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The

Letort Papers

In the early 18th century, James Letort, an explorer 

and fur trader, was instrumental in opening up the 

Cumberland Valley to settlement. By 1752, there was 

a garrison on Letort Creek at what is today Carlisle 

Barracks, Pennsylvania. In those days, Carlisle Barracks 

lay at the western edge of the American colonies. It was 

a bastion for the protection of settlers and a departure 

point for further exploration. Today, as was the case 

over 2 centuries ago, Carlisle Barracks, as the home 

of the U.S. Army War College, is a place of transition 

and transformation. 

In the same spirit of bold curiosity that compelled 

the men and women who, like Letort, settled the 

American west, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and 

U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press presents The 

Letort Papers. This series allows SSI and USAWC Press 

to publish papers, retrospectives, speeches, or essays 

of interest to the defense academic community which 

may not correspond with our mainstream policyoriented publications. 

If you think you may have a subject amenable to 

publication in our Letort Paper series, or if you wish 

to comment on a particular paper, please contact 

Dr. Steven K. Metz, Director of Research, Strategic 

Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 

U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn Drive, Carlisle, 

PA 17013-5010. His phone number is (717) 245-3822; 

email address is steven.k.metz.civ@mail.mil. We look 

forward to hearing from you.
Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING 

SYSTEM INSIGHTS: CHAIRMEN 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 1990 TO 2012

Richard M. Meinhart

June 2013

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and 

do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the 

Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and 

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academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified 

information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent 

official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to 

offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for 

public release; distribution is unlimited.

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This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, 

Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be 

copyrighted.
ii

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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should

be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. 

Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn 

Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013-5010. 

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ISBN 1-58487-578-X
iii

FOREWORD

In the leadership and management literature, we have 

learned from others who have used strategic planning 

to respond to the demands of the current and future environment. This Letort Paper by Dr. Richard Meinhart 

builds upon his earlier doctorate work, Strategic Planning 

Through An Organizational Lens, that examined what higher 

education leaders could learn from strategic planning by 

the Chairmen Joint Chiefs of Staff in the 1990s. Further, it 

also builds on a 2006 Letort Paper, Strategic Planning by the 

Chairmen Joint Chiefs of Staff: 1990 to 2005, that provided 

strategic planning and leadership insights to 2005. This 

current update is particularly relevant, as it focuses on the 

many significant changes made to the Chairman’s strategic 

planning system in 2008, compares the current strategic 

environment with that of the previous 2 decades, and updates the Chairmen’s use of the strategic planning system 

to 2012. 

How leaders use a strategic planning system to position their organizations to respond to internal and external 

challenges has multiple perspectives whether those leaders are in education, business, government, or the military. 

This Paper provides an historic perspective in assessing 

the past six Chairmen’s leadership legacies using their 

planning system from 1990 to 2011. It also has a contemporary focus, as it describes the current Chairman’s focus 

and the planning system’s current processes and products. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it provides 

relevant leadership and management insights for senior 

leaders related to a vision’s impact, decisionmaking styles, 

planning process and system characteristics, and overall 

organizational impact.

 

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press 

v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

RICHARD M. MEINHART is currently Professor of 

Defense and Joint Processes at the U.S. Army War 

College (USAWC). He has taught at the USAWC 

since 1997 and held the college’s General Brehon 

Burke Somervell Chair of Management, the Defense 

Transformation Chair, and the General Matthew B. 

Ridgway Chair of Leadership. His teaching and research interests are in the areas of strategic leadership, 

strategic thinking, and in the systems and processes 

used by civilian and military leaders in the Department 

of Defense. Professor Meinhart’s military experiences 

include almost 30 years of active service in the Air 

Force, which involved assignments on the Joint Chiefs, 

Army, and Air Force Staffs at the Pentagon and in supply and logistics operations at three stateside bases and 

three overseas locations. He has lectured and facilitated discussions to a variety of government, business, 

military, and foreign audiences on subjects centered on 

strategic planning, thinking, and leadership. Professor 

Meinhart holds a doctorate degree in education from 

The George Washington University, a master's degree 

in national security and strategic studies from the 

Naval War College, a master of arts degree in management from Central Michigan University, and a bachelor of science in chemistry from Lehigh University. 

vii

SUMMARY

Military leaders at many levels have used strategic 

planning in various ways to position their organizations to respond to the demands of the current situation, while simultaneously preparing to meet future 

challenges. This Letort Paper examines how the different Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1990 to 

2012 used a strategic planning system to enable them 

to meet their formal leadership responsibilities as outlined in Title 10 U.S. Code. As such, it provides an historic perspective in assessing the different Chairmen’s 

leadership legacies in using and modifying their 

strategic planning system. It also has a contemporary 

focus as it describes the planning system’s current 

processes and products. 

Because the strategic environment and its challenges can affect both a leader and staff’s use of a 

planning system, this Paper examines major characteristics of the current strategic environment during 

this 2-decade-plus time frame. The current decade’s 

challenges, which began in 2010 and are still evolving, appear to be significantly different from those 

of the previous decade in light of the nation’s fiscal 

challenges, the military’s departure from Iraq, and 

forecasted future force reductions in Afghanistan. The 

current decade’s challenges associated with shifting, 

interest-driven conditions, and a multi-nodal world 

as described in the 2011 National Military Strategy are 

different from the rigid security competition between 

opposing blocks associated with the 1990s. 

To respond to these challenges, the planning system was formally revised five different times during 

this period. The most current revision in 2008 has 

specified processes and planning products under an 
overall framework of assess, advise, direct, and execute components. The assess component provides a 

comprehensive joint assessment of global challenges 

and joint capabilities, as well as force readiness and 

risk concerns. The advise component has specific resource, risk, and strategic assessment products to enable the Chairman to execute roles associated with 

being the principal military advisor, articulating 

combatant commander concerns, validating military 

requirements, and providing advice in other strategic 

documents. The direct component focuses on implementing the President and Secretary of Defense’s 

guidance through strategies, plans, and doctrine. 

Finally, the execute component focuses on assisting 

with the command function through the National 

Military Command Center associated with planning 

and execution of orders.

