2009 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

11-24-2009

Kai Ingram v. David Lupas

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 09-1688

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CLD-015 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 09-1688

___________

KAI DWAYNE INGRAM,

Appellant

v.

DAVID LUPAS, Luzerne County Chief District Attorney; DANIEL BEKY, Luzerne

County Detective; STEPHEN KOFCHAK, Larksville Assistant Chief of Police

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 3:07-cv-02259)

District Judge: Honorable Thomas I. Vanaskie

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

October 16, 2009

Before: BARRY, FISHER and COWEN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: November 24, 2009)

_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM

Kai Dwayne Ingram, a Pennsylvania state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from

the District Court’s order entering summary judgment in favor of the defendants. For the

following reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order.
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 I.

 In May 2006, several witnesses saw a man known as “Kai” fire shots from a tancolored van at two men on the street. The witnesses described Kai as a black male about

five feet and ten inches tall who weighed approximately one hundred and eighty pounds,

and who was wearing a white t-shirt and baggy pants. Several witnesses recognized the

van as belonging to Kai’s girlfriend, Faith Lane. 

After interviewing the witnesses at the scene of the shooting, Luzerne County

Detective Daniel Beky and Larksville Borough Assistant Chief of Police Stephen

Kofchak spoke to Ms. Lane, who told them that Kai Ingram had taken her van to his

mother’s house. As a result, the officers went to look for Ingram there. Upon arrival,

they spoke to Ingram’s mother on her front porch, and she agreed to let them enter the

house. As the officers entered, Ingram descended the stairs wearing clothes that matched

the witnesses’ descriptions. Detective Beky told Ingram that his name had been

mentioned in connection with a crime, and asked him to accompany them to the police

station for questioning. Ingram agreed. Once at the station, however, Ingram asked for a

lawyer and declined to answer any questions. The officers consulted Luzerne County

Chief District Attorney David Lupas, who determined that the evidence established

probable cause to support an arrest. Ingram was subsequently arrested and charged with

the shooting. 

Before trial, Ingram filed a motion to suppress certain evidence on the ground that
 Because the defendants attached portions of the criminal record to their pleadings, 1

and because Ingram responded to their submissions, the District Court appropriately

considered their motions to dismiss as motions for summary judgment. See In re

Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997). 

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it had been obtained in violation of his rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, but

the court denied relief. A jury subsequently found him guilty of two counts of aggravated

assault and one count of carrying a firearm without a license. The judgment was affirmed

on appeal. Ingram is presently serving a sentence of twelve-and-a-half to twenty-five

years in state prison. 

In December 2007, Ingram filed the present pro se civil rights complaint in the

United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against Detective

Beky, Officer Kofchak, and District Attorney Lupas. In the complaint, Ingram claimed

that his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated in connection

with his arrest and detention. Specifically, Ingram alleged that: (1) Detective Beky and

Officer Kofchak illegally entered his home; (2) he was arrested without probable cause;

and (3) he was not brought before a District Justice until ten hours after his arrest. 

Ingram also asserted both federal and state claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and

malicious prosecution.

Shortly after Ingram filed his complaint, the defendants filed motions to dismiss. 

By memorandum and order entered February 3, 2009, the District Court converted the

defendants’ motions into motions for summary judgment, and entered judgment in their 1
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favor. This appeal followed.

II.

We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a

District Court’s entry of summary judgment de novo. Pennsylvania Coal Ass’n v.

Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 235 (3d Cir. 1995). Summary judgment is proper only if it appears

“that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled

to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Carrasca v. Pomeroy, 313 F.3d

828, 832–33 (3d Cir. 2002). After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the

appeal presents “no substantial question” under Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

and will, therefore, summarily affirm the District Court’s order. 

A. Fourth Amendment Claims

1. Illegal Entry

In the complaint, Ingram first claimed that Detective Beky and Officer Kofchak

violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they entered his mother’s home without a

warrant because his mother did not consent to their entry. As the District Court correctly

concluded, however, this claim is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel because the

state court already considered it at the suppression hearing. 

