F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

T O N J A A M E S , Plaintiff-Appellee

,

v

.

K I N G C O U N T Y , W ashing ton,

Defendant

,

and

H E A T H E R R. V O L P E , member of the King County

Sheriff’s Department; C H R

I S T O P H E R S A W T E L L E , member of the King County Sheriff’s Department; D A N I E L L

. C H R

I S T I A N , member of the King County

Sheriff’s Department, Defendants-Appellants. No. 14-36035

D.C. No. 2:13-cv-01030-RSM

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the W e stern District of W ashing ton Ricardo S. Martinez

, Chief J udg e, Presiding

Arg u ed and Submitted December 7, 2016

Seattle, W a shing ton

F iled J anuary

13, 2017A M E S V

. K I N G C O U N T Y 2

B efore: M. Marg a

r et McKeown, Richard C. Tallman, and Morg an B . Christen, Circuit J udg es.

Opinion by

J u dg e Tallman

SUMMARY *

Civil Rights

The p anel reversed the district court’s denial, on summary judg ment, of q

ualified immunity to K i n g County Sheriff’s Deputies in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action i n w h ich p laintiff alleg ed, among other thing s, that deputies violated h er F ourth Amendment rig hts by

using ex cessive force during an arrest and unlawfully

searching

her truck.

The panel held that the deputies were entitled to qualified immunity because their a ctions were o bjectively reaso n a b le in lig h t of the urg e nt need to deliver life-saving care to an overdose victim, and to ensure the safety of ev ery one at the

scene.

COUNSEL

David J

. H ackett (arg

u ed), S enior Deputy Prosecuting Attorney ; Daniel T. Satterberg

, Prosecuting Attorne y ; King

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o p art o f th e o pin io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.A M E S V

. K I N G C O U N T Y 3

County Prosecuting A ttorney ’s Office, Seattle, W ashing ton; for Defendants-Appellants.

Darry l Parker (arg

ued), C ivil Rig hts J ustice Center PL L C, Seattle, W ashing ton, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OP INION

TAL L MAN, Circuit J u dg e:

This interlocutory appeal requires us to addr e s s the reasonableness of actions ta k en by King County Sheriff’s Deputies functionin g in their community caretaking capacities during a life-and-death medical emerg ency

. W e

reverse t h e district court’s denial of qualified immunity on Appellee’s ex cessive force and u nlawful sea rch c laims because we c onclude the deputies’ actions were objectively

r e a s o nable in lig ht of the urg e nt need to deliver life-saving

care to an overdose victim, and to ensure the safety o f
every one at the scene.

I

The events leading up to t h e use o f force and search at issue in thi s c a se are larg ely undisputed. 1 On F ebruary 6, 20 1 3, at 6:30 p.m., T onja Ames called 911 to summon an ambulance for her 22-y

ear-old son, Colin B rig anti. B rig anti lived in a converted g arag e apartment attached to his mother’s home and suffered from heart a nd lung problems a s

1 W h ere t he d e t ails are d isp u ted

, w e rely o n A m es’ s acco u n t as th e

n o n

- m o v i n g p arty fo r p u r p o ses o f o u r rev iew

. See W ilkin so n v. To rres , 6 1 0 F.3 d 5 4 6 , 5 50 (9 th

Cir. 2 0 1 0 ).A M E S V

. K I N G C O U N T Y 4

a result of prior drug abuse. Upon arriving home from work that d ay , Ames found B rig anti in his bedroom “slumped over

on the couch d

rooling ” and incoherent. She also found what

a ppeared to be a suicide note and feared B rig a nti may h a v e overdosed on one of his medication s

. A m e s called her neig hbors, W illiam and L inda Eby , who came over to help.

The 9 11 operator classified the call as a Priority 1 suicide attempt and dispatched a firefig hter/EMT aid cr e w and a police o fficer to Ames’s residence. According to the County
, it i s c o m mon practice for police officers to respond to attempted suicide calls in order to secure the scene and ensure the safety of the aid crew. Kin g C o u n ty Sheriff’s Deputy Heather Volp e , wh o is a n ex pert instructor in d rug recog nition, arrived at Ames’s house within approx imately fo u r m i n utes of Ames’s 911 call, pulling up at virtually the

same time as an aid car f

rom W oodinv i l l e F ire and Rescue. The aid c ar was manned by L ieutenant D r a go N evistic a nd F irefig h ter/EMTs Chris Mez z one a n d L arry L a u r e nt. A mes met Deputy Volpe and the aid c rew in her d riveway by the front rig ht corner of the house and told them about B r ig anti’s medical h istory

, his current cond i t i on, and the suicide note. Ames then directed Deputy Volpe and the aid crew around to the g arag e a p artment entrance a t the back of the house. F irefig h ter/EMTs Mez z one and L aurent were in the lead a nd entered the apartment, with Ames, D eputy Volpe, a nd L ieutenant Nevistic following behind.

As Ames, Deputy Volpe, and L ieutenant Nevistic arrived
at the doorway

, Ames refused entry to Deputy Volpe. A mes told Deputy Volpe t h a t only the aid crew could enter the apartment. According to A mes, Deputy Volpe replied, “I f I can’t enter the home, then y o u g et no s e r v i ce,” and directed the a id crew to ex it the apart m e n t

. F irefig hter/EMTsA M E S V

. K I N G C O U N T Y 5

Mez z o ne and L aurent withdrew from the apartment; they h ad
not y et eng a g ed with B rig a nti but L a u r ent had observed that he was s i t t i ng in a chair, “semi-conscious” and “letharg ic,” and that he “barely could keep his ey es open.”

Neither D e p u t y Volpe nor a ny member of the aid crew had ever encountered a situation where the person who called 911 would n ot allow police to enter with the emerg ency medical personnel responding to the call. B ecause Ames’s refusal was unusual, a

nd because the call involved a possible suicide a ttempt, Deputy Volpe b e c ame concerne d f o r the safety of the responders on the s c e n e and what mig h t have happened inside the a

partment. Tog ether, Deputy Volpe a nd the aid crew r etreated to their vehicles parked at the curb. Deputy V olpe radioe d to inform dispatch and h er p atrol supervisor, Serg eant Kevin J ohannes, that Ames was refusing
t o l e t police enter and the aid crew was refusing to work o n B rig a nti inside the apartment. Deputy V o lpe requested backup and waited, further advising dispatch that B rig anti h a d o verdosed on pills and w as semi-conscious and very letharg ic. Deputy V olpe had special i z ed training as a Drug Re c o g n ition Ex pert I n structor w ith knowledg e o f v arious medications and their e f f ects. She w as concerned that B rig a nti would die. Ames had listed B rig anti’s medications for Deputy Volpe when the aid crew f irst arrived, and Deputy Volpe recog niz ed most o f them as Central Nervous Sy stem depressants.

B e fore leaving B rig anti’s a partment, the aid crew did not tell Ames that they could treat her son outside the apartment

or that they would wa i t outside for him. W hen the first responders w ithdrew, Ames a n d her neig hbors had remained in B r ig anti’s apartment. A m es panicked—thinking the aid

crew w as g oing to leave—and enlisted her neig hbors to h elpA M E S V

. K I N G C O U N T Y 6

her carry B rig anti outside a nd load him into her pickup truck parked in the driveway

so she could drive him to the nearest hospital. Deputy Volpe w atched a s Ames and her neig hbors carried B rig anti, apparently unconscious, out from behind the house. She assumed Ames would now let the aid c rew work

o n B rig a nti in the driveway but, once she observed their eff o rts to load B rig a

nti into Ames’s truck, Deputy Volpe radioed h er patrol supervisor: “L o oks like they ’re try ing to load him u

p into a truck a

nd leave.

. . . Should I stop them[ ? ] ” Serg e ant J ohannes r eplied: “Yeah, if y ou have aid there they need to work on him. So, y eah.” Deputy Volpe then moved her patrol car to block the truck’s ex it from the driveway a nd approached Ames as she was climbing into the driver’s side of the truck cab. Ames’s neig hbo r s h ad finished buckling B rig a nti into the passeng er seat, where h e remained slumped over and unresponsive during the events that followed.

Deputy Volpe y elled at A mes as she a p p r oached the truck, telling Ames that she n eeded to let the EMTs take B rig a nti and that it was unlawful for A mes to leave with him. W h en De p u t y Volpe refused to move her patrol c ar, A mes became ang ry , pointed her fing er at Deputy Volpe, a nd
y elled: “ Move y our f-ing vehic l e

. I ’m taking my son to the hospital. You g uy s left. You won’t help him. Get out of my way .” She continued climbing int o t h e driver’s seat, then placed the suicide note she had r etrieved from the apartment in between the tru c k s e a t s and put the key s in the ig nition while reaching out w ith her left a rm to close the driver’s-side door. Simult a n e o usly

, Deputy Volpe r eached the driver’s side of the truck and used h e r b o d y to block the door from closing

. She then a ttempted to pull Ames from the truck cab. Ames g rabbed the steering wheel tig htly with her rig ht hand and Deputy Volpe employ ed a hair hold to distract A mes a nd l o osen her g rip so the officer could remove Ames from t h eA M E S V

. K I N G C O U N T Y 7

truck. Deputy Volpe took Ames down to th e g round into a prone handcuffing position. Accordi n g to the County ’s
p o l i ce practices ex pert, a hair hold is a low-level distracti o n and minor pain compliance technique that is at the lower e nd of takedown options in relativ e level of force. Essentially

, Deputy Volpe g rasped A mes’s hair close to her scalp, causing Ames to release the steering wheel and reach up towards her scalp, whereupon Deputy Volpe was able to pull Ames out o f the cab of the truck and down to the g round.

Ames landed o n the g r o u nd with her rig ht arm pinned under h er b ody

. D eputy Volpe held o nto Ames’s hair with

one hand and p u s h ed her k nee into Ames’s back while she handcuffed Ames’s left a r m

. She ordered Ames to provide her rig ht a

rm f or cuffing and, acc o r d i n g to Ames, slammed Ames’s head into the g round th r e e times a s Ames tried to

ex p lain that her arm w as pinned and that she suffered f rom a back injury

. Deputy Volpe was then able to pull Ames’s rig ht

arm behind her back, handcuff her, and radio that she had her pinned on the g round. I n all, 97 secon d s e l apsed b etween Serg e ant J ohannes’s instruction that Deputy Volpe keep Ames from leaving the scene and D eputy Volpe’s report that she had Ames subdued on the g round. The first backup unit did not arrive on t h e scene until a little under a minute a fter Deputy Volpe had subdued Ames.

The aid crew rushed to assist B rig anti as soon as Deputy Volpe r e m o v ed Ames from the truck. They first moved B rig a nti from the truck into the aid c a r a n d then drove
approx imately 1 0 0 y ards down the street for initial assessment because they were concerned about the potential for f urther confrontatio n s. B ased on their assessment of the

s e v e r i ty of B rig a

nti’s condition and the shallowness of his breathing

, the aid crew called for a nearby advanced lifeA M E S V

. K I N G C O U N T Y 8

support medic unit to transport B rig anti to the hospital in case airway support was required en route to keep him alive.

Deputy Christopher Sawtelle, the first backup o ffi cer to reach the scene, arrived shortly after the aid c rew had beg un to treat B rig anti. Deputy S a w t el le observed A mes handcuffed on the g round near the open driver’s-side door o f the truck. He go t o u t o f his v ehicle and approached Deputy Volpe to ask whether she needed assistance secu r i n g t he

s c e n e

. Deputy Volpe moved Ames to the back seat of h e r patrol car. Deputy Sawtell e did not speak with the aid crew treating B rig anti, but understood from D eputy Volpe’s radio
t r a n s m i ssions and information he received on the scene that B rig a nti h a d been in the truck a

nd that the suicide n ote was in
t he truck. As a result, D eputy Sawtelle believed the t r u c k

was a possible overdose scene a n d he searched the cab, g love compartment, and truck bed, a ssisted by Deputy Daniel Christian. Deputy Sawtelle found a loaded g un in the g love compartment (leg a lly r eg istered to Ames) a s w e l l as bottles of prescription drug s, at least one of which was prescribed to B rig a nti. He also retrieved the suicide note. Deputy Sawtelle did not specifically recall communic a t i n g the n ote and the medications he found to the medical personnel on the scene, but swears it would have bee n his standard p ractice to communicate any

relevant information to the treating EMTs and paramedics, including the nature of me d ications o r relevant portions of a suicide note.

B r ig a nti w as transported in the advanced life support unit
to the emerg en c y room at Everg reen Hospital Medical Center, located some di stance away

. Ames was released from her handcuffs and g ave a statement t o S erg eant J o h a n n es, who had by then arrived at the scene. A photog raph of Ames taken by Serg eant J ohannes at the timeA M E S V

. K I N G C O U N T Y 9

of her statement shows abrasi o ns on Ames’s rig ht palm. Ames reported to Serg eant J ohannes that she was

ex p eriencing pain in her rig ht p alm, her wrist, her rig h t knee, and her rib c ag e. 2 Ames then followed B rig anti t o t h e hospital to have her injuries checked. B rig anti survived his overdose and no charg es were filed ag ainst Ames or B rig anti.

II

Ames b ro ug h t a number of c laims ag ainst King County and Deputies Volpe, Sawtelle, and Christian under 42 U .S.C. § 1983. Ames alleg ed that Deputy Volpe violated her F ourth Amendment r ig hts by arresting he r without probable cause, conducting an unreasonable seiz ur e, using ex cessive force during the a

rrest, and conducting a

n u nlawful search o f her truck. 3 Ame s a s s e rted that Deputy Volpe violated her F irst Amendment rig hts by retaliating ag ainst her after she refused entry to Deputy Volpe. F inally

, Ames a l l e ge d that King County acted with deliberate indifferen c e t o her rig hts b y failing to adequately train its deputies, a nd b r o ug ht pendant
state law c laims of assault, battery

, fa l s e a r rest, and false imprisonment ag ainst Deputy Volpe and King County (under

a respondeat superior theory ).

On summary judg ment, the district court g ran t e d q u alified immunity to D eputy Vol p e on all but the ex c essive force claim (and the related state law assault and battery claims ),

2 Du rin g h er su

bseq u en t d ep ositio n , A m es d escrib ed h er in j u ries as:

“ My h e a d

, m y r i g h t w

rist, m y p alm s w ere b leed in g , m y rig h t k n ee,

. . . [m ]y lef t sid e o f m y rib cag e, all th e w ay

o v er in to m

y b ack . My

n eck .”

3 Dep u ties Saw telle an d Ch ristian also w ere n am e d in th e u n l aw f u l search claim

.A M E S V

. K I N G C O U N T Y 10

denied qualified i mmunity to Deputies Sawtelle and Christian

o n the unlawful search claim, and dismissed the delibera t e indifference c laim ag ainst K ing County

. 4 S p ecifically

, the district court ruled that it could not resolve as a matter of law whether the amount of fo r c e used during Ames’s arrest a nd the scope of the search o f her truck were reasonable

. The
court also dismissed the s t a t e l aw false arrest and false i mprisonment c laims ag ainst Deputy Volpe and the r e m a i n i n g state law claims ag ainst King County

. Deputies Volpe, Sawtelle, and Christian timely appealed the d istrict court’s denial of qualified immunity on the

ex c e ssive force and unlawful sea r c h claims. The district
court stay e d the case pending res o l u t i on of the deputies’ appeal now b efore us. W e have jurisdiction under 28 U .S.C. § 1291. W e reverse.

III

W e review a denial of qualified immunity d e novo, viewing the facts and drawing reasonable inferences in the lig ht most f

avorable to the part y o p p osing summary judg ment. W

ilkinson

, 610 F .3d at 550 (citing Scott v. Harris
, 5 5 0 U. S

. 372, 378 (2007)). W here the district court h a s determined the parties’ e vidence p resents g enuine issues o f material fact, such d eterminations are not reviewable on interlocutory appeal. See Lee v. G regory , 363 F

. 3d 931, 932 (9th C i r

. 2 004). However, we may adjudicate “leg al” interlocutory a p p ea ls; that is, we may properly review a denial of qualif

i e d i mmunity where a defendant arg ues—as the d e puties a

rg ue here—that the facts, even when considered in the lig ht most favorable to the plaintiff, show no violation

4 A m es d id n o t o p p o se th e d ism i ssal o f th is claim

.A M E S V

. K I N G C O U N T Y 11

o f a constitutional rig h t, o r no violation of a rig ht that i s

c l e a r l y established in law. See A.K.H. v. City of Tusti n , 837 F .3d 1 005, 1 0 1 0 ( 9th Cir. 2 016) (“A d e fendant w ho appeals a denial of qualified immunity on the g round that his

c o n d uct did not violate the F ourth Amendment and, in a n y event, d id not violate clearly established law has raised leg al issues that may be properly heard in a n interlocutory appeal.” (internal quotat i o n marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Plumhoff v. Rickard

, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 (2014))).

IV

“I n determining whether a n officer is entitled to qualified immunity

, we consider (1) whether there has been a violation of a c onstitutional rig ht; and (2) w h e t her that rig ht was clearly established at the tim e o f t he officer’s alleg ed misconduct.” Lal v. California

, 7 46 F .3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Pearson v. Callaha n , 555 U .S. 223, 232 (2009)). W e may ex ercise discretion in deciding which o f the two prong s to address first. Id.

“A clearly established rig h t is o ne that is ‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable officia l w o uld have u nderstood that what he is doing violates that rig ht.’” Mullenix v. Luna
, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (201 5 ) (per curiam) (quoting Reichle v

. Howards

, 132 S. Ct. 2 088, 2093 (2012)). “W e do not require

a case to be direc t l y on point, but ex isting precedent must have placed the statutory o r constitutional question bey ond debate.” Id. (internal q uotation marks omitted) ( q uoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd

, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). The “ clearly established” inquiry

, however, “‘must be undertaken in lig ht of t h e s p e c ific c ontex t of the case, not as a broad g eneral proposition,’” and factual specificity is “especially important in the F o urth A mendment c ontex t.” Id. (quoting Brosseau v

.A M E S V

. K I N G C O U N T Y 12

Haugen
, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per curiam)). “ Qualified immunity g ives g overnment officials breathing room to make

r easonable but mistaken judg ments,” and “protects ‘all b u t the plainly incompetent or those who knowing ly violate the law.’” Stanton v. Sims
, 134 S. Ct. 3, 5 (2013) (quot ing Ashcroft

, 563 U.S. at 743).

W ith t h e s e principles in mind, we review whether Deputies Volpe, Sawtelle, and Christian are ent i t l e d to qualified immunity

in this case. W e conclude that they are.

A

Use o f force is a s e i z u r e that is subject to the F ourth Amendment’s reasonable n ess requirement. W ilkinson

, 610 F .3d at 550. Under the F ourth Amendment, officers may

u s e o nly such force as is “objectively reasonable” under t h e circumstances. Graham v. Connor
, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). According ly

, w e must determine

, in lig h t of the particular facts and circumstances Deputy Volpe faced at the

scene o f B rig anti’s apparent suicide att e m p t, whether the actions she took in subduing Ame s w e re objectively reasonable. See S

cot t , 5 5 0 U.S. at 381. W e make this determination “from the per s p ective of a reasonable officer

on the scene” and n ot “with the 20/20 v ision of hindsig ht.” Graham

, 490 U.S. at 396. Additi o n a l l y , we r ecog n iz e “that police officers are o f

t e n forced to make split-second judg ments—in circumstances that are tense, unce r tain, a nd rapidly e volving

— about the a mount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 3 96–97. “Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in t h e p eace o f

a judg e ’s chambers, violates the F ourth Amendment.” Id. at 396 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).A M E S V

. K I N G C O U N T Y 13

I n o rder to deter m ine whether a use of force was objectively reasonable, courts balance “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s F ourth A mendment interests” ag ainst the “countervailing g overnment interests at sta k e .” Id. ; see also Scott
, 550 U.S. at 383. Proper application o f the test “requires c a reful attention to the facts and ci r c umstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime a t issue, whether th e s u spect p oses an im mediate threat to the safety o f the officers or o thers, a nd whether [the suspect] is actively resisting arrest or attempting
to evade arrest by flig ht.” Graham

, 490 U.S. a t 396. The second of these so-called Graha m f actors—whether there is

an immediate threat to the safety o f the arresting officer o r others—is the most important. See Smith v. C i ty of Hemet
, 394 F .3d 689, 702 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc).

F or purposes of our a n a l y sis, we accept Ames’s description of Deputy Volpe’s use of f o rc e

. W ilkinson

, 610 F .3d at 550. According ly

, w e must d e termine w hether, in p reventing Ames from obstructing efforts to save B rig anti, it w as objectively reasonable for Deputy Volpe to ex ecute three head slams and use her knee to pin Ames to the g round. Apply in g the Graham factors to the p articular facts a nd circumstances of this case, we conclude that Deputy Volpe’s use of force was objectively reasonable.

The g overnment interest in subduing Ames here was substantial. The first Graham factor speaks of the “ s e verity of the crime at issue,” but we think the district court applied th i s fa c tor too narrowly when it focused on Ames’s misdemeanor obstruction of Deputy Volpe rather t han the
nature of th e ong oing e merg ency ex acerbated by Ames’s resistance. Deputy V o l p e w as acting in her community caretaking capacity

, “to t a lly divorced from the detection,A M E S V

. K I N G C O U N T Y 14

investig ation, or ac q u i sition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute,” w h e n s he responded to the 911 call for help. Ca d

y v

. Dombrowski

, 413 U.S. 433, 441 ( 1973); see also United States v. Stafford

, 416 F .3d 1 0 6 8
, 1073 (9th Cir. 2005) ( ex plaining that the “emerg ency doctrine is based on and justified by the fact that, in addition to their role a s c riminal investig ators and law enforcer s , t h e police also function as community caretakers”). Thus, we b e lieve the better analy

tical approach here under the fir s t Gr a h am factor s h o uld be to focus our inquiry not on Ames’s misdemeanor crime of obstruction but instead on the

s e r i o u s

— i n d ee d

, l i f

e- t h r e a t en i n g— s i t u a t i o n t h at w a s unfolding at the time. Ames was prolong ing a d i re medical
emerg ency throug h her di s r e gard o f Deputy Volpe’s lawful commands, and her a c t i o ns risked severe consequences. B ecause the g ravity of Deputy Volpe’s community caretaking responsibilities under these c ircumstances must b e factored into the analy sis, w e conclude that the first G r a h a m factor weig hs in Deputy

Volpe’s favor.

The second—and most important— Grah am factor

ex a mines wheth e r Ames presented an immediate dang e r to Deputy Volpe or others. O n this record, we have no difficulty in concluding that she did. I n D ep u t y Volpe’s words, as Ames an d the Eby s loaded B rig anti into Ames’s truck, Deputy Volpe “continued to be hig hly concerned for Mr. B rig anti’s immediate su r v ival” because he “appeared comple t e ly unconscious” and “needed immediate help.” Deputy Volpe, still waiting for b ackup

, and acting on instructi ons from her patrol supervisor to prevent Ames a nd B rig a nti from leaving so that the aid crew could c o m m e nce treating B rig a

nti a t the s cene, faced a rapidly escalating situation. After Deputy Volpe blocked Ames’s truck with her vehicle, commanded Ames to stop, a nd declined to move herA M E S V

. K I N G C O U N T Y 15

vehicle, Ames y elled at the De p u ty to “Move y o ur f-ing

v e h i c le” a

nd “Get out of my way ” a s she started to put h e r key s in the ig nition and reached to close the truck door.

Ames admitted she was “panicked,” and testified that she “g ot a ng r y ” when Deputy Volpe told h er she could not leave with B r ig anti. Deputy Volpe was co n c e r ned that A mes would fu rther delay B rig a nti’s access to urg ently needed medical care. I n lig ht of these circ u m stances, a reasonable officer on t h e s c ene could c o n clude, as Deputy Volpe did here, that Ames presented a n immediate dang er. As a r esult, the second Graham factor weig h s in favor of Deputy Volpe.

The third Graham factor a l s o favors Deputy Volpe because u ndisputed e v i d ence in the record demonstrates Ames w as a ctively interferi n g with B rig anti’s medical treatment, p h y sically resisting arrest, a nd attempting to evade Deputy Volpe by flig ht. Ames admits Deputy V olpe told her it was unla w ful to leave with B rig a nti and that A mes responded by y elling obscenities and indicating her intent to drive away with him. Ames also testifie d s h e grabbed the steering wheel with her rig ht hand when D eputy Volpe b eg an pulling her out of the truc k

. Finally

, A mes described being unable to g ive Deputy Volpe h er rig ht arm to be cuffed despite Deputy Volpe’s r e p eated requests. Even if this was because Ames’s arm was p inned beneat h her body

, from Deputy Volpe’s perspective it reasonably appeared that A mes

was still refusing to comply with h er r equests as pa r t o f her
ong oing resistance to the o fficer’s commands. On these facts, the use of force to effect her arrest may have been mistaken, but was not unreasonable.

O n b a lance, we conclude the g overnment interests at stake—here, B rig anti’s urg ent ne e d f o r life-saving emerg encyA M E S V

. K I N G C O U N T Y 16

medical care and the need to protect the first responders and other motorists from potential h arm—outweig hed any intrusion on Ames’s F ourth Amendment rig hts

. W e think Deputy Volpe’s use of force in this case was reasonable in
response to the totality of th e ci rcumstances. She needed to make a split-second d eci s i on during rapidly evolving circumstances to disable Ames. Deputy Volpe did not know whether Ames had access to a weapon in the truck. A mes refused Deputy Volpe’s c ommands

, resisted being pulled from her truck, and (whether or not by c h o i c e) was not submitting to being handcuffed

. Even were we to conclude Deputy Volpe was mistaken in the judg ments she made as to the amount of for c e r e q uired, as a matter of law her actions did n ot rise t o t h e level o f plain incompetence or a knowing violation of c learly e stablished law reg arding police actions in response to this serious medical emerg ency

. S e e Stanton
, 134 S. C t

. at 5, 7. A ccording ly

, Deputy Volpe is entitled to qualified immunity

from Ames’s ex cessive force claim.

B

Deputies Sawtelle a

nd Christian a

re also e nt i tled to qualified immunity from Ames’s unla w f u l search claim under
t h e “emerg e ncy doctrine.” W e previously h ave recog n iz e d that o fficers acting in their community caretaking capacities and respondi ng to a perceived emerg ency may conduct certain searches without a warr a n t o r probable cause. See Stafford

, 4 1 6 F. 3d a t 1073–74. To determine whether the
emerg ency e x ception applies to a part icular warrantless search, we e x amine whether: “(1) considering the totality o f the circumstances, law enforcement had an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that there was an immediate need to protect others or themselves from serious harm; and ( 2) the search’s scope and manner were reasonable to m e etA M E S V

. K I N G C O U N T Y 17

the need.” United S

tates v. Snipe
, 515 F .3d 947, 952 (9th Cir. 2008). Here, the deputies’ search o f Ames’s t ruck f alls within the emerg ency

ex ception.

Deputy Sawtelle had an obje c t i v ely reasonable basis for concluding Ames’s truck n eeded to be searched in order to protect B rig anti from serious harm—in this instance, the lifethreatening harm B rig anti faced a s a resul t o f h is d rug overdose. 5 W hen Deputy Sawtelle arrived on the scene in
response to Deputy Volpe’s request for backup, h e understood the truck to be a possible o verdose scene b a sed on the fact that B rig anti had been in the pickup prior to Deputy S aw t e l l e’s arrival and his knowledg e of the presence of the suicide note inside the truck. Deputy Sawtelle ex plained that it is common practice for officers responding to an attempted suicide call involving a drug overdose to s e a r c h locations associated with the suicide victim in order to find out wh at drug s were used in the suicide attempt. The County ’ s ex pert further e x plained: “W hen a patient has ing ested an unknown drug or combination of drug s the need to identify tox ins and other p otential health haz ards is a top priority and is v ery time sensitive.” We ag r ee with the district court that, g iven what Deputy Sawtelle knew when he f i rst arrived at the scene, he had an objectively reasonable basis for concluding there was

an immediate need to search the truck to find the medications B rig a nti took in his overdose.

5 T h e reco rd d em on strates Dep u ty Ch ristian assisted in t h e search of th e tru ck a t Dep u ty Saw

t elle’ s directio n , an d d o es n o t in d icate Dep u ty Saw telle in stig ated th e search in resp o n se to a req u est b y Dep u ty Vo lp e. A cco rd i n g ly

, th e relev an t in qu iry is w h eth er Dep u ty Saw

t elle h ad an

o b j ectiv ely reaso n ab le basis to co n clu de th e tru ck n eed ed to b e search ed f o r ev id en ce o f

w h at B rig an ti h ad in g ested

.A M E S V

. K I N G C O U N T Y 18

W e part way s with the d i s trict court on the question whether the scope o f the truck search w as reasonable to meet the need Deputy Sawtelle identified. W e conclu d e it was reasonable f

o r Deputy Sawtelle to search the g love compartment of the truck, g iven that the specific purpose o f the search was to assist in B r ig anti’s medical care by finding
any medications or drug s he had taken, and that medications and drug s easily can be s tored in a g love compartment. Sig nificantly

, De p u t y Sawtelle stated that he was not “investig ating a crime, nor operating to g ather evidence of a crime” w hen he conducted his search o f the truck, nor d id the

sear c h lead to any charg es ag ainst either Ames or B rig anti. Moreover, althoug h Deputy Sawtelle has no specific memory of informing the aid crew o f the prescription medications a nd suicide note he found in the truck, he testified it wa s h is standard practice to do so.

Ames has p ut forward no e vidence to contradic t Deputy Sawtelle’s testimony

, nor to sug g est h e w a s searching her truck for a

ny purpose other than to assist the emerg e ncy care for B rig anti’s suicide a ttempt. I nstead

, Ames claims that if Deputy Sawtelle were really motivated b y such a purpose, he would h av e s e arched B rig anti’s apartment as well. This
arg ument—in e ssence, that the deputies’ search was unreasonably narrow in scope—is ins u f f icient to defeat
summary judg ment because it is n o t e vidence that creates a g enuine d ispute of material fact. The deputies’ search of the truck in furtherance of their duties to assi st in resolving an active medic al emerg ency , including the search of the g love compartment, did not violate the F ourth Amendment.A M E S V

. K I N G C O U N T Y 19

V

Deputy Volpe’s use of forc e w hile discharg ing her community c aretaking function was o bjectively reasonable in l i g ht of the unfolding e merg ency with which she was f a c ed

. As the lone law enforcement officer on the scene, responsible for assuring the safety o f B r ig anti, Ames, the first r esponders, and other motorists, Deputy Volpe needed to act qu i c k l y to disable the clearly panicked m o ther from leaving with her
g ravely ill son and enable the a i d c r e w immediately to treat B rig a nti. T he level of force D eputy Volpe em p l o y ed to

remove Ames from the truck and apply handcuffs did not r ise
to th e level of a constitutional violation under these circumstances. L ikewise, Deputie s Sawtelle and Christian did not violate Ames’s F ourth Amendment rig hts when they searched her truck in an attem p t t o f ind the medications B rig a nti had ing ested in h is overdose. The deputies’ actions

were r easonable under the emerg e ncy d o c t r i ne and they a re entitled to qualified immunity from suit.

That portion of the district c ourt’s order deny ing qualified immunity on A m e s’s e x cessive force a nd unlawful search claims is REVERSED and the c ase is R EMANDED to the district court for entry

of an order of dismissal.

Each party

shall bear its own costs.