An examination of how the seven Chairmen used 

this planning system provides a formal leadership legacy and, most importantly, five broad decisionmaking 

insights for future senior leaders. First, leaders need to 

articulate a vision to shape effectively any long-term 

change. Second, leaders need to ensure their planning 

system maintains a balance between flexibility and 

structure. Third, the strategic planning process needs 

to be inclusive and integrated with processes of leaders whose level of authority is above and below the 

Chairman. Fourth, leaders must modify the planning 

system to align with their decisionmaking style and 

organizational challenges. Finally, a strategic planning system that has well-defined and inclusive processes and products can be a powerful mechanism to 

create a climate and help embed a culture.

viii
1

JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING 

SYSTEM INSIGHTS: CHAIRMEN 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 1990 TO 2012

Military leaders at many levels have used strategic 

planning in various ways to position their organizations to respond to the demands of a current situation, 

while simultaneously preparing to meet future challenges. This Letort Paper will first describe the Chairman’s statutory responsibilities and how strategic 

challenges for these responsibilities affect both a leader and a strategic planning system’s focus. It will then 

briefly examine how the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) changed in five major ways, from 1990 to 

2012, before describing the current system’s key products and processes. The Paper will then summarize the 

more significant ways each Chairman used this system during the past 2 decades and produced specific 

planning products, which is part of their formal leadership legacy. During this time, the Chairmen were: 

Generals Colin Powell (1989-93), John Shalikashvili 

(1993-97), Hugh Shelton (1997-2001), Richard Myers 

(2001-05), Peter Pace (2005-07), and Admiral Michael 

Mullen (2007-11). General Martin Dempsey became 

Chairman in October 2011, and his current strategic 

planning focus is also summarized. This leadership 

focus and concluding thoughts provide insights on 

how senior leaders used a strategic planning system 

to respond to internal and external challenges. 

CHAIRMAN’S RESPONSIBILITIES 

Congress specified the Chairman Joint Chiefs 

of Staff (CJCS) formal leadership responsibilities in 

Title 10 U.S. Code, Section 153 under the following 
2

descriptive subheadings: (1) Strategic direction; (2) 

Strategic planning; (3) Contingency planning and preparedness; (4) Advice on requirements, programs, and 

budget; (5) Doctrine, training, and education; and, (6) 

Other matters.1

 These responsibilities were a result of 

the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA), which many 

consider the most significant defense legislation since 

the National Security Defense Act of 1947 established 

the Department of Defense (DoD) after World War 

II.2 The GNA, which also fundamentally changed the 

Chairman’s responsibilities, was the result of almost 

4 years of somewhat contentious dialogue and debate 

among Congress, military leaders, the defense intellectual community, and the Ronald Reagan administration on how best to fundamentally organize the DoD.3

In passing this Act, Congress’ focus was to strengthen 

civilian authority, improve military advice to civilian 

leaders, place more responsibility on combatant commanders, provide for more efficient resource use, improve joint officer policies, and enhance effectiveness 

of military operations.4

When comparing the 1986 GNA to the current U.S. 

Code, the major functions and the broad wording describing the Chairman’s key responsibilities have fundamentally remained the same, but there have been 

a few key additions. These additions are primarily 

associated with specific information now required by 

Congress, but not envisioned in 1986, to assist with 

their oversight and resource responsibilities. For example, the Chairman must now provide Congress an 

annual report on Combatant Command requirements 

about the time when a budget is submitted, as well 

as provide information on readiness levels. Further, 

the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 

required the Chairman to produce by February 15 of 
3

every even-numbered year a detailed report that is a 

review of the National Military Strategy (NMS), to include the strategic and military risks to execute that 

strategy, and to produce a stand-alone risk assessment 

by January 1 on odd-numbered years.5

The strategic environment and its associated challenges can affect both a leader and staff’s use of a strategic planning system. As the 1990s progressed, the 

first three Chairmen were faced with responding to a 

strategic environment that began with the Gulf War 

and the Soviet Union’s demise and continued with 

an increasing number of regional military operations 

across the spectrum of conflict. They faced slowly 

declining financial resources and a one-third smaller 

force structure, while needing to control rising maintenance and infrastructure costs. They also needed to 

infuse technology throughout the existing equipment, 

which was primarily produced with a Cold War focus. 

Since 2000, and particularly after September 2001, 

the Chairmen were faced with entirely different strategic challenges. These included the focus on terrorism, 

wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the need to transform by developing future capabilities to execute the 

full range of military operations. These challenges resulted in a greater focus on upgrading and developing 

better equipment, changes to force development and 

employment, and an increase of financial resources. 

Furthermore, there was a greater use of Reserve forces 

and small increases in Army and Marine Corps force 

structure as wars continued in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

along with more stress from multiple deployments 

within the military and their families. 

The third decade’s challenges, which began in 2010 

and are evolving as of this writing, appear to be significantly different from the previous decade in three 

main ways.6

 First, and perhaps most significant, is that 
4

the nation’s fiscal issues will lower defense spending 

that will in turn reduce force structure and result in 

less weapon system platforms. Second, the military’s 

departure from Iraq in 2011 and forecasted force reductions in Afghanistan between 2012 and 2014 will 

cause more forces to return to the United States and 

focus more on training for a wide spectrum of missions. Third, there are uncertain challenges associated with “a ‘multi-nodal’ world characterized more 

by shifting, interest-driven conditions based on diplomatic, military and economic power, than by rigid 

security competition between opposing blocks.”7

 This 

includes rising powers in the Asia-Pacific region, other regional alignments, and the dynamics associated 

with persistent tension. Figure 1 summarizes these 

challenges to illustrate key similarities and differences 

in the strategic environment during these 3 decades. 

Figure 1. Chairmen’s Strategic Environment 

Challenges 1990s vs. 2000s vs. 2010s.

1990-1999 2000-2009 2010-2012

Regional competition and 

threats

Global War on Terror & 

insurgencies

Persistent tension & 

violent extremism

Gulf War Wars in Iraq and 

Afghanistan

Wars winding down & 

Asia-Pacific rebalance

Diverse military 

operations

Increased operations tempo 

& stress

Greater home training & 

cyber focus

Decreased financial 

resources

Increased financial resourcesDecreased financial 

resources

Reduced personnel by 

one-third

Reserve use & ground force 

increases

Overall reduced force 

structure

Need to integrate 

technology

Need to transform to capabilitiesBalance capabilities & 

technology

Robust overseas bases 

and forces Less global infrastructure Less forces stationed overseas

Quality Cold War 

equipment

Sustain, modify & buy new 

equipment

Retire, reset & invest in new 

equipment
5

The Chairman’s strategic planning system produces ways to integrate defense processes and influence other senior leaders related to global assessment, 

vision, strategy, plans, and resources. Briefly, this 

planning system integrates the processes and guidance of people and organizations above the Chairman 

(President, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council), and people and organizations he coordinates with (Services, combatant commanders, and 

agency directors). It provides a formal framework for 

the Chairman’s staff to execute their tasks. The CJCS 

has no control over any significant defense resources 

(Secretary of Defense, Services, and agencies control 

resources) or direct control of operational military 

forces (combatant commanders control operational 

forces); however, orders to those forces currently flow 

through the Chairman.8 The Chairman formally influences his civilian leaders and those he coordinates with 

through this strategic planning system. In addition to 

influencing leaders, this system provides specific direction for the many staffs that support these leaders. 

