The Canadian

 Theater 1814

THE U.S. ARMY C AMPAIGNS

OF THE WAR OF 1812
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

CMH Pub 74–6
•••

The Canadian Theater 

1814

by

Richard V. Barbuto

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

Center of Military History

United States Army 

Washington, D.C., 2014

•••• 5 ••••

•••

Introduction

The War of 1812 is perhaps the United States’ least known conflict. Other than Andrew Jackson’s 1815 victory at New Orleans and 

Francis Scott Key’s poem “The Star-Spangled Banner,” written in 

1814 during the British attack on Baltimore, most Americans know 

little about the country’s second major war. Its causes are still debated 

by historians today. Great Britain’s impressment of American sailors, 

its seizure of American ships on the high seas, and suspected British 

encouragement of Indian opposition to further American settlement 

on the western frontier all contributed to America’s decision to declare 

war against Great Britain in June 1812.

None of these factors, however, adequately explain why President James Madison called for a war the country was ill-prepared to 

wage. Moreover, the war was quite unpopular from the start. Many 

Federalists—chiefly in the New England states—opposed an armed 

conflict with Great Britain, continued to trade with the British, and 

even met in convention to propose secession from the Union. Some 

members of the president’s own Republican Party objected to the 

war’s inevitable costs and questionable objectives, such as the conquest of Canada.

To declare war was one thing, but to prosecute it successfully was 

a different matter. Much of the story of the War of 1812 is about 

the unpreparedness of America’s Army and Navy at the conflict’s 

outset, and the enormous difficulties the new nation faced in raising 

troops, finding competent officers, and supplying its forces. Most 

of America’s military leaders were inexperienced and performed 

poorly, particularly in the first two years of war. Only gradually did 

better leaders rise to the top to command the more disciplined and 

well-trained units that America eventually fielded. But despite costly 

initial setbacks, by the time the fighting stopped American arms had 

won key victories at Chippewa, Lundy’s Lane, and New Orleans 

under excellent officers such as Winfield Scott, Jacob Brown, and 

Andrew Jackson. Although the United States achieved few of its 

political objectives in the War of 1812, its Regular Army emerged 

more professional, better led, and fit to take its place as the foundation of America’s national defenses.
•••• 6 ••••

I encourage all Army leaders and soldiers to read this pamphlet 

and the others in our series of campaign pamphlets in commemoration of the bicentennial of the War of 1812. We can all profit from 

greater knowledge about the beginnings of our Army: an Army forged 

in victory and defeat during what has often been called the second 

war of American independence.

RICHARD W. STEWART

Chief Historian
•••• 7 ••••

•••

The Canadian Theater

1814

After eighteen months of war, victory over Great Britain remained 

an elusive goal for the United States in January 1814. American attempts to conquer Canada had failed, and Britain had not budged 

on its assertion that it had the right to impress U.S. sailors of British 

birth. In the South, fighting with the Red Stick Creeks smoldered, 

while on the Atlantic seaboard the Royal Navy had tightened its 

blockade and begun raiding villages and plantations on Chesapeake 

Bay with impunity.

Along the border with the province of Upper Canada, results 

had been mixed. In the West, Master Commandant Oliver Hazard 

Perry’s stunning naval triumph on Lake Erie in September 1813 had 

led directly to Maj. Gen. William Henry Harrison’s decisive victory at 

the Battle of the Thames and the subsequent recapture of Detroit the 

following month. The Indian confederacy had died with Tecumseh, 

and Indian power in the Northwest now lay shattered. However, victory in the West had not translated to success elsewhere. The British 

still occupied Fort Mackinac, which controlled the waters between 

Lakes Huron and Michigan. In December 1813, the British had 

destroyed virtually every building along the Niagara frontier, forcing U.S. citizens to flee through the deep snows to seek shelter miles 

inland. A British flag flew over Fort Niagara. The attempts to capture 

Montreal late in 1813 had been disastrous failures. American troops 

had withdrawn to winter quarters in the brutal cold of French Mills 

and Plattsburgh, New York. 

In all of this, President James Madison had come to realize 

the severe shortcomings of many of his senior officers. Maj. Gens. 

Henry Dearborn, James Wilkinson, Wade Hampton, and Morgan 

Lewis had all failed in command. Only Harrison had established a 

reputation for competence and aggressiveness. But if many had been 

found wanting, the hard knocks of 1812 and 1813 had also identified 

reasons for hope. Some brigadier generals, such as Jacob Brown, had 

risen above the mediocrity and demonstrated that they were ready for 
•••• 8 ••••

high command, and a crop of colonels had also proved their mettle 

under trying circumstances. Moreover, American junior officers and 

the troops they led had shown that what they lacked in skill they made 

up for in spirit. Realizing the errors of the past, a growing number 

of officers had begun to redress the serious organizational problems 

that had bedeviled U.S. military forces with an eye toward fielding a 

better-trained and more effective force in the coming year. 

The development came none too soon. In March 1814, Napoleonic France capitulated in its long war against Britain, Prussia, 

Russia, and Austria. With the war in Europe over, Britain could 

begin transferring large numbers of experienced soldiers and sailors 

to join the struggle against the United States. The year 1814 would 

test whether the United States had learned enough from the disappointments of the past eighteen months to defeat the wave of British 

veterans that was about to reach North America.

Strategic Setting

Madison and his cabinet understood only too well that, if the 

United States was to win its war, victory would have to come quickly 

before the full might of Britain arrived on America’s borders. To achieve 

this end, the Army would need to be stronger. Congress attempted to 

expand the size of the Army by raising the enlistment bonus from $40 

to $124 and by increasing the authorized strength to 62,500 men. It also 

augmented the numbers of regimental officers and noncommissioned 

officers to give regimental commanders more recruiters. Despite these 

measures, Army strength rose only to approximately forty thousand 

men by the time active campaigning began in 1814. 

Meanwhile, Madison and Secretary of War John Armstrong 

set out to improve the Army’s senior leadership. In March, General 

Hampton, who was thoroughly outraged at General Wilkinson’s attempts to make him the scapegoat for the failed 1813 campaign to 

capture Montreal, resigned. Two months later, Harrison, who had 

bickered with Armstrong over command issues throughout 1813, 

resigned as well. General Lewis, Wilkinson’s second in command 

in the 1813 campaign, was too ill for field duty, so in early 1814, 

Armstrong sent him away from the front lines to command the 3d 

Military District. Meanwhile, General Wilkinson, an inveterate intriguer, attempted to redeem his failing reputation with an invasion of 

Lower Canada in April 1814. After a small British force stopped him 

in his tracks at Lacolle Mill in Lower Canada, Armstrong removed 

Wilkinson from command, charging him with neglect of duty and 
•••• 9 ••••

intoxication. Wilkinson remained 

on the sidelines during 1814 and 

was acquitted of charges in January 1815. Thus, by the end of the 

summer of 1814, the only man 

remaining who had held a major 

generalcy at the start of the year 

was Dearborn, and Armstrong 

had shunted him off to command 

the defenses of New York City. 

Madison and Armstrong 

understood that cutting the British supply line extending from 

Montreal westward along the St. 

Lawrence River and across the 

length of Lake Ontario would 

prove decisive to the war effort. 

This region came within the responsibility of the 9th Military 

District, which was composed 

of Vermont and all of New York 

State above the Highlands. Armstrong massed his forces there, 

and it was in this area that two 

new major generals took their 

commands.

Both of the generals in the 9th District had significant combat 

experience. Educated in European military schools, George Izard had 

commanded the 2d U.S. Artillery and a brigade in Hampton’s division 

during the October 1813 Battle of Chateauguay. Jacob Brown had 

been a general in the New York militia until success at the Battle of 

Sackett’s Harbor had earned him the rank of brigadier general in the 

Regular Army. He had competently commanded the advance guard in 

Wilkinson’s 1813 campaign. The Senate approved both of Madison’s 

nominations, and Izard and Brown were promoted to major general 

on 24 January 1814, with Izard’s promotion taking precedence over 

Brown’s. Armstrong then reorganized the forces in the 9th Military 

District. Izard commanded the Right Division on Lake Champlain, 

while Brown commanded the Left Division that was responsible for 

the border between Buffalo, New York, on Lake Erie to Ogdensburg, 

New York, on the St. Lawrence River. Brown initially established his 

headquarters at Sackett’s Harbor. Armstrong ducked the obvious 

John Armstrong

by John Wesley Jarvis 

(National Portrait Gallery, 

Smithsonian)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 10 ••••

violation of unity of command 

within the military district, directing that each general would 

command the forces assigned to 

his division and that Izard, as the 

senior officer, would command 

when both divisions were united.

Madison reinforced these 

efforts by elevating to brigadier 

general several talented colonels, four of whom would figure 

prominently in the battles ahead. 

Alexander Macomb, a career 

soldier, was both intelligent and 

competent. He commanded a 

brigade in Izard’s Right Division. Winfield Scott, another 

career soldier, was aggressive and 

charismatic. Armstrong assigned 

him to command a brigade in the 

Left Division. Eleazar Wheelock 

Ripley had been a successful 

politician when the war erupted. 

Commissioned as a lieutenant 

colonel, he had turned the 21st 

Infantry into a particularly effective fighting organization. 

Brown gave him command of a 

brigade in his division, although the two were of distinctly different 

temperaments. Ripley was much less aggressive than either Brown 

or Scott. Edmund Pendleton Gaines was promoted last of the four. 

A professional soldier, Gaines commanded the critical shipbuilding 

base at Sackett’s Harbor whenever Brown was away.

Secretary Armstrong issued guidance that would confuse Brown 

and ultimately direct the Left Division away from the decisive objectives of the British shipbuilding base at Kingston or the key logistical center at Montreal. Armstrong sent Brown two letters. The first 

directed him to consider attacking Kingston across the ice “if practicable.” The second directed Brown to take a large force westward 

to retake Fort Niagara. Armstrong suggested that he use this second 

letter to mask his true objective should he choose to attack Kingston. 

Brown consulted with Commodore Isaac Chauncey, commander of 

George Izard

(Arkansas History 

Commission) •••••••••••••••
•••• 11 ••••

naval forces on the Great Lakes 

and Lake Champlain. Chauncey 

and Brown agreed that an attack 

across the ice was too risky to attempt. Chauncey also persuaded 

Brown that the second letter was 

an alternate course of action. 

Brown put his troops on the 

march to the Niagara frontier. 

When Armstrong realized that 

Brown had misconstrued his 

guidance, he failed to redirect 

him but instead urged him to 

“go on and prosper. Good consequences are sometimes the result 

of mistakes.”

While Brown worked out 

the many logistical and administrative issues of the upcoming 

campaign, General Scott undertook preparation of the troops. 

His brigade arrived in Buffalo in 

mid-April amid a late snowfall. 

Scott embarked on an intensive 

training regimen for his men. Six 

days a week and starting before 

breakfast, Scott’s men, in their 

threadbare uniforms, practiced 

individual and company drill. In the afternoon, regimental commanders drilled their men in battalion movements and maneuvers. During 

the nineteenth century, tactical drill was referred to as “discipline.” 

Drummer Jarvis Hanks remembered Scott as “the most thorough 

disciplinarian I ever saw.”

Early in the campaign season, three minor engagements on the 

shores of the Great Lakes shaped strategic thinking for the remainder 

of the war. Maj. Gen. Sir Gordon Drummond, commander of British 

forces in Upper Canada, and Commodore Sir James Yeo, commander 

of the Royal Navy on the Great Lakes, understood well that command 

of the water was the key to defending the province. While Sackett’s 

Harbor had been strongly reinforced after the abortive raid of May 

1813, the major American supply depot at Oswego, New York, on 

Lake Ontario was largely undefended. General Brown learned of 

Jacob Brown

by James Herring

(New-York Historical 

Society)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 12 ••••

the British plan to raid Oswego and sent Lt. Col. George Mitchell 

and 342 artillerymen fighting as infantry to protect the ammunition, 

guns, and naval stores intended for Commodore Chauncey’s fleet at 

Sackett’s Harbor. 

Mitchell and his small battalion arrived at Oswego only days 

before the British attack. Guarding the mouth of the Oswego River 

as it entered Lake Ontario stood old Fort Ontario. Capt. Rufus 

McIntire of the Corps of Artillery noted that “the hands of time 

had destroyed every picket and the escarp could be easily ascended 

on any point—in some places as easily as through a gate.” Mitchell 

found five condemned artillery pieces, and his men repaired them as 

best as they could for the battle ahead. They had hardly completed 

preparations when Yeo’s fleet carrying over a thousand soldiers 

and marines arrived on 5 May 1814. Due to adverse winds, Yeo 

could not land his troops until the following day. The resulting 

engagement was short and sharp, with Mitchell’s men fighting a 

determined withdrawal in the face of overwhelming odds. Mitchell brought his men to the large supply cache at Oswego Falls and 

prepared to defend that station. Yeo was unwilling to move upriver 

and contented himself with the capture of nine naval cannons and 

a large amount of food. President Madison recognized Mitchell’s 

Attack on Fort Oswego, by William Strickland

(New York Public Library)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 13 ••••

success in preventing the majority of naval stores from falling into 

enemy hands with a brevet promotion to colonel.

