This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A13-2055

State of Minnesota, 

Respondent, 

vs. 

Gregory Levon Spraggins, Jr.,

Appellant

Filed September 8, 2014

Affirmed

Peterson, Judge

Rice County District Court

File No. 66-CR-12-2713

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and 

G. Paul Beaumaster, Rice County Attorney, Terence John Swihart, Assistant County 

Attorney, Faribault, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael Wallace Kunkel, 

Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and 

Klaphake, Judge.

*

 

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to 

Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. 
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

PETERSON, Judge

In this appeal from convictions of fourth- and fifth-degree criminal sexual 

conduct, appellant argues that because there are significant inconsistencies between the 

victim’s trial testimony and her prior statements and there is no corroborating evidence, 

the evidence was insufficient to prove that he had sexual contact with the victim. We 

affirm.

FACTS

In September 2012, the victim was 14 years old. After school on three days each 

week, she went to the home of her mother’s friend, J.S., and stayed there until her mother 

was done with work. J.S. lived with appellant Gregory Levon Spraggins, Jr. 

On September 21, 2012, the victim went to J.S.’s house after school. The victim 

was in the living room watching television when appellant came into the living room, 

told the victim that he wanted to teach her about sex, and then reached down and grabbed 

her left breast over her clothes. The only people in the house were the victim, appellant, 

and appellant’s one-year-old son. The victim pushed appellant away, picked up the son, 

and went outside to wait for her mother. 

The victim told her friend B.G. about the sexual assault. On September 26, 2012, 

the victim sent her mother two text messages about the assault. The first text states, 

“Mom greg says hes trying to teach me about sex but he touches me.” The second text 

states:
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I was downstairs and he comes over and says im at that 

age when I need to no about sex and then he thouches me and 

asks me how it felt but I just ran outside with bubu 

[appellant’s son] and stayed there for a while and later he 

went out to his car and left when he came back he had the 

kids then he didn’t talk to me again that day. 

After receiving the text messages, the victim’s mother brought her to Hope Center, 

and an advocate from Hope Center set up a meeting with Faribault Police Detective 

Brandon L. Gliem. Gliem interviewed the victim with her mother and the advocate 

present. Gliem described the victim as shy, fearful, avoiding eye contact, and very 

uncomfortable. The victim told Gliem that she was seated on the floor in front of the 

television while babysitting appellant’s son when appellant came into the room, sat next 

to her on the floor, and started to talk to her about sex and sex education. The victim 

stated that appellant said that she was at an age when she should know about sex, groped 

her breast one time, and asked her how it felt. The victim was scared, so she took the son 

and went outside. Either the victim or her mother told Gliem that the victim had been 

released from school early that day. 

Appellant was charged with one count each of fourth-degree criminal sexual 

conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.345, subd. 1(b) (2012); and fifth-degree 

criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.3451, subd. 1(1) (2012). To 

convict appellant of the charged offenses, the state was required to prove that he engaged 

in sexual contact with the victim without her consent and with either sexual or aggressive 

intent. Minn. Stat. §§ 609.345, subd. 1(b), .3451, subd. 1(1), .341, subd. 11(a) (2012). 

Appellant waived his right to a jury trial, and the case was tried to the court.
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There were discrepancies between the victim’s statement to Gliem and her trial 

testimony. The victim testified at trial that she got out of school at 3:05 p.m. on 

September 21, 2012. She testified that she was sitting on the couch and that appellant 

was standing in front of her when he touched her breast. The victim testified that 

appellant’s son was by the couch when she grabbed him to go outside but admitted on 

cross-examination that she had told Gliem that she went upstairs to get the son. Gliem 

testified that the victim said that the son crawled up the stairs by himself. The victim 

testified that she told her mother and B.G. about the sexual assault, but she told Gliem 

that she also told another friend about it.

There were also discrepancies between the victim’s and B.G.’s testimony. The 

victim testified that she “just told [B.G.] that my mom’s best friend’s boyfriend touched 

me and that I wasn’t feeling like myself,” and that she did not provide B.G. with specific 

details. B.G. testified that the victim said that a person named Gregory “touched her 

while he was trying to teach her about sex” and that Gregory said that he cared about and 

loved her. B.G.’s testimony was consistent with the statement she gave to Gliem. Also, 

the victim testified that B.G. was no longer her best friend because they had a falling out. 

B.G. testified that nothing had happened between them and that the only reason they were 

no longer friends was because B.G. was no longer attending Faribault High School. 

The victim testified that she was nervous being in court and that, when she is 

nervous, “a lot of things tend to slip my mind.” The victim testified that some of the 

details about the sexual assault were hard for her to remember and that she had tried to 

forget the details. 
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The district court found appellant guilty and sentenced him on the fourth-degree 

offense to a stayed term of 18 months in prison. This appeal followed.

D E C I S I O N

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we apply the same standard of 

review to bench and jury trials. In re Welfare of M.E.M., 674 N.W.2d 208, 215 (Minn. 

App. 2004). When considering a claim of insufficient evidence, this court conducts “a 

painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a 

light most favorable to the conviction,” was sufficient to allow the fact-finder to reach the 

verdict that it reached. State v. Caine, 746 N.W.2d 339, 356 (Minn. 2008) (quotation 

omitted). We must assume that “the [fact-finder] believed the State’s witnesses and 

disbelieved the defense witnesses.” State v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 858 (Minn. 2008). 

We will not disturb the verdict if the fact-finder, acting with due regard for the 

presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could 

reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged. Bernhardt v. 

State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (Minn. 2004). 

Assessing the credibility of witnesses and weighing their testimony is within the 

exclusive province of the fact-finder. State v. Folkers, 581 N.W.2d 321, 327 (Minn.

1998). Minor inconsistencies in testimony and conflicts in evidence do not require 

reversal, but rather are factors for the jury to consider when making credibility 

determinations. State v. Johnson, 679 N.W.2d 378, 387 (Minn. App. 2004), review 

denied (Minn. Aug. 17, 2004). A sexual-abuse victim’s testimony need not be 

corroborated to sustain a conviction, Minn. Stat. § 609.347, subd. 1 (2012); and “a 
6

conviction can rest on the uncorroborated testimony of a single credible witness. State v. 

Foreman, 680 N.W.2d 536, 539 (Minn. 2004).

The inconsistencies between the victim’s pretrial statements and her trial

testimony are minor and go to collateral matters, such as whether the victim was released 

from school about one hour early on the day of the assault, whether the victim was sitting 

on the couch or the floor in the living room, whether appellant’s son was still in the living 

room when the victim picked him up or had crawled up the stairs, whether she told two or 

three people about the assault, and the amount of detail she provided to B.G. about the 

assault.

Appellant argues that the victim’s specific testimony about the assault at trial was 

inconsistent with her reluctance to discuss details with Gliem. But the substance of the 

victim’s statement to Gliem about the assault was consistent with her trial testimony that 

appellant was talking to her about sex education and grabbed her breast. The victim’s 

reluctance to talk to Gliem is consistent with her mother’s description of the victim’s 

demeanor as upset, depressed, and more quiet than normal following the assault, and the 

fact that the victim’s demeanor when she was interviewed by Gliem less than one week 

after the assault was different from her demeanor at trial does not demonstrate that the 

victim was not credible.

Appellant argues that the victim’s testimony on direct examination that appellant 

grabbed her breast was inconsistent with her testimony on cross-examination that 

appellant only touched her breast and that she pushed his hand away before he could 

squeeze it. Defense counsel used the word “touch” when cross-examining the victim, 
7

and the victim agreed that appellant had “touched” her breast. Defense counsel then 

asked if appellant had squeezed her breast, and the victim responded that he tried but she 

pushed his hand away before he could do so. Describing the contact as grabbing and

describing it as touching without squeezing are consistent descriptions of appellant’s 

conduct. “Grab” means “[t]o take or grasp suddenly.” The American Heritage Dictionary 

of the English Language 784 (3d ed. 1992). “Grabbed” does not imply that the sudden

grasp was followed by exerting pressure, as appellant seems to suggest.

Appellant submitted a pro se supplemental brief that also challenges the victim’s 

credibility. In addition to the issues already addressed, appellant cites the inconsistency 

between the victim’s trial testimony that appellant did not come out of the house after the 

assault and her text message to her mother that said that appellant went out to his car and 

left to pick up the other children and then returned with them. This is a minor 

inconsistency about a collateral matter. Appellant also argues that the victim’s testimony 

that she and B.G. had a falling out is inconsistent with B.G.’s testimony that their 

friendship ended because B.G. no longer attended Faribault High School. When asked 

about the falling out, the victim explained that B.G. had made new friends and that she 

and B.G. drifted apart. The differences between B.G.’s and the victim’s testimony

simply reflect differences in perception as to why the friendship ended.

Appellant also challenges the victim’s credibility based on J.S.’s testimony about 

the victim’s character for dishonesty and the lack of corroborating evidence. The district 

court specifically found J.S.’s testimony incredible. And there was corroborating 

evidence. The victim’s testimony about how the sexual assault occurred was consistent 
8

with her out-of-court statements. See State v. Christopherson, 500 N.W.2d 794, 798 

(Minn. App. 1993) (stating that consistent statements about an assault to multiple 

individuals self-corroborated a child victim’s testimony). The change in the victim’s 

demeanor following the assault is also corroborating evidence. See State v. Mosby, 450 

N.W.2d 629, 635 (Minn. App. 1990) (stating that sexual-assault victim’s demeanor after 

assault corroborated her testimony), review denied (Minn. Mar. 16, 1990).

Assessing the victim’s credibility and weighing her testimony was within the 

exclusive province of the district court as fact-finder, the district court specifically found 

her testimony credible, and appellant has not identified any basis for us to conclude that 

the evidence was not sufficient to allow the district court to reach the verdict that it 

reached. See Nelson v. Nelson, 282 Minn. 487, 492, 166 N.W.2d 70, 74 (1969) (stating 

that “[i]t cannot be expected that statements given by a witness at different times and 

under different circumstances must conform in every detail” and that “[i]t is for the jury 

to pass upon the credibility of the witness”); Mosby, 450 N.W.2d at 634 (stating that 

“inconsistencies are a sign of human fallibility and do not prove testimony is false, 

especially when the testimony is about a traumatic event”).

Affirmed.