- *. 2.19CUMENT RESUME

. , S

. ED 206 871 _

'-

) '. CE 029 980

. TITLE Improving the .Implementation of YEDPA Programs*

Implementatidn IsSues. Youth Knowledge* Development.

Report B.6.

INSTITUTION Brandeis Univ., Waltham, Mass. Center for Public

r. Service.'

SPONS AGENCY Employment and Training Administration (DQL),

Washington, D,C. Office 'of Youth Programs.

PUB' DATE / May 80 . NOTE, 1-32p.; For related cuments_see note of CE' 029

968. ' AVAILABLE FROM Superintendent of U 1acizerament_Printing-

--*------rafficlasti.g on,' e20402 (Stock No.

029-014-00141-3, $5.00). . EDRS PRICE MF01/iC06 Plus Postage.

4?EkRIPTORS Adolescents; Adults; Case Studies; *Demonstration

Programs; *Disadvantaged Youth; *Employment Programs;

'Federal Programs; *Job Ilraining; *Program'

Effectiveness; *Program Impledentation; Success;

Youth Programs.

IDENTIFIERS' *Youth Employment a6 Demonstration Projects Act

ABSTRACT. . This study reports on one of the knowledge

development activities conducted' under the Youth Employment and

Demonstration Projects Act of 1977 (YEDPA). The report contains

findings of an'analysis of nine YEDPA projects and the factors that

contributed to effective implementatiou of these programs. 'The study

compares discrete projects vith*different goals and objectives and

identifies the =successful implementation measures. The following

common features, of successfully-implemented programs were found: (1)

programs were' conceptualized and designed as well as administered by

local personnel; (2) all participating institutions cooperated

hecaus,e each benefit from the program; (3) potential pitfalls are

thought through in advance so that responses are available rapidly;

(4) projects are built on ideas that have already been tested locally

. and delivered by institutions of demonstrated effectiveness; (5)

feedback and evaluation are built-in from the beginning and results

wate used; each project has a problem solver; (6) persbns with

significant contacts in two or more institutional arenas required for

program success are .involved in key ways; (7) the prdjects tend to

consider all 'elements necessary -to make the activity succeed,

especially ,enkphasizing job placement frem the-Optset. It was

recommended that these °,success factors be taken into account when

planning for the implementation of other YEDPA projects. (Detailed

case studips of the nine'programs are included in the report.)

(KC)

..******************i*****4c***********C**********************************

Reproductions supplied, by EDMS are the best that can be mane * from the original document.

. **********************************************************************

ay 980 1

0 0
U S. Department of Labor

Ray Marshall, Secretary

Employment and Training Administration

Ernest G. Green. Assistant Secretary for

Employment and Training Administration

Office of Youth Programs

Material contained in this publication is

in he pubiic domain and may t5e

reprobuced, fullyoi partially, without

permission of the Federal Government.

.Source credit is requested but not

required Permission is required only.

to reproduce any copyrighted material

contained herein

ce

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YOUTH KNOWLED EVELOPMENT REPORT.8.6

.IMPROVING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF YEDPA.PROGRAMS

Center, for Puplic Service . Brandeis University

- Mayi1980.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents. U.S. doverarment Printing Office

iVashington, D.C. 20402

a.

O
r OVERVIEW

1 . Riarch, evaluation .and demoistration activity is usually directed toy 2

-e -

qt1

problem identification and analys , determination of what works and for.

whom, and testing of model program esigns. Mugh lesS attention' is paid,to

implementation issues--the "how-to-do-it" .questions such as the way

designs- need to be adapted to local conditions, how key players can be.

involved and their interest maintained, how linkages'can be achieved with

4

other institutions, how problems can be detected and corrected, how.

4Conflictcan be resolved, how the learning curves and stabilization period

can'be Compressed. . These research and development priorities are the reverse of what

imptratrlymaires the -most n-rwe- -pent ibTfally and -What wou Id -have the

greatest impact. Even the most innovative program approach can founder, on

, implementation issues, While the most pedestrian approach may have positive

impacts if properly operated. Until basic activities are, operated

effectively, it may be counterproductive to parsue more sophisticated

designs. As a generalization, the margin for improvelient in employment and

training activities, is overwhelming concentrated in the implementation

Sena. With no change An program designs--no "models! programs or pew

approaches--the effectiveness of employment, and training activities could

be improved substantially with common sense in planning and management, and

more consideration of implementation issues. Modifications and program

destr are not likely to be prdductive unless the basic implementation

tasks are already being handled effectively.

In the "knowledgement development" activities under the Youth

Employment and Demonstrati6n Projects Act, there has been a major emphasis

on process evaluations linked,to impact, evaluations in order to determine

not oply what works (or does not) for whom, but also why. Every major

demonstration includes at' least one process evaluation_ and may 'also be

covered by crosscutting studies of replication, processes, program "batting

_averages," learning curves and the like. The Standardized Assessment

System for youth demonstrations *grams includes a process ciaestionnaire

which permits qUantifjcation of the key dimensions of local program

implemention so that these can be analyzed along with quantitatively

measured impacts. , L.

This volume represents another dimension of this effort. One of the

integral knoWledge development activities- has been the identification of

"model". programs and elements-that have emerged at the local level under

the decentralized CETA system. These models include both well-run

conventional activities and those that have innovative 'features. Identification of models includes an effort to identify implementation hints.

However, each project can only explain how it achieved success, which may

notsbe.the key ingredients in other circumstances. The present analysis,

in contrast, compares discrete projects with different goals and objectives

and seeks to identify the success ingredients. It findsc tain common

First, the projects involve all the key local "player from the

outset. Those that conceptualize the projects are,closely lin ed to or.are

the same persons who subsequently administer the project.
-///

Second, there is a convergence of interest among the key institutional

players; all benefit from cooperation.

Third, the potential pitfaqls are thought.through in advance so that

responses are forthcoming rapidly.

M1 Fourth, the projects are built on ideas that have already been tried

locally sand are delivered by institutions of demonstrated effectiveness,

suggesting the need for an evolutionary rather than revolutionary process

of program change.

- Fifth, mechanisms for feedback and evaluation are built-in from the

outset and the results utilized. Each project. has .a "fixer" who concentrates on problekresolution.

Sixth, "double agents":-persons with sAnificant contracts iri two or

more institutional arenas required for program succesS--involved in key

ways.

ki Seventh, the projects tend to consi der all elements necessarx to make

the activity succeed. In particular, pldtement iss given emphasis frog the

outset rather than waiting -until. participants are far along in the

programs.

More detailed implementation findings will emerge from the research,

evaluation and demonstration' activities now underway, but this 'review

contains important information of use At both the national and local

levels.

This review was commissioned as part of the work of the Vice

President's .Task Force on Youth Employment'. Its findings- were -f-a-CfaTed--

into the legislative and administrative recommendations made by the Task

Force and subsequently proposed by the Carter Administration.

This study is the of "knowledge' development" activitie mounted'in

conjunctian Withresearch, evaluation and development activities funded

under the Youth Employment and -pemonstration Projects Act of 197/. The

knowledge devOopment effort will result in literally thousands of written

produCts. Each -activity has been structured from the outset so that it is

self-standing but also interrelated with a hostjbf other activities. the

, framework is presented in A Knowledge Development Plan fete the Youth Diployment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977, A Knowledge Development

Plan for the Youth Initiatives Fiscal 1979 and Completing the Youth Agenda:

A Plan for Knowledge Development, Dissemination and Application for Fiscal

1980.

Information .is avail4ble or will* be coming available from these

various knowlidge development efforts to help,resolve an almost limitless

array of issues. However, policy and practical' application will usually

.reqtre tntegratt& and synthesis from a wide,range of products; which, in,

turn, depend on "knowledge and availability of these products. A major

-shortcoming of past research, evaluation and demonstration activities has

been the failure to organize and.disseminate the products adequately to

assure the full exploitation of the findings. The magnitude and structure

V

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of the youth knowledge development effort puts a premium on structured

analysis and wide dissemination.

As part of its knowledge development mandate, therefore, the Office of

Until Programs of the Department of Labor will organize, publish and

disseminate the written, products of all major research, evaluation sand

demonstration activities _supported directly by'or mounted in conjunction

with OYP knowledge development efforts. Some of the same products may also

be published and disseminated through other channels, but they will be

included in the structured series of Youth Knowledge Development Reports in

order to facilitate access and integi4ation.

The Youth Knowledge Development, Reports, of which this is one-, are divided into twelve broad categories:

1. Knowledge Development Framework: The products' in this category

ale concerned with the structure of knowledge development activities,, the

aksessmerit methodologies which are employed, the measirement instruments

and their validation, the' translation of'knowledge info policy, and the

strategy for dissemination of findings. . 2. Research on Youth Employment and Employability Development: The

products tn this category represent analyses of existing data, presentation

of findings from new data sources, special studies of dimensions of youth

labor market problems, and policy issue assessments.

3. Program Evaluations: The products in this categ ry include

impact, process and benefit-cost evaluations of- youth programs including

the Summer Youth Employment Program, Job Corps, the Young _Adult Conservation Corps, Youth Empliyment and Training Programs, Youth Community

Conservation. and Imptovement Projects, and the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit.

4.. Service and Participant Mix: The evaluations and deffionstratigns

summarized. in this category concern the matching of different types of

youth with different service combinations. This involves' experiments with

work ys. work plus remediation vs. straight remediation' as treatment

options. It also includes attempts to mix disadvantaged and more affluent

participants, as we'll as youth with older workers.

5. Education and Training Approaches: The pr ductsin this category

present the findings of structured experiments tb test th impact and

effectiveness- of various education and -ifocatIonal training approaches

intlu

ternati education approaches and advanced career training.'

'rig specific education methodologies for the disadvantaged, alPre-Emplaylent and Transition Services: The products~ in this

categhry present the findings of structured experiments to test the impact

and, effectiveness of school-to-work transition activities, vocational

exploration, job-search assistance and other efforts to. better prepare

youth for labor market success.

I

7. Youth Work Experience: The produCts in this categOry address the

organizatibn of work activities, their output; producti roles for youth,

andtheAMpacts of'various employment approaches.,

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8. 'Implementatiodissues: This category includes 'cross-cutting

4/ analyses of the practical lessons concerning "how-to-do-it." Issueestich

as learning .curves, 'replication' prdcesses and programmatic "batting

averages" will be addressed under this category, as well as the comparative

.adVantages oralternative delivery agent's:

9. Design andOrganizational Alternatives: The .products in this

category represent assessments of demonstrations of al;:Tipative program and

delivery aerangements,such,as consolidation, year-r d preparation far

summer programs, the use of incentives, and tracking of

individuals.

4 10. Special Needs Groups: The products in this category- present

findings on the special problems of and the programmatic, adaptations needed

for significant' segments including minorities, young mothers, 'troubled

youth, Indochinese refugees, and the handicapped:

. . 11. Innovative Approaches:- The products in this category present the.

findings ,of those. activities". designed to explore new approaches., The -I- sukiects covered include the...Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot Projects,

private sector initiatives, the national ,youth service experiment, and

energy initiatives in weatherization, low-head hydroelectric dam restoration, wihdpower; and the like12. Institutional Linkages: The products in this category include

studies of institutional arrangements and linkages as well-as assessments

of demonstration ,activities to encourage such-flnkages with education,

volunteer groups, drug abuse', and other youtheserving agencies.

In each of these. know,ledge,development categories, there will be a

range of discrete demonstration, research and evaluation activWes focused

on tlifferent policy, program and analytical issues: In turn, Wtch discrete

knowledge development project may have ,0 series of written products

addressed to different dimensions, of the'Ossue: For 4nstance, all

experimental demonstration projects have' both process and impact evaluations, frequently undertaken by different evaluation agents. findings

will be published as they become available sa that there will usualily be a

series of reports as evidence accumulates. To .organize these products,

each publication is classified in one of the twelve broad knowledge

development categbries, described in terms ,of the more specific issue,

activity or cluster of activities to which it is addressed; with an identifier of the product and what it represents'relative to other products

in the demonstrations. Hence, the multiple products under a knowledge

development activity are closely interrelated and the actirttis in each

broad cluster have significant interconnections.

This volume should be avessed in conjunction with Program Models'

and Innovations and ImprOvinethe'Design and Operation of the Summer Program, Volume II,which both identify model prograpis and elements.

iv

. Robert Taggart

Administrator

Office of Youth Irograms
qp OVERVIEW

TABLE OF CONTENTS

VOLUME I

'PAGE

i

. \- SECTION I - EXECUTIVE SUKOARY vii t

. --"2 I. Nine yup Rrograms . i _ a,

.

; N 4

II. The Implementation Of These-Nine Programs ) 1 III. What YEDPA-Is, What Its Goals Are, And What It Has Done So Far

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IV.- Some Background On Policy Implementation , 8

..' V. The'Effec.tiveness Of'The Implementation Of These Nine Programs . ,,, .11

VI. The Development Of A Social Policy InLastructure.At The Local Level 29 /-

.. , - VII. Yi6PA's Effective Iinplementaiim In A Variety Of Settings F.4'. 34),...,,,, VIII. What This.Report-Does And Does Not'Do 35

1/4 . :SECTION II ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION .-- t

I. I.- Focusing On The Implementation Stage . ,. , .r- . -. ,. 68

, II.

III.

V.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

IX.

.,'g.

XI.

XII.

-Implementation:,, Complex Program Assembly And A

.. Process Of Avoiding

Pitfalls . ._--

4-

,........ 'Program Assembly r

o.

Successful Program Assembly': A Strong ExedutiVe, The Creation Of

Interest Convergence Ad Securing It Down To The Worksite

Implementation:, A Process Of Avoiding Pitfalls ' . The Benefits Of Previous Direct Oper,. ting Experience ---

Building And Modeling New YEbPA Programs On Previously Successful

e Programs (..,

Scenario Writing: _Another Aid Iri,Anticipating Implementation Pitfalls.

t y /

----, Institutionalizing Evaluation #nd Reassessment. Mechanisms . , ....- . \ . , The Need For Strong Program Expcutives And The Pursuit Of "Fixer" f - Strategies -,

N . --, A Program Executive's Contributions As A "Double Agent"

. ..7 'Program Executives' Ties To Sources of Jobs ' ,. '.

Executive ient Is Mwe Scarce tan Money Or Good Ideas,

.... The Need For Mode6t And Simple-Program Design . .'

. ..,- Maintai..pgThe Diversity of k YEDPA's Overall Deliign.As ANational

Program

. -. Some Final' Thoughts'

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, 73 1 79 . 79'

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86

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1 'XIII.XIV.

XV.

XVI.

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lab 4 , EXECUTIVE SUMARY

IThis summary contains twc\ sections. The "intrOduction" presents our

most general findings and explains what the report does ancedoei not do.

Phe second section, "analysis and recommendations," combines these two:

the recommendations areThrasaly Based on our analys,iLof nine YEDPA pre--

grams. Thus these recbmmendatious should indicate to the reader the actual

1conditions that we found contributing to effective implementation in the

. nine. For'this summary, the second section merely 'asserts the conclusions

of our analysis. The detailed evidence and,'illustration behind them are

. presented in the body of the Final Report, with the complete case studies

....--

. ... of the nine in Volume II, Appendix B.

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"Z.
ti INTRODUCTION

(I) NINE YEDPA PROGRAMS 4

Our report focuses exclusively on nine YEDPA programs* selected on,, , the basis of preliminary evidence (collected by us and previous investigators who had analyzed scores of YEDPA programs) which indicated that

; the nine had beerieffectively implemented. ir Our analysis first addressed the question of whether in fact these

'nine 'programs were implemented effectiNely. Then, to the extent that

they were implemented effectively, we attempted to wlain why they were.

0

. Finallr, we attempted to analyze the policy implications of our descrip-

- tions and explanations in order to fvme recommendations.

Our analysis was greatly assisted by, the cooperation of the staffs

of these nine programs and many DOL administrators, especially Robert

Taggart, Joseph Seiler, Janet Rosenberg, aud Frank Slobig.

III) THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE NINE PROGRAMS

0:. Implementation generally was effective in the nine programs analyzed.

These programs generally satisfied to a significant degree.our broad cri7

teria for effective implementatio'h:

4 /J,i

ItI l'd0 The program was able to, hold delay to a reasonable level.

Are * Albuquerque's WORP, Albuquerque',s THE, Baltimore's YouthWorks,

'New Haven's Ventures in Community Improvement Program, Newark's Independence

High School, Pittsburgh's STAY, Portland's Emergency Home Repair Program,

San Antonio's YCCIP, Syracuse's BOCES-Hancock Training Program.

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A

A.
TW6 program was able to hold financial costs to a reasonable

level. -0

The program was able to meet its original objectives without

significant alteration or underachievement of these objectives.

(Here we mean the specificobjectives of DOL and local program

executives rater than merely the general objectives of the

original legislative mandate:)

(III) WHAT YEDPA IS, ,WHAT ITS GOALS ARE, AND WHAT IT HAS DONE SO PAR

\

. (A) The Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act of 1977 represented a major new fede;tal initiative aimethat understanding And\al-

, ieviatin:t :7blen:o:u:e::::: :d.. :u1 :.::: A:::ed:7r:w::0, grams (each and different strategies), , veloped a complex process of "knowledge development" (which mounted' a

variety of studies, demonstration projects, and experiments). The size

if and scope of the Act are significant: nearly $1.7 billion through. the

end of this fiscal year and 460 CETA Prime Sponsors serving nearly

230,000 youth slots in .YEDPA programs. Nevertheless, YEDPA should be

-viewed as,a beginning: ,an important first step in addressing in a com-

. prehensive,.diverse, innovative, and often ekperimental fashion,,wkat

has beeldescribed as a national crisisstaggering leVels of youth unemployment; primarily concentrated in poor urban and rural ateas.

P.'"No During the proCess of selecting the nine upon which we would focus,

we collected preliminary evidence on scores of other YEDPA programs.

Ourspreliminary.impression is that in addition to the nine"we selected,

many of these other YEDPA programs' were implemented rather effebtively.

Moreover, for the nine we analyzed, during the first eighteeen months .v of YEDPA's existende, implementation seems to have Occurred more rapidly

than usually is the case for most social programs.

12

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(B) YEDPA is coilprised of four programs:

Youth Conservation and Comrgunity Improvement Projects (YCCIP)

purpose_is "to provide youth experiencing severe difficulties obtai

ployment with we41-supervised work in projects that pr duce ttngibl

. YCCIP's

ninq erne benefits to'the community" (usually involvingwork.whichlwo 1d otherwise

, carriqd out; including ( a range of.community improvements such as,pub

9, housing reha\bilitation and repairs to the homes of the low income persons.

$115 million was allocated to YcCIP, which has served nearly--3-27000 youthi0

.(- 1

. J

in YEDPA's first fiscal, year. v

not be

is

s Youth Incentive Entitlement PilotProjects (YIEPP),: YIEPP is themost

.experimental'of the YEDPA programs. Its .explicit purpose is to demonstrate

"the .efficacy 'of guaranteeing otherwise pnavailable employment" to disadvantaged youth who "resume or maintain attendance in secondary sc*ol" or in

an equivalency program. YIEPP's fundamental goal is to test The effect of *

assured work on school attendance. $115 million was reserved for the Entitlements A

titlements and throtgh March 1979, over 50,000 youth had been served in the

17 Entitlement project's. Over 80% were from minority groups. The minority

%. -

''.11?.- percentage is,the highest'.for any of YEDPA's parts. . `Youth Employment and Training Programs "(YETP): YETP is the lynchpin

of YEDPA with programs' ranging from,"community betterment activities" similar to YCCIP to a host of "training and'services" generally similar to

those already allowed under CETA Title II, B. V

. Several features distinguish YETP from the Other parts of YEDPA and

from previous CETA youth programs, although most of them arematters of de-

- gree and emphasis: broader eligibility; an elaborate planning process; the

involvement of 'public schools; coordination with other parts of CETAi and

allowances for experimentation.

Twenty-two percent of. the money' allocated to each prime sponsor was to

be "used for programCFor in-school youth carried out pursuant to agreements

between prime sponsors and local educational agencies". This 22% set-aside

is probably the most well known provision of YEDPA.

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xi
4.

6

The original appropriation for YETP was $537 million, with 185;600

participants enrolled in YETP through March 1979,(overthree times'the numenrolled.in 0A's other three programs combined).

Young Adult] Conservation Corps (YACC): The Young Adult Conservation

Corps was created through a-new Title added to CETA to offer employment to

"youths who would otherwise mot be currently productively employed" through

"useful conservation work" on "public lands and waters". It is administefed

through an Interagency agreement

, with the Departments of Intefior and Agriculture who virtually manage all of YACC. Except for the modest,referral

role of the Employment Service and some pro forma coordination requirements,

YACC is divorced entirely from the CETA system. This is a major reason that

this study did not include any YACC programs. We also focused exclusively

.onthe other three types of gramme because they will be considered for re-

, funding in 1980 while YACC,Willt come up for refunding until 1982'.

. )% ,

, . (C) In general terms, the Accomplishments of YEDPkare quite significant.

Nearly 750,000 youths have participated in YEDPA programs dgiting

the first two years of implementation.'

YgDPA's major Aograms have been impletented by,the nation's CETA

prime sponsor system.

'Innovative experimentS have been put in place both on the national

and local'leVel.

7), Research commissioned through YEDPA has greatly expanded knowledge,

'about the extent and causes of youth kinemployment.

te For the first time,/61e youth employ system has4been brought

...into substantial contact with public secondary education.

Youth unemployment rates have come down, with YEDPA.accountihg for

most of the new jobs gained by minority youths in the past year.

The majority of youths served by YEDPA are from Minority groups.

In the twenty years prior to YEDPh, employment/population ratios

for black youth fell almost in half and unemployment rates nearly

tripled. Some improvement in black youth labor force participation

_has occurred in the 1977,z79 period, although official jobless rates

partially mask the progress by not revealing the extent of Aew

young entrants. Over the past two years, for example, Unemployment

A A 'I/ a xii'
7 rates for white youth age 16-21 degreased 3.1 percentage points

while it decreased 4.8 points for minority youth and there was a

20% increase in the employment of black teenagers ages 16 to 19.

It is eStimated,that at least half this'increase stems from YEDPA

and the other federal youth initiatives.

Numbers alone, do not reveal-`the remarkable range of local programs.

The employment and-raining system has been capable of adapting-to/;

new requirements, ot cutting through normally expected delays anA

of providing youth job opportunities on a large scale 811d rather

quickly.

Prime Sponsors have targeted their programs an the economically

disadvantaged"to a degree greater than reglired by YEDPA.

Work performed under YEDPA has been shown to have both tangible com-

. munity benefits and genuine economic value,

There is a growing consensus, on all levels, that private, for-profit

employers must be more deeply involved in solving,the nation's youth

gmploymont problems. YEDPA has achieved more private sector ihvolvement then any previous feZeral effort.

The 22 percent setaside tends to work well as a financial incentive

for Local Education Agencies to participate in joint action with

the prime sponsor.

Prime sponsors are, capable of managing youth programs, even those

with the scale and complexity of the Ntitlement, although their

* a capability varies greatly.

F6

The knowledgeydevelopment strategy has been particularly effective

in devising innovative delivery approaches (such as interMediary

corpvations) structuring demonstration projects, coordinating

basic research, and increasing awareness of the value of experimentation. i YEDPA has led to increased connections between prime sponsorsrid

a multiplicity of community basedand non-profit organizations.

The record is less auspicious with unions and private employers.

(IV) THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE NINE PROGRAMS -

The complete details of the degree to which these nine programs satisfied

our three criteria foeffective implemer4 ll ation are in Appendix B. There are

summaries in the introduction, presented roughly in the order of each program's

2
effectiveness of,implementation (ranked by'quartiles). There are n6 exact

rankings because the nature of the data does not, lend itself to such precision:

Very Effective Implementation: Pittsburgh's STAY, New Haven's VICI

Highly Effective Implementation; POrtland's EHR, yracuse's BOCESHancock, Albuque ue's THE program

Medium Effective Implementation: 1lbuquerque's WORP program, Newark's

IHS

Borderrine Effective ImplementationA Baltimore's YouthWorks, San

Antonio's YCCIP

4. Even these quartilerankings, are not exact, and there is an overlap between,

; - c most prbgrams !.n contiguous categories. But t4eir major purpose is to in-

. dicate that though all nine were effectively implemented, there is,significant variation in the degree of effective implementation of each. This

variation is significant because it seems to )pe'associated with the presence

or absence of some of the conditions that we'found to contribute to effective

implementation of YEDPA.

s

(V) THE 'DEVELOPMENT OF A SOCIAL POLICY INFRAS''RUCTURE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

We found that the conditions in 1979 surrounding the'impiementation of ,

YEDPA and similar domestic programs) seem to be significantly more favorable

for effective implementation than 'they were fifteen or even ten years ago,

.especially local conditions. Thus many\of our recommendations are more feasible

today than in the past. They are based on programs that are more replicable

than in the past because these favorable condiy.ons are more widespread now.

(A) As Sar Levitan has argued, actors and designers at both the fedaal and

local level,learged a lot about designing and implementing social policy

during the 1960's and 70's.

However, in addition to this learning, in the past fifteen years a

rich and developed social policy infrastructure has grown up at the

local level.

xiv

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The individlaks and organizations which comprise this infrastructure are

oriented toward' innovation and social pr%gress. Many are alumni of Great

Society programs, others are alumni of the post -Great Society innovative

programs df DOL and; HUD.

The individuals represent,a new class of activist bureaucrats. Organizers is a good functional description; likening them to community or

labor organizers captures a good deal of aeir b'ackgrOund and personal'

predilection. However, they play a rappr role and their "pdsitioning"

is broader (e.g., they are. bureaucrats).

We also found rich organizational development. Tliege organizatigps

are "established". These persons have helped to develop numerous community

ba;?pd.organizations (CBO's) as well as new public agencies (or special programs within them). These organizations are experienzed, effectivf and

relatively prosperous, ,

(B) All this has produced complex organizational and personal networks that

link persbns and organizations and give them overlapping interests The networks have grown over time and are built on past relationships and trust.

All of this greatly facilitates securing joint action and program assembly.

They smooth the'way for effective implementation.

(C) For YEDPA.a good deal of this learning,

1

experience, infrastructure and

a good many outstandAlg alumni have developed directly and indirectly from

s CETA and earlier manpower programs. YEDPA has benefited greatly from CETA's

positive and negative' lessons.'

(D) These organizations and indivitals have not/Used these experiences,

knowledge, and networks to become conservative: They have used itcto become

more innovative, They are established, but they are not "esiablishment".

They continue to seek new programs, new solutions and are open to experiment

and change.

.

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xv

d,
(E) The development of this local infrastructure and local networks that

',smooth the way for effective implementation represents a major change from"

the pattern described in the implementation literature on programs of the

1960's and early 1970's. A common theme in th6se studies was the impleMen- . tation difficulties caused by local actors. At worst, local actors were

'found to resist innovative federal designs 4nd programs. At best, even

when they sought to aid implementation, local actors were found to be lack-a

ing in sufficierit resources and/dr abilities to make itork..

11). By Contrast, our findings of tpese local infrastructures and networks means that local conditions and actors now tend to provide

an extra'bOost to the implementation of federal designs and pro-,

grams ratper tkan an obstacle. . J

14,4

(VI) YEDPA'S EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION IN A VARIETY OF SETTINGS

within the pattern of effective implementation of these,

is a good deal of programmatic, geographical, and sociaIt occurred in different types of YEDPA programs (the

We found th/

nine programs there

economic va*riation.

nine iliclude two YIEPP programs - -a Tier 1 and a Tier 2--two YCCIP programs,

and five YETP programs) and in different types of cities (varying by size,

region, economic bases, and ethniC and income mixes). Of course, all of

this is no accident; our program selection sought to produce these variations.

4 44

The nature of our data and analysis -are such that no systemativ conclugions can be drawn from this variation. However, effective implementation of YEDPA in such a variety, of seiTings is signiffCant because it

gives a rough indication that the possibilitiet of effectiveness are not

limited to any one type of program or city:

xvi

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Go--

(VII) WHAT THIS REPORT DOES AND DOES NOT DO

We can tell the Task Force.6much about--

How to improVe the implementation of these programs

How t4 Void implementation failures.

We cannot tell the TasX Force with full confidence how to produce ultimately

1

effective outcomes fromyouth employment programs.

We analyzed the effectiveness of the implementation of these nine programs, but,nottheir ultimate outcomes. Of course, our ultimate goal is a

policy that has effective outcomes (one whose effect on the target population is positive; one that tends to ameliorate that social problem in response to which it was created, or, at least creates some positive.chafige in

it). In addition to being adopted effectively and then implemented effectively, it must be first a good policy, with a design appropriate to the

problem. "A fast train is worse than a slow one if it takes you in the

wrong dikection." Thus effective implementation is necessary to achieve an

effective outcome but not sufficient in.itself.

0- a e

Why then does this study focus almost exclusively on the element of-implemehtatiol? First, to ana lyze conditions and factors associated with ef-

- ti fective outcomes, we must be able to measure the outcomes (e.g., the effects

of the program on its participants). However, these nine YEDPA programs are

so relatively new that there as yet has nci been enough time for the pro4rami

to have measurable effects on a Ihwe number of participants. "(Ail had been

in their YEDPA operation for less than eighteen months at the time of this

study, June 1979. But on the whole, these nine YEDPA programs have been implemented mortdoapialy than visually is the cap for most social programS.)

Thus, placement data (one indAgtor Of outcomes) are scarce 'as yet. Moreover,

pimple placement data do not yield in themselves definitive conclusions ahout

outcomes because the arkdhaped or "cont ted" by factors other than"programs'effectivene s (e.g., the tightness of the local labor market And other

environmental factors).

xvii

4" ' 10

or. 1'
In focusing almost

less than we would like

pure social science and

* 6 have to wait to do so

measurable.

exclusively on implementation, we are able to say

to. But we'are interested in action rather than

thus reject the alternative of saying more, but

until the outcomes are fully discernible and

' Second, of the three major elements required for an effective out-

_ come--an effective design, effective adoption, and effective implementationsi-presently,the most difficult one to achieve is eft fective implementation.

-It is the element on which domestic social policies most frequAntly founder.

Indeed, in the pdst decade or so, problems at the implementation stage have

been the largest source of social policy failures Ind this is predictable

When the ,iiiiplementation of programs depends on many actors, as it must in

-our heterogeneous.society and pluralistiC political system, there are numerous possibilities for disagreement and delay..

Tables 1 - 15 indicate'-how the multiplicity of participants and per-

.

1 spectives An a YEDPA program combine to produce a formidable' obstacle

course of policy implementation (summarized on Table A of the executive , summary, p. xii). However: these obstacles to effective implementation are

generic to social policymaking in the U.S. rather than limited to youth employment programs. this is the lesson of the biroad range of case studies

which we review from outside this area.

4

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04

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TABLE A

tt

POINTS OF DECISION AND CLEARANCE NECESSARY FOR COMPLETION OF EACH OF THE

.NINE YEDPA PROGRAMS: THE. MULTIPLICITY OF PARTICIPANTS,, PERSPECTIVES., AND

AGREEMENTS THAT SHAPED THE COURSE OF EACH PROGRAM.

Decision CumulatiVe Total

PROGRAM Points Participants of AgreeMents

Pittsburgh's STAY

New Haven's VICI

10

19

39

22

. 50,

72

Portland's ERR 15 13 31 . Syracuse's BOCES-HANCOCK 13 12 46

uerque's THE,

Albuquerque's WORD \_.

11

8

98

6

119

23

4

Newark's IHS 12 20 33

Balt' ore's YouthWorks .15 / 408 _ 446

Sap onio's YCCIP ----g. - t. 13 22

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a
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations in this report are empirically grounded. They do

not represent our wishful thinking. Rather they are specifically based on

our analysis of these nineiYEDPA programs and secondary analysis of earlier

studies for OYP. Z - . 0 4

W ci * ....,... Since they are empirically based, these recommendations also should in-

% dicate to the reader the actual conditions that we found contributing to ef-

. fective implementation.in these nine. They are, however, written in the

format of recommendations rather than as descriptions to make them more useful to \the following audiences who want answers to the qtestion: "O.K.,

this is how those programs worked and why, but what do we do-on Monday?"

Program*etators

F. Analysts in VPTFYE, DOL, and Congress who are drafting.legrslaton

OYP and ETA policymakers who are making4allocational decisiops 4

4 -." For this suMmary, we merely assert the/donclusions of our analysis.

4 . Th4,detailed evidence and illustration bei.nd them are presented in the , ,body of the report, wits the complete caise studies of the nine in Appendix B.

i . . % I ,.

. 1.

tI) FOCUSING ON THE\IMPLEMENTATION STAGE

/ For.the folloWing reasons we recommend that YEDPA policymakers at t

top, program operators, and everyone in-between focus,a disproportionate

amount of their attention and resources On the implementation stage of these

programs. (For some, such ht OYP under Robert Taggart, this will represent

7'

a continuation of their already significant effort at process evaluation.)

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(A) Of the three major elements. required for an effective outcome---an

k

fective design, effective adoption, and effective implementation--presently

the most difficult to achieve is effective implementation. It is the element

on .which domestic social policies4ost frequently founder.

Currently there are many good generafideas.for ameliorating social

problems and many.good specific policy designs. But the legislative successes (the adoption stage)-of yesterday have often become the impl nta-

, tion probleTar-at-today. Since the mid-1960's it his become much eas r for

)good policy ideas to traverse the adoption stage without major alterationS.

But then they were implemented ineffectively and did not create effective

aqIvomes for citizens. Their implementation. was either (a) inordinately de1 ect, of .(b) it required expenditures far beyond what objectively wa,

pe essary,-or (c) there was an alteration and/or-underachievement of the

policy's objectives, or some combination of all three.

(B) We alsorec end giving more attention to the implementation stage in

order to seiiiitize policymakers to the essential role of implementation in

creating effective outcomes. There is ample evidence that most of the in-

. .creased lip Service paid to implementation in the last1few years is just

that. The belief hat implementation issues are're atively Ar4.qpificant

remains firmly grounded in may otherwise astute pal ak rs and policy

analysts $or several understandable re tons.

4

(II) IMPLEMENTATION: COMPLEX PROGRAM ASSEMBLY AND A PROCESS OF AVOIDING

PITFALLS

More sp fically,we recommend that these actors become sensitized to

. ' the.true nature of implementation: ' Farst, effective implementation does not occur automatically.

Rather it is a complex process of program assembly. It requires joint action to achieve the full assemblage.

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Second, major diffidulties willsIplmoSt always characterize the

process of policy Implementaticd,, especially if the p64oies are

even mildly innovative.. Implementation is a orocess,of avoiding

pitfalls.

(III) PROGRAM ASSEMBLY

I A

Program assembly should be.'viewed as involving the following general

elements:

Numerous actors (organizations and individual) areinvolved in the

/-- prcgrad assembly process. (e.g., for a YEDPA program: The local

/ --------- program itself and its staffs the prime Sponsor, the larger political .entity and its leaders- -the Mayor, the schools, the unions,

public sector worksites, private sector worksites, CBO's, and postprogram employers; often DOL and Regional DOL are also relevant,

actors as well as intermediate bodies like YouthWork, CPPV, MDRC or,

HUD). %

'

. . These .ctors L fotors have significant interests which are largely indepen:

dent of each other and independent of thp YEDPA program and/or 'of'

the prime sponsor and its larget politi4a1 entity.

. __.... ...--- , , r . k

- I

(IV) SUCCESSFUL PROGRAM ASSEMBLY: A STRONG EXECUTIVE, THE CREATION OF

INTEREST CONVERGENCE, ANDrSECURING IT DOWN TO THE WORKSITE

Successful program assembly should involve the following ellents:4

A

The program assembly process should be guided by a strong, effective executive:, It will not run itself. It has to be put together

piece by piece. Acta's and interests have to be cajoled, convinced,

and persuaded into joint action. Adjustments and adaptations have

to be made. Coalitions have to be built.

46,

Perhaps the most essential action or strategy for effective program

assembly is the creation'of a pattern-of interest convergence in

the relevant actors and interests through the development °roomplementary incentives:

N.
The executive should distribute incentives that will lead actors to find 6

their interest and the interest obtbe YEbPA program in

ations in which while achievinq'hig. own objectives, _One

butes to achieving the objectives o another actor (e.g

'convergence: .situactor also contriwe found that the

work-providing agencies could, not receive the free labor they sought to in7

, crease their productivity without simultaneously providing the YCCIP programs with the worksites which they sought).

* 'Program assembly in a YEPPA program must be secured all the way

down to tole worksite.and through to the process of job placement.

Worksite management is difficult; it will not occur automaticb.ily.

Securing cooperation from bureaucrati ctors and achieving`t110 appropriate

recruitments.(participants that fit income and minority. targets; meaningful

worksitRv good .supervisors) are necessary but not sufficient steps. The

program executive next must be certain that something is going on at the

worksites: the difficult task of teaching skill functions must be achieved.

The least automatic part of assembling a. YEDPA program is the development of

satisfactory job placement, and it requires constant efforts by the program

executive. a. ) IMPLEMENTATION: A PROCESS OF AVOIDING PITFALLS

We.now return to the details of the second major'element of implementation.

We recommend that YEDPA policymakers come Io assume that major dif.%

ficulties will almost always chgracterize implementttion and that it

is a process of avoiding pitfalls. They cannot assume that someone

else will consider the issue of implementation feasibility and that

someone else will worry about the specific steps of program assembly.

The major strategy for avoiding ±mplementation pitfalls should be

steps to anticipate them so as to develop ways of avoiding them,

coping with them, and/or overcoming theil.'

,The next eleven sections suggest some anticipatory tactics. They are dtscribed roughly in ascending order of importance.

xxiv

A.
' (VI). THE BENEFITS OF PREVIOUS DIRECT OPERATING EXPERIENCE

YEDPA designers and implementors will be better able to anticipateimplementation pitfalls if they previously have nad direct operating experience in another YEDPA or manpower or education program. (A, corollary: .we

found that%the teparAion between planning and implementation, which has

plagued many earlier federal programs, can be bridged if'the program planner

then becomes the program operator.)

4

(VII) BUILDING AND MODELING NEW YEDPA PROGRAMS ON PREVJOUSLY SUCCESSFUL

PROGRAMS

'The supply of persons with operating experience obviovsly is limited,

even though recently it has been growing. Also, it is usually more reliable to base policy strategies on instituiiOnal,,impersonal factors rather

than on personal, individualistic ones.

We thus recommend an additional strategy: building net/ YEDPA programs on youth programs prey usJ9.N..luccessful in that locality c

modeling YEDPA programs on ther successful programs so as to avoid

continually "reinventing the wheel".

New programs,have many advantages, but when a program-is new, untried

and innovative, it,is'nur possible.w anricipare all or even most of the

likely implementation difficulties. Our findings indicate that building on

a prior one or modeling it after one increases the ability to aniicippte implementation pitfalls.

ilk

(VIII) SCENARIO WRITING: ANOTHER AID IN ANTICIPATING IMPLEMENTATION PITFALLS

Since it is not always possible or desirable to' build or.model upon a

. # . prior program, we recommend the writing of a scenario as an additional aid

in anticipatini implementation difficulties.

.

.10

44 2b 5

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r- Scenario writing involves the imaginative construction of future sequences of actions, the resulting conditions and reactions, and in turn

the further conditions and reactions that are developed, by all actors and

organizations.

Scenario writing sensitizes program executives to obstacles ahead

and helps develop a "dirty mind": the tendenc5>tec anticipate and

predict implementation difficulties and be especially attuned to

the interests involved and their likelihOod of delaying, even re- sisting the planned implementation route (a "dirty mind" would

have predicted 'the ineffective implementation of the swine flu

vaccination camp ).

Scenario writing brings the likely flaws and problems to the forefront

and forces designers and program executives to try to take account of,them.

Unlike almost all of our other recommendations, scenario writing is

not primarily extrapolated from our findings. Only the New Haven program

made, approximate use of it. But our recotmendation is also based on the

findings in other areas, both positive and negative (e.g., theewinl flu

case).

(IX) INSTITUTIONALIZING EVALUATION AND REASSESSMENT MECHANISMS

A "dirty mind" is aware that most implementation difficulties cannot

be anticipated fully and that a program's implementation cannot even come

close to being free of error. The test of a good program is not the absence of error, but the ability to detect its own errors and theli'ecrrect

them.

or Thus we recommend that the processes.of anticipation, prediction,

error detection and correction be institutionalized beyond scenario,

writing by building into YEDPA programs mechanisms for feedback,

evaluation, and reassessment of implementation. In many'of the

nine programs, the processes of evaluation and reassessment led to

the detection and correction of serious' Implementation problems.

SI

=
(X) THE NEED FOR STRONG.PROGRAM EXECUTIVES AND THE PURSUIT OF "FIXER"

STRATEGIES

Detecting errors without being able to execute remedies is useless

and frustrating. Neither program assembly nor the subseguenLadaptationcompensation responses run by themselves. They, should be guided by a

strong executive who has enough power to operate.

We also recommend that program executives consciously adopt "fixer"

strategies.

A "fixer." is a person who makes repairs and adjustments in the implementation Obcess to make it work. The "fixer's" adaptations-and compensations are designed to protect, correct, and sometimes expand his program,

especially through coalition building and constant intervention in administratikre detail. There is always a need for compensating in the implementation process for omissions made at the design and adoption stages, which

are inadvertent (because then we can never anticipate fully all the later

implementation difficulties) and intended (because it was not politically

or fi6ncially feasible to include them earlier).. Numerous instances of

each of these elements of the "fixer" strategy were used in the nine cases.

(XI) A PROGRAM EXECUTIVE'S CONTRIBUTIONS AS A "DOUBLE AGENT"

We recommend that prime sponsors seek program executives who can play

the role of "double agent".

Some program executives in the nine cases made major contributions

to effective implementation by acting as a "double agent". This,

role consiyta-of the ability to secure joint action among various

interests in the program assembly process by virtue_9Pthe.execvtive's standing and membership in more than one of the relevant

camps in. the implementation process. A double agent activates and

operationalizes linkages between organizations, agencies and other

persons.

In particular, all these double agents had direct experience with or

access to major providers of jobs (most of which were either in the private

sector. or with a semi-public agency).

2 s
C. C

4 4

In 1979 it does not seem gratuitous to advise prime sponsors to try to

find "double agents." The social policy infrastructure and Overlapping or-'

ganizational and personal netwostks.have developed locally so much in the

past decade that there seems to have been a significant-increase in the supply of talented program executives in general and potential "double agents"

in particular.

Despite this recent increase, potential program executives continue to

be relatively scarce because of our limited knowledge of hoW to increase - their supply by exogenous means. The limits this' places on strategies built

around executives will be discussed shortly.

(XII) P OGRAM EXECUTIVES' TIES TO R SOURCES OF JOBS

I

i Prime sponsors in particular ought to seek program executives who already have ties to sources of jobs.

/ .

There are so many ways that money can be absorbed in a manpower program

before one gets to job development that there is a tendency to forget that

jobs are essential for its effective implementation. Developing an effective

clasgroom component is not easy but it is much easier than getting good jobs

for youths.

O These program executives' ties preferably should be to pkivate sector

jobs.

Private sector jobs are more likely to constrain youths in positive ways

because someone there is more likely to care if the youth doesn't show up or

does his,job poorly. As Arnold Packer, Assistant Secretary'of Labor, has Said,

"Public sector jobs developed for youth typically tend to be short on pro-

. viding enOugh of the discipline needed to hold down a private sector job."

2,9
. There is a need to emphasize piivate sector jobs because they tend to

be overlooked. Manpower programs are publid sector organizations and are run primarily by persons who have spent most of their careers in the public

sector (or academic world). Thus it is understandable that program executives'and their superiors are oriented toward public sector job development.

(XIII) EXECUTIVE TALENT IS MORE SCARCE THAN MONEY OR GOOD IDEAS.

Our advice about fixers and double agents, though sound, has limits..

The fixer strategy is difficult to replicate. Talent is more scarce

than either money or good ideas, especially atthe executive, level.'

And we have very imperfect knowledge of how to develop such executives.

c As Professor James Q. Wilson has argued: "The supply of able, experienced executives is not increasing nearly as fast as the number of problems

being addressed by public policy. This deserves emphasis, for it is rarely/A

N recognized as a constraint. Anyone who opposed 1 bold new program pn the;

grounds that there was nobody around able to run it would be accused of

c being a petifogger at best and a reactionary,do-gOthinliat worst."

4414., (XIV) THE NEED FOR MODEST AND SIMPLE PROGRAM DESIGN

i In light of the scarcity of such persons, we recommend that the design

of YEDPA should not rely exclusively.on their presence., Moreover, the near necessity of talented executives to achieve effective implementation, coupled

with their scarcity, leads ,us to recommend a commensurate modesty in YEDPA

program design and in our overall expectations for the programs' effectiveness. YEDPA prograt designs should be(innovative but realistic in that they:

(a) anticipate implementation difficulties;

(b) are modest, straightforward, and even simple.

4 XX. iX

a 0

U 0

I
lb We have already discussed what we mean by this anticipation process.

Program designs should be modest and simple in tliat they maintain YEDPA''

A fdcus on the goals of job experience, training, job development,,and place-

, ment. By keeping to these specific, purposes, YEDFA'S implementation,ber comes more manageable and more likely to avoid the implementation pitfalls

which have beset other social programs since the mid-1960's.

lb

Effective implementation is a function, to a significant degree, of

good Local administration, but that is not sufficient in itself. Even if

and when a local progr has a talented program executive, he and the entire implementation p ocess may founder on a highly complex program design.

(XVI MAINTAINING THE DIVERSITY OF YEDPA'S OVERALLDESIGN AS A NA,TiONAL

PROGRAM

A strength of YEDPA's overall design as a national program bems to be

the diversity it encompasses (e.g., the nine pro clu -d two from

YIEPP, two from YCCIP, and five from YETP, with a good deal of diversity

among local program designs). Moreover, the flexible overall federal design

has allowed this diversity to develop rather than 94ndating it.

We recommend that DOL continue to allow and encoilrage this diersity

,through continuing its flexible approach.

--YdiathThinplOyment-is-not- a:single problem-with-a- single cause -or_a__single

manifestation. It is a constellation of interrelated problems With complex

`sources, occurring all'across a large and heterogeneous nation. Thus, both

to maximize effective outcomes and to maximize learning, it seems wise to

simultaneously allow various policy approaches to it.

We do not recommend that diversity' be required through the maintenance

of three or four separate programs within YEDPA. Rather, programmatic and

local diversity should be allowed and encouraged in the specific design of

-individual programs.

I

XXX
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Final Report

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OP

(I) NINE YEDPA PR6GRAMIS

16

.1,Our report focuses exclusively on nine YEDPA programs* selected on the

basis of preliminary evidence (collected by us and previous investigators \,

who had analyzed scoresof YEDPA programs**IrAich indicated that these nine

had been effectively implemented.

Our analysis first addressed the question of whether in fact these nine

programs were-impIemented.effectively. Then, to the extent that they were

implemented effectively, weltt:tpted tp explain why they were. Finally, We

attempted to analyze the policy implications of our descriptions -and explanations in order,to frame recommendations.

Our analysis was greatly assisted by the cooperation of the staffs of

these nine programs and many DOL administrators, especially Robert Taggart,

Joseph Seiler, Janet Rosenberg, and Frank Slobig.

(II) THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE NINE PROGRAMS

Implementation generally was effective in these nine programs. Illese

programs generally satisfied to a significant degree our broad criteria for

effective implementation:

The program wag"able to hold delay to a reasonable level.

The program was able to hold financial costs to a reasonable level.

L

*Albuquerque's WORP, Albuquerque's THE, Baltimore's YouthWorks, New Havep's

Ventures'in Community Improvement Program, Newark's Independence High Schobl,

Pittsburgh's STAY, Portland's Emergency Home Repair Program, San Antonio's

YCCIP, SyracdsJrs BOCES-Hancock Training Program.

**In "Refdrences" (p.100), see Wurzburg (1978a), Wuftburg (1978b), Dement

(1978), Ball.(1979A), Ball (1979b), Feldman and bstrower (1979)'.

1
- >\The program was able to meet its original objectives without

",significant alteratton or underachievement of*thege objectivss.

(Here we .mean the specific objectives of DOL and local program

executives rather than merely the 'general objectives of the

original legislative mandate.

"r,

(III) WHAT YEDPA IS, WHAT ITS GOALSARg, AND WHAT, IT S DONE SO FAR*

The Youth Employment and Deffignstratibn Pkojects Act of 1977 represented

. wmajor new Federal initiative aimed at undeistanding and alleviatitlg the

6r.

problems of unemployed youth. YEDPA created four new programse each of

which had different target groups and different strategies. It also doubled.

the size of the Job Corps and set in motion an'elaborate an4 complex process

of "knowledge development' through which a variety:of studies, demonstration

p5ojects, and experiments have been mountid in-the past two years.

_,-

The size and scope of the Act are significant: nearly $1.7 billion

through the end of this fiscal rear and 460 CETA Prime Sponsors serving

nearly 230,000 youth slots in YEDPA programs. Nevertheless, YEDPA should

be viewed as a beginning: an important .first step in addressing in a come . prehensive, diverse, innovative', and often experimental fashion, what has

been described as a national crisis--staggering levels45of youth uneriiploy-

. ment, primarily concentrated in poor urban and rural areas-.

06 . During the process of selecting the ni, programs upon which we would

focus, we collected preliminary evidence n scores of other YEDPA' programs.

Out preliminary impression is that.in addition to the dine we selected,

many of these other YEDPA programs were implemented rather effectively.

O *This section is primarily based on the excellent material developed by

Erik Butler and James Darr in 'he Youth Employment Demonstration Projects

Act of' 1977: Preliminary Lessons

a

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too
Moreover, gpi the nine we analyzed, during the first eighteen

YEDPA'Axistence implementation seems to have occurred more rapid

usually is the case for most social programs.

months of . Ly than

YEDPA is comprised of four programs: Youth Employment & *Training,Pro-

. grams (YETP). YETP is the lynchpinbfYEDFIA. Its goals are sweeping and am5' bitiouS: programs "designed to make a significaht long-terp impact on the

structural unemployment problems of youth". These programs can range from

"community betterment activities" similar to YCCIP to a host of."training and

services" generally, similar to those already allOwed under CETA Title II B.

Several features distingishYETP from the other parts'of YEDP4 and from

pre CETA yolith programs, though most are matters of degree and emphasis:

'broad`` eligibility; an elaborate'planning process; the involvement of public

a Schools; coordination with other parts of CETA; ailoWhnceg-for experimentation

E14:gible participants are so- called "in-school" youth who are unemRyloyed or un- Ae

deremplTyed and Whose -family income does not exceed 85% of the lower living

standard.

The YETP/planning prOcess required consultation with unions and community

based organizations, an inventory local needs and resources, special do- _ orAnation with local education agencies (pEAs) and the establishment of Youth

Councils (with youth members), Twent two percent* of the money allocated -to

each pkime sponsor was.ta be "used for programs for in- school y'outh carried

°out pursuant to agreements betWeen.prime sponsors and local educational

agencies." This 22% set aside le probably the most well known provision of

. ,. ; . YEDPA and the one which has caused the greatest immediate change in the paan-

'ning activities of prime sponsors. 4' .

4

.3.

....... *In discussing the dollar 'allocations for YEDPA, we'have stayed with the

original appropriations in order to provide a sense of their relatiVe

share of the funds. Actual expenditures have'varied so much that_the

subsequent funding years alter this balance considerably.,

A

3
combined. Over 80% 4 YETP_participants were economically disadvantaged, and

altt half were. women and half mindrittes.

The original appropriation fOr YETP was,$537 million, of which about /

$450 mil,lion was available o prime sponsors and GroverWN. 1 As of March 31,

I

1979, there were 185,600 p rticipants enrolled in YETP programs, excluding'

those involved in the discretionary projects. This is over three times the

'number enrolled in YEDPA's other thz'ee programs (YACC, YIEPP, and YCCIP),

Youth Conservation & Community Improvement Projects (YCCIP):, YCCIP's

purpose is: "to provide youth experiencing severe difficulties obtailling em-

. ployment with well-supervised work in projects that produce tangible benefits

to. the community% 1

, Appropriate projects are defined by the Act aS being."10.4k which would

otherwise not be carried out" and can include a range of "community improve- men such .zs rehabilitation of public housing, tepairs to the homes of lowincome residents, energy conservation measures, and park maintenance.,'

0/

The Act emphasizes the'qual.ity of the supervision provided to youths in

YCCIP projects a the need to,cotTlinate the youths' work experience with

looal.educatis agencies, including "the awarding of academic credit". At the

same'tiene, proposed projects'are to be nabOr intensive" and to provide "job

training and skill development opportunities".

YCCIP is the only part of YEDPA with mandated limit administrative

costs (10% of project funds) and participant wages Cat least 65i of total pro- ° a

ject costs). $115 million was allocated, for Yip), equal to the amount for

.00,\

* 'Nearly 32,000 youth were served by YCCIP in the, first YEDPA fiscal year

(1978) and over 80V of these were economically disadvantaged, indicating that

prime sponsors moi'e than.pet the dpecial emphasis_of the law. Over 50% of

.those served were minorities, but only a quarter of-the enrollees were women.

.

4

,3c

tr
- . Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot Projects CYIEPP): YIEPP is the most

experimental of the YEDPA programs. Its explicit purpose is to demonstrate

"the efficacy of guaranteeing otherwise unavailable employment" to disadvantaged youth who "resume or maintain attendance in second Ei-Y school" or 7'in a

program which leads to a certificate of high-school equivalency". To be*

elite

gible ,for an Entitlement project, a youth would have to be (a) economically

disadvantaged; (b) between 16 and 19 years old; (c) reside in a specific geo4kaphic area and (d),comply with the school attendance pr vision.

4YIEPPi's fundamental goal is to test the effect of assured work on school

att dance. Subsidiary goals incl ded testing the capacity of prime sponsors

to perate such large scale administrative and job cre tion programs for youth,

,experimenting with the use of direct wage subsidies in the private sector; and

utilizing alternative'schooling arrangements to entice out-of-school youth

back into the educational system.

Several features of the Entitlement set it apart from the rest of YEDPA:

the concept of entitlement; the allowance for private sector wages; the most

.restricted-income eligibility in all of YEDPA; and the most el

rigorous evaluation desigAl.

ale and

$115 million has been reserved for the Entitlements. Through March 1979,

over 50,000 youth hga been served in the Entitlement projects. All were economically disadvantaged, just over half were women, and over 80% were from

minority groups. The minority percentage is the highest for,any of YEDPA's

parts.

Young Adult Conservation Corps (YACC): The Young Adult Conservation

Corps was created through a new Title added to CPA. Its purpose was to offer

employment to "youths who would otherwise not be currently productively em- ployed" through "useful conservation work° on "public lands and waters".

e It is administered through an Interagency agreement with the Departments

of Iriterior and Agriculture who virtually manage all of MCC. Except for the

r"

5

.1
modest role of the Employment Servi,e4 in referring applicants and for some

pro forma coordination requirements, YACC is divorced entirely from the

CETA system. This is a major reason that this study did not includeany

-YACC programs. We also focused exclusively on the other three types of

programs because they will be considered for refunding in 1980 while YACC

will not come up for refunding til 1982.

In glieral, the accomplishments of YEDPA are quite significant:

Nearly 750-,000 youths have participated in YEDPA programs during

the two years of it's implementation.

YEDPA's major programs have been implemented by'the nation's CETA

prime sponsor system.

Innovative, experiments have bth put in'place both on'the national

and local level.

\)% Research commissioned through YEDPA has greatly expanded knowledge

about the extent and causes of youth unemployment.

/los For the first time, the youth employment system has been brought into substantial contact with public secondary education.

Youth unemployment rates have come down, with YEDPA accounting for

most of the new jobs gained by minority youths in the past year.

Numbers alone do not reveal the remarkable range of local programs.

, The following are the specific results of YEDPA:

A. Public Sector Job_Creation

o The employment and training system has been capable of adapting to

new requirements, of cutting through normally expeted delays and

of providing youth job opportunities on a large scale and rather

;quickly.

"'

*There are 230,000 youth slots in YEDPA, but nearly 750,000 youths have

participated because this includes youths who have dropped out or graduated'

and then replaced by new enrollees.

6
The majority of youth served by YEDPA are from minority groups. Be-

, tween 1954 and 1977, employment/population ratios were almost halved

for all groups of black youth. Unemployment rates nearly tripled

(foom 13P.r4 to 38.7 percentt° for the'16-17 group and from 14.7 to 36.-

for the 18-19 group). Some improvement in black youth labor force

particip'ation has occurre&i,n the 1917-1979 period, although official

jobless rates partially mask the progress by not revealing the extent

of new young entrants. Over the past two years, for example, the unemployment rate for white youth age 16-21 decreased 3.1 percentage

,-plaiata-while they decreased 4.8 points for minority youth. Government officials also note the 20 percent increase in the employment of

black teenagers ages 16 to 19. They estimate that at least half this

increase Stems from YEDPA and the other federal youth initiatives. A

20-year decline in black teenage labor force participation was reversed for black malts in the YEDPA period (it increased from 41.1

percent in 1977 to 47.4 percea-in 1979):

Prime s sors have targeted their programs on the economically dis4kv taged to a degree greaker than required by YEDPA.

'r4/0 Work performed under YEDPA has been'shown to have both tangible community benefits and genuine economic value.

B. Access to the Private Sector

There is a growing consensus, on all levels, that private, for-profit

employers_must be more deeply involved in solving the nationJs youth employ1 ment problems. Baged on their own identification of needs, large and small

employers require significantly different policy approaches.

'There has been no long-term or large-scale test Of direct wage subsidies for youth in the private sector; but the Entitlement has

shown that direct wage subsidies will attract private sector participation.

C. Educational1Strategies and Institutions

The 22 percent set-aside tends to work well as a financial incentive

for local Education Agencies td participate in joinkaction with the

prime sponsor.

/ ore Young people previously out of school were attracted to participate

in the Entitlement through non-traditional sqttings, primarily alternative schools.

944 7
.-

The YEDPA experience suggests that a more diverse menu of program offerings

is required in order to meet the different needs and interests of out-of -4

school and underachieving youth. A simple "return -te- school" formula is riot

pgiodent.

D. Supportive Services

Acst prime Sponsors.have planned and offered a wide array services.

to, youth participants in YETP, YCCIP, and YIEPP.

Three services=- transportation, child care, and health care--have

emerged as having an increasing impact on youth employability.

E. Management

Prime sponsors are capable of managing youth programs, even those with 4 the scale and complexity of the Entitlement, though their capability

varies greatly.

The knowledge development strategy haslaeen particularly effective in

devising innovative delivery approaches (such as intermediary corporations), structuring demonstration projects', coordinating basic research, and increasing awareness of the value of experimentation.

YEDPA has led to increased connections between prime sponsors and a

. multiplicity of community based and non-profit organizations. The

record is less auspicious with unions and piivate employers.

(IV)' SOME BACKGROUND ON POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

/ . ?, The generally effective, implementation of the nine YEDPA programs ana-

, lyzed is no mean accomplishment in light of the frequent ineffective implementation that most epalysts of domestic social policy have found,

home brief examples of these historical patterns will serve as a useful background and point of contrast fcir the analysis of the effective4I'nplementation

of, the nine YEDPA programs. They will also indicate the ge'eric nature of

implementation difficulties, which is to say the generiC nature of the implementation obstacles which tiLse nine YEDPA programs faced and generally over.- came.

8

41 0

i

4
In 1965 a new agency, the Economic Developmen t Administration (EDA),

was established by Congress. The EDA decided to go into cities for

the purpose of providing permanent new jobs to minorities through

economic development! In 1966,0akland was chosen is an experiment'

in showing how the provision of public works, and building loans can

provide incentives for employers to hire minorities. All participants at the local and national levels agreed about the prograM's

goals; there was minimum publicity.' Ample funds were on hand at the

right time. Congressional appropriations; EDA commitment of funds,

eo Oakland, and approval of local projects by city officials and

private employers all occurred within a few months.

EDA was to provide $23 million in loans and grants to enterprises in

Oakland which agreed to'hire minorities and build facilities leading

to minority employment for a total of 3,,,o0 new jobs. The later

steps of implementation were felt to be "technical questions" that

would resolve themselves once the initial agreements were negotiated

and commitments made. But these "technical quettiops" provided continual problems for five year. Indeed, three years after EDA entered Oakland, only $4 million had been spent and only 63 new jobs'

had been created. After five years, only $12 million had been spent

ando only 900 new jobs had been created (Pressman and Wildaysky).*

In 1967 the Johnson administration launched a new program, New Towns

in-Town ,(NTIT), to create model communities on surplus federal land

in metropolitan areas. The NITIT's objectives were to demonstrate

the federal government's commitment to help the nation's troubled

central cities, build new housing for the poor, and to show how much

could be accomplished by,a combination of high level political support and imaginative urban planning and new technology. Initial

agreements, by local officials seemed to federal officials to be widespread. But disagreements rapidly came tcAhe'surface. A number of

locallgroups strongly opposed low income. public housing; local officials preferred development plans that would yield more tax revenue;

and conservationists were opposed to any plans for construction:

Finally, after four years, no new towns had been built and practically

none had even, been started (Derthick).

In mid-1969, the Lanterman-Petris Short (L-P-S) Act went into effect

in California. This law was intended to protect the civil liberties

of persons alleged to be mentally ill and to accelerate the trend

toward "community" treatment of the mentally ill as an alternative

/ to hospitalization in remote state institutions. Implementation of

half of the legislation, protectiOn of civil liberties and a_general

movement toward de-institutionalization went well. But the other

half--provision of outpatient services at the community level--was

*Authors Will be \Ritea in the body of'report. See "References". section

for complete citations.

, 9
it;

very slow, expensive and reached only a portion of those released

from state institutions. For instance, in San Mateo County (noted

for having the state's most progressive coimunity mental health

service system)lof 260 patients discharged between June 1972 and

D'cember 1973 fkom Napa State Hospital to San Mateo County, only a

minority, 107, received follow ;up mental health services. Another

-66 received public assistance "welfare" but no mental health services. (Bar.dach, 1977)

One of the lessons of the above case'studies is that at the heart of

many instances of ,ineffective dmplementation is a vicious cycle of delay.

It often may begin with merely minor disagreements between just au ew actors

or with the minor delays associated with simple standard operating procedures

-in bureaucracies. But, in the context which routinely characterizes social

programs--changing actors, 'diverse perspectives, and multiple clearance

points--these delays often lead to the next step in the cyole:' suspicion

of ultimate failure or high salvage costs, withdrawal of previous commitments,

more delay, increased anxieties, more suspicion, withdrawal, further delay,

and so forth.

Furthermore, it seems likely that this pattern of ineffective implementation is not a recent phenomenon. Most of the etudies documenting this

pattern are based on programs of the 1960's and 70's. But what is new seems

only to be our more explicit and direct interest in the implementation stage

of the policy process and our willingness to ask hard questions about the

actual effectiveness of implementation efforts.

This pattern of ineffective implementation probably existed before

the 1960's because the fundamental factors underlying it are long -.

°standing elements of ourpolieical system. These factors include

the fragmentation and dispersion of political power which make implementation agreement difficult (federalism, local control, shared

power between separate executive and legislative branches and the

multiplicity of decision points at all these levels); the separation

of policy designers from poliby implementers; the annual budget re-

,view pressures and biennial or quadrennial election pressures, which

create demands for instant results and counterproductive implementation decisions, e.g. (selecting programs that can be processed in the

shortest time); vague standards which make-implementation difficult.

but which are almost endemic because legislators rarely can agree on

more precision and specificity and so they pass the problem on to

the implementation stage. .

4

4.1

10

4

4
-Mt it should be emphasized that these factors which seem to underlie

ineffective implementation invglye significant dilemmas. These factors are

valued characteristics of our political systet. The behavior which often

is associated with ineffective implementation is legitimate. Indeed, it is

purposive rather than aberrant or pathological behavior: The actors who

pursue thus behavior are trying to achieve values that are widely accepted

in our political culture. However, this involves significant dilemmas because at the same time these actions tend to contribute to ineffective implementation.

Some of tikes,7dilemmas associated with the factors just noted include the

fact that the fragpentation of power in the form of federalism (and especially,

local control) is widely valued despite the fact that it makes implementation

difficult. Separate executive and legislative branches seem to lead to many

inefficiencies, especially at the implementation stage. But they are considered by many to contribute to sustaining democracy, pluralism, and many efficiencies such as providing a pattern of policy oversight thathelps to detect

and correct policy errors. Separatioh of policy design from implementation may

cause difficulties but it also gives policy designers the freedom and incentive

to innovate. The short run pressures of elections and budget reviews indicate

the tension between the need for electoral control over political leaders within short periods and the much longer period required for policy fruition.

(.V} THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE NINE PROGRAMS

The complete details of the degree tb which these nine programs satisfied

our' three criteria for effective implementation are in Appendix B con- tains the nine complete case studies, preceded by the abstracts of these case studies in Appendix A. Summaries of the cases are presented here roughly in

the order of each prograp's effectiveness of implementation (ranked by quartiles). There are no exact rankings because the nature of the data does not

lend itself to such precision.
11% , .rte r" Very Effective Implementation: Pittsburgh's STAY, New Haven't VICI

Highly Effective Implementation:

cs' Medium Effective Implementation:

Portland's EHR, Syracuse's BOCESHancock, Albuquerque's THE program

Albuquerque's WORP program, Newark's

IHS

Borderline Effective-Implementation:_ Baltimore's YouthWorks, San

We found that all nine programs were effectively implemented and these

rankings* indicate their varying degree of effective implementation. This

variation is significant because it seems to be associated with the p\esence

or absence of some of the c ditions:that we found to contribute to effective

implementation of YEDPA. (Most of these conditions tend to be 'present in the

Antonio's YCCIP

programs which were most effectively'implemented and some of the conditions

were missing from some of the programs that were not as effectively implemented.

/hese programs are reviewed in terms of our, three criteria for effective

implementation: (1) minimizing delay; (2) minimizing financial costs; (3)

meeting objectives. (Each gummary begins with a brief description of the pro-

., gram.)-

These summaries are not evaluations of these programs. Such evaluations

would include analyses of the programs' ultimte,outcomes (the programs' ef-:

fect on the target population) as well as the effectiveness of their implementation. For the reasons detailed inthe section (Via) of this introduction,

we cannot fully analyze these ultimate outcomes at this time.

These analyses are based on the programs' operation, through May 31, 1979.

SEven these quartile rankings afe not exact, and there is an overlap

between most programs in contiguOts pategories. But we, are confident in our%

'assessment at the poles: The implemebtation of the program in San Antonio

and Baltimore generally was effective but the 'implementation of the program

irlliew Haven and Pittsburgh was much more effective, with the implementation

of the rest of the programs lying somewhere between those two poles and gen-

. erally being in the direction of highly effective implementation.

12

4)
O VERY EFFECTIVE,IMPLEMENTATION

Pittsburgh's STAY

STAY.is a YETP program which is operated by the Pittsburgh Public

Schools. STAY seeks'to introduce economicallyand.educationally disadvantaged, in-school youth to the rewards and riere of the world of work. STAY . consists of work experience, academic instruction about the world of work, crr and support services. (a) 'Work qxperience: an attemRclO provide,practical

job experience for youth who have never worked. (b) Academic instruction:

teaches STAY

its rewards for th'

ants what is xequired of them in the world of work and

(c) Supporb t'services: assts the student in dealing

with personal problems.

Delay: The program began in February, 1978 (the earliest possible date for

_aYETpprograz0,....

Financial costs: No overruns

Satisfaction'of objectives: STAY is. 0 large (5'60 participants annually) program that takes the poorest and most academically disadvantaged youth. It is

highly effective in recruiting the target population which must meet the most

stringent eli4ibility requirements of.the nine programs analyzed. -YETP allows

participants to have, a family income of up to 85 lercePt of DOL's lower living

standard. But STAY's requirement is more stringent--a family income not high

. %11. er,than 70 percent of DOL's lower living tandard. STAY also introduced the

requirement of having a two-year academic average below a"C4.

Job experiepce i crucial to the success of such a.program, and job de-

. velopment is a very difficult task fO?-these programs to achieve. STAY has.,

been highly effective in developing a large number (approximately 35) of hAh

I

13
./*

a

quality publi6 sector job sites* which mUst meet the following two criteria;

*IV) there is a job for the student to do; (b) the student is well L.Tpervised."

,4 Poi the firstfall semester (the only one for which data are now-available) able)65 percent of participants completed h am,(152 of the 231 initial

enrollees). And 47 percent (72 of the 152) of the got private sector jobs

within three,noths of program completion.

Ned Haven's VICI

New Haven's VICI began in October /of 1978. It is funded thrdugh the

4

Corpbration for Public and Private.Ventures 4CPPVI. Its desigri was modeled

after Emergency Home Repair, a pre- DPA program in Portland, Oregon. It

enrolls approximately 55 out-of-school youth to perform rehab and weatherization on private, owner-occupied homes in low-income neighborhoods. The

worksites and the supplies are provided by five city agencies. Supervisors'

are union carpenters and painters, w o instruct as well.

r *When he developed the program, STAY's director, Fred Monaco, decided

that it should-have exclusive use of the 35,or so best public sector job

sites developed over the yeAs by its predecessors, the SET/AVERT prOgrAms.

(As we wi'll detail below, SET/AVERT are programs In tide Pittsburgh public

schools begun in 1971 by t'red,Monaco and designed to provide low-income-in -

schem1 youth permanent part-time employment. STAYwas designed to deal with.

the types of youths,who dropped out of SET/AVERT. Monacoreasonydthat

since the participants of the STAY program faced multiple barriers to employment, in order for the program to work at all; the work experience component

of STAY would have to be o high quality. o "*STAY students work i'h hospital dietary sections, school custodial jobs,

the YMCItecreation department. , Unlike "THE".in Albuquerque, STAY neither

expects. or hopes that students will be hired by these agencies. The-aim of

STAY is toPtake-students who ITtehlever worked and who would probably have N.. droppe of the SET/AVERT program and let them experience the world of

`.work. T who successfully complet9gridare channeled into SET/AVERT and

, access to higher quality,jobsmithAfuture employment possibilities.

4.. ,.

it?
Delay: The program.began two weeks after RDOL (Boston) siened the

1contract in

September.* 4

1

Financial Costs: No overruns But because Qf slight underenrollment to the

program (see below), there has been slight underspending on both participant

wages and the administrative component.

i

h

,SAtisfaction of objectives: Minor problems in he skilltraining component

were remedied throUgh effective error detection a d swift error correction:

there was initial overemphasis' on achieving job productivity through many

small jobs which could be completed quickly. But this offered participants

a lesser menu of skill experiences. The program'director shifted the policy

.

, to larger worksites which offeed a broader variety of skill experience.

Under both the small and large job site policies, the program's community A

provement objective also has been effectively achieved.

"\\

Post-prograM placement in apprenticeship programs initially did not meet

projections because'of factors beyond the program's control--New Haven's tight

labor market. While still making union placements, the program has coped with

this by also successfully focusing on non-union placements.

It also should be noted that the New Haven VICI program is one that the

general implementation literature (summarized. above) would predict would be

implemented ineffectively: First, though there were signilcant design inputs

, made by the locals, this program was essentially a national design (based on

_ . the very different context.of Portland, Oregon).being brought to a locality.

The literature suggests that this generally makes implementation difficult.

Second, as both the "Analysis and Recommendation" section and Appendix B will

indicate, the New Haven program also faced more than an average amount of potential implementation difficulties. Given this background, the progranf's

Effective implementation is all the more significant.

*This was three months after New Haven's proposal had 1001.approved by

CPPV. Rut New Haven experienced less delay than five of the eight VICPpro-'

grams administered by CPPV; the other two experienced only two weeks less delay than New Haven.

15

4
GO

0

HIGHLY-EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION

o k Portland's EHR (Emergency Home Repair)

. EHR is a work experience program serving in- school ankall-of-school

,' youth. Begun in 1974, the program has since become a YETP program combining ing funds from DOL, HUD, the school diditrict and the, city. The prograit is '? contracted out to the PortlendPublic Schools Igho hire personnel, recruit . ' , in-school youth, and provide a headquarters. Supportive services and re-

, cruitment of out-of-school youth is done by the city through CETA. The

Air program receives its worksites and supplies from the Portland Development

Commission (privatekowner-occupied homes of the poor, handicapped and elderly). Youths perform emergency rehab under the supervision of public

school teachers with construction backgrounds.

Delay: The program began less than one month after, the proposal was accepted.* a

Financial costs? No overruns on an annual budget of $400,000 (including inkind services of school district and city personnel).

lk

Satisfaction of objectives: EHR's projected enrollment has been achieved (am

11g#

average of 38 of the 40 projected youths) through strong decentralized recruitment procedures (each high schooAhas its own work experience coordinator who

refers youth to this and other programs). But the absence of any screening '. standards fqr referrals resulted in a ;4 high. participant turnover rate.

This was later remedied by the personal interviewAng of each applicant by the'

program dirgctor which resulted in an almost 70 percent'reduction in parti-

'cipant.turnover. The target of economically disadvantaged youth has been

achieved. But;in'contrast to ISittsburgh., EHR has used the higher standara,

(family income under 85 percent of the DOL lower living standard). The community improvement objective'has also.been'satisfied.

*Several months later the program closed Ain while the agreement with 4,

the school district4was being fineliteds. But it only took three weeks to

_,start it up again.

16

48

I

ti
V

(1- 4

EHR had significant administrative difficUlties in its early stages.

But even in the short run'they had little effect on piogram participants.

(This contrasts with San Antonio and Baltimore where similar difficuitie%,

did adversely affect participants in the short run.) Moieovert, these difficulties were overcome relatively soon, which is one of the charactetis,r

tics of effective implementation. EHR has been opeigting long enough to

obtain placement data. 1.0st yeaethe program had a p8bitive termination

rate of 60 percent with approxiMately half going into unsubsidized employMint and the other half obtaining further training outside the progral.

tz.

, The noteworthy aspect of the potential difficulties,faoing the Portland program is that when it began (in its pie-YEDPA stage), it was a completely new and rather innovative idea, Again, on this basis one would

predict. ineffective implementation, yet EHR was highly effective.

BOCES- Hancock

0

This YETP formula-funded program serving out-of-school Youth, wht?r

began in November, 1978,under agreements between the City of'Syracuse

(Office of Federal and State Aid Coordinator OFSAC), the Air National

Guard (ANG), and the Board of Cooperative Educational Services ( BOCES) with

an enrollment of 20-25 youths, is conducted at the National Guard quarters

of the'Hancock Air Force Base. The youths receive onthe-job training in a

wide variety of fields, under the supervision of Guardsmen, and remedial

reading instruction from a BOCES teacher.

Delay:" The program began within two weeks of initiaa target date.

0

Financial Cpsts: No overruns. Indeed, this is a very low cost program.

Many youth programs with a skills training component receive free morksites,

but th'y have to purchase supplies and materials and pay supervisors' salaries.. By contrast, the,SYracuse prime sponsor (the city government through

«

)40

v

17
its Office of Federal and State Aid Cpordinaf OFSAC ) negOtiated,an agrees

ment with a state agency, the Air National Gu rd, to zecre all of these elements including skilled technicians as supe sors) at no costs. The only

opm,cpmponent ($21,10 annually) on d' costg, the prime sponsor are a-claPAF

participants' wages.

Satisfaction of objectives: The program has not had any'problems recruiting

low income andminority'yobth. But with an tnrpllment of 20-25, it has never

reached its target of 30 participants. Placement data were .11100i available be-

.

, causeethe program is still in its first term. But impressionistic evided6e

indicates that the implementation of the OJT skills component has gthle well.

The remedial education component met resistance from the participants, most

of whom believe that they do not need it because4hey-are high school, graduates. However,.adjustments in this curriculum have reducedthis resistance.

0. (

Just as major potential difficulties faced the New Haven program, it

.