The Battle of Oswego led directly to one of the most lopsided 

engagements of the war. Yeo’s squadron blockaded Sackett’s Harbor, 

and Chauncey desperately needed the naval guns at Oswego Falls to 

complete his two new frigates. Master Commandant Melancthon 

Woolsey loaded thirty-four heavy guns into nineteen bateaux and 

moved stealthily along the shore toward the American shipyard at 

Sackett’s Harbor. Maj. Daniel Appling and about a hundred fifty men 

of the 1st U.S. Rifle Regiment protected this supply convoy, while an 

additional escort of a hundred fifty Oneida Indian allies moved along 

the shore. Yeo discovered the convoy and sent seven small vessels 

and two hundred marines and sailors to capture the precious cargo. 

Woolsey pulled his bateaux into Big Sandy Creek, and Appling set 

up an ambush. On 30 May, the British raiding party walked into the 

fire of the expert riflemen. Nineteen British troops fell in the fusillade, 

and the remainder—more than a hundred seventy—surrendered. 

Woolsey and Appling delivered the guns to Chauncey’s fleet. 

The other event that shaped wartime strategy was the raid on the 

Canadian village of Port Dover on the northern shore of Lake Erie. 

On 13 May 1814, about three hundred regulars and four hundred 

Pennsylvania militiamen under Col. John Campbell departed Erie, 

Pennsylvania. At daylight on Sunday, 15 May, they landed at Port 

Dover and burned about forty buildings—legitimate targets such 

as mills and storehouses, but private homes as well. Pvt. Alexander 

McMullen of the Pennsylvania Volunteers recalled, “A scene of destruction and plunder now ensued, which beggars all description. In 

a short time the houses, mills, and barns were all consumed, and a 

beautiful village, which the sun shone on in splendor that morning, 

was before two o’clock a heap of smoking ruins.” The gratuitous vandalism so disgusted the Governor General of British North America, 

Lt. Gen. Sir George Prevost, that he appealed to V.Adm. Alexander 

Cochrane to retaliate. Cochrane obligingly launched destructive raids 

on Chesapeake Bay, culminating in the burning of Washington, D.C.

On 7 June, Madison met with his cabinet to discuss the strategy for 

the border with Canada. Secretary of War Armstrong reported that 

eight thousand regulars were guarding the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, 

and twenty-one hundred regulars were stationed in the West, mostly 

around Detroit. About eight thousand regulars were available in the 9th 

Military District—five thousand with Izard and the rest with Brown. 

Armstrong believed that approximately seven thousand new recruits 

were available for commitment. Madison ordered one thousand troops 
•••• 14 ••••

and the Lake Erie squadron to retake Fort Mackinac on Mackinac 

Island. Izard would make a movement toward Montreal to divert British attention from Brown. Brown’s Left Division would make the main 

attack to seize Burlington Heights, thus cutting British supply lines 

to the West. However, the cabinet understood that Brown could not 

move on to York (present-day Toronto) or Kingston unless Chauncey 

defeated Yeo on Lake Ontario. Chauncey, cautious to a fault, would 

not challenge Yeo until he was ready. Yeo, for his part, would not accept 

battle unless he was confident of victory. The 1814 campaign hung in 

the balance of a naval battle that might never occur (Map 1).

Operations

Brown’s Left Division quickly grew in strength for the attack on 

the Niagara frontier. Scott commanded the 1st Brigade, his soldiers 

all wearing new gray uniform coats and white trousers. They drilled 

as smartly as they looked. In addition to Scott’s brigade, General Ripley commanded the 2d Brigade, also of regulars. The last brigade to 

join the division included a diverse collection under Brig. Gen. Peter 

B. Porter. Porter, an ardent War Hawk, had left his seat in Congress 

to serve in the New York militia. The war was a personal matter for 

Porter; he lived and maintained a business on the Niagara River and 

had lost property in the British raid of the previous winter. His 3d 

Brigade consisted of several elements. A party of six hundred Iroquois 

warriors—Seneca, Oneida, Onondaga, and Tuscarora men, with a 

few women as well—fighting under the command of the elderly Seneca chief, Red Jacket, was the first to join. A small company called 

the Canadian Volunteers followed. These men, many of them U.S. 

born, had lived in Upper Canada but had become disaffected with 

the Crown and now served as scouts for the Americans. Col. James 

Fenton’s Regiment of Pennsylvania Volunteers arrived next. Scott had 

little use for militia. When he learned that the Pennsylvanians would 

join the invasion, he wrote to Brown, “Col. Fenton and his militia 

are already in march for this place. I am sorry for this circumstance, 

for I had rather be without that specie of force, than have the whole 

population of New York & Pennsylvania at my heels. I now give it 

as my opinion that we shall be disgraced if we admit a militia force 

either into our camp or order of battle.” A company of New York 

mounted riflemen was the last group to join Porter’s brigade. They 

were the only portion of a brigade of New York Volunteers to arrive, 

the rest of which, having been delayed due to a lack of camp equipment, missed the opening battles. 
Oswego

6 May

Sandy Creek

30 May

Plattsburgh

11 Sep

Port Dover

15 May Fort Erie

15 Aug

17 Sep

Chippewa

5 Jul

Lundy’s Lane

25 Jul

Lacolle Mill

30 Mar

to New York City

St. Lawrence R

Ottawa R

Hu

s d

no

R

Lake Champlain

Lake George

Lake Oneida

L a k e O n t a r i o

L a k e E r i e

G e o r g i a n B a y

T h a m e

R

s

Richelieu R

Fort Niagara Fort George

Kingston

Albany

Greenbush

Lewiston

Burlington Heights

York

Black Rock

Bualo

Prescott

Ogdensburg

French Mills

Beekmantown

Burlington

Otter Creek

Whitehall

Montreal

Erie

Isle aux Noix

Sackett’s Harbor

N E W Y O R K

P E N N S Y L V A N I A CONNECTICUT

V E R M O N T M A S S A C H U S E T T S U P P E R C A N A D A

L O W E R

C A N A D A L A K E O N TA R I O

OPERATIONAL AREA

March–September 1814

Battle Site

0 100 25

Miles

Map 1
•••• 16 ••••

The Battle of Chippewa, 5 July 1814

The Left Division began crossing into Canada after midnight on 

3 July. Brown had kept that date a secret, even accepting an invitation 

from his staff for a gala Fourth of July dinner. He knew that if there 

was a celebration of national independence, it would take place in a 

foreign land. A dense fog on the water delayed the movement. British 

pickets discovered Scott’s brigade as it landed on the western shore 

of the Niagara River and rushed back to warn the garrison of Fort 

Erie. The pilots of the vessels carrying Ripley’s brigade across Lake 

Erie lost their way and found the Canadian shore only after dawn. 

Scott’s and Ripley’s brigades surrounded Fort Erie, and the British 

commander surrendered his garrison of 137 soldiers late in the afternoon. All that night vessels went back and forth over the Niagara 

River ferrying Porter’s brigade, wagons, cannons, animals, and tons 

of supplies. The major campaign of 1814 had begun.

Alerted to the U.S. invasion but still unaware that Fort Erie had 

fallen, Maj. Gen. Phineas Riall, commanding the Right Division of 

the British Army of Upper Canada, directed reinforcements from Fort 

George to move south to the Chippewa River. He also sent orders to 

York for the 8th Regiment of Foot to sail immediately for Fort George. 

Lt. Col. Thomas Pearson, a particularly competent and experienced 

British officer, assembled a small force of infantry, native warriors, 

and dragoons to contest the American movement north from Fort 

Erie. Brown designated Scott’s brigade as the advance guard, and 

Independence Day found Scott’s and Pearson’s men disputing every 

stream crossing along the western shore of the Niagara River as the 

Americans pushed relentlessly northward.

Pearson’s troops drove off cattle and horses and destroyed every 

bridge over the numerous streams ahead of the advancing Americans. 

Fortunately, the water levels were low and allowed Scott’s men to ford 

with little difficulty. One particular incident in the approach caught 

Scott’s attention. He had sent Capt. Turner Crooker and his company 

of the 9th Infantry across a stream to cut off a party of Pearson’s 

men. The British withdrew before Crooker arrived. Scott watched 

from the south side of Black Creek as Crooker’s men crossed an open 

area north of that stream. Seemingly from nowhere, a detachment 

of British dragoons charged out of the woods heading directly for 

Crooker’s company. The captain immediately ordered his men to fall 

back to the shelter of a small house, from where the heavy fire of the 

infantrymen eventually drove back the dragoons. Scott asserted, “I 

have witnessed nothing more gallant in partisan war than was the 
•••• 17 ••••

conduct of Captain Crooker and 

his company.” Crooker won the 

first of many brevet promotions 

during the long campaign.

Scott’s brigade reached the 

Chippewa River. When Scott 

noted the strong defenses on the 

north bank, he moved south of 

Street’s Creek and established 

camp. During the evening, Ripley’s men arrived and pitched their 

tents as well. Both commanders 

sent out pickets to provide early 

warning of any British activity. 

Brown planned to attack the British position on the Chippewa on 

6 July after the arrival of Porter’s 

brigade. Riall had other ideas. 

He believed that the American 

units were fragile and would not 

withstand a determined assault. 

He resolved to strike as soon as 

the 8th Foot arrived.

Flat meadowland defined 

the area between the two camps. 

The long convex shore of the 

Niagara bordered the battlefield 

on the north and east while the Chippewa River, too wide to ford, 

lay to the northwest. A primeval forest, heavy with deadfall, lay to 

the southwest, and fordable Street’s Creek completed the perimeter 

of the battlefield. Of particular note, a long tongue of the forest 

extended to within a quarter mile of the Niagara, forming a natural 

defile between the camps and cutting the view between the bridges 

over the Chippewa and Street’s Creek (Map 2).

Early on 5 July, Riall sent Indian warriors and Canadian militiamen into the forest to determine the U.S. strength. From their 

reports, Riall estimated that he faced only two thousand Americans. 

The 8th Foot had just conducted a grueling eighteen-mile forced 

march from Fort George. Riall planned to attack at 1600 after the 

newly arrived infantrymen had an opportunity for a short rest. 

Meanwhile, Porter’s brigade approached the American camp from 

the south. 

Winfield Scott,

by Joseph Wood

(Library of Congress) •••••••••••••••
11th 25th

9th/22d

P O R T E R

S C O T T

PA Militia

Iroquois

ROYAL SCOTS

100th

8th

Indians

Militia

R I A L L

N i a g a r a R i v e r

N i a g a r a R i v e r

Lyon’s Creek

Street’s Creek

Chippewa Ri v e r

Rapids

Goat Island

N a v y

I s l a n d

Falls

Fort Schlosser

Chippewa

Manchester

B AT T L E O F C H I P P E WA

5 July 1814

0 1

Mile

Initial U.S. movement

Initial British movement

Main U.S. Attack

Main British Attack

Map 2
•••• 19 ••••

Brown conferred with Porter and directed him to clear the forest of 

the enemy. Porter assembled his brigade late in the afternoon and issued 

his orders. He formed a long thin line perpendicular to the Niagara 

River with the Iroquois on the left and the Pennsylvania militiamen on 

the right. Pennsylvania militiaman Private McMullen watched as the 

native warriors readied for the fight. “One of their chiefs in a speech, 

which for gesture and strength of lungs I had never heard equaled, was 

preparing them for a bloody battle.” The Iroquois put on red and black 

war paint and white headbands, while the militiamen removed their 

hats to better identify friend from foe. Leaders stepped ahead of the 

line and put out scouts even farther forward. On Porter’s command, 

the brigade, about eight hundred strong, entered the dark forest. As the 

extended skirmish line crossed Street’s Creek, it overwhelmed a body of 

British-allied Indians. Riall sent a small battalion of Canadian militiamen and more native warriors into the forest from the north. Porter’s 

line disintegrated as small bodies on both sides rushed one another in 

close combat. While the desperate no-quarter fighting continued in the 

forest, Brown spotted dust rising from the direction of the bridge over 

the Chippewa, indicating Riall’s advance had begun.

General Scott was forming his brigade in camp to drill in the 

meadow north of Street’s Creek when Brown rode up and ordered 

him to cross the creek and fight the approaching British. At first, Scott 

could hardly believe that the British would leave their strong defensive 

line to give battle. However, British cannonballs flying over the head 

of Maj. Henry Leavenworth’s battalion persuaded everyone that a 

battle was in the offing. Leavenworth’s combined battalion of the 9th 

Infantry and 22d Infantry led the brigade across the Street’s Creek 

bridge followed by Col. John B. Campbell’s 11th Infantry and Maj. 

Thomas S. Jesup’s 25th Infantry. Meanwhile in the forest, Colonel 

Pearson led a battalion of British light infantry into the fray, routing 

the Americans and their Iroquois allies. As they retraced their steps 

through the forest, Porter’s men passed over the bodies of eightyseven British-allied Indians and eighteen Canadian militiamen. The 

Americans had lost twelve dead in fighting.

