J-A11003-24

2024 PA Super 160

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

NICKERS BEAUCHAMPS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1216 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 15, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-28-CR-0000448-2022

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

OPINION BY BOWES, J.: FILED: JULY 30, 2024

Nickers Beauchamps appeals from the judgment of sentence of sixteen 

to thirty-six months of incarceration imposed following his two convictions for 

failing to comply with his Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act 

(“SORNA”) obligations.

1

 We affirm.

Appellant was required to register due to his conviction for child 

pornography charges, for which he was arrested on June 18, 2018. He

entered a plea on July 18, 2018, and was sentenced on August 29, 2018, to 

a period of nine months of incarceration in the county jail, followed by five 

years of restrictive intermediate punishment. Appellant initially registered as 

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1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10 – 9799.42.
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a sexual offender in Pennsylvania on March 15, 2019.2 See Trial Court 

Opinion, 10/6/23, at 2 (“[Appellant] completed his initial [registration] . . . on 

March 15, 2019, and . . . is required to register every [twelve] months until 

March 15, 2034.”). Appellant signed paperwork acknowledging his SORNA 

obligations.

Appellant was ordered to return to Pennsylvania from Florida for 

violations of his intermediate punishment program sometime in October of 

2020, which resulted in his incarceration through December 28, 2021.3 

Thereafter, Appellant, according to his testimony, “stay[ed] with [his] friend 

for about a week” before he had enough money “to go back down to Florida.” 

N.T. Trial, 12/1/22, at 72. Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) trooper Erica 

Polcha testified that she received a request to investigate Appellant for 

noncompliance on February 2, 2022. She learned through her investigation 

that Appellant had initially registered a Florida address with that jurisdiction’s 

equivalent of the PSP no later than February 28, 2020. She identified October 

27, 2020, as Appellant’s last update with the PSP.4 See N.T. Trial, 12/1/22, 

at 51. Trooper Polcha determined that Appellant last updated his address with 

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2 As this date is exactly nine months from June 15, 2018, it appears that 

Appellant was paroled on this date and registered at that time.

3 Appellant was apparently released upon parole to Immigrations and Customs 

Enforcement (“ICE”) officials, who placed Appellant into a home plan in 

Charlotte County, Florida. The trial court opinion cites Appellant’s testimony 

on this point. 

4 Presumably, that update was made in conjunction with his revocation.
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Florida authorities on or about February 28, 2022, and she testified that 

Appellant never informed the PSP that he had moved to Florida or otherwise 

satisfied his annual registration obligations. Id. at 50. Appellant was arrested 

and charged with one count each of violating 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1(a)(1) and 

(2).

A jury convicted Appellant of both counts. Following imposition of the 

aforementioned sentence, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion, which was 

denied. He lodged a timely notice of appeal and complied with the trial court’s 

order to file a concise statement. The trial court authored its responsive 

opinion, and we now turn to the eight issues raised on appeal. 

I. Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict [Appellant] of 

count one . . . when the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that [Appellant] was an individual who was 

required to register with the [PSP] . . . .

II. Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict [Appellant] of 

count two . . . when the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that [Appellant] knowingly failed to register with 

the [PSP] . . . . 

III. Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict [Appellant] of 

count one . . . when the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that [Appellant] was an individual required to 

verify his current address with or to be photographed by the [PSP] 

by appearing at the [PSP] station as required . . . . 

IV. Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict [Appellant] of

count two . . . when the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that [Appellant] knowingly failed to verify his 

current address with or to be photographed by the [PSP] by 

appearing at the [PSP.]

V. Whether the trial court erred in failing to merge counts one and 

two for sentencing purposes as both counts have the same 

elements and arose from a single act[.]
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VI. Is it not apparent from the record that trial counsel was 

ineffective due to failing to object to the hearsay testimony, 

including double hearsay of unnamed residents, from Trooper 

Polcha?

VII. Is it not apparent from the record that trial counsel was 

ineffective due to failing to object to the relevancy of [Appellant]’s 

registration status in Florida?

VIII. Is it not apparent from the record that trial counsel was

ineffective due to failing to object to, or attempt to correct, the 

inaccurate conclusion of law of Trooper Polcha that [Appellant]

was required to register while he was incarcerated?

Appellant’s brief at 4-6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

Appellant’s first four claims collectively challenge the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support his two convictions. The following well-settled principles 

apply to our review:

We assess the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn 

therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict-winner. We 

must determine whether there is sufficient evidence to enable the 

fact-finder to have found every element of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh 

the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the 

fact[-]finder. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by 

means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying 

the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all 

evidence actually received must be considered.

Commonwealth v. Wallace, 244 A.3d 1261, 1273-74 (Pa.Super. 2021) 

(cleaned up). “Whether sufficient evidence exists to support the verdict is a 
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question of law; our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is 

plenary.” Commonwealth v. Tejada, 107 A.3d 788, 722 (Pa.Super. 2015).

Appellant asserts, with respect to each of his two convictions, that the 

Commonwealth failed to establish that (1) he had to register with the PSP and 

(2) he knowingly failed to comply with his obligations. We begin with the 

statutory text of 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1(a)(1) and (2):

(a) Offense defined.--An individual who is subject to 

registration under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.13 (relating to applicability) 

commits an offense if he knowingly fails to:

(1) register with the Pennsylvania State Police as required 

under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15 (relating to period of 

registration), 9799.19 (relating to initial registration) or 

9799.25 (relating to verification by sexual offenders and 

Pennsylvania State Police);

(2) verify his address or be photographed as required under 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9799.15, 9799.19 or 9799.25 . . . . 

18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1. 

Regarding the § 4915.1(a)(1) conviction, the parties agreed that

Appellant “is a person required to register under . . . [§] 9799.56, otherwise 

known as [SORNA].” N.T. Trial, 12/1/22, at 43. During closing argument, 

Appellant’s counsel acknowledged that Appellant was required to register, 

albeit without reference to a specific statute. Id. at 86 (“We heard that 

[Appellant] is required to register . . . and he admitted that. That’s not a 

question here.”). The trial court concluded, and the Commonwealth agrees, 

that this stipulation was sufficient. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/6/23, at 6 
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(“[W]e respectfully . . . find that [Appellant] was required to register under 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9799.56[.]”). 

The concession that Appellant had to register pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9799.56 is confusing, as that statute is not referenced within

§ 4915.1(a)(1). Briefly, we observe that § 4915.1 is the enforcement 

mechanism for Subchapter H of SORNA, whereas § 4915.2 addresses

Subchapter I.

5

 Notably, § 4915.2 criminalizes failures to “register . . . as 

required under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.56[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.2(a)(1). Thus, 

the parties agreed that Appellant had to “register” pursuant to statute that 

has no applicability to this case.6 Nonetheless, we conclude that Appellant is 

not entitled to discharge for the violation of § 4915.1(a)(1) for two reasons: 

(1) the stipulation is binding regardless of the error, and (2) Appellant fails to 

develop any argument establishing that he is entitled to relief. 

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5 Due to various decisions deeming parts of SORNA unconstitutional, “the 

General Assembly divided SORNA into two subchapters. Subchapter H is 

based on the original SORNA statute and is applicable to offenders who 

committed their offenses after the December 20, 2012 effective date of 

SORNA; Subchapter I is applicable to offenders . . . who committed their 

offenses between April 22, 1996 and the effective date of SORNA.” 

Commonwealth v. Lacombe, 234 A.3d 602, 607 n.4 (Pa. 2020) (citation 

omitted). The docket for Appellant’s child pornography charges lists an 

offense date of April 5, 2018.

6 The criminal information charged Appellant with violating 18 Pa.C.S. 

§ 4915.2. The Commonwealth moved to amend the charges to 18 Pa.C.S. 

§ 4915.1 during trial, which the trial court granted. See N.T. Trial, 12/1/22, 

at 64-65. 
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Beginning with the first point, in Commonwealth v. Padilla, 80 A.3d 

1272 (Pa. 2013), a capital case, the defendant stipulated that he committed 

the killing while in the perpetration of a felony. The stipulation was legally 

incorrect as the crime at issue was only a misdemeanor. Our Supreme Court 

held that the stipulation was nonetheless binding for purposes of sufficiency 

review. “[R]egardless of whether the stipulation was legally correct, we 

consider only if the stipulation . . . constituted sufficient support for the jury’s 

finding[.]” Id. at 272 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, despite the 

confusing nature of this stipulation, the jury was entitled, if not required, to 

accept what the court and parties told them is true.7

We now address whether the stipulation is conclusive, mindful that the 

Padilla Court cautioned that a stipulation must still constitute sufficient 

support for the jury’s finding. We observe that sufficient proof to support a §

9799.15(a)(1) conviction is met if the Commonwealth establishes that the 

individual failed to: initially register; periodically appear for a photograph and 

disclosure of information such as phone numbers, Internet identifiers, and 

employment status; or register for the applicable number of years. The trial 

court instructed the jury on this charge as follows: “The Commonwealth 

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7 This case underscores the importance of considering each word of a 

stipulation. The SORNA framework involves “registration” as an initial matter, 

i.e. the initial registration with the PSP, and a failure to “register” as a 

substantive offense. A stipulation intended to convey only that Appellant was 

lawfully required to register with the PSP could have used the precise language 

of § 4915.1, “subject to registration.” Instead, the parties agreed to a 

stipulation that Appellant was required to “register.” 
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specifically alleges that [SORNA] requires [Appellant] to do the following: 

Register . . . as required under . . . [§] 9799.56 and, second, [Appellant] 

knowingly failed to do so.” N.T. Trial, 12/1/22, at 105. 

This instruction does not squarely match any portion of § 4915.1(a)(1), 

and the statute does not criminalize a failure to comply with § 9799.56. 

However, the fact remains that Appellant must convince this Court that he is 

entitled to relief, and his argument does not discuss any of the foregoing 

points. “It is, of course, an appellant’s burden to persuade us the trial court 

erred and relief is due.” Commonwealth v. Claffey, 80 A.3d 780, 787 

(Pa.Super. 2013). We have uncovered the discrepancy only by examining the 

statutory text and the stipulation. We cannot ignore that Appellant, in addition 

to agreeing to an incorrect stipulation, did not object to the jury instructions.

Nor has he developed any argument concerning whether the verdict is invalid

notwithstanding the error.

8

 By conceding that he had to “register,” the 

Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence that he did not register as 

required by § 4915.1(a)(1).

9 We therefore conclude that Appellant has failed 

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8 Relatedly, we do not have the benefit of the Commonwealth’s advocacy on 

this issue. 

9

 It is questionable that a developed claim on these points could succeed on 

direct appeal. Appellant’s stipulation is legally incorrect, and as our High Court 

stated in Commonwealth v. Padilla, 80 A.3d 1238, 1272 (Pa. 2013), “a 

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence cannot be employed as an 

alternative route to obtain review of trial court or counsel error.” 
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to meet his burden due to the stipulation and concomitant failure to develop 

any claim on appeal addressing the effect of said stipulation. 

Finally, with respect to the § 4915.1(a)(1) conviction, Appellant stresses 

in his brief that the following statutory tolling provision applies: “The period 

of registration . . . shall be tolled for the period of time in which the individual 

specified in [§] 9799.13 is . . . incarcerated in a Federal, State or county 

correctional institution, excluding a community contract facility or community 

corrections center[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15(c)(1)(ii). Appellant does not 

discuss the significance of this tolling provision beyond the following 

presentation:

The tolling of the registration period is important due to the 

following exchange between the Commonwealth and Trooper 

Polcha:

Commonwealth: What was the date that you received that

[Appellant] moved from [the local jail]?

Trooper Polcha: December 28, 2021.

Commonwealth: Is that time period greater than a year 

from when he last updated his address in October of 2020?

Trooper Polcha: Yes.

Commonwealth: Would [Appellant] have been required to 

report annually during that time period?

Trooper Polcha: Yes.

Appellant’s brief at 7-8 (quoting N.T. Trial, 12/1/22, at 52). 

The tolling provision by its text simply means that the period of 

registration is tolled during incarceration, e.g., if an offender must register for 
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ten years any time spent incarcerated does not count towards that time

Appellant does not explain how this statute applies here. 

Turning to the conviction for § 4915.1(a)(2), the Commonwealth’s 

evidence plainly suffices. That subsection criminalizes a registrant’s failure to 

“verify his address . . . as required” by law, which, in this case, is within 

seventy-two hours. The evidence established that Appellant never informed 

the PSP that he moved to Florida, and Appellant freely admitted the same. 

We now turn to the second attack on each conviction, wherein Appellant 

asserts that the Commonwealth did not establish the requisite mens rea of 

“knowingly.” At trial, Appellant testified that he misunderstood the nature of 

his obligations. He relayed to the jury the following version of events. When 

ICE placed him in Florida in March of 2019, he registered with Florida’s 

equivalent of the PSP. Florida authorities told Appellant that he had to register

in that jurisdiction every six months. When he was ordered to return to

Pennsylvania in October of 2020 for violating the conditions of his release in 

this Commonwealth, he remained incarcerated in this jurisdiction until 

December 28, 2021. During that time, nobody spoke to him about his

Pennsylvania obligations and Appellant believed that he was only required to

register in Florida. N.T. Trial, 12/1/22, at 71 (“Q. Okay. And as far [as] you 

were concerned at that point[,] where were you registered for your [SORNA]

purposes? A. Down in Florida.”). Shortly after his release on December 28, 

2021, he returned to the same Florida residence he had previously registered 
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in that jurisdiction. That Appellant offered a mistake of law defense is

demonstrated by the following exchange: 

Q. Again, did you think you were in compliance with Florida law?

A. Yes.

Q. And Pennsylvania law?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. I guess let me ask you this. Were you aware that 

Pennsylvania law was applying to you while you were living in 

Florida?

A. No. Because I thought, like, since I registered in Florida which 

was fine, like, that I didn’t have to come back up to register with 

Pennsylvania again.

Id. at 74.

Appellant does not specifically discuss the mistake-of-law issue on 

appeal, but his brief alludes to this concept. Specifically, he contends as 

follows:

The Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

that [Appellant] knowingly, i.e. voluntarily, failed to register when 

he was registered in Florida, involuntarily returned to 

Pennsylvania and was registered at the Franklin County Jail, did 

not have to register while incarcerated, returned to Florida and 

updated his address on his driver’s license and then was arrested 

while verifying his Florida registration.

Appellant’s brief at 12.

Appellant’s claim that he failed to “voluntarily” register in this context 

reads as an assertion that the Commonwealth must prove that he specifically 

intended to shirk his SORNA obligations. In addition to the fact that this 

argument views the evidence through inferences most favorable to Appellant 
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instead of focusing on inferences drawn in favor of the Commonwealth as 

verdict winner, the legal theory is in tension with our precedents. In 

Commonwealth v. Roberts, 293 A.3d 1221 (Pa.Super. 2023), appeal

granted, 304 A.3d 329 (Pa. 2023), a panel of this Court examined Roberts’s 

claim that he subjectively believed that he was required to register only for 

ten years. We pointed out that pursuant to § 4915.2, “a SORNA registrant 

violates by knowing that he failed to report, regardless of his subjective view 

of the duration of the underlying reporting obligation[.]” Id. at 1222. The 

Roberts Court applied the General Assembly’s definition of “knowingly” within 

18 Pa.C.S. § 302 and held that “a registrant must be aware that it is practically 

certain he will fail to report and to verify with the [PSP] if he fails to do so.” 

Id. at 1225. The Court noted that in most cases a failure to register “will be 

knowing, because a rational actor knows when he fails to do something. The 

only exceptions would be in cases where a registrant has dementia, is in a 

coma, or suffers from a similar mental incapacity.” Id. at 1225. The Roberts

Court interpreted § 4915.2 to “codif[y] the ancient maxim that ‘ignorance of 

the law is no excuse.’” Id. at 1226 (citation omitted). While the case was 

not interpreting the statute at issue here, the two statutes are functionally 

identical.

10

 Appellant offers no argument that the analysis should be any 

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10 Compare 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1 (“An individual who is subject to registration 

under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.13 (relating to applicability) commits an offense if 

he knowingly fails to . . . .”) with 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.2(a) (“An individual who 

is subject to registration under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.55(a), (a.1) or (b) (relating 

to registration) . . . commits an offense if the individual knowingly fails to 

. . . .”).
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different for purposes of § 4915.1. Accordingly, we follow Roberts on this 

issue. Appellant’s subjective belief that he was not required to comply with 

Pennsylvania law is irrelevant, and the Commonwealth’s evidence establishes 

that Appellant knew of his obligations as he signed paperwork informing him 

of those responsibilities. The Commonwealth’s evidence readily establishes 

that he knew he failed to report as contemplated by Roberts. This challenge 

therefore fails.

Appellant’s fifth claim posits that his convictions merge for sentencing 

purposes as both involve the same harm to the Commonwealth, to wit, each 

statutory subsection broadly addresses an offender’s failure to keep the PSP 

apprised of his current status. “Appellant is unable to locate case law on the 

specific crimes above, however finds support [sic] in other contexts such 

multiple [sic] violations of Driving Under the Influence [‘DUI’)] arising from a 

single act.” Appellant’s brief at 14. Appellant’s substantive argument then 

quotes, with no further development, a portion of Commonwealth v. Given, 

244 A.3d 508, 509 (Pa.Super. 2020). Therein, we held that sentences for 

violations of 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(1)(i) and (iii) merged where the conviction 

was based on the presence of a drug’s active compound and its metabolite in 

Given’s blood. We reasoned that § 3802(d)(1) “proscribes a single harm to 

the Commonwealth . . . . Subsections 3802(d)(1)(i) and (iii) provide alternate 

means by which the Commonwealth can establish the offense, but do not 

provide proof of different offenses.” Id. at 512.
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We decline Appellant’s invitation to simply adopt Given’s reasoning 

wholesale. Appellant does not develop why § 4915.1 is comparable to the 

DUI statute explored in Given, which is reason enough to reject his claim. 

However, Appellant’s argument suffers from an additional flaw, as it does not 

acknowledge 42 Pa.C.S. § 9765, which states: “No crimes shall merge for 

sentencing purposes unless the crimes arise from a single criminal act and all 

of the statutory elements of one offense are included in the statutory elements 

of the other offense.” Our Supreme Court has held that “a plain reading of 

[§] 9765 reveals the General Assembly’s intent that crimes with different 

statutory elements be punished separately.” Commonwealth v. Edwards,

256 A.3d 1130, 1137 (Pa. 2021) (quoting Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 985 

A.2d 830, 831 (Pa. 2009)). To be fair, the Given Court likewise did not 

discuss § 9765, instead applying the “same harm” test in lieu of the statute. 

However, we decline to extend Given given its questionable departure from 

§ 9765. See Given, 244 A.3d at 514 (Bowes, J., dissenting) (“I am greatly 

concerned that the . . . holding will encourage the disparate application of 

§ 9765 by creating one merger doctrine that applies to Pennsylvania’s DUI 

statute, and a separate merger doctrine for all other criminal statutes.”). 

Appellant’s challenge fails.11

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11 Appellant makes a fleeting assertion that the elements of one of the offenses 

is included in the other, but this is plainly incorrect. Subsection (a)(1) as 

charged requires proof by the Commonwealth that Appellant failed to 

“register” whereas (a)(2) involves the specific requirement that he failed to 

report an address change within the applicable timeframe. 
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Appellant’s remaining three claims all assail trial counsel’s stewardship, 

arguing that the trial court erred by not reviewing the claims pursuant to 

Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562 (Pa. 2013). He first argues that 

counsel ineffectively failed to raise the tolling provision previously discussed. 

Second, Appellant asserts that counsel should have objected to testimony 

regarding Appellant’s registration status in Florida. The third complaint is that 

counsel did not object to testimony from Trooper Polcha in which she related 

hearsay from a Florida detective which contained statements from people who 

lived at Appellant’s Florida address.

The Holmes Court recognized two exceptions to the general rule that 

collateral claims must be deferred to the PCRA stage. One of these exceptions 

is not applicable as it requires, in addition to good cause shown, an express 

waiver of PCRA proceedings. Appellant asserts that the remaining exception 

applies, which permits review of ineffectiveness claims in “extraordinary 

circumstances where a discrete claim (or claims) of trial counsel 

ineffectiveness is apparent from the record and meritorious to the extent that 

immediate consideration best serves the interests of justice[.]” Id. at 563.

In Commonwealth v. James, 297 A.3d 755 (Pa.Super. 2023), we 

interpreted the “meritorious and apparent from the record” standard to 

require proof that counsel’s ineffectiveness was “so blatant and so shocking 

to the judicial conscience that there is no need for a hearing and the court is 

compelled to grant relief.” Id. at 761. That standard has not been met here. 

The trial court opined that Appellant’s “claims are not apparent, as this [c]ourt 
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remains unaware of [counsel]’s legal strategy and reasons for failing to 

object.” Trial Court Opinion, 10/6/23, at 12. We agree. Indeed, two of 

Appellant’s claims assert that his activities in Florida were irrelevant.

Appellant’s trial strategy, however, was centered on a mistake of law defense 

based on his compliance with Florida’s sexual offender laws. As to the claim 

regarding tolling, we reiterate that Appellant does not explain why or how the 

tolling provision is relevant to this case.

In Commonwealth v. Burno, 94 A.3d 956 (Pa. 2014), our Supreme 

Court noted that “it is within the purview of the trial court’s discretion to 

determine whether review at the post-verdict stage of the ineffectiveness 

claims is appropriate.” Id. at 971. We discern no abuse of discretion in the 

trial court’s ruling, and Appellant makes no attempt to develop why his claims 

are so obviously meritorious that the trial court erred in deferring them to 

collateral review. We therefore reject these three claims without prejudice to 

Appellant’s ability to raise them and any others in collateral proceedings.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 07/30/2024