The doctrine of collateral estoppel generally precludes a party from re-litigating

issues or claims that have already been adjudicated. See Montana v. United States, 440

U.S. 147, 153 (1979). It is well established that principles of collateral estoppel are fully
5

applicable to civil rights actions brought under § 1983. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411

U.S. 475, 497 (1973). Furthermore, this Court has held that defendants in a § 1983 suit

can raise the issue of collateral estoppel when the plaintiff attempts to re-litigate in

federal court issues decided against him in state criminal proceedings. Anela v. City of

Wildwood, 790 F.2d 1063, 1068 (3d Cir. 1986); see also Matthews v. Macanas, 990 F.2d

467, 468 (9th Cir. 1993), abrogated on other grounds as stated in Pascual v. Matsumura,

165 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1151 (D. Haw. 2001) (noting that collateral estoppel may be

asserted to preclude a defense to a Bivens claim); Scherer v. Balkema, 840 F.2d 437, 443

(7th Cir. 1988) (same). Under Pennsylvania law, the doctrine of collateral estoppel

requires that: (a) the issue in question be identical to an issue actually litigated in the prior

litigation; (b) the prior litigation resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (c) the

party against whom the estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the

prior adjudication. Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840, 844 (3d Cir.

1974).

 Here, all of the elements of the collateral estoppel doctrine are satisfied: the issue

that Ingram litigated at the suppression hearing is identical to the issue he raises here; the

plaintiff in the instant action was the defendant in the criminal case; and the denial of a

suppression motion followed by a conviction is a final judgment for collateral estoppel

purposes, see Shaffer v. Smith, 543 Pa. 526, 530–31 (1996). Therefore, the District Court

correctly concluded that Ingram was barred from re-litigating this issue.
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 2. Arrest Without Probable Cause

The District Court also correctly concluded that Ingram failed to show that

Detective Beky and Officer Kofchak lacked probable cause to arrest him. “[P]robable

cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s

knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an

offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.” Estate of Smith v.

Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 514 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d

480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995). Although, in general, “the question of probable cause in a

section 1983 damage suit is one for the jury,” Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120,

124 (3d Cir.1998), a district court may conclude “that probable cause did exist as a matter

of law if the evidence, viewed most favorably to Plaintiff, reasonably would not support a

contrary factual finding,” and may enter summary judgment accordingly. Sherwood v.

Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 401 (3d Cir.1997).

Upon review of the record, we agree with the District Court that Detective Beky

and Officer Kofchak had probable cause to arrest Ingram. As the District Court noted,

several eyewitnesses provided the same physical description of Ingram, some even

identifying him by name. The witnesses also reported that Ingram was driving a tan van. 

In addition, the officers were able to locate the owner of the van, who confirmed that

Ingram had borrowed it to drive to his mother’s house. 

3. The Preliminary Hearing 
7

Ingram next claimed that the defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights by

detaining him for ten hours before bringing him before a proper issuing authority. These

allegations do not make out a constitutional violation. The Supreme Court has made clear

that, after a warrantless arrest, a suspect may be detained before appearing before an

issuing authority “for a brief period of detention to take the administrative steps incident

to arrest.” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113–14 (1975). Absent proof that the

probable cause determination was delayed unreasonably, a probable cause determination

within forty-eight hours of arrest is sufficient to comply with the Fourth Amendment. 

County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991). Here, Ingram was brought

before a judicial officer for a probable cause determination within ten hours of his

arrest—well within the forty-eight hour period. Furthermore, Ingram does not allege any

improper conduct on the part of the officers in connection with the ten-hour period, nor

does he argue that he was prejudiced as a result thereof. Therefore, the District Court

correctly concluded that these allegations failed to establish a constitutional violation.

4. False Arrest and Imprisonment, Malicious Prosecution

Finally, the District Court correctly rejected Ingram’s claims of false arrest and

false imprisonment because, as discussed above, the officers had probable cause to arrest

him. See Dowling v. City of Phila., 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that the

proper inquiry in a § 1983 claim based on false arrest is whether the arresting officers had

probable cause to believe the person arrested committed the offense). The District Court
 To the extent that Ingram’s complaint raised state-law claims for false arrest, false 2

imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, the District Court acted within its discretion

when it declined to exercise jurisdiction over these claims. See United Mine Workers of

America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). 

also correctly entered summary judgment against Ingram on his malicious prosecution

claim, as success in the underlying criminal proceeding is a necessary element in such a

claim. See Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 81 (3d Cir. 2007). 2

B. Fifth Amendment Claim

The District Court also correctly held that Ingram failed to establish a Fifth

Amendment claim, as he did not provide any inculpatory statements to the police and

therefore was not compelled to be a witness against himself. See Guiffre v. Bissell, 31

F.3d 1241, 1256 (3d Cir. 1994). 

IV.

Because there is no substantial question presented by this appeal, we will

summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See Third Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.

 9