alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### § 29.1517 Limiting height-velocity envelope.

For Category A rotorcraft, if a range of heights exists at any speed, including zero, within which it is not possible to make a safe landing following power failure, the range of heights and its variation with forward speed must be established, together with any other pertinent information, such as the kind of landing surface.

[Amdt. 29-21, 48 FR 4391, Jan. 31, 1983, as amended by Amdt. 29-59, 88 FR 8739, Feb. 10, 2023]
§ 29.71 Helicopter angle of glide: Category B. For each category B helicopter, except multiengine helicopters meeting the requirements of § 29.67(b) and the powerplant installation requirements of category A, the steady angle of glide must be determined in autorotation— ( a ) At the forward speed for minimum rate of descent as selected by the applicant;
( b ) At the forward speed for best glide angle;
( c ) At maximum weight; and
( d ) At the rotor speed or speeds selected by the applicant.
[Amdt. 29-12, 41 FR 55471, Dec. 20, 1976]
DENY and Opinion Filed October 6, 2022

In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05

- 22

- 01022

- CV
IN RE URBAN 8 LLC AN D URBAN 8 MANAGEMENT LLC , Relator s Original Proceeding from the 191st Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC

- 21

- 08919

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Osborne, Partida

- Kipness, and Smith

Opinion by Justice Osborne Relator s ask for a writ of mandamus to vacate an orde r denying a motion to
set aside a default judgment. To be e ntitle d to mandamus relief , relator s must show
that the trial court clearly abused its discretion and that they lack an adequate remedy
by appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co

. of Am. , 148 S.W.3d 124 , 135

– 36 (Tex. 2004)
(orig. proceeding).
After reviewing the petition and the record before us, we conclude relator s
ha ve not shown t he y are entitled to mandamus relief. Accordingly, we deny the– 2

–

petition for writ of mandamus. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 52.8(a).

221022f.p05 /Leslie Osborne/ LESLIE OSBORNE JUSTICE
MORTGAGES.

[Hamilton Circuit Court,

January Term, 1898.]

Cox, Swing and Smith, JJ.

#### John B. Bobe v. John Rankin et al.

Correction of Defective Mortgage Addowed, Opposed by Generad Creditors.

Court authorizes correction of a mortgage, defective in that, that the grantee, who was agent of plaintiff and afterwards transferred the mortgage to him, was one of the witnesses, and also took and certified the acknowledgment as notary public. '

Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton county.

*A. B. Benedict,*for the plaintiff.

*Marsh & Ritchie, Wm. Hartley Pugh, Gorman &*Thompson, and *Shay & Cogan,*for the general creditors.

The plaintiff loaned to Mary A. Rankin, $2,400, taking a mortgage on real estate as security. The mortgage was recorded, but proved to be defective in execution, in that the grantee, who was the agent of the plaintiff and alterward transferred the mortgage to him, was one of the witnesses, and also took and certified the acknowledgment as a notary public. Mrs. Rankin died leaving insufficient property to pay her debts. The present suit was brought for correction of the mortgage, which is resisted by the general creditors. At the hearing below Judge Wilson granted a decree making the correction. The circuit court held :

> “A majority ol the court is of the opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief asked.”
#### § 608.843 Nonwaiver of rights by payments.

An employee's involuntary payment of all or any portion of a debt being collected under this subpart shall not be construed as a waiver of any rights the employee may have under 5 U.S.C. 5514 or any other provisions of a written contract or law unless there are statutory or contractual provisions to the contrary.
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 89 (Monday, May 8, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 26621]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-11436]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences; Amended 
Notice of Meeting

    Notice is hereby given of a change in the meeting of the National 
Advisory Environmental Health Sciences Council, May 15, 2000, 8:30 AM 
to May 16, 2000, 2:00 PM, Building 31C, Conference Room 6, National 
Institutes of Health, 3100 Center Drive, Bethesda, MD, 20892 which was 
published in the Federal Register on April 13, 2000, 65 FR 19916.
    The NAEHSC meeting will be held for one day on May 15, 2000. The 
Open and Closed Sessions will be as follows: Open 8:30 a.m. to 1:15 
p.m. and Closed 1:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. The meeting is partially Closed 
to the public.

