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i

iii

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

RUSSIAN MILITARY TRANSFORMATION—

GOAL IN SIGHT?

Keir Giles

with

Andrew Monaghan

May 2014

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public release; distribution is unlimited.

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copyrighted.
iv

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ISBN 1-58487-612-3
v

FOREWORD

The questionable performance of the Russian 

armed forces in the conflict in Georgia in 2008 provided the impetus for a program of far-reaching reform 

in the Russian military. The progress of this reform 

has been the subject of intensive study, including in a 

number of monographs issued by the Strategic Studies Institute. But as Mr. Keir Giles and Dr. Andrew 

Monaghan describe in this Paper, the most recent 

phase of military transformation in Russia allows conclusions to be drawn about the final shape of the Russian military once the process is complete—and about 

the range of threats, some of them unrecognizable to 

us, that is guiding that process. 

In this monograph, the authors use a wide range of 

Russian language sources and interviews to illustrate 

not only the Russian threat assessments highlighting 

the United States as a potential aggressor, but also 

the many unique challenges facing Russia in renewing and rearming its military. They conclude that, 

although many of the stated aims of reform will not 

be met, Russia will still have much more capable conventional and nuclear forces as a result. This, together 

with the Russian aim of closing the capability gap 

with the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization, should be an essential consideration for 

U.S. decisionmakers evaluating options for reducing 

expenditure on the U.S. military capability. 

This monograph was completed 6 months before 

the Russian military demonstrated its new capabilities in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in early-2014. Presciently, the authors had concluded with a warning 

that close attention to Russian military transformation 

and its eventual aims was essential both for Russia's 
vi

immediate neighbors, and for the United States. The 

Strategic Studies Institute therefore recommends this 

Letort Paper not only to scholars of Russia, but also 

to policymakers considering the range of challenges 

which the U.S. Army may be expected to face in the 

coming decades.

 

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press
vii

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

KEIR GILES is the director of the Conflict Studies Research Centre (CSRC), a group of deep subject matter 

experts on Eurasian security formerly attached to the 

United Kingdom (UK) Ministry of Defence. Now operating in the private sector, CSRC provides in-depth 

analysis on a wide range of security issues affecting 

Russia and its relations with overseas partners. After 

beginning his career working with paramilitary aviation in Russia and Ukraine immediately following the 

fall of the Soviet Union, Mr. Giles joined the BBC Monitoring Service (BBCM) to report on political and military affairs in the former Soviet space. While attached 

from BBCM to CSRC at the UK Defence Academy, he 

wrote and briefed for UK and North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization government agencies on a wide range 

of Russian defense and security issues. Mr. Giles’s 

work has appeared in a wide range of academic and 

military publications across Europe and in the United 

States. Uniquely, he is a double Associate Fellow of 

the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham 

House) in London, UK, as well as a regular contributor to research projects on Russian security issues in 

both the UK and Europe.

ANDREW MONAGHAN is a Research Fellow in the 

Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House 

and Academic Visitor at St Antony’s College, Oxford 

United Kingdom (UK). He is the Founder and Director of the Russia Research Network, an independent 

organization for the generation of information and 

expertise on Russian politics, security, and economic issues, based in London. In this capacity, he has 

served as an expert witness to the House of Commons 
viii

Foreign Affairs Select Committee. Until late-2012, 

he directed Russian related research in the Research 

Division of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 

Defense College (NDC) located in Rome, Italy. In this 

role, he was also the NDC’s senior researcher on energy security matters. Prior to that, he held positions as 

a Senior Research Associate at the Advanced Research 

and Assessment Group (ARAG), part of the Defence 

Academy of the UK, and a Visiting Lecturer in the Defence Studies Department of King’s College, London, 

the civilian academic arm of the Joint Services Command and Staff College at the Defence Academy. Dr. 

Monaghan holds an M.A. in war studies and a Ph.D. 

in Russian foreign policy (Russian perspectives of 

Russia-EU security relations) from the Department of 

War Studies, King’s College.
ix

SUMMARY

The depth and scale of change that the Russian military has undergone during the last 5 years of transformation is impossible to overstate. This monograph 

reviews the overall direction and intention of Russia’s 

military transformation, with particular reference to 

the specific range of threats—real and hypothetical—

against which it is intended to ensure. Stated aspirations for transformation will be measured against 

known challenges facing the defense establishment 

and Russia as a whole, with the conclusion that several specific goals are unlikely to be met. 

Fundamental organizational changes that finally broke the Russian armed forces away from the 

Soviet model in 2008-09 are now irreversible. It has 

been clear for some time that Russia no longer sees 

its military as a counter to a massive land incursion

by a conventional enemy. While the idea of vulnerability to U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

hostile intentions remains strong, this vulnerability 

finally is no longer seen in Cold War-era conventional 

military terms: instead, it is missile defense and precision strike capabilities that have come to the fore, even 

while lingering suspicions over a limited Libya-style 

intervention still provide a driving force for military 

modernization. 

There is a persistent argument voiced by senior 

military commentators wielding prodigious authority in Russia that foreign powers are planning to seize 

Russia’s natural resources, including by means of a 

paralyzing first strike by precision munitions against 

which Russia’s air and space defenses will be entirely 

insufficient. This provides the backdrop for repeated 

statements by Vladimir Putin emphasizing defense 
x

against this eventuality. As a result, spending priorities and the transformation process overall are skewed 

and fail to address more realistic security threats to 

Russia. Spending on offensive strategic weapons has 

also been increased as a direct result of this consideration. One area that needs special consideration is 

Russian activity in developing and introducing new 

types of strategic weapons while continuing strengths 

in non-strategic nuclear weapons.

Meanwhile, the real and immediate security threat 

facing Russia is an entirely different one from an entirely different direction—Russia’s southern periphery, where incursions, insurgency, weapons proliferation, and terrorism are all expected to increase in 

intensity following the U.S. and allied drawdown in 

Afghanistan and as a result of continued instability in 

the Middle East. 

But many of Russia’s remaining problems in implementing its transformation aims are not with 

money or equipment, but with people. Demographic 

change in Russia now means that service personnel 

are at a premium, and, for the first time in Russia’s 

history, conscripts are a valuable asset rather than a 

disposable commodity. The examples of noncommissioned officer training and junior officer assignments 

show that Russia still awaits the fundamental cultural 

shift in how it treats its service people that is essential 

for dealing with human capital as a finite resource. 

Deep and persistent challenges, including those of 

manning, funding, and procurement, mean that many 

ambitions for the Russian military will not be achieved 

in the short- to medium-term. All the same, it is undoubtedly the case that post-transformation Russia 

will have a very different force available from the one 

that went into action in Georgia in 2008, and one that 
xi

is more effective, flexible, adaptable, and scalable for 

achieving Russia’s foreign policy aims.

1

RUSSIAN MILITARY TRANSFORMATION—

GOAL IN SIGHT?

INTRODUCTION 

The end of 2012 and beginning of 2013 brought apparently momentous changes for the Russian defense 

establishment. In addition to its recently-inaugurated 

new Commander-in-Chief, Vladimir Putin, the Russian military received a new Minister of Defence, 

Sergey Shoygu; a new Chief of General Staff, Valeriy 

Gerasimov; and a new Defense Plan in January 2013. 

Russian servicemen and defense commentators who 

had been highly critical of the main aims of military 

reform under the previous Minister, Anatoliy Serdyukov, were briefly optimistic that this could mean a reversal of some of its more controversial elements. But 

the statements and actions of the new leadership team 

to date suggest strongly that the direction of travel for 

Russia’s military is now set, and reliable conclusions 

can now be drawn about its future. 

This monograph seeks to review the overall direction and intention of Russia’s military transformation, with particular reference to the specific range of 

threats—real and hypothetical—which it is intended 

to ensure against. Based on research up to September 2013, it reviews the period from 2011 when this 

transformation entered a qualitatively new and stable phase, which has continued through the change 

of leadership. It is not the intention to provide a detailed, blow-by-blow account of each reform initiative 

to date, since a number of excellent studies that do so 

are already available in both Russian and English.1

But some of the stated aspirations for transformation 

will be measured against known challenges facing the 
2

defense establishment and Russia as a whole, with the 

conclusion that several specific goals are unlikely to 

be met. 

Fact and Fiction. 

When examining the progress of Russia’s military 

modernization, it is easy but dangerous to refer to 

public statements by senior Russian officials without 

measuring these statements against actual progress 

made or against reality. This monograph deliberately 

avoids citing statistics relating to reform plans. This is 

because despite the fact that many statistics from official Russian sources are widely quoted as indicative 

of what is actually happening in the Russian military, 

they are in almost all cases unreliable. 

To illustrate this, we can use three key criteria and 

indicators of progress used by Russian officials to describe the reform process: “modern weapons,” “readiness,” and numbers of military personnel. 

1. “Modern Weapons.” A repeatedly stated key 

aim of military transformation and the accompanying 

rearmament spending is to increase the proportion of 

“modern” weapons and equipment in use in the Russian armed forces. There are aspirations to increase the 

specific percentage of equipment considered modern 

in different arms of service by specific dates. Yet nowhere has a reliable indicator been provided of what 

exactly “modern” means in this context—the word has 

been variously interpreted as meaning brand new, or 

under 10 years old, or recently renovated and upgraded. This lack of clarity gives the Russian armed forces 

considerable leeway in deciding when to declare that 

this criterion has been met, which at the same time 

means it cannot be used as a meaningful measure 

of progress. 
3

2. “Readiness.” Another key aim from the earliest 

stages of the transformation process was to increase 

the number of Russian military units which were at 

“permanent readiness.” Yet again, there is no single 

overall definition for what precisely this means in a 

Russian military context. Common interpretations 

include defining readiness as being at a high state 

of manning or being actually combat-ready. Some 

Russian military officers suggest that being “ready” 

means being in a position to move rapidly away from 

the place of permanent basing in order to be outside 

a strike zone at the beginning of hostilities. In other 

words, “readiness” is purely a measure of force protection.2

 In any case, the lack of a commonly agreed 

definition limits the use of this metric as well. 

3. “Manpower.” It has been clear for almost a decade that the official figures for current numbers of 

servicemen, and plans for manning the armed forces 

in the future, are very remote from reality.3 Yet Russian official sources persist in referring to a total 

manpower count of one million servicemen, despite 

mounting evidence that this is a purely notional and 

unachievable figure. Detailed discussion with senior 

Russians leads to a more nuanced and realistic picture, 

but the fact remains that it is impossible to deduce 

from open sources exactly what is Russia’s military 

manpower strength. 

This pattern continues throughout each statistical 

indicator describing the Russian military. As put by 

an authoritative Swedish study, “No single source 

on equipment holdings and the organization of Russia’s Armed Forces is both verifiable and detailed 

enough to be useful to assess military capability.”4

For this reason, this monograph mostly avoids citing 
4

statistics and focuses instead on overall trends and 

verifiable events. 

