Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 91 / Wednesday, May 10, 2000 / Proposed Rules 30021

Replacement

(a) Within 18 months after the effective

date of this AD, replace existing door handle

mounting hub assemblies in the forward and

aft entry doors, forward galley door, and aft

service door, with new, improved hub

assemblies, in accordance with Boeing

Service Bulletin 737–25–1322, Revision 2,

dated February 19, 1998.

Note 2: Replacements accomplished prior

to the effective date of this AD in accordance

with Boeing Service Bulletin 737–25–1322,

dated January 19, 1995, or Revision 1, dated

December 19, 1996, are considered

acceptable for compliance with paragraph (a)

of this AD.

Alternative Methods of Compliance

(b) An alternative method of compliance or

adjustment of the compliance time that

provides an acceptable level of safety may be

used if approved by the Manager, Seattle

Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA,

Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators

shall submit their requests through an

appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance

Inspector, who may add comments and then

send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO.

Note 3: Information concerning the

existence of approved alternative methods of

compliance with this AD, if any, may be

obtained from the Seattle ACO.

Special Flight Permits

(c) Special flight permits may be issued in

accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199

of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR

21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to

a location where the requirements of this AD

can be accomplished.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on May 4,

2000.

Vi L. Lipski,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 00–11725 Filed 5–9–00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–U

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 2000–NM–50–AD]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell

Douglas Model DC–10–10, –15, –30,

–30F (KC–10A Military), and –40 Series

Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking

(NPRM).

SUMMARY: This document proposes the

adoption of a new airworthiness

directive (AD) that is applicable to

certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC–

10–10, –15, –30, –30F (KC–10A

military), and –40 series airplanes. This

proposal would require performing

repetitive ultrasonic inspections of the

attaching bolts on the inboard and

outboard support on the inboard and

outboard flap assembly to detect failed

bolts, or verifying the torque of the

attaching bolts on the inboard support

on the outboard flap; and follow-on

actions. This proposal also would

require replacing all bolts with bolts

made from Inconel, which would

constitute terminating action for the

repetitive inspection requirements. This

proposal is prompted by a report of an

in-flight loss of the inboard flap

assembly on an airplane during

approach for landing. The actions

specified by the proposed AD are

intended to prevent in-flight loss of

inboard and outboard flap assemblies

due to failure of H–11 attaching bolts,

which could result in reduced

controllability of the airplane.

DATES: Comments must be received by

June 26, 2000.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in

triplicate to the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), Transport

Airplane Directorate, ANM–114,

Attention: Rules Docket No. 2000–NM–

50–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,

Renton, Washington 98055–4056.

Comments may be inspected at this

location between 9 a.m. and 3 p.m.,

Monday through Friday, except Federal

holidays.

The service information referenced in

the proposed rule may be obtained from

Boeing Commercial Aircraft Group,

Long Beach Division, 3855 Lakewood

Boulevard, Long Beach, California

90846, Attention: Technical

Publications Business Administration,

Dept. C1–L51 (2–60). This information

may be examined at the FAA, Transport

Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at

the FAA, Transport Airplane

Directorate, Los Angeles Aircraft

Certification Office, 3960 Paramount

Boulevard, Lakewood, California.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ron

Atmur, Aerospace Engineer, Airframe

Branch, ANM–120L, FAA, Transport

Airplane Directorate, Los Angeles

Aircraft Certification Office, 3960

Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood,

California 90712–4137; telephone (562)

627–5224; fax (562) 627–5210.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to

participate in the making of the

proposed rule by submitting such

written data, views, or arguments as

they may desire. Communications shall

identify the Rules Docket number and

be submitted in triplicate to the address

specified above. All communications

received on or before the closing date

for comments, specified above, will be

considered before taking action on the

proposed rule. The proposals contained

in this notice may be changed in light

of the comments received.

Comments are specifically invited on

the overall regulatory, economic,

environmental, and energy aspects of

the proposed rule. All comments

submitted will be available, both before

and after the closing date for comments,

in the Rules Docket for examination by

interested persons. A report

summarizing each FAA-public contact

concerned with the substance of this

proposal will be filed in the Rules

Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to

acknowledge receipt of their comments

submitted in response to this notice

must submit a self-addressed, stamped

postcard on which the following

statement is made: ‘‘Comments to

Docket Number 2000–NM–50–AD.’’ The

postcard will be date stamped and

returned to the commenter.

Availability of NPRMs

Any person may obtain a copy of this

NPRM by submitting a request to the

FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate,

ANM–114, Attention: Rules Docket No.

2000–NM–50–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue,

SW., Renton, Washington 98055–4056.

Discussion

The FAA has received a report of an

in-flight loss of the left inboard flap

assembly on a McDonnell Douglas

Model DC–10 series airplane during

approach for landing. Investigation

revealed that bolts made from H–11

steel, which attach the outboard hinge

to the lower surface of the flap, had

failed. Analysis of the bolts determined

the cause of failure to be stress

corrosion. The FAA has received no

damage or failure reports about the

outboard flaps. However, the inboard

and outboard hinges are attached to the

lower surface of the flap using similar

type design and the same material as the

installation of the inboard flap outboard

hinge. Failure of H–11 attaching bolts

could result in an in-flight loss of

inboard and outboard flap assemblies,

and consequent reduced controllability

of the airplane.

Explanation of Relevant Service

Information

The FAA has reviewed and approved

McDonnell Douglas Alert Service

Bulletin DC10–57A143, dated December

30022 Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 91 / Wednesday, May 10, 2000 / Proposed Rules

20, 1999. The service bulletin describes

procedures for performing an ultrasonic

inspection of the attaching bolts on the

inboard and outboard support on the

inboard and outboard flap assembly to

detect failed bolts, or verifying the

torque of the attaching bolts on the

inboard support on the outboard flap,

and follow-on actions. The follow-on

actions include replacing any failed bolt

and associated parts, if necessary;

performing repetitive ultrasonic

inspection of the subject area, if

necessary; temporarily installing a new

Inconel bolt without a new PLI washer;

and replacing the PLI washer with a

new washer; if necessary. The service

bulletin also describes procedures for

replacing all bolts with bolts made from

Inconel, which would eliminate the

need for the repetitive inspections.

Accomplishment of the actions

specified in the service bulletin is

intended to adequately address the

identified unsafe condition.

Explanation of Requirements of

Proposed Rule

Since an unsafe condition has been

identified that is likely to exist or

develop on other products of this same

type design, the proposed AD would

require accomplishment of the actions

specified in the service bulletin

described previously.

Cost Impact

There are approximately 412

airplanes of the affected design in the

worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that

244 airplanes of U.S. registry would be

affected by this proposed AD.

It would take between 2 and 8 work

hours per airplane to accomplish the

proposed inspection/torque verification,

at an average labor rate of $60 per work

hour. Based on these figures, the cost

impact of the inspection/torque

verification proposed by this AD on U.S.

operators is estimated to be between

$29,280 and $117,120, or between $120

and $480 per airplane, per inspection

cycle.

It would take approximately 288 work

hours per airplane to accomplish the

proposed bolt replacement, at an

average labor rate of $60 per work hour.

Required parts would cost

approximately $2,987 per airplane.

Based on these figures, the cost impact

of the replacement proposed by this AD

on U.S. operators is estimated to be

$4,945,148, or $20,267 per airplane.

The cost impact figures discussed

above are based on assumptions that no

operator has yet accomplished any of

the proposed requirements of this AD

action, and that no operator would

accomplish those actions in the future if

this AD were not adopted.

Regulatory Impact

The regulations proposed herein

would not have substantial direct effects

on the States, on the relationship

between the national government and

the States, or on the distribution of

power and responsibilities among the

various levels of government. Therefore,

in accordance with Executive Order

12612, it is determined that this

proposal would not have sufficient

federalism implications to warrant the

preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

For the reasons discussed above, I

certify that this proposed regulation (1)

is not a ‘‘significant regulatory action’’

under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not

a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the DOT

Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44

FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) if

promulgated, will not have a significant

economic impact, positive or negative,

on a substantial number of small entities

under the criteria of the Regulatory

Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft

regulatory evaluation prepared for this

action is contained in the Rules Docket.

A copy of it may be obtained by

contacting the Rules Docket at the

location provided under the caption

ADDRESSES.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation

safety, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the

authority delegated to me by the

Administrator, the Federal Aviation

Administration proposes to amend part

39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations

(14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS

DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39

continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by

adding the following new airworthiness

directive:

McDonnell Douglas: Docket 2000–NM–50–

AD.

Applicability: Model DC–10–10, –15, –30,

–30F (KC–10A military), and –40 series

airplanes, as listed in McDonnell Douglas

Alert Service Bulletin DC10–57A143, dated

December 20, 1999; certificated in any

category.

Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane

identified in the preceding applicability

provision, regardless of whether it has been

modified, altered, or repaired in the area

subject to the requirements of this AD. For

airplanes that have been modified, altered, or

repaired so that the performance of the

requirements of this AD is affected, the

owner/operator must request approval for an

alternative method of compliance in

accordance with paragraph (d) of this AD.

The request should include an assessment of

the effect of the modification, alteration, or

repair on the unsafe condition addressed by

this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not

been eliminated, the request should include

specific proposed actions to address it.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless

accomplished previously.

To prevent in-flight loss of inboard and

outboard flap assemblies due to failure of H–

11 attaching bolts, which could result in

reduced controllability of the airplane,

accomplish the following:

Inspection and Corrective Actions

(a) Within 2 months after the effective date

of this AD, perform an ultrasonic inspection

of the attaching bolts on the inboard and

outboard support on the inboard and

outboard flap assembly to detect failed bolts,

or verify the torque of the attaching bolts on

the inboard support on the outboard flap, in

accordance with McDonnell Douglas Alert

Service Bulletin DC10–57A143, dated

December 20, 1999.

(1) If no failed bolt is found, repeat the

ultrasonic inspection thereafter at intervals

not to exceed 6 months.

(2) If any failed bolt is found, prior to

further flight, replace the bolt and associated

parts with a new Inconel bolt and new

associated parts in accordance with the

service bulletin, except as provided by

paragraphs (a)(2)(i) and (a)(2)(ii) of this AD.

Accomplishment of the replacement

constitutes terminating action for the

repetitive inspection requirements of

paragraph (a)(1) of this AD for that bolt.

(i) If an Inconel bolt is not available for

accomplishment of the replacement,

replacement with a new H–11 steel bolt is

acceptable provided that operators repeat the

ultrasonic inspection thereafter at intervals

not to exceed 6 months until the

requirements of paragraph (b) of this AD are

accomplished.

(ii) If a PLI washer is not available for

accomplishment of the Inconel replacement,

a new Inconel bolt can be temporarily

installed without a new PLI washer provided

that the bolt is torqued to the applicable

value specified in the service bulletin.

Within 6,000 flight hours after an Inconel

bolt is torqued, replace the PLI washer with

a new washer in accordance with the service

bulletin.

Bolt Replacement

(b) Within 2 years after accomplishing the

initial inspection required by paragraph (a) of

this AD, accomplish the action specified in

paragraph (a)(2) of this AD for all H–11 bolts.

Accomplishment of the replacement of all H–

11 bolts with Inconcel bolts constitutes

terminating action for the requirements of

this AD.

Spares

(c) As of 2 years after the effective date of

this AD, no person shall install, on any

Federal Register / Vol. 65, No. 91 / Wednesday, May 10, 2000 / Proposed Rules 30023

airplane, an H–11 steel bolt, part number

71658–8–44, 71658–7–44, 71658–7–54,

71658–7–56, 71658–7–29, 71658–9–31,

71658–9–34, 71658–9–38, 71658–9–41,

71658–10–41, 71658–7–26, 71658–7–27, or

71658–8–29, on the inboard or outboard flap

assembly.

Alternative Methods of Compliance

(d) An alternative method of compliance or

adjustment of the compliance time that

provides an acceptable level of safety may be

used if approved by the Manager, Los

Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO),

FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate.

Operators shall submit their requests through

an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance

Inspector, who may add comments and then

send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO.

Note 2: Information concerning the

existence of approved alternative methods of

compliance with this AD, if any, may be

obtained from the Los Angeles ACO.

Special Flight Permits

(e) Special flight permits may be issued in

accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199

of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR

21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to

a location where the requirements of this AD

can be accomplished.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on May 4,

2000.

Vi L. Lipski,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 00–11724 Filed 5–9–00; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–U

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 99–NM–368–AD]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Saab Model

SAAB 2000 Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking

(NPRM).

SUMMARY: This document proposes the

adoption of a new airworthiness

directive (AD) that is applicable to

certain Saab Model SAAB 2000 series

airplanes. This proposal would require

repetitive detailed visual and dye

penetrant inspections of the backup

struts in the left and right nacelles to

detect discrepancies; and corrective

actions, if necessary. This proposal is

prompted by issuance of mandatory

continuing airworthiness information by

a foreign civil airworthiness authority.

The actions specified by the proposed

AD are intended to prevent failure of the

backup struts in the left and right

nacelles due to fatigue cracking, which

could result in loss of fail-safe

redundancy in the design of the nacelle

in terms of load capability.

DATES: Comments must be received by

June 9, 2000.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in

triplicate to the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), Transport

Airplane Directorate, ANM–114,

Attention: Rules Docket No. 99–NM–

368–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,

Renton, Washington 98055–4056.

Comments may be inspected at this

location between 9 a.m. and 3 p.m.,

Monday through Friday, except Federal

holidays.

The service information referenced in

the proposed rule may be obtained from

Saab Aircraft AB, SAAB Aircraft

Product Support, S–581.88, Linko ̈ping,

Sweden. This information may be

examined at the FAA, Transport

Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Norman B. Martenson, Manager,

International Branch, ANM–116, FAA,

Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601

Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington

98055–4056; telephone (425) 227–2110;

fax (425) 227–1149.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to

participate in the making of the

proposed rule by submitting such

written data, views, or arguments as

they may desire. Communications shall

identify the Rules Docket number and

be submitted in triplicate to the address

specified above. All communications

received on or before the closing date

for comments, specified above, will be

considered before taking action on the

proposed rule. The proposals contained

in this notice may be changed in light

of the comments received.

Comments are specifically invited on

the overall regulatory, economic,

environmental, and energy aspects of

the proposed rule. All comments

submitted will be available, both before

and after the closing date for comments,

in the Rules Docket for examination by

interested persons. A report

summarizing each FAA-public contact

concerned with the substance of this

proposal will be filed in the Rules

Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to

acknowledge receipt of their comments

submitted in response to this notice

must submit a self-addressed, stamped

postcard on which the following

statement is made: ‘‘Comments to

Docket Number 99–NM–368–AD.’’ The

postcard will be date stamped and

returned to the commenter.

Availability of NPRMs

Any person may obtain a copy of this

NPRM by submitting a request to the

FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate,

ANM–114, Attention: Rules Docket No.

99–NM–368–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue,

SW., Renton, Washington 98055–4056.

Discussion

The Luftfartsverket (LFV), which is

the airworthiness authority for Sweden,

recently notified the FAA that an unsafe

condition may exist on certain Saab

Model SAAB 2000 series airplanes. The

LFV advises that field experience has

revealed fatigue cracking in the internal

backup struts in the forward part of the

nacelle structure. Such cracking was

found in the area of the welded splices

for the upper and lower attachment

fittings. In the lower end of the

attachment fittings, cracks were found

near the local cut-out in the tube or

areas adjacent to the welding, and in the

upper area in the radius of the

attachment fittings. On one occasion,

fatigue cracks resulted in complete

failure of the backup strut. Such fatigue

cracking, if not corrected, could result

in failure of the backup struts in the left

and right nacelles, which could result in

loss of fail-safe redundancy in the

design of the nacelle in terms of load

capability.

Explanation of Relevant Service

Information

The manufacturer has issued Saab

Service Bulletin 2000–54–023, Revision

01, dated January 28, 2000, which

describes procedures for repetitive

detailed visual and dye penetrant

inspections of the backup struts in the

left and right nacelles to detect

discrepancies; and corrective actions, if

necessary. Descriptions of the two types

of inspections are as follows:

• The initial detailed visual

inspection includes the upper areas of

the backup strut around the welding in

the pipe and in the attachment fittings.

• The initial dye penetrant

inspection, using a Penetrant Type 1

(fluorescent dye) sensitivity level 2,

includes the lower areas of the backup

strut around the welding in the pipe and

in the attachment fittings, and specifies

taking special care to check the inside

edge of the cutouts.

If any inspection reveals a failed

backup strut, procedures include the

following additional inspections of the

engine mount surrounding structure:

• Detailed visual inspections of each

engine mount strut and mounting