COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Petty, Alston and Senior Judge Annunziata

RAYMOND LEROY WELLER MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 2020- 18-2 PER CURIAM JUNE 11, 2019 SPOTSYLVANIA COUNT Y DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY Ricardo Rigual, Judge (Brenda Lee Greene; Strentz & Greene, PLC, on brief), for appellant. (Robert F. Beard; Cynthia C. Ed wards; Carolyn S. Seklii, Guar dian ad litem for the minor children; Vanderpool, Frostick & Nishanian, P.C.; Sulliva n & Seklii, PLC, on br ief), for appellee.
Raymond Leroy Weller (father) a ppeals the orders terminating h is parental rights to his children and approving the goal of adoption. Father argues tha t the circuit court erred by (1) “basing its decision on facts and circumstance s that occurr ed in a prior foster care placement that also involved the mother, not a party to this case;” (2) findin g that it was in the children’s best interests to terminate father’s p arental rights; and (3) findin g that father was unable, within a reasonable period of time, to remedy substantially the conditio ns that led to or re quired foster care placement. Upon reviewing the r ecord and briefs of the parties , we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision o f the circuit court. See Rule
5A:27.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this op inion is not designated fo r publication.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - BACKGROUND 1 “On appeal from the termination of parental rights, this Court is required t o review the evidence in the light most favor able to the party prevailing inthe circuit court.” Yafi v. Stafford Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 69 Va . App. 539, 550-51 (2018) (quoting T hach v. Arlington Cty. Dep’t of Human Servs., 63 Va. App. 157, 168 (2014)). The Spotsylvania County Departmen t of Social Services (the Dep artment) first became involved with the family on A ugust 11, 2015, after the Spotsylv ania County Sheriff’s Office conducted a drug raid at father’s home. Father’s two children, who were six and nine years old at the time, were home during t he raid. The police seized pill s, heroin, drug paraphernalia, and cash. Father was arrested and l ater pleaded guilty to possessi on with the intent to distribute a Schedule I/II controlled substance as an accommodation and felo ny child abuse. The children’s mother, Heidi Lambert, was in carcerated for a probation violati on. Since there were no appropriate relatives, the child ren were placed in foster care. On September 4, 2015, the Spotsylvan ia County Juvenile and Dom estic Relations District Court (the JDR court) adjudicate d that the children were abused or neglected. On October 2, 2015, the JDR court entered disposi tional orders for the childr en. The Department provided father with numerous services , which he completed, and on Janua ry 6, 2017, the JDR court approved the foster ca re goal of return home. On July 27, 2017, the Department again became involved with th e family after there was another drug raid at father’s home. The police seized heroin, fentanyl, and drug paraphernalia.

1 The record in this case was seal ed. Nevertheless, the appeal necessitates unsealing relevant portions of the record to resolve the issues appellant has raised. Evidence and factual findings below that are necessar y to address the assignments of error are included in this opinion. Consequently, “[t]o the extent that this opinion mentions facts found in the seale d record, we unseal only those specific facts , finding them relevant to the decision in this case. The remainder of the previously sealed recor d remains sealed.” Levick v. Mac Dougall, 294 Va. 283, 288 n.1 (2017).- 3 - Father admitted that he purchas ed the heroin in Washington D.C. and that he had used “a small amount” of it before the poli ce entered the house. Father also told the police that he sold heroin to support his addiction. Father was arrested and later pleade d no contest to po ssession with intent to distribute a Schedule I/II controlled substance. As before, the children were hom e during the raid. The Departm ent placed the children with their paternal grandmother , who was unable to care for the children for more than a few days. The Department investigat ed other individuals and determ ined that there were no other possible relative placements, so t he children were placed in fo ster care on August 4, 2017. On October 6, 2017, the JDR court ad judicated that the childre n were abused or neglected. On the same date, the JDR court also entered the di spositional orders. On November 16, 2017, father was r eleased from jail and contac ted the Department. Father refused to provide the De partment with his address or ph one number, but on November 28, 2017, he asked to visit with the children. The Department arranged for father to visit with the children, and overall the “visitations went well.” The Department had offered “extens ive services” to father when the children were in foster care previously. Those se rvices included a substance ab use evaluation, family reunification services, visitati on, and referrals to a substanc e abuse program, parenting class, and the Village Fathers program. Wh en the children entered foster care for the second time, the Department’s goal was relative placement, with a concurrent goa l of adoption. During the children’s second foster care pl acement, father did not partici pate in, or request, any new services, other than visita tion. On January 10, 2018, father w as incarcerated again and remained incarcerated until August 2018. On May 4, 2018, the JDR court entered orders terminating fathe r’s parental rights and approving the foster care goal of adoption. Father appealed to the circuit court.- 4 - After father’s release fro m incarceration in August 2018, he co ntacted the Department and requested visitation. Since th e JDR court had terminated h is parental rights, the Department did not arrange for visitation betw een father and the children. On September 27, 2018, the parties appeared before the circuit court. The circuit court first spoke with the chi ldren and their guardian ad litem in chambers. The children, whom the circuit court found to be “sufficiently mature, intelligent, an d articulate to express to the court their experiences and preferences ,” informed the court of their desire to be adopted by their foster parents. The children enj oyed their current “positive, safe relationship and living situation” with their foster pa rents. The children described t heir chaotic and dangerous life with father. The children knew that dr ugs were in father’s home, an d his home did not always have electricity or food. After the in camera proceeding, father moved to continue the termination hearing, which the cir cuit court granted. The parties appeared before th e circuit court again on Novembe r 13, 2018. At that hearing, the Department informe d the court that it was not awar e of any services in which father had participated since August 2017, when the children entered f oster care the second time. The Department explained that there were no other services that it could offer father. The Department presented evidenc e that the children were “doing very well” in foster care and had been livi ng with the same fam ily since August 4, 2 017. They were on the honor roll at school and invo lved in extracurricu lar activities. The children had bonded with their foster parents and were happy. The foster parents were willing and able to adopt the children. Father testified that he did not know that he could ask for se rvices after the children were returned to his care in Ja nuary 2017, nor did he know who to as k for services. Father admitted that he recently had lost his home and did not have a car. His driver’s license was suspended,- 5 - and although he was working, he did not earn very much money. He asked the circuit court for additional time, perhaps six mont hs, to “get back on his feet.” After hearing the evidence and a rgument, the circuit court too k the matter under advisement and subsequently issued a letter opinion on November 16, 2018. The circuit court terminated father’s parental rights under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) and approved the foster care goal of adoption. 2 On November 30, 2018, the circuit court entered its final ord ers. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS Prior foster care placement Father argues that the circu it court erred by “basing its deci sion on facts and circumstances that occurred in a prior foster care placement th at also involved the mother, not a party to this case.” Although father repeat ed his first assign ment of error in the conclusion section of his opening brief, he provided no argument or author ities that addressed the issue; therefore, this Court will not consider it. See Muhammad v. Co mmonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 478 (2005) (“Failure to adequately b rief an assignment of error is considered a waiver.”). Termination of parental rights Father argues that the circu it court erred by finding that the evidence was sufficient to terminate his parental rights. H e contends that the terminatio n of his parental r ights was not in the best interests of the ch ildren and that he had substantiall y corrected the conditions that led to the children’s foster care placement. Father emphasizes that h e was no longer incarcerated, had no pending criminal charges, was working, and was clean of all substances.

2 Mother’s parental rights were t erminated after she signed a pe rmanent entrustment agreement.- 6 - “On review, ‘[a] trial court is presumed to have thoroughly wei ghed all the evidence, considered the statutory requirements, and made its determinati on based on the child’s best interests.’” Castillo v. Loudoun C ty. Dep’t of Family Servs., 68 Va. App. 547, 558 (2018) (quoting Logan v. Fairfax Cty. D ep’t of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128 (1991)). “Where, as here, the court hears the evidence ore tenus , its finding is entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless plai nly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Fauquier Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Ridgeway, 59 Va. App. 185, 190 (2011) (quotin g Martin v. Pittsylvania Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 20 (1986)). The circuit court terminated f ather’s parental rights under Co de § 16.1-283(C)(2), which states that a court may terminate parental rights if: The parent or parents, wit hout good cause, have been unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed 12 mont hs from the date the child was placed in foster care to remedy substantially the condi tions which led to or required continuat ion of the child’s foster care p lacement, notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental h ealth or other rehabilitative agencies to such end. “[S]ubsection C termination deci sions hinge not so much on the magnitude of the problem that created the origi nal danger to the child, but on t he demonstrated failure of the parent to make reasonable changes.” Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of S oc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 257, 271 (2005). The Department removed the ch ildren from father’s care in 2015 and 2017, after police conducted drug raids at his home. A fter the first incident in 2015, the Department provided “exhaustive services to father,” who successfully completed the Department’s requirements so that the children could be retu rned to his care in January 2017 . The circuit court found that father “failed to take advantag e of the post reun ification reco mmendations” and resumed his drug activities, which led to the children’s removal in the sum mer of 2017. The circuit court- 7 - further found that the childre n had been exposed to father’s “u nlawful and dangerous criminal activity” and were present duri ng both of the police raids. Th e circuit court noted that the children were aware that father was us ing and distributing drug s and that there were drugs and paraphernalia throughout the house . The circuit court held tha t the children’s “relationship with their father was irreparably damaged.” In addition, the circuit court found that father was “still notin a position to resume his parental role.” At the time of the circuit court hearing, fath er did not have a home for the children, and although he was working, he admitted that he was not earning much money. He had no car, and his driver’s licen se was suspended. Father con ceded that he needed additional time to be in a position to care for the children. The children, however, had been in foster care for approximate ly thirty out of thirty-nine months. They were doing “extremel y well” in their foster home, “where they [felt] safe, [were] well cared for and properly fed.” “It is clearly not in the be st interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting t o find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming his [or her] responsibilities.” Tackett v. Arlington Cty. Dep’ t of Human Servs., 62 Va. App. 296, 322 (2013) (quoting Kaywood v. Halifa x Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs ., 10 Va. App. 535, 540 (1990)). Based on the totality of the cir cumstances, the circuit court did not err in terminating father’s parental right s under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). 3

3 In addition to his other arguments , father asserts that the ci rcuit court erred in terminating his parental ri ghts under Code § 16.1-283(B); howev er, the circuit court terminated father’s parental rights unde r Code § 16.1-283(C)(2), not (B). Therefore, this Court will not consider father’s arguments relating to Code § 16.1-283(B).- 8 - CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s ruling is summar ily affirmed. Rule 5A:27. Affirmed.