CHANGE AND CONTINUITY 

The change in leadership for the Russian military 

brought some change in the direction of the armed 

forces that was real, and much more that was purely 

symbolic. It was signaled at an early stage that the 

fundamental organizational changes that have finally 

broken away from the Soviet model for the Russian 

armed forces are irreversible.5

 In a much-quoted 

speech, Putin told the Defence Ministry Board that: 

We cannot constantly chop and change. Once made, 

decisions must not be constantly changed. This is all 

the more important now that we have reached the 

stage of polishing and fine-tuning the many components in this complex military machine.6

This “polishing and fine-tuning” (shlifovka) has led 

to a number of top-level organizational changes that 

do not affect the overall structure of the armed forces. With a new law in late-December 2012, President 

Putin introduced important changes to the organizational structure of the armed forces, subordinating the 

General Staff directly to the President as Commanderin-Chief, as opposed to the previous system, where 

the Chief of General Staff reported to the Minister of 

Defence. In addition, the General Staff acquired new 

functions, which gave it direction of local authorities 

and organizations outside the Ministry of Defence for 

the purpose of organizing territorial defense.7

 This reversed the relative concentration of power in the person of the Minister of Defence that had been seen under Serdyukov.8

 This period also saw the creation of a 
5

Russian Special Operations Command, which leading 

military analyst Dmitriy Trenin links to the incapacity 

of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) 

Collective Rapid Reaction Forces, among other factors.9

 A new classified Defence Strategy through to 

2016 was presented by Shoygu and Chief of General 

Staff (CGS) Gerasimov to President Putin in January 

2013.10 But by March 2013, 5 months after Shoygu reluctantly took office, an expert assessment was able 

to state that the main discernible difference was “a 

shift in favour of domestic military industry” from 

Serdyukov’s attempts to promote the interests of the 

military as a customer, including through attempts to 

buy military equipment abroad.11

Many of the remaining apparent changes under 

Shoygu arguably can be described as purely symbolic 

and a sop to military pride. These include the Minister 

of Defence appearing in military uniform (although 

the practice of other officials appearing in uniform 

with rank badges corresponding to their civil service 

positions has received a mixed reception). Units have 

been granted historical names, and two high-prestige 

units have been restored from brigade to division status, even though at the time of writing, it remains to 

be seen whether this will translate into a full return to 

their previous composition.12 Unlike his predecessor, 

Shoygu resumed the practice of addressing the general assembly of the Academy of Military Science, a key 

event in the Russian military calendar for summing 

up the results of the previous year.13

This balance between actual change and “polishing” suggests strongly that the direction of the Russian military is, at least for the time being, stable. 

Lieutenant-General Andrey Tretyak, former head 

of the General Staff’s Main Operations Directorate, 
6

speaking in November 2012, said that the Russian 

government’s current efforts are intended to “smooth 

the consequences” of previous reorganizations, and 

correct mistakes that resulted from following the 

“intuitive views and opinions of individual leaders, 

which did not always give the best result.” Overall, 

he added, Shoygu and Gerasimov have an easier task 

than their predecessors, as the task ahead of them is 

much clearer.14

Thus, while there has been change at the top, the 

dominant characteristic of the transformation process 

now is continuity. Those expecting radical changes of 

direction with the appointment of Shoygu have been 

disappointed, and the eventual shape of the Russian military at the end of the transformation process 

is now finally becoming clear. As summarized by 

Fredrik Westerlund of Sweden’s Defence Research 

Agency (FOI), “These were neither Serdyukov nor 

Shoygu reforms. They were Vladimir Putin reforms, 

with Ivanov, Serdyukov and Shoygu periods.”15

2011—THE NEW PHASE 

This stable transition contrasts markedly with previous upheavals. The final destination, and indeed 

the direction of travel, of military transformation in 

Russia had long been unclear, with official announcements only serving to cloud the picture as they were 

countermanded, contradicted, rescinded, unachieved 

or in some cases simply ignored.16 In this fluid context, 

it was dangerous to take for granted the next steps in 

Russia’s modernization of its military. At the time of 

writing, the transformation effort has been under way 

for 5 years, and during most of this time, servicemen 

in Russia were expressing increasing disorientation 

and discontent at the relentless pace of change. 
7

From 2008 to 2010, some of the fundamental aims 

of transformation were compromised by planning 

failures. For example, manpower planning relied on 

use of professional servicemen, but the retreat from 

wide-scale introduction of these “contractors” resulted in excessive churn of conscripts in units and a 

consequent sharp fall in average training standards. 

Meanwhile, implementation of procurement plans 

continued to show basic flaws in financial planning 

and reporting, which still pose a serious threat to 

transformation aims. 

From early-2011, however, it appeared that transformation had entered a new and more stable phase, 

with more clearly articulated and realistic goals. It is 

the continuation of this process in 2012-13 that suggests that conclusions can now be drawn about the 

change program in Russia’s armed forces and what 

those forces will look like at the end of this program. 

Key personnel decisions taken before and after the 

2012 Russian presidential elections already suggested 

that the transformation process was to continue on 

its current course with full support from President 

Putin. One of these indicators was the remarkable 

durability of Serdyukov in the face of perennial predictions of his imminent departure.17 Serdyukov was 

one of the small minority of cabinet ministers to retain their posts in the major reshuffle following the 

presidential elections. 

Furthermore, during the equally sweeping replacement of a large number of Russia’s most senior 

military commanders in April and May 2012,18 enthusiasts for reform were promoted to important roles, 

while those who questioned the process or objected to 

changes to their commands were retired or sidelined. 

This retention of the key actors who implemented the 
8

most radical reform seen in the Russian military for 

decades suggested that the process overall continued 

to enjoy President Putin’s approval and support, and 

consequently that this reform was set to continue 

along its current path. 

Backing Serdyukov. 

The first stages of the fundamental overhaul of 

Russia’s military implemented following the summer 

of 2008 have been well-documented in both Russian 

and foreign analyses.19 A striking feature of the early 

stages of implementation of reform was strident and 

vociferous opposition to change from a broad sector 

of serving and retired military officers and defense officials. The reforms struck at some of the most deeplyheld convictions about the nature of Russian military 

power, for example by moving away from the principle of mass mobilization, and in the process causing 

large numbers of mid-ranking officers who manned 

mobilization units to lose their jobs. A combination of 

direct career vulnerability and indirect concern for the 

future of Russia’s defense capability led to trenchant 

opposition to initiatives by Serdyukov and his ally 

(CGS) Nikolai Makarov. A symptom and by-product 

of this opposition was innumerable hints, suggestions, 

and rumors that Serdyukov was to be fired for going 

too far in his efforts to overhaul the military—or in the 

view of his detractors, destroying it. It was therefore 

a mild surprise even to some of Serdyukov’s backers 

that he was one of only five ministers to retain his post 

in the first government of Putin’s latest presidency. 

According to reporting by Kommersant newspaper, 

Serdyukov had come his closest to being retired in 

December 2011 when, at then-Prime Minister Putin’s 
9

behest, Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB) 

Aleksandr Bortnikov had reviewed a list of potential 

replacements, including Deputy Prime Minister Dmitriy Rogozin. Rogozin was, supposedly, the only willing candidate, but Putin at that point decided to retain 

Serdyukov in order to see his reform process through 

to its conclusion.20 The desire to avoid changing leadership in the midst of reform has been contrasted with 

a similar situation in the Ministry of Internal Affairs 

(MVD), which underwent its own traumatic upheaval but did not retain its chief, Rashid Nurgaliyev, in 

the same reshuffle. In theory, the MVD’s reform process has been completed, thereby removing the need 

to retain Nurgaliyev despite his being a key 

Putin associate. 

Nevertheless, reporting of Serdyukov’s imminent 

sacking reached a crescendo of conviction shortly before the March 2012 presidential elections. Unattributed reports in some mass media criticized Serdyukov’s ability to push through reform, and suggested 

that Rogozin could ease the friction between the Defence Ministry and industry, and thus successfully rearm the military. Notably, some of these reports cited 

“sources in the military-industrial complex”—in other 

words, people working under Rogozin’s direction.21

Serdyukov, however, remained in place after the 

election. Once again, the fact that Serdyukov’s reforms were incomplete was cited by observers as a 

main reason to retain him—along with his demonstrated loyalty to Putin and his willingness to take 

unpopular decisions. As noted by defense commentator Aleksandr Konovalov, “Serdyukov always goes 

for decisive steps with which the military are most 

often dissatisfied but which are requested from him 

by the bosses. None of the professional military would 
10

have acted this way.”22 Other suggested rationales for 

retaining Serdyukov instead of installing Rogozin included a desire not to give Rogozin too much political power and thereby risk creating a political rival to 

Putin himself.23

This reappointment of Serdyukov by newlyreinstated President Putin contrasted with repeated 

reports of friction between Serdyukov and Dmitriy 

Medvedev while Medvedev occupied the position of 

President (and Commander-in-Chief).24 The perception that direction of the military sat more comfortably 

with Putin persisted throughout Medvedev’s tenure. 

One characteristic report, albeit from a consistently 

outspoken and critical Russian commentator, claimed 

that “no-one is taking Medvedev seriously—he seems 

to have the authority to yell angrily at Serdyukov and 

other top ministers, but cannot make them do his bidding.”25 Yet even President Putin, at the first meeting 

of his latest term with senior military figures, appeared 

challenged by the problem of gripping the perennial 

issues of pay, manning, procurement, and housing—

in effect, not far removed from the problems with the 

military that exercised Putin at the beginning of his 

first presidential term 12 years previously.26

This contrast in the relative relationships of the 

two presidents with the military under their command was brought into sharp relief shortly before 

the fourth anniversary of the armed conflict between 

Russia and Georgia, with the release online of a documentary video in which senior officers, including former CGS Yuriy Baluyevskiy, accused Medvedev of 

dithering and indecision in responding to the crisis 

in South Ossetia, Baluyevskiy in particular said that 

a decision to respond by Medvedev as commanderin-chief required “a kick up the arse” from Putin in 

Beijing, China.27
11

Although interpretations by commentators of the 

motivations behind the video were many and varied, 

there is general agreement that “there are plenty of 

‘offended generals’ in the Russian army now, and directing their ‘propaganda attack’ against the current 

premier is not a difficult matter.”28 At the same time, 

the video gave fresh life both in Russia and abroad to 

the apparently moribund theory of competition, confrontation or at the very least, differences, between 

Putin and Medvedev.29 But the forthright comment by 

Baluyevskiy is interesting, in particular because of his 

role as a key opponent of the principles of the current 

transformation process: Baluyevskiy was a principal 

actor in the production of Russia’s most recent Military Doctrine, which was drafted during his tenure as 

CGS and released after he had been “retired” to the 

Security Council. This Doctrine therefore describes a 

military system that for Russia has already passed into 

history, with the armed forces already unrecognizable 

from their pre-2008 incarnation.30

As well as the Defence Minister, personnel changes 

within the military itself in May-June 2012 indicated 

strong support for continuing the current reform program.31 Colonel-General Aleksandr Postnikov (also 

known as Postnikov-Streltsov) was appointed deputy 

CGS and at the time widely tipped as a successor to his 

patron, Makarov, in the top job.32 Analysis as early as 

February 2006 had identified Postnikov as a key individual benefiting from the “stovepipe” promotion of 

Makarov and a number of reform-minded senior officers.33 This appointment suggested that, despite losses 

along the way, there was still a cadre of Makarov protégés from Siberian Military District supporting his 

ideas on reform and in position to implement them.34
12

At the same time, reputed opponents of reform, 

including former Air Force Commander-in-Chief 

Colonel-General Aleksandr Zelin, were sidelined or 

dismissed—Zelin, allegedly, for opposing the method 

by which Russia’s new Aerospace Defence Command 

was created35 and for bypassing the chain of command to protest over educational reform for the air 

force.36 The sacking of Zelin has also been attributed 

to his opposition to the way the new Aerospace Defence Command (VKO) was created.37 Furthermore, 

shortly before his dismissal, Colonel-General Zelin 

had given an impressively long and detailed interview on the problems facing the reorganization of his 

command—indeed, the tone of the interview may not 

have inclined Serdyukov or other civilian leaders to 

retain him in place.38 Zelin in particular highlighted 

command and control issues, and Russian commentators back him in questioning the effectiveness of subordinating air units to the OSK, arguing that this may 

lead to the “regionalization” of air power rather than 

its concentration. 

This cull of the topmost ranks of the military left 

a cadre of supportive commanders occupying senior 

posts but at lower ranks than their predecessors. A 

subsequent round of promotions in early August 2012 

appeared to confirm the new team in place by bringing newly-appointed senior commanders like Chief of 

the Navy Viktor Chirkov and VKO Oleg Ostapenko 

up to a rank commensurate with their status.39 Personnel changes at the highest level since that date have 

not translated into reversals of reform decisions, and 

in particular, the removal of Serdyukov over issues 

unrelated to the main thrust of transformation have 

not indicated that President Putin disapproves of his 

achievements. As noted by eminent analyst of Russian 
13

defense economics Professor Julian Cooper, “Putin 

never criticised Serdyukov.”40

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS—

WHAT IS TRANSFORMATION FOR? 

The overall direction of reform of Russia’s military 

seems, therefore, to have been endorsed with approval at the highest level and so can be expected to continue unchanged. Curiously, however, some aspects 

of the assumptions driving this transformation remain 

unclear. In the early stages of reform, Serdyukov and 

Makarov were criticized for embarking upon major 

change without having first put in place the academic 

or theoretical basis for managing this change or defining the desired end state—a significant departure 

from previous Soviet and Russian practice.41

In the absence of a coherent narrative on the precise purpose of Russia’s military—or perhaps in the 

presence of too many conflicting narratives—and with 

the shape of the military in direct contradiction to the 

current version of the Military Doctrine, which should 

define it, criticisms of this kind were echoed by more 

pessimistically inclined observers such as veteran 

commentator Pavel Felgenhauer: 

Serdyukov’s military reform has been radical, but 

it lacked a clear strategic objective or a defined doctrine. The United States and NATO continued to be 

the presumed main enemy; and the Defense Ministry 

made massive investments into new strategic nuclear 

weapons and air defences. At the same time, attempts 

to meet all other possible threats resulted in thinly 

spreading out limited resources. Major military reform decisions have never been openly discussed in 

parliament or in the expert community.42
14

Even objective chroniclers of the Russian military 

noted with disquiet that the military was taking its final shape while the threats it is intended to counter 

were, in fact, still being defined.43

A particular symptom of lack of clarity over the 

military’s purpose was the shifting role of the Russian 

navy. The fluctuating fortunes of the navy as a whole 

could be traced in the declared plans for building of 

capital ships. At the time of writing, aircraft carriers 

are once again promised for the medium term. But 

doubts remain over Russia’s shipbuilding capability—accentuated by a succession of disappointments 

with the long-term submarine building and refit 

program, exemplified by delays and faults with the 

Severodvinsk and Aleksandr Nevsky.44 Meanwhile, 

the repeated changes of direction in the debate over 

new capital ships left the Navy in a state of uncertainty. Often defined principally by financial arguments, 

these debates also hint at questions over the role and 

usage of a blue-water navy if there is no evident role 

for long-range power projection in the current military doctrine—the old adage being that the Russian 

military intervenes in places to which it can drive. 

The subordination of Russia’s fleets to joint strategic 

commands gave rise to deep concern over what this 

entailed for prosecution of an independent maritime 

doctrine, and whether in effect it cemented the navy 

into the role of a supporting actor for land operations 

rather than an independent arm of service with its 

own doctrine45—in fact, according to Dmitry Gorenburg, the navy “has already largely been consigned to 

the role of a coastal protection force for the foreseeable 

future.”46 But the new role of the navy, even if defined 

in the minds of the reformers, does not appear to have 

been articulated publicly in doctrinal statements, giv-
15

ing rise to continuing uncertainty over the strategic 

purpose of Russian maritime power. 

It appeared from the earliest stages of post-2008 

change in the Russian armed forces that it was now 

clear to Serdyukov, Makarov and their supporters 

what the military was not needed for: namely, countering a massive land incursion by means of mobilized mass. While the idea of vulnerability to U.S. and 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) hostile 

intentions remains strong, this vulnerability is finally 

no longer seen in Cold War-era conventional military 

terms. Instead, missile defense and information security in the broad Russian sense have come to the fore,

even while lingering suspicions over a limited Libyastyle intervention still provide a driving force for military modernization.47

At the same time, there remains a deep-seated failure to grasp that aggression against Russia in one form 

or another is not a key aim of NATO or U.S. policy—

which stems from the even deeper failure to perceive 

that, in the current decade, it is no longer axiomatic 

that no significant problem can be addressed without 

Russian involvement. It is taken as read in Moscow 

that Russia matters, and the notion that Russia can be 

ignored is in itself felt as threatening. 

This mindset of Russia’s leadership and institutions compounds the problem of Russia misreading 

the assumptions and intentions of NATO and the 

United States. As noted by leading British commentator James Sherr: 

Russia ascribes intentions to its ‘partners’ that they do 

not hold. Neither in Kosovo, nor Iraq, nor Libya was 

Western policy ‘about’ Russia... The result is a misdiagnosis of threat and ‘danger’, a misallocation of resources and an ‘aggravation of contradictions’ on Rus-
16

sia’s periphery that, by now, might have been settled. 

The connection, axiomatic to Moscow and unfathomable to Brussels, between NATO policy in the Balkans 

and the Caucasus primed the fuse for armed conflict 

in 2008, and one must hope (but dare not assume) that 

other spurious connections will not do so in future.

Further: 

The factors that frequently offset one another in a judicious threat assessment—capability, interest and intention—are invariably compounded in Russian threat 

assessments on the basis of worst-case assumptions. 48

What is the Purpose of the Russian Military? 

According to liberal Russian analyst Alexei Arbatov, “Contrary to the widespread belief among the 

Russian military-political elite, all objective parameters indicate that the threat of a major war is now (and 

in the future) less than ever in modern history.”49 In a 

joint publication with Vladimir Dvorkin, he continues 

the argument by suggesting that military preparations 

take no account of the state of relations with competitors, including the United States: 

Russian military policy has to a large extent existed 

in a way independently of the state’s international direction... These contradictions. . . . suggest insufficient 

control by the political leadership over the military in 

developing the military doctrine as an important part 

of defence policy.50

Arbatov and Dvorkin go on to question Vladimir 

Putin’s emphasis on military strength as the most important attribute of a great power: 
17

We should not forget that the Soviet Union also relied 

entirely on military might and nuclear deterrence, but 

ended in disaster as a result of economic collapse and 

political paralysis. The USSR [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics] lost a global empire, sovereignty and 

territorial integrity, despite the fact that it had five or 

six times as many nuclear weapons as Russia, and a 

much smaller military-technical quality gap with the 

United States.51

Another leading Russian commentator, Sergey 

Karaganov, goes further in explaining Russia’s perceived need for strong military forces: “It looks like 

the military buildup is expected to compensate for the 

relative weakness in other respects—economic, technological, ideological and psychological.”52

Andrey Tretyak, while still a serving officer, explained that, while the: 

likelihood of war is infinitesimal (nichtozhnyy), the 

Armed Forces exist against that likelihood. There is no 

specific enemy, and a very small likelihood of major 

war, but even though it is small it needs to be prepared 

for, wherever the attack may come from, whether a 

more or less technologically advanced enemy.53

This leaves the question of where this enemy can 

be found. According to FOI: 

Up to 2020, the primary area of operations for the 

Army will probably remain Russia and its immediate 

surroundings. The Army’s capability for operations 

outside Russia’s territory is not necessarily dependent 

on the exact number of brigades and their location in 

each military district, but rather on whether they can, 

if required, be moved relatively quickly (within weeks 

or months).54
18

The fact that speed of movement is best achieved by 

different means in different parts of Russia was a key 

consideration in plans to introduce “light, medium, 

and heavy” brigades in Russia’s ground forces, with 

procurement of wheeled armor55 intended to provide 

for more agile, wheeled “light” units more suitable 

for intervention in Russia’s Western neighbors with a 

well-developed road net.56

Further comments by Andrey Tretyak support the 

FOI assessment: In his words, there are no Russian 

plans for operations outside Russia except as part of 

an alliance, for example the Collective Security Treaty 

Organization (CSTO), or through bilateral agreements, 

for example with Armenia or Belarus. Therefore there 

are no plans, “not even the consideration of the possibility,” of a military intervention in countries with 

no direct border with Russia.57

It has to be noted that a large number of countries 

do still have a direct border with Russia, and some of 

them will not be comforted by this. According to British academic and former soldier Rod Thornton, Russian foreign policy ambitions will “inevitably result in 

occasional Russian military interventions abroad.”58

The implement of choice for this, Thornton says, 

would be the Airborne Assault Forces (VDV)—still the 

most professional force available to Russia, and able 

to move with little visible preparation. Tretyak notes 

that “the VDV are not called rapid reaction forces, but 

fill that role.”59

Thus it has to be recalled that use of military force 

has to be considered a useful foreign policy tool available to Russia, a concept validated by the outcome of 

the armed conflict in Georgia in August 2008, which, 

despite Western perceptions, resolved a number of 
19

key doctrinal challenges for Russia. As Arbatov and 

Dvorkin note, ahead of the conflict: 

All the warnings were not taken seriously, either by 

the U.S. or in NATO capitals—it was only the use of 

force that made an impression, which was openly 

admitted in the West. Moscow has also learned this 

lesson.60

RUSSIA’S HIERARCHY OF THREATS 

According to prominent scholar of the Russian 

military, Stephen J. Cimbala: 

Russian military reform is endangered by continuing threat perceptions that exaggerate Russian 

military weakness and by domestic forces that play 

against a rational assessment of Russia’s geostrategic 

requirements.61

A repeated criticism of Russia’s current officially 

stated threat assessment is that it overstates the likelihood of armed attack from the United States and its 

allies, and that as a result, spending priorities and the 

transformation process overall are skewed and fail to 

address more realistic security threats to Russia. Arbatov and Dvorkin write that:

It seems that once again, as is not rare throughout 

history, Russia is unprepared either militarily or politically for the real threat [and instead is] prioritising 

preparations for war with NATO on land, at sea and 

in air and space.62

There is a persistent argument, voiced by senior 

military commentators wielding prodigious authority 

in Russia, that foreign powers are planning to seize 
20

Russia’s natural resources, including by means of a 

paralyzing first strike by precision munitions against 

which Russia’s air and space defenses will be entirely 

insufficient.63 This provides the backdrop for repeated 

statements by Putin emphasizing defense against this 

eventuality. For instance, speaking at a meeting on 

implementing the 2011–20 state arms procurement 

program focusing on development of the technology 

base for air and space defence: 

We see that work is active around the world on developing high-precision conventional weapons systems 

that in their strike capabilities come close to strategic 

nuclear weapons. Countries that have such weapons 

substantially increase their offensive capability... Furthermore, there has been increasing talk among military analysts about the theoretical possibility of a first 

disarming, disabling strike, even against nuclear powers. This is something that we also need to take into account in our plans for developing the armed forces.64

Meanwhile, independent commentators like Sergey Karaganov dismiss these as as “phantasmagoric 

threats” which have “no bearing on reality and are 

nothing but caricature replicas of Soviet-era fantasies.” This includes: 

Horror stories about the United States acquiring a 

capability for a massive attack on Russia with smart 

conventional missiles. Even if such missiles are ever 

created, the threat of a strike against Russian territory 

looks ridiculous as the retaliatory blow can be only a 

nuclear one.65

Nevertheless, it is this threat perception which is 

currently guiding Russia’s funding priorities. According to Putin: 
21

In accordance with the state arms procurement programme through to 2020, we will invest around 3.4 

trillion roubles in developing our air and space defences. This is around 20 percent—around 17 percent 

to be more exact—of the total money earmarked for 

re-equipping the armed forces.66

Spending on offensive weapons is also increased 

as a direct result of this consideration. According to 

the head of the General Staff’s Center for MilitaryStrategic Research (Tsentr Voyenno-Strategicheskikh 

Issledovaniy—TsVSI), Sergey Chekinov, “Parity in offensive weapons with USA while USA develops BMD 

is fundamental for strategic stability.”67 This reflects 

the particular role that offensive nuclear weapons 

play in the Russian defense psyche, as both a symbol 

of great power status and a last-ditch guarantee of 

sovereignty.68 As put by Putin: 

We will not under any circumstances turn our back 

on the potential for strategic deterrence, and we will 

reinforce it. It was precisely this which allowed us to 

maintain state sovereignty during the most difficult 

period of the 1990s.69

Stephen Cimbala adds essential perspective: 

Russian military planners might reasonably assume 

that the initial period of war can be one of great danger. What seems politically absurd in a day and age of 

U.S.-Russian “reset” and post-post-Cold War Europe 

is not necessarily impossible from the standpoint of 

Russian military planners and analysts. Russian and 

Soviet historical experience so dictates.70
22

Aerospace Defence Command.

The response to this perceived vulnerability to 

high-precision attack was the creation of VKO, notionally activated on December 1, 2011 but still in the 

process of development at the time of this writing.71

The process of establishment of VKO has been subject 

to intense criticism, as for instance by Arbatov and 

Dvorkin: 

The formation of the Aerospace Defence Troops and 

the aerospace defence programme is not subject to 

clear military aims, does not have a logical command 

structure or a unified information system, and is not 

in accordance with the economic or military-technical 

capabilities of the country.72

But objections to its current structure miss the point 

that it is still in the process of integration into Russia’s 

command and control system and is not scheduled 

to take on its full duties until 2015, with the integration continuing to 2020. On assuming the post of CGS, 

Gerasimov is said to have asked for “clarification” of 

the development of the VKO, but not to have suggested renouncing the changes made, since purchases of 

arms and equipment for the new command have been 

planned through 2020 and the only questions remaining are organizational ones. 

According to Yuriy Aleksandrovich Levshov and 

other senior officers from the Russian General Staff 

Academy, the purpose of VKO is a response to the 

possibility of all campaigns being in air and space and 

not reaching the ground operations stage. It serves as 

a deterrent “so if an opponent is more technologically 

advanced, he must risk suffering unacceptable damage to prevent aggression.” It is a “military response to 
23

a new threat for the medium and long term [according 

to] forecasts over decades—all possibilities. The task 

is not to allow the worst case scenario to develop.”73

Other Threat Directions. 

If any potential major adversary is mentioned in 

Russian discourse, it is almost inevitably one in the 

West. As always, the potential for a military threat 

from China is the exceptional case which, if discussed 

at all, is approached in exceedingly delicate terms. 

There is a mood of cautious optimism in assessments 

of relations with China.74 The possibility of conflicts 

with countries that are not part of the Western bloc, 

including China, “is very unlikely to materialise because there are very few areas where Russian interests are at odds with the interests of these countries.”75

Furthermore:

China, aware of its growing competition with the United States, including in the military-political sphere, is 

doing its utmost not to threaten Russia. True, there exists the problem of China’s gaining too much strength, 

which in a situation where there is no energetic policy 

for development of the Trans-Baikal region may result 

in “Finlandization” of Russia, so to speak. But this risk 

is not a military one.76

Meanwhile, in the opinion of a range of authoritative commentators, the real security threat facing Russia is an entirely different one, from an entirely different direction—Russia’s southern periphery. Arbatov 

and Dvorkin write that: 

A fundamental deficiency of military policy and the 

reform is that the system of priorities, emphasising 
24

nuclear deterrence and aerospace defence (presuming 

confrontation and competition with the U.S. and its allies) does not address the real security threats, which 

arise from southern directions and are also connected 

with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 

and means of their delivery.77

Sergey Karaganov agrees, arguing that: 

From the standpoint of military security [Russia] is 

in a situation that is unprecedented in its history. The 

country that for a thousand years has been building 

around the fundamental national idea—defense from 

outside threats and protection of its physical sovereignty—is no longer under threat and will have no 

risk of coming under threat in the medium term... 

Real threats of conflicts keep multiplying along Russia’s southern borders. These conflicts will have to be 

prevented or neutralized in various ways, including 

the use of armed force. But these threats are fundamentally different from the existential ones that had 

shaped Russia’s history for centuries.78

Ruslan Pukhov, of Moscow’s authoritative Centre 

for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST) 

think tank, also agrees that the most likely military 

threat to Russia, ahead of the United States, is:

Post-Soviet type conflicts, both in Russia itself (in 

the form of separatist uprisings and attempts to secede) and similar conflicts with the neighbouring 

former Soviet republics. Most of these republics regard Russia as the main threat to their sovereignty, 

and are, therefore, interested in weakening Russian 

influence on their territory and internationally by all 

possible means.79
25

Cimbala, along with many Russian commentators, 

argues that it is this that should be the guiding influence for Russian defence planning: 

Russia is threatened neither primarily nor immediately by NATO. Instead, the threat of regional or smaller 

wars on Russia’s periphery or terrorism and insurgent 

wars within Russia and other post-Soviet states must 

now take pride of place in General Staff and Ministry 

of Defense contingency planning. Preparedness for 

these contingencies of limited and local wars, regular 

and irregular, will require a smaller, more professional and more mobile military than post-Soviet Russia 

has fielded hitherto.80

Yet these preparations are not at present Russia’s 

funding priority. According to Andrey Tretyak: 

The significance of ground forces is diminishing in 

modern war. The VDV are not called rapid reaction 

forces, but fill that role, so the VDV still have priority [for funding] over ground forces. What money the 

ground forces get goes to their funding priority, the 

Spetsnaz. So motor-rifle divisions are right at the back 

of the queue.81

The Southern Military District.

Despite apparent low priority in the funding queue 

and in presidential rhetoric, security issues affecting 

Russia from the south are not ignored. According to 

then Secretary of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev, “Russia’s steps are directed towards the construction, together with the former Union republics, of 

a system of security for the protection of our interests 

on the southern flank.”82 Despite capability improvements overall, including in the sensitive northwest of 
26

Russia,83 priority in re-equipment and reorganization 

is still going to the Southern Military District (MD). 

This continues a process started in South Ossetia,84

where new units established after August 2008 were 

by October 2011 almost totally equipped with Russia’s most up-to-date weapons systems.85 A FOI study, 

when discussing the Southern MD, notes not only unusually high manning levels, and the greatest share 

of new arms and equipment, but also that the “Southern MD lacks equipment stores, which indicates an 

intention to be able to start fighting quickly with 

available assets.”86

The emphasis on reorganization and re-equipment 

in the Southern MD indicates clearly enough that this 

is the area where Russia considers it most likely that 

the ground forces are likely to be employed in the 

foreseeable future. This arises not only from security 

concerns within Russia, but also over the next Western 

intervention, be it in Syria, Iran, or another candidate 

yet to emerge—reinforced by the persistent Russian 

perception, leaning on the examples of Afghanistan, 

Iraq, and Libya, that the United States and its allies do 

not always grasp the second- and third-order consequences of precipitate action. The private internal debate over for what precisely Russia does need a military is likely to have been influenced in later stages by 

the “mild panic” experienced by the Russian leadership when observing the fate of Muammar Gaddafi.87

To Euro-Atlantic eyes, the Middle East can appear 

tolerably remote from Russia; but this is to ignore 

Moscow’s perception that “the approaches to Russia’s 

borders” extend to a very considerable depth. According to Sherr, the Russian state has historically “maintained a set of security ‘needs’ out of kilter and scale 

with those of most European powers,” leading to the 
27

need to address these needs by “creating client states 

and widening defence perimeters.”88 These wide perimeters of security consciousness mean that the consequences of military action in Syria or Iran would be 

seen as a direct security problem for Russia. According to Arbatov and Dvorkin, “In the near and medium 

term, destabilisation of South and Central Asia, the 

Near and Middle East, the South and North Caucasus 

are the greatest real military threat to Russia.”89

In Russian perceptions, the Middle East is “right 

next door” (sovsem ryadom),90 and there are not only 

complex political networks between the Middle East 

and former Soviet states like Azerbaijan, but also 

major influences from Muslim ideology and political 

processes in the North Caucasus. It is implicit in Russian thinking that the Russian Federation is a multiconfessional state and needs to manage its relations 

with the Islamic world accordingly. 

Furthermore, bolstering military capacity in the 

Southern MD allows freedom of action in bringing 

hard influence to bear on Georgia with none of the 

doubts and disasters that attended the August 2008 

intervention. According to one U.S. analyst:

It is . . . quite clear that once the reforms are fully enacted, Russia’s ability to project power outside its borders in regions other than the ‘south’ will be severely 

constrained.

But at the same time, the reforms will allow “increased capacity to perform successful military operations along [Russia’s] southern periphery, which includes several former union republics of the USSR.”91
28

Threat Responses—Nuclear. 

When reviewing the nature of threats as perceived 

from Moscow and the means of countering them, one 

area needing special consideration is Russian activity 

in developing and introducing new types of strategic 

weapons while continuing strengths in nonstrategic 

nuclear weapons. The entry into force of the New 

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) treaty in 

February 2011 saw the start of intensive Russian activity aimed at developing and introducing new strategic 

weapons systems, including at least three new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) programs. Tellingly, several of these are being conducted in conditions 

of secrecy, running counter to the common Russian 

habit of loudly proclaiming new advances in weapons 

technology.92

Nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) remain in 

the Russian inventory in large numbers and intended 

for use in a wide range of scenarios, including for “deescalation.” Lying outside the bounds of New START, 

NSNW are, according to two Western analysts: 

prized and important assets to Moscow, and they 

have become even more prized and important assets 

as Russia’s conventional military has become weaker. 

They are seen more and more as the fallback option if 

Russia one day faces some sort of defeat in a conventional conflict.93

“The result is that when a threat escalates from 

armed conflict to local war, we will have to go over 

to the use of nuclear weapons,” agrees one leading 

Russian analyst.94
29

Thus while conventional forces remain in a state of 

transition, with a perceived decrease in their effectiveness, nuclear forces fill the deterrence gap in a manner reminiscent of the Russian armed forces’ nadir in 

the late 1990s. Scenarios for the use of NSNWs can be 

deduced from exercises which culminate in their use: 

dangerously, however, NSNWs are not covered by 

public Russian doctrine, with, in addition, no transparency for effective deterrence. 

This, plus current Russian efforts to develop precision very low yield and low collateral damage nuclear 

weapons, lends a keener edge to Russian statements 

on the possibility of pre-emptive strikes to neutralize perceived threats. At the time of this writing, the 

highest-profile example of this is a comment by CGS 

Makarov at the Moscow conference on Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) on May 3-4, 2012—so often misleadingly or incompletely quoted that it is worth reproducing in full: 

Bearing in mind the destabilising nature of the missile 

defence system, specifically the creation of the illusion 

of carrying out a destructive strike with impunity, a 

decision on pre-emptive use of destructive means at 

our disposal will be taken during the period when the 

situation deteriorates. Deploying new strike weapons 

in the south and north-west of Russia for destroying 

the missile defence systems by fire, including the deployment of the Iskander missile complex in Kaliningrad Oblast, presents one of the possible options for 

destroying missile defence infrastructure in Europe.95

Despite the repetitiveness with which it is threatened, Iskander is far from the only means at Russia’s 

disposal for the destruction of U.S. and allied BMD 

sites in Europe. Besides the NSNWs discussed above, 
30

developments in cruise missiles are seen by some analysts as alarming.96 The deployment of S-400 missile 

systems to Kaliningrad presents particular interest, 

given their reported additional ground attack role.97

Again, in contrast to the habitual noise and bluster 

surrounding threats of deploying Iskanders to Kaliningrad, this system has been deployed with no visible 

public announcement. This, together with the departure from the classic pattern of deploying Russia’s 

most advanced anti-air and anti-missile capabilities 

around the capital first, argues that this deployment 

is a statement of intent that should be taken at least as 

seriously as the eventual Iskander move. 

Regardless of the widespread attention it received, 

Makarov’s statement on countering the BMD problem, in effect, contained nothing new; but it served as 

a useful reminder to those who consider that assurances of good intent will be sufficient to assuage Russian suspicion of BMD and the willingness to act on 

that suspicion. The continuing impasse over missile 

defense and promised Russian countermeasures have 

the potential to increase military tension in Central 

Europe to levels not seen since the end of the Cold 

War; as one analysis puts it, “hair triggers and tactical 

nuclear weapons are not comfortable bedfellows.”98

Meanwhile, according to President Putin speaking in 

July 2012, a key aim of the state arms program is not to 

compete in an arms race, but to ensure the “reliability 

and effectiveness of [Russia’s] nuclear potential.”99

PROCUREMENT AND REARMAMENT 

In 2011, this arms purchasing program began and 

was scheduled to run to 2020. It attracted excited headlines and broke all records for the proposed level of 
31

spending.100 The hugely ambitious rearmament plans, 

as well as the state of Russian armaments in service 

before it began, generated a wealth of statistics, but as 

always a dearth of meaningful and measurable ones—

as noted earlier, a favorite index, the “percentage of 

modern weapons” available in service, is cited almost 

universally but never defined. What hard figures do 

exist, particularly on the number of weapons systems 

actually arriving in service, are generally discouraging. Leading commentator on the transformation process Dmitry Gorenburg has singled out the example of 

the Pantsir-S air defense system as “a good example of 

how, for all the worry about a massive Russian rearmament program, this rearming has been pretty slow 

thus far.”101

Slow deliveries need to be seen against the backdrop of on-going infighting between the defense industry and the Ministry of Defence and General Staff. 

This public spat reached a peak ahead of the March 

2012 presidential elections,102 with President Putin 

backing the defense industry against those who argued that its output was no longer fit for its purpose. 

One of the key tasks of Deputy Prime Minister Dmitriy 

Rogozin, in his new role as defense and space industry supremo, was to bring order to the procurement 

process. This involved heavy criticism of the defense 

industry—while never quite in direct opposition to 

Putin—and the willingness to trample vested interests, as witness his role advocating the cancellation of 

flagship procurement projects such as the BMP-3 and 

BMD-4M.103

But the changes that Rogozin apparently wished 

to introduce were so deep, and the challenges to ingrained assumptions so severe, that progress was 

slow and painful, and reverses are common. There 
32

were continuing instances of open discord between 

Rogozin and Nikolai Makarov,104 including over plans 

to produce a next-generation strategic bomber.105

Meanwhile, Rogozin’s personal style, not diminished 

in the slightest on his return to Russia from his colorful tenure as head of the Russian Mission to NATO, 

kept colleagues, opponents, and observers equally 

alert—not least through his continuing habit of causing havoc with unexpected announcements released 

via Twitter and shortly afterwards issuing retractions 

or explanations.106 Rogozin sought to introduce a number of measures intended to impose or enforce control, 

including the creation of a “Council for State-Private 

Partnership,” intended to “combat monopolism in the 

military-industrial complex.”107

Nonetheless, pragmatic decisions on equipment 

purchasing and disposal are now being made that 

appear more closely related to Russia’s force optimization goals and purchasing capability, for example, 

the purchase of Su-30SM multirole aircraft—a localized variant of the Su-30MKI as successfully supplied 

to India. This is an aircraft that should, in theory and 

despite noises to the contrary by the manufacturers, 

be well within Russian capabilities to produce early 

and in significant quantities.108 At the other end of 

the service lifespan, the long-awaited trimming of 

the tank fleet appears to have started in earnest, with 

disposal of T-64, T-55, and even T-80 models finally 

under way.109 Thus at least in some areas, equipment 

programs are beginning to fall in line with plans for 

reorganized and better equipped units in the individual commands. 

At the same time, the over-ambitious nature of the 

procurement plans was noted immediately on their 

announcement and is now becoming clear.110 Both the 
33

capabilities of the defense industry,111 and the funding 

allocated, were questioned. As put by Aleksei Arbatov, “Russia declares clearly unrealistic plans for the 

armed forces’ re-equipment, whose failure will once 

again damage the country’s prestige.”112

A denial of reality long colored the debate over 

funding for procurement,113 even well after former 

Minister of Finance Aleksey Kudrin was induced to 

resign after he pointed out that the plans were unaffordable.114 On his pre-election tours, Putin would 

point out that, after the current spending plans, “there 

is no more money”—but not that there was not enough 

even to cover those plans.115 Later, in June 2012, Putin 

re-emphasized that defense orders must be filled as 

agreed by manufacturers, and no further funds would 

be forthcoming: 

There won’t be other money, greater than the amount 

allocated to 2020. I’ve already talked about this 100 

times. At one recent conference, proposals were again 

heard to increase it. We would be happy to increase it, 

perhaps, but there’s no money!116

Financial constraints were exacerbated by ongoing difficulties in administering procurement and 

restarting production in moribund facilities—problems that caused parts of the State Defence Order to 

be postponed for 3 years at an early stage of implementation.117 Most recently at the time of this writing, 

the Ministry of Finance has issued a weighty report 

on budget spending that is harshly critical of the arms 

procurement program and will make uncomfortable 

reading for anyone involved in defense spending.118
34

CONTINUING CHALLENGES TO REFORM 

Difficulties in pushing through ambitious procurement plans are not the only obstacle to realizing the 

desired new shape of the Russian military. The hangover from the long period of stagnation in military 

spending and development also has direct effects in 

individual arms of service. One indicative symptom 

is the air force continuing to suffer from a failure to 

retain junior officers, despite huge increases in salaries. Flying hours were only being allocated to senior 

officers—a problem that was supposed to have been 

rectified at the early stages of increased funding, with 

fuel provision for the air force as part of the general 

increase in military spending realized from Russia’s 

increased oil revenues from 2005 onwards.119 The fact 

that fundamental issues such as this have not been resolved by the simple provision of money is indicative 

of the extent to which Russia’s military was degraded 

during the years of relative neglect prior to 2005. 

Many of Russia’s remaining problems in implementing its transformation aims are to do, not with 

money or equipment, but with people. As noted by 

Arbatov and Dvorkin: 

The traditional Russian and Soviet approach has always been, from the times of the regular army and the 

wars of Peter the Great, down to the Second Chechen 

Campaign in 1999-2000, that servicemen are the Army 

and the Navy’s cheapest ‘consumable’.120

Now, under fundamentally new circumstances 

where demographic change means that servicemen 

are at a premium, and furthermore that they each 

require greater investment in order to be trained in 
35

operating ever more sophisticated equipment, this approach needs fundamental revision. But difficulties 

in implementing plans for professional noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and for managing manpower 

overall, show that progress is slow. 

NCOs. 

The selection and training of NCOs is a particularly difficult challenge, for Russia’s transformation 

aims. Despite early recognition of the importance of 

developing NCOs into more effective leaders, administrators, and operators, very little progress appears 

to have been made. Reporting in early-2012 suggested 

that some NCOs were still undergoing the 10-month 

warrant officer (praporshchik) course in order to fill administrative posts—despite the fact that praporshchiki

had notionally been abolished. Meanwhile, poor planning and basic failures of arithmetic in predicting the 

required numbers of officer cadets led to several thousands of cadets graduating from military academies 

as officers, but continuing to serve as NCOs.121

June 2012 saw the graduation of the first “longcourse” NCO cadets from the Ryazan Airborne Forces 

Institute. The course, lasting over 2 years, saw 241 enrolled, with 180 graduating the course.122 In November 2012, 175 cadets graduated out of 240 accepted,123

and another 124 NCOs are expected to graduate in 

2013. The tiny numbers of graduates, and the length 

of the course, bring the extent of the challenge into 

perspective when compared with the requirement 

for tens of thousands of trained and effective NCOs 

in order to meet Russia’s ambitions for its military. 

This pace makes a mockery of the declared target for 

numbers of professionally trained NCOs. One result 
36

is the announcement by Shoygu in February 2013 that 

some 55,000 warrant officer posts were to be reintroduced. At the time of this writing, it remains unclear whether this is intended as an interim fix or a 

permanent solution. 

Lieutenant-General Andrey Tretyak explains the 

small numbers graduating from Ryazan by stating that 

the NCO courses of 2.5-3 years are still experimental. 

Russia has never had NCOs in the sense understood 

in other armies, he notes, and foreign experience in 

creating an NCO cadre was examined but rejected as 

not appropriate for Russia—so Russia developed its 

“own national program.” 

Tretyak went on to explain a fundamental difference between Russian and Western practice in selection of individuals with the right leadership skills for 

NCO training. In Russia, leadership is tested during 

the 2-3 year training course—not assessed before selection for training. If leadership skills are not detected during this period, then the candidate goes on to 

a technical post instead of a leadership position. The 

challenge of junior leadership, he concludes, remains 

a new and difficult one for the Russian military.124

The problem was formally recognized in May 

2012, with the announcement that over 10,000 posts, 

downgraded to be filled by NCOs, would revert to 

requiring commissioned officers.125 This followed 

sustained reporting of units being unable to carry out 

their functions since the NCOs or conscripts tasked 

with carrying out duties previously assigned to officers simply did not have the training or experience to 

do so, with examples including an anti-air missile unit 

deciding on its own initiative to rehire dismissed officers after exercises proved conscripts were incapable 

of commanding Buk systems.126 In the move to “pro-
37

fessional” NCOs, as with the development of officer 

manning overall, the Russian military’s ambitions 

have run ahead of what is possible without detailed 

long-term planning and a corresponding fundamental 

cultural shift in the understanding of what precisely 

effective noncommissioned servicemen are and how 

they are formed. 

Manpower and Training.

It has been apparent to observers both within 

and outside the Russian Federation since well before the start of the current reforms that a reduction 

in the conscription term from 2 years to 1 would be 

the beginning of a slow-motion disaster for the Russian military’s manpower plans.127 Five years later, 

Russia is continuing to scramble to broaden the conscription pool and debates continue over deferments 

for students, accepting conscripts with a criminal record, and even extending conscription liability to the 

age of 30.128 Meanwhile, the fiction is maintained at 

the highest level that Russia enjoys a “million-man 

army,” despite the impossible nature of this claim being demonstrated again and again.129 Privately, senior 

Russian officers recognize that the one million figure 

is unreal, even when taken to refer to posts not people, 

but argue that the difference between the target figure 

of one million and actual numbers is not as large as 

suggested in the media—the rolling deficit (tekushchiy 

nekomplekt) is partially filled from the reserve. They 

add that there is no aim to actually reach one million 

men under arms during peacetime.130

In the meantime, those men and women that do 

arrive in the military are faced with an accelerated 
38

training program whose nature depends on the time 

of year they are called up. Stephen Cimbala notes that: 

Many of the ‘permanent readiness’ brigades would be 

undermanned and not capable of combat deployment 

with their full complement of personnel. Further, most 

of the troops are conscripts serving 1-year terms and 

called up twice each year: at any given time, half of 

them have been in uniform less than 6 months and 

lack adequate training for battle.131

FOI agrees: 

Although the Armed Forces often send new recruits 

on exercises and even commit them to combat operations, shorter training time means that both individual 

soldiers, and consequently their units, have a reduced 

capability.132

There are clearly limitations on what 12-month 

conscripts are capable of. This is tacitly recognized in 

decisions like the 31st Detached Guards Air Assault 

Brigade being assigned an additional “peacekeeping” 

function “because it is [the unit] with the highest proportion of contract manning.”133

Meanwhile, the ground forces retain a higher proportion of conscript manpower, while contract servicemen are more prominent in permanent readiness 

units and posts involving more challenging tasks, as 

for instance in the navy, VKO, or VDV. But the range 

of posts for which a 12-month conscript can be trained 

usefully continues to narrow. As Aleksei Arbatov 

points out: 

Plans to keep the number of conscripts, serving 

12-month compulsory military service, at more than 

30 percent of the armed forces’ personnel are at vari-
39

ance with plans to introduce new sophisticated weapons systems and military equipment and methods of 

conducting intensive operations.134

On occasion, this gives rise to alarm over personnel performance in Russia’s intensifying series of major exercises, as the proportion of servicemen with 

very little experience rises.135 Major-General Aleksandr Rogovoy describes the current round of exercises as an assessment (aprobatsiya) of new forms and 

methods of utilization of troops and forces.136 As such, 

they have highlighted deficiencies in training not just 

among conscripts, but also among officers, especially 

in those scenarios involving joint operations. A large 

number of officers are not used to working with other 

services and do not know their specific features.137

Furthermore, according to anecdotal evidence, the 

Kavkaz 2012 exercise demonstrated that officers were 

losing the ability to work without information systems—so they ran into difficulties when their information support and command and control systems 

were switched off. It was determined that training for 

operations against an opponent with total information 

superiority required “teaching officers to work with 

paper maps again, not electronic ones.”138

CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 

The current transformation of the Russian armed 

forces marks the final demise of the Soviet military, 

with a decisive step away from the cadre unit and mass 

mobilization structure inherited from the USSR. This 

transformation is intended to meet threats as they are 

perceived from Moscow, not from any other capital. 

According to Putin, “The changing geopolitical situ-
40

ation requires rapid and considered action. Russia’s 

armed forces must reach a fundamentally new capability level within the next 3-5 years.”139

After the application of shock therapy to the military in the autumn of 2008 and subsequent twists and 

turns in both policy and implementation that left Russian officers joking about roller-coasters and about 

their new secret weapon being complete unpredictability, 2011 saw the beginning of a more smooth and 

stable transformation process. This qualitatively new 

phase affected all areas of military reform and—in all 

probability—has shaped the force that will emerge after the reform process is deemed complete.140

In part, this appeared to be due to new supervisory arrangements at the highest level, with the Security Council of the Russian Federation (SCRF) now 

approving reform plans.141 The apparent effect was to 

introduce stability not only by planning further ahead 

than in the early stages of reform, but also by providing a more methodical approach—with fewer instances of the Minister of Defence attracting criticism for 

enthusiastically embracing ideas from abroad without first assessing their suitability for Russian conditions.142 But this latest phase of reform has continued 

with little adjustment through a change of defense 

leadership with the arrival of Shoygu as Minister of 

Defence in November 2012. 

It follows that the impact on the direction of reform 

of leadership change at anything less than a presidential level should not be overstated. At the same time, 

it is essential to pay continuing attention to the aims 

and goals of the transformation process, since they 

are directly relevant to the military security not only 

of Russia’s immediate neighbors, but also of those 

states who Russia sees as a competitor, including the 

United States. 
41

Deep and persistent challenges, including problems with manning, funding, and procurement, mean 

that many ambitions for the Russian military will not 

be achieved in the short- to medium-term. All the 

same, it is undoubtedly the case that post-transformation Russia will have a very different force available 

from the one which went into action in Georgia in 

2008, and one that is more effective, flexible, adaptable, and scalable for achieving Russia’s foreign policy aims.143 The depth and scale of change which the 

Russian military has undergone in the last 5 years is 

impossible to overstate, and few of the certainties that 

underpinned analysis of Russian military capability 

in the last decade still hold good. The striking differences in equipment and uniforms that were apparent 

when watching parade rehearsals on Moscow’s Tverskaya Street in April 2013 may be largely cosmetic, but 

the fact that Russian servicemen now resemble those 

of a modern military instead of their previous plainly 

post-Soviet appearance is also symbolic of much deeper transformation, and of readiness to change further. 

As noted by FOI, “Although Russia will probably not 

be able to reach all of the ambitious goals of its reform 

programme for the Armed Forces, there is little doubt 

that its overall military capability will have increased 

by 2020.”144

The advice given to President Putin on what precisely is achievable using the military will be broader 

accordingly. Critically, it can be expected that the military’s role as a tool in Russian foreign policy—validated for Russia by the medium-term outcomes of the 

armed conflict with Georgia—will still be at odds with 

what is considered normal behavior in international 

relations in 21st century Europe.145
42

ENDNOTES 

1. Among many other examples, see “Russian Military Reform from Administrative Reorganization to Structural Reform,” 

Presentation by Andrey Frolov and Mikhail Barabanov, Washington, DC, U.S. National Defense University, Center for Analysis of 

Strategies and Technologies (CAST), April 26, 2012.

2. Author interviews with Russian officers, who preferred to 

remain anonymous, in late-2012.

3. Keir Giles, “Where Have All the Soldiers Gone? Russia’s 

Military Plans Versus Demographic Reality,” Shrivenham, UK: 

Conflict Studies Research Centre, October 2006, available from 

www.academia.edu/929850/Where_Have_All_the_Soldiers_Gone_

Russias_Military_Plans_Versus_Demographic_Reality/.

4. Märta Carlsson, Johan Norberg, and Fredrik Westerlund, 

“Military Capability of Russia’s Armed Forces in 2013,” Russian 

Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective—2013, Stockholm, 

Sweden: FOI, forthcoming.

5. Viktor Litovkin, “Prezident ne ostavil armii vybora—kurs na 

reformy budet prodolzhen” (“The President Gives the Army No 

Choice: The Reform Path Will Continue”), Nezavisimoye voyennoye 

obozreniye, March 8, 2013, available from nvo.ng.ru/nvo/2013-03-

08/1_president.html.

6. “Expanded Meeting of the Defence Ministry Board,” Russian presidential website, February 27, 2013, available from eng.

Kremlin.ru/transcripts/5050.

7. Vladimir Mukhin, “Glavkoverkh beret Genshtab pod lichnyy 

control” (“Supreme Commander Takes General Staff under Personal Control”), Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, December 17, 

2012, available from www.ng.ru/wars/2012-12-17/1_genshtab.html.

8. Märta Carlsson, “The Structure of Power—An Insight 

into the Russian Ministry of Defence,” Stockholm, Sweden: FOI, 

November 2012.
43

9. Dmitri Trenin, “Russia’s New Tip of the Spear,” Foreign 

Policy, Vol. 8, May 2013, available from carnegie.ru/2013/05/08/

russia-s-new-tip-of-spear/g2ti.

10. “Russia’s Defence Strategy Submitted to the President,” 

Russian presidential website, January 29, 2013, available from eng.

news.Kremlin.ru/news/4906.

11. Katri Pynnöniemi, “Russia’s Defence Reform,” Briefing 

Paper 126, Helsinki, Finland: Finnish Institute of International 

Affairs (FIIA), March 2013.

12. “Vossozdany gvardeiskaia Tamanskaia ordena Oktiabrskoi 

Revoliutsii Krasnoznamennaya ordena Suvorova motostrelkovaia i 

Kantemirovskaia ordena Lenina Krasnoznamennaia tankovaia divizii” 

(“Tamanskaya Guards Order of the October Revolution Red Banner Order of Suvorov Motor-Rifle and Kantemirovskaya Order of 

Lenin Red Banner Tank Divisions Restored”), Russian Ministry of 

Defence website, May 4, 2013, available from stat.function.mil.ru/

news_page/country/more.htm?id=11735703@egNews.

13. Viktor Litovkin, “Akademiki analiziruyut reformu” (“Academicians Analyse the Reform”), Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 

February 1, 2013, available from nvo.ng.ru/realty/2013-02-01/1_

reform.html.

14. Speaking at a briefing at NATO Defense College, Rome, 

Italy, November 27, 2012.

15. Private comment, September 5, 2013.

16. For an overview of the many changes of plan and direction in the current round of Russian military transformation, see 

“Chronology of Military Reforms since 2008,” in Marcel de Haas, 

Russia’s Military Reforms: Victory after Twenty Years of Failure? Clingendael Papers No. 5, The Hague, The Netherlands: Netherlands 

Institute of International Relations, November 2011. 

17. For a particularly vitriolic example, see Konstantin Sivkov, 

“Serdyukov ne prosto nepopulyaren—on omerzitelen” (Serdyukov is not just unpopular, he is repellent), KM-Novosti, May 17, 

2012, available from www.km.ru/v-rossii/2012/05/17/ministerstvooborony-rf/k-sivkov-serdyukov-ne-prosto-nepopulyaren-omerzitelen.
44

18. Vladislav Kulikov, “Medvedev proizvel kadrovyye perestanovki v voyskakh” (Medvedev carried out personnel reshuffles in 

the forces), Rossiyskaya Gazeta, May 6, 2012, available from www.

rg.ru/2012/05/06/oficeri-site.html.

19. Among many others, see Mikhail Barabanov, ed., Novaya 

Armiya Rossii, Moscow, Russia: Tsentr analiza strategiy i tekhnologiy, 

2010; Bertil Nygren, Roger McDermott, and Carolina Pallin, eds., 

The Russian Armed Forces in Transition, New York: Routledge, 

2012; Bettina Renz and Rod Thornton, “Russian Military Modernization. Cause, Course and Consequence,” Problems of PostCommunism, Vol. 50, No. 1, January/February 2012. 

20. Ivan Safronov, “Minoborony vypalo v ostatok,” Kommersant, 

May 21, 2012, available from www.kommersant.ru/doc/1939822.

21. See for example Moskovskiy Komsomolets, March 13, 

2012; Argumenty Nedeli, February 29, 2012.

22. Ekho Moskvy radio, May 21, 2012. See also commentators Leonid Razikhovskiy in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Vadim Solovyev 

in Kommersant-Vlast, Viktor Ozerov on RIA-Novosti, all on May 

21, 2012. 

23. See for example Profil, March 26, 2012; and Novaya Gazeta, 

March 19, 2012.

24. Unlike the majority of ministers, Serdyukov is constitutionally answerable to the president, not to the prime minister. 

25. Pavel Felgenhauer, “Solomonov Attacks Defense Ministry 

For Holding Back Funds,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 8, Issue 130, 

July 7, 2011. See also Pavel Felgenhauer, “The Failure of Military 

Reform in Russia,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 9, Issue 123, June 

28, 2012. 

26. “Vstrecha s rukovodstvom Minoborony,” Kremlin.ru, May 30, 

2012, available from Kremlin.ru/transcripts/15508.

27. “Lost Day: The Whole Truth About The War 08.08.08,” 

available from www.youtube.com/watch?v=sYQeeFXhOQw. 
45

28. Open Source Center (OSC), “Internet Film Accusing Medvedev of Delaying Military Action Against Georgia Eyed,” Politkom.ru, August 13, 2012.

29. As, for example, in “Rossiyskaya elita na grani raskola,” Pik 

TV, August 9, 2012, discussing analysts’ suggestions of “the beginning of a campaign against Dmitriy Medvedev and a symbol 

of a split in the tandem,” available from pik.tv/ru/news/story/44626-

rossiyskaia-elita-na-grani-raskola. See also Catherine Belton, “Rift 

Grows Between Putin and Medvedev,” Financial Times, August 

10, 2012. 

30. Keir Giles, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2010,” Rome, Italy: NATO Defense College, February 2010, 

available from www.conflictstudies.org.uk/files/MilitaryDoctrine_

RF_2010.pdf.

31. “Russian president appoints, dismisses several senior 

military commanders,” Moscow, Russia: OSC, Kremlin.ru, April 

27, 2012.

32. “Naznachen novyy nachalnik Genshtaba,” Argumenty Nedeli, 

May 4, 2012, available from www.argumenti.ru/army/n338/174844.

33. As cited in Giles: “Georgia: Lessons Learned.”

34. Sergey Ishchenko, “Generalskaya uborka,” Svobodnaya 

pressa, April 27, 2012.

35. Ivan Gladilin, “Voyennyy tandem pristupil k ‘zachistke 

kadrov’,” KM-Novosti, April 28, 2012, available from www.km.ru/

v-rossii/2012/04/28/organy-vlasti-rf/voennyi-tandem-pristupilk-zachistke-kadrov.

36. “Naznachen novyy nachalnik Genshtaba,” Argumenty Nedeli, 

May 4, 2012, available from www.argumenti.ru/army/n338/174844.

37. At the time of this writing, the establishment of the new 

command and the precise extent of its duties and how they overlapped with those of the air force appeared still controversial, 

with open sources contradictory, and Russian interviewees unwilling or unable to comment.
46

38. Viktor Litovkin, “7 aviabaz, 28 modernizirovannykh aerodromov i noveyshiye samolety. Glavnokomanduyushchiy VVS Rossii general-polkovnik Aleksandr Zelin rasskazal ‘NVO’ o razvitii otechestvennoy voyennoy aviatsii” (Seven airbases, 28 modernised aerodromes 

and the newest aircraft. Russian Air Force C-in-C Col-Gen Aleksandr Zelin tells NVO about the development of Russian military 

aviation), Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, March 16, 2012.

39. “Ukaz o prisvoenii voinskikh zvaniy vysshikh ofitserov voyennosluzhashchim Vooruzhennykh Si” (Order on awarding flag ranks 

to servicemen of the Armed Forces), Kremlin.ru, August 9, 2012, 

available from news.Kremlin.ru/acts/16199.

40. Private comment, September 5, 2013.

41. See, among others, Nygren, McDermott and Pallin, eds. 

42. Felgenhauer.

43. Boris Sokolov, “Orientirovat Vooruzhennye Sily nado na 

otrazheniye realnykh, a ne fantasticheskikh ugroz” (We need to 

direct the Armed forces at repelling real threats, not fantasy ones), 

Voyenno-promyshlennyy kuryer, August 8, 2012, available from 

vpk-news.ru/articles/9127.

44. See Thomas Nilsen, “Brand new attack submarine not 

ready for service,” Barents Observer, January 24, 2012, available 

from barentsobserver.com/en/briefs/brand-new-attack-submarine-notready-service and related reports at barentsobserver.com/en/security/

nuclear-submarine-needs-more-testing and barentsobserver.com/en/

security/dozens-major-flaws-newest-submarine.

45. See “The Role of the Navy” in Giles, “Russian Operations 

in Georgia.” 

46. Dmitry Gorenburg, “Predictions on Future Russian Air 

Force Procurement,” Russian Military Reform blog, July 10, 2012, 

available from russiamil.wordpress.com/2012/07/10/predictions-onfuture-russian-air-force-procurement/.

47. Keir Giles, “The State of the NATO-Russia Reset,” Shrivenham, UK: Conflict Studies Research Centre, September 2011.
47

48. James Sherr, “Russia and the Rest of Us: The Dynamics of 

Discontent,” Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, August 2012.

49. Alexei Arbatov, “Real and Imaginary Threats: Military 

Power in World Politics in the 21st Century,” Russia in Global Affairs, April 15, 2013, available from carnegie.ru/2013/04/15/real-andimaginary-threats/g0ms#.

50. Aleksey Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, “Voyennaya 

reforma Rossii: sostoyaniye i perspektivy” (“Russia’s Military Reform: Status and Prospects”), Moscow, Russia: Carnegie Centre, 

2013, p. 16. 

51. Ibid., p. 23. 

52. Sergey Karaganov, “Security Strategy: Why Arms?” 

Russia in Global Affairs, October 26, 2012, available from eng.

globalaffairs.ru/pubcol/Security-Strategy-Why-Arms-15716.

53. Speaking at a briefing at NATO Defense College, Rome, 

Italy, November 27, 2012.

54. Carolina Vendil Pallin, ed., “Russian Military Capability 

in a Ten-Year Perspective—2011,” FOI, August 2012, p. 124. 

55. Aleksey Nikolskiy, “Rossiya ispytyvayet italyanskiye kolesnyye tanki” (“Russia testing Italian wheeled tanks”), Vedomosti.ru, May 12, 2012, available from www.vedomosti.ru/politics/

news/1732497/rossiya_ispytyvaet_italyanskie_tanki.

56. Kristopher Rikken, “Meanwhile, Over at the Massive Russian Military Buildup. . .,” ERR News, February 13, 2013, available 

from news.err.ee/582a4ad5-d634-40b4-b3c7-b2f26e6071a3.

57. Speaking at a briefing at Rome, Italy, NATO Defense College, November 27, 2012.

58. Rod Thornton, Organizational Change in the Russian Airborne Forces: The Lessons of the Georgian Conflict, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, December 2011.
48

59. Ibid.

60. Arbatov and Dvorkin, p. 19. 

61. Stephen J. Cimbala, “Russian Threat Perceptions and Security Policies: Soviet Shadows and Contemporary Challenges,” 

The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies, Issue 14/15, 

2013, available from pipss.revues.org/4000.

62. Arbatov and Dvorkin, p. 29. 

63. As, for instance, in Makhmut Gareyev, “Na poroge epokhi 

potryaseniy: dlya obespecheniya bezopasnosti trebuyetsya obyektivnaya otsenka ugroz” (On the threshold of an epoch of upheaval: in 

order to provide security, an objective assessment of the threats 

is required), Voyenno-promyshlennyy kuryer, No. 3, January 23, 

2013, p. 471. 

64. “Meeting on implementing the 2011–2020 state arms procurement programme,” Russian presidential website, June 19, 

2013, available from eng.Kremlin.ru/transcripts/5615.

65. Sergey Karaganov, “Security Strategy: Why Arms?” 

Russia in Global Affairs, October 26, 2012, available from eng.

globalaffairs.ru/pubcol/Security-Strategy-Why-Arms-15716.

66. “Meeting on implementing the 2011–2020 state arms procurement programme.” 

67. Speaking at a briefing at NATO Defense College, Rome, 

Italy, November 27, 2012.

68. See also Keir Giles, “Ballistic Missile Defence and Russia,” 

forthcoming publication. 

69. Vladimir Putin, “Byt silnymi: garantiya natsionalnoy bezopasnosti dlya Rossii” (“Being strong is a guarantee of national security for Russia”), Rossiyskaya gazeta, February 20, 2012. 

70. Stephen J. Cimbala, “Russian Threat Perceptions and Security Policies: Soviet Shadows and Contemporary Challenges,” 

The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies, Issue 14/15, 

2013, available from pipss.revues.org/4000.
49

71. For a detailed analysis of the development of the VKO, 

see Colonel-General Viktor Yesin, “Rossiyskiye vozdushno-kosmicheskiye voyska i programma vooruzheniya” (“Russian Aerospace 

Troops and the Armaments Program”), in Arbatov and Dvorkin 

(eds.), Protivoraketnaya oborona: protivostoyaniye ili sotrudnichestvo? 

(Missile defence: confrontation or cooperation?), Moscow, Russia: 

Carnegie Centre, 2012, pp. 141-159. 

72. Arbatov and Dvorkin, p. 71. 

73. Speaking at a briefing at NATO Defense College, Rome, 

Italy, November 27, 2012.

74. Vasiliy Kashin, “The Sum Total of All Fears. The Chinese 

Threat Factor in Russian Politics,” Russia in Global Affairs, April 

15, 2013, available from eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/The-Sum-Totalof-All-Fears-15935.

75. Ruslan Pukhov, “The World vs Russia,” Force, August 

2013, available from www.forceindia.net/TheWorldvsRussia.aspx.

76. Sergey Karaganov, “Security Strategy: Why Arms?” Russia in Global Affairs, October 26, 2012, available from eng.globalaffairs.ru/pubcol/Security-Strategy-Why-Arms-15716.

77. Arbatov and Dvorkin, p. 5. 

78. Karaganov.

79. Ruslan Pukhov, “The World vs Russia,” Force, August 

2013, available from www.forceindia.net/TheWorldvsRussia.aspx.

80. Cimbala.

81. Speaking at a briefing at NATO Defense College, Rome, 

Italy, November 27, 2012. 

82. Interview with Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, “The real threats for Russia, the USA and the EU lie in the 

current instability,” Kommersant, January 12, 2012.
50

83. Stefan Forss, Lauri Kiianlinna, Pertti Inkinen, and Heikki 

Hult, “Venäjän sotilaspoliittinen kehitys ja Suomi” (The Development of Russian Military Policy and Finland), Series 2: Research 

Reports No. 47, Helsinki, Finland: Finnish National Defence University, 2011.

84. Keir Giles, “Understanding the Georgian Conflict, Two 

Years On,” Rome, Italy: NATO Defense College, September 2011, 

available from www.ndc.nato.int/research/series.php?icode=9.

