In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: June 21, 2021

S21A0297. TAYLOR v. THE STATE.

 LAGRUA, Justice.

Appellant Micayla Christina Taylor, also known as “Cay Cay,” 

was convicted of felony murder and other crimes in connection with 

the shooting death of Divante Rodriekus Simmons and the 

aggravated assault of William Lawton. On appeal, Appellant raises 

seven enumerations of error: (1) the evidence was legally insufficient 

to support her conviction; (2) the trial court erred in denying her 

motion to suppress; (3) the trial court erred in denying her plea in 

bar; (4) the trial court erred in giving the State’s requested charge 

on conspiracy over Appellant’s objection; (5) trial counsel provided 

ineffective assistance by failing to object to prospective Juror No. 44 

being struck from the jury panel; (6) trial counsel provided 

ineffective assistance by failing to object to alleged hearsay 
2

statements given by Jeston Yates; and (7) trial counsel provided 

ineffective assistance by allowing admission of testimony regarding 

Appellant’s request to take a polygraph test.1 For the reasons that 

follow, we affirm Appellant’s convictions. 

1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the 

evidence presented at trial showed the following. Appellant was 

arrested on February 5, 2016, after being implicated in the February 

1, 2016 shootings of Lawton and Simmons. The shootings occurred 

in Newton County in an area known as “Gum Tree.” According to 

Jeston Yates, who lived in the Gum Tree area at the Salem Terrace 

 1 The crimes occurred on February 1, 2016. In April 2016, a Newton 

County grand jury indicted Appellant for malice murder, felony murder, two 

counts of aggravated assault (as to Simmons and Lawton), and possession of a 

firearm during the commission of a felony. In November 2018, a jury found 

her guilty of felony murder and the two counts of aggravated assault. The jury 

acquitted Appellant of malice murder and the firearm possession count. The 

trial court sentenced Appellant to serve life in prison for the felony murder 

count and 20 consecutive years for the aggravated assault count as to Lawton. 

The remaining count of aggravated assault as to Simmons merged with the 

felony murder count for sentencing purposes. Appellant filed a motion for new 

trial on December 18, 2018, which she amended through new counsel on July 

5, 2019. On July 16, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on the motion for new 

trial. On October 2, 2019, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion for new 

trial. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on October 31, 2019, and the 

case was docketed to this Court’s term beginning in December 2020 and 

submitted for a decision on the briefs. 
3

Apartments, he encountered Appellant at the apartment complex 

around 10:15 a.m. on the morning of February 1. Appellant asked 

Yates where she could sell some marijuana, and he noticed 

Appellant had “about five blunts with her,” as well as “a 9” handgun. 

After smoking marijuana with Appellant, Yates told Appellant to go 

down to Gum Tree Court or Plum Orchard Road, two nearby streets,

to sell the marijuana. Yates testified that around 11:00 a.m., 

Appellant left the apartment complex driving a silver Malibu or 

Impala. About five to ten minutes later, Appellant returned, telling 

Yates that she went to Gum Tree Court to make a sale but two men 

ran off with the marijuana after asking if they could smell it. Yates 

testified that he left the apartment complex after this conversation 

because he did not want to get involved. 

Reginald West and his son, Demarkcus Jones, who was also 

known as “Head Head,” testified that the same morning, between 

10:30 a.m. and 11:00 a.m., they were walking to West’s duplex in the 

Gum Tree area from another part of the neighborhood. As West

and Jones approached West’s duplex, West noticed a silver Impala 
4

parked in front of the neighbor’s unit. When the two men neared 

the driveway, the Impala started to leave but stopped beside West. 

A man in the driver’s seat said to West, “[S]omebody going to pay.” 

West observed that a woman was seated in the front passenger seat 

of the vehicle.

Yates testified that about an hour or so later, he was walking 

through the Gum Tree area when Appellant’s silver car pulled up 

next to him. A man was driving the car, and Appellant was seated 

in the passenger seat. They told Yates to get in the car, and when 

Yates hesitated, the man drew a gun – the same gun Yates saw 

Appellant with earlier that morning. Appellant started giving Yates 

a description of the man who stole her marijuana, saying he was 

“cross-eyed.” Yates testified that he immediately knew Appellant

was describing Jones because Jones has a damaged eye and is the 

only person in the area with an eye like that.2 Appellant then asked 

Yates where “Head Head” lived, and Yates said he did not know. 

 2 Jones is blind in his left eye and has visible damage to that eye caused 

by a childhood accident.
5

According to Yates, the three started driving around the Gum Tree 

area near West’s duplex. Yates heard Appellant call the driver 

“Plug,” which Yates knew to mean her drug dealer or supplier. The 

man driving the car told Yates that he and Appellant were “going to 

handle some business” and “make an example out of them boys down 

there that night,” and “they were going to go riding tonight until 

they find who did it.” At around 1:00 p.m., they dropped off Yates 

on Plum Orchard Road.

According to West, later that afternoon between 2:30 p.m. and 

4:30 p.m., he was standing outside his duplex with his other son, 

Reggie, and he saw a silver Impala driving up and down the street 

multiple times. At some point during this timeframe, the car pulled 

into West’s driveway. The same man and woman from the earlier 

encounter were inside the vehicle, and the man said to West and 

Reggie, “I know y’all ain’t got nothing to do with this, but when I 

come back, they going to have to pay, give me my money.” 

Tobias Dickerson, a resident of the Salem Terrace Apartments, 

also testified at trial. According to Dickerson, at approximately 5:30 
6

p.m. on the same day, he was walking up a path from Plum Orchard 

Road to the Salem Terrace Apartments with his young daughter. As 

they entered the apartment complex parking lot, Dickerson saw a 

gray or silver Impala parked nearby – a car he had seen at the 

complex most of the day. A man was standing outside the driver’s 

side of the car, and a woman was standing on the passenger side. 

As Dickerson and his daughter approached, the woman pointed a 

handgun – a “.40-caliber” or a “baby 9” – at them, asking “[W]here 

he go, where he go?” Dickerson responded that he did not know what 

she was talking about, and the woman ran to the other side of the 

apartment complex. Dickerson rushed his daughter into his 

apartment and came back outside to confront the woman “because 

she drawed down on [him] and [his] daughter.” When he came back 

outside, the car sped out of the complex. Dickerson then walked to 

his mother’s house on Plum Orchard Road, and while he was 

standing in the yard, he saw the silver Impala driving up and down 

the street eight or nine times. 

Yates testified that about two hours later, between 7:00 p.m. 
7

and 7:30 p.m., he was outside a house on Plum Orchard Road and 

saw a silver car driving slowly up and down the road. Yates noticed 

that the car looked like the one he had ridden in earlier in the day 

with Appellant, and he observed that the same man was driving the 

car, holding a gun. 

West and Jones testified that about 8:30 p.m. that evening, 

they were with their friends Lawton and Simmons at Lawton’s home 

on Gum Tree Court. According to West and Lawton, at around 10:00 

p.m., a silver or gray Impala turned down Gum Tree Court, drove 

past Lawton’s house, turned around in the cul-de-sac at the end of 

the street, and drove back up the street. The men testified that as 

the Impala neared Lawton’s house again, multiple gunshots were 

fired from the vehicle. Lawton said that Simmons pulled him to the 

ground behind a car parked in front of the house. West stated he 

also got down and slammed Jones to the ground. Jones testified that 

he could see “fire” coming up off the ground where the bullets were 

hitting the parking area. One of the bullets struck Lawton in his 

left bicep. Lawton testified that after the shooting stopped, he got 
8

up to go inside his house but noticed that Simmons was still on the 

ground. The men then realized Simmons had been shot. 

Officers responded to the shootings at approximately 10:30 

p.m. They observed Simmons lying on the ground, apparently 

deceased. They spoke briefly with Lawton and assisted in applying 

a tourniquet to his arm. The officers recovered multiple shell 

casings from a .40-caliber weapon located in the immediate vicinity 

and along the road.3 When the ambulance arrived, emergency 

personnel confirmed Simmons was deceased. The ambulance 

transported Lawton to the hospital where he was treated and 

released. 

A few days after the shootings, Dickerson, West, and Yates

were interviewed by officers. During these interviews, officers 

presented the men with photographic lineups and asked if they 

recognized anyone matching the appearance of the woman they 

encountered on February 1. Dickerson selected a photograph of 

Appellant and also identified her at trial. West circled a photograph

 3 Officers never recovered the handgun used in the shootings. 
9

of Appellant, but indicated that he was not sure she was the woman 

he encountered on February 1. However, West positively identified 

Appellant at trial. Yates could not identify anyone in the 

photographs presented to him, but at trial, he identified Appellant 

as the woman who asked him where she could sell marijuana, had a 

gun in her possession, and was riding in the silver car. 

Appellant was arrested on February 5 and interviewed by

Investigator Jocelyn Detweiler and Corporal Charles Cook. The 

interview lasted approximately four hours. At the beginning of the 

interview, Appellant agreed to waive her Miranda4 rights and give 

a statement to the officers. 

During the first few minutes of the interview, Appellant told 

the officers that on the day of the shootings, she “did try to go 

purchase some weed” in the Gum Tree neighborhood and “somebody 

did steal from” her. She also told the officers that she was “driving 

around the neighborhood in the day time” in a silver Impala looking 

 4 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) 

(1966). 
10

for “Head Head.” The officers then asked her to describe Head Head, 

and Appellant responded, “He got messed up eyes.” When the 

officers asked for more details about the events surrounding the 

robbery, Appellant stated:

I went to go purchase some weed, I’m gonna be honest, 

earlier that day. And, he ended up taking it from me. 

Like, he stole from me. So I just let it go, like, I just roll 

– at first, I did ride around the neighborhood. I’m not 

gonna lie. I rolled around the neighborhood. I’m, like, 

have you all seen – you all seen a dude? 

One of the officers then inquired as to what Appellant was 

planning to do once she found Head Head, and Appellant responded 

that she was “gonna try to get [the marijuana] back,” “was going to 

chase after him,” and “[b]eat him up or something.” Appellant also 

told the officers that “J” was in the car with her the whole time, 

indicating “J” was her “plug” or supplier. Appellant then stated that 

around 2:00 or 3:00 p.m., she and “J” drove over to the Salem Terrace 

Apartments to find Yates to get the name of the man who had stolen 

the marijuana from her. Appellant said she described the man to 

Yates and said he had “cock eyes,” and Yates told her the man’s 
11

name was “Head Head.” Appellant said she, “J,” and Yates then 

rode around Gum Tree to see if Yates could show them where Head 

Head lived, but Yates “act like he ain’t know where he live. He was 

just pointing.” She said they dropped off Yates after that. Appellant 

told the officers that she returned to the Gum Tree area throughout 

the day looking for Head Head because she wanted to “get [her] sack 

back,” and if she saw Head Head “with [her] stuff,” she was “going 

to beat him up.” 

2. Appellant contends that the evidence presented at trial was 

insufficient to support her convictions because the State “simply 

cobbled together circumstantial evidence and the testimony of 

insufficient and unreliable witnesses” to show that “Appellant was 

somehow involved in the shooting in the Gum Tree neighborhood 

that evening.” See OCGA § 24-14-6 (“To warrant a conviction on 

circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent 

with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable 

hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.”). Appellant claims 

that while the evidence may have established that on February 1, 
12

she was robbed of marijuana and was riding around in a silver or 

gray Impala in the Gum Tree area, no evidence was presented by 

the State to place her at the actual scene of the homicide or in 

possession of the murder weapon or to show that the silver or gray 

Impala in which she was riding was the same one at the scene of the 

shootings that night. 

However, the evidence presented at trial established that the 

vehicle in which Appellant was riding on February 1 was the same 

make, model, and color as the one driven by the assailant during the 

shootings. Furthermore, several witnesses saw Appellant with a 

handgun before the shootings, and Yates saw the same handgun in 

possession of the man driving Appellant’s car. Testimony at trial 

also showed that for most of the day on February 1, Appellant was 

looking for “Head Head” – the man who allegedly stole marijuana 

from her – and Appellant’s own statements to officers demonstrated 

that when she found Head Head, she intended to retaliate for the 

theft. 

It is the jury’s role to resolve conflicts in the evidence and 
13

determine the credibility of witnesses. Questions as to the 

reasonableness of hypotheses are generally to be decided 

by the jury which heard the evidence and where the jury 

is authorized to find that the evidence, though 

circumstantial, was sufficient to exclude every reasonable 

hypothesis save that of guilt, that finding will not be 

disturbed unless the verdict of guilty is insupportable as 

a matter of law. 

Smith v. State, 280 Ga. 161, 162 (1) (625 SE2d 766) (2006) (citations 

and punctuation omitted). 

Here, the State presented evidence that Appellant had a 

motive for the shootings, that Jones was with the victims at the time 

of the shootings, that a car matching the description of Appellant’s 

was involved in the shootings, and that Appellant had a handgun 

with her and in her vicinity during the day of the shootings, which 

authorized the jury to find that she was at least a party to the 

crimes. See id. See also OCGA § 16-2-20 (defining parties to a 

crime). Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to exclude every 

other reasonable hypothesis save that of guilt and to enable a 

rational trier of fact to find Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt of the crimes of which she was convicted. See Smith, 280 Ga. 
14

at 162. 

Appellant also contends that no rational trier of fact could have 

found her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the commission of the 

alleged crimes under the constitutional standard set forth in 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) 

(1979). Properly viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the verdicts, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient for a jury 

to find Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of 

which she was convicted under the Jackson standard. See id. See 

also Boyd v. State, 306 Ga. 204, 207 (1) (830 SE2d 160) (2019). 

3. Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in denying 

her motion to suppress a portion of the statements she made during 

her February 5 custodial interview with Investigator Detweiler and 

Corporal Cook. An audio recording of the interview was introduced 

at a pretrial Jackson-Denno5 hearing and played for the court.6 

 5 See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (84 SCt 1774, 12 LE2d 908) (1964).

6 A written transcript of the interview was also introduced at the hearing 

and admitted during trial. 
15

As noted above, early in the interview, after knowingly and 

voluntarily waiving her rights under Miranda, Appellant told the 

officers that she was in the Gum Tree area to sell marijuana on 

February 1; that a man named Head Head stole her marijuana; and 

that she was driving around Gum Tree in a silver Impala looking for 

Head Head to beat him up and get the marijuana back. After 

making these admissions, about two hours into the interview, 

Appellant asked the officers: 

APPELLANT: I have a right to a – do I have a right to a 

lawyer or not? Do I need a – I need an attorney?

DETWEILER: Do you need an attorney?

APPELLANT: I mean, no, because I’m telling you all 

what happened. . . . 

COOK: So you still want to keep talking to us?

APPELLANT: Huh?

COOK: You confusing me. You still want to keep talking 

with us?

APPELLANT: I mean, is it a waste of time?

DETWEILER: At – no.

COOK: Cay Cay, only you know that.

DETWEILER: Yeah.

COOK: And I just need to hear it from you, that you want 

to just keep talking with us and keep moving forward. 

Because, listen, I wasn’t – you know where I was? I was 

at home in bed. Cause I was sick that day. I ain’t going 

to tell you no story about it. I can tell you exactly what I 

was doing.
16

APPELLANT: Okay.

COOK: I was at home in the bed, sweetheart.

APPELLANT: All right. Well, I’m just going to be 100 

then.

COOK: Please.

APPELLANT: All right. So from the –

DETWEILER: Just –

APPELLANT: Just hold on. Just let me talk. 

(Emphasis added.)

The interview resumed, and Appellant told the officers again 

that on the day of the shootings, she was driving around Gum Tree 

looking for Head Head because she was going to “chase after him” 

until she got her marijuana back. Then, about 30 minutes after the 

exchange quoted above, the following exchange occurred:

COOK: Describe [your plug] good to us.

APPELLANT: Naw. I need my attorney.

DETWEILER: Okay. You wish to not speak with us at 

this time?

APPELLANT: I mean, you all going to try and put a 

murder on me, and I didn’t commit.

DETWEILER: Do you wish to not speak with us at this 

time?

APPELLANT: I mean, I’ll – I keep talking. Man, I didn’t 

–

DETWEILER: Are you sure?

COOK: Go over it again to make sure.

DETWEILER: All right now.

APPELLANT: What?
17

DETWEILER: It’s all right.

APPELLANT: So what?

DETWEILER: So I’ll let them go into the thing 

(inaudible).

APPELLANT: So what?

COOK: What we got to do now, Cay Cay, is you – you 

requested an attorney but then you said you wanted to 

keep talking. We got to review these again.

APPELLANT: For real?

DETWEILER: Yeah. You ready? 

(Emphasis added.)

At this point, the investigators reviewed Appellant’s Miranda

rights, and Appellant signed the corresponding waiver form and 

agreed to continue speaking with the investigators. During the 

remainder of the interview, Appellant reiterated that on the day of

the shootings, she was looking for Head Head in the Gum Tree area 

to get her marijuana back, but she did not have a weapon and was 

not involved in or present when the shootings occurred. She told the 

officers that she “let it go,” and she “didn’t go shoot nobody.” 

Appellant contends that the two statements emphasized above 

unequivocally invoked her right to counsel, and thus, the 

interrogation should have stopped until an attorney was made 
18

available to her or until she reinitiated the conversation with the 

officers. See State v. Estrada, 300 Ga. 199, 201 (794 SE2d 103) 

(2016) (“When a defendant invokes his right to counsel, all 

interrogation is to cease until such time as an attorney is made 

available or until such time as the defendant reinitiates 

conversation with law enforcement and waives his right to having 

counsel present.”). Appellant argues that because the interrogation 

did not cease after she invoked her right to counsel, her subsequent 

statements should have been suppressed at trial, and the trial court 

erred in denying her motion to suppress. 

“In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, this 

Court must affirm the trial court’s findings on disputed facts unless 

clearly erroneous.” Mack v. State, 296 Ga. 239, 241 (765 SE2d 896) 

(2014). Here, however, there are no disputed facts, given that 

Appellant’s custodial interview was captured in an audio recording 

that is part of the appellate record. See id. “Accordingly, our review 

of the trial court’s application of the law to the undisputed facts is 

de novo.” Id. at 242. 
19

A suspect who asks for a lawyer at any time during a 

custodial interrogation may not be subjected to further 

questioning by law enforcement until an attorney has 

been made available or until the suspect reinitiates the 

conversation. If the police persist in questioning a suspect 

who has requested that counsel be present, any resulting 

statements made by the suspect are inadmissible in the 

State’s case-in-chief. In order for a suspect to properly 

invoke his right to counsel during a custodial 

interrogation, he must articulate his desire to have 

counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable 

police officer in the circumstances would understand the 

statement to be a request for an attorney. 

Dubose v. State, 294 Ga. 579, 582 (2) (755 SE2d 174) (2014). See also

Willis v. State, 287 Ga. 703, 704 (1) (699 SE2d 1) (2010). However, 

[a]n invocation must be clear and unambiguous; the mere 

mention of the word “attorney” or “lawyer” without more, 

does not automatically invoke the right to counsel. If the 

defendant makes reference to an attorney that is 

ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in 

light of the circumstances would have understood only 

that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, 

cessation of the questioning is not required.

Dubose, 294 Ga. at 582 (citations and punctuation omitted) 

(emphasis in original). 

In this case, Appellant’s first reference to a lawyer – “I have a 

right to a – do I have a right to a lawyer or not? Do I need a – I need 
20

an attorney?” – was not an “unequivocal and unambiguous request[] 

to have counsel present during interrogation.” Lee v. State, 306 Ga. 

663, 668 (3) (832 SE2d 851) (2019). See also United States v.

Wysinger, 683 F3d 784, 795 (II) (A) (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that 

defendant’s initial question – “Do I need a lawyer before we start 

talking?” – “was not an unequivocal request for a lawyer and [law 

enforcement] was not required to cease the interrogation at that 

point.”); Mueller v. Angelo, 181 F3d 557, 573-574 (III) (4th Cir. 1999) 

(concluding that the defendant’s question, “Do you think I need an 

attorney here?,” which was posed to the police officer during 

interrogation, was an ambiguous “query whether his interrogator 

thought that counsel might be helpful” and not “a clear assertion of 

his right to counsel”). “When a defendant makes an equivocal 

reference to counsel, as [Appellant] did here, interviewing officers 

are not always required to clarify the request, but they can.” Lee, 

306 Ga. at 668. After Appellant made the equivocal and ambiguous 

statement inquiring whether she needed an attorney, the officers 

“reasonably sought clarification” of Appellant’s statement, asking 
21

several times if Appellant wanted to keep talking to them. See id. 

Appellant clearly indicated that she did want to keep talking to the

officers. Accordingly, at this point, Appellant did not 

unambiguously invoke her right to counsel.

Turning now to Appellant’s second reference to counsel during 

the interview, the recording reflects that when officers asked 

Appellant for a more detailed description of her plug, “J,” she 

responded, “Naw. I need my attorney.” Assuming without deciding 

that this statement was an unequivocal invocation of Appellant’s 

right to counsel and that the officers’ subsequent questions violated 

her Fifth Amendment right to counsel, see Edwards v. Arizona, 451 

U.S. 477 (101 SCt 1880, 68 LE2d 378) (1981), the trial court’s error 

in admitting the statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt

because in the remainder of the interview, the information elicited 

from Appellant was cumulative of other statements she made earlier 

in the interview when she had been advised of her Miranda rights 

and had not yet made any reference to counsel. See Frazier v. State, 

278 Ga. 297, 298 (4) (602 SE2d 588) (2004) (“Because [the 
22

defendant’s] custodial statement merely repeated what he had 

earlier told his aunt and admitted in his non-custodial statement to 

the first officer on the scene, admission of the custodial statement 

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt even assuming, arguendo, 

that officers during that interrogation failed to scrupulously honor 

[the defendant’s] right to remain silent.”). See also Ensslin v. State, 

308 Ga. 462, 472 (2) (d) (841 SE2d 676) (2020) (in conducting 

harmless error analysis after concluding that the appellant invoked

his right to remain silent, this Court held “it is clear that the 

challenged statements were cumulative of [a]ppellant’s testimony 

admitting that he killed [the victim] but claiming self-defense, 

rendering their admission harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 

Additionally, throughout the entire interview, Appellant

consistently denied any involvement in the shootings or knowledge 

of who the perpetrator was. For these reasons, even assuming the 

trial court erred in admitting the challenged statements at trial, this 

error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Ensslin, 308 Ga. 

at 474.
23

4. Appellant’s next contention alleges error by the trial court 

in denying her plea in bar. On August 18, 2018, Appellant filed a 

plea in bar, asserting that her constitutional right to a speedy trial 

had been violated because, following her indictment, the trial of her 

case was continued from multiple trial calendars, primarily at the 

State’s request. The trial court denied Appellant’s plea in bar,

determining that the delay in trial was not excessive; that both 

parties contributed to the delay and each party had specific reasons 

for the requested continuances; that the Appellant’s right to a 

speedy trial was not asserted until the plea in bar was filed; and that 

no prejudice to Appellant had been shown. On appeal, Appellant 

contends that the trial court’s ruling was erroneous because at the 

time she filed her plea in bar, the delay in her trial had been over 30 

months, which “clearly harmed her.” We see no clear error in the 

trial court’s factual findings or any abuse of discretion in the trial 

court’s weighing of the factors and decision to reject Appellant’s 

speedy trial claim. See Cash v. State, 307 Ga. 510, 513 (2) (837 SE2d 

280) (2019).
24

(a) Threshold inquiry

Courts examining an alleged denial of the constitutional 

right to a speedy trial first must consider whether the 

interval between the defendant’s arrest, indictment, or 

other formal accusation and the trial is sufficiently long 

so as to be characterized as presumptively prejudicial. If 

the delay is long enough to invoke the presumption of 

prejudice, the trial court must balance four factors: (1) 

whether the delay before trial was uncommonly long, (2) 

whether the government or the criminal defendant is 

more to blame for the delay, (3) whether, in due course, 

the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and (4) 

whether [s]he suffered prejudice as the delay’s result. 

Id. (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-533 (92 SCt 2182, 33 

LE2d 101) (1972); Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (112 

SCt 2686, 120 LE2d 520 (1992)). “The trial court’s weighing of each 

factor and its balancing of all four factors—its ultimate judgment—

are reviewed on appeal only for abuse of discretion.” State v. Porter,

288 Ga. 524, 526 (2) (a) (705 SE2d 636) (2011). 

The trial court determined that the pretrial delay in 

Appellant’s case was 30 months – Appellant was arrested in 

February 2016, filed her plea in bar in August 2018, and was tried 

in November 2018. Appellant does not contest that the trial court 
25

accurately calculated this delay. The trial court properly held that 

the pretrial delay was presumptively prejudicial, and the court 

proceeded to consider and weigh the Barker factors. See Barker, 407 

U.S. at 530-533. On appeal, Appellant argues that she was deprived 

of her right to a speedy trial due to the continuances that delayed 

her trial, which were predominantly the fault of the government. 

The following continuances are reflected in the record: (1) at 

Appellant’s request, the trial court granted a continuance of the 

June 2016 pretrial motions and status hearing; (2) at the joint 

request of both parties, the trial court granted a continuance of the 

pretrial motions hearings scheduled for August 2016 and September 

2016; (3) the trial court rescheduled the pretrial motions hearing on 

March 2017 due to its own conflict; (4) the case appeared on the trial 

court’s October 2017 trial calendar, but was continued at the State’s 

request because Yates, one of the State’s witnesses, had absconded; 

(5) Appellant’s attorney filed a motion to withdraw in January 2018, 

which was granted by the trial court on January 30, 20187; (6) 

 7 Appellant’s private attorney withdrew because Appellant was no longer 
26

Appellant’s new counsel requested a continuance from the February 

2018 and April 2018 trial calendars to allow counsel to review the 

file and prepare for trial, and the trial court granted the requests; 

(7) the case appeared on the trial court’s September 2018 trial 

calendar, but was continued to November 2018 at the State’s request 

for the State to locate Yates; and (8) the trial court ordered that the 

trial would proceed in November 2018 with or without the State’s 

witnesses. The trial went forward in November 2018. 

(b) The Barker Factors

(i) Length of the Delay

As noted above, Appellant does not contest that the length of 

the delay was properly calculated by the trial court as 30 months. 

In considering this time period, the trial court held that the delay 

was not uncommonly long given the nature of the charges and the 

time period required for investigation. However, the trial court held 

that the length of delay should be weighed against the State, as the 

 

able to pay for her representation, and new counsel was then appointed by the 

trial court. 
27

delay amounted to a “little less than three years” from the time of

Appellant’s arrest to her trial. On appeal, neither party contests the 

trial court’s conclusion, and we conclude that the trial court properly 

weighed the length of the delay against the State. See Porter, 288 

Ga. at 527. 

(ii) Reasons for the Delay

The trial court considered the reasons for the delay in 

Appellant’s trial and noted that they included requests for 

continuances by both parties. The trial court thus attributed the 

delays to the State and Appellant, and we conclude that the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in weighing this factor neutrally. 

See Robinson v. State, 287 Ga. 265, 268 (1) (b) (695 SE2d 201) (2010)

(concluding that, “in balancing all of the reasons for the delay that 

[we]re attributable to the State against those that [we]re 

attributable to the defendant[], this Barker factor ultimately 

remains neutral.”). 

(iii) Assertion of the Right to a Speedy Trial

The trial court weighed the third factor against Appellant 
28

because she waited 30 months to file a plea in bar asserting her right 

to a speedy trial. We see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 

conclusion that this factor should be weighed against Appellant. See 

Cash, 307 Ga. at 518 (“We do not see an abuse of discretion in the 

trial court’s conclusion that [the defendant’s] failure to assert the 

right sooner weighed against him.”).

(iv) Prejudice

The trial court found that Appellant failed to satisfy her burden 

of showing she was prejudiced by the pretrial delay and failed to 

demonstrate actual prejudice, and thus, this factor did not weigh in 

Appellant’s favor. See id. at 518-519. On appeal, while Appellant 

generally asserts that her defense was prejudiced, she does not 

explain how or provide any concrete basis for this assertion, such as 

an inability to prepare her defense, the loss of any witnesses, and/or 

any impairment to her defense. See Porter, 288 Ga. at 529 (“The 

types of prejudice associated with an unreasonable delay before trial 

include oppressive pretrial incarceration, anxiety and concern of the 

accused, and the possibility that the accused’s defense will be 
29

impaired by dimming memories and loss of exculpatory evidence.”). 

The trial court did not clearly err in finding that Appellant did not 

demonstrate actual prejudice from the delay of her case or abuse its 

discretion by failing to weigh the prejudice prong in Appellant’s 

favor. See Cash, 307 Ga. at 520.

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

concluding that Appellant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated 

and denying her plea in bar. 

 5. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in instructing

the jury on conspiracy. During the charge conference, the State 

requested that the trial court charge the jury on conspiracy, and the 

trial court advised that it would give the Suggested Pattern Jury 

Instructions on conspiracy and party to a crime. Appellant objected 

to the conspiracy instruction – both at the conclusion of the charge 

conference and again after the trial court finished reading the 

instructions to the jury. On appeal, Appellant contends that because 

conspiracy was not the theory under which she was charged and 

because the evidence did not support a conspiracy charge in this 
30

case, it was error for the trial court to charge the jury on conspiracy 

over Appellant’s objection. We disagree. 

It is not error to charge on the subject of conspiracy when 

the evidence tends to show a conspiracy, even if a 

conspiracy is not alleged in the indictment. The State 

may prove a conspiracy by showing that two or more 

persons tacitly came to a mutual understanding to pursue 

a criminal objective. And the conspiracy may be inferred 

from the nature of the acts done, the relation of the 

parties, the interest of the alleged conspirators, and other 

circumstances.

Smith v. State, 306 Ga. 753, 758 (2) (833 SE2d 117) (2019). “And, 

only slight evidence is necessary to warrant a charge on the subject 

of conspiracy.” Id. 

Here, more than slight evidence supported giving a conspiracy 

instruction to the jury. This evidence included testimony from 

several witnesses who observed Appellant and a man, whom 

Appellant referred to as her “plug” or drug supplier, in the Gum Tree 

area at various points during the day on February 1, 2016, riding in 

a silver or gray Impala and searching for the man who allegedly

stole Appellant’s marijuana. Appellant and her associate were also 

seen with a handgun, with which they threatened both Yates and 
31

Dickerson. The gunshots that caused Simmons’s death and 

Lawton’s injuries were fired from a silver or gray Impala matching 

the description of the car in which Appellant and her associate were 

traveling. Appellant admitted to police officers that she and her 

“plug” were looking for the man who stole her marijuana and 

intended to harm the suspected offender – “Head Head” – when they 

found him, and Jones was with Simmons and Lawton at the time of 

the shootings. This evidence constituted the “slight evidence” 

needed for the trial court to charge the jury on conspiracy, and the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in doing so. See id.

6. In Appellant’s next three enumerations of error, she 

contends that her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in 

regard to the following: (a) failing to object to a prospective juror 

being struck prior to voir dire; (b) failing to object to alleged hearsay 

statements given by Yates; and (c) allowing the admission of 

testimony regarding Appellant’s request to take a polygraph test. 

We will address each contention in turn, applying the constitutional 

standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (104 
32

SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). 

In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, Appellant must show “both that counsel’s performance was 

deficient, and that the deficient performance was prejudicial to h[er]

defense.” Lockhart v. State, 298 Ga. 384, 385 (2) (782 SE2d 245) 

(2016). See also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (III). To show deficient 

performance, Appellant must “overcome the strong presumption

that counsel’s performance fell within a wide range of reasonable 

professional conduct, and that counsel’s decisions were made in the 

exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Lockhart, 298 Ga. at 

385.

The reasonableness of counsel’s conduct is examined from 

counsel’s perspective at the time of trial and under the 

particular circumstances of the case, and decisions 

regarding trial tactics and strategy may form the basis for 

an ineffectiveness claim only if they were so patently 

unreasonable that no competent attorney would have 

followed such a course.

Id. See also Robinson v. State, 278 Ga. 31, 36 (2) (d) (597 SE2d 386) 

(2004) (“As a general rule, matters of reasonable trial tactics and 

strategy, whether wise or unwise, do not amount to ineffective 
33

assistance of counsel,” and “[a] reviewing court evaluates trial 

counsel’s performance from counsel’s perspective at the time of 

trial.”). To show prejudice under the Strickland test, Appellant 

must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, absent any 

unprofessional errors on counsel’s part, the result of h[er] trial 

would have been different.” Lockhart, 298 Ga. at 385 (citation and 

punctuation omitted). 

“An appellant must prove both prongs of the Strickland test, 

and if [s]he fails to prove one prong, it is not incumbent upon this 

Court to examine the other prong.” Winters v. State, 305 Ga. 226, 

230 (4) (824 SE2d 306) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). 

“In reviewing either component of the inquiry, all factual findings 

by the trial court will be affirmed unless clearly erroneous.” Id. See

also Robinson v. State, 277 Ga. 75, 76 (586 SE2d 313) (2003) (“We 

accept the trial court’s factual findings and credibility 

determinations unless clearly erroneous, but we independently 

apply the legal principles to the facts.”). 

(a) Appellant first contends that her trial counsel failed to 
34

provide effective assistance in regard to the striking of a potential 

juror prior to voir dire. As shown by the record, prior to jury 

selection, the trial court excused prospective Juror No. 44 because 

there was a warrant outstanding for her arrest, and she was taken 

into custody. The trial court advised the parties on the record of this 

juror’s excusal and asked if there was any objection. The prosecutor 

responded, “None,” and defense counsel responded, “I guess not. I 

would have taken her.” The trial court inquired further, “But no 

objection as far as the record?” Defense counsel responded, “There 

is not, Judge.” 

On appeal, Appellant contends that Juror No. 44 was 

improperly excused by the trial court, and Appellant’s trial counsel 

was ineffective for failing to inquire into or object to this juror’s 

removal. During the hearing on Appellant’s motion for new trial, 

trial counsel was asked about her decision not to object to the 

removal of this juror, as well as her comment that she would have 

taken the juror. She testified that her comment, “I would have taken 

her,” was “probably meant somewhat facetiously” because she did 
35

not have “any information on that juror,” and her understanding 

was that the juror was taken into custody and was unavailable for 

jury selection. In denying Appellant’s motion for new trial, the trial 

court determined that trial counsel’s decision not to make a 

meritless objection to the removal of Juror No. 44 was strategic and 

not constitutionally deficient. 

There is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct fell 

within the wide range of what is reasonable, and Appellant bears 

the burden to show that her counsel’s actions were “patently 

unreasonable.” Lockhart, 298 Ga. at 386. The evidence brought 

forth during the motion for new trial hearing shows that Appellant’s 

trial counsel pursued a reasonable strategy in deciding not to object 

to the dismissal of Juror No. 44 because the juror was in custody and 

unavailable for jury service. See id. (“Decisions regarding which 

jurors to strike and which to accept are questions of trial strategy.”). 

We conclude that Appellant failed to show deficient performance 

under Strickland, and thus, this ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim fails. 
36

(b) Appellant next contends that her trial counsel was 

ineffective in failing to object to alleged hearsay statements from 

Yates, one of the State’s key witnesses at trial. During the State’s 

direct examination of Yates, he testified about statements made to 

him by Shanteria Hicks, a friend of Appellant’s, who was supposedly 

with Appellant on the morning of the shootings. Yates repeated 

statements Hicks supposedly made regarding the events 

surrounding the theft of Appellant’s marijuana, such as where the 

theft happened and who committed it. Appellant contends that: (1)

this testimony was inadmissible hearsay because Hicks did not 

testify at trial; (2) no exception to the hearsay rule applied to permit 

these statements to be introduced through Yates; and (3) trial 

counsel therefore should have objected to the admission of this 

testimony. 

At the hearing on Appellant’s motion for new trial, when trial 

counsel was questioned about her failure to object to Yates’s hearsay 

testimony, trial counsel explained that she did not expect Yates to 

testify about Hicks’s statements, and the testimony caught her “off-
37

guard.” Trial counsel also indicated that she knew she could 

impeach Yates with information showing that Hicks was 

incarcerated on the day of the shootings and could not have been 

present to make these statements to Yates. In the trial court’s order 

denying Appellant’s motion for new trial, the trial court found that 

Appellant failed to demonstrate that her trial counsel’s performance 

fell below the broad range of professional conduct because her 

decision not to object was not a “professionally unreasonable choice, 

particularly in considering that she was aware that she could 

potentially impeach the witness concerning the remarks made.” 

The trial court also found that Appellant failed to establish any

prejudice. 

At trial, trial counsel thoroughly cross-examined Yates and 

impeached him with information showing Hicks was incarcerated on 

the day of the shootings. Officers also testified to Hicks’s 

incarceration on that day. Trial counsel used this evidence in her 

closing argument to argue to the jury that Yates should not be 

believed. In addition, the State elicited testimony from Yates about 
38

the statements Appellant made to him following the robbery and 

about Yates’s own interactions with Appellant that day. Appellant

also admitted in her custodial interview that she had been robbed of 

marijuana, and she described the man who robbed her and where it 

occurred. 

Thus, even if we assume without deciding that Yates’s 

testimony at issue was inadmissible hearsay, the admission of these 

statements was not prejudicial because the testimony was 

cumulative of other evidence that was properly admitted at trial and 

was used to impeach Yates. See Carter v. State, 310 Ga. 559, ____

(2) (b) (852 SE2d 542) (2020). “In short, this testimony was not 

detrimental to Appellant.” Id.

(c) Finally, Appellant contends that her trial counsel provided 

ineffective assistance by failing to object to testimony about 

Appellant’s initial refusal and later offer to take a polygraph test. 

Appellant’s claim fails. 

As previously noted, the recording of Appellant’s February 5, 

2016 custodial interview was introduced at trial. During this 
39

interview, officers questioned Appellant about whether she wanted 

to take a polygraph test. Appellant initially declined to take a 

polygraph test, but later in the interview, she told the officers they 

could “polygraph” her. At trial, one of the officers testified about this 

exchange and indicated they decided not to give Appellant a 

polygraph test. During closing arguments, Appellant’s trial counsel 

pointed to the officers’ failure to obtain a polygraph test from 

Appellant to support the argument that they failed to conduct a 

thorough investigation in this case.

On appeal, Appellant contends that her trial counsel should 

have objected to the admission of testimony regarding the polygraph

test and requested that the related portions of Appellant’s custodial 

interview be redacted. Appellant argues that because the results of 

a polygraph test are not admissible at trial unless stipulated to by 

Appellant, her trial counsel’s decision to allow these references to a 

potential polygraph test to be admitted was deficient performance. 

See State v. Chambers, 240 Ga. 76, 76-77 (239 SE2d 324) (1977). We 

disagree.
40

At the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel testified that 

her decision not to object to the polygraph test references was

strategic. Trial counsel explained that it allowed her to argue to the 

jury that Appellant explicitly asked law enforcement officers to give 

her a polygraph test, and they elected not to do so. In denying 

Appellant’s motion for new trial, the trial court found that trial 

counsel made a reasonable and strategic decision to allow this 

evidence to be admitted to further the defense’s theory of inadequate 

investigation by law enforcement officers. The trial court also found 

that Appellant failed to present any evidence to show prejudice or 

that the outcome of the trial would have been different had this 

testimony been omitted. 

The trial court’s rulings were supported by the record and trial 

counsel’s rationale for allowing the evidence to be admitted. Trial 

counsel testified that she made this decision as part of her trial 

strategy, and “in order to show deficient performance of trial counsel 

in regard to trial strategy, an appellant must demonstrate that 

counsel’s decision was so patently unreasonable that no competent 
41

attorney would have made it under the circumstances at the time.” 

Clark v. State, 300 Ga. 899, 903 (1) (b) (799 SE2d 202) (2017). We 

conclude that Appellant failed to meet the burden of showing that 

her trial counsel was constitutionally deficient because the record 

shows that her trial counsel’s decision not to move to exclude the 

statements about the polygraph test was a reasonable strategy. See 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. See also Clark, 300 Ga. at 903 (“The 

fact that [Appellant] and [her] present counsel may now find fault 

with the strategy and tactics employed at trial does not support a 

finding that trial counsel failed to provide effective assistance to 

[Appellant].”). Therefore, this enumeration of error fails.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.