MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 2021	ME 49 Docket: Cum

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- 319 Argued: July	13,	2021 Decided: October	7,	2021 Panel: GORMAN,	JABAR,	HUMPHREY,	HORTON,	and	CONNORS,	JJ. *

CECELIA	BOLES

v. KAREN	M.	WHITE	et	al.

HUMPHREY,	J. [¶1]		Cecelia	Boles	was	a	guest	of	tenants	who	rented	a	two

- story	house owned	by	Karen	and	Ronald	White. Boles	appeals	from	a	summary	judgment entered	by	the	Superior	Court	(Cumberland	County, Stewart,	J. )	in	favor	of	the Whites	on	Boles’s	co mplaint	alleging	premises	liability.		Boles	argues	that	the court	erred	when	it	concluded	that	the	tenants	were	in	exclusive	control	of	the
pr emises ,	that	the	Whites	did	not	expressly	agree	to	maintain	the	premises	in good	repair,	and	that	there	was	no	alt ernative	basis	for	finding	the	Whites	liable for	Boles’s	injury.		We	affirm	the	judgment	in	all	respects.

* Justice	Mead	sat	at	oral	argument	but	did	not	participate	in	the	development	of	the	opinion.2 I.		BACKGROUND [¶ 2 ]	 	 The	 following	 facts	 are	 drawn	 from	 the	 parties’	 supported statements	 of	 material	 facts,	 viewed	 in	 the	 light	 most	 favorable	 to	 Boles.
See MSR	Recycling,	LLC	v.	Weeks	&	Hutchins,	LLC ,	2019	ME	125,	¶	6,	214	A.3d	1

. [¶ 3 ]	 	 Cecelia	 Boles	 was	 injured	 on	 Septe mber	 18,	 2016,	 at	 the	 ho use rented	by	her	daughter	and	son

- in

- law	 (the	Lytles)	when	she descended	 the staircase	 between	 the	 first	 and	 second	 floor	 and fell	 off	 the	 landing	 at	 the bottom	of	the	staircase. 1 The	height	of	the	landing	step	measured	eleven	in ches, which was greater than	the heights	of	the rest	of	the	stairs of the	staircase 2 and did	 not	 comply	 with the a pplicable building	 codes.	 	 The	 Lytles	 had	 recently entered	into	a	written	agreement	to	rent	the	ho use from	the	Whites. The lease included the	following	paragraphs that	are	relevant	to	this	appeal : 10. Access: Renters	 shall	 allow	 homeowner	 to	 access	 the property for	purposes	of	repair	and	inspection.		Renters	shall	keep the	 owners	 informed	 of	 any	 issues	 that	 arise	 with	 the	 property and/or	appliances.
12. The	renter	is	responsible	for	mowing	the	lawn	and	watering the	plants.		The	renter	is	responsible	for	all	snow removal,	either snow	 blowing	with	 the	machine	available;	 or	arranging	 plowing.

1 Boles had arrived	at	 the	premises	 the	prior	afternoon	 to	babysit	her	grandchildren	and	had never	visited	 the	premises	before.		Boles	awoke	 the	next morning	at	approximately	5:00	a.m.	and ascended	the	staircase	for	the	first	time	to	look	for	her	son

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- law.		Thereafter,	while	descending	the stairs,	Boles	fell	as	she	stepped	off	the	landing	onto	the	first	floor.

2 The	record	does	not	reflect	how	much higher	the	landing	step	was than the	other	steps.3 The	 renter	 is	 responsible	 for	 salting	 or	 sanding	 walkways	 if necessary	to	prevent	personal	injuries	from	slipping	on	ice. [¶ 4 ]	 	 On	 June	 24,	 2019,	 Boles	 brought	 suit	 against the	 Whites	 on	 the theory	of	premises	liability	for	injuries	she	sustained	as	a	result	of	the	fall.		On June	26,	2020,	the	Whites	moved	 for	summary	judgment	on	all	counts	of	the complaint,	 contending	 that	 Boles	 could	 not	 establish	 that	 the	 Whites	 owed Boles a	duty	 of	care.	 	The	court	granted	 the	Whites’	motion,	concluding	 that there	was	no	genuine	dispute	that	the	Lytles	were	in	exclusive control of	the premises,	 that	 the	lease	 did	 not	 contain	an	express	agreement	 requiring	 the Whites	 to	maintain	 the	premise s	in	good	repair,	and	 that	 the	Whites	did	not otherwise	have	a	duty	to	maintain	the	premises. [¶ 5 ]		Boles	 timely	 filed	 this	appeal. See 14	M.R.S.	 §	1851	 (2021);	M.R. App. P.	2A,	2B(c)(1).
II.		DISCUSSION [¶ 6 ] “ We	review	a	grant	of	summary	judgment	de	novo, considering	the evidence	in	 the	light	most	 favorable	 to	 the	nonprevailing	party	 to	determine whether	 the	parties’	statements	 of	material	 facts	and	 the	 record	evidence	 to which	 the	 statements	 refer	 demonstrate that	 there	 is	 no	 genuine	 issue	 of material	fact	and	the	moving	party	is	entitled	to	judgment	as	a	matter	of	law.” Kurtz	&	Perry,	P.A.	v.	Emerson, 2010	ME	107,	¶	15,	8	A.3d	677 (quotation	marks4 omitted) ; see	also M.R.	Civ.	P.	56(c). “ A	material	fact	is	one	that	can	affect	the outcome	 of	 the	 case,	 and	 there	 is	 a	 ‘genuine	 issue’	 when	 there	 is	 sufficient evidence	 for	a	 fact

- finder	 to	choose	between	competing	versions	of	 the	 fact.”
Stewart

- Dore	v.	Webber	Hosp.	Ass’n ,	2011	ME	26,	¶	8,	13	A .3d	773

. [¶ 7 ] A	landlord	is	not	liable	for	injuries	caused	by	a	dangerous	condition on	property	that	is	under a	tenant’s exclusive	control	except	when	the	landlord “(a)	fails	to	disclose	the	existence	of	a	latent	defect	which	he	knows	or	should have	kno wn	existed	but	which	is	not	known	to	the	tenant	nor	discoverable	by him	in	 the	 exercise	 of	 reasonable	 care ; (b)	 gratuitously	 undertakes	 to	make repairs	 and	 does	 so	 negligently;	 or	 (c)	 expressly	 agrees	 to	 maintain	 the premises	in	good	repair.” Nichols	v.	Marsden ,	483	A.2d	341,	343	 (Me.	1984) (citations	omitted)

. This	rule	and	its	exceptions	apply	to	injuries	sustained	by a	 tenant’s	 guest	 or	 other s	 on	 the	 premises	 with	 the	 tenant’s	 consent.
See Stewart	 v.	 Aldrich ,	 2002	 ME	 16,	 ¶¶ 2, 6,	 10

- 14 ,	 788	 A.2d	 603	 (applying Nichols and	 its	 exceptions where	 the injured	 plaintiff	 was	 a	 guest	 of	 the landlord’s	 tenant).	 	 Finally,	 unambiguous	 contract	 language	 m ust	 be interpreted	according	to	its	plain	meaning, and	that	interpretation is	a	question of	law. T

- M	Oil	Co.	v.	Pasquale ,	388	A.2d	82,	85	(Me.	1978)

.5 A. Exclusive	Control [¶ 8 ]		Boles	argues	that	the	court	erred	in	concluding	that	the	premises was	under	the	exclusive	control	of	the	Lytles	because	the	Whites	reserved	the right	 to	 access	 the	 premises	 “for	 purposes	 of	 repair	 and	 inspection”	 in paragraph	ten	of	the	lease. Under Ni chols ,	a	landlord	must	 first establish	the landlord’s	 “absence	 of	 control	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 liability	 for	 a	 dangerous condition	 on	 the	 premises.” Stewart ,	 2002	 ME	 16,	 ¶ 12,	 788	 A.2d	 603 (quotation	marks	omitted).		“ Although	we	have	not	explicitly	defined	the	term ‘control,’ the	cases applying Nichols illustrate	that [it]	means	a	power	over	the premises	that	the	landlord	reserves	pursuant	to	the	terms	of	the	lease	or	the tenancy,	 whether	 express	 or	 implied,	 and	 does	 not	 include	 the	 incidental control	that	comes	from	being	able	to	threa ten	tenants	with	nonrenewal	of	a lease	or	with	eviction.” Id. ¶	13.		More	specifically,	“landlords	may	retain	control

over	non - common	areas	when	 they	 reserve	certain	 rights	 or	 responsibilities over	the	premises	by	the	terms	of	the	lease	or	tenancy.” Id. [¶ 9 ] Applying	these	principles, we	vacated	a	summary	judgment	in	favor of	the	defendant	landlords	after	concluding	that	there	was	a	genuine	dispute	of fact	concerning	 the	degree	of	control	retained	by	 the	landlords	because	 they reserved	the	right	to	enter	the	premises	to	plow	snow	from the	parking	lot and6 did	in	fact	plow	snow	“whenever	necessary

. ” Hankard	v.	Beal , 543 A.2d	1376,
1377

- 78	(Me.	1988) .		Similarly,	we	vacated	a	summary	judgment	in	favor	of	the defendant	landlord	after	concluding	 that	 there	was	a	genuine	dispute	of	 fact

conc erning	the	degree	of	control	retained	by	the	landlord	over	the	basement stairs	because,	although	the	stairs	could	be	accessed	only	through	the	plaintiff’s apartment,	there	was	evidence	that	the	lease	did	not	include	the	basement	or
its	stair s, that	the	pla intiffs	accessed	the	stairs	only	at	the	landlord’s	behest ,	and that	 the	 landlord	 occasionally	 used	 the	 stairs	 to	 service	 the	 furnace	 in	 the basement. Rodrigue	v.	Rodrigue , 1997	ME	99,	¶¶ 4, 12

- 13 n.2 ,	694	A.2d	924 ; see also Chiu	v.	City	of Portland ,	2002	ME	8,	¶¶	12

- 15,	788	A.2d	183 (reasoning	that there	was	a	genuine	dispute	as	 to	whether	 the	 tenants	had	exclusive	control over	 an	 exterior	 window	 because	 the	 landlord	 had	 previously	 repaired	 an adjacent	exterior	window , could	have	repaired	 th e	window	without	entering the	residence ,	had	been	asked	by	 the	 tenant	 to	 fix	 the	windows	at	issue , and “did	not	disavow	his	obligation	to	repair”	them ). [¶1 0 ] The	 question	 before	 us	 is	 whether,	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 law,	 the reservation	of	access	in paragraph	ten	of	the	lease	for	purposes	of	“inspection and	repair,”	without	more,	creates	a	genuine	dispute	as	to	whether	the	Lytles had	exclusive	control	over the	premises,	including	the	interior	staircase.		We7 conclude	that	it	does	not	create	such	a	disp ute.		The	Whites’	general	reservation of	access	for	purposes	of	repair	and	inspection	is	distinct	from	the	landlords’ degree	of	control	disputed	in Hankard , Rodrigue ,	and Chiu .		In	those	cases, there was	at	least	some	evidence	of	shared	control	in	each	cas e	between	the	landlord and	 tenants

— those	 landlords	 had	 actually	 exercised	 some	 form	 of	 control, whether	reserved	or	not,	over	the	portion	of	the	premises	at	issue	during	the tenancy. See	Hankard ,	543	A.2d	at	1377

- 78	 (landlords	 reserved	 the	 right	 to plow	 a nd	 did	 plow	 snow	 on	 parking	 lot	 over	 which	 control	 was	 disputed); Rodrigue , 1997	ME	99,	¶	12	n.2,	694	A.2d	924	(landlord	did	not	clearly	include in	 the	lease	 the	stairs	over	which	control	was	disputed	and	used	 those	same stairs	 during	 the	 lessee’s	 tenancy) ; Chiu ,	 2002	 ME	 8,	 ¶	 14,	 788	 A.2d	 183 (landlord	previously	repaired	windows	over	which	control	was	disputed). 3 [¶ 11 ] Our conclusion	is	consistent	with	decisions	in	other	jurisdictions that	have	deemed	a	landlord’s	mere	reservation	of	the	right	to	enter	and	repair the	 premises	insufficient	 evidence	 of	 that	 landlord’s	 control	 for	 purposes	 of liability. See	e.g. , Lucier	v.	Im pact	Rec.,	Ltd. ,	864	A.2d	635,	640	(R.I.	2005)	(“The

3 Even viewing the	landlords’	reservation	of	access	in Hankard in	isolation ,	paragraph	ten remains distinguishable	because	the	reservation	in Hankard was	not	a	general	reservation	of	the	right	to	enter fo r	inspection	and	repair;	rather,	it	was	a	reservation	of	the	right	to	enter	for	the	specific	purpose	of plowing	snow. Hankard ,	543	A.2d	at	1377

- 78.8 lease	 provisions,”	 including	 the	 landlord’s	 right	 to	 enter	 the	 premises	 to determine	whether	it	was	in	good	condition,	“did	not	give	[the	landlord]	control over	 the	 property,	 but	 rather	 were	 merely	 to	 pr otect	 [the	 landlord’s] investment	and	reversionary	interest	in	the	property.”); Settles	v.	Redstone	Dev. Corp. ,	797	A.2d	692,	696	(D.C.	2002)	(“A	landlord	has	retained	sufficient	control to	 create	 a	 duty	 to	 repair	 if	 he	 has	 the	 power	 or	 authority	 to	 manage , superintend,	direct	or	oversee , ” but “ the	landlord’s	explicit	reservation	of	the authority	to	enter	the	premises	and	to	make	repairs	is	insufficient	to	constitute retention	of	control. ”)	(quotation	marks	omitted); Dubay	v.	Cambridge	Hous. Auth. , 225 N.E.2d	374,	375 ( Mass. 1967)	(“The	reservation	of	the	right	to	enter the	tenant’s	premises	to	make	repairs	.	.	.	did	not	put	the	lessor	in	control	of	the premises.”)	(quotation	marks	omitted); Webb	v.	Danforth, 505	S.E.2d	860,	861 (Ga.	Ct.	App.	1998)	 (“A	l andlord’s	retention	of	 the	right	 to	enter,	inspect	and repair	is	not	inconsistent	with	a	full	surrender	of	possession	to	the	tenant.”). [¶1 2 ] Given	 the	 “bedrock	 principle”	 that	 a	 lease	 “is	 equivalent	 to	 a conveyance	for	almost	all	purposes,” Stewart ,	2002	ME	16,	¶	14,	788	A.2d	603, and in the	absence	of	evidence	showing	that	the	Whites	had,	in	fact,	retained	or exercised	any	degree	of	control	over	any	portion	of	the	premises	after	renting9 it	 to	 the	 Lytles,	we	 conclude	 that	 the	 Lytles	were	in	 exclusiv e	 control	 of	 the premises.
B. Express	Agreement	to	Maintain	Premises [¶1 3 ] Boles	argues	that	paragraphs	ten	and	twelve,	the	latter	of	which enumerates	the	maintenance	responsibilities	of	the	Lytles	as	tenants,	create	a genuine	 dispute	 as	 to	 whether	 the	Wh ites	 expressly	 agreed	 to	 maintain	 the premises	in	good	repair. Even	if	a	tenant	is	in	exclusive control of	the	premises, the	third	exception	under Nichols provides	that	the	landlord	may	still	be	liable for	injuries	 sustained	 on	 the	 premises	if	 the	landlord	 “expressly	 agree[d]	 to maintain	the	premises	in	good	repair.” Nichols ,	483	A.2d	at	343. [¶1 4 ] Boles	 contends	 that	 paragraph	 ten	 triggers	 this	 third	 e xception because	 it	 constitutes	 “a	 written	 assurance”	 by	 the	 Whites	 to	 repair	 the property.		In Nichols ,	we	vacated	a	summary	judgment	in	favor	of	the	defendant landlords	 because	 there	 was	 a	 genuine	 dispute	 of	 fact	 as	 to	 whether	 the landlords	 expressly	 pro mised	 to	 maintain	 the	 premises	 after	 one	 of	 the landlords	 testified	 that,	 prior	 to	 signing	 the	 lease,	 she	 orally	 informed	 the tenants	 that	minor	 repairs	 would	 be	 the	 tenants’	 responsibility	 while	major repairs	would	be	handled	by	the	landlords	themselves. Id. at	344.10 [¶1 5 ] Conversely,	 in Saunders	 v.	 Picard ,	 we	 affirmed	 a	 summary judgment	in	 favor	of	the	defendant	landlord,	holding	that	“evidence	that	[the landlord]	fixed	the	furnace,	the	water	system,	and	the	chimney, without	more , will	 not	 support	 an	 inf erence	 that	 [the	 landlord]	 had expressly	 agreed	 to maintain	 the	 premises	 in	 good	 repair.” 683	 A.2d	 501,	 502	 (Me.	 1996) (emphasis	added). Further,	with	particular	reference	to	the	case	before	us, the rule imposing landlord	 liability	 when	 the	 landlord	 cont racts	 to	 keep	 the premises	in	repair	“has	no	application	where	the	landlord	.	.	.	merely	reserves the	privilege	 to	enter	and	make	 repairs	if	he	sees	 fit	 to	do	so.”		Restatement (Second)	of	Prop .: Landlord	&	Tenant	§	17.5	cmt.	b(1)	(Am.	Law	 Inst.	1977) ;

see also Givens	v.	Union	Inv.	Corp. ,	359	A.2d	40,	42	(R.I.	1976)	(“The	general	rule .	 .	 .	is	 that	 the	inclusion	in	 a	lease	 of	 a	 provision	 reserving	 to	 the	lessor	 the privilege	 to	 enter	 and	 to	make	 repairs	is	 commonly	 held	 not	 to	 obligate	 the lessor	to	make repairs.”)	(quotation	marks	and	alteration	omitted). [¶1 6 ] Thus,	although	 the	plain	language	 of	paragraph	 ten	 of	 the	lease reserves	a	right	of	access	to	the	Whites,	as	landlords,	in	the	event that	repairs are	needed,	it	does	not	expressly	require	 them	 to	undertake	any	repairs	nor does	 it,	 unlike	 the	 landlord’s disputed oral	 commitment	 to	 make	 repairs	 in Nichols ,	provide any assurance	that	they	will.11 [¶1 7 ] Boles	also	argues,	based	on	the	maxim expressio	unius	est	exclusio alterius ,	that	all	repair	obligations	not	enumerated	in	paragraph	twelve	of	the lease	fell	to	the	Whites. This	maxim	reflects a	“well

- settled”	rule	of	construction useful	 for	 the	 interpretation	 of	 ambiguous	 language	 in	 statute s	 and	 other documents	“that	[the]	express	mention	of	one	concept	implies	the	exclusion	of others	not	listed.” Musk v. Nelson , 647 A.2d 1198, 1201

- 02 (Me. 1994) ( applying the	maxim	 to	interpret	a	statute ); see	also Stone	v.	U .S. Envelope	Co .,	119	Me.
394 ,	 396

- 97,	 111	 A.	 536	 (1920) ( applying	 the	maxim	 to	interpret corporate bylaws that lacked	express	provisions	on	the	disputed	issue )

. [¶1 8 ] However,	 the	 maxim	 has	 no	 application	 to	 language	 that	 is unambiguous, s ee,	e.g. , Young	v.	Greater	Portland	Transit	Dist. ,	535	A.2d	417, 418	 n.2	 (Me.	 1987) (declining	 to	 apply	 the expressio	 unius maxim	 to	 an unambiguous	statute),	and	paragraph	twelve	of	the	lease	is	not	ambiguous	in any	respect	material	to	the	Whites’	obligations.		Indeed,	any	application	of	the maxim	to	interpret	paragraph	twelve,	assuming	its	applicability,	would	mean only that any	 repairs	 not	 listed	 in	 paragraph	 twelve	 are	 excluded	 from	 the tenants’	 responsibilities

— not	 that	 the	Whites	would	 be	 required	 to	 perform them.12 [¶1 9 ] We	conclude	that	neither	paragraph	ten	nor paragraph twelve	of the	 lease	 contain s an	 express	 agreemen t	 that	 the	 Whites	 will	 maintain	 the premises	in	good	repair. 4
C. Alternative	Basis	for	Liability [¶ 20 ]		I n	her	opposition	to the	motion	for summary	judgment	and	now on	appeal, Boles	cites Patten	v.	Bartlett ,	111	Me.	409,	89	A.	375	(1914) , to	argue that	a	landlord	may	be	liable	if	he	“rents	a	premises	containing	an	unreasonably dangerous	 condition	 therein,”	 and	 “fail[s]	 to	 remedy	 the	 danger	 before accepting	 tenants.”	 	 The	 Superior	 Court	 did	 not	 address	 this	 argument,	 and although Patten rema ins	good	law,	we	find	that	it	has	no	application	to	the	facts of	this	case	and	is	easily	distinguished. [¶ 2 1 ]	 	 In Patten ,	 the	 plaintiff’s	 horse	 was	 killed	 after	 it	 fell	 into	 an unmarked	pit,	which	was	concealed	by	ice	and	snow	and	which	the	defendant lan dlord	had	promised	to	repair	before	the	tenant	took	occupancy.		111	Me.	at
410

- 14,	89	A.	375.		Here,	unlike	in Patten ,	the	Whites	did	not	promise	to	repair the	step,	nor	is	the	step	the	type	of	concealed	“nuisance”	that	was	contemplated

4 Although	Boles characteriz es Karen	White’s	deposition	testimony about	the	Whites’ interest	in conditions	identified	in	their	ho use inspection as	evidence t hat	the	Whites	had	agreed	to	maintain the	premises in good repair upon	renting	it	to	the	Lytles ,	th e	Whites’ prior repairs	and	intentions	to improve	the	house do	not	establish	the	exi stence	of	an	agreement with	the	Lytles

.13 in Patten

. See	id. at	415,	89	A. 37 5 .		This	latter	distinction	is	consistent	with	the legal	 principle that	 a	landlord	is	liable	 for	injuries	 caused	 by	 a	latent	 defect when	 that	 defect	 is	 “hidden	 from	 knowledge	 as	 well	 as	 from	 sight	 and	 one which	could	not	be	discover ed	by	ordinary	and	reasonable	care.” Cole	v.	Lord , 160	Me.	 223,	 22 8 ,	 202	A.2d	 560	 (1964) (quotation	marks	 omitted) ; see	 also Nichols ,	483	A.2d	at	343. 5 [¶ 2 2 ]	 	 Moreover,	 “no	 duty	 is	 owed	 to	 tenants	 to	 make the	 structural design	or	plan any	more	safe	tha n	it	was	at	the	time	of	letting.” Thompson	v. Frankus ,	 151	Me.	 54,	 56,	 115	A.2d	 718	 (1955)	 (citing Rosenberg	v.	 Chapman Nat’l	 Bank ,	 126	 Me.	 403,	 405,	 139	 A.	 82	 (1927)); see	 also	 Miller	 v.	 Hooper , 119 Me.	527,	529,	112	A.	256 (1921)	( “An	owner	may build	a	tenement	house with	 stairways	 which	 because	 of	 steepness	 or	 for	 other	 obvious	 structural reasons	are	inconvenient	or	even	unsafe.		The	tenant	cannot	exact	any	change. If	such	stairways	need	to	be	repaired	or	rebuilt,	the	owner	is	not	required	to

m ake	them	safer	or	more	convenient.”).

5 The	first Nichols exception imposes	liability	upon a	landlord	when	the	landlord	“fails	to	disclose the	existence	of	a	latent	defect	which	he	knows	or	should	have	known	existed	but	which	is	not	known to	the	tenant	nor	discoverable	by	him	in	the	exercise	of	reasonable	care.” Nichols	v.	Marsden ,	483 A.2d	34 1,	343	(Me.	1984) .		Although	Boles’s	argument	alleges	liability	under Patten ,	the	concealed nature	of	the	defect	in Patten mirrors	the	latent	defect	exception,	which,	in	addition	to	requiring	that the	latent	defect	be	one	that	the	landlord	should	have	know n	of,	also	requires	that	the	defect	be	one that	is	undiscoverable by the	tenant. Id .		We	also	note	that	the	parties’	statements	of	material	facts do	not	contain	an	assertion	that	the	Whites	failed	to	warn	the	Lytles	of	any	alleged	defect.14 The	entry	is: Judgment	affirmed.

Christian	 J.	 Lewis,	 Esq.,	 and	 Sean	 V.	 Walton,	 Esq. ( Orally) , Hardy	 Wolf	 & Downing,	P.A.,	Lewiston,	for	appellant	Cecelia	Boles John	B.	Schulte,	Esq. ( Orally ), and	L.	John	Topchik ,	Esq.,	Law	Offices	of	John	B. Schulte,	Portland,	for	Karen	M.	White	and	Ronald	C.	White	Jr.

Cumberland	County	Superior	Court	docket	number	CV

- 2019

- 238 F OR C LERKS R EFERENCE O NLY