alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 200 (Monday, October 19, 2009)]
[Notices]
[Page 53500]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-25045]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM


Change in Bank Control Notices; Acquisition of Shares of Bank or 
Bank Holding Companies

    The notificants listed below have applied under the Change in Bank 
Control Act (12 U.S.C. 1817(j)) and Sec. [thinsp]225.41 of the Board's 
Regulation Y (12 CFR 225.41) to acquire a bank or bank holding company. 
The factors that are considered in acting on the notices are set forth 
in paragraph 7 of the Act (12 U.S.C. 1817(j)(7)).
    The notices are available for immediate inspection at the Federal 
Reserve Bank indicated. The notices also will be available for 
inspection at the office of the Board of Governors. Interested persons 
may express their views in writing to the Reserve Bank indicated for 
that notice or to the offices of the Board of Governors. Comments must 
be received not later than November 3, 2009.
    A. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (Todd Offenbacker, Assistant 
Vice President) 1 Memorial Drive, Kansas City, Missouri 64198-0001:
    1. The Bonita M. Hegemann Irrevocable Trust, Newman Grove, 
Nebraska, and Bonita M. Hegemann, Lindsay, Nebraska, and James B. 
Hegemann, Newman Grove, Nebraska, as trustees; to acquire voting shares 
of Lindsay State Company, and thereby indirectly acquire voting shares 
of Bank of Lindsay, both of Lindsay, Nebraska.

    Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, October 14, 
2009.
Robert deV. Frierson,
Deputy Secretary of the Board.
[FR Doc. E9-25045 Filed 10-16-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6210-01-S
Exhibit 23.3


                       CONSENT OF OIL AND GAS CONSULTANT
                       ---------------------------------


As  independent  petroleum  consultants to The Houston  Exploration  Company and
KeySpan Exploration and Production,  LLC, Miller and Lents, Ltd. hereby consents
to the  incorporation  of our  report  included  in this Form  10-K/A of KeySpan
Corporation and into the KeySpan  Corporation's  previously  filed  Registration
Statements File Nos.  333-53657,  333-53765,  333-92003,  333-79151,  333-40472,
333-43768, 333-60294 and 333-82230.


                                           MILLER AND LENTS, LTD.



                                           By  /s/Christopher A. Butta
                                               ------------------------
                                               Christopher A. Butta
                                               Senior Vice President


July 24, 2003
Houston, Texas
#### WEATHERS v. MITCHELL.

(Decided February 10, 1916.)

Appeal from Randolph Circuit Court.

Heard before Hon. S. L. Brewer.

No counsel marked for either party.

Per Curiam.

Appeal dismissed for want of assignment of error.
#### § 295.1 Purpose.

Air charter brokers, defined as an indirect air carrier, foreign indirect air carrier or a bona fide agent, provide indirect air transportation of passengers on single entity charters aboard large and small aircraft. This part grants exemptions to such air charter brokers from certain provisions of Subtitle VII of Title 49 of the United States Code (Transportation), and establishes rules, including consumer protection provisions, for the provision of such air transportation by air charter brokers.
DISMISS and Opinion Filed October 9, 2019 

# S

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-19-01139-CV

THE ROMACK COMPANY AND HOLMGRE N JOHNSON: MITCHELL MADDEN, LLP, Appellants V. JP ABERDEEN PARTNERS, LP, Appellee
On Appeal from the 44th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-19-06523



### MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Burns, J ustice Whitehill, and Justice Molb erg Opinion by Chief Justice Burns Before the Court is appellants’ October 2, 2019 unopposed motio n to dismiss this
interlocutory appeal without pre judice. In the motion, appella nts state “there is now no need for
this appeal and the issues involved are, or shortly will be, mo ot.” We grant the motion to the extent
we dismiss the appeal.

191139F.P05 /Robert D. Burns, III/ ROBERT D. BURNS, III CHIEF JUSTICE–2– 

# S

Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT

THE ROMACK COMPANY AND HOLMGREN JOHNSON: MITCHELL MADDEN, LLP, Appellants

No. 05-19-01139-CV V.

JP ABERDEEN PARTNERS, LP, Appellee On Appeal from the 44th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-19-06523. Opinion delivered by Chief Justice Burns, Justices Whitehill and Molberg participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, this int erlocutory appeal is DISMISSED

. Subject to any agreement of the parties, we ORDER that appellants The Romack Company and Holmgren Johnson: Mitchell Madden, LLP bear the cos ts, if any, of this appeal.

Judgment entered October 9, 2019
Exhibit
15

















May 6,
2008








Securities
and Exchange Commission


450 Fifth
Street, N.W.


Washington,
D.C. 20549














Commissioners:





We are
aware that our report dated May 6, 2008 on our review of interim financial
information of Unit Corporation for the three month periods ended March 31,
2008 and 2007 and included in the Company’s quarterly report on Form 10-Q for
the quarter ended March 31, 2008 is incorporated by reference in its
registration statements on Form S-3 (File No.’s 333-104165 and 333-83551)
and Form S-8 (File No.’s 33-19652, 33-44103, 33-49724, 33-64323, 33-53542,
333-38166, 333-39584, 333-135194 and 333-137857).





Very
truly yours,





/s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers
LLP





PricewaterhouseCoopers
LLP


Tulsa,
Oklahoma
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</TABLE>
1 Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-40101

Summary Calendar

BRENDA ANDERSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

ROBERT BEHRNS, DR.; CORRECTIONAL CORPORATION OF AMERICA;

MRS. BEHRNS, DR.,

Defendants-Appellees.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:98-CV-1581

-------------------- March 20, 2000

Before DAVIS, DUHÉ, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 1

Having consented to proceed befor e the magistrate judge

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Brenda Anderson, Texas prisoner No.

768897, appeals the magistrate judge’s dismissal of her civil

rights complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (i) and

(ii).

We reje ct Anderson’s argument that she did not voluntarily

consent to proceed before the magistrate judge and we find no error

in the court’s failure to appoint counsel to represen t Anderson.Anderson test ified that the defendant doctors discontinued her

psychotropic medication because they believed that she did not need

it. Thus, the magistrate judge properly found that neither the

doctors nor their employer, Correctional Corporatio n of America

(CCA), was liable to Anderson under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. H are v. City

of Corinth , 74 F.3d 633, 650 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); Flores v.

Cameron County, Texas

, 92 F.3d 258, 263 (5th Cir. 1996).

Anderson’s argument that she should have been offered an

opportunity to amend her compl aint is meritless. As Anderson

failed to allege a constitutional violation, we find no abuse of

discretion in the dismissal of he r complaint prior to discovery.

Mayo v. Tri-Bell Indus., Inc.

, 787 F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir. 1986).

In her appellate br ief, Anderson argues for the first time

that the defendant doctors discontinue d her medication in

deliberate disregard of a known danger to her health because CCA

has a blanket policy of not allowing inmates to take expensive

drugs. We decline to address this argument because it would

require resolution of factual issues that were not presented to the

district court. S ee Diaz v. Collins

, 114 F.3d 69, 71 n.5 (5th Cir.

1997)

AFFIRMED.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED July 24, 2007 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-40862 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus RAUL CARBAJAL-ADAME; VICTOR ARCOS-BENITEZ Defendants-Appellants.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 2:05-CR-701-2

-------------------- Before HIGGINBOTHAM, STEWART and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * A jury convicted Raul Carbajal-Adame (Carbajal) and Victor Arcos-Benitez (Arcos) of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and the district court sentenced each defendant to a 121-month term of imprisonment. Carbajal argues on appeal that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, while Arcos argues that the district court erred by refusing to accept Arcos’s guilty plea. Although Carbajal moved for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the Government’s case-in-chief and again at the close ofNo. 06-40862 -2- the defense evidence, he did not renew the motion at the close of the Government’s rebuttal evidence. Accordingly, we review the evidence only to determine whether there has been a manifest miscarriage of justice. United States v. Green , 293 F.3d 886, 895 (5th Cir. 2002). Because the trial evidence supports the jury’s determination that Carbajal conspired to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute it, we affirm his conviction. Because Arcos denied any involvement with illegal drugs at his rearraignment hearing, the district court did not err by refusing to accept his guilty plea. United States v. Cano-Guel , 167 F.3d 900, 906 (5th Cir. 1999); F ED . R. CRIM . P. 11(b)(3). U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a)(1). Furthermore, Arcos has failed to show that acceptance of his guilty plea after trial commenced would have made him eligible for a reduction in offense level under the advisory Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. §§ 3E1.1(a)(1), 5C1.2(a); United States v. Sanchez-Ruedas , 452 F.3d 409, 414 (5th Cir. 2006). Thus, any error resulting from the court’s refusal to allow Arcos to enter a guilty plea after the jury was empaneled was harmless. See F ED . R. CRIM . P. 52(a).
AFFIRMED.
**EXHIBIT
      32.1**





**CERTIFICATE
      OF THE PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER**


**PURSUANT
      TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**





Solely
      for the purposes of complying with 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant
      to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, I, the undersigned Principal
      Executive Officer of Auriga Laboratories, Inc. (the “Company”), hereby certify
      that, to the best of my knowledge, the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of the
      Company for the quarter ended June 30, 2007 (the “Report”) fully complies with
      the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
      1934 and that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
      material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.





/s/
                Philip S. PesinPhilip
                S. PesinChief
                Executive OfficerAugust
                9, 2007
Exhibit 10.2
 
 
 September 1, 2010
 
 
 Playboy Enterprises, Inc.
 2706 Media Center Drive
 Los Angeles, CA  90065
 Attn:  Gary Rosenson
 
 Dear Gary:
 
 Reference is made to that certain Amended And Restated Affiliation And License Agreement For DTH Satellite Exhibition Of Programming between DIRECTV, Inc. ("Affiliate") and Playboy Entertainment Group and Spice Hot Entertainment, Inc. ("Programmer") made as of August 1, 2007 as extended by the Letter Agreements dated October 12, 2009, November 13, 2009, December 14, 2009, January 14, 2010, February 12, 2010, March 11, 2010, April 8, 2010 and June 25, 2010 (the "Agreement").
 
 Except as modified expressly below, all terms of the Agreement are hereby ratified and remain in full force and effect.  All capitalized terms used herein shall have the meanings ascribed to them as set forth in the Agreement.
 
 Affiliate and Programmer hereby agree to extend the Term of the Agreement as set forth in Paragraph 6.(a) through the earlier of the parties entering into a replacement agreement or November 2, 2010.
 
 Very truly yours,
 
 DIRECTV, Inc.
 
 /s/ Toby Berlin
 
 Toby Berlin
 Vice President, Programming Acquisition
 
 
 ACCEPTED AND AGREED:
  PLAYBOY ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, INC.

SPICE HOT ENTERTAINMENT, INC.By:
/s/ Roy J. Liebrecht


By:
/s/ Roy J. LiebrechtTitle:
Roy J. Liebrecht


Title:
Roy J. LiebrechtSenior Vice President



Senior Vice PresidentBusiness and Legal Affairs



Business and Legal Affairs
1 The Honorable Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr ., Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 10-1841

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the v. * Western District of Missouri. * Jerome E. Thomas, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: October 21, 2010 Filed: November 8, 2010

___________ Before BYE, BOWMAN, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. In this direct criminal appeal, Jerome Thomas challenges the 240-month statutory minimum sentence the District Court 1 imposed following Thomas's unconditional guilty plea to one count of c onspiring to distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846, and one count of possessing with intent to distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S .C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). Counsel has filed a brief under Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in which hemoves to withdraw and-2- argues that Thomas’s prior felony drug convi ction was too remote in time to justify the application of the 20-year statutory mandatory minimum.
We hold that the District Court did not have discretion to sentence Thomas below the statutory minimum because the government did not move for a departure based on substantial assistance and Thomas was not eligible for safety-valve relief. See21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (stating that if a person commits a qualifying violation after a prior conviction for a felony drug o ffense, such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be le ss than 20 years and not more than life); United States v. Chacon , 330 F.3d 1065, 1066 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that the only authority to depart from the statutory minimum is in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and (f), which apply only when the government move s for a departure ba sed on substantial assistance or the defendant qualifies for safety-valve relief); see also U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e)(1) (noting that in applying Gu idelines, a court is to count any prior sentence exceeding one year and one month, whenever imposed, th at resulted in the defendant being incarcerated within 15 years of the instant offense). After reviewing the record i ndependently under Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988), we have found no nonfrivolous issues . Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and we affirm.

______________________________
#### O’Harrow *v.*Henderson *et al.*

*(Circuit Court, D. Indiana.*

October 10, 1892.)

No. 7,958.

Removal oe Causes—Joint Dependants—Separable Controversy.

An action for wrongful arrest and imprisonment and for malicious prosecution, instituted in a state court against two defendants jointly, cannot be removed by either into the federal court, under Act March 3, 1875, § 2, upon the ground of a separate controversy; and the fact that the defendant seeking removal has filed separate defenses does not make such cause of action separable.

At Law. Action by John W. O’Harrow against John W. Henderson and the Adams Express Company. On motion to remand. Granted. Statement by Baker, District Judge:

On the 1st day of April, 1885-, the plaintiff, O’Harrow, filed his complaint in two paragraphs in the superior court of Marion county, Ind., against the defendant Henderson and the express company. The first paragraph is for the recovery of damages for wrongful arrest and imprisonment without warrant or process of law. The second is for malicious prosecution. On the 17th day of April, 1885, the defendant the Adams Express Company filed its motion in writing to quash the return of service of process upon it, which was overruled by the court. On the 17th day of April, 1885, the defendant Henderson filed his separate answer in three paragraphs. Two paragraphs were special, and one in denial. On the 3'0th day of April, 1885, the defendant Henderson filed his separate, verified petition, accompanied by a proper bond, praying for the removal of the cause from the state court into this court. On the 2d day of May, 1885, the prayer of the petition was granted, and the said cause was ordered to be transferred into this court. The plaintiff moves to remand.

*Claypool & Ketcham,*for plaintiff.

*Baker & Daniels,*for defendants.

Baker, District Judge,

*(after stating the facts.)*This is an action sounding in tort for wrongful arrest and imprisonment and for malicious prosecution. The wrongs are alleged to have been jointly committed by the defendants. The cause must be remanded. One of two or more defendants, sued as joint wrongdoers, cannot remove such cause of action from a state court into the United States circuit court. It has often been decided that an action brought in a state court against two, jointly, for a tort, cannot be removed by either of them into the circuit court of the United States, under Act March 3, 1875, c. 137, § 2, upon the ground of a separate controversy between the plaintiff and himself. The fact that the defendant asking the removal has filed separate defenses does not make the cause of action separable, although the plaintiff might have brought the action against either alone. *Pirie*v. *Tvedt,*115 U. S. 41, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1034, 1161; *Sloane v. Anderson,*117 U, S. 275, 6 *770Sup. Ct. Rep. 730; *Plymouth Consolidated Gold Min. Co.*v. *Amador & S. Canal Co.,*118 U. S. 264, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1034; *Hedge Co.*v. *Fuller,*122 U. S. 535, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1265; *Railroad Co.*v. *Wangelin,*132 U. S. 599, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 203. Remanded. Exception by defendant.
§ 193.7 What does it mean for the FAA to designate information as protected? ( a ) *General.* When the FAA issues an order designating information as protected under this part, the FAA does not disclose the information except as provided in this part.
( b ) *What findings does the FAA make before designating information as protected?* The FAA designates information as protected under this part when the FAA finds that— ( 1 ) The information is provided voluntarily;
( 2 ) The information is safety or security related;
( 3 ) The disclosure of the information would inhibit the voluntary provision of that type of information;
( 4 ) The receipt of that type of information aids in fulfilling the FAA's safety and security responsibilities; and
( 5 ) Withholding such information from disclosure, under the circumstances provided in this part, will be consistent with the FAA's safety and security responsibilities.
( c ) *How will the FAA handle requests for information under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)?* The FAA does not disclose information that is designated as protected under this part in response to a FOIA request.
( d ) *What if the FAA obtains from another source the same information I submit?* Only information received under a program under this part is protected from disclosure under this part. Information obtained by the FAA through another means is not protected under this part.
( e ) *Sharing information with other agencies.* The FAA may provide information that you have submitted under this part to other agencies with safety or security responsibilities. The agencies are subject to the requirements of 49 U.S.C. 40123 regarding nondisclosure of information. The FAA will give the information to another agency only if, for each such request, the other agency provides the FAA with adequate assurance, in writing, that— ( 1 ) The agency has a safety or security need for the information, including the general nature of the need.
( 2 ) The agency will protect the information from disclosure as required in 49 U.S.C. 40123, this part, and the designation. This includes a commitment that the agency will mark the information as provided in the designation.
( 3 ) The agency will limit access to those with a need to know to carry out safety or security responsibilities.
( f ) *What if the FAA receives a subpoena for the information I submit?* When the FAA receives a subpoena for information you have submitted under this part, the FAA contacts you to determine whether you object to disclosure of the information or you wish to participate in responding to the subpoena. If both you and the FAA determine that release of the information is appropriate, the information is released. Otherwise, the FAA will not release information designated as protected under this part unless ordered to do so by a court of competent jurisdiction.