[Cite as Wehr v. Div. of Oil & Gas Resources Mgt., 2018-Ohio-5247.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

John and Arlene Wehr, : 

 Appellees-Appellees, : 

v. : No. 17AP-855 

 (C.P.C. No. 17CV-6294) 

Division of Oil and Gas Resources : 

Management, Ohio Department of (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

Natural Resources, : 

 

 Appellee-Appellee, : 

Gulfport Energy Corporation, : 

 Appellant-Appellant. : 

John and Arlene Wehr, : 

 Appellees-Appellees, : 

v. : No. 17AP-861 

 (C.P.C. No. 17CV-6294) 

Division of Oil and Gas Resources : 

Management, Ohio Department of (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

Natural Resources, : 

 

 Appellee-Appellant, : 

Gulfport Energy Corporation, : 

 Appellant-Appellee. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on December 27, 2018 

 

On brief: Stubbins, Watson, Bryan & Witucky Co., L.P.A, 

Mark W. Stubbins, Kyle S. Witucky, and Grant J. Stubbins, 

for John and Arlene Wehr. Argued: Grant Stubbins. 
Nos. 17AP-855 and 17AP-861 2 

On brief: Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Brian J. 

Becker, and Gerald Dailey, for Division of Oil and Gas 

Resources Management and Ohio Department of Natural 

Resources. Argued: W. Scott Myers. 

On brief: Steptoe & Johnson PLLC, John Kevin West, and 

Alana Valle Tanoury, for Gulfport Energy Corporation. 

Argued: John Kevin West. 

 

APPEALS from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

DORRIAN, J. 

{¶ 1} These consolidated appeals are taken from a judgment of the Franklin County 

Court of Common Pleas exercising its appellate jurisdiction pursuant to R.C. 1509.37 and 

upholding an order issued by the Ohio Oil and Gas Commission ("commission"). The 

parties to the current appeal are Gulfport Energy Corporation ("Gulfport"), appellant 

herein and before the common pleas court; the Division of Oil and Gas Resources 

Management ("division"), appellant herein and appellee before the common pleas court; 

and John and Arlene Wehr, appellees herein and before the common pleas court. 

I. Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 2} Although the appeal reaches this court only on limited procedural questions, 

some factual background will help establish the posture of the case. 

{¶ 3} The matter arises from Gulfport's application for a unitization order under 

R.C. 1509.28 to combine multiple leased and unleased properties into a single production 

unit for mineral extraction ("the Brown #9 unit") of approximately 619 acres. Typically, 

objections to the unitization application come from landowners who do not have a mineralrights lease agreement with the operator and, therefore, find themselves "forced in" to the 

production unit. See generally State ex rel. Kerns v. Simmers, 153 Ohio St.3d 103, 2018-

Ohio-256. The Wehrs differ from the typical objector. They own land included in the 

proposed production unit, and although they are successor parties to an oil and gas lease 

with Gulfport, they assert the terms of that lease are inconsistent with the proposed 

unitization because the lease prohibits consolidation of the leased property into an 
Nos. 17AP-855 and 17AP-861 3 

extraction unit larger than 40 acres.1 The Wehrs assert Gulfport utilized the unitization 

process to circumvent the lease restriction, that the division refused to address the lease 

terms at the unitization hearing, and that as a result they have been afforded neither the 

contract rights of a lessor nor the statutory rights of an owner of unleased property. 

{¶ 4} In accordance with R.C. 1509.28, on May 14, 2014, the division conducted a 

public hearing on Gulfport's application. The Wehrs attended the hearing and made a 

statement on the record apparently contesting the inclusion of their interests in the unit. 

The chief of the division issued an order on October 17, 2014, approving Gulfport's 

application to form the Brown #9 unit. The Wehrs appealed the chief's order to the 

commission under commission appeal No. 912. Gulfport received permission from the 

commission to intervene in the appeal. On June 15, 2017, the commission issued an order 

dismissing appeal No. 912 on the basis the commission lacked statutory authority to act. 

