MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2017 ME	186

Docket: Cum-16-305

Argued: May	9,	2017

Decided: August	29,	2017

Revised: November	30,	2017

Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER,	MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	HJELM,	and	HUMPHREY,	JJ.

THERESA	L.	ALLOCCA	et	al.	

v.	

YORK	INSURANCE	COMPANY	OF	MAINE et	al.

HJELM,	J.

[¶1]		In	January	2014, Timothy	Austin	Davison,	who	was	known	as	Asti,	

was	fatally	shot	while	operating a	vehicle	that	an	assailant,	operating another

vehicle, had	 forced	 onto	 a	 median	 on	 an	 interstate	 highway.	 	Asti’s	 parents,	

Theresa	 L.	 Allocca	 and	 Timothy	 Allen	 Davison, filed this	 action	 in	 their	

individual	capacities,	and	Davison	also	filed	as	personal	representative	of	the	

Estate	 of	 Timothy	 Austin	 Davison,1 seeking	 to	 recover	 uninsured	 motorist	

(UM)	 benefits	 based	 on several	 automobile	 insurance	 policies	 issued	 by	

defendants York	 Insurance	 Company	 of	 Maine,	 Allstate	 Insurance	 Company,	

and	 Horace	 Mann	 Teachers	 Insurance	 Company.	 	 The	 Superior	 Court	

 1		Except	where	indicated	otherwise,	we	refer	to	the	plaintiffs	collectively	as	“Davison”	because	

Timothy	Allen	Davison	is	the	party,	either	individually	or	in	his	representative	capacity,	who	seeks	

recovery	in	most of	the	claims	in	the	complaint.		
2

(Cumberland	County,	Warren,	J.)	granted	a	summary	judgment	in	favor	of	the	

insurers,	 concluding	 that	neither	any of	 the	 policies	nor	Maine’s	UM	 statute,	

24-A	M.R.S.	§	2902	(2016), provides UM	coverage	for	the	loss associated	with	

Asti’s	death.		On	this	appeal	by	Davison,	we	affirm.	

I.	 BACKGROUND

[¶2]	 	 The	 following	 facts	 are	 undisputed.	 	 See Cote	 Corp.	 v.	 Kelley	

Earthworks,	Inc.,	2014	ME	93,	¶	8,	97	A.3d	127.		On	January	4,	2014,	Asti	was

driving to	Maine	in	his	father’s	sport utility	vehicle.		While on	Interstate	81	in	

Maryland,	an assailant2 driving a	pick-up	truck began	pursuing	Asti and	fired	

shots	 at	 Asti’s	 vehicle.	 	 The	 two	 vehicles	 crossed	 the	 state	 line	 into	

Pennsylvania,	 and	 the	 assailant	 rammed	 his	 truck	into	 the	 SUV,	 pushing	the	

SUV off	the	road	onto	the	median.		The	assailant	then	reversed direction	and	

approached Asti from	 the	 southbound	 side	 of	 the	 highway.	 	 The	 assailant

pulled	up	next	to	Asti’s SUV	in	the	median,	and,	from	his	truck,	fired	multiple	

shots	at	Asti and	drove	away.	 Asti died	of	the	gunshot wounds.	

 2 In	its	statement	of	material	facts,	see	M.R.	Civ.	P.	56(h),	Allstate	made	a factual	assertion	that	

included the	 name	 of	 a	 person	 charged	 with	 murdering	 Asti.	 	 Davison’s	 opposing	 statement	 of	

material	facts objected	to	that	assertion	on	evidentiary	grounds,	and the	court	correctly	concluded	

that	the	assertion	had	not	been	properly	established. See	M.R.	Civ.	P.	56(e). Further,	as	the	court	

observed	in	its	order,	the	identification	of	the	assailant	could	be	material	to	the	claims	in	this	case	

because	 Davison	 seeks	 UM	 benefits	 based	 on	 the	 characterization	 of	 the	 criminal	 incident	 as	 a	

hit-and-run.	 	None	 of	 the	 parties	argued	in	 the	 trial	 court or	 here,	 however,	 that	 the	existence	 of	

coverage	turns	on	that	factual	issue,	and	so	we	do	not	address	it.		
3

[¶3]	 	Four	insurance	 policies	issued by	the	 defendants	 are	 relevant	 to

this	case.	

[¶4] First,	Asti was	 the	named	insured on	an	automobile policy and a	

motorcycle	 policy	issued	 by	Allstate.	 	 Each	 policy	insured	a	 vehicle	 that	 had	

been	owned	by	Asti and provided	the	following	UM	coverage:	

We	will	pay	damages	for	bodily	injury	which	an	insured	person	is	

legally	 entitled	 to	 recover	 from	 the	 owner	 or	 operator	 of	 an	

uninsured	motor	 vehicle.	 Injury	must	be	 caused	 by	 accident and	

arise	 out	 of the	 ownership,	maintenance	 or	 use	 of	 an	 uninsured	

motor	vehicle.		

(Emphasis	added.)	

[¶5]	 	 Next,	 Asti’s father was	 the	 named	 insured	 on	 a	 York	 Insurance

automobile policy	covering the	SUV	that	Asti	was	driving at	 the	 time	he	was	

killed.	 The	definition	of	an	 “insured”	in	 the	York	policy	includes	any	 “family	

member”	 and	 “[a]ny	 other	 person	 ‘occupying’	 ‘your	 covered	 auto,’”	 thereby	

rendering both Asti and	his	 father insureds within	the	meaning	of	the	policy.		

The	York	policy	included	the	following	statement	of	UM coverage:

We	will	pay	compensatory	damages	which	an	“insured” is	legally	

entitled	 to	 recover	 from	 the	owner	or	operator of	an	 “uninsured	

motor	vehicle” because	of	“bodily	injury”:

1.	Sustained	by	an	“insured”;	and

2.	Caused	by	an	accident.
4

The	 owner’s	 or	 operator’s	liability	 for	 these	 damages	must arise	

out	of the	ownership,	maintenance or	use	of the	“uninsured	motor	

vehicle[.]”		

(Emphasis	added.)	

[¶6]	 	Finally,	Asti’s mother	was	 the	 named	insured	 on	 a	Horace	Mann	

policy covering	 her	 vehicle.	 	That policy	included	 the	 following	 statement	 of	

UM coverage:

We	 will	 pay	 damages	 for	 bodily	 injury	 an	 insured	 is	 legally	

entitled	to	collect	from	the	owner	or	driver	of	an	uninsured	motor	

vehicle.	 The	bodily	injury	must	be	caused	by	accident arising	out	

of the	operation	or	ownership	of the	uninsured	motor	vehicle.		

(Emphasis	added.)		

[¶7]		In	August	2015,	Timothy	and	Theresa	individually,	and	Timothy	as	

the	personal	representative	of	Asti’s estate,	filed	a	complaint	against	Allstate,	

York,	 and	 Horace	 Mann.	 	 The	 Estate	 sought	 payment	 of	 UM	 benefits	 from	

Allstate	and	 York.	 	Asti’s	 parents	alleged	 that	 they	are	entitled	 to	 recover	in	

their	 own	 right	 as	 statutory	 beneficiaries	 under	the wrongful	 death	 statute,

18-A	 M.R.S.	 §	 2-804	 (2016), based	 on the	 UM coverage	 of	 their	 York	 and	

Horace	 Mann	 policies,	 respectively.	 All	 of	 these claims	 were based	 on	 an	

allegation	that	Asti’s	death	was	caused	by	a	hit-and-run	driver.		

[¶8]	 	Each	 of	 the	 defendants moved for	 summary	 judgment,	 asserting	

that	the	losses	arising	from	Asti’s	death	are	not	covered	by	the	UM	provisions	
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in	the	policies	because	his death	was	not	caused	by	an	“accident” and	did	not	

arise	out	of	the	“use” of	a	vehicle	within	the	meaning	of	the	policies	or	the	UM

statute.	 Davison	opposed	the	defendants’	motions.		