85. Sergey Konovalov, “Obnovlennaya oborona Severnogo Kavkaza. Generaly otchitalis o prakticheski polnom perevooruzhenii voysk 

v regione” (“Renewed defence of the North Caucasus. Generals 

report on the almost complete rearmament of troops in the region”), Nezavisomoye voyennoye obozreniye, October 25, 2011, available from www.ng.ru/nvo/2011-10-25/6_kavkaz.html.

86. Carlsson, Norberg and Westerlund.

87. “Zapreshchennoye nastupleniye: Intervyu prezidenta Akademii 

geopoliticheskikh problem general-polkovnika Leonida Ivashova” (“Forbidden offensive: Interview with the President of the Academy 

of Geopolitical Problems, Col-Gen Leonid Ivashov”), Segodnya, 

March 8, 2012, available from www.segodnia.ru/content/106674.

88. Sherr. 

89. Arbatov and Dvorkin, p. 29. 

90. Andrey Tretyak, speaking at a briefing at NATO Defense 

College, Rome, Italy, November 27, 2012.

91. Gregory Lannon, “Russia’s New Look Army Reforms and 

Russian Foreign Policy,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 

24, No. 1, pp. 26-54, February 2011.

92. Mark B. Schneider, “Russian Nuclear Modernization,” 

Presentation at National Institute for Public Policy, Fairfax, VA, 

June 20, 2012.

93. Renz and Thornton. 
51

94. Konstantin Sivkov, as quoted in Lannon.

95. As cited in Vzglyad newspaper, available from www.vz.ru/

politics/2012/5/3/577140.html. Transcripts and slides of presentations made by the United States at the same conference are available from moscow.usembassy.gov/missile_defense.html.

96. Dennis M. Gormley, “Cruise Missiles and NATO Missile Defense—Under the Radar?” Paris, France: Institut français 

des relations internationales (IFRI), Security Studies Centre, 

Spring 2012. 

97. Schneider. 

98. Renz and Thornton.

99. “Soveshchaniye po vypolneniyu gosprogrammy vooruzheniya 

v oblasti yadernogo sderzhivaniya” (“Conference on implementing 

the state armaments programme in the field of nuclear deterrence”), Kremlin.ru, July 26, 2012, available from news.Kremlin.ru/

news/16058.

100. Frolov, Andrey. “Russian Military Spending in 2011-

2020.” Moscow Defense Brief, No. 1, 2011.

101. Dmitry Gorenburg, “Realities of Rearmament,” Russian 

Defense Policy blog, June 22, 2012, available from russiandefpolicy.

wordpress.com/2012/06/22/realities-of-rearmament/.

102. “The winner is . . .,” Russian Defense Policy, March 9, 2012, 

available from russiandefpolicy.wordpress.com/2012/03/09/the-winner-is/.

103. “Defense news,” Russian Defense Policy, April 25, 2012, 

available from russiandefpolicy.wordpress.com/2012/04/25/defensenews-5/.

104. “Zakupki bronetekhniki prodolzhatsya, nesmotrya na slova 

Makarova” (“Purchases of armoured vehicles will continue regardless of what Makarov says”), RIA Novosti, February 14, 2012, 

available from ria.ru/defense_safety/20120214/565663330.html. 
52

105. “Rogozin i Makarov posporili iz-za novogo bombardirovshchika” (“Rogozin and Makarov argue over new bomber”), Army 

News, June 6, 2012, available from army-news.ru/2012/06/rogozin-imakarov-posporili-iz-za-novogo-bombardirovshhika/.

106. “Rogozin utochnil sroki nachala proizvodstva tankov na platforme ‘Armata’” (“Rogozin clarifies the timescale for beginning 

production of tanks on the Armata platform”), RIA Novosti, April 

13, 2012. 

107. “Sovet dlya borby s monopolismom v sfere OPK sozdadut 29 

iyunya—Rogozin” (“A Council for Fighting Monopolism in the 

Defence Industrial Complex will be created on 29 June - Rogozin”), RIA-Novosti, June 28, 2012, available from ria.ru/defense_safety/20120628/686844070.html.

108. Maya Mashatina, “Sukhoi Su-30SM: An Indian Gift to 

Russia’s Air Force,” RIA Novosti, March 23, 2012, available from 

en.rian.ru/analysis/20120323/172357523.html.

109. Anton Denisov, “Russia Announces ‘Massive’ Tank 

Scrappage Scheme,” RIA Novosti, March 23, 2012, available from 

en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20120323/172346264.html.

110. Mikhail Barabanov, “Kriticheskii vzgliad na GPV-2020” 

(“A critical look at the State Arms Program-2020”), Voyenno-promyshlennyy kuryer, January 8, 2013, available from vpk-news.ru/

articles/13870.

111. Pallin, ed., p. 65 onwards. 

112. Alexei Arbatov, “Real and Imaginary Threats: Military 

Power in World Politics in the 21st Century,” Russia in Global Affairs, April 15, 2013, available from carnegie.ru/2013/04/15/real-andimaginary-threats/g0ms#.

113. Ruslan Pukhov, “Natsionalnaya oborona: vozmozhna ekonomiya” (“National Defence: Economies are Possible”), Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, March 16, 2012, available from nvo.

ng.ru/forces/2012-03-16/11_economy.html.
53

114. “Kudrin Stands Firm on Defense Spending During 

‘Timeout’,” The Moscow Times, October 10, 2011. 

115. Kira Latukhina, “Lomat’ stereotypy” (“Breaking stereotype”), Rossiyskaya Gazeta, February 21, 2012. 

116. “Soveshchaniya po vypolneniyu gosudarstvennoy programmy 

v oblasti aviatsionnoy tekhniki” (“Conference on Implementing the 

State Program for Aviation”), Kremlin.ru, June 14, 2012, available 

from Kremlin.ru/transcripts/15646.

117. Konstantin Bogdanov, “Gosprogrammu vooruzheniya pridetsya perezagruzit’ za tri goda” (“State Program Will Have To Be 

Set Back Three Years”), RIA-Novosti, July 2, 2012, available from 

www.ria.ru/analytics/20120702/690180731.html.

118. “Itogovyy otchet o rezul’tatakh dejatel’nosti ekspertnykh grupp 

po provedeniyu otsenki effektivnosti raskhodov federal’nogo bjudzheta i 

predstavleniyu predlozheniy po ikh optimiztsii” (”Final report on the 

results of the activity of expert groups in carrying out an assessment of the effectiveness of expenditures of the Federal budget 

and presentation of recommendations on their optimisation”), 

Ministry of Finances of the Russian Federation website, September 3, 2009, available from www1.minfin.ru/ru/?id56=19933.

119. Aleksey Mikhaylov, “Molodyye letchiki begut iz VVS” 

(“Young Pilots Are Running From The Air Force”), Izvestiya, 

August 6, 2012, available from izvestia.ru/news/531968.

120. Arbatov and Dvorkin, p. 45. 

121. Keir Giles, “Who Gives the Orders in the New Russian 

Military?” Rome, Italy: NATO Defense College, March 2012. 

122. Viktor Litovkin, “VDV commander Shamanov interviewed on intermediate results of VDV reform,” Nezavisimoye 

voyennoye obozreniye, March 2, 2012. 

123. Vladimir Mukhin, “Professionalnaya armiya poyavitsya 

cherez 100 let” (“There will be a professional army in 100 years”), 

Nezavisimoye voennoye obozreniye, November 26, 2012, available 

from www.ng.ru/printed/276089.
54

124. Speaking at a briefing at NATO Defense College, Rome, 

Italy, November 27, 2012.

125. Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, May 23, 2012; Rossiyskaya 

Gazeta, May 29, 2012. 

126. Krasnaya Zvezda, April 2, 2012, as cited in “OSC Report: 

Military Increases Officer Billets To Address Combat Readiness 

Problems,” Reston, VA: Open Source Center, June 14, 2012. 

127. Keir Giles, “Russia’s Military Plans Versus Demographic 

Reality,” Shrivenham, UK: Conflict Studies Research Centre, October 2006. 

128. Mikhail Lukanin, “Demographics vs the Russian Army,” 

Defense Brief, No 1, Moscow, Russia, 2011. 

129. Aleksey Nikolskiy, “Minoborony: nekomplekt v Vooruzhennykh silakh dostigayet 20%” (“Ministry of Defence: Personnel 

deficit in Armed Forces reaches 20%”),Vedomosti.ru, June 9, 2012, 

available from www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/1837940/voennyh_

ne_hvataet#ixzz1ydVdnGXy.

130. Author interviews with Russian officers who preferred to 

remain anonymous, late-2012.

131. Cimbala, “Russian Threat Perceptions and Security Policies: Soviet Shadows and Contemporary Challenges.” 

132. Pallin, ed., p. 104. 

133. “V VDV poyavyatsya mirotvorcheskiye batalyony” (“Peacekeeping Battalions Will Make Their Appearance In The Airborne 

Assault Forces”), Natsionalnaya oborona, undated, available from 

www.oborona.ru/pages/mainpage/news/index.shtml.

134. Alexei Arbatov, “Real and Imaginary Threats: Military 

Power in World Politics in the 21st Century,” Russia in Global Affairs, April 15, 2013, available from carnegie.ru/2013/04/15/real-andimaginary-threats/g0ms#.
55

135. See, for example, “Ucheniya na Kamchatke: rakety s kreysera ‘Varyag’ ne doletali do tseli, boyevaya tekhnika zastrevala v peske” 

(“Exercise in Kamchatka: missiles from the cruiser Varyag don’t 

reach their target, military equipment stuck in the sand”), Novyy 

region, September 22, 2011, available from nr2.ru/society/349713.

html; Igor Kravchuk, “Takogo pozora VMF RF eshche ne znal. 

Pokazushnyye ucheniya na Kamchatke” (“The Russian Navy 

has never seen such an embarrassment. Show exercise in Kamchatka”), Gaidpark, September 20, 2011, available from gidepark.

ru/user/2976644430/article/424394. 

136. Speaking at a briefing at NATO Defense College, Rome, 

Italy, November 27, 2012. 

137. “Experiences and Conclusions of the Russian Military 

Exercises since 2009,” in Forss, Kiianlinna, Inkkinen, and Hult, 

eds., The Development of Russian Military Policy and Finland. 

138. Author interviews with Russian officers who preferred to 

remain anonymous, late-2012. 

139. “Expanded meeting of the Defence Ministry Board,” 

Russian presidential website, February 27, 2013, available from 

eng.Kremlin.ru/transcripts/5050.

140. See also Igor Korotchenko, “Vooruzhennye sily Rossiyskoy 

Federatsii: modernizatsiya i perspektivy razvitiya” (“Armed Forces of 

the Russian Federations: Modernisation and Prospects for Development”), Natsionalnaya oborona, 2012.

141. Giles, “Who Gives the Orders in the New Russian 

Military?” 

142. Keir Giles, “Russian Operations in Georgia: Lessons 

Identified Versus Lessons Learned,” in The Russian Armed Forces 

in Transition. 

143. Frederic Labarre, “Defence Innovation and Russian Foreign Policy,” J. Larry Black, ed., Russia after 2012, New York: Routledge, 2012.
56

144. Pallin, ed., “Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year 

Perspective—2011,” p. 21. 

145. “Russia—Future Directions,” Shrivenham, UK: Advanced Research and Assessment Group, Defence Academy of 

the United Kingdom, October 1, 2008. See also Labarre.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Authors

Mr. Keir Giles

Dr. Andrew Monaghan

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil