Cover: William J. Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Services
MCMXLVII
4 5 /

The men who have held the highest office in the 

Central Intelligence Agency are an eclectic group. 

They include two Rhodes Scholars and a college 

dropout, captains of industry and career public 

servants, Agency veterans and newcomers to the 

field of intelligence. More than 65 years after the 

Agency was founded, there is still no established 

road to the top. 

Th is is just one of the many themes presented in this 

revealing look at the 23 leaders who have directed 

the CIA and its forerunners from 1941 to 2012. 

The publication opens with a profile of Major 

General William J. Donovan—the legendary intelligence chief who ran the Office of Strategic Services, 

a precursor of the CIA during World War II—and 

those of two other intelligence pioneers who, like 

Donovan, never served at the CIA but helped lay 

the groundwork for its foundation. Th e publication 

then traces the careers of my predecessors in the 

Director’s office, who were known as Directors of 

Central Intelligence until that title was replaced 

in 2005 with Director of the Central Intelligence 

Agency, after the establishment of the Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence.

The profiles depict the 23 leaders in the context 

of their times, describing their triumphs and their 

setbacks not in isolation but as elements in a larger 

drama of domestic politics and foreign affairs. Their 

stories are inspiring, sometimes sobering, and always 

fascinating. Th ey also feature, of course, the controversy 

that seems endemic to the sensitive and challenging 

work of intelligence. 

Taken together, these profiles offer an illuminating 

account drawn from the full unclassified record. It 

is written in broad strokes but with enough detail to 

spark the kind of informed debate that has always 

been a hallmark of the CIA. Since its inception, our 

Agency has been rooted in a culture of inquiry and 

constant self-examination. Th is work stands as a fine 

example of that honorable tradition.

John O. Brennan

Foreword

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, September 2013
6 7 /

Directors Timeline

William J. Donovan, 

Major General, US Army

Sidney W. Souers 

Rear Admiral US Naval Reserve

Hoyt S. Vandenberg, 

Lieutenant General, US Army

Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter

Rear Admiral, US Navy 

Walter Bedell Smith

General, US Army

Allen W. Dulles

John A. McCone 

William F. Raborn Jr. 

Vice Admiral, US Navy (Ret.)

Richard M. Helms 

James R. Schlesinger 

William E. Colby 

George H.W. Bush 

Stansfield Turner 

Admiral, US Navy

William J. Casey 

William H. Webster

Robert M. Gates

R. James Woolsey 

John M. Deutch

George J. Tenet

Porter J. Goss

Michael V. Hayden 

General, US Air Force 

Leon E. Panetta 

David H. Petraeus 

General, USA (Ret.)

John O. Brennan

8

10

14

18

22

26

30

36

40

44

50

54

60

66

70

76

80

84

88

92

98

102

106

110

114

Table of Contents
8 9 /

Directors Timeline

1 President Franklin D. Roosevelt nominated Donovan to the position of Coordinator 

of Information (COI) on July 11, 1941, creating the nation’s first peacetime, 

non-departmental intelligence organization. On June 13, 1942, COI was then 

superseded by the Office of Strategic Services, which had a mandate to collect and 

analyze strategic information and conduct counterintelligence operations during 

World War II.

2 Before the National Security Act of 1947 established the CIA on September 18, 

1947, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) served as a member of the National 

Intelligence Authority and head of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) by authority 

of a Presidential Directive of January 22, 1946.

3 The National Security Act of 1947, established the CIA, which replaced the CIG 

on September 18, 1947.

1940 1950 1960 1970

William J. Donovan1

Major General, US Army

Jul 11, 1941 – Jun 13, 1942 (COI)

Jun 13, 1942 – Oct 1, 1945 (OSS)

Sidney W. Souers2

Rear Admiral, US Naval Reserve

DCI, Jan 23, 1946 – Jun 10, 1946 (CIG)

Hoyt S. Vandenberg2

Lieutenant General, US Army

DCI, Jun 10, 1946 – May 1, 1947 (CIG)

Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter3

Rear Admiral, US Navy

DCI, May 1, 1947 – Oct 7, 1950

William F. Raborn Jr.4

Vice Admiral, US Navy

DCI, Apr28, 1965 – Jun 30, 1966

Walter Bedell Smith,

General, US Army (Army Air Forces)

DCI, Oct 7, 1950 – Feb 9, 1953

Allen W. Dulles 

DCI, Feb 26, 1953 – Nov 29, 1961

John A. McCone 

DCI, Nov 29, 1961 – Apr 28, 1965

Richard M. Helms 

DCI, Jun 30, 1966 – Feb 2, 1973

James R. Schlesinger 

DCI, Feb 2, 1973 – Jul 2, 1973

4 Raborn retired from the US Navy on September 1, 1963.

5 Turner retired from the US Navy on December 31, 1978, while serving as DCI.

6 The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 abolished 

the position of DCI and created the position of Director of the Central Intelligence 

Agency (D/CIA).

7 Hayden retired from the US Air Force on July 1, 2008, while serving as D/CIA.

8 Petraeus retired from the US Army on August 31, 2011.

1980 1990 2000

Leon E. Panetta

D/CIA, Feb 13, 2009 – Jun 30, 2011

John O. Brennan

D/CIA, Mar 8, 2013 – Present

2010 2013

William E. Colby

DCI, Sep 4, 1973 – Jan 30, 1976

David H. Petraeus8

General, US Army

D/CIA, Sep 6, 2011 – 

Nov 9, 2012

George H.W. Bush

DCI, Jan 30, 1976 – Jan 20, 1977

Stansfield Turner5

Admiral, US Navy

DCI, Mar 9, 1977 – Jan 20, 1981

William J. Casey 

DCI, Jan 28, 1981 – Jan 29, 1987

Robert M. Gates

DCI, Nov 6, 1991 – Jan 20, 1993

William H. Webster 

DCI, May 26, 1987 – Aug 31, 1991

R. James Woolsey

DCI, Feb 5, 1993 – Jan 10, 1995

Michael V. Hayden7

General, US Air Force

D/CIA, May 30, 2006 – 

Feb 13, 2009

George J. Tenet 

DCI, Jul 11, 1997 – Jul 11, 2004

John M. Deutch 

DCI, May 10, 1995 – Dec 15, 1996

Porter J. Goss6

DCI, Sep 24, 2004 – Apr 21, 2005

D/CIA, Apr 21, 2005 – May 26, 2006
10 11 /

W i l l i a m 

Joseph

Donovan

M a j o r G e n e r a l , U S A r m y 

Tenure:

Director of the Offi ce of the Coordinator of Information, 

July 11, 1941 – June 13, 1942

Director of Strategic Services, June 13, 1942 – October 1, 1945 

Presidents Served: 

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Harry S. Truman

Appointed:

July 11, 1941, by President Franklin D. Roosevelt as Coordinator of Information

June 13, 1942, by President Franklin D. Roosevelt as Director of Strategic Services

Born:

January 1, 1883, Buff alo, New York

E d u c at i o n : 

Attended Niagara College, 1903; Columbia University, B.A., 1905; 

Columbia University Law School, LL.B., 1907

Career Highlights:

• Served with New York National Guard on Mexican border, 1916, and with 

165th Infantry (69th New York) Regiment in World War I; awarded Medal 

of Honor in 1923 for bravery in 1918 Second Battle of the Marne

• Assistant US Attorney General, 1924-29

• Practiced law in New York, 1929-41

• Republican nominee for Governor of New York, 1932

• Placed on active duty and appointed Brigadier General in US Army, 1943

• Promoted to Major General, 1944

• Released from US Army, 1946

• Practiced law in New York, 1946-1953

• Ambassador to Th ailand, 1953-54

Died February 8, 1959
12 13 /

As US involvement in World War II appeared 

increasingly likely, President Franklin D. Roosevelt 

recognized that America urgently needed to piece 

together the fragmented intelligence organizations 

across the US Government to bring focus, context 

and clarity to the information reaching the White 

House. To lead the effort, he turned to William J. 

Donovan, one of the most decorated US soldiers 

in World War I, asking him in July 1941 to begin 

laying the groundwork for what would become 

America’s first centralized intelligence organization. 

Donovan’s military experience and keen interest in 

intelligence and foreign affairs made him uniquely 

qualified for the job. During World War I, Donovan 

led the 165th Regiment of the US Army, gaining the 

nickname “Wild Bill” for putting his men through 

grueling training drills to prepare them for battle. 

He was wounded in action three times and earned 

the Medal of Honor for bravery under fire during 

the Second Battle of the Marne in September 1918. 

He also was awarded the Distinguished Service 

Cross and two Purple Hearts.

In 1940, with Britain standing alone against Nazi 

Germany, President Roosevelt asked Donovan, his 

former classmate at Columbia Law School, to travel 

to England to determine if Britain would be able to 

withstand the Nazi onslaught. Donovan reported 

that the British could stand firm if given enough aid. 

While conducting his inquiry, Donovan developed a 

deep appreciation of British intelligence operations, 

which heightened his interest in establishing an 

American intelligence organization modeled on the 

British system. 

President Roosevelt, impressed by Donovan’s views 

on intelligence, asked him to take the lead in centralizing the nation’s intelligence eff orts. On July 11, 

1941, he named Donovan to the position of Coordinator of Information (COI) to direct a small civilian intelligence unit that consolidated information 

collected abroad for review by the president. Within 

months, America’s entry into World War II prompted 

a reassessment of the COI, and in June 1942 the bulk 

of its mission was transferred to a new intelligence 

organization, the Offi ce of Strategic Services (OSS). 

Donovan became director of the OSS, envisioning 

it as a strategic intelligence center encompassing collection, research and analysis, counterintelligence, 

and paramilitary activities. Throughout World War 

II, the OSS engaged in espionage and sabotage operations in Europe, the Middle East, North Africa 

and East Asia. Donovan’s vision for the OSS formed 

the basis for the future CIA and it shaped the role, 

“Wild Bill” Donovan’s favorite picture of himself, taken in structure and doctrine of America’s foreign intelliSeptember 1918. 

gence effort for decades to come. Four Directors of 

Central Intelligence (DCIs)—Allen Dulles, Richard 

Helms, William Colby and William Casey—were 

OSS veterans.

By war’s end, Donovan was promoted to major general. He received the Distinguished Service Medal, 

the highest American military decoration for outstanding non-combat service. Although Donovan 

cautioned against it, President Truman disbanded 

the OSS in September 1945, folding some of its 

components into the War and State departments. 

Donovan died on February 8, 1959, at the age of 

76. President Eisenhower called him “the last hero,” 

and Donovan remains an inspiration to the men and 

women of the CIA. Although he never directed the 

agency that was based on his ideas and initially staff ed 

in large part by people he personally led, Major 

General William Donovan embodied the creativity, 

courage and can-do spirit that are the hallmarks of 

the CIA. Its offi cers regard him as the founder of both 

their agency and the American intelligence profession.

“A l l m a j o r p o w e r s e x c e p t t h e U n i t e d S t at e s h av e 

h a d f o r a l o n g t i m e pa s t p e r m a n e n t w o r l dw i d e 

i n t e l l i g e n c e s e rv i c e s , r e p o rt i n g d i r e c t ly t o t h e 

h i g h e s t e c h e l o n s o f t h e i r G ov e r n m e n t s . P r i o r t o 

t h e p r e s e n t wa r , t h e U n i t e d S tat e s h a d n o f o r e i g n 

s e c r et i n t e l l i g e n c e s e rv i c e . It n ev e r ha s ha d a n d 

d oes not now have a c o ordinated intelligence system.”

- OSS Director Donovan to President Harry Truman, August 25, 1945, 

quoted in For the President’s Eyes Only (1995) by Christopher Andrew

Major General William J. Donovan preferred to be in the 

field meeting with his officers instead of working behind a 

desk in Washington. It was said that if the American flag 

were raised and lowered every time Donovan came and went 

from OSS Headquarters, a Color Guard would have to be on 

hand 24 hours a day.
14 15 /

Tenure:

Director of Central Intelligence, Central Intelligence Group, 

January 23, 1946 – June 10, 1946

P r e s i d e n t S e rv e d : 

Harry S. Truman

Appointed:

January 23, 1946, by President Harry S. Truman; sworn in on that date

Deputy Director:

Kingman Douglass, March 2, 1946, through the remainder of Souers’s tenure

Born:

March 30, 1892, Dayton, Ohio

Education:

Attended Purdue University; Miami University (Ohio), B.A., 1914

Career Highlights:

• Commissioned Lieutenant Commander, US Naval Reserve, 1929

• Volunteered for active duty, 1940

• Promoted to Rear Admiral and named Deputy Chief 

of Naval Intelligence, 1945

• Relieved from active duty, 1946

• Executive Secretary, National Security Council, 1947-50

Died January 14, 1973

Rear Admiral, US Naval Reserve

S i d n e y 

W i l l i a m 

S o u e r s 
16 17 /

As America took on a vastly expanded overseas role 

in the wake of World War II, President Harry 

Truman grew frustrated with the cables, dispatches

and reports piling up at the White House and 

requested a systematic process for reviewing the 

information. In response, his administration established a small interdepartmental organization called 

the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), which was 

charged with consolidating intelligence reports into 

daily summaries for the president. 

President Truman chose Rear Admiral Sidney 

Souers, the deputy chief of Naval Intelligence at 

the end of World War II, to lead the CIG, making 

Souers the first person to hold the title of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Souers, a wealthy 

businessman, wanted to return home after the war 

but accepted the job reluctantly, saying that he 

would serve no more than six months. At the swearing-in ceremony in January 1946, Truman added 

some levity to the proceedings by presenting Souers 

with a black hat, black cloak and wooden dagger, 

declaring him “Director of Centralized Snooping.” 

When asked not long after his appointment what he 

wanted to do, Souers responded, “I want to go home.” 

The CIG was staffed and funded by the State, War 

and Navy departments because it was not receiving 

separate Congressional appropriations. Souers’s role 

was to enable the CIG to gain more control of intelligence collection and analysis since it had no capacity 

to collect information from agents in the field or to 

produce estimates.

Truman regarded the CIG as his personal intelligence 

service and became an avid consumer of its work. 

The CIG provided a comprehensive intelligence 

summary for Truman by consolidating reports and 

cables from other government departments. The 

CIG’s first Daily Summary was produced on February 15, 1946, and a Weekly Summary was added on 

June 7, 1946. As the president’s demands for intelligence increased, the group began conducting interdepartmental studies across intelligence elements. 

When Souers left the CIG in June 1946, he submitted a progress report stating that it was ready to 

expand its mission into new areas, such as collecting 

foreign intelligence by clandestine methods, producing intelligence studies of foreign countries, and 

engaging in basic research and analysis. The CIG 

also needed to grow its professional and clerical staff, 

which numbered approximately 100 when Souers 

departed. Despite Souers’s begrudging acceptance 

of the post of DCI, he succeeded in establishing the 

framework for what would become the CIA.

“The evaluation of informat ion is not an exact s c i e n c e 

a n d ev e ry s a f e g ua r d s h o u l d b e i m p o s e d t o p r ev e n t a n y 

o n e d e pa rt m e n t f ro m hav i n g t h e o p p o rt u n i t y t o i n t e r p r e t 

i n f o r m at i o n i n s u c h a way a s t o m a k e i t s e e m t o s u p p o rt 

previously ac cepted p olicies or prec onceived opinions .”

- Rear Admiral Sidney Souers’s letter to presidential aide Clark 

Cliff ord before his appointment as DCI, December 27, 1945

President Truman awards the Distinguished Service Medal to Admiral Sidney Souers on December 1, 1952. (Picture courtesy of the 

Harry S. Truman Presidential Library)
18 19 /

Tenure:

Director of Central Intelligence, Central Intelligence Group, 

June 10, 1946 – May 1, 1947

P r e s i d e n t S e rv e d : 

Harry S. Truman

Appointed:

June 7, 1946, by President Harry S. Truman; sworn in, June 10, 1946

Deputy Director:

• Kingman Douglass, until July 11, 1946

• No Deputy Director from July 11, 1946 – January 20, 1947

• Brigadier General Edwin Kennedy Wright, US Army, January 20, 1947, 

through remainder of Vandenberg’s tenure

Born:

January 24, 1899, Milwaukee, Wisconsin

Education:

US Military Academy, B.S., 1923; attended Army War College, 1939

Career Highlights:

• Pilot, fl ight commander, fl ying instructor in Army Air Corps, 1924-36 

• Commanded 9th Air Force in Europe during World War II 

• Assistant Chief of Staff , G–2, War Department General Staff , 1946 

• Appointed Vice Chief of Staff of US Air Force with rank of General, 1947

• Chief of Staff , US Air Force, 1948-53 

• Retired from Air Force and Joint Chiefs of Staff , 1953

Died April 2, 1954

Lieutenant General, US Army (Army Air Forces)

Hoyt Sanford

V a n d e n b e r g 
20 21 /

During the summer of 1946, US military forces 

quickly demobilized, and many military components 

were transferred to civilian government entities. 

Lieutenant General Hoyt Vandenberg, who succeeded 

Rear Admiral Sidney Souers as Director of the 

Central Intelligence Group (CIG), moved aggressively to claim some of the components for the 

CIG, obtaining the Foreign Broadcast Information 

Service and the intelligence portion of the Manhattan Project, the program that produced the atomic 

bomb. The acquisitions helped Vandenberg carve 

out a more significant role for the new organization.

Vandenberg was hesitant to accept the Director of 

Central Intelligence (DCI) position, hoping instead 

to secure a leadership role in what would become 

the US Air Force. But Souers persuaded him to 

accept the DCI position, saying it was a wiser career 

move and would help him build relationships with 

senior officials. 

