MILITARY ENGAGEMENT AND FORWARD 

PRESENCE: DOWN BUT NOT OUT AS TOOLS TO 

SHAPE AND WIN

John R. Deni

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Carlisle Barracks, PA and

UNITED STATES 

ARMY WAR COLLEGE

PRESS

i

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Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

MILITARY ENGAGEMENT AND 

FORWARD PRESENCE: 

DOWN BUT NOT OUT AS TOOLS TO SHAPE 

AND WIN

John R. Deni

January 2016

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ISBN 1-58487-720-0
vii

FOREWORD

Although different U.S. Presidential administrations often face differing national security challenges, 

one element common to all American Presidents is the 

desire for policy options when it comes to managing 

those challenges. Options provide room for maneuver strategically, operationally, and politically. In this 

monograph, the U.S. Army War College’s Dr. John 

R. Deni argues that some persistent biases and some 

more recent trends in defense strategy, planning, and 

budgeting are likely to have the effect of reducing the 

options available to current and future senior U.S. 

leaders. 

The drawdown of U.S. ground forces from Europe 

and elsewhere overseas, the return to a focus on major 

interstate war, the assumption that DoD-led security 

cooperation detracts from readiness, and the highprofile failure to build capable security forces in places 

like Iraq and Afghanistan have combined to frustrate 

American efforts to protect itself, its allies, and its interests. More specifically, these factors have weakened 

the effectiveness of forward presence and military engagement when it comes to protecting the homeland, 

conducting counterterrorism operations, assuring allies, and deterring aggressors. In their place, precision 

strike stand-off capabilities and a strategy of surging 

American military might from the United States after 

a crisis has already started have become more attractive policy choices.

However, Dr. Deni posits that these are inherently 

limited tools, diminishing U.S. influence abroad, incentivizing aggression on the part of adversaries, and 

ultimately reducing options available to senior American leaders. In their place, Dr. Deni convincingly 
argues that forward presence and military engagement remain effective, efficient tools in the policy toolbox available to senior leaders. The author is careful 

to note though that there are some key caveats. First, 

permanent forward presence—vice merely rotational 

presence—is particularly beneficial, and potentially 

not as expensive as commonly assumed, when it 

comes to assurance and deterrence. Second, military 

engagement is not a panacea, and policymakers must 

take care to understand when and where DoD-led security cooperation will have a positive, lasting impact.

Nevertheless, permanent forward presence and 

carefully targeted military engagement can be highly 

effective, cost-efficient methods for safeguarding vital 

and important U.S. interests. They do this by shaping 

the security environment, preparing U.S. and allied 

militaries for joint operations, and ultimately contributing to the ability of American and allied troops to 

prevail in a variety of conflicts—from major interstate 

war to far messier stability operations. Given the 

array of challenges facing the United States today—

including Russian aggression in Ukraine, China’s 

island-building in the South China Sea, the Islamic 

State’s consolidation of territory in Iraq and Syria, occasional North Korea saber rattling, and Iran’s ongoing sponsorship of terrorism—it seems a particularly 

useful time to seek out policy tools that create options 

for policymakers in an effective and efficient manner.

The Strategic Studies Institute is therefore pleased 

to offer this monograph as a contribution to the continuing debate on the mission, roles, structure, and 

composition of U.S. military forces. Dr. Deni’s analysis and argumentation should prove particularly 

relevant to defense strategists, planners, and force 

structure analysts as they contemplate how best to 

viii
ix

shape and employ the U.S. military in protecting and 

promoting American interests. More specifically, Dr. 

Deni’s work should benefit those seeking a better understanding of how political leaders at both ends of 

Pennsylvania Avenue can more effectively wield two 

often underappreciated tools in the policy toolbox—

forward presence and military engagement.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

JOHN R. DENI is a research professor of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) 

security studies at the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). He is also an adjunct lecturer at the American University’s School of International Service. Previously, he worked for 8 years as a 

political advisor for senior U.S. military commanders 

in Europe. Prior to that, he spent 2 years as a strategic 

planner specializing in U.S. security cooperation and 

military-to-mililitary relations. While working for the 

U.S. military in Europe, Dr. Deni was also an adjunct 

lecturer at Heidelberg University’s Institute for Political Science. There, he taught graduate and undergraduate courses on U.S. foreign and security policy, the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), European security, and alliance theory and practice. Dr. Deni 

has spoken at conferences and symposia throughout 

Europe and North America. He is the author, editor, 

or co-editor of five books, including Alliance Management and Maintenance: Restructuring NATO for the 21st 

Century, and he has written several peer-reviewed 

monographs and journal articles. Dr. Deni holds degrees from the College of William & Mary, American 

University, and George Washington University. 

x
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SUMMARY

Reliance on precision strike stand-off capabilities 

and a strategy of surging American military might 

from the continental United States (CONUS) after a 

crisis has already started have become particularly attractive approaches for managing insecurity in a more 

resource-constrained environment. However, the security challenges facing the United States and its vital 

interests over the coming years require more than a 

retreat to “Fortress America.” Relying on stand-off 

capabilities and surge readiness cannot provide adequate deterrence or reassurance, promote effective 

regional security, or build the capability and interoperability necessary to succeed in combined military 

operations at reasonable cost, and will have the effect of reducing, not expanding, options available to 

any President. Mitigating the security challenges of 

tomorrow necessitates investment in a more effective 

and more efficient set of tools.

Two such tools—forward presence and, when employed selectively, military engagement—can help to 

promote stability and security in contexts short of major interstate war. Moreover, engagement and presence can also contribute dramatically to operational 

capacity and capability across a range of military 

operations, including major interstate war. Military 

engagement and forward presence have been essential tools allowing the United States to wield influence 

around the globe, yielding greater stability in peacetime and greater effectiveness in times of conflict, yet 

both are imperiled today. 

Military engagement programs—often referred to 

as security cooperation—enable the United States to 

achieve the following strategic objectives:
• Enhance the ability of America’s foreign partners to maintain stability and security in their 

own neighborhoods;

• Deter adversaries;

• Assure allies;

• Develop the capabilities of coalition partners 

for current and future operations; 

• Improve the ability of U.S. forces to operate 

with international partners; and,

• Reduce the number of American boots on the 

ground in a military operation.

However, there is a longstanding—and incorrect—assumption that military engagement detracts 

from readiness. In fact, the opposite is true—military 

engagement contributes directly to unit readiness by 

building and maintaining coalition capability and interoperability. Other critics cite the examples of Iraq, 

Afghanistan, and Syria, concluding that military engagement does not work. In reality, the evidence is 

far more nuanced and other successful cases can shed 

light on when, where, and how engagement works.

Like military engagement, forward presence provides an effective and efficient means of achieving 

several U.S. strategic objectives, including:

• Deterring aggression against vital interests 

more effectively than CONUS-based forces;

• Assuring allies through a tangible U.S. commitment;

• Enabling a more effective response to security 

crises when and if they occur by being closer to 

crises;

• Providing access to en route infrastructure 

and the lines of communication necessary for 

collective defense and specific U.S. and allied 

operations; and, 

xii
xiii

• Contributing directly to building and maintaining interoperability with America’s most likely 

and most capable coalition partners.

Some have argued that rotational deployment 

models are a good substitute for permanent presence. 

However, a rotationally deployed force from CONUS 

is unlikely to deter effectively because it is unable to 

prevent “opportunity motivated” aggressors—especially nuclear-armed ones—from seeking a fait accompli with a quick, successful military operation 

occurring between rotations. Moreover, a rotational 

deployment from CONUS during a period of insecurity is likely to be interpreted as escalatory. 

Additionally, rotationally deployed forces from 

CONUS are unlikely to arrive in theater as well-informed about local or regional culture, habits, standard operating procedures, and rules and regulations. 

Finally, arguments favoring rotational deployments 

based on cost are somewhat misleading and not 

necessarily reflective of data from recent rotational 

deployments to Europe.

The inability to surge quickly enough, the incorrect assumptions about reduced cost, the risks of appearing escalatory, the loss of global influence, and 

the failure to deter and assure are all concomitant with 

a strategy of surging as circumstances demand and/

or relying on stand-off capabilities. Continuing pockets of institutional bias against engagement as a force 

multiplier and readiness enhancer and significant cuts 

to overseas permanent presence have combined to 

limit the leverage possible through engagement and 

forward presence. Reversing these trends will require 

bureaucratic courage and leadership, and a deeper institutional embrace of engagement as well as forward 

presence.

1

MILITARY ENGAGEMENT AND 

FORWARD PRESENCE: 

DOWN BUT NOT OUT AS TOOLS TO SHAPE 

AND WIN

John R. Deni, PhD1

The 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS) contends that “U.S. forces will continue to defend the 

homeland, conduct global counterterrorism operations, assure allies, and deter aggression through forward presence and engagement.”2

 However, four factors imperil the ability of U.S. military forces to fulfill 

these objectives. The first is a relentless, fiscally ill-informed, strategically and operationally short-sighted 

drawdown of the permanent forward presence of U.S. 

forces, particularly U.S. Army forces in Europe. Practically all of the arguments made over the last 15 years 

against continued drawdown of U.S. permanent forward presence—especially in terms of the difficulty, 

costliness, and effectiveness of surging from bases in 

the continental United States (CONUS) at levels sufficient to assure and deter—have proven to be true.

The second factor is a return to a focus on major 

interstate war. Related to this is unwarranted confidence in the ability of senior U.S. leaders to discern vital interests from merely important ones and thereby 

avoiding messier conflicts and crises. The most likely, 

more demanding missions—involving non-state forces disrupting the international order for example—

are ones that the U.S. military may not be trained, 

equipped, or structured for.
2

The third factor is the longstanding incorrect assumption that military engagement detracts from 

readiness. Although views are evolving in this area, 

the ability to work with foreign partners or to be 

capable of participating in coalitions is not yet part of 

unit readiness reports, for instance.

Finally, the fourth factor is the lack of success in 

building capable indigenous security forces in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, despite a massive U.S. and allied effort. The 2014 collapse of Iraqi army units in the face 

of an Islamic State attack and the more recent capture 

of Kunduz by the Taliban have led many to conclude 

that military engagement for the purposes of building 

partner capacity and foreign internal defense simply 

does not work. In reality, the evidence is far more 

nuanced, and other successful cases are dismissed or 

ignored in a rush to judgement.

Despite the inhibiting effects of these four factors, 

forward presence and military engagement remain 

important tools for the United States to address the 

most likely security challenges of the next several 

years as well as the less likely but arguably more 

consequential threat of major interstate war. In fact, 

military engagement, when applied selectively, and 

forward presence represent highly effective and efficient means of protecting and promoting vital U.S. interests—arguably far more effectively than relying on 

a “surge” of American forces abroad during a crisis. 

This monograph will first assess the strategic context 

and the security environment of the foreseeable future. The monograph will then describe and explain 

how carefully targeted military engagement and forward presence—especially permanent presence—are 

two effective and efficient tools to enable fulfillment 

of U.S. national security objectives such as those laid 

out in the 2015 NSS.
3

Conflict and Strategic Context.

The United States remains the only superpower in 

the world—the only country that can decisively wield 

dominating political, economic, and military influence 

anywhere. Like any country though, it faces threats 

and challenges both internal and external. Internally, 

the greatest challenge facing the United States is to 

discern vital interests from important or merely tertiary ones. American involvement in Vietnam beginning in the early 1960s and in Iraq during most of the 

previous decade are two cases in which the United 

States proved unable to draw distinctions between vital and important interests, resulting in errors of strategic magnitude with commensurate negative impacts 

on U.S. power and influence. While such a meta-level 

challenge remains ever-present for a country with the 

ability to intervene anywhere, this section will focus 

primarily on the external threats. 

During his June 2015 confirmation hearing, 

General Joseph Dunford argued that Russia is the 

most significant national security threat confronting 

the United States today, primarily because of its extensive nuclear arsenal as well as the erratic behavior of President Vladimir Putin. Dunford’s argument 

made great sense, but he could have conceivably argued for China, North Korea, or Iran as the greatest 

threat, since each of these state actors pose significant challenges to U.S. national security. Recent U.S. 

strategies, such as the 2015 National Military Strategy 

(NMS), the 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS), 

and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), as 

well as the major defense acquisition programs now 

underway and on the horizon, make it clear that the 

United States remains largely focused on state adver-
4

saries.3 The rationale for this is quite simple—as the 

2015 NMS notes, states are still the dominant actors 

in the international system.4 While this may be true, 

the reversion to emphasis on interstate war is also 

the product of a strong institutional bias within the 

Department of Defense toward what the U.S. military 

does well—that is, systematically overwhelming the 

conventional military forces of another state. According to one prominent analyst, the Army’s, “organizational culture continues to focus nearly exclusively on 

state-on-state war.”5 Compounding this institutional 

bias is the fact that American leaders are poor prognosticators when it comes to predicting where military force may be applied in the coming years. Some, 

such as Robert Gates and Ike Skelton, have argued 

that senior U.S. military or political leaders actually 

have a “perfect” track record in this regard—American leaders have been wrong 100 percent of the time. 

A more focused assessment of the aforementioned 

states reveals that direct interstate war between the 

United States and any one of them remains highly 

unlikely, not simply because of America’s continuing 

conventional military dominance, but more importantly, because of weaknesses within each potential 

adversary. For example, China is beset with internal 

challenges that consume the attention of its leadership 

and the energy of its governing bodies.6 These challenges are manifold. First, there are the basic internal 

contradictions in the Chinese system that threaten to 

undermine the legitimacy of central authority. That 

is, China is nominally communist, yet there are massive, obvious disparities of wealth between the elite 

few and the poor hundreds of millions. Second, corruption remains endemic.7

 Third, environmental degradation there is potentially unprecedented in human 
5

history. A recent study estimated that the average life 

expectancy in North China had dropped by 5.5 years 

because of air pollution generated by coal power production.8

 Fourth, unrest among environmentalists, 

ethnic minorities, those frustrated with corruption, 

those frustrated with high inflation in food prices and 

other commodities, and others groups continues to 

grow. Today there are hundreds of protests per day 

of varying sizes—roughly four times the tally from a 

decade earlier. Finally, China faces increasing financial turmoil as a result of slow growth, a housing market bubble, and an opaque regulatory environment. 

For all of these reasons, the Chinese Communist Party 

is deeply concerned with control, and it is more likely 

to devote most energy and focus to internal stability 

and security.

Nearby, the most likely security challenge on the 

Korean peninsula involves not an attack by the North 

against the South, but rather a coup, regime collapse, 

or other form of implosion that would compel hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of refugees 

and/or migrants to cross the DMZ into the South.9

From Washington’s perspective, this would present a 

short-term challenge in terms of helping its South Korean ally to manage the anticipated flow of humanity, 

one that would probably be on par with what Europe 

is experiencing vis-à-vis Syrian refugees.10 In the mid 

to long term, the challenge to Washington would likely come in the form of a major debate within a unified 

Korea over whether it should or could remain host to 

roughly 30,000 U.S. troops, given the disappearance of 

the DPRK threat as well as the magnetic pull of China and Beijing’s strong interest in seeing U.S. forces 

removed from the peninsula. 
6

Regarding Iran, the nuclear agreement signed in 

mid-2015 would appear to have removed the most salient aspect of any Iranian threat to vital U.S. interests. 

More specifically, the agreement will most likely defer 

indefinitely an Israeli attack on nuclear infrastructure 

in the Islamic Republic, which would have triggered a 

broader war between those two countries and which 

would have undoubtedly pulled in the United States.11

Russia, unlike Iran, North Korea, or China, is the 

only entity on the planet that has the proven ability 

to decisively threaten American vital interests in all 

three of the regions most important to the United 

States—Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Middle 

East—and the only country with the ability to annihilate the United States. However, Western sanctions 

and low oil prices have had a significant impact on 

Russia—the ruble has lost half its value, economic 

growth has slowed dramatically, domestic production 

has contracted, and Russian’s hard currency reserves 

are dwindling quickly. More importantly, factors internal to Russia—its poor demographic outlook, its resource extraction-based economy, its inability to successfully implement military reform, and its endemic, 

crippling corruption—all point to a state ultimately 

mired in great difficulties. For these reasons, while 

Russia is a significant threat in the short to mid term—

and arguably the most significant as General Dunford 

argued—over the long run it is a state in decline and 

hence unlikely to risk challenging the United States in 

interstate war. 

In sum, major interstate war between the United 

States and the aforementioned states seems highly 

unlikely for many reasons, most of them internal to 

those states. The more probable threats to U.S. vital 

interests are those that may involve those adversar-
7

ies, but in less direct ways than major interstate war. 

Much more likely are conflicts involving substate or 

transnational actors, as well as more nebulous forms 

of instability, disorder, and insecurity. Nonetheless, 

the American defense establishment—evidenced 

through the most recent national-level strategies as 

well as major defense procurement programs such as 

the Ford-class of supercarriers, a new long-range strategic bomber, and a sixth generation fighter—remains 

focused on major interstate war.12 For example, the 

2015 National Military Strategy notes clearly that the 

first national military objective is, “to deter, deny, and 

defeat state adversaries.”13

One might argue that it makes sense to prepare, 

organize, structure, and procure materiel for the worst 

possible cases—that is, to prepare for major interstate 

war—and subsequently to assume that U.S. leaders 

will have the good sense to avoid “unimportant” conflicts or crises that do not affect vital interests or that 

the U.S. military will be able to handle conflicts or crises short of major interstate war if and when necessary. 

In theory, such logic may seem particularly appealing 

and even compelling in an extraordinarily resourceconstrained environment. Reduced resources require 

ruthless prioritization of goals and objectives, hence 

it is better to focus on preparing for the potentially 

catastrophic rather than the more likely other types of 

crises or more nebulous forms of insecurity.

However, acting on this rationale leads to a significant shortcoming. If the United States chooses to engage in a conflict or crisis short of major interstate war, 

it will do so with a military force structured, equipped, 

organized, and trained to address the “wrong” type 

of mission. The learning curve—the time necessary 

for the military to adapt to adversaries, tactics, equip-
8

ment, locales, and formations that it was not prepared 

for—results in greater loss of life and treasure. An 

example of this was seen in Iraq, where an American 

military force capable of quickly demolishing Saddam 

Hussein’s military subsequently struggled to adapt to 

the requirements of counterinsurgency. 

The key to overcoming this conundrum is not to 

simply muddle through the learning curve with its attendant high casualties and other costs, or to place all 

hope in the wisdom and ability of political leaders at 

both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue to keep the United 

States out of messier conflicts and crises. Instead, policymakers should place greater reliance on military 

engagement and forward presence. Together, these 

tools can provide decision-makers with effective, efficient mechanisms for managing the most likely security challenges of the next decade while simultaneously 

mitigating the risk of a less likely but potentially more 

catastrophic security challenge of major interstate war 

from becoming a reality.

The Necessity of Engagement and Presence.

Engagement and presence are “the currency that 

Washington uses to buy a good portion of its international influence.”14 Indeed, there is a broad consensus 

in academia that military engagement and forward 

presence have been essential tools for the United 

States to wield influence around the globe.15 That 

consensus was also reflected by the congressionally-mandated Overseas Basing Commission (OBC), 

which explicitly equated overseas basing and forward 

presence with American influence abroad.16
9

It is not simply influence, though, that comes with 

engagement and permanent presence. More importantly, greater stability in peacetime and greater effectiveness in times of conflict, all at costs far below 

what would be required for any one nation to attempt 

alone, are what the United States can achieve in return for the costs of engagement and permanent presence. Engagement and permanent presence are not 

panaceas, as will be shown. This section will first address military engagement programs and then turn to 

address the importance of forward presence.

Military Engagement.

Military engagement programs—often referred 

to as security cooperation—include educational exchanges, training efforts, military exercises, seniorleader visits, foreign military sales, and multinational 

research and development. Together, they form a 

critical means by which the U.S. Government encourages and enables countries and organizations to work 

with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. 

Military engagement activities enable the United 

States to achieve its strategic objectives in several 

ways. First, there is clear evidence that Army engagement activities can enhance the ability of America’s 

foreign partners to maintain stability and security 

in their own neighborhoods, thereby empowering 

states to deal with regional and transnational threats, 

including extremist networks and drug traffickers, 

and helping to prevent conflict before it can start.17

By building partner capacity for self-defense and a 

sort of international neighborhood policing through 

military engagement programs and activities, the U.S. 

military can help to spread the responsibility of defending common security interests. There are many 
10

examples of where this has been the case. For instance, the United States approved the sale of nearly 

two dozen Blackhawk helicopters and 3,000 high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles (Humvees) to 

the Mexican military, which provided the Mexican 

government with increased capability to fight drug 

cartels and traffickers.18 Elsewhere, the Global Peace 

Operations Initiative (GPOI) has enabled the United 

States to train more than 206,000 peacekeepers since 

2005. At a cost of roughly $70-$105 million per year, 

GPOI has facilitated the training, equipping, and deployment of 162,000 peacekeepers from 38 countries 

for 21 peacekeeping operations. Although not without critics, GPOI has nonetheless improved the ability of troops to conduct peacekeeping tasks.19 More 

recently, American efforts to conduct aerial refueling 

of French fighter aircraft operating over Mali proved 

critical to the success of French forces. Military engagement between the U.S. and French air forces enabled operational and tactical cooperation during a 

time of crisis, serving both French as well as American 

security interests in Africa and beyond.20 In the Philippines, from 2002 until 2015, the United States spent 

roughly $50 million per year to support as many as 

600 U.S. military personnel involved in training and 

equipping the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). 

There is evidence that this effort improved security 

conditions in the southern Philippines, institutionalized defense reform and professionalization in the 

AFP, increased investigative capabilities of the Philippine National Police, and improved quality of life and 

economic development in the southern Philippines.21

Elsewhere, the $8 billion spent by the United States on 

military engagement in Colombia, as part of the “Plan 

Colombia” initiative, is largely viewed as money well-
11

spent.22 Colombia is not free of violence, but it is far 

from the near-failed narco-state that some feared it 

would become over a decade ago. 

However, military engagement is not always successful in producing regional security or strengthening foreign security forces for internal defense and 

stability. The 2015 cancellation of the train-and-equip 

program in Syria and the 2014 collapse of Iraqi army 

units facing Islamic State militants north and west of 

Baghdad, and the resulting fall of Mosul—a major city 

in northern Iraq—raised serious questions about the 

utility of having spent roughly $20 billion to train and 

equip a force that ultimately proved incapable and/

or unwilling to safeguard Iraqi citizens and property.23 Similar doubts have been raised with regard to 

American efforts in Afghanistan—especially in light 

of the recent fall of Kunduz, the first provincial capital 

captured by the Taliban since 2001.24 

These and other cases of failure make it clear that 

military engagement for the purposes of enhancing 

foreign internal defense and/or regional security cannot be pursued and implemented blindly. Judging 

from just the cases of the Philippines, Colombia, Iraq, 

and Afghanistan a key independent variable is the 

unmistakable presence of parallel interests and policy 

preferences on the part of the recipient state’s government and the vast majority of its citizens. Some studies dealing with security cooperation have examined 

larger sets of cases, concluding that the most important factors include not just parallel interests and policy preferences on the part of recipient governments 

and their citizens, but also the following:25

• Deep familiarity and repetitive experience in 

the operational environment on the part of the 

U.S. advisory team;
12

• Close coordination between the U.S. advisory 

team and the country team, with the U.S. embassy in the lead;

• Consistent, long-term funding by donors like 

the United States; 

• Recipient capacity and ability to absorb and use 

assistance; and,

• Donor and recipient goal alignment. 

When these variables are present, military engagement has a proven record of achieving success over 

time at reasonable cost, especially relative to a fullscale American assumption of security responsibility 

in a given country or region.26

The second way in which military engagement 

results in the achievement of strategic objectives is 

through deterrence and assurance. In particular, multinational military exercises form a critical means of 

assuring allies and friends and deterring adversaries 

in non-lethal ways.27 Exercises instill confidence in allies by clearly signaling U.S. ability and willingness to 

partner in the face of security challenges. At the same 

time, exercises appear to have a deterrent effect, signaling to a potential adversary the ability and willingness of allies or partners to work together in response 

to a perceived threat.28

It has been argued that exercises may in fact worsen 

a security dilemma among two or more states.29 This 

is certainly possible, but increased transparency—for 

example, by announcing exercises in advance, by encouraging extensive media coverage, or by inviting international observers to attend an exercise—can help 

to reduce the risk of a worsened security dilemma 

while simultaneously allowing the states participating in the exercise to achieve both their deterrence and 

assurance objectives.
13

The third way in which military engagement helps 

the United States achieve strategic objectives is by 

enhancing the capabilities of coalition partners. Both 

U.S. national security strategies and American history 

reveal that the United States prefers to wield international force in a coalition or multinational context. For 

example, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review report 

stated, “Whenever possible, the United States will use 

force in an internationally sanctioned coalition with 

allies, international and regional organizations, and 

like-minded nations. . . . We have an enduring need to 

build future coalitions.”30 The more recent 2015 National Security Strategy calls for American capabilities 

to be employed in the pursuit of U.S. national security 

“within diverse international coalitions.”31 Moreover, 

it is difficult to recall when, over the last 20 years or 

more, the United States has committed combat forces 

to any military operation unilaterally, without a single 

international partner.

Certainly there are a range of interoperability 

levels, from deconfliction in order to avoid fratricide 

when military forces of different countries operate in 

close proximity, all the way up to actual integration, 

when a British brigade operates under an American 

division for example. At the lower end of that spectrum, crafting interoperability on the fly can often be 

successful, but usually barely so. During the NATO 

operation against Libya, French and British attack 

helicopter units, which had never operated in such a 

context before and hence were incapable of conducting combined operations without great risk, agreed to 

fly at certain times of the day in order to avoid shooting each other. The French flew from noon to 2pm, the 

British flew from 3pm to 5pm, and nobody flew from 

2pm to 3pm.
14

At the upper end of the interoperability spectrum 

—in the realm of high-intensity conflict or hybrid warfare—the ability of U.S. and foreign forces to operate 

side by side cannot be crafted from scratch, at least 

not without a steep learning curve and significant 

operational risk. Training, exercises, and common 

acquisition programs are critical to maintaining some 

minimal level of integrative interoperability with and 

among America’s most capable allies. Such tools expose foreign forces to U.S. tactics, techniques, and procedures that are necessary to fight side by side with 

American troops, while also improving U.S. capabilities by exposing American forces to the best practices 

of their foreign partners.

The “surge” effort in Afghanistan—where nonU.S. coalition forces made up a substantial portion of 

the necessary troops deployed in 2009—proves there 

may be instances where the United States needs the 

mass provided by a broad, collective, coalition endeavor. The available evidence indicates that engagement activities better enable U.S. allies and partners 

to more efficiently and effectively operate in coalition 

environments, which remain vitally important to U.S. 

military endeavors.32 No one can say with absolute 

certainty where the next military conflict will unfold 

and under what conditions, and it is equally impossible to discern which of America’s allies will have 

the political will to join in a coalition. However, if the 

leaders of those allies know that their national forces 

are capable of successfully operating side by side with 

U.S. forces while incurring minimal casualties, anecdotal evidence from the cases of Poland and Romania 

suggest that allies will be more likely to accept both 

the operational and political risks and therefore join 

the coalition.33
15

Fourth, military engagement improves the ability 

of U.S. forces to operate with international partners.34

At the operational level, if coalition warfare is how 

the United States will prefer to fight in the future, it 

can only help U.S. troops to train as they would fight 

—that is, to provide them with exercises and training events that include multinational and coalition 

partners. This improves the ability of U.S. troops to 

operate with partners that do not necessarily speak 

English as their native language, to understand the 

practices and procedures of organizations like NATO, 

and to become comfortable working with and in other 

cultures. American troops role-playing—or paying 

for U.S. contractors to play the part of coalition partners—unnecessarily handicap U.S. forces when they 

are actually called upon to conduct an operation in a 

coalition context. Given the experience of the last 15 

years, in which coalition partners played critical roles 

in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Libya, and elsewhere, 

the participation of multinational forces in every U.S. 

mission rehearsal exercise and every U.S. decisive action training event should be given higher priority in 

American military doctrine, defense policy guidance, 

and exercise planning and implementation. 

Finally, military engagement that leads to increasingly capable and interoperable allies and partners 

results in fewer American boots on the ground, lessening the burden on the Army and Marine Corps to 

generate combat units for deployment rotations and 

thereby reducing costs in the long run. Without a 

draft, Washington may need to rely on capable allies 

to fill validated force requirements in the event of a 

major or longer-term conflict. Examples of military 

engagement leading to substantial and tangible contributions in recent operations include U.S. efforts to 

train and professionalize Polish, Romanian, and Geor-
16

gian forces. Following implementation of U.S. train 

and equip initiatives, each of these countries made 

important contributions to military operations in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. For instance, from 2006 until 2011, a 

U.S. infantry company served under the command of 

a Romanian infantry battalion in Afghanistan’s Zabul 

province. In preparation for those deployments, U.S. 

and Romanian forces routinely trained together at the 

Joint Multinational Training Center in Germany, providing Romania’s military and political leaders with 

the confidence to deploy Romanian forces.35 Similarly, efforts by U.S. Army forces in Europe to train 

Polish forces for missions in Iraq and Afghanistan 

proved invaluable for enabling and facilitating the 

deployment of Polish troops. Poland was one of only 

five countries to contribute ground forces to the initial 

invasion of Iraq.36 At its height, the Polish contingent 

in Iraq numbered 2,400 mechanized infantry troops, 

and Poland commanded the multinational forces in 

southern Iraq that were subsequently dubbed MultiNational Division - Central-South. U.S. forces in Europe facilitated these deployments through the Stable 

Guardian exercise series. Meanwhile, the biannual 

“Bagram” exercise series between U.S. forces in Europe and Polish counterparts prepared the latter for 

deployments to Afghanistan. Training on the systems 

they would use in Afghanistan and with the allies 

they would be working with during the deployment 

provided invaluable experience, enabling the Poles to 

maintain deployments to Afghanistan—without caveats—through 2014. From the U.S. military’s perspective, increased coalition participation should mean 

fewer, less frequent rotations of U.S. troops into combat zones, thereby increasing time at home station as 

well as spreading risk more broadly among coalition 

partners.
17

Forward Presence.

Like military engagement, forward presence provides an effective and efficient means of achieving 

several U.S. strategic objectives. The most important 

of these is deterring aggression against vital interests. 

There is a broad-based consensus that forward presence mitigates threats and instability through deterrence (as well as assurance—more on this to follow).37

Forward-based overseas forces can deter aggression far more effectively than CONUS-based forces 

in both deterrence-by-punishment and deterrenceby-denial contexts. The former entails the promise 

of punishment so severe as to outweigh any potential gains from aggression. For example, American 

soldiers in South Korea accomplish this by playing 

the role of a “trip-wire” that would trigger a larger 

response. During the Cold War, U.S. forces in West 

Germany accomplished the same objective vis-à-vis 

the Soviet Union. 

Relying entirely or mostly on a CONUS-based 

force to accomplish deterrence-by-punishment is 

not nearly as credible for at least two reasons. First, 

CONUS-based U.S. forces are very unlikely to sustain 

casualties in any attack by an aggressor on a U.S. ally. 

Treaty signatures and political rhetoric are important 

signs of commitment, but aggressors understand that 

they are relatively weaker substitutes for an American military casualty when it comes to spurring the 

United States to respond. Second, it is reasonable to 

assume that U.S. adversaries are more likely to avoid 

aggression aimed at an American ally when there is 

a temporary or rotational U.S. military presence in or 

near that ally.
18

Deterrence-by-denial amounts to preventing an 

adversary from making any gains whatsoever. In the 

context of the Korean peninsula, deterrence-by-denial 

was more credible when American forces on the peninsula were more numerous and deployed near the 

demilitarized zone. In the case of Europe, even with 

300,000 U.S. troops arrayed across the continent at the 

height of the Cold War, Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces were numerically superior. Hence it was the task 

of U.S. forces permanently forward-based in Europe 

to limit territorial losses until reinforcements arrived 

from the United States or until the West employed 

nuclear weapons.38 Then and now, of the two forms of 

deterrence, deterrence-by-denial is far more difficult 

operationally, politically, and fiscally.39

Second, forward-based forces reassure allies. 

The presence—particularly permanent presence—of 

American military forces abroad is perceived by the 

countries in which they are based, as well as other 

nearby countries, as a tangible commitment of the 

United States to the security of its allies.40 This presence and the accompanying reassurance dampens security competition in key strategic areas of the world, 

including the heart of Europe and northeast Asia, 

regions that are vital to U.S. interests.41

Additionally, forward presence enables a more effective response to security crises when and if they occur. Available evidence indicates that for small-scale 

contingencies requiring a battalion or less, forwardbased forces in the Central Region of Europe are able 

to more quickly deploy than CONUS-based forces to 

other regions of Europe, the Caucasus, the Levant, 

and Southwest Asia.42 The case of the deployment of 

four companies from the 173rd Airborne Brigade from 

locations in Italy and Germany to the Baltic States and 
19

Poland in early 2014 would appear to confirm that forward presence facilitated a faster response than what 

was capable from CONUS.43 For larger contingencies, 

there are limited advantages of forward presence assuming adequate strategic airlift from CONUS exists. 

However, this assumption is not valid, which places 

even greater significance on the role that forward 

presence plays in contingency response.44

Another benefit of forward presence is that it provides access to en route infrastructure and the lines 

of communication necessary for American security 

and that of its allies. The U.S. presence in Iceland during the Cold War was an example of this, promoting 

Washington’s ability to secure and defend the North 

Atlantic approaches to both North America and Europe. More recently, throughout the many years of 

large-scale U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, access to 

facilities at Ramstein in Germany and Mihail Kogilniceanu Air Base in Romania played vital roles in 

enabling the United States and its allies to resupply 

forces in combat. Likewise, in the Pacific theater, U.S. 

Army forces in Japan provide logistical support to 

forces in South Korea.

Finally, forward presence also contributes directly 

to building and maintaining interoperability with 

America’s most likely and most capable coalition 

partners, and to building and maintaining more limited but no less important capabilities among other, 

less capable partners.45 The basing of U.S. troops in 

Europe since the early 1950s has provided opportunities for regular—quarterly or in some cases monthly 

or weekly—training, engagement, and education.46

This intense, routine engagement conducted over the 

course of decades resulted in a high degree of interoperability among U.S. and European militaries, char-
20

acterized by two-way learning.47 In particular, U.S. 

forces learned to operate effectively in coalitions with 

highly capable allies and to adapt to foreign environments.48 From the European perspective, engagement 

with forward-based American military forces was—

and remains—highly attractive as a means of gaining 

additional military capability. The case of American 

military presence in South Korea has had a similar effect on interoperability between the U.S. Army and 

the South Korean army across the range of military 

operations.

Over the last quarter century, the U.S. military 

presence in Europe has fallen from about a quarter 

million soldiers at the end of the Cold War to roughly 

30,000 today, and numerous overseas military facilities—particularly those in Germany—have been returned to host nations. These two factors have dramatically reduced the ability of forward presence to 

deter and reassure, among other core functions of 

forward presence as discussed previously, and Washington has found itself struggling to augment its diminished permanent presence with rotational forces 

in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. 

In addition to a perceived lack of U.S. commitment to critical allies, the cut in U.S. force structure 

in Europe has also manifested itself in a significantly 

reduced command structure. For example, the U.S. 

corps and division headquarters previously based 

in Europe have all been deactivated or transferred to 

CONUS. Since most of the unit partnerships—critical 

to interoperability in the most intense military operations—between U.S. and key allies prior to the attacks 

of 9/11 were at the corps and division levels, a significant tool in maintaining interoperability has largely 

disappeared over the last two decades.
21

Additionally, reduced American permanent presence in Europe has left the United States scrambling 

to find and/or retain infrastructure it had previously 

thought would be unnecessary for operations and logistical support in Europe and beyond. For instance, 4 

days before the United States was to turn over control 

of Coleman Barracks in Mannheim, Germany to German government authorities, Washington realized it 

needed the facility in order to store additional military 

equipment it had recently decided to pre-position in 

Europe.49 Yet despite all of this, there is still the possibility that U.S. military units forward stationed in 

Europe may be subject to further downsizing, disbanding, or relocation to CONUS, most likely in the 

name of theorized cost savings and/or to justify a 

long-overdue base realignment and closure effort in 

the United States.50

Permanent versus Rotational Presence.

Some analysts have argued that rotational deployment models appear to be a good substitute for permanent presence.51 Advocates point to two examples 

to justify this perspective. First, since U.S. military 

forces returned the Panama Canal Zone to Panamanian sovereignty in 1999, U.S. Southern Command 

has relied chiefly on a rotational deployment model to 

conduct military engagement activities with partner 

militaries in Central and South America. Likewise, 

U.S. Africa Command—with no assigned forces of its 

own—has relied on rotational deployments to conduct 

military engagement activities across Africa since the 

command’s inception in 2008. Rotational models of 

deployment—and the occasional, temporary engagement they permit—can be useful in momentarily 
22

contributing to deterrence and reassurance, and in 

building basic military capabilities, such as individual 

troop skills, among less-capable military forces.52

However, rotational deployments do not satisfy 

mid- to long-term allied requirements for deterrence 

and reassurance.53 For example, Polish and Estonian 

leaders have vocally pursued the permanent stationing of allied military forces on their soil, despite the 

insistence of U.S. officials that this issue is not up for 

discussion and despite the fact that these countries 

are already hosts to rotational deployments from the 

United States and other allies.54 Additionally, a rotationally deployed force from CONUS is unlikely to 

deter effectively because it is unable to prevent “opportunity motivated” aggressors—especially nuclear-armed ones—from seeking a fait accompli with a 

quick, successful military operation occurring between 

rotations.55

Moreover, a rotational deployment from CONUS 

during a period of insecurity—no matter how small or 

insignificant—is likely to be interpreted or characterized as escalatory.56 This will have the effect of limiting the choices available to the President. Finally, rotationally deployed forces from CONUS are unlikely 

to arrive in theater as well-informed about local or regional culture, habits, standard operating procedures, 

and rules and regulations, making their learning curve 

somewhat steeper and inhibiting their effectiveness.57

In terms of developing capability and building 

interoperability, permanent forward basing appears 

to be more effective than rotational forward presence 

across the entire range of military operations, particularly for more intensive combat operations against hybrid or adaptive enemies.58 Indeed, existing evidence 

appears to indicate that the development and sustain-
23

ment of personal and unit relationships through permanent forward basing enables smoother integration 

during complex combat operations against hybrid 

threats.59

Some argue that rotational deployments cost less 

than permanent forward basing.60 This argument is 

based on the fact that rotational forces typically use 

host-nation training and exercise facilities, as well as 

host-nation life-support facilities for lodging and dining, when conducting security cooperation activities 

overseas. However, such arguments are misleading, 

shortsighted, and/or factually inaccurate. First, arguments in favor of rotational presence based on lower 

costs often overlook the costs of preparing a unit for 

an overseas training rotation. Administrative preparations plus pre-deployment training for a unit unfamiliar with NATO and Europe can add significant time 

and cost.61

Second, the more frequent the rotations—even 

without equipment such as Stryker vehicles or Humvees—the more expensive the overall effort to conduct security cooperation. This is largely due to the 

transportation costs involved every time a unit is sent 

overseas. Indeed, one former commander of U.S. 

Army forces in Europe has argued that, “[U.S.] forces 

based on the continent can conduct significantly more 

partnership exercises, with a significantly cheaper bill, 

than rotational forces.”62

Perhaps most importantly, available data appears 

to undermine expectations of reduced costs through 

CONUS basing. One of the most comprehensive 

studies on this subject concluded that there was little 

difference in the fixed costs associated with basing in 

CONUS versus overseas, undermining the commonly 

held assumption that overseas bases, particularly in 

Europe, always cost more than CONUS bases.63
24

Additionally, available evidence from the last year 

or more of intensified rotational deployments from 

CONUS to Europe have revealed some unexpected 

findings.64 First, the costs to rotate a single airborne 

brigade combat team (ABCT) from the United States to 

Europe for 6 months is roughly $300 million, far more 

than some military officials expected.65 This figure includes transportation, travel within theater, life support, and exercises. Just as unexpected are the costs 

of sustaining the prepositioned equipment in Europe 

that the ABCT is expected to use once it arrives there 

—currently, the United States is spending $80 million 

per year for this sustainment, roughly double what 

was planned for.

In addition to potentially higher costs and limited 

utility for developing capability and interoperability 

for the most complex military operations, rotational 

deployment models carry other risks. For example, 

in times of tight budgets, troop rotations for training 

are among the first items to be cut, further undermining efforts to build capability, maintain interoperability, and achieve any of a number of other necessary 

national security objectives. This was precisely the 

experience of the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment (2-8 CAV) of the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st 

Cavalry Division based at Ft. Hood, Texas. This unit 

of roughly 900 Soldiers was designated to travel to 

Germany and Poland in fall 2013 to participate in the 

NATO Response Force (NRF) exercise Steadfast Jazz. 

However, in early spring 2013, 2-8 CAV was notified 

that it was not going to be sent after all due to budgetary constraints as a result of sequestration. Instead, it 

was decided that only a small headquarters response 

cell would attend, consisting of roughly 45 personnel. 
25

Conclusion.

The most likely security challenges facing the United States and its vital interests over the coming years 

require more than a retreat to “Fortress America.” 

Messy, localized, perhaps inconclusive conflicts and 

other more nebulous forms of insecurity are far more 

likely to occupy the time and attention of the U.S. 

military in the next decade than major interstate war. 

However, the drawdown of U.S. ground forces from 

overseas and especially Europe, a persistent bias in the 

American military establishment toward preparing 

for major interstate war, a false assumption that DoDled security cooperation detracts from readiness, and 

the perceived failures of security cooperation in places 

like Iraq and Afghanistan threaten to push the United 

States toward an excessive overreliance on precision 

strike stand-off capabilities and a strategy of surging 

American military might from the United States after 

a crisis has already started.

Relying on stand-off and surge capabilities cannot 

provide reasonable deterrence or reassurance, promote effective regional security, build the capability 

and interoperability necessary to succeed in combined 

military operations at reasonable cost, or provide senior policymakers with adequate options in managing security threats. The inability to surge quickly 

enough, the incorrect assumptions about reduced 

cost, the risks of appearing escalatory, the loss of global influence, and the failure to deter and assure are 

all concomitant with a strategy of surging as circumstances demand and/or relying on stand-off capabilities. Mitigating the security challenges of tomorrow 

necessitates investment in a more effective and more 

efficient set of tools.
26

Two such tools—forward presence and, when employed selectively, military engagement—can help to 

promote stability and security in contexts short of major interstate war. Moreover, engagement and presence can also contribute dramatically to operational 

capacity and capability across a range of military operations, including major interstate war. Unfortunately, significant cuts to overseas permanent presence 

and continuing pockets of institutional bias against 

engagement as a force multiplier and readiness enhancer have combined to limit the leverage possible 

through these two policy tools. Reversing these trends 

will require bureaucratic courage and leadership and 

a deeper institutional embrace of engagement as well 

as forward presence.

ENDNOTES

1. The author is indebted to Con Crane, Trey Braun, Matt 

Dawson, Nate Freier, Bill Johnsen, Richard Lacquement, Doug 

Lovelace, Bill Pierce, Jim Pierce, and Don Snider for comments on 

an earlier draft. The views expressed in this monograph are the 

author’s alone.

2. The National Security Strategy of the United States, Washington, DC: The White House, 2015, p. 9, available from https://www.

whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf, hereafter, 2015 NSS; The Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National 

Military Strategy of the United States, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2015, p. 6, available from www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/

Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf, hereafter, 2015 NMS; and the Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2014, p. 22, available from 

archive.defense.gov/home/features/2014/0314_sdr/qdr.aspx, hereafter, 

2014 QDR.
27

3. See, for example, 2015 NMS, p. 3, which notes, “...today, 

and into the foreseeable future, we must pay greater attention to 

challenges posed by state actors.”

4. 2015 NMS, p. 2.

5. John Nagl, quoted in Julian E. Barnes, “Shrinking Budget 

Forces Army Into New Battlefield,” The Wall Street Journal, May 

10, 2013, p. 1. 

6. See, for example, David Shambaugh, “The Coming Chinese 

Crackup,” The Wall Street Journal, March 6, 2015.

7. See, for example, David Barboza and Sharon LaFraniere, 

“‘Princelings’ in China Use Family Ties to Gain Riches,” The New 

York Times, May 18, 2012.

8. Yuyu Chen, Avraham Ebenstein, Michael Greenstone, and 

Hongbin Li, “Evidence on the impact of sustained exposure to air 

pollution on life expectancy from China’s Huai River policy,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, Vol. 110, No. 32, August 

6, 2013, pp. 12936—41.

9. See, for example, Jamie Metzl, “Doomsday: The Coming 

Collapse of North Korea,” The National Interest (online), June 14, 

2015, available from nationalinterest.org/feature/doomsday-the-coming-collapse-north-korea-13107.

10. Bruce W. Bennett and Jennifer Lind, “The Collapse of 

North Korea: Military Missions and Requirements,” International 

Security, Vol. 36, No. 2, Fall 2011, pp. 84—119; Na Jeong-ju, “3 Million NK Refugees Expected in Crisis: BOK,” Korea Times, January 

26, 2007.

11. Kenneth M. Pollack, “U.S. policy toward the Middle East 

after the Iranian nuclear agreement,” statement before the Senate 

Committee on Foreign Relations on the implications of the Joint 

Comprehensive Plan of Action for U.S. policy in the Middle East, 

August 5, 2015.

12. William G. Braun III and Charles D. Allen, “Shaping a 21st 

Century Defense Strategy,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Vol. 73, No. 2, 

2014, p. 54.
28

13. 2015 NMS, p. 6.

14. Hal Brands, The Limits of Offshore Balancing, Carlisle, PA: 

U.S. Army War College Press, 2015, p. 43.

15. See, for example, Derek Reveron, Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of 

the U.S. Military, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 

2010; Alexander Cooley, Base Politics: Democratic Change and the 

U.S. Military Overseas, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008; 

and the Commission on Review of the Overseas Military Facility 

Structure of the United States, “Report to the President and the 

Congress,” August 2005, p. ix.

16. The Commission on Review of the Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States, “Report to the President and 

the Congress,” August 2005, p. ix. The Overseas Basing Commission was established in 2003 by Public Law 108-132, as amended 

by Public Law 108-324.

17. Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster, Reshaping Defence 

Diplomacy: New Roles for Military Cooperation and Assistance, London: IISS Adelphi Papers, 2004; Derek S. Reveron, Exporting 

Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the 

Changing Face of the U.S. Military, Washington, DC: Georgetown 

University Press, 2010, pp. 31-33 and 46-48; Paul J. Smith, “Transnational Security Threats and State Survival: A Role for the Military?” Parameters, Vol. 30, No. 3, Autumn 2000, pp. 77-91; Andrew 

J. Shapiro, “A New Era for U.S. Security Assistance,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 4, Fall 2012, pp. 23-35.

18. Sarah Kinosian, “Mexico prepping to buy more Black 

Hawks: settling in for a lengthy fight in drug war?” The Christian 

Science Monitor, April 29, 2014.

19. Paul D. Williams, Enhancing U.S. Support for Peace 

Operations in Africa, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 

2015, p. 20.

20. Veronica McMahon, “Coalition refueling training enhances interoperability, partnerships, mission capabilities,” CJTFHOA Press Release, November 28, 2012; “US military sending air 
29

tankers to refuel French jets over Mali,” Associated Press, January 

27, 2013; and Paul D. Williams, Enhancing U.S. Support for Peace 

Operations in Africa, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 

2015, p. 20.

21. Peter Chalk, “U.S. Security Assistance to the Philippines: 

A Success Story Against Terrorism,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 1, Iss. 

3, February 15, 2008; Mark Munson, “Has Operation Enduring 

Freedom-Philippines Been a Success?” Small Wars Journal, April 

5, 2013.

22. Michael Shifter, “Plan Colombia: A Retrospective,” Americas Quarterly, Summer 2012, pp. 36-42; Michael E. O’Hanlon and 

David Petraeus, “The Success Story in Colombia,” The Brookings 

Institution, September 24, 2013.

23. Dan Murphy, “The Iraqi army the US spent billions building is a disaster,” The Christian Science Monitor, July 2, 2014. The 

United States reportedly spent $17 billion training and equipping 

the Iraqi military from 2003-12.

24. M. Chris Mason, The Strategic Lessons Unlearned from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan: Why the ANSF Will Not Hold, and the Implications for the U.S. Army in Afghanistan, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army 

War College Press, 2015.

25. Michael P. Noonan, Complexity, Conflict, and Cooperation: 

The Micropolitics of American Civil-Military Relations in Small Wars, 

1945-Present, Ann Arbor, MI: ProQuest LLC, 2013, dissertation 

submitted to Loyola University of Chicago; Seth G. Jones, et al., 

Securing Tyrants or Fostering Reform? U.S. Internal Security Assistance to Repressive and Transitioning Regimes, Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND, 2006; Christopher Paul, et al., What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances? Santa Monica, 

CA: RAND, 2013.

26. For example, the U.S. support in the Philippines cost 

roughly $50 million per year, while the far grander American 

effort in Afghanistan, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, was 

reportedly costing as much as $2 billion per week. See Jim Michaels, “Philippines a model for counterinsurgency,” USA Today, 

March 31, 2011.
30

27. Mackenzie Eaglen, “The Super Bowl of Combat Training,” 

U.S. News & World Report, August 12, 2015; Derek S. Reveron, Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and 

the Changing Face of the U.S. Military, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2010.

28. Lolita C. Baldor, “Carter: U.S. must boost military exercises to counter Russia,” Associated Press, June 5, 2015.

29. Julian Borger, “Russia and Nato war games increase risk 

of real clash, report says,” The Guardian, August 11, 2015.

30. Quadrennial Defense Review 2010, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2010, pp. 10, 74, hereafter, 2010 QDR.

31. 2015 NSS, p. 7.

32. Theresa Baginski, et al., A Comprehensive Approach to Improving U.S. Security Force Assistance Efforts, Carlisle, PA: U.S. 

Army War College Press, 2009; Lieutenant Colonel Gregory J. 

Dyekman, Security Cooperation: A Key to the Challenges of the 21st 

Century, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2007; Nora 

Bensahel, The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Europe, 

NATO, and the European Union, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp, 

2001; John E. Peters, et al., European Contributions to Operation Allied Force. Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation, Santa Monica, 

CA: RAND Corp, 2001.

33. Research discussions with a senior general officer, 

Heidelberg, Germany, Summer 2011.

34. See, for example, William G. Braun III and Charles D. 

Allen, “Shaping a 21st Century Defense Strategy,” Joint Forces 

Quarterly, Vol. 73, No. 2, 2014, p. 56.

35. Jim Tice, “U.S. battalion to deploy with Romanian troops: 

Army says nation on ‘right track’ in becoming more professional 

force,” Army Times, December 20, 2009; Mark Abramson, “U.S. 

soldiers team up with Romanian troops for Afghan mission,” 

Stars and Stripes, June 20, 2009.
31

36. Matthew Omolesky, “Polish-American Security Cooperation: Idealism, Geopolitics and Quid Pro Quo,” Dusseldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy, June 2006.

37. See, for example, Kenneth Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1, Summer 

2000, p. 36; Robert J. Art, “Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of 

Selective Engagement,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3, Winter 1998-99, p. 92; Klaus Naumann, “Staying In Europe: A Vital 

American Interest,” in Lloyd Matthews, ed., The Future Of The 

American Military Presence In Europe, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, May 2000; John Bolton, “The 

Next President and NATO,” The Washington Times, July 21, 1999; 

and Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, Alliances and American National 

Security, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2006, pp. 30-1.

38. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical 

Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy, Oxford, UK: 

Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 167.

39. Despite these difficulties, some argue denying a potential adversary its objectives is more likely to be effective than the 

promise of retaliation. See Edward Rhodes, “Conventional deterrence,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2000, p. 223.

40. Lynn E. Davis, et al., U.S. Overseas Military Presence: What 

Are the Strategic Choices? Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012. 

41. Stephen G. Brooks, John G. Ikenberry, and William C. 

Wohlforth, “Lean Forward: In Defense of American Engagement,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92, No. 1, January-February 2013, 

pp. 130-42.

42. Michael Lostumbo, et al., Overseas Basing of U.S. Military 

Forces An Assessment of Relative Costs and Strategic Benefits, Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND, 2013, pp. 64-5.

43. Interview with a senior field grade officer assigned to 

Europe, July 14, 2014.

44. “Strategic lift is not sufficient to the task,” according to 

the Commission on Review of the Overseas Military Facility 
32

Structure of the United States, “Report to the President and the 

Congress,” August 2005, p. 19.

45. Ian J. Brzezinski, “Obama’s Five Challenges at Lisbon,” 

The New York Times, November 15, 2010; Michael Lostumbo, et 

al., Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces An Assessment of Relative 

Costs and Strategic Benefits, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013, p. 97.

46. See comments by Mark P. Hertling, delivered at Wilton 

Park on October 2, 2012, on the importance of the trust and the 

military capabilities built up among NATO allies through the decades of U.S. permanent forward basing in Europe, available from 

www.eur.army.mil/pdf/10022012-wilton-park-remarks.pdf.

47. Interview with a retired general officer with command 

experience in U.S. Army Europe, U.S. Army Central, and U.S. 

Southern Command, July 18, 2013.

48. Michael Lostumbo, et al., Overseas Basing of U.S. Military 

Forces An Assessment of Relative Costs and Strategic Benefits, Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND, 2013, pp. 95, 97.

49. Interview with U.S. Government civilian employee 

assigned to U.S. Army Europe headquarters in Wiesbaden, 

Germany, August 4, 2015.

50. Interview with U.S. Government civilian employee 

assigned to U.S. Army Europe headquarters in Wiesbaden, 

Germany, August 4, 2015.

51. A New US Defense Strategy for a New Era: Military Superiority, Agility, and Efficiency, Washington, DC: Stimson, November 2012, available from stimson.org/images/uploads/researchpdfs/A_New_US_Defense_Strategy_for_a_New_Era.pdf. On page 

5, the authors argue, “The US should shift from a mind-set that 

emphasizes static deployments overseas, and instead rely on frequent rotations of expeditionary forces home-based in the United 

States to exercise jointly with allies, to familiarize themselves with 

potential combat theaters, and to demonstrate US resolve and 

capabilities.”
33

52. For instance, the U.S. National Guard’s State Partnership 

Program (SPP)—and the familiarization visits and traveling contact team events that comprise it—have contributed greatly to the 

successful development of basic military skills, to understanding 

the role of a military force in a democracy, and to building both 

partner capabilities and institutional capacity. See James N. Williams, “The National Guard State Partnership Program: Element 

of Smart Power,” research paper published by the U.S. Army War 

College, March 9, 2012, available from dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?L

ocation=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA562110; Peter Howard, 

“The Growing Role of States in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case of 

the State Partnership Program,” International Studies Perspectives, 

Vol. 5, Iss. 2, May 2004, pp. 179—196.

53. Interview with a general officer assigned to Europe, 

August 4, 2015.

54. “Nato treats Poland like a buffer state, says new president,” The Financial Times, August 13, 2015; David Blair, “Sitting 

near a nuclear tripwire, Estonia’s president urges Nato to send 

troops to defend his country,” The Telegraph, April 11, 2015.

55. Edward Rhodes, “Conventional deterrence,” Comparative 

Strategy, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2000, pp. 221-53.

56. Luke Garratt, “Russia warns of escalation of conflict after 

US paratroopers arrive in Ukraine,” The Independent (UK), April 

18, 2015. 

57. Interview with a U.S. Government civilian employee 

assigned to U.S. Army Europe headquarters in Heidelberg, 

Germany, July 17, 2013. 

58. Lance M. Bacon, “Congress pushing toward Europe base 

closures,” The Army Times, January 27, 2013; Michael Lostumbo, et 

al., Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces An Assessment of Relative 

Costs and Strategic Benefits, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013, p. 99. 

This report notes that rotational deployments make it more difficult to build deep military relationships and to develop expertise 

working with highly capable partners.
34

59. René Moelker, Joseph Soeters, and Ulrich vom Hagen, 

“Sympathy, the Cement of Interoperability: Findings on Ten 

Years of German-Netherlands Military Cooperation,” Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 33, No. 4, July 2007, pp. 496-517; Michael Lostumbo, et al., Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces An Assessment 

of Relative Costs and Strategic Benefits, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 

2013, p. 94.

60. Congressman Mike Coffman, letter to Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, dated February 9, 2012, available from coffman.house.gov/images/stories/coffmansecdeflettereuropebases2-9-12.

pdf; see also, W. Michael Hix, J. Michael Polich, and Thomas F. 

Lippiatt, Army Stationing and Rotation Policy, Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND, 2003.

61. Raymond A. Millen, Reconfiguring The American Military Presence In Europe, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 

2004, p.10, available from strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf

files/pub369.pdf.

62. Mark P. Hertling, as quoted by Lance M. Bacon, “Congress pushing toward Europe base closures,” The Army Times, 

January 27, 2013.

63. Michael Lostumbo et al., Overseas Basing of U.S. Military 

Forces An Assessment of Relative Costs and Strategic Benefits, Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND, 2013, pp. 196, 232.

64. Email exchange with a U.S. Army civilian employee, 

September 28, 2015.

65. Email exchange with a mid-ranking field grade officer 

assigned to Europe, October 5, 2015.
35

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