As such, this planning system is the key system that 

formally integrates the nation’s strategy, plans, and 

resources from a joint military perspective. 

JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM 

Having described the Chairman’s broad challenges, this Paper now focuses on changes to the JSPS to 

give one insight into its evolution and use. There were 

five formal changes made to the JSPS in 1990, 1993, 

1997, 1999, and 2008 that were codified in Chairman’s 

memoranda or instructions. While the Chairman’s 

1999 strategic planning instruction was the official version for almost a decade until December 2008, it was 
6

not completely followed for some time during this period. Each of these five formal changes is now briefly 

described for what it required and how it changed. 

1990. 

Prior to 1990, there was a realization that the strategic planning system was not fully accomplishing 

its purpose to enable the Chairman to fully execute 

his increased 1986 GNA responsibilities. This planning system was described as “unwieldy, complex, 

and bureaucratic, and produced no less than 10 major 

documents every 2-year planning cycle,” and Congress criticized it during hearings that led to passing 

the GNA.9

 Hence, the Joint Staff’s Director of Strategy 

and Policy undertook a comprehensive evaluation of 

the entire system’s processes and products.10

This complete overhaul culminated with a Memorandum of Policy No. 7, dated January 30, 1990, which 

streamlined the system by adding front-end leader’s 

guidance and eliminating or combining many other 

documents into more concise products. The front-end 

guidance was provided through a formal joint strategy review for “gathering information, raising issues, 

and facilitating the integration of strategy, operational 

planning and program assessments,”11 that would 

culminate in publishing its first product—Chairman’s 

Guidance. This concise document (6-10 pages) was to 

provide the principal guidance to support developing 

the planning system’s National Military Strategy Document (NMSD), and the remaining two others that followed sequentially; the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 

(JSCP) and the Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA).12

This was a significant streamlining effort to reduce 

10 strategic planning products to four, while making 
7

them more responsive to the Chairman’s leadership 

focus. With the Soviet Union’s demise, those pre-1990 

bureaucratic processes and associated documents 

were an impediment to agile decisionmaking that the 

current environment required. 

Although streamlined, this system still required 

that a classified NMSD be produced with several 

defined parts, one which was titled National Military 

Strategy (also classified), under a rigid 2-year cyclic 

process. There were several separate functional annexes added to this document (e.g., intelligence, research 

and development, etc.), which consisted of hundreds 

of more pages. For example, one annex alone had 

11 chapters, 13 tables, and 15 tabs.13 The part of the 

NMSD called the National Military Strategy was sent to 

the Secretary of Defense for review, forwarded to the 

President for approval, before returning to formally 

influence defense resource guidance. The JSCP provided planning direction to combatant commanders. 

The CPA provided resource advice to the Secretary 

of Defense. 

1993.

The next formal revision to the strategic planning 

system in 1993 documented what was executed in 

previous years rather than designing a new system. 

Three major revisions included: (1) place more focus 

on long-range planning overall by requiring a formal 

environmental scanning report resulting in a Joint 

Strategy Review or vision paper; (2) issue the NMS as 

an unclassified document to communicate with the 

American people and other audiences rather than 

providing classified internal military direction; and, 

(3) establish a Joint Planning Document to focus the 
8

Chairman’s resource advice to the Secretary of Defense.14 The JSCP, which provided guidance to combatant commanders to develop plans to execute the 

strategy, remained essentially unchanged. In essence, 

the ending of the Cold War and decreasing financial 

resources required the Chairman to be more futureand resource-focused. 

1997.

The next major revision to the strategic planning 

system occurred in 1997. It reflected execution by the 

Chairman, which is different from changing a strategic 

planning system before execution, as occurred in 1990. 

A main reason for this change was that the Chairman 

needed to provide better resource advice and longrange direction to make needed mission or weapon 

system trade-offs required by fiscally constrained 

defense budgets. Hence, in 1996 General Shalikashvili published the first Chairman’s vision, Joint Vision 

2010, a 34-page document designed to provide a conceptual template to focus the vitality and innovation 

of people and leverage technology to achieve more 

effective joint warfighting.15 He greatly expanded the 

charter of the existing Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council (JROC) and empowered them to assess specific joint warfighting areas.16 This expanded charter, 

aided by greater analytical rigor from a newly created 

and inclusive process called Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments, gained more combatant commanders’ input and shaped weapon system decisions. 

This resulted in adding a leader-focused resource document, called the Chairman’s Program Recommendation, 

to proactively influence DoD resource advice.

17 These 

changes were documented in a new CJCS instruction 
9

as the Memorandum of Policy was phased out. Figure 

2 illustrates this evolution during the 1900s.18

Figure 2. JSPS Evolution from Pre-1989 to 1999.

As shown in Figure 2, the strategic planning system 

change in 1999 did not change any major processes or 

products. It expanded guidance on combatant commanders’ theater engagement plans, while providing 

greater clarity on JROC processes.19 There was more 

focus placed on implementing the 1996 Joint Vision 

2010, a priority General Shelton identified when he 

became Chairman. He later updated the CJCS’s vision 

in 2000. These changes resulted in the strategic planning system evolving from being unwieldy, rigid, and 

Cold War focused at the decade’s beginning to being 

flexible, vision oriented, and resource focused at the 

decade’s end. 
10

1999-2008.

While there were no official changes to the 1999 

Chairman’s instruction that described this strategic 

planning system until 2008, it significantly changed 

in execution. For example, two formal planning documents were discontinued, four remained, and several 

more were added. The two strategic planning products discontinued were the Joint Vision (vision was 

mentioned in the strategy) and Joint Planning Document (staff resource advice deleted). The four documents that remained were the NMS, Chairman’s Program Recommendation, Chairman’s Program Assessment 

and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. 

