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i 

95–320 2016

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–45] 

ASSURING NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE: 

INVESTING IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 

TO END RELIANCE ON RUSSIAN 

ROCKET ENGINES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JUNE 26, 2015 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Vice Chair 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska 

PETE AGUILAR, California 

STEVE KITAY, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Counsel 

ERIC SMITH, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces ............................................................................ 2 

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Bruno, Salvatore T. ‘‘Tory,’’ President and Chief Executive Officer, United 

Launch Alliance .................................................................................................... 3 

Culbertson, Frank, Jr., President of Space Systems Group, Orbital ATK .......... 6 

Greaves, Lt Gen Samuel A., USAF, Commander, Air Force Space and Missile 

Systems Center .................................................................................................... 34 

Griffin, Dr. Michael D., Deputy Chair, RD–180 Availability Risk Mitigation 

Study ..................................................................................................................... 36 

Hyten, Gen John E., USAF, Commander, Air Force Space Command ............... 33 

McFarland, Hon. Katrina G., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Department of Defense ........................................................................................ 32 

Meyerson, Robert, President, Blue Origin ............................................................. 4 

Thornburg, Jeffery, Senior Director of Propulsion Engineering, SpaceX ............ 8 

Van Kleeck, Julie A., Vice President, Advanced Space and Launch Systems, 

Aerojet Rocketdyne .............................................................................................. 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Bruno, Salvatore T. ‘‘Tory’’ .............................................................................. 63 

Culbertson, Frank, Jr. ...................................................................................... 103 

Greaves, Lt Gen Samuel A. ............................................................................. 143 

Griffin, Dr. Michael D. ..................................................................................... 154 

Hyten, Gen John E. .......................................................................................... 135 

McFarland, Hon. Katrina G. ........................................................................... 128 

Meyerson, Robert .............................................................................................. 79 

Rogers, Hon. Mike ............................................................................................ 61 

Thornburg, Jeffery ............................................................................................ 113 

Van Kleeck, Julie A. ......................................................................................... 86 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Section 1604, from ‘‘Carl Levin and Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Legislative Text and 

Joint Explanatory Statement to Accompany H.R. 3979, Public Law 

113–291’’ ........................................................................................................ 163 

Liquid Rocket Engine—Multi Program Applicability .................................... 164 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Coffman ...................................................................................................... 168 

Mr. Lamborn ..................................................................................................... 167 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 167 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Bridenstine ................................................................................................. 177 

Mr. Brooks ......................................................................................................... 178 

Mr. Coffman ...................................................................................................... 176 

Mr. Cooper ........................................................................................................ 172 
Page

IV 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING—Continued 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 171 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 180 
(1) 

ASSURING NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE: INVESTING IN 

AMERICAN INDUSTRY TO END RELIANCE ON RUSSIAN 

ROCKET ENGINES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Friday, June 26, 2015. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:03 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. ROGERS. Good morning. I want to welcome everybody to our 

Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing on ‘‘Assuring National Security Space: Investing in American Industry to End Reliance on 

the Russian Rocket Engines.’’ 

Before I get started, I think we all ought to take note today that 

this is the day of the funeral, those nine families in South Carolina. And it is a real tragedy. And I know our hearts and thoughts 

are with them and our condolences to their family and friends. As 

for today’s business, we will be conducting two panels. In this first 

panel, we have five expert witnesses from the industry who represent current and potential providers of the space launch and 

rocket propulsion for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle 

[EELV] program. 

In our second panel, we have three senior government officials 

who have responsibilities in managing and overseeing the EELV 

program. And we also have an expert adviser to the government on 

recent launch study. 

On panel one, we have Tory Bruno, president and CEO [chief executive officer] of United Launch Alliance [ULA]; Mr. Rob Meyerson, president of Blue Origin; Ms. Julie Van Kleeck, vice president, 

advanced space and launch programs at Aerojet Rocketdyne; Mr. 

Frank Culbertson, president of space systems, Orbital ATK; and 

Mr. Jeff Thornburg, senior director of propulsion engineering at 

SpaceX. I thank all of you for participating in this hearing, providing your perspective on national security. I know it takes time 

and energy to prepare for these things. And it is really an inconvenience to come up here, but it really helps us a lot in developing 

public policy. 

So I really appreciate your service. This is our second hearing we 

recently conducted on space. We are dedicating the time to this 

topic because of its significance to our national security. Without 
2 

an effective space launch program, we lose all the advantages we 

gain from space capabilities. Losing space for our warfighters is not 

an option. There are key policy and acquisition questions regarding 

the future of national security space that need to be addressed. As 

we have said before, I am committed to ending our reliance on Russian rocket engines for national security space launch. 

I believe we must end our reliance in a manner that protects our 

military’s assured access to space and protects the taxpayers by ensuring we don’t trade one monopoly for another. The House bill accomplishes this. And I look forward to perspectives of our witnesses 

on the current legislation under consideration for fiscal year 2016 

NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act], both the Senate version and the House version. 

Because we are committed to ending our reliance on Russian engines, we must invest in the United States rocket propulsion industrial base. Investment in our industry for advanced rocket engines 

is overdue. While we may lead in some areas of rocket propulsion, 

we are clearly not leading in all. This is a painfully obvious fact 

considering that two of the three U.S. launch providers we have 

here today rely on Russian engines. 

And it is not just the Russians leading the way. According to online press reports, the Chinese may be flying a new launch vehicle 

on a maiden flight this summer with similar technologies as the 

Russians, using advanced kerosene engine. The time has come to 

resume U.S. leadership in space. And I believe the companies before us today can help us do that. 

However, I am concerned with the Air Force’s recent approach in 

what may amount to a very expensive and risky endeavor in development of new engines, new launch vehicles, and new infrastructure. Congress has only authorized funding for the development of 

a rocket propulsion system. Launch vehicles are not the problem. 

The problem is the engine. 

Thank you for being with us this morning. I look forward to your 

testimony and discussion of these important topics. I now recognize 

my friend and colleague from Tennessee, the ranking member, Mr. 

Cooper, for any opening statement he may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the Appendix on page 61.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

TENNESSEE, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think we should approach this hearing as all others with a 

great deal of humility. Because I think the bottom line is if we had 

gotten last year’s NDAA right, we wouldn’t even be having this 

hearing. So we are correcting a self-inflicted wound here. Now, 

there are many self-inflicted wounds depending on how far back 

you want to go in history. It is a little embarrassing for America 

that we haven’t been able to duplicate or exceed the Russian technology already, given the billions of dollars we have expended. But, 

actually, there are tremendous signs of hope because if we had this 

hearing a few years ago, that is when we really should have been 

worried, but we weren’t smart enough to be worried back then. 
3 

Now due to the investment, sometimes of our own billionaires and 

their love of space, there are some amazingly exciting things happening. So we are really just managing this transition. 

I am confident we can do it. I wish, and I don’t know whether 

the Chinese with their Long March missile have, in fact, bought 

the RD–180 or at least copied it successfully, something we apparently have been unable to do. But we don’t want to just be held 

to the past standard. There are new generation technologies that 

are even more exciting, more capable. So how do we effectively 

transition to that. Company competition can be contentious sometimes, but it is also exciting. And sometimes it brings out the best 

in us no matter how painful it is. So I am glad we are having this 

hearing. I hope that the net result will be superior congressional 

performance, as well as superior company performance so that we 

can have assured access to space. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the testimony of the 

witnesses. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

And the Chair would inform the other members if they have 

opening statements, they can submit them for the record. 

Now we will move to our first panel. The witnesses are asked to 

summarize their opening statements. Your full opening statements 

will be accepted into the record. 

And we will start with Mr. Bruno. You are recognized for 5 minutes to summarize your opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF SALVATORE T. ‘‘TORY’’ BRUNO, PRESIDENT 

AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, UNITED LAUNCH ALLIANCE 

Mr. BRUNO. Thank you. 

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, members of the 

committee, I appreciate the opportunity to come here today and 

talk about our ongoing transformation of ULA and our journey to 

replace the Russian RD–180 with an all-American solution for our 

rocket engine. As you know, we partnered with Blue Origin last 

year for the development of the BE–4 engine. It is a methane engine. It was 31⁄2 years into its development. And the engine portion 

of that effort was fully funded, allowing us to move out smartly on 

that activity. 

Rocket science is hard. And rocket engines are the hardest part. 

So prudence required that I also enter into a partnership with 

Aerojet Rocketdyne for the AR1 rocket engine as a backup. That is 

a kerosene engine. It is at present 16 months behind the Blue Origin 4 engine simply because it started later. And it does require 

significant government funding in order to continue. Both engines 

are currently on plan. They are meeting their project and technical 

milestones. And, most importantly for our Nation, both will bring 

the advanced engine cycle technology that is present on the RD– 

180 to American shores and allow us to regain our leadership in 

this key technical area. 

Now, as we do all of this, ULA’s focus will remain laser sharp 

on mission success and schedule certainty. We are very proud of 

our perfect, on-time successful record of now 96 consecutive 

launches, many of which were critical national security assets. 

Now, in order to do all of this and avoid an assured access gap and 
4 

generate the commercial funds necessary for this investment in 

this new engine, it is necessary that we be allowed to continue 

competing with the Atlas launch vehicle in order to support those 

missions and provide the funds that are required to do this. And 

so I am grateful to the House and especially for this committee and 

the work that you have done to correct the situation that Ranking 

Member Cooper referred to that will allow us to have true and 

proper competition going forward while we protect our own national security. 

Now, as we stand here today, the industry has matured to admit 

a second provider for national security launch. I think that is a 

good thing. Competition is healthy for the taxpayer, and it is 

healthy for the industry. I look forward to competing in this new 

environment. And I am confident that when there is a fair and 

even playing field, that ULA can come to that field, and we can 

win. So I am optimistic about the future of space launch. I am inspired by the missions that I have the privilege to be entrusted 

with. And I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bruno can be found in the Appendix on page 63.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Thank you, Mr. Bruno. 

Mr. Meyerson, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT MEYERSON, PRESIDENT, 

BLUE ORIGIN 

Mr. MEYERSON. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to 

speak before you today. Assured access to space is a national priority and a challenge that we must meet domestically. Blue Origin 

is working to deliver the American engine to maintain U.S. leadership in space and deliver critical national security capabilities. 

Our partnership with ULA is fully funded and offers the fastest 

path to a domestic alternative to the Russian RD–180 without requiring taxpayer dollars. For more than a decade, we have steadily 

advanced our capabilities, flying five different rocket vehicles and 

developing multiple liquid rocket engines. We are spending our 

own money rather than taxpayer funds. And we are taking a clean 

sheet approach to development. As a result, we are able to outcompete the Russians, building modern American engines to serve multiple launch vehicles. 

Our recent successes demonstrate that. In April of this year, our 

BE–3 engine performed flawlessly, powering our New Shepard 

space vehicle to the edge of space. The BE–3 is the first new American hydrogen engine to fly to space in more than a decade. United 

Launch Alliance recognized the merits of our approach when they 

selected our BE–4 for their Vulcan rocket. The BE–4 improves performance at a lower cost and is already more than 3 years into development. Most importantly, it is on schedule to be qualified in 

2017 and ready for first flight on the Vulcan in 2019, 2 years ahead 

of any alternative. 

Being available 2 years earlier means that there is 2 years less 

reliance on the Russians. As with any ox-rich [oxygen-rich] stagedcombustion development, there are many technical challenges. Blue 

has made conscious decisions, design choices to mitigate risk. And 
5 

we also have an extensive testing program underway, completing 

more than 60 staged-combustion tests and multiple hotfire tests on 

our powerpack to date. Full BE–4 engine testing is on track, on 

schedule to be completed or being conducted by the end of next 

year. And because we own our own test facilities, we can do this 

much faster. Blue is well capitalized, and significant private investment has been made in the facilities, equipment, and personnel 

needed to make the BE–4 a success. 

The engine is fully funded primarily by Blue with support from 

ULA and does not require government funding to be successful. Instead of duplicating private efforts, the U.S. Government should 

focus its resources on developing the next generation of launch vehicles to meet national security requirements. 

In conclusion, no new engine can simply be dropped into an existing launch vehicle. Launch vehicles have to be designed around 

their engines. And launch vehicle providers are the ones who are 

best able to decide what type of engine they need. Thank you. 

And I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Meyerson can be found in the 

Appendix on page 79.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Meyerson. 

Ms. Van Kleeck, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JULIE A. VAN KLEECK, VICE PRESIDENT, ADVANCED SPACE AND LAUNCH SYSTEMS, AEROJET ROCKETDYNE 

Ms. VAN KLEECK. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, 

and members of the subcommittee, it is a privilege to be here today 

to discuss this important national security issue. 

Simply stated, we have an engine problem on the Atlas V rocket, 

the Nation’s best and most versatile national security launch vehicle. It uses a Russian-made RD–180 booster engine. On behalf of 

Aerojet Rocketdyne and its 5,000 employees nationwide, I want to 

thank this committee for recognizing the problem and taking action. 

It continues to be our position that the fastest, least risky, and 

lowest cost way to fix this problem is to develop an advanced American rocket booster engine to replace the Russian RD–180. With a 

focused competitive acquisition based on a robust public-private 

partnership, we firmly believe this can be accomplished by 2019. In 

fiscal years 2015 and 2016, this committee took a leadership role 

by authorizing funding and direction for the Air Force to competitively develop this engine by 2019. 

Aerojet Rocketdyne welcomes the opportunity to compete for this 

effort for an engine that we call the AR1. Unfortunately, more than 

6 months have passed since fiscal year 2015 funds were authorized 

and appropriated for the engine development program that this 

committee mandated. And virtually no money has been spent. It 

appears that this engine development is being subsumed into a 

lengthy new launch vehicle development and subsequent launch 

service acquisition. 

Mr. Chairman, earlier this week, you stated in the press, and I 

quote, ‘‘It is not time to fund new launch vehicles or new infrastructure or rely on unproven technologies. It is time for the Pen-
6 

tagon to harness the power of the American industrial base and 

move with purpose and clarity in order to swiftly develop an American rocket propulsion system that ends our reliance on Russia as 

soon as possible,’’ end quote. 

You are exactly right. And we wholeheartedly agree with you. 

This is a national security imperative and should be treated as 

such. We have the technology to fix this problem, but we must get 

moving. For the focused public-private partnership, Aerojet Rocketdyne has the proven capability to develop a state-of-the-art, advanced-technology kerosene-fueled booster engine that can be certified by 2019 and be a near drop-in replacement for the Russian 

RD–180 on the existing Atlas V. 

Aerojet Rocketdyne is able to say this with confidence based on 

more than 60 years of experience developing and producing launch 

vehicle propulsion. We have at hand these technologies as we have 

worked on them for the last 20 years. We have active state-of-theart liquid rocket engine factories that are currently delivering engines supporting upcoming national security launches. We are the 

only domestic company that has designed, developed, produced, 

and flown rocket engines with thrust greater than 150,000 pounds 

thrust. Replacing the RD–180 requires nearly a million pounds of 

thrust. We have experience developing large liquid rocket engines 

on short timelines such as our Nation now faces. The R–68, the 

first-stage engine on the Delta 4 launch vehicle, which produces 

700,000 pounds of thrust, was developed and produced on a 5-year 

schedule. AR1 will not be a copy of the RD–180. It will be a superior all-American engine and will leapfrog Russian technology. AR1 

will be available to any U.S. launch booster propulsion user and 

configurable to any launch vehicle. 

The engine’s intellectual property will be retained by the government. To reiterate, our Nation has an engine problem on its premiere launch vehicle, the Atlas V. We must get rid of the Russian 

rocket engine. At Aerojet Rocketdyne, we believe the fastest, least 

risky, lowest cost manner to do this is to develop an advanced 

American engine to replace the RD–180 on Atlas V. This can only 

be done by 2019 with a focused and robust engine development program and a public-private partnership. Doing so will preserve access to space and reinvigorate the U.S. rocket propulsion industrial 

base. 

Chairman Rogers, I want to thank you again for holding this important hearing. These are difficult issues. And each of us at the 

table has competing equities at stake. On behalf of Aerojet Rocketdyne, I appreciate you allowing our voice to be a part of this conversation. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Van Kleeck can be found in the 

Appendix on page 86.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Ms. Van Kleeck. 

Mr. Culbertson, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF FRANK CULBERTSON, JR., PRESIDENT OF 

SPACE SYSTEMS GROUP, ORBITAL ATK 

Mr. CULBERTSON. Good morning, Chairman Rogers, Ranking 

Member Cooper, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for 

the opportunity to appear today. I have submitted my full state-
7 

ment for the record, of course. And, in the interest of time, I will 

briefly describe for the committee how Orbital ATK is working to 

support the United States national security space systems and 

launch vehicle programs. As a global leader in aerospace and defense technologies, Orbital ATK designs, builds, and delivers affordable space, defense, and aviation-related systems to support 

our Nation’s warfighters, as well as civil, government, and commercial customers in the U.S. and abroad. 

Our company is the leading provider of small- and medium-class 

space launch vehicles for civil, military, and commercial missions, 

having conducted more than 80 launches of such vehicles for NASA 

[National Aeronautics and Space Administration], the U.S. Air 

Force, the Missile Defense Agency, and other government, commercial, and international customers in the last 25 years, including delivering approximately 4 tons of cargo to the International Space 

Station. 

As the committee is aware, earlier this year, the U.S. Air Force 

announced its EELV Phase 2 development and launch services acquisition plan. One of the key components of this plan, beginning 

in fiscal year 2015, centers on the rocket propulsion [system] or 

RPS prototype program. We believe the Air Force’s acquisition plan 

for RPS is well conceived and, if supported by Congress, will be 

successful in providing new space launch capabilities that are affordable, reliable, and available by the end of this decade. As both 

a launch vehicle builder and a propulsion system supplier, Orbital 

ATK is prepared to support the Air Force’s RPS prototype program. 

Orbital ATK has proposed both solid and liquid propulsion system 

developments that will support a new, all-American launch vehicle 

family that meets all the specified national security launch requirements, as well as civil, government, commercial, and international 

launch needs. 

It is true that we are currently using the Russian engine on one 

of our launch systems. That is because it was the only one available to us at the time. We had to meet our commitment to the 

International Space Station and deliver cargo. Our new systems, 

however, will be developed in a public-private partnership with significant private investment. And we are confident that our alternatives will be ready to support first flights by early 2019. Orbital 

ATK is committed to supporting our Nation’s assured access to 

space policy. Reliable, affordable, and capable space launch systems 

are critical to ensuring our country is prepared to maintain access 

to space. 

Through the program outlined by the Air Force, we believe that 

U.S. industry is able and poised to respond to this need and will 

provide the best possible combinations of systems for the future of 

U.S. access to space. We appreciate the efforts of this committee 

and this Congress to correct the situation we find ourselves in propulsion development in this country. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Culbertson can be found in the 

Appendix on page 103.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Culbertson. 

Mr. Thornburg, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 
8 

STATEMENT OF JEFFERY THORNBURG, SENIOR DIRECTOR OF 

PROPULSION ENGINEERING, SPACEX 

Mr. THORNBURG. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cooper, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear 

before this committee. In addition to my opening statement, I have 

prepared a detailed written statement, which I have submitted for 

the record. 

Mr. Chairman, this country’s ability to launch rockets without 

using Russian engines should not be in question. America right 

now has talented rocket scientists, engineers, and technicians currently flying or developing innovative, American-made solutions to 

end U.S. reliance on Russia today. It bears noting that there has 

been a concerted movement towards national consolidation of the 

Russian space industry and a series of recent failures with Russian 

rockets, engines, and spacecraft. 

Having worked in this business for 20 years for both government 

and private industry, including the Air Force and NASA’s Marshall 

Space Flight Center, I can tell you that more is happening now in 

propulsion development in the United States than at any time in 

my career. 

What is SpaceX doing? SpaceX today is the largest private producer of liquid-fuel rocket engines in the world. The first stage 

Merlin engine has flown 162 times to space, more than any other 

domestic boost-phase rocket engine flying, including the RD–180 

and the RS–68 combined. In the past 13 years, SpaceX has developed nine different rocket engines. Merlin is the first new American hydrocarbon rocket engine to be successfully developed and 

flown in the past 40 years, all while offering the highest thrust-toweight ratio ever achieved. 

We are investing in a next-generation rocket engine called 

Raptor, which will be a fundamental advancement in propulsion 

technology and serve a number of applications for the national security space market. And we have captured more than 50 percent 

of the global space launch market, unilaterally increasing U.S. 

market share from zero percent in 2012. 

With respect to a national engine program, the Air Force is 

undertaking a strategy to result in not just a rocket engine but in 

launch systems. We believe this approach will, if done correctly, 

benefit the entire U.S. industrial base, properly require private industry co-investment, and meet requirements for U.S. Government 

launches. Most importantly, the Air Force is seeking to ensure that 

any new system is commercially viable in order to end the current 

practice of costly and unsustainable government subsidization. 

SpaceX stands ready and able to provide access to space for the 

United States with our launch systems today, as well as next-generation propulsion launch systems. In May, the Air Force certified 

the Falcon 9 launch system to launch the most critical national security space payloads. We appreciate the Air Force’s confidence. 

Powered by SpaceX’s Merlin rocket engine, the Falcon 9 can perform 60 percent of the DOD [Department of Defense] launch requirements to date. We are also building, qualifying, and certifying 

the Falcon Heavy, which also uses the Merlin rocket engine. Between these two launch vehicle systems, SpaceX will be able to execute 100 percent of the DOD launch requirements and provide 
9 

heavy-lift redundancy for the first time to the government. We anticipate Falcon Heavy certification in mid-2017. At the same time, 

SpaceX is developing Raptor. This staged-combustion reusable system will not only be extremely powerful but also versatile, efficient, 

and reliable while achieving commercial viability through notable 

risk and cost-reducing improvements. Raptor will advance the state 

of the art, ensure the U.S. remains the global leader in rocket propulsion technology, and serve important applications for national 

security space launch. 

Importantly, meaningful competition is reentering the EELV program. With this, we have seen the incumbent make promises to reduce its costs, innovate, and fund new development efforts with private capital. These are good things. Much has been made of a socalled impending capability gap in assured access to space. The 

only gap that currently exists relates to heavy-lift capability. This 

is because the Russian-powered Atlas V does not have a heavy-lift 

variant. Otherwise, there is no credible risk of any capability gap 

for national security launch now or in the future. Existing vehicles, 

including the Falcon 9 and the Delta 4, are both made in America, 

certified for DOD launch. 

The Atlas will continue to fly through 2020 under current law. 

Even if no engine or launch vehicle is flying by the congressionally 

mandated deadline of 2019, there will be no gap. Soon, however, 

the Falcon Heavy Launch System will close the preexisting gap in 

heavy-lift through internal funding by SpaceX. Falcon Heavy will 

be certified years before any proposed national engine program is 

set to fly. I want to close my testimony with some constructive solutions to truly achieve assured access. 

First, the United States doesn’t need more Russian engines to 

get national security space payloads to orbit. Second, continue 

working to achieve assured access through genuine competition between multiple qualified providers with redundant, truly dissimilar 

launch vehicle systems. Third, Congress must properly structure 

its engine development effort to maximize smart investment. Any 

government money should be matched at 50 percent by private capital to ensure meaningful co-investment. And commercial viability 

must be a key component of the future system. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. SpaceX, with our U.S.-built Falcon 9 

and Falcon Heavy, as well as our investments in homegrown, nextgeneration propulsion systems like Raptor, looks forward to contributing to the Nation’s space enterprise. I am pleased to address 

any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornburg can be found in the 

Appendix on page 113.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Great job. I thank all of you. 

My first question was going to be to the companies, do you think 

you are capable of providing us a rocket propulsion system, an advanced rocket propulsion system that can replace the RD–180 by 

2019? Mr. Meyerson and Ms. Van Kleeck both answered that in 

their opening statement. 

Mr. Culbertson, I was interested in your opening statement, you 

implied that you all are going to get into competition for this replacement engine. Was that an accurate interpretation of your 

opening statement? 
10 

Mr. CULBERTSON. Yes, sir. We certainly are working towards 

that end. 

Mr. ROGERS. Excellent. 

Mr. Thornburg, are you all planning on getting in that competition for a replacement engine for the RD–180? And can you have 

it done by 2019? 

Mr. THORNBURG. Through our existing launch vehicles with Falcon 9 and Falcon Heavy, we can provide 100 percent of the Nation’s 

needs for national security space missions. In addition, we will continue our investment in next-generation propulsion systems and capability to further increase the U.S.’s position in propulsion development. 

Mr. ROGERS. My understanding is you are talking about you can 

use your Falcon 9 1.1 and Falcon Heavy when it is certified to compete for this mission, but you are not planning to get in the competition to develop a propulsion system to fit on the Atlas V? 

Mr. THORNBURG. We are investing internally in next-generation 

propulsion systems like Raptor. And we are happy to have the conversation about how we can support the U.S. Government. And any 

time the Congress and the U.S. Government asks, ‘‘what can industry provide to service the needs of the country,’’ we are ready to 

participate in that conversation. 

Mr. ROGERS. I heard you make reference to both the Merlin and 

the Raptor. If those, in fact, would work in some way with a launch 

system, would you be willing to sell those to other U.S. companies, 

launch companies? 

Mr. THORNBURG. From an engineering standpoint, yes, that is 

something that we would entertain at SpaceX. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Culbertson, you wanted to be recognized? 

Mr. CULBERTSON. Yes, sir. I am not sure I totally understood 

your question correctly. We are not proposing a replacement engine 

for Atlas. We are proposing a launch system that would meet the 

needs of the country in response to the Air Force—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. That’s what I thought. You had me excited 

for a minute there. I want a new engine. I don’t want a new rocket. 

We want something to replace the RD–180 and if not be a dropin fit on the Atlas V, something that doesn’t require a whole lot of 

modifications to work on the Atlas V. I understand all of you all 

like what you have got. And I know Mr. Bruno wants a new rocket 

and a launch system. That is awesome, as long as we are not paying for it. We want an engine to be able to get our critical missions 

into space in a timely fashion. And 2019, as you know, is a critical 

time for us. I will now go back to the two people I know are going 

to compete for it, Mr. Meyerson and Ms. Van Kleeck. And we will 

start with Mr. Meyerson. Will the cost of your engine be comparable to what we are currently paying for the RD–180? 

Mr. MEYERSON. According to our customer at ULA, we understand it is. It is comparable or better than what is being, the RD– 

180. 

Mr. ROGERS. Ms. Van Kleeck. 

Ms. VAN KLEECK. Yes, sir, we have designed the AR1 to be at 

or below the price point of the RD–180. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. I want to stay with you, Ms. Van Kleeck, for 

a minute. Mr. Bruno, in his opening statement, made reference to 
11 

the fact that you were 16 months behind Blue Origin in your development of your engine. Could you address that observation? And 

what does he mean by that? 

Ms. VAN KLEECK. Well, I don’t have my competitor’s schedule, so 

I can’t say for certain where the 16 months comes from. What I can 

say is we will be certified by 2019. We are very confident about 

that. We have spent 20 years developing this technology from the 

Russians, that was pioneered by the Russians. We have the factories. We have a schedule. We will be testing full-scale engines in 

the beginning of 2017. We will provide a full engine set to ULA in 

2018. And we will complete certification in 2019. 

Mr. ROGERS. 2018 or 2019? 

Ms. VAN KLEECK. We will complete certification of the engine in 

2019. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Meyerson, tell us what your schedule is. When 

do you think you will complete certification? 

Mr. MEYERSON. We believe the engine will be qualified in 2017 

and certified for flight on the Vulcan in 2019 or ready for the first 

flight on the Vulcan in 2019, with certification of the system coming after. We have been working at this for more than 3 years. And 

we have the facilities and the people and processes and equipment 

in place to do so. So we have high confidence in our schedule. We 

are testing hardware now. We are testing today. So the confidence, 

the level of data is well ahead of any alternative. So that is what 

gives us the confidence in our schedule. 

Mr. ROGERS. Now, you made reference to the Vulcan in your 

opening statement. And I know Mr. Bruno really wants to have a 

Vulcan launch system. 

Mr. MEYERSON. Yes. 

Mr. ROGERS. We are interested in the Atlas or I am in my questioning. Will your engine work on the Atlas with modifications? 

And how significant a modification would it take? 

Mr. MEYERSON. So our engine runs in liquid oxygen and liquified 

natural gas. So, no, as it is, as the Atlas is designed, it will not 

integrate with the Atlas. 

Mr. ROGERS. We would have to have a new launch system? 

Mr. MEYERSON. That is right. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. 

Mr. Bruno, let’s talk about this Vulcan system. Tell me where 

that came from and when you see that happening and how does 

that play into what we are doing right now. Given, you know, our 

previous testimony and my comments publicly and our conversations privately, I feel very strongly, I just want a replacement for 

the RD–180. Why are we talking about the Vulcan? 

Mr. BRUNO. Certainly. Well Vulcan really refers to a series of 

evolutions to the Atlas that takes several years to accomplish. The 

first step in that evolution is simply replacing the engine that is 

on the Atlas. So whether it is an AR1 or a BE–4, that Atlas with 

that new engine would be called Vulcan and it would still have the 

Atlas upper stage, Atlas fairings, Atlas strap-ons. It is essentially 

an Atlas with a new engine. If I might take a moment, I would like 

to expand on my colleagues’ answers, I think they were far too 

modest when they responded to your question relative to the cost 

of their engines. 
12 

First, understanding that there is no such thing as an RD–180 

drop-in replacement, we are not at this time capable of replicating 

the performance and the thrust level of the RD–180. What they are 

talking about is providing a pair of engines that would replace the 

single RD–180. That pair of engines we expect to be upwards of 35 

percent less expensive than a single RD–180. So while the performance of the engine is only first generation and lagging what the 

RD–180 has, the manufacturing technology is a giant leap ahead. 

Mr. ROGERS. I will get back to you all on my next round of questions. I want to turn to my friend now from Tennessee, the ranking 

member, for any questions he may have. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you. I appreciate the expertise on this panel. 

And I appreciate my friendship with the chairman. I am a little 

worried that we are pursuing a unicorn here because I think Mr. 

Bruno just said there is no such thing as a replacement for the 

RD–180 engine, there is no drop-in equivalent. And we are kind of 

fooling ourselves if we think there could be, at least in the reasonable future. 

Now, there are some, you know, workarounds, replacements. And 

there is certainly new launch systems. So continuing the theme of 

my opening statement, I think our first role should be, ‘‘first, do no 

harm,’’ because we wouldn’t even be here if we had gotten the language right in last year’s NDAA. So I am not a technical expert. 

I am certainly not a rocket scientist. But it seems to be that in this 

testimony there are some remarkable differences. 

First of all, I regret, it is a little bit unfair, the witnesses are at 

least three to one against SpaceX. And I am not sure that is fair. 

Perhaps we should have given Mr. Thornburg three times the time. 

It may be three and a half to one against, but he more than held 

his own. And it should be exciting for all Americans that we have 

billionaires and entrepreneurs who are willing to devote so much 

of their resources to coming up with new and apparently more efficient solutions. 

But the factual question, is there a gap? It seems to me that we 

need at least 9 RD–180s. We may need 29. We may need more 

than 29. And, meanwhile, a lot of what you hear on the Hill is a 

lot of bad-mouthing of the Russians. And there is plenty of reason 

to bad-mouth at least their leaders. But while we are dependent on 

the RD–180, it may not be the smartest thing strategically to badmouth the source. 

Hopefully, we can overcome this gap. And Mr. Thornburg’s testimony is that the real gap is the premature decision to retire the 

Delta Medium. So there you don’t blame the Russians, you blame 

us. Or the gap could be the Air Force dragging their feet to certify 

the new Falcon Heavy. And certainly there are a lot of worthy and 

important requirements and certification, three required successful 

launches, lots of things. I loved Mr. Culbertson’s quote of Wernher 

von Braun when he said: We can lick gravity, but sometimes the 

paperwork is overwhelming. What Congress is really good at is 

paperwork and putting in artificial requirements that oftentimes 

impede the private sector’s ability to innovate. 

I get worried that when it comes to a drop-in engine, you are 

talking about my beloved old Chevrolet Impala and trying to find 

a new V–8 to put in the old vehicle. I want a car that will work, 
13 

not just an engine that will perform. And when we talk about assured access to space, we want a vehicle that can get our payloads 

up into the appropriate orbit. And it may be that we haven’t had 

enough discussion on this panel of appropriate orbits, and maybe 

we can’t do that in an open setting. But we have to serve all of our 

national security needs. And some of those are harder to achieve 

than others. 

So I hope that this hearing, and it may take the second panel 

to do it, will be able to resolve the question of whether there is a 

gap and, if so, how large, and how best to bridge that gap. And to 

a certain extent, all of the witnesses are asking us to buy some 

vaporware because nobody can predict, nobody has a perfect crystal 

ball. One tends to believe in Mr. Bruno when he says really, getting realistic, ain’t going to happen before 2021, 2023, maybe because it takes time, at least the American way of doing it. I hope 

it is not that long. And we should all be encouraged with the new 

methane engine, the Blue Origin is completely amazing. But also 

the idea of the Raptor is totally amazing. But some existing accomplishments are things we should be deeply proud of. 

I am a little bit worried about Mr. Thornburg’s methodology because the Falcon uses 9 or 10 engines. And you claim an engine 

heritage that is able to be multiplied due to the number of engines. 

It makes me think that if the Falcon 9 were composed of 100 engines, then you would have a track record 10 times or 100 times 

more successful than all the RD–180s. That is, perhaps, a specious 

methodology for coming up with a track record. But still you can’t 

deny the accomplishments because you have exceeded what most 

people would have expected. But, again, our job here is to not stand 

in the way of progress. And I think the statement of administration 

policy was pretty on point when it said so often the congressional 

language, especially last year’s section 1608, gets in the way. 

So how do we resolve this in a sensible way? We want commercial competition. We want assured access to space. But, above all, 

we have to have assured access to space. So I am hopeful that the 

witnesses can help us resolve these questions. And, as I say, it 

make take the second panel, but there seems to be general consensus that no one is talking about a drop-in engine. Because it is 

my understanding that even the proposed solutions are either 18 

inches too long or 4 inches too long or there are really two engines 

instead of one engine. So the chairman’s goal, as worthy as it may 

be, is really not available from any of the witnesses on this panel. 

Now, the chairman’s goal of cost savings is extremely important. 

But I don’t need to remind members of the Armed Services Committee how much money we are wasting on various things here or 

there. And in the scheme of things, the money we are talking about 

here is relatively small and manageable. The key is assured access 

to space. 

So if any of the witnesses want to correct my impressions, I 

spent much of last night reading your testimony. It was very helpful. But it also is so conflicting, it is hard to find where the truth 

lies. So I hope—Ms. Van Kleeck, you seem poised. 

Ms. VAN KLEECK. Yes, yes, sir, thank you for the opportunity. 

Rockets have been re-engined in the past, okay, on numerous occa-
14 

sions both in this country and others. There is, you can replace 

rocket engines. The AR1 is a near drop-in replacement. It uses—— 

Mr. COOPER. The AR1 is—— 

Ms. VAN KLEECK. Yes. And I will explain the differences. And 

they are minor. There is, we can reproduce an RD–180 in this 

country. It would cost, in my opinion, more money than it would 

to develop a new engine. It is a very complex engine. It would also 

cost a lot from a recurring standpoint. And I think it is time for 

the U.S. to leapfrog that technology anyway. 

The AR1 uses the same propellant. It has the same engine cycle, 

so it has a very similar environment. It would use the same tankage, would have the same attach points, has the same performance, 

not lower performance, the same performance. It is two engines. 

We did look at making it a single engine. But two engines is probably a better long-term solution for the U.S. because it can be used 

in multiple other applications in the future. And you can have the 

exact same physical attach points with the two-engine solution, so 

really where the propellant feeds the engines and how it attaches. 

It is 11 inches longer. But we have been told by ULA engineers 

that the length is not an issue; there is length to work with. That 

will affect minor ground support equipment but it is very minor. 

We are talking modest modifications, things that we have done in 

the past. So it is as near to a drop-in replacement as can be made. 

Mr. COOPER. But there are many other issues, acoustics. You 

know, and Mr. Bruno was saying just because you started late, you 

are 16 months behind. So we don’t know what they will choose in 

the down select a year or two from now. 

Ms. VAN KLEECK. Yes, sir. That is a fact. The acoustics, every 

rocket engine has a specific signature. The fact that it is the same 

cycle, runs at a very similar operating point, we would anticipate 

that would be similar. 

Mr. COOPER. But there have been lots of anticipations that didn’t 

necessarily pan out. And for assured access to space, we need 

something that will work. 

Ms. VAN KLEECK. Yes, sir. But we have been a part of reengining numerous launch vehicles over time. And we have been 

successful with those re-enginings. This engine has been designed 

from the beginning to be a replacement to Atlas V. Because we saw 

this problem coming 10 years ago. And we have focused on that. 

We understand the Atlas V very well. This engine was designed to 

interface with the Atlas V. 

Mr. COOPER. Well, you may have seen the problem 10 years ago, 

but you are 16 months behind right now, even Blue Origin and 

some of these other things. So what, that puts us in a tough spot. 

We have to measure the gap and figure out how to fill the gap. 

Ms. VAN KLEECK. You know, whether we are, again, we feel we 

can meet 2019, whether we are 16 months behind or not, we would, 

one would have to look at the details of these schedules and the 

different milestones to really come to that. I have not seen that. 

Mr. COOPER. Mr. Chairman, I think my time has more than expired. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. 

Bridenstine, for 5 minutes. 
15 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

One of the concerns I have is when you consider the House’s position and the Senate’s position on RD–180s, our positions are different. And I have heard that ULA is interested in developing the 

Vulcan to the extent that they have a certain number of RD–180s 

available for the future. And if we don’t have that certain number, 

then they are not interested in developing the Vulcan. 

My question for you, Mr. Bruno, is what happens if the Senate 

doesn’t come the direction of the House? In that case, what happens to the Vulcan and what is your backup plan? 

Mr. BRUNO. So either engine path that has just been discussed 

requires significant investment on the part of ULA. Without the 

continued revenue generation of the Atlas, until that new American 

engine is available, we will lack the funds to be able to accomplish 

that activity. Without that, we are entering into a marketplace 

where the Air Force market has declined and is incapable of supporting two providers. 

Now, the good news is the overall lift market is large enough to 

support both of us, both the new entrant and us and the other traditional suppliers. But in order to be a viable economic entity in 

that environment, we need to be able to effectively compete for civil 

and commercial missions in addition to competing for national security space missions. Without that lower-cost rocket and without 

the investment required to get there, we are simply not economically viable in that window. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. You indicated that with the commercial 

launches in addition to the military launches that there would be 

economic viability for multiple providers. And it looks like even, 

you know, we might get a third provider with Orbital ATK potentially participating. That being the case, is there a reason ULA 

couldn’t get private capital to support the investment? 

Mr. BRUNO. It is unlikely that the capital markets would look at 

this uncertain investment environment any more favorably than 

our parents do. So investment really dislikes and avoids uncertainty. And as we sit here today, it is very uncertain whether the 

Atlas will even be available to fly during the period between the 

end of its current contracts and the availability of the new rocket 

engine. So that leaves a multiyear period of time when we have no 

product to bring to the marketplace. Not very likely I could attract 

money from capital markets for that. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Mr. Culbertson, does Orbital ATK agree with 

that position, that it is not worth the investment if there is not 

more RD–180 engines? Obviously, you guys are doing it without 

the RD–180 engine. 

Mr. CULBERTSON. I can’t really comment on ULA’s position on 

this. We do see a market out there, but it is still pretty slim in the 

classes we are discussing here. We actually are working with ULA 

to continue to supply cargo to the International Space Station. 

After we had the accident, they, SpaceX, and a couple other companies stepped forward and said: We can give you a ride. 

And we have contracted with them on a commercial basis to do 

that. So we are sort of the beginning of their commercial market 

to continue to fly. But we also are continuing to develop our own 
16 

systems to fly not only to the space station, but to fly national security missions. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Mr. Thornburg, when you think about the 

commercial market with the EELV program, is the market big 

enough? And for how many providers? And, clearly, you guys are 

already making the investment privately. 

Mr. THORNBURG. Correct. And I would also say, you know, that 

as an engineer, I am not necessarily studying the markets. But I 

can say that SpaceX believes there is, that we can be very competitive across the market. As I mentioned in my opening statement, 

we have recaptured for the United States 50 percent of the launch 

market share. So certainly with more cost-effective launch solutions, the market does open up. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. And for Mr. Bruno, you would know that the 

United States and we, as Members of Congress, we want to make 

sure we have assured access to space which means we need multiple launch service providers for the EELV program. That being 

the case, your investors have got to understand that it is not in our 

interest as a Nation to have two providers and one of them go out 

of business and end up with a monopoly, which means there is 

going to be some level of security, would you agree with that? And 

are your investors, your parents, aware of that? 

Mr. BRUNO. The only data I have to operate on at the moment 

is the forecasts that the government has provided for the space lift 

that occurs in that window of time. And it is important to remember that we are the ride for national security assets. They are recapitalized in waves. So we are currently recapitalizing a set of national security satellites that are well past their design life. That 

is going to complete in a short number of years. There will be a 

long trough until the new assets run out of life, and then they will 

be recapitalized. So it is very cyclic. What has been forecasted to 

us by the government—and it is a pretty sound forecast because we 

can see the satellites in the pipeline being designed and built—is 

that that marketplace drops from about 8 to 10 a year to 5. And 

then that will be divided between at least two providers, so two or 

three. And that is not a sustainable economic model if you do not 

also have access to civil and commercial markets. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you very much. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. 

Coffman, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, Mr. Bruno, congratulations for an outstanding record of 

success. Jeff Bezos, founder of Blue Origin and Amazon, said, 

quote, ‘‘ULA has put a satellite into orbit almost every month for 

the past 8 years. They are the most reliable launch provider in history. And their record of success is astonishing,’’ unquote. I am 

proud that ULA is headquartered in Colorado. I am fully confident 

ULA will remain very competitive in the future. You enjoyed an exclusive contract because of your competence. But I want to ask you 

what exactly can Congress do to ensure that across the board we 

have created an environment that promotes innovation while not 
17 

unfairly tipping the playing field towards or away from any potential provider. 

Mr. BRUNO. Certainly. But, first, I have to observe that that comment reveals that Mr. Bezos is obviously a very intelligent man. So 

in order to have a fair and even competitive playing field that is 

healthy and in the interest of the government and good for industry, it is important, of course, that the participants in that competition are able to bring competitive products to the marketplace. 

That is why we need continued access to Atlas. 

In addition to that, the competition itself needs to be fair and 

even. So we must be held to the same technical standards in terms 

of the performance and the missions that we are able to fly, as well 

as the contracting requirements. So, today, the ULA is required to 

perform to what is called FAR [Federal Acquisition Regulation] 

Part 15, which are a set of very complex and sophisticated acquisition regulations. They require for us to provide elaborate, extensive, and expensive financial recording, tracking, and reporting systems. 

Our competitor in a commercial marketplace does not. So all of 

these elements have to be leveled. And then I would also advise the 

government that for national security missions, for which our Nation’s safety depends and warfighters’ lives are at risk, that a lowprice, technically acceptable, type of priced shootout is not an appropriate methodology. You wouldn’t buy your car that way. You 

wouldn’t buy your home that way. And our soldiers’ lives should 

not be dependent upon it. So when competing and when making selections, they should consider cost equally balanced with technical 

performance, reliability, and schedule certainty. Remember, I mentioned that the assets being recapitalized are generally beyond 

their design life. There is an urgency to replacing them as soon as 

possible. That, too, should be considered. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Thornburg, congratulations on the successful certification of 

Falcon 9. In March, Ms. Shotwell testified in this committee that 

you have DCAA [Defense Contract Audit Agency] auditors doing 

manufacturing audits right now, and your cost and your rates have 

been audited. Was that testimony correct? And can you briefly describe the frequency and extent of the DCAA audits that SpaceX 

undergoes and the number of DCAA personnel resident at SpaceX 

facilities? 

Mr. THORNBURG. To your first question, was her testimony correct, yes, the answer to that is yes. With regard to the questions 

about DCAA audit and frequency, in my position within engineering and working engine and vehicle development, I am not familiar 

with the frequency of the visits. I can tell you that we are working 

very closely with the Air Force and the DOD. I would be happy to 

go collect that information and return it for the record. 

Mr. COFFMAN. I would really appreciate if you could get that 

back to us for the record. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 168.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 
18 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. 

Lamborn, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this very 

important hearing. And thank you for the timeliness of this hearing. 

Mr. Thornburg, I would like to ask you about the current version 

of the Merlin engine that you are using. Is it the new, is the new 

baseline, is the full thrust Merlin engine the new baseline for the 

Falcon version 1.1 going forward? And does SpaceX intend to bid 

that system for upcoming EELV launches? 

Mr. THORNBURG. The current engine we are flying is the Merlin 

1D boost engine. Your reference to the full thrust is a minor upgrade to that engine that basically takes the full potential of that 

engine system for future missions on the Falcon 9 1.1. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Now, what are the differences between the two 

systems, both hardware and software? I heard there are hundreds 

of differences. Is that correct? 

Mr. THORNBURG. I can’t recall the exact number of differences. 

I can say that from a technical standpoint engineering-wise, the 

differences are very minor in terms of the changes in the upgrades 

to the engine. It is all in line with our continual improvement of 

our propulsion systems and overall vehicle systems. But, essentially, we are taking the existing Merlin 1D with its present design 

and performance and taking the additional performance that we 

have available there and offering it to our customers to enhance 

the performance of the Falcon 9 1.1 system. 

Mr. LAMBORN. But what I am trying to get at is with the changes 

that you have incorporated, does the previous certification cover 

the new, what amounts to what I would consider a new version 

once you have started making a lot of changes? 

Mr. THORNBURG. As far as the certification effort to date, the recent certification of the Falcon 9, the Merlin 1D engine now and 

going forward, the bulk of that is identical. So we are talking about 

minor changes and upgrades to the system that will be reviewed 

through ongoing and future Engineering Review Board activity 

with the Air Force. 

Mr. LAMBORN. So even though there are an undetermined number of changes, indeterminate number of changes, you can’t give a 

number, you don’t think that amounts to anything worth recertifying? 

