9400 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 35 / Monday, February 23, 2015 / Proposed Rules 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On 

December 19, 2014, DOE published in 

the Federal Register a notice of 

proposed rulemaking (NOPR) to update 

the energy conservation standards for 

residential dishwashers. 79 FR 76142 . 

In the NOPR, DOE invited written 

submission of public comments, to be 

received by February 17, 2015. On an 

email dated January 16, 2015, the 

Association for Home Appliance 

Manufacturers (AHAM) requested an 

extension of the public comment period 

by 60 days. AHAM stated in its request 

that AHAM required additional time to 

review the published analysis in order 

to prepare and submit comments 

accordingly. DOE has determined that 

extending the comment period to allow 

additional time for interested parties to 

submit comments is appropriate based 

on the foregoing reason. DOE believes 

an additional 30-days, providing a total 

comment period of 90 days, allows 

sufficient time for submitting inputs 

regarding DOE’s analysis. Accordingly, 

DOE will consider any comments 

received by midnight of March 25, 2015, 

and deems any comments received by 

that time to be timely submitted. 

Issued in Washington, DC, on February 12, 

2015. 

Kathleen B. Hogan, 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Energy 

Efficiency, Energy Efficiency and Renewable 

Energy. 

[FR Doc. 2015–03599 Filed 2–20–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6450–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2012–0187; Directorate 

Identifier 2011–NM–094–AD] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; the Boeing 

Company Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Supplemental notice of 

proposed rulemaking (NPRM); 

reopening of comment period. 

SUMMARY: We are revising an earlier 

proposed airworthiness directive (AD) 

for certain The Boeing Company Model 

757 airplanes. The NPRM proposed to 

require modifying the fuel quantity 

indication system (FQIS) wiring or fuel 

tank systems to prevent development of 

an ignition source inside the center fuel 

tank. The NPRM was prompted by fuel 

system reviews conducted by the 

manufacturer. This action revises the 

NPRM by revising the applicability, 

including optional actions for cargo 

airplanes, and extending the compliance 

time. We are proposing this 

supplemental NPRM (SNPRM) to 

prevent ignition sources inside the 

center fuel tank, which, in combination 

with flammable fuel vapors, could result 

in fuel tank explosions and consequent 

loss of the airplane. Since these actions 

significantly change the corrective 

action options for cargo airplanes 

relative to the proposal in the NPRM, 

and because the cost estimate is 

significantly revised, we are reopening 

the comment period to allow the public 

the chance to comment on these 

proposed changes. 

DATES: We must receive comments on 

this SNPRM by April 24, 2015. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments, 

using the procedures found in 14 CFR 

11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following 

methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Fax: 202–493–2251. 

• Mail: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., 

Washington, DC 20590. 

• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., 

Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. 

For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Boeing Commercial 

Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services 

Management, P. O. Box 3707, MC 2H– 

65, Seattle, WA 98124–2207; telephone 

206–544–5000, extension 1; fax 206– 

766–5680; Internet https:// 

www.myboeingfleet.com. You may view 

this referenced service information at 

the FAA, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., 

Renton, WA. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, 

call 425–227–1221. It is also available 

on the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2012– 

0187. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2012– 

0187; or in person at the Docket 

Management Facility between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this proposed AD, the 

regulatory evaluation, any comments 

received, and other information. The 

street address for the Docket Office 

(phone: 800–647–5527) is in the 

ADDRESSES section. Comments will be 

available in the AD docket shortly after 

receipt. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jon 

Regimbal, Aerospace Engineer, 

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, 

Seattle Aircraft Certification Office 

(ACO), 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, 

WA 98057–3356; phone: 425–917–6506; 

fax: 425–917–6590; email: 

jon.regimbal@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

We invite you to send any written 

relevant data, views, or arguments about 

this proposed AD. Send your comments 

to an address listed under the 

ADDRESSES section. Include ‘‘Docket No. 

FAA–2012–0187; Directorate Identifier 

2011–NM–094–AD’’ at the beginning of 

your comments. We specifically invite 

comments on the overall regulatory, 

economic, environmental, and energy 

aspects of this proposed AD. We will 

consider all comments received by the 

closing date and may amend this 

proposed AD because of those 

comments. 

We will post all comments we 

receive, without change, to http:// 

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information you provide. We 

will also post a report summarizing each 

substantive verbal contact we receive 

about this proposed AD. 

Discussion 

We issued an NPRM to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 by adding an AD that would 

apply to certain The Boeing Company 

Model 757 airplanes. The NPRM 

published in the Federal Register on 

March 1, 2012 (77 FR 12506). The 

NPRM proposed to require modifying 

the fuel quantity indication system 

(FQIS) wiring or fuel tank systems to 

prevent development of an ignition 

source inside the center fuel tank. We 

subsequently issued an NPRM (77 FR 

33129, June 5, 2012) to reopen and 

extend the comment period for an 

additional 2 months. 

Related Service Information Under 1 

CFR Part 51 

We have reviewed Boeing Service 

Bulletin 757–28–0136, dated June 5, 

2014. This service information describes 

procedures for the built-in test 

equipment test/procedure (BITE check) 

specified in paragraph (h)(1) of this 


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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 35 / Monday, February 23, 2015 / Proposed Rules 9401 

supplemental NPRM. For information 

on the procedures and compliance 

times, refer to this service information. 

This service information is reasonably 

available; see ADDRESSES for ways to 

access this service information. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

comment on the NPRM (77 FR 12506, 

March 1, 2012). The following presents 

the comments received on the NPRM 

and the FAA’s response to each 

comment. 

Request To Withdraw NPRM (77 FR 

12506, March 1, 2012): Unjustified by 

Risk 

Boeing and Airbus requested that we 

withdraw the NPRM (77 FR 12506, 

March 1, 2012). Airbus requested that 

we consider risk levels before pursuing 

anticipated ADs for similar models. 

Boeing’s request was based on a 

determination that the risk posed by the 

FQIS is not high enough to warrant AD 

action. Boeing described the detailed 

design features that it considers make 

the failures contributing to the unsafe 

condition unlikely. Boeing added that 

its own numerical probability analysis 

of the average risk level due to the 

combination of failures required to 

cause a fuel tank explosion is on the 

order of one catastrophic event per 

billion flight hours. Boeing pointed out 

that this probability level would meet 

the certification standard for systems 

contained in section 25.1309(b) of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

25.1309(b)). Boeing also pointed out 

that, because the Model 757 is out of 

production and has a limited remaining 

fleet life, the total risk of a catastrophic 

event occurring in the remaining fleet 

life is approximately 0.5 percent. Boeing 

also noted that if a conductive condition 

were to exist between the probes or 

wiring and structure, it would be 

identified by FQIS faults and therefore 

would not be latent for multiple flights. 

We disagree with the request to 

withdraw the NPRM (77 FR 12506, 

March 1, 2012). Average risk per flight 

hour and total fleet risk were not the 

safety criteria that drove the FAA to 

propose the AD. In addition to 

examining average risk and total fleet 

risk, the FAA examines the individual 

flight risk on the worst reasonably 

anticipated flights. FAA Transport 

Airplane Risk Assessment Methodology 

(TARAM) Policy Statement PS–ANM– 

25–05 (http://rgl.faa.gov/ 

Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/

rgPolicy.nsf/0/4E5AE870716467

4A862579510061F96B?Open

Document&Highlight=ps-anm-25–05) 

calls for the FAA to assess individual 

flight safety risk in consideration of preexisting hidden failure conditions and 

accounts for dispatch with inoperative 

equipment. The TARAM policy 

classifies a flight dispatch condition as 

‘‘reasonably anticipated’’ if, in absence 

of corrective action, ten or more flights 

are expected to occur. 

Average risk is an arithmetic average 

of the risk of a given event during all 

operation of an aircraft fleet, regardless 

of whether the risk actually varies 

during the operation of the fleet. We use 

average risk analysis to assess whether 

a risk is acceptable when there is little 

or no variation in risk from flight to 

flight. Total fleet risk is the aggregate 

sum of all risk throughout a fleet during 

the remaining fleet life. Total fleet risk 

analysis is meaningful in assessing total 

societal risk, but it does not assess the 

variation in risk between flights or the 

risk on the worst anticipated flights. 

Individual flight risk as used by the 

FAA is an assessment of the specific 

safety risk that exists or will exist on the 

worst reasonably anticipated individual 

flights due to a given issue. 

Individual risk analysis is used by the 

FAA to determine whether the public’s 

expectation for a reasonable level of 

safety on each transport airplane flight 

is met. An acceptable average risk level 

and acceptable total fleet risk do not 

ensure that all reasonably anticipated 

flights (flights with known inoperative 

equipment, flights with undetected 

failures, flights in less-than-ideal but 

approved and expected weather or 

operational conditions, etc.) will 

provide the minimum level of safety 

expected by the public. When the safety 

risk is concentrated on flights with a 

given pre-existing dispatch condition or 

expected operational condition, it is 

possible to have an unacceptable 

individual flight safety risk on the worst 

reasonably anticipated flights even 

when the average risk and total fleet risk 

are acceptable. 

In the case of this SNPRM, the risk 

due to the current Model 757 FQIS 

design architecture is not spread equally 

among all of the flights conducted on 

the affected airplanes. Instead, the risk 

is concentrated almost entirely on the 

small subset of flights that occur with a 

latent failure condition pre-existing in 

the fuel tank. Flights with such a latent 

failure condition and flammable 

conditions in the center fuel tank have 

been judged by the FAA to be 

reasonably anticipated to occur based 

on the numerical probability analysis 

submitted by the manufacturer in 

response to Special Federal Aviation 

Regulation No. 88 (‘‘SFAR 88,’’ 

Amendment 21–78, and subsequent 

Amendments 21–82 and 21–83) (http:// 

rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_

Library%5CrgFAR.nsf/0/EEFB3F94451

DC06286256C93004F5E07?Open

Document) and the flammability 

analysis submitted to support 

certification of Boeing’s flammability 

reduction means (FRM), which Boeing 

refers to as a nitrogen generation system 

(NGS). For those reasonably anticipated 

flights, the probability of a catastrophic 

event (or individual flight safety risk) is 

the probability of an additional single 

failure in the related aircraft wiring or 

equipment sending a high energy signal 

onto the already compromised in-tank 

circuit(s). The individual flight safety 

risk of a catastrophic event on these 

flights is in excess of the FAA’s 

threshold for an unsafe condition 

determination contained in the 

published TARAM Policy Statement 

PS–ANM–25–05 (http://rgl.faa.gov/

Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/

rgPolicy.nsf/0/4E5AE870716467

4A862579510061F96B?Open

Document&Highlight=ps-anm-25-05). 

As discussed above, this risk of a 

catastrophic event on those flights is 

due to a single additional failure 

condition. The risk on those flights due 

to a single failure violates the FAA’s 

general fail-safe design requirements 

philosophy for transport airplanes. In 

general, we issue ADs in cases where 

reasonably anticipated flights with preexisting failures (either due to latent 

failure conditions or allowable dispatch 

configurations) are vulnerable to a 

catastrophic event due to an additional 

foreseeable single failure condition. 

This is because the FAA considers 

operation of flights vulnerable to a 

potentially catastrophic single failure 

condition to be an excessive safety risk 

to the passengers on those flights. This 

SNPRM is consistent with that 

continued operational safety 

philosophy. 

In its comment, Boeing stated that the 

existing design meets the numerical 

probability requirements of section 

25.1309(b) of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 25.1309(b)), which 

requires safety analysis of systems. 

Boeing concluded that the existing 

system would need no further risk 

reduction to meet the requirements of 

that rule. We disagree with this 

conclusion. First, the existence of a 

general safety standard, even if met by 

a design, does not in and of itself 

preclude a determination that there is a 

specific unsafe condition. The 

recognition that compliance with an 

existing regulation may not be sufficient 

to ensure safety is specifically addressed 

in type certification by section 

21.21(b)(2) of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 21.21.(b)(2)) and 


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9402 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 35 / Monday, February 23, 2015 / Proposed Rules 

has often led to changes in regulations 

to address newly recognized unsafe 

conditions. Second, because Boeing 

mentioned only that rule, we infer that 

Boeing may be suggesting that section 

25.1309(b) of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 25.1309(b)) is the 

most relevant safety analysis standard 

applicable to the FQIS. As discussed 

above, even if later changes to section 

25.981 of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 25.981) are not 

considered and only the original 

certification basis for the Model 757 is 

applied, there are safety standards more 

specific to powerplant installations 

including fuel tanks and FQIS than 

section 25.1309(b) of the Federal 

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

25.1309(b)). 

The original certification basis for 

Model 757 airplanes included section 

25.901(c) of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 25.901(c)) (http://

rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_

Library/rgFar.nsf/FARSBySectLookup/

25.901) at Amendment 25–40. 

According to that subsection, ‘‘For each 

powerplant and auxiliary power unit 

installation, it must be shown that no 

single failure or malfunction or probable 

combination of failures will jeopardize 

the safe operation of the airplane. . . .’’ 

(The FQIS is considered to be part of the 

powerplant installation in accordance 

with the definition in section 25.901(a) 

of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 

CFR 25.901(a)).) Section 25.901(c) of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

25.901(c)) sets a more stringent 

applicable standard than that of section 

25.1309(b) of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 25.1309(b)) for 

catastrophic failure conditions that are 

due to latent failure conditions 

combined with a subsequent single 

failure condition (referred to as ‘‘latentplus-one’’ conditions). 

The more stringent intent of section 

25.901(c) of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 25.901(c)) (http://

rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_

Library/rgFar.nsf/FARSBySectLookup/

25.901) is discussed in further detail in 

the notice of proposed rulemaking and 

the preamble that were published for 

Amendment 25–102. The FAA’s longstanding practice in applying the ‘‘no 

single failure or malfunction’’ clause of 

section 25.901(c) of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 25.901(c)) has been 

to apply that standard to all reasonably 

anticipated flights—not simply to an 

average flight or an ideal flight. As such, 

we examine all conditions: Flights with 

reasonably anticipated pre-existing 

failure conditions, flights with 

inoperative equipment allowed for 

dispatch, and flights in adverse 

environmental conditions or other 

operational conditions for which the 

airplane is approved. If single failure 

conditions that jeopardize safe 

operation of the airplane (catastrophic 

or hazardous conditions) are identified 

as part of this examination, the design 

is considered to be non-compliant with 

section 25.901(c) of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 25.901(c)). 

Finally, the SFAR 88 AD-decision 

policy (Policy Memo ANM–100–2003– 

112–15) (http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_

and_Guidance_Library/rgPolicy.nsf/0/

DC94C3A46396950386256D5E006

AED11?OpenDocument&Highlight

=anm-100-2003-112-15) classifies a 

‘‘latent-plus-one’’ condition in a high 

flammability fuel tank as an unsafe 

condition requiring corrective action. 

That policy actually provides some 

relief from the latent-plus-one criteria 

contained in the airworthiness 

regulations. 

We have not changed this SNPRM 

regarding this issue. 

Request To Withdraw NPRM (77 FR 

12506, March 1, 2012): Not Supported 

by Risk Analysis 

Airlines for America (A4A) proposed 

that we re-evaluate the NPRM (77 FR 

12506, March 1, 2012) because it is ‘‘not 

founded on a data-based risk analysis.’’ 

A4A stated that the FAA determined 

that an unsafe condition exists based 

only on non-compliance with one SFAR 

88 criterion. A4A noted that the design 

approval holder, Boeing, has performed 

a numerical probability analysis and has 

calculated that the probability of a fuel 

tank explosion due to the FQIS issue is 

approximately one event per billion 

flight hours, with cargo airplanes being 

slightly better due to a lower average 

tank flammability. A4A also stated that 

existing ignition-prevention ADs have 

reduced the overall risk of an ignition 

event to a level that questions the need 

for FQIS modification. We infer that the 

commenter is requesting that we 

withdraw the NPRM. 

We disagree to withdraw the NPRM 

(77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012). We 

performed a qualitative risk assessment 

in accordance with our published SFAR 

88 unsafe condition determination 

policy based on Boeing’s submitted 

SFAR 88 design review, and determined 

that the FQIS design on the Model 757 

series airplanes presents an unsafe 

condition and that AD action was 

warranted under that policy. We also 

performed a data-based numerical risk 

analysis using data provided by the 

manufacturer, and assessed the risk 

under the transport airplane unsafe 

condition criteria in the TARAM policy 

currently used by the FAA. Our risk 

analysis determined that the risk of an 

explosion event due to an FQIS latentplus-one failure condition is not evenly 

shared by all flights of airplanes of the 

affected design. Instead, the risk of an 

FQIS-related fuel tank ignition event is 

largely concentrated on the subset of 

flights that occur with a pre-existing 

latent failure condition and that operate 

with flammable conditions in the center 

fuel tank. Based on Boeing’s data, such 

flights are reasonably anticipated to 

occur. 

For those flights, the risk exceeds the 

allowable threshold for individual flight 

safety risk in the TARAM policy. In 

addition, that risk on those flights is due 

to a single additional failure, which is 

inconsistent with the fail-safe design 

philosophy; that philosophy is 

fundamental to the excellent safety 

record of transport airplanes. (See FAA 

Advisory Circular (AC) 25.1309–1A, 

‘‘System Design and Analysis,’’ dated 

June 21, 1998 (http://www.faa.gov/

documentLibrary/media/Advisory_

Circular/AC%2025.1309-1.pdf), for a 

discussion of the fail-safe design 

philosophy.) We would normally 

classify either of those conditions as an 

unsafe condition. Based on this risk 

analysis, we have determined that the 

individual flight safety risk due to this 

issue on the worst anticipated flights 

does not meet the minimum level of 

safety required by the FAA and 

expected by the public. We have not 

changed this SNPRM regarding this 

issue. 

Request To Withdraw or Delay NPRM 

(77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012): Need 

Detailed Risk Assessment 

FedEx requested that we revise the 

NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012) to 

provide a numerical risk assessment 

justifying the proposed action. UPS 

made a similar comment. UPS stated 

that, if the FAA has gathered new data 

since the issuance of the ‘‘Reduction of 

Fuel Tank Flammability in Transport 

Category Airplanes’’ rule (73 FR 42444, 

July 21, 2008) (http://www.gpo.gov/

fdsys/pkg/FR-2008-07-21/pdf/E8- 

16084.pdf), referred to as the Fuel Tank 

Flammability Reduction (FTFR) rule, 

the FTFR working group should be 

reconvened in order to collaborate and 

discuss the proposed safety risk, assess 

the risk statistically, evaluate solutions 

and options, and establish accurate cost 

and economic impact for the options. 

FedEx provided an analysis showing 

that the total risk of a tank explosion 

due to this issue on the fleet of Model 

757 cargo airplanes is relatively low. We 

infer that the commenters are requesting 

that we withdraw or delay the NPRM. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 35 / Monday, February 23, 2015 / Proposed Rules 9403 

We disagree with the request to 

withdraw the NPRM (77 FR 12506, 

March 1, 2012), pending review of the 

FAA’s numerical risk assessment by the 

‘‘FTFR working group.’’ The Aviation 

Rulemaking Advisory Committee 

(ARAC) Fuel Tank Harmonization 

Working Group (FTHWG) was tasked to 

recommend new rulemaking to 

eliminate or significantly reduce the risk 

of exposure to flammable fuel-air 

mixtures in fuel tanks. The ARAC 

FTHWG issued its final report in 1998. 

The subsequent ARAC Fuel Tank 

Inerting Harmonization Working Group 

(FTIHWG) was tasked to provide data 

needed for the FAA to evaluate the 

feasibility of implementing regulations 

that would require eliminating or 

significantly reducing the development 

of flammable vapors in fuel tanks on 

transport-category airplanes. This effort 

was an extension of the previous work 

performed by the FTHWG. The ARAC 

FTIHWG issued its final report in 2002. 

The FAA’s work in developing the 

SFAR 88 corrective action decision 

policy and in determining specific 

unsafe conditions was outside the scope 

and charter of these working groups that 

contributed to the FTFR rule (73 FR 

42444, July 21, 2008). We determined 

that an unsafe condition exists in 

accordance with the SFAR 88 corrective 

action decision policy and TARAM 

policy. We have provided a summary of 

our risk assessment as discussed in the 

responses to ‘‘Request to Withdraw 

NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012): 

Unjustified by Risk’’ and ‘‘Request to 

Withdraw NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 

1, 2012): Not Supported by Risk 

Analysis’’ in this SNPRM. As explained 

previously (see ‘‘Request to Withdraw 

NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012): 

Unjustified by Risk’’ in this SNPRM), 

the FAA determined the unsafe 

condition based on the unacceptable 

risk on anticipated flights with a latent 

FQIS failure and flammable fuel tank 

conditions, not the total fleet risk. We 

have not changed this SNPRM regarding 

this issue. 

Request To Withdraw NPRM (77 FR 

12506, March 1, 2012): No Unsafe 

Condition 

UPS stated that an SFAR 88 working 

group analyzed potential fuel tank 

ignition sources and that maintenance 

programs were revised using MSG3 

methodology to meet the revised criteria 

in ‘‘14 CFR 25.981(3).’’ (We assume UPS 

intended to refer to section 25.981(a)(3) 

of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 

CFR 25.981(a)(3))) (http://www.faa.gov/

regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/

index.cfm/go/document.information/

documentID/73716).) UPS stated that 

the unsafe condition identified in the 

NPRM is inconsistent with the working 

group analysis and lacks new data or 

evidence indicating that ‘‘excessive 

flammability or other known unsafe 

condition exists, or is likely to 

develop.’’ Finally, UPS made the 

following observation about the NPRM: 

The NPRM fails to consider the beneficial 

effects of the timing and effects of the 

maintenance action in response to a single 

in-tank or out-of-tank failure mode, or the 

beneficial effects of previous airworthiness 

directives and other SFAR 88 related actions 

taken to mitigate the proposed risk and 

reduce the probability. 

We infer that the commenter is 

requesting that we withdraw the NPRM 

(77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012). We 

disagree with the request to withdraw 

the NPRM. The FAA has performed a 

risk assessment and has determined that 

an unsafe condition does exist, both 

from a design architectural standpoint 

and a numerical risk standpoint. The 

basis for that determination is discussed 

in detail in the responses to ‘‘Request to 

Withdraw NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 

1, 2012): Unjustified by Risk’’ and 

‘‘Request to Withdraw NPRM (77 FR 

12506, March 1, 2012): Not Supported 

by Risk Analysis’’ in this SNPRM. 

The requirements of section 

25.981(a)(3) of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 25.981(a)(3)) 

cannot be met with an approved 

maintenance program only. While an 

appropriate maintenance program is 

required, section 25.981(a)(3) of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

25.981(a)(3)) has the effect of setting 

minimum requirements for the design 

architecture and the reliability of system 

elements. The Model 757 FQIS as 

originally designed does not meet all of 

those requirements. Previous AD 

actions, other than the required 

maintenance program revisions 

included in AD 2012–12–15, 

Amendment 39–17095 (77 FR 42964, 

July 23, 2012) (which superseded AD 

2008–10–11, Amendment 39–15517 (73 

FR 25974, May 8, 2008)), have no effect 

on the level of individual flight risk that 

has been determined to be an unsafe 

condition. Some of the airworthiness 

limitations (AWLs) introduced by AD 

2012–12–15 will reduce the rate of 

introduction of additional risks due to 

future maintenance errors or 

modifications compromising required 

design features, but are not expected to 

prevent all errors. Those AWLs do not 

address problems that may already exist 

or develop on in-service airplanes 

separate from maintenance activity, and 

they do not address the basic noncompliant aspects of the original FQIS 

design architecture. Those AWLs 

therefore would not have a significant 

effect on either the number of flights 

that occur with a latent failure condition 

or the FQIS-related fuel tank explosion 

risk level on those flights estimated in 

the FAA’s risk assessment. We have not 

changed this SNPRM regarding this 

issue. 