During this time, additional strategic-related planning products, which responded in specific ways to 

an ever-changing global environment, were added 

as needed. These included: additional military strategies on cyber space, terrorism, and weapons of mass 

destruction; additional plans such as theater security 

and global force management; risk and strategic environment assessments; and future joint concepts and 

capability documents. In total, there were 11 or more 

documents associated with various aspects of strategy, 

resource, and capability advice. Some of these additive 

products were considered part of the Chairman’s formal strategic planning system while others were not.20

In essence, there was not a great sense of clarity, as no 

one Chairman’s instruction documented these many 

changes, but they all needed to be integrated by the 

Chairman and his staff in concert with the Secretary of 

Defense’s processes and strategic guidance products. 
11

2008 Change.

The joint strategic planning system underwent a 

comprehensive review that took over a year to integrate processes and products, both within the Joint 

Staff and within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

to provide holistic assessments and unified strategic 

direction. The planning system was organized around 

three key Chairman’s roles of assess, advise, and direct. The formal components were depicted in the 

2008 Chairman’s instruction as follows: Assess—Comprehensive Joint Assessment and Joint Strategic Review 

Process; Advise—Chairman’s Risk Assessment, Chairman’s Program Recommendation, Chairman’s Program 

Assessment, Joint Strategy Review Report, and as found 

in CJCS strategic documents, speeches, and in discussions with senior leaders; and, Direct—NMS and Joint 

Strategic Capabilities Plan.

21

In a 2010 Joint Staff JSPS slide, the Chairman’s Readiness System and the Joint Combat Capability Assessment, 

while they existed in 2008, were added to explicitly 

address the assess readiness role.22 On this same slide, 

an “Execute” word was added to the bottom arrow in 

the 2008 figure to illustrate the Chairman’s role to assist with the command function through the National 

Military Command Center that processes execute and 

planning orders. Figure 3 visually portrays these strategic planning roles and documents. Further, there 

was flexibility in execution, and as identified in the 

Chairman’s Instruction, this visual portrayal “does 

not depict all interactions and process within the JSPS 

nor is it meant to imply a firm sequence of actions.”23
12

Figure 3. Role of the Chairman and the Joint 

Strategic Planning System.

JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM’S 

KEY COMPONENTS

As identified in Figure 3, under the Chairman’s key 

assess, advise, and direct roles, there are formal planning system processes and documents produced in 

different time frames to help the Chairman execute his 

formal U.S. Code Title responsibilities described earlier. This chart does not identify all the processes and 

products, but only the main ones that are integrated 

with the Secretary of Defense’s different planning and 

resource processes, as well as those that help enable 

the Chairman to execute his responsibilities associated 

with the President, National Security Council, and Con-
13

gress. These key components are now briefly described 

under the assess, advise, and direct framework. 

ASSESS - Comprehensive Joint Assessment (CJA). 

A key component of any planning system is the 

ability to scan the internal and external environment 

in a holistic and deliberate manner. The CJA, conducted annually, addresses this requirement as it gets inputs from Service chiefs and combatant commanders 

related to their ability to execute their responsibilities. 

It also integrates other ongoing Joint Staff assessments 

to include a shared database that provides a view 

across various missions, domains, and functions, all 

of which are used later to update other strategic planning documents. The CJA’s shared, collaborative, and 

focused nature generally includes the following six 

parts: (1) Combatant Commander and Service Chief 

Integrated Response; (2) Security Environment; (3) 

Current Operations and Health of the Force; (4) NearTerm Military Risk Assessment; (5) Near-Term Risk 

Drivers and Mitigation; and, (6) Implications for the 

Future Force.24

ASSESS - Joint Strategy Review Process.

This annual process synthesizes information from 

the CJA, along with other Joint Staff data and processes, into a comprehensible and cogent analytical 

framework that supports other CJCS documents and 

processes. Components of this process include: Joint 

Intelligence Assessment, Joint Strategic Assessment, 

Capability Gap Assessment Process, Joint Concept 

Development and Experimentation, Joint Logistics 

Estimate, Joint Personnel Estimate and Health of 
14

Force Metrics, and Operational Availability Studies.25 Two key outputs from data gathered in these 

processes, discussed later under the advise function, 

are the annual Chairman’s Risk Assessment (CRA) and 

the Joint Strategy Review (JSR), which is generally 

produced biennially. 

ASSESS – Chairman’s Readiness System and Joint 

Combatant Capability Assessment.

The Chairman’s Readiness System (CRS), which 

“establishes a common framework for assessing unit 

and joint readiness against approved strategic planning documents,” has two main components: unit 

readiness reporting and the strategic assessment enabled by the Joint Combatant Capability Assessment 

(JCCA) process.26 The unit readiness part focuses on 

units providing data to their Services on core and directed missions using two complementary readiness 

reporting systems: Global Status of Resources and 

Training System (GSORTS) and the Defense Readiness and Reporting System - Strategic (DRRS-S).27 In 

essence, the GSORTS is resource-focused on personnel, equipment, and training domains for a unit to 

execute its organized or designed missions with a C1 

to C5 rating assessment. DRRS-S provides a “missionfocused, capabilities-based common framework for 

all DoD readiness reporting organizations.”28 It uses 

a mission essential task construct associated with 

specific standards and conditions to assess readiness 

using a three-tier approach with green, yellow, or 

red ratings. 

The JCCA process evaluates DoD’s ability to execute the NMS through the quarterly Joint Force Readiness Review (JFRR), specific plan assessments, and the 
15

annual Readiness Deficiency Assessment.29 The JFRR 

is compiled quarterly and uses Services assessment 

of their ability to execute approved Joint Capability 

Areas and assigned missions. Further, specific plan 

assessments are conducted by combatant commanders and Combat Support Agencies on their ability to 

integrate and synchronize available joint forces to execute specific war plans, which are identified in the 

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The Readiness Deficiency Assessment “assesses the cumulative impact of 

combatant command, Service, and CSA reported deficiencies on the Department of Defense’s readiness to 

execute the NMS.”30 Within this process, the top two 

readiness concerns of all commanders, Service chiefs, 

and agency directors are gathered to identify key 

readiness issues.31

ADVISE – CJCS Risk Assessment. 

The CRA, now formally required annually in U.S. 