Mr. THORNBURG. No. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Or reopening the—— 

Mr. THORNBURG. No. And I can comment that the ongoing dialogue with the Air Force through the certification process has been 

fantastic. We are working very closely with the Air Force as well 

as the Aerospace Corporation. The type of improvements and modifications that the Falcon 9 launch vehicle is going through now is 

no different than improvements that Atlas and Delta have taken 

on over the years. So we are in line with that in terms of the initial 

certification and then ongoing certification activities as these improvements come online. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. I just wish there was a little more certainty 

in this. Because you can’t even tell me how many changes there 
19 

are. I guess that is a concern I think we should get to the bottom 

of. 

Changing gears here, Ms. Van Kleeck, what advanced technology 

does the RD–180 use? And why isn’t it important that we bring 

that technology to the U.S.? 

Ms. VAN KLEECK. Well, the RD–180 is what is called an ox-rich 

[oxygen-rich] staged-combustion engine. It is a closed-cycle engine 

which, closed-cycle engines are the most efficient engines that can 

be, chemical rockets that can be produced. The RS–25 that powered 

the space shuttle was also one of these engines. The Russians pioneered and perfected the ox-rich staged-combustion engine during 

the Cold War. And the U.S. didn’t. The U.S. perfected solids and 

hydrogen systems. It is a very high-performing, hydrocarbon engine. It provided a lot of advantage to the original Atlas vehicle. 

Some of the things that are in it are advanced coatings, advanced 

materials. It is very compact, very high pressure. Those are things, 

particularly the materials, were things that this country did not 

choose to pursue and didn’t develop. And so that is where the— 

there is a technology gap in this particular variant of rocket engines in this country. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Mr. Meyerson, do you agree with that assessment? 

Mr. MEYERSON. In terms of the RD–180 and the importance and 

the efficiency of the cycle, yes, I agree. I think, you know, if you 

look back to the time that Lockheed Martin, ULA’s parent, and the 

choice of the RD–180 was an enabler for the Atlas V. That Atlas 

V rocket would not have worked without the RD–180. Today, I 

think it is time to take a fresh look and look at a new engine. The 

ox-rich staged-combustion cycle is critical. And that is what Blue 

Origin has chosen for the BE–4. But the BE–4 is the enabler for 

the next generation of American launch vehicles. And it is—the 

choice of methane, liquified natural gas, as the propellant is one of 

those enablers. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you. 

And thank you all for being here. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. I will start our second 

round of questions. I was listening to my buddy from Tennessee 

when he was talking about his Chevy and dropping a new engine 

in and how sometimes that wasn’t all that easy because, you know, 

I made it very clear, my priority is to re-engine the Atlas V. And 

it just reminded me as he was talking, he and I had the true privilege to meet with an American treasure earlier this week, retired 

General Tom Stafford, also an Apollo astronaut. And we both visited this topic with him, you know, how big a deal is this to reengine this rocket? And he basically said: It is nothing. We reengined fighter jets for generations. And that is much more complicated than what we are talking about here. 

And so, with that backdrop, Mr. Culbertson, your company is in 

the process of changing the engine in the Antares launch vehicle 

from the NK–33 to the RD–181 Russian engine, is that correct? 

Mr. CULBERTSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Considering your current experience, how reasonable is it to change an engine to an existing launch vehicle? 
20 

Mr. CULBERTSON. It depends on the background of the engine 

and what it was originally designed for and the maturity of it at 

the time that you move forward with it. 

The engine that we are using in the future generation of Antares 

launch vehicles, which we intend to start flying next year, was specifically designed as a replacement for the NK–33, which the AJ– 

26 was based on. So the arrangement of the thrust vector, the piping, if you will, for the fuel systems, the connections, the size of the 

engine, and the thrust levels were all very comparable to the NK– 

33 because it had been in development for almost 10 years now to 

replace that engine on a couple of different Russian rockets. So 

when we started talking to them over 3 years ago, they were pretty 

far along on that path already. We did a lot of analysis to make 

sure that it would, in fact, be compatible. And when we reached the 

point where we needed to move forward with another engine, it 

was the one that was most likely to succeed in our application and 

the one that was available to ensure we could continue to deliver 

cargo. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Ms. Van Kleeck, you have already heard 

some reference to it today in the interchange with the ranking 

member, and in the next panel, we are going to hear that it is 

going to cost a significant amount of money to re-engine the Atlas 

V with the AR1. Can you address where 200—and as I understand 

it, you are going to hear it is going to cost at least $200 million 

to modify the Atlas V for the AR1. Can you address that? 

Ms. VAN KLEECK. Yes, I can. We have been working closely with 

ULA for several years now on replacing an RD–180 in various 

forms. Like I said, we have looked at this problem over the past 

10 years. We have an active contract right now identifying the specific changes that need to be made, assuming this goes into an 

Atlas V vehicle. We are also looking at a Vulcan configuration. 

That configuration requires a different launch vehicle. Relative to 

the Atlas, I have summarized the changes that need to be made, 

and I will submit those for the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 167.] 

Ms. VAN KLEECK. In terms of the estimate for those costs, I have 

heard a variety of numbers. I have never heard a $200 million 

number. A number I have heard for the changes associated with 

an AR1 going into an Atlas V, are low tens of millions of dollars. 

I think that cost estimate is—still needs to be refined, but the type 

of modifications that are required are very minor. 

Mr. ROGERS. For the AR1? 

Ms. VAN KLEECK. For the AR1 to fit on the Atlas V vehicle. Yes, 

sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Mr. Meyerson, same question. 

Mr. MEYERSON. Well, can I add to Mr. Culbertson’s comment, his 

response? The key word was that 10 years of investment by the 

Russian government to develop a replacement for the NK–33, 

which was developed into the AJ–26, that is the key point. Ten 

years, and we don’t know how much money was invested. The BE– 

4 is being developed. It is fully funded. We are more than 3 years 

into development. So this engine is real. There is real hardware to 

see. It is not a paper engine. 
21 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Tell me, Mr. Bruno has stated that both the 

BE–4 and the AR1 would work on the Atlas V with modifications. 

One with more modifications than the other. Can you describe the 

extent to which we would have to modify the Atlas V for your engine to work? 

Mr. MEYERSON. I think that is a better question for Mr. Bruno. 

But the engine, when you are developing a new engine, you start 

with requirements, and the details really matter. Because the BE– 

4 is so far along in its development, those details are much more 

well understood so that Mr. Bruno’s team at ULA can look at that 

and design the right system to meet the national security need. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Bruno, I would love for you to visit this topic. 

Mr. BRUNO. Well, this is an excellent sort of example of the difference between an engine provider and a launch vehicle service 

provider. It will not cost tens of millions of dollars to incorporate 

any version of an AR1. Recall that we started with an understanding that the performance level coming out of either of these two engines will not match the RD–180, and we will be using a pair of 

engines to do that. The thrust level—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Let me stop you there. Will the combined thrust of 

the two engines be comparable to the RD–180? 

Mr. BRUNO. Yes, it will. In fact, it will be larger than the two. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. 

Mr. BRUNO. In addition to that, the RD–180 uses a very novel 

thrust vector control system to move the nozzle and steer the rocket based on fluidics that tap off the engine fuel system. That is also 

a technology that does not exist in the United States, and, by the 

way, one that we do not have an interest in developing. So there 

will be a new thrust vector control system to go along with that. 

So when we do all of that, with the new performance point that is 

required and the new thrust levels that will be delivered, there will 

be software changes; there will be structure changes; there will be 

alterations to the pad to accomplish even the AR1. The number 

that was quoted was not unreasonable, but I think you will hear 

from—— 

Mr. ROGERS. $200 million, I think, we are going to hear from the 

Air Force later. 

Mr. BRUNO. Right. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you think that’s an accurate? 

Mr. BRUNO. I do think that’s an accurate. 

Mr. ROGERS. That is for the AR1? 

Mr. BRUNO. That is for the AR1. I can drive that number down 

if I am willing to leave the tank exactly the same size that I have 

on Atlas. But if I do that, because of the lower efficiency of that 

engine and its first generation as a launch system for several missions, I will be adding one or more solid rocket boosters to the 

launch vehicle. And so the cost competitiveness, the affordability of 

that system, will be less than the Atlas today. 

Mr. ROGERS. So getting you those modifications moves you towards the new rocket system you want, but is not necessary for the 

replacement engine that we are pursuing, or that I am pursuing? 

Mr. BRUNO. It will not lift the same missions. So I think you are 

asking me, could I keep the tank size the same, take the engine 

that I am—that is made available to me, strap on the extra strap- 
22 

ons and just deal with the additional cost. I could do that for the 

first set within the fleet. So remember that the Atlas is a fleet of 

rockets, the least capable of which is equivalent to a Falcon. There 

are much more difficult orbits that we go to. Eventually, there is 

a limit to how many strap-ons I can physically attach to the rocket 

because of the way the rocket is configured. Those most difficult 

missions would suddenly become out of reach of an Atlas in this 

configuration without a longer tank to carry more fuel. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Now that is the AR1 we are talking about. 

Let us talk about the BE–4. 

Mr. BRUNO. Yes. So the BE–4 requires more extensive changes 

to our infrastructure and to our rocket. 

Mr. ROGERS. So what the does $200 million figure turn into with 

the BE–4 as the down-selected engine? 

Mr. BRUNO. It would not be unreasonable to triple or quadruple 

that number. 

Mr. ROGERS. So $600 to $800 million? 

Mr. BRUNO. Yes. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Let’s talk about the other infrastructure involved when we change—let’s say we do change to a new rocket. 

And I am not saying I am ready to go there, but what else is required for the launch? I mean, modifications other than just the 

rocket. Don’t you have to change the infrastructure that you use for 

the launch process? 

Mr. BRUNO. Yes. So, you know, you can think of it in these 

pieces: there is the rocket; there is the pad; factory, of course, with 

its tooling; and then the equipment that we use actually at the 

launch site to integrate the rocket with the satellite and roll it out. 

So those things, you know, are more dependent upon the physical 

size and configuration of what changes we have to make to accommodate the engine. So my colleague is correct, there are far fewer 

changes with the AR1, because it is the same propellant, and so 

the diameter and the length of the rocket will be much more similar, much more of the tooling in the factory can be the same. The 

equipment at the launch pad can be only slightly modified and the 

pad will have smaller modifications. 

For the methane engine, because methane is less dense, the tank 

will be much larger. I will have to replace much more tooling in 

the factory. I will have to redo what is called the mobile launch 

platform that moves the rocket to the pad, and then the changes 

to the pad are more extensive. 

Mr. ROGERS. Are those costs a part of the tripling or quadrupling? 

Mr. BRUNO. Yes. 

Mr. ROGERS. So that was a comprehensive figure. 

Maybe I missed it, but were you able to explain the difference 

in the 16 months of lead that you assert the Blue Origin has over 

Aerojet in their development? 

Mr. BRUNO. Yes. So both companies are under contract with us. 

We have, you know, sort of weekly engagements, monthly formal 

program reviews. We are tracking both schedules side by side. As 

I mentioned in my opening remarks, Aerojet Rocketdyne started 

several years later than Blue Origin, and that is essentially the nature of the 16 months. 
23 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Thank you. This would be for all the witnesses. Do you agree that the government should own the intellectual property of any investment it makes in a new propulsion system? 

Mr. Meyerson, I know you are talking about your private money. 

But if we are going to invest money in it, do you believe that we 

should own some of the intellectual value? 

Mr. MEYERSON. I think if the government fully invested in the 

system, they should own the IP, yes. 

Mr. ROGERS. Ms. Van Kleeck. 

Ms. VAN KLEECK. Yes, sir. I do agree. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Culbertson. 

Mr. CULBERTSON. Yes, sir. If the government has invested a majority of the money, then they should, as the law allows, own the 

IP for it. But the companies also investing should own their IP that 

they develop to enable the systems. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Thornburg. 

Mr. THORNBURG. I agree with my colleagues in that if the government fully invests, then they would own and retain the IP 

rights. But for systems that are privately developed, they would 

not. 

Mr. ROGERS. Now, I am a recovering attorney, so two of you used 

the term fully invest, Mr. Meyerson and Mr. Thornburg. 

What if we paid for 60 percent of the development cost, is that 

something that you believe should inhibit our owning a percentage 

of the intellectual property’s value? Let’s start with Mr. Thornburg. 

Mr. THORNBURG. I think it would depend on what type of development we were talking about in terms of the technology. If the 

technology was an offshoot of something that had been completely 

developed and invested by the private corporation, maybe not. But 

I think it would be case dependent. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Meyerson. 

Mr. MEYERSON. I think the contracting methods, there is publicprivate partnerships, and there are mechanisms that can be in 

place to allow industry to invest and account for shared ownership. 

Mr. ROGERS. That is one of my concerns. We have already set 

aside a little over $400 million for this, and we project that by the 

time it is all said and done, $1.3- to $1.5 billion is going to be spent 

in pursuit of this new engine, and as much as $800 million or more 

may be paid for by the Federal Government. So it just seems to me 

that there should be some interest that we have in the intellectual 

property that arises out of that. 

I want to ask the witnesses this, and this is for all the witnesses: 

Are there clear requirements from the Air Force as we go into this 

process about what they are expecting, and do you think they are 

not only clear, but fair and reasonable? 

Mr. Meyerson. 

Mr. MEYERSON. I think—yeah, I think that the requirements are 

clear. Yes. 

Mr. ROGERS. Ms. Van Kleeck. 

Ms. VAN KLEECK. I assume you are referencing the current acquisition process that is underway? 

Mr. ROGERS. Yes, ma’am. 
24 

Ms. VAN KLEECK. Yeah. And there is a—there is a process that 

is well spelled out in that. It does focus more on an ultimate launch 

service as opposed to an engine, but it is spelled out. I think there 

is a lot of different paths that that particular process can go. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Culbertson. I am sorry. 

Mr. CULBERTSON. Yes, sir. We do feel like, based on our experience in both the commercial and the government market, we understand the requirements of the Air Force and what they are looking for, and we do think it is focused on a system that could be developed in a public-private partnership that would give the government the most options for competition as well as success. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Thornburg. 

Mr. THORNBURG. With regards to the ongoing source selection activity, I don’t think it is appropriate for me to comment on that 

right now, because I wouldn’t want to say anything that would 

undo—unduly influence that ongoing source selection. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Bruno, do you have any comment on this? You 

are not building an engine, but you are going to be buying it. 

Mr. BRUNO. I believe the requirements in the RPS activity that 

you are referring to are very clear from the government. 

Mr. ROGERS. Are they fair and reasonable? 

Mr. BRUNO. Yes. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. A couple of cleanup questions. This is for Ms. 

Van Kleeck. Your history is partnering with launch service providers or being a launch service prime when developing a new engine. Why do you believe that this approach is not appropriate in 

this situation? 

Ms. VAN KLEECK. I think the issue at hand that we are talking 

about is replacing an engine. And right now we are looking at an 

acquisition process that is looking at replacing a service or looking 

at an evolution of that service. I believe with that acquisition you 

can get to an engine through that process, but it isn’t the most efficient way to do that. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. And then finally, Mr. Bruno. As ULA moves 

forward with a new Vulcan launch vehicle, can you tell the committee if you intend to mitigate your risk by carrying forward both 

the AR1 and BE–4 as design options? If not, why not? And if yes, 

when will you be able to require—be able to down select a new single option? 

Mr. BRUNO. I will not carry them all the way until completion. 

We will carry both until it is clear that the major technical risk 

with either path has been retired and we are in a position to make 

a down selection based on their technical feasibility, their schedule, 

and their forecast of recurring cost. I expect that to happen at the 

end of 2016. The reason we will down select and not carry both forward is simply because I cannot afford to carry both all the way. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Thank you very much. 

The ranking member is recognized for any additional questions 

he may have. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

There are 5 areas I would like to pursue. Some are just context 

and peripheral, but I think it is going to be important for this committee to understand. 
25 

In the Air Force RPS, is there a prediction in the out-years of 

payload size? Because I think the assumption is they are going to 

get—stay about the same size as they are today, some large and 

some small. There is some trends—if we’re going to Mars, probably 

need to be on the big side. If we are going to do CUBESATs [miniaturized satellites], maybe we don’t need the lift capability. So all 

this talk about launch systems and lift capacity, the question is, 

what are we lifting? And as electronics get smaller and smaller, it 

could be that lighter lift capacity is sufficient to do the job. I don’t 

know the answer to that question. Anybody have any answers on 

this panel? 

Mr. BRUNO. The standard reference for technical performance remains what the Air Force calls the 8 reference missions. And so 

they provide us with a set of orbits and payload weight to be lifted 

to that orbit. Those have not changed as of this date. The most 

challenging of those orbits require our complete capability all the 

way to the Atlas V with its 5 strap-ons and its largest payload fairing. 

Mr. COOPER. Part of it is orbit, part of it is weight? 

Mr. BRUNO. Yes. And it is probably important to understand the 

subtlety within that as well, which is the time required in space 

to reach the highest orbits, and that dictates some of the technical 

characteristics of the upper stage. So when we go to, for example, 

geosynchronous orbit, if you wish to directly inject, which the government generally does to preserve the life of the satellite, it takes 

8 hours flying in space operating in upper stage in order to circularize that orbit, something not possible with conventional fuels 

like kerosene, for example, without elaborate systems to keep them 

from simply freezing up. 

Mr. COOPER. Yeah. We haven’t given much attention at all to the 

second-stage problems. And what you point out are very, very important. On the intellectual property issue, it is the greatest source 

of wealth on the planet, but we have increasing difficulty understanding ownership and relationships like that. I guess it gives us 

some comfort that an American citizen might be owning all this IP, 

but sometimes citizens move. Sometimes they make private sale 

decisions that could endanger a national security. So this is something that we need to figure out better. And in terms of payback 

to the taxpayers, if we could get one or two pharmaceutical companies to pay back all the benefits of their blockbuster drugs from 

basic research done at NIH, it would return many more than a few 

billion dollars. So perhaps we need to work with our colleagues on 

other committees on that. 

On the question of paperwork, Mr. Bruno mentioned FAR 15, I 

think you called it. And that is a requirement that you have to endure, but some others might not. But I am not sure, is all of FAR 

15 really good paperwork? Is that necessary paperwork? Can we 

streamline FAR 15 so that we can reduce the burden for anybody 

who might have to be subjected to all that paperwork burden? It 

is not the 10 Commandments. It is not written in stone. 

Mr. BRUNO. The Federal Acquisition Regulations actually provide 

for different models; 15 is one set. There is another set referred to 

as 12, and there are others that do exactly that and provide guidance when it is appropriate to use the less-elaborate systems. 
26 

Mr. COOPER. So there is some flexibility within that. Is FAR 15 

the biggest and scariest monster out there? 

Mr. BRUNO. Yes. 

Mr. COOPER. But there are lesser monsters? Okay. So you just 

mentioned that to scare us. 

Mr. BRUNO. It happens to be the world that we live in at ULA. 

Mr. COOPER. A question Mr. Bridenstine mentioned, monopoly. 

Nobody likes monopoly, but I think in the best case situation we 

would have a duopoly or maybe an oligopoly. We need to find another billionaire to back Ms. Van Kleeck here. Where is Richard 

Branson when we need him? Or maybe there are others with sufficient egos. Because when you correctly said the business case isn’t 

very exciting about this. Diminishing number of payloads, substantial risk. It takes an investor’s ego to kind of propel this sort of 

speculative investment, the glory of spacefaring. So I think as we 

fear a monopoly we should bear in mind that even in the best case 

we are going to have an oligopoly, and that is not a whole lot better. We love the retail model where we can get Amazon pricing for 

everything. It is not likely to be available here, despite Mr. Bezos’s 

involvement. So we don’t want to be too idealistic in this pursuit. 

And, finally, there is this touchy issue of recruiting brilliant personnel. And we in America relied heavily on Wernher von Braun 

and lots of other folks who were imported from Germany. And I 

think the last one just died in the last year or so down in Huntsville, Alabama. So, unquestionably, there are some brilliant scientists who make a difference. 

I couldn’t help but note on the first page of Mr. Meyerson’s testimony, he has recruited lots of folks from lots of places, including 

someone with Merlin experience. That is interesting. It makes me 

think, regarding the RD–180, that our failure is not to have recruited a Russian who actually knew how that worked. Where is 

that person? 

And maybe the Chinese did that when they have integrated that 

into their Long March, or maybe they just stole the blueprints. But 

you kind of wonder, you hope that a team of scientists can do great 

things, and, in many cases, they have. But in some cases, at least, 

there are these brilliant individuals who come up with the secret 

sauce. And that leads us to the very interesting feature of SpaceX, 

where they do not rely on the patent system to protect their IP, 

preferring, instead, the trade secret system, which is basically 

thumbing their nose at the entire Western system of protecting intellectual property. 

And I am not defending the inefficiencies of the Patent Office 

or—you know. But, this is kind of an interesting challenge here. 

You just keep it locked up in a safe like maybe the Coca Cola formula as opposed to publishing and disseminating and then protecting legally. So there are many challenges we face as we get into 

this issue to make sure that we have assured access to space, that 

we have a perhaps unique national security capability to lift whatever is required on the timetable that we need to serve the warfighter, and, yet, we are increasingly relying on commercial models, 

global models, international models that may or may not service 

this unique national capability. 
27 

So these are some of the challenges the subcommittee faces as 

we try to come up with some sort of fair solution that, above all, 

puts America first. So that is how I see it. 

If you all publicly or privately have corrections, amendments to 

that, modifications, I would appreciate hearing from you, because 

we are trying to do the right thing and not have Congress mess up 

yet again like we did last year. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

I would note, when Congress messed up last year, it was with 

language the private sector gave us to put in that bill. We didn’t 

dream up that language. 

Let’s go to the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Bridenstine, for 

any additional questions he may have. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Bruno, you mentioned earlier to close the business case, ULA 

will need to be able to compete in the commercial sector for space 

launch; is that correct? 

Mr. BRUNO. Yes. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Mr. Meyerson, does Blue Origin intend to also 

compete in the commercial space launch industry with its own system? 

Mr. MEYERSON. In the very long term, yes, we do. Our first 

iteration we are working on is our suborbital New Shepard vehicle, 

which we flew last month, and our focus on our rocket engines as 

a merchant supplier to ULA and other companies and making 

those engines available. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So if—and just for you, Mr. Bruno, if Blue Origin enters a space, and they are competing directly against you in 

the commercial market, and you are entirely dependent on them 

for your rocket engine, does that pose a risk to the costs of government launches? 

Mr. BRUNO. In the foreseeable future, I see our activities in the 

marketplace as complementary. And what my colleague Rob is referring to is in the far future, when we will have ample opportunity 

to work out arrangements. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. If the AR1 engine ultimately is not what is 

down-selected, what is the future for the AR1? 

Ms. Van Kleeck. 

Ms. VAN KLEECK. Currently, the AR1 is relevant to this particular change in launch vehicles in this particular point in time. 

We don’t re-engine launch vehicles. You know, but every 10 years 

we have different opportunities to do that. We would maintain the 

technology. We would probably put it at a technology level. But if 

there isn’t a launch vehicle provider that will use it, the development will not be completed at this point in time. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Is there a chance that that launch vehicle provider might materialize and the AR1 would find itself relevant in 

both commercial and the EELV program? 

Ms. VAN KLEECK. It is possible. There are—it clearly depends on 

what some of the launch vehicle providers, what their paths going 

forward are. But, as you know, there are multiple providers here 

on this panel, and we have talked about a limited market. So in 

the near term, it is not a high probability. 
28 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. One of the—one of the challenges we have is— 

certainly, it seems like there are two different directions that the 

panel is trying to accommodate. One direction is the Air Force’s position, which is we need to purchase launch as a service. And, of 

course, that has been the going mindset for everyone for quite a 

while. Then we ended up in this position where the Russians got 

aggressive. And, boy, I will tell you, I share Chairman Rogers’ position. We don’t want to send one more dollar to Russia that we don’t 

absolutely have to send to them. And certainly I agree with Chairman Rogers that we need to do everything possible to mitigate the 

risk to our own assured access to space. That is kind of what drove 

us to this position today where we have got language in the NDAA 

that ultimately might not be compatible with language that says, 

we need to purchase launch as a service. 

So this is a challenge we are going to continue to have. Unfortunately, the panelists today find themselves in a challenge where 

they are trying to basically go two different directions at the same 

time, given what has happened in the world. And, of course, we as 

Congress, need to figure out a way to make this the best for our 

country, the best for the taxpayers, the best in the national security interest of the United States. I know Chairman Rogers has 

that in his heart. The goal here is to get off any Russian engines 

and to make sure we have assured access to space. And we have 

got to make that happen. And I just appreciate you guys being here 

and working through this with us as we try to make it happen for 

our country. 

Thank you guys very much. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. And I concur with that completely. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. 

Coffman, for any additional questions he may have. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have one question. 

Mr. Meyerson from Blue Origin and Mr. Thornburg from SpaceX, 

has a large methane rocket engine ever been built and flown in 

space? And why is this? And what are the advantages and the challenges of building this type of engine? 

Mr. MEYERSON. By and large, I will say no. Engines that are 

greater than 250,000 pounds in thrust, there has been no large 

methane engine that has been built and flown to space that I know 

of. We have been busily working on the BE–4, and we have made 

some specific design choices to mitigate any risk with that development, design choices in our chamber pressure, design choices in our 

injector, and design choices in our materials that will give us confidence that we can develop this engine by the end of next year, 

get into testing, and meet the Vulcan launch vehicle requirements. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Thornburg. 

Mr. THORNBURG. To your first question about have we flown a 

large methane rocket engine, no, we have not done that. But the 

one thing I did want to point out is that the one aspect of, as you 

hear a lot about this novel technology in some of the new engine 

power plants that are being discussed today, I wanted to point out 

to the committee that the one common thread across, whether it is 

Raptor, whether it is AR1, or whether it is BE–4, is really the oxrich staged-combustion technology. All three engines that the three 
29 

companies are working on incorporate that. And that really does 

represent the technology coming to the table. 

So whether you are trying to replace something with Atlas in 

terms of an AR1, you still have to finish the development of ox-rich 

staged-combustion technology. And it is the same for BE–4; it 

would be the same for a Raptor engine. 

And I wanted to also comment that the talented engineers in the 

United States have been working on these types of technologies 

since the late 1990s. Through programmatic investments of the Air 

Force Research Laboratory and NASA, these technologies have 

been available, but have yet to be fully funded and brought to the 

table until these conversations are happening now. So that is kind 

of where we stand on the methane engine development. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Would anyone else like to comment on that? 

Ms. VAN KLEECK. Yes, sir, I would. I agree that the common 

thread through these things is the ox-rich staged technology. However, I would say there has been—I mean, we have worked on 

methane as a company, Aerojet Rocketdyne has worked on methane since the 1960s, and we have built a number of different devices, none of which have flown yet. Methane is probably going to 

be an important technology for Mars missions when you are dealing with landers and things like that where you want to make your 

propellant in space. 

In terms of the difference, though, between a methane and a kerosene engine for a booster, the ox-rich side is the same, but the 

fuels, kerosene is characterized. The ability to run kerosene in an 

ox-rich environment is also characterized. The Russians have perfected this technology over decades. 

I am confident we can also do that with methane, but it is going 

to take time. It took the Russians a long time to get where they 

are. I think we understand what they have done. We will be building off of that technology. We have studied that technology for 20 

years. I believe this can also be done for methane, but I think the 

timeframe is going to be quite a bit longer. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Anyone else comment? Yes. 

Mr. CULBERTSON. Not about methane, sir, but I would like to 

point out that there are other technologies involved here that involve propulsion systems, and they have been mentioned several 

times, and that is the solid rocket motors that contribute to our access to space, whether they are strap-ons or main stages. 

That is a part of our heritage as a country and Orbital ATK is 

very much involved with that and working with several people here 

on the panel on making sure that that is a part of their systems. 

Any system going forward is going to have to have either newly developed or perfected solid rocket motors as a part of it, whether it 

is the main engine or additional propulsion or second stages. And 

I think that that needs to be a part of the discussion too, is how 

to maintain the lead that we have in this country in solid rocket 

motors and solid rocket propellants over the rest of the world to 

help with national defense, as well as our access to space for these 

big payloads. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Yes, Mr. Thornburg. 

Mr. THORNBURG. Just a comment back on the methane side. I 

think the research and development and the testing that has been 
30 

performed by SpaceX’s private investment, as well as activities we 

have been having with Blue Origin, are proving out the viability 

of methane as a fuel, whether it is ox-rich or a full-flow stagedcombustion cycle. 

I would also like to say that we have been operating hydrogen 

propulsion systems in this country since the dawn of the space age. 

Hydrogen, obviously, offers a lot more complexities in the design, 

et cetera. Methane typically falls somewhere between hydrogen and 

kerosene in terms of handling due to the nature of its cryogenic 

properties. 

But I did want to point out that there has been a lot of research 

and development in methane ongoing in the private sector, independent of government investment over the last several years. 

Mr. MEYERSON. Can I just add one comment to that? We talked 

about methane, but the choice of fuel for the BE–4 is liquefied natural gas, which is commercially available methane. It is the commodity that you can buy, and the infrastructure in the U.S. is 

growing rapidly in the last decade. So we have chosen LNG because it is cheap. It is four times cheaper than kerosene, RP–1, the 

rocket propellant grade. It is available, and it is clean. So it supports reusability applications, which we are interested in, in the 

long term. And those are very important points that I want to add. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. 

Lamborn, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Thornburg, I would like to drill down just a little bit more 

on a line of questions I was pursuing earlier to hopefully get a little 

more clarity. In response to a question for the record from the last 

hearing, General Hyten stated that, quote, ‘‘SpaceX has not formally submitted the changes desired to be accepted under certification for the full thrust system to the Air Force,’’ unquote. 

If SpaceX hasn’t formally submitted the changes, then how is it 

that your system should be certified for launch or eligible for competition on EELV? 

Mr. THORNBURG. Sir, I would have to get back to you on the specifics of what has been transferred. But I can tell you that to my 

knowledge presently, since the last hearing, there have been numerous conversations between the Air Force and SpaceX specifically to address this information. I believe the bulk of all that has 

been provided and is being discussed between the Air Force and 

SpaceX. But I am happy to take that and provide it back for the 

record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 167.] 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, that doesn’t really satisfy me. Let me approach this from a little different angle. And I am going to refer 

to an article from March 17 of this year, Aviation Week article entitled ‘‘SpaceX Sees U.S. Air Force Certification of Falcon 9 By Midsummer.’’ Okay. And here is a quote out of that article. And it is 

a lengthy quote, so bear with me a minute. 

‘‘This year, SpaceX expects to debut another Falcon 9 upgrade, 

one that will see at least a 15 percent increase in thrust for the 
31 

Falcon 9’s Merlin 1D core-stage engines and a 10 percent increase 

in the upper stage tank volume. NASA has said such an increase 

in thrust is likely to require significant design modifications to the 

engine and rocket, which could necessitate additional certification 

work, including a series of successful flights to prove the vehicle.’’ 

So how is it that NASA can say that these are significant modifications and that they require additional certification and possibly 

test flights, and yet you don’t seem to think that there is a need 

for more certification? 

Mr. THORNBURG. The language you use, no need for more certification, just to clarify, I guess my comments earlier were mainly 

with regards to resetting the clock on certification. There has been 

ongoing certification work to upgrades of launch vehicles long before SpaceX was in existence. So my comments there were mainly 

focused on the fact that SpaceX is not doing anything different 

than ULA has done over the years with Atlas and Delta in terms 

of bringing on new improvements to systems that improve performance and costs. 

I can also say that we are working very closely with NASA and 

the Air Force, who have both certified us for their launches, for 

their own payloads this year, and we have ongoing conversations 

with them with regards to the status of the vehicle. They are fully 

read into all of the changes, all of the modifications that are 

planned and are ongoing, and are fully supportive of what we are 

doing in terms of gaining the certification for upcoming launches. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Well, let me change gears and ask my last 

question. You stated in your opening statement that there should 

be a 50–50 investment in a new engine. Did SpaceX follow that 

guideline for Falcon 9 investment? 

Mr. THORNBURG. With Falcon 9 investment, SpaceX 100 percent 

invested in development of that launch of that vehicle. So, yes. 

Mr. LAMBORN. You said 100 percent. It is my understanding that 

the bulk of SpaceX’s capital is actually forward-funded NASA contracts totaling around $3.5 billion. Is that correct? 

Mr. THORNBURG. I can’t speak to the total. But if you are referring to the COTS [Commercial Orbital Transportation Services] 

program itself, the NASA money under the COTS program to supply the space station was focused on the Dragon space capsule 

versus the Falcon 9 launch vehicle, which SpaceX funded the development of. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

Really, I appreciate all of you all. 

Mr. Thornburg, you made a great point when you emphasized we 

got ourselves into this situation, and the ranking member did, 

when the U.S. stopped investing heavily enough in this technology 

and developing where we need to be and where we should have 

been before now. But our full attention is focused on the matter 

now, and we appreciate you being here. 

I would remind all the witnesses, we are going to keep the record 

open for at least 10 days in case any members have any additional 

questions they would like to ask you to respond to for the record, 

and I would appreciate a timely response to those. 
32 

We are about to have another panel of government witnesses. I 

very much hope you will listen to them and let us know what you 

think about what they say, because it will continue to help us as 

we continue to grow and develop in trying to move this policy in 

the right direction. 

And with that, we stand in recess for this panel to adjourn and 

then bring the new panel in. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I would now like to welcome the experts for our second panel. I want to thank you all for coming here today and preparing for it. We have the Honorable Katrina McFarland, Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition; General John Hyten, Commander, Air Force Space Command. 

And, General Hyten and Ms. McFarland, it is great to have you 

back to testify on this topic. We truly appreciate your opinions. 

And we also look forward to hearing from Lieutenant General 

Sam Greaves, Commander, Air Force Space and Missile Command 

Center. And we also have Dr. Mike Griffin, who is representing 

himself today, but he was deputy chair of the SecDef’s [Secretary 

of Defense’s] RD–180 Availability Risk Mitigation Study, and he is 

also a former NASA Administrator. 

Ms. McFarland, I will turn it over to you to start with. You are 

recognized for 5 minutes to summarize your opening statement. 

I will tell all the witnesses, your opening statements in full will 

be submitted for the record. If you would just like to summarize 

with your time, we will get right to questions. 

Ms. McFarland. 

STATEMENT OF HON. KATRINA G. McFARLAND, ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, DEPARTMENT 

OF DEFENSE 

Secretary MCFARLAND. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking 

Member Cooper, and distinguished members of the committee. I 

appreciate the opportunity to speak and appear before this committee, particularly since you are supposed to be at recess. And I 

ask that my written testimony, as you state, be taken for the 

record. 

Mr. ROGERS. Without objection, so ordered. 

Secretary MCFARLAND. Thank you. 

Assured access to space continues to be critical to our defense 

space capabilities and national security, especially as our world has 

changed over the last decade into a nonpermissive environment. 

During our March 17 hearing on assured access to space we 

touched on many topics concerning the Evolved Expendable Launch 

Vehicle program. Amongst those were the Department’s plans for 

reintroducing competition on how we procure our launch services 

for national security space, or NSS, satellites and our plan for 

transitioning away from the use of the RD–180 engine, the Russian 

engine, onto domestically sourced propulsions capabilities. 

And while I am pleased to state that we are making progress on 

both of these, competition and transition is intrinsically and fundamentally intertwined. This interdependency can’t be ignored. It 

must be managed. And as you heard with the members from before 

us, it is a complex issue. And with SpaceX Falcon 9v1.1 launch sys-
33 

tem now certified for NSS launches, we have for the first time 

since ULA’s joint venture formation enabled competition for NSS 

launch contract services. 

However, section 1608 of the fiscal year 2015 NDAA prohibits 

any use beyond the Block 1 contract with ULA for our most costeffective launch capability, ULA Atlas V, which relies on that Russian RD–180 engine. As enacted, section 1608 creates a multiyear 

gap without at least two price-competitive launch providers and 

trades ULA for SpaceX as the sole providers on medium and some 

intermediate NSS launches. It also impacts ULA’s viability to compete in the future, as discussed, as an estimate to replace and certify this capability is optimistically about 7 years. And, yes, I am 

a recovering engineer, and it is a complex issue, sir. 

To avoid this unacceptable situation, the Department submitted 

Legislative Proposal Number 192 requesting section 1608 be 

amended. The Department believes this legislative proposal, combined with the addition of the newly certified SpaceX Falcon 9v1.1, 

enables the Department to minimize impacts to its assured access 

to space-based capabilities while industry completes its transition 

using domestically designed and produced propulsion systems. The 

Department greatly appreciates this subcommittee’s support of the 

legislative proposal and looks forward to working with Congress 

and the defense committees as the fiscal year 2016 budget authorizations and appropriation languages are debated. 

The Air Force released a request for information, RFI, you have 

heard some of it earlier, to industry around August 2014 soliciting 

feedback on approaches for transitioning away from the RD–180. 

Responses supported the Department’s strategy to co-invest with 

industry to transition off the RD–180 and provide launch capabilities able to support NSS requirements, but markedly broader approaches than anticipated, as you heard. 

As a result of the RFI and in order to comply with the commercial space trade transportation services and assured access to space 

mandates, the Air Force developed a four-step incremental strategy 

to fully transition onto domestic propulsion capabilities as being 

discussed. The Department remains committed to working with 

Congress and industry to transition off this RD–180 engine in the 

most efficient, expeditious, and affordable manner possible while 

ensuring continued compliance with the assured access to space 

and commercial trade space transportation service laws. 

Again, thank you for your support to our critical missions, and 

I look forward to our discussion. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary McFarland can be found in 

the Appendix on page 128.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Ms. McFarland. 

General Hyten, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN E. HYTEN, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR 

FORCE SPACE COMMAND 

General HYTEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Cooper, distinguished members of the subcommittee. It is an honor 

to appear before you again to talk about this important issue with 

my distinguished colleagues. Thank you all for your continued ef-
34 

forts to work this hard topic, because, as Ms. McFarland said, it 

is a very difficult topic to try to work through. 

So I believe everybody has been fortunate enough to witness our 

Nation’s evolution in space power, while our combatant theater 

commanders have fully realized how fundamental space-based effects are to every military operation that takes place on the globe 

today. However, these capabilities are merely an illusion without 

assured access to space. With today’s national reliance on space capabilities, assured access has gone from important to imperative 

and remains one of our highest priorities. 

The launch industry has fundamentally changed over the last 

few decades. The Air Force no longer owns the vehicles we launch. 

We purchase access to space as a service. And industry is now investing large amounts of private capital in developing new engines 

and rockets, and we are collaborating closely with them to determine how best to invest in public-private partnerships and U.S.- 

made rocket propulsion system. 

So within context of assured access to space, it is absolutely critical that we move as fast as we can to eliminate reliance on the 

Russian RD–180 rocket engine. The United States should not remain dependent on another nation to assure access to space, and 

we need an American hydrocarbon engine. That will be a significant challenge, but we think, with the efforts and ingenuity of our 

government and industry teams, it is possible to develop an American engine by 2019. 

However, the engine still has to be made into a rocket. It still 

has to be made into a complete space launch system. And even if 

that system looks similar to the Atlas V, we still need to integrate 

that new engine, test it, certify it, and that is going to take another 

year or two once the engine is developed. We do not want to be in 

a position where significant resources have been expended on a 

rocket engine and no commercial provider has built or modified the 

necessary rocket. 

This subcommittee can be assured of our commitment toward 

competition and a healthy space launch industrial base as we move 

as fast as we can towards U.S.-built rocket engines. Thank you for 

your support. I look forward to continuing in partnership, and I 

look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Hyten can be found in the 

Appendix on page 135.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, General Hyten. 

General Greaves, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF LT GEN SAMUEL A. GREAVES, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR FORCE SPACE AND MISSILE SYSTEMS CENTER 

General GREAVES. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, 

and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the 

opportunity to appear before you today. 

Space capabilities are essential to the American way of life, and 

they multiply the effectiveness of our warfighters. Thanks to the efforts of the men and women of the Space and Missile Systems Center, our many contractors, and many mission partners, we continue 

to deliver worldwide precision navigation, threat warning, pro-
35 

tected strategic and tactical communications, and many other capabilities from space. 

As we have all come to know, space launch is a key to providing 

all of that capability. We address the critical nature of space 

launch through a policy of assured access to space. Maintaining at 

least two reliable launch systems is a credible method for continued access to space should one suffer a grounding event. As part 

of this approach, we purchase launch services on a commercial 

basis, leveraging America’s most important source of innovation 

and national economic strength, our free market. 

These two concepts, assured access to space and competition, are 

the cornerstones of our national launch policy. They guide our implementation as we execute the 2015 National Defense Authorization Act, which outlines the use of the RD–180 and mandates that 

we develop a next-generation rocket propulsion system. 

In response, I will emphasize that the Air Force is 100 percent 

committed to transitioning off of the RD–180 for national security 

space launch as quickly and as prudently as possible to a domestically produced liquid- or solids-based rocket propulsion system. 

From our perspective, solely replacing the RD–180 with a new 

engine is not the complete solution, since rockets are heavily influenced by engine design. Even a drop-in replacement which closely 

matches the RD–180 physical interfaces and performance would require modifications to launch vehicle structures, the fuel and 

oxydizer feedlines, and the heat shields to accommodate even 

minor differences in performance. 

As was mentioned by the previous panel, the thrust vector control and throttling of the RD–180 engine is a critical characteristic 

of the Atlas V. The new engine’s thrust vectoring and throttling 

will require changes to the electronic control systems and significant engineering analysis to develop new flight profiles to launch 

the various satellites. 

So, in other words, a rocket engine specifically engineered to replace the RD–180 on the Atlas would most likely be usable only for 

ULA’s Atlas and not by any other launch service provider without 

significant modifications to the engine and/or the launch vehicle. 

We also do not believe this would meet the intent of open competition. 

Additionally, as a product of our market research, we found that 

if we procured an engine not designed for a specific launch vehicle, 

commercial providers would be unlikely to build a rocket around it 

without the government also funding the redesign of their launch 

vehicles, adding time, cost, and risk we cannot afford. 

So the Air Force is pursuing a strategy of shared investment 

with industry using public-private partnerships at the launch service level. The goal of this plan is to produce at least two domestic, 

commercially viable launch systems, including the accompanying 

liquid-fuel engines or solid rocket motors. 

In our research, we assess that industry timelines predicting 

complete rocket propulsion systems by 2019 are aggressive. History 

has consistently shown that developing, testing, and maturing an 

engine takes 6 to 7 years, with another year or two beyond that 

to be able to integrate into the launch vehicle. 
36 

Now, with all that said, we are moving fast, very fast on this. 

To execute this plan, we have developed an aggressive four-step acquisition strategy to reach this end state as quickly as possible. 

Step one pursues technical maturation and risk-reduction efforts, 

building our expertise within the U.S. Step two targets shared investments in rocket propulsion system development. Step three 

guides the transition of our shared investments into the provider’s 

launch system. And finally, step four directs the acquisition of 

launch services to meet national security space requirements. 

As we move forward, our overall goal is to preserve assured access to space by maintaining our laser focus on mission success. 

Our approach will accomplish this by supporting competition where 

it credibly exists and by acquiring space launch as a service from 

certified, commercially viable providers using domestically produced rocket propulsion systems. If we do this, we will be on a path 

to transitioning off of the RD–180 and having at least two domestically produced, commercially viable launch providers that are certified to meet national security space requirements by the end of 

fiscal year 2022. 

Thank you for your support in helping us get here, and I look 

forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Greaves can be found in the 

Appendix on page 143.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, General Greaves. 

Dr. Griffin, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL D. GRIFFIN, DEPUTY CHAIR, RD– 

180 AVAILABILITY RISK MITIGATION STUDY 

Dr. GRIFFIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and distinguished 

members of the committee, I am honored to be asked to appear before your subcommittee to testify on the matter before us today. 

However, before beginning any substantive discussion, I think I 

should note for the record that I am here as an independent witness and a private individual. I have received no consideration of 

any kind in connection with the topic of today’s hearing from anyone. I am here on personal leave and at personal expense and do 

not represent any company, agency, or committee on which I have 

served in the past or presently serve. 

So with that said, we are here to discuss the RD–180 and its replacement. The RD–180 has been used for two decades on various 

versions of Atlas. And without that engine or a functionally equivalent replacement, today’s Atlas V launch vehicle will be grounded 

and with it two-thirds of our national security payloads as we presently have the manifest. 

And so while I completely agree that we should not continue to 

be dependent upon a foreign power, much less an adversary, for 

any element of our national space launch capability, I do believe 

that the legislative action which has been taken in this regard is 

a bit too abrupt. It might be that we should wean ourselves of this 

dependence a bit more gently. 

But if the Atlas is grounded, then what? Well, U.S. policy and 

law require two independent systems for national security space 

launch capability. This requirement is met, but only partially so, 
37 

with the Delta 4 family. The previous panel said that payloads 

could be shifted from Atlas to Delta 4. That is so, but many critical 

payloads are not immediately interchangeable between these vehicles and would require considerable rework at considerable cost to 

shift from Atlas to Delta. 

Moreover, the Delta is, in general, more expensive than the 

equivalent Atlas, and the top-end Delta performance of Delta 4 Medium is less than that of the top-end Atlas. So some Atlas payloads 

will not be transferable to Delta. 

Finally, the Delta production limitations are such that without a 

massive increase in manufacturing and launch infrastructure, very 

limited surge capacity is even possible. 

So the net effect of shifting national security space systems from 

Atlas to Delta, should we have to do so, will be several years of 

delay for the average payload and many billions of dollars of increased cost. 

Now, some have said that the best forward path is to discard decades of government investment in and experience with the Atlas 

and develop a whole new system. This does nothing to solve today’s 

problems. And even if it did, it is irrational to suppose that an entirely new launch vehicle can be obtained more quickly or at less 

cost than a new engine alone. 

Others would have us believe that the U.S. Government can 

merely purchase launch services from among multiple competitors 

as if one were selecting a particular airline for a desired trip based 

on airfare and schedule. Purveyors of this launch-as-a-service view 

would have us believe that if we have an engine supply problem, 

the U.S. Government should stay on the sidelines while the market 

solves the problem. 

But in reality, the U.S. national security launch architecture is 

a strategic capability having far more in common with other strategic assets such as fighters, bombers, aircraft carriers, and submarines than it does with airlines and cruise ships. The vagaries 

of the market cannot be allowed to determine whether or not critical payloads make it to space. 

Accordingly, the U.S. Government must be prepared to ensure 

that the supply chain required to maintain this critical asset remains intact. That supply chain is currently quite fragile, because 

while we have been supporting the Russian rocket engine industrial base, our own has withered. 

To conclude, we have an engine problem, not a rocket problem. 

I believe we should solve it by building a government-funded, government-owned, American equivalent to the RD–180 as quickly as 

we can possible do so. We should not allow the many obfuscating 

issues which have been raised in connection with this problem to 

cloud our view of what must be done. 

Thank you. My full statement, I hope, will be entered for the 

record. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Griffin can be found in the Appendix on page 154.] 

Mr. ROGERS. It certainly will. 

Well, listen, before I get into my questions that I prepared, you 

heard the previous panel. Is anybody just chomping at the bit to 
38 

take on something that came out in that previous panel that you 

think the committee needs to hear for sure? 

Dr. Griffin. 

Dr. GRIFFIN. Sir, I need to comment on one of the last statements 

of the SpaceX representative, that the development of Falcon 9 was 

done on private funds and that NASA money spent went on Dragon. 

I personally am the originator of the COTS program, and that 

program was intended to provide seed money—and I emphasize 

seed money, not majority funding—for the development of a new 

launch vehicle and a delivery system for cargo to space station. 

After I left the agency with the inauguration of President 

Obama, considerably more money was supplied to SpaceX. I think 

from public sources it is easily possible to show that SpaceX has 

received about $3.5 billion or so, possibly more, in open source 

funding. Seeing as how they have conducted seven launches for 

NASA, counting the one upcoming this week, that is either an 

extraordinarily high price per launch of about a half a billion dollars per launch, which I don’t believe is the case, or a considerable 

amount of that money has gone into capitalizing the company. 

The money was not segregated out, according to Dragon or Falcon 9, so I very strongly believe that the government money which 

has been provided to SpaceX has in fact gone for the development 

of Falcon 9. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. 

Anybody else? Anything that just jumps out at you? 

You know, you all heard me hope optimistically that more than 

two companies are going to be competing for this engine, and I 

hope that we wind up with three or four or more getting into this 

competition when it really gets going. 

All right. In last year’s 2014 space hearing, I asked the witnesses 

if they think developing a competitively acquired next-generation 

engine available to all U.S. providers that could effectively replace 

the RD–180 was important. General Shelton, the predecessor of 

General Hyten, stated, quote, ‘‘I would be a strong supporter of 

that if we can find the money to do it,’’ close quote. Mr. Gil Clinger, 

who used to work for Ms. McFarland, stated, quote, ‘‘I think in the 

long run it is in the interest of the United States Government to 

develop a next-generation rocket, U.S.-produced rocket engine,’’ 

close quote. 

We took their advice and directed the Department to build a domestic propulsion system that ends our reliance on the engines by 

2019, and we provided $220 million just to get started. 

But, now, when I read your plan, it is not clear to me that we 

are focused on developing a domestic engine. What has changed 

since that testimony? 

And I would like to ask all the witnesses: In your professional 

judgment, if we have two options—one, to replace an engine with 

a proven technology or, two, to build a new engine with an 

unproven technology, new launch vehicle, and new infrastructure— 

what is the low risk, most expedient, and the least cost to the taxpayers? 

Anybody that wants to take it on. 

General Hyten. 
39 

General HYTEN. So, Mr. Chairman, I will make two comments, 

and then I will turn it over to my fellow members on the panel. 

So the first comment is that the United States leads the world 

in two elements of the rocket engine business. We lead the world 

in solids, and we lead the world in liquid oxygen/hydrogen engines. 

I think we should lead the world in every category of engine development. The one we don’t lead in is hydrocarbon development. 

I believe the United States, no matter what the rest of this discussion goes on, the United States should develop a technology program that builds hydrocarbon technology for the United States 

across the board. I think it is essential to what we do as a country. 

We have avoided that for about 20 years, and we ought to take that 

on and go forward to that, however this turns out. 

The second issue is what has changed. What has changed since 

the last time we talked is we actually have a bill, we have a National Defense Authorization Act, that gave us very specific guidance. And the guidance said that we need to pursue engines that 

grow to a domestic alternative for national security space launches. 

It tells us they have to be made in the United States; I think all 

the previous panel did that. They said they have to meet the requirements of the national security space community; I think they 

did that. Developed not later than 2019; that is a challenge, but we 

heard that. And then be developed using full and open competition. 

That full and open competition is exactly the structure we put in 

place. We were specifically told by the law not to go to a specific 

vendor, not to go build a specific engine, but to go look at full and 

open competition across the industry. And when you look at the 

previous panel, the thing that struck me about the previous panel 

that was very impressive is how much they had embraced that 

across the board, from Blue Origin to ULA to Aerojet Rocketdyne 

to Orbital ATK to SpaceX, to embrace that, to look at that place. 

So the competition was very important, but when you do full and 

open competition, you have to go through the process to make sure 

it is full and open and fair across industry. That does not happen 

overnight. 

So I would just make those two comments for the record, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Greaves. 

General GREAVES. Mr. Chairman, you asked whether or not we 

should replace the RD–180 with technology. As the previous panel 

did express, we do not have the capability within the United States 

today to replace that engine. So whatever we come up with will be 

a new engine. And the AR1, BE–4, they were both mentioned. 

Now, from our point of view, replacing an engine has effects on 

the overall capability that we plan to deliver. So we must verify the 

impacts of any changes to any component in the system, especially 

engine, on the rocket itself and our ability to deliver that capability 

to orbit. 

So, combined with what General Hyten just mentioned, our approach is to look at the total capability, the total system, that will 

result from any changes to any component, to include the engine. 

And that is why we start from the launch service ultimate capability, assess what the impacts are, and then decide whether or not, 

as you will see through the four-step process that we have in place, 

whether or not any of the providers—and, by the way, we did have 
40 

what we are referencing as a broad response from industry to the 

RPS proposal that we put out there that arrived a couple days ago 

that we are assessing right now. So there is interest. But we must 

look at the impacts from any changes to the rocket, to the system, 

on that system. 

Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. Ms. McFarland. 

Secretary MCFARLAND. Chairman, I think it was very clear that 

one thing came out from each of the previous industry comments: 

There isn’t a drop-in replacement for an RD–180 on the table. 

Form, fit, and function, maybe, but not a drop-in exact replacement. 

So really what we are focused on is risks. How do we leverage 

our funds and risks? Is it going to be leveraging funds from the 

government and the risk is to the government and we pass that 

risk back to industry? Or do we take and work together with industry and funding and share the risks? I call it the ‘‘pay me now or 

pay me later.’’ 

Each of these industries have already stated there is a limited 

industrial base for commercialization immediately. I shared with 

you earlier the Satellite Industry Association study that says there 

is a modest growth, somewhere between 4 and 9 percent. They, in 

commercial world, don’t use the size as you are familiar with that 

we have for payloads. 

So we carry, no matter what, an underwriting of whatever comes 

out of here. And because we don’t have the IP to the RD–180 and 

we haven’t developed, as has been stated repeatedly here, the engineering expertise that understands the metallurgy and necessarily 

the methodology to do the propulsions in exact form, we have to assess that we are going to have some modicum of risk. 

The Air Force proposal, as it stands, and with their RFP, are 

pursuing getting the government and industry smart together to 

the point where they can make a logical decision to the next step. 

Can we purvey going forward with a launch system? Shall we look 

at just propulsion system? Shall we look at just engine? And what 

is the most cost-effective and, by the way, timely—we are racing 

against time—proposal? 

The advancements from industry is reassuring. The question is 

now where do we place that risk and how can we afford it. Particularly, as I mentioned to you also earlier and with the ranking member, we are concerned with sequestration right in the midst of trying to rush to moving forward on this replacement. It hits us right 

at our weakest joint, fiscal year 2016. 

Mr. ROGERS. You heard the witnesses in the previous panel talk 

about the degree of modifications that would be required to take 

one of the new proposed rocket engines and put it on the rocket 

itself. And they didn’t disagree with the numbers I have heard 

from you earlier, General Hyten, of $200 million for not just the 

rocket but all the infrastructure changes, and that was the floor. 

Do you still believe that is at a minimum what we are going to 

be looking at, no matter which alternative we select? 

General HYTEN. Mr. Chairman, I won’t disagree with what Mr. 

Bruno said—what his numbers are. The numbers I shared with 

you are the numbers I heard from Mr. Bruno. 
41 

We will know more as we actually get into the contract activities 

with them. General Greaves will be going down that path with him 

directly. But I think those are ballpark numbers that are fair to 

look at. But they are not tens of millions of dollars. I think $200 

million is the floor. 

Mr. ROGERS. Is the floor. 

One big change from the last assured access hearing to this hearing that has been striking to me is the idea of hitting 2019 for completion of testing and providing your system for Air Force certification seemed ambitious but realistic. Now, you have heard from 

the previous panel, with high degrees of confidence, they believe 

they are going to have not only completed testing of their systems 

but have completed certification easily by 2019. 

General Greaves, you seem to have some real concerns about 

that. Do you think that is just optimism or silly? 

General GREAVES. Sir, I believe they are discussing certification 

of the engine. When we talk certification, we are talking certification of the system. So the engine, plus everything—any modification to the engine brings with it software, structures, loads, flight 

dynamics, processing, manufacturing. And that is what we refer to 

as certification. 

So I do believe it is aggressive, but, then, that is only part of the 

answer. 

Mr. ROGERS. So you just created a new question for the record 

for all of our industry panelists, is we are going to find out if they 

were talking about—what certification process. 

General HYTEN. So, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. ROGERS. Yes, General Hyten. 

General HYTEN. I was listening real close, and the BE–4 answer 

from Blue Origin, the quote was ‘‘ready to integrate and fly in 

2019,’’ and the Aerojet Rocketdyne was ‘‘certification of the engine 

in 2019.’’ 

So I think that is a great question for the record, but I was listening very close to that, as well, to hear what they said about certification. 

Mr. ROGERS. Yeah. 

Dr. GRIFFIN. May I add a comment, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. ROGERS. Dr. Griffin, yes, I would love to hear your thoughts 

on this. 

Dr. GRIFFIN. I first want to say that I very strongly agree with 

General Hyten that large hydrocarbon engine technology is one 

which we let go at our peril, our national peril. I would point out 

we have never actually agreed not to have it. We just did a makeor-buy decision back in 1995, and we decided to buy it. That option 

doesn’t look so smart right now, and so I think we need to relearn 

how to make it. I am not interested in replicating RD–180 technology; I am interested in going beyond it. And that is what I believe we will and should do. 

Secondly, I believe that there is considerable self-interest on the 

part of a number of different parties in estimating the difficulty of 

integrating a new engine on a launch vehicle. I don’t think it is a 

$10 million problem, but I am not sure that I agree that it is a 

multi-hundred-million-dollar problem. 
42 

I actually compiled an incomplete list of 14 different engines 

which have been used on a plethora of different launch vehicles 

and stages and 8 different rocket engine stages which have been 

re-engined over the course of, you know, 50-some years of American 

space history. I would be happy to submit that for the record. 

But I simply—the history of this matter does not show it to be 

so horribly difficult to re-engine a vehicle, as some of our earlier 

witnesses were saying. I just—— 

Mr. ROGERS. And if you would submit that for the record, I 

would appreciate it. 

Dr. GRIFFIN. I will submit that for the record. I just simply don’t 

believe it to be so difficult. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 167.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Before I go to the ranking member, General Hyten, 

I want to go back to the specific language you wrote down that 

Blue Origin and Aerojet offered. 

When Blue Origin said they would be ready to fly by 2019, how 

did you interpret that? Did that mean they had completed the certification process? 

General HYTEN. For their engine. I interpreted that as the engine would be ready for us to start into a certification flight test 

program in 2019. 

The certification flight test program takes a year or two, usually 

about 2 years, to go through from a very first flight of an engine. 

So that was interesting to me because—— 

Mr. ROGERS. And what does the Aerojet language mean to you? 

General HYTEN. What the Aerojet language means to me was a 

similar thing, except they said by the end of 2019 the engine would 

be ready. And they didn’t say ready to fly on a rocket; they said 

it would be ready by the end of 2019. 

Mr. ROGERS. Which you interpreted as meaning having completed the certification process? 

General HYTEN. The engine, not the system. 

Mr. ROGERS. So, in either case, you are talking about just the engine, not the system. 

General HYTEN. And that is what I heard from both of them. I 

heard the engine would be ready in 2019 at best. 

But I think it is important to point out that both of those technologies have significant challenges that they are going to have to 

work through. Now, I believe that industry on both sides, especially 

on the competitive environment, can aggressively pursue those and 

get through those. 

But methane, as I think a number of the members of committee 

talked about, is a new endeavor when you get above 250,000 

pounds of thrust. And this lox-rich [liquid oxygen-rich] staged combustion across the board has not been done yet. So there are still 

technical risks to pursue in either activity that we need to remember. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Thank you. 

The ranking member is recognized for any questions that he may 

have. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
43 

I am a budget hawk, and I hate to bring up the issue of sequestration, but that probably is, as Ms. McFarland pointed out, the 

most important issue we face, not only for this issue but for all the 

military issues. And this committee has ducked it yet again. 

So, to put a fine point on it, under this NDAA, we will be bor- rowing $30 billion, we say from the OCO [overseas contingency operations] account, but it is not budgeted; increase the deficit. We 

will probably be borrowing it from China. And yet none of us has 

thought of or proposed, oh, we would buy the Long March missile 

from China to meet our gap. But we are taking the money from 

them. But we wouldn’t consider buying their missile based on RD– 

180 technology. 

So I hope the members of this committee and of this Congress 

will solve the sequestration problem, something that repeated Congresses have failed to do, which dramatically injures our national 

defense capability. So that is the big issue. So, within that giant 

issue, we are focusing on this. 

I need to ask the witnesses and the chairman this question. General Greaves indicated there has been broad interest in the latest 

RFP. Great. But that is for more than re-engining. So I am interested to find out and get clarity in this hearing whether the chairman would be interested in a new RFP just for a new engine. Are 

we buying missile systems, or are we buying new engines? 

General Greaves. 

General GREAVES. Congressman Cooper, the broad response from 

industry includes initial proposals from both engine providers as 

well as launch service providers. So we are assessing that combination as we speak. We received it 3 days ago. We are on a timeline 

to select the best and get detailed proposals from the remainder. 

Mr. COOPER. But any new RFP would delay the whole process—— 

General GREAVES. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COOPER [continuing]. Terribly. 

General GREAVES. But we believe that—— 

Mr. COOPER. And you have already expressed, or at least General 

Hyten has, extreme skepticism about the possibility of getting a 

certified engine replacement by 2019. 

General GREAVES. Yes, sir. We believe a new RFP would delay 

the process. But we also believe that the current process we have, 

the RPS we had, encompasses both opportunities for inputs from 

engine providers and launch service providers themselves. So, within that sum total of inputs we have today, we believe it is highly 

likely we will find a way through this. 

Mr. ROGERS. And I would respond to the ranking member’s question with last year’s NDAA specific language on this. 

‘‘The agreement includes the House provision with an amendment that would direct the Secretary of Defense to develop a rocket 

propulsion system that is made in the United States, is developed 

no later than 2019 using full and open competition, meets the requirements of the national security space community, and is available for purchase by all space launch providers of the United 

States.’’ 

We note that this provision is, quote, ‘‘not an authorization for 

funds for development of a new launch vehicle,’’ period. 
44 

And I will submit that for the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 163.] 

Mr. COOPER. But this Congress, this committee, can say 2019. 

That doesn’t mean it is going to happen. And we have heard from 

our Air Force experts extreme skepticism that that could happen. 

General HYTEN. Well, you may have heard skepticism, but I hope 

you also heard optimism. Because when you get into a competitive 

environment and you actually engage the best scientists and engineers that we have, I think it is possible to get there in 2019. 

The skepticism that I think you are referring to is talking about 

the significant technical challenges in a couple of areas. And then 

we also have the thrust vector control issue that was talked about 

by the previous committee, too, that we have to work through. We 

are not going to go down that technology path. I think in the long 

term that would be a good technology program for the United 

States to go down, as well. 

Mr. COOPER. Well, we keep on using this word ‘‘competition,’’ at 

least from the previous panel. There are really only two competitors, if you get down to it. You know, there is the ULA group, and 

then there is SpaceX. And Orbital wants to get in, maybe, sometime. But this isn’t retail environment. There are not lots of folks 

vying for this lumpy business. 

Now, there are more folks interested in commercial, but that is 

not what we are talking about here. You know, this basically, at 

least due to market interest, is not an interesting business space 

unless you are a multibillionaire with a big ego. 

And, by the way, the missing billionaire for the hydrocarbon engine? Maybe we could find a Texas oilman who would be interested 

in funding a hydrocarbon research platform. Because Dr. Griffin is 

probably right; we need world-class research in this area. Well, 

where has it been for decades? You know, we haven’t had the backing for it somehow. So we are in this fix right now. 

Dr. GRIFFIN. We were buying it from Russia because it was, in 

Ms. McFarland’s earlier words, pay me now or pay me later. And 

we chose to take the route of buying a relatively inexpensive recurring engine rather than preserving our own industrial base. At this 

point, that does not look like it was the smart alternative then, and 

I would suggest that we do not repeat it. 

Mr. COOPER. Well, I don’t want to put words in your mouth, Dr. 

Griffin, but there are some advantages sometimes to big government. And you proposed a government-funded and governmentowned solution. Many of my colleagues across the aisle call that big 

government, and they resist that. They want to turn over virtually 

everything to the private sector. 

Dr. GRIFFIN. Well, sir, I am a free-market conservative. And if 

I thought that the market were such as to supply this item, as it 

does for airline transportation or computers, then I would want the 

government to buy it off the market. 

My observation is that—well, I will just put it like this: Last 

year, ULA conducted one commercial launch and something like a 

dozen national security or other government launches. That is the 

ratio here of free market to national requirements. 
45 

So I am urging the committee to consider regarding this item as 

a national security item first, with some possibility of dual use. 

But for the national security side, if we believe it to be so, then 

we must ensure our supply chain. And that is everything from 

thrust vector control systems and guidance systems to ground infrastructure to airframes to engines. We must ensure that, cradle 

to grave, we in the national security community have taken care 

that we can get every item we need. 

Mr. COOPER. I like your argument, because we do need assured 

access to space. I think you went a little bit too far if you used the 

ULA ratio last year as the appropriate mix. It could be that ULA 

is the higher-cost provider for commercial, and that is why so much 

of the business has been taken by SpaceX. 

But, regardless of that, there are certain needs that only the government can perform, and we should step up and do that and fully 

pay for those, unlike we are doing with our overall defense budget. 

Because we are still relying on sequestration and borrowing the 

money, essentially from the Chinese. So we have to get real about 

this, and this committee has failed in that regard. 

I am a little worried about the aspect of the Air Force demanding, you know, competition and performance and everything like 

that, and then you are the gatekeeper. So you could slow-walk or 

prevent an otherwise-qualified vendor from achieving success. This 

assumed horizon of 6 to 7 years is worrisome because we won 

World War II in that timeframe, but now everything is slower in 

the modern age. 

So I am a little bit worried, and we saw this a little bit with the 

last SpaceX certification. It was 6 months, at least, longer than expected. And I want to make sure all the i’s are dotted and t’s are 

crossed, but sometimes we are not quite sure where it is lost in the 

bureaucracy. 

General Greaves. 

General GREAVES. Congressman Cooper, just let me restate that 

we are 100 percent focused on expediting our transition off the RD– 

180, as well as ensuring that we have a level playing field between 

all applicants for that work effort. And we have not, to date, excluded any of the proposed options, to include solids. 

We have the four-step process, which will drive us to a conclusion expeditiously. And we do have the opportunity, if we find that 

for one or more reasons that one or more of the proposals that we 

are reviewing now will not close from a business-case perspective, 

won’t meet requirements, someone can’t meet what we need, to essentially go back to step one, which is the technical maturation activity, to pursue an engine development if needed. 

Mr. COOPER. See, that sounds like such a great answer. And you 

said ‘‘expeditiously,’’ and that sounds great. But the definition of 

‘‘expeditiously’’ in the modern age is 6 to 7 years. 

General GREAVES. Sir, I am talking for step two, which is the 

RFP that we are currently assessing, awards between September 

and December of this year. It is a two-step process. Does the set 

of initial proposals that we have now even meet or not meet the 

requirement? Narrowing it down and moving on. 

Because, as you heard from the previous panel, sir, these providers have been working on this issue for quite some time on their 
46 

own, and we do not believe it will take an exorbitant amount of 

time to get to a decision. 

Mr. COOPER. Well, we all hope it won’t be an exorbitant amount 

of time, but, you know, we heard the FAR 15 problems, and no one 

has ever proposed to us reforming FAR 15. 

Ms. McFarland. 

Secretary MCFARLAND. If I could, I think that was one of the 

things that is underlying your question. What the Air Force used 

was an other-than transaction. They aren’t using FAR 15. That is 

similar to what you see in DARPA [Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency], I am sure. That is a very important tool that they 

are using to expedite not only the speed but the innovation. It is 

not as proscriptive as we discussed in that earlier one. 

Mr. COOPER. So it is not as scary as FAR 15, the big monster, 

but this is a little monster. 

Secretary MCFARLAND. This is like boo-boo. 

Mr. COOPER. Well, I am sure they will be comforted by that. 

Essential question of fact here. SpaceX testifies that they can 

handle 60 percent of national security loads—60 percent. Okay. Ms. 

McFarland, in her testimony, said that they can do four of eight, 

which sounds like 50 percent. And then Dr. Griffin, in his testimony, said two-thirds of the payloads would be grounded. You 

know, so what is it? 

Dr. GRIFFIN. Well, I will answer first. 

I was privileged to be asked to serve on the Mitchell Committee 

last year as deputy chair to look at RD–180 alternatives, and we 

surveyed the manifest at that time. And two-thirds of the individual flights in the manifest were on Atlas V, one version of it or 

another. That is just a fact. 

When SpaceX talks about ‘‘can lift 60 percent of the payloads,’’ 

I am not arguing that that is not the case, but many of those payloads will be repeat versions of the same thing. It doesn’t mean 

that they can lift 60 percent of all possible spacecraft that the national security community has to be launched. 

Mr. COOPER. Uh-huh. 

Do we have the legal ability here to force the continuation of the 

Delta Medium? Because that is what SpaceX claims would eliminate any gap even today. 

Dr. GRIFFIN. Sir, I am not a lawyer. 

Mr. COOPER. Uh-huh. 

General Greaves, you are a lawyer, aren’t you? 

General GREAVES. Yes, sir. 

I believe the entire discussion of the Delta IV revolves around 

the ability of United Launch Alliance to remain competitive with 

something like a Falcon 9. And, as Mr. Bruno mentioned before, 

they are asking for the time to transition between where we are 

today and whatever their new system, the new—the Vulcan is. 

