORD, South Carolina 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania (Ex Officio) 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

JANICE HAHN, California 

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia 

(Ex Officio) 

(III) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... iv 

TESTIMONY 

Vice Admiral John P. Currier, Vice Commandant, United States Coast Guard 3 

PREPARED STATEMENT AND ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS FOR THE 

RECORD SUBMITTED BY WITNESS 

Vice Admiral John P. Currier: 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 26 

Answers to questions from the following Representatives: 

Hon. Duncan Hunter, of California ......................................................... 30 

Hon. John Garamendi, of California ........................................................ 32 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Vice Admiral John P. Currier, Vice Commandant, United States Coast Guard, 

responses to requests for information from the following Representatives: 

Hon. John Garamendi, of California, requested details on how the Coast 

Guard’s internal acquisition enterprise operates in a way consistent 

with the Coast Guard’s planning and budgeting efforts ............................ 9 

Hon. Rick Larsen, of Washington, requested justification for the Coast 

Guard’s program of record reduction for the Response Boat-Medium 

(RB–M) from the original program of record of 180 RB–Ms to the 

Coast Guard’s new Acquisition Program Baseline of 170 RB–Ms ............ 14 

Hon. Duncan Hunter, of California, requested a comparison of the capabilities of the National Security Cutter (NSC) and the Offshore Patrol 

Cutter (OPC) that indicates why the NSC costs so much more than 

the OPC ......................................................................................................... 21 

Hon. Tom Rice, of South Carolina, asked if U.S. shipping safety standards are more stringent than international shipping standards, and, 

if more stringent, is this the reason why the size of the U.S.-flagged 

vessel fleet has decreased ............................................................................. 23 

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(1) 

COAST GUARD MISSION EXECUTION: HOW IS 

THE COAST GUARD MEETING ITS MISSION 

GOALS? 

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 11, 2013 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME

TRANSPORTATION, 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m., in Room 

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. HUNTER. The subcommittee will come to order. 

The subcommittee is meeting this morning to examine why the 

Coast Guard cannot meets its mission performance targets and 

whether those targets are truly achievable, as well as to review 

mission requirements and the capabilities the Service plans to acquire. 

As the Coast Guard’s own data shows, the Service is not meeting 

its mission performance targets. In fiscal year 2012, the Coast 

Guard met less than half of its mission performance measures. 

Over the last 5 fiscal years, the Service never scored better than 

61 percent. 

Other metrics of mission performance paint an equally bleak picture. For instance, the Coast Guard has reported that since fiscal 

year 2005 the total number of flight hours for aircraft and underway hours for cutters has declined by more than 14 percent. The 

reduction in these and other metrics that judge mission performance are largely attributable to the fact that the Coast Guard’s 

fleet of aircraft and vessels are not longer reliable. Most Coast 

Guard assets have surpassed their service lives and become increasingly prone to failures. Simply put, the Service cannot perform 

its missions when its aircraft and cutters are not working. 

For years, this subcommittee has advocated for more funding for 

the Coast Guard’s recapitalization program in an effort to acquire 

new and more capable assets. The thinking was, if we could complete the recapitalization program of record in a timely manner, we 

could restore the capability and ensure mission success. 

The truth of the matter is, in this budget environment, there is 

simply not enough money to complete the program of record. Both 

the Commandant and the GAO noted that at least $2 billion annually would be needed to build the program of record on schedule, 

but the President’s fiscal year 2014 budget only requests $909 milVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:07 Jun 04, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\113\CG&JOI~1\2013\12-11-~1\85898.TXT JEAN
2 

lion for the Coast Guard acquisitions, a 41-percent cut over fiscal 

year 2013. Let me repeat that: a 41-percent cut by this administration over fiscal year 2013. 

Projected future funding for the Coast Guard acquisitions also 

falls significantly short of what is required. The Service reports 

that it does not plan to spend more than $1.1 billion on acquisitions in any of the next 5 fiscal years. 

The Coast Guard has taken some steps to reduce costs. For instance, it has reduced plan capability for the Offshore Patrol Cutter 

and worked with Congress on the potential transfer of aircraft from 

the Air Force. This morning I am pleased to announce that, thanks 

to the hard work and leadership of Chairman McKeon and, I would 

say, Bob Simmons, the staff director for the Armed Services Committee, the Air Force will soon transfer 14 new C–27J aircraft to 

the Service and avoid over $600 million in planned acquisition 

costs. 

However, even if sufficient funding was in place, the program of 

record does not provide the capability necessary to meet mission 

performance targets. As the charts on the screen indicate, building 

the program of record still leaves the Coast Guard tens of thousands of hours short of what is needed to meet its post-September 

11th mission requirements. 

The time has obviously come for the Coast Guard to conduct a 

thorough review of its program of record and for the Service, the 

administration, and Congress to make some hard decisions about 

how to rebalance capabilities and mission requirements. 

I thank Vice Admiral Currier for being here today, for his service 

and leadership. I look forward to your insight, Admiral, on how to 

resolve this situation. 

With that, I yield to Ranking Member Garamendi. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I want to 

thank you for scheduling this meeting to discuss the internal and 

external factors affecting the ability of the United States Coast 

Guard to execute and fulfill its important missions and responsibilities. 

Admiral Currier, welcome. I am looking forward to your testimony. 

Oversight by this subcommittee to stay on top of the activities of 

the Coast Guard is a necessity. Why? For the simple reason the 

Coast Guard is responsible for the safety and security of the maritime transportation system, a diverse intermodal network which 

moves waterborne cargo valued at more than $649 billion annually 

and sustains more than 13 million U.S. maritime-related jobs. 

It is no exaggeration to say that the Coast Guard is indispensable to commerce, security, and the environmental protection of 

the United States. And, regrettably, it is also no exaggeration to 

say that our Coast Guard is overlooked, overworked, and 

underresourced. 

But that is nothing new. We have been down this road before, 

most recently at the subcommittee’s hearing in February regarding 

the Coast Guard’s mission balance. So I am compelled to ask: Exactly what new information do we expect to receive today? 

Should any member of this subcommittee really be surprised or 

shocked to hear the Coast Guard is failing to meet roughly half of 

3 

its performance goals? If so, tell me why we would be shocked. 

After all, it is the Coast Guard itself who told us in February that 

the budget cuts imposed by the bludgeon of sequestration would 

force the Service to reduce by over 20 percent its operating hours 

across all missions except search, rescue, and emergency response. 

So what has it meant? Well, off the California coast, the Coast 

Guard has had to curtail air operations by approximately 15 percent and maritime operations by approximately 22 percent. Consequently, security patrol supports and critical infrastructure, security escorts of cruise ships and ships carrying hazardous cargoes, 

drug and migrant interdiction and other law enforcement operations have been reduced. 

Considering all the challenges facing the Coast Guard, especially 

those challenges related to its $29 billion recapitalization program, 

sequestration only ensures that underperformance will be the preordained outcome. The fact of the matter is that the Congress, by 

failing repeatedly to pass budgets and provide the Coast Guard 

with sufficient annual appropriation, is complicit and, in my view, 

the reason why the Coast Guard underperforms. 

Nonetheless, we often hear critics claim that the Coast Guard 

must get real, that it must adjust its performance targets and its 

operations to meet the new budget realties. And while there is 

more than a small grain of truth to that, I contend it is more the 

Congress that is living in a fantasy world. Considering the impacts 

caused by sequestration and the recent announcement of the chairs 

of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees stating that the 

threat of terrorism against the United States is growing, an inadequately funded Coast Guard presents an ill-advised gamble. 

Instead of proposing additional cuts to funding levels, we should 

be working with the administration and our colleagues on the Appropriations and the Budget Committee to provide the Coast Guard 

with the resources it needs. It is doubtful that the budget proposal 

that is now being discussed in the halls of the Congress and across 

this Nation will meet that challenge. It will not provide the resources necessary. 