Code, “provides to Congress the Chairman’s assessment of the nature and magnitude of strategic and 

military risk in executing the missions called for in 

the NMS.”32 The overall JSR process discussed earlier 

contributes to this assessment. The Joint Staff J-5’s 

staff, which initially coordinates the risk assessment 

data, ensures that a range of operational issues, future 

challenges, force management, and institutional factors are considered as inputs and are gathered from 

Services, combatant commands, combatant support 

agencies, and Joint Staff directors.33 The Chairman has 

been very involved with this assessment process and 

product. The Chairman submits his risk assessment 

to the Secretary of Defense for his review, and comments if needed, before the report goes to Congress. If 
16

the risk assessment is considered significant, Congress 

requires that “the Secretary shall include with the report as submitted to Congress the Secretary’s plan for 

mitigating that risk.”34

ADVISE – Chairman’s Program Recommendation 

and Chairman’s Program Assessment.

These two key annual resource documents, which 

are fully synchronized with the Secretary of Defense’s 

Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution 

process, formally enable the Chairman to provide specific advice on requirements, programs, and budgets. 

Both classified documents are considered personal 

advice to the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman’s 

Program Recommendation (CPR) is produced in the 

year’s first quarter to influence the Secretary of Defense’s Defense Planning Guidance before it is finalized. The Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA), 

produced in the year’s third quarter, provides the 

Chairman’s assessment of Service and Defense Agencies’ Program Objective Memorandums (POMs) and 

Budget Estimate Submissions (BESs) to influence their 

review before the proposed Defense Budget is finalized by Secretary of Defense.35 In developing these 

documents, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council processes, as well as various assess products and 

combatant commanders’ Integrated Priority Lists, are 

used to shape this resource advice.

ADVISE – Joint Strategy Review Report.

This report, produced on a biennial or as required 

basis, uses the latest Joint Strategy Review (JSR) process discussed earlier to provide a formal assessment 
17

of the strategic and military implications associated 

with the current and future security environment. 

This formal report, generally done in odd numbered 

years, can also be focused on specific areas “to include 

NMS preparation, QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] preparation, strategic environment review, or in 

preparation for transition to a new administration.”36

DIRECT - National Military Strategy.

This unclassified strategy document, now required 

in U.S. Code, was produced five times in the past 20 

years in 1992, 1995, 1997, 2004, and 2011. The Chairman’s instruction identifies this strategy’s strategic 

direction, advice, and communication areas, while 

stating “the purpose of the NMS is to prioritize and 

focus the efforts of the Armed Forces of the United 

States while conveying the Chairman’s advice with 

regard to the security environment and the necessary 

military actions to protect vital U.S. interests.”37 The 

strategic direction focus is related to specific objectives for combatant commanders in force employment 

and for Service chiefs in development of Joint Force 

capabilities. The strategic advice focus is related to the 

Chairman’s assessment of the global security environment, its military implications, and how the military 

can best accomplish the goals in President and Secretary of Defense strategic documents. The strategic 

communication focus is related to how the strategy 

communicates to the American people the military’s 

ways and resolve to achieve national and defense 

policy objectives. 
18

DIRECT – Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

This strategic planning product, which has remained fairly consistent in its use over the past 2 

decades, is the key document that provides detailed 

planning direction to implement the Secretary of Defense’s guidance, now called Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF). A key word is detailed,

as it “tasks combatant commanders to prepare campaign, campaign support, contingency, and posture 

plans and apply security cooperation guidance.”38 The 

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) also addresses force apportionment and planning assumptions, 

while establishing supported and supporting relationships to synchronize activities. This document generally has a 2-year focus, as planning guidance is often 

updated. Further, there are supplemental instructions 

published separately from the JSCP in 14 different 

areas such as mobility, logistics, and intelligence, all 

of which provide further planning guidance to implement this strategic direction. 

CHAIRMAN’S LEGACY 

Each of the six Chairmen since 1990 used the Joint 

Strategic Planning System in different ways to respond 

to internal and external challenges. A brief summary 

of the major ways each Chairman used this formal system that can provide leadership and decisionmaking 

insights for future senior leaders when using planning 

systems and processes is now provided. 
19

Chairman Colin Powell (1989-93).

General Powell simplified strategic planning by 

greatly reducing the number of formal planning products from 10 to 4 and increased the system’s flexibility 

to respond to his direction by issuing a concise leader-focused document called Chairman’s Guidance. He 

short-circuited his system’s processes, as he did not 

wait for a completed environmental assessment specified by his planning system to develop this guidance, 

but instead issued it based on a meeting with senior 

commanders.39 He did not wait for his planning system’s structured processes to produce another classified NMSD with hundreds of pages of annexes, 

but instead published an unclassified 27-page NMS

in 1992 in a short coordination cycle after the Soviet 

Union’s quick demise stabilized. This strategy’s coordination, to include the broad force structure incorporated within it, was more a result of his interpersonal skills than a formal planning process.40 In the 

resource area, while his planning system specified a 

detailed assessment of Service programs not to exceed 175 pages, his actual assessment was just a few 

pages long.41

While General Powell did not use many existing 

planning processes, which in a way represents an intuitive and direct decisionmaking style with an external 

focus to capitalize on strategic events, he kept some 

structure. For structure, he used the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and its very structured processes that 

defined war-planning requirements for combatant 

commanders. This formal direction enabled military 

planners to develop the variety of plans to execute the 

Secretary of Defense’s contingency planning guidance 
20

and focused the military in the field. His external focus is reflected by his unclassified NMS that communicated with the American people the need and size of 

the military, versus the classified internal staff advice 

that earlier military strategy advice provided. The unclassified NMS is an important leadership legacy that 

remains today. 

Chairman John Shalikashvili (1993-97).

General Shalikashvili used the strategic planning 

system in a markedly different way from his predecessor, reflecting more of a rational and analytical 

decisionmaking style. He kept the flexibility and simplicity his predecessor established by limiting the complexity of strategy documents, but emphasized using 

the planning processes to develop them. For example, 

his two national military strategies in 1995 and 1997 

were coordinated fully within the planning system’s 

processes, and he used other strategic planning products, such as the JSR, to influence these strategies.42 He 

kept the same structure in the war planning document 

as his predecessor, but he expanded its focus by requiring theater engagement plans to more fully implement the military strategy’s shape component. 

General Shalikashvili went further to provide 

long-term strategic direction when he published the 

Chairman’s first vision in 1996, called Joint Vision 

2010, and later formally placed the vision within the 

strategic planning system. The concept of a Chairman providing a joint vision, although not codified 

in a separate vision document, continues today in 

other Chairman’s strategic documents. Due to the 

constrained fiscal environment, he expanded strategic 

planning advice in the resource areas. In doing so, he 
21

used the considerable energies of his Vice Chairman 

and the expanded the Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council to analytically assess programs and to frame 

resource advice. This resource advice appeared in his 

two leader-focused resource documents, the CPA that 

he retained from Chairman Powell while expanding 

it considerably, and a new CPR to proactively shape 

resource advice.43 Both of these documents and the 

JROC’s influence continue today. To amplify his resource advice, he also produced an annual staff-focused Joint Planning Document, but this document did 

not continue throughout his successor’s tenure. 

Chairman Hugh Shelton (1997-2001).

General Shelton used the strategic planning system in a very process-oriented manner, which reflects 

more of a rational and incremental decisionmaking 

style. No substantive changes were made to the strategic planning system overall, but he focused on using 

the existing system to continue evolutionary changes 

and provide difficult resource recommendations. 

He improved the process and timeliness of his two 

leader-focused resource recommendations to defense 

leaders, while elevating the JROC’s focus and the associated warfighting capabilities assessment process 

to be more strategic in nature.44 He also expanded his 

resource advice into people programs such as pay and 

health care, which reflected a broader approach to 

executing his U.S. Code responsibilities. 

Similar to his predecessors, he kept the heavily 

structured war planning document and processes relatively untouched, but more fully integrated theater 

engagement plans within these processes. He defined 

a process to implement his predecessor’s joint vision 
22

by identifying 21st century challenges and their associated desired operating capabilities, while providing 

direction to conduct experiments to implement that 

vision.45 To further enhance joint interoperability, in 

2000 he fully used strategic planning processes to formally update the vision, now called Joint Vision 2020, 

to better address issues associated with information, 

innovation, and interagency. 

Chairman Richard Myers (2001-05).

General Myers experienced a more challenging 

strategic environment caused by the September 11, 

2001, attack and the resultant global terrorism focus 

that included wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. If this 

was not enough, the need to transform military capabilities in stride also occupied his energy. These challenges caused him to significantly modify in execution 

the strategic planning system he inherited, which reflected a flexible and inclusive decisionmaking style. 

These modifications, while not defined in an updated 

Chairman’s strategic planning instruction, provided 

greater input to his leader-focused strategy and resource documents. To illustrate a greater inclusiveness, membership on lower boards that shaped issues 

before going to the JROC and programs this council 

reviewed greatly expanded.46 He produced a military 

strategy focused on the War on Terrorism in 2002 to 

better link the military element to other national terrorism documents. He completed a National Military 

Strategy in May 2004, as Congress clarified the need 

for this strategy in the 2004 NDAA. Rather than publishing a vision as a separate document, the CJCS’s 

joint vision was now embedded within this strategy under a separate section called “Joint Vision for 

Future Warfighting.”47
23

Chairman Myers provided advice to the Secretary 

of Defense on how the future force should operate by 

developing a nested group of operating, functional, 

and integrating concepts to focus on needed capabilities. These concepts reflect a systems thinking approach. These were developed by the guidance from 

the 2003 Joint Operating Concept that was later replaced 

by the 2005 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations. This 

entire capabilities process, called the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), was 

established to provide greater top-down institutional 

as well as combatant commander’s inputs on joint capabilities to help create a joint end-state now called 

interdependence. 

Chairman Peter Pace (2005-07).

General Pace continued to have his strategic planning focus heavily influenced by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and a need to transform. Upon taking 

over, he provided guidance to the Joint Staff in an 11-

page document called The 16th Chairman’s Guidance to 

the Joint Staff. This guidance reflected a collaborative 

and partnering decisionmaking style as illustrated 

by the following statement: “We should help others 

succeed.”48 He emphasized an integrated approach, 

where success in one supports the other, when he 

identified the following four priorities: Win the War 

on Terrorism; Accelerate Transformation; Strengthen 

Joint War Fighting; and Improve the Quality of Life 

of our Service Members and their Families.49 He asked 

that unresolved issues be elevated to higher decision 

levels, rather than having others of lower rank spend 

too much time developing consensus at lower levels. 
24

Although General Pace did not formally update 

the 2004 National Military Strategy, he published additional military strategies in coordination with the Secretary of Defense. These strategies addressed specific 

warfighting issues and were titled: National Military 

Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, National Military 

Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, and 

National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations. He 

also kept his staff focused on developing additional 

operating concepts, furthering the capabilities process, 

and resolving capability gaps as JCIDS gained maturity and complexity, all of which reflected a systems 

thinking focus. Just before leaving, he started a comprehensive assessment of the current planning system 

to revise the outdated 1999 Chairman’s instruction. 

Chairman Michael Mullen (2007-11).

When he became Chairman in October 2007, Admiral Mullen issued guidance to the Joint Staff titled, 

CJCS Guidance for 2007 to 2008. He displayed a focused 

decisionmaking style, as he published new CJCS guidance to his staff every year. He was the first Chairman to publish this guidance annually. This succinctly 

provided his staff the overall direction that a strategic 

planning system must address. His guidance had a 

consistent message, as it centered broadly on the following areas: national interests in the broader Middle 

East; the health, capabilities, and readiness of military 

forces; and balancing global strategic risk.50 He often 

had an external and war focus associated with these 

priorities. For example, he made frequent trips to Islamabad and had more than two dozen meetings with 

the Pakistan Army Chief.51 He holistically addressed 

various issues associated with the health of the cur-
25

rent force, its families, and the proper care of Veterans.52 He placed more emphasis on the proper care of 

Veterans than previous chairmen did. 

A main strategic planning legacy was the significant modification to the existing 1999 strategic planning instruction that was finalized in December 2008. 

This change reflected a smoother and more integrated 

approach with the Secretary of Defense, his staff, and 

resource processes. Overall, the access, advise, and direct parts of this planning system were fully executed. 

He published the Capstone Concept of Joint Operations

in January 2009, where he provided “. . . my vision for 

how the joint force circa 2016-2028 will operate in response to a wide variety of security challenges.”53 He 

published a National Military Strategy in February 2011 

and identified its purpose as “provide the ways and 

means by which our military will advance our enduring national interest as articulated in the 2010 National 

Security Strategy and to accomplish the defense objectives in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review.” 54 In this 

strategy, he also articulated a vision for a Joint Force 

and emphasized, “. . . how the Joint Force will redefine 

America’s military leadership to adapt to a challenging new era.”55

General Martin Dempsey (October 2011-Current).

When General Dempsey became the 18th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in October 2011, he 

sent a one-page letter to the Joint Force. In his letter, he 

identified the following four key themes that he would 

focus on: achieve our national objectives in the current 

conflicts; develop Joint Force 2020; renew our commitment to the Profession of Arms; and keep faith with 

our Military Family.56 In February 2012, he published a 
26

14-page Chairman’s Strategic Direction to the Joint Force,

which provides broad guidance on how to achieve 

those four themes identified in his October letter.57

More recently, in September 2012, he published the 

Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020, 

“to inform our ideas and sharpen our thinking, as we 

determine how to meet the requirements laid out in 

the new defense strategic guidance, Sustaining U.S. 

Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense.”58

These last two documents provide succinct guidance 

for the strategic planning processes within the Joint 

Staff and advice to those leaders with whom the 

Chairman interacts. 

INSIGHTS AND CONCLUSION 

From this analysis of strategic planning processes 

and Chairman’s use, there are five broad insights 

for senior leaders who use, or are contemplating 

using, a strategic planning system. These insights 

are related to planning system characteristics and 

decisionmaking. 

First, leaders need to articulate a vision within a 

strategic planning system to effectively shape longterm change. Chairman Shalikashvili developed the 

first formal vision, Joint Vision 2010, and Chairman 

Shelton focused on implementing it and later formally 

updated it with Joint Vision 2020. Chairmen Myers 

and Pace articulated a joint vision of full spectrum 

dominance through a capability approach in a section of the 2004 National Military Strategy. Chairman 

Mullen provided an update when he explicitly identified his vision in the 2009 Capstone Concept for Joint 

Operations and later provided a vision for the Joint 

Force in his 2011 National Military Strategy’s preface. 
27

General Dempsey, in the 2012 Capstone Concept for 

Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020, provides a vision of 

how the future force will operate. In total, these vision-related documents focused the intellectual energy of the military staffs, guided experimentations, and 

helped develop new concepts and capabilities to meet 

future needs. 

Second, a strategic planning system should have 

a balance between flexibility and structure. The flexibility was illustrated as each Chairman changed 

some planning processes and products to respond to 

internal and external challenges. The structure was illustrated as each Chairman kept other processes and 

products, such as the war planning guidance, relatively structured with the continual review and modifications to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The flexibility enabled the Chairman, the Joint Chiefs, and their 

staffs to nimbly respond to global challenges, while 

the structure provided needed guidance in the integrated nature and complex development of various 

types of theater and campaign plans. 

Third, a strategic planning process needs to be inclusive and integrated. Throughout these 2 decades, 

there was much broader representation and intellectual capacity on the boards and councils that developed and integrated guidance provided in many 

strategic planning documents. For example, the Joint 

Requirements Oversight Council, which advises the 

Chairman on many strategic planning resource and 

capability documents, now gains much more input 

from combatant commanders, defense leaders, and 

other organizations, to include interagency, versus 

just the military staffs resident in the Pentagon. The 

integrated nature is also reflected by the linkages 

with the Secretary of Defense’s resource processes 

and products. 
28

Fourth, leaders must modify the strategic planning system to meet their decisionmaking style and 

strategic environment. All Chairmen made varying 

changes to their strategic planning system depending 

on their decisionmaking style and the nation’s challenges. Some changes were more revolutionary in 

nature: Chairman Powell greatly streamlined a ColdWar focused system and did not use some long processes when the strategic environment changed rapidly. Other leaders were more evolutionary, as when 

Chairman Shelton made minor process changes as the 

environment evolved. Chairman Pace developed different strategies not identified in the planning system 

to respond to the strategic environment’s characteristics. Chairman Mullen formally updated the system 

to link it more closely with the Secretary of Defense’s 

planning system. General Dempsey published two 

relatively succinct 2012 strategic guidance documents 

that were closely linked with recent Secretary of 

Defense guidance. 

Finally, a formal strategic planning system that 

has well-defined and inclusive processes and products can be a powerful mechanism to create a climate 

and help embed a culture within a complex organization. This last insight comes from seeing how the 

U.S. military is more jointly focused. In many ways, 

the Armed Forces have evolved from Service deconfliction in warfare and weapons capabilities in the 

early 1990s to a greater joint interoperability in the late 

1990s to early 2000s and now to a growing focus on 

joint interdependence.59 While there may not be a joint 

culture in parts of the military, as Service or specialty 

cultures can dominate, the seamless way different Service members communicate and work together today 

is remarkably different from a decade or more earlier. 
29

ENDNOTES

1. While the Chairman’s key responsibilities are outlined in 

this Title 10 Section, there are other responsibilities in Sections 117, 

118, 153, 163, 165, 166 and 181, and Titles 22 and 50, available from 

www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode10/usc_sec_10_00000153----

000-.html.

2. Robert H. Cole et al., The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, Washington, DC: Joint History Office, 1995, p. 30.

3. Richard M. Meinhart, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Leadership Using the Joint Strategic Planning System in the 1990s, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 

2003, p. 2. 

4. U.S. Congress House of Representatives, Goldwater-Nichols 

Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Conference Report 

(99-824), Washington, DC: 99th Cong., 2nd sess., September 12, 

1986, Section 3.

5. House Report 108-354-National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2004, Section 903, “Biennial Review of the National 

Military Strategy by Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff,” available from 

thomas.loc.gov/. 

6. M. G. Mullen, The National Military Strategy of the United 

States of America, 2011. Challenge discussion comes primarily 

from the 2011 NMS but includes insights in 2011 and 2012 Congressional testimony by DoD leaders and Service chiefs.

7. Ibid., p. 3. 

8. Discussion on relationships and integration of the CJCS 

with those above and those he coordinates is influenced by the 

2000 edition of The Joint Staff Officers Guide published by Joint 

Forces Staff College and in memoranda and instructions that define the organization’s strategic planning system.
30

9. Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., and Thomas-Durell Young, 

U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus, 

Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1995, pp. 11, 36-37.

10. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCS Memorandum 

of Policy No. 84 (CJCS MOP 84), Joint Strategic Planning System, 

Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 30, 1989, p. 3.

11. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCS Memorandum of Policy No.7 (CJCS MOP 7), Joint Strategic Planning System, 

Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 30, 1990, p. 20.

12. Ibid., Figure 2, pp. 12, 30-31.

13. For a more expansive NMSD discussion, see Meinhart, 

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Leadership Using the Joint Strategic 

Planning System in the 1990s, pp. 20-23. 

14. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCS Memorandum of Policy No.7 (CJCS MOP 7), Joint Strategic Planning System, 

1st Revision, Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 17, 

1993, pp. 1-2. 

15. John M. Shalikashvili, Joint Vision 2010, Washington, DC: 

U.S. Government Printing Office, p. 1. 

16. Office of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

JROC Planning in a Revolutionary Era, Washington DC: The 

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1996, pp. 4-5.

17. Ibid., pp. 11-12.

18. “Joint Strategic Planning System,” briefing slides for Joint 

Processes and Landpower Course 3, Lesson AY 05, Carlisle, U.S. 

Army War College, October 28, 2004, slide 5. 

19. Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCS Instruction 3000.01A, 

Joint Strategic Planning Instruction, Summary of Changes, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 1, 1999. 

20. Author’s view based on observing various Joint Staff slides 

where these documents, particularly the additional strategy and 
31

plans, have been portrayed as being part of the planning system, 

while joint operating concepts are related to but not always a specific aspect of the JSPS. 

21. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCS Instruction, 

3100.01B, Joint Strategic Planning System, Washington, DC: Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, December 12, 2008, pp. A-3-4. 

22. The 2008 figure was updated visually with execute 

and readiness information during a Joint Staff September 2010 

Joint Faculty Education Conference briefing at the U.S. Army 

War College. 

23. Ibid.; and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCS Instruction, 3100.01B, Joint Strategic Planning System, p. A-3. This figure “depicts critical relationships between formal CJCS activities 

along with the statutory role they fulfill within the larger national 

and Department-level processes.” 

24. CJCS Instruction, 3100.01B, Joint Strategic Planning System,

pp. B-1-5. Information on CJA is summarized from these pages in 

the CJCS instruction.

25. Ibid., pp. B-5-9.

26. Chairman Joint Chiefs, CJCS Instruction 3401.01E, Joint 

Combat Capability Assessment, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, April 13, 2010, p. A-1.

27. Chairman Joint Chiefs, CJCS Guide 3401D, CJCS Guide to 

the Chairman’s Readiness System, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, November 15, 2010, pp. 8-10. 

28. Ibid., p. 10.

29. CJCS Instruction 3401.01E, Joint Combat Capability Assessment, Enclosure D and CJCS Guide 3401D, CJCS Guide to the Chairman’s Readiness System, Ch. 2, pp. 13-17.

30. CJCS Instruction 3401.01E, Joint Combat Capability 

Assessment, p. D-2.
32

31. Ibid., p. C-2.

32. CJCS Instruction, 3100.01B, Joint Strategic Planning System, 

p. B-8.

33. Ibid.

34. Title 10 UScode section 153b(2), available from www.law.

cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode10/usc_sec_10_00000153----000-.html.

35. Joint Strategic Planning System 3100.01B, p. C-3.

36. Ibid., p. B-7.

37. Ibid., p. D-2. The following discussion on direction, advice, 

and communication comes from this instruction. 

38. Ibid., p. D-4. Discussion in this paragraph on the JSCP is 

summarized from pp. D-3-6. 

39. Lovelace and Young, p. 37, endnote 45.

40. Harry E. Rothman, Forging a New National Military Strategy 

in a Post Cold War World: A Perspective From The Joint Staff, Carlisle, 

PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992, p. 

16; and Lorna S. Jaffe, The Development of the Base Force 1989-1992,

Washington, DC: Joint History Office, 1993, pp. 48-50.

41. Meinhart, pp. 32-33.

42. Ibid., pp. 24-25, 39-40. 

43. Office of the Vice Chairman, JROC Planning in a Revolutionary Era, Washington, DC: The Institute for Foreign Policy 

Analysis, 1996, pp. 10-12.

44. “Statement of General Richard B. Myers, Vice Chairman of 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee,” April 4, 2000, 

available from armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/2000/e000404.htm. 
33

45. See the processes described in CJCS Instruction 3010.02, 

Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan, Washington, DC: Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, December 9, 1998; and CJCS Instruction 3010.02A, 

Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan, Washington, DC: Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, August 29, 2000.

46. Chairman Joint Chief of Staff, CJCSI 5121.01C, Charter of 

the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, Washington, DC: Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, April 15, 2004. 

47. Richard B. Myers, The National Military Strategy of the 

United States of America, Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman, 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004, p. 23. 

48. Peter Pace, The 16th Chairman’s Guidance To The Joint Staff, 

October 1, 2005, p. 2.

49. Ibid., pp. 3-6. 

50. While the exact words in his annual guidance changed depending on strategic events and progress from the previous year, 

these three broad areas were emphasized in some manner every 

year. See CJCS Guidance for 2007 to 2008, CJCS Guidance for 2008 to 

2009, CJCS Guidance for 2010-11, and CJCS Guidance for 2011. 

51. “Adm. Mullen’s words on Pakistan come under scrutiny,” 

available from www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/

adm-mullens-words-on-pakistan-come-under-scrutiny/2011/09/27/

gIQAHPJB3K_story.html.

52. Available from scmilitarynews.com/2011/01/05/wars-caringfor-troops-and-families-top-mullens-guidance-for-2011/. Also, the author listened to many of his speeches that covered this issue. 

53. M. G. Mullen, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, 

Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 15, 2009), p. iii. 

54. M. G. Mullen, The National Military Strategy of the United 

States of America, Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, February 8, 2011, preface.

55. Ibid.
34

56. Martin E Dempsey, available from www.dodlive.mil/index.

php/2011/10/general-dempseys-letter-to-the-joint-force/.

57. Martin E. Dempsey, available from www.jcs.mil//content/

files/2012-02/021312101535_CJCS_Strategic_Direction_to_the_Joint_

Force_--_13_Feb_2012.pdf. This strategic direction guidance has 

been identified in the Joint Staff’s strategic planning charts.

58. Martin E. Dempsey, Capstone Concept for Joint 

Operations Joint Force 2020, available from www.jcs.mil//content/

files/2012-09/092812122654_CCJO_JF2020_FINAL.pdf.

59. Author assertions as the way the words deconfliction, 

interoperability, and interdependence were used over the past 

2 decades. For more information, see how interoperability was 

explained in 2000 Joint Vision 2020, and interdependence in 2005 

Capstone Concept for Joint Operations. 
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE 

and 

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Author

Dr. Richard M. Meinhart

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil