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i 

94–224 2016

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–22] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

THE PRESIDENT’S PROPOSED 

AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USE OF 

MILITARY FORCE AGAINST ISIL AND THE 

FISCAL YEAR 2016 NATIONAL DEFENSE 

AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST 

FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 18, 2015 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

THOMAS MACARTHUR, New Jersey 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

PETE AGUILAR, California 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

KARI BINGEN, Professional Staff Member 

MIKE CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

MICHAEL TEHRANI, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Davis, Hon. Susan A., a Representative from California, Committee on Armed 

Services ................................................................................................................. 2 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac,’’ a Representative from Texas, Chairman, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Carter, Hon. Ashton B., Secretary of Defense ....................................................... 3 

Dempsey, GEN Martin E., USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ............ 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Carter, Hon. Ashton B. .................................................................................... 64 

Dempsey, GEN Martin E. ................................................................................ 84 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ..................................................................... 63 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Moulton ...................................................................................................... 103 

Mr. O’Rourke .................................................................................................... 102 

Mr. Takai .......................................................................................................... 102 

Mr. Thornberry ................................................................................................. 101 

Dr. Wenstrup .................................................................................................... 101 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 107 

Mr. Conaway ..................................................................................................... 110 

Ms. Duckworth .................................................................................................. 112 

Mr. Shuster ....................................................................................................... 108 

Mr. Walz ............................................................................................................ 113 

(1) 

THE PRESIDENT’S PROPOSED AUTHORIZATION FOR 

THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST ISIL AND THE 

FISCAL YEAR 2016 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF 

DEFENSE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 18, 2015. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ 

Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Committee will come to order. 

Before we begin today, I want to ask unanimous consent that 

non-committee members, if any, be allowed to participate in today’s 

hearing after all committee members have had an opportunity to 

ask questions. 

And by way of explanation, I might say that one of our committee members has tentatively been appointed to another committee, and his replacement has tentatively been named, Mr. Russell from Oklahoma, but it has not been ratified by the Republican 

Conference yet. And so Mr. Russell is with us today. 

But without objection, non-committee members will be recognized at the appropriate time. 

Let me welcome our distinguished witnesses to today’s hearing. 

Secretary Carter, thank you for being with us. You have been in 

this room in a variety of capacities over the years, but this is the 

first hearing since you were confirmed as Secretary of Defense 

roughly a month ago, and we are very glad to have you with us. 

General Dempsey, thank you for being here. And I want to say 

again, all the committee members appreciated your participation in 

our retreat about a month ago at Annapolis. The fact that you 

would take time to come out there, meet with us and discuss some 

of the challenges we face was extremely helpful and meant a lot, 

and we are very grateful for that, for being here today, and for your 

many years of service. 

As you all know, this committee has done things a little differently this year. Rather than start out talking about the President’s budget, we have spent the last 2 months looking at the national security challenges that we face around the world, and I 

think that has put us in a better place to be able to look at the 
2 

administration’s budget request and a number of the other issues 

that are before us. 

I would say for me, one of the key takeaways from the last 2 

months has been the growing threat to our technological superiority. We have had classified and unclassified sessions on that, and 

to me, it is one of the key challenges we face. 

And as I mentioned, Mr. Secretary, as I was perusing my bookshelf, I came upon a very brilliant edition called ‘‘Keeping the 

Edge: Managing Defense for the Future,’’ edited by one Ashton B. 

Carter and John P. White. 

And there is a particular chapter talking about the technological 

edge that I had made some notes in, where essentially, it said two 

of the things we have to do to maintain the technological edge is 

to align our defense procurement practices with market forces, and 

secondly, to remain the world’s fastest integrator of commercial 

technology into defense systems. 

I kind of wonder how we are doing these days. I think that is 

very relevant for today. I just had a meeting with one of the leading defense thinkers last week that talked about the challenge of 

integrating commercial technology into defense articles and how we 

are not doing as well as we should. 

As you know, reform is a major priority of this committee on both 

sides of the aisle. Mr. Smith certainly shares my concern, as do, I 

think, all the members here. And so that is one of the topics that 

we want to talk with you about. 

There are many others, including the President’s request for the 

authorization to use military force against ISIS [Islamic State of 

Iraq and Syria]. We have had several sessions on that with a lot 

of concerns with the wording that has come to us from the administration, and I know members will want to ask questions about that 

and other topics. 

Before we get to those, let me talk—let me yield to the distinguished ranking member sit-in for today, the distinguished gentlelady from California, Mrs. Davis, for any comments she would like 

to make. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN A. DAVIS, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Carter, Chairman Dempsey, thank you both for being 

here today. 

I want to first send our best wishes to the ranking member, 

Adam Smith. We all know that he has been through a difficult 

time, and we wish him a quick and a speedy recovery. 

I want to ask unanimous consent that we put his remarks and 

his opening statement into the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 63.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Chairman Dempsey, this will likely be your last time 

before this committee. We are probably going to find some excuse 

to get you back, I am sure. 
3 

While I am sure you aren’t too broken up about not coming back, 

we will surely miss your thoughtful discourse and your care of our 

young service members. Thank you very much, sir, for your service. 

And Secretary Carter, I bet you would rather have waited until 

after the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] was complete 

before coming up and speaking with us, but I think that it presents 

a great opportunity to help shape the budget during a very difficult 

time, and your expertise, your insights, are going to be very well 

received. Thank you, sir. 

Sequestration is obviously at the forefront of everyone’s minds. 

But we must also remember that we are still engaged in two conflicts, facing unconditional threats halfway around the world, while 

still battling suicide, sexual assault, and retention and recruitment 

issues here at home. 

But these are only a few of the discussion points that we face 

when looking at the budget. We have to look beyond just defense 

to the entire budget, and we realize that cuts to other portions of 

the Federal budget will affect the Department of Defense [DOD] 

more often than we realize. 

It was just yesterday that the secretaries and the service chiefs 

spoke about of those who consider going in to the service, roughly 

75 percent do not meet the requirements today. And we have to be 

mindful of that, and maybe that is what we call a whole-of-government approach to that particular issue. 

We must also ensure that this budget is in line with our national 

security strategy. We cannot address conflicts around the globe if 

our strategy is not in line with current threats and our budgetary 

situation. 

We should not be finding piecemeal ways of fixing these problems in our budget, but we really do, and I know the chairman believes in this, rolling all of our sleeves up, and working together in 

addressing sequestration as a whole. 

I look forward to both of your statements here today, as well as 

the opportunity for an honest and open dialogue. Thank you, again. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentlelady. 

Mr. Secretary, again, thank you for being here. Without objection 

your full written statement will be made part of the record. Please 

proceed. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ASHTON B. CARTER, SECRETARY 

OF DEFENSE 

Secretary CARTER. Thank you very much, Chairman Thornberry. 

Thank you, Congresswoman Davis, thank you also. 

And all the members of the committee, thank you for having me 

here today. It is a pleasure to be with you once again. 

I have had the opportunity to speak with many of you before, but 

this is my first time testifying as the Secretary of Defense. And I 

know that all of you, all of you on the committee, including the 23 

veterans on this committee, share the same devotion that I do to 

what is the finest fighting force the world has ever known. And to 

the defense of our great country. And I thank you for that. And I 

hope that my tenure as Secretary of Defense will be marked by 

partnership with you on their behalf. 
4 

I am here to present the President’s budget for the Department 

of Defense for this year, fiscal year 2016, and I strongly support 

the President in requesting a defense budget above the artificial 

caps of the Budget Control Act, that is, above so-called sequester 

levels, next year, and in the years thereafter. 

I also share the President’s desire to find a way forward that upholds the fundamental principles behind the Bipartisan Budget Act 

of 2013. And I support his commitment to vetoing any bill that 

locks in sequestration, because to do otherwise would be both unsafe and wasteful. 

The administration is therefore proposing to increase the defense 

budget in line with the projections submitted to Congress last year, 

halting the decline in defense spending imposed by the Budget 

Control Act, while giving us the resources we need to execute our 

Nation’s defense strategy. 

As the chairman noted, strategy comes first. And that is the appropriate way to think about the budget. 

But, and I want to be very clear about this, under sequestration, 

which is set to return in 197 days, our Nation will be less secure. 

And Mr. Chairman, as you and your colleagues have said, sequestration threatens our military’s readiness. It threatens the size 

of our warfighting forces, the capabilities of our air and naval 

fleets, and ultimately, the lives of our men and women in uniform. 

And the Joint Chiefs have said the same. 

And the great tragedy is that this corrosive damage to our national security is not a result of objective factors, logic, reason. Instead, sequester is purely the fallout of political gridlock. Its purpose was to compel prudent compromise on our long-term fiscal 

challenges. A compromise that never came. 

And this has been compounded in recent years, because the Defense Department has suffered a double whammy. The worst of 

both worlds, that has coupled mindless sequestration with constraints on our ability to reform. We need your help with both. 

And I know that Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, 

and others on this committee, are as dedicated to reform as I am. 

And I appreciate the—your dedication to it and the opportunity to 

work with you, because we at the Pentagon can and we must do 

better at getting value for the defense dollar. There are significant 

savings to be found across DOD, and we are committed to pursuing 

them. 

But at the same time, I have to note that in the past several 

years, painful but necessary reforms proposed by DOD, reforms involving elimination of overhead and unneeded infrastructure, retirement of older systems, and reasonable adjustments in compensation have been denied by Congress at the same time that sequestration has loomed. 

If confronted with sequestration-level budgets and continued obstacles to reform, I do not believe that we can simply keep making 

incremental cuts. We would have to change the shape and not just 

the size of our military, significantly impacting parts of our defense 

strategy. We cannot meet sequester with further half measures. 

As Secretary of Defense, I will not send troops into a fight with 

outdated equipment, inadequate readiness, or ineffective doctrine. 
5 

But everything else is on the table, including parts of our budget 

that have long been considered inviolate. 

This may lead to decisions that no Americans, including Members of Congress, want us to make. 

And, now, I am not afraid to ask the difficult questions. But if 

we are stuck with sequestration’s budget cuts over the long term, 

our entire Nation will have to live with the answers. So instead of 

sequestration, I urge you to embrace the alternative—building the 

force of the future. Powerful enough to underwrite our strategy. 

Equipped with boldly new technology as the chairman stressed. 

Leading in domains like cyber and space. Being lean and efficient 

throughout the enterprise. Showing resolve to friends and potential 

foes alike. And attracting and retaining the best Americans to our 

mission. Americans like the elite cyber-warriors I met last week 

when I visited our Cyber Command. That is the alternative that 

we can have without sequestration. 

So, Mr. Chairman, the world in 2014 was more complicated than 

anyone could have predicted. Given today’s security environment, 

the President’s proposed increase in defense spending over last 

year’s budget is responsible, prudent, and essential for providing 

our troops what they need and what they fully deserve. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Carter can be found in the 

Appendix on page 64.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. 

General Dempsey, I am not quite ready to let you go yet, so I 

am not gonna talk about this being one of your last hearings. But 

thank you for being here, and please make any oral comments you 

would like to make. 

STATEMENT OF GEN MARTIN E. DEMPSEY, USA, CHAIRMAN OF 

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

General DEMPSEY. Thank you, Chairman, Congresswoman Davis, 

distinguished members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to provide you an update on our Armed Forces and to discuss the defense budget for 2016. 

And I will add, it has been a rare privilege to have represented 

the Armed Forces of the United States, the men and women who 

serve around the world, before this committee to live up to our Article I, Section 8 responsibility together. And so, if this is my last 

hearing, I thank you for the opportunity, and if it is not, until we 

meet again. 

I would ask you, Chairman, to submit my written statement for 

the record, and I will defer the many—I will defer mention in my 

opening statement of the many security challenges we face because 

I am quite confident they will be addressed in questions. 

But I will say the global security environment is as uncertain as 

I have seen in my 40 years of service. And, we are at a point where 

our national aspirations are at risk of exceeding our available resources. 

We have heard the Congress loud and clear as it has challenged 

us to become more efficient and to determine the minimum essential requirements we need to do what the Nation asks us to do. 
6 

And PB16 [President’s budget for fiscal year 2016] is actually that 

answer. 

In my judgment this budget represents a responsible combination of capability, capacity, and readiness. It is what we need to remain at the bottom edge of manageable risk against our national 

security strategy. There is no slack. 

I have been here for 4 years now, and we have watched our 

budget authority decline. I am reporting to you today there is no 

slack, no margin left for error, nor for response to strategic surprise. 

Funding lower than PB16 and a lack of flexibility to make the 

internal reforms that we need to make will put us in a situation 

where we will have to adjust our national security strategy. That 

doesn’t mean it disappears in its entirety, but we will have to make 

some adjustments to the way we do business. 

You may decide that is a good thing. I will certainly be willing 

to have that conversation with you. 

For the past 25 years, the United States military has secured the 

global commons. We have deterred adversaries, we have reassured 

our allies, and we have responded to crises and to conflict principally by maintaining our presence abroad. It has been our strategy to shape the international environment by our forward presence and by building relationships with regional partners. 

In general terms, one third of our force is forward-deployed, one 

third has just returned, and the other third is preparing to go. 

Of necessity, even at that, there have been certain capabilities 

who actually operate half the time deployed and half the time back 

at home. And this, as you know, puts a significant strain on the 

men and women and their families who serve in those particular 

specialties. 

Sequestration will fundamentally and significantly change the 

way we deploy the force and the way we shape the security environment. We will be, at the end of the day, if sequestration is imposed, 20 percent smaller, and our forward presence will be reduced by more than a third. 

We will have less influence, and we will be less responsive. Conflict will take longer to resolve and will create more casualties and 

cost more. In an age when we are less certain about what will happen next, but I think we would agree, quite certain that it will happen more quickly, we will be further away and less ready than we 

need to be. Simply stated, sequestration will result in a dramatic 

change in how we protect our Nation and how we promote our national security interests. 

Mr. Chairman, members of this committee, our men and women 

in uniform are performing around the globe with extraordinary 

courage, character, and professionalism. We owe them and their 

families clarity and, importantly, predictability on everything from 

policy to compensation, health care, equipment, training, and readiness. 

Settling down uncertainty in our decision-making processes and 

getting us out of the cycle that we have been in, which has been 

one year at a time, will help us keep the right people, which, after 

all, is our decisive edge as a nation in our All-Volunteer Force, and 
7 

we will be able to maintain the military that the American people 

deserve and, frankly, expect. 

I am grateful for the continued support to our men in uniform— 

men and women in uniform from this committee and from the Congress of the United States, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Dempsey can be found in the 

Appendix on page 84.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. 

I might also note that we have Mr. Michael McCord, the Comptroller of the Department, who is available with us to answer questions. 

And Mr. McCord, I might just warn you that audit came up several times yesterday with the service chiefs, and if somebody else 

doesn’t ask about it, I am going to at the end, because there is concern that some of the defense-wide agencies are going to be the 

hold-up rather than the services. And we will get into that as appropriate. 

Mr. Secretary, I very much appreciate your willingness to work 

with us and the Senate on various reform issues. I think you make 

excellent points about the need to find greater efficiency in the Department. 

And again, thinking back to what you wrote 15 years ago, as the 

chairman just said, our security environment is incredibly more 

complicated than we could have imagined in the year 2000 when 

you wrote those words. 

And so it seems to me that even more than efficiency, some sort 

of reform, and especially reform in how we acquire goods and services, is needed to make the Department more agile, because there 

is no way we are going to predict what is happening. And if we— 

if it takes us 20 years to field a new system, there is no way we 

will be up with technology or meeting the threat. 

So the need for agility is even a higher priority, in my mind, 

than the need for efficiency. 

Do you have any comments about how that interplays? 

Secretary CARTER. I think that is very wise. 

It is not just about saving money; if we can’t keep up with the 

pace at which technology is changing in the world as a whole and 

we can’t turn technological corners faster than a typical program 

duration now in the Department of Defense, which lasts years and 

years and years, we are not going to be the most modern military. 

So it is not just a matter of saving money; it is a matter of being 

the best. And the word ‘‘agility’’ is a perfect one. 

Back when that was written, it was even apparent then, 15 years 

ago, that the era in which all the technology of consequence to defense was developed within the Department of Defense and within 

the United States, it was even apparent then that that era was 

coming to an end. 

Now a lot of technology of vital importance to defense is out 

there in the world. We need to be the fastest and the first to have 

it in order to keep up with and keep ahead of all our opponents. 

So I couldn’t agree with you more. 

The CHAIRMAN. And let me ask about one other area of reform. 

A number of people are concerned about the reductions in end 

strength for especially the Army and the Marine Corps. And yet as 
8 

one looks at the Pentagon, you haven’t seen commensurate reductions in the number of folks who work there. 

And so there is interest, including from a number of people who 

come out of the Obama administration, to streamline the bureaucracy in the Department and thin out some of those layers that add 

cost and time to—that affect this agility we were talking about. 

Is that something that is on your radar screen, and is there a 

chance we could work together to give you some authorities to 

move folks around but have the effect of thinning that out and lowering the bureaucratic hassles? 

Secretary CARTER. I would very much welcome and appreciate 

your help in that regard. 

Now, a lot of that is on us, and we need to do it ourselves. But 

in many cases, we would benefit from legislative help. 

But if—as you used the example of end strength, if all we are 

doing in a period of straightened budget is shrinking tooth and the 

tail remains the same size, that is an unjustifiable way of managing the place. 

So we have gotta, gotta, gotta get after these headquarters, these 

offices that were set up once upon a time, seemed like a good idea 

at the time, but have lost their purpose or lost their way or lost 

their vitality, and we need to be aggressive with ourselves and rigorous. 

So I would very much appreciate your help and working with 

you. And I don’t know who those people are that you said, but I 

associate myself with them, if that is the—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I think there is interest on that on both 

sides of the aisle, again, and we look forward to working with you. 

Mr. Chairman, let me just ask you one question. When you were 

kind enough to be with us at our retreat, and you said we could 

quote you—that the President’s budget level was the lower ragged 

edge of what it takes to defend the country. The President has requested $561 billion in base, $51 billion in OCO [overseas contingency operations] for a total of $612 billion 

when you put it together. 

Is it still your opinion that that is the bare minimum. I don’t 

want to put words in your mouth, but how would you describe how 

that figure, $612 billion, meets the national security needs of the 

country for the coming fiscal year? 

General DEMPSEY. Thank you, Chairman. 

As I mentioned at our retreat, or your retreat where you were 

kind enough to invite me, the strategy that we developed in 2012, 

if you recall, we submitted a budget to support that strategy in 

2012 and then in 2013 and 2014, and the budget has been continually pushing down from that level at which we said we could 

achieve our strategy at moderate risk. 

We are now at the point where the risk to the strategy has increased. And what we are reporting to you, as a group of Joint 

Chiefs, is that we have reached the edge of that. 

So anything below that level of budget support, however you 

choose to knit it together for the total amount, will cause us to 

have to adjust our strategy. It is as simple as that. 

Some of those adjustments will not be life-altering, if you will, 

or security-environment altering, and some very well may be. 
9 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In line I think with the discussion that we are going to have 

today, could you go back and be a little more specific in terms of 

not just the authorities that you need but flexibility? How can we 

get that best value for the dollar that you were suggesting? What 

is it that—what is it that the Congress has denied, actually, in 

terms of that flexibility in the past, and what would you like to 

see? How can we best work together on that? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, thank you, and I will give you some examples. And I realize this is not a popularity contest, in terms of 

these proposals. Because they are tough things to do. And that is 

why there has been debate over them. 

Mrs. DAVIS. That is why you are here. 

Secretary CARTER. I think that is why we are all here. We have 

to do what we have to do for the country’s defense. But it is tough. 

And it falls into three categories. And I am using the categories 

that I have learned from the chairman. One is in the acquisition 

area, where we need to have the discipline to stop things that 

aren’t working. To not pretend that something is going to work 

when it isn’t, just to keep going. That we can afford it, when we 

can’t, just to keep going. Then we have to stop it and all the money 

on it has been wasted. 

So in the acquisition area there is a lot—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. Is there one particular area that when you make 

that statement, that you are thinking about, that needs work? 

Secretary CARTER. Yes, I—well, there is—one is the process and 

the paperwork, which is ridiculous, and which leads to these perverse results. Because the system can sort of keep suggesting to 

itself that it is doing the right thing. 

And the other thing is the incentives that we—remember we 

don’t do anything in the Pentagon—we don’t build anything in the 

Pentagon. We contract out to our excellent industry. So we depend 

upon our industry and the incentives that we give them that to 

provide what we need that are included in contracts and other relationship is another place that is critical to think about in the area 

of acquisition. 

Then there is compensation, how we compensate our troops, our 

retirees, families, all very important, very sensitive issues. But an 

important part of our spending. 

And then a third is the one the chairman was mentioning a moment ago which is kind of the overhead—the people overhead, the 

facilities infrastructure, and I know base closings are not a wonderfully popular thing either. 

But at some point, when the budget comes down, you need to 

make sure that you are taking away the tail the same way you 

take away the tooth. 

So I would—I organize it in those three categories which I think 

are the same ones that the chairman does. But these are difficult 

choices, there is no question about it. We can only do these things 

when we do them together. I know they are hard. 

Mrs. DAVIS. And, General, did you want to comment on that, as 

well? And flexibility for the service chiefs, I know that there is 
10 

some concern that Goldwater-Nichols has created some constraints, 

and perhaps it is time to address those. 

General DEMPSEY. Well, speaking as a former service chief, the 

service chiefs have been uniquely limited in their influence over the 

acquisition process in terms of identifying requirements, and then 

it passes into the acquisition community. You know, neither side 

is trying to in some way limit the other. But there is no kind of 

life-cycle responsibility. 

So the requirements grow, and the procurement timelines 

stretch. And I will just give you an example. Many of you in this 

room probably have an iPhone, iPhone 6, I would imagine. Well, 

the first iPhone was introduced to the market 8 years ago. So in 

8 years, we have got six variations of iPhone. That is not the way 

we deliver our information technologies. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Go on to other members. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentlelady. 

Mr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

And, General Dempsey, thank you for your service. 

And to Secretary Carter, welcome to this hearing today and your 

new leadership of our Nation and our military. And I want to 

thank you. 

I would like to start with an article that I read back in December 

this year, and then get to a question. The article is titled ‘‘Down 

the Opium Rat Hole.’’ If you have spent 13 years pounding money 

down a rat hole with little to show for it, you might wake up one 

morning and say, ‘‘Hey, I am going to stop pounding money down 

the rat hole.’’ 

Unfortunately, the United States Government does not think 

that way. And when that rat hole is Afghanistan, the billions are 

essentially without end. 

Mr. Secretary, when I listen to all the threats to a strong military, and I have Camp Lejeune down in my district and Cherry 

Point Marine Air Station. And I think about all the problems we 

are faced with, it brings me to this question: We have 9 years of 

an obligation, an agreement, that was not voted on by the Congress 

and of course the President did not have to bring it to the Congress, I understand that, so I am not being critical, but here we are 

in a almost desperate situation to fund our military so we will have 

an adequate and strong military, and then you read articles like 

this, and there is one more that came out this week that says, this 

is from John Sopko, by the way, ‘‘Afghanistan cannot manage billions in aid, U.S. inspector finds.’’ 

There are people on this committee in both parties, and we have 

met unofficial I with Mr. Sopko for 2 years and listened to him, 

and I am going to ask you and Mr. McCord how in the world can 

we, for 9 more years, continue to spend millions and billions of dollars in a country that we have very little accountability? 

And we had General Campbell here last week, and I was very 

impressed with him. Let me make that clear. But the point is that 

we will continue to put money down the rat hole and never say 

that it is time to stop putting money in the rat hole. 
11 

Why in the world can’t an administration, and I would say this 

if you were Secretary of Defense with George Bush or the next 

President, whomever it might be, why can’t people like yourself, 

sir, be honest with the American people who pay our salaries, who 

pay for the military, and say, ‘‘You know what? We need to rethink 

where we are. We need to have a benchmark. We need to say in 

3 years, if this has not been accomplished, and we have not reduced the waste of money, then we might need to change our policy 

and start pulling out’’? 

I want to ask you, sir, with Mr. McCord there, are you going to 

bring in John Sopko and these other people to tell you about the 

absolutely waste of money in Afghanistan that is taking away from 

us rebuilding our military? 

Secretary CARTER. Well thank you for that, Congressman, and 

your very straightforward question. I will try to give you a very 

straightforward and honest answer. There are kind of two parts to 

it. 

One is, the effectiveness and the controls on contingency contracting in Afghanistan and before that in Iraq. There were and 

persist issues with contingency contracting, going back years now. 

And I know that Mr. Sopko tracks them. 

And I remember when I was Under Secretary for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics, the difficulties in teaching our people to 

do contingency contracting in such a way that there were always— 

that contracts were awarded properly. That they were overseen 

when they were being executed. And that was not happening in Afghanistan in many places. 

I think the Department has improved over these long years of 

war, but it is not perfect yet by any means. It is not where it 

should be. So I want to associate myself with your argument. I 

guess, indirectly, and Mr. Sopko’s, we have got some work to do. 

On the strategic question of Afghanistan, I would say the following: I—it, to me, ‘‘rat hole’’ doesn’t quite capture where we are 

in Afghanistan. I certainly hope that where we are in Afghanistan 

is that we are going to be able over the next couple of years to increasingly turn the security, the basic security for that place, over 

to the Afghan security forces that we have built in such a way that 

it doesn’t—that country doesn’t pose a threat to the United States 

anymore, which is the reason we got in there in the first place. 

Now that is a difficult task. General Campbell is doing it as well 

as anyone can possibly expect. And we have in President Ghani in 

Afghanistan one new ingredient, which is a very bright one. This 

is somebody who, when I visited in my first week in office, Kabul, 

the first thing he said to me was, would you please go back and 

thank Americans, and especially thank American service members, 

for what they have done here and are doing here in Afghanistan? 

That is a whole different atmosphere. 

And so, in partnership with him over the next couple of years, 

our objective is to stand the Afghan security forces up on their feet, 

so that we can have a very small presence there in the future, not 

the big force we have had, and leave it in a circumstance where 

it doesn’t threaten us anymore. That is the plan we have. And, you 

know, you can never say a plan is 100 percent probability of being 
12 

successful but I think this has a high probability of being successful. And Ghani is an important new ingredient in that. 

Mr. JONES. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, we have got the largest committee in 

Congress. In order to get everybody a chance to ask questions, I am 

going to ask members to limit their time to 5 minutes. If at any 

point you need to supplement and add because if a question lasts 

3 minutes and you have got 2 minutes to answer it it puts you in 

a tough position. So feel free to add any that you need to at the 

end. 

Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, thank you for coming 

today. 

Secretary Carter, it was a pleasure working with you in the past 

and I am glad to have you back. As I mentioned in the service 

chiefs and secretaries hearing yesterday, I appreciate your sharing 

the dangers of sequestration. It is a short-sighted policy that undermines our Nation’s ability to project power, work with our 

friends and allies, and protect our citizens, and I hope that our 

Congress can show the courage to repeal this bill. 

Now while our Nation faces challenges across the globe we have 

made strategic choices in developing a focus in the Asia-Pacific region. Mr. Secretary, it is my understanding that in many areas 

such as infrastructure, maintenance, when we take cuts today we 

end up paying far more in the future. 

Can you talk about areas where we would likely see increased future cost, if sequestration cuts funding today? 

And if you could, make your answers brief, please. 

Secretary CARTER. I will give you one simple example of why sequestration is wasteful, as well as damaging to security. And that 

is when we are forced by the suddenness of it to curtail the number 

of things of the overall size of our procurement in such a way that 

we drive up unit costs or we prolong the duration of a contract. 

And you all know that a short-term contract you pay more for than 

a long-term contract. That is the kind of thing we are driven to by 

sequester. 

And it is obvious to anybody who has contracted with somebody 

to get their lawn mowed or something, that that is economically inefficient. So it is more than strategically dangerous as the chairman rightly said, it is wasteful, which is not what people want. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much. Also I have another question for you. Can you comment on how, broadly speaking, the fiscal 

year 2016 budget supports the strategic rebalance to the AsiaPacific region? 

How important was removal of the restrictions on the government of Japan funds for the relocation of the Marines in last year’s 

defense bill? 

And also, are you looking to activate the Guam Oversight Committee, which I felt was a helpful Internet tool to the DOD? 

And how is revision of the U.S.-Japan defense guidelines going 

and how important is that to our bilateral relationship with Japan? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, thank you. 
13 

Just the Asia-Pacific so-called rebalance is central to our strategy. That is where half of humanity lives. That is where half of the 

economy of the world is. And you know, one of the—strategy means 

keeping everything in perspective. And while we are focused as we 

need to be on ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant], Afghanistan, which is already mentioned, Ukraine and other trouble spots 

elsewhere in the world, we have to remember that this is where 

much of our future lies. 

And the American military presence there has been the central 

factor that has kept peace and stability and therefore prosperity 

going in that region. We need to keep that going—and you mentioned Japan and the revision of the guidelines there. This is an 

extremely important development. 

And by the way, Prime Minister Abe will be visiting the United 

States shortly. This is an opportunity for Japan to become a—help 

us maintain the peace in the Asia-Pacific region, but the guidelines 

are global in scope. So it gives a military that is quite capable in 

Japan and a country that shares a lot of our strategic objectives 

and basic values a new way of helping us out in the region and 

around the world. It is a very positive thing. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Secretary. My time is almost out so I don’t have time for the third question. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentlelady. 

Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Dempsey, we—the country owes you a great deal of 

gratitude. We thank you for your service, all you have done for this 

committee and for the country. 

Mr. Secretary, we thank you for being here today and it was my 

full intention to come in here and applaud you and talk about how 

talented you were, which I believe that to be the case, and realize 

what a difficult job you have until I heard your opening remarks. 

And let me just ask this question, because you heard Chairman 

Thornberry mention the phrase that if we get the—anything below 

the President’s budget, that we would go below the lower ragged 

edge of what we need for national defense. 

Do you agree with that? 

Secretary CARTER. I do. 

Mr. FORBES. And would you therefore say if we are going below 

that lower ragged edge, that it would be a crisis for national defense if we went to sequestration, as opposed to the budget the 

President’s proposed? 

So that would be yes? 

Secretary CARTER. Yes, yes. 

Mr. FORBES. Would you also say that that would be devastating 

to defense if we went there? 

Secretary CARTER. Devastating. 

Mr. FORBES. Then help me with this, because what really took 

me back is when you said that you supported the President’s position to veto any bill that didn’t do away with sequestration, because you do understand that the President’s position is that he 

would veto any bill that doesn’t do away with sequestration, not 

just for national defense, but also for everything else. 
14 

Do you understand that is the President’s position? 

Secretary CARTER. I do. 

Mr. FORBES. So then what you are telling me as the Secretary 

of Defense, you would be prepared to support a veto that would end 

up with a crisis for national defense and be devastating to national 

defense, unless the President can also get all the funding he needs 

for EPA [Environmental Protection Agency], IRS [Internal Revenue 

Service], and all the other nondefense items that he has proposed 

in the budget. 

Is that your position? 

Secretary CARTER. What we need for defense, Congressman 

Forbes, is two things. We need stability—— 

Mr. FORBES. And that is not my question. I don’t mean to cut you 

off. But as the chairman said, I only have 5 minutes. 

I just need to have you tell this committee that as the Secretary 

of Defense you are coming in here today and saying that unless the 

President gets a full sequestration taking off the limits of spending 

that he has on EPA, IRS, and other nondefense matters, you would 

rather have a crisis when it comes to national defense funding? 

Secretary CARTER. No, that is not—— 

Mr. FORBES. Then would you support a bill that this committee 

would pass that would do away with sequestration for national defense only? 

Secretary CARTER. No, the President—no, I would not. 

Mr. FORBES. So then you would support—— 

Secretary CARTER [continuing]. I will tell you why. I will tell you 

why. We need relief from sequestration across the board. Every 

other manager of an agency in the government—— 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Secretary, you are not managing all these other 

agencies. You are coming in here today telling us that you would 

be prepared to accept a crisis for national defense unless the President gets the funding he needs for EPA or the Internal Revenue 

Service or all these other programs he has across the country? 

Secretary CARTER. No, I—no, Congressman. I take a view of national defense and national security that is—that takes into account the fact that to protect ourselves and as part of security, we 

need the Department of Homeland Security—— 

Mr. FORBES. I am not saying that. But I am saying you don’t necessarily need the Internal Revenue Service—— 

Secretary CARTER. We need our law enforcement agencies. 

Well, I think each of those budgets can be looked at in their own 

terms. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Secretary you are the expert on defense and 

what we need is that testimony today. 

And what bothers me is when you will come in here and say that 

you would rather have a crisis in national defense, which is what 

the President is saying, by the way, than to cut or have a cap on 

any nondefense spending that could be in anywhere else in the government. And I just find that a travesty. 

Let me just say this—— 

Secretary CARTER. I think what the President is saying, Congressman, and which I agree with, is that we need relief from sequester across the board. It is no way to run—— 

Mr. FORBES. But you are the expert on defense. 
15 

Secretary CARTER [continuing]. A government—— 

Mr. FORBES. And we may argue on IRS or EPA but what we 

need is when you come in here as Secretary of Defense to tell us 

that you are not willing to accept a crisis in national defense if you 

can’t get everything you want with the IRS or EPA, some of these 

other funding programs. 

And just to put it on the line, when you talked about the flexibility that you need in Department of Defense, let’s just recognize 

also, that sometimes Congress has to hold up flexibility. If we 

would have given it to the Pentagon in the 1980s we wouldn’t have 

stealth platforms, we wouldn’t have precision munitions, we probably wouldn’t have jointness and also sometimes when you talk 

about these outside cuts to facilities, remember what we did to the 

Joint Forces Command. 

Oh, we cut that down and said we are going to save all the 

money. All we did is take all those jobs and centralize them in the 

Pentagon and the Joint Staff. So we need to make sure, Mr. Secretary—and I just say this with all due respect, that we are dealing 

with a crisis we have in national defense. That is what this committee should be about. That is what the Pentagon should be 

about. And we shouldn’t have to hinge all of that on what happens 

to the Internal Revenue Service or the EPA. 

And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And welcome, Secretary Carter. It is great to have you, and I 

look forward to working with you, and have appreciated your insight and knowledge just in the brief testimony you have been able 

to make today. 

And, Chairman Dempsey, it is always great to see you. And, as 

we may not see you again, I just want to reiterate again how much 

I have appreciated your always candid, forthcoming testimony before this committee. 

And just to address briefly the issue of sequestration, I too share 

the view you have, Secretary Carter, that we have to deal with it 

across the board. As we know, how we defend our country does not 

exist in isolation. I come from a State that is heavily invested in 

education and it is that educated community that leads so often on 

developing all the technologies that all the service chiefs have acknowledged are very important to how we move forward in defending our country as we remain very agile. 

So, to protect our country as well as we want to, we have to invest in our minds as much as anything else. So it all is all very 

much linked. And I appreciate your acknowledging of that. 

But 2 weeks ago, this committee had the chance to discuss the 

proposed AUMF [authorization for the use of military force] against 

ISIL with General Austin and Secretary Wormuth, so I thank you 

both for your presence here today to continue that discussion. 

And at that hearing, I asked General Austin about the complexity of the challenges that the United States has to address to 

successfully confront ISIL. I liken it to a multidimensional chess 

game. And nowhere is that more apparent than in Tikrit, where recent news reports detail Iran’s involvement in training and equip-
16 

ping Shia militias in support of the Iraqi government efforts to retake that city. 

Iraq’s engagement, I think, highlights the complexity of the challenge, rooted as it is in a highly complex region, and underscores 

the need for Congress to weigh in and think through the assistance 

that we are providing to the Iraqi government as well as other 

partners. 

So with that in mind, Secretary Carter, how does Iran’s engagement with the Iraqi government and its military efforts—the Iraqi 

government military efforts to confront ISIL complicate our efforts 

to ensure a pluralistic order? As we know, it was the Maliki government’s unwillingness to create an inclusive governing structure 

that created the opening for ISIL. So as the Iraqi government seeks 

out Iran’s help and is receiving it, how do you see it complicating 

our efforts going forward? 

And then, General Dempsey, how does it complicate our military 

efforts? 

Secretary CARTER. It can complicate our efforts, and that is why 

we need to watch this very closely, because, as you say, it is sectarianism which brought the Iraqi security forces to the low point 

that led to their rout last summer in the first place. And we are 

supporting a government of Iraq that is multi-sectarian and that 

encompasses the entire country. That is our preference. 

And so, our preference is that all operations to combat ISIL, 

which we obviously support, are conducted with the knowledge and 

authority of the Iraqi government. And we support them in doing 

that. When there are others who are conducting operations without 

the authority of the Iraqi government, that is the face of sectarianism rising again in Iraq. 

Ms. TSONGAS. So, I am sorry, are you saying—— 

Secretary CARTER. And we are very concerned about that. 

Ms. TSONGAS. So, are you saying what is happening in Tikrit is 

without the authority of the Iraqi government, independent of it? 

Secretary CARTER. No, I am not. But you are asking me would 

I be concerned about a purely sectarian military activity there, and 

I would be concerned about that. And I am concerned that the Iraqi 

government be controlling and the Iraqi security forces be controlling in directing all military activity on Iraqi soil, and that is why 

the nature of some of the militia activities and so forth is so concerning to us. 

Ms. TSONGAS. General Dempsey. 

General DEMPSEY. In terms of how it complicates things militarily, you know, we are building the Iraqi security forces to contribute to inclusivity. And they are being the kind of internal 

media blitz by the Popular Mobilization Forces has made them popular because they did succeed in pushing back on ISIL in and 

around Tikrit, although they are not having as much success as I 

think they initially reported. 

So we have the issue of trying to make sure the Iraqi security 

forces remain the force for stability in the future and not this mobilization force. 

And, secondly, there is just an issue of deconflicting space—air 

space, ground space and decision space. And so, yes, it does make 

it complicated. 
17 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you. 

My time is up. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you for being here today. General Dempsey, your 

service to our country, we appreciate so much and wish you well 

in the future. 

And Secretary Carter, best wishes for success in your position. 

I am very pleased, in a way, to see the concern being expressed 

about defense sequestration, because many of us have been talking 

about this for the last 2 years. And we have—and, in particular, 

General, thank you for pointing out the issue of readiness, putting 

our troops at risk. 

And this needs to be addressed, but it should also be put in the 

context that actually Bob Woodward, the very respected journalist, 

in his books, ‘‘The Price of Politics,’’ identified that this was the 

President’s policy. And so, I believe that I hope he makes every effort to change that policy because the consequence was revealed 

yesterday by Secretary James, and that is that we will have the 

smallest Air Force since it was created in 1947, the smallest Army 

since 1939, the smallest Navy since 1916. 

I believe the American people are at risk and this needs to be 

addressed. And it should be pointed out, and I don’t want to finger 

point, and we don’t need to get to that, but the facts are clear. The 

House Republicans twice voted to address defense sequestration, 

but it was never taken up by the former U.S. Senate. 

As we look at the world today, I am very concerned. General 

Jack Keane testified earlier this year about the spread of radical 

Islam across North Africa, Central Africa, the Middle East, Central 

Asia. And I am just so concerned that safe havens are being created, which can attack the American people. And in light of that, 

in fact, Boko Haram last week, Mr. Secretary, indicated that they 

would be a part of ISIL, Daesh [Arabic acronym for ISIL]. What is 

our policy to address this particular situation in Central Africa? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, you are—as you say, the ISIL phenomenon is metastasizing. There are groups, and Boko Haram or 

some parts of Boko Haram may be one of them, that are rebranding themselves as ISIL, joining ISIL, getting a new lease on 

life by affiliating with this movement. 

And it is the ability of this movement to spread through social 

media, to motivate younger members of groups that already existed, radical groups that already existed, but whose younger members are particularly attracted to the ISIL ideology, that makes it 

so dangerous and makes it so important to combat it wherever it 

arises. 

Mr. WILSON. And I—has there been any progress on releasing 

the kidnapped young girls in the region? 

Secretary CARTER. You are speaking of the ones that were kidnapped some time ago. 

Mr. WILSON. Yes, by Boko Haram. 

Secretary CARTER. Yes, I think the best I can say about that in 

here is that we continue to assist in trying to locate them and return them to their homes. But that that effort still continues. 
18 

Mr. WILSON. It is such a clear indication of the barbarity of the 

people that we are facing. 

I want to commend you in regard to your visit to Afghanistan. 

You expressed concern about a drawdown and how it should be 

conditions-based, and then action has been properly taken. 

What are the conditions that you are looking at in regard to the 

drawdown? 

Secretary CARTER. There are conditions on the ground in terms 

of the strength of the Afghan security forces, the performance of 

those Afghan security forces. They are conducting operations, as we 

speak, in the Helmand Valley, which are very impressive and unprecedented in the scale and complexity of an operation that the 

Afghan security forces do by themselves. They are absorbing 

enablers, and so they are beginning to—the Afghan forces—operate 

independently. And that is one set of conditions that are very important. 

Another one I mentioned earlier is the successful creation of a 

national unity government with President Ghani and CEO [Chief 

Executive Officer] Abdullah—their willingness and ability to do 

that and what that could mean for the political development and 

coherence of Afghanistan. 

So there are both things at the military level over there and 

things at the political level, both of which are change—a very different circumstance from a year ago or 2 years ago. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Duckworth. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And General Dempsey, I join my colleagues in sending you warm 

wishes your way and thanking you for your many, many years of 

serving our great Nation. 

Mr. McCord, I would like to chat with you a little bit about the 

proposed budget that is upcoming. The House Budget Committee 

chairman has proposed boosting the fiscal year 2016 defense budget with an increase of OCO allocation. Is an OCO dollar just as 

useful for the Department as a base budget dollar? In other words, 

should there be limitations on OCO funding that Congress needs 

to be mindful of? 

Secretary MCCORD. Congressman, both dollars are useful to us 

if they are provided for the purposes for which, you know, they are 

intended and needed. We don’t need $36 billion or $38 billion extra 

OCO. We need that money in the base budget, but they are both 

useful to use and both have restrictions in law and in regulation. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. So if you had your druthers, you would rather 

have that—those dollars be in the regular budget as opposed to 

OCO funding? Is that correct? Mr. Secretary, do you want to speak 

to that? 

Secretary CARTER. Absolutely. That is where we asked for it. 

That is where we need it. That is where we have identified the 

needs. And that also, and this is very important and this gets back 

to the earlier discussion of sequester, if it is in the base budget, it 

is the base upon which we build our future budgets. And we need 

stability. We need a horizon so that we know what our budget is 
19 

going to be not only this year, but in years to come. Otherwise, we 

can’t spend it efficiently and we can’t spend it strategically. 

So that is—we need that kind of horizon. And sequester is what 

robs us of that. And that is why it is bad in a managerial sense 

for anybody who has their budget sequestered. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. General Dempsey, do you want to speak to that 

and perhaps its effect on readiness? 

General DEMPSEY. Well, as you know, we have been trying to dig 

out of a readiness hole. We said 3 or 4 years ago that if the wars 

in Iraq and Afghanistan ended then, it would take us 3 or 4 years 

to recover our readiness. Because we were ready for 10 years for 

a particular kind of conflict, which you know better than most. And 

so we had to kind of recapture our credentials for other kinds of 

military missions, to include high-end. 

And sequestration when it hit us last time, readiness tends to 

suffer a deeper impact because you have to go get the money where 

you can get it. And you can’t—in some cases, you can’t get it in 

manpower. You can’t shed it quickly enough. You can’t shed excess 

infrastructure quickly enough. You sometimes can’t terminate contracts because of the penalties involved. 

You end up taking more than you should out of readiness. So, 

yes, I do think readiness always suffers more than we think. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you. 

Mr. Secretary, I, you know, I share the concerns of my colleagues 

and other defense officials in terms of the detriment of sequestration. But I also am interested in implications for money that is also 

spent in wasteful and inefficient ways. Specifically, I am thinking 

about the fact that we really don’t know the kind of money that 

we are spending when it comes to service contractors. And there 

is still yet to be enterprise-wide contract manpower reporting application in DOD. Under your own documentation, I believe the goal 

was to have 95 [percent] compliance by 2018. I don’t think you are 

probably going to make that goal. 

