Filed 8/19/24 P. v. Williams CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MILES JAMES WILLIAMS,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B330154

(Super. Ct. No. 23CR00323)

(Santa Barbara County)

Miles James Williams appeals a judgment following his 

conviction of dissuading a witness by use of “threat of force or 

violence” (Pen. Code, § 136.1, subd. (c)(1)),

1 a felony (count 2);

three counts of shoplifting (§ 459.5, subd. (a)) (counts 4, 5, and 6);

and trespass (§ 602.1, subd. (a)) (count 7). The trial court 

sentenced him to an aggregate prison term of four years. We 

conclude, among other things, that: 1) the trial court did not err 

by instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 372 (flight showing a 

consciousness of guilt); and 2) the court did not abuse its 

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2

discretion by imposing the upper term of four years for the 

conviction on count 2. We affirm.

FACTS

The CVS Incident 

(January 2023) (Count 2)

Blake Kiriakidis was the shift supervisor at CVS. The 

store has a policy of giving shoplifters a chance to purchase the 

items. Employees are not allowed to “physically engage with 

them.” 

Kiriakidis saw Williams put a jacket under his shirt. He 

asked Williams to return the item; Williams walked away. 

Kiriakidis touched the jacket. Williams kicked him in the arm 

causing his coffee cup to fly over an aisle. He asked Williams to 

leave the store. Williams challenged him “to a fight” and said 

“Fight me, bitch.” He repeated that phrase 5 to 10 times. 

Williams “pursued” Kiriakidis, “throwing punches and kicking in 

the air.” Williams threw punches at him 10 to 20 times. 

Kiriakidis called 911. Williams tried to grab the phone 

from him. Williams became “violent,” he tried to kick and punch 

him, and he told Kiriakidis to “get off the phone.” Williams left 

the store. He walked 200 to 300 feet to another business. He 

then returned to the outside of the CVS store to return the jacket. 

Kiriakidis told him to leave the jacket on a bench. Williams 

walked away. He was arrested in front of Vons market. 

Williams testified that he did not punch Kiriakidis or make 

contact with him. He did not prevent Kiriakidis from calling 911.

He did not try to take his phone away. He was told to leave by 

the store employees. When the CVS employees were on the 911 

call, he said, “You can tell them that it’s Miles.” He said that to 

make it easier for them to identify him. He was not “thinking 
3

clearly” at the time of this incident. There was a moment at CVS 

when he was thinking of taking the jacket. After his initial 

contact with Kiriakidis, he was simply trying to return the jacket. 

When asked whether he kicked the coffee cup, Williams 

responded, ”I felt as though it was an existential threat. It was a 

threat to me, how he was holding it.” During his testimony 

Williams testified about his prior criminal convictions.

Doctor Rebecca Aponte, a defense forensic psychologist,

testified Williams suffers from Bipolar I, a mental disorder. 

People with this disorder may experience episodes of paranoia or 

disorganized thinking. When they have such episodes, they may 

react in an “agitated state” and “react aggressively.” They may 

have delusions about threats that do not exist and aggressively 

respond. But if they have such an episode, they will not

necessarily be “aggressive.” Aponte reviewed his medical history.

She concluded there was no evidence that Williams had any 

episodes of “recent hallucinations” or recent delusions. 

Shoplifting at Marshalls 

(January 13 and 14, 2023) (Counts 4 and 5)

Nathaniel Dye, a loss prevention employee at Marshalls, 

testified that Williams committed a theft at the store on January 

13. Williams put on a flannel shirt and he left the store with that 

shirt. Rafael Garcia Aguilar, a loss prevention employee at 

Marshalls, testified Williams committed a theft at the store on 

January 14. Williams took a backpack and walked out of the 

store with it. 

Shoplifting and Trespass at Ralphs

(December 2022) (Counts 6 and 7)

Eric Salmeron, the sales manager at Ralphs, testified that 

he had to call 911 because of Williams’s conduct in December
4

2022. He saw Williams grab a bottle of alcohol and attempt to 

leave the store. Salmeron contacted Roderick Talbert, the 

security guard. Williams had been previously barred from 

entering Ralphs. Talbert told Williams to drop the bottle. 

Williams did not comply and he became aggressive. Salmeron 

reminded Williams that he was not allowed to enter the store. 

Salmeron said Williams “wouldn’t listen to [him]. . . . It looked 

like he wanted to punch [them].” Williams eventually set the 

bottle down and walked out of the store. 

The Judgment

After the jury verdicts convicting Williams on counts 2, 4, 

5, 6, and 7, the trial court imposed an aggregate four-year 

sentence. The court held a bench trial and found based on court 

records that Williams served “two prior prison” or county jail 

terms under section 1170, subdivision (h), and this constituted 

aggravating sentencing factors under California Rules of Court, 

rule 4.421(b)(3).2 Williams had a mental illness, but he did not 

fall within the lower term presumption under section 1170, 

subdivision (b)(2) for psychological trauma for count 2. It found

other aggravating sentencing factors supported the imposition of 

the four-year high term for count 2.

The trial court found: “[Williams’s] prior convictions as an 

adult are numerous and increasing in seriousness. He is engaged 

in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to the 

community . . . . His prior performance on probation or parole 

was unsatisfactory.” It found the defense mitigating factors 

based on mental health and substance abuse were outweighed by 

“the safety of the public.” It imposed the upper term of four years 

2 All references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
5

on count 2. For counts 4 through 7, it imposed a sentence of 180 

days to run concurrently. 

DISCUSSION

The Jury Instruction

Williams contends the trial court erred by instructing the 

jury with CALCRIM No. 372, which provides: “If the defendant 

fled or tried to flee immediately after the crime was committed or 

after he was accused of committing the crime, that conduct may 

show that he was aware of his guilt. If you conclude that the 

defendant fled or tried to flee, it is up to you to decide the 

meaning and importance of that conduct. However, evidence that 

the defendant fled or tried to flee cannot prove guilt by itself. [¶] 

This instruction applies only to Counts 1 through 5.” 

The trial court overruled the defense objection to this 

instruction. Williams argues there was no evidence of “flight” 

because CVS employees “told [him] to leave.” On the way out he

knew there was a 911 call and said, “Tell ‘em it’s Miles.” The 

People respond that the crime scene was the store. He left the 

store knowing there was a 911 call and walked between 200 and 

300 feet away from CVS. 

Here there are conflicting inferences regarding why 

Williams walked away from CVS. The trial court did not have to 

resolve them. It could reasonably allow the triers of fact to do 

that. The People did not have to prove flight from CVS. “To 

obtain the instruction, the prosecution need not prove the 

defendant in fact fled, i.e., departed the scene to avoid arrest, 

only that a jury could find the defendant fled and permissibly 

infer a consciousness of guilt from the evidence.” (People v. 

Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 328, some italics added.)
6

Moreover, Williams walked out of Marshalls after taking items 

without paying. The instruction also applied to these counts. 

Williams contends giving the instruction was error because 

the prosecutor did not rely on his flight from the stores. (People 

v. Tuggles (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 339, 367.) But the prosecutor 

said the People intended to rely on Williams’s flight, and in the 

People’s opening argument, the prosecutor said, “[Williams]

walks out of [CVS] carrying the jacket.” “The instruction did not 

assume that flight was established, but instead permitted the 

jury to make that factual determination and to decide what 

weight to accord it.” (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 

1182-1183, italics added.)

Imposing the Upper Four-Year Term

Williams contends the trial court abused its discretion in 

imposing the upper four-year term on count 2.

Section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A) provides, in relevant 

part, “[U]nless the court finds that the aggravating 

circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances that 

imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of 

justice, the court shall order imposition of the lower term if any of 

the following was a contributing factor in the commission of the 

offense: [¶] (A) The person has experienced psychological, 

physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to, 

abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence.”

Wiliams argues his “psychological trauma based on his 

mental illness invoked the lower term presumption in section 

1170, subdivision (b)(6).” (Boldface omitted.) 

In People v. Banner (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 226, 241, the 

appellate court held, “[P]sychological trauma based on mental 

illness may be a circumstance qualifying for the lower term 
7

presumption in section 1170, subdivision (b)(6). To be clear, we 

do not hold mental illness alone qualifies for the lower term 

presumption. Psychological trauma must attend the illness, and 

that trauma must contribute to the crime under section 1170, 

subdivision (b)(6).” (Italics added.)

Aponte testified Williams has a mental illness. But the 

trial court found she did not prove he fell within the lower term 

sentencing provision. The trial court decides the credibility of the 

witnesses. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) It 

determines whether psychological trauma was a contributing 

factor. (People v. Dunn (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 394, 410, review 

granted Oct. 12, 2022, S275655.) The court found, “[W]ith regard 

to Dr. Aponte’s opinion, I did not find persuasive that his bipolar 

disorder caused him to be irritable or paranoid resulting in the 

offense. I have no doubt that Mr. Willimas suffers from mental 

health issues. And I recognize that he has mental health issues. 

But I don’t find that that’s what drove him to commit the crime 

he was convicted of.” 

Aponte said Williams had a bipolar disorder. But the issue 

was whether Williams suffered a psychological “trauma” at the 

time he committed the offense, not whether he had a mental 

illness. (People v. Banner, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 241.) The 

trial court could reasonably find her testimony was insufficient

on psychological trauma. Aponte reviewed Williams’s medical 

history. The CVS incident was recent. She said there was no 

evidence that Williams had episodes of “recent hallucinations” or 

recent “delusions.” The court could reasonably infer that showed

Williams was not suffering from an episode of a psychological 

“trauma” at CVS. Moreover, the store employees who 

approached Williams did not create an atmosphere for “trauma.”
8

The court said Kiriakidis was “nonconfrontational.” Williams 

testified Kiriakidis “very cordially asked me for the jacket back.” 

Williams’s counsel told the jury that because Williams was 

“seriously mentally ill,” he could not be guilty of a felony. The 

jury’s verdict was a rejection of that claim.

In addition, the lower term does not apply where “the court 

finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating 

circumstances that imposition of the lower term would be 

contrary to the interests of justice.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).) The 

court’s findings show that it reached the conclusion required by 

the statute. Its paramount concern for imposing the high term 

was public safety. The conviction on count 2 and his three prior

felony convictions for resisting an officer with force or violence 

(§ 69) showed a dangerous pattern. The court said, “I have to 

consider community safety first.” (Italics added.) Its emphasis 

on his violent criminal history showed it determined a lower term 

would be “contrary to the interests of justice.” The court found 

Williams put “individuals and customers in significant danger.”

Its findings show that it found these aggravating factors

outweighed Williams’s alleged mitigating factors. (People v. 

Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 725; People v. Castellano (1983) 

140 Cal.App.3d 608, 614-615.)

Imposing a Sentence Above the Middle Term

Williams contends the trial court improperly relied on 

aggravating factors that were not proven by proper evidence

which contravened section 1170, subdivision (b)(2).

Section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) provides, in relevant part, 

“The court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term 

only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime 

that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding 
9

the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances 

have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true 

beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a 

court trial.” (Italics added.)

Williams claims the trial court relied on aggravating 

factors to support a sentence above the middle term that were not 

based on court records or his stipulation. But Williams concedes 

that the court relied on “certified records” to find that Williams 

served two prior prison or county jail terms and they constituted 

aggravating sentencing factors. (Rule 4.421(b)(3).) “[U]nder

amended section 1170(b)(2), a trial court may still impose an 

upper term sentence based on one aggravating circumstance the 

trial court concludes justifies upward departure from the 

presumptive middle term maximum . . . .” (People v. Falcon

(2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 911, 954, italics added, review granted

Sept. 13, 2023, S281242; see also People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 

Cal.4th 825, 839.) Moreover, from properly admitted court 

records, the trial court found Williams had three prior felony

convictions for resisting an officer with force or violence. (§ 69.) 

The Probation Report

Williams claims the trial court improperly relied on the 

probation report to find that he engaged in violent conduct that 

was a danger to society; his convictions were increasing in 

seriousness; and his performance on probation or parole was 

unsatisfactory. He notes one court has held the probation report 

is not a court record that can be considered. (People v. Dunn,

supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 403.) He therefore claims there were 

no facts that could be considered from that report.
10

A Forfeited Claim?

The People’s position that this claim was forfeited has 

merit. The forfeiture doctrine applies to bar claims on appeal

that were not raised by the defendant at the sentencing hearing. 

(People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353; People v. Achane (2023) 

92 Cal.App.5th 1037, 1043; In re Beal (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 94, 

100.) Williams did not object to the trial court’s consideration of 

the probation report at that hearing. (Beal, at p. 100 [defendant 

waived objection to probation report by not raising it at the 

sentencing hearing].) The probation report documented the 

following aggravating sentencing factors: 1) Williams “inflicted 

physical injury”; 2) his prior record of criminal conduct “indicates 

a pattern of . . . increasingly serious criminal conduct”; and 3) his 

“prior performance on probation and parole was unsatisfactory.” 

Williams relied on that probation report to support his 

sentencing brief. He therefore is estopped to claim the trial court 

erred by relying on it. (People v. Gonzalez (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th

960, 972.) If he believed some of it was inadmissible, he should 

have objected in the trial court. (In re Beal, supra, 46 Cal.App.3d 

at p. 100.) Because he did not object, he may not claim error on 

appeal. (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435; Gonzalez, 

at p. 972; Beal, at p. 100.) In People v. Hall (2023) 97 

Cal.App.5th 1084, 1101, the defendant raised the same issue. 

The court held the defendant’s claim that the trial court erred by 

relying on the probation report to make aggravating sentencing 

factors was forfeited where the defendant failed to object on that 

ground in the trial court. (Ibid.)

The Probation Report’s Continuing Role in Sentencing

But even had Williams not forfeited this claim, his

contention that a probation report is inadmissible at sentencing 
11

is incorrect. The Penal Code authorizes it to be considered by 

trial judges in making sentencing decisions. (§ 1203, subd. 

(b)(1).) The statute provides the probation report’s “prior history 

and record of the person” may “be considered either in

aggravation or mitigation of the punishment.” (Ibid.)

Our Supreme Court has held the probation report is 

admissible in sentencing. (People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 

749, 754, fn. 2.) In People v. Cheatham (1979) 23 Cal.3d 829, 836, 

the court held a “probation report covers not only ‘the 

circumstances surrounding the crime,’ but also ‘the prior history 

and record’ of the defendant,” which the trial court may properly

consider. In People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 818, footnote

7, the court held that the trial court’s “conclusion that 

defendant’s prior convictions were numerous or of increasing 

seriousness is supported by the probation report.” In People v. 

Towne (2008) 44 Cal.4th 63, 76, the court held a trial court could

rely on a probation report listing 10 prior convictions to make a 

constitutionally adequate aggravating sentencing finding that a 

defendant’s prior convictions were numerous. 

The statute provides, “[T]he court may consider the 

defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on 

a certified record of conviction . . . .” ( § 1170, subd. (b)(3), italics 

added.) The Dunn court interpreted this phrase narrowly to 

prohibit a probation report from being considered as a qualified 

record of conviction. (People v. Dunn, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 403.) But the statute is permissive not prohibitory, and Dunn

did not consider section 1203, subdivision (b)(1), which expressly

authorizes the court to rely on the probation report for 

sentencing. Moreover, “[t]he probation report is part of the 

superior court record.” (People v. Sledge (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th
12

1089, 1096, italics added.) It documents the “circumstances” of 

the offense. (People v. Tran (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 877, 891.) It 

is an authorized record of prior convictions. (People v. Saelee

(2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 744, 756 [“Examples of evidence that have 

been used to establish a defendant’s criminal history or 

disciplinary record include . . . Probation reports” (italics 

added)].) The probation report is the most important

comprehensive document to “assist the court” in sentencing. 

(Rule 4.411(a)(1)(B).) 

The new sentencing statute also specifically authorizes the 

trial court to consider “the probation officer’s report” (§ 1170, 

subd. (b)(4)), which shows the intent to continue to use probation 

reports for sentencing decisions. The probation report’s lists of 

prior convictions supports findings on aggravating sentencing 

factors, and is sufficient to withstand constitutional challenges to 

its sufficiency. (People v. Towne, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 76.) The 

report may be relied on for sentencing consistent with the goals of 

section 1170 because it contains “information that is readily 

available from official records”; its lists of “prior convictions and 

probation status are well documented”; it documents 

“unsatisfactory performance on probation” (People v. Flores

(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 495, 501); and it is a part of the court 

record that provides a basis for sentencing choices. (§ 1203, subd. 

(b)(1); Towne, at p. 76; People v. Sledge, supra,7 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 1096.) 

The probation report is also essential in determining a 

defendant’s right to a fair sentence. We have held “reliable 

hearsay statements in a probation report are admissible to show 

whether a petitioner is eligible for resentencing under 

Proposition 47” and Proposition 64. (People v. Hall (2019) 39
13

Cal.App.5th 831, 838.) In Hall, we ruled, “The trial courts’ ability 

to consider reliable hearsay in probation reports is necessary to 

assure the fair and efficient implementation of Proposition 64.” 

(Id. at p. 840, italics added.) “In many cases the probation report 

will be the only document in the court file setting forth the facts 

underlying the marijuana offense to which the Proposition 64 

petitioner pleaded guilty.” (Ibid., italics added.) Its reliability as 

a foundation for sentencing has long been established. (Williams 

v. New York (1949) 337 U.S. 241, 249-250; People v. Shenouda

(2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 358, 368 [facts relevant for sentencing 

may be found in “the probation officer’s report”]; People v. Ingram

(1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 435, 439; People v. Hollis (1959) 176 

Cal.App.2d 92, 97.)

Moreover, section 1203 is entitled to statutory priority over 

section 1170. “[I]f a specific statute is enacted covering a 

particular subject, the specific statute controls and takes priority 

over a general statute.” (Estate of Kramme (1978) 20 Cal.3d 567, 

576.) Section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) is a general statute 

governing the standards for imposing a sentence above the 

middle term. Section 1203, subdivision (b)(1) is a specific statute 

governing the use of probation reports in making sentencing 

decisions on aggravating and mitigating factors. On the issue 

Williams raises involving the use of probation reports in 

sentencing, this specific statute takes priority. (Ibid.)

The suggestion that section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) is a 

repeal of the laws that authorize probation reports for sentencing

is not persuasive. That section does not mention probation 

reports or section 1203, subdivision (b)(1). In 2023, the 

Legislature amended section 1203. But it did not repeal or 

modify section 1203, subdivision (b)(1). Section 1203, subdivision 
14

(b)(1), coupled with section 1170, subdivision (b)(4) [on probation 

reports], shows a strong legislative intent to maintain and 

continue the Arbuckle, Cheatham, Black, and Towne line of cases 

which authorize the use of probation reports in sentencing. 

Consequently, section 1203, subdivision (b)(1) is the current law 

and it must be considered with section 1170, subdivision (b)(2).

(People v. Bouzas (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 475; Wilkoff v. Superior 

Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 345, 353.)

These two provisions are harmonious which negates the 

claim that there has been an implied repeal of section 1203, 

subdivision (b)(1). (Tan v. Appellate Division of Superior Court

(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 130, 138.) Probation reports record 

convictions based on jury verdicts and pleas. Reliance on that 

type of criminal record history is well established and consistent 

with the goals of section 1170, subdivision (b)(2). (Rule 

4.411(a)(1)(B); People v. Flores, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 501.)

Lawmakers were also aware of Arbuckle, Cheatham, Black, and

Towne, and the longstanding use of probation reports in 

sentencing. (Rule 4.411(a)(1)(B).) They could have changed the 

admissibility of these reports, but they elected not to for good 

reason. Such a change would have a drastic impact on the ability 

of sentencing courts to make sentencing choices. (Williams v. 

New York, supra, 337 U.S. at pp. 249-250.) It also would render

current statutory provisions, which authorize the use of these 

reports for sentencing, to be meaningless and would lead to a 

contradictory statutory scheme. We do not interpret statutes to 

lead to such “absurd results.” (Cassel v. Superior Court (2011) 51 

Cal.4th 113, 119.)

In People v. Flores, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pages 500-501, 

the court considered the impact of Senate Bill No. 567 and section 
15

1170, subdivision (b)(2). It held that a trial court properly relied 

on the probation report to make findings on the defendant’s prior 

convictions and his performance on probation. (Flores, at p. 501.) 

The Court of Appeal concluded it could determine whether to 

affirm the judgment by considering the aggravating sentencing 

circumstances documented in the probation report. It ruled, ”The 

report further established Flores’s unsatisfactory performance 

while on probation.” (Ibid.) Our Supreme Court denied review 

and denied a request to depublish the opinion.

In People v. Falcon, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at page 942, 

footnote 10, the court considered section 1170, subdivision (b)(2), 

and citing People v. Towne, supra, 44 Cal.4th 63, 76, 82, it ruled,

“[W]e presume prior conviction findings made from a probation 

report would remain constitutionally sound.”

Other Issues

Williams’s claim that the trial court exclusively relied on 

the probation report to make its aggravating sentencing findings 

is not true. It had independent documentation to support its 

findings that Williams engaged in violent conduct and that his 

convictions were of increasing seriousness. From his conviction 

on count 2 and from properly admitted court records, the court 

found Williams had three prior felony convictions for resisting an 

officer with force or violence. 

The sentencing statute (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2)) also does not 

prohibit a defendant from stipulating to facts that constitute 

aggravating factors. (People v. Dunn, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 410.) The prosecutor and defense counsel disagreed about 

what caused Williams’s behavior, but there was no disagreement 

about Williams being a long time repeat offender. Williams’s

counsel said Williams was “incarcerated for the majority of his 
16

adult life,” and “time and time again [Williams] is released from

[jail].”

Williams also admitted in his trial testimony that he had a 

substantial prior criminal record. In 2006, he was convicted of 

felony stalking. In 2018, he was convicted of assault with force 

likely to cause great bodily injury. In 2020, he was convicted of 

grand theft. He admitted that in 2022 he had three convictions of 

resisting arrest by law enforcement “with violence.” His criminal 

history also included prior theft convictions. 

Reliance on Williams’s Testimony about Prior Convictions

The People’s claim that the trial court could rely on 

Williams’s trial testimony about his prior record to base its 

findings on aggravating sentencing factors is correct.

Section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) allows a defendant’s 

stipulation about his or her criminal history to be considered in 

sentencing. Here Williams voluntarily disclosed his criminal 

history and testified about it in his defense case. Facts a 

defendant admits and a defendant’s admissions in testimony may 

be considered in sentencing. (People v. Sandoval, supra, 41 

Cal.4th at p. 836; People v. Thoma (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1096, 

1102 [a defendant’s admissions made prior to a guilty plea may 

be relied on to find the fact of a prior conviction]; People v. Harris

(1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 104, 108.) There was no error.
17

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

GILBERT, P. J.

We concur:

YEGAN, J.

BALTODANO, J.
Von Deroian, Judge

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

______________________________

Mi Kim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Amanda V. Lopez and J. Michael Lehmann, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.