The hard reality remains, you get what you pay for. And if the 

Congress continues to think it can underfund the Coast Guard yet 

expect our guardians of the sea will magically fulfill all of its mission responsibilities, we will simply be perpetuating a delusion— 

one that is harmful to the Coast Guard, to the U.S. maritime economy, and the safety and security of the United States and the safety and security of those who are on the water. 

I yield back. 

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the ranking member. 

On our witness panel today we have Vice Admiral John Currier, 

Vice Commandant of the United States Coast Guard. 

Admiral Currier, you are recognized for your opening statement. 

TESTIMONY OF VICE ADMIRAL JOHN P. CURRIER, VICE 

COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD 

Admiral CURRIER. Thank you, Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member Garamendi, and members of the subcommittee. Good morning, 

and thank you for the opportunity to speak about the Coast 

4 

Guard’s mission performance and our continued efforts to best 

serve the American people. 

On behalf of the Commandant and the men and women of the 

Coast Guard, thank you for your oversight and continued support 

of our service. 

The United States faces an increasingly broad set of maritime 

risks to people, cargo, conveyances, and the environment. These 

risks drive the need for effective maritime governance and an increased demand for Coast Guard’s unique authorities and operational capabilities. 

As we balance the demand for our services with available resources in this challenging fiscal environment, tough choices have 

to be made. Unfortunately, despite our continuing efforts to meet 

all mission demands, we are not able to sustain effective presence, 

meet every demand, or conduct operations in all areas that are 

needed. However, we are making responsible and informed decisions through our performance planning process to mitigate our 

highest risks and to respond to the highest maritime threats. 

An integral component of this performance planning process is 

continually evaluating our mission effectiveness. This requires 

careful consideration, robust metrics, as well as a number of internal and external factors. These factors are not only influenced by 

the dynamic nature of the threats we face, but also by the fiscal 

realties that inform our performance targets and our budget priorities. 

The Coast Guard has missed several of our mission performance 

targets in fiscal year 2012, and we expect similar shortfalls in fiscal 

year 2013. Specifically, what concerns me is the Coast Guard fell 

short in key performance areas such as drug interdiction, migrant 

interdiction, and ports, waterways, and coastal security. 

In executing its drug interdiction mission, the Coast Guard and 

its partners removed 88 metric tons of cocaine from the Transit 

Zone last year. That is 19 fewer tons than 2012. Just to frame this, 

that is an uncut value on the street of over a half-billion dollars. 

Maritime interdiction of narcotics remains the most effective interdiction method. Moreover, at-sea interdictions deprive 

transnational criminal organizations of profits and facilitate prosecutions that destabilize these criminal networks. 

As we continue to enhance security in our land borders, illicit 

maritime activity and threats to our maritime borders will increase. There are implications on this interdiction in the Transit 

Zone on political security in the Central American countries. 

Intelligence indicates in 2013 the flow of undocumented migrants 

attempting to enter the U.S. via maritime routes increased. Last 

year, we interdicted approximately 860 fewer individuals attempting to illegally enter the U.S., and that is a 28-percent decrease 

over prior years. The tragic loss of life aboard a Haitian sail 

freighter migrant vessel last month, where 30 people perished at 

sea, is a stark reminder of the need for effective presence to deter 

illegal immigration and to prevent loss of life at sea. 

Protection of the maritime transportation system is vital to promote the safe and efficient flow of legitimate maritime commerce 

in executing our ports, waterways, and coastal security mission. 

5 

In fiscal year 2013, we conducted fewer security boardings and 

escorts of high-interest vessels, high-capacity passenger vessels 

such as ferries and cruise ships, and vessels carrying what is 

termed ‘‘certain dangerous cargo.’’ The effect of this reduction is 

difficult to quantify, but persistent levels of reduced activities could 

impact our ability to deter and disrupt terrorist activity. It is the 

same concept as the value of the policeman on the beat. 

While no single year’s data can indicate a real trend, I have to 

express my growing concern with the erosive impacts of sequestration. As this subcommittee is aware, the funding impact of sequestration totaled approximately $340 million and required the Coast 

Guard to reduce operations by an average of 25 percent, which impacts this ability to meet mission goals. 

In addition, critical maintenance on our aging cutters/aircraft 

has been deferred, further degrading availability rates and longterm viability of these systems. Our cutter, boat, and aircraft crews 

are trained to minimum levels of proficiency. 

You know, sir, the Coast Guard’s unique value is our ability to 

perform these many missions across the 11 statutory missions set, 

yet still, when called upon, react to a national level of contingency. 

This surge capability is not always apparent until it is needed. And 

it is eroding at a rate that should be of great concern to Congress 

and the American people. 

I am also concerned with the long-term effects of decreased funding levels of acquisition, construction, and improvement accounts. 

Speaking candidly, continued funding at current levels will prevent 

us from adequately recapitalizing critical assets and will ultimately 

increase risk in the offshore environment and will dramatically 

change the face of the Coast Guard. 

Our legacy major cutters, many of which were commissioned during the Johnson administration, continue to age. They are proving 

to be increasingly unreliable and cost-prohibitive to operate. This 

past year, we conducted emergency dry-dock availabilities for three 

of our almost 50-year-old 210-foot cutters due to structural deterioration. In no uncertain terms, these cutters are increasingly unable 

to carry out mission requirements, and ultimate concerns for the 

safety and welfare of our crews will force us to remove them from 

service. 

With reductions to the U.S. Navy presence in the drug Transit 

Zone, emerging operations in the Arctic, and increased focus on the 

Pacific, demands for Coast Guard services are increasing. Yet our 

ability to meet these demands is in decline. This reality reinforces 

the need to continue to invest and recapitalize in the offshore cutter fleet, the Offshore Patrol Cutter in particular. 

I would like to thank the support of Congress, the administration. We have gained significant recapitalization success through 

acquisitions of the National Security Cutter, Fast Response Cutter, 

the Response Boat-Medium, and other major projects. We are currently embarked on our largest and most important acquisition, the 

Offshore Patrol Cutter. 

There are three things necessary for major systems acquisition 

success: stable requirements, an efficient acquisition organization, 

and predictable funding. With these three things, we can acquire 

6 

and deliver our much-needed assets and capabilities on time, according to specifications, and within budget targets. 

Clearly, we face difficult times on the way forward. We have 

made tough choices within significantly reduced budget authority, 

effectively conducting operations to counter the greatest maritime 

risks faced by the Nation while continuing to recapitalize our most 

vital assets. 

We are America’s first responders in the maritime. And the current fiscal path foreshadows a less capable Coast Guard, perhaps 

not fully able to respond natural disasters such as Katrina, Sandy, 

the Haitian earthquake, or manmade disasters akin to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. My greatest fear is that when our Nation 

calls the Coast Guard to respond in the future, we will be less 

ready, less proficient, and less capable of providing the standards 

of service that have been our hallmark for 223 years. Semper 

Paratus, our motto, our ethic, may not ring true. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today and, in particular, for your support and hard work on the NDAA and the C– 

27 transfer. We appreciate your steadfast support for our Coast 

Guard. And I look forward to answering any questions. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Admiral Currier, for your testimony. 

I will now start recognizing Members, starting with myself. 

I guess my first question is—could we put that graph back on the 

screen? 

So if my friend from California were sitting here, he might have 

sequester included in this. This does not include sequester. If sequester was included in this graph, those vertical bars would all be 

lower than they are. Sequester is not included. 

Do you have this graph in front of you, Admiral? 

Admiral CURRIER. No, sir, I don’t, but I am—— 

Mr. HUNTER. Can someone get him one of these so we can go 

through it? 

