AFRICA SECURITY BRIEF

A P u b l i c at i o n o f t h e A f r i c a C e n t e r f o r S t r at e g i c S t u d i e s

n o . 2 7 / Apr i l 2 0 1 4

1

Creating Sustainable Peacekeeping 

Capability in Africa

By Daniel Hampton

u Over 60,000 African troops from 39 different nations serve in peace operations worldwide.

u Maintaining African peacekeeping capability requires an ongoing training process to sustain the skill 

proficiency of troop contingents for rapid deployment and crisis response. 

u Continued reliance on international trainers undercuts the institutionalization of African peacekeeping 

capability. An African-led training model would not only be more sustainable but would draw on the 

relevant, practical experience that African peacekeepers have gained over the years.

H I G H L I G H T S

A state maintains a military to defend its borders, 

deter aggression, and fight and win its wars. These are 

missions normally associated with conventional force 

capabilities. Yet, many states are now more likely to call 

upon their militaries to conduct peace support operations than conventional combat operations. Over 100 

countries provide uniformed personnel in support of 15 

ongoing United Nations (UN) peace operations. Correspondingly, more and more nations train, resource, 

and equip their armed forces to achieve proficiency in 

the unique military skillset required for a peacekeeping 

environment. This is particularly true in Africa. Not only 

do 78 percent of all UN peacekeepers currently serve on 

the African continent, but nearly half of all uniformed 

peacekeepers are African. Over 60,000 uniformed personnel from 39 different African countries serve in peace 

operations worldwide. This preeminence of African 

nations among troop contributing countries (TCCs) to 

peace operations is understandable. Since most peace 

operations occur on the African continent, it is in African states’ regional security interests to participate, 

stabilize, and help shape a postconflict environment. 

Participation in a peacekeeping operation (PKO) 

can also augment traditionally resource-constrained defense budgets. When a TCC deploys, the accompanying 

UN payment of per-soldier stipends, combined with 

reimbursement for contingent-owned equipment, provides the TCC with a significant financial supplement.1

For example, the provision of a standard 800-person 

battalion to a UN PKO can yield a TCC upwards of 

$7 million from the UN over the course of a 6-month 

rotation.2 Furthermore, external actors (i.e., Western 

nations) perceive a comparative advantage in offering 

training and equipment to African governments rather 

than deploying their own troops to a crisis area. Provision of training and equipment is not only viewed as 

a relatively low-cost endeavor to address an emergent 

or existing security crisis, but it likewise strengthens 

security cooperation relationships with African partners. 

Hence, there are shared interests among all parties 

in creating and enhancing the capability of African 

governments to conduct peace operations. 

This intersection of mutually supporting interests 

has resulted in an abundance of programs, activities, 
Colonel Daniel Hampton is a Senior Military Advisor at 

the Africa Center for Strategic Studies. He is a career 

infantry officer and Foreign Area Officer with the U.S. 

Army, having served for 29 years, including as Defense 

Attaché to South Africa, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, 

and Zimbabwe. 

2

systems. The result is a model that produces at best 

episodic and transitory proficiency. 

While African states receive peace operations training assistance from various international partners, the 

United States is the predominant donor nation.4

 From 

2008 to 2012, the United States spent in excess of $1 

billion in support of PKOs.5 For fiscal year 2014, the 

U.S. Department of State requested $347 million for 

assistance to PKOs, of which $228 million was designated for Africa. Through programs such as the African 

Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), Africa Contingency 

Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA), and 

the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), the 

U.S. government rightly claims to having trained over 

250,000 African soldiers in peace support operations. 

These seemingly impressive numbers suggest that 

there exists a quarter of a million well-trained African 

peacekeepers available to deploy on peacekeeping missions. This is not the case. The reality is that all military 

skills are inherently perishable, and it is inaccurate to 

reference a cumulative total of trained peacekeepers. A 

trained peacekeeper in the past is not a trained peacekeeper in the present, nor does a trained peacekeeper 

