Docket No. 108038.



### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STA TE OF IL LINOIS

K ENNETH W. SCHULTZ, Appel lee, v. ILLI NOIS FA RMER S INSU RANCECOMPANY, A ppellant .–IL

LI NOI S FARMERS INSU RANCECOMPAN Y, Appellan t, v. BARB ARA WEGL

ARZ

e t al. , Appelle es.
Opinion filed March 18, 2010.

JUSTICE KARMEI

ER delive red the j udgmen

t of the c ourt, with opinion. Chief Justice Fitzgerald and

Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Garman, and Burke concurr ed in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

Before us in this appeal are two actions for declaratory judgment presentinga single issue: does Illinois law permit insurers to issue motor vehicle li abi lity policies in which occupants of a covered vehicle are afforded uninsured motorist (UM) cover age but excluded fromunderins

ured (U IM) c overag e? Both act

ions in volve d motor vehicle li ab il it y polici es conta

ining pr ovisions wh

ich purported to eliminate UIM coverag e for occupants by defining “insureds” more

narrowly under the policies’ UIM prov isions than they did for purp oses of li ability and UM cover age. In the

first case, Schultz v.-2- Illinois Farmers Insuran ce Co., th e circu it court of

Cook County upheld the exclus ion of occ

upants fr om UIM c ov erage and gr anted summary judgment in favor of the insurance company . In thesecond case, Illinois Farmers I

nsurance Co. v. Weglarz, the court found that the attempt to exclude occupants from UIM cove rage was rendere d ineffective by ambiguity

in the po li cy. On appeal, the appellate court held th at th e p ol ic y p rovis io ns e xc lu di ng o ccu pan ts fro m UIM
covera ge contravene section 14 3a–2 of the Illinois I nsurance Code (215 I LCS 5/143a–2 (West 2002)) and are therefore void a nd unenforceable. Based

on this conclusion, it reversed the judgmen t in favor of the insuranc e compan

y in the Schult

z caseand affirmed the judgment in favor of the insured in the Weglarz case. 387 Ill. App. 3d 622. We granted the insurance company ’s petition for lea ve to appe al. 210 Ill. 2d R. 315. For the reas o ns that follow, we now affirm the appella te court’s judgment and remand to thecircuit court for further procee dings.

BACKGROUND The S chultz litigation arose from an automobile accident which occurred in Augus t of 2005. I

n the acc ident, a ve hicle driven by Kathleen O’Conner and

owned by He

rbert and Alvina Hummelberg

was st ru ck by a vehicledriven by Alexandri a Fotopo

ulos. Patr icia Smetan a was a passenger in O’Conner’ s car. Neither she nor O’Conner was rela

ted to the

Hummelbe

rgs. Both were injured. Smetana ultimately died

of her injuries. Following Smetana’s death, the cir cui t court appointed Kenneth Schultz independent administrator of her estate. At the time of the accident, Fotopolous’ vehicle was cove red by

a motor vehicle liability policy

issued by Illinois Farmers Insurance Company (Farmers) and gover

ned by the laws of

Illinois. The policy contained liability limits of $100,00 0 per p erson and $300,000 per accide nt. Farmers settled with both O’Conner and Smeta na’s est ate for the policy limits. The Hummelbe

rgs’ ve hicle wa s also insured

by Far mers, but had higher coverage l im its of $250,000 per person and $500,000 per1 Both th e Hum melbe rgs’ p olicy and the

Farmers policy

invol ved in the Weglar z litigation con

t ained “step-dow

n” provisions wh

ich reduced liability cover age fo r per miss ive us ers of co vere d vehi cle s to t he min imums required by Illinois law. Although we previously held that such step-down provisions did not offend

the pub lic poli cy of this state ( State Farm Mutual Automo bileInsur ance Co. v. Illinois Farmers Insurance C o. , 226 Ill. 2d 395 (2007), legislation which took effect January 1, 2008, now require s that all policies for

private passeng er automobiles prov ide “the same lim

its of bod ily injury liability, prope rty damage liability, uninsured a n d underinsured

motorist bod

ily in jury, a nd me dical pa

yme nts cov erage to all persons insured

under t hat poli cy, w

hether o r not aninsured person is a named insured o

r permissive user under the policy.” 215 ILCS 5/143.13a (West 20 08).

2 Tho ugh not relevant here, the UM and UIM prov isions also b ot h

co vered any other person

“for damag es that person is entitled to recover because of bod

ily in jury” to individuals who

qualified as “insureds” un der the respective prov

isions. That is also true of the pol icy i n the We glarz

case.
-3- accident fo r bod ily injury , UM coverage, and UI M coverage. 1 O’Conner and Smetana’s estate each filed claims ag ainst Farmers requestingadditional compensation und er t he p ol icy’ s UIM provision s. Those claims were denied based on p ol icy langua ge pertainingto UIM coverage. For purpose s of UM coverage, the policy defined an “insur

ed person” as t

he per son to whom the policy was issued, a family

member, or

“[a]ny other person while occ upying the

car described in the policy.” With respect to UI M coverage, however, the definition of “insured person” omitted occupants of the car. The policy purported to limit UIM coverag e to the person to w hom the policy was issue d or a family membe r. 2 Because O’Connor and Smetana wer e not among

the pers ons to whom

the Humme lbergs ’ policy had been issued and

were not members of the family of any
su ch per son, they could not meet the UI M provision’s more restrictive definition. For this reason, their claims were denied. Believing the policy’s disparate

definitions of “insur

ed persons” failed to meet the

requir eme nts of Illinois law, Schultz, as administrator

of Smetana’s estate, and O’Conner brought an ac tion in the circuit c ourt of Cook County pursuant to sectio n 2 –701 of the-4- Code of Civil Procedure (735 IL CS 5/2–701 ( West 2002) ) to obtain

a de claration that the UIM provision’s more r estrictive definition violated Illinois law an

d was une nforce able and

that the $ 250,000 in UIM coverage should therefore be available to them

under th e p ol ic y. Farmers filed a c ounterc la im, a sking that the policy pr ovisions be upheld. Smetana’s est ate an d O’Conner moved for summary judgment (735 IL CS 5/2–1005 (

West 2002) ) on their

claim. F arme rs, in

turn, moved for summary

judgmen t on its counterclaim. Before the court ruled on t hose motions, Farmers voluntar ily agreed to recog

nize the UIM claim submitted by

O’Conner, leaving only

the claim submitted by Smetana’s estate in dispute. Following a hearing, the circuit court granted summary judgme

nt in favor of Farmers and again st Smetana’s estate. In the court’ s view, omission of a vehicle’s occupa nts from the defini tion of “in sur ed” for pur pos es o f UIM

covera ge did not viol ate I llinois law and precluded the estate from

re co ve ri ng un de r t he UIM pr ov is io ns of th e H um me lb er gs ’ p ol ic y. Withrespect

to the Weglarz case, the record shows that in January of 2005, Ba rbara We glarz wa s riding

ina sport ut

ility vehicle owned by Krysztof and Jol anta Maj chrowicz and driven by Jolanta. The vehicle, which wa s insured by F armers, was struck by a car driven by Galyna Kovalyz. Kovaly

z’s car was insur ed by A

llstate pu rsuant to
a po li cy that carr ied a bodily injury liability limit of $25,000 per person. Weglarz suffered

serious in

juries as a result of the collision, and Allstate tendered Kovaly

z’s policy’s full $25,0 00 policy limits to her. Believing this sum wa s insuffic ient to ful l compens a te her for her injuries, Weglarz made a claim to Farmers under the UIM provisions of the policy

it had issued on the Majchrowicz’s vehicle. That policy provided UIM coverag e in the amount of $50,000 per person and $100,000 per occurrence, the same limits specified in the policy for liability and UM covera

ge. As w i th the Fa

rmers ins urance policy at issue in

the Schult

z litigation, the definition of an “insured” in the UM provisions of the policy relevant to Weglarz’s claim included occupants of the vehicle. Withrespect to the UIM provisions, howeve r, o ccupant s were omitted. The UIM provisions limited “insureds” to th e person to whom the policy was issued or a member of th at pe rs on ’s fa mi ly.-5- There is no disput

e that Weglarz did no t fall with in th i s definition. While she was Jolanta’s mother, the p ol ic y l imited cov ered fa mily members to those persons related to the policy holders by bloo d , marri age or

adopti on who also resided in the policyholde r’s household. Weglarz did not live with the Majchrowiszes. Becau se Weglar

z did not qualify

as an “insured” as defined by the UIM provisions of

th e M aj ch ro wi cz es ’ p ol ic y, it denied her claim for underinsured

motorist c overag e. I

t then brought an action in the circuit cour t of Coo k County

to obtain a

judicial d

eclara tion that, under the terms of the pol icy

it had issue d to the Ma

jchrowic zes, it had n o duty

to provide

UI M cov erag e to We gla

rz. Wegla rz a nd the Maj chrowic zes filed a n answer to Farme

rs’ complaint in which they asser

ted that the language in the

body of the policy and policy e

ndorseme nts rende red the d ocument a

mbig uous , that the ambig

uity should be resolved against Farmers, and that under the policy as so construed, Weglarz qualifies as an insured under the policy’sUIM provisions . Weglar z and the Ma

jchrowic zes arg

ued, in the alterna

tive, tha t i f Farm ers’ construction is accepted and a

ve hicle’s occupants are excluded from the definition of wh o constitutes an insu

re d under the UIM provisions, the denial of

covera ge to Weglarz would nevertheless be improper because (1) the exclusion would viola

te the Illinois I

nsuranc e Code an

d Illi nois public policy and (2) F armers i mplemente d the exclu sion withou t first obtaining authorization from the Department of I nsurance. Following various d

evelopme nts not per

tinent to th

is appeal, the parties subsequently filed cr oss-motions for summa

ry judgmen t. The circuit court granted summary judgme

nt in favor of Weglarz and the Majchrowiczes and against Farmers. I t based its decisi on on the c laim of ambigui ty in the poli cy’s lan guage. The court did not rea ch the question o f w het her Far mer s’ a tt emp t t o l im it th e sc ope of i ts UIM
covera ge violated state law or offended pu blic policy conce

rns, nor did it address the issue of whether the challeng ed provi sions were fatally defective because they

had not be en approved in advance by the Department of Insura

nce. Farmers appealed the ci rcuit co urt’s judg ment. I n the Schu

ltz litigation, where F armers had preva iled, an a ppeal wa s taken by Smetana’ s est ate. The

appeals were c onsolidat

ed by the appe llate court. The appellate court reversed the judg ment in favor of Farmers-6- inthe Schultz litigation and affirmed the judgmen t against Farmers inthe case

brough t by Weglar z and the Ma

jchorwic zes. The b asis for the court’s ruling w as the sa me with respect to both cases. It be lieved that exclusio n of a v ehicle’s occupants from the definition of an insured in the UI

M p rovision s of the policies issued by Fa rmers violated the requ irements of Il linois law and was therefore void and unenforceable. Becau se this hold ing was d ispositive in both cases, the court did not reach the questions of whether thepolicy involved i

nthe Weglarz litigation was ambiguous or whether its res tricti ve U IM provisions were inv ali d b ecause they had not been submitted to the Department of Insura

nce for approval. 387 I ll. App. 3d at 628-29.

ANA LYSIS Both of the consolidated cases before us wer e decided in the cont ext of motions f

or summar

y ju dgment. Suc h motions are gove rne d by section 2–1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 IL CS 5 /2–1005 (West 2008)). Pursuant to that statute, summary judgment should be g

ranted only

where the ple adin gs, dep ositions, admissions and affidavits on file, w hen viewed in

the ligh t most favora ble to the nonmoving party, show that there is no genuine issue

as to any materia l fact an d that the moving pa

rty is clear ly e ntitled to judgment as a matt er of law. 735 ILCS 5/2–1005(c) (2008). Construction of the terms of an insurance policy and whether

th e policy comports with statutory require ments are qu estio ns of law properl y decided on a motion for summary judgment. See Librizzi v. State Farm Fir

e & Casual ty Co. , 236 Ill. App. 3d 582, 587 (1992). Where an order

granti ng summa

ry judgmen t is befor e us on ap

peal,

our review i s de novo

. Adams v. Northern Illinois Gas Co. , 211 Ill. 2d 32, 42-43 (2004). Inunderta

king our review, we beg in with

the familiar

principle that a court’s primary

objective in construing an insurance contract is to ascertain and give effe ct to the intention of the parties as expressed inthe agreement. I f i nsur ance policy terms are clear and unambig uous, th ey m

ust be enf orced a s written

unless doi

ng so wou ld violate public policy. Nicor, Inc. v. Associated Electric & Gas Insurance Service

s, Ltd., 223 Ill. 2d 407, 416-17 (2006)

. The public policy of this state is reflected in its constitution, statutes, and judicial decision s. Terms of an

insuranc e policy

that conf lict with a statute are-7- void and unenforceable. Similarly , terms of an insur ance p olicy cannot circumvent

the underlying

purpose of a statute in force at the time of the policy ’s issuance. State FarmMutual Aut omobile Insurance Co. v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. , 226 Ill. 2d at 400- 01. As we have

indicate d, the app ellate

court concluded that

Farmers’ attempt to exclude occupants of insured vehicles from UIM cover age under the polic ies at issue in this cas e canno t be squar ed with governing Illinois law

and is therefore unenforcea ble. A similar r

esult

was recently r

eached on analogous facts by a differ ent panel of

t he appella te court from a differen

t district. See Desaga v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Co. , 391 Ill. App. 3d 1062 (2009). To our knowledge, no reported decision in Illinois has upheld the validity of the ty pe of exclu sion f

rom UIM cove rag e cha lleng ed in this c ase. We find this unsurprising, for the exclusion p lainly violates I llinois law. Withcertain

exception s not rele

vant her e, all mo tor vehicles operated or registered in this State and designed for use on a p ublic highway must be covere d by

a li ability

insuranc e policy . 625 ILCS 5/7–601(a) (West 200 4)). By statute, the policy is required to provide certain minimum liability amounts. 625 ILCS 5/7–203, 7–317(b)(3) (West 2004). It m

ust also me et speci fic cove rage r equirem ents. Among these are that

the policy

insure no t only

the pers ons named

in the policy, b ut als o “any other person using or responsible for the use” of the sub

ject veh icle with the express or implied permission of the insured. 625 I LCS 5/7

–317(b)(2) (West 20 04); State Fa rm Mutua l Automobil

e Insuranc e Co. v. I

llinois Farm ers Insurance Co. , 226 I ll. 2d at 402; Progressive Universal Insurance Co. of Illinois v. Liberty Mutual Fir

e Insuran ce Co ., 215 Ill. 2d 121, 137 (2005). Ininterpreting the fore going statutory provision , which tr

eats permissive users the

same as named insu

reds for purposes of liabili ty coverage, it is important to note the langua ge chosen by the legislature. The law does not refer to permissive drivers. I t speaks in terms of permissiv e users. The statute itself does not define the term

user. We must therefore must give it its plain and ordinary meani ng. Granite City Division of National St eel C o. v. Illinois Pollution C ontrol Board , 155 Ill. 2d 149, 181 (1993). A user, in the generi c sense, is si mply on e who mak es use of a thing. “Use,”

in turn, is synony mous with

“EMPL OY, UTI

LI ZE, APPL

Y, [and] AVA

IL [. It]3 Some courts ha ve concluded that one can be “using ” a m otor vehic le

even when one is no t occupying it as either a driver o

r passenger

at th e time the injury is sustained. See , e.g. , George son v. Fidelit

y & Gu a ranty Insurance Co. , 48 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1267- 68 (D. Mont. 1998 ) (applying Montana law). It has been held, for exam ple, th at one i s “using” a vehicle, for purpos es of in surance

cover age, when lo ading

personal belon

ging s into itor unlo ading

personal belon

ging s from

it. See, e.g ., Travelers Insurance Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 491 S.W.2d 363, 3 65 (Tenn. 1973). The concept of use does, howev er, hav e its lim its. Fo r exam

ple, one Ill inois appella te decision held that an in dividual whowas acting as a spotter and

-8- is general and indi cates any putting to service of a thing ***.” Webster’s Third International Dictionar y 2524 (1976). Consistent with this definition, the use of an automobile has been held t o denote i

ts employ ment for s ome purpo se of the user. As th e NewJersey Supreme Court has explained, “ ‘ “operation” denotes the manipula tion of the

car’s c ontrols in order to propel it a s a vehi cle[, b ut‘use’] is * ** broad

er than o peration.’ [Citation.]” (Emphasis omitted.) Jaquez

v. National Continental Insurance Co. , 178 N.J. 88, 96, 835 A.2d 309, 314 (2003). One uses an automobi le whenever suchuse “is rationally conne cted to the vehicle for the purpos e of providing transportation or satisfy ing some other related need of the user.” Jaquez v. National Continental Insurance Co. , 178 N.J. at 96, 835 A.2d at 315. Courts in other jurisdictions have followed this reason ing an d concluded

that for purposes of motor vehicl e insurance polic ies, “use” is not limited

to operating or driving a motor vehicle. It also includes riding in one as a passenger. See 7 Am Jur 2d Automobil

e Insurance §93 (1997) (“ [a] pas senger in an automobile is ‘using’ the automobile, where the passenger ha s authorization for the use of the automobile

and it is be ing driv en by another person with his or h er permission”); Marchand v. Safeco Insuranc e Co. of America , 2 S.W.3d 826, 828-29 (Mo. App. 1999); Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Cummings , 4 38 Pa. Super. 586, 600, 652 A.2d 1338, 1345 (1994); State FarmMutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Fran cis , 669 S.W.2d 424, 4 27 (T ex. App. 1984) (collecting cases); see also Unisun Insuran ce Co. v. Schmidt , 339 S.C. 362, 366, 529 S.E.2d 280, 282 (2000). 3 No princ iple o f statutory construction supports a moredirecting the m ovement’s o f the truc k’s dr iver at th e time the truck struck

an d killed a pedes trian at a constr

uction s ite was not, hi

mself , using th e truck within the m

eaning of the insura

nce policy ’s provisions. See Apcon Corp. v. Dana Trucking

, Inc. , 251 Ill. App. 3d 973 ( 1993 ). Because none of these circumstance s are before us here, we express no view on them.

4 By way of comparison, an example o f statutory langu age which can be constru ed to excl ude pas senge

rs from the def inition of “use

rs” is the Califor nia Insurance C ode, which specifically states that (1) “the term

‘use’ when applied to a m otor v ehicle shall onl

y m ean ope

ra ti ng, mainta ining, loadi ng, or unloading a motor vehicle ,” and that (2) “the te rm ‘oper ated by’

or ‘when operatin

g’ sha ll be co nclusiv

ely presumed to d

escribe the conduct of the person sitting im

mediately beh

ind the steering con

trols of the motor vehic le.” Ca

l. In s. Cod

e §§115 80.06( f), (g).

5 That was not done in eithe r of the cases invo lved in this appea l, and th ere is no dis pute th at, in b oth cas es, the amount of UM covera ge i s ident ical t o the co verage amou nt for bodily i njur y liabi lity.

-9- limitedinterpre ta tion. 4 We therefore construe I llinois’ mandatory liability covera ge req uiremen ts to extend to permissive passengers as wel l as permis sive driv ers. Bo th must be tr eated a s insured s f

o r purposes of liability covera ge. Illinois law also r

equires mo tor vehicle li ability policies to include UM cov era ge. See 625 IL CS 5/7 –601(a)(West 2004 ); 215 I LCS 5/143a(West 2004 ). If

the limits f

or liabil it y coverage exceed the minimum amounts required by la w, as they di d in the policies challenged here , the UM provisions must provide the same higher

cov e rage amounts. That is so unless the insured makes a written election to specif ically reject U M covera ge in exc ess of the statutory minimums required for liability f o rbodily injury . 215 ILCS 5/143a–2(1) (West

2004). 5 Moreover, the UM coverage must extend to all who a re insured under the policy ’s liability provisions. I f a person const itut es an i nsure d for p urpos es of l iabil ity cover age under

a policy, the insurance

company may

not, either

directly or

in di re ct ly, deny uninsure d-motoris t covera ge to that person. Heritage Insurance Co. of America v. Phelan , 59 Ill. 2d 389, 395 (1974). Farmers doe s notdispute any of these r

equirements, and

they are, in fact, integrated into the terms of both of the policies which gave rise to this litigation.-10- In add ition to providing U M covera ge, motor vehicl e liabilit y policies in Ill inois are als o re qui red to pro vi de U IM coverage where , as in the case s before

us, the UM

covera ge exce eds the st

atuto r y minimums required

for liabi lity for b odil y injury. The UIM cover age must be in an a

mount equa

l to the tota

l amo unt of UM c overage provided under the policy. As w

ith UM coverage, UI

M co vera ge must also extend to a

ll those who are ins

ured und er the po licy ’s liabilit

y provision s. See 215 IL CS 5/143a–2(4) (West 2004). For the reasons explained earlier in this opini on, the ca

tegory of those insured under

a policy’s liability

provisions must always include permissive users, and permissiv e users i

nclu des permissive passengers as well as permissive drivers. Under Illinois law, li ability , UM and UIM provisions are thus inextrica bly linked. See Lee v. John Deere Insurance Co. , 208 Ill. 2d 38, 44-45 (2003); Mercury Indemnity Co. of Illinois v. Kim , 358 I ll. App. 3d 1, 11 (200 5). On ce a person qualifies as an insured for purposes of the pol icy ’s bodily injury liabil i ty provisions, he or she must be treated

as an insu

red for UM and UI

M purpose s as well. Ac co rd in gl y, just as the governing statutes prohibi t an i nsurance
c ompany from directly or

indirectly deny

ing uninsured-mot oris t
covera ge to someone who qualifies as an i nsured f or purposes of liability coverage (

Heritage Insurance Co. of America v. Phelan , 59 Ill

. 2d at 395), it likewise prohibits companies from directly or indirec tly denying underinsured coverage to such a person where, as here, the basic liability c overage exceeds statutory minimums. Section 143a–2 of the Illi nois I nsuranc e Code (2 15 IL CS 5/143a–2 (West 2002)) does state that, for purposes of the Code, an “underinsured

motor veh

icle” me ans a motor vehicl e whose ownership, maintenance or use has resulted in bodily injury or death to an insured “as defined in the policy .” Contrary to the view taken by Farmers, however, t

hi s langua

ge doe s not give

insurers the rig

ht to define insureds for UIM purposes differently tha

n it does for

purposes of liability and UM coverag e. I llinois law afford s some latitude to the parties to determine who will be insured u nder the liability provisions of the policy, b

ut as we ha

ve indica ted, it doe s no t give them the option of excluding permissive users, a categor y which includes permissive passengers as well as permissive drivers. Moreover, once it has bee n determined who qualifies as an insured for purposes of-11- liability coverage, that

determination must be applied consistently for purposes of UM a

nd U IM coverage. See DeSaga v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Co. , 391 Ill. App. 3d 1062, 1070 (2009). Farmers cannot successfully argue that public policy considerations wa rr an t t re at in g U M a nd UIM co ve ra ge di ff er en tl y. That is so for se

veral r easons. F irst, our c ourt has s pecific ally

held that UM and UIM covera

ge were mandated by

the legislature for the

same reason, namely , to plac e an insured in the same position he or she would hav e occup ied had th e to rtf easor c arried

adequa te insurance. Sulser v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. , 147 Ill. 2d 548, 555 (1992). Because “[u]ninsured and underinsured motorist policies provide virtually

the same covera ge to the insured” ( Sulser v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. , 147 Ill. 2d at 556), i t would be anoma

lous to declare in sur eds in eli gib le f or a ny UIM benefits under circumstances where they would be entitled t o full UM benefits but for the happenstance that the tortf easor had minimal insurance rather than

none at all. Such a result would, in fact, be dire ctly contrar y to the le gis lature’s intent whe

n it enac ted sect

ion 143a–

2 of the I

llinois Insurance Code. See Cummins v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. , 178 Ill. 2d 474, 484

(1997) ( through the st atute’s provisions, “ ‘the legislature avoided the absurdity of a situation where a policy

holder would receive fewer benef

its in the fortuitous event of being injured by an unde rinsured rather than an uninsured motorist’ “), quoting Sulser v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. , 147 Ill. 2d at 557. Second, even if we could formulate a valid rationale for treating UM and UI

M covera ge diff erently , that wou ld not ju stify

the resu lt urged by Far mers in this case. We must interpret and apply statutes inthe manne

r in which

they are wri tten and c annot re

write the m to make them cons istent with our own id

ea of or derline ss and pub lic po li cy. Roselle Police Pension Board v. Villageof Roselle , 232 Ill. 2d 546, 558 (2009). The language of the UIM statute, section 143a–2(4) of the Illinois Insura

nce Code (215 I

LCS 5/1 43a–2(4 ) (West

2004)), makes clear that the leg

islature intended a policy ’s UI

M covera ge to parallel the coverage af

fo rded by UM provisions wher e, as here,

covera ge li mi ts ex cee d st atu to ry mi ni mu ms . In deed, our court has specif i cally cited this statute as exemplifying how the le gislature expresses itself wh en it inten ds for dif ferent typ es of cov erage

in

excess o f the minimum statutory requirements manda ted by the-12- Illinois Safety and F amily Responsibility Law to b e the s ame. State Farm Mutual Aut

omobile I

nsurance Co. v. Illi

nois Farme

rs Insurance Co. , 226 Ill. 2d at 403. Farm ers argues that the disparity between the UM an d UI M prov isions in its policies does not run afoul of section 143a–2(4) o f the Illinois In surance

Code bec ause tha

t statute a

pplie s only

to
covera ge amounts and does not prevent it from limiting the definition of insureds who may

avail themselves of cover age. T his arg ument is untenable. Even i f the s tatut e were t aken as requi ring o n ly p arity in

covera ge amounts, that requirement would be violated

here, for under Farmers’ poli cies, the co verage amo unts for one particular ty pe of insureds , occupa

nts, is clearly not the

same. Oc cupants a

re elig ible to receive substantial UM benefit s. Their U IM be nefits, by contrast, ar

e
zero. We note, moreover, that if Farmers’ ar gument were acce pted, it would mean that the UIM provisions of a policy would pass statutory muster so long a s the dolla

r amount o f co verag e specif ied in thos e provisions was the sa

me as tha

t specifi ed in th e policy ’s UM provisions , eve n if the UIM provisions were dra fted in such a way that no one could e ver qua lify to rece ive UIM benefits. Such a construct ion w ould rend er our st

atutory UIM r equirem ents meaningless. Farmers’ argument must also be rejected beca use it overlooks the

more fundame

ntal prob lem that it

would require us to ignore the clear statutory requ irements impos ed by the Ge neral Assembly. As w e have discussed, Illinois law requires that UIM c overag e must be o ffere d to all insureds where, as here, the UM coverage exceeds the minimum amounts require d for bodi ly in jury liability . Under I

llinois law

all motor vehicle liability policies, insureds must include permissive

users of covered

vehic les (625 I

LCS 5/7 –317(b)(2), (b)( 3) (West 2004)), and “use

rs” inclu de passe ngers a s well as d

rivers. Sme ta na and Weglar z were cl early

using the insured v ehicles

with permission at the time th ey

were inj ured. As a re sul t, th ey qu ali fie d fo r UIM coverage as a matter of

law. In t he course of its argument, Far mers seems to accept that the law bars it from excluding permissive users fro m UIM cov era ge. In its view, however, permissive users are limited to drivers. Passengers

are not included. Tha t, apparently, is why it ultimately recog

nized-13- O’Conner’s UIM c lai m i n t he S chu lt z l it iga ti on. Inresp onse to thi s argument , we s imply note aga in that such a distinction cannot be squared with the plain and ordinary meaning of the relevant statutory language. To acce

pt Farme rs’ position would require d us to adopt an interpretation

of the word

“user” which has been consistently rejected by courts in other ju

risdictions. It would also necessitate that we r ead into the governing statutes a di s tinction w hich the l egisla

ture itse lf has not made . This we may not do. A court may not add pr ovisions that are not found in a

statute, n or may it depar t from a st atute’s p lain langua ge by read

ing int o the law exceptions, limitations, or conditions tha t th e legis lature d id not expre ss. Madison Two Associates v. Pappas , 227 Ill. 2d 474, 495 (2008). Fi na ll y, Farmers asserts t

hat requ iring it t o provi de UIM cov erage for the injuries sustained by Smetana and Weg larz will imper

missibly infri nge on its rig

hts of fre edom of c ontract . This cla im is witho ut merit. As indicate d earlie

r in this opinion, the terms of an insurance policy must c omp ort with the statutory require ments in effect when the policy

is issued. Insu

rers ha ve no rig ht to depa

rt from va

lid

s ta tutory requirements. Farmers’ policies must therefor e adhere to the statutory provision s discusse d in

this opinion. The UIM provisions at issue here fail to do so.

CONCLUSIO N For the foregoing

reasons, the appellate court correctly concluded that the portions of the Far

m ers insurance policies which purported to exclude occupants of

covere d mot or veh icles from U IM covera ge
v iolate Illinois law and are unenfor ceable. The judgment of the appellate court is therefore affir med.

Affirmed

.