PUBLISH UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________ ARTHUR NOREJA, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. COMMISSIONER, SSA, Defendant - Appellee. No. 18-1383

_________________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Colorado (D.C. No. 1:17-CV-02047-CMA)

_________________________________ Lawrence D. Saunders, Pueblo, Colorado, appearing for Appellant. Noah M. Schabacker, Special Assistant United States A ttorney, Assistant Regional Counsel, Social Security Administrati on, Denver, Colorado (Jason R. Dunn, United States Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney for the Di strict of Colorado, Denver, Colorado, and Mona Ahmed, Acting Regional Chief Counsel, Office of the General Counsel, Region VIII, So cial Security Administrati on, Denver, Colorado, with him on the briefs), app earing for Appellee.

_________________________________ Before BRISCOE , LUCERO , and EID , Circuit Judges.

_________________________________ BRISCOE , Circuit Judge.

_________________________________ Arthur Noreja appeals the denial of hi s claim for disability benefits. Noreja alleges that the Administrativ e Law Judge (“ALJ”) failed to follow an instruction in a FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### March 5, 2020 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court2 remand order from the Appeals Council, th e entity responsibl e for adjudicating administrative appeals in Social Security cases . We hold that (1) we have jurisdiction to determine whether an alleged ALJ violati on of an Appeals Council order warrants reversal; but (2) our “usual” review standards remain in force, mean ing that the alleged violation is material only if it shows the AL J meaningfully failed to apply the correct legal standards, or the denial of benefits is unsupported by substantial evidence; and (3) applying those standards here, the ALJ’s denial of Noreja’s application must be affirmed.
I Noreja filed his disability claim in Marc h 2012. Volume I, Ad ministrative Record (“I Admin. R.”) at 129. In July 2013, fo llowing a hearing, an ALJ issued a detailed written order – exceeding 13 page s with single spacing – in which she denied Noreja’s claim. Id. at 129–42. After summarizing the five-s tep process for determining disability, id. at 129–31, the ALJ stated that Noreja had several severe impairments, including “arthritis of the left upper extremity and right lower extremity,” “co gnitive disorder,” and “headaches.” Id. at 131 (emphasis omitted). Neverthele ss, the ALJ determined that these impairments (or a combination of the impair ments) did not warrant relief under 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 1. Id. at 132. Among other thi ngs, the ALJ found that “the claimant’s mental impairment does not meet or medically equal the criteria of listing
1202.” Id. at 133–34. The ALJ also found that Noreja had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to do “medium” work, subject to various limitations, and that there were “jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy” which Noreja could perform. Id. at 134, 141 (emphasis omitted). Th e ALJ considered various sources of3 medical evidence, including (1) assessments provided by Dr. Michael A. Dallenbach following Noreja’s involvement in a car accident in February 2011, id. at 135–36; (2) a June 2012 “consultative examina tion” of Noreja by Kent J. Lofley, D.O., which qualified Noreja’s limitations, id. at 136, 138; (3) a June 2013 “psychological examination” of Noreja by Richard B. Madsen , Ph.D., which supported a findi ng of cognitive impairment, id. at 136–37; (4) a May 2013 questionnaire f illed out by one of Noreja’s primary care physicians, Dr. Ben Martinez, id. at 139; and (5) a review of Noreja’s case file by James J. Wanstrath, Ph.D. Id. at 139–40. The ALJ evaluated the evidence, decided that Dr. Madsen’s opinion was entitled to “little wei ght,” and concluded that Noreja was not cognizably disabled. Id. at 136–40, 142. Noreja asked the Appeals Council to revi ew the ALJ’s July 2 013 decision. The Appeals Council obliged, and in March 2015 issued a written order vacating the ALJ’s decision and remanding the case for further proceedings. Id. at 149–50. The Appeals Council noted that the ALJ ne ither adopted the limitations id entified by Dr. Madsen, nor assigned Dr. Madsen’s opinion significant we ight, because according to the ALJ, Dr. Madsen did not “have a treati ng relationship with the claima nt, apparently relied quite heavily on subjective co mplaints, and only examined the cl aimant to generate evidence for his disability claim.” Id. at 149. The Appeals Council disagreed with the ALJ’s assessment, stating not only that “[i]t does not appear Dr. Madsen had to rely on subjective complaints to form his opinion,” but also that Dr. Madsen’s “objective exam results” showed Noreja had multiple cognitive impairments. Id. The Appeals Council observed that “[i]f Dr. Madsen’s opinion me rits less weight ba sed on the manner by4 which it was obtained, then these results should be confirmed or contradicted by impartial consultative examination.” Id. The Appeals Council then issued this directive: Upon remand the Admini strative Law Judge will:

 Obtain additional evidence con cerning the claimant’s mental impairments in order to complete the administrative record in accordance with the regulatory st andards regarding consultative examinations and existing medi cal evidence (20 CFR 404.1512- 1513 and 416.912-913). The additi onal evidence shou ld include, if available, a consultative mental examination with psychological testing and medical source statemen ts about what the claimant can still do despite the impairment. Id. at 149–50 (bullet in original). The case was remanded to the same ALJ, who held another hearing. Id. at 11–12. In May 2016, the ALJ issued another detailed written order, this time exceeding 17 single-spaced pages, denyi ng Noreja’s claim. Id. at 11–28. After again summarizing the five-step procedure for determining disability, id. at 12–14, the ALJ expanded the list of Noreja’s severe impairments to include “rig ht hip and ankle degenerative joint disease,” “left shoulder degenerative joint disease,” “headaches,” “depressive disorder,” and “cognitive disorder.” Id. at 14–15 (emphasis omitted). Once more, however, the ALJ determined that Noreja did not have “an impa irment or combination of impairments” that warranted relief under 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 1. Id. at 15 (emphasis omitted). The ALJ found that “the claimant’s mental impairments, considered singly and in combination, do not meet or medically equal the criteria of listings 12.02 and 12.04.” Id. at 16–17. The ALJ reiterated that Norejahad the RFC to do “medium” work, subject5 to various limitations, and that there were “j obs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy” which Noreja could perform. Id. at 17, 27 (emphasis omitted). The ALJ did not obtain a ne w consultative mental examination before issuing her May 2016 decision, but she procured ad ditional evidence regarding Noreja’s impairments. This additional evidence includ ed further mental heal th treatment records ( e.g., id. at 22–23) and (1) an assessment of Noreja by Dr. Timothy Papsidero, id. at 20, 23; (2) a June 2013 neurological evalua tion of Noreja by Dr. Richard Gamuac, id. at 20– 21; (3) an initial evaluation of Noreja fo r purposes of therapy by Lesli St. John, id. at 23– 24; and (4) testimony from James Bruce, Ph.D., who opined that Noreja’s mental health impairments “include listings 12.02 and 12. 04” but Noreja “would be able to perform simple tasks” in an environm ent involving “occasional and superficial contact” with coworkers and the public. Id. at 18, 24–25. In light of the overall record, id. at 18–26, the ALJ reaffirmed her decision to afford Dr. Madsen’s opinion “little weight.” Id. at 23, 25. In contrast, the ALJ assigned “great weight” to Dr. Bruce’s assessment, as Dr. Bruce was “a mental health specialist” w ho “had the opportun ity to evaluate th e complete record” and to “hear the claimant’s testimony.” Id. at 25. The ALJ assigned “great weight” to Dr. Lofley’s assessment of Noreja as well. Id. at 21 (brackets added ). For a second time, the ALJ found no disability under th e governing legal standards. Id. at 26, 28. Noreja asked the Appeals Council to re view the ALJ’s May 2016 decision. The Appeals Council denied Noreja’s second request for review. In a July 2017 written order, the Appeals Council explained that it “found no reason” to examine the ALJ’s decision under Appeals Council rules, which rules perm itted review for an abuse of discretion, an6 error of law, a lack of substantial evidence, a “broad policy or procedural issue that may affect the public interest,” or significant new evidence. Id. at 1–2. The Appeals Council eschewed a second review of Noreja’s case based on the ALJ’s alleged noncompliance with the remand order, stating as follows: [Y]our representative alleged that th e Administrative Law Judge failed to comply with the prior order of remand and that this dem onstrates bias and lack of basic due process (Exhibit 19E/ 2). The Appeals Council considered the allegations solely as they relate to abuse of discretion. After reviewing the entire record, includ ing the hearing recordin g, the Appeals Council determined that the Administrative Law Judge did not abuse his or her discretion in this case and that none of the other r easons in our rules existed to review your case. Id. at 1 (brackets added). Noreja appealed to federal district cour t. Appellant’s Appendix at 4–5. The district court affirmed the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”), as reflected in the ALJ’s May 2016 order. Id. at 48, 79. The district court concluded that the Appeals Council “lef t the decision up to th e ALJ as to whether she deemed another consultative mental examination with psychological testing necessary.” Id. at 67; see also id. (“[A] review of the Appeals Council’s remand order makes clear that it did not order the ALJ to obtain a consultative mental examination; it merely determined that add itional evidence was required to support the ALJ’s assignment of little weight to Dr. Madsen’s opinion.”). The district c ourt emphasized that the ALJ on remand “obtained additional evidence sufficient to complete the admi nistrative record,” including Dr. Bruce’s opinion on Noreja’s mental impairments and “several more specific pieces of evidence th at do not support the level of limitations that Dr. Madsen7 described.” Id. at 68. Noting the Appeals Council’s decision in July 2017 to decline further review, the district court added that “the Appeals Council was apparently satisfied that the ALJ complied with its remand order.” Id. at 69. The district court rejected Noreja’s remaining arguments that the AL J improperly accorded no weight to Dr. Martinez’s opinions, id. at 65, 69–73; failed to include all of the work restrictions identified by Dr. Bruce, id. at 65, 74–76; and erroneousl y gave minimal weight to the opinions of Dr. Madsen. Id. at 65, 76–79.
II We have previously addressed the import of an ALJ’s failure to follow a directive from an Appeals Council, but only in unpubl ished dispositions. Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1(A) provides that “[u]npu blished decisions are not precedential, but they may be cited for their persuasive value.” Our case law generally follows that principle, looking in appropriate circumstances to an unpublished opinion if its rationale is persuasive and apposite to the issue presented. See, e.g., United States v. Engles , 779 F.3d 1161, 1162 n.1 (10th Cir. 2015) (stating that “[a]lthough unpublished orders a nd opinions generally are not considered binding precedent,” such an order or opinion “may be relied on for the purpose of disposing the issue presented if it has persuasive value with respect to a material issue in a case and would a ssist the court in its disposition”); United States v. Lyons , 510 F.3d 1225, 1233 n.2 (10th Cir. 2007) (mentioning an unpublished decision “as we would an opinion from another circuit, pe rsuasive because of its reasoned analysis”). One of our first notable references to ALJ compliance with an Appeals Council directive was in Scott v. Chater , 70 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. Nov. 24, 1995) (unpublished).8 There, an ALJ denied benefits but the Appeals Council remanded the matter with instructions. Id. at *1. The ALJ then denied benefits a second time. Id. We reversed and remanded, holding that the ALJ improperly assessed the evidence. Id. at *2–5. We concluded that “the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantia l evidence, was not reached by application of the pr oper rules, and did not comply with the directives of the Appeals Council on remand.” Id. at *6. After Scott , we issued several more opinions implying that a federal court has the author ity to evaluate ALJ compliance with an Appeals Council order. See, e.g., Rice v. Apfel , 242 F.3d 390, *6 & n.1 (10th Cir. Nov. 14, 2000) (unpublished) (holding that an AL J did not “fail to comply with the remand instructions of the district court and the Appeals Council,” but noting that any such instructions were not specific); Gardner-Renfro v. Apfel , 242 F.3d 388, *2 (10th Cir. Dec. 18, 2000) (unpublished) (deter mining that an ALJ “did no t fail to comply with the remand instructions of the district court or the Appeals Council”); Garza v. Apfel , 162 F.3d 1173, *2 (10th Cir. Nov. 5, 1998) (unp ublished) (rejecting the argument that “the ALJ took action inconsistent with th e Appeals Council’s order on remand”). Our decision in Gallegos v. Apfel , 141 F.3d 1184 (10th Cir. Apr. 10, 1998) (unpublished) arguably suggested a different approach. Gallegos again involved ALJ denials of benefits before and after an Appeals Council remand. Id. at *1. We held that a “challenge to the ALJ’s adherence to th e Appeals Council’s remand order is not cognizable by this court. By statute, our jurisdiction extends only to the Commissioner’s final decision, which in this case is the ALJ’s second decision.” Id. (citing, among other things, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). We qualified th at ruling by noting “Plaintiff does not argue9 that the ALJ failed to adhere to a legal requi rement to obtain add itional medical evidence in reaching her second, final decision, but only that the AL J did not follow the Appeals Council’s direction.” Id. A few years later, we decided Miller v. Barnhart , 175 F. App’x 952 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished). Unlike in Gallegos , the parties in Miller pointed out that Social Security regulations require an ALJ to take any action on remand that is ordered by the Appeals Council. Id. at 955 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 4 04.977(b)). But we observed in Miller that the claimant erroneously interpreted the Appeals Counc il’s instructions, and in a second administrative appeal, the Appeals Coun cil found that the ALJ “complied with its remand order.” Id. at 956. “Under these circumstance s,” we said, “it is appropriate to examine the Commissioner’s final decision u nder our usual standards, rather than focusing on conformance with the particular terms of the remand order.” Id.
III The standard for judicial review in Soci al Security cases is well settled. “Our review is limited to dete rmining whether the Commissione r applied the correct legal standards and whether the agency’s factua l findings are supported by substantial evidence.” Knight ex rel. P.K. v. Colvin , 756 F.3d 1171 , 1175 (10th Cir. 2014). We do not defer to the district court when evaluating the Commissioner’s decision. See Fischer-Ross v. Barnhart , 431 F.3d 729, 731 (10th Cir. 20 05) (“We review the district court’s decision de novo and independently determine whether the ALJ’s decision is free from legal error and supported by substantial evidence.”). “Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla and is such relevant ev idence as a reasonable mind might accept as10 adequate to support a conclusion.” Grogan v. Barnhart , 399 F.3d 1257, 1261 (10th Cir. 2005). “Evidence is not substantial if it is overwhelmed by other ev idence in the record or constitutes mere conclusion.” Id. at 1261–62 (citation omitted). “We may neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of the agency.” Knight , 756 F.3d at 1175 (citation and brack ets omitted). “The agency’s fa ilure to apply correct legal standards, or show us it has done so , is also grounds for reversal.” Hamlin v. Barnhart , 365 F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th Cir. 2004). No party in this matter ch allenges the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, but we are of course required to satisfy ourselves that we have the authority to proceed. Consistent with our unpublished decision in Miller , 175 F. App’x at 956, we now reaffirm the use of our usual review standard s when considering allegations that an ALJ failed to comply with an Appeals Council remand order. As discussed below, Congress specified in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) that courts are to evaluate denials of Social Security benefits by ascertaining whether the Commiss ioner’s decision applies the correct legal standard and is supported by substantia l evidence. An ALJ violates 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.977(b) and 416.1477(b) when he or she ignores a direc tive from the Appeals Council. That violation may or may not re nder the ALJ’s decision legally or factually insupportable under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). It is within our ju risdiction to consider alleged non-compliance as it pertains to our review under the statute. The modern jurisprudential tr end is toward greater precision in analyzing whether a statutory provision truly concerns “jurisdict ion.” In recent years, the Supreme Court has undertaken “[t]o ward off profligate use of the term.” Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med.11 Ctr. , 568 U.S. 145, 153 (2013) (brackets added ). Noting the overuse of “jurisdictional” classifications, the high court has emphasized that the word “is generally reserved for prescriptions delineating the classes of cas es a court may entertain (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons over whom the court may exercise adjudicatory authority (personal jurisdiction).” Fort Bend Cty., Tex. v. Davis , 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1848 (2019). “If the Legislature clearly states that a threshol d limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional, then courts a nd litigants will be duly instruct ed and will not be left to wrestle with the issue.” Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick , 559 U.S. 154, 161 (2010) (citation omitted). “But when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonj urisdictional in character.” Id. at 161–62 (citation omitted); see also United States v. Kwai Fun Wong , 575 U.S. 402, 409–10 (2015) (reiterating that the Court has “repeatedly” held procedural rules “cabin a court’s power only if Congress has clearly stat e[d] as much,” and without such a clear statement, “courts should treat the restriction as nonjuris dictional”) (citations omitted, brackets in original). The relevant statute in this case is 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). That subsection provides for “Judicial review” of final decisions of the Commissioner. See id. (“Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the am ount in controversy, may obtain review of such a decision by a civil action commenced w ithin sixty days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow.”) The law states that:12 The court shall have the power to ente r, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, m odifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, w ith or without re manding the cause for a rehearing. The findings of the Co mmissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantia l evidence, shall be conclusive, and where a claim has been denied by the Commissioner of Social Security or a decision is rendered under su bsection (b) of this sec tion which is adverse to an individual who was a party to th e hearing before the Commissioner of Social Security, because of failure of the claimant or such individual to submit proof in conformity with any regulation prescribed under subsection (a) of this section, the court shall re view only the question of conformity with such regulations and the validity of such regulations. Id. Section 405(g) of title 42 ma y be more than a claim-processing provision, but it does not strip federal courts of jurisdiction to consider all arguments regarding an ALJ’s compliance with an Appeals Council order. The statute vests federal tribunals with authority to hear cases concerning final d ecisions of the Commissioner denying benefits. The law dictates the manner in which courts should evaluate such a final decision; courts are to treat factual findings supported by substantial evidence as “conclusive,” and to look at regulatory compliance (and the validity of the underlying regulations) when a claimant’s proof is deemed inadequate. If an ALJ violation of an Appeals Council remand order does not materially implicate compliance with a proof-related rule or regulation, then that means the claimant’s challenge to the Commissioner’s decision will fail on the merits. It does not mean that the court lacks authority to hear the argument in the first place. Characterizing any review of ALJ noncomp liance as beyond th e court’s authority is inconsistent with the shift toward greater ju risdictional precision. It also invites courts13 to give this issue the back of the hand, without examining whether a violation of an Appeals Council remand order materially misapp lies legal requirements or robs an ALJ’s decision of substantial evidence . While some district courts go on to apply these “usual standards” when confronted w ith an ALJ’s alleged failure to follow an A ppeals Council order, others invoke a “jurisdi ctional” argument and refuse to consider the issue at all. Declining to review the issue at all swee ps too broadly, because an ALJ’s failure to follow an Appeals Council remand order w ill often implicate conformity with a proofrelated rule or regulation. An ALJ “shall ta ke any action that is ordered by the Appeals Council and may take any action that is not inconsistent with the Appeals Council’s remand order.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.977(b), 416.1477(b); see also Hayden v. Barnhart , 374 F.3d 986, 992 n.9 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing 20 C. F.R. § 402.35(b) for the proposition that Social Security Rulings, or SSRs, are also “binding on the ALJ”). When the Appeals Council remands a case with instructions, th ose instructions become legal requirements with which the ALJ is bound to comply. If the Appeals Coun cil directs the ALJ to take additional or different steps to build or evaluate the record, then the remand order supplements or affirms the rule s shaping the evidence that is available or pertinent to the claimant. Reviewing an ALJ’s complian ce with such rules is hard ly unusual, and within a federal court’s authority under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Indeed, for jurisdictional purposes, there is little difference be tween reviewing an ALJ’s decision for compliance with a remand order under 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.977(b) and 416.1477( b) and reviewing an ALJ’s decision for compliance with other regulati ons relating to gathering and evaluating14 evidence. We issue reversal or ders all the time based at leas t in part on an ALJ’s failure to comply w ith the latter. 1 Jurisdiction is not lacking because Appe als Council remand orders are not “final decisions” under the applicable statute. It is true that a post-remand ALJ opinion generally constitutes the “final decision” of the Commissioner, and we have held (assuming there is no constitutional challenge) that “we do not have subject matter jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the propriety of the Appeals Council’s remand order.” Martinez v. Barnhart , 444 F.3d 1201, 1204–05 (10th Cir. 2006). But reviewing a final decision by an ALJ for compliance with an Appeals Council order is not the same thing as reviewing the Appeals C ouncil order itself. As part of our review

1 See, e.g., Harrold v. Berryhill , 714 F. App’x 861, 865, 869–71 (10th Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a) and 404.1527(c), plus SSR 96-7p and 06-03p); Winick v. Colvin , 674 F. App’x 816, 82 0 (10th Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c) and 416.927(c)); Brown v. Colvin , 595 F. App’x 803, 805 (10th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (20 C.F.R. § 416.928(a) and SSR 96-7p); Bledsoe v. Colvin , 544 F. App’x 823, 824–26 (10th Cir. 2013) (unp ublished) (20 C.F.R. §§ 416.927(c) and 416.928(a)); Chrismon v. Colvin , 531 F. App’x 893, 900–01 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.15 27(d), 416.912(d), and 416.927(d)); Murdock v. Astrue , 458 F. App’x 702, 704 (10th Cir. 2012) (u npublished) (20 C.F.R. part 404, subpt. P, app. 1 § 1.02); Kilinski v. Astrue , 430 F. App’x 732, 736–38 (10th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)-(b) and SSR 96-8p); Grotendorst v. Astrue , 380 F. App’x 879, 882–83 (10th Cir. 2010) (unp ublished) (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a and 404.1545(e)); Ramirez v. Astrue , 255 F. App’x 327, 330 ( 10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1569a and 416.969a, along with 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpt. P, app. 2 § 200.00); Salazar v. Barnhart , 468 F.3d 615, 621–26 (10t h Cir. 2006) (20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a), 416.923, 416.9 27(d), 416.935(a)-(b), and 416.945, plus 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpt. P, a pp. 1 § 12.08); Smith v. Barnhart , 172 F. App’x 795, 799–801 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (20 C.F.R. part 404, subpt. P, app. 1 § 12.05(C) and SSR 00-4p); Lackey v. Barnhart , 127 F. App’x 455, 457 (10th Ci r. 2005) (unpublished) (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a), (d), and (e), combined with SSR 96-5p); Allen v. Barnhart , 357 F.3d 1140, 1143 (10th Cir. 2004) (20 C.F.R. §§ 4 04.1569 and 404.1569a, along with 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpt. P, app. 2 § 200.00).15 of a final decision under § 405(g), we may consider whether the ALJ complied with any legal requirements imposed by the App eals Council upon remand. Absent a constitutional-level objection, this review is neutral as to the a ppropriateness of the Appeals Council’s directions. It is thus si milar to measuring the ALJ’s decision against other legally binding regulatory requirements c oncerning the collection and assessment of evidence. Such a revi ew does not culminate in a judici al decision affirming or reversing the remand order from the Appeals Council. It culminates in a judicial decision affirming or reversing the order from the ALJ.
IV Noreja’s sole substantive argument on appeal is that the ALJ’s failure to follow a directive from the Appeals Council to acquire another examination constitutes reversible error. We conclude that the ALJ did not, in fact, violate the Appeals Council’s remand order. The Appeals Council stated that th e ALJ “will” obtain additional evidence “to complete the administrative r ecord in accordance with the regulatory standards regarding consultative examinations and existing medi cal evidence[.]” I Admin. R. at 149 (brackets added, citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512–13 and 416.912–13). The Appeals Council added that this supplementary evid ence “should” include, if available, a consultative medical examination. Id. at 149–50. The language in the Appeals Council’s order is significant. The order used the term “will” when it generally directed the AL J to obtain additional evidence concerning Noreja’s mental impairments. The order used the term “should” in connection with its specific reference to a consultative medical ex amination. In this context, the only16 mandatory directive to the ALJ was to obtain add itional evidence on a particular topic, which evidence might or might not include a new examination. Cf. United States v. Tisdale , 248 F.3d 964, 977 (10th Cir. 2001) ( holding that a Sentencing Guideline provision using the word “should” was permi ssive rather than mandatory, because in common parlance “[t]he phrase ‘s hould be’ is defined as some thing that ‘ought to be,’” while “‘shall’ is ‘used to express a comma nd or exhortation,’ and is ‘used in laws, regulations, or directives to express what is mandatory’”) (brackets added, citations omitted). Similarly, the order commanded th e ALJ to obtain ad ditional evidence in accordance with identifi ed regulatory standards. As they relate to consultative medical examinations, those standards are also permissive. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(b)(2) (indicating that the Commissioner “may” as k a claimant to attend a consultative examination, and generally “w ill not request” such an exam ination “until we have made every reasonable effort to obtain evid ence from your own medical sources”); id. § 416.912(b)(2) (same); see also id. § 404.1519a(a) (“If we cann ot get the information we need from your medical sources, we ma y decide to purchase a consultative examination.”). The ALJ not only complied with the remand order by obtaining additional proof, but also supported her denial of Noreja’s application for disability benefits with substantial evidence. The new materials relied upon by the ALJ on remand included mental health treatment records and testimony about Noreja’s status from Dr. Bruce. Combined with the rest of the evidence, that was mo re than enough to qualify as what “a reasonable mind might accept as adeq uate to support a conclusion.” Grogan , 399 F.3d at17 1261. The ALJ carefully co mpared and weighed this proof against the opinions presented by Dr. Madsen. I Admin. R. at 17–26. 2 We are not at liberty to second-guess the ALJ’s determination. Knight , 756 F.3d at 1175.
V For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner’s denial of Noreja’s claim for Social Security benefits is affirmed.

2 The ALJ recapped her analysis as follows: In sum, these findings are supported by the objective record and reports of the claimant’s daily activities. Objective imaging confirmed mild degenerative joint disease in the right ankle, right hip, and left shoulder, while clinical findings support pain an d limitation with range of motion of these joints. The claimant was consiste nt in his reports of headaches, and a neurologist prescribed medication to tr eat this impairment. Further, mental health assessments confirmed mild cognitive deficits and symptoms associated with depressive disorder, to include lack of interest, social isolation, and irritability. However, he did not require the use of an assistive device to walk, and he was sti ll able to engage in activities such as bicycle riding and yardwork. Further, he was described as pleasant upon examination, and objective mental a ssessments indicate his psychological symptoms were no more than mild. Th erefore, due to the symptoms caused by his severe impairments previously di scussed, the undersigned finds that the claimant retained the ability to perform work w ith the limitations described in the residual func tional capacity outlined above. I Admin. R. at 26.