And, to do that, they need a steady stream of revenue to maintain 

the capability to get there. 

So, from what they have briefed us, they have briefed me, if the 

Delta IV was forced to compete with the Falcon 9, it would not be 

cost-competitive and most likely would not win. So, without that— 

and Mr. Bruno mentioned it in the previous hearing—without that 
47 

assurance of that steady stream of revenue, it would be hard to receive the capital investment they need to make that transition. 

So it is not, in our opinion, a matter of whether or not the Delta 

IV can meet our requirements or we can force them to stay. I believe it is a matter of whether or not ULA can remain in business 

during the transition with the Delta IV as the competitive item. 

Mr. COOPER. So we could make it happen if we paid them to 

make it happen. 

General GREAVES. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COOPER. Okay. 

Final point would be this. I am worried overall that the short 

tenure of generalships does not meet these multiyear national security capabilities. Because so many of the personnel and leaders of 

these companies are retired Air Force, and, you know, when we 

have 3-year, 4-year tours of duties—and I am not impugning anyone’s integrity. It just seems like, when we have a 20-year or 30- 

year time horizon on some of these things and we are rotating in 

and out personnel, success is sometimes defined as punching your 

ticket on your command. And, if that is sufficient, you know, that— 

because we are on the receiving end of a 20-year problem here, and 

I wonder where those folks are. 

General HYTEN. So I understand the argument, Congressman. I 

really do. And it may be an anomaly, but I will just point out that 

I came back into this element of the business in February of 2010. 

And I started coming over here to the Hill in February of 2010, 

working this issue as the space acquisition person under the acquisition chain for 2 years, then as the vice commander of Space Command, now as the commander of Space Command. So I have been 

in this area, focused on this area for over 5 years now. 

And this is essentially important to me, personally, to make sure 

we get this done correctly, because I don’t want to leave a problem 

for the people that come after me. Because I understand that I 

have a finite amount of time left in the service now, and I want 

to make sure that we get it right so that the folks that come after 

me don’t have to worry about this problem. 

Mr. COOPER. Yeah. And you are a good man, and 5 years on a 

problem is a very long time for the Air Force. But that pales in 

comparison to Admiral Rickover’s tenure with Navy Nuclear. 

General HYTEN. It does, sir. I understand the argument. 

Mr. COOPER. Yeah. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. And the point the ranking member is making is one 

I completely agree with. It is one of my frustrations in this world 

that is so complex that we have these short tenures of really sharp 

people like you. And it would be awful nice if we could make those, 

instead of 3-year tenures, 6 years or thereabouts. 

Anyway, the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Bridenstine, is recognized. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Since the issue of the sequester came up, I will take an opportunity to share what I think a lot of us on this panel worked on 

very hard. Every year, we reauthorize the Department of Defense. 

Every year, we appropriate funds for the Department of Defense. 

We have done that again this year, and we have found a way to 
48 

unwind the sequester on defense for a year and meet the President’s budget request. 

Some people would argue that the color of money isn’t right. I 

would argue that they are correct. I would also argue that the 

money spends the same way, and the money is all green, and what 

we need to do is unwind this defense sequester permanently. But, 

for now, we have funded the Department of Defense at the President’s budget request level. That is what we have done. And we 

worked really hard on both sides of the aisle to make this happen. 

I would also let people know that, when the President threatens 

to veto defense appropriations or to veto the NDAA after we met 

his budget request, the world is listening to that, and it doesn’t 

help the situation at all. 

This is an important issue. We need to unwind the defense sequester permanently, and, certainly, I support that. But the reality 

is, every year, we reauthorize the Department of Defense. Every 

year, we appropriate funds for the Department of Defense. This 

meets that same situation. 

My question is, when I heard General Greaves talk about technical maturation—that is step one—and risk reduction as part of 

step one, rocket propulsion system investment as step two, launch 

systems investment as step three, this sounds an awful lot like the 

same process that Dr. Griffin went through with COTS. 

And my question for you, Dr. Griffin, is, why is it inappropriate 

now but it was appropriate then? Was the COTS program unsuccessful? Which—now we have commercial crew and commercial resupply; it seems like it is at least working. Why is this different? 

Dr. GRIFFIN. Well, a major difference, I think, is in the amount 

of money involved. In the COTS program at NASA—now, this is 

taking us back nearly 10 years—we allocated, as we intended, a 

fairly small amount of money across two providers, and the clear 

terms of the agreements were that there would be a very significant majority of corporate investment. That was our plan at that 

time. 

The program did work. We got two new launch vehicles out of 

it, domestic launch vehicles: the Falcon 9 and the Orbital ATK Antares. 

I think it is a very different thing for the national security 

launch infrastructure to be told to purchase launch as a service, 

implying that there is an open market of providers from which the 

Department can buy a launch on a marginal cost basis, as if it 

were an airline ticket—— 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Real quick—— 

Dr. GRIFFIN [continuing]. And then, oh, by the way, to be told 

that they have to fund the development of that capability. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Is that not what COTS was? COTS was the 

funding of the development, ultimately, right, that led to—— 

Dr. GRIFFIN. A small portion of the development. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So the level of the investment was—— 

Dr. GRIFFIN. Money matters. That is exactly right. The level of 

the investment matters a lot. When we established the COTS program, we wanted to see a major element of contractor skin in the 

game. We did not want the skin in the game to be entirely that 
49 

of the government. If the government was going to fund it as a new 

development, then we should just do it as a prime contract. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. 

I just have a few seconds left. And I just want to reiterate the 

point I made earlier, which is the Department of Defense will be 

fully funded, and the President needs to sign that into law. 

And I think it is critically important that we not, you know, take 

risk of, you know, shutting down the Department of Defense because the President believes we don’t have enough money spent on 

the IRS [Internal Revenue Service] or enough money spent on the 

EPA [Environmental Protection Agency] or the National Endowment for the Arts. That is not an appropriate thing to do, especially 

given the threats that we face in the world. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Coffman from Colorado. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, General Hyten, everyone appears to be in unanimous agreement on two points: first, that competition is good since it provides 

cost savings and resiliency; and, two, that we need to eventually 

transition off the Russian RD–180 engine. 

I am very concerned we haven’t rationally thought through that 

process and the timelines. In other areas of national defense, we 

would never consider phasing out a capability until we had confidence in a follow-on—for example, F–35 will be ready to fight before phasing out the F–16. You know, as a combat veteran, I would 

never advocate for the phase-out of one weapon system until I was 

confident the follow-on system is operationally ready to support the 

mission. In this space launch arena, we are anxious to phase out 

the RD–180 engine without full confidence that a robust capability 

is ready to replace it. 

What is the Department doing to ensure there is no gap in assured access to space between the time the Atlas and Deltas are 

phased out and the follow-on Vulcan and Falcon Heavy become 

operational? 

General HYTEN. So, Congressman, I agree with your overall assessment. It is the first rule of wing-walking; you don’t let go with 

one hand until you got firm hold of the next hand. And I am concerned we are about to let go of one before we have a firm hold on 

the next. So I think it is very important that we logically transition 

off these capabilities. 

I think the efforts that General Greaves and the acquisition community have come up with to reach out to industry broadly to come 

up with a competitive strategy that looks at that, to use different 

acquisition authorities to allow them to go as fast as the acquisition process will allow them to go has been exactly the right thing 

to do. 

But I still am concerned, is that if he does everything exactly according to plan and we get an engine by 2019, we still can’t let go 

of the wing. And that is why the Department has come back to you 

and requested the ability to continue to have RD–180s for that 

transition period, whatever that is. And I agree with that request. 

Mr. COFFMAN. General Hyten, if the supply of RD–180s were cut 

to less than 14 engines, what would be the practical result? 
50 

General HYTEN. There are two possible practical results. Practical result number one is that ULA can no longer be competitive 

in a competitive market, and, therefore, they decide that they can’t 

compete and we move into another monopoly. 

The other is that the government, because of the assured access 

to space requirement, decides that that can’t be allowed to stand, 

and, therefore, for the transition period we decide to pay the premium and fly the Delta IV at a price point that will be significantly 

higher and pay the difference with the taxpayers’ dollars. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. 

General Hyten, what is the Department doing—and, Lieutenant 

General Greaves, you might want to comment on this too—what is 

the Department doing to ensure you are not replacing a, quote/unquote, sole source provider with a different, quote/unquote, sole 

source provider? 

General HYTEN. Well, I think the whole approach that we are 

taking is to figure out how to develop the rocket propulsion system 

that will be available for the capabilities that we need in the future. We are going down that path so we can have that new rocket. 

Whether it is Vulcan with the Atlas V upper stage, or whether it 

is the Atlas first stage with the other pieces, we are going down 

that path. 

And we have a much healthier industrial base now. SpaceX is 

certified for an element of the capabilities now, so we have SpaceX 

that is out there. So we have capabilities out there if we can take 

advantage of all of those systems, and that is what our approach 

is trying to do. 

General GREAVES. Congressman Coffman, we initiated this in 

earnest last August with a request for information from industry, 

and we have been working with them very, very closely. And the 

rocket propulsion system effort that is ongoing now, step two, as 

we refer to it, the goal is to, based on what we gathered from industry on their capabilities across the board, to end up with an initial four potential candidates and then whittle it down to two. 

So we are ensuring, based on the capability within the Nation, 

that we will preserve assured access to space. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Assistant Secretary McFarland, would you like to 

comment further? 

Secretary MCFARLAND. Exactly what the two gentlemen here 

said. The Department’s look at this is that: Here we are. We have 

not got the intellectual capital currently inside of our government, 

let alone outside in industry, to do a one-for-one replacement. The 

RFP that is out on the street is to grow that knowledge immediately under a special type of an acquisition tool, if you would, the 

OTA [other transaction authority]. It has in there logical steps that 

would say, okay, we can now see what is the quickest, clearest, 

most affordable way to get to closure. And, at this time, that is, I 

think, the most prudent approach to doing it. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Lamborn of Colorado for any additional questions he may have. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Chairman. 
51 

And I want to follow through on a question I was asking earlier. 

And if I could just go down the line, starting with you, Ms. McFarland. And it has to do with questions I was asking to SpaceX. 

If they haven’t submitted changes for the upgrade Falcon 9, then 

how can it be said that their system is certified for launch or eligible for competition on the EELV? 

Secretary MCFARLAND. Well, post that hearing on March the 

17th, they did come in with a statement of intent and, indeed, are 

working with the Air Force for the heavy launch Falcon 9. 

General HYTEN. And the other point I will say, sir, is that part 

of the transition phase of that is moving with the full-thrust engines on their Merlin capability. Now, that is a very similar process 

to what we went through on the Delta vehicle when we went from 

an RS–68 to the RS–68A. They actually work closely with us as 

they go through that. That is part of the normal process that we 

work with both Atlas and Delta over the years. We have done that 

on the upper stage, as well. 

Once we go through and certify the system, it is basically a baseline capability. And then, as industry learns and develops new capabilities, they have to come back to us and demonstrate their 

changes they go through. And the lucky part is General Greaves 

is actually the certifier, so he can talk about all the details of that. 

So I will pass it to General Greaves. 

General GREAVES. Well, Congressman, as General Hyten said, 

the Air Force has designated my position as the certification official 

for new entrants. And, as part of that, in assessing space access capability, we are working with them very closely. In fact, I co-chair 

meetings every 2 weeks with the Glenn Shotwell/Elon Musk level 

to assess the current status of what they have proposed, any 

changes that they are envisioning or have realized into their system to ensure it becomes certified in time. 

So, in the end, we are well aware of proposed changes to the Falcon 9 1.1 system as part of the upgrade that was discussed in the 

other panel. Daily, our teams are—our organic government team, 

our FFRDC [Federally Funded Research and Development Center] 

team—are working with SpaceX to fully understand what it will 

take to accept those changes, whatever they may be, as a certified 

system. 

This is no different, sir, than we have done with ULA in the 

past. In fact, last December, when we flew the RL10C, which is an 

upgraded second-stage engine, we went through a significant effort 

with ULA ahead of time to understand the changes of that engine, 

what it would do to the system, and then certify it for flight, which 

we did last December, and it flew very successfully for the first 

time. 

So, today, as we speak, SpaceX has provided what changes they 

envision for the upgraded Falcon 9. We are, daily, in an intense effort with them to understand and hopefully certify that system. 

Mr. LAMBORN. And you mentioned test flights in the case of 

ULA. Will test flights be part of the protocol with SpaceX? 

General GREAVES. As a basis, yes, sir. But I will use the RL10C 

as an example. That engine was qualified as part of ULA’s design 

and delivery process, and we flew it for the first time with an operational mission—it was a classified mission—back in December. 
52 

So it depends on the level, degree, amount, impact of the changes 

that we are looking at, to determine whether or not it would require a re-flight or test flight. It is no different, sir, than what we 

have done historically with our launch providers. 

Mr. LAMBORN. And, Dr. Griffin, would you care to comment? 

Dr. GRIFFIN. I would agree with General Greaves with regard to 

certification of new capability. In fact, I would say the idea that we 

fly a large number of repeated copies of rockets is something that 

may look true from the outside, but, truthfully, it is rare to go very 

long in a string without upgrading or changing something about 

the rocket. So you are in this continual process of evolution. 

And, certainly, we don’t do a non-value-added test flight, a whole 

separate test flight, with no payload merely because we go from an 

RL10B to an RL10C. You just wouldn’t want to spend that kind of 

money. On the other hand, when you are fielding an entirely new 

rocket, you will do a couple of test flights, typically, before you put 

a valuable payload on it. 

So there is an informed engineering and program management 

judgment that has to be applied to determine when you are willing 

to risk an upgrade without a test flight and when you need a test 

flight because the upgrade is just so big that you don’t want to risk 

the payload. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. 

And for a couple of clarifications, Ms. McFarland, some people 

have made unhelpful comments out in the public that the money 

from the sale of the RD–180 engines goes to, quote, ‘‘Vladimir 

Putin and his cronies.’’ 

Can you clarify that, please? 

Secretary MCFARLAND. Congressman, I can’t say where the 

money goes. The government buys launch services from ULA. But 

I can state that, on May the 6th of 2014, the U.S. Court of Claims 

received the opinion of the United States Department of the Treasury, the United States Department of Commerce, the United States 

Department of State, that the payments to NPO Energomash do 

not directly contravene Executive Order 13661 at this time and 

would inform the court in the case of such determination in the future had to be overturned. 

So, from our perspective, we did exactly due diligence on this to 

ensure that those statements were not factual. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, thank you for your background work and for 

that clarification. 

And, lastly, I would like to clarify with you or possibly General 

Greaves, Reuters reported at one point that the contracting approach used by ULA to purchase RD–180 engines via RD Amross 

employed, quote/unquote, ‘‘questionable contracting practices.’’ 

Is that true? 

General GREAVES. Congressman, no. It followed the standard 

process where the Air Force procurement contracting officer, with 

advice from such agencies as the DCMA [Defense Contract Management Agency], DCAA [Defense Contract Audit Agency], examined the contracting approach for both ULA and RD Amross, and 

they did a couple of things. 

They went through and essentially did a price analysis to assess 

whether or not the proposed prices we were paying were within 
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historical bounds. They also took a look at, for instance, the RS– 

68, what it cost to produce that engine versus what we were paying 

for the Russian engines. 

And they correlated all this information. And there was also a 

cost study that was done. So, in the end, all the steps were taken. 

The RD–180 was procured on a fixed-price basis. So we followed all 

those rules, and we vehemently dispute the accuracy of that information. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you for that clarification. 

Thank you all for being here. 

Thank you, General Hyten and General Greaves, for your service 

to our country. 

Dr. Griffin, Ms. McFarland, thank you for helping our country, 

as well. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for indulging those questions. 

Mr. ROGERS. Glad to. I appreciate the questions. 

I mentioned this earlier—I think it was during our first panel— 

that the House version of the NDAA for 2016 in this subject matter 

area and the Senate language is different. So this will be a question for all the witnesses. 

Please comment on the impact of the current fiscal year 2016 

NDAA Senate language regarding the prohibition of Russian rocket 

engines. Are nine engines from the 2015 to 2017 timeframe enough 

to maintain assured access to space and keep competition going? 

Why does this issue need to be addressed now? 

Ms. McFarland. 

Secretary MCFARLAND. No, it does not. We have in block 1–A 

multiple launch, competitive launch opportunities that this would 

not allow us to have two viable competitors for. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Hyten. 

General HYTEN. And then the follow-on to that is, as we go to 

Phase 2—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, first, do you concur with that? 

General HYTEN. I concur with what Ms. McFarland just said. 

And it goes further than that, because my biggest concern is really 

when we get into Phase 2, which is the period between 18 and 22, 

where we have approximately 28 launches that we are going to 

manifest. There would be no Atlases available to compete for those 

launches at that time. That brings the whole discussion that we 

had a little while ago about the viability of ULA to get through 

that period—that is an even bigger concern for me as we get into 

Phase 2. 

Mr. ROGERS. So I want to make sure that for the record we understand. Both Ms. McFarland and General Hyten are saying that 

the nine engines are not enough to maintain assured access to 

space? 

General HYTEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. 

General Greaves, you had something you wanted to say? 

General GREAVES. Chairman, I concur entirely. It gets back to 

the entire discussion on whether or not ULA remains commercially 

viable to make the transition between today and 2022. 

Mr. ROGERS. And that is important because? 
54 

General GREAVES. Because they need the steady stream of revenue to—— 

Mr. ROGERS. I mean, in the big picture, we need to have two people that can—— 

General GREAVES. Yes, sir. Assured access to space, yes, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. So we would be falling down on our overall goals 

of making sure we maintain assured access to space by having two 

providers. 

General GREAVES. Yes, sir. 

Dr. GRIFFIN. May I come in on this? 

Mr. ROGERS. Dr. Griffin, absolutely. 

Dr. GRIFFIN. The requirement for two providers comes more out 

of, if you will, my era. Back in 1986, we lost in sequence a space 

shuttle, a Titan, an Atlas, and a Delta. And so, by the second half 

of 1986, the United States had no access to space capability at all. 

From among the many recovery actions taken following the loss 

of Challenger, it was determined that we would, in the expendable 

vehicle arena, keep two independent paths to space at all times for 

national security purposes. That is now—it is Presidential policy 

for several past administrations, and it is law. And I think, although the history is now 30 years old almost, I think we depart 

from that at our peril. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. You know, one of the things you will hear 

from the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee is: 

Well, you know, we can just rely on NASA to make sure we maintain this assured access to space. 

Do you concur with that interpretation of our circumstance, Ms. 

McFarland? 

Secretary MCFARLAND. Sir, I do not. I am going to be visiting 

with NASA to see what they have in their SLS [Space Launch System] vehicle. From what I understand—and I am sure General 

Greaves and Hyten can explain further—it is a very costly way to 

send up an asset given what we have to do for our mission manifest. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. 

General Hyten. 

General HYTEN. NASA uses Atlas and Delta for most of their scientific missions today. They are working down a couple of other 

paths. The Space Launch System, the SLS program, is a giant 

rocket, a giant rocket that is built for interplanetary exploration. 

It is not built to put satellites in low-earth, medium-earth, or geosynchronous orbit. So the good news is we meet with NASA, the 

Air Force, and the NRO [National Reconnaissance Office] all the 

time to talk about the partnerships. And we have great technology 

partnerships. But they do not have a rocket system that would 

meet our requirements. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Greaves. 

General GREAVES. Chairman Rogers, I concur with what has 

been said before. One additional note is that my position also functions as the flight worthiness certification official for every national 

security space launch. And that set of criteria that we use—in fact, 

I sign letters for every one of them, that criteria that we use to certify missions that are ready to support national security space, in 

most cases, are somewhat different than what NASA uses because 
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their risk tolerance is, in most cases, a little higher than ours because ours are low risk. So that would be a difference if we were 

told to go to NASA for these engines. 

Mr. ROGERS. Dr. Griffin, you used to run NASA. Do you think 

we ought to be relying on NASA for our assured access to space? 

Dr. GRIFFIN. I don’t because, in actuality, as was said earlier, 

NASA relies on the Department of Defense for the procurement of 

Delta and Atlas launch vehicles for its own robotic payloads. The 

larger rocket, the SLS, to which General Hyten referred, is intended for human exploration of the solar system, which I devoutly 

hope we will resume. But to use it for unmanned national security 

launches is possibly somewhat equivalent to using an aircraft carrier to transport cargo across the ocean. It would be a bit of an 

overkill. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Greaves, what is the estimated cost of your 

four-part plan, including all necessary investments in engines, 

launch vehicles, and infrastructure? And what is the basis of that 

estimate? 

General GREAVES. Chairman, we do not have a final estimate. 

And a lot of it depends on the assessment that we are doing right 

now. We do have funding in the 2016 PB [President’s budget] to 

address step two and step three of the four-step process. But we 

are looking to see what estimates we get. And we will work that 

in in future budgets. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Dr. Griffin, what are your thoughts on the 

cost of the Air Force’s four-part plan versus funding an RD–180 replacement for existing launch vehicles and infrastructure? 

Dr. GRIFFIN. As General Greaves just said, I can’t know yet what 

the cost of the four-part plan will be. I will offer the opinion that 

I believe, I very strongly believe that the cheapest way for the 

United States to regain its national security launch independence 

is to re-engine the Atlas V. I said that in my testimony for the 

record. So I can’t prejudice the outcome of a procurement process 

which is ongoing. Even though I am not an attorney, I know that. 

But I do hope that the outcome of that procurement process results 

in a decision to re-engine the Atlas V. 

Mr. ROGERS. Ms. McFarland, what would it take to off-ramp the 

current Air Force plan to a path that is focused on developing an 

engine that complies with the law and without government development of a new launch vehicle? 

Secretary MCFARLAND. I think that would be a good question to 

ask us after we have a chance to review what has been proposed 

from the Air Force’s current solicitation. I think that would be a 

good question for the record. And I think that would be good product. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. General Greaves, you stated in your testimony that, quote, ‘‘a rocket engine specifically engineered to replace the RD–180 on the Atlas would most likely be usable only for 

ULA’s Atlas,’’ closed quote. However, according to press reports, 

Orbital ATK wanted the RD–180 so much, they sued ULA to get 

access to it. That suit was settled out of court. And Orbital went 

up with another Russian engine. But isn’t it reasonable to conclude 

that the RD–180 would be flying on an Atlas and Antares today if 

Orbital had access to the RD–180? 
56 

General GREAVES. Chairman, the answer is yes. But I believe 

what I also said is that without significant modification to the receiving launch system, the launch vehicle—so, yes, the RD–180 

could be transitioned to another launch system, but it would come 

with mods [modifications]. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Hyten, there are claims that industry 

doesn’t need any money to get off the RD–180 or the solutions are 

fully funded. In your judgment, can we just rely on industry to provide us the capabilities we need for our military? In the end, will 

the government need to pay for its requirements? 

General HYTEN. No, we can’t, Congressman, in my opinion, and 

I think Dr. Griffin answered this well earlier when he talked about 

the business case that is really out there. And if you look at the 

business case, the business case is national security space 

launches, which means this is national security mission, which 

means we need to be able to fund the critical elements of the industrial base to make sure that is there. And, right now, that element 

of the industrial base is not there to support where we need to go 

in the future. I think it is the responsibility of the Department of 

Defense and the government to make sure that industrial base is 

there for national security. 

Mr. ROGERS. Excellent. I have many more questions. But I am 

going to submit them to you all to get back to us for the record because it is noon, and we have worn out our welcome with you all, 

I am afraid. But, I very much appreciate your time and effort. You 

have been enormously helpful to us. And I look forward to our continuing efforts to get off this RD–180 and onto a new path of independence. 

With that, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

JUNE 26, 2015 

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JUNE 26, 2015 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

JUNE 26, 2015 

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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Ms. VAN KLEECK. It is Aerojet Rocketdyne’s position that major modifications to 

the Atlas V launch vehicle are not required to integrate the AR1 main propulsion 

system as a replacement for the RD–180. Aerojet Rocketdyne engineers have been 

working directly with ULA engineers under a cooperative agreement to ensure that 

AR1 will interface with the existing Atlas vehicle and launch pad infrastructure. For 

example, Aerojet Rocketdyne has taken specific actions to ensure the length of the 

AR1 engine does not interfere with the mobile launch platform. AR1 propellant 

interfaces meet the RD–180’s, ensuring major re-routing of vehicle feed lines is not 

required. Some modification to avionics, ancillary feed systems, thrust structure, etc. 

will be required but are considered minor impacts. If ULA chooses to take advantage of the AR1’s increased performance over the RD–180 by increasing the vehicle’s 

propellant load, that would require greater changes to the launch vehicle and pad; 

however, it is Aerojet Rocketdyne position that those changes are not required to 

address the immediate concern of maintaining the viability of Atlas and could be 

reserved for future upgrades. In addition, it is Aerojet Rocketdyne’s position that 

none of these upgrades represent the level of impact to all aspects of ULA’s launch 

infrastructure that will be required by a the proposed new methane/liquefied natural gas (LNG) fueled ‘‘Vulcan’’ launch vehicle. [See page 20.] 

Dr. GRIFFIN. My list of re-engined stages and engines which have been used on 

more than one launch platform is attached. [See page 42.] 

[The list referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 164.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN 

Mr. THORNBURG. The Falcon 9 Launch System was certified on May 27, 2015. As 

General Hyten, General Greaves, Secretary McFarland, and Dr. Griffin noted in response to your line of questions, the Air Force has a standard procedure in place 

to validate upgrades to launch systems in the EELV Program. These procedures 

have been used for both the Atlas V and Delta IV systems for numerous upgrades, 

including to the RL10 upper-stage engine and the RS–68A first-stage engine, among 

other upgrades for the incumbent provider’s rockets. 

In their testimony, Gen Hyten and Gen Greaves, explained this process (emphasis 

added): 

‘‘HYTEN: And the other point I will say, sir, is that part of the transition 

phase of that is moving to the full thrust engines on their Merlin capability. 

Now that’s a very similar process to what we went through on the Delta 

vehicle when we went from an RS–68 to the RS–68A. They actually work 

closely with us as they go through that. That’s part of the normal process, 

that we work with both Atlas and Deltas over the years. We’ve done 

that on the upper stage as well. Once we go through and certify the system, it’s basically a baseline capability, and then as industry learns and develops new capabilities, they have to come back to us and demonstrate their 

changes that go through. And the lucky part is General Greaves is actually the 

certifier. So he can talk about all the details of that. So I will pass it to General 

Greaves. 

GREAVES: Well, Congressman, as General Hyten said, the Air Force has designated my position as the certification official for new entrants. And as part 

of that in assessing SpaceX’s capability, we’re working with them very closely. 

In fact, I co-chair meetings every two weeks with Gwynne Shotwell, Elon Musk 

level, to assess the current status of what they have proposed, any changes that 

they are envisioning or have realized into their system to ensure it becomes certified in time. So in the end we are well aware of proposed changes to 

the Falcon 9 1.1 system as part of the upgrade that was discussed in 

the other panel. We are daily, our teams are organic government team, 

our FRDC team, we are working with SpaceX to fully understand what 

it will what it will take to accept those changes, whatever they may be, 

as a certified system. This is no different, sir, than we have done with 

ULA in the past. In fact, last December, when we flew the RL10C, which is 
168 

an upgraded second stage engine, we went through a significant effort with 

ULA ahead of time to understand the changes of that system, what it of that 

engine, what it would do to the system and then certify it for flight, which is 

which we did last December and it flew very successfully for the first time. So, 

today as we speak, SpaceX has provided what changes they envision for the upgraded Falcon 9. We are daily in an intense effort with them to understand and 

hopefully certify that system. 

LAMBORN: And you mentioned test flights in the case of ULA, will test 

flights be part of the protocol with SpaceX? 

GREAVES: As a as a basis, yes, sir, but I will use the RL10C as an example. That engine was qualified as part of ULA’s design and delivery 

process. And we flew it for the first time with an operational mission, 

it was a classified mission, back in December. So it depends on the level, degree, amount, impact of the changes that we’re looking at to determine whether 

or not it would require a reflight or test flight. It is no different, sir, than 

what we’ve done historically with our launch providers. 

LAMBORN: And, Dr. Griffin, would you care to comment? 

GRIFFIN: I would agree with General Greaves with regard to certification of new capability. In fact, I would say the idea that we fly a large 

number of repeated copies of rockets is something that may look true from the 

outside but, truthfully, it’s rare to go very long in a string without upgrading 

or changing something about the rocket. So you are in this continual process 

of evolution and, certainly, certainly we don’t do a non-value-added test flight, 

a whole separate test flight with no payload, merely because we go from an 

RL10B to an RL10C. You just wouldn’t want to spend that kind of money. On 

the other hand, when you’re fielding an entirely new rocket, you will do a couple 

of test flights before typically before you put a valuable payload on it. So there’s 

an informed engineering and program management judgment that has to be applied to determine when you’re willing to risk an upgrade without a test flight 

and when you need when you need a test flight because the upgrade is just so 

big that you don’t want to risk the payload.’’ [See page 30.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN 

Mr. THORNBURG. SpaceX refers you to our response to Question #15 from Mr. 

Coffman [on page 176]. [See page 17.] 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JUNE 26, 2015 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. When there is a failure of a launch system, which is the same system to be used national security space missions, should the Department conduct an 

independent failure review board? Why or why not? What is the historical precedent? 

Secretary MCFARLAND. If a launch system that carries, or intends to carry, a National Security Space (NSS) payload has a flight failure, as has recently occurred 

with the Space X Falcon 9, the Department expects to be granted insight into the 

investigation and its findings. This expectation remains true even if the launch failure did not involve an NSS payload. 

Failure investigations for NSS missions are typically handled by the Air Force 

under Air Force Safety and Accident Board regulations. For additional information 

on this process the Air Force can provide you with details of historical precedents 

and current Failure Review Board practices. This effort is performed under the direction of the Air Force Space Command Commander and the Air Force Space and 

Missile System Center Commander. 

Mr. ROGERS. Considering SpaceX’s recent failure with a Falcon 9, are you planning to revisit the certification decision? Why or why not? If there is no root cause 

identified and final plan to address the problem before the upcoming GPS launch 

competition, what is your plan? 

Secretary MCFARLAND. Air Force Space Command is charged with determining 

the certification status of any launch system/launch provider seeking to provide 

launch services for National Security Space payloads. The Space and Missile Systems Center Commander (SMC/CC) is the designated certification official and 

makes all certification decisions. 

If a root cause for the Space X Falcon 9 v1.1 flight failure is not identified prior 

to the award of the GPSIII–2 launch service, the certifying official will make a riskbased decision on the offered launch systems certification status. The evaluation criterion for the GPS III–2 mission, which has been released for industry review, requires that the offered launch system must be certified. Unless the launch system 

offered to the government is not certified, the contractor proposals will be evaluated 

in accordance with the published criteria. 

Mr. ROGERS. When there is a failure of a launch system, which is the same system to be used national security space missions, should the Department conduct an 

independent failure review board? Why or why not? What is the historical precedent? 

General HYTEN and General GREAVES. (1) The Air Force conducts parallel, independent investigations or reviews of significant launch anomalies and launch failures of launch systems used for NSS missions, regardless of the nature of the mission. 

(2) NSS missions are subject to the USAF mission assurance process, resulting 

in a certification of spaceflight worthiness. Therefore, the cause and corrective action of any failure of a launch system used for NSS launches needs to be understood 

so that any residual risks can be folded into the spaceflight worthiness assessment 

for future NSS missions. Furthermore, in the event of the failure of a NSS mission, 

an AFSPC-chartered Accident Investigation Board (AIB) or Independent Review 

Team would need to ascertain whether the NSS mission assurance process adequately addressed any elevated risk areas. The USAF would conduct an independent failure review for any NSS launch failure. 

For non-NSS missions (such as the SpaceX Falcon 9–20 CRS–7 mission), other 

agencies such as the FAA would have the responsibility for mishap reviews; but 

AFSPC (to include SMC) have official representation on those review teams and access to all data. AFSPC or the Department could choose to begin an independent 

review at any time if needed to support a future NSS mission. 

The Air Force mission assurance process includes a post flight analysis for all 

launches whether successful or not. The results of these analyses are incorporated 

into the spaceflight worthiness determination for future launches. This process includes independent verification and validation activities. 
172 

(3) There was an in-flight anomaly on the GPS–IIF–3 mission in 2012. SMC and 

AFSPC convened Independent Review Teams, even though the mission was successfully accomplished. The SMC team, which included technical support by The Aerospace Corporation, worked in close coordination with the contractor (United Launch 

Alliance, ULA) on the investigation, conducting independent analyses and tests 

where appropriate. The NASA and the NRO also participated in the ULA-led investigation. The AFSPC Independent Review Team complemented the ULA-led anomaly investigation team, provided an independent assessment of the investigation 

processes and conclusions, and reported their conclusions directly to the AFSPC 

Commander. The return to flight was granted by the SMC Commander (the certifying official) after Launch Systems Directorate and Delta IV Chief Engineer recommendations to do so, and with concurrence of the AFSPC Commander. 

Mr. ROGERS. Considering SpaceX’s recent failure with a Falcon 9, are you planning to revisit the certification decision? Why or why not? If there is no root cause 

identified and final plan to address the problem before the upcoming GPS launch 

competition, what is your plan? 

General GREAVES. (1) Not at this time; SpaceX remains certified for the Falcon 

9 Launch System and can compete for and win award of NSS missions. 

(2) A failed mission does not automatically drive a revisit to a certification decision or a revocation of a certification. A launch system remains certified unless a 

significant process or design change, or some other certification factor (such as manufacturing quality), causes the certification authority (SMC/CC) to determined that 

the launch system or provider is no longer certified. 

The Falcon 9 Launch System has flown 18 successful missions prior to the failure. 

Also, as part of the certification, the USAF assessed and accepted the SpaceX anomaly resolution process, which they are using to determine the root cause of the recent in-flight failure. 

(3) Space X expects to arrive at initial root cause findings and implement corrective actions by Fall 2015, which will support the GPS launch competition timelines. 

If root cause determination and corrective actions are not complete in this timeframe, then the USAF, in support of the GPS launch competition, will evaluate 

Space X’s plan for completing the remaining open non-recurring work, to include 

work to resolve open flight and qualification anomalies. Regardless of the outcome 

of the GPS launch competition evaluation, the USAF will continue to observe Space 

X’s technical progress and stay engaged as we do with all certified providers who 

are addressing technical issues with their launch systems. 

Mr. ROGERS. When there is a failure of a launch system, which is the same system to be used national security space missions, should the Department conduct an 

independent failure review board? Why or why not? What is the historical precedent? 

Dr. GRIFFIN. Historically, when a launch system failure has occurred the DOD has 

always either conducted a failure review under its own auspices, or required total 

visibility into any failure investigation conducted by its contractors, or both. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER 

Mr. COOPER. To clarify, how much do you estimate the adjustments to Atlas will 

cost with respect to using an AR1 engine? Is it $100 million-$200 million? 

Mr. BRUNO. A U.S. developed engine will not be a pure ‘‘drop-in’’ replacement for 

the RD–180. Current U.S. technology is not capable of replicating RD–180 performance, and the RD–180 fluid-mechanical thrust vector control (TVC) technology does 

not exist outside of Russia. None of the variants of the AR–1 under consideration 

would address these differences. 

The current U.S. state of the art allows two near drop-in design options: 1) Almost 

the same physical interfaces, but lower system performance as a result of reduced 

engine performance (higher weight, lower efficiency). 2) Same or greater system performance through some vehicle changes to offset lower engine performance. 

The minimum set of vehicle/system changes as outlined above for the lower performance option would cost approximately $100M. To enable equivalent or greater 

Atlas performance the cost would be approximately $200M. 

Mr. COOPER. If you pursue the Atlas with the AR1, will you be able to reach the 

more difficult orbits? 

Mr. BRUNO. No, we could not fly the missions that currently require the most capable Atlas variant with 5 solid rocket boosters (Atlas 551). Other missions would 

require the addition of an SRB making Atlas less competitive. 

A less capable Atlas booster when coupled with our planned advanced upper stage 

(ACES) could not fly the missions that currently require a Delta IV Heavy launch 
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vehicle. ULA would have to continue to offer the more expensive Delta IV Heavy 

to meet the requirements for these critical national security payloads. 

More extensive modifications to the booster to offset the lower engine performance 

could address these shortfalls, but would increase the total booster development 

costs to approximately $200M. 

Mr. COOPER. Would the BE–4 be available to other launch providers other than 

ULA? 

Mr. MEYERSON. The blue Origin BE–4 engine will be available for purchase by 

all space launch providers of the United States. 

Mr. COOPER. Mr. Griffin stated during the hearing that ‘‘It is easily possible to 

show that SpaceX has received about $3.5 billion or so, possibly more, in open 

source funding. Seeing as how they have conducted seven launches for NASA, counting the one upcoming this week, that is either an extraordinarily high price per 

launch of about a half a billion dollars per launch, which I don’t believe is the case, 

or a considerable amount of that money has gone into capitalizing the company. The 

money was not segregated out, according to Dragon or Falcon 9, so I very strongly 

believe that the government money which has been provided to SpaceX has in fact 

gone for the development of Falcon 9.’’ Would you care to respond to this statement 

or clarify it for the record? 

Mr. THORNBURG. Dr. Griffin’s testimony merits clarification and correction. To 

begin, under the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) Program, 

NASA contributed a total of $396M toward the development of a capability to carry 

cargo to and from the International Space Station (ISS), as well as demonstration 

missions of that capability. The milestones associated with these payments are publically available. SpaceX invested well more than $450M of private funds toward the 

development of Falcon 9, including upgrades, and the Dragon spacecraft. To date, 

beyond the COTS Program, NASA development funds include $75M for CCDev2 and 

$460M for CCiCap. 

SpaceX has operational launch services contracts with a host of international and 

domestic commercial purchasers of launch services, as well as operational contracts 

with NASA for cargo missions and satellite delivery missions. Dr. Griffin misunderstands and conflates milestone-based payments under operational launch services 

contracts versus system development contracts. For instance, SpaceX’s cargo contract under NASA Commercial Resupply Services (CRS) is a services, not a development, contract. This service includes the manufacture and launch of a Dragon 

spacecraft on a Falcon 9 launch vehicle, plus the operations, ISS berthing, reentry, 

and recovery of the Dragon spacecraft. Pricing for these missions is approximately 

$130M per mission, on a fixed price basis. SpaceX notes that NASA pays for all of 

its launches, including those with other providers, under services-based agreements. 

Finally, SpaceX recently won a firm fixed price contract, as did Boeing, for astronaut carriage capability development and demonstration missions under the 

‘‘CCtCap, for a total possible value of $2.6B depending on the number of missions 

that NASA exercises. Notably, the SpaceX contract includes up to six missions— 

launches and returns from the Space Station—as well as development. Further, this 

contract is structured with performance, milestone-based payments. In other words, 

SpaceX is only paid when it performs contractually agreed-upon milestones (or 

work) under the contract. SpaceX would note that the Boeing Company received a 

similar contract with a total value of $4.2B, for performing the exact same requirements. If Dr. Griffin’s reasoning were true, which it is not, then the same arguments would apply to Boeing, of course. 

SpaceX Falcon 9 pricing for commercial customers is $60M; pricing for U.S. Government missions for satellite carriage is well below $100M. 

Mr. COOPER. How will SpaceX plan to fulfill its national security, civil, and commercial missions, and how will you prioritize the missions if necessary, in response 

to potential disruption to its manifest caused by the recent CRS–7 mission failure? 

Mr. THORNBURG. SpaceX currently anticipates returning to flight in the fall of 

2015. With respect to prioritization of missions, SpaceX will work with all of our 

customers to satisfy their needs and meet contractual requirements. 

SpaceX maintains a clear manifest policy that is part of each of our commercial 

contracts, which prioritizes critical U.S. Government missions. Here, SpaceX’s Air 

Force and NASA Commercial Resupply Services (CRS) contracts are rated either 

DO, DX, or in support of the International Space Station (ISS), meaning that 

SpaceX has a contractual legal right to prioritize these launches ahead of commercial missions, as necessary. Further, SpaceX has invested internal funds in the development of additional launch infrastructure (i.e. the South Texas launch site and 

LC–39A at NASA Kennedy Space Center) to eliminate any manifest congestion and 

any schedule conflicts at the Federal Ranges in the coming years. 
174 

Presently, SpaceX is not under contract for any EELV missions; the first competitive opportunity in over a decade is set for release in the coming weeks. The first 

launch of a competed EELV opportunity would occur no earlier than 2017 based on 

acquisition and satellite integration timelines. 

Mr. COOPER. Can SpaceX describe how it plans to reach the more difficult orbits? 

Mr. THORNBURG. The SpaceX Falcon 9 launch vehicle is currently certified under 

the EELV Program for 4 of the 8 reference orbits for the Program. The four reference orbits for which the Falcon 9 has been certified correspond to upcoming competitive missions in Phase 1A. SpaceX will certify the Falcon Heavy launch vehicle 

to all eight EELV reference orbits. 

Mr. COOPER. What is the right balance in a public/private partnership in terms 

of funding a new engine? What are the incentives for private industry to develop 

a new engine and what is the value of planned expenditures by the Department of 

Defense that these companies would compete for in the national security market 

once they have developed an engine? 

Secretary MCFARLAND. The Department is very supportive of a public/private 

partnership for the development of a new rocket propulsion system. The actual 

funding balance between the Department and industry will be based on the evaluation of industry proposals as the Air Force implements its 4-step acquisition strategy. The 4-step strategy allows for an incremental approach to develop new launch 

capabilities that utilize domestically designed and manufactured rocket propulsion 

systems and result in systems that meet all the Department’s launch service requirements. The Department’s goal is to have industry fund the public/private partnership to the maximum extent possible that still supports a positive return on investment for industry. This strategy will enable the Department to transition away 

from the use of RD–180 engines for National Security Space (NSS) missions in the 

2022 timeframe. 

At present, the Department is confident that market forces support a public/private investment strategy. Launch service providers will likely be highly motivated 

to ensure their ability to participate in the future NSS launch market due to the 

projected mission requirements and the corresponding long-term revenue opportunities. The Department estimates that between now and 2030, which is the currently 

projected end of the EELV program of record, over $40B in NSS launch services contracts may be awarded. 

Mr. COOPER. What is your recommendation for getting best value for the taxpayer 

money with regard to launch and development of a new engine or launch system, 

as we seek to ensure access to space while phasing out reliance on RD–180s? 

Secretary MCFARLAND. The Department supports the Air Force’s strategy for obtaining the best value to the government by implementing their 4-step acquisition 

process to develop a new launch system utilizing a domestically produced propulsion 

system. This process allows industry to communicate all alternatives and government to ensure we gain the information required to be a ‘‘good customer.’’ The 4- 

step process also allows for an incremental approach to develop new launch capabilities that utilize domestically designed and manufactured rocket propulsion systems 

and result in systems that meet all the Department’s launch service requirements. 

This process was also designed to allow the Air Force and industry to optimize the 

ratio between government/industry investment. 

Mr. COOPER. What is the right balance in a public/private partnership in terms 

of funding a new engine? What are the incentives for private industry to develop 

a new engine and what is the value of planned expenditures by the Department of 

Defense that these companies would compete for in the national security market 

once they have developed an engine? 

General HYTEN and General GREAVES. 1) The balance between the Government 

and private industry will be dependent on each industry solution. Some industry solutions may be mature, but require additional development to meet national security space requirements. In those cases the Government may fund a higher share 

of the investment. Other solutions may be less mature, but show great promise to 

both be commercially viable and meet national security launch needs. In those 

cases, the industry share may be larger. Industry has generally responded favorably 

to public/private cost share. 

2) The primary incentive for industry investment is the ability to capture future 

market share in both the national security and commercial launch markets. The 

EELV program plans to procure $36.6B of launch services for National Security 

Space (NSS) missions from FY18–FY30, and the commercial launch market appears 

to have a stable demand during that same period. However, if either the Government or commercial market weakens, it may be difficult for industry to achieve 

their desired return on investment. 
175 

Private industry benefits from developing a new or upgraded engine if it is quickly combined with investment to integrate the engine into or develop a domestic commercially viable launch system that allows them to compete for NSS missions. Industry participants will share development costs with the Government, a fact that 

will help them obtain favorable financing and increase their attractiveness to commercial satellite providers. The goal is a robust U.S. industry for future NSS launch 

services that is also competitive for the global commercial launch market. 

The exact amount of planned expenditures by the Department of Defense for the 

shared investment portion of these programs depends largely on the solutions proposed by industry, and ultimately, which solutions are selected for Government investment. 

Mr. COOPER. What is your recommendation for getting best value for the taxpayer 

money with regard to launch and development of a new engine or launch system, 

as we seek to ensure access to space while phasing out reliance on RD–180s? 

General HYTEN and General GREAVES. Investing in industry at the launch service 

level is the best option to quickly and effectively transition off the RD–180 while 

also meeting program cost, schedule, and performance goals. Specifically, partnering 

with industry harnesses industry’s creative ideas to meet national security launch 

needs while keeping the Government from bearing the full cost burden. Cost sharing 

offers the best chance of solving technical challenges and meeting schedule goals. 

Partnering with industry will also improve assured access to space, because the 

commercial partners will develop domestic, commercially viable launch systems that 

meet national security space launch requirements, rather than just a domestic engine that would still require complete launch system development. 

The Air Force has developed a four step plan to partner with industry and invest 

in domestic, commercially-viable launch services. Step 1 is funding the up-front 

technical maturation and risk reduction. Step 2 is shared investment in industry’s 

proposed rocket propulsion systems. Step 3 expands this shared investment to encompass the entire launch system. Step 4 is to award launch services to certified 

providers. These four components are not mutually exclusive, and aspects of each 

may overlap or be conducted in parallel with the others. The goal of this plan is 

to ensure two or more domestic, commercially viable launch providers that also meet 

National Security Space requirements and are available as soon as possible but no 

later than the end of Phase 2 (FY22) or earlier. 

Mr. COOPER. What is the right balance in a public/private partnership in terms 

of funding a new engine? What are the incentives for private industry to develop 

a new engine and what is the value of planned expenditures by the Department of 

Defense that these companies would compete for in the national security market 

once they have developed an engine? 

