J-S15012-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

RICHARD RODRIGUEZ

Appellant No. 1113 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 11, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-38-CR-0000368-2013

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., WECHT, J., and JENKINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED JUNE 05, 2015

Richard Rodriguez appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in 

the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County following his convictions for 

Sexual Assault, Aggravated Indecent Assault Without Consent of Other, and 

Indecent Assault Without Consent of Other. After careful review, we affirm. 

The trial court set forth the factual history as follows.

[Rodriguez] was charged with two counts of Sexual Assault,1one 

count of Aggravated Indecent Assault Without Consent,2and one 

count of Indecent Assault Without Consent of Other,3for an 

incident which occurred on June 24, 2011 in the apartment of 

the victim, B.W. After discovery was provided by the 

Commonwealth, [Rodriguez] filed a Motion to Compel additional 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3124.1.

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3125(a)(1).

3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(1). 
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discovery regarding a notation by Detective Keith Uhrich of the 

Lebanon City Police, which referenced two previous allegations of 

rape against other individuals by B.W.: “I investigated two 

previous rapes reported by [B.W.] and I knew her to be mentally 

retarded.” When [Rodriguez] requested Detective Uhrich’s 

complete investigative file regarding those allegations, the 

Commonwealth denied the request on the basis of irrelevancy. 

[Rodriguez] subsequently filed a Motion to Compel the 

Commonwealth to provide that information. By Order of 

September 6, 2013, we denied the Motion to Compel and the 

matter proceeded to a jury trial which was conducted on January 

7, 2014.

The testimony at the jury trial revealed that at the time of the 

incident, [Rodriguez] was employed as a cable repairman. He 

had gone to B.W.’s apartment the day prior to the incident as 

B.W. had arranged a service call with [Rodriguez]’s employer. 

[Rodriguez] was unable to correct the problem that day, but 

offered to return to make the repairs the next day. He returned 

the next day, June 24, 2011, at around noon. He and B.W. were 

in the bedroom where the television was located. B.W. testified 

that [Rodriguez] started jumping on her, pulled down her pants, 

touched and sucked her breasts, and penetrated her vagina with 

his finger and his penis. After he pulled his penis from her 

vagina, he masturbated and ejaculated on her stomach and 

wiped his semen on a towel. She testified that the entire 

episode had taken approximately one hour.

During the trial, Detective Uhrich testified that he had gone to 

B.W.’s apartment and located a towel with semen. When 

Detective Uhrich initially questioned [Rodriguez], he denied 

having had any sexual contact with B.W. When told of the 

presence of semen on the towel, [Rodriguez] explained that he 

had wiped his sweat on it and stated that if the semen was his, 

he did not know how it got there. He spoke of having a possible 

lapse of memory and asked whether he could press charges if 

something had happened to him.

Subsequent to the initial interview, [Rodriguez] called Detective 

Uhrich, admitted that he had not been truthful, and indicated 

that he was stressed and wanted to get things straightened out. 

[Rodriguez] explained that B.W. had manually stimulated his 

penis while the two were on her bed, and that he may have 

passed out during the episode, but that he was not sure. He 
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denied having committed a sexual assault on her and 

complained that he did not want to lose his job or family.

This conversation between Detective Uhrich and [Rodriguez] was 

recorded. Prior to trial, the Commonwealth submitted a motion 

in limine seeking permission to play the audio recording of the 

interview to the jury. Due to issues with the quality of the audio 

recording, we denied the Motion in Limine, but permitted 

Detective Uhrich to read the transcript of the recording to the 

jury. The defense objected to the use or reading of the 

transcript on the basis that a minute and nine seconds of the 

conversation was lost as it had not been recorded.

[Rodriguez] testified that while he worked on B.W.’s television, 

B.W. sat on the bed and flirted with him. After she began 

rubbing his body, he sat down on the bed and she unbuckled his 

pants and pulled down his zipper. He explained that he “just let 

it happen.” He claimed that she manually stimulated his penis 

until he ejaculated, but that he had no other physical contact 

with her and that he did not act out sexually on her. He admitted 

that he could only recall bits and pieces and that the details of 

the incident were a little blurry as the heat, the confined area 

and the time affected his memory. However, he insisted that 

B.W. initiated the act and that he had wanted to press charges 

against her.

[Rodriguez] was found guilty of all charges and was sentenced 

on June 11, 2014 [to three to ten years’ incarceration at a state 

facility].

Trial Court Opinion, 9/5/14, at 1-4 [citations to record omitted]. 

On July 8, 2014, Rodriguez filed a timely notice of appeal. On July 14, 

2014, he filed his concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion 

on September 5, 2014. 

On appeal, Rodriguez presents the following issue for our review:

Whether the trial court improperly denied defense 

counsel’s motion to compel discovery of previous 

allegations of rape [made] by [the] victim, and therefore 

deprived appellant of [probative] evidence.
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Appellant’s Brief, at 2.

The trial court’s order denying a motion to compel discovery is 

reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. 

The term ‘discretion’ imports the exercise of judgment, 

wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion, 

within the framework of the law, and is not exercised for 

the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge. 

Discretion must be exercised on the foundation of reason, 

as opposed to prejudice, personal motivations, caprice or 

arbitrary actions. Discretion is abused when the course 

pursued represents not merely an error of judgment, but 

where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where 

the law is not applied or where the record shows that the 

action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 753 (Pa. 2000) [citation 

omitted]. . 

Rodriguez argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to 

compel discovery as to Detective Uhrich’s investigative reports regarding 

B.W.’s past sexual assault accusations. He argues that had defense counsel 

been able to see the requested records, it “could have made for a compelling 

argument that the victim, B.W., has a mental health concern that prohibits 

her from understanding the nature of sexual conduct.” Appellant’s Brief, at 

5. The trial court relied on the Rape Shield Law, stating that “[a]ny prior 

allegation of rape against another individual was irrelevant to this matter[.]” 

Trial Court Opinion, supra at 5. 

Our inquiry must begin with an analysis of the Pennsylvania Rape 

Shield Law, which states, in pertinent part:
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§ 3104. Evidence of victim’s sexual conduct

(a) General rule – Evidence of specific instances of the alleged 

victim’s past sexual conduct, opinion evidence of the alleged 

victim’s past sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the 

alleged victim’s past sexual conduct shall not be admissible in 

prosecutions under this chapter except evidence of the alleged 

victim’s past sexual conduct with the defendant where consent of 

the alleged victim is at issue and such evidence is otherwise 

admissible pursuant to the rules of evidence.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3104(a). 

We must consider the statute in conjunction with its purpose and the 

holding of Commonwealth v. Johnson, 638 A.2d 940 (Pa. 1994). The 

purpose of the Rape Shield Law is “to prevent a sexual assault trial from 

denigrating into an attack upon the victim’s reputation for chastity”, Id. at 

942, citing Commonwealth v. Majorana, 470 A.2d 80 (Pa. 1983), and to 

“prevent a trial from shifting its focus from the culpability of the accused 

toward the virtue and chastity of the victim ... [and] to exclude irrelevant 

and abusive inquiries regarding prior sexual conduct of sexual assault 

complainants.” Commonwealth v. Burns, 988 A.2d 684, 689 (Pa. Super. 

2009). 

In Johnson, our Supreme Court considered the application of the 

Rape Shield Law to the admissibility of prior accusations of sexual assault. 

There, a mentally handicapped child accused Johnson of sexually assaulting 

her. Johnson, 638 A.2d at 941. At trial, Johnson attempted to introduce 

evidence that several years earlier, the victim had complained to a friend 

that another male (one of the Commonwealth’s witnesses) had sexually 
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harassed her, and that she was now afraid of him. Johnson intended to offer 

this evidence of past accusations both to attack the credibility of the victim, 

and to suggest that he had been falsely accused. Id. Ultimately, the Court 

found that although the Rape Shield Law did not bar this sort of testimony, 

the traditional rules of evidence still applied. The Court concluded the 

proffered testimony was not relevant and therefore inadmissible. Id. at 

943. 

Here, Rodriguez argues he was wrongly denied the opportunity to 

present evidence in support of his theory that B.W. was mentally ill, had 

previously accused others of sexual assault, and might not understand the 

“nature of sexual conduct.” Appellant’s Brief, at 5. Rodriguez also argues 

that the appellant in Johnson attempted to advance a similar argument to 

cast doubt on the credibility of the victim. On that point, the Supreme Court 

stated: “Appellant argues that the testimony is material as it concerns the 

credibility of [the victim]. However, a witness may not be contradicted upon 

a collateral matter. A collateral matter is one which has no relationship to 

the matter on trial. The proffered testimony does not bear upon a matter in 

issue in this case.” Id. at 942-43 (citations omitted). See Commonwealth 

v. Fink, 791 A.2d 1235 (Pa. Super. 2002). Thus, the Court found that past 

accusations against third parties are collateral; they do not bear on the 

ultimate question, which was whether the defendant sexually assaulted the 

victim. We find this reasoning applies here, and bars the admission of 

Detective Uhrich’s report as irrelevant.
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Even if we assume, arguendo, that Johnson does not apply, and the 

evidence in question is relevant, Rodriguez has failed to show, in his one 

page argument, that the evidence would be otherwise admissible. We have 

previously faced this question, concluding:

While we hold that Pennsylvania's Rape Shield Law may 

not be used to exclude relevant evidence showing witness’ 

bias or attacking credibility, we do not hold that all 

material evidence is necessarily admissible. Although 

logically relevant, evidence tending to show the victim’s 

prejudice or lack of credibility may be excluded if it would 

so inflame the minds of the jurors that its probative value 

is outweighed by unfair prejudice.

Commonwealth v. Black, 487 A.2d 396, 401 (Pa. Super. 1985); see also

Pa.R.E. Rule 403 (court must balance probative value of evidence against 

possibility of unfair prejudice). 

Here, the trial court granted in camera review of the evidence, but did 

not find that the probative value outweighed the potential prejudice. Trial 

Court Opinion, supra, at 6-7. In fact, the court found the evidence had no 

probative value at all because the fact that Detective Uhrich had prior 

contact with the victim and knew that she was mentally challenged “was 

immaterial to issues regarding [her] report of the sexual assault alleged to 

have been perpetrated by [Rodriguez].” Trial Court Opinion, at 7. The court 

also reasoned that the reports contained nothing exculpatory to Rodriguez 

and provided no grounds to attack the victim’s credibility. Id. The court 

was well within its discretion to make such a finding. Further, on appeal, 

Rodriguez failed to present argument as to why the court’s application of this 
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balancing test constituted an abuse of discretion. Rodriguez argues, and we 

agree, that under Johnson, the Rape Shield Law does not apply to bar 

evidence of past accusations of sexual assault. He fails to recognize, 

however, that even if the Rape Shield Law does not apply to bar the 

evidence, the traditional rules of evidence apply. Johnson, 638 A.2d at 

942. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/5/2015