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TURKEY: POLITICAL TRENDS IN 2016

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND 

EMERGING THREATS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 3, 2016

Serial No. 114–139

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS

DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Nate Schenkkan, project director, Nations in Transit, Freedom House ...... 5

Mr. Ali Cinar, president, Assembly of Turkish American Associations .............. 16

Gonul Tol, Ph.D., director, Center for Turkish Studies, Middle East

Institute ................................................................................................................ 27

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Nate Schenkkan: Prepared statement ............................................................ 7

Mr. Ali Cinar: Prepared statement ........................................................................ 18

Gonul Tol, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................................... 29

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 56

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 57

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 58

(1)

TURKEY: POLITICAL TRENDS IN 2016

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 2016

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:12 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. The subcommittee’s first hearing of the 

new year is called to order. To mark this occasion, I can think of 

no more fitting subject for us to focus on than Turkey. As we watch 

the turmoil in Syria and the displacement of millions of civilians, 

no one needs a reminder about the vital place Turkey holds on the 

world stage. Any lasting solution in that part of the world must involve Turkey. 

However, our hope is that Turkey is not only stable and peaceful, 

but also democratic and secular as well, with a strong and independent civil society and a government that upholds fundamental 

freedom. 

Things are changing in Turkey, and today we ask, are those 

changes for the better or for the worse? President Erdogan and his 

party, the AKP, after well over a decade in power, failed to secure 

a majority of seats in the Parliament during the elections last 

June. The pro-Kurdish HDP attracted a cross section of secular 

Turks and Kurdish voters and entered Parliament as the fourth 

major political party. 

Yet following that election, no party was able to build a coalition 

and form a government, so in November, a second round of voting 

took place, and the AKP regained its majority. Unfortunately, that 

may reflect the AKP’s appeal to the Turkish nationalists over renewed fighting, and I say it is unfortunate if this is the reason why 

they are still in power is because there has been renewed fighting, 

and Turkey may become a more polarized rather than being elected 

because we have done a more harmonious job. We will be asking 

our witnesses to comment on that. 

During today’s hearing, I hope to discuss how these elections, 

and the shifting domestic political environment within Turkey, will 

play out over this coming year. What about reports of a crackdown 

on independent journalism and journalists? How will the latest 

PKK Turkish fighting affect events in Syria? And how will it affect 

the people who live in Turkey? 

2

As I stated during this subcommittee’s previous hearing on Turkey, our discussions and our comments, and even our criticisms of 

the Turkish Government, are predicated on a deep respect for the 

Turkish people and a deep respect for the Turkish nation and the 

role that it has played over the last century. That said, sometimes 

friends, and that is what the United States and Turkey are, we are 

friends, but friends need to speak plainly to one another about 

problems and about challenges that they both face. 

There is a reason for concern. President Erdogan’s continuing effort to empower his office by passing a new constitution and creating a powerful, Turkish-style Presidential system is harmful to 

Turkish democracy. Some of his policies at home and abroad raise 

alarm bells, and there should be people paying attention to disturbing reports of what appears to be abuses of power. 

The natural ebb and flow of democracy in Turkey is being impacted by Erdogan’s extension of his already historically long-term 

epicenter of power in his country. Recent actions against the Kurds 

appear to indicate a violent strategy based on military action. 

That is not the way that we are going to build a more peaceful 

region, is it? Or, perhaps, it is perhaps not the way you bring peace 

to your country is basing your, how you say, basing the common 

good and basically the tranquility of your country on military action and fear. 

So today, we are interested in talking to our witnesses, seeing 

what they have to say about these, as I say, trends of concern 

about Turkey, and with that, I would turn to my ranking member 

and see if he has an opening statement. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for organizing today’s subcommittee’s hearing on the political trends in 

Turkey, who is one of our most important allies in an increasingly 

complicated region. And I am especially grateful for the opportunity to look at the domestic situation which drives Turkey’s foreign policy. 

While President Erdogan enjoys strong support, the Kurdish nationalists rooted HDP was successful in achieving a voice in Parliament. That is a good thing. That is democracy. Much of the concern of the international observers, however, we have been informed that the Kurdish message has been suppressed by the ruling party, and as someone who represents the minority voice in 

government, here the minority party, also as an African American, 

where we feel voices are not heard, I am deeply concerned with 

how Turkey will find a peaceful political resolution to the Kurdish 

question. 

I always equate what is going on someplace else with what we 

did and what happens in the United States of America, and I think 

one of the keys in the 1960s with the issues of African Americans, 

for example, and the genius of Dr. King working with the government was there was a peaceful resolution to the question of African 

Americans that we still are dealing with. 

Clearly, one cannot completely separate domestic Turkish issues 

from international concerns. For example, Turkey has been doing 

a commendable job in housing over 2.5 million Syrian refugees. 

Turkey is taking in those families fleeing Assad’s bombs and ISIS’ 

3

repossession—repression, while other countries, including the 

United States, are reluctant to do so. 

In this effort, Turkey is carrying the world’s burden in the face 

of evil and addressing a grave humanitarian crisis, and while Germany and the EU seek a more cooperative relationship with Turkey, today’s congressional hearing is an important examination of 

the nature of our relationship with Turkey. 

During Vice President Biden’s recent trip to Turkey, he rightly 

stressed the importance of a values-based approach to our cooperation with Turkey, both bilaterally and within NATO. We, in the 

United States Congress, are concerned with the democratic 

progress in Turkey. Tolerance in the face of domestic criticism is 

difficult, and regional events further complicates the situation. Believe me, I know. But nevertheless, we fully defend the fight for 

academic freedom, for freedom of the press, and for the right of individuals to criticize their governments as well as it may—as hard 

and as difficult as it may be to hear. People should have the right 

to voice those concerns. 

As we all know too well in America, suppressing these voices 

only leads to an erosion of democracy and then eventually to violence. And as violence spreads across southeastern Turkey, we are 

reminded of the delicacy of the balance between security and liberty. Tragically, they are not isolated incidents. They serve to highlight the need of a path to peace between the government and the 

Kurdish forces. 

What could that path look like? Should and will the constitution 

be changed to accommodate such a process? Turkey’s democratic 

progress in the region is essential for our shared ideas, and today’s 

conversation about the domestic situation in Turkey may be difficult, but it is essential for our understanding. 

We need to, I think, as Members of Congress, to try to really understand what is taking place on a domestic basis on the ground 

in Turkey, just as I am sure that some need to understand, on a 

domestic basis, what is taking place here in the United States as 

we are getting involved in our political system in our Presidential 

election. 

So, I thank the chairman for this hearing because we want to 

learn and understand so that we can make sure that we are working collectively for democracy and working collectively to stomp out 

those who are threats to us all. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We appreciate your very substantive remarks 

that you set us and inaugurated this hearing with. 

Mr. Cicilline, I understand, has a short opening statement as 

well. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Chairman Rohrabacher and Ranking 

Member Meeks, for calling this important and timely hearing. The 

issue of Turkey, its political atmosphere, and its role in the region 

is critically important. A key ally in the fight against ISIS and 

Syria, Turkey has its own internal political dynamics that are driving its overall military policy. A key factor in this is Prime Minister 

Erdogan and the AKP’s relationship with the Kurds and other minorities. 

4

Erdogan’s decision to abandon the peace process with the PKK 

and undertake a harsh crackdown against Kurds, including civilians, is extremely disturbing. Since July, approximately 230 civilians have been killed during the campaign by the Turkish Government. Tens of thousands of people have been forced from their 

homes, and the Turkish military has essentially created a war zone 

within the Kurdish part of southeast Turkey. 

Kurdish political leaders have been rounded up and imprisoned 

without due process, and there has been a widespread crackdown 

on media and civil society. In line with its targeting of religious 

and ethnic minorities, Turkey has also continued its policies of antagonizing Armenia by supporting Azerbaijan in the conflict in 

Nagorno-Karabakh. 

Sadly, the Turkish Government continues to deny the very wellestablished history of genocide against the Armenian people. Turkey certainly has the right to protect itself from terrorism, but we 

should all be alarmed by the antidemocratic tactics that Turkey 

has been using against the Kurds, other minorities, and most widely, against Prime Minister Erdogan’s perceived critics. 

Turkey was once solidly on the path to democratization, and I 

fear that it has strayed so far that it may not be able to recover. 

And while the United States must continue to support Turkey in 

the fight against ISIS and its absorption of refugees, we do it at 

our own peril if we let the issues of democracy and human rights 

fall by the wayside. 

So I look forward to working with my colleagues on these issues 

and hearing the testimony of our witnesses today, and thank you 

again, Mr. Chairman, for the courtesy. I yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And we appreciate your presence with us 

today. The witnesses will proceed, and—following my introduction, 

and I would just request that if we could, again, have your actual 

written testimony presented but keeping your remarks down to 

about 5 minutes. 

First we have with us, and I will introduce all of the witnesses. 

Nate, and pronounce—please forgive me if I mispronounce your 

name. Schenkkan? 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Schenkkan. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Nate Schenkkan is the Freedom House 

project director for their annual Nations in Transit report. He previously served as senior program officer for Freedom House’s Euro/

Asia program, which covers Turkey and Central Asia. 

Ali Cinar is executive vice president of the Turkish Heritage Organization, a nonprofit group established to promote dialogue 

around Turkey’s role in the world and the U.S.-Turkey relationships. 

And finally, Dr. Gonul Tol, got it, okay, is the founding director 

of the Middle East Institute’s Center for Turkish Studies and an 

adjunct professor at George Washington University. She has written about Turkey extensively and frequently appears in the media. 

She has earned her Ph.D. From Florida International University. 

And Nate, you may proceed. 

5

STATEMENT OF MR. NATE SCHENKKAN, PROJECT DIRECTOR, 

NATIONS IN TRANSIT, FREEDOM HOUSE 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Thank you. Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking 

Member Meeks, and members of the subcommittee, it is an honor 

to testify before you. I ask that my full written testimony be entered into the record. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Without objection. 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. I last appeared before this subcommittee in 

July 2014 to speak then about the future of Turkish democracy. I 

described how the government led by then-Prime Minister Recep 

Tayyip Erdogan pursued an aggressive society-wide crackdown on 

dissent in response to the Gezi Park protests of June 2013 and the 

corruption cases against the government in December 2013. 

Since that time, the situation for democracy and freedom of expression in Turkey has significantly worsened, and most significantly, the government has returned to open conflict with the PKK 

in July 2015, which has resulted in the deaths of at least 230 civilians inside Turkey and 230 Turkish security forces, while the 

President says that the state has killed 3,000 PKK militants. 

The Islamic State’s suicide bombers during this time have killed 

another 135 Turkish citizens and 11 foreign visitors to Istanbul. 

The return to conflict is, in significant part, the result of leaving 

the war in Syria to fester. This has emboldened radical parts of the 

Kurdish movement in Turkey by showing that violence can achieve 

autonomy, and it has strengthened the position of Turkish nationalists in Turkey. 

Turkish members of the Islamic State, who have traveled frequently to Syria, have entered the fray and are trying to widen this 

cleavage. In these context, President Erdogan, and the AKP took 

what I believe is a cynical decision, in July, to return to war with 

the PKK to strengthen their position in the November 1 repeat 

parliamentary elections. 

This decision has played into the hands of hardliners within the 

PKK that are threatened by the success of the HDP, the Kurdish 

Movement Party, which promotes nonviolent integration into the 

Turkish state in order to realize Kurdish rights. 

The conflict is having terrible consequences. There is the horrific 

civilian death toll that I mentioned. There have been at least 62 

day and night curfews for military operations since July, including 

some lasting up to 2 weeks, and some that are going on now. Tens 

of thousands of people have been forced from their homes, and the 

military is using tanks and heavy weaponry inside of Turkish cities. 

At least 22 HDP members of Parliament are under criminal investigation, as is the HDP mayor of Diyarbakir. Dozens of local officials from the HDP and other Kurdish parties have been arrested, 

including 18 co-mayors. Last week, prosecutors requested at least 

7 years imprisonment for the mayor of Mardin, Ahmet Turk, who 

was one of the elder statesmen of the Kurdish movement in Turkey. 

These are the people on whom the peace process relied, and without them, it will be impossible to end the cycle of conflict. This 

crackdown comes on top of one that was already taking place on 

media and civil society. The government has branded the Gulen 

6

movement officially a terrorist organization, and is persecuting it 

relentlessly after the movement helped launch the December 2013 

corruption investigations. 

The newspaper Bugun and the TV stations Bugun and 

Kanalturk were seized immediately previous to the November 1 

parliamentary election. There are over 108,000 Web sites blocked 

in Turkey, many of these now increasingly are Kurdish Web sites 

or Web sites linked to the Gulen movement, like the magazine 

Nokta. 

In the last quarter of 2015 alone, there were 93 cases for insult 

and violation of personal rights of President Erdogan, including 

against 42 journalists. That is practically one per day. 

In 2015, 19 journalists and two cartoonists received prison sentences for insulting President Erdogan or other high officials. The 

editor-in-chief and the Ankara bureau chief of the country’s oldest 

newspaper, Cumhuriyet, are facing possible life sentences for reporting on the National Intelligence Agency’s use of humanitarian 

convoys to smuggle weapons into Syria. 

I have two recommendations. The Turkish Government’s attempt 

to destroy the Kurdish movement inside Turkey, which is, I believe, what is happening, is counterproductive not only to peace in 

Turkey, but to the efforts of the United States to bring an end to 

the crises in Syria and Iraq. The conflict in Turkey is contributing 

to deepening radicalization of Kurds in Turkey and in Syria, and 

foreclosing a possibility that Turkey will be able to coexist with a 

stronger Kurdish presence in northern Syria, which is an inevitable 

outcome of any end to this crisis. 

The U.S. should call on its political capital, both with the Government of Turkey and with the Kurdish movement in Syria to 

bring about a ceasefire in Turkey and to return to the peace process. 

Second, when I testified in 2014, I advocated a strong U.S. emphasis on EU membership for Turkey in order to encourage 

progress on human rights. I must admit such a policy now seems 

untenable. Despite a superficial commitment to EU accession, the 

current government has repeatedly and directly rejected the requirements of EU membership in the areas of human rights and 

rule of law. 

They EU’s decision this fall to trade Turkish cooperation on stopping refugee flows in exchange for a supposedly reinvigorated accession process has discredited membership by making it a matter 

of quid pro quo instead of a matter of political and economic convergence. 

Advancing Turkish accession to the EU at the expense of the 

EU’s human rights principles has exposed the EU as cynical and 

shortsighted and has undermined its greatest strength as a rulesbased, values-driven institution. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schenkkan follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Cinar. 

STATEMENT OF MR. ALI CINAR, PRESIDENT, ASSEMBLY OF 

TURKISH AMERICAN ASSOCIATIONS 

Mr. CINAR. Dear Mr. Chairman and subcommittee members, 

thank you for giving me the opportunity to be here today. As an 

American with a Turkish descent and a longtime community leader, I am honored to be one of the witnesses of ‘‘Turkey: Political 

Trends in 2016.’’

Mr. Chairman, I would like to summarize my written statement. 

I believe 2015 was an extraordinary year in U.S. and Turkish relations. Whether it was in foreign or domestic policy, economy or 

military, there was no shortage of critical developments and cooperation between two nations. 

Just to give you an example, over the past 12 months, the U.S. 

and Turkey have continued to work together to fight ISIS, provide 

assistance to 2.2 million Syrian refugees living in Turkey, and 

strengthen economic cooperation during the G–20 summit. Most recently, the U.S., along with other NATO-ally countries, stood behind Turkey in downing of Russian’s fighter jet that violated Turkish airspace in November 2015. 

I believe it is important to emphasize that most of these critical 

developments took place at a time when Turks were experiencing 

critical domestic challenges. Results of free, fair, and peaceful second election showcased the strength of the democratic process in 

Turkey. Despite their differences on various issues, the U.S. was in 

need of a strong and secure Turkish Government that was, first 

and foremost, ready to cooperate in the campaign against ISIS and 

play a critical role in Syria. 

Having put all these developments behind it, I would like to 

briefly highlight Turkey’s priorities in 2016. National security. For 

over 30 years, Turkey has confronted violence by a militant terrorist group known as Kurdistan Workers Party, PKK. During this 

time, more than 40,000 lives have been lost in Turkey. PKK attacks have, once again, flared up in Turkey since July 11, 2015, 

when the PKK announced the end of the ceasefire that had existed 

for 21⁄2 years. 

Some were attempting to mischaracterize recent events as Turkish hostility toward all Turks. However, the reality is far different. 

Ethnic Kurdish citizens of Turkey are an integral part of the nation. Turkey established strong relations with the Kurdish regional 

government in the region, which are not limited to military support 

and financial aid. 

Honorable committee members and Mr. Chairman, I would like 

draw your attention to PKK’s recent terrorist attacks. PKK and the 

Kurdish citizens in Turkey are totally different. 221 Turkish security personnel and 89 civilians have been killed by PKK; 1,170 security personnel and 477 civilians have been wounded by PKK; 14 

security personnel and 110 civilians have been kidnapped by PKK. 

In recent years, several Kurdish language television and radio 

stations have been established in Turkey, courses teaching Kurdish 

language and dialects have been created, and the Turkish Kurds 

have significant representation in the Turkish Parliament and elsewhere in the government. 

17

Presently, there are more than 120 parliamentarians out of 550 

of Kurdish origin in Turkish Parliament from various political parties. Most Turkish Kurds don’t support PKK, which ended the 

ceasefire on July 2015. 

In addition to PKK, Turkey is threatened by ISIL, terrorist acts 

such as those in Suruc, Ankara, and Istanbul. Border security and 

control measures around the 511-mile border have improved significantly. It is my understanding that strengthening of this border 

security has always made important contributions. 

Humanitarian aid, according to the United Nations, Turkey shelters the largest number of refugees in the world. Total expenditures for Syrians is $7.6 billion, and rapidly edging toward 8 billion 

U.S. dollars. Turkey has announced it offers Syrian refugees work 

permits in order to encourage fewer of them to migrate. 

Freedom of expression and media constitutes an important pillar 

of human rights priorities for Turkey. It is a fundamental freedom 

guaranteed under the constitution and relevant legislation. Turkey 

is putting a series of comprehensive judicial reforms in line with 

both our international and European Union standards and principles for the protection and promotion of freedom of expression 

and media. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman and subcommittee members, I am 

optimistic about Turkey’s future and U.S.-Turkish relations. I believe, starting this year, Turkey will begin to effectively address its 

domestic and foreign policy challenges, strengthen its global position. 

I believe that strong partnership and friendship, rooted with 

common values and interest, will be reinforced by the enduring 

links between the people of both countries, will continue to get 

stronger this year. I would like to thank you, again, Mr. Chairman 

and committee members, for giving me this opportunity. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cinar follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you. And Dr. Tol. 

STATEMENT OF GONUL TOL, PH.D., DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR 

TURKISH STUDIES, MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE 

Ms. TOL. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is an 

honor to be invited to speak with you today. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You need to move a little closer, please, and 

if it is on. 

Ms. TOL. It is on. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Can you move it a little closer to you? There 

you go. Thank you. 

Ms. TOL. Mr. Chairman, I will summarize my statement now and 

submit the full text for the record. 

2015 was a difficult year for Turkey. The Islamic State launched 

three attacks inside Turkey, killing more than 140 people and 

wounding hundreds. Journalists have been fired, detained, prosecuted, and physically attacked. Economic growth has slowed 

sharply, and several factors have left Ankara more isolated in its 

neighborhood. 

The ongoing chaos in Syria, Turkey’s downing of a Russian jet, 

Ankara’s deployment of troops in Iraq without the approval of 

Baghdad, joining a Sunni alliance with the Saudis to counterbalance Iran, but most concerning of all, however, is the ongoing 

conflict with—between the Turkish state and the PKK. 

A string of clashes in the mainly Kurdish region between the 

PKK and Turkish security forces has left hundreds, including 

women and children, dead since the 2-year-old ceasefire broke 

down in July. Areas of the Kurdish region have been subject to 

round-the-clock curfews since then. 

During state-imposed curfews, the wounded have been denied access to medical treatment, neighborhoods have had their water and 

electricity cut, and they have been left without access to food. 

For decades, Turkey’s conflict with the Kurds has hindered Turkey’s democratization. Neither Turkey’s democratization nor the 

Kurdish quest for political rights have occupied an important place 

in U.S. policy toward Ankara and the Kurds. Turkey’s democratic 

shortcomings have been ignored by U.S. administrations for the 

sake of greater geostrategic interests. In a similar fashion, Kurdish 

rights have been overlooked in the game of power politics. 

But as you mention, Mr. Chairman, today’s regional context ties 

Turkish democracy and the peaceful resolution of the Kurdish conflict to U.S. security interests in the region. Turkey still considers 

the PKK and the PKK-linked PYD in Syria a bigger threat than 

the Islamic State. Therefore, Ankara has not played the effective 

role the United States has been seeking from its NATO ally in the 

fight against ISIS. 

Although Turkey has recently stepped up its effort to counter 

ISIS, at times, Ankara worked at direct odds with the U.S. antiISIS strategy by targeting Washington’s most effective partner on 

the ground, the PYD. Turkey’s refusal to engage with the PYD also 

complicates the U.N. talks on ending the Syrian civil war. 

Recently, Turkey has warned the United Nations and the United 

States that it will walk out of the political process if the PYD is 

involved, included among the opposition to the Assad regime, and 

28

the U.N. envoy decided not to invite the PYD to the meetings in 

Geneva. 

The exclusion of the PYD from future meetings is likely to complicate efforts to find a political solution as they are the most powerful Kurdish faction, controlling around 10 percent in Syria. 

If Turkey fails to find a peaceful resolution to its Kurdish question, Ankara will keep attacking the Kurds, rendering U.S. strategy against ISIS less effective and derailing the political process. 

The prospects for both the government and the Kurds to de-escalate the conflict, however, remain slim in 2016. Therefore, it is necessary for the United States to use its leverage over both parties 

to push for a ceasefire and a return to the negotiating table. 

The fighting is likely to intensify in the spring when more PKK 

militants return to Turkey from their winter bases in the mountains. Escalation of the conflict will deal a further blow to Turkey’s 

democracy and harden ethnic identities on both sides, making it 

even more difficult to resume negotiations. It will also undercut 

U.S. efforts to counter ISIS, pursue a political solution to the conflict in Syria, and promote an inclusive government in Iraq. 

Without a rapid political solution to the Kurdish problem, Turkey will remain an ineffective partner in the fight against ISIS, derail future efforts to find a political solution to the Syrian conflict, 

and fail to play a constructive role in Iraq and the region. To secure Turkey’s full cooperation in Syria, Iraq, and the fight against 

ISIS, the United States must use this leverage. Washington has leverage over the PYD and the PKK. 

U.S. cooperation with the PYD has been crucial for the group as 

it boosted the PYD diplomatically and militarily. Washington has 

influence over Ankara as well. After the crisis with Russia and the 

ongoing chaos on its doorstep, Turkey has rediscovered its Western 

allies. Turkey feels threatened by Putin’s actions and values its 

NATO membership more than ever, which gives the United States 

more leverage over Ankara than it had a few months ago. The 

United States could use both Ankara’s current vulnerability and 

isolation in its immediate neighborhood and several trust-building 

measures to secure Ankara’s cooperation. 

As a trust-building measure, the U.S. could redeploy patriot missiles in Turkey. That would ease some of Turkey—Ankara’s security concerns stemming from Syria and show Ankara that the 

United States is committed to Turkey’s security. Washington could 

also eliminate another sticking point in Turkey-U.S. relations. 

Turkey has long opposed engaging the PYD, arguing that it is 

linked to the outlawed PKK and that the PYD fights alongside the 

Assad regime. If Washington can convince the PYD to take a clearer stance against the Assad regime, it might be relatively easier for 

Ankara to drop its opposition to the PYD’s involvement in the political process. 

The PKK sees the conflict in Turkey through the lens of the developments in Syria. The U.S.—the U.S.–PYD cooperation in Syria, 

therefore, is crucial for the PKK’s strategic calculations. The 

United States could use that leverage to pressure the PKK to deescalate the conflict, and that, in turn, could give Ankara a face 

saving way to de-escalate its heavy-handed military operations. 

Thank you. 

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[The prepared statement of Ms. Tol follows:]


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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you all for your testimony today, 

and—so let me just ask the basic question of each of you. Is the 

situation in Turkey a greater concern today than it was a year ago? 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Yes, absolutely. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Sir? 

Mr. CINAR. It is improving, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It is improving, okay. We have got one sort 

of ‘‘not improving,’’ one ‘‘improving,’’ and Dr. Tol? 

Ms. TOL. Turkish democracy——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You have got to push that button. We can’t 

hear you otherwise. 

Ms. TOL. It is certainly worse than it was a year ago. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So we got two votes for worse and one 

vote for better. Oh, improving. Well, better is improving, isn’t it? 

All right. Dr. Tol, your suggestion that we have influence over 

the Kurdish population in Turkey and in their conflict with their 

own government. Could you expand upon that a little bit because 

it seems that your suggestions were predicated on the fact that we 

have that type of influence. 

Ms. TOL. I think, I believe, Mr. Chairman, Washington has leverage not over the Kurdish population, but over the PKK and the 

PYD in Syria, because after the U.S. air-dropped weapons to the 

PYD in 2014, the PYD’s international image has changed. It has 

been transformed. And the PYD today is working very closely with 

the United States in Syria. The PYD have almost become the 

ground troops for the anti-ISIS coalition. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. What would you have us do? What kind of 

pressure would you have us put on them? 

Ms. TOL. I think on the PYD, the U.S. Government could certainly pressure the PYD to take a clearer stance against the Assad 

regime. That has been one of the concerns of Ankara. Recently, 

Prime——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Excuse me. Could you repeat that? A clearer 

stand against——

Ms. TOL. Against the Assad regime. Because recently, Prime 

Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said that one of the reasons why Turkey is opposed to any role for the PYD in the Syrian opposition is 

that the PYD has close links with the Assad regime, and they are 

not. They are fighting alongside the Assad regime. So I believe if 

the PYD takes a clearer stance, then Ankara will have a face-saving way of changing its stance, vis-a`-vis, the PYD. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. And is it the United States’ interest 

that the Assad regime then ceases to exist? Is that what you are 

saying? 

Ms. TOL. Excuse me, could you repeat the question, please. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So you are predicating that on a belief that 

the Assad regime would be better for the United States if the 

Assad regime would collapse and go away? 

Ms. TOL. In my personal opinion, I think it is in the U.S.’s interest and Turkey’s interest to see the Assad regime toppled, but I 

think the Obama administration, its first priority is confronting the 

Islamic State, not toppling the Assad regime. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Well, that is what I was trying to get 

at. It seems to me that the Assad regime, whatever happens there, 

36

it is just like what happened with—too bad our Bush Presidents 

didn’t understand that what Saddam Hussein did within his own 

country wasn’t worth American intervention, and Assad may be 

killing people who want to kill us, and that may be a good thing. 

So what is your assessment of that, Mr. Cinar? 

Mr. CINAR. I mean, for Turkey, ISIS, PKK and PYD are the 

same. Thousands of PKK militants are fighting on the frontlines of 

PYD. The chain of the command for both terror organizations and 

their leaders are related to Mount Qondil. Both adopt Abdullah 

Ocalan, who is the founder of the PKK terrorist organization. And 

I would like to highlight the PYD declaration of 2013 stating the 

PYD is undertaking a revolution to build a democratic society in 

west Kurdistan. Later on, time will come for north Kurdistan, 

which is in Turkey. 

So Turkey is against the PYD because they are, right now, encouraging some Kurdish citizens to declare autonomous, which four 

cities right now is in trouble right now, and start to target to the 

Turkish security personnels. So Turkey is respect to the Turkish 

citizens, but PYD has a different objective showing that they are 

fighting with ISIS, but at the same time, they are collaborating 

right now, PKK, with a big threat to Turkey. 

And as I said on my statement, Turkey is also helping the other 

Kurdish groups, including militarily and also financial aid to the 

Kurdish groups that are also fighting against ISIS. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I think you made your case very well that 

Erdogan’s government, they knew the Government of Turkey had 

some major steps aimed at trying to either of reconciliation or 

reach out to the Kurds. I would like to get Dr.—or Mr. Schenkkan’s 

reaction to that. 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Specifically on the question of outreach to the 

Kurds? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yeah. The gentleman is suggesting—your 

suggestion was is that there is more repression. 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Correct. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And journalists are being thrown in jail, opposition parties are being charged with criminal offenses, you 

know, corruption, et cetera, which I don’t think that ever happens 

here, but it is happening there, and that this gentleman, on the 

other hand, thinks that the government has reached out to the 

Kurds, and there is no excuse——

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Well——

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. For opposition to become violent 

opposition. 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. If I may, the sequence of events, I think, is very 

important, and I wrote about it in my written testimony, which is 

that there was a ceasefire with the PKK, and so if we looked back 

directly a year ago, we would be looking at a period of time when 

the ceasefire was still in effect and when there were negotiations 

ongoing between the Turkish Government, this government, and 

the PKK. 

There were delegations going to visit Abdullah Ocalan in prison 

in order to have his voice be heard in those negotiations, and at 

the end of February, there was a joint announcement by the TurkVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:41 Mar 03, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\020316\98485 SHIRL
37

ish Government and the leaders of the Kurdish movement, members of the HDP, of a roadmap for how to get to peace. 

And we could talk perhaps about whether that roadmap was 

implementable, but it was a roadmap and it was a joint announcement. Three weeks after that, 3 weeks later in March, President 

Erdogan rejected that roadmap, said that he had never been informed about these negotiations, which was never plausible, and 

even these weekend, his deputy prime minister, Bulent Arin, another of the cofounders of the AKP said explicitly he knew about 

the negotiations, he knew exactly what their contents were. 

Why did Erdogan denounce this agreement? I think that is a 

very, very key question. What happened in March 2015? I believe 

that what happened is that Erdogan recognized he would not get 

his constitutional reform, he would not get his Presidential system 

through a negotiation with the Kurdish parties, and if he couldn’t 

get it through the Kurdish parties, the only other source he could 

get it from would be the nationalist parties in Turkey. And therefore, nationalist policy is what he had to pursue, and that is what 

he did pursue from March through June 7 in the first elections 

where he did not succeed in getting a parliamentary majority, and 

then, again, in the new elections. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So it is your position that his turnaround on 

that, what you considered to be a very pivotal negotiation, has actually spurred violence——

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Absolutely. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. In the country and thus created 

a cycle, we have violence, repression, et cetera? 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Absolutely. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. And Mr. Meeks, would you like to 

take over from there? 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me—you know, we 

have got some Americans that may be looking in, and I want to 

make sure that everybody, you know, clearly understands various 

issues. That is important, because we are talking about and trying 

to focus first on the domestic situation within Turkey. 

So during each of your testimony, some talked about the PKK, 

some talked about—and I know I mentioned HDP, some talked 

about PYD, some talked about the Gulen movement, and some 

talked about the Kurdish movement, so—and when we just, I 

think, simplify this to say it is a Kurdish problem, or is there a 

problem within certain sectors within the Kurdish community, is 

that domestic or international, you know, for example, from what 

I am hearing, PKK is not domestic. PKK are outside of the boundaries. We are trying to infiltrate the boundaries of Turkey. 

HPD is part of the government, but they are Kurds and what the 

situation is there. The Gulen movement, what is that, and you 

know, who is involved there? Then the PYD, who is in Syria, and 

then you have the Kurds who are in Iraq and that scenario, so can 

someone just, you know, explain when we are talking about the 

Kurdish problem, what are we talking about, and who are we talking about? 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Sure, if I may. I would separate out the Gulen 

movement. Let’s set that aside for now as a different set of questions that maybe we can come back to later. 

38

The HDP is a political party primarily representing Kurds. Most 

of it is constituents. Most of it is votes come from Kurds, either in 

the southeast or in Istanbul, which actually has the largest Kurdish population in the country, people who have moved to that city. 

The PKK is a Turkish Kurdish organization. Now, its militant 

basis are primarily in northern Iraq, or in northern Syria in areas 

controlled by the PYD, which is very closely affiliated with the 

PKK. 

And so you ask, is it a Kurdish problem? It is. This is a—it is 

such a trope in Turkish politics that everyone says ‘‘the Kurdish 

problem.’’ This is what everyone says for just talking about it, they 

say ‘‘the Kurdish problem.’’

Mr. MEEKS. Let me—I want to make sure everybody is in agreement with what he just said, the other two witnesses. 

Mr. CINAR. Mr. Ranking Member, I don’t agree about the PKK. 

It is a terrorist organization. I just want to make sure. 

Mr. MEEKS. Okay. But do you agree, he said that the PKK is affiliated with the PYD. They are fighting together in the northern 

part of Turkey and Syria and Iraq. Is that correct? So we could 

make sure who is aligned with who. So the PKK is affiliated with 

the PYD, but does not necessarily have anything to do with the 

HDP. Is that correct? 

Ms. TOL. Yes. The PKK is a Turkey-based militant organization——

Mr. MEEKS. Okay. 

Ms. TOL [continuing]. That has been waging a war. 

Mr. MEEKS. So——

Ms. TOL. But the PYD is in Syria. 

Mr. MEEKS. So again, I am just trying to focus right now on the 

focus of this hearing. That is the domestic issues within Turkey, 

okay. 

So if what I am hearing is correct, then Turkey, because—no, let 

me ask another question before I say that. So is the PKK and the 

PYD focused on changing the government in Turkey? And if they 

are focused on changing the government in Turkey, are they focused in doing that in a political process or by a military operation? 

Ms. TOL. May I? The PKK is not focused on—the PKK has a political wing, which is the HDP, and they are in the Parliament 

right now. So they are not interested in toppling the government. 

The Kurds——

Mr. MEEKS. So hold on. I don’t understand. So now you are telling me that the PKK—I mean, the HDP is part of the PKK, but 

they are the political wing of the PKK? 

Ms. TOL. They represent—their base consists of people who are 

sympathetic to the PKK, but it is larger than that. 

Mr. MEEKS. Okay. 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. If I may, similar to the Irish Republican party 

in Sinn Fein. 

Mr. MEEKS. Okay. 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Just as an analogy. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you. 

Mr. CINAR. Yes, HDP is a kind of part of PKK, but Turkey is 

very clear that HDP can’t deal in the Turkish Parliament, not in 

using the PKK. I mean, when we look at right now in four cities, 

39

they declare autonomous administrations in four Turkey cities and 

set up trenches, planted mines or other explosives near barricades, 

and converted houses into a munitions depots near to barricades. 

So every week, 20 Turkish personnel are killed by PKK, and Turkish army right now is taking action against some, not the Kurds. 

Mr. MEEKS. But what I am trying to figure out then, if HDP is 

part of the government, do they have the right to voice their concerns within the government and the freedom to do that as a minority party since they were elected to be part of an existing government and they are now trying to do something militarily 

against the government, as some others, from what I am hearing, 

want to do? 

Mr. CINAR. They do. I mean, they have the right to talk and 

speak at the Turkish Parliament, but the biggest problem, Mr. 

Ranking Member, the HDP leaders are engaging and motivating 

some Kurdish groups in southern part to Turkey to supporting the 

declaration of autonomy. I mean, can you imagine a city in the 

United States, some groups declare autonomy and try to have an 

independent region in the United States? I mean, of course——

Mr. MEEKS. Texas tries it sometimes. 

Mr. CINAR. So this is unacceptable. I mean, there are ways that 

you need to talk in the Turkish Parliament, talk about the investment, how the Turkish Government should bring to investment, 

economic investment to the region. 

Mr. MEEKS. Let me—and I am out of time, but let me just say 

this, in my opinion, because I am just a—in the United States, if 

someone wanted to talk about being autonomous, they could talk 

about it, they could try to gather support for it without it being 

that someone goes to jail or is prosecuted for it. They don’t gain the 

support, they can’t gain the support. 

I can’t imagine them gaining the support to break up the United 

States in that regard. I mean, that happened once in the United 

States history, and that was called the Civil War. But if you ask 

me today, you know, I know, for example, in New York City, one 

of the boroughs, Staten Island, had a movement to separate from 

the city of New York, and the democratic process went on. 

And we didn’t go, you know, against those folks that wanted to 

separate the borough, so all I am trying to understand is the democratic process within the country. Now I understand that if somebody is a terrorist organization outside of militarily trying to overthrow you, the government has the responsibility to protect the 

government, but if you are within the government and within the 

people, you are not doing it in a violent way, then you should have 

the opportunity to voice those concerns. I mean, that is from my 

thought of view, and I yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Meeks. We are going to have 

a little quiz on the meaning of each and every one of those abbreviations, and we get them right. I remember—can we all remember 

LAPD, Los Angeles Police Department, you know. All right. 

Just again, to get more serious, the fact is that we have been 

talking about an area that now, in the last 4 years, has been—and 

especially in the last 8 years, but especially the last 4, have drifted 

into chaos and violence, and hundreds of people, if not thousands 

of people are losing their lives. Some of us are very concerned that 

40

Assad’s hatred—excuse me—that the hatred by Erdogan of Assad, 

for some reason, the regimes hating each other, has, in some way, 

convinced Erdogan, and we are going to go into this in greater detail, that he should be supporting Islamic opponents of the Assad 

regime who may be radicals, and it looks like that to some of us. 

Colonel Cook, could you take over from there? 

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much. Right now, I have PTSD, posttraumatic stress disorder after listening to all the acronyms. The 

question I have for Mr. Schenkkan, and that is, the relationship of 

Erdogan with the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. Can you give 

me your opinion on that? I think there has been a radical shift 

which is affecting a lot of the region, if you can answer that. 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. I will do my best. It is not my area of specialization, but I will say that the now-President Erdogan and his government have pursued a strategy in Syria. Their goal in Syria from 

the beginning was to empower the equivalent of Muslim Brotherhood actors inside Syria. 

Mr. COOK. Yeah, but hasn’t there been a—the whole country, in 

fact, is—and you mentioned or somebody mentioned about how secular it was, perhaps one of the most secular nations in the area, 

and that this shift is going on about Hamas, can you comment 

about Hamas? 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Well, the relations—you know, Hamas has had 

individuals who resided in Turkey at times, and those have been 

tolerated by——

Mr. COOK. Did this contribute to the stress that Israel had with 

that particular country? 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. I am sure it does. 

Mr. COOK. Okay. Moving on a little bit on Erdogan and any activity about the Christians’ persecution. 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Well, Turkey has officially—has officially recognized Christian communities in the Greeks and the Armenians. 

There are still churches. 

Mr. COOK. But would you say that situation has deteriorated? 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. I would not say it has deteriorated in the last 

year. I would say it has always been a very tense and very unpleasant relationship, to say the least. Certainly the ethnic cleansing and the genocide against the Armenians that took place in Turkey is a scar on Turkey’s history. 

Mr. COOK. Okay. One other thing I had, or a couple of things. 

Mr. Chairman, I recommend next time, if we review this, that we 

actually have a joint Foreign Affairs House Armed Services Committee because the hidden elephant right here right now is one of 

our most important NATO allies; at least when I was in Turkey, 

I was really, really disturbed at the restrictions, the restrictions 

that were placed upon our military personnel, particularly in select—other places, and this is huge. And I think we—we have got 

to attack—ask these questions because it is going to affect us, and 

it could just destroy that whole NATO relationship. 

Moving on a little bit, and that is, in regards to the border that—

where so many people have fled through Turkey and what Turkey 

is doing right now to close that off, and I am talking about that 

border, particularly with Syria. Anybody, can they address that 

41

shortly, because I am running out of time, and I have got about 10 

more questions. 

Ms. TOL. Well——

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Go ahead. 

Mr. COOK. Doctor. 

Ms. TOL. Turkey recently stepped up its border patrols. There 

are 330 kilometer of trenches on the border. 

Mr. COOK. Is it working? 

Ms. TOL. There is a war. It is not working because there has 

been—Turkey has been trying—doing more, but on the other hand, 

there are illegal crossings, and we have seen that in the recent Ankara bombing, who the attacker, he crossed into Turkey very easily, so there have been illegal crossings. 

Mr. COOK. Doctor, let me ask you another question. Is Turkey involved with Libya, politics of Libya right now? 

Ms. TOL. Yes. 

Mr. COOK. Could you go into that a little bit? 

Ms. TOL. Yes, it has been working. It has his—it has been working with local Salafi organizations, and Turkey has always——

Mr. COOK. Muslim Brotherhood? 

Ms. TOL. Yes. 

Mr. COOK. Would you characterize it as extreme groups? 

Ms. TOL. They are extreme groups. 

Mr. COOK. I yield back. No further. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So if I could summarize, we have Turkey, 

there are questions about a level of repression, or one gentleman—

one of our witnesses believes the situation has actually gotten better because he points to different negotiations that have taken 

place. 

Our other witness suggests that after negotiations, the President 

reneged on the agreement that was made to make things better. 

So we have an increase of tensions, of killing, of violence. We have 

now the concept of that same government, same person who is in 

power who is involved with providing weapons to people who are 

radical Islamists, whether it is in Libya or whether it is in Syria 

in the name of stopping Assad. So we will go to Mr. Sires. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you for that resume. Thank you for that, Professor. Well, now I got a little bit straight now with these letters, 

but I am still a little bit confused. 

You know, with Turkey, I always look at Turkey as taking one 

step forward and two backwards. I mean, they seem to have come 

a long way, and then this crackdown on journalists, putting people 

in jail for insulting the President, for being against the President, 

I mean, to me, that is just taking two steps backwards, and I think 

it is the oldest playbook in the world where you have an election 

coming up, you go after these people in order to control the outcome. 

So to me, you know, I don’t know. Turkey just is an enigma to 

me. It is a country that has so much potential, and yet they do 

these things, and quite frankly, I don’t even know if Turkey should 

join the EU because the EU is a mess, and you know, they could 

wait a little longer and see what happens with the EU. 

But you know, with all this going in Syria and the amount of refugees and everything else, it seems that Cyprus has been forgotten, 

42

or an effort to bring a solution to Cyprus. Since 1974, the Turkish 

have been in Cyprus. They have about 30,000, 40,000 troops, and 

the Cyprus people seem to have crossing the green line, and millions of times, and just when they are getting a little bit closer to 

come to some sort of understanding, they just walk away. 

I have been to the green line, I have been there, and one of the 

things that I think after 1974 in an effort to bring some sort of solution, I think the Turkish should take down that flag that they 

have on the hill, which is kind of insulting when you have a whole 

side of a hill with a Turkish flag and then they light it up at night. 

I mean, I don’t think that is necessary to have that if you want 

to come to some sort of an understanding and get the Cyprus issue 

resolved. 

So I am just wondering if the economic situation in Turkey gets 

worse, where do we go from here? Do we continue to go after these 

people as an excuse, or do we try to resolve the issues in Turkey? 

Can you——

Ms. TOL. Of course. May I just say a few words on the Cyprus 

negotiations. I think there are negotiations going on between these 

two parties, Greek Cypriots and the Turkey Cypriots, and they are 

both hopeful that something is going to happen this year, but they 

haven’t yet discussed the most contentious issue of Turkish withdrawal of troops. 

So that is going to be a main problem because it has to be a solution that Erdogan can agree to. And on your question about economy——

Mr. SIRES. How can you have a solution when you are wanting 

to leave the troops there? 

Ms. TOL. Yes, that is——

Mr. SIRES. That is the problem. 

Ms. TOL. Yes. They haven’t discussed that yet, and it is going to 

be a problem. And on the question of economy, I think that could 

be a good thing for Turkish democracy. An economic crisis could be 

a good thing for Turkish democracy because contrary to many people—what many people in DC believe, the people in Turkey, those 

who are voting for the AKP, they are not voting for the AKP because they have Islamist suits, or Islamist values. They vote for 

bread-and-butter issues, so—and we have seen that in June. Many 

people thought that Erdogan—it was not possible to beat Erdogan, 

but in June, in fact, the party lost its parliamentary majority, so 

it can happen. 

So if there is a problem in Turkish economy, I think we will see 

the weakening of the AKP, and which I believe will translate into 

a better democratic—more democratic country. 

Mr. SIRES. Mr. Cinar. 

Mr. CINAR. Congressman, regarding the Cyprus, as you know, 

during the Kofi Annan, the original Kofi Annan term, there was a 

referendum, and then the Greek Cypriots declined to reunification 

for—with the north part. So I mean, if the Turkish army has to 

leave the island before they agree each other, it seems like State 

Department and the administration, I think, is working right now 

with all parties to get some negotiations, and the President of the 

northern Cyprus are also optimistic to might get reunification on 

the island. 

43

Regarding the economy. When you look at the, as you said, European Union, they are still in trouble. Turkey is doing much better 

compared with the other countries, so it seems like Turkish economy is still stable. We don’t—I don’t think so, there will be a recession in 2016, and they are taking also more investment plans for 

this year. 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Well, I will just speak on the question of the 

economy and whether Turkish voters get a chance to have a say 

again. 

The issue is that Turkey has been through a run of elections 

now, four elections in 2 years, and they don’t have more unless the 

government decides to call early elections. So essentially, the political agenda at this point is whether the AKP, the President 

Erdogan’s party, can reach the super majority necessary to call a 

constitutional referendum on a Presidential system. 

And if such a referendum is called, that would be the next moment when we find out whether President Erdogan still has a mandate. But barring that or barring early elections, we don’t have another vote when there is a time that this train stops. 

Mr. SIRES. Just one last question. It seems that Turkey seems to 

depend on Russia for about 20, 25 percent of its energy. I would 

just warn Turkey that the Russians cut off the gas to the Ukraine 

in the middle of winter, so I would be a little bit concerned knocking down their planes. 

Thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Marino. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you, Chairman. 

Good afternoon, and thank you for being here. 

Turkey is clearly the linchpin of American interests and policies 

in many areas. Turkey is an ally of the U.S., and we appreciate 

that relationship. I have been to Turkey, I have been to Istanbul, 

the people and the government were extremely generous to our 

codel that visited there. 

I do have a concern about the restrictions concerning U.S. military personnel in Turkey, and I hope that the President takes that 

into very serious consideration when addressing the relationship 

with the U.S. 

But I want to switch gears here a little bit. I want to talk about 

Turkey’s relationship with Russia via Turkey’s relationship with 

the United States. Just recently, Defense Secretary Carter said 

that Russia is one of the top threats to global order. In fact, he put 

ISIS down, I think, either third or fourth on that. 

I would like you to give me some insight, each of you, and I 

would like to start with Dr. Tol, ladies before gentlemen, what you 

see are Turkey’s relationship with the United States and then Turkey’s relationship with Russia concerning the interests of the 

United States. You understand my question? 

Ms. TOL. Sure. 

Mr. MARINO. Please. 

Ms. TOL. Turkey, as Mr. Congressman just mentioned, Turkey is 

dependent on Russian energy, and that has made things very difficult for Turkey. And that was one of the reasons why Turkey 

could be able to compartmentalize its relations with Russia despite 

44

different stances in Syria until very recently, until Turkey shot 

down a Russian jet. 

Mr. MARINO. That was in Turkey’s airspace. 

Ms. TOL. Yes. But it had happened many times. It just happened 

recently again. 

I think, right now, the main concern for Turkey in Turkey-Russia 

relations is what Russia is doing in Syria. So the Russian military 

buildup poses a great challenge for Turkey’s strategy in Syria. Turkey has been asking for a no-fly zone in northern Syria, and now 

there is a no-fly zone, a de facto no-fly zone enforced by Russia. 

Turkish planes cannot fly in northern Syria because of the Russian 

S–400 missiles. 

And the Russians, they are attacking the Turkey-backed Syrian 

opposition groups. They are attacking the Turkmen. The Turkmen, 

they are ethnically related to Turkey, and they have almost been 

Turkey’s B plan in Syria. They have been training them militarily. 

They have been working with them closely. And Russians, they 

have been bombing them. 

So Russian military buildup in Syria has been a great challenge 

for Turkey. And also in Iraq, Russia is trying to play an important 

role in the region that really make things very difficult for Turkey’s 

Middle East policy. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you. 

Mr. Cinar. 

Mr. CINAR. So Congressman, regarding the U.S.-Turkish from 

the military aspect, I would like to share a small quote from the 

General John Allen, what he said on the testimony on the Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee. 

He said, we must not forget the Turkish Government, a critical 

partner in this fight, which recently increased its participation in 

the coalition, opening its bases to U.S. and other coalition members, and conducting air strikes on ISIL targets inside Syria alongside other coalition aircraft. This cooperation has already had an 

impact and will continue to have significant impact on our operations in Syria. 

So when we look at Russia right now and the Pentagon also, 

when I look at the statements, Pentagon also said Russia air 

strikes are not targeting the ISIL 100 percent. 80 percent of the 

air strikes, Russian air strikes targeting the Assad regime’s opponents. And we know the United States and the other coalition’s 

strategy on fighting against ISIS and Turkey’s on that coalition. 

So there is actually right now a big argument between both 

sides. And I believe Turkey and United States will have a much 

stronger military strategic partnership in this year. 

Mr. MARINO. Mr. Schenkkan. 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Thank you. I will follow on what Mr. Cinar 

said. 

I think there is a temptation to see Russia as an ally in Syria 

because of the Russian messaging about what its goals are in 

Syria, but I think the fact is, Russia, under its current government, 

defines its interests in terms of opposition to the West. This is how 

the current government of Russia defines its interests, whether it 

is in Syria, or whether it is Ukraine or in Europe. 

45

And given that, it is impossible to see how those interests are 

going to converge. Russia will move its goals if it sees them converging with the United States, because its goal is to increase its 

leverage against the United States in any possible outcome in 

Syria. 

Mr. MARINO. I see my time is expired. Thank you very much. 

Yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We will have another hearing on Russia to 

go through those issues, whether or not Russia is basing its policies 

on what criteria. Some people think that we have pushed Russia 

in that direction with an endless hostility. Others believe that Russia is just playing on its heritage of, for the last 100 years of being 

an adversary of the United States. 

Mr. MARINO. I look forward to that. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So we will have an honest discussion on that. 

Both sides will always be presented in my hearings. 

Ms. Gabbard. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Schenkkan, I will start with you, if you can talk about Turkey’s standing within NATO. I think both you and Dr. Tol have 

talked about different examples of where Turkey has worked in a 

direct opposite manner to the objectives that the United States and 

our NATO allies are working toward in the effort to defeat ISIS. 

Why is it that stronger accountability measures have not been 

taken against Turkey from different NATO allies with respect to 

the open border with Syria and the continued open flow of foreign 

fighters who are going and working with ISIS, al-Qaeda, al-Nusra, 

and other Islamic extremist groups in Syria, who are working to 

overthrow Assad so that they can take over all of Syria and establish their caliphate, the direct and indirect support that Turkey 

provides to some of these Islamic extremist groups who are fighting 

toward that end in Syria, and Turkey’s focus on defeating the 

Kurds rather than standing with NATO allies and the United 

States against ISIS? 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Thank you. 

I think the Turkish relationship with NATO has certainly been 

extremely complicated by the war in Syria. Turkey has seen its interests in Syria as diverging at times from what NATO interests 

are. I would argue, however, that Turkey has—and this is despite 

the fact that I have been very critical of Turkish Government, as 

you can see in my testimony, domestically. 

The Turkish Government has, in fact, changed its policies regarding the border. It has taken steps to attempt to seal——

Ms. GABBARD. Why haven’t they closed it after all this time and 

as strong of a military as Turkey has? Why have they not closed 

the border and stopped these foreign fighters from coming in and 

out and going back into Europe? 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. They would be the ones to answer specifically. 

But my opinion would be many of those fighters that are fighting 

in Aleppo, for instance, and who lost their corridor today are also 

being supported by the United States. 

Ms. GABBARD. Well, it is a problem. 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. But that is a question then not of diverging 

from NATO strategy or United States strategy. That is a question 

46

of NATO or United States strategy. So I don’t think it is simply 

that Turkey has gone off on its own tangent completely in opposition to what NATO or the United States have been trying to do. 

What NATO and the United States have been trying to do in 

Syria has been a moving target, and it has changed. It clearly continues to evolve, and it can be at times hard to say what the goals 

are. 

Ms. GABBARD. Mr. Cinar, can you comment on that? 

Mr. CINAR. Sure. 

Congresswoman, first of all, Turkey is not defeating the Kurds. 

They are defeating the PKK terrorists. So I just want to——

Ms. GABBARD. But to Dr. Tol’s point, they are working against 

to defeat some of the very same Kurdish groups who are fighting 

against ISIS on the ground in northern Syria. 

Mr. CINAR. Correct. So it is linked with the PYD. That is why, 

for Turkey, it is a terrorist organization, same as ISIS. 

Regarding the border security, yes, you are right, Turkey needs 

to improve securing the border. And it seems like there is a much 

stronger cooperation with U.S. and other allies. 

And also, let’s keep in mind that most of the fighters are coming 

from the west side, especially from the European side. And if they 

have the British passports, French passports, and if Turkey doesn’t 

get intelligence sharing from Europe, then Turkey is not to stop 

them at the borders, and they are going to just use the Turkish as 

a bridge. 

So it is very important that Europe also share the strong intelligence with Turkey. 

Ms. GABBARD. Are you saying that Turkey, if there is someone 

with a British or French passport coming in through Turkey and 

attempting to enter Syria, that there is some form of—that they 

are marking that down; that they know which British and French 

and foreign fighters are coming through Turkey and to Syria, and 

then therefore able to provide that intelligence back into the EU 

and other countries? 

Mr. CINAR. No. If they get notified by Europe——

Ms. GABBARD. But if they don’t know, if these people haven’t 

been identified in the EU prior to their going through Turkey to 

fight in Syria with groups like ISIS——

Mr. CINAR. Right. If they have a British passport and if Turkey 

doesn’t know that they are ISIS volunteers or fans, and if they 

don’t get notification from the origin country, how can Turkey stop 

them at the border? So I think it is an intelligence sharing issue 

that both parties need to solve that. 

Ms. GABBARD. So you are saying that they are enforcing the border, just not stopping these foreign fighters from going through. Is 

that what you are saying? 

Mr. CINAR. Correct. Intelligence sharing——

Ms. GABBARD. So the border is enforced by Turkey? 

Mr. CINAR. It is 511 kilometers. It is a long border. 

Ms. GABBARD. So the 97 kilometers that President Obama talked 

about and others have admitted that Turkey is not enforcing on the 

border, that is completely closed and enforced at this point? 

47

Mr. CINAR. It is not completely closed, but what I see is from the 

State Department statements, ISIS start to encourage some of 

them to go to Libya or North Africa countries to join the ISIS. 

Ms. GABBARD. So that just goes to my point that Turkey has no 

excuse for allowing these openings in their border, which further 

helps these Islamic extremist groups. 

Mr. CINAR. Right. No excuse, but with the support of the European allies. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

Ms. TOL. While both the U.S. and European countries have been 

pushing Turkey to close the border, in May 2015 Turkey closed the 

last two border crossings. I think it is a matter of capability and 

political will. Compared to last year, the political will is, I think, 

there, but there are still illegal crossings and the security forces on 

the border, they are turning a blind eye to those illegal crossings. 

And I think Turkey has been doing more, and I think it could 

do more. But I think the Turkey security forces are overstretched, 

because they have been waging the war against the PKK. And secondly, your question about why Turkey is attacking the Kurds in 

Syria, it all goes back to Turkey’s domestic drivers. I mean, one of 

the reasons why the ceasefire broke down was Turkey’s fear of the 

PYD’s empowerment. 

The Kurds, they have been one of the main beneficiaries of our 

uprisings. They are very strong. The PYD has become a close ally 

of the United States and Syria. Europeans, they have been supporting that. So this heightened Turkey’s fear of an independent 

Kurdistan and other entity, autonomous entity on its doorstep. 

And that is why, I think, that is one of the reasons why Turkey 

is being very unwilling to go back to the negotiating table with the 

Kurds, and that is why Turkey attacked the PYD. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If at some point in the future you 

were to hold a hearing on this, on the Kurds, specifically, I think 

it would give us a good opportunity to really dive into the situation 

so that we can hear from all sides and understand. 

While we hear what Turkey says and why they are attacking the 

Kurds, from the Kurdish perspective. We saw in the recent elections how the HDP, as soon as they won enough seats in Parliament to threaten Erdogan’s power were manipulated, the elections were manipulated and things turned out to that Erdogan was 

able to maintain his situation. So I hope that in the future we will 

have the opportunity to dig into that further. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We always appreciate everyone on this committee, your correction and guidance and suggestions. In this case, 

I will check to see if we have jurisdiction to hold such a hearing. 

Kurds may or may not, but the fact that the Kurds are part of Turkey, you know, at least there is a connection there, because this is 

not the Middle East, of course, subcommittee. But I will check to 

see if we can get permission to do that and appreciate that suggestion from you. 

We now have Mr. Connolly, who will make his disagreement 

with the chair absolutely clear. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank my friend. 

48

You know, I sometimes wonder on our committee, when we talk 

about Turkey, whether we can step back a little bit and look at 

context and attributes as opposed to looking for fault only, none of 

which is to diminish the legitimate concerns all of us have about 

various trends in Turkey, and about the role of President Erdogan 

and his philosophy about accreting power and how to use it. 

Turkey is, and has been, a reliable NATO ally since the founding 

of NATO. Turkey has been an interlocutor between Israel and its 

neighbors in the Middle East, and has played a pivotal and positive 

role in that regard since the founding of the State of Israel. It has 

accepted 2 million refugees from Syria without much help from the 

international community, 2 million. 

It shares an enormous border with Syria and an enormous border with Iran. It is a dangerous neighborhood. It is key to a Cyprus 

settlement. There won’t be a Cyprus settlement if we are not involved in Turkey in a meaningful way. 

We share a military base on Turkish soil. Mr. Schenkkan mentioned four elections in the last 2 years. I believe, Mr. Schenkkan, 

I am right, that our own State Department has said, by and large, 

they have been free and fair. 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. I will not speak to—the OSCE has said they 

were free but questioned the fairness in it. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, I sometimes question our elections, how 

fair they are, but, I mean—it is not perfect, but where else in the 

region can you point to? And I will point out Erdogan suffered, in 

a sense arguably, two losses: First one outright; the second one, 

you know, he didn’t get the super majority he wanted and needed 

because the voters in Turkey had a different point of view. 

None of this is to whitewash real issues, but there is a context 

here. We want to make Turkey a more stable democratic state. It 

is in our interest to have European integration with Turkey, not 

to push it away. 

History has a lot of umps and a lot of tragedies, and it should 

be recognized. But it shouldn’t be dispositive. We are where we are, 

and this relationship is a critical one. Let’s not kick it away. 

Having said that, Mr. Schenkkan, you outlined concerns and I 

share your concerns. There are anti-democratic impulses that have 

manifested themselves in Erdogan’s own approach with respect to 

the press, with respect to dissent. And, you know, I guess I invite 

you to comment on that a little bit, and the other two witnesses 

as well. 

How worried should we be about that? And are there countervailing forces that can be looked to to try to redress what is, in 

fact, happening in Turkey? From this distance, it is alarming. 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Thank you. It is very alarming, and I think we 

should be very worried. I think the return to violence and a return 

to an open conflict inside the country comes on top of what was already a very grave situation. 

You asked, are there things within the society that might hold 

it back? Yes, there are. Turkey is a diverse country. It is a pluralist 

country. You are correct to note that the electoral system functions 

better than many other electoral systems in the neighborhood. 

There are major concerns about the media environment and how 

49

that affects the ability for voters to access information or to make 

judgments fairly. 

But there is diversity, there is still outspokenness in Turkish society, even though it is punished quite frequently. So I do think 

there is some hope, but it is grim and it is getting grimmer. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Cinar. 

Mr. CINAR. Congressman, yes, there are some issues in Turkey 

and, as I said, there are some improvements that I see. 

And I will give you an example about the freedom. Recently I 

was on the discussion many times about academic freedom. Freedom of expression is safeguarded in the Turkish constitution, legislation. Yet, it goes without saying that academic freedom shouldn’t 

be abused for political ends. 

Article 130 of the Turkish constitution clearly states, and I quote,

‘‘Universities and members of the teaching staff, and their assistants may freely engage in all kinds of scientific research 

and publication. However, this shall not include the liberty to 

engage in activities against the existence and independence of 

the state, and against integrity and indivisibility of the nation 

and the country.’’

So since I don’t have the media credentials and I sometimes 

write articles, and I respect my colleagues and journalists, but 

some of them, if they are sharing the national intelligence information to the public, then the 

Turkish Government says that it is illegal, they can’t do that. So 

there is lots of discussion going on. I mean, there should be an improvement on that sense. 

But there are also regulations that there is no threat for the 

Turkish unity in the country. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman, if I might be allowed just two 

more points. One is just to comment on Mr. Schenkkan, what you 

talked about Russia and Syria, and you characterize their behavior 

as just anti-West. They don’t like us. And I guess I would respectfully suggest to you it is maybe a little more than that. 

I mean, Syria sends Hafez al-Assad, was the Soviet Union’s one 

client state in the region, and that goes back to 1970. So almost 

50 years of investment. They have got a military presence in Syria. 

It is all they got. And Putin, in a long tradition, now a Russian tradition, previously a Soviet tradition, doesn’t want to give it up, and 

is going to fight and can be expected to fight. 

I am not justifying his behavior at all, but, I mean, I think it is 

more that than it is culturally anti-West. I think it is protecting 

Russian interests, perceived interests that is fueling a lot of his behavior with respect to Syria. I mean, I wouldn’t deny either there 

is a patina of anti-Western bias and chip on the shoulder that 

Putin has, no question about it, but I do think they are looking at 

this not so much from a cultural, even political point of view, it is 

a geostrategic point of view where if they lose that, they lose all 

toehold in the region. And they don’t want to do that. 

And you may want to comment, but before you do, just one more 

thing, and then I will cease and desist, Mr. Chairman. I would like 

all of you to have an opportunity if you wish, from the United 

States point of view, and I worry how much this causes friction in 

50

our relationship with Turkey, increasingly here, certainly in the 

Congress, I think, we see the Peshmerga as a very positive force 

with which we can work. They are pro-American; they are willing 

to fight; they will gain territory; why wouldn’t we partner with 

them, equip them, train them, and help them along the way in recapturing lost ground to ISIL? And I sense that that puts us on a 

collision course, frankly, with the Government of Turkey, because 

they don’t distinguish between PKK and the Peshmerga. 

And we most certainly do. And with that, I will be quiet, and if 

the chairman will indulge, to allow the panel to respond. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you very much. I will have to say 

that this is somewhat of a miracle hearing my distinguished colleague from Virginia giving the benefit of the doubt to squirrellish 

charges against the Putin regime, for giving benefit of the doubt to 

the Putin regime on this. They are just being mean and nasty because they are mean and nasty, not because of their habitually 

being mean and nasty. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yeah. Let’s not go crazy, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. And let me note that this hearing 

has been very good and that we have now some challenges ahead 

of us: One is to have a hearing specifically on the Kurds, and all 

of these issues dealing with the Kurds. We will also have a hearing 

and, again, every one of my hearings we try to have both sides represented, I insist on that, and to give everybody a chance to make 

their case. So we will have one from Russia as well. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman, I don’t think any of us on our side 

of the aisle would ever question how fair you have been. No question about it. I just wonder if he will indulge the panel to respond 

to that last point. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Go right ahead. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Sure. Regarding Russia just briefly, I didn’t 

mean to imply that this is a culture war or that there is some kind 

of a central Russianess that leads it into conflict with the west. I 

think your characterization is correct. However, I would argue that 

the Russian definition, this current Russian Government’s definition of its interest is whether its gains vis-a`-vis the West. 

And so it simply can’t align them right now with the United 

States because it constantly redefines them in terms of its position 

and its status vis-a`-vis the United States and that makes it—you 

know, I know the Secretary of State and others are always seeking 

nonzero-sum outcomes, but you can’t have a nonzero-sum outcome 

if the other partner is changing the equation. 

And I will leave the other question. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, actually——

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Oh, regarding the Peshmerga and the PYD. My 

understanding is that the United States is working closely with the 

PYD in northern Syria. They are working closely with them not 

only as spotters for aerial operations, but also probably providing 

weapons, and perhaps even providing training or other kinds of 

support. 

That seems to be certainly the most effective in that region of 

Syria in the fight against ISIS. One of the core questions, however, 

is that not all of these parts of Syria, where ISIS, where the IsVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:41 Mar 03, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\020316\98485 SHIRL
51

lamic State is successful and operational, are Kurdish areas. They 

are not inhabited majority by Kurds. 

And so a Kurdish group, a Kurdish militia will not have the legitimacy to hold those areas, even if they are cleared of the Islamic 

State. And that makes it very difficult to say that we can simply 

outsource this work onto the PYD and say that is how we solve the 

Islamic State problem. There have to be Sunni Arab allies for the 

United States in Syria. 

And as Congresswoman Gabbard was suggesting, yes, some of 

these are Islamist groups, if not all of them at this point. And that 

is the tough choice that the United States is dealing with in its policy inside Syria. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I want to give the other two panelists a 1-

minute summary of what you would like to finish up the hearing 

with. Go right ahead. 

Mr. CINAR. Congressman, regarding the Peshmerga and Turkey, 

I just want to give the facts. Turkey loaned $500 million to Turkish 

regional government to help meet the budgetary needs of the government. So, in addition to financial support, Turkey continues to 

protect the military support to the Kurdish Peshmerga forces. So 

it is not the PYD issue, but Turkey supporting the other Kurdish 

groups that are fighting against ISIS. 

So far, Turkey has also trained and equipped over 2,300 

Peshmerga forces, and transferred to Peshmerga from northern 

Iraq to Syria to Turkey. As you said, Turkey shouldn’t kick it 

away. Turkey shouldn’t be punished. I mean, unfortunately, Turkey is not doing a great PR, what they are doing right now. 

So Turkey and United States should be closely working. Military 

strategic partnership should be improved this year and beyond, and 

I believe that with these kind of hearings and collaborations, both 

administration will improve their relationship. Thank you. 

Ms. TOL. Mr. Congressman, you mentioned that you would like 

Turkey to be a stable and a democratic country. I believe Turkey 

will not be a stable country until it is democratic. Yes, you are 

right, the elections were free, but it is an electoral democracy, and 

there is more to democracy. Freedom of expression is one of the 

most fundamental pillars of democracy and it is lacking. 

And even in this room, I can count at least two people who have 

been victimized by a lack of freedom of expression and media freedom and were fired because of their critical views of the government. 

And it is not just a matter of lack of freedom of expression or 

media freedom, but basic rights and freedoms are missing. And 

that is why there is a Kurdish political movement that is fighting, 

and that is why we have 200 civilians who were killed in a matter 

of a few months. 

Those people, they are not asking to topple the regime. They are 

not looking for a new regime. All they are asking for is they want 

to be able to have the right to have an education in Kurdish. They 

want a new definition of citizenship, a civic definition of citizenship 

that is not ethnocentric. And they want to revise the vague definition of antiterrorism law because they have been victimized by that 

law. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. We agree, Dr. Tol. 

52

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

And we are going to have two summaries, one by Mr. Meeks and 

then myself, and then we will close the hearing. Thank you. 

Mr. MEEKS. And I will be very brief. 

I want to thank the witnesses. And I think in just listening and 

in trying to educate ourselves, you have helped us tremendously. 

And if I was to summarize where we are in the conversation that 

we have had, I think I could do it in one word, well, two words: 

It is complicated. 

For sure, I believe that Turkey has to look out for its own national interests, and that if there was an extremist group that was 

attacking it, et cetera, just as we would in the United States, that 

Turkey has to do what Turkey has to do to make sure it preserves 

its government in moving forward. 

But I also believe that the people, just as Dr. Tol had talked 

about, should have the right to dissent and to give their viewpoints 

and to run in government, and if they get elected, to participate 

without fear of being persecuted or prosecuted, that that is what 

a democratic society is all about. 

And from what I have heard, and I just think three excellent witnesses, Mr. Chairman, and the perspectives that you have come 

from is that we have got to try to figure it out. But most importantly, the Turkish people have to try to—what I call the Turkish 

people, if you are living in Turkey, whether you are Kurd or not. 

I am talking about the Turkish people, everyone that is there who 

are citizens of Turkey, have to figure out how to get to a table, you 

work it out, and you resolve these differences, because it is important not only for Turkey but in a glowing and interconnected world, 

it is important for the entire region and, thereby, really important 

for every one of us. 

So, again, thank you for really good insights and helping this 

committee understand what is going on domestically in Turkey. 

Thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Meeks. We will 

both do a little course before we have the next hearing on what all 

those abbreviations mean, those different designations. It does get 

complicated. It gets real complicated. 

Let me just note, again, thank you to the witnesses. We have had 

some interesting discussion. We have also basically brought forward the need for two other hearings that this chairman and the 

ranking member will work on, in terms of just one, just specifically 

about the Kurds, specifically dealing with the Kurds, wherever 

they are in that region, then one specifically about Russia. And we 

will have, again, witnesses on both sides of the issues dealing with 

those particular entities. 

Let me just say, that in terms of this issue today, the reason for 

this hearing, it is evident to some of us—and I am glad we had another witness to explain that there are some other perspectives on 

this, but that Turkey is going in the wrong direction. And I am 

very happy, as I say, that Mr. Cinar actually, you know, was able 

to present some of the positive sides that we should certainly look 

into and make that part of our decision-making process. 

But those of us who are concerned, we see a President trying to 

change the law to extend his rule. I will have to say that I just visVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:41 Mar 03, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\020316\98485 SHIRL
53

ited Mt. Vernon with my children. God blessed me and my family 

with triplets 11 years ago, so I brought them up to Mt. Vernon. 

And one of the great things that we had in this country was the 

fact that our first President set down the custom and then it became law after FDR violated the custom, which is that a President 

last two terms. Eight years, that is enough to be President. And 

after that it begins to corrupt. 

And I think that we are beginning to see that, signs of either corruption or corruption of power, not just money, but of power, desire 

for power taking place in Turkey. And we see also the incredible 

problems that are going on right now and that have been going on 

with Turkey. 

There has always been this drug trafficking that has gone across 

Turkey that has corrupted their society. Human trafficking is a 

huge problem and a lot of the traffickers come through Turkey and 

go right into Albania and the Balkans. And that, too, should be an 

issue of concern to us. 

And, of course, we see that Turkey, instead of playing the part 

of we are a more democratic Islamic country, thus we are going to 

become a force for moderation and reconciliation to try to find 

peaceful solutions, we more and more find Turkey looking toward 

the military and saying, actually, we are going to side with one 

radical group or another, or even decide that they are going to 

shoot down a Russian airplane that was over their territory for 30 

seconds after it had already left. 

And let me just note, American planes and all across the place 

cross people’s borders all the time. Of course, this was in a combat 

mission. That plane was in a combat mission. We know that. But 

it was in a combat mission in order—and here is another thing 

that we will be looking into—whether or not—when we are talking 

about Assad and his whole relationship to Turkey and Syria, the 

leaders of these two countries, which obviously are looking at each 

other as enemies, whether or not simply becoming an enemy of 

Assad means that those forces that are being bombed are, in some 

way, democratic as compared to radical Islamic, as well as 

Erdogan’s assessment that the Kurds are, by definition, because 

they are against him, they are in some way radical. 

This is an economy that is—there are connections here in logic 

that need to be examined to see if that, in any way, is attached to 

reality or if this isn’t just people excusing their own military action 

against whatever group is against them. 

I would suggest—and we will go into—again, whether or not 

Assad—those people against Assad—I am sure some of them are 

very democratic, but frankly we heard the same in Libya and we 

have heard the same in other countries, that it is better sometimes 

not to help overthrow a dictator unless we know that there will be 

a democratic government that will replace it instead of a radical Islamic government that wants to be allied with people who want to 

hurt us. 

And that is why when that plane was shot down over Turkey, 

I assume that that plane would have ended up killing terrorists 

who want to kill us. And if that was the case, that was not something a friend of the United States should be doing as keeping alive 

those kind of people. 

54

Finally, let us note this: There are, as I said, I think, and it is 

clear, that there are people in Turkey, the opposition, loyal Turks, 

people who love their country, who are very concerned that their 

country is not becoming more democratic or it is actually becoming 

less democratic and that there are more controls on journalists 

than there were before. Clearly there is more control on journalists 

now than there were before. 

And also, on opposition, for example, the Gulenists, I guess that 

is how you pronounce it, and we have looked into those people and 

they were a very legitimate opposition. In any other democratic society, they would have been a perfectly acceptable part of the national debate. 

Erdogan’s regime has declared them the enemy, and they have 

been arrested. They have been persecuted basically. And this is a 

group of people, yes, they have a tie of sort of a liberalization philosophy and a humanitarian philosophy, and they are Islamists, 

but having them repressed, I mean, they had basically been declared the enemy of the government there, just because they disagreed with what the government wants and is trying to educate 

people to an alternative. That is somewhat similar to the Falun 

Gong in China who are brutally repressed and actually murdered 

by the Chinese Government. 

These are things that we need to talk about, we need to bring 

out to public debate. And let us hope that—and I am going to close 

it with this—let us hope that Turkey does go in the right direction. 

For those of us who, over the years—and I have visited Turkey 

many, many times. During the Cold War, I visited Turkey many 

times and was so proud that they were standing with us at a time 

when it was the Soviet Union and not Russia. 

The Soviet Union had targeted Turkey. They were putting millions of dollars and undermining that government and their freedom and their independence as much as they possibly could do, and 

the Turkish people stood tall. And we shouldn’t ever forget that 

unanimity we had, that support that we had when it really counted 

from the people of Turkey. 

So with that, we close the hearing. It is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:53 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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