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i 

97–197 2016

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–54] 

PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION AND THE 

MOX PROJECT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

OCTOBER 7, 2015 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Vice Chair 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska 

PETE AGUILAR, California 

DREW WALTER, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Counsel 

MIKE GANCIO, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces ............................................................................ 2 

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Klotz, Hon. Frank G., Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration ........................................................................................................................ 2 

MacWilliams, John J., Senior Advisor to the Secretary of Energy, U.S. Department of Energy .............................................................................................. 4 

Mason, Thom, Ph.D., Director, Oak Ridge National Laboratory ......................... 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Cooper, Hon. Jim .............................................................................................. 42 

Klotz, Hon. Frank G. ........................................................................................ 44 

Mason, Thom .................................................................................................... 50 

Rogers, Hon. Mike ............................................................................................ 41 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Letter to Mr. Wilson from CB&I Power ......................................................... 63 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 67 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 70 

Mr. Norcross ..................................................................................................... 70 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 67 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 73 

Mr. Wilson ......................................................................................................... 75 

(1) 

PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION AND THE MOX PROJECT 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, October 7, 2015. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:34 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. ROGERS. Good afternoon. The subcommittee will come to 

order. 

Welcome to our hearing on Plutonium Disposition Program and 

the MOX Project. 

To our witnesses, thank you for being here. We know it takes a 

lot of time to prepare and get ready for these things, and I really 

appreciate your investment. Your contributions make a big difference to our ability to do our jobs. 

Our distinguished witnesses today are the Honorable Frank 

Klotz, Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration 

[NNSA]; Mr. John MacWilliams, Associate Deputy Secretary, U.S. 

Department of Energy [DOE]; and Dr. Thom Mason, Director, Oak 

Ridge National Laboratory. 

This hearing is examining one of the Department of Energy’s 

largest and highest profile construction projects. The MOX Project 

and the broader Plutonium Disposition Program have been the subject of several recent reviews. The leaders of two of those reviews 

are at the witness table today: Mr. MacWilliams and Secretary 

Moniz’ internal assessment team, and Dr. Mason led the independent Red Team. They have both also been involved in figuring 

out what DOE should do about key uranium capabilities that are 

critical to our national security. 

Gentlemen, you seem to get all the easy issues. 

They are joined by General Klotz, who is no stranger to difficult 

challenges. General Klotz has the overall responsibility for executing the program as head of the NNSA. 

We look forward to hearing from all of you about the Department’s current status on this program as the committee looks to 

help the Nation determine what is in the best interests of the taxpayer and our national security. 

With that, let me turn to our ranking member for any statement 

that he might like to make. 
2 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the Appendix on page 41.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

TENNESSEE, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I ask unanimous consent that my opening statement would be 

put into the record. And I would like to make some additional oral 

remarks. 

Mr. ROGERS. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you. 

Welcome to the witnesses. 

And I am glad we are having this oversight hearing. It has been 

a long time since this committee has had one—by some counts, almost 10 years. A lot has happened in that time. And I am worried 

that, as we enter the month of October and head toward Halloween, that really the subject of this hearing is a horror story for 

the American taxpayer. Because we all want a good outcome, and 

yet this has been way more expensive and way slower than anybody really could have imagined 10, 15 years ago. 

I almost want to dedicate this hearing to a former colleague of 

ours, a Republican Congressman named Dave Hobson, who spotted 

the trouble way back 10 or 15 years ago. He wanted to do something about it; he was unable to. And then he later reported in 

2007 he was politically pressured not to do anything about it. 

So there have been various people for a long time trying to do 

the right thing for the American taxpayer. I hope that we can do 

it today. Dr. Mason’s testimony, I think, will make clear that, 

whatever we decide, we need to decide something. We can’t let the 

day of decision just keep on waiting. 

So I am hopeful that we will read the studies. I congratulate the 

Department of Energy and NNSA for having followed Congress’ 

mandate to do these studies and to report, you know, what we can 

expect unless we take a prompt decision. 

So I thank the witnesses, and I look forward to your testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the Appendix on page 42.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

We will now ask each of our witnesses to make an opening statement and summarize their opening statements in 5 minutes. Your 

written testimony will be accepted for the record. 

General Klotz, I understand you have one written statement for 

the Department of Energy. 

And, Mr. MacWilliams, no statement? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. That is correct. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. 

General Klotz, you are recognized for a verbal opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK G. KLOTZ, ADMINISTRATOR, 

NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

General KLOTZ. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member 

Cooper, other members of the subcommittee. It is an honor, as al-
3 

ways, to appear before you on behalf of the Department of Energy 

and the National Nuclear Security Administration. Again, we 

thank you for your continued support for our nuclear security mission and for our people. 

We also appreciate the opportunity to discuss plutonium disposition and the Mixed Oxide, or MOX, Fuel Fabrication Facility 

project with you today. And I appreciate the fact you will put our 

written statement into the record. 

Let me state at the outset that the Department remains committed to the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, 

or PMDA, between the United States and Russia and will continue 

to support the mission to dispose of 34 metric tons of excess U.S. 

weapons-grade plutonium. 

At the same time, the Department has been working to determine if there are opportunities to make the current MOX fuel approach for plutonium disposition more efficient since it has become 

clear that this approach will be significantly more expensive than 

originally anticipated. 

There have been, as you noted, several efforts over the last 2 

years to analyze the current MOX fuel approach and alternatives, 

including a 2014 internal Department of Energy review; the 2015 

congressionally mandated independent assessments by The Aerospace Corporation; and, most recently, a 2015 Red Team review, 

tasked by the Secretary of Energy and conducted by a team of U.S. 

and U.K. experts led by Dr. Thom Mason, the Director of Oak 

Ridge National Laboratory. 

Consistently, these analyses have concluded that the projected 

lifecycle costs of the MOX fuel approach for plutonium disposition 

will be in the range of $30 billion to $50 billion and possibly higher 

and will require approximately a billion dollars a year, in escalated 

dollars, for decades for construction and for the operational expenses for the life of the project. 

With the challenging and uncertain budget environment and 

with a lifecycle cost in excess of $30 billion, we believe there will 

be insufficient long-term funding available to support the MOX fuel 

approach and do all the other things which the administration and 

the Congress have called upon the Department of Energy and 

NNSA to do in its full portfolio of activities. 

Further, these analyses have all concluded that there is an alternative option that would be less than half the cost of the MOX fuel 

approach and have far lower risks, the so-called dilution and disposal approach. 

The fiscal year 2015 appropriations and authorization acts directed that construction of the MOX Project continue in fiscal year 

2015 at a level of $345 million. The fiscal year 2016 continuing resolution, which funds the Department through December 11, 2015, 

maintains the status quo for this project. As such, the Department 

has been continuing construction of the MOX facility despite the 

fact that, in our view, this funding level is too low to make any significant progress in completing the project. 

While these studies were underway throughout the last two calendar years, the Department has been discussing with individual 

Members of Congress and with staff the best path forward. 
4 

We have also raised our ongoing analysis of plutonium disposition options with our Russian counterparts. The U.S.-Russian 

PMDA provides for disposition by irradiation or any other method 

as may be agreed by the two parties to the agreement. As we determine our path forward as a Nation, we will continue these discussions with the Russians. 

So, again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to be 

here. And I look forward to answering your questions and Mr. Cooper’s questions as well as the other members of the subcommittee. 

[The prepared statement of General Klotz can be found in the 

Appendix on page 44.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, General. 

Mr. MacWilliams, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN J. MACWILLIAMS, SENIOR ADVISOR TO 

THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Department of 

Energy’s efforts to dispose of surplus weapon-grade plutonium, 

which is a topic of great importance to Secretary Moniz and to Deputy Secretary Sherwood-Randall. 

I am, as was mentioned, the Department of Energy’s Associate 

Deputy Secretary, and I also serve as the Secretary’s senior finance 

advisor. I have a private-sector background and have focused most 

of my career on investment and financing in the energy sector since 

about the mid-1980s. I joined the Department in June of 2013, and 

I have had the opportunity since then to work closely with Administrator Klotz on a variety of national security issues, including the 

Plutonium Disposition Program. 

Shortly after I joined the Department, the Secretary asked me to 

lead a new special working group that he established in June of 

2013 focused on plutonium disposition. As part of our efforts to determine ways to improve the efficiency of the plutonium disposition 

mission—which, as General Klotz just mentioned, it remains a critical and very important mission—the working group undertook a 

detailed analysis of our disposition options. 

The Plutonium Disposition Working Group includes the Office of 

the Administrator as well as the Offices of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Nuclear Energy, Acquisition and Project Management, General Counsel, and Congressional and Intergovernmental 

Affairs. 

And the Department issued a report with the working group’s 

analysis of surplus weapon-grade plutonium disposition options in 

April of 2014. The analysis concluded that the projected lifecycle 

costs of the MOX fuel approach for plutonium disposition would be 

approximately $30 billion. 

I think it is important at the outset to clarify that the MOX fuel 

approach lifecycle cost includes much more than just the MOX Fabrication Facility, which is located at Savannah River. Rather, it is 

the entire disposition program, which starts with pit disassembly 

and conversion, then moves into the MOX Fabrication Facility. 

Wastes come out in the Waste Solidification Building. We then 
5 

have waste qualification and, ultimately, reactor modifications necessary to burn the fuel in light-water reactors. 

The analysis also concluded that there is an alternative option 

that would be less than half the cost of the MOX fuel approach and 

have far fewer risks, and that is the dilution and disposal approach, which we will discuss today at length. 

Our efforts to reexamine the ways that we are implementing our 

plutonium disposition mission are part of a larger focus in the Department on improving our performance of major projects across 

the enterprise. As you are well aware, we manage some of the most 

truly one-of-a-kind projects, very difficult projects, often handling 

radioactive conditions. And, in light of these, we have struggled, 

and we have been on GAO’s [Government Accountability Office’s] 

high-risk list since the inception of that list in the 1990s. 

To meet those challenges, the Secretary has instituted a number 

of changes to improve our performance on major projects, and he 

has made improving management performance at the Department 

of Energy a top priority, which has been recognized by GAO and 

others. In fact, in 2013, GAO narrowed its DOE focus to only the 

contracts and projects over $750 million in the Department’s Office 

of Environmental Management and also in NNSA. 

In addition, since the creation of NNSA’s Office of Acquisition and Project Management in 2011, they have delivered on an $800 

million project portfolio, approximately $60 million or 71⁄2 percent 

below budget. 

In the last year, the Secretary has issued two significant decision 

memos. One of those created the Project Management Risk Committee, which I chair. 

So the reforms and processes that we are instituting at DOE 

with respect to project management are critical steps to ensuring 

we continue to be responsible stewards of taxpayers’ dollars. We 

are encouraged by the work that we have done over the last 2 

years, but we recognize that many challenges remain, including the 

Plutonium Disposition Program. We look forward to working with 

Congress to ensure that the program is on the best path forward. 

Thank you. And I will be pleased to answer your questions. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

And, Dr. Mason, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF THOM MASON, PH.D., DIRECTOR, OAK RIDGE 

NATIONAL LABORATORY 

Dr. MASON. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and 

members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today. 

My name is Thomas Mason. I am Director of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Oak Ridge National Laboratory. And, as General 

Klotz has told you, Secretary Moniz tasked me with assembling 

and leading a Red Team to assess options for disposing of surplus 

weapons-grade plutonium. 

We were directed to consider the mixed oxide fuel, or MOX, approach that is the current baseline, an alternative entitled ‘‘diluteand-dispose,’’ and any other alternatives that we viewed as meriting consideration. In particular, we were asked to evaluate the 

previous assessments of plutonium disposition options and rec-
6 

oncile cost differences among them, analyze ways that the MOX approach might be modified to reduce its cost, and examine risk assumptions and their impact on the cost. 

The Red Team reviewed a number of previous assessments of 

plutonium disposition options, and, as part of the process, we interviewed several members of the teams that conducted these assessments. We heard topical presentations on the MOX approach and 

potential alternatives. We were briefed by Ambassador Michael 

Guhin of the U.S. State Department and Dr. Siegfried Hecker, the 

former Director of Los Alamos National Lab, on the terms and history of the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement and 

interactions with Russian scientific leaders that led up to this 

agreement. We conducted site visits and interviews at Los Alamos, 

the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, or WIPP, and the Savannah River 

Site. And, finally, we reviewed the prior cost analyses to assess annual funding needs for a successful disposition program, focusing 

on the three most recent assessments. 

We quickly screened out most of the potential alternatives, including some that were addressed in the Plutonium Working Group 

[PWG] assessment that John MacWilliams was involved in, primarily because they had sufficient uncertainties in terms of cost 

and schedule that we concurred with the prior assessments that 

did not consider them near-term options for an alternative pathway. 

The two remaining alternatives, the baseline MOX approach and 

the dilute-and-dispose, are those addressed in the Phase 1 Aerospace assessment of the PWG report. 

The Aerospace team reached four primary conclusions: The PWG 

cost and schedule estimates were performed in reasonable accord 

with accepted best practices. The programmatic risks were generally underestimated for both the MOX approach and the diluteand-dispose alternative; and that the dilute-and-dispose alternative 

cost less than the MOX. Finally, they concluded that the MOX approach is essentially nonviable at anticipated capital funding levels 

because of the time needed to complete construction of the MOX 

Fuel Fabrication Facility, up to 86 years at $350 million a year. 

We agreed with the first three conclusions and, importantly, the 

conclusion that the best-case scenario for MOX was substantially 

more expensive than the worst-case scenario for dilute-and-dispose. 

We did find that the assertions regarding the time needed to complete the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility at reduced funding levels 

were not able to take into account possible optimization of the 

project effort at reduced funding levels. However, as I said, we concurred with the primary conclusion regarding the relative cost. 

We also reviewed the High Bridge critique of the Aerospace report, and the primary concern expressed by High Bridge was that 

the MOX risk elements and resulting impact costs are overstated 

and inconsistent and that the dilute-and-dispose, which they refer 

to as ‘‘downblend,’’ risk elements are understated. 

While we concurred with findings that the MOX lifecycle costs in 

the Aerospace report were overstated, as described, due to the extension of the project over very long durations and the impacts of 

escalation, we disagreed with their contention that dilute-and-dispose should have a risk profile commensurate with a complex nu-
7 

clear facility construction project in its early stages, given that it 

can begin already in existing facilities and has much smaller capital investment requirements in order to optimize its production 

rate. 

And, in fact, the simplest statement that we can arrive at in 

terms of understanding the cost differences is that the dilute-anddispose option is essentially a subset of what is needed for MOX. 

All of the requirements for pit disassembly and oxidization are necessary in either scenario. In the case of MOX, you then have to go 

on to convert that into nuclear fuel in the MOX Fuel Fabrication 

Facility, hence the additional cost. 

And, in particular, the dilute-and-dispose uses much simpler 

technology than MOX, so the technical risks are reduced. And it 

has already been demonstrated in the dispositioning of weapons 

plutonium material from the Rocky Flats facility. 

So the primary risks associated with the dilute-and-dispose option are not so much cost and schedule risks; they are risks associated with getting Russian concurrence with the modification of the 

PMDA. Such modification is allowed for in the agreement, but, of 

course, it does require concurrence. We believe there is a sufficient 

technical basis to constitute a good starting point for those negotiations, although there can be other factors beyond technical merits 

that could influence their outcome. 

And, also, receiving agreement from the State of New Mexico for 

the optimal regulatory pathway for dilute-and-dispose is another 

factor that can impact the overall viability, particularly due to its 

impacts on the WIPP capacity. 

The bottom line in terms of relative cost we analyzed in terms 

of the operating cost requirement on an annual basis in unescalated dollars, the dilute-and-dispose option, we believe, can be executed at basically the current funding level of roughly $400 million 

a year, whereas successful execution of the MOX plan would require ramping up over the next 2 years or so to more like $700 million to $800 million a year. In both cases, you would have to sustain that funding over the multi-decade operating life of the facility 

against inflation, so it would escalate over time. 

So, I think at that point, I am over my time, so I will conclude, 

and we can turn to questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Mason can be found in the Appendix on page 50.] 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank all the witnesses. 

And now I will recognize myself for questions. 

The Plutonium Management Disposition Agreement between the 

U.S. and Russia, as amended, requires the U.S. to pay Russia $400 

million to help Russia hold up its end of the deal. That is pretty 

hard to believe, given what Russia is up to around the world right 

now. 

How much of this assistance has been paid to Russia so far? Will 

any current or prior-year funding be paid to Russia for these purposes in 2016? How much of these funds are currently available 

and on your books? And what is the plan for the $400 million in 

U.S. assistance mentioned in fiscal year 2017–2018? 

General Klotz, I guess you are the perfect person for this question. 
8 

General KLOTZ. I am. And thank you. And anticipating that you 

might ask this question, Mr. Chairman, I carefully quizzed our 

staff. 

The United States has not provided Russia with any funding towards the $400 million commitment. No funds will be paid to Russia in current or prior-year funding towards this commitment. And, 

in accordance with recent congressional direction, all Russia program funds that were appropriated to meet U.S. PMDA obligations 

were rescinded, and there are currently no funds available within 

the NNSA available to support Russian plutonium disposition. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Well, given that so many senior U.S. military 

leaders are saying they are our biggest threat, it is going to be a 

virtual impossibility to get more money out of Congress for Russia. 

The Waste Isolation Pilot Program, or WIPP, in New Mexico is 

a key part to making the dilute-and-dispose option work, but WIPP 

has been shut down for over a year and a half due to a radiation 

leak. What risks are in the dilute-and-dispose option given the uncertainty surrounding WIPP? 

Dr. Mason. 

Dr. MASON. WIPP is a critical asset for a number of programs. 

It is required for the ongoing operations of facilities, a lot of the 

cleanup activity, so it is certainly urgent that it be restarted. 

We estimated that it would take roughly 5 years to prepare for 

initial shipments to WIPP, assuming that a decision was made to 

transition to that pathway. And you have to go through a termination process, obviously, in the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility. 

That will entail some cost. 

And, also, there is some preparatory work in terms of reaching 

an agreement with the Russians and establishing the framework 

for monitoring of the agreement, which would be done under the 

auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency. 

And based on the visit that we made to WIPP and the discussions with the Federal officials there, we believe 5 years is consistent with the timeframe that is envisaged for not only the restart of WIPP, which is within the next year or so, but also dealing 

with the backlog and getting back up to a full operational status. 

So we don’t see a major inconsistency there. 

Mr. ROGERS. Are the costs of expanding WIPP as well as redoing 

the regulations and agreements with New Mexico included in the 

dilute-and-dispose option? And how much will that cost? 

Dr. MASON. What you might call the baseline approach to diluteand-dispose would be following the protocols and procedures that 

were used to disposition the Rocky Flats material, which included 

diluting the plutonium oxide to 10 percent with the diluent, the details of which are classified, but it is often referred to as ‘‘stardust’’ 

as a sort of shorthand. And that pathway is currently permitted in 

terms of both the transportation to WIPP and the emplacement in 

WIPP. 

However, it would be optimal to explore the possibility of increasing the fraction of plutonium oxide. That has the effect of reducing 

the duration and therefore the cost of the project and reducing the 

consumption of volumetric capacity at WIPP. That would require 

additional regulatory approval both from NRC [Nuclear Regulatory 
9 

Commission] for transportation and also permitting actions in the 

State of New Mexico to permit disposition in WIPP. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, this is kind of a follow-up to that. Your Red 

Team says that, quote, ‘‘Perceived fundamental barriers to diluteand-dispose approach, namely WIPP capacity limits and the PMDA 

compliance, are not viewed as insurmountable by the Red Team 

but should be retired as early as possible in the planning phase for 

this option as possible,’’ closed quote. 

How quickly could you know if these fundamental barriers can 

be resolved successfully? 

Dr. MASON. Well, as I said, in terms of the WIPP and New Mexico, you can initiate within the already-approved framework at this 

10 percent dilution. What you would like to do is, as quickly as possible, get to a more optimal pathway at higher concentration and 

also explore with the State possibly changing the basis for calculating the amount of waste deposited in WIPP. 

At the moment, per the agreement with the State, it is calculated 

based on the volume of container rather than the volume of the 

waste. And if you could get an agreement to actually look at the 

waste volume, that would obviate the need for any modification to 

the Land Withdrawal Act. 

As I said, those aren’t a barrier to starting the process but would 

have to happen in a timely way in order to avoid consuming the 

full capacity of WIPP at the lower dilution rate. So, given that it 

would take 5 years to be ready to begin emplacement, there is 

probably time for such discussions, although, obviously, the nearterm focus is on restart. 

In terms of the Russian agreement, that is a little harder to assess the duration, because, quite frankly, there are factors around 

getting an agreement with the Russians that may have nothing to 

do with plutonium disposition and the technical merits. And it is 

a little bit hard for us to, you know, consider all the possible geopolitical scenarios that might slow that down or speed it up. 

As we stated in the report, we believe that the U.S. has a solid 

negotiating position to initiate those discussions based on the fact 

that, from a technical point of view, in our judgment, this is an acceptable disposition, in that it puts the material beyond use by 

state or non-state actors, which is the intent of the agreement. And 

the fact that there has been prior modification, you know, is a good 

basis for the discussion. 

But it is a little hard for us to project, you know, how other extraneous factors, be they, you know, Ukraine, Syria—pick your 

problem—could slow down or, you know, if things improved, speed 

that up. Although 5 years is probably not an unreasonable window. 

Mr. ROGERS. All right. Thank you. 

Before I turn it over to the ranking member, I ask unanimous 

consent that non-committee members be allowed to participate in 

today’s hearing after all subcommittee members have had an opportunity to ask questions. Is there objection? 

Hearing none, the Members will be recognized at the appropriate 

time for 5 minutes. 

With that, I turn it over to my friend and colleague from Tennessee, the ranking member, Mr. Cooper. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
10 

The topic of today’s hearing is extraordinarily technical, so let me 

try to simplify it. 

I think the real news of this hearing is that most all the experts 

agree that there is a new and better and cheaper way to dispose 

of this plutonium. That is good news. Now, that option is called the 

dilute-and-dispose option. That is good news. 

But, Congress being Congress, there is a lot of inertia, and there 

are some folks who may prefer what is now the worst and more expensive and slower option, which is the one we have been fooling 

with all these years. 

The key thing, politically, is to realize that no one here today is 

talking about taking money away from South Carolina. Because, as 

the Red Team testimony says on page 5 here—let me quote. ‘‘The 

Red Team concluded that the dilute-and-dispose alternative could 

be executed at current annual funding levels,’’ about $400 million 

per year in fiscal year 2015 dollars. 

The real question of this hearing is, if we are forced, due to the 

fact that we are in love with the older, worse, more expensive technology—force American taxpayers to double or triple their commitment to South Carolina and the other parts of the supply chain, I 

think they are okay where they are. You know, $300 million or 

$400 million a year, let’s get the new and better technology, let’s 

dispose of this in the new, more affordable, more reliable, more enlightened way, and let’s kiss the old technology goodbye. Because 

we simply cannot afford to double or triple the commitment. 

So I have the utmost respect for my friends from South Carolina, 

all of them. The delegation is awesome. Mr. Wilson is particularly 

awesome. He does a great job supporting his constituents. But $300 

million or $400 million a year is enough, on top of the $12 billion 

that various government agencies—DOE, DOD [Department of Defense]—are already spending in direct support to South Carolina. 

So if you look at it on a chart—and we have a chart of this, if 

my colleagues would be interested—the MOX money is almost insignificant. But do they have a right to force that MOX money to 

go up to double or triple? I just don’t think so. We are doing enough 

already. The MOX money is the little dark part on the very top 

there. You see it is a rising slope. 

So why can’t we just maintain current funding levels, maintain 

current employment levels, maintain current job levels, but get the 

technology right as we dispose of this plutonium? That should do 

no injury to our friends in South Carolina. That should preserve 

our nonproliferation goals. That should help us prevent this terrible squeeze on the DOD/DOE nuclear budget. Because we don’t 

know where the funding is going to come from. 

I believe, General Klotz, didn’t you say the funding is insufficient 

to continue the MOX facility? Didn’t you use the word, adjective, 

‘‘insufficient’’? 

General KLOTZ. If I could quote my boss, the Secretary of Energy, it is less than optimal for completing the project. 

Mr. COOPER. Well, I love euphemisms. 

So, again, the question is whether we embrace this new and better approach, this more affordable, more reliable approach that is 

at the same cost—no one is talking about taking away money from 

South Carolina or from Savannah River or anything like that. The 
11 

only real question for this committee is whether we force ourselves 

and the American taxpayer to double or triple that commitment by 

sticking with this old, largely outmoded technology. 

So I would urge my committee members to put it in that light. 

We are not hurting anybody here. We are just trying to choose the 

better technology to achieve our national security goals. 

Mr. MacWilliams. 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Thank you, sir. A couple points. 

We absolutely agree with the comments you made about Savannah River. General Klotz and I and the Secretary have made repeated trips to Savannah River, and the Department very strongly 

believes that Savannah River is not a closure site. We want to see 

it have a long and prosperous future. And we are very open to work 

with Congress and to look for new mission, to expand existing infrastructure, to look at things like creating a strategic plan, overall 

strategic plan, for the site; finding investment to expand the mission of the lab, which has done truly extraordinary work for the 

country in the last couple of years. So, certainly, on that point. 

With respect to the costs, the Secretary has said numerous times 

that MOX, you know, will accomplish the mission technically. And 

so, if money were not an issue, MOX would be a straightforward 

way to go. But, unfortunately, as you have indicated, it is an issue. 

One can look at different assumptions. I am happy to get into 

and explain any of those different assumptions. But whether it is 

Dr. Mason’s group talking about $700 million to $800 million in 

unescalated dollars or whether it is the number that the Secretary 

and the Department has used recently, that essentially we believe 

it is about a billion dollars each year for the lifecycle of the project. 

Because we used inflation, which I believe Aerospace also used, 

using the Engineering News-Record, which goes back to 1915, so it 

was a 40-year construction average, which uses about 4.2 percent 

inflation—but one can differ on inflation assumptions, which I believe is why Dr. Mason chose not to inflate. 

But, essentially, a billion dollars a year to get this done, it just 

doesn’t seem to be within the scope of what is practical. Whereas 

the dilution-and-disposal approach, we believe, would take about 

$400 million a year, and we would agree with Dr. Mason’s report 

that there may be opportunities to lower that. 

General KLOTZ. Mr. Cooper, if I could, let me just add to what 

Mr. MacWilliams said about the importance of Savannah River in 

South Carolina to us. 

Looking at it strictly from the NNSA perspective, Savannah 

River is the site of where we do most of our tritium operations, 

which is one of the most important commodities that we have to 

deal with within the weapons program of the NNSA. 

In addition, other aspects of Savannah River and South Carolina 

are extraordinarily important to our nonproliferation mission. L 

Basin, K Area, H Canyon are extraordinarily important in carrying 

out efforts that we undertake across the globe to reduce materials 

that might be attractive to terrorists or would-be proliferators. 

So we are in it for the long haul with Savannah River. And I 

agree with Mr. MacWilliams and the Secretary that there are a lot 

of neat and interesting and worthy things that we would love to 
12 

be doing at Savannah River over not just the short term but the 

long-term future. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, General. 

And, to reiterate, this hearing should be good news for America 

and good news for South Carolina. We can do both at current funding levels, but not if we double or triple it. So let’s keep it where 

it is. 

Thanks. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes Chairman Forbes for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I want to thank you for 

your unbiased and analytical approach to this issue and so many 

more that come before this subcommittee. 

I thank Mr. Cooper for his persistence and passion on this issue, 

and just acknowledge that what seems to some as inertia may be 

to others due diligence. And I think the goal of everyone on this 

subcommittee and on this full committee is to get it right. But 

many of us also heard voices coming over here telling us that reducing our military significantly over the last several years was the 

right thing to do. When they look at the world today, they realize 

they were dramatically wrong on that. So we want to get it right. 

And, Dr. Mason, the question I would ask for you is kind of following up on what the chairman asked, but in the Red Team report 

you state that the WIPP capacity limits and the PDMA compliance 

are not viewed as insurmountable. Who did the Red Team consult 

with at the State Department and in New Mexico State government to come to this conclusion? 

Dr. MASON. With the State Department, it was Ambassador 

Guhin, who has had responsibility for the agreement, who briefed 

us. And, as I mentioned, we also spoke with Sig Hecker, who had 

a lot of early experience interacting with the Russians in some of 

the discussions leading up to the agreement. 

And, you know, the takeaways from those discussions were that, 

you know, first off, as I noted, there has been modification to the 

agreement in the past to accommodate what you might characterize as Russian national interest with their desire to proceed 

with the fast reactor program. And so it is not unreasonable, if the 

decision were made to proceed down a different pathway in the 

U.S. national interest, to propose that. 

However, according to Ambassador Guhin, the Russians were not 

interested in negotiating a hypothetical. They were aware that 

there were discussions going on about possible—— 

Mr. FORBES. And I don’t want to cut you off because I would love 

for you to have time. I just have 3 minutes. 

So, basically, you talked to two people? 

Dr. MASON. Well, of course, in addition to relying on the expertise on the Red Team, that is correct. 

Mr. FORBES. Yeah, but the Red Team was consulting with two 

people with the State Department. 

How about the New Mexico State government? 

Dr. MASON. With New Mexico, our primary interactions were at 

WIPP with the contractors and Federal officials on the site who 

have been the ones dealing with the State. 
13 

Mr. FORBES. So you were talking to the contractors there that 

would be doing—— 

Dr. MASON. And to the DOE officials who were responsible for 

the negotiations that are ongoing at the moment in terms of WIPP 

restart, yes. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. So, then, basically, your report suggesting 

this was not viewed as insurmountable was two people at the State 

Department and the contractors and the people at Department of 

Energy and New Mexico State government. 

Let me move on to a second question the chairman raised to you. 

How can you be confident that using a downblending option at the 

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico will only cost $400 million annually, given its capacity limits and with it currently being 

closed? 

Dr. MASON. Well, as I noted, the likely timeline for being ready 

to initiate shipments to WIPP is 5 years down the road, which allows sufficient time for the current plans for restart and resumption of full-scale activities to unfold. So, from that point of view, the 

current restart schedule does not interfere with the likely timeline 

for dilute-and-dispose. 

In terms of the capacity limits, there are a number of options. 

At the current mechanism for disposal, using the 10 percent dilution that was demonstrated for the Rocky Flats material, there is 

not sufficient capacity at WIPP to accommodate all 34 metric tons 

based on the calculations of the needs for the EM program. 

However, there are a couple of options for addressing that prior 

to even consideration of whether or not there is any need to modify 

the Land Withdrawal Act, which defines that limit. Those options 

include some things that are within the purview of the Department, in terms of making more efficient use of the resource by 

packing containers more fully. And some of the options would require negotiation with the State of New Mexico, in terms of the 

methodology for calculating the volume of waste that is in place 

and—— 

Mr. FORBES. And my time is about—I have 20 seconds left. But 

if you could, for the record, just submit to us, if you would, the 

analysis that you did to make sure those options could actually be 

done, instead of just recognizing there are potential options. We always have a lot of options. 

Dr. MASON. Sure. 

Mr. FORBES. We need to run down to make sure that we actually 

can do them and what the analysis that went behind them to do. 

And, again, just talking to a couple people, we need a little bit 

more than that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 67.] 

Mr. FORBES. So thanks, Dr. Mason. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. 

Aguilar, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. AGUILAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 
14 

Director Mason, if you could just expand a little bit on that. In 

your testimony, you mentioned that 75 percent of the money, under 

the dilute-and-dispose option, the WIPP option, 75 percent of the 

money appropriated over the next 3 years would go toward the 

MOX facility, while the rest would go toward WIPP prep. You have 

also mentioned a 5-year window, a 5-year transition and termination. 

So can you kind of walk me through the difference between the 

3- and 5-year window? 

Dr. MASON. Sure. 

The 5 years is how long we would estimate it would take to be 

ready to make a shipment to WIPP. And part of the reason for that 

is, for the first 3 years of that period, a substantial fraction of the 

funds would be required to, in an orderly and responsible way, 

close out the activities at the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility. 

So that would decline over the 3 years, and you would use the 

funds that were made available then to begin ramping up the activities towards WIPP emplacement, which would then occur, you 

know, at the end of the 5 years. 

Mr. AGUILAR. Conversely, then, 75 percent of the allocation 

would go toward ramping down—— 

Dr. MASON. Yes. 

Mr. AGUILAR [continuing]. The existing operation. Can you talk 

a little bit about, you know, what goes into that cost structure and 

why that is? 

Dr. MASON. Sure. And recognize this is a rough estimate based 

on termination costs associated with other large capital projects. 

And, obviously, it would be the subject of a negotiation, but it is 

our best estimate. 

Some of the cost is just associated with the fact that you would 

want to leave the project in an appropriate physical condition, prevent egress of water and so forth, so that the asset there would be 

preserved. We did not consider possible alternative uses for the facility, but, obviously, you would want to leave the facility in a state 

where the investment that has been made in a, you know, seismically qualified, high-security facility would be preserved in the 

event that an alternative use was identified. So that involves some 

physical work, to put the facility in that state, since it is open to 

the environment now to allow access for construction purposes. 

There would also be termination costs associated with the various contractual requirements for procurement of equipment and 

construction. Those all have to be negotiated. And you have to continue to pay project staff during the time period that you are going 

through that process. 

So that would be the rough mix of things, should the decision be 

made to pursue that. 

Mr. AGUILAR. I guess that kind of leads into the—my next question would be, you also discussed the worst-case scenario in your 

testimony, and you mentioned that the worst-case scenario from 

the WIPP side—the costs associated are better than the best-case 

scenario for MOX. 

So can you walk us through what some of the complications 

could be? I am hearing you say that those negotiations to, kind of, 
15 

ramp down, that could be a potential variable within the winddown cost structure. 

Dr. MASON. Yeah, there is obviously uncertainty associated with 

the termination costs. The other sorts of risks that we considered 

in looking at that is, as we have seen, you know, the existing facilities that would be used, you know, can be subject to perturbations 

in their operations. PF4, for example, which would be used for disassembling the pits, is coming out of a process where it has been 

down for a period of time. And, obviously, over a multi-decade operating activity, that sort of thing can interrupt the operation and extend the duration. 

And there are some capital investments needed in order to optimize the throughput on the dilute-and-dispose. And, obviously, 

those are projects that have associated with them risks and contingencies. Kind of ballpark estimate for adding the additional lines 

to K Area is around $200 million, but that is a preconceptual number, so it could increase. 

And then there are the standard uncertainties associated with 

the fact that there will be escalation of salaries and everything else 

over the operating life. Those are hard to estimate over that long 

period of time. And, you know, obviously, from year to year, you 

can have budget fluctuations that you have to adapt to in your 

schedule, and those can translate into project risks in terms of cost 

and duration. 

Mr. AGUILAR. I appreciate you walking me through this. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Coffman for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

My questions are to the cost overruns on the construction of the 

MOX facility, in that, originally, in 2002, cost estimates to build 

the MOX facility were $1 billion; by 2007, when construction 

began, the cost estimate rose to $4.8 billion; and, in 2014, the total 

design and construction costs rose to $7.8 billion. 

I just had an issue back home with the building of a veterans 

hospital that was dramatically over budget. And the VA [Department of Veterans Affairs], clearly, is not a construction management entity, and they demonstrated that on this project. The Army 

Corps of Engineers has since taken over this project, a project that 

started out at $600 million that wound up to, I think, almost $1.7 

billion. 

And part of the legislation to fully fund the hospital was to strip 

the Veterans Administration of their construction management authority for any project in excess of $100 million and give that to 

entities like the Army Corps of Engineers who do it for a living. 

It is their day job; it is their focus. 

And I want to know—I think I heard something, projects over 

$750 million. That seems like an awfully high number to me. Could 

you comment on that further? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Yes, sir. I did say that the GAO had removed 

us from the high-risk list for projects of that size. And you are correct, that is a large number. 

Essentially, as I came in and started to look at our project performance, to say it has been challenging would be overly polite, ac-
16 

tually. And I would be happy to discuss some of the reasons behind 

these overruns, if that would be helpful to you, sir. 

But what I was referring to is that, subsequent to NNSA putting 

in their Office of Acquisition and Project Management 3 years ago, 

which was designed to deal with some of these problems, their performance on their smaller projects, the rest of their portfolio, has 

been quite good. 

Mr. COFFMAN. How do you define smaller projects? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. The $800 million, below 750. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Oof. That—okay. 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. No, and so the—you are correct, sir, that 

when you look at where the money is in these projects—and this 

is the problem that we face, and we face this across the Department—— 

Mr. COFFMAN. Right. 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS [continuing]. That if you look at where the 

money is in these four or five large projects, they are historical 

projects, and we do have problems. And I can get into the reasons 

if you—— 

Mr. COFFMAN. There are entities in the Federal Government, 

whether GSA [General Services Administration], whether NAVFAC 

[Naval Facilities Engineering Command], whether the USAC or the 

Army Corps of Engineers, that they are professionals. I mean, this 

is what they do. And there are agencies, like the VA, who have just 

lost this construction management authority, and agencies, you 

know, like the DOE, that choose to go out on their own. And I 

think it is the taxpayers that suffer for this. 

And I really think that—I wish agencies in the Federal Government would focus on what their core mission is and not venture out 

to areas that they have redundant, inefficient capability on. 

I wonder if you could respond to that. 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Yes, sir. And I would point out that, as we 

began to look, when we started looking at this a couple years ago, 

this project, one of the first things we did was bring the Army 

Corps of Engineers in to look at estimates of the MOX Fabrication 

Facility construction cost. At the time—this was almost 2 years 

ago, and it was a preliminary analysis—they concluded that they 

felt the MOX Fabrication Facility would cost $10 billion at that 

point. There has been underfunding for 2 years, so I am sure that 

if they were to look at it again it would be higher than that. 

But you are raising a very legitimate point, given the history of 

the Department. The reason that we put in very substantial project 

management changes is because of these problems. I will just point 

out one, not to take away from your point, the value of your point, 

sir, is that NNSA, for example—immature design is one of the biggest problems we face—— 

Mr. COFFMAN. And let me—— 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Okay. 

Mr. COFFMAN. The Army Corps of Engineers was not brought in 

at the beginning. Am—— 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. No, sir. 

Mr. COFFMAN [continuing]. I correct? So, yeah, of course, they are 

pricing the mismanagement that has already been done on the 

project into that figure. 
17 

Go ahead, please. 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. No, I was just going to make one point, and 

then we can get into others as you wish. 

The immature design, so we get into design-build-design, is a 

huge problem. And so, actually, NNSA now has a rule that is mandated that we will not get into nuclear projects unless we have 90 

percent design complete. So I recognize that is only one point, but 

that is to address one of the biggest issues that we have had. 

Mr. COFFMAN. It is just unnecessary and inefficient to have these 

redundant abilities created in every department of the Federal 

Government. It is unnecessary. There are elements in the Federal 

Government that do this for a living. 

And I hear the same thing in the VA, when we were going 

through this process, about how they were going to get better, 

about how they were working through it. And if we look back at 

the VA historically, you will find throughout the decades they made 

the same commitments and never delivered. And, again, it is just— 

it is a waste of taxpayer dollars to have this redundant capability, 

and it needs to go away. 

And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. 

Garamendi, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. 

First, a quick question: AREVA has claimed that construction is 

nearly 70 percent complete. Do you agree? And how much work 

would have to be redone to move into this dilute process? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Thank you, sir, for the question. 

We don’t agree. And the reason we don’t agree is that we are required to look at cost to complete. So—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. How much would have to be redone if you are 

going to this other dilute process? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Well, we are at 35 to 41 percent. That is 

where we are, sir. And if you are referring to rework, sir, currently, 

the contractor is running at a rate of 25 percent rework. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. Wanted to get that on the record. 

Russia is using a fast reactor system. Is that correct? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. How far along are they on their process? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. The BN–800 is nearing operations as we 

speak, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I see. 

All right. What is the U.K. doing in its disposition of plutonium? 

Dr. MASON. Actually, one reason that we included on our team 

some representatives from the U.K. is because they are also going 

through a process of trying to analyze their options for dealing with 

a considerable quantity of civil plutonium, 120 tons. At the moment—or, actually, it may be 140. I correct myself. 

At the moment, their current plans have not been fully finalized. 

They are considering a MOX option for a portion of that inventory, 

although there is some that will be unsuitable for MOX due to its 

chemical composition. But they are also pursuing R&D [research 

and development] into geological disposition pathways in parallel. 

They are not as far along in terms of their decision process, but—— 
18 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Are they considering a fast reactor? 

Dr. MASON. Not to my knowledge, no. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. The analysis here indicates that an American 

fast reactor doesn’t exist. Is that correct? It doesn’t exist for this 

purpose. 

Dr. MASON. In fact, there isn’t an operating fast reactor in the 

U.S. The last facility, the Fast Flux Test Reactor at Hanford, was 

shut down—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Is that the integral fast reactor? 

Dr. MASON. The FFTF, no, it is a different facility. We have not 

operated one for a number of years. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Did we have an integral fast reactor operating 

in the United States? 

Dr. MASON. Idaho has in the past operated fast breeder reactors 

but not for a number of years. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So we actually had the technology. Is that technology in existence today? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Arguably, the technology was developed in 

the U.S. originally—actually, as was most of the technology behind 

the MOX option. However, we are not currently aggressively pursuing other possible reactor technologies in general. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Does GE [General Electric] have the license for 

the integral fast reactor? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. We will have to check that. I don’t want to 

make something up—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. It does. 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS [continuing]. On the fly. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. It does. I am surprised you don’t know. 

In fact, I am not at all surprised. I guess I should not be surprised because the Department seems to have dismissed the fast 

reactor as an option and moved on to study the MOX and the 

downblend-and-dispose option. Is that correct? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Actually, sir, when we did our 2014 study as 

part of that, we did a very actually comprehensive study, NE [Office of Nuclear Energy] did, on the fast reactor. Because, as the 

Russians are showing, a fast reactor would accomplish the mission. 

The issue became that it would be a new start. The cost estimate 

was approximately $50 billion, and it would take many, many 

years with complexity. 

But it was looked at. We have a study which I think—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Is Russia willing to sell its fast reactor to us? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. I can’t answer that. I haven’t asked them 

that. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well, apparently they have one. Apparently 

they are using it for the very same purpose that we would use this. 

And you didn’t bother asking Russia or didn’t bother looking at 

their technology. Is that correct? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. To my knowledge, we have not asked Russia 

whether—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Why? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS [continuing]. We could buy a reactor. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Why? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. I don’t have an answer for that, sir. 

Dr. MASON. I could comment if I—— 
19 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I find that unacceptable. But, please, tell me 

why, since there is a technology available, a fast reactor available 

in Russia—you cited the name of it—why didn’t you look at that 

as an option? Any of the three of you. 

Dr. MASON. I can comment on the Red Team. We did consider 

the fast reactor option in our analysis—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Did you consider the Russian fast reactor? 

Dr. MASON. Our consideration was not a specific fast reactor design—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. 

Dr. MASON [continuing]. So it was—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. General, did you consider it? 

General KLOTZ. No, I did not. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Why not? 

General KLOTZ. I wasn’t part of this review, and the NNSA 

doesn’t build reactors. That is another part of the Department of 

Energy. But what I understand—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I find it incomprehensible. We are looking at 

tens of billions of dollars here. And we know that there exists in 

Russia a fast reactor that is operating or will very soon be operating to dispose of plutonium. And the brilliant scientists and generals didn’t bother to ask if maybe the Russian reactor or something similar to it could be used to this purpose? Is that correct? 

Mr. ROGERS. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina, 

Mr. Wilson, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Ranking 

Member Cooper, for your leadership. 

And I am grateful to be here with NNSA, with DOE, with National Labs. I have a unique perspective of your professionalism. I 

am the only Member of Congress who has actually worked at the 

Savannah River Site and worked at DOE, and so I know the professionalism of the people that you work with. 

In fact, it is my humble opinion that an indication of your success has been the level of completion of the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility. Indeed, it has been completed 67.3 percent. We 

have 160,000 cubic yards of structural concrete in place. I remember the first time I visited, it looked like a forest of rebar. And so 

I have seen it come to life. And the thought of creating a facility 

that can take weapons-grade plutonium and convert it into fuel, I 

sincerely hope that we can proceed. 

And, further, 19 of 31 of the modules are installed in the pipe 

gallery. We have the gloveboxes received in place. Over and over 

again, there actually has been, I believe, tremendous success and 

achievement. 

And, with that in mind, too, General Klotz, the State of South 

Carolina, I feel like, is—I am concerned about South Carolina. This 

is, of course, adjacent to our beloved Georgia, Peach State. And so 

this is a concern of both States, that the agreement of our State 

was to accept the highly radioactive weapons-grade plutonium and 

to process it and move it out. And it is a concern for the people that 

I represent. That is the greatest concern that we have. 

With that in mind, what has been proposed is to use the Waste 

Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico. But, General Klotz, is the 
20 

commitment still to South Carolina, to the people of our State, 

Georgia, our neighbors, that indeed this weapons-grade plutonium 

will be removed from our presence? 

General KLOTZ. Yes, Congressman, it most definitely is. And, of 

course, one of the questions becomes, you know, which pathway 

will get there sooner and quicker. 

Mr. WILSON. But, gosh, to convert weapons-grade plutonium into 

fuel as opposed to some inert storage facility that—and that goes 

to WIPP itself. 

And another person who has an extraordinary clarity on this 

issue is Bill Richardson, the former Governor of New Mexico, 

former Secretary of Energy. And in the Aiken Standard newspaper 

on August 21st, he had a letter, which was printed, to Senator 

Harry Reid saying, quote, ‘‘As a former Secretary of Energy and 

Governor of New Mexico, I can assure you that WIPP in our lifetimes has the same chance of accepting weapons-grade plutonium 

that Yucca Mountain has for accepting spent nuclear fuel. It is selfdeluding to claim otherwise.’’ 

Is the Secretary correct or not? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Well, we have great respect for the Secretary 

and his service to the country. He may have forgotten that there 

is already 4.8 metric tons of plutonium that has been delivered in 

exactly this format into WIPP. 

Mr. WILSON. But we also know, too, as we are talking about this 

technology, the MOX facility that currently exists in France. And 

so, as we were talking about the technology, it has been proven, 

and it will work. 

With that in mind, at the WIPP site, there was an incident 

where there was airborne radiation particles in February 2014 at 

the WIPP site. It has certainly, General, been placed in a closed 

facility. Is it currently open or not? 

General KLOTZ. It is not currently operational. The expectation 

is by sometime during next year, the year 2016, it will be up and 

operational again. 

This is a very, very important site to the Department of Energy, 

to the Nation, because it is where we can store transuranic waste. 

And so the Secretary and the entire Department are seized with 

the importance of returning WIPP to full operation as soon as we 

possibly can. 

Mr. WILSON. And so you indicated it will be open within the next 

2 years? 

General KLOTZ. By the end of 2016. 

Mr. WILSON. And, as I conclude, I appreciate your service, but I 

can’t wait to invite my colleagues to visit the mixed oxide fuel facility, MOX facility. It is adjacent to the Augusta National Golf 

Course, Sage Valley Golf Course. It is a world-class place. I want 

John Garamendi to be there and see it. 

So thank you very much. 

General KLOTZ. Well, I can attest, Congressman, you give a great 

tour through the facility. 

Mr. ROGERS. The gentleman’s time has expired. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Norcross for 5 minutes. 
21 

Mr. NORCROSS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and certainly Ranking 

Member Cooper, for allowing me to sit in. 

Having spent the better part of my life in the industry, I hear 

much of the testimony, and it is not unique to this project, but the 

MOX facility, when it first started to put a shovel in the ground, 

how much of the project was design-finished? What percentage? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Sir, obviously, I wasn’t there, but from my 

understanding, it was about 20 to 25 percent design-incomplete, 

which is obviously a significant problem. 

Mr. NORCROSS. So the original cost estimates were based on a 20 

percent completed design. 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Somewhere between 20, 25, yes, sir. 

Mr. NORCROSS. We usually call that throwing darts in the night 

and hoping you hit a bull’s-eye. So the original premise here was 

horrible at least. 

How far along—you said it was 90 percent design-completed. 

Now, from when it actually started, how many design changes took 

place in that time? What I am trying to ascertain here is the incremental increases and why they occurred. 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Sure. I can’t give you the exact number, 

though I will take it for the record and get you—— 

Mr. NORCROSS. Round numbers. 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS [continuing]. The exact number, but the issue 

that you are referring to is exactly on point, which is it is this design-build-design problem. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 70.] 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS This project was originally based on, as Congressman Wilson mentioned, some French designs. The problem is 

that this is a weapon-grade plutonium, and the French design is 

civil plutonium. And there are a number of complexities, including 

NRC licensing and other things, robotics, the way we approach 

safety in this country. And so the complexities of the design were 

not properly appreciated, in addition to the regulatory costs, and 

that is one of the major issues. 

But the issue that you are focusing on was one of the first issues 

that we focused on when we put together our review, which is why 

the NNSA now requires 90 percent design-complete before it will 

go forward. 

Mr. NORCROSS. And we understand, we want to get things completed very quickly. Just start and we’ll figure it out—— 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. That is what happened. 

Mr. NORCROSS [continuing]. Which is the most expensive way to 

ever do a project. 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. NORCROSS. So let’s move on, the same if we go to WIPP. Is 

that 100 percent designed, the type of facility we would build? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. WIPP, first of all, was used in our study, in 

the 2014 study, as a reference case. And the reason it was a reference case is it was the only existing repository that could accept 

defense true waste. And, as I mentioned, 4.8 metric tons of this 

plutonium using dilute-and-dispose has been shipped there, including a small amount from Savannah River. 
22 

So the process is proven. Dr. Mason could speak in more technical terms about the technical risk there, if you wish, but it is a 

proven process that we have been using. In fact, until the incident 

that was referred to at WIPP, plutonium was scheduled to be continued to be shipped. 

Mr. NORCROSS. So when we look at that—and the agreement is 

with Russia. And it was mentioned earlier. What makes us think 

that they will agree to this change? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. The—and General Klotz can speak to this. 

We did have, in addition to what Dr. Mason said, we did, about 

a year ago, have a DOE-State Department team go over and talk 

with the Russians. And, basically, the message—it was a good conversation, because the agreement, as I think we are all aware, provides disposition by reactor or other methods as agreed to by the 

parties, which is what the Russians availed themselves of in 2010. 

So the team went over, had the conversation. And, basically, the 

message that came back was the Russians were willing to have a 

conversation, but they said you need to figure out what direction 

you want to go in, then come back, and we will have a conversation. 

But I think General Klotz also can give you some firsthand—— 

General KLOTZ. No, I think Mr. MacWilliams, sir, has given a 

very fair rendition of the response we have gotten from technical 

people on the Russian side. 

As recently as a couple weeks ago, Secretary Moniz raised it in 

conversation with Mr. Sergey Kiriyenko, who is the head of 

Rosatom in Russia, and, basically, it was the same response. You 

know, we recognize that you acceded to our desire to amend the 

agreement in 2010 to allow for the approach which the Russians 

are now pursuing; when you have a plan, come back to us, and we 

will sit down and negotiate. 

But, also, I think as Dr. Mason laid out, there are a lot—I have 

spent most of my lifetime in negotiations with the Soviet Union 

and Russia. There are a lot of other political, economic, strategic 

variables that get injected into any discussion with them on any 

issue in this area. 

Mr. NORCROSS. Well, you certainly said a mouthful there, because you are suggesting that the Russians are going to be reasonable. And I guess we all hope that, but, certainly, that is a large 

mountain to climb. 

I yield back my time. Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes Dr. Wenstrup for 5 minutes. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MacWilliams, thank you for being here today. I know we 

have had some of these discussions before that I would like to talk 

about today. 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Yes, sir. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. And I know you understand that I am frustrated 

with DOE’s recent decision to demobilize the uranium enrichment 

D&D [decontamination and decommissioning] project in Piketon, 

Ohio. And I think it is incredibly shortsighted to do this, especially 

in light of the Iran deal, where we are seeing that the world’s larg-
23 

est sponsor of state terrorism is now maintaining 6,000 centrifuges 

and continue to enrich uranium. 

DOE’s decision to demobilize this project was based on data that 

was collected for a report that DOE was mandated by Congress to 

complete in April and which we received Monday night. 

And my question is, if the United States must have the technology for a fully domestic source of enriched uranium to support 

our nuclear Navy, what is DOE’s long-term plan to ensure that we 

do not lose the research and the workforce gains that were made 

in Piketon, Ohio, while also maintaining immediate production capabilities for a domestic source of enriched uranium? 

It seems like we are diving into a black hole, shutting things 

down when they are spinning things up. And for our national security interest, we need to keep this maintained and ready to run. 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Thank you, sir. And I want to answer that. 

I also wanted to say in a related subject that we have been discussing that, per conversations that we had with you this week, we 

have been working to finalize our plan for spending under the CR 

[continuing resolution], pursuant to direction from the Secretary. 

We will be giving updated funding guidance and direction to FBP 

[Flour-BWXT Portsmouth], the contractor, today to spend at a 

higher level to avoid involuntary layoffs for D&D [decommissioning 

and demolition] activities at Portsmouth, which I recognize is separate, sir. And so the contractor is going to issue a notice to employees later today. 

To go to your exact question, sir, as we talked about last week, 

the first important point here is these potential layoffs are clearly 

regrettable, but the administration remains committed to reestablishing a domestic enrichment capability—— 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Okay. My question, though, originally—and I appreciate that—— 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Yeah. 

Dr. WENSTRUP [continuing]. Is we are going to have a time 

down—— 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Yes, sir. 

Dr. WENSTRUP [continuing]. Where we do not have this capability 

up and running, and that is my concern. 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Yeah. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. The other thing is, when I spoke to Secretary 

Moniz last night, I said, do you have an estimate of what the cost 

is to shut down the ACP [American Centrifuge Project], this 

project? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Yeah. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. And he said, ‘‘No, I don’t know. Let me get back 

to you.’’ Now, to me, that is a huge component to the equation. 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Sure. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. If it cost a billion dollars to shut it down—— 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. No, it does not. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. I am just throwing this out as an example. 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Yeah. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. But you don’t know. He didn’t know—and it cost 

$350 million, say, to maintain it for 7 years, and we are able to flip 

a switch and produce what we need to protect our country at a moment’s notice—— 
24 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Right. 

Dr. WENSTRUP [continuing]. Then that is the wise business decision. 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Right. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. He didn’t even know. 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Okay. Well, I can—— 

Dr. WENSTRUP. So I am very concerned about that. You are making decisions on a report we were supposed to have in April that 

we didn’t get—— 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Yes, sir. 

Dr. WENSTRUP [continuing]. And didn’t get a chance to weigh in, 

and you don’t even know what these costs are, and you are making 

a decision. And I just—I am sorry, I find that really irresponsible 

and a threat to our national security capabilities. 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. So, sir, as we discussed, what we are talking 

about doing is having to stand down 120 test centrifuges. We do 

not have a capability—those centrifuges don’t have a capability 

today to provide us the material that we need. But the cost that you are referring to is approximately $100 mil- lion to $150 million. Under our agreements with Centrus, they 

have obligations to pick up a very large portion of that, obviously 

provided they have the financial means to do that. That is the answer. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. So let me ask you this. So when it comes to, say, 

tritium, I mean, you say that the AC–100 design, that technology 

is as good as we can have right now, right? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Yes, sir. That is the technology that we plan 

to use. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Okay. And the report indicates that building out 

a national security plan based on that technology would require 

1,400 centrifuges. 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Yes, sir. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. So how can we meet our tritium needs and build 

out these 1,400 centrifuges if we are dismantling the 120 that we 

have? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Because the 120 that we have, the purpose 

of those was to continue to prove out the technology, and they have 

essentially neared the end of their useful life. They would not be 

centrifuges that we would add into the 1,400 for a variety of reasons. 

So what we are doing immediately, because we are not standing 

down—this is important to say this, that we are continuing with 

the program, we are not putting a cold standby. We are issuing— 

we will issue a RFI [request for information] to build out. The 

issue, however, sir, is that it is going to take 5 to 7 years to reestablish that capability, but we are starting that now. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. What is our capability, when this plan is played 

out, on a moment’s notice to produce enriched uranium that we 

may need based on whatever may happen in the—— 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. That capability does not exist today. It does 

not exist today. It will take us 5 to 7 years to reestablish, but the 

standing down of the 120 centrifuges does not affect that. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. You say that they are at the end, but they are 

the only thing that we have. 
25 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. But they are not—they are running on—they 

are not producing material for this purpose. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. But they could. 

My time has expired. Thank you. 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. 

Fortenberry, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for accommodating my interest in sitting on the committee. And I thank the 

members of the committee for your consent in allowing me to testify before you today and ask you questions. 

I am Jeff Fortenberry from Nebraska. I am on the Appropriations Committee and the Energy and Water Subcommittee, so we 

see this issue, as well. And, frankly, if I could be just right up front 

with you, this conversation would be very boring if it wasn’t so essential, because we keep talking about the same things over and 

over again. 

And it has been repeated today, but I want to go back through 

the numbers. In 2002, the initial cost estimate was $1 billion; 2007, 

it is now $4.8 billion; today, it is estimated to be $7.8 billion. 

So every year we go through this debate. This year, the Appropriations Committee allocated and the committee marked $345 million, which is not enough to build it out, not enough to close it 

down. So we are kind of saying, sort of, maybe, we will continue 

to think about it, if it is possible in the time that we have while 

we are serving, but then somebody else might have to deal with it 

later. We will punt. 

You are doing that, we are doing that, everybody is doing that. 

So a decision has to be made whether or not this is a viable project 

or whether the alternatives are real enough to continue an alternative, to pursue an alternative pathway. 

From my perspective, this is a fragile program with a very unclear future. And the alternatives that have been laid out, they are 

a responsible way to look at the diversion of limited public resources to deal with a very significant problem. 

Now, I was very interested in the line of questioning that Mr. 

Garamendi, who is gone now, was asking about, alternative disposal through fast reactors. 

But, first, let me ask you this. How much funding has been spent 

to date on the MOX facility and its related programs and infrastructure? We have various numbers floating out there, so could 

you give us your number? 

And then what percentage of completion are we in regarding the 

facility? What percent complete are we in? And do you and the contractors agree on these figures? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Thank you, sir. 

The amount of funding on the MOX facility itself, through July, 

was about $4.8 billion. When you add in the rest of the program, 

you are north of $6 billion because that adds in the Waste Solidification Building, which is essentially complete, and some of the 

other program—— 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. So, totally completed, the cost would be what? 
26 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Totally, for the whole lifecycle—for the whole 

program? 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. However you define it. 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Yeah. Well, it is important that we look at 

the whole program, not just the MOX Project. There are various estimates. Our number was north of $30 billion, but estimates range 

as high as $50 billion. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Okay. So appropriating $345 million a year, 

what does that buy? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Nothing. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. How could that money be better used? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. $400 million—well, I think we agree with the 

Red Team’s conclusions, essentially. And General Klotz—— 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Now, by the way, during the appropriations 

debate, I offered an amendment to reduce the program by a very 

small amount, simply to divert the money to other nonproliferation 

programs, more so as a statement to begin to try to have a reasoned debate about the quality of this investment. 

And I really did appreciate, frankly, up front, the conversation 

about how you successfully—if we went another direction—successfully transition this commitment to the South Carolina-Georgia 

community in other ways. And I think that is very important. But 

I think we have to look at the mission of this particular policy and 

whether or not it is feasible. 

General KLOTZ. I agree. And, as I said at the outset, you know, 

from looking at it from the perspective of NNSA and the whole 

range of portfolio that we have that includes a rather large weapons program as well as nonproliferation, emergency response, and 

counterterrorism, it is a question of, in a constrained budget, you 

know, how can you afford to cover the many tasks which the administration and the Congress have asked us to do. 

So if we can achieve the disposition of 34 metric tons of excess 

weapons-grade plutonium through a less costly way than the path 

that we are currently embarked upon, then that is why this is of 

such interest to—— 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Can I ask one other question? Who has the 

prime contract for building the facility? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. CB&I Shaw. And then AREVA is also involved. It is MOX Services, which is a joint venture between both 

companies. AREVA, going forward, if we built the project, would 

handle the marketing as well. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. AREVA is a French company? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. And they purchased Shaw or have partnered 

with Shaw? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. No, no, they are a separate company. They 

have a joint venture, which they call MOX Services. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. But it is my understanding AREVA took over 

some major component recently. Is that correct? Changed the nature of the agreement in relation to—— 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Well, AREVA has had some reorganization in 

other areas. They have had some financial issues, and so they have 

had reorganization—— 
27 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. How much of the $345 million goes to a 

French company? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. I can’t answer that, sir. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes the vice chairman of the committee, 

Mr. Lamborn, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I know we have touched on this some already, but let me get into 

a little more detail, because this is so important. 

And, Dr. Mason, I would like to direct a few questions to you. 

About the PMDA, the Plutonium Management and Disposition 

Agreement, with Russia, depending on who you talk to, it seems 

like you get different answers about whether it is even possible to 

renegotiate that or how difficult it might be. Can you elaborate on 

that, please? 

Dr. MASON. Sure. 

I think the first point that we considered was, did we ourselves 

consider in particular the dilute-and-dispose alternative an acceptable disposition? Because if you can’t convince yourself, you would 

obviously have little chance of convincing the Russians. And so our 

conclusion was that it was an acceptable pathway, in the sense 

that it did put the material beyond use for all practical purposes 

and therefore met the intent of disposition. 

So, having satisfied ourselves on that question, you then have to 

ask, okay, if we have convinced ourselves, what are the prospects 

for reaching an agreement with the Russians? 

As I noted in my remarks, and I think General Klotz has made 

similar remarks, from the point of view of entering into the discussion, we judge that there is a reasonable negotiating position for 

the U.S. based on the fact that, first, as I said, it is an acceptable 

disposition pathway in terms of putting the material beyond use, 

akin to what has been called the spent-fuel standard, which was 

first discussed in a 1994 National Academy study, not identical but 

meeting many of the same kind of characteristics, and the fact that 

there has been prior modification to the agreement to accommodate 

Russian national interests. 

And so the difficulty is, that may all be true and you still might 

not reach a conclusion for reasons that have nothing to do with the 

merits of the argument. That is a little harder for us to judge as 

a technical committee. We are not diplomats, and so, to some extent, we viewed that broader question as one that was a little bit 

beyond our purview and really restricted our analysis to, is this a 

viable technical pathway and is there a good basis for negotiation. 

And, on those two points, we felt that there was reasonable basis 

for negotiation. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Now, for any one of you, then, if there was a renegotiation, would there be any risk to the whole issue of proliferation? 

If you are saying, Dr. Mason, that some of these things were beyond what you felt really comfortable, I would like to know from 

the rest of you, who might be a little more comfortable with that 

question, is proliferation being brought into question? 
28 

General KLOTZ. I think there are—you know, the major concern 

we have with and the reason why we pursue disposing of excess 

weapons-grade plutonium is, if you have no need for it, it is best 

to get rid of it so that it does not fall into the wrong hands, whether that would be would-be proliferators at some point or if it turns 

out to be terrorists who would use special nuclear materials for 

their activities. So that is fundamentally why both sides in this 

agreement have pursued getting rid of this excess weapons-grade 

plutonium. 

At the same time, we have also been getting rid of excess highenriched uranium that is no longer necessary for weapons programs. And, in fact, through a very successful program we have 

with the Russians that is referred to as, you know, Megatons to 

Megawatts, we have actually been burning that uranium in U.S. 

civil nuclear reactors for a number of years for purposes beyond 

which it was originally intended. 

Dr. MASON. I think there is another important point on this 

which has to do with the timing. 

The original agreement had an objective of beginning the process 

by 2018. Our understanding is the Russians are close to that, 

maybe delayed a little bit. But even in, you know, the event that 

they are successful in their current schedule and start their fast reactor, it is highly unlikely that they would begin dispositioning 

their weapons plutonium until the U.S. was dispositioning its. They 

have other sources of plutonium that they would use. So you will 

not begin the disposition in either country until both countries are 

prepared to move. 

So there is a certain urgency in beginning, just because, as General Klotz mentioned, the whole point is to not have it sitting 

around, susceptible to any sort of untoward use. And, obviously, 

you know, the shorter the duration before you get rid of it, the 

greater the reduction in risk. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes himself for a second round of questions. 

General Klotz, the Russians sought an amendment to the PMDA 

with the United States, and the Obama administration signed off 

on it, allowing Russia to use its 34 metric tons of excess plutonium 

in a, quote, ‘‘fast breeder,’’ close quote, reactor. 

Is such a reactor technically capable of producing additional plutonium for Russia? How much plutonium will Russia put into this 

reactor? And has the U.S. been able to gain access to the reactor 

to make sure we know what they are up to? 

General KLOTZ. If I could, Mr. Chairman, not being a nuclear scientist, if I could defer that to Dr. Mason, I think he would probably 

give you a more technically correct and precise answer than I could 

possibly give. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank you. 

Dr. Mason. 

Dr. MASON. I think that the first point on the Russian program 

and the reason that the Russians proposed it is it was their intent 

to build a fast reactor anyway, so, in some sense, there was no additional cost incurred to build a special-purpose facility. 
29 

Of course, that reactor could be fueled on either civil plutonium 

or weapons-grade plutonium. And it is intended, by its design, to 

be a breeder—in other words, to produce more fissile material as 

part of its operation for energy purposes. So, through its operation, 

you will be making more plutonium. 

The modification to the PMDA provides requirements for the operating cycle under which the weapons-grade plutonium is burned 

in order to change the isotopic composition in a way that the plutonium produced in the reactor is not suitable for use in weapons. 

And that is part of the agreement as amended in 2010. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. 

General Klotz, as a rough order-of-magnitude estimate, how 

much did it cost the U.S. to produce the 34 metric tons of plutonium that we are talking about in the PMDA? And what were the 

production costs in dollars, human health, and environmental damage? 

General KLOTZ. I don’t know the cost of how much it cost us to 

produce 34 metric tons. I could take that for the record and will 

give you an estimate of that process, which took place, unfolded 

over years during the cold war period. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 67.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Do you have a—— 

General KLOTZ. No. 

Mr. ROGERS. No rough estimate? 

General KLOTZ. No, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. 

With that, I will yield to the ranking member for any questions 

he may have. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Although this has been a technical and calm hearing so far, I 

think a couple of bits of testimony are truly startling. I, at least, 

was amazed. 

One was the difference in outlook on completion of the MOX facility. The company seems to think it is 67 percent complete. The 

owner, the United States Government, seems to think it is 35 to 

41 percent complete. 

Whoa. The contractor is supposed to be working for us, and we 

see things so differently? Like, whoa. That is a big failure of communication, at the very least. 

Mr. MacWilliams. 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Yes, sir. Well, we do have a longstanding difference with the contractor on this point. 

Let me explain our numbers in a little more detail. 

We are required to look at percentage completion, so cost to complete. So our current estimate is $12 billion to $14 billion for the 

MOX Fabrication Facility. As I mentioned, the Army Corps of Engineers, when they looked at it a couple years ago, were around $10 

billion and up, but that was preliminary, and now there have been 

delays for 2 years. So I can’t speak for them, but I am sure it would 

be a little bit north of that. 

So if we spent $4.8 billion so far, you know, you just do the math and you put that over $12 billion to $14 billion, and you get the 

range that I gave you of 35 to 41 percent. 
30 

Now, in addition, Congressman Wilson is, you know, absolutely 

right and the picture shows that there has been a lot of work done, 

and some very good work, in terms of civil engineering, et cetera. 

This is a very, very complex project, and the difficult work, the 

more difficult work remains to be done. And that tends to be the 

instrumentation; the piping is very complicated. 

I mentioned the 25 percent rework rate. The contractors estimated a 2.5 percent rework rate, and we are running 25 percent 

at this point. So there is a difference in view, and that is the reasons. 

Dr. MASON. And if I could add, we noted in our report that the 

relationship between the NNSA, the project staff, and the contractor is not good. There is little trust, in both directions. You 

know, there are reasons that both parties to that disagreement will 

point to for their distrust, but it does mean that, should the decision be made that it is necessary to stick with MOX, that has to 

be addressed, because it is not functioning well in terms of their 

relationship at the moment. 

And the disagreement about the percent complete is really just 

one manifestation of that disconnect. And, actually, it is both—you 

know, a percent is a fraction. And the disagreement is both in the 

numerator, how much work has been done, and in the denominator, how much work is it going to take to complete the project. 

Mr. COOPER. Well, the second most startling bit of information 

was the one that Mr. MacWilliams just referenced again. Any 

project that has 25 percent rework? Like, oh, my gosh. Because 

that means you build it, then you have to tear it down 25 percent 

and redo it. So we get to pay twice, as a taxpayer? Like, whoa. 

And then it turns out there is even a disparity there, because the 

company says it is only 2.5 percent. 

Well, this is unbelievable. This really gets to core competency 

and viability of the project, I would think. 

Mr. MacWilliams. 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Sir, just to clarify one thing, I can’t speak for 

the contractors, whether they would today say that it is 2.5 percent. The numbers we are seeing is 25 percent. What I was saying 

is, in their original planning, which produced some of these cost estimates, the assumption was 2.5 percent. 

Mr. COOPER. Dr. Mason was telling me earlier about the faulty 

incentive structure that NNSA or someone had put out there, 

where it was fee based on placement of equipment. So, in some 

cases, apparently, the company would go ahead and place the 

equipment, even though it blocked access to other equipment, just 

so they get their fee. So we would pay to place the equipment, to 

move the equipment, and then replace the equipment. So, in that 

case, we got to pay three times for the same work. That seems too 

unbelievable to be true. 

Dr. MASON. Well, and I think that is an origin of some of the distrust. And, as you know, you do wind up essentially paying 3X in 

those instances. 

The contractual arrangement, as it stands right now, is really 

not functioning for the management of the project. The project has 

been without a baseline for really nearly 3 years. And so, again, 

as we stated in the report, if the decision is to continue with the 
31 

MOX, there would have to be what I would judge to be a rather 

difficult negotiation take place. It is not a case where you can simply, as might occur, you know, if you were building a home, fire the 

contractor and hire a new one. AREVA actually owns the IP [intellectual property] associated with it, and so there would have to be 

significant restructuring of the contractual arrangement in order to 

provide a rational basis for future work. 

General KLOTZ. I think, if I could, Mr. Cooper, I think this goes— 

part of the distrust which exists has a lot to do with uncertainty. 

I mean, this is a program, this is a project of which there has been 

some great uncertainty over the past couple years. It is uncertainty 

that is felt, you know, by the Federal force down there that has responsibility for oversight. It is uncertainty that is felt by the contractor and the labor force, and some uncertainty felt by the good 

citizens of South Carolina and Georgia. 

Mr. COOPER. This brings me to a final point that wasn’t revealed 

in testimony yet but it was in General Klotz’s written testimony, 

where he says, ‘‘If a decision were made to complete construction 

of the facility’’—the MOX facility—‘‘the contractor would be requested to provide a baseline change proposal to complete the facility, a specified annual funding level, and a new contract cost proposal would be negotiated.’’ 

This just gets us to the point that Dr. Mason was just talking 

about. In a homeowner situation, you don’t like the contractor, you 

fire him, you get somebody new. Here, AREVA owns the IP. You 

essentially can’t fire them. They are already failing to communicate 

or on a completely different page, maybe a different planet, on this. 

And then we would have to enter into new contract cost negotiations with them. 

These wouldn’t be negotiations; this would be a hostage-taking. 

And we are already the hostage here. We would have no leverage 

at all in this situation, would we? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Sir, the reason we haven’t done a baseline 

change proposal is, essentially, we have been waiting to do studies 

to see where we are. Because, as you are aware, that is a multipleyear process, many million dollars required. And so, at this point, 

at least in our perspective, there have been numerous studies, and 

it is pretty clear that the MOX Project is going to be very, very expensive. 

I would also say that we have been talking about AREVA a lot, 

but it is MOX Services, which is a joint venture. And so I think 

that the purpose here is certainly not to demonize the contractor 

in any way, but it is a joint venture between CB&I and AREVA. 

Dr. MASON. And I would also like to point out that, in noting 

that there was little trust, that was in both directions—— 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Yeah. 

Dr. MASON [continuing]. In the sense that the contractor does not 

feel that they have the trust and confidence in the Department either, partly for the reasons of uncertainty that were mentioned. 

And so, you know, like any relationship, it is not working in both 

directions. 

Mr. COOPER. Failure to communicate is usually two ways. 

A final point. When it comes to not dealing with NNSA but with 

the NRC, it was my impression from talking to Dr. Mason that the 
32 

MOX joint venture approach was to engage in redundancy. When 

they wanted to lower risk, they would have redundant or backup 

systems. So, that way, essentially, we get to pay twice, but that 

had the net effect of lowering risk. But it is completely a different 

approach than we use in this country to solve problems. 

Could you elaborate, Dr. Mason? 

Dr. MASON. Actually, the redundancy that you refer to, I think, 

even predates the contract award. It goes back to some of the original design thinking. And, you know, it is illustrative of a challenge 

that I have seen, for example, when we looked at the uranium production facility in a different exercise. It has been mentioned already, some of the difficulties that the Department has encountered in setting requirements. 

And I am reminded of a remark that I saw attributed to General 

Odierno when asked why some of the DOD major acquisitions have 

not yielded weapons systems. The phrase he used was ‘‘utopian requirements.’’ And I think that is very apt in this instance. And 

sometimes fear of what the regulator might do, whether it is the 

Nuclear NRC or DOE and its self-regulating mode for other facilities, has on occasion led to very conservative decisionmaking that 

gives the appearance of reducing risk but may actually increase it 

because of the cost that is occurred in avoiding difficulties that may 

or may not actually materialize. 

Mr. COOPER. Uh-huh. 

Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROGERS. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Garamendi, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. 

From the previous testimony, there was no discussion with Russia about the BN–800. Is that correct? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. To my knowledge, sir, there wasn’t, but I 

would be happy to go back to NE and find out. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. 

Was there any discussion with General Electric Hitachi about 

their fast reactor design? 

Dr. MASON. The analysis that we looked at of the fast-reactor option was actually based on work that had been done by the Department’s Office of Nuclear Energy, which had been doing an analysis 

of a potential fast reactor as a component of the nuclear energy 

mission. That did include consideration of a number of the different 

designs that have been proposed, including those that have been 

mentioned. 

And the reason that our group, the Red Team, did not further 

pursue that option is because, were you to pursue a fast-reactor option, you would have to build both a fuel fabrication facility, which 

is the, you know, current topic, and a reactor. So, because of that, 

it did not offer any obvious—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Did you explore the potential for doing both of 

those? 

Dr. MASON. Yes, we did, relying on the analysis that has been 

done by the Office of Nuclear Energy, which I would leave it to my 

colleagues to—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Mr. MacWilliams. 
33 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Yes, sir. The Office of Nuclear Energy did 

have conversations with GE. I can get you more information if that 

would be helpful for you, sir. In our studies—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well, the question is, was it helpful to your 

analysis? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. It was incorporated into the study. There was 

a—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And how was it helpful to your analysis? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. The analysis that our working group, which 

included representatives from NE, did—and they did a very comprehensive study on the fast reactors, which we would be happy to 

give you another copy of. And the essential conclusion was that, 

while it would accomplish the mission, it would be roughly a $50 

billion project. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. At an expenditure level of $300 million or $400 

million a year forever. 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. You are correct, sir, that we—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Did you take—— 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. It was $500 million, and the reason we 

looked at that is so we could compare all options. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well, I would just simply share with everybody, 

it is a fool’s errand to base all of this analysis on the appropriation 

level rather than on what it would cost to do the process. 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. We would be happy to give you the unconstrained funding number, which is still very, very substantial, sir, 

for a brand-new fast reactor. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well, I will make the point once again. You did 

not analyze any of this based upon what it would actually cost but, 

rather, assuming a funding level from the Federal Government 

that, frankly, would stretch all of these options out to kingdom 

come. 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. NE did look at an unconstrained case, sir. I 

just—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Did you? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. No. Our NE group did a study this thick on 

this—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I don’t care how thick the study is. 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. But they did a very comprehensive—which 

did look at unconstrained funding, and I would be happy to provide 

it for the record. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Did anybody ask General Electric Hitachi what 

it would cost to build the reactor and the fuel fabrication system? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. My understanding is they had extensive conversations with GE, and I would be happy to provide more information for you. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Please do so. And when will you deliver it to 

me? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Let me go back, and we will do it promptly, 

sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. No, that is not an answer. Next week? Week 

after next? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. I will get you information by the end of next 

week, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. 
34 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 70.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I think I still have some more time. Let’s talk 

about the dilute process. What exactly is it? And what is the result 

of the dilute? What is the nature of the material at the end of the 

result of the dilute? 

Dr. MASON. Sure. 

So the first step in the process is to convert the material from 

whatever form it is in, which is typically metal for the majority of 

the material, into oxide, which is accomplished in a furnace, an oxidizing furnace. 

That oxide then is mixed in a very simple mechanical operation 

with a diluent that is given the name ‘‘stardust.’’ The exact constituents of it are classified because it is intended to make it very 

difficult to reconstitute the plutonium into a—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Very difficult but possible to reconstitute using 

a mechanical process? 

Dr. MASON. Yes, because in order to get the plutonium out, you 

would have to do a chemical process, and the constituents of the 

diluent are designed to make that chemical process very costly and 

difficult. 

So the final material you end up with is a blend of oxides, just 

loose oxides like—it looks like sand you would find on a beach. It 

isn’t, however, very much like sand you would find on a beach. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Could you please deliver to me a detailed description of what that is and what the end result of that process 

is and the potential for reconstitution of that material back into a 

weapons-grade plutonium? Can you do that? 

Mr. ROGERS. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. We can do that, sir. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 70.] 

Mr. ROGERS. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Wilson for the final 

questions of the afternoon. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

And, indeed, I appreciate the information being provided today. 

It is really reassuring to me, as a former DOE employee, a person 

who has worked at the Savannah River Site. Actually, your service 

gives me confidence, because I know of the health and safety that 

is at the Savannah River Site, the level of populations of South 

Carolina and Georgia that really appreciate the record of safety 

that we have at that site. 

And, indeed, I also share with my colleagues a concern about the 

cost, obviously. And I have been asking about that since day one. 

And so much of it—and there has been terminology used: percentage of design completion, rework, utopian requirements. So much 

of the increase in cost, as has been explained to me, has been due 

to change of specifications. 

It is in good faith by everybody involved. It is not because of persons not being interested in health and safety, but because you are 

interested in health and safety. It is due to changes in technology 

over the years, the experience that has been with the facility in 

France, over and over again. And that is my interest, about health 

and safety. 
35 

But, as we do talk about the cost, Dr. Mason, the Red Team had 

a situation of disagreeing with Aerospace relative to the $47 billion 

lifecycle cost. And so what was the disagreement? 

Dr. MASON. Yes. Of the four primary conclusions of the Aerospace report, the one where we did have a different conclusion related to their analysis under constrained funding scenarios. So, 

while we agreed with their overall conclusion in terms of the relative cost of the two options in their Phase 1 report, the difficulty 

was that they did not have access to the detailed resource-loaded 

schedules that would allow them to reoptimize the schedule at different funding levels. 

And so they did what I think any of us would have done with 

that same limited information and made their best estimate, but 

it really didn’t give them the flexibility to try and reoptimize and 

replan the work, and, therefore, extended the duration, you know, 

in the case of $350-million-a-year cap on construction out to 86 

years. And we believe that you could do better than that with a 

proper replan of the schedule and a rebaseline. 

Mr. WILSON. And I appreciate that. 

And it is always, actually, been frustrating to me about lifecycle 

cost. By using that terminology, I think of purchasing a car. If you 

use the lifecycle cost, what the cost of it was and what the cost of 

maintaining it, filling it with fuel, whatever, insurance, goodness, 

you would buy no car. Who would know what the cost would be? 

You would have to have 10 Red Teams to figure out what the cost 

would be. But the net result is you wouldn’t do it, you wouldn’t buy 

a vehicle. 

And so that is why I hope we look at this. And that is the reason 

that I brought the map, or the picture today of the facility. Because 

whether it is 33 percent completed or, as I think it is, nearly 70 

percent completed, if you look at it, hey, it is virtually completed. 

And the interior equipment is being installed as we are here today. 

But it is a testimony to the people that you work with and that 

you helped train for the health and safety and the appreciation in 

our State and our neighbors, Georgia, for the Savannah River Site. 

And so I would like to, again, conclude by letting everybody know 

that I can’t wait for my colleagues to visit. It is a beautiful community. It is very humbling for me to have the opportunity to represent it. And I can’t wait for them to see the actual facility and 

the percentage of completion. 

And, with that, I will yield my time. 

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair wants to, again, thank the witnesses for their time 

and commitment and your contributions today. You have been very 

helpful. 

I would remind the panelists that we will leave the record open 

for 10 days. If anybody has any additional questions—I know I 

have a few that I couldn’t get to—we will submit them to you. And 

if you could just respond to them in a timely manner, I would appreciate that. 

And, with that, we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

OCTOBER 7, 2015 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

OCTOBER 7, 2015 

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

OCTOBER 7, 2015 

(63) 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

OCTOBER 7, 2015 

(67) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

General KLOTZ. Following the Cold War, the United States stopped producing plutonium for weapons purposes and, as such, no longer assigns a value for the plutonium. Dealing with the environmental legacy of the Cold War remains a significant 

challenge, but the Department of Energy (DOE) is committed to cleaning up the environmental legacy of nuclear weapons production by decontaminating and decommissioning facilities that provide no further value, remediating soil and ground 

water contaminated with radioactive and hazardous constituents, and fulfilling its 

commitments to reduce risk and complete cleanup across all DOE sites. [See page 

29.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Dr. MASON. The current administrative capacity of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant 

(WIPP), as established by the Land Withdrawal Act (LWA), is 6.2 million cubic feet 

(176,000 cubic meters) of waste, although a much greater capacity is physically possible. According to subject matter experts interviewed by the Plutonium (Pu) Disposition Red Team (Red Team) at WIPP, this administrative capacity limit was derived from the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) early estimates of a transuranic 

(TRU) waste disposal rate over the course of the then-anticipated WIPP operating 

life. The current method for volume accounting established in the WIPP Resource, 

Conservation, and Recovery Act (RCRA) permit is based on the external container 

volume, regardless of how much waste is actually contained within that volume. 

Thus, of the 176,000 m3 capacity, approximately 91,000 m3 of waste (based on the 

sum of external container volumes) has already been emplaced. Of the 85,000 m3

left, 60,000 m3 are already subscribed to other DOE programs based on waste forecasts from around the DOE complex, leaving just 25,000 m3 to potentially host the 

dilute and dispose Pu disposition option without modifying the LWA. 

If criticality control overpacks (CCOs, see Figure 1) with a 380 g fissile material 

limit are used as an authorized payload container within the TRUPACT–II, and Pu 

is blended to less than 10% by mass, then the 34 MT of excess Pu discussed in the 

Pu Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA) would be packaged into approximately 89,500 CCOs, each taking up 55 gallons of WIPP’s administrative capacity despite the fact that only a small percentage of the container volume is actually waste (see Figure 1). In total, approximately 18,600 m3 of the remaining 25,000 

m3 of unsubscribed remaining capacity would be utilized (about 75%). 

However, this assumes no buffer in the fissile gram loading, and the Red Team 

learned that it is more likely that an administrative limit of 300–320 g per CCO 

would be used to ensure compliance with the package limit. With a conservative 300 

g limit, 23,600 m3 would be utilized at WIPP. After adding ancillary TRU waste 

generated during processing, one could reasonably conclude that all of the remaining 25,000 m3 of unsubscribed remaining WIPP administrative capacity would be 

utilized by the dilute and dispose option. Thus, in theory no modification of the 

LWA would be needed to support the dilute and dispose option. 
68 

Figure 1: The Criticality Control Overpack 

However, as discussed in the Red Team report, there may not yet be a full accounting of volumes of future TRU waste requiring disposal at WIPP. Thus, it would 

be wise to preserve as much of the existing capacity as possible to support on-going 

and future programs beyond the immediate Pu Disposition Program. One option for 

doing this could potentially be within the control of the Pu Disposition Program: Increasing Pu loading per container. The Pu Disposition Working Group (PDWG) report discussed this augmentation of the dilute and dispose option in some detail, 

and the Red Team described it as a potential efficiency improvement that could be 

implemented at any point during a dilute and dispose project. In brief, the PDWG 

report suggested that individual container loading up to 1 kg of Pu could be feasible, 

albeit with certain security considerations. This larger quantity of blended plutonium would be packaged into 35-gallon 9975 Type B shipping containers for shipment instead of CCOs. Assuming an administrative limit of 900 g per 9975 container, only about 6,000 m3 (about 24%) of the remaining unsubscribed administrative capacity at WIPP would be utilized (including ancillary waste), leaving the rest 

to support future DOE operations, and far fewer shipment and handling evolutions 

would be required. However, the 9975 container would require certification for shipment to WIPP, and the quantity of material involved in each shipment may require 

additional safeguards and security measures which could offset some of the cost savings. Even without any cost savings though, the preservation of valuable existing 

WIPP administrative capacity would be worth investigating the feasibility of this 

potential enhancement. 

A technically simpler and less expensive approach would be to change the current 

method of accounting for waste volume disposed at WIPP. WIPP subject matter experts have estimated that a typical disposed container may only be filled to less 

than 70% of its volume, often due to other limitations. In the case of CCOs, only 

a maximum of 3.3 gallons of the 55-gallon CCO volume would actually contain 

waste material. The rest is interior packaging and dunnage. A Class III RCRA permit modification allowing capacity accounting at WIPP to be based on actual waste 
69 

volume instead of external container volume would greatly increase the available remaining administrative capacity at WIPP (by nearly 90%) after excess Pu disposition is completed, as shown in Figure 2. 

Figure 2: Effect of Different Enhancements of the Base Dilute and Dispose Option 

on WIPP Space Utilization 

While it was evident to the Red Team that modification of the LWA is not a prerequisite to implementation of the dilute and dispose alternative, without implementing the enhancements discussed above there is a risk that Pu disposition may 

eventually stimulate such a consideration. It is important to realize, however, that 

the dilution process would take many years to complete. Thus, even if the diluted 

volume ultimately threatens to exceed the remaining administrative capacity at 

WIPP under the LWA, mitigating actions, such as the improvement of disposal efficiency via higher Pu loading per container or an enhanced volume accounting tech-
70 

nique at WIPP, would not have to be executed in the near term. But the Red Team 

noted that these kinds of enhancements should be implemented as a matter of national policy regardless of the excess Pu disposition approach in order to preserve 

WIPP as a national resource. Efforts to improve container volume utilization and/ 

or WIPP volume accounting practices are best implemented as soon as possible to 

optimize the utilization of precious WIPP disposal space. [See page 13.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. The Department of Energy is providing a copy of the April 

2014 Report of the Plutonium Disposition Working Group: Analysis of Surplus 

Weapon-Grade Plutonium Disposition Options, which includes the unconstrained 

funding case for the fast reactor option for plutonium disposition in Appendix B. 

[The report is retained in committee files and can be viewed upon request. The report is also available at http://www.nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/04-14- 

inlinefiles/SurplusPuDispositionOptions.pdf] [See page 33.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. NORCROSS 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. There have been two NNSA-directed changes to the U.S. MOX 

Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) project. In 2010, a change to the facility was requested by MOX Services and approved by NNSA to allow for the manufacture of 

multiple types of MOX fuel. The modifications would provide MFFF with the capability to produce fuel for both Boiling Water Reactors (BWR) and Pressurized Water 

Reactors (PWR) as well as the next generation of nuclear reactors. The contract 

with MOX Services was modified in December 2010 to add this scope of work for 

a cost of $34 million. In addition, part of the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF) scope was identified to be added to the MFFF. The $242 million estimate 

for adding this work to the MFFF was included in the 2012 Baseline Change Proposal but has not been added to the contract. It is important to note that this is 

a design-build contract in which MOX Services initiates design changes as it completes design. One of the lessons learned by the Department from this project and 

other projects is ensuring that the design is at least 90 percent complete before 

baselining complex nuclear work. Since this project was baselined, MOX Services 

has made approximately 33,050 design changes as they have completed their design 

due to design maturity issues, discovery of design omissions, and constructability 

issues. The design changes initiated by MOX Services have had a much larger impact on total project cost than the Department’s requested changes. [See page 21.] 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

OCTOBER 7, 2015 

(73) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Did you consider the use of existing Fast Reactor technology, 

such as the Russian BN–800, when doing your analysis of Advanced Disposition Reactors? If not, why not? 

General KLOTZ and Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Yes, in the Department’s April 2014 Report of the Plutonium Disposition Working Group: Analysis of Surplus WeaponGrade Plutonium Disposition Options, the Department analyzed the use of a fast 

reactor. The Department used the DOE-owned Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor design as a reference case for the analysis. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Did you discuss the use of PRISM reactors with GE during the 

course of your analysis of Advanced Disposition Reactors? If not, why not? 

General KLOTZ and Mr. MACWILLIAMS. The Plutonium Disposition Working Group 

considered using the GE-owned design as a data point. However, inclusion of the 

GE-owned design may have adversely impacted GE’s ability to compete in a future 

procurement if that option was ultimately pursued. Thus, the Department used 

DOE-owned Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor design information as a reference case 

in the fast reactor analysis. In addition, the Department performed reactor core design work to optimize the plutonium disposition aspects of the reference case. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Did you consider the use of existing Fast Reactor technology, 

such as the Russian BN–800, when doing your analysis of Advanced Disposition Reactors? If not, why not? 

Dr. MASON. The Pu Disposition Red Team considered fast reactor technology as 

a potential alternative to the MOX baseline approach, but elected not to include it 

in the options for more detailed analysis: ‘‘An early consensus was struck within the 

Red Team on the ability to screen out most alternative approaches to Pu disposition 

based on the available background reading . . . The [Advanced Disposition Reactor] 

ADR option involves a capital investment similar in magnitude to the MFFF but 

with all of the risks associated with first-of-a kind new reactor construction (e.g., 

liquid metal fast reactor), and this complex nuclear facility construction has not 

even been proposed yet for a Critical Decision (CD)-0. Choosing the ADR option 

would be akin to choosing to do the MOX approach all over again, but without a 

directly relevant and easily accessible reference facility/operation (such as exists for 

MOX in France) to provide a leg up on experience and design.’’ To reach this conclusion, the Red Team received a detailed briefing from Deputy Assistant Secretary 

John Herczeg of DOE’s Office of Nuclear Energy on the ADR option (‘‘The Advanced 

Disposition Reactor Study: An Analysis of Plutonium Disposition Options Using Advanced Fast Reactors, July 10, 2015’’), and consulted an extensive library assembled 

specifically for the Red Team, including the following relevant documents: 

• DOE Report of the Plutonium Disposition Working Group: Analysis of Surplus 

Weapon-Grade Plutonium Disposition Options, April 2014 (Final Options Report) 

• Excess Plutonium Disposition: The Failure of MOX and the Promise of Its Alternatives, E.S. Lyman, December 2014 

• Alternatives to MOX: Direct-disposal options for stockpiles of separated plutonium, F. von Hippel and G. MacKerron, International Panel on Fissile Materials, April 2015 

• Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, Committee on 

International Security and Arms Control, National Academy of Sciences report, 

1994 (NAS Report on Management and Disposition of Excess Weapon Pu) 

• Business Case, DOE’s Proposed Baseline Approach for Disposing of Surplus 

Plutonium, April 2007 (Plutonium Disposition Business Case FINAL—April 30, 

2007) 

• Progress on approaches to the management of separated plutonium—Position 

paper, Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, January 2014 

• DOE/MD–0002, Summary Report of the Screening Process To Determine Reasonable Alternatives For Long-Term Storage And Disposition Of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials, DOE Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, March 29, 

1995 
74 

• 2010 PMDA Protocol—Protocol to the Agreement Between the Government of 

the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation 

Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as no 

Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation • (OUO) SE&PID–13–0003, Revision D, Preliminary Program Execution Plan for 

the National Nuclear Security Administration Fissile Materials Disposition Program, July 31, 2013 • 2014 Plutonium Disposition Working Group Analysis of Surplus Weapon-Grade 

Plutonium Disposition Options, presentation by Sachiko McAlhany, July 8, 2015 • UK Plutonium Disposition Programme Overview, presentation by United Kingdom National Nuclear Laboratory, July 2014 

We examined the fast reactor option generically without focusing on any one reactor design such as the Russian BN–800 or GE PRISM designs referenced in the 

questions. Our conclusions about the level of detail on cost, licensing, and overall 

feasibility as well as the observation that switching to a fast reactor option implies 

construction of both a fast reactor and a MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility with the 

resulting implications for overall program cost are not affected by the specific fast 

reactor design considered. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Did you discuss the use of PRISM reactors with GE during the 

course of your analysis of Advanced Disposition Reactors? If not, why not? 

Dr. MASON. The Pu Disposition Red Team considered fast reactor technology as 

a potential alternative to the MOX baseline approach, but elected not to include it 

in the options for more detailed analysis: ‘‘An early consensus was struck within the 

Red Team on the ability to screen out most alternative approaches to Pu disposition 

based on the available background reading . . . The [Advanced Disposition Reactor] 

ADR option involves a capital investment similar in magnitude to the MFFF but 

with all of the risks associated with first-of-a kind new reactor construction (e.g., 

liquid metal fast reactor), and this complex nuclear facility construction has not 

even been proposed yet for a Critical Decision (CD)-0. Choosing the ADR option 

would be akin to choosing to do the MOX approach all over again, but without a 

directly relevant and easily accessible reference facility/operation (such as exists for 

MOX in France) to provide a leg up on experience and design.’’ To reach this conclusion, the Red Team received a detailed briefing from Deputy Assistant Secretary 

John Herczeg of DOE’s Office of Nuclear Energy on the ADR option (‘‘The Advanced 

Disposition Reactor Study: An Analysis of Plutonium Disposition Options Using Advanced Fast Reactors, July 10, 2015’’), and consulted an extensive library assembled 

specifically for the Red Team, including the following relevant documents: • DOE Report of the Plutonium Disposition Working Group: Analysis of Surplus 

Weapon-Grade Plutonium Disposition Options, April 2014 (Final Options Report) • Excess Plutonium Disposition: The Failure of MOX and the Promise of Its Alternatives, E.S. Lyman, December 2014 

• Alternatives to MOX: Direct-disposal options for stockpiles of separated plutonium, F. von Hippel and G. MacKerron, International Panel on Fissile Materials, April 2015 

• Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, Committee on 

International Security and Arms Control, National Academy of Sciences report, 

1994 (NAS Report on Management and Disposition of Excess Weapon Pu) 

• Business Case, DOE’s Proposed Baseline Approach for Disposing of Surplus 

Plutonium, April 2007 (Plutonium Disposition Business Case FINAL—April 30, 

2007) 

• Progress on approaches to the management of separated plutonium—Position 

paper, Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, January 2014 

• DOE/MD–0002, Summary Report of the Screening Process To Determine Reasonable Alternatives For Long-Term Storage And Disposition Of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials, DOE Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, March 29, 

1995 

• 2010 PMDA Protocol—Protocol to the Agreement Between the Government of 

the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation 

Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as no 

Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation 

• (OUO) SE&PID–13–0003, Revision D, Preliminary Program Execution Plan for 

the National Nuclear Security Administration Fissile Materials Disposition Program, July 31, 2013 

• 2014 Plutonium Disposition Working Group Analysis of Surplus Weapon-Grade 

Plutonium Disposition Options, presentation by Sachiko McAlhany, July 8, 2015 

• UK Plutonium Disposition Programme Overview, presentation by United Kingdom National Nuclear Laboratory, July 2014 
75 

We examined the fast reactor option generically without focusing on any one reactor design such as the Russian BN–800 or GE PRISM designs referenced in the 

questions. Our conclusions about the level of detail on cost, licensing, and overall 

feasibility as well as the observation that switching to a fast reactor option implies 

construction of both a fast reactor and a MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility with the 

resulting implications for overall program cost are not affected by the specific fast 

reactor design considered. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON 

Mr. WILSON. in your reply to the question of what $345 million a year for MOX 

Fuel Fabrication Facility construction ‘‘would buy,’’ you stated ‘‘nothing.’’ However, 

1,800 men and women are currently at work on the MOX Project, the physical structure being completed, glove boxes being delivered, tested and installed, progress 

being made even at the rate of $345 million per year. How does your statement 

square with MOX Services’ claim that 4 percent construction progress has been 

made per year even at $345 million, and that the facility is nearing 70 percent construction completion this year—which until recently DOE has defined as engineered, 

procured and physically built according to a certified Earned Value Management 

System? In fact, in testimony earlier this year, General Klotz stated that that construction of the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility is ‘‘over 60 percent’’ complete, but 

you now claim 35 to 41 percent. Why has DOE changed its definition of percentage 

completion to one based on DOE’s estimated costs to complete—is there any basis 

for this metric, and does DOE define project percentage completion for any other 

construction project by this basis, such as for UPF? If in fact 4 percent construction 

progress is being made at $345 million per year, even by the most conservative 

measures wouldn’t construction be MFFF complete in under 10 years, not in more 

than 50 years? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Standard Earned Value Management practice measures 

project completion percentage by dividing the value of work completed against the 

total budget to complete a project. Given the latest estimates of total cost to complete the project, the lowest case is $9.4 billion and the highest case is $21 billion. 

Assuming that the $4.5 billion spent to date was all earned towards project completion, the percent completion is 21–48 percent. 

Additionally, MOX Services’ June 30, 2013 estimate, at $350 million annual funding assumption without the additional project scope needed to oxidize metal, was 

$9.4 billion. Given this estimate, and in accordance with MOX Services’ earned 

value reporting, the MOX project is significantly less than the 70 percent complete. 

Mr. WILSON. In your testimony you claim that by DOE’s measure, the MOX 

Project has a rework rate of 25 percent. Would you explain how you get to those 

figures? According to industry studies, on a typical project, rework costs between 2 

percent and 20 percent of the project cost, but the MOX Project record shows that 

the rework cost to date is less than 0.5 percent—far less than that which is typical 

of large construction projects. In fact, the rework on this project has been approximately $8 million of the $4.5 billion spent to date. Do you care to comment on this 

discrepancy? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. Until recently, MOX Services has not tracked re-work. Based 

on field observations, NNSA believed that there was significant re-work that needed 

to be better managed. In the fiscal year (FY) 2015 Award Fee Plan, NNSA included 

a specific criterion for rework to drive the management and minimization of unnecessary rework. In anticipation of the Award Fee criterion, MOX Services issued the 

initial version of a procedure for the tracking and trending of re-work in September 

2014. The $8 million reported for re-work was only for re-work in direct accounts 

in FY 2015. Supporting work (e.g., engineering, construction management, quality 

assurance) is not tracked and would be in addition to the $8 million. HVAC, pipe 

and electrical were the primary commodities being installed in FY 2015 and these 

items had a re-work rate of approximately 25 percent. These re-work rates are significantly higher than what MOX Services is utilizing in their budget projections, 

which included a re-work rate of 2.5 percent. 

Mr. WILSON. In 2013, DOE and the contractor completed a critical milestone in 

the advancement of the mission of the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility with finalization of the Blanket Commercial Agreement (BCA), providing the necessary framework from which AREVA can begin negotiating contracts for MOX fuel sales with 

U.S. nuclear utilities. However, while DOE has claimed that no customers have 

signed contracts for the fuel that will be produced by the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility, to date DOE has refused to sign the BCA that will allow the contractor to 

negotiate those very sales contracts. In fact, several U.S. utilities have invited the 
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contractor to discuss the purchase of MOX fuel once the BCA is signed, and the Red 

Team agrees that there will be customers for the MOX fuel—sales for which would 

provide a significant benefit to American ratepayers and offset some of the costs of 

the non-proliferation program. Why does DOE refuse to sign the BCA? 

Mr. MACWILLIAMS. NNSA negotiated and finalized a blanket commercial agreement with Areva to market the fuel that would be fabricated at the U.S. MOX Fuel 

Fabrication Facility to Areva’s customers. However, NNSA has deferred signing the 

agreement since the Department is currently analyzing options to complete the plutonium disposition program more efficiently. 

Areva has indicated that it has identified U.S. utilities interested in MOX fuel, 

but thus far will not share the names of the utilities with the Department despite 

repeated requests and the Department’s offer to sign a nondisclosure agreement. Regardless, depending on the uranium market prices, the Department has calculated 

the potential revenue stream from the sale for MOX fuel to be between $500 million 

and $1 billion over the lifetime of a program with a total cost exceeding $30 billion. 

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