* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 97-11000

Summary Calendar

__________________

ALVIN JONES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP.,

Defendant-Appellee.

______________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Texas

(3:95-CV-2111-R)

______________________________________________

May 12, 1998

Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:*

Appellant Alvin Jones appeals the district court’s grant of

summary judgment to Appellee Federal Express Corporation. We

affirm.

Federal Express terminated Alvin Jones’s employment on

February 18, 1992. On November 8, 1994, Jones, acting pro se,
2

brought suit in federal district court alleging that his

termination constituted race and gender discrimination in violation

of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000e et seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. While this lawsuit (“Jones

I”) was pending, Jones applied for and was denied re-employment

with Federal Express. Jones filed a complaint with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging that Federal

Express refused to rehire him based on disability discrimination

and in retaliation for his previous discrimination charge. On June

22, 1995, the EEOC issued Jones a right-to-sue letter. 

On September 19, 1995, Jones filed the lawsuit out of which

this appeal arises (“Jones II”). In his original complaint in

Jones II, he alleged that his February 1992 termination violated

the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-

12213, and constituted retaliatory discharge for filing a worker’s

compensation claim. He made no factual allegations regarding

Federal Express’s 1994 refusal to rehire him in his original

complaint, but attached to the original complaint the EEOC rightto-sue letter relating to his refusal-to-rehire claim. The record

does not reflect that the original complaint was ever served on

Federal Express. 

In October 1995, more than 90 days after the EEOC issued the

right-to-sue letter, Jones filed his first amended complaint in

Jones II, which included factual allegations relating to his
3

refusal-to-rehire claim. The first amended complaint was served on

Federal Express in January 1995. Federal Express filed a motion

for summary judgment in Jones I on March 28, 1996, and the motion

was granted on July 16, 1996.

The district court granted summary judgment to Federal Express

in Jones II on August 14, 1997. The district court held that

Jones’s claims relating to his February 1992 discharge were barred

by res judicata (claim preclusion), and that his claims arising out

of Federal Express’s refusal to rehire him were barred by the 90-

day statute of limitations set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).

This appeal followed. 

The district court properly concluded Jones’s claims of

disability discrimination and retaliatory discharge in Jones II

were barred by claim preclusion. “Res judicata bars all claims

that were or could have been advanced in support of the cause of

action on the occasion of its former adjudication.” Fleming v.

Travenol Labs., Inc., 707 F.2d 829, 834 (5th Cir. 1983). Although

Jones attached different legal labels to his claims in the two

lawsuits, the factual bases for his earlier termination claims are

the same as those in Jones II. See Fleming, 707 F.2d at 834

(concluding that the factual basis for § 1983 and fourteenth

amendment claims was the same as the factual basis for sex

discrimination claims arising out of the same termination).

Accordingly, the doctrine of claim preclusion bars his claims in
4

Jones II relating to the February 1992 termination because Jones

could have brought these claims in Jones I.

The district court also properly dismissed as time barred

those claims relating to Federal Express’s refusal to rehire Jones.

He first pleaded his refusal-to-rehire claims in his amended

complaint, which was filed on October 24, 1995. This filing was

untimely under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) because it occurred more

than 90 days after the EEOC issued the right-to-sue letter. Even

employing the liberal rules of pleading applicable to pro se

litigants, Jones’s original complaint in Jones II, which was filed

within the 90 days, was insufficient to satisfy 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(f)(1). That pleading contained no factual allegations concerning

Federal Express’s refusal to rehire him. Instead, his original

complaint contained factual allegations relating only to his

February 1992 termination. The filing of his EEOC right-to-sue

letter as an attachment to this original complaint was insufficient

to comply with § 2000e-5(f)(1)’s requirement that a complaint be

brought within 90 days of the issuance of a right-to-sue letter and

was insufficient to provide notice of such claims. See Baldwin

County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 104 S. Ct. 1723 (1984);

Antoine v. United States Postal Serv., 781 F.2d 433 (5th Cir.

1986); Firle v. Mississippi State Dep’t of Educ., 762 F.2d 487,

488-89 (5th Cir. 1985). Under these circumstances, there was no

basis for allowing the claims in his amended original complaint to
5

relate back to the date of filing the original complaint under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c). See Baldwin County, 466

U.S. at 150 n.3, 104 S. Ct. at 1725 n.3. Thus, Jones’s claims

arising from Federal Express’s refusal to rehire him were properly

dismissed as untimely.

AFFIRMED.