IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

September 7, 1999 Session

CHARLES DALLAS CAUTHERN, ET AL. v. 

CITY OF WHITE BLUFF, TENNESSEE

 Appeal from the Chancery Court for Dickson County

No. 4820-97 Leonard W. Martin, Judge

No. M1998-00991-COA-R3-CV - Filed June 27, 2002

This appeal stems from two landowners’ efforts to change the zoning classification of their property

from residential to commercial and industrial. After the White Bluff Town Council denied their

request, the landowners filed a petition for writ of common-law certiorari in the Chancery Court for

Dickson County alleging that the council’s action was invalid because one council member who had

recused himself from voting on the proposed zoning change actively opposed their request and

caused another council member to recuse himself. The trial court, sitting without a jury, denied the

landowners’ petition, and the landowners have appealed. Treating the petition as a complaint of

declaratory judgment, we have determined that the effectiveness of the council member’s recusal

is a nonjusticiable political question. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that the

landowners were not entitled to judicial relief. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

WILLIAM C.KOCH,JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which BEN H.CANTRELL, P.J.,M.S.,

and WILLIAM B. CAIN, J., joined.

Kevin T. Sommers, Kingston Springs, Tennessee, for the appellants, Charles Dallas Cauthern and

Carolyn Sue Cauthern.

Stan Reynolds, Dickson, Tennessee, for the appellee, The City of White Bluff, Tennessee.

OPINION

Charles Dallas Cauthern and Carolyn Sue Cauthern own lots 34, 35, and 36 of the Howell

subdivision in the City of White Bluff. Their home at 1020 Oak Drive is on lot 35, and lots 34 and

36 are on either side of lot 35. All three lots are zoned R-1 (residential), as is every lot on Oak

Drive. The Cautherns’ property is bounded on the west and north by the lumber cutting operation

of World Wide Woods, Inc. The company’s property on the west side of the Cautherns’ property
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The appellate c ourts hav e repeated ly pointed out that an action for declaratory judgment, rather than a petition

for common-law writ of certiorari, is the only proper vehicle for obtaining judicial review of a local legislative body’s

decision not to am end a zo ning ord inance. Fallin v. Knox County Bd. of Commr’s, 656 S.W.2d 338, 342 (Tenn. 1983);

Cato v. Montgomery County Bd. of Commr’s, No. M 2001- 01846 -COA -R3-CV , 2002 T enn. Ap p. LEX IS 369, a t *3 n.1

(May 23, 200 2); Day v. City of D echerd, No. 01A01-9708-CH-00442, 1998 WL 684533, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 1,

1998) (No Te nn. R. A pp. P. 11 application filed). Like the courts in Fallin, Cato, and Day, we will reach the merits of

the landowners’ appeal in this case by treating their petition for writ of common-law certiorari as a complaint for

declarato ry judgm ent.

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is zoned industrial. Even though the company’s property to the north of the Cautherns’ property is

zoned residential, logging is permitted on this property as a prior nonconforming use. 

The Cautherns became unhappy with having a sawmill so close to their home. Accordingly,

they tentatively agreed to sell their three lots to World Wide Woods. The sale was contingent on

rezoning lot 35 to C-1 (commercial) and lot 36 to I-1 (industrial). Accordingly, the Cautherns

applied to the White Bluff Planning Commission to have lots 35 and 36 rezoned. Following a public

hearing, the planning commission recommended approval of the requested rezoning.

Next, the Cautherns requested the White Bluff Town Council to enact an ordinance rezoning

their property. During the public hearing, Eric Tidwell, a member of the town council, announced

that he intended to recuse himself from voting on the Cautherns’ request because he lived near their

property and was biased against any zoning change. Following his announcement, Mr. Tidwell

spoke against the zoning change and called on another council member, Mack Bennett, to recuse

himself as well. Mr. Bennett had previously done survey work for World Wide Woods and had

approved the Cautherns’ request when he was a member of the planning commission. Mr. Bennett

acceded to Mr. Tidwell’s request and recused himself.

The three remaining members of the town council unanimously voted against rezoning the

Cautherns’ property. They based their decision on three factors. First, they feared that rezoning the

Cautherns’ property might be construed as illegal “spot zoning” by a reviewing court. Second, they

were concerned that rezoning the Cautherns’ property would increase logging activity and bring

lumber cutting operations closer to the other residents on Oak Drive. Finally, they determined that

lot 35 could not be zoned commercial because it was not served by a sanitary sewer. 

The Cautherns filed a petition for common-law writ of certiorari1

 in the Chancery Court for

Dickson County alleging, among other things (1) that the town council arbitrarily failed to give

consideration to the evidence in favor of rezoning their property, (2) that Mr. Tidwell’s continued

opposition to their request for rezoning “invalidated” the vote, (3) that Mr. Bennett was “wrongfully

required” to recuse himself, and (4) that White Bluff has acted arbitrarily and capriciously by

allowing industrial development to surround their property but refusing to rezone their property for

its highest and best use. The trial court denied the Cautherns’ petition on the grounds that the

Council did not act illegally, arbitrarily, or capriciously when it denied the Cautherns’ request to

rezone their lots. The Cautherns now appeal from this judgment.
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II.

THE ROLES PLAYED BY MESSRS. TIDWELL AND BENNETT

We first take up the two related issues regarding the participation of Messrs. Tidwell and

Bennett in the town council’s consideration of the Cautherns’ rezoning request. The Cautherns argue

that Mr. Tidwell’s vocal opposition to rezoning their property after he recused himself from voting

on their request and his request that Mr. Bennett likewise recuse himself somehow invalidated the

council’s decision. These arguments reflect a fundamental misconception regarding the courts’ role

when asked to review legislative decisions.

Amending a zoning ordinance is a legislative act. McCallen v. City of Memphis, 786 S.W.2d

633, 639 (Tenn. 1990); Family Golf of Nashville, Inc. v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 964 S.W.2d 254,

258 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). The procedures adopted by a legislative body for the conduct of its

business and its decisions regarding a particular legislative issue are not subject to the same standard

of review routinely used to review the fairness of judicial or administrative proceedings. In judicial

and administrative proceedings, the litigants are entitled to the cold neutrality of an impartial

tribunal. Davis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 38 S.W.3d 560, 564 (Tenn. 2001) (judicial tribunal); Martin

v. Sizemore, No. M1997-00203-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 950190, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 22,

2001) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed) (administrative tribunal);Kinnard v. Kinnard, 986

S.W.2d 220, 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (judicial tribunal). Thus, judges and members of

administrative tribunals must step aside when their impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

Chumbley v. People’s Bank & Trust Co., 165 Tenn. 655, 659, 57 S.W.2d 787, 788 (1933) (judges);

Tennessee Cable Television Ass’n v. Tennessee Public Serv. Comm’n, 844 S.W.2d 151, 164-65

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). 

The same cannot be said for the legislative arena. Persons seeking essentially legislative

decisions from legislative bodies are not entitled to the same degree of impartiality. Members of

legislative bodies are not acting like judges when they consider a proposed change in an existing

zoning ordinance. As this court has pointed out: 

Legislators, however, do what legislators do; they listen to

their constituents; they test the wind; they try to please as many

people as possible, consistent with the constitution and good

conscience. And they are not to be condemned for doing so. That is

their job.

Day v. City of Decherd, 1998 WL 684533, at *3.

The question of recusal by members of local legislative bodies in the context of amendments

to a zoning ordinance is not new. Approximately twenty years ago, landowners who were

unsuccessful in having their property rezoned challenged the legislative body’s decision on the basis

that three of the local legislators were biased against their proposal for political reasons. Sensing
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the futility of challenging the decision on the legislators’ failure to recuse themselves, the

landowners argued that the proceeding was “quasi-judicial” and, therefore, that they were entitled

to an impartial hearing based only on the facts presented to the legislative body. This court rejected

the characterization of the proceeding as “quasi-judicial” and upheld the local legislative body’s

decision. Fiser v. City of Knoxville, 584 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979). The courts cannot

inquire into the motives or methods of the local legislative body in matters such as this. White v.

Henry, 199 Tenn. 219, 230, 285 S.W.2d 353, 358(1955); Davidson County v. Rogers, 184 Tenn. 327,

333-34, 198 S.W.2d 812, 815 (1947); Soukup v. Sell, 171 Tenn. 437, 441, 104 S.W.2d 830, 831

(1937). Thus, a legislative action by a local legislative body will not be second-guessed by the

courts simply because one or more of the legislators were biased either for or against the proposal

under consideration. 

The White Bluff Town Council’s decisions regarding amendments to its local zoning

ordinance are essentially political questions. Unless the town council violates the town charter, state

law, or the state or federal constitutions, it’s actions are not subject to judicial review. While Tenn.

Code Ann. § 12-4-101(c)(3)(A) (1999) contains rules governing the conduct of members of local

governing bodies who have a direct interest in a public contract, we can find no statute or other rule

of law forbidding members of a town council who have recused themselves from considering a

change in a tract’s zoning classification from lobbying other council members either in favor of or

against the proposed zoning change. Thus, neither Mr. Tidwell’s conduct after he recused himself

nor Mr. Bennett’s decision to recuse himself or the effects of their actions on the remaining council

members are reviewable by the courts. The Cautherns’ remedy is at the ballot box.

III.

THE ADEQUACY OF THE BASIS FOR THE TOWN COUNCIL’S DECISION

The courts have consistently used a deferential standard to review a local legislative body’s

enactment or revision of its zoning ordinance. Because local legislative bodies have broad discretion

in zoning matters, Family Golf of Nashville, Inc. v. Metropolitan Gov’t, 964 S.W.2d at 260, the

courts decline to second-guess a decision either to approve or disapprove an amendment to a zoning

ordinance as long as the decision has some conceivable, appropriate basis to justify it, Fallin v. Knox

County Bd. of Commr’s, 656 S.W.2d at 343-44, or if the issue is fairly debatable. Keeton v. City of

Gatlinburg, 684 S.W.2d 97, 98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984). 

The White Bluff Town Council’s denial of the Cautherns’ request to rezone their property

easily passes muster under this rational basis test because the record contains cogent reasons for the

decision. First, allowing the sawmill to expand its operations further into the residential

neighborhood surrounding Oak Drive would simply pass the problems the Cautherns had been

experiencing to the remaining homeowners. Second, the town council determined that rezoning lot

35 from R-1 to C-1 would have violated another ordinance requiring permitted uses in C-1 districts
2White Bluff, Tenn essee, Municipal Z oning O rdinanc e § 5.06 2.1(B) (Ju ne 5, 19 90). 

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to be served by public water and sanitary sewer.2 Third, the Council found that rezoning lot 36 to

I-1 (industrial) would expand the existing logging operations, thereby increasing the danger to

residents of Oak Drive. Finally, the town council feared the courts could invalidate the requested

rezoning of lots 35 and 36 as illegal “spot zoning.” 

IV.

We affirm the judgment dismissing the landowners’ challenge to the White Bluff Town

Council’s denial of the proposed change in the zoning classification of their property and remand

the case to the trial court for whatever further proceedings may be required. We tax the costs of this

appeal to Charles Dallas Cauthern and Carolyn Sue Cauthern and their surety for which execution,

if necessary, may issue.

______________________________ 

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE