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OVERSIGHT OF THE 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

OCTOBER 22, 2015 

Serial No. 114–55 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia, Chairman 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TED POE, Texas 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

RAU ́ L LABRADOR, Idaho 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

RON DeSANTIS, Florida 

MIMI WALTERS, California 

KEN BUCK, Colorado 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas 

DAVE TROTT, Michigan 

MIKE BISHOP, Michigan 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

PEDRO R. PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico 

JUDY CHU, California 

TED DEUTCH, Florida 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

KAREN BASS, California 

CEDRIC RICHMOND, Louisiana 

SUZAN DelBENE, Washington 

HAKEEM JEFFRIES, New York 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

SCOTT PETERS, California 

SHELLEY HUSBAND, Chief of Staff & General Counsel 

PERRY APELBAUM, Minority Staff Director & Chief Counsel 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

OCTOBER 22, 2015 

Page 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Bob Goodlatte, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Virginia, and Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary ................................. 1 

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary ......... 3 

WITNESS 

The Honorable James B. Comey, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 9 

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Questions for the Record submitted to the Honorable James B. Comey, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation .................................................................. 76 

(1) 

OVERSIGHT OF THE 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 22, 2015 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:15 a.m., in room 

2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Bob Goodlatte 

(Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Goodlatte, Smith, Chabot, Issa, Forbes, 

King, Franks, Gohmert, Poe, Chaffetz, Marino, Labrador, Collins, 

DeSantis, Buck, Ratcliffe, Trott, Bishop, Conyers, Lofgren, Jackson 

Lee, Cohen, Johnson, Chu, Deutch, Gutierrez, Bass, DelBene, 

Jeffries, Cicilline, Peters. 

Staff Present: (Majority) Shelley Husband, Chief of Staff & General Counsel; Branden Ritchie, Deputy Chief of Staff & Chief Counsel; Allison Halataei, Parliamentarian & General Counsel; Jason 

Herring, FBI Detailee, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations; Caroline Lynch, Chief Counsel, 

Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations; Robert Parmiter, Counsel, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations; Ryan Breitenbach, 

Counsel, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, 

and Investigations; Kelsey Williams, Clerk; (Minority) Perry Apelbaum, Staff Director & Chief Counsel; Aaron Hiller, Chief Oversight Counsel; Joe Graupensperger, Chief Counsel, Subcommittee 

on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations; Tiffany Joslyn, Deputy Chief Counsel, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations; Eric Williams, 

Detailee, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, 

and Investigations; and Veronica Eligan, Professional Staff Member. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Good morning. The Judiciary Committee will 

come to order. And without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare recesses of the Committee at any time. 

We welcome everyone to this morning’s hearing on the oversight 

of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and I will begin by recognizing myself for an opening statement. 

Welcome, Director Comey, to your second appearance before the 

House Judiciary Committee since your confirmation as the seventh 

Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. We are happy to 

have you here with us today. I once again commend your distin-
2 

guished service to our Nation, and I’m confident you will continue 

to serve honorably at the helm of the FBI. 

Today, the FBI continues to face the effects of one of the worst 

national security leaks in our Nation’s history by Edward Snowden 

2 years ago. Over the past year, the House Judiciary Committee 

spearheaded the passage of the USA FREEDOM Act, a bipartisan 

law that ended a controversial national security program and provided expanded oversight and transparency of America’s intelligence gathering. The USA FREEDOM Act ensures that Federal 

law appropriately respects civil liberties while providing the necessary tools to preserve our collection capabilities and thereby meet 

our national security responsibilities. 

I want to again thank Director Comey and the men and women 

of the FBI for working closely with Members of this Committee to 

ensure passage and enactment of the USA FREEDOM Act. 

Events over the past year in the Middle East have deeply violated the world’s moral compass with scenes of unimaginable brutality at the hands of ISIS. In particular, the appalling and indiscriminate targeting of anyone who fails to abide by ISIS’ stated 

goal to establish a global caliphate has resulted in the shedding of 

innocent blood by the most revolting methods. 

As a radical Islamic terrorist organization, ISIS mandates conformity to an ideology which permits no dissent. As Americans with 

a strong history of protecting religious liberty, we stand in total opposition to ISIS’ decimation of Christian populations in the Middle 

East and to its vicious tactics. 

America is not immune to ISIS’ propaganda of terror. American 

teenagers have been radicalized in part by ISIS’ concerted social 

media efforts promoting the killing of fellow Americans, and just 

last week a like-minded cyber hacker was indicted for providing 

ISIS with information on U.S. service members. 

Director Comey, you are at the forefront of protecting our country from those who patiently plot to do us harm, and I am interested today in hearing more about the FBI’s efforts to combat ISIS. 

Over 3 years ago, our diplomatic mission to Benghazi, Libya, was 

attacked by terrorists and four Americans, including our Ambassador, were killed. As of today, only one subject has been apprehended and placed on trial. I am interested in hearing more from 

you about the status of the FBI’s investigation and efforts to bring 

to justice other terrorist killers who murdered four of our citizens. 

Separately, it was revealed this past year that former Secretary 

of State Hillary Clinton used a private e-mail server to conduct her 

official business while serving as Secretary of State. Two inspectors 

general have already reported that classified information was contained within Secretary Clinton’s private e-mail and have referred 

the matter to the Justice Department. 

While the apparent lack of transparency related to the use of a 

private server to conduct the Nation’s diplomatic business is troubling, it also raises significant questions concerning the security of 

national secrets and the potential insight that such a home-brew 

setup may afford a foreign intelligence service into the day-to-day 

digital record of a top-level government official. 

On the technology front, the issue known as Going Dark has 

been at the top of the FBI’s concerns in recent years. Encryption 
3 

technology is exciting and can effectively secure private communications when privacy is needed or desired. In fact, over 15 years 

ago, I led congressional efforts to ensure strong encryption technology and to ensure that the government could not automatically 

demand a backdoor key to encryption technologies. 

This enabled the U.S. encryption market to thrive and produce 

legitimate encryption technologies for legitimate actors rather than 

see the market head completely overseas to companies that do not 

have to comply with basic protections. However, it is true that this 

technology can also be used by those who wish to do us harm. 

Adoption of new communications technologies by those intending to 

harm the American people is outpacing law enforcement’s technological capability to access those communications in legitimate 

criminal and terrorist investigations. 

In light of the Administration’s recent announcement that it is 

not currently seeking a legislative solution to its Going Dark challenges, I am interested to hear your perspective on whether the Administration’s newly announced approach to work in an ad hoc 

fashion with communication providers is an adequate solution. 

Finally, violent crime appears to be on the rise across the country, particularly around our major metropolitan centers. It is disconcerting to watch the gains of the past decades unravel in an explosion of community violence. We have also witnessed several incidents in the past year that, unfortunately, have led to increased 

community tension with law enforcement. This tension will hopefully be resolved through improved communication, accountability, 

policing practices, and various other initiatives. 

I hope to hear the FBI’s perspectives on the reasons for the increase in crime and how to ensure that law enforcement officers 

and the citizens they serve can coexist in a safe and respectful environment. 

In conclusion, Mr. Director, please know that this Committee sincerely appreciates your efforts to keep us safe and the heroic actions consistently performed by the men and women of the FBI to 

protect our country. I look forward to hearing your answers on all 

of these important topics today, as well as on our other issues of 

significance to the FBI and our Nation. 

At this time, I am pleased to recognize the Ranking Member of 

the Committee, the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers, for his 

opening statement. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Chairman Goodlatte. 

Good morning, Director Comey. We welcome you for this second 

appearance before the House Judiciary Committee since taking office on September the 4th, 2013. 

The FBI’s mission is a complex undertaking to protect the United 

States from terrorism, to enforce our criminal laws, and to lead the 

Nation’s law enforcement community. And yet, as vast as this mission seems, I think nearly all of the discussion we will have here 

today can be distilled into one word: Trust. Trust in the executive 

branch to respect and secure our privacy and our civil liberties. 

Trust in the FBI as an institution. Trust in State and local agencies that police our communities. 

In many respects, Director Comey, I think we agree on this 

point. For example, you have spoken powerfully about the hard 
4 

truths we must keep in mind when we discuss race and policing, 

and particularly when we discuss the use of force by police officers. 

I am told that you require all new agencies to study the FBI’s 

interaction with Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and to visit his memorial at the Tidal Basin. I’m also advised that you keep on your 

desk a copy of Robert Kennedy’s approval of J. Edgar Hoover’s request to place a wiretap on Dr. King. 

These are powerful reminders of a troubling and not-too-distant 

history. It’s not difficult to draw a line from that era to recent 

events in Ferguson, Baltimore, New York, and Cleveland. And 

that’s why your work to build trust between police and our communities is so important. 

Nowhere is that effort more apparent than in your call for better 

data on the use of force by police. Although the FBI is the national 

custodian of crime statistics, that data is reported voluntarily and 

inconsistently. You have been honest in your assessment that official statistics in this area are so incomplete as to be embarrassing 

and ridiculous. 

We need a better understanding of what drives police use of 

force, and we cannot study the problem without reliable data. I 

urge you to continue to press your State and local partners for consistent and accurate reporting to the National Incident-Based Reporting System. 

Just as we must rebuild trust in certain State and local law enforcement units, we will look to your testimony today to reassure 

us about a number of programs and activities at the FBI. Earlier 

this year, the public noticed a small plane flying in a tight pattern 

directly over the site of unrest in west Baltimore. Other reports 

from other parts of the country, including my own district in Detroit, raise questions about the presence of similar aircraft. 

The FBI has since confirmed the existence of its aerial surveillance program. On June 3, 15 Members of this Committee wrote 

you to ask for more information about this program. Your team 

provided our staff with a briefing soon thereafter. But the public 

still has many questions about aerial surveillance, and you have 

said that there is a great deal of misinformation about this program. I would like you to use your testimony and presence here 

today to explain from your perspective how this program works and 

why we should trust the Bureau to operate it. 

Similarly, I think we would benefit from a fuller description of 

encryption and what you’ve called the Going Dark problem. Over 

the past year, you have called for a congressional mandate to give 

the FBI special access to otherwise encrypted data. 

I have a difficult time understanding this proposal. Every technical expert who has spoken on this issue has concluded that it is 

technically impossible to provide this access without also compromising our security against bad actors. Even if it were technically 

feasible, it would cost our technology sector perhaps billions of dollars to implement the scheme and perhaps billions more from loss 

of business overseas where the United States Government surveillance programs have already taken a toll on the industry. 

And even if it were technically feasible and easy to implement, 

a new rule for United States companies would not succeed in keep-
5 

ing bad actors from using unbreakable encryption, which is open 

source, free, and widely available from companies based overseas. 

As Chairman Goodlatte argued when we had this debate in 1999, 

only by allowing the use of strong encryption, not only domestically 

but internationally as well, can we hope to make the Internet a 

safe and secure environment. I agree with that sentiment, and you 

have made similar public statements, and I hope that you can help 

us to reconcile that view with your call for special access. 

And finally, because rigorous oversight is necessary for public 

trust, I hope that you will commit today to full compliance with the 

Inspector General Act. For the past 5 years, the FBI has resisted 

the clear mandate of that law. The inspector general of the Department of Justice is to have timely access to every document he requires to carry out his duties. 

Noncompliance has real consequences. This Committee waited 

until February of this year to receive a report about the FBI’s use 

of Section 215 orders from 2007 to 2009. The public waited until 

May for the unclassified version. In the middle of a national debate 

on government surveillance, we waited 6 years for critical information. This delay is unacceptable. 

I understand that there are other interpretations of the law. Congress will soon clarify the matter, likely in overwhelmingly bipartisan fashion. But in the meantime, Director Comey, I hope that 

the Bureau will step away from its litigating position and give the 

Office of the Inspector General the access it requires and deserves. 

Your job is a complex and demanding one, Director. We appreciate you being here today, and I look forward to your testimony. 

And I thank the Chairman and yield back. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Mr. Conyers. 

Without objection, all other Members’ opening statements will be 

made a part of the record. 

We welcome our distinguished witness today. And if you’ll please 

rise, we’ll begin by swearing you in. 

Do you swear that the testimony that you are about to give shall 

be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help 

you God? 

Director COMEY. I do. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you. 

Let the record reflect that the witness has responded in the affirmative. 

On September 4, 2013, Director Comey was sworn in as the seventh director of the FBI. He began his career as an assistant 

United States attorney for both the Southern District of New York 

and the Eastern District of Virginia. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Director Comey returned to New York to become the United 

States attorney for the Southern District of New York. In 2003, he 

was appointed Deputy Attorney General under United States Attorney General John Ashcroft. Director Comey is a graduate of the 

College of William and Mary and the University of Chicago Law 

School. 

We welcome you again today to your second appearance before 

the House Committee. Your written statement will be entered into 

the record in its entirety, and we ask that you summarize your tes-
6 

timony in 5 minutes. And with that, we welcome you again to the 

Committee. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE JAMES B. COMEY, 

DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

Mr. COMEY. Thank you, Chairman Goodlatte, Congressman Conyers. It’s good to be back before you and the Members of the Committee for my second annual oversight hearing. I expect to be back 

for eight more during my 10-year term, which I look forward to 

very much. 

What I thought I would do is just explain to the Committee in 

very short form how we at the FBI think about ourselves and a 

couple of the things that are prominent in our work today. I think 

the FBI can best be described in a single sentence: We are a national security and law enforcement organization that uses, collects, and shares intelligence in everything that we do. 

That sentence captures us in two different ways. First, the first 

half of that sentence, we are a national security and law enforcement organization. There is great strength to the American people 

in having our criminal responsibilities and our national security responsibilities in the same place. 

Perhaps no better example is there of the strength that’s gained 

from that combination than the rule of law as the spine of the FBI. 

It is a great thing, I think, for this country that the people responsible for counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and the criminal 

work all have as part of their being the rule of law and the Bill 

of Rights. 

The second half of that sentence, we use, collect, and share intelligence in everything that we do, is a description of what I think 

we have always been but what we have tried to get so much better 

at since 9/11. That is being thoughtful about what we know, what 

we need to know, and who needs to know what we know so that 

we can all be more effective in protecting this country. 

I want to touch on two topics under our responsibilities. Start 

with national security. The threat posed to us from ISIL’s 

crowdsourcing of terrorism using social media is a significant feature of our work. It was an especially taxing threat the FBI dealt 

with earlier this summer when all over the country, in hundreds 

of investigations, we were trying to evaluate where people are from 

consuming ISIL’s poison to acting on it. 

Through the Internet, the so-called Islamic State has been pushing a twin-pronged message to troubled souls all over the world 

and all over our country. The first prong is come to the so-called 

caliphate and live a life of glory; and if you can’t come, the second 

prong says, kill. Kill where you are. Kill anyone. If you can kill 

people in uniform, military or law enforcement, best of all. 

That message has gone out since the summer of 2014 aggressively and in a very sophisticated way to thousands of consumers 

on Twitter. And Twitter works to sell books or movies or magazines. It works to crowdsource terrorism. And so in every State we 

have investigations trying to understand where people are on the 

path from consuming to acting. 

And this is a very different paradigm than the traditional Al 

Qaeda paradigm because this is not about national landmarks and 
7 

sophisticated, long-tail, carefully surveilled events. This is about 

trying to motivate murder anywhere, by anyone. And, unfortunately, it’s a message that resonates with troubled souls seeking 

meaning. 

And so earlier this summer, especially in May, June, and July, 

we were faced with the prospect of a whole lot of people acting out 

on this inspiration or direction from ISIL, and thanks to great work 

by the men and women of the FBI and our partners in State, local, 

and Federal law enforcement, we disrupted a whole lot of efforts 

to murder innocent people in the United States. 

That work, though, continues, and it is made particularly difficult by an issue both you and Mr. Conyers touched upon. Our 

mission is to find needles in a nationwide haystack, and we have 

hundreds of investigations aimed at doing that in all 50 States. But 

increasingly what ISIL does is move the real live ones who might 

be willing to kill on their behalf off of Twitter to a mobile messaging app that is end-to-end encrypted. And at that moment, the 

needle that we may have found becomes invisible to us even with 

court orders, which is how the FBI does its business. 

And so that’s the challenge we face called Going Dark in real living color. We are trying to interdict, trying to stop, trying to understand people on the cusp of acts of violence, and increasingly a tool 

that the American people count on us to use is less and less effective. I don’t know exactly what to do about that, frankly, but I 

think my job, given the responsibility I have, is to tell people 

there’s a problem and we need to talk about it. And so I look forward to a conversation about it with you. 

Our law enforcement responsibilities is the second thing I just 

want to touch very briefly. Obviously, we do public corruption 

work. We protect children. We fight fraud. We do a whole lot of 

work with our partners around the country to address violent 

crime. Something very disturbing is happening in this country 

right now in law enforcement and in violent crime. 

I imagine two lines, one being us in law enforcement and the 

other being communities we serve and protect, especially communities of color. Those two lines over the last year or so have been 

arcing away from each other, and that continues. Each incident 

that involves police misconduct or perceived misconduct bends one 

line away. Each time an officer is killed or attacked in the line of 

duty bends the other line farther away. 

And in the midst of those arcing away from each other, maybe 

because they’re arcing away from each other, we are seeing a dramatic spike in violent crime, especially homicide, in cities all across 

the country. In communities of color especially, especially young 

men are dying at a rate that dwarfs what we’ve seen in recent history. It’s happening all over the country, and it’s happening all in 

the last 10 months. 

And so a lot of us in law enforcement are talking and trying to 

understand what is happening in this country, what explains the 

map we see, what explains the calendar. Why is it happening all 

over the country? Why is it happening this year? 

I don’t know the answer to that. I, as I said, like a lot of people 

in law enforcement, are struggling with it. We simply must focus 

on this because all lives matter. This is not a problem America 
8 

should drive around. We should stare at it. And as we stare at it, 

we should all work for ways to bend those lines back toward each 

other, because we need each other. We need each other to make 

sure our communities are safe. We have achieved in 2014 historically low violent crime in this country. We cannot let that slip 

away from us. 

I am grateful for the hard work of the men and women of the 

FBI on these challenges. I am especially grateful for our partners 

in law enforcement around the country who help us address those. 

As you know, the FBI doesn’t have a lot of fancy stuff. We have 

people, and we have great people, thank goodness, who are Americans who care deeply about protecting all their fellow citizens. I am 

honored to be in this job where I get to watch what they do and 

help them. And I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Comey follows:] 
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Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Director Comey. 

We’ll now proceed under the 5-minute rule with questions for the 

Director, and I’ll begin my recognizing myself. 

Since the passage of the USA FREEDOM Act, a law that struck 

a balance between privacy and national security, is the FBI experiencing any difficulty in complying with the new law? 

Mr. COMEY. We have not, Mr. Chairman. We haven’t yet gotten 

to the place where the alternative system for telephone metadata 

has been built, but so far we haven’t seen an adverse impact. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. But you’re getting very close to that, I think—— 

Mr. COMEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GOODLATTE [continuing]. The date when the metadata collection will be completely turned off? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. The end of next month, I believe. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Even with a decade’s worth of information on 

Iraqi refugees, didn’t we still encounter cases of domestic terrorism 

conducted by those admitted as refugees? With significantly less information on potential Syrian refugees, isn’t it true that you can’t 

ensure that the Iraqi experience is not going to be replayed? 

Mr. COMEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Yes, you’re correct that we did discover in people who had come 

in as refugees from Iraq a number of people who were of serious 

concern, including two that were charged when we found their fingerprints on improvised explosive devices from Iraq. And there’s no 

doubt that that was the product of a less-than-excellent vetting 

that had been done on Iraqi refugees. 

There’s good news and bad news. The good news is we have improved dramatically our ability as an interagency, all parts of the 

U.S. Government, to query and check people. The bad news is our 

ability to touch data with respect to people who may come from 

Syria may be limited. That is, if we don’t know much about somebody, there won’t be anything in our database. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. In fact, much less than we had access to when 

we were in Iraq—— 

Mr. COMEY. I think that’s fair. 

Mr. GOODLATTE [continuing]. And had extensive networking and 

access to information about Iraqi citizens that simply does not in 

any way compare to the lack of information we have today about 

Syrian nationals who are seeking refugee status in the United 

States. 

Mr. COMEY. I think that’s a fair generality, that the data we had 

available to us from Iraq from a decade of our folks being there, 

encountering people, is richer than the data we have from Syria. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Director of the National Security Agency 

has said that former Secretary of State Clinton’s private e-mail 

server would be a sought-after target for a foreign intelligence 

agency. Do you also believe that a foreign intelligence agency, particularly an adversary’s, could benefit from acquiring and exploiting sensitive and classified information of a top-level U.S. Government official? 

Mr. COMEY. Mr. Chairman, I’d respectfully say that’s one I’m not 

going to comment on. As you know, the FBI is working on a referral given to us by inspectors general in connection with former Secretary Clinton’s use of a private e-mail server. As you also know 
29 

about the FBI, we don’t talk about our investigations while we’re 

doing them. This is one I’m following very closely and get briefed 

on regularly. I’m confident we have the people and the resources 

to do it in the way I believe we do all our work, which is promptly, 

professionally, and independently. But I don’t want to do anything 

that would compromise my ability to do it that way by commenting 

beyond that. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Well, how about answering my generic question, 

not directed at the specifics of that case, but rather the question 

of whether you believe that a foreign intelligence agency, particularly an adversary’s, could benefit from acquiring and exploiting 

sensitive and classified information of a top-level U.S. Government 

official? 

Mr. COMEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope you’ll understand 

why I don’t think it’s appropriate for me to answer that. I want to 

preserve my ability to oversee this investigation in a way that is 

both in reality independent and fair and is perceived that way. 

I believe the Bureau is three things. We are competent, we’re 

independent, and we’re honest, and I want to make sure the American people have confidence that that’s the way we’re doing our 

business. And if I start answering questions like yours, which is a 

reasonable question, I worry that I could infringe upon that. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. You’ve said that encryption represents the 

Going Dark problem in high definition. Earlier this month you testified in front of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental 

Affairs Committee that the Obama administration has decided to 

no longer seek a legislative remedy to address challenges law enforcement faces with encryption and Going Dark. What has 

changed? And do you agree with the concerns that I and the Ranking Member, Mr. Conyers, have expressed about some of the proposals that had previously been made with regard to addressing 

this problem? 

Mr. COMEY. I think what the Administration has decided, Mr. 

Chairman, is that it is not going to seek a legislative remedy now 

so that we can continue the conversations we’re having with the 

private sector, with our allies around the world, and with State and 

local law enforcement, who are hugely impacted by this, and I 

think that makes good sense. I don’t think we are yet to a place 

where we know exactly so how would we fix this legislatively. This 

is a very hard problem. 

I think you and Mr. Conyers have raised serious questions and 

concerns. I believe this is an incredibly hard problem because two 

sets of values we all care about, safety and security on the Internet. I’m a big fan of strong encryption for the reasons you said. It 

helps us fight cybersecurity. It helps us protect all that matters 

most to us personally and as a Nation and public safety that we 

all care about. And those two things are colliding with each other. 

There’s not an easy answer, but given how important both of 

those values are and what’s at stake, I think we have to wrestle 

with it, and we are continuing to do that. We’re having very good 

conversations along all the dimensions I just said, and we’ll continue it, I hope. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. I just came from a meeting with Bill Gates who 

indicated that the progress being made in quantum computing is 
30 

dramatic and that computers of that high capability will soon be 

able to crack any kind of encryption that anyone has. That I found 

to be very interesting information. I have both good and bad views 

of that because obviously that can be seriously abused and invade 

the privacy of law-abiding citizens, but it also will be a source of 

solving your problem when you encounter encrypted materials by 

people who are suspected enemies of the United States or criminals 

capable of using high technology to protect themselves and evade 

prosecution under the law. 

Do you have any comments or knowledge about the current state 

of quantum computing? 

Mr. COMEY. Nothing that would be useful to you. I’ve read about 

it in the popular press. I only have 8 years left in my term. I have 

a hard time imagining a police officer in New York City in a kidnapping case having access to a quantum computer any time in the 

near future when they encounter a device that’s locked. And so it 

may be some day that’s an answer to the challenge, to the conflict 

of those two sets of values. I don’t see it anywhere near in the near 

term. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you. 

I now recognize the Ranking Member for his questions. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome again, Director Comey. 

You observed that The Washington Post and The Guardian are 

becoming the lead source of information about violent encounters 

between police and civilians. You called the state of FBI statistics 

on these accounts embarrassing and ridiculous. And now that 

you’ve had some time to reflect on them, do you stand by this comment? 

Mr. COMEY. I do, Mr. Conyers. I think it’s embarrassing for those 

of us in government who care deeply about these issues, especially 

the use of force by law enforcement, that we can’t have an informed 

discussion because we don’t have data. People have data about who 

went to a movie last weekend or how many books were sold or how 

many cases of the flu walked into an emergency room, and I cannot 

tell you how many people were shot by police in the United States 

last month, last year, or anything about the demographics, and 

that’s a very bad place to be. 

Mr. CONYERS. Why, sir, does the FBI have trouble collecting this 

information? 

Mr. COMEY. I think the big challenge, Mr. Conyers, is that it requires cooperation from 18,000 law enforcement organizations all 

around the country, and we are a big, diverse country of many different size organizations in the law enforcement space, and so we 

have never all sat together and said let’s change the way we do 

this, and I’m optimistic we’re about to do that. 

Mr. CONYERS. You’re working on the problem—— 

Mr. COMEY. Very hard. 

Mr. CONYERS [continuing]. And you think that it’s coming together. 

Mr. COMEY. Very hard. And the good news is chiefs and sheriffs 

get it and want to be in a position we as a country can have informed conversations. And so what I have been asking for resonates with them. I’m going to speak to them again at a huge con-
31 

ference in Chicago next week. And I’m optimistic that we can get 

to a much better place. It’s going to take us a few years, but I think 

we can get to a much better place. 

Mr. CONYERS. I hope so. Your written testimony takes a rather 

dim view of the so-called Going Dark problem. You want private 

companies to understand the public safety and national security 

risks that result from malicious factors’ use of their encrypted 

products and services. In the past you have balanced comments 

like these with an honest assessment of the benefits of strong 

encryption. I want you to take some time to do that here. Why is 

encryption important to the Internet economy, to cybersecurity, 

and in many cases to our personal security? 

Mr. COMEY. Encryption is vital to our personal security because 

all of our lives are now online. I like people locking their cars when 

they go into a store. I like people to lock their homes so that people 

can’t break in and steal what matters to them. Now what matters 

to us as people and as companies and as a country are online, and 

so it ought to be secured in a way so people can’t steal our innovation, our identities, information about our children. So encryption 

is a very good thing, and the FBI has long said that. 

The challenge we face is that we never lived in a world with 

locks that couldn’t be opened on a judge’s order, and so now we face 

that world where all of our lives will be covered by strong 

encryption and so a judge’s orders under the Fourth Amendment 

will be unable to be complied with, and there are significant costs 

to that. That’s what I meant by the conflict of the values, public 

safety and security on the Internet, and that’s what makes it such 

a really hard problem. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. 

Over the summer we received reports that a single engine 

Cessna operated by the FBI and mounted with surveillance equipment had flown multiple times over metro Detroit, including two 

lengthy flights over Dearborn where many citizens feel reason to 

distrust the FBI because of their religious or ethnic background. 

You’ve been forthcoming to my staff about some of the details of 

this program. Can you give the public a similar overview here? 

Mr. COMEY. Sure. I’d be happy to, Mr. Conyers. 

When we investigate criminals or spies or terrorists, a key tool 

is surveillance, to follow them. We follow them a lot in cars. We 

follow them on foot. There are plenty of circumstances where both 

of those options don’t work real well, and so since the Wright 

brothers, we have used airplanes to follow people in our investigations. If a spy is going out to meet somebody and it’s an area where 

we can’t park cars, we’ll sometimes try and get a small plane up 

to be able to get eyes on that meet with their contact. 

And so it’s a feature—and I hope this doesn’t shock the American 

people, I think I should be in trouble with them if we’re not doing 

this—we use planes in our predicated investigations to conduct surveillance of people who are under investigation. We do not use 

planes for mass surveillance. 

And so the good folks in Michigan who saw a plane in the air, 

I think a lot of them had a chance to meet with my SAC out there 

and have him explain, look, this is what we do in criminal cases. 
32 

It should make sense if you understand how we use it in individual 

cases. 

So we have a small number of airplanes—I actually wish we had 

more—that we use to follow people in places where it’s hard to follow them on foot or in a car. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you for your response to my questions. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Forbes, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Director Comey, thank you, not just for being here, but for your 

service. I also want to thank all of your staff. I know the dedication 

they put into serving this country, and we appreciate them being 

here. 

If my friend Steve Chabot were here, he would also commend you 

for your selection of William and Mary as an undergraduate. And 

I will tell you that if we couldn’t convince you to go to the University of Virginia Law School, Chicago was probably a good second 

choice. 

But I have a question. As I listened to the Ranking Member 

today talk about trust, and he talked about the symbols that you 

have on your desk regarding police brutality and efforts by law enforcement, but you mentioned it was important to have reality and 

perception, both of those, when you’re looking to that trust. 

Tell me the symbols if you would, because what he raised was 

important, but tell me the symbols on your desk or in your office 

that would give me comfort in knowing that there was also a perception that you were equally looking at organized groups that 

were coming into areas like Ferguson and Baltimore to foment unrest, especially groups that were outside those communities and especially those groups who might be impacting violence against law 

enforcement. Because as you mentioned, there are two curves, not 

just one curve. 

Mr. COMEY. Thank you, Mr. Forbes. 

First of all, to make sure the record is clear, what I have on my 

desk to me is a message of the importance of restraint and oversight within government. And so it’s just—it’s a wiretap order that 

relates to Martin Luther King. It’s not about police misconduct, 

which is something—obviously, police misconduct is something we 

take very seriously. 

I’ve devoted my whole life to law enforcement. I come from a law 

enforcement family. One of the things that’s prominent in my office 

is a picture of my grandfather in 1929 escorting a dangerous felon 

to jail. My grandfather was a detective who rose up to lead a significant police department. And so I care an awful lot about making sure law enforcement has the confidence of the community, 

that we conduct ourselves well, but that we protect law enforcement from attacks. 

One of the things in my office that reminds me of this is my 

phone. Whenever a police officer is killed in the line of duty, I call 

the chief or sheriff of that slain officer to offer the condolences of 

the FBI. I make far too many phone calls. 

And so we care about both, making sure law enforcement acts 

well and that we investigate people who would harm law enforce-
33 

ment, whether it’s groups, sophisticated groups, or individual actors. It’s a feature of all the work that we do. 

Mr. FORBES. And, Director, I would ask that at some point in 

time you could submit for the record the data you have on these 

outside groups that are coming into these communities when we 

have situations like this who might be stirring up unrest and especially activity against law enforcement; and also any data you have 

regarding the impact or even the numbers of gang members that 

might be currently being released by the government who might be 

here illegally, because when we ask those questions of Homeland 

Security, they can’t give us any of that data. 

The second question I’d have for you, as you know, the OPM 

breach impacted over 22 million current, former, and prospective 

Federal employees and contractors. Considering these individuals 

use personal e-mail accounts for their own personal communication 

and store private information relating to financial transactions, 

their children, and health care, do you think the OPM breach has 

made these individuals more vulnerable to social engineering tactics used by hackers? And in what ways could encryption enhance 

the security of personal information of those who have had their information compromised during the OPM breach? 

Mr. COMEY. I think the OPM breach, as I’ve said in other settings, is disastrous because it’s a gold mine for foreign intelligence 

services that would allow them to use that material to conduct very 

sophisticated socially engineered spear phishing attacks, for example, to penetrate people’s systems. 

I think encryption is very important to protect people’s information. I don’t think encryption will directly blunt that particular vector because it would allow a nation state to send me an e-mail from 

my sister about my nephew with an attachment, and it’s highly 

likely I will open that e-mail and click on that attachment. So I actually see them as two separate problems, both serious problems, 

though. 

Mr. FORBES. Good. Thank you, Mr. Director. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. That Chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Lofgren, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Director Comey, for being here again. 

The National Instant Background Check System was created as 

a result of the Brady Act of 1993, before I was in the Congress, and 

it requires that gun sales by licensed gun dealers are subject to 

background checks but allows transactions to proceed after 3 days 

unless the FBI stops the transaction based on criteria such as felony record or domestic violence, misdemeanor convictions, and the 

like. 

Now, under the rule, even if the FBI has not completed its check, 

the dealer has the discretion to complete the sale after 3 days have 

passed and they haven’t received a red light from the FBI. 

Now, it’s my understanding from news reports that the man who 

shot and killed nine people at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina, on June 17 was sold 

the gun by a dealer who waited 5 days but did not receive a response from the NICS examiner. Now, the shooter had a drug pos-
34 

session conviction that, if it had been found by the NICS examiner, 

would have prevented the gun sale. Due in part to an error in the 

shooter’s arrest records and also the large caseload and time constraints placed on the NICS examiner, the gun dealer didn’t receive 

the red light that would have prevented this gun sale and possibly 

prevented this massacre. 

So I have a couple of questions. First, what can be done to make 

sure that we have a timely response and we have the data available to prevent the sale of guns to those who are not eligible to buy 

them, number one? Number two, should the law require a green 

light from the FBI to prevent a firearms transfer to those prohibited by law from buying them instead of the red light system that 

we have now? And do you think that we should examine the 

amount of time that we give for background checks beyond 3 days 

if we don’t go to an affirmative green light system? 

Mr. COMEY. Thank you, Ms. Lofgren. 

With respect to the case of Dylann Roof, as you said, dealers 

must wait 3 days, business days, to give the FBI an opportunity 

to conduct a background check. In that circumstance the gun dealer was notified it was in delayed pending status; and at the end 

of 3 days, if it’s still in delayed pending, the gun dealer has the discretion to transfer or to wait. Some large gun dealers wait. This 

gun dealer transferred, which was consistent with the law. And 

there were a number of errors in the processing of his that allowed 

his drug possession arrest to be missed, and so the gun was transferred. 

We have stared very, very hard at that and have tried to figure 

out what we can learn from that. There were some easy fixes to 

our processes, but we are looking at bigger fixes to see whether we 

can surge resources, whether we can add innovation to make our 

processing faster. 

But the other key piece is going to be we must get better records 

from our State and local partners so that when our examiners 

query a database they have the disposition reported and they don’t 

have to go tracking it down. We’re having lots of productive conversations with State and local law enforcement who see in the 

wake of the pain of that tragedy the importance of giving us those 

records. So that’s what we’re doing to try and improve our processing. 

The policy questions are really not for the FBI. We comply with 

the law as it stands today, which is we have 3 days to get it done. 

We’ll do our best to get it done in 3 days. If Congress were to 

change that, we would comply, obviously. 

Ms. LOFGREN. All right. Getting back to encryption, I understand 

the concerns that you’ve used raised here today and in the past, 

but the experts really say trying to get a back door is a mistake. 

I mean, all the way from the inventors of public key encryption, 

people like Whit Diffie, who did a very excellent report from MIT, 

if you have the back door the hackers will get it and China will 

get it and we will be less safe. 

So that leads me to a question about the use of encryption by the 

FBI. Are you encrypting all of your data about your FBI agents and 

your personnel and your payroll and all of your systems? 
35 

Mr. COMEY. We do not encrypt all of our data. We use encryption 

on a significant amount of our data. I’d have to follow up with you 

to give you the particulars on maybe a percentage breakdown. It’s 

an important feature of our work. 

Ms. LOFGREN. I’d like to follow up with that because I was 

stunned that the Office of Personnel did not have important data 

that encrypted. The Federal Government should protect itself by 

encrypting this data. We know that we’re being hacked constantly 

by state actors and enemies of our country, and I’m sure that they 

would love to get data about the FBI as well, and I look forward 

to hearing greater details on that. 

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair thanks the gentlewoman and recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Issa, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’ve got so many questions and so little time, so I will try to 

touch on each of them, and bear with me. On Stingrays I’m going 

to ask you to tell us now or for the record how you control the access to these products when they’re not being used, how you control 

them when they are being used, not just at the FBI, but to the extent that you’re cooperating with non-Federal agencies around the 

country that have these devices. 

And specifically I’m very concerned that since they’re being used 

at times without warrant, almost mostly, and there are at least 

some allegations they’ve been used to track policemen’s girlfriends’ 

or wives’ activities and so on, that they are too powerful a tool not 

to have a series of controls. And I’d like to—again, some of this you 

can answer for the record—I think on that I’d like to have a full 

understanding of Federal policy and controls. 

In the case of encryption, I’m only going to ask you, it will be 

a long answer, provide for the record, any and all studies you have 

to show the value of encryption and the value of your access or 

ability to not go dark. And if it’s classified, I’ll look at it in a classified session, but I’d like to fully understand the value and the studies related to that general direction of the Administration. 

But I’d like to take up for today more a question on some historic 

pieces. A few offices away they’re dealing with Secretary Clinton, 

so I won’t ask about those today. I think that’s certainly an ongoing 

investigation as to her use of private e-mail for transmitting what 

turns out to be sensitive information. 

But in the case of late 2011, well before your tenure, Solyndra 

went bankrupt after accepting half a billion dollars in taxpayers’ 

money. At that time we began an investigation in an adjacent Committee, the Oversight Committee, and we were told by the DOE inspector general that he could not talk to us because the FBI at that 

time had an ongoing investigation. 

It’s now 4 years later, and the Department, the IG did release 

information, but we have not received any indication from the FBI. 

So today I’d like to ask you who at the FBI made decisions not to 

bring any charges against Solyndra executives and what the basis 

was to find no fault in that loss of $500 million, and particularly 

since there was evidence provided publicly by our Committee that 

there were emergency efforts to get them additional money to try 
36 

to have their bankruptcy delayed. And that was done by Federal 

employees, including a gentleman named Jonathan Silver. 

You might remember that in May in 2013, the President stood 

beside the Attorney General and declared that there would be serious investigation by DOJ and FBI into the political targeting done 

by the IRS. Months later the President declared there wasn’t a 

smidgeon of corruption related to the IRS. 

Director, you know that, in fact, there was targeting. The evidence is convincing. Where do you stand on bringing accountability 

to those involved at all levels to targeting conservatives and proIsrael groups by the IRS, including but not limited to Lois Lerner? 

Mr. COMEY. Thank you, Congressman. 

With respect to the first two, the Stingrays and the encryption, 

we’ll get you information for the record. 

With respect to Solyndra, first of all, just to clarify something, 

the FBI doesn’t make decisions to prosecute. We investigate, bring 

the evidence to prosecution. 

Mr. ISSA. And I appreciate that, but there is either a decision to 

refer for prosecution or not. And to the extent that there was one, 

I would like the evidence that it was referred but not prosecuted. 

To the extent that there was a decision not to refer one or more, 

that would be helpful. I appreciate that the other part of Justice 

handles the other part, and we will have the Attorney General here 

shortly. 

Mr. COMEY. Got you. We worked the Solyndra matter, we, the 

FBI, very, very hard and had it reviewed by two different U.S. attorney’s offices, one in California, one in New York, who both made 

the same decision, that there was insufficient evidence to bring 

prosecutions. I’m probably limited in what I could say about the details of it here because it was a grand jury investigation, but that’s 

the upshot of it. I had a lot of folks worked it very, very hard. One 

U.S. attorney’s office looked it. I asked that it be brought to a second U.S. attorney’s office, my alma mater, the Southern District of 

New York. They took a look at it and decided there was insufficient 

basis to prosecute criminally. And so that’s where the matter 

stands. 

With respect to the IRS investigation, I think as I sit here it’s 

still pending, and so I am not able to talk about it in any way because it’s still a pending investigation. 

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Chairman, I just want to close with a very short 

comment. It was 2010 when we became aware that the IRS was 

targeting conservatives. It’s now 2015, almost 2016. I really would 

appreciate if the FBI would come up with a time line that says an 

investigation is not ongoing and aggressively pursued if a certain 

period of time passes and nothing has happened. I would only ask 

that 5 years begin to become an amount of time in which the FBI 

can say: We can’t say with a straight face it’s ongoing if it’s 5 years 

later and nothing has happened. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Cohen, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 
37 

First, I want to welcome you. I’m a big fan of yours. But at the 

same time I would like to ask you a question. I understand you 

keep a copy of the FBI’s request to wiretap Dr. Martin Luther 

King, Jr., on your desk as a reminder of the FBI’s capacity to do 

wrong. Is that correct? 

Mr. COMEY. That’s correct. 

Mr. COHEN. I commend you for that. 

That occurred during J. Edgar Hoover’s tenure as Director. As 

you know, J. Edgar Hoover did some awful, terrible things in his 

life and as FBI Director. He started the COINTELPRO. I might be 

mispronouncing that. How do you pronounce that? 

Mr. COMEY. I think you got it, COINTELPRO. 

Mr. COHEN. COINTELPRO program, which harassed civil rights 

workers, SNCC people, SCLC people, Dr. King in particular, others, political activists and homosexuals. He was abusive. He was 

the opposite of justice. His efforts to silence Dr. King and out homosexuals working for the Federal Government were deplorable 

and a stain on our Nation’s history and on the FBI. 

It’s been reported that at one point he even had a letter sent to 

Dr. King threatening to expose all kinds of private information collected surreptitiously. The letter appeared to suggest that Dr. King 

should kill himself to save himself from embarrassment. ‘‘King, 

there is only one thing left for you to do. You know what it is. You 

have just 34 days in which to do it. You are done. There is but one 

way out for you. You better take it before your filthy, abnormal, 

fraudulent self is bared to the nation.’’ This was the head of FBI. 

His treatment of homosexuals was no better. He called them sex 

deviants. He ordered the FBI to undertake extraordinary efforts to 

identify everyone in the Bureau who was even suspected of being 

homosexual in the Federal Government. 

There’s a documentary been done on this, it’s on Yahoo.com, by 

Michael Isikoff called ‘‘Uniquely Nasty.’’ I encourage you to watch 

it. I watched it and was shocked. It premiered at the Newseum. It’s 

sickening what the FBI did. 

In 1951, Hoover issued a memo to top FBI officials saying each 

supervisor will be held personally responsible to underline in green 

pencil the names of individuals who are alleged to be sex deviants. 

This was discovered through a FOIA effort 2 years ago. The FBI 

eventually collected more than 360,000 files on gays and lesbians. 

It’s reported in 1952 he outed a young campaign aide, a Vandenberg, Jr., and went on a war on him. And Senator Vandenberg, a 

Republican, eventually committed suicide in the Senate office because of what they brought out about his son and what they were 

doing to destroy him. 

J. Edgar Hoover was a man that doesn’t reflect the good people 

of the FBI or reflect what you and the FBI are trying to do today. 

The FBI’s own Web site declared the COINTELPRO program, as 

rightly criticized by Congress and the American people, for breaching First Amendment rights and other reasons, yet his name continues to adorn the FBI building. 

Would you agree that his name is not appropriate as a reflection 

of what the fine people at the FBI today try to do to bring about 

justice in our country? 

Mr. COMEY. I’m sorry, Hoover’s name? 
38 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COMEY. I am not following the question. 

Mr. COHEN. I’m saying does it not reflect the qualities that the 

FBI individuals and the FBI today have in pursuing justice and 

being fair and not using tactics to attack minorities in this country? 

Mr. COMEY. I see. Thank you. I’m sorry. The FBI today is vastly 

different than it was under its first Director in some of the ways 

you mentioned and in lots other ways. I keep that under the glass 

of my desk, not to dump on Hoover—I never knew the man—but 

to make sure people understand the danger in becoming—in falling 

in love with your own view of things and the danger in the absence 

of constraint and oversight. 

I am somebody who believes people should be very skeptical of 

government power. I’m a nice person. I suppose you should trust 

me, but you should oversee me, and I should be checked, and I 

should be balanced. That’s the way you constrain power. It’s there 

to remind me. 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, sir. And I agree and I appreciate that, but do 

you agree that his name is not reflective of the what the FBI 

stands for and what the FBI agents of today believe in and do? 

Mr. COMEY. I think that’s fair if you’re focusing on—I mean, Hoover did a lot of good things for law enforcement in the United 

States, did a lot of things that, through the lens of history, we reject as improper, and so you—I’m no historian, but I would imagine 

a historian would say you’ve got to take the total measure of the 

person to figure out what’s bad and what’s good. I’m just not 

equipped to do that. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, sir. I would like to see his name taken 

off the building, and I have bill. Representative Burton had it with 

Chris Shays in the past, and I’m going to reintroduce that bill, but 

I was hoping, as I mentioned to you the last time, that when we 

have a new building some time in the future, it’s named for somebody like you. 

Mr. COMEY. Well, I appreciate that. I hope it’s not. 

Mr. COHEN. Or Congressman Edwards or Attorney General Kennedy. 

And I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes 

the gentleman from Iowa, Mr. King, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Comey, thanks for coming to testify, and I just would 

comment that I appreciate your response. So when you use the reference ‘‘the lens of history,’’ there is a different set of values that 

applies today than applied back in those days. But I’m looking at 

our values today, and I’m watching as there is a fairly strong push 

here for sentencing reform in the United States. And I’ve watched 

as the President or the Administration, at least, has directed that 

thousands be released onto the streets before they serve their 

terms and that we’ve seen that some of them have been charged 

with homicide and found guilty of homicide. I think that number 

is around 121 or so, but I thought I saw the number 36,007 felons 

released and then a subsequent number. 
39 

I’m actually blurred by the parade of releases that we’ve seen, 

and now I see it appears to be a group of legislators that believe 

we can save us some tax dollars by releasing more onto the streets. 

Are you aware of any studies that would help us quantify the impact of these releases in terms of either prospective crimes that are 

likely to be committed or perhaps even quantifying it in terms of 

the dollar value as that’s suffered in great huge whopping chunks 

by crime victims? 

Mr. COMEY. I’m not aware of any studies on that. It’s not that 

I would be. That’s sort of a policy question, but I’m not aware of 

any. 

Mr. KING. They’re very hard to find. I’ve searched a long ways 

back. I’m only going from memory. It occurs to me that in 1992 

there was a Justice Department study that did quantify numerically the cost of crime, but you have any studies that show statistically whether there would be more crime or less crime that would 

take place because of the releases, the early releases? 

Mr. COMEY. I’m not aware of any studies on that. 

Mr. KING. What would be your professional estimate? I don’t 

need a number. Would we have more crime or less crime? 

Mr. COMEY. Well, I know we face, as a country, a significant 

challenge with recidivism, a high re-offend rate among people who 

are released, and my whole career is dedicated to the proposition 

that law enforcement contributes to a drop in crime. It’s certainly 

not entirely responsible for the historic drop in crime we’ve seen 

over in my lifetime, but it’s a big part of it, and so that’s the way 

I think about it. 

Mr. KING. Mandatory sentencing statistically shows to have had 

a positive impact on reducing the crime in the streets of America? 

Mr. COMEY. I think so. Mandatory minimums have been an important part of my work as a prosecutor. Reasonable people can 

discuss whether it should be at this level or this level, but some 

mandatory sentence, some fixed prospect of punishment is very, 

very valuable in incapacitating people and in developing cooperators. 

Mr. KING. And some time back I sat down with a very impressive 

chief of police of one of our major cities who remarked to me about 

the high, the very high homicide rate in the inner city of his city, 

and his response was that the Black-on-Black homicide rate in that 

city was roughly 98 percent of the homicides that took place. 

I don’t know that we discuss these kind of statistics, and I’d be 

hopeful that we could find a way to do this and alleviate this situation that we have. I’d just say we’ve done into a void on this for 

a politically correct reason, but are you aware of any data that 

would reflect what I represented to you? 

Mr. COMEY. I think there’s a lot of data collected by criminologists and others on the demographic component—excuse me, the 

demographics of homicide victims and perpetrators. I can’t cite it 

to you off the top of my head, but I know there is smart people that 

have done that work. 

Mr. KING. And that 98 percent number, that wouldn’t be shocking to you if that were proven out to be true by a legitimate study? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t think it would shock me in particular neighborhoods that are heavily concentrated with people of a certain de-
40 

mographic background, but I don’t know the number off the top of 

my head. 

Mr. KING. Yes, thank you. Is there an investigation of Planned 

Parenthood currently taking place in the FBI? 

Mr. COMEY. I know, Congressman, as I sit here, I’m not able to 

answer that question because I don’t know enough. I know there’s 

been letters written to the Department of Justice about it. I’ll have 

to get back to you on that one because I don’t know the status of 

matters within the FBI on that, sitting here this morning. 

Mr. KING. Has anyone from the Administration, to your knowledge, ever sought to influence you or any of your subordinates on 

whether or not to investigate a crime? 

Mr. COMEY. Never. 

Mr. KING. And specifically not Planned Parenthood either would 

be included in that? 

Mr. COMEY. That would be included. 

Mr. KING. I thank you. That would be consistent with your competent, independent, and honest characteristics of the FBI. I’d just 

pose this question that—let me quickly go another way. USA 

FREEDOM Act, you’re implementing it now, and do you have access to more or less information than you had before the USA 

FREEDOM Act was passed? 

Mr. COMEY. It really hasn’t changed because we’re still under the 

old telephone metadata system. As I said to the Chairman, I think 

the new one kicks in at the end of November, so currently our 

world is unchanged. 

Mr. KING. Okay. Do you expect more or less? 

Mr. COMEY. I expect more, actually. 

Mr. KING. That would be interesting to follow up on if I had another minute, but I will yield back and thank the Chairman. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The gentleman does not have another minute. 

But the Chair will recognize the gentlewoman from California, 

Ms. Chu for 5 minutes. 

Ms. CHU. Director Comey, I want to discuss with you a series of 

very troubling Federal investigations against Chinese American 

scientists, who are treated as spies, have their lives turned upside 

down, only to have all the charges dropped. 

Most recently, we have a case of Dr. Xi Xiaoxing, an American 

citizen and well respected professor who was a chair of the Physics 

Department at Temple University. 

He led a normal and peaceful life as a scientist, professor, and 

researcher with his two daughters and a wife in a quiet Pennsylvania neighborhood. He had no criminal record, no history of violence, just an average American in academia. But one day, at the 

break of dawn, about a dozen armed FBI agents stormed into his 

house with their guns drawn. He was handcuffed in his own home, 

and his two young daughters and wife in pajamas and directed outside of the house at gunpoint. The stated charge, wire fraud. However, in the interrogation, it was clear he was being accused of 

being a spy for China. 

Since then, his life has been turned upside down. He lost his title 

as chair of the Physics Department. His reputation was irreparably 

damaged. His wife endured psychological and emotional trauma, as 
41 

does his own whole family and himself, of course. And after all of 

this, the charges against Dr. Xi were dropped. 

My understanding of cases of wire fraud is that generally people 

aren’t even handcuffed, let alone arrested or paraded in font of 

their family or neighborhood as criminals at gunpoint. Rather, 

they’ve been given an opportunity to self-surrender, and if someone 

is being investigated for wire fraud, they are usually informed 

about such an investigation in a target letter. 

But we know that Professor Xi is not alone. Sherry Chen was 

also recently arrested, a U.S. citizen, an employee of the National 

Weather Service in Ohio. She was arrested at her place of work, 

led in handcuffs past her coworkers to a Federal courthouse 40 

miles away, where she was told she faced 25 years in prison and 

a million dollars in fines. Several months later, all the charges 

were dropped without any explanation. 

This is reminiscent, of course, of Dr. Wen Ho Lee another U.S. 

citizen whose life was ruined when he was accused of being a spy 

for China, only to have 58 of the 59 charges dropped. 

Let’s not forget that during World War II, 120,000 Japanese 

Americans lost everything they had and were imprisoned in desolate camps because they were accused of being spies for Japan. 

Three-quarters of them were U.S. citizens. Seventy years later, not 

a single case of espionage was proven. I’m particularly concerned 

about this because there is a stereotype that Asian Americans are 

perpetual foreigners, no matter how long they’ve lived in this country. 

So my question to you is, is this common practice to have a dozen 

armed FBI agents arrest someone for wire fraud, someone who is 

not a flight risk and poses no harm to law enforcement, or is there 

a presumption of guilt went it comes to Chinese Americans because 

they are viewed as spies for China? 

Mr. COMEY. Thank you, Congresswoman. 

At the outset, the challenge—I’m going to answer. The challenge 

for me in answering is I can’t talk about the facts of something 

that is of an investigation, including ones that are pending. 

I guess I can say this. First of all, we operate with no presumption that anyone is guilty or any stereotype about any particular 

person. We are a fact-based organization. We are required to gather facts and then, through a prosecutor, present them to a judge 

to make a showing of probable cause before we can get a warrant 

to arrest anybody. 

A whole lot of people in this country are arrested on wire fraud 

charges. I’ve been involved in many cases where people were handcuffed and arrested because wire fraud is a very serious felony. The 

particulars of the case I can’t talk about it, but I would not connect 

the dots in the manner that you have, and that’s probably all I can 

say about individual matters. 

Ms. CHU. Well, we understand that the threat of economic espionage is real, and we do not take it lightly. However, we want to 

make sure that in all cases, there is due process and that otherwise 

innocent Americans do not become suspicious simply because the 

person taking those actions have an ethnic surname. 
42 

Yet in the case of Professor Xi, his investigation came out of the 

blue. He had no idea he was being investigated, primarily because 

he did nothing wrong, as evidenced by the dropped charges. 

Do you know how many Chinese Americans are being surveyed? 

Mr. COMEY. I do not. 

Ms. CHU. Well, I will personally follow up with you on this issue 

to figure out what is happening in cases like Professor Xi’s and how 

we can make sure that no other American, regardless of their origin or background, endures this kind of egregious humiliation and 

shame. 

And, with that, I yield back. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair thanks the gentlewoman and recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Gohmert, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Well, Director Comey, thank you for being here. 

I don’t think I ever told you, but back in July-August timeframe 

of 2007, I was talking with a powerful Democratic Senator, and we 

agreed that you had a great reputation for justice, honorable man 

that would potentially be a good Attorney General. It ended up 

being Mukasey, but you were discussed very favorably by both 

sides of the aisle, people unlikely to be talking, but we appreciate 

your work. 

I want to touch on something my friend Steve King brought up. 

I know there’s a lot of talk about how we need to have reform and 

people being released from prison, but as someone who has worked 

with the system, you prosecuted, I prosecuted, I’ve been a judge, 

I’ve been court-appointed to defend, and isn’t it true that some people that actually plead to nonviolent offenses do so as part of a plea 

agreement where the prosecutor drops a gun charge or some charge 

of violence in order to get a plea in the case and a lesser sentence, 

haven’t you seen that happen? 

Mr. COMEY. I’ve seen that happen. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Yes. And so that’s why for someone like me, who’s 

a former judge, who saw those kind of plea agreements take place, 

even though I was in the State side, it’s shocking to see people 

come from the outside and say this wasn’t a fair sentence without 

really considering what could have been prosecuted, what could 

have been pursued, and what was, you know, a transaction or an 

agreement between a prosecutor and defense attorney that the 

judge considered all the circumstances and came down on the side 

of the agreement. 

Now, I want to touch on something else you had said about with 

Iraq refugees, you had a database, apparently, of fingerprints from 

IEDs, evidence that had been obtained from Iraq. Did I understand 

that correctly? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Now, with regard to the masses of Syrian refugees, I’m not aware of a lot of IEDs evidence we’ve gotten from 

which you could get fingerprints. Is there such a database? 

Mr. COMEY. I think that’s right. There may be some and a variety of other intelligence sources that may help us try and understand who people are, but the point I was trying to make is we had 

a whole lot more information about Iraq because our soldiers had 

been there. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Right. 
43 

Mr. COMEY. Run into people and collected information. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Well, and that goes to a concern of mine. I’m not 

the biggest fan of the U.N., but they have data pulled from their 

Web site this morning that says—starting off at more than 43 million people worldwide are now forcibly displaced as a result of a 

conflict and persecution, and it goes on to say that children constitute about 41 percent of the world’s refugees, and about half of 

all refugees are women. 

So it was very disturbing to pull this from the U.N. Web site in 

September that says of the 381,412 arrivals that came across the 

Mediterranean sea just this year, up to September, that 15 percent 

were children, 13 percent were women, and 72 percent were men, 

and then when you take that along with our DNI James Clapper 

saying that this provides a prime opportunity for Islamic State 

groups to attack Western targets—he said, ‘‘It’s a disaster of biblical proportions’’—and then you take statements that have been 

made by ISIS leaders themselves that they have been able to place 

more than 4,000 warriors in with the refugees, this inordinate 

number of men, has that spiked concern in the FBI, along with 

what you’ve testified before about ISIS having people in every 

State? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes, sir. It’s a risk that we are focused on and trying 

to do everything we can to mitigate. 

Mr. GOHMERT. But without a good fingerprint database, without 

good identification, I mean, how can you be sure that anyone is 

who they say they are? You don’t have fingerprints to go against 

it. They’ve got documents that say they’re one—I’ve been there on 

the border when I’ve watched people exchange identification information and decide to use the other ones. Is there a good way to 

avoid that that the FBI is able to use? 

Mr. COMEY. The only thing we can query is information that we 

have, and so if we have no information on someone, they’ve never 

crossed our radar screen, never been a ripple in the pond, there 

will be no record of them there, and so it will be challenging. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you. My time is expired. 

I yield back. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes 

the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Gutierrez, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GUTIERREZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And welcome, Director. 

I’m just going to ask you to have a conversation about one area, 

and that’s about guns. In my hometown, there could be 40, 50 

shootings in a weekend. That’s about a whole classroom of kids any 

weekend. And so I know that you have a relationship with making 

sure that we check who can and cannot purchase guns here at the 

FBI. And it just seems that whatever we do in Chicago, guns are 

just—well, first, our laws have been weakened because there have 

been challenges to them, so we used to have pretty strong—when 

I first got elected in 1986 to the Chicago City Council, they give 

you a badge in Chicago, and you can get a gun. I opted not to take 

the badge or the gun. I figured the Chicago police could do both of 

those things, wear the badge and carry the gun for me and for the 

rest of the people, and I think the people of the city of Chicago 

were well served by me making that decision. 
44 

But, look, so here we have like a majority in the Congress of the 

United States that’s really unwilling to take up the challenge that 

guns and firearms are—and they’re coming from Indiana, and 

they’re coming from Mississippi, and they’re coming from all over, 

and they wind up in Chicago. So I guess, if you could just tell us, 

what are you ideas on how do I and people at a local level or as 

a Member of Congress, how do I help curb gun violence? What 

things can we do to help curb, absent legislation? 

Mr. COMEY. Well, the FBI’s business is not policymaking; it’s enforcement of the law. And so we spend a lot of time trying to reduce gun violence through aggressive enforcement. It’s a crime for 

a felon to possess a gun in this country; for a drug addict; for a 

drug dealer; for someone who is convicted of a domestic violence 

misdemeanor to do it; to use it in crime of violence. And so I’ve devoted a lot of my career as a prosecutor—and the FBI does investigating—to impose cost to change behavior so the bad guys don’t 

have a gun on their waistband. And that means more fistfights, 

maybe more stabbings, but fewer shootings because the challenge 

we face in a lot of cities is the bad guys think it’s just another a 

piece of clothing. So they think about as much about the gun as 

they do about their socks, and that leads to a whole lot more shooting based on people bumping into each other, frankly. 

And so our mission is to try and send a strong message of deterrence that you ought not to have that gun, you ought to think a 

lot more about the gun than your socks, and that will make that 

corner safer. But it requires tremendous effort by the law enforcement community. We’re doing a lot of that, though, including in 

Chicago, where your characterization is exactly right. 

Mr. GUTIERREZ. Could you tell us, the Members, what kinds of 

things are we doing in Chicago via your agency and the Federal 

Government to help the people of the city? 

Mr. COMEY. Well, in Chicago, we have actually gone so far as to 

put FBI agents with Chicago police officers in squad cars to try and 

focus on some of the predators who are driving this violence, the 

gang bangers who think that they operate freely. So we do gang 

task forces. We do drug task forces. And as I said, we operate even 

on an ad hoc basis to try and lock up some of the repeat offenders. 

And the idea there is to try and change behavior by ripping out the 

worst and convincing the rest you should not have a firearm with 

you if you are a prohibited person. 

Mr. GUTIERREZ. So as I look at the challenge of gun violence in 

the city of Chicago and I see that there are—I mean, if we took a 

map of the city of Chicago and we put, reluctantly, little stars 

where people had been murdered due to gun violence, do you know 

or have you seen, is it the whole city of Chicago? When I look at 

it, I’m not that worried about my grandson walking in Portage 

Park to the park. I’m worried but not that worried as I would be 

in other neighborhoods of the city. So what other dimensions are 

there that relate to gun violence as you’ve seen from a—— 

Mr. COMEY. I know the city of Chicago pretty well, having gone 

to law school and been there many, many times. And the story of 

Chicago is a lot like the story of a bunch of cities around the country. It’s localized. The violence is heavily concentrated. Chicago, 

primarily south, some west, obviously. And it is groups of primarily 
45 

young men who are carrying firearms when they’re prohibited by 

law from carrying them on the streets, and that inevitably leads— 

all human encounters ratchet up to the most serious available 

weapon. And so what would have been a fistfight when you were 

a kid, today is a shootout because the gun is there. And what we 

in law enforcement are trying to do is change that behavior. These 

kids may not be well educated, but they are very good at cost-benefit analysis. And the idea is to force a cost-benefit analysis. That 

gun should be a huge liability in the eye of that felon, that drug 

dealer, that drug addict, and that’s the way we hope to change behavior. 

Mr. GUTIERREZ. Mr. Director—just 15 seconds, and I’ll finish up, 

Mr. Chairman. 

So Mr. Director, there are a group of us in the Hispanic Congressional Caucus and African American Members of color, we like to 

have a roundtable discussion with you, a conversation from different parts of the United States and not in such a formal setting 

as this in which you might be able to share with us how better, 

in communities of color in America, where the gun violence is so 

rampant, you might give us some of your thoughtful input. Would 

you agree to do that with us? 

Mr. COMEY. I’d be happy to. 

Mr. GUTIERREZ. Thank you so much, Mr. Director. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, 

Mr. Poe, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Director, thank you for being here. I’m going to talk about 

several subjects, see how many of them I can get in in 5 minutes. 

I first want to talk about ECPA, the idea that under current law, 

that if e-mail is stored in the cloud, government doesn’t need a 

warrant to obtain that e-mail. Is that your understanding of the 

law? 

Mr. COMEY. I think the law is—and you probably know best than 

I, but I think it’s after 180 days. 

Mr. POE. Yes, after 180 days. 

Mr. COMEY. Right. We still operate under a warrant, the FBI 

does, that’s just our policy, but I think that’s the law. If it’s older 

than 180 days, it can be gotten through other legal processes. 

Mr. POE. And thanks for your clarification. It’s after 180 days. 

Before 180 days or during 180 days, you got to have a warrant, no 

matter who you are. FBI policy is, though, you still get a warrant 

if it’s over 180 days? 

Mr. COMEY. Correct. 

Mr. POE. But other government agencies still have the ability to 

seize that e-mail without a warrant. Law enforcement. I mean, it 

could be a local law enforcement, the city police, sheriff’s department, other law enforcement can seize that e-mail in their jurisdiction because the law doesn’t require they get a warrant. I mean, 

is that your understanding of the law? 

Mr. COMEY. They would need some kind of legal process. They 

couldn’t just walk in and take it, but my understanding is the law 

would permit them to get it through a subpoena or some other 

court order short of a warrant. 
46 

Mr. POE. That’s right. So they don’t need a warrant. They need 

some other court document from a magistrate, if so. And I’m sure 

you’re aware that myself and Ms. Zoe Lofgren filed legislation to 

require any law enforcement agency, any government agency to obtain a warrant if e-mails are over 6 months old stored in a cloud. 

You aware of that legislation? 

Mr. COMEY. I am. I’m generally aware, yes, sir. 

Mr. POE. Okay. Next subject, 702, talk about obtaining backdoor 

information from different companies such as Google or Yahoo or 

whoever. Does the act, the FBI request that a backdoor device be 

put into like a cell phone? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t know what you mean by backdoor device. 

Mr. POE. Well, where the FBI could obtain the information in the 

cell phone without a warrant and ask the maker of the phone, for 

example, to install a device in the phone to obtain that information. 

Mr. COMEY. Oh, I see. No, we would need a court order to be able 

to either in a device or online to be able to take content or implant 

something in a phone, not just a warrant. We need a title III order 

or a FISA court order. 

Mr. POE. My question, though, is does the FBI request—and it 

may be that you don’t—manufacturers to put a device in the phone 

itself to obtain that backdoor information, to have it available and 

then a warrant obtained? 

Mr. COMEY. No. 

Mr. POE. You don’t request that? 

Mr. COMEY. Nope. 

Mr. POE. Okay. 

Mr. COMEY. No, when we collect information, it’s pursuant— 

we’re talking about the content of people’s communication or what 

they’ve stored on a device, we do it through a court order. We don’t 

do it through asking someone who made the device to give us access to it voluntarily. 

Mr. POE. Okay. When you say court order, are you talking about 

a warrant or some other type of court order? 

Mr. COMEY. Right. Either a search warrant from a judge to open 

a locked device or an order from a Federal judge either in a national security case or a criminal case if we’re looking to intercept 

communication as it’s moving. 

Mr. POE. I think that, you know, the Fourth Amendment applies 

to that type of procedure, and you’re saying the FBI complies with 

the law, the Fourth Amendment, on obtaining that information? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. The Fourth Amendment is part of this sort of 

the spine of the FBI. 

Mr. POE. It’s the what of the FBI? 

Mr. COMEY. The spine of the FBI. 

Mr. POE. I am glad to hear that. Let’s talk about the surveillance 

with the use of drones and fixed-wing aircraft. Specifically, targeted surveillance with the use of a drone, does the FBI obtain a 

warrant to do that, use of a drone, fixed-wing aircraft or drone, 

whichever you want to call it. 

Mr. COMEY. Any kind of aircraft, we don’t. If what we’re doing 

is, which is what we used them for, we have a pilot fly around and 

follow somebody. Drones, we don’t. We have a small number of unmanned aircraft. We may use them for fixed surveillance, like 
47 

when that guy had the kid in the bunker in Alabama, we used a 

drone to go over the top because we were afraid he would shoot one 

of the pilots. We had unmanned aircraft. We operate drones within 

line of sight. 

Mr. POE. Okay. 

Mr. COMEY. So when we’re talking about surveilling someone, 

we’re really talking about an airplane with a human being in it flying them around. We do not get a warrant for that. The law doesn’t 

require it, but that’s not involved with collecting the communications of somebody. 

Mr. POE. I understand. I’m not talking about exigent circumstances. I’m just any circumstance, the law doesn’t require—or 

there is no law saying the Fourth Amendment applies to the use 

of drones. The FAA makes those decisions. Does it not? 

Mr. COMEY. Right. To follow somebody in a car or on foot or in 

a plane, we have to have a predicated investigation, but we don’t 

have to go to court to get permission to follow that person. 

Mr. POE. Do you think the FBI ought to make the rules regarding protection of the Fourth Amendment, or should Congress weigh 

in on what reasonable expectation of privacy should be regarding 

that type of issue? 

Mr. COMEY. The FBI doesn’t make any laws. Congress makes the 

laws, and the courts interpret them. 

Mr. POE. I didn’t say the FBI. Reclaiming my time, if the Chair 

would be so patient. The FAA—F-A-A, not the F-B—I—. 

Mr. COMEY. I misunderstood. 

Mr. POE. Not the F, B, and I, the FAA may make the regulations 

on what you can do with a drone and what you can’t do. I think 

that Congress ought to weigh in and determine what the reasonable expectation of privacy ought to be with the use of drones. 

Do you have an opinion on that, being the Director of the FBI? 

Do you want the FAA to continue to do it, or do you think Congress 

ought to set that standard? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t think I have—— 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The time of the gentleman has expired, but we’ll 

permit the Director to answer the question. 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t think I have a view or a preference. I mean, 

the FBI, we are maniacs about wanting to follow the law. 

Mr. POE. I understand. 

Mr. COMEY. So if Congress decided to change the law, we would 

follow it. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Johnson, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Comey, in your testimony, you mentioned how ISIL and 

other terrorist organizations field potential recruits in publicly accessible social networking sites and via encrypted private messaging platforms. Could you detail the issues that law enforcement 

is facing due to the end of encryption? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes, sir. The ISIL challenge illustrates the problem 

we call Going Dark. That ISIL increasingly uses, when they find 

someone who I call a live one, that is, someone who they might be 

able to motivate to engage in acts of violence in the United States, 
48 

they move them from Twitter or Twitter direct messaging—Twitter 

direct messaging is available to us with court process—to a mobile 

messenger app that is end-to-end encrypted, meaning if we get a 

court order from a judge and intercept the communication, we can’t 

decipher it, we can’t read it. And so those people, their communications become invisible to us even with a court order. 

That’s the challenge. We actually face that in all kinds of criminal cases as well, but it is very well illustrated by the ISIL challenge. That’s what I mean when I talk about that. 

Mr. JOHNSON. So, in other words, a foreign based person, a foreign person operating from a foreign location using social network 

such as Twitter can identify a potential target for radicalization, or 

someone who’s already radicalized but who’s reaching out to this 

foreign based person, and then they can take it to another site 

where their communications are encrypted, correct? 

Mr. COMEY. Correct. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And because they’re encrypted, then law enforcement, whether or not it has a warrant or not, cannot discover what 

they are talking about, even though they know that this foreignbased person is a ISIL member? 

Mr. COMEY. That’s correct, and we have to have a court order, 

but the court order would be useless. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yeah. So now the practical impact of that is what? 

Mr. COMEY. That we can’t know what somebody, who’s planning 

on an act of violence against a police officer or military member or 

a civilian is up to and when they are going to act, and we’re limited 

to physical surveillance, trying to watch them and figure out what 

they’re going to do or trying to get other ways to get visibility into 

what they’re up to. So it is darkness, or they go dark to us in a 

way that’s really important in those matters. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay. And you mentioned about traditional 

crimes, domestic crimes, and how encryption hurts your ability to 

get at domestic criminal activity. Can you talk about how in a case 

of hot pursuit or exigent circumstances, this adversely affects our 

ability to keep Americans safe from domestic crime? 

Mr. COMEY. There’s lots of different ways in which it impacts. In 

fact, I believe the going dark problem overwhelmingly affects State 

and local law enforcement. People talk about it like it’s an intelligence question, but it’s actually almost entirely a law enforcement 

question because—I mean, to give you an example that a lot of DAs 

talk about. If they recover a cell phone, right, at a scene where 

someone has been murdered or been kidnapped, they cannot open 

the device, even with a court order, to figure out who was that person communicating with before they disappeared? That’s the most 

basic example. 

We also are increasingly encountering it where drug gangs or 

carjacking gangs are communicating using apps, text apps that are 

encrypted end to end and with a court order we can’t read. So it’s 

becoming increasingly—the logic of it is, it will affect all of our 

work at some point. Hundreds and hundreds of cases will eventually be affected by it because it is all of our lives are becoming part 

of the digital world. And when the digital world is covered by 

strong encryption, judges will not be able to order access in serious 

criminal cases or in national security cases. That’s the future we’re 
49 

coming towards, and my view is maybe that’s where we want to be, 

but we ought to talk about it as we’re going to that place. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, thank you for your responses to my questions. 

And I’ll yield back. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair thanks the gentleman and recognizes 

the gentleman from Utah, Mr. Chaffetz, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I thank the Chairman, and Director, thank you 

for being here. 

The FBI has had to change through the course of time since my 

grandfather, who was a career FBI agent, served. I have great admiration for the agency and what you in particular are doing. 

I want to go back to cyber, we’ve talked a lot about cyber. Can 

you articulate the size, scope, and investment that you in both personnel, dollars to address the cyber threat that’s going to continue 

in perpetuity? 

Mr. COMEY. Thank you, Congressman. 

I probably can’t give you exact numbers sitting here, but we have 

a cyber division headquarters that does nothing but cyber-related 

work and then cyber task forces in every single FBI field office, 

cyber squads, but that doesn’t quite capture it because all of the 

threats we’re responsible for come at us through the Internet now, 

whether it’s kids being protected or terrorists coming after us, and 

so everybody actually has to be, in a way, a cyber analyst or a 

cyber agent. So I could give you specifics on how many hundreds, 

thousands of people are assigned to do cyber work, but it’s actually 

even broader than that. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. What is it that you can’t do? That is, is there another department or agency that’s doing something that the FBI 

couldn’t do? 

Mr. COMEY. In the cyber realm? 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Yeah. 

Mr. COMEY. That’s a good question. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Well, thank you. 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah, I can’t think of it sitting here. Our responsibilities are obviously confined to the United States, and so we work 

with our partners, NSA, in particular, in trying to fight the cyber 

threat that’s coming from overseas. The bureau doesn’t have the 

ability to reach out in that way, and so that’s something we 

can’t—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Let me ask you in the context of the United 

States Secret Service. I was surprised to learn that the agents that 

they have, two-thirds of their time is spent on investigations and 

cyber. And it begs the question to me, why do we have such a small 

group of people doing that, which the FBI has a much bigger resource, infrastructure, and expertise in doing? And as we look at 

potentially restructuring the Secret Service and getting more focused on the protective mission, why not combine the two? Or what 

is it that they do that you don’t want to do or that they do that 

you can’t do? I’m trying to get my arms around it. 

Mr. COMEY. It was such a good question, I misunderstood it. I’m 

sorry. One of the things I’ve been trying to do is drive us closer together with the Secret Service because they have expertise, especially in the financial related intrusions and credit card scams. 
50 

They’ve spent years developing that expertise, and so I don’t want 

to duplicate it, so we’re trying to drive ourselves together. 

I’d like us to combine our task forces. It doesn’t make any sense 

for them to have an Electronic Crimes Task Force and me to have 

a Cyber Task Force, there ought to be one. They do great work. I 

want to make sure we don’t duplicate, and I want to do joint training with them. They’re doing some great training, so are we. That’s 

one of the things we can’t do. We can’t do enough for State and 

local law enforcement to help them deal with digital crimes. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. So in terms of the personnel that you have associated with that, how would that work? Are there other agencies that 

would also—I mean, Secret Service is but one. Are there other 

agencies that should be also included in that because we’ve got a 

homeland security organization that thinks they should be in 

charge of all the cyber? 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah, I think with respect to the criminal work that 

we do, there are people at HSI within Department of Homeland Security who are doing cyber-related crime work, and then there’s a 

lot of State and local law enforcement doing it, and they are part 

of our task forces. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Can you shed anymore light on the FBI’s nextgeneration cyber initiative? Explain that to me a little bit more. 

Mr. COMEY. Without eating up all your time, it’s our strategy, my 

strategy for where we are going to take the FBI in the next 3 to 

5 years, and so it involves deploying our people in a different way, 

getting better training, better equipment, focusing ourselves on the 

threats that I think the FBI, given its footprint, is best able to address, so it’s our sort of whole of FBI approach to cyber over the 

next 3 to 5 years. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And so when you have FBI personnel that will 

focus potentially their entire career just an cyber, correct? 

Mr. COMEY. Correct. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. They won’t necessarily be bouncing around to different tasks? 

Mr. COMEY. Correct. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. All right. 

I appreciate the time. I’ll yield back. 

Mr. FRANKS [presiding]. And I thank the gentleman, and we’ll 

now recognize Mr. Deutch for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Comey, thanks so much for being with us today. I represent south Florida, Broward County and Palm Beach County, 

and we are experiencing an alpha-PVP, or flakka, epidemic. 

Broward County is the epicenter of the ongoing national flakka crisis. In Broward, the number of cases is spiraling out of control. The 

Broward County Sheriff’s Office has stated that in January 2014, 

they analyzed a single flakka case. By September 2014, they were 

analyzing 80 cases. This year, the sheriff’s office has reported analyzing approximately 100 cases per month. 

Flakka cases are also flooding the county health system. The 

Broward health system has reported that they’re receiving, on average, 12 cases per day. In this past year, it has contributed to the 

death of 45 people in Broward County. 
51 

Flakka use has also started to spread northward into Palm 

Beach County. In 2014, there were 35 submissions involving flakka 

to the Palm Beach Sheriff’s Office crime lab. In 2015, there have 

been 42. There have been 10 arrests in Palm Beach County, and 

flakka is now moving into Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, and other 

the States. 

As you’re aware, people using flakka experience hallucinations, 

delirium, violent outbursts, and extreme body temperatures that 

often cause the users to remove their clothes. Flakka is extremely 

cheap. It costs $5. And it can be easily purchased online from 

China. The low cost of the drug and the easy access are very troubling. 

Flakka, as is the case with other synthetic drugs, is extremely 

difficult for law enforcement to prosecute. The primary problem is 

that the composition of the synthetic drug can’t be pinpointed and 

classified as illegal because the drugs are constantly changing their 

composition. And as soon as the synthetic drug is listed as illegal, 

the composition is changed ever so slightly to evade the listing that 

made the drug more readily available. 

In fact, a recent news report in Miami found that flakka is now 

being made into gummy bears—gummy bears. The only difference 

between the real ones and flakka gummy bears is that the ones 

containing flakka are individually wrapped and stickier. Dealers 

are using them now to hook young people. 

So if you could target the efforts that the FBI has taken to crack 

down on this epidemic of synthetic drugs, flakka, in particular, and 

speak to the challenge that you face in cracking down on, again, 

these sorts of cases involving flakka and other synthetic drugs. 

Mr. COMEY. Thank you, Congressman. The synthetic, I think the 

word is cannabinoids, and my friend, Chuck Rosenberg, the leader 

of the DEA, is probably laughing listening to me mispronounce it, 

but it is a serious problem that I hear about all over the country. 

So DEA obviously has the lead on the Federal level, but we are 

participating through our drug task forces with DEA in trying to 

do something about that scourge, which you’re exactly right: it’s appearing in gas stations or little markets where kids can walk up 

and buy these things not knowing exactly what they’re buying, and 

it will wreck their life. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And the current law permits synthetic drugs to be 

treated as a controlled substance if they are proven to be chemically and/or pharmacologically similar to schedule I or schedule II 

controlled substances, but as I pointed out, the nature the drugs 

keep changing. They change the chemical structure to avoid being 

listed as a controlled substance, so my question to you is what 

steps can lawmakers take to help in your efforts, local enforcement 

efforts, as well, to crack down on this epidemic? 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah. I honestly don’t know. I from talking to Acting 

Administrator Rosenberg, that they are keenly focused on that 

problem, which is every time they schedule one of these things, it 

comes in from China slightly different, and so it’s not scheduled 

anymore. They are sort of chasing it, playing Whack-A-Mole with 

a very dangerous substance. I don’t know what the answer is, 

frankly. 
52 

Mr. DEUTCH. Well, Director Comey, I would invite representatives of your task force and the DEA to come to south Florida. This 

is an issue that dominates the headlines. It’s an issue that affects 

young people, and as you point out, the moment that somebody 

takes this, one of these synthetic drugs, flakka, which is so readily 

available in Florida and elsewhere, it changes and often ruins their 

lives. So I’m grateful for your focus on it, and I hope we have the 

opportunity to do something down in south Florida to really raise 

the issue so that people in south Florida can know what this focus 

is and how much we can do about it. Thank you very much. 

Mr. COMEY. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. FRANKS. I thank the gentleman. 

Will now recognize Mr. Marino for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you, Chairman. 

Good afternoon. Good morning. It’s good to see you. 

Mr. COMEY. Good to see you again, sir. 

Mr. MARINO. I, too, am a maniac for the rule of law. As you’re 

aware, most of my adult career was in law enforcement, and I still 

consider myself a law enforcement guy. My family has been in law 

enforcement for a long time as well, so I appreciate your comments 

concerning oversight and the rule of law, and that’s needed very 

much today. I think even more so today, but I do want to emphasize the fact that I’ve worked with all agencies, State, local, and 

Federal, and 99.9 percent of our agents out there are topnotch, and 

I trust them watching my back at any time. 

But, with that, you have very effectively answered two questions 

that I had that I was going to ask you, so as a result, I will yield 

back the remainder of my time, and best of luck. 

Mr. COMEY. Great to see you, Mr. Marino. 

Mr. FRANKS. And I thank the gentleman. 

I now recognize Ms. Bass for 5 minutes. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

And thank you, Director, for coming and testifying today. 

I’d like to talk about the recent operation cross traffic, FBI’s nationwide effort to crack down on child sex trafficking. The FBI’s October 13 release about the operation states: ‘‘Operation Cross Country, a nationwide law enforcement action that focused on underage 

victims of prostitution has concluded with the recovery of 149 sexually exploited children and the arrest of more than 150 pimps and 

other individuals.’’ 

And, first of all, I’d like to commend the agency for correctly referring to the children as sexually exploited children versus prostitutes because a child who is under the age of consent should 

never be considered a prostitute. 

This release refers to other individuals, and I was wondering 

who those other individuals were. I have a concern that while it’s 

extremely appropriate to focus on the pimps, it’s also, in my opinion, very much appropriate to focus on the child molesters who 

some people would call Johns, but I would like to know if that’s 

who you were referring to, and what is the focus on the child molesters? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes, Congresswoman, that is what I understand was 

meant by that. There were more than 100 so-called Johns arrested 
53 

as part of Operation Cross Country along with the pimps and the 

children being exploited. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. The release also says that the children 

were recovered, and I wondered what does that mean. So what has 

happened or will happen with the children? 

Mr. COMEY. As part of Operation Cross Country, the folks I call 

the angels of the FBI, which are our victim specialists, are deeply 

involved in the operation to make sure that those kids get either 

reunited with their families, or so many of them come from foster 

care. 

Ms. BASS. Right. 

Mr. COMEY. If they get in a new placement, a healthier placement, a lot of them need medical attention right away. And that’s 

what was meant by that, to get that child to a place where they 

are cared for either by the biological family or a placement in a foster family. 

Ms. BASS. And in addition to medical attention, they certainly 

need a tremendous amount of therapy. I think it’s important, you 

know, in the future, I would appreciate it if you would lift up— 

where you were saying that the other individuals were referring to 

the child molesters, I think it’s really important that we focus, we 

call it correctly and that we focus on that. 

In addition, I would also like to know if the FBI tracks the number of children that are in foster care. We know that a large percentage of these kids are in foster care, but there’s not a lot of documentation. Do you have documentation that could give us some 

numbers? 

Mr. COMEY. I think we do. I think our intelligence analysts, who 

support an effort like this, have done some good work on that front. 

I’m a foster parent, so they know it’s a passion of mine. 

Ms. BASS. Oh, I didn’t know that. 

