The Historical Review Program, part of the CIA Information Management Services, 

identifies, collects, and produces historically relevant collections of declassified documents.

These collections, centered on a theme or event, are joined with supporting analysis, essays, 

video, audio, and photographs, and showcased in a booklet plus DVD, and made available 

to historians, scholars, and the public.

All of our Historical Collections are available on the CIA Library Publication page located 

at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/historical-collection-publications/ or contact 

us at HistoricalCollections@UCIA.gov.

The Warsaw Pact contingency plan for war with NATO in the Central Region of Europe – as 

revised by the Soviets in the early 1960s – assigns the initial offensive missions to the forces 

already deployed in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. In addition, it gives both the 

Czechs and Poles command over their own national forces. After the initial objectives have been 

gained, Soviet forces in the western USSR would move quickly into the Central Region and 

take over the offensive against NATO. 

Under the previous plan, the initial offensive would have been conducted mainly by Soviet 

forces, including those based in the western USSR, with the East European forces integrated 

into Soviet-led Fronts. This concept, to be effective, required a high level of combat readiness 

for the Soviet forces in the western USSR. The reduction of Soviet ground force strength in the 

early 1960’s probably made this plan infeasible and stimulated concurrent improvements in the 

East European ground forces to permit them to assume greater responsibilities.

Warsaw Pact War Plan 

for Central Region 

of Europe

Summary 

Intelligence Memorandum 

Directorate of Intelligence 

18 June 1968
✯

✯

CIA ANALYSIS OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES : THE IMPORTANCE OF CLANDESTINE REPORTING 

Table of Contents 

Essay One 

CIA Analysis of the Warsaw Pact Forces: The Importance of Clandestine Reporting i

Table of Contents ii

Scope Note 1

Introduction 2

Frequently Used Acronyms 3

The Warsaw Treaty 4

The Statute of Unified Command 6

Chapter I: Early Khrushchev Period (1955–60) 9

Organizing and Managing the Warsaw Pact 10

Intelligence Sources and Analysis in the Early Years 11

Chapter II: The Berlin Crisis – Col. Oleg Penkovskiy and 

Warsaw Pact Preparations for Associated Military Operations (1958–61) 13

Intelligence Sources and Analysis 14

Chapter III: Soviet Debate on Military Doctrine and Strategy:

The Contribution of Clandestine Source, Col. Oleg Penkovskiy (1955–64) 17

USSR Developments and the Warsaw Pact 17

Intelligence Sources and Analysis 18

Chapter IV: New Insights into the Warsaw Pact Forces and Doctrine –

The Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) 21

Khrushchev’s Gamble Provides an Intelligence Bonanza 21

Intelligence Sources and Analysis 21

Chapter V: New Estimates of the Soviet Ground Forces (1963–68) 25

Defining the Problem 25

Revising the Estimates of the Strength of Soviet – Warsaw Pact Forces 25

Clarifying the Estimate of Capabilities and Mobilization of Soviet – Warsaw Pact Forces 27

Chapter VI: Turmoil in the Soviet Sphere (1962–68) 29

The Demise of Khrushchev 29

The Brezhnev-Kosygin Team 30

Managing the Warsaw Pact 30

Intelligence Sources and Analysis 30

Chapter VII: Clandestine Reporting and the Analysis and Estimates (1970–85) 33

Soviet-Warsaw Pact Developments and MBFR 33

Managing the Warsaw Pact 33

Intelligence Sources and Analysis 34

Essay Two 

How Much is Enough? by Alain C. Enthoven 36
CIA ANALYSIS OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES : THE IMPORTANCE OF CLANDESTINE REPORTING

1

Scope Note

This study focuses on the contribution of clandestine source 

reporting to the production of finished intelligence on the Warsaw 

Pact’s military doctrine, strategy, capabilities, and intentions during 

the period 1955–85. It examines products of CIA and national 

intelligence estimates (NIEs) of the Intelligence Community (IC) 

writ large. It includes more than 1,000 declassified CIA clandestine 

reports and CIA finished intelligence publications. Some of the 

finished intelligence publications were produced after 1985, but 

none of the clandestine reports. Although the focus of the study is 

on the contributions of clandestine human sources, the clandestine 

and covert technical operations such as the U-2 and satellite 

reconnaissance programs yielded a treasure trove of information 

that was incorporated in CIA’s analysis. Chapter V illustrates 

the special significance of those reconnaissance programs for the 

solution of some important problems in the 1960s but those 

programs yielded essential information throughout the thirty year 

period studied.

The analytical reports featured in the study are generally the 

results of long-term research using all sources of information. 

With some exceptions, the study excludes CIA current intelligence 

reporting. Nor does it address intelligence on Warsaw Pact 

naval forces or Soviet strategic forces, the great contributions of 

signals intelligence (SIGINT), or intelligence from the US Army, 

Navy, or Air Force. The services’ intelligence components played 

important roles, for example, as the principal contributors to the 

military-focused NIEs for the period 1955–61, with the exception 

of the military-related economic and scientific estimating and in 

accord with the National Security Council Intelligence Directives 

(NSCID)1

 of the time. This study also does not specifically 

address the contributions of economic, political, weapons, or 

scientific intelligence efforts, but it does, as appropriate attend 

to the operational and strategic consequences of those efforts. It 

only generally discusses intelligence support for the Mutual and 

Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) negotiations. 

The study refers to many documents provided by clandestine 

sources; these references are generally meant to be illustrative, 

not exhaustive. Finally, the study includes historical material to 

provide a general context for discussing the intelligence. It is not 

intended, however, to be a definitive history of the times. 

The authors owe a debt of gratitude to the many intelligence 

officers who painstakingly sifted through the not always wellorganized archives for documents sometimes 50 or more years 

old. They especially note the assistance of officers of the Defense 

Intelligence Agency (DIA) for searching their archives for CIA 

reports the authors were unable to locate in CIA archives.

Session of the Council of Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty Member States, December 1981

1 See NSCID No.3, Coordination of Intelligence Production, 13 January 1948, and NSCID 

No. 3, Coordination of Intelligence Production, 21 April 1958 for details of the responsibilities 

of the CIA and other intelligence departments and agencies of the US government. NSCID 

No. 3 limited the role of CIA to economic and scientific analysis, making the military services 

responsible for all military intelligence. The 1958 revised version broadened the areas for 

which the CIA could produce intelligence.

This essay was produced by Joan and John Bird.
CIA ANALYSIS OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES : THE IMPORTANCE OF CLANDESTINE REPORTING

2

Introduction 

The Soviet Union established itself as a threat to the West by 

its military occupation of Poland and other eastern European 

countries at the end of World War II and through the unsuccessful 

attempts by its armed proxies to capture Greece and South 

Korea. Its unceasing attempts to subvert governments throughout 

Western Europe and America, and later through the “wars of 

national liberation” cast a shadow over everyday life in the West. 

The massive Soviet armed forces stationed in central Europe stood 

behind its political offensives such as the Berlin Crises. The West 

countered with the formation of NATO and the acceptance into 

NATO, and rebuilding of, West Germany. During the same period 

that the West welcomed West Germany into NATO, the Soviets 

established – through the Warsaw Treaty of May 1955 – a formal 

military bloc of Communist nations. 

This study continues CIA’s effort to provide the public with a 

more detailed record of the intelligence derived from clandestine 

human and technical sources that was provided to US 

policymakers and used to assess the political and military balances 

and confrontations in Central Europe between the Warsaw Pact 

and NATO during the Cold War. Finished intelligence2

, based 

on human and technical sources, was the basis for personal 

briefings of the President, Vice President, Secretary of Defense, 

Secretary of State, and other cabinet members, and for broader 

distribution through NIEs. It is the opinion of the authors that 

the information considerably aided US efforts to preserve the 

peace at a bearable cost. 

This study showcases the importance of clandestine source 

reporting to CIA’s analysis of the Warsaw Pact forces. This effort 

complements the CIA’s release of the “Caesar” series of studies3

and other significant CIA documents in 2007; and releases by 

other IC agencies. It also complements ongoing projects, including 

those of the Wilson Center of the Smithsonian Institution and 

NATO that reexamine the Cold War in light of newly available 

documentation released by several former members of the 

Warsaw Pact. 

The clandestine reports by the predecessor organizations of CIA’s 

current National Clandestine Service (NCS) are representative 

of those that at the time made especially valuable contributions 

to understanding the history, plans, and intentions of the Warsaw 

Pact. Many of these documents are being released for the first time. 

The clandestine source documents do not represent a complete 

record of contemporary intelligence collection. There was much 

information made available from émigrés and defectors as well as 

from imagery and SIGINT that was essential in the estimative 

process but is not the focus of this study.

The study includes NIEs that CIA has previously released. It 

also includes finished intelligence documents produced by the 

CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence (DI), some previously released, 

and the clandestinely obtained information upon which those 

reports were largely based. The DI reports were selected in 

part because they were the detailed basis of CIA contributions 

to NIEs that focused on the military aspects of the Warsaw 

Pact. The DI finished intelligence reports also provided the 

background for future current intelligence. Appended to this 

study is a collection of declassified intelligence documents 

relating to the Warsaw Pact’s military forces, operational 

planning, and capabilities. Although many of the documents 

were released in past years, new reviews have provided for the 

restoration of text previously redacted. All of the documents 

selected for this study are available on the attached DVD, on 

CIA’s website at http://www.foia.cia.gov/special_collections.asp

or from the CIA Records Search Tool (CREST) located at the 

National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College 

Park, MD or contact us at HistoricalCollections@UCIA.gov.

The finished intelligence during this period seldom linked the 

specific clandestine or other sources of evidence to the analysis 

based on their information. For example, the early intelligence 

documents often described clandestine sources only in the most 

general fashion. Rules to protect sources, especially the human 

agents, rarely allowed analysts to acknowledge a clandestine 

source, openly evaluate a source’s reliability, or describe a source’s 

access to the information. Only in publications of extremely 

limited distribution, for as few as a handful of recipients, were 

these rules relaxed. They changed little until the 1980s, when 

analysts could provide evaluations that included some sense of 

the source’s reliability and access.

The study lists in the Catalogue of Documents on the DVD 

important clandestine and covert source reports and finished 

intelligence publications by chapter. These documents are 

generally arrayed chronologically according to the dates of 

dissemination within the IC, not the dates of publication by the 

Soviets that sometimes were years earlier.

2 Finished Intelligence is the CIA term for the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available all source information. 3 The Caesar 

Studies are analytic monographs and reference aids produced by the DI through the 1950s to the mid-1970s. They provided in-depth research on Soviet internal politics primarily intended to give 

insight on select political and economic issues and CIA analytic thinking of the period.

All of our Historical Collections are available 

on the CIA Library Publication page located 

at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/

historical-collection-publications/ or contact us at 

HistoricalCollections@UCIA.gov.
CIA ANALYSIS OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES : THE IMPORTANCE OF CLANDESTINE REPORTING

3

Frequently Used Acronyms

CPSU/CC Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee

CSI Center for the Study of Intelligence

DCI Director of Central Intelligence

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DI Directorate of Intelligence (CIA)

DO Directorate of Operations, 1973–2005 (CIA)

DP Directorate of Plans, 1950s–1973 (CIA)

FBIS Foreign Broadcast Information Service

FRG Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)

FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States (A US Department of State History Series)

GDR German Democratic Republic (East Germany)

IC Intelligence Community

MBFR Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions

NARA National Archives and Records Administration

NCS National Clandestine Service, 2005–present (CIA)

NIC National Intelligence Council, established December 1979 (DCI)

NIC/WC National Indications Center/Watch Committee, pre-1979 (DCI)

NIE National Intelligence Estimate

NPIC National Photographic Interpretation Center

NSCID National Security Council Intelligence Directive

NSC National Security Council

NSWP Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact [countries]

NTM National Technical Means

OCI Office of Current Intelligence (CIA)

OER Office of Economic Research (CIA)

ONE Office of National Estimates (CIA)

OPA Office of Political Analysis (CIA)

ORR Office of Research and Reports (CIA)

OSR Office of Strategic Research (CIA)

PCC Political Consultative Committee (Warsaw Treaty Organization)

SOVA Office of Soviet Analysis (CIA)

SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

SIGINT Signals Intelligence

SNIE Special National Intelligence Estimate

SRS Senior Research Staff

TO&E Table of Organization and Equipment

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
CIA ANALYSIS OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES : THE IMPORTANCE OF CLANDESTINE REPORTING

4

The Warsaw Treaty

The founding document of the Warsaw Pact organization 

was signed in Warsaw on 14 May 1955, and came into 

force on 6 June 1955. At the time, CIA analysts judged 

that Moscow had drafted the treaty without consulting 

its allies and had modeled it after the 1949 North Atlantic 

Treaty (sometimes referred to as the Washington Treaty) that 

established NATO. CIA analysis showed that some clauses of 

the Warsaw Treaty appeared to be almost direct translations from 

the Washington Treaty and that both had similar provisions, 

for example, for joint action in case one of the signatories was 

attacked, recognition of the ultimate authority of the UN, and 

settlement of all disputes without use or threat of force. The 

combined military command seemed to be a facsimile of NATO’s 

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).4

 The 

treaty apparently was not crafted to override existing bilateral 

treaties of mutual assistance, friendship, and cooperation between 

Moscow and its allies, which were the basis for addressing Soviet 

security concerns in Europe at that time. CIA analysts believed 

that the Warsaw Treaty was set up primarily as a bargaining chip 

to obtain the dissolution of NATO. The following text of the 

treaty does not include the signature blocks.

Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance 

between the People’s Republic of Albania, the People’s Republic 

of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People’s Republic, the German 

Democratic Republic, the Polish People’s Republic, the Romanian 

Socialist Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and 

the Czechoslovak Republic.5

The Contracting Parties

Reaffirming their desire to create a system of collective security 

in Europe based on the participation of all European States, 

irrespective their social and political structure, whereby the 

said States may be enabled to combine their efforts in the 

interests of ensuring peace in Europe;

Taking into consideration, at the same time, the situation 

that has come about in Europe as a result of the ratification 

of the Paris Agreements, which provide for the constitution 

of a new military group in the form of a “West European 

Union”, with the participation of a remilitarized West 

Germany and its inclusion in the North Atlantic bloc, 

thereby increasing the danger of a new war and creating 

a threat to the national security of peace-loving States;

Being convinced that in these circumstances the peace-loving 

States of Europe must take the necessary steps to safeguard 

their security and to promote the maintenance of peace 

in Europe;

Being guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of 

the United Nations Organization;

In the interests of further strengthening and development of 

friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance in accordance 

with the principles of respect for the independence and 

sovereignty of States and of non-intervention in their domestic 

affairs;

Have resolved to conclude the present Treaty of Friendship, 

Co-operation and Mutual Assistance and have appointed as 

their plenipotentiaries: [not listed here]

who, having exhibited their full powers, found in good and due 

form, have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The Contracting Parties undertake, in accordance with the 

Charter of the United Nations Organization, to refrain in their 

international relations from the threat or use of force, and to settle 

their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner 

that international peace and security are not endangered.

Article 2

The Contracting Parties declare that they are prepared to 

participate, in a spirit of sincere co-operation in all international 

action for ensuring international peace and security, and will 

devote their full efforts to the realization of these aims.

In this connexion, the Contracting Parties shall endeavor to 

secure, in agreement with other states desiring to co-operate in 

this matter, the adoption of effective measures for the general 

reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen 

and other weapons of mass destruction 

Article 3

The Contracting Parties shall consult together on all important 

international questions involving their common interests, with a 

view to strengthening international peace and security.

Whenever any one of the Contracting Parties considers that a 

threat of armed attack on one or more of the States Parties to the 

Treaty has arisen, they shall consult together immediately with a 

view to providing for their joint defense and maintaining peace 

and security. 

its allies and had modeled it after the 1949 North Atlantic 

4 A comparison of the Warsaw Treaty with the 1949 Washington Treaty establishing NATO can be found in a study prepared by the CIA’s Office of Current Intelligence 22 years later, The Warsaw 

Pact: Its Role in Soviet Bloc Affairs from Its Origin to the Present Day, A Study for the Jackson Subcommittee, 5 May 1966 (See the Catalogue of Documents, Chapter VI, Document VI-13, Annex 

B, p B-1. 5 The text of the treaty was available through the FBIS Daily Report on 14 May 1955, but we do not have a copy of that report. The text of the treaty here is a UN English translation of the 

text of the treaty as registered at the UN by Poland on 10 October 1955.
CIA ANALYSIS OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES : THE IMPORTANCE OF CLANDESTINE REPORTING

5

Article 4

In the event of an armed attack in Europe on one or more of 

the States Parties to the Treaty by any state or group of States, 

each State Party to the Treaty, shall, in the exercise of the right 

of individual or collective self-defense, in accordance with Article 

51 of the United Nations Charter, afford the State or States so 

attacked immediate assistance, individually and in agreement with 

the other States Parties to the Treaty, by all means it considers 

necessary, including the use of armed force. The States Parties 

to the Treaty shall consult together immediately concerning the 

joint measures necessary to restore and maintain international 

peace and security.

Measures taken under this Article shall be reported to the 

Security Council in accordance with the provisions of the United 

Nations Charter. These measures shall be discontinued as soon 

as the Security Council takes the necessary action to restore and 

maintain international peace and security.

Article 5

The Contracting Parties have agreed to establish a Unified 

Command, to which certain elements of their armed forces 

shall be allocated by agreement between the parties, and which 

shall act in accordance with jointly established principles. The 

Parties shall likewise take such other concerted action as may be 

necessary to reinforce their defensive strength, in order to defend 

the peaceful labour of their peoples, guarantee the inviolability 

of their frontiers and territories and afford protection against 

possible aggression. 

Article 6

For the purpose of carrying out the consultations provided for in 

the present Treaty between the States Parties thereto, and for the 

consideration of matters arising in connexion with the application 

of the present Treaty, a Political Consultative Committee shall 

be established, in which each State Party to the Treaty shall be 

represented by a member of the government or by some other 

specially appointed representative. 

The Committee may establish such auxiliary organs as may prove 

to be necessary.

Article 7

The Contracting Parties undertake not to participate in any 

coalitions or alliances and not to conclude any agreements the 

purposes of which are incompatible with the purposes of the 

present Treaty.

The Contracting Parties declare that their obligations under 

international treaties at present in force are not incompatible with 

the provisions of the present Treaty.

Article 8

The Contracting Parties declare that they will act in a spirit of 

friendship and co-operation to promote the further development 

and strengthening of the economic and cultural ties among them, 

in accordance with the principles of respect for each other’s 

independence and sovereignty and of non-intervention in each 

other’s domestic affairs.

Article 9

The present Treaty shall be open for accession by other States, 

irrespective of their social and political structure, which express 

their readiness, by participating in the present Treaty, to help in 

combining the efforts of the peace-loving states to ensure the 

peace and security of the peoples. Such accessions shall come 

into effect with the consent of the States Parties to the Treaty 

after the instruments of accession have been deposited with the 

Government of the Polish People’s Republic.

Article 10

The present Treaty shall be subject to ratification, and 

the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the 

Government of the Polish People’s Republic.

The Treaty shall come into force on the date of deposit of the last 

instrument of ratification. The Government of the Polish People’s 

Republic shall inform the other States Parties to the Treaty of the 

deposit of each instrument of ratification.

Article 11

The present Treaty shall remain in force for twenty years. For 

contracting Parties which do not, one year before the expiration 

of that term, give notice of termination of the treaty to the 

government of the Polish People’s Republic, the Treaty shall 

remain in force for a further ten years.

In the event of the establishment of a system of collective security 

in Europe and the conclusion for that purpose of a General 

European Treaty concerning collective security, a goal which the 

Contracting Parties shall steadfastly strive to achieve, the Treaty 

shall cease to have effect as from the date on which the General 

European Treaty comes into force.

Done at Warsaw, this fourteenth day of May 1955, in one copy, in 

the Russian, Polish, Czech and German languages, all texts being 

equally authentic. Certified copies of the present Treaty shall be 

transmitted by the Government of the Polish People’s Republic 

to all other Parties to the Treaty.

In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed the present 

Treaty and affixed their seals.
CIA ANALYSIS OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES : THE IMPORTANCE OF CLANDESTINE REPORTING

6

The Statute on Unified Command

A Statute on Unified Command was completed on 7 September 

1955, but not approved, signed or ratified until March 18, 1980. It 

was kept secret by the USSR and was not available to CIA analysts 

in 1955.

The Establishment of a Combined Command of the Armed Forces 

of the Signatories to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and 

Mutual Assistance.6 

In pursuance of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual 

Assistance between the People’s Republic of Albania, the People’s 

Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People’s Republic, the German 

Democratic Republic, the Polish People’s Republic, the Rumanian 

People’s Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and 

the Czechoslovak Republic, the signatory states have decided to 

establish a Combined Command of their armed forces.

The decision provides that general questions relating to the 

strengthening of the defensive power and the organization of 

the Joint Armed Forces of the signatory states shall be subject 

to examination by the Political Consultative Committee, which 

shall adopt the necessary decisions.

Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev has been appointed 

Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces to be assigned 

by the signatory states.

The Ministers of Defense or other military leaders of the 

signatory states are to serve as Deputy Commanders-in-Chief 

of the Joint Armed Forces, and shall command the armed forces 

assigned by their respective states to the Joint Armed Forces.

The question of the participation of the German Democratic 

Republic in measures concerning the armed forces of the Joint 

Command will be examined at a later date.

A Staff of the Joint Armed Forces of the signatory states will 

be set up under the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed 

Forces, and will include permanent representatives of the General 

Staffs of the signatory states. 

The Staff will have its headquarters in Moscow.

The disposition of the Joint Armed Forces in the territories of the 

signatory states will be effected by agreement among the states, in 

accordance with the requirement of their mutual defense.7

6 Ibid, Catalogue, Document VI-13, see Annex A, p A-5. 7 For additional information about the 

fate of this statute, see the Catalogue of Documents, Document VII-177.
CIA ANALYSIS OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES : THE IMPORTANCE OF CLANDESTINE REPORTING

7

Bulgaria

U . S.S. R

Romania

Hungary

slovakia

Poland

East

Germany

CzechoAlbania

Moscow

Black Sea

Nor th

Atlantic

Ocean North

Sea

Mediterranean Sea

Barents

Sea

Norwegian Sea

Baltic Sea

Caspian

Sea

Boundary representation is

not necessarily authoritative.

0 500 Kilometers

0 500 Miles

UNCLASSIFIED 788399AI (G00112) 10-09

Warsaw Pact

Albania*

Bulgaria

Czechoslovakia

East Germany

Hungary

Poland

Romania

U.S.S.R.

*Albania withheld support in 

1961 over the China split and 

officially withdrew in 1968.

Warsaw Pact Countries, 1955–1991

9

Changes in Soviet relations with the West after the death of 

Stalin and the consolidation of power by Nikita Khrushchev8 

initially characterized this period. By deed and word Moscow 

offered prospects for détente. At the same time Khrushchev 

attempted to bully the West by exploiting the purported strength 

of Soviet military and economic superiority. Soviet actions 

included the signing of the Vienna Agreement (known formally 

as the Austrian State Treaty) freeing Austria of Soviet controls, 

which contrasted with his threats to “bury” the West, and explicit 

military confrontation over Berlin and Cuba between 1958 and 

1962. Advances in military-related technologies as well as the 

changing relationships between the Soviet and Western Blocs 

also led to internal debates and changes in national military 

strategies beginning first in the West and later in and among the 

Warsaw Pact countries and the Soviet Union. 

Khrushchev’s policies affected Soviet internal, political, economic, 

and military developments. Perhaps most important were his 

responses to the looming disastrous economic effects of Stalin’s 

legacy, the Sixth Five-Year Plan. To Khrushchev, Stalin’s military 

programs alone required massive misallocation of economic 

resources. Taken together with the overconcentration of resources 

for development of heavy industry and inattention to agricultural 

production, the economy must have looked to Khrushchev like a 

train heading for a wreck. He instituted a major reorganization 

of the bureaucracy to control the economy including huge new 

agricultural programs, and substituted a new Seven-Year Plan for 

the doomed Sixth Five-Year Plan.9

On 15 May 1955, the United States, United Kingdom, France, 

and the Soviet Union signed the Vienna Agreement, which 

provided for the withdrawal of the Soviet and Western forces 

from Austria. This show of confidence on the part of the Soviets 

was followed by Khrushchev’s August 1955 announcement of 

a reduction of 640,000 men from the Soviet armed forces. In 

May 1956 he called for another cutback of 1.2 million Soviet 

troops. In 1957, in a climax to maneuvering by military and 

political leadership for power, Khrushchev ousted Minister of 

Defense Marshal Zhukov and reestablished party control of the 

military. He also began retiring senior Soviet military officers 

who disagreed with his policies. Khrushchev reorganized the 

Soviet military10 and promoted those officers who supported 

his pronouncements on the nature of a war with NATO. He 

advocated military capabilities with which he believed wars 

would be fought. These actions and his fixation on missiles and 

planning for nuclear war took center stage by 1961 when a debate 

took place among Soviet military officers that was reflected in 

special Top Secret Editions of Military Thought.11

Khrushchev later announced additional unilateral troop 

reductions including one of 300,000 troops in January 1958 and 

another of 1.2 million in January 1960 in a speech to the Supreme 

Soviet. All of the proposed decreases were meant to serve several 

purposes: to shift funds into the production of missiles and longrange bombers; to lessen the burden of ground force requirements 

on heavy industry; to free labor for productive purposes in 

the civilian economy; and to bring international pressure on 

the United States to cut its forces. The aim of the reductions 

proposed in 1960 and in the years immediately following 

also may have been to compensate for the smaller numbers of 

militarily acceptable men available to the armed services, because 

of the low birth rate attendant to the tremendous losses suffered 

during World War II (WWII).

chapter i

Early Khrushchev Period (1955-1960)

8 Khrushchev became First Secretary of the CPSU/CC in March 1953 and Premier in March 1958. 9 The editors have drawn from the documents listed in the Catalogue of Documents for each 

chapter for much of the material in the chapter essays. References in the essays to material drawn from documents listed in other chapters are noted in footnotes. 10 For more information on the 

reorganization of the Soviet Army, see the Catalogue of Documents, Document VII-91, Organizational Development of the Soviet Ground Forces, 1957-1975, 7–14. 11 See FBIS Radio Propaganda 

Reports addressing the debates among the military leadership that appeared in the open press following the death of Stalin in 1953. The debates also were addressed in secret and top secret 

versions of the Soviet military journal, Military Thought that are addressed in Chapter III. 
CIA ANALYSIS OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES : THE IMPORTANCE OF CLANDESTINE REPORTING

10

Organizing and Managing the Warsaw Pact

The Twentieth CPSU Congress in February 1956, famous for 

Khrushchev’s anti-Stalin speech, ushered in what would become 

an era of many changes in Soviet–East European relations. The 

congress set forth new guidance for communist governance, implicit 

and explicit, and dissolved the COMINFORM12 to “facilitate 

cooperation with the socialist parties” of the noncommunist 

world. The resulting policy vacuum in Eastern Europe persisted 

though the fall of 1956 and probably was an important precipitant 

of the Hungarian uprising and the riots in Poland. Intentionally 

or not, Khrushchev’s condemnation of Stalinism unsettled the 

communist governments of Eastern Europe, most of which were 

run by unreconstructed Stalinists. Their ousting from office was 

accompanied by unintended disorder and some violent outbreaks 

of worker discontent in Eastern Europe that the presence of Soviet 

garrisons could not avert. Subsequent actions would illustrate that 

Moscow’s guidance for communist governance notwithstanding, 

the Warsaw Treaty was providing a new vehicle for establishing 

Soviet authority over intra-Bloc relations. Moscow defined this 

authority even to include “legitimizing” physical intervention, a 

vehicle that the Soviets would soon use.

By midsummer 1956, riots in Poland threatened the future 

integrity and success of the year-old Warsaw Pact. The Soviets 

mobilized and prepared forces in response, but the crisis was 

resolved short of Soviet military intervention. Instead, the Soviets 

employed those forces to suppress the far more serious situation 

developing in Hungary, after the Hungarians forcibly removed 

the remnants of the oppressive Stalinist regime and installed the 

mildly communist one of Imre Nagy. Nagy opted to lead Hungary 

out of the Warsaw Pact, treason in the eyes of the Soviets. After 

the garrison of Soviet forces in Hungary initially took a beating at 

the hands of the revolutionaries, the Soviets unleashed the forces 

mobilized to intervene in Poland. The bloody suppression that 

ensued reimposed Soviet control. In a declaration on 30 October 

1956, Moscow hypocritically stated its readiness to respect the 

sovereignty of its Warsaw Pact allies even as the Soviets already 

were in the process of violating Hungary’s.

Outweighing the promise of a common defense of the Bloc, 

the Soviet military threat to Poland and the aggression 

against Hungary represented the downside of the Warsaw 

Treaty—that it was a formal mechanism for Soviet control. 

The rocky start for the Warsaw Pact was followed by the growing 

estrangement of Albania and Romania, and problems with China. 

Yugoslavia had already bolted from the Soviet orbit in 1948. 

Nonetheless, the Soviets persevered, building the Warsaw 

Treaty Organization into an ever-tightening device for controlling 

its satellite allies, and a source of additional military power. 

In broad general terms, the Soviet General Staff created the 

Warsaw Pact military plans even though the Warsaw Treaty 

provided formal arrangements for the Soviets and their East 

European allies to share management of their combined military 

forces. Contrary to the Articles of the Warsaw Treaty, particularly 

Article 5, Soviet planning for the Warsaw Pact initially called for 

the forces of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) countries to 

remain under nominal national control, with the intention that 

the Soviets would closely direct all forces during a crisis or war. 

Nonetheless, throughout the life of the Warsaw Pact, the NSWP 

members, with varying degrees of success, resisted yielding 

control of their own forces to Soviet unilateral command. Only 

in the case of East German forces did the Soviets fully succeed. 

During the 1950s CIA analysts assessed that the Warsaw Pact’s 

forces were not integrated and jointly controlled and that only 

the Soviets really managed them. The IC in NIE 11-4-58, Main 

Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1958-1963, judged 

it unlikely that Soviet planners would count on East European 

forces to make an important contribution to Soviet military 

operations except perhaps for air defense. Soviet preparations 

for military contingencies associated with Moscow’s projected 

aggressive moves against West Berlin in the summer of 1961 

called for putting all NSWP forces into Soviet field armies, clearly 

a plan to subordinate the former to Soviet control. 

After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, archival documents 

from former members further illustrated their unequal treatment 

during this period. In a 1956 classified critique of the statute of 

the Unified Command, Polish Gen. Jan Drzewiecki complained, 

“The document in its present form grants the Supreme 

Commander of the Unified Armed Forces certain rights and 

obligations, which contradict the idea of the independence and 

sovereignty of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty.”13 In 

a January 1957 Memorandum on Reform of the Warsaw 

Pact, General Drzewiecki further stated, “The authority of 

the Supreme Commander [a Soviet officer] on questions of 

leadership in combat and strategic training is incompatible with 

the national character of the armies of the corresponding states.”14

In the latter half of the 1970s Col. Ryszard Kuklinski, a CIA 

clandestine source, provided information revealing the NSWP 

members finally signed and ratified the Statutes on 18 March 

1978, except for the one on Unified Command for Wartime. That 

one was not signed and ratified until 1980.15 Clearly the Soviets 

had not achieved their aims at legal control for decades.

12 COMINFORM was the acronym for the “Information Bureau of the Communist and Worker’s Parties” that was founded in 1947. Its purpose was to coordinate the foreign policy activities of the 

East European communist parties under Soviet direction. 13 A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact 1955-1991, edited by Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne, Central European 

University Press, Budapest, New York, p.84–86. 14 Ibid, 87–90. 15 See Chapter VII, page 35 for more details on the statutes. For the documents, see the Catalogue of Documents, Chapter 7, 

Section, “Formal Mechanisms to Manage the Warsaw Pact,” page 185.
CIA ANALYSIS OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES : THE IMPORTANCE OF CLANDESTINE REPORTING

11

Intelligence Sources and Analysis in the Early Years 

The Western Allies shared military and policy information to a 

limited extent with the Soviet Union during WWII, but even that 

all but ceased when the war ended. By 1949, the Soviet Union 

and its allies were concealing much of their military activities and 

policy decisions from the outside world. The police state that 

Stalin established made recruiting human sources inside the USSR 

extremely difficult16 and prevented Western diplomats and military 

attachés from traveling widely there. Thus, the central problem for 

CIA analysts during this period of the Cold War in Europe was 

the lack of direct and convincing evidence other than that derived 

from SIGINT, defectors, and the media. Efforts to fill the gaps in 

collection with photography and other supporting information were 

of limited success. 

In the early 1950s military analysts based their understanding of 

Soviet military organization, doctrine, capabilities, and tactics largely 

on evidence from World War II, SIGINT, information available 

from the Soviet press, military attaché reporting, defector and 

émigré debriefings, and the observations of US military missions 

in Austria and East Germany. Some German prisoners of the 

Soviet Union from the WWII period and some Spanish émigrés 

from the Spanish Civil War days who were returning to the West 

provided valuable military-industrial information. For example, the 

German prisoners, who had worked on Hitler’s missile program and 

were forced to help the Soviet program, relayed useful data about 

Soviet missile programs. Most Soviet military émigrés or defectors, 

however, were generally low level and the military defectors could 

report only on their experiences in the military units where they 

served—typically located in Austria or East Germany.

During the period 1955–59, CIA had only two productive 

clandestine sources of Soviet military information. One was a special 

project, the Berlin Tunnel Operation, which yielded invaluable 

information, for example, about deployed military forces, Soviet 

political-military relationships, and the tactical-level organization 

and manning of Soviet forces in East Germany through most of 

1955 until spring 1956.17 The other was Major (later promoted to 

Lt. Colonel) Pyotr Popov, the CIA’s first high-quality clandestine 

Soviet military source.

Popov served in place and reported on Soviet military policy, 

doctrine, strategy, tactics and organization from 1953 until the late 

1950s. Richard Helms testified that “Lieutenant Colonel Pyotr 

Popov, until he fell under suspicion, single-handedly supplied the 

most valuable intelligence on Soviet military matters of any human 

source available to the United States” during the period.18 He also 

said Popov’s reporting had a “direct and significant influence on the 

military organization of the United States, its doctrine and tactics, 

and permitted the Pentagon to save at least 500 million dollars in 

its scientific research program.”19 The information and documents 

he provided continued to inform the CIA analysis years after he 

was arrested. 

Popov provided the IC with unique classified documentary and 

semi-documentary information otherwise unavailable after the late 

1940s, including extant Field Service Regulations of the Armed 

Forces of the USSR and other manuals that provided new doctrine 

and strategies for the armed forces.20 The subjects of his reports 

ranged from routine unit locations to nuclear warfare tactics, 

strategic air operations, and guided missiles. He supplied the IC with 

information on the organization and functions of the Soviet General 

Staff and technical specifications of Soviet Army conventional 

weapons, including the first information about new weapons such as 

the T-10 heavy tank and PT-76 amphibious light tank. Popov also 

provided documents on Khrushchev’s reorganization of the Soviet 

military and a number of unique and highly valuable classified 

documents of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central 

Committee (CPSU/CC), including those concerning Soviet policy 

toward Berlin. The information Popov supplied was important 

for understanding the Soviet political and military establishments 

following the Stalinist years and at the startup of the Warsaw Pact. 

And it provided a basis for understanding how the political and 

military establishments of the satellite countries would operate with 

the Soviet Union. Because of the tight control over disseminated 

information from the Popov operation, analysts made no references 

in finished intelligence that might lead to his apprehension. 

However, much later, a former officer in the CIA’s Directorate of 

Plans (DP), William Hood, in his 1982 book, Mole,

21 extensively 

discussed Popov’s contribution. 

According to CIA records, Popov also supplied copies of the Soviet 

military publication, Military Thought.

22 We know from the 

author of a CIA study, Soviet Naval Strategy and the Effect on 

the Development of the Naval Forces 1953-1963, that Military 

Thought articles from the 1953–59 period were available for his 

analysis. Analysts who participated in the 1963 CIA/DIA joint 

study, discussed in Chapter V,23 also had Popov-supplied documents 

available to support their analysis. The above testimony shows that 

his efforts provided the IC with some of the best human-source 

information on developing Soviet military tactics and doctrine 

during the period.

16 For more information on the difficulties in recruiting Soviet human sources during the early years, see William Hood, Mole, The True Story of the First Russian Intelligence Officer Recruited 

by the CIA, (New York: W .W. Norton and Company, 1982). 17 For more information on the Berlin Tunnel project see Catalogue of Documents, Document I-34 the official Clandestine Services 

History, The Berlin Tunnel Operation 1952-1956, 24 June 1968; for information on the intelligence derived from the Berlin Project, see Annex B, “Recapitulation of the Intelligence Derived”. 

Also see Donald P. Steury, ed., On the Front Lines of the Cold War: Documents on the Intelligence War in Berlin, 1946 to 1961 (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999). 

18 See Richard Helms, with William Hood, A Look over My Shoulder A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency (New York: Random House, 2003), 105. 19 Ibid. Helms p.132. 20 See Catalogue of 

Documents, Document III-11, Military Thought, Issue No.1, 1964, “The New Field Service Regulations of the Armed Forces of the USSR, for a discussion by Marshal Chuykov on the importance of 

the Field Service Regulation Manuals for putting into effect new doctrine and strategies for the armed forces. 21 Hood, Mole. 22 NARA has available fourteen Russian-language issues of Military 

Thought from the period 1953–58, when Popov was active. 23 For references to documents provided by Popov that aided the Joint CIA/DIA study, See the Catalogue of Documents, Document 

V-13, p. 54, A Study of the Soviet Ground Forces, An Interim Report of the CIA-DIA Panel for a Special Study of the Soviet Ground Forces for Secretary McNamara, 21 August 1963.

13

The second Berlin crisis was a continuation of the disagreement 

over the future of Germany and Berlin that caused the first crisis in 

1948. The seeds of both were sown in discussions during WWII 

over who would eventually control Germany and Berlin. The 

Allied powers—the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet 

Union—agreed in 1944 on joint occupation and administration 

of the country and its capital. This arrangement was formalized in 

June 1945, after Germany had surrendered, and a fourth sector of 

occupation was established for France. The agreement provided 

the three Western powers with the right of access to Berlin, 

located deep within the Soviet-controlled part of Germany that 

later became the German Democratic Republic (GDR).24 In an 

attempt to abrogate the agreement over the city, the Soviets walked 

out of the first Allied Control Council in 1948, declaring that the 

Western powers no longer had any rights to administer Berlin. By 

23 June, the Soviets had completely blocked deliveries of food and 

other supplies over land to the three Western-controlled sectors 

of the city. Thus began the first Berlin crisis. The Western powers 

responded with a huge operation, known as the Berlin Airlift, 

flying in 4,000 tons of supplies a day to the city until the Soviets 

lifted the blockade in May 1949.

After the crisis subsided the Soviets continued to harass Allied 

military truck convoys to West Berlin from West Germany. In the 

meantime, the United States, France and the United Kingdom 

began establishing a nucleus for a future German government 

that eventually became the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). 

Khrushchev instigated a second crisis on 10 November 1958. 

At the Friendship Meeting of the Peoples of the Soviet Union 

and Poland, he delivered what was in effect an ultimatum calling 

for a separate peace treaty with the GDR that would terminate 

the Western powers’ right of access to West Berlin. After the 

speech, relations between the United States and the Soviet 

Union deteriorated sharply, and a series of political and military 

confrontations over the status of Berlin followed. The crisis 

culminated in the building of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 

and with US and Soviet armored forces facing off directly against 

each other at Checkpoint Charlie on the border between East and 

West Berlin. As in the crisis of 1948, the Soviets sought to force 

the West to abandon control of the Western sectors of Berlin and 

to stop the flow of East German refugees. CIA analysis judged 

Khrushchev evidently also hoped that forcing the Western powers 

to recognize East Germany and leave Berlin would discredit the 

United States as the defender of the West and eventually cause 

NATO to dissolve.

The crisis proved to be an important milestone in the development 

of both NATO and Warsaw Pact military thinking and planning. 

The strategic importance of what seemed to be overwhelmingly 

strong Soviet conventional forces facing NATO in Europe became 

starkly evident to the new US administration of John F. Kennedy. 

The attempted US responses to the crisis revealed the lack of 

readiness of the Western forces and underscored the dangers to 

the West of US reliance on the massive retaliation doctrine for 

inter-Bloc confrontations short of general (total) war. The crisis 

was perhaps the greatest test of the solidarity and meaning of 

NATO since the Berlin Airlift.25 It threatened to lead to direct 

conventional military hostilities between NATO and the Warsaw 

Pact ground forces that could easily escalate to nuclear warfare.

chapter Ii

The Berlin Crisis—Col. Oleg Penkovskiy and Warsaw Pact 

Preparations for Associated Military Operations (1958–1961)

24 Op cit. On the Front Lines, Preface and Introduction, pp iii, v, 131-135. See also Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1948, Germany and Austria, Volume II, Chapter IV, “The Berlin 

Crisis”, pages 867–1284, for more detailed information on this period of post-WWII Four Power occupation and administration of Germany and the ensuing crisis. The early FRUS volumes are 

available through the Library website of the University of Wisconsin. 25 For a brief summary of the discussions in August 1961 of how Western countries saw future developments of the Berlin 

situation and how they proposed to handle it, see Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) Vol. XIV, 372–73. The term, “Live Oak”, which appears in the FRUS discussion, was the code name 

for Western Quadripartite Powers’ planning for a military confrontation within the larger context of NATO war planning.
CIA ANALYSIS OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES : THE IMPORTANCE OF CLANDESTINE REPORTING

14

Intelligence Sources and Analysis

Col. Oleg Penkovskiy, a Soviet officer who 

became a clandestine source of CIA and the 

British MI-6, began reporting in April 1961 

about Khrushchev’s views of the Kennedy 

administration, and subsequently supplied 

invaluable insights into Khrushchev’s plans 

and military capabilities for confronting the 

West over Berlin. 