in the present indicate an available trained peacekeeper 

for the future (see Figure 1). There are several reasons 

why this is so. Soldiers trained to proficiency on military 

tasks show marked degradation of task retention after 

just 60 days. Without practice or retraining, proficiency 

continues to erode to the point that after 180 days there 

is an estimated 60 percent loss in skill retention.6 With 

respect to collective task training (team training), the 

rate of degradation is even more rapid. This is due to 

both the increased complexity of collective tasks and 

the difficulty in retaining cohesion of the unit.7 

Cohesion of the collective is a recurring constraint 

to sustainable peacekeeping capability. With African 

peacekeeping contingents, frequently the unit receiving 

training is a composite formation cobbled together from 

multiple organizations and rounded out with individual 

soldiers who have never previously trained together as 

a collective. (This is primarily due to insufficient force 

structure and inadequate levels of deployable soldiers 

within many African units to meet the troop strength 

requirements for a standard UN infantry battalion comprised of 3 or 4 company groups of 850 personnel). In 

exercises, and events all aimed at increasing peacekeeping capacity on the African continent. Denmark, 

France, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United 

States are but a few of the many international donors that provide peacekeeping assistance to Africa. 

However, the tangible effects and long-term benefits 

of these efforts remain open to debate. While it is 

true that capability is often created or enhanced to 

address specific crises or missions, sustained capacity 

and operational readiness is short-lived. This is evidenced by the recurring cycle of donor-led training 

programs and the frequent inability of the African 

Union (AU) to rapidly respond to emerging crises 

despite their recurrence on the continent. This is a 

shortcoming that the AU has itself recognized. For 

example, an AU study of the 2012-2013 crisis in 

Mali lamented “Africa’s inability, despite its political commitment to Mali, to confront the emergency 

situation...and to respond adequately to the Malian 

government’s request for assistance. The only recourse 

was the French intervention to stop the offensive of 

the armed groups.”3 In short, the current manner and 

method of security assistance provided in support of 

PKOs does not appear to adequately or effectively 

advance the interests of any of the actors. 

The Challenge of Retaining Readiness

for Peace Operations

The standard model of donor peacekeeping assistance is often characterized as “train and equip” (T&E). 

A stereotypical T&E model consists of an African military pulling together a composite trainee cohort (a group 

that may or may not be the actual troop contingent that 

will deploy on an operation). The instructors providing 

the training are normally Western soldiers or, more 

often than not, private military contractors (PMCs) 

who teach from a standardized program of instruction. 

An equipment package is donated that may or may not 

be compatible or interoperable with the preexisting 

host nation’s inventory, spare parts, and maintenance 

“all military skills are inherently 

perishable”
3

this scenario, upon completion of training the cohort 

disbands and the soldiers return to their parent units and 

organizations, with collective task proficiency essentially 

lost. In instances where the trained formation deploys 

directly into a peace support operation, proficiency is 

retained longer. However, upon completion of a normal 6-month rotation the formation can no longer be 

termed a trained peacekeeping asset if it does not retain 

cohesion and receive sustainment training. 

Retaining postdeployment unit cohesion is difficult 

in any military due to the normal cycle of reassignment, 

promotion, retention, and replenishment. Hence, the 

need for institutionalized training within an established professional military education (PME) system 

is of paramount importance to sustained peacekeeping 

capability. Within the African context, many states lack 

an effective PME system to complement the training 

received from international partners. The result is that 

acquired knowledge and experience erodes, capacity 

is not increased, and capability is not retained. Both 

African states and their international partners must 

avoid training programs that do not create enduring 

indigenous capacity to sustain skills. In short, “welltrained security forces are of limited utility, or indeed 

can even be counterproductive, without the institutional 

systems and processes to sustain them.”8

Clearly, the key to retention of peacekeeping skills 

is an indigenous, institutionalized training capability. 

The United States’ ACOTA program acknowledges 

this tenet in its mission statement, yet to date there has 

been limited success in creating sustainable peacekeeping 

training institutions within Africa.9 At the inception 

of the ACRI program in 1997, there was a stated focus 

on “training the trainer.” However, such a methodology 

has never been fully implemented. When the ACRI 

program transitioned to ACOTA in 2002, the desire to 

build institutional capacity remained but, in practice, 

the program continued to provide training primarily 

to African soldiers rather than creating professional 

instructor cadres within African militaries. The trainers 

standing in front of the trainees were still predominantly 

American and almost exclusively PMCs. 