The red line is the 1998 baseline of what the Coast Guard had 

to do to fulfill its requirements. The blue line is the post-9/11 hours 

required and acquisitions required to meet those goals. You have 

big cutters, small cutters, rotary-wing, and fixed-wing. 

So the question is, regardless of sequester—because I like to sit 

in on my Armed Services Committee and listen to everybody say 

how Congress ruined sequester while they do billions and billions 

of dollars’ worth of bad programs in DOD—regardless of sequester, 

the blue line is unattainable. 

I just came back from Huntington Ingalls, where I got to go on 

the NSC and walk around on it. That is a beautiful ship, but it is 

also an almost $700 million ship that you could paint gray and put 

a Navy crew on. OK? So what you got is you got the best gizmo 

possible, the best ship you could possibly ever get, and in exchange 

for that now you are not going to have enough of anything else. 

You almost meet your requirement on the large cutters because of 

the NSC, almost, but you don’t reach it anywhere else. And one 

reason for that is you probably overspent by $250 million, $300 

million what you really needed for your NSC. Now, you have the 

best frigate in the world now that any Navy and any military 

7 

would be happy to have, but now you are going to be short everywhere else, with no sequester. 

So the question is now—it is up to you to go back and say, the 

blue line is too high. We can maybe meet our 1998 line, that baseline, but there is no way you are going to hit the blue line. And 

I think until we, kind of, face that and realize that that is true, 

there is no fixing this. You will just fall short year after year after 

year after year and never be able to drill down on what you really 

need to get. 

So that is my question. If you look at that blue line, you look at 

the red line, regardless of sequester, are your post-9/11 mission requirements achievable? 

Admiral CURRIER. Sir, thanks for that question. 

Clearly, when we look at the blue line, it was envisioned as the 

Deepwater goals that assumed, when they set that line, that all the 

systems were in place, fully funded, crewed, and operating to optimal capacity. That has not been achieved to date. While I believe 

that we will make progress toward the blue line, I tend to agree 

with you that we probably will not achieve that. 

It requires us to relook at that, revalidate that particular part of 

it, but I think I want to underscore that, despite numerous studies 

that have been done, we believe that the program of record is still 

valid. 

And I would say to you, sir, that, yes, the National Security Cutter is certainly expensive, it is highly capable, the three that we 

have in the water are performing outstanding, but there are areas 

that we operate where that size ship is not an overreach. The Bering Sea, the Gulf of Alaska, even the Eastern Pacific and the Western Caribbean for drug interdiction often have sea states where a 

ship of that size is really required to do the job. 

So while I agree with you, sir, that we certainly need to revalidate where we are with the unconstrained mission, our line, the 

blue line, that made the assumptions of fully functional and acquired and funded systems, the actual POR, the program of record, 

from the National Security Cutter down to the Fast Response Cutter and the aircraft pieces of it are still valid and have been revalidated multiple times. 

Mr. HUNTER. All right. So let me get this straight. So just looking at this graph—— 

Admiral CURRIER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. HUNTER [continuing]. You are still saying that the program 

of record which this represents, this is your program of record—— 

Admiral CURRIER. Right. 

Mr. HUNTER [continuing]. That falls massively short of the blue 

line, you are saying that that is still a valid program of record? 

Admiral CURRIER. Yes, sir. And I think we will be up around 

that blue line when we get these systems fully acquired, fully in 

place, fully crewed, and fully funded. And to date, that has not 

happened. 

We are in a transit period. We have legacy assets, and we are 

driving toward the program of record. Were that bought on time, 

were that fully funded, fully crewed, fully capable, I don’t think the 

blue line is an unattainable goal. But, certainly, in the budget enviVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:07 Jun 04, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\113\CG&JOI~1\2013\12-11-~1\85898.TXT JEAN
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ronment we are in, I am not going to tell you in the near term we 

are going to make material progress toward that. 

Mr. HUNTER. Well, I just want to get this straight. This is the 

program of record fully funded and fully capable, correct? 

Admiral CURRIER. Correct. 

Mr. HUNTER. OK. I want to understand. This is the program of 

record that you are looking at that is fully funded. This is a fully 

funded program of record. Those are those vertical bars. That is if 

you got every single thing that you wanted, that is what those blue 

bars represent. 

Admiral CURRIER. Not exactly, sir. When they established that 

blue line was back—it was in a time when none of this had taken 

place. The force lay-down that you see reflected in these blue 

vertical bars is the reality of today. 

So when they established that theoretical blue line, that was 

making the assumption that we would have bought all these assets 

on time, they would be fully funded, implemented largely by now, 

and fully functioning. And that has not proven to be the case for 

a myriad of reasons. But I want to make sure we are in agreement 

on what we are looking at here. 

Mr. HUNTER. I will yield to the ranking member while we look 

at that. Thank you. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. It seems to me that there is a preceding question that needs to be asked in this issue of whether you are able 

to perform to the desired level, and that is: What is the desired 

level? What is necessary to achieve the mission of the Coast 

Guard? 

And that is, presumably, the program of record. And so it is several years old now; it needs to be updated. But let’s go to the history here that is the program of record that is on the books today 

that is, as I understand it, a statement of what the Coast Guard 

should be doing. Is that correct? 

Admiral CURRIER. Yes, sir, that generally is correct. I think what 

we established when we baselined the program of record were the 

goals that we established, Congress approved, where we would be 

capabilities-wise operationally when the program of record was 

bought out. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. I appreciate that. But it is a statement—bottom line, it is a statement of what must or should be 

done to achieve the mission of the Coast Guard. Given the resources, given the allocation and so forth, you would want to 

achieve that mission. Is that correct? 

Admiral CURRIER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. OK. 

Now, then the question arises, why are you not able to achieve 

that goal? I would assume that there are several reasons. I think 

you just said there are several reasons. 

One, the acquisition program didn’t work out as planned. It is 

more expensive. It takes longer. That is one reason. The second 

reason is we are not giving you the money to carry it out—that is, 

the financial resources necessary to carry it out. 

Are those the two principal reasons here? 

Admiral CURRIER. Yes, sir. I think that is true. If I could expand 

on it just for a second? 

9 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Take both of those, and you can come back to 

us on the second piece, but take the first piece. 

Admiral CURRIER. The acquisition enterprise, I will tell you that, 

given the time in the 1980s when we kicked this off, the thinking 

on acquisition—and we had gone through a Government 

downsizing at the time—was that you could outsource systems integration. We found out that just not a viable way forward. The 

thinking changed. We reintegrated the acquisition enterprise inside 

our fence line, and I think we have got it right going on. But I can’t 

say that there weren’t errors made, delays incurred previously. 

And then when we look at that blue line, the assumption made 

when that line was put on paper was that we would acquire on 

time, they would be fully funded, fully crewed, fully operational, 

and by certain time gates that, clearly, we have not met, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I want to really drill on this and get down into 

this in some detail. 

There are two pieces to that blue line, which is the performance 

level that the Coast Guard wants to have. It is the availability of 

equipment being delivered, ships and planes and so forth being delivered on time, on budget. That didn’t happen. There has been a 

long history here and numerous hearings about that. 

And I think your testimony a moment ago was that seems to be 

straightened away. Is that correct? Are you now operating on the 

acquisition side of this and in a way that is consistent with your 

planning and budgeting? 

Admiral CURRIER. Yes, sir, we certainly are. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. OK. I would like to see some details on that, the 

new ships, planes, and so forth. 

[The Coast Guard submitted the following information for the 

record:] 

The Coast Guard is mindful of the current fiscal climate 

and our acquisition enterprise has worked hard to ensure 

the assets we are acquiring or planning to acquire are affordable. 

