Office of Inspector General

Audit Report

FAA HAS MADE PROGRESS FIELDING 

ERAM, BUT CRITICAL WORK ON COMPLEX 

SITES AND KEY CAPABILITIES REMAINS 

Federal Aviation Administration

Report Number: AV-2013-119

Date Issued: August 15, 2013
U.S. Department of

Memorandum

Transportation

Office of the Secretary

of Transportation

Office of Inspector General

Subject: ACTION: FAA Has Made Progress Fielding 

ERAM, but Critical Work on Complex Sites and 

Key Capabilities Remains

Federal Aviation Administration

Report No. AV-2013-119

Date: August 15, 2013

From: Jeffrey B. Guzzetti

Assistant Inspector General 

 for Aviation Audits

Reply to 

Attn. of: JA-10

To: Federal Aviation Administrator

The Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) efforts to modernize the National 

Airspace System depend on the successful implementation of the foundational En 

Route Automation Modernization (ERAM) system—a multibillion dollar system

for processing flight data at facilities that manage high-altitude traffic. However, 

we reported in September 20121 that extensive software-related problems have 

significantly delayed ERAM’s nationwide implementation, resulting in hundreds 

of millions of dollars in increased costs. Our report highlighted a number of 

fundamental weaknesses with program and contract management that had 

contributed to ERAM’s delays, and we made a series of recommendations to 

reduce risk with further implementation. FAA concurred or partially concurred 

with all our recommendations and is currently working to address them. 

Following our report, and given the importance of ERAM’s role in transitioning to 

the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen), the House Committee 

on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Transportation, Housing, and Urban 

Development and Related Agencies, requested that our office continue monitoring 

ERAM’s progress. Accordingly, our objectives were to (1) provide an update on 

FAA’s progress in implementing ERAM, and (2) identify key issues that could 

delay the program and impact NextGen initiatives. We briefed the Committee on 

the results of our work on April 18, 2013 (see exhibit D). We conducted our work 

 1 Weaknesses in Program and Contract Management Contribute to ERAM Delays and Put Other NextGen Initiatives at 

Risk (OIG Report Number AV-2012-179), September 13, 2012. OIG reports are available on our Web site at 

http://www.oig.dot.gov/. 
2

prior to the sequestration resulting from the Budget Control Act of 20112 and 

therefore did not assess its impact on the ERAM program.

3

We conducted this follow-up audit work in accordance with generally accepted 

Government auditing standards. Exhibit A details our scope and methodology. 

RESULTS IN BRIEF

FAA made considerable progress deploying ERAM. The Agency is currently 

using ERAM at 16 sites either on a full- or part-time basis—a significant step 

given the extensive problems FAA encountered at the first two ERAM sites. FAA 

plans to have ERAM fully operational at all 20 sites and decommission the legacy 

system4 by August 2014. However, as FAA deploys ERAM to the Nation’s 

busiest facilities, such as New York and Washington, DC, the Agency expects to 

identify new software-related problems that could impact the program’s cost and 

schedule. FAA is currently spending about $12 million a month just on the 

Facilities and Equipment (F&E) portion of the ERAM contract. As of February 

2013, the Agency had spent approximately 65 percent of the available funding for 

the program with 9 sites still remaining to be completed. If the current contract 

spending rate does not decline significantly, the Agency will need additional

funding to complete the program as planned. 

While FAA’s progress with ERAM deployment is noteworthy, the Agency faces 

multiple challenges that could delay the program. For example, air traffic 

controllers who are working as ERAM subject matter experts raised concerns that

FAA has become too schedule driven and is rushing to complete implementation 

before site-specific issues are adequately addressed. In addition, controllers told us

that they have raised concerns with FAA senior management that the amount of

software allotted in the program baseline will not be sufficient to fix unresolved

issues and successfully complete the program. Our discussions with controllers 

and subject matter experts also identified other issues with current ERAM 

capabilities that are required to enable key NextGen initiatives. For example, these 

officials raised concerns about ERAM’s tracker software, which is needed to 

combine radar- and satellite-based data to more accurately show aircraft 

location—a key requirement for future NextGen capabilities. Collectively, these 

concerns point to the need for continued oversight of the program by FAA 

management. 

 2 P.L.112-25 (Aug.2, 2011). 3 Due to sequestration, which began on March 1, 2013, FAA incurred a $637 million dollar reduction in funding for the 

remainder of fiscal year 2013.

4 HOST, the legacy en route automation system that ERAM intends to replace, has been in place at facilities since the 

1970’s.
3

BACKGROUND

ERAM is a key NextGen-enabling program for processing high-altitude air traffic5

flight information. It replaces HOST, the legacy en route automation system, 

which consists of a 40-year-old computer hardware and software system, plus a 

backup, and more than 800 computer display workstations at 20 of FAA’s Air 

Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCCs).6 As a foundational component of 

NextGen, ERAM is critical for meeting FAA’s goals of increasing airspace 

capacity and reducing flight delays. Without ERAM, the key benefits from new 

NextGen systems—such as satellite-based surveillance systems and data 

communications for controllers and pilots—cannot be realized.

FAA originally planned to complete ERAM deployment at all 20 sites by 

December 2010. However, significant software problems identified early on at the 

program’s first two sites impacted the system’s ability to safely manage and 

separate aircraft and raised questions as to what capabilities ERAM would 

ultimately deliver. In June 2011, FAA rebaselined ERAM, pushing its expected 

completion to 2014 and increasing costs by an additional $330 million.

Our September 2012 report highlighted a number of fundamental program 

management weaknesses that contributed to FAA’s difficulties in advancing 

ERAM. These weaknesses included (1) setting an unrealistic schedule; 

(2) allowing ERAM to successfully pass Government Acceptance even though 

testing at the Agency’s Technical Center was limited and could not replicate actual 

field conditions; (3) ignoring early warning signs of trouble, such as an 

unexpectedly high number of problem reports; and (4) not committing enough

management attention to identify, communicate, and fix ERAM’s problems.

FAA MADE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS DEPLOYING ERAM, 

BUT FAA’S ABILITY TO MEET COST AND SCHEDULE GOALS 

REMAINS UNCERTAIN

FAA is making considerable progress with fielding ERAM and is currently using 

ERAM at 16 of the 20 sites either on a full- or part-time basis—11 of which are 

relying on ERAM to control all en route air traffic full time. FAA is currently 

moving ERAM to the most complex en route sites and plans to bring the 

remaining four sites that are still running on the legacy system to initial ERAM 

operations. However, the efforts required to achieve initial and continuous 

operations at early sites such as Salt Lake City or Seattle are significantly different 

from upcoming sites like New York, Washington DC, Atlanta, and Miami. Given 

the complexity of these remaining locations, such as special airspace concerns,

 5 En route airspace is high-altitude traffic typically above 10,000 feet, where aircraft reach their cruising altitudes and 

fly as direct a route as possible between their departure and destination points. 

6 ARTCCs, also referred to as en route centers or centers, control high-altitude air traffic nationwide. 
4

FAA may face unique challenges with site-specific software requirements that

could delay ERAM’s initial operations at these sites. Ultimately, FAA’s plans call

for all 20 sites to be fully operational with ERAM and for decommissioning7 and 

removing the HOST legacy system by August 2014.

While FAA’s progress in deploying ERAM is commendable, concerns remain that

the Agency will not be able to complete the program within its current cost and 

schedule goals. As the table below shows, FAA already expended approximately 

65 percent of its re-baselined budget and continues to spend nearly $12 million 

each month on the program, excluding other funding from NextGen programs and 

other sources. 

Table 1. ERAM Budget and Spending 

Total average ERAM contract monthly spending 

rate in CY 2012—F&E only

$12.4 million per month (includes 

only ERAM contract F&E)

Total average ERAM monthly spending rate in 

CY 2012—all sources

$21.2 million per month (includes 

F&E, O&M, and NextGen)8

Total F&E funding approved for the program $374 million (includes $330 million 

approved in 2011, plus another 

$44 million shifted from operations 

funding and other FAA accounts)

Total dollars spent on the program (as of 

February 2013)

$242 million (about 65 percent of 

the total approved)

Total dollars remaining in the approved budget

(as of February 2013) $132.1 million

Source: OIG analysis of FAA data.

As of February 2013, ERAM had only $132.1 million remaining in its approved 

budget—with 18 months of work remaining before its August 2014 schedule goal. 

However, ERAM’s average monthly spending rate is currently about $12 million

on the F&E portion of the contract alone. If costs continue and the program 

spending rate does not drop significantly, FAA will likely need additional funding 

to complete ERAM.

CONCERNS REMAIN THAT ERAM MAY NOT BE FULLY READY 

TO PROVIDE KEY NEXTGEN ENABLING CAPABILITIES

Although FAA is making progress in deploying ERAM, the Agency faces several 

significant challenges that could impact implementation. According to FAA 

 7 Decommissioning involves the disconnection, removal, and disposal of the HOST computer system once ERAM has 

been declared operationally ready at a site.

8 This amount includes $12.4 million of Facilities and Equipment (F&E) funding and $3.3 million of Operations and 

Maintenance (O&M) funding, and $5.5 million from other NextGen program (i.e., ADS-B, DataComm, and SWIM) for 

CY 2012. 
5

facility staff and National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) officials, 

FAA has become overly driven by the program schedule at the expense of 

developing needed and important requirements and enhancements. We found that 

the ERAM Program Office is aggressively managing all remaining ERAM 

software efforts—but focusing only on fixes to “core functionality” to get ERAM 

operational at the remaining sites. Under the program’s new limited focus, the 

Program Office has reclassified some previously identified requirements, such as 

flexible and dynamic airspace9

—which is needed for controllers to manage air 

traffic at some specific sites—as “enhancements” instead of requirements. 

Because FAA has prioritized core functionality fixes over all other 

“enhancements,” some important site-specific issues that controllers insist are 

needed are being deferred to future software releases due to cost concerns. 

Moreover, FAA subject matter experts working directly with the ERAM program 

office and air traffic controllers continue to raise concerns about some ERAM

capabilities that are foundational to other NextGen initiatives. While these issues 

are not expected to delay ERAM’s 2014 implementation, they will need to be 

addressed to advance NextGen and achieve important benefits. These capabilities 

include: 

● Flight Plan Trajectory Modeler—This is an ERAM capability that models 

aircraft flight paths and is used to predict conflicts between converging aircraft 

and ensure accurate aircraft “handoffs” between facilities. However, the 

modeler software often required adjustments to change the flight plan 

trajectory to ensure accurate handoffs. According to controllers, improvements 

are needed in order to support current operations and NextGen capabilities that 

use trajectory-based operations.10

● Aircraft Tracking and Sensor Fusion—This capability allows ERAM to 

integrate—or ‘fuse”—multiple radars and satellite-based information for 

controllers. However, thus far, controllers have not been able to take advantage 

of this improved capability because of technical issues with ERAM’s current 

tracking capability. A MITRE11 analysis found that the ERAM tracker will 

require adjustments to use the Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast 

system (ADS-B)12 and ground- based radar together to manage air traffic. Until 

these issues are addressed, it is unlikely FAA will be able to reduce separation 

between aircraft at high altitudes. 

 9 Flexible and dynamic airspace allows controllers to shift control of airspace segments to other controllers, based on 

weather and traffic pattern changes.

10 Trajectory-based operations focus on more precisely managing aircraft from departure to arrival, with the benefits of 

reduced fuel consumption, lower operating costs, and reduced emissions. 11 MITRE Corporation managers a Federally Funded Research and Development Center for the FAA—the Center for 

Advanced Aviation System Development—that assists FAA with scientific research and analysis. 12 ADS-B, one of NextGen’s transformational programs, is a satellite-based surveillance technology that combines the 

use of aircraft avionics and ground-based systems. 
6

Finally, FAA managers told us that ERAM efforts may likely be impacted further 

by budget adjustments resulting from sequestration. We did not independently 

analyze the impact of sequestration on the ERAM program in this review. 

However, according to FAA officials we interviewed, sequestration funding 

reductions will significantly impact ERAM implementation. Agency officials told 

us that FAA will continue to support the facilities that use ERAM on a full-time 

basis. However, the Program Office intends to halt activities for facilities that were 

working to transition from part-time use of ERAM to full-time operations. In 

addition, the Agency will not initiate efforts at the last four sites that are still using 

the HOST legacy system full-time to control air traffic and have not begun 

transitioning to ERAM. According to FAA, furloughs, the reduction of overtime

and limited travel funding will limit controllers’ ability to serve as subject matter 

experts and participate in workgroups that support ERAM implementation. 

CONCLUSION

FAA’s long-term goals for NextGen ultimately depend on the success of its 

ongoing efforts to deploy and fully implement ERAM. Though FAA made 

significant progress deploying ERAM, it is uncertain whether the program will 

stay within cost and on schedule. Challenges are expected as ERAM deployment 

continues at complex sites on the East coast. To better ensure ERAM progress and 

stakeholder buy-in, FAA will need to address ongoing concerns regarding system 

capabilities and fully determine the impact sequestration is having on the program.

Ultimately, continued management oversight will remain critical to meeting 

FAA’s ERAM and NextGen goals.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We made a series of recommendations in our September 2012 report to reduce risk 

with ERAM implementation. FAA concurred or partially concurred with all our 

recommendations and has been working to address them. We acknowledge FAA’s 

work and progress to date in addressing our recommendations and in getting 

ERAM on track. We encourage the Agency to continue its efforts to address our 

previous recommendations and to improve ERAM implementation. 

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

RESPONSE

On March 22, 2013, we met with FAA’s Air Traffic Organization Program Office 

and ERAM program management to discuss the results of our follow-up work. 

They agreed with our findings and conclusions, and provided comments to the 

briefing that we provided to Congressional staff on April 18, 2013 (exhibit D). 

Subsequently, we provided FAA a copy of our draft report for review on June 13, 
7

2013, and received technical comments on June 25, 2013, which we incorporated

into the final report. 

#

cc: DOT Audit Liaison, M-1

FAA Audit Liaison, AAE-100
8

Exhibit A. Scope and Methodology

EXHIBIT A. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

We conducted this performance audit between September 2012 and June 2013 in 

accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. 

The scope of our review was FAA’s ongoing efforts since September 2012 

through June 2013 to deploy ERAM at its 20 Air Route Traffic Control Centers. 

This included review and analysis of program plans, progress reports, and 

documentation on implementation costs. As part of our work, we visited and 

interviewed staff and subject matter experts at 3 of the 20 air traffic facilities 

fielding ERAM that were experiencing problems or had not yet begun using 

ERAM (in particular Atlanta, Chicago, and New York) for a first-hand perspective 

on ERAM progress and any issues going forward. We also met with FAA program 

officials, NATCA representatives, controllers, and the MITRE Corporation.
9

Exhibit B. Organizations Visited or Contacted

EXHIBIT B. ORGANIZATIONS VISITED OR CONTACTED

FAA Facilities

FAA Headquarters

Atlanta Air Route Traffic Control Center

Chicago Air Route Traffic Control Center

Chicago Terminal Radar Approach Control Center

New York Air Route Traffic Control Center

New York Terminal Radar Approach Control Center

Other Organizations

MITRE Corporation

National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA)
10

Exhibit C. Major Contributors to This Report

EXHIBIT C. MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT 

Name Title 

Barry DeWeese Program Director 

Joseph Hance Project Manager 

Sean Woods Senior Auditor 

Won Kim Senior Auditor

Vicki Smith Senior Analyst

Audre Azuolas Writer-Editor
U.S. Department of Transpo

Office of Inspector 

Exhibit D. ERAM Status Briefing to House Appropriations Committee, April 2013
 In September 2012, we reported on FAA’s En Route Automation Moderniza

program—a multibillion dollar program that is intended to replace and 

enhance the hardware and software at FAA’s en route facilities that ma

altitude air traffic. 

 We made a series of recommendations to FAA to improve ERAM’s program m

testing, contract structure, and oversight to reduce the associated risks to 

ERAM and to future NextGen-related programs. FAA has been respon

recommendations. 

 

 Subsequent to our report, the Majority and Minority staff from the House Co

Appropriations, Subcommittee on Transportation, Housing, Urban Develo

Related Agencies asked the Inspector General to monitor the status of ERAM’

 We focused on: (1) FAA’s progress in implementing ERAM to include curren

costs; and (2) key issues that could delay the program and impact NextGe

going forward. 

Exhibit D. ERAM Status Briefing to House Appropriations Committee, April 2013
 FAA’s goals for NextGen—increasing airspace capacity and reducing flig

depend on the success of its efforts to deploy ERAM—a $2.1 billion 

processing flight data. Without ERAM, the key benefits from new NextGe

such as satellite-based surveillance systems and data communications fo

and pilots—cannot be realized. 

 FAA originally planned to complete deploying ERAM to 20 sites by the e

However, significant software problems identified early on at the key sites i

system’s ability to safely manage and separate aircraft and raised question

capabilities ERAM will ultimately deliver. 

 Our work found that FAA’s problems in advancing ERAM were attributable t

of fundamental program management weaknesses. These weaknesse

(1) setting an unrealistic schedule; (2) allowing ERAM to successfully pass 

Acceptance even though testing at the Agency’s Technical Center was limite

not replicate actual field conditions; (3) ignoring early warning signs of trou

an unexpectedly high number of problem reports; and (4) a lack of attention 

communicate, and fix ERAM’s problems. 

 In June 2011, FAA rebaselined ERAM, pushing its expected completion t

increasing costs by an additional $330 million. 

Exhibit D. ERAM Status Briefing to House Appropriations Committee, April 2013
 FAA is making significant progress in deploying ERAM at the Agen

route centers in the continental United States. Currently, there are 

that are fully operational and FAA has begun to remove the lega

and rely totally on ERAM. Another eight sites are using the system 

or part-time basis. 

 ERAM is now being deployed to the most complex sites, such as Ne

the National Airspace System (NAS). The efforts required to ach

operations, and then continuous operations, at sites such as Salt L

Seattle were less complicated when compared with achiev

operations at more complex sites. 

 FAA is working to begin using ERAM at the last four sites a

Jacksonville, Miami, and Fort Worth, that are still using the lega

FAA plans to begin using ERAM at the four remaining sites tha

running on the legacy HOST system by September 2013. 

Exhibit D. ERAM Status Briefing to House Appropriations Committee, April 2013
 

 As FAA deploys ERAM to more complex sites, program off

stated that they expect to continue to discover problems 

impact the cost and schedule. For example: 

◦ New York Center recently fell back to the legacy HOST syst

altitude handoff issues. ERAM use will be restricted to 4-hour r

solution is delivered. 

◦ Atlanta and Miami Centers have identified site-specific issue

dynamic airspace that must be addressed prior to begin

operations. 

 FAA plans for all 20 sites to achieve full operational capabi

decommission and remove the legacy HOST system at a

August 2014. 

Exhibit D. ERAM Status Briefing to House Appropriations Committee, April 2013
 As of February 2013, FAA has spent a total of $302 million of the $

added since rebaselining of the ERAM program in June 2011. Th

$242 million in facilities (F&E) funding and $60 million in operat

funds. 

 FAA’s total monthly average spending rate in the ERAM contract is $

This includes $12 million of F&E funding, $3 million of O&M fundin

million from other NextGen programs (i.e., ADS-B, DataComm, and 

 

 Source: OIG analysis of FAA data on ERAM contract expenditures (numbers rounded)

 

Funding Source Monthly Average 

(CY12) 

F&E $12.4 million

O&M $3.3 million

F&E and O&M - Non-ERAM (NextGen 

Programs)

$5.5 million

Average Monthly Total $21.2 million 

Exhibit D. ERAM Status Briefing to House Appropriations Committee, April 2013
 FAA has reprogrammed operations funding to support ER

Office of Management and Budget (OMB) appro

reprogramming of a total of $44 million of existing ER

funding in FY 2012 and 2013 to F&E funding. While this a

not add additional funding to the program, it did incr

funding available to complete ERAM by August 2014 fr

million to $374 million. 

 Concerns remain that additional funding will be required to 

ERAM. With 18 months remaining in the schedule, and 

FAA’s most complex en route sites remaining ahead, if th

contract burn rate does not decline significantly, the agency 

additional funds to complete this stage of the program. 

Exhibit D. ERAM Status Briefing to House Appropriations Committee, April 2013
So

Exhibit D. ERAM Status Briefing to House Appropriations Committee, April 2013
‣ FAA is making progress resolving problems and deploying ERAM, but 

senior FAA management oversight is still needed. 

‣ Concerns are rising that ERAM implementation is overly milestone dri

detriment of system performance. According to FAA facility and Nationa

Controllers Association (NATCA) officials, controllers like ERAM and are 

of the efforts to field the system. However, there are concerns that FAA h

overly schedule driven, and tensions have increased between NATCA an

the perception that on-time implementation is the primary goal, at the 

promised or needed capabilities. This has resulted in NATCA leaders

concerns to senior FAA management. 

‣ The remaining software baseline is tight, and most is already allocated 

software builds, leaving little room to fix current or new problems. Th

Office is aggressively managing the remaining software code—only fix

needed for “core functionality” (i.e., functionality that is necessary for co

control and manage air traffic). As a result, the Program Office is focus

critical and high-priority problems and is deferring lower-priority softw

future releases. Some FAA experts estimate that as much as an additio

lines of software code, in excess of the current baseline, may be 

complete this stage of the program. 

Exhibit D. ERAM Status Briefing to House Appropriations Committee, April 2013
‣ Tension exists between the facilities and the program office over cla

of basic requirements versus enhancements. Previously 

requirements, such as dynamic airspace and holding functions 

necessary for certain facilities to manage air traffic, are being recl

the Program Office as “enhancements” and are not being fully ad

this time. 

 FAA is assessing whether it will retain or remove the ERAM/Lega

system. There are concerns among controllers, technicians an

experts that FAA is planning to remove the Enhanced Back-Up Sys

from ERAM. This system is an independent back-up system that 

temporarily take over air traffic control should ERAM fail. FA

examining this issue. 

 FAA has approved funding for follow-on ERAM NextGen related c

FAA’s Joint Resources Council has approved ERAM software release 

several planned for ERAM, with a cost of $410 million in F&E and $5

in O&M. This effort will be used to continue to address site specific 

to add new NextGen related capabilities. 

Exhibit D. ERAM Status Briefing to House Appropriations Committee, April 2013
Based on our discussions with controllers and experts, there are sev

that do not preclude the implementation of ERAM in the 2014 time

will need to be addressed for the system to support NextGen. For ex

 Flight Plan Trajectory Modeler - This capability models aircraft flight p

used to show current and predicted aircraft position to, among ot

predict conflicts and ensure accurate handoffs between controllers 

facilities. However, the modeler unexpectedly displays a target in 

location, in direct contradiction to an aircraft’s actual position. This h

adjustments to the modeler software to change the flight plan tr

ensure accurate handoffs. According to controllers, improvements are 

order to support current operations and NextGen capabilities t

trajectory based operations. 

 Aircraft Tracking and Sensor Fusion - This capability allows ERAM to 

or ‘fuse”—multiple radars and satellite based information for contro

far, controllers have not been able to take advantage of this improve

(for using all available radars because) of tracking issues. As a result

not been fully enabled in ERAM. A MITRE analysis found that the ER

will require adjustments to use ADS-B and radar together to m

traffic. Until issues with fusion tracking are addressed, it is unlikely 

able to reduce separation between aircraft at high altitudes. 

Exhibit D. ERAM Status Briefing to House Appropriations Committee, April 2013