STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A23-0619

Robert W. Starbeck, individually, and 

As Trustee of the Arthur C. Starbeck Trust 

under agreement Dated August 21, 2000, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

Mary Gibson, et al., 

Respondents.

Filed January 8, 2024

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded

Segal, Chief Judge

Chippewa County District Court

File No. 12-CV-22-376

Douglas D. Kluver, Kluver Law Office and Mediation Center, P.L.L.C., Montevideo, 

Minnesota (for appellant)

Krystal M. Lynne, J. Richard Stermer, Stermer & Sellner, Chtd., Montevideo, Minnesota 

(for respondents)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and 

Hooten, Judge.

∗

 

SYLLABUS

1. On a claim for adverse possession, the boundary-line exemption from the 

property-tax-payment requirement in Minn. Stat. § 541.02 (2022) requires the existence of 

genuine confusion over the true location of the boundary line between adjoining properties. 

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to 

Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2

2. The uses of land to establish a prescriptive-easement claim are not limited to 

using another’s land for access purposes. 

OPINION

SEGAL, Chief Judge

In this appeal from a grant of partial summary judgment, appellant challenges the 

dismissal of his complaint alleging title by adverse possession to two portions of 

respondents’ property and an alternate claim for a prescriptive easement. He argues the 

district court erred in holding that his adverse-possession claims failed because he never 

paid property taxes for any portion of respondents’ property as provided in Minn. Stat. 

§ 541.02. He asserts that his claim to one of the portions of respondents’ property is exempt 

from the property-tax-payment requirement because it involved a boundary-line dispute 

and because he was claiming less than all or substantially all of respondents’ property. 

Appellant also argues that the district court erred when it dismissed his prescriptiveeasement claim for the second portion on the ground that prescriptive easements are limited 

to using another’s land for access; appellant’s claim was that he used the land for 

“recreational and hunting purposes,” not access.

We conclude that the district court correctly applied Minn. Stat. § 541.02 and affirm 

the district court’s grant of summary judgment on appellant’s adverse-possession claim. 

But because we conclude that the types of uses of land to establish a prescriptive-easement 
3 

claim are not necessarily limited to access, we reverse and remand to the district court for 

further proceedings on that claim.1

 

FACTS 

Appellant Robert W. Starbeck is the trustee of the Arthur C. Starbeck Trust. The 

trust is the record owner of a parcel of land in western Minnesota (the Starbeck property). 

The Starbeck property is bordered to the south by a parcel of land owned by respondents 

Dennis and Mary Gibson and Keith and Vicki Poier (the Gibson/Poier property). Both 

properties were acquired by the respective parties or their predecessors in 1974. In July 

2022, Starbeck initiated this action asserting that he had acquired two portions of the 

Gibson/Poier property through adverse possession—the “encroached farm property” and 

the “campground property” (jointly, the disputed area). In his prayer for relief, he sought, 

in the alternative, a prescriptive easement for the campground property. Starbeck 

separately recorded a notice of lis pendens against the Gibson/Poier property.2

 

1

 Appellant also challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment 

seeking dismissal of respondents’ counterclaims for slander of title and tortious 

interference with contract. But this is an appeal from a final partial judgment under Minn. 

R. Civ. P. 54.02 only on appellant’s adverse-possession and prescriptive-easement claims. 

There is no final judgment on the counterclaims, and therefore those claims are not properly 

before us in this appeal. 

2 A notice of lis pendens is a notice filed “for record with the county recorder” providing 

notice of an “action[] in which the title to, or any interest in or lien upon, real property is 

involved or affected, or is brought in question by either party.” Minn. Stat. § 557.02 

(2022). 
4

The image below depicts the Starbeck property, the Gibson/Poier property, and the 

disputed area.3 

As shown in the image, the Starbeck property contains a field, which the Starbeck family

has historically used for farming. The encroached farm property is the portion of that field 

that crosses over onto the Gibson/Poier property, and the campground property is slightly 

south (or below on the image) of the encroached farm property. The complaint alleges that 

Starbeck and his predecessors farmed the encroached farm property each year since 

acquiring the Starbeck property, and that Starbeck constructed and has maintained the 

campground property consistently since 2000, using it “for his recreational and hunting 

purposes.” 

3 The labeled image was attached as an exhibit to the complaint. We have cropped the 

image to show only the portion relevant to this appeal; it therefore does not depict the full 

parcels owned by either Starbeck or the Gibsons and Poiers. 
5

The Gibsons and Poiers answered the complaint, contesting Starbeck’s claims and 

asserting counterclaims for slander of title and tortious interference with contract. They 

claimed that they had a contract to sell the Gibson/Poier property to Chippewa County to 

create a county park. They alleged that Starbeck was aware of the contract and they were 

unable to complete the sale due to this litigation and the notice of lis pendens. 

The Gibsons and Poiers filed a motion for summary judgment on Starbeck’s claims. 

In a supporting affidavit, they alleged that Starbeck’s use of the disputed area was with 

their permission and that Starbeck never paid any property taxes for the Gibson/Poier 

property. They also alleged that the campground property has been used by other members 

of the public as an outdoor recreational and educational site. 

Starbeck opposed the motion and moved for summary judgment in his favor on the 

Gibson/Poier counterclaims. Starbeck argued that it was not relevant whether he paid any 

property taxes for the property and submitted an affidavit in which he denied receiving 

permission to use the disputed area. He further asserted in the affidavit that he “controlled 

access to the campground by requiring all users of the campground to request [his]

permission prior to use,” exercised exclusive control over the campground property, and 

“constructed a chain barrier to prevent access to the property and . . . put up ‘no trespassing’ 

signs to prevent unauthorized access.” 

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Gibsons and Poiers on 

Starbeck’s complaint and denied Starbeck’s motion to dismiss the counterclaims. The 

district court determined that Starbeck could not maintain his claims for adverse possession 

because he never paid property taxes on the Gibson/Poier property and was not entitled to 
6

a prescriptive easement because his use of the Gibson/Poier property was for a purpose 

other than accessing his own property. In response to a request from the Gibsons and 

Poiers, the district court entered partial final judgment on the dismissal of Starbeck’s 

complaint. After initially questioning jurisdiction, we accepted jurisdiction over the appeal 

from the partial final judgment. 

ISSUES

I. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment in favor of the Gibsons and 

Poiers on the adverse-possession claim for the encroached farm property? 

II. Did the district court err in dismissing Starbeck’s prescriptive-easement claim for 

the campground property on the ground that Starbeck did not use the property for

access? 

ANALYSIS

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo to determine whether there are 

any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in applying the law. 

Ruiz v. 1st Fid. Loan Servicing, LLC, 829 N.W.2d 53, 56 (Minn. 2013). “We view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was 

granted.” STAR Ctrs., Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, L.L.P., 644 N.W.2d 72, 76-77 (Minn. 

2002). A genuine issue of material fact exists when there is sufficient evidence that could 

lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 

60, 69 (Minn. 1997). 
7 

I. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the 

Gibsons and Poiers on the adverse-possession claim for the encroached farm 

property.

4

 

To prevail on an adverse-possession claim, a party “must show, by clear and 

convincing evidence, an actual, open, hostile, continuous, and exclusive possession for the 

requisite period of time,” which is 15 years in Minnesota. Ganje v. Schuler, 659 N.W.2d

261, 266 (Minn. App. 2003) (quoting Ehle v. Prosser, 197 N.W.2d 458, 462 (Minn. 1972)). 

When the real estate at issue is “assessed as tracts or parcels separate from other real 

estate,” section 541.02 of the Minnesota Statutes imposes an additional requirement that 

the claimant have paid property taxes for the claimed real estate subject to certain 

exemptions. See St. Paul Park Refin. Co. v. Domeier, 950 N.W.2d 547, 547-48 (Minn. 

2020) (Domeier II). 

Minnesota Statutes section 541.02 provides: 

No action for the recovery of real estate or the 

possession thereof shall be maintained unless it appears that 

the plaintiff, the plaintiff's ancestor, predecessor, or grantor 

was seized or possessed of the premises in question within 15 

years before the beginning of the action. 

Such limitations shall not be a bar to an action for the 

recovery of real estate assessed as tracts or parcels separate 

from other real estate, unless it appears that the party claiming 

title by adverse possession or the party’s ancestor, predecessor, 

or grantor, or all of them together, shall have paid taxes on the 

real estate in question at least five consecutive years of the time 

4 As noted above, Starbeck asserted claims of adverse possession for both the encroached 

farm property and campground property. The district court dismissed both claims but, on 

appeal, Starbeck’s adverse-possession arguments relate only to the encroached farm 

property, not the campground property. His only argument relating to the campground 

property is that the district erred in dismissing his claim for a prescriptive easement for use 

of that property. 
8 

during which the party claims these lands to have been 

occupied adversely. 

The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not 

apply to actions relating to the boundary line of lands, which 

boundary lines are established by adverse possession, or to 

actions concerning lands included between the government or 

platted line and the line established by such adverse 

possession, or to lands not assessed for taxation. 

Starbeck argues that the property-tax-payment requirement of section 541.02 does not 

apply to his claim for the encroached farm property for two reasons. First, he argues that 

his claim involves a boundary-line dispute and that it is therefore exempt from the 

requirement under paragraph three of the section. And second, he argues that 

section 541.02 is not applicable because his claim is for less than all or substantially all of 

the Gibson/Poier property. We address each in turn. 