Mr. COMEY. And so I think we could equip you with at least 

some of our thinking on it as we do this work. 

Ms. BASS. Great. Well, I would like to follow up with your office 

and get that data. 

I’d also like to commend you for your Innocence Lost Task Force, 

and I’d like to know if there’s more that we can be doing to assist 

your efforts in Innocence Lost. I work with them in the Los Angeles 

area, and you know, you have been in the leadership of bringing 

different sectors of law enforcement together to understand this 

problem and address it. 

Mr. COMEY. Well, I appreciate your interest in it, and I will ask 

my staff to think about ways in which we might get more help. We 

appreciate the offer. 

Ms. BASS. Okay. Thank you. 

And I yield back my time. 

Mr. FRANKS. And I thank the gentlewoman. 

We now recognize Mr. Labrador for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LABRADOR. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. Director, it’s great to have you here. I have heard from many 

of my constituents about the refugee program and its impact on 

Idaho. As refugee admissions are increasing, there is growing concern that bad actors are not being caught in the vetting process 
54 

and are gaining admission alongside bona fide refugees living in 

fear. 

I’m actually an advocate of refugee programs. I think it’s a good 

thing to have refugee programs, but there’s a lot misconceptions 

out there and a lot of real fear about the people that are coming 

into the United States. This Congress has an obligation to address 

those concerns and ensure that the process is working correctly and 

protecting our national security. 

Numerous times over the past year, including yesterday, both the 

FBI’s Assistant Director for the Counterterrorism Division Michael 

Steinbach and yourself have testified about the flaws and limitations in the vetting of Syrian refugees. 

On October 8, you testified that you were concerned about certain gaps in the data available to the FBI, and yesterday you testified that the FBI can only query what has been previously collected, which is obvious. 

I know that you have addressed this issue before and you’ve addressed it, I think, once here today, but can you please explain to 

this Committee the security gaps that exist for purposes of conducting full and effective background checks on foreign nationals 

who claim to have fled the conflict zone of Syria and who are seeking to be resettled as refugees in the United States? 

Mr. COMEY. Certainly. Thank you, Mr. Labrador. We learned 

some good lessons from less than excellent screening of Iraqi refugees 8 years ago or so, and in fact, we learned that some folks we 

had let in were serious actors that we had to lock up after we figured out who they were. And so we have gotten much better, as 

an intelligence community, at joining our efforts and checking our 

databases in a way that gives us high confidence. If we have a 

record on somebody, it will surface. That’s the good news. 

The bad news is, as we talked about earlier, with Iraqi refugees, 

we had an opportunity for many more encounters between folks in 

Iraq and our soldiers, for example, so we had a lot more data. We 

had fingerprints, iris scans, we had forensics of different kinds. The 

challenge we face with Syria is that we don’t have that rich a set 

of data, so even though we’ve gotten better at querying what we 

have, we certainly will have less overall. 

And so as I said to a question earlier, someone only alerts as a 

result of our searches if we have some record on them. That’s the 

challenge we face with Syria. 

Mr. LABRADOR. So is it accurate to state that the lack of intelligence available on the ground in Syria is rendering our traditional database biographic and biometric checks obsolete? 

Mr. COMEY. I wouldn’t agree obsolete, but I would say we have 

a less robust data set dramatically than we had with Iraq, so it will 

be different. 

Mr. LABRADOR. So the FBI has repeatedly contrasted the United 

States’ ability to collect intelligence on the ground in Iraq with its 

ability to do so in Syria. What can the FBI do to adapt to improve 

security checks for refugees originating from failed states with no 

available intelligence? 

Mr. COMEY. Well, that’s a hard one. What we can do, the FBI, 

is just make sure that whatever is available figures into our review, but the underlying problem is, how do you generate intel-
55 

ligence in failed states? And that’s one I don’t have a good answer 

for. 

Mr. LABRADOR. So are you currently working with the intelligence community to try to fix this problem? 

Mr. COMEY. Oh, certainly. Everyone in the intelligence community is focused on trying to mitigate this risk by querying well and 

also finding additional sources of information so we can check 

against it. 

Mr. LABRADOR. Recognizing that ISIS and Syria and that there 

is a risk that bad actors may attempt to take advantage of this Administration’s commitment to bring at least 10,000 Syrian refugees 

into the United States over the next year, can you estimate the 

manpower and resources that will need to be diverted from other 

investigative programs to address this threat? 

Mr. COMEY. I’m not able to do that sitting here. 

Mr. LABRADOR. How can I ensure my constituents that the people that may come to Idaho are safe, that they are not terrorists, 

that the people in my community are going to be safe? 

Mr. COMEY. Well, on behalf of the FBI, what you can assure 

them is that we will work day and night to make sure that if 

there’s information available about somebody, we have surfaced it, 

and we have evaluated it. 

Mr. LABRADOR. And I understand that if there is information, but 

the problem is that we don’t have the information on most of these 

people. Isn’t that true? 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah, and so I can’t sit here and offer anybody an 

absolute assurance that there is no risk associated with this. 

Mr. LABRADOR. Thank you very much. 

I yield back my time. 

Mr. FRANKS. And I thank the gentleman. 

I now recognize Ms. DelBene for 5 minutes. 

Ms. DELBENE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

And thank you, Director Comey, for being here and for your service. I know as Acting AG, you demonstrated a commitment to the 

Fourth Amendment and protecting Americans’ privacy, despite 

enormous pressure to do otherwise, and you mentioned in your 

original testimony and in other comments that the rule of law and 

the Fourth Amendment is the spine of the FBI, and so I appreciate 

that commitment. I’d like to ask you a few questions about the 

FBI’s use of aircraft. 

The FBI deployed aircraft over Ferguson last year in response to 

requests from local law enforcement. Is that correct? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Ms. DELBENE. Does the FBI respond to these types of requests 

frequently? 

Mr. COMEY. Well, thank goodness there aren’t the kind of turmoil and pain in communities frequently, but sure. If local law enforcement asks for help in getting a look at a developing situation, 

we will offer that help. We’ve done it in Baltimore. We did it in 

Ferguson, as I recall. 

Ms. DELBENE. And what criteria have to be met for the FBI to 

send aerial resources to assist local law enforcement, or who makes 

that decision? 
56 

Mr. COMEY. It’s made at a fairly high level in the FBI. I think 

at the special agent in charge level, at least that is the commander 

of the field office, so it has to go up through a variety of checks 

before it can be approved. 

Ms. DELBENE. And what are the criteria that you use to make 

that decision? 

Mr. COMEY. I think it has to be part of an open investigation of 

ours or part of an open assistance to law enforcement matter. We 

can get you the particulars of our policy, but as you know, the bureau has a policy for everything, so there’s a series of steps that 

have to be walked through to make sure it’s part of either an open 

case of ours or it’s a legitimate open assistance to law enforcement 

matter. 

Ms. DELBENE. Okay. Thank you. I’d appreciate that information. 

Your staff also acknowledged that the FBI ‘‘routinely uses aviation assets in support of predicated investigations targeting specific 

individuals, and when requested and appropriate, in support of 

State and local law enforcement.’’ 

Why is it so important to stress this distinction when it appears 

that it’s kind of more generalized type of surveillance? 

Mr. COMEY. I’m sorry, the distinction? 

Ms. DELBENE. The distinction that you have in the feedback 

from your staff that you use aviation assets in support of predicated investigations targeting specific individuals when in these 

cases of local law enforcement, et cetera, it seems to be more generalized type of surveillance. 

Mr. COMEY. Oh, I see. Well, I think we’re just trying to explain 

how we use it. We don’t fly planes around America looking down 

trying to figure out if somebody might be doing something wrong. 

The overwhelming use of our aircraft is a pilot flies as part of an 

investigation to help us follow a spy, a terrorist, or a criminal, and 

then with local law enforcement, if there is tremendous turbulence 

in a community, it’s useful to everybody, civilians and law enforcement to have a view of what’s going on: Where are the fires in this 

community? Where are people gathering? Where do people need 

help? And sometimes the best view of that is above rather than trying to look from a car in the street. 

Ms. DELBENE. And do you feel that warrants are necessary when 

you’re targeting specific individuals, especially when you have aircraft equipped with new technologies like high-resolution cameras? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t think so. I mean, I meant what I said about 

the Fourth Amendment. We are not collecting the content of anybody’s communication or engaged in anything besides following 

somebody when we do that investigation, so as I said, we’ve done 

it since the Wright brothers with planes, and we do it in cars, and 

we do it on foot, and the law is pretty clear that you don’t need 

a warrant for that kind of observation. 

Ms. DELBENE. But now that there are technology changes—I 

think even the most recent court case, you know, Florida v. Riley, 

was in 1989—there has been a lot of changes in technology, and 

so it’s not just what you might see with the human eye anymore. 

So are there other types of technologies, and do you think warrant 

standards should be in place when you have other types of technologies that might be used on this aircraft? 
57 

Mr. COMEY. I suppose if you are putting technology on an FBI 

aircraft that had Fourth Amendment implications, that is that it 

was reaching someone’s communications or looking within a dwelling or something like that, it would have Fourth Amendment implications. But that’s not what we use the aircraft for. 

Ms. DELBENE. So what led to the decision to seek court orders 

when aircraft are equipped with Stingray technology? 

Mr. COMEY. Right. We have one aircraft that we can put Stingray technology on it, that is cell-site simulators, and I suppose we 

can mount it on others if we had a court order to do it. But we 

have decided as a matter of policy—now the whole Department of 

Justice does this—that if we’re going to be operating a cell-site simulator, it has Fourth Amendment implications, so we will get a 

warrant for that. So whether that’s on the ground or in an airplane, we treat it the same way. 

Ms. DELBENE. You said you decided. Do you feel like that you’re 

required by law to do that? 

Mr. COMEY. I think we made that move before there was even 

a divide among opinions in the court. Some courts have said you 

need it for that, some not. We went nationwide with a requirement 

for warrants. There has been no national decision on that, no Supreme Court-level decision on that, but we just think, given that 

some courts are requiring it, we do it across the country. 

Ms. DELBENE. Thank you. My time has expired. 

Mr. FRANKS. I thank the gentlewoman and now recognize Mr. 

Buck for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BUCK. Good morning, Director Comey. 

Mr. COMEY. Good morning. 

Mr. BUCK. I wanted to ask you, do you remember Mr. Cohen’s 

questions about renaming the FBI headquarters building earlier? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. 

Mr. BUCK. And I appreciate your response that we have to look 

at things through the lens of history. I wanted to ask you about 

a few other historical figures and see if there were any other FBI 

buildings named after some of these folks. 

Former Democrat Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia was a 

member of the KKK. He was a recruiter for the KKK, and he held 

leadership positions with the KKK. The State Capitol in Charleston, West Virginia, is named after Senator Byrd. The United States 

Courthouse and Federal Building in Beckley, West Virginia, is 

named after Senator Byrd. The United States Courthouse and Federal Building in Charleston, West Virginia, is named after Senator 

Byrd. And the Federal Correctional Institution in Hazelton, West 

Virginia, is named after Senator Byrd. 

My question is, do you know of any FBI buildings named after 

Senator Byrd? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t know. And I don’t know whether we have 

folks sitting in the courthouse. I just don’t know sitting here. 

Mr. BUCK. Okay. Former Democrat President Woodrow Wilson 

resegregated the entire government, including the Armed Forces, 

held a showing of the movie ‘‘Birth of a Nation’’ at the White 

House, and went so far as to praise it in spite of calls by the 

NAACP to ban it. ‘‘Birth of a Nation’’ was subsequently used as a 

recruiting tool for the Ku Klux Klan. Likewise, there are a number 
58 

of buildings around this country named after President Wilson. In 

fact, there is a bridge leading in and out of Washington, D.C., 

named after President Wilson. 

Do you know of any buildings that the FBI occupies or predominantly owns that are named after President Wilson? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t. 

Mr. BUCK. Former President Lyndon Baines Johnson was fond of 

using the ‘‘N’’ word, used it in the White House, used it while he 

was Senate majority leader, and used it in many other public settings. Many Federal buildings are named after him. 

Are there any FBI buildings named after President Johnson. 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t know. 

Mr. BUCK. And lastly, President Truman wrote to his soon-to-be 

wife the following words: ‘‘I think one man is just as good as another so long as he is not a ’N’ word or a Chinaman.’’ Again, many 

buildings named after President Truman. 

I’m just wondering, any FBI buildings named after President 

Truman? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t know, sir. 

Mr. BUCK. And last after last, Democrat Senator Richard Russell 

was also a member of the Ku Klux Klan, and there is a Senate 

building named after Senator Russell. I assume there are, at least 

to your knowledge, no FBI buildings named after Senator Russell? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t know. I don’t think so, but I don’t know. 

Mr. BUCK. And my last statement I guess would be that perhaps 

Congress should clean up its own act in naming buildings before 

it asks the FBI to, without the lens of history, try to rename buildings. 

I yield back my time. 

Mr. FRANKS. And I thank the gentleman and now recognize Mr. 

Cicilline for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Director Comey, for your service and for coming before the Committee today and for sharing your valuable insights. 

And thank you also to the extraordinary men and women who 

serve the Bureau and help keep our country safe, and I think our 

entire Nation owes them a debt of gratitude. 

Many us expressed our sincere concern and condolences following 

the recent mass shooting in Roseburg, Oregon, where nine innocent 

men and women lost their lives. Many of us have shared the same 

sentiments following tragically similar events in Lafayette or Newtown and Blacksburg. 

But as more Americans lose their lives to senseless gun violence, 

this Congress has failed to act. And, Director Comey, with this in 

mind, I’d like to draw on your experience to help us find solutions 

to this growing epidemic and to help us find the guts to take necessary action. 

And so first I want to just draw your attention to the shooting 

which occurred at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal 

Church in Charleston, South Carolina. Following the shooting, you 

ordered the FBI to conduct an internal review of policies and procedures surrounding background checks for weapons purchases. So 

my first question is, did that review occur, and what were the findings of that review? 
59 

Mr. COMEY. Thank you, Congressman. The review did occur. I 

asked my folks to do a 30-day examination, and two things came 

out of that. First, it confirmed the facts as I understood them. 

There were no new facts with respect to Dylann Roof’s purchase in 

particular that changed. And then it highlighted two potential 

areas for improvement, one internal to the FBI, one external. 

Internal, it highlighted for us that maybe we can surge resources 

and technology to try and reduce the number of gun sales that are 

held in the delayed pending status longer than 3 days, and so that 

work is underway. And then secondly, to get better and more timely records from State and local law enforcement about the disposition of people’s arrests so that our examiners have good records to 

make a judgment on. And those conversations are ongoing. 

Mr. CICILLINE. So those are actually the two areas I’d like to discuss. As you well know, the current law requires that if a requested purchase of a firearm is made, a background check is initiated, the FBI has 3 days to respond. If no response is provided, 

then the gun dealer is able to sell the weapon. My understanding 

is the FBI continues the review anyway, even in it’s beyond the 3 

days. That information is then conveyed to the gun dealer, and if 

that person is disqualified from buying a gun, what does the FBI 

do? So you now know a sale has occurred—or do you know a sale 

has occurred—and do you take action? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. If after the 3-day window the gun is transferred 

and then the examiners discover disqualifying information, my 

recollection is—and if I’m wrong, we’ll fix this—a notice is sent 

both to local law enforcement in that jurisdiction and to the Bureau 

of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms so that they can retrieve the firearm from the prohibited person. 

Mr. CICILLINE. So I would like to work with you on that because 

I’m not sure that that is actually the practice. I think that notice 

may go to ATF, but I don’t believe it goes to the gun dealer or to 

local law enforcement. And I think that’s a way that we can try to 

keep guns out of the hands of people who don’t have them, and I 

would very much like to work with you on that. 

The second issue is how do we incentivize, require, encourage 

local law enforcement to actually use the NICS system? Because 

that background check system is only as good as the information 

that’s in it. Have you done an analysis of what States participate, 

where the deficiencies are, or things we could do or that Congress 

can do to help ensure that more States are providing that disqualifying information so at the bare minimum we’re keeping guns out 

of the hands of people who shouldn’t have them under law? 

Mr. COMEY. Yeah. The mass murder in Charleston was an event 

that I think caused a lot of folks in local law enforcement, State 

law enforcement, to focus on this question. And as I said, there’s 

a whole lot of conversation going on, and we are pushing out training to State and local law enforcement to explain to them what we 

need and why we need it in a timely fashion. 

I don’t have as I sit here suggestions for how Congress might 

help us incentivize that cooperation. I think they’re good people, 

and when they see the pain of a situation like Dylann Roof’s, they 

want to be better. But I will get back to you if I have ideas for how 

Congress can help. 
60 

Mr. CICILLINE. Because, as you well know, Director, we can’t require participation with the NICS system as a result of a Supreme 

Court decision, but we ought to be able to do things to create serious incentives or maybe penalties for States that fail to furnish 

that information, because as a result of that information not being 

in the NICS system, people are walking into gun stores and buying 

guns who would be otherwise disqualified if that information were 

known. 

So I look forward to working with you on that. I think it should 

be an urgent national priority, and I thank you for the work that 

you’re doing. 

I yield back. 

Mr. FRANKS. I now recognize the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. 

Collins, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Director, for being here, and I appreciate it. My father, as well as some of the others, my father was a Georgia State 

trooper for all his life, 30-plus years. So I appreciate your commitment to law enforcement and being a part. 

I do have some quick questions that I wanted to go back on. One 

has to do with an advisory that was put on October 8 for dealing 

with credit cards and the chip issue here that was for consumer 

fraud, stated that new credit cards equipped with the microchip security technology were still vulnerable to identity theft and that 

the use of PIN authentication in addition to a chip would be a more 

secure way that consumers’ transactions would be more simple, signature verification. However, within 24 hours that advisory was 

taken down and a few days later issued an advisory that no longer 

included the PINs. 

Now, it’s my understanding Canada, Australia, many other countries have encouraged the PIN authorization because it, frankly, 

has a lower fraud rate. 

My question would be is, in light of that, does the FBI consider 

PIN as a more secure form of authentication over signature 

verification? 

Mr. COMEY. I think the experts at the FBI would say that PINand-chip is more secure than PIN-and-signature. And the confusion 

there was our folks put out that public service announcement, and 

it was a miss on our part, without focusing on the fact that most 

merchants in the United States don’t have the capability to accommodate the PIN-and-chip. And so the worry was that’s going to 

cause a whole lot of confusion when people start saying where’s the 

PIN-and-chip when our equipment is set up in this country for 

PIN-and-signature. 

Mr. COLLINS. Okay. Well, let’s talk about that a second, because 

many of the places that I go to you either swipe—they’re older 

cards, you just swipe, like on a gas station, or you go into—I used 

to own a store. We had a swipe machine. Many of them now have 

the—and many of those even with a swipe machine have a number 

for debit cards which is already there for the PIN. I know now, I’ve 

just gotten broken into using the chip because my new cards have 

chips, so I slide them in. I’m still learning how to do this. But the 

keypad is right there above it. 
61 

I’m not sure I follow your answer there that the technology is not 

available. If the keypad is right there to input a number, why is 

the technology not available? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t know. And I’m not the world’s smartest person on this, but what I’ve been told by my folks is it is available 

in some places, but it’s not widely available in the United States. 

And if I’m wrong about that, we’ll correct that. 

Mr. COLLINS. I’m just going on my own personal. And, look, my, 

Doug Collins, me going into the store and putting my card in. I’ve 

rarely found one that is just pure swipe with no keypad, I think. 

And I was just concerned, and if that’s not right and if you want 

to go back and look into that. 

I think the concern came among many that maybe there is also 

an issue because as a business owner myself, I paid different fees 

depending on how I did it, like if a consumer used a credit card 

versus a debit card. And I’m just wondering, could that have been 

an issue, because using the PIN typically is a different fee? Was 

that possibly taken into account as the reason for the removal of 

this and changed to say, well, it’s not as worrisome as we first 

thought? 

Mr. COMEY. No. I think that could be the reason that, if I’m 

right, that the equipment is not widely available in the United 

States, that people don’t have an economic incentive to change. But 

that was not a factor in why we withdrew the public service announcement. My understanding is we withdrew it because our 

worry was we’re going to confuse a whole lot of people who are 

going to roll into places saying where is the chip-and-PIN and it 

isn’t widely available. That’s, as I understand it, that was the concern. 

Mr. COLLINS. Well, it is. And it’s like everything, there was a lot 

of times before debit card. I think the concern here is, as we deal 

in information security and everything else, is you’re always trying 

to move toward the more secure atmosphere. That’s my only concern. And by moving back on that, it seemed like, at least in my 

opinion, that we’re saying, okay, there is a better way, but we’re 

not going to encourage that, we’re just going to let the, you know, 

let the status quo sort of stand. So it was just a question. 

I do have a question. We hit ECPA earlier and the e-mail privacy, which I have a great interest in. One was said is basically 

the 180-day distinction in current law is something that we have 

talked about. You said that you use a warrant in all cases. It 

doesn’t matter. Would you say that 30, you know, 30—and there’s 

been statements 30 prosecutors, former judges, all say that requiring law enforcement to obtain a warrant from a court does not prevent law enforcement from doing its job. Would you agree with 

that, especially in light of this issue? 

Mr. COMEY. I think by and large that’s true. I think it poses 

unique challenges for our colleagues at the SEC, for example, investigating corporate fraud, but I think by and large for law enforcement judges are available, and if we have the evidence, we can 

make the showing. So I think at a general level, sure. 

Mr. COLLINS. But in a general level, and also from your high 

standards as the FBI, I’ve always considered high standards, even 

the SEC, some of these agencies, that a warrant, whether they use 
62 

it or not, they like it or not, I think from a law enforcement standpoint, from a concern standpoint, from a warrant standpoint, this 

is something that they could use that they could go through normal 

means in the investigation. I think that’s the concern that many 

of us have. 

There is time for other questions, the hacking issues with OPM 

and China. Just a quick question, from the FBI’s perspective, have 

we actually traced that and say, yes, for a fact, that we confirm 

that Chinese hackers stole this data from the OPM? 

Mr. COMEY. I have with high confidence an understanding of who 

did it. I’m not in a position to say it in an open forum. 

Mr. COLLINS. Okay. And maybe we can get back on a different 

forum and discuss that, because like I said, that is a concern. We 

can’t reward bad behavior, and I’m concerned that’s what we’re 

doing. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. FRANKS. And I thank the gentlemen and now recognize Mr. 

Jeffries for 5 minutes. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

And thank you, Director Comey, for your presence here today 

and of course your great service to this country. 

I think you testified earlier today in your belief as to the efficacy 

of mandatory minimums. Is that correct? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. I think I said they were a useful tool in my career as a prosecutor, especially in eliciting cooperation. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. And can you just elaborate as to whether you still 

believe that mandatory minimums in light of the explosion of the 

United States prison population, particularly relative to every 

other developed country in the world, is still a relevant law enforcement tool? 

Mr. COMEY. I think it is. Again, I’m not in a position by expertise, and I shouldn’t in my job offer a view on whether it ought to 

be 10 years or 5 years, but I think the certainty of punishment is 

a useful tool in fighting crime. And in the absence of mandatory 

guidelines, that often comes in the form of a mandatory minimum. 

But that’s about as far as I have the expertise and the position to 

go. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. And is your view anchored in the fact that many 

prosecutors have articulated the position that in the absence of 

mandatory minimums they don’t have the same club by which to 

solicit cooperation and perhaps obtain plea bargains? Would that 

be part of your view here? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. In my experience and comparing my experience 

with the State system, which did, again, in my experience as a 

prosecutor, did not have the tools to elicit cooperation that we did. 

But, again, that’s not a view on whether it ought to be this or it 

ought to be that. I don’t have the expertise, or I’m not in a position 

to offer a view on that. But some certainty of punishment absent 

cooperation is very, very valuable in eliciting cooperation. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Now, there have been studies that have shown 

that in crimes that actually don’t have mandatory minimums, the 

conviction rates at the Federal level are actually higher than the 

conviction rates of those where mandatory minimums do exist. And 

so I think that’s part of the reason why an ideologically diverse 
63 

group of individuals on both the left and the right, including the 

Heritage Foundation, which I believe said there’s no evidence that 

mandatory minimums reduce crime, have questioned their continued need, at least in its current form. 

Now, can you comment on sort of the explosion of the United 

States prison population. When the war on drugs began in the 

early 1970’s, we had less than 350,000 people who were incarcerated in America. Currently that number is in excess of 2.3 million. 

As you know, we’ve got 5 percent of the world’s population; 25 

percent of the incarcerated individuals in the world are here in the 

United States of America. Many of us believe it creates a competitive disadvantage for us going forward in addition to the damage 

that it does to the social fabric of many communities. 

Could you comment as to the mass incarceration phenomenon 

that exists in America and what, if anything, you think should be 

done about it from a public safety standpoint? 

Mr. COMEY. Sure. I struggle with the word mass incarceration 

because it conveys a sense that people were locked up en masse 

when every case in some respects is a tragedy, in my view, but 

every one was individual, everyone had a lawyer, everyone had a 

judge, everyone had to be proven guilty. 

There is no doubt a whole lot of people are locked up, and that 

is a big problem for our country in one respect. But here’s the fact: 

In 2014, America was far safer than it was when I was born in 

1960. And I think a big part of that change, as a result of which 

a whole lot of people are alive today who wouldn’t be, is due to law 

enforcement. 

And so I’m of a view that, yes, we can reform our criminal justice 

system. It can be better in a lot of ways. But we ought to reform 

it with an eye toward where we used to be and how we got from 

there to here, because I would not want to give back to our children 

and our grandchildren the America that we lived in, in the 1970’s, 

1980’s, and 1990’s. That’s the reason I want us to be thoughtful 

about it. 

But I believe we can be better in a whole lot of ways that we 

probably don’t have time to talk about. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. I certainly think it’s important for us to be 

thoughtful. I grew up in New York City in the 1980’s in the midst 

of the crack cocaine epidemic, 2,000-plus homicides in the city of 

New York alone. We’re down under 350. And obviously no one 

wants to return to that. 

A Pew study, though, however, I believe concluded that in all 17 

States that have cut their incarceration rates, they’ve experienced 

a decline in crime over the past decade. And so it seems to me that 

there’s room empirically, based on the data, for a real discussion 

as to how to get the balance correct. I gather you share that view. 

And I just appreciate your willingness to continue in a dialogue 

for us to get the benefit of your views as we move forward toward 

criminal justice reform. 

Mr. COMEY. Thank you. Happy to. Thank you. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. FRANKS. I thank the gentleman, and I now recognize—— 
64 

Mr. COHEN. Mr. Chairman, can I be recognized for a point of personal privilege? 

Mr. FRANKS. The gentleman is recognized, without objection. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

I’m a student of history, and when I make a mistake I want to 

correct it. And I was wrong in saying that Senator Vandenberg’s 

son had committed suicide. It was a Senator Hayes, and his son 

was arrested in Lafayette Park for being gay. But that was McCarthy who was after him. So it was right church, wrong pew, but I 

wanted to correct the record. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. FRANKS. I thank the gentleman. 

I now recognize Mr. DeSantis for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Good afternoon, Director Comey. 

I’ve noticed—I’m a former prosecutor—companies have begun notifying customers when law enforcement requests data through a 

subpoena or warrant unless there is a court ordered nondisclosure 

requirement. And I think particularly for, like, child pornography 

investigations this may be an issue. Do you think that that that’s 

something that could hamper investigations? 

Mr. COMEY. I do. It’s something I’ve been hearing more and more 

about over my 2 years in this job from prosecutors who are worried 

about it. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Okay. I think we’re going to address that, so I’m 

glad to hear you say that. 

The President has a plan to bring over a lot of people from the 

civil war in Syria, tens of thousands, perhaps as many as 100,000. 

Can we vet them? And if not, isn’t it just a fact that some of those 

people will be contributing to some of the homegrown terrorism 

that we have in this country? 

Mr. COMEY. Thank you for that question. It’s a very important 

issue that we have talked about a little bit here today. We can vet 

them. We have gotten better at vetting and learned lessons from 

the vetting of Iraqi refugees. The challenge we face is we can only 

vet against data that’s been collected with respect to a person, and 

so the information we had for Iraq was much richer than we’ll have 

for Syria. 

Mr. DESANTIS. You can’t call up the Damascus police department 

and get files, correct? 

Mr. COMEY. You got it. 

Mr. DESANTIS. So there’s a problem here potentially, and I know 

it’s going to fall on you then to have to defend the American people 

once some of these individuals come into the country, and it’s just 

something that I’m concerned with. 

There has been talk about reforming sentencing. Is it your 

view—people will say that drug offenses are nonviolent offenses, 

but particularly when they get into the Federal system, where 

these are really significant trafficking offenses typically, is it accurate to say that they’re nonviolent or is the drug trade inherently 

violent, in your judgment? 

Mr. COMEY. Well, I guess each case is different. But in my experience anyone who is part of a trafficking organization is part of 

an organization that has violence all through it, and that whether 

you’re a mill worker or runner or lookout or enforcer, you’re part 
65 

of something that’s suffocating a community. And so I have a hard 

time characterizing drug organizations in any respect as nonviolent. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And in terms of the drop in crime that you alluded to, is part of that simply because there have been stiffer sentences and so habitual criminals are incapacitated and they’re off 

the streets, and therefore our communities are safer? 

Mr. COMEY. I believe that was a big part, and I think most experts believe it was a big part of the historic reduction we’ve seen 

in crime over my career. 

Mr. DESANTIS. With respect to individual offenses, I know there’s 

been discussion about mishandling of classified information, 18 

U.S.C. 1924. Just one, does the FBI keep records of all the investigations related to each offense of the criminal code? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t know that it’s searchable by each offense implicated by an investigation. If a case was charged, then the 

charged offenses would be reflected in Sentinel—that’s our recordkeeping—but I don’t think every possible charge. 

Mr. DESANTIS. So in other words, we know every mishandling of 

classified information offense, we can look that up, that actually 

gets brought by the U.S. attorney, but we don’t know whether the 

U.S. attorney declined X number of cases pertaining to that? 

Mr. COMEY. I think that’s correct, but I also don’t know with 

what clarity our records would reflect, if there were a number of 

potential violations in a case, whether it would be clear from our 

case files that it was that. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Understood. In terms of handling classified information, there has been just stuff in the press about, well, something needs to be marked classified. And is your understanding of 

the U.S. Code that if I were to send classified information over an 

unsecure system, the fact that it was not marked classified, does 

that mean that I have not committed the offense? 

Mr. COMEY. That one, as I did with Chairman Goodlatte, I think 

I’d prefer not to answer. I’m trying to make sure that, given that 

we have a matter under investigation now that relates in part to 

that topic, that I preserve our ability to be seen and to be in reality 

honest, independent, and competent. And if I start commenting on 

things that might touch it, I worry that I could jeopardize that. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And I think that’s an admirable posture, and I 

think it’s one you’ve shown throughout your career. How does when 

the President of the United States renders a judgment about a specific case saying that there’s no, for example, national security 

damage if certain information has been disclosed, how does that 

help the investigation, or does it hurt the investigation? 

Mr. COMEY. The FBI is the three things I said earlier, honest, 

competent, and independent. We follow the facts, only the facts. All 

we care about are the facts. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Well, I have no doubt that that will be how you 

conduct yourself. I just hope that as you guys do your work, as it 

moves on to other aspects of our system, that it’s based on the merits of the case in every instance and it’s not based on political 

edicts from on high. 

So thank you for your time. I appreciate it. 

I yield back. 
66 

Mr. FRANKS. I thank the gentleman and now recognize Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee for 5 minutes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

And to Director, thank you so very much. You appeared yesterday in front of the Homeland Security Committee and added a 

great deal of insight. And so I’d like to not pursue a line of questioning but hope to have an opportunity to meet with you on something we began discussing yesterday, which is cybersecurity and 

the whole role that it plays as really, I’d almost call it another figure, if you will, another entity in this scheme of terrorism. 

I am the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations, and with my Ranking Member and Chairman, we are looking to be responsible in addressing, which I believe, issues in the criminal justice system and 

somewhat overlapping the question of terrorism in this Committee, 

and certainly in Homeland Security. 

Let me just quickly start with a question that I think I introduced in the record yesterday, the No Fly for Foreign Fighters. And 

we heard testimony that indicated the numbers might be going 

down, and then I had a number in my notes that there was 250, 

approximately, Americans who had left to the foreign fight and 

may be coming back. 

The thing that I would say to you is that we must always be prepared. 9/11, the scenario of 9/11 was one that we had never imagined before. We had never imagined an airplane being used as a 

torpedo. We imagined hijacking. We lived through that. We never 

imagined. So most time imagination comes with Disney World, but 

I know that this is a very serious posture. 

And so we want to just, hopefully, any extra tool that we can 

give you with respect to refining and defining the lists that you 

have to make sure that we have every potential—not every potential—but every foreign fighter. Would that be helpful to you? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes, we want to make sure the list is comprehensive. 

If we could get every foreign fighter on there, that would be great. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So if we have this legislation, which is to add 

extra tools to you to ensure that that list is a vetted and a wellupdated list, would that be helpful? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t know the legislation, but the goal I share is 

to have a complete, updated, carefully vetted list. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I appreciate that very much. 

Let me move now to guns. I don’t want to put words in your 

mouth, but I imagine—and let me say that I served as a municipal 

court judge. I would see officers all the time, particularly see them 

undercover, and with a little smile on my face I’d have to say, 

‘‘Who are you?’’ Because, obviously, dealing with some of the matters in local government, they were in some tough places and had 

to look that way as well. 

And I recognize the dangers that our officers face. We had a horrific tragedy in our community in Houston, but we just recently lost 

an officer again in New York, and we lose officers, as we do with 

others who are impacted by guns, the 11-year-old who is a child 

who shot an 8-year-old over a dog, and another youngster, 3 years 

old, that had a gun, I believe, over this weekend and found it. We 

never can again imagine the ability of our children. 
67 

I ask you the question, why law enforcement is not our biggest 

champion, not on gun control? I call it gun safety regulation, not 

on diminishing the Second Amendment, but I call it responsibly 

handling weapons. Who would want to lose a 4-year-old in a driveby shooting in New Mexico because someone had a gun? 

And so can you answer? We’ve introduced legislation, and you 

might want to comment on this in particular, that gives you an extended period of time on this gun check situation, which was one 

of the horrible situations in the South Carolina nine where you 

were doing your work or the system was doing its work, but since 

you weren’t heard from, they just allowed this gentleman to get a 

gun and kill nine people. 

But can you answer? We have a number of legislative initiatives, 

Members of Congress don’t want anything to do with taking away 

your gun, controlling, they want to regulate the safety infrastructure. I’ve introduced legislation to keep guns away from children. 

Mr. Director, in your dealing with law enforcement, the impact 

that guns have on this, more guns in the United States than people, the impact on the work that you all do, would you answer that 

for me, please? 

And my last thing before you go. There have been a number of 

church fires. We keep ignoring it. There’s a series that just happened. We had another series before. Would you comment on the 

FBI’s work that they’re doing? 

And if the Chairman would just indulge me, I’d just throw another question there, and I appreciate it. If you take this name 

down, Robbie Tolan, T-o-l-a-n, who was killed on his front porch— 

it wasn’t a porch, it was a cement driveway of his home. Excuse 

me. Let me stand corrected. Let me apologize to his mother. He 

was wounded and still lives with a bullet in his liver. 

And the disappointing aspect is that it was an officer who mistook him as an African American male in a stolen car. He was in 

his mother’s car going home to his house in Houston, Texas, in a 

small city called Bellaire. 

And my question is for you to look into what further FBI investigation can go into this case, and I would greatly appreciate it. 

If, Mr. Chairman, you would allow him to answer that. I thank 

you for your indulgence. 

Mr. FRANKS. The gentlemen is welcome to answer the question. 

Mr. COMEY. Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee. I will certainly look 

into it, the last matter. 

With respect to church fires, we have not ignored them. Our 

agents are investigating a number of church fire incidents around 

the country. We have not found patterns and connections that connect to our civil rights enforcement work, but we are continuing to 

work on it. 

With respect to guns, the people in the FBI care deeply about 

trying to stop gun violence. What the Bureau does not do is get involved in the public policy legal questions because our job is to enforce the law. We leave it to the Department of Justice to make 

recommendations as to what the law should be. I think that’s a 

place it makes sense for us to be, but we are passionate about trying to enforce the law against bad guys with guns of all kinds, es-
68 

pecially in our cities where gun violence, especially gang-related 

gun violence, is increasingly a plague this year. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, proliferation of guns endangers law enforcement across the Nation, does it not? 

Mr. FRANKS. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, he was just shaking his head saying yes. 

Mr. COMEY. Guns in the hands of criminals endanger all of us, 

including law enforcement. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FRANKS. I think all of us would agree with that. 

Director Comey, I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes for 

questions. And I want to thank you for being here. Many people 

here in the Committee have recognized your unbiased attitude toward enforcing the law as it’s written, and I think that speak very 

highly of you, and I’ve been very impressed with the cogency and 

just the clarity of your testimony this morning. I believe that a 

commitment to independent enforcement of the law is a genuine 

and sincere conviction on your part. 

Director Comey, the Department of Justice has investigated past 

allegations of possible violations—and I know you’ve touched on 

this subject before, so forgive me for sort of rehashing it—possible 

violations of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act. Indeed, in a letter 

dated August 4, 2015, responding to this Committee’s request for 

an investigation of possible violations of the Partial-Birth Abortion 

Ban Act by Planned Parenthood, the Department of Justice stated 

that, ‘‘Since the inception of the Partial-Birth Abortion Act, the Department has investigated allegations of health facilities that are 

related to possible violations of that law.’’ 

Is there any current investigation by the FBI related to Planned 

Parenthood and the footage that’s been released by the Center for 

Medical Progress at this time that you know of? 

Mr. COMEY. As I said in response to your earlier question, I will 

get back to you and let you know. As I sit here now, I don’t have 

a strong enough grasp of where that stands. I do know letters were 

sent to the Department of Justice, but I’ve got to figure out exactly 

where we are, and I can get back to you. 

Mr. FRANKS. Okay. But as far as you know, even apart from the 

Planned Parenthood videos, do you know if any partial birth abortion ban investigations or enforcement actions have been taken by 

the FBI? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t. I know we have jurisdiction to investigate 

such things. I believe we have, but I don’t know enough to answer 

that well right here. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, I would appreciate that last part being included in any response you have. Obviously, there’s some of us, you 

know, that think that the rule of law applies to these little ones 

that have so little ability to protect themselves as well. 

Let me shift gears on you. I know there’s been several questions 

asked today about gun violence, and I assure you I agree with your 

last answer completely that we want to do everything that we can 

to keep guns out of the hands of criminals and that it’s vital for 

the sake and safety of the public that we do that. 

There are those of us that would ask law enforcement do we 

think that it would be wise to take guns out of the hands of law 
69 

enforcement, and almost no one would suggest that, because we believe—I do—that guns in the hands of properly trained FBI agents 

is a protection to the public. 

And from my perspective, that would suggest that it’s not the 

guns, it’s whose hands they’re in, because it’s hard to make a case 

that if they’re on the one hand a protective measure in the hands 

of police officers, that they’re something that can protect and deter 

and prevent or interdict violence, that they’re a good thing and that 

all of us from almost every spectrum of political consideration 

would suggest that, then the obvious, reasoned response becomes 

that it is, indeed, not the guns but whose hands they’re in. 

So my question to you is, how do we separate the argument so 

that we are doing everything that we can to prevent those who 

have lost their Second Amendment rights, who have demonstrated 

violence toward society or some issue with a mental illness, how do 

we deal with that while still leaving intact the right to own and 

bear arms under the Second Amendment by those who follow the 

law and, indeed, oftentimes protect themselves and sometimes even 

protect officers of the law? 

Mr. COMEY. I think, Congressman, that’s a question for others, 

including Congress. The FBI’s role is such that I think it’s very important that that not be a conversation debate that we participate 

in because we don’t make policy for the American people. The 

American people tell us what they think the law should be, how 

to solve these hard problems, and then we will enforce the law. I 

think that’s critical to us remaining those three things I said, honest, competent, and independent. And so honestly it’s just not a 

question I think the FBI should participate in professionally. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, that’s a very reasonable answer. I hope that 

we can do that. I think it will make your job easier, and it will augment the great work you do for the country. 

And with that, I am going to end my question time. Do we have 

any other—yes, we do. I think that Mr. Bishop is not here. Oh, I’m 

sorry. 

The gentleman, Mr. Bishop, you’re recognized for 5 minutes. Flying under the radar there. 

Mr. BISHOP. I did. I flew under the radar. 

Director, I was here earlier. I apologize for stepping out. I want 

to begin by thanking you for what you and your entire team does, 

because what you do on a daily basis is something that most of us 

don’t even know about, we can’t comprehend. And you keep us safe, 

and we’re grateful for what you do. And on behalf of my family, my 

constituents, my State, my Nation, I’m very grateful to you and 

your entire department. So I wanted to tell you that. 

And I admire your testimony today, and thank you for your candor. You’ve been here forever taking a lot of questions. 

I thought maybe I’d asked you about Syrian refugees and what 

we’re seeing. My State of Michigan is a huge hub for those of Middle Eastern descent. There is some concern about the onslaught of 

refugees into our country. And I apologize if you’ve answered this 

question, but I’d like to ask you, what do we know, how do we vet 

these refugees coming into our country? Is there a way to do it that 

we can rely upon? 
70 

My office does a lot of immigration work. We work with those 

who are attempting to immigrate legally every day, and we help 

them any way we can to try and get through, jump through the 

hoops. It’s very strange that we now have groups that are coming 

in in the way they are that really skip all those steps in between. 

So I’m just wondering if you could share with me what your experience is and what you know about the process. 

Mr. COMEY. It’s a process I describe as good news and bad news. 

The good news is we have gotten as a country, and the intelligence 

community in particular, much better at organizing ourselves so 

that we get a complete picture of what we know about somebody. 

We learned some lessons from Iraqi refugees 8 years ago or so. And 

so we have gotten better at querying our holdings. And so if there 

is a ripple this person has created in our pond, I’m confident that 

we will see it and be able to evaluate it. 

The bad news is we will have less data with respect to folks coming out of Syria than we did with respect to Iraq, because we don’t 

have the U.S. Army presence and all of that that would give us biometrics to query. So the risk is that someone who is a blank slate 

to us will be vetted by us in a process that’s efficient and complete 

but will show no sign of anything because they’ve never crossed our 

radar screen. That’s why I describe it as a process that’s gotten a 

lot better but that we can’t tell you is risk free. 

Mr. BISHOP. And as time goes on, the process that you are going 

through will be more apparent to the American people. I say that 

because there are a lot of folks in my State who are very concerned. 

And, you know, that level of unknown, of not understanding exactly the process, has caused a little panic across the district. And 

the more that we can hear, the more we understand what the process is. 

We remember the Iraqi refugees in the State of Michigan, especially in my area, in southeast Michigan. So I appreciate your ongoing communication on how that’s going. 

I want to switch gears with you real quick. I’ve had the pleasure 

of visiting and working with a number of youth-serving organizations in my district, and I know at least one of those organizations 

is here today represented. It’s important work that they do in the 

community. And I’ve spoken to some of them about the importance 

of keeping their kids safe, and one of the ways to do that is getting 

background checks. It ensures so many different ways of fostering 

a safe environment. And it’s really an issue I feel very deeply 

about. I have kids of my own. 

Can you talk a little bit about the value of including national 

FBI fingerprint background checks as a part of the comprehensive 

screening of staff and volunteers? There are so many that are right 

there with our children, and we know that the FBI background 

checks is the gold standard of the process. Can you share a little 

bit about how we can promote that and encourage that? 

Mr. COMEY. Yes. Thank you, Congressman. And I think, if I remember correctly, we have actually been doing a pilot program on 

that topic at our criminal justice information systems operation, 

which I do believe is the gold standard. You’re right. So anybody 

who wants to ensure that people in contact with children or in any 
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other sensitive position have been checked out, the best way to do 

it is working with us so we can query our holdings. 

And as an exciting new feature that’s coming on now as part of 

our Next Generation Identification, we’re building in something 

called Rap Back, which means if you query somebody as a daycare 

provider, if they are ever again arrested, you will get notified, because that’s been a hole in the system. People are clean when they 

first go in. Then they get in trouble 5 years down the road. You 

never tell the daycare about this. So Rap Back will make a big difference and make the gold standard platinum in a way. So I very 

much agree with your sentiment on that topic. 

Mr. BISHOP. Did you say Rap Back? 

Mr. COMEY. Rap Back, R-a-p B-a-c-k. So if someone develops a 

rap sheet, we get back. 

Mr. BISHOP. Got you. All right. That’s the connotation. Okay. 

Sir, thank you very much for your time. I appreciate all your testimony today. 

With that, I yield back. 

Mr. FRANKS. I thank the gentleman, and I apologize for missing 

him the first time. 

And I now recognize Mr. Ratcliffe for 5 minutes. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Comey, thanks for being here. It’s good to see you a second day in a row. 

Mr. COMEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. I want to ask you a couple cybersecurity issues. 

Before I do that, I did want to follow up from a question I asked 

you at the Homeland Security Committee yesterday. We had a 

brief exchange about the President’s decision to take in 10,000 Syrian refugees over the next year. And as we talked about, that’s a 

500 or 600 percent increase over prior years. 

And I had indicated to you that, humanitarian concerns aside, I 

was troubled with respect to the national security aspects of it, as 

you’re hearing from many of my colleagues here, particularly because ISIS has said that it would use or would try to use the refugee process to get into the United States. And further to that 

point, as you’ve testified, our own databases don’t have information 

on some of these individuals, so there are gaps of intelligence there. 

So we had a discussion about that figure of 10,000 yesterday. I 

guess if you had been the sole decider on that issue, what figure 

would you have recommended to the President? 

Mr. COMEY. I don’t know. And I’m pleased to say it’s not my job 

to recommend that to the President. I just don’t know. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Well, I understand that. I know the FBI is not 

a policymaking body with respect to that issue. But as you recall, 

we had a discussion. I asked Secretary Johnson the same thing, 

and he assured me that there was an interagency process. 

But I guess what I’m trying to get at was, is this a figure that 

the Administration presented to you and said, you know, meet the 

security obligations that come with this, or was this part of a process where there was actually input from folks like you that should 

be providing input on what that number would be? 

Mr. COMEY. I think there was plenty of input from the FBI and 

other parts of the intelligence community on sort of how we 
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thought about the good news and the bad news. I don’t know and 

don’t recall and don’t know if I could say even if I did recall how 

a number came up. It wouldn’t have come from the FBI. But I just 

don’t know. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Okay. Well, you understand the concern that we 

would hope that these decisions were driven by intelligence rather 

than political reasons or pressure from our European allies or other 

folks around the world. And so that’s why I asked the question. 

But turning to cybersecurity, and I Chair the Subcommittee on 

Cyber at Homeland, and in your written testimony you said—I 

want to make sure I get this right—‘‘An element of virtually every 

national security threat and crime problem the FBI faces is cyberbased or facilitated.’’ And I want that to sink in for everyone because it’s such an important point for us to consider in our oversight of the FBI. I think it really speaks to the gravity of the issue 

here that you’re seeing a cyber element to almost every national security threat and crime problem. 

So aside from the encryption issue, which I’ve had the opportunity to hear you talk about in the past, what are the major challenges that you face in detecting and prosecuting cybercrime right 

now at the FBI? 

Mr. COMEY. Thank you for that question and thank you for your 

interest in that issue and your leadership there. 

Two big issues are getting the right folks and the right equipment, in reverse order. The bad guys have very sophisticated 

equipment, and so if we’re going to be good at responding to all the 

threats we’re responsible for, we got to make sure we have world 

class systems. 

And then we got to have great people to operate them, and that’s 

a challenge when we’re facing a cybersecurity industry that will 

pay young folks a lot of dough to go work in the private sector. We 

compete on mission. I tell these people you’re not going to make 

much of a living, you’re going to make a great life. I hope that convinces their families as well, but those are the two big focuses for 

us. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Terrific. Thank you, Director. 

So the issue of insider threats has been described by at least 

some as the greatest threat to businesses that operate in cyberspace. And of course we all saw the scale of that threat with respect to Edward Snowden. I know that the Department of Justice 

has asked Congress for clarity on the law in this area for assistance in prosecuting insiders who access sensitive data that they’re 

not authorized to, and I want to give you an opportunity to elaborate on that from your perspective. 

Mr. COMEY. It’s an important part of the threat. That’s absolutely true. I don’t know what the Department’s questions and concerns are about their legislative authorities on that front, so I don’t 

think I can offer anything useful there. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Okay. Well, good. 

My time has expired, but like everyone else, I want to express 

my thanks. Of course I had the opportunity to work for you, both 

when you were the Acting Attorney General and as the Deputy Attorney General, and because of that I have great confidence in you. 

And I am grateful for your continued service and am comforted by 
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the fact that you’re in the Director’s chair and that you’re the person making such important decisions about our Nation’s security. 

So thank you. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. COMEY. Thank you. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, I would take a moment to echo those comments. With 7-year-old children, we’re grateful that people like you 

are on the job. 

This would conclude today’s hearing. Thanks to our distinguished 

witness for attending. Thank the audience here. Grateful to all of 

you for being here. 

Without objection, all Members will have 5 legislative days to 

submit additional written questions for the witness or additional 

materials for the record. 

And with that, thank you again, Director Comey. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:01 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(75) 

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD
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*Note: The Committee did not receive a response to these questions at the time this hearing 

record was finalized and submitted for printing on March 21, 2016. 

Questions for the Record submitted to the Honorable James B. Comey, 

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation* 
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