J-S44045-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: N.M.P., a 

Minor

APPEAL OF: A.V.P., Mother

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 3657 EDA 2015

 

Appeal from the Decree entered October 27, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000257-2015,

CP-51-DP-0002517-2013

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., STABILE and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED JUNE 30, 2016

A.V.P. (“Mother”) appeals from the Decree granting the Petition filed 

by the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”), seeking to 

involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights to her son, N.M.P. (born in 

August of 2013) (hereinafter, “Child”), pursuant the Adoption Act, 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), and to change Child’s 

permanency goal from reunification to adoption, pursuant to the Juvenile 

Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351.

1

 We affirm.

On April 27, 2015, DHS filed the Petition to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights to Child (hereinafter, “the Petition”). The trial court held an 

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1

In a separate Decree entered on October 27, 2015, the trial court 

terminated the parental rights of Child’s unknown father. Additionally, the 

trial court entered an Order, on that same date, withdrawing the Petition for 

involuntary termination that DHS had filed against J.J., who was previously 

designated as Child’s father, as there is no father listed on Child’s birth 

certificate.
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evidentiary hearing on the Petition on October 27, 2015. At the hearing, 

DHS presented the testimony of Melanie Handberry (“Handberry”), the 

Associacion Puertorriquenos en Marcha (“APM”) – Community Umbrella 

Agency (“CUA”) supervisor. N.T., 10/27/15, at 9. DHS then presented the 

testimony of Bessie Lee, the DHS social worker assigned to the case. Id. at 

36. Mother testified on her own behalf. Id. at 38.

The trial court found that Mother has another child, N., and Mother’s 

rights were terminated as to N. on June 13, 2013. Trial Court Opinion, 

12/29/15, at 1; N.T., 10/27/15, at 9.2 Additionally, the trial court noted that 

Judge Walter Olszewski previously made a finding of aggravated 

circumstances regarding Child on June 17, 2014, based on the termination 

of Mother’s parental rights to N. Trial Court Opinion, 12/29/15, at 1; N.T., 

10/27/15, at 9. 

The trial court set forth the remaining factual background and 

procedural history as follows: 

On [December 20,] 2013[, Child, who was approximately three 

months old,] arrived at St. Christopher’s Hospital [in 

Philadelphia] dehydrated and losing weight. Mother was 

incoherent and unable to respond. DHS [thereafter] obtained 

[an Order of protective custody concerning Child,] and sought 

emergency placement. (N.T.[, 10/27/15, at] 10);

[On] January 7, 2014[, Child] was adjudicated [d]ependent[, 

and committed to the care of DHS.] ([Id. at] 11);

____________________________________________

2 N. was adopted by Child’s maternal aunt and uncle. N.T., 10/27/15, at 33.
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[On] January 17, 2014[, a permanency] planning [meeting was 

conducted, wherein DHS] set goals for [M]other to attend mental 

health treatment and seek reunification. Mother was invited to 

[the] planning meeting[, but] failed to appear. Mother’s 

objectives were to attend mental health services at CO[MH]AR,[3]

[] attend [the Clinical Evaluation Unit (“CEU”)] for a drug screen 

[and] assessment[, have a Behavioral Health Services] consult 

and evaluation, comply with CUA services[,] and ... comply with 

court[-]ordered visitation. ([Id. at] 12);

Mother failed to attend drug and alcohol treatment[.] ([Id. at] 

13);

[On] April [20,] 2014[,] Mother appeared at CEU for [a] drug 

screen[;] she tested positive for [m]arijuana and PCP. [Mother 

t]hen never appeared for another assessment or drug screen[.] 

([Id.]);

Mother [participated in mental health [treatment] at CO[MH]AR 

and PATHWAYS. She was discharged from CO[MH]AR after an 

altercation with staff. She was also discharged from PATHWAYS 

for non[-]compliance. Mother [has] a mental health diagnosis of 

[bip]olar disorder and [s]chizophrenia[.] ([Id. at] 13-14);

Mother attended supervised visitation with [C]hild for 2-3 

months. This visitation was suspended in April 2014[,] after 

[M]other attempted to stuff [C]hild down her pants and leave 

the [CUA] building[.] ([Id. at] 15). 

[Also in April 2014, Child was placed with his pre-adoptive foster 

mother, with whom Child currently resides. Id. at 18-19.]

Mother was offered reinstatement of visitation if she complied 

with a parenting capacity evaluation[; however,] [M]other 

refused[.] ([Id.] at 15);

[Mother’s visitation of Child was reinstated in February 2015; 

however, she never requested to visit Child. Id. at 60.]

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3 COMHAR (the Community Organization for Mental Health and 

Rehabilitation) is a mental health treatment facility located in Philadelphia.
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Mother has been minimally cooperative with CUA, resurfacing 

periodically to supply contact information[,] but [she] then 

[would] not respond to agency attempts to communicate[.] 

([Id. at] 16);

Mother has never completed any of her single case plan 

objectives[.] ([Id.]);

As of [the] date of [the] termination hearing, [October 27, 2015, 

C]hild has had no interaction with [M]other since her attempt to 

abduct him ... in April 2014 [(]or 18 months[.)] ([Id.]);

Child is thriving in [his] foster home and has bonded with [his] 

foster family[.] ([Id. at] 17-19);

Mother has also failed to appear at court hearings for goal 

changes and reviews[.] ([Id. at] 54).

Trial Court Opinion, 12/29/15, at 1-2 (footnote added). 

On October 27, 2015, the trial court entered the Decree terminating 

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b) of the 

Adoption Act, and an Order changing Child’s permanency goal to adoption 

pursuant to section 6351 of the Juvenile Act. On November 30, 2015, 

Mother timely filed a Notice of Appeal from the Decree and Order pursuant 

to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).4

Mother now presents the following issues for our review:

A. Whether the [trial] court erred in failing to find that for the six 

months immediately preceding the filing of the [P]etition, when 

[Child] was bonded with [Mother], when [Child’s] other siblings 

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4 We note that the appeal is timely, as the thirtieth day following the entry of 

the Decree fell on a court holiday, when the court was closed. See Pa.R.A.P. 

903(a) (providing that a notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after 

the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken); 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908 

(regarding computation of time). 
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were placed in New Jersey with an aunt, who was granted 

[Permanent Legal Custodianship (“PLC”)], and when [] [M]other 

made efforts towards completing a parenting class, stabilizing 

her mental health issues, seeking housing for herself and 

[Child], and was visiting with [Child], and did not intend to 

relinquish her claim to [Child] or refused and/or failed to perform 

parental duties[?] 

 

B. Whether the [trial] court erred in failing to find that for the six 

months immediately preceding the filing of the [P]etition, 

[M]other had consistent contact and visits with [Child], when 

[Child] was bonded with her, when [Child’s] other siblings were 

placed in New Jersey with an aunt, who was granted PLC, and 

when [] [M]other made efforts towards completing a parenting 

class, stabilizing her mental health issues, seeking housing for 

herself and [Child], and was visiting with [Child?]

C. Whether the [trial] court erred in finding that there were 

repeated and continuing findings of incapacity, abuse, neglect 

and/or dependency of [Child] by [Mother], when [Child] was 

bonded with her, when [Child’s] other siblings were placed in 

New Jersey with an aunt, who was granted PLC, and when [] 

[M]other made efforts towards completing a parenting class, 

stabilizing her mental health issues, seeking housing for herself 

and [Child], and was visiting with [Child?]

D. Whether the [trial] court erred in finding that the conditions 

which led to the removal or placement of [Child] continue to 

exist, as to father,[5] when [Child] was bonded with [Mother], 

when [Child’s] other siblings were placed in New Jersey with an 

aunt, who was granted PLC, and when [] [M]other made efforts 

towards completing a parenting class, stabilizing her mental 

health issues, seeking housing for herself and [Child], and was 

visiting with [Child?]

E. Whether the [trial] court erred in finding that the conditions 

which led to the removal or placement of [Child] continue to 

exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the 

needs and welfare of [Child], when [] [M]other can remedy the 

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5 Mother’s isolated reference in her issue to “father” appears to be a 

typographical error. Child’s unknown father is not a party to this appeal.
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conditions within a reasonable period of time, and when [Child] 

was bonded with [Mother], when [Child’s] other siblings were 

placed in New Jersey with an aunt, who was granted PLC, and 

when [] [M]other made efforts towards completing a parenting 

class, stabilizing her mental health issues, seeking housing for 

herself and [Child], and was visiting with her [Child?]

F. Whether the [trial] court erred in finding that DHS made[] 

reasonable efforts toward reunification, by either failing and/or 

refusing to help find a viable option or to consider options other 

than terminating [M]other’s parental rights, when [Child] was 

bonded with her, when [Child’s] other siblings were placed in 

New Jersey with an aunt, who was granted PLC, and when [] 

[M]other made efforts towards completing a parenting class, 

stabilizing her mental health issues, seeking housing for herself 

and [Child], and was visiting with [Child?]

G. Whether the [trial] court erred in terminating the rights of 

[M]other, when the sole reason she was unable to obtain 

housing, [and] provide medical care for the care and 

maintenance of [Child], was her lack of income[?]

H. Whether the [trial] court erred in terminating the rights of [] 

[M]other where it was not supported by clear and convincing 

evidence and not in the best interests of [Child], and there was a 

bond between [] [M]other and [C]hild[,] and the termination of 

parental rights would have a negative effect on the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs of [Child], 

pursuant to 23 P[a.C.S.A.] Section 2511(b)[?]

Mother’s Brief at 3-4 (footnote added).6 We will address Mother’s related

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6 Mother waived any challenge concerning the trial court’s changing of 

Child’s permanency goal from reunification to adoption, pursuant to the 

Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351, by failing to include this issue in her 

court-ordered Rule 1925 Concise Statement and Statement of Questions 

Involved portion of her brief. See Krebs v. United Ref. Co. of 

Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) (holding that an 

appellant waives issues that are not raised in both his or her concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal and the statement of questions 

involved in his or her brief on appeal).
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issues together.

In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we 

adhere to the following standard: 

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard 

when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for 

termination of parental rights. ... [O]ur standard of review 

requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 2012) (citations omitted).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). “The 

standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so 

clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to 

a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in 

issue.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights under section 

2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). This Court may affirm the trial court’s 

decision regarding the termination of parental rights with regard to any one 

subsection of section 2511(a), along with a consideration of section 2511(b). 

See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Here, 

we will focus on section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
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(a) General rule.-- The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

* * *

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be 

without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the 

conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

* * * 

(b) Other considerations.-- The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b). 

Concerning the termination of parental rights based upon a finding of 

parental incapacity under section 2511(a)(2), our Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court has stated that

[a] decision to terminate parental rights, never to be made 

lightly or without a sense of compassion for the parent, can 

seldom be more difficult than when termination is based upon 

parental incapacity. The legislature, however, in enacting the 

1970 Adoption Act, concluded that a parent who is incapable of 

performing parental duties is just as parentally unfit as one who 

refuses to perform the duties.
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In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 827 (citation omitted). In accordance 

with the Adoption Act, a parent is required to make diligent efforts towards 

the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities. In re 

A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002). A parent’s vow to cooperate, 

after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or 

availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or 

disingenuous. Id. at 340.

Additionally, a child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in the hope 

that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of 

parenting.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1125 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation 

omitted). Rather, “a parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and 

rearing of his child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental 

duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of his or 

her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M., 

856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004).

Mother contends that the trial court abused its discretion by 

terminating her parental rights under section 2511(a)(2) because she (1) 

was consistently visiting and bonded with Child; (2) obtained mental health 

treatment and “has addressed her mental health issues”; (3) participated in 

drug and alcohol treatment; (4) was working towards completion of her 

single case plan objectives; (5) did not intend to relinquish her claim to 

Child; and (6) did not refuse and/or fail to perform parental duties. See

Mother’s Brief at 7, 13. Additionally, Mother contends that she “certainly did 
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not want to lose the contact she was having with [Child] and hoped [Child] 

would be placed with family members.” Id. at 12; see also id. at 13; 

(asserting that Mother “has shown continued positive intent in establishing a 

home for her and [Child] and assuming her parental responsibilities[,] or[,] 

in the alternative, to have [Child] reside with family members and 

siblings.”).

The trial court assessed the evidence regarding Mother’s repeated 

incapacity to parent Child, and her inability to remedy the conditions and 

causes of her incapacity to parent Child. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/29/15, 

at 4. The court additionally pointed out that Mother (1) failed to meet her 

single case plan objectives; (2) had a positive result for drugs in one of her 

drug screens, after which she stopped attending scheduled screens; (3) was 

minimally compliant with her mental health treatment for her bipolar 

disorder and schizophrenia, and was discharged from two mental health 

providers for non-compliance and aggressive conduct; (4) attended 

supervised visitation for only 2-3 months, until visitation was revoked after 

she had attempted to abduct Child; (5) did not seek reinstatement of her 

visitation rights; (6) has been minimally compliant with CUA; and (7) has 

not seen Child for approximately 18 months, the last time being when Child 

was only approximately seven months old. Id. The trial court expressed 

“grave concern about [M]other’s ability to provide the level of protection, 

security and stability that [] [C]hild needed ....” Id. at 3. 
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Our review discloses that the evidence supports the trial court’s 

determination that the repeated and continued incapacity of Mother has 

caused Child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being, and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity cannot or will not be remedied by Mother. Further, 

the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse 

of discretion. We therefore affirm the trial court’s decision with regard to 

section 2511(a)(2). See In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27.

Additionally, Mother contends that DHS did not make reasonable 

efforts to avoid the termination of her parental rights. See Mother’s Brief at 

13. However, our Supreme Court has held that the trial court is not required 

to consider reasonable efforts in relation to a decision to terminate parental 

rights under section 2511(a)(2). In re D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662, 675 (Pa. 

2014). Thus, Mother’s argument does not entitle her to relief.7

Next, we review the termination of Mother’s parental rights under 

section 2511(b). 

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a 

court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child 

have been properly interpreted to include [i]ntangibles such as 

love, comfort, security, and stability. ... [T]he determination of 

the child’s “needs and welfare” requires consideration of the 

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7 Moreover, contrary to Mother’s claim, the record indicates that DHS had 

considered Child’s maternal aunt and uncle as a possible kinship placement 

resource for Child. See N.T., 10/27/15, at 30-31, 33.
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emotional bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost 

attention” should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of 

permanently severing the parental bond. 

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (some citations and quotation 

marks omitted).

Mother asserts that she maintained contact with Child and made 

progress to alleviate the problems that led to Child being placed in care. 

Mother’s Brief at 15. Mother claims she attended drug and mental health 

programs and had supervised visits with Child. Id. According to Mother, 

there was very little evidence that the bond between her and Child has been 

broken, and there was scant testimony concerning the likely effect on Child 

from severing any bond that might exist. Id. Mother argues that, without 

evidence of the impact that termination would have on Child, the trial court 

could not conduct a proper section 2511(b) analysis. Id. Additionally, 

Mother points out that there was no expert testimony presented regarding 

Child’s best interests, as to Child’s physical, intellectual, moral, and spiritual 

well-being. Id. She further asserts that there was no expert testimony as 

to the relationship, interaction, and bond between Mother and Child. Id. 

Mother urges that, “[g]iven the circumstances of the family and the efforts 

that all parties put forth for the family,” Child’s interests would be best 

served by (1) the denial of the Petition; (2) a remand for testimony and 

evidence concerning the bond between Mother and Child; or (3) in the 

alternative, to explore his placement with family and siblings. Id. at 15-16.
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We have stated that, in conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not 

required to use expert testimony, but may rely on the testimony of social 

workers and caseworkers. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. This Court has 

also has observed that no bond worth preserving is formed between a child 

and a natural parent where the child has been in foster care for most of the 

child’s life, and the resulting bond with the natural parent is attenuated. In 

re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 764 (Pa. Super. 2008). Additionally, it is 

appropriate to consider a child’s bond with his or her foster parent. In re 

T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268.

In the present matter, the trial court considered the needs and welfare 

of Child, and set forth its bond-effect analysis. See Trial Court Opinion, 

12/29/15, at 5. The court found that “the testimony established [that C]hild 

would not suffer any irreparable emotional harm if [] [M]other’s parental 

rights were terminated. Furthermore, [Handberry] testified that ... [Child] is 

thriving in [his] foster home and has bonded with [his] foster family.” Id.;

8

 

see also In re K.Z.S., supra (stating that no bond worth preserving is 

formed between a child and a parent where the child has been in foster care 

for most of the child’s life); In re T.S.M., supra. 

____________________________________________

8 Handberry testified that (1) Child has resided with his pre-adoptive foster 

family for 18 months, which comprises most of his life; (2) Child is bonded 

with his foster mother, whom he calls “mommy”; and (3) to remove Child 

from her care would cause Child serious harm. N.T., 10/27/15, at 18-19.
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The record reflects that that the trial court properly considered the 

best interests of Child in rendering its decision to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights. As the trial court’s factual findings are supported by the 

record, and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law 

or an abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s decision with regard to 

section 2511(b). See In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27. 

Accordingly, we affirm the Decree terminating Mother’s parental rights, 

and changing Child’s goal to adoption.

Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/30/2016