alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### GRAHAM v RICHARDSON

Case No. AP-90-10962-AY

Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County

October 3, 1991

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Janice L. Jennings, Esquire, for appellant.

Kevin F. Richardson, Esquire, Clyatt & Richardson, P.A., for appellees.

Before FINE, RAPP, OFTEDAL, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

FINE, Judge.

This is an appeal from an order denying a motion for rehearing/ reconsideration of a post judgment order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In short, it is an appeal of a denial of a rehearing.

*23Rehearings and reconsiderations of orders are discretionary and thus are not appealable. *E.g., Niesz v R.P. Morgan Building Co., Inc.,*401 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 5 DCA 1981).

Denials of rehearings of post judgment orders denying relief against the final judgment are not final orders. *Reilly v Hyster Company,*307 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 4 DCA 1975). Nor is the underlying order denying relief against a final judgment a final order. *Shields v Flinn,*528 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 3 DCA 1988). Even if it denies that the judgment is void. *Albano v Albano,*579 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 5 DCA 1991).

A non-final order is not subject to rehearing and rehearings do not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal for non-final orders. *Smith v Weede,*433 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 5 DCA 1983); *Albano v Albano, supra.*

Florida Rule of Civil Procedure (the Rules of Civil Procedure apply to evictions), Rule 1.530 only authorizes rehearings of final orders. *E.g, Id.*

Florida Appellate Rule 9.020(g) does not toll the appeal time for non-final orders.

The motion to dismiss could be considered to be a Rule 1.540, Rules of Civil Procedure motion since it sought to set aside or vacate the final judgment. Denials of 1.540 motions are non-final orders and their appeal time is not tolled by the filing of a motion for rehearing. *Waiswilos v Feacher,*370 So. 2d 1250 (Fla 4 DCA 1979).

This Court sitting as an Appellate Court must consider the question of whether the order is appealable even though such question is not * raised by the parties since it affects the jurisdiction of this Court. Fla. Jur. 2d *Appellate Review,*section 51.

The final judgment was rendered on November 8, 1989. The motion to dismiss or vacate was denied on July 27, 1990. The motion to rehear or reconsider that denial was denied on September 11, 1990, and the notice of appeal was filed on September 25, 1990.

The notice of appeal was filed within thirty days of a non-appealable order (order denying rehearing) and more than thirty days after the rendition of a non-final order (denying motion to vacate or dismiss) and thus this appeal is unauthorized as to the former and untimely as to the latter.

Accordingly this appeal is hereby DISMISSED.

RAPP and OFTEDAL, JJ., concur.
#### GLENN v. McLEOD et al.

No. 33100.

Oct. 14, 1947.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 16, 1947.

*187 P. 2d 985.*

Fred Davis and Odes Harwood, both of Oklahoma City, for plaintiff in error.

Reily, Reily & Spurr, of Shawnee, for defendants in error.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the district court rendered on the 21st day of October, 1945, in an action wherein plaintiff sought to quiet title to certain real property. The issues of fact were tried before the Honorable Clyde G. Pitman; trial judge, who entered the judgment in the cause and also the order overruling the motion for new trial. The case-made was settled by Judge Kenneth Jarrett. The case-made attached to the petition in error was settled and signed without any certificate showing the inability of Judge Pitman to settle the same, and under the decisions of this court it has been many times held that such a case-made presents nothing to this court for review. Knox v. Krause, 140 Okla. 7, 282 P. 120; Incorporated Town of Guymon v. Triplett, 71 Okla. 298, 177 P. 570; Davis v. Lambard Hart Realty & Investment Co., 88 Okla. 301, 213 P. 78; Brown v. Marks, 45 Okla. 711, 146 P. 707; Arkansas Fertilizer Co. v. Brattin, 127 Okla. 9, 260 P. 43.

The cause cannot be reviewed on transcript, for, assuming the record is properly certified as a transcript, the order overruling the motion for new trial was entered on the 23rd day of October, 1946, and the appeal was not lodged in this court until six months thereafter. In such case, in order to review any alleged errors arising upon the transcript, it is necessary to file the cause within six months from the 21st day of October, 1946, the date on which the payment was rendered. . See Richardson v. Beidleman, 33 Okla. 463, 126 P. 818.

The appeal is dismissed.

HURST, C.J., DAVISON, V.C.J., and RILEY, BAYLESS, WELCH, CORN, GIBSON, and LUTTRELL, JJ., concur.
#### Jacob M. Zinaman, as Executor of Hyman Silberman, Deceased, Appellant, *v.*Sophie Stivelman, Respondent, Impleaded with Another.

(Argued October 7, 1936;

decided October 23, 1936.)

*581
      *Jacob M. Zinaman*for appellant.

*Norman Laidhold*and *William Weisman*for respondent.

Judgment affirmed, with costs; no opinion.

Concur: Crane, Ch. J., Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs, Crouch, Loughran and Finch, JJ.
II 

116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 4249 

To ensure the protection of human genetic information collected as a result 

of diagnostic testing for COVID–19. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JULY 21, 2020 

Mr. TILLIS introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 

A BILL 

To ensure the protection of human genetic information 

collected as a result of diagnostic testing for COVID–19. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. PROTECTION OF HUMAN GENETIC INFORMA4 TION. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provi6 sion of law, the Secretary of Health and Human Services 

7 shall ensure that no person may collect, store, analyze, dis8 seminate, or otherwise make use of, or benefit from, any 

9 human genetic information collected as a result of diag10 nostic testing for COVID–19, for any incidental use, or 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 4249 IS

1 any reason other than such diagnostic or serologic testing, 

2 except with the express, written, informed consent of the 

3 individual being tested. 

4 (b) ENFORCEMENT.—Any person who violates sub5 section (a) shall be subject to a civil monetary penalty of 

6 not more than $100 for each such violation. 

7 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section— 

8 (1) the term ‘‘genetic information’’ has the 

9 meaning given such term in section 160.103 of title 

10 45, Code of Federal Regulations (or any successor 

11 regulations); and 

12 (2) the term ‘‘incidental’’ means any action 

13 taken by any person, directly or indirectly, to obtain 

14 genetic information from an individual, for any pur15 pose, other than the purpose specifically authorized 

16 by the living individual from whom the specimen has 

17 its biological origin or another designated individual 

18 if the individual is a minor or is incapacitated, or if 

19 the individual is deceased, the individual’s next of 

20 kin. 

Æ 


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Certification
by Chief Executive Officer
 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350,
 as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
 
 In connection with the Quarterly Report
on Form 10-Q of Capital Bank Corporation (the “Company”) for the period endedSeptember 30,
2008as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, B.
Grant Yarber, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to my knowledge that:
 
 The Report fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
as amended; and
 
 The information contained in the Report
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
of operations of the Company.
 
 
 /s/B. Grant
      Yarber
 B. Grant Yarber
 President and Chief Executive
Officer
 November 7, 2008
 
 This Certification is being furnished
solely to accompany the Report pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed “filed” by the Company
for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended,
and shall not be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company under
the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
as amended, whether made before or after the date of this Report, irrespective
of any general incorporation language contained in such
filing.
 
 A signed original of this written
statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
§ 121.473 Fatigue risk management system. ( a ) No certificate holder may exceed any provision of this subpart unless approved by the FAA under a Fatigue Risk Management System.
( b ) The Fatigue Risk Management System must include: ( 1 ) A fatigue risk management policy.
( 2 ) An education and awareness training program.
( 3 ) A fatigue reporting system.
( 4 ) A system for monitoring flightcrew fatigue.
( 5 ) An incident reporting process.
( 6 ) A performance evaluation.
[Doc. No. FAA-2009-1093, 77 FR 403, Jan. 4, 2012]
[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-10394

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ROBERTO ODUARDO-SUAREZ, 

Defendant- Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 6:20-cr-00026-PGB-GJK-7

USCA11 Case: 22-10394 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 12/07/2022 Page: 1 of 2
2 Opinion of the Court 22-10394

____________________

Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Andrew Searle, appointed counsel for Roberto Oduardo-Suarez in this direct criminal appeal, has moved to withdraw 

from further representation of the appellant and filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Our independent 

review of the entire record reveals that counsel’s assessment of the 

relative merit of the appeal is correct. Because independent examination of the entire record reveals no arguable issues of merit, 

counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and Oduardo-Suarez’s conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED. 

USCA11 Case: 22-10394 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 12/07/2022 Page: 2 of 2
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Falconer , ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2021-Ohio-3597.]

D ISCIPLINARY C OUNSEL v . F ALCONER . [Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Falconer , ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2021-Ohio-3597.] (No. 2020-0227

— Submitted October 5, 2021

— Decided October 7, 2021.)
O N A PPLICATION FOR R EINSTATEMENT

.

____________________ {¶ 1} This cause came on for further consideration upon the filing of a motion to purge contempt and an a pplication for reinstatement b y respondent, Christine Lynn Falconer, Attorn ey Registration No. 0069256, las t known business address in Carrollton, Ohio. {¶ 2} The court coming now to consider its order of August 12, 2021, wherein the court found respondent in contempt of its March 31, 2020 order and suspended her for failing to pay board costs, finds that respon dent has substantially complied with that order and with the provisions of Gov.Bar R. V(24). {¶ 3} Therefore, it is ordered by this court that the motion to purge contempt is granted and that r espondent is reinstated to the pr actice of law in the state of Ohio. {¶ 4} It is further ordered that the clerk of this court issue certif ied copies of this order as provided for in Gov.Bar R. V(17)(E)(1) and tha t publication be made as provided for in Gov.Bar R. V(17)(E)(2). {¶ 5} For previous case, see Disciplinary Counsel v. Falconer , 160 Ohio St.3d 1208, 2020-Ohio-1194, 153 N.E.3d 126.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., and K ENNEDY , F ISCHER , D E W INE , D ONNELLY , S TEWART , and B RUNNER , JJ., concur.

_________________
1 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 99-40101

Summary Calendar

 

BRENDA ANDERSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

ROBERT BEHRNS, DR.; CORRECTIONAL CORPORATION OF AMERICA; 

MRS. BEHRNS, DR.,

Defendants-Appellees.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:98-CV-1581

--------------------

March 20, 2000

Before DAVIS, DUHÉ, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:1

Having consented to proceed before the magistrate judge

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Brenda Anderson, Texas prisoner No.

768897, appeals the magistrate judge’s dismissal of her civil

rights complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (i) and

(ii). 

We reject Anderson’s argument that she did not voluntarily

consent to proceed before the magistrate judge and we find no error

in the court’s failure to appoint counsel to represent Anderson.
Anderson testified that the defendant doctors discontinued her

psychotropic medication because they believed that she did not need

it. Thus, the magistrate judge properly found that neither the

doctors nor their employer, Correctional Corporation of America

(CCA), was liable to Anderson under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Hare v. City

of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 650 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); Flores v.

Cameron County, Texas, 92 F.3d 258, 263 (5th Cir. 1996).

Anderson’s argument that she should have been offered an

opportunity to amend her complaint is meritless. As Anderson

failed to allege a constitutional violation, we find no abuse of

discretion in the dismissal of her complaint prior to discovery.

Mayo v. Tri-Bell Indus., Inc., 787 F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir. 1986).

In her appellate brief, Anderson argues for the first time

that the defendant doctors discontinued her medication in

deliberate disregard of a known danger to her health because CCA

has a blanket policy of not allowing inmates to take expensive

drugs. We decline to address this argument because it would

require resolution of factual issues that were not presented to the

district court. See Diaz v. Collins, 114 F.3d 69, 71 n.5 (5th Cir.

1997) 

AFFIRMED.
<PAGE>

EXHIBIT 10.74

                AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO REGISTRATION RIGHTS AGREEMENT
                ------------------------------------------------

         This Amendment No. 1 to Registration Rights Agreement (this
"Amendment"), dated April 29, 2003, is made by and among iBIZ Technology Corp.,
a Florida corporation with its headquarters located at 2238 West Lone Cactus
Drive, Phoenix, Arizona 85027 (the "Company") and AJW Partners, LLC, AJW
Offshore, Ltd. and AJW Qualified Partners, LLC (collectively, the "Investors").

         WHEREAS:

         The Company and the Investors are parties to that certain Registration
Rights Agreement, dated January 31, 2003 (the "Registration Rights Agreement"),
and certain related documents; and

         The Company and the Investors desire to amend the Registration Rights
Agreement as set forth below.

                  NOW, THEREFORE, the Company and the Investors hereby agree as
follows:

1.       AMENDMENT. The Company and the Investors hereby agree to amend the
         definition of "Registrable Securities" in Section 1 of the Registration
         Rights Agreement to provide as follows:

                  "(III) "REGISTRABLE SECURITIES" means the Conversion Shares
issued or issuable upon conversion or otherwise pursuant to the Debentures and
Additional Debentures (as defined in the Securities Purchase Agreement) and
Warrant Shares issuable, upon exercise or otherwise pursuant to the Warrants and
Additional Warrants (as defined in the Securities Purchase Agreement), and any
shares of capital stock issued or issuable as a dividend on or in exchange for
or otherwise with respect to any of the foregoing."

2.       NO OTHER PROVISIONS OR DOCUMENTS AFFECTED HEREBY. This Amendment does
         not affect any other provisions of the Securities Purchase Agreement or
         the provisions of any other document entered into in connection with
         the transactions set forth therein.




                       [Signatures on the Following Page]



<PAGE>




         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused this Amendment to be duly
executed as of the date first written above.


IBIZ TECHNOLOGY CORP.


/s/ Kenneth W. Schilling
-------------------------------------
Kenneth W. Schilling
President and Chief Executive Officer


AJW PARTNERS, LLC
By:  SMS Group, LLC


/s/ Corey S. Ribotsky
-------------------------------------
Corey S. Ribotsky
Manager


AJW OFFSHORE, LTD.
By:  First Street Manager II, LLC


/s/ Corey S. Ribotsky
-------------------------------------
Corey S. Ribotsky
Manager

AJW QUALIFIED, LLC
By:  AJW Manager, LLC


/s/ Corey S. Ribotsky
-------------------------------------
Corey S. Ribotsky
Manager



                                       2
II 

116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 4294 

To provide supplemental appropriations to the Community Development 

Financial Institutions Fund, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JULY 23, 2020 

Mr. MENENDEZ (for himself, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. MANCHIN, Ms. WARREN, Mr. 

WYDEN, Ms. KLOBUCHAR, Ms. HIRONO, Mr. SCHATZ, Mrs. GILLIBRAND, 

Mr. MARKEY, Mr. VAN HOLLEN, and Mr. BLUMENTHAL) introduced the 

following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on 

Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 

A BILL 

To provide supplemental appropriations to the Community 

Development Financial Institutions Fund, and for other 

purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Coronavirus CDFI 

5 Funding Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION. 

7 There is appropriated to the Community Develop8 ment Financial Institutions Fund established under secVerDate Sep 11 2014 00:02 Aug 09, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S4294.IS S4294

kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 4294 IS

1 tion 104(a)(1) of the Community Development Banking 

2 and Financial Institutions Act of 1994 (12 U.S.C. 

3 4703(a)(1)), out of amounts in the general fund of the 

4 Treasury not otherwise appropriated, $1,000,000,000 for 

5 fiscal year 2020, for providing financial assistance and 

6 technical assistance under subparagraphs (A) and (B) of 

7 section 108(a)(1) of the Community Development Bank8 ing and Financial Institutions Act of 1994 (12 U.S.C. 

9 4707(a)(1)), except that subsections (d) and (e) of such 

10 section 108 shall not apply to the provision of such assist11 ance. 

Æ 


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#### WILLIAMS v. CITY OF TUSCALOOSA. (Two Cases)

(Decided November 25, 1915.)

Appeal from Tuscaloosa County Court.

Heard before Hon. H. B. Foster.

J. P. VandeVoort, for appellant. Brown & Ward, for appellee.

Per Curiam.

Appeals dismissed for want of prosecution.
§ 303.43 Action following the comment period. ( a ) [Reserved]
( b ) *Section 41309 applications.* After the period for which comments, requests for a hearing or responses to an order to show cause are due concerning a section 41309 application, the Assistant Secretary may proceed by order requesting further information or justification or by order of approval or disapproval or, in appropriate cases, may proceed by order to show cause or by order instituting a full evidentiary hearing.
( c ) Notice to the public of any full evidentiary hearing or order to show cause concerning an application shall be made by publication in the Federal Register.
[50 FR 31142, July 31, 1985, as amended by Amdt. 303-2, 54 FR 33500, Aug. 15, 1989; Doc. No. DOT-OST-2014-0140, 84 FR 15937, Apr. 16, 2019]
180529 SCH ORD RE VIRGILIO ACEVEDO LIFT STAY VERSION MAY 29, 2018 1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

----------------------------------------------------------x 

In re: PROMESA

Title III

THE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND

MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO,

as representative of No. 17 BK 3283-LTS

THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, (Jointly Administered)

et al., 

Debtors.1

----------------------------------------------------------x 

ORDER SCHEDULING BRIEFING OF MOTION BY VIRGILIO F. ACEVEDO FOR RELIEF FROM

AUTOMATIC STAY

The Court has received and reviewed the Motion by Virgilio F. Acevedo for Relief 

from Automatic Stay (the “Motion”) filed by Virgilio F. Acevedo (the “Movant”). (Docket Entry

No. 3163.) Opposition papers to the Motion must be filed by June 11, 2018. Movant’s reply 

papers must be filed by June 18, 2018. The Court will thereafter take the Motion on submission, 

unless a party thereto requests a hearing. 

SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 29, 2018 

 /s/ Laura Taylor Swain 

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN

United States District Judge

1 The Debtors in these Title III Cases, along with each Debtor’s respective Title III case number 

and the last four (4) digits of each Debtor’s federal tax identification number, as applicable, are the (i) 

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (Bankruptcy Case No. 17 BK 3283-LTS) (Last Four Digits of Federal Tax 

ID: 3481); (ii) Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation (“COFINA”) (Bankruptcy Case No. 17 BK 

3284-LTS) (Last Four Digits of Federal Tax ID: 8474); (iii) Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation 

Authority (“HTA”) (Bankruptcy Case No. 17 BK 3567-LTS) (Last Four Digits of Federal Tax ID: 3808); 

(iv) Employees Retirement System of the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (“ERS”)

(Bankruptcy Case No. 17 BK 3566-LTS) (Last Four Digits of Federal Tax ID: 9686); and (v) Puerto Rico

Electric Power Authority (“PREPA”) (Bankruptcy Case No. 17 BK 4780-LTS) (Last Four Digits of

Federal Tax ID: 3747). (Title III case numbers are listed as Bankruptcy Case numbers due to software

limitations).

Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:3167 Filed:05/29/18 Entered:05/29/18 14:13:18 Desc: Main

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