Lieutenant General Hoyt Vandenberg (standing second from the left) commanded the 9th Air Force in Europe during World War 

II. Commanding General of First Army and future DCI Walter Bedell Smith is standing to the left of Vandenberg and (future US 

President) General Dwight D. Eisenhower is seated in the center.

Vandenberg reformed the CIG by creating new 

roles and responsibilities and by seeking additional 

authorities. He established four major offi ces during 

his short tenure: the 

Office of Special 

Operations, responsible for clandestine 

collection; the Offi ce 

of Reports and Estimates (ORE), which 

conducted research 

and analysis; the 

Offi ce of Collection 

and Dissemination, 

which coordinated 

the fl ow of intelligence; and the Offi ce 

of Operations, which 

collected unclassifi ed 

information from 

open sources. Covert 

action—operations 

designed to conceal a 

US role—remained 

outside the CIG’s 

portfolio. The CIG 

also received increased 

funding and personnel authorization, which permitted Vandenberg to 

grow the organization to some 1,800 offi cers by the 

end of 1946, reducing the group’s dependency on 

government departments. 

When President Truman asked the CIG to provide 

an assessment of the strength and capabilities of 

the Soviet Union, Vandenberg oversaw the production of the CIG’s first intelligence estimate, 

ORE-1, the predecessor of the CIA’s National 

Intelligence Estimate. Released on July 23, 1946, 

the estimate concluded that Soviet leader Joseph 

Stalin did not have 

the capability or desire 

to wage war with the 

Western powers. 

Vandenberg wanted 

the CIG to become a 

permanent organization with additional 

authority to collect 

foreign intelligence 

and conduct independent research and 

analysis. To achieve 

this, he advocated the 

establishment of a 

new organization, the 

CIA, which would be 

independent from the 

Department of State 

and the military. This 

required legislation, 

and Vandenberg—the 

nephew of a prominent Republican senator—had the contacts to foster the necessary political support. On July 26, 1947, President Truman 

signed the National Security Act of 1947, creating the 

CIA and overhauling the country’s outdated national 

security structure. Th e Act was not approved until 

shortly after Vandenberg left the CIG, but his eff orts 

were pivotal in securing its passage and establishing 

the CIA.

“ S t rat e g i c a n d nat i o na l 

p o l i c y i n t e l l ig e n c e i s t hat 

composite intelligence, 

i n t e r d e pa rt m e n ta l i n 

character, which is required 

b y t h e P r e s i d e n t a n d o t h e r 

high officers and staff to 

a s s i s t t h e m i n d et e r m i n i n g 

p ol ic i e s w i t h r e s pe c t 

to national planning and 

s e c u r i t y i n pe ac e a n d i n 

war and for the advancement 

of broad national policy.”

- DCI Hoyt Vandenberg’s proposed 

defi nition of intelligence for the Central 

Intelligence Group, approved by 

the National Intelligence Authority on 

February 12, 1947
22 23 /

Tenure:

• Director of Central Intelligence, Central Intelligence Group, 

May 1, 1947 – November 23, 1947

• Director of Central Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 

November 24, 1947 – October 7, 1950

P r e s i d e n t S e rv e d : 

Harry S. Truman

Appointed:

• April 30, 1947, by President Harry S. Truman; sworn in, May 1, 1947

• Reappointed under the National Security Act by President Truman, 

November 24, 1947; confi rmed by the Senate on December 8, 1947

Deputy Director:

• Brigadier General Edwin Kennedy Wright, US Army, until March 9, 1949

• No Deputy Director for remainder of Hillenkoetter’s term

Born:

May 8, 1897, St. Louis, Missouri

Education:

US Naval Academy, B.S., 1919 

Career Highlights:

• Assistant Naval Attaché, France: 1933-35, 1938-40, 1940-41 (Vichy regime), 

and 1946-47

• Offi cer in Charge of Intelligence, on the staff of Commander in Chief, Pacifi c 

Ocean Area (Admiral Chester W. Nimitz), 1942-43

• Promoted to Rear Admiral, 1946

• Commander, Cruiser Division 1, Cruiser–Destroyer Force, 

Pacifi c Fleet, 1950-51

• Promoted to Vice Admiral, 1956

• Inspector General of the Navy, 1956

• Retired from Navy, 1957

Died June 18, 1982

Rear Admiral, US Navy

R o s c o e H e n r y 

H i l l e n k o e t t e r 
24 25 /

The CIA was created on July 26, 1947, as part of 

a broad reorganization of the nation’s intelligence 

structure. The new system, which was mandated by 

the National Security Act of 1947, established the 

CIA to coordinate intelligence collection and analysis across the US Government. The act also created 

the National Security Council (NSC) to advise the 

president on national security and foreign policy 

matters. With this new arrangement in place, the 

Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), Rear Admiral

Roscoe Hillenkoetter, was directed to oversee the 

development of the CIA. 

Hillenkoetter was a career naval officer who served 

as an assistant naval attaché in Vichy France from 

1940-41. Later assigned to the battleship USS West 

Virginia at Pearl Harbor, Hillenkoetter was the 

most senior offi cer of his crew to survive the Japanese 

attack on December 7, 1941. As the US entered 

World War II, Hillenkoetter became the officer in 

charge of intelligence for the Pacific Fleet Staff. In 

the spring of 1947, President Truman asked him to 

become DCI. 

Eight months into Hillenkoetter’s tenure as DCI, 

the NSC created a survey group to review the 

intelligence system’s progress since World War II 

and to determine how the NSC should oversee the 

CIA’s activities. Th e NSC Survey Group—of which 

future DCI Allen Dulles was a member—submitted a report to the NSC that was highly critical of 

Hillenkoetter and the CIA, identifying a failure 

to coordinate the eff orts of the Intelligence Community (IC) and a lack of organizational structure as 

key problems. The NSC directed Hillenkoetter to 

reform the CIA based on the report’s suggestions, but 

DCI Roscoe Hillenkoetter (pictured top left) attends a National Security Council meeting with President Harry Truman on August 

19, 1948. (Picture courtesy of the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library)

Hillenkoetter failed to implement the requested changes, in large measure 

because of resistance from other federal agencies. 

A major concern during Hillenkoetter’s tenure was the spread of communist regimes, which led him to establish an interagency committee to prepare 

estimates on East Bloc capabilities—the fi rst time that intelligence estimates 

were conducted as an interagency eff ort. Despite the focus on communist 

expansion, however, the IC failed to provide suffi cient warning about North 

Korea’s invasion of South Korea in June 1950, a major intelligence failure that 

contributed to Hillenkoetter’s departure as DCI later that year. 

“ Th e s e rv i c e s h av e a t e n d e n c y t o r e f l e c t t h e i r ow n 

i n t e r e s t s i n t h e i r i n t e l l i g e n c e e s t i m at e s . F o r t h i s 

r e a s o n , C I A s t r i v e s t o m a i n t a i n i n i t s e s t i m at e s 

a n o b j e c t i v e , b a l a n c e d v i ew, a n d t o k e e p U S nat i o na l 

s e c u r i t y, r at h e r t h a n d e pa rt m e n t a l i n t e r e s t s , a s 

the d ominant c onsideration.”

- DCI Roscoe Hillenkoetter in a 1950 letter to President Truman, 

quoted in Th e Agency (1986) by John Ranelagh
26 27 /

Tenure:

Director of Central Intelligence, October 7, 1950 – February 9, 1953

P r e s i d e n t S e rv e d : 

Harry S. Truman

Appointed:

August 21, 1950, by President Harry S. Truman; confi rmed by the Senate, 

August 28, 1950; sworn in, October 7, 1950 

Deputy Director:

• William H. Jackson, October 7, 1950 – August 3, 1951

• Allen W. Dulles, August 23, 1951, through remainder of Smith’s tenure 

(served as Acting Director, February 9 – 26, 1953)

Born:

October 5, 1895, Indianapolis, Indiana

Education:

Attended Butler University; Army Command and General Staff School, 1935; 

Army War College, 1937

Career Highlights:

• Commissioned into US Army, 1917; served in France in World War I; 

received regular commission, 1920

• Served during World War II as General Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff , fi rst in 

European Th eater, 1942; then for Allied Forces in North Africa and Mediterranean, 1942-43; and during 1944-45 at Supreme Headquarters, Allied 

Expeditionary Forces 

• Promoted to Lieutenant General, 1944 

• Ambassador to Soviet Union, 1946-49 

• Commanding General of First Army, 1949-50

• Retired from US Army, 1953

• Under Secretary of State, 1953-54 

Died August 6, 1961

General, US Army

W a l t e r B e d e l l 

S m i t h 
28 29 /

Often referred to as Dwight D. Eisenhower’s “hatchet 

man,” General Walter Bedell Smith was described 

by many as even-tempered—he was always angry. 

At his first staff meeting as Director of Central 

Intelligence (DCI), Smith opened by saying, “It’s 

interesting to see all you fellows here. It will be all 

the more interesting to see how many of you are here 

a few months from now.” Although Smith could be 

brusque, his great skill as an administrator and his 

renown as a formidably talented Washington insider 

made him one of the CIA’s most successful directors.

At a young age, Smith, nicknamed “Beetle,” envisioned himself as a soldier fighting on the front lines. 

His upbringing emphasized the family’s record of 

serving in every American war since the Revolution. 

Smith received a high school education but never 

graduated from college. In 1911, at the age of 16, 

he enlisted in the Indiana National Guard and was 

promoted quickly to company sergeant, later serving as an officer in World War I. He was wounded 

by shrapnel on his second day in combat in France 

and was sent back to Washington, where he worked 

on the War Department General Staff in the newly 

established Bureau of Military Intelligence. 

As World War II began, Smith was promoted to 

work for Army Chief of Staff General George C. 

Marshall. Smith was known for his organizational 

skills and became a key aide to Marshall. Smith later 

became General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Chief of 

Staff in Europe, where he negotiated and signed the 

terms of surrender with Italy in 1943 and Germany 

in 1945. After the war, President Truman appointed 

Smith ambassador to the Soviet Union, where he 

served until 1949.

In 1950, after the CIA’s failure to warn of the outbreak of the Korean War, President Truman asked 

Smith to take over as DCI. Smith moved quickly 

to make changes and quell infighting among Agency 

officers, using a report submitted a year earlier by 

the National Security Council Survey Group—of 

which future DCI Allen Dulles was a member—as 

a blueprint for reforming the Agency.

Smith divided the Agency’s main activities into 

three directorates: one for espionage and covert 

actions, one for analysis, and one for administrative functions. The Directorate for Administration 

was formed in 1950 to centralize support elements 

such as finance, logistics, medical services and security. Smith later consolidated the offices responsible 

for covert action and intelligence collection into 

Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith.

the Directorate of Plans—a predecessor of today’s 

National Clandestine Service. In January 1952, 

the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) was formed 

to conduct basic, current, and estimative analysis. 

The DI also performed a 

liaison function, collecting 

information from other 

intelligence services including the Department of State, 

the Armed Forces Security

Agency—a predecessor of 

today’s National Security 

Agency—and Army, Navy and 

Air Force intelligence agencies.

Smith also appointed the 

Agency’s fi rst inspector general to increase accountability 

within the organization.

Smith continued the practice 

of sending a daily intelligence 

brief to the president and 

established regular Friday 

briefings at the White House. 

Smith also launched the 

Current Intelligence Bulletin 

and the Current Intelligence 

Weekly Review to provide 

President Truman and senior 

policymakers a customized review of the intelligence 

collection and analysis conducted at the CIA. After 

Truman received the first Bulletin, he wrote, “Dear 

Bedell, I have been reading the intelligence bulletin 

and I am highly impressed with it. I believe you have 

hit the jackpot with this one.” The Bulletin evolved 

into the President’s Daily Brief, a report the president continues to receive today. Smith also established the practice of providing intelligence briefings 

to presidential candidates and presidents-elect.

To improve analysis, Smith 

recruited Harvard professor 

William Langer—a veteran 

of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the predecessor 

of the CIA—to organize the 

Office of National Estimates. 

Langer persuaded another 

OSS veteran, Sherman Kent, 

to leave his teaching position at Yale and join him in 

Washington as his deputy. 

Langer and Kent developed 

a process to produce national 

estimates by reaching out 

to all the intelligence agencies to ensure that estimates 

were fully coordinated. Smith 

personally reviewed the estimates before sending them to 

the president. 

Smith saw himself as a manager not only of the CIA but 

of the entire Intelligence Community. He is remembered as being one of the most effective DCIs 

because of his ability to lead and to revolutionize 

how intelligence was gathered, processed, analyzed 

and disseminated.

“ Th e D i r e c t o r o f 

C e n t ra l In t e l l ig e n c e 

i s on e of t ho s e j ob s 

where one can never

be r ig h t, a s t h e 

American people 

expect t h e i n c u m b e n t 

t o p r e d i c t w i t h 

ac c u rac y j u st w hat 

S ta l i n i s l i k e ly t o 

d o t h r e e m on t h s f ro m 

t o d ay at  :   a . m . 

and, of course, that is 

beyond the r e a l m of 

human infallibility.”

- General Walter Bedell Smith, August 

1950 before becoming DCI, quoted 

in Th e CIA and American Democracy

(1989) by Rhodri Jeff reys-Jones
30 31 /

Tenure:

• Acting Director of Central Intelligence, February 9 – 26, 1953

• Director of Central Intelligence, February 26, 1953 – November 29, 1961

P r e s i d e n t s S e rv e d : 

• Dwight D. Eisenhower

• John F. Kennedy

Appointed:

• February 9, 1953, by President Dwight D. Eisenhower; confi rmed by the 

Senate, February 23, 1953; sworn in, February 26, 1953

• Asked by President-elect John F. Kennedy to continue as Director of Central 

Intelligence, November 10, 1960 

Deputy Director:

General Charles Pearre Cabell, US Air Force, April 23, 1953, through remainder 

of Dulles’s tenure

Born:

April 7, 1893, Watertown, New York

Education:

Princeton University, B.A., 1914, M.A., 1916; Th e George Washington 

University, LL.B., 1926

Career Highlights:

• US Diplomatic Service, Department of State, 1916-26 

• Practiced law in New York, 1926-42 and 1946-50 

• Head of Offi ce of Strategic Services post in Bern, Switzerland, 1942-45 

• Deputy Director for Plans, CIA, 1951 

• Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, 1951-53

• Private pursuits including writing several books

• Served on President’s Commission on the Assassination 

of President Kennedy, 1963-64

Died January 28, 1969

A l l e n W e l s h 

Dulles
32 33 /

Allen Welsh Dulles once said that “intelligence is 

probably the least understood and most misrepresented of professions.” Dulles, the longest-serving 

Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), had perhaps 

the most intimate knowledge of how intelligence is 

perceived and how it influences policy. 

Dulles’s early life and career aff orded him a unique 

opportunity to build impressive experience in world 

aff airs. Many of Dulles’s relatives were prominent 

government offi cials; in fact, his older brother, John 

Foster Dulles, was President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 

Secretary of State. Dulles began his government 

career in the Foreign Service in 1916. His fi rst tour 

was in Vienna, Austria, as third secretary, and his 

next assignment was at the US Embassy in Bern, 

Switzerland, where he was introduced to espionage 

operations. When Dulles arrived in Vienna, the fi rst 

secretary said, “I guess the best thing for you to do 

is take charge of intelligence. Keep your ears open. 

Th is place is swarming with spies.” Dulles advanced 

in the State Department, but he eventually resigned 

and joined John Foster Dulles’s law fi rm in New York 

City. Despite becoming a partner at the law fi rm in 

1930, Dulles kept his hand in international relations. 

In 1942, Dulles joined the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), after having been selected by General 

William Donovan to run intelligence operations in 

Switzerland. Dulles had also been offered a position 

in London, but chose Switzerland, calling it “a less 

glamorous post, but one where I felt my past experience would serve me in good stead.” Dulles recruited 

and ran agents like Fritz Kolbe, a German diplomat 

who identified Nazi spies for the US, and Hans 

Bernd Gisevius of the German Consulate in Zurich, 

who informed Dulles of plans by a German opposition group to assassinate Hitler. Dulles also was a 

key player in Operation Sunrise, facilitating the surrender of German forces in northern Italy on May 1, 

1945. After the war, Dulles served as the OSS station 

chief in Berlin for six months and then returned to 

the US to practice law. 

Dulles was widely recognized as one of the nation’s 

leading experts on intelligence and was consulted 

about developing the CIA by President Harry Truman and the National Security Council (NSC). In 

1948, the NSC asked him to work with a team to 

review the intelligence system’s progress since World 

War II. The report, disseminated in 1949, criticized 

DCI Roscoe Hillenkoetter for failing to coordinate the Intelligence Community’s (IC) efforts. 

When Walter Bedell Smith became DCI in 1950, 

he reportedly called Dulles and said, “You made 

your comments and now come down and run the 

place.” Smith named Dulles the Deputy Director for 

Plans, responsible for running the Agency’s clandestine operations; Smith promoted Dulles to Deputy 

Director of Central Intelligence in 1951.

Allen Dulles (center) and Richard Helms (far right) pose with 

colleagues in an OSS-era photograph. (Courtesy of the Helms 

Family Collection)

As President Eisenhower took office, Dulles was 

concerned about the lack of intelligence on Soviet 

intentions and capabilities and feared the US could 

face another strategic surprise like the attack on 

Pearl Harbor. Eisenhower appointed Dulles DCI in 

1953 and authorized him to lead the effort to confront communist expansion through covert means. 

He also asked him to keep a close eye on Soviet 

actions and intentions regarding the United States. 

Dulles launched a range of covert operations, including the overthrow of leftist leaders in Iran and Guatemala who were viewed as potential Soviet allies. In 

February 1955, the completion of the Berlin Tunnel 

allowed American and British intelligence units to 

tap the telephone lines of the USSR’s military in 

East Berlin. The CIA also organized “hearts and 

minds” campaigns to motivate those under communist rule to take action against their governments. 

Dulles increased the use of Radio Free Europe and 

Radio Liberty, created by CIA in 1950 and 1953 

respectively, to support the free flow of information 

behind the Iron Curtain.

To assess the number of strategic bombers and missiles in the Soviet arsenal, the CIA needed to devise 

a way to look behind the Iron Curtain. Dulles advocated partnering with Lockheed to develop several 

reconnaissance projects, including high-altitude 

aircraft—such as the U-2, A-12 OXCART and 

the CORONA satellite imagery programs. The 

U-2 enabled the CIA to scrutinize Soviet capabilities from 70,000 feet, leading to discoveries that 

dispelled concerns within the US Government of a 

“bomber gap” or “missile gap.” This intelligence led 

to the cancellation of defense programs that were 

intended to counter those perceived gaps, ultimately 

saving the government billions of dollars. 

The U-2, a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, was one of the first espionage planes developed by the CIA during DCI Allen 

Dulles’s tenure.
34 35 /

Perhaps Dulles’s most tangible legacy is the CIA headquaters compound 

in Northern Virginia. In the 1940s and 50s, the Agency occupied several 

temporary buildings along the Mall in Washington, DC. DCI Smith 

recognized the need for a new building, and Dulles pushed for a new 

headquarters once he became 

DCI. Initially, Dulles considered 

tearing down the old Heurich 

Brewery—on the site that now 

houses the Kennedy Center—to 

build the CIA Headquarters. 

However, President Eisenhower 

opposed the location because 

he felt Washington lacked the 

space to accommodate another government agency. Dulles presented 

an alternate location—Langley, a former peach orchard near the town 

of McLean, Virginia—and Eisenhower accepted. Construction on the 

Construction of the Original Headquarters Building (OHB); OHB’s cornerstone was laid by President Dwight D. Eisenhower on 

November 3, 1959. 

The Original Headquarters Building was completed in March 1961. 

Original Headquarters Building (OHB) started in late 1958 and was 

completed in the fall of 1961, near the end of Dulles’s term; Dulles 

never occupied the DCI’s OHB office. 

Dulles’s tenure also had its share of missteps. He was criticized for 

neglecting analysis and leadership of the IC while focusing on covert 

action operations, and for the abortive efforts to destabilize the Castro 

regime in Cuba. The Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba in April 1961 effectively 

ended Dulles’s career as DCI; he left office seven months later.

Nonetheless, Dulles is remembered as a giant in the fi eld of intelligence 

who, perhaps more than anyone, helped turn the CIA into the global 

intelligence service it is today. In the main entrance of the CIA Headquarters, a memorial to Dulles bears an inscription that sums up his 

many contributions to the Agency: “His monument is around you.” 

“ I t h a s t ru t h f u l ly b e e n s a i d 

t h at i n t e l l i g e n c e i s o u r f i r s t 

line of defense.”

- Allen Dulles’s statement regarding the proposed 

National Security Act of 1947, April 25, 1947
36 37 /

Tenure:

Director of Central Intelligence, November 29, 1961 – April 28, 1965

P r e s i d e n t s S e rv e d : 

• John F. Kennedy 

• Lyndon B. Johnson

Appointed:

September 27, 1961, by President John F. Kennedy; sworn in as recess 

appointee, November 29, 1961; confi rmed by the Senate, January 31, 1962; 

sworn in, February 13, 1962

Deputy Director:

• General Charles Pearre Cabell, US Air Force, until January 31, 1962

• Lieutenant General Marshall A. Carter, US Army, April 3, 1962, through 

remainder of McCone’s tenure

Born:

January 4, 1902, San Francisco, California

Education:

University of California, Berkeley, B.S., 1922

Career Highlights:

• Private pursuits in corporate business 

• Member of President’s Air Policy Commission, 1947-48 

• Deputy Secretary of Defense, March-November 1948 

• Under Secretary of the Air Force, 1950-51 

• Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, 1958-61

• Member of public committees investigating race relations and inner 

city poverty in California, 1965-67

• Member of President’s Commission on Strategic Forces (Scowcroft 

Commission), 1983

• Awarded Presidential Medal of Freedom, 1987

Died February 14, 1991

J o h n A l e x 

McCone
38 39 /

The sixth Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), 

John McCone had a reputation for being dynamic, 

hard-driving and brilliant. Ray Cline, McCone’s 

second Deputy Director for Intelligence, observed 

that “his sharp, penetrating queries kept everyone in 

the Central Intelligence Agency on his toes, and he 

had little patience with imprecision, inefficiency or 

slowness in producing results.”

McCone’s drive started at a young age. His father 

died in 1920 when he was a junior in college and 

McCone helped support his family and paid his college tuition by working summers in shipyards and 

iron mills. After graduating with honors from the 

University of California at Berkeley, McCone rapidly worked his way to a management position in 

the steel industry, joining Consolidated Steel and 

becoming a General Sales Manager at age 29. He 

saved the company from bankruptcy by striking a 

deal with an old school friend, Stephen Bechtel, and 

was promoted to executive vice president at age 31. 

McCone joined forces with Bechtel in 1937 and 

established the Bechtel-McCone Corporation, which 

won enormous contracts with oil companies and 

produced Liberty ships during World War II. 

After the war, McCone turned to government service, 

first as undersecretary of the Air Force and later as 

chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission from 

1958 to 1961. He gained experience dealing with a 

variety of agencies, including the CIA. 

Following the Bay of Pigs failure, President John 

F. Kennedy turned to McCone to lead the Agency. 

When McCone was sworn in as DCI, Kennedy shook 

McCone’s hand and told him that he was “now living 

on the bull’s eye, and I welcome you to that spot.”

President Kennedy regarded McCone as an adviser 

and expanded his advisory duties beyond those of 

Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missiles photographed in Cuba. DCI John McCone served as a close adviser to President John 

F. Kennedy. 

his predecessors, asking McCone to help formulate 

the Kennedy Administration’s national security policy. 

McCone was aware of the danger of politicizing intelligence judgments, saying, “You have to be very, very 

careful ... that your views on 

the policy are not aff ecting the 

purity of your intelligence ... 

and you have to be awfully sure 

that nobody suspects that it is.”

In August 1962, imagery 

from U-2 flights over Cuba 

captured the distinctive sixpoint star pattern indicative 

of Soviet surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites. McCone—

recently remarried after 

the death of his wife a year 

earlier—had departed for 

his honeymoon but was informed of these developments through a series of messages dubbed the 

“honeymoon cables.” McCone was the only senior 

US Government official who argued that Moscow 

intended to deploy nuclear missiles in Cuba. During 

those famous 13 days in October, McCone advised 

the president, asserting that Washington should 

give Moscow a deadline for removing the missiles 

before taking additional measures. After relying on 

the Agency’s technical skills to bolster that assessment, McCone created the Directorate of Science 

and Technology less than a year later to centralize 

the capabilities.

After President Kennedy’s assassination on November 

22, 1963, McCone reported to a new boss, President 

Lyndon B. Johnson. Whereas Kennedy had been fascinated with espionage and covert action, Johnson 

knew little about intelligence and was indiff erent 

toward the CIA. It became clear that Johnson was 

not reading the daily publications the CIA produced 

for the White House. McCone revamped the product to suit Johnson’s interests 

and habits, culminating in the 

President’s Daily Brief. Nonetheless, McCone realized his 

prominent role as adviser to 

the president was waning. 

Th e decisive break was over 

Vietnam. McCone argued 

that deploying ground forces 

was a mistake and that gradual escalation of the bombing 

campaign would not work. 

He did not hesitate to voice 

his opinions on Vietnam, 

which increasingly distanced 

him from Johnson. McCone resigned on April 28, 

1965, and returned to the private sector. He died of 

cardiac arrest at home in Pebble Beach, California, 

on February 14, 1991, at the age of 89. 

Today, McCone is known as one of the CIA’s greatest directors and was named as one of the Agency’s 

Trailblazers in 2011. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., historian 

and adviser to President Kennedy, wrote one of the 

fi rst assessments of McCone as DCI in early 1965: 

“McCone was a cautious, realistic and self-eff acing 

director who repaired morale within the Agency, 

instituted measures to keep the CIA and himself out 

of the newspapers ... restored its relations with the 

State Department and Congress ... declined to allow 

his own views to prejudice the intelligence estimates 

... and showed a fair-mindedness which shamed some 

of us who had objected to his appointment.”

“ S u c c e s s f u l wa r n i n g i s 

e s s e n t i a l ly a t w o - f o l d 

p r o c e s s ; i f wa r n i n g 

i s t o b e e f f e c t i v e , n o t 

o n ly m u s t t h e a l e rt 

be given, but the cons u m e r o f i n t e l l i g e n c e 

m u s t a c c e p t t h e f a c t 

t h at h e h a s i n f ac t 

been warned.”

- DCI John McCone in 1962, quotation in 

CIA’s Historical Intelligence Collection
40 41 /

Tenure:

Director of Central Intelligence, April 28, 1965 – June 30, 1966

P r e s i d e n t S e rv e d : 

Lyndon B. Johnson

Appointed:

April 11, 1965, by President Lyndon B. Johnson; confi rmed by the Senate on 

April 22, 1965; sworn in, April 28, 1965 

Deputy Director:

Richard M. Helms, April 28, 1965 – June 30, 1966

Born:

June 8, 1905, Decatur, Texas

Education:

US Naval Academy, B.S., 1928; attended Naval War College, 1952

Career Highlights:

• Director, US Navy Special Projects Offi ce, 1955-62

• Promoted to Vice Admiral, 1960 

• Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Development), 1962-63 

• Retired from US Navy, 1963 

• Private industry, 1963-65

Died March 6, 1990

Vice Admiral, US Navy (Retired)

W i l l i a m 

F r a n c i s 

R a b o r n J r . 
42 43 /

William Raborn’s 14-month tenure as Director of 

the Central Intelligence (DCI) was dominated by 

increasing US involvement in Vietnam and concern 

over the potential spread of communism in the 

Caribbean and elsewhere. Raborn had extensive 

military and technical expertise, but was inexperienced in foreign affairs. Raborn was best known for 

directing the Navy’s Special Projects Office, where 

he completed the Polaris submarine-launched 

missile program three years ahead of schedule. He 

quickly won the confidence of Congress when President Lyndon B. Johnson appointed him as DCI. 

On April 28, 1965, the day Raborn was sworn in, 

a rebellion underway in the Dominican Republic 

raised concern about a possible communist takeover. 

As the US Government intervened, Raborn spent 

most of his time working with the Operations Center at CIA Headquarters to receive around-the-clock 

updates on the rebellion. Rethinking the Center’s 

mission would prove to be the most lasting legacy of 

Raborn’s relatively brief tenure. He assigned senior 

offi cers to weekend duty in the Operations Center 

to ensure that emergencies were managed eff ectively; 

though implementation changed over time, the policy 

of staffing the Center with senior duty officers continues today. Th e Dominican crisis gradually receded, 

and Raborn turned his attention to other matters. 

He established a Vietnam Task Force to further consolidate and focus the Agency’s diverse operations in 

the volatile Southeast Asia region. Additionally, he 

created a China community coordinator position to 

produce better intelligence on China after its test of 

an atomic weapon in late 1964.

DCI William Raborn (left) and DDCI Richard Helms (right) pose for a photograph with President Lyndon B. Johnson.

Overhead reconnaissance programs were a point of contention during 

the mid-1960s, especially because of their cost and the diffi culty of coordinating CIA and Air Force interests. Revolutionary technology had 

been developed and was now operational, including the CORONA satellite and the OXCART (the A-12)—a supersonic, high-altitude plane 

designed to avoid radar detection and equipped with a high-resolution 

camera. Although 12 planes were ready for use in November 1965, they 

were never fully deployed during Raborn’s tenure because of confl icts 

over the need for imagery and the risks associated with fl ights over hostile 

countries. Th e Agency gained greater control over reconnaissance programs when Raborn signed an agreement—initially negotiated by DCI 

McCone—to further defi ne the roles and responsibilities of the National 

Reconnaissance Offi ce (NRO). Th e agreement resulted in formal recognition that the DCI would determine the intelligence requirements that 

would drive NRO’s research and development programs.

Raborn never became a close national security adviser to President 

Johnson. As Raborn left the DCI position, the Agency was the target of 

increasing public criticism over its activities in Vietnam. 

CIA developed the highly secret A-12 OXCART as the U-2’s successor, intended to meet the nation’s need for a very fast, high-flying 

reconnaissance aircraft that could avoid Soviet air defenses.

“ L e t m e a s s u r e 

y o u — a n d I s ay 

t h i s w i t h 

t h e s t r o n g e s t 

c o n v i c t i o n a n d 

e m p h a s i s — U S 

i n t e l l i g e n c e 

ag e n c i e s d o n o t 

make p olicy.”

- DCI William Raborn testimony 

in February 1966 before the Committee on Armed Services, quoted 

in Michael Krepon, Strategic 

Stalemate (1985)
44 45 /

Tenure:

Director of Central Intelligence, June 30, 1966 – February 2, 1973

P r e s i d e n t s S e rv e d : 

• Lyndon B. Johnson

• Richard Nixon

Appointed:

June 18, 1966, by President Lyndon B. Johnson; confi rmed by the Senate, 

June 28, 1966; sworn in, June 30, 1966

Deputy Director:

• Vice Admiral Rufus L. Taylor, US Navy, October 13, 1966 – February 1, 1969

• Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman Jr., US Marine Corps, 

May 7, 1969 – December 31, 1971

• Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters, US Army, May 2, 1972, through 

remainder of Helms’s tenure

Born:

March 30, 1913, St. Davids, Pennsylvania

Education:

Williams College, B.A., 1935

Career Highlights:

• Journalist

• Commissioned into US Naval Reserve, 1942 

• Served with Offi ce of Strategic Services and its successors, 1943-47 

• Various posts in CIA 

• Deputy Director for Plans, CIA, 1962-65 

• Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, 1965-66

• Ambassador to Iran, 1973-77

• Private consultant 

Died October 22, 2002

R i c h a r d 

M c G a r r a h 

Helms
46 47 /

Richard Helms’s tenure as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) came at the height of the Vietnam 

War, a time that presented the Agency with a diffi cult 

mission in the fi eld and a tough political environment 

in Washington. 

Helms grew up in a suburb of Philadelphia in a 

community described by his brother as “conventional upper-middle class, well educated, well 

traveled, interested in good schools, and sports, and 

with a social life centering around the country club.” 

Helms spent two of his high school years attending 

the prestigious Institute LeRosey in Switzerland 

and the Realgymnasiium in Freiburg, Germany, 

becoming fluent in both French and German. Upon 

graduation from Williams College in 1935, Helms 

became a journalist, covering the 1936 Summer 

Olympics—dubbed the “Hitler Games”—in Berlin. 

Helms even managed to interview Adolf Hitler just 

after the Nazi rally at Nurenburg.

During World War II, Helms joined the US Navy 

Reserve as a lieutenant, eventually transferring in 

1943 to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 

where he worked in the Morale Operations Branch 

producing false data known as “black” propaganda. 

In early 1945, Helms deployed to London for his 

fi rst overseas assignment in the OSS, working under 

and sharing a flat with another future CIA director,

William Casey. Helms helped set up resistance 

networks and worked to infi ltrate German lines. In 

August 1945, under the leadership of future DCI 

Allen Dulles, Helms was transferred to Berlin, where 

he tracked down remaining Nazi sympathizers and 

monitored the Soviet military. Helms then returned 

to Washington and began working for the new Central 

Intelligence Group, which became the CIA in 1947.

At the CIA, Helms was assigned to the Office of 

Special Operations, which collected foreign intelligence. He became the office’s chief of operations 

before his promotion in 1962 to lead the Directorate 

of Plans, handling espionage and covert action. 

As McCone departed the Agency, he recommended

Helms or Ray Cline, also a CIA offi cer, for the DCI 

position. President Lyndon B. Johnson instead chose 

Vice Admiral William F. Raborn Jr., and appointed 

Helms as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. 

President Johnson believed Helms needed more 

Washington experience before becoming DCI. 

Helms assumed the position of DCI in 1966, 

becoming the fi rst career Agency offi cer to lead the

CIA. He learned of the appointment shortly 

before President Johnson held a press conference 

to announce the news. As DCI, Helms opted for 

a moderate approach to reform, sensing that drastic

Richard Helms was the first career Agency officer to lead the CIA.

changes would be counterproductive while the Agency 

weathered the turbulence of the Vietnam War.

Th e fi rst major Agency success under Helms came in 

1967, when the Agency correctly predicted that Israel 

could prevail in the Six-Day War without US support. President Johnson soon began inviting Helms 

to “Tuesday lunches,” where senior policymakers met 

informally to discuss international aff airs. In 1970, 

the Agency further enhanced its reputation under 

Helms by correctly predicting that a US invasion of 

Cambodia would destabilize Cambodia and widen 

the war throughout Southeast Asia. 

Helms also experienced failure during his tenure. In 

January 1968, for example, the Agency did not issue 

adequate warnings that the communist forces of 

North Vietnam were preparing to launch a wave of 

major attacks in the South, in what became known 

as the Tet Offensive. That same year, the CIA failed 

to warn of the Soviet Union’s invasion of Czechoslovakia despite having intelligence about a military 

buildup on the Czech border. 

Helms was criticized within the Agency for politicizing community estimates, especially for what 

some saw as his removal of judgments that displeased the Pentagon. Helms disagreed with the 

assertion, and when CIA analysts produced assessments on the Vietnam War suggesting that US policy 

was not working, Helms did not alter them or limit 

their distribution.

DCI Richard Helms meets with President Lyndon B. Johnson at the White House. (Courtesy of the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library)
48 49 /

presidents’ requests. Helms also allowed the Agency 

to supply equipment to the “Plumbers,” a group set 

up during the Nixon Administration to stop the 

“leaking” of national security information to the 

media. The “Plumbers” later carried out the Watergate break-in at the Democratic National Committee 

headquarters in 1972. 

Near the end of Helms’s tenure, the Agency drew criticism from Congress and an American public growing increasingly distrustful of the US Government. 

During this time, Helms tried to protect the Agency’s 

reputation. In his only public speech as DCI, he said, 

“Th e nation must to a degree take it on faith that we, 

too, are honorable men devoted to her service.”

As DCI, Helms focused his energies on serving 

the president, leaving leadership of the Agency’s 

day-to-day functions to his deputies. But he found 

that supporting the president was at times difficult, 

especially during the Nixon Administration, when 

he had to compete with National Security Adviser 

Henry Kissinger for influence on intelligence matters. Kissinger, in effect, served as President Richard 

Nixon’s senior intelligence officer.

Under Helms’s leadership, the CIA spied on American antiwar protesters at the direction of President 

Johnson and President Nixon, who believed the 

protestors were receiving foreign support. Helms 

believed he would be fired if he did not carry out the 

DCI Richard Helms attended “ Tuesday lunches” with President Lyndon B. Johnson and other senior policymakers to discuss 

international affairs. (Courtesy of the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library)

my statutory responsibility to protect intelligence 

sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, 

I could not reveal covert ops to people unauthorized 

to learn about them.” 

In 1983, President Reagan awarded Helms the 

National Security Medal, which Helms considered 

“an exoneration.” Helms died of bone cancer on 

October 22, 2002, and was buried with full military 

honors at Arlington National Cemetery. 

Helms dedicated his career to enabling the work of 

an agency he so greatly admired. He remained the 

director for seven years under difficult conditions. 

Despite evolving threats from around the world and 

administrations that were at odds with the Agency, 

Helms continued to deliver essential intelligence to 

policymakers during a time of great uncertainty.

In November 1972, President Nixon asked for the 

resignation of all agency directors, federal department heads, and presidential appointees. Helms 

declined, believing the move would cause the DCI 

position to become politicized. President Nixon 

eventually forced Helms out in 1973. 

President Nixon later nominated Helms to be 

Ambassador to Iran, hoping to take advantage of 

Helms’s good relations with the ruling Shah—

Helms’s former schoolmate at Le Rosey. During 

Helms’s public confirmation hearings in 1973, senators asked him if the CIA—at the behest of President 

Nixon—had tried to overthrow the government of 

Chilean President Salvador Allende in 1970. Since 

the operation was still secret, Helms responded that 

the CIA was not involved. As a result, Helms was 

convicted of misinforming Congress. Helms later 

stated, “If I was to live up to my oath and fulfill 

“ Th e s e c r e t i n t e l l i g e n c e w o r l d o f a n y c o u n t ry m u s t 

b e h av e a s a t y p e o f fa m i ly. I t s m e m b e r s h av e o n ly 

e ac h o t h e r o n w h o m t o l e a n . Th o s e o n t h e o u t s i d e 

e i t h e r d o n ’ t k n o w t h e m o r d o n ’ t l i k e t h e m . Th o s e 

a b ov e t h e m s e e k t h e i r l o ya lt y, t h e i r c o m p e t e n c e , 

b u t h a s t e n t o d i s ta n c e t h e m s e lv e s w h e n s o m e t h i n g 

goes wrong.”

- Keynote address by Richard Helms at June 7, 1996 

 during the Memorial Garden Dedication Ceremony 
50 51 /

Tenure:

Director of Central Intelligence, February 2, 1973 – July 2, 1973

P r e s i d e n t S e rv e d : 

Richard Nixon

Appointed:

December 21, 1972, by President Richard M. Nixon; confi rmed by the Senate, 

January 23, 1973; sworn in, February 2, 1973

Deputy Director:

Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters, US Army, through remainder 

of Schlesinger’s tenure (served as Acting Director, July 2, 1973 – 

September 4, 1973)

Born:

February 15, 1929, New York, New York

Education:

Harvard University, B.A., 1950; M.A., 1952; Ph.D., 1956

Career Highlights:

• Assistant and Associate Professor of Economics, University of Virginia, 1955-63

• RAND Corporation: Senior Staff Member, 1963-67, and Director 

of Strategic Studies, 1967-69

• Assistant Director and Acting Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget, 1969-70

• Assistant Director, Offi ce of Management and Budget, 1970-71

• Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, 1971-73

• Secretary of Defense, 1973-75

• Assistant to President-elect Jimmy Carter, 1976

• Secretary of Energy, 1977-79

• Private consultant 

J a m e s R o d n e y 

Schlesinger
52 53 /

taught at the University of Virginia and worked 

in various corporate and government positions. 

In 1970, as the assistant director of the Office of 

Management and Budget with responsibility for 

international programs, he was asked by President 

Nixon to identify ways to improve the quality of US 

intelligence. Working with the National Security 

Council, Schlesinger suggested improvements that 

ranged from conservative to radical. The study was 

controversial, and it changed how the DCI position 

was perceived and how the IC was managed. It also 

led President Nixon to streamline and strengthen 

intelligence collection throughout the IC.

Once selected as DCI, Schlesinger wasted no 

time putting his reform plans into place. One of 

his most significant reforms was to designate the 

DCI as the head of the IC, reserving the leadership 

role of the CIA for the Deputy Director of Central 

Intelligence. This change affected all future DCIs, 

President Richard Nixon’s second term brought 

major personnel changes throughout the US Government. In 1972, President Nixon asked for the 

resignation of all his agency directors, federal department heads and presidential appointees. Eager to 

reform the CIA, Nixon asked Director of Central 

Intelligence (DCI) Richard Helms to step down 

and replaced him in 1973 with James Schlesinger, 

who had recently written an extensive study on 

reforming the Intelligence Community (IC), which 

now consisted of the CIA, National Security Agency, 

Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of State, 

National Reconnaissance Office, Federal Bureau of 

Investigation and the four military services’ intelligence components. Schlesinger used the study as 

a guidebook of sorts during his five-month tenure, 

implementing many of its recommendations. 

Before becoming DCI, Schlesinger, who held a 

doctorate in economics from Harvard University, 

James Schlesinger is sworn in as Director of Central Intelligence alongside President Richard Nixon on February 2, 1973.

allowing them to oversee the preparation of the 

IC’s budget, establish intelligence requirements 

and ensure the quality of products across the IC. 

Believing that the CIA’s structure was ineffective, 

Schlesinger made organizational changes and cut 

the CIA’s workforce by nearly 7 percent. He focused 

in particular on reductions in the Directorate of 

Plans, which Schlesinger renamed the Directorate of 

Operations (the precursor to today’s National Clandestine Service). By contrast, Schlesinger expanded 

the workforce in the Directorate of Science and 

Technology, believing that technical collection had 

been used insufficiently. Schlesinger also thought 

the quality of the CIA’s intelligence was uneven and 

not commensurate with the cost of producing it. To 

help guide further reforms, he established the Center 

for the Study of Intelligence within the Agency to 

act as an internal “think tank,” capturing insights of 

historical importance.

When the media connected the CIA to the Watergate scandal in May 1973, Schlesinger took steps to 

end the CIA’s participation in activities that might 

appear legally or ethically suspect. He ordered the 

CIA officers to report any Agency activity that 

could be seen as a violation of the Agency’s charter. 

The responses covered activities going back as far as 

the 1950s and resulted in a nearly 700-page internal 

document coined the “Family Jewels.” Public disclosure of some of its contents in 1974 caused a major 

controversy and prompted inquiries into CIA activities by a presidential commission and two Congressional committees. (The report was released 

to the public in 2007.) The CIA’s relationship with 

Congress deteriorated further as more questionable 

operations surfaced, ranging from assassination 

plots to espionage against US citizens. 

Indeed, Schlesinger’s tenure was a time of controversy both inside and outside the CIA, but it 

included many reforms that shaped the intelligence 

business for years to come. Schlesinger departed the 

Agency upon being appointed by President Nixon 

as Secretary of Defense. 

“Intelligence is inherently

a d i f f i c u lt bu s i n e s s . 

I n t e l l i g e n c e i s n o t o n ly 

s u p p o s e d t o g at h e r fac t s , 

m a n y o f w h i c h o t h e r s a r e 

e a g e r t o c o n c e a l o r 

disguise. It is also expected

t o p rov i d e a c o h e r e n t 

p i c t u r e t h at h e l p s t o 

p r e pa r e u s f o r f u t u r e 

development s .”

- Statement of former DCI James 

Schlesinger before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 

United States, October 14, 2003
54 55 /

Tenure:

Director of Central Intelligence, September 4, 1973 – January 30, 1976

P r e s i d e n t s S e rv e d : 

• Richard Nixon

• Gerald Ford

Appointed:

May 10, 1973, by President Richard Nixon; confi rmed by the Senate, 

August 1, 1973; sworn in, September 4, 1973

Deputy Director:

Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters, US Army, through remainder of 

Colby’s tenure 

Born:

January 4, 1920, St. Paul, Minnesota

Education:

Princeton University, B.A., 1940; Columbia University, LL.B., 1947

Career Highlights:

• 2nd Lieutenant, US Army, 1941

• Offi ce of Strategic Services, 1943-45 

• Attorney in private practice, New York, 1947-49; with National Labor 

Relations Board, Washington, DC, 1949-50 

• Various operational posts in CIA, 1950-62 

• Chief, Far East Division, Directorate of Plans, CIA, 1962-67 

• Assigned to Agency for International Development as Director of Civil 

Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS), Saigon (with rank 

of ambassador; on leave from CIA), 1968-71 

• Executive Director-Comptroller, 1972-73

• Deputy Director for Operations, 1973 

• Post-CIA pursuits included practicing law, work on public policy issues, 

and writing books 

Died April 27, 1996

W i l l i a m E g a n 

Colby
56 57 /

William Colby was appointed Director of Central 

Intelligence (DCI) at a time when the CIA was 

under great scrutiny from Congress and the public. 

Because he was an Agency insider, many believed 

that Colby would resist demands for greater oversight and transparency. Instead, Colby embraced 

transparency, asking the Agency to be more open 

with Congress. He also sought to better use 

resources to ensure both intelligence analysis and 

collection were treated as core missions.

Colby’s father worked with the US Army and the 

family moved frequently during Colby’s childhood. 

Th e longest period the young Colby spent in one location was three years in Burlington, Vermont, where 

his father was an ROTC instructor at the University 

of Vermont. Colby graduated from Princeton University in 1940 and then studied law at Columbia University. In August 1941, Colby put his law degree on 

hold; he enlisted in the Army to serve in World War 

II and was assigned the rank of second lieutenant. 

Following various assignments in the Army—

including parachute training—Colby joined the 

Office of Strategic Services in 1943 and organized 

and directed resistance forces in France during 

World War II. He later led Operation Rype—a 

cleverly conceived ski-parachute operation—in 

Norway to prevent German troops from returning 

home to combat the Allied forces there. In carrying 

out that mission, Colby and his team skied across 

the Norwegian countryside sabotaging railroads and 

destroying bridges. Colby was awarded the Bronze 

Star medal, the French Croix de Guerre and the Silver Star for his service during World War II. 

After the war, Colby returned to the US, where he 

finished law school in 1947 and became an associate 

attorney at William J. Donovan’s New York City law 

firm. In 1949, Colby moved to Washington, DC, 

and worked at the National Labor Relations Board, 

gaining experience in government litigation.

In 1951, Colby began his career at the CIA, where 

he was given increasingly important field assignments. In 1962, he returned to Washington to lead 

the CIA’s Far East Division. While overseas in 

1968, Colby supervised a highly controversial initiative—called the Phoenix Program—designed to 

eliminate the Viet Cong infrastructure at the village 

level. The initiative was labeled an assassination 

program by critics. 

Colby returned to Washington in 1971, becoming 

the executive director comptroller in 1972 and then 

the Deputy Director for Operations. On May 10, 

1973, President Richard Nixon nominated Colby to 

succeed Schlesinger as DCI.

Colby became the director at a tumultuous time. 

The Vietnam War was escalating, a majority of 

Americans said they had an overall distrust of the 

US Government, and the Watergate investigation was 

infl aming public opposition to the Nixon Administration. Meanwhile, 

the CIA was struggling to maintain its influence inside the White 

House, where Henry Kissinger was asserting himself as the president’s 

main intelligence adviser. Colby, by contrast, was seen more as a senior 

staffer and did not have the same access to the president that previous 

directors had enjoyed.

As Colby began his tenure, the onset of the Yom Kippur War—also 

known as the 1973 Arab-Israeli War—caught the US Government by 

surprise and became the first intelligence failure to occur on Colby’s 

watch. The war surprised intelligence analysts in part because they were 

not expecting another conflict so soon after the 1967 Six-Day War; 

other factors included inadequate technical collection against the Arab 

forces and signals intelligence that—although abundant—still failed to 

reveal Egyptian invasion plans. Moreover, Colby had recently dissolved 

one of the Agency’s key forecasting groups, the Board of National EstiDCI William Colby (bottom left) attends a National Security Council meeting along with National Security Adviser Henry 

Kissinger, President Gerald Ford and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger.

William Colby supervising the Phoenix Program in South 

Vietnam in January 1969, prior to serving as Director of 

Central Intelligence. 
58 59 /

mates, which he planned to replace with a new group of senior officers 

that would be more responsive to the needs of the policymakers.

Later in Colby’s tenure, Congress began to take an aggressive look at the 

Agency because of disclosures by New York Times journalist Seymour 

Hersh. In December 1974, Hersh revealed some of the controversial 

CIA operations that had been compiled in the Agency’s so-called “Family

Jewels” report, which had been prepared under Colby’s predecessor. 

While the operations took place before Colby’s directorship, Colby 

handled the aftermath. Colby responded by revealing the existence of 

other activities and programs that had been hidden from Congress, 

believing that transparency was the best way to rebuild the Agency’s 

trust on Capitol Hill. 

President Gerald Ford established a commission headed by Vice 

President Nelson Rockefeller to investigate the Agency’s questionable 

activities. Both houses of Congress launched investigations of their own, 

with the Senate’s Church Committee focusing on covert action and the 

House’s Pike Committee examining analytic failures. Th e result was 

additional Congressional oversight, which at one point required the CIA 

to report to eight Congressional committees. 

Despite the increased oversight from Congress, press leaks, and the 

lack of support from the Nixon and Ford administrations, Colby still 

managed to leave a lasting mark on the CIA, positioning the Agency 

to handle the intelligence requirements of the future. While Colby was 

heavily involved in operations throughout his career, he recognized that 

the Agency would benefit from devoting more resources and attention 

to other aspects of its mission, such as analysis. In so doing, he helped 

the Agency shift from what was perceived as a one-dimensional, operations-focused organization to a well diversified intelligence service. 

Colby stepped down as DCI on January 30, 1976, and went back to practicing law. He drowned in a boating accident on April 27, 1996, possibly 

after collapsing from a heart attack. He was buried with military honors 

at Arlington National Cemetery.

Colby’s tenure was a transitional period for the Agency. Many CIA 

officers and former CIA directors were frustrated by Colby’s admissions to Congress of controversial operations. But even some of Colby’s 

most fervent critics later began to change their minds about his leadership of the CIA. According to Colby’s book, Honorable Men, Henry 

Kissinger took Colby aside in the Oval Office in late 1975 and said, 

“Bill, I feel required to say this to you. For the longest time I believed 

that what you were doing was wrong, that what you should have done 

was to cry havoc over the investigations in the name of national security. 

But I have come around to believe that your strategy was really correct.”

“Intelligence has traditionally existed in a shadowy

f i e l d o u t s i d e t h e l aw. Th i s y e a r’ s e x c i t e m e n t 

h a s m a d e c l e a r t h at t h e ru l e o f l aw a p p l i e s t o 

all parts of t h e A m e r i c a n G ov e r n m e n t, i n c l u d i n g 

i n t e l l i g e n c e . . . I t s s e c r e t s w i l l b e u n d e r s t o o d 

t o b e n e c e s s a ry o n e s f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f o u r 

d e m o c r ac y i n t o m o r r ow ’s w o r l d , n o t c ov e r s f o r 

m i s t a k e o r m i s d e e d . . . Th e c o s t s o f t h e p a s t 

y e a r w e r e h i g h , b u t t h ey w i l l b e e xc e e d e d b y t h e 

va lu e o f t h i s s t r e n g t h e n i n g o f w h at wa s a l r e a dy 

the best intelligence service in the world.”

- DCI William Colby’s assessment of his tenure shortly after leaving offi ce
60 61 /

Tenure:

Director of Central Intelligence, January 30, 1976 – January 20, 1977

P r e s i d e n t S e rv e d : 

Gerald Ford 

Appointed:

November 3, 1975, by President Gerald R. Ford; confi rmed by the Senate, 

January 27, 1976; sworn in, January 30, 1976

Deputy Director:

• Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters, US Army, until July 2, 1976

• E. Henry Knoche, from July 3, 1976, through remainder of Bush’s tenure 

(served as Acting Director, January 20, 1977 – March 9, 1977)

Born:

June 12, 1924, Milton, Massachusetts

Education:

Yale University, B.A., 1948

Career Highlights:

• Volunteered for active duty, US Navy, 1942

• Served in World War II as naval aviator in the Pacifi c

• Member of Congress, 7th District, Texas, 1966-71 

• Ambassador to the United Nations, 1971-72 

• Chairman, Republican National Committee, 1973-74 

• Chief, US Liaison Offi ce, People’s Republic of China, 1974-75

• Private business and politics

• Vice President of the United States, 1981-89 

• President of the United States, 1989-93 

• Awarded Presidential Medal of Freedom, 2011

• Founded the George Bush Presidential Library & Museum and 

George Bush School of Government and Public Service, both located 

at Texas A&M University

G e o r g e 

Herbert

Wa l k e r B u s h
62 63 /

Thirteen years before becoming the President of the 

United States, George H.W. Bush was appointed 

the 11th Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). 

Many believed leading the CIA would mark an end 

to his political career. Instead, Bush became the only 

US president to have previously held the position of 

DCI, which gave him a unique perspective on both 

providing and receiving intelligence.

Bush’s father, Prescott Bush, was a Republican senator from Connecticut who played an important 

role in introducing Bush to public service. Bush 

was accepted into Yale University, but following the 

attack on Pearl Harbor, he enlisted in the US Navy 

on his 18th birthday. After completing a 10-month 

training course, Bush received his wings, becoming 

the youngest pilot in the Navy. He was assigned to 

Torpedo Squadron (VT-51) based on the USS San 

Jacinto. During a mission over the Pacific, Bush’s 

plane was hit by Japanese antiaircraft fire, but he 

completed his mission before bailing out. He was 

the only member of his crew to survive. During 

World War II, Bush flew 58 combat missions and 

received the Distinguished Flying Cross, three Air 

Medals and the Presidential Unit Citation that was 

awarded to the crew of USS San Jacinto.

Discharged from the Navy in September 1945, Bush 

enrolled in an accelerated program at Yale University, where he excelled in both academics and sports. 

He was the captain of the baseball team and played 

in the first two College World Series. After graduating in 1948, Bush and his family moved to Midland, 

Texas, where he started his career in the oil industry 

as a sales clerk with Dresser Industries. In 1951, 

Bush started Bush-Overby Oil Development and 

later cofounded Zapata Petroleum. In 1954, Bush 

was named president of Zapata Offshore Company 

and moved it to Houston, Texas. 

Bush’s focus later turned to public service; in 1966, 

he became the first Republican to represent Houston in Congress where he served two terms. He 

also made two unsuccessful bids for a US Senate 

seat from Texas. Throughout his political career, 

Bush received a series of high-level appointments, 

including US Ambassador to the United Nations, 

chairman of the Republican National Committee, 

and chief of the US Liaison Office in the People’s 

Republic of China, with the rank of ambassador. 

Upon Gerald Ford’s nomination as Republican candidate for president, Bush was considered for vice 

president, but the Governor of New York, Nelson 

Rockefeller, received the nod instead.

On November 1, 1975, while serving as ambassador 

in Beijing, Bush received a telegram from President 

Ford’s Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, requesting that Bush accept the position of DCI. Bush later 

recalled, “Almost every friend I had in politics felt this 

would be the dead end, the absolute end of any politics in the future for me. And I kind of thought that 

maybe was true. Th at happily proved to be wrong.”

Bush began his tenure on January 30, 1976. Though 

an outsider, Bush quickly restored morale, using his 

political influence to restore the Agency’s access to 

the White House. He also allayed fears within the 

Agency that he would use his position to support 

his political agenda, and he demonstrated his commitment to the Agency by solving problems rather 

than overhauling the organization.

Bush’s tenure at the CIA lasted just less than a year, 

but he worked swiftly to raise morale internally and 

to restore the Agency’s reputation with the public. 

He also recognized that Congressional support was 

critical to the CIA’s success, and he worked with the 

Senate and House of Representatives to establish 

permanent intelligence oversight committees. On 

May 19, 1976, the Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence was established, followed by the House 

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on July 

14, 1977—shortly after Bush departed the Agency.

To sharpen the Agency’s analysis, Bush also helped 

pioneer a new analytic technique known as “Team A 

/Team B.” In 1976, he agreed to an exercise that pitted

a team of working-level Intelligence Community 

(IC) analysts (Team A) against one from the PresDCI George H.W. Bush greets President Gerald Ford upon his arrival at CIA Headquarters.

DCI George H.W. Bush in his office at CIA Headquarters. 

(Picture courtesy of the George W. Bush Presidential Library)
64 65 /

Bush is remembered as one of the CIA’s most popular directors. The first DCI who had served in Congress, he had the political influence and authority 

to mold the Agency into an 

entirely different organization, but he chose not to 

do so. Instead, he focused 

on protecting the objectivity and independence of the 

CIA. Bush nevertheless realized that the Agency needed 

to become more forthright 

with information to earn the 

respect of Congress and the 

American public. 

On April 26, 1999, the 

CIA named its headquarters compound “The 

George Bush Center for 

Intelligence” in honor of 

Bush’s contributions to 

the field of intelligence 

and to the Agency. At the 

dedication ceremony, thenDirector George Tenet read 

a message from President 

Bill Clinton that paid tribute to Bush’s achievements, 

“When you assumed your 

duties as Director of Central Intelligence in January 1976, the nation had 

just endured one of the most tumultuous periods 

in its history. Many Americans had lost faith in 

ident’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Team 

B)—a group that provides advice to the president 

concerning the quality and adequacy of intelligence. 

Both teams were asked to 

conduct analysis of Soviet 

strategic capabilities based 

on the same classified data. 

The exercise compared the 

analyses of the two teams, 

generating new insights 

and provocative debate. 

The Agency continues to 

use the “Team A/Team B” 

technique to better identify 

assumptions, biases, and 

alternative views.

After leaving the CIA at the 

end of the Ford Administration, Bush became President 

Ronald Reagan’s vice president in 1981. He brought 

with him a deep appreciation 

for the President’s Daily Brief 

(PDB) and read it avidly 

throughout his vice presidency. When Bush became 

the 41st US president in 

1989, he made a CIA briefing his first order of daily 

business in the Oval Offi ce. 

“Th e reason I like to get intelligence from you folks is 

that I know you tell it like you see it,” he said. “You have 

no policy axe to grind and you are absolutely discreet.” 

“It’s hard for people in

a f r e e s o c i et y t o ac c e pt 

t h e f a c t t h at c o v e rt 

ac t i o n i s o f t e n 

n e c e s s a ry f o r a w o r l d 

p ow e r t o s u rv i v e . 

An American President

fac e d w i t h a p o t e n t ia l 

t h r e at t o n at i o n a l 

s e c u r i t y s h o u l d h av e 

s o m e a lt e r n at i v e 

between doing nothing

a n d wa i t i n g f o r a 

crisis to blow up in our

f ac e . Th e a n s w e r i s 

c o v e rt a c t i o n — b u t i t 

h a s t o b e c o n d u c t e d 

a l o n g s t r i c t ly l e g a l 

guidelines .”

- Vice President George H. W. 

Bush, Looking Forward (1987)

government. Many asked whether the CIA should 

continue to exist. As Director, you accomplished 

a great deal. You restored morale and discipline to 

the Agency while publicly emphasizing the value of 

intelligence to the nation’s security. You also restored 

America’s trust in the CIA and the rest of the Intelligence Community.”

On April 26, 1999, DCI George Tenet honored George H.W. 

Bush at a ceremony to officially change the name of the headquarters compound to the “George Bush Center for Intelligence.” 

On April 26, 1999, the CIA named its headquarters compound 

the “George Bush Center for Intelligence” in honor of George H.W. 

Bush’s contributions to the field of intelligence and to the Agency. 
66 67 /

Tenure:

Director of Central Intelligence, March 9, 1977 – January 20, 1981

P r e s i d e n t S e rv e d : 

Jimmy Carter

Appointed:

February 8, 1977, by President Jimmy Carter; confi rmed by the Senate, 

February 24, 1977; sworn in, March 9, 1977

Deputy Director:

• E. Henry Knoche, until August 1, 1977

• Frank C. Carlucci, from February 10, 1978, through remainder 

of Turner’s tenure

Born:

December 1, 1923, Highland Park, Illinois

Education:

Attended Amherst College, 1941-43; US Naval Academy, B.S., 1946 

(Class of 1947); Rhodes Scholar, Exeter College, Oxford University, 

B.A., 1950, M.A., 1954 

Career Highlights:

• Commissioned in the US Navy, 1946

• Director, Systems Analysis Division, Offi ce of Chief 

of Naval Operations, 1971-72

• Promoted to Vice Admiral, 1972

• President, US Naval War College, 1972-74

• Commander, US Second Fleet, 1974-75

• Promoted to Admiral, 1975

• Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe (NATO), 1975-77

• Retired from the US Navy on December 31, 1978 while serving as Director 

of Central Intelligence

• Author, professor, corporate director, and senior research scholar

Admiral, US Navy

S t a n s f i e l d 

T u r n e r 
68 69 /

The CIA had five directors during the 1970s. The 

last director of the turbulent decade was Admiral 

Stansfield Turner, picked by President Jimmy Carter

to succeed George H.W. Bush. Turner sought to 

create a more integrated Intelligence Community 

(IC), reshaping some of the Agency’s traditional 

roles. Familiar issues, like the spread of communism, and new ones, like the Islamic fundamentalist 

movement, were the pivotal intelligence problems 

of Turner’s tenure. The Iranian Revolution in early 

1979 surprised the US Government and introduced 

new and unfamiliar political movements that were a 

source of deep concern. 

Turner was a career naval offi cer and former classmate of President Carter’s at the US Naval Academy. 

He was an analyst at heart and an experienced leader 

who liked to challenge the ideas of those around him 

to spur action and debate. Early on, Turner immersed 

himself in studies and briefi ngs on the structure of 

the IC, seeking ways to improve its organization. 

One of his conclusions was that the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) lacked the authority to fully 

manage the IC. In response to Turner’s urging, President Carter gave him additional authority to handle 

requests from policymakers, produce analysis and 

manage the overall intelligence budget. 

Turner’s solution for improving the management of 

the IC was a “Three Vice President” model. Turner 

believed that assigning three senior managers to 

oversee resource collection, analysis, and resource 

management would make the IC more efficient and 

improve its long-range planning. But his experiment 

ran into trouble almost immediately when he brought 

in Navy colleagues to fi ll the three manager positions, 

alienating many career CIA offi cers. Turner intended 

to create a lean management structure; instead, his 

system only added to the bureaucracy. Th e top-level 

structure ultimately did not work. 

Turner considered the CIA’s operational side overstaffed and made deep cuts to its personnel, which 

led to low morale. Both Turner and President Carter

believed that satellite imagery could provide the 

bulk of intelligence collection and that human intelligence would be needed only to fill the gaps. The 

Directorate of Operations was reduced to half of 

what it was at its peak during the Johnson Administration as technical intelligence gained prominence.

On the analytical side of the CIA, Turner promoted 

more innovative analytic techniques on a wider range 

of intelligence issues and even involved himself in 

preparing the annual estimate of Soviet off ensive strategic nuclear forces. According to the IC Staff ’s chief 

budget offi cer at the time, Turner would approve any 

budget increase that promised to improve analysis. 

Th e IC Staff was convened to oversee the integration 

and performance of the IC.

In 1978, Turner faced new restrictions on the CIA 

when President Carter signed Executive Order 

(EO) 12036, which banned domestic espionage 

operations and mandated that the National Security 

Council provide closer review of covert action. New 

legislation also required the CIA to give the newly 

established House Permanent Select Committee on 

Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence prior notification of “significant” covert 

action operations. 

In 1979, two challenges in the Middle East and 

South Asia caught the CIA by surprise. In February, 

the Iranian Revolution, arising from an Islamic fundamentalist movement, took root with unexpected 

speed. The CIA lacked intelligence sources in the 

region to provide information on exiled opposition 

leader Ayatollah Khomenei and on popular attitudes toward the Shah’s government. In November 

1979, the US Embassy in Tehran was taken over 

by Iranian students and militants who supported 

the revolution. Several attempts to rescue the hostages were made, some of which were costly and 

disastrous. In December 1979, a second challenge 

emerged when the Soviet Union—at the behest of 

the pro-Soviet Democratic Republic of Afghanistan 

(DRA)—invaded Afghanistan, beginning a long 

fight against the Mujahideen—Afghan resistance 

fighters who opposed communism and rebelled 

against DRA and Soviet troops.

Turner’s efforts to create a more integrated IC were 

frustrated by counterintelligence issues and a changing political landscape in the Middle East. A major 

effort to integrate the IC would not be made again 

until the early 2000s. 

“A m e r i c a’s i n t e l l i g e n c e s y s t e m i s u n l i k e a n y o t h e r . It 

a n s w e r s t h e s p e c i a l n ew s o f a d e m o c r at i c s u pe r p ow e r 

w i t h w o r l dw i d e i n t e r e s t s ; i t i s r e l at i v e ly y o u n g , 

as is our nation; it benefits from the technological

g e n i u s o f A m e r i c a n i n du s t ry ; a n d i t i s p e o p l e d by 

Americans of every stripe who share the patriotism,

t h e h i g h m o r a l s ta n d a r d s , a n d t h e d e c e n c y f o r 

which Americans are known.”

- DCI Stansfi eld Turner, Secrecy and Democracy: Th e CIA in Transition (1985)

DCI Stansfield Turner greets President Jimmy Carter upon 

his arrival at CIA Headquarters.
70 71 /

Tenure:

Director of Central Intelligence, January 28, 1981 – January 29, 1987

P r e s i d e n t S e rv e d : 

Ronald Reagan

Appointed:

January 20, 1981, by President Ronald Reagan; confi rmed by the Senate, 

January 27, 1981; sworn in, January 28, 1981

Deputy Director:

• Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, US Navy, February 12, 1981 – June 10, 1982

• John N. McMahon, June 10, 1982 – March 29, 1986 

• Robert M. Gates, April 18, 1986, through remainder of Casey’s tenure 

(served as Acting Director, December 18, 1986 – May 26, 1987)

Born:

March 13, 1913, New York, New York

Education:

Fordham University, B.S., 1934; St. John’s University, LL.B., 1937

Career Highlights:

• Lawyer, writer and businessman

• Commissioned into US Naval Reserve, 1943 

• Joined Offi ce of Strategic Services, 1943

• Chief of Special Intelligence Branch in European 

Th eater of Operations, 1944-45 

• Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, 1971-73 

• Under Secretary of State for Economic Aff airs, 1973-74 

• President and Chairman, US Export-Import Bank, 1974-76 

• Member, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 1976-77 

• Campaign Manager for presidential candidate Ronald Reagan, 1980

Died May 6, 1987

W i l l i a m 

J o s e p h 

Casey
72 73 /

William Casey came to the CIA determined to 

improve the Agency’s access to the president, to 

reenergize its workforce and to sharpen its focus 

on defeating Soviet expansion efforts. Casey’s time 

as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was not 

without controversy, but he took risks to confront the 

great challenges of his tenure.

Casey graduated from Fordham University in 1934 

and earned his law degree from St. John’s University 

in 1937. He finished law school in just two years—a 

year ahead of schedule—even though he was also 

working full time as a social worker. In 1943, Casey 

was commissioned into the US Navy Reserve and 

joined the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) as 

a lieutenant commander. OSS Director William 

J. Donovan appointed Casey chief of espionage 

operations in the European Theater, where he was 

responsible for coordinating more than 100 teams 

for deployment into Germany. Casey was awarded 

the Bronze Star for his service during the war. 

After the war, Casey became a successful venture 

capitalist, founding, directing or financing about 

30 businesses. One former associate stated, “Bill 

Casey had the two absolutely essential traits of a 

venture capitalist. He could pick horses and jockeys. 

He could spot a promising company, an idea, an 

invention, and he could judge if the people running 

it were any good.” 

Casey lost a 1966 Congressional race but went on 

to hold several senior positions in politics and government, including chairman of the Securities and 

Exchange Commission, president and chairman of 

the US Export-Import Bank, member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and 

campaign manager for presidential candidate Ronald 

Reagan. Casey’s eff ective management of the campaign 

prompted President Reagan to appoint him as DCI.

Casey brought influence and prestige to the Agency 

as a result of his relationship with President Reagan. 

Casey’s leadership helped restore the CIA’s prominent role in the national security arena. He became 

the first DCI to receive cabinet rank, giving him a 

stake in policy decisions and unprecedented political influence. The move conflicted with what many 

saw as the CIA’s traditional role of informing policy 

rather than making it. 

Casey and President Reagan shared the belief that 

Soviet expansion posed a grave threat to US interests and that any softening of Western opposition 

to communism was a mistake; they were determined 

to curtail Soviet influence. Casey believed centralized intelligence was necessary to win the Cold War 

and persuaded President Reagan to give him a free 

hand in revitalizing the Agency. Casey rebuilt the 

CIA’s operations division—which was downsized 

under DCI Turner—hiring a significant number of 

new officers and growing the Intelligence Community’s budget, which had been declining for years. 

The larger budget funded the construction of a new 

building at CIA Headquarters in Langley. 

Many observers credit Casey with forming a strategy 

to end the Cold War and implementing the “Reagan

Doctrine,” the new policy of confronting Communist 

forces in the Th ird World by backing opposition elements. Casey was creative in identifying opportunities to end the Cold War. For example, he persuaded 

Saudi Arabia to increase oil production to force down 

the price of crude oil, an important source of revenue 

for the Soviets. Casey also convinced South African 

gold mining companies to expand production and 

depress the price of gold, another key Soviet export. 