    Dated: May 1, 2000.
Anna Snouffer,
Acting Director, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. 00-11436 Filed 5-5-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-M
JURISDICTION.

[Portage Circuit Court,

May, 1894.]

Frazier, Woodbury and Laubie, JJ.

#### Erie Railroad Co. v. Furry.

Action for Burning Fences, Etc., not Within Jurisdiction of Justice.

An action against a railroad company for damages for burning fences, grass, etc., is not an action of trespass to realty, but is an action involving the title to or possession of real estate and not within the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace.

Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Portage county.

*Hon. M. Stuart,*for the Railroad Company.

*W. J. Beckley,*for defendant in error.

Per Curiam.

Furry sued the Erie Railroad Company before a justice of the peace to. recover damages for burning his fences, grass, pasture and meadow, claiming that the engines which set the fire were out of order when they ran through his farm. The justice gave judgment against the railroad company for $213.00, and the common pleas on error affirmed the judgment. The circuit court reversed the justice and common pleas, and held that the justice had no jurisdiction : that the action involved the title or possession to real estate which it was incumbent on the plaintiff to establish in order to maintain his suit, and that it was not an action of trespass to realty.
**Exhibit 10.23 to 2008 10-K**

**AMENDMENT TO**

**CONVERGYS CORPORATION PENSION PLAN**

**(EGTRRA RESTATEMENT)**

ConvergysCorporation Pension Plan is hereby amended effective as of March 31, 2008 in the following respects: 

1. A new Section 1.3 isadded to the Plan to read as follows: 

1.3 Closing and Freeze. Notwithstanding any other provision of the Plan to the contrary, thefollowing shall apply: 

1.3.1 No person shall become a Participant in the Plan after March 31, 2008. 

1.3.2 No person shall accrue additional benefits under the Plan after March 31, 2008. For purposes of clarity, interest credits shallcontinue to be credited after March 31, 2008 to the Cash Balance Account of each Participant in accordance with Section 5.4.3. 

2. A new Section 2.1.7(i) is added to the Plan to read as follows: 

(i) The term “Covered Employee”shall not include any person who was not a “Covered Employee” on or prior to March 31, 2008. 

3. A new paragraph is added tothe end of Section 4.1 of the Plan to read as follows: 

Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this Section 4.1, no personshall be eligible to become a Participant after March 31, 2008. 

4. A new sentence is added to the end of Section 4.2 of the Planto read as follows: 

Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this Section 4.2, no person shall become a Participant in the Planafter March 31, 2008. 

5. Two new sentences are added to the end of Section 5.4.2 of the Plan to read as follows: 

Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this Section 5.4.2, no amount shall be credited under this Section 5.4.2 to the Cash Balance Accountof a Participant with respect to periods after March 31, 2008. For the calendar year 2008, the amount credited under this Section 5.4.2 to the Cash Balance Account of each Participant who received Covered Compensation, shall be determinedas if the date the Employee was last employed as an Employee was March 31, 2008 (or, if earlier, the date he was last employed as an Employee). 

6. A new Section 5.5.4 of the Plan is added to read as follows: 

Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this Section 5.5, “Covered Compensation” shall not include any amounts paid or which would havebeen paid with respect to pay periods after March 31, 2008. 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Convergys Corporation has hereunto caused its name tobe subscribed this 31st day of March, 2008. 

 
CONVERGYS CORPORATIONBy: /s/ David F. DoughertyTitle: Chief Executive Officer
#### PESNELL v. THE STATE.

(Decided June 10, 1915.)

Appeal from Cleburne Circuit Court.

Heard before Hon. Hugh D. Merrill.

Johnson & McMahan, J. R. Barker, and P. F. Wharton, for appellant. W. L. Martin, Attorney General, and W. H. Mitchell, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

Ti-iomas, J.

Dismissed under Rule 26, Supreme Court. Practice, on the authority of *Clark v.*State, 8 Ala. App. 105; 62 South. 987.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

HEYWOOD BECKER

v.

U.S. BANK, N.A.

PETITION OF: HEYWOOD BECKER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 301 MAL 2022

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

U.S. BANK, N.A.

v.

GEORGE KIRIAKIDIAND HEYWOOD 

BECKER

PETITION OF: HEYWOOD BECKER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 302 MAL 2022

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

HEYWOOD BECKER

v.

U.S. BANK, N.A. 

PETITION OF: HEYWOOD BECKER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 303 MAL 2022

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court
[301-05 MAL 2022] - 2

HEYWOOD BECKER

v.

E. KEITH DARROW

PETITION OF: HEYWOOD BECKER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 304 MAL 2022

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

HEYWOOD BECKER

v.

ESTATE OF RICHARD RESTIFO 

DECEASED A/K/A RICHARD J. RESTIFO, 

EMILY MARIE CIPRIANO, ADMIN. A/K/A 

EMILY M. CIPRIANO, AND UNITED 

STATES OF AMERICA

PETITION OF: HEYWOOD BECKER, 

ESTATE OF RICHARD RESTIFO 

DECEASED A/K/A RICHARD J. RESTIFO 

AND EMILY MARIE CIPRIANO, ADMIN. 

A/K/A EMILY M. CIPRIANO

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 305 MAL 2022

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 24th day of January, 2023, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal, 

the Petition for Leave to File a Response in Support of Petitioners’ Petition for Allowance 

of Appeal, and the Conditional Cross-Application for Leave to File Sur-Reply in Opposition 

to Petitioners’ Petition for Allowance of Appeal are DENIED.
#### BRITT v STATE OF FLORIDA

Case No. 82-66 (Lower Court Case No. TA82-3417)

Ninth Judicial Circuit, Orange County

September 20, 1991

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Office of the Public Defender, for appellant.

Office of the State Attorney, for appellee.

Before MICHAEL F. CYCMANICK, Circuit Judge.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Appellant seeks review of a judgment of conviction and sentence for violation of a driver’s license restriction, asserting reversible error in the trial court’s interpretation of the applicable restriction. The trial court’s narrow reading of the language of the restriction was error which requires that Appellant’s conviction be reversed.

A lengthy discussion of the facts is unnecessary. It is sufficient to *17note the Appellant’s driver’s license was restricted to “Business Purposes Only.” This restriction permits any driving necessary to maintain livelihood, such as to and from work, necessary on the job driving, to and from school and any driving at the school which may be required by the school for purposes of education, essential shopping, and for church or medical purposes. No pleasure or non-essential driving is permitted.1

The evidence showed that Appellant was ticketed while en route to pick up his fiancee from her place of employment.2 Appellant presented testimony that his fiancee contributed a large part of his support, including paying the rent and food expenses from her wages. Appellant argued that the “Business Purposes Only” limitation is broader than the “Employment Purposes Only” category and that his license restriction allows any driving necessary to maintain livelihood. Appellant asserted that the term “livelihood” included transporting his fiancee to and from the employment which supported both of them. This Court agrees. The subject license restriction is much broader than the trial court’s limited interpretation and could allow driving, as in this case, which was not proven to be pleasure or non-essential but which was still within the realm of maintaining livelihood.

A fundamental rule of statutory construction is “that criminal statutes are to be construed strictly in favor of the person against whom a penalty is to be imposed.” *Ferguson v State,*377 So.2d 709, 711 (Fla. 1979). *See also*Fla. Stat. §775.021 (1991). Because the license restriction *sub judice*is susceptible of differing constructions as applied to the facts in this case, any reasonable doubts concerning its meaning must be resolved in favor of Appellant. Thus the trial court erred when it stated that it was “going to read the business purposes only restriction code very narrowly” (T 49).

Therefore, this Court reverses Appellant’s conviction and remands to the trial court with directions to enter an order of acquittal.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, at Orlando, Orange County, Florida, this 20th day of September, 1991.

1

A second type of restriction entitled “Employment Purposes Only” is also available. It only allows driving to and from work and any necessary on the job driving required by the employer or occupation.

2

 The evidence also demonstrated that Appellant’s fiancee had only a learner’s permit.
#### The Inhabitants of Hanson *versus*The Inhabitants of Pembroke.

By *St.*1819, *c.*147, by which a part of the town of Pembroke was incorporated as a new town by the name of Hanson, it is enacted, that *t(*the poor now supported by the town of Pembroke, and all such who may hereafter be returned for support in virtue of having acquired a settlement in said town, shall be supported in the town of Pembroke or Hanson, as they shall have acquired their settlement within the territorial limits of either town as described in this act.” It was held, that this provision did not apply to a person not then a pauper, who had then acquired a settlement in the territory set off as the town of Pembroke, but whose dwelling-place was within the territory set off as the town of Hanson, but that such person, upon the incorporation of Hanson, acquired a settlement in that town by virtue of die general statute of 1793, c. 34.

Assumpsit for the support of a female pauper. The question was, whether ' her settlement was in the town of Pembroke.

The plaintiff and defendant towns formerly constituted the town of Pembroke, and were made separate towns by *St.*1819, c. 147, which contains this clause —“ The poor now supported by the town of Pembroke, and all such who may hereafter be returned for support in virtue of having acquired a settlement in said town, shall be supported in the town of Pembroke or Hanson, as they shall have acquired their settlement within the territorial limits of either town as described in this act.” At the time of the enactment of this statute the pauper was a single woman, and dwelt and had her *198home in that part of Pembroke which is now Hanson, and she has continued to reside there, but has acquired no settlement there since that time. She had, at that time, acquired her settlement within the territorial limits of Pembroke as described in the statute.

*Eddy,*for the plaintiffs,

cited *Dalton*v. *Hinsdale,*6 Mass R. 501 ; *Princeton*v. *West Boylston,*15 Mass. R. 257 ; *Bridgewater*v. *West Bridgewater,*9 Pick. 56.

*Beal,*for the defendants.

*Per Curiam.*

The words, “ who may be hereafter returned,” refer to persons having their settlement, but not their residence, in the town of Pembroke at the time of its division into these two towns. The present case therefore does not come within the clause recited from the statute of 1819, *c.*147 ; but is embraced by the general provision in the statute of 1793, c. 34, the effect of which is, that when a new town shall be incorporated, composed of a part of an old town, all persons having a legal settlement in the original town, who shall actually dwell within the limits of the new town at the time of its incorporation, shall thereby gain a legal settlement in the new town.

*Plaintiffs nonsuit*
[No. 49337-0-I.

Division One.

November 12, 2002.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. Christopher John Mott, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 01-8-01528-3, Nicole Maclnnes, J., entered October 11, 2001. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per Kennedy, J., concurred in by Baker and Ellington, JJ.
# regan

John A. Kitzhaber, MD, Governor

March 10,2011 Dennis McLerran, Regional Administrator U.S. Environmental ProtectionAgency Region 10 1200 SixthAvenue, Suite 900 Seattle, WA 98101 

### Department of Environmental Quality Headquarters 811 SW Sixth Avenue Portland, OR 97204-1390 (503) 229-5696 FAX (503) 229-6124 TTY: 711

RE: Oregon SIP Infrastructure for Addressing the Interstate Transport of zondlffi!:Qf

### 00iti.lf£EXECUTIVE Particulate. Dear Mr. McLerran: Pursuantto EPA's request, we wishto clarify that DEQ'srecent SIP revision entitled "Oregon SIP Infrastructure for Addressing the Interstate Transport ofOzone and Fine Particulate," submittedby ODEQ onJune 23, 2010, and supplemented on December 22,2010 was intendedto meet interstate transport requirements ofsection 110(a)(2)(D)(i) ofthe CleanAirAct for the 1997 PM2.S NAAQS, the 1997 8-hour ozone NAAQS, the 2006 PM2.S NAAQS and the 2008 8- hour ozone NAAQS. Our interstate transport document focused chiefly onthe more stringent 2006 PM2.S NAAQS and the 2008 8-hour ozone NAAQS; however, DEQ believes its conclusion that Oregon does not cause orcontribute to exceedances ofNAAQS in other states applies equally to the earlier and less stringent PM2.S and ozone standards. Therefore, we affirm that the conclusions inthe June 23, 2010, SIP submission and December 22,2010 supplement specifically apply to the interstate transport standards for the 1997 PM2.S and 1997 8-hour ozone NAAQS, as well as the 2006 PM2.S NAAQS and the 2008 8-hour ozone NAAQS. Ifyouhave further questions, please contactDavid Collier, Manager ofAir Quality Planning, at (S03) 229-S177.

Dick Pedersen Director

cc: DonnaDeneen, U.S. Environmental ProtectionAgency, Region 10 Paul Koprowski, EPA Oregon Operations Office Andrew Ginsburg, DEQ Air Quality Administrator Margaret Oliphant, DEQ Air Quality SIP Coordinator -- - ----- ---
<PAGE>



                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Quarterly Report of American Plumbing &
Mechanical, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30,
2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the "Report"), I, Robert A. Christianson, Chief Executive Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

          (1)  the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
               or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

          (2)  the information contained in the Report fairly represents, in all
               material respects, the financial condition and results of
               operations of the Company.



Date: August 14, 2003                          /s/ Robert A. Christianson
                                               --------------------------
                                               Robert A. Christianson,
                                               Chief Executive Officer



                                       35
§ 382.97 To which aircraft does the requirement to provide boarding and deplaning assistance through the use of lifts apply? The requirement of section 382.95(b) of this part to provide boarding and deplaning assistance through the use of lifts applies with respect to all aircraft with a passenger capacity of 19 or more, with the following exceptions: ( a ) Float planes;
( b ) The following 19-seat capacity aircraft models: the Fairchild Metro, the Jetstream 31 and 32, the Beech 1900 (C and D models), and the Embraer EMB-120;
( c ) Any other aircraft model determined by the Department of Transportation to be unsuitable for boarding and deplaning assistance by lift, ramp, or other suitable device. The Department will make such a determination if it concludes that— ( 1 ) No existing boarding and deplaning assistance device on the market will accommodate the aircraft without a significant risk of serious damage to the aircraft or injury to passengers or employees, or
( 2 ) Internal barriers are present in the aircraft that would preclude passengers who use a boarding or aisle chair from reaching a non-exit row seat.
II 

116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 4056 

To prohibit certain individuals from being appointed to positions if the individual worked, as part of that individual’s employment with the United 

States, on behalf of a special counsel investigation that investigated 

or prosecuted a President or a candidate for election to the office of 

President. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JUNE 24, 2020 

Mr. COTTON (for himself and Mrs. LOEFFLER) introduced the following bill; 

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

A BILL 

To prohibit certain individuals from being appointed to positions if the individual worked, as part of that individual’s 

employment with the United States, on behalf of a special counsel investigation that investigated or prosecuted 

a President or a candidate for election to the office 

of President. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Restore Integrity of 

5 Special Prosecutors Act’’. 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 4056 IS

1 SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON APPOINTMENT OF CERTAIN INDI2 VIDUALS WHO INVESTIGATED OR PROS3 ECUTED A PRESIDENT OR CANDIDATE FOR 

4 ELECTION TO THE OFFICE OF PRESIDENT. 

5 (a) DEFINITION.—The term ‘‘special counsel inves6 tigation or prosecution’’ means an investigation or pros7 ecution conducted pursuant to part 600 of title 28, Code 

8 of Federal Regulations. 

9 (b) PROHIBITION.—The President may not appoint 

10 any individual to a position that requires the advice and 

11 consent of the Senate if, during the 7-year period ending 

12 on the date of the nomination, the individual worked, as 

13 part of that individual’s employment with the United 

14 States, on behalf of a special counsel investigation or pros15 ecution, that investigated or prosecuted a President or a 

16 candidate for election to the office of President. 

Æ 


pbinns on DSKJLVW7X2PROD with BILLS
#### § 253.3 Definitions.

*Large aircraft* means any aircraft designed to have a maximum passenger capacity of more than 60 seats.

*Passenger* means any person who purchases, or who contacts a ticket office or travel agent for the purpose of purchasing, or considering the purchase of, air transportation.

*Ticket office* means station, office, or other location where tickets are sold that is under the charge of a person employed exclusively by the carrier, or by it jointly with another person.