. . should be noted that the opposite was true for this program: Foreinstance,

,.,. its pbjectives are modest - -a small pfograk (for a maximum pf 30 participantS)

,.,,, aimed alph'-group with better-than-average educational credentials--high

4

sihooli4eduates. : .,.,. .

, &

' ' e , AlbU94rue's THE Program

,le THE Is a YETP operation run by e;Albuquer9ue Public Schools (APSY:

V , * . Serving in-school youth, THE consists of (arJob e eriehce: participants in

4

. , the prOgram are placed in one of five Albuquerga, tels and given hands-on

instruction,in each of five areas of the hotel operation. (b) Academic instrucstruction: students attend twice weekly clas-!-diie with the reqUirementg,

// services: 'help stuearliest

1 \

(

rewards, and problems of the world of work

dents deal with personal problems.

Delay: The pre(ram began in,Fairuary 1978

YETP program).

.

( 50

AM,

possible-date for a
t "

Financial costs: No overruns. In fact, despite initial difficulties over

neqbtiations with the hotels over their training fee (see belbwl, two of

the six hotels never billed the program at all.

Satisfaction of objectives: THE has achieved over 95 percent of its target

90 participants. It did this by overcoming initial recruitment difficulties

315' (the necessity of the counselot Making several trips to each guidance counselor to explain and 'sell the program). It has also achieved the target of

family income no higher than 85 percent of the DOL lower living standard,

which required a waiver by the,p4me sponsor because the prime's initial tar-

#.

, get was the 70 percent level.

But THE has not been effective in the recruitment of academically disadvantaged youths -- potential dropouts. It has no specific recruitment system

for this and no entrance requirement such as Pittsburgh's of a below C aca- demic average. The training objective

7----...-- is very effectively achieved. THE

provid s some of the most significant training'of the nine programs analyzed

because elatively rapid advancement is possible in the hotel industry, especially in Albuquerque where it'is strong and growbig.--tHE's initial placement record of 80 Percent was strong hit the following semester it dropped

. tb between 40 and 50 percent.* . MEDIUM EFFECTI)E IMPLEMENTATION

Albuquerque's WORP

, As a (Tier II) Entitlement program, WORP "entitles" any exigible youth

living in a geogiaphically defined areas to a part time job during the

school year and a full time job during the summer as long as thg,youth remains in school. Participants can also earn credit-toward gra ation by en-

, *This may be dueto seasonal employment fluctuations in the hotel in- . diistry and the directo s contention that THE began to attract more disadvantaged participants.

19
4

rolling'in WORP (listed in the schOol catalogue as an elective). Once eligibility is certified, yOuths are assigned a WORP counselor who informs them

of their rights and responsibilities and helps them select a job from WORP's

available pool.

Del4': The program experienced modest but troublesome delay receiving the

grant award. Thus, the program had to begin after the start of the school

semester which heightened the pressure to enroll youths rapidly and move them

on to worksites. .But the main significance of this delay for the/issue of ef-J

fective implementation is that the program was able to effectively gain the

1

. , school system's cooperation ,n making the adjustments to the late start-up

date which was out of phase with the school calendar. ,.. . Financial costs: No overruns. Moreover, the program has been ab4 to allocate

more thap the required amount on participant wages (77 percent of the total budget) because of its ability to obtain worksite supervisors at no cost to the

program.*

4

Satisfaction of objectives: The program has reached 80 percent of it pro---

jected enrollment. But it has not been effective in reaching school dropouts.

' The initial target was that 10 percent of entitlement eligible youths would be

dropouts, but the'program has only enrolled 5 percent.- (Baltimore, by contrast,

has achieved its target of enrolling dropouts to the level of 20 percent of its

total enrollment.) Unlike most entitlement programs, WORP has been successful, -

however, in gaining the award of ac emic credit for work experience: But it

has not achieved the YIEPP o je ive of job'development in the private sector,

.which is significant hothmba erially and symbolically for YIEPP. WORP's two

worksites--the University of New Mexico and Kirtland Air\Force Base--have several advantages which will will discuss below. Nevertheless, they dp not offer private sector experience or direct future placement.

This also permits the-pro 9ram to pay counselors according to the public

school salary schedules .mithoutethe strain on other portions of the administrative budget experienced in other YEDPA programs.

,

20

5r)
4

Newark's Independence High School (IHS)

IHS is a private, non-profit, alternative school which seeks to integrate

its academic curriculum with practical work experience in order to assist aca- demically, socially, and ecbnordically didadvantaged youth. The student alternates between nine weeks of academic instruction with heavy emphasis on reading

and math and nine weeks of work in an area of employment in which the student

has expressed some interest. In addition to work experience and academic instruction, IHS also has social service department for aid with personal probA

Delay: The orogram began o ime at the start of the school year., IHS was

awarded its $00,000 grant DOL in August 1978. But because of conflicts

with the prime sponsor (detailed below), the contract was not signed until

October 1 and tures were not,received'until the end of October. IHS's intensely Adicated staff went for over a month without pay in order to have

the program begin on time.

Financial costs: The original grant was increased by $56,000 to solve a problem with the program's work experience component. It should be noted, however,

that IHS was willing to forego this increase and operate the program differently.

It received the money at DOL's insistence.

Satisfaction of objectives: Recruitment is not a problem at IHS. It has a

waiting list of 2,6 youths for 100 positions. It has also achielled its target

of youths with previous difficulties both in and out of schoOl: Over half of

the student body were expelled or dropped out of a previous high school and

almost half have arrest records.

IHS was not able to meet DOL family income qualifications and had to re-

. ceive a waiver from the prime sponsor which involved a fair amount of conflict

21

td
, so between IHS and the prime.* Satisfying objectives of overall implementation

progress, IHS was able to*resolve the cohflict in its own favor and with only

a small amount of delay. But the fact remains that the-family income objective was underachieved by quite a bit since the waiver for IHS allowed it to

go beyond not only the 70 percent level (the initial target) but also the 85

percent level. Similar conflicts between IHS_and the prime sponsor and IHS

and DOL characterized several elements of the implementation process. But

unlike the one over income eligibility these did not result in any other sub-

-stantial underachievement of objectives. But there was e good deal of bureau-

, cratiCvimplementation difficulty with which IHS was only moderately adept-at

handling. However, as in the Portland case, with a minor exception these

difficulties in Newark have not yet adversely affected the participants or

the substance of the program.

IHS has had some small pro ems in retaining all of its private sector

employers because of DOL'w successful insistence that these employers would

have to fulfill DOL requirements and paS, one-half of the wage bill.**

CEs

1' *In its initial proposal IHS had agreed to serve only students whosg

family income was 70 percent of the lower lim,ing standard. However, the

_sUbsequent income verification found there were a 'number of students at IHS . whose family income was as high as 85 percent of the lower living standard.

The pr4.e told IHS t9 take these students offthe work experience,componentand that the prime tuld no longer pay for them. After several weeks of conflict and negotiation, IHS received a waiver to go beyond not only the 70

percent level but also the 85 percent level.

**IHS's initial proposal had stipulated that in their YETP program they

would continue their tradition of having the youths paid either no wages for

their work experience component or wages below the minimum wage. IHS initially rejected DOL' insistence on both paying the minimum wage and he emplOyers paying one -ha f of the ge bill. They said that this confl ted with

the schodl-es image as n inno ative edUCgtional experience rather than an employment agency and t would cause the school 'to lope all of its private

sector employers., Months of pre- and post-proOosal negotiations resulted in

INSacquiescence tosthe DOL requirement and DOL'sincreasing the grant by

$56,000 to cover this element.

22

4

^.
The academic instruction compChent hap-been implemented effectively and'

'is well integrated with the work experience component. Average schoolattendance is approximately 80 percent and average job attendance, is 90 percent.

The separate Career Develqpment Seminar, which is designed to explore issues

surrounding the world of work, has hot been effective. It requires the type

of adaptations that were made in a similar class in Pittsburgh's STAY program.

But unlike Pittsburgh, these have not been implemented as yet at IHS.

-Unlike most of the other programs, the ultimate goal at IHS is graduation

from the school rather than simply job placement. After. only one year of the

YETP prograithere are insufficient data omits possible effect on the school's

dropout rate or post-graduation job placement.

BORDERLINE EFFECTIVE, IMPLEMENTATION

Baltimore's YouthWorks

This .s \a YIEPP (Entitlement) program placing 7,000 youths in part time

jobs during the school year and full time jobs during the summer so long as the

participant remains in school. The majority Of the youth (over 80%) are placed ,

in:either public sector or private non-profit jobs.- The remaining 10% are placed in private sector jobs with most-of these placements coming from smatl

"ma and pa".budinesses rather than larger, corporate operations..

Delay: The program was only moderately successful in avoiding delay. Placement of enrollees in jobs was delayed bythe program's inability to cope with

the very large initial volume and subsequent continuous enrollments: After

one month of operation, 6,000 youths had been enrolled but only 35 percent of.

them had received assignments. Six months later this figure had_been increased

to 83 percent. But this compares to a 99 percent job assignment rate in

Albuquerque's entitlement, program (though the latter is the highest rate for

any entitlement program). These delays in Baltimore were reduced by eventually

riviacing,the continuous enrollments with a monthly assignment system. The pro- , grammatic and organizational difficulties, which will be noted shortly, occurred

so early in Baltimore that they further contributed to implementation delay.

23.

o
Financial costs: To remain within its budget, YouthWorks had to negotiate

an increase (from approximately $3 million in-the first 18 months to $5 mil-

. liOn for its one year extension period] ih DOL funding to pay additional

staff necessitated by implementation difficulties and the elimination of PSEs

from direct srvice delivery positions. Furthermore, another eAment of the

financial costs was only held to a re sonaldle level because MDRC made a special

, adjustment for YouthWorks.*

0

Satisfaction of Objectives: The program has been generally successful in

A meeting its projected enrollment levels. One month after the-program began,

in March 1978,' 6,000 youths (99 percent of projections) were enrolled. Enrollment levels held at between 80 to 85 percent of projections in the first sum-

* mer and rose to 95 percent in the'fall. Twenty percent of its eprollees are

dropouts, which is much greater than Albuquerque's 5 percent. YouthWolks has

met its target of placing 10 percent of its participants in private sector

worksites. However, to meet this goal, the program shifted from its early

emphasis on corporate and institutional. job development to a focus on "ma and

pa" service and retail businesses.** Whether this shift will lessen the program's ability to achieve its goals of meaningful work experience and future

job opportunities must await a comparison of placement.outcomes between programs which provide work experience in'the small business and large corporate

sectors. ,

*As will be detailed later, after the increased funding for additional

staff, YouthWorks'would not have'been able.to remain within the restriction

requiring that 65 peCent of budget be paid triihrticipants unless YouthWorks

was permitted todeduct funds received for "enrichment activities" from its

administrative budget in computing those percentages.

**Corporate placements raised problems in terms of "perceived displacement

of union labor and employer intolerance of youths with poor work habits. The,

small business sector demonstrated-greater willingness to put time and effort' -

into training youths in return for useful free labor. The concern of the

prime sponsor, MOMR, that it establish a good relationship with the large -scale

business sector in order to meet other organizational goals also seems to have

been a factor in this shift.

24 ,

56
Breakdowns in the particeiptit payrollsysteM_Auring the first few months

of operation.creaiedmany citizen complaints to the Mayor's Office and MOMR

as well as bad press publicity. It is estimated that only between 300 and 600

pairticipants were !lc:t paid on time out of a total of 6,000. But this is large

in absolute terms and enough to generate a good deal of bad publicity informally

and in the media. Also, employers became discouraged when youths assigned to

them were not paid.

This triggered a swift response from Marion Pines, MOMR director, and

Robert Ivory, MOMR youth services manager. These and other administrative difficulties' were detected and overcome through two strenuous reorganization efforts, which is a characteristic of effective implementation. Indeed, these

successful detection and correction efforts and the substantive

4

improvements

that they created are one of the major reasons that we consider the Baltimore

program to be effectively implemented despite its other limitations. Nonetheless, it'shou/d be emphasized that these adininistrative difficulties reduced

the effectiveness of the program's implementation because they were relatively

numerous, sizable,,and,they affected the participants in the prograM,' In all

these respects they differ from the administrative difficulties in the Portland

program. For instance, intake was halted for a month while the reorganization

took place. Our conclusions here are confirmed by MDRC's similar findings.*

0 Finally, tn asse sing the implementation effectiveness of YouthWorks, its

large number of participants and other ambitious goals should be considered as major positive elements.

*MDRC praises Baltimore's YouthWorks as a leader among-Entitlement programs

in organization, ability to recruit participants, and absence of conflict be-

, tween schools and the prime. But MDRC goes on to note that. major reorganization

was necessitated by the initial inaccurate belief that its summer SPEDY staff

could run Entitlement. among other things, MDRC found that the reorganization

caused YouthWorks to halt intake for one month. "The Youth Entitlement Demonstration: An Interim Report in Implementation," MDRC, April 1979.

25

(

L
San.

Th exican American Unity Council (MAUC) of San Antonio operates a

YCCIP which offers training.to economically disadvantaged high school dropouts between the ages of 16-19 in the building'and construction trades. In

addition to on-the-job training, each participant receives two weekly classes

\\ in construction techniques and monthly employment and personal counseling sessions. Each participant is offered four hours of academic instruction leading

to .a GED. Participation inthe GED class is voluntary but nearly three-fourths

of participants attend. The work done by the participants is confined to a 30-

block low income area and consists of weatherization, landscaping and home im-,

provements. The program is run by hispanics and it helps hispanics help their

community.

.Delay: The program began slowly and experienced several significant delays.

It was scheduled to begin in February 1978, and reached its peak enrollment of

100 youths in April. After an initial 50 youths and five supervisors were

broUght on, the YCCIP ran into tequble in enrolling youths and hiring union . supervidors. Slow applicant processing and poor screening delayed progress

toward enrollment projectionsjouths were admitted to the YCCIP without careful

screening. Thus, there was a large number of dropouts because of drug or alcohol

abuse or Who were picked up by police at job sites for prior offenses or

court proceedings. Turnover among newly-hired CETA staff (along with inadequate operation procedures and training) exacerbated these problems. During

the spring the program was phut down for ee weeks while negotiations with

unions concerning pay and working arrang4 nts for journeymen supervisors

were,concluded. Finally, an agreement on iring additional union supervisorswas not completed until July. Youths could, not be admitted until additional

supervisors were hired.

Financial costs: San Antonio YCCIP has had problems in meeting its budgetary

objectives. During what we will call 'the program's first phase (prior to its

significant reorganization), participant expenditures' were below the required

1

26
level of 65 percent_Pf_he_XPX42,t114.9iggt-and-in fact- barely reached the 55 percent -

filvel. Difficulties have continued in phase two. As late as March 1979, the

program 'still was $30,000 over its administrative budget. However, recent efforts have raised participant expenditure levels torabout 63 percent.

. This budgetary imbalance seems to have occurred because MAUC did not antigipate the high cost.of union supervision. Throughout this report we will

tee anticipation as an essential factor in overcoming implementation obstacles.

Also, youth abdenteeism reduced wage expenditures because youths are oily

paid for hours worked. There were also cost overruns in the weatherization

expenditures. Subsequent improved procedures and careful monitoring have

virtually eliminated these overruns.

Satisfaction of objectives: The early stage of.the prograM was marred by administrative confusion and a failure to meet objectives. MAUC's executive

director, Juan Patlan, did not respond to signs of trouble with the YCCIP until there was a low HUD ranking of the program. Then, in the Fall of 1978,

the program underwent a major reorganization after Patlan used thg resources of two top staffpeople to analyze the YCCIP's difficulties and recommend

/ solutions. YCCIP's first director--an inexperienced former MAUC investment

manager--was then replaced by MAUC's youth services coordinator; Maggie

Eureste. She was given major administrative support from Patlan and his staff.

With this help, she and the,new YCCIP staff increased significantly the effectiveness of the program's implementation.

By June 1979, YCCIP had enrolled'48 percent of its projected 257 youths

and had long waiting lists for work projects. It also enrolled 93 percent of

its tafget for females (70.youths), a significant accomplishment in a program

de up largely of hispapics and focused a the traditionally male building

\\2:el\\I!ades.

In phase one, institutional community improvement,proisicts were emphasized

at thi expense of other-project goals. Large, institutional projects'were simpler to administer (supplies were provided by the-institution) and to schedule

Al9 27

5D

a.

a
. -

(projects were long-term). However, residential

weatherization objectives hadheen in YCCIP's d

needs other than youth job training. "Thu's YCCI

tutional pAtects and directed its efforts to me

construction goals.

repair, rehabilitation and

ign to respond to community

later discontinued institing the original mix of

Placements and terminations initially have,beefi close to projected goals.

As of June.1979, there was positive termination for 48 percent of participants

(85 youths), which Baas 89 percent of projected.goal terminations. Eighteen

youths have been placed in union apprenticeships which is within the range of

the program's goal_ of 25 union pl' cements.

St ff recruitment and hiring has proble1, which has not

been fu ly resolved. In addition to problems with CETA staff, turnover among

the core professional staff occurred frequently during the program's first

phase and personnel problems continue.*

, A final word on the significance of implementation effectiveness of

these nine programs. As noted, these are only approximate estimates

of their relative.implemantation effectiveness. We are more confi,7

dent about the rankings at the poles than any specific ranking be-,

tween the programs. But these approximations should suffice to indicate the variation among the programs in implementation effective-

.. ness. Furthermore, the reader is cautioned to recall that the purpose of

our analysis is not to rank these programs. Rather, it is to suggest

a model of the various components and processes of a YEDPA program

which would contribute to its effective implementation. Analysis of

all nine of these programs was useful in this because on the whole

all were effectively implemented.

Finally, we wish to emphasize our conclaTin that the ability of these

nine YEDPA programs to cope rather effectively with their implementation /

difficulties represents significant, though incremental, progress for

domestic social initiatives. P+

r-* *At this time, it is not possible to determine the extent to which continuing personnel problems are the result of decisions made before the program's

- reorganization. However, it seems likely that reliance on CFA staff is at

least partly responsible.

28

se
A

A

(VI) THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SOCIAL POLICY'INFRASTR RE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

I

We found that, the conditions in 1979 surrounding the implementation of

'YEDPA -(and similar domestic programs) seem to be significantly more favorable

for effective implementation than they were fifteen or even ten years ago,.

espeekally local conditions. 'Thus, -many of our recommendations are more

feasible today than in the past. They are based on programs\hat are more

replicable than in the past because

. these favorable conditions are more widespread now.

# (A) As Sar Levitan has argued, actors and designen4_,Ltdboth the Federal and

local level 'learned a lot about designing and implementing social policy during the 1960's and 70's (Levitan, 1976).*

ti

In addition to this learning, in the past fifteen years aricE and developed Social policy infrastructure has grown up at the local level.

The individuals and organizTtions which comprise this infraktructure FP Are oriented toward innovation'and socialprogress. Many are alumni of

Great Society programs and their spin-offs via foundations. Others

are alumni of post-Great Society innovative priagmEs of DOL and HUD.

: The accumulated experiences of these programs ObeTproduced-a-greatdeal of learning for individuals sand organizations.

many of these persons re still young, but they have learned much from

these previous varied experie ces. They represent a new class of activist

bureaucrats. Organizers is a,good functional description o them and likening them to community or labor organizers captures a good teal of their back.!

ground and personal predilection.. However, they play a larger role and their

"positioning" is broader: for instance, they are bureaucrats.) They are not

just inside the "system" and established, they are also government officials.

*One of Levitan's conclusions is that "new-and experimental efforts will

usually come up wanting when compared to longstanding programs. A longer time

period encompassing the evolution of the more successful approaches, the retrenchment of the less successful, as well as implementation of needed -ref rms,

is required to get an adequate perspective" (The Promise of Greatness] p. 2

277).

c--

29

64.

7

.4
But we wish to stress the organizational rather than personal elements, and this is why we use the word-"infrastructure". We also

found rich organizational 'development. These organizations are 1112. !'established".

These persons have helped to develop numerous community based organizations

(CEO's) as well as new public agehcies -(or special programs withill them).

These organizations are experienced, effective, and relatively prosperous.

They know how tb.develop monetary and political support.

A (B) This growth in local organizational infrastructure has produced complex

or anizational and personal networks that link ersons and organizations and

give them overlapping interests. These networks have grown over time and

are built on past relationships and trust. All of this greatly facilitates

securing joint action and program assembly. They smooth the.way for effective

im lementa 'o

The develop ent of thesenetworks which sow facilitate program assembly

is seen in the close cooperative working relationship in Pittsburgh between

the assistant director of the Prime Sponsor, Phil Shugar, and Fred Monaco,'

the director of STAY. During the late 1960's and early 70's,Shugar and Monaco

worked together on'a regular basis when both were Neighborhood Louth Corps

counselors in Pittsburgh.

In Albuquerque, linkage between key actors in each organization was already in place before the development of WORP. OCETA youth program head, Carlos

Duran and the APS (Albuquerque Public Schools) QCETA liaison, Jack Kaemper, had

first worked together in the Neighborhood Youth Corps in the late 19601g. )

Romero, the high school principal, had worked with OCETA through the SChool on

Wheels. Contreras, WORP coordinator, had been a participant in an early man-

- power program and then headed a youth manpower program for the Albuquerque

Public Schools. Finallythe mayor of Albuquerque had once headed OCETA.

These earlier experiences formed mutual associations which developed a co

\view on program operation and a deny to call on another to deal with

A routine implementation problems whic 'if unresolved can lead to major failures.

30
For instance, the delay in,receiving the grant award'required WORP to begin

enrolling students after the start of the school term. But when Romero was

informed of the delay, he directed his staff to make the necessary adjustments for this and,other program needs.

Similarly,. in Portland Over several years the exchange of personnelJnYk volving several persons between the school district and the prime sponsors

has contributed to informal working relationships which have aided implementation. In New Haven, Alitogers, the assistant director of VICI, had a previous background in construction which provided himovith many contacts with

the building trades and the work- providing agencies. These lent general

creditability to VICI and helped get past many implementatioti obst4cles.

For example, this removed much of 3adkson's initial skepticism about "another

_.-- CETA program" and also facilitated' the assembly of worksite day-to-day opera- , tion (e.g., a willingness to short-circuit the normally time-consuming supply

requisition, and ordering process).

/

, N.

. Before be oming director of MOMR (the Mayor's Office of Manpower Resources)

thewprime sponsor of Baltimore's YouthWorks, Marion Pines was a key gigure in

B41 imore's Job Corps demonstration program and a member of Maryland Health

and kelfareCouncil. There she developed linkages throughou e aiEy ancLat----

the federal level which have aided MOMR and YouthWorks, especially in obtaining

, .. both federal fund g and a sympathetic federal1response t6 the common implementation adjustment nd adaptation problems. Similarly, in San Antonio the links

with WashingteActivist network e.g., withi6gr. Baroni) of Juan Patlan,- the

executive director of MAUC, both aided it in getting the initial YEDPA grant

and in MAUC's relationships With the city government.

4

N

(C) Networks have developed that link organizations as we as individuald._

o , The programs in.Portland, Syracuse, and San Antonio provide examples of this

kind of organizational infrastructure that has developed locally since the

1960's and has contributed to effective YEDPA/implementation,..

31

6g3
For almost twenty Years Portland has had a history of adviso council"

whichhaSeffectively brought together representatives of labor, industry, the

city, and theschools to improve the fit between vocational educatioil councils

and industry needs. Equally important for a YEDPA program, the council's latent function has been the creation of what amounts to a supportive "Infrastructure among these groups for endeavors such as EHR.

The priority status that the prime sponsor in Syracuse, OFSAC, and its

director, Ann Michel, have,given youth programs such as .BOCES-Hancock seems to

have aided implementation significantly. OFSAC represents an instance of a . more formally developed piece of local infrastructure than in Portland. OFSAC,

established in 1970 by Michel`, was initially a division of the mayor's office

and -is now a separate city department. It controls all federal and state funds

that Syracuse receives. OFSAC has grown into a very strong local organization

because of its ability to obtail new money for the city. Moreover, it has exerciseoka good deal.of budgetary cohtrol and demanded overall accountability

of its programs, and inturn, has been able to proteCt several controversial

programs.

In San Antonio, the elevant and helpful new infrastructure is.in,the

Hispanic community rather than in municipal institutions. MAUC, thT prime

sponsor of the YCCIP program, is an influential CDC founded in 1967. ,mAnc is

not dependent on the support of lbcal poi.itical,institutions for its survival.

With the close cooperationof the Roman Catholic parishes in the south and

west sides of the city, MAUC has helped the Hispanic community's economic developmerit.

(D) For YEDPA, a good. deal of this learni4 experience, infrastructure and

many outstanding alumni have come directly and indirectly from CETA and earlier

manpower programs: YEDPA has benefited greatlfrom CETA's positive and negative lessons. If there never had been a CETA program (or any of its predecessors such as MDTA and NYC),development and implementation of YEDPA probably

would have been slower and less effective; there wound have been more learning

on the job; there wbuld hive been less of what we will describe as an

32

4

tar
,,..

experienced program manager's ability to anticipate implementation pitfalls

and develop ways'of avoiding, coping or overcoming them.

For instance, Sally Connally, the director of New Haven's VICI, had previoutly had a good deal of experience administering CETA programs in New Haven.

Several of her successful implementations that are described below seem to have

been developed from her previous experience. Similarly, Joan Coria, the official director of the Syracuse' program, previously had a good deal of experience in SYS (Syracuse Youth Services). The program's de facto director, Lt.

Jones, tiad been co- director of a youth employment program of the Syracuseibus-

, ing-A-Uthc)rity in the early 1970's. The Hancock Base itself was no newcomer to

youth programs. SYS had used/the Base as a workstte in a previous similar Oro-

, gram.

(E)' These organizations and individuals have not used this experieftd, ktowledge, and networks to become conservative. They have used it to becomd more

innovative. Though these organizations and individuals are established, they

are nolOrestablishment". They continue to seek new programs, new solutioni,

and are open to experiment and change.

.00

( For instance, Phil Shugar of the Pittsburgh prime sponsor, is close to the

director ofSTAY, Fred Monaco. Nevertheless, he feels.from the prime sponsor's

_perspective, that STAY is a good program, but it is not perfecteand needs to im=

pra4 (especially in supportive services and better targeting). Ha. is also de-

. 'termined that STAY avoid what he considers the serious mistake of resting on its laurels. Similarly, Betty Lou Snapp of the Albuquerque Public Schools (APS)

is not satisfied with the status quo. After developing the THE program with

YETP money, she now urges APS to take over THE so that YETP money can be used

to fund other demonstration projects. /She is now planning aprogram to take advantage of the current construction boom:in Albuquerque by teaching students

newer construction occupations (e.g., air conditioning installation).

(F) ThedeVblopment of this local infrastructure and lOcal networks that smooth

the way for effective implementation represents a major change from the pattern

described in the implementation literature on programs of the 1960's,.and early

33
1970's. A common theme in those'studies wit the implementation diffiCulties

caused by local actors. At worst local actors were found to resist innovative

federal de signs and programs. At best:even when they sought to aid implementation, local actors were found to b< lacking in sufficient reso ces a'11./or

abilities to make it,work.

By contrast, our finding of these local infrastructures and networks

means that local conditions and actors now tend to proVide an extra

4 boost -to the implementation of federal designs and programs rather

than an obstacle.

(VII) YED 'S EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION'IN A VARIETY OF SETTINGS

We found that within the pattern of effective implementation of these

nine prcigrams there is a'good deal of programmatic, geographic, and

socio-economic variation.

It,Occurred.in different types of YEDPA programs and in different types

of cities. The nine include two-YIEPP-programs. (a Tier 1 and a Tier 2), two

YCCIP programs, and five YETP programs. The nine include some cities that

r_ r

. . are large (Baltimore, San'Antonio, Pittsburgh), medium (Newark, Portland,

.Syracuse), and medium to small (Albuquerque and New Haven). There are some

eastern, western and southwestern cities; there is,a city with a small minority

population (Portland), and cities with high minority populations (Newark, San * Antonio and Baltimore), and even variation within that category (black and his-

. panic).One has a relatively large middle income population (Portland), and

'others hay re large lew income 'populations (Newark, San Antonio). Ahd finally,

there is a good deal of difference in the economic bases of these cities. Of

course, all o this is no accident. One of the goals of our program selection

tolarp uce these variations.

The nature of our data and Analysis is such, of course, that no systematic

conclusions or even tests can b- rformed because of this variation.*

*Indeed, while there is signifi ant variation in 'these categories, even if

the nature of the data and analysis ere more systematic, there are not enough

cases in each category to permit sig ificant testing.

34

CC
K

However, effective implemeniation_94,11§0PA in such a variety of settings is significant because it gives a rough indication that the possibilities of'effeCtiveness are not limited to any one type of program

or city. It also generates a broad base of data, albeit largOi impressionistic.

(VIII) WHAT REPORT AND DOES NOT DO

We can tell the Task Force much abou--

HoW to'improve the implementation of these programs

4".

How to avoid implementation failures`;,

For the reasons noted below, we cannot tell the Task Porce with full confidence how to produce ultimately effective outcomes from youth employment

programs. A L. We analyzed the effectiveness of the implementation of these nine programs, /r

but not their ultimate outcomes. Of c2urse, our ultimate goal is-'a policy that

has effective outcomes: one.whose effect on the target population is positive;

one that tends to ameliorae that social Probleth in,response to which it was

created, or at least creates some positive change in it: To achieve

. ". -.

in addition to being.adopted effectively and then implemented,effectively, it

must be first a good policy, with a design appropriate to the problem As

Pressman and Wildaysky have argued, "A fast train is worse than a slow one if

it takes you in the sarong direction." (Pressmen and WildaVsky, 1973) Or as

Bardach suggests, "'Good' implementation cannot by itseltifoffset the ill effects,

of a 'bad' policy design any more than a more perfect compasS" and straight

edge can help us square the circle." (Bardach, 1977)

Thus, effective implementation is a necessary element t'O'achieve an effective outcome, but it is not sufficient in itself.

Why then does this study focus almodt exclusively on the element of imple-

. mentation? First, to analyze the conditions and factors associated With effective outcomes, we must be able to measure the outcomes (the effects of the

35

6
4

program on,its participants). However, these nine YEDPA programs are so relatively new that there as yet has not been enough time for the program to have

measurable effects on a large number of participants. (All had been in their

YEDPA operation less than eighteen months at the time of this study, June 1979

But on the whole, these nine YEDPA programs have been implemented more rapidly

than usually is the case for most social programs. Thus, placement data (one'

indicator oe outcomes) are scarce as yet. Moreover, simple placement data do

They are shaped

These oth'r facand other environmot in themselves yield definitive conclusions about outcomes.

or "contaminated" by factors other than program effectivenees.

tor3 especially include the tightness of the local labor market

P

mental factors. For instance, even in the absence,of training programs, youths

constantly are moving in and out of the labor market. Thus, without control

groups it is difficult toAefinitdvely attribute how much of the placement rate

is a function of the Program and how much would hive occurred its absen94*

I In focusing almost exclusively on implementation, we are able tt& say less

than we would dike to. But we are interested in action rather than pure social

science and thus reject the alternative of saying more, but ha,re totimit to 4o

so until the.outcomes are fully discernible and measurable. Becauseof thiSgoal

of:action we cannot afford the luxury,of applying only the highest methodological

standards:- Confronted with research ambiguities, the policy anAyst cannot afford to remain agnostic and passive in the face of pressing social problems. (In

our first recommendation below, we will discuss further this tension as described N.

in Hargrove's research on how DOL tried to deal with it in the previous administration.)

. .o Second, of the three major elements required for an effective outcome--

41A *Even if it were not contaminated in this way, outcome data that is cur= 4 rently collected by those-monitoring YEDPA programs for DOL often tends not to

be useful. For eiamplw, MDRC's data on "Reasons for Termination of YIEPP Youth"

does not permit distinctions between positive and negative termination. Instead

as a single category of analysis it identifies terminations due to youth having

"graduated or dropped out" (emphasis:added). Similarly, ADRC prgsents another

category labeled "voluntary resignations" without explaining whether this might

tend more to lot positive or negative. "Monthly Statistical Summary of Youth

Enticement Demonstration". May 19791 Table Q-4.

44; .1 .

36

eon

I
an effective design, effective adoption, and effective implementation-- presently the most difficult pne to achieve is effective implementation.

It is :the element on whiN domestic social policies most frequently founder.

Indeed, in the past decade or so, problems at the implementation stage have

been the ).argest source of social policy failures and this iS predictable.°

When implementation depends on many actors, as it must in our heterogeneous

society and pluralistic political system, there are numerous possibilities for

disagreement and delay.

Tables 1-15 illustrate how'this pattern applies to YEDPA. They indicate

how the multiplicity of participants and perspectives in a YEDPA program combin(tto produce a formidable obstacle course of policy implementation: o In short, these obstacles to effective implementation are generic to

social.policmaking in the U.S. rather than limited to youth employment programs. This is the lesson of the broad range of case studies

which we reviewed from outside this area.

There is a table for each of the nine programs. Each table lists the

major decision points that determined the course of:the program and had to be

passed ordpr for the program to continue. The participants in each deoisionarealso liseed. For simplicity We make the admittedly unrealistic assumption that each decision point is independent of each other'. Table A sumpar-'

izes all nine programs.

r

P I

a .

r

xk

37 =r-4

et)
TABLE A

POINTS OF DECISION AND CLEARANCE NECESSARY FOR COMPLETION'OF EACH QF THE

NINE YEDPA PROGRAMS: THE MULTIPLICITY OF PARTICIPANTS, PERSPECTIVES, AND

AGREEMENTS THAT-SHAPED THE COURSE OF EACH PROGRAM.

AL Decision Cumulative Total

Program Points Participants of Agreement

Pittsburgh's STAY 10 -, 39 50 1 New Haven's VICI . 19 22 . -72,

Portland's EHR .,15 13 31

Syracuse'i BOCES-HANCOCK 13 12 46

Aibuguerique's THE 11 98 119

" Albuquerque's WORP 8

6

23

Newark's IHS. . 12 20 33

Baltimore's YouthWorks 15 408 3446

San Antonio's YCCIP 9

13 22

set

38

7fL
I

TABLE 1

PITTSBURGH

Organizations

Student Training and Assistance for Youth (STAY)

Select Employment Trainee (SET)

Alternative Vocational Education Readiness Training (AVERT)

Actors Title/Position

.0

Fred Monaco Project Coordinator of Student Placement Section

Director'of Project STAY

Phil Shugek Prime Sponsor

William Bowes Assistanybirector of STAY .

=

room.

it

t . 39

C*

4

Jr*

1
TABLE 2

r

Points of Decision and Clearance Necessary for Pittsburgh's STAY

Cumulative Total

Decision Points Participants of Agrelment

1. Request for proposal sent out by Phil Shugar 1

the Prime Sponsonto organizations

interested in a YET? for in-school

youth.(Fall of 1977)

2. Proposal returned-to the Prime "by Monaco 2 Monaco of Pittsburgh Public Schools.

(Fall of 1977)

3. Proposal accepted by the Prime in Monaco/Shugar 4

princip but with a number of reservat ns. Prime wants to negotiate

the oposed salary of FSA's, the

eligibility requirements of participants, and the student-staff ratio.

(Fall of 1977) , 4. egotations are held between Prime Monaco/Shugar 7 and schools.over the issues detailed

above. At the end of the negotations,

the scorecard-reads: salary settled

in favor of schools, eligibility requirements and student-staff ratio

settled in favor of Prime-

(Fall of 77)

5 Project STAY is givem final approVal Shugar 8

by` the-Prime. (December 1977) =

6. Monaco hires an assistant program

-1bperators and 13 Field service Aides..

(.7rpary 1978)

4 Monaco/Bowes 10

7. Thirty-five public sectoi:Workeitest- --,_ Monaco & 35

are conacteiand'enrolled in Project worksites

STAY. (January /978)

8. Recruitment begins for STAY. ..The recvuitment is-conducted bythe.FSA's

and after some initial difficulties,

40250 youths are enrolled. (February 1978)

40

FSA's

46

47
'Table 2 (cont.)

Decision Points

Cumulative Total

Participants of Agreements

9. As the program nears its final weeks Monaco 48

of its first semester, Monaco contacts

the 13 FSAss from SET/AVERT and asks

to give the highest priority to

the g aduates of STAY in their (SET/

"'AVERT SA's) job placement efforts.

(April 978)

10. As the problems with the STAY become Monaco/Shugar 50

more severe, Monaco decides to hire

a full-time currictlum developer.

This necessitates negotiations with

the Prime. (June 1978)

a A

41

7 r.
sTABLE 3

New Haven

Organizations

Corporation for Public & Private Ventures (CPPV)

CETA (Prime Sponsor)

Carpenters Union

PaintefUnion'

Human Resources Administration (HRA)

'Neighborhood Preservation (NP)

,New Haven Redevelopment Agency

Regional Rehab. Institute (RRI)

Neighborhood Housing Inc. (NHI)

Work Providers

Regional. Office -- Department of 16abor (R/DOL)

Actors

Tom Corso

Tom Peterson

Sally Connolly

Al Rogers

Lou D'Antonio

Sal Monarco

David Saldibar

Frank Perelli

Tom Laugeni

Ed White

George Musgrove

Stephen Darley

Mike Catania

Robert Jackson

Stephen Whetstone

P'at Tisi

Gerald Tirozzi

Mark Barbarino

John Kelly

Lane Smith

David Newtori

Judy Andrews

Title /Position 00" CETA Director

Planner in CETA

Program Director for Ventures

Assistant Director for Ventures

Budget Department - CETA

Carpenters Union Representative

Carpenters Union - Business Manager

Businebs Rep. of Painter's Union

Vice President of Painting & Decorating

Contractors of America

Executive Director - New Haven Housing Authority

Human Resources Administrator

Executive Director - Neighborhood Housing, Inc.

Deputy Director - New Haven Re&velopment Agency

Office of Neighborhood Preservation

Director - Regional Rehab Institute

Energy 'CoordinatOr in Regional Rehab Institute.

'Superintendent of Schools

Director of Adult Education

CPPV Representative

CPPV Representative

Counselor - Ventures

Counselor.- Ventures

42

7`-;

.41
TABLE 4

Points of Decision and Clearance Necessary for New Haven's 17= Program

Decision Points

1. Selection in New Haven of people to write

pr6posal (Corso wanted people that he

trusted and knew would do the best job

possible). (May 1978)

2. Negotiation with Central Connecticut

carpenters, Local Union No. 24.

(May-June 1978)

a) Un ns would establish criteria

for worksites;

b) Union would provide safety

instruction; $ c) Union personnel would be hired

as crew chiefs;

d) ] Program would not take work away

from union;

e) Union would provide criteria for

training program;

f) Advisory Council would be established

including representative of union and

council would have access to all re-

&rds and reports:-

g) Union representative could sit on

interviewing/hiring committee.

3. Negotiations with brotherhood of painters,

and Allied Trades of America Local Union

No. 186. (May-June 1978) )

a.

43

Cumulative Total

Participants of Agreements

Corso, Connolly

Peterson, DiAntonio

3

Saldibar (union), 8

Connolly

Connolly, Saldibar,.

Peterson, Coi'so

(involved in decision

re: hiring committee)

Connolly, Perrelli 11
Table 4 (cont.)

Decision Points

- aY Agree to sit on Advisory Council;

1.

Cumulative Total

Participants of Agreements

b) Agree to give preference to ventures

graduates for apprenticeship openings;

c) Program would not conflict with labor

or union policy.

4. tiations with Painting and Decorating Connolly, Laugeni

Contractors of.America.(May-June 1978)

4

r. a) Unions would establish criteria. for

worksites;

b) Union personnel would be hired as

crew chiefs;

c) Program would not take work away

from union;

d) Agree to sit on Advisory Council.

5.' Negotiations with Housing Authority. Peterson, White 20

(May-June 1978)

a) Housing authority would provide

worksites to program;

b) Projects must be within one of the

four target areas;

f

c) Projects will represent "noncontractible" work;

. . d) Projects;mpst meet community development needs.

6. Negotiation with Human Resodrces Adminis- Peterson 24

tration.(May-June 1978)

a)- HRA would provide at least three

projects to program) Prince Street

School; Davenport Library and Ivy

Street School;

44
Table 4 (cont.)

Decision Points

b) Projects must be within one of

four target'areas;

c) Projects will represent "noncontractible" work, that is, work

not ordinarily contracted to unions;

d) Projects must meet community development needs.

7. Negotiations-with Neighborhood Housing, Peterson, Darley 28

Inc. (May-June 1978)

%umulative Total

Participants of Agreements s.

a) NHI agreed to use at least one crew

from the program for rehab. work;

b) Project must be within one of four

target areas;

c) Projects will represent "noncontractible" work;

Projects must meet community development needs.

8. Negotiations with New Haven Redevelopment Peterson, Catania 32

Agency. (May-June 1978)

a) NHRA agrees to provide worksites to

program;

b) Project must be within.one of fo,./

target areas;

c) Projects will represent "non-

. contractible" work;

d) Projects must meet community develop-

, mentceds;

40'
Table 4 (cont.)

Decision Points

9., Negotiations with Office of Neighborhood Preservation. (May-June 1978)

k .

. 10. Negotiations with Regional Rehab. Institute. (May-June 1978)

a) N.P. agrees.to provide worksites

on trial basit--if satisfied with

quality of work, supply will be

increased;

b) Project must be within one Of four

target areas;

c) Projects will representf"noncontractible" work;

Projects must meet community development needs.

a) RRI agrees to supply worksites to

program. Work to be done will be

weatherization work;

b) Project must be within one of four

target areas;

c) Proje47s will represent "noncontractible" work;

d) Projects must meet community development needs.

11. Negotiations with New Haven Public Schools

(May-June 1978)

a) Agree to supply program with parttime instructor to teach blue print

reading andtrade-related mathematics"

b) Provide GED instructor.

46

Cumulative Total

Participants of Agreements

Peterson,

Jackson

36

Peterson, Whetstone 40

Peterson, Connolly,

Corso, Tirozzi

(superintendent),

Barbarino.(Director

of Adult Ed.)

42
1

Table 4 (cont.)

Decision Points "

12. On-site visit by CPPV Representative.

(June 1978)

CPPV essentially reiterated most of

the agreements made with unions andwork-providing agencies.' Approximately 38--not included in tot*

because they art not new agreements, 4'

merely confirmations of existing

agreements:

13. CPPV approves proposal.(June-July 1978)

14.- R/DOL approves--signs contract--money

released. (Sept. 1978)

15. Hiring carpenter crew chiefs.

(Summer 1978)

a) Saldibar does initial screening

within his union;

b) Hiring committee then decides out r of the applicants--Unanimous agreementon all.

16. Hiring painting crew chiaa.(Summer 1978)

a) Laugenni does initia screening

within his union;

b) Hiring committee then decides- -

unanimous agreement on all.

17. Selecting Program Director. (Sept. 1978),

a) As it turned out, it was a non-

- decision decision. The procedure

consisted of submitting an application for the position. Corso

wanted Connolly to run program.

Everyone in CETA believed that

she would get the job. No one

else applied.

t 47

7D

Cumulative Total

Participants of Agreements

-.15

Included CPPV

"rep: Connolly,

Peterson,

DiAntonio, Corso

and all the Union

and Work-Providing

Agency reps.

(CPPV tep.

2 43

45

Saldibar, rep: from 57

CEIIA Personnel Office,

Rep. from Work-Providing

Agency 1

Laugenni, from 66

CETA Person Office,

rep. from Work-Prqviding

Agency

'1 Corso,' Connolly

111.

68
- .Table 4 (cont.)

F

Decision Points

Cumulative Total

Participants of Agreements

18. Hiring Assistant Director. (Oct. 1978) Laugeni, Saidibar -70

rep, from WorkAgreement to increase salary for-that Providing Agency

position. As it stood'originally,

assistant director's'salary was less

than crew chief's salary. (One of

the union people (forgot which one)

said that director's salary had to be

higher. It was agreed.

19. Hiring counselors CETA Personnel Dept. 72-

) Counselors were referred to program

by CETA Personnel Dept. David Newton

started before Sally_ was chosen-as

director, so the only interview was

within CETA. (Aug. 1978);

b) Judy Andrews was hired after Sally

so she was interviewed both within

Personnel aept. and by 4Sally:

(Oct. 1978)

Note: Total (72) does notinclude preliminary negotiations and decisions at DOL

with respect to.the VICIC demonstration ix general.

eel

;s3 6

a

es

, 48

o

I

G0

P
0"

Organizations

TABLE 5

PORTLAND

1 Human Resource Bureau (HRB)

Office of Planning & Development (OPD)

Portland Development Commission (PDC)

City Council

Bureau'of Buildings

Associated General Contractors (ACC)

Carpenters Union

School District

Portland Community College (PCC)

CETA

Actors

Neil Goldschmitt

John Pendergrass

Charles Jordan

Ron Anderson

Don Staudenmeir

Will Newman

Don Silvey

Mary Rasmussen

Gary Tuck

Bill Hadley

Bob Olson

John Ries

Leon Johnson

Title/Postition

Mayor of Portland

Former Youth Career Training Coorefgator

Former Director of Human*Resourbe Bureau

Head of Associated General Contractors

Head of Local Carpenters Union

First Program DireCtor of Emergency Home Repair

Housing Manager in Portland Development Commission

Director of District Programs, Portland Public ools

Youth Employment Coordinator -- Portland Pub Schools

ORerations Specialist--Youth Career Tr ing Division_

Second PrOgram Director

Present (3id) Program Directo

Former Head of Youth Sery Division

49.
s.

TABLE 6

Points of Decision and Clearancft Necessary for Portland's Emergency How Repair Program

Decision Points

1. Mayor decideato have youth program.

(Summer 1974)

,, Mayor requests that Pendergrass write

proposal for youth program.

2. Penddrgrass submits,propoaalo Council:

(Super 1974)

Council votes-Unanimously.ta accept proposai andfall'but one councilor vote to

paaa-li on emergency" basis. i3eaatse of

%------1-1at one vote, funds cannot be dispersed

for 30 days.

3. Pendergrass lines up staff. (Summer 1974)

4. City Council passes ordinance to waive

' building permit fee . (Summer 1974)

Per ordinance, Bur au of Buildings will

issue building permits to EHR7cirs'rsatNN

no cost.

5. City Council passes ordinance that Ofelce.,

of Planning and Development will earmark

a portion of their HUD community.

(Summer 1974)

Office of Planning and Development

6. Charles Jordan (Human Resource Bureau)

approaches AGC for their endorsement.

(Summer 1974)

a) AGC agrees to support program;

b) AGC agrees to provide tdchnicalassistance; 000

c), Jordan agrees that EHR will not

take away work from unions.

A - 50

IP 0

Ar

0 Cumulative Total

Participants of Agreements

Mayor, Human

Reqource Bureau,

,---Pendergrass,

/Youth Ca

Training Office

Mayor,

/CityXouncil

p

(_"

Paladdrgrass

City Council,

Bureau of

Buildings

City Coundil,

OPD, PDC

IP Jordan, AGC.

o

1

2

3

9
o Table 6'(cont.)

Decision Points

of

411-

- Cumulative Total

Participants of Agreements

,71 AGC bfings'in Carpenters Union, *A C, City, ,:e1 (Summed 1974) s arpenters

.-

. % .. Union , a) "Carpenters Union agrees to support' . prograff;

. _- ---

b) Agrees to provide technical assistance;'

Agrees to0povide pro4rah with union

journeymen;

7 I d) ,Agreement that EHR will not perform

union work.

0 8. Agreement tq award academic credit.

(Summer 1974)

School District agrees to award-academic

credit'to in-school youth who Afticipate

in program./

aa

City and School

District

13

14

9/ Program Director is hired. . v, (Summer 1974) City and Director, 15

,(Newman)

10. Agreement with Portland Community College. City and PPC 16

(Summer 1974)

.Portland unity College agrees to supp.y

piOgram w a shok.teacher.

' 11. Program is contracted outeto sdhodls.

(Spring .1975)

, .

a) School District agrees to.iun

b)* Schoo- l District agrees to provide

-marweriab and'fisCal support,

c) 'School District agreeso hire and 1

supervise'inAructbr;

d) Schbol District agrees to provide

building to' house program's headquarters.

program;

O.

. 51

4 City (Hum Resource : 20,

Bureau), District

School,

A

C. A

A,

:

. .4
Table 6'(cont.)

Decision Points

e

12i,12. -New Director is 'hired. (Summer 1975)

13etause of personality conflict between. . director and youth services personnel,

it was deciderby City and School Districtthdt when school took over prograni,sa new director would be brought'.

?- in:

13. ...Program encounters 'gdministrative 53ifsficulties resulting in administrative

oQyerhaui. (Winter 1977) .

a) Accountant is hired--establishes

fisdal codtrol aysteW

b) Establish formal criteria for

job description for prograni

director;

c) Old director decides not to apply;

d) New director is hired;

e) Purchasing is centralized and made

responsibility of project coordinator; , f) Formal criteria for screening

established.

14. Replacement of Crew Chiefs. (Winter 1977)

a) Tensions created by procedural

changeS. Attrition and:fayorable

-- climate for construction led to

staff turnover'among crew chiefs;

b) Carpenters, Union was approached for

replacement personnel but they had

no more to supplyi

c) School' District supplied program with

- shop teachers to work as crew chiefs:

.30

.s

52

8

Cumulative Total

Participants . of Agreements

City School 21

District, AGC

City, School

Distridtr AGC

City, Schddl

District, AGC, ,- Carpenters Union

e

0

27 ,

30

L.
o . Table 6 (cont.)

Decision Points

,15. Establish a Skills Development curriculum. (Spring/Summer 1979) - -a)' Ail of the actors cited arg71*-

.sently Working on.a curriculum

that will aid in providing parti

.cipantswith the necessary skills

of the craft and monitor` their

progress.

Cumulative Total

Participants of Agreements

Program Director, 31

City, School,

Carpepters Union

6 ,

s3

dit

.f

es
19

-Organizations

Air National Guad (ANG)

Syracuse Youth,Serviee (SW

Office of Eederal & State Coordinatore(OFSAC) 7

Urban League , _ Board ofCooperative & Educational Services (BOCES)

Regional Office - Department of Labor.(R/ROL)

TABLE 7

Syracuse

Actors

Ralph Jones

Major -Purple

Major Hall'

Andy Willis

Lee Best

Mike Tierney

Terry Dolan

Joann Coria

Ann Michel

Jim Brower

lieutenant (Burton'Lieutenant Bdtier

Tile /Position --J`

41, Lieutenant - Air National Guard - Syracuse

Major - Air National Guard - Syracuse

Major; - Air National Guard - Syracuse

Director of Urban League - Syracuse

Director of Syracuse Youth Service

u ManpowerPlanning DireCtor in OFSAC

Operations Supervisor - Syracuse Youth Service

Counselirig Supervisor - Syracuse Youth Service

Former Director of Office.of Federal and State

Aid Coordinator

Director\of Adult Education Services - BOCES

BOCES teacher

Base's CE1PA Liason ,Officer

41-

/ .

54

IS 86'

It

0 ab
.4F

0

TABLE 8

. Pointg of Decisi n Ahd'ClearancedNecessary for the Implementation of

Syracuse's BOCES-Hancock Program

Decision, Points

1. Decision to have program at Base.

(Summer 1978)

2. - Attempts'to start program with

Urban League.(Summer 1978)

ir

No agreement -'Base would have to 4

pay kids directly and get reimbursed.

Base does not have funds.

3. Decision/to have program with SYS(.1

(Sumner 1978)

a) Agree that Base will train kids

in various shops at Base;

b) Agree, that city (SYS) will ,pay.

ybuths;

c). Agree that there will be a . remedial education component;!

d) Agree that Base will supply

-transportation. - 4 4. ,Amn Michel of OFSAC endorses program.

I/ (Summer 1978)

Jones brought Ann Michel to Base and

showed'her a yputh who was working in

one of the shops. She was very impressed and gave her support for the

program.

5. Bringing BOCES-into progr.ari.(Sept. 19787

BOCES agrees to supply piogram with

teacher and materials. for $21,0e0.

ilt

la

55.

a .

.'

8

fry

S

Cumulative Total

Participants of Agreements.

Jones, Majors,

Hall & Purple

Jones, Willis

(Urban League)

Jones, Hall,

Purple, Best,

Tierney, Dolan

Coria'

I

Michel

4

SYS'(Dolan)

BOCES (Bowen)

4

10

12

4

cl

/
4

Table 8 (cant.)

Decision Points

6. Firing teacher (Sept- 1978)

BOLES coordinator hires Bettsy Burton,

who hadIrjust finished' working in another

BOLES program, to teach youths at Base.

_7. R/DOL approves program (Sept. 1978)

8. 'Majore,4urple and Halk arrange to keep

Jones on Base (Fall 197$)

9. Recruiting supervisors (Sept. - Oct. 1978).

Jones spoke to guardsmen individually to

solicit their.particip4ion. At least 10

agreed to participate.` A

10. Jones receives transfer to'Washington, D.C.

Majors requests thk.he select a successor , (Nov.4 1978)

1,1. Jones picks Butler (Nov, 1978)

Majors agrees to ask Butler to run program

12.' Butler is chos (Nov. 1978)

Butler, who was in Officer's Training

Sciool in Tennessee, agreed to run the

program.

. 13. Majors arranges to keep Butler on Base

(Nov. 1978)

Paperwork is filed to rdceive,additional

active duty days for Butler.

X 4i.

4 A.: * 56

r. a

Cumulative TOtal

Participants of Agreemente

BaTen

s.

R/DOL

Majors, Purple, C 16

Hall

13

14.

Jones and at least

20-cater guardeme(1

Hall, Purple,

Jones

Hall, Purple,

Jones, Butler

Hall, Purple

I

39. '

40

44

46; .

O
TABLE 9

I

Albuquerque's THE

,Organizations

Tourism Hospitality Education (THE)

Albuquerque Public Schools (AIDS)

Office of Comprehensive Em loyment and Training Act (OCETA)

a

*tars

Bettie

Carlos. Duran A

Title/Position 4

Lou Snapp -Assistant of. Director of Vocational Education

(Home Econoiics)

Youth Coordinator, Office of Comprehensive Employment

' Training.Act (OCETA)

:President of Albuquerque Inkeepers Associat4pn

Russ Rutledge Counselor for THE

I

rG

sf,

57

so

.0

7
t 9,

.TABLE 10

Points of Decision and Clearance Necessary for Albuquerque's THE

,Decision Points

I. Carlos Duran asks APS to submit a proposal.

for the 22 percent of YETP money that mUst be

spent in accordance with a_signed,agPeeTent between LEA and Prime Sponsor.

2. Bettie Lou Snapp of ABS contacts President

of Hotel/Motel Association about her "hotel

idea".

3. President of Hotel/Motel Association iorms

Snapp that five full service hotels will

participate in her program for a training

fee of' $i0,000 fer hotel. r

o

4. Snapp submits the plan to the OCETA.

5., Prime Sponsor likes the proposal in4principle but objects rather strenuouSlyto the

training fee. ?rime SpOnsor asks Snapp to

renegotiate -the training fee.-

6. Snapp inf6rms the President of the Hotel%

Motel Association of the problems with the

fee., The President agrees to approach the

fivehotels-about a lower fee. 4 7. Snapp, esidentof Hotel/Motel Association

and representatives of the five hotels

agree q, a set figure of $ 5 a,week for the

training-fe

8. Prime,Sponsor approves the new revised plan

and gives the go-ahead for THE.

9. Snapp hires the staff for THE'cOnSisting

of a teacher/administrator and a dounselOt.

4

58

S

,Participants

APS

Prime Sponsor

Snapp,_President

of Hotel/Motel

Five'hotels,

President Snapp

Snapp

Prime Sponsor.

.:Snapp, Presi49nt

Snapp, Awsideht

5 hotels

Prime SpOnsor

Snapp

Cumulative Total

of Agreements

'2

4

11

12

13

15

22

23

24

40
gO I

Table 10 (cont.)

Decision 'Points Participants

Cumulative Total

of Agreements

10. Rutledge contacts the guidance counselors Rutledge & (90) 117

of the nine high schools participating in guidance counselors

THE, explains the program, and asks their

help in recruiting participants.

'10a. Recruitment is forced to make a Rutledge & the 118

return visit to the guidance / guidance counselors

counselors and reexplain the program'to them.

11,- Sixty students are finally, enrolled in THE. Prime, THE

But in order to do so, THE asks the -Prime

for permission to allow 15 percent of THE

participants with family inomes between

70 and-80 percent of the DOL%e-lower living

standard.ito enroll in the program. The

Prime gives,its permissiOn.

4

n 59

_r

r

9

a

51.

r

119

r
s'

a

TABLE 11

Albuquerque<

') Organizations

OCETA

APS

WORP'

MDRC (Manpower Development Research Corporation))

University of New Mexico

Kirkland Air Force Base

Actors Title/Position

Carlos Duran

Jack Kaemper

Dennis Contreras

Youth Coordinator for Office of CETA ( OCETA)

Albuquerque Public Schools (APS) liaison with OCETA

Director of Work Opportunity Research Program (WORP)

Points of Decision and Clearance Necessary for Albuquerque's WORP

Decision Points

..4* 1. Preparation of Applicationlor YIEPP grant.

2. Selection of Entitlement Area.

3. Agreement on worksites at University o

Mexico and Kirkland Air Forc se. New

4. Agreement to adjust Schedules of entitlement youths.

5. Agreement to provide WORP bus.

6. Agreement to include New Futures School

in Entitlement Program.

-7. greement to hold GED class at vocational

institute.

8. Agteement taolladd support service staff.

4 .)

*O. .

rrr

A

60

ti

gc

Contreras, Roiero 11

OCETA, APS; UNM, 9

AFB

) Cumulative Total

'Participants of Agreements

OCETA, APS 2

OCETA, APS, MDRC 5

WORP, Duran, MDRC

Contreas, Kaemper, 18

Duran

14 /

APS, Contreras 20

Contreras, OCETA, 23

MDRC

ti

rp
o 0 TABLE 12 .

Newark

Organizations

6 Independence High School (IHS)

YouthWork, Inc.

Regional Department-of Labor (R/DOL)

Mayor's Office of Employment and Training (Prime Sponsor)

# . -

#

4..,. Actors Title/Position

, Harry Wheeler Director: Mayor's Office of Employment and Training

,-- Dan O'Flaherty Youth Coordinator of Mayor's Office of Employment and

Training

-

D a

0 t..

61

.1
13

oints of Decision and Clearance Necessary for Newark's IHS

Ak Decision Points

Cumulative Total

Participants of.Agreements ,

. 1. Prime Sponsor's officeinforms IHS of Prime Sponsor 1 ,- the competition being 'conducted by

. Youthwork forDOL furl T..fa, InSchool

Exemplary prograrde t help youth avoid.

unemployment. Prim asks.for proposal:

. 0

2,.. IHS submitt prop6sal which is la ely IHS

a description of the IHS program hat

,

r

O'Flaherty 3 -- ....

si....-e1 Youthwork. 4

.

i?N%4'- YothWork 5

, 4 4

/ES 6

.'' was reorganized An 1976. . 3. Dan O'Flaherty receives the proposal

and tells IHS that he is' afraid 'that- ----- IHS would not be funded by Youth4ork

and that IHS will havedigficnity

with the work experience part gf the

program.

. ....:, . . 4. IHS iSmotified by YOuthWork.that they

have qualified for the final competition.

Youthwork makes a site visit to IHS:.

5. 'INS is notified that they haVe been..,

selected by YouthWork to participate T5

in the In-School Exemplary ram. qe . . IHS receives a grant of $289 0 from "'," Youthwork. ' 6. School opens and after three-week

orientation, the student body is

divided in half. Approximately 45

students begin academic instruction.

and 45 begin their work experience.'

The work necessitates

placing 45 tudents in jobs they expressed some interest in. Thus -approximately 45 employers must be

found for these students. 'C

62

'4

1/4,

4 S

,
Table 13 (cont.)

Decision ;lint)

Cumulative Total

Participants of Agreements

7. IHS is contacted by YouthWork and IHS, RDOL, DOL, 12

informed that the work experience Prime Sponsor;

as presently constituted is illegal. Peter Rodino,

After day-long negotiations in- YouthWork

volving IHS, YouthWork,' Prime Sponsor, , DOL, RDQL and Congressman Peter Rodino,

IHS agrees,to change its work eperi-

.. encewhich will necessitate asking itsprivate sector employers'to pay oilehalf of the wage bill of students.

,8. IHS contacts its (approximately) 15 J .rIHS 28

private sector employers and informs 15 employers

them'of the change. Surprisinglyll

agree, to the change.

9. After eight weeks of'woriing, 45 dtu-'

dents return to IH,S for eight weeks

of academic instruction. Thus, 45

new jobs must befound,for the students

who were at academic instruction for

the preceding eight weeks.

1 e

IHS

10. IHS is contacted by thePrime SpontOr Prime

concerning the eligibility of some students. ,Prime informd IHS that in- ..

. eligible students must be removelr from

, , DOL 'Supported --..-

, i ,., C," .'

11. IHS asks or permission enroll stu= 4This

A 'de4s w family incomet-in excess4of

. 85'p: cent of DOL's lower living stan-' 6.

29

30

. dar .. Having read *PA regUlgions,',...':

. I lEneunthat,sucWpIn4ssion.boul46b-.

., ranted,bTDOL ifLthe:Prime,b.gred:: Thai

.-pfirte restate'd'it'EnAillt 4,ou't removing . IHSlatudents'irom IDOL dppported4activi- * . , .4c qes,..,..'

ii 4 44 .44),V

. Ai. Av ,

:.- -;c, .,

, 0 : ' \ . . 1 . :. te ee4

` ... e cr -4 12. IHS,deWands a meeting with Rtaiind oyez' ""-'j \ IHS, YoppilOrk; ""f! 33 A -.. ,.. eligibility- issue. Pr sae. thkt ''''°' grime .- tf,'. '.,, 4.,,61 lif.X,' i , We. ',

. , '. YouthWork.bepresentoe*the mating-, :,:. . , _ . , t.'' e.,41

. ,. 1, At*the meeting Prime ..) *<," "Al *-1... accedds%to MS'S , . '40 .' .1.: % s-. i - , i 1 - ,

; t.,

4

T

request, 'if YoUthWork has no obi

; :

/4. 10

'e

i.

#14 '

I

' t V 1.

, 11 % le,. .. \

oie .4 -'' d''

. 1 .% 41

'A. ,

ek,a '

s P.44N

f$.
e

Or anzation

MOMR f Manpower Develo ent Resource CorpOration.(MDRC)

Baltimore City-SChboie (BCS)

TABLE 14.

Baltimore . 7

,Actor

-Marion Pines

Robert Ivry

William Schaefer

Thomas Bradley

James Keck

Ilenry.'Snyder

$

'Title/Posi:tign

e.

:

.1;

4

e. . ., S,A

4, . ,,

.44( 6.4

, r :I

'' ,

.

. .i . .

R

... Director of Mayor's Office Of M4npowet'Resources (MOMR) .4..

. 4 South Services Manager of MOMR... . ' ;it` , Mayor of Baltimore .4 ° AFL-CIO ikepresenta'tive ', 'Ar . 1 ' Diredtor of iouthWorks

. 1.

' Head of the Ramsey Conference '.

-...,..

%.

Decifiion 4nd Clearance points Necessary for theImplementatiow`of

4

4. Fhtitlement Program ' 4

1 Debision Points* .0, .;- . 4

v.

,., q

, . . . 0. ;

, . 1 .

. _ . 1..N pref.aratioh.'of Applicallon:iofir VEPR"

0 '''il ':,. geant.' ' ' A

4i tv31

-*

, t , 4

. .., 4. N. , ' 4

4 t ., 4, a '

,

. - ,i`t' t

4,, 2 . , Select*I. of iliVernoreedfdemoletra-J-, 40

''' ian*.ilte.,,,,..., I . V. 41' '' 74 ./eP ,

...

.

...7 3. Aitl4ktion ot,:itileMene'Area. , ".44) !

.. ..

`.,,!4 4: Acre merit to SubbOntract v4.th LEA fon,/

. alternative education pkogiams and int vetiool administration.

.413

V 5%4 Agreement to mith'CBO 's

for alternative ucationbo 4,

6. Agreement of AFL-CIO-to suppo't the'

program.

44,

64

$altimote's.a 4,4 S. 7, . Cuttklati've;TOtal

Participante of "Aq'kearaents'

4

tik01/

A Pints Ivry ,' o1

7

..,,, ,1 f

Mayor, BCS" DPO

'7 )4 A . . ... - v. ,- ° It MIXIC ,'

i

v.) ° .5 ,- 4

. . . e

: -- ',4,-. .71:... 4,

.. Ill I 7

e:: .4.. - .4 ilteS:, Mayor., '8 ',1- ': ,°

- 4 . lif 13 '--

...

400

V 4. 5,,

4e:9

gitt -,7;

MOMR

CBO's (3)

Tom Bradley

.41 15

4

0

F
..), X .. ',.

.. - . Table 14 (cont.)" _

,

r

\

Decision Points

, 7. ,Agreement to pay wage differential

\to city employees supervisin youth.

I , 8. Agreement of large businesses to

provide worksites. . 9. Agreement of smaller businesses to

provide worksites.

10. ,Agreement of city department heads

to provide worksites.

11. Agreement of CBO's and non-profit

organizations to provide worksites.

. . 12. Development of MOMR task force t \I

.examine difficulties of YIEPP imPle-'

' mentation.

, 13. Reorganization,of Entitlement Program.

. I

,14. Subsequent reorganizations.

15. Elimination of Public Service ETployees

from service delivery and staff expansion. la 'a

4

,

Cumulative Total

Participation . of Agreements

k MOMR, Civil 19

. Service Comm.,

Labor Comm., ), Union Rep.

1,)

Hank Snyder 20

300 individual

businessmen

320

City. department

heads (15) - 335

Organization 435

,heads (100)

. Pines; Ivry 437 r

Pines, Ivry, Keck 440

Ivry, Keck 442

Pines, Ivry,

Keck,MDRC

446

65

977 '

e>

A
TABLE 15,

San Antonio

Organizations

MAUC

Housing and Ullban Development (HUD)

Community Services Agency,(CSA

Neighborhood Housing Services (NHS)

Texas.Employment Commission (TEC)

Six Catholic Churches

Building and Trade Unions of San Antonio

Actor Title/Posit/on

4-?Juan Patlan Executive Director of Mexican American Unity Council (MA C)

Decision and Clearance Points Necessary bor the Implementation of MAUC's ycuy

Cumulative Total

4 recision Points Participants of Agreements 1 - 1. Decision to ask MAUC to submit a prop6Sal HUD 1

to HUD.

2. MAUC decision to apply for HUD grant and , Patlan, MAUC dept. 4

preparation of preliminary proposal, heads, MAUC,board '7,

3. HUD selection of MAUC.for grant ,ward, HUD 5

4. Agreement to provj.de worksites for

YCCIP.

5. Agreement to provide worksite supervisors. Wage and working conditions

approval.

Churches, lopal

school district,

city dept. involved

in NHS

8

Union .representatives 12

4)

6. Union agreement to write letters in Union representatives 18

support o YCCIP. (6) , /

*4 7. Texas Employment Commission agfee- TEC 19

ment to certify youths,

CSA agreement to allow venture capital ,CSA 20

funds awardesif to MAUC's community

development department to be used for

YCCIP weatherization project,

9. Decision to reorganize YCCIP and hire

a new director,

e' 66

Patlan and MAUC 22'\

Board
I

1-

COMBING ANALYSIS'AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

HOW THESE PROG S WORKED AND "WHAT DO WE DO ON..MONDAY?"

r.

¶he recompendatiohs 9i this report are empirically grounded. They do not

re resent our wishful thi in or an effort to en a e in broad social theory.

Rather they are specific ly based on our analysis of these nine YEDPA programs

and seconder 'anal sis o earlier studies for OYP. *'

Since they are empirically based, these recommendations also should indicate to the reAder the Actual conditioni.that we found contributed to effective

r, implementation in these nine. They are, hpwever, written in the format of recommendations rather than' as descriptions to make them more useful to the following

/,

audiences who want a wers to the question: "O.K., this is how hose prpgrams

*worked and why, but Wat do we do on Monday?"

1 .

, (1) Program Operators:

(a) as an aidlta.thoe kilho will be initiating 'new programs;

(b) as an aid to thoSe operating ongoing programs and who seek to reassess

and improve thpm.

(2) Analysts in i/PTFYE, DOL and Congress who are drafting:

`(a) 'futyreacluth employment legislation;

(b) technical assistance "how to run programs" guides.

V (3) OYP and ETA policymakers who are making allocation decisions:

(a) where and in what type of programs should discretionary funds be"put;

(b) what proportion of total fundsshOuld be alloted to such discretionary

allocations.

* See references cited above, p.1

1: I z

67

90

-.44-,"

4

4
) OUR RECOMMENDATIONS:

(I) FOCUS ON THE IMPLEMENTA N STAGE

That YEDPA policy Makers, program operators, and everyone in between

focus a disproportionate amount of their attentionnd- resources on

implementation stage of these programs. . . For some, such as OYP under Robertgaggart, this will represent a contknuation of their, already significant effort'at process evaldation. Indeed, this

study.benefited greatly from the process evaluation studies previously undertaken

at the rdquest of OYP. These formed 'significant building blocks. for our analysis.

(A) Of the threwmajor lements required for an effective outcome*--an effective

design, effective adoption, and effective implementationpresently the most dif-

.

;,... ficult one to achieve is effectivelmpiementation. It is the element on which

. .

A - l

domestic social policies most frequently founder.,ei

For most of them, the allegedly simple, technical, details of implementation

cannot be successfully completed. We must start with effective designs, for YEDPA

programs and we have started with them. B1.4. these designs will not be put into

practice nor will the policy have an effect on the target population unless it

is implemented effectively.

Cdtrently there are many good general ideas for ameliorating social problems,

and there are many good specific policy designs. But the legislative successes

(the adoption stage) of yesterday have often become the implementation problems

of today. Since the mid-1960's it has become much easier for'good policy,ideas

to traverse the adoption stage withoutkimajor alterations. ,Butmany,of these

good ideas, which in turn become laws, were-implemented ineffectively and thus

could not create effective outcomes for citizeps.. Their irlOteMentation was lit either (a) inordinately delayed, or 00,,it required e4enditures far beyond what

/ was necessary, or (c) there was an alteration and/or'underachievement of the

0

policy's objectives; or some Combinition of the three.

*By an effective policy outcome we mean a polity whose effect on the target population-is positive and tend to ameliorate the social problem in

'sponse to which\it was created. ,f

v
)'

..,.. . -,..., Indeed, in the past decade or so, problems at the implementation stage , have b n the largest source of the'type of policy failures that we noted in

our desc. iption of the New Town In- own program, the EDA program in Oakland,

and, California's community mental health services. These failures prevent

, participants from benefiting from a program and ,also tend to undermine general political support for such programs. If the implementation stage can

. arid such faildres, then not only will there be better delivery of.policies

to citizens but also increased political support &pr such policies\.

44A

In short, policy designers and administrators can no longer consider

implementation as someone else's problem.

Of course, if implementation becomes more effective yet there are weak

a - Policy designs, outcomes will rmain.ineffective. However, there seem to be

a sufficient number of good ideas and ;policy designs around today, especially

in the manpower and employment areas.

(B) We also recommend giving more attention to the implementation stage in

ordero sensitize policymakers, especially those drafting legislation and

allocating scarce federal funds, to the essential role of.impleientation in

creating effective outcomes. There is ample evidence that most of the increased lip service paid to implementation in the last few years is just that. 7 The belief that implementation issues are relati'vely insignificant and are someone

, else's Problem remains firmly grounded in many otherwise astute policymakers and policy analysts for several understandable reasons.

First, as Bardach suggests, "Implementation issues often seem to be of

slight practical conseqUence alongside basic theoretical or political issues

like,'Do we really want to treat heroin use as a chime ?' or 'How much should

we spend on exploring outer spade?' or 'Who should bear the financial burden

of national health insurance?' Also, implementation issues tend to come up

(when they do come up) toward the end of an analytical process, mrhen professional and political investments in resolutions to more basic issues may already be 'in place and are very resistant 'to being disturbed by 'mere' considerAtiong.of implementability. People who insist on raising these issues at this

stage'risk being called small-minded or being accused of defeatism or conspiring ith^the opposition:" (Bardach, 1977)

,69

6

\

hit
) ' Second, the recent emphasis on policy evaluation seems to have unwit7

tingly made the analysis of policy implemerftation seem relatively insignificant'. Since the idea of systemic evaluation of policies took root in

Washington,in the early 1960's, it has contributed much to the improvement

of both, policy and its analysis. But one of the negative consequences of

this otherwise salutary change in outlook is a tendency on the pert of some \--/

to ask about a program--"Does it work?"and expect primarilya "Yes" or "No"

answer.o, In the following sections (especially III-V)1.we will indicate that

programs like .YEONA, which require relatively complex joint action,

do not simply "work" or "not work". en if they have a good design,

it takes much effort-to make them work. Programs do not get implemented automatically; they have to be put together piece by piece.

Certain conditions will impede the wvorking of a program despite its

good initial design and other conditions are necessary to put a good

design into operation.

A major goal of this report is -tar-Spell out the latter set of conditions in the approximate form of an impressionistic model.

In some instances, the design of the program itself can create problems for implementation. Even with good local administration, the

implementay.on process may founder on an/excessively complex program design. This means that where posdible (as inYEDPA) there

should be an effort to maintain simple And modest program designs

(see section XV). When the program design has become excessively

complex and has other problems, actions must be taken in the implementation process to compensate for and repair theSe design inade-

. quacies% (Section IV and X will detail these actions.)

6

Erwin Hafgrove's just completed study of DOL's efforts unC:14.r the previous

administration to evaluate CETA in 1974-75,indicates both of the aboye reasons

for slighting implementation at work. Among other things, Hargrove found that

the economists, of ASPER (the office of the Assiqtant Secretav for Policy,

Evaluation and ReSearch) tended to discount the perspective of what Hargrove

calls the political and bureaucratic people in the rest of the department.

Hargrove found that the ASPER economists wanted( almost to the exclusion of

all else, a study that would- measure the impact half of the evaluation: what

percentage.of trainees got and kept good jobs. Whey were not concerned with

what Hargrove callp the process ha3f of the question: the factors that

70

10

ti
.4

explained why some cities' programs were working better than others. The

reason, Hargrove reports, is that while the first task w4s suitable to their

quantitative economic models, the latter was not. "Their methods, as eco- . nomer&icians, did not permit them to easily suggest how to link process data

to findings ebout impact Therefore,.their energies went into safe-

, guarding theyethodological correctness-of the plap."(Hargrove, 1979)

(II) IMPLEMENTATION: COMPLEX-PROGRAM ASSEMBLY AND A PROCESS OP AVOIDING

PITFALLS

More specifically we recommend that these actors become sensitized to

the rue nature of implementation.

First, effective implementation does not occur automatically. Rather,

it is a complex process of program assembly. It requires joint action in order to achieve the full and necessary assemblage.

Second, major difficulties will almost always characterize the process of policy implementation, especially if the policies are even

mildly innovative. Implementation is a process of avoiding pitftlls.

The following sections will detail these two elements.,

(III) PROGRAM ASSEMBLY

Program assembly should be viewed as involving the following general

elements.

(A) Numerous actors are ,involved in the program asse mlly process. (We shall

refer to both organizations and individuals as hectors ".) , 4

. This is true even of programs with relatively straightfdrward_design . such as YEDPA. The tables in the introduction which listed the points4of

%).-

. decision and clearance necessary for program completion clearly indicated

this. A general list of actors for a lbcal YEDPA prqgram includes most of the

71

1p,3 af
following: The local program itself and'its staff, the prime sponsor, the

larger political entity and its leaders (e.g., the Mayor), the schools, the

o unions, public hector worksites, private sector worksites, CBO's,and post/

program employers. Often DOL and Regional DOL (RDOL) are also relevant

actors as well as intermediate bodies like YouthWork, CPPV, MDRC or HUD.

Table 3 gives a specific list of actors invo'lved/f::one of our ine

programs, New Haven" Ventures.

\\

(B) These actors have significant interests which are largely independent

of'each other and independent of the YEDPA program andlor okthe prime sponsor

and its larder political entity. Moreover, most of these actors are independent of each ot'her's control even when both are in the public sector.

In Newark, for example, Indep'endence High School (IHS), the prime sppsor,

(Mayor's Office of Employment and Training). and YouthWork were all strangers

to each other in MayBiK--By Odtbrier-of-194-8.-,--all_three2rganizations knew\

each.other quite well but still held independent agendas: IHS remained 4n

autonomous, alternative school mainly interested in helping disaffected youth.

The prime sponsor was mainly interested in avoiding any hint of fraud or misapplication of funds. YouthWork was a private, non-profit organization ad- ,

ministering DOL's Exemplary In-School program, mainly ihterested in seeing all

of their projects succeed. All three organizations became involved in negotiationsover joint action concerning who would pay for'the work experience component (and howtzuch) and, income.eligibility requirements for participants:

In Albuquerque's THE program, the prime and the schools had wo*ked together before. Buta(the hotels, which were the worksites and the entire focal

. 0 -point of the program, had no prior relationshiprwith either the prime or the

schools. The hotels agreedto participate only after some rather hard;bargain-

, ing beeen the prime, the- schools and the hote16. The schools originally of: ° fered each hotel $10,000 for participating in the program. The prime rejected

the fee as being far too generous. The schools and the hotels and the prime'

finally agreed do a figure of $75 a week.

V Iv

7

7.2

4

-s

a
.

Finally, in BaltiMore, representatives of large businesses (The Ramsey

Conference) backed' the Entitlement program and pledged suppck and worksites.

But at the site, theSe employers wee not quite so cooperative. They wanted . to be able to make their

not tolerant of behavior

t the personal level of

own selection of youth employees and generally were

problems: They offered lessin the way of training

supervisor-to-youthethan did "ma and pa" stores. Indegd, ultimately the Baltimore program shifted its emphasid in rivate

" Ork- , site develppMent to the small business sector.

(IV) SUCCESSFUL PROGRAM ASSEMBLY: A STRONG EXECUTIVE, THE OVATION OF INTEREST

CONVERGENCE, AND SECURING IT DOWN to THE'WORKSIT

4.

Successful program adsembly should inVolve;the following.elementh.:

(A) The program assembly praceis will not run by itself. It-basjo be put

together piece by piece. It should be guided by .1 strong executive, which means:

First, tIr. executive-should-have-en6gh power.te operate-. Se4ond, be nlu5L pursue

the following actions: Actors and interests hake to bebcajoled, convinced, and

per aded into joint action. Adjustments and adaptations haveto be made. Coalitions have to be 'built.

. . The Syracuse program offers two examPles: The selection-of an able program oplrator,w4skey to thd-progrim's success. Lt. Jones, the'originator of -

the conception, was the obVioUS choice. However, Air National Guard regulations prevented this. Jones would not havg,become the program's executive

i if the Base commander had not intervened to.make adjustments and adaptations.

i Jones htto leave

fel', w e .selection of ,a pro

Jones c refully provided for . .

.Syracuse because of an Air National Guard.trans-1*

gram executive was again reguireq, This time's

the selection of an able tiaccessor. He reviewed'-

the qualTcations of many potential candidates and then, found one that was

' not only strong but whom he personally knew. Jones thWn.took/steps'fb aid

the transfer of this AN9 cffiwer fromilennessee to Syracuse.

a

73

1 05

O

L

so,
I

%-.

In San Antonia, f,atlan,the MAUC director, created a coalition behInd

his program by developing support for itk.from the Six Parish Coalition (a

group previously fOrmed by activist priests to organize barrio residents)

and fkom local construction, unions.' These parishes aided YCCIP by helping . with recruitment of youth, individual homeowners, and institutional clients.

MAUC staff were permitted to speak at parish g6therings to explain YCCIP and

solicit participation. The church buildings themselves provided MAUC with

some oLts'earliest worksites and also paid for materials. This enabled

:crews to be-putto work rapidly at the program's inception. Indeed, one"MAUC

/criteria for selecting areas within the city to receive YCCIP service was

whether,it had an active parish. The unions provided supervisors for, the

YCCIP,crews and apprenticeships,for program, graduates. (The incentives that

Patlan in tutn was able to offer the parithes and Untons will, be described in

the next section.)

(B) A Perhaps the most important strategy for effective program assembly is the

e. creation of a attern of interest conver ence amon the relevant actor rou h

the deve opment of complementary incentives.

s, The'program executiye first must identify the interests of.relevant actors. He should be mindful that they will be most likely to respOnd poitively to the program if they are offered

, incentives rather than'pleas to

altruistic motives or authoritative declarations, formal rules, or regulations.

The executive should distribute incentives that will lead these actors

into a pattern of interest convergence: one in which they will find

their interests and the interest of the YEDPA program in convergence.

(,The use of complementary incentives, can help create this. Since different actors and organizations often have divergent interests, in- , centies to:create Program assembly must focus on the points at which

thesevarious objectives converge.

In the ideal, there are points

jectives is highly interlocked:

one's own objectives, the actor

jectives of another actor.

at whichVthe achievement of these obsituations in which while achieving

also'contributes to achieving the ob7 For instance, we found that in the two YCCIP programs and in Portland's EHR,

the work-providing agencies could not receive the free.labor that they sought

to increase their productivity v./. hout simultaneously providing the YCCIP

74

4,
program with worksites. This is a striking,convergence, but there were several other' instances of similar cdnvergence through'complementary incentiveS. * In New. aven, VICI needed general support from the carpenters and' 4

4 ? painters 'unions, specific aid such as providing Supervisdrs for VICI crews

and apprenticeships for VIII graduates, and a willingness to hold in abeyance their suspicions of "another CETA program". In turn, in negotiations

with the unions, the VICI program executive stressed the following benefits:

the union would be getting a pre-apprenticeship vogram which would reduce

thei cost of training apprentices, referral service for skilled minorities , whic would help them satisfy affirmative action requirements, and jobs for

unemployed journeymen by hiring them as crew- chiefs. Involvement in the pro-

/. gram- would be good public relations for the unions (New Haven was the only

New England city to receive a V,ICI grant).. Finally, 'the ,program would not

bq taking work away from the unions because the rehab.work to be-done is

dinarily contracted out.to nonunion carpenters and bainters.

4'1 The.referraltervice for,skilled minorities Was very attractive to the

unions. Most federal jobsahave affirmativd action requirements, but the

uni e experienced difficulty in recruiting minorities on their Own.

And br oneldnion, having VICI serve1as a pre-apprentice/hip program was,at-

, tractive because it did not haVe an apprenticeship program.

am)

SimilSrly,VICI in New Haven needed worksites. In turn,/ in negotiations

A

with work-providing agencies,,the program executive slkessed that 'involvement

in VICI would give them aCcess, to fee labor which would increase'their pro-

' 1 ductivity. The,money-saved on labor costs could-be used to purchase addition-

\ A . k al materials and, thuS allow more work to 1:* dOne on the individual jobs. Mini1

, -.... . ihazi g labor aosts was a powerful incentive t6 these agencies because they are ltmi ed in the amount they can spend, on each house:by federal, state and city

guidelines. 1)

In Portland, \he Portladd Development Cdmmission provided worksites. In turn,

it Ptceived crews to do work that PDC otherwise would not have been 'able to do

S )

75

4
because of HUD loan restrictions and an inability to find qualified private

contractors willing to work for what PDC could pay.' The School District

vided a director and a building for the program headquarters. In turn,' it

received a vocational education program at minimal cost. Also, EHR relieved . 4 the schools of students that the conventional classroom had difficulty aqqomodating. Labor provided crew supervisors with technical assistance for training,

skills development, and tool maintenance. rn-return they.received a preapprenticeship program, a tvehicle for work experiende in'the high school, a

referral'service for skilled minorities and jobs fOr

1their unemployed-joupeymen.

In San Antonio, in;return'for providing crew Supervisors and- apprenticeships for Program graduates,.unions were offered even broader incentives than

in other cities. Unions are not strong in San Antonio and are continually

,undercut by the cheap, dmigrant 1,aVor pool. In negotiations with the unions,

MAUC's Patlan emphasized thatthe YCCIP program offered unions an opportunity

40.....teglqbmnion_.,yalues (fair wapes_and work practicesLsqthe youth would notes

become .a part of that pool. Patlan also emphasized that admitting youths to

the unions,would inhibit the growth of skilled nonunion_ laborers who.could

depress union wages. Finally, as an investor in two major (including theflyatt

. Hotel) and numerous-Minor building projects, MAUC assured the unions that these

construction sites wouldlu4e union labor.* In the case of the parishes, in

return for the aid which:they gave mAugo the churches themselves received

significant physical Improvements since they also served as.worksites.

(C) Program assembly -in 'a YEDPA program must be secured gThithe way down to'

the vforksitte and through to the process of job placement. Worksite management

is a difficult taSk; it Will not occur automatically.

Securing cooperation from bureaucratic actors and achieving the appropriath recruitments (participants that fit income and minority targets;

meaningful workSites; good supervisors) are 'necessary but not sufficient steps. The program executive must be certain that something is

Ving on at the worksiteS: the difficult"task of teaching specific

skill functionS must be acgieved.

*In San Antonio, this is a significant pledge bycause the unions are 4ware

that without MAUC's insistence, contractors probably would lure nonunion labor

for those projects.

76

r 45,

*SI
et. All the pieces of the program must be put together-at the worksite and

in the classroom. The activity at the worksite should develop the partici-

. pants' job skills and should be relevant to future job placements. YEDPA

programs perform important screening and certification unctiont for employers,

but even more essential are the specific skill function

4 rThe desired activities will not automatically or easily be established

. at he worksites. Youths participating in YEDPA are not easy to work

with-br train. They do nol,t come tp the program with many job or aca- demic skills and often have:not had successful experiences,in other

skill -preparation situations subh as acko3. -s

4. .Allc this' should iiotbe surprising 'Since it is'precisely analogous to the

street4evelmanageMent problems that .executives have it other public organizetilons. "Streetlevel 'thureauAree are official's at the lower leyels of public.organizations'hierarchy wt are in direct contact with their clients, ex ercise a great deal of discretion in making'nontrivial decisignssout apply--

ing general rules to particular cases, and often must work with very general,

imprecise and ambiguous rules br laws. In effect they create and change poli- . .cies. But it is-difficult for executives to effectively .supervise and control, r°

--ghese'officials, such as police patrolmen, teachers, social workers in weifefte

work, lower court.judges, property tax assessors, and worksite supervisors and

teachers in manpower- programs.

"ip Finally, the development of a satisfactory job placement pr?cess. may

be the least automatic part 'of assembling a,YEDPA program and'requires significant and constant efforts by the program executive.

There are numerous instances of adjustments and repairs made by program

executives in order to secure program assembly down.to,the w rksite and the way

this contributed to the effective implementation of these p ograMS. In Pittsburgh, during STAY's first semester, a weak curriculum (class content had been

up to individual teacherS)'and the fact that a majority of STAY participants

strongly disliked school, made the two-hour after-school class a disaster with 4 --,, polor attendance. Monaco, the 'pro ram executive, respondedlay hiring a full .

time curriculum developer to put together a curriculum that would attract and

teach students who hated school. He also made class attendance mandatory.

The curriculum and attendance improved. Reading scores for over half the par-

. ticipants also improved, though the causal connection and significance of that

are debatable.

77
In Syracuse there were similar improvements in the classroom curriculum.

Lt. Butler added an interview with the worksite supervior as part of, the

screening and admiions process., The supervisors make the final admission decision which prevents their.feeling that a particular participant is being

forced on them. This interview also focuses on better tailoring the work to

the participant's interests as well as job market conditions..°

In New Haven's VICI, program'nrector Connolly responded effectively,to

placement problems. When the bleak job market fOr union carpenters and

paintets resulted in very limited openings in apprenticeship programs, Connolly

adjusted and through a good deal of detail work, developed nonunion placements.

Sheand crew supervisors also *ade,important.adjustments.when faced with problems at the Worksites. Initially the crews undehook many small projects to

achieve a high productivifk.rate7But the skills deilelopment component sUfs.u 41k, fered. In response to external suggestions from CPPV and complaints from crew

supervisors, Conntlly shifted .he policy to one of bigger worksites. They in-'

corporated a wider variety of skill and a higher ratio of rough work to finish

work which also gave participants broader skill experiences.

- The need for attentirion to putting pieces together as far dOwn as the work-

..40c4 site is indicated by the Entitlement program in general and the Baltimore program in particular. The Entitlement program's provisionsof a job guarantee . and the admission of all eligible youth in an area'seem to result in less

specific skill training related to particular careers than in the other pro=

graths. 'Tfiis is because there seem to be,more'difficulties in Entitlement in

getting the desired typg of worksitela9d sufficient worksite supervision. In

4 - Baltimore, for example, we noted the program's worksite difficulties with

large employers.

We now return to the details behind what we called the second major

element of the true nature of implementation.

78

A 1 I e

0.

`41 4.
(V) IMPLEMENTATION: A P)2OCSSS OF AVOIDING PITFALLS

(A) We recommind---that YEDPA policymakers assUme' that major fficulties

will almo always characterize implementation and that-i .3. a process of

avoidi pitfalls.

They must eschew the view that good ideas will implement themselves

or at least face a relatively easy implementation process because

they have good designs.

They dannot, assume that someone else will consider the issue of implementation feasibility and that someone elsedkill worry about the

specific teps otprograh assembly.

(B) We specifically recommend that the major strategy for avoiding imple-

. mentation'pitfalls should be steps to aftticipate them. If One can antici-

, pate these pitfalls, then one will be better able to, develop ways of avoid-

'ing them; coping with them, and/or overcoming them.

(C) But how is one to go about anticipating them?

will suggest some ways, They are described roughly

importance.

The next dozen sections

in ascending order of

..(.VI) THE BENEFITS OF PREVIOUS DIRECT OPERATING EXPERIENCE ' f YEDPA designers and implementors will be better.able to anticipate

implementation pitfalls if they have previously had direct operating experience in another YEDPA or manpower or education program.

$

79

V'
_

A corollary: We found that the separation between planning and implementation,which has plagued many federal programs,* can be bridged if the program

planner then becomes the program ,operator.

The prior operating dxperience of STAY's (Pittsburgh) director, Fred

Monaco, seems to have contributed to effective iMplem4tation by helping him

anticipate implementation difficulties,

years' experience running the SET/AVERT

He knew what kinds of difficulties kids

Before Monaco began STAY,'he had six

a s Programs for the Pittsburgh schools.**

were havingA.n adjusting to work and-

. designed STAY for the type of youth who, was failing to successfully complete

the SET/AVERT Progiam.

44 4

Albuquerque's WORP Program began auspiciously.when Dennis Contreras'was

recruited as program planner. He was able to bridge the gap bgtween planning

and implementation. He had operating experience as director of YIEP (Youth In4 School Employment,Program), a work opportunities program for in- school youths.

He used procedures that hadworked, well at YIEP to anticipate potential difficulties. For example, he built into the program a systemlof documentation

to identity participants' and work supervisors' responsibilities and their oCn-,

tacts with WORP counselors. (In San Anto .nio and Baltimore.such clelr operating

procedures were not part of the initial program design and significant problems

occurred which necessitated developing them later.) Contreras then bridged the

. planning-implementation gap by moving directly'from his position as program

. . planner to program coordinator.

>e

*In the past, the implementation of many programs has been made ery difficult because of a separation oepolicy design and policy implementation.

,Planning has'been done by one organization; the consequences have been felt by

another. Design has been done by persons at the federal level; implementation

has been carried out at the local level. Design has been done by perlons with

4 a planning background who have no operating experience4 Planningohas_been

done by a top executive staff; implementation has been done by persons lover

down in the organization's hierarchy.

**SET/AVERT are two similar programs in which in-school youth who are having problems with school are assisted in finding permanent parX-time employment.

80

a
o A Similarly, in New Haven's VICI the planning and implementation separation

was bridged when one of its original planners, Sally Connolly, became program

director. She brought a good deal of experience"as youth program administrator

and as author of New'Hayen's Entitlement proposal. In her previous ope gting

experience she

had to be more

the unions' and

posal for VICI.

had learned that linkages with other organizations and agencetes

than proposed linkages. This led her to negotiate them with

work-proViding agencies even prior to submitting the grant pro-

.

.. b, Equally important in VICI was the prior operating experience of t e assistant director, Al Rogers, as Director of the Maintenance Divisi n in ,the. ew

--.N,

.,, . Haven Housing Authority. In addition to his contacts in the bui ding trades,

his perspective from the field as well as from a managerial positionwas es-1

pecially helpful with the technical. field details over which implementation

taw typically stumbles and is delayed (e.g., the schedulin4 work for thf crews and

familiarizing the journeymen with paperwork and supervisory tasks).,

The previous experience of Phil Yourish, Newark IHS's program director,

helped him implement an innovative progral. Yourish previously worked at both

traditional and alternative high schools and had some feel for the needs of IHS

students. He felt that their needs were better served by an intense concentra-

. 'tion on bas?c reading, writing, and math skills and rejected the prior emphasis

of IHS on raising political consciousness.

The importance of previous experience is even more sharply indicated by

the,area in which Yourish lacked it a(ld the resulting implementation difficulties. In his first years at IHS (and earlier), Yourish had worked in rather

insulated and independent school settings. in which it was not necessary to

deal with other agencies equal to or higher than his school in an administrative hierarchy. This inexperience resulted in difficulties and delays in the

joint activity with the prime sponsor for the YETP program.

Similarly the inexperience of the first direct:ix. of San Antonio's YCCIP

program and the consequent implementation difficulties also indicates in a

negative way the importance of'prior operating experience.

81
(VII) BUILDING AND MODELING NEW YEDPA PROGPMS ON PREVIOUSLY SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMP,

The supply of persons with operating experience obyiously is limited,

even though recently it has been growing. Also, it is ,usually more reliable

to base policy strategies on institutional, impersonal factors rather than on'

personal, individualistic ones.

We'-thus recommend an additional strategyi building new YEDPA programs

(---. on youth programs previously, succesful in that locality or modeling ) YEDPA programson other successful/programs so as to avoid continually'

"reinvepting the wheel".

New programs ,have many.advantages, but when a program is new, untried and

innovative, it is not possibloeto anticipate al) or/even most of the likelyimplementation difficulties. The experience of sveral of the nine programs an-

. alyzed seems to indicate that building on a prior one orOmodeling it after one

increases the ability to anticipate implementation pitfalls. We found that incrementalism works by contributing to effective implementation.

lcThe first strategy seems to have been crucial in contributing to the effective implementation of the programs in Portland,,Pittsburgh,°and Newark. For

instance, Pittsburgh's STAY was i$deled very closely on the school system's previously successful SET/AVERT programs. But it actually went one step, further

and was built upon these, prOgrams, enabling STAY to avoid most of the ordinary

implementation difficulties (e.g., the key actors for STAY--the worksites and

the schools - -were exactly the'same ones who had worked together successfully on

SET/AVERT for seven,years.) The, seond .strategy of modeling on success from efse4 where was used. effectively in New Maven'and an Antonio.

Previously successful program s tend to be relatively scarce in most fields.

But as we have argued, by 1979'the quality of local manpower programs and re-

. fated personnel has grown greatly. Thus, today there are a significanenumbe

of successful prograMS to serve as seedbeds or models for YEDPA programs. 'Nevertheless, even to the e*tent that such programs exist, using them directly or

as models may,pot be appropriate for the particular context at hand: the particular city, demographic mix, or temporal context. For instance, as noted in

-A-

'Baltimore, the use of the BSC administrative model for entitlement was inappropriate and contributed to implementation difficulties.

'82
Also, it is not always desirable to build or modelion a prior program.

' When facing difficult social problems, like youth unemployment, innovative

programs often must be created fr',Ne scratch. Often this will mean developing

a program thaejs quite unlike previous ones.

#

Sometimes it is necessary and

desirable to invent a new and different wheel. To some extent the Syracuse

program did this by.using a ilitary base that was far from the inner city.

(VIII) SCENARIO WRITING: ANOTHER AID IN ANTICIPATING IMPLEMENTATION PITFALLS

Since it is not always possible or desirable to build or model upon a

prier program, we recommend the writing of a scenario as an additional

major aid in trying to anticipate implementation difficulties.

Scenario writing involves the imaginative construction of,future sequences

\ of actions, the resulting conditions and reactions, and in turn the further conditgons and reactions that are developed by all actors and organizations involved

in the implementation process.

At its best'scenario writing should sensitize the program executive to

the obstacles that lie ahead. It should help him develop one of the

most important characteristics of an effective implementor--what Bardach

has called a "dirty mind" "The implementor with a 'dirty mind' anticipates and tries to predict implementation difficulties. He is especial7

ly attuned to the interests involved and their likelihcod of delaying

and even resistink the planned implementation route."* A dirty mind

would have predicted the ineffective impleme4tation of the swine flu

vaccination campaign. ** /'

Scenario writing brings the likely flaws and problems to the forefront.'

Thus it forces design and program'executives to try t® take account

. of them. It sensitiAiMolicymakers at the top to the importance of

.local capacity in carrying out a successful program.

*Perhaps because of the frequent artificial and inaccurate, distinction between policy (politics) and administration (implementation), we more familiar with a "dirty mind" in policy at thepolicy adoption stage. For RNample,

a "dirty mind" would have predicted that within a week after Carter's energy

speech of Sunday night, July 75# Congress's iniVal positive responte to hls

prcpOsals would change and then be greeted with more caution and deliberat on.

**A dirty mind would have predicted the perfectly commOn delays, bu in

thig case they were extraordinarily detrimental to the program the resistance

or foot-dragging of almost all the actors' including the private vendors4(the

drug companies), some of the HEW doctors and expert, and some private doctors.

r f

83
14.

41'

w Thus scenario writing can help the program executive to predict the

obstacles that are most likely to arise.

. 4 Following this effort at prediction, the executive -will be better able to

take actions to:

, avoid these obstacles;

adapt, readjust and cope with them;

overcame them;

4

43

dr some combination of all these things.

7

In scenario writing, among other things, one must have a keenisense of the

political and bureaucratic terrain where the progr is taking place. One must

be able to "walk throughil.step-by-step all the functions involved in the pro-

. grams' continuing-operation, all the actions necessary to assemble the*reguired

resources, and all the likely intersections with relevant political and bUreaucratic actors that will affect the process of setting up and managing the program (Chase). In "walking through" the program orte must try to anticipate what

is going to happenoanspecially what will go wrong.* /,

In writing an implementation scenario one tries to invent plausible stories

tr.

which may highlight the more obvious flaws"of a program. For example, a good

ri deal of delay might haVe been avoided in Entitlement programs if a scenario had

been written concerning its policy of lacademic credit for_work experience".

//

is has encountered significant opposition from local school officials who inesisted that it was their Province to decide what merit%d credit and'resented

"nonprofessionals" tellingthem

A

how to,run their schools. A reasonable scenario

would have anticipated the reluctance. (even resistance) of educators in *kg

along with 'such a policy. Thus it would have forcedoprogram executives to try

, to take account of this obitacle in adVance and then try tosdevelop adaptations *

,to deal with it.

ei4

, *Compliance features of successful grant proposal's to the federal gOvernment often con in a "Workplan" which details activities, participants'and timetables. Ao nario would go Beyond thidand relate the workplan to the real political and b eaucrWc Conditions that are likely to surround these adminis4

-trative details especially the potential obstacles that the wor plan is likely

to face. Moreover, unlike the "workpThe -( which- is submitted DOL) ;- the- - -__

scenario is entirely an 'internal document to aid-the people running the prograM.

.

44.

. 84.

4 16

O

./
ScehariozrAingis an art. ince it requires imagination and intuition,

there is not mil that can be formalized or codified aboutnhow to do it well

(Bardach, 1977): This is'probably-a majOr, reason why scenario writing has not

been advocated before and is rarely done by policy analysts and designers. Also,

scenario writing is .an exercise in concentrated pessimism and cre4es psy3 chologically difficult processes' to undertake and thus usually is shunned.

Scenario writing in effect was approximated in the planning process for

New Haven's VICI. Ne Haven's CETA director chose two People with operations

bac grounds to writer the VICI grant propTal. They developed the proposal by

trying to anticipate programmatic probems that could hinder implementation

Q. and therl tried_to set tip plans to `avoid or overcome them. In this manner they

_....,,,, combined planning and implementation in a way that approximated the _process of

scenario writing and then acted on these predictions. For example, from their

previous experience' they anticipated the need to have more than proposed link--

ages. Thus they negotiated them with the unions at the outset.

4

-Y.,- Un14ke almost all of cIa other recommendations,

, scenario writing is not

primarily extrapolated from our findings among the new programs-analyzed. Only

the N w Haven program made approximate use of it.' Hut our ecommendation is

b.ased on the findings of theleneral literature on socials icy implementation

and recent cases such as the swine flu vaccine vrogram. M ver, the 'other

programs eV:mg the nine analyzed do' offer some empirical reinforcement for ur , scenario writing regommndation. The absence oesystematic efforts at anticipating,and predicting implementation difficulties resulted in significant implementation problems in many of the nine.

For, instance, when one considers--that-the clientele for Pittsburgh's STAY

consists entire* of youths who had severe problems in school, then it lould * , have been anticipated that its .two -hour after-school class would meet with

student resistance. A reasonable scenario for STAY would have anticipated

this iesistanceand would have initially led to a more structured class at the

outset with strong penalties for non-attendance. This, o£ course, is preciseiY what'happened. But it took a semester's experience before STAY made

these-changes.

85

Me'
4

ft

A reasonable ,.scenario for Albuquerque's THE would have anticipated difficulty.in convincing high school counselors of thekprogram's benefits.,_

felt the program was so good that kids would flack in and did not spend enough

_ time selling it to counselors or school administrators.- Thus they had to make

.dits a feverish' attempt in February' of 1W8fto get the desired number of youths when

a significant short fallJin recruiting seemed likely.

For Newark's IHS the central implemeptation problem was ti$t they did not

anticipate (1) that there would be a need a significant degree of joint act tion; (2) that joint action would be diffi ult to achieve'given IHS's previous

history of autonomy from both the public school system and the city government.

..../ ,' . ...\ Finally, Baltimore titlement planners should have anticipated that Public

Service Employees would require special training and and that:they would have more

problers than a staff hired from a more marketable pool of applicants. They

also should have anticipated that,a 'program o4 this one's size and complexity

required clear operating procedures rather than the inappropriate adpinistrative

t model,of the Baltimore Summer Corps. The major reason that they did not4levelop

/

. these anticipatings and then act on them- eems to fit Qur description above of

. ... the political imperatives (such as fa's results). Thei, were anxious to,begin

the program to symbolize-the city government's concern about youth unemployment

, k -b , and to satisfy DOL. , ., k

o (IX) INSTITUTIONALIZING EVALUATION AND REASSESSMENT MECHANISMS

4.

-a? _____ A "dirty mind" is aware, first, 4hat mostAmpletentation difficu4ties .4k cannot be anticipated fully; second, that a plogram'A implementation

cannot even come close to being ,free of,error: theltest-6-f a good

policy or a good prograth is not the absence of error, but the ability.

to detect, its own, errors and then corrects them. 4 Thus we recommend that the proTss of anticipation, prediction, and

adaptation be institutionalize&,beyond scenario writing by building

into YEDPA programA mechanisms fkfesdbackeevaluation,' and reassessment of the implementation. (There also must be Provisions made for

the execution of these remedies; which we will,discuss in the,dext

section.)

86 C

e
In many of the.niqe programs, the processes of evaluation and

ment led4tO the'ideiection and correction of serious implementation

Thus in some of these cases, what was in effect their second phase

fectively implemented, which their initial phase tended not to be. --- be noted that in all these instances of reassessment the processeS,

r;ther than institutionalized.

I

reassTssproblems.

was ef -

It shou-d

were informali

For instance in Baltimore, after the first few months of operation, published reports, citizen complaints, and mayoral /inquiries made it clear to

Pines and Iiiiir;ct the program had implementation pfoblems. They also knew.

a that staff was. too absorbed in its operation to objectively analyze and evaluate them.) Pines and Ivry assembled a task force of top staff from other parts

of mr. It worked intensively ,for a month reviewing operations 'and developing

4 recommendations. Some changes were made immediately; others followed a sec d.

reassessment at the conclusion of the program's first summer.* These changes

substantially improved program implementation.

MAUC dir,eetor, Juan Patlan, undertook/A similarly successful reassessment

and reorganization of San Antonio's YCCIP. Responding to outside criticisms,

\\

in the summer of. 1918( ..atlan instructed bomingo Ewen°, head of MAUC's family.

. development department, to. investigate the YCCIP and prepare recommendations.

,Patlan confronted the YCCIP director with the investigation's results and in-

-4

strUated him to comply with its administrative dit*tives (e.g., those ,,needed

to stop budget overruns'and match wR5ksite assignments with'project objectives).

Patlan also directed his administrative assistantjervantes, to Work *ithsand

monitor the YCCIP director. The'YCCIP director failed to comply with the, directives.' In September, Patlan created another three-week investigation of

YCCIP. With full' documentation of poor administration before him, Patlan replaced the YCCIP head with Maggie Eureste, MAUC's youth coordinatx. Ale and

her new staff-ignificantly improved the program's implementation.

. a *The major problems identified inclUded: 1) the functional separation of

operating divisions, 2) unclear operating procedures, 3) inadequate staff

41antitykand quality, 4) managerial overload, and 5) inequitable caseload allocation. These problems were addressed and largely overcome by: 1) realigning staff along geographic rather than functional lines, 2) developing clear

operating procedures, 3) appointing a director whose sole responsibility was

entitlement, 4) eliminating CETA public service employees from most direct service positions, 5) adding staff, and 6) reallocating caseloads.

87

110

0

'
44,44"'"

4.

Note that in San Antal() as in altimore, the initial feedback mechanism

wa pressure from outside the progra Internal mechanisms id, not alert MAUC's

director to YCCIP's probl s. It was not until critical HUD evaluators gave

the program a very low ra ng in comparison with-Others that the director took

r notice of these problems:

. - We di cussed above bow internal and external pressures in New Haven's

VICI led the program director to reassess the balance between skills develop- ,

4 ment and job productivity. Ultimately the di5ectOr decided to shift focus to

. larger job sites to. improve the skills deveflopment component which suffered

with small worksites. We also discussed some of the problems in Pittsburgh

with STAY's two-hoUr after-school class. They were brought to the director's

attdfftion by the Field' Service Aicles, who successful* recommended that the

class be improved in several ways. ' As noted in all these cases the error correction mechanisms wereAinformal.

rather than institutionagzed. The.creation of serious and systematic internal

evaluations tends not to be in.the nature of most public sector organizations.

Thus, the institutionalization of these mechanisms probably must be created at

an external level such as in the office of the prime sponsor.

(X) THE NEE6 FOR STRONG PROGRAM EXECUTIVES AND THE PURSUer OF "FIXER"

STRATEGIES

Detecting errors Withouttbeing able.to exe to remedies is useless and

frustrating. Neither the program assembly nor t e subsequent adaptation-compensation responses wi9.1 run by themselves. They should be guided by a strong

executive who has enough power:710 operate:.

We also recommend thatFrogramexecutives consciously add t "fixer"

strategies. .

88

141
4 WV'

_o A "fixer" is a person who makes repairs and adjustments in the imPle-

.mentation process to make it work. .(Bardach, 1977) The "fixer's"

adaptations and compensationd are designed.to protect, correct, and

`- sometimes expand his program,.espegially though coalitition building

and constant intervention in

t administiative detail.

There is always a need to compensate in the implementation process foromissions made at the design and adoption stages. One can never anticipate

fully all the implementation diffichlties and counter act resistance activities

of other,actOs. .In fact, some omissions were intended because the designer Or

program executive felt that it was not politically or financially feasible,to

a include thep earlier.

If

tpumerous instances of each of thes'e Particular elements of the "fixer"

strategy were used in the nine ,cases to achieve effective implementation. In

New Haven's Ventures, job placement faced problems because it was aimed at

apprenticeship slots requiring aitligh school diploma (or equivalent) which

many participants did noi. have. When the first planned response--hiring a GED..

`instructor- -fell through, program director, Connolly and her original co- planner,

Tom Peterson, responded by jumping right in to the details of the program. They

taught GED instruction'classes, at night. (Many other actions in VICI taken by

Connolly and assistant director, Rogers which were described abdve in,other

sections, would also correspond to several elements of the "fixer" strategy.)

The program 4rector's intervention in administrative detail also seems

to)have'contribilted to effective implementation in Syracuse. Program assembly

. . . $

must be secured all the way downto the worksate and no one has a more important

role at the worksite than the supervisors`\ In Syracuse, Lt. Jones personably,

recruited the supervisors.N He went around the base explaining to the guardsmen

the objectives of the progAtm, the types of youth involved, and what would be

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required of them as supervisors. He then selected supervisors on the ,basis of

1 their desire tq-participate and thgr ability to work with minorities and

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.trou4led youth.

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In,Portlancrf when the transportation line inadvertently was omitted from

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the budget,.the EHR program director took immediate compensating steps. He

persuaded the school district to absorb that cost initheir own transportation

budget. In Albuquerque (WORP) it was necessary tocomgensate".for an intended

omission. Tpe initial planners realized that it would.'be difficult for profl ' gram 'participants to use Albuquerque's small publictransportatiort system,

but they were reluctant'to pUt...an expensive ,transportatiOn;item in the grant

lest they lose out to less COStly competitors, ,After they were funded and

began operating, counselors found many negative terminations iccurringlite-

. cause participants could not get to their jobs on time using 'public trans-

. portation. The program director "ion approval of a riewbudget item for a

WORP bus by persuading OCETA, thejoUblic schools,and MDRC (a privatresearch

gtoOLthat wasnonitoring Entitlement for, DOM.. ' Baltimore, and an Antonio's successfUl reassessments and reorganizaiions

(described in Section IX) were carried out by executives pUrsuing the fixer

strategy of adaptation. An illustration of 'successful adaptation and compensation comes from Baltimore. ther Entitlement programs, MOMR did

not fully anticipate its staff needs. In addition to qualitative problems g

Stemming from its use of PSE'S to supervise youths and worksites,x.youthWork's

staff was too-small fc5r such a large and complex program. The contract re-

.quirement that 66 percent. its budget be spent on participant wages and

benefits also contributed to OMR's initial staff problems. These problems

were dealt with by MOMR negotiating an increased personnel budget4to pay for

additional staff and upgrade PSE-funded positionk. In effect MOMR got MDRC

tomodify the 66 percent administrative budget limit by awarding "enrichment

grants" to meet "program needs not anticipated in the original grant".

The final case which reinforces our recommendation c4 fixer strategies is

a negative one. Yourish's I.ck of ability pr willingnessto develop coalition

support for IHS frequently caused implementation difficulties. IHS sought to

maintain its separateness and autonomy, especial 4r from all public agencies

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(Such as the public school system and-the city government) so itch that they'

also avoided developing a close relationship with the prime sponsot. , This

led to some of the implementation difficulties' noted.

(XI) A PROGRAM EXECUTIVE'S CONTRIBUTIONS AS A "DOUBLE AGENT"

We recommend that prime sponsors seek program executives who can play the

role of "double agent".

Some program executives in the nine cases made major contributions to

effective implementation by acting as a "double agent". This role cons.

sisted of the ability to secure joint action among various interests

in the program assembly process by virtue of the executive's. - standing

and membership in more than one of the relevant camps in the implementation_process.

Too often the term linkage is used rather loosely in policy analysis, but the

role of double agent seems to give meaning and personification to the idea of

linkages.' A double agent activates and operationalizes linkages between grganig zations, agencies and other persons. 4

In particular, all these double agents had direct experience. with or

access to major providers of jobs, most of which were either in the

private sector or with a semi-Public agency.

For, example, in creating and assembling the "THE" program, the hotel indUstry and the Albuquerque Public Schools had to be brought together. This

was largely achieved through the efforts of Betty Lou Snapp.. She was a "double

agent" who was head of vocational training in the Albuquerque Public Schopls,

and whose husband was a hotel executive and leader in the local hotel industry.

Lt. Jones conceived of and designed the BOCES-Hancock program ancithen became its de fato program executive. His positions'in several of the relevant

camps aided him in creating and then successfully operating the program. He

was an officer at the base. He had been active in a broad rangof black community affairs and once had worked in the city's Human Rights Department with

Lee Best.who now works in OFSAC. t.

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: As an officer at the base; Jones.was aware of its need to augment manpower and utilize resources that were not being used. He was aware that ithere

was a labor shortage at the base which could be ameliorated by bringing these

youths there. ManyNof thq;base's shops were operating at less than full capa- ' city because their workload exceeded their manpower. The knowledge that double , agents Betty Lou Snapp apd Norman Watts had bf labor shortages in the industries that they igere close to also was a major aid to implementation.

Jones also knew of the requirement that New York State's Departmeni of

Military Ilia Naval Affairs had that the base become more involved in the communities and with minorities. As head of the base's SoCial%Action

Program (SATP), a race'relations program, 'Jones had a special interest in a

program that would bring minority youth onto the base. Through SATP he knew

all the guardsmen and had same insight into their attitudes toward working

f with minorities, which aided him in the selection of appropriate program alp-

. ervisors.

Jones' contact with community groups also aided implementation. The di1 rector of the Urban League helped draft the proposal. SYMPAC, an organization'

of minority professionals, provided Jones with job availability information

which helped develop marketable worksites. The Urban League alsoOmade.available their counseling services to program youths.

in the Delaware County (PA) YETP (one of, the scores of programs whose outside evaluations were reviewed), No'rman Watts' position as a double agent (per-

;taps even a- triple agent) helped him to create and sustain this effectively implemented program. He was both a longtime member of the Delaware County Manpower Board (with a significant interest in youth employment problems) and the

personnel administrator of the hbspital where'the YETP program eventually

started: He became a triple agentof sorts when he became the actual operating

executive of the YETP program that he helped to found andilosate in his hospital,

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Watts' firsthand knowledge of the hospital industry, especially its local

labor shortage, was a major resource. His pqsition and influence ^within the

hospital enabled himfto sell the YETP idea to its staff with relative ease.

Selling it to the prime sponsor was also easy because of his manpower "board

position.

Finally, the crucial assembly step of obtaining the University of New

Mexico (UNM) as one of the two worksites for Albuquerque's WORP was achieyed

through some double-egentry. The key suggestion that WORP seek UNM as a worksite came from a member of the Albuquexque,School Board who was familiar with

WORP from the public schools perspective. The school board member was also a

senior administrator'at UNM and knew both of the availability of University

, resources and its interest in participating in such an image-enhancing project.

This double agent arranged a successful meeting between WORP planners andthe

UNM president:

In 1979 it does not seem gratuitous to advise prime sponsors to try

to find "double agents". The social policy infrastructure and overLlapping organizational and personal networks have developed locally

so much in the past decade that there seems to have been a significant

increase in the supply of talented program executives in general and

ti potential "double agents" in particular.

Despie'this recent increase, potential program executives continue

to be relatively scarce because of our limited knowledge of how to

increase their supply by exogenous means. The limits this places on

strategies built around executives will be discussed shortly.

P

(XII) PROGRAM EXECUTIVES' TIES TO SOURCES OF JOBS

Prime sponsors in particular ought to seek program executives who al-;

ready have ties to sources of jobs.

As noted, all the executives who made contributiOns as double agentsIP had

direct experience with or access to major providers of jobs. One of the several

camps in which they had a foot also happened to be a source of jobs.

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There are so many ways that mon can be absorbed in a manpower pro-'

gram before one gets to job developTent that there is a tendency to

forget that jobs*are essential for its effective implementation.

Developing an effective classroom component for a manpower program i not easy

. but it is much easier than getting good jobs for youths.

These executives' access.tojobs was especially significant because it occurred without the expenditure of program funds. Moreover, most of these jobs

were either in the private sector or with a semi-public agency whose budget

tended to have some slack in it and were appropriated by bodies quite distant

from the program or its city government (e.g., the Air National Guard and the

University of New Mexico).

, . These program executives' ties _preferably should be to private sectoi.

lobs.

Private sector jobs are more likely to constrain youths in pdsitive ways

because someone there,, s more likely to care if the youth dOesn't show up c)r

does his job poorly.. As Arnold Packer has s4id, "Public sector jobs developed

for youth typically tend to be short on providing enough of the discipline

needed to hold down a private sector joh."

There is a need to emphasizeprivate sector jobs because they'tend to

be overlooked. Manpower programs are public sector orgaAizations and

are run primarily by persons who have spent most of theiFpareers in

the public sector (or academic world). Thus it' is understandable that

program executives and their superiors are oriented toward public sector job development.

(XIII) EXECUTIVE TALENT IS MORE 'SCARCE THAN MONEY OR GOOD IDEAS

4 Our advice about fixra7and double agents,.though sound, has limits.

The fixer strategy is difficult to replicate. Talent is more scarce

than either money or good ideas, especially at the executive level.

And we have very imperfect knowledge of how to develop such executives.

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As Professor James Q. WilSon has argued: -"The supply of able, experienced 1

executives is not increasino nearly as fast as the number of problems being addressed by public policy. This deserves emphasis, for it is rarell recognized

'as a constraint. Anyone who opposed a bold new program on the grounds 'that

4 there was nobody around able to run it would be accused of being a pettifogger

I at best and a reactionary do-nothing at worst. Everywhere, except in government,

it seems, the scarcity of talent is accepted as a fact cif life.... The govern-/".

ment--at least publicly--seems to act as if the supply of able political executive were infinitely elastic, though people setting up new agencies will often

admit privately that they re so frustrated and appalled by the shortage of

talent that the only wonder is why disaster is so long in coming." (Wilson,

1967)

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(XIV) THE NEED FOR MODEST AND SIMPLE PROGRAM DESIGN

(A) In light of the scarcity of such persons, we recommend that the design of

YEDPA should not rely exclusively on their presence.

Indeed, the near necessity of talented executives to achieve effective

implementation, coupled with their scarcity, leads- us to recommend a commensurate modesty in,YEDPA program design and in our overall ex- pectations for the.programs' effectiveness.

(B) YEDPA program designs sho.ild be innovative but realistic in that they:

1) anticipate implementation difficulties;

217 are modest, straightforward, and even simple.

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e have already discussed what we mean by this anticipation process.

( Program designs should be modest and simple in that they maintain

YEDPA's focus on the goals of job experience, training, job development, and placement.

g, By keeping to these specifid purposes, YEDPA's implementation becomes

more manageable and mor likely to avoid the implementation pitfalls which

have beset other social programs since the mid-1960's. YEDPA programs do

not redistribute political power or create political autonomy in low income

neighborhoods as the 0E0 and Model Cities programs sought to. But the nine

4YP.DPA programs we analyzed did achieve the goals' upon which YEDPA focused.

Effective implementation is a function, to a significant,degree,' of

good local administration, but that is not sufficient in itself.?

Even if and when a local program has a talented program executive,

the entire implementation process may founder on a highly complex

program design. It might even be said in a figurative sense that

fOr every 1 percent increase in program complexity, it is likely

that there will be a 5 percent reduction in implementation effectiveness.

The type of social programs that we reviewed in the Introduction have

also had other design problems, Too often they, in effect, have been efforts

to feed the horses by feeding the sparrows. Theikabe Goldberg nature of

these programs' purpose and implementation process have'usUally been major

contributions'to ineffective implementation and poor outcomes. Our descrip4on ,(page 9) of the EDA program in Oakland and its circuitous design

(subsidizing the capital of business--rather thMmtheir wage bill--on the

promise that they will later hire low skilled minority persons) is a striking,example of this.

By contrast, YEDPA's desid6 basically have been rather straightforward. Th1 bulk of YEDPA expenditures has gone foi youth wages and . benefits. In fact, there is a formal regulation in the YCCIP and

YIEPP programs that 65 percent of a program's budget must go directly

4 for, youth wages and benefits and it has been rigorously enforced.

YEDPA's de igns have sought to achieve the specific goals just noted

throu0.0a elatively straightforward process.

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trFor instance, in three cif the nine programs analyzed there were two worksites or less for all the program's participants.* This type of design alsofacilitated the programs ".day to day operation as well as its bureaucratic

program assembly. In these programs there was a relatively limited number

of discrete functions handled by a relatively limited number of actors (recruitment, job supervision, teaching, counseling, placement). Teaching

masonry, for example, is_lesscomplex than organizing street gangs. Its results can be more readily seen and evaluated. GED, carpentry, tend painting

require the mastery of specific techniques that can be measured.

The curriculum at Newark's IHS, especially its changes over time, re- flects YEDPA's salutary emphasis on modest and specific program design. IHS

attempts to help youth develop work experienCe and career goals, while at the

same time improving basic math, reading, and writing skills. IHS' failure to

achieve these goals in its early years while it was raising students' political consciousness prompted IHS, under Yourish's leadership, to change to this

more modest and focused approach. however, though modest, IHS is innovative.

It is an alternative high school.. Unlike the public high schools it has successfully sought to integrate work experience with a student's education.

For rotating 9-week periods, half of the student body participate in the acadsic curriculum and the other half work in public and. private sector jobs

obtained by IHS. Among other successfully achieved aims, this program shows

the students that school and getting a job are interrelated.

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(XV) MAINTAINING THE DIVERSITY OF YEDPA'S OVERALL DESIGN AS A NATIONAL PROGRAM

4

(A) A strength of YEDPA's overall design as a nationarrpt2gram seems to be the

o- ,diver4ity it encompasses. For example, the nine'programs we analyzed include

two from YIEPP, two from:iCCIP, and five from YETP, with a good deal of diverdity among local program designs.

*In Syracuse there was only one worksite--the-Hancock Air National Guard

Base; Albuquerque's WOd two--the Kirtland Air Force Base and the University of New Mexico; in Albuquerque's THE there was only one type of worksite--

a full service hotel and there were five of them.

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Indeed, the flexible overall federal design has allowed this,di7

"versity to develOp rAther than mandating it. ' 4

0. We recommend that DOL continue to allow' and encOurage'this diver-"

sity through continuing its flexible approach.

S Youth employment is not a single problem with a single cause or a single

manifestation. It is a constellation' of interrelated problems with complex

large and heterogeneous

learning, it seems wise

to it. it is true that

sources, occurring all across a

maximize effective:outcomes and

allow variousloolicv approaches

nation. Thuse to

to simultaneously

this has none of the

required systematic variation andNcontrolg of a "planned variation" approach.

But there still is enough variation among local program designs to give' us

both broad experience and broad data upon which to base future youth programs.

A specific example of the type of diversitrthat ought,to be allowed and

encouragecl'is the use of military facilities by YEDPA programs as wav'done in

Syracuse and Albuquerque's WORP. These facilities have experience in teach-

. ing job skills to youth, including those who had only mixed success in schools.

They have sufficient organizational and resource slack to take on the extra

duties involved in YEDPA prograbs. Furthermore, the military facilities we

analyzed.had a special ability to convey a crucial message about, employment

and adulthood to low income youth: Subordination in an organization and'on a

worksite is not a sign of cowardice but often an ordinary characteristic of

dignified work. tinfortunately this 'is not a message that the schools have

been. good at conveying. But we found that at these two bases the exposure to

a military chain-of-command which involved-men skilled in' their professions

(and many times having several stripes on eir uniforms) taking \orders from

(and even saluting) their superiors would bring home this message to these

(B)' We do not recommend that diversity be required through the maintenance

of three of four separate programs within YEDPA. Rather, programmatic and

. local diversity should be allowed and encouraged in the specific design Of

individUal programs.

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(XVI) SOME FINAL THOUGHTS

YEDPA's purposes are specific and modest, but they are_impdrtant, even

weighty., ,Attpmpting to.achj.eire them is a major and laudable task`, alb6it a

difficult one. There is an old Groudilo Mal-x story. about two patients in a

hospital., It reflects the tokenism of too many public policy programs. One

patient°says to the other, "The fOod is awfulin this place." And the-other

replies, "Yes, and the portions are so small."

In urging that YEDPA's progiam designs maintain their modesty and specft , ificity of focus, we are nOmerely trying to get bigger portions of awful

food. Rather, we aim to fundamentally improve the basic nature of the food;

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we aim to fundamentally improve youth employment in the United States. Our

analysis of these nine YEDPAlprograms suggests, first, that in principle and

0 in design, a YEDPA program can impl.Ove youth employment; second, that these.

YEDPA Programs can be effectively implemented., 'We hope our recolpendations

will be useful.in suggesting further improvements for the implementation of

YEDPA programs.

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REFERENCE;

o a Ball, J., et al., ",The Youth Entitlement Demonstration Program: A Summary Report

on the Start-Up Period of 'the Youth Incentive Entitlement Pilot Projects,"

Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, January 1979.

Ball, J., et al., "An Interim Report c:T- Program Implementation}," Manpower Demon- -

stration Research Corporatipn, April 1979.

Bardach; E.,'"On Designing Implementable Programs," in Mhjone, G.,(ed),Pitfalls of °' Analysis, 1979.

Bardach, E., The Implementation Game, 1977.

Chase, G., "Human Services Program Implementation: A Framework f6r Predicting How

Hard It Will Bee" Public Policy, 1979.

Dement, E.., et al., "Aspects of Meaningful Work Experience'for)Youth: Five Case

Mini-studies of Exemplary Programs Under YEDPA," MDC, Inc., Vol. II,

November 1978.

Derthick, M., New Towns In-Town, 1972.

Feldman, R., Ostrower, J., "Evaluation of. the HUD/YCCIP Demonstration Projects," - Boston University't Regional Institute on Employment Policy, April 197%

Harigrove, E.,." e Bureaucratic Politics of Evaluation," 1979.

Levitan, S., Taggart', R., The Promise of Greatness, 1976.

Pressman, J., Wildaysky, A., Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington

are Dashed in Oakland, 1973.

,Wilson, 'J\, "The Bureaucracy Problem," The Public IntereSt,.Winter 1867.

Wurzburg, G., et al., 'Initial Youth Employment Demonstration Projects Act ( YEDPA)

,ExperIence at the.Local Level," National dedUncii on EihOloyment Policy;

Report 1, February 1978.

Wuriburg, G.-, et al., "The Unfolding Youth Initiatives in Imp1777nti7iyEDPA," .

_ National Council on EmploYilii Policy; Report_2;_August 1978.°

Wurzburg, G., et al., "The Local Focus on Youth, A Review of Prime Sponsor

Experienbe in Implementing YEDPA," Report 3, March 1979.

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* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1980 0 - .326-763 : QL 3 132,