Khrushchev implicitly threatened to use the massive array of 

Soviet armored ground forces to prevent the West from protecting 

its interests in Berlin. He reinforced this threat through largescale Warsaw Pact exercises conducted in October and November 

1961. At the same time, Penkovskiy’s reporting indicated the 

growing concern among the Soviet elite that Khrushchev’s threats 

risked uncontrolled war. Indeed, Penkovskiy reported that the 

Soviet military hierarchy strongly believed that the Red Army was 

not ready for a war with NATO over Berlin.26

During the summer and fall of 1961 CIA continued to disseminate 

reports based on information surreptitiously passed by Penkovskiy 

and elicited at clandestine meetings during his trips to England 

and France. The reports almost certainly bolstered the President’s 

resolve to take strong military actions to counter any Soviet 

attempts to force change in the status of Berlin. The reports also 

showed growing Soviet concern about US and NATO intentions 

toward Berlin. According to the clandestine information, Moscow 

ordered Soviet embassies in all capitalist countries to determine 

the degree of participation of each NATO country in decisions 

about Berlin.

Because of the extreme sensitivity of the source, little was 

written down about the precise communication of Penkovskiy’s 

information to the President. Circumstantial evidence suggests 

Penkovskiy’s reporting was an important unrecorded motivation 

in US policy councils. It was certainly prescient regarding Soviet 

reaction to the US decisions. CIA does have evidence that DCI 

Allen Dulles briefed the President on 14 July 1961 and that 

Penkovskiy’s reporting was read by the President as he prepared 

his 25 July speech to the American people. CIA also has evidence 

that Penkovskiy’s reporting was sent to the White House for 

a morning briefing on 22 August and that his reporting was 

pouched to the President in Newport, RI, in September 1961. 

Penkovskiy’s suggestions for appropriate reactions to Soviet 

moves basically paralleled what actually happened. They were 

the basis for a special national intelligence estimate (SNIE) on 

20 September 1961 that was passed to US decision makers as 

part of the planning process for US and Allied responses to 

Khrushchev’s demands. Penkovskiy’s reporting in September 

was the subject of another SNIE, 11-10/1-61, dated 5 October 

1961. Whatever the actual effects of US and other western 

actions, in the end, Khrushchev did not order the access to West 

Berlin closed and the more serious military scenarios did not 

play out.

The whole episode gradually receded until Khrushchev was 

removed from power in 1964. In the meantime, his actions served 

to focus Western attention on the conventional military threat 

posed by the Warsaw Pact forces in Europe. In the USSR, the 

military began to raise questions about a doctrine dependent on 

massive nuclear-missile strikes. In a sense, the Soviets were a few 

years behind changes underway in the United States that were 

foreshadowed by General Maxwell Taylor’s influential 1959 book, 

The Uncertain Trumpet.

27

The seriousness of the confrontations notwithstanding, the Soviet 

military preparations and movements associated with the crisis 

provided Western intelligence valuable information about the 

organization and strength of the Warsaw Pact ground forces—

Penkovskiy’s reporting provided further understanding of the 

potential foe.

US Announced Responses 

to Khrushchev’s Moves in Berlin

To demonstrate US intentions not to abandon 

Berlin, President Kennedy announced by radio and 

television on 25 July 1961 that his administration 

was beginning a program to enlarge the US Army 

and mobilize Reserve and National Guard forces 

to strengthen US forces in Europe and to send 

additional forces to West Berlin. 

Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell Gilpatric, 

followed up the President’s 25 September 1961 

speech to the UN General Assembly by telling the 

US Business Council on 21 October 1961 that 

the United States not only would significantly 

improve its forces protecting Europe but would 

further augment them should the USSR pursue an 

aggressive course in Berlin.

26 See the Catalogue of Documents, Chapter II, Document II-13 for the Penkovskiy report exposing Khrushchev’s threats to use ICBMs as unfounded. 27 General Maxwell D. Taylor U.S.A. (Ret.), 

The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper Bothers, Publishers, 1959).
CIA ANALYSIS OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES : THE IMPORTANCE OF CLANDESTINE REPORTING

15

Top : 1944: First Ukrainian Front; from right to left, Penkovskiy; Lieutenant General Varentsov; Pozovnyy, Adjutant to Varentsov; and an orderly. 

Bottom: Graduating class of the Dzerzhinzkiy Artillery Engineering Academy; Penkovskiy is the third from right in the front row.
Penkovskiy’s Comments on Two 

1960 Top Secret Articles from 

Military Thought*

“Lieutenant General Gastilovich [probably Col. 

Gen A. I Gastilovich], deputy commandant of the 

Military Academy of the General Staff (1958-64) 

sets the theme for the entire series. In ‘The Theory 

of Military Art Needs Review,’ found in the Top 

Secret Military Thought Special Collection Issue 

No.1, 1960, he discusses the need for a new Soviet 

military doctrine based on the availability of 

missiles to deliver weapons thousands of kilometers. 

He describes how wars conducted with nuclear 

weapons will reduce industrialized countries to 

wastelands in a brief period, thus eliminating the 

necessity of maintaining large ground forces.”

“The article by General of the EngineeringTechnical Service Makar F. Goryainov, titled 

‘Nuclear Missile Armament and Some Principles 

of Military Doctrine,’ Military Thought Special 

Collection Issue No.2, 1960, compares the views of 

Soviet, American and British generals on the roles 

of nuclear weapons and missiles in war. Goryainov 

states, for example, that the Americans require 

nuclear weapons to be used in ways that minimize 

radioactive contamination. In contrast, Goryainov 

champions maximum radioactive contamination 

of industrial and population centers to shorten the 

duration of war and lessen the need for massive 

ground troops.”

* The Penkovskiy Papers (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965), 243–45. 
17

Stalin’s death ended proscriptions against discussion of nuclear 

strategy. The Soviet military soon initiated a debate on military 

doctrine, a debate that centered on the effect of the rapidly 

advancing weapons technologies, especially the development 

of nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems. Early debate 

demonstrated a surprisingly unsophisticated appreciation of 

the impact of nuclear weapons by placing emphasis on adapting 

the new weapons to traditional battlefield concepts. As more 

and better weapons became available and their potency better 

understood, the focus shifted to modifying traditional concepts 

to suit contemporary trends in military science and art. By the 

end of the 1950s, the Soviets addressed the questions of whether 

all crises would require the use of nuclear weapons, would the 

conventional phase precede nuclear attacks, would conventional 

military means be useful in some crises, and whether antagonists 

could prevent limited wars from escalating to a general war.

USSR Developments and the Warsaw Pact

The historical prime mission of the Soviet military was the 

strategic defense of the homeland, focused on massive ground 

forces and supported by a clearly subordinate navy and air 

force. Soviet experience during World War II reinforced this 

concept of military mission.28 After the elimination of German 

and Japanese military, the United States stood as the Soviets’ 

principal source of opposition. To bring military power to bear 

against the United States, Stalin launched a major program to 

build medium and long range bombers and naval forces. He 

believed the basic nature of war would remain unchanged. US 

military analysts as early as 1947 assessed this belief would 

dominate Soviet military strategy. Until Stalin died in March 

1953, his position effectively choked off theoretical discussion in 

the Soviet military press about integrating nuclear weapons into 

military doctrine.

As change swept through the Soviet hierarchy in 1953, the 

military must have seen that the time was ripe for throwing off 

Stalin’s straightjacket on military thinking. The November 1953 

issue of Military Thought contained an excellent illustration of 

the intellectual ferment. The editor urged contributors to attend 

to the times. “The military art of the Soviet Army must take into 

account a whole series of new phenomena which have arisen in 

the postwar period.” By May 1954 the Ministry of Defense had 

enunciated a new doctrine addressing the role of nuclear weapons 

and missiles in its Manual on the Characteristics of the Conduct 

of Combat Operations under Conditions of the Employment 

of Nuclear Weapons. The Soviet military press undertook a 

systematic effort to inform military officers of the character, 

potential, and effect on the military of the new weapons and 

rapidly advancing weapon technologies, and to induce responsible 

officers to write about adapting the new weapons to traditional 

concepts of military science and military art. The debate continued 

throughout the 1950s.

During the latter 1950s, Khrushchev pursued a new military 

doctrine consistent with new weapon capabilities and his 

economic priorities. Articles appearing in the Soviet military 

press began to indicate a divergence in opinion among the military 

leadership about Soviet doctrine for the future. While their 

ground forces remained huge by US standards, the Soviets lagged 

in the production of both intercontinental-delivery systems and 

nuclear weapons, although their capabilities to make both were 

improving. No matter what was the actual cause behind the drive 

for a new military doctrine, Khrushchev and the Soviet military 

were certainly influenced by the implicit threat from the massive 

chapter IIi

Soviet Debate on Military Doctrine and Strategy: 

The Contribution of Col. Oleg Penkovskiy (1955–1964)

28 The material in this section on history after WWII and into early 1950s is drawn from several sources. The main source of this information is contained in the Catalogue of Documents, Chapter 

III, Document III-5 “Historical Background Since World War II,” Section I, Soviet Naval Strategy and Its effect on the Development of Naval Forces 1953-63, 22 October 1963, 23–30.
CIA ANALYSIS OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES : THE IMPORTANCE OF CLANDESTINE REPORTING

18

American nuclear forces, the accession of West Germany into 

NATO, and a West German rearmament program. During this 

period the Soviet military did reach an uneasy consensus on the 

place of nuclear weapons in its operational doctrine. The Field 

Services Regulations issued on 2 March 1959—and passed to the 

West by Penkovskiy in 1961—represented the culmination of the 

line of military thought evident after the death of Stalin. Almost 

as soon as it was published, however, it was overtaken by agitation 

for a dramatically new direction in military theory.

Seeing the potential of the nuclear arms as a cheap and flexible 

means of providing greater security and prominence for the 

USSR, Khrushchev outlined a new military policy in his report 

to the Supreme Soviet in January 1960. His plan in essence was to 

rely mainly on nuclear-missile forces, to reduce military manpower 

substantially, and to accelerate the retirement of older weapons. 

This, he asserted, was the force structure best suited both to 

advance Soviet political and economic interests, and to fight a 

war when necessary. Khrushchev’s speech set off an impassioned 

debate among the Soviet military in open-source and classified 

publications. 

In 1960 the Soviets began publishing a Top Secret “Special 

Collection” of Military Thought29 that had limited distribution. 

It provided a forum for high-ranking military officers to debate 

the problems of fighting a future war in the context of forces 

equipped with a multitude of long-range nuclear weapons. 

Under Khrushchev’s apparent tutelage, several well-placed Soviet 

general officers proposed a doctrine for conquering Europe that 

relied heavily on massive nuclear strikes. It assigned little role to 

conventional ground forces or to the Warsaw Pact allies except 

perhaps for air defense of the approaches to the Soviet Union. The 

more conservative elements of the military opposed much of this 

new thinking. These “traditionalists” began to question reliance on 

a military doctrine dependent almost solely on massive nuclearmissile strikes and instead posited the need for large armored 

forces as well. Beginning in 1961, Colonel Penkovskiy passed this 

series of classified articles to the West.

In addition to the Military Thought articles, Penkovskiy drew 

on his ties to some of the most senior officers in the Ministry 

of Defense and related organizations to supply priceless 

commentary about Soviet intentions, Soviet military leadership 

thinking on the character of war, Soviet and Warsaw Pact 

capabilities, and the organization of Warsaw Pact forces for 

war. He reported Soviet officers were concerned about the 

readiness of the military to face a confrontation with the United 

States and NATO that might result from Khrushchev’s threats 

to sign a separate treaty with East Germany. He provided 

invaluable insight into Khrushchev’s inclination to use a massive 

concentration of conventional weapons, especially tanks, in 

confrontations with the West, notwithstanding his championing 

of a doctrine that denigrated their significance. Penkovskiy 

presented the West with the Soviet idealized view of military 

doctrine as well as the practical consequence of contemporary 

Soviet reality. For example, he explained the Soviets had deployed 

no intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in 1960 and 

1961, despite statements implying they had massive numbers 

of intercontinental strike systems. Penkovskiy’s information 

on Khrushchev’s military contingency plan for the Berlin crisis 

illustrated again the gap between the new doctrinal positions 

and military realities in the early 1960s.

Intelligence Sources and Analysis

The efforts of CIA to understand the Soviet–Warsaw Pact 

forces increased steadily during this period, as Secretary of 

Defense McNamara and other officials of the Kennedy and 

Johnson administrations asked CIA to address a broader array 

of questions about Soviet military capabilities. Analysts from 

the DI’s Office of Research and Reports (ORR) and the DI 

Research Staff in 1964 contributed to the first NIE devoted 

exclusively to Soviet and East European theater forces. CIA 

29 The Soviets continued to publish a secret edition of Military Thought.

US Discussions

Following Dwight Eisenhower’s inauguration in 

January 1953, his administration reviewed the 

US military and formulated a policy it called 

the “New Look.” This policy sought to deter 

communist aggression of any sort by threatening 

prompt nuclear reprisal. The resulting doctrine 

of “massive retaliation” focused on the delivery, by 

bombers and later by missiles, of hundreds, if not 

thousands, of nuclear weapons against an enemy. 

Accordingly, the United States sharply increased 

the size and capability of its nuclear armed air 

forces and drastically reduced resources allocated 

to US ground forces. It also accorded low priority 

in military doctrine and strategy to tactical air 

forces that did not deliver nuclear weapons.* 

In 1961, however, the Kennedy administration 

shifted US doctrine toward a full spectrum of 

nonnuclear and nuclear capabilities, especially 

after the experience of the Berlin crisis.

* For more on this policy, see History of the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, “Strategy , Money and the New Look,” 1953-1956, Volume 

III, Richard M. Leighton, Historical Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

Washington, D.C. 20001.
CIA ANALYSIS OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES : THE IMPORTANCE OF CLANDESTINE REPORTING

19

Documents written by Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy, obtained for the United States by Oleg Penkovskiy.

devoted more analytic resources to these issues, but not until 

1967 did it establish the Office of Strategic Research (OSR) 

in the DI to focus on military analysis of the Soviet–Warsaw 

Pact forces, and other target military forces, capabilities, 

and intentions. 

During the same period CIA and other IC analysts gained two 

new tools with which to develop estimates of Soviet military 

capabilities and intentions: 

→ Photography from the Corona satellite program supplied 

information on force locations and new developments with 

much greater accuracy than any previous system. 

→ Clandestine reporting by Colonel Penkovskiy provided the 

first high-level insight into the development of Soviet military 

hardware and strategy and a wealth of data about the military 

establishment. 

Analysts now could determine how the Soviets envisioned their 

total force from intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) 

to infantry and tank regiments would operate against NATO 

in Europe. Analysts began to understand, moreover, some of the 

discontinuities that characterized developments in the Soviet 

forces and as they were implied by Soviet military doctrine.

Penkovskiy’s clandestine reporting remained relevant long 

after the KGB apprehended him in 1962 because much of it 

represented the discussion by senior officers of major issues in 

Soviet military thinking for the future development of weapons 

and strategy. For more than 10 years, the IC continued to base 

analyses on his reporting about Warsaw Pact plans, capabilities 

and intentions about developments in Soviet strategic thought, 

even as other, more circumstantial evidence became available. 

When key East European clandestine sources began supplying 

information in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Penkovskiy 

collection helped validate the relevance of the new evidence for 

evaluating the Warsaw Pact, proving the enduring value of the 

work of this remarkable Russian.
From Cold War International History Project, CWIHP.org, used with permission.
21

This chapter highlights the importance of the clandestine 

reporting before and during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the 

relationship of the reporting to the general NATO–Warsaw 

Pact equation, and the impact of analytic experience gained 

during the crisis in evaluating the reporting.

Khrushchev’s Gamble Provides an Intelligence Bonanza

After the failure of his Berlin gambit and with the US advantage 

in intercontinental attack capabilities growing, Khrushchev in 

a break with precedent launched the first major expeditionary 

force outside the Soviet orbit since WWII. The Soviet plans in 

May 1962 called for the deploying to Cuba a large number of 

strategic-range guided missiles with an integrated military force 

to protect them.30

In their discussions of Soviet military doctrine in 1960–61, the 

Soviets hotly contested the role of medium-range ballistic missiles 

(MRBMs) and IRBMs in Soviet strategy and operations against 

NATO. Most participants in the internal high-level military 

debates posited the decisive importance of having those missiles to 

destroy the enemy’s nuclear weapons located deep in the theater, 

beyond the range of tactical aviation. They argued for leaving the 

destruction of US-based nuclear delivery systems to the ICBMs 

and long-range bombers of the Supreme High Command. Some 

protagonists insisted that the nuclear forces, especially MRBMS 

and IRBMs, could defeat NATO without much assistance 

from the ground forces beyond some minor mopping up and 

occupation tasks. By early 1962, the principals seemed to be 

reaching a consensus that combining missile and conventional 

land forces was the correct operational solution. 

The mix of forces involved in Khrushchev’s Cuban adventure—

missile, ground, air, air defense, coastal defense, and naval—

generally copied those deployed against NATO. Indeed, the 

specific forces sent to Cuba came from larger groupings in 

the western USSR, whose contingent mission had been the 

destruction of NATO in Europe. The special Top Secret series 

of Military Thought described various proposals to integrate 

long-range missiles into theater war planning and utilize the 

shorter range nuclear-armed rockets known as FROGs that were 

deployed with the Soviet and other Warsaw Pact ground armies 

in Europe. The composition of the Soviet Group of Forces sent 

to Cuba reflected real preferences of the military leadership when 

confronted with an unrehearsed potential combat situation. 

The deployment to Cuba of a virtual cross section of these forces 

provided military intelligence analysts, for the first time, an 

important example of what Soviet forces looked like when they 

were out of garrison and away from the supporting infrastructure 

of their Warsaw Pact Allies. It also allowed analysts to factor out 

other confusing aspects of military operations like mobilization.

Intelligence Sources and Analysis

Not evident in contemporary intelligence publications because of 

its sensitivity was the real contribution of Col. Oleg Penkovskiy. 

Even though he was unable to provide any information about 

the actual Soviet deployment of forces to Cuba, he had already 

delivered technical specifications and detailed operational 

information on the types of missiles that the USSR sent in the fall 

of 1962. Penkovskiy had managed to photograph and pass highly 

sensitive documents that proved invaluable during the crisis. They 

were the source for most of the understanding analysts had of field 

chapter IV

New Insights into the Warsaw Pact Forces and Doctrine – 

The Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)

30 See Mary S McAuliffe, ed., Cuban Missile Crisis 1962 (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1992) for many of the intelligence documents issued during the crisis period as 

well as a sample of the clandestine reporting from the CIA’s Cuban sources. This study is available on CIA’s website, www.cia.gov. 31 FROG is the acronym for “Free Rocket over Ground,” the 

name for large unguided missiles.
CIA ANALYSIS OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES : THE IMPORTANCE OF CLANDESTINE REPORTING

22

deployment and standard operating procedures for missile forces, 

the time required to achieve different levels of readiness, and 

the camouflage the Soviets prescribed to hide their forces, all of 

which contributed to US response decisions during the Cuban 

Missile Crisis.

Other information from Penkovskiy provided the basis for the 

analytical judgments that allowed the United States to calculate 

reaction times, capabilities, and limitations of the deployed Soviet 

air defense missile systems. The descriptions and the technical 

specifications of the “V-75” or SA-2, a surface-to-air missile, and 

the discussions in the Top Secret 1960–61 special collection

Military Thought series about the limitations of the SA-2 and 

the overall air defense organization disclosed critical Soviet 

vulnerabilities to high-speed low-level air attack. This information 

enabled US tactical reconnaissance planes to fly frequently over 

Cuba and monitor the status of Soviet missile deployments and 

other militarily important targets without the loss of a single 

low flying reconnaissance aircraft. This information would have 

been even more critical had the United States implemented 

plans calling for more than 500 sorties in the first day for the 

neutralization or destruction of Soviet missiles, the invasion of 

Cuba, and the destruction or capture of the Soviet ground and air 

forces deployed there.32 After Khrushchev agreed to remove the 

missiles and light bombers from Cuba, analysts relied on imagery, 

clandestine reporting, and information from Cuban immigrants 

to verify that no MRBMs remained and the agreement was met.33

In addition to the Military Thought articles, Penkovskiy supplied 

invaluable commentary about general Soviet intentions, the Soviet 

military leadership’s thoughts about the nature of war, Soviet and 

Warsaw Pact military capabilities, and the organization of the 

Warsaw Pact forces for war. All of this contributed to Kennedy’s 

confidence in the judgments reached by the intelligence analysts. 

Although Penkovskiy talked earlier with US intelligence officers 

about Soviet military aid to Cuba following the April 1961 Bay 

of Pigs disaster, he was unable to warn or give any details of the 

buildup of forces in Cuba. Clandestine sources in Cuba, however, 

supplied enough timely information about developments on 

the ground to prompt the United States to launch the U-2 

reconnaissance flights that yielded detailed, incontrovertible 

evidence of the Soviet deployment. 

In sum, there were three major types of human intelligence 

sources during the Cuban Missile Crisis. 

The inside source, Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy, who provided 

Soviet classified documents that greatly helped military 

analysts understand how the Soviets set up and conducted 

missile operations. 

Cuban refugees, who described being displaced from their 

farms, and thus furnished clues about where Soviet deployed 

the missiles. 

Clandestine sources inside Cuba, who delivered information 

that cued US flight plans for reconnaissance aircraft.

32 See FRUS 1961-1963 Volume XI, p. 267, The Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Department of State, Washington, DC, 1996. 33 Ibid.

Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 

SA-2 Air Defense Missiles
CIA ANALYSIS OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES : THE IMPORTANCE OF CLANDESTINE REPORTING

23

U-2 Overflights of Cuba, October 1962

25

In early 1963, Secretary of Defense McNamara wrote DCI John 

McCone to convey his concern that US national intelligence 

estimates about Soviet forces and capabilities34 were “causing 

NATO Allies and many Americans to despair of the possibility of 

achieving adequate non-nuclear forces.” The Secretary of Defense 

stated that he believed “the estimates of the strength of the Soviet 

ground forces...contained in NIE 11-14-62 were overstated.” 

Referring to the NIE, he wrote that he “could not understand 

how the Soviets, with the resources available to them, could 

have the number of ‘well-trained divisions equipped with the 

excellent materiel’ that the IC was estimating they had, when the 

United States could not afford even half that number of forces.” 

McNamara requested the DCI and the Director of the Defense 

Intelligence Agency (D/DIA) to reexamine the estimates. In the 

spring of 1963, a team of CIA and DIA intelligence analysts was 

formed to address these concerns and to produce a joint study.

Defining the Problem 

According to the officer in charge of the CIA effort, Dr. Edward 

Proctor, estimating the size and capabilities of Soviet forces in 

general posed problems; a Soviet division, for example, was not 

like a US division.35 Analysts had assessed the ground forces on the 

basis of captured Soviet documents, observations and statements 

by defectors, and bits and pieces of additional information. They 

had little opportunity to confirm the continued existence of many 

of the units known in the time of Stalin. 

The 1962 estimate,36 based on the contributions of the US 

Army and the new DIA, had described a Soviet force of some 80 

combat-ready divisions, with an additional 65 divisions “requiring 

substantial augmentation before commitment to combat.” It 

also calculated that, given 30 days to mobilize before hostilities 

began, the Soviets could expand their total forces to about 100 

combat-ready divisions and 125 others less well prepared. Earlier 

estimates had calculated a Soviet Army of 175 active divisions 

and an additional 125 available in 30 days.37 It is no wonder the 

Secretary of Defense wanted a better appraisal. The joint team of 

CIA and DIA analysts was instructed to discard all past positions 

and to start from scratch to determine the number of divisions the 

Soviets actually had in 1962. New intelligence from Penkovskiy 

and satellite photography38 made possible a critical review and 

revision of the previous estimates.

Revising the Estimates of the Strength 

of Soviet–Warsaw Pact Forces 

By the time the Secretary of Defense made his request for a new 

study, the analysts had accumulated much information about 

Soviet ground forces:

The reductions39 and reorganizations in the 1950s provided 

insight into the modifications of the organization of the combat 

divisions of the ground forces to about 1960. 

Information from Popov, Penkovskiy, and other sources of 

military writings provided insights into the changes in the 

ground forces on an aggregate level. 

The 1961 Berlin and 1962 Cuban crises provided additional 

insights into the organization, size and operational planning for 

the Warsaw Pact Ground Forces.

chapter V

New Estimates of the Soviet Ground Forces (1963–1968)

34 Ibid. Catalogue of Documents, Chapter V, Document V-13. p 3, reported that Soviet ground forces were defined to include “those Soviet military personnel performing functions similar to most 

of those performed by the US Army with the principal exception of continental air defenses.” 35 Edward Proctor interview with John Bird, 22 April 2008. 36 See Catalogue of Documents, Chapter 

V, Document V-8a for the 1962 NIE 11-14-62, Capabilities of Soviet Theater Forces. 37 See Catalogue of Documents, Chapter I, Document I-78, NIE 11-4-58, page 43. 38 Low-resolution satellite 

photography began covering military installations in 1960. 39 See Catalogue of Documents, Chapter VI, Document VI-7, page 4, Caesar XXVI, Warsaw Pact Military Strategy: A Compromise in Soviet 

Strategic Thinking, for a summary of various Soviet announcements of reductions in forces and reassignments from the Warsaw Pact countries during the period 1958–65.
CIA ANALYSIS OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES : THE IMPORTANCE OF CLANDESTINE REPORTING

26

Nonetheless, determining the details of the changes unit by unit 

had still been beyond what the evidence would bear. Moreover, 

because of the lack of specific information about the Soviet 

reorganizations of the early 1960s, analysts were less certain about 

current organizational standards. In the words of the authors of 

the Joint CIA-DIA Panel Study in 1963: “In the mid-1950s good 

insights into divisional and other TO&Es [tables of organization 

and equipment] were obtained from clandestine and documentary 

sources. Thus far, information of similar quality is not available for 

the TO&Es of divisions reorganized since the 1960s.”40

The Joint Study authors described the problem they needed 

to address and the process they devised to accomplish the 

assessments as they saw them at the time: 

“For the assessment of the personnel strength of 

the Soviet ground forces by unit or in the aggregate 

there is no unique type of intelligence source that 

has as yet become available. The process is one 

of gathering fragmentary bits of information in 

print from which inferences can be drawn with 

varying degrees of confidence. In general, the 

statements that are made regarding the quality 

of each source of information are applicable to 

questions of Soviet personnel strengths. Attachés 

and military liaison officers can gain general 

appreciations of manning levels at the various 

installations they observe, but the presence of 

reservists in training or the co-location of units 

usually obscures the meaningfulness of such 

appreciations. In East Germany approximate 

head counts could be made for small units when 

such units were en route as units. Similarly, 

defectors and repatriates, covert sources and 

informants can provide reasonably trustworthy 

indications with respect to the small units in 

which they have served. However, more broadly 

knowledgeable sources had been rare.”41

The satellite photographic coverage of the whole USSR made 

it possible for the first time to ascertain the existence of most of 

the division sized units in 1963. Questions did remain, however, 

because of the rudimentary quality typical of the early satellite 

photography. 

In the Second Panel Report—on Soviet Ground forces—

completed in 1965, the authors noted that for assessing production 

and inventory of land armaments:

The collective output from [all] sources [to 1963] 

has proved disappointing in quality, timeliness 

and comprehensiveness. In addition none of the 

sources has provided consistent coverage over the 

period since World War II. This situation is not 

surprising in view of the nature of the problem.

Land combat equipment and ammunition 

represent a wide variety of comparatively small 

items. Production can be dispersed widely in a 

number of different types of plants. Storage can 

be accomplished in a variety of ways with little 

difficulty. Different models may appear identical 

to all but trained observers.

Even Penkovskiy, with his access in the highest levels in the 

Ministry of Defense, was unable to provide information on the 

rates of production or inventories of land armaments.

The CIA/DIA team analyzed each division of ground forces 

by combining Penkovskiy’s information on the Soviet theory 

of mobilization and peacetime readiness of forces with newly 

available satellite photography. Even though the satellite photos 

were of poor quality for this task, the classified Soviet military 

documents supplied by Penkovskiy and the evidence provided by 

other human sources enabled the estimative process to proceed. 

The Joint Study concluded that:

With a high degree of confidence between 115–135 Soviet 

ground forces divisions, including 22–45 cadre (skeleton) 

divisions existed in the first half of 1963. 

The total number could be as low as 100 or as high as 150.

The cadre divisions had few troops but could be fleshed out 

with reservists in order to participate in a subsequent stage of 

the war.

The study found no basis for the 125 additional divisions to be 

mobilized in 30 days mentioned in earlier estimates. Clearly, 

however, the Soviet army was larger in many respects than the 

ground forces of NATO but significantly smaller than the analysts 

previously thought. Unanswered questions about the quality of 

those forces remained. Nonetheless, the doctrinal discussions in 

the documents Penkovskiy passed to the West put the seemingly 

confusing picture of the whole ground forces’ establishment into 

meaningful perspective. 

40 This refers to the TO&Es Popov provided in the mid-1950, see Catalogue of Documents, Chapter I, Documents I-15, I-67, I-68, I-69, I-70, I-71, I-72. 41 Ibid. Catalogue of Documents, Chapter 

V, Document V-13, page 55.
CIA ANALYSIS OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES : THE IMPORTANCE OF CLANDESTINE REPORTING

27

Clarifying the Estimate of Capabilities 

and Mobilization of Soviet–Warsaw Pact Forces 

After addressing the questions about the quantity of forces, 

the next all-source analytic challenge was to understand the 

qualitative distinctions between theory and practice. Secretary 

McNamara again requested a CIA-DIA team of analysts 

be brought together. Throughout 1967 and 1968, this team 

sought better estimates of the capabilities of the Warsaw Pact 

to mobilize forces and strengthen the area opposite NATO in 

the central region of Europe. The important question was how 

well the Soviets could carry out the intentions described in their 

writings—specifically, how well the divisions were manned and 

equipped and how well the rear echelons could transport and 

supply war materiel to combat units in order to meet Soviet 

requirements for a war with NATO.

Studying the 1962 Soviet expedition to Cuba increased the 

confidence of military analysts in estimates of what a full regiment 

might look like. Soviet Ministry of Defense classified documents, 

such as the 1959 Field Service Regulations of the Armed 

Forces of the USSR and the 1962 draft of the revised version, 

informed them on how the forces generally would be used. Pieces 

of evidence about the process of mobilization and reinforcement, 

found within numerous Soviet classified documents copied by 

Penkovskiy, provided an increasingly clear picture of the Soviet 

forces aimed at NATO. Nonetheless, it was also clear that the 

observations and other evidence of Soviet military units suggested 

a gap between what the theoretical journals described and the 

actual condition of typical Soviet units on the ground.

The analysis improved significantly once high resolution imagery 

from KH-7 satellites became available during the period 1965–

68. Analysts combined this information with the evidence from 

human sources, reconstructed their view of the organization of the 

Soviet divisions, and judged their actual size and readiness. There 

were, of course, many more ingredients involved in the all-source 

analysis, but the synergistic effects of the documentary and other 

human source evidence with the new higher resolution imagery of 

the KH-7 system constituted the basis of major improvements in 

the analysis of Warsaw Pact ground forces. These improvements 

were evident in the marked differences, for example, between the 

contributions to NIE 11-14-67 and NIE 11-14-68. The latter 

estimate contained a much more detailed assessment of the forces, 

including their overall size and intended use in operations against 

the West, than had existed since the end of WWII.

By 1969 the CIA assessed that military analysis during the 

1960s had made strides in understanding Soviet capabilities for 

conducting a war against NATO in the Central Region, but it had 

not answered all of Secretary McNamara’s questions:

Major areas of uncertainty about the capabilities 

of the Soviet ground forces remain. The most 

significant gap is in the understanding of servicesupport organization and capabilities above 

the level of the division. The detailed study of 

Soviet logistical capabilities requires different 

methodologies than have been applied to the 

study of the combat forces, and depends to a 

greater degree on sources of information other 

than overhead photography. Considerable 

uncertainty also remains about the peacetime 

personnel strengths of combat support units 

inside the USSR.42

The two studies, however, had not addressed the Soviet plan for 

conducting a war with NATO in the Central Region of Europe. 

That study did not occur until June 1968.

42 See Catalogue of Documents, Chapter V, Document V-61. Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Facing NATO, CIA/DI/OSR Intelligence Report, September 1969.

Warsaw pact general purpose forces available for early commitment in central Europe. From NIE 11-14-69 Soviet and East European General Purpose Force. 4 December 1969.

29

The Demise of Khrushchev

The Soviet Communist Party expelled Khrushchev from office 

in October 1964. During his last two years in power, many of 

his policies were halted or reversed. His tactics during the Berlin 

crisis had failed to bring about control of West Berlin, and he 

had to abandon his proposal for a separate peace treaty with East 

Germany.43 Worse, the Berlin crisis drew the NATO countries 

closer together and motivated the Western alliance to improve its 

defenses. Khrushchev’s Cuban gamble, moreover, ended in retreat 

when the United States forced him to remove the missiles. These 

failures humiliated him and the other Soviet leaders and exposed 

Soviet strategic inferiority to the world. The hangover from the 

two debacles would affect Soviet political and military policies 

well into the following decades.

In the aftermath of the two crises many of Khrushchev’s foreign 

policy goals tied to the German question obstructed his desire 

to improve East-West relations, including favorable stability in 

Europe. Although the USSR concluded the Limited Test Ban 

Treaty with the United States and the United Kingdom in 1963, 

further efforts to manage the race in strategic weapons and ground 

forces and to obtain nonaggression agreements stalled. Had he 

achieved these goals, Khrushchev could have pressed forward 

with economic, agricultural, and resource allocation reforms at 

home and could have perceived opportunities to influence political 

changes in Western Europe to Soviet advantage, including the 

USSR’s relationship with West Germany.

During the same period, fallout from the Sino-Soviet dispute 

caused Khrushchev political problems in Europe and military 

problems along the border with China. China initiated a 

propaganda and diplomatic campaign in Europe that used 

Khrushchev’s plan to visit West Germany as evidence of Soviet 

intent to “sell out” East Germany in favor of West Germany. 

China also made claims to some Soviet territory, prompting 

Soviet military concern about the need to move troops there 

from Europe. The latter threat had implications for Khrushchev’s 

goals to reduce Soviet forces and reallocate resources. Khrushchev 

seemed to calculate that the need to maintain forces in Europe 

and also along the Sino-Soviet border would prevent him from 

shifting resources to the nonmilitary sector. All of which added 

urgency to achieving his objectives in Europe. 

Internal Warsaw Pact issues also plagued the Soviets. Albania 

severed diplomatic relations with the USSR in December 1961 

and expelled Soviet naval ships from the base they occupied. 

Romania began to take a separate road on foreign policy, especially 

with West Germany, culminating in its recognition of the Federal 

Republic of Germany two months after Khrushchev’s ouster. East 

Germany feared that rapprochement between West Germany and 

Moscow would weaken the position of Moscow on consolidating 

the status quo in Germany. Bonn made overtures to the Soviet 

Union for recognition, but clandestine reports indicated that, 

before dismissing Khrushchev, the Politburo cancelled a plan for 

him to visit Bonn. 

According to CIA analysis at the time, in addition to the continuing 

repercussions from his failed policies on Berlin and Cuba, the many 

reported charges against Khrushchev at his “trial” by the CPSU 

Central Committee included his personal mishandling of the 

Sino-Soviet dispute, the total failure of his agriculture polices, and 

the fostering of a personality cult. The analysis also indicated that 

an immediate reason for Khrushchev’s ouster was the fallout from 

his continued mishandling of German affairs during the period 

1963 and 1964 and the plans he had for a plenum he had called 

for November 1964. Despite his removal, however, Soviet–West 

German policy, problems with East European allies, and internal 

problems raised during the final two years of Khrushchev’s tenure 

did not change fundamentally until later in the decade.

chapter VI

Turmoil in the Soviet Sphere (1962–1968)

43 The treaty was ratified in September 1964. Moscow had settled for a Friendship and Mutual Assistance Treaty as a panacea for East Germany in place of the unattainable Peace Treaty in June 

1964, about four months prior to Khrushchev’s ouster. The treaty was ratified in September 1964.
CIA ANALYSIS OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES : THE IMPORTANCE OF CLANDESTINE REPORTING

30

The Brezhnev-Kosygin Team 

Following the selection of Brezhnev as general secretary and 

Kosygin as premier to succeed Khrushchev in 1964, CIA 

analysts characterized the new “collective” leadership as cautious 

and conservative, one consumed by internal debates and political 

maneuvering to consolidate their positions. Astutely and in 

contrast to his predecessor, Brezhnev relied on the military for 

advice on strategic defense policy issues. His policies emphasized 

persistent international dangers, such as the 1966 US military 

expansion in Vietnam. He backed the military on the utility 

of conventional forces and supported increasing the strategic 

forces. He defended the interests of the military by buttressing 

investment in heavy industry and the defense sector of the Soviet 

economy. In contrast, apparently out of optimism on long-term 

international trends, Kosygin pursued policies that the military 

leadership opposed. He supported arms control talks, increased 

trade with the West, and more investment in agriculture and 

non-military industry. 

Managing the Warsaw Pact 

In 1966, Brezhnev moved to reorganize the military of the 

Warsaw Pact by focusing on the 1955 Statute of Unified 

Command and the creation of new military institutions. The 

NSWP members, however, had resisted agreeing to the full set 

of statutes because they granted the Soviets virtual control over 

the NSWP forces.

The Political Consultative Committee (PCC) of the Warsaw 

Pact continued to work on the Statutes to the Warsaw Pact 

Treaty. At a meeting in Budapest in March 1969, all member 

states except Romania adopted four statutes. The statutes 

established the Unified Armed Forces and Unified Command 

of the Warsaw Pact for Peace Time, the Committee of Defense 

Ministers, the Military Council, and the Unified Air Defense 

System, as well as the Staff and Technical Committee of the 

Combined Armed Forces. However, the members failed to agree 

on a Statute of Unified Command of the Warsaw Pact for War 

Time and did not announce the content or implementation 

of the statutes. In the mid-1970s, a well-placed clandestine 

source provided information about the content, approval, and 

ratification of the statutes.

The Soviets’ difficulties with managing their Warsaw Pact 

allies notwithstanding, by the end of the 1960s CIA analysts 

retrospectively assessed that Brezhnev could look at the foreign 

policy of his first years as a success. The Soviet leadership kept 

large, well-equipped forces in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East 

Germany. It also maintained its alliance with the East Europeans, 

whose territories and forces buffered the Soviet Union from 

NATO. Both achievements protected Soviet vital interests.

Intelligence Sources and Analysis 

The early years of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime coincided 

with one of the driest periods for clandestinely obtained Soviet 

military information. From Penkovskiy’s apprehension in 1962 

until the Soviet-Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 

1968, the IC lacked any important clandestine sources of Soviet 

military information. As events unfolded, some classified Soviet 

military documents from Penkovskiy that indicated doctrinal 

changes provided the basis for understanding the rationale for 

changes in doctrine and forces revealed in the open press and 

by other intelligence sources. For example, satellite photography 

supplied information about the quantity and quality of Soviet 

forces that was consistent with Penkovskiy’s reporting and 

ultimately improved the IC’s military estimates.

Even so, intelligence collection and analysis during the 1960s 

suffered from a number of shortcomings. The IC did not know 

at the beginning of the decade how the Soviets would conduct 

war with the West, how well they were prepared for such a war, 

how well their divisions were manned and equipped, how well 

their rear services transportation capabilities matched wartime 

requirements, and how well their supplies of war materiel 

matched their perceptions of the requirements of war with 

NATO. Moreover, while the Penkovskiy documents provided 

significant insights into Soviet thinking about operations and 

mobilization, they neither revealed contingency plans for war 

with NATO nor supplied a sufficient guide for the changes 

in the military organization and planning of the Warsaw Pact 

coincident with Brezhnev’s initiatives.

Other clandestine information, however, did corroborate 

circumstantial or less comprehensive information about the 

organization and operation of forces in the war planning of the 

Warsaw Pact. The new information greatly clarified, for example, 

the changed roles of NSWP forces in these plans. Finished 

intelligence produced in 1968 was based on this information. 

Still, the Penkovskiy documents provided the broader theoretical 

basis for extrapolating from a basic war plan of the Warsaw Pact 

against NATO to conditions different from those assumed in 

that plan. When the Czech crisis was peaking in August 1968, 

analytical breakthroughs at the time and some excellent analysis 

and material from FBIS laid the foundation for concluding that 

the Soviets were preparing a force to invade Czechoslovakia 

that was larger than any amassed theretofore in peacetime. The 

Soviet and other Warsaw Pact nations’ gross violation of Czech 

sovereignty followed.

After the invasion of Czechoslovakia, excellent military sources 

virtually flooded out of Warsaw Pact countries, and the CIA 

clandestine service recruited many of them. Dissatisfaction with 

the communist regimes controlling the Pact countries inspired 

these sources to work for the West. Some were extraordinarily 
CIA ANALYSIS OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES : THE IMPORTANCE OF CLANDESTINE REPORTING

31

well placed. The most important was Col. Ryszard Kuklinski of 

the Polish General Staff, who began his plans to work with the 

United States at about this time and ultimately established contact 

in 1972. Kuklinski and other sources provided information 

on the Warsaw Pact that corroborated and expanded upon 

Penkovskiy’s reporting. The new information, when combined 

with Western observations of the Group of Soviet Forces in 

East Germany (GSFG) and the more theoretical and predictive 

military discussions in special editions of Military Thought 

between 1960 and 1962, allowed analysts to extrapolate from 

the documentary materials of the early 1960s to the status of 

the Warsaw Pact forces and doctrine in late 1960s and beyond.

31

Key Statements on Sovereignty 

and Communist Independence*

Soviet-Yugoslav Declaration (Pravda, 3 

June 1955) “The two governments decided 

to proceed from the following principles: 

Respect for sovereignty, independence, 

integrity, and equality among states in mutual 

relations and relations with other countries...

Adherence to the principle of mutual respect 

and noninterference in internal affairs for 

any reason whatsoever, be it for economic, 

political, or ideological nature, since questions 

of international order, of different social 

systems, and different forms of development 

of socialism are the exclusive business of the 

peoples of the respective countries.”

General Secretary Brezhnev (Pravda, 13 

November 1968): “It is known, comrades, 

that there are common laws governing socialist 

construction, a deviation from which might 

lead to a deviation from socialism as such. And 

when the internal and external forces hostile 

to socialism seek to reverse the development of 

any socialist country toward the restoration of 

the capitalist order, when a threat to the cause 

of socialism in that country emerges, a threat 

to the security of the socialist community as 

a whole exists; this is no longer a problem of 

the people of that country but also a common 

problem, a concern for all socialist states.

“It goes without saying that such an action 

as military aid to a fraternal country to cut 

short a threat to the socialist order is an 

extraordinary enforced step; it can be sparked 

off only by direct actions of the enemies of 

socialism inside the country and beyond its 

boundaries, actions creating a threat to the 

common interest of the camp of socialism.”

Soviet-Yugoslav Joint Declarations (Pravda, 

19 March 1988): “The USSR and SFRY 

underscore the historical role and abiding 

value of the universal principles contained 

in the Belgrade (1955) and Moscow (1956) 

declarations, and in particular: mutual respect 

for independence, sovereignty, and territorial 

integrity, equality, and impermissibility of 

interference in internal affairs under any 

pretext whatever...

“The USSR and SFRY confirm their 

commitment to the policy of peace and 

independence of peoples and countries, to 

their equal rights and the equal security of 

all countries irrespective of their size and 

potential, sociopolitical system. The ideas 

by which they are guided and the forms and 

character of their associations with other 

states, or their geographical position...

“The sides attach special significance to 

the strict observance of the UN Charter, 

the Helsinki Final Act, other fundamental 

international legal documents prohibiting 

aggression, the violation of borders, the seizure 

of other countries’ territories, all forms of the 

threat or use of force, and interference in other 

countries’ internal affairs on whatever pretext.”

The “Brezhnev Doctrine”

Brezhnev, at a July 1968 meeting with the 

Czech leadership, claimed a common Warsaw 

Pact responsibility for Czech defense. After 

the invasion the Soviets issued a proclamation 

known as the “Brezhnev Doctrine” that 

claimed Moscow’s right to intervene when, 

in its opinion, “socialism” in any country of 

its “commonwealth” might be in danger (See 

Brezhnev in Pravda, 13 November 

1968 above)

The following two documents were released at 

the end of the Cold War.

At a 24 July 1968 meeting in Budapest 

the Soviets told the Hungarians to begin 

preparations to invade Czechoslovakia. 

This was revealed in a memorandum of a 

conversation between Hungarian and Soviet 

military officials on the state of the final 

military planning for the invasion–codenamed Operation Danube.**

On 17 August 1968 at the conclusion of 

a three-day meeting, the Soviet Politburo 

decided to intervene in Czechoslovakia with 

military force and unanimously approved a 

resolution to that end. The invasion took place 

20/21 August 1968. The Resolution and 

attachments were released at the end of the 

Cold War.***

* See “Gorbachev Renounces Brezhnev Doctrine during Yugoslav 

Visit,” FBIS Trends, 6 April 1988 pages 11-1

** In 1968 CIA analysts did not know about the July 1968 meeting. 

The information was not revealed until after the end of the Cold War, 

reported in Mastny and Byrne, A Cardboard Castle, xxxii. 

*** For text of the memorandum, see Document No. 62 in The Prague 

Spring ’68, National Security Archive Documents Reader, compiled 

and edited by Jaromir Navratil, The Prague Spring Foundation, 

(Budapest: Central European University Press, 1998). Ibid. For text of 

the resolution and accompanying documents, see Document No. 88

31

33

Soviet-Warsaw Pact Developments and MBFR

Throughout the 1960s and into the 1980s, the decisiveness of 

strategic nuclear weapons was undisputed among Soviet military 

theorists. However, by the late 1960s and early 1970s discussions 

relating to the evolution of military doctrine elaborated on the 

increased probability that nuclear weapons would not be used in 

the initial or even later stages of a war with NATO in Europe. 

As new doctrine for conventional war evolved, so did demands 

for qualitative and quantitative changes for new weapons and 

forces in Europe. Nonetheless, the Soviets were constrained by 

the costs of building new divisions and armies opposite China, 

investing heavily in strategic weapons and the Navy, and trying to 

manage a floundering economy. In this context, even more than 

in the 1960s, the NSWP forces were an increasingly important 

component of the force opposite NATO in the central region of 

Europe. As the Soviets strove to meet all their perceived requirements, they demanded their reluctant allies participate more in 

the increased defense efforts. During this period the records of 

Soviet successes and failures prodding their Warsaw Pact allies 

to invest more in the military were often chronicled in clandestine services’ disseminated intelligence information reports. Less 

precise reflections of the resulting strains appeared in various 

open sources.

The Soviets expanded and reequipped their ground forces to 

address the problems posed by a strategy to fight a war only 

with conventional weapons. They added tanks to the divisional 

structure, expanded artillery units and outfitted them with selfpropelled weapons, and deployed new antiaircraft and antitank 

systems. They also expanded rear echelon support units. Finally, 

they developed new operational doctrine and established the 

Operational Maneuver Group as an important form of organization within plans for war in Europe. Clandestinely acquired 

writings exposed the thinking behind these changes and foretold 

much of what was to come.

By the 1970s, the Soviets also reacted to the potentially crippling 

impact of NATO airpower on Soviet ability to execute their war 

plan.44 Soviet classified military theoretical journals and defector reports illustrated how the devastating effect of the Israeli 

Air Force in the 1967 Middle East War and the dominance of 

US tactical airpower in Vietnam seriously influenced Soviet 

military leaders. In response, the Soviets started developing new 

operational-strategic doctrine, strategy, and plans for massive air 

operations in Europe at the outset of hostilities. In the 1970s, 

they began to deploy more capable tactical aircraft that partially 

remedied the existing shortcomings in range, payload, and allweather capability.

Managing the Warsaw Pact

The Warsaw Pact opened the 1980s with almost every member 

having “approved” virtually all of the Warsaw Treaty Statutes 

and having established new institutions to manage the alliance. Only Romania had not signed and ratified the statutes on 

21 March 1978, and only the Statute on Unified Command 

for War Time had not been endorsed. The Pact, again minus 

Romania, finally approved, signed, and ratified that statute on 

18 March 1980. Nonetheless, Soviet control of the alliance’s 

forces continued to be a problem. 

The authors of NIE 12/11-83 judged that, in Soviet eyes, the 

participation of East European forces would be crucial to success 

in a war with NATO in Europe. They noted the Soviets had taken a number of political and military actions to ensure cooperation but did not entirely control the effectiveness of these actions 

chapter VII

Clandestine Reporting and the Analysis and Estimates 

of the Warsaw Pact (1970–1985)

44 As reported in Chapters I and II, the Soviets, under Khrushchev, dramatically reduced the size of their tactical aviation forces in the late 1950s and early 1960s. At that time, Khrushchev and 

his military supporters expressed little interest in traditional massive land forces and associated aviation. They posited nuclear-armed missiles and long-range bombers as the decisive weapons of 

modern conflict. They reduced the light or tactical bomber force, for example, to about one-sixth of its former size. Other tactical aviation also suffered considerable decrements.
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and remained concerned. The authors acknowledged they had 

no concrete evidence on the reliability of the East European forces. For the most part, they based their judgments on perceptions 

of the probable views of the NSWP countries, observations of 

precautionary actions by these countries, and estimates of probable behavior of NSWP forces under various circumstances.

Throughout this period the Soviets faced a persistent problem. 

They had to balance the policy of détente and the need for economic reform in the USSR and the NSWP member countries 

on the one hand against the political unrest in Eastern Europe 

and the need to maintain Warsaw Pact security on the other. 

The Soviets remained apprehensive about Romania’s wayward 

course and its potential to contaminate the other members of 

the Warsaw Pact. Trouble was brewing again in Poland by the 

mid-1970s, and warming relations between East and West 

Germany posed potential problems for the Soviet Union. The 

Sino-Soviet dispute continued, and the Soviet puppet government in Afghanistan was failing. While the 1970s had begun 

with successful completion of the ABM Treaty and the SALT 

I agreement, the Soviet arms control agenda started to unravel 

a few years later. First, the United States cancelled the SALT II 

negotiations, and the policy of détente went belly up as the international community denounced Soviet military intervention 

in Afghanistan. Moreover, in 1979, the US administration, with 

concurrence of its NATO allies, moved to begin deployment of 

intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe by 1983 to deter 

or protect against potential Soviet nuclear attack.

Intelligence Sources and Analysis

In the years following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the 

quantity and fullness of clandestinely obtained information about 

the Warsaw Pact military establishments increased at unprecedented rates. These new streams of reporting enabled analysts to 

develop assessments about the extent of cooperation among the 

Warsaw Pact members and the level of their future investment in 

military equipment. The Warsaw Pact war plans became clearer 

through the mosaic of evidence gleaned bit by bit from the wealth 

of classified documents clandestinely obtained from several of the 

Warsaw Pact members. Collection of technical intelligence blossomed as well, yielding a true bonanza for analysis and ultimately 

for all defense-related policymakers in the US government. CIA 

produced new assessments of Pact forces’ readiness, logistical capabilities, mobilization and reinforcement capabilities, peacetime 

and wartime postures, and plans for wartime employment. The 

IC in general, especially DIA, also made good use of the mass of 

evidence from the clandestine efforts. Many of the more important CIA analytic publications are represented in the Catalogue 

of Documents.

The classified theoretical articles often betrayed misgivings—

carefully—about the contemporary doctrine and strategy for 

Soviet forces. Other documents—field service manuals and General Staff Academy manuals and lectures—thoroughly described 

extant operational and tactical doctrine. Another group of documents describing and critiquing major exercises provided insight 

into the practical application of strategy and doctrine. The quantity and quality of all of these documents available from the end of 

the 1960s to 1985 provided the firmest basis yet for analysis and 

estimating Warsaw Pact military capabilities. 

In the 1960s, much of the added impetus for producing more and 

better intelligence on the Warsaw Pact forces came from the Secretary of Defense, while in the early 1970s it came initially from 

National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and his staff. In the 

1960s the IC had reached a consensus about the size of the Warsaw Pact ground forces in terms of divisions and their equipment. 

There was not, however, enough known about above-division 

support, especially service support, to provide the basis for much 

more than gross extrapolations. In the 1970s the improved technical intelligence collection efforts yielded evidence of organizational and equipment changes in the deployed forces at all echelons 

as well as in production of new armaments. Those efforts and 

clandestine reporting of change in Soviet military thinking and 

of the demands being made by the Soviet leadership in Warsaw 

Pact councils provided a broader and firmer basis for assessing the 

rising conventional threat to NATO. Clandestine reporting provided a confident basis for new force readiness studies clearly more 

relevant than previously possible.

Through clandestine reporting, CIA military analysts were able 

to piece together the main elements of Soviet planning for a major air operation at the outset of hostilities with NATO. Classified military journals indicated Soviet military thinkers were on 

a quest for change in concepts for theater air operations as they 

sought to evaluate the full significance of the successes of the 

Israeli and US theater air operations. Later in the decade more 

evidence became available indicating which changes were actually 

incorporated in Soviet theater warfare doctrine for air operations. 

Previously, the Soviets had mainly viewed their tactical air forces 

as supporting the ground forces and delivering nuclear weapons. 

Consistent with long-held doctrinal views, the generally limited 

range and payloads of Soviet tactical aircraft as of 1970 restricted 

their usefulness to areas relatively close to the battlefront. Operations to the depth of the theater were the preserve of the missile 

forces and Long-Range Aviation, a strategic arm of the air forces 

analogous to the US Strategic Air Command (SAC).

Soviet classified writings reflected an evolution in military thinking that ended in a consensus about how to conduct initial air 

operations in the European theater, with the concept of a major 

theater-wide strategic air operation involving all theater aviation. 

The new strategy called for tactical aviation and strategic bombers to carry out missions massively at the outset of hostilities that 

were designed to achieve early air supremacy. The strategy emphasized the importance of such an operation in nonnuclear warfare 

when the Soviets saw their missiles, with limited payload and 

accuracy, to be of little value beyond the immediate battle area. 

Soviet aviation theorists also saw achievement of air supremacy 
CIA ANALYSIS OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES : THE IMPORTANCE OF CLANDESTINE REPORTING

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in the initial stage of conflict as essential for the success of the 

ground operations.

CIA analysis based on Soviet classified writings and subsequent 

information described an intellectual ferment. The writings of air 

operations theorists suggested a certain sense of desperation inherent in the Soviet Air Operation Plan. In contrast, articles by 

Soviet ground forces officers reflected a confidence that NATO 

air forces would not make a critical difference in the outcome of a 

war in Europe. The latter view might have resulted from hubris or 

merely reflected the long-held primacy of ground forces doctrine 

in Soviet military thinking. For whatever reason, Soviet air forces, 

including Long-Range Aviation, were reorganized during the period 1978–81.

During approximately the same time period, the US national 

security establishment had added conventional arms control—

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR)—to interests 

that required more of the IC than ever before. Policymakers demanded assessments of actual quantities of signature component 

parts of the forces, not extrapolated estimates. And they wanted 

more definitive assessments of the qualitative aspects of forces 

such as training, support, and materiel stocks. Interest in enhancing NATO defenses was also building. Some of the intelligence 

collection and analysis produced in support of the MBFR effort 

in effect overturned old assumptions about the Warsaw Pact 

forces, revealing opportunities for improving NATO defenses. 

Although there was political and military resistance among the 

Western allies to the changed appraisals of the balance between 

NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces, the IC’s increasingly refined data and estimates during the 1970s provided 

the foundation for major changes in the defense posture of the 

United States and NATO allies. In particular, these new estimates formed a basis for influencing NATO efforts toward more 

secure defenses against the Warsaw Pact massed tank forces. 

The changes in NATO equipment, force posture and mobilization capabilities resonated with the Soviet military leadership and 

had repercussions for the future, as foretold in clandestinely obtained classified reporting. 

In the course of preparing the basic data for MBFR negotiating 

positions, the NSC aggregated data on NATO from the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff ( JCS) and on the Warsaw Pact forces from CIA 

and DIA and compared the two forces under several scenarios. 

These efforts exposed shortcomings in information the IC had 

not yet resolved. High-resolution satellite imagery was a great 

advancement, especially for revealing the extent of deployed forces 

and the technical characteristics (mensuration, etc.) of many 

weapons systems, but it did not provide the kind of evidence needed to support the more refined estimates required by the MBFR 

effort. New clandestine sources in the 1970s, by contrast, did yield 

a breakthrough in such evidence. 

The wealth of material provided by clandestine sources, especially 

Colonel Kuklinski, provided other insights. It formed the basis 

of new judgments about the logistical capabilities to support the 

Pact’s ambitious war plans. Shortfalls in training and readiness 

of Warsaw Pact forces became evident. The evidence also illustrated the differences in quality among the Warsaw Pact forces. 

The analysis of this evidence was reflected in numerous formal 

CIA publications and in unpublished replies to requests by the 

NSC staff, samples of which 

are reproduced in this study. 

That same evidence informed 

the production of other component agencies of the IC. 

Intelligence studies produced 

during the decade, based 

on the increasing quantity 

and quality of the collected 

evidence, reflected a growing 

analytic sophistication and a 

more comprehensive understanding of the Warsaw Pact 

forces building finally to the 

watershed 1979 National Intelligence Estimate: Warsaw 

Pact Forces Opposite NATO

(NIE 11-14-79). The DO 

disseminated a virtual blizzard of reports during the period 1973–85, including more 

than 100 just on Warsaw 

Pact exercises. The reports 

also contained more than 60 

documents, manuals, or lecture notes from the USSR 

General Staff Academy and 

other higher military academies. Summaries of these 

documents are located in the 

Catalogue of Documents.
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Following is an excerpt from Chapter 4 of How Much is Enough? 

by Alain C. Enthoven. 

For the complete chapter see How Much is Enough? contained in the attached DVD.

© 1971, Alain C. Enthoven, K. Wayne Smith; 2005, Rand Corporation. 

Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved.
CIA ANALYSIS OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES : THE IMPORTANCE OF CLANDESTINE REPORTING

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This is an excerpt from Chapter 4 of How Much is Enough? by Alain C. Enthoven.

For the complete chapter see How Much is Enough? contained in the attached DVD.
CIA ANALYSIS OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES : THE IMPORTANCE OF CLANDESTINE REPORTING

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How Much is Enough? Chapter 4 – NATO Strategy and Forces, pg. 132–156
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How Much is Enough? Chapter 4 – NATO Strategy and Forces, pg. 132–156
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How Much is Enough? Chapter 4 – NATO Strategy and Forces, pg. 132–156
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How Much is Enough? Chapter 4 – NATO Strategy and Forces, pg. 132–156
CIA ANALYSIS OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES : THE IMPORTANCE OF CLANDESTINE REPORTING

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How Much is Enough? Chapter 4 – NATO Strategy and Forces, pg. 132–156
CIA ANALYSIS OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES : THE IMPORTANCE OF CLANDESTINE REPORTING

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How Much is Enough? Chapter 4 – NATO Strategy and Forces, pg. 132–156
CIA ANALYSIS OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES : THE IMPORTANCE OF CLANDESTINE REPORTING

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How Much is Enough? Chapter 4 – NATO Strategy and Forces, pg. 132–156
CIA ANALYSIS OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES : THE IMPORTANCE OF CLANDESTINE REPORTING

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How Much is Enough? Chapter 4 – NATO Strategy and Forces, pg. 132–156
CIA ANALYSIS OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES : THE IMPORTANCE OF CLANDESTINE REPORTING

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How Much is Enough? Chapter 4 – NATO Strategy and Forces, pg. 132–156
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How Much is Enough? Chapter 4 – NATO Strategy and Forces, pg. 132–156
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How Much is Enough? Chapter 4 – NATO Strategy and Forces, pg. 132–156
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How Much is Enough? Chapter 4 – NATO Strategy and Forces, pg. 132–156
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How Much is Enough? Chapter 4 – NATO Strategy and Forces, pg. 132–156
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How Much is Enough? Chapter 4 – NATO Strategy and Forces, pg. 132–156
CIA ANALYSIS OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES : THE IMPORTANCE OF CLANDESTINE REPORTING

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This is an excerpt from Chapter 4 of How Much is Enough? by Alain C. Enthoven. 

© 1971, Alain C. Enthoven, K. Wayne Smith; 2005, Rand Corporation. 

Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved.

How Much is Enough? Chapter 4 – NATO Strategy and Forces, pg. 132–156
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Acknowledgments

The CIA Historical Collections Division gratefully acknowledges the following 

for their courtesy and assistance in providing material for this collection:

National Security Agency for their thorough review and assistance toward 

the declassification of documents for this study.

Defense Intelligence Agency for the assistance of (DIA) officers who searched 

their archives for CIA reports not found in CIA archives.

National Geospatial Intelligence Agency for their thorough review and 

assistance toward the declassification of documents for this study.

Alain C. Enthoven for granting permission to include in this study, the 

chapter on “NATO Strategy and Forces” from his book – How Much Is 

Enough: Shaping the Defense Program, 1961–1969.

We note the critical contribution to this project by the late James (Les) 

Griggs (Colonel, US ARMY, Retired) who brought his deep knowledge of 

the Warsaw Pact military to bear in evaluating and preparing for release the 

complex documents in this study.

CIA’s Imaging and Publishing Support (IPS) graphic artists 

John Bassett, Robert Karyshyn, and Mary Alexander.

Principal Contributors

A special thank you to those who searched for, located, reviewed and redacted 

more than 1,000 classified documents for the study:

John C. Guzzardo 

James H. Noren 

Anthony Williams

Terry A. Bender

and the two persons who initiated the project more than ten years ago:

Michael J. Sulick former Deputy Director of Operations 

Herbert O. Briick former Chief of the Information and Review Group, IMS

Agency Disclaimer

All statements of facts, opinion, and analysis expressed in this booklet are those of the authors. They do not necessarily 

reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present. 

Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of an article’s 

statements or interpretations. 
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Col Oleg Penkovskiy (top); Col Ryszard Kuklinski(middle right), Col Kuklinski assisting Minister of Defense of the Soviet Union 

signing the Wartime Statutes of the Warsaw Pact in 1979.(lower left); Maj (later Lt Col) Pyotr Popov (lower right)
CIA ANALYSIS OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES : THE IMPORTANCE OF CLANDESTINE REPORTING

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CIA ANALYSIS OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES : THE IMPORTANCE OF CLANDESTINE REPORTING

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The Historical Collections Division (HCD) of CIA’s 

Information Management Services is responsible for 

executing the Agency’s Historical Review Program. 

This program seeks to identify and declassify 

collections of documents that detail the Agency’s 

analysis and activities relating to historically significant 

topics and events. HCD’s goals include increasing 

the usability and accessibility of historical collections. 

HCD also develops release events and partnerships to 

highlight each collection and make it available to the 

broadest audience possible. 

The mission of HCD is to: 

Promote an accurate, objective understanding of 

the information and intelligence that has helped 

shape major US foreign policy decisions.

Broaden access to lessons-learned, presenting 

historical material that gives greater understanding 

to the scope and context of past actions.

Improve current decision-making and analysis by 

facilitating reflection on the impacts and effects 

arising from past foreign policy decisions.

Showcase CIA’s contributions to national security 

and provide the American public with valuable 

insight into the workings of its government.

Demonstrate the CIA’s commitment to the Open 

Government Initiative and its three core values: 

Transparency, Participation, and Collaboration.

The mission of the National War College is to 

educate future leaders of the Armed Forces, State 

Department, and other civilian agencies for highlevel policy, command, and staff responsibilities by 

conducting a senior-level course of study in national 

security strategy. 

The National War College (NWC) provides a singlephase Joint Professional Military Education ( JPME) 

program for mid-career US military officers, civilian 

US government officials, and foreign military officers. 

We achieve our mission by offering a professional, 

rigorous, multi-disciplinary curriculum emphasizing 

active-learning and immersion in a joint environment. 

This joint experience is further enriched by the 

inclusion of interagency and multinational partners 

in all aspects of the program. The NWC program 

is accredited by the Middle States Commission 

on Higher Education, and qualified graduates are 

awarded a Masters of National Security Strategy. 
✯

✯

CIA ANALYSIS OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES : THE IMPORTANCE OF CLANDESTINE REPORTING 

Table of Contents 

Essay One 

CIA Analysis of the Warsaw Pact Forces: The Importance of Clandestine Reporting i

Table of Contents ii

Scope Note 1

Introduction 2

Frequently Used Acronyms 3

The Warsaw Treaty 4

The Statute of Unified Command 6

Chapter I: Early Khrushchev Period (1955–60) 9

Organizing and Managing the Warsaw Pact 10

Intelligence Sources and Analysis in the Early Years 11

Chapter II: The Berlin Crisis – Col. Oleg Penkovskiy and 

Warsaw Pact Preparations for Associated Military Operations (1958–61) 13

Intelligence Sources and Analysis 14

Chapter III: Soviet Debate on Military Doctrine and Strategy:

The Contribution of Clandestine Source, Col. Oleg Penkovskiy (1955–64) 17

USSR Developments and the Warsaw Pact 17

Intelligence Sources and Analysis 18

Chapter IV: New Insights into the Warsaw Pact Forces and Doctrine –

The Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) 21

Khrushchev’s Gamble Provides an Intelligence Bonanza 21

Intelligence Sources and Analysis 21

Chapter V: New Estimates of the Soviet Ground Forces (1963–68) 25

Defining the Problem 25

Revising the Estimates of the Strength of Soviet – Warsaw Pact Forces 25

Clarifying the Estimate of Capabilities and Mobilization of Soviet – Warsaw Pact Forces 27

Chapter VI: Turmoil in the Soviet Sphere (1962–68) 29

The Demise of Khrushchev 29

The Brezhnev-Kosygin Team 30

Managing the Warsaw Pact 30

Intelligence Sources and Analysis 30

Chapter VII: Clandestine Reporting and the Analysis and Estimates (1970–85) 33

Soviet-Warsaw Pact Developments and MBFR 33

Managing the Warsaw Pact 33

Intelligence Sources and Analysis 34

Essay Two 

How Much is Enough? by Alain C. Enthoven 36
The Historical Review Program, part of the CIA Information Management Services, 

identifies, collects, and produces historically relevant collections of declassified documents.

These collections, centered on a theme or event, are joined with supporting analysis, essays, 

video, audio, and photographs, and showcased in a booklet plus DVD, and made available 

to historians, scholars, and the public.

All of our Historical Collections are available on the CIA Library Publication page located 

at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/historical-collection-publications/ or contact 

us at HistoricalCollections@UCIA.gov.

The Warsaw Pact contingency plan for war with NATO in the Central Region of Europe – as 

revised by the Soviets in the early 1960s – assigns the initial offensive missions to the forces 

already deployed in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. In addition, it gives both the 

Czechs and Poles command over their own national forces. After the initial objectives have been 

gained, Soviet forces in the western USSR would move quickly into the Central Region and 

take over the offensive against NATO. 

Under the previous plan, the initial offensive would have been conducted mainly by Soviet 

forces, including those based in the western USSR, with the East European forces integrated 

into Soviet-led Fronts. This concept, to be effective, required a high level of combat readiness 

for the Soviet forces in the western USSR. The reduction of Soviet ground force strength in the 

early 1960’s probably made this plan infeasible and stimulated concurrent improvements in the 

East European ground forces to permit them to assume greater responsibilities.

Warsaw Pact War Plan 

for Central Region 

of Europe

Summary 

Intelligence Memorandum 

Directorate of Intelligence 

18 June 1968