Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Lacy, Hassell, 

and Keenan, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice 

LAWRENCE CHRYSLER PLYMOUTH CORPORATION 

OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 

v. Record No. 950568 January 12, 1996 

OKEY H. BROOKS, JR. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY 

George F. Tidey, Judge 

 In this appeal, we consider whether a former employee 

at-will has a cause of action for wrongful discharge against 

his former employer. 

 Okey H. Brooks, Jr., filed his motion for judgment 

against Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corporation. Brooks 

alleged that he was fired by Lawrence Chrysler because he 

refused to perform certain repairs on a car and that his 

termination violated the public policy of this Commonwealth. 

 Lawrence Chrysler repeatedly argued in the trial court that 

Brooks does not have a cause of action for wrongful 

discharge because he was an employee at-will, and his 

termination did not contravene any enunciated public policy 

of Virginia. 

 The trial court rejected Lawrence Chrysler's 

assertions, and a jury returned a verdict of $90,000 in 

favor of Brooks. The trial court required the plaintiff to 

remit a part of his recovery, reduced the verdict to 

$50,000, and entered a judgment thereon. Code § 8.01-383.1. 

 We awarded Lawrence Chrysler an appeal. 

 We will review the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to 

Brooks, who comes to this Court armed with a jury verdict 
confirmed by the trial court. Brooks was employed as a body 

shop repairman for Lawrence Chrysler. Lawrence Chrysler 

relied upon Brooks to repair cars in a safe manner. 

 In March 1992, Lawrence Chrysler's body shop manager, 

Glenn Fowlkes, requested that Brooks repair a car that had 

sustained rear end damage. Fowlkes directed Brooks to 

repair the car by utilizing a procedure described as 

"clipping" or "sectioning." Brooks described his 

conversation with Fowlkes as follows: 

 [Glenn Fowlkes] asked me to cut the car in 

half and -- which the short term they call is 

clipping. Cut it in half through the floors, 

through the rocker panel and through the 

windshield posts. Roll away that half and go to 

the junkyard and get another half and put to that 

front part and try to weld it together. 

Brooks believed that this method of repair was unsafe. 

Brooks testified: 

 [W]hat they [were] asking me to do was cut 

the car in half and cut all your major panels and 

all the floor panels, in which the floor panels 

have all your stress conductors. They are crush 

points designed in this car to crush if this car 

is wrecked. If it's hit again, if I had repaired 

it the way I was asked, I would be destroying all 

that area. 

Lawrence Chrysler's general manager fired Brooks because he 

refused to repair the car as instructed.*

 Lawrence Chrysler asserts that Brooks, who admits he is 

an employee at-will, does not have a legally cognizable 

cause of action against it. Brooks contends that even 

 

 *Lawrence Chrysler vigorously disputed, at trial, that 

this method of repair is unsafe. Lawrence Chrysler 

presented evidence that the "sectioning" procedure is 

considered a safe practice in the automotive repair 

industry. 
though he is an employee at-will, Lawrence Chrysler 

wrongfully discharged him in violation of Virginia's public 

policy and that "the public policy of Virginia need not be 

found in an express statutory command." We disagree with 

Brooks. 

 Virginia strongly adheres to the common-law employmentat-will doctrine. We have repeatedly stated: 

 "Virginia adheres to the common-law rule that 

when the intended duration of a contract for the 

rendition of services cannot be determined by fair 

inference from the terms of the contract, then 

either party is ordinarily at liberty to terminate 

the contract at will, upon giving the other party 

reasonable notice. 

 An employee is ordinarily at liberty to leave 

his employment for any reason or for no reason, 

upon giving reasonable notice, without incurring 

liability to his employer. Notions of fundamental 

fairness underlie the concept of mutuality which 

extends a corresponding freedom to the employer." 

Lockhart v. Commonwealth Education Systems, 247 Va. 98, 102, 

439 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1994) (quoting Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc., 

234 Va. 462, 465, 362 S.E.2d 915, 916-17 (1987)); accord

Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 229 Va. 534, 535, 331 

S.E.2d 797, 798 (1985); Stonega Coal and Coke Co. v. 

Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 106 Va. 223, 226, 55 S.E. 

551, 552 (1906). 

 This rule is not absolute, and we have recognized 

certain very narrow exceptions. In Bowman v. State Bank of 

Keysville, supra, we permitted at-will employees of a bank 

to prosecute causes of action for wrongful discharge against 

their former employer, State Bank of Keysville. The Bank 

allegedly fired the employees, who owned shares of the 

Bank's common stock, because the employees ultimately failed 
to vote in favor of the Bank's proposed merger. We held 

that the employees had pled valid causes of action in tort 

for improper discharge from employment. The alleged 

discharges violated the public policy of the Commonwealth as 

enunciated in former Code § 13.1-32, now Code § 13.1-662, 

which conferred upon the employees as stockholders the right 

to vote. We stated: 

 Because the right conferred by [Code § 13.1-662] 

is in furtherance of established public policy, 

the employer may not lawfully use the threat of 

discharge of an at-will employee as a device to 

control the otherwise unfettered discretion of a 

shareholder to vote freely his or her stock in the 

corporation. 

Bowman, 229 Va. at 540, 331 S.E.2d at 801. 

 In Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc., supra, we observed that 

Bowman recognized an exception to the employmentat-will doctrine limited to discharges which 

violate public policy, that is, the policy 

underlying existing laws designed to protect the 

property rights, personal freedoms, health, 

safety, or welfare of the people in general. . . . 

 The exception we recognized was not so broad as 

to make actionable those discharges of at-will 

employees which violate only private rights or 

interests. 

234 Va. at 468, 362 S.E.2d at 918. 

 In Lockhart v. Commonwealth Education Systems, supra, 

we reiterated that even though we strongly adhere to the 

employment-at-will doctrine, there are narrow exceptions to 

that doctrine. There, we permitted two former employees, 

who alleged that they had been terminated because of their 

race or gender, to prosecute causes of action against their 

respective former employers. We emphasized in Lockhart that 

the former employers' actions, if proven, would have been 

violative of Virginia's public policy against race and 
gender discrimination as enunciated in Code § 2.1-715. That 

statute, which is a part of the Virginia Human Rights Act, 

states that it is the policy of the Commonwealth of Virginia 

to "safeguard all individuals within the Commonwealth from 

unlawful discrimination" because of, inter alia, race and 

gender. 

 Brooks asserts, on brief, that "[t]o repair a car in 

such a manner as was requested in this case is an obvious 

violation of both statutory and common law duties, including 

duties under the Consumer Protection laws, the Automobile 

Salvage laws (Virginia Code §§ 46.2-1600 et seq.), and 

common law duties of the dealership concerning the exercise 

of due care." We simply find no language in Code §§ 46.2-

1600 through -1610 (which govern salvage, nonrepairable, and 

rebuilt vehicles) that supports Brooks' position. More 

telling, Brooks does not specify what precise statute that 

Lawrence Chrysler purportedly contravened. 

 In Bowman and Lockhart, the plaintiffs, who were 

permitted to pursue causes of action against their former 

employers, identified specific Virginia statutes in which 

the General Assembly had established public policies that 

the former employers had contravened. Unlike the plaintiffs 

in Bowman and Lockhart, Brooks does not have a cause of 

action for wrongful discharge because he is unable to 

identify any Virginia statute establishing a public policy 

that Lawrence Chrysler violated. We also reject Brooks' 

attempt to expand the narrow exception we recognized in 

Bowman by relying upon so-called "common law duties of the 
dealership." 

 Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial 

court and enter final judgment here on behalf of Lawrence 

Chrysler. 

Reversed and final judgment.