[¶9]		In June	2016,	 the	court	entered	an	order granting	each	summary	

judgment	motion	based	on	its	conclusion	that	UM	coverage	applies	only	to	the	

“reasonable	and	proper	use”	of	an	uninsured	or	hit-and-run	vehicle	and	 that	

the	way	 the	assailant	used	 the	 vehicle	he	was	 operating did	not	constitute	a	

proper	use.		Adjudicating	the	issue	on	that	ground,	the	court	did	not	reach	the	

question	of	whether	Asti’s	death	was	“caused	by	an accident”	pursuant	to	the	

uninsured	motorist policies	and	the	UM statute.			

[¶10] Davison timely	appealed.	

II.	 DISCUSSION

[¶11]		When	the	material	facts	are	not	in	dispute,	we	review the	grant	of	

a	motion	 for	 summary	 judgment	 de	 novo.	 	 See Grant	 v.	 Foster	Wheeler,	 LLC,	

2016	ME	 85,	 ¶¶ 12-13,	 140	 A.3d	 1242.	 	On	 appeal,	Davison	 argues	 that	the	

court	 erred	 by	 entering	 a	 summary	 judgment	 in	 favor	 of	 the	 defendants

because	 the	 terms	 of	 UM	 coverage	 in	 the	 policies themselves allow	 for	

recovery	 here,	 or,	 alternatively,	 if	 the	 loss	 caused	 by	 Asti’s	 death	 is	 not	
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covered	 by the	 policies,	 the	 UM	 statute nonetheless	 entitles	 them	 to	 UM	

coverage.		See 24-A	M.R.S.	§	2902(1). 		

[¶12]		We first	address	whether	Asti’s	death	is	a	covered	loss	under	the	

UM	provisions	of	the	policies.		Because	we	conclude	that	it	is	not,	we	proceed	

to	address	whether	such	coverage exists as	a	requirement of section	2902(1).		

See	Tibbetts	v.	Me.	Bonding	&	Cas.	Co.,	618	A.2d	731,	732	(Me.	1992) (stating	

that	“when	the	terms	of	an	insurance	policy	conflict	with	mandatory	statutory	

provisions,	the	statutory	provisions	must	prevail”).

A. Uninsured	Motorist Coverage	Pursuant	to	the	Insurance	Policies

[¶13] Each of	 the	UM	provisions in	 the	policies at	issue	here	requires	

that,	to	be	covered,	the	loss	must	be	caused	by	“an	accident.”3 To	determine	

the	applicability	of	the UM	provisions,	we	must therefore determine	whether	

Asti’s	death	was	caused	by	an	accident	within	the	meaning	of	the	policies.		In	

construing	 the	 terms	 of an	 insurance	 contract,	 we “interpret	 unambiguous	

policy	 language	 consistent	 with	 its	 plain	 meaning	 and	 construe	 ambiguous	

policy	language	strictly	against	 the	insurance	company	and	liberally	in	 favor	

 3		To	qualify	for	UM	coverage,	the	York	policy requires that	an	injury	be	“caused	by	an	accident,”

and	in	 the	Allstate	 and	Horace	 Mann	 policies an	injury	 must	 be	“caused	 by	 accident.”	 See	 supra

¶¶ 4-6.	 	Notwithstanding	Horace	Mann’s	argument	 to	 the	contrary,	we	see	no	material	difference	

between	the	two	phrases	and	therefore	analyze	them	identically.			
7

of	the	policyholder.”		Langevin	v.	Allstate	Ins.	Co.,	2013	ME	55,	¶	9,	66	A.3d	585

(quotation	marks	omitted).		

[¶14]	 	 Applying	 these	 principles	 of	 construction	 to	 the	 policies,	 we	

conclude	that	Asti’s	murder	was not	an	“accident”	and	therefore	that	the loss	

is	not	covered	by	the	UM	protection included	in	any	of the policies	issued	by	

the	defendants.

[¶15]	 	 We	 recently	 concluded	 that	 the	 term	 “auto	 accident”	 in	 an

automobile	 insurance	 policy, although undefined by	 the	 policy, is	

unambiguous	and	thus	must	be	given its	plain	meaning.		Kelley	v.	N.	E.	Ins.	Co.,	

2017	 ME	 166,	 ¶	 7,	 --- A.3d ---.	 	 We	 stated	 that	 the	 commonly	 understood	

meaning	 of	 an	 “accident”	 is	 “an	 event	 that	 is	 without	 apparent	 cause	 or	

unexpected;	an	 unfortunate	event,	especially one	 causing	injury	 or	 damage.”	

Id. (alterations	 omitted) (citing 1 Shorter	 Oxford	 English	 Dictionary	 14	

(6th ed.	 2007)).	 	 Based	 on	 this,	 we	 interpreted	 the	 term	 “auto	 accident”	 to	

mean	 “an	 unintended	 and	 unforeseen	 injurious	 occurrence	 involving	 an	

automobile.”	 	 Id.	 	 Here, as	 in	 Kelley, the	 policies	 at	 issue	 do	 not	 define	

“accident,” 2017	ME	166,	¶ 7,	--- A.3d ---, and	the	summary	judgment	record	

establishes	 that	Asti’s	death	was	not	unintended	but	rather	was	 the	result	of	
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the	assailant’s	deliberate	and	purposeful	conduct.		The	loss	occasioned	by	his	

death	is	therefore	not	an	accident	that	would	invoke	UM	coverage.

[¶16]	 	We recognize	 that	 some	 courts	 have	 adopted	 the	 view	 that	 the	

question	 of	 whether	 a	 loss	 results	 from	 an	 “accident”	 is	 answered	 from	 the	

perspective	of	the	insured.		See	Am.	Family	Mut.	Ins.	Co.	v.	Petersen,	679	N.W.2d	

571,	581-82	 (Iowa	2004);	Wendell	v.	State	Farm	Mut.	Auto.	 Ins.	Co.,	974	P.2d	

623,	 635	 (Mont.	 1999);	 State	 Farm	 Mut.	 Ins.	 Co.	 v.	 Pitman,	 809	 A.2d	 1280,	

1282-83	(N.H.	2002);	State	Farm	Mut.	Auto.	Ins.	Co.	v.	Langan,	947 N.E.2d	124,	

127-29	(N.Y.	2011).		Although	 the	conduct	of	 the	person	who	killed Asti	was	

indisputably	deliberate	and	not	accidental,	there	is	no	evidence	in	the	record	

that	 it	 was	 foreseeable	 to	 Asti	 himself,	 and	 so, based	 on	 that	 approach,	 his	

death	would	be	viewed	as	“accidental.”

[¶17]		We	conclude,	however,	 that	describing	an	intentional	act—such	

as	an	intentional	killing—as	an	“accident”	stretches	the	plain	meaning	of	that	

word	too	far.		Instead,	we	find	more	persuasive	the	contrary	view,	consistent	

with	 our	 holding	in Kelley, 2017	ME	 166,	 ¶ 7,	--- A.3d ---, that	 the	 plain	 and	

commonly	understood	meaning	of	an	“accident” is	an	unexpected	event.		That	

the insured himself may	 have	 been	 unsuspecting	 does	 not	 transform	 the	

intentional	 act—something	 as	 heinous	 as	 the	 murder	 of	 Asti—into	 an	
9

accident.	 Other	jurisdictions	have	held,	and	we	agree,	that	“an	injury	resulting	

from	 a	 willful	 act	 was	 no	 accident	 because	 the	 harm	 had	 been	 intended.”		

Landry	v.	Dairyland	Ins.	Co.,	701	A.2d	1035,	1036	(Vt.	1997); see	also Austin	v.	

State	Farm	Mut.	Auto.	Ins.	Co.,	625	N.W.2d	213,	217	(Neb.	2001) (holding	that,	

in	an	uninsured	motorist	coverage	provision	of	an	automobile	liability	policy,	

“the	word	‘accident’ does	not	cover	intentional	torts”); Roller	v.	Stonewall	Ins.	

Co.,	801	P.2d	207,	210	 (Wash.	1990) (explaining	that	 “an	intentional	act	can	

never	be	an	accident”	because	a	“loss	is	accidental when	it	happens	without	

design,	 intent,	 or	 obvious	 motivation” (quotation	 marks	 omitted)),	 partially	

overruled	 on	 other	 grounds by Butzberger	 v.	 Foster,	 89	 P.3d	 689,	 693-96	

(Wash.	2004).

[¶18]	 	 For	 this	 reason,	 without	 addressing the	 court’s	 conclusion that	

the	UM	 coverage	in	 the	 policies	was	 not	 applicable because	 the	loss	 did	 not	

arise	 from	 the	 “use”	 of	a	motor	 vehicle,	we	 conclude	as	a	matter	 of	law	 that	

Asti’s	death	was	not	caused	by	an	“accident.”		The condition	of	coverage that	

the	loss	must	be	the	product	of	an	accident	is	therefore	not	satisfied here,	and	

UM	coverage	is	not	available	 to	Davison	pursuant	 to	 the	 terms	 of	any	 of	 the

policies issued	by	the	defendants.		
10

B. Uninsured	Motorist Coverage	as	Required	by	Statute

[¶19]		We	next	consider	Davison’s	alternative	argument	 that	if—as	we	

have	concluded—the terms	of	 the UM	protection	provisions	in the	insurance	

contracts do	 not	 provide	 coverage	 for	 the	 loss,	 that	 coverage still	 exists	 by	

statutory	prescription.

[¶20]	 	 The	 statute	 at	 issue	 is	 24-A	 M.R.S.	 §	 2902(1),	 which	 states,	 in	

relevant	part:

A	 policy	 insuring	 against	 liability	 arising	 out	 of	 the	 ownership,	

maintenance	or	use	of	any	motor	vehicle	may	not	be	delivered	or	

issued	 for	 delivery	in	 this	State	with	 respect	 to	any	 such	 vehicle	

registered	or	principally	garaged	in	 this	State,	unless	coverage	is	

provided	 in	 the	 policy	 or	 supplemental	 to	 the	 policy	 for	 the	

protection	 of	 persons	 insured	 under	 the	 policy	 who	 are	 legally	

entitled	 to	 recover	 damages	 from	 owners	 or	 operators	 of	

uninsured,	underinsured	or	hit-and-run	motor	vehicles,	for	bodily	

injury,	 sickness	 or	 disease,	 including	 death,	 sustained	 by	 an	

insured	person	resulting	from	the	ownership,	maintenance	or	use	

of such	uninsured,	underinsured	or	hit-and-run	motor	vehicle.

[¶21]	 	 Davison	 asserts	 that	 section	 2902(1)	 requires	 UM	 coverage	 to	

provide	indemnification that the insured	is “legally	entitled” to	recover	 from	

the	operator	of	a	hit-and-run	vehicle, even	if	the	underlying loss	is	not “caused	

by	 an	 accident”—a	 limitation	 created by	 the policies at	 issue	 here. The	

defendants,	in	contrast, argue	that	the	purpose	of	the	UM	statute	is to	mirror	
11

the	 scope	 of	 existing	 liability	 coverage,	 rather	 than	to	 broaden	 the	 scope	 of	

covered	losses.		

[¶22]	 	 This	 issue	 calls	 for	 us	 to construe	 section	 2902(1).	 	 “[T]he	

fundamental	 rule	 in	 statutory	 construction	 is	 that	 the	 legislative	 intent	 as	

divined	from	the	statutory	language	controls	the	interpretation	of	the	statute.”		

Tibbetts,	618	A.2d at	733 (quotation	marks	omitted).	

[¶23]	 	 Although	 Davison	 contends	 that	 section	 2902(1)	 requires	 UM	

coverage	 to	 extend	 to	 nonaccidental	 losses	 for	 which	 the	 uninsured	 or	

hit-and-run	vehicle	operator	would	be	liable,	we	have	stated	that	in	enacting	

that	 statute,	 the	 Legislature	 intended	 to	 provide	 compensation	 to	 insureds	

when	 they	sustain	losses	resulting	 from	accidents.		See Dickau	v.	Vt.	Mut.	 Ins.	

Co.,	 2014	 ME	 158,	 ¶	 43,	 107	 A.3d	 621;	Beal	 v.	 Allstate	 Ins.	 Co.,	 2010 ME	 20,	

¶ 34,	 989	 A.2d	 733;	 Wescott	 v.	 Allstate	 Ins.,	 397	 A.2d	 156,	 167	 (Me.	 1979).		

Because	Asti’s	death	was	not	 the	 result	 of	an	accident,	 section	2902(1)	does	

not	require	the	insurers	to	compensate Davison	to any	extent	 further	than	is	

provided	in the	UM	provisions	of	the	policies.

[¶24]		Additionally,	“[w]e	have	consistently	held	that	the	[L]egislature’s	

purpose	in	enacting	section	2902	was to	provide	an	injured	insured	the	same	

recovery	which	would	have	been	available	had	the	tortfeasor	been	insured	to	
12

the	 same extent	 as	 the	 injured	 party.”	 	 Jipson	 v.	 Liberty	 Mut.	 Fire	 Ins.	 Co.,	

2008 ME	 57,	 ¶	 8,	 942	 A.2d	 1213 (alteration	 omitted)	 (quotation	 marks	

omitted);	see	also Wallace	v.	State	Farm	Mut.	Auto.	Ins.	Co.,	2017	ME	141,	¶	12,	

--- A.3d ---;	Farthing	v.	Allstate	Ins.	Co.,	2010	ME	131,	¶	6,	10	A.3d	667;	Molleur	

v.	Dairyland	 Ins.	 Co.,	 2008	ME	 46,	¶	 10,	 942	A.2d	 1197.	 In	 other	words,	UM	

coverage	 provides	 the	 insured	 with	 the	 same	 recovery that	 the	 policy’s

liability	coverage	would	provide to	a	third	person	to	whom the	insured	causes

a	compensable loss.	 See Wallace,	2017	ME	141,	¶	12,	--- A.3d ---.		Thus,	with	

exceptions	not	applicable	here4 and	for	purposes	of	this	case,	the liability	and

UM	 coverage created	 in an	 automobile	 insurance	 policy	 are	 symmetrical.		

Accordingly, we	 have	 “characterized	UM	insurance	as	gap	 coverage	 that	fills	

the	 gap	 left	 by	 an	 underinsured	 tortfeasor.”	 	Id. (citing	Tibbetts v.	 Dairyland	

Ins.	 Co., 2010	 ME	 61,	 ¶¶	 17,	 21,	 999	 A.2d	 930).	 Although section	 2902	

requires	 automobile	 policies	 to	 include	 UM	 protection to	 fill	 gaps	 in	 the	

amount of	 the	 tortfeasor’s	 liability	 insurance available	 to	 cover	 the	 UM	

insured’s	damages,	it	does	not create	a	new	and broader	coverage,	as	Davison	

argues.	 	 See	 Tibbetts,	 2010	ME	 61,	 ¶	 17,	 999	A.2d	 930	 (“In	 enacting	 the	UM	

statute,	 the	 Legislature	 intended	 to	 permit	 the	 injured	 party	 to	 recover	 the	

 4 For	example,	UM	 coverage	 provided	 by	 the	 policies	 relevant	 to	 this	 case	 does	not	extend	 to	

property	damage,	which	is	covered	by	liability	protections.	
13

amount he	would	have	received	had	 the	 tortfeasor	been	insured	 to	 the	same	

extent	as	the	injured	party.”		(emphasis	added) (quotation	marks	omitted)).

[¶25]	 	 None of	 the	 automobile	 policies	 relevant	 to	 this	 action	 would	

have	 provided	liability	 coverage	 for	 a	loss	 arising	 from	the	 conduct	 at	issue	

here.		Each	policy	contains	an	exclusion	 from	coverage	 for	liability	based	 on	

intentional	acts.5		We	have	held	that	an	intentional	act	exclusion	in	a	liability	

policy	 “applies	 only	 when	 the	 insured	 has	 acted	 with	 the	 intention	 or	

expectation	that	another	will	be	harmed	by	the	insured’s	intentional act,”	and	

that	the exclusion	applies,	for	example,	where	the	insured	defendant	shot	and	

killed	 three	 people	 and	 those	 “injuries	 . .	 .	 were	 intended.”	 	 Royal	 Ins.	 Co.	 v.	

Pinette,	 2000	ME	 155,	 ¶¶	 8,	 11,	 756	 A.2d	 520;	see	 also State	 Mut.	 Ins.	 Co.	 v.	

Bragg,	589	A.2d	35,	38 (Me.	1991).		

[¶26]	 	The	 parties	 do	 not dispute	 that	 the	 hit-and-run	 driver	 pursued	

Asti’s	 SUV; fired	 shots at	 it; rammed	 the	 SUV	 off	 the	 road; and	 then	 circled	

back	in	his	own	vehicle	and	 fatally	shot	Asti.	 Because	 the	assailant’s	actions	

would	not	have	been	covered	under	 the	liability	protections	provided	in	 the	

 5 The	York	policy	does	not	provide	liability	coverage	“for	any	‘insured’	who	intentionally	causes	

bodily	 injury	 or	 property	 damage.”	 	 The	 Allstate	 policy	 excludes	 coverage	 for	 “bodily	 injury	 or	

property	 damage	intended	 by,	 or	 reasonably	 expected	 to	 result	from,	 the	intentional	 or	 criminal	

acts	 of	 an	 insured	 person.”	 	 The	 Horace	 Mann	 policy	 excludes	 coverage	 “for	 any	 bodily	 injury	

. . . caused	intentionally	by	the	insured.”		These	intentional	act	exclusions	are	common,	since	“[t]he	

language	 of	liability	insurance policies	is	standardized	 throughout	 the	insurance industry.”		Mass.	

Bay	Ins.	Co.	v.	Ferraiolo	Constr.	Co.,	584 A.2d	608,	609	(Me.	1990).		
14

policies	issued	by	York,	Allstate,	or	Horace	Mann,	 the	loss	arising	 from	Asti’s	

death	is	not	covered	by	the	UM	provisions	of	those	policies.	 Therefore,	section	

2902	 does	 not	 require	the	 defendants	 to	 provide	UM	 coverage	 arising	 from	

Asti’s	death.		

III.	 CONCLUSION

[¶27]	 	 We	 therefore	 conclude	 that	 the	 UM	 provisions included	 in	 the	

policies	issued	by	the	defendants	do	not	provide	coverage	for	losses	caused	by	

Asti’s	 death.	 	 Additionally,	 section	 2902(1)	 does	 not	 mandate that	 the	 UM	

protections	 in	 those	 policies	 provide such	 coverage.	 	 The	 court	 therefore	

correctly	granted a	summary	judgment	for	the	insurers.6

The	entry	is:

Judgment	affirmed.	

 6 We	 need	 not	 and	 do	 not	 reach	 Horace	 Mann’s	 separate	 arguments,	 unique	 to	 the	 claims	

brought	by	Allocca, that	she is	not	entitled	to	UM	coverage because	Asti was	not	an	insured	on	her	

policy	and	because	UM	recovery	cannot	arise	based	on	her	independent wrongful	death	claim.	
15

Jeffrey	T.	Edwards,	Esq. (orally),	and	Timothy	D.	Connolly,	Esq.,	Preti Flaherty	

Beliveau	 &	 Pachios,	 LLP,	 Portland,	 for	 appellants	 Theresa	 L.	 Allocca	 and	

Timothy	Allen	Davison

John	 S.	 Whitman,	 Esq. (orally),	 Richardson,	 Whitman,	 Large	 &	 Badger,	

Portland,	for	appellee	York	Insurance	Company	of	Maine

Martica	S.	Douglas,	Esq. (orally),	Douglas,	Denham,	Buccina	&	Ernst,	Portland,	

for	appellee	Allstate	Insurance	Company

James	 D.	 Poliquin,	 Esq. (orally),	 and	 Jonathan	 W.	 Brogan,	 Esq.,	 Norman,	

Hanson	 &	 DeTroy,	 LLC,	 Portland,	 for	 appellee	 Horace	 Mann	 Teachers	

Insurance	Company

Cumberland	County	Superior	Court	docket	number	CV-2015-375

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY