Joint Urban Operations 

 

Joint Integrating Concept 

Version 1.0 

 

23 July 2007 

 

iii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This concept provides an operational-level description of how a joint force 

might conduct urban operations circa 2015-2027. Joint urban 

operations are all joint operations planned and conducted across the 

range of military operations on, or against objectives within, a 

topographical complex and its adjacent natural terrain where manmade 

construction or the density of noncombatants are the dominant features. 

This concept focuses on combat situations, in particular 

counterinsurgency and major combat operations against primarily 

irregular enemies embedded within urban areas. This concept focuses 

on the operations of the joint force and its components, although always 

with the recognition that the joint force may be operating in conjunction 

with other military, governmental, and nongovernmental partners. 

 This paper has three main objectives: 

• To stimulate and shape professional discussion on the challenges 

of future joint urban operations and on possible operational 

methods and capabilities for dealing with those challenges. 

• To provide a common intellectual framework for all developmental 

efforts with respect to joint capabilities for urban operations, 

including performing a capability-based assessment, conducting 

experimentation into future urban operational methods and 

capabilities, identifying required capabilities and institutional 

changes, and making programmatic, budgetary, organizational, 

and other force planning decisions. 

• To inform operational decision making in current and future joint 

urban operations. 

 The essential problem this concept addresses is how to operate in 

an urban environment to defeat adversaries embedded and diffused 

within populated urban areas without causing catastrophic damage to the 

functioning of the society there. This is a hybrid problem combining the 

coexistence of challenging combat and societal crisis in the same urban 

area. Urban areas are conventionally viewed as a type of physical 

environment—as complex terrain. While the terrain implications of 

urban areas are significant, this concept argues that urban areas are not 

merely terrain that must be operated in, but also objects that must be 

operated on. Urban areas are complex living systems with a wide range 

of structures, processes, and functions that have evolved to sustain 

concentrated human societies in confined space. In this context, 

adversaries can be seen as malignant growths embedded within and 

diffused throughout the host urban system, intermixing with the urban 
 

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population and subsisting on host institutions and infrastructure. Each 

adversary is an element in the urban system, but can also be thought of 

as a system in its own right, with its own structures, processes, and 

functions. There might be multiple adversaries in any given urban 

system. A metaphor might be a malignant tumor or even a leukemia, 

which is not a contiguous growth but is diffused throughout the host 

system. Because the adversary is embedded in the urban system, any 

military action against the adversary will necessarily be traumatic for the 

host urban system as well—potentially to the point of creating the 

conditions for more and potentially worse conflict. 

 The controlling idea for how to deal with adversaries embedded 

and diffused within urban systems is not merely to attack the embedded 

adversary with destructive force, but to treat the entire urban system 

comprehensively, applying power to disable hostile elements in the system 

and enable those elements that are essential to the system’s functioning, 

through a combination of isolating, protective, improving, sustaining, 

persuasive, destructive, and disruptive actions or capabilities. 

Discriminate and persistent isolating actions are intended to cut off 

support for the embedded adversary. Highly discriminate destructive or 

disruptive actions are intended to defeat or disable embedded enemy 

elements systemically while minimizing damage to the host urban 

system. Protective, improving and sustaining actions are intended to 

stimulate, maintain or reconstitute those subsystems deemed essential 

to ensure the necessary functioning of the urban system despite the 

damage inflicted by combat. Since an urban system is fundamentally a 

social system, persuasive capabilities are intended to influence favorably 

the attitudes and behaviors of the population, the government or other 

groups. Ideally, the intent is to induce the urban system to reject the 

embedded adversary—to participate actively in detecting, differentiating, 

and defeating hostile elements. Where this is not feasible, the intent is 

simply to facilitate the defeat of the adversary without causing 

catastrophic damage to the host—and potentially creating a worse 

problem than existed before. 

 The supporting ideas of this concept, which elaborate the 

controlling idea, are: 

• Conduct a systemic assessment—as the basis for all planning and 

execution, understand the urban area as a dynamic, living system 

with various structures, processes, and functions, which will be 

disrupted by combat operations but which are essential to the 

continued viability of the system. 

• Integrate all actions within the context of an overarching campaign—

combine the various isolating, protective, improving, sustaining, 
 

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persuasive, destructive, and disruptive actions, military and 

nonmilitary, into a cohesive, mutually reinforcing whole. 

• Learn and adapt—since an urban system will defy comprehensive 

understanding because of its complexity and since the system will 

adapt to actions taken against it, design operations to learn about 

the system and adapt those operations as a result. 

• Selectively isolate the urban system—control the influx into the 

urban system of people, material, and information that could help 

support the adversary. 

• Apply highly discriminate destructive or disabling force to disrupt an 

adversary’s ability to pursue its objectives—actively locate and 

attack embedded enemy elements while minimizing impact on 

other elements of the urban system.

• Establish and extend control and protection of urban sectors and 

subsystems—create the secure environment that allows enabling 

actions to occur and may help gain the allegiance of the 

population, while at the same time denying the adversary access to 

segments of the population and other key resources in the urban 

system. 

• Persuade municipal governments, groups, and population segments 

to cooperate with joint force operations—influence indigenous 

perceptions and attitudes through strategic communication efforts. 

• Provide sustaining aid to the urban system—infuse essential 

support into the urban system to sustain it during the ordeal of 

combat operations to improve its ability to survive. 

• Make improvements to urban institutions and infrastructure—

restore, transform, or create essential subsystems as a means to 

making the urban system better able to sustain itself.. 

 In conclusion, this concept proposes one possible joint solution to 

the problem of urban operations based on the conception of an urban 

area as a dynamic, living system vulnerable to the destructive effects of 

military action. This concept does not claim to provide the conclusive 

answer to this very probable and challenging problem; rather, it attempts 

to stimulate informed discussion and experimentation that will 

eventually lead to that answer in the form of a set of future joint 

capabilities. 
 

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Table of Contents 

Executive Summary ..............................................................................iii

1. Introduction ..................................................................................... 1

2. Purpose ........................................................................................... 2

3. Scope .............................................................................................. 3

4. The Operational Problem: Adversaries Embedded within Urban 

Systems............................................................................................ 5

5. The Operational Solution: Comprehensive Treatment of the Urban 

System ........................................................................................... 13

6. Key Required Capabilities............................................................... 24

7. Potential Risks of Adopting this Concept......................................... 25

8. Potential Implications of Adopting this Concept .............................. 26

9. Conclusion..................................................................................... 33

Appendix A. Illustrative Vignette: “Counterinsurgency in Port Lewis, 

2015-2021”.................................................................... 34

Appendix B. Illustrative Vignette: “The Attack on Qabus, 2027”......... 50

Appendix C. Table of Capabilities, Tasks & Measures ......................... 65

Appendix D. Assessment Plan ...........................................................105

Appendix E. Glossary of Terms..........................................................110

Appendix F. Glossary of Abbreviations...............................................118

Appendix G. References.....................................................................121
 

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1. INTRODUCTION

Should the United States go to war in the coming decades, operations in 

urban areas will be increasingly likely, not least of all because the world 

is quickly becoming increasingly urbanized. Cities have always figured 

prominently in the conduct of war, as primary objectives of internal 

insurrectionists and external invaders alike. Cities are militarily 

important as logistical and communications hubs, often occupying key 

geography along the transportation corridors that also serve as military 

lines of communications. They are symbols and concentrations of 

political, economic, and cultural power. They are seats of government, 

centers of industry and trade, engines and repositories of wealth, oracles 

of religion and education, media hubs, homes of the societal elite, 

sources of culture, and symbols of national pride. Not only are cities 

important objectives in war, increasingly they are also hotbeds of 

conflict, especially in the developing world in which exploding 

populations and rampant urbanization can overwhelm existing 

infrastructure and services, leading to widespread suffering, friction, and 

discontent. Cities intensify all human social interactions. They are 

mixing bowls that place people from different social, cultural, economic, 

religious, and ethnic backgrounds into close interdependence. They are 

centers of poverty, squalor, unemployment, and crime, places where 

critical masses of the discontented and aggrieved can assemble. They 

are breeding grounds for various kinds of contagion—diseases, rumors, 

ideologies, and rebellions. They are places where the differences between 

haves and have-nots are on vivid display. They are places where radical 

ideas ferment and grievances fester. Cities are concentrations of people, 

and future conflicts will arise and play out where people are. 

 Although these dynamics are most obvious in major cities, they 

apply also to smaller cities, suburbs, towns, and villages, and even to the 

urban sprawl that now connects once-distinct urban areas into 

unbroken urban landscapes. These factors apply anyplace a “certain 

energized crowding of people takes place.”1 In the coming decades, this 

is the environment in which joint forces are likely to have to operate. 

 Combat in these conditions tends to be unavoidably brutal, bloody, 

resource-intensive, and time-consuming—to the point that U.S. doctrine 

during and after the Second World War advocated avoiding urban 

combat whenever possible.2 Urban operations require very different 

 

1 Spiro Kostof, The City Shaped: Urban Patterns and Meanings Through History (New 

York: Bullfinch Press, 1991), p. 38. 

2 The U.S. Army’s doctrinal manual on urban operations from 1979 begins with this 

statement: “Tactical doctrine stresses that urban combat operations are conducted 

only when required and that built-up areas are isolated and bypassed rather than 

risking a costly, time-consuming operation in this difficult environment.” Field Manual 

90-10, Military Operations on Urban Terrain (Washington: Headquarters, Department of 

the Army, 1979), p. 1-1. Prior to FM 90-10, Army MOUT doctrine was contained in FM 

31-50, first published in 1944 as Combat in Fortified Areas, and revised in 1952 and 
 

2

capabilities than those required for fighting in natural terrain, for which 

U.S. forces are primarily designed. 

 This paper hypothesizes a military concept for conducting joint 

operations against adversaries embedded within these urban areas. It 

proposes that urban areas are not merely a form of terrain, but are 

dynamic, living systems dramatically affected by military action. It 

argues that adversaries can be thought of as hostile growths within these 

systems, subsisting off the urban system’s own infrastructures. The 

operational concept it proposes is to treat the entire urban system 

comprehensively, disabling those adversaries while enabling the parts of 

the system that are deemed essential to system functioning, through a 

simultaneous combination of isolating, protective, improving, sustaining, 

persuasive, destructive, and disruptive capabilities. 

2. PURPOSE

This paper has three main objectives: 

• To stimulate and shape professional discussion on the challenges 

of future joint urban operations and on possible operational 

methods and capabilities for dealing with those challenges. 

• To provide a common intellectual framework for all developmental 

efforts with respect to joint capabilities for urban operations, 

including performing a capability-based assessment, conducting 

experimentation into future urban operational methods and 

capabilities, identifying required capabilities and institutional 

changes, and making programmatic, budgetary, organizational, 

and other force planning decisions. 

• To inform operational decision making in current and future joint 

urban operations. While the paper’s primary aim is to influence 

force planning, it also provides concepts that could help 

operational commanders plan and conduct urban operations more 

effectively today. This paper is in no way meant to constrain joint 

force commanders, but simply to offer ideas for consideration. 

 

1964. “FM 31-50, just like every other Army publication on MOUT doctrine, stresses 

bypassing built-up areas rather than fighting. Furthermore, the commander should 

only consider offensive operations as a last resort.” Philip T. Nethery, MAJ, USA, 

Current MOUT Doctrine and its Adequacy for Today’s Army, Master’s thesis (Ft. 

Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1997), p. 12. 

Current U.S. Army doctrine recognizes the inevitability of urban combat. Field Manual 

3-06, Urban Operations (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006), p. 

1-1. 
 

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3. SCOPE

This concept provides an operational-level description of how a joint force 

might conduct urban operations circa 2015-2027.3 It attempts to 

formulate the problem of urban operations in new terms, describing the 

urban area as not merely a physical environment, but as a complex living 

system affected dramatically by military action. In keeping with the 

Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, this systemic framework carries 

through to the proposed operational concept. 

 Joint urban operations are all joint operations planned and 

conducted across the range of military operations on, or against 

objectives within, a topographical complex and its adjacent natural 

terrain where manmade construction or the density of noncombatants 

are the dominant features.4 This concept focuses on combat situations, 

in particular counterinsurgency and major combat operations, against 

primarily irregular enemies embedded within urban areas. 

 This concept applies the broad principles of the Capstone Concept 

for Joint Operations more specifically to the urban environment, in 

particular taking a systemic approach to understanding both the urban 

environment and the adversaries embedded in it. This concept has 

considerable overlap with three joint operating concepts: Major Combat 

Operations; Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and 

Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO); and Irregular Warfare. This overlap 

is shown in Figure 1. This concept overlaps with the Irregular Warfare

concept, which defines irregular warfare as “a violent struggle among 

state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant 

populations.”5 It overlaps with the Major Combat Operations concept, 

including the “low end” of major combat operations, against primarily 

irregular enemies, but not the “high end” involving combat against a 

conventional adversary.6 It overlaps with the Military Support to SSTRO

concept, including those operations involving significant combat, such as 

 

3 This paper uses the term joint force throughout, but multinational force or interagency

force could be substituted as appropriate. 4 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dictionary of Military Terms (Joint Pub 1-02), online version, 

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/j/02970.html [accessed 21 Nov 06]. 

5 Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, version 1.0 (Tampa, FL: U.S. Special 

Operations Command, December 06), pp. 1 and 4. The passage continues: “IW favors 

indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military 

and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will.” 

6 “irregular forces—(DOD) Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the 

regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces.” DOD Dictionary of 

Military Terms, online version, 

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/i/02833.html [accessed 21 Nov 06]. 

 The key distinction this concept makes is between conventional forces that 

merely occupy urban terrain and forces that can truly blend into an urban population 

and subsist on urban infrastructure. This concept would exclude, for example, two 

industrial powers with high-technology, platform-based militaries clashing on an urban 

battlefield that is foreign territory to both. 
 

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counterinsurgency, but excluding purely humanitarian missions in 

which there is no significant combat.7 This integrating concept applies 

the broad principles of those operating concepts more specifically to the 

particular challenges of the urban environment. 

Figure 1. 

The scope of this concept in relation to selected JOCs. 

 This concept applies to operations either in support of a hostnation government or against a foreign government or other political 

entity. It applies whether the United States operates as part of a 

multinational effort or unilaterally. 

 This concept focuses on the operations of the joint force and its 

components, although always with the recognition that the joint force 

may be operating in conjunction with other military, governmental, 

and/or nongovernmental partners. It does not focus on the tactical or 

technical details of execution, although, because of the particular 

importance of tactical considerations in urban operations, it will discuss 

some tactical capabilities. Nor does it address strategic planning and 

conduct, although it does address civil-military operations within the 

context of an existing theater strategy. 

 This concept is broadly hypothetical and propositional. It does not 

claim to provide universally accepted, comprehensive guidance on the 

conduct of joint urban operations. It is meant to be debated. It attempts 

to provide only enough detail to serve its stated purpose of stimulating 

discussion, providing a common intellectual framework for 

experimentation and other developmental efforts, and informing 

operational decision making. 

 

7 The scope of the SSTRO concept ranges from non-combat missions such as 

humanitarian assistance, limited security cooperation, and military assistance and 

training to assisting a “fragile national government that is faltering due to serious 

internal challenges, which include civil unrest, insurgency, terrorism and factional 

conflict.” Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction 

Operations Joint Operating Concept (JOC), v2.0, Aug 06, pp. 3-4. 
 

5

4. THE OPERATIONAL PROBLEM: ADVERSARIES EMBEDDED 

WITHIN URBAN SYSTEMS

The essential problem this concept addresses is how to operate in an 

urban environment to defeat adversaries embedded and diffused within 

populated urban areas without causing catastrophic damage to the 

functioning of the society there.8 This is a hybrid problem combining the 

coexistence of challenging combat and societal crisis in significant 

measure in the same urban area. 

 Urban areas are conventionally viewed as a type of physical 

environment—essentially as complex terrain—which obviously they are.9 

In this respect, urban areas are terrain complexes in which manmade 

construction and a density of civil population are the dominant 

features.10 Like any other type of terrain, urban terrain influences what 

can and cannot be done militarily.11 The tactical implications of urban 

terrain are so significant that they can assume operational or even 

strategic importance. From the U.S. perspective, urban terrain tends to 

restrict operations by counteracting most technological advantages in 

range, mobility, lethality, precision, sensing, and communications. This 

may not be true for many potential adversaries, for whom urban terrain 

can provide advantages, such as cover and concealment, which actually 

improve operational capabilities. The highly compartmented geography 

of urban terrain limits observation, communications, fires, and 

movement. Urban terrain tends to favor the defender over the attacker 

and the ambusher over the active patroller. It provides an attractive 

environment for guerrilla warfare. It tends to absorb higher densities of 

troops and other resources than other types of terrain.12 It slows tactical 

 

8 A key premise of this concept is that the United States is making war against a 

political entity and not against a people. If that condition does not apply in a given 

situation, if the United States has no interest in preserving an urban area or its 

population, then this concept does not apply. Defeat here means denying an 

adversary’s objectives; it may or may not require battlefield destruction. 

 Keith Holcomb introduced the idea of “adversaries embedded within 

infrastructures” in an unpublished briefing, “Facing the Future: The Marine Corps and 

the RMA,” presented at a Revolution in Military Affairs conference sponsored by the 

OSD Office of Net Assessment in Warrenton, VA, 13 Nov 96. 

9 The doctrinal term military operations on urban terrain (MOUT) epitomizes this view. 

10Joint Pub 3-06, Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations, (Washington: Government 

Printing Office, 2002), p. I-1. JP 3-06 identifies three main characteristics, which it 

calls an “urban triad,” that all urban areas have in common: complex manmade 

physical terrain; a population of significant size and density; and an infrastructure 

upon which the area depends [p. I-2]. 

11 Urban terrain affects some aspects of joint urban operations more than others. For 

example, while urban terrain profoundly affects ground operations, air and cyber 

operations tend not to be fundamentally affected by urban geography. 

12 The various vertical levels, above and below ground, and the various interior and 

exterior locations in an urban area create a much greater number of distinct spaces 

that can be occupied than any other type of terrain of similar size. Limits on line of 
 

6

ground movement and shortens the distance of individual ground 

maneuvers, which are often measured in meters rather than kilometers. 

Urban terrain is more alterable than any other type of terrain: military 

operations tend to rubble urban areas, often to significant tactical effect, 

making the terrain even more complex and compartmented.13 As a 

result of these terrain implications, urban combat tends to devolve into 

brutal, small-unit engagements at close range, and tends to inflict 

significant casualties on both combatants and civilians. It is hard on 

equipment and consumes high levels of ammunition and other 

supplies—to the degree that it typically becomes impossible to sustain 

continuous activity. Urban combat operations thus tend to be bloody, 

episodic, and prolonged, with the costs of achieving a decision running 

unusually high. The essential quality that distinguishes urban terrain 

from other types of terrain is the presence of concentrations of people, 

which complicates every aspect of operations. But even then, in this 

view people are seen essentially as just another element of the operating 

environment that, from the U.S. perspective at least, restricts military 

action primarily by limiting the use of firepower for fear of inflicting 

civilian casualties. 

 While the terrain implications of urban areas are significant, this 

concept argues that urban areas are not merely terrain that must be 

operated in, but also objects that must be operated on. Urban areas are 

complex living systems with a wide range of structures, processes, and 

functions that have evolved to sustain concentrated human societies in 

confined space.14 These structures are all the various familial, tribal, 

professional, commercial, governmental, social, religious, educational, 

 

sight and direct-fire range severely limit the amount of urban terrain that a unit can 

control. 

13 Ironically, the physical reduction of urban terrain by an attacker improves the 

defensive qualities of the terrain by creating more obstacles and potential defensive 

positions that the attacker must overcome. Williamson Murray, War and Urban Terrain 

in the Twenty-First Century (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2001), p. 

13. 

14 The argument here is not that urban areas resemble living things in some ways, but 

that urban areas are actual living systems according to living systems theory. See 

James G. Miller, Living Systems (Niwot, CO: University of Colorado Press, 1995). Miller 

defines living systems as “open systems, with significant inputs, throughputs, and 

outputs of various sorts of matter-energy and information. They maintain a steady 

state of negentropy even though entropic changes occur in them as they do everywhere 

else.” [p. 18.] (Negentropy is the loss of total entropy, or the net gaining of structure, in 

a system by exporting entropy faster than it is imported.) They occupy physical space. 

They consist of biomass, although they may also include non-living components [p. 18]. 

Miller identifies seven hierarchical levels of living systems, from cells to supranational 

organizations [p. 1]. Cities are an example of the sixth level, societies. Living systems 

theory is the application of general system theory to living things. On general system 

theory, see Ludwig von Bertalanffy, General System Theory: Foundations, Development, 

Applications (New York: George Braziller, 1968). 
 

7

media, etc., institutions that typify urban society.15 The processes 

include all the various official and unofficial social, criminal, economic, 

governmental, informational, and cultural interactions that take place 

within the ebb and flow of urban life. The functions are the various roles 

the urban area plays, both for its own inhabitants and for the 

surrounding area: source of government, cultural center, manufacturing 

center, provider of services, source of jobs, marketplace for goods and 

services, etc. Some of these structures, processes and functions are 

fundamental to the functioning of the urban system, providing for basic 

human needs, while others satisfy higher-order desires rather than 

essential needs. These system dimensions may be generically common 

to all urban systems, but each urban system is unique in its specifics. 

Combat changes urban systems, often significantly and generally for the 

worse. The essential quality of urban areas by this view is not merely the 

presence of people, but the presence of intense societal interaction 

(although not necessarily interactions that are functioning smoothly). 

 Urban systems16 comprise a variety of subsystems that 

continuously input, throughput, and output various forms of matter, 

energy, and information. See Figure 2. All human society is a 

continuous flow of people, goods, energy, and information; urban 

systems are merely particularly dense, intertwined concentrations of 

these flows, shaped by the forces of geography, culture, and history.17 In 

urban areas these flows exhibit increased intensity, accelerated pace, 

and greater interdependence.18 

 

 

15 Structure here does not refer only to physical constructions, such as buildings, but 

primarily to organizational forms. 

16 This paper will use the term urban system to refer to these dynamic, living systems 

and the terms urban area or urban terrain when referring more specifically to the 

physical, terrain aspects of those systems. 

17 Lewis Mumford defines a city as a “point of maximum concentration for the power 

and culture of a community. It is the place where the diffused rays of many separate 

beams of life fall into focus, with gains in both social effectiveness and significance. The 

city is the form and symbol of an integrated social relationship: it is the seat of the 

temple, the market, the hall of justice, the academy of learning. Here in the city the 

goods of civilization are multiplied and manifolded ...” The Culture of Cities (New York: 

Harcourt Brace & Co., 1938), p. 3. 

18 In general, an urban area’s tempo and interdependence correspond to its size and 

density: the larger and denser, the higher the tempo and the greater the 

interdependence. Roger J. Spiller, Sharp Corners: Urban Operations at Century’s End

(Ft. Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC Press, 2000), p. 26. 
 

8

Figure. 2. 

Notional schematic of an urban system.19

 As examples: People commute to and from work. They move from 

the country in search of jobs or to a bigger city in search of a better job. 

Food stuffs and other essentials are shipped in, stored, and distributed. 

Sewage and other waste are expelled. Raw materials converge on the 

urban area from elsewhere to be transformed into manufactured goods, 

which are then distributed locally or exported. Criminals are processed 

through the legal system, students through the school system. 

Electricity and natural gas are carried in and then distributed. 

 Urban systems are suffused with flowing information as well. 

While matter and energy fuel an urban system, information organizes 

 

19 This schematic is a functional vice geographical map, although there can be rough 

geographical dimensions to many urban functions. Many flows into and out of the city 

tend to follow physical lines of communication such as roads, rail lines, and rivers. 

Many urban subsystems tend to have a geographical locus—the manufacturing and 

business districts, the government center, residential areas (often segregated by 

ethnicity). While functionally each adversary can be thought of as a single entity, 

physically, its elements might be dispersed throughout the urban area. 
 

9

and controls it. Municipal government produces and administers local 

ordinances. Religious and educational institutions establish and 

promote acceptable beliefs, values, and behaviors. Media outlets, 

including the internet-based “new” media, propagate facts, opinions, 

misinformation, and even disinformation. Businesses large and small 

advertise their goods and services. The latest fads or social trends arrive 

from afar, introduced by travelers, magazines, or television. Rumors and 

gossip pass through neighborhoods and over communications networks 

like infections. World and regional news is broadcast in; local events are 

reported on locally and broadcast out. 

 Once formed, urban systems tend to persist. They are not easily 

destroyed, but if significantly damaged, manage to form a new 

equilibrium at some lower level of functionality. Even obviously and 

massively dysfunctional cities often continue to grow. Though persistent, 

urban systems are dramatically transformed, whether intentionally or 

not, through military and other action. 

 An urban system cannot be separated from its physical 

construction. All infrastructures exist to protect and support these 

system interactions and, once in place, serve to reinforce and formalize 

them. As a result, any damage to that infrastructure through military 

action will tend to have significant impact on the urban society. 

 While the physical infrastructure of an urban area changes 

relatively slowly, the urban system is more dynamic. Urban systems are 

highly complex, interdependent, and tightly-coupled—and potentially 

highly sensitive to disturbances. Because urban systems are tightly 

coupled, effects of events tend to be amplified. Tactical or local events 

can take on added importance, largely because of the amplifying effect of 

pervasive mass media.20 

 Urban system dynamics are rarely uniform across an urban area. 

An urban population is not a monolith, but a heterogeneous aggregation 

of individuals and groups all pursuing their various interests. Different 

physical sectors in an urban area may exhibit very different 

characteristics, which impose different operational requirements such 

that operations in adjoining sectors could take on very different 

qualities.21

 Urban areas always exist in a regional context. An urban system 

subsists on its surrounding regions—which provide a continuous influx 

of the people, food stuffs, raw materials, products, fuel, and energy, etc., 

needed to sustain the urban system—but it also dominates the 

surrounding area culturally, governmentally, economically, and 

 

20 A phenomenon sometimes known as “strategic compression.” A contributing factor is 

the “CNN effect.” 

21 Popularly called the “Three-Block War.” See Gen. Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic 

Corporal: Leadership in the Three-Block War,” Marines Magazine, Jan 1999, 

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm [accessed 7 Nov 

06]. 
 

10

informationally.22 Urban areas also exist in a hierarchical urban 

network consisting of major cities that function at the national or even 

global level, lesser regional hubs, surrounding towns and villages, and so 

on. Each urban area performs a function in this network and has 

relationships with other urban areas.23 To understand the functioning of 

any urban system, it is necessary to understand it in these regional and 

hierarchical contexts. Any significant damage to an urban system will 

impact the broader systems of which it is a part, a factor that should 

figure into the design and conduct of an urban operation. 

 Many urban systems are dysfunctional to a greater or lesser 

extent. This is especially true in the developing world, which is 

characterized by exploding population growth that overwhelms 

institutions and infrastructures and fuels rapid, haphazard urbanization. 

To the extent that urban systems are dysfunctional they give rise to 

human suffering and become breeding grounds for conflict. The conflict 

further overwhelms the system, creating a vicious cycle that fosters even 

more conflict. It is in these situations that U.S. forces will often be 

required to intervene. 

 In this context, adversaries can be seen as malignant growths 

embedded within and diffused throughout the host urban system, 

intermixing with the urban population and subsisting at least in part on 

host institutions and infrastructure.24 Each adversary is an element in 

the urban system, but can also be thought of as a system in its own 

right, with its own structures, processes, and functions. Each adversary 

will be unique, but will tend to comprise some combination of different 

elements. These could include: enemy combatants and combatant 

leadership, whether regular or irregular; terrorist cells; criminal 

elements who see the joint force as a threat to their interests; political, 

religious, and ideological leaders; financial and material supporters, 

both internal and external; sympathetic media; and segments of the 

population who actively or passively support the adversary cause, 

whether from true belief or coercion. There might be multiple 

adversaries in any given urban system. Enemies might embed 

themselves within urban systems as a purely operational decision to 

neutralize U.S. technological advantages, but more likely they already 

exist there because the urban environment is where their primary 

 

22 Spiro Kostof: “Cities are places that are intimately engaged with their countryside, 

that have a territory that feeds them and which they protect and provide services for.” 

The City Shaped: Urban Patterns and Meanings Through History (New York: Bullfinch 

Press, 1991), p. 38. 

23 “Cities come in clusters. A town never exists unaccompanied by other towns. It is 

therefore inevitably locked in an urban system, an urban hierarchy.” Kostof, p. 38. 

24 Malignant in the medical sense of “characterized by progressive and uncontrolled 

growth (especially of a tumor),” and not implying malevolence or maliciousness. 

OneLook Dictionary Search, http://www.onelook.com/?w=malignant&ls=a [accessed 7 

Nov 06]. 
 

11

struggle originates. A metaphor might be a malignant tumor or even a 

leukemia, which is not a contiguous growth but is diffused throughout 

the host system. 

 This implies a largely irregular or guerrilla enemy vice a 

conventional enemy with its own dedicated and distinguishable military 

infrastructure that cannot easily conceal and shelter itself within the civil 

system. These enemies will rely heavily on guerrilla warfare, terror 

tactics, sabotage, and intimidation of the population. Under these 

conditions, detecting the adversary within the urban system and 

differentiating it from other system elements becomes problematic. In 

practice, fighting forces are not necessarily either irregular or 

conventional, but often exist on a continuum. To the degree that fighting 

forces employ distinctly military platforms and support them with 

dedicated and distinct military infrastructures, this lessens the problem 

of detection and differentiation. 

 Because the adversary is embedded in the urban system, any 

military action against the adversary will necessarily be traumatic for the 

host urban system as well—potentially to the point of creating the 

conditions for more and potentially worse conflict. Combat often takes 

place in the midst of dense human population that attempts to continue 

to function during the fighting, but which functioning is severely 

disrupted.25 Because of the lack of security, nonmilitary agencies may 

have only a limited role. Even when participating, they will almost 

certainly require significant support and security provided by the joint 

force. 

 Two primary cases apply. First is the case of an invasion or some 

other major combat operation against a defending adversary that goes to 

ground in one or more urban areas. This could occur several ways: a 

purely operational decision to draw the United States into an 

environment that negates its technological advantages, a conventional 

enemy defeated in the field withdrawing into urban terrain to 

reconstitute as a guerrilla force, or a popular resistance movement 

originating in the city—or any combination thereof. In any event, this 

requires the adversary to shed or forego at least some of the qualities of a 

conventional military to better disappear into the urban system. The 

 

25 To the extent that the population evacuates the area and ceases to be a primary 

concern, the urban system reverts to being merely complex terrain. This said, large 

numbers of civilians have tended to remain in wartime cities, even when forced 

evacuations have attempted to remove them. Approximately 5,000-10,000 civilians 

remained in Aachen in 1944 despite Allied orders to leave and repeated roundups by 

authorities. See Charles Whiting, Bloody Aachen (New York: Stein and Day, 1976), pp. 

48 and 70. In Manila in 1945, large numbers of civilians were forced to stay by the 

Japanese, but many others stayed voluntarily to protect their homes and property 

despite the urging of city officials to evacuate. An estimated 100,000 were killed in the 

fighting. See Richard Connaughton, John Pimlot and Duncan Anderson, The Battle for 

Manila (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 2002), pp. 15 and 70. 
 

12

primary struggle in this case is a direct conflict to defeat enemy fighting 

forces in battle without destroying the urban system within which they 

have taken root. Second is the case of operations against an urban 

insurgency that has risen up against the controlling establishment.26 

Here the insurgent likewise resorts to guerrilla warfare, terror tactics and 

subversion, in this case largely because he lacks the means to field a 

conventional fighting force. The primary struggle here is not a direct 

conflict to defeat enemy fighting forces in battle, but essentially a tug-ofwar to win the allegiance of the population, whether by gaining willing 

support or by intimidation. In the context of this paper, both major 

combat operations and counterinsurgency means defeating an adversary 

that has not merely moved into and occupied urban terrain, but that has 

roots in the urban system. 

 

26 As a practical matter, the former case may naturally evolve into the latter as a 

victorious invader becomes an occupier, especially if the manner of conducting the 

invasion fosters widespread resentment and animosity among the population. 
 

13

5. THE OPERATIONAL SOLUTION: COMPREHENSIVE TREATMENT 

OF THE URBAN SYSTEM

The controlling idea for how to deal with adversaries embedded and 

diffused within urban systems is not merely to attack the embedded 

adversary with destructive force, but to treat the entire urban system 

comprehensively, applying power to disable hostile elements and enable 

those elements that are essential to the system’s functioning, through a 

combination of isolating, protective, improving, sustaining, persuasive, 

destructive and disruptive actions or capabilities.27 See Figure 3. 

Figure 3. 

Comprehensive treatment of the urban system. 

 

27 This can be thought of as injecting both disruptive and structuring energy into the 

urban system. In systems terms disruptive equates to entropic (i.e., dissipative, 

disorder-producing) and structuring to negentropic (i.e., constructive, order-producing). 

While this concept envisions a significant element of combat, the underlying logic could 

apply to other situations, in particular other types of stability operations in which the 

combat element is not significant. The conduct of humanitarian assistance/disaster 

relief (HADR) operations could thus be described as the application of this concept with 

a minimal or non-existent disabling element. 
 

14

 Discriminate and persistent isolating actions are intended to cut 

off support to the embedded adversary. Highly discriminate destructive 

or disruptive actions are intended to defeat or disable embedded enemy 

elements systemically while minimizing damage to the host urban 

system. Protective, improving and sustaining actions are intended to 

stimulate, maintain or reconstitute those subsystems deemed essential 

to ensure the necessary functioning of the urban system despite the 

damage inflicted by combat. Since an urban system is fundamentally a 

social system, persuasive capabilities are intended to influence favorably 

the attitudes and behaviors of the population, the government or other 

groups. 

 Ideally, the intent is to induce the urban system to reject the 

embedded adversary—to participate actively in detecting, differentiating 

and defeating hostile elements. The urban system thus becomes an 

active partner in ridding itself of the embedded adversary. This is an 

essential condition in most successful counterinsurgency operations, 

which are fundamentally a struggle to win the allegiance of the

 population. This intent is not feasible in all cases, however. 

Unavoidably, the urban system will sometimes be actively hostile to the 

joint force and its partners, or at least passively uncooperative. 28 In the 

event that it is infeasible to induce the urban system to reject the 

adversary, the intent is simply to facilitate the defeat of the adversary 

without causing catastrophic damage to the host—and potentially 

creating a worse problem than existed before. 

 This concept applies whether the ultimate objective is defeating an 

enemy unconditionally or isolating or reducing the threat to the point 

that it becomes a tolerable nuisance that can be managed by civil 

authorities. 

 The nature of urban systems calls for setting realistic objectives. 

Urban systems are more easily degraded through combat than improved 

through constructive efforts. As complex social systems, urban systems 

will exhibit unexpected and intractable behaviors. The objective is not 

to create a model city, but to achieve some basic level of functional 

equilibrium that is maintainable by civil authorities. After a successful 

urban operation concludes, the urban system will still likely require a 

lengthy period of physical and social rebuilding. 

 The joint force will not necessarily conduct urban operations 

unilaterally. Because of the emphasis on enabling actions, this concept 

envisions significant cooperation with nonmilitary agencies and 

organizations to achieve full effectiveness. Some aspects of joint 

operations may consist of building partner capabilities and supporting 

those partners rather than acting directly upon the urban system. 

 

28 Even a people suffering under an oppressive regime may likely choose to resist a 

foreign invasion. 
 

15

Importantly, this concept envisions maximizing the role of indigenous 

forces, agencies or groups where feasible, especially for those elements of 

the operation that involve close and continuous contact with the local 

population. In addition to indigenous participation, or as an alternative 

where it is not feasible, participation of accepted international 

organizations is an option. Despite the emphasis on cooperation, the 

ability or willingness of other agencies and organizations to participate 

will vary with circumstances, especially with respect to the security 

situation. As a result, the joint force should be able to conduct the 

operations envisioned in this concept both as part of a larger effort and 

unilaterally, at least temporarily at some baseline level of capability. 

 Some of the elements of this concept are strictly military actions 

and some are civil-military, performed by other agencies or organizations 

or by the military alone as needed. Although some of these actions may 

naturally tend to precede or follow others, there is no strict sequence. 

This concept envisions that enabling actions can occur prior to the 

conclusion of disabling actions and the establishment of security. 

Various actions will overlap significantly in time and space. The specific 

combination and phasing of actions will vary with each situation. It is 

the task of operational design to combine these elements to create a 

particular concept of operations. Figure 4 lists the supporting ideas of 

this concept and identifies possible agents for each. 

 

The supporting ideas of this concept are: 

• Conduct a systemic assessment

A systemic assessment of the situation becomes the basis for all 

planning and action, military and nonmilitary. While much can be done 

beforehand, the systemic assessment is a continuous process. The idea 

of conducting a systemic assessment does not mean to suggest that 

operations will be based on anything approaching exquisite knowledge 

about the urban system. As complex and dynamic social creations, 

urban systems are fundamentally unknowable. The systemic 

assessment is less a matter of reaching comprehensive truth about the 

urban system and more a matter of making assertions and hypotheses 

which are then revised through experience. A key element of the 

assessment is the idea of prognosis, determining reasonable expectations 

given the complex and unpredictable nature of the situation. Conducting 

the systemic assessment is largely a function of intelligence activities. 

 The systemic assessment involves interpreting the overall urban 

complex as a living system, of which any adversary is a component. 

Since combat operations will inevitably disturb the urban system, it is 

wise to understand the likely effects of those actions—both for the urban 

system itself and for the broader systems of which it is a part. This 

requires a doctrinal understanding of urban-system dynamics in general, 
 

16

i.e., the common structures, processes and functions of all urban 

systems, as well as specific situational knowledge of the particular urban 

system under consideration. 

SYNOPSIS OF THE CONCEPT 

Controlling Idea: 

Treat the urban living system comprehensively, applying power to disable hostile elements in the 

system and enable those elements that are essential to the system’s functioning, through a 

combination of isolating, protective, improving, sustaining, persuasive, destructive and disruptive 

actions or capabilities. 

Supporting Ideas: Possible Agents: 

Conduct a systemic assessment Coalition, joint, interagency leadership in 

conjunction with émigrés, SMEs and 

HN government as appropriate 

Integrate all actions within the context of an 

overarching campaign 

Coalition, joint, interagency leadership in 

conjunction with HN as appropriate 

Learn and adapt Coalition, joint, interagency leadership in 

conjunction with HN as appropriate 

Selectively isolate the urban system Law enforcement (HN, US or other as 

appropriate) 

Military forces (HN, US and/or other 

military partners as appropriate) 

Financial institutions 

Apply highly discriminate destructive or disabling 

force to disrupt an adversary’s ability to pursue its 

objectives 

Military forces (HN, US and/or other 

military partners as appropriate) 

Establish and extend control and protection of 

urban sectors and subsystems 

Law enforcement (HN, US or other as 

appropriate) 

Military forces (HN, US and/or other 

military partners as appropriate) 

Persuade municipal governments, groups and 

population segments to cooperate with joint force 

operations 

Coalition info agencies 

International media 

Public diplomacy (DoS) 

Military PA and PSYOP units 

Provide sustaining aid to the urban system HN agencies, organizations & companies 

UN, USAID, Coalition aid agencies 

NGOs, Military CSS units 

Other US agencies as needed 

Make improvements to urban institutions and 

infrastructure 

UN 

USAID 

Coalition aid agencies 

NGOs 

HN and other private corporations 

Military CA and CSS units 

Other US agencies as needed 

Glossary:

HN Host nation NGO Nongovernmental organization 

CA Civil affairs PA Public affairs 

CSS Combat service support PSYOP Psychological operations 

DoS Department of State SME Subject-matter expert

Figure 4. 

Synopsis of the concept. 
 

17

 The systemic assessment also involves appreciating each key 

element of the urban system—adversaries, population segments, 

government, and social institutions, etc.—as a system in its own right. 

Critically, this means appreciating each adversary as a dynamic system 

as to the basis for defeating it as effectively and efficiently as possible, 

per the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations. Different adversaries will 

require different approaches, as will different elements within the same 

adversary system. Some could be co-opted, others marginalized or 

effectively isolated, while some must be physically destroyed. Finally, the 

assessment involves analyzing how the urban and adversary systems 

interact; in particular, how each embedded adversary subsists off the 

host urban system, as a means to understanding how to disassociate the 

two. 

 The systemic assessment will routinely need to be a collaborative 

effort involving key stakeholders and subject-matter experts from various 

fields because the type of complex operational problem posed in this 

paper will routinely exceed any one organization’s ability to solve, or even 

comprehend. Urban operations require these stakeholders to form a 

cohesive entity around the resolution of the problem. Assessing the 

operational situation will typically require people to interact across 

organizations, institutions, jurisdictions, languages, and cultures to 

recognize the systemic dynamics of the situation. It will require the 

extensive sharing of information, including tacit knowledge that is a 

function of expertise and cannot be captured in any database. The 

requirement for functional knowledge about any given urban system will 

place a premium on foreign-area expertise and could involve maintaining 

databases of “systemic” intelligence on select urban areas. 

• Integrate all actions within the context of an overarching campaign

The various actions envisioned by this concept need to be integrated into 

a cohesive whole within the context of the broader campaign of which the 

urban operation is a part. Effectively integrated, the various elements of 

this concept together constitute an interdependent system of mutual 

reinforcement. As examples: The systemic assessment provides the 

basis for all other actions, while those other actions, by causing the 

urban system to react, in turn improve the systemic assessment. 

Discriminately attacking enemy elements improves security. Improved 

security facilitates providing sustaining aid and improving institutions 

and infrastructure. A cooperative population facilitates discriminate 

attacks, improved security, sustaining aid, and institutional and 

infrastructural improvements, while all these actions in turn help 

persuade the population to cooperate. 

 Integration is a function of command and control, and much of it 

is achieved through planning. Importantly, this element involves 

integrating the strictly military elements of the concept with the civil-
 

18

military elements and maintaining the appropriate balance between the 

two. This applies whether the joint force acts unilaterally or in 

conjunction with other agencies or organizations. In its fullest form, 

therefore, this concept requires effective communications and 

coordination among the joint force and other cooperating agencies and 

organizations. 

 The complexity of urban systems and the severely 

compartmentalizing nature of urban terrain necessitate a command and 

control system that provides latitude for independent action down to 

small-unit levels. These same factors necessitate robust 

communications down to the lowest echelons, which can be a challenge 

given the degrading effect that urban terrain tends to have on radio 

signals. 

• Learn and adapt

It is imperative that leaders recognize the need to learn from experience 

and continuously adapt actions as a result. This is a critical function of 

command and control. Because of the complexity of urban systems, any 

initial assessment of the situation will invariably get some aspects wrong. 

The dynamics of the urban system and the embedded adversary will 

reveal themselves only over time as the result of actions taken against 

the system. Moreover, the adversary and the urban systems will adapt to 

any actions the joint force may take, and so the situation will change 

continuously over time. Importantly, this will require establishing 

information requirements specifically designed to corroborate or 

invalidate assertions about the functioning of the adversary and the 

urban system. 

 Learning about the urban system is not merely a matter of 

collecting information, but also of acting upon the system and watching 

how it responds. This means designing operations specifically to learn 

about the system. 

 Learning and adapting is the natural continuation of the systemic 

assessment. The systemic assessment establishes hypotheses about the 

functioning of the urban system and the adversary embedded in it. 

Learning and adapting assesses those hypotheses and modifies 

operations as a result. In this way, the entire urban operation becomes a 

learning process. 

• Selectively isolate the urban system

Selectively isolating the urban system militarily, materially, financially, 

energetically, informationally, etc. is a critical shaping action.29 This 

 

29 Current Army doctrine recognizes the importance of isolation: “Isolation of an urban 

environment is often the most critical component of shaping operations. ... Isolation is 

usually the key shaping action that affects UO [urban operations]. It applies across the 

range of ... operations. Most successful UO have effectively isolated the urban area. 
 

19

does not mean complete and indiscriminate isolation, because urban 

systems require matter, energy and information to function. Nor is this 

simply a matter of geographically surrounding an urban area with 

blocking positions or checkpoints (although it certainly may include 

that), because information flows especially are independent of geography. 

Instead, this element involves selective filtering to prevent the influx of 

personnel, materiel, and information that could strengthen the 

adversary’s cause. In effect, isolation attempts to turn the open urban 

system into a closed system with respect to support for the adversary—to 

choke off adversary growth from the outside so that joint operations are 

dealing with a fixed problem rather than one that continues to develop 

without disrupting other essential flows. Physical isolation involves 

interdicting the movement of units, persons, weapons, supplies, funds, 

contraband, and other shipments into the urban area. Informational 

isolation involves interrupting hostile military, political, ideological, and 

financial or media communications. 

 Given the openness and potential size of modern urban areas—and 

the fact that many modern cities do not have a distinct perimeter but 

merge into other urban areas through urban sprawl—total interdiction of 

matter, energy, and information will not be feasible. Instead, isolation 

becomes a matter of identifying and controlling the most important 

ingress points into the urban system (and adapting as the adversary 

finds different routes). 

 The level of granularity required in isolating an urban system will 

depend on the nature of the threat. In the case of a conventional 

adversary it may require detecting and intercepting combat formations, 

while with an irregular adversary it may require intercepting individual 

persons, civilian vehicles, or shipments. Isolation could involve the use 

of a wide variety of detection technologies and techniques, especially 

those that can detect hostile persons, materiel, or information attempting 

to blend in with the general ebb and flow of the urban system. 

• Apply highly discriminate destructive or disabling30 force to disrupt 

an adversary’s ability to pursue its objectives 

This is the one supporting idea that involves actively locating and 

attacking embedded enemy elements. It involves the use of both kinetic 

 

Failure to do so often contributed to a difficult or failed UO. In fact, the relationship 

between successful isolation and successful UO is so great that the threat often opposes 

isolation actions more strongly than operations executed in the urban area.” FM 3-06, 

Urban Operations (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006) para. 6-

11, pp. 6-3 and 6-4.

30 In the broader context of the controlling idea disabling applies to any actions 

designed to degrade an adversary’s ability to operate effectively, in contrast to enabling

actions, which improve the functioning of the urban system. In the context of this 

particular concept element, disabling refers specifically to nonlethal actions to interrupt 

adversary actions without causing physical destruction or permanent injury. 
 

20

and non-kinetic means aimed at achieving both lethal and nonlethal 

effects. It applies whether the ultimate objective is defeating the enemy 

unconditionally on the battlefield or reducing the threat to a chronically 

manageable level. The basic aim here is to excise hostile elements from 

the urban system while causing as little damage as possible to that 

broader system. 

 Discrimination here does not necessarily imply only pinpoint 

attacks. Discrimination means discretely striking intended targets but 

not impacting other elements. The joint force could thus launch highly 

discriminate broad-area attacks as the situation requires. 

 This idea can apply if the intent is to physically destroy the enemy 

through cumulative attrition, but consistent with the Capstone Concept 

for Joint Operations, this concept envisions defeating the enemy through 

systemic disruption—disrupting the enemy’s ability to function as a 

cohesive and purposeful whole, even if some significant enemy elements 

may remain undamaged. A key way to do this could be interrupting the 

mechanisms by which the adversary draws support from the urban 

system. The purpose in taking this approach is not merely to defeat the 

enemy as efficiently and effectively as possible, but also to minimize 

collateral damage to the host urban system. 

 While this idea promotes economy, this does not mean to imply 

that defeating the enemy will be a painless or clinical process with little 

physical or societal damage. In fact, because the enemy will almost 

certainly seek cover in the physical infrastructure of the urban area, this 

concept will inevitably require selective destruction of parts of the urban 

system. The level of destruction, which could be significant, will depend 

on how deeply embedded the adversary is and how successful the joint 

force is in differentiating adversary elements from the broader 

population. 

 The joint force can apply destructive or disabling force by 

establishing a ground presence within the urban system and applying 

force through close combat or by injecting combat power into the system 

from without, using long-range capabilities—or likely a combination of 

both. Either way, this idea will require detection and differentiation 

capabilities specifically suited to the highly compartmented 

infrastructure and ambiguous, cluttered signatures of the urban 

environment. It will also require precision weapons and munitions 

suited to defeating urban fortifications. 

 A key aspect of this element is detecting hostile elements and 

differentiating them from other elements of the population. This 

detection and differentiation will have to occur at a level of granularity 

appropriate to the situation, which in the case of an irregular adversary 

could very well be the individual person or platform. In this regard, this 

concept envisions extensive use of law enforcement techniques and 

technologies, including the full range of forensic science. 
 

21

• Establish and extend control and protection of urban sectors and 

subsystems

This idea involves gradually extending dominance over parts of an urban 

system both to protect them against the adversary and to deny them as 

resources to the adversary. In this way, control and protection do not 

only serve an enabling function, but also contribute to defeating the 

adversary. Control is not an either/or condition and is not achieved 

instantly. The idea is to establish some level of control, and then to 

extend both the degree of control and the dimensions of the controlled 

area over time—realizing that total control is not possible in most cases. 

Where necessary, this element involves physically seizing urban areas 

through direct combat. In effect, this element involves choking off the 

adversary within the urban system and so complements the external 

isolation of the urban system. 

 A key aspect of this element is providing security for the local 

populace to gain its cooperation and support. Another is protecting 

improvements and support to the urban system, both of which are likely 

to become targets of enemy action. Maintaining control and providing 

protection implies a significant physical presence within the urban 

system—although this could certainly be augmented by stand-off 

capabilities such as detection, characterization, and targeting. Like the 

others, this supporting idea is based on the systemic assessment, which 

seeks to understand the adversary’s relationships and interactions with 

the host system as the basis for interrupting them. The level of 

granularity of this element will once again depend on the nature of the 

threat, ranging from conventional defensive measures against regular 

forces to law-enforcement activities designed to protect against actions 

by individuals. This element involves close and extensive contact with 

the civil population and may be best performed using indigenous forces if 

possible. 

 

• Persuade municipal governments, groups, and population segments 

to cooperate with joint force operations

Because urban systems are social systems, the attitudes and behaviors 

of the population are important to the collective behavior of the urban 

system. This concept envisions significant actions to influence those 

attitudes and behaviors, with the ultimate intent being to persuade the 

government and the population to cooperate with the joint force—ideally 

by actively helping to identify and defeat hostile elements and by 

supporting enabling actions, but at least passively by disassociating 

themselves from the adversary. This element could include coercion 

(e.g., threats to withdraw support) or inducements (e.g., promises of 

support) to influence behaviors, but perhaps more importantly it would 

include persuasive efforts to influence perceptions and attitudes. While 

coercion and inducements will tend to work only as long as they continue 
 

22

to be applied, successful efforts to change perceptions and attitudes will 

tend to be more enduring. 

 Efforts to change indigenous perceptions and attitudes will involve 

use of various capabilities that support strategic communication, 

including psychological operations, public affairs, military diplomacy, 

and defense support to public diplomacy. These efforts will occur before, 

during, and after combat. A key part of this effort will be performing 

expectation management—keeping targeted audiences informed about 

U.S. objectives, intentions, and actions as well what to expect in terms of 

hardships.31 Since every action sends a message, another key element of 

this effort will be ensuring that actions are consistent with the 

information being distributed. If actions and information are not 

consistent, credibility will suffer. Finally, because it will be impossible to 

completely isolate the urban system informationally, this idea involves 

actions to limit adversary efforts to influence the local populace and 

decision-making groups. 

• Provide sustaining aid to the urban system

This idea involves infusing aid into the system to sustain it during the 

ordeal of combat operations to improve the system’s ability to survive. 

Most often this will mean delivering essentials such as food, shelter, 

clothing, and emergency medical treatment to the urban population. It 

can also mean injecting economic support to sustain the urban economy. 

This is a civil-military action, whether performed in cooperation with 

nonmilitary agencies or organizations or by the military alone. 

Importantly, this element not only supports the urban system, but also 

serves to undermine an insurgency (or potential insurgency) and so can 

make an important contribution to ultimately defeating an adversary. 

• Make improvements to urban institutions and infrastructure

This idea relates to restoring degraded urban subsystems to previous 

levels of functioning, transforming or improving subsystems that were 

previously dysfunctional, or creating subsystems that previously did not 

exist. The goal here is not to try to create a model urban system, but 

merely to achieve a basic level of stable functioning. Where the previous 

idea involves flowing support into the urban system to sustain its 

functioning, this element involves making actual improvements to the 

system’s internal structures and processes to make it better able to 

sustain itself. As examples, this could mean restoring degraded public 

services, performing physical construction and reconstruction projects, 

creating conditions that foster economic growth, training municipal law 

enforcement, or guiding a host-nation government in instituting political 

reforms. 

 

31 Balanced against the requirements for operations security. 
 

23

 Improving institutions and infrastructures will require identifying 

those urban subsystems that are critical to system survival. In extreme 

cases this element could involve creating alternative institutions or 

infrastructure, such as creating refugee camps to house a displaced 

urban population (or one that is about to be displaced by combat). 

 This concept envisions actions to rehabilitate critical institutions 

and reconstruct critical infrastructure as soon after combat as possible. 

These actions would be ready for execution even before combat has 

finished. In addition to rehabilitation and reconstruction, this concept 

envisions making improvements to the urban system in advance of 

significant combat when possible in order to improve the system’s ability 

to withstand the damage combat will inflict—realizing that it often may 

not be possible to gain access to those institutions or infrastructures 

without combat. All these actions will become the basis for transition to 

longer-term reconstruction operations that succeed the urban operation. 

These actions should be performed in such a way that does not make the 

urban system permanently dependent on outside support, but should be 

aimed at encouraging self-sufficiency as expeditiously as feasible. 

 Like providing sustaining aid, these are civil-military activities, 

usually performed by a wide variety of nonmilitary and military agencies 

and organizations. However, the joint force should possess some 

capability to improve an urban system in the absence of other agencies 

and organizations. As with sustaining aid, these actions can also serve 

the important function of undermining an insurgency or potential 

insurgency. 
 

24

6. KEY REQUIRED CAPABILITIES

These are the key capabilities that would be required to implement this 

concept.32 These capabilities apply to the overall conduct of urban 

operations, as a national or even multinational effort. The joint force 

may be required to apply these capabilities unilaterally, if other agencies 

or partners cannot participate, or it may cooperate with or support other 

agencies or partners in applying these capabilities. 

JUO-001. The ability to collect, disseminate, and access situational 

information on an urban system. 

JUO-002. The ability to assess an urban operational situation 

systemically. 

JUO-003. The ability to integrate all the various elements of urban 

operations within the context of a theater campaign. 

JUO-004. The ability to adapt urban operations to the changing 

situation. 

JUO-005. The ability to maneuver to, into, and through an urban area. 

JUO-006. The ability to apply highly discriminate destructive or 

disabling force to attack hostile elements while minimizing 

damage to an urban system. 

JUO-007. The ability to persuade municipal governments, organizations, 

and the general populace to cooperate with joint force 

operations. 

JUO-008. The ability to secure, control, and protect urban areas to limit 

hostile presence, activity, and influence. 

JUO-009. The ability to protect the joint force and other agencies and 

organizations within an urban area. 

JUO-010. The ability to selectively isolate all or relevant portions of an 

urban system to limit unwanted external influence. 

JUO-011. The ability before, during, and after combat operations to 

effect institutional and infrastructural improvements to 

 

32 This is not meant to be a comprehensive list, but to identify only those capabilities 

that are peculiar to urban operations or have a unique application in the urban 

environment. 
 

25

strengthen selected urban subsystems identified as essential 

to the continued functioning of the urban system. 

JUO-012. The ability to facilitate humanitarian aid to suffering urban 

populations under both combat and noncombat conditions. 

Appendix C decomposes these capabilities into constituent tasks and 

provides potential measures for evaluating the performance of those 

tasks. 

7. POTENTIAL RISKS OF ADOPTING THIS CONCEPT

Adopting this concept for joint urban operations, as opposed to another, 

carries with it certain potential risks. These include: 

• The concept’s conclusion that the military requires a significant 

capacity to apply enabling, in addition to disabling, force in some 

situations could lead to the misconception that the military can 

routinely succeed unilaterally or that the military is trying to usurp 

the rightful roles and authorities of other governmental agencies. 

• Conversely, the emphasis on civil-military cooperation could lead 

to the expectation by military forces that other agencies and 

organizations will always be present to perform enabling activities 

and that the military can therefore concentrate on security and 

combat activities. 

• The significant levels of cultural awareness and functional 

information on urban systems implied by this concept could be 

unattainable in time to be of operational use. 

• The significant flow of support to the urban system envisioned by 

this concept could be diverted by enemy action or subverted 

indigenous institutions to actually strengthen the adversary. 

• The emphasis on support provided by the joint force to the urban 

system could lead to the neutering of local authorities and 

institutions. 

• The potentially significant requirement for ground troops suggested 

by this concept could be counterproductive in some situations by 

creating frictions with the indigenous population. 

• The concept’s emphasis on the use of enabling power could lead to 

the misconception that joint urban operations can be conducted 

successfully with limited casualties and little physical destruction. 
 

26

• The systems outlook described in this concept could lead to a 

systems-engineering approach to urban operations based on the 

misconception that urban ecologies can be treated as if they are 

engineered systems (i.e., structurally complicated but interactively 

simple). 

• Building within the military the enabling capacity that is suggested 

in this concept could occur at the expense of warfighting capacity. 

• The concept’s emphasis on applying enabling force on behalf of a 

given urban population could lead to the creation of a dependent 

society not willing to work for self-sufficiency. 

• The adversary succeeds in creating the dilemma that defeating the 

adversary and preserving the urban system become mutually 

exclusive objectives.33

There are no simple mitigations to these risks, which are generally the 

result of an unbalanced interpretation or application of this concept. 

The general mitigation is the application of judgment based on an 

understanding of each situation. 

8. POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ADOPTING THIS CONCEPT 

Developing the capabilities to implement this concept carries a variety of 

institutional implications, the full range of which will only be learned 

through experience and experimentation. The following is an initial list 

of possibilities: 

Policy. With respect to policy matters: 

• The joint force must be prepared to support and participate in 

civil-military teams as prescribed by the U.S. Government 

Interagency Management System (IMS). 

• Military forces will sometimes be used to perform predominantly 

nonmilitary missions, if only temporarily and at a baseline level 

until other agencies can participate. 

• The Department of Defense will develop the capabilities and 

capacities to perform extensive civil-military operations. 

 

 

33 Strictly speaking, this risk is not unique to this concept, but is a general operational 

risk of dealing with embedded urban adversaries. Any urban enemy is likely as a 

primary goal to try to create this dilemma for the joint force, so the risk warrants 

mention. 
 

27

• The Department of Defense and other agencies and organizations 

will commit to extensive information sharing with respect to urban 

systems, both internally and between agencies. 

• Joint forces will conduct extensive peacetime shaping operations, 

including building partnership capacities, which may set the 

conditions for success in future urban combat or preclude the 

need for urban combat altogether. 

• A robust Commander’s Emergency Response Program could 

provide a useful tool in sustaining and improving parts of an urban 

system during operations. 

Doctrine.34 With respect to military doctrine: 

• Because of the complexity of urban systems and urban operations, 

command and control will be a fundamentally collaborative 

process involving nonmilitary stakeholders and subject-matter 

experts. 

• Doctrinal knowledge about the nature of urban areas as living 

systems, the functioning of those urban systems, and best 

practices for influencing that functioning must be developed. 

• Doctrinal concepts, terminology, and symbology for operating 

within, discussing, and representing urban areas as dynamic 

systems must be developed. 

Organization. With respect to force structure: 

• The joint force will require potentially significant numbers of 

ground combat forces to perform the isolation, security, and 

combat elements of this concept, potentially in numerous urban 

areas simultaneously. 

• The joint force will require significant capacities in military police, 

civil affairs, psychological operations, public affairs, special 

operations, and engineering (including civil engineering) units. 

• The joint force will require the logistical and medical capacities to 

aid the civil population and enemy prisoners of war as well as 

support the force. 

 

34 Doctrine here refers not only to “fundamental principles by which the military forces 

or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives” [JP 1-02, 

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/d/01753.html, accessed 22 Dec 06], 

but also to authoritative tactics, techniques and procedures. 
 

28

• The significant reliance on nonmilitary assets, especially for 

cultural expertise, civil governance, law enforcement, and 

detention, and construction operations, may necessitate an 

increased reliance on outsourcing. 

• The requirement for a significant civil affairs capacity suggests 

reconsidering the current active-reserve mix of civil affairs units. 

• Given the location of many cities on rivers or coastlines, the joint 

force may require significant coastal/riverine forces. 

• Because of the increasing threat of weapons of mass destruction in 

urban areas, there is a role for specialized teams to locate and 

render those weapons safe and secure and to respond to the effects 

of their employment. 

Training. With respect to training: 

• U.S. forces will develop competence in performing the essential 

public-service functions required of municipal governments. 

• U.S. forces will likewise develop competence in training indigenous 

personnel in the essential public-service functions of municipal 

governments. 

• U.S. forces will increase training in foreign language and cultural 

skills.35

• The probable lack of front lines in urban operations suggests a 

need for significant combat training for all support personnel.

• Due to the high stress of urban combat on ground forces, there is 

a potential need for battle stress awareness training.

• Because of the highly compartmented nature of urban terrain, 

ground forces should be trained to operate in a distributed manner 

at the small-unit level.

• Because of the likely role of nonmilitary agencies and 

organizations—including private security forces—in urban 

operations, joint forces may require training in integrating with 

those elements. 

Materiel. With respect to technology development and materiel 

acquisition: 

 

35 Also mandated in the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington: Department 

of Defense, 6 Feb 06), pp. 5, 78-79, 89. 
 

29

• First and foremost, the nature of urban operations as described in 

this paper suggests that there are no technological “silver 

bullets”—no technological advances that will fundamentally alter 

the challenges of urban operations or will obviate the need for 

significant force levels. 

• For forces operating for extended periods within urban terrain, the 

rugged, compartmented nature of that terrain places a premium on 

simple, durable, and disposable technologies available in great 

numbers as opposed to advanced, low-density technologies.36 

• Technologies that facilitate detecting and differentiating hostile 

elements from others, down to the level of individual persons or 

platforms, are a priority. 

• Surface, air, and maritime conveyances that provide for the rapid, 

protected, and precise movement of forces in urban terrain are a 

priority for urban operations. 

• Technologies that facilitate information collection within the 

particular conditions of urban terrain, such as detection through 

walls or other surfaces, are a priority. 

• Technologies that facilitate the tagging of persons, vehicles, 

weapons materials, or other potential targets for continuous and 

automatic tracking within a cluttered urban environment could be 

beneficial. 

• Urban operations require stand-off and point technologies to detect 

the presence of various types of weapons of mass destruction 

against the backdrop of a cluttered urban environment. 

• Because of the requirement for combat in the close vicinity of 

noncombatants, nonlethal technologies could prove especially 

useful in urban operations. 

• Technologies, including nonlethal technologies that facilitate 

destroying or disabling hostile forces while minimizing collateral 

damage to the urban system are a priority. 

• Effective command and control of urban operations could benefit 

from technologies that facilitate the modeling and dynamic 

representation of urban systems. 

 

36 Ralph Peters, “Our Soldiers, Their Cities,” Parameters (Spring96), p. 45. 
 

30

• Because of the need for collaboration in urban operations, 

technologies that facilitate collaboration among people from 

different organizations and cultures, especially when not 

collocated, could prove especially useful. 

• Technologies that provide lightweight personnel protection and 

protect materiel and facilities from threats characteristic of urban 

environments—such as snipers, improvised explosive devices, or 

chemical, biological, and radiological weapons—are a priority. 

• Urban operations require, down to the small-unit or even 

individual level, communications technologies that overcome the 

debilitating effects of urban terrain on tactical communications. 

• Urban operations require weapons that facilitate precision 

engagement, are effective against the hardened nature of urban 

terrain, and provide discriminate and even tailorable effects. 

• Automated language-translation capabilities, for both speech and 

writing, could significantly improve interactions with a local 

populace. 

• Because of their social dimension, urban operations require 

technologies to rapidly communicate with intended audiences to 

inform, persuade, counter adversary propaganda, and assess 

communication efforts. 

• This concept implies the development of modeling and simulation 

of urban systems beyond current capabilities and software that 

facilitates better analysis of the issues associated with urban 

operations across the warfighting functions. 

Leader development. With respect to leader development: 

• This concept implies the development of leaders with an 

understanding of urban areas as living systems to be treated 

comprehensively vice merely as an operating environment. 

• This concept implies the development of leaders with an 

understanding of, and even working experience in, urban system 

dynamics—e.g., through tours with municipal governments. 

• This concept implies the development of leaders with a strong 

understanding of the employment of civil affairs units. 

• This concept implies the development of leaders with an 

understanding of the influence of culture on urban systems, both 

in general and in specific instances. 
 

31

• The emphasis on civil-military operations implies the development 

of leaders with a strong understanding of the roles and capabilities 

of the nonmilitary agencies and organizations that will be likely 

partners in urban operations. 

• This concept implies the development of leaders with strong 

proficiency in consequence management because of the potentially 

dramatic effects of destructive action on urban systems. 

• The compartmentalizing effect of urban terrain implies the 

requirement for developing strong small-unit leaders with a 

penchant for acting independently and with initiative. 

• The phenomenon of “strategic compression” that is common to 

urban operations implies the need for junior leaders with a strong 

appreciation for the potential operational and strategic 

implications of local actions. 

Personnel. With respect to personnel policy: 

• This concept implies the requirement for ready access to and 

standing relationships with various subject-matter experts in 

urban and related issues. 

• This concept implies potentially significant use of nonmilitary 

personnel in the form of advisors, contractors, etc., in order to gain 

the necessary expertise in some areas. 

• This concept implies appropriate numbers of foreign-area officers 

and increased continuity in foreign-area assignments to increase 

expertise on the urban systems within a theater. 

• The exhausting nature of urban combat suggests the potential 

need for frequent troop rotations and implies significant demands 

on the personnel replacement system. 

Facilities. With respect to the development of facilities: 

• This concept implies a requirement for urban training centers that 

capture the rich dynamics and social qualities of urban systems 

rather than merely the terrain aspects. 

The military functional areas are common to all operations, but urban 

operations in general and this concept in particular carry specific 

implications for the performance of some of those functions. Some of the 

functional implications that have not been treated yet include: 
 

32

Intelligence. With respect to intelligence capabilities: 

• This concept implies the need for “systemic” intelligence—

intelligence methods and technologies that facilitate understanding 

urban system dynamics, potentially including techniques for 

“mapping” urban systems. 

• This concept implies the need for highly discriminate methods and 

technologies for detecting, identifying, characterizing, tracking, and 

potentially targeting the various supporting, neutral, potentially 

hostile, and hostile elements embedded within an urban 

environment characterized by clutter and ambiguous signatures. 

• This concept implies an increased requirement for human 

intelligence (HUMINT), counterintelligence (CI), and interrogator 

capabilities. 

• This concept implies a heavy reliance on open-source intelligence 

(OSINT), including subject-matter experts, about the functioning of 

specific cities. 

• This concept suggests the need for building “systemic” databases 

on selected urban areas linked to visualization tools.

• Since information flow is a key element of urban systems, this 

concept implies improved capabilities to collect against various 

communication systems characteristic of urban environments.

Command and Control. With respect to command and control: 

• This concept suggests that command and control of urban 

operations will become increasingly collaborative across 

organizational, functional, and cultural lines—to include 

collaboration throughout the interagency community and with 

coalition partners. 

• This concept potentially implies the integration of military and 

nonmilitary capabilities at increasingly lower levels of application. 

• The extremely compartmented nature of urban terrain implies a 

particular need for robust, decentralized command and control of 

ground forces based on junior leaders exercising initiative within 

the context of higher-level intents. 

Sustainment. With respect to the sustainment function: 
 

33

• The demands of urban operations will require a shift in traditional 

supply ratios—e.g., likely less expenditures in fuel, greater 

expenditures in ammunition and medical supplies, increased 

requirements for replacement weapons, uniforms, protective, and 

personal equipment.37

9. CONCLUSION

This concept proposes one possible joint solution to the problem of urban 

operations based on the conception of an urban area as a dynamic, living 

system particularly vulnerable to the destructive effects of military 

action. This concept does not claim to provide the conclusive answer to 

this very probable and challenging problem; rather, it attempts to 

stimulate informed discussion and experimentation which will eventually 

lead to that answer in the form of a set of future joint capabilities. If this 

concept serves to catalyze the process that generates those capabilities, it 

will have served its purpose. 

 

37 Peters, “Our Soldiers, Their Cities,” p. 48-49. 
 

34

APPENDIX A. ILLUSTRATIVE VIGNETTE A

COUNTERINSURGENCY IN PORT LEWIS, 2015-202138

The summer of 2015 sees simultaneous outbreaks of bacterial meningitis 

and influenza A in the Democratic Republic of Bafonga, a major global 

supplier of crude oil. The federal government in Doma is completely 

unprepared for the outbreaks. The congested squalor of Doma and Port 

Lewis provide ideal conditions for widespread infection. The World 

Health Organization fears a flu pandemic. Triggered by the ineffective 

government response to the outbreaks—but owing as much to pent-up 

unrest over a national economy in ruins after a decade of government 

mismanagement, drought conditions in the interior and widespread 

religious and tribal frictions—Bafonga erupts in a wave of antigovernment and sectarian violence that washes over the country. A 

heavy-handed response by the Bafongan Army in Doma, Port Lewis and 

other cities only causes the violence to escalate. Oxfam International 

estimates that by September, when the initial spasm of violence has 

ended, 200,000 are dead from disease or killing. Most Western oil 

companies and relief organizations have already withdrawn most of their 

workers by now; U.S. forces evacuate those remaining from Port Lewis to 

ships offshore or to nearby countries. 

 The Bafongan government requests international assistance and 

the United Nations passes an emergency resolution authorizing foreign 

relief efforts. Fifteen nations, including the other East African 

Community (EAC) nations, eventually respond with assistance. The 

spasm of violence plays itself out, and a lull settles over the country. 

British troops return to Doma for the first time since Bafonga gained 

independence in 1960. Spain, Germany, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, 

Lithuania, and China send relief contingents. The United States 

assumes responsibility for the oil-producing northeastern quadrant of 

the country, including Port Lewis, deploying a national integrated task 

force (NITF) of contingents from various federal departments and 

agencies under overall coordinating authority of the U.S. Ambassador in 

Doma supported by a planning team from the State Department’s Office 

of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The 

NITF includes task forces from State, Defense, Commerce, Treasury, 

Justice, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, the Central 

 

38 This is a work of fiction. Any resemblance to actual places, events or operations is 

entirely coincidental. 
 

35

Intelligence Agency, and various subordinate agencies such as USAID, 

FEMA, FBI, and others. U.S. Africa Command establishes Joint Task 

Force East Africa (JTF-EA) as the military component to the U.S. national 

effort. JTF-EA will have primary responsibility for security within the 

national effort, but will also contribute “constructive” capabilities in 

support of other leading federal agencies. It will be commanded from an 

afloat joint operations center by the commander of the U.S. Fifth Fleet. 

The joint task force commander is designated as the deputy commander 

of the NITF. 

Figure A-1. 

Port Lewis and environs. 

 Elements of 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit arrive in the 

municipal port at Old Port Lewis on 23 September, deploying up the 

Nassawara delta by air-cushion landing craft and tilt rotor. A day later, 

1st Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division begins deplaning at Ndoni-Port 

Lewis International. Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadron 2 

(MPSRON-Two) deploys from Diego Garcia and links up en route via 
 

36

high-speed connector ships with elements of II Marine Expeditionary 

Force deploying by air to Mombassa, Tanga, and Dar es Salaam. Other II 

MEF elements deploy from North Carolina by amphibious shipping. 

Humanitarian agencies and organizations begin returning to the country 

to begin the recovery process. U.S. Transportation Command begins 

flowing relief supplies into the port and international airport. Air 

Expeditionary Wing 461 establishes an aerial port of debarkation and 

begins delivering supplies into Ndoni-Port Lewis International Airport. 

Expeditionary Strike Force 6 deploys to the area and will be reinforced by 

significant riverine and maritime expeditionary security capabilities from 

the continental United States. U.S. and coalition naval forces begin 

assembling a sea base near the mouth of the Nassawara River, which will 

serve as the primary support base for the operation. Maritime 

Expeditionary Security Squadron 3 deploys to provide security for the 

sea base. 

 While a tenuous truce holds over the rest of the country in October 

and November, and relief work proceeds, the violence in northeastern 

Bafonga quickly transforms from the initial irrational spasm of 

bloodletting into an organized insurgency with Port Lewis at its epicenter. 

 Port Lewis is a commercial and industrial port located in the 

network of rivers that form the Nassawara River delta. It is the center of 

the Bafongan oil industry and the second-largest city in Bafonga, with a 

heterogeneous population of 2.4 million people in the city proper and 

some 5 million in its greater metropolitan area. The indigenous 

population does not identify itself primarily as Bafongan, but by tribal 

affiliation—Hano, Addoa, Enow, Ugoni, Atsekiri, and others. The 

population is predominantly Christian, although an important Muslim 

minority exists. Within the Christian majority there are significant tribal 

frictions. Port Lewis is also home to a large foreign population including 

Western aid workers and oil company employees. Port Lewis has also 

become the center of a burgeoning Pentecostal movement. 

 With a sustained population growth of five percent, the 

metropolitan area has doubled its population in the last 15 years, 

overwhelming local infrastructure and services. Because of poor zoning 

much of this growth has been uncontrolled and haphazard, sprawling 

outward in all directions from the old British port, carving industrial 

facilities and squalid, government-built tribal settlements out of the 

mangrove swamps of the river delta. Despite fundamentally 

dysfunctional municipal government, Port Lewis has continued to attract 

people from the impoverished countryside. Most physical infrastructure 

is in a state of decay. Old Port Lewis and the City Centre have 

underground sewage, but the outlying growth does not. The Bandu 

Power Station about 50 kilometers upriver produces 60 megawatts (out 

of a maximum capacity of 160), but most of that electricity goes to Doma 

and elsewhere; as a result, electricity in Port Lewis is intermittent, and 

most of the oil facilities generate their own electricity. The miles of paved 
 

37

roads are crumbling and the intermittent electricity to the traffic signals 

causes continuous traffic jams and frequent interruption of the 

inefficient commuter rail system. The local economy is severely 

depressed, although a Black Market thrives in medicines, produce, 

electronics, illegal drugs, manufactured goods, and now arms. 

 Despite its economic state, Port Lewis is a “connected” city, with 

significant information-technology infrastructure and countless internet 

cafes used by foreign nationals and the indigenous population alike. 

There are nearly five million cell phone users in the greater Port Lewis 

area. 

 The insurgents use terror and guerrilla tactics—because they are 

too weak to confront government forces conventionally, but also because 

these tactics are a natural extension of their historical methods of 

warfare. These initially include assassination and intimidation, bomb 

and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) attacks against government offices, 

sabotage against oil-company facilities and pipelines, car and suicide 

bombs in crowded public places, and hostage-taking. By December the 

insurgents have begun attacking U.S. forces with improvised explosive 

devices (IEDs, including chemical IEDs made from industrial chlorine), 

snipers, and ambushes with automatic weapons, RPGs and even 

mortars. 

 In February 2016 the insurgents begin launching suicide attacks 

by small craft disguised as fishing boats against shipping in the narrow 

waters of the river. On 16 May 2016, a Shell Oil maintenance ship is 

sunk by a mine in the Balior River just east of Rainbow Island. 

 

Assessing the Urban System 

As initial steps are being taken on the ground to stabilize the situation, 

the NITF commander convenes what he calls the “System Framing 

Working Group,” a collaborative design group consisting of senior leaders 

and other key stakeholders, whose aim is to come to grips with the 

driving logic of the problem and to reconcile all key stakeholder 

perspectives in the decision-making process. Although membership 

changes over time as requirements change, the core group includes the 

JTF commander, the heads of the other agency task forces, an expert on 

the oil industry, a professor from Northwestern University renowned in 

East African culture and politics, senior members of the S/CRS team, an 

expert in Developing World urbanization, Bafongan military 

commanders, and several local municipal leaders. 

 The JTF commander forms a similar enduring collaborative design 

group to focus on the military aspects of the situation. The working 

group includes all functional component and subordinate task force 

commanders, as well as Bafongan military leaders and various subjectmatter experts. The design process is facilitated by the existence of 

networks of indigenous sources and advisors that have been established 

in Bafonga for years as part of steady-state shaping operations. The 
 

38

outputs of this Operational Logic Working Group (OLWG) feed upward 

into the SFWG. The working group holds virtual meetings on a monthly 

basis, which the JTF commander requires that all principals attend. 

 One of the most important early assessments the OLWG makes is 

that the humanitarian disaster has mutated into an insurgency. The 

ambassador agrees, and, as a result, all operations throughout the 

theater will now be governed by the unique logic of insurgency and 

counterinsurgency. JTF-EA will now have lead responsibility not only for 

providing security, but also for offensive actions directly aimed at 

disrupting insurgent activities. 

 The working group collaborates to build and adapt a logical causal 

model meant to hypothesize the dynamics driving the situation in and 

around Port Lewis. The members envision Port Lewis as a dynamic 

urban system in which economic weakness and municipal dysfunction 

generate popular suffering and grievances which foster disruption, 

subversion and violence, which in turn feed economic weakness and 

dysfunction in a vicious cycle of accelerating decay. They hypothesize 

that heavy-handed government crackdowns, inherent ethno-religious 

frictions, overpopulation due mostly to migration from impoverished 

rural areas, oil company actions, and external subversion are additional 

factors feeding the destructive cycle. They begin to posit ways to 

intervene in the system to halt and reverse the destabilization dynamic. 

See Figure A-2. 

 The resulting “integrated design” becomes the guiding logic for all 

JTF operations and is disseminated throughout the force. The OLWG 

identifies possible metrics to test its hypotheses, and those metrics 

become information requirements feeding the integrated collection plan. 

Based on feedback, which corroborates or contradicts the hypotheses, 

the working group revises its causal model over time. This design 

process continues for the entire duration of the counterinsurgency 

campaign. 

 The systemic assessment reveals that “the insurgency” is actually 

an alphabet soup of insurgent movements with overlapping—and 

sometimes competing—goals. Some advocate secession and the creation 

of an independent state. Some advocate overthrow of the Bafongan 

government. Among these are groups that differ over methods and 

others that battle among themselves over primacy in the liberation 

movement. Some merely pursue reparations, political concessions or a 

redistribution of revenues from oil profits. Most groups list 

environmental destruction by the oil industry among their grievances. 

Some actually mean it; for others it is a public relations ploy. 
 

39

Fig. A-2. 

Port Lewis envisioned as a dynamic system, with potential interventions. 

 Planners exploit advancements in social network analysis to map 

the various insurgent movements and the leadership structure within the 

movements as the basis for taking those movements apart effectively. 

 In addition to the primary insurgent currents are other violent 

dynamics. There is Atsekiri violence against Hano and Enowi as part of 

an effort to maintain Atsekiri dominance, and there are Hano and Enowi 

reprisals against the Atsekiri for decades of abuses. There is violence 

between Christian and Muslim elements. There is increasing Muslim 

violence designed to draw attention to the plight of Muslim populations 

in the interior of the country, which attracts much less attention from 

the Bafongan government and the world media. 

 The insurgencies receive external support from some unexpected 

sources. Contributions in the millions of dollars to the large and growing 

Pentecostal community in Port Lewis often find their way to insurgent 

organizations. Likewise, because the insurgencies have tied their 

movements to environmental causes, they receive enthusiastic and 

significant support from various environmental groups—ranging from 

moderate groups that provide only money to openly militant groups that 

also provide arms, training, and even a small number of die-hard ecoguerrillas. The oil companies themselves unwittingly finance the 
 

40

insurgency by hiring various militia groups to protect their facilities 

against sabotage (often in response to veiled threats by the same militia 

groups). 

 The insurgents also support themselves through kidnapping of 

Westerners, mostly oil company employees (who tend to net larger 

ransoms) but also aid workers. Kidnapping has been a fact of life in Port 

Lewis for decades and has grown into a multimillion-dollar business. 

The oil companies accept it as a necessary cost of doing business. Oil 

companies routinely provide protection for their employees, although 

many local security providers are now connected to insurgent groups. 

Most kidnap victims have eventually been released unharmed, but in the 

last two years, as the movements have become increasingly radicalized, 

kidnappings have increasingly become a tool of terror rather than a 

business enterprise. 

 Finally, the insurgent groups support themselves by stealing crude 

oil through a variety of means, including tapping into the hundreds of 

miles of oil pipeline in the area. Oil theft is a multibillion dollar annual 

industry around Port Lewis. 

Isolating the Urban System

The JTF commander recognizes that isolating the insurgents in Port 

Lewis will be an essential shaping action—and a very challenging task 

given Port Lewis’s fundamentally open nature as a commercial port city. 

Physical isolation in Port Lewis will not mean blocking the movements of 

conventional military units, but instead screening and selectively 

intercepting the movements of individual persons, vehicles, and 

containers. Isolating the adversary in Port Lewis will remain a major 

effort for the JTF throughout the duration of the counterinsurgency 

campaign. 

 In some ways the local geography actually simplifies physical 

isolation because numerous districts—Rainbow Island, Waji, Elimaddoa, 

Mgera, Elephant Island—are semi-isolated enclaves that have been 

reclaimed from the marshy delta and have limited access by road. This 

allows the force, in some cases, to isolate specific districts known to 

support the insurgency. The city center, with its expressway and 

countless surface roads radiating in most directions, is more 

challenging—and the JTF commander knows that the isolation effort will 

only reduce the flow of support to the insurgents, but not cut it off 

altogether. In any event, physical isolation involves significant ground 

forces running countless checkpoints, which are moved regularly and 

supported by directed-energy vehicle-stopping capabilities, to screen the 

movement of people and vehicles. 

 The geography of Port Lewis also demands a significant riverine 

capability to isolate insurgent movements in the dense network of rivers 

and creeks in the river delta east of the city. Riverine Squadron 3 

deploys from the United States as part of the maritime component to 
 

41

handle this mission. The squadron is equipped with directed-energy 

capabilities that can stop boat engines from stand-off distances. 

 Airborne and unattended ground sensors that alert quick-reaction 

forces fill in the gaps between ground and riverine checkpoints. Ground 

and riverine forces are both equipped with facial-recognition capabilities 

linked to a universal database, which allow them to identify and detain 

persons of interest. They use digital photographic and fingerprinting 

technology to grow the database and provide intelligence analysts 

information for understanding legal and illegal movement patterns. They 

screen vehicles and containers with sensors designed to detect 

armaments, explosives and other dangerous materials. They use 

biometric technology originally developed for airport screening to detect 

persons with possible hostile intent. Intelligence sections analyze and 

predict insurgent patterns at the urban system level, including 

emplacement of roadside bombs, using profiling algorithms first 

developed by law enforcement to anticipate the activities of serial 

arsonists and rapists. 

 Informational isolation is impossible given Port Lewis’s “connected” 

nature, although one capability still in its infancy pays dividends. An 

airborne sensor “maps” all radio emissions in the city—including 

microwaves and cell phones. This “radio-geographic map” is compared 

to generic templates of “normal” urban electromagnetic patterns as well 

as limited historical data on emission patterns in Port Lewis. Based on 

this, analysts identify significant recent changes in the “radio-geography” 

of Port Lewis that coincide with the emergence of various insurgent 

groups, providing the basis for electronic attack operations to jam 

insurgent communications. 

 An important aspect of isolation is restricting funding to the 

insurgent groups—much of which is internet-based and originates 

outside the country. A significant source of support is Pentecostal and 

environmental groups in Europe and the United States, many of which 

have a naïve view of insurgent objectives and methods. An important 

part of the counterinsurgency, conducted by a combination of 

governmental agencies and nongovernmental groups (including respected 

academics and public relations agencies under contract), thus includes 

locating financial supporters and educating them as to the true nature of 

the insurgencies to discourage contributions. 

Improving and Rehabilitating Institutions and Infrastructure

To coordinate the critical task of improving and rebuilding local 

institutions and infrastructure, the NITF commander establishes a 

Government and Infrastructure Task Force (GITF), an interagency 

organization under USAID coordinating authority and directly 

subordinate to the NITF. The GITF includes elements from Defense, 

State, Commerce, Health and Human Services, and subordinate agencies 

such as the Centers for Disease Control. The military contribution to the 
 

42

GITF includes civil affairs, public affairs, psychological operations, 

engineer, military police, signals, preventive medicine, and special 

operations units. A key element is the U.S. Army’s 2nd Civil Affairs 

Brigade, which consists of a combination of active-duty, reserve, and 

civilian personnel, including a battalion specializing in urban systems. 

U.S. Air Force contracting organizations manage most of the construction 

and jobs contracts administered by the JTF. 

 A State Department contingent from the GITF works with the 

national government in Doma to enact policy reforms, including 

reworking the formulas by which oil revenues are distributed to different 

sectors of the population. The Bafongan government is by no means 

excited about the reforms, but the U.S. government makes clear that its 

support is contingent on them. 

 Military combat service support elements concentrate their efforts 

in areas in which the security situation remains too dangerous for 

civilian organizations. First Naval Construction Regiment, which 

eventually reaches a strength of six Naval Mobile Construction 

Battalions, rebuilds port facilities, oil refineries, and miles of damaged 

pipeline in the delta. An effort led by the Army Corps of Engineers, and 

including five other private corporations, makes repairs and 

improvements to the Bandu Power Station and ensures that sufficient 

power is distributed to Port Lewis. Army and Marine engineer units 

rebuild civil infrastructure directly in trace of combat units as they 

secure sectors of the city—or even while those sectors are being secured. 

Nonmilitary agencies focus on more secure areas. 

 Because of the importance of training Bafongan military and law 

enforcement units, the NITF commander forms a separate Training Task 

Force (TTF) not under the GITF. The TTF consists primarily of U.S. 

military, Coast Guard, Department of Justice, and state and local law 

enforcement personnel. U.S. military police and U.S. Coast Guard patrol 

units work alongside civil law enforcement personnel to improve local law 

enforcement, most of whom are Atsekiri with strong tribal loyalties. 

Another Justice Department contingent, with British representation, 

works to rebuild the local judiciary, which is based on the British legal 

model. At the same time, construction work builds new prisons in 

anticipation of the burgeoning need that the increased violence of the 

insurgency will generate. 

 Even when the deployment is being viewed primarily as a relief 

operation, before the insurgency gains momentum, U.S. Special 

Operations Forces begin working to rebuild the Bafongan 18th Airborne 

Division, which is stationed at the Maj. Gen. O.P. Ezezi Air Assault 

Headquarters near the old Port Lewis Airfield and several other garrisons 

on the outskirts of the city. The “Screaming Warhawks” are plagued by 

tribal divisions. As the insurgency gains strength, the army forces 

increasingly stay in their garrisons, venturing out only occasionally to 

run large, motorized, daytime sweep operations through insurgent 
 

43

sectors. These tend to exacerbate rather than lower tensions and 

generally turn people away from the government cause. By the 

beginning of 2016, the 18th has ceded entire districts of the city to the 

insurgents. The U.S. plan is to incorporate Bafongan units into security 

operations as quickly as possible, but it becomes clear that bringing 

them to the necessary state of readiness will be a significant task, and 

additional U.S. trainers are brought in. 

Discriminately Destroying or Disabling Hostile Elements

Offensive operations are a relatively inconspicuous part of the campaign, 

by design. A key method is raids by U.S. Special Operations Forces or 

other military units to destroy adversary equipment, supplies and 

facilities or to kill or capture personnel within the city. These forces 

employ vehicle-mounted high-energy lasers or are supported by airborne 

lasers for ultra-precise engagement. Before entering buildings or spaces 

that are suspected of containing noncombatants in addition to enemies, 

they sometimes incapacitate all occupants and sort them out later. 

When conditions favor the use of air strikes, attack aircraft, and 

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) attack insurgent positions or materiel 

using precision-guided, reduced-diameter munitions to minimize 

collateral damage. 

 On the occasions when the enemy resorts to more conventional 

tactics, such as occupying a fortified complex in platoon strength or more 

(often because the pressure of the counterinsurgency campaign is 

working), joint operations become correspondingly more conventional 

and destructive. Ground forces employ armored vehicles firing reducedcaliber main-gun ammunition that again allows them to limit the amount 

of collateral damage inflicted in an urban firefight. They employ 

nonlethal building-clearing devices that sometimes allow them to avoid 

costly room-to-room clearing operations and minimize injury to the 

occupants or damage to the structure. 

 Another key element of the effort to defeat or disrupt insurgent 

groups is extensive offensive information operations, including electronic 

attack, computer network attack, psychological operations, and 

deception operations to disrupt insurgent command and control, cause 

divisions among insurgent factions, and weaken insurgent morale and 

resolve. Because the insurgency is not a monolith, but a collection of 

insurgent movements, the information operations program requires an 

understanding of the different interests, objectives, and animating 

narratives of the various insurgent factions. 

Integrating the Various Efforts 

The JTF headquarters is distributed, with a forward echelon at 

Government Centre in downtown Port Lewis and an afloat joint 

operations center on the sea base supported by significant reachback to 

the States. A key element of the JTF commander’s logic is to maintain a 
 

44

Bafongan face on the counterinsurgency by minimizing the visible 

presence of U.S. military authority. 

 The JTF integrates operations with other agencies and 

organizations through the NITF’s Interagency Coordinating Group, which 

employs distributed collaboration capabilities to coordinate execution. 

The JTF will eventually coordinate with 74 different American and 

international nongovernmental relief organizations. Although the 

situation demands that these groups coordinate their efforts with the 

official governmental effort, many of these organizations find it necessary 

to maintain independence from government agencies for their own 

security and credibility. The primary vehicle for facilitating integration 

with these organizations is a mechanism officially called the Bafongan 

Relief Optional Online Tasking Integration Service (BROOTIS) but 

popularly known as the “Jobs Bazaar.” The Jobs Bazaar is an online 

coordination service that allows registered organizations to access 

situational information, register for tasks, negotiate funding and 

deliverables, coordinate activities, submit invoicing, and procure 

transportation, security, logistical support, and other services. Through 

the Jobs Bazaar, the JTF provides current threat and security 

information while the NITF lists open reconstruction and aid taskings, 

prioritized and linked to contract mechanisms and funding sources. 

Organizations can sign up for tasks based on their own capabilities and 

priorities. Organizations can use the service only to gain situational 

awareness if they choose—which many of them do initially—but by 

registering their activities they also gain potential privileges, such as 

protection and lift support from the JTF. The Jobs Bazaar allows private 

organizations to gain support and integrate their actions within the 

larger effort without openly cooperating with the government. In this way 

the overall effort becomes an adaptive market process rather than a 

centralized bureaucratic one. Over time the process serves to lessen 

some of the distrust between private and government organizations. 

Persuading the Local Population to Support the Government 

Getting the populace to cooperate with the counterinsurgency effort is 

another critical element of the campaign. In fact, the ambassador 

identifies it as the essential element of success—and all other elements of 

the campaign, starting with maintaining a secure environment, 

ultimately are meant to support it. He forms an integrated Public 

Communication Coordination Cell to organize the effort at the NITF level. 

The JTF commander likewise forms a Joint Strategic Communication 

Cell (JSCC) to integrate the effort within the JTF. Joint public affairs, 

psychological operations and civil affairs play major roles in this effort. 

 As a first priority the JSCC works to ensure that public 

communication activities keep the local populace informed as to JTF 

goals and actions, and especially their implications for the populace—for 

example, what hardships can be expected, and for how long. The JSCC 
 

45

provides warnings and alerts to the population, even sometimes to the 

point of sacrificing tactical surprise—warning people to stay away from a 

specific location prior to a military strike, for example. 

 A key step in the effort is to ensure that all actions within the JTF, 

down to the lowest level, are consistent with stated objectives and values. 

All personnel are trained to understand that “every action sends a 

message,” whether intended or not, and to be sensitive to the messages 

that are being received by the population. Required after-action reviews 

at all levels evaluate the impact that actions and information activities 

are having on local audiences. The JTF commander disseminates 

frequent e-mails providing guidance and expectations to all personnel. 

Violations of stated policies are handled harshly. 

 The JTF has hired several public relations and advertising firms to 

supplement organic capabilities. Initial “market research” suggests that 

there are two dominant narratives that motivate the insurgency, and 

which must be successfully counteracted if the counterinsurgency 

campaign is to succeed. The first is that the national government in 

Doma has waged a deliberate campaign of persecution and oppression 

against the Enow, Addoa, Hano—fill in the tribe—in the Nassawara delta 

for over 50 years. The second is that the oil companies have knowingly 

exploited the Enow, Addoa, Hano—again, fill in the tribe—for obscene 

profits at the cost of irreparable societal and ecological destruction. The 

firms conduct a series of focus groups to determine what 

countermessages resonate with different sectors of the population—

since, like the insurgency, the population is not a monolith but a highly 

complex system of overlapping religious, tribal, and economic groups. 

Based on this research, the public relations firms develop information 

products and pay for their placement in various media. Public affairs 

and psychological operations units also use the data to modify their 

actions accordingly. 

 Combat camera units from the different services provide still and 

video imagery in support of this effort. The JTF also exploits the fact that 

digital video cameras are distributed throughout the force—carried by 

troops as personal items or mounted on vehicles, aircraft, helmets, 

weapons, and sensors. Troops post video footage and still photographs 

to a common web-based JTF video library for possible posting on public 

video-sharing websites and dissemination to other external media 

sources in support of the JTF public communication plan. 

Sustaining the Urban Population 

The task of providing support directly to the population is a combined 

effort among the military, other governmental agencies and 

nongovernmental relief organizations. It is a straightforward task, but 

one requiring massive capacity. Military combat service support units 

concentrate on areas in which the security situation prevents other 

organizations from operating. They move into sectors of the city directly 
 

46

in trace of security forces, delivering food, clothing, bedding, and other 

supplies, providing emergency medical treatment, and improving living 

conditions. In some cases, military engineering units build housing 

encampments in the more congested areas of the city, such as Waji and 

Umedi. Relief supplies are flown into Ndoni-Port Lewis, shipped in 

through the municipal port, and even trucked in from neighboring 

Tanzania and Kenya. Cash funds are distributed to energize the local 

economy. U.S. hospital ships Mercy, Comfort, and Samaritan and the 

Spanish Esperanza Del Mar serve as afloat disease-treatment centers off 

the Bafongan coast and treat over 10,000 severe cases of meningitis 

during the months of the epidemic. 

Controlling and Protecting Elements of the Urban System 

The ambassador sees controlling and protecting key elements of the 

urban system as another important element of the counterinsurgency 

campaign: there will be no chance of winning the allegiance of the 

population without first providing and maintaining security. This 

mission falls to the JTF. In the end, this will come down primarily to 

providing a significant and enduring ground presence within the urban 

system. Elements from 2nd Marine Division and Task Force 8239 move 

into selected areas, starting in areas most easily secured. The ground 

forces move into neighborhoods in platoon- and even squad-sized 

detachments, which cooperate with the local population to provide 

security. They immediately begin to compile a census of their areas, 

including digitally fingerprinting residents. Other detachments provide 

permanent security at key locations, such as the Bandu Power Station, 

government offices, municipal port, petroleum refining, and other 

industrial facilities, and key nodes in the city’s electrical grid. These 

ground forces gradually expand the secured areas, but do not abandon 

areas previously occupied, although the density of troops in those areas 

may decrease. The process moves slowly. The Marines move initially 

into Kifuru and Waji, the Army into Kisoto, Gubuma, and Chopa, where 

the University of Port Lewis, a key institution, is located. By midyear the 

Marines have expanded into East Island, Elimaddoa, and Ndumi, and the 

Army into Matimbwa. In 2017, the Marines move into Rumenowi while 

the Army moves into the critical Enowi neighborhoods of Omi and 

Omenowi. In 2017, a Canadian brigade and two National Guard brigade 

combat teams join in the security efforts to increase troop density. 

Bafongan Army units and police forces are transitioned into the effort as 

they become available. 

 Meanwhile, Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadron 1, 

augmented by U.S. Coast Guard port security units, provides security at 

 

39 Consisting of U.S. 82nd Airborne Division headquarters, two infantry brigade combat 

teams (IBCTs), two Stryker brigade combat teams (SBCTs), a combat aviation brigade 

(CAB) and a combat support brigade (CSB). 
 

47

municipal and oil-company port facilities, while Riverine Squadron 3 

patrols the miles of built-up waterfront in the Nassawara delta. Because 

the insurgents have begun employing mines in the river, Mine 

Countermeasure Squadron 3 deploys from Texas and employs aerial, 

surface, and subsurface capabilities to detect and clear mines in 

shipping channels. 

 The process of securing Port Lewis resembles police work as much 

as military operations, and security forces make significant use of the 

latest forensic techniques and technologies to take disruptive elements 

off the streets, at which point the improved judicial and prison systems 

deal with them. The prison population grows to over two percent of the 

total population, as over 100,000 insurgents and criminals are removed 

in this way from the population of Port Lewis. 

 Regular patrolling, networks of “watchers” recruited from the local 

population, UAVs from JTF to platoon level, tethered aerostats, and 

unattended ground sensors, with a variety of detection capabilities, all 

provide persistent surveillance of secured areas. These are all linked 

together in an integrated sensor network. Hyperspectral sensors on 

UAVs search for signs of disturbed earth or changes in vegetation or 

potholes, indications of possible IEDs; anomalies are immediately 

reported to patrols and bomb-disposal units. Security forces use facialrecognition and digital fingerprinting technologies to build up a database 

of the local population and gain an understanding of local urban 

patterns. Unit positions and motorized patrols are protected by weapons 

that use directional millimeter-wave energy that can repel or incapacitate 

approaching persons without causing permanent injury. Checkpoints 

are also equipped with directed-energy weapons that can disable a 

suspicious approaching vehicle without harming the inhabitants. 

Motorized patrols are equipped with counter-sniper systems, such as 

acoustic shot-detection or ocular incapacitation technology that uses 

retro-reflection to detect eyes or optics and engages with an eye-safe 

laser dazzler that prevents a shooter from acquiring the target. 

 Every effort is made to involve the local population in the security 

effort. For example, the JTF sets up a mechanism that allows any 

person with a cell phone to anonymously report an IED or other 

insurgent activity. For security reasons, the reporting software is easily 

deleted from the cell phone and just as easily downloaded again. 

Learning and Adapting

The design process that the NITF, JTF and some other contingents use is 

explicitly a process of learning and adapting. Each collaborative design 

group makes hypotheses about the underlying logic of the problem it 

faces, identifies information requirements specifically designed to 

corroborate or falsify those hypotheses, tests the hypotheses through 

action, and changes the hypotheses and actions accordingly based on 

feedback. As working causal models change, the NITF and JTF 
 

48

commanders both develop the habit of issuing regular “Guidance 

Memos,” e-mail messages outlining goals and objectives, the rationale for 

all actions, practical “dos” and “don’ts,” and any other pertinent 

instructions designed to guide individual actions. 

 Three examples: 

 Operations by Riverine Squadron 3 to shut down support for the 

insurgency in the delta are immediately effective, resulting in a 

significant decrease in insurgent use of inland waterways. When this 

does not have the expected impact on insurgent strength, the JTF 

intelligence staff surmises that the insurgents have switched to primarily 

ground movement and reorients the collection effort. Based on 

intelligence affirming this judgment, the JTF increases its effort on 

screening of overland avenues of approach into the city. This effort does 

seem to have the desired effect on insurgent strength. The insurgents 

respond with a surge in attacks against U.S. forces and oil facilities, 

which JTF analysts eventually reason is an attempt to draw U.S. forces 

away from the isolation missions. Despite a spike in casualties in the 

short term, the JTF commander takes this development as a 

counterintuitive indicator that the isolation effort is working and refuses 

to be goaded into changing his concept of operations, reasoning that the 

insurgents cannot sustain the increased level of violence on a restricted 

flow of support. He establishes this explicitly as a hypothesis and tasks 

his staff to identify indicators that will refute or corroborate it. In the 

event, a drop-off in enemy operational tempo within a few months 

suggests that the hypothesis is correct, and that the enemy is shifting to 

a different tack. 

 The initial military deployment employs two divisions on the 

ground—2nd Marine Division and Task Force 82—to establish a strong 

presence to get a handle on the security situation. After eight months, 

most of Task Force 82 redeploys. But over the next year the operation 

fails to gain the expected support from the population. The JTF 

commander convenes several special sessions of the Operational Logic 

Working Group, which eventually concludes that the population is 

unwilling to take a stand against the insurgents because the JTF has not 

provided an adequately secure environment. At the same time, training 

of Bafongan military forces is taking longer than expected, and the 

premature deployment of some Bafongan units has actually exacerbated 

the problem. The U.S. Army deploys another division task force—

designated as Task Force 3—which is reinforced by two more U.S. 

brigade combat teams and one Canadian brigade to control the 

expanding area now under government control. These units begin 

redeploying again in less than a year as trained Bafongan forces begin 

assuming a greater role. 

 Despite a significant effort by the NITF to provide support to the 

local population, indicators suggest that living conditions in Port Lewis 

have not improved after a year. Consensus grows among commanders 
 

49

and staff at various echelons that overpopulation is simply overwhelming 

the relief effort. In fact, there are indicators that the significant relief 

effort is drawing more people from the outlying region to the city. The 

NITF begins shifting some aid—provided by military forces and other 

agencies and organizations—to outlying regions to halt the flow of 

refugees to the city. 

 The force adapts quickly at the tactical level as well, employing an 

“open-source” vice a proprietary approach to developing and 

disseminating new methods—for example, disseminating new insurgent 

bomb-making techniques or sharing a new counter-sniper technique via 

online bulletin boards and communities of interest. 

 In these ways, the counterinsurgency campaign changes 

continuously, both from the top down and from the bottom up. Although 

the basic elements of the campaign generally remain unchanged 

throughout the U.S. deployment, the relative weight and the tactical 

application of each element change dramatically. Within the national 

effort, the military role fluctuates over time. By 2019, the U.S. ground 

combat strength in Port Lewis is a division, and by 2020 a reinforced 

brigade. By 2021, the U.S. military presence in the city consists 

essentially of a cadre of trainers and advisors. There are still grievances 

among some elements of the population, and these flare up every once in 

a while, but the violent eruption that in 2015 threatened to tear apart the 

country has been reduced by 2021 to a level that is generally manageable 

by civil authorities. 
 

50

APPENDIX B. ILLUSTRATIVE VIGNETTE B

THE ATTACK ON QABUS, 202740

Throughout the early 2020s, the Republic of Kirmenia proves to be a 

major destabilizing factor in the greater Middle East and is the subject of 

several United Nations sanctions. In late 2026, the Chicago and San 

Francisco attacks, which that summer killed over two thousand, are 

traced back to Kirmenian involvement. In early 2027, the United States 

leads an international coalition in a military campaign to topple the 

hostile regime. 

 The Kirmenian Army has nine active armored or mechanized 

divisions, although these are of variable quality. The best of these are 

the 1st and 3rd Armored. The army can mobilize another five or six 

reserve divisions, which are considered to be poorly trained and 

equipped. The army’s best fighting forces are the 14th Special Forces 

Division, the 12th Parachute Division, the Kirmenian Guards Division, 

which is essentially an armored division, and the Saif al-Ameen (“Sword 

of the Faithful”), a corps of about 5,000 fighters of fanatical loyalty whose 

mission is to protect the regime at all costs. The Kirmenian Air Force 

flies obsolescent aircraft. Kirmenia has no navy. 

 It is clear that the decisive action of the campaign will be the battle 

for Qabus, the Kirmenian capital city. With a population over eight 

million, Qabus is overwhelmingly the largest and most important city in 

Kirmenia. It is one of the oldest continuously inhabited settlements in 

the world. Symbolically, Qabus is Kirmenia. It is the national military 

headquarters, the economic engine, and the cultural and ethnic heart of 

the country. Due in part to international sanctions, Kirmenia is a 

relatively closed society, and Qabus is ethnically and religiously 

homogeneous—over 90 percent Sunni, with very small Druze and Coptic 

Christian populations. By contemporary standards, Qabus is a relatively 

“disconnected” city: all media are state-controlled and internet and cell 

telephone usage are below the global average. 

 Qabus is located in the interior of Kirmenia, 175 miles from the 

nearest international border, at the hub of an extensive road network 

built by the Soviets in the 1960s. Qabus consists of three distinct 

“rings.” First is the ancient city known as Old Qabus, a dense warren of 

residential areas, souks, and religious sites surrounded by a four-mile 

 

40 This is a work of fiction. Any resemblance to actual places, events or operations is 

entirely coincidental. 
 

51

stone wall with 18 gates. At the center is the Qabus Citadel atop its 

prominent mound. Surrounding Old Qabus is the modern city, with 

typical urban infrastructure—vertical architecture, paved streets, 

electricity, underground sewage—although this infrastructure is not 

always highly functional. Modern Qabus has grown in spurts, resulting 

in numerous distinct districts. Last is “post-modern” Qabus, a 

haphazard sprawl of squalid squatter settlements radiating mostly 

northward out of the modern city along the main thoroughfares. These 

are characterized by a lack of modern infrastructure. These sprawling 

ghettos now enclose what once were distinct suburbs—At Tarub, 

Nashabiyah, Durraya, Marj as Samah—in a single, unbroken 

megalopolis. See Figure B-1. 

 Qabus is dominated to the south by mountains. It is immediately 

surrounded west, east, and north by agricultural lands, which feed the 

city. Qabus International Airport is located 20 kilometers north of the 

city center. Qabus is built on an oasis, which is known to be shrinking 

due to population and industrial growth, and is becoming increasingly 

polluted due to industry and sewage. The circumstances of geography 

dictate that coalition ground forces will be forced to attack on a single 

main axis from the west, along the M1 highway corridor. 

 Qabus is a militarized city. It is the national military headquarters 

and headquarters for I Corps, which includes the 1st, 3rd, 6th, and 7th 

Divisions. Military command and control centers are located in 

hardened facilities and communicate by buried landlines. The city is 

protected by a dense integrated air-defense system. Fortified 

emplacements exist throughout the city. Approximately 250 immobilized 

older-model tanks defend the city in depth. Many military positions and 

facilities are sited in close proximity to residential areas, souks, shrines, 

and hospitals. 

 The Kirmenian high command also clearly recognizes that Qabus 

will be the decisive battle and begins flowing forces into the city even as 

coalition forces begin building up in the region. Intelligence analysts 

estimate that the Kirmenians will attempt to inflict as much attrition as 

possible on coalition forces during the advance to Qabus and then will 

attempt to turn Qabus itself into a quagmire by defending every city 

block—all with the intention of driving coalition losses above what the 

member nations are willing to bear. 
 

52

Figure B-1. 

Qabus and Environs. 

Organization

Commander, U.S. Central Command, will command the coalition 

campaign. The coalition commander activates Coalition Joint Task Force 

17 (CJTF-17), a coalition-joint task force headquarters specially 

organized and equipped for civil-military operations. CJTF-17 will 

include engineer, signals, civil affairs, military police, medical, airlift, 

military intelligence, psychological operations, ground combat, special 

operations forces, and other units. It will include liaison teams from a 

variety of other U.S. governmental departments and agencies and some 

nongovernmental organizations. Some of these will be under the 

operational control of CJTF-17; others will have a coordinating 

relationship. Importantly, CJTF-17 will include the U.S. Army’s 3rd Civil 

Affairs Brigade. The brigade includes a reserve civil affairs battalion 
 

53

based in Charlotte, North Carolina, home of the world’s largest 

Kirmenian population outside of Kirmenia. 

 The land component will consist of two corps, U.S. V Corps and I 

Marine Expeditionary Force. V Corps will launch the ground offensive 

against Qabus while I MEF secures the remainder of the country. V 

Corps will consist of five divisions: three U.S. Army divisions, 2nd 

Marine Division, and the European Union 1st Composite Division. The 

three U.S. Army divisions are modular division task forces: Task Force 1 

includes two heavy brigade combat teams (HBCTs), a Stryker brigade 

combat team (SBCT), a fires brigade, a combat aviation brigade, a 

combat support brigade, and a sustainment brigade under 1st Infantry 

Division headquarters; Task Force 10 includes two infantry brigade 

combat teams (IBCTs), an HBCT, an SBCT, a fires brigade, a combat 

aviation brigade, a combat support brigade, and a sustainment brigade 

under 10th Mountain Division headquarters; and Task Force 101 

consists of three IBCTs, an SBCT, a reinforced combat aviation brigade, a 

combat support brigade, and a sustainment brigade under 101st 

Airborne Division (Air Assault) headquarters. 

 The air component, headquartered in Qatar, will conduct air 

operations with forces stationed worldwide. The maritime component 

will provide primarily logistical support, naval aviation support, and 

cruise-missile fires from positions in the Mediterranean Sea, Arabian 

Sea, and Indian Ocean. The special operations component will form 

Coalition Joint Special Operations Task Force-Kirmenia (CJSOTF-K) to 

conduct special operations in theater. 

 U.S. forces make extensive use of first- and second-generation 

ethnic Kirmenians as advisors and translators in return for an expedited 

path to U.S. citizenship. 

Systemic Assessment and Planning

Operational design and planning for the campaign commence once the 

Lake Mead investigation begins to indicate probable Kirmenian 

complicity. Since the attack of the capital will manifestly be the focal 

point of the campaign, CJTF-17, once activated, begins an assessment of 

the situation around Qabus, viewing the city as an organic system in 

terms of its structures, processes, and the functions it performs. An 

existing baseline assessment of the Qabus system serves as a starting 

point. (This was prepared primarily by a pair of foreign area officers with 

18 years of experience with Kirmenia between them. They were 

designated as Kirmenian specialists with the full realization that they 

might never use their expertise in a conflict in their entire careers. They 

are now key members of the systemic assessment.) Using mostly open 

sources, planners seek to identify various individual officials or experts—

city managers, police, judges, politicians, public works supervisors, 

utilities managers, bureaucrats—who could be used to restore the urban 

system to some level of functionality after the fighting. In addition to 
 

54

military staff, the assessment involves urbanologists, sociologists, 

cultural anthropologists, political scientists, civil engineers, experts in 

Kirmenian culture, law enforcement officials, relief experts—some 

organic to the combatant command and some accessed as consultants; 

some collocated with the staff and some accessed through “reachback” 

technologies. Analysts begin to get a sense for the critical elements and 

processes within the urban system and which of those are relatively 

stable and which are not. They begin to get a sense for the level of 

damage that the system is likely to sustain and the level of effort that will 

be required to sustain the population and repair damaged institutions 

and infrastructure. 

 CJTF-17 operational designers assess Qabus as a relatively 

functional and stable, if oppressive, urban system. They conclude that 

the city’s institutions will be able to withstand a significant amount of 

damage to physical infrastructure, which is good since intelligence 

estimates suggest that enemy forces will be deeply rooted in the physical 

and social terrain and will be well supported by the local population, at 

least at first. The crime rate is low, thanks mainly to a large and 

powerful national police force that is concentrated in Qabus. While it 

appears that institutions may hold up, it is clear that the population will 

suffer. The economy is stagnant and has suffered under U.N. sanctions. 

Fuel, food, and other essentials are routinely rationed. Poverty is 

rampant in the large slum areas like Chaaba Jawbar and Chaaba 

Fiddah, which together are home to about three million people. A 

significant Black Market exists in medicines, electronics, clothes, and 

food. There are few reserve stores, so popular suffering as a result of 

coalition attacks will be dramatic and almost immediate. Military 

command and control, both within the city and throughout the country, 

is likewise centralized and vulnerable to systemic attack. 

Influencing the Local Population

The combatant commander does not establish a coalition psychological 

operations task force (CPOTF), but instead assigns psychological 

operations units to CJTF-17 to ensure that psychological operations are 

well aligned with the civil-military effort, which he sees as critical to 

eventual success. 

 Coalition and CJTF-17 planners have no delusions about winning 

the willing support of the general population, in Qabus or across the 

country. (Intelligence has identified some subversive elements in 

Kirmenia that may be willing to cooperate with the coalition. These tend 

to be marginalized groups, however, with little potential for assuming a 

leadership role after the fighting.) The Kirmenian people may live under 

an oppressive regime, but they will support that regime over foreign 

invaders. Planners estimate that the best the invasion force will be able 

to achieve is general non-interference based on consistent and humane 

treatment of the population over time. The coalition commander decides 
 

55

it is critical that all personnel are perfectly clear on what constitutes 

acceptable treatment of the local population, and he issues guidance to 

all personnel explaining his expectations. 

 All personnel receive cultural training. This is meant to augment 

the more in-depth cultural and language training that select members of 

most units receive. Thanks to incentive programs that provide bonuses 

for foreign language skills, Arabic speakers are distributed throughout 

U.S. forces. Contract interpreters are also used extensively. To facilitate 

communications with the indigenous population when translators are 

not available, forces down to the squad level are also equipped with 

automated translation technology that recognizes Kirmenian Arabic and 

several other local dialects. 

 Planners recognize that there will be inevitable unintended civilian 

casualties and damage, sometimes significant, as a consequence of 

combat operations. Funds are distributed down to the company level for 

disbursement of reparations as justified. 

 The coalition hires a world-renowned Madison Avenue public 

relations firm to supplement the public affairs and psychological 

operations capabilities resident in the force in improving the public 

image of coalition forces—among Kirmenians, with the various domestic 

publics, and internationally—using techniques long-ago honed to a 

science in American election campaigns. A key objective is to counter 

the narrative that this Western invasion is merely the latest in a long 

string of infidel Crusades aimed at destroying the Muslim world. The PR 

firm consults with aid organizations, former diplomats, relief workers, 

Kirmenian émigrés now living in the United States, and cultural 

anthropologists. It conducts focus-group polling with Kirmenian 

audiences to determine what messages resonate most. All personnel are 

provided with talking points and behavioral expectations. 

 CJTF-17 conducts extensive public information and psychological 

operations to inform the populace as to the reasons for the invasion, 

provide safety warnings and instructions for cooperation, and explain 

coalition objectives and expectations—both what the people can expect 

from coalition forces and what coalition forces expect from the people. 

This program eventually makes use of a wide variety of media including 

radio and television broadcasts, printed fliers and handbills, web posts, 

blogs, email, and cell telephone voice and text messages. 

Opening Moves

During the early months of 2027, coalition forces begin to stage in the 

region—both the combat resources that will defeat the Kirmenian 

military and the civil-military resources that will support and rehabilitate 

Kirmenian society. At staging bases around the world, ammunition 

stores stack up next to relief supplies and construction equipment. 

Combat formations share strategic and operational lift with units 

earmarked for reconstruction missions. 
 

56

 In March, special operations forces develop contacts with 

Kirmenian subversive groups that may support the invasion, gather 

targeting information for upcoming operations, and collect intelligence in 

support of the ongoing assessment of the urban system. Coalition forces 

and materials continue to stage in the theater. 

 On 26 April, coalition aviation and cruise missiles, often directed 

by special operations forces, begin striking key government and military 

targets with the objective of destroying as much of Kirmenia’s 

conventional military capability as possible, both in the approaches to 

Qabus and within the city itself. The strikes attack key headquarters, 

operational reserves, logistics facilities, artillery and rocket batteries, and 

air defenses. Attacks against operational formations concentrate on 1st 

Armored Division, 12th Parachute Division, 14th Special Forces Division 

and the Kirmenian Islamic Guards Division. Strikes also target some 

dual-use infrastructure, including sectors of the electrical grid. Here the 

intent is to disable these systems with reversible effects so that services 

can be restored quickly when needed. 

 The ground offensive commences on 10 May, with V Corps rolling 

across the border and driving directly for Qabus with Task Force 1 in the 

lead. The Kirmenian forces that remain after the systematic two-week 

bombardment are no match for coalition air-ground combined arms. 

Kirmenian 1st Armored Division, considered one of the best formations 

in the regular Kirmenian Army, is quickly destroyed. V Corps covers 

some 200 miles in five days, closing on Qabus by 15 May. By the time V 

Corps moves into final attack positions west of Qabus, most of 

Kirmenia’s regular forces have been destroyed. Intelligence estimates 

that some 30,000 enemy fighters now occupy the capital. These include 

remnants of the 3rd and 6th Divisions that have withdrawn into the city 

to fight as irregulars after being defeated on the road to Qabus, elements 

of the 14th Special Forces Division, 12-15 Saif al-Ameen companies, 

local militia, and a small number of Kirmenian and foreign fighters who 

have managed to infiltrate into the city. These forces occupy positions in 

depth throughout the city, digging in among the rubble left from the 

coalition bombardment. Intelligence also estimates that there remain as 

many as 100 immobilized tanks in defensive positions around the city, 

some 15-25 surface-to-air missile batteries, and as many artillery or 

rocket batteries. 

Isolation of the City

On 15 May, as other V Corps forces approach Qabus from the west, Task 

Force 101 moves by air into battalion-sized blocking positions south and 

east of Qabus, where they link up with special operations forces that 

have been operating in the area for weeks. The division will be supported 

entirely by air until link-up with advancing ground forces. The division’s 

mission is to isolate Qabus, preventing the influx of forces, individual 

fighters, and any materials that could support the enemy in the city. 
 

57

Unattended ground sensors and aviation, including operational and 

tactical UAVs with a variety of sensor packages, augment the blocking 

positions in detecting hostile movements. On 15, 17, and 18 May, Task 

Force 101 units call in repeated air strikes to destroy Kirmenian 

mechanized forces, believed to be Guards units, trying to reinforce the 

city. After that date, they see no more large conventional formations, but 

are instead dealing almost exclusively with individuals and small groups 

of irregulars trying to infiltrate into the city and large numbers of 

apparent civilians trying to evacuate. Blocking positions rely on facialrecognition and digital fingerprinting technology to identify suspicious 

persons. Checkpoints detain or turn away all suspicious persons and 

any materials or items not on a predetermined list of approved goods. 

(Based on feedback from the 101st checkpoints, CJTF-17 civil affairs 

personnel continuously review and revise the approved list.) Large 

scanner arrays with combinations of sensor capabilities span the major 

roads; all vehicles and persons must pass through them. Some scanners 

are designed to detect armaments, explosives and toxic chemicals that 

could be used for chemical warfare. Some detect persons with possible 

hostile intent. Based on feedback from the data collection from Task 

Force 101’s checkpoints, intelligence analysts reach a better 

understanding of adversary movement patterns and routine urban flows, 

which leads to tactical and operational adjustments on the ground. 

 

The Ground Attack 

V Corps briefly occupies attack positions on the outskirts of Qabus and 

begins to advance on 20 May. Elements of 2nd Marine Division make 

the first contact, overrunning dug-in Kirmenian forces at the small 

settlement of Hawsh an Najiyah northwest of Diya in a short but intense 

fight. The Marines push on to secure Hawsh ar Rafal on 22 May and 

continue east to capture Al Fawza on 26 May after two days of fighting. 

Second Marine Regiment bypasses Al Fawza and captures Qabus 

International Airport on 27 May; on 28 May, 460th Air Expeditionary 

Wing begins delivering supplies in support of both the ground forces and 

CJTF-17 operations to sustain the local population. QIAP will be a 

critical airhead for flowing support into Qabus to keep the urban system 

functioning throughout the fighting, so a Marine infantry battalion is 

detached to provide security for the airport until relieved by security 

forces assigned to CJTF-17. Another reinforced Marine infantry battalion 

continues clockwise around the northeastern part of the city to make 

contact with Task Force 101 on 30 May. 

 On 20 May, advancing east on the M1 axis, Task Force 1 meets 

resistance at Diya, a suburb of 20,000 on the western slope of Jabal Abu 

al Awar about 15 kilometers west of the city. It is the first real indication 

of the ferocity of fighting to come. Kirmenian forces fight from fortified 

positions in populated areas, shrines and hospitals. They conduct 

ambushes and employ emplaced and robotic mines, improvised explosive 
 

58

devices (IEDs), snipers, human shields, and suicide bombers. It will take 

one HBCT three days of house-to-house fighting to secure the town. On 

22 May, the Saif al-Ameen begins forcing refugees by the tens of 

thousands west out of the city to disrupt the advance of Task Force 1. 

Irregular forces ranging from individual suicide bombers to platoons 

equipped with automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) 

are interspersed among the refugees to attack U.S. forces at close range 

and complicate target discrimination for the superior U.S. forces. 

Advancing American units employ a combination of airborne and vehiclemounted millimeter-wave emitters to clear the refugees off the route of 

advance and portable barriers and anti-traction material to canalize 

refugee movements. Kirmenian artillery batteries in Qabus, controlled by 

forward observers moving among the refugees, begin shelling the refugee 

column to create confusion and inflict massive casualties for the 

Americans to deal with. Since the Kirmenian artillery fire originates from 

a known residential area, the American counterbattery response is to 

engage the artillery with high-energy lasers, which destroy the guns with 

no collateral damage, and to repel the gun crews with an airborne 

millimeter-wave directed-energy weapon. Later, observed fires controlled 

by an Air Force aerial observer will destroy the dug-in firing position. 

Forty-first IBCT, which has been assigned to CJTF-17 in a security role, 

moves forward to deal with the refugees. Elements from 2nd Marine 

Logistics Group, moving directly behind Task Force 1, quickly assemble 

“pop-up” prefabricated encampments to create temporary refugee camps 

off the main axis of advance. Task Force 1 pushes on to Dayr Alhena, 

which it secures on 26 May. There the division halts, reverting to corps 

reserve while continuing to deal with the forced refugee flow. Meanwhile, 

one SBCT moves northeast to secure the ghetto-slum of Chaaba Jawbar, 

which turns out to be defended in strength by dug-in irregular forces 

employing automatic weapons, RPGs, mortars, and improvised explosive 

devices. Intelligence later identifies elements from the 12th and 14th 

Divisions and the Saif al-Ameen. It is here that the enemy’s first 

instance of hostage-taking occurs, as four U.S. soldiers are taken. The 

American response is immediate and aggressive, but remains 

discriminate. In the makeshift construction of the ghetto, the brigade 

employs reduced-caliber munitions in its tank main guns to minimize 

collateral damage. Technology designed to locate people inside buildings 

proves effective, as do nonlethal building-clearing devices that cause the 

occupants to vacate the shanty structures. 

 Meanwhile, the European 1st Division advances on the southern 

axis, meeting little resistance until it reaches At Tahiyat overlooking the 

city from the southwest. Kirmenian infantry forces fight tenaciously for 

this dominant terrain, but European Union forces secure the town by 25 

May, thanks in large part to precision-guided bombing from U.S. naval 

and Air Force aviation. The Baltic Brigade continues counterclockwise 

around the south side of the city, making contact with elements of Task 
 

59

Force 101 on 28 May and holding a solid lodgment in Nashabiyah by 3 

June after a four-day fight. The Franco-German Brigade continues on 

and captures Najha on 10 June. 

 Throughout the advance of V Corps, CJSOTF-K units have 

continued to operate within the city, calling in precision air strikes 

against key military and governmental targets and laying the groundwork 

for follow-on CJTF-17 operations. On the morning of 25 May, human 

intelligence sources inside the city report that several high-ranking 

regime officials are trying to escape. Air Force UAVs track the threevehicle convoy as it passes through Chaaba Fiddah. Meanwhile, a raid 

package is put together in under 90 minutes using real-time distributed 

collaboration capabilities. A U.S. Air Force airborne high-energy laser 

disables the vehicles as they speed northeast on an open stretch of 

Highway 12. CJSOTF-K units move in by helicopter on the disabled 

vehicles, capturing nine first- and second-tier regime officials. 

 V Corps now has footholds on the western and southern limits of 

the city; the main ground attack will now come from the north. From 

now on the Americans will be attacking through contiguous urban 

terrain. The advance will occur in fits and starts as forces build up 

necessary combat power, push through a fortified defensive belt, and 

then recover. Second Marine Division attacks from the north and 

northeast on the M8 and Highway 12 corridors, striking Marj as Samah 

and Chaaba Fiddah on 28 May. The attacks bog down in the face of 

determined resistance by elements of the 3rd Armored Division 

reconstituted as irregular infantry. Kirmenian irregular forces employ 

chlorine-based chemical IEDs for the first time, inflicting some casualties 

on Marine forces until warnings are broadcast to all forces to adopt 

protective postures. The Marines make use of extensive psychological 

operations and public information activities aimed at encouraging the 

civilian population to evacuate the city. Sometimes even at the expense 

of tactical surprise, they provide warning before attacking, giving the 

population a deadline by which to evacuate. Navy shore patrol units 

manage the flow of people. Engineer elements from 2nd Marine Logistics 

Group and 460th Combat Engineer Squadron have begun constructing a 

major refugee camp outside the International Airport to handle the 

possible refugee flow. In the end the Marines have little choice but to 

level whole sections of Marj as Samah, making heavy use of attack 

helicopters and fixed-wing attack aircraft employing reduced-diameter, 

precision-guided bombs. Sixth Marines secure Marj as Samah on 6 

June. CJTF-17 elements move in directly behind them to begin 

reconstruction of the heavily-damaged district. Second Marines pass 

through and begin the assault into Durraya, which is expected to be an 

enemy stronghold defended by elements of the 14th Special Forces 

Division. This phase sees the first significant examples of high-rise and 

subterranean fighting. The Marines use severe malodorants and 

acoustic weapons designed for cave-clearing to flush enemy forces out of 
 

60

the underground sewer system.41 Meanwhile, 8th Marines are slowly 

advancing through Chaaba Fiddah, which poses completely different 

kinds of challenges. The lighter, makeshift construction does not offer 

the enemy the same defensive advantages that the block and stone 

construction of Marj as Samah does, but the dense population and the 

tightly packed, random layout of the built-up area places a greater 

premium on discrimination. The division finally captures Chaaba Fiddah 

and Durraya by 16 June, and halts for an operational pause, now 

concentrating on maintaining tight control of the potentially volatile 

sectors it has just captured. 

 Meanwhile Task Force 10 has followed in trace of 2nd Marine 

Division as it pushes east on Highway 27. West of Al Fawza, Task Force 

10 turns south to conduct the main attack into the heart of Qabus. 

Because of this mission, Task Force 10’s combat support brigade has 

been assigned additional psychological operations, civil affairs, public 

affairs, military police, and combat engineer units. Task Force 10’s 

brigades have all recently completed rotations at the Joint Urban 

Training Center-South (commonly known as “Jutland” by the troops) in 

New Orleans, where they billeted in abandoned buildings, patrolled the 

streets and lived off the local economy continuously for three months. 

 Like the other U.S. ground formations, Task Force 10 is well 

equipped for urban operations. Capabilities include reduced-caliber 

main-gun rounds to minimize collateral damage, high-energy lasers for 

ultra-precise engagement, nonlethal weapons that use millimeter-wave 

energy for crowd control and force protection, close-in active protection 

against incoming RPGs and similar low-velocity projectiles, nonlethal 

high-decibel acoustic weapons (which can also be used as long-range 

hailing and warning devices), UAV ground-control, high-power white light 

and laser dazzlers for temporary ocular incapacitation, automated antisniper shot-detection, and multi-spectral sensors with optical, radar, 

infrared, acoustic, and chemical-biological detection. The division’s 

maneuver units are equipped with mini-UAVs down to platoon level. 

 Task Force 10 strikes Ad Durayj on 24 May. Its attached 

psychological operations, civil affairs and military police elements are 

integrated into its line units down to the company level. The division 

reaches the northern edge of the modern city by 14 June, providing food, 

clothing, and emergency medical treatment for the civil population as it 

advances. Public affairs personnel work with the media to publicize 

these efforts and maximize their impact among the population. Spent 

 

41 The Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 

Compliance Review Group (CRG) is assessing whether malodorants are considered riot 

control agents (RCAs). If considered RCAs, then use as a method of warfare is 

prohibited under the CWC (Art. I, Para. 5). If malodorants are not assessed as an RCA, 

use would be subject to CR approval. 
 

61

after three weeks of continuous operations, the division digs in and 

concentrates on controlling the areas it has captured. 

Task Force 1, which has been holding at Dayr Alhena and Chaaba 

Jawbar since 30 May, begins pushing east again on 7 June and has 

secured At Tarub by 15 June. It now drives into the heart of modern 

Qabus, which means clearing some buildings as tall as 10 stories. With 

enemy forces oriented north to face Task Force 10, it makes slow but 

steady progress against fierce resistance, systematically clearing areas as 

it advances. By 5 July, Task Force 1 has pushed east of Old Qabus, 

which it surrounds but does not enter. Second Marine Logistics Group 

continues to follow in trace, providing immediate support for the 

population and stopgap repairs to critical urban infrastructure. Old 

Qabus becomes the target of an intense propaganda campaign designed 

to encourage the population to evacuate the walled city. Intelligence 

indicates that Old Qabus is defended by significant numbers of Saif alAmeen that are executing civilians who attempt to leave. 

 The Baltic Brigade strikes north out of Nashabiyah and overruns 

Asfar Military Airfield on 4 July. The attack is initially intended as a 

raid, but based on the weakening resistance it meets, the brigade digs in. 

Task Force 1 also senses the weakening resistance, and an SBCT pushes 

into the heart of downtown Qabus, linking up with advance elements of 

2nd Marine Regiment at the public fountain at Ibn al Qutayha Square on 

16 July. 

 The British Brigade moves into Al Ghusulah, an industrial suburb 

southeast of the city, on 14 July. Elements of 12th Parachute Division 

continue to resist from fortified positions in the industrial construction. 

Most of the civilian population has evacuated, however, and the British 

are able to mass artillery and airpower to rubble the area. Task Force 

101 moves into Al Jaraba and meets only token resistance. 

 Old Qabus is now the one sector of the city not under coalition 

control. The task will fall to Task Force 10 to capture the ancient walled 

city. Because of the large number of culturally significant sites and the 

considerable civilian population still inside the old city, the decision is 

made to move slowly and escalate gradually as necessary. Speed of 

advance is not considered a critical factor at this stage. Airborne highenergy lasers strike precisely at key point targets as they are acquired 

and confirmed inside Old Qabus. These targets include loudspeakers on 

the mosques, which are being used to broadcast tactical instructions. 

Coalition snipers pick off enemy fighters who expose themselves inside 

the ancient city from upper stories of surrounding buildings. 

 On the night of 22 July, elements of two IBCTs break into the 

ancient city through the Bab al-Salam, Bab Sharqi and Bab al-Souq 

gates. They move systematically from building to building. Although 

they make extensive use of nonlethal and reduced-caliber weapons 

because of the density and proximity of the population, it is a slow and 

bloody process, with engagements often taking place at ranges less than 
 

62

50 meters. When the situation requires and conditions permit, soldiers 

use shoulder-launched thermobaric weapons to implode buildings in 

which enemy forces are dug in. In other cases they use nonlethal devices 

to empty buildings, sometimes deploying the devices into the buildings 

with ground robots. The ability to clear buildings without having to enter 

them—even though not always possible—saves the lives of countless 

noncombatants and American soldiers. They use persistent malodorants 

to render key buildings uninhabitable to prevent enemy forces from 

reoccupying them after they leave. 

 Immediately behind the advancing combat forces are civil affairs 

and military police units, which quickly screen civilians and evacuate 

them from the area, at which point they are immediately provided any 

needed emergency medical treatment. This assistance is covered by 

public affairs personnel for distribution to the media. The assault takes 

on some of the characteristics of an ongoing hostage-rescue operation, as 

U.S. forces process hundreds of civilians as they advance. 

 By 4 August, the last defenders are holed up near the Taba’een 

Great Mosque, for which the V Corps commander has established very 

restrictive rules of engagement. Task Force 10 makes extensive use of its 

various nonlethal technologies, coupled with unrelenting psychological 

operations by various means, to try to drive the defenders from the 

buildings. Assault elements from 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (an 

SBCT assigned to Task Force 10) gradually tighten the noose around the 

defenders, employing their attached combat engineers to disable the 

numerous booby traps and IEDs that the enemy has rigged. On 11 

August, assault elements kill or capture the last die-hard defenders, 

making maximum use of weapons that minimize structural damage, and 

the city is declared secured. 

 

Control and Rehabilitation

During July and August, even as intense fighting continues, the main 

effort shifts from defeating the enemy to controlling and rehabilitating 

the city—that is, the emphasis shifts from major combat to stability, 

security, transition, and reconstruction. Even before Qabus is secured, 

CJTF-17 establishes an Occupation Municipal Government. The 

coalition commander wants to “put a Kirmenian face on the 

rehabilitation. Find a local official for every service or institution from 

the start, and then give him a stake in stability,” he instructs. Municipal 

officials and others with knowledge of the working of the city who were 

identified during planning are now being recruited to support the 

rehabilitation. Special operations forces and intelligence operatives have 

for several weeks similarly been developing contacts with officials and 

others who might be willing to cooperate with the coalition in restoring 

the city to normalcy. 

 CJTF-17 personnel have made arrangements to reopen markets. 

They have previously made arrangements to restart the shipment of 
 

63

goods into the city from other countries in the region. They disburse 

funds to encourage the opening of local businesses. They hire local 

companies to do initial clean-up and reconstruction work. CJTF-17 

institutes a weapons and munitions buy-back program, including 

rewards for reporting weapons and munitions caches. Public affairs 

personnel promote these actions to the media and encourage news 

coverage of the ongoing efforts. 

 Engineer units—the Marines’ 8th Engineer Support Battalion, the 

Army’s 130th Engineer Brigade, Naval Construction Regiment 1, U.S. Air 

Force 460th Combat Engineer Squadron, Army Corps of Engineer 

detachments, and even several civilian engineering and construction 

companies under contract to the Department of Defense—work side-byside with local companies in rebuilding damaged and destroyed 

infrastructure according to established priorities. 

 A key element of rehabilitation is addressing public health issues 

in Qabus. CTF-17 includes personnel from medical treatment and 

preventive medicine units, which quickly move into the community to 

provide medical care and perform a public health assessment of the city. 

A pre-invasion assessment by the Central Command medical staff has 

depicted a backwards public health system in disrepair. Wargaming has 

estimated the additional damage that combat operations would inflict. 

Now Army preventive medicine detachments, Navy forward-deployed 

preventive medicine units, and Air Force preventive and aerospace 

medicine teams move in to assess actual conditions on the ground, 

analyzing potable water and wastewater systems, infectious disease 

vectors and rates, environmental hazards, immunization programs, 

nutrition, maternity and infant health care, and other factors. Based on 

this assessment, CTF-17 personnel work to rebuild Qabus’ public health 

system, restoring some health services to pre-war levels and actually 

improving others. They institute upgrades at local hospitals, reopen 

clinics, and restaff both with Kirmenian and foreign medical personnel. 

 None of this rehabilitation is possible without a secure 

environment, and this becomes V Corps’ primary mission after Old 

Qabus falls. The corps commander is very sensitive to the possibility of 

an emergent insurgency, and his immediate goal is to keep a very tight 

lid on the situation to prevent the creation of the chaotic conditions that 

might give rise to public unrest. Toward that end, the coalition 

establishes a strict curfew (one of the tasks of the propaganda effort is to 

explain the need for and temporary nature of such measures). 

 The coalition commander sees this period of time as a critical 

transitional phase—“the Golden Hour,” he calls it—in which the coalition 

must move the situation toward stability before it can tip toward 

grievance, unrest, and rebellion. Key to the coalition’s success will be 

adapting the force quickly to the fundamentally new situation. “The 

Qabus system has undergone a phase change,” he writes in one of his 

guidance e-mails. “New environment, new dynamics, new challenges. 
 

64

This is no longer an invasive surgical procedure to get rid of a cancer; it 

is an effort to stabilize the patient.” Planners develop a new operational 

design with a new guiding logic, which is disseminated to all echelons. 

They develop time-based metrics to judge whether their new hypotheses 

are valid or not, and these metrics drive the collection plan. As units are 

periodically rotated for rest they receive training in the dynamics of the 

new situation—“reprogramming,” as the troops like to call it. 

 Task Force 1 has been transferred to I MEF operational control 

for operations elsewhere in theater, so V Corps now has four divisions to 

secure a city of eight million people. In the end, controlling the city 

comes down to continuous and pervasive patrolling and surveillance. 

This includes use of vehicle-mounted multi-spectral sensors, manned 

aircraft and UAVs of various types, tethered aerostats carrying a variety 

of sensor suites, and a variety of disposable and recoverable unattended 

ground sensors. It also involves continuous monitoring of radio 

communications, including cell phone and microwave. 

 Security forces continue to screen movement of people, vehicles 

and shipments into, out of and through the city through a system of 

checkpoints. These checkpoints employ facial-recognition and digital 

fingerprint technologies to build a database of local residents and to 

identify and detain persons of interest. From this growing database 

intelligence analysts gain a better understanding of Qabus’ normal flow 

patterns, and from this forces can adapt their actions on the ground. 

 Improving security means restoring law and order at least to the 

level that existed before the invasion. This means returning local police 

officers to the streets. Military police assigned to CJTF-17 train and 

patrol with municipal police forces, progressively turning responsibility 

over to the local forces. They employ the latest forensic techniques and 

technologies to fight crime and subversive activity. 

 

Conclusion 

As the security situation holds steady, and then begins to improve over 

time, other agencies, governments, and nongovernmental organizations 

increase their participation. Military forces increasingly concentrate on 

security and leave other activities—reconstruction, governance support, 

institutional reform—to other agencies. Kirmenian society, and in 

particular Qabus, shows signs of recovering. The United Nations arrives 

to oversee the creation of a new Kirmenian government and takes an 

increasing role in stabilization and reconstruction. The coalition 

gradually reduces its military presence. In May 2028, 13 months after 

the start of the coalition campaign, the coalition transfers overall 

authority to the United Nations, although the United States and other 

coalition partners will maintain a military presence in Kirmenia for years 

to come.
APPENDIX C. TABLE OF CAPABILITIES, TASKS & MEASURES 

JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

JUO-001.1: Collect, 

process, post and access intelligence information on the location, status and activities of hostile, potentially hostile or subverted elements in a cluttered urban environment. 

M1: Hours since most current intelligence information 

was last collected. M2: Hours since all available collection assets were integrated into a comprehensive collection plan. M3: Percent of PIRs collected in time to meet current operational needs. M4: Percent of PIRs with at least one source yielding intelligence information. M5: Percent of PIRs with more than one source yielding intelligence information. M6: Percent of total targets accurately identified prior to attack. M7: Percent of targets accurately located. 

JUO-001 (Battlespace Awareness): 

The ability to collect, disseminate and access situational information on an urban system. 

JUO-001.2: Maintain, 

provide, post and access information on the location, status, activities and plans of friendly forces, down to the small-unit or even individual level. 

M1: Percent of friendly forces accurately reporting 

location, status and activities. M2: Frequency in minutes of friendly location, status and activity reporting. 

M3: Percent of friendly units, individuals, platforms, end 

items and materials providing automated positionlocation information. 

MCO 2.0 - 0

broadly accefriendly compicture (CROMCO 2.0-00

display all stand influenccampaign plMCO 2.0-01and shared uinteragency, in order to kthe operatioadversaries, MCO 2.0-01sustain a peappropriateltailored ISR MCO 2.0-04to-tactical coincluding inpartners, to situational aunderstandiSSTR 2.0 C
JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

JUO-001.3: Collect, 

maintain, post and access information on the location, status and activities of neutral elements in a cluttered urban environment, including the populace and governmental and nongovernmental agencies and organizations. 

M1: Hours since most current intelligence information 

was last collected. M2: Hours of instances all available collection assets were integrated into a comprehensive collection plan. M3: Percent of PIRs collected in time to meet current operational needs. M4: Percent of PIRs with at least one source yielding intelligence information. M5: Percent of PIRs with more than one source yielding intelligence information. 

JUO-001.4: Collect, 

maintain, process, post and access information on the functioning of urban institutions and processes. 

M1: Number of critical urban organizational structures, 

processes and functions for which information has been collected. M2: Number of key municipal leaders or officials identified. M3: Weeks to assess threats to installation and community critical infrastructure through joint military and civilian partnership vulnerability assessments. M4: Minutes to assess damage to infrastructure at locations of operational interest (key military bases, critical infrastructure nodes; etc). M5: Minutes to assess potential impacts to critical infrastructure/assets. 

JUO-001.5: Provide 

three-dimensional mapping data on urban terrain, to include data on the composition of urban construction, 

M1: Percent of urban areas for which three-dimensional 

mapping data is available. 

M2: Percent of underground and interior spaces mapped 

in any given urban area. M3: Percent of any given urban area for which data on exterior apertures, building composition, and multiple 

conduct seaamong DOD agencies, anprior to, durcompletion oSSTR 2.0 C

develop intecoordinate, acollection asthe tactical lSSTR 2.0 Cunderstand which operathe culture oorganizationIW 0.7-014C

exploit inforObtain signiInformation forces and thcharacteristand its resid
JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

presence of multiple stories, locations of apertures (i.e., doors and windows) in building exteriors, mapping of interior and underground spaces, and changes in terrain due to combat or other causes. 

stories is available. M4: Days since mapping data has been updated for any 

given urban area. 

JUO-002.1: Assess and 

model an urban complex as a dynamic, living system. 

M1: Time to provide comprehensive analysis of physical, 

climatic, economic, political, and military characteristics in commander's area of interest. M2: Minutes to access current situation and formulate plan of action. M3: Percent of a given urban complex represented by a model. M4: Weeks to assess HN government, including economic conditions and attitudes of civilians. M5: Percent of available operational sources integrated 

with intelligence sources for combat assessment. M6: Yes/No Threat, friendly and neutral capabilities were 

identified in the IPB process and accounted for in the military decision-making process. M7: Time required to incorporate new intelligence data and products into ongoing threat evaluations. M8: Time to update or create threat, friendly and neutral models or templates. 

JUO-002 (Battlespace Awareness):

The ability to assess an urban operational situation systemically. 

JUO-002.2: Assess 

and model an urban adversary as a dynamic, living system embedded 

M1: Percent of any given of urban complex visually 

represented. M2: Seconds to access and display shared local data 

MCO 2.0-01

and shared uinteragency, in order to kthe operatioadversaries, MCO 2.0-01assessment information, include secoMCO 2.0-01holistic undeof all parties the conflict. MCO 2.0-03force projectsustainment achieve sharmultiple echMCO 2.0-04tactical collaincluding inpartners, to 
JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

within the urban system, as the basis for defeating it effectively and efficiently.

bases. M3: Seconds to access and display shared remote data 

bases. M4: Seconds to update current information. M5: Minutes lag between joint force common operational picture and real world situation. M6: Percent accuracy of mission-essential information maintained on situation displays. M7: Percent accuracy of data used by operations staff. M8: Yes/No The threat’s capabilities were stated in the IPB process and accounted for in the military decision process. M9: Time required incorporating new intelligence data 

and products into ongoing threat evaluations. M10: Time To update or create threat models or 

templates.

JUO-002.3: Provide a 

dynamic, visual representation of an urban system, to include the urban adversary system. 

M1: Time to provide comprehensive analysis of physical, 

climatic, economic, political, and military characteristics in commander's area of interest. M2: Minutes to access current situation and formulate plan of action. M3: Percent of available operational sources integrated 

with intelligence sources for combat assessment. M4: Number of critical enemy operational variables 

identified in a timely manner. M5: Instances of enemy operational plans or actions correctly anticipated. M6: Time to direct, establish, and control the means by which the various staffs and forces send and receive operationally significant data/information. 

situational aunderstandiMCO 2.0-05

processes, aholistically uparties with conflict (advmultinationaIW 0.7-002C

operational IW 0.7-028Cappropriate support the and operatio
JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

M7: Time to display shared local databases. 

M8: Time for decision maker to understand display in decision making. M9: Percent accuracy of mission-essential information maintained on situation displays. M10: Percent of operational displays that are current. 

JUO-002.4: Identify 

critical functions, processes, organizations, locations and relationships within an urban system and an urban adversary. 

M1: Estimated percent of friendly, neutral, hostile, 

potentially hostile or subverted elements with current status known. M2: Seconds to access and display shared local data bases. M3: Seconds to access and display shared remote data bases. M4: Seconds to update current information. M5: Minutes lag between joint force common operational picture and real world situation. M6: Percent accuracy of mission-essential information maintained on situation displays. M7: Percent accuracy of data used by operations staff. 

JUO-002.5: Estimate 

the intentions and plans of neutral, hostile or potentially hostile elements in a cluttered urban environment, including governmental and nongovernmental agencies and organizations. 

M1: Number of potential neutral, hostile or potentially 

hostile elements' operational branches and sequels identified during planning. M2: Time to provide comprehensive analysis of physical, 

climatic, economic, political, social, cultural and military characteristics in commander's area of interest. M3: Minutes to access current situation and formulate plan of action. M4: Percent of available operational sources integrated 
JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

with intelligence sources for combat assessment. 

JUO-003.1: Command 

and control the joint force. 

M1: Minutes to process and disseminate status 

information (to subordinate units). M2: Percent of available information examined and considered in latest status reporting. M3: Percent of organizations or units receiving latest 

information. 

JUO-003.2:

Coordinate operations with foreign military partners. 

M1: Percent of appropriate foreign military partners' 

resources and capabilities factored into operational plans. M2: Percent of components, involved foreign governments, and NGOs (suitably) represented on designated joint force staff. M3: Hours to establish liaison with appropriate foreign nation military officials (after mission assignment). 

JUO-003 (Command and Control):

The ability to integrate all the various elements of urban operations within the context of a theater campaign. 

JUO-003.3:

Coordinate actions with nonmilitary agencies and organizations. 

M1: Estimated percent of appropriate nonmilitary 

agencies and organizations' resources and capabilities factored into operational plans. M2: Percent of components, involved foreign governments, and NGOs appropriately represented on or cooperating with designated joint force staff. M3: Hours to establish liaison with appropriate nonmilitary agencies and organizations (after mission assignment). M4: Days to establish CMOC to conduct liaison with and to coordinate activities with NGOs in the JOA. 

MCO 2.0-00

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JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

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JUO-004 JUO-004.1: Make M1: Minutes to access current situation and formulate MCO 2.0-04
JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

assertions about the functioning of the urban system and embedded adversaries based on the systemic assessment. 

plan of action. M2: Hours to develop and provide operational options. 

M3: Percent of time mission-essential intelligence and threat assessments passed within established time criteria. M4: Minutes to assess potential impacts to critical infrastructure/assets. M5: Hours to generate a comprehensive analysis of characteristics of commander’s area of interest. M6: Percent of questions on enemy military forces answered by data in joint force intelligence databases. 

JUO-004.2: Establish 

and promulgate measures for evaluating those assertions. 

M1: Instances of time commander/senior staff made 

aware of emerging political, economic, or military event (which could impact theater) from outside source. M2: Percent of enemy actions or operations forecast. M3: Days to determine FP enhancement processes/procedures/facility modifications, etc and provide "answer" to the combatant commander. M4: Hours to construct an adaptive plan against one target M5: Hours to provide intelligence support for adaptive planning.

(Command and Control):

The ability to adapt operations to the changing situation. 

JUO-004.3: Collect 

information on measures of operational effectiveness. 

M1: Percent of limitations (constraints and restraints) 

identified that significantly affect the operation. M2: Percent of requests for collection or production validated. M3: Hours to prepare report on available collection assets. M4: Instances of incoming information (which could affect outcome of operation) not getting to person 

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JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

responsible for action. M5: Minutes to enter most current information on force 

status. M6: Time to complete organizational assessment. M7: Time to provide full assessment to force commander. M8: Time to provide initial assessment of operations to 

force commander. 

JUO-004.4: Assess 

collected information to evaluate assertions about the functioning of the urban system and embedded adversaries. 

M1: Subjective evaluation of collected information. 

M2: Yes/No Relevant information that meets the quality criteria serves the commander’s needs. M3: Time to conduct assessment of collected relevant data. M4: Percent of available information examined and considered in latest status reporting. M5: Percent accuracy of data transmitted/disseminated. M6: Percent of time information passed within established time criteria. M7: Percent of time information on CCIR passed within established time criteria. M8: Percent of time mission-essential intelligence and threat assessments passed within established time criteria. 

JUO-004.5: Prior to 

executing operations, plan branches, sequels and COA development to address possible changes to the urban system or adversary 

M1: Days into future planning branches have been 

developed. M2: Percent of decision points that have branches. 

M3: Percent of forecast branches that appeared at execution. M4: Days into future that planning is completed and 
JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

situation. available. 

M5: Percent of decision points that have sequels. 

M6: Percent of enemy actions or operations forecast. M7: Percent of identified sequels with COAs developed. M8: Percent of possible follow-on operations that have 

preplanned sequels.

JUO-004.6: Modify the 

organization design and subsequent plans and actions based on feedback about effectiveness. 

M1: Hours to adjust original plan for decisive 

operations. M2: Percent of forces identified as required to accomplish the essential tasks. M3: Percent of essential tasks derived in operational mission analysis and carried into planning. M4: Percent of organization and unit plans current with respect to operations. M5: Months to change unit or organization design. M6: Weeks to transition a given unit to new or modified weapons systems or equipment. M7: Months from concept to unit or organization design approval. 

JUO-005 (Force Application):

The ability to maneuver to, into and through an urban area. 

JUO-005.1: Maneuver 

forces through air, land and maritime domains to positions of advantage to bring disabling and enabling power to bear against an urban system. 

M1: Hours for joint force to transition to or from 

operational battle formation. M2: Hours from planned execution time force transitions to or from operational battle formation. M3: Hours to move operational joint forces into locations to facilitate tactical commanders’ plans for implementing subordinate campaign plan. M4: Percent of operational force moved into position to facilitate tactical commander’s plans. M5: Hours to mass joint force forces at decisive points, 

MCO 2.0-01

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JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

intact and combat effective (after transition to battle formation). M6: Percent of maneuver force concentrated at decisive 

point prior to detection. 

JUO-005.2: Penetrate 

an urban area by direct assault, infiltration or other means as necessary. 

M1: Hours between planned and actual entry. 

M2: Hours for multinational and interagency linkages to be established (after initial entry). M3: Percent of operations for which appropriate force employed. M4: Percent of operations for which full coordination and deconfliction accomplished. M5: Percent of forcible entry force arrives at objective as 

planned. M6: Hours to reach critical check points and blocking 

positions. 

JUO-005.3: Suppress 

enemy air defenses in and around an urban area. 

M1: Percent of enemy air defense capabilities neutralized 

by nonlethal means. M2: Percent of enemy air defense targets successfully engaged. M3: Percent of enemy air defenses destroyed. M4: Percent of fixed wing sorties unable to complete mission because of lack of clearance. M5: Days to achieve air superiority. M6: Percent of joint tactical air requests filled. M7: Percent of operations degraded, delayed, or modified due to delays in moving or evacuating personnel, supplies, and equipment by air. M8: Percent of personnel, supplies, and equipment in AO that arrive by air at their destination on schedule. 

JUO-005.4: Suppress M1: Percent of enemy targets successfully attacked by 

throughout creating preMCO 2.0-02

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JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

enemy direct and indirect surface fires. 

friendly forces. M2: Percent of targets attacked IAW requests for fires. 

M3: Mean number of minutes to attack immediate targets after most recent information on target provided. M4: Percent of immediate targets successfully coordinated and attacked. M5: Minutes to develop attack plan after identification of HPT. M6: Percent of attacks using nonlethal means without lethal results. M7: Percent of targets attacked with desired effects. M8: Percent coverage of AO by counter battery assets. M9: Estimated percent of enemy indirect-fire weapons capabilities neutralized by nonlethal means. M10: Estimated percent of enemy indirect-fire weapons 

targets successfully engaged. M11: Estimated percent of enemy indirect-fire weapons destroyed. 

JUO-005.5: Provide 

freedom of movement. . 

M1: Percent of operations delayed until key strategic 

areas controlled by friendly ground forces. M2: Percent of deploying forces delayed by enemy strategic counter-mobility efforts. M3: Hours that joint force operational airlift/sealift delayed due to obstacles. M4: Days to clear minefield to allow amphibious landing. M5: Days to clear port and restore to full capacity. M6: Days to clear port to allow discharge of cargo. M7: Hours to restore ground LOC after closure due to 

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JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

heavy rain and flooding. M8: Percent of mine countermeasure operations that 

provide needed freedom of movement. M9: Hours enemy-emplaced obstacles delay movement of friendly forces. M10: Hours joint force operations delayed for insufficient 

engineer support. M11: NM between two most distant airfields or LZs in combat zone. M12: NM between two most distant airfields, LZs, or EZs in combat zone. 

JUO-005.6: Move and 

operate freely in both subterranean and multistoried structures in urban areas. 

M1: Yes/No Mobility enhancing activity was completed 

within the period specified in the order. M2: Time to respond to an event (natural disaster or 

combat activity) that impacts the unit’s movement and maneuver. M3: Time that the preparation and execution of unit operations are delayed due to a natural disaster or combat activity that impacts the unit’s movement and maneuver. M4: Time to conduct a route/area reconnaissance of location where mobility enhancing activity is required. M5: Time for staff to disseminate event data to subordinate units, higher headquarters, and laterally after discovery. M6: Time to plan for the mobility enhancement effort. M7: Time to move mobility enhancing systems to work site. M8: Time to establish conditions necessary for the 
JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

success of the mobility enhancement effort, such as establishing security, gaining permission from local authorities for construction, and obtaining supplies—gravel, sand, airfield mats, soil stabilization systems, etc.—necessary for construction. M9: Time to complete mobility enhancing activity. 

JUO-006 (Force Application):

The ability to apply highly discriminate destructive or disabling force to attack hostile elements while minimizing damage to an urban system. 

JUO-006.1:

Discriminate between hostile and non-hostile elements in a cluttered urban system in which potential target signatures are ambiguous. 

M1: Hours since most current intelligence information 

was last collected. M2: Percent of enemy targets accurately located. M3: Percent of enemy targets correctly identified. M4: Percent of friendly units/organizations and personnel with current status known. M5: Percent of time, accurate common operational picture maintained within sector/region. M6: Hours to update and confirm data reported to operational commander (after daily briefing). M7: Minutes to confirm identity of unidentified friendly target. M8: Percent of coalition forces accurately reporting force locations. M9: Percent of force employing passive identificationinterrogation capability. M10: Percent of friendly forces with procedures or 

equipment to allow positive identification that employ such procedures or equipment. 

MCO 2.0-01

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JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

JUO-006.2: Conduct 

offensive operations in an urban environment while minimizing collateral damage. 

M1: Instances of collateral damage/effects. 

M2: Minutes to identify, validate, conduct collateral damage/effects mitigation analysis/recommendations, prioritize, and nominate immediate targets for attack, deception, disruption, exploitation, and re-attack based on the commander’s guidance and objectives for preplanned and near-real-time (NRT) precision engagement. M3: Percent of attacks assessed to have greater collateral damage/effects than planned/expected. M4: Percent of attacks have collateral damage within limits defined by Secretary of Defense or geographic combatant commander. M5: Percent of potential targets not reviewed for collateral damage/effects potential, political ramifications/sensitivity, LOAC consequences, etc. by appropriate personnel. M6: Estimated percent that enemy LOC capacity is degraded by friendly force offensive operations. M7: Percent of anticipated collateral damage/effects that exceeds guidance and legal limitations. M8: Instances synchronized multiple attacks on targets using appropriate time over- target or launch windows minimizing collateral damage, civilian casualties, and fratricide. M9: Percent of targets reviewed for collateral damage/effects, damage expectancy, casualties, and political ramifications or sensitivities. M10: Number of collateral damage/effects incidents as a 

result of friendly weapon employment. M11: Minutes to identify, validate, conduct collateral 

environmentbattlespace engage with with great speliminate or asymmetric and strengthadvantages. MCO 2.0-02

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JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

damage/effects mitigation analysis/recommendations, prioritize, and nominate immediate targets for attack, deception, disruption, exploitation, and re-attack based on the commander’s guidance and objectives for preplanned and near-real-time (NRT) precision engagement. 

JUO-006.3: Conduct 

direct action in an urban environment while minimizing collateral damage. 

M1: Hours between desired and actual time in position. 

M2: Hours between planned and actual infiltration. M3: Percent of DA missions that achieve their aim. M4: Percent of DA missions that are deliberately planned. M5: Percent of time-sensitive DA missions that achieve their aim. M6: Instances of collateral damage/effects. M7: Percent of attacks assessed to have greater collateral damage/effects than planned/expected. M8: Percent of attacks that have collateral damage within limits defined by Secretary of Defense or geographic combatant commander. M9: Percent of potential targets not reviewed for collateral damage/effects potential, political ramifications/sensitivity, LOAC consequences, etc. by appropriate personnel. 

JUO-006.4: Conduct 

precision engagement in an urban environment. 

M1: Minutes to identify, validate, conduct collateral 

damage/effects mitigation analysis/recommendations, prioritize, and nominate immediate targets for attack, deception, disruption, exploitation, and re-attack based on the commander’s guidance and objectives for preplanned and near-real-time (NRT) precision engagement. 

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JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

M2: Number or percent of known or suspected missile, 

rocket, and other CBRN or long-range attack systems successfully engaged targets. M3: Percent of immediate targets successfully coordinated and attacked. M4: Percent of operational targets attacked by lethal and nonlethal means together. M5: Percent of friendly or neutral forces or noncombatants influenced by collateral effects from friendly attacks on CBRN or other targets. M6: Yes/No Availability of a weapon system designed to 

destroy, disrupt, or deny access to CBRN capabilities while minimizing negative collateral damage. M7: Yes/No Ability to model and predict collateral effects prior to a strike on CBRN targets. 

JUO-006.5: Conduct 

offensive information operations (IO) against targets in the urban environment 

M1: Hours to identify required operational IO 

information necessary for IO planning after onset of planning. M2: Hours to task intelligence community and other operational support organizations and agencies to fill information requirements for IO planning. M3: Hours to get JFC approval for proposed operational IO plans and actions. M4: Hours to modify operational IO plans and actions due to operational contingencies. M5: Percent of operational IO-cell-nominated targets struck with lethal or nonlethal means during the timeframe planned for in the IO appendix or other planning document. M6: Days to conduct battle damage assessment of 
JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

operational IO “targets” struck with lethal and nonlethal means after receipt of information. M7: Percent of operational IO-cell-nominated targets 

restruck when recommended by battle damage assessment reporting from initial strike. M8: Hours to respond to subordinate command requests for IO support or coordination. 

JUO-007.1: Provide 

incentives for municipal governments, organizations, groups, or persons to cooperate with joint force operations in an urban area. 

M1: Percent of theater support in concert with published 

theater strategy and combatant commander’s intent. M2: Percent difference between promised aid during planning and support to NGOs in execution. M3: Percent of requests by allies for civil military support, met within required timeframe. M4: Percent of requests by allies for communications support met within required timeframe. M5: Percent of requests by allies for logistics support met within required time frame. M6: Percent of requests by allies for security assistance support met within required timeframe. 

JUO-007 (Force Application):

The ability to persuade municipal governments, organizations and the general populace to cooperate with joint force operations. JUO-007.2: Within 

established restraints, pressure municipal governments, organizations, groups or persons to cooperate with joint force operations in an urban area. 

M1: Percent of theater support in concert with published 

theater strategy and combatant commander’s intent. M2: Percent of municipal governments, organizations, groups, or persons that require pressure in order to corporate with the JTF. M3: Evaluate the perceptions, knowledge, and factors that influence particular targets. M4: Instances of operational plans or objectives being delayed, defeated, or disrupted due to uncooperative 

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JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

municipal governments, organizations, groups, or persons offensive IO actions. 

JUO-007.3: Conduct 

operations to influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, attitudes and ultimately the behavior of municipal governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in an urban area. 

M1: Estimated percent of target audience that exhibits 

behavior in accordance with joint force commander's desires. M2: Estimated percent of target audience reached by more than one media in PSYOP campaign. M3: Hours to initiate PSYOP activities (after warning order). M4: Minutes to complete attack on target (after initiation) using nonlethal means. M5: Percent of joint force targets attacked with lethal means also attacked with PSYOP. M6: Percent of preplanned targets successfully attacked. M7: Percent of PSYOP objectives accomplished. 

JUO-007.4: Conduct 

operations to negate the effectiveness of adversary psychological operations against an urban population, group or government. 

M1: Time to identify adversary psychological warfare 

operations. M2: Percent of adversarial psychological operation attempts detected and countered. M3: Time to expose adversary attempts to influence friendly population and military forces. M4: Percent of potential multi-crisis situations in which 

counterpropaganda operations were war gamed. M5: Time to disseminate accurate information to 

friendly forces as to counter adversarial psychological attempts. M6: Hours to respond to misinformation and disinformation. 

JUO-007.5: Conduct 

public information 

M1: Hours to release factual public information to the 

media. 
JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

activities to educate and inform populations of joint force objectives and to counter misinformation and disinformation. 

M2: Hours to respond to misinformation and 

disinformation deemed worthy of response. M3: Hours to acquire and distribute multimedia products (still and video) to support communication objectives. M4: Hours to deliver public information via a commandsponsored public website. M5: Minutes to advise a commander on public impact of emerging events. M6: Percent of public information activities that support strategic and theater communication objectives. 

JUO-008.1: Seize and 

secure sectors of an urban area. 

M1: Percent of objectives seized within planned times. 

M2: Days to seize objectives. M3: Percent of operational objectives achieved by friendly offensive action. M4: Percent of objectives secured. M5: Percent of maneuver forces that secure assigned objectives. M6: Percent of sectors secure. M7: Percent of critical terrain features under control of friendly forces. M8: Percent of operationally significant areas currently contested by opposing forces. 

JUO-008 (Force Application):

The ability to secure, control and protect urban areas to limit hostile presence, activity and influence. 

JUO-008.2: Maintain 

persistent surveillance of urban systems. 

M1: Hours required identifying enemy operational and 

tactical center of gravity. M2: Percent of identified critical elements, decisive points, and high payoff targets monitored by combatant command’s JIC. M3: Percent of identified decisive points within AO under friendly observation. M4: Percent of critical terrain features under 

MCO 2.0-02

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Joint Force tmeasured ofoperations a
JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

observation of friendly forces. M5: Percent of identified enemy decisive points 

translated into HPTs. M6: Percent of identified enemy decisive points developed as strategic targets. 

JUO-008.3: Conduct 

patrolling within an urban area under combat conditions. 

M1: Percent of assigned area covered during the patrol. 

M2: Time to conduct the patrol within time allocated by 

higher headquarters. M3: Time from receiving task until placing unit patrol 

assets to start the mission. M4: Time to provide collected route data to tasking agency analysts. M5: Percent of patrol collection requirements satisfied by piggybacking on other existing ongoing activities on a noninterference basis. M6: Percent of accuracy of data provided. M7: Percent of friendly casualties received during the combat patrol. M8: Percent of information requirements achieved. M9: Time to conduct rehearsals. M10: Time to prepare patrol plan. 

M11: Average time between patrols passing through a given location. 

JUO-008.4: Provide 

law enforcement in an urban area. 

M1: Percent of security forces committed to law 

enforcement operations versus combat operations. M2: Percent of security force requirement available to meet operational needs. M3: Instances of law and order incidents not covered by existing/established policy/SOP. 

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JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

M4: Time to conduct law enforcement patrols designed 

to obtain police information. M5: Yes/No Suppress criminal behavior within the unit AO. M6: Percent of time military police subordinate elements conduct law and order missions. M7: Percent decline in criminal behavior in an AO. M8: Percent of military police assets distributed to conduct law and order operations in accordance with the plan. 

JUO-008.5: Provide 

populace and resource control in an urban area before, during or after combat operations. 

M1: Estimated percent of HN population under control 

of civil government. M2: Days between occurrences of civil unrest. 

M3: Percent of normal public services (sewer, water, 

electricity, trash removal, as appropriate) maintained during operation. M4: Percent of joint force personnel assigned to perform basic public services in HN. M5: Percent of joint force personnel assigned to perform police functions in HN. M6: Percent of friendly force engaged in refugee care and handling. 

JUO-008.6: Perform 

crowd and riot control. 

M1: Number incidents of hostile crowd or mob behavior 

the joint force is able to influence without crowd or mob fatalities or serious casualties. M2: Percent of joint force personnel assigned to perform crowd and riot control functions in HN. M3: Percent of friendly force, engaged in crowd and riot control functions. M4: Time to coordinate with host-nation agencies for 
JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

implementation of population and resource control measures. M5: Time to develop plans for imposing crowd and riot 

control by the enforcement of curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits and registration cards, and assisting in the evacuation of noncombatants. M6: Time to develop plans for crowd and riot control, such as establishing roadblocks and checkpoints, inspecting facilities, enforcing local regulations and guidelines, controlling rations, and assisting with amnesty program. M7: Time to inform local population of new/revised crowd and riot control measures imposed on them. 

JUO-008.7: Protect the 

populace. 

M1: Percent of friendly or neutral forces and 

noncombatants influenced by collateral effects from friendly attacks on CBRNE weapon targets. M2: Hours to evacuate noncombatants (after combatant 

commander notified). M3: Incidents of noncombatants inadvertently attacked 

by friendly fire. M4: Yes/No Fully implemented and coordinated security plan in place and operational. M5: Percent monthly decline or increase in HN central government popularity in the civil populace. M6: Days between occurrences of civil unrest. M7: Percent of joint force personnel assigned to perform police functions in HN. M8: Percent of friendly force engaged in refugee care and handling. M9: Percent change in per capita access to normal 
JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

markets activities since before hostile action or disaster. M10: Percent of civil populace without public utilities 

compared to before hostile action or disaster.

JUO-008.8: Control 

basic urban services within the urban area. 

M1: Hours to respond to non-duty hours request for 

support. M2: Minutes to analyze potential consequences of global 

event. M3: Minutes to assess potential impacts to critical infrastructure/assets. M4: Minutes to assess damage to infrastructure at strategic interest locations. 

JUO-009 (Force Protection):

The ability to protect the joint force and other agencies and organizations within an urban area. 

JUO-009.1: Provide 

responsive medical support for trauma, concussion and other combat and non-combat injuries. 

M1: Percent accountability of personnel entering the 

Joint Health Service Support system. M2: Percent of patients returned to duty (RTD) versus transported to definitive care facilities outside of the theater. M3: Per/day provided medical treatment. M4: Minutes from wounding or injury to receipt of stabilizing care. M5: Hours turnaround time for medical lab serology and other technical lab testing results. M6: Hours to assess all medical protective actions and make recommendations upon notification of specific bioagent. M7: Percent of DPs assisted by joint force medical units. M8: Percent of EPWs assisted by joint force medical units. M9: Percent of injured or incapacitated personnel returned to duty. 

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JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

M10: Percent of personnel incapacitated by noncombat 

injuries and illness. M11: Percent of required patient bed spaces actually available. M12: Percent of U.S. national private citizens needing emergency medical assistance who receive it. 

JUO-009.2: Detect and 

defeat improvised explosive devices and similar threats to personnel, materiel and facilities. 

M1: Percentage of friendly operations supported by 

successful collection and dissemination of actionable intelligence. M2: Number of patterns of insurgent behavior identified. M3: Percent increase in checkpoint detection of IED materials. M4: Number of IEDs rendered safe at a stand-off distance or with manual deployed equipment and then exploit IED at the time/place chosen by U.S. forces. M5: Number of enemy bomb-making personnel, explosive devices, component parts, and bomb-making equipment and facilities detected. M6: Number of known devices found, marked, destroyed, neutralized or removed from a known area so as to facilitate needed operations. M7: Percent of friendly operations degraded, disrupted, or delayed due to enemy IED warfare. M8: Percent of detected and monitored IED enemy cell operations successfully interdicted or source areas eradicated. 

JUO-009.3: Detect and 

defeat snipers. 

M1: Percent of snipers detected/located prior to contact. 

M2: Percent of snipers defeated before contact or avoided. M3: Percent of snipers located and defeated during contact. 

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JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

M4: Percent of snipers located and defeated after 

contact. M5: Number of snipers killed/captured. 

JUO-009.4: Detect and 

protect against diseases common to densely populated urban areas. 

M1: Hours to conduct Medical Surveillance to identify 

use of hazardous materials and/or endemic disease outbreaks. M2: Hours to complete food, water, and vector vulnerability assessments. M3: Number of immunizations and medical countermeasures on-hand. M4: Percent difference in disease incidence in affected 

civil populace compared to before hostile action or disaster. M5: Percent of disease nonbattle injury (DNBI) (from 

unanticipated medical threats). M6: Percent of friendly forces incapacitated by disease for which there was no advance warning. M7: Days to issue disease counter measures such as vaccines, prophylaxis and post-exposure countermeasures. M8: Hours conduct medical surveillance to identify endemic disease outbreaks. M9: Hours to establish disease detection, warning, and analysis reporting system. M10: Percent of patients treated for disease and 

nonbattle injuries (DNBI) versus wounded in action (WIA). M11: Percent of U.S. personnel who receive vaccines, antidotes, and protective equipment. M12: Percent U.S. personnel who receive individual 
JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

chemical/biological warfare protective training. M13: Yes/No In-place theater-wide system for tracking 

status of U.S. personnel vaccines, antidotes, chemical/biological protective training. 

JUO-009.5: Detect and 

protect against chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-explosive weapons. 

M1: Estimated percent of CBRNE weapon capabilities 

that are detected and identified. M2: Percent of intelligence on enemy CBRNE weapon systems that prove to be accurate. M3: Minutes to provide unambiguous attack warning. M4: Minutes to provide accurate attack assessment. M5: Estimated percent of detected CBRNE weapons intercepted. M6: Hours to acquire, positively identify, select, and prioritize CBRNE weapon targets. M7: Number of nations in the JOA, or with influence, that have CBRNE attack capabilities M8: Estimated percent change in number of CBRNE weapon capable JOA actors in the past year. M9: Number of nonstate actors with assessed CBRNE weapon capabilities in the JOA. M10: Number of operational plans without CBRNE 

considerations when, in fact, a valid CBRNE threat existed. M11: Hours to conduct Medical Surveillance to identify use of CBRNE agents and/or endemic disease outbreaks. M12: Instances of false positive and/or false negative alarms. 

JUO-009.6: Protect 

and secure operationally critical installations, 

M1: Incidents of critical friendly facilities (e.g., command 

posts), damaged or destroyed in previous week. M2: Percent of critical assets and facilities hardened. 
JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

facilities, and systems. M3: Percent of planned facility hardening completed at 

execution. M4: Percent of unhardened theater assets damaged or destroyed. M5: Months to assess threats to installations and community critical infrastructure through joint military and civilian partnership vulnerability assessments. M6: Incidents of U.S. POE facilities and installations 

being damaged or destroyed by enemy terrorist action. M7: Percent of critical friendly facilities (e.g., PODs, 

command posts) destroyed, damaged, or rendered inoperable by sabotage. M8: Percent of critical friendly facilities hardened or protected against hostile acts. M9: Incidents of damage to APOD and APOE facilities. M10: Percent of critical friendly facilities (e.g., PODs, 

command posts) destroyed, damaged, or rendered inoperable by sabotage. M11: Percent of identified terrorist attacks that penetrate 

security in operational area.

JUO-009.7: Protect 

against rocket, artillery, and mortar (RAM) fires. 

M1: Percent of identified threat precision-guided 

weapons, associated delivery platforms, and target acquisition systems for which effective countermeasures are available. M2: Number of incidents where enemy forces affect the security of friendly units and facilities, such as terrorist attacks, snipping, and isolated mortar/rocket attacks. M3: Percent of friendly casualties inflicted by RAM fires. 

M4: Number of friendly and noncombatant casualties. M5: Percent reduction in enemy targeting effectiveness 
JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

due to the implementation of force protection measures. M6: Percent reduction in the effectiveness of enemy 

action due to friendly measures to harden units and facilities from enemy attack. M7: Percent enhancement in personnel, equipment, and 

facility survivability because of measures taken to harden against enemy attack. 

JUO-009.8: Provide 

personal protection against kinetic, nonkinetic, lethal and nonlethal effects to the joint force. 

M1: Percent increase in the time it takes the unit to 

conduct operations because of the need to protect itself from the effects of identified enemy weapons systems. M2: Percent of unit personnel trained to use available 

detection equipment. M3: Percent of friendly casualties due to failure of protective equipment. M4: Percent of personnel, systems, and facilities hardened by protective equipment and systems. M5: Percent of personnel trained to use protective equipment. M6: Percent of friendly casualties due to improperly used protective equipment. M7: Percent of casualties or equipment and supplies lost due to the nonavailability of protective equipment. M8: Percent of unit force protection activities integrated with those of other services and nations. M9: Percent reduction in enemy targeting effectiveness due to the implementation of force protection measures. M10: Percent reduction in the effectiveness of enemy 

action due to friendly measures to harden units and facilities from enemy attack. 
JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

M11: Percent enhancement in personnel, equipment, 

and facility survivability because of measures taken to harden them from enemy attack. M12: Number of friendly and noncombatant casualties due to terrorist attack. 

JUO-009.9: Provide 

protected movement of the joint force and other agencies/organizations through urban terrain. 

M1: Percent of JOA in which friendly freedom of 

movement allowed. M2: Number of assets prioritized and allocated to protect required movements, and were assets saved for contingencies. M3: Number of potential scenarios evaluated for enemy courses of action relating to friendly movements along the movement routes. M4: Number of friendly assets determined to be available to protect movements along the movement routes. M5: Percent of movements that might be likely targets identified, based the enemy's CONOPS. M6: Percent of unit movements tracked by in-transit visibility or total-asset visibility. M7: Percent of movements provided convoy protection during movement. 

JUO-009.10: Protect 

access to and release of joint force and critical external information for the Joint force. 

M1: Yes/No Do commands responsible for operation and 

maintenance of information systems perform risk assessments of potential threats and take appropriate action to respond to those risks which meet the appropriate criteria? M2: Percent of operational information systems not protected by firewalls, virus detection software and other 
JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

appropriate defensive IO measures. M3: Percent of operational information system hardware 

and software components that have backup components to replace them if they fail or are corrupted. M4: Number of redundant communications paths available to connect operational information systems. M5: Instances of operational information systems being disabled, corrupted or compromised through identified adversary IO actions or criminal mischief. M6: Percent of allies with whom joint information security agreements exist. M7: Percent of information systems located within highsecurity areas. M8: Percent of system administrators with full OPSEC training. M9: Percent of system administrators with full information system security training. M10: Percent of adversary-trusted sources (systems 

and personnel) under friendly control. M11: Number of adversary penetrations of friendly information systems identified and targeted.

JUO-009.11: Protect 

against hazardous material and remove militarily significant hazards. 

M1: Casualties caused by militarily significant hazards 

(per week). M2: Hours in delay in executing scheme of maneuver. M3: Percent of casualties attributed to militarily significant hazards. M4: Percent of identified militarily significant hazards successfully removed or neutralized. M5: Percent of joint force exposed to or affected by militarily significant hazard. 
JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

M6: Number of militarily significant hazards identified in 

advance by joint force staff. M7: Hours to conduct Medical Surveillance to identify use of hazardous materials and/or endemic disease outbreaks. M8: Casualties to U.S. military personnel attributed to 

the hazardous materials incident. M9: Casualties to U.S. noncombatants attributed to 

hazardous materials incident. 

JUO-010 (Force Protection):

The ability to selectively isolate all or relevant portions of an urban system to limit unwanted external influence. 

JUO-010.1: Prevent 

movement of enemy forces and materiel by surface, air or subsurface into, out of, or within an urban area. 

M1: Percent of identified critical routes controlled or 

blocked. M2: Percent of force required to isolate key sector. M3: Estimated percent reduction in movement of adversary supplies into theater of operations/JOA. M4: Days to isolate key sector of theater of operations/JOA. M5: Estimated percent enemy avenues of approach closed as maneuver possibilities by friendly barriers, obstacles, or mines. M6: Estimated percent of enemy military force prevented from entering or leaving secured area. M7: Percent of known scheduled and unscheduled transport prevented from entering or leaving secured area. M8: Number/estimated percent of available enemy LOCs and PODs interdicted by friendly obstacles. M9: Estimated percent of hostile external surface communication absorbed by other LOCs after barrier emplacement. M10: Estimated percent of hostile internal surface 

MCO 2.0-01

procedures, systems to fumaneuver, unonkinetic wand nonlethcollateral daMCO 2.0-02simultaneoumultidimens(including uentry operattarget area ienvironmentbattlespace engage with with great speliminate or asymmetric and strengthadvantages. MCO 2.0-02irregular for
JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

communication absorbed by other LOCs after barrier emplacement. M11: Estimated percent reduction in hostile military 

surface communications after barrier emplacement. M12: Estimated percent reduction in hostile overall surface communications after barrier emplacement. 

JUO-010.2: Screen 

and interrupt the transmission of military and other potentially hostile information into, out of, and within an urban area characterized by the free flow of information. 

M1: Hours to identify required theater level IO 

information necessary for IO planning after onset of planning. M2: Hours to task intelligence community and other theater level support organizations and agencies (including those of allies where appropriate) to fill information requirements for IO planning. M3: Percent of identified theater-level IO information requirements unfilled at time-critical points in planning process. M4: Percent of theater IO-cell-nominated targets restruck when recommended by battle damage assessment reporting from initial strike. M5: Percent of theater level IO objectives verifiably achieved. M6: Hours to identify IO targets that support the commander’s plan. M7: Estimated percent of enemy operations disrupted, cancelled, or modified, attributable to IO plan. M8: Percent of theater IO-cell-nominated targets restruck when recommended by battle damage assessment reporting from initial strike. 

JUO-010.3: Control 

potentially hostile financial transactions 

M1: Time to evaluate the public financial system within 

the AO M2: Time to conduct legal review of proposed public 

through conmilitary and and nonkineMCO 2.0-02

communicatinformation adversary prdestroy their influence, dedecision maIW 0.7-023C

conducting Iland areas. IW 0.7-024Cconducting Ilittoral areas
JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

into, out of, and within the urban area. 

finance actions. M3: Estimated percent of economy conducted on the 

black market. M4: Number and types of public institutions within the AO over which the United States must impost public fund controls. M5: Amount in dollars/local currency of public funds controlled by military agencies within the AO. M6: Number/instances of adversary organizations unable to receive financial support because of joint force actions. 

JUO-011 (Focused Logistics) :

The ability before, during and after combat operations to effect institutional and infrastructural improvements to strengthen selected urban subsystems identified as essential to the continued functioning of the urban system. 

JUO-011.1: Perform 

civil engineering to improve institutions and infrastructure in an urban system before, during or after combat operations. 

M1: Hours to restore essential utilities. 

M2: Hours to reestablish damaged LOCs. M3: Days to restore POD/APOD to handle required shipping. M4: Percent of main supply routes, pipelines, airfields, and maintenance facilities in JOA that have accurate condition assessments. M5: Hours to respond to a request for real estate coordination by JTF or other subordinate command. M6: Hours to respond to a request for assistance by JTF or other subordinate command for facilities contracting requirements external to the JOA. M7: Percent of civil engineering tasks correctly assigned (right engineers/location/time). M8: Percent of engineering requests satisfied by contractor assets from outside theater. M9: Percent of engineering requests satisfied by theater assets. M10: Percent of total procurement costs in contract 

MCO 2.0-04

facilitates idmilitary, govand occupatand deploy gnongovernmcapabilities operations. SSTR 2.0 Ctrain DOD aenhance theSSTR-functiSSTR 2.0 Cconduct immcritical infraservices. IW 0.7-016C

civil-military IW 0.7-017Cnation assisorganization
JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

administrative costs. M11: Percent of construction material acquired or 

produced locally. 

JUO-011.2: Perform 

civil administration within an urban area before, during or after combat operations. 

M1: Percent of CA planning (e.g. Annex G, CA area 

study, CA estimate) completed by execution of CA mission. M2: Percent of essential services/facilities damaged/destroyed during hostilities returned to operation prior to transition from U.S. military administration. M3: Percent of U.S. forces CA personnel required to remain in country to coordinate post transition activities with local government/UN administration. M4: Percent of U.S. forces redeployed prior to transition to local government/UN administration. M5: Percent of U.S. forces, other than CA assets, retained in theater to support civil administration after transition from military administration. M6: Days to coordinate transition between U.S. forces and local government/UN administration. M7: Days to determine U.S. post conflict policy objectives. M8: Days to properly account for funds and equipment expended during military administration and to close outstanding claims against military administration. M9: Hours to receive direction or approval from Secretary of Defense to become directly involved in executive, judiciary, or legislative functions of HN government. 

JUO-011.3: Provide 

advisory support to 

M1: Weeks to respond to request for assistance. 

M2: Percent of coalition and peacekeeping forces with 

IW 0.7-018C

combat and training and armed forces of a foreign sgroup. IW 0.7-020Cselected parinternal defe
JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

municipal governments and civic organizations before, during or after combat operations. 

theater military participation have major weapons systems common with U.S. systems. M3: Percent of Country Teams' annual security 

assistance proposals (FMFP/IMET) funded. M4: Percent of Country Teams' requests for military goods/services supported. M5: Percent of designated foreign military personnel trained. M6: Percent of designated foreign military students trained. M7: Percent of military goods/services/training purchased from the United States. M8: Percent of weapons common with U.S. systems. M9: Weeks to respond to request for assistance with equipment in country during security assistance surge. 

JUO-011.4: Improve or 

provide basic services—security, water, food supply, shelter, electricity, sanitation, and basic health services—within an urban environment before, during or after combat operations. 

M1: Hours for U.S. Country Team and combatant 

command to coordinate response to natural disaster. M2: Hours to establish liaison with Country Team, HN, and other U.S.G agencies, NGO/IO and coalition forces, as appropriate. M3: Instances of insufficient logistical support provided to nations, groups, or agencies. M4: Instances of insufficient personnel support provided to nations, groups, or agencies. M5: Instances of personnel provided to support other nations, groups, or agencies. M6: Instances of NGOs in OA maintaining liaison with commander. M7: Instances of NGOs in OA receiving U.S. military support. 
JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

M8: Estimated percent of local population with access to 

HN healthcare services compared to pre-hostilities. 

JUO-011.5: Train 

indigenous personnel and organizations to perform critical civic functions before, during or after combat operations. 

M1: Days to establishment of military government (after 

occupation of area). M2: Hours to develop request for SecDef guidance. M3: Hours before required, SecDef guidance or direction requested. M4: Months to prepare plan for local government. M5: Months to prepare populace for local government. M6: Percent nutrition improvement in civil populace in hostile territory, after establishment of military government. M7: Percent of children attending school. M8: Percent of day under curfew. M9: Percent of indigenous forces trained to conduct civil administration within contested areas. M10: Percent of joint force dedicated to civil 

administration activities. M11: Percent of population under curfew. 

JUO-011.6: Set 

conditions for and support economic development of the urban system. 

M1: Days to assess HN government organization, degree 

of effectiveness, and economic conditions of civilians. M2: Instances of time commander/senior staff made aware of emerging economic event (which could impact theater) from outside source. M3: Time to provide comprehensive analysis of economic characteristics in commander's area of interest. M4: Percent of HN and U.S. military civic action assistance mission objectives accomplished. M5: Percent of military civic action projects performed 
JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

by units without primary training mission. M6: Percent of projects deemed long-term investments 

(e.g., continue to pay off five years after completion). M7: Percent of projects or deployments with materials supplied by HN. 

`JUO-012 (Focused Logistics):

The ability to facilitate humanitarian aid to suffering urban populations under both combat and noncombat conditions. 

JUO-012.1: Provide 

foreign humanitarian assistance to an urban population during combat operations. 

M1: Days to deploy civil-military engineering units and 

begin engineering tasks. M2: Days to organize relief effort in country. M3: Days to reestablish communications in country, including information-sharing links between joint force, coalition, interagency and NGO partners. M4: Hours to assess situation and define assistance needed. M5: Hours to begin delivering disaster relief supplies into host country. M6: Hours to deliver critical material/supplies in crisis. M7: Hours to distribute supplies and services where needed. M8: Hours to insert disaster survey liaison team. M9: Days to reestablish lines of communication in country. M10: Percent of funds provided for HCA, SA and MCA 

operations accounted for. M11: Tons/day of supplies and materiel provided in assistance. M12: Personnel provided to support other nations, groups, or agencies. M13: Days to provide healthcare to an urban population. M14: Days to integrate requested or needed joint force 

MCO 2.0-04

facilitates idmilitary, govand occupatand deploy gnongovernmcapabilities operations. IW 0.7-016C

civil-military 
JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

medical specialties into a host-nation medical infrastructure. 

JUO-012.2: Provide 

emergency services in an urban environment during combat operations. 

M1: Percent difference in disease incidence in affected 

civil populace compared to before hostile action or disaster. M2: Percent difference in mortality rates in affected civil populace, compared to before hostile action or disaster. M3: Percent difference in water availability to individuals in affected civil populace compared to before hostile action or disaster. M4: Percent of affected civil populace displaced, as consequence of hostile action or disaster. M5: Percent of affected civil populace without access to 

normal markets, to buy or sell, compared to before hostile action or disaster. M6: Percent of affected civil populace without public utilities, compared to before hostile action or disaster. M7: Percent of casualties to civil populace joint force is 

prepared to treat (without impacting operational tempo). 

JUO-012.3: Provide 

emergency health service support to noncombatants in an urban environment during combat operations. 

M1: Percent of injured or ill noncombatants moved 

through the medical system. M2: Percent of noncombatants using health support system, including veterinary support. M3: Percent of valid requests for health service assistance met. M4: Hours to deliver critical material/supplies in crisis. M5: Hours to distribute supplies and services where needed. M6: Percent of forces available trained and properly equipped to perform emergency health service support. 
JIC Capability 

Task Measures Associated 

Capability 

M7: Days to assess conditions of local HN hospitals and 

clinics available to provide emergency health care. M8: Percent of local HN hospitals’ and clinics’ total capacity required to provide needed emergency health care for local population. 
105

APPENDIX D. ASSESSMENT PLAN 

1. Activities in Support of Initial Concept Development 

 a. The following recent urban experiments have informed the 

development of this concept: 

• Joint Urban Warrior 04 (Apr 04) 

• Joint Urban Warrior 05 (Apr 05) 

• Joint Urban Warrior 06 (May 06) 

• Urban Resolve Phase 1 (Aug 03-Oct 05) 

• Urban Resolve 2015 (Apr 05-Oct 06) 

• Unified Quest 05 (Apr 05) 

• Unified Quest 06 (Apr 06) 

• Joint Urban Medical Tech Wargame (Oct 05) 

• Emerald Express Seminars (2-3/year since 03) 

• Israeli Defense Force Conference (Jun 06) 

• Joint Urban Operations Training Workshops/Conferences (3-

4/year) 

 b. The following joint and Service stakeholder reviews have informed 

the development of the concept: 

• Detailed outline (Nov 06) 

• Draft version 0.1 (Dec 06) 

• Draft version 0.2 (Jan 07) 

• Draft version 0.5 (Mar 07) 

 c. In February 2007, U.S. Joint Forces Command conducted a limited 

objective experiment (LOE) to stimulate critical discussion of the 

concept’s operational solution. The experiment was designed around a 

small panel of subject matter experts with recent urban and interagency 

experience. A senior concept developer and a facilitator moderated the 

experiment based upon a series of questions designed to focus the 

discussion. The experiment affirmed the concept’s problem description 

and controlling and supporting ideas. The panel’s change 

recommendations were then incorporated into the concept. The panel 

emphasized the importance of a whole-of-government, vice merely 

military, approach to urban operations. 

 d. Also in February 2007, the concept was reviewed by the Joint Staff 

J7-funded Defense Adaptive Red Team (DART), an independent team that 

reviews all official joint concepts. The DART consists of subject matter 
106

experts with senior military or government experience. A key aspect of 

DART’s charter is to find “failure modes” in concepts, i.e., situations 

under which the concept could fail, if applied. The DART review strongly 

affirmed the operational problem, controlling idea, supporting ideas, and 

illustrative vignettes. 

2. Plans for Future Capabilities Assessment and Experimentation 

 a. In parallel with concept development, U.S. Joint Forces Command 

J9 planned a capabilities based assessment (CBA). This concept, in 

conjunction with joint functional concepts, forms the foundation for 

measuring and evaluating joint initiatives and conducting analysis and 

future joint experiments with respect to joint urban operations. Pending 

Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) approval, the CBA will 

examine the capabilities in Appendix C and, through a detailed series of 

analyses and experiments, will identify doctrinal, organizational, 

training, materiel, leader development, personnel, facilities (DOTMLPF) 

and policy changes required to improve joint capabilities for conducting 

urban operations in the 2015-2027 timeframe. Based on these efforts, 

the CBA will make necessary adjustments to the capabilities outlined in 

version 1.0 of this concept. 

 b. The CBA will: 

• Identify critical capabilities and associated attributes required for 

future joint urban operations 

• Prioritize capability gaps 

• Identify potential DOTMLPF alternatives to mitigate or eliminate 

these gaps 

• Make recommendations for future concepts and related 

experiments 

 c. The CBA is a three-phased effort. During Phases I and II, U.S. 

Joint Forces Command will lead the effort to identify and prioritize 

capability needs and gaps. During these phases, U.S. Joint Forces 

Command will solicit Service support and potential sponsorship for 

Phase III solution efforts. During Phase III, U.S. Joint Forces Command 

will assist appropriate sponsors in identifying and recommending 

solution sets. U.S. Joint Forces Command J9 will coordinate detailed 

plans for each step with participants. During all phases, the study will 

integrate appropriate modeling and simulation, experimentation, expert 

analysis, wargaming, and senior leader examination to provide 
107

comprehensive analysis of joint urban operation capability requirements, 

shortfalls, and recommendations in the selected joint capability areas. 

 d. Deliverables: 

 

• Joint Capabilities Documents. Functional Area Analysis (FAA) and 

Functional Needs Analysis (FNA) efforts will yield one or more joint 

urban operations Joint Capacities Documents (JCDs). Estimated 

completion is the second quarter of FY 08. JCDs will provide the 

JROC with a framework for evaluating ongoing and future 

alternatives for improving joint urban operations capabilities. 

Completed joint urban operations JCDs and supporting FAA and 

FNA inputs will: 

o Identify critical performance measures associated with 

required capabilities 

o Prioritize capability gaps based on operational considerations 

o Report results of joint urban operations FAA and FNA 

studies, identifying required capabilities, gaps, and 

redundancies. 

• DOTMLPF and Policy Change Recommendations. The Functional 

Solutions Analysis (FSA) will yield DOTMLPF and policy change 

recommendations to support budgeting process recommendations. 

Estimated completion date is the fourth quarter of FY 08. 

• Initial Capabilities Documents. The FSA will also yield Initial 

Capabilities Documents (ICDs) for materiel solutions. Estimated 

completion date is the fourth quarter of FY 08. 

 e. The Joint Urban Operations Office (JUOO), the DOD Executive 

Agent for urban operations, recommends the following CBA capabilities 

sequence: 

• JUO-001. The ability to collect, disseminate, and access 

situational information on an urban system. 

• JUO-002. The ability to assess an urban operational situation 

systemically. 

• JUO-003. The ability to integrate all the disabling and enabling 

elements of urban operations within the context of a theater 

strategy. 
108

• JUO-010. The ability to selectively isolate all or portions of an 

urban system to limit unwanted external influence. 

• JUO-007. The ability to persuade municipal governments, 

organizations, and the general populace to cooperate with joint 

force operations. 

• JUO-004. The ability to adapt urban operations to the changing 

situation. 

• JUO-008. The ability to secure and control urban areas to limit 

hostile presence, activity, and influence. 

• JUO-009. The ability to protect the joint force and other agencies 

and organizations within an urban area. 

• JUO-011. The ability before, during, and after combat operations 

to effect institutional and infrastructural improvements to 

strengthen selected urban subsystems identified as essential to the 

continued functioning of the urban system. 

• JUO-006. The ability to apply highly discriminate destructive or 

disabling force to attack hostile elements while minimizing damage 

to an urban system.

• JUO-005. The ability to maneuver to, into, and through an urban 

area. 

• JUO-012. The ability to provide humanitarian aid to suffering 

urban populations under both combat and noncombat conditions. 

 f. Initial CBA analysis will focus on the first three of these prioritized 

capabilities, establishing attributes, conditions, and standards, and 

modifying tasks as necessary. Later CBA analysis will do the same for 

the remaining capabilities over time based on available resources. This 

effort will be done in partnership with the Joint Staff, other combatant 

commands, Services, and agencies. 

 g. All CBA activities will be linked to the ongoing efforts of the Joint 

Urban Operations Office as laid out in the JUOO Master Plan. 

 h. The implications and application of this concept will be rigorously 

explored during the Urban Resolve series, an ongoing experiment 

sponsored by the Joint Urban Operations Office and the Joint Innovation 

and Experimentation Directorate (J9), U.S. Joint Forces Command, with 

technical assistance from the Joint Warfighting Program of the Institute 

for Defense Analyses. Urban Resolve uses a distributed simulation 

capability with a future scenario in which a U.S.-led coalition must 
109

confront a skilled adversary equipped with modern capabilities and 

operating in an urban environment. The multi-phase experiment will 

explore all the concept elements and capabilities discussed in this 

concept, but will concentrate on the priority capabilities listed above. 

 i. U.S. Joint Forces Command recommends the following broad areas 

be the focus of further joint urban operations experimentation: 

• The early involvement and integration of military, nonmilitary, 

multinational, and host-nation mission partners in operating in 

the urban environment 

• The synergy gained by integrating enabling and disabling actions 

in an urban environment. 

U.S. Joint Forces Command further recommends that these areas be 

explored in the following events: 

• Joint Urban Warrior 

• Unified Quest 

• Expeditionary Warrior 

• Multinational Experiment 5 

• Unified Action 
110

APPENDIX E. GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Unless otherwise stated, all definitions are taken from the Dictionary of 

Military Terms, Joint Pub 1-02 online version, 

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/, as amended through 8 

August 2006. 

adversary—A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly 

party and against which the use of force may be envisaged. 

capability—The ability to execute a specified course of action. (A 

capability may or may not be accompanied by an intention.) 

civil administration—An administration established by a foreign 

government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the 

government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally 

the function of the local government; or (2) hostile territory, occupied by 

United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, 

legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government 

can be established. Also called CA. 

civil affairs—Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units 

organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs 

activities and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA. See 

also civil affairs activities; civil-military operations. 

civil affairs activities—Activities performed or supported by civil affairs 

that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil 

authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve 

application of civil affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally 

the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of civil-military 

operations. See also civil affairs; civil-military operations. 

civil engineering—Those combat support and combat service support 

activities that identify, design, construct, lease, or provide facilities, and 

which operate, maintain, and perform war damage repair and other 

engineering functions in support of military operations. See also civil 

engineering support plan; combat service support; combat support. 

 

civil-military operations—The activities of a commander that establish, 

maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, 

governmental, and nongovernmental civilian organizations and 

authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile 

operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate 

and achieve operational U.S. objectives. Civil-military operations may 

include performance by military forces of activities and functions 
111

normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. 

These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other 

military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other 

military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by 

designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of 

civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. See also civil affairs; 

operation. 

coalition—An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for 

common action. See also alliance; multinational. 

collateral damage—Unintentional or incidental injury or damage to 

persons or objects that would not be lawful military targets in the 

circumstances ruling at the time. Such damage is not unlawful so long 

as it is not excessive in light of the overall military advantage anticipated 

from the attack. 

conflict—An armed struggle or clash between organized groups within a 

nation or between nations in order to achieve limited political or military 

objectives. Although regular forces are often involved, irregular forces 

frequently predominate. Conflict often is protracted, confined to a 

restricted geographic area, and constrained in weaponry and level of 

violence. Within this state, military power in response to threats may be 

exercised in an indirect manner while supportive of other instruments of 

national power. Limited objectives may be achieved by the short, 

focused, and direct application of force. 

consequence management—Actions taken to maintain or restore 

essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from 

disasters and catastrophes, including natural, manmade, or terrorist 

incidents. Also called CM. 

control—Physical or psychological pressures exerted with the intent to 

assure that an agent or group will respond as directed. 

conventional forces—1. Those forces capable of conducting operations 

using nonnuclear weapons. 2. Those forces other than designated 

special operations forces. 

coordinating authority—A commander or individual assigned 

responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving 

forces of two or more Military Departments, two or more joint force 

components, or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander 

or individual has the authority to require consultation between the 

agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. 

In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter 
112

shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a 

consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may 

be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and 

similar activities than to operations. 

counterinsurgency—Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, 

psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat 

insurgency. Also called COIN. 

counterintelligence—Information gathered and activities conducted to 

protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or 

assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or 

elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or 

international terrorist activities. Also called CI. See also 

counterespionage; countersabotage; countersubversion; security; 

security intelligence. 

counterpropaganda operations—Those psychological operations 

activities that identify adversary propaganda, contribute to situational 

awareness, and serve to expose adversary attempts to influence friendly 

populations and military forces. 

defense support to public diplomacy—Those activities and measures 

taken by the Department of Defense components to support and facilitate 

public diplomacy efforts of the United States Government. Also called 

DSPD. 

disabling—Making incapable or ineffective. [Merriam-Webster’s Online 

Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com, accessed 22 Dec 06.] 

disinformation—Misinformation that is deliberately disseminated in 

order to influence or confuse rivals. [OneLook Dictionary Search, 

www.onelook.com, accessed 12 Apr 07.] 

doctrine—Fundamental principles by which the military forces or 

elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It 

is authoritative but requires judgment in application. See also 

multinational doctrine; joint doctrine; multi-Service doctrine. 

enabling—1. Providing with the means or opportunity. 2. Making 

possible, practical, or easy. 3. Causing to operate. [Merriam-Webster’s 

Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com, accessed 22 Dec 06.] 

enemy combatant—Any person in an armed conflict who could be 

properly detained under the laws and customs of war. Also called EC. 
113

facility—A real property entity consisting of one or more of the following: 

a building, a structure, a utility system, pavement, and underlying land. 

guerrilla warfare—Military and paramilitary operations conducted in 

enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous 

forces. Also called GW. 

hostile force—Any civilian, paramilitary, or military force or terrorist(s), 

with or without national designation, that have committed a hostile act, 

exhibited hostile intent, or have been declared hostile by appropriate U.S. 

authority. 

information—1. Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form. 2. 

The meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known 

conventions used in their representation. 

information operations—The integrated employment of the core 

capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, 

psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in 

concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, 

disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision 

making while protecting our own. Also called IO. See also computer 

network operations; electronic warfare; military deception; operations 

security; psychological operations. 

infrastructure—The stock of basic facilities and capital equipment 

needed for the functioning of an area. [OneLook Dictionary Search, 

http://www.onelook.com, accessed 31 Jan 76.] 

insurgency—An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a 

constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. 

intelligence—1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, 

integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available 

information concerning foreign countries or areas. 2. Information and 

knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, 

investigation, analysis, or understanding. 

irregular forces—Armed individuals or groups who are not members of 

the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces. 

joint force—A general term applied to a force composed of significant 

elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments 

operating under a single joint force commander. See also joint force 

commander. 
114

joint operations—A general term to describe military actions conducted 

by joint forces, or by Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, 

coordinating authority), which, of themselves, do not establish joint 

forces. 

joint urban operations—All joint operations planned and conducted 

across the range of military operations on or against objectives on a 

topographical complex and its adjacent natural terrain where manmade 

construction or the density of noncombatants are the dominant features. 

Also called JUOs. See also joint operations. 

line of operation—1. A logical line that connects actions on nodes 

and/or decisive points related in time and purpose with an objective(s). 

2. A physical line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the 

force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or 

decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s). Also called 

LOO. 

logistics—The science of planning and carrying out the movement and 

maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects 

of military operations that deal with: a. design and development, 

acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, 

and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and 

hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or construction, 

maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition 

or furnishing of services. 

maneuver—1. A movement to place ships, aircraft, or land forces in a 

position of advantage over the enemy. 2. A tactical exercise carried out 

at sea, in the air, on the ground, or on a map in imitation of war. 3. The 

operation of a ship, aircraft, or vehicle, to cause it to perform desired 

movements. 4. Employment of forces in the operational area through 

movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in 

respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. 

materiel—All items (including ships, tanks, self-propelled weapons, 

aircraft, etc., and related spares, repair parts, and support equipment, 

but excluding real property, installations, and utilities) necessary to 

equip, operate, maintain, and support military activities without 

distinction as to its application for administrative or combat purposes. 

See also equipment; personal property. 

misinformation—Information that is incorrect. [OneLook Dictionary 

Search, www.onelook.com, accessed 12 Apr 07.] 
115

mobility—A quality or capability of military forces which permits them to 

move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary 

mission. 

objective—1. The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward 

which every operation is directed. 2. The specific target of the action 

taken (for example, a definite terrain feature, the seizure or holding of 

which is essential to the commander's plan, or an enemy force or 

capability without regard to terrain features). See also target. 

operation—1. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, 

operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. 

2. The process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, 

attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any 

battle or campaign. 

operational design—The conception and construction of the framework 

that underpins a campaign or major operation plan and its subsequent 

execution. See also campaign; major operation. 

operational level of war—The level of war at which campaigns and 

major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve 

strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. Activities 

at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational 

objectives needed to achieve the strategic objectives, sequencing events 

to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying 

resources to bring about and sustain these events. See also strategic 

level of war; tactical level of war. 

personnel—Those individuals required in either a military or civilian 

capacity to accomplish the assigned mission. 

propaganda—Any form of communication in support of national 

objectives designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or 

behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or 

indirectly. See also black propaganda; grey propaganda; white 

propaganda. 

psychological operations—Planned operations to convey selected 

information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their 

emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of 

foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The 

purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign 

attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called 

PSYOP. See also overt peacetime psychological operations programs; 

perception management. 
116

public affairs—Those public information, command information, and 

community relations activities directed toward both the external and 

internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense. Also called 

PA. 

public information— Information of a military nature, the dissemination 

of which through public news media is not inconsistent with security, 

and the release of which is considered desirable or nonobjectionable to 

the responsible releasing agency. 

range—1. The distance between any given point and an object or target. 

2. Extent or distance limiting the operation or action of something, such 

as the range of an aircraft, ship, or gun. 3. The distance that can be 

covered over a hard surface by a ground vehicle, with its rated payload, 

using the fuel in its tank and its cans normally carried as part of the 

ground vehicle equipment. 4. Area equipped for practice in shooting at 

targets. In this meaning, also called target range. 

sabotage—An act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct 

the national defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or 

attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war materiel, 

premises, or utilities, to include human and natural resources. 

special operations forces—Those Active and Reserve Component forces 

of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and 

specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support 

special operations. Also called SOF. See also Air Force special 

operations forces; Army special operations forces; naval special warfare 

forces. 

systemic—Of or relating to a system. [Merriam-Webster’s Online 

Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com, accessed 22 Dec 06. Compared to: 

systematic—Characterized by order and planning.] 

terrorism—The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful 

violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate 

governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally 

political, religious, or ideological. See also antiterrorism; combating 

terrorism; counterterrorism; force protection condition; terrorist; 

terrorist groups. 

theater strategy—Concepts and courses of action directed toward 

securing the objectives of national and multinational policies and 

strategies through the synchronized and integrated employment of 

military forces and other instruments of national power. See also 

national military strategy; national security strategy; strategy. 
117

urban system—A dynamic, living system occupying an urban area and 

characterized by various structures, processes and functions, including 

physical infrastructure, that have evolved to sustain concentrated 

human interaction in a confined space. [From the concept, p. 9.] 

weapons of mass destruction—Weapons that are capable of a high 

order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy 

large numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be high 

explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons, but 

exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such 

means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon. Also called WMD. 

See also destruction; special operations. 
118

APPENDIX F. GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS 

AO Area of operations 

APOD Aerial port of debarkation 

CA Civil affairs 

CAB Combat aviation brigade 

CBRN Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear 

CBRNE Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield 

explosives 

CJTF-17 Coalition Joint Task Force 17 

CJSOTF-K Coalition Joint Special Operations Task Force-Kirmenia 

CMOC Civil-military operations center 

COA Course of action 

CONOPS Concept of operations 

CSB Combat support brigade 

CSS Combat service support 

DA Direct action 

DART Defense Adaptive Red Team 

DNBI Disease and nonbattle injury 

DOD Department of Defense 

DOS Department of State 

DOTMLPF Doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader 

development, personnel, facilities 

DP Displaced person 

EAC East African Community 

EEFI Essential elements of friendly information 

EPW Enemy prisoner of war 

EW Electronic warfare 

EZ Extraction zone 

FAA Functional Area Analysis 

FMFP Foreign military financing program 

FNA Functional Needs Analysis 

FP Force protection 

GITF Government and Infrastructure Task Force 

HADR Humanitarian-assistance, disaster-relief 

HBCT Heavy brigade combat team 

HN Host nation 

HPT High-priority target 

IBCT Infantry brigade combat team 

IED Improvised explosive device 
119

IMET International military education and training 

IO Information operations 

IW Irregular Warfare 

JOA Joint operations area 

JOC Joint operating concept 

JTF Joint Task Force 

LOAC Law of armed conflict 

LOC Line of communication 

LOE Limited-objective experiment 

LZ Landing zone 

MCO Major combat operations 

MOUT Military operations on urban terrain 

NBI Nonbattle injury 

NGO Nongovernmental organization 

NITF National integrated task force 

NM Nautical miles 

NRT Near-real-time 

OLWG Operational Logic Working Group 

OSINT Open-source intelligence 

PA Public affairs 

PIR Priority information requirement 

POD Port of debarkation 

POE Port of embarkation 

PSYOP Psychological operations 

RAM Rocket, artillery and mortar 

RCA Riot control agent 

RPG Rocket-propelled grenade 

SBCT Stryker brigade combat team 

S/CRS Department of State Coordinator of Reconstruction and 

Stabilization 

SecDef Secretary of Defense 

SFWG System Framing Working Group 

SME Subject-matter expert 

SOP Standing operating procedure 

SSTRO Stabilization, security, transition and reconstruction 

operations 

TTF Training Task Force 
120

UAV Unmanned aerial vehicle 

USG United States government 

WIA Wounded in action 
121

APPENDIX G. REFERENCES 

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Connaughton, Richard, John Pimlott & Duncan Anderson. The Battle for 

Manila. Presidio Press. Novato, CA, 2002. 

De Landa, Manuel. A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History. Zone Books. 

New York, 1997. 

Doxiadis, Constantinos A. Ekistics: An Introduction to the Science of 

Human Settlements. Oxford University Press. Oxford, England, 

1968 

Harrigan, James & Philippe Martin. “Terrorism and the Resilience of 

Cities,” FRBNY Policy Review, Nov02, 

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Holcomb, Keith. “Facing the Future: The Marine Corps and the RMA.” 

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conference sponsored by the OSD Office of Net Assessment in 

Warrenton, VA, 13 Nov 96. 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dictionary of Military Terms. Online version as 

amended through 8Aug06, 

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Kostof, Spiro. The City Shaped: Urban Patterns and Meaning Through 

History. Bullfinch Press. New York, 1991. 

----------. The City Assembled: The Elements of Urban Form Through 

History. Thames & Hudson. London, 1992. 

Krulak, Charles C. “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the ThreeBlock War,” Marines Magazine, Jan 1999. 

Miller, James Grier. Living Systems. University of Colorado Press. 

Niwot, CO, 1995. 

Mumford, Lewis. The Culture of Cities. Harcourt Brace & Co. New York, 

1938. 

Murray, Williamson. War and Urban Terrain in the Twenty-First Century. 

IDA Paper P-3568. Institute for Defense Analyses. Alexandria, VA, 

2001. 
122

Nethery, Philip T., MAJ, USA. “Current MOUT Doctrine and its Adequacy 

for Today’s Army.” Master’s thesis. U.S. Army Command and 

General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1997. 

Peters, Ralph. “Our Soldiers, Their Cities,” Parameters (Spring96), pp. 

43-50. 

Robb, John. “Urban Takedowns,” Global Guerrillas weblog, 28Dec04, 

http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2004/12/state

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Spiller, Roger J. Sharp Corners: Urban Operations at the Century’s End

U.S. Army. Combat in Fortified Areas, Field Manual 31-50. 

Headquarters, U.S. Army. Washington, 1944. 

----------. Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain, Field Manual 3-

06.11. Headquarters, Department of the Army. Washington, 2002. 

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Whiting, Charles. Bloody Aachen. Stein and Day. New York, 1976. 
123

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