A. The boundary-line exemption is not applicable. 

Starbeck argues that the boundary-line exemption applies to his claim for the 

encroached farm property because his adverse-possession claim had ripened by 1989. As 

such, he contends he has held title to the encroached farm property by operation of law 

since 1989. He maintains that this case is therefore a boundary-line dispute “with the 

respondent[s] claiming the boundary of record and the appellant claiming the boundary as 

a matter of law.” But as we conclude in the next section, Starbeck’s adverse-possession 

claim to the encroached farm property never ripened because he paid no property taxes for 

the Gibson/Poier property as required by section 541.02. Starbeck therefore never 

achieved title by operation of law, and his argument fails. 
9 

We also reject Starbeck’s claim that the boundary-line exemption applies because it 

has no support in the record. To qualify as a boundary-line dispute that is exempt from the 

tax-payment requirement, there must be genuine confusion over the true location of the 

boundary lines. While there is not much caselaw addressing what constitutes a boundaryline dispute for purposes of the exemption in section 541.02, the caselaw that exists 

supports the conclusion that it requires genuine confusion between the parties concerning 

a property line. For example, in Ganje, we held that the boundary-line exemption in 

section 541.02 was applicable based on evidence that the disputed area involved a zigzagged boundary line featuring a fence line and a roadway and that the respondent had 

walked the area with the prior owners of the appellant’s parcel “in an attempt to determine 

where the boundary line lay between the properties.” 659 N.W.2d at 270. 

Other boundary-line-exemption cases cited by the supreme court in Domeier II, 950 

N.W.2d at 551, similarly involved uncertainty over the exact location of the property line. 

See Mellenthin v. Brantman, 1 N.W.2d 141, 143 (Minn. 1941) (stating that “[a]ll [parties] 

concerned” thought that the adverse claimant’s predecessor in interest had purchased land 

up “to the fence,” and the parties acted as if the fence was the boundary line between the 

properties); Skala v. Lindbeck, 214 N.W. 271, 272 (Minn. 1927) (observing that “both 

parties believed [a fence] was located on the true boundary line between their respective 

holdings” until a survey revealed a different boundary); Fredericksen v. Henke, 209 N.W. 

257, 258-59 (Minn. 1926) (concluding that a decades-old fence built by a previous owner 

resulted in a party mistakenly claiming that the fence was the proper boundary line); Kelley 

v. Green, 170 N.W. 922, 923-24 (Minn. 1919) (noting that the parties and their 
10 

predecessors treated a row of trees as the boundary line for approximately 26 years before 

discovering that the row of trees might not be the actual boundary). 

In this case, there is no indication that the parties were confused about the location 

of the boundary lines between the Starbeck and Gibson/Poier properties. Starbeck never 

claimed that he believed the encroached farm property was within the boundary lines of 

his property. To the contrary, the allegations in the complaint and in Starbeck’s affidavit 

demonstrate that Starbeck was fully aware of the actual boundary lines and that he claims 

to have possessed the disputed area “in a manner that was, for no less than 15 years, actual, 

open, hostile, continuous, and exclusive.” As the district court observed, this case 

“involves two separate properties with precise legal descriptions and definite property 

lines,” and “[t]he parties argued this case with these boundary lines in mind.” In the 

absence of evidence supporting the existence of genuine confusion over the boundary line 

between the two properties, the district court correctly concluded, as a matter of law, that 

the boundary-line exemption was not applicable. 

B. In the absence of a statutory exemption, payment of property taxes is 

required for adverse-possession claims involving any portion of a 

separately assessed parcel. 

In the alternative, Starbeck argues that the property-tax-payment requirement does 

not apply to his claim for the encroached farm property because he “was not claiming 

substantially all of [the Gibson/Poier] property.” Starbeck cites as his authority our

decision in State v. Grubb, which held that the tax-payment requirement applies only “to 

actions where the disseizor claims all or substantially all of an assessed tract or parcel.” 

433 N.W.2d 915, 920 (Minn. App. 1988), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 22, 1989). The supreme 
11 

court in Domeier II, however, rejected this holding. In Domeier II, the supreme court 

disagreed “with the court of appeals’ approach as set out in Grubb.” 950 N.W.2d at 552. 

The supreme court held that, in cases where there is no boundary-line dispute, “[a] claim 

to any portion of a separately assessed parcel requires tax payment.” Id. 

Because the property-tax-payment requirement of section 541.02 applies, and

Starbeck paid no property taxes, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment 

in favor of the Gibsons and Poiers on the adverse-possession claim for the encroached farm 

property. 

II. The uses of land to establish a prescriptive-easement claim are not limited to 

using another’s land for access purposes. 