For example, the OPC acquisition strategy has been designed to maximize affordability and flexibility. We have 

incorporated lessons learned from the NSC project, and 

many others, into the OPC acquisition to ensure that it remains affordable moving forward. Additionally, the Coast 

Guard, in close collaboration with the Department, completed over a 2-year effort to ensure the ship specifications 

represented minimum requirements; making significant 

cost trade-off decisions to balance capability and affordability through extensive deliberations on speed, range, 

boat launching requirements, and aviation capability. 

With an efficient acquisition enterprise, a stable funding 

profile and stable requirements, I am confident we can acquire and deliver assets on-time, according to specification, 

and within an affordable budget. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And also, in that regard, you are picking up 14 

C–27Js. That relieves, I think the chairman said, some $600 milVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:07 Jun 04, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\113\CG&JOI~1\2013\12-11-~1\85898.TXT JEAN
10 

lion of acquisition that is planned but will not now be necessary. 

What will you do with that line item in the budget? 

Admiral CURRIER. Well, it gets back to the level of funding in the 

capital accounts. We were looking forward. Our operational gaps 

are in the offshore. That is where our most pressing need is, so 

that is where our capitalization focus has been, that being the NSC 

and the OPC. 

We have bought out—on the program of record, we had 36 HC– 

144 aircraft envisioned. But we had gotten to this fiscal year—or 

last fiscal year, when I testified, I mentioned we had struck a strategic pause in that aircraft acquisition. So that was about halfway 

through the procurement of the program of record. We will have 18 

of those 36 on contract. 

Now, what the C–27 does for us is, by acquiring those 14, with 

their capacity, is to close out that MRS aircraft mission requirement in the program of record. So we will basically have 14 C–27s 

and 18 HC–144s and have that class of aircraft bought out. That 

$500 million to $600 million that we are estimating is not there, 

because we had taken a strategic pause. Actually, that money has 

not been appropriated at this point because it was in the out-years 

that we were looking for that requirement. So it is not like there 

is $500 million inside the CIP level that we could reapply. The 

money was not there. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Oh, darn. 

Admiral CURRIER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well, so much for that idea. 

It seems as though we need to, as a committee and the Coast 

Guard, we need to look at and readjust, if necessary, the program 

of record—that is, what is it that the Coast Guard must do, needs 

to do, wants to do, and the money necessary to achieve that, both 

in terms of capital equipment as well as in personnel and the like. 

It has been some time. When was the last record? 

Admiral CURRIER. Well, sir, if I could take just a second on that. 

I want to be crystal-clear on this blue line, and I don’t think I am 

articulating it very well to either you or the chairman. 

That was established as the justification for the program of 

record and the level of operations that we would achieve with a 

fully funded, on time. We have done four separate studies, one of 

which has not been completed, validating the program of record. 

Because each year this comes up; how can we look back at 2004 

and take that requirement and carry it forth to 2013 or 2014 without having revalidated? 

And there has been two DHS-sponsored cutter studies, an additional one and one in progress that involves the administration and 

the Department, all of which have validated and pointed to—and 

I don’t say this in a smug way, but each one of these reports has 

not only said the program of record is justified, but there is need 

for additional capacity, given the increased mission demands on the 

Coast Guard. 

And I say that as a matter of fact, not to be smug or to try to 

gain advantage. It is just a fact. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I want to stay with this for a while because it 

is, in my mind, fundamental to our work that we have a clear unVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:07 Jun 04, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\113\CG&JOI~1\2013\12-11-~1\85898.TXT JEAN
11 

derstanding of the mission and the resources necessary to carry out 

that mission. 

I am pleased to hear that you have looked at that program of 

record, which dates back a decade. You have updated it four times. 

You have come to the conclusion, through those updates, that the 

requirements remain the same or similar. Is that correct? 

Admiral CURRIER. Yes, sir. And to be clear, these have not been 

Coast Guard studies. These have been sponsored by the Department, with outside, third-party looks, as well. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. All right. And I think you also said that the program of record and the four updates indicate that you are not able 

to meet some new requirements that have come about as a result 

of, for example, terrorist threats. Is that correct? 

Admiral CURRIER. Well, the 2004 program of record took into account post-9/11 requirements, which generally addressed terrorist 

threats and the other security concerns. We have not, over the 

years, met our performance goals every year in areas like that. 

And, I mean, there are 23 performance measures, and each year 

we grade ourselves on them, but we have not consistently achieved 

our goals across the board. You are correct. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. As I look at this and try to sort out our responsibilities, it seems to me that we really need, I really need, to have 

a clear understanding of the mission, its various elements—drug 

interdiction, rescue, safety, all of the things you do, including the 

terrorism requirements—and then, against that mission, the resources you need to carry it out at the optimal level. 

Recognizing the realities of the budget and appropriations, we 

are tasked with two decisions. One is your analysis of optimal performance to meet all those missions. We need to correct, the overstating/understating, we have to make that judgment. And then we 

have the obligation of providing the resources based upon that 

judgment. Failing to do both of those things is something that creates this burden that we must not have. 

That is where I am coming from, Mr. Chairman. You have given 

me 5 extra minutes. You are most generous. Thank you very much. 

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Coble from South Carolina is now recognized. 

Mr. COBLE. North Carolina. 

Mr. HUNTER. Excuse me, North Carolina. They are all the same 

to us Californians. I am sorry. 

Mr. COBLE. That is a very delicate boundary you are walking 

there, Mr. Chairman. 

Good to have you with us, Admiral. 

Chairman, you and the ranking member may have already 

touched this with the Admiral. And, as you know, Mr. Chairman, 

when it comes to the Coast Guard, I am not objective; I am very 

subjectively involved. So I will try to insert some objectivity into 

the question. 

Admiral, I will ask you—and, as I said, you may have already 

plowed this ground earlier today. What were the primary reasons 

for the failure of the Coast Guard to better achieve its own mission 

performance measures, A? And, B, what steps is the Coast Guard 

taking to improve its performance? And I realize assets, or lack 

thereof, may be part of the problem. 

12 

Admiral CURRIER. Thanks for that question, Congressman. It is 

great to see you, sir. 

It is a little bit—as always, I can’t give a simple answer to this 

because we have to talk just a little bit about what these mission 

performance goals really are. They are self-generated. They are 

made up of multiple factors, not the least of which is the Government Performance and Results Act, GPRA. 

So we established these internal requirements and goals. We 

passed them through strategic screening. The flaw, in my opinion, 

on these performance goals is, part of it, when you establish them, 

you look at historical levels of funding, and when you are in a declining level of funding, then that biases your ability to achieve the 

performance goals because they made the assumption you were 

funded at a higher level. So that is kind of a trick that happens 

that we do to ourselves. 

We run it through a strategic planning process. We come out 

with goals that are given to the operational commanders with a caveat that they have some flexibility, based on whether they are in 

California or North Carolina or where they are, to adjust according 

to the local requirements. 

When we aggregate these goals at the end of the year, oftentimes 

we exceed them, sometimes we don’t. We could walk through each 

of the 23 and provide a detailed explanation on why. 

But to categorize it in real generalities on us not having the 

equipment or the funding, the only thing I could say about this is, 

as I have explained these performance measures, it is virtually impossible for us to meet many of them, some of which are aspirational, in a declining budget environment when their levels were 

informed by previous funding levels. 

I am not sure I am making that clear. I hope I am, sir, but—— 

Mr. COBLE. I think so. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman from North Carolina. 

The gentleman from Washington, Mr. Larsen, is now recognized. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral, last month, the Coast Guard released a business-case 

analysis for reactivating and extending the service life of the Polar 

Sea and the icebreaker. That report found that the Polar Sea 

would cost $99 million to reactivate and then provide 7 to 10 years 

of service to the Coast Guard. How does that compare with the cost 

of building a new icebreaker? 

