SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA

En Banc

STATE OF ARIZONA, ) Arizona Supreme Court 

 ) No. CR-06-0205-PR 

 Appellee, ) 

 ) Court of Appeals 

 v. ) Division One 

 ) No. 1 CA-CR 04-0999 

JOHN DAVID CRAWFORD, ) 

 ) Maricopa County 

 Appellant. ) Superior Court 

 ) No. CR2004-011318-001 DT 

 )

 )

 ) O P I N I O N

__________________________________) 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

The Honorable Thomas W. O'Toole, Judge

VACATED; REMANDED 

_______________________________________________________________

Memorandum Decision of the Court of Appeals, Division One

Filed Feb. 16, 2006

VACATED

________________________________________________________________

John David Crawford Buckeye

In Propria Persona

TERRY GODDARD, ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL Phoenix

 By Randall M. Howe, Chief Counsel, 

 Criminal Appeals Section

 Joseph T. Maziarz, Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for the State of Arizona

________________________________________________________________

H U R W I T Z, Justice

¶1 Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 13-604 (Supp. 

2004) subjects a criminal defendant who has a “prior historical 
felony conviction” to enhanced sentences. See A.R.S. § 13-

604(W)(2) (defining “prior historical felony conviction”). If 

the prior conviction occurred “in any court outside the 

jurisdiction of this state,” it is treated as a prior historical 

felony conviction only if it involves “an offense which if 

committed within this state would be punishable as a felony.” 

A.R.S. § 13-604(N). The issue in this case is how a court 

determines whether a foreign conviction involves an offense that 

would be punishable as a felony under state law if committed 

here. 

I. 

¶2 John David Crawford was convicted after a jury trial 

of one count of burglary in the first degree, a class 2 felony 

under A.R.S. § 13-1508 (2001), and two counts of aggravated 

assault, class 3 felonies under A.R.S. § 13-1204 (Supp. 2004). 

The State sought enhanced sentences under A.R.S. § 13-604(D), 

alleging that Crawford had two historical prior felony 

convictions. 

¶3 Crawford admitted the prior convictions, but claimed 

that one did not qualify as a historical prior felony under 

A.R.S. § 13-604(N). That conviction occurred in the United 

States District Court for the District of Arizona in 2003, after 

Crawford pled guilty to one count of an indictment alleging that 

he had violated 18 United States Code (“U.S.C.”) § 1708 by 

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possessing a credit card stolen from the United States mail. 

Crawford contended that the federal conviction did not meet the 

statutory definition of a prior historical felony conviction 

because 18 U.S.C. § 1708 can be violated by conduct that would 

not constitute a felony under Arizona law. 

¶4 The State did not contest that the federal statute can 

be violated by conduct that would not constitute a felony under 

Arizona law. The State argued, however, that Crawford’s 

actions, as described in the relevant count of the federal 

indictment, would have violated either A.R.S. § 13-1802(a)(5) 

(2001) (theft) or A.R.S. § 13-2102(a)(1) (2001) (credit card 

theft), both felonies. After reviewing the allegations in the 

federal indictment, the superior court agreed. Finding that 

Crawford had two historical prior felony convictions, the court 

imposed the presumptive sentences in A.R.S. § 13-604(D).1

¶5 The court of appeals affirmed. State v. Crawford, 1 

CA-CR 04-0999 (Ariz. App. Feb. 16, 2006) (mem. decision). We 

 

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 Because Crawford had committed the crimes for which he was 

convicted while on probation, the superior court was required 

under A.R.S. § 13-604.02 (2001) to impose no less than the 

presumptive sentences specified in A.R.S. § 13-604(D) -- 15.75 

years for the burglary conviction and 11.25 years for each of 

the aggravated assault convictions. 

 If the superior court had found only one prior historical 

felony conviction, sentencing would have been imposed pursuant 

to § 13-604(B). The presumptive sentences would have been 9.25 

years for the burglary and 6.5 years for the aggravated 

assaults. Id.

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granted Crawford’s petition for review because defining the 

method by which a court determines whether convictions in other 

jurisdictions should be treated as historical prior felony 

convictions involves a recurring issue in our criminal 

jurisprudence. We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 

5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 31.19. 

II. 

¶6 “[W]hether a foreign conviction constitutes a felony 

in Arizona . . . raises an issue of law,” which we review de 

novo. State v. Heath, 198 Ariz. 83, 84 ¶ 4, 7 P.3d 92, 93 

(2000). The defendant’s admission of the prior conviction is of 

no consequence in that legal analysis. “Although an admission 

by a defendant at trial dispenses with the necessity of proof of 

prior convictions, such an admission does not constitute proof 

that the foreign conviction would have been a felony under 

Arizona law.” Id.

A. 

¶7 Before using a foreign conviction for sentencing 

enhancement purposes under § 13-604, the superior court must 

first conclude that the foreign conviction includes “every 

element that would be required to prove an enumerated Arizona 

offense.” State v. Ault, 157 Ariz. 516, 521, 759 P.2d 1320, 

1325 (1988). The court makes this determination by comparing 

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the statutory elements of the foreign crime with those in the 

relevant Arizona statute. Id. (comparing California and Arizona 

rape statutes to determine if prior California rape convictions 

constituted “serious” crimes under previous version of A.R.S. § 

13-604(S)); State v. Benenati, 203 Ariz. 235, 242 ¶¶ 24-26, 52 

P.3d 804, 811 (App. 2002) (comparing Florida and Arizona robbery 

statutes to determine if prior Florida robbery convictions 

“constituted a prior felony conviction for sentencing purposes” 

under A.R.S. § 13-604(N)). “[T]here must be strict conformity 

between the elements of the [foreign] felony and the elements of 

some Arizona felony before [A.R.S. § 13-604(N)] can apply.” 

State v. Clough, 171 Ariz. 217, 219, 829 P.2d 1263, 1265-66 

(App. 1992) (comparing Montana bad check statute with various 

Arizona theft and fraud statutes). 

¶8 The cases interpreting § 13-604 are consistent with 

our case law involving the use of foreign convictions in capital 

sentencing. The capital cases make plain that only the 

“statutory definition of the prior crime, and not its specific 

factual basis” can be considered in determining whether a 

foreign conviction is treated as a “serious offense” and thus an 

aggravating circumstance under A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(2). State v. 

Henry, 176 Ariz. 569, 587, 863 P.2d 861, 879 (1993) (reviewing 

California involuntary manslaughter statute to determine if a 

statutory element of that crime involved violence in order to 

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determine whether the California conviction was an aggravating 

circumstance under previous version of A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(2)); 

accord State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, 216-17 ¶¶ 82-88, 141 P.3d 

368, 391-92 (2006) (refusing to “look beyond the language of the 

[foreign] statutes” to the complaint describing the defendant’s 

conduct in determining whether prior California robbery 

conviction constituted a “serious offense” under A.R.S. § 13-

703(F)(2)); State v. Schaaf, 169 Ariz. 323, 334, 819 P.2d 909, 

920 (1991) (reviewing Nevada attempted murder statute to 

determine if that crime involved violence and holding that 

sentencing courts “may consider only the statute that the 

defendant [was] charged with violating; it may not consider 

other evidence”). 

¶9 Under our precedents, the sentencing court focuses 

solely on the elements of the foreign statute under which the 

defendant was convicted, a purely legal issue, and is freed from 

the burden of making factual determinations about the 

defendant’s underlying conduct. We thus conserve judicial 

resources by avoiding, “in effect, a second trial on defendant’s 

prior conviction.” State v. Gillies, 135 Ariz. 500, 511, 662 

P.2d 1007, 1018 (1983) (involving previous version of § 13-

703(F)(2)); see also Schaaf, 169 Ariz. at 333, 819 P.2d at 919 

(affirming the approach taken in Gillies). 

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B. 

¶10 The State acknowledges the general rule that prior 

foreign convictions are to be analyzed for enhancement purposes 

under § 13-604 only by comparing the elements of the foreign 

statute to Arizona law, but nonetheless argues that State v. 

Thompson, 186 Ariz. 529, 924 P.2d 1048 (App. 1996), supports the 

result below. In Thompson, the court of appeals held that 

“charging documents” could be examined to “pinpoint the 

statutory basis of a prior conviction.” Id. at 532, 924 P.2d at 

1051. Such documents could be used for “establishing that the 

defendant was convicted under a particular subsection of a 

foreign statute, if that subsection encompasses only conduct 

that would constitute a felony in Arizona.” Id.

¶11 Thompson is of no avail to the State here. As we made 

clear in Roque, Thompson allows use of a charging document “only 

to narrow the foreign conviction to a particular subsection of 

the statute that served as the basis of the foreign conviction” 

and not to establish “the factual nature of the prior 

conviction.” 213 Ariz. at 217 ¶ 88, 141 P.3d at 392. The 

federal statute at issue here, 18 U.S.C. § 1708, has no 

subsections. The courts below used the charging documents not 

to “pinpoint” the subsection describing the crime for which 

Crawford was convicted, but instead to establish the “factual 

nature of the conviction.” 

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III. 

¶12 The courts below erred in using the federal indictment 

to determine whether Crawford’s 2003 federal conviction was a 

prior historical felony conviction under § 13-604(N). We 

accordingly vacate Crawford’s sentence and the memorandum 

decision of the court of appeals and remand to the superior 

court for further sentencing proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

 _______________________________________

Andrew D. Hurwitz, Justice

CONCURRING:

_______________________________________

Ruth V. McGregor, Chief Justice

_______________________________________

Rebecca White Berch, Vice Chief Justice

_______________________________________

Michael D. Ryan, Justice

_______________________________________

W. Scott Bales, Justice

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