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S. HRG. 114–157 

GETTING TO ‘‘YES’’ ON TAX REFORM: 

WHAT LESSONS CAN CONGRESS LEARN 

FROM THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986? 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FEBRUARY 10, 2015 

( 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Finance 

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah, Chairman 

CHUCK GRASSLEY, Iowa 

MIKE CRAPO, Idaho 

PAT ROBERTS, Kansas 

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

PATRICK J. TOOMEY, Pennsylvania 

DANIEL COATS, Indiana 

DEAN HELLER, Nevada 

TIM SCOTT, South Carolina 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

DEBBIE STABENOW, Michigan 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado 

ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania 

MARK R. WARNER, Virginia 

CHRIS CAMPBELL, Staff Director 

JOSHUA SHEINKMAN, Democratic Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Page 

Hatch, Hon. Orrin G., a U.S. Senator from Utah, chairman, Committee on 

Finance .................................................................................................................. 1 

Wyden, Hon. Ron, a U.S. Senator from Oregon .................................................... 3 

WITNESSES 

Packwood, Hon. Bob, former chairman, Committee on Finance, Portland, 

OR .......................................................................................................................... 6 

Bradley, Hon. Bill, former member, Committee on Finance, New York, NY ..... 10 

ALPHABETICAL LISTING AND APPENDIX MATERIAL 

Bradley, Hon. Bill: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 10 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 39 

Hatch, Hon. Orrin G.: 

Opening statement ........................................................................................... 1 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 41 

Packwood, Hon. Bob: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 42 

Responses to questions from committee members ......................................... 48 

Wyden, Hon. Ron: 

Opening statement ........................................................................................... 3 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 50 

COMMUNICATIONS

The ESOP Association ............................................................................................. 51 

NFIB ......................................................................................................................... 56 

(III) 

(1) 

GETTING TO ‘‘YES’’ ON TAX REFORM: 

WHAT LESSONS CAN CONGRESS LEARN 

FROM THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986? 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The hearing was convened, pursuant to notice, at 10:17 a.m., in 

room SD–215, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Orrin G. Hatch 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Grassley, Crapo, Thune, Isakson, Coats, Heller, Scott, Wyden, Stabenow, Cantwell, Nelson, Menendez, Carper, 

Cardin, Bennet, and Warner. 

Also present: Republican Staff: Chris Campbell, Staff Director; 

Jim Lyons, Tax Counsel; Mark Prater, Deputy Staff Director and 

Chief Tax Counsel; and Caleb Wiley, Professional Staff Member. 

Democratic Staff: Adam Carasso, Senior Tax and Economic Advisor; Michael Evans, General Counsel; Kara Getz, Senior Tax Counsel; and Todd Metcalf, Chief Tax Counsel. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ORRIN G. HATCH, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM UTAH, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON FINANCE 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. 

Today’s hearing is about the need for tax reform and what lessons we can learn from the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the last successful overhaul of the United States tax code. 

We have before us today two former Senators who were key to 

that effort. I do not know why they call you former Senators. I 

think you are always going to be Senators to me. I look forward 

to hearing your thoughts and advice, and I think we all do, during 

today’s hearing. 

Before we engage meaningfully in tax reform, we need a clear vision of what we want success to look like. A vision is not a specific 

system of rates, deductions, or credits. Instead, a vision is how we 

want to change the opportunities for American families and the rewards that Americans receive from their labor, entrepreneurship, 

and investment. 

A successfully reformed tax system will help make America the 

best place in the world to work, conduct business, invest, and prosper. A successfully reformed tax system will be one that provides 

economic growth and is simple and fair. This more than anything 

else should be our vision for tax reform. 

2 

The landmark Tax Reform Act of 1986 was developed by thenchairman Bob Packwood through a careful and methodical bipartisan process that relied heavily on member input. Senator Bradley 

was a key part of that process. I do not want to leave out Congressman Rostenkowski and a whole raft of others in the White House 

at that time, but these two were the two great leaders in the Senate at the time. 

Over the last few weeks, we have begun a similar process that 

we hope will yield a similar result: tax reform legislation that both 

parties can support. 

The 1986 Act, signed into law by President Reagan, reformed a 

costly and complicated tax system into a simpler one with lower 

tax rates for American households and businesses, affording them 

greater personal prosperity. Over time, our tax system has once 

again become costly and complex. It is impeding growth, standing 

in the way of shared prosperity, and placing American workers and 

businesses at a distinct disadvantage. 

Put simply, it is past time for Congress to stand up once again 

to fix our broken tax system. If you have been around Washington 

over the last few years, chances are you have already heard me 

talk about tax reform. I have been making the case for tax reform 

on the Senate floor, here in the Finance Committee, in public appearances, in written materials, and in private conversations. 

In December, the Republican staff of this committee produced a 

comprehensive report outlining the need for tax reform and providing some direction to our overall efforts. I am sure everyone 

here has read that report cover to cover. [Laughter.] I have already 

publicly laid out seven principles that I believe should guide our 

tax reform efforts. I will not go into much detail on each principle 

today. Instead, I will just talk about them briefly. 

The first principle is economic growth. Tax reform, if it is done 

correctly, should promote growth and significantly reduce economic 

distortions that are present under the current income tax system. 

The second principle is fairness. The income tax base, which has 

become riddled with exclusions, exemptions, deductions, and credits, should be as broad as possible. Tax reform should broaden the 

tax base by eliminating or reducing a number of tax expenditures, 

along with lowering tax rates and removing distortions. 

The third principle is simplicity. Taxpayers and businesses spend 

over 6 billion hours a year complying with tax filing requirements, 

with annual compliance costs in excess of $171 billion, which is 

more than the gross domestic product of New Zealand, for instance. 

Simplifying the tax code will result in greater clarity and compliance and will free up resources for families, job creation, and other 

productive uses. 

The fourth principle is revenue neutrality. Tax reform should be 

revenue-neutral and not an occasion to raise taxes on American 

households or businesses. Federal revenues already exceed their 

historic average as a share of our economy, and greater revenue 

should not be an objective of reform. 

The fifth principle is permanence. The Joint Committee on Taxation lists almost 100 provisions in the tax code that will expire 

over the next decade. This is unacceptable. Families and businesses 

3 

* For more information, see also, ‘‘Background Information on Tax Expenditure Analysis and 

Historical Survey of Tax Expenditure Estimates,’’ Joint Committee on Taxation staff report, 

February 6, 2015 (JCX–18–15), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id= 

4705. 

should be able to plan for the future without wondering if the tax 

code is going to change from year to year. 

The sixth principle is competitiveness. The combination of a high 

corporate tax rate, worldwide taxation, and the temporary nature 

of some tax incentives makes American companies less competitive 

when compared to their foreign counterparts. Tax reform should reduce burdens on businesses large and small to allow them to more 

effectively compete on the world stage. 

The seventh principle is the promotion of savings and investment. Many aspects of our current tax system discourage savings 

and investment, thereby hindering long-term growth. Savings and 

investment help build the capital stock, providing fuel for economic 

growth that generates prosperity for American workers and businesses. 

These seven principles are the guideposts I will use when looking 

at tax reform proposals. 

I think we are going to have an interesting hearing today. We 

have two really great former leaders, Chairman Packwood and 

Senator Bradley, to see what advice they can give us as we undertake our tax reform efforts in this Congress. 

I did read ‘‘Showdown at Gucci Gulch,’’ and it gives some indication as to how difficult this really was. If anything, it may be even 

more difficult today because of the messes that have occurred since, 

none of which you deserve to be blamed for.* 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Hatch appears in the appendix.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Wyden? 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RON WYDEN, 

A U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you very much, Chairman Hatch. 

As Chairman Hatch noted, the Finance Committee is joined this 

morning by two legislators who were at the heart of the last major 

overhaul of the U.S. tax code in 1986. Chairman Packwood spent 

more time than anyone figuring out how to make the numbers in 

tax reform work. That is the tough work of legislating. 

Senator Bill Bradley was the intellectual godfather of the reform 

plan that broadened the base, closed loopholes, and kept progressivity in the code. Senator Bradley lit the fire that got the Reagan 

administration invested in reform, and I do not think anyone would 

question my judgment that Senator Bradley had, by a wide margin, 

the best jump shot in the Senate Tall Guy Caucus. 

Now, if there is one obvious similarity between 1986 and today, 

it is that people are quick to say that tax reform is absolutely impossible. Americans say Congress cannot organize a 2-car parade— 

there is no way they can come together on major economic legislation. 

So what happened 3 decades ago needs to happen again: turning 

the impossible into the possible. 

4 

The Congress and President Reagan came together to pass the 

1986 Tax Reform Act based on what I call principled bipartisanship. One side wanted to flatten the tax code. The other side wanted to close loopholes and guarantee that the tax code treated everyone fairly. Both sides said, ‘‘We are going to set aside the partisan 

attacks and look for common ground,’’ and each side came away 

with the feeling that it had upheld its principles. 

When President Reagan signed the bill into law, he called it a 

historic overhaul of our tax code and a sweeping victory for fairness. He continued, and I quote here, ‘‘It is also the best antipoverty program, the best pro-family measure, and the best job creation program ever to come out of the Congress of the United 

States.’’ 

Those same objectives ought to guide the Finance Committee and 

the Congress as they work again to modernize our tax system. Reforming the tax code is always a herculean task, but the same 

strategy of principled bipartisanship can work once again. The Congress can turn the impossible into the possible. 

However, policymakers need to recognize that the process is 

going to look different. Not every part of a 30-year-old game plan 

for tax reform can work today. China and India are now superpowers in the global economy, which is a much bigger factor in the 

tax reform debate. The gulf between wage earners and the top of 

the income ladder has widened, and America is at its best when 

a rising tide lifts all boats, and it should be obvious that making 

that a reality once again is going to take some hard work. 

The status of the middle class in Oregon and across America is 

at the top of the list of compelling issues for tax reform to address. 

It is fundamentally unfair that a middle-class wage earner could 

pay a higher tax rate than an affluent person whose earnings come 

entirely from investments. 

The tax code should not be used to punish the wage earner in 

America. And many tax incentives for college education and retirement savings are simply out of whack. The support those incentives provide does not always get to those who need it the most, 

and that ought to change. 

Another challenge is making America more competitive in the 

global economy. Today you often come away saying that our country is trying to win a road race in a 30-year-old car. Our competition meanwhile trades up to more efficient models. America has not 

done enough to drive innovation at home, and, worse, the tax provisions for research and development expire year after year. 

In 1986, there was not a lot of talk about the tax code, for example, in a clean energy future for our country. That is something else 

that has to change this time. And finally, modernizing our tax code 

has to be done in a fiscally responsible fashion. Tax reform cannot 

become an exercise at slashing rates at any cost. 

The biggest lesson from 1986 is that tax reform is possible when 

Democrats and Republicans set partisanship aside, come together, 

and focus on shared principles. Over the years I have talked frequently with Senator Bradley about how tax reform is always totally, completely, and thoroughly impossible until that moment 

when it happens. 

5 

The Finance Committee today has two experienced, knowledgeable witnesses who are going to help us get closer to that point 

today. 

Chairman Hatch, thank you. And I look forward to our witnesses. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Wyden appears in the appendix.] 

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman? 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes? 

Senator MENENDEZ. If I may have a point of privilege just for a 

moment. And I thank the chair very much. 

I have an intelligence briefing on Iran, but I wanted to come to 

join the committee and its leadership in welcoming the most outstanding U.S. Senator New Jersey has ever had to represent it. Not 

only does he have a great ability to shoot a 3-point shot effortlessly, 

but the intellect that Bill Bradley possesses and his willingness to 

pass the ball to fellow teammates made him a consummate successful U.S. Senator here and in New Jersey. 

So I have read his testimony. I look forward to the Q&A so we 

can engage in some of it, and I appreciate him and Senator Packwood joining us. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. I think that was a pretty 

good outline of our Senator. 

Our first witness is Bob Packwood. Senator Packwood was first 

elected to the U.S. Senate in 1968 and served the people of Oregon 

in this body for 26 years. He was chairman of the Finance Committee from 1985 to 1987 and presided over this committee’s efforts 

to draft and pass the Tax Reform Act of 1986. He made a pivotal 

difference in this, as did our other witness. 

He also served as chairman of the Commerce Committee for 4 

years. Prior to his time in the Senate, Senator Packwood practiced 

law in Portland, OR for 10 years. He was elected to serve for 3 

terms in the Oregon State Legislature. 

He received a bachelor’s degree in political science from Willamette University in Portland, OR and a law degree from New York 

University Law School. 

We feel honored to have you here today. We know you can help 

us in many ways to understand some of the difficulties we are 

going to have to get through, and hopefully give us some advice on 

how to get through them. 

Our second witness is another great human being whom I greatly admire and admired before he came to the Senate. That is Senator Bill Bradley. Senator Bradley represented the people of New 

Jersey here in the Senate for 3 terms, beginning in 1979. 

As a member of the Senate Finance Committee, he played a pivotal role in the drafting and passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 

Of course, prior to his time in the Senate, Senator Bradley was a 

great professional basketball player. He is a two-time NBA champion and a member of the Basketball Hall of Fame. 

Senator Bradley holds a bachelor’s degree in American history 

from Princeton University and a master’s degree from Oxford University, where he was a Rhodes Scholar. He is the author of seven 

books on American politics, culture, and economy, and currently 

6 

hosts ‘‘American Voices,’’ a radio show highlighting the remarkable 

accomplishments of both famous and unknown Americans. 

We welcome you, Senator Bradley, as well. We thank both of you 

for being here today, and we look forward to your testimony. 

Senator Packwood, you go first. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BOB PACKWOOD, FORMER CHAIRMAN, 

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, PORTLAND, OR 

Mr. PACKWOOD. And Senator Bradley also holds the record for 

the most points ever scored in the basketball playoff in Portland, 

OR when he scored, what, 64 points? 

Mr. BRADLEY. Fifty-eight. [Laughter.] 

Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. Chairman, when I was contacted, everyone 

asked, how did you do it in 1986, and are there any parallels to 

today? There are some, but the circumstances were different. 

In our era, fairness was the issue, not income inequality. In the 

next to last page of my statement, you will see a list of newspaper 

stories about people who paid no taxes at all. There were industries, defense industries, at the time of the Reagan buildup that 

not only paid no taxes, they got money back, and the public and 

the members of Congress could not understand how wealthy corporations and wealthy individuals could pay nothing. It was not 

fair. So that was the premise we were operating under at the time. 

You will find in my statement, on occasion, the word ‘‘diary.’’ 

That means that it was taken specifically from my diary at the 

time. 

Now, what happened? Of course, tax reform is not a new idea. 

Stanley Surrey, who was President Kennedy’s Assistant Treasury 

Secretary for Tax, came up with the idea of tax expenditures. You 

can lower taxes if you get rid of them. 

Bill Bradley and Dick Gephardt, in their fair tax plan, said the 

same thing. The studies known as Treasury I and Treasury II all 

said the same thing. We all knew how it worked. We all knew that 

you could lower the rates if you could get rid of deductions. It was 

just pure mathematics. 

The House had public hearings for a year in 1985, and they had 

a lot of individual votes on things as they went along, and they 

picked up enemies. They picked up barnacles because, with some 

of those interest groups, they lost their votes. And there are lots 

of single-issue groups, and I do not mean the NRA or Right to Life, 

but if you touch mortgage interest, you have the realtors; if you 

touch inside buildup, you have insurance companies; if you touch 

501(c)(3) charitable contributions, you have every organization in 

the country opposed. 

And the problem with the House bill was that they had enough 

of these barnacles attached to the bill when it finally came out of 

committee that the votes were not there on the floor to pass it. 

It would have failed but for the fact that Ronald Reagan literally 

came up on the Hill, met with the Republicans and said, ‘‘Please 

vote for this bill. I will veto it if it passes in this form, but send 

it to the Senate and see what they can do.’’ With that, enough Republicans changed their vote, and the bill passed, although you 

would never know if they changed their vote because it passed on 

a voice vote in the House. 

7 

It came to the Senate. And in those days the Senate did not get 

going as quickly as you have gotten going now. We did not get 

going until mid-February or March. I finally started having some 

hearings on this bill, but we did not need many hearings because, 

in the summer of 1985, we had had about 30 hearings on the subject of tax reform just in case the House would pass something, because if they passed it, I knew we would have to act relatively 

quickly, and I did not want to have a lot of hearings at the same 

time. 

So we pretty much cleared the deck of hearings. But there was 

one thing that caught my mind at the time of the hearings. I would 

ask witnesses how low the tax rate would have to be before they 

did not care whether there were any deductions. Oh, 30 percent, 

20 percent, 25 percent—it was always in that range. I did not think 

much about it at the time, but I was intrigued that almost every 

witness I would ask, that is what I would get. 

Well, all right. We come to the spring of 1986. I am, frankly, 

making no progress in committee. We are not making the bill any 

better, we are not making it any worse. We just are not getting 

anyplace. 

So on Friday, April 18th, I simply adjourned the committee and 

said, ‘‘We are done with the bill.’’ Somebody said, ‘‘You mean we 

are done for the day?’’ I said, ‘‘No, we are done with the bill. It is 

the end of this bill.’’ And at that stage, I called—and this is where 

things moved so rapidly. 

I called David Brockway, who was then the Chief of the Joint 

Tax Committee, and said, ‘‘Give me three bills: 25 percent, 26 percent, 27 percent high.’’ He said, ‘‘At 25 percent, you will have to 

get rid of mortgage interest.’’ 

And, Bill, I remember you saying how much trouble mortgage interest gave you on your bill. So I asked him, ‘‘What about 26 percent?’’ That was Friday. 

The following Tuesday he comes and he gives me three—not 

bills, they were not in bill form, but three plans as to how you 

could get to 25 percent, 26 percent, 27 percent. And I looked at 

them, and then I was delayed for 21⁄2 days because at this stage, 

up came fast-track for the Canada Free Trade Agreement. It was 

one of those things where the President cannot move unless you 

give him fast-track authority. And there was a deadline. If Congress had not acted by—this was Tuesday—the next Wednesday at 

midnight, he got it. 

The House had not acted. It fell on our side to take care of it. 

I thought it was a slam dunk. I was sure we were there. It turned 

out I did not have the votes. I was missing one, and it was Spark 

Matsunaga from Hawaii, who was mad that the President had not 

answered his letter on macadamia nuts. And I had to get over that 

hurdle and bring him around. 

We finally succeeded in doing it, but it was Thursday before I 

was done. 

Then on Thursday, I presented to the committees at the same 

time, our committee, just the outlines—we have no bill—just the 

outlines of what might be possible, and they seemed to like that. 

So I thought to myself—the meeting was over and I was getting 

toward the weekend, and I was thinking at this stage, ‘‘How are 

8 

we going to do this?’’ And I thought the only way it could be done 

was bipartisan, quickly, and behind closed doors. Bipartisan because I could see any bill that was utterly partisan on the Republican side would have no success with the House Conference. Any 

bill that was not done quickly, but hung out like the House bill had 

been, would pick up enemies all along the way. And it would have 

to be done behind closed doors. 

It was helpful to have the President on board at the start. It was 

not critical, but it was helpful to have him basically tilting the 

same way we were going to go in the Senate. 

On that weekend, on Saturday and Sunday, I called six Senators—Bill Bradley, George Mitchell, Pat Moynihan, Jack Danforth, John Chafee, Malcolm Wallop—and I said, ‘‘Would you be 

willing to meet in my office starting next Tuesday at 8:30 to see 

if we can work out a bill that will be satisfactory to us and the 

President?’’ Every one of them said, ‘‘yes.’’ 

And then passed, starting that Tuesday, the most extraordinary 

experience in my life in politics. We met from Tuesday to Tuesday, 

and Bill was at every meeting. In fact, they were all at every meeting, every morning at 8:30. I would meet with staff at 7:30 and this 

core group, a cabal as I called it, at 8:30, and we would work out 

what we thought should be in the bill. 

We had one or two open committee meetings, but basically the 

committee was just marking time waiting for us to finish. And you 

could tell, although the meetings were behind closed doors, there 

are no secrets in this town and word was getting out we were having the meetings, but no one exactly knew what it was we were 

doing. 

But on the Thursday between these two Tuesdays came a phone 

call that became very important in this whole process, and I will 

read it to you because it is from the diary. 

‘‘Back again to tax reform in closed session. Was interrupted by 

a phone call from Danny Rostenkowski. Bless his soul, he said, 

‘Pal, I’ve been thinking of coming over there and without fanfare, 

without press, just to say I’ve been through it. I know every day 

you go through troughs and on hills and I’ve been bleeding for you. 

But I think what you’ve got in terms of tax reform is the best thing 

Congress has seen in 10 years. You get this through the Senate 

and between the two of us, we’re going to put out a bill that for 

a generation of Americans will look like a pinnacle.’ God, I appreciated it.’’ 

What he was saying, what the Ways and Means Committee 

chairman was saying was, write this bill in the Senate, which 

Ways and Means does not say very often. 

We continued our meetings through Friday and then we had a 

public meeting Friday afternoon, and I said to everybody, ‘‘We are 

done, and we are not going to meet this weekend.’’ 

By this time, the hallway was packed with lobbyists. We had 

speakers out there. ‘‘Committee, we are done, we are not meeting 

at all this weekend’’—cheers and huzzahs. And then I said to the 

core group, ‘‘But we will meet tomorrow.’’ 

Bill had already planned—you went to Kentucky that night for 

a speech, canceled your trip to the Kentucky Derby, and came back 

to be with us the next day. On that Saturday, the seven of us met 

9 

all day, from about 8:30 to around 4:30 or 5 in the afternoon, and 

that tied up all the last of the things we needed. 

Joint Tax needed a couple of days to get it together, but they 

would have it for us Monday or Tuesday, and we were ready to go 

on Tuesday night, until I finally had to make an odious deal with 

the oilies to get their support—not in committee, we could have 

beaten them in committee, but to get their support for something 

we needed desperately on the floor, and if we lost this particular 

issue on the floor, the bill was dead. 

And that was it. We voted that night. Most of the committee had 

not ever seen the whole outline of the bill or the whole bill until 

that night. And so from Tuesday to Tuesday, the seven of us 

worked. That night the bill was adopted 20–0. 

Now, can you do the same thing now in this committee? Here are 

the things that would be critical. It is helpful to have the President 

on board, to have him with you from the start. But at a minimum, 

you have to make sure that he is not against you or gives the impression that he is not sure if he is going to support it or he has 

some questions, because you are not going to get your members to 

take tough votes on things that the President might veto if you put 

them in the bill. So at a minimum, he must say, ‘‘I am open; send 

me a good bill.’’ 

Two, I think you are going to have to do it in much the same 

way we did, which is behind closed doors, but that is not uncommon in the House and the Senate even today. Do it behind closed 

doors and try to do it quickly and present it in one grand bill. We 

did it combining both corporate and individual into one bill and 

then used the money we raised from them to lower tax bills for everybody else. 

If you look on the last page of the statement, you will see who 

the major groups were we hit. It was almost all corporations and 

rich individuals. And do it in one bill so that people do not have 

to pick out a particular thing that they do not like and are forced 

to vote against. 

You give them this. You give them the whole bill, and I think 

they will go for it. So that is what we succeeded in doing, and, believe it or not, by hitting business as hard as we did, raising their 

taxes about $140 billion, we managed to lower the corporate rates 

from 48 percent to 34 percent, lower the individual rates from 50 

percent to 27 percent, and keep the bill revenue-neutral. 

You can do it, but, Orrin and Ron, the two of you are going to 

have to make an agreement as to what you are trying to get. And 

the thing I like about the fact that it is the two of you doing it— 

Ron, you may recall about 10 years ago we ran into each other in 

the dry cleaners, and you were working on tax reform then. 

I know, Orrin, you have crossed party lines many times. I remember you working with Ted Kennedy on things. You both 

showed a willingness to work across party line on some occasions 

when it did not please your parties too much. 

So it can be done, but it can only be done if the majority and the 

minority at the start are on the same page. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. That was fascinating. We are very 

fortunate to have that overview. 

10 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Packwood appears in the appendix.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Bradley, we would love to hear from you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BILL BRADLEY, FORMER MEMBER, 

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, NEW YORK, NY 

Mr. BRADLEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is always 

a pleasure to be on a panel with Senator Packwood. He is an extraordinary leader, and he ran the committee with great effectiveness not only on tax reform, but on a whole series of other issues. 

This is also a first for me: the first time I have been in this room 

since December 1996. I notice it has not changed. 

But what I would like to do is, I would like to give you a few 

thoughts about structure and provide amplification on two things 

that Senator Packwood said. 

First, what is the ideal income tax system? I believe the ideal income tax system is a system that provides the greatest number of 

people the lowest rate. And in terms of principles—and these were 

the principles that I think we used in 1986 to determine what was 

in, what was out—one was efficiency. It is a basic threshold question for members of the Finance Committee. And the efficiency 

point is, I believe, that the market is a more efficient allocator of 

resources than is a member of the Ways and Means Committee or 

the Finance Committee. So that is one principle. 

The second principle is an equity question: horizontal equity. 

Equal incomes should pay equal taxes, not somebody has the same 

income, and next door somebody is using loopholes to reduce their 

tax rate. 

Third is fairness, which is essentially vertical equity, and that is, 

those who have more should pay more; in other words, the progressive nature of the system. 

And fourth, do whatever you can to make the system less complex. We live in a time where few people fill out their returns and 

where tax fraud is estimated to be yearly $80 billion to $100 billion. 

So those are the principles—efficiency, equity, fairness, simplicity—and you measure everything against those principles. 

Now, what do you need to pass tax reform? Drawing on our experience, I think you need at least six things. The first thing you 

need is the exact thing Senator Packwood said. You need a President who is going to put his prestige and clout on the line to drive 

things through when the inevitable obstacles appear. 

Second, you need a Treasury Secretary who is the President’s 

designee to deal with it every day, and you need a Treasury Secretary who has an incredible person who constantly monitors that. 

Of course, in 1986 the President was Ronald Reagan, his Secretary of Treasury was Jim Baker, and his assistant was Dick 

Darman, all of whom played critical roles in this. And I cannot tell 

you how important it was to have a Treasury Secretary who could 

speak for the President so I did not have to run back to the White 

House all the time to check this or check that. 

In fact, as Bob remembers, we had gotten down to the critical 

strokes at the end of this process. There was some difference of 

opinion, and Jim Baker was in the room doing the negotiating beVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:15 Feb 10, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 R:\DOCS\98328.000 TIMD
11 

cause he knew enough of the substance and had paid attention to 

it. I remember him convening a meeting during the period when 

there was Treasury I and Treasury II, which were things that Ronald Reagan tasked the Treasury Department to do, and he convened a meeting with Jack Kemp at his house with me and I think 

Bob—a few other people. 

I think it is important to know the longer-term journey of tax reform. One of the reasons I ran for the Senate was I wanted to reform the income tax system. I remember reading an article by Milton Friedman many years before when I was a basketball player 

about how you could have a tax system with a 16-percent rate, and 

I thought that was pretty interesting. And I have read all of Stanley Surrey from Harvard, Joe Pechman at Brookings. 

And I remember in 1984 I went to Walter Mondale, who was the 

candidate for President for the Democrats, and tried to convince 

him to do tax reform. I said it could take the issue away from the 

Republicans: they were out there talking about tax cuts, here you 

could talk tax cuts and equity. 

He had been a member of the Finance Committee, and Charlie 

Rangel was his advisor on this issue, and I think the combination 

of those things made him unwilling to take what he thought was 

the big risk for a hopeless cause. And so it passed. 

However, as everyone in politics knows, nothing is secret, and it 

leaked that maybe Mondale would be doing tax reform. And so that 

is when Ronald Reagan, in the middle of the campaign, called for 

a study by the Treasury Department, which was Treasury I. And 

it so happened that the people at the Treasury Department in the 

tax area were really great people. And so they took the charge seriously, and they produced a document that was an outstanding document, laying out the boundaries and the parameters and the specifics of what tax reform is. 

Naturally, when you throw it out there, as I had experienced 

when I threw out the Bradley-Gephardt bill in 1982, you throw out 

something specific and everybody chews on it. So everybody chewed 

on Treasury I and how terrible this is and how terrible that is and 

you ended up having Treasury II, and Treasury II accommodated 

some of those interests, stiff-armed others, but it was an improvement over Treasury I. 

And so that is how the Treasury Department got involved, and 

you absolutely need a commitment from the Treasury Secretary. So 

you need the President, and you need a Treasury Secretary who 

likes it, knows it, and can cut the deal for the President. 

The third thing you need