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BENGHAZI, INSTABILITY, AND A NEW GOVERNMENT: SUCCESS AND FAILURES OF U.S. INTERVENTION IN LIBYA 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 1, 2014 

Serial No. 113–110 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

http://www.house.gov/reform 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California, Chairman 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan 

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

DOC HASTINGS, Washington 

CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming 

ROB WOODALL, Georgia 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

KERRY L. BENTIVOLIO, Michigan 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

MATTHEW A. CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

TONY CARDENAS, California 

STEVEN A. HORSFORD, Nevada 

MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico 

Vacancy 

LAWRENCE J. BRADY, Staff Director 

JOHN D. CUADERES, Deputy Staff Director 

STEPHEN CASTOR, General Counsel 

LINDA A. GOOD, Chief Clerk 

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on May 1, 2014 ................................................................................. 1 

WITNESSES 

Brigadier General Robert Lovell, U.S. Air Force (Retired), Former Deputy 

Director for Intelligence and Knowledge Development Directorate (J–2), 

U.S. Africa Command, Former Deputy Commanding General of Joint Task 

Force Odyssey Guard 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 6 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 8 

Kori Schake, Ph.D., Research Fellow Hoover Institution 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 11 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 13 

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of 

Democracies 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 16 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 18 

Frederic Wehrey, Ph.D., Senior Associate, Middle East Program, Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 33 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 35 

APPENDIX 

‘‘Lessons from Libya: How Not to Intervene’’ Policy Brief from September 

2013 Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center, submitted by Rep. Chaffetz .... 88 

‘‘Libya’s Guns Free-for-All Fuels Region’s Turmoil’’ Article by Maggie Michael, 

submitted by Rep. Chaffetz ................................................................................. 92 

NATO’s ‘‘Humanitarian Intervention’’ in Libya: Transforming a Country into 

a ‘‘Failed State’’ Article by Iskandar Arfaoui, Gloval Research, submitted 

by Rep. Chaffetz ................................................................................................... 96 

‘‘West Should Have Put Boots on the Ground in Libya, says Former Prime 

Minister’’ Article by Mick Krever, CNN, submitted by Rep. Chaffetz ............. 98 

E-mails from State Department regarding Libya timeline, submitted by Rep. 

Chaffetz ................................................................................................................. 101 

March 11, 2014, letter to the President regarding the Benghazi attacks signed 

by over 60 members, submitted by Rep. Mica ................................................... 138 

Statement from Rep. Cartwright ............................................................................ 141 

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BENGHAZI, INSTABILITY, AND A NEW 

GOVERNMENT: 

SUCCESS AND FAILURES OF U.S. INTERVENTION IN LIBYA 

THURSDAY, MAY 1, 2014 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, Washington, D.C. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:33 a.m., in Room 2154, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Darrell E. Issa [chairman of 

the committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Issa, Mica, Duncan, Jordan, Chaffetz, 

Walberg, Lankford, Amash, Gosar, DesJarlais, Gowdy, Farenthold, 

Lummis, Woodall, Massie, Meadows, DeSantis, Cummings, 

Maloney, Norton, Tierney, Lynch, Connolly, Speier, Duckworth, 

Kelly, Horsford, and Lujan Grisham. 

Staff Present: Alexa Armstrong, Staff Assistant; Brien A. Beattie, 

Professional Staff Member; Molly Boyl, Deputy General Counsel 

and Parliamentarian; Lawrence J. Brady, Staff Director; Caitlin 

Carroll, Press Secretary; Sharon Casey, Senior Assistant Clerk; 

Steve Castor, General Counsel; John Cuaderes, Deputy Staff Director; Jessica L. Donlon, Senior Counsel; Kate Dunbar, Professional 

Staff Member; Adam P. Fromm, Director of Member Services and 

Committee Operations; Linda Good, Chief Clerk; Frederick Hill, 

Deputy Staff Director for Communications and Strategy; Christopher Hixon, Chief Counsel, Oversight; Caroline Ingram, Professional Staff Member; Jim Lewis, Senior Policy Advisor; Mark D. 

Marin, Deputy Staff Director of Oversight; Ashok M. Pinto, Chief 

Counsel, Investigations; Andrew Rezendes, Counsel; Laura Rush, 

Deputy Chief Clerk; Jessica Seale, Digital Director; Jonathan J. 

Skladany, Deputy General Counsel; Rebecca Watkins, Communications Director; Aryele Bradford, Press Secretary; Jennifer Hoffman, 

Minority Communications Director; Peter Kenny, Minority Counsel; Chris Knauer, Minority Senior Investigator; Elisa LaNier, Minority Director of Operations; Lucinda Lessley, Minority Policy Director; Juan McCullum, Minority Clerk; Dave Rapallo, Minority 

Staff Director; and Valerie Shen, Minority Counsel. 

Chairman ISSA. The Committee on Government Oversight will 

come to order. Today’s hearing on Benghazi Instability and a New 

Government: Successes and Failures of U.S. Intervention in Libya. 

The Oversight Committee’s mission statement is that we exist to 

secure two fundamental principles. First, Americans have a right 

to know that the money Washington takes from them is well spent; 

and second, Americans deserve an efficient, effective government 

that works for them. Our duty on the Oversight and Government 

2 

Reform Committee is to protect these rights. Our solemn responsibility is to hold government accountable to taxpayers. It’s our job 

to work tirelessly in partnership with citizen watchdogs to deliver 

the facts to the American people and bring genuine reform to the 

Federal bureaucracy. This is our mission. 

Today, the Oversight Committee convenes a fourth hearing related to the security situation in Libya before, during, and after the 

September 11 terrorist attack in Benghazi which claimed the lives 

of four Americans. The committee has previously brought forward 

important witnesses who offered new enlightening testimony on security failures that forced the administration to walk back, false 

claims about the nature of the terrorist attack. 

The testimony of previous witnesses also identified key questions 

in the interagency process that only this committee has the jurisdiction and the charge to investigate. While much of the committee’s effort in the investigation has focused on the Department of 

State, we have recently conducted several joint interviews of relevant military personnel with the House Armed Services Committee. While we had requested that these interviews be conducted 

as unclassified, the Pentagon leadership insisted that they occur at 

the inexplicable and unreasonable level of Top Secret. 

Some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle have called 

for an end to this investigation. These calls are clearly premature, 

and only raise public concerns about the political agenda to stop an 

important investigation before it has completed gathering facts 

about this interagency Obama administration debacle. In particular, the committee seeks insight into communications and directions that flowed between the State Department, the Department 

of Defense and, yes, the White House. 

It is essential that we fully understand areas of responsibility before, during, and after the attacks. It’s my hope that today’s hearing will help us add to our investigation’s expanding body of knowledge, and I am pleased that we will be proceeding on an entirely 

unclassified basis. We do so because the American people, more 

than anyone else in this body, have the absolute right to know why 

four men are dead in an attack that could have been prevented. 

We have a distinguished panel of witnesses before us today that 

will bring expertise to us about the current situation in Libya. One 

of our witnesses, retired United States Air Force Brigadier General 

Robert Lovell, brings with him firsthand knowledge of U.S. military efforts in Libya as he served at U.S. African Command. 

U.S. African Command is sometimes called AFRICOM. In the 

military command lingo, this is the organization that had responsibility, not just for Libya, but for the entire continent of Africa. This 

unit’s mission included both the Libyan revolution and the September 11, 2012 terrorist attack on a diplomatic compound in 

Benghazi. At the U.S. African Command, General Lovell served as 

the Deputy Director For Intelligence and Knowledge Development 

and as Deputy Commanding General of Joint Task Force Odyssey 

Guard. In this assignment, he was tasked with helping the State 

Department reopen the U.S. embassy in Tripoli after the fall of Qadhafi. We appreciate all of our witnesses taking time to testify and 

enlighten the public about the situation in Libya and the effects of 

U.S. decisions. 

3 

In addition to pursuing the relevant information about the military’s involvement in Libya, we continue to receive documents from 

the State Department. Since late March alone, we have received 

over 3,200 new documents, many of which have never been seen 

before by anyone outside of the administration and all of which, 

and I repeat, all of which, should have been turned over more than 

a year and a half ago when the committee launched its investigation. Some of these documents which were brought to light only 

days ago through a FOIA request by an organization known as Judicial Watch, show a direct White House role outside—I’m going to 

repeat this. The documents from Judicial Watch’s FOIA which were 

pursuant to our request more than a year and a half ago, show a 

direct White House role outside of talking points prepared by the 

Intelligence Community. The White House produced the talking 

points that Ambassador Rice used, not the Intelligence Community. 

In pushing the false narrative that a YouTube video was responsible for the deaths of four brave Americans, it is disturbing, and 

perhaps criminal, that documents like these were hidden by the 

Obama administration from Congress and the public alike, particularly after Secretary Kerry pledged cooperation, and the President 

himself told the American people in November of 2012 that, ‘‘every 

bit of information we have on Benghazi has been provided.’’ 

This committee’s job is to get to the facts and to the truth. I, for 

one, will continue to chip away at this until we get the whole truth. 

The American people—sorry. The Americans who lost their lives in 

Benghazi, those who were wounded, and the American people deserve nothing less. 

So today’s hearing is critical for what our witnesses will give us, 

and I welcome you and I thank you for being here. But it comes 

in a week in which the American people have learned that you cannot believe what the White House says. You cannot believe what 

the spokespeople say, and you cannot believe what the President 

says, and the facts are coming out that, in fact, this administration 

has knowingly withheld documents pursuant to congressional subpoenas in violation of any reasonable transparency or historic 

precedent at least since Richard Milhous Nixon. 

I now recognize the ranking member for his opening statement. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank the chairman for yielding, and thank you 

for this hearing. 

In 2011, the people of Libya rose up against their dictator, 

Muammar Qadhafi, to end his oppressive role which lasted more 

than four decades. At the time, Republicans and Democrats alike 

strongly supported helping armed rebels in their efforts to overthrow Qadhafi. For example, in April 2011, Senator John McCain 

traveled to Libya and met with the rebels, after which he proclaimed, ‘‘They are my heroes.’’ 

During a national television appearance on July 3, 2011, Senator 

McCain warned that allowing Qadhafi to remain in power would be 

far more dangerous to the United States than the alternative. He 

stated, ‘‘This notion that we should fear who comes after or what 

comes after Qadhafi ignores that if Qadhafi stays in power, it is 

then a direct threat to our national security.’’ During a television 

appearance on April 24 of 2011, Senator Lindsey Graham agreed 

that taking the fight directly to Qadhafi would protect our national 

4 

security. He stated, ‘‘You cannot protect our vital national security 

interests if Qadhafi stays.’’ He also stated, ‘‘The focus should now 

be to cut the head of the snake off.’’ 

As the revolution grew stronger, Qadhafi embarked on a brutal 

crackdown, and on March 17, 2011, he threatened his own people 

and warned that he would show them ‘‘no mercy.’’ The next day, 

President Obama explained to the world why the United States 

was joining the effort to remove Qadhafi, and he said this: The 

world has watched events unfold in Libya with hope and alarm. 

Last month protestors took to the streets across the country to demand their universal rights in a government that is accountable to 

them and responsive to their aspirations. But they were met with 

an iron fist. Instead of respecting the rights of his own people, Qadhafi chose the path of brutal suppression. Innocent civilians were 

beaten, imprisoned, and in some cases, killed. 

Senator McCain applauded the President’s decision by the way. 

During a press conference in Libya, he stated, and ‘‘Had President 

Obama and our allies not acted, history would have remembered 

Benghazi in the same breath as former Yugoslavia, a scene of mass 

atrocities and a source of international shame.’’ 

In an op ed in April 2011, Senator McCain wrote this: ‘‘The 

President was right to intervene. He now deserves our support as 

we and our coalition partners do all that is necessary to help the 

Libyan people secure future freedom.’’ 

In October 2011, Qadhafi finally met his ugly demise. During his 

oppressive rule, he was an extremely dangerous tyrant. During the 

1980s, he supported international terrorism, including the bombing 

of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, which claimed the 

lives of 270 innocent civilians. He also reportedly pursued chemical, 

nuclear and biological weapons. In fact, after Qadhafi was killed, 

the new Libyan government reportedly uncovered two tons of 

chemical weapons that Qadhafi had kept hidden from the world, 

yet armed and ready to use. 

As we all know our dedicated and patriotic special envoy named 

Christopher Stevens arrived in Benghazi to work with the Libyan 

people on their transition to democracy. He had forged deep connections and affiliations with the Libyan people during his career. 

He understood the challenges caused by 40 years of oppression. 

Ambassador Stevens believed in the promise of a new future for 

this country. Today Libya is at a crossroads. Open a newspaper 

and you will read about persistent violence in a country awash in 

weapons and a central government that has not yet consolidated its 

control over the country. 

On the other hand, the Libyan people continue to look to the 

West with respect and with hope. They aspire to work with the 

United States to build a stable, pro-democratic country. 

If we want the people of Libya to succeed, we must find a way 

to reengage the world and ourselves on behalf of a nation that desires our help. This was the bipartisan goal shared by Republicans 

like Lindsey Graham and John McCain who called on the United 

States, ‘‘to build a partnership with a democratic and pro-American 

Libya that contributes to the expansion of security, prosperity and 

freedom across a pivotal region at a time of revolutionary change.’’ 

5 

I hope today is a step towards this goal. I look forward to hearing 

from our witnesses about how we can assist the people of Libya. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. All members may have 

7 days in which to submit opening statements for the record and 

any quotes of Senator Lindsey Graham or John McCain they wish. 

For what purpose does the gentleman seek recognition? 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Chairman, I have four documents I would 

lack to ask unanimous consent to enter into the record. One is from 

the Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, entitled Lessons From Libya, How Not to Intervene, dated September 2013. Another is an Associated Press article 

of March 22, 2014, entitled Libya’s Guns, Free for All Fuels Regions’ Turmoil. Another one is the Global Research of April 5, 2014. 

Headline is, NATO’s Humanitarian Intervention in Libya, Transforming a Country Into a Failed State. The final one is a document 

that’s listed as unclassified. It’s a State Department document that 

I previously referenced by Congressman Trey Gowdy, and the subject line is Libya update from Beth Jones. The date is September 

12 at 12:46 p.m. There’s a paragraph in here that I think is pertinent to our discussions today. It’s referencing the Libyan ambassador: ‘‘When he said his government suspected that former Qadhafi regime elements carried out the attacks, I told him that the 

group that conducted the attacks, Ansar al-Sharia, is affiliated 

with Islamic extremists.’’ This coming from the State Department 

going to Victoria Nuland, Patrick Kennedy, Cheryl Mills, Secretary 

Clinton’s chief of staff. I’d like to enter this into the record which 

has not been out there in the public. 

Chairman ISSA. One question. What was the date and time on 

that? 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Date is September 12, 2012, 12:46 p.m. This is 

hours after the attack. It is what the State Department told the 

Libyan government what was happening, ‘‘I told him,’’ meaning the 

Libyan ambassador, ‘‘that the group that conducted the attacks, 

Ansar al-Sharia, is affiliated with Islamic extremists.’’ Those were 

the facts as the State Department knew them and I think everybody should see this. 

Chairman ISSA. Without objection. So ordered and copies will be 

distributed to all members on the dais. 

Chairman ISSA. We now welcome our guest and witnesses. Brigadier General Robert Lovell is the Former Deputy Director for Intelligence and Knowledge Development Directorate at United States 

African Command, and the Former Deputy Commanding General 

of Joint Task Force Odyssey Guard. 

Ms. Kori Schake, Ph.D. Is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution. Mr. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Ph.D., is a senior fellow at 

the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Mr. Frederic Wehrey 

is a Ph.D. He is a senior associate for Middle East Program at the 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. General, your title is 

impressive, but they’re all doctorates. 

Pursuant to the rules, if all witnesses would please rise to take 

the oath and raise your right hands. Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the 

6 

whole truth and nothing but the truth? Thank you. Please be seated. 

Let the record reflect that all witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

In order to allow sufficient time for questions, I would ask that 

each witness summarize their opening statements which will be 

placed in the record in the entirety in addition to other extraneous 

material you may want to submit as a result of this hearing, but 

please try to stay close to the 5 minutes. And as my predecessor, 

Mr. Towns, often said, green means go everywhere. Yellow means 

hurry up through the intersection, and red means stop, so please 

observe that on the little countdown clocks. And with that, General, you’re recognized. 

WITNESS STATEMENTS 

STATEMENT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT LOVELL 

General LOVELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ISSA. And for all the witnesses, pull your mic close to 

you when you speak because they’re fairly insensitive in that sense. 

Thank you, General. 

General LOVELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Minority 

Member, and members of the committee. I retired this past year 

after 33-plus years of service. My service began in 1979 upon enlistment in the United States Air Force. It’s also been my honor 

and privilege to serve as an officer since earning my commission 

in 1985. Throughout these years I’ve served with many brave and 

distinguished men and women, both uniformed and civilian. I 

thank them for their service and their example. My time in service 

was filled with many great and humbling opportunities. I’m thankful for these as well. Over the span of my career, I’ve been shaped 

by professional education, training, and experience. These and 

other personal influences have formed my thoughts on today’s subject. 

To present a sense of context, here’s a brief outline of my previous service most relevant at hand. The chairman has already covered some. What I would like to add is as an AFRICOM plank 

holder, I twice served in Africa Command, first as Colonel as the 

NRO representative to the command, and next as a general officer 

as the Deputy Director of Intelligence and Knowledge Development 

Division. Additionally, I served as a JOC watch officer for Joint Operations Center during Odyssey Dawn and Operation Unified Protector. And in addition to that, I also served as the senior military 

liaison to National Science Foundation. That’s relevant since the 

Science Foundation was also an interagency partner that greatly 

influenced my views on how interagency partnership works. 

My theme is three topics are submitted in my written statement. 

First topic, U.S. Africa Command and the interagency nature of 

that command. 

Second, Military Operations With Regard to Libya, discusses 

strategy, supporting policy, and policy in a highly dynamic and limiting—can be highly dynamic and limit strategy when it’s challenged to achieve a desired result. 

7 

Benghazi in 2012. This is the most serious of the themes. There 

are many sayings in the military. One saying that rings most true 

is you fight the way you train, and in Benghazi we did. Many with 

firsthand knowledge have recounted the heroism displayed by the 

brave Americans in Benghazi that night. They fought the way they 

trained. That’s in the record. Outside of Libya there were discussions that churned on about what we should do. These elements 

also fought the way they were trained, specifically the predisposition to interagency influence had the military structure in the spirit of expeditionary government support waiting for a request for assistance from the State Department. There are accounts of time, 

space and capability, discussions of the question could we have gotten there in time to make a difference. While the discussion is not, 

could or could not of time, space and capability, the point is we 

should have tried. 

As another saying goes, always move to the sound of the guns. 

We didn’t know how long this would last when we became aware 

of the distress, nor did we completely understand what we had in 

front of us, if we had a kidnapping, rescue, recovery, protracted 

hostile engagement, or any or all of the above. But what we did 

know quite early on was that this was a hostile action. This was 

no demonstration gone terribly awry. 

To the point of what happened, the facts led to the conclusion of 

a terrorist attack. The AFRICOM J2 was focused on attribution. 

The attacks became attributable very soon after the event. Thank 

you for the invitation to appear before this committee. I’m here because I take this matter very seriously. I’m prepared to take your 

questions. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you, General. 

[Prepared statement of General Lovell follows:] 

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Chairman ISSA. Ms. Schake. 

STATEMENT OF KORI SCHAKE 

Ms. SCHAKE. Sir, I think the starting point for our conversation 

about Libya is that this is a failing state. Right? Security is eroding. Governance is ebbing, and as a result of those two things, 

Libya is unable to capitalize on its one big advantage which is the 

oil revenue on which its economy is predominantly based. And unless we are uninterested in this outcome, both for Libyans themselves and from the threats that are emanating to us from them, 

American policy should actually work to strengthen security in 

Libya and to strengthen governance in Libya so that the economy 

can help buffer the transition period of a fragile democratizing government. 

Our policies are not doing that. Our policies are principally interested in limiting our involvement, and as a result of that, the problems inherent in all transitioning societies, in societies that have 

lived 40 years under repressive governments and had dysfunctional 

economies, they need structured assistance and help. The United 

States knows how to do that in terms of security sector reform, in 

terms of governance, and yet we helped overthrow a government 

without helping establish security or governance. We have largely 

ignored the growing restiveness of militia in Libya and the migration of jihadists to Libya where, you know, the jihadists are now 

in possession of a Libyan government military base less than 20 

miles from the capitol. And in overtaking that base, they also got 

some pretty valuable American military equipment which we are 

going to be seeing in Syria, in Libya, and even in our own country 

unless we really help manage the problem of jihadism in Libya and 

elsewhere. 

Building government capacity is the key to doing that. That is, 

we cannot expect that the Libyan government is going to be able 

to disarm militia or to control the spread of jihadism in their territory. That will be the result of political negotiation. It cannot lead 

political negotiation because militia will not disarm until they have 

a high level of confidence that the reason, the political vacuum that 

exists in Libya, is actually going to be managed by political means. 

The Libyans are having a very messy, very slow, one-step-forward/ 

one-step-back conversation about governance in their country, but 

this is what democratization looks like, and they deserve an awful 

lot more help from us and from nongovernmental institutions that 

the United States supports, the National Democratic Institute, the 

International Republican Institute. Instead, we have been largely 

silent on an election that was marred by violence and in which, you 

know, yesterday’s parliamentary vote in Tripoli was prevented 

from coming to conclusion by storming of the parliament by armed 

men. As Mr. Cummings said, we need to do all that is necessary 

to help the Libyan government transition, and we are not. 

The last thing I would say is that if American policies won’t help 

this fragile government transition to establish security and governance, that we ought actually to encourage other states to do so, 

states in the region that can situate it politically amongst its neighbors, or states from outside the country, and predominantly this 

12 

administration’s policies have criticized both the motives and the 

actions of others instead of encouraging them into a void our own 

policies are leaving. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

[Prepared statement of Ms. Schake follows:] 

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Chairman ISSA. Dr. Gartenstein-Ross. 

STATEMENT OF DAVEED GARTENSTEIN–ROSS 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Chairman Issa, Ranking Member 

Cummings, distinguished members, it’s an honor to appear before 

you to discuss the successes and failures of the NATO intervention 

in Libya. Two days ago, it seemed that we were seeing rare good 

news out of Libya. Oil exports were about to resume from the 

Zueitina port after rebels holding it had come to an agreement with 

the government. On another optimistic note, the interim parliament had convened to select a new prime minister. The previous 

prime minister had resigned only after 6 days after his family was 

attacked. The prime minister before him was actually kidnapped by 

rebels. But the prime minister vote didn’t go well. Gunmen stormed 

the parliamentary building and forced lawmakers to abandon their 

plans. This is Libya today. Each step forward seems to produce another step or two back usually driven by security problems. 

The central government can’t execute basic sovereign functions 

in its own capital building. Last year gunmen shut down the ministries of justice and foreign affairs for two weeks due to a political 

dispute, the equivalent of gunmen here shutting down the Departments of Justice and State. Outside countries are questioning 

whether it’s safe to even keep diplomats in Libya. 

Jordan’s ambassador was kidnapped last month. Two Tunisian 

diplomats are being held by jihadists, and there have been many 

other attacks on embassies and diplomatic staff. I need not remind 

anyone here of what happened to our own Ambassador Stevens. 

I’ve submitted 15 pages of written testimony explaining at some 

length why I conclude that the cost of NATO’sintervention in Libya 

outweigh the benefits. It’s worth acknowledging that the war was 

superbly executed. NATO responded with extraordinary speed to 

the situation and saved the lives that Qadhafi would have taken 

had he overrun Benghazi, the rebel stronghold that he was threatening when the intervention began. This was accomplished with no 

allied casualties and only a $1.1 billion cost, but the question remains: Was going to war in Libya the right choice? I would suggest 

that the strategy of intervention should be called into question. 

Several advocates of military action argue that the Arab Spring 

had stalled at the time and that intervening could help breathe 

new life and new momentum into the revolutionary events. 

The desire to see dictators fall is, of course, noble, but noble intentions do not automatically make for wise actions. NATO’s intervention came when there was already wrenching changes and an 

unpredictable regional situation. The Tunisian and Egyptian leaders had fallen, and there were other revolutionary rumblings. Intervening represented not just a decision to stop Qadhafi’s advance, 

but also to speed up the pace of change. The problems associated 

with speeding up events can be seen in the intervention’s second 

order consequences. The most well-known occurred in north Mali 

where a collection of Al Qaeda-linked jihadists, including Al 

Qaeda’s North African affiliate, and Tuareg separatist groups, 

gained control over broad swaths of territory prompting a Frenchled intervention in January 2013. 

17 

Mali’s Tuareg rebellion has a long history, but Qadhafi’s overthrow transformed the dynamics. Libya’s dictator had been a longtime supporter of Tuareg separatism, and with him gone, the Tuaregs had lost a major patron. Jihadist groups exploited the Tuaregs’ loss of Qadhafi. There were other ways that NATO’s intervention contributed to the jihadist takeover in Mali. Thousands of Tuareg rebels fought for Qadhafi as mercenaries, and after the dictator’s defeat, they raided his weapons caches. Their heavily armed 

return to Mali reinvigorated a longstanding rebellion. The French 

military intervention pushed the jihadists from areas that they 

controlled, but there are signs that now a year later the jihadists 

may be back and, indeed, southern Libya has played a role in their 

comeback. Fighters from Ansar al-dine and Al Qaeda Islamic 

Maghreb fled from the advancing French and allied forces into 

southwest Libya and blended with local militants. 

The jihadists in North Africa have also been able to gain from 

the situation in Libya. A variety of Jihadist groups operate training 

camps there. Militants have benefited from the flow of arms into 

neighboring countries, and these factors make Libya a concern as 

a possible staging ground for future terrorist attacks, something 

vividly illustrated in the January 2013 hostage crisis at Algeria’s 

In Amenas gas plant, 30 miles from the Libya-Algeria border, 

which had multiple links to Libya, including training, weapons and 

point of origin. 

Despite the superb execution of NATO’s intervention, it has created a much more complicated regional dynamic for the U.S. It has 

helped jihadist groups, and it has had negative consequences for 

Libya’s neighbors. Further, it isn’t clear that the intervention saved 

lives. Some scholars, including in the Belfer Center document that 

Representative Chaffetz introduced, argue that the fact that the 

NATO intervention prolonged the war, meant that on net it cost 

more lives than it saved. And even if it saved lives in Libya, further lives were lost as a result in places like Mali, Egypt and Algeria. This is why I cannot join with those who proclaim NATO’s 

intervention to be a strategic success. Again, I appreciate the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Gartenstein-Ross follows:] 

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Chairman ISSA. Dr. Wehrey. 

STATEMENT OF FREDERIC WEHREY 

Mr. WEHREY. Chairman Issa, Ranking Member Cummings, and 

distinguished committee members, I’m grateful for this opportunity 

to speak with you about Libya’s security crisis and what the international community can do to assist. I bring the perspective of both 

a scholar who travels frequently to the country and a reserve military officer who served in Tripoli prior to the revolution. During my 

four visits to Libya, I have spoken with Libyan government officials, military officers, Islamists and militia leaders across the 

country including in Benghazi. 

At the core of Libya’s crisis is the power of its militias who draw 

support from a wide array of local, tribal, ethnic and religious constituencies. Their persistence is rooted in the absence of effective 

municipal governance, representative institutions and a strong central army and police. Since 2012, these militias have become politicized. They have used armed force to compel the passage of a 

sweeping law barring Qadhafi era officials from the government, 

kidnapped the prime minister, and blocked oil production in the 

east. Weapons are now the de facto currency through which demands are pressed and concessions obtained. Militias have also 

captured illicit trafficking networks. 

Libya’s instability has been aggravated by a decision by the weak 

transitional government to put the militias on its payroll under the 

loose authority of the Ministries of Defense and Interior. The idea 

then was to harness the manpower of the revolutionaries to fill the 

security void left by the nonexistent army which was kept deliberately weak by Qadhafi who feared its potential for coups. By all 

accounts, this has been a disastrous Faustian bargain. It has attracted new recruits to the militias through the promise of high 

salaries, and it has given the militia bosses even more political 

power. That power is especially evident in the East where Islamist 

militias demand the removal of Qadhafi era personnel from state 

institutions and the implementation of a Sharia-based constitution 

before they surrender arms. 

These actors, however, remain on the outer fringes of Libya’s politics and security institutions. Overwhelmingly, the country’s 

Islamists reject violence for political means. 

Faced with the weakness of the central government, an array of 

informal societal actors, tribal elders, NGOs, municipal councils 

and religious authorities have mobilized against the militias, especially radical groups like Ansar al-Sharia. They have demonstrated 

a societal resilience and a moderation that has kept the country 

from sliding down the path of civil war. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to emphasize that every Libyan I spoke 

with attributed Libya’s crisis to the enduring legacy of Qadhafi’s 

rule rather than the policies or decisions during the NATO-led 

intervention. It was Qadhafi’s 42-year tyranny that deprived Libyans of even a basic role in governance, pitted tribe against tribe 

and region against region, wrecked the economy, kept the security 

institutions deliberately weak, and marginalized the eastern part 

34 

of the country. Overwhelmingly Libyans remain supportive of the 

NATO-led operation, and they welcome outside assistance. 

What are the areas where this assistance can be best applied? 

Obviously the most important task is reforming the security sector 

in training and equipping a new generation of Army and police. 

The U.S. and its allies are currently engaged in just such a project 

under the auspices of what is known as the general purpose force, 

but in doing so, they must ensure that the ranks of this new force 

are inclusive of Libya’s diverse tribes and region and that effective 

civilian oversight is in place so that political factions do not capture 

the new security entities as their personal militias. 

It is important to recognize that lasting security cannot be 

achieved without addressing the economic and political motives 

that drive support for the militias. The government has tried with 

various schemes to disarm, demobilize, and integrate the young 

men of the militias. None of these efforts has succeeded because 

the country is paralyzed between opposing political factions. Each 

side sees any movement on the security sector as a win for its rivals. In essence, Libya suffers from a balance of weakness amongst 

its factions and militias. No single entity can compel the others to 

coercion, but every entity is strong enough to veto the others. 

With this in mind, the ultimate solution for Libya’s woes lies in 

the political realm, in the drafting of a constitution, the reform of 

its elected legislature, and a broad-based reconciliation under the 

auspices of the national dialogue. These are areas where outsiders 

can lend advice and measured assistance, but where the ultimate 

burden must be borne by Libyans themselves. 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you here today. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Wehrey follows:] 

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Chairman ISSA. Thank you. I’ll now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning. 

General Lovell, you were not on this or the Armed Services Committee’s primary list of people that were interviewed in this process, and yet you came forward here today, came forward to the 

committee. Could you explain to us why you believe it was necessary to come forward to offer us your testimony? 

General LOVELL. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I came forward because as 

a retired officer, most importantly, having served a number of 

years, I felt it was my duty to come forward. The young men and 

women that serve in uniform, those that serve along with us in civilian clothes, the circumstances of what occurred there in 

Benghazi that day need to be known. And with all of the discussion 

that ensues over a full forthcoming to the American people, it’s important. It’s a duty to be here. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. Our committee has interviewed a 

number of people, including those downrange people, both in Libya 

and in Benghazi, but as I said earlier, we for the most part have 

not interviewed people at AFRICOM with the exception, of course, 

being General Ham, although Carter Ham was at the Pentagon on 

September 11. Do you believe it is appropriate for us to interview 

other officers and enlisted personnel that served with you in Stuttgart that day as part of our discovery of what they believe could 

have been done, not just in what the military people call the 2 

shop, but also in the 3 shop and so on. 

General LOVELL. Sir, I think if it’s any information that gives the 

most well-rounded picture of the occurrences at the time are important to obtain. 

Chairman ISSA. One of the questions as we fan out here, but one 

of the questions that I have for you is, your primary job is, in fact, 

knowing the risk, knowing who the bad guys are and where they 

are and knowing what might face them. Is that correct? 

General LOVELL. Yes, sir. 

Chairman ISSA. So your expertise is not in the operational response of what refuelers were where and could have reacted within 

a certain amount of time; is that correct? 

General LOVELL. That’s correct. 

Chairman ISSA. However, you were intimately familiar with the 

risk of extremist groups in Egypt, Libya and throughout North Africa, and for that matter, all of Africa. Is that correct? 

General LOVELL. That’s correct. 

Chairman ISSA. Now, African Command basically doesn’t have 

any jets. It doesn’t have any conventional divisions. Is that correct? 

General LOVELL. That’s correct. 

Chairman ISSA. So you leverage all the other commands when 

you need physical boots on the ground. Is that right? 

General LOVELL. Boots on the ground, planes in the air, ships in 

the sea, et cetera. Right. 

Chairman ISSA. However, the role of African Command, and I’m 

not trying to put words in your mouth, so please correct me if I’m 

even a little off. 

General LOVELL. I will. 

Chairman ISSA. Is, in fact, to look at a continent in which we 

have almost no troops and almost no basing. We have a small joint 

46 

base in Djibouti, I believe, but for the most part we have no major 

military assets in Africa. Is it fair to say that counterterrorism, 

looking for and being aware and working with the governments in 

Africa with, or without if necessary, to combat terrorism and, in 

fact, to make sure that governments are stable and able to support 

our missions, USAID and the aid missions and the embassies, is 

that really, to a great extent, why there is a unique command with 

a four star general in charge of it that focuses on this continent of 

a billion people larger than North America? 

General LOVELL. That’s precisely the understanding. It’s to help 

Africans help Africans, and to work with Africans and our other 

partners to do so. 

Chairman ISSA. So in that role, on September 11 earlier there 

was an attack in Egypt. Did you know of, anticipate, or do you believe that the attack in Egypt was based on seeing a YouTube 

video? 

General LOVELL. Personally no. 

Chairman ISSA. So that never came to you even though intelligence and what may have caused something would have been 

right up your, if you will, 2 alley? 

General LOVELL. Yes, sir. 

Chairman ISSA. And in the hours that ensued after the attack on 

our compound in Benghazi, did you hear YouTube video? 

General LOVELL. Briefly discussed but not from any serious 

standpoint. 

Chairman ISSA. What time did you first hear that there was a 

video roughly? 

General LOVELL. It was early on in the evening of September 11. 

Chairman ISSA. Before 3:15 in the morning? 

General LOVELL. Absolutely. We were—absolutely. We were, I 

would have to say, probably dismissed that notion by then by working with other sources. 

Chairman ISSA. Okay. I just want to follow-up this one last 

thing. You heard about this early on, and you, as the deputy and 

the highest ranking person that moment working these issues, you 

dismissed the idea that this attack was, in fact, a demonstration 

that went awry and was based on a YouTube video out of Los Angeles? 

General LOVELL. Yes, sir. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. Recognize the ranking member. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. More than 3 years ago, 

a wave of political change swept through the Middle East and 

North Africa. This Arab Spring promised hope for people oppressed 

by dictators for decades, but it also led to abrupt change and sometimes budding conflicts. I’m looking forward to hearing about how 

this movement has evolved over the last 3 years and how the 

United States can support a peaceful democratic transition in the 

region. 

I’d also like to focus on the choice our country faced when the 

uprising against dictator Muammar Qadhafi began in 2011. At that 

time, the United States could have done nothing and allowed Qadhafi to remain in power, or we could have supported the liberation 

of the people of Libya. At the time, both Republicans and Democrats called on the President to support the rebels and oust QaVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:01 Jun 10, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\88089.TXT APRIL
47 

dhafi. For example, on April 24, 2011, Senator Lindsey Graham 

said this, ‘‘You cannot protect our vital national interests if Qadhafi 

stays.’’ General Lovell, I want to thank you for coming forth. I really do. Do you agree with Senator Graham that Qadhafi was a 

threat to our national security? 

General LOVELL. Yes, I do. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And, Dr. Schake, how about you? Do you agree 

with that? 

Ms. SCHAKE. Yes, I do. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And I think you, a little bit earlier, agreed with 

me that there are things that we need to do to be supportive of the 

government. What would those things be, Doctor, the present situation? 

Ms. SCHAKE. There are several things. First as several panelists 

mentioned, helping establish a Libyan national army that can actually police Libya’s territory, reign in the militia as you begin to get 

political solutions to problems that will permit their disarmament. 

Second, support and help structure and help organize civil society 

and elections in Libya. We are doing much, much, much too little 

in helping the Libyans move a political process forward and we do 

that largely with examples, our own example, but also what all of 

us know about democratizing societies. We know how to do this. 

We’re just not doing it nearly enough. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, 3 months later on July 3, 2011, Senator 

John McCain stated, ‘‘If Qadhafi stays, it is then a direct threat to 

our national security.’’ Dr. Gartenstein-Ross, what’s your view, and 

did you agree with Senators McCain and Graham? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. I do not, sir. Qadhafi was a brutal dictator. Nobody should have tears for him, but he was also about as 

rehabilitated as a dictator could be. I think that the statement that 

he threatened our national security would have been very true in 

the 1980s, true in the 1990s, but by 2011, he was, at most, a third 

or fourth tier security concern, in my view. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So therefore you disagree with the Senators? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Yes, I do, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Dr. Wehrey, do you agree with the Senators? 

Mr. WEHREY. Well, I believe that Qadhafi was keeping a lid on 

a lot of things that were brewing. I mean, he was probably not a 

direct security threat the way he was in the 80s, but it depends on 

how we define security. I mean, many of the ills that spilled over 

from Libya and the current problems with Libya were because of 

his rule, because of the way he kept things clamped down, didn’t 

permit civil society, marginalized the East. I mean, the seeds of extremism were sown during his regime. So in that sense, it was a 

security threat I think, and we know that Libyans were fighting in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, so he was exporting a lot of those problems 

beyond his borders. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And what do you think we should be doing? 

What steps should the United States be taking to improve the situation in Libya? 

Mr. WEHREY. Well, I think under the circumstances the U.S. is 

doing quite a lot with other partners in Europe and elsewhere. The 

U.S. is committed to train over 19,000 new Libyan soldiers as part 

of the general purpose force along with Turkey, Britain, Italy, and 

48 

Morocco. This proposal is underway. We’re engaged in civil society. 

Much of the problem is the lack of a partner on the other side. 

There’s such a disarray in the Libyan government that we can’t 

really interface with them. So for instance, the Libyan government 

has not agreed to provide payment for the general purpose force, 

which is why we’re unable to move forward with this training of 

the new Army. But during my four travels to Libya since the revolution, I found the international community has been engaged, and 

the U.S. is there in terms of reforming the defense sector, helping 

with ministerial oversight, reaching out to Libya’s vibrant civil society. A lot of this, the problem is access. The security situation 

doesn’t permit our diplomats to go out and reach Libyans. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And General Lovell, what would you have us do 

there now to make the situation better in Libya? 

General LOVELL. Well, sir, no longer serving and having access 

to a lot of the pertinent information and data, I wouldn’t be able 

to give you a strong military answer to that. My personal answer 

to that would be one where it’s a set of circumstances where we 

would have to work together to develop, that development would 

have to be very engaged on the ground with the people to make 

that happen. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you, and I ask unanimous consent just to 

put something in the record at this time. Our records show that or 

agreed to be made public that we have interviewed, as I said, the 

Combatant Commander, General Ham. We have also interviewed 

the Vice Commander, Admiral Leidig, Admiral Landolt and Losey, 

or Rear Admiral Losey, who’s the SOC commander. Would you 

agree to provide the committee additional suggestions of the people 

that from your recollection are, outside of this hearing so that it 

not be public, the people you believe would be most helpful to gain 

knowledge directly of the facts on the ground on that day? 

General LOVELL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. May I? 

Chairman ISSA. Of course. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Of the list of people that we have already interviewed, I’m sure you’re familiar with those titles, would they be 

people that would be able to render an opinion like you were able 

to—and I’m not saying you would come up with the same conclusion, but would have the same type of information to render an 

opinion? These are people who are public servants who are military 

people. I’m just curious. 

General LOVELL. Sir, I know each of those gentlemen and served 

with them. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. An what do you think of them? 

General LOVELL. Fine officers. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And so would they be in a position to render an 

opinion as you have? 

General LOVELL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Very well. 

Chairman ISSA. Okay. So I think we have established that we’ll 

get additional names and that the names that we have already 

interviewed would be ones that would have been on your list? Yes. 

General LOVELL. Yes. 

49 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. And I thank the gentleman from 

Florida. Recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Lovell, a couple of questions. First of all, you have testified that we knew the night of September 11 that this was not just, 

say, the result of some of the video that had been shown. We knew 

this wasn’t just a demonstration. We knew this was a concerted attack? 

General LOVELL. Yes, I did. 

Mr. MICA. Okay. That being said, in your position, you would 

know sort of who knew what. The State Department also would 

have known pretty instantaneously that there was a pretty serious 

incident going on in Benghazi. I’ve seen videos of it. Some of that 

was transmitted into the State Department and other locations. So 

we had a pretty good idea of what was going on there. You did. 

Would you say the State Department should have or could have? 

General LOVELL. It could or should, yes, sir. 

Mr. MICA. Okay. The attack started at 9:40, which was 3:40 in 

the afternoon here, approximately a 6-hour difference, I think. Is 

that correct? 

General LOVELL. Yes. 

Mr. MICA. So it wasn’t an unusual time here in the United 

States that appropriate people and the highest level people should 

have been alerted that something serious was going on at one of 

our posts; is that correct? 

General LOVELL. It was during the duty day here in the United 

States, yes, sir. 

Mr. MICA. I don’t know if we could have saved the Ambassador 

and aide that was with him. They may have been killed in the 

smoke or the first part of that. Would you say that was a pretty 

good assumption, that they were not, it was not possible to save 

them because they were probably killed within an hour or two— 

the U.S. really doesn’t have a capability of responding there. Not 

that we shouldn’t have had on the ground the capability to respond 

to some kind of attack. Would that be a correct assumption? 

General LOVELL. You would typically, greatest desire for whatever situation you were going to be in to have adequate security. 

Mr. MICA. I know we have over 100 posts, and there were about 

14 listed on sort of the endangered or high risk list, and Benghazi 

was one of them. Isn’t that correct? 

General LOVELL. You would have to look to the State Department for that. I don’t know. 

Mr. MICA. We were told that in the past, so if someone failed, 

they failed to have the proper protections were the posts at risk. 

Every post doesn’t have the same risk. Every point we don’t have 

the same risk, but that was one of the major ones. The time frame 

didn’t allow us maybe to save the Ambassador because they came 

in and attacked. It was an attack. It wasn’t a little demonstration 

in the street. I believe we had enough time to save the two former 

Navy SEALS that were trying to protect the post. They were killed 

at approximately 5:15 a.m. It started at 9:40. That’s a good 6 

hours. I’ve been to Italy. I’ve been to Spain. I’ve been to Turkey. 

I’ve been to Stuttgart. I was informed, as a Member of Congress, 

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spond, we had the capability of responding in a short order to save 

American personnel, particularly an ambassador or key assets or 

American citizens from points, and North Africa isn’t exactly the 

toughest spot. There are places deeper in Africa that are tougher 

to get to, but I believe we could have saved those two if someone 

had taken action. Do you think we had the ability to do that? 

General LOVELL. Presently or at the time? 

Mr. MICA. At the time. 

General LOVELL. At the time, it didn’t happen that way, and others have discussed the time sequence. 

Mr. MICA. Did the United States of America have the ability to 

protect its, again, people at that post within 6 hours? 

General LOVELL. The State Department would be responsible for 

the time on the ground. Military could have made a response of 

some sort. 

Mr. MICA. The military could have made a response. 

General LOVELL. Of some sort. 

Mr. MICA. I believe those two individuals were not saved—Mr. 

Issa and I went to Roda. We interviewed people. Our military personnel, they were not given the go-ahead. They were not given the 

assets. No one responded to go in and save the two individuals who 

were lost at approximately 5:50, and I believe we had that capability. Can you tell the committee if you think we had the capability of saving them at that time once again? 

General LOVELL. You just mentioned personnel, assets and time 

and distance. Do I think we had all of those things put together 

at that moment? I wasn’t in operations—— 

Mr. MICA. But again, it’s not—again, we had that capability, I 

believe. I was told even before this that if we had an incident, that 

we could go in and rescue or save or resolve the situation, and do 

you believe we had that capability? 

General LOVELL. If capabilities were in hand, then they could be 

employed. 

Mr. JORDAN. [Presiding.] The gentleman from Virginia is recognized. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair. Welcome to our panel. 

General, let me pick up on that. You were not in the operational 

chain of command, is that correct, at the time of the tragedy? 

General LOVELL. Not in the chain of command. I was serving in 

a staff role at that point in time. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. So you weren’t making decisions? 

General LOVELL. That’s correct. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I don’t know if you’re familiar with the fact that 

the House Armed Services Committee on February 10th issued a 

report, the Republican majority issued a report, and I want to 

quote from it and see what part of this you disagree with, because 

my friend from Florida suggests we could have, should have done 

something from, for example, Rota, Italy. 

Secretary Panetta—I’m quoting from the report—I mean Spain 

rather—in consultation with General Ham, General Dempsey, and 

others verbally authorized three specific actions. First, two Marine 

FAST platoons in Rota, Spain, were ordered to prepare to deploy, 

one bound for Benghazi and one destined for Tripoli. Second, a Special Operations unit assigned to the European Command known as 

51 

Commander’s In-Extremis Force, CIF, training in Croatia was ordered to move to a U.S. Naval air station in Italy and await further 

instructions. And third, a Special Operations unit in the United 

States also dispatched to the region. These orders were issued approximately 2 to 4 hours after the initial attack. Is it your contention that we could have done it sooner or should have done more 

of it? Or do you deny this happened? 

General LOVELL. My belief, as I put in my statement, has to do 

with we should have continued to move forward with whatever 

forces we were going to move forward with. The timeline and what 

specifically happened there was in the operational channels. What 

I’m looking at is the future, and how we choose to respond in the 

future really needs to be along the lines of the military feeling empowered to take action under the authorities that it has—— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. 

General LOVELL. —so that they can move forward and do that 

when the capabilities exist. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I want to read you the conclusion of the committee, the Republican chairman, Buck McKeon, who conducted 

formal briefings and oversaw that report. He said, ‘‘I’m pretty well 

satisfied that given where the troops were, how quickly the thing 

all happened, and how quickly it dissipated, we probably couldn’t 

have done much more than we did.’’ 

Do you take issue with the chairman of the Armed Services Committee in that conclusion? 

General LOVELL. His conclusion that he couldn’t have done much 

more than they did with the capability and the way they executed 

it? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Given the time frame. 

General LOVELL. That’s a fact in the record, the way it is written, 

the way he stated it. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Okay. All right. Because I’m sure you can appreciate, General, there might be some who for various and sundry 

reasons would like to distort your testimony and suggest that 

you’re testifying that we could have, should have done a lot more 

than we did because we had capabilities we simply didn’t utilize. 

That is not your testimony? 

General LOVELL. No, that is not my testimony, no, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank you very much, General. 

Well, actually, Mr. Gartenstein-Ross, if I understood your testimony, Libya is a mess. I mean, it’s a very unstable, violent environment. There is no central government control, and that’s the environment in which we’re trying to work and in which we were 

working at the time of the tragedy in Benghazi; is that correct? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Yes, that’s correct, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And no amount of U.S. troops, security forces 

even at the time of the tragedy in Benghazi was going to change 

that environment; is that correct? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Yeah. I mean, certainly you’re not going 

to change the fact that the central government can’t exercise a 

writ. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You know, like my friend from Utah, I went to 

Tripoli, not Benghazi, and the airport at the time was—security at 

the airport was controlled by a militia—— 

52 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Yeah. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. —not by the government. I don’t know if that’s 

changed. Has it? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. I’m not aware if—of whether it has now. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yeah. That made one very uneasy about security, 

you know. Let’s hope they’re friendly. But it’s obviously painful 

transparent symbolism of the lack of any central authority. And I 

see you shaking your head, Ms. Schake, as well. Did you want to 

comment? 

Ms. SCHAKE. I agree with you. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yeah. I just think that’s also very important, the 

testimony the three of you have provided, which I very much appreciate. But, I mean, you know, again people can play politics 

with a tragedy all they want. The fact of the matter is at the time 

of the tragedy and even to this day, Libya is a very unstable situation postrevolution, and the object is to do the best we can to try 

to change that dynamic to create a more stable government that 

can provide security not only for us and our diplomats, but also for 

its own people. Fair statement, Dr. Wehrey? 

Mr. WEHREY. Absolutely. I mean, as I mentioned, we—I mean, 

since, I think, 2013 the U.S. has been planning for helping the Libyan Government with its security forces. Our diplomats are involved with reaching out to civil society, but it’s a tough challenge, 

and, I mean, I really want to emphasize that a lot of this is on the 

Libyans’ shoulders. I mean, this is a country that needs to reach 

a broad political reconciliation among its factions before they can 

be in a position to receive outside help. So when I talk to people 

from AFRICOM and State Department, there’s just this sense that 

there’s a lack of partnership on the other side, and you need that. 

And I think much of this is taking time. I mean, Libyans are moving forward. They are writing a Constitution. They held elections 

in 2012 that by all accounts were relatively transparent and fair, 

and they remain very pro-American, which is in contrast to many 

other countries in the region. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you very much, and I want to thank all 

four of you for your testimony. I think it’s very enlightening, and 

actually it’s a contribution to what has heretofore been a rather 

desultory conversation about the tragedy in Libya. Thank you very 

much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ISSA. [Presiding.] I thank the gentleman. 

For what purpose does the gentleman from Florida seek recognition? 

Mr. MICA. A unanimous consent request. March 11th, along with 

more than 60 Members, sent this letter to the President saying it 

had been a year and a half since the Benghazi attacks, nothing had 

been done to bring these people to justice, and asking for the administration to act. I would like that to be part of the record. 

Chairman ISSA. Without objection, so ordered. 

Chairman ISSA. The gentleman from Utah is recognized for 5 

minutes. Mr. Chaffetz. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Thank the chairman, and thank you all for being 

here. Thank you for your service to your country, and, General, 

God bless you. Thank you for your service, over 33 years. 

53 

What was—on September 11, 2012, what was your rank and 

title? 

General LOVELL. Brigadier general, United States Air Force, and 

I served as the Deputy Director for Intelligence and Knowledge Development, J2. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. J2. 

Where were you the night of September 12th, September 11th 

and 12th? 

General LOVELL. I was at my home until I was recalled to the 

JOC, Joint Operations Center. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Joint Operations Center in Germany? 

General LOVELL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. You were in the room? 

General LOVELL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. You were able to see, hear, feel, understand what 

was going on in that room? 

General LOVELL. We work towards understanding. That’s the job 

of the J2, yes, sir. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Were you ever interviewed by the Accountability 

Review Board, the ARB? 

General LOVELL. No, sir. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. CIA station chief—your prime responsibility was 

to try to—as you say in the last sentence of your testimony, that 

the attacks—the AFRICOM J2 was focused on attribution; that attacks became attributable very soon after the event. What do you 

believe they were attributable to? 

General LOVELL. That they were attributable to an Islamist extremist group. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Al Qaeda? 

General LOVELL. It was—we felt it was Ansar al-Sharia. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Which is affiliated with Al Qaeda? 

General LOVELL. Yeah. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. AQIM, were they involved? 

General LOVELL. The AAS is who we most principally looked at, 

but all of the groups at large. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. How quickly did you come to the conclusion that 

you believed that there were Al Qaeda affiliates or Al Qaeda themselves involved and engaged in this attack? 

General LOVELL. Very, very soon, when we were still in the very 

early, early hours of this activity. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Was it a video? 

General LOVELL. No, sir. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Was it a video that sparked a protest? 

General LOVELL. No, sir. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. What I want to get at, Mr. Chairman, are the 

facts at the time. That’s what the White House keeps talking 

about, the facts at the time. The CIA station chief is quoted as saying, ‘‘quote, quote, quote, not not an escalation of protest, end 

quote.’’ Would you agree or disagree with the CIA station chief’s 

analysis? 

General LOVELL. That it is not not an escalation? Absolutely. It 

was an attack. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Beth Jones at the State Department, in an email 

that went to, among others, Hillary Clinton’s Chief of Staff, says 

54 

that she told the Libyan Ambassador—this is September 12th, 

12:46 p.m.—‘‘I told him that the group that conducted the attacks, 

Ansar al-Sharia, is affiliated with Islamic extremists. Would you 

agree or disagree with that statement? 

General LOVELL. I would agree with it. The timing of it, I don’t 

know, but the content, yes. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Mr. Chairman, the scandal that is here that some 

choose to ignore as a phony scandal is the fact that the CIA, the 

CIA station chief, the military themselves, you have the person sitting in front of us who is the head of intelligence, he is looking at 

the intelligence, they come to the conclusion that it’s Ansar alSharia. And then you also have the Department of State telling the 

Libyans that it was Ansar al-Sharia. None of them think it’s a 

video. None of them; the military, the CIA, the CIA station chief, 

the State Department, all of them. The facts at the time, Mr. 

Chairman, the facts do not point to a video. That only comes from 

the White House. 

What was going on in the room, General? Our people are under 

attack. There are people dying. What is the military doing? 

General LOVELL. Desperately trying to gain situational awareness in an area where we had a dearth of it. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Were they moving to the sound of the guns? Were 

they doing what they were trained to do, or were they sitting 

around waiting for the State Department and Hillary Clinton to 

call them up and say, do something? What did they actually do? 

General LOVELL. We sent a Predator drone overhead to be able 

to—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Did we do enough, General? 

General LOVELL. Sir—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Your professional opinion. You are retired, sir. I 

know you care deeply about this. 

General LOVELL. Yes. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. What was the mood in the room? What was the 

feeling? Was it to save our people? 

General LOVELL. It was desperation there to be able to gain—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. It was what? 

General LOVELL. Desperation there to gain situational awareness 

and to be able to do something to save people’s lives. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Did they actually do it? Did they actually do it? 

The three actions that we talk about, a FAST team, FAST team is 

not—they’re not even trained to go in to engage into a fight. The 

other force they talk about is coming from the United States of 

America. We had assets there in Europe. Did they actually go to 

the sound of the guns? Did they actually go into Benghazi? 

General LOVELL. No, sir, those assets did not. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Why not? 

General LOVELL. Basically there was a lot of looking to the State 

Department for what it was that they wanted, and in the deference 

to the Libyan people and the sense of deference to the desires of 

the State Department in terms of what they would like to have. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Did they ever tell you to go save the people in 

Benghazi? 

General LOVELL. Not to my knowledge, sir. 

55 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. We didn’t run to the sound of the guns. They 

were issuing press releases. We had Americans dying. We had dead 

people, we had wounded people, and our military didn’t try to engage in that fight. Would you disagree with that? 

Chairman ISSA. The gentleman’s time has expired, but the gentleman may answer on any of the questions if you didn’t think you 

got enough time to answer fully. 

General LOVELL. Four individuals died, sir; we obviously did not 

respond in time to get there. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Could we have? 

Chairman ISSA. The gentleman’s time has expired. Go ahead. 

General LOVELL. We may have been able to, but we’ll never 

know. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Because we didn’t try. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. 

We now recognize the gentlelady from the District of Columbia 

Ms. Norton. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

This hearing is interesting. It seems to be based on the notion 

that there were unintended consequences after the intervention 

into Libya. Let me begin by saying it’s the nature of the beast, if 

one is talking about the Mideast, and it’s interesting to note in contrast that when we intervene in Iraq where the consequences 

were—indeed, where we could have prevented by simply letting the 

monitors on the ground continue to look for weapons of mass destruction, we just went in willy-nilly. We didn’t have anything like 

that in Libya. And, of course, in Iraq clearly one of the unintended 

consequences surely would have been renewed conflict between the 

Sunni and Shi’a, and yet we went in head first, perhaps the most 

catastrophic war of the 20th century, invasion by the United States 

of America. 

Well, many of us were very doubtful about Libya, to be sure, and 

many Democrats, frankly, followed our Republican colleagues, who 

argued very forcefully for intervention in Libya. Democrats were 

quite split on it. Senator McCain, who I think should be quoted 

here, he was the Republican standard bearer in the last Presidential—or in the Presidential election of 2008, and he is a leader 

on foreign policy. He said in 2011, some critics still argue that we 

should be cautious about helping the Libyan opposition, warning 

that we do not know enough about them or that their victory could 

pave the way for an Al Qaeda takeover. Both arguments, he said, 

were hollow. 

Dr. Gartenstein-Ross, how do you respond to Senator McCain’s 

arguments? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. I think that Senator McCain, with respect, was incorrect. I think that we did not know enough about 

the rebels at the time, something which was testified to contemporaneously by members of the Intelligence Community. 

Ms. NORTON. Do we ever know? Do we know enough about them 

now in Syria? I mean, as I said in the beginning, and I agree we 

didn’t know enough about them, and even if we did, one wonders 

whether that could have moved us one way or the other as we saw 

this dictator in power. 

56 

Dr. Wehrey, it seems that McCain was saying—Senator McCain 

was saying that if we did not intervene, the war might have 

dragged on even longer, and that Al Qaeda would have been 

strengthened. Now, do you agree that that was a risk? 

Mr. WEHREY. I do agree. I think if the war had dragged on, you 

might have seen sort of the de facto partition of Libya, Qadhafi 

holding on to certain loyalist areas. The country might have become a magnet for jihadism. Al Qaeda might have gained an even 

greater foothold. 

Ms. NORTON. Were these rebels generally seen as pro-Western? 

Why do you think Senator McCain praised them so powerfully? 

Mr. WEHREY. Well, because they were. I mean, in my interactions with them after the revolution, even Islamists in the East 

were supportive of NATO’s help, and they interfaced with NATO, 

and so by and large they remain pro-Western. 

Now, certainly what happens in any opposition is there are splinters, and there are fissures, and so you had groups peel off that are 

more radical and have formed links with radical groups, but I 

think he was accurate. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentlelady. 

I would let Members know that there will be a vote on the floor 

at approximately 10:55. We will remain here, taking questioning 

probably for the first 10 or so minutes after they call the vote. We 

will then recess until approximately 10 minutes after the last vote 

is called, meaning if you vote quickly and head back, you’ll be here 

when I regavel us open again. 

We now go to the gentleman from Ohio Mr. Jordan. 

Mr. JORDAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, I want to pick up where my colleague Congressman 

Chaffetz was at. You had two statements in your testimony that 

I think are most telling. The first is always move to the sound of 

the guns. That means something to you, doesn’t it, General? 

General LOVELL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. JORDAN. It means something to anyone who has ever worn 

the uniform of our country, doesn’t it? 

General LOVELL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. JORDAN. We take seriously the airmen who have been under 

your command, the soldiers, the sailors, the airmen who you’ve had 

a chance to be an officer for, you take that seriously? 

General LOVELL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. JORDAN. And you couldn’t do that on September 11th because you say in your testimony we were, ‘‘waiting for a request 

for assistance from the State Department.’’ You couldn’t react normally, customarily the way the military always react; in this situation, you couldn’t do what the military always does. Is that accurate? 

General LOVELL. From my perspective, yes, sir. 

Mr. JORDAN. And you’ve been in the military 33 years, deployed 

all over the planet, all over the world. Has there ever been a situation prior to this where you couldn’t react in the normal, customary 

way that the military reacts? 

General LOVELL. No situation in—— 

57 

Mr. JORDAN. First time in your 33 years rising to the rank of 

general, first time in your 33 years you couldn’t do what the military always does, run to the sound of the guns? 

General LOVELL. Yes, sir, for me. 

Mr. JORDAN. And why was that the case? What had the State 

Department done in your time at African Command; what had they 

done, what was the culture, what was the climate, what had happened where you couldn’t do what you normally do? 

General LOVELL. This was a command that was created to be a 

bit different. It was created to work with an interagency environment to ensure that—— 

Mr. JORDAN. I get that. 

General LOVELL. Yes. 

Mr. JORDAN. That’s in your testimony, too. I get that. But what 

specifically—I mean, we have soldiers down, you have people under 

attack. You knew, as everyone now knows, it was a terrorist attack. So when you have soldiers, seamen, airmen under attack, you 

run to the sound of the guns. You couldn’t do that. 

So what specifically had the State Department done or said that 

prevented you from doing—I don’t care about—we know this is 

unique in that it was a little different in the way it was set up, 

but still when that happens, you still react the way you’re supposed 

to react, the way the military always reacts, and yet you couldn’t. 

What specifically had the State Department—what had they done, 

or what prevented you from doing that? 

General LOVELL. Well, it’s not what they did in that particular 

situation, it’s what they didn’t do. They didn’t come forward with 

stronger requests for action. 

Mr. JORDAN. So—and previously in your time dealing with Libya, 

when there was a situation, the State Department said, okay, let’s 

do this. Now suddenly they’re hesitating and not giving you any 

guidance at all. 

General LOVELL. Prior to that our conditioning was, obviously, 

with Odyssey Guard, we were there to support the State Department in setting up and establishing the embassy in Tripoli. Therefore, the work that was done relative to Libya was one where the 

State Department was in the lead, and we worked to support them 

to achieve the goals of the United States. 

Mr. JORDAN. Who at the State Department did you and your— 

and the officers directly above you, who did you directly interface 

with? 

General LOVELL. Well, in varying circumstances, but for me I 

had interactions when I was in Langare, Italy, working with Odyssey Guard, would—had talked on occasion with Ambassador Cretz. 

Mr. JORDAN. Anyone else at the State Department you interacted 

with? 

General LOVELL. Well, briefings back at AFRICOM over that 

other summer. Mr. Andrew Shapiro came there as well, he was 

briefed. And then, of course, Ambassador Johnnie Carson, who was 

African Bureau, was very engaged, obviously, in what went on. 

Mr. JORDAN. And this is the Andrew Shapiro who was senior adviser to Secretary of State Clinton, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Political Military Affairs; is that correct? 

58 

General LOVELL. That was his role. He was Assistant Secretary 

for, right, Political Military Affairs. 

Mr. JORDAN. Currently Andrew Shapiro who is part of Beacon 

Global Strategies, correct? 

General LOVELL. That could be where he works, I don’t know. 

Mr. JORDAN. That’s definitely where he works. 

Did the general urge the State Department to take a specific action? Did you and/or the general urge the State Department to take 

specific action on the night of September 11th when you knew a 

terrorist attack had taken place on our people at our facility in 

Benghazi? 

General LOVELL. I can’t speak for anyone other than myself. 

That was not my place to encourage them to do that. 

Mr. JORDAN. And you don’t know if the general urged? 

General LOVELL. Oh, I don’t know that they urged to take action. 

There was definitely dialogue over what action wanted to be taken. 

Mr. JORDAN. But the general, just like you, is trained in the culture that says when you have seamen, airmen, soldiers under attack, you respond, right? 

General LOVELL. On location where I was located, it was a senior 

admiral that was in charge there, but General Ham was engaged 

back in D.C. 

Mr. JORDAN. I understand. 

General LOVELL. Yes. 

Mr. JORDAN. Thank you, chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. If I could have just 10 

seconds. 

You mentioned Mr. Shapiro and the engagement. Was Libya different in State Department interface with AFRICOM than the rest 

of Africa, and if so, how? 

General LOVELL. This was the—other than the—the answer is 

yes, it was different, and it was different because our other engagements where we were engaged militarily, where there was obviously—we were supporting the military strategy, the policy of the 

United States, we obviously worked with a CT-type focus, 

counterterrorism focus. This was the first activity that did not start 

out as a counterterrorism effort that employed military combat 

power for Africa Command since it had stood up. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

Mr. Lynch, are you next or Ms. Duckworth? 

The gentlelady is recognized. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to Mr. 

Lynch as well. 

Given the atrocities that Qadhafi committed, it’s no question that 

the people of Libya are much better off without him. However, 

after 42 years of authoritarian rule, we have a pretty delicate transition to a democracy. 

Dr. Wehrey, you testified previously that overwhelmingly the 

country’s political leaders are rejecting violence for political means, 

and that they’re committed to some sort of a democratic path forward, and that they welcome greater cooperation with the U.S. Can 

you explain in more detail what their willingness is, or how that 

willingness to cooperate with the U.S. is manifesting itself, and 

what can we do? 

59 

Mr. WEHREY. Well, again, I think it’s really significant that a lot 

of—some Islamists who at one time were foes of the United States, 

the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, these leaders are now in the 

Parliament, they’re in ministries, they’re meeting with United 

States diplomats, they’re meeting with our Ambassador there, and, 

again, it goes back to the tremendous goodwill that stems from our 

intervention there. And I think they look at the areas where we 

can help as applying our own expertise in democracy, how do you 

run a Parliament. 

You have to remember, and I was in Libya under Qadhafi, it was 

an Orwellian state where people had absolutely no role in their 

own self-governance. They had absolutely no experience at things 

that you and I take for granted at the very basic local level, so it’s 

all very new to them. So what they’re doing is having to learn to 

scratch. They’re sending delegations to other countries to learn how 

do you run a town council, how do you—what are some structures 

for federalism, how do you oversee a budget, just basic things, and 

I think the U.S. has an important role to play. 

As I mentioned, there’s a tremendous need for security, and they 

are—you know, the former Prime Minister Zeidan came to the 

United States and asked for U.S. help in training the new Libyan 

Army. The United States has stepped up to that request along with 

Turkey, Britain, Italy, and Morocco, so we are helping and are prepared to help in that respect. 

But, again, I would also say engaging with the people of Libya, 

when I talk to the U.S. diplomats, they tell me that Libyan society 

is tremendously vibrant, there’s an educated class, there’s young 

people, there’s a thirst for openness. We’re training their media. 

We’re reaching out to youth groups, to women. And I think these 

are all incredibly, you know, valuable areas. And, yes, the country 

does have a terrorism problem, but I urge policymakers to not be 

consumed by that terrorist problem and not let that be the only 

lens through which we view this country. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Can you speak about their police forces? You 

said needing help to train their military. Are they asking for help 

to train their police forces as well from the U.S. or any other allies? 

Mr. WEHREY. Other allies. I believe that much of this training 

is already going on in places like Italy. The Italians are involved, 

the Jordanians, the Turks. So many countries are stepping up and 

training their police, and this training, again, is happening overseas at other countries for security reasons. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Are there additional risks to consider as we 

support Libya’s effort towards its transition? For example, are 

there risks from a program for demobilization, disarmament and 

reintegration of the militia members? You talked about combating 

terrorism. You know, as the United States helps Libya move forward, I also want to make sure that we minimize risks to our Nation and to our citizens as well, so are there any risks that we 

should be sort of keeping an eye on as we try to help them move 

forward? 

Mr. WEHREY. Well, absolutely. I think when we train the new 

Libyan security forces, we want to make sure we’re doing a thorough vetting of these individuals to make sure we’re not imparting 

training and equipment to bad actors. I mean, we do this in our 

60 

security engagement elsewhere in a number of states, and there’s 

always risks involved. And as I understand it, you know, 

AFRICOM, they’re asking the tough questions; okay, we’re going to 

step in and help train this force, but what are the unintended consequences down the road? 

We don’t want to create a military that steps in and subverts the 

democratic process in this country, that, you know, becomes more 

authoritarian or goes back to the old ways of Qadhafi. I think 

that’s a risk. 

I think border control is a huge area that we need to focus on. 

The European Union is heavily involved in this. I think the United 

States needs to, I think, push the Europeans to take on more of 

the burden. Much of their security is directly impacted by what 

happens in Libya. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentlelady. 

We now go to the gentleman from Michigan Mr. Walberg. 

Mr. WALBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And General Lovell, I thank you for your service, and I thank 

you for your willingness and desire to be here. 

General LOVELL. You’re welcome, sir. 

Mr. WALBERG. I recognize the fact that you led as a commander, 

but you were under command as well, and the frustrations of being 

under command at times and in this situation appear to be very 

evident, but I appreciate you being here. You mention in your written testimony that AFRICOM’s ability to mobilize and supply combat power with, ‘‘limited boots on the ground, and in the implied 

time frame, was commendable.’’ What do you mean by ‘‘the implied 

time frame’’? 

General LOVELL. The United States was acting under Odyssey 

Dawn and then was supporting under the U.N. resolution. So in 

working through the compressed time frame prior to OUP taking 

place, the United States was acting with allied partners, and then 

a more focused NATO-plus effort, if you will, with OUP. So there 

was a definite desire to get done what we could get done prior to 

that and then moving forward. 

Also there is so much you can do without boots on the ground. 

Obviously I wasn’t in an operational role at that time, but just 

military knowledge tells you you need boots on the ground to hold 

and make changes, much as the rest of the panel has discussed 

here today. 

Mr. WALBERG. So the effectiveness, could you elaborate, of this 

policy? 

General LOVELL. Of a ‘‘no boots on ground policy,’’ sir? 

Mr. WALBERG. Yes, yes, sir. 

General LOVELL. Well, you can effect from the sea, you can effect 

from the air, but you hold and have lasting change by being 

present on the ground. In a situation where you need more than, 

say, diplomacy or economic influence, and the military is called in, 

that’s serious business, and the change takes place on the ground. 

Mr. WALBERG. So am I to understand, then, that the effectiveness was compromised, that it wasn’t complete, that it wasn’t as 

61 

full as possible, that it wasn’t satisfactory without having this 

boots on the ground available to you? 

General LOVELL. I would characterize it as you would obviously 

have had a different outcome and effect had you had boots on the 

ground than you had without it. 

Mr. WALBERG. Without it. 

When did AFRICOM start becoming aware of political turmoil in 

Libya? 

General LOVELL. Well, Libya was a country that we watched, as 

we watched all of the—I’m speaking from a J2 perspective, we kept 

tabs on all of the countries there. In the Arab Spring we knew especially that there could be other effects going across that area. 

There were really things that we watched that were CT oriented, 

and then other things that we watched that were more broadly politically affecting, and that began to happen. 

Mr. WALBERG. When you began monitoring it, when was that? 

General LOVELL. That would be in the early 2000—2011 time 

frame. 

Mr. WALBERG. Did AFRICOM have any role in the decisionmaking process to intervene in Libya, and what type of role? 

General LOVELL. I’m sorry, sir, would you please repeat? 

Mr. WALBERG. Did AFRICOM have any role in the decisionmaking process, direct decisionmaking process, to intervene into 

Libya, and what was that role? 

General LOVELL. That would be more at the commander’s—the 

combatant commander’s level than my own. I wouldn’t have that 

information. 

Mr. WALBERG. What was AFRICOM’s role during Odyssey 

Dawn? 

General LOVELL. Their role is to work with other allied partners 

prior to the U.N. resolution taking effect to assist the rebels in 

Libya. 

Mr. WALBERG. What about Unified Protector? 

General LOVELL. That was a more broad effort sanctioned by the 

United Nations to assist the rebels in Libya. 

Mr. WALBERG. Dr. Gartenstein-Ross, some have praised the 

NATO intervention as a model intervention, but your testimony 

points to consequences of the intervention. What are some of the 

most pronounced consequences of this Libyan intervention? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. The largest consequence is what happened in north Mali. There’s—— 

Mr. WALBERG. Well, excuse me—— 

Chairman ISSA. The gentleman’s time has expired. You can finish your answer. 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. The largest consequence is what happened in north Mali. A direct line can be drawn between the intervention in NATO and the Jihadist takeover of north Mali, something that became an issue in the 2012 campaign both because the 

Tuareg separatist groups, who are not themselves Jihadists, lost a 

major sponsor in Qadhafi, and Jihadists were able to exploit that; 

but also because the returning Tuareg mercenaries who fought for 

Qadhafi both pillaged his armories and came back heavily armed. 

There are other consequences that can be felt with the flow of 

arms throughout the region going to places like Egypt, Algeria, and 

62 

Tunisia. Lives have been directly lost there, and one thing that we 

can see that happened in January of this year is the shoot-down 

of an Egyptian military helicopter. We don’t know for sure where 

those arms came from, but both the U.N. panel of experts which 

looks at the diffusion of Libyan arms and also contemporaneous 

media accounts believe that Qadhafi’s armories are the most likely 

place that militants were able to get this weaponry to shoot down 

the helicopter. I think that when you look at the unintended consequences, it has made the region much less stable. 

Mr. WALBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

The gentleman from Nevada. 

Mr. HORSFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you to our witnesses who are here today to testify before 

this committee. And it’s important to recognize that before us today 

is a panel of experts for whom we as a committee can gather critically important information and advice as well as insight into the 

on-the-ground and geopolitical realities in Libya and the greater 

Middle East region. 

The tragedy that occurred in Benghazi is that, a tragedy, and out 

of respect for those who died serving our country, and for the safety 

of those who continue to do so around the world, it’s imperative 

that this committee gain actionable policy reforms so that we can 

prevent similar disasters from occurring again. 

So I want to ask the panel, and I’ll start with Dr. Wehrey, in 

your testimony you discussed at length the challenges that outside 

assistance, including from countries like the United States, Turkey, 

Britain, Morocco, and Italy, face in terms of providing training assistance in the developing—development of an effective Libyan 

Army. Can you elaborate in what your recommendations to this 

committee would be? 

Mr. WEHREY. Well, again, I think I would recognize that before 

this training can really take effect, or before you can build a real 

security sector, you have to have political reconciliation in this 

country. The Libyans have to get together and hammer out a broad 

pact, there has to be democratic structures in place, they have to 

go forward with this national dialogue. 

Much of the paralysis and why outside assistance has not had an 

effect is because there hasn’t been this reconciliation among these 

factions. So I would really urge outsiders to focus on sequencing; 

that we need to support the Libyans in these political issues, in reforming their parliaments, in the national dialogue, in the Constitution so that this training can take full effect. 

Now, it’s sort of, you know, the horse before the wagon. I mean, 

there has to be security in the country for these institutions to 

function. So we do have to help them to a certain degree create the 

space for these institutions. But, again, I think the United States 

since at least last year has recognized that this country needs 

greater help. When I speak to people in the Defense Department, 

in AFRICOM, there’s a willingness and appreciation for the situation. NATO is engaged, there are other Arab countries, Europe. So 

the willingness is there. 

Mr. HORSFORD. Thank you. 

63 

General or the other panelists, would you propose specific actionable reforms that this committee could recommend? 

Ms. SCHAKE. In addition to what Dr. Wehrey said, all of which 

I agree with, there are several other specific things we could do. 

One of the United States’ great strengths in helping transitioning 

countries is to emphasize how federalism works in the United 

States not just politically, but also militarily. The balance of the 

National Guard and Reservists and their functions in the States is 

for Libya, in my judgment, a very useful model because their political reconciliation is not going to progress without a more activist 

federalism that makes the regions of the country and the tribes of 

the country feel more politically secure than they now feel, and 

you’re not going to get disarmament of the militia until then. So 

I would put a lot of focus on that. 

Second, we need to be a much more vibrant voice talking about 

how the violence damaged the elections, how much it matters that 

only 15 percent of the Libyan people were represented in the 48 

people elected for the Constitutional Council. We need to create political attention to this, and that will help them to the political reconciliation they need to make. 

It’s not enough for us to say—and I don’t think Dr. Wehrey was 

doing this, but some people do say nothing can be done because the 

Libyans themselves need to make progress. They won’t make 

progress without us helping them have the security to make brave 

domestic political choices, and we’re underinvesting in that. 

Mr. HORSFORD. Anyone else, last 17 seconds? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. One specific reform that I would recommend is that while the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group which Dr. 

Wehrey referred to did issue revisions breaking from Al Qaeda, I 

think that it’s important for the U.S. to be aware of whether some 

figures within government are also helping Jihadist groups. One 

thing that I think we learned from our experience in Egypt is that 

that can be very damaging. 

One figure in particular I would draw attention to is Abdul 

Hakim Belhadj, former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group member, 

whose media adviser had been a member of the Global Islamic 

Media Forum, which is a Jihadist forum. Online Jihadist celebrated his advances within government, and according to regional 

media, he’s been providing shelter to Abu Iyad al-Tunisi, who is the 

emir of Ansar al-Sharia, a Jihadist group in that country, so even 

while we help Libya, I think it’s also good to be aware of and to 

bring political pressure down on those who are supporting America’s enemies. 

Mr. HORSFORD. Thank you. 

Mr. LANKFORD. [Presiding.] Thank you all. 

Let me walk through a couple things, and I’ll be the final questioner, and then we’ll take a short recess after this for the votes, 

and then come back and be able to finish up. So let me walk 

through about 5 minutes or so of some brief questions. 

General Lovell, thank you for your service and for all of you in 

your service and your research and everything. I want to be able 

to ask just a couple of quick questions. 

Based on what you were watching that night, do you feel like the 

United States was doing everything it could do to protect the peoVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:01 Jun 10, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\88089.TXT APRIL
64 

ple, its facilities abroad—that the United States was doing everything it could do to protect our people and our facilities abroad 

based on what you saw that night? 

General LOVELL. No, sir. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Do you believe that night, and even during that 

night did you believe, that this was a protest rooted in an Internet 

video? 

General LOVELL. No, sir. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Did you have any sort of sense that night based 

on what you were hearing, the communication between State and 

DOD and what was happening on the ground trying to gather information, that there was a steadiness and a strength through that 

evening in trying to make the decisions? 

General LOVELL. There was a bit of—there was definitely a 

strong desire to come to decisions. There was a period of time 

where gaining an understanding of what was needed from folks on 

the ground because we didn’t have a lot of insight—— 

Mr. LANKFORD. So was there ongoing communication and coordination? Were you spending time waiting on the State Department 

to try to get your information? 

General LOVELL. There was a lot of back and forth, yes, sir. 

Mr. LANKFORD. No question for that, but do you feel like there 

were clear lines of communication and steadiness of leadership that 

was happening that night, so there was a consistent here’s who is 

in the lead, here’s what we’re going to do, and a plan that was unfolding? 

General LOVELL. It was continually strived for in that room. We 

were looking back to the United States for more. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Were you getting it from the United States? In 

the room they were planning and strategizing, were you getting 

clear communication and leadership from Washington, from the 

United States on what to do next? 

General LOVELL. My observations were that they were still looking for more decisions. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Does anyone know if we brought the people to 

justice that did this in our embassy and our facilities? Is anyone 

aware if justice has been carried out? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. We have not. 

General LOVELL. No, sir. 

Mr. LANKFORD. So the four things that I just walked through 

were the four talking points that were presented by Ben Rhodes 

saying these were the areas we’re going to talk about when we go 

on the Sunday shows. All four of those things we knew in the initial days are not true, and we are still waiting for this statement 

that came out from the beginning—we will take these individuals 

to justice—2 years later. So the four things the White House put 

out, three of them are factually not true, and one of them was a 

promise that is still unkept. 

What were you tracking that evening? Were you watching video? 

Were you tracking phone calls? How were you gathering information through the course of the evening? 

General LOVELL. Obviously there were national means being 

used to gain intelligence. There were the actual communiqus that 

65 

we received either directly or indirectly from individuals that were 

on the ground. 

Mr. LANKFORD. So you’re talking about the email traffic and such 

of when they were trying to email out and get information. 

General LOVELL. They work through Chat, yes, sir. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Correct. 

General LOVELL. And then the analysts work through Chat, and 

then in addition to that, the operational channels do the same 

thing. We also had a Pred feed at a certain point in time. We were 

able to swing a bird over there and then relieve that and gain 

more. That was an unmanned UAV or—unmanned. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Then there’s phone conversations happening at 

different points where the individuals on the ground are in phone 

communication with other individuals. Were you getting any information about that as well? 

General LOVELL. We knew that the—we would have information 

filtered back to us, yes, that people on the ground were back in 

communication. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Were you aware there was closed-circuit TV that 

was also on the compound itself, video feed? 

General LOVELL. No, sir, I wasn’t aware of that. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Okay. There is video feed of that night that’s 

fairly extensive, both leading up to the event that you can actually 

look down the street and see that there’s no protest going on on 

the street, and you can actually see the actions on the compound 

and be able to go through that. So that video obviously you didn’t 

have a feed to, weren’t able to track, but that closed-circuit TV does 

exist as well as the Predator feed that you’re dealing with as well. 

So all this information is gathering and trying to walk through 

this, and you’re trying to make decisions, and you’re in the process 

of all these decisions being made and trying to gather all this information and be able to give advice to what was going to happen. 

Did you get from State—or let me say it this way: Did you know 

who from State would call you if they wanted you to take action? 

Was there a clear line of communication; okay, the military is getting into a position of readiness, who are you waiting for from 

State to call you? 

General LOVELL. We—those calls would go back through the 

operational chain of command, so those people that were engaged 

were back in Washington, D.C. General Ham was dealing with that 

as well as Admiral Leidig. 

Mr. LANKFORD. So there was a clear line of communication; you 

knew who would make the call and where that would come from 

as far as that is concerned? 

General LOVELL. Those gentlemen would be in contact with people, we would hear back at that command center from—at my level 

from a military authority to do something. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Okay. Did we have Americans’ back that night? 

General LOVELL. Sir? 

Mr. LANKFORD. The United States military always watches for 

other Americans and their back. Did we have their back that 

night? 

General LOVELL. Obviously not, sir. 

66 

Mr. LANKFORD. Based on the situation in Libya now or 2 years 

ago, would you consider the security situation normal for one of our 

facilities? Was this a normal security situation? Prior—obviously 

when the attack is going on, that’s not normal. Prior to that attack, 

was this a normal environment for our personnel? 

General LOVELL. No, sir. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Does anyone else have a comment on that? Was 

this a normal security environment? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. It was not a normal security environment. 

Mr. LANKFORD. I’ve heard over and over again from the State Department there was a push to normalize security and actually withdraw individuals that were our own, that were Americans, to provide security and to put in country security folks, which is typical 

for us, that we have a larger force in our embassies and facilities 

that are provided from in country. We had a militia watching our 

front door from Libya. So the front door of the facility, a local militia was actually providing the security for it. 

Just a quick question for anyone. If you went to Libya right now, 

would you be okay if one of the local militias guarded your front 

door? Would anyone be open to that? 

Mr. WEHREY. With all due respect, that’s the way security is 

functioning in this country, and I think—— 

Mr. LANKFORD. No, I understand. 

Mr. WEHREY. Yes, but—— 

Mr. LANKFORD. Was it a normal security environment that we 

would run it with one of the local militias? I understand local security is typically provided in Libya. At that point were we in a normal environment that we would have one of the local militias, 

would you trust their loyalty at that time to provide your security 

for your front door? 

Mr. WEHREY. As a matter of embassy protocol, I would make 

sure that they were vetted; I mean, that they’re loyal. But, I mean, 

this is the nature of Libya right now. These militias consider themselves the army. There is no army. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Did you vet the militia at that time based on 

where we were—— 

Mr. WEHREY. I don’t know. I wasn’t there. But, I mean—— 

Mr. LANKFORD. Just your guess. 

Mr. WEHREY. I mean, this is the challenge that we have in this 

country is, you know, there is—as I mentioned, there was no central army. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Correct. So you would assume if there is no central army, then we’re not going to try to normalize the security situation. It’s not normal. The British have already been run out 

based on an attack on their facility. The Red Cross has already 

been run out based on an attack on their facility. Instead, we reduce the number of gun toters, American gun toters, and increase 

local militia that we can’t vet. 

Mr. WEHREY. From an embassy standpoint it is highly, I would 

say, risky. I am saying from my own perspective traveling to Libya, 

you can go and feel relatively safe, because these militias, as Dr. 

Schake mentioned, they do provide a sort of neighborhood watch 

program. Many of them are filling the void of the security forces. 

67 

So I think we need to look at how we use the term ‘‘militia’’ very 

carefully, because these are the groups that are for all intents and 

purposes the security forces in the country. 

Mr. LANKFORD. Right. But 2 years ago it was not normal in a situation. It was as dramatic or more dramatic than it is now and insecure, no way to be able to vet people, unknown on that, and yet 

we reduced the number of American folks that are providing security and increased local folks that we did not know how to vet. 

They were watching our front door, and it’s now clear they walked 

away from the front door, and we had Ansar al-Sharia walk 

through the front door that they walked away from, and the attack 

was on. 

So with that, let me take a recess. We’re going to move towards 

votes, and then we will be able to come back and be able to visit 

again. So we’ll stand in recess until the call of the chair. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman ISSA. [Presiding.] The committee will come to order. 

We now recognize the distinguished gentleman from Arizona. No, 

I’m sorry, the distinguished other doctor, the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. DesJarlais. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the 

panel for being here for this very important hearing. 

And, General Lovell, special kudos to you. I know you’re exceptionally well trained because you were commissioned in our great 

State of Tennessee. 

I wanted to talk to you a little bit about the DOD timeline of 

Benghazi-related events. It says it wasn’t until 6:05 a.m. that 

AFRICOM ordered a C–17 in Germany to prepare to deploy to 

Libya to evacuate the Americans wounded in the attack; and furthermore, the timeline says it wasn’t until 2:15 p.m., over 8 hours 

later, that the plane took off from Germany for Libya. Can you explain why that took so long? 

General LOVELL. No, sir, I cannot. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. General, are you familiar with the term ‘‘the 

golden hour?’’ 

General LOVELL. Yes, sir, I am. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. Can you tell us what that means to military 

personnel who have been wounded? 

General LOVELL. Yes, sir. The golden hour is absolutely the period of time from when you’re wounded in an engagement or accident and you receive medical treatment. The golden hour, the 

greatest ability for you or a buddy to survive is during that period 

of time. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. And if I’m correct, the survival rate, if they do 

not die on the battlefield, the chance of survival is about 95 percent 

if they’re reached within that golden hour? 

General LOVELL. That’s why it’s the golden hour, yes, sir. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. In this case it looks like they were functioning 

under maybe what would be called the golden day by this timeline? 

General LOVELL. You could characterize it that way, sir. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. Okay. Were there, indeed, assets in the region 

that could have been deployed sooner, in your opinion? 

General LOVELL. Again, those are—in the operational area, looking back at it reflectively, there were assets in the area, but, you 

68 

know, operations responded the way they did. My contention is 

that we need more dedicated assets available to the command continuously in order to make a difference in the future. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. In your opinion, if you were given the green 

light to pick up the phone and make the call to get someone there 

to help our bleeding Americans, how long would it have taken? 

Having that opportunity to just make the call, how quickly could 

someone have gotten there, in your opinion? 

General LOVELL. With the assets available, I don’t have an answer to that question, sir, in the operational environment. I don’t 

know. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. Do you believe it’s much quicker than it was? 

General LOVELL. Oh, I would certainly hope it would be much 

quicker than it was, yes. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. So one thing our soldiers, we talked about this 

earlier in today’s hearing, you’re taught to run towards the gun, all 

the military people that I know want to run towards danger, not 

away from it, but they were not able to do so. Why was that? 

General LOVELL. The—within the authorities to move, given the 

desire to move, it appeared to me from my perspective working 

there as a staff member of the J2 in there that there were dialogues ensuing with the State Department as to how they wanted 

to have it approached within Libya as to whether deference to 

State or deference to Libya. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. I know General Ham was in Washington that 

night, which left his deputy commander as the senior-most officer 

at AFRICOM. Was he consulting with the State Department about 

what he should do in response to the attack in Benghazi? 

General LOVELL. From my observations sitting in that room with 

him when I saw it there, he was absolutely leaning forward to get 

answers so he could do something, yes. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. So, in your opinion, what was the hold-up? You 

testified earlier that the CIA knew, the military knew, the State 

Department knew that this was a terrorist attack, yet somebody 

was holding this process back. Who was it? 

General LOVELL. I wish I knew, sir. From my perspective, it appeared that State Department was the conduit for the ask by the 

Africa Command. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. So I can say this, you might not be able to, but 

as an American and you as now a civilian, having bravely served 

our country for 33 years, the fact is that there was a Presidential 

election just a few weeks away, and there was a White House that 

knew all the same things these agencies knew, but yet they were 

busy concocting a story, a cover-up, an alibi, that we all know now 

isn’t true because they were more concerned about protecting their 

image in a Presidential election than saving American lives. The 

IRS targeting to effect the outcome of an election is criminal. This 

is just sickening. And I’m sure that you’re here today partly because you have similar feelings. Not to speak for you, but you’re 

welcome to respond. 

General LOVELL. I will say that I’m here today because as a military professional for over 33 years, as well as a citizen of this country, a father of a previously serving military person, father-in-law 

of serving military people, neighbor to a young man down at Parris 

69 

Island going through basic training in the Marine Corps, and just 

having served, as I said earlier, with a number of brave men and 

women in uniform and in civilian clothes in this Nation, we need 

to get this right. We need to get it right. That’s what brings me 

here today. Not that I have all the answers, I don’t say that I do, 

but attention needs to be paid in the most serious way possible to 

cut through any games and get to the point that we as a Nation 

are able to support through our military forces the policy and efforts of this country anywhere in the world, and we need to be able 

to do it and secure American lives as we get the job done. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. Thank you for that. 

Chairman ISSA. Ms. Schake, it looked like you wanted to answer. 

The gentleman’s time has expired, but if you need to answer, you 

may. 

Ms. SCHAKE. I didn’t want to answer, but I did want to endorse 

the doctor’s suggestion that there was information available from 

the CIS station chief in Libya, from the deputy chief of mission in 

Libya, from elsewhere in the Central Intelligence Agency, as your 

committee’s investigations have brought out. 

The White House made a political choice that the President was 

running for reelection, campaigning on the basis that Al Qaeda was 

on the run and the tide of war was receding, and the tragedy in 

Benghazi was an extraordinarily inconvenient outlier to that story 

line, and I think that’s the basis on which the White House—the 

choices that people made during the attacks in Benghazi, in my 

judgment, are unfortunate and had tragic consequences, but the 

choices the White House made about pretending that we didn’t 

know things that we did know I think are an overt politicization 

of the events. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Gowdy. You’re next on 

my hit parade, I think. 

Mr. GOWDY. I am, your—Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman ISSA. Yes. 

Mr. GOWDY. I started to say Your Honor. That was a previous 

job. 

Chairman ISSA. Yeah. No, I still get a gavel, but you’re shown 

as next. 

Mr. GOWDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman and General, I am confounded, in fact I continue 

to be confounded, and what I find so confounding is the administration’s mantra hasn’t changed from Jay Carney to Hillary Clinton, 

to the President himself, to Ben Rhodes, to even yesterday Bernadette Meehan, the National Security Council. And maybe, Mr. 

Chairman, instead of teaching reading comprehension, maybe we 

ought to teach writing comprehension, because I don’t understand 

what this statement means except the end of it: The content reflects what the administration was saying at the time—whatever 

that means—and what we understood to be the facts at the time. 

So that’s the mantra, Mr. Chairman and General, is that we 

used the best evidence we had at the time, the facts that we had 

at the time. So you can imagine, General, that that would make 

someone who is interested in facts and evidence to say, okay, well, 

then, cite all the facts for me. Cite the evidence. If your mantra 

70 

really is that we used the best facts and the best evidence we had 

at the time, then cite the facts for me. Call your first witness. Introduce your first piece of evidence. Because I’ll tell you the first 

piece of evidence I would introduce is from the State Department. 

Beth Jones to Cheryl Mills, Mr. Chairman—you know who Cheryl 

Mills is—Jake Sullivan. This is September the 12th, Mr. Chairman. This is well before the administration started misleading the 

American people. We’ve got an email from Beth Jones to Cheryl 

Mills and Jake Sullivan and a plethora of other people: I told him, 

with ‘‘him’’ being the Libyan Ambassador, the group that conducted 

the attacks, Ansar al-Sharia, is affiliated with Islamic extremists. 

So that’s the State Department that knew the day after that this 

video had nothing to do with the attack in Benghazi. So that’s the 

State Department. 

CIA station chief in Tripoli, Mr. Chairman, not—and for those 

who don’t know what that word means, he repeated it again—not 

not an escalation of protest. This is someone in Libya at the time. 

CIA says video had nothing to do with it. 

Mr. GOWDY. Now we go to DOD, military. What evidence did you 

have that this was an escalation of a protest rooted in spontaneity 

that got out of control and resulted in the murder of our four fellow 

Americans? Did the military have any evidence supporting the 

video narrative? 

General LOVELL. No, sir, there was none. 

Mr. GOWDY. Well, that’s what’s so confounding, Mr. Chairman, 

is the State Department knew it wasn’t a video, the CIA knew it 

wasn’t a video, and for those that are a little bit slow, they repeated the word ‘‘not’’ twice. The military knew it had nothing to 

do with a video. But that brings us to the White House. And I 

know, Mr. Chairman, initially we were told that the White House 

had nothing to do with the drafting points, that Mike Morell is the 

one who sanitized those and changed the word terrorist to extremist and changed it from attack to demonstration and did whatever 

he could to cast the administration in the most favorable light. We 

thought that it was just Mr. Morell doing that, until we got an 

email from Ben Rhodes, Mr. Chairman. 

Goal number one: to convey that the United States is doing everything we can to protect our people and facilities. I’m glad that 

this is dated September 14, 2012, Mr. Chairman, because it sure 

as hell was not their goal before September 11. We have had hearing after hearing about the failure to provide security at our facility in Benghazi. So I’m glad that that was their goal after four of 

our fellow Americans were murdered, but it sure as hell was not 

their goal beforehand or they would not have refused to provide security to that facility. 

Goal number two: to underscore that these protests are rooted in 

an Internet video and not a broader failure of policy. And therein 

we have our answer. The goal was to do everything we can to deflect attention away from this feckless foreign policy we have in the 

Middle East that isn’t working. Remember the mantra, Mr. Chairman—Al Qaeda is on the run, GM is alive, Osama bin Laden is 

dead, Al Qaeda is on the run—when really they’re standing at the 

front door of our facility in Benghazi getting ready to murder our 

Ambassador and burn it down. 

71 

And then yesterday, Mr. Chairman, you may remember the 

White House—I’m going to edit out all the stumbling and stammering that Jay Carney did, I’m just going to give you the nuts and 

bolts of what he said—is that this memo I just made reference to 

has nothing to do with Benghazi. 

Well, I find that interesting because of the third point, and I 

know I’m out of time, Mr. Chairman, but the third goal was to 

show that we are resolute in bringing people who harm Americans 

to justice. If that’s not talking about Benghazi, where else did we 

have people harmed other than Benghazi, Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. And our goal is to bring 

people to justice, too. 

We now recognize the gentleman from Texas for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And, General, I appreciate your service. Thank you for your service. Appreciate your being here today. 

In your testimony you talked about your training and natural 

impulse as a member of the American military is to run towards 

the gunfire. And we have heard testimony today about what we 

should have done, and we’re kind of unclear about what we could 

have done and whether or not we had the forces that could have 

gotten there in time. I’m going to say we definitely should have 

tried. 

But as an American citizen, I’m not asking you to give away any 

secrets, as an American citizen, does it trouble you that we can’t 

respond in a timely manner to threats to an American Embassy 

anywhere in the world. 

General LOVELL. That’s part of the reason I sit here today, sir. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you very much. I think it’s something 

we should all be concerned about. 

Let’s talk a little bit about your role the evening of the Benghazi 

attacks. You talk about you fight your way to the train, and the 

brave men and women in Libya did in running toward the sound 

of the guns. You also say that outside of Libya there were discussions going on about how to respond to the attack and that these 

folks also fought the way they were trained. Are you referring to 

the AFRICOM headquarters with that comment? 

General LOVELL. AFRICOM headquarters—— 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Right. 

General LOVELL. —and interagency interactions. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. All right. So you wrote, ‘‘The predisposition to 

interagency influences had the military structure—in the spirit of 

expeditionary government support—waiting for a request for assistance from the State Department.’’ That kind of sounds like 

bureaucratese of saying that the military that night was not its 

own master as far as taking steps to go to the rescue of the Americans in Benghazi but were waiting for directions from the State 

Department. Would that be a fair assessment? 

General LOVELL. That characterization is part of what’s in that 

comment, yes. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. That just seems crazy. We have got Americans 

who need help. You ought to be able to hop on an airplane, and 

they could have been ordered to stand down if the situation warranted that. I know General Ham was in Washington that night 

72 

and left his deputy commander as the senior most officer at 

AFRICOM. Was he consulting the State Department about what to 

do during the attacks at Benghazi? 

General LOVELL. The Admiral worked tirelessly to do that. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Obviously, we didn’t have much of a response 

there. 

Let me go to Ms. Schake. I apologize if I mispronounced your 

name. In your testimony you talked about in the Arab spring how 

we should be focusing on helping these countries out. You look at 

the track record that we have under the Obama administration 

with nation building. You look at Iraq. A lot of blood, a lot of treasure shed in Iraq. Yet we see Al Qaeda flags flying in Fallujah. We 

have seen instability all throughout that region. You look at the 

civil war going on in Syria. Obviously, I mean, it’s hard to tell the 

good guys from the bad guys without a playbook, but we draw a 

red line and step back from it. 

We can even go over into Crimea and see some problems. Are we 

sure we really want to be involved in that based on our track 

record there? 

Ms. SCHAKE. I share your skepticism about the administration’s 

choices in the Middle East. It does seem to me that one of the fundamental mistakes the Obama administration is making is they act 

as though taking action is something that sets in motion all sorts 

of consequences, but that taking no action means we have no moral 

responsibility for any consequences. And as I think Daveed’s testimony made really clear, there are consequences for what we have 

not done in Libya, and Mali is bearing them out at the moment, 

Libya is bearing them out at the moment. And the gap between 

what the administration claims it is achieving and what we are actually doing in the region is encouraging people to take—— 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. I’m almost out of time, and I had one more 

question for General Lovell. 

The U.S. intervention in Libya was constrained by the White 

House’s strict prohibition of boots on the ground. Do you think that 

limited boots on the ground and that policy might have been one 

of the driving forces in the fact that we didn’t send a response 

there to Benghazi? 

General LOVELL. Well, I would say if there were boots on ground 

and there were marines in uniform as part of a security team that 

were around any of the State Department facilities, I would say 

that would intimidate most that were going to try to make an attack. And boots on the ground are the best and only way to hold 

the ground, if that’s what you’re looking to do. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you very much. 

I just want to point out quickly before I yield back, Mr. Chairman, that as we investigated embassy security together, some of 

the key factors that are considerations are the willingness and ability of the host country to provide security. And I think that’s a 

common understanding at the State Department. At a time a government is undergoing change both the ability and willingness to 

provide security for embassies should be severely in question, and 

that should be an indication to immediately prepare to take care 

of ourselves. And maybe we could have avoided the loss of life in 

73 

Benghazi had we followed our own directives in evaluating the 

ability and willingness of the host country. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman for his comments. 

We now go to the gentleman from Arizona, Dr. Gosar. 

Mr. GOSAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

General Lovell, now, you were the deputy commander of Operation Odyssey Guard, which you describe as the missions to help 

the State Department reestablish the Embassy in Tripoli, Libya. 

Can you describe what the mission involved? 

General LOVELL. Yes. The mission involved being supporting to 

the desires of the Ambassador, Ambassador Cretz, and there was 

a 16-person DOD team that was in place working directly for him. 

Our job was to help monitor that situation as well, even though 

they worked for the State Department. We also worked to help 

plan for any other activities that might be developing in that particular area. We worked with a group to help with the EOD, for 

example, in one of the areas, and we also helped to provide some 

of the watch and communication when other senior U.S. officials 

visited the country. 

Mr. GOSAR. How would that differ in a normal protocol under 

military jurisdiction? 

General LOVELL. Well, we, as a JTF deputy commander—— 

Mr. GOSAR. Does it change the chain of command any? 

General LOVELL. Yes, sir. Absolutely. That’s the point I was getting to, absolutely. The SST team worked not for DOD, it worked 

for Department of State, and there were no other forces on the 

ground specifically that belonged to us. 

Mr. GOSAR. In your testimony that the State Department was in 

the lead, as we just confirmed, for the effort to get back Libya on 

its feet, one of the things this committee has encountered in its investigation of the State Department’s conduct in Libya is the overwhelming focus on normalization, whether it be the attempt to reduce security personnel at the diplomatic facilities, or so-called normal levels or attempt to view the government of Libya as normal 

host nation partners capable of providing meaningful protection 

like my colleague from Texas just talked about. Did you encounter 

this normalization philosophy in your dealings with the State Department during Operation Odyssey Guard? 

General LOVELL. Yes, sir, I did. 

Mr. GOSAR. Could you elaborate a little bit on that? 

General LOVELL. Yes. For instance, a desire to create a new normal within this environment was basically redefining what I would 

consider a suboptimal situation. 

Mr. GOSAR. Would you consider it hostile? 

General LOVELL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GOSAR. Go ahead and continue. 

General LOVELL. The hostile environment that we were dealing 

with, yeah. Our interaction certainly was not with our interagency 

counterparts. But to keep a low profile by the American Government and the U.S. military in that environment at the time we 

weren’t deploying our forces. There was no Marine security detachment, et cetera, some of the other things that you might have seen 

in place in other areas where you’d consider a normal type of an 

environment that was secure. 

74 

And I guess that’s what it really comes down to, is how much security are you willing to—how insecure are you willing to be and 

still be present is really what it comes down to. And let’s face it, 

our diplomats take risks every day, but in certain situations. It’s 

always measured risk. And when we measure risk in an environment whereby some yardsticks it comes out, the measurement 

comes out short, and it seems to be hostile, you know, if it looks 

hostile and it smells hostile, it probably is a hostile environment. 

Mr. GOSAR. Well, you complement, you make this worse, because 

we had an email in regards to what Al Qaeda was looking to do. 

Number one, take out the British Embassy, consulate, the international Red Cross, and then Benghazi, the consulate. We accomplished that, too, your intelligence. So wouldn’t that have heightened the awareness that we were in a fractionalized, more hostile 

environment? 

General LOVELL. You just described it, yes. 

Mr. GOSAR. So, I mean, this is absurd to me. I mean, I’m talking 

to a man that’s spent his life on the defense of our country. Are 

you aware of any other operation that was this disjointed in your 

career, the flagrant—— 

General LOVELL. In my career and in my experience, this operation absolutely in terms of the—yeah, no, sir, no. 

Mr. GOSAR. So, I mean, you just made a comment just earlier 

that the best force is to put our forces there in a fragmented aspect, that’s the best deterrent. So without those, aren’t you inviting 

an attack? 

General LOVELL. You very well could be through your own vulnerability. 

Mr. GOSAR. Yeah. Okay. What was AFRICOM’s role in Libya 

after Odyssey Guard ended? Did Libya receive any sort of heightened monitoring—— 

Chairman ISSA. The gentleman’s time has expired, but you can 

finish quickly. 

Mr. GOSAR. Yeah. Did Libya receive any sort of heightened monitoring after Odyssey Guard ended? 

General LOVELL. Most certainly, as some of the other panelists 

have stated here today, we absolutely had a keen watch from a CT 

perspective, absolutely, as well as also just helping to monitor 

things going on in the nation in general. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. GOSAR. Thank you. 

Chairman ISSA. We now go to the gentleman from Florida, Mr. 

DeSantis. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, can you explain the significance of the fact that the J2 

shop at AFRICOM wasn’t just the intelligence shop, but the intelligence and knowledge development shop? 

General LOVELL. Yes. As I also provided in the written statement, the IKD, Intelligence and Knowledge Development Division, 

was the nomenclature used to identify what would be a typical 2 

shop in other commands. Later on it became a J2 shop but retained 

a knowledge development piece. Knowledge development also has 

more to do with many sources that may be unclassified, opensource type reporting, et cetera. So you are trying to bring in and 

75 

coalesce a more comprehensive intelligence picture utilizing knowledge. 

In a command and in a theater of operations such as Africa 

where you have a great need for intelligence and information but 

not many resources to go get it, using open source and other types 

of things could be your best source of information in some instances. 

Mr. DESANTIS. So in that position you were able to observe the 

interplay between the military and the State Department as it relates to those issues, correct? 

General LOVELL. The exchange of information, others as well, our 

three letter partners. 

Mr. DESANTIS. In terms of the military response, I mean sometimes people, and we have had other hearings and they’ve said, 

well, look, we would not have been able to get there in time. And 

my response has always been once you know that you have men 

in contact, you don’t know how long the whole enterprise is going 

to last. I mean, once the first word that we have problems at this 

annex, it could have lasted 12 hours, 24, 48 hours. So the idea that 

somehow looking back in hindsight and saying, oh, well, we didn’t 

marshal forces, we wouldn’t have gotten there in time, that just 

doesn’t satisfy me. Am I wrong in that? 

General LOVELL. No, sir, I don’t believe you are. It’s one of the 

motivating factors for me to be here in this environment right now, 

so that we don’t do this again. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And my thing is, is you guys are waiting for the 

State Department, and State Department said we need to help 

these guys. And even if you ended up getting there a little bit late, 

I think it matters to the American people that there was the effort 

made and that we were willing as a Nation to devote the resources 

we had to try to save those men. I think it would matter to those 

families that that was done. And so I appreciate you coming here 

today. 

I mean, it seems to me this whole idea with the video, this deception that was propagated to the American people, one, it actually 

hurt the counterterrorism efforts, we have heard on this committee, 

immediately after. Libyans were upset with us because they had 

actually tried to take action against terrorists and here we’re saying it’s just a video and trying to downplay the fact, our own administration, that it was a terrorist attack. It actually I think 

brought more attention to the video throughout the Islamic world 

and gave Islamists a pretext to pursue more violence. 

And so you have a situation where the American people, based 

on the emails we have seen in this investigation, and the families 

of the fallen were deceived about who perpetrated that attack and 

have not been level with about our government’s response. And so 

to this day, and we spend a lot of time talking about who did what 

in the White House and the emails, that’s very important because 

the truth matters, but even to this day the perpetrators have not 

been brought to justice at all. I mean, if forces really couldn’t have 

made it there in time to prevent these Americans from being killed, 

then at least we would like to see the administration avenge their 

death by bringing these terrorists to justice. And yet to this day, 

this has just been something that has happened, and we have not 

76 

responded in kind, and I think that that really is something that 

bothers me to this day. 

So I thank the witnesses for coming, and I yield back the balance 

of my time. 

Chairman ISSA. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. DESANTIS. Yes. 

Chairman ISSA. General, as the 2 shop, you weren’t doing operational. So I don’t want to get into the operational side. But from 

an intelligence standpoint, you earlier said that you knew, and I’ll 

paraphrase, from the get-go that this was not a video inciting some 

sort of a demonstration but, in fact, a terrorist attack. That is correct? 

General LOVELL. That’s correct. 

Chairman ISSA. And when you knew it, did the deputy, the Vice 

Admiral, did he know it? 

General LOVELL. Most certainly. We kept him—I worked directly 

for him. 

Chairman ISSA. And to your knowledge, did General Carter Ham 

then know it back on stateside? 

General LOVELL. He certainly should. He was in the NMCC. 

Chairman ISSA. And from your experience long time in the military, it is reasonable to assume that the Secretary of Defense also 

would have known what each of you in the chain of command knew 

since he was standing by General Ham? 

General LOVELL. That’s the way it should work, sir. 

Chairman ISSA. So is there any conceivable way at 3:00 in the 

morning Libyan/Stuttgart time, is there any conceivable way that 

anyone could reasonably be promoting the YouTube video from the 

White House or from anywhere in the know in government? 

General LOVELL. If they were in the know, with relative information that we were putting out, no, sir. 

Chairman ISSA. So for someone to do that at 3:00 in the morning 

Stuttgart time, they would have to either not know what you, your 

boss and your boss’ boss knew and presumably people above him, 

or they would have to be working contrary to what was known? 

General LOVELL. That’s correct. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. 

We now go to the gentlelady from Wyoming, Ms. Lummis. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, I’m late to this hearing, but I have the advantage of 

your written testimony, so if these questions are a bit redundant, 

forgive me. But some things caught me in your written testimony. 

You said, ‘‘We didn’t know how long this would last’’—‘‘this’’ meaning the attacks on 9/11/12—‘‘We didn’t know how long this would 

last when we became aware of the distress nor did we completely 

understand what we had in front of us, be it a kidnapping, rescue,’’ 

or a protracted hostile engagement. 

Can you elaborate on that? What was it like watching from 

Stuttgart, watching what was happening in Benghazi? 

General LOVELL. And I further went on to say or any or all of 

those things. It was a situation where we were very much in the 

hunt for information from the J2 shop perspective so we could give 

the commander, the vice on station and the commander back in 

D.C., the best information possible. 

77 

So for us, we were very much on the trail through chat rooms, 

et cetera, using the mechanisms—not to go into it too deeply—but 

using the mechanisms that are out there for an intelligence organization to formulate understanding based upon facts. That’s what 

we pursued, and we provided that to our on-scene commander, the 

Vice Admiral, as well as up-channeled that and sent it across to 

other organizations so that we were sharing to the maximum extent possible in order to help build that picture of understanding 

and flesh it out even further. It’s not good enough to know what’s 

going on right there. We need to find attribution so that then you 

can take action. You want actionable intelligence. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Okay. And at what point did you know that no assets were going to be sent to Benghazi that night, no special ops, 

no units? 

General LOVELL. It began to become more and more evident. As 

the morning went on, it appeared as though that was to take place. 

But it even continued on further as we tried to help, you know, FBI 

and others get in there after, if you will, the death of those Americans, to go into the pursuit mode. As I just described, actionable 

intelligence is what you provide to an operator. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. And who was making the decisions not to go in, 

not to respond? 

General LOVELL. That would be, from my perspective, it appeared that it was up-channeled beyond the Department of Defense, somewhere outside of DOD. We respond to civilian leadership, and that’s what we would be looking for, civilian leadership. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. So normally those kinds of decisions would be 

made after the military conferred with civilian leadership in Washington? 

General LOVELL. Yes. Now we’re into my boss’ boss’ business, but 

indeed that would be who he would be talking with. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Okay. And that would be the normal chain of discussion? 

General LOVELL. Yes. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Okay. Did you assume that those discussions were 

going on, those discussions between the military chain of command, 

the State Department, the Defense Department, and the White 

House? 

General LOVELL. Absolutely. And the reason I can state it emphatically is because part of what we did as an intelligence organization, and all intelligence organizations, you’re looking for what’s 

the next step so you can ferret out the next best pieces of information and fact to help inform so that those operations can be effective. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. In your military experience, what would have been 

a more normal response in the middle of the night, 3 a.m. Stuttgart 

time, when you knew you had an Ambassador down and later in 

the night you knew you had personnel on the CIA annex roof and 

there was an exchange of fire? What would you have expected in 

your military experience to happen? 

General LOVELL. Go, go, go. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. And when did it become apparent to you there 

would be no go? 

78 

General LOVELL. As the morning progressed and we had some 

people moving at some points in time, they’re asked to stop midway 

through some of their deployments reaching Europe, et cetera, or 

other locations. It did not appear to us that there was any momentum behind it to make it happen. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. And how many of you were together in Stuttgart 

watching this unfold? 

Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. [Presiding] Go ahead. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. My time has expired, General. Thank you. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. General, I now recognize myself for 5 minutes. I 

want to complete the thought from Congresswoman Lummis. I 

know you care deeply about our military family. You are one. We 

have parents, loved ones, brothers, sisters. What would you say to 

the mother of one of the people that was killed? Did we, did the 

military, did the Pentagon, did the United States of America do everything it could to save those people? 

General LOVELL. I would say sorry for your loss and your sacrifice. We should have done more, whether it was in preparation 

prior to or execution at the time, even if we simply just burned gas 

in airplanes moving people. 

We have to have the confidence of the American people that provide us with their sons and daughters, brothers and sisters, moms 

and dads, and continue to fill the uniforms and to fill those civilian 

positions that are so key and so brave as well out there in harm’s 

way. We have to ensure that we rebuild the trust. This is Bob 

Lovell talking to you now. We have to rebuild their trust. It’s a big 

part of why I want to be here, because we need to say to them, we 

should have done more, and we owe it to the memory of those four 

people that are fallen and to those that were hurt and wounded. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Could we have done more? 

General LOVELL. Sure, we could have done more. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Secretary Hillary Clinton whispered, evidently, 

according to one of the mothers, whispered in the ear, said it was 

the video that had done this. Is that true? 

General LOVELL. Absolutely not, sir. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. When did you think it was over? When were 

Americans in harm’s way? When were they safe? 

General LOVELL. They’re still not safe today, sir. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. When did you think the fight was over? 

General LOVELL. We’re still there. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. That night, though, September 12, while we still 

had people in Benghazi, when was the fight over? 

General LOVELL. When the people from Benghazi finally made 

their way back and were extracted back to Tripoli. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Your opinion, your vantage point there in Libya, 

was Al Qaeda on the run? 

General LOVELL. No, sir. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. What was going on with Al Qaeda September 11, 

September 12, in the months leading up to that? Were they on the 

run? 

General LOVELL. No, sir. They were actually, affiliates and other 

Islamic extremists, were actually responsible for the perpetration of 

these attacks. 

79 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Are they growing in strength, shrinking in 

strength? 

General LOVELL. My estimation would be that they were growing 

in strength, in number and in capability. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. My understanding is that your shop, J2, 

AFRICOM, on September 14, 17 hours, 17 hours before the Ben 

Rhodes email, they actually produced a document to my ranking 

member and other people on this committee, the front of this email 

is stamped Secret, but the second page, I believe, is not classified. 

It’s not stamped with anything. In deference, I’m not putting it out 

there, but what I do hope this committee does, what I do hope the 

American people can see for themselves is what the military intelligence thought was happening there in Libya, and clearly, they 

put this out saying it says multiple times, I’ve read it myself. It 

says Al Qaeda. It says Ansar al-Sharia. It says AQIM. And that 

this was sent to the State Department as the best intelligence that 

you had, to the State Department, as to what happened at the attack and what the attack profile might look like if we wanted to 

counter. Do you have knowledge of this document? Are you familiar 

with this document, and as I described it, would that be an accurate representation? 

General LOVELL. Not seeing the document itself, but I will certainly comment on the information that you just characterized and, 

yes, that was the picture that we were working with. Those were 

the facts we were working with. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And to my fellow colleagues here, again, the facts 

as we know them, the military intelligence, folks sharing with the 

IC community, sharing with the State Department, they believed 

that it was Al Qaeda, AQIM, Ansar al-Sharia, that was responsible 

for this attack. That was the best information. Those were the facts 

as we have them. My time is expired. 

I now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Cummings. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I thank the gentleman for yielding. General, first 

of all, I want to thank you for your testimony. As I sit here and 

I listen to many witnesses as a lawyer, I could tell that this is 

something that is very important to you, and I thank you for coming forward. And you talked about the military and how we have 

to protect them and our State Department people and certainly, 

and I agree with you a million percent. And one of the things that 

I’ve done as a member of this committee is also try to protect the 

integrity of the people who come before us. We have had General 

Ham, Admiral Leidig, Admiral Losey, and they came to different 

opinions, and that’s okay. They’re probably watching this right 

now, and I want to make sure that just as you, I’m sure, feel very 

strongly about your opinion, I want to make sure that you’re saying 

what I think you’re saying, so that they are clear, because they are 

men who have given their lives for our country, too. And so I just 

want to ask you a few things. 

I want to go to you, because it seems like you’re saying one thing 

in response to questions from this side of the room and another 

thing in response to questions from the other side of the room. In 

your written testimony to the committee you said this, ‘‘The discussion is not in the could or could not in relation to time, space and 

capability. The point is we should have tried.’’ But when Mr. 

80 

Connolly was asking you questions, you said you were not in the 

chain of command. You said you weren’t really talking about 

Benghazi, but about the future, and you said that you agreed with 

the Republican chairman of the House Armed Services Committee 

Buck McKeon, who said that the military did, in fact, try. So let 

me just go through the specific steps the military took on that 

night and ask you whether they are accurate because, again, we 

have got people here like General Ham who’ve testified before us 

and given statements that maybe give different opinions. 

First, Chairman McKeon found that our military, including General Ham, General Dempsey and others, authorized two Marine 

fast platoons in Rota, Spain to prepare to deploy. Do you agree that 

this did, in fact, occur? Did that happen? Do you know? 

General LOVELL. That they moved forward, yes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes or no? 

General LOVELL. Yes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Second, Chairman McKeon found that a special 

operations unit assigned to the European command known as Commander’s In-extremis Force, CIF, which was training in Croatia 

was ordered to move to a U.S. Naval air station in Sigonella, Italy. 

Do you dispute that? 

General LOVELL. No, sir. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And, third, Chairman McKeon found that a special operations unit in the United States was also dispatched to the 

region. You don’t dispute that, do you? 

General LOVELL. No. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So I’m afraid I just don’t understand why you 

are testifying here today under oath that the United States military did not try to help the night of the attacks, and how do you 

explain that? And if I’m misstating you, correct me. 

General LOVELL. Yes, I did not say that they did not try the 

evening of those attacks. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So what did you say? I’m sorry. Again, I know 

General Ham is watching this, so I want him to be clear. 

General LOVELL. I’m not disputing any of their actions or testimony in that. What I’m speaking to is as a Nation, we should try 

to do more, that the preparations prior to, the capability and capacity that we put forward in order to deal with situations such as 

this, so that in the future as we find ourselves out there in a expeditionary government environment or just in places around the 

world that we have provided as much military capacity and capability as we can muster so that we can support the people and have 

their backs in these situations. My testimony was not to counter 

the previous statements—— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I just wanted to make sure we were clear. That’s 

all. And so we all agree that we would have liked, all of us would 

have liked the military to have responded more quickly, and 

changes have been made to allow the military to respond faster, 

but the facts are that the military did mobilize forces. It did act 

and it did try. So will you concede that point now that you have 

been presented with the actual evidence? I mean, so you agree that 

they did try? 

General LOVELL. I have always stated that they had tried and 

acknowledged that. My point is that there is more that we should 

81 

be able to do, and if there is a further line that we can move towards, if across the interagency, this is spoken about in the way 

that you described it to me, sir, as a DOD issue. This is not about 

a DOD issue. This is an interagency issue, and that’s what we really need to look at here. And I respect absolutely what the House 

Armed Services Committee put together, but they looked at it from 

a DOD perspective. We need to look, and why I came to this body 

was because I felt that it looked more broadly across the spectrum 

of all of the agencies. And the fact of the matter is, that’s the perspective we need to have so that we can see exactly across the 

board how did we interact? How did we behave? How did that 

translate into action? And most importantly in many situations, inaction. As we have heard from some of my colleagues here, inaction 

can, at times, even be worse so that we can do that in the future 

in a different way, but we need a comprehensive across-the-board 

interagency view so that we can move ourselves forward into those 

next steps. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Again, I want to thank you very much. 

General LOVELL. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman ISSA. [Presiding.] Mr. Cummings, would you yield for 

a question. I’m trying to understand. All of the units that you mentioned were deployed to Tripoli. None of them were ever headed to 

Benghazi. You know that; right? 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes. 

Chairman ISSA. So when it comes to what was done for the people dying in Benghazi, none of those were going to help them. They 

weren’t activated for the people dying in Benghazi. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, I asked him what I wanted to ask him, and 

he was very clear, and I appreciate it. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. We now go to the gentlelady from 

Wyoming, Ms. Lummis. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I yield such portion of my time to Mr. Chaffetz as he wishes to use. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentlewoman from Wyoming. To follow up on the chairman’s point, General, and to point the ranking 

member is trying to make. We had two fast teams that in a public 

setting General Ham has said can respond within hours. And I 

think that begs the question why, why, did the fast team go into 

Tripoli and it took them almost 24 hours to get there, 24 hours? 

These people operate on an end plus just a few hours, and yet it 

took them 24 hours. I think that begs the question. 

The other thing is it’s very clear that the fast team was not intended to go engage in the fight. That’s not what a fast team does. 

It’s not what they’re engaged to do. It’s not what they train to do. 

They go in to secure an embassy. If you want to put somebody in 

the fight, somebody who’s going to go extract people who are under 

the gun, there are other troops and other types of assets that you 

would put in there. But these people were not put into place to go 

into Benghazi. And the CIF, the Commanders In-Extremis Force, 

again, begs the question. This fight started as 9:40 p.m. The General has just said it was six something in the morning before they 

were able to get out of Benghazi. It was so bad in Tripoli that they 

had to evacuate the embassy in Tripoli and go to another secure 

facility. 

82 

So, again, did they try to do what they were ordered to do? I 

think the General is absolutely right. Were they ordered to engage 

in the fight in Benghazi? The answer is unfortunately no. That’s 

the question. That’s the concern. 

General, do you have any comments about what I said? Is there 

anything that you would disagree with, take issue with or want to 

further comment on? 

General LOVELL. No, sir, I would not. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. What about the idea that the fast team is getting 

ready to deploy? People are dead. We’re taking a fire. We’re in a 

fight. Why did the fast team have to change clothes out of their 

military uniforms and into civilian clothes? Do you have any 

knowledge about that? 

General LOVELL. The knowledge I have I was not directly related 

in, but I watched the conversation ensue in the room. It was a sensitivity to the impact potentially in Libya. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Well, what do you think about it? What do you 

think about it? 

General LOVELL. Sir, at that point in time, someone must have 

thought it was a great idea to have Marines be out of uniform potentially to go in there, but I like Marines in uniform and Marines 

to—— 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Why do they wear a uniform? 

General LOVELL. Pardon me, sir? 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Why? Why do they wear a uniform? 

General LOVELL. Why wouldn’t they? 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. Why do they wear a uniform? 

General LOVELL. They wear a uniform because without saying a 

word, it’s the visual symbol of the United States of America, the 

United States Marine Corps and what it’s represented for hundreds 

of years. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. The outrage here is we got to fight. We got Americans dying. And somebody at the State Department it looks like 

wanted them to change their clothes because they didn’t want them 

going in there with the American flag. They didn’t want them going 

in there wearing the American uniform. They wear it to carry ammunition, to carry weapons. They do it so they know who’s on 

who’s side. And it took them almost an hour later to get them to 

engage because they wanted them to look better. That’s the outrage. General, do you have any other personal comment? You’ve 

been in the military for more than 33 years. Why, how, have you 

ever seen that happen before? We’re in the fight. How does that 

make you feel? 

General LOVELL. I don’t want to see that happen again. If Marines are our choice, and they’re going forward, they’re in uniform 

because they’re our Marines. We have other forces that can go 

places that aren’t wearing that uniform. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. And they were going to Tripoli, correct? They 

weren’t going to Benghazi. 

General LOVELL. That’s right. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. I’m sorry? 

General LOVELL. Yes, sir. That’s correct. 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. That were headed where? 

General LOVELL. They were going into Tripoli. 

83 

Mr. CHAFFETZ. They weren’t even going to Benghazi. That’s the 

point. I thank the gentlewoman for her time. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. Reclaiming my time. General, I have one last question. It’s about a gentleman named Andrew Shapiro. This is someone who is a former Assistant Secretary of State, former Senate 

staffer to former Secretary Clinton, played a prominent role in coming out to AFRICOM and providing guidance on what the military 

would do with respect to Libya. Did Mr. Shapiro’s prominence seem 

odd to you given your military experience? 

General LOVELL. He was in the Pol-Mil Bureau. The Pol-Mil Bureau was active with Africa Command, especially through our J5 

shop. His area was influential in that we would certainly need to 

coordinate what it is that we were doing with that interagency 

partner, and he did come to the command and interact with members in the command. 

Mrs. LUMMIS. My time is expired. I yield back. Thank you. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank the gentlelady. We now go not gentleman from Arizona, Dr. Gosar. 

Mr. GOSAR. General Lovell, in your testimony you described the 

new normal in Libya was a formerly intact country now fractured 

and divided along many lines. Was there anything normal about 

the so-called new normal in Libya after Qadhafi, and could you 

elaborate on that? 

General LOVELL. Normal, by my definition, would be a functioning government that has intact a political process, a prospering 

economy, and a military that’s disciplined and able to fend for the 

defense of the nation. That, as we have heard here today, the Libyans continue to struggle with as they move forward. 

Mr. GOSAR. But particularly after the fall of Qadhafi, it becomes 

more chaotic. Would you agree? 

General LOVELL. Absolutely. 

Mr. GOSAR. Now, in your role as intelligence, could you highlight 

what you knew beforehand about eastern Libya? What were you 

predisposed as far as following intelligence? 

General LOVELL. Well, in eastern Libya, obviously that’s where, 

for us, some of the rebel activity at the time began. Much of what 

we also watched in that area was who were, what we would consider the good guys and the bad guys. What really were the roles 

that those forces were in that were militias or others. When you 

are in the J2 shop, you’re continuously trying to identify, especially 

forces that are not part of government forces, you are trying to discern all the time how friendly to our viewpoint are those types of 

forces, so we spent a lot of time on eastern Libya as well other 

areas around the country because it’s so fractionalized by militia 

groups and entities that have varying interests. 

Some can be interested in their community being a safe place to 

live and prosper and can be fairly what we would consider benign 

in their viewpoint, but then there are others where we would look 

at them, and we would consider them extremists, whether they 

would be Islamist extremists or others, so constantly trying to keep 

track of what was going on around the country, not just even in 

that particular portion. 

Mr. GOSAR. But in that portion, would you consider maybe a hot 

bed? 

84 

General LOVELL. A hot bed, absolutely, that’s where the strongest part of the revolution came from. 

Mr. GOSAR. So a normal CEO, or somebody that’s receiving this 

intelligence, has got to put higher priority on that; right? 

General LOVELL. That’s one of the areas in that country to put 

the high priority on, absolutely, yeah. 

Mr. GOSAR. I want to go back to the Accountability Review Board 

from 1999 in Nairobi, Kenya. I mean, we outlined specifics that 

should have been in place, so the State Department should have 

known. I mean, we just had Admiral Pickering, who was part of 

that discussion, sitting here in front of this committee earlier. They 

should have known, because if we had have followed those protocols, we wouldn’t have had this catastrophe. Do you believe this 

event was totally preventable, in Benghazi? 

General LOVELL. Totally preventable? 

Mr. GOSAR. Yep. 

General LOVELL. No, not totally preventable. We’re dealing in an 

environment—let me clarify my answer. The reason I don’t believe 

it’s totally preventable is because we’re dealing in a hostile environment, in an environment where we’re dealing with extremist organizations. 

Mr. GOSAR. I guess let me qualify that. 

General LOVELL. Okay. 

Mr. GOSAR. Given the information that should have been normally going up the chain for somebody to make a decision, this was 

preventable? 

General LOVELL. Oh, in order to perhaps not even expose yourself and be there. 

Mr. GOSAR. Exactly. Are you familiar with the term ‘‘malpractice’’? 

General LOVELL. I certainly don’t want to have it happen to me, 

yeah. 

Mr. GOSAR. Well, I mean, I’m a dentist impersonating a politician, so I mean, America doesn’t understand a lot of our jargon, 

and what happens is when an executive who is in charge of facilitating knows that the Inman Standards of a consulate do not meet 

those qualifications, that they’re on a hot bed of activity, they knew 

something was coming along those lines, that you should have prevented this, would you consider this malpractice? 

General LOVELL. By the definition that you gave, I would go 

along with that.? 

Mr. GOSAR. Ms. Schake? 

Ms. SCHAKE. I am hesitant, to be honest. And the reason is because of the confidence I place in the good judgment of Ambassador 

Chris Stevens, who made a set of choices himself about his engagement, his trip to Benghazi, and while I absolutely agree with you 

that the State Department should have been paying more attention 

to the growing jihadist threat and the growing militancy of militia 

in Benghazi, I would not want to take away from an American ambassador the ability to assess risk of accomplishing his mission or 

putting himself in harm’s way, which I think Chris Stevens did a 

lot of in Benghazi to tragic effect. 

Mr. GOSAR. But doesn’t he also have the impugned liability to 

those that are surrounding him as well? 

85 

Ms. SCHAKE. That’s an excellent question. 

Mr. GOSAR. Yeah. Last one, Mr. Ross. 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Since I wasn’t in the room, I can’t speak 

to whether it was or not. 

Mr. GOSAR. But given the circumstances of what we have seen 

played out by the information, there was definite neglect. 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. I think we see a lot of deficiencies, both 

in terms of what happened at the time and particularly—— 

Mr. GOSAR. And leading up to. 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Both leading up to what happened at 

the time and also thereafter the response. As you know, sir, malpractice is a very steep standard, so I couldn’t speak to that, but 

the deficiencies are clear. 

Mr. GOSAR. I thank the gentlemen and yield. 

Chairman ISSA. I thank all of you, and I’ll yield myself my final 

5 minutes. 

General, and this really applies in some ways to all of you, but 

I’m going to concentrate on the General for a moment. General, 

when I was on active duty, I did joint exercises, had the opportunity to serve with a lot of other services, and they used terms 

like JAMFU and JAFU and all kinds of terms. They may not be 

as popular today, but they generally stood for joint Army-Air Force 

foul-up. Not always that way. Joint Army-Marine foul-up. But in 

your case, this wasn’t about the joint command that’s known as 

AFRICOM, this was about interagency. 

If I understand you correctly, on 9/11, leading up to it with the 

normalization policy, but on 9/11, with the assets that were available in and out of Libya, you had a State Department, to a certain 

extent, under Mr. Shapiro, under somebody who had special authority for one country in Africa while near east, the rest of it was 

run by other people. You had one country, Libya, that was being 

run by a different group of people, and you mentioned this earlier. 

And they determined whether or not you got to go. Is that correct? 

General LOVELL. When you say ‘‘got to go,’’ you’re talking about 

the—— 

Chairman ISSA. If Deputy Assistant Secretary, I guess he is, Andrew Shapiro, if he had called the Deputy Combatant Commander 

and said we need you to put all assets on the target, would you 

have been taking action at that command in concert with the European command to begin moving assets toward Benghazi sooner? 

General LOVELL. From my perspective working as a staff officer 

there in J2 as I saw what was going on surrounding, it appeared 

to me that had the State Department made such a request within 

the authority that existed on the part of the Combatant Commander, they could have done more. 

Chairman ISSA. And within the joint—— 

General LOVELL. That’s my understanding. 

Chairman ISSA. Right, and within the joint interagency arrangement, you saw before, during and after 9/11, 2012, the decision on 

movement, if I understand you correctly, did not belong to the Department of Defense. It belonged to the Department of State. 

General LOVELL. There are certain things a Combatant Commander can do, but a greater sense of interaction and what it is 

86 

that would happen within that country, absolutely, consultation 

with Department of State would have been warranted. 

Chairman ISSA. So in your opinion, the Vice Admiral, General 

Ham, yourself, nobody out of Stuttgart had the authority to unilaterally launch combatant aircraft or personnel? 

General LOVELL. Combatant Commander has certain authorities, 

absolutely. How coordinated they would be with the outcome desired by the State Department and the executive within our Nation, that’s where that Combatant Commander has that dialogue 

along with the Secretary of Defense to ensure that we take the 

right action? 

Chairman ISSA. Basically put a suit and tie on, dress nice, and 

hide your weapons to go in as Marines, to take a little liberty with 

the order that was given to get out of your uniforms before going 

into Tripoli, that was a State Department decision. That would not, 

to your knowledge, have been a Combatant Commander decision? 

General LOVELL. I wouldn’t think a Combatant Commander 

would say that, but it’s not a typical approach to take with Marines 

that you’re sending forward into harm’s way, in my experience. 

Chairman ISSA. Well, you know, we’re an armed service, and if 

you show a heavy assault rifle or a machine gun, generally the uniform just emphasizes who you are because you’re showing what 

you can do. The fast team did have a number of weapons. 

In your opinion, now I’ll have you take off the September 11th 

hat, as a retired long-serving military officer who saw the relationship and the arrangements that existed for Africa at the African 

Command relative to how decisions were made to go or not go in 

support of Americans in harm’s way, would you insist on material 

changes in how we do business so that there could be faster response in the future? 

General LOVELL. Sir, one of the very first things I would look at 

would be the capacity and capability that’s afforded to the Combatant Commander that would be immediately at his disposal. That 

is absolutely necessary just given the sheer size of the continent 

itself and the number of governments that exist on the continent, 

the number of countries. So many things can happen on that continent in any of those countries, and it can be anything from a need 

for a neo evacuation to, you know, use of force and power, anywhere along that spectrum. 

First and foremost would be to properly, or equip to the best extent possible, agreed there were other arrangements with 

CENTCOM and UCOM, et cetera, and we have finite resources, 

and we’re doing the best we can. I understand that. But in this instance, it seems focused on this particular command, I would look 

and say if we’re asking for them to do more and to ensure that we 

have got the backs of all of our Americans around the continent 

and we’re partnering with the African partners that we have there 

on the continent, we certainly need these types of resources in locations proximate to where they would have to be engaged. 

Chairman ISSA. Thank you. Any other witness have anything 

else? In that case, I’d like to thank the witnesses for taking time 

out of their busy schedules to appear before us today, and we stand 

adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:26 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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