This inability to shift peacekeeping training responsibilities onto an African cadre is not entirely due to a 

lack of commitment on the part of ACOTA. In instances 

where a train-the-trainer approach has been applied, too 

frequently the African partner nation failed to utilize 

the trained instructors for their intended purpose, and 

many were reassigned or deployed shortly after receipt of 

donor-provided training.10 Interestingly, as more African 

states commit a portion of their defense force to peace 

operations on a recurring and near continuous basis, 

several have seen the utility in establishing dedicated 

peacekeeping training facilities. However, designating a 

training site and resourcing a training institution require 

vastly different levels of commitment. If an international 

partner is willing to provide instructors, training aids, and 

resources for a specific training event or exercise, then 

there is not a perceived advantage for the host nation 

to incur the cost of manning and operating a training 

facility on a full-time basis. While this would seem to 

be a pragmatic approach in a resource-constrained defense budget, it is a model that offers little in the way 

of institutional longevity. For this reason it is important 

Fi g u r e 1 . S ustai n e d Read i n ess
4

that peacekeeping training centers are incorporated into 

a larger PME system. This will not only better ensure 

sustained capacity, but also create economies of scale 

with respect to the cost of full-time instructor cadres 

and required operating resources.

Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 

stated in 2010, “The United States has made great strides 

in building up the operational capacity of its partners by 

training and equipping troops and mentoring them in 

the field. But there has not been enough attention paid 

to building the institutional capacity.”11 For example, 

the United States’ GPOI program has spent only 12 

percent of its budget on building institutionalized African 

peacekeeping capacity.12 The majority of this institutional support has gone to the physical establishment 

of training centers and sites. The next step of manning 

those facilities with permanent and professional African 

cadres is still not fully realized, however. Official U.S. 

policy directs a shift in focus from training peacekeepers 

to building indigenous peacekeeping capacity.13 Despite 

this acknowledgement of a need for change, there has 

not been a corresponding shift in the allocation of U.S. 

resources. The continuing training of African troop 

contingents for deployment into crisis areas diverts assets and energy from what should be the priority effort: 

institution building.14 

Considering that the United States has been working to build sustainable African peacekeeping capacity 

since 1997, it is hard to imagine that there is not more 

to show for the effort and money spent in the form of 

sustained capacity. If the enduring focus had been trainthe-trainer, the PMC trainers running these programs 

should have been able to work themselves out of a job. 

Yet as the ACOTA program works diligently to prepare 

African soldiers for deployment into the Central African 

Republic, eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo 

(DRC), Mali, Somalia, or other current hotspots on the 

continent, the trainers conducting that training are not 

professional African cadres but still mostly American 

contractors. 

A New Model

A new model of peacekeeping assistance must focus 

on building and supporting indigenous institutions—

where a professional military instructor cadre trains the 

soldiers that will comprise peacekeeping contingents 

(see Figure 2). In this new model, peacekeeping tactics, 

techniques, and procedures are embedded in doctrine 

and reinforced throughout all levels of a PME system. 

Lessons learned and operational experience are captured 

and incorporated into curricula and training exercises. 

Under this approach, the real metric of success is not 

how many personnel receive training, but rather how 

well a country sustains capability and maintains operational readiness with a capacity to respond to an AU 

or UN request.

The days of Western soldiers standing in front of 

African soldiers as primary instructors should be long 

gone. In fact, several African militaries could accurately 

be characterized as professional peacekeepers with little 

need for outside training. For example, Ghana, Rwanda, 

Senegal, and South Africa each have provided troop 

contingents to UN missions almost continuously for 

well over a decade. Their operational experience and 

institutional knowledge far exceed that of the average 

 Train the trainer: build African NCO capacity

 Train the contingent: Africans train Africans

 Institutionalize: dedicate training facility or mobile training team concept

 Retain expertise: maintain professional instructor cadre within the defense force

 Sustain: integrate instructor cadres and curricula within African PME systems

 Adapt: capture and analyze operational lessons, update training curricula

 Optimize resources: coordinate donor support to ensure complementarity

“the real metric of success is not how 

many personnel receive training, but 

rather how well a country sustains 

capability and maintains operational 

readiness”

Fi g u r e 2 . Bu i l d i n g Bl o c ks f o r S ustai n e d Capac i t y
5

American PMC. Incorporating these lessons, proficiencies, and experience into African PME systems is the 

key to sustainable capacity and capability. 

Another advantage of removing the Western face 

from troop training is the opportunity to empower and legitimize host-nation noncommissioned officers (NCOs). 

When a training instructor stands in front of a formed 

unit, there is an understood expert-to-novice relationship. Training a cadre of professional instructors prior 

to a troop contingent training exercise ensures that 

the recognized expert on the subject matter is not an 

American contractor but a NCO from the responsible 

African force. The less active involvement by foreign 

personnel during training exercises the better. Once the 

cadre has been trained, the role of international advisors 

should be to provide training resources and observe. 

They can then teach, coach, and mentor the African 

cadre in separate instructor “after action reviews” away 

from the trainees.

Emergent requirements to field trained peacekeepers for missions in areas such as the DRC, Mali, or 

Somalia will naturally shape the method employed. A 

deliberate policy decision by both African and partner 

nations to rapidly create capability to address an urgent 

need is understandable and will occur on occasion. One 

cannot discount the short-term impact achieved via 

T&E missions to prepare thousands of peacekeepers 

for deployment into crisis areas. However, at issue is 

the missed opportunity for long-term gains from the 

millions of dollars spent. If African and partner nations 

adopt and adhere to a policy of building institutional 

capacity, the demand for reactionary training diminishes 

as more TCCs sustain and maintain a higher level of 

operational readiness. The goal must be to create the 

conditions where train-and-equip missions are the exception not the rule. 

 Several African states that are UN TCCs—Nigeria 

and South Africa to name but two—are in the enviable position of having both a dedicated peacekeeping 

training center and a fully developed PME system up 

through defense college level. However, the linkage 

between operational experience and institutional education has yet to be fully optimized. What is absent is a 

formal process and organization to capture lessons from 

the field, analyze them, and then develop and adapt 

training curricula to sustain and improve performance 

and capability. 

The International Peace Support Training Centre 

(IPSTC) in Kenya and the Kofi Annan International 

Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Ghana 

are examples that reflect successful partnerships between 

international actors and African states to create indigenous peacekeeping capacity. While neither of these 

centers is designed to provide training for formed battalions, they are an excellent resource for sustainment 

training. As indicated in their mission statements, the 

principal focus of these institutions is not predeployment training for peacekeeper contingents. They are 

primarily donor-funded, subregional assets that provide 

multinational classroom and seminar instruction at the 

operational and strategic level. These regional centers 

are not a substitute for institutionalized peacekeeping 

training capacity within a military’s PME system. However, they can be an effective complement to sustaining 

and maintaining critical peacekeeping skills. 

Sustaining African Peacekeeping 

Capability

Enhancing capacity and capability is a continuum 

not an event. Achieving this will require changes from 

both African governments and international partners. 

Both parties must ensure that resources and assistance 

are applied to the lifecycle of a peacekeeping contingent to maximize retention of skill and experience for 

future units (see Figure 3). This means that in addition to predeployment and postdeployment interaction, 

mentors should visit a unit in the theater to assess the 

suitability of the predeployment program of instruction 

(POI) and then modify the POI as necessary. Capturing 

lessons learned and incorporating them into specific 

POIs, general PME curricula, and defense doctrine is 

a challenge for most militaries, but particularly so for 

African militaries that struggle with limited resources, 

underdeveloped institutions, and demanding operational 

cycles. This is an area of expertise that international 

military partners can help build.

Donor programs designed to increase the capability 

of African peacekeepers require a collective approach. 

“the operational experience 

and institutional knowledge 

[of experienced African troop 

contingents] will far exceed that of 

the average American private military 

contractor”
6

Assistance should be coordinated with and complement 

other international and regional efforts. International 

assistance must begin with the baseline list of established 

UN and AU peacekeeping standards (the “United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual” is an excellent foundational document for the basic soldier skills required to 

ensure interoperability in UN peacekeeping missions). 

From this baseline, a POI can be adapted to the existing tactics, techniques, procedures, and experiences of 

the host nation. 

In addition to leveraging donor assistance to train 

instructor cadres and develop PME institutions, African 

policymakers should selectively identify bilateral partnerships that can provide added value in the form of 

expertise or resources that transfer a unique or superior 

capability. Basic soldier skills and traditional collective 

tasks associated with PKOs can be taught and proficiency 

achieved in a fairly straightforward and structured fashion. There are UN-approved POIs available that any 

capable training cadre can adopt and apply.15 However, 

the more complex tasks and problem sets associated 

with peace support operations are not rote. 

For example, countering improvised explosive 

devices (C-IED), explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), 

and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) 

are capabilities the United States can offer to enhance 

African peacekeeping capability beyond basic soldier 

skills. Although these skills were honed by the U.S. 

military during counterinsurgency operations, their 

application in the PKO environment is increasingly 

evident. More and more, the threats and situations faced 

by peacekeepers in the eastern DRC, Mali, and Somalia 

are asymmetrical in nature, involving nonstate actors 

possessing varying degrees of capability, equipment, and 

technology. 

Unfortunately, security assistance of this nature is 

too often lumped under a rubric of “counterterrorism” 

programs. This is not only too limiting, but can evoke 

negative connotations. Therefore, it is important to 

address the range of capabilities required in PKOs and 

avoid labeling certain military assistance and skillsets 

too narrowly. 

The same principle is true concerning the discourse 

on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Media coverage of “drone attacks” has nurtured a perception that 

all UAVs are armed platforms capable of delivering 

Fi g u r e 3 . En han c i n g Capac i t y: A Co n t i n u um No t an Ev e n t
7

precision strikes against designated individual targets. 

In fact, few UAV models are designed for or capable of 

carrying and delivering ordnance. The more common 

application resides in providing a clearer operational 

picture to a unit commander. The ability of peacekeeper contingents to effectively use UAVs to see 

and understand the operating environment is critical 

to sound decisionmaking, protecting civilians, and 

overall mandate enforcement. 

When entering into military assistance partnerships, 

it is also worth examining the role of PMCs. There are 

several benefits for both African and donor nations 

in utilizing uniformed personnel rather than civilian 

contractors for PKO training. While PMCs are fully 

capable and qualified to conduct most training to the 

same standards as uniformed military trainers, the issue 

returns to one of short-term versus long-term effects. The 

professional bonds formed during military-to-military 

interaction cannot be underestimated. A residual security cooperation benefit is achieved in bilateral defense 

relationships when uniformed military are training and 

working side by side with their uniformed partners. At 

the soldier level, the sharing of experiences and expertise during an exercise is mutually advantageous. With 

PMCs the interaction is more one sided. While there is 

a role for PMCs to play in augmenting a military lead 

during training events, the value of military-to-military 

interaction endures beyond any specific training event. 

In summary, the cornerstone of sustainable peacekeeping capability is institutional training capacity. 

Entering into security cooperation programs with international partners can be an effective method to build 

or rapidly advance indigenous institutions. A generic 

peacekeeping training model in its simplest form is 

comprised of three phases. In the first phase—train 

the trainer—international subject matter experts are 

used as needed to train a host-nation instructor cadre. 

In the second phase—train the peacekeepers—the international trainers observe and mentor the African 

instructors in a passive role with little to no interaction with the trainees. The more challenging third 

phase—sustainment training—requires retention of 

a professional cadre within the African defense force 

that endures over time. This requires the will of senior 

defense and military leadership, and will often necessitate an organizational restructure within the force to 

create instructor billets that are permanent positions 

and considered career enhancing. 

Donor-provided train-the-trainer programing is 

not in itself a cure-all for creating institutional capacity. 

Once a cadre has been formed and trained, the onus is 

then on the African military to make a commitment 

to utilize the trainers for their intended purpose. Too 

often the trainers are diverted to other positions or 

assignments, resulting in a loss of indigenous instructor 

expertise. Moreover, African militaries must sustain 

the existence of the cadre beyond the initial cohort of 

individuals that received donor training and establish 

a replenishment cycle for designated and dedicated 

instructor positions within the defense force structure. 

Ideally, a professional cadre of peacekeeping trainers would exist within a defense force’s PME system at 

an institutionalized peacekeeping training school or 

center. Furthermore, peacekeeping curricula should be 

incorporated throughout all professional development 

courses (e.g., platoon and company commander courses, 

staff colleges, warrant officer courses). While this is an 

option for the more mature and better resourced defense 

forces, less endowed militaries can still institutionalize the training program without a designated brickand-mortar facility or comprehensive PME system. 

A peacekeeping training cadre organized as a mobile 

training team (MTT) can effectively prepare and train 

units to sustain capacity. However, this assumes cohesion and replenishment of the MTT instructor cohort 

over time. Again, this becomes a matter of will on the 

part of African defense force leadership to prioritize 

and resource a professional instructor cadre within the 

force as a key component of readiness.

African states must better leverage donor assistance 

to increase and then maintain the operational readiness 

of their force. African soldiers are the best resource to 

train African soldiers. African states must not allow 

themselves to become habitually dependent upon donor 

support to participate in UN or AU missions. It is in 

their interest to develop and sustain an indigenous 

capacity to generate trained and ready peacekeepers. 

Likewise, donor nations at some point must break from 

a seemingly perpetual cycle of training hundreds of 

thousands of African peacekeepers, frequently from 

the same handful of countries, with little sustained 

impact. The real shared interest of both parties is the 

“the goal must be to create the 

conditions where train-and-equip 

missions are the exception not the 

rule”
8

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) supports United States 

foreign and security policies by strengthening the strategic capacity 

of African states to identifiy and resolve security challenges in ways 

that promote civil-military cooperation, respect for democratic 

values, and safeguard human rights. Toward these aims, ACSS is 

committed to building networks of African, American, European, and 

international military and civilian leaders and articulating African 

perspectives to U.S. policymakers.

The Africa Security Briefs series presents research and analysis 

by ACSS experts and outside scholars with the aim of advancing 

understanding of African security issues. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of ACSS, 

the U.S. Department of Defense or any other agency of the U.S. 

Government.

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establishment of sustainable peacekeeping capability 

that is institutionalized within African defense forces. 

It is time to move beyond the reactionary nature of 

train-and-equip missions and create enduring capacity.

Notes

1 Madu Onuorah, “How policy, funding issues clog Nigeria’s UN 

peace-keeping operations,” The Guardian, June 10, 2013, available at 

<http://www.safpi.org/news/article/2013/how-policy-funding-issuesclog-nigerias-un-peace-keeping-operations>.

2 Manual on Policies and Procedures Concerning the Reimbursement 

and Control of Contingent-Owned Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors 

Participating in Peacekeeping Missions (COE Manual) (UN doc. 

A/C.5/66/8, October 27, 2011).

3 Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the operationalisation of the Rapid Deployment Capability of the African Standby Force and 

the establishment of an “African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises”

(AU doc. RPT/Exp/VI/STCDSS/(i-a)2013, April 29-30, 2013).

4 By comparison, the United Kingdom (the next largest contributor of bilateral assistance to peacekeeping operations in Africa) 

allocated $85 million from its Conflict Pool toward Africa in fiscal 

year 2013. 

5 Congressional Budget Justification, Vol. 2, Foreign Operations, 

Fiscal Year 2013, U.S. Department of State, 144.

6 A.M. Rose, M.Y. Czarnolewski, F.E. Gragg, S.H. Austin, 

Acquisition and Retention of Soldiering Skills, Technical Report 671 

(Alexandria: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and 

Social Sciences, February, 1985).

7 B.D. Adams, R.D.G. Webb, H.A. Angel, and D.J. Bryant, 

Development and Theories of Collective and Cognitive Skill Retention

(Toronto: Defence Research and Development Canada, March 31, 

2003), available at <http://cradpdf.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/PDFS/unc18/

p521114.pdf>.

8 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, U.S. Department of 

Defense, February 2010.

9 Peacekeeping: Thousands Trained but United States is Unlikely 

to Complete All Activities by 2010 and Some Improvements are Needed, 

U.S. Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional 

Committees, June 2008, available at <www.gao.gov/new.items/d08754.

pdf>.

10 Ibid, 22.

11 Robert M. Gates, “Helping Others Defend Themselves: The 

Future of U.S. Security Assistance,” Foreign Affairs 89, No. 3 (May/

June 2010), 74.

12 Peacekeeping, 9.

13 Congressional Budget Justification, 226.

14 Peacekeeping, 11.

15 United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual, Volumes I and II 

(New York: UN DPKO/DFS, August 2012).