General Riall carefully brought his brigade through the defile 

and placed two battalions forward, the 100th Regiment of Foot on 

the right and the Royal Scots on the left. He then positioned small 

artillery batteries on each flank and maintained the 8th Foot in reserve. For his part, Scott positioned Leavenworth’s battalion on the 

right of the line. Campbell moved his men to the left of Leavenworth. 

After he collapsed with a severe knee wound, Campbell was quickly 

evacuated, and command of the 11th Infantry passed to Maj. John 
•••• 20 ••••

McNeil. Scott, watching Porter’s men streaming to the rear along the 

wood line, sent Jesup and the 25th into the forest to secure the left 

flank of the brigade and to work their way around the British right 

flank. Capt. Nathan Towson, Scott’s artillery commander, brought 

his guns up between Leavenworth’s line and the Niagara River and 

U.S. Corps of Artillery, 1814–1821, by H. Charles McBarron Jr. 

(Company of Military Historians)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 21 ••••

soon returned British fire. The British approached the American line, 

and the musketry volleys commenced.

When he first saw Leavenworth’s gray-jacketed troops crossing 

the bridge, Riall remarked to the commander of the 100th Foot that 

he would have no trouble, as the troops were obviously militiamen. 

However, as Scott’s brigade deployed into line heedless of the screaming shot and shell, Riall realized his error and remarked, “These are 

regulars!” Both sides were quite evenly matched. Not counting Porter’s brigade or Pearson’s command fighting in the forest, Riall had 

about 1,400 infantrymen and 6 pieces of artillery on the Chippewa 

plain, while Scott had 1,350 infantry and 7 guns. 

Hardly an opening existed between the two leading British battalions as they pressed forward. Scott had left a sizable gap between 

Leavenworth’s and McNeil’s battalions; thus, they overlapped the flanks 

of the oncoming British. Scott saw an opportunity and ordered McNeil 

to throw his left flank forward. Soon the 11th Infantry faced the 100th 

Foot at an oblique angle, and, as the British approached, U.S. fire was 

striking them in the flank. The two sides fired furiously at one another. 

Every American cartridge contained three buckshot and a musket 

ball, which caused greater destruction than the British ammunition. 

Although the British decried “buck and ball” as ungentlemanly, they 

could not dispute its effectiveness. A British artillery shot severed Capt. 

Thomas Harrison’s leg below the knee, but he refused attention until 

after the battle. Scott noted that “so glorious a display of fortitude had 

the happiest effect.” Lt. Col. John Gordon, leading the Royal Scots, 

was shot through the mouth and unable to give commands. When 

an American bullet severed the Achilles tendon of the Marquess of 

Tweeddale, commander of the 100th Foot, his men placed him on a 

horse so that he could remain effectively in command. Neither side 

would budge. It all came down to the two regiments not yet in contact: 

the British 8th Foot and Jesup’s 25th Infantry. 

Riall ordered the commander of the 8th Foot, Maj. Thomas Evans, to bring his men into the fight on the far right of the British line. 

However, before Evans could do so, Jesup marched his men out of the 

forest and onto the British right flank. Jesup had his men fire three 

quick volleys and then attack into the British. McNeil saw the 25th 

advancing and ordered his battalion forward. Soon, Leavenworth 

had his men assault as well. The British line lost cohesion as soldiers 

withdrew, bringing many of their wounded with them. Soon, Riall’s 

brigade was back across the Chippewa River, with the men removing 

the bridge planking as they retreated. The Battle of Chippewa was 

over, and the Americans were exultant.
•••• 22 ••••

Among regulars, Indians, and militia, Riall had between 2,130 

and 2,280 in the fight on 5 July. Of these, approximately 500 were 

killed, wounded, or missing, which amounted to a casualty rate of 

about 22 percent. Brown’s Left Division had 2,105 engaged and suffered 325 losses, or about 15 percent. However, soldiers and warriors 

were not the only casualties. After the battle, Capt. Benjamin Ropes 

of the 21st Infantry recalled that “our doctor was very angry after 

the action. The enemy hove a cannon shot through his marquee [large 

tent] in which lay his hospital stores. [It] struck a cask [of] wine and 

he lost the whole.” Wine, of course, was used in various medical 

treatments during the nineteenth century. 

In an oft-quoted passage, historian Henry Adams wrote, 

The battle of Chippewa was the only occasion during the war when 

equal bodies of regular troops met face to face, in extended lines on 

an open plain in broad daylight, without advantage of position; and 

never again after that combat was an army of American regulars 

beaten by British troops. Small as the affair was, and unimportant 

in military results, it gave to the United States Army a character 

and pride it had never before possessed.

The Battle of Chippewa, by H. Charles McBarron Jr.

(U.S. Army Art Collection)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 23 ••••

Scott stands out as the person most closely associated with this victory, not only for his inspirational battlefield leadership, but also for 

his work in training his officers and men during the months preceding 

the invasion. General Brown sent a report to Secretary of War Armstrong noting that “Scott is entitled to the highest honors our country 

can bestow to him, more than to any other man, am I indebted for 

the victory of the fifth of July.” The troops idolized Scott. Captain 

McIntire of the Corps of Artillery wrote to a friend that “Genl. 

Brown is a very industrious officer but I consider Genl. Scott as the 

life and soul of that army.” Madison conferred brevet promotions 

for gallantry to Scott’s three battalion commanders—Leavenworth, 

McNeil, and Jesup—and to three other officers.

Brown lost no time in exploiting his victory. He had not destroyed 

Riall’s force; the Left Division had much work yet to do. Over the 

next several days, the men of the Left Division buried their dead and 

those of their enemy. Ripley’s brigade built a bridge upriver from 

Riall. Threatened with being outflanked, Riall withdrew his men to 

Fort George. Brown put his division on the march and moved in pursuit. General Drummond at Kingston read Riall’s battle report and 

immediately decided to confront the Americans along the Niagara 

River. He ordered several battalions to sail or march to Fort George 

and Burlington Heights. For their part, most of the native warriors 

withdrew from the campaign. Iroquois on both sides were sickened 

by the heavy casualties among their clans. Red Jacket, the nationalist, 

had achieved his goal; he got the Iroquois out of the war with honor. 

Reinforcements joined the Left Division to make up for the departure 

of the Iroquois. Lt. Col. Philetus Swift brought his battalion of six 

hundred New York Volunteers, and 2d Lt. David Douglass marched 

into camp with his company of bombardiers, sappers, and miners. 

This unique unit, with engineering and artillery skills, had recently 

been a demonstration company at West Point.

Brown halted the Left Division at Queenston Heights while he 

waited for Chauncey and the Lake Ontario naval squadron. He had 

only four 18-pounder guns with his division, not enough, in his opinion, to batter down the walls of Fort George. At this point, Brown 

received a disquieting letter from General Gaines at Sackett’s Harbor. 

Gaines stated that he thought it unlikely that Chauncey would sail 

soon, and, if he did, Chauncey would focus on Yeo’s squadron, not 

on assisting the army on the Niagara. 

With his campaign unraveling, Brown moved to force the issue with 

Riall. On 20 July, he marched the Left Division to within a mile of Fort 

George and offered battle, but the British commander refused to leave 
•••• 24 ••••

the safety of his fortifications. After the army arrived in front of Fort 

George, Scott and a party of officers inspected the fortification through 

telescopes from about a mile away. A gun barked out from the fort. Scott, 

seeing the muzzle flash, raised his sword to measure the trajectory and 

saw that the cannon shot was coming straight at his group. Scott and his 

officers wheeled their horses and scattered just as the round impacted 

on the spot where they had been standing. All escaped without injury.

Disappointed that the British would not meet him in battle, Brown 

reluctantly marched the Left Division back to its camp south of the 

Chippewa River. He then decided to attack Burlington Heights and 

block the road to York, thereby cutting Riall’s supply line. While 

Brown got his men ready to move, General Drummond arrived at 

Fort Niagara on 24 July, determined to turn back the U.S. invasion.

Learning that the Americans at Youngstown, New York, were 

building artillery positions that could fire on Fort George, Drummond 

ordered five hundred troops from Fort Niagara to capture the guns 

and destroy any boats on the eastern bank of the Niagara River as 

far south as Lewiston, New York. He ordered Riall to move with two 

small brigades closer to the U.S. position south of the Chippewa to 

distract Brown from the operation on the New York side of the river. 

Riall then sent his men to occupy a low ridge along Lundy’s Lane 

within a mile of Niagara Falls. 

The British raiding party found neither guns nor boats in New 

York and returned to Fort Niagara. However, the militiamen guarding 

the stockpile of supplies at Fort Schlosser panicked and sent urgent 

reports across the river to Brown. The American general feared losing 

his supplies just as he was readying his division to move on Burlington 

Heights. Unable to reinforce Fort Schlosser, he decided to send Scott 

and his brigade north to Queenston Heights. Scott’s movement on 

the western shore might intimidate the British on the eastern shore 

enough to break off their advance. Brown had dismissed reports from 

his pickets of sightings of British dragoons and infantry. For his part, 

Scott believed that he had been ordered to find and fight the British. 

The Battle of Lundy’s Lane was about to begin.

The Battle of Lundy’s Lane, 25 July 1814

Scott’s brigade consisted of about eleven hundred infantrymen in 

four regiments: Leavenworth’s 9th, McNeil’s 11th, Col. Hugh Brady’s 

22d, and Jesup’s 25th. For support, Scott had Bvt. Maj. Nathan Towson’s artillery company and Capt. Samuel Harris’ company of light 

dragoons. As the brigade moved northward, Scott received a report 

that about eleven hundred enemy were situated along Lundy’s Lane. 
•••• 25 ••••

Without personally viewing the British position, Scott decided to attack and sent a note to Brown to that effect (Map 3). 

As the U.S. column emerged from the woods, Scott realized that 

the enemy was in greater strength than had been reported. Nonetheless, he decided to press the attack. Looking across a large open area 

surrounded by woods, Lundy’s Lane sat six hundred yards away atop 

a long, low ridge that at its highest point rose about fifty feet above 

the surrounding area, with five British guns positioned near the summit. The gun crews opened fire as Scott’s men deployed into a long 

line parallel to Lundy’s Lane. Scott sent Jesup into the woods to the 

east with orders to move on the left flank of the British line. Towson 

posted his two 6-pounder guns and a howitzer on Portage Road, 

which ran alongside the Niagara River, and returned fire. However, 

with the objectives on higher ground, the U.S. guns missed their targets. Thus, the American fire was less accurate and less deadly than 

the British, whose round shot bounced through the lines of infantry. 

British grape and round shot methodically ravaged Scott’s brigade 

for about an hour in the dwindling light. U.S. infantrymen opened 

fire with their muskets at a range of nearly four hundred yards and 

inflicted few casualties. McNeil was wounded early in the action, 

and every company commander in his regiment was either killed or 

wounded. Colonel Brady was wounded as well but refused to leave 

his men. Drummer Jarvis Hanks remembered a particular act of 

bravery amid the carnage. As a drummer, he stood very near to the 

regimental flag in the center of the 11th Infantry’s line. The enemy 

aimed at the color party hoping to break the morale of the regiment. 

During this engagement, nine different persons were shot down, 

under this flag, successively. At last, this sergeant Festus Thompson, 

took it and threw its proud folds to the breeze. He was wounded 

in the hip, and the staff was severed into splinters in his hand. But 

he again grasped it by the stump, and waved it triumphantly over 

his own, and his fellow soldiers’ heads, until the close of the battle.

One element of Scott’s brigade, Jesup’s 25th Infantry, found success on its part of the battlefield. Jesup led his men stealthily through 

the woods and drove off a battalion of Canadian militia. He then 

posted his troops to watch the junction where Lundy’s Lane met 

Portage Road. In the rapidly fading light, the 25th captured more 

than two hundred British troops traveling through the crossroads. 

One of the captives was General Riall, who had been wounded and 

was heading to the rear to seek medical attention. 
89th

8th 41st

1st Militia

Militia

R I A L L

D R U M M O N D

25th

21st

23d

1st

11th

22d 9th

R I P L E Y

S C O T T

R a p i d s

N i a g a r a R i v e r

Falls Goat Island

to Queenstown

L U N D Y ’ S L A N E

P O R T A G E R O A D

Chippewa

Manchester

B AT T L E O F L U N D Y ’ S L A N E

25 July 1814

0 1

Mile

Initial U.S. Attack

U.S. Reinforcements

British Reinforcements

Map 3
•••• 27 ••••

The second phase of the 

battle began in the dark as the 

rest of the Left Division entered 

the fray. As soon as he heard 

the cannons fire from the north, 

General Brown directed Ripley 

to assemble his men and the artillery and march to Scott’s aid. 

He ordered Porter to prepare his 

brigade to march as well. None 

of the U.S. generals—Brown, 

Ripley, or Porter—had expected 

a major battle, and now they urgently summoned their soldiers 

from guard details and work parties to form and advance toward 

the sound of the guns. Arriving 

on the battlefield, Brown saw 

the many dead, wounded, and 

stragglers from Scott’s brigade. 

He also saw an opportunity with 

the British having moved out 

from behind their defenses and 

in position to give battle. Maj. 

William McRee, Brown’s chief 

engineer, conducted a reconnaissance of the British line and reported 

that the artillery position atop the ridge was the key to the battle. 

Brown agreed and ordered Col. James Miller to attack the enemy 

battery with the 21st Infantry. Miller famously replied, “I’ll try, sir.”

Ripley formed his brigade in the dark between Scott’s shattered 

brigade and Drummond’s extensive line. He sent Maj. Daniel McFarland’s 23d Infantry to the right of Miller’s battalion. Most unexpectedly, 

a new unit appeared on the battlefield. Lt. Col. Robert C. Nicholas 

brought with him two companies, about a hundred fifty men, of the 

1st Infantry. The 1st Infantry had been in St. Louis when it received 

Secretary of War Armstrong’s orders in March to move east. Traveling 

by boat and road, the regiment had reached Buffalo that day and had 

continued on to the American camp, arriving just in time to join the 

battle. Ripley positioned Nicholas on the left of the 21st. Due to the 

darkness, however, none of the regimental commanders could see one 

another and Ripley could not coordinate the assault. There was every 

reason to believe that the crucial attack would miscarry.

Eleazar W. Ripley 

(Minnesota Military 

Museum) •••••••••••••••
•••• 28 ••••

And miscarry it nearly did. The 1st Infantry stepped off and immediately drew intense fire from the numerous British troops on the 

ridge. The fire stopped the Americans cold, and Nicholas withdrew 

them to re-form for a second try. On the far right, the men of the 

23d were greeted with the fierce musket fire that was the hallmark 

of stalwart British infantry. Momentarily recoiling, the regiment approached to within twenty yards of the British line and opened its 

own fire. In the ensuing exchange, British musketry cut down Major 

McFarland.

With the British infantry distracted by the attacks of the 1st 

Infantry and 23d Infantry, Miller was able to move his men stealthily forward toward the artillery. The 21st Infantry delivered a single 

volley that bowled the British gunners over. The Americans followed 

with a furious bayonet assault that overran the enemy artillery. Miller 

re-formed his lines quickly as Ripley moved his other two battalions 

to the crest of the ridge. The maneuver occurred just in time, as the 

British 89th Regiment of Foot was starting up the northern slope, 

determined to recapture the lost guns. The next few minutes’ fighting was intense. Captain Ropes of the 21st Infantry observed, “The 

enemy finding he had lost his artillery made some desperate charges 

to retake it and gain the rise of ground, but all in vain for our men 

Lundy’s Lane (Niagara Falls Museum)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 29 ••••

fought like bull dogs. So close did they charge that the fire from their 

discharges would seem to strike our faces.” 

The Americans beat back the first attack, and General Drummond ordered the 89th to assault again. It marched to within twenty 

yards of the American line, halted, and delivered volley after volley. The U.S. infantry returned fire with equal speed and accuracy. 

Drummond threw nearby units into the fray, but American steadiness 

prevailed and the British line receded into the darkness. Drummond’s 

horse was shot out from under him, and a bullet passed through the 

general’s neck. Refusing medical attention, he tied handkerchiefs 

around the wound and continued to lead his soldiers. He refused 

to accept the loss of the guns and sent riders to gather nearby units 

for another assault. Meanwhile, Brown sent Porter with about three 

hundred men to form the left of the U.S. line, bending it back to better 

protect the flank. Jesup brought the 25th Infantry up the ridge and 

positioned his men just south of Lundy’s Lane and linked in with 

Ripley’s brigade on his left. Maj. Jacob Hindman brought his three artillery companies forward and spread them across the American front. 

Bvt. Lt. Col. Henry Leavenworth gathered the remnants of Scott’s 

brigade and formed them as a single composite battalion behind the 

center of the U.S. line. General Brown and his aide rode forward in 

the darkness to get some sense of the location of the British. After 

perceiving some troop movement to their front, Brown’s aide boldly 

called out, “What regiment is that?” “The Royal Scots,” came the 

response, inadvertently giving away their position. Rewarded with 

this intelligence, the two Americans quickly returned to their line.

Drummond had assembled about three thousand soldiers in 

a lengthy line a few hundred yards north of Lundy’s Lane. They 

tramped forward and up the slope toward the thin American line, 

stopping about forty yards away. Both sides opened fire with controlled volleys. British fire cut down so many U.S. artillerists that too 

few remained to man the guns. Sgt. James Commins of the 8th Regiment of Foot had only one explanation for the determination of the 

U.S. infantry. “The Yankees was loth to quit their position and being 

well fortified with whiskey made them stand longer than ever they 

did.” Sergeant Commins, like Drummond, was unwilling to accept 

that the U.S. Army was now on parity with the British regiments in 

Canada. British attitudes would change by the end of the campaign. 

Unable to break the American line, Drummond withdrew his 

men to regroup them for another try. After about twenty to thirty 

minutes, the British surged forward for another counterattack. The 

two sides opened fire. Ripley urged Brown to bring Scott’s brigade 
•••• 30 ••••

back into the action. Brown gave the order, and Scott directed Leavenworth to form the remaining two hundred fifty soldiers of the 1st 

Brigade into an attack column. Scott later wrote that he “resolved 

to try an experiment,” and led the column through the 2d Brigade 

Private of Scott's brigade, 1814, by Don Troiani

(Don Troiani Image Bank)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 31 ••••

directly toward the British line. However, in the darkness and on the 

steeply sloping ground, the column veered hard to the left, so that it 

moved between the U.S. and British lines. Receiving fire from friend 

and foe alike, Scott and Leavenworth managed to return to the far 

left of the American position. 

For its part, Porter’s brigade was deep in the fighting, standing in 

line of battle exchanging volleys with the British. Private McMullen 

recalled,

I had twenty rounds of cartridge in my box when I went to the 

battle ground, and when the firing ceased on examining my box I 

found that the last was in my musket. Cartridges and flints were now 

hastily distributed along the line, and our brave brigade, blackened 

with powder, marched forward toward the top of the hill to drive 

the enemy from his position there. In our march we passed over 

the dead and dying, who were literally in heaps, especially where 

the British had stood during the battle. 

For a second time, Drummond saw that his attack had stalled. He 

signaled a withdrawal to reorganize his men for another push. 

About 2330, the British made the third and final attempt to force 

the Left Division off of the ridge. The Royal Scots and the 89th Foot

were locked in desperate hand-to-hand fighting with the 1st Infantry 

and 21st Infantry. Ripley was everywhere urging his men to fight on. 

Two musket balls pierced his hat, and his horse was shot out from 

under him. On the far left, Scott and Leavenworth formed up the 

two hundred undaunted survivors of the 1st Brigade. Without waiting for orders, Scott led these brave men out from the American line. 

As the British sensed the oncoming assault, they opened a fierce fire 

that fractured the U.S. column into two pieces. The trailing portion 

withdrew to the American line, while the enemy destroyed the leading fragment. Capt. Abraham Hull, son of the disgraced General 

William Hull and cousin of naval hero Capt. Isaac Hull, lost his life 

at the head of the U.S. bayonet assault.

After he brought his wrecked brigade back to the American 

line, Scott galloped off to see his orphaned battalion, Bvt. Lt. Col. 

Thomas Jesup’s 25th Infantry. While Scott and Jesup conversed, 

British musket fire found the two officers. Jesup received his third 

wound of the day but remained on his feet. Scott was not so fortunate; struck down and unconscious, he was out of the battle and the 

war. At about the same time, two bullets struck General Brown. He 

was evacuated from the battlefield, unable to continue in command. 
•••• 32 ••••

At this most critical moment, just when so many U.S. officers were 

out of the fight, General Drummond called off the attack. The British 

infantrymen receded into the darkness, and the Americans paused 

to evacuate their wounded. 

Ripley reported to Brown for orders. Weak from loss of blood, 

Brown directed Ripley to march the men back to camp to get water 

and ammunition and to be back on the battlefield at dawn to fight 

the British if they should appear. Ripley got the army moving back 

to camp but failed to tell the regimental commanders to prepare 

their men to reoccupy the ridge they had so valiantly defended. The 

few uninjured American artillerists did what they could to withdraw 

their guns from the exposed position atop the ridge. However, from 

miscommunication and lack of horses, the artillerymen failed to 

bring back the captured British cannons. Once back at their tents, 

the exhausted Americans rested as best as they could. Some of the 

worst wounded were already on their way to the hospitals in Buffalo 

and nearby Williamsville, New York.

As the sun rose the next morning, the soldiers realized how harsh 

the fighting had been. Private McMullen noted that “the next morning a scene of distress presented itself to my view, which I hope I may 

never witness again. I started early to see Thomas Poe, hearing he 

was lying in a house at Chippewa, a short distance from our camp. 

Calling at some of the tents as I passed along, I found that nearly all 

of them contained one or more wounded men, their clothes covered 

with blood and they were suffering severely.” 

Once the sun was up, Brown became aware that his division 

was still in camp. Frustrated that Ripley had disobeyed his orders, 

he directed the army to march. Just before 0900 Ripley led about 

fifteen hundred soldiers back to the battlefield, only to discover that 

Drummond had reoccupied the ridge after dawn. Vastly outnumbered, Ripley turned his men around and returned to camp. When he 

reported his failure to Brown, the division commander was furious. 

As he was being evacuated across the Niagara River, Brown sent 

word to General Gaines at Sackett’s Harbor to report immediately 

and assume command of the Left Division. 

Ripley then gave an order that shocked many of his officers. He 

directed the division to give up its excellent defensive position south 

of the Chippewa River and to move to the ferry site opposite Black 

Rock, New York. When subordinate commanders protested his actions, Ripley, unwilling to accept responsibility for the army if it 

remained in Canada, sought permission from the wounded Brown 

to withdraw back into the United States. Refusing to accept that the 
•••• 33 ••••

campaign had been a failure, Brown gave Ripley a written order to 

defend Fort Erie. Twenty-four days after the invasion began, the Left 

Division was back where it started. 

The Battle of Lundy’s Lane was the largest and hardest fought 

engagement of the war until that time. The Left Division went toeto-toe with some of the finest British battalions in North America 

and retained possession of the battlefield until voluntarily withdrawing. Clearly, the U.S. Army had become equal to the regular British 

and Canadian regiments in the theater. Casualties were heavy and 

roughly equal.

Army Killed Wounded Missing/Captured Total

British 84 559 235 878

American 173 571 117 861

Yet, as the sun rose on 26 July 1814, the initiative had passed to the 

British, and the campaign would extend deep into the autumn.

The Siege of Fort Erie, 1 August–17 September 1814

When the Americans captured Fort Erie in early July, it had 

consisted of two stone barracks and two earthen bastions. The small 

garrison Brown had left behind had erected a redoubt to protect the 

bastions. Still, the fort was hardly large enough to accommodate more 

than two hundred men. The Left Division returned to Fort Erie on 27 

July. The following day, Bvt. Lt. Col. William McRee and Bvt. Maj. 

Eleazar Wood began laying out a fortified camp. Fort Erie anchored 

the northern end of the camp, and a large sand mound known locally 

as Snake Hill anchored the southern. A breastwork and ditch seven 

hundred fifty yards long connected the two positions. Work parties 

labored without rest; Drummond and his army were expected at any 

moment. The breastwork was six to seven feet high, and the ditch 

outside the earthworks was three to four feet deep. The men also 

constructed traverses—earthen walls set at right angles to the breastwork—to stop any incoming cannonballs from careening through 

the length of the camp. Soldiers cut down small trees, sharpened the 

branches, and embedded them into the breastwork and ditch and 

outside the ditch to create an abatis, an additional barrier protecting 

the camp from a direct infantry assault. Engineer Lieutenant Douglass fortified a limestone kiln between Fort Erie and the shoreline, 

converting it into an artillery site. Work parties leveled Snake Hill 

and built timber gun platforms. Captain Towson placed his artillery 

pieces atop the resulting strong position, called Towson’s Battery. 
•••• 34 ••••

Three schooners cruised offshore, adding protection to the camp. 

Regular shuttles across the Niagara between Fort Erie and Buffalo 

brought supplies and reinforcements and evacuated the wounded. As 

each day passed, the American fortification grew stronger. 

For his part, General Drummond lost several days resupplying 

his men and waiting for reinforcements before pursuing the Left 

Division. His delay probably saved the U.S. position. Drummond 

ordered a raid on the New York side of the river for the purpose of 

destroying boats and supplies around Black Rock and Buffalo. In 

the early hours of 3 August, six hundred British regulars crossed the 

Niagara and began their march south. Maj. Ludowick Morgan, a 

gifted tactician, had seen signs of British activity the previous day. 

Suspecting British intentions, he led a small battalion of the 1st 

Rifle Regiment to a strong position immediately south of Conjocta 

Creek. For nearly three hours the British attempted to cross the steepbanked creek, each assault rebuffed by accurate rifle fire. Despairing 

of accomplishing their mission, the British called off the raid and 

recrossed the river. Drummond had lost his best chance to cut off 

Fort Erie from its supplies. 

General Drummond decided to lay siege to the American camp. 

Over the next two weeks he moved more than two thousand men, 

supplies, heavy artillery, and ammunition toward Fort Erie. Drummond was confident that superior British discipline would overcome 

the shaky American foe. He had not fully accepted the notion that 

the men of the Left Division were well trained and well led. General 

Gaines arrived at Fort Erie on 4 August to assume command from 

the brave but pessimistic Ripley, who resumed command of his brigade. Capt. J. B. Varnum, writing to his senator-father, noted, “since 

Gen[eral] Gaines has taken command, a new life and spirit appears to 

have been inspired into our army.” Gaines energetically took charge. 

He sent parties of men into the forest to skirmish with the British 

pickets nearly every day. In one of these forays, British fire cut down 

Major Morgan at the head of his men. The Americans mourned the 

passing of this gallant leader and redoubled their efforts to prepare 

for an assault that was sure to come. Gaines kept one-third of the 

division awake throughout the night hours. The remainder slept fully 

clothed with their weapons at their sides. 

Drummond’s engineers served him less well than the U.S. engineers served their commander. The first battery constructed proved 

too far away to bring the most effective fire on the American camp. 

A Canadian observer related that he doubted “if one shot in ten 

reached the rampart at all, and the fortunate exceptions that struck the 
The American Soldier, 1814, by H. Charles McBarron Jr.

(U.S. Army Art Collection)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 36 ••••

stone building at which they were 

aimed, rebounded from its sides 

as innocuous as tennis balls.” 

Nonetheless, the sheer quantity 

of cannon and mortar fire took 

its toll. It knocked over rows of 

tents and disrupted camp life. Dr. 

William E. Horner treated casualties in a field hospital across the 

river in Buffalo. 

I remember, one day, in making 

my hospital rounds, a patient 

just arrived presented an amputated forearm, and in doing so 

could scarcely restrain a broad 

laugh; the titter was constantly 

on his face. “What’s the matter? 

This does not strike me as a 

subject of laughter.” “It is not, 

Doctor, but excuse me, I lost 

my arm in so funny a way, that 

I still laugh, whenever I look 

at it.” “What way?” “Our first 

Sergeant wanted shaving, and 

got me to attend to it, as I am a 

Corporal. We went out together in front of his tent, I had lathered 

him, took him by the nose, and was just about applying the razor, 

when a cannon ball came, and that was the last I saw of his head 

and of my hand. Excuse me, doctor, for laughing so; I never saw 

such a thing before.” 

Drummond carefully planned a three-pronged night assault. Lt. 

Col. Victor Fischer would conduct the main effort, a bayonet assault 

by a thousand infantrymen around the southern flank. Drummond 

had directed that Fischer’s men remove the flints from their firelocks so that an accidental discharge would not warn the Americans 

standing guard in the night. Fischer would lead his men into the gap 

between Snake Hill and Lake Erie, unaware that the Americans had 

recently constructed an abatis across this area. The second prong of 

the strike would spring forward when Drummond heard the noise of 

Americans firing at Fischer’s men. Col. Hercules Scott would then 

Edmund P. Gaines,

by Rembrandt Peale

(Historical Society of 

Pennsylvania)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 37 ••••

lead seven hundred men against the breastworks connecting Fort Erie 

to the lake. Once this attack commenced, Lt. Col. William Drummond would lead a charge of three hundred sixty soldiers, sailors, 

and marines directly into Fort Erie. General Drummond expected 

that these two secondary assaults would persuade Gaines not to send 

reinforcements to stop Fischer’s onslaught at the southern end of 

the U.S. camp. Gaines had about twenty-six hundred men, mostly 

veterans, waiting for the British offensive.

Fischer moved out of the cover of the forest about 0200 on 15 

August. American pickets, fully expecting a night attack, gave warning 

and scurried as fast as they could through a narrow opening in the 

abatis to the safety of the camp. Fischer’s men followed so closely that 

2d Lt. William Belknap of the 23d Infantry, bringing up the rear of the 

pickets, received a bayonet wound while entering camp. As Fischer’s 

soldiers rounded the corner of Snake Hill, they encountered the abatis. 

Major Wood, leading four companies of the 21st Infantry, directed 

his men to fire over the abatis and into Fischer’s troops. During the 

attack, the guns of the battery commanded by Captain Towson fired 

so quickly that after the battle, the Americans referred to it as Towson’s Lighthouse. Caught in a blizzard of musket and artillery fire, 

dozens of British infantrymen moved into the waters of Lake Erie 

in an attempt to work their way into the rear of the American line. 

General Ripley sent two companies to counter this threat. Over the 

long minutes of the engagement, the Americans killed, wounded, or 

captured over a hundred sixty British soldiers. Finally, Fischer had 

no choice but to call off the attack. 

As Fischer’s survivors retreated into the forest, Colonel Scott 

ordered his attack to commence. Again, American pickets gave ample 

warning and returned to the protection of their line. The defenders 

heard Scott’s officers urging the men forward. Without waiting to see 

their foe, the Americans opened with tremendous musket and cannon 

fire. Scott was mortally wounded almost immediately when a musket 

ball penetrated his forehead. His second in command and fourteen 

officers also fell. With few leaders remaining, the attack column broke 

up and returned to the protection of the forest. 

Of the three prongs of the British strike, Colonel Drummond’s 

assault into Fort Erie achieved the most success. The British attackers scrambled into the ditch and threw ladders against the northeast 

bastion of the fort. In the desperate hand-to-hand fighting, no quarter 

was granted by either side. The two artillery officers commanding the 

bastion, Capt. Alexander Williams and 1st Lt. Patrick McDonough, 

died defending their guns. The British captured the bastion but could 
•••• 38 ••••

move no farther into the fort. Gaines sent reinforcements into the 

deadly brawl but could not force out the tenacious attackers. 

Lieutenant Douglass, who commanded the U.S. battery close to 

the fort, recalled, 

But suddenly, every sound was hushed by the sense of an unnatural 

tremor, beneath our feet, like the first heave of an earthquake; and 

almost at the same instant, the centre of the bastion burst up, with 

a terrific explosion; and a jet of flame, mingled with fragments of 

timber, earth, stone, and bodies of men, rose, to the height of one or 

two hundred feet, in the air, and fell, in a shower of ruins, to a great 

distance, all around. One of my men was killed by the falling timber.

No one can say for certain what caused the explosion of the gunpowder stored in the bastion. The attacking force was all but annihilated. 

Colonel Drummond was among the dead. The British assault was 

over. 

The next day, U.S. defenders found more than a hundred bodies 

in the ruins of the bastion. First Lt. Jonathan Kearsley of the 4th 

U.S. Rifle Regiment stated, “Day soon after dawned and an appalling scene presented itself—some dying, others groaning under their 

wounds and dead bodies heaped upon them, other[s] burnt and blind, 

many crying out for water to slake their burning thirst, in short every 

form of human suffering and misery.” Kearsley himself had received 

a bayonet wound over his left eye in the close combat. The Americans 

sent dozens of severely wounded soldiers, friend and foe alike, to the 

hospital in Buffalo. General Drummond reported 905 casualties in a 

battle that had lasted less than three hours. Gaines counted 2 officers 

and 15 soldiers killed and 57 wounded. Brown recognized Gaines as 

the architect of the stunning U.S. victory, and President Madison 

rewarded him with a brevet promotion to major general. Brown’s 

decision to replace Ripley with Gaines had been fully vindicated. 

Despite the heavy losses of the night attack and an unsure supply of food, Drummond decided to continue the siege. It rained 

nearly every day, and soldiers in both camps struggled with the 

mud as they strengthened their defensive lines. The British opened a 

second battery, much closer to the U.S.-held fort, and started work 

on a third battery, nearer still. Some days as many as five hundred 

rounds of shot, shell, and Congreve rockets landed in the American 

camp. Eventually, the men inside Fort Erie became somewhat used 

to the persistent cannonade. Lieutenant Douglass observed that “the 

soldier-boys of the camp were seen constantly running races with 
•••• 39 ••••

spent balls and throwing stones 

at a bombshell, just ready to 

explode, in much the same spirit 

as we see them, sometimes, stoning a hornet’s nest.” Then, on 28 

August, a British shell crashed 

through Gaines’ headquarters, 

severely injuring the general. 

Brown, still recovering from his 

wounds, refused to hand command of the fort to Ripley. He 

left his sick bed in Batavia, New 

York, and moved to Fort Erie to 

assume personal command of the 

2,246-soldier garrison. 

Both sides poured reinforcements into the siege. At Plattsburgh, General Izard reluctantly 

obeyed a questionable order from 

Secretary of War Armstrong and 

led the Right Division across 

New York to assist the Left Division on the Niagara. Not to be 

outdone, Prevost sent thousands 

of British soldiers to Drummond 

and positioned nearly fourteen 

thousand more men to move on Plattsburgh. Feeling hard pressed 

by the British counteroffensive, General Brown asked New York 

Governor Daniel Tompkins to call out the militia for operations 

along the Niagara River. Tompkins was more concerned with the 

defenses of New York City in the face of news that Britain was sending thousands of veteran troops to North America. Nonetheless, he 

gave his aide, Lt. Col. John B. Yates, full authority to summon the 

militia of western New York for federal service. Yates immediately 

called four thousand militiamen to rendezvous at Williamsville on 1 

September. General Porter departed Fort Erie immediately to arm 

and equip this force with the intention of aiding the Left Division.

By 9 September, more than three thousand New York militiamen 

had gathered at Buffalo. General Porter assembled the men in a drizzling rain and asked for volunteers to cross the Niagara to relieve the 

Left Division. A few hundred volunteered immediately, and, with a 

band playing martial music, Porter marched these men around the 

Peter B. Porter,

by Lars Sellstedt

(Buffalo and Erie County 

Historical Society) •••••••••••••••
•••• 40 ••••

others. Heartened by the opportunity to fight under Generals Brown 

and Porter to break the siege at Fort Erie, hundreds more joined 

them. Eventually, Porter marched twenty-two hundred New York 

citizen-soldiers to the river, where boats began shuttling them across 

to Fort Erie. Once in Canada, the New Yorkers established a camp 

near Snake Hill and constructed breastworks to protect themselves. 

Now, Brown had the men necessary to break the siege.

After learning that only about one-third of the British force was 

assigned to protect the three batteries while the rest remained in camp 

two miles away, Brown determined to launch a raid to destroy the 

siege guns. Porter would lead a strong column of regulars, volunteers, 

militia, and Indians through the forest to attack Battery 3. The raid 

would follow two trails that American axmen had carved through 

the woods to within a hundred fifty yards of the target. Col. James 

Gibson, a West Point graduate, would command the advance guard 

of two hundred riflemen and native warriors. Another West Pointer, 

Major Wood, would lead the column moving along the right trail 

while militia Brig. Gen. Daniel Davis led the column on the left. 

Meanwhile, Bvt. Brig. Gen. James Miller, formerly commander of the 

21st Infantry, would infiltrate a smaller column of about six hundred 

fifty regulars from Fort Erie to occupy a ravine north of the fort. 

When he heard Porter’s column assaulting Battery 3, Miller would 

lead his men toward Battery 2. General Ripley would command a 

small reserve of regulars, about five hundred fifty soldiers. With the 

plan set, Porter’s men moved into the forest at about noon on 17 

September in a light fog and a drizzle. 

Two hours later, Porter’s brigade attacked the British at Battery 3. 

The defenders were completely surprised. As the Americans emerged 

from the fog and rain, many British regulars surrendered or rapidly 

withdrew. The British position consisted of a maze of trenches protected by scattered abatis and a blockhouse. Nevertheless, Porter’s 

men blew up stores of ammunition and used sledgehammers to disable 

the guns. Two lieutenants blew up the blockhouse with gunpowder 

found nearby. Upon hearing the noise of the assault, General Miller 

led his men out of the ravine and into the forest. By now, Porter’s 

men were thoroughly intermixed as militiamen and regulars coalesced 

around the nearest officers. Some militiamen escorted the numerous 

prisoners to the rear. The rest, with Porter in the lead, found Miller’s 

column. The two groups pressed on toward the second battery. 

The noise of the raid also alerted the British camp. British regulars 

grabbed their weapons and cartridge boxes, formed up, and soon 

were on their way to drive off the attackers. 
•••• 41 ••••

The defenders of Battery 2, unlike their unfortunate comrades 

at Battery 3, were waiting for the strike. The rain had rendered many 

muskets inoperative, and much of the fighting was hand to hand. The 

New York militia did not hang back but pressed forward. Colonel 

Gibson was killed in the fighting, but eventually numbers told, and 

the battery fell into U.S. hands. By this time, the American leaders 

were losing control over their scattered followers. It took some time 

before Porter, Miller, and their officers exerted enough control to move 

on toward Battery 1. Once there, the first of the British relief forces 

crashed into the Americans. 

The British killed General Davis and mortally wounded and captured 

Major Wood. General Porter got ahead of his men and came on a group 

of redcoats standing while waiting for orders. Porter tried to bluff his way 

out of a tricky situation by yelling commands to nonexistent followers 

and demanding that the British surrender. Not to be outwitted, a British soldier knocked Porter to the ground and pierced Porter’s hand with 

his bayonet. Fortunately, an American militia company arrived on the 

scene and captured the British. More British troops arrived at Battery 

1 and eventually drove out the Americans. General Brown sent Ripley 

into the forest with the reserve force in an attempt to help extricate the 

attackers. Porter’s men, Miller’s, and now Ripley’s merged in a confused 

mass and started a fighting withdrawal back to Fort Erie. A musket ball 

passed through Ripley’s neck taking him out of the fight. British-allied 

Indian warriors entered the fray and caught isolated Americans, smashing their heads with tomahawks. Slowly the Americans exited the forest. 

The bloody, chaotic fight had lasted about two hours. 

The Americans fared better in the fight in terms of casualties. 

Brown reported 79 killed, 216 wounded, and 216 missing: a total 

of 511. General Drummond reported a loss of 719: 115 killed, 178 

wounded, and 426 missing. The number of missing corresponds to 

Brown’s report that he captured about four hundred of the enemy. 

Brown was very pleased with the results of the sortie in spite of the 

heavy losses. The militia had fought well under trying circumstances, 

and Brown told Governor Tompkins that “they behaved gallantly.” 

The loss of the talented Major Wood saddened all in the Left Division. Brown reported that Wood “died as he had lived, without a 

feeling but for the honor of his country and the glory of her arms.” 

Ironically, the U.S. sortie proved unnecessary to break the siege 

because Drummond had already decided to withdraw his forces. 

He could not continue to supply his division around Fort Erie, and 

his men were becoming ill from daily exposure to the cold rain. The 

Americans, who knew none of this, rejoiced in the victory. The British 
•••• 42 ••••

buried the dead from both sides in the trenches around the gun positions 

and hauled away the artillery that had not been ruined in the attack. On 

the evening of 21 September, Drummond marched his army northward. 

His men left their campfires burning so that the Americans were unaware 

of their departure until the next day. General Brown maintained contact 

with the British, now largely north of the Chippewa River, but did not 

move the bulk of his division. He wanted to act in concert with Izard’s 

Right Division, even then approaching the Niagara. 

As the first columns of his division tramped into Sackett’s Harbor on 

15 September, Izard briefly considered an attack on Kingston to destroy 

the shipyard there. However, he felt compelled to rescue the Left Division. 

Torrential rains and adverse winds prevented sailing for several days. Finally, starting on 21 September, Commodore Chauncey’s squadron began 

moving the Right Division westward as far as the mouth of the Genesee 

River. There, the army quartermasters hired the few wagons and teams of 

horses available. The Right Division, about three thousand soldiers, picked 

up the march westward, leaving behind many of its tents and other camp 

equipment. Brown and Izard met at Batavia to consider how to proceed. 

They thought about retaking Fort Niagara. While Brown pinned Drummond in place on the Chippewa River, Izard would lay siege to the former 

Repulsion of the British at Fort Erie, 15th August 1814, by E. C. 

Watmough (Chicago History Museum/Bridgeman Art Library)

•••••••••••••••
•••• 43 ••••

U.S. fort. The problem, however, was siege artillery. The Americans had 

only one 24-pounder gun and a few 18-pounders, insufficient to breach 

Niagara’s walls. Over the next several days, Brown and Izard decided to 

forgo a move on Fort Niagara and resolved to unite their divisions and 

attempt to destroy Drummond’s army along the Niagara River instead.

On 5 October, as his men arrived in Lewiston, Izard received a letter 

from James Monroe, who had replaced Armstrong as secretary of war 

on 27 September 1814. Correcting one of Armstrong’s poor decisions, 

Monroe placed Izard in command of the entire 9th Military District. Izard 

renamed his command the Northern Army and designated his division 

as the 1st Division. Brown’s Left Division became the 2d Division. The 

two brigade commanders of the 1st Division were a talented pair. Brig. 

Gen. Thomas A. Smith, former commander of the 1st Rifle Regiment, 

commanded the 1st Brigade, and Brig. Gen. Daniel Bissell commanded 

the 2d Brigade. Bissell had been the commander of the 5th Infantry. 

Izard wanted to cross the Niagara somewhere close to the mouth of 

the Chippewa. However, too few boats were available near the desired 

site. Instead, the 1st Division marched to Buffalo and traversed it there 

on 10 October. This delayed the campaign as a cold winter approached. 

Over the next few days, Izard’s Northern Army of fifty-five hundred 

regulars and eight hundred militia volunteers closed on the Chippewa 

River, stopping at the site of Scott’s victory three months earlier. There, 

the men saw Drummond’s strong defenses on the northern shore. Izard 

pondered how to maneuver Drummond out of his defensive works and 

force him to give battle. Brown offered Izard the plan he had used in July 

following the Battle of Chippewa, and Izard agreed. Brown’s men started 

cutting a usable trail that would terminate near where Lyon’s Creek joined 

the Chippewa River. 

The next several days underscored the profound difference between 

the cautious Izard and his risk-taking subordinate. Izard despaired of accomplishing anything further. In a letter to Monroe he wrote, “I confess, 

sir, that I am greatly embarrassed. At the head of the most efficient army 

which the United States have possessed during this war, much must be 

expected from me, and yet I can discern no object which can be achieved 

at this point, worthy of the risk which will attend its attempt.” Izard 

decided to try to bring Drummond to battle, but failing that, he would 

return the Northern Army to New York and put it into winter quarters. 

The next day Izard pulled both divisions back from the Chippewa 

and arrayed them for combat, hoping to entice Drummond to leave his 

defenses to give battle. Unlike General Riall in July, Drummond would 

have none of it. Izard then withdrew the army even farther south, hoping that Drummond would take advantage of the increased maneuver 
•••• 44 ••••

room and attack. By this time, however, Commodore Yeo had blockaded 

Chauncey in Sackett’s Harbor, and Drummond, with his supply lines 

secured, had even less reason to risk his division in a fight against superior 

numbers. Much to Brown’s frustration, the stalemate continued.

Izard did, however, take one offensive action. Upon learning of a 

large supply of flour at Cook’s Mill on Lyon’s Creek, he sent General 

Bissell to seize or destroy the flour. Bissell led his men out of camp on 

the morning of 18 October to fight what would become the last battle 

of the Niagara campaign. 

Paralleling Black Creek, Bissell’s four infantry battalions, augmented 

by a company of riflemen and a detachment of dragoons, struggled along 

bad roads and across numerous smaller streams. After arriving at Cook’s 

Mill, Bissell built a bridge over Lyon’s Creek. He sent the riflemen and 

two companies of light infantry across the bridge to secure it, but the 

remainder of the brigade rested south of the creek. When Drummond 

learned of Bissell’s advance, he suspected an attempt to outflank the British position north of the Chippewa. He sent Col. Christopher Myers with 

a brigade of infantry, supported with one 6-pounder gun and a Congreve 

rocket launcher, to learn more about Bissell’s intent. That night, the British and American pickets skirmished, but casualties were light (Map 4).

The next morning, 19 October, Myers arrayed his troops in line at 

a right angle to Lyon’s Creek and about a mile east of Cook’s Mill. His 

mission was to learn more about this puzzling U.S. force, not to become 

decisively engaged. A shallow ravine leading toward the creek separated the British brigade from the American security force, with a small 

wooded area west of the ravine. Myers decided to probe the American 

pickets in the woods and deployed the skilled Canadian fighters of the

Glengarry Light Infantry Fencibles. The Glengarries traversed the ravine 

and confronted the American riflemen and light infantry in the woods. 

When Bissell heard the sporadic firing, he ordered the 5th Infantry and 

14th Infantry to cross Lyon’s Creek, and he alerted the 15th Infantry and 

16th Infantry to be ready to move as needed. The Glengarries advanced 

relentlessly against the outnumbered American skirmishers, pushing them 

back through the woods and onto open ground. As the situation became 

clearer to Bissell, he decided to drive off the Canadians. 

Bissell ordered the 14th Infantry to march directly toward the woods 

and the 5th Infantry to pass north of the woods to trap the Glengarries. 

He brought the 16th Infantry north across Lyon’s Creek and moved 

the 15th eastward along the creek to get closer to the main British line. 

Myers ordered the Glengarries to withdraw. As Bissell moved forward, it 

appeared to him that he was driving off the British. The two main lines 

opened fire at long range, the British throwing artillery and rocket fire into 
Fort Erie

17 Sep

15 Aug

Lundy’s Lane 25 Jul

Chippewa 5 Jul

Cook’s Mill 19 Oct

Four Mile Cr

Frenchman’s Cr

L a k e O n t a r i o

L a k e E r i e

Niagara R

Niagara R

Lyon’s Creek

Street’s Creek

Black Creek

Chippewa River

Conjocta Creek

Goat Island

Niagara Falls

Queenston Heights

to Burlington

Heights

Tuscarora Village

G r a n d I s l a n d

Fort George

Fort Schlosser

Fort Niagara

Manchester

Lewiston

Queenston

Newark

Youngstown

Chippewa

Bualo

Black

 Rock

N E W Y O R K

U P P E R

C A N A D A

N I A G A R A R I V E R

OPERATIONAL AREA

5 July–19 October 1814

0 5

Miles

Battle Site

Map 4
•••• 46 ••••

the mix. Myers expected Bissell to attack, but the U.S. general declined to 

send his brigade across the ravine. Myers determined that Bissell’s force 

was not an imminent threat to Drummond and withdrew about three 

miles through the forest toward the British camp on the Chippewa. Bissell believed that he had bested the British. His men destroyed about two 

hundred bushels of grain but left the mill intact. 

The Battle of Cook’s Mill or Lyon’s Creek was not decisive. The 

British suffered thirty-six casualties, the Americans sixty-seven. When 

it became clear to Brown that Izard would not press the fight, he used 

the opportunity to take his men to Sackett’s Harbor to defend that post 

over the winter. With dysentery spreading through the Northern Army, 

Izard began the careful process of bringing the 1st Division back to Buffalo and establishing them for the winter. He directed Porter to muster 

his men out of federal service so that they might return to their homes. 

Brown’s regulars spent seventeen days marching through rain and sleet 

across muddy roads and arrived at Sackett’s Harbor on 13 November. 

There were two thousand wounded and ill at the hospitals at Buffalo and 

Williamsville, and Izard ordered as many as possible to be evacuated to 

Greenbush, New York, where food and medical care were more available. 

Izard’s last decision of the campaign was to abandon Fort Erie. He 

believed that it would be nearly impossible to keep a garrison supplied 

through the winter, and the fort would not be of much use in the next 

campaign. Work parties took twenty-five pieces of artillery back to Buffalo and dug shafts into the earthen ramparts, which they packed with 

gunpowder. On 5 November, explosion after explosion rocked the venerable fort. The stone barracks were reduced to rubble, and Snake Hill was 

once again a pile of sand. The campaign on the Niagara that had started 

four months earlier had come to a close without changing the strategic 

situation, but it did establish a shining tactical legacy for the U.S. Army. 

The Battle of Plattsburgh, 11 September 1814

In September 1814, about the time the fighting on the Niagara was 

sputtering to a close under General Izard’s leadership, American arms 

won a resounding victory at Plattsburgh. Ironically, the victory came as 

the result of errors committed by the national government. 

Madison and Armstrong appeared to have forgotten that Montreal 

and Quebec City were more decisive strategic goals than anything on the 

Niagara River. In late July, the president had prompted his secretary of 

war to send Izard’s Right Division from Plattsburgh on Lake Champlain 

to the Niagara River to assist the Left Division. Izard had protested the 

order. He warned, “I will make the movement you direct if possible; but 

I shall do it with the apprehension of risking the force under my com-
•••• 47 ••••

mand and with the certainty that every thing in this vicinity but the lately 

constructed works at Plattsburgh and at Cumberland Head [New York] 

will in less than three days after my departure, be in the possession of the 

enemy.” Even as Izard wrote, thousands of British troops, most of them 

veterans of the lately concluded war in Europe, were landing at Montreal 

and preparing to march toward Plattsburgh and Lake Champlain.

The Plattsburgh region had enormous strategic value. Long, narrow 

Lake Champlain lay along a break in the Appalachian Mountains and 

was a traditional invasion route between Montreal and New York City. 

Except for a short portage at Lake George, the waters of the Hudson, Lake 

Champlain, and the Richelieu River connected New York City with the 

St. Lawrence River. The village of Plattsburgh was important because it 

sat near the northern end of Lake Champlain, near the Canadian border 

and astride this route between Montreal and the Hudson Valley. It was 

situated north of the Saranac River that emptied into Plattsburgh Bay 

on the lake (Map 5).

The two sides still had forces in the area. U.S. Navy Master Commandant Thomas Macdonough had built a squadron on Lake Champlain 

and maintained shipyards at Plattsburgh and Whitehall, New York, and 

in Burlington and at Otter Creek, Vermont. The Royal Navy based a 

competing squadron at Isle aux Noix, Lower Canada, on the Richelieu 

River, less than ten miles from the international border. The U.S. Army 

had occupied the peninsula formed between the Saranac River and 

Plattsburgh Bay. Izard’s men had fortified their camp by constructing 

a line of three earthen redoubts across the peninsula and by blocking 

the southern approaches. These New York redoubts were named Forts 

Brown, Moreau, and Scott. Although the encampment was fairly strong, 

no escape route existed. Defeat meant certain capture. 

When Izard departed for the Niagara front on 29 August with the 

bulk of his army, he left General Macomb in charge at Plattsburgh. 

Macomb had been commissioned an ensign in the Light Dragoons at 

age sixteen and in 1805 had completed training as an engineer at the U.S. 

Military Academy at West Point, New York. Secretary of War William 

Eustis had selected Macomb to be acting adjutant general of the Army at 

the beginning of the war; however, Macomb wanted a troop command. 

Madison had promoted him to colonel and had transferred him from 

the Corps of Engineers to the artillery. Macomb had commanded the 

3d U.S. Artillery with distinction in 1813 and had served under Brown 

during the Crysler’s Farm campaign. Promoted to brigadier general in 

1814, Macomb was an intelligent, energetic, and inspirational leader. 

After Izard’s departure, Macomb had about seventeen hundred men, 

many of them new recruits, and more than nine hundred hospitalized 
•••• 48 ••••

soldiers to defend Plattsburgh. He coordinated a joint land-sea defense 

with Master Commandant Macdonough, and he called on the governor 

of Vermont for volunteer militia. Macomb put hundreds of soldiers and 

militiamen to work building more field fortifications between the three 

forts. He was determined to hold onto his camp between the Saranac and 

Lake Champlain come what may. 

On 29 August, the day Izard departed for the Niagara, British General Prevost crossed the border with more than ten thousand soldiers, 

heading for Plattsburgh. He organized his troops into a division of three 

brigades commanded by Maj. Gen. Sir Francis De Rottenburg. Two of 

the brigades were composed of veterans from Europe, while other British 

and Canadian troops made up the third. Tensions existed between PreDead Creek

Saranac River

L

A

K

E

C

H

A

M P L A I N

P l a t t s b u r g h

B a y

T i c o n d e r o g a

C o n  a n c e

S a r a t o g a

Lighthouse

C r a b

I s l a n d

D e a d C r e e k

B r i d g e

U p p e r

B r i d g e

C

U

M

B

E

R

L

A

N

D

H

E

A

D

Fort Scott

Fort Moreau

Battery

British Battery

British Battery

Fort Brown

Battery

Plattsburgh

N AVA L A C T I O N

O N P L AT T S B U R G H B AY 

11 September 1814

Based on a sketch by Benson J. Lossing

U.S. Ship

British Ship

Map 5
•••• 49 ••••

vost and the officers from Europe, 

who tended to regard the Canadian 

governor general as a man of lesser 

accomplishment compared with 

their former commander, Field 

Marshal Sir Arthur Wellesley, the 

future Duke of Wellington. 

When the populace in and 

around Plattsburgh learned that 

the British were on the march, 

more than three thousand people 

abandoned their homes and fled 

for safety. Macomb’s job was easier 

without civilians to feed and defend. 

He reacted to the British advance 

by sending Lt. Col. Daniel Appling 

with about a hundred riflemen and 

some New York militia dragoons 

to slow down the British while the 

garrison at Plattsburgh struggled 

to complete preparations for the 

upcoming battle.

Soon after, militia Maj. Gen. 

Benjamin Mooers led about seven 

hundred militiamen to destroy 

bridges and block roads. On 6 September, Mooers called on Macomb for 

reinforcement against the British, who were advancing on two parallel routes. 

Macomb sent Maj. John Ellis Wool and two hundred fifty regulars and two 

cannons north to support the militia. Wool made contact with the British 

near Beekmantown, New York, on the western route, while Maj. John 

Sproull blocked the eastern approach at the bridge crossing Dead Creek. 

Wool directed his regulars and a handful of militiamen who chose to stand 

and fight in a delaying action. The Americans formed a skirmish line and 

fired at the marching columns of British infantry as they approached. Then, 

the Americans broke contact, moved rearward, and repeated the sequence. 

Wool kept his troops under tight control; he feared that his men risked 

being outflanked if they remained too long in any position. Appling and 

his riflemen joined Sproull at Dead Creek. Two U.S. gunboats approached 

the shore, directing their cannon fire into the British columns. The British 

brought their own artillery forward and drove off the gunboats. After a 

short firefight, Sproull withdrew his men. In the skirmishing that day, the 

Americans suffered forty-five casualties, the British about a hundred. 

Alexander Macomb,

by Thomas Sully

(West Point Museum) •••••••••••••••
•••• 50 ••••

Prevost planned a coordinated attack. He intended for the naval 

squadron to attack Macdonough’s flotilla in Plattsburgh Bay, while the 

army assaulted the U.S. camp. Prevost urged Capt. George Downie, the 

commander of the Royal Navy squadron at Isle aux Noix, to sail, but 

Downie demurred. His shipwrights were struggling to complete his flagship, the frigate Confiance, which carried more than one-third of all of the 

naval guns in the British squadron, and Downie refused to give battle until 

it was ready. While waiting for the Royal Navy, the land armies opened a 

cannonade that lasted four days. 

Although greatly outnumbered, American morale remained high. 

Capt. George McGlassin of the 15th Infantry led fifty men in a nighttime raid that frightened off as many as three hundred British soldiers 

and damaged a battery of Congreve rockets without the loss of a single 

soldier. In another act of bravery, the commander of the guns at Fort 

Brown, 1st Lt. John Mountfort, picked up a small British bomb that had 

landed inside the fort and threw it over the ramparts saying, “Don’t be 

alarmed, boys; it is nothing but a humbug.” Actions like these steadied 

the soldiers, inspiring them to fight. 

Meanwhile, news of the British attack stimulated an outburst of 

patriotism in Vermont. Despite the fact that the governor of Vermont 

opposed the war and refused to mobilize his militia, local militia officers 

on their own authority raised more than twenty-five hundred volunteers. 

Boats of every description crossed Lake Champlain each day, bringing 

more citizen-soldiers over to the camp on the Saranac. New York and 

Vermont militiamen likewise ranged the woods firing on British pickets. 

Early in the morning of 11 September, Downie’s squadron began 

rounding Cumberland Head to enter Plattsburgh Bay. The British 

squadron consisted of the frigate Confiance, a brig, two sloops, and a 

dozen gunboats. Before them at anchor in a line were Macdonough’s 

ship Saratoga, a brig, a schooner, and a sloop, supported by ten gunboats. Macdonough had chosen to give battle in Plattsburgh Bay for two 

reasons. First, the northern winds that would bring Downie south would 

impede the British squadron as it rounded Cumberland Head. Second, 

Macdonough’s vessels had a preponderance of short-range carronades, 

while the British vessels were armed largely with long-range guns. In deep 

water, the British would be at an advantage, able to fire more ordnance 

at long range than the Americans. However, the confines of Plattsburgh 

Bay could negate this British firepower advantage. The American commander put his four largest vessels on line, supported by ten gunboats. He 

had his vessels “set anchor spring lines.” By planting their bow anchors 

at the stern, when the sailors drew in the anchor line, they could rotate 

their ship 180 degrees. When the guns of the starboard battery were out 
•••• 51 ••••

of action, the ship’s crew could rotate the vessel and present the enemy 

with the portside guns. 

As Macdonough had foreseen, the British vessels had to tack into the 

northerly winds and entered the fight piecemeal. Eight British gunboats 

never joined the battle. By 0900, the engagement was general. A shot 

from Saratoga killed Downie early in the battle. Macdonough was also 

knocked to the deck twice. For two hours, the fleets battered one another 

mercilessly. When all the Saratoga’s starboard guns were out of action, 

Macdonough ordered his crew to bring the ship around. Soon, the fresh 

port batteries poured fire into Confiance. The maneuver proved decisive, 

and by 1100 the battle was nearly over. One British vessel after another 

struck its colors, and the Battle of Plattsburgh Bay was decided. 

Meanwhile, as soon as the naval battle had commenced, the British 

land batteries in and around the village of Plattsburgh had opened a terrific fire on the U.S. camp. The American artillerists, sensing that the day 

would see an attempt to storm their positions, answered the cannonade 

with equal vigor and accuracy. Prevost finally gave the order for two of 

his three brigades to ford the Saranac southwest of the U.S. forts. Maj. 

Gen. Frederick Robinson commanded the two brigades. Unfortunately 

for the British, their guides took the wrong road from the camp to the 

ford. Robinson’s men arrived at the ford as the naval battle was winding 

down. The British easily drove off the militia and volunteers guarding the 

ford and soon began crossing. Once the entire force was across, Robinson 

intended to assault the three American forts that he could see in the distance. Then, an order arrived from Prevost. Citing the surrender of the 

squadron, Prevost called off the strike and directed the troops to return 

to camp. Obedient to orders, the columns of redcoats turned about and 

retraced their steps. One company of British soldiers did not receive the 

word to retire. Vermont volunteers attacked the isolated unit, killing or 

capturing most of the company. 

British artillery continued firing on the U.S. forts until about 1500. 

After the British ceased fire, the American musicians in Fort Moreau 

played “Hail Columbia” and “Yankee Doodle,” and the soldiers gave 

three cheers to celebrate their victory. A Vermont volunteer, Jonathan 

Stevens, recalled, “The forts kept firing till night having silenced the most 

part of the enemy’s guns. The last of all they fired a federal salute, gave 

three cheers, then the music struck up Yankey Doodle thus ended the 

conflict with Governor Prevost who took leave of us that night without 

bidding us good by.” 

The battle’s outcome stirred controversy in Britain. Although Macomb, in his report, claimed to have repulsed the attackers, the British 

actually had withdrawn on their own and not under pressure. Prevost 
•••• 52 ••••

came under intense criticism for starting the land attack late and then for 

calling off the assault. He wrote to his superiors that without naval support to bring him supplies, he could not maintain his army. He also noted 

that the American forts were useless and not worth the loss of blood to 

assault them. That evening, in the darkness, the British pulled their guns 

out of position and started moving them northward. With few wagons 

and teams to evacuate all the ammunition and camp equipment, the 

British destroyed all that they could not carry. The Battle of Plattsburgh 

was over, a resounding U.S. victory in a war too full of defeats. 

Operations in Northern Maine

Perhaps nowhere in the United States was political divisiveness 

and the lack of preparedness more evident than in the loss of eastern 

Maine in 1814. The District of Maine was a detached part of Massachusetts and many of its citizens were Federalists. The Federalist Party 

had vigorously opposed the war, and Massachusetts Governor Caleb 

Strong had repeatedly refused to allow the use of state militia outside 

of the state. Moreover, the merchants of Maine carried on a thriving 

trade with their counterparts in the British maritime provinces of Nova 

Scotia and New Brunswick. When Congress had declared war in 1812, 

legal trade had turned into smuggling, and British forces survived on 

American flour and meat. Maine also supplied the Royal Navy with tar, 

turpentine, spars, and other naval necessities. Britain chose to spare New 

England from the blockade of the U.S. Atlantic and Gulf coasts that it 

slowly established. However, with the defeat of Napoleon, the British 

government changed its policy toward New England. Implicit collusion 

shifted into territorial ambition.

In June 1814, the British government ordered Sir John Sherbrooke, 

lieutenant governor of Nova Scotia, to conduct operations against 

Maine. His objective was to secure the land route between the maritime 

provinces of British North America and the city of Quebec. Sherbrooke 

also wanted to secure New Brunswick by occupying eastern Maine 

from the Penobscot River to the western border of New Brunswick. 

Because of a lack of trust and cooperation between the federal government and the governor of Massachusetts, few regular troops were 

in Maine, and the Maine militia was notoriously reluctant to support 

“Mr. Madison’s War.”

On 21 June, the British launched a minor raid on the coastal villages 

of St. George and Thomaston just west of Penobscot Bay. British forces 

easily captured two small forts and spiked the guns. The raiders also 

captured four coastal traders laden with goods and then made their way 

back to Nova Scotia. The local militia failed to intervene. Sherbrooke in-
•••• 53 ••••

terpreted these results as indicative of an absence of defensive capability. 

He followed this strike with a more ambitious operation, an expedition 

to occupy the islands of Passamaquoddy Bay. Admiral Horatio Nelson’s 

protégé, Capt. Thomas Hardy, led a naval squadron and a battalion of 

regulars into the bay. On 11 July, Hardy anchored off Moose Island 

and demanded the surrender of the village of Eastport and nearby Fort 

Sullivan. Maj. Perley Putnam, commanding about eighty soldiers of the 

40th U.S. Infantry, surrendered to the overwhelming odds as the local 

militiamen failed to rally to defend their homes. Sherbrooke annexed 

Eastport into New Brunswick and forced any citizens who failed to take 

an oath of allegiance to the king to leave the island. 

Sherbrooke himself led the largest expedition directed against Maine. 

On 1 September, a large Royal Navy squadron carried twenty-five hundred British regulars to Castine. The defenses there were intended to 

protect the entrance to Penobscot Bay. However, these small fortifications had been sadly neglected. A single battery manned by about forty 

regulars and a hundred militiamen stood in the way of the invasion 

force. After firing one volley from the four small cannons of the battery, the defenders, regulars and militia alike, withdrew as fast as they 

could to avoid capture. Moving upriver, the British confronted about 

six hundred untrained militiamen guarding the 28-gun sloop-of-war, 

USS Adams. Striking in a dense fog and supporting their attack with 

the fire of Congreve rockets, the British scattered the militia and took 

eighty-one of them prisoner. The crew of Adams, now without infantry 

support, burned their vessel and escaped. The British proceeded upriver 

and accepted the surrender of the village of Bangor without a fight. Days 

later, Machias similarly surrendered. 

The British worked peacefully and well with the civil authorities in 

eastern Maine. They required that citizens take oaths of neutrality and 

allowed them to keep personal weapons. Open trade between eastern 

Maine and the maritime provinces resumed and expanded. President 

Madison conferred with his military advisers on the prospects of retaking 

the lost territory. However, Governor Strong refused to back the campaign. Without the support of the Massachusetts militia and control of 

coastal waters, success was improbable. The peace negotiations between 

the United States and Britain in Ghent, Belgium, eventually determined 

the fate of these occupied lands. 

Operations in the Old Northwest

Three significant operations occurred in the Old Northwest and 

western Upper Canada in 1814. The first was the struggle to control 

the upper Mississippi River. The second was the American attempt to 
•••• 54 ••••

recapture Fort Mackinac, held by the British since July 1812. The third 

was Brig. Gen. Duncan McArthur’s raid across Upper Canada to bring 

some relief to U.S. forces on the Niagara River. 

When the British had captured Fort Mackinac and Detroit in 1812, 

they had moved quickly to establish civil authority in occupied U.S. territory for the purpose of controlling the lucrative fur trade. Good relations 

with the native population were essential, and the British provided food 

and trade goods insofar as they were able, given the tenuous supply lines 

to the east. Indian tribes were much more inclined to align themselves 

with the British as a means of forestalling creeping American expansion 

into native lands. General Harrison’s victory at the Battle of the Thames 

in 1813 had removed British domination, yet General Drummond did 

what he could to maintain a British presence on the upper Mississippi 

and in western Upper Canada. 

In May 1814, the governor of the Missouri Territory and famed 

explorer, William Clark, mounted a campaign from St. Louis that captured Prairie du Chien, a small, yet important, settlement of trappers 

and traders in Illinois Territory (present-day Wisconsin). Clark wanted 

to reestablish a U.S. presence in the fur country, which might serve to cool 

relations between the Indians and the British. He left a small garrison in 

a newly erected stockade that he named Fort Shelby. The British reacted 

quickly. Lt. Col. William McKay, commander of the Michigan Fencibles, 

surprised the garrison at Fort Shelby when he arrived on 17 July with 

approximately a hundred twenty Canadians and five hundred Indian 

warriors. First Lt. Joseph Perkins and about seventy soldiers inside the 

fort were prepared to defend as long as possible. A large gunboat was 

anchored close by the fort in the Mississippi to assist Perkins and the 

garrison, but leaks forced it to withdraw down the river for repairs. Both 

sides were running low on ammunition, and, on the fourth day of the 

siege, the Americans ran out of water. Perkins surrendered the fort, and, 

in return, McKay allowed him and his men to withdraw to St. Louis. 

Knowing that the garrison at Fort Shelby was woefully understrength, 

Governor Clark had sent more than a hundred regular U.S. infantrymen 

and rangers under Capt. John Campbell up the Mississippi to reinforce 

Perkins. On 18 July, Campbell’s command, traveling in five large boats, 

arrived at the Rock Island Rapids, Illinois Territory, near present-day 

Moline, Illinois. Bad weather delayed its movement farther and gave time 

for more than four hundred hostile Fox, Sac, and Kickapoo warriors to 

gather. On 21 July, the natives attacked and boarded several of the boats. 

Fighting desperately, Campbell’s men managed to escape downriver after 

losing seventeen killed and twenty-six wounded. The Indians suffered 

two dead. 
•••• 55 ••••

Upon learning of the twin defeats at Prairie du Chien and Rock Island 

Rapids, Brig. Gen. Benjamin Howard dispatched a punitive expedition 

against the Indians along the Rock River. Future president Maj. Zachary Taylor led about four hundred thirty regulars, rangers, and Missouri 

militia upriver. On 5 September, more than twelve hundred warriors 

led by the Indian chief Black Hawk attacked Taylor’s command at the 

Rock Island Rapids. Taylor led a determined yet futile assault against the 

natives. Unable to advance, he ordered his expedition back downriver. 

The natives pursued, and Taylor’s men conducted a fighting withdrawal 

in their boats. Finally breaking free of their attackers on the shore, the 

Americans retreated to the mouth of the Des Moines River, leaving the 

upper Mississippi in British hands until the end of the war. 

President Madison himself insisted that the recapture of Fort Mackinac on Mackinac Island be a strategic goal for 1814. The island was a major 

transshipping station for the fur trade, and Madison wanted to ensure 

that it was not permanently lost in a peace settlement. On 4 August, Capt. 

Arthur Sinclair’s Lake Erie squadron landed Lt. Col. George Croghan 

and seven hundred fifty regulars and two hundred fifty Ohio militiamen 

on Mackinac Island. The British commander, Lt. Col. Robert McDouall, 

decided not to allow the Americans to invest the fort. Instead, he formed in 

the open field about two hundred regulars and militia in line to block the 

road to the fort, with about three hundred sixty Indians in the woods on 

both of his flanks. Croghan marched his men into the open area, formed a 

line opposite the British infantry, and sent flanking parties into the woods 

to work their way around the British line. The Americans in the clearing 

opened fire and advanced slowly on the defenders. The woods on both 

sides of the gap erupted in violent combat as the flanking parties ran into 

Indian warriors. The fighting was intense, and shortly the Americans gave 

way. Unable to dislodge McDouall’s men, Croghan broke off the attack 

and returned to Sinclair’s boats. The Americans lost nineteen dead and 

forty-five wounded, while British losses were negligible. The Americans 

had been on Mackinac Island less than five hours. Like Prairie du Chien, 

Fort Mackinac would remain in British hands until the end of the war. 

The last military action of substance to occur in the Old Northwest 

during 1814 occurred when Brig. Gen. Duncan McArthur advanced 

to assist U.S. forces on the Niagara frontier. McArthur had assumed 

command of the Northwestern Army when Maj. Gen. William Henry 

Harrison resigned his commission in May 1814. He departed Detroit on 

22 October at the head of seven hundred fifty mounted volunteers and 

rangers and seventy-five Wyandot warriors. He intended to capture Burlington Heights, thus cutting off the British who were contesting General 

Izard’s forces along the Niagara River. McArthur’s fast-moving column 
•••• 56 ••••

came within fifteen miles of the Grand River in Upper Canada before 

the British detected it. A scratch force of British regulars, Canadian 

militia, and allied warriors destroyed the ferry across the Grand River 

and blocked McArthur’s path eastward. The U.S. column rode along 

the southern bank of the Grand River looking for a place to cross. The 

Americans brushed aside about five hundred Canadian militiamen at 

Malcolm’s Mills on 6 November but failed to find a usable ford between 

them and their objective. Finally giving up, McArthur turned his raiders 

around and returned to Detroit. Other than destroying a number of mills, 

the operation was a failure. Even had McArthur reached Burlington 

Heights, Izard had called off his campaign and returned to New York 

before the fight at Malcolm’s Mills. At the end of 1814, the British and 

their Indian allies thus maintained a precarious hold over the upper 

Mississippi and the fur trade routes of the upper Great Lakes.

Analysis

Flawed strategy and a continuing lack of success in harnessing national resources led directly to the U.S. failure to seize Upper and Lower 

Canada in 1814. Despite measurable improvements in the quality of 

troops, leadership, and logistics, victory eluded the American republic. 

Strategic misjudgments hindered the U.S. effort. The president and 

his cabinet understood that the capture of Montreal and Quebec City 

would lead, eventually, to the possession of all of Canada west of those 

points. Once in American hands, the president could either keep Canada 

or trade it for recognition of neutral rights and protection from impressments. Yet President Madison and Secretary of War Armstrong continued 

to direct national power away from those decisive objectives. Control of 

Lake Ontario would move the national effort in the right direction, yet 

Commodore Chauncey could neither bring himself to attack the Royal 

Navy shipyard at Kingston nor to force battle with Yeo’s squadron on 

the lake waters. Chauncey was an able administrator, but his methodical approach and refusal to accept reasonable risk meant that a decisive 

naval battle never took place. Clearly, he was not Oliver Hazard Perry.

Armstrong failed the nation repeatedly. His mismanagement of the 

war in the north lost the United States its last chance at victory. His petty 

meddling in Maj. Gen. William Henry Harrison’s command led directly 

to the loss of that charismatic and successful general. His failure to unite 

the command in the 9th Military District meant that no one general had 

responsibility for this critical region. Generals Izard and Brown tended to 

focus on their assigned local areas, but neither looked to a unified approach 

to advance on Kingston or Montreal. Armstrong’s muddled guidance 
•••• 57 ••••

to Brown had sent that aggressive general to the indecisive front of the 

Niagara frontier. Armstrong’s insistence that Izard leave Plattsburgh to 

assist the Left Division was an unconscionable strategic decision. Only 

the resolute defiance of Master Commandant Macdonough and General 

Macomb, and lack of resolution in Lt. Gen. Sir George Prevost, saved 

Plattsburgh. 

Although Armstrong mismanaged strategy, he did play a role in moving old generals away from battlefield commands and replacing them with 

younger, more energetic leaders. Promotion and important commands 

went to Izard and Brown. Likewise, a class of new brigadier generals such 

as Scott, Macomb, and Gaines served the nation courageously and well. 

American troop performance improved in 1814. For all of its efforts and 

incentives, Congress could not entice enough young men to join the Regular 

Army. Raw recruits barely replaced experienced soldiers who left the service 

at the completion of their enlistments. Citizens who sought adventure preferred to serve in volunteer units whose success was mixed. Yet, unexpectedly, 

state militias saw much more success in 1814 than in previous years. Brown 

could not have attacked the British batteries without the hundreds of New 

York militiamen who waived their constitutional rights and volunteered to 

cross the Niagara to save the soldiers in beleaguered Fort Erie. Likewise, 

Vermont militiamen, defying the clear intentions of their governor, flocked 

to the defense of Plattsburgh in New York. Militia generals, such as Porter 

and Davis, led from the front and inspired their men. Meanwhile, the quality 

of the regular officer corps had improved considerably as the war progressed. 

Regimental officers, such as Leavenworth, Jesup, and Mitchell, trained and 

motivated their men, creating battalions that achieved tactical parity with 

British units at Chippewa, Lundy’s Lane, and Fort Erie. 

At the end of 1814, the United States controlled only a small portion 

of Upper Canada across from Detroit. Great Britain occupied eastern 

Maine, Fort Niagara, Fort Mackinac, and the upper Mississippi Valley. The stunning and unlikely victory at Plattsburgh maintained Lake 

Champlain as a U.S. possession. Fortunately, Britain was ready for peace 

and agreed that all occupied territories would be returned to their original 

owners at the conclusion of the war. 

For the U.S. Army, the War of 1812 marked a watershed. Competent 

leaders such as General Scott would remain on active duty for years, 

and soldiers of all ranks achieved levels of experience and confidence 

that could be gained only through active campaigning. Spurred in part 

by the war, the Army would embark on a long and successful quest for 

professionalism. Perhaps most of all, the Army established a reputation 

for endurance, a heritage of service, and a legacy of tactical victory that 

continues to inspire soldiers to this day.
•••• 58 ••••

•••

The Author

Richard V. Barbuto holds a Ph.D. in history from the University 

of Kansas and is a professor and deputy director of the Department 

of Military History at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff 

College. He served twenty-three years as an armor officer before 

retiring from the U.S. Army in 1994. His publications include Niagara 1814: America Invades Canada (2000) and Long Range Guns, 

Close Quarter Combat: The Third U.S. Artillery Regiment in the 

War of 1812 (2010).
•••• 59 ••••

•••

Further Readings

Barbuto, Richard V. Niagara 1814: America Invades Canada. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000.

Everest, Allan S. The War of 1812 in the Champlain Valley. Syracuse, 

N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1981.

Gilpin, Alec R. The War of 1812 in the Old Northwest. East Lansing: 

Michigan State University Press, 1958.

Graves, Donald E. Red Coats & Grey Jackets: The Battle of Chippawa, 

5 July 1814. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1994.

———, ed. Soldiers of 1814: American Enlisted Men’s Memoirs of 

the Niagara Campaign. Youngstown, N.Y.: Old Fort Niagara 

Association, 1995.

———. Where Right and Glory Lead! The Battle of Lundy’s Lane, 

1814. Toronto: Robin Brass, 1993.

Malcomson, Robert. Lords of the Lake: The Naval War on Lake 

Ontario, 1812–1814. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1998.

Whitehorne, Joseph. While Washington Burned: The Battle for Fort 

Erie, 1814. Baltimore: Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company 

of America, 1992.

For more information on the U.S. Army in the War of 1812, please 

read other titles in the U.S. Army Campaigns of the War of 1812 series 

published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History.
•••• 60 ••••

P I N : 1 0 4 0 9 0 – 0 0 0

CANADA 1812-1815