J. S07040/18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 Appellant :

:

v. : No. 2808 EDA 2016

:

CHARLES RALSTON :

Appeal from the Order, August 3, 2016,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at Nos. CP-51-CR-0008279-2012,

CP-51-CR-0008280-2012

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 18, 2018

The Commonwealth appeals1from the August 3, 2016 order quashing 

the consolidated attempted burglary charges filed against appellee, 

Charles Ralston.2 After careful review, we vacate the order and remand for 

further proceedings.

The trial court summarized the relevant facts of this case as follows:

On November 11, 2011, complainant Monica 

Robinson left her home at 1521 N. 20th Street

around 5[:]30 [p.m.] and returned around 

8:00 [p.m.] Sometime after her return she noticed 

that the first floor, rear window of her house was 

broken. She did not see or hear anyone and no 

 

1 The Commonwealth has certified, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(d), that the 

trial court’s August 3, 2016 order will terminate or substantially handicap the 

prosecution. 

2 The record reflects that appellee has not filed a brief in this matter.
J. S07040/18

- 2 -

entry was made into the house, nor was there

anything missing. After finding the broken window, 

the complainant called the police. Police Officer 

Crespo responded and assisted a fingerprint 

technician in recovering fingerprints from the 

outside, lower part of the broken double pane 

window; not the inside pane. No fingerprints were 

recovered from the glass on the ground. The 

Commonwealth marked and moved the fingerprint 

report matching the fingerprints recovered to 

[a]ppellee.

Five days later, on November 16, 2011, at 

6:30 [a.m.], someone rang the complainant’s

doorbell. Her dog started to bark and she checked 

the peephole but did not see anybody. She returned 

to her bedroom in the back of the house when the 

sensor light went off in her open, non-fenced-in 

yard. At that point the complainant saw a man 

jiggling her doorknob. She then opened her window 

and yelled at him, he quickly looked up and ran 

away. The complainant identified [a]ppellee as this 

man in court. The window was not replaced at this 

point. Complainant had bars placed on the window 

area until it could be replaced. On January 18, 

2012, two months after the incidents, based on the 

fingerprints recovered from the November 11, 2016 

incident, Detective Anderson of the Philadelphia 

Police Department, compiled a photo array 

containing the photo of [a]ppellee. Complainant 

identified [a]ppellee as the person she observed 

outside of her door on November 16, 2011, the date 

of the second incident.

Trial court opinion, 7/31/17 at 1-2 (citations to notes of testimony omitted).

Appellee was arrested in connection with this incident and charged 

with criminal attempt – burglary, criminal attempt – criminal trespass, and

criminal mischief.3 On July 13, 2012, appellee appeared for a preliminary 

 

3 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901 (3503(a)(1) and 3502(a)) and 3304(a), respectively.
J. S07040/18

- 3 -

hearing before the Honorable James M. DeLeon and was held for court on all 

charges. Following multiple continuances, appellee filed a motion to 

quash/petition for writ of habeas corpus on July 30, 2016. On August 2, 

2016, a hearing was held before the Honorable Roxanne E. Covington. 

Thereafter, on August 3, 2016, the trial court entered an order granting 

appellee’s motion, in part, and quashing the consolidated attempted burglary 

charges. The Commonwealth filed a timely appeal on August 31, 2016. 

Although not ordered to do so, the Commonwealth filed a concise statement 

of errors complained of on appeal, in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) that 

same day. The trial court filed its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion on July 31, 

2017.

The Commonwealth argues that the trial court erred in granting 

appellee’s motion to quash the consolidated attempted burglary charges. 

(Commonwealth’s brief at 7, 11.) In support of this contention, the 

Commonwealth avers that the evidence at the preliminary hearing, when 

“[p]roperly viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

establish[ed] [a] prima facie case of attempted burglary[.]” (Id.) We 

agree.

A motion to quash a criminal information is the equivalent in 

Philadelphia County to a pre-trial petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 

Commonwealth v. Dantzler, 135 A.3d 1109, 1112 (Pa.Super. 2016) 

(en banc) (stating, “a pre-trial habeas corpus motion is the proper means 
J. S07040/18

- 4 -

for testing whether the Commonwealth has sufficient evidence to establish a 

prima facie case.” (citation omitted)). A motion to quash should be 

granted when, “examining the evidence and reasonable inferences derived 

therefrom in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth[,]” the 

Commonwealth fails to set forth a prima facie case of guilt. Id.

To establish a prima facie case,

[t]he Commonwealth must show sufficient probable 

cause that the defendant committed the offense, and 

the evidence should be such that if presented at 

trial, and accepted as true, the judge would be 

warranted in allowing the case to go to the jury.

When deciding whether a prima facie case 

was established, we must view the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and we 

are to consider all reasonable inferences based on 

that evidence which could support a guilty verdict. 

The standard . . . does not require that the 

Commonwealth prove the [defendant’s] guilt beyond 

a reasonable doubt at this stage.

Commonwealth v. Patrick, 933 A.2d 1043, 1045 (Pa.Super. 2007)

(citations omitted), appeal denied, 940 A.2d 364 (Pa. 2007). Whether the 

Commonwealth has presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie

case for a charged crime “is a question of law as to which an appellate

court’s review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Karetny, 880 A.2d 505, 513 

(Pa. 2005) (citation omitted).

Here, the trial court found that “the Commonwealth has failed to 

present sufficient evidence to prove that [appellee] possessed the requisite 

intent to commit a crime inside complainant’s home and thus cannot 
J. S07040/18

- 5 -

establish a prima facie case of [attempted] burglary.” (Trial court opinion, 

7/31/17 at 5.) The trial court reasoned that “there is no per se assumption 

that [evidence of a forced entry alone] automatically gives rise to a sufficient 

inference of intent to commit a crime inside.” (Id. at 4.)

In reaching this conclusion, the trial court relied on our supreme 

court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Wilamowski, 633 A.2d 141 (Pa. 

1993). Wilamowski involved a defendant who was convicted of, 

inter alia, attempted burglary after he kicked in a complainant’s garage 

door and tore it off its hinges before simply walking away from the scene. 

Id. at 142. The Wilamowski court found that the evidence was insufficient 

to convict the defendant of attempted burglary, reasoning that the 

Commonwealth must establish additional evidence of specific intent to 

commit a crime within occupied structure “that goes beyond the mere 

breaking in of a door or window.” Id. at 144. The Wilamowski court 

stated:

Although the Commonwealth’s facts prove that [the 

defendant] kicked at the door and tore it off of its 

hinges, there was no additional evidence to establish 

that he possessed an intent to commit a crime 

inside. He broke the door and apparently walked 

away from it without any showing that he entered 

the structure or attempted to enter. His path into 

the structure was now unobstructed, but he chose to 

walk away and go to the neighbor’s house to ask for 

directions. Evidence of [the defendant’s] subsequent 

actions in flight is also insufficient, standing alone, to 

lend any support to a permissible inference of intent 

to commit a crime inside since the flight is consistent 
J. S07040/18

- 6 -

with his efforts to avoid apprehension for his conduct 

of breaking down the door.

Id. 

In Commonwealth v. Alston, 651 A.2d 1092 (Pa. 1994), our

supreme court made the following observations about its holding in 

Wilamowski:

In Wilamowski, . . . we discussed circumstantial 

proof of the intent element in situations involving 

attempted burglary. There, we found unacceptable a 

per se assumption that evidence of a forced opening 

into an occupied structure automatically gives rise to 

an inference of intent to commit a crime inside. We 

held that a “totality of the circumstances” approach 

is more appropriate when evaluating the 

Commonwealth’s evidence supporting the intent 

element. We then held that more than merely 

breaking a door or window is required to support an 

inference of intent to commit a crime inside.

Alston, 651 A.2d at 1094 (footnote and emphasis omitted; internal 

quotation marks in original).

Viewing the evidence and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in a 

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we find that the Commonwealth 

has set forth a prima facie case of attempted burglary in this matter. “A 

person is guilty of burglary if he enters a building or occupied structure, or 

separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with intent to commit a 

crime therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the 

actor is licensed or privileged to enter.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a). “A person 

commits an attempt when, with intent to commit a specific crime, he does 
J. S07040/18

- 7 -

any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that 

crime.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a). The specific intent necessary for burglary

“may be proved by direct evidence or inferred from circumstantial evidence” 

surrounding the entry. Commonwealth v. Galindes, 786 A.2d 1004, 1010

(Pa.Super. 2001) (citations omitted), appeal denied, 803 A.2d 733 (Pa. 

2002). Moreover, “the Commonwealth is not required to specify what crime 

a defendant, who is charged with burglary (or attempted burglary), was 

intending to commit.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 886 A.2d 256, 260 

(Pa.Super. 2005) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 902 A.2d 969 (Pa. 

2006).

Instantly, we find that the evidence presented at the July 13, 2012 

preliminary hearing established a prima facie case that appellee intended 

to both unlawfully enter complainant’s residence and commit a crime 

therein. Specifically, Monica Robinson (hereinafter, “complainant”) testified 

that on November 11, 2011, she returned home at approximately 8:00 p.m. 

and discovered that a first-floor, rear window of her home had been broken. 

(Notes of testimony, 7/13/12 at 4-5.) Complainant subsequently called the 

police following this incident, who lifted appellee’s fingerprints from the 

“lower bottom part of the glass” of the broken window. (Id. at 12-13). The 

evidence further established that the window in question was a double pane 

window and did not break all the way through. (Id. at 13.) Complainant 

testified that she had bars put up that day until the window company could 
J. S07040/18

- 8 -

come out and fix the damage. (Id. at 9-10.) Complainant further testified 

that although her backyard where this window is located is not fenced-in, 

“there’s no street in [her] back yard” and it is essentially fenced-in on three 

sides because “[her] neighbor behind [her] has a fence.” (Id. at 10.)

The evidence presented at the preliminary hearing further established

that appellee returned to complainant’s house five days later and once again 

attempted to gain entry. Specifically, complainant testified that at 

approximately 6:30 a.m. on the morning of November 16, 2011, her front 

doorbell rang, but she could not see anyone through the peephole. (Id. at 

6, 8.) Complainant testified that after she returned to her second-floor 

bedroom, she noticed that her backyard motion-sensor lights were activated

and spotted appellee looking in her lower window and jiggling the rear 

doorknob to her home. (Id.) Appellee fled after complainant screamed at 

him from her second-floor window. (Id. at 7, 9.) At the preliminary 

hearing, complainant identified appellee as the individual who was in her 

backyard on November 16, 2011, and further testified that she had never 

seen appellee prior to that date and never gave him permission to enter her 

residence. (Id. at 8.) Complainant later identified appellee in a police photo 

array. (See notes of testimony, 8/2/16 at 4-5.)

Additionally, we find that Wilamowski is distinguishable from the 

instant matter. In contrast to Wilamowski, where the defendant simply 

walked away from the damaged garage door “without any showing that he
J. S07040/18

- 9 -

. . . attempted to enter[,]” see Wilamowski, 633 A.2d at 142, 144, one

could reasonably infer in the case sub judice that appellee fled the 

complainant’s residence before entering it, not because he had no intent to 

enter it, but because he had been discovered by complainant attempting to 

gain entry. (See notes of testimony, 7/13/12 at 6-8.) Furthermore, unlike 

the isolated incident in Wilamowski, here appellee’s combined acts of 

breaking a window, returning to the same home less than a week later at an 

early morning hour, and jiggling a rear doorknob after ringing the front 

doorbell to see if anyone was home were indicative of his intent to commit a 

crime therein. 

Based on the totality of these circumstances, and examining these 

incidents contemporaneously, we find that the Commonwealth set forth a 

prima facie case of attempted burglary in this case. See, e.g., Dantzler, 

135 A.3d at 1114 (noting that, “a prima facie case is a low threshold of 

proof[.]”). Accordingly, the trial court’s August 3, 2016 order quashing the 

consolidated attempted burglary charges was in error.

Order vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction 

relinquished.
J. S07040/18

- 10 -

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/18/18