Admiral CURRIER. Sir, the comparison of cost, our estimate for a 

new icebreaker from a cold start is about a billion dollars. And, as 

you said, the estimate in the business-case analysis for Polar Sea 

would be in the $99 million to $100 million range to buy 5 to 7 

years of service life. So that is also the difference is, what you are 

actually buying for that $100 million. 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. Right. 

On page 4 of the findings, the BCA notes that current requirements do not justify the need for heavy icebreaking capability in 

the Arctic. Is that statement not in conflict with the Coast Guard’s 

own assessment of needs in the Arctic Strategy document issued 

earlier this year? 

13 

Admiral CURRIER. No, sir, I don’t think it is. I mean, if you are 

asking how do we go forward with the acquisition of a new icebreaker and how do we establish the requirements for that ship, 

that would be a whole-of-government solution. What I don’t want 

people to think is that the Coast Guard is advocating or looking to 

procure a new-start icebreaker for a billion dollars that is strictly 

to address Coast Guard requirements. 

Two caveats on the new start of the icebreaker. One is it needs 

to be a whole-of-government solution where the National Science 

Foundation, the Department of Defense, and everyone else that has 

a stake in the Arctic contributes to the requirements build and, 

ideally, contributes to the financial solution, the funding of the 

ship. Because a billion dollars is clearly not something we can absorb in our out-year acquisition accounts. 

Mr. LARSEN. So what will the Coast Guard do now with the 

Polar Sea? Will you go forward with reactivating the Sea now that 

the BCA has made clear it is a cost-affordable option? What is the 

plan now? 

Admiral CURRIER. Well, Polar Star got underway for the South 

Pole, which is a success after—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah. 

Admiral CURRIER [continuing]. A $62 million overhaul. 

We currently have the option, to be honest, Congressman, on the 

Polar Sea. It is cold iron tied up in Seattle, at this point. We have 

not been appropriated funds to reactivate that ship. We have been 

appropriated seed money to start the requirements generation on 

a new polar icebreaker, but we have no plans at this point to reactivate Polar Star. Mr. LARSEN. Polar Sea. 

Admiral CURRIER. I am sorry. Yes, sir. Polar Sea. Thanks. 

Mr. LARSEN. Sure. 

I will switch gears a little bit here to the RB–Ms, Response BoatMedium. In section 220 of the Coast Guard Act in 2012, it required 

the Commandant to maintain an approved program of record of acquisition of 180 RB–Ms. My understanding is that last month you 

all signed a smaller acquisition request for 170 boats. 

We submitted a—or, actually, I submitted a question on the 

record on this issue from our last hearing asking for justification 

for the smaller request. We haven’t received that answer, so I will 

ask again. 

Admiral CURRIER. Thank you, Congressman. 

There are two documents in circulation. One is an acquisition 

program baseline that authorizes or cites our program of record at 

170 boats. And that is with the Department for review and will be 

en route to Congress, visible by your office shortly. 

And then there was an operational validation of the number of 

boats actually needed, which came out to be 167 boats. And that 

is a report to Congress that is under review at this time by the administration and will become visible very shortly. 

Mr. LARSEN. Is that revised program of record going to just have 

a different number, or is there going to be some justification written into that? 

Admiral CURRIER. Yes, sir, both will justify the numbers. It is 

167 required operationally, and we are going for 170 on the proVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:07 Jun 04, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\113\CG&JOI~1\2013\12-11-~1\85898.TXT JEAN
14 

gram of record. And I believe that the extra boats will be spares 

to enhance our operational readiness. 

To be clear, on the RB–M, which is built at Kvichak Marine in 

Kent and also in Wisconsin, it is an unbelievable success for us 

from an acquisition perspective. The boat is performing above our 

expectations, which caused us to reevaluate the number we actually needed. It is a fantastic boat, and we are having great luck 

with it. A lot of it is due to the quality of workmanship that comes 

from the Kent facility. 

Mr. LARSEN. All right. We look forward to getting that and getting back with you about our thoughts about it. 

[The Coast Guard submitted the following information for the 

record:] 

The Coast Guard reanalyzed its requirements for the RB– 

M acquisition and determined that 166 boats are sufficient 

to meet operational needs as reflected in the Fiscal Year 

2013 President’s Budget request. The RB–M has proven to 

be more capable than originally envisioned, and, in addition to its substantially increased speed and range compared to the 41-foot Utility Boat it replaces, can safely conduct missions in up to 12-foot seas and 50-knot winds. 

Also, crew habitability on the RB–M is significantly improved over the previous fleet of boats, which contributes 

greatly to mission effectiveness. 

In the 2013 Coast Guard Acquisitions, Construction and 

Improvement appropriation, funds were appropriated 

above the President’s request for acquisition of four additional RB–Ms. As a result, the Coast Guard has adapted 

boat siting plans for 170 RB–Ms and revised the RB–M 

Acquisition Program Baseline. The new 170-boat Acquisition Program Baseline was approved by the Coast Guard 

Acquisition Executive, Vice Admiral John P. Currier, on 

November 25, 2013. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thanks a lot. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. 

The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Rice, is now recognized. 

Mr. RICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Looking at the Coast Guard missions listed here, 11 statutory 

missions, to fully implement these—and looking, also, at this table 

that shows how many of these missions were met and how many 

weren’t met, it looks like we are about 50/50 here. 

What would you suggest—I mean, perhaps—I guess, how much 

money would it take, first, for you to be able to meet all of your 

missions as listed, these 11 missions here? How much money do 

you think is the shortfall that prevents you from—or is it money? 

Is it some other failure other than money? 

Admiral CURRIER. Well, sir, as you see from that table, that is 

a complex equation. 

Mr. RICE. Right. 

15 

Admiral CURRIER. I would say it is not only money. It is the refining of our ability to set these performance goals that we hold 

ourselves and you all hold us responsible for. 

Mr. RICE. Yes, sir. 

Admiral CURRIER. The process is somewhat flawed, in that one 

of the assumptions it uses as a foundation are previous levels of 

funding. And that biases it to a negative side when you look at the 

next year. You assumed you were going to get more than you got. 

So how did you perform at that projected level? 

Mr. RICE. Right. 

Admiral CURRIER. And so part of it is that. And part of it is funding. If we achieve the level of funding that we need in the capital 

accounts, as we bring these new assets on line, they are going to 

contribute to the successes that we need in our own performance 

goals. 

Mr. RICE. How much more annual funding would the Coast 

Guard need to fully fund everything it would want and carry out 

all its missions? 

Admiral CURRIER. Sir, that is a difficult question. I can address 

the capital accounts. The Commandant has been on record saying 

a $2 billion annual capital account, AC&I account for the Coast 

Guard. 

Mr. RICE. $2 billion? 

Admiral CURRIER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. RICE. More or $2 billion total? 

Admiral CURRIER. No, $2 billion total. 

Mr. RICE. OK. How much are they getting now? 

Admiral CURRIER. Well, over the last few fiscal years, we have averaged between $1.2 billion and $1.4 billion. 

Mr. RICE. OK. All right. So about a 50-percent increase. 

Admiral CURRIER. And then the budget that is—the 2014 budget 

is significantly less than that. 

Mr. RICE. All right. Well, you know, everybody knows that we 

are spending far more money than we take in, almost 40 cents on 

the dollar, and that additional 50-percent increase is probably not 

a realistic thing. So we have to look for alternatives, and, you 

know, I don’t know what those would be. 

Particularly, I am interested in your recommendations, should 

we scale back on these missions? Should we eliminate some of 

them? Should we just go into it knowing we are going to fail in 

some and accept that? Or should we try to shift some of these missions to other entities? What should we do? 

Admiral CURRIER. Sir, for 223 years, we have been trying to meet 

the expectations of the American public in the maritime. These 11 

statutory missions, we can adjust capacity around, but we feel giving up the capability on any of these missions would violate the intent of Congress and certainly the law. 

Mr. RICE. You know, I am sitting here looking at this list, and, 

I mean, obviously, I know that the Coast Guard’s missions are incredibly important to the security and sovereignty of this country. 

And when you look at search and rescue, I mean, I have spent a 

lot of time offshore fishing, and believe me, the fact that the Coast 

Guard is there, thank God I have never had to call on them, but 

knowing that they are there means a lot. And then the aids to 

16 

navigation, obviously, coastal security, drug interdiction, migrant 

interdiction, I agree. 

But, you know, we know that we are not going to meet these 

funding goals that you would like to see to fully meet all your missions. So we know that. So how are we going to fix it? How are we 

going to bring the two lines together? What can we eliminate? 

What can we move to make sure that we succeed in the priorities 

that we have? 

Admiral CURRIER. Sir, you know, I will be honest. It is very difficult for me to give an answer that is not looking through the lens 

of my service. But I will tell you, as we have wrestled with this 

problem with our own department, we have taken hard looks at the 

mission set. And the latest one is in the portfolio review that we 

have enjoined between the Department and the national security 

staff. And every time we have a meeting and we come in and we 

look at areas that could be reduced or cut off that 11 mission list, 

people will come to the conclusion that there is really—no one 

wants to take the responsibility for reducing performance in those 

mission areas. As a matter of fact, generally what we find is people 

will come to the meetings and say, well, wait a minute, how about 

this, how about that, and add to the portfolio. 

So it really is almost impossible for me to offer you what we 

shouldn’t do to protect the maritime public. Because I can tell you, 

in that list of performance indicators or in the list of the 11 mission 

sets, there is nothing that doesn’t materially add to the security 

and safety of the people that use our waterways; there is nothing. 

Is it less aids to navigation? Is it less search and rescue? Is it less 

ability to search through a Katrina? I just can’t tell you. 

Mr. RICE. Well, you know, I mean, there are excesses in every 

department, in every entity. I have been, I mean, I am not talking 

about once, I am talking about numerous times, on the waterways 

around my area and seen a Coast Guard boat checking people right 

next to a sheriff’s deputy boat and a DNR boat. So, I mean, there 

is obviously redundancy that perhaps doesn’t need to be there. 

And while I agree that it is important that, you know, the Coast 

Guard should be out there on Saturday afternoon checking people’s 

life jackets, some of these other things are more important. And I 

think maybe if we know that we are not going to have the money 

to fully fund everything, that maybe we should prioritize those 

things and use our resources in the most efficient and wise way. 

Admiral CURRIER. Yes, sir. And I offer this counter to your question, your answer to your question, not in a flip way but in an honest way. So those people that are—and we have interagency partnerships all over the place, and it really adds to it, and it reduces 

our requirement to be out there, to be perfectly honest. 

But that boat that is checking life jackets on Saturday afternoon 

is the same boat that is going to have to go 40 miles offshore to 

get somebody in 8-foot seas. But by checking those life jackets, 

hopefully—and we empirically can demonstrate this—it reduces the 

chances that they will have to go 40 miles offshore and rescue 

somebody. 

So search and rescue has been a shrinking enterprise, to a certain extent, mainly because of the enhancements that have occurred in hardware, in radios, in GPS, in boating safety standards. 

17 

All of those things are affected globally by the Coast Guard, but 

they are all interrelated. 

So, you know, I don’t mean to be argumentative, but it is a system that works to great effect. 

Mr. RICE. And I understand and don’t argue that. The only point 

that I am trying to make is, we know we are not going to have 

these 100-percent funding levels. We know that. And so, shouldn’t 

we prioritize among these various missions to most efficiently utilize the funds that we have? 

Admiral CURRIER. Yes, sir, I think that is where we are going to 

have to be. I agree with you. 

Mr. RICE. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. 

A couple things, Admiral. Playing off of what Mr. Rice just talked 

about, it seems that there is a period of time with organizations, 

whether it is the Coast Guard, the military, or other entities, 

where if you can come to Congress and say, ‘‘We are only making 

half of what we are supposed to be doing with what you are giving 

us,’’ over and over and over, at some point Congress goes, ‘‘We need 

to give them all of that money so they can get 100 percent.’’ 

I think the Coast Guard is trapped in that phase right now, 

where if they came in 60 percent, 60 percent, 60 percent, we are 

never going to reach the blue line, the reality is the blue line needs 

to move down. Because if you have checked and rechecked and validated four times the acquisition requirements to that blue line, to 

those missions sets that you have, then that is fine, but that means 

that the mission sets need to be validated. 

And I know that when you go in these meetings and everybody 

wants something else, that that is how you get a $700 million NSC, 

that that is how you get Deepwater, is you have requirements 

added on, added on, added on while they are still designing. Then 

you start building and doing requirements at the same time and 

doing design change, and then you add hundreds of millions of dollars onto your shipbuilding cost. And that is how you get to the 

whole scuttled program that you had big problems with, right? 

So the missions need to change and the missions need to be 

prioritized so you can at least say, ‘‘We are meeting 90 percent of 

our mission requirements, and here is how we have changed 

those.’’ And when people come in and want more and more from 

the Coast Guard, the Coast Guard needs to be able to say no. And 

I don’t see that happening with that blue line staying where it is. 

It needs to come down. Because the bottom line isn’t moving up. 

It is not going to happen. 

Number two, there are things, when it comes to vessel certification, that ABS can do, the American Bureau of Shipping can do, 

that the Coast Guard doesn’t need to concern itself with, where you 

can have them do that and carry out the Coast Guard’s mission 

when it comes to certification. It would be more efficient, more effective, and more cost-saving not just for the Coast Guard but for 

the entities that you are certifying, whether that is tuna vessels or 

whether that is offshore resupply for oil rigs in the gulf. 

There are things that other organizations can do that the Coast 

Guard doesn’t necessarily have to, especially if you want to focus 

on your core competencies. Because the reality is, Admiral, that 

18 

you can’t make everything your core competency. Every businessman knows that and every military knows that. The Army is not 

going to build a bunch of amphibs. The Marine Corps is not going 

to try to do a land war. The Navy is not going to go build runways 

to fly an F–35 off of. Everybody has their core competency. 

And I think the Coast Guard is in place where you are saying 

everything from search and rescue to vessel certification to Marine 

safety to drug interdiction to military—you cannot be all things to 

all people when you are getting less of a piece of that pie than anybody else is. So that is what is going to have to change, because 

you cannot make everything your core competency. 

Have at me. 

Admiral CURRIER. OK, sir. Well, first of all, I would say that 

your comments on Deepwater, I would not dispute that. But I want 

to make it crystal-clear that it is in the past, and where we are 

today in acquiring these systems, the mechanism of acquisition, the 

stability of the requirements are there. The third leg in that 

stool—— 

Mr. HUNTER. They are. I agree. 

Admiral CURRIER. The third leg in that stool, sir, is the predictable funding. 

OK, set that aside. I had to say that because I was part of the 

redesign of the acquisition enterprise. 

You know, Congressman, to be perfectly honest with you, we 

have 11 statutory missions. You know, when the Commandant is 

not there, I sit on the Joint Chiefs, and I have friends at that level; 

the vice service chiefs are all very close. They have a different mission set. You know that, having been a former Marine. Go in, take 

the beach, establish dominance; those things they do. 

Ours is much more diverse, but it is grounded in law, it is 

grounded in statute. So it is not discretionary on our part, necessarily, to say we are not going to do certain things. 

Mr. HUNTER. I understand. But here is what we are asking you, 

I think. And I think this goes for everybody. Here is what we are 

trying to get from you. If you can’t make mission based on the missions that you have now, your statutory missions, we would love 

to hear from you what needs to change there, as opposed to foisting 

upon you mission changes and saying, here is what your new missions are. 

And we are trying to get from you, here is what I would look at 

if I were you. Because if you have to change it statutorily, we can 

do that. That is why we are here. But we would love to have input 

from you and from the Coast Guard on how to do that as opposed 

to us doing it blind. 

I mean, John and Jeff can do a great job at that, but we would 

much rather have you tell us now, hey, here are some places where 

I think and the Coast Guard thinks that we should scale back in 

order to improve our search and rescue or interdiction capability; 

here are the places where we would farm that out a little bit or 

we would lease that out or we would give that to ABS or those 

types of things. 

Otherwise, you force us to come up with those things for you, and 

we are not as smart as you are on the things that you do. 

19 

Admiral CURRIER. Well, Congressman, I think that dialogue can 

take place. Of course, we have equities with the Department of 

Homeland Security and the administration on that. But—— 

Mr. HUNTER. But you say these are statutory missions, right? So 

how do you get a statutory mission? 

Admiral CURRIER. But our relative weighting of what we suggest 

that could be scaled down or scaled or eliminated, you know, we 

would not unilaterally come to you with that. We are, as you know, 

part of the Department of Homeland Security, and they have codependency with us in our mission sets. So it wouldn’t just be the 

Coast Guard saying that. 

But if your staff and our staff want to enjoin that conversation, 

then we are not going to object to it. But it is going to be a complex 

undertaking. 

Mr. HUNTER. But right now you wouldn’t say that there is any 

part of your statutory mission set that you would scale back on or 

prioritize higher? 

Admiral CURRIER. I would say, sir, that based on what I know 

of the Coast Guard, the interdependency of our mission set and 

what we deliver as a system to the American public, it is very difficult, and I would not be prepared today to offer you candidates 

for a reduction one over another. I just couldn’t do it. 

Mr. HUNTER. OK. Thank you, Admiral. 

Mr. Garamendi is recognized. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I want to carry on from where the Chair was 

going with this question. 

Eleven statutory missions. You are working in an environment, 

physical environment, and leaving that aside, are also subject to 

the political environment here in Washington, the prioritization 

and the amount of money available year-to-year to carry out those 

11 statutory missions that is not made by the Coast Guard alone. 

You only need to look at the President’s budget to determine that, 

I don’t know, some $400 million was reduced from previous levels 

by the administration. 

So you are operating in an environment administered by the Office of Management and Budget and within the Department of 

Transportation where priorities are made, resulting in a budget, in 

this case the President’s budget, which is your budget. Like it or 

not, that is your budget. 

From this point of view—and I was in your seat not a decade 

ago, a little longer than that, and dealing with all of that internal 

administrative give and take. I am in a different seat now, looking 

at it from a different point of view. And what I need to know and 

I think this committee needs to know is, what does the Coast 

Guard need to carry out the 11 statutory missions that you have? 

Not after being reviewed by the Department of Homeland Security first and then by the Office of Management and Budget and 

then given to us, which is a different document than what the 

Coast Guard might—no, excuse me, the Coast Guard would put out 

on its own. 

I don’t know that you are going to be able to go there unless we 

force you to go there by asking very specific questions that require 

you to respond to us directly, understanding that—in other words, 

going past your chain of command. 

20 

I think we need to do that, Mr. Chairman. It is a complex—it is 

something that we need to do, taking into account each of those 11 

statutory missions and then asking the Coast Guard specifically 

what it needs to do, recognizing that they are in a big bind, having 

to go up through the Secretary and then to OMB and then back 

to us. But I think we can get a better fix on what is actually necessary, those 11 missions, to be carried out. 

So I am going to try to formulate that and, working with you and 

others, try to ask the Coast Guard very specific questions about the 

11 missions so that we can then get a baseline of what is necessary 

to achieve an appropriate level. And then we are going to have to 

make a decision on our side, and that is to prioritize—the word you 

used in a conversation with me just a few moments ago. 

Right now we are kind of in the dark. We are dealing with ancient history, in many ways. We are obviously dealing with the internal administrative priorities of the administration, understandably. But we have to, I think, get a different view of this. 

So I am going to make it my task and David’s task over the next 

several weeks to try to lay out a series of questions that go to the 

heart of that and then come back hopefully by the time we do an 

authorization bill here. 

Leaving that aside, I have a series of other questions that deal 

with tiny things. You know, I don’t want to take a lot of time in 

this committee. I am going to ask them in writing. I am just going 

to quickly go through the subject areas, not asking you to respond 

to them right now. There is a series of things that have come to 

my attention by various interested parties. 

We have talked about the level of funding. I will let that go for 

now. 

Maritime education and training institutions are concerned about 

a lack of interaction between the Coast Guard and those institutions on what the educational requirements are. You really ought 

to be consulting with them before you march off requiring educational programs that may or may not be able to be put in place. 

So I will put a specific question to you. 

There is a question about maritime licensing examinations, 

whether the Coast Guard is really up to the challenge of that. And 

I will get that question to you. 

Another question about the Standards of Training, Certification, 

and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, the standards: How you are putting those out? Are they consistent? Are they going beyond what 

ought to be required? Again, a series of questions. 

Almost every one of these go to interaction and communication 

with the interested parties. And, as I look at it, you are doing it 

on your own. You really need to bring these interested parties in 

to help you understand the full implications of what you are proposing. 

I will let it go at that. You will have specific questions, and, of 

course, I am sure you will respond in an appropriate and timely 

way. 

I yield back. 

Mr. RICE. Mr. Chairman, I just have one more comment with respect to your comment—— 

Mr. HUNTER. The gentleman is recognized. 

21 

Mr. RICE. I just wanted to point out that, as the country music 

song says, it is heads, Carolina—this goes to the chairman and the 

ranking member—heads, Carolina; tails, California. 

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. 

I just have one last thing to bring up, too, and that is, as you 

are looking at the cost, the acquisition cost, especially the OPC and 

the NSCs and the requirements that those boats have, I think right 

now—because looking at the OPCs, a couple of the submissions 

that were accepted in the—I think it was the top five you have narrowed it down to now, the top five submissions for the OPC, and 

what the NSC is and how cheap it will be as you get to ship number eight or nine and what the different mix of those is that you 

really need if they almost do the same thing. And from what I 

could see, they almost do the same thing. There is stern launcher 

and recovery, which was not required on the OPC; same sea states; 

same—there is a different propulsion system between the OPC and 

the NSC. And there is not much more difference than that in their 

abilities. 

And at the same time, you have a $700 million price tag compared to a $250 million projected price tag. So you have a big discrepancy there with just a few things that would account for the 

$500 million in difference. And those numbers just didn’t add up 

to me. 

So I would say a question for the record from me is, if you could 

give me a breakdown of those things. And I have seen breakdowns 

done by outside parties where you have the NSC, OPC, and FRC 

and the different mixes. But I would just like to hear the justification for the discrepancy in the cost for that delta based on what 

things, right, whether it is propulsion or stern launch and recovery 

and that kind of thing. 

[The Coast Guard submitted the following information for the 

record:] 

The table below shows a comparison of top-level requirements between the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) and National Security Cutter (NSC). 