The commission concluded the Wehrs had not been properly served with the chief's 

unitization order, their 30-day appeal period had not yet begun to run, and their appeal 

before the commission could not be heard. However, the commission further found the 

appeal was not time-barred but merely premature, and the Wehrs could again bring an 

appeal once they had been properly served with the division's order. It is this last aspect of 

the commission's decision that prompted Gulfport and the division to seek further review.2 

{¶ 5} Gulfport filed its notice of appeal from the commission's June 15, 2017 order 

in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas on July 14, 2017. The common pleas court 

rendered a decision on November 6, 2017 affirming the commission's June 15, 2017 order. 

Gulfport and the division have both appealed to this court, pursuant to R.C. 1509.37, and 

we have consolidated their appeals for briefing and determination. Gulfport and the 

division do not assert the commission erred in dismissing the Wehrs' appeal. Instead, they 

 

1 Prior to pursuing an appeal before the commission, the Wehrs attempted to pursue a declaratory judgment 

action in the Noble County Court of Common Pleas. Wehr v. Gulfport Energy Corp., Noble C.P. No. CVH218-

oo42 (Compl. filed July 15, 2015). The outcome or impact of that case in relation to the present appeal has not 

been briefed. 

2 During the pendency of the appeal before the commission, Gulfport filed an action in prohibition before this 

court seeking a writ ordering the commission not to exercise jurisdiction over appeal No. 912. This court 

eventually dismissed Gulfport's complaint in prohibition on the basis that the commission had dismissed 

appeal No. 912 and rendered the prohibition action moot. State ex rel. Gulfport Energy Corp. v. Oil & Gas 

Comm., 10th Dist. No. 17AP-358, 2017-Ohio-8553. 
Nos. 17AP-855 and 17AP-861 4 

complain the commission did so for the wrong reasons, and included language indicating 

that the Wehrs could file a renewed appeal to the commission after dismissal of appeal No. 

912.3 

II. Assignments of error 

{¶ 6} Gulfport appeals and assigns the following four assignments of error for our 

review: 

[I.] The Franklin County Common Pleas Court erroneously 

applied Ohio Revised Code § 119.09 without determining 

whether John and Arlene Wehr (the "Wehrs") were parties to 

the unitization application and without reference to the 

controlling statute, Ohio Revised Code § 1509.36. 

[II.] The Franklin County Common Pleas Court erred in 

finding the Ohio Department of Natural Resources, Division 

of Oil and Gas Resources Management, was required to serve 

the Wehrs with the Chief's Order via certified mail in order for 

the time to appeal to begin to run. 

[III.] The Franklin County Common Pleas Court erred in 

finding the Wehrs' appeal is not time-barred. 

[IV.] The Franklin County Common Pleas Court erred in 

finding Gulfport Energy Corporation was not harmed by the 

June 15, 2017 Order of the Oil and Gas Commission. 

{¶ 7} The division appeals and assigns the following three assignments of error for 

our review: 

[I.] The Court of Common Pleas abused its discretion by 

applying the incorrect standard of review; appeals from 

decisions of the Ohio Oil and Gas Commission are governed 

by R.C. 1509.37. 

[II.] The Court of Common Pleas erred by finding that R.C. 

119.09 applies to chief's orders issued pursuant to R.C. 

1509.28. 

 

3 Following the commission's June 15, 2017 order, the division duly served the Wehrs with a copy of the 

unitization order by certified mail and the Wehrs filed a new notice of appeal with the commission under 

commission appeal No. 947 on August 23, 2017. The present appeal to this court does not address that later 

commission appeal or any other aspect of the case occurring after the commission's June 15, 2017 order in 

appeal No. 912. 
Nos. 17AP-855 and 17AP-861 5 

[III.] The Court of Common Pleas erred in affirming the 

Commission's determination that the appeal time for the 

Wehrs was triggered only by certified mail service, which 

unlawfully ignores the plain language of R.C. 1509.36. 

III. Analysis 

 A. Standard of Review 

{¶ 8} The initial step in addressing this case requires a determination of the 

applicable law governing appeals from unitization orders, including the standard of review 

before the commission, common pleas court, and court of appeals. 

{¶ 9} At both the commission and common pleas levels, the decisions invoke and 

discuss Ohio's general statutory framework governing administrative appeals, R.C. Chapter 

119, in addition to the more specific statutes governing orders issued by the division under 

R.C. Chapter 1509. 

{¶ 10} The commission's June 15, 2017 order assumes three pertinent facts: first, on 

October 17, 2014, the division issued unitization order 2014-471 affecting the Wehrs' 

property, second, there is no indication in the record that this order was ever mailed to the 

Wehrs, and third, the Wehrs otherwise received a copy of the order sometime in late 2014. 

(Commission Decision at 3.) To these facts, the commission applied the following law: R.C. 

1509.28, governing the issuance of unitization orders, does not specify procedure in such 

cases, other than requiring the division to conduct a hearing. R.C. 1509.03(D) addresses 

the division chief's general authority to issue orders, and provides that these will be issued 

under R.C. Chapter 119, which governs many other forms of administrative action in Ohio. 

In turn, R.C. 119.09 requires orders issuing from agency hearings to be served by certified 

mail, return receipt requested, upon the party affected thereby. Finally, pursuant to R.C. 

1509.36, orders issued by the division may be appealed to the commission " 'within thirty 

days after the date upon which the appellant received notice by certified 

mail.' " (Emphasis sic.) (Commission Decision at 7, quoting R.C. 1509.36.) 

{¶ 11} Based upon application of these statutes, the commission concluded the 

Wehrs were "appellants" under R.C. 1509.36, and 1509.36 required they be served a copy 

of the order by certified mail. The commission also found the Wehrs and "all members of 

this unit, regardless of whether they have voluntarily leased their interests or not," are 

parties "affected" by the division's order. (Commission Order at 9.) Accordingly, pursuant 
Nos. 17AP-855 and 17AP-861 6 

to R.C. 119.09, the division was required to serve them a copy of the order by certified mail. 

Therefore, because the Wehrs were never served by certified mail as required by R.C. 

1509.36 or 119.09, they had not missed the 30-day deadline to appeal the division's 

unitization order to the commission but, in fact, had done so prematurely because the 

appeal period had not been triggered by proper issuance of the appealable order. Because 

the 30-day appeal period to appeal the division's unitization order had never begun to run, 

the commission concluded that "no appealable order has been issued to the Wehrs, [and 

the commission] lacks the statutory authority to proceed in this matter." (Commission 

Decision at 10.) Most troubling to the division, the commission then added the following 

language: "Once the Wehrs are properly served, they may perfect an appeal by filing their 

notice of appeal with the Oil & Gas Commission within thirty days of their receipt, via 

certified mail, of said order." (Commission Decision at 10.) 

{¶ 12} Upon further appeal to the common pleas court, the common pleas court 

invoked the standard of review appropriate to R.C. 119.12 appeals set forth in Univ. of 

Cincinnati v. Conrad, 63 Ohio St.2d 108 (1980), and considered whether the commission's 

order was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and in accordance with 

law. The court further noted that "[a]ll parties agree that R.C. § 119.09 applies to orders 

from the Commission."4 (Common Pleas Decision at 6.) The court then affirmed the 

commission's dismissal of the Wehrs' appeal No. 912. The court noted language taken from 

our decision in the above-cited prohibition action before this court, and concluded "the 

Commission is finished with the appeal filed by the Wehrs and that administrative process 

is over. As to the appeal of the June 15, 2017 Order the Appellant is unharmed. What 

happens - or what has already happened - is up to the Wehrs upon receipt of the R.C. § 

119.09 notice concerning the Order 2014-741. That matter is not currently before this 

Court." (Common Pleas Decision at 8.) 

{¶ 13} We begin by noting that, despite the court's reference to R.C. 119.12, the 

correct standard of review to be applied by the common pleas court when considering an 

appeal under R.C. 1509.37 from the commission is whether the commission's order was 

reasonable and lawful. Simmers v. N. Royalton, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-900, 2016-Ohio-

 

4 The pleadings filed by the parties before the court of common pleas do not indicate agreement by Gulfport 

on this issue, at least with respect to unitization orders issued by the division. 
Nos. 17AP-855 and 17AP-861 7 

3036, ¶ 21, citing Martz v. Div. of Mineral Resources Mgt., 10th Dist. No. 08AP-12, 2008-

Ohio-4003, ¶ 13, and Johnson v. Kell, 89 Ohio App.3d 623, 625 (10th Dist.1993). Unlawful 

means that which is not in accordance with law, and unreasonable means that which is not 

in accordance with reason, or has no factual foundation. Johnson at 626, citing Citizens 

Commt. to Preserve Lake Logan v. Williams, 56 Ohio App.2d 61, 70 (10th Dist.1977). 

{¶ 14} On further appeal from the common pleas court to this court, our standard 

of review is more restrictive. We determine only whether the common pleas court has 

abused its discretion. Wood v. Simmers, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-269, 2017-Ohio-8718, ¶ 13, 

citing Lorain City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 40 Ohio St.3d 257, 

260-61 (1988); N. Royalton at ¶ 24, citing Childs v. Oil & Gas Comm., 10th Dist. No. 99AP626 (Mar. 28, 2000). The term "abuse of discretion" implies not merely an error of 

judgment, but perversity of will, passion, prejudice, partiality or moral delinquency. Childs, 

citing State ex rel. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc. v. Lancaster, 22 Ohio St.3d 

191, 193 (1986). However, on questions of law, the common pleas court does not exercise 

discretion, and this court's review is plenary. B & D Drilling v. State, 10th Dist. No. 02AP52, 2002-Ohio-5010, ¶ 12, citing Childs, citing Univ. Hosp., Univ. of Cincinnati College of 

Med. v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 63 Ohio St.3d 339 (1992). 

{¶ 15} The division's first assignment of error asserts the common pleas court 

applied an incorrect standard of review in assessing the commission's decision. As stated 

above, the standard of review under R.C. 1509.37, which specifically governs appeals from 

the commission to the court of common pleas, is whether the commission's decision is 

lawful and reasonable. It is true that the common pleas court mentioned the R.C. 119.12 

standard generally employed in administrative appeals, under which the court was to 

determine whether the commission's order was supported by reliable, probative, and 

substantial evidence and in accordance with law. We agree that the standard at all levels of 

review should be addressed under the specific statute, R.C. 1509.37, rather than the general, 

R.C. 119.12. "It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that specific 

statutory provisions prevail over conflicting general statutes." State v. Chippendale, 52 

Ohio St.3d 118, 120 (1990). Under either standard, however, there were no factual 

determinations to which the common pleas court would defer, and the only question was 

whether the commission's decision was in accordance with law (R.C. 119.12) or lawful (R.C. 
Nos. 17AP-855 and 17AP-861 8 

1509.37). In the context of this case, the distinction is immaterial and any error by the 

common pleas court in this respect was harmless. The division's first assignment of error 

is overruled. 

 B. Applicable Law 

{¶ 16} The division's second and third assignments of error, and Gulfport's second 

and third assignments of error, address the commission's interpretation of the notice 

provisions of R.C. 1509.36, and application of notice and service standards from R.C. 

Chapter 119 to supplement, and allegedly contradict, the provisions specifically applicable 

to commission appeals under R.C. Chapter 1509. 

{¶ 17} We begin by considering the commission's interpretation of R.C. 1509.36, 

which governs appeals to the commission and provides as follows: 

Any person adversely affected by an order by the chief of the 

division of oil and gas resources management may appeal to 

the oil and gas commission for an order vacating or modifying 

the order. 

The person so appealing to the commission shall be known as 

appellant and the chief shall be known as appellee. Appellant 

and appellee shall be deemed to be parties to the appeal. 

The appeal shall be in writing and shall set forth the order 

complained of and the grounds upon which the appeal is 

based. The appeal shall be filed with the commission within 

thirty days after the date upon which the appellant received 

notice by certified mail and, for all other persons adversely 

affected by the order, within thirty days after the date of the 

order complained of. Notice of the filing of the appeal shall be 

filed with the chief within three days after the appeal is filed 

with the commission. 

{¶ 18} Ohio Adm.Code 1509-1-11 parallels the language of R.C. 1509.36 regarding 

notice and timing for an appeal, with some variation: "within thirty days after the date upon 

which the order recipient received notice by registered or certified mail of the making of the 

order complained of or, for all other persons adversely affected by an order of the division 

chief, within thirty days after the date of the chief's issuance of the order complained of." 

Ohio Adm.Code 1509-1-11(A). The substitution of "order recipient" for "appellant" in the 

administrative code, and the other minor differences, do not seem to intend any substantive 

variation from the statute. 
Nos. 17AP-855 and 17AP-861 9 

{¶ 19} While these sections are fairly comprehensive with respect to appeals, they 

are vague as to the distinction between parties required to appeal: (1) within 30 days of 

notice of the order by mail, or (2) within 30 days of the order, irrespective of notice. The 

definition of "appellant" (or "order recipient" in the administrative code) and "other 

persons adversely affected" is not provided. This ambiguity creates the two successive 

questions to be answered in the case. First, applying R.C. 1509.36, were the Wehrs entitled 

to notice by certified mail of the division's order, or were they merely "other persons 

adversely affected"? Second, if R.C. 1509.36 did not specifically give the Wehrs a right to 

be notified of the order, were they entitled to notice under R.C. 119.09? 

{¶ 20} The division argues the only persons entitled to notice of an R.C. 1509.28 

unitization order are "parties" to the proceeding, which they assert can include only: (1) the 

applicant operator, and (2) unleased landowners. 

{¶ 21} The commission determined to the contrary that the Wehrs, as nominally 

leased landowners who were members of the Brown #9 unit, were entitled to receive 

certified service of the division's unitization order. The commission looked to R.C. 1509.36 

and determined the Wehrs were "appellants" entitled to receive notice of the division's 

order by certified mail, rather than merely "persons adversely affected" by the division's 

order. For the definition of "appellant," the commission looked to Ohio Adm.Code 1509-1-

02(B), which states the "appellant" to the commission shall be "a person, claiming to be 

aggrieved or adversely affected by an order of the chief of the division of oil and gas 

resources management, who is applying or petitioning for review or relief, and who is 

requesting a hearing before the commission." (Commission Order at 9, fn. 8, quoting Ohio 

Adm.Code 1509-1-02(B)). The commission determined the Wehrs belonged in such a class 

of persons. 

{¶ 22} Courts will generally give due deference to an administrative interpretation 

formulated by an agency that has accumulated substantial expertise and that has 

responsibility for implementing a legislative command. State ex rel. V&A Risk Servs. v. 

State Bur. of Workers' Comp., 10th Dist. No. 11AP-742, 2012-Ohio-3583, ¶ 23, citing 

Frisch's Restaurants, Inc. v. Ryan, 121 Ohio St.3d 18, 2009-Ohio-2, ¶ 16. Deference to an 

administrative agency's interpretation of its rules, however, is not unfettered. An appellate 

court need not defer to an agency's interpretation when it is unreasonable and fails to apply 
Nos. 17AP-855 and 17AP-861 10 

the plain language of a statute or rule. Id., citing Frisch's and HCMC, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of 

Job & Family Servs., 179 Ohio App.3d 707, 2008-Ohio-6223, ¶ 25 (10th Dist.). 

{¶ 23} We are not inclined to disagree with the commission's interpretation of the 

service requirements of R.C. 1509.36 and accordingly with commencement of the appeal 

time for the Wehrs. Because the Wehrs' tracts were included by Gulfport in the application, 

they were certainly persons affected thereby; the adversity of that impact, to some extent, 

is for the Wehrs to ascertain based upon the evaluation of their own interests in the 

transaction. Granting deference to the administrative agency's interpretation of its own 

statutes and regulations, and considering the Wehrs' position as landowners who were 

members of the Brown #9 unit and the fact that they had made a statement on the record 

at the May 14, 2014 public hearing, we cannot find the commission's interpretation of 

parties entitled to receive notice by certified mail of a division order was in error. In this 

case, the commission's interpretation is not unreasonable and certainly not contrary to law 

on the face of the statute. Accordingly, Gulfport's second and third assignments of error 

and the division's second and third assignment of error are overruled. 

{¶ 24} Because our overruling of Gulfport's second and third assignments of error 

and the division's second and third assignments of error are dispositive, it is not necessary 

for us to address Gulfport's first and fourth assignments of error. Accordingly, Gulfport's 

first and fourth assignments of error are rendered moot. 

IV. Conclusion 

{¶ 25} Because the court of common pleas did not err in affirming the commission's 

July 14, 2017 order, we overrule Gulfport's second and third assignments of error and the 

division's three assignments of error, render moot Gulfport's first and fourth assignments 

of error, and affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. 

Judgment affirmed. 

BROWN, P.J., and LUPER SCHUSTER, J., concur.