Under Casey, the CIA also took a more aggressive 

approach to fi ghting terrorism. On April 18, 1983, a 

truck bombing at the US Embassy in Beirut killed 

seven CIA officers, marking the greatest loss of 

Agency lives in a single incident. In 1986, Casey 

established the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center—

the fi rst Agency unit in which operators and analysts 

worked side by side—with the mission of disrupting and defeating terrorists and expanding the 

Agency’s counterterrorism efforts.

William Casey (far left) attends a meeting in the Oval Office with President Gerald Ford and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. 

Casey served as a member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 1976-77.

William Casey was commissioned into the US Naval Reserve in 

1943 and served in the Office of Strategic Services. From 1944-

45, Casey was Chief of the Special Intelligence Branch for the 

European Theater. (Courtesy of Bernadette Casey-Smith)
74 75 /

Despite success in fi ghting the Cold War and building CIA capabilities, 

Casey’s tenure was not without controversy. Casey bristled at the idea of 

oversight and his relationship with Congress was strained. Th e ultimate 

unraveling of Casey’s tenure came during the eff ort to fund opposition 

fi ghters in Nicaragua through arms sales to Iran, in what came to be 

known as the Iran-Contra Aff air. Th e initiative, which violated the US 

embargo on arms sales to Iran, prompted fi erce criticism from Congress. 

Casey suff ered two seizures just as the Congressional hearings were 

underway in December 1986 and never returned to his position as DCI. 

He died on May 6, 1987, at the age of 74.

“ Th e E st i m at e s a r e m y E st i m at e s . I ’m a l i t t l e bi t lo o s e r a b ou t 

that when it c omes to put ting in other views . But they’re my 

E s t i m at e s . I ’m r e s p o n s i b l e f o r d raw i n g t h e c o n c lu s i o n s a n d 

pr e s e n t i n g t h e m . Bu t I f e e l I hav e a c on c o m i ta n t obl ig at ion 

t o t h e u s e r t o s e e t hat a n y w e l l - s u b sta n t iat e d a lt e r nat i v e 

view is also l aid on the table.”

- DCI William Casey, October 1985, quoted 

in Th e Agency (1986) by John Ranelagh

Casey was respected by Agency personnel for revitalizing operations and analysis. He implemented 

a strategy to defeat Soviet expansion and carved a 

more significant role for the CIA in US security 

policy. President Reagan paid tribute to Casey by 

stating, “His nation and all those who love freedom 

honor today the name and memory of Bill Casey. 

In addition to crediting him with rebuilding America’s intelligence capability, history will note the 

brilliance of his mind and strategic vision, his passionate commitment to the cause of freedom and his 

unhesitating willingness to make personal sacrifi ces 

for the sake of that cause and his country.”

Exterior of the New Headquarters Building (NHB); DCI William Casey helped increase the Agency’s budget, which funded the 

construction of NHB. The building was completed in March 1991.

DCI William Casey’s close relationship with President Ronald Reagan helped restore 

CIA’s prominent role in the national security arena.
76 77 /

Tenure:

Director of Central Intelligence, May 26, 1987 – August 31, 1991

P r e s i d e n t s S e rv e d : 

• Ronald Reagan

• George H.W. Bush

Appointed:

• March 3, 1987, by President Ronald Reagan; confi rmed by the Senate, 

May 19, 1987; sworn in, May 26, 1987

• Requested by President-elect George H.W. Bush to continue as Director 

of Central Intelligence, December 6, 1988

Deputy Director:

• Robert M. Gates, until March 20, 1989

• Richard J. Kerr, from March 20, 1989, through remainder of Webster’s tenure 

(served as Acting Director, September 1, 1991 – November 6, 1991)

Born:

March 6, 1924, St. Louis, Missouri

Education:

Amherst College, A.B., 1947; Washington University Law School, J.D., 1949

Career Highlights:

• Lieutenant in US Navy, World War II (1943-46) and Korean War (1951-52)

• Private law practice, 1949-59 and 1961-70 

• US Attorney for Missouri’s Eastern District, 1960-61 

• Judge, US District Court for Missouri’s Eastern District, 1970-73 

• Judge, US District Court of Appeals for Eighth Circuit, 1973-78 

• Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1978-87

• Private law practice

W i l l i a m 

H e d g c o c k 

Webster
78 79 /

The late 1980s brought major change to the international political scene and to the CIA’s approach to 

national security. During Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) William Webster’s tenure, the Berlin 

Wall came down after nearly 30 years, ending the 

post-World War II division of Europe and leading 

to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The fall of 

communism prompted the CIA to reevaluate its 

mission to ensure that it remained relevant to US 

national security. Webster wanted to change the 

image of the Agency as a “runaway” organization and 

direct it toward new challenges, such as nuclear proliferation, counternarcotics and counterterrorism.

As DCI, Webster improved cooperation across 

the Intelligence Community (IC) and repaired the 

Agency’s reputation after the Iran-Contra scandal. 

Webster had a reputation for integrity, and upon 

becoming DCI, he asked President Ronald Reagan 

to restore the position to its traditional non-cabinet 

status because he believed it allowed him to maintain an objective stance when providing intelligence 

judgments. Webster’s desire to isolate the DCI from 

policymaking may have reflected his experience as a 

federal judge and as a director of the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation.

Under Webster’s leadership, the CIA’s Inspector 

General (IG) evaluated the performance of the IC 

Staff, which oversaw the integration and performance of the IC. The study concluded that the Staff 

was carrying out a useful mission but was unfocused 

and lacked impact. The study also found that recent 

DCIs were detached from the rest of the IC and 

segregated from the Staff. Webster approved most 

of the IG’s recommendations, which included developing a mission statement and creating a leaner IC 

Staff. He also tried to strengthen ties within the IC 

by hosting conferences and initiating biweekly luncheons with heads of intelligence agencies. 

DCI William Webster (right) briefs President George H.W. Bush in the Oval Office along with Robert Gates, Assistant to the 

President and Deputy for National Security Affairs. (Picture courtesy of the George H.W. Bush Presidential Library)

As the new decade progressed, Webster recognized 

that redefining intelligence objectives was critical 

to the Agency’s ability to confront new threats. 

Webster created two more interdisciplinary centers—for counterintelligence and counternarcotics—

adding to the Counterterrorism Center established 

by DCI William Casey. 

Th e centers enabled 

collectors and analysts 

to span regional boundaries by focusing on an 

issue instead of a specifi c country. 

Webster also tightened 

internal review processes for covert action 

initiatives in response 

to the Iran-Contra 

Affair. A government 

review of the scandal 

concluded that the 

Agency as an institution was not involved, 

but Webster nonetheless instituted guidelines for covert action 

to guard against similar problems.

The Persian Gulf War

presented the US Government with a new set of 

national security concerns. In August 1990, Iraqi 

President Saddam Hussein led his forces into 

Kuwait City, seizing 10 percent of the world’s proved 

oil reserves. The Agency increased collection and 

analysis on Iraq to support President George H.W. 

Bush, who eagerly consumed the intelligence. Diplomatic efforts failed to secure an Iraqi withdrawal 

and Operation Desert Storm began in January 1991. 

The US-led coalition bombed Iraqi positions for six 

weeks, and a discrepancy emerged between CIA and 

US military tank-kill 

estimates. Th e destruction of Iraqi tanks was 

critical to the plans 

of General Norman 

S c h w a r z k o p f — t h e 

Commander of US 

Central Command and 

Coalition Forces for the 

Gulf War—and he was 

frustrated with the lack 

of a coordinated estimate for the number 

of tanks eliminated. An 

estimate produced by 

Army intelligence components—indicating a 

weaker Iraqi army—

was ultimately used. 

Th e Bush Administration lost confi dence in 

Webster, resulting in 

his departure from the 

Agency. 

Webster had a detached management style, but he 

improved the Agency’s credibility, helped unify the 

IC and transitioned the CIA to the emerging challenges of the post-Cold War era.

“ The activities in which we 

engage must be consistent 

w i t h ou r f o r e i g n m i s s i o n 

a n d ou r ow n l aws , a n d t h ey 

m u st r e f l e c t w hat t h e 

A m e r i c a n p e o p l e e x p e c t 

of us . We must find ways 

t o g et t hat m e s s ag e k n ow n 

a n d u n d e r s t o o d. Th e 

American public is very 

r e s p on s i v e w h e n i t be l i ev e s 

t hat t h e r e i s s o m e or de r 

i n t h i s e lu s i v e wo r l d o f 

cloak and dagger.”

- DCI William Webster, remarks at the Intelligence Community Attorney’s Conference, 

Williamsburg, Virginia, May 11, 1988
80 81 /

Tenure:

Director of Central Intelligence, November 6, 1991 – January 20, 1993

P r e s i d e n t S e rv e d : 

George H.W. Bush

Appointed:

May 14, 1991, by President George Bush; confi rmed by the Senate, 

November 5, 1991; sworn in, November 6, 1991

Deputy Director:

• Richard J. Kerr, until March 2, 1992

• Admiral William O. Studeman, US Navy, April 9, 1992, through remainder of 

Gates’s tenure (served as Acting Director, January 20, 1993 – February 5, 1993)

Born:

September 25, 1943, Wichita, Kansas

Education:

College of William and Mary, B.A., 1965; Indiana University, M.A., 1966; 

Georgetown University, Ph.D., 1974

Career Highlights:

• Intelligence analyst, CIA, 1966-74

• National Security Council Staff , 1974-79 

• Director, DCI/DDCI Executive Staff , CIA, 1981-82 

• Deputy Director for Intelligence, 1982-86 

• Chairman, National Intelligence Council, 1983-86 

• Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, 1986-89 

• Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Aff airs, 1989; 

Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Aff airs, 1989-91

• Author

• Interim Dean of the George Bush School of Government and Public Service, 

Texas A&M University 1999-2001

• President, Texas A&M University, 2002-06

• Secretary of Defense, 2006-11

• Chancellor of the College of William and Mary, 2012 – present

Robert

Michael

Gates
82 83 /

Robert Gates became the first Director of Central 

Intelligence (DCI) to come from the Agency’s analytic arm, the Directorate of Intelligence. Besides 

having 25 years of analytical experience, he had 

earned a reputation as a knowledgeable and insightful voice on national security during his tours at 

the National Security Council (NSC). He had also 

worked successfully with leaders throughout Washington, developing a broad understanding of how 

government worked. 

Gates had a diffi cult confi rmation process. Originally 

nominated to succeed DCI William Casey in 1987, 

Gates withdrew his nomination because of controversy surrounding the Iran-Contra Aff air; Gates had 

been the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence 

during the scandal. When President George H.W. 

Bush nominated Gates to the DCI position a second 

time, Gates faced opposition from former CIA analysts who believed he forced intelligence estimates to 

conform to his own views. Gates was eventually confi rmed, and he asserted his commitment to unbiased 

and objective intelligence analysis. 

During his confirmation hearing, Gates signaled 

his intention to take advantage of the opportunity 

presented by the end of the Soviet Union to reassess the role, mission, priorities and structure of US 

intelligence. While still at the NSC, Gates began a 

review of national security policy, asking policymakers to provide a comprehensive list of the key countries and intelligence questions for the United States 

through 2005. “This effort will allow us to correlate 

resources and requirements we can or cannot meet 

at different budget levels—in essence, to let the customer decide what to do without at different budget 

levels,” Gates explained. In March 1992, President 

Bush signed National Security Directive (NSD) 67, 

which formalized the review and provided a list of 

requirements through 2005, dividing them into four 

levels of priority. The directive served as a guide 

for the Intelligence Community (IC) during Gate’s 

tenure as DCI.

In his first month as DCI, Gates established task 

forces to study ways to improve organization and 

process. He immediately commissioned 14 task 

forces, adding 10 more four months later. They were 

assigned topics ranging from imagery to human intelligence to National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). 

The work of the task forces resulted in many organizational changes, including the creation of an Office 

of Military Affairs, the restructuring of the National Reconnaissance 

Offi ce—as well as public acknowledgement of its existence—and the 

eventual establishment of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, 

which eventually became the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

In addition, Gates disbanded the IC Staff, which had overseen the 

integration and performance of the IC, and dividedits responsibilities between the National Intelligence Council (NIC) andthe newly 

created Community Management Staff (CMS). CMS—established 

based on the studies that DCI William Webster initiated—handled 

resource matters; the NIC dealt 

with substantive matters. Gates 

believed that this distribution 

of duties allowed him to better 

fulfill his community management responsibilities. 

The whirlwind changes that 

Gates brought to the Agency 

included increased accessibility 

and openness to the media and 

public. Gates understood that 

intelligence must match the needs of its customers, including the public. 

He modified declassification standards so the public could access CIA 

records of historical significance. Gates resigned when it became clear 

that President-elect Bill Clinton wanted to select his own DCI. Th irteen 

years later, Gates returned to public service as Secretary of Defense, 

once again helping to defend the country he had long served.

“ Th e m o s t d i f f i c u lt ta s k t hat fa l l s 

t o u s i n i n t e l l i g e n c e i s t o s e e 

the wo r l d a s i t i s , n o t a s w e — o r 

others—would wish it to be.”

- DCI Robert Gates address at CIA 

Headquarters, December 4, 1991

Deputy Director of CIA Robert Gates speaks at a ceremony 

dedicating the William J. Donovan statue located in the CIA 

Headquarters lobby on October 28, 1988.
84 85 /

Tenure:

Director of Central Intelligence, February 5, 1993 – January 10, 1995

P r e s i d e n t S e rv e d : 

William J. Clinton

Appointed:

January 21, 1993, by President William J. Clinton; confi rmed by the Senate, 

February 3, 1993; sworn in, February 5, 1993

Deputy Director:

Admiral William O. Studeman, US Navy, April 9, 1992, through remainder of 

Woolsey’s tenure (served as Acting Director, January 10, 1995 – May 10, 1995)

Born:

September 21, 1941, Tulsa, Oklahoma

Education:

Stanford University, B.A., 1963; Rhodes Scholar, St. John’s College, Oxford 

University, B.A., 1965, M.A., 1970; Yale University, LL.B., 1968

Career Highlights:

• Captain, US Army, 1968-70; Program Analyst, Offi ce of the Secretary of 

Defense, 1968-70

• Adviser with US Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I 

(SALT I), Helsinki and Vienna, 1969-70

• National Security Council Staff , 1970

• General Counsel, Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, 1970-73 

• Private law practice, 1973-77, 1979-89, 1991-93 

• Under Secretary of the Navy, 1977-79 

• Delegate-at-Large, US-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) 

and Nuclear and Space Talks (NST), Geneva, 1983-86 

• President’s Commission on Strategic Forces, 1983-84; President’s Commission 

on Defense Management, 1985-86; President’s Commission on Federal Ethics 

Law Reform, 1989 

• Ambassador and US Representative, negotiations on Conventional Armed 

Forces in Europe, 1989-91

• Private Consultant

R. J a m e s

Wo ol s e y
86 87 /

Advancements in communications technology in the 

1990s changed how the CIA managed the Intelligence 

Community (IC), established security standards, and 

collected foreign intelligence. At the same time, the 

CIA was adjusting to a declining intelligence budget 

in the post-Cold War environment. 

After his election in 1992, President Bill Clinton 

chose R. James Woolsey as Director of Central 

Intelligence (DCI), based on recommendations 

from foreign policy advisers. Clinton did not know 

Woolsey personally, and the two never developed 

a relationship. Woolsey brought impressive experience in national security, including service as Undersecretary of the Navy in the 

Carter Administration and 

as an ambassador in Europe 

negotiating arms control 

limitations on non-nuclear 

forces at the end of the 

Cold War. Woolsey continued DCI Robert Gates’s 

efforts to integrate the IC 

while also taking on new 

issues, such as improving the 

CIA’s relationship with law 

enforcement and redefining 

security standards.

In 1994, a CIA officer, 

Aldrich Ames, was arrested 

on charges of spying for the 

Soviet Union. An investigation revealed that Ames had 

been passing information to the KGB—the Soviet 

Union’s external intelligence agency—since 1985, 

initially motivated by money. Ames gave the KGB 

enough information to compromise at least 100 US 

operations and the identities of CIA assets, at least 

10 of whom were executed. Woolsey reprimanded 

Ames’s supervisors, but Congress criticized the 

punishment as inadequate. 

The Ames case highlighted the need to redefine 

security standards across the IC. Woolsey worked 

with senior offi cials in the Clinton Administration to 

establish a Joint Security Commission to review the 

IC’s security systems as new technologies emerged. 

The commission concluded that the US Government’s security systems were inadequate to identify 

top-tier threats and that security standards varied 

widely across the IC. It recommended improving personnel security and giving 

more resources to protect 

information management 

systems. Woolsey developed 

policies and practices aimed 

at fostering an exchange of 

information among intelligence and law enforcement 

elements, which he believed 

were critically important to 

US national security. 

A new communications system called Intelink—which 

had recently been developed 

to unify electronic communications throughout the 

community—also drew criticism. Linking members of the IC electronically made 

sense from a community management viewpoint, but 

security concerns—stemming from the Aldrich Ames 

“ We h av e s l a i n a 

l a r g e d r ag o n . B u t 

w e l i v e n ow i n a 

j u n g l e f i l l e d w i t h 

a b ew i l d e r i n g 

variety of poisonous

s n a k e s . A n d i n 

m a n y way s , t h e 

d r ag o n wa s e a s i e r 

to keep track of.”

- R. James Woolsey, February 2, 1993, 

in testimony before the Senate Select 

Committee on Intelligence explaining 

why intelligence resources are still 

needed in the post-Cold War era

case—led some to question the new system and the 

ease with which sensitive information could be shared. 

Th e Clinton Administration’s eff ort to return Haiti’s 

fi rst democratically-elected president, Jean-Bertrand 

Aristide, to power also turned to controversy during 

Woolsey’s tenure. In September 1991, Haiti’s security 

forces, with the broad support of the civilian elite, 

removed the newly-elected Aristide from power. 

The resulting violence against Aristide’s supporters 

caused many Haitians to flee their country. Both 

the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations 

tried to restore Aristide to power over a three-year 

period. The CIA’s analysis on Aristide was criticized 

by some policymakers and members of Congress 

as inaccurate and policy prescriptive. This became 

a major point of contention among the Agency, the 

Clinton Administration, and Capitol Hill, and it 

significantly impaired Woolsey’s relationships with 

the White House and Congress.

Improved security and IC integration were major 

themes during Woolsey’s tenure. But Woolsey 

struggled to carry out many of his initiatives, in large 

part because he never established a close relationship 

with President Clinton. 

President Bill Clinton and DCI R. James Woolsey meet at the White House. (Picture courtesy of the William J. Clinton 

Presidential Library)
88 89 /

Tenure:

Director of Central Intelligence, May 10, 1995 – December 15, 1996

P r e s i d e n t S e rv e d : 

Bill Clinton

Appointed:

March 19, 1995, by President Bill Clinton; confi rmed by the Senate, 

May 9, 1995; sworn in, May 10, 1995

Deputy Director:

• Admiral William O. Studeman, US Navy, until July 3, 1995

• George J. Tenet, July 3, 1995, through remainder of Deutch’s tenure 

(served as Acting Director, December 15, 1996-July 11, 1997)

Born:

July 27, 1938, Brussels, Belgium

Education:

Amherst College, B.A., 1960; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 

B.S., 1961, Ph.D., 1965

Career Highlights:

• Became US citizen, 1945

• Systems Analyst, Department of Defense, 1961-65

• Assistant Professor of Chemistry, Princeton University, 1966-69

• MIT faculty, 1970-77 and 1980-93: Professor of Chemistry, Chairman 

of Chemistry Department, Dean of Science, Provost

• Director of Energy Research, Acting Assistant Secretary for Energy 

Technology, and Under Secretary, US Department of Energy, 1977-80 

• Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, 1993-94

• Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1994-95 

• MIT Professor

J o h n M a r k 

Deutch
90 91 /

The shift in roles and responsibilities that occurred 

throughout the Intelligence Community (IC) after 

the Cold War proved difficult to manage. Sharing 

information was now critical to addressing intelligence questions that spanned geographic and 

bureaucratic boundaries, but many resisted this new 

approach to national security. 

For his second Director of Central Intelligence 

(DCI), President Bill Clinton appointed John 

Deutch because of his knowledge of national intelligence issues gained while serving as Deputy Secretary 

of Defense. Deutch’s Department of Defense (DoD) 

background left many concerned that Deutch’s loyalties would be split during a time when the Agency 

was competing with DoD for more authority and 

for shrinking resources.

Deutch’s decision to bring in personal aides and senior 

offi cers from outside the CIA to assume top positions 

created internal resentment, yet he succeeded in having a lasting eff ect on the CIA’s organization. Deutch 

aided in the establishment of the National Imagery 

and Mapping Agency—now the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency—fi rst recommended by DCI 

Robert Gates. Deutch created the position of Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military 

Support to improve coordination with the military. 

He also created the fi rst formal program encouraging employees to take positions in other IC agencies, 

strengthening personnel development.

The DCI’s role as manager of the IC proved to be a 

contentious matter during Deutch’s tenure. Intelligence committees in Congress wanted a more powerful DCI, while the defense committees wanted a 

more powerful Secretary of Defense. Unless Congress revised the National Security Act of 1947, 

DoD would have a decisive advantage because of its 

control over most of the intelligence budget. This 

essentially prevented the DCI from effectively managing the entire IC.

On March 2, 1995, President Clinton issued Presidential Directive, PDD-35, which grouped intelligence topics into tiers based on their importance 

to the president and policymakers. George Tenet, 

then-senior director for Intelligence Programs at 

the National Security Council, championed PDD35. When Tenet became Deputy Director of Central Intelligence in July 1995, he and Deutch initially planned to focus the Agency’s efforts on “hard 

targets,” where collection was most difficult. Many 

feared that targets of lesser importance would have 

reduced resources; that concern eventually led 

Tenet and Deutch to settle on the concept of “global 

coverage,” which aimed to strike a balance between 

intelligence priorities. 

“ I b e l i ev e m o s t A m e r i c a n s u n d e r s t a n d t h e n e e d t o 

keep secrets. Where Americans want to be reassured

i s t h at t h e o b j e c t i v e s m a k e s e n s e a n d t h at i t ’ s 

d o n e e f f e c t i v e ly a n d r e s p o n s i b ly. I d o n ’ t t h i n k t h e 

A m e r i c a n p e o p l e o b j e c t t o k e e p i n g s e c r e t s . Th ey 

wa n t u s t o m a k e s u r e t h at o u r o p e r at i o n s a r e 

c o n s i s t e n t w i t h A m e r i c a n va l u e s a n d t h at t h e y ’ r e 

carried ou t in a resp onsible way.”

- DCI John Deutch, testimony before the House Permanent Select 

Committee on Intelligence, December 19, 1995

President Clinton also urged the IC to intensify its 

efforts against terrorism as the threat continued to 

grow. As a result, Deutch created a Terrorism Warning Group—a dedicated national-level threat warning unit within the Counterterrorism Center—to 

provide warning on possible terrorist attacks against 

the US. Officers from across the IC filled the positions to review intelligence from all sources.

In December 1996, after President Clinton’s re-election, Deutch resigned as DCI. Despite his short 

tenure, he accomplished some important changes 

within the Agency. He also made an effort, just as 

other directors had, to integrate the community, but 

the DCI’s role in leading the IC remained uncertain. 

DCI John Deutch (right, foreground) and DDCI George Tenet (left) accompany President Bill Clinton as he departs the main 

entrance of CIA Headquarters. (Picture courtesy of the William J. Clinton Presidential Library)
92 93 /

Tenure:

Director of Central Intelligence, July 11, 1997 – July 11, 2004 

P r e s i d e n t s S e rv e d : 

• William J. Clinton

• George W. Bush

Appointed:

March 19, 1997, by President William J. Clinton; confi rmed by the Senate, 

July 10, 1997; sworn in, July 11, 1997

Deputy Director:

• General John A. Gordon, US Air Force, October 31, 1997 – October 18, 2000

• John E. McLaughlin, October 19, 2000, through remainder of Tenet’s tenure 

(served as Acting Director, July 11, 2004 – September 24, 2004)

Born:

January 5, 1953, Flushing, New York

Education:

Georgetown University, School of Foreign Service, B.S.F.S., 1976; Columbia 

University, School of International Aff airs, M.I.A., 1978

Career Highlights:

• Legislative Assistant, Legislative Director, offi ce of Senator John Heinz, 1982-85

• Staff Member, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), 1985-88 

• Staff Director, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), 1988-93 

• Member of President-elect Clinton’s national security transition team, 1992-93 

• Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Intelligence 

Programs, National Security Council, 1993-95 

• Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, 1995-97 

• Visiting Professor at Georgetown University

G e o r g e J o h n 

Te n e t
94 95 /

The CIA faced an unprecedented challenge after the 

terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Knowing 

that intelligence would be essential to American 

success in the campaign against al-Qa‘ida, Agency 

leaders immediately began developing a blueprint 

for collecting intelligence and conducting operations 

against the terrorist group and its Afghan allies, the 

Taliban. Guiding the Agency during this demanding 

time was Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) 

George Tenet, whose years of intelligence experience 

helped instill public confi dence in the Agency’s ability 

to conquer the challenges ahead.

Tenet began his career in public service in 1982 in 

the office of former Senator H. John Heinz II of 

Pennsylvania, where he served as a legislative assistant and legislative director. In 1985, Tenet became 

a staff member of the Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence (SSCI) and was involved with monitoring arms control negotiations between the Soviet 

Union and the US. In 1988, Tenet was appointed 

staff director of SSCI, coordinating the staff support 

to the committee’s oversight and legislative activities. 

He worked to strengthen covert-action reporting 

requirements, to create a statutory inspector general for the CIA, and to reorganize the Intelligence 

Community (IC). In 1992, Tenet was a member 

of President Bill Clinton’s national security transition team and later served as special assistant to the 

president. In 1993, he was named senior director 

for intelligence programs at the National Security 

Council (NSC); he was named Deputy Director of 

Central Intelligence in July 1995. Two years later, he 

was appointed DCI. 

The challenges Tenet faced as DCI were far different than those of his predecessors. Tenet’s mission 

was to revitalize the Agency, which had experienced 

a 25 percent decline in personnel from its Cold War 

peak, while also managing the continued integration 

of the IC. Moreover, Tenet came to office as the 

technology revolution of the 1990s was creating new 

opportunities for technical collection. Old familiar 

targets were also changing rapidly, forcing the Agency 

to upgrade its human intelligence. 

Early in his tenure, Tenet placed particular emphasis 

on addressing the increased threat of terrorism. He 

expanded and revitalized the Agency’s Counterterrorism Center (CTC), adding new offi cers and taking 

steps to further integrate the analysts, operations offi -

cers and technical experts who were working there.

On October 12, 2000, the Navy destroyer USS Cole

was attacked in the port of Aden, Yemen, by a small 

boat carrying suicide bombers. Al-Qa‘ida operatives 

were identified as the perpetrators. Soon thereafter, 

Tenet asked CTC to develop a comprehensive plan 

to address terrorism; it was called the “Blue Sky” 

report. The paper outlined the Agency’s ideal strategy for fighting terrorism, assuming no resource or 

policy limitations. CTC recommended disrupting al-Qa‘ida networks in 

Afghanistan and providing support for the Northern Alliance in an effort 

to combat al-Qai’da’s host, the Taliban. The plan highlighted the need to 

employ a multifaceted approach to fighting terrorism, but it was not immediately implemented because of policy constraints and insufficient resources. 

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the George W. Bush Administration called on the CIA to develop a plan to respond to the attacks. Agency 

leaders used the “Blue Sky” report as their guide. As quoted in Tenet’s book, 

At the Center of the Storm, Tenet explained to President George W. Bush, 

“We’re prepared to launch in short order an aggressive covert action program that will carry the fight to the enemy, particularly al-Qa‘ida and its 

Taliban protectors.” 

Th e CIA created a seven-man team that landed in Afghanistan on September 

26, 2001; it linked up with the Northern Alliance to overthrow the Taliban and 

deny al-Qa‘ida its safe haven. By mid-November of that year, all of Afghanistan 

had fallen to US and Northern Alliance forces. Usama Bin Ladin’s mountain 

This scorched and tattered American flag recovered from the debris of Ground Zero was given to DCI George Tenet, who hung it 

in his office at CIA Headquarters. The flag serves as a constant reminder of the strength and durability of the nation we serve.

On September 29, 2001, three days after the first CIA team 

entered Afghanistan, Chief of Staff Andrew Card, National 

Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, President George W. Bush 

and DCI George Tenet held a meeting at Camp David (clockwise, from bottom left).
96 97 /

hideout of Tora Bora was cleared on December 22, 2001, but he escaped, 

marking the close of the fi rst phase of Operation Enduring Freedom.

The Agency’s close relationship with President Bush and senior policymakers after 9/11 moved the CIA into a pivotal role in national security decision making. Tenet promoted the CIA’s capabilities and carved 

a larger role for the Agency through increased funding and personnel. 

Tenet led the Agency through one of its darkest periods, as it faced 

withering criticism for failing to detect and prevent the 9/11 plot. Later, 

the failure to find evidence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in 

DCI George Tenet (left) and President George W. Bush (right) admire George H.W. Bush’s portrait on display in the Directors 

Gallery at CIA Headquarters.

Iraq after the toppling of Saddam Hussein brought increased scrutiny 

on the Agency and Tenet. WMD had formed the basis of the case to 

invade Iraq. 

Tenet’s tenure—the second longest in the Agency’s history—ended on 

July 11, 2004. The CIA, like America, had changed as a result of the 

attacks on 9/11. Tenet led the Agency to adapt, to continue seeking the 

truth, and to make the tough decisions to protect our country.

“We will always call it as we see it ... We cannot afford an environment 

to develop where analysts are afraid to make a call, where judgments are 

held back because analysts fear they will be wrong. Their work and these 

judgments make vital contributions to our nation’s security ... We constantly 

learn and improve. And at no time will we allow our integrity or our 

willingness to make the tough calls be compromised.” DCI George Tenet’s 

remarks at Georgetown University, February 5, 2004.

“ This is a time for all of us to c ome to gether, to bring 

a l l ou r ta l e n t s t o be a r i n a st e e ly det e r m i nat ion 

t o d o w hat w e a r e c a l l e d t o d o — prot e c t ou r f e l low 

c i t i z e n s . It i s ou r t u r n ag a i n t o s t e p u p t o t h e 

c ha l l e n g e , a n d t o m e et i t as w e m e et a l l c ha l l e n g e s : 

w i t h c o m m i t m e n t a n d c o u r ag e . P u t s o m e s p i r i t i n 

y o u r s t e p, s q ua r e y o u r s h o u l d e r s , f o c u s y o u r ey e s . 

We have a job to d o.”

- DCI George Tenet’s message to CIA employees on September 12, 2001
98 99 /

Tenure:

• Director of Central Intelligence, September 24, 2004 – April 21, 2005

• Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, April 21, 2005 – May 26, 2006

P r e s i d e n t S e rv e d : 

George W. Bush

Appointed:

August 10, 2004, by President George W. Bush; confi rmed by the Senate, 

September 22, 2004; sworn in, September 24, 2004

Deputy Director:

• John E. McLaughlin, until November 12, 2004

• No Deputy Director from November 12, 2004 – July 15, 2005

• Vice Admiral Albert M. Calland III, US Navy, July 15, 2005 – July 23, 2006

Born:

November 1938, Waterbury, Connecticut

Education:

Yale University, B.A., 1960

Career Highlights:

• US Army intelligence offi cer, 1960-62 

• Clandestine Service Offi cer, Central Intelligence Agency, 1962-72 

• Small-business owner, newspaper founder; member of the city council 

and mayor, Sanibel, Florida, 1974-83 

• Commissioner, Lee County (Florida) Commission, 1983-88; 

chairman, 1985-86 

• Member of Congress, 14th District, Florida, 1989-2004 

• Chair, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 1997-2004 

• Co-chair, Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before 

and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 

Porter

J o h n s t o n 

Goss
100 101 /

In the years following 9/11, management of the 

Intelligence Community (IC) came to the forefront. 

Integrating intelligence capabilities was now a critical 

priority. Just as Pearl Harbor led to the creation of the 

CIA, 9/11 prompted the US Government to reassess 

the eff ectiveness of the intelligence structure.

President George W. Bush nominated Porter Goss 

to be the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) following DCI George Tenet’s resignation in July 2004. 

Goss’s career in intelligence began when he served as 

a US Army intelligence offi cer at age 22. Two years 

later, Goss began working for the CIA as a case offi -

cer, mainly in Latin America. He left the Agency in 

1972 when a serious illness forced his resignation. 

Goss moved to Florida, 

founded a newspaper 

and became active in 

local politics. In 1989 

he was elected to the 

House of Representatives, where he served 

15 years. Th roughout 

Goss’s time in Congress, 

he consistently defended 

the CIA. He chaired the 

House Permanent Select 

Committee on Intelligence for much of his 

time on the Hill. After 

9/11, he helped lead the joint Congressional inquiry 

into IC activities, seeking to indentify gaps in America’s 

defense. Some members of Congress expressed concerns that Goss was too politically partisan to lead the 

Agency, but in August 2004 he was confi rmed as DCI. 

Goss brought in personal staff from outside the 

Agency to assume senior positions at the CIA. 

CIA offi cers—especially veterans—were not eager 

to accept outsiders, and some clashed with Goss’s 

advisers. Several senior officers departed, including Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John 

McLaughlin and operations director Stephen Kappes 

(who later returned to serve as Deputy Director 

under Director Michael Hayden). 

Goss’s tenure marked the beginning of a time of 

rapid growth for the CIA. President Bush asked him 

to increase CIA personnel across all directorates by 

as much as 50 percent; new analysts, case officers, 

engineers and foreign language-proficient officers 

joined the ranks. Goss 

also emphasized research 

and development to identify new approaches to 

combating terrorism. 

On December 17, 2004, 

President Bush signed 

the Intelligence Reform 

and Terrorist Prevention Act (IRTPA) to 

institute the changes 

recommended by the 

9/11 Commission. The 

goal of the Act was to 

narrow the divide between foreign and domestic 

intelligence organizations, to create more effective 

management of the entire IC, and to promote intelligence sharing between organizations. The Act split 

the duties of the DCI and abolished that position; 

“ Th e r e i s n o c o n t r a d i c t i o n 

b e t w e e n i n t e l l i g e n c e a n d 

f r e e d o m . A m e r i c a m u s t 

ac q u i r e t h e s e c r e t s o f i t s 

e n e m i e s i f i t i s t o r e m a i n 

f r e e , a n d o u r s k i l l a n d 

d e d i c at i o n i n t h at c a l l i n g 

are sec ond to none.”

- DCI Porter Goss remarks at 

the Ronald Reagan Presidential 

Library, March 2, 2005

it created the positions of the Director of National 

Intelligence (DNI) to take over the management of the 

IC and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 

(D/CIA) to manage the Agency’s functions. Th us, 

Porter Goss became the last DCI and the fi rst D/CIA. 

The D/CIA also assumed responsibility for overseeing the collection of human intelligence abroad 

by IC agencies and, under the guidance of the DNI, 

to coordinate the relationships between US intelligence agencies and their foreign counterparts. The 

new legislation also established the Terrorist Threat 

Integration Center, later renamed the National 

Counterterrorism Center, to integrate IC analysis of 

terrorist threats and to develop strategic operational 

plans related to counterterrorism. 

The reactions to the changes were mixed. While 

understanding the need for reforms after 9/11, 

many at the Agency perceived the new structure as a 

loss of prestige for the CIA. Almost from the beginning, the relationship between D/CIA Goss and 

DNI John Negroponte was strained as both sought 

to define their new roles. Goss lost the president’s 

confidence and resigned in May 2006.

Director Porter Goss (right) greets President George W. Bush as he arrives at CIA Headquarters.
102 103 /

Tenure:

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, May 30, 2006 – February 13, 2009

P r e s i d e n t S e rv e d : 

• George W. Bush

• Barack Obama

Appointed:

May 8, 2006, by President George W. Bush; confi rmed by the Senate, 

May 26, 2006; sworn in, May 30, 2006

Deputy Director:

Stephen R. Kappes, July 24, 2006, through the remainder of Hayden’s tenure

Born:

March 17, 1945, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

Education:

Duquesne University, B.A., 1967; M.A., 1969

Career Highlights:

• Air Force intelligence offi cer, 1970-84

• Air Attaché in Bulgaria, 1984-86

• Political-Military Aff airs Offi cer, Air Force Headquarters, 1986-89

• Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, 

National Security Council, 1989-91

• Chief, Secretary of the Air Force Staff Group, 1991-93

• Director of Intelligence, US European Command, 1993-95

• Commander, Air Intelligence Agency, and Director, Joint Command 

and Control Warfare Center, 1996-97

• Deputy Chief of Staff , UN Command and US Forces Korea, 1997-99

• Director, National Security Agency, 1999-2005

• Principal Deputy Director for National Intelligence, 2005-06

• Retired from the US Air Force on July 1, 2008 while serving as Director 

of the Central Intelligence Agency

• Visiting Professor at George Mason University

General, US Air Force

M i c h a e l 

V i n c e n t 

H a y d e n 
104 105 /

In 2004, President George W. Bush signed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act (IRTPA), 

mandating a major reorganization of the Intelligence 

Community (IC). Th e law meant that the Director of 

the Central Intelligence Agency (D/CIA) would no 

longer oversee the coordination of the IC or provide 

daily briefi ngs to the president. Th is role was given to 

the new position of Director of National Intelligence 

(DNI), leaving the CIA to focus on foreign intelligence collection, analysis and covert action. 

After the departure of Porter Goss, the task of managing the CIA during this transition went to Air 

Force General Michael Hayden, who was appointed 

D/CIA by President Bush in May 2006. The selection of an active-duty military officer for the Agency’s chief worried some—as did General Hayden’s 

previous assignment as Deputy Director of National 

Intelligence—but Hayden made a relatively easy 

transition, perhaps because of his long and distinguished career in intelligence. Beginning in 1970, 

Hayden served as an Air Force intelligence officer 

for 14 years and later became the Director of the 

National Security Agency (NSA), where he served 

for six years—the longest tenure of any director in 

that agency’s history.

Agency officers welcomed Hayden’s management 

style, which promoted integration of the Agency’s 

directorates without interfering with their internal 

operations. Hayden further unified the workforce 

by developing a Strategic Intent—with the theme of 

“One Agency, One Community”—that focused on 

integration, leadership and building a 21st century 

infrastructure. As part of that plan, Hayden centralized communications to the workforce by developing an internal director’s website that provided a 

central repository for his speeches and workforce 

messages. Th e website also allowed offi cers to submit 

comments directly to him. 

Hayden believed in investing in the workforce, promoting diversity and encouraging officers to engage 

in joint-duty assignments that gave them experience 

in other elements of the IC. When he left the CIA, 

Hayden explained to his successor, Leon Panetta, 

“You’re inheriting the best leadership team in the 

federal government. If you give them half a chance, 

they will not let you fail, the way they would not 

let me fail.” Hayden’s leadership team included the 

Deputy Director of the CIA, Stephen Kappes—a 

former Director of Operations whom Hayden asked 

to return after his resignation during DCI Porter 

Goss’s tenure—and the Associate Deputy Director 

of the CIA, Michael Morell. 

Hayden inherited controversial issues tied to counterterrorism, notably the CIA’s detention and interrogation program for terrorist suspects. While 

Hayden understood the internal and public debates 

surrounding the program, he also believed that there 

were risks in ending it, and he discussed those views 

candidly with the public at the time. 

Hayden also thought it was important to educate the 

public about the Agency’s mission. For example, he 

advocated the public disclosure of the role that intelligence played in detecting a nuclear reactor in Syria, 

arguing that the story would help Americans appreciate the value of CIA contributions to national security. 

Hayden hoped to remain D/CIA after the 2008 

presidential election, but President Barack Obama 

replaced him with Leon Panetta. The turmoil that 

had surrounded the Agency in the years after 9/11 

quieted during Hayden’s tenure. He understood that 

the CIA had seen enough change, and he became a 

strong advocate for the Agency’s mission and its people.

“O ur nation owes them a tremend ous debt of gratitude. 

We w i l l r e pay i t. We w i l l r e pay i t b y l i v i n g t h e 

values they demonstrated: loyalty, integrity, excellent 

service—these are the things that must and will 

guide our work.”

- D/CIA Michael Hayden remarks at the CIA Memorial Ceremony, May 21, 2007

General Michael Hayden is sworn in as Director of the Central 

Intelligence Agency on May 30, 2006. (Picture courtesy of the 

George W. Bush Presidential Library)

While serving as D/CIA, Michael Hayden signs papers retiring 

from the US Air Force on July 1, 2008.
106 107 /

Tenure:

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, February 13, 2009 – June 30, 2011

P r e s i d e n t S e rv e d : 

Barack Obama

Appointed:

January 9, 2009, by President Barack Obama; confirmed by the Senate, 

February 12, 2009; sworn in, February 13, 2009

Deputy Director:

• Stephen R. Kappes, until May 5, 2010

• Michael J. Morell, May 6, 2010, through the remainder of Panetta’s tenure 

(served as Acting Director, June 30, 2011 – September 6, 2011)

Born:

June 28, 1938, Monterey, California

Education:

Santa Clara University, B.A., 1960; Santa Clara University Law School, 

LL.B., 1963

Career Highlights:

• Volunteered for active duty as 2nd Lieutenant, US Army, 1964

• Legislative assistant, US Senate, 1966-69

• Special Assistant to Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, 

and Director of Offi ce of Civil Rights, 1969-70

• Executive Assistant to New York City Mayor John Lindsay, 1970-71

• Private law practice, 1971-77

• Member of Congress, 16th District, California, 1977-93

• Director, Offi ce of Management and Budget, 1993-94

• White House Chief of Staff , 1994-97

• Co-Director, Panetta Institute for Public Policy, 1998-2009

• Secretary of Defense, 2011-13

L e o n E d w a r d 

Pa n e tta
108 109 /

Th e theme of change rippled throughout the government as Barack Obama took offi ce as the 44th President 

of the United States. Th e new president moved quickly 

to fi ll the job of Director of the Central Intelligence 

Agency (D/CIA), nominating Leon Panetta, a choice 

that initially drew skepticism because of Panetta’s lack 

of experience in the intelligence fi eld. Concerns quickly 

evaporated as Panetta 

won the loyalty of the 

Agency workforce, 

smoothed relations 

with Congress and 

established himself as 

a key member of the 

president’s national 

security team. 

Panetta, the son of 

Italian immigrants, 

decided at an early 

age to commit his 

life to public service. 

He served in the US 

Army from 1964 

to 1966 and then 

became a legislative 

assistant to US Senator Thomas Henry Kuchel 

(R-CA). In 1969, Panetta joined the Nixon Administration as the director of the Office of Civil Rights. 

When the administration instituted the so-called 

“Southern strategy” in an effort to reduce civil rights 

enforcement, putting pressure on Panetta to back 

off from enforcing Brown v. Board of Education, 

Panetta resisted and lost his job. Reflecting upon 

this experience, Panetta said, “I don’t think you are a 

good public servant unless you are protecting what 

you believe in. If you compromise, then you’re not 

worth much.” 

Panetta was elected to the House of Representatives 

and served 16 years as a member of Congress from 

Northern California. Elected to a ninth term, Panetta 

relinquished his seat in 1993 when President Bill 

Clinton selected him to be the Director of the Offi ce 

of Management and Budget. A year later, President 

Clinton asked Panetta to become the White House 

Chief of Staff , a position he held until the 

end of Clinton’s fi rst 

term. In 1997, Panetta 

and his wife, Sylvia, 

co-founded the nonpartisan Panetta Institute for Public Policy. 

Panetta resigned from 

the Institute after a 

decade there to begin 

his tenure at the CIA 

in February 2009.

Panetta emphasized 

strengthening “global 

coverage”—expanding the CIA’s ability to anticipate and 

respond to events across the entire globe—even while 

pressing the Agency to remain aggressive in its eff ort 

to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qa‘ida. Th e campaign against al-Qa‘ida was not without sacrifi ce: on 

December 30, 2009, seven CIA offi cers were killed 

and several others injured in a suicide bombing in 

Khowst Province, Afghanistan. Th e day after the 

attacks, Panetta said, “Th ose who fell yesterday were 

far from home and close to the enemy, doing the hard 

work that must be done to protect our country from 

terrorism. We owe them our deepest gratitude, and 

“ What ha ppe n e d y e st e r day i s t h e 

h i st or ic m o m e n t f or C I A . 

Th i s i s g o i n g t o b e a m o m e n t i n 

history that will be remembered 

f o r ev e r . It i s a p i vo ta l m o m e n t 

t hat w i l l f or ev e r c ha n g e 

t h e wa r o n t e r ro r i s m , a n d i t 

w i l l g i v e u s t h e o p p o rt u n i t y 

t o not on ly ope rat iona l ly 

defeat them, but to permanently 

defeat al- Qa‘ida.”

- D/CIA Leon Panetta addressing the 

workforce on May 2, 2011, the day 

Usama Bin Ladin was killed

we pledge to them and their families that we will 

never cease fi ghting for the cause to which they dedicated their lives—a safer America.”

Not long after the tragedy at Khowst, the CIA 

developed promising leads in its search for al-Qa‘ida’s 

founder, Usama Bin Ladin, and on May 2, 2011, bin 

Ladin was killed in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Nearly a 

decade after the September 11th attacks revealed the 

need for government organizations to work across 

bureaucratic lines, the operation showcased the benefi ts of close collaboration among intelligence agencies, 

as well as between the CIA and the military. 

In his strategy for the Agency through 2015, Panetta 

emphasized the importance of a diverse workforce, 

the need to bolster foreign language capabilities, and 

the imperative of maintaining a global presence that 

would allow the Agency to respond with speed and 

agility to events anywhere in the world. Beginning in 

December 2010, this need for agility became especially acute, as a wave of revolutionary demonstrations starting in Tunisia rippled through the Arab 

world in what became known as the Arab Spring. 

The tumult forced the CIA to quickly reallocate 

resources to ensure the president and policymakers 

remained informed about the rapidly changing political landscape in the Middle East.

Panetta led the Agency during a time of profound 

loss and great achievement. He had never been an 

operations officer or an analyst at the CIA, but he 

nevertheless understood the Agency’s mission and 

had a deep appreciation for the needs of the men 

and women he led. 

D/CIA Leon Panetta stands next to President Barack Obama in front of the Memorial Wall located in the main lobby of CIA 

Headquarters during a visit to CIA Headquarters on April 20, 2009.
110 111 /

Tenure:

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 

September 6, 2011 – November 9, 2012

P r e s i d e n t S e rv e d : 

Barack Obama

Appointed:

April 28, 2011, by President Barack Obama; confi rmed by the Senate, 

June 30, 2011; sworn in, September 6, 2011

Deputy Director:

Michael J. Morell through the remainder of Petraeus’s tenure 

(served as Acting Director, November 9, 2012 – March 8, 2013)

Born:

November 7, 1952, Cornwall-on-Hudson, New York

Education:

US Military Academy, B.S., 1974; Princeton University, M.P.A, 1985; Ph.D., 1987

Career Highlights:

• Commissioned into US Army, 1974

• Chief of Operations of the UN Force, Haiti, 1995

• Executive Assistant for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , 1997-99

• Chief of Staff , XVIII Airborne Corps, 2000-01 

• Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations of the NATO Stabilization 

Force and Deputy Commander of the US Joint Counterterrorism 

Task Force, Bosnia, 2001-02

• Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division, 2002-04

(Including Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003-04)

• Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq and 

NATO Training Mission–Iraq, 2004-05

• Commanding General, Combined Arms Center, 

Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2005-07

• Commanding General, Multi-National Force–Iraq, 2007-08

• Commander, US Central Command, 2008-10

• Commander, NATO International Security Assistance Force Commander, 

US Forces–Afghanistan, 2010-11

• Retired from US Army, August 31, 2011

General, US Army (Retired)

D a v i d H o w e l l 

P e t r a e u s 
112 113 /

David Petraeus was sworn in as Director of the Central Intelligence 

Agency (D/CIA) five days before the 10th anniversary of 9/11. 

During his 14-month tenure, the Agency remained focused on the long 

campaign against al-Qai’da, but it also stepped up global coverage to 

address an increasingly diverse set of challenges to the nation’s security, 

especially those arising from the political turmoil in the Arab World. 

Petraeus served in the US Army for 37 years, beginning with his 

graduation as a “distinguished cadet” from the United States Military 

Academy in 1974. In the decade following the 9/11 attacks, Petraeus 

held six consecutive general officer commands, five of which were in 

combat. In addition to being in the vanguard of the fight to Baghdad 

in 2003, he also led the “surge” of troops into Iraq that began in 2007. 

He then became the head of the US Central Command and later took 

charge of the NATO International Security Assistance Force and US 

forces in Afghanistan, his final military assignment before leading the 

CIA. He retired from the Army to take the position of D/CIA.

D/CIA David Petraeus addresses Agency officers at an event on September 24, 2011.

As D/CIA, Petraeus developed several initiatives to prepare the next 

generation of Agency leaders, creating the Chief of Corporate Learning 

position and launching the Director’s Scholars Program, designed to 

help promising officers attend graduate school and improve the CIA’s 

overall mission performance. Petraeus also focused on improving the 

CIA’s technology infrastructure and upgrading operational tradecraft 

to ensure that Agency offi cers were 

equipped to take advantage of the 

latest changes in technology.

In 2012, the CIA celebrated its 

65th anniversary and the 50th 

anniversary of the Original 

Headquarters Building (OHB). 

In January 2012, during a ceremony commemorating the OHB 

anniversary, Petraeus referred to the Biblical quotation that is fixed in 

stone in the OHB lobby. “It is in these marble walls,” he said, “that our 

Agency honors its past and proclaims its fundamental mission in words 

borrowed from the Gospel according to John: ‘And ye shall know the 

truth, and the truth shall make you free.”

On September 11, 2012, militants attacked the US consulate and a 

nearby annex in Benghazi, Libya, killing four Americans, including the 

US Ambassador to Libya. This event prompted a series of reviews and 

investigations by the US Government near the end of Petraeus’s tenure. 

Petraeus encouraged a spirit of innovation across the Agency, and his leadership skills, relationships with foreign leaders, and understanding of 

international aff airs ensured that the CIA had a prominent seat at the table 

whenever the president faced important decisions on national security.

“ I hav e f ou n d t h rou g h ha r d e x pe r i e n c e 

that, for any organiz ation, there is 

no substitute for continually learning, 

adapting and improving.” 

- D/CIA David Petraeus announcement 

to the workforce on December 21, 2011
114 115 /

Tenure:

Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, March 8, 2013 – Present

P r e s i d e n t S e rv e d : 

Barack Obama

Appointed:

January 7, 2013, by President Barack Obama; confi rmed by the Senate, 

March 7, 2013; sworn in, March 8, 2013

Deputy Director:

Michael Morell, until August 9, 2013

Avril Haines

Born:

September 22, 1955, North Bergen, New Jersey

Education:

Fordham University, B.A., 1977; The University of Texas 

at Austin, M.A., 1980

Career Highlights:

• Various posts in CIA, 1980-1999

• Chief of Staff , Director of CIA, 1999-2001

• Deputy Executive Director, CIA, 2001-03

• Director, Terrorist Th reat Integration Center, 2003-04

• Interim Director, National Counterterrorism Center, 2004-05

• President and CEO, Th e Analysis Corporation, 2005-08

• White House Assistant to the President for Homeland Security 

and Counterterrorism, 2009-13

J o h n O . 

Brennan
“ I t i s i n c u m b e n t o n u s n o t o n ly t o a n t i c i pat e t h e 

c h a n g e s t h at l i e a h e a d b u t a l s o t o a d j u s t o u r 

t r a d e c r a f t, c a p a b i l i t i e s , p r i o r i t i e s , a n d w o r k 

p r o c e s s e s a c c o r d i n g ly a n d t o l e v e r a g e o p t i m a l ly 

t h e t r e m e n d o u s t a l e n t a n d e n e r g y t h at r e s i d e 

w i t h i n o u r w o r k f o r c e .” 

- D/CIA John Brennan’s message to CIA employees on March 18, 2013

A publication from the Central Intelligence Agency

Office of Public Affairs

www.CIA.gov

September 2013

Designed and Printed by IPS #10011337611