22 

Capability OPC (Threshold) NSC 

Seakeeping Sea State 5—Boats and 

Helicopter Operations 

Sea State 5+ —Boats and 

Helicopter Operations 

Range & Endurance 8500NM & 45 Days 12000NM & 60 Days 

Boats & Aviation 

(Hangar) 

2 boats & H–60/Vertical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 

(VUAV) (1 H–65) 

3 boats with stern launch & 

H–60/VUAV (2 H–65s) 

Speed 22 knots 28 knots 

Accommodations 120 146 

Command and Control Limited integration & interoperability NATO interoperable, Integrated, Link 

Surface Combat Capability Medium Caliber Deck Gun, 

Small Caliber Anti-Terrorism and Force Protection (ATFP) Weapons 

Medium Caliber Deck Gun, 

Close In Weapons System 

(CIWS), Small Caliber 

ATFP Weapons 

ASCM Defense Capability Soft Kill 

Provides a passive defense 

capability to divert missile threats 

Hard & Soft Kill 

Provides both passive and 

active defense to detect, 

track, and eliminate the 

threat through weapons 

systems 

CBRN Capability Countermeasure Washdown 

To support the evacuation 

from a contaminated environment 

Collective Protection System 

& Countermeasure 

Washdown 

Provides a system to support the continued operation in a CBRN contaminated environment 

Intelligence Gathering Limited (Space, Weight, and 

Power reserved) 

Full SCIF 

The Coast Guard, in close collaboration with the Department, completed over a 2-year effort to ensure the OPC 

specifications represented minimum requirements; making 

significant cost trade-off decisions on the OPC to balance 

capability and affordability through extensive deliberations 

on speed, range, boat launching requirements, and aviation capability. 

23 

OPC requirements are at ‘‘threshold’’ levels—the lowest 

levels that can still meet mission demands. Further descoping of OPC requirements will prevent the Coast Guard 

from meeting operational need and achieving effective 

maritime governance in all of our operating areas, including those with more demanding environmental conditions 

(Eastern/Western Pacific, Gulf of Alaska, Bering Sea, and 

the Arctic). 

Additionally, the OPC acquisition strategy has incorporated lessons learned from other acquisitions, including 

the NSC, and has been deliberately formulated to maximize affordability. For example, the NSC was a sole source 

procurement using a cost plus fixed fee contract type while 

the OPC is planned to use a fixed price incentive firm target contract type specifically tailored to maximize competition and incentivize affordability while minimizing government risk. 

Mr. HUNTER. If there are no further questions, I thank the witness—Admiral, thank you for your testimony—and the Members 

for their participation. 

I yield to Mr. Rice. 

Mr. RICE. Admiral, one thing that I have learned a lot about, 

being on this committee, and it is really not the subject so much 

today, but, from what I understand, there is a set of—with respect 

to international shipping, there is a set of international standards 

that comply worldwide. I can’t remember the name of that set of 

standards. And then the United States has their own set of standards. 

And I have been inquiring of shipping companies as to why international carriers don’t flag here, you know, why we have essentially lost our entire international shipping fleet over the last 50 

years. And one of the reasons that always comes up is that our 

safety standards are so much higher than the international standards. 

Can you comment on that at all? 

Admiral CURRIER. Sir, I can provide a detailed answer for the 

record, but in general there is a U.N. organization called IMO, 

International Maritime Organization, centered in Europe. Most nations are participants in that, and they set a safety standard regime that we follow. 

As a matter of fact, ships, foreign-flag ships that come into our 

ports are routinely inspected for safety—safety of life at sea, basically, tenets of the IMO standards. 

So I think our safety standards are pretty well-aligned with 

international safety standards. But we can provide you a more detailed briefing or answer for the record. 

[The Coast Guard submitted the following information for the 

record:] 

The Coast Guard submitted a report to Congress in September 2013, entitled ‘‘Impediments to the United States 

Flag Registry.’’ As explained in that report, the Coast 

Guard has researched available information on the operVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:07 Jun 04, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\113\CG&JOI~1\2013\12-11-~1\85898.TXT JEAN
24 

ating costs related to the design, construction and operations relating to inspections for U.S.-flagged merchant 

vessels. An analysis by the Maritime Administration 

(MarAd) of the operating costs comparing the costs of U.S.- 

flag vessels with foreign-flag vessels has shown that ‘‘U.S. 

flag carriers face a significantly higher cost regime than do 

foreign flag carriers’’ (See MarAd, Comparison of U.S. and 

Foreign-Flag Operating Costs, September 2011, page 1). 

The MarAd report identified operating costs, including 

crew, stores and lubes, maintenance and repair, insurance 

costs, and overhead costs, as potential cost impediments to 

operating vessels under the U.S. flag. The cost of design, 

construction and operations relating to inspections was not 

separately identified in the MarAd report. 

The Coast Guard has taken steps to make its regulations 

less burdensome and more flexible, and to implement improvements that could be made to the enforcement process, 

while still ensuring a high level of safety and environmental protection. As part of the Coast Guard’s regulatory 

reform initiative, the Coast Guard published in the Federal Register (62 FR 51188) on September 30, 1997, a final 

rule entitled ‘‘Harmonization with International Safety 

Standards.’’ This rulemaking amended U.S. regulations for 

both inspected and uninspected vessels by removing obsolete, unnecessary or excessive provisions, and harmonizing 

regulations with international safety standards. 

In addition, the Coast Guard also developed the Alternate 

Compliance Program (ACP) with the intent of providing 

more autonomy to U.S-flagged shipowners to utilize the 

services of classification societies to perform plan review 

and inspection functions which have historically been retained by the Coast Guard. Under ACP, the Coast Guard 

retains authority to issue a Certificate of Inspection (COI) 

to a U.S-flagged vessel, while relying on the expertise of a 

classification society to perform the inspection functions 

that must be carried out to ensure U.S.-flag vessels comply 

with both domestic and international standards. This is 

similar to how many other nations conduct safety oversight inspections for vessels under their administrations. 

The Coast Guard strives to ensure our national standards 

are consistent with new and revised international standards. The Coast Guard’s goal is to quickly adopt the most 

recent design and engineering requirements of the international conventions, and delegate authority to recognized 

classification societies in order to ensure that the U.S.-flag 

fleet keeps pace with the rest of the international shipping 

industry. 

For further details on these efforts, please refer to the report to Congress dated September 03, 2013, entitled ‘‘Impediments to the United States Flag Registry.’’ 

Mr. RICE. I would like to know if ours are—I just keep hearing 

that ours are very much more strict, and that is one of the reasons 

25 

why our shipping fleet has dropped from 1,000 American-flag ships 

in international commerce to 80. 

Admiral CURRIER. Sir, I couldn’t comment yea or nay on that. 

But I will tell you that, in general, our safety standards are aligned 

with international IMO standards and that if there are individual 

company policies that are more stringent than that, I am not 

aware. 

But, in general, the safety regime is pretty well-evolved around 

the world, and we are not only in compliance but we are enforcing 

those regulations. 

Mr. RICE. Thank you, sir. 

Again, going back to the role of Congress in this, if there is some 

area in which you are bound by statute to safety regulations that 

are far more onerous, I sure want to hear about it and see if we 

can fix that. 

Admiral CURRIER. Yes, sir. We can provide you background information on that. 

Mr. RICE. Thank you, sir. 

Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. HUNTER. The gentleman yields. 

I recognize the ranking member. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Yeah, I will try to do this quick. 

We were discussing earlier the C–27s, the $600 million that is 

not going to need to be spent on additional aircraft. And I have 

been trying to think this thing through. But in your future budget 

years, you are projecting that expenditure over a period of time— 

maybe it is $100 million a year, $50 million a year—going into the 

future. Is that correct? 

Admiral CURRIER. Well, currently, in the SIP that exists, capital 

projected accounts, we have not made accommodation for that class 

of aircraft past the 18 that are on contract. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I am sorry, past the—— 

Admiral CURRIER. The 18 aircraft that are currently on contract. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So future budgets never anticipated the full 

purchase of the 40 force? 

Admiral CURRIER. Not at this point, sir. Not in the current 4- 

year budget projection. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. 

Mr. HUNTER. There are no further questions. 

Thank you, Admiral, for your testimony. 

And this subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:17 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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