So despite the numerous commitments from senior-level DOD officials, can you tell me when you will re-start work on the ECMRA 

[Enterprise-wide Contractor Manpower Reporting Application]; 

when you are going to use accepted Army methodology; and when 

will you be insisting on compliance from the components and agencies to ensure that inventory is used to inform and review decisionmakings on taxpayer dollars spend in the Department? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, thank you for that. And some of the detail I will have to supply to you separately. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. That is fine. 

Secretary CARTER. But the general point that you are raising is 

our tradecraft and excellence in the acquisition of services. And I 

will just say something for everyone’s benefit that you know, which 

is half of the money that DOD contracts is not for goods. It is for 

services. And so as we talk about acquisition reform and improving 

our game, we need to improve how we acquire services as well. And 

the initiatives you cite are some of the ways in which we are trying 

to improve our performance and our tradecraft in the acquisition 

of services because that is half of our spend. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Right. And I will give you that—or the question for answering on the record. 
20 

Secretary CARTER. Will do. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, Mr. Chairman, thank you for being here. Thank 

you for all your hard and diligent work. 

Mr. Secretary, welcome. We are all very pleased and very happy 

that you are in your position. You do have very difficult times and 

issues as the chairman was indicating in the world view that we 

see in front of us. 

We need some plain answers and talk on the issue of this budget. 

Chairman Dempsey, you and I as you were walking in had a brief 

conversation about this. So let me tell you where we are and then 

tell you why we need your help. 

Right now, the President had submitted a budget that had a base 

amount of $561 [billion] and our Budget Committee is currently 

marking up a budget with a base of $523. They are indicating that 

they want to make up the difference to that jagged edge of the lowered number, as you said, Mr. Chairman, by OCO, so that the aggregate number, as you said, Mr. Chairman, would be somewhere 

around $613. 

You sort of said, however you cobble it together, but how you cobble it together does make a difference. And I would like you guys 

to help us with this. I have told the Budget Committee that making it up with OCO does not work. Seventy members of the House 

signed a letter and sent it to the Budget Committee asking to 

honor the base budget number of $561 that the President asked 

for. 

What I have said to the Budget Committee is that they should 

ask you guys. So this is my asking you guys; help us. 

So Mr. Secretary, you said that, one, it affects because based 

upon—this is the basis upon which you build your next budget. 

That is certainly important. But we don’t need to hear that it is 

an issue of ‘‘rather.’’ I think there are structural issues, as Ms. 

Duckworth was going to, that are important that could impede 

your ability to access those funds. 

One, the National Defense Authorization Act isn’t marked up 

until December. Your fiscal year begins in the fall. Tell us why a 

base of $523 with an OCO of $90-plus billion doesn’t work? Or, you 

are going to be facing that. 

Secretary CARTER. I will start first, and then the chairman. 

It doesn’t work because to have the defense we need and the 

strategy that we have laid out, we need the budget that we have 

laid out not just in one year, but in the years to come. And so, 

budgeting one year at a time, and this proposal is a one-year-ata-time thing, doesn’t work for national defense. It is not going to 

permit us to carry out the strategy as we have planned. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Secretary, one more thing, to jump in, because 

you have said that point before. You said that the President would 

veto a bill that legislates sequestration. If we pass a budget that 

has $523 as the base and we send you a National Defense Author-
21 

ization Act that is a base of $523 with OCO of $90-plus billion, is 

that within that veto threat? 

Secretary CARTER. I think what the President meant was that a 

budget that did not relieve sequestration—that is, give a multiyear 

perspective for the budget, he would veto not just for defense, but 

as has been mentioned earlier, for others as well. 

Mr. TURNER. Okay. Now, getting to, Mr. Chairman, OCO, Mr. 

Secretary, there are restrictions. If we don’t lift those restrictions 

in our bill, the NDAA doesn’t get passed until December and your 

fiscal year begins before that. Won’t you have a period of time, almost a quarter of a year, where you can’t use the money? 

Secretary MCCORD. Yes. If this is done without an appropriation 

that is in line with it, you are right. We would have that problem. 

And I think your earlier point, too, the question about whether this 

approach being proposed by the House committee would be acceptable to the Senate, to the President; the uncertainty about whether 

this would even work for this year, is another one of the problems 

with that approach. 

Mr. TURNER. So you guys have got 40 more seconds. If you want 

to tell the Congress why they shouldn’t do this, you should do it 

now. Because otherwise, you will be facing this. 

General DEMPSEY. I am not going to tell the Congress why they 

shouldn’t do it; the Congress makes its own decisions with my advice. 

My advice is that we need to fix our base budget, because you 

build the institution through the base budget, and you respond to 

contingencies with the fund called Other Contingency Operations. 

We submit a 1-year budget but in the context of a 5-year Future 

Defense Plan, and we won’t have the kind of certainty we need 

over that period if the current strategy is followed. 

But look, as you heard the service chief say, you know, we are 

at the point where this is better than nothing, but frankly, it 

doesn’t do what we should be doing for defense in a predictable 

fashion. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I would mention to the gentleman, it is going to 

be before December before we have a defense authorization bill this 

year. Senator McCain and I are determined to move—I know it is 

different than we have had in the past, but it is going to move a 

whole lot quicker. 

Mr. O’Rourke. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, you said in your opening comments that you 

would never send our men and women into harm’s way without the 

necessary readiness, the necessary equipment, and the necessary 

doctrine. I think you would also agree that we shouldn’t send them 

in harm’s way without the necessary strategy. 

I am having a difficult time in light of the 6 months during 

which we have been at war in Iraq and Syria against ISIS and in 

light of the President’s authorization for the use of military force, 

or AUMF, that is now before this Congress for consideration. 

I am having a very hard time understanding what the strategy 

is, and I want to make sure that—as my colleagues have said, that 

we fund our military well beyond the budget caps and sequester 
22 

levels—I agree with them there—but I think, perhaps more importantly, that we have the necessary strategy in place so that their 

efforts, those men and women serving this country and our interests overseas are not in vain. 

Could you answer the strategy question for me? 

Secretary CARTER. Certainly, first of all, strategy is—does take 

a—in addition to geographic perspective, a multiyear perspective 

and a multiyear commitment, which is why annual budgetary turmoil isn’t consistent with our strategy in taking a strategic view. 

With respect to the strategy against ISIL, and defeating ISIL, in 

Iraq, the first thing I would say is that we not only need to defeat 

ISIL, we need to defeat them in a lasting manner. That is always 

the difficult part. 

We can defeat ISIL, but defeating them in a lasting manner 

means having somebody on the ground who keeps them defeated 

after we assist them in the defeat. 

On the Iraq side of the border, that is the Iraqi government, a 

multi-sectarian force organized by the Iraqi government. That is 

our strategic objective—— 

Mr. O’ROURKE [continuing]. To interrupt there, we will just take 

the Iraqi portion of this. 

From my understanding, based on the testimony from the excellent series of hearings that the chairman has brought before us, 

our strategy there largely relies on training, equipping, and advising the Iraqi national army. We have spent tens of billions of dollars doing just that from 2003 to 2010 to awful effect. The army 

melted in the face of a far inferior enemy. 

What is different about our strategy today that is going to ensure 

its success? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, it will hinge, as it did then, upon a 

multi-sectarian approach by the government of Iraq. Without that, 

it cannot succeed. 

And what happened to the Iraqi security forces a year ago was 

that they collapsed because sectarianism had taken root in the government of Iraq, and the people who lived in the regions that were 

swept over by ISIL were not willing to accept or support the Iraqi 

security forces, as they were then configured. 

They need to be configured in a non-sectarian manner—a multisectarian manner, or it won’t be possible to have that lasting defeat 

of ISIL on the Iraqi side of the border. It is as critical now as it 

was last year. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Mr. Secretary, with all due respect, the strategy 

insofar as we understand it today, I think, is insufficient to achieving the President’s aims of degrading and destroying ISIS, to your 

aims of ensuring a lasting defeat of ISIS. I think if we are honest 

with ourselves and the American public and the service members 

who will act out the policies of this country, if we are going to 

achieve those aims, we are going to need U.S. ground forces in Iraq 

and Syria. 

We cannot depend on a Syrian moderate opposition force. We 

cannot depend on the political whims of the different sectarian factions in Iraq. We should not depend on Iranian-backed Shia militias in that country as well. 
23 

If we are going to do this, let’s be honest about what it is going 

to take to do it. 

And with today’s topic of the budget in mind, do we have the resources necessary in the President’s request to support ground 

forces to achieve our tactical and strategic goals in Syria and Iraq 

vis-a-vis ISIS? 

Secretary CARTER. I will answer that first, and the chairman 

may want to add something to it. We do have the resources to support our strategy. 

The one ingredient, very important ingredient, that you left out 

was air power, and we are applying air power in a very effective 

way in support of ground forces that are not U.S. ground forces but 

that are local ground forces, because we want a lasting defeat of 

ISIL and only local forces on the ground can impose a lasting defeat. And that is our strategy. 

Chairman. 

General DEMPSEY. And if I could, just in the interest of time, 

Chairman, I will take this for the record, because I do think the 

strategic advantage we have is the coalition, and I think that will 

eventually be the path to enduring defeat. 

But I will take it for the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 102.] 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you both. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for 

being here. 

Secretary Carter, I want to start off with a shamelessly parochial 

issue. 

The AMPV [Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle] program, which I 

know you are familiar, is replacing the M113 combat vehicle, which 

is maintained at the Anniston Army Depot. I am very interested 

in seeing the AMPV maintained at the Anniston Army Depot. 

Do you know who is going to make that decision and when about 

where the source of repair is going to be made? 

Secretary CARTER. I do not know when that source selection will 

be made, but I will find out and make sure we get back to you. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you very much. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. ROGERS. General Dempsey, based on open-source reporting, 

Russia is planning to put tactical nuclear weapons in the illegally 

seized territory of Crimea. 

What is your best military advice as to how we as a nation 

should respond to that? 

General DEMPSEY. Well, there are several things. 

I saw the same open-source report. I haven’t seen it reflected in 

intelligence, and if I had, I would have suggested we would have 

this conversation in closed session. 

There are other things that Russia is doing that seem to be provocative in nature, and I think we have to make it very clear that 

things like their compliance with the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty—that there will be political, diplomatic, and 

potentially military costs in terms of the way we posture ourselves 
24 

and the way we plan and work with our allies to address those 

provocations. 

So I have seen it. It concerns me greatly. I certainly would counsel them not to roll back the clock to previous experiences, and I 

have had those conversations with my counterpart. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. 

And this would be for Secretary Carter. I was very pleased, a 

couple days after you were approved by the Senate for your new 

position, to see you publicly announce that this INF Treaty violation by Russia can no longer be tolerated without some sort of response. 

I am curious. How much longer do you think it will be before we 

do provide some sort of response to that violation, that continued 

violation of the INF Treaty? 

Secretary CARTER. Our response is twofold. 

One is to—a diplomatic one, which is to try to get the Russians 

to come back into compliance with the INF Treaty. Not my responsibility, but an important part of it. 

But on the military side, we have begun to consider—and I think 

this—what our options are, because the INF Treaty is a treaty, 

meaning that it is a two-way street. We accepted constraints in return for constraints of the then Soviet Union. It is a two-way 

street, and we need to remind them that it is a two-way street, 

meaning that we, without an INF Treaty, can take action also that 

we both decided years ago it was best for neither of us to take. 

So we are looking at our alternatives in the areas of defense 

against the systems that they might field in violation of the INF 

Treaty, counterforce options and countervailing options. 

All of those are available to us. We are looking at all of those because the Russians need to remember this is a two-way street. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I appreciate that. I would hope that one thing 

that you would consider is to modify the Aegis Ashore site that we 

are currently constructing in Deveselu, Romania, with the capacity 

to defend itself against those intermediate-range missiles that they 

are illegally testing. 

Secretary CARTER. Defenses are one of those, the categories of response that we can consider. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you very much. 

That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Takai. 

Mr. TAKAI. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And welcome, Mr. Secretary. 

And nice to see you again, General. I wanted to ask a little bit 

about what is happening in Hawaii. There has been a lot of talk 

regarding the drastic reductions in Army troop levels, which I believe actually is contrary to the Defense Strategic Guidance that 

called for the rebalance or the shift to the Pacific. 

So, Mr. Secretary, does the President’s fiscal year 2016 budget 

request provide you with the capabilities and the resources to conduct a rebalance to the Pacific? And how would drastic reductions 

in this theater affect this capability? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, it does provide for the rebalance, but I 

want to second what the chairman said, which is we are on the 
25 

ragged edge of being able to satisfy all the ingredients of our strategy, of which the Asia-Pacific rebalance is a central ingredient. 

So if we don’t get some budget stability and we keep doing things 

one year at a time and one piece at a time, we are going to have 

to reconsider our strategy. The way I put it earlier is not just the 

size, but the shape. 

Now, I would hope that our rebalance to the Asia-Pacific is something that we are able to sustain. And, in our budget and our 

multiyear budget plan, we are able to sustain it. 

But under sequester and in one-year-at-a-time fashion, as the 

chairman said, we are on the ragged edge in our strategy, and 

something will have to give. 

Mr. TAKAI. Okay, thank you. 

And, Mr. Secretary, the other purpose of this hearing is to talk 

about the President’s requests, the AUMF requests, so I wanted to 

shift gears a little bit and talk about that and ask you to clarify 

some aspects of the request. 

In subsection (c), called ‘‘limitations,’’ it says the authority granted in subsection (a) does not authorize the use of the United States 

Armed Forces in, ‘‘enduring offensive ground combat operations.’’ 

So what is ‘‘enduring offensive ground combat operations’’? Does 

this refer to the length of time in which the operation is ongoing, 

the scope of the operations, some undefined relationship between 

time and scope? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, thanks. The AUMF, for me, as Secretary 

of Defense, two things are important in the AUMF. One is that it 

gives us the flexibility to carry out our campaign, and that speaks 

to the provision you quote, and I will come back to that in a 

minute. 

But the other is that it is passed up here on Capitol Hill in a 

way that says very clearly to our men and women who are conducting the campaign against ISIL that the country is behind 

them. That is very important to me. Both the content of the AUMF 

and that it is supported widely in the Congress. 

To get to the provisions of it, the AUMF doesn’t try to say everything that is permitted. Instead, which is, I think, wise because for 

the chairman and me we need the flexibility to conduct the campaign against ISIL in the way that the enemy—that defeating that 

enemy requires. 

It does rule out, using the language that you described, what the 

President has said, an Iraq- or Afghanistan-type long off-period of 

offensive combat operations. And that is, that language, by taking 

that possibility only out, leaves, to me, our Department, the flexibility we need to conduct the campaign against ISIL both practically and geographically, because we don’t foresee having to conduct another campaign like Iraq or Afghanistan, and that is the 

one thing that is ruled out in the formulation you describe. 

Elsewhere, we have substantial flexibility under the President’s 

formulation, and I welcome that, because I said, flexibility and 

widespread support are the two things that we need most. 

Chairman, do you want to add anything to that? 

General DEMPSEY. There is no doctrinal term in our military taxonomy that is ‘‘enduring offensive.’’ But it is clearly a statement of 
26 

intent by the Commander in Chief. It does allow us to execute the 

campaign as it is currently designed. 

Mr. TAKAI. Okay, thank you, I appreciate that. But maybe if you 

can, for the record, provide it to us. I mean, I think it is important 

to define this provision of the request. So if you can provide it in 

writing, some clarity as to what the President means by ‘‘enduring 

combat ground offensive operations?’’ Thank you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 102.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you so much for joining us today, and thank 

you for your service to our Nation. 

We have heard a lot about how we are going to address future 

challenges in our military. Obviously, a lot on the funding side, but 

I want to follow up, Secretary Carter, with some of the things you 

have spoken about about how we can do a better job in the dollars 

that we get in spending. Especially in making decisions on things 

like acquisition, big programs, making sure we have efficiency and 

timeliness in those decisions. That agility, as Admiral Howard 

spoke about yesterday, is critical. 

Give me your perspective on where you believe we are right now 

with the acquisition process. Should there be greater authorities 

given throughout the different levels of decision-making in acquisition? And what do we really need to do as far as acquisition and, 

well, acquisition reform throughout the process? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, thank you, and thank you for your interest in that subject, because it is central. And I appreciate the fact 

that this committee is committed to it. 

And I am sorry I can’t give a simple answer to that because 

there are so many ways that we can improve our performance in 

acquisition. And that we need to improve our performance in acquisition. 

There is acquisition of services that has been mentioned previously. There is the requirements process and the role of the service chiefs. And I would—I personally welcome a greater role on the 

part of the service chiefs in the acquisition system. I think maybe 

Goldwater-Nichols went too far in the other direction in that regard, and we could get some of that back. 

There is an enormous amount of simple process that encumbers 

good sense. There is some training that is required to better equip 

our people to interact with industry and understand how to give 

appropriate incentives and partnership with the industry that we 

serve. 

There is the technology point that the chairman was pointing to 

earlier, where we have to work very hard to stay up with today’s 

eight generations of iPhones. We can’t take for granted anymore 

that we are at the cutting edge. We have to fight our way to the 

cutting edge again. 

So there are many, many dimensions to this. And I—this is 

something that I believe we will be continuing to struggle with for 

a long time because technology changes, the world changes, and we 
27 

have to keep up if we are gonna continue to have the best military 

in the world. 

Mr. WITTMAN. General Dempsey, your perspective on what we 

can do to help the procurement and acquisition process? Yesterday, 

some of the chiefs said they would like to be able to have the 

thresholds heightened so that they can be more involved in that decision-making process. 

And give me your perspective too on how do we get, as Secretary 

Carter said, how do we get technology ideas, innovation, more 

quickly to the warfighter? 

General DEMPSEY. Well, I align myself both with what the chiefs 

said yesterday about increasing their role in this process because 

it is a very bright red line right now that probably needs to be dotted, as we say, so there can be much more collaboration across it. 

And, in terms of the technology, I think it is a combination of 

shortening our programmatic time horizons. You know, I recall the 

days of the Future Combat System, which was conceived in 2003. 

It was going to deliver in 2017, which, to my way of looking at it, 

doomed it to a graceless death from the moment because we—that 

is seven cycles of the Congress of the United States. 

So I just think we have to take a look at the pace at which we 

try to develop. 

I think, as the Secretary said, commercial is outpacing government at this point. And we can either fight that or find ways to 

conform to it. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. 

Secretary Carter, just your perspective, it seems like what you 

are advocating is putting more authority but also accountability in 

the hands of decision-makers, so taking it more away from process, 

which, right now, is more of a process-driven effort, to more of a 

person- or individual-driven effort. 

Kind of give me your perspective on where you think the balance 

is there, because it seems like we are too much of a process-driven 

effort today. 

Secretary CARTER. I think that is right. 

We have gotten to a point where there are as many checkers as 

there are doers. And we need the doers to be enabled and then held 

accountable. 

So today, you have the worst of all worlds. There aren’t enough 

doers, and when something goes wrong, you can’t tell how it happened or what its causes were or who is responsible for it. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Graham. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Secretary Carter and General Dempsey. 

First, Secretary Carter, congratulations on your recent confirmation. 

And General Dempsey, I want to say thank you not only for your 

generosity of time before this committee but also with new members in general. You have been very, very kind, so thank you. 
28 

First, I would like to start, Secretary Carter, in 1915, 100 years 

ago this year, the Mark V dive helmet, the trademark of diving, 

was created. 

Military divers are located at a number of military installations 

around the country, including at the Naval Support Activity Center 

in Panama City, which is in my district. I had the opportunity to 

visit recently, and it is just phenomenal. 

With the 100th year upon us, Mr. Secretary, I would much appreciate if you would support the designation of 2015 as the year 

of the military diver to honor those who are serving and have 

served and will serve as military divers for our country. 

Secretary CARTER. Well, first of all, thank you for hosting our 

folks and for supporting service members in your district. We don’t 

take it for granted. We are very appreciative of it. 

And that sounds like an excellent way of commemorating the significance of the diver community, so thank you for that suggestion. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Thank you. I really appreciate that support, and I 

know that the men and women who serve as military divers do as 

well. So thank you. 

A separate question; yesterday, to both General Dempsey and 

Secretary Carter, I asked the secretaries about their wounded warrior care programs. 

As the Congress debates a new authorization for use of military 

force, one of my priorities is knowing that we should engage in 

military—in current or future—or military—current or future conflicts that our military service members go into this fight with confidence that this country will take care of them, especially the most 

severely injured, when they return home. 

So I would like to learn, what is the Department of Defense 

doing to ensure the transition from active service to the VA [U.S. 

Department of Veterans Affairs] for our most injured and ill service 

members, and what can we do to make sure that we identify every 

discharged service member who qualifies for the VA’s Federal Recovery Care? 

And I appreciate your answers. 

Secretary CARTER. Well, I will start, and then, Chairman, if you 

want to join in. 

First of all, thank you for your interest in that, too. We are fortunately at a period right now where the chairman, and I, on a weekend at Bethesda, won’t find 10 new wounded warriors, as was the 

case for many years when I was serving in the Department and 

chairman was serving in the Department. And we are very grateful 

for that. 

But we can’t forget that those who have been wounded will—in 

many cases, they are 20 years old. They have a long life ahead of 

them, and that means we have a long obligation to them. And I am 

concerned that our country remembers the sacrifice of the service 

members in all the years that they will live, and I think we owe 

them that. 

And of course, we hand them off to the VA, and your question 

goes to, how good is the transition program for their care to the VA 

and, in general, to civilian life. That is something that we have 

done a lot of work on in the course of these works, but I think 
29 

there is more that we can do and should do to smooth that transition and prepare them for the life ahead. 

But, you know, to me, it is really something from the heart that 

we need to—remember, these are young people. They have got a 

long life ahead of them. It can be a productive, happy, and wonderful life for them, notwithstanding the sacrifice they made at a 

young age. 

But we owe them the help to make sure that they can do that. 

Chairman, do you want to add anything? 

General DEMPSEY. Thanks, Mr. Secretary. 

Yes, we have actually—the service chiefs and I and with the help 

of the Department have included in our budget two aspects of this. 

One is the care of those who have already been wounded through 

the life cycle of their care. 

And secondly, importantly, we are taking a look at—there are 

three areas where we have developed incredible expertise, and we 

can’t let it erode. One is amputees, second is burn victims, and 

third is brain injury. 

And so we are looking to the future now that we don’t have a 

population, thankfully, that is suffering those injuries. We have got 

to make sure we can sustain our expertise that we have developed, 

and that is also baked into the budget as well. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Thank you very much. And our hearts are in the 

same place. 

And I yield back the time I don’t have left. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. 

Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here. Mr. Secretary, it is great 

to see you in your new position. 

So three things. 

First one is this: When it comes to acquisition reform, one of the 

best ways to do it, I think, is, instead of doing a process or policy 

change, which we do every year, part of the—if you can use technology and actually change the system itself. 

For instance, you have testing. It takes months to test our systems, whether you are talking F–35 or an Aegis test. It takes forever. 

There is now a programmatic line in your budget request that we 

are going to match and hopefully put more money in. It is a new 

way to test, where you can test your Aegis cruisers on the spot, literally on the spot as they are out there in the water and see if they 

are going to work or not. 

That has met with fierce resistance, even in SPAWAR [Space 

and Naval Warfare Systems Command] in San Diego, where they 

say, ‘‘We have entire departments that are testing departments.’’ 

That is what they do. You have entire departments that spend 

years and years simply testing. They aren’t happy about things like 

this that really disrupt the system and cause reform just because 

of the nature of the technology, if that makes sense. 

So I would encourage this committee and you to, instead of just 

doing policy reforms, working within the system and technology to 
30 

put in systems that reform no matter what. Because people can’t 

stop it, right? If it is faster, it takes fewer people. 

There is major pushback, because you have literally tens of thousands of people within DOD and OSD [Office of the Secretary of 

Defense] who test. That is their job. They don’t like it. That is the 

first thing. 

Number two, we talked about ISIS in Syria and Iraq and our coalition partners. 

You have Jordan, for instance. Jordan, I have talked to them. I 

have written the President letters. We have MQ–1s and MQ–9s in 

warehouses, even if—and we have the Exportable Predator, too, 

the XP. Even if you would change the ITAR [International Traffic 

in Arms Regulations] rules and State approves this stuff, it will 

take a year or two to get these in the hands of the Jordanians. 

You have to deal them with the qualitative military edge [QME] 

issue with Israel, because the Jordanians would then own those 

aircraft. A fix to this, I think, is taking some of the aircraft that 

we have now that are in warehouses, letting the Jordanians fly 

them and basically having the contractor that makes the Predator, 

have them recover and launch and have them do it. 

So then the Jordanians don’t own them, there is no QME problem, and they are able to use that now. And they are requesting 

this now. The king has requested this, his ambassador has requested this, and their military liaisons here in the U.S. have requested this, too. 

Just want to run that by you. What do you think? 

Secretary CARTER. Thank you. 

That is one of the, actually, many forms of assistance to the Jordanians and other coalition partners that we are looking at, and no 

decision has been made about that. 

But the logic that you describe and the possibility that you describe is a real one. And to get back to your testing thing, I think 

that is a very good point also. Technology can transform the way 

we do tests and therefore the ponderousness and the cost of the 

test system. So both good points. 

Chairman, you want to add anything on the—— 

General DEMPSEY. Just after King Abdullah visited, the Secretary chartered his deputy to run a senior initiative group [SIG] 

to take a look at all the coalition members, because there are many 

requests coming in and there is this thing—it is called a 

warfighting SIG—that the Secretary directed that is getting at 

things like that. 

And you are right. Your letter is being addressed at the Department of State right now. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. 

And the last thing is, I am going to have a piece of legislation, 

due to all the hostages that we have had taken in Iraq and Syria 

and Afghanistan. We kind of have—it is on an unprecedented level 

to have so many hostages taken in places where we don’t have a 

big FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] contingency, where the 

FBI can’t do it. 

The FBI still has purview over hostages, anywhere in the world. 

So, even if they only have 3 agents at the embassy in Iraq, or 12 

agents, whatever, they don’t have the ability that JSOC [Joint Spe-
31 

cial Operations Command] has, that any of our special operators or 

just big Army, big Marine Corps, whoever. 

I think that there needs to be a buck-stops-here person. Your 

predecessor, Mr. Secretary, put in Mike Lumpkin, who was the 

ASD SO/LIC [Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations/ 

Low-Intensity Conflict]. He became the hostage guy during the 

Bergdahl case, at our recommendation. 

And we also recommended this, that there be a buck-stops-here 

person that answers to the President. So that person, whether they 

choose the FBI or the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] or the DIA 

[Defense Intelligence Agency] or DOD, whoever has the most resources to bring to bear for that particular hostage case, I think 

that is the way we should go, and we can maybe recover a few of 

these hostages, which we haven’t done yet. 

Just wonder if you could comment on that. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary CARTER. My only comment would be you are absolutely 

right, that this hostage rescue is an example of something that can 

only be done with a whole-of-government approach. We need, obviously, things to be done in a way that is law enforcement sensitive, 

but in many cases, we have the assets or the Intelligence Community has the assets, or it involves Homeland Security. 

And this gets to the point I was making earlier. I mean, I have 

to take a view of security and the future strength of our Nation 

that is—that looks beyond the Department of Defense itself to all 

of the instruments of national power and everything that is going 

to carry us into the future. 

And these kinds of operations are a perfect example of that, 

where you need all those parts to come together. You are right, we 

do need a choreographer when that time comes to bring all those 

pieces together. It is very—it is essential. But the times in which 

we live require for most problems that there be the defense instrument and then other pieces of the government as well, whether it 

be technology, whether it be our personnel, or whether it be operations. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Moulton. 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, gentlemen, thank you very much for your service to the 

country. There is tremendous bipartisan agreement on this committee that we need to move past the sequester. I just came from 

a Budget Committee hearing where this is being debated. There is 

a lot of frustration with the way that the budget is being handled 

at the present. 

But the question, therefore, is just how do we get there? How do 

we figure that out? One question that has been debated much this 

morning on this committee is is there a role for nondefense spending cut under the Budget Control Act in ensuring our national defense? And, I think, Secretary Carter, you have made your view 

quite clear on that. 

General Dempsey, I was wondering if you could offer your own 

comments. 

General DEMPSEY. Look, everything we do around the world in 

terms of security these days are done with other government partners. Whether it is DEA [Drug Enforcement Administration], [De-
32 

partment of] Homeland Security, FBI, CIA, and so, yes, there is a 

role on the nondefense side for security. 

Mr. MOULTON. Great, thank you. 

If you could both comment on this, and I want to be just very 

specific here to try to cut through the rhetoric. What are the top 

five programs or weapons systems that you want to cut to take 

that money and better invest it in ensuring the safety of our 

troops—the safety and success of our troops on the ground or more 

broadly in our future national defense, but are prevented from cutting by congressional politics? 

Secretary Carter, perhaps we can start with you. 

Secretary CARTER. There are more than five, I am sorry to say. 

And some of them are programs, some of them are older platforms. 

There has been a lot of discussion and debate around the A–10, 

for example, in the Air Force, which the Air Force wishes to retire, 

not because it is not an excellent airplane but because their budget 

doesn’t provide room for it anymore compared to other things that 

are higher priority. So that is one. 

And we—there are a number of those that we have enumerated 

in past years. And we are willing to work with people here. We understand—I want to find common ground with people, but we can’t 

just continue to be frustrated year after year in these program 

areas or in a whole number of compensation areas, efficiency areas, 

and so forth. 

And I would be happy to provide to the committee a list, and it 

will be more than five items of initiatives that we have proposed 

in past years. This was before I was here. But that we thought on 

balance and sometimes with great regret, as in the retirement of 

older systems, we needed to do, and we have not been permitted 

by Congress to take those steps. 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, Secretary. If you could provide that 

list, I would greatly appreciate it. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 103.] 

Mr. MOULTON. General Dempsey, if you could, as specific as possible, outline—specifically as possible, outline what things would be 

on your list. 

General DEMPSEY. Well, I actually can’t, Congressman, because— 

recall my role. The services build their program to deliver service 

capabilities, which then we integrate into a joint force. So what we 

submitted was actually what we believed we need to accomplish a 

joint force to execute the strategy. 

I am not in a position now to tell you that, you know, there were 

ways we could have done it otherwise. We have given you our best 

advice. And I can’t help you decide how to find the money to do 

it. We need the capabilities we have described in our budget. 

Mr. MOULTON. Fair enough. Thank you very much, gentlemen. 

Chairman, I yield my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both, or all of you being here. I appreciate that, and 

we all do. 
33 

Secretary Carter, as you know, Qatar is an important partner of 

ours. We have troops stationed there, and they have played a role 

in the counter-ISIS fight. 

However, they are playing both sides. There are a number of 

U.S.-designated terrorist financiers operating openly in Qatar. The 

leadership of Hamas, a designated terrorist organization, openly 

operates there and they have been financing some very bad 

Islamist extremists. 

So my question is, how can the U.S. hold them accountable and 

how can we make it clear that playing both sides is simply unacceptable? 

Secretary CARTER. Thank you for the question. Qatar, as with 

other of our coalition partners in the fight against ISIL, are being 

very helpful. And in the case of the Qataris in terms of the air base 

we use, indispensable. 

At the same time, not everything that our coalition partners do 

in the region are things that we support or that we think are constructive with respect to either the ISIL fight or other things. 

And so, all of our partners are—we are trying to work with so 

that we get their support for the fight against ISIL, but we can 

continue to work with them on areas where we disagree. And there 

are disagreements we have with almost all of our coalition partners 

that are helping us with ISIL. And we just try to work through 

them. 

Mr. LAMBORN. But, Secretary, I understand that we may disagree on this or that issue, but when their policy is cutting against 

what we are trying to accomplish in that very fight, I have got a 

real problem with that. 

Secretary CARTER. Well, we have problems with that too in some 

cases, and we explain that in our view that their policies are contradictory in that way. But we have those disagreements with them 

we try to work through while at the same time benefiting from 

their help where we can agree. 

But we don’t agree 100 percent of the time. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay, thank you. 

Also, Secretary Carter or General Dempsey, on the AUMF, I 

have a real problem with the two major limitations that the President has put into his proposed language: a limitation on time and 

a limitation on scope. 

Is it right to be tying the hands of this President or a future 

President in that way? 

Secretary CARTER. I will start first, and then, Chairman, if—— 

Mr. LAMBORN. And if you have already addressed this, I apologize. I was in another committee meeting. 

Secretary CARTER. No, the time part—no, no, no, I did not. 

On the scope, the proposed AUMF gives us wide scope to conduct 

the campaign that we are anticipating against ISIL. 

The time limitation has nothing to do with the length of the campaign. It has—it—I cannot tell you that the campaign will be over 

in 3 years. I don’t think anybody can tell you that. 

That feature of the AUMF is included for reasons that are not 

military-related. They are related to the fact—they are derived 

from the fact that we will have a new President in 3 years and the 
34 

AUMF provides for a new President, and for that matter a new 

Congress, to revisit this issue. 

Now, that is not something that comes from the Secretary of Defense, or I would say from our thinking. But we understand and 

respect it. It derives from the way the Constitution regards use of 

military force as a very grave matter in which both the Congress 

and the executive branch play a role. 

So I understand that; I respect that. But the number three 

doesn’t come from the campaign. It comes from our political system. And again, as I understand and respect that and I hope the 

result of all this is an AUMF that tells our troops that we are behind them in this fight. 

That is the key thing to me, in addition to having the flexibility 

to main—to carry out the campaign that will win. 

General DEMPSEY. Congressman, I was consulted on the AUMF 

before it was submitted to you and I believe it does allow us to execute the campaign that we anticipate against ISIL. 

I think what you are sensing is the difference in using military 

force against state actors, nation states, and these groups of nonstate actors, which have a very different character to them. 

And I think the last time we ever were handed a completely unconstrained authorization to use force was probably Eisenhower’s 

orders on the eve of the invasion of Europe, where he was told to 

take the Armed Forces of the United States, deploy them to the 

continent of Europe and defeat Nazi Germany. That is probably the 

last time we have had a completely unconstrained AUMF. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Aguilar. 

Mr. AGUILAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary and General Dempsey. Good to see you 

again. 

I wanted to talk a little bit about that—the AUMF that was just 

discussed in this wide scope that you just mentioned. You know, 

one of the questions I had was the hostility. 

Would the—if the hostility—it doesn’t say anything about the 

termination of hostilities at the 3-year period. 

Is it your feeling that hostilities could continue and that we could 

have actions against ISIL beyond the 3 years as currently written 

and implemented? 

Secretary CARTER. Again, the 3 years is not a prediction about 

the duration of the campaign to defeat ISIS. It is a recognition of 

the way our political system works and the recognition that a new 

President and a new Congress in 3 years may wish to revisit this 

issue. As I said, I understand and respect that. But it isn’t a prediction about the duration of the campaign against ISIL. 

Mr. AGUILAR. General. 

General DEMPSEY. My military experience and judgment suggests that the answer of your question is it will likely extend beyond 3 years. 

Mr. AGUILAR. Could it extend—could hostilities extend without a 

new AUMF by a new commander? 

General DEMPSEY. If I understood the question, the enemy gets 

a vote, as we say, on how long hostilities extend. 

I don’t—I honestly don’t understand the question. 
35 

Mr. AGUILAR. Sure, sure. I guess what I am trying to understand 

is, is as proposed, if Congress gives the authority to use military 

force, we have this 3-year window which you both said is—you 

know, offers a flexibility but is more a political discussion than 

anything and it allows the new President to make that determination. 

Absent a new discussion about AUMF, could hostilities continue 

in perpetuity beyond the 3-year window? 

Secretary CARTER. I think the AUMF that the President proposed would require action by a new administration and a new 

Congress in 3 years, in light of the circumstances at the time, 

which we can’t foresee. 

Mr. AGUILAR. One of the other pieces that isn’t discussed is detention policies within the AUMF and this was discussed in another hearing that this committee had as well. 

Could you provide us with examples of what U.S. forces could 

and could not do with respect to detention policies under the 

AUMF, under the proposed AUMF? 

Secretary CARTER. Under the AUMF, the law of armed conflict 

and all the applicable U.S. and international law would apply to 

detention operations, as they would apply to all aspects of waging 

this campaign. 

Mr. AGUILAR. General. 

General DEMPSEY. I have nothing to add to that, Congressman. 

Mr. AGUILAR. Thank you. 

I will yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Dr. Fleming. 

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And Secretary Carter, Chairman Dempsey, thank you for your 

service and thank you for coming for us today. 

You know, the President has said that his goal is to destroy ISIS. 

He has submitted a proposed AUMF. In the AUMF it says a limitation is no enduring offensive ground combat operations. That suggests no significant boots on the ground, sort of a colloquial expression that we use about that. 

So my question to both of you gentlemen is can you give examples of wars America has won with sustained success and peace 

without substantial ground forces in relation to the foe? 

Secretary CARTER. I am not a historian so I am not sure I can 

answer your question from an historical point of view. I can give 

a logical answer, a commonsense answer to the boots on the ground 

question as it applies to a campaign like the one against ISIL. 

And it has to do with the—who sustains the victory after ISIL 

is defeated, because we seek not only the defeat of ISIL but we 

seek the lasting defeat of ISIL—— 

Dr. FLEMING. Well, if I can interrupt you—— 

Secretary CARTER [continuing]. That means that—if I can just 

finish the thought that means that there are local forces involved 

who control the territory after it is won back. That is our strategy 

and otherwise we have boots on the ground for a very long time. 

Dr. FLEMING. Well, you know, many experts believe that the 

main reason why we have the ISIS problem we have today is we 
36 

didn’t have a status of forces agreement and we didn’t have a staybehind force. 

So again, I will ask you, Chairman Dempsey, can you name the 

wars that America has won without sustained boots on the ground 

against a significant foe? 

And I do believe—I remember that Boko Haram now has given 

its allegiance. The forces are growing with ISIS and we know how 

barbaric they are. 

Can you name some examples of wars we have won without 

boots on the ground? 

General DEMPSEY. We have—historically we have had several 

campaigns against insurgencies—in the Philippines, for example, 

back at the turn of the last century and generally our—actually our 

campaign strategy has been the same as it is today, which is to 

find a coalition and to find indigenous forces—as we used to call 

them, now we call them regional partners—to do the lion’s share 

of the lifting because, unless they own it, they will often allow us 

to own it. 

Dr. FLEMING. Well, then can you tell us who this—these forces 

are going to be? 

Now I get we are trying to stand up, again, an Iraqi army that 

fell apart because we left. 

But can you explain in other regions outside of Iraq, where we 

are getting these forces, where they are coming from and when 

they are going to take action? 

General DEMPSEY. I will. But I don’t want to align myself with 

that we were the cause of the current crisis. I think the Secretary 

mentioned earlier that Iraq had an opportunity to demonstrate to 

its population that it would actually work on its behalf of all 

groups and failed to do that, which provided the environment in 

which this challenge arose. 

We have got a 20-nation coalition; we have—two of—members of 

which are the Kurdish forces and the Iraqi forces. We have—we 

are working to develop a moderate Syrian opposition. We are calling it the New Syrian Forces. We are hardening regional allies— 

you heard some of that discussed moments ago—and it is actually—the reason that the campaign has a defeat mechanism is the 

coalition. It is not—— 

Dr. FLEMING. Well, again—— 

General DEMPSEY [continuing]. Our activities. 

Dr. FLEMING [continuing]. Who are the core forces, who are going 

to be the core forces, in Syria, for example? 

Again, we hear about the Free Syrian Army, which nobody really 

seems to know who they are. They were referred to, of course, as 

doctors and pharmacists before and we are going to, I guess, offline 

train them someplace maybe in Kuwait. 

But again ISIS is growing every day; they are killing a number 

of people in very brutal ways, specifically going after Christians 

and Jews, so my question is who is this core force that is going to 

go up against ISIS in the near future? 

I am still very vague on who this force is? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, there are forces. It depends on which 

side of the border you are talking about. 

On the Iraqi side, there are the forces that—— 
37 

Dr. FLEMING. Well, I get Iraq. I am talking—in the limited time 

I have I am talking about Syria now. Who—where are these 

forces—— 

Secretary CARTER. On the Syrian side, as the chairman indicated, we are trying to build a—— 

Dr. FLEMING. Trying to build. 

Secretary CARTER. Trying to build. 

Dr. FLEMING. So we really don’t know who they are. We don’t 

know the size. 

Secretary CARTER. Well, the reality of the situation is, you have 

the forces of the Assad regime and you have the forces of ISIL, neither of which we want to align ourselves with, and they are the 

largest forces on the ground in Syria. That is the circumstance in 

which we find ourselves. 

And we are trying to create a moderate Syrian force that will be 

able to defeat them and own the future of Syria. That is our objective. 

Dr. FLEMING. Mr. Chairman, as I yield back, I just have to say 

we are not finding out who these people are. There is no answer 

here in this question. 

The CHAIRMAN. Appreciate. 

Mr. Ashford. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, 

And General and Mr. Secretary. 

Pardon my parochialism, I am just going to have to ask kind of 

a broad question related back to our people in our district, University of Nebraska at Omaha [UNO]. When we went to the—to see— 

I absolutely agree with you about President Ghani, and there is a 

lot of hope there, in his ability to start reforms in the armed services, open up discussions with Pakistan which are meaningful, apparently. 

It was interesting, when we went in to visit with the President, 

one of his first comments to me was how is my friend Tom 

Gouttierre. And Tom, many of you probably know of Tom, but he 

started the Afghan studies program at UNO 35 years ago, and is 

a friend of the President’s and they communicate. So that was nice 

to see. 

Also, you know, the Peter Kiewit Institute at University of Nebraska at Omaha is doing research into ISIS and has had—in fact 

had been doing the research prior to June of last year. And the 

Ebola work done at the University of Nebraska Medical Center, 

and is pretty significant. And we are very proud of all that. 

Having said that, I guess my question is, when I visit those institutions and talk to the principals, it is clear that not just the University of Nebraska, clearly, but all over the country, there are 

partners at that level who are sophisticated, significant partners in 

our efforts in the Mideast. 

And would you comment on that, on how you foresee those partnerships continuing to develop and evolve and move forward? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, it is critical, because we depend for our 

technology, all the research and development that underlies our 

system, we depend upon private institutions to do that, whether 

they be our universities, excellent universities, university-affiliated 

R&D [research and development] centers, in industry. 
38 

I always have to remind people, we don’t build anything in the 

Pentagon. This isn’t the Soviet Union. Our way of doing things is 

not to do it in the government, it is to contract with private entities, because we think that is the best way to stay up with technology and to get excellence. And that is how we—and so, we depend upon those institutions, our great university systems, our 

great laboratories, and our great defense industry to make us the 

best military in the world. 

Mr. ASHFORD. I just—I think that is absolutely right. And I think 

it does differentiate us from everywhere else in the world, really. 

And, you know, we are proud of what we have contributed in Nebraska, obviously, but every State has similar experiences. 

One other—and thank you for that answer. 

One other—this goes back really to Congresswoman Graham’s 

question, and this is something that I am trying to figure out. Your 

comment about transitioning the military back into civilian life and 

the role of the Veterans Administration, I don’t necessarily want to 

comment on that, but I know in Nebraska, we have had, as most— 

a lot of States have had, this infusion of new veterans, obviously, 

with distinct problems that are somewhat unique, are unique to a 

great degree to the Middle East, and the higher degree of disability 

claims and all of that. 

And I know what we are trying to think about doing in Nebraska, in Omaha and Sarpy County, where Offut [Air Force Base] 

and STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command] is to think about developing sort of outpatient clinics, because we are seeing a real need 

of the veterans coming back now, the military coming back now 

and needing that sort of that outpatient in the mental health area, 

women’s health issues that are not being addressed in the traditional mode. 

I don’t actually need a comment on that because that is a different department, but if you have any thoughts on that, kind of 

the new way of delivering health care. 

Secretary CARTER. I would only echo something that the chairman said, which is that by sad necessity over the last dozen years, 

we have learned a lot and in a sense pioneered techniques in treating amputees, burn victims, very importantly TBI [traumatic brain 

injury], PTS [post-traumatic syndrome], and we need to make sure, 

as the chairman said earlier, we remember those lessons and that 

we transfer that knowledge to society more widely, which I think 

is happening in our medical system, including the medical system 

of the Veterans Administration. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Right. And I agree. And my only thought would 

be that clearly in our area of the country where we have a robust 

medical system at the university and other facilities is, you know, 

being able to develop those new options as we move forward is part 

of our strategy in the Mideast generally and everywhere. 

So thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Thank you, Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gibson. 

Mr. GIBSON. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. And greatly appreciate the 

panelists. 

Thank you for your leadership and commitment to our Nation. 
39 

General Dempsey, I noted in your opening remarks you laid out 

a case for continued forward presence, put some passion behind 

that. Some of us, myself included, have really been arguing for 

thinking and acting differently, certainly recognizing the need for 

some forward presence, particularly with naval forces for open sea 

lanes and access to markets. And then in places like Korea, of 

course, there is going to be a need for land forces there for the near 

term, at least. 

But that when we rely on this, as we have really have since the 

end of the Cold War, we end up with free-rider problems, and we 

end up with friends and allies who don’t fully ante up for what 

they had admitted on paper that they would do, and we end up 

with some other second-order effects. 

I have been arguing for a peace-through-strength approach that 

really puts reliance on agility, strategic maneuver, and particularly 

the restoration of the global response force capability, with the idea 

that—and of course we deal with nation states and we deal with 

transnational actors, here I am talking about the former, not the 

latter, you know, this idea of deterrence and deterrence really 

being defined by capability and will. 

And here is where I get to the point on the global response force. 

Now, we had the service secretaries and the chiefs here yesterday, 

and they gave a response to this. And so, I am interested in, from 

the Department standpoint, from the Secretary and from the chief, 

leadership, as it relates to restoring the global response force and 

how you see that factoring into our posture going forward. 

Secretary CARTER. I will start, and then the chairman. We do 

have something called the GRF, the global response force, which 

we provide very carefully for just the reason you describe, namely, 

it is the most ready force, it is the one that has the greatest deterrent value, because it has global reach and it is highly ready. 

And one of the things that is concerning about our whole—this 

whole budget drama of sequester and so forth year after year and 

its effect on readiness is that if it continues in the way that it is, 

it is going to affect our readiness, even at the GRF level. And that 

is not good for deterrence. It is not good for the picture of American 

strength that is so necessary to avoiding conflict in the first place. 

General DEMPSEY. Congressman, you have touched on two things 

that are actually near and dear to my heart. One is the GRF. We 

do have to restore its readiness. There are times when, of late, because of increasing demand and reducing supply, we have had to 

actually reach into it and send it forward, which is not the intention, but we are forced into that position on occasion. 

The other one is the issue of presence. You know, I think we 

have got our forward stationing about right. And what we are 

doing is looking at how we can be a little less predictable to our 

adversaries, more reassuring to our allies, and maintain readiness 

through a thing we call—we are calling ‘‘dynamic presence.’’ 

And so, we are very much interested in pursuing that idea. 

But I will tell you, you know, sequestration actually makes this— 

both of those almost impossible. 

Mr. GIBSON. I appreciate those responses. 

And to be clear, even the vision that I am laying out here requires the world’s strongest military as a deterrent to those who 
40 

would do us harm. And we are also—this vision also includes 

American leadership. It is just a different conception of power and 

how we would array it that would look for the contributions from 

our friends and allies I think at the level that we would expect. 

And also recognize the moral strength of our country as evidenced through diplomacy, commerce, and trade. And in the way 

that we are able to strategically maneuver our forces with a real 

capability, I believe, strengthens the hands of our diplomats that 

will allow us to, I think, reach a level of security that we are striving for. 

So thanks. Thank you very much, once again, for everything you 

do for our service men and women and their families. And I will 

yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank 

the Secretary and general for your service and all the witnesses 

here today. 

I think when historians write the book on this administration, 

one of the overlooked achievements was the New START [Strategic 

Arms Reduction] treaty, which was ratified on a bipartisan basis. 

And you know in the wake of it we have heard a lot of testimony 

at the Seapower Committee about the fact that the triad is going 

to change as a result of the realignment that the treaty created in 

terms of the leg of the triad that is going to carry the heaviest burden is the sea-based deterrence, about 70 percent, according to, 

again, some of the Navy witnesses that we have had here. 

In the wake of that, in the aging out of the existing Ohio fleet, 

Admiral Greenert, Secretary Stackley, yesterday Secretary Mabus, 

I mean they made it crystal clear that the Ohio replacement program is at the absolute top of the list because the timing, even 

with the President’s robust funding for design work, which again 

is another reason why we should support that top line. 

You know really there is just no margin for delay in terms of 

making sure that we are going to be able to implement New 

START. So you know, Mr. Secretary, I was reading your testimony 

over at the Appropriations Committee and others about, again, we 

have been hearing about this for years, you know what the impact 

is going to be on the shipbuilding account. 

So last year’s defense bill when we created the Sea-based Deterrence Fund, we thought you know really used well-established 

precedent from the National Sealift Defense Fund, which again 

was an effort to take pressure off the shipbuilding account for a 

once in a multi-generation investment missile defense, et cetera. 

I was just wondering if you could kind of talk with us a little bit 

about what your sort of thinking is. Because there is just no question that something is going to give when the resources are needed 

to build those boats in terms of the shipbuilding account, if it has 

to all come out of there. 

Secretary CARTER. Well, thank you for that. And you are right. 

The triad is part of our future. It is part of our future planning. 

You know nuclear weapons aren’t in the news very much, thank 

God. So they are not the answer to the ISIL crisis and so on. But 

they are a bedrock of our security. 
41 

And we have to—we are going to need a safe, secure, and reliable 

deterrent as far into the future as I can see. And we need to provide for that. 

And the sea-based leg is an essential leg because it is survivable 

on a day-to-day basis. That has long been a tenet of strategic stability. It remains true now. 

And it is also true that the Ohio-class replacement is a very expensive proposition. Now, we are trying to get the cost of that down 

like all our other programs as much as we can. But it is—we have 

to pay that bill. And I think it is more complicated, as I am sure 

you would say also, than how we label the money. 

The money has to come from somewhere, and we are going to 

have to make difficult tradeoffs, particularly in the decade between 

2020 and 2030. And that is just a fact of life if we are going to have 

an Ohio-class replacement. 

And if Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert said it was a 

highest priority, they are absolutely right. It is just something we 

have to do and we have to find room in the budget to do it. And 

there are going to be tradeoffs there that are not going to get alleviated by calling the money this or that. 

General DEMPSEY. The only other thing I would add, Congressman, is we—the Joint Chiefs and I firmly believe that the triad, 

all three legs, which as you know is intercontinental ballistic missiles, long-range bomber, and the Ohio-class replacement submarine, are necessary to make our deterrence credible and survivable. 

And just because it is an unfortunate happenstance of time that 

the three legs of the triad are all requiring modernization at some 

level over the next decade. But you know we have been kept safe. 

This is our strategic deterrent responsibility. And we are going to 

have to find a way to do it. 

Mr. COURTNEY. No quarrel with your comment. Again, just when 

you look at the size of the legs, it is not quite—it is a kind of funny 

looking stool because one of them is a lot longer than the other I 

guess. 

And as long as I got a few seconds left, General, first of all thank 

you for your service. First time I met you was in Iraq when you 

were in charge of retraining the Iraqi forces. And I know you are 

probably more passionate than anyone about trying to re-bolster 

that force that is over there. 

We had a National Guard unit leave for Afghanistan a few 

nights ago out of Hartford. And I just—the expectation was that 

the Reserve force was kind of going to stand down as the troop 

drawdown took place. 

And frankly, for some people it was a little jarring to still see National Guard forces going over there. And I hope you are keeping 

an eye on those guys because you know it caused a lot of dislocation for the families to have a 60-day call-up when I think, again, 

people’s world expectations, thought was going to change with the 

drawdown. 

With that, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
42 

First of all, Secretary Carter, some of us were a little bit surprised at your appointment. And I just have to say to you, it was 

a pleasant surprise. And I, for one, am very gratified, sir, that you 

are where you are. I think it is a good thing for the country. 

Secretary CARTER. Thank you. My wife and I were surprised 

also. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, as you know, producing fissile material is by 

far the most challenging component of developing nuclear weapons. 

And I know you also know that once the 4.5 percent enrichment 

level has been reached that about 75 percent of the work or the enrichment has been done to gain the weapons grade material. 

Requiring Iran to dismantle its mechanism to enrich uranium or 

produce plutonium was the centerpiece of nearly a dozen U.N. 

[United Nations] Security Council resolutions because essentially 

we considered that in many ways the whole ballgame. But in direct 

contradiction to that reality and the U.N. Security resolutions, Mr. 

Obama’s interim agreement with Iran astonishingly provides a protected protocol to enrich uranium. 

And if you forgive the political importunity of the question, do 

you believe that an agreement of the long-term with Iran going forward that allows him to enrich uranium or produce plutonium is 

in the best national security interests of the United States? 

Secretary CARTER. It is an excellent question and I think it is the 

key question for the—for such an agreement is, does it provide insurance against breakout and the development of a bomb by Iran? 

Now, I am not involved in the negotiations there and so I can’t 

discuss an agreement that hasn’t been concluded yet. But that has 

got to be its underlying principle. And I think that is the underlying principle with which the negotiations are being conducted. 

And I associate myself with the phrase that no deal is better than 

a bad deal. 

The only other thing I would say about that is for me and for 

our Department, we have some other obligations associated with 

this. One is to continue to deter Iran’s other detrimental behavior 

in the region and in the Gulf, and protect allies and partners there 

to include, secondly, very importantly, are in critical partnership 

with Israel, is a very strong ally. And that is important. And then 

the third is our general presence in the Gulf. 

So those responsibilities which reside to us which are also related to Iran and Iranian behavior, those are responsibilities that 

fall on the Department of Defense and that we take very seriously. 

I know the chairman does also. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, I certainly wish you the very best in that and 

everything else that you do, sir. 

And General Dempsey, let me just express—just personal gratitude and collective gratitude for the whole country for the gallant 

service that you have offered to the human family. I mean this has 

been an amazing thing that you have done and we are grateful to 

you. 

So with that you know I always ask you a tough question. 

General DEMPSEY. Let me—can I go on for a minute and 25 seconds thanking you for the kindness that you have just—— 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. FRANKS. I think he gauged that I have about 25 seconds left. 
43 

General Dempsey, what is the current cap on troop developments—deployments I should say, in Iraq? I think it is around 

3,100. And is there a justification for that troop level? Or is it really an arbitrary policy decision? 

General DEMPSEY. No. 

Mr. FRANKS. And do you believe in your best military judgment 

that that policy represents the surest and best policy to expeditiously defeat ISIS? 

General DEMPSEY. My military advice on the best and most enduring way to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant is 

through our partners, with a coalition, and using our unique capabilities, whether they be training or precision strikes or working to 

build institutions, so that the Iraqis, notably, understand they 

have—and other regional stakeholders who have more to lose and 

more to gain by the defeat of ISIL—actually are in the lead. 

And therefore, that number is not arbitrary at all. It is purposebuilt to that effect. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield back. 

Thank you both again. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Nugent. 

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And to Mr. Carter, and first of all, I want to thank both of you. 

General Dempsey, I really appreciate your service to our country, 

and particularly the uniform that you wear, the United States 

Army. It means a lot to me. 

Secretary Carter, first time I get to meet you. 

But the question I have, and I guess where I am kind of perplexed, is what is going on within Iraq today, where we have the 

general of the Quds force leading the charge, basically. And, you 

know, I get our reluctance to have boots on the ground. Because 

let me tell you, I mean, my kids have been there. So I don’t necessarily want to see them go back. 

But the other—on the same token, though, I hate to see that 

Iran now has taken the lead, and particularly when you go back 

to the history in Iraq with us recently, in 2011 when I was there, 

we had five U.S. service members killed the night I was there by 

an advanced IED [improvised explosive device] supplied—go figure—from Iran. And now we are allowing them to take the lead. 

And, you know, you remember back, I mean, we had our forces in 

Iraq at the drawdown. We had American troops being killed and 

ambushed. And because of the status of forces agreement, particularly as it related to Iraq, they kept us from going and hunting or 

capturing or killing these guys that were killing our troops. 

We knew where they were laying their heads down at night, but 

the fact was these are the same people now that are taking the 

lead in Iraq and we think we are going to see a different outcome 

with the Iranian regime today than what it was then. And the 

pressure it is going to put on the Iraqi leaders—and Ghani I think 

is a breath of fresh air, but I don’t know how he is going to operate 

within that when the Iranians are standing there saying, ‘‘Listen, 

we are giving you back your country.’’ 

How do we deal with that? 
44 

Secretary CARTER. Well, it is a very good question because the— 

what defeated the Iraqi forces last summer was sectarianism. And 

if the fight against ISIL becomes a purely sectarian fight and not 

an Iraqi fight, then we—— 

Mr. NUGENT. But let me interrupt you, I mean, because the time 

is limited. But isn’t it going to turn back into a sectarian fight 

when you have Iran providing the leadership and the training to 

the troops that are going to push ISIS back out of Iraq? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, it is actually a complicated situation. In 

many places, the Iraqi security forces, including with Sunni elements and the support of Sunni tribes, are participating in the recapture of ground. In other places, it is our air power and Iraqi security forces entirely. 

In Tikrit, you are right. There is a heavy presence of Popular 

Mobilization Forces which are Shiite in sectarian orientation and 

getting some support from the Iranians. And that is concerning to 

us. So it is a very mixed picture. But the side that we are on is 

the side of the Iraqi government operating on a multi-sectarian 

basis. And that is the only way in which we are going to achieve 

success. 

Mr. NUGENT. I don’t disagree with that, but, you know, when you 

talk to the forces that were there in place in 2011 and the training 

that we did for the Iraqis, it was pretty evident then that we had 

some very, very good brigades within the Iraqi military, and then 

we had some that were the sectarian split-off that were incompetent. 

And I think that is what we saw, you know, happen. I think that 

is kind of the remarks we have heard is that having an enduring 

force there would have prevented it, I don’t know, but we would 

have had a much better chance of preventing it had we been there 

to train and assist and keep the pressure on the Iraqis at the time. 

And I just want to make sure we don’t do the same now in Afghanistan. 

Secretary CARTER. I will say something about Afghanistan, and 

then maybe the chairman wants to say something about Iraq. 

We have fortunately at the moment a very different situation in 

Afghanistan, namely a bilateral security agreement in place that is 

welcomed by the government of Afghanistan, and a partner in the 

government of Afghanistan in the national unity government of 

Ghani and Abdullah that is not sectarian in nature; that is welcoming of the American assistance and the American training. 

So it is a very different situation from—Iraq and the reason why, 

as I said earlier, we may well be achieving our objectives in Afghanistan in a way that a few years ago when I was working on 

that campaign, I would not have predicted that we would get as far 

as we did. It is a very different situation, fortunately, in Afghanistan today from Iraq a few years ago. 

Mr. NUGENT. And I appreciate your comments. 

And with that, General, I would love to hear from you, but I have 

been gaveled back and—— 

General DEMPSEY. And I would love to chat, sir, but my time is 

out. 

Mr. NUGENT. Okay. 

[Laughter.] 
45 

The CHAIRMAN. Yep, you all are right. 

Dr. Wenstrup. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. 

As I am looking at the AUMF, it says the use of special operations forces to take military action against ISIL leadership—and 

again, this is a proposed AUMF—does that include capture or is it 

kill only? 

Secretary CARTER. It includes capture. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Okay. So, you know, my question is, we talk 

about capture and the use of all of our tenets of war, whether it 

is diplomatic, intelligence, military, economic—all those things. You 

know, I have some visions of how we could form multiple coalitions—our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]-type coalition and Middle Eastern coalition. Then we work together with 

command and control. This is good versus evil. I think that is the 

message the world should hear. 

And, you know, when it comes to holding, though, you know, I 

have some ideas about holding those we capture and how we try 

them and how we involve maybe the nation of incident, whether it 

is ISIL or the global war on terror, how we involve the nation of 

incident and the nation of origin. And are they going to be part of 

the process of those that we capture. 

So my question is, if we capture, what do we do with them? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, thanks for that question. Let me just go 

back to the logic of capture. Obviously, our objective where possible 

is to capture, rather than dispatch. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Have we been capturing anyone? Have we been 

capturing anyone in the last couple of years? Or especially since we 

reengaged in Iraq? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, exactly as you say. Our coalition partners have been capturing. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Okay, so what are we doing—— 

Secretary CARTER. They have been doing that and they have 

been detaining. Now, just to take Afghanistan as an example, these 

are Afghan—on Afghan territory. They are detained by the Afghans and subject to Afghan law. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Okay. So our special forces, for example, you say 

their mission is to capture or kill. And so if we capture, what are 

we doing with them? 

Secretary CARTER. The answer is it depends on the circumstances and the location; the willingness of a host country to 

take custody of them, to prosecute them. I am not an expert on 

this. You have got to talk to the Justice Department about that and 

they are involved in these decisions. 

But since these are—captures are—your question concerns captures that take place outside of U.S. territory, there are laws respecting that that we obey. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. So, Mr. Secretary, are we capturing and then 

hands-off, we just turn them over? Are we involved with what may 

happen? The collection of intelligence is what I am after here. And 

so, what are we doing? And if you can’t answer, maybe General 

Dempsey can, what our current posture is under this—— 
46 

Secretary CARTER. Well, the answer is, Congressman, it depends 

on where—the circumstances of the capture. But to get to the point 

you are making, which is interrogation and intelligence value that 

is an important value to us. And it is important that whatever the 

ultimate disposition of the detainee is, that we have the opportunity to interrogate and debrief. And that is very important to us 

whatever the ultimate disposition of the detainee is. 

And the chairman can add to that if he wants to. 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, Congressman, what I would do is I think 

this is probably an important enough question that I will have my 

legal team work with the Secretary’s and provide you a longer answer for the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 101.] 

General DEMPSEY. But I will say in places where we are in support of the host nation, for example in Iraq, we are literally in support of them. So they will do the capture operation, they will give 

access to the prisoners for us to conduct the kind of interrogation 

you describe as well as sensitive site exploitation, which is where 

you get even more. 

Where someone is a direct threat to us, either U.S. persons and 

facilities or to the homeland, we actually have conducted operations 

with the Department of Justice represented and those individuals—there has been a handful, have been brought back to this 

country for trial. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you, I appreciate that answer. 

Can I ask you, if you could, Mr. Secretary, to finish this sentence 

for me. 

And the sentence is, publicly stating that we will not use ground 

troops, although I may agree with the policy of using other troops, 

but publicly stating that we will not use ground troops is a good 

idea because— 

If you could finish that sentence for me? 

Secretary CARTER. I have got—I am not sure what you are getting at. I don’t—— 

Dr. WENSTRUP. I am wondering why we want in our AUMF to 

say what—that we will not use this entity that we have? 

Why is—— 

Secretary CARTER. Oh, the AUMF—well—— 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Even if I am not in favor of using them, why 

would we say that? 

Secretary CARTER. What the AUMF says is that in the campaign 

against ISIL, we have a very wide range of authorities to wage that 

campaign, including those that we anticipate are necessary to conduct the campaign—and there is one limit to that, which is a Afghanistan or Iraq-like long ground campaign. That is not foreseen 

and so the AUMF does not request the authority to conduct that. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. That doesn’t really explain to me why it is a good 

idea. But I thank you for your answer and I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Walorski. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thanks for being here. 

Mr. Secretary, in follow-up to Representative Wenstrup’s question, it just brings back to my mind this issue of GTMO [Guanta-
47 

namo Bay Naval Station], when we are talking about people taken 

on the battlefield, people taken for questioning, intelligence gathering, do you support the President’s plan? 

I just came back from GTMO a couple of weeks ago, carried a 

lot of legislation since I have been here in a very short amount of 

time on the issue of GTMO. 

Do you support the President’s proposal to close GTMO by the 

end of this year and transfer those terrorists back to this country, 

to U.S. prisons? 

Secretary CARTER. Thank you for that question. I don’t think the 

President has a plan to close GTMO and return all the detainees 

to this country by the end of this year because there is a law that 

prohibits that. The President does have the stated intention to 

close GTMO and I am in favor of the safe closure of Guantanamo 

Bay. 

I have been there, too; I thank—— 

Mrs. WALORSKI [continuing]. Would that include the core that 

can’t be released to be—come back to the United States, the United 

States’ prison system? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, they have to be incarcerated in some 

way, there is no question. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. The U.S. prison system? 

Secretary CARTER [continuing]. But it cannot—— 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Do you—Mr. Secretary, do you support them 

coming back to the U.S. prison system? 

Secretary CARTER. There has to be some final disposition—— 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Is that the only option for final disposition is the 

U.S. prison system? 

Secretary CARTER. A, that is an option that is available—— 

Mrs. WALORSKI. What is the other alternative? 

Secretary CARTER. But—— 

Mrs. WALORSKI. What is the other—— 

Secretary CARTER. Just a moment. 

But it is now forbidden by law to do that. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. This President has been known to override the 

law. It is not that this would be breaking news. 

So do you support—not that you—what is the other alternative, 

if the U.S. prison system is not the final destination, what is the 

alternative, where would they go? 

Secretary CARTER. I think that there—we need to work with 

those of you on Capitol Hill to find a lawful disposition for people 

who cannot be transferred or released safely from Guantanamo 

Bay. 

The reason why I think it is desirable to close GTMO, though I 

realize it is now unlawful to transfer people to the United States, 

is that I think it still provides a point—a rallying point for jihadi 

recruiting, and I think that is unfortunate. That is the reason to 

try to close it. But I say safely close it. We need to find a way—— 

Mrs. WALORSKI. I appreciate—— 

Secretary CARTER [continuing]. To safely close it and that needs 

to be lawful and that has got to be done in cooperation with you. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. I appreciate it. 

As you know, Mr. Secretary, this committee is undertaking an 

investigation of the transfer of the Taliban Five from GTMO to 
48 

Qatar in May of 2014. I am just asking, in light of the committee’s 

responsibility to conduct a comprehensive assessment based on a 

review of this important subject, will you commit today where the 

previous Secretary left off to continue the Department’s engagement in ensuring all the requested materials provided and to work 

with the interagency to ensure that requested information is provided in those limited instances in which other organizations and 

the U.S. government have an equity? 

Secretary CARTER. You bet, Congresswoman. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. I appreciate it. 

And then my final question is, in the—our President as the Commander in Chief said in his State of the Union address that the 

number one threat to the national defense is climate change. 

General—Admiral Mullen just a few years ago said he believes 

the number one national defense issue in our Nation is the debt 

in our country. 

Do you believe that the debt this Nation is carrying, nearly $18 

billion as we are sitting here as well, having budget conversations, 

is more of a threat to this Nation’s national security than climate 

change? 

Secretary CARTER. There are a number of serious dangers to the 

future of our country—— 

Mrs. WALORSKI. I would agree with you, sir. I am just asking—— 

Secretary CARTER [continuing]. Of which—— 

Mrs. WALORSKI [continuing]. I don’t know you well. I am just trying to get a perspective from where you are coming from, as we are 

going to be voting on a huge leap in this budget, and I think the 

American people want to know where the national defense leader 

is coming from as well. 

Do you believe that the Nation’s debt is a greater issue than climate change, as our Commander in Chief has stated? 

Secretary CARTER. I think they are both serious problems and 

there are other serious problems that are not those two and that 

we have to deal with all of those strategic challenges at the same 

time. You are naming two of the problems. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. I am naming what the Commander in Chief said 

as he puts forth a budget that you guys have been defending here 

for 3 hours now. 

I am just saying he says the greatest threat to our Nation is climate change and we are trying to make an argument that says, 

you know, the greatest threat to this nation in trying to rally people and understanding is that we have an issue of debt that an admiral went on the record to say was a serious consequence and a 

threat to the survivability of this country. 

Did you agree? 

Secretary CARTER. I think that to the extent that the deficit 

drives a budget behavior like the year-to-year struggle with sequester that we faced, that is a challenge to our national security because of the challenge to our national defense. 

I think we have threats around the world that are very dangerous to us. I think that, to get to back to an earlier line of questioning, the strength of our Nation depends upon other instruments 

of national power than our military power. 
49 

I think in the long run the strength of our Nation depends upon 

our ability to educate people and to have scientists and engineers. 

There was a discussion of our scientific base earlier. There are 

many, many ingredients to making a healthy and productive America going forward. We need to tend to them all and I think we have 

to have balance in how we approach these things. So I would appeal for balance and a strategic view that looks at all of these 

issues. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Zinke. 

Mr. ZINKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And gentlemen, the country is in your debt. 

General, I have known you a long time and certainly for your 

service. 

And Mr. Secretary, I had not known you as long but thank you 

for taking the job. 

Having said that, this committee, I am a freshman. And before 

this committee, we have heard the testimonies of General Abizaid. 

We have heard certainly in conversations with General Conway 

that I know well and fought with in Fallujah. 

And both of them have said that—I will quote General Conway— 

‘‘there is not a snowball’s chance in hell that our operations alone 

are going to degrade and defeat ISIS.’’ 

And then given the recent success of Iran, certainly they have 

embedded commanders in their forces, even though it is a modern 

Shia force, which has great ramifications long term. 

And I have always been a fight-or-go-home guy. If we are going 

to fight, fight to win. I was never a flag officer; I was a deputy acting commander of special [operation] forces in Iraq, and I was a 

commander at SEAL Team Six. But I have always—in my career 

I have always looked at protection of our troops and making sure 

they had the right equipment, the right training, and the right 

rules of engagement to win decisively on the battle of field. 

And having said that, if we are to embed, as Iran is having success to do, and if we are going to look at General Abizaid and General Conway’s and some of your senior leadership, then my concern 

is that if we embed, we don’t just embed with just a few, because 

we have seen what happens should an individual get captured. He 

is going to die a heinous death in a cage and burned alive. 

So embedding is going to take a force package of relative weight 

and we are going to have to have a MEDEVAC [medical evacuation] because if one of our guys gets hurt, we are going to have 

to bring him out. And it is going to be at a U.S. facility somewhere 

close. 

And if our guys get pinned down for some reason, that is a QRF 

[quick reaction force]. So that is American armor, American forces, 

because we don’t want another Somalia or Benghazi. 

Then we have to have, you know, a logistics arm to make sure 

our allies we are fighting with—the Sunnis and the Kurds directly 

and the centralized government—have the ammunition, food, fuel, 

everything it takes to win, because now we have committed and 

embedded. 

And my question is, do the current authorization as proposed, 

does it allow the flexibility for you, should the decision be made to 
50 

embed the force structure I have laid out? Does that authorization 

that you are asking—does it include the flexibility to embed that 

force package to win? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, first of all, thanks for your own service, 

and thanks for bringing what is evidently a great store of knowledge to this committee. So thanks for that. 

And the answer is yes. In fact, the President, when he first described the AUMF, enumerated a few things that were specifically 

permitted by it, which include many of the items on your list, so 

the answer is yes. 

Mr. ZINKE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

And Mr. Chairman, I yield the remaining part of my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Knight. 

Mr. KNIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Chair, but not least. 

I am going to talk about air power a little bit, since it seems like 

over the last 15 or 20 years, we have diverted kind of a little away 

from X-Plane technology, put it into a little bit different phase of 

different exploration. 

And now we are in a phase of flying the wings off an aircraft 

after 40 or 50 years and not going onto the next generation in, it 

seems to me to be a little quicker phase to stay up with technology. 

Everyone has talked about the iPhone here today, and I have a 

16-year-old at home that doesn’t know anything different than living with the iPhone, even though it has only been out for 8 years. 

So in the time—in the 1950s, when we had five or six fighters 

working through the program and we worked through the Century 

series and about an 8-year program, now we are looking at fifthgeneration fighters that will probably go through 2050 or 2060. 

Is that a concern? Is that a concern that we can do something 

quicker? We always talk about how we acquire things and how we 

can get through the acquisition phase quicker. 

Well, if we could do that with technology, say we could do a sixth 

generation fighter today, it would be much more advanced than our 

Raptors in the air. 

But how could we do that in a quicker phase of 15- to 20-year 

period and then fly them for 40 or 50 years? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, thanks for that, and that, to me, recalls 

a word that the chairman used at the beginning of this hearing, 

which is agility. And if we don’t have agility and our programs take 

15 or 20 years to develop, we are not going to have the best military in the world. 

On the other hand—not on the other hand, but in addition, it is 

the case that aircraft remain in our inventory for a long time. Now, 

they are not the same old aircraft; they are continually modified, 

their software is changed, their armaments are changed, and so 

forth. 

But few realize, but I am sure you do, that 70 percent of the cost 

of a military system is in owning it, not buying it in the first place. 

And so as we talk about acquisition reform and cost control, as 

we began this morning discussing, we must pay attention to 

sustainment costs. And in the fifth generation aircraft, the F–35 

and so forth, we are trying to be very attentive to sustainment 
51 

costs because they are going to be the lion’s share of the total lifecycle cost of the airplane. 

Mr. KNIGHT. And Mr. Secretary, I do not argue with you, but in 

the phase of an aircraft, before fifth-generation, we are talking 

about armament and how we could change the aircraft. Some of 

that was with avionics. Some of that was with guts. But a lot of 

that was what we hung off the airplane. 

Today, it is changing quicker, and it is changing yearly, of what 

the advancement in aircraft can be, how we detect them, how far 

they can get into the battlefield without being seen. 

Those are the things that our young airmen are—should be worried about, because the advancements are coming so quickly. For 

about 50 years, those advancements weren’t there. It was just, if 

we were faster than you and we could shoot first, then we beat you. 

Secretary CARTER. I am with you, and I am very concerned that 

we keep up in the electronic-warfare field, which I think you are 

referring to in that. 

Some of our potential opponents have made advances in that 

area, enabled by the spread of technology around the world. And 

so if we are going to keep the advantage that we have historically 

had, we need to keep up in those areas. So I am completely with 

you. 

Mr. KNIGHT. Okay. In my last 50 seconds, I am just going to say 

that if there is some way we can do this in DOD that, you know— 

companies do this all of the time. We have talked about one today. 

They talk about how quickly they can get it out into the field, because the quicker they get it out there, the quicker they make 

money. 

The quicker we can do that in DOD, the quicker the warfighter 

is safer or is ahead of the technological curve. And we have seen 

that with UASs [unmanned aircraft systems], with the young soldiers on the field where they are able to see the enemy where they 

probably couldn’t see them without them getting around. 

So those things, I would ask that we can do something like that 

in DOD that might replicate what they do in the private industry. 

Secretary CARTER. We have a number of initiatives, Congressman, in our budget that have exactly that intent, and I would be 

pleased to provide you with more information on them. 

But I think you are onto something that is terribly important, 

and it is one of the areas where we are trying to make investments, 

and we need the funding to make those investments. 

Mr. KNIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

And General, thank you. You have helped the freshman class 

very much. I am sure you have helped everyone on this dais, but 

I appreciate your service and your commitment to our country. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. McSally. You are on. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Secretary Carter, General Dempsey. I was a masters 

of public policy graduate, so you were one of my instructors back 

in 1988 to 1990, so it is good to see you again. 

Secretary CARTER. Wonderful. Good to see you. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Good that we have both been able to find a, you 

know, good job to make a difference here, right? 

Secretary CARTER. Well, thank you. You make me proud. 
52 

Ms. MCSALLY. Well, I look forward to working with you in future. 

I want to talk a little bit about combat search and rescue capabilities in Iraq and Syria. I was 26 years in the military. I was an 

A–10 pilot, just truth in advertising there, and ran our joint search 

and rescue center during Operation Southern Watch and then the 

early days of the Afghanistan war. 

So I know there are tremendous challenges in trying to make 

sure that if someone has to eject or they get shot down, that we 

are able to rescue them very quickly, also in the environment that 

we have seen with the fate of the Jordanian pilot, to be able to immediately be overhead to locate and protect them while we are 

moving the forces to pick them up. I mean, we have got to get them 

right away. I am sure you are aware of that. 

I have gotten an initial brief, and I will get a more detailed, classified briefing tomorrow by the Joint Staff on our combat search 

and rescue posture. 

But I am concerned, and I know maybe we will have to talk more 

classified about our response capability and our posture and whether it is limited by the 3,100-person-on-the-ground limitation, because we have got to be able to make sure, especially the guys flying single-engine airplanes, like the F–16, that if they have to 

eject, that we are going to do everything it takes, and sometimes 

that takes tremendous resources on airborne alert to be able to go 

in and protect them so that we can get them out. 

So could you speak generally about that, and I would like followup probably in a more classified hearing. 

Secretary CARTER. I will speak generally, because as you know 

full well—and thank you for what you did—we need to talk the details about this in a classified session, which we can do. 

But in general, it is not the 3,100 limit that in any way paces 

the search and rescue effort there; it is time and distance, and we 

are very attentive to that. 

Again, I don’t want to say more here, but I am sure you can well 

imagine what I mean. Very attentive to that, indeed, for our air operations over both Iraq and Syria. 

Let me see if the chairman wants to add anything. 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, thanks, Mr. Secretary. 

By the way, Congresswoman, speaking to you about combat 

search and rescue is like talking about nuclear issues sitting next 

to a nuclear physicist. But I will do so nevertheless. 

It isn’t—we are not limited—the BOG [boots on the ground] does 

not limit our ability to do combat search and rescue. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. 

General DEMPSEY. And you know generally where we are postured. My staff will articulate that tomorrow. 

We also, if we think the mission is high risk, as you know, we 

can actually put the package airborne as part of the air-tasking 

order. So we are very attentive to that. But I think you will find 

the staff will ease your concerns tomorrow. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay, great, thank you. I wanted to follow up on 

the A–10 issue. You mentioned it earlier. I commanded the 354th 

Fighter Squadron. It’s now deployed over to the European theater 

dealing with working with our allies related to the aggression that 
53 

we have seen come out of Russia. And we also have A–10s deployed, as you know, to Iraq and Syria. 

But the President’s budget requests mothballing 160 of them, 

and while we don’t really have a suitable replacement. And I asked 

yesterday, Secretary James, if that was strictly a budget decision, 

and she said yes. 

And I just wanted to hear from you if that is the case; whether 

this is—because we have heard many different arguments over the 

last few years, quite frankly, which are all over the map, that if 

you had the resources, would you keep the A–10 flying to its lifespan, which is 2028? 

Secretary CARTER. I agree with Secretary James. It is strictly a 

budgetary issue. We are squeezed on all directions, and we are 

doing our best under—to give the country the defense it needs for 

the amount of money that we have. 

The A–10 is a very proud aircraft, and has done an enormous 

amount for us over the years. And I think we have tried to find 

common ground with those here on the Hill. And very important 

to me, which is not a money issue, is to make sure that our close 

air support from the Air Force to our ground forces is a real enduring capability. I am satisfied that it is. I am sure that Secretary 

James said the same thing yesterday. Chairman, you want to add 

anything? 

General DEMPSEY. You know, Congressman, we have got aircraft 

providing close air support from the Apache helicopter to the B–1. 

And the A–10 is in that sweep of capabilities. But it is, we are 

faced with a budget issue, and trying to make sure we keep enough 

capability that can operate both in contested and uncontested airspace. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great, thank you. My time is about to expire. But 

for the record, I do have a question I will be following up with. I 

know we are talking about making sure that women can be fully 

integrated into all jobs in the military, but I also want to hear 

whether there are deployment positions that are male-only positions. 

We have seen some of the issues pop up at GTMO, when I served 

in Saudi Arabia. There are some specific positions that were maleonly. So across the board, military and civilian, I would like a follow-up, whether you have male-only deployment positions for civilian and military. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. McCord, as promised, I want to 

come back on the audit issue, because we had two service secretaries yesterday who said the biggest impediment to achieving—to 

meeting the deadline in 2017 for their service to pass a clean audit 

was the Defense Finance and Accounting Service [DFAS] over 

which they had no control. Are you aware of the problem, and are 

you going to fix it? 

Secretary MCCORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes. I think we 

have a lot of hard work to do on audit, and we are making good 

progress. I think you probably heard both of those thoughts, both 

those sides yesterday. 
54 

The issue that came out—audit is very much a team sport in two 

ways. It requires the military departments who were here yesterday to work with service providers, which DFAS is probably the 

most important one in the Department in that respect. 

The second way, though, it also requires the collaboration of people throughout the Department, people who do audit as a primary 

function, like our DFAS folks, it is a primary responsibility of 

theirs, but it also requires the logisticians and the personnel community, people who don’t normally think, ‘‘Audit is my primary 

job,’’ to work, or we can’t make it work because it requires information from all those systems. 

So in that respect, it is very much like if the Secretary were to 

turn to General Dempsey, to his right, and ask him to accomplish 

a task, and set up a task force, it would require the people at the 

tip of the spear, but it also requires the logisticians to airlift all the 

things that support. 

Very much the same with our audit task. It requires financial 

managers that I am in charge of, but also, again, the logisticians 

and the personnel community, the people that own information 

across the Department. 

So with respect to the DFAS issue that was raised yesterday, as 

I understand it, DFAS is an entity of itself. As an entity—reporting 

entity, it has passed a clean audit 15 times in a row. So they are 

not an incapable organization in any way. They are also doing the 

contracting for audit for all the military departments to get people 

on contract to do the independent auditing. 

In a role as a service provider, they have had four areas where 

they have a clean audit, and have had a clean audit, which is their 

bread-and-butter areas of paying military, paying civilians, paying 

contractors, and disbursing. 

The issue that came up where they did not pass was called ‘‘financial reporting,’’ which is the most involved, complex, spreads 

across the whole Department issue, and that is where the challenge lies. So they were given 10 areas, 10 areas where they 

didn’t—where they were examined, and there were 9 that didn’t 

pass. 

They were given 12 items to work on by the auditors. Ten of 

those will be done by the end of this year. But the other two will 

require a little more time. So I would say that this is why you do 

audits and exams the same way, again, just to make a military 

analogy, why you have an operational readiness inspection of a 

unit, to find out where you are good and where you are not. 

But I just wanted to say that the DFAS is a capable partner. 

They do have a problem here. But financial reporting is not strictly 

a DFAS issue only, because it is interaction of information across 

the Department, which is one of the real hard parts of audit for us. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, all this talk about budget up here, 

and this makes a big difference. And those of us who believe we 

need to spend more on defense, if we can’t improve the accountability for how we spend that money, it makes our job much, much 

more difficult. 

And I appreciate how many—how complex this is, but I am 

just—as an editorial comment, it makes a big difference in getting 

budget support up here if we can meet those deadlines for an audit. 
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And if we can’t, it undermines that effort. I know you know that, 

but it—particularly in the middle of these budget discussions, it is 

very much on my mind. 

Mr. McCord, let me ask you one other thing. You have heard 

some of the discussion about what we can use OCO for, what we 

can’t. My understanding is there is OMB [Office of Management 

and Budget] guidance, and perhaps some Department guidance, 

that helps direct the uses for OCO funds versus base funds. 

My understanding, and my memory is that Congress can also 

designate OCO funds for procurement. And we bought F–35s in the 

past with OCO funds. Am I on the right track here? 

Secretary MCCORD. Yes, Mr. Chairman. There is an agreement 

between the Office of Management and Budget and the Department of Defense. I was involved in negotiating that early on in this 

administration. We felt that it needed to be a little tighter than it 

had been when we got here. 

That agreement dates to 2010, and it has got geographic aspects 

to it. Things that happened in this country, that country, the other 

country, are okay. Things that happened in countries not in the 

agreement may not be. And we have had some modifications to 

that. 

You are also correct in that Congress plays a role. In general, 

OCO funding has to be designated by both the Congress and the 

President, as OCO spending, as emergency spending. That is the 

procedure that was followed both by this administration, and under 

the previous administration as well. So both parties have a voice. 

And you mentioned F–35s have been an issue of contention in 

the past. In fact, just a few months ago, we requested to buy some 

F–35s to replace aircraft that were destroyed at Kandahar, as well 

as some training losses, and several of the committees, including 

this one, approved, but one did not. So there was division, remains 

division on these questions, sometimes of what was appropriate use 

of OCO. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Would you do me a favor, and would you 

or your folks submit to us in writing an overview of how OCO 

works now? As y’all said, this is not the best way to run a railroad. 

And I hope that we can have a different method of funding the Department as we move down the many steps ahead in the budget 

process. 

If, however, we end up with a substantial amount of OCO to 

make up for gaps in the base, then I want to understand what all 

of those restrictions, administrative or legislative, may be, because 

those are things that we can obviously address in the authorization 

bill. 

I don’t know how this is going to go. I just want to be ready, and 

you can help us in understanding that. I would appreciate it. 

Secretary MCCORD. Certainly will provide that information for 

the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 101.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, last question I have 

got is about Ukraine. Mr. Smith has introduced legislation along 

with me that would require lethal assistance be provided to the 

Ukrainians so they can defend themselves, so they can do some-
56 

thing about these tanks and armored personnel carriers that are 

pouring in from Russia. 

What we have been told in all our previous hearings from the administration witnesses is, ‘‘Well, we are studying it.’’ 

Well, every day that the White House dithers about this, more 

equipment is pouring in for what I presume is going to be a renewed offensive at some point. So can you help me understand 

what the timeline is for a decision on—from the administration on 

providing lethal assistance to the Ukrainians? 

Secretary CARTER. Yes. Thank you, Chairman. Two things. The 

first is you are right; our support for Ukraine, as it tries to create 

a place for itself in Europe, situated as it is between Europe and 

Russia, is very important. And I know you are asking about the 

military side of it. 

The part I would preface, though, is that is principally a political, 

and above all, economic challenge, because the economy of Ukraine 

is in serious trouble. So I think the assistance of Western countries 

to the economy of Ukraine is the most important thing. It is not 

my responsibility, but I just wanted to say I think that is the most 

important thing. 

We are supplying military assistance to the Ukrainian military. 

The President just made an announcement about a week ago about 

a military assistance at a number of categories, vehicles and so 

forth, that I think will be of material assistance to the Ukrainian 

military. 

There are also under consideration—and yes, it is under consideration—some additional categories of assistance, which are defensive lethal assistance. And those are being considered. I think they 

should be considered. And I have said that before. 

But it is a complicated decision that involves other kinds of assistance that we are giving, and the paramount fact, which is that 

we need to support the Ukrainians politically and economically. 

And in particular, our NATO partners and our European allies 

need to support Ukraine economically. 

In the end, that is going to be the key to keeping what we all 

want, which is an independent Ukraine that can find its own way, 

and isn’t pushed around by the Russians. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I don’t disagree with you about the importance of financial assistance. But what concerns me is while we 

study to death, and thus do not provide them the means with 

which to defend themselves against armor, among other things, 

and artillery attacks and so forth, the positions in the Eastern 

rebel-held area are strengthening. 

And last point is countries around the world are watching how 

reliable a friend we are. And I am concerned that this has tremendous detrimental effects, encouraging Putin’s aggression, and discouraging countries from being friends of the United States, because we are sitting here wringing our hands and providing a few 

blankets and whatnot. 

I don’t think that is a good way to go. I realize that this has 

turned into a White House call. Sorry. Last point is there is tremendous bipartisan support in both the House and the Senate for 

providing this assistance. And I really think the administration is 
57 

isolated on this issue. That is also something that is not good for 

the country. 

I will—unless you have something you want to add, I don’t want 

to cut you off, but—— 

Secretary CARTER. I would simply say that, a sort of personal observation, I was in Budapest in 1994 when the agreement was 

signed, that the Russians have violated. So I am very alive to the 

possibility that we had then, and I think still need to stick up for, 

of an independent Ukraine able to find its own way politically and 

economically, is the only thing I would say in the first instance. It 

is terribly important that that occur. 

And the other thing I would say is nobody ought to mistake that, 

you know, Ukraine is a very, very important country to us. It is 

not a NATO ally. And I just want to make the point that as far 

as NATO allies are concerned, that raises a whole other set of 

issues that I hope anyone who is considering encroaching upon a 

NATO ally takes very seriously. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I hope so, too. I will be traveling to that 

region shortly, and talking with some of those folks about it. 

Secretary CARTER. Thank you for doing that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you all for being here. Mr. Secretary, welcome back. General Dempsey, you are going to miss us when you 

are gone. 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you all for being here. With that, the 

hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 18, 2015 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 18, 2015 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 18, 2015 

(101) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY 

Secretary CARTER. There is very little in terms of the legal framework applicable 

to the designation of funds for ‘‘Overseas Contingency Operations.’’ 

Section 251(b)(2)(A)(ii) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act 

of 1985 (BBEDCA), codified at 2 U.S.C. § 901(b)(2), provides for an adjustment to 

the discretionary spending limits specified elsewhere in the BBEDCA for the security category. The adjustment corresponds to the sum of appropriations for discretionary accounts that ‘‘the Congress designates for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism in statute on an account by account basis and the 

President subsequently so designates’’. 

Section 251(b)(2)(A)(i) of the BBEDCA provides for the same type of adjustment 

for appropriations for discretionary accounts that ‘‘the Congress designates as emergency requirements in statute on an account by account basis and the President 

subsequently so designates’’. 

There is no BBEDCA statutory definition of ‘‘Overseas Contingency Operations/ 

Global War on Terrorism’’ (OCO/GWOT). In contrast, the BBEDCA does define the 

term ‘‘emergency.’’ Section 250(c)(20) of the BBEDCA, codified at 2 U.S.C. § 900(c), 

defines the term ‘‘emergency’’ as: ‘‘a situation that- (A) requires new budget authority and outlays (or new budget authority and the outlays flowing therefrom) for the 

prevention or mitigation of, or response to, loss of life or property, or a threat to 

national security; and (B) is unanticipated.’’ Further, subsection (c)(21) defines the 

term ‘‘unanticipated’’ to mean that ‘‘the underlying situation is—(A) sudden, which 

means quickly coming into being or not building up over time; (B) urgent, which 

means a pressing and compelling need requiring immediate action; (C) unforeseen, 

which means not predicted or anticipated as an emerging need; and (D) temporary, 

which means not of a permanent duration.’’ 

Although there is no definition of OCO/GWOT, OMB has promulgated guidance 

regarding what costs can be budgeted for in the OCO request. While most of the 

funds designated for OCO/GWOT have been requested and appropriated to the Department of Defense, funds designated for OCO/GWOT have also been requested 

and appropriated for the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development, and Related Agencies. In addition, there is no statutory cap 

on amounts that can be designated for OCO/GWOT. Thus the Congress has broad 

discretion as to what accounts and what amounts to designate for OCO/GWOT; the 

sole check is that the President must also designate the funds for OCO/GWOT. If 

the President does not so designate, the funds are still appropriated and would be 

available for their intended purpose, but they would count against the statutory 

spending limits, which may result in or increase the magnitude of a sequestration. 

Finally, while funds designated for OCO/GWOT are not counted against discretionary spending limits when determining if a breach has occurred, if a breach does 

occur and accounts are sequestered, funds designated for OCO/GWOT are subject 

to sequestration. [See page 55.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY DR. WENSTRUP 

General DEMPSEY. The policy of the United States is not to use lethal force when 

it is feasible to capture a terrorist suspect, because capturing a terrorist offers the 

best opportunity to gather meaningful intelligence and to mitigate and disrupt terrorist plots. Capture operations are conducted only against suspects who may lawfully be captured or otherwise taken into custody by the United States and only 

when the operation can be conducted in accordance with all applicable laws and consistent with our obligations to other sovereign states. 

Throughout its history, the United States has held detainees captured during 

armed conflict in various overseas theaters as well as on U.S. soil. Historically, the 

circumstances of each conflict have determined the appropriate detention location. 

In similar fashion, decisions regarding where to detain members of al-Qaida and associated forces will be made on a case-by-case basis, in consultation with the Department’s interagency partners. 
102 

The Administration approaches new captures outside Afghanistan based on the 

facts of the situation on a case-by-case basis with a range of options, including: 

• Prosecution in our military commission system or in the Federal courts; 

• Transfer to another country for an appropriate disposition there; or 

• Law of war detention, in appropriate cases. 

When we do detain a suspect, we interrogate him/her. Both the law of war and 

the civilian criminal justice system allow for the questioning of unprivileged enemy 

belligerents. 

If we are holding them under AUMF authorities, then we may continue exploitation for strategic intelligence purposes, and still maintain the options to transfer 

them to another government for prosecution, or hold them in U.S. Government custody for prosecution in military commissions or under Article III in the U.S. Federal 

courts. Generally speaking, we are not required to immediately turn them over to 

another government. 

If the detainee can be prosecuted, we decide whether to try him in a civilian court 

or a military commission. A criminal conviction could be a basis for incarceration 

even after a cessation of hostilities. 

The President has directed the Department of Defense to designate a site in the 

United States where we can hold military commissions. 

The law of war allows the government to continue detention until the cessation 

of hostilities. The end of armed conflict against al-Qaida would terminate the United 

States’ authority to detain individuals based solely on their status as enemy combatants. Detainees could be held until released under post-conflict ‘‘wind-down’’ authority, subject to determination that the risks they pose are mitigated; or if there is 

an independent basis for continued detention. When the armed conflict against alQaida ends, we will face difficult questions about what to do with any detainees remaining in military detention without a criminal conviction and sentence. [See 

page 46.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. O’ROURKE 

General DEMPSEY. Yes, we have the necessary resources to achieve our tactical 

and strategic goals against ISIL, but our strategy requires supporting indigenous 

forces in both Iraq and Syria. We are enabling our ISF partners on the ground to 

take the fight to ISIL, who have made advances and suffered setbacks. In Syria, 

we continue to work diligently to develop a capable and reliable partner on the 

ground in order to confront ISIL. We have the resources to achieve our strategic and 

tactical goals, but this effort takes time, and we are only 8 months into a long campaign to degrade ISIL. Air Strikes are a key component of our kinetic support to 

these ground forces, but as the SecDef stated in his testimony, only local forces on 

the ground can impose a lasting defeat. [See page 23.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TAKAI 

General DEMPSEY. As the President noted in his letter transmitting the proposed 

AUMF to the Congress, the proposal does not authorize long-term, large-scale 

ground combat operations like those our nation conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Such operations will be the responsibility of local forces because that is what our 

local partners and allies want, that is what is best for preserving our international 

coalition, and, most importantly, that is in the best interest of the United States. 

The President has been clear, however, that there always may be exigent or unforeseen circumstances in which small numbers of U.S. forces may need to engage 

in limited or short duration ground combat operations, for example, to protect and 

defend U.S. personnel or citizens. The proposed AUMF would therefore provide the 

flexibility to conduct ground combat operations in other, more limited circumstances, such as rescue operations involving U.S. or coalition personnel or the 

use of special operations forces to take military action against ISIL leadership. The 

proposal would also authorize the use of U.S. forces in situations where ground combat operations are not expected or intended, such as intelligence collection and sharing, missions to enable kinetic strikes, or the provision of operational planning and 

other forms of advice and assistance to partner forces. 

As the ground combat limitation is focused on major operations—long-term, largescale—the proposal would provide the authority and the flexibility required to perform the mission. [See page 26.] 
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON 

Secretary CARTER. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 President’s Budget includes several 

initiatives that will retire force structure, eliminate excess infrastructure, and reform compensation and health care, and the budget reallocates those savings to 

higher priority programs, such as improving readiness and weapon system modernization. 

The top examples of these initiatives include adopting several recommendations 

from the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission 

(MCRMC), slowing the growth of military basic pay and housing allowances, modernizing the military healthcare system, reforming commissary operations, authorizing a new Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round, retiring A–10 aircraft, 

and permitting the Army Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI) to proceed. 

MCRMC: The Department supports MCRMC’s objective to improve the military 

compensation and retirement systems, and encourages Congress to support the recommendations for which the Department has submitted legislation to Congress. 

• For instance, the Department recently submitted a Blended Retirement proposal that would blend a 20-year cliff-vested defined benefit annuity with a defined contribution plan that would allow service members to contribute to a 

portable Thrift Savings Plan account. 

• The Department’s proposed Blended Retirement System would ensure 85 percent of service members receive Government contributions toward their retirement—compared to fewer than 20 percent under the current system, provide 

DOD with better tools to recruit and retain the All-Volunteer Force, and 

produce significant savings over the long term. 

• The retirement changes were considered holistically in the context of the recruiting, retention, and retirement continuum that would best enhance the 

readiness of the All-Volunteer Force in an increasingly competitive labor market. The Department looks forward to continuing to work with Congress and the 

MCRMC to meet our solemn responsibility to ensure that any changes protect 

the long-term viability of the All-Volunteer Force, improve quality-of-life for 

service members and their families, and safeguard the fiscal sustainability of 

the military compensation and retirement systems. 

Compensation Reform: The President’s Budget provides funding and commonsense reforms to ensure service members receive competitive pay and benefits as 

well as critical training and equipment. Within compensation reform, the following 

initiatives are essential: 

• Slow the growth of military basic pay—High retention rates reflected within the 

military force allow the Department to recruit and retain the requisite force and 

continue to offer a competitive military pay and benefits package. It is important to emphasize that even with a lower basic pay raise, military compensation 

will still remain well above the 70th percentile of wages for comparable civilians 

by age and education, while achieving substantive savings. Given the current 

Budget Control Act funding caps for Defense, increasing the military pay raise 

in excess of the President’s Budget request would force the Department to displace critical modernization and reduce readiness funding to finance the increase. 

• Slow the growth of basic allowance for housing (BAH)—The Department’s military and civilian leaders carefully considered this option to generate savings— 

savings needed to help close serious resource shortfalls in training, maintenance, and equipment. The Department found that slowing BAH growth until 

an average member’s out-of-pocket expenses reached five percent achieved an 

appropriate and reasonable balance between the Department’s need to achieve 

savings in the BAH program and the need to continue to offer a generous, competitive, and sustainable package of military pay and benefits. 

• Modernize military healthcare—The proposed Consolidated Health Plan structure would make it easier for beneficiaries to focus on health (no cost shares 

for preventive care), maintain a close relationship with their primary care provider (zero to low copayments), and offer beneficiary freedom of choice of providers. A proven utilization management design would attract beneficiaries to 

Military Treatment Facilities (MTF) for care as their provider of choice, thereby 

maximizing utilization of investments in the MTF structure. 

• Reform commissary operations—Our proposals would allow the Department to 

offset operating costs and develop effective commissary business practices without significantly affecting patron savings. 

Conducting Additional BRAC Round: The Department is facing a serious problem 

created by the tension of declining budgets, reductions in force structure, and limited flexibility to adapt its infrastructure accordingly and, therefore, urges the Con-
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gress to provide the BRAC authorization as requested. The Department needs to 

find a way to strike the right balance so that infrastructure does not drain resources 

from the warfighter. The Department’s goal is a BRAC focused on efficiency and 

savings, and it is a goal that is achievable. 

A–10 Aircraft: Divestiture of the A–10 is critical. It enables the Air Force to fund 

higher priority programs and balance current readiness with future modernization 

requirements. Such prohibitions limit or delay savings, efficiencies, and operational 

capabilities necessary to meet mission objectives in the current fiscal environment. 

In the case of the A–10, DOD believes the Joint Strike Fighter and other multi-mission aircraft will replace the A–10’s singular mission of close air support while also 

providing other critical capabilities. 

ARI: The DOD plans to transfer 72 Apache aircraft in FY 2016. The ARI, introduced in the FY 2015 President’s Budget and planned in the FY 2016 President’s 

Budget, will position Army aviation assets where they can best meet the combatant 

command requirements and strategic priorities. The Army remains steadfast in its 

conviction that ARI is the Total Army enterprise solution given the mounting costs 

of aging aircraft, growing operational requirements, and increasing fiscal pressures. 

In FY 2015, the Army began to divest the oldest, least capable aircraft while retaining the best, most capable airframes. When fully implemented, this initiative will 

use Army aviation forces more efficiently, increases the Army National Guard’s domestic response capacity, and optimizes the Army’s capability to meet combatant 

commanders’ requirements. [See page 32.] 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 18, 2015 

(107) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Ms. BORDALLO. How important was the removal of the restrictions on Government 

of Japan funds for the relocation of Marines from Okinawa to Guam in last year’s 

[National Defense Authorization Act]? I felt the Guam Oversight Committee was a 

helpful internal tool to the Department of Defense; are you planning to reinvigorate 

the committee? 

Secretary CARTER. The Department appreciates the support of Congress in lifting 

the restrictions on Government of Japan funds for the relocation of Marines from 

Okinawa to Guam. Removal of these restrictions will allow us to move forward on 

this essential component of the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, resulting in a 

more geographically dispersed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable 

posture in the area. 

Pursuant to Title 10, U.S. Code, subsection (e) of section 132, the Deputy Secretary of Defense chairs the Guam Oversight Committee (GOC) and serves as the 

Department of Defense’s principal representative for coordinating the interagency 

efforts in matters relating to Guam. The GOC convenes on a quarterly basis and 

addresses issues specific to the relocation. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Frank Kendall recently testified before the committee, ‘‘What I am seeing in foreign modernizations . . . is a suite of capabilities that are intended clearly . . . to defeat the American way of doing power projection, American way of warfare . . . And, 

without saying too much about this, the Chinese, in particular and, again, to a lesser extent, the Russians are . . . making advances beyond what we currently have 

fielded.’’ Many studies have determined that the United States utilized a cost imposition strategy that significantly contributed to the downfall of the Soviet Union. I’m 

concerned that rogue nations are now in the position to impose that strategy on the 

United States by developing ballistic missiles that cost in the small millions of dollars while we spend multiple billions on a limited missile defense system. Can you 

comment on how the fiscal year 2016 budget, or future budgets, will account for the 

development of missile defense or others systems that protect against this dynamic? 

General DEMPSEY. We are very much aware of our potential adversaries’ intent 

to use a cost imposition strategy against us, especially in the area of missile defense 

where it is inherently cheaper to build missiles to hit ground targets than to build 

missiles to hit other missiles. Our approach to this problem is to find and develop 

innovative capabilities that are both affordable and effective in achieving our goals 

in integrated air and missile defense. 

Our vision includes greater contributions to our missile defense capabilities by encouraging our partners and allies to share more of the burden for regional defense, 

particularly to protecting their home soil. To this end, we are seeing an uptick in 

foreign military sales of systems like Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). Additionally, we are looking at future innovative ways to mitigate 

air and missile threats via advanced technologies like railguns, directed energy, 

electronic attack, and even cyber. These hold promise in the long term to reverse 

the cost imposition back on our adversaries. Other techniques like dispersal of our 

assets, hardening, and defeating missile systems before they launch via kinetic or 

non-kinetic means are also in our plans. Furthermore, we want to ensure the systems we already have are properly modernized, ensure that our personnel are fully 

trained to operate those systems, and fully integrate missile defenses within the 

joint force and with our foreign partners and allies. 

For homeland defense, we remain committed to the cost of fielding a reliable, effective system to defeat a limited ballistic missile attack from a rogue nation. Here, 

deterrence based on denial is essential because of the enormous destruction if one 

of these countries were able to target our population centers with ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile]-delivered weapons of mass destruction. We have also budgeted for affordable sensor and shooter solutions to deterring and defeating cruise 

missile attacks on the homeland. All of these concepts are in the discussion for our 

Fiscal Year 2016 budget and beyond, and we will continue to reassess our plans to 

ensure we are finding smart ways to outpace the threat within realistic budget constraints. 
108 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER 

Mr. SHUSTER. We keep hearing that there is 20 percent excess capacity in Department of Defense infrastructure, but there is no guarantee that infrastructure will 

not be needed to fight future conflicts. I believe there are ways to seek efficiencies 

without a Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), a process that produces questionable cost savings. Within my district, I have seen the flexibility that an installation, 

Letterkenny Army Depot, gains through the use of leased land and contract personnel to respond to ever changing demand signals. What innovative solutions are 

available to address excess infrastructure and are there benchmarks that can be 

shared across the services to avoid the BRAC process? 

Secretary CARTER. The Department does not believe that innovations such as leasing arrangements or similar measures to repurpose excess space on installations 

would be sufficient to offset the costs of maintaining the Department’s excess infrastructure. As is the case in the private sector, it is more efficient to close an entire 

installation rather than mothball or lease a portion of that installation. The majority of BRAC savings come from civilian and military personnel eliminations, reduced 

base operating support costs, and reduced facility sustainment costs. Non-BRAC approaches do not achieve these savings because they do not enable the Department 

to eliminate the overhead personnel and sustainment costs associated with running 

and guarding the base. 

The Department believes the BRAC process could address concerns of needed infrastructure to fight future conflicts. The Department believes that the BRAC process provides appropriate safeguards to ensure the Department retains the capacity 

to respond to surge, accommodate a significant reconstitution of the force, and support all forces, including those currently based outside the United States. In fact, 

the selection criteria contained in the previous BRAC language (and the Department’s current request), specifically criteria one and three, capture the concept of 

surge capacity. Criterion one requires the Department to consider ‘‘current and future’’ mission capabilities and criterion three assesses the ‘‘ability to accommodate 

contingency, mobilization and future total force requirements.’’ Moreover, in the execution of prior BRAC rounds, and as verified in a 1999 study, the Department has 

demonstrated that it will retain within the U.S. installation infrastructure sufficient 

difficult-to-reconstitute assets to respond to surge, accommodate a significant reconstitution of the force, and support all forces, including those currently based outside 

the United States. 

Mr. SHUSTER. President Obama’s proposal for a new Authorization for the Use of 

Military Force ‘‘does not authorize the use of the United States Armed Forces in 

enduring offensive ground combat operations.’’ General Allen, the Special Presidential Envoy on countering the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations last month that the definition of ‘‘enduring offensive ground combat operations’’ could ‘‘be two weeks, it might 

be two years.’’ Please specifically define ‘‘enduring ground operations.’’ 

Secretary CARTER. The proposed Authorization for the Use of Military Force 

would not authorize long-term, large-scale ground combat operations like those the 

United States conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan. It would provide the flexibility 

to conduct ground combat operations in more limited circumstances, such as rescue 

operations involving U.S. or coalition personnel or special operations to take military action against Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant leadership. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Since the administration has not clearly defined ‘‘enduring ground 

operations,’’ who will be responsible for determining whether an action violated the 

stipulation against ‘‘enduring ground operations’’? 

Secretary CARTER. Any requirement for U.S. ground combat operations would be 

assessed on a mission-by-mission basis. I do not believe there would be opportunities for the commanders on the ground to engage in ‘‘enduring ground operations’’ 

without further orders from the President. 

Mr. SHUSTER. The President has placed a three-year limitation in his proposed 

Authorization for the Use of Military Force. Do you believe that the current strategy 

will defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in that time window? 

Secretary CARTER. While the campaign to degrade and ultimately defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) will not be over anytime soon, the proposed three-year term will provide the next president, the Congress, and the American people an opportunity to review progress and evaluate the authorities in place. 

Execution of the current strategy is the best way to ensure progress between now 

and then, while remaining flexible to the dynamic situation on the ground. 

Mr. SHUSTER. The United States manufactures a number of weapons systems that 

our allies can utilize as a counterpoint to the military advantages of hostile nations 

like Russia and Iran. Countries like Poland are increasingly looking to proven weap-
109 

ons systems, such as the Patriot Air and Missile Defense System, which are maintained and modified right here in United States at Letterkenny Army Depot in my 

district. In light of this, how do you believe we can best utilize our organic industrial 

base to assist our allies in hostile regions? 

Secretary CARTER. Our industrial base, both organic and commercial, can and 

does provide weapons support to our allies. For example, a number of foreign military sales (FMS) customers have the PATRIOT Air and Missile Defense System in 

their inventory, although Poland does not have an FMS case with the United States 

for PATRIOT. Missile recertification for PATRIOT can be/is performed at 

Letterkenny Army Depot for three FMS customers with certain components recertified at Raytheon. The organic and commercial industrial base will continue to support the various weapons systems that our allies utilize. 

Mr. SHUSTER. The Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) gives the 

President authority to ‘‘use the Armed Forces of the United States as the President 

determines to be necessary and appropriate against ISIL or associated persons or 

forces.’’ What impact does the use of the term ‘‘associated persons or forces’’ have 

with regards to how broadly this AUMF can be leveraged in areas of the world outside of Iraq and Syria? 

Secretary CARTER. ‘‘Associated persons or forces’’ means individuals and organizations fighting for, on behalf of, or alongside the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 

(ISIL) or any closely-related successor entity in hostilities against the United States 

or its coalition partners. To be considered an ‘‘associated force,’’ a group must both 

be an organized, armed group that has entered the fight alongside ISIL; and a cobelligerent with ISIL in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. Before a group is targeted, it will be evaluated against this standard, its current activities, our regional security priorities, and existing Presidential policy guidance. 

I do not currently envision using U.S. military force against ISIL outside of Iraq 

or Syria. That said, the enemy in this conflict has not confined itself to the geographic boundaries of any one country, and I believe it would be a mistake to signal 

to ISIL that there are safe havens for them outside Iraq and Syria by limiting the 

authorization to specific countries. The President’s proposed AUMF would provide 

the flexibility to address the threat as necessary. 

Mr. SHUSTER. We have seen previously how the premature withdrawal of American forces leads to destabilization and future conflicts in places like Iraq. Indeed, 

terrorist groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) thrive and grow 

in a power vacuum. Do you believe that President Obama’s Authorization for the 

Use of Military Force allows for adequate planning for security operations after the 

defeat of ISIL? 

Secretary CARTER. Yes, I believe President Obama’s Authorization for the Use of 

Military Force allows for adequate planning for security operations after the defeat 

of ISIL. The immediate introduction of security and governance elements into contested areas from which ISIL has recently been driven out is essential to ensuring 

lasting success. This cannot be a military-only solution. The Department of State, 

along with General Allen in his role as the Special Presidential Envoy for the Global 

Coalition to Counter ISIL, is leading efforts on stabilization and is working closely 

with the Government of Iraq. I refer you to the Department of State for additional 

information about these efforts. 

Mr. SHUSTER. General Dempsey, you stated ‘‘sequester-level cuts will lead to a 

hollow [Defense Industrial Base] that no longer holds all of the critical design and 

manufacturing capabilities our military needs.’’ Do you believe that under the burden of the sequester our industrial base still has the capacity to support U.S. action 

in a major, large-scale conflict? 

General DEMPSEY. Passing the President’s FY16 budget request will best ensure 

our industrial base can provide the military needs our warfighting men and women 

require to prevail in a major, large-scale conflict. Conversely, the impact of potential 

budget reductions—particularly sequestration—places substantial pressure on the 

Defense Industrial Base (DIB), creating a difficult environment for long-term planning. Firms must plan and realign business activities while competing for capital 

in competitive markets. In many cases, DOD comprises an ever-smaller portion of 

much larger markets (Aerospace, Electronics, IT/Telecom, Services, etc.). Companies 

are skeptical that DOD will be able to fully fund even its prior commitments. Since 

the 1990s, the DIB has seen erosion in multiple sectors, including fixed-wing aircraft, missiles, electronics, ground vehicles and materials, with some associated decreases in design engineering and manufacturing capability. While DIB arguably 

produces the best systems in the world, in many cases, the defense department is 

requiring lower quantities. Significant stress also exists in the lower sub-tiers of the 
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DIB as smaller firms, with limited access to capital, deal with the downturn in the 

defense budget further thinning the supply chain. 

Mr. SHUSTER. General Dempsey, you state ‘‘Our Nation cannot sustain the world’s 

finest military without also sustaining the world’s strongest and most innovative defense industrial base.’’ My district is home to Letterkenny Army Depot, and I have 

seen firsthand the high level of technical skill that goes into supporting our 

warfighter with the best equipment possible. Do you believe the sequester will impact depot workload, and how do you feel we can best support and preserve our depots and industrial base? 

General DEMPSEY. Passing the President’s FY16 budget request will best ensure 

our industrial base can provide the military needs our warfighting men and women 

require to prevail in a major, large-scale conflict. Conversely, the impact of potential 

budget reductions—particularly sequestration—places substantial pressure on the 

Defense Industrial Base (DIB), creating a difficult environment for long-term planning. Firms must plan and realign business activities while competing for capital 

in competitive markets. In many cases, DOD comprises an ever-smaller portion of 

much larger markets (Aerospace, Electronics, IT/Telecom, Services, etc.). Companies 

are skeptical that DOD will be able to fully fund even its prior commitments. Since 

the 1990s, the DIB has seen erosion in multiple sectors, including fixed-wing aircraft, missiles, electronics, ground vehicles and materials, with some associated decreases in design engineering and manufacturing capability. While DIB arguably 

produces the best systems in the world, in many cases, the defense department is 

requiring lower quantities. Significant stress also exists in the lower sub-tiers of the 

DIB as smaller firms, with limited access to capital, deal with the downturn in the 

defense budget further thinning the supply chain. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY 

Mr. CONAWAY. This committee is concerned with and focused on improving bureaucratic processes such as acquisition to be more efficient to better serve our 

warfighters. Personnel are critical in making these improvements. We have learned 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has nearly two times as many contractor FTEs as they do military and civilian FTEs combined. In fact, two Under 

Secretary offices have three to nearly five times as many contractor FTEs as they 

do military and civilian FTEs. As compared to the Services, OSD has more than six 

times as many contractors. Given the role of execution falls to the Military Departments, can you explain why so many contractors work for OSD? How does this degree of bureaucracy help the services execute programs? 

Secretary CARTER. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) staff, like other 

elements of the Department, utilizes contracted support to augment and complement its organic government staff of military and civilian personnel. Contracted 

support to the OSD staff provides, among other things, a wide-range of professional, 

administrative, and management services that do not necessitate government performance. This use of contracted support allows the Department’s military and civilian employees to focus on inherently governmental tasks—command & control; policy development; budget formulation; program management; and oversight of the 

multitude of programs and services across the Department that exist to support the 

readiness, morale, and well-being of our uniformed service members and their families. 

As stated in the ‘‘Plan for Streamlining Department of Defense (DOD) Management Headquarters, Section 904 Initial Report to Congress,’’ the Deputy Chief Management Officer and DOD Chief Information Officer are co-leading a business processes and systems review (BPSR), and the supporting information technology systems, within OSD organizations and their associated Defense Agencies and DOD 

Field Activities. The BPSRs will help OSD offices identify their primary mission and 

outcomes, along with the necessary resources allocated (including contracted support), identify obstacles to achieving those outcomes (e.g., resource shortfalls, policy/ 

legislative issues, process obstacles), and identify activities that might be improved 

or eliminated. 

Senior leaders will continue to examine opportunities to achieve additional efficiencies in OSD, as well as other headquarters activities in the Department. 

Mr. CONAWAY. In light of the fact that Acquisition, Technology and Logistics has 

more than 2,600 contractor FTEs, 99 percent of their staff is GS–15 or higher, is 

the organization too top heavy and contractor dependent to eliminate unnecessary 

bureaucracy within the acquisition process? If Military Departments are ultimately 

responsible for executing acquisition programs, is it necessary, efficient, and effec-
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tive to have an oversight organization that is itself larger than the Military Department acquisition organizations they provide oversight to? 

Secretary CARTER. The Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics (OUSD(AT&L)) does not have 2,600 contractor FTEs. 

The contractor FTE figure cited is derived from the operations and maintenance 

(O&M) budget justification material for the entire Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD), which includes the offices of the Undersecretaries for Personnel and Readiness, Policy, and Intelligence, as well as the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office, and the office of the Deputy Chief Management Officer. In addition, 

OUSD(AT&L) itself encompasses a far broader scope than oversight of the acquisition process. OUSD(AT&L) duties also include departmental oversight of logistics, 

nuclear and chemical/biological activities, energy, installations, industrial base, engineering, and science and technology. 

The OUSD(AT&L) acquisition staff is a highly skilled, technical staff aligned to 

the objective of guarding against unwarranted optimism in program planning and 

budget formulation, and to prevent excessive risk taking during execution—all of 

which is essential to avoiding overruns and costly delays. The Military Departments 

plan, manage, and execute their acquisition programs, with reviews by the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics at discrete milestones 

associated with major Department resource commitments. The reviews work to ensure programs are affordable, executable, and follow sound business and risk management practices. Routine execution monitoring of programs by OSD also affords 

the opportunity to intercede well before programs are at risk of failure. The Department is fully committed to reducing unnecessary bureaucracy and continuing the 

important work of improving the performance of the acquisition system while delivering superior capabilities to our forces. 

AT&L’s civilian workforce utilizes the Acquisition Demonstration Project system. 

The civilian workforce is spread across various pay bands comparable to multiple 

GS grades and steps. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Most of the discussion regarding the Defense Department’s efforts 

to achieve financial statement auditability has focused on the Military Department’s 

(MilDep) plans. However, about 25 percent of the Defense Department’s budgetary 

resources are appropriated to defense organizations outside of MilDeps. What is the 

current status of financial statement auditability for each of these defense organizations outside the MilDeps, and will each of them meet the goal of full financial 

auditability by fiscal year 2017? 

Secretary CARTER. In December 2014, the Department issued an audit strategy 

for the other defense organizations (often described as the ‘‘Fourth Estate’’). This 

strategy includes a focus on all funds and entities, not just the General Funds, in 

order for the Fourth Estate to catch up with the Military Departments and be ready 

for a full financial statement audit by Fiscal Year (FY) 2018. Although, much of the 

dollar value of the Fourth Estate Defense wide accounts is already under audit and 

some individual organizations have asserted audit readiness, the goal is to have the 

remaining organizations under audit as soon as possible. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) remains committed to meeting the congressionally mandated FY 2017 goal for full financial statement auditability. The Fourth Estate audit strategy groups Fourth Estate entities into standalone audits or examinations categories, to track and demonstrate progress toward a full statement audit 

in FY 2018. The priorities begin with the most material components that are large 

enough to potentially impact DOD as a whole. These entities are referred to as the 

DOD Designated Audit Entities, and are comprised of entities such as the Defense 

Logistics Agency, the Defense Health Agency, U.S. Special Operations Command, 

and U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). The next set of important entities is the DOD Designated Exam Entities, such as the Washington Headquarters 

Service which includes the Office of the Secretary of Defense for audit purposes, and 

the Missile Defense Agency. Per the Fourth Estate strategy, all remaining Fourth 

Estate entities (except for USTRANSCOM and the Defense Information Systems 

Agency) will or are already undergoing an examination of their Schedule of Budgetary Activity by independent public accounting firms. Current plans call for all material entities to begin full financial statement audits or examinations during 

Mr. CONAWAY. Has a comprehensive plan been developed by the staff of the Office 

of Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Services and other Defense agencies, to re-mediate the internal control deficiencies impeding auditability in the 

‘‘Transportation of Things’’ business area? 

Secretary CARTER. The Department has a comprehensive Financial Improvement 

and Audit Readiness strategy for remediating deficiencies, constructed on an enterprise-wide initiative together with individual component initiatives. The Military 

Services and Defense Agencies are focused on corrective actions to remediate their 
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Transportation of Things internal control deficiencies. Led by an executive steering 

committee, a Transportation Financial Auditability (TFA) working group has been 

established to develop standardized processes and procedures supported by policy 

guidance, system integration, and enterprise-wide training, all in support of the Department’s long-term auditability goals and desire to strengthen overall business 

processes. The TFA effort complements the Military Services’ audit efforts. 

Mr. CONAWAY. When were these auditability weaknesses brought to Office of the 

Secretary of Defense’s attention? 

Secretary CARTER. The auditability weaknesses at the Departmental level, as distinct from weaknesses limited to individual components, were first acknowledged beginning in June 2013. The nature of the weaknesses initially identified is similar 

to other business processes where funding is managed centrally but decentrally executed. 

Mr. CONAWAY. What is an acceptable period of time for Office of the Secretary 

of Defense to develop a corrective action plan in this business area, i.e., from identification of the weakness during auditability preparations until development of a remediation plan? 

Secretary CARTER. The Department has implemented a comprehensive Financial 

Improvement and Audit Readiness strategy for addressing the challenges based on 

enterprise-wide and component initiatives. The strategy relies on the Military Services to address specific weaknesses and developing corrective action plans to address 

their processes and systems. The Office of the Secretary of Defense strives to be as 

responsive as possible in addressing enterprise weaknesses. More detailed plans 

that potentially impact field level activities across the entire Department require 

collaboration and tend to take more time. 

Mr. CONAWAY. What is the likely impact of the Transportation of Things deficiencies on the Services’ audit? 

Secretary CARTER. Auditors apply the concept of materiality to financial statements. Amounts for Transportation of Things are less material compared to the 

amounts of payments to military and civilian personnel and for purchases of goods, 

e.g., weapons systems. Hence, Transportation of Things deficiencies will potentially 

have less impact on the auditability of the Military Services. The Department of the 

Army’s Transportation of Things materiality is slightly greater than that of the Department of the Air Force’s materiality or the Department of the Navy’s materiality. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. DUCKWORTH 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Secretary Carter, one area in particular continues to be problematic despite years of acknowledgments from your predecessors, as well as yourself, and numerous Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Inspector General 

(IG) reports. Expenditures for service contracting continue to be invisible in the Department’s budget. Given the history of senior leader commitments towards compliance, including yourself, you can imagine my disappointment when I learned that 

the acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness & Force Management decided in September 2014 there is a lack of specific factual evidence to proceed forward in this area and appointed a Strategic Review and Planning Officer to look 

into this matter. Work on the ECMRA has been suspended ever since. Making matters worse, both GAO (GAO–14–491R) and Department of Defense IG report 

(DODIG–2014–114) that the Department is not resourcing the ECMRA effort. Despite the importance of an inventory of service contracts that is integrated into the 

budget process, particularly when the Department must make significant spending 

reductions, P&R has suspended work on the ECMRA, notwithstanding commitments from more senior-level Department leaders. Why? What additional requirements must Congress impose in order to ensure compliance? Will you commit to lift 

the suspension that your office has imposed on the ECMRA; use the accepted Army 

methodology; oversee compliance with the ECMRA by the services and the defense 

agencies in accordance with your office’s statutory responsibilities as well as overall 

responsibility for Total Force Management; and ensure that the ECMRA is used to 

inform spending decisions on service contracts in order to allow the Department to 

finally be compliant with the laws that govern such spending? 

Secretary CARTER. The Department of Defense (DOD) is proceeding deliberately 

to implement a solution that will meet Congressional intent: to generate an improved Inventory of Contracted Services (ICS), using ‘‘instances’’ of the Contractor 

Manpower Reporting Application (CMRA). These ‘‘instances’’ are each separate and 

specific operating IT systems of CMRA that are used across DOD to capture contractor-reported data. 
113 

There are currently four ‘‘instances,’’ one for each Military Department and the 

fourth for OSD and the rest of the Fourth Estate, all modeled after a system developed by the Army, being utilized and accessible through a common portal at 

www.ecmra.mil. In the near term, all four ‘‘instances’’ of CMRA will be co-located 

on a Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) server; DMDC will ensure system 

compliance with DOD security and information technology policies. Because data 

collection for the FY 2014 ICS has already been completed, it is expected that this 

new operational model will be used to generate the FY 2015 ICS. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALZ 

Mr. WALZ. Secretary Carter, can you tell me the status of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans and Capabilities? What is the office’s 

staffing level now? What should it be? What was it over the last five years? 

Secretary CARTER. Mr. Robert Scher was appointed as the first Assistant Secretary of Defense for the new Office of Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities and confirmed by the Senate in December 2014. Mr. Scher is responsible for advising the 

Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on national security and defense strategy, the forces and contingency plans necessary to implement defense strategy, nuclear deterrence and missile defense policy, and security 

cooperation plans and policies. 

Mr. Scher oversees four Deputy Assistant Secretaries, and the office has approximately 70 action officers. This level of staffing is appropriate for the duties and responsibilities assigned to the office. The office was created by reorganization within 

the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and has assumed responsibilities that were previously assigned to other organizations, so it is not feasible to 

make a direct comparison to the level of staffing of previous offices. 

Mr. WALZ. General Dempsey, with so much of our national resources our nation 

invested previously in Iraq before we terminated our ‘‘advise and assist’’ effort in 

Operation New Dawn, and the apparent ineffectiveness of the Iraqi Security Forces 

to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, why is our ‘‘train, advise, and 

equip’’ effort expected to work this time? What is different this time? 

General DEMPSEY. There are three fundamental reasons why I expect our train, 

advise and equip effort to succeed despite the ISF’s recent failures. First and for 

most, ISIL is an existential threat to the GOI, this provides significant motivation 

for the GOI and MOD to implement necessary reforms as well as provides the catalyst for cooperation between all groups, Sunni, Shia and Kurds. Additionally, though 

the security forces that existed in 2011 were largely proficient, years of neglect and 

mismanagement by the Maliki regime left the security forces void of proficient leaders and equipment degrading their morale and combat effectiveness. The current security forces are part of a government that is under reform and moving towards 

inclusivity. As PM Abadi incorporates Shia, Kurds and Sunnis into his government, 

a non-sectarian driven government will result in a more proficient military. 

Mr. WALZ. General Dempsey, please describe the planning assumptions that went 

into the defense strategy outlined in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review and 

whether those planning assumptions hold true today. For example, what were the 

planning assumptions regarding Russia and our Department of Defense footprint in 

Europe, or the assumptions about future conflicts in the Middle East? General 

Dempsey, what key strategy, posture, force size, and force structure decisions resulted from these planning assumptions that you would recommend be revisited 

today given what you know about how the security environment has evolved? 

General DEMPSEY. The 2014 QDR acknowledged the complexity and uncertainty 

inherent in the international security environment. Chapter I of the 2014 QDR outlines assumptions regarding the future security environment by outlining expected 

global and regional trends. With regards to Russia, the risks associated with Russia’s ‘‘multi-dimensional defense modernization’’ and ‘‘actions that violate the sovereignty of its neighbors’’ were acknowledged and integrated into the QDR analysis. 

Regarding the security environment in the Middle East, the QDR described the 

risks of regional destabilization as a result of the ongoing crisis in Syria including 

the potential for ‘‘rapidly developing threats’’ with the potential to ‘‘directly threaten 

US interests at home and abroad.’’ As the global security environment changes, we 

will continually reconsider our planning assumptions and make strategic adjustments to mitigate risks to US interests. In light of changes in the European theater, 

we have already made decisions to defer planned posture changes and are considering a range of options for further strategy, posture and structure changes in Europe. Recent developments in the Middle Eastern and Pacific theaters will also necessitate a review of planning assumptions and will likely have additional implica-
114 

tions for our strategy and posture. Our planning assumptions will also adapt as 

resourcing levels evolve over time. The 2014 QDR strategy and force sizing construct were based on the capacity of the joint force at FY2015 Presidential Budget 

funding levels. Resource reductions below the PB level will create additional tensions above and beyond those generated by rapid changes in the global security environment. We have an ongoing effort to reform our global force management processes to ensure we adequately mitigate risks across the broad range of demands on 

the joint force. We are committed to ensuring our planning efforts adjust to a continually changing security environment while also adapting the joint force to successfully execute our national security strategy. 

Mr. WALZ. General Dempsey, it has been reported that the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) remains largely an infantry-based force and lacks, or has only 

an emerging capability, many of the critical enablers that the United States provided in the past, including close air support, helicopter and fixed wing transport, 

medevac, and logistics support. Moreover, the ANSF has limited institutional capability and capacity for force generation and sustainment, which is concerning given 

the high number of casualties that the ANSF has suffered. A) If our primary mission responsibility is the train, advise, and assist (TAA) of the ANSF at corps-level 

in key locations in Afghanistan, and the recent stated policy of the President to 

transition the TAA mission from a corps-level effort to one at the ministerial level, 

how can there be an expectation that the ANSF will be able to exist as an established competent security force in the future? B) Data indicates that the ANSF took 

as many as 5,000 causalities in 2014. Is this sustainable from force generation and 

morale perspectives? If not, what are your predictions for the future regarding the 

ANSF and security environment in Afghanistan? a. If our primary mission responsibility is the training, advising, and assisting (TAA) of the Afghan National Security 

Forces (ANSF) at corps-level in key locations in Afghanistan, and the recent stated 

policy of the President to transition the TAA mission from a corps-level effort to one 

at the ministerial level, how can there be an expectation that the ANSF will be able 

to exist as an established competent security force in the future? b. Data indicates 

that the ANSF took as many as 5,000 causalities in 2014. Is this sustainable from 

a force generation and morale perspectives? If not, what are your predictions for the 

future regarding the ANSF and security environment in Afghanistan? 

General DEMPSEY. In general, the Afghan National Defense and Security Force 

(ANDSF) are better trained and equipped than the insurgent forces, and continue 

to demonstrate tactical proficiency as they work together across security pillars. 

When they collaborate, they have proven that they can overmatch the insurgents 

whenever challenged. Afghan soldiers continue to demonstrate courage and resolve 

on the battlefield. Afghanistan’s increasingly proactive approach to finding and 

eliminating threats to Afghan security and governing institutions is an important 

step in offensive operations to retain control of Afghan soil and to protect the population. 

The focus of ongoing coalition advisory efforts is to close gaps in ANDSF capability and foster Afghan self-sustainment. Good leadership is key to the ANDSF 

being a competent Security force in the future. President Ghani has made security 

his number one priority and is focused on maintaining the trust of the Afghan people while demonstrating resolve against the enemies of Afghanistan. Maximizing 

their ability to employ, sustain and maintain critical equipment, coupled with the 

identification and promotion of capable leaders, will be a near-term focus for Afghan 

and coalition leadership to maximize ANDSF effectiveness in the 2015 fighting season and beyond. 

Although ANDSF attrition has been a concern, recruitment and retention efforts 

have ensured that the growth of ANDSF forces has outpaced attrition since November 2014. The ANA leadership, from the ministerial to the tactical level, tracks force 

generation and attrition data. ANA end strength has been increasing since Nov 

2014 and ANDSF leaders are implementing appropriate and effective measures to 

reduce attrition. The ANA currently has approximately 174,000 soldiers, airmen, 

and civilians serving in the MoD and are projected to recruit 4000–6000 per month 

over the next few months. The ANDSF assumed the lead for security operations 

during the 2013 fighting season and increased their operational tempo by a factor 

of four in the 2014 fighting season. As such, there was a corresponding increase in 

ANDSF casualties. Casualties and attrition rates remain challenges but the ANDSF 

leadership is taking the following measures to address casualty rates: 

1. The AAF CASEVAC system has gone from flying 291 missions in 2012 to more 

than 1300 missions in 2015. 2. The ANA continues to field MRAPs, which offer enhanced mobility and protection as they move into FS 2015. 3. The AAF has also 

added significant aerial fires capabilities. They armed their Mi-17s with 23mm guns 
115 

and honed the ability to fly and shoot at night under NVGs. They will also bring 

several MD–530s armed with .50 caliber machine guns to the 2015 fighting season. 

In addition to casualties, ANDSF are working to address the issue of soldiers 

leaving their units—without authorization—and being dropped from rolls (DFR). 

The most routinely cited reasons for leaving without authorization are poor leadership and quality of life. President Ghani and ANDSF leaders are taking steps to 

address the DFR issue to include making leadership changes in the ANDSF, enforcing leave policies, and looking at retention incentives. Some personnel that leave 

without authorization eventually return to their units. Over the course of 2014, the 

ANA did not set recruiting goals at levels sufficient to outpace attrition—which resulted in a decline in end strength. In November 2014, the ANA significantly increased its monthly recruiting targets and began work on a 14-month recruiting and 

training surge plan—and ANA end strength has increased steadily since. 

Æ