PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 16-2465

_______________

M.R.; J.R.,

Parents of Minor Child E.R.,

Appellants

v.

RIDLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT

_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(E.D. Pa. Civil Action No. 2:11-cv-02235)

Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg, U.S. District Judge

_______________

Argued: March 30, 2017

Before: VANASKIE, KRAUSE, and RESTREPO, Circuit 

Judges

(Opinion Filed: August 22, 2017)
2

Alan L. Yatvin (Argued)

Popper & Yatvin

230 South Broad Street, Suite 503

Philadelphia, PA 19102

Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellants M.R. and J.R.

John Francis X. Reilly (Argued)

230 North Monroe Street

Media, PA 19063

Attorney for Defendant-Appellee Ridley School District

_______________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_______________

KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.

Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 

a parent of a child with a disability can bring administrative

and judicial proceedings to challenge a school district’s

alleged violations of the Act, and, if the parent emerges as “a 

prevailing party,” the parent is then eligible for an award of 

attorneys’ fees. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). This case 

presents the question whether a fee award is available to 

parents who, after unsuccessfully challenging a school 

district’s proposed educational placement for their child, later 

obtain a court order requiring the school district to reimburse 

them for the costs of the child’s “stay put” placement—the 

“then-current educational placement” in which the Act 

permitted the child to remain while administrative and 
3

judicial proceedings were pending. Id. § 1415(j). We answer 

this question in the affirmative and conclude, consistent with 

the Act’s text and with the opinions of this Court and the 

other Courts of Appeals, that a court-ordered award of 

retrospective and compensatory relief, even if awarded under 

the Act’s “stay put” provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j), confers 

“prevailing party” status. We therefore will reverse the 

District Court’s denial of attorneys’ fees and remand for 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Background

This case pertains to a long-running dispute between 

Appellants, the parents of E.R., and Appellee, the Ridley 

School District, concerning E.R.’s schooling and Ridley’s 

obligations under the Individuals with Disabilities Education 

Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482. Before turning to 

the details of that dispute, we briefly review the statutory 

framework from which it arose.

A. Statutory Context

The IDEA is a comprehensive statutory scheme 

enacted “to ensure that all children with disabilities have 

available to them a free appropriate public education.” 

20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). To that end, the Act allocates 

federal dollars to assist the states’ educational services for 

children with disabilities. Id. § 1411(a)(1). In return, 

recipient states must provide a “free appropriate public 

education” to children with disabilities residing in their states, 

an “individualized education program” (“IEP”) for each child 

with a disability, and specified procedural safeguards for 

children with disabilities and their parents. Id. § 1412(a)(1), 

(4), (6).
4

One consequence of the IDEA’s requirements is that

school districts must sometimes reimburse parents of children 

with disabilities for educational expenses made on their 

children’s behalf. Specifically, because an IEP must account 

for a child’s “strengths,” the parents’ “concerns” about the 

child’s education, the child’s most recent disability 

evaluation, and the child’s “academic, developmental, and 

functional needs,” id. § 1414(d)(3)(A), an IEP that meets the 

Act’s requirements may require the child to be placed in a 

private school. If so, the IDEA obliges the school district, in 

providing the child with a “free appropriate public 

education,” to reimburse the parents for the child’s 

private-school tuition and related expenses. See Sch. Comm. 

v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 363, 369-70 (1985); see also

20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(10)(B), 1415(i)(2)(C).

This reimbursement obligation exists not only when 

the school district and the parents agree that the child should 

be in private school but also sometimes when they do not. 

See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C). For example, even 

when parents place a child in a private-school setting to 

which the school district will not consent, the school district 

remains liable for the private-school costs if an adjudicator 

later determines that the private school was the appropriate 

educational placement for the child. See Sch. Comm., 471 

U.S. at 372-74. And even if, on appeal, a court were

ultimately to determine that the private school was not the 

appropriate educational placement, the child is entitled to 

“stay put” in the “then-current [private] educational 

placement” during the pendency of the appeal. 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1415(j). In that circumstance, as long as the child is 

twenty-one years of age or younger, see 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1412(a)(1)(A); Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 
5

480 F.3d 259, 272 (3d Cir. 2007), the school district must 

continue reimbursing the child’s parents until the point, if 

ever, that the “proceedings,” including on appeal, resolve in 

the school district’s favor, M.R. v. Ridley Sch. Dist.

(Ridley IV), 744 F.3d 112, 117-19, 124-28 (3d Cir. 2014)

(quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j)).

School districts have one more economic reason to 

adhere to the Act’s requirements: although under the 

“American Rule” parties typically pay their own attorneys’ 

fees, district courts can order school districts that lose IDEA 

disputes to pay “reasonable attorneys’ fees” to “a prevailing 

party who is the parent of a child with a disability.” 

20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B); P.N. ex rel. M.W. v. Clementon 

Bd. of Educ., 442 F.3d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 2006). The scope of 

school districts’ potential liability for fee awards is the subject 

of this appeal, the facts of which we recount below.

B. Factual and Procedural Background

1. IEP Litigation

E.R. attended an elementary school in the Ridley 

School District for kindergarten and first grade. Ridley 

School District v. M.R. (Ridley II), 680 F.3d 260, 264 (3d Cir. 

2012). After identifying E.R.’s learning disabilities during 

her first-grade year, Ridley and E.R.’s parents agreed to an 

IEP for the remaining months of that academic year. Id. at 

265-66. The parties’ IEP negotiations for second grade,

however, were unsuccessful because they disagreed about 

what reading aids would be appropriate for E.R., so E.R.’s 

parents opted to enroll her in a private school and to file an 

administrative complaint accusing Ridley of “fail[ing] to 

develop an appropriate IEP.” Id. at 267-77.
6

The administrative hearing officer agreed with E.R.’s 

parents and, in a report dated April 21, 2009, opined that 

Ridley’s proposed IEPs “were inadequate and therefore 

denied E.R. a free appropriate public education.” Id. at 267 

(internal quotation marks omitted). This decision in the 

parents’ favor during the administrative review process 

equated to “an agreement between the State and the parents”

and rendered E.R.’s private-school placement her 

“then-current educational placement” for purposes of the 

IDEA’s “stay put” provision. Ridley IV, 744 F.3d at 119 

(quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j)). Beginning at that point, 

therefore, Ridley was obliged to reimburse E.R.’s parents for 

their private-school costs. See id.

But the administrative ruling in E.R.’s parents’ favor 

did not fare well in the District Court or on appeal to this 

Court. After Ridley petitioned for review of the 

administrative hearing officer’s decision, the District Court 

rejected the parents’ contention that the challenged IEPs were 

“not based on peer-reviewed research” and were therefore 

deficient, Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R. (Ridley I), No. 09-2503, 

2011 WL 499966, at *12-15 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2011), and we 

affirmed, explaining that “although schools should strive to 

base a student’s specially designed instruction on 

peer-reviewed research to the maximum extent possible, the 

student’s IEP team retains flexibility to devise an appropriate 

program, in light of the available research,” Ridley II, 680 

F.3d at 275-79.

2. Reimbursement Litigation

E.R.’s parents did not pursue their IEP-related claims 

further, but they did ask Ridley to reimburse them for their

private-school expenses between the administrative hearing 
7

officer’s decision in 2009 and the conclusion of the IEP 

appeal in this Court in 2012. See Ridley IV, 744 F.3d at 

116-17. When Ridley declined, E.R.’s parents filed suit in 

the District Court under the IDEA’s “stay put” provision, 

20 U.S.C. § 1415(j), seeking “to have the cost of [E.R.’s] 

placement paid through final resolution of the dispute over 

her educational placement,” App. 23.

This time, the District Court ruled in the parents’ 

favor. See M.R. v. Ridley Sch. Dist. (Ridley III), No. 11-2235, 

2012 WL 3279230, at *5-13 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2012). 

Although Ridley asserted a trio of defenses—claim 

preclusion, the parents’ alleged failure to bring a compulsory 

counterclaim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) in 

their first suit, and the IDEA’s ninety-day statute of 

limitations—the District Court rejected each of them,

concluding that Ridley’s reimbursement obligations began 

once the hearing officer issued her decision in E.R.’s parents’ 

favor and continued through the completion of the appeals 

process. See id.

On appeal, we affirmed the District Court’s decision

on the reimbursement issue in full. See Ridley IV, 744 F.3d at 

120-28. Ridley then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ 

of certiorari, which was denied on May 18, 2015. See Ridley 

School District v. M.R., 135 S. Ct. 2309 (2015). Only after 

that denial did Ridley reimburse E.R.’s parents as the District 

Court had ordered in 2012. 

3. Attorneys’ Fees Motion

Having finally obtained the reimbursement they 

sought, E.R.’s parents filed a motion for an award of 

attorneys’ fees under the IDEA’s attorneys’ fees provision, 
8

20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i), but the District Court denied the 

motion, holding that reimbursement for the costs of E.R.’s 

temporary “stay put” placement was only “interim” relief and 

thus E.R.’s parents were not “prevailing parties,” App. 10-11. 

This appeal followed.

II. Standard of Review1

Although ordinarily we review attorneys’ fees rulings 

for abuse of discretion, our review is plenary where, as here, 

the district court based its denial on legal conclusions. Raab 

v. City of Ocean City, 833 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2016). That 

is, the District Court here did not deny fees on the ground 

that, even if E.R.’s parents were “prevailing part[ies]” under 

§ 1415(i)(3)(B)(i), their success was de minimis; if it had,

then our review would be for abuse of discretion. See Farrar 

v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114-16 (1992); id. at 119 (O’Connor, 

J., concurring). Instead, the District Court determined, as a 

threshold matter, that E.R.’s parents were not “prevailing 

part[ies],” so the District Court lacked discretion to award any

fees. Its determination on the “prevailing party” issue is a 

legal conclusion over which our review is plenary. See D.F.

v. Collingswood Borough Bd. of Educ., 694 F.3d 488, 495 (3d 

Cir. 2012).

III. Discussion

Applying this standard of review, we conclude, 

contrary to the District Court’s decision, that E.R.’s parents in 

 

1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(A). We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
9

fact are “prevailing part[ies]” under § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i) and 

thus are eligible for a fee award. To provide context for the 

reasons behind our conclusion, we first retrace the District 

Court’s analysis.

The IDEA attorneys’ fee provision, like various other 

statutory fee-shifting provisions, allows courts to award 

attorneys’ fees to a “prevailing party.” 20 U.S.C. 

§ 1415(i)(3)(B)(i).2 Because statutory language is generally 

interpreted in the same way as its “functional equivalent” in a 

similar context in the United States Code, Gomez-Perez v. 

Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 481 (2008), we interpret this fee 

provision consistently with other federal statutes using the 

term “prevailing party,” see Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, 

Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598,

603 n.4 (2001). Thus, to “prevail” under the IDEA, as under 

other statutes with “prevailing party” fee provisions, a party 

must obtain a “material alteration of the legal relationship of 

the parties” that is “judicially sanctioned.” Raab, 833 F.3d at

292 (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604-05). Importantly, 

a party achieves a “material alteration” of the parties’ legal 

relationship and “prevail[s]” for attorneys’ fees purposes only 

if he obtains relief that is “in some way merit[s]-based.” Id.

at 293. Fee-shifting under a “prevailing party” statute is not 

appropriate, for example, when a plaintiff wins a preliminary 

injunction with respect to a particular request for relief but 

 

2 See also, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (certain civil 

rights statutes); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964); 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) (Fair Housing 

Act); 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (Americans with Disabilities Act); 

52 U.S.C. § 10310(e) (Voting Rights Act of 1965).
10

then loses on the merits of that request for relief. See Sole v. 

Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 86 (2007). 

In the IDEA context, our opinions in John T. ex rel. 

Paul T. v. Delaware County Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545 

(3d Cir. 2003), and J.O. ex rel. C.O. v. Orange Township

Board of Education, 287 F.3d 267 (3d Cir. 2002), have 

applied the requirement of merits-based relief to three 

forward-looking injunctive orders: an order requiring a 

child’s temporary reinstatement to public school after the 

school district had requested home-schooling, J.O., 287 F.3d 

at 269-70, a preliminary injunction to preserve supplemental 

services previously provided by a school district, John T., 318 

F.3d at 549-50, and a contempt order aimed at ensuring the 

school district’s compliance with the preliminary injunction, 

id. at 551, 554. We held in John T. and J.O. that all three 

orders relating to temporary and preliminary relief were not 

merits-based and thus could not confer “prevailing party”

status under § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i). See John T., 318 F.3d at 

558-60; J.O., 287 F.3d at 273-74.3

 

3 We acknowledge that our conclusion with respect to 

the preliminary orders in J.O. and John T. exists in tension 

with the fact that, when a preliminary injunction pertains to a 

child’s education, the injunction awards schooling or 

supplemental services that cannot be nullified, even if an 

adjudicator ultimately holds that those educational services 

were not required under the IDEA. See generally N.D. v. 

Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 600 F.3d 1104, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(implying, because the temporary denial of educational 

services can create irreparable harm, that even interim 

educational services can create lasting benefits); 

Nieves-Márquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 122 (1st Cir. 
11

In its diligent attempt to follow our opinions in John T.

and J.O., the District Court here wrote a thoughtful and 

thorough opinion, denying attorneys’ fees because, in 

comparing the orders in John T. and J.O. to the 

reimbursement award here, the District Court reasoned that 

the reimbursement award was a form of temporary “stay put” 

relief and that, under John T. and J.O., such “interim” relief 

could not confer “prevailing party” status. App. 10-11. 

Although we disagree with that analysis, we acknowledge the 

novelty of the fee motion before the District Court: John T.

and J.O. addressed forward-looking and injunctive IDEA

“stay put” relief, but we have never before addressed 

eligibility for fees in a case where a party received backwardlooking and compensatory relief arising from the IDEA’s 

“stay put” provision.

We hold today that such relief is merits-based and 

confers “prevailing party” status. In so doing, we draw 

support, first, from the IDEA’s text; second, from our case 

law; and third, from the persuasive precedent in other 

Circuits.

 

2003) (same). Indeed, a claim for such preliminary and 

injunctive educational relief could be viewed as having its 

own merits, independent of a dispute over a child’s IEP or 

educational placement. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). But J.O.

and John T. constrain us to consider preliminary injunctions 

in the education context no differently from those outside of 

the education context, and we therefore will ignore any 

distinctions between educational and non-educational 

preliminary injunctions in our discussion below.
12

A. Statutory Text

1. “Prevailing Party”

We begin with the IDEA’s text. Kingdomware Techs., 

Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1976 (2016). 

Borrowing from the “prevailing party” fee provision 

applicable to suits brought under various federal civil rights 

statutes, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the IDEA’s attorneys’ fees

provision states that a district court, “in its discretion, may 

award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs . . . to a 

prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability.”

20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i).

4

 For that reason, we interpret 

the language of § 1988 and the IDEA attorneys’ fees 

provision in “the same way,” In re Cmty. Bank, 418 F.3d 277, 

295-96 (3d Cir. 2005), and are bound by our cases addressing

§ 1988—two of which counsel in favor of holding that E.R.’s 

parents received merits-based relief that conferred “prevailing 

party” status. We discuss those two cases below.

First, in Bagby v. Beal, we held that, because the 

plaintiff was afforded a due process hearing, she was the

“prevailing party” under § 1988 with respect to her 42 U.S.C. 

 

4 The text of the IDEA attorneys’ fees provision itself, 

by tracking § 1988 nearly verbatim, makes clear that it is 

premised on § 1988. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i); cf.

42 U.S.C. § 1988. The legislative history reinforces that 

conclusion, as a conference report on the IDEA’s “prevailing 

party” fees provision expressly references Marek v. Chesny, 

473 U.S. 1 (1985), a Supreme Court case interpreting § 1988.

See H.R. Rep. No. 99-687, at 5 (1986) (Conf. Rep.); see also

Marek, 473 U.S. at 7-18.
13

§ 1983 procedural due process claim, even if she did not 

ultimately prevail at the due process hearing. 606 F.2d 411, 

414-15 (3d Cir. 1979). We reasoned that the hearing’s 

outcome meant only that the plaintiff did not succeed on her 

underlying substantive due process claim, even though the 

fact of the hearing meant that she had prevailed on her 

procedural due process claim. See id.

So too here. Even though E.R.’s parents did not 

succeed with respect to their request for a permanent private 

school placement, see Ridley II, 680 F.3d at 273-79, they did

prevail with respect to their procedural right to 

reimbursement under the IDEA’s “stay put” provision, 20 

U.S.C. § 1415(j). See Ridley IV, 744 F.3d at 117-19. Indeed, 

§ 1415 has the heading “procedural safeguards,” and section 

headings are “tools available for the resolution of a doubt 

about the meaning of a statute.” Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. 

Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 47 (2008) (quoting 

Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 528 (2002)). Bagby thus

counsels in favor of deeming E.R.’s parents’ procedural 

success a victory “on the merits” that conferred “prevailing 

party” status. Bagby, 606 F.2d at 415.

Second, in People Against Police Violence v. City of 

Pittsburgh, we held that the plaintiffs were “prevailing 

parties” under § 1988 by virtue of an injunction that had

permanently prevented the defending city from enforcing an 

unconstitutional ordinance; had granted the plaintiffs “what 

they sought on an enduring basis”; and had been a temporary 

or “preliminary” injunction only in the sense that it did not 

apply to the city’s later-revised ordinance, which had

remedied the preexisting constitutional defects. 520 F.3d 

226, 228-30, 232-36 (3d Cir. 2008). Given that the district 

court’s analysis of claims and defenses with respect to the 
14

unconstitutional first ordinance was independent of its 

analysis with respect to the revised ordinance, we held that 

the injunction afforded the plaintiffs “lasting relief on the 

merits of their claims,” id. at 229-30, 234, providing “an 

example of that rare situation where a merits-based 

determination is made at the injunction stage,” Singer Mgmt. 

Consultants, Inc. v. Milgram, 650 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 

2011) (en banc).

Here, likewise, the particular claims and defenses

about E.R.’s educational placement, which the parties had

litigated in the IEP action, were independent of the claims and

defenses about Ridley’s “stay put” obligations, which the 

parties litigated in the reimbursement action. Compare Ridley 

IV, 744 F.3d at 120-28, with Ridley II, 680 F.3d at 267-83. 

Because the presence of independent claims and defenses 

signals the presence of independent merits, see People 

Against Police Violence, 520 F.3d at 229-30, 234; see also

Sch. Dist. v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd. (In re Sch. 

Asbestos Litig.), 842 F.2d 671, 678 (3d Cir. 1988), our 

reasoning in People Against Police Violence, like our 

decision in Bagby, favors the view that the reimbursement 

obtained here, arising from claims and defenses that were 

independent of those relating to E.R.’s IEP, conferred

“prevailing party” status to E.R.’s parents.

Read together, Bagby and People Against Police 

Violence support an interpretation of “prevailing party” under 

42 U.S.C. § 1988 that allows permanent procedural relief,

when the plaintiff has obtained it through an independent

merits determination, to confer “prevailing party” status. 

Today we import that analysis into the IDEA context, where, 

as we explain below, the IDEA’s statutory context and 

“overall object” provide additional support for holding that
15

E.R.’s parents are prevailing parties. Long v. Tommy Hilfiger 

U.S.A., Inc., 671 F.3d 371, 375 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting 

Disabled in Action of Pa. v. SEPTA, 539 F.3d 199, 210 (3d

Cir. 2008)).

2. Statutory Context

We read statutory provisions in context, see King v. 

Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015), and must consider any 

legislative findings that would “enable us to evaluate 

[Congress’s] legislative judgment,” United States v. Lopez, 

514 U.S. 549, 562-63 (1995). Here, Congress expressly 

found that “[i]mproving educational results for children with 

disabilities is an essential element of our national policy of 

ensuring equality of opportunity . . . for individuals with 

disabilities,” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1), and thus the statute 

seeks to make “the education of children with disabilities . . . 

more effective,” to “ensure that all children with disabilities 

have available to them a free appropriate public education . . . 

designed to meet their unique needs,” and to “ensure that the 

rights of children with disabilities and parents of such 

children are protected,” id. § 1400(c)(5), (d)(1)(A), (d)(1)(B). 

Along these lines, the IDEA’s legislative history reflects that 

Congress enacted the attorneys’ fees provision specifically to 

ensure “that due process procedures, including the right to 

litigation if that [becomes] necessary, [are] available to all 

parents.” S. Rep. No. 99-112, at 2 (1985).

These child- and parent-friendly goals are not a reason 

for us to interpret “prevailing party” under the IDEA any 

differently than we would under other statutes, Buckhannon, 

532 U.S. at 610; John T., 318 F.3d at 558, but, in considering

the statutory context, we must consider the practical 

consequences of withholding attorneys’ fees in cases like this 
16

one, see Sturgeon v. Frost, 136 S. Ct. 1061, 1070 (2016);

Long, 671 F.3d at 375. After all, courts are “decidedly 

receptive” to remedies that are “necessary or at least helpful 

to the accomplishment of the statutory purpose.” Cannon v. 

Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 703 (1979).

We accordingly reject Ridley’s contention that any and 

all relief relating to the IDEA’s “stay put” provision simply 

cannot confer “prevailing party” status. Ridley’s position, if 

made law, would render it impossible in many cases for 

parents, who ordinarily cannot afford private counsel, to 

enforce their “stay put” rights. See generally Kay v. Ehrler, 

499 U.S. 432, 436 & n.8 (1991); Newman v. Piggie Park 

Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). While we are 

confident the vast majority of school districts view their

mission as collaborative, not adversarial, with parents in their 

joint endeavor to provide children with meaningful 

educational opportunities and appropriate support, we cannot 

ignore the reality of occasional lapses. Nor can we allow 

school districts that ignore their obligations under the IDEA’s 

“stay put” provision to do so with impunity—a result that is 

the antithesis of the IDEA’s goals. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(d), 

1415(f)-(j).

The IDEA’s statutory scheme accords far better with 

an attorneys’ fee regime that allows parents to take effective

legal action if necessary to enforce their “stay put” rights. 

Granted, fees are not available when parents seek a

forward-looking “stay put” injunction, see John T., 318 F.3d 

at 558-60; J.O., 287 F.3d at 273-74, but such injunctive relief 

is often litigated as part and parcel of the underlying 

proceedings about the child’s IEP or educational placement, 

see, e.g., John T., 318 F.3d at 549-51, with a commensurate 

reduction in the time and burden of litigation. By contrast, 
17

when a school district violates its “stay put” obligations and 

parents must take action—whether by motion or by separate 

complaint—to obtain retrospective compensatory relief, then,

for all practical purposes, the resulting proceedings are

separate from any IEP or educational placement proceedings.

Our customary interpretation of the term “prevailing 

party” and the statutory context of the fee provision at issue 

compel us to consider not only the course charted by our prior 

opinions, but also the real consequences of withholding 

attorneys’ fees when parents obtain retrospective 

compensatory relief arising from the IDEA’s “stay put” 

provision. In situations like these, we conclude that the 

parents are “prevailing part[ies]” eligible for an award of 

attorneys’ fees under § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i).

B. Third Circuit Cases

Our previous opinions in the IDEA context buttress 

our conclusion in this case. In P.N. ex rel. M.W. v. Clementon 

Board of Education, for instance, we held that an award 

reimbursing parents for the costs of supplemental services 

conferred “prevailing party” status under the IDEA. See 442 

F.3d at 850-51, 856-57. Likewise, after affirming the parents’ 

right to reimbursement for the costs of a child’s “stay put” 

placement in Drinker ex rel. Drinker v. Colonial School 

District, we stated that the parents were “entitled to renew 

their motion for attorneys’ fees” on remand, thereby

confirming that the parents were prevailing parties. 78 F.3d 

859, 863-68 (3d Cir. 1996). Even when discussing 

reimbursement related to a temporary “stay put” educational 

placement, thus, our prior opinions establish that retrospective 

and compensatory relief can ground a fee award.
18

Ridley, however, points to isolated phrases in John T.

and J.O. and contends they oblige us to hold that relief arising 

from the IDEA’s “stay put” provision can never confer

“prevailing party” status. Not so. The school district ignores 

the procedural postures of those cases, which, as discussed 

above, involved forward-looking and temporary injunctive 

relief, not backward-looking and compensatory relief that 

requires an independent merits determination. See John T., 

318 F.3d at 549-51, 558-60 (preliminary injunction); J.O., 

287 F.3d at 269-70, 273-74 (order granting temporary 

reinstatement to public school).

To be sure, the contempt order in John T. awarded 

John T.’s parents $1100 as a rough estimate of the value of 

services that the school district, in violating the district 

court’s preliminary injunction, had refused to provide for a 

particular month. John T., 318 F.3d at 551. But that 

monetary award, in contrast to the compensatory relief 

equating to actual damages awarded here, took the form of a 

remedial civil sanction, existing not merely to remedy “losses 

sustained due to noncompliance” but also to “coerce 

compliance” with the district court’s underlying injunction. 

Id. at 554 (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. 

Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719, 735 (3d Cir. 1993)). For that reason, 

the contempt order awarded an amount approximating John 

T.’s parents’ losses, but did not purport to reimburse their 

actual expenses. See McDowell v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 423 

F.3d 233, 240-41 (3d Cir. 2005); John T., 318 F.3d at 554.

As we explained in John T., the contempt order’s close 

relationship with the underlying preliminary injunction alters 

the nature of the “prevailing party” analysis for such an order: 

a contempt order is considered “in . . . relation to the 

underlying relief that it enforces” and cannot confer 
19

“prevailing party” status unless the underlying relief does. 

John T., 318 F.3d at 559-60. Accordingly, when the 

underlying relief is forward-looking, injunctive, and 

temporary, the contempt order is too. See id. And the basic 

equivalence between a contempt order and the underlying 

relief it enforces extends not only to the “prevailing party” 

analysis, but also to whether the contempt order is appealable: 

because “a civil contempt proceeding is a continuation of the 

underlying civil action from which it arises,” in most cases 

the contempt order is not immediately appealable when the 

underlying action is not yet appealable. 3A Charles Alan 

Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 703, 714 

(4th ed. 2017); see John T., 318 F.3d at 559; Halderman v. 

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 673 F.2d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 

1982). In John T., thus, the contempt order equated to a 

rewriting of the underlying forward-looking and temporary 

injunction in stronger terms, and hence it did not confer 

“prevailing party” status. See John T., 318 F.3d at 559-60.

What we have here is something wholly different. 

True, the reimbursement suit arose because of Ridley’s 

refusal to obey its obligations under the IDEA’s “stay put” 

provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j), see Ridley IV, 744 F.3d at 

119. But E.R.’s interim forward-looking right under 

§ 1415(j) to stay in private school was not at issue, and, in 

contrast to a contempt order that we must consider in relation 

to an underlying preliminary injunction, cf. John T., 318 F.3d 

at 559-60, or forward-looking and temporary injunctive relief, 

cf. John T., 318 F.3d at 558-59; J.O., 287 F.3d at 273-74,

E.R.’s parents’ reimbursement award equated to 

backward-looking compensatory relief intended “to redress 

the concrete loss that the plaintiff[s] . . . suffered by reason of 

the defendant’s wrongful conduct,” State Farm Mut. Auto. 
20

Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003). The

reimbursement award, in other words, had its own, 

independent merits and sought relief separate from any other 

relief that E.R.’s parents had sought from Ridley—

characteristics that confer “prevailing party” status.

C. Other Circuits’ Cases

The distinction we adopt today between 

forward-looking injunctive “stay put” relief and 

backward-looking compensatory “stay put” relief accords 

with the approaches taken by our Sister Circuits. On the one 

hand, other Courts of Appeals addressing forward-looking 

injunctive orders have held that “stay put” injunctions and 

similar temporary orders relating to a child’s educational

placement cannot confer “prevailing party” status, as we did 

in John T. and J.O.5 On the other hand, Courts of Appeals

addressing reimbursement awards in the broader context of 

the IDEA have held generally that retrospective and 

compensatory relief confers “prevailing party” status,6and 

 

5 See Tina M. ex rel. S.M. v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. 

Bd., 816 F.3d 57, 58-62 (5th Cir. 2016); Bd. of Educ. v. 

Nathan R. ex rel. Richard R., 199 F.3d 377, 382 (7th Cir. 

2000); Bd. of Educ. v. Steven L. ex rel. Andrew L., 89 F.3d 

464, 466-67, 469 (7th Cir. 1996); Christopher P. ex rel. 

Norma P. v. Marcus, 915 F.2d 794, 797-98, 804-05 (2d Cir. 

1990).

6 See T.D. v. LaGrange Sch. Dist. No. 102, 349 F.3d 

469, 473, 479-80 (7th Cir. 2003); G ex rel. RG v. Fort Bragg 

Dependent Schs., 343 F.3d 295, 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2003); 

Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 128 F.3d 1431, 1433, 

1439-40 (10th Cir. 1997).
21

both appellate and district courts have ruled, specifically in 

the context of addressing backward-looking “stay put” relief

(analogous to the reimbursement award here) or similar 

independent relief obtained under the IDEA, that such relief

does confer “prevailing party” status, consistent with our 

conclusion today.

7

* * *

For the reasons discussed above, we hold that the 

IDEA’s “stay put” provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j), gives rise 

to two concomitant rights. First, the provision establishes a

physical right for a child with a disability to “stay put” in her 

 

7 See Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 35 v. Mr. & Mrs. R., 

321 F.3d 9, 15-16 (1st Cir. 2003); A.D. ex rel. L.D. v. Dep’t of 

Educ., No. 12-0307, 2014 WL 692910, at *1, *3 (D. Haw. 

Feb. 20, 2014); Dep’t of Educ. v. C.B. ex rel. Donna B., 

No. 11-0576, 2013 WL 704934, at *2-3, *6-7 (D. Haw. Feb. 

26, 2013); Student X. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 07-2316, 

2008 WL 4890440, at *27 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2008); K.R. ex 

rel. M.R. v. Bd. of Educ., 66 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450-51 

(E.D.N.Y. 1999). Citing to Termine ex rel. Termine v. 

William S. Hart Union High School District, Appellants point 

out that a Ninth Circuit panel held that a tuition 

reimbursement award “in a separate stay-put action” rendered

the parents “prevailing parties.” Appellants’ Br. 21 (citing 

Termine, 288 F. App’x 360, 362 (9th Cir. 2008)). While we 

agree that the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit panel is 

persuasive, pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3(a), we cannot 

ascribe precedential value to Termine, which is an 

unpublished and non-precedential opinion. See 9th Cir. 

R. 36-3.
22

“then-current educational placement,” which is a temporary 

right to forward-looking injunctive relief that does not 

determine the merits of any claim. See Drinker, 78 F.3d at 

864. Second, if a school district refuses to provide or pay for 

the child’s “then-current educational placement,” the “stay 

put” provision establishes the parents’ right to monetary 

reimbursement or, alternatively, the child’s right to 

compensatory education, both of which are rights to 

backward-looking compensatory relief and require an

independent merits determination. See Ridley IV, 744 F.3d at 

119; see also Lester H. ex rel. Octavia P. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 

865, 872-73 (3d Cir. 1990).

If the school district violates either right, then the 

parents can bring administrative or judicial action to enforce 

the violated right, and the parents’ eligibility for a fee award, 

if they are successful, depends on the underlying right 

enforced. Where the action enforces the child’s physical right 

to “stay put” and the parents obtain temporary 

forward-looking injunctive relief, there is no determination

“on the merits” and the parents are not eligible for a fee 

award. See John T., 318 F.3d at 558-59. But where the 

action enforces the parents’ right to reimbursement or the 

child’s right to compensatory education and the parents 

obtain backward-looking compensatory relief, the action 

requires an independent merits determination and the parents 

are eligible for a fee award.

8

 

8

In the course of oral argument, the issue was raised 

as to whether the “prevailing party” analysis is materially 

different for actions commenced at the administrative level 

and seeking backward-looking compensatory relief under the 

IDEA’s “stay put” provision. For the avoidance of doubt, and 
23

E.R.’s parents’ reimbursement litigation falls into the 

latter category: When Ridley refused to pay for E.R.’s “stay

put” placement, E.R.’s parents sued for backward-looking 

compensatory relief, and, when they won the relief they 

sought, they obtained a merits-based victory. See Ridley IV, 

744 F.3d at 117-28. E.R.’s parents are therefore “prevailing 

part[ies]” under the IDEA and are eligible for an award of 

attorneys’ fees, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i), to be set by the 

District Court.

9

 

given that there is no exhaustion requirement for actions 

seeking relief under the IDEA’s “stay put” provision, see

Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 297 F.3d 

195, 199-200 (2d Cir. 2002), we hold that parents who obtain 

backward-looking compensatory relief are prevailing parties 

under the IDEA, whether they first pursue such relief in an 

administrative agency or in a court.

9

In their application for attorneys’ fees and costs in 

the District Court, counsel for E.R.’s parents made a lengthy 

submission, including multiple declarations concerning the 

hours expended and the prevailing rates for attorneys of 

comparable experience. While we leave it to the District 

Court on remand to consider the amount of E.R.’s parents’ 

fee award in the first instance, we note that the litigation here 

was conducted by highly qualified and experienced counsel 

and was itself extensive and protracted, with proceedings 

spanning from March 2011 to April 2016 and encompassing 

pleadings, motions, and briefing in the District Court; full 

briefing and argument in the Court of Appeals; and 

opposition to a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court.
24

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse and remand 

for proceedings consistent with this opinion.