Dr. GRIFFIN. I cannot say what the ‘‘right balance’’ of public/private investment 

would be for a new engine, as the answer depends in part upon a corporate business-case assessment. I am not privy to any of the internal financial information 

that the relevant companies would use to make this assessment. However, I will 

offer the opinion that even if no corporate investment is made in developing a new 

engine to replace the RD–180 presently employed on the Atlas V, we as a nation 

should still proceed with this effort. This is a critical national security item, and 

whether or not a corporate business case can be made for private investment in 

such an engine, it is needed for U.S. government purposes and should be developed. 

The projected cost of such an engine, less that $1.5 billion, is considerably lower 

than even the most optimistic cost estimates associated with grounding the Atlas 

and moving its present manifest of national security payloads to the Delta 4 family. 

Replacing the Russian RD–180 with an equivalent American engine is the lowestcost forward path for the Department of Defense to preserve its national security 

launch architecture, irrespective of whether any private investment is brought to 

bear. 

Mr. COOPER. What is your recommendation for getting best value for the taxpayer 

money with regard to launch and development of a new engine or launch system, 

as we seek to ensure access to space while phasing out reliance on RD–180s? 

Dr. GRIFFIN. I believe that ‘‘best value’’ for the American taxpayer would be attained by building, as expeditiously as possible, an American replacement for the 

Russian RD–180 as it is used on Atlas V. In the meantime, to avoid any gap in our 

national security space access, we should procure as many RD–180 engines from 

Russia as that nation is willing to sell. 
176 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Coffman informed SpaceX that Ms. Shotwell testified in March 

that DCAA has been working in SpaceX facilities. Mr. Coffman asked if this was 

a correct statement and SpaceX responded yes. As a follow-up, can SpaceX please 

describe the audits that DCAA has conducted with SpaceX and how many DCAA 

professionals are currently working with SpaceX? [Question #15, for cross-reference.] 

Mr. THORNBURG. In her March 2015 appearance, Ms. Shotwell testified that 

SpaceX presently had DCAA auditors doing manufacturing audits. Here, a distinction should have been drawn between DCAA and DCMA. DCAA does not do manufacturing audits; rather, ‘‘DCMA’’ was auditing SpaceX at the time of the Shotwell 

testimony and has done so annually relative to certain NASA and DOD contracts. 

Further, DCMA professionals worked on SpaceX’s EELV certification for more than 

a year. Further, SpaceX has provided audited financials and rates to the Government for review. For its part, in the context of the EELV Program, DCAA has performed verification of SpaceX labor rates. SpaceX provides 10–15 in-facility workspaces for U.S. Government officials engaged in contract management oversight, 

with the division of these seats between NASA, Air Force, DCMA and DCAA, as 

appropriate and at the discretion of our Government customers with input from 

SpaceX. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Prior to June 28th, During the CRS–1 missions there have been 

numerous anomalies of both the launch vehicle and spacecraft (Dragon). Out of 6 

missions flown, 4 of the Dragon capsules have experienced anomalous behavior, including thruster failure and salt water leakage. Considering that the next evolution 

(Dragon 2) will be utilized for Crew efforts, and that capsule is anticipated to be 

re-usable, what is SpaceX doing to mitigate the anomalies that occurred during 

CRS–1 missions (for missions 1–6)? What ‘‘turnaround’’ activities does SpaceX anticipate performing to ready a previously flown Dragon capsule for a subsequent 

crewed mission? What specialized readiness reviews will SpaceX and the USG conduct to ensure readiness of the capsule? 

Mr. THORNBURG. It is important to understand that anomalies occur on every 

space mission ever flown. As General Hyten noted in his recent testimony before 

the committee when asked about launch anomalies: ‘‘we’ve also had the same things 

with Atlas launches. We’ve had the same thing with Delta launches. And we go 

back and look at that.’’ 

Dragon has successfully performed missions to and from the ISS seven times. Notably, Dragon is the only operational capsule in the entire world at present capable 

of carrying significant down-mass from space—all other capsules either burn up on 

reentry or have highly limited cargo capability. Although Dragon was lost during 

the CRS–7 mishap, Dragon was not the cause of the failure—and in fact survived 

a high energy event intact, demonstrating the spacecraft’s inherent robustness. 

SpaceX’s rockets and spacecraft were designed from the beginning to carry crew 

with built-in redundancies throughout, including avionics with triple-string computing, engine-out capabilities on both Falcon 9 and Dragon, and an integrated escape capability, which unlike past abort tower systems, provides astronauts with escape capability all the way to orbit. SpaceX and NASA conduct robust post-mission 

analyses with a focus on continuous improvement of our systems and vigilance regarding safety and mission assurance. 

One of the best ways to validate safety systems is through actual flight testing. 

With our cargo version of the Dragon spacecraft, SpaceX is able to test the vast majority of systems designed to keep astronauts safe well before any astronaut actually 

flies. This provides a distinct advantage to not only meet NASA’s safety requirements, but ultimately, with NASA’s support, build the safest and most reliable 

human spacecraft ever flown. 

There is no agreement in place with NASA to fly ‘‘previously flown’’ Dragon capsules for subsequent crewed missions. SpaceX and Boeing have contracts with 

NASA under the CCtCap program that dictate the reviews necessary prior to 

crewed missions. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Falcon Heavy is 3 years delayed on original commitments. In 2011 

Elon Musk stated that, ‘‘Falcon Heavy will arrive at our Vandenberg, California 

launch complex by the end of next year, with liftoff to follow soon thereafter. First 

launch from our Cape Canaveral launch complex is planned for late 2013 or 2014.’’ 

In March of 2015 SpaceX testified that Falcon Heavy would finally fly, ‘‘later this 

year.’’ 

Considering the delayed schedule and the recent letter of intent submitted regarding the certification process of Falcon Heavy, how does SpaceX plan to mitigate the 

schedule gap? Why is Falcon Heavy 3 years behind schedule? 
177 

Mr. THORNBURG. SpaceX submitted its updated EELV certification statement of 

intent (SOI) for the Falcon Heavy on April 14, 2015. SpaceX has timed Falcon 

Heavy development and demonstration to precede our contractual obligations for the 

operational launch of the vehicle. Contractual commitments are the gaining factor 

here. The first launch contract for Falcon Heavy—for STP–2, an Air Force mission— 

was pushed back as a result of a delay with the Government’s COSMIC–2 payload. 

Accordingly, SpaceX was in a position to move back our self-funded demonstration 

flight of the Falcon Heavy, while focusing on EELV certification of the Falcon 9 

launch vehicle and other matters. 

SpaceX anticipates flying a Falcon Heavy demonstration flight in the first half of 

2016, well in advance of the vehicle’s first contracted missions. We have additional 

commercial Falcon Heavy flights under contract in 2016. Falcon Heavy will be ready 

for any planned Phase 2 EELV missions years ahead of their anticipated launch 

dates, scheduled to begin no earlier than 2020, and will have numerous flights in 

advance of any EELV mission that the vehicle might be used to perform. 

Mr. COFFMAN. The Mitchell Study recommended stockpiling RD–180 engines to 

smooth the transition to an American made system but current legislation prohibits 

such a stockpile. Given the recent failure of SpaceX’s Falcon 9, do you believe Congress should relook at the timelines and numerical restrictions imposed on the use 

of the RD–180? 

General HYTEN and General GREAVES. This anomaly does not alter the Air Force’s 

position with respect to the RD–180 restrictions. The Air Force maintains assured 

access to space via two launch vehicle families per U.S. law and Presidential policy. 

This is currently provided by United Launch Alliance’s (ULA) Atlas V and Delta IV 

launch vehicles. However, the Air Force is reintroducing competition into the 

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program. ULA’s Atlas V vehicle is their 

lowest-cost offering when compared to the Delta IV vehicle, thereby providing competitive prices until new launch vehicles are available, likely no earlier than 2021. 

Additional RD–180s will be required in order to maintain assured access to space 

at a reasonable cost to the Government. 

Excluding heavy lift missions in EELV Acquisition Phase 1A and Phase 2, the 

Atlas V is capable of lifting approximately 9 and 25 missions, respectively, for a 

total of approximately 34 missions. However, we believe authorization to use up to 

18 RD–180 engines in the competitive procurement and award of launch service contracts through Fiscal Year 2022 is a reasonable starting point to mitigate risk associated with assured access to space and to enable competition. As the competitive 

environment develops and evolves, we will re-assess the number of engines required 

to ensure we maintain assured access to space. 

Mr. COFFMAN. The Mitchell Study recommended stockpiling RD–180 engines to 

smooth the transition to an American made system but current legislation prohibits 

such a stockpile. Given the recent failure of SpaceX’s Falcon 9, do you believe Congress should relook at the timelines and numerical restrictions imposed on the use 

of the RD–180? 

Dr. GRIFFIN. I am absolutely of the opinion that our present legislative quota on 

the import and stockpiling of the RD–180 engine is far too low. While I strongly 

believe that we should end our dependence upon Russia for this engine as soon as 

it is possible to do so, we should not ‘‘cut off our nose to spite our face’’ in the attempt. Continued use of the RD–180 until we have a domestic replacement is the 

best course of action available to us at this point, and I offer that opinion irrespective of the status of Falcon 9. Even if the recent failure of that vehicle had not occurred, most payloads manifested on Atlas could not be launched on Falcon 9, as 

its payload capacity is relatively limited for the foreseeable future. Our national security space launch requirements cannot be fully met without Atlas, and for the 

next 5 years Atlas cannot launch without the RD–180. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BRIDENSTINE 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. In a worst case scenario, the United States could find itself reliant on a single provider for national security space launches. If that sole U.S. provider failed, then America could lose access to space for national security payloads. 

Given the possibility of such a scenario, are there any launch vehicles currently provided by close allies which can cover a broad range of EELV-class missions? 

Secretary MCFARLAND. A waiver to National Space Transportation Policy and 

statute would be required to launch a National Security Space (NSS) payload on a 

launch vehicle not manufactured in the United States. Even if such a waiver was 

granted, significant engineering analysis would be required to determine what, if 

any, NSS payloads would be compatible with an allied nation’s launch vehicle. At 
178 

present, no allied launch capability has a demonstrated capability that meets all 

NSS requirements. While it is possible to evolve this capability, NSS payloads would 

need to be assessed for compatibility. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. In a worst case scenario, the United States could find itself reliant on a single provider for national security space launches. If that sole U.S. provider failed, then America could lose access to space for national security payloads. 

Given the possibility of such a scenario, are there any launch vehicles currently provided by close allies which can cover a broad range of EELV-class missions? 

General HYTEN and General GREAVES. Public Law 111–314 (51 U.S.C. 50131) and 

National Space Transportation Policy require National Security Space (NSS) systems be launched using United States commercial providers. Currently, assured access to space for NSS missions is provided by United Launch Alliance (ULA) with 

the Delta IV and Atlas V. The SpaceX Falcon 9 recently completed certification to 

compete for NSS launch services. While it is possible that other allied systems could 

launch a subset of NSS missions, the detailed studies have not been accomplished 

to ensure we can meet all NSS stressing requirements. If all domestic paths to 

space are precluded, the Air Force would consider all options, in consultation with 

the Congress, to regain access to space as quickly as possible. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS 

Mr. BROOKS. Both the U.S. Air Force and ULA have asserted to this committee 

that it will require approximately $200 million to integrate AR1 into the Atlas V. 

You, however, stated to the committee that the cost to do so would be in the tens 

of millions. I am wondering why there is such a large discrepancy. 

Are we comparing apples to apples—or apples to oranges? How so? In your view, 

what vehicle are the Air Force and ULA referring to when they cite an AR1 integration cost of $200 million? What vehicle are you referring to when you cite an AR1 

integration cost of ‘‘tens of millions?’’ 

Ms. VAN KLEECK. The $200 million figure ULA refers to is the estimated cost to 

develop a proposed ‘‘Vulcan/AR1’’ launch vehicle. While Vulcan/AR1 would be a derivative of the current Atlas V, it is envisioned by ULA that this new launch vehicle 

would have an approximately 30% greater propellant load. Integration of an AR1 

engine main propulsion system is included in that value. Vulcan/AR1 is not to be 

confused with Vulcan/BE–4, which represents a wholesale change of the launch vehicle and infrastructure from kerosene propellant to methane (Liquefied Natural 

Gas, or LNG) propellant. Mr. Bruno, in his testimony, acknowledged that Vulcan/ 

BE–4 would cost $600M–$800M. Aerojet Rocketdyne’s work with ULA on the AR1 

engine and an AR1 main propulsion system—comprised of two AR1 engines mated 

together—has revealed that no major modifications to the Atlas V launch vehicle are 

required to integrate the AR1 as a replacement for RD–180 booster engine. Aerojet 

Rocketdyne estimates the non-recurring costs to integrate the AR1 engine main propulsion system into the existing Atlas V launch vehicle to be between $50 million 

and $75 million, including launch vehicle integration and certification costs. 

Mr. BROOKS. Is there precedent for re-engining a launch vehicle, particularly the 

Atlas? Please elaborate for the committee. 

Ms. VAN KLEECK. Yes, there is a strong precedent for re-engining launch vehicles, 

including the Atlas. Most recently, as the Atlas evolved from the Atlas IIAS to the 

Atlas III, the vehicle was re-engined from the Rocketdyne MA5 engine to the Russian-made RD–180 engine. Throughout its history, the Atlas program has made incremental changes rather than wholesale launch vehicle changes, to include stretching the onboard tanks, avionics changes and engine changes. The incremental evolution of the Atlas system maintains mission success with far less risk than an entirely new launch vehicle and the required accompanying infrastructure changes. 

Similarly, in the civil space arena, the Antares launch vehicle is currently undergoing a re-engining from the AJ26 (derived from the Russian NK–33 engine) to the 

Russian-made RD–181 booster engine. 

Mr. BROOKS. What would be the cost to integrate AR1 into the current existing 

version of Atlas V? Upon what do you base this cost estimate? Has this estimate 

been shared with ULA? 

Ms. VAN KLEECK. Aerojet Rocketdyne estimates the non-recurring costs to integrate an AR1 engine main propulsion system into the existing Atlas V launch vehicle would be between $50 and $75 million. This estimate includes launch vehicle integration, infrastructure mods and certification. Our estimate is based on: 1) Aerojet 

Rocketdyne’s two decades of work on the oxygen rich staged combustion cycle, previous internal company and U.S. government investment, and advances in materials 
179 

science and manufacturing techniques, 2) an engine designed to integrate into the 

Atlas V with minimal changes required. This estimate has been shared with ULA. 

Mr. BROOKS. What would be the range of payloads the current Atlas V with an 

AR1 booster engine could launch to geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO)? What 

number and type of expected NSS payloads would such a configuration be unable 

to launch? 

Ms. VAN KLEECK. The Atlas V featuring an AR1 engine main propulsion system 

would provide similar performance to the existing Atlas V, including coverage of all 

USAF EELV missions currently served by Atlas V. The same Atlas V/AR1 combination however would not be able to launch missions currently flown on the Delta IV 

Heavy. 

Mr. BROOKS. Would re-engining the Atlas V with AR1 allow for a faster, less costly and lower risk transition off of the RD–180? If yes, how so? If not, why not? 

Ms. VAN KLEECK. Yes, coupling the AR1 engine in a main propulsion system comprised of two AR1 engines mated together onto the Atlas V offers the fastest, lowest 

cost and lowest risk approach to the U.S. government. The AR1 engine has been 

designed from the start to minimize launch vehicle modifications to the current 

Atlas V. Building on Aerojet Rocketdyne’s long history of successfully developing 

rocket engines for the Nation, the AR1 features advanced oxygen-rich staged combustion technology, is an all U.S. design, provides a 500,000 lbf thrust class that 

is configurable to multiple U.S. launch vehicles—including the 1 million lbf thrust 

AR1 main propulsion system for the current Atlas V—leverages the existing liquid 

oxygen-kerosene launch infrastructure, operations and facilities and utilizes new 

materials and advanced manufacturing techniques, like additive manufacturing. 

Aerojet Rocketdyne developed the last major U.S. liquid rocket engine, the RS–68 

that powers the Delta IV launch vehicle, in five years. Similarly, Aerojet Rocketdyne 

is on course to complete development, undergo certification and bring the AR1 into 

production by the end of 2019—5 years after initiation of dedicated development. 

Mr. BROOKS. How has Aerojet Rocketdyne gained the knowledge and experience 

to build an engine that will leapfrog the Russian technology used in the RD–180 

engine? Over what time period did you execute this work? 

Ms. VAN KLEECK. Aerojet Rocketdyne’s development of a new American liquid 

rocket engine, the AR1, is not a new program in Fiscal Year 2015. Since the 1990s, 

Aerojet Rocketdyne has been working on Oxygen Rich Staged Combustion (ORSC) 

technology. ORSC is the combustion cycle that will be used in the AR1. More than 

two decades of technology efforts support the rapid development of this advanced 

engine. AR1 leverages over $300 million in government and Aerojet Rocketdyne 

company investments. AR1 will be a thoroughly modern rocket engine using the latest engineering analysis, manufacturing techniques, and advances in materials 

science. As an example, Aerojet Rocketdyne materials science research and development has enabled us to develop an oxygen resistant material to eliminate the need 

for the coatings that the Russians used in earlier designs. Through the use of modern electronics, AR1 will also forego the need for the hydraulic ‘‘step ladder’’ actuation that is used in the RD–180. Aerojet Rocketdyne is also employing additive 

manufacturing techniques to develop state of the art, world class launch engine 

components at an affordable price for the government customer. 

Additionally, Aerojet Rocketdyne currently participates in two existing competitively won contracts to perfect ORSC technology: NASA’s Advanced Booster Engineering Development and Risk Reduction Program (ABEDRR) and the U.S. Air 

Force’s Hydrocarbon Booster Technology Program (HCBT). 

Mr. BROOKS. Dr. Griffin stated that as NASA Administrator he funded development of the Falcon rocket. To SpaceX, how much money has NASA invested in 

SpaceX development efforts since inception of the company? If SpaceX is unable to 

answer, would DCAA be able to assist in the evaluation of USG funds paid to 

SpaceX? 

Mr. THORNBURG. Dr. Griffin was referring to the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program, which was initiated under his tenure during the 

Bush Administration. 

Under the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) Program, NASA 

contributed a total of $396M towards the development of a capability to carry cargo 

to and from the International Space Station, as well as demonstration missions of 

that capability. Your question pertains to development alone. SpaceX went beyond 

this to both develop and demonstrate. The milestones associated with these payments are publically available. SpaceX invested well more than $450M of private 

funds toward the development of Falcon 9, including upgrades, and the Dragon 

spacecraft. To date, beyond the COTS Program, NASA development funds include 

$75M for CCDev2; and $460M for CCiCap. 
180 

SpaceX recently won a firm fixed price contract, as did Boeing, for astronaut carriage capability development and demonstration under CCtCap, for a total possible 

value of $2.6B. Notably, the SpaceX contract includes up to six missions—launches 

and returns from the Space Station—as well as development. This contract is structured with performance, milestone-based payments. In other words, SpaceX is only 

paid when it performs contractually agreed-upon milestones (or work) under the 

contract. SpaceX would note that the Boeing Company received a similar contract 

with a total value of $4.2B, for performing the exact same requirements. 

SpaceX has operational launch services contracts with a host of international and 

domestic commercial purchasers of launch services, as well as operational contracts 

with NASA for cargo missions and satellite delivery missions. 

Mr. BROOKS. Can SpaceX provide a technical description of how the Falcon vehicle 

and propulsion system can meet all 8 of the EELV reference missions to, as Representative Cooper described, the appropriate orbits? 

Mr. THORNBURG. SpaceX would be pleased to brief the Congressman on the technical aspects of the Falcon family of vehicles, in the appropriate forum. In short, 

Falcon 9 is certified to execute missions associated with 4 reference orbits, and Falcon Heavy will be certified to all 8 reference orbits. The Air Force will validate that 

these requirements will be met as part of the EELV certification process. 

Mr. BROOKS. SpaceX stated that any government funding should be matched 50/ 

50 by commercial investment. Can SpaceX verify that this 50/50 split was the case 

for the development of Falcon and Dragon? If SpaceX is not able to verify, would 

DCAA be able to assist in the evaluation of the proper use of USG funds? 

Mr. THORNBURG. Under the Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) 

Program, NASA contributed a total of $396M toward the development of a capability to carry cargo to and from the International Space Station, as well as operational demonstration missions of that capability. As noted above, under the COTS 

program, SpaceX contributed 53% of the development funds. The U.S. Government 

contributed $396M under this program; SpaceX invested well more than $450M of 

private funds toward the development of Falcon 9, including upgrades, and the 

Dragon spacecraft. 

Mr. BROOKS. In the hearing, the term Low-Price Technically Acceptable (LPTA) 

was mentioned. In light of the SpaceX accident and considering the value of national security payloads, can you describe the risk that is required to compete 

launches with a LPTA selection criteria? In the long run and beyond current budget 

challenges, is LPTA worth the risk to the tax payer and to the warfighter? What 

criteria will the USG use in assessing a proper balance between price and technical 

acceptability? 

Mr. THORNBURG. The Air Force and the Department of Defense are responsible 

for development of source selection criteria associated with Requests for Proposals. 

SpaceX cannot comment on the criteria that the USG will use in assessing price and 

technical acceptability. SpaceX notes that NASA and a number of other agencies, 

as well as the entire commercial world, purchase launches services on a commercial 

fixed-price basis. Further, DOD itself has purchased LPTA launch services in the 

recent past. Launch should be treated as a commercial commodity and, based on 

this, the appropriate FAR contracting models should apply, as required by law. 

Mr. BROOKS. Can you please describe how the SpaceX accident on the June 28th 

will impact the schedule and selection criteria for the upcoming GPS III mission 

competition? 

Mr. THORNBURG. The Air Force and the Department of Defense are responsible 

for the schedule and selection criteria for the upcoming GPS III mission competition. 

According to public reports, the Air Force has stated that it plans to issue the RFP 

for this mission in the coming weeks. SpaceX looks forward to participating in this 

competition—the first competition held in the EELV Program in the last ten years. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. Knowing that Atlas V and Delta IV rockets are the two systems currently capable of meeting the full gamut of national security payload requirements, 

what is the Department’s existing backup plan should there be a catastrophic failure or disruption preventing either system from being used? 

At this year’s Space Symposium in Colorado Springs, you mentioned your concerns with using an unproven system to launch some of our nation’s most critical 

and costly satellites. If the United States is faced with a scenario in which a backup 

system is immediately needed, are there proven systems currently being used by 

NATO allies that could serve as viable alternatives? 
181 

It’s my understand that Europe’s Ariane 5 rocket is a proven system capable of 

heavy-lift launches and slated to be the launch vehicle for the James Webb Space 

Telescope—the most sophisticated and costly telescope ever built. Given its track 

record, could the Ariane 5 serve as a viable backup to both the Atlas and Delta systems? 

General HYTEN. Public Law 111–314 (51 U.S.C. 50131) and National Space Transportation Policy require National Security Space (NSS) systems be launched using 

United States commercial providers. If all United States commercial providers are 

precluded, the Air Force would consider all options, in consultation with the Congress, to regain access to space as quickly as possible. Preliminary studies based on 

open source information indicate that the Ariane 5 launch vehicle is capable of 

meeting the requirements for some NSS missions. 

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