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82–570 PDF 2014

S. Hrg. 113–316 

SAFEGUARDING OUR NATION’S SECRETS: 

EXAMINING THE SECURITY CLEARANCE PROCESS 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE EFFICIENCY AND 

EFFECTIVENESS OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS AND THE 

FEDERAL WORKFORCE 

AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL AND 

CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JUNE 20, 2013 

Available via http://www.fdsys.gov 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

( 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Staff Director 

KEITH B. ASHDOWN, Minority Staff Director 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Chief Clerk 

LAUREN M. CORCORAN, Hearing Clerk 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF 

FEDERAL PROGRAMS AND THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE 

JON TESTER, Montana, Chairman 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

TONY MCCLAIN, Staff Director 

BRENT BOMBACH, Minority Staff Director 

KELSEY STROUD, Chief Clerk 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL AND CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire 

MARGARET DAUM, Staff Director 

RACHEL WEAVER, Minority Staff Director 

KELSEY STROUD, Chief Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statement: Page 

Senator Tester .................................................................................................. 1 

Senator McCaskill ............................................................................................ 2 

Senator Portman .............................................................................................. 4 

Senator Johnson ............................................................................................... 5 

WITNESSES 

THURSDAY, JUNE 20, 2013 

Hon. Patrick E. McFarland, Inspector General, U.S. Office of Personnel Management; accompanied by Michelle B. Schmitz, Assistant Inspector General 

for Investigations, U.S. Office of Personnel Management ................................ 7 

Merton W. Miller, Associate Director of Investigations, Federal Investigative 

Services, U.S. Office of Personnel Management ................................................ 8 

Stephen F. Lewis, Deputy Director, Security Directorate, Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense (Intelligence), U.S. Department of Defense; accompanied by Stanley L. Sims, Director, Defense Security Service, U.S. Department of Defense .................................................................................................... 10 

Brenda S. Farrell, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, U.S. Government Accountability Office ............................................................................. 11 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Farrell, Brenda S.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 11 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 45 

Lewis, Stephen F.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 10 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 41 

McFarland, Hon. Patrick E.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 31 

Miller, Merton W.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 8 

APPENDIX 

Article submitted by Senator Johnson ................................................................... 57 

OPM’s White Paper submitted for the Record ...................................................... 59 

Questions and responses for the Record from: 

Mr. Miller .......................................................................................................... 69 

Mr. Lewis .......................................................................................................... 91 

Ms. Farrell ........................................................................................................ 93 

(1) 

SAFEGUARDING OUR NATION’S SECRETS: 

EXAMINING THE SECURITY 

CLEARANCE PROCESS 

THURSDAY, JUNE 20, 2013 

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF

FEDERAL PROGRAMS AND THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE,

AND SUBCOMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL AND

AND CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT,

OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in 

room SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jon Tester, 

Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Tester, McCaskill, Portman, and Johnson. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TESTER 

Senator TESTER. I call to order this joint hearing of the Subcommittee on Efficiency and Effectiveness of Federal Programs and 

the Federal Workforce and the Subcommittee on Financial and 

Contracting Oversight. I want to say thank you to Senator Johnson 

for being here. Senator McCaskill will be here shortly as well. I am 

sure Senator Portman will be, too. 

This afternoon’s hearing is titled, ‘‘Safeguarding Our Nation’s Secrets: Examining the Security Clearance Process’’ I want to thank 

my colleagues who I mentioned previously as well as their staffs 

for helping us organize this hearing, and I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. Thank you for your time. 

Recent events have forced us all to take a closer look at the programs carried out by this government in the name of national security. As we move forward, it is critical for us to examine the scope 

of these programs to determine whether they properly balance our 

security and our essential liberties. But it is also incumbent upon 

us to raise critical questions about how our government is vetting 

the individuals, whether they are Federal employees or contractors, 

who have access to our Nation’s most sensitive data. 

Last week, I asked General Keith Alexander, the Director of the 

National Security Agency (NSA), a pretty straight-up question: 

After the outcry of WikiLeaks, after the Presidential Executive 

Order (EO) calling for improved classified network security, and 

after spending tens if not hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars 

to keep outsiders from accessing our Nation’s secrets, how in the 
2 

world does a contractor, who had been on the job for less than 3 

months, get his hands on information detailing a highly classified 

government program that he subsequently shared with foreign 

media outlets? 

The long answer is one that we will ultimately require a great 

deal of soul searching by the folks in this room and throughout our 

government. But the short answer is that, in terms of securing 

classified information, we don’t just have an external problem; we 

have an internal one. 

Today there are nearly 5 million individuals inside and outside 

of our government who have been granted security clearances and 

access to our Nation’s most sensitive data; 1.4 million hold a top 

secret security clearance. Given the increasing amount of classified 

information produced and maintained by our government and the 

increasing number of folks with access to that information, we have 

a real problem on our hands if we cannot get this right. And because of the national security implications involved, there is simply 

no margin for error. None. 

Today’s joint hearing builds upon the previous work of this Subcommittee as well as the work of our colleagues on the Senate 

Armed Services Committee and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. We will examine the efficiency and effectiveness of the 

security clearance process, and we will discuss the management 

and oversight of the Federal employees and contractors tasked with 

carrying out investigations for the granting of clearances. 

I hope for and expect an open and frank discussion with our witnesses today about the particular roles they play in the security 

clearance process. We need to know what we are doing right, and 

we need to know what we can do better. A lot of progress has been 

made in recent years, but we certainly still have a ways to go. 

I would now like to turn it over to my good friend and Chairman 

of the Financial and Contracting Oversight Committee, Senator 

Claire McCaskill, for her opening statement. Welcome, Claire. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCASKILL 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you very much. Thank you, Senator 

Tester, and I hope this is the first of many joint hearings we have 

with Senator Portman and Senator Johnson. I think all four of us 

have demonstrated a desire to get after various problems that are 

sometimes embedded in our government without adequate oversight, and I am very happy to work with all three of you in this 

regard today. 

Earlier this month, a contractor working for NSA, Edward 

Snowden, released classified information regarding the NSA program. Mr. Snowden had access to this information because he had 

received a security clearance. That security clearance was issued 

following an investigation of Mr. Snowden’s background. 

Over 90 percent of the background investigations for both government employees and contractors are conducted by the Office of 

Personnel Management (OPM), including all background investigations for members of the military and Defense Department, civilian 

and contractors. 

In preparation for today’s hearing, we received information regarding how the government plans, conducts, oversees, and pays 
3 

for background investigations. This information portrays a government agency where there is fraud, limited accountability, and no 

respect for taxpayer dollars. Conducting and managing background 

investigations costs the Federal Government over $1 billion per 

year. 

The Office of Personnel Management’s Federal Investigative 

Services Division uses a Revolving Fund structure in which Federal 

agencies pay OPM for the different investigations each agency 

needs, both for its employees and for its contractors. As a former 

Missouri State auditor, I was shocked to learn that this fund has 

never been audited. The Inspector General (IG) will testify that he 

has tried several times, but the agency simply does not have or 

keep the records that would allow him to do an audit. 

We also learned that at least 18 investigators have been convicted of falsifying investigations since 2007. These convictions 

called into question hundreds of top-secret-level clearances as well 

as hundreds of lower-level clearances. There are more than 40 

other active and pending investigations into fabricated investigations, and it is possible that there are far more. 

We also learned that approximately 75 percent of all the government’s investigations are conducted by contractors, and just one 

contractor, U.S. Investigations Services (USIS), conducts 65 percent 

of those investigations. 

Now, USIS also has a contract to provide support to the Office 

of Personnel Management in managing and overseeing investigations, work which appears to put USIS in the position of being a 

contractor to do the investigations and then to be the contractor 

overseeing their own employees doing the investigations. 

For its work for the Office of Personnel Management, USIS received more than $200 million last year. We have received information that USIS is currently under criminal investigation by the Office of Personnel Management Inspector General. We have also received information that this investigation is related to USIS’ systematic failure to adequately conduct investigations under its contract. 

We have also learned that USIS conducted a background investigation for Edward Snowden in 2011, part of the time period that 

is under review. 

We are limited in what we can say about this investigation because, clearly, it is ongoing. But it is a reminder that background 

investigations have real consequences for our national security. 

Federal agencies like the Department of Defense (DOD) rely on 

these background investigations to make assessments of whether 

people should be trusted with our Nation’s most sensitive information. This hearing will attempt to answer this important question: 

Are we handling background investigations in our government effectively and in a way that is deserving of our trust? 

I thank the witnesses for being here, and I look forward to their 

testimony. 

Senator TESTER. Thank you, Senator McCaskill. 

I will turn it over to Senator Portman, the Ranking Member of 

the Federal Programs and Federal Workforce Subcommittee, for his 

opening statement. Welcome. 
4 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PORTMAN 

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank my 

Chair from the last Congress who is here with us and the Ranking 

Member, my colleague from Wisconsin. 

This is timely. It is a really important topic and obviously timely 

given the Snowden disclosures and the inadequacy of the system 

that they demonstrated. 

The security clearance process, performed well, is critical because 

it protects our Nation’s most valuable information while ensuring 

that we have the necessary personnel to handle and safeguard it. 

Done poorly, it can be incredibly damaging. Damaging leaks can 

hamstring our agencies’ abilities to fulfill their missions, as we 

have seen in cases over the last couple years, harming our allies 

and our ability to build alliances around the world. 

This Committee has had a long history of looking into this issue, 

oversight of the processes that now manage almost 5 million government and contracted personnel who are authorized to have 

some form of security clearance—5 million people. 

Given the many challenges in the past, it is only appropriate 

that followup today to see how these agencies are progressing and, 

again, in light of what just happened, to see why it is not working 

as well as it should be. 

For 6 years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) had the 

Department of Defense Personnel Security Program on its high-risk 

list. It is now off the high-risk list. It got off in 2011. But there is 

a long list of concerns and recommendations for the Department of 

Defense, for OPM, and for other agencies involved in the security 

clearance process. These include incomplete and poorly synchronized fielding of electronic case management systems and 

other tools across government, shortcomings in metrics for reciprocity, a sound requirements process to determine positions that 

require a clearance, and most troubling, I think, is the pressure to 

meet timeliness metrics impacting the quality of investigations. 

Additionally, our Inspectors General, have also identified issues 

of concern from the financial oversight of OPM’s $2 billion annual 

Revolving Fund, numerous cases of fraudulent investigations conducted by government and contractor investigators, and inadequate 

steps taken to prevent the risks posed by these negligent investigators from continuing. 

We must have adequate, effective, efficient, timely completion of 

background investigations. While attention has been paid in recent 

years to timeliness, there remain many questions as to the effectiveness and efficiency of this process. 

I look forward to hearing a progress report, Mr. Chairman, on 

meeting these recommendations that were provided and the actions 

that have been taken to avoid further mismanagement. Thank you 

to the witnesses for being here, and I thank the two Subcommittees 

and the Chairs for bringing this issue before us. 

Senator TESTER. Thank you, Senator Portman. 

Now we will turn it over to Senator Johnson, who is Ranking 

Member of the Financial and Contracting Oversight Subcommittee. 

Welcome, Senator Johnson. 
5 

1 Article referenced by Senator Johnson appears in the Appendix on page 57. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHNSON 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would also like 

to thank the witnesses for appearing. I did not count how many 

times I heard the word ‘‘process,’’ but that is exactly what this is 

all about. How do you develop a process that actually works? Coming from a manufacturing background in business, there are all 

kinds of processes that we have standardized. For example, International Organization for Standardization (ISO) certification works 

amazingly well. We all adhere to it. It is standardized. And there 

are things like surveillance audits on an ongoing basis. 

As I was reviewing the information prior to this hearing, that is 

what kept jumping into my mind. If we could apply these standardized type of processes across the government, I think we would be 

in a far better place. 

Probably the best piece of preparation material I read was an article written on February 28, 2013 by John Hamre,1 a former Deputy Secretary of Defense. The article describes how this gentleman 

went through a clearance process. He had already filed his electronic version of an SF86. But it was somewhere on a government 

computer and could not be retrieved. He had to fill it out again, a 

4-hour process. His subsequent review was a government employee 

or a contract employee going through question by question. He contrasts that with his experience in the private sector, answering five 

questions which had a 99-percent reveal rate in terms of whether 

that person was committing fraud. 

So, again, in the private sector, we can get to this, we can get 

to a process that works, and my question is: Why can’t we get that 

in the government? Hopefully what this hearing is about is coming 

up with that standardized process that actually works because, I 

agree with all three of you, this is critical if we want to protect our 

national secrets. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator TESTER. Thank you, Senator Johnson. 

Now for our witnesses. I would like to welcome all of you here 

today. I would like to point out that we extended an invite to the 

Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). They were 

unable to provide us with a witness. I know that they are under 

huge demands right now, and I acknowledge that the notice was 

short, but hopefully it can happen next time, because I am sure 

there will be a next time. 

However, we are fortunate to have assembled a great panel this 

afternoon. We will start with Patrick McFarland, who is the Inspector General of the United States Office of Personnel Management. He has served in this capacity since 1990, making him the 

longest tenured Federal Inspector General. As Inspector General of 

OPM, he heads up the audit and investigative programs seeking to 

identify fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement in programs administered by OPM. 

Mr. McFarland, I understand you were a police officer in St. 

Louis at one time. Hopefully your path did not cross Senator 

McCaskill’s. 
6 

Senator MCCASKILL. Only if we were combining up to put a 

criminal in jail. [Laughter.] 

Senator TESTER. OK. 

Mr. MCFARLAND. That is correct. 

Senator TESTER. Very good. Mr. McFarland is also accompanied 

by Michelle Schmitz, OPM’s Assistant Inspector General for Investigations. Welcome to you both. 

Merton Miller is Associate Director of Investigations for OPM’s 

Federal Investigative Services (FIS), the Federal Government’s 

larger provider of background investigations and services. Mr. Miller is responsible for FIS operations, policy development, and contractor oversight of OPM’s investigations program. Before joining 

OPM, Mr. Miller served a long and distinguished career in the 

United States Air Force. As a side note, if you are looking to fly 

a C–130 again, please come to Montana. We are going to be looking 

for pilots. 

And then we have Stephen Lewis, who is Deputy Director for 

Personnel, Industrial, and Physical Security Policy in the Office of 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. Welcome. That office exercises planning policy and strategic oversight over Defense 

Department intelligence, counterintelligence, and security matters, 

including the security clearance process. Today Mr. Lewis is accompanied by Stanley Sims, Director of the Defense Security Service 

(DSS) at the Defense Department. Welcome to both you, Mr. Lewis, 

and Mr. Sims to the hearing today. Thank you for your service. 

And then last, but certainly not least, we have Brenda Farrell, 

who is the Director of Defense Capabilities and Management at the 

Government Accountability Office. In that capacity she is responsible for overseeing the military and DOD civilian personnel issues, 

including governmentwide personnel security clearance issues. She 

has worked extensively on a number of national security issues 

since she began her career at the GAO in 1981. Welcome, Brenda. 

Thank you all for being here today. 

It is the custom in this Committee to swear in the witnesses who 

appear before it, so if you do not mind, I would ask you all to 

stand, including Mr. Sims and Ms. Schmitz, and repeat after me. 

Raise your right hand. Do you swear that the testimony you will 

give before this Subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, 

and nothing but the truth, so help you, God? 

Mr. MCFARLAND. I do. 

Ms. SCHMITZ. I do. 

Mr. MILLER. I do. 

Mr. LEWIS. I do. 

Mr. SIMS. I do. 

Ms. FARRELL. I do. 

Senator TESTER. Let the record reflect they all answered in the 

affirmative. 

Now, each one of you are going to have 5 minutes for your oral 

statements. Your entire written testimony will be a part of the 

record, and you can add more to that complete written testimony 

up until July 8. 

We will start with you, Mr. McFarland, and if you can keep it 

to 5 minutes, we would sure appreciate it. Patrick. 
7 

1The prepared statement of Mr. McFarland appears in the Appendix on page 31. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HON. PATRICK E. MCFARLAND,1 INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT; 

ACCOMPANIED BY MICHELLE B. SCHMITZ, ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. OFFICE OF 

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 

Mr. MCFARLAND. Chairmen Tester and McCaskill, Ranking 

Members Portman and Johnson, and other distinguished Members 

of the Subcommittees, good afternoon. My name is Patrick McFarland, and I am the Inspector General at the U.S. Office of Personnel Management. Thank you for inviting me here today to 

speak about our oversight work related to OPM’s Federal Investigative Services Program Office. 

In 1978, the U.S. Congress took a bold step in passing the Inspector General Act—bold in that it was an experiment born out 

of a multitude of governmentwide mistakes, serious problems, and 

just plain wrongdoing. In the face of much opposition from entrenched government bureaucracy, it was, I believe, a Congress’ 

pledge to the American citizen that their expectations of good government and their tax money would be protected. 

The Inspector General concept is transparency at its core 

functionality. It must be transparency without any shades of gray. 

Indeed, it is with this understanding that each Inspector General’s 

organization honors the independence required of them free of any 

political influence, which Congress mandated. 

Today you have asked me here because of concerns about the 

lack of transparency in an organization that plays an integral part 

in protecting our national security and the integrity of the government’s workforce. 

OPM Federal Investigative Services conducts approximately 90 

percent of these background investigations for the Federal Government. These investigations are used by agencies to determine 

whether to grant a Federal employee or contractor a security clearance. 

Due to recent events, a key discussion point in recent public debates has become: Who should we trust with sensitive information 

related to national security? The very first step the government 

takes in answering this question is to conduct background investigations. 

I am here to inform you that there is an alarmingly insufficient 

level of oversight of the Federal Investigative Services program. 

The lack of independent verification of the organization that conducts these important background investigations is a clear threat 

to national security. If a background investigation is not conducted 

properly, all other steps taken when issuing a security clearance 

are called into question. 

Every day I have the privilege of leading an organization of people dedicated to a work ethic that embodies our organizational 

pledge to know our business and responsibilities better than anyone else, and at the close of the day to be able to say that we did 

what was right for the American taxpayer. 

This having been said, what is most noteworthy for your Subcommittee’s understanding is that our oversight of OPM’s Federal 
8 

Investigative Services program has been thwarted by virtue of an 

agency funding decision. 

Under current law, the Federal Investigative Services must price 

its products and services in a manner that allows it to recover its 

actual costs of administering the program. OPM uses a Revolving 

Fund as the financing vehicle for these activities. For several years, 

OPM has taken the position that oversight is not considered to be 

an administrative cost, and, thus, our office has been denied access 

to the Revolving Fund. I do not think that anyone here would 

argue that oversight, financial audits, performance audits, and investigative activity are not a crucial part of the Administration of 

any government program. To compensate, we have used the $3 million we have for nontrust fund work to maintain a modicum of oversight viability in the 

Revolving Fund programs, with special emphasis on the Federal 

Investigative Services program because of the national security implications. 

Please be assured even with bare resources that, because of recent developments discussed in my written testimony, we feel compelled to engage our office in a joint initiative between the Audit 

and Investigation Divisions to thoroughly oversee the policies and 

procedures of the quality review practices of the Federal Investigative Services program. 

I am pleased to say that with the support of former Director 

John Berry, the Administration has included a legislative proposal 

in the President’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 budget that would grant 

us access to the Revolving Fund. 

I close by also requesting your Subcommittee’s support for the 

proposal so that our office will have the resources to finally do the 

job with which we have been entrusted. 

Thank you. 

Senator TESTER. Thank you, Patrick. 

We will go with you, Merton. 

TESTIMONY OF MERTON W. MILLER, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR 

OF INVESTIGATIONS, FEDERAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES, 

U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Chairman. 

Chairmen Tester and McCaskill, Ranking Members Portman and 

Johnson, thank you very much for the opportunity to testify today 

regarding OPM’s role in the Federal Government’s secret clearance 

process. 

In response to 2004 legislation authorizing the transfer of DOD’s 

personnel security investigations function to OPM and the enactment of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 

OPM has continued to enhance the background investigation process by improving timeliness, quality, and efficiency. Our successes 

are due in large part to our partnership with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), ODNI, Department of Defense, and other 

agencies that require investigations for security clearances. We 

have no backlogs, are meeting timeliness mandates, and have increased automation. 

OPM’s Federal Investigative Services conducts background investigations to support Executive Branch hiring, security clearances, 
9 

credentialing determinations, among others. The processes supporting these investigative activities are highly integrated, automated, consistently measured against timeliness and quality performance standards for Federal hiring and security clearance process reforms. 

Performance data for these background investigation products 

are largely reported to ODNI, Executive Branch agencies, OMB, 

and Congress. These products and services are then utilized as a 

basis for making security clearance suitability and fitness and 

credentialing determinations by agencies. 

Since absorbing DOD’s background investigative program in fiscal year 2005, DOD personnel security clearances have been removed from the Government Accounting Office’s high-risk list. And 

OPM has conducted over 95 percent of the background investigations required by the Federal Government. 

OPM manages, oversees the Federal employees and contractors 

responsible for conducting investigations. Now, pursuant to Executive Order 13467, the ODNI, as a security executive agent, is responsible for directing the oversight of investigations and determinations and for developing uniform and consistent policies and 

procedures to ensure the effective, efficient, and timely completion 

of investigations and adjudications relating to the determinations 

of eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold 

a sensitive position. And actual clearance decisions themselves are 

adjudications that are made by the sponsoring agencies. Agency 

heads apply uniform adjudicative guidelines which were approved 

by President Clinton and subsequently amended in 2005 by President Bush. 

Conducting background investigations is one of OPM’s core missions. FIS provides background investigations for over 100 Federal 

agencies with approximately 10,000 separate submitting offices 

worldwide. Currently we have more than 2,500 Federal employees 

and 6,700 contractors that form a nationwide network of field investigators, support staff, as well as a cadre of Federal agents that 

we have working abroad. 

OPM manages to balance nationwide Federal and contract workforce to provide a flexible, responsive, and cost-effective investigative program. Our core Federal investigators present us the opportunity to manage highly sensitive and inherently governmental investigation requirements while our contractor workforce permits us 

to expand and contract operations as the workload and locations 

dictate. 

Information technology has been and will continue to be a crucial 

ability to support us in balancing our timeliness, quality, and cost 

goals. It plays a key role in reducing costs, streamlining operations, 

improving efficiencies, eliminating waste, and providing a better 

service for the agencies that require these investigations. 

In addition, we consult with the security community in developing new policies and standards concerning the security clearance 

investigations program, to ensure governmentwide reciprocity, and 

address program needs, guaranteeing superior investigative products. 

Security clearance and suitability process reform has provided 

program enhancements particularly in the timeliness and quality 
10 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Lewis appears in the Appendix on page 41. 

of investigative products and has laid policy groundwork structure 

to support dramatic enhancements in the coming years. The enhancements to date have strengthened the government’s ability to 

recruit top talent and effectively put Federal and contractor employees to work. 

Last, FIS is working with OMB, ODNI, and DOD, and the other 

Federal agencies to establish and important Executive Branch-wide 

training standards, revise investigative and adjudicative standards 

and processes, and develop reciprocity standards and metrics to 

gauge improvements and demonstrate savings. 

I thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss this 

important issue, and I will be happy to respond to any questions. 

Senator TESTER. Thank you for your testimony, Mr. Miller. 

Mr. Lewis, you may proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF STEPHEN F. LEWIS,1 DEPUTY DIRECTOR, SECURITY DIRECTORATE, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY 

OF DEFENSE (INTELLIGENCE), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY STANLEY L. SIMS, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE SECURITY SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you. Good afternoon. Chairmen Tester and 

McCaskill, and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting 

me to testify today. My name is Steve Lewis. I am the Deputy Director of the Security Policy and Oversight Directorate within the 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. We appreciate the Committee’s continued interest in the effectiveness of the 

personnel security clearance process. Because of your commitment 

to this critical function of our government and its ability to protect 

national security, we have achieved major improvements over the 

years and look forward to even more gains in the future. 

I am here today on behalf of Dr. Michael Vickers, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and I would also like to introduce 

Mr. Stan Sims, the Director of Defense Security Service, who is accompanying us today. 

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is the Principal 

Staff Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary for security 

matters and is responsible for setting overall DOD policy to implement national policies for access to and the protection of classified 

national security information. In addition, he is the senior official 

for DOD’s personnel security program and has responsibility for 

policy and procedures governing civilian, military, and industrial 

base personnel security programs. 

Executive Order 13467 designates the Director of National Intelligence as the security executive agent with the responsibility to 

develop uniform policies and procedures to ensure effective completion of investigations and determinations of eligibility for access to 

classified information, as well as acceptance of those determinations on a reciprocal basis across the government. 

With regard to the oversight roles and responsibilities within 

DOD, the heads of DOD components are responsible for establishing and overseeing implementation of procedures to ensure protection of classified information and taking prompt and appropriate 
11 

1The prepared statement of Ms. Farrell appears in the Appendix on page 45. 

management action in cases of compromise of classified information. Such actions are required to focus on correcting or eliminating 

the conditions that caused, contributed to, or brought about the incident. This responsibility encompasses military service members, 

DOD civilians, and embedded contractor personnel. 

Under the National Industrial Security Program, the Defense Security Service is responsible for conducting oversight of companies 

cleared to perform on classified contracts for DOD and 26 other 

Federal agencies which use DOD industrial security services. 

The Department has instituted various process improvements 

that have resulted in greater efficiencies and effectiveness with regard to initiating and adjudicating background investigations, and 

this has helped to result in the removal of DOD from the high-risk 

list for its personnel security program. 

We have deployed multiple initiatives to ensure consistent, highquality investigative products, highly skilled and professionally certified personnel security adjudicators, and robust documentation of 

adjudicative rationale in support of these adjudicative decisions. 

This helps to ensure appropriate oversight and reciprocity. 

In October 2012, DOD consolidated its adjudicative functions and 

resources except for the DOD intelligence agencies in a centralized 

adjudication facility to realize efficiencies and standardize practices 

of this critical inherently governmental function. 

You specifically asked for the costs of obtaining security clearances for the Department, and in fiscal year 2012, DOD paid the 

Office of Personnel Management a total of $753 million for security 

clearance investigations and approximately $471 million for military service members, $30 million for DOD civilians, and $252 million for cleared industry. 

Thank you for your time. 

Senator TESTER. Thank you for your testimony, Mr. Lewis. 

Ms. Farrell, you may proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF BRENDA S. FARRELL,1 DIRECTOR, DEFENSE 

CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. FARRELL. Chairmen Tester, McCaskill, and Members of the 

Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today to 

discuss the governmentwide personnel security clearance process. 

As you know, we have an extensive body of work on issues related 

to the security process dating back several decades. 

Since 2008, we have focused on the governmentwide effort to reform the security clearance process. My statement today is based 

on GAO reports issued between 2008 and 2013 on DOD’s personnel 

security clearance program and personnel security reform efforts. 

Personnel security clearances allow government and contractor 

personnel to gain access to classified information that through unauthorized disclosure can in some cases cause exceptionally grave 

damage to U.S. national security. 

As you know, a high number of clearances continue to be processed. The Director for National Intelligence reported this year that 

more than 4.9 million government and contractor personnel held 
12 

clearances, making it a formidable challenge for those deciding who 

should have a clearance. My written statement addresses three 

areas for improvement to the process. 

The first area addresses having a sound requirements determination process in place. Agencies need an effective process for determining whether positions require a security clearance and, if so, at 

what level. Underdesignating positions can lead to security risks 

while overdesignating can also lead to security risks and result in 

significant cost implications. 

Last year, we found guidance did not exist to help agencies determine whether or not a civilian position should require a clearance 

and, importantly, no requirement exists to review existing positions 

with clearances. We made recommendations to the Director of National Intelligence, to develop such guidance. 

The second part of my statement addresses quality measurement. Since the 1990s, we have emphasized the need to build quality and quality metrics into the clearance process. Executive 

Branch efforts to reform the process have focused more so on timeliness than quality. We have seen programs on speeding up the 

processing of initial clearances, but not on developing metrics for 

qualitative investigations, implementing those metrics, or reporting 

on those metrics’ findings. 

We have reason for concern about the quality of investigations. 

For example, in May 2009, GAO reported that documentation was 

incomplete for most OPM investigative reports we reviewed, about 

87 percent of 3,500 total. We have made recommendations in this 

area, but those recommendations have not been implemented. 

The last area of my statement addresses the guidance to enhance 

efficiencies of the clearance process. Governmentwide personnel security reform efforts have not yet focused on potential cost savings, 

even though the stated mission of these efforts includes improving 

cost savings. For example, OPM’s investigative process, which represents a portion of the security clearance process and has significant costs, has not been studied for process efficiencies or cost savings. In February 2012, GAO reported that OPM received over $1 

billion to conduct more than 2 million background investigations in 

fiscal year 2012. 

We have raised concerns about transparency of costs and investments in technology while maintaining a less efficient and duplicative paper-based process. We have made recommendations in this 

area, but actions have still not been realized. 

This concludes my opening statement. I would be pleased to take 

questions. Thank you very much. 

Senator TESTER. Thank you all for your opening statements. 

We will put 7 minutes on the clock, and we will go from here. 

I am going to start with you, Mr. McFarland. Without making 

any specific statements that could compromise the ongoing investigation, could you confirm that the Office of Personnel Management’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) is currently investigating USIS? They are one of the three major contractors conducting background checks on behalf of the U.S. Government? 

Mr. MCFARLAND. Yes, Senator, we are. 

Senator TESTER. Can you also confirm that USIS carried out the 

background investigation on Mr. Snowden? 
13 

Mr. MCFARLAND. Well, I am not sure regarding that question. 

Senator TESTER. OK. It is my information that there were two. 

There was an initial investigation and then a—— 

Mr. MCFARLAND. Oh, I am sorry. Yes, the re-investigation, absolutely. 

Senator TESTER. So USIS did do the re-investigation. 

Mr. MCFARLAND. Yes. 

Senator TESTER. But you are not sure who did the initial investigation? 

Mr. MCFARLAND. That is correct. 

Senator TESTER. Would it be possible to get that information? 

Mr. MCFARLAND. Yes, it is. 

Senator TESTER. OK, good. Are there any concerns that Mr. 

Snowden’s background investigation by USIS may not have been 

carried out in an appropriate or thorough manner? 

Mr. MCFARLAND. Yes, we do believe that there may have been 

some problems. 

Senator TESTER. OK. And when more information gets available 

on this, I would assume it is going to be made public. Is that correct? 

Mr. MCFARLAND. Well, it will all depend on the time and situation, but we will do our best to keep you informed. 

Senator TESTER. OK, that is good. So let me ask you this: USIS 

is under investigation. But yet they are given the re-investigation 

of Mr. Snowden. How does that happen? 

Ms. SCHMITZ. It is our understanding that the periodic re-investigation was done in 2011, which would have pre-dated the initiation of our investigation. 

Senator TESTER. OK. When did you initiate your investigation of 

them? 

Ms. SCHMITZ. It was later in 2011. 

Senator TESTER. OK. If I am correct—I believe it was in one of 

your opening statements—USIS conducts about 65 of the 75 percent of investigations that is contracted out. Is that correct? 

Ms. SCHMITZ. That question is probably best answered by FIS. I 

understand the number varies depending on whether you are talking about all investigative products or those which include significant field work. 

Senator TESTER. OK. Merton. 

Mr. MILLER. USIS conducts 45 percent of the overall contract 

workload. 

Senator TESTER. OK. Very good. 

I am going to go with you, Mr. Lewis, and then I will kick it over 

to Senator McCaskill. I touched in my opening statement how 

much classified data is being generated and maintained and the increasing number of individuals granted access to that data. DOD 

currently accounts for a vast majority of the initial personnel security clearances. Since 9/11, heightened security has obviously led to 

an increased number of background checks. I am not challenging 

that at all. 

What I am asking is, given our redeployment of troops in Iraq 

and now the drawdown in Afghanistan, do you anticipate that DOD 

security clearances are going to decrease in the future, maintain, 

or increase? 
14 

Mr. LEWIS. It is hard to have a crystal ball on that subject. One 

would think that as the drawdown processes, there would be less 

of a requirement for clearances. And we are engaging with the 

military services and others to look at scrubbing the requirements 

for clearances and validating need more aggressively than we have 

in the past. But I cannot predict what is going to happen with any 

degree of certainty. 

Senator TESTER. Now, understanding that the clearances are 

driven by specific needs, is that scrubbing what you are using to 

monitor or manage the number of overall clearances for the DOD? 

Or what kind of metrics are you using? Or are there metrics to 

use? 

Mr. LEWIS. We are looking at the number of clearances and engaging with the military services to validate those needs. So we do 

not have metrics at this point on that issue. 

Senator TESTER. OK. Senator McCaskill, go ahead. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Mr. Miller, have you read Ms. Farrell’s testimony today? 

Mr. MILLER. I just heard it for the first time. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I am not going to start now, but I would appreciate if you would read and respond to it with specificity. It is 

overwhelming to me the amount of recommendations that have 

been made in this area that have been ignored by your agency. If 

you want to address why the recommendations have been ignored 

now, you are welcome to. I have spent a lot of time around GAO 

reports and looking at recommendations and whether or not they 

are implemented. And, typically, agencies that have the least 

amount of oversight by Congress have the worst record of thinking 

that what GAO says matters. 

Is there some kind of cogent answer you can give to why all 

these recommendations have been basically wholesale ignored? 

Mr. MILLER. We take what GAO recommends through their audits very seriously—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. When is the last time you implemented one 

of their recommendations? 

Mr. MILLER. We have implemented all this fiscal year a number 

of recommendations regarding—I will take the last audit—cost 

transparency. We have done a number of things to support cost 

transparency for our customers. We submitted our first annual 

stakeholder report, a 33-page report that details not only workload 

and resources but also talks specifically about where our money 

goes to support the program. We—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. If you would be so kind, Ms. Farrell, to do 

a scorecard for us, list the recommendations that GAO has made 

in this area and give us an actual score as to how many of them 

have been implemented and when, by your estimation, and then I 

will have a chance to share that with you, Mr. Miller, and you can 

argue as to whether it is accurate or not. 

Senator MCCASKILL. How many times has the IG asked to try to 

audit the Revolving Fund that pays for all these background investigations? 

Mr. MILLER. I do not have a number of times they have asked 

to audit, but my understanding is we are very amendable to moving forward with the process. The issue was determining whether 
15 

there was a legal basis to provide Revolving Fund dollars for the 

audit. 

Senator MCCASKILL. According to Mr. McFarland, the documents 

do not exist to audit the fund. 

Mr. MILLER. Oh, there are lots of documents, financial reports—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. So I need some kind of agreement here as to why this fund has never been audited. It is $1 billion a year. 

It is outrageous that it has never been audited. And so what is 

your rationale as to why this fund has never been audited? 

Mr. MILLER. My understanding is OPM—we support the current 

request by the OIG for Revolving Fund dollars to support audits in 

the future. The issue in the past was there was not a legal basis 

for Revolving Fund dollars to be given to the IG for audit purposes. 

We welcome the IG’s oversight. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, these are all public dollars. 

Mr. MILLER. They are public dollars. They are not appropriated 

dollars. And, honestly, I cannot speak to—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, they were appropriated at some point. 

Mr. MILLER. Yes, ma’am, they were. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Because you cannot get them unless they 

were appropriated. 

Mr. MILLER. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So what you are saying is all somebody has 

to do in government is give some of the money that has been appropriated to another agency and, presto, whamo, no audit? 

Mr. MILLER. No, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, that is what you are saying. You are 

saying that there was some legal question as to whether this 

money was auditable by an IG just because it had been transferred 

to your agency by another agency. 

Mr. MILLER. It was absolutely auditable. The issue was whether 

Revolving Fund dollars could be given to the IG to resource additional personnel to actually conduct the audit. They could have 

used appropriated dollars at any time to audit the Revolving Fund. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. Let me see if I understand. What is 

your view of this, Mr. McFarland and Ms. Schmitz, as to why the 

audits have not occurred? He seems to be saying that this was an 

acknowledgment by you that you did not have the resources to do 

it. Is that the problem? 

Mr. MCFARLAND. We absolutely have the resources to do it. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So what from your view is the reason why 

this fund has never been audited? 

Mr. MCFARLAND. When you say ‘‘the fund,’’ you are speaking—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. The Revolving Fund. 

Mr. MCFARLAND. Our intent, as always, is to get involved as 

deeply as we can in any subject matter. The problem that we have 

is that we could not identify—excuse me just a second, please. I 

want to give you as correct an answer as possible. 

Ms. SCHMITZ. My understanding—and this may be subject to 

later correction because audits is not my area—is that they were 

attempted in the late 1990s, and there was insufficient documentation. Since that time the OIG has not had the financial resources 

to pay to do an audit. 
16 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. Well, we need to get that figured out, 

because if we are actually saying to the American people that there 

are not the resources available to audit a fund that holds $1 billion 

worth of public money, we have a real problem. So I am going to 

need you to come up with the specific answer that you believe is 

holding you back from auditing this fund, and I would need the 

same kind of specificity from you, Mr. Miller, as to your willingness 

and your capability of being audited. We know the Department of 

Defense cannot be audited. We are working on that. It has been 

decades long process trying to get them audited. This seems to me 

to be a discrete fund for which an audit ought not be very expensive. It ought to be as easy as brushing your teeth for the tens 

upon thousands of government auditors we have working right 

now. So let us get to the bottom of that. 

I want to talk just for a minute, before my time is up, about the 

number of convictions for falsifications. You have had 18 people 

convicted for falsifying investigations since 2007. Of those, 11 were 

government employees, 7 were contractors. Eighteen convictions 

seems high to me for an office as small as this is. Do you believe 

you are catching most of the fraud, Mr. McFarland? Or do you believe there is more? 

Mr. MCFARLAND. No, I believe there may be considerably more. 

I do not believe that we have caught it all by any stretch. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. My time is up. I will wait for my second round. Thank you. 

Senator TESTER. Senator Portman. 

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

One thing we have heard today which is disturbing is that we 

cannot confirm the quality of Mr. Snowden’s investigation. This 

leads to a broader question about whether the pressure that you 

all feel to speed up investigations and the backlog that occurs is 

leading to lower quality. And I am wondering about whether you 

are measuring those metrics. 

You have been pressed on timeliness, I am sure, but here is some 

data. In 2009, GAO assessed from a sample that 87 percent of investigative reports that DOD adjudicators used to make clearance 

decisions were missing background documentation—87 percent. 

GAO subsequently recommended OPM measure the frequency with 

which investigative reports meet Federal investigative standards. 

It seems like a pretty straightforward and commonsense recommendation. 

GAO also notes that OPM is developing a tool similar to DOD’s 

Rapid Assessment of Incomplete Security Evaluations. Ms. Farrell, 

you talked more about that in your testimony. You basically stated 

that from GAO’s observation, OPM continues to assess quality 

based on voluntary reporting from customer agencies. 

In light of what has just happened and in light of this information from GAO now going back 4 years, Mr. Miller, how do you 

measure quality? 

Mr. MILLER. Senator, we have a number of ways that we measure quality, but if I could address just up front the 87 percent number: You probably saw OPM’s response to that audit. There are 

challenges associated with capturing every element of a background investigation, and let me just explain very quickly. 
17 

An employment check, that was one of the areas where there 

was the highest number of elements missing in background investigations. Employers can choose not to cooperate with the government when we conduct a background investigation. I am not saying 

Federal agencies. I am talking all kinds of commercial entities 

where individuals may have previously worked. 

One of the challenges is actually getting cooperation. If an employer either goes away, does not exist any longer, or chooses not 

to provide information to the government, that information has to 

be documented in a Report of Investigation, but you do not get that 

employment coverage that is required. 

There are issues regarding the 87 percent subject interviews that 

were not accomplished. Many of those subjects had been deployed 

into a hostile environment where investigators could not go to conduct those interviews. So there is documentation in the Report of 

Investigation saying this subject was not available due to deployment, and that case is closed. 

And, Senator, you are exactly right. Every time we initiate an investigation, we put what we refer to as a close date, a CD date, 

because that date must be met to meet the mandated 40-day challenge that we are given for timeliness. So all investigative leads 

must be accomplished in that period of time, and the case is then 

closed. 

Senator PORTMAN. Let us followup on this a little bit, and, Ms. 

Farrell, jump in here. Eighty-seven percent is a high figure for incomplete reports. Given that we are trying to protect some of our 

most valuable classified information and we have seen some of the 

impact of this recently, do you agree with what Mr. Miller just 

said, that the major problem is that employers in the private sector 

do not want to respond to questions and/or that people have been 

deployed into hostile environments? Is that the reason 87 percent 

of these are not properly completed? 

Ms. FARRELL. The documentation was not in the files. We recognize that it may be challenging to track down people who may be 

deployed, and if the documentation is there, then that could explain it. We found the same types of incomplete documentation 

with DOD’s adjudication files. We recommended they offer guidance in these situations, and that if there are difficulties, you document it so that the adjudicator or whoever does a review will know 

why that was left blank, the person was deployed. 

DOD implemented our recommendation—— 

Senator PORTMAN. So if the person was deployed, for instance, 

and that was the only reason that there was an incomplete investigation, that would not be part of the 87 percent? 

Ms. FARRELL. If it were documented. 

Senator PORTMAN. If you simply had that documentation. 

Ms. FARRELL. If they had that documentation. The Federal Investigative Guidelines, like the Federal Adjudicative Guidelines, look 

at it as a baseline. So we had our staff attend investigative training. We used GAO-certified adjudicators to help us do these file reviews, so we made sure that the relevant staff had the competency 

to see what was missing and what should be there. So this is about 

documentation, not having to look at a file and guess. 
18 

Senator PORTMAN. And your recommendation was that they develop tools to be able to deal with that? Mr. Miller, just quickly, 

what tools have you developed to be able to close this gap? 

Mr. MILLER. There are a number of initiatives ongoing currently 

as well as our own quality process. We have quality procedures for 

contracts and Federal employees that include several stages and 

layers of review while a background investigation is being worked 

and when it is finalized. 

There are a number of requirements within a contract for a full 

quality review of the investigation before it is delivered to the government. As each lead is accomplished there is a review conducted 

by our reviewers. We have 400 Federal employees whose sole role 

is quality assurance of our products that do a full review of each 

investigation. 

When that is finalized and the final review and the delivery is 

to our customers, there is a subsequent review—the most important review, quite frankly—the adjudicative decision made by the 

agency itself. So they review the investigation and make a determination whether all elements are there required to make a determination. They can make an adjudicative decision—I am not an adjudicator—claiming a deviation, meaning that there are certain elements not there, but based on the whole of the investigation, they 

determine to grant that person either a clearance or the Federal 

employment. 

Senator PORTMAN. And are you now providing these metrics to 

all of your adjudicators? And are you providing this documentation 

so that when GAO looks at your process the next time, they are 

going to be able to know why somebody was not provided all the 

information? 

Mr. MILLER. We have not had any followup recently with GAO. 

We would welcome a followup on that, as well as to address quality 

standards. We have an interagency working group chaired by the 

ODNI, at DOD and OPM that is working on establishing clear and 

concise standards for evaluating background investigations to meet 

the quality standard. Today quality is in the eye of the beholder, 

depending on the agency, depending on the adjudicator, whether it 

is complete, whether it is not. So there is a lot of gray area that, 

quite frankly, I advocated in standing up this quality working 

group to give us defined roles. I can tell you, give us quality standards we understand that are clear and we will absolutely meet 

them. 

Senator PORTMAN. I think one would be not to have the vast majority of the reports be incomplete. But thank you for your testimony. We will be back on the second round. Thank you, Ms. 

Farrell. 

Senator TESTER. Thank you, Senator Portman. 

Senator Johnson. 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Miller, what does it mean, case closed? 

Mr. MILLER. Case closed means all the elements of the background investigation have been obtained and completed and passed 

on to the customer. 

Senator JOHNSON. Or you have not gotten all of them and you 

are still closing the case when 40 days is up? 
19 

Mr. MILLER. If they are not obtainable, like an employment 

check, that will be documented in the Report of Investigation, and 

it will be closed and—— 

Senator JOHNSON. So how many of those case-closed, incomplete 

investigations then are actually adjudicated and clearances granted? 

Mr. MILLER. Well—— 

Senator JOHNSON. Do you keep any metrics on that? 

Mr. MILLER. Yes, sir. When a customer comes back to us and 

says, ‘‘You are missing elements, there is information we do not 

have here to make the decision, we are asking you to reopen that 

investigation,’’ that is—— 

Senator JOHNSON. What percent do you get back then? 

Mr. MILLER. That is less than 1 percent, sir. 

Senator JOHNSON. So then do you know how many clearances are 

granted based on your case closed with incomplete documentation? 

Mr. MILLER. No, sir. The only way we would know what is granted would be what would be updated in our—— 

Senator JOHNSON. You have 87 percent of cases that are incompletely documented, considered case closed, and then only 1 percent 

get kicked back with a request for more information? So we could 

potentially have 86 percent of investigations incomplete and then 

security clearances granted. That is probably what is happening, 

right? Yikes. 

Ms. Farrell, something pretty disturbing in your testimony is the 

lack of guidance in terms of what is a requirement for a security 

clearance being granted. 

Ms. FARRELL. That responsibility falls on the Director of National 

Intelligence. He is responsible for oversight of the security area by 

providing guidance regarding efficiencies, effectiveness, and timeliness of—— 

Senator JOHNSON. There is no standard for even requesting a security clearance? 

Ms. FARRELL. The guidance, I must say, is under draft. We have 

a recommendation, and I want to acknowledge that. 

Senator JOHNSON. We have been granting security clearances for 

how many decades? 

Ms. FARRELL. Decades. 

Senator JOHNSON. And there is literally no standard, no guidance 

for what circumstances require a clearance. None. 

Ms. FARRELL. You are correct. In the absence of any guidance, 

it is left up to the agencies to determine how they are going to classify those jobs, and what you find is inconsistency. We also found 

that some of the agencies were using an OPM tool that helps determine the sensitivity of a job position. The sensitivity of a position 

does not tell you the classification, but by knowing the sensitivity, 

then you can translate that into whether or not a security clearance is needed. 

Unfortunately, this tool is geared more toward determining suitability for the job rather than if the job requires a security clearance. It was developed without a lot of collaboration with ODNI. 

Senator JOHNSON. Does anybody want to challenge this in terms 

of no standards, no guidance, in terms of what is a requirement for 

even seeking a security clearance? Mr. Miller, help me out here. 
20 

Mr. MILLER. Sir, OPM did create a position designation tool that 

was focused on suitability and determining what type of level of investigation is required for the position in question. 

Senator JOHNSON. Mr. Lewis, in the Department of Defense, is 

there a guidance, is there a standard? 

Mr. LEWIS. The key focus is on what level of access is required 

to perform the duties associated with the job, and that is going to 

depend upon what those duties are. For industry it is very carefully 

and closely scrutinized by Defense Security Service when they inspect contractor facilities. Within DOD, it is going to depend on 

what level of access is determined to be required to perform the duties. 

Senator JOHNSON. Isn’t that somewhat of a guidance, Ms. 

Farrell? We have classifications of different secrecy levels, and if 

your job description says you need X classification, isn’t that a 

guidance? 

Ms. FARRELL. The guidance does not exist, is what I am telling 

you, for governmentwide determination whether or not a civilian 

position needs a clearance. You will find that individual agencies 

thus have developed their own rules or procedures. What we found 

from our audit last year was inconsistency in their application. In 

fact, even the OPM IG reviewed use of the OPM position tool that 

Mr. Miller mentioned and found that, for the majority of the cases 

reviewed applying OPM’s tool came up with a different determination. Quite alarming. 

Senator JOHNSON. Security clearances, we have clearances for individuals, but we also have them for contractors and for facilities, 

correct? I mean, you also are basically certifying contractors to be 

able to handle classified material. Is that correct? Mr. Miller, can 

you just step me through an investigation of a contractor or facility 

versus an individual? 

Mr. MILLER. Yes, sir. For an individual, there is a determination 

whether that the contractor needs a clearance. It is sponsored by 

the Department of Defense. They submit the individual—— 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. I am really more interested in facilities 

right now. 

Mr. MILLER. OK. I cannot speak to facilities, sir. We are not involved with that. 

Senator JOHNSON. Because I want to find out how often—if the 

certification is granted, are there surveillance audits on a regular 

basis? Because I think that is kind of the crux of the problem potentially, with the most recent incident. Mr. Lewis. 

Mr. LEWIS. I would like to defer to Mr. Sims on that as his agency exercises that oversight. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. Thank you. 

Mr. SIMS. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate the opportunity. I 

oversee the Defense Security Service for contractors and facilities. 

As Mr. Lewis stated up front, as part of the National Industrial Security Program, the Defense Security Service oversees the granting 

of facility clearances. The facility clearance is actually required by 

for the government. If the contractor is operating on a contract that 

requires a certain level of clearance, for example, secret or top secret, then they submit those requirements to DSS, but it is sponsored by the government. 
21 

We then look at the facility, the company, if you will, and we 

look at the contract and the requirements of the contract. If the 

contract requires a secret clearance we evaluate the facility by a 

number of different criteria and then grant the facility clearance 

first. 

Once the contractor gets a facility clearance, that caps the level 

of access an individual working their can acquire. For example, if 

there is a level of effort, however many contractors are required to 

perform on that government contract, and then that facility clearance is at the secret level, that is only the level that the individual 

can even apply for. 

We audit or do security reviews on a routine basis of all the contract facilities out there. There are about 13,500-plus facility clearances that we oversee, awarded to about 10,000 companies. We do 

routine security reviews, and when our investigative organization 

or our agents go to those facilities, we look at those contracts. We 

verify on a routine basis whether they have personnel operating 

above the clearance level specified by the facility clearance. For example, if we find that they have a person that is cleared at top secret, that is trying to work on a secret contract, then we mandate 

the lowering of or removal from the—— 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. I am out of time, and I am going to have 

to leave. Just a quick question. How many man-hours does the first 

certification process take? How many man-hours are involved in a 

surveillance audit? I am just trying to get some sort of feeling of 

how rigorous these certifications are. 

Mr. SIMS. Senator, it depends on the size of the facility. Those 

10,000 facilities range from Mom-and-Pops all the way up to Lockheed-Martin? 

Senator JOHNSON. Is this a day-long process? Is it a 3-month 

process? 

Mr. SIMS. For some of the smaller companies, it could be a day 

or two. For the larger companies, facilities like a Lockheed-Martin, 

a large manufacturing facility, we have done at least 2 to 3 weeks 

onsite with a team of security professionals from my agency. 

Senator JOHNSON. OK. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator TESTER. You bet. Thank you, Senator Johnson. 

I am going to read the second paragraph on page 3 of Mr. 

McFarland’s testimony, and this will be a question for you, Mr. 

Miller. The testimony goes like this: 

‘‘The problem that [Patrick McFarland’s] office has encountered 

is that the Office of Inspector General oversight costs are not permitted to be charged against the Revolving Fund.’’ This is a followup on Senator McCaskill’s question. This $1 bil- lion or $2 billion fund, somebody has made a call that none of that 

money can be used for things like annual financial audits or any 

basic oversight. Who made that call? 

Mr. MILLER. I cannot answer that, sir. 

Senator TESTER. Mr. McFarland. 

Mr. MCFARLAND. Yes, I can speak to that, Senator. This has 

been probably the most frustrating thing that has happened regarding the Revolving Fund for us, because it has almost literally 

taken us out of the picture. We have a limited amount of money 
22 

from salaries and expenses—in our case, it is $3 million right 

now—to spend on non-trust fund issues, and the Revolving Fund 

is a non-trust fund issue. 

So what we have tried to do as best we can is stay tuned in to 

what is going on, and that is kind of a sad State of affairs for an 

IG to have to say, stay tuned in. We want to be in depth in all of 

these things. But we have not been able to simply because it was 

decided by the General Counsel’s office and then supported by the 

Director of OPM that we do not fit into the category that would 

allow us to have funds from the Revolving Fund. 

Now, we take total disagreement with that, of course. We feel 

just the opposite. 

In order to try to remedy the situation, I suggested a couple 

years ago the Director of OPM should suspend his decision in 

agreement with the General Counsel’s office, that, we are not entitled to those funds. 

Senator TESTER. We have a confirmation hearing on the new Director of OPM on July 12, and I have a notion that is going to be 

a question that is going to be asked right out of the gate: Are you 

going to support using some of those monies? 

Let me ask you one more thing, and I want you to be very brief, 

if you can. 

Mr. MCFARLAND. Sure. 

Senator TESTER. When you do an oversight, an audit, or whatever it may be, is typically the cost paid for by the fund that you 

are doing the audit on? 

Mr. MCFARLAND. Everything we do for health insurance, retirement, and life insurance is done out of those trust funds. 

Senator TESTER. OK. Is there any other fund out there that you 

know of that has been declared off limits for reimbursement for 

your duties? 

Mr. MCFARLAND. No. We are using our salary and expenses to 

do what we can in the Revolving Fund. That is why it is so limiting. 

Senator TESTER. I understand that. But when you do any other 

audits on any other funds, I assume you are getting paid out of 

those funds that you are auditing. 

Mr. MCFARLAND. That is correct. 

Senator TESTER. Are there any other funds that you are auditing 

that you are not able to get your costs reimbursed from those 

funds? 

Mr. MCFARLAND. No. In general. I think—— 

Senator TESTER. OK. That is what I needed to know. The hearing is July 16, not July 12. 

I have a question to followup on Senator Johnson’s, if I could to 

you, Ms. Farrell. Short of the President of the United States, I do 

not know who is responsible for these security clearances. There 

are different standards, there are different responsibilities, different metrics, different everything. 

So this incident comes up with Snowden. We should not be surprised at all. Where does the buck stop on this situation? Does the 

buck stop with Congress? Are we falling back? Should we be dictating what you should be doing? Or who should be doing this? 
23 

Ms. FARRELL. Well, we were encouraged when a governance 

structure was put in place by Executive Order back in 2008. The 

Executive Order established a Performance Accountability Council 

(PAC) to drive reform efforts toward effectiveness, efficiency, keep 

it going. And the Deputy for Management at OMB is the Chair of 

the Performance Accountability Council. 

The order also established the Director of National Intelligence 

as the Security Executive Agent. It also established OPM as the 

Suitability Executive Agent. 

So that question we asked many times after the Council was 

formed, when we were looking at the reform efforts and who is in 

charge. It comes down to the Performance Accountability Council, 

headed up by the Deputy Manager at OMB. 

Senator TESTER. Very quickly, Mr. Miller, should I be concerned 

about this, concerned that there is no apparent metrics or standards or—— 

Mr. MILLER. Sir, there are standards. 

Senator TESTER. Yes, but they vary between each agency, so consequently there is no reciprocity, and the standards could go from 

soup to nuts. 

Mr. MILLER. Yes, sir. There has been a great deal of effort under 

the Performance Accountability Council to align standards and get 

consistency across Federal agencies. 

Senator TESTER. Have we been successful in that to develop a 

single measurable standard? 

Mr. MILLER. Sir, we are better than we have been. There is still 

work to do. 

Senator TESTER. OK. Senator McCaskill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Let me go back to the convictions. When 

you have convictions of people who falsify investigations, what kind 

of processes are in place, Mr. McFarland or Ms. Schmitz, as to the 

investigations that the person was responsible for? 

Ms. SCHMITZ. The Federal Investigative Services has an integrity 

assurance process in place, which is how most of these cases are 

initially detected. When they suspect that falsification is occurring, 

they do what they call a recovery effort, which is to identify the 

scope of the falsifications and then they have a federally employed 

background investigator go back and redo every single investigation that was assigned to that person, both to make sure that a 

quality product replaces the possibly defective product and to identify what is falsified for further criminal investigation and potential 

prosecution. 

Senator MCCASKILL. For the people who are in the parameters 

of the investigation around these criminal convictions for falsification, I assume that their access to classified material is cutoff while 

that is done? Or are they allowed to keep their clearance while you 

look into it? 

Ms. SCHMITZ. You mean the individuals who hold the security 

clearance? 

Senator MCCASKILL. Correct. 

Ms. SCHMITZ. Mert may know more than I do, but to my knowledge, they are not affected while the investigation is in process. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Is that true? They are allowed to keep their 

classification even though you have discovered that during the pe-
24 

riod of time their security clearance was given that somebody was 

criminally falsifying? 

Mr. MILLER. Yes, ma’am, that is correct. The recovery process 

that was just mentioned is the top priority. Our integrity assurance 

program, as Michelle testified, is how these falsifications are uncovered. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And you are doing that by recontact letters? 

Is that how this happens? 

Mr. MILLER. Yes, ma’am. That is one of the processes, the recontact letters. 

Senator MCCASKILL. How many people get recontact letters? 

Mr. MILLER. Three percent a month of all investigations receive 

recontact activity, and that is for every agent we have employed. 

So there is not any agent that does not receive some recontact activity on their investigations. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And when you say ‘‘agent,’’ you mean government employee or contractor? 

Mr. MILLER. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So everybody who is doing background 

checks, 3 percent of their work every month, the people who they 

say they interviewed, you do recontact letters to confirm they have 

been interviewed. 

Mr. MILLER. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. What if they falsify who they contacted and 

they are the ones getting the recontact letter? 

Mr. MILLER. Then we will uncover the fraud. 

Senator MCCASKILL. How? 

Mr. MILLER. If the individual that we recontact was the individual, the lead that was falsified, typically the response is they 

were never spoken to by OPM. 

Senator MCCASKILL. No. I mean what if the person making the 

falsification falsifies the person they contacted, makes up that it is 

them, and puts down a phone number that is a phone number they 

have access to or an address they have access to, a post office box, 

and they actually get the letter and say, ‘‘Yes, they contacted me,’’ 

when in reality the whole thing was made up? How do you catch 

that? 

Mr. MILLER. That is an interesting scenario. But we know where 

our agents reside. We know where our agents—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, aren’t some of these post office boxes? 

Mr. MILLER. Some of the contacts are post office boxes, yes, 

ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I know your background, and I know that 

you are through and through an investigator. It worries me that 

we have this many criminal falsifications, which means that there 

are people that are employed, by contractors or by you, that are not 

doing the work, and you are catching them sometimes. But if you 

are catching as many as you are, that means there are a lot you 

are not catching. If I was going to falsify something, I would not 

be stupid enough to put down the name and the address of the person who is going to say, ‘‘No, they never contacted me.’’ I would put 

down a name and address where I would be able to control the receipt of that document and handle it so that I would go along undetected. 
25 

Mr. MILLER. One of the challenges for that scenario is that when 

they fill out their SF86, they identify references, the individual we 

are investigating, references and specific leads. So we are actually 

contacting the people that the individual being investigated has referred us to speak to. So that would help keep that problem from 

occurring. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. Have you given any thought to shutting 

off the classification as you look at the investigation? 

Mr. MILLER. Yes, ma’am. There has been some discussion about 

that. In fact, we have gone back and reviewed—I saw the handout 

that Mr. McFarland put out. It talks about the level and extent of 

investigations that were involved. But what we have determined is 

through the recovery process there have been no serious issues out 

of all the cases involved that resulted in a change in access. And 

so we expedite the recovery process and coordinate that with the 

agency and update the background investigation to make sure it is 

correct. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, since these background checks are potentially falsified, I think we should consider during the pendency 

of your investigation into the falsification suspending clearance 

temporarily for any of the people that could be impacted by the falsification just because I think it would be easy for us to have a disaster in that area. 

I am curious about paying for these for contractors; $250 million, 

I think Mr. Lewis said, was paid just for security clearance for contractors in 1 year. 

Now, you have a price sheet here. Are the contractors being 

asked to identify this separately in their contracts, the defense contractors, so that those costs are being delineated in their contracts? 

Or are they absorbed in their contract price and we just cover the 

cost? Which is it, Mr. Sims? 

Mr. SIMS. Ma’am, those costs are paid for by public dollars. We 

do not charge contractors for the costs of their security clearance. 

Part of our budget is the cost for funding cleared contractors in industry, and that is what that $252 million was for fiscal year 2012. 

Senator MCCASKILL. All right. Well, then here is the question: If 

we are doing this for the contractors, which I question—it seems 

to me that this would be something that they should pay for. If 

they want to do business with the government in a classified setting, it seems like this should be their dime and not ours. But assuming that we are paying for it, then why in the world are we 

paying a premium for those that already have it? It sounds like to 

me we are paying for it twice. Because I know in defense contracts, 

they get extra money for having employees who have the clearance. 

So not only are we paying to give it to them, we are paying them 

again the second time that they already have it. 

Mr. SIMS. Yes, ma’am, I see your point. I cannot address that 

last part of the question, but I can address the first part. We have 

done extensive research as to what is the most cost-effective way 

to pay for security clearance within the Department. The analysis 

shows that if we were to allow the contractors to build the cost of 

clearances into the contract then they would add overhead on the 

management of that. So the most cost-effective way was to manage 
26 

it from the Department, we pay those costs, because we pay it either way. 

Senator MCCASKILL. That makes some sense. It does not make 

sense that we pay them for it since we did it in the first place. I 

mean, that does not make any sense. So I guess the contractors 

say, ‘‘Well, we are not going to make you pay for it again, so therefore you need to pay us more.’’ Gee, that is a good deal if you can 

get it. And it sounds like to me our contractors are getting it. 

So I would like you, Mr. Lewis, to get back to the Committee 

with why you cannot cease and desist paying a premium to contractors who have clearance since they did not pay for it in the first 

place. 

Mr. SIMS. Ma’am, maybe I am confused. The $250 million that 

we pay for contractor clearances on government contracts, those 

funds go to OPM through the Revolving Fund. 

Senator MCCASKILL. No, I understand. I understand that public 

dollars are being used to provide clearances for private contractors. 

So the government, the taxpayers are providing clearances for contractors. Now, I know that in the area of defense contracting, you 

get a premium on your contract if the people who are working on 

your contract have clearance. That is what is irritating me, because 

they are getting a premium for something that the taxpayers provided them. 

Mr. SIMS. You are correct. 

Senator MCCASKILL. It would be one thing if they were getting 

a premium for something they had paid for, but they are not. They 

are getting a premium for something we paid for. That seems dumb 

to me. That is why I would like to figure out why we are doing 

that. 

Mr. LEWIS. Ma’am, if I could just add in there, that is an issue 

we would have to address with the acquisition community, and we 

will be happy to come back to you with more information on that. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I would love that, and the next time I see 

Ash Carter, I will mention it to him, too. It does not make any 

sense to me that we would do that. 

I am out of time. 

Senator TESTER. Mr. Lewis, what measures or safeguards are in 

place to monitor the military personnel, DOD civilians, private contractors with security clearances? 

Mr. LEWIS. If you are talking about their day-to-day access to 

classified information, for contractors DSS does its oversight. From 

the standpoint of a military servicemember or a DOD civilian, that 

is the responsibility of the component head to establish a program 

to monitor and conduct oversight of their own operations. 

Senator TESTER. Do you know what kind of criteria is used in 

these cases? 

Mr. LEWIS. There is a DOD Information Security Program Manual which establishes criteria for not only how classified material 

is to be protected, but also issues of security concern that need to 

be reported to the central adjudication facility about an employee. 

Senator TESTER. When we are talking about clearances that are 

potentially revoked, can you tell me what the biggest disqualifiers 

are? 
27 

Mr. LEWIS. Often it is for financial issues and individuals who 

have been involved in criminal activity. 

Senator TESTER. OK. How many clearances have been revoked in 

the last year, or two, or three? 

Mr. LEWIS. I would have to come back to you with those. 

Senator TESTER. That would be good if you could. 

In response to a previous question, I think Ms. Schmitz said that 

USIS was under investigation since late 2011. Did I hear that correctly? 

Ms. SCHMITZ. Yes, sir. 

Senator TESTER. And they are still under investigation now? 

Ms. SCHMITZ. Yes, sir. 

Senator TESTER. A year and a half later? How long do these investigations typically take? 

Ms. SCHMITZ. A complicated contract fraud case typically takes 

several years. 

Senator TESTER. And during that time business goes on as usual 

with these contractors even if they are under investigation? 

Ms. SCHMITZ. It depends on the investigation. In this case, FIS 

has been aware of what we have been investigating since the beginning, and—— 

Senator TESTER. Can you tell me what that investigation is 

about? Can you legally tell me that? 

Ms. SCHMITZ. Since it is ongoing, sir, I really do not want to risk 

jeopardizing the potential to—— 

Senator TESTER. That is fine. I do not want you to. 

Senator McCaskill, do you have any further questions? 

Senator MCCASKILL. I do. Just a couple. 

I want to get at USIS in terms of not only having the biggest 

contract to do the background checks; but also having this program 

support contract. And these contracts are one of my nemeses in my 

job of overseeing contracts. All through our government there has 

been an easy way to augment personnel by doing these program 

support contracts, and at one point in time, and probably still at 

Homeland Security, you could not tell the contractors from the employees. They were doing the same functions. They were sitting at 

the same desks. They were working on the same things. One was 

a contractor and one was not, and partly it was because supposedly 

they were easier to get rid of. 

So my question is: Why is USIS getting this $45 million a year 

for program support? And what is that? 

Mr. MILLER. Yes, ma’am. USIS, it is one of our primary support 

contracts. We provided some background to your staff about the 

costs associated with it. But our front-end operation has a number 

of routine activities it has to conduct, and much of it is manual 

based on the way the records come to us in paper style. We actually have 999 personnel that work the front-end operation for us. 

That is everything from scoping the investigation pre-review, 

inputting the data, and ensuring that the investigation gets distributed to our investigators in the field. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. So we are paying USIS several hundred million dollars a year to do background checks, and we are 

paying them $45 million a year to do the office work. 

Mr. MILLER. Yes, ma’am. 
28 

Senator MCCASKILL. What percentage of that 999 are contractors 

and what percentage of them are Federal employees? 

Mr. MILLER. We have 35 personnel that oversee the contract, the 

support contract. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So of the 999, 35 of them are employees and 

965 are contract people? 

Mr. MILLER. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Why are we paying contractors instead of 

hiring people? 

Mr. MILLER. As we add automation, we are able to downsize the 

staffing, and so year to year we have seen a decline in the contract 

staff required for our support services. Also, based on the low-level 

jobs that they are, it is more financially beneficial for us to have 

contractors doing that work than bringing on full-time—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. So you have a cost/benefit analysis that you 

could give to me? 

Mr. MILLER. Not one I can give you, no, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. You don’t? Because there is not one? 

Mr. MILLER. There is not one. 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. Well, then how do you know they are 

cheaper? 

Mr. MILLER. Well, we will do a cost/benefit analysis and provide—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, it sounds like to me you have not done 

one, but yet you said they were cheaper. 

Mr. MILLER. Yes, ma’am, because we—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, how do you know that? 

Mr. MILLER. We can contract our workforce very quickly on the 

contract side, so as the automation gets added, we can go ahead 

and downsize those requirement within—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. So you are telling me 999 is downsized? 

Mr. MILLER. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So it is lower than it was? 

Mr. MILLER. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. What was it last year? 

Mr. MILLER. I would have to get that number to you. It is over 

1,000, but that is the only—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. OK. Well, I am going to dig in here, just to 

warn you. I want the numbers. I want a cost/benefit analysis. I am 

tired of this assumption being made that contractors are cheaper, 

because I have been at this for 6 years, and I guarantee you about 

half the time I have looked hard, they have not been cheaper. In 

fact, there have been studies done that they are more expensive. 

So I would like to take a hard look at that and make sure that 

that is the case, and that was the last line of questioning I wanted 

to make sure I covered today. I know all of you want to make this 

as good as possible, and we do not have these hearings to make everyone feel awkward and uncomfortable. We have these hearings 

because we know oversight is needed in this area, and I think all 

of you will acknowledge oversight. 

I know that my friend from GAO and my friend from the IG’s 

office know that oversight is needed, and I think even you all will 

acknowledge that this is an area that we have neglected oversight 

in. And, it takes one incident for all of us to realize that here is 
29 

a whole area of the government that most Americans don’t know 

about and most Members of Congress have no idea how it actually 

works. The more we dig in, the more we realize more work needs 

to be done. 

So I appreciate all of your public service. I know we asked some 

specific questions, and I know the Chairman may have others he 

wants to ask now. But I would appreciate getting that information 

back, and I am going to stay on this, Mr. Miller, about the cost/ 

benefit analysis, because you know what? I bet we are going to figure out you can hire those people for less. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator TESTER. Thank you, Senator McCaskill. I want to close 

now. If you have any closing remarks, have at it. 

I just want to thank all of you for being here. I think Senator 

McCaskill said it well. We have these hearings to try to get information so we can make things run better. I appreciate you, given 

the short notice especially, all being here today because I know you 

are busy. Oversight is critically important. I think that has been 

brought up several times today, and making sure that we have the 

proper metrics, do the proper oversight, making sure we hold both 

government employees and contractors accountable is critically important. 

What we are talking about here is the intelligence of the Nation. 

We have a ways to go to make sure that we have the kind of oversight in place and the kind of reciprocity in place, the kind of 

metrics in place that will ensure that our intelligence stays solid 

even to folks inside the Department. 

We look forward to working with you, to constructively move forward in a way that makes sense for this country. Once again I 

want to thank you for your testimony. The record will remain open 

until July 8 for any additional comments or any questions by any 

of the Subcommittee Members. 

With that, this hearing is adjourned. Thank you all. 

[Whereupon, at 4:01 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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