COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Willis and Annunziata 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

SUZANNE HUGHES 

v. Record No. 2345-94-4 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 BY JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER 

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES FEBRUARY 6, 1996 

 ARLINGTON COUNTY 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 

William T. Newman, Jr., Judge 

 Deborah E. Kramer, for appellant. 

 Mary E. Craig, Assistant County Attorney, 

 for appellee. 

 Suzanne Hughes (appellant) appeals from a judgment of the 

Circuit Court of Arlington County (trial court) that terminated 

her parental rights to her daughter (the child). Appellant 

contends that she was denied due process; that the trial court 

erred in permitting her to be cross-examined concerning her 

experiences with a cult, and in finding that her neglect and 

abuse of the child had not and could not be substantially 

corrected or eliminated within a reasonable period of time. She 

further alleges that the trial court, in arriving at its 

conclusion, wrongfully considered evidence that appellant's 

"father yelled at her when she was a young girl" and that "the 

man who repeatedly raped [her] when she was a young girl and 

again in 1993" was still at large. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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 On September 29, 1990, the child, then five months old, was 

placed in foster care as the result of an emergency removal. On 

October 1, 1990, the county filed an abuse and neglect petition. 

It alleged that appellant physically assaulted the child and 

could not cope with caring for her. Appellant has been diagnosed 

as suffering from myoclonus, a movement disorder, an eating 

disorder, a substance abuse problem, borderline personality 

disorder, and emotional problems later diagnosed as multiple 

personality disorder. Dr. Janieth Wise treated appellant for her 

multiple personality disorder and eventually reported to the 

county that appellant was capable of parenting the child. The 

county retained Dr. M. Kathryne Jacobs, a psychologist with 

expertise in early childhood development, to work with appellant 

and the child. On February 3, 1992, the child was returned to 

appellant. On May 29, 1992, the child was returned to foster 

care after further incidents of neglect and abuse. After the 

child was removed from appellant's custody, Dr. Jacobs described 

the child as suffering from separation anxiety disorder, temper 

tantrums, an inability to eat and sleep, and clinical depression. 

 Following the second removal of the child from appellant, 

the Department of Social Services' (DSS) goal was still to return 

the child to appellant; however, concern for the child's 

well-being caused the DSS to change its goal from the return of 

the child to appellant to adoption.1

 

 1The child's father, Bruce Stewart, voluntarily surrendered 

his parental rights on May 3, 1993. 
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 In July 1992, at a hearing, Dr. Wise testified that 

appellant had told her of appellant's interactions with a satanic 

cult. Appellant and Dr. Wise elaborated, describing incidents 

appellant witnessed in which cult members killed adults and 

babies, times when multiple perpetrators had sex with appellant, 

and times when she experienced death threats and the like. 

Appellant did not deny these occurrences. 

 Appellant said that the abuse started when she was seven 

years old. Marianne O'Connell, a social worker, testified that 

in October 1992, appellant told her that "the night that you 

removed [the child], I returned to the cult." 

 Throughout the latter part of 1992 and into 1993, appellant 

was repeatedly in and out of hospitals. Appellant testified that 

during a break between hospital stays, during Christmas 1992, 

Dwight McMillan, a relative by marriage who had previously abused 

her for years as a member of the satanic cult, and other cult 

members, abducted and raped her and then dropped her back at the 

site where she had been abducted. Appellant believed McMillan to 

be hiding from authorities in Canada. 

 Between March 2, 1993 and June 23, 1993, a judge of the 

Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court for the County of 

Arlington (district court), over a four-day period, heard 

evidence relating to the termination of appellant's parental 

rights, after which the court ordered a continuance of the case 

to allow for more time to evaluate appellant's progress and the 
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impact of her mental condition on her parenting skills. On 

January 31, 1994, after a six-month continuance, appellant's 

residual parental rights were terminated by the district court. 

Appellant filed notice of appeal to the circuit court where the 

child's foster parents filed a motion to be notified of and for 

leave to participate in all proceedings. The motion was granted. 

 At the circuit court trial, Dr. Jacobs testified that 

following the termination hearings in district court, the child, 

who had been confused and uncertain about where she would live 

and who would be her mommy, began to recover from her separation 

anxiety disorder. She slept through the night and for the first 

time began to take an interest in other children and in the toys 

during therapy sessions. Dr. Jacobs described her as "no longer 

clinically depressed. She was no longer showing the symptoms of 

the reactive attachment disorder." When queried at trial 

concerning the child's own desires about her living 

circumstances, Dr. Jacobs stated "[The child] has never been 

ambivalent about what she wants. . . . She has a momma and a 

dadda, that she lives with, the [foster parents], and she has a 

person that she calls mommie Suzie that she is attached to." Dr. 

Jacobs described the child's bond with her foster parents as "a 

primary, primitive, primal attachment of a child to the first 

human beings that gave her consistent, appropriate nurturing and 

care. They are her psychological parents. . . . They're her 

mother and father and that's how she feels toward them." 
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 The trial court, over appellant's objections permitted the 

county to cross-examine appellant about her involvement/ 

victimization by the satanic cult and about her parents' 

knowledge of the cult's abuse of her when she was a little girl 

and her parents' failure to contact the police at that time. At 

the time of the trial court hearings, appellant lived at her 

father's house on the weekends. 

 A psychological evaluation to assess appellant's prognosis, 

as to her ability to parent, was conducted in September and 

October 1992, by Dr. Mary L. Froning, an expert in the areas of 

psychology, multiple-personality disorders, and child psychology. 

The doctor testified at the circuit court that she concluded from 

those evaluations that appellant was not able to parent at that 

point and recommended that she continue therapy and be 

re-evaluated within one year. Dr. Froning stated that a person 

with a complicated multiple personality disorder would typically 

take five to seven years to recover from the disorder. 

 On October 18, 1994, the trial court ruled that appellant's 

residual parental rights should be terminated. In making this 

ruling, the trial judge addressed his concern over the continued 

existence of the satanic cult, appellant's inability to help the 

police prosecute a member of this cult, appellant's continued 

residence in the same family home where she had been verbally and 

physically abused as a small child, and lack of family support 

that was missing when appellant was an abused child. 
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 We have examined the record in this case, including the 

details of the various foster care plans required by law, and we 

find there has been no denial to appellant of due process rights. 

 Whether evidence is admitted or refused is left largely to 

the sound discretion of the trial court. We hold that evidence 

of appellant's participation in the cult described was relevant 

to these proceedings and that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in permitting appellant to be examined on that 

subject. 

 In this case, the child came into care at an extremely early 

age and lived with her mother for a total of nine months out of 

her five plus years. Dr. Jacobs testified that during the most 

important formative years of her life, the child became attached 

to her foster family and established a primal bond. Dr. Jacobs 

opined: 

It's too late. The critical period is 

passed. [The child] is four years old. She 

has made her own emotional bond. It would be 

an extreme trauma to her to be placed with 

someone else for reasons that don't make any 

sense to her. She also has a history with 

[appellant] which causes her to mistrust 

giving herself into the care of [appellant]. 

 So even though our criteria might be met, 

you know, [the child's] criteria wouldn't be 

met, either biologically or emotionally. 

There is substantial evidence to support the trial court's 

decision. Appellant asserts that she should be allowed more time 

to show that she could be suitable to parent the child. 

 What is a reasonable period of time depends upon the context 
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and circumstances of each case. Virginia Ass'n. of Ins. Agents 

v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 574, 579, 47 S.E.2d 401, 404 (1948). 

Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court did not err 

in refusing to delay its decision. Appellant argues that her 

illness has a predicted five-year cure. From this record, the 

reality is that there is a three- to five-year treatment plan 

with an uncertain outcome. 

 The primary question always is what is in the best interest 

of the child. 

[A] court must evaluate and consider many 

factors, including the age and physical and 

mental condition of the child or children; 

the age and physical and mental condition of 

the parents; the relationship existing 

between each parent and each child; the needs 

of the child or children; the role which each 

parent has played, and will play in the 

future, in the upbringing and care of the 

child or children; and such other factors as 

are necessary in determining the best 

interest of the child or children. 

Barkley v. Alexandria Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 2 Va. App. 662, 668, 

347 S.E.2d 188, 191 (1986). 

 Although maintenance of the family structure in all possible 

circumstances is important in Virginia, the code recognizes, 

however, that there are circumstances in which this is not likely 

to occur. "It is clearly not in the best interest of a child to 

spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even 

if, a parent will be capable of resuming his responsibilities." 

Kaywood v. Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 
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S.E.2d, 492, 495 (1990).2

 The testimony of Dr. Jacobs, the social worker, and the 

foster mother makes it clear that the child needs a mother who 

can put her interests first and offer her sensible, safe, 

consistent, responsible parenting. The child had formed a primal 

attachment to the foster family over many years in their care. 

Whatever bond remains with her mother is ambivalent and fraught 

with mistrust. It is clear in this case that the child regards 

her foster parents as her mother and father, and it would likely 

do irreparable harm to her to remove her from her home and send 

her to an uncertain future with a mother who is still struggling 

with serious mental health issues. 

 For the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court is 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.

 

 2The record discloses that post-trial, appellant continues 

to have unresolved problems. She remains in therapy for multiple 

disorder and borderline personality disorder. By filing a motion 

to reinstate visitation rights pending appeal, appellant opened 

the door for a discussion of her present emotional stability. 

Appellant has demonstrated serious emotional instability since 

the circuit court trial. She was hospitalized following the 

trial; she made threats directed at the foster family and the 

social workers; and she has expressed to social workers an 

obsessive determination to inform the child that she intends to 

take her from the foster family.