Request To Withdraw NPRM (77 FR 

12506, March 1, 2012): No Unsafe 

Condition 

Airbus acknowledged that the latentplus-one scenarios that prompted the 

unsafe condition determination are a 

technical possibility, but stated that the 

failure combinations that can create an 

ignition source are extremely 

improbable. Airbus also stated that ADrequired airworthiness limitations 

related to FQIS have significantly 

reduced the likelihood of an FQISrelated fuel tank ignition event. We infer 

that Airbus is requesting that we 

withdraw the NPRM (77 FR 12506, 

March 1, 2012) based on Airbus’s 

contention that no unsafe condition 

exists. 

We agree to clarify the likelihood that 

the unsafe condition could occur. The 

FAA’s unsafe condition determination 

was not based on an assessment of 

average risk. We agree that the average 

risk of a fuel tank explosion on the 

Model 757 is likely to be lower than the 

numerical guidance for ‘‘extremely 

improbable’’ of 1.0x10E–9 per flight 

hour. We also agree that the average risk 

was likely reduced by AD-required 

airworthiness limitations that specify 

extra checks after in-tank work, and 

adequate separation of newly installed 

out-of-tank wiring from FQIS wiring. 

As discussed in ‘‘Request to 

Withdraw NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 

1, 2012): Unjustified by Risk’’ in this 

SNPRM, however, the FAA’s unsafe 

condition determination was driven by 

the identification of an unacceptable 

level of individual risk that exists on 

flights that are anticipated to occur with 

a pre-existing latent in-tank failure 

condition and with a flammable center 

fuel tank. In the remaining life of the 

affected airplanes, a significant number 

of such flights are reasonably 

anticipated to occur—even with the 

improvements expected under the 

AWLs required by AD 2012–12–15, 

Amendment 39–17095 (77 FR 42964, 

July 23, 2012). For those flights, a fuel 

tank explosion can be caused by an 

additional single wiring failure. In 

addition, the manufacturer’s estimated 

probability of such a failure (the 

additional single wiring failure) 

significantly exceeds the FAA’s unsafe 

condition numerical threshold for 

individual flight risk. The probability of 


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a fuel tank explosion on those flights is 

not reduced by the existence of the 

above-mentioned AWLs. The AWL that 

requires extra checks after in-tank work 

has been done has the potential to 

reduce the number of flights with a preexisting in-tank failure condition. The 

AWL that requires newly installed 

wiring to meet separation standards 

should prevent a significant increase in 

the risk on those flights that would have 

resulted from the installation of 

additional, inadequately separated 

wiring. 

We have not changed this SNPRM 

regarding this issue. 

Request To Withdraw NPRM (77 FR 

12506, March 1, 2012) Based on Similar 

Rulemaking for Cargo Airplanes 

ASTAR Air Cargo (ASTAR) requested 

that we withdraw the NPRM (77 FR 

12506, March 1, 2012). In support of its 

request, ASTAR cited the TWA Flight 

800 accident investigation and its 

finding that the most probable cause of 

the accident was a fuel tank explosion 

due to a latent-plus-one failure of the 

FQIS. ASTAR stated that the FAA had 

proposed the FTFR rule (73 FR 42444, 

July 21, 2008) to mitigate the risk of fuel 

tank explosions, and that cargo 

airplanes had been exempted from that 

requirement based on a cost-benefit 

analysis. ASTAR argued that, because 

the basis for exclusion of all cargo 

aircraft from the FTFR rule has not 

changed, all cargo aircraft should be 

exempt from any corrective action for 

the FQIS latent-plus-one issues, and the 

NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012) 

should be withdrawn. 

We disagree with the request. We 

have determined that an unsafe 

condition requiring corrective action 

exists in the Model 757 FQIS. The FTFR 

rule (73 FR 42444, July 21, 2008) was 

proposed not because of FQIS issues 

specifically, but because of the history 

of fuel tank explosions in the transport 

airplane fleet due to various causes, and 

an acknowledgement that industry and 

the FAA may not be able to anticipate 

and prevent all of the fuel tank ignition 

sources that may arise due to design and 

maintenance issues in the life of a fleet 

of airplanes. 

The intent of the FTFR rule (73 FR 

42444, July 21, 2008) was to reduce the 

overall exposure to flammable fuel tank 

conditions in the fleet by approximately 

one order of magnitude with the 

expectation that this would have a 

significant impact on the rate of fuel 

tank explosions in the future due to 

unanticipated causes. In promulgating 

this improvement in the safety 

standards, the FAA acknowledged that 

installation of FRM or ignition 

mitigation means on a given airplane in 

accordance with the FTFR rule would 

be sufficient to address the FQIS latentplus-one unsafe condition. The FTFR 

rule was not intended to prevent the 

FAA from addressing that unsafe 

condition on airplanes that would not 

be affected by the FTFR rule. This was 

clearly stated in the preamble to the 

FTFR rule. We have not changed this 

SNPRM regarding this issue. 

Request To Withdraw NPRM (77 FR 

12506, March 1, 2012): Underestimated 

Economic Impact 

Several commenters requested that we 

withdraw the NPRM (77 FR 12506, 

March 1, 2012) because the FAA’s cost 

estimate was too low. A4A estimated 

that the costs associated with the NPRM 

would be up to 3 times the $100,000 to 

$200,000 estimated by the FAA, and 

would be comparable with the cost of 

Boeing’s NGS installation. Goodrich 

pointed out that any redesigned FQIS 

would likely be subject to the current 

requirements of section 25.981 of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

25.981), resulting in higher costs than 

estimated by the FAA. A4A speculated 

that these higher costs were the reason 

the NGS was acknowledged as a method 

of compliance in the NPRM. A4A and 

UPS stated that the FAA appears to be 

using the NPRM as a method to require 

the installation of Boeing’s NGS (or 

equivalent actions) on airplanes that 

were not included in the applicability of 

the FTFR rule (73 FR 42444, July 21, 

2008) based on a cost-benefit analysis. 

Although we disagree to withdraw the 

NPRM, we agree with some of the 

commenters’ assertions. We agree that 

our original cost estimate was low. We 

agree to adjust the cost estimate, based 

on the information provided by the 

commenters, as discussed below under 

‘‘Request to Revise Cost Estimate Based 

on New Data.’’ Our original estimate 

was based on information provided 

previously by manufacturers of original 

equipment FQIS, retrofit FQIS, and both 

original equipment and aftermarket 

transient suppression and isolation 

devices. Our current estimate has been 

increased to reflect the written 

comments from and further discussions 

with Boeing and Goodrich. There is no 

change to our determination that an 

unsafe condition exists. We are 

therefore proceeding with this AD 

action based on the identified corrective 

actions that will address the unsafe 

condition. 

We disagree with the characterization 

that we are using the AD process to 

require an FRM to be installed on 

airplanes that were excluded from the 

FTFR rule (73 FR 42444, July 21, 2008) 

because inclusion could not be justified 

in a cost-benefit analysis. The FTFR rule 

was intended to enhance the 

airworthiness standards in a manner 

that would increase the level of safety 

for affected airplanes over that ensured 

by the existing regulations. That 

enhancement was expected to result 

from an increased level of protection 

from ignition sources that had not been 

identified by manufacturers in their 

safety analyses. That enhancement of 

the airworthiness standards was 

required to be justified by a cost-benefit 

analysis. Cargo airplanes were excluded 

because the FTFR rule safety 

enhancement could not be justified for 

those airplanes from a cost-benefit 

standpoint. 

This SNPRM would not require a 

safety enhancement over the level of 

safety required by previous standards. 

Instead, this SNPRM addresses an 

unsafe condition that was identified 

from the manufacturer’s SFAR 88 safety 

analysis using the FAA’s published 

corrective action decision criteria for 

SFAR 88 identified design issues (see 

section 25.981(a)(3) of the Federal 

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

25.981(a)(3) (http://www.faa.gov/

regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/

index.cfm/go/document.information/

documentID/73716). We deferred taking 

action on this unsafe condition until 

after the FTFR rulemaking activity 

because the installation of an FRM 

would sufficiently address the FQIS 

latent-plus-one unsafe condition. Now 

that the FTFR rulemaking process is 

complete, we are resuming our activity 

to address these unsafe conditions via 

AD actions. The Boeing NGS has been 

acknowledged as a method of 

compliance in this SNPRM because the 

Boeing NGS is an available design that 

the FAA knows would address the 

unsafe condition. No additional change 

was made to this SNPRM as a result of 

this comment. 

Request To Withdraw NPRM (77 FR 

12506, March 1, 2012) Due to Its 

Hidden Effects 

A4A requested that we withdraw the 

NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012) 

because of certain hidden effects that 

may not have been anticipated by the 

FAA. A4A pointed out that some 

operators are already anticipating 

difficulty in meeting the deadlines for 

compliance with the FTFR rule (73 FR 

42444, July 21, 2008). Based on A4A’s 

assumption that airlines would comply 

with the NPRM by incorporating 

Boeing’s current NGS design, A4A 

expressed concern that using Boeing’s 

NGS for these additional airplanes 

would potentially exceed the rate at 


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which industry can modify the fleet 

affected by the planned ADs and the 

FTFR rule. A4A also noted that the 

compliance time for the NPRM would 

overlap the compliance period for the 

FTFR rule. 

While we disagree with the request to 

withdraw the NPRM, we agree with 

some of the assertions made by the 

commenter. We agree with the concern 

that this AD action has the potential to 

further burden the operators and 

modifiers that are working to meet the 

FRM operating rule deadlines, because 

some additional airplanes are likely to 

be modified by installing FRM such as 

Boeing’s NGS. But since we issued the 

NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012), 

two factors have changed that reduce 

A4A’s concern. First, we have identified 

a less costly option for cargo airplanes, 

which most cargo operators are 

expected to prefer over installation of 

FRM. This is expected to result in 

significantly fewer airplanes competing 

for FRM modification resources. 

Second, this AD action has been 

delayed due to numerous factors, 

including the number of comments, the 

development of a different corrective 

action option, and the resultant need to 

extend the comment period to allow the 

public the chance to comment on these 

proposed changes. 

Also, as discussed below under 

‘‘Request to Extend Compliance Time 

Pending Issuance of Service 

Information,’’ we have extended the 

proposed compliance time by 12 

months. These delays and changes will 

result in the AD compliance deadline 

being at least 3 years beyond the final 

compliance deadline of the FTFR rule 

(73 FR 42444, July 21, 2008). Similar 

planned ADs for other models have 

been similarly delayed. We have 

determined that the industry 

modification capacity will be sufficient 

to support the modification of the 

expected additional airplanes receiving 

FRM within the new proposed 

compliance time. We have not changed 

this SNPRM further regarding this issue. 

Request To Withdraw NPRM (77 FR 

12506, March 1, 2012): Potential 

Significant Rule 

A4A stated that the combined costs of 

the NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012) 

and other anticipated ADs for U.S. 

airplane models with an FQIS latentplus-one issue would exceed $177 

million and would require a cost-benefit 

analysis. We infer that the commenter is 

requesting we withdraw the NPRM (77 

FR 12506, March 1, 2012) on the basis 

that the planned ADs for various 

models, if combined, would qualify as 

a significant rule that would require a 

cost-benefit analysis. 

We disagree with the request. First, in 

assessing whether an AD is a significant 

rule in accordance with FAA policy, we 

do not combine the cost of multiple 

planned ADs for different airplanes, 

even when the design issues and unsafe 

conditions addressed are similar. 

Second, the changes discussed 

previously in this SNPRM will 

significantly reduce the cost impact. We 

have made no further changes to this 

SNPRM regarding this issue. 

Request To Withdraw NPRM (77 FR 

12506, March 1, 2012): Inadequate 

Notice to Public 

A4A recommended that we provide 

information on any other designs that 

have been reviewed under SFAR 88, 

and provide industry with information 

regarding their planned disposition. 

A4A asserted that, during the FTFR 

rulemaking activity, we did not provide 

notice to the industry that we still 

intended to address the FQIS issues 

identified via SFAR 88. We infer that 

A4A is requesting that we withdraw the 

NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012) 

based on inadequate notice to the public 

and the chance to comment on the 

proposal. The commenter stated that the 

preamble of the FTFR rule (73 FR 

42444, July 21, 2008) was unclear 

regarding whether AD actions would be 

taken to address the FQIS issues on 

airplanes that were not required to 

incorporate FRM. 

We disagree with the request to 

withdraw the NPRM (77 FR 12506, 

March 1, 2012). We determined that an 

unsafe condition exists. FTFR 

rulemaking was done because the FAA 

recognized the benefit for the specific 

design changes involving incorporation 

of FRM required by the FTFR rule (73 

FR 42444, July 21, 2008) to enhance fuel 

tank safety. Because the FTFR final rule 

requires action on only a subset of the 

airplanes that have the FQIS unsafe 

condition, we are taking action to 

address the remaining airplanes that 

will continue to have the unsafe 

condition if no further corrective action 

is taken. 

The commenter has taken the 

statement from the FTFR preamble out 

of context. In fact, the paragraph from 

which the commenter quoted 

specifically states that the FAA 

expected to take AD action to address 

FQIS issues identified through SFAR 88 

analyses. The paragraph simply states 

that the proposed FRM has the potential 

to reduce the industry cost associated 

with those expected ADs because the 

installation of an FRM likely would 

eliminate the need for action to further 

address the FQIS issue with AD actions. 

The purpose of that statement was to 

note that there would be some cost 

savings to industry resulting from the 

elimination of other actions required to 

address an unsafe condition for the 

airplanes affected by the proposed rules, 

and to point out that the FAA did not 

take credit for those potential cost 

reductions in assessing the cost of the 

FTFR rule (73 FR 42444, July 21, 2008) 

because the costs were not well 

understood at the time. That statement 

was not a commitment by the FAA to 

reverse its intentions to address an 

identified unsafe condition on the 

airplanes that are not required to 

incorporate FRM. We have not changed 

this SNPRM regarding this issue. 

Request for Cost-Benefit Analysis 

Boeing, FedEx, Airbus, ASTAR Air 

Cargo, and A4A requested that we 

perform a cost-benefit analysis for the 

NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012) 

and publish the results. Airbus stated 

that its own cost estimates exceed those 

used by the FAA for the FTFR rule (73 

FR 42444, July 21, 2008) cost-benefit 

analysis that ended up excluding cargo 

airplanes. A4A and ASTAR Air Cargo 

requested that the NPRM be withdrawn 

until a cost-benefit analysis is 

performed. The commenters suggested 

that a cost-benefit analysis would show 

that the NPRM cannot be justified 

because the costs of the proposed 

actions would exceed the monetary 

value of the AD’s safety benefits. The 

commenters cited the cost-benefit 

analysis that was performed to justify 

the FTFR rule, and pointed out that a 

requirement for FRM could not be 

justified for the airplanes that would be 

affected by the proposed AD. 

We infer that, pending a full costbenefit analysis, these commenters are 

requesting that we either withdraw the 

NPRM or delay this action further until 

a cost-benefit analysis demonstrates that 

an AD is justified in this case. We 

disagree. The FAA’s process and legal 

obligations for introducing new 

airworthiness standards are different 

from those for initiating an AD to 

address an unsafe condition in an 

existing product. In addition, the 

commenters’ assertions were based on 

the assumption that the only design 

solution that would be made available 

to address the solution would be an 

FRM, or another solution of similarly 

high cost. 

When we propose a new 

airworthiness standard, as in the case of 

the FTFR rule (73 FR 42444, July 21, 

2008), we are required to perform a costversus-benefit comparison to justify the 

application of the new standard. The 


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decision in that rulemaking action—to 

not require FRM installation on cargo 

airplanes—was based in significant part 

on cost estimates that industry provided 

to show that AD-required FQIS design 

changes would be far less costly than 

installing FRM on cargo airplanes. We 

specifically considered the option to not 

require retrofit of cargo airplanes with 

FRM because of the expectation that 

alternative design solutions to address 

the specific, known unsafe condition of 

FQIS latent-plus-one vulnerability 

would still be required through AD 

actions. For this AD action, however, 

industry submitted written comments 

and made verbal statements that the cost 

of an FQIS design solution would be 

comparable to, and possibly greater 

than, the cost of its FRM modification. 

In general, a full cost-benefit analysis 

is rarely required for an AD. As a matter 

of regulation, in order to be airworthy, 

an aircraft must conform to its type 

design and be in a condition for safe 

operation. The type design is approved 

only after the FAA makes a 

determination that the design complies 

with all applicable airworthiness 

requirements. In adopting and 

maintaining those requirements, the 

FAA has already made the 

determination that those requirements 

establish a level of safety that is cost 

beneficial. A finding of an unsafe 

condition that warrants AD action 

means that this cost-beneficial level of 

safety is no longer being achieved, and 

the required AD actions are necessary to 

restore that level of safety. Because this 

level of safety has already been 

determined to be cost beneficial and 

does not add an additional regulatory 

requirement, a full cost-benefit analysis 

for each AD would be redundant and 

unnecessary. 

We have not changed this SNPRM 

regarding this issue. 

Request To Revise Applicability 

Statement To Clarify the Intent of the 

Rule for Non-U.S.-Registered Airplanes 

The European Aviation Safety Agency 

(EASA), the Technical Agent for the 

Member States of the European 

Community, requested that we revise 

the proposed applicability. Specifically, 

EASA requested that we add Model 757 

airplanes that did not have FRM 

installed in production. EASA further 

requested that we exclude airplanes 

equipped with FRM that meet the FAA’s 

FTFR rule (73 FR 42444, July 21, 2008). 

EASA stated that it has not issued an 

operating regulation corresponding to 

the FAA’s requirements for retrofitting 

FRM in the FTFR rule. EASA noted that, 

at least for European operators, the 

unsafe condition would not be required 

to be addressed for airplanes that would 

have been subject to the FTFR rule in 

the U.S., and suggested that EASA 

might have to issue an AD (instead of 

adopting the FAA AD), with similar 

technical content, but extending the 

applicability to the entire Model 757 

fleet in Europe. 

We agree to revise the applicability. 

EASA is correct that the unsafe 

condition potentially affects all Model 

757 airplanes, whereas the applicability 

statement in the NPRM (77 FR 12506, 

March 1, 2012) could be interpreted as 

not covering airplanes in passenger 

service that are not operated under parts 

121, 125, or 129 of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR part 121, 125, or 

129). The EASA comment makes it 

apparent that the proposed applicability 

statement may be unclear to some 

operators and regulatory authorities. 

While the applicability statement in the 

NPRM is technically correct (e.g., an 

EASA operator is not operating under 

those FAA operating rules and therefore 

would have been subject to the AD), we 

now agree that there is a potential for 

confusion that can be eliminated by 

more directly stating the requirement 

and applicability in a manner similar to 

that proposed by EASA in their 

comment. We have changed the 

applicability in this SNPRM to all 

Model 757 airplanes except for 

airplanes equipped with an FRM 

approved by the FAA as compliant with 

the FTFR requirements of section 

26.33(c)(1) of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 26.33(c)(1)), as 

discussed below. As with any required 

equipment, the FRM must be 

operational with the exception of any 

relief granted under master minimum 

equipment list (MMEL) provisions. 

With the clarification in paragraph (c), 

‘‘Applicability,’’ of this SNPRM, we 

have determined that paragraph (h), 

‘‘Optional Installation of Flammability 

Reduction Means,’’ of the NPRM would 

be superfluous and is no longer 

necessary. Paragraph (c) of this 

supplemental NPRM, as revised, would 

not apply to airplanes equipped with 

FRM. 

Requests To Withdraw NPRM (77 FR 

12506, March 1, 2012) Based on 

Applicability 

Boeing and ASTAR Air Cargo 

requested that we withraw the NPRM 

(77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012) because 

cargo airplanes on average have a lower 

flammability exposure due to a larger 

portion of night operations (with 

resultant cooler outside air 

temperatures) and a lower rate of 

utilization of the cabin air conditioning 

system on the ground. Boeing stated that 

operation of the air conditioning system 

on the ground significantly contributes 

to the heating of the center fuel tank. 

Boeing’s analysis estimated a fleet 

average flammability for the center fuel 

tanks of the cargo airplane fleet of 50 

percent of the level for the passenger 

fleet. Boeing also noted that cargo 

airplanes generally accumulate flight 

hours at a lower rate than passenger 

airplanes. 

We disagree with the request to 

withdraw the NPRM (77 FR 12506, 

March 1, 2012). 

We acknowledge that the increased 

night operation and reduced use of the 

air conditioning system on the ground 

reduce the average flammability 

exposure for the fleet of cargo airplanes 

relative to the fleet of passenger 

airplanes. That reduction in fleet 

average flammability, however, is not 

sufficient to allow the center fuel tanks 

on those airplanes to be classified as 

low flammability fuel tanks. The FAA’s 

determination that an unsafe condition 

exists for the cargo airplanes as well as 

passenger airplanes was driven by the 

FAA’s individual risk safety decision 

criteria rather than an average risk or 

fleet risk criterion. There is no 

difference in the individual flight risk 

on the worst anticipated flights between 

passenger airplanes and cargo airplanes 

due to this issue. The worst anticipated 

flights in either case involve a preexisting latent in-tank failure and 

operation with flammable conditions in 

the center fuel tank. Flights with that 

combination of conditions are 

anticipated to occur in both the 

passenger fleets and cargo fleets 

(although at a somewhat lower relative 

rate on cargo airplanes, for the reasons 

cited by the commenters). 

For those flights, a fuel tank explosion 

could occur due to a single failure in the 

airplane wiring or the FQIS processor 

that conducts a high level of electrical 

energy onto circuits that enter the fuel 

tank. As discussed previously in the 

response to ‘‘Request to Withdraw 

NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012): 

Unjustified by Risk,’’ this is not 

consistent with the FAA’s fail-safe 

design philosophy for transport 

airplanes. In addition, the numerical 

probability of the single failure as 

estimated by the manufacturer and the 

FAA significantly exceeds the unsafe 

condition threshold for individual flight 

risk in the FAA’s TARAM) Policy 

Statement PS–ANM–25–05 (http://

rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_

Library/rgPolicy.nsf/0/4E5AE87071646

74A862579510061F96B?Open

Document&Highlight=ps-anm-25–05). 

We have therefore determined that an 

unsafe condition does exist on cargo 


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airplanes even in consideration of the 

lower fleet exposure factors cited by the 

commenters. 

While we have determined that this 

unsafe condition requires corrective 

action, we have identified additional 

corrective action options that we expect 

will be significantly less costly to 

incorporate than the originally proposed 

requirement. We have determined that 

this additional corrective action option 

is not suitable for passenger airplanes 

because it does not provide a sufficient 

level of risk reduction for passenger 

operations. The FAA normally does not 

differentiate between the safety 

requirements or corrective action 

requirements for cargo airplanes and 

passenger airplanes. However, after 

reviewing all of the comments on the 

estimated high cost of the corrective 

action and the uncertainty in those 

estimates, we examined other options 

for less costly risk reduction on cargo 

airplanes. We identified an option that 

provides significant risk reduction at a 

per-airplane cost that is estimated to be 

less than one-quarter of the cost of the 

original proposal (77 FR 12506, March 

1, 2012). The amount of risk reduction 

from this option is not at this time 

considered to be adequate to address the 

unsafe condition for passenger 

airplanes. 

In this case, the FAA is proposing to 

accept a higher level of individual flight 

risk exposure for cargo flights that are 

not fail-safe due to the absence of 

passengers and the resulting significant 

reduction in occupant exposure on a 

cargo airplane versus a passenger 

airplane, and due to relatively low 

estimated individual flight risk that 

would exist on a cargo airplane after the 

corrective actions are taken. The FAA 

has allowed a higher risk level to exist 

on cargo airplanes due to other issues, 

and applies a slightly less stringent 

numerical fleet risk threshold standard 

for unsafe conditions in the published 

TARAM policy. Because this is an 

unusual determination, we have 

reopened the comment period to give 

affected operators, pilots, and the public 

the opportunity to comment on this 

proposal. 

We expect that the optional wire 

separation design change to support 

compliance with the proposed AD for 

cargo airplanes will involve the 

manufacturer or any other modifier 

petitioning for a partial exemption from 

the ‘‘latent-plus-one’’ requirements of 

sections 25.901(c) and 25.981(a)(3) of 

the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 

CFR 25.901(c) and 14 CFR 25.981(a)(3)). 

We have informed the manufacturer that 

we are open to granting such an 

exemption, and they indicated their 

willingness to make such a petition. 

We have added new paragraph (h) in 

this SNPRM to allow repetitive FQIS 

built-in test equipment (BITE) checks 

and modification of the airplane by 

separating FQIS wiring from other 

aircraft wiring that is not intrinsically 

safe (in a manner acceptable to the FAA) 

as an additional option for airplanes 

used exclusively for cargo operations. 

We have redesignated subsequent 

paragraphs of this SNPRM accordingly. 

Request To Change Applicability To 

Address Unsafe Condition on Airplanes 

With FRM 

National Air Traffic Controllers 

Association (NATCA) requested that we 

revise the NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 

1, 2012) to include airplanes on which 

FRMs were incorporated either 

voluntarily or to comply with the FTFR 

rule (73 FR 42444, July 21, 2008). 

NATCA noted that the introduction of 

FRM on such airplanes only reduces the 

fraction of time the airplane is operated 

with flammable conditions in its fuel 

tanks, but does not eliminate flammable 

operation. NATCA further noted that 

FAA operating rules allow limited 

operation of the airplane with the FRM 

inoperative. NATCA added that the 

likelihood of a fuel tank explosion 

during operation with flammable tanks 

is similar regardless of whether an FRM 

is installed. 

We disagree with the request. We 

have developed and published policy 

for determination of unsafe conditions 

and the need for corrective actions 

during the evaluation of SFAR 88 fuel 

tank safety review findings. The 

decision to allow FRM as an acceptable 

mitigating action for the identified 

unsafe condition is consistent with that 

policy. We acknowledge NATCA’s point 

that, if no actions are taken on an 

airplane to correct the FQIS latent-plusone issue other than installation of an 

FRM, flights on that airplane where 

FRM is inoperative or ineffective would 

have the same risk of a fuel tank 

explosion due to the FQIS latent-plusone issue as flights on an airplane with 

no FRM installed. However, the 

published unsafe condition criteria 

(section 25.981(a)(3) of the Federal 

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

25.981(a)(3)) (http://www.faa.gov/

regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/

index.cfm/go/document.information/

documentID/73716) differentiate 

between low- and high-flammability 

fuel tanks, with a higher level of 

conservatism applied to highflammability tanks. 

The criteria recognize that lowflammability tanks are still flammable 

for a portion of their operating time, and 

the criteria include ignition prevention 

thresholds commensurate with that 

level of flammability. The regulatory 

performance standard for FRMs is 

equivalent to the flammability of a 

conventional aluminum wing tank, 

which is the benchmark for the 

definition of a low-flammability tank. 

We have therefore determined that it is 

appropriate to treat ignition sources in 

center fuel tanks with compliant FRMs 

the same way they would be treated for 

a tank that has inherent low 

flammability. Because the FQIS latentplus-one vulnerability for Model 757 

airplanes was classified as a theoretical 

vulnerability and not as a condition 

known to have occurred, the SFAR 88 

corrective action policy does not require 

corrective action for that condition in 

low-flammability fuel tanks. The 

installation of an FRM causes the center 

fuel tank to meet the criteria for 

classification as a low-flammablity fuel 

tank, and therefore FRM installation 

was considered to be acceptable 

mitigating action. We have not changed 

this SNPRM regarding this issue. 

Request To Remove Requirement for 

Goodrich FQIS 

Goodrich stated that its FQIS fuel 

height and dielectric sensor interface 

circuitry presently meets the energy, 

voltage, and current limits specified in 

FAA AC 25.981–1C, ‘‘Fuel Tank Ignition 

Source Prevention Guidelines,’’ dated 

September 19, 2008 (http://

www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/

advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/

document.information/documentID/

73716). Goodrich stated that the system 

design would require multiple serial 

failures to enable a fault to propagate to 

the tank, resulting in the combination of 

those failures being extremely 

improbable on average. Goodrich added 

that the system built-in test detects open 

circuits and short circuits in the sensors 

and aircraft wiring, including shorts to 

structure. Goodrich stated that there 

have been no failures in service in 

which the Goodrich FQIS exposed the 

fuel tank to an unsafe condition. 

Goodrich asked whether the actual 

system operation and service life have 

been considered in the evaluation of the 

probability of an unsafe condition and 

the mitigation provided by the present 

Goodrich FQIS. 

We infer that the commenter is 

requesting that we revise the NPRM (77 

FR 12506, March 1, 2012) to eliminate 

any requirement for corrective action for 

airplanes equipped with a Goodrich 

FQIS. We partially agree. The Goodrich 

system is recognized as having 

significant improvements relative to the 


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original 757 system developed by 

another manufacturer. We recognize 

that the Goodrich FQIS has the ability 

to identify a significant portion of the 

potential latent in-tank failure 

conditions that can occur inside the fuel 

tanks. Those conditions, however, are 

detected and corrected only when the 

built-in test capability is activated 

during maintenance. Currently, 

activating the built-in test features is 

required only when troubleshooting an 

FQIS problem that has become apparent 

to flight or maintenance crew. This still 

potentially leaves significant latency 

periods for those failures. 

We have agreed that the Goodrich 

processor has sufficient circuit isolation 

such that the processor itself is not 

expected to create hot short conditions 

in tank circuits, and is not expected to 

pass energy from non-tank-side lowvoltage hot shorts onto tank-side 

circuits. There remains, however, a 

significant potential for a single failure 

causing a hot short onto tank-side 

circuits, or a single failure causing a 

high-voltage hot short onto non-tankside circuits to cause non-intrinsically 

safe energy, voltage, or current levels to 

be conducted into the fuel tanks. The 

latent-plus-one concern therefore still 

exists even with the additional 

detection capabilities that exist in the 

Goodrich FQIS. We have determined 

this concern requires corrective action 

in accordance with the SFAR 88 

corrective action decision policy 

discussed previously. We disagree with 

the request to revise this SNPRM to 

eliminate any requirement for corrective 

action for airplanes equipped with a 

Goodrich FQIS because we have 

determined that an unsafe condition 

requiring corrective action exists on the 

Goodrich FQIS-equipped airplanes even 

after considering the differences 

between the Goodrich FQIS and the 

original 757 system developed by 

another manufacturer. We have not 

changed this SNPRM regarding this 

issue. 

Request To Clarify Affected Tanks 

FedEx requested that we revise the 

NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012) to 

clarify that only the center fuel tank is 

affected. FedEx stated that the proposed 

wording could be interpreted as 

applying to all tanks. 

We agree to clarify the intent of this 

SNPRM. The FQIS wiring and related 

system components are to be modified 

to the extent necessary to prevent the 

development of an ignition source in the 

center fuel tank due to FQIS failure 

conditions. If modification of wing tankrelated components is necessary to 

prevent an ignition source in the center 

fuel tank (for example, because of 

common wiring between the tanks), 

then that modification would be 

required. Paragraph (g) of this SNPRM 

already states this (‘‘modify the FQIS 

wiring or fuel tank systems to prevent 

development of an ignition source 

inside the center fuel tank’’). A change 

to this SNPRM itself therefore is not 

necessary. 

Request To Revise Proposed AD 

Requirements To Apply to All Fuel 

Tanks 

NATCA noted that action similar to 

the proposed requirements of the NPRM 

(77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012) was 

required for all fuel tanks on early 

Model 747 and 737 airplanes via AD 

98–20–40, Amendment 39–10808 (63 

FR 52147, September 30, 1998); and AD 

99–03–04, Amendment 39–11018 (64 

FR 4959, February 2, 1999). The 

commenter also noted that the FAA’s 

published SFAR 88 unsafe condition 

criteria (section 25.981(a)(3) of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

25.981(a)(3)) (http://www.faa.gov/

regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/

index.cfm/go/document.information/

documentID/73716)) require corrective 

action for ‘‘known latent-plus-one 

conditions’’ in both low- and highflammability tanks. 

We infer the commenter is requesting 

that we revise the proposed actions of 

the NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012) 

to apply to all fuel tanks. We disagree. 

NATCA’s interpretation of the word 

‘‘known’’ appears to be different from 

that intended by the FAA when the 

SFAR 88 decision criteria were 

developed and implemented. For lowflammability fuel tanks, the FAA has 

proposed that corrective action for 

‘‘latent-plus-one’’ issues be required 

only in cases where the particular 

latent-plus-one scenario is known to 

have occurred on that particular design. 

Where relevant design details are 

significantly different, a condition that 

has occurred with one design is not 

considered to be a ‘‘known’’ latent-plusone condition on another design simply 

because the same architectural 

vulnerability theoretically exists. 

In the case of AD 98–20–40, 

Amendment 39–10808 (63 FR 52147, 

September 30, 1998); and AD 99–03–04, 

Amendment 39–11018 (64 FR 4959, 

February 2, 1999); we required 

corrective action for all fuel tanks 

because the details of those designs 

were identical or very similar to the 

details of the design that were 

considered to be the most likely cause 

of the 1996 Model 747–100 accident. 

The actions of AD 98–20–40 and AD 

99–03–04 are consistent with the intent 

of the later-developed SFAR 88 unsafe 

condition criteria. We have not changed 

this SNPRM regarding this issue. 

Request for Specific Corrective Action 

EASA noted that the NPRM (77 FR 

12506, March 1, 2012) did not cite 

service information for a specific design 

solution other than acknowledging FRM 

as an acceptable method of compliance. 

We infer that EASA is requesting that 

the NPRM propose to require a specific 

corrective action for the unsafe 

condition. EASA pointed out that, 

under its regulations and policies, 

EASA issues ADs based on specific 

solutions provided by the responsible 

manufacturer. EASA stated that, in the 

absence of a specific solution, EASA 

will not be in a position to simply adopt 

the FAA AD, and may need to develop 

its own AD or find another solution. 

We disagree with the request to 

require a specific corrective action in 

this SNPRM. In this case, the 

manufacturer has not provided a 

corrective action specific to FQIS in 

time to support the NPRM, noting that 

they have provided service instructions 

to install FRM that the FAA has defined 

as one method of compliance within the 

NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012). 

While the FAA has the authority to 

compel the manufacturer to provide a 

solution specifically providing FQIS 

protection, in this case the FAA decided 

to seek public comment on the NPRM 

(77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012) before 

deciding whether to take that action. 

The FAA already requires the vast 

majority of passenger airplanes 

registered in the U.S. to be equipped 

with FRM, and since we defined 

incorporation of FRM as one method of 

compliance within the NPRM (77 FR 

12506, March 1, 2012), and because 

Boeing and Goodrich provided 

information to show that a specific FQIS 

protection solution would have a perairplane cost similar to that of Boeing’s 

FRM design solution, we have 

determined there is no practical reason 

to require the manufacturer to provide 

a corrective action specific to FQIS for 

passenger airplanes. Consideration of 

the many comments on the NPRM (77 

FR 12506, March 1, 2012) has resulted 

in a revision of the FAA’s approach for 

cargo airplanes, leading to a 

significantly different proposed AD. At 

this point we do expect the 

manufacturer to provide service 

information for the proposed optional 

solution for cargo airplanes. We have, 

however, decided not to further delay 

action on this issue by waiting for that 

service information. The service 

information is expected to be released 

shortly after the issuance of a final rule. 


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No change to this SNPRM is necessary 

for this issue. If service information 

becomes available before the final rule 

is issued, we might consider 

incorporating it into the AD. 

Request for Information on 

Modifications 

Icelandair requested more detailed 

information on the specific 

modifications that would need to be 

performed to comply with the proposed 

requirements specified in the NPRM (77 

FR 12506, March 1, 2012), and asked if 

a related service bulletin was available. 

Service information is available for 

incorporation of FRM approved by the 

FAA as compliant with the FTFR rule 

(73 FR 42444, July 21, 2008) 

requirements of section 26.33(c)(1) of 

the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 

CFR 26.33(c)(1)). 

As stated previously, we have revised 

the NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012) 

to provide more specific information 

about a less costly optional modification 

for cargo airplanes. Service information 

related to this modification is not 

currently available. We have not 

changed this SNPRM further regarding 

this issue. 

Request for Optional Modification 

Goodrich requested that we revise the 

NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012) to 

require or allow a modification to 

separate and shield the FQIS tank-side 

circuits from other wiring as corrective 

action for the identified unsafe 

condition. Goodrich referred to its 

discussion regarding the capability of 

the Goodrich FQIS processor to isolate 

the tank-side circuits from the non-tankside circuits. 

We partially agree with the request. 

We considered that method of 

compliance and determined that the 

benefit from that corrective action 

would be sufficient for cargo airplanes 

when combined with regular FQIS 

checks using the previously mentioned 

built-in test capability. We disagree with 

allowing the proposed alternative for 

passenger airplanes that are not 

equipped with FRM because the level of 

risk reduction achieved from that 

alternative corrective action would not 

provide a sufficient risk reduction for 

those airplanes. Even when the built-in 

test capability is periodically exercised, 

there will still be a significant latency 

period for some in-tank failures. The 

risk on the flights where those failures 

exist and where flammable conditions 

exist in the fuel tank is considered to be 

excessive for passenger airplanes, 

because it results from a single 

additional failure (those flights would 

not be fail-safe). Even if it did not result 

from an additional single failure, it 

would still exceed the TARAMallowable risk level for individual flight 

risk. This determination is consistent 

with the SFAR 88 corrective action 

decision policy and TARAM policy. As 

discussed previously, we have added 

new paragraph (h) in this SNPRM to 

allow the option of a periodic BITE 

check and partial wire separation for 

cargo airplanes. 

Request for Repetitive Inspections or 

Replacement 

Oy Air Finland Ltd. stated that wires 

within the fuel tank must remain in an 

undamaged condition and therefore 

requested that we revise the NPRM (77 

FR 12506, March 1, 2012) to specify 

their repetitive inspection or 

replacement. The commenter provided 

no justification. 

We disagree with including specific 

requirements to periodically inspect or 

replace the wiring within the fuel tanks 

because airworthiness limitations and 

existing maintenance practices are 

already in place to monitor the 

condition of in-tank wiring. This 

SNPRM would require installation of 

flammability reduction means or a 

combination of periodic system checks 

(which would detect many types of 

wiring defects or damage) and wire 

separation improvements, either of 

which would significantly reduce the 

probability of a fuel tank explosion on 

a given airplane flight to an acceptable 

level. We have not changed this SNPRM 

regarding this issue. 

Request To Compel Issuance of Service 

Information 

NATCA requested that we enforce 

sections 21.99 and 183.63(d) of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

21.99 and 183.63(d)) and SFAR 88, 

Amendment 21–78, and subsequent 

Amendments 21–82 and 21–83) (http:// 

rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_

Library%5CrgFAR.nsf/0/EEFB3F9445

1DC06286256C93004F5E07?Open

Document) to obtain necessary service 

information from design approval 

holders. NATCA noted that EASA 

cannot ‘‘issue ADs’’ (that is, EASA may 

not be able to adopt the FAA AD per se) 

if specific service information is not 

identified. NATCA expressed concern 

that other civil aviation authorities may 

take a similar position. 

We partially agree with the request. 

We agree that the cited regulations are 

relevant in setting requirements for 

action by design approval holders when 

we have identified an unsafe condition. 

We also recognize that issuance of an 

AD without service information creates 

significant issues for regulatory agencies 

and for operators that must comply with 

the AD. This SNPRM, however, is not 

the appropriate forum to discuss 

potential enforcement action. We have 

not changed this SNPRM regarding this 

issue. 

Boeing’s Planned Service Information 

Boeing stated that it will offer only 

the Boeing FRM as a solution, if the AD 

is issued as proposed. Boeing added that 

it does not develop detailed cost 

estimates for design changes they do not 

intend to provide. Further, Boeing 

stated that it does not advocate FRM 

installation on airplanes for which FRM 

is not required under the FTFR rule 

(‘‘Reduction of Fuel Tank Flammability 

in Transport Category Airplanes’’ (73 FR 

42444, July 21, 2008)). Boeing proposed 

no change to the NPRM (77 FR 12506, 

March 1, 2012). Boeing noted that a 

requirement to install an FRM on the 

affected airplanes could not be justified 

in the cost-versus-benefit analysis 

performed for the new FTFR rule, and 

therefore cannot be justified to address 

the unsafe condition identified by the 

FAA. 

We have provided the basis for this 

SNPRM in response to ‘‘Request for 

Cost-Benefit Analysis’’ in this SNPRM. 

We emphasize, however, that this 

SNPRM does not require installation of 

a nitrogen generation system or other 

FRM. The actions specified in this 

SNPRM will correct a specific, known 

unsafe condition with the FQIS. We 

decided to propose this AD action 

without specific service information for 

the expected design solution 

specifically because Boeing has not to 

date provided a design solution specific 

to FQIS. As a result of considering the 

comments to the NPRM (77 FR 12506, 

March 1, 2012), the FAA has identified 

a less costly option for Model 757 cargo 

airplanes. We have asked Boeing to 

develop service information for that 

option, and Boeing has agreed. Since the 

FAA already requires the vast majority 

of passenger airplanes registered in the 

U.S. to be equipped with FRM and we 

defined incorporation of FRM as one 

method of compliance within the NPRM 

(77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012), and 

because Boeing and Goodrich provided 

information to show that a specific FQIS 

protection solution would have a perairplane cost similar to that of Boeing’s 

FRM design solution, we have 

determined there is no practical reason 

to require the manufacturer to provide 

a corrective action specific to FQIS for 

passenger airplanes. We have not 

further changed this SNPRM regarding 

this issue. 


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Request To Extend Compliance Time 

Pending Issuance of Service 

Information 

A4A requested that we revise the 

NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012) to 

extend the compliance time from 60 

months to ‘‘a 96-month compliance 

period that commences one year after 

the effective date of the AD’’—for a total 

compliance time of 9 years. A4A noted 

that SFAR 88 (Special Federal Aviation 

Regulation No. 88 (‘‘SFAR 88,’’ 

Amendment 21–78, and subsequent 

Amendments 21–82 and 21–83) (http:// 

rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_

Library%5CrgFAR.nsf/0/EEFB3F94

451DC06286256C93004F5E07?Open

Document)) required design solutions 

for non-compliant designs to be 

provided by December 6, 2002, and 

considered that the absence of service 

information reflects a failure of 

communication and coordination, 

presumably between the FAA and 

Boeing. A4A was concerned that 

Boeing’s declaration that it does not 

intend to develop a design solution 

other than its existing nitrogen 

generation system indicates that the 

development of any other design 

solution would be technically 

challenging and time consuming. A4A 

also cited the implementation of the 

requirements of part 26 of the Federal 

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 26) as 

an example of the FAA underestimating 

the costs and time required to develop 

design solutions. 

We partially agree with the request to 

extend the compliance time. While we 

agree to provide additional time for 

manufacturers to develop service 

information, we acknowledge that 

service information is not likely to be 

available until several months after the 

final rule is issued. We disagree with 

the assertion that the delay in proposing 

an AD to address the FQIS latent-plusone unsafe conditions on several 

transport airplane models reflects a 

failure to communicate and coordinate 

with design approval holders. 

In 2003, the FAA held a series of AD 

board meetings to decide which of the 

design areas identified in SFAR 88 

design reviews as non-compliant on 

Boeing airplanes would be classified as 

unsafe conditions requiring AD action. 

The FQIS latent-plus-one issue was 

identified as an unsafe condition for 

high flammability fuel tanks at that time 

for several models, including the Model 

757. Several airplane models from other 

manufacturers were identified as having 

similar issues. However, during that 

same time period, the National 

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) had 

recommended FAA action to require 

inerting systems for center fuel tanks, 

and the FAA was working with industry 

to develop a practical nitrogen 

generation system for new production 

and retrofit installations on transport 

airplanes. The FAA was also planning 

to propose a new rule requiring those 

systems to be installed on new and 

existing airplanes, as recommended by 

the NTSB. The FAA recognized that, if 

such a system was installed on a given 

set of airplanes, the unsafe condition 

determination for the center fuel tank 

latent-plus-one would be addressed due 

to the modified center fuel tank meeting 

the conditions for a low flammability 

fuel tank after installation of a nitrogen 

generation system. 

The FAA therefore decided to defer 

addressing the FQIS latent-plus-one 

issue on the affected airplanes until 

after the outcome of the FTFR 

rulemaking process. Now that the 

rulemaking process is complete and the 

safety enhancement provided by the 

FTFR rule (73 FR 42444, July 21, 2008) 

has been limited to certain airplanes (14 

CFR part 121, 125, and 129 passenger 

airplanes), the FAA is addressing the 

FQIS latent-plus-one unsafe conditions 

on the airplanes that are not required to 

receive the safety enhancement of the 

FTFR rule. This history was discussed 

in detail in the NPRM (77 FR 12506, 

March 1, 2012) and in the preamble for 

the FTFR rule. 

We disagree with extending the 

compliance time to 9 years. Service 

information to support the modification 

portion of the option for cargo airplanes 

is expected to be available shortly after 

the final rule is issued. The service 

information for the inspection portion of 

that option and the FRM option is 

already released. We have determined 

that a compliance time extension to 72 

months for the modification will give 

adequate time for manufacturers to 

complete the remaining service 

information and for operators to 

complete the modification. 

We have revised the compliance time 

in this SNPRM to 72 months after the 

effective date of the AD. 

Request To Reduce Compliance Time 

NATCA requested that we reduce the 

compliance time from 60 months to 36 

months because of the time that has 

already passed to address this unsafe 

condition since its identification in 

2003. 

While we acknowledge the time that 

has passed since the identification of 

the unsafe condition identified in this 

SNPRM, the FAA delayed taking action 

for this issue while we developed the 

FTFR rule (73 FR 42444, July 21, 2008), 

determined its applicability, which 

directly affected the applicability of this 

SNPRM, and implemented the FTFR 

rule. Now that we are proposing action 

for the affected airplanes, we must 

consider the ability of industry to 

develop an appropriate design change 

and incorporate it on all affected 

airplanes; we find that it is not practical 

for industry to respond to this AD in 

only 3 years. We have therefore not 

reduced the compliance time in this 

SNPRM. 

Request To Revise Cost Estimate Based 

on New Data 

Boeing requested that we revise the 

cost estimate specified in the NPRM (77 

FR 12506, March 1, 2012) because the 

actual cost to develop and implement a 

design change to fully address the FQIS 

latent-plus-one failure conditions would 

be significantly higher. Boeing 

estimated in their comment that the cost 

to develop and implement a transient 

suppression unit design for Model 757 

airplanes would be about the same as 

the cost of Boeing’s FRM provided for 

the airplanes affected by the FTFR rule 

(73 FR 42444, July 21, 2008): in excess 

of $300,000 per airplane for airplanes 

equipped with the early FQIS design, 

and in excess of $200,000 per airplane 

for airplanes equipped with a Goodrich 

FQIS. 

In a subsequent meeting initiated by 

the FAA to obtain more detail on this 

cost estimate, Boeing provided a higher 

cost estimate than they provided in their 

written comment. However, in 

subsequent discussions with Boeing as 

part of developing this SNPRM, Boeing 

indicated that they were working on an 

isolation-based design alternative to the 

FAA’s proposed modification option for 

the cargo airplanes that would likely be 

significantly less costly than the FAA’s 

proposed cargo airplane option of 

partial wire separation. 

We partially agree with the 

commenter. We agree to revise the cost 

estimate because both Boeing and one of 

Boeing’s affected FQIS vendors 

provided similar cost estimates that 

were higher than the estimates made in 

the NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012) 

by the FAA. We disagree to revise the 

cost estimate as Boeing proposed. We 

have received several inconsistent cost 

estimates from industry during the 

development of the FTFR rule (73 FR 

42444, July 21, 2008), in their written 

comments to the NPRM, and during 

discussions of the FAA’s proposed 

alternative for cargo airplanes. We have 

therefore provided a revised cost 

estimate for the originally proposed 

action based on input from Boeing’s 

written comment and from the FQIS 

vendor. We also have considered that it 


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is likely that aftermarket vendors may 

develop competing design solutions, as 

has occurred for other similar ADs, and 

those solutions will likely cost less than 

the original manufacturer’s solutions. 

In addition, we have identified an 

additional compliance option—with a 

different cost—for cargo airplanes. That 

cost estimate is based on Model 757 

service information that described a 

very similar modification. We have used 

the work-hour estimate from that service 

bulletin, increased the work-hour 

estimate by 20 percent to account for 

any unforeseen increases in the work, 

and increased the parts prices to 

account for inflation and the potential 

that additional parts may be needed. 

Request To Revise Cost Estimate Based 

on AD Scope 

Goodrich requested that, if the intent 

of the NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 1, 

2012) is to protect all fuel tanks rather 

than just the center fuel tank, we revise 

the cost estimate of the NPRM 

accordingly. Goodrich stated that the 

cost estimate is based on three 

assumptions: (1) That current 

technology circuit isolation devices 

similar to those previously approved for 

other models would be acceptable, (2) 

that no further changes to airplane 

wiring would be required, and (3) that 

the design change would be required to 

protect only the center fuel tank. 

Goodrich noted that protection for all 

fuel tanks is required for the two similar 

ADs: AD 99–03–04, Amendment 39– 

11018 (64 FR 4959, February 2, 1999), 

for Model 737 airplanes; and AD 98–20– 

40, Amendment 39–10808 (63 FR 

52147, September 30, 1998), for Model 

747 airplanes. Goodrich requested that 

we revise the cost estimate if the AD’s 

intent is to require protection for fuel 

tanks other than the center fuel tank or 

if other wiring change requirements are 

anticipated. Goodrich stated that the 

cost specified in the NPRM should be 

estimated based on the actual design 

changes expected, rather than on 

previous AD actions. 

We provide the following clarification 

of the intended scope of the NPRM (77 

FR 12506, March 1, 2012) and the 

associated cost estimate regarding 

which fuel tanks are subject to the 

proposed requirements. AD 99–03–04, 

Amendment 39–11018 (64 FR 4959, 

February 2, 1999), and AD 98–20–40, 

Amendment 39–10808 (63 FR 52147, 

September 30, 1998), affect FQIS 

designs that are considered to have a 

higher level of risk of a fuel tank 

ignition source than the systems used 

on Model 757 airplanes. In addition, 

those systems were identical or nearly 

identical to the FQIS that was 

determined by the NTSB to be the most 

likely cause of the 1996 Model 747–100 

accident described in the NPRM. 

Because the latent-plus-one failure 

scenario was suspected of actually 

having occurred on that system type, we 

determined that corrective action for all 

fuel tanks was appropriate. This 

decision was consistent with the 

subsequently published FAA policy on 

SFAR 88 AD decision criteria (section 

25.981(a)(3) of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 25.981(a)(3))) 

(http://www.faa.gov/regulations_

policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/

go/document.information/documentID/

73716)). Also, it was our understanding 

that the design of that FQIS was such 

that, due to wiring interconnections 

between fuel tanks, it was necessary to 

protect the circuits for all fuel tanks in 

order to achieve effective protection for 

any one fuel tank. 

We have determined that the FQIS 

used on earlier production Model 757 

airplanes has the same fuel tank 

interconnection issue, but that the 

Goodrich system used on later 

production Model 757 airplanes does 

not have that issue. Since the cost 

estimates provided by both Boeing and 

Goodrich were based on design 

solutions that included upgrading to a 

Goodrich FQIS, we assume that the 

level of circuit protection for the center 

fuel tank can be significantly increased 

relative to the existing Goodrich design 

without having to further alter circuits 

or wiring for the main fuel tanks 

(beyond the alterations necessary to 

replace the FQIS with the Goodrich 

FQIS). 

Because the latent-plus-one scenarios 

for Model 757 airplanes equipped with 

the Goodrich FQIS are classified as 

‘‘theoretical’’ rather than ‘‘known to 

have occurred’’ under the FAA policy 

on SFAR 88 AD decision criteria 

(section 25.981(a)(3) of the Federal 

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

25.981(a)(3))) (http://www.faa.gov/

regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/

index.cfm/go/document.information/

documentID/73716)), we have 

determined in accordance with that 

policy that the corrective action for 

passenger airplanes must eliminate the 

potential for all theoretical latent-plusone scenarios to create an ignition 

source in the center fuel tank, which is 

classified under that policy as a high 

flammability fuel tank. The need to 

modify the circuits or wiring for the 

main fuel tanks to achieve that intent 

will depend on the proposed design 

solution and the existing configuration 

of the airplane. 

As stated previously, we have revised 

the cost estimate in this SNPRM. For the 

purpose of the cost estimate for 

passenger airplanes, we have assumed 

that the airplane will be upgraded to the 

Goodrich FQIS if necessary, and any 

further modifications will be to only the 

center fuel tank circuits or wiring. For 

the purpose of the additional proposed 

cargo airplane option, we have provided 

separate estimates for each design. For 

cargo airplanes equipped with the early 

757 FQIS design, we have assumed that 

additional isolation of some main fuel 

tank wiring will be required. It is not 

necessary to change the proposed 

requirement itself in paragraph (g) of 

this SNPRM, which is very specific that 

protection is required for the center fuel 

tank. 

Request To Revise Cost Estimate To 

Consider Long-Term Effect of AD 

Goodrich asked whether the cost 

estimate specified in the NPRM (77 FR 

12506, March 1, 2012) considers the 

expectation that the affected fleet will 

be in operation for at least 20 more 

years, and that a complete redesign of 

the FQIS would need to be considered 

to ensure the availability of key FQIS 

electrical components. Goodrich stated 

this concern could drive potential 

development costs higher. 

We agree with the commenter’s 

assertion. We did consider that the 

affected fleet will be in service for a 

considerable period of time. In the cost 

estimate in the NPRM (77 FR 12506, 

March 1, 2012), we assumed that the 

existing FQIS could be modified to meet 

the intent of the AD. However, 

comments from Boeing and Goodrich 

led us to recognize that it was likely that 

operators of airplanes with the early 757 

FQIS design will likely need to be 

upgraded to the later Goodrich FQIS. 

The cost estimates used in this SNPRM 

for the fully compliant FQIS option (as 

opposed to the newly added cargo 

airplane option) are based on the 

estimates provided by Boeing and 

Goodrich. We previously described 

changes to the cost estimate in this 

SNPRM, but no further change is 

necessary regarding this issue. 

Request To Explain Delay in 

Rulemaking and Identify Planned 

SFAR 88 ADs 

A4A requested that we explain the 

delay in rulemaking for this issue, and 

identify any further planned SFAR 88 

ADs. A4A asked why the NPRM (77 FR 

12506, March 1, 2012) was issued 

approximately 10 years after the 

identification of the unsafe conditions 

and development of design solutions 

was required to be completed under 

SFAR 88. A4A further asked that the 

FAA provide information on any other 


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9412 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 35 / Monday, February 23, 2015 / Proposed Rules 

designs that were already reviewed 

under SFAR 88, and provide industry 

with information regarding their 

planned disposition. 

We have specifically discussed these 

issues in the preamble to the FTFR rule 

(73 FR 42444, July 21, 2008) and the 

NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012), 

and explained the reasons for the delay 

in the response to ‘‘Request to Extend 

Compliance Time Pending Issuance of 

Service Information’’ in this SNPRM. 

We cannot provide additional 

information on the results of design 

reviews and the planned disposition of 

issues identified in those design reviews 

because that information is proprietary. 

The FAA has not made available to the 

public an overall list of the specific 

product issues identified and the plans 

to address those issues, but operators 

can request the design review results 

from the manufacturers. We will likely 

propose additional AD rulemaking, and 

the public will be notified of those 

proposals via NPRMs. We have not 

changed this SNPRM regarding this 

issue. 

Request To Explain Timing of NPRM 

(77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012) and 

Deficiencies of Affected Design 

FedEx requested that we explain what 

is non-compliant about the affected 

design and why we are proposing this 

design change at this late date. FedEx 

stated that Boeing and Goodrich 

determined in their safety reviews that 

only the FQIS densitometer was noncompliant. 

We agree to provide further 

explanation. This SNPRM addresses the 

question about the timing of this 

proposal under ‘‘Request to Extend 

Compliance Time Pending Issuance of 

Service Information’’ in this SNPRM. 

Boeing and Goodrich did identify that 

the densitometer of the Goodrich system 

had the potential for a single failure to 

cause an ignition source in a fuel tank. 

That issue was addressed by AD 2009– 

06–20, Amendment 39–15857 (74 FR 

12236, March 24, 2009). However, the 

Boeing safety review and the FAA SFAR 

88 AD Board also identified the 

potential for a failure in airplane wiring 

outside the fuel tank or in the FQIS 

processor unit that, combined with a 

pre-existing latent failure of wiring or 

certain types of probe contamination 

inside the fuel tank, could cause an 

ignition source. These identified failure 

combinations were considered to be 

non-compliant with section 25.901(c) of 

the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 

CFR 25.901(c)) and section 25.981 of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

25.981). We have not changed this 

SNPRM regarding this issue. 

Request for Independent Review 

Regarding Timeliness of AD 

NATCA requested an independent 

review to identify and document how 

this issue was allowed to go 

unaddressed for 16 years since the TWA 

accident and 9 years since SFAR 88 

required the development of service 

information. The commenter requested 

that the findings from that review be 

published. 

We acknowledge that there have been 

significant delays in addressing the 

issue that is the subject of this SNPRM. 

We are also fully aware of the events 

and factors that have led to those delays. 

We infer that NATCA made the request 

to ensure that the public is aware of 

those events and factors. We have 

described those events and factors in the 

NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012) 

and in the other comment responses 

included in this SNPRM, and therefore 

the FAA does not plan to conduct the 

proposed review. We have not changed 

this SNPRM regarding this issue. 

Request To Clarify Compliance Times 

A4A requested that we revise the 

NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012) to 

clarify that the compliance deadlines in 

the AD prevail over the compliance 

deadlines in section 121.1117 of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

121.1117) for any airplane for which the 

operator has chosen to comply with the 

AD by installing FRM. 

The proposed compliance times 

reflect the desired interpretation of the 

commenter as they pertain to cargo 

airplanes and airplanes that are not 

operated per part 121, part 125, or part 

129 of the Federal Aviation Regulations 

(14 CFR part 121, 14 CFR part 125, or 

14 CFR part 129). Passenger airplanes 

operating under part 121, part 125, or 

part 129 of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR part 121, 14 CFR 

part 125, or 14 CFR part 129) must meet 

the compliance deadlines established in 

those operating rules. No change to this 

SNPRM is necessary regarding this 

issue. 

Request To Clarify Master Minimum 

Equipment List (MMEL) Relief 

A4A requested that we revise the 

NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012) to 

clarify that the MMEL relief provided 

for the Boeing NGS also applies to 

airplanes for which the operator has 

chosen to comply with the AD by 

installing an FRM such as the Boeing 

NGS. 

We acknowledge the commenter’s 

concern. The revised applicability 

statement in paragraph (c) of this 

SNPRM excludes airplanes that are 

‘‘equipped with a flammability 

reduction means (FRM) approved by the 

FAA. . . .’’ That exclusion does not 

state that the installed equipment must 

be operative. However, installed 

equipment is required to be operative by 

sections 121.628, 125.201, and 129.14 of 

the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 

CFR 121.628, 14 CFR 125.201, and 14 

CFR 129.14) except as allowed by the 

MMEL and the operator’s approved 

minimum equipment list (MEL). 

Dispatch with an inoperative FRM 

under the MMEL is not prohibited by 

the AD, and our intent is to allow such 

operation. We have not further changed 

this SNPRM regarding this issue. 

Request To Clarify Airplanes Excluded 

From Applicability 

A4A requested that we revise the 

NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012) to 

clarify that airplanes equipped with 

FRM before conversion to all-cargo 

operations are excluded from the 

proposed requirement to modify the 

FQIS. 

We agree to provide clarification. The 

revised applicability of this SNPRM 

excludes airplanes for which operators 

have installed FRM. No further change 

is necessary to this SNPRM regarding 

this issue. As noted above, the FRM 

must be operational with the exception 

of any relief granted under MMEL 

provisions. 

Additional Change to NPRM (77 FR 

12506, March 1, 2012) 

We have removed NOTE 1 of the 

NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012). 

The note was included only as reminder 

that maintenance and/or preventive 

maintenance under 14 CFR part 43 is 

permitted provided the maintenance 

does not result in changing the ADmandated configuration (reference 14 

CFR 39.7). 

FAA’s Determination 

We are proposing this SNPRM 

because we evaluated all the relevant 

information and determined the unsafe 

condition described previously is likely 

to exist or develop in other products of 

the same type design. Certain changes 

described above expand the scope of the 

NPRM (77 FR 12506, March 1, 2012). As 

a result, we have determined that it is 

necessary to reopen the comment period 

to provide additional opportunity for 

the public to comment on this SNPRM. 

Proposed Requirements of the SNPRM 

This SNPRM would require 

modifying the FQIS wiring or fuel tank 

systems to prevent development of an 

ignition source inside the center fuel 

tank. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 35 / Monday, February 23, 2015 / Proposed Rules 9413 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this proposed AD 

affects 167 airplanes of U.S. registry. 

This estimate includes 148 cargo 

airplanes and 19 non-air-carrier 

passenger airplanes. We estimate the 

following costs to comply with this 

proposed AD: 

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per product 

Estimated Costs—Basic Proposed Requirement for All Airplanes 

Fully correct FQIS vulnerability to latent-plus-one 

failure conditions.

1,200 work-hours × $85 per hour = $102,000 ..... $200,000 $302,000. 

Estimated Costs—Optional Actions for All Airplanes 

Install FRM ............................................................ 720 work-hours × $85 per hour = $61,200 .......... $323,000 $384,200. 

Estimated Costs—Optional Actions for Cargo Airplanes 

Wire separation ..................................................... 230 work-hours × $85 per hour = $19,550 .......... $10,000 $29,550. 

FQIS BITE check (required with wire separation 

option).

1 work-hour × $85 per hour = $85 ....................... 0 $85 per check (4 checks 

per year). 

Existing regulations already require 

that air-carrier passenger airplanes be 

equipped with FRM by December 26, 

2017. We therefore assume that the FRM 

installation specified in paragraph (g) of 

this SNPRM would be done on only the 

19 affected non-air-carrier passenger 

airplanes, for an estimated passenger 

fleet cost of $5,738,000. We also assume 

that the operators of the 148 affected 

cargo airplanes would choose the less 

costly actions specified in paragraph (h) 

of this AD, at an estimated cost of 

$4,373,400 for the wire separation 

modification, plus $50,320 annually for 

the BITE checks. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs’’ describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

We determined that this proposed AD 

would not have federalism implications 

under Executive Order 13132. This 

proposed AD would not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

Government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify this proposed regulation: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

the DOT Regulatory Policies and 

Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 

1979), 

(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska, and 

(4) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

The Proposed Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 

39 as follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive (AD): 

The Boeing Company: Docket No. FAA– 

2012–0187; Directorate Identifier 2011– 

NM–094–AD. 

(a) Comments Due Date 

We must receive comments by April 24, 

2015. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to The Boeing Company 

Model 757–200, –200PF, –200CB, and –300 

series airplanes; certificated in any category; 

except airplanes equipped with a 

flammability reduction means (FRM) 

approved by the FAA as compliant with the 

Fuel Tank Flammability Reduction (FTFR) 

rule (73 FR 42444, July 21, 2008) 

requirements of section 25.981(b) or section 

26.33(c)(1) of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 25.981(b) or 14 CFR 

26.33(c)(1)). 

(d) Subject 

Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) 

Code 7397: Engine fuel system wiring. 

(e) Unsafe Condition 

This AD was prompted by fuel system 

reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We 

are issuing this AD to prevent development 

of an ignition source inside the center fuel 

tank caused by a latent in-tank failure 

combined with electrical energy transmitted 

into the center fuel tank via the fuel quantity 

indicating system (FQIS) wiring due to a 

single out-tank failure. 

(f) Compliance 

Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

(g) Modification 

Within 72 months after the effective date 

of this AD, modify the FQIS wiring or fuel 

tank systems to prevent development of an 

ignition source inside the center fuel tank, 

using a method approved in accordance with 

the procedures specified in paragraph (i) of 

this AD. 

(h) Optional Actions for Cargo Airplanes 

For airplanes used exclusively for cargo 

operations: As an option to the requirements 

of paragraph (g) of this AD, do the actions 


Rmajette on DSK2VPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
9414 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 35 / Monday, February 23, 2015 / Proposed Rules 

1Carnavale, A., Smith, N., Strohl, J., Help 

Wanted: Projections of Jobs and Education 

specified in paragraphs (h)(1) and (h)(2) of 

this AD, using methods approved in 

accordance with the procedures specified in 

paragraph (i) of this AD. 

(1) Within 6 months after the effective date 

of this AD, record the existing fault codes 

stored in the FQIS processor and then do a 

BITE check (check of built-in test equipment) 

of the FQIS, in accordance with the 

Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing 

Service Bulletin 757–28–0136, dated June 5, 

2014. If any fault codes are recorded prior to 

the BITE check or as a result of the BITE 

check, before further flight, do all applicable 

repairs and repeat the BITE check until a 

successful test is performed with no faults 

found, in accordance with Boeing Service 

Bulletin 757–28–0136, dated June 5, 2014. 

Repeat these actions thereafter at intervals 

not to exceed 750 flight hours. 

(2) Within 72 months after the effective 

date of this AD, modify the airplane by 

separating FQIS wiring that runs between the 

FQIS processor and the center fuel tank, 

including any circuits that might pass 

through a main fuel tank, from other airplane 

wiring that is not intrinsically safe. 

(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft 

Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the 

authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 

requested using the procedures found in 14 

CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, 

send your request to your principal inspector 

or local Flight Standards District Office, as 

appropriate. If sending information directly 

to the manager of the ACO, send it to the 

attention of the person identified in 

paragraph (j) of this AD. Information may be 

emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOCRequests@faa.gov. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the local flight standards district office/

certificate holding district office. 

(j) Related Information 

For more information about this AD, 

contact Jon Regimbal, Aerospace Engineer, 

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, Seattle 

Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), 1601 Lind 

Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98057– 

3356; phone: 425–917–6506; fax: 425–917– 

6590; email: jon.regimbal@faa.gov. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on 

December 18, 2014. 

Jeffrey E. Duven, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2015–03540 Filed 2–20–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 

34 CFR Chapter VI 

Proposed Priorities, Requirements, 

Selection Criterion, and Definitions— 

First in the World Program 

CFDA Numbers: 84.116F and 84.116X 

AGENCY: Office of Postsecondary 

Education, Department of Education. 

ACTION: Proposed priorities, 

requirements, selection criterion, and 

definitions. 

SUMMARY: The Assistant Secretary for 

Postsecondary Education proposes 

priorities, requirements, a selection 

criterion, and definitions under the First 

in the World (FITW) Program. The 

Assistant Secretary may use these 

priorities, requirements, selection 

criterion, and definitions for FITW 

competitions in fiscal year (FY) 2015 

and later years. These priorities, 

requirements, selection criterion, and 

definitions would enable the 

Department to focus the FITW program 

on identified barriers to student success 

in postsecondary education and 

advance the program’s purpose to build 

evidence for what works in 

postsecondary education through 

development, evaluation, and 

dissemination of innovative strategies to 

support students who are at risk of 

failure in persisting in and completing 

their postsecondary programs of study. 

DATES: We must receive your comments 

on or before March 25, 2015. 

ADDRESSES: Submit your comments 

through the Federal eRulemaking Portal 

or via postal mail, commercial delivery, 

or hand delivery. We will not accept 

comments submitted by fax or by email 

or those submitted after the comment 

period. To ensure that we do not receive 

duplicate copies, please submit your 

comments only once. 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

www.regulations.gov to submit your 

comments electronically. Information 

on using Regulations.gov, including 

instructions for accessing agency 

documents, submitting comments, and 

viewing the docket, is available on the 

site under ‘‘Are you new to the site?’’ 

• Postal Mail, Commercial Delivery, 

or Hand Delivery: If you mail or deliver 

your comments about these proposed 

regulations, address them to Frank 

Frankfort, U.S. Department of 

Education, 1990 K Street NW., Room 

6166, Washington, DC 20006. 

Privacy Note: The Department’s 

policy is to make all comments received 

from members of the public available for 

public viewing in their entirety on the 

Federal eRulemaking Portal at 

www.regulations.gov. Therefore, 

commenters should be careful to 

include in their comments only 

information that they wish to make 

publicly available. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Frank Frankfort. Telephone: (202) 502– 

7513 or email: frank.frankfort@ed.gov. 

If you use a telecommunications 

device for the deaf (TDD) or a text 

telephone (TTY), call the Federal Relay 

Service (FRS), toll free, at 1–800–877– 

8339. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Invitation to Comment: We invite you 

to submit comments regarding this 

notice. To ensure that your comments 

have maximum effect in developing the 

notice of final priorities, requirements, 

selection criterion, and definitions, we 

urge you to identify clearly the specific 

proposed priority, requirement, 

selection criterion or definition that 

each comment addresses. 

We invite you to assist us in 

complying with the specific 

requirements of Executive Orders 12866 

and 13563 and their overall requirement 

of reducing regulatory burden that 

might result from these proposed 

priorities, requirements, selection 

criterion, or definitions. Please let us 

know of any further ways we could 

reduce potential costs or increase 

potential benefits while preserving the 

effective and efficient administration of 

the program. 

During and after the comment period, 

you may inspect all public comments 

about this notice by accessing 

Regulations.gov. You may also inspect 

the comments in person in room 6164, 

1990 K. St. NW., Washington, DC 

between the hours of 8:30 a.m. and 4:00 

p.m., Washington, DC time, Monday 

through Friday of each week except 

Federal holidays. Please contact the 

person listed under FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT. 

Assistance to Individuals with 

Disabilities in Reviewing the 

Rulemaking Record: On request we will 

provide an appropriate accommodation 

or auxiliary aid to an individual with a 

disability who needs assistance to 

review the comments or other 

documents in the public rulemaking 

record for this notice. If you want to 

schedule an appointment for this type of 

accommodation or auxiliary aid, please 

contact the person listed under FOR

FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. 

Purpose of Program: Earning a 

postsecondary degree or credential is a 

prerequisite for the growing jobs of the 

new economy and the clearest pathway 

to the middle class. Average earnings of 

college graduates are almost twice as 

high as that of workers with only a high 

school diploma and, over this decade, 

employment in jobs requiring education 

beyond a high school diploma will grow 

more rapidly than employment in jobs 

that do not.1


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