The only reference in Starbeck’s complaint to a claim for a prescriptive easement 

appears in paragraph two of the prayer for relief where he seeks a judgment: 

Declaring that Robert W. Starbeck, individually is the 

owner of the Campground Property, free of any estate, right, 

title, lien, or interest by the defendants. 

OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE 

Declaring that Robert W. Starbeck, individually, holds 

a prescriptive easement over the Campground Property.

The district court granted summary judgment on Starbeck’s prescriptive-easement claim

regarding the campground property, concluding that such claims are limited to claims for 

a right of use for access purposes and, because Starbeck does not use the campground 

property for that purpose, his claim for a prescriptive easement fails. Starbeck challenges 

the district court’s conclusion, arguing that a prescriptive-easement claim is not so limited. 

The primary difference between a claim for a prescriptive easement and adverse 

possession is that a prescriptive easement grants only a right to nonexclusive use of a 
12

portion of another’s property, not to a right of exclusive possession or title to that property. 

Hebert v. City of Fifty Lakes, 744 N.W.2d 226, 231 n.3 (Minn. 2008); see also Block v. 

Sexton, 577 N.W.2d 521, 526 (Minn. App. 1998) (“An easement does not give title to the 

land upon which it is imposed, nor does it exclude use by the landowner or the public.”). 

“[S]ubject to such differences as are necessarily inherent in the application of the rules in 

such cases,” the elements of proof required to establish a prescriptive easement are 

otherwise the same as those necessary to establish adverse possession. Rogers v. Moore, 

603 N.W.2d 650, 657 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted). “The scope of a prescriptive 

easement is ‘measured and defined by the use made of the land giving rise to the 

easement.’” Block, 577 N.W.2d at 525-26 (quoting Romans v. Nadler, 14 N.W.2d 482, 

486 (Minn. 1944)). 

As the parties note, most of the cases involving claims for prescriptive easements 

concern the use of a driveway or access road owned by another to access one’s own 

property. See, e.g., Boldt v. Roth, 618 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 2000); Rogers, 603 N.W.2d 

at 654; Nordin v. Kuno, 287 N.W.2d 923, 924 (Minn. 1980); Oliver v. State ex rel. Comm’r 

of Transp., 760 N.W.2d 912, 918 (Minn. App. 2009), rev. granted (Minn. App. Apr. 29, 

2009), and appeal dismissed (Minn. Nov. 16, 2009); Heuer v. County of Aitkin, 645 

N.W.2d 753, 755-56 (Minn. App. 2002). But none of these cases state that a prescriptive 

easement may only be established for such a use. 

To the contrary, there are other cases involving prescriptive easements for uses other

than access purposes. In Romans, the supreme court determined that a party was entitled 

to a prescriptive easement “to have the eaves and gutters of the[ir] house and the[ir] garage 
13

[to] project and to drip” onto the land of another. 14 N.W.2d at 487. In Barth v. Stenwick, 

this court reversed the grant of summary judgment against a township on its claim that the 

public had acquired a prescriptive easement to use a disputed portion of a beach for 

recreational purposes. 761 N.W.2d 502, 512 (Minn. App. 2009). In addition, this court 

has, in a nonprecedential opinion we cite for its persuasive value, affirmed the grant of a 

prescriptive easement to individuals to use motorized vehicles for recreational purposes on

certain trails owned by another where the use of such vehicles was otherwise prohibited. 

See Anderson v. State, No. A06-1673, 2007 WL 2472359, at *1, *4-6 (Minn. App. Sept. 4, 

2007), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 13, 2007). 

We conclude that the uses of land to establish a prescriptive-easement claim are not 

limited to using another’s land for access purposes. The district court thus erred in 

dismissing Starbeck’s prescriptive-easement claim for use of the campground property on 

the ground that his use of that property was for “recreational and hunting purposes,” not 

access. The Gibsons and Poiers assert other grounds for summary judgment on Starbeck’s 

prescriptive-easement claim but, because these were not addressed by the district court, we 

decline to address them for the first time on appeal. We therefore reverse the grant of 

summary judgment on Starbeck’s prescriptive-easement claim for the campground 

property and remand that claim to the district court for further proceedings. Nothing in 

this opinion, however, is intended to limit the district court’s consideration of any 

alternative grounds for summary disposition of the prescriptive-easement claim. 
14

DECISION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the 

district court for further proceedings. We affirm the district court’s summary-judgment 

dismissal of the adverse-possession claim to the encroached farm property because the 

district court properly concluded that the boundary-line exemption to the property-taxpayment requirement does not apply, and it is undisputed that Starbeck did not pay property 

taxes for any portion of the Gibson/Poier property. But we reverse and remand for further 

proceedings on the prescriptive-easement claim for the campground property because the 

district court erred in determining that Starbeck could not maintain a claim for a 

prescriptive-easement on the ground that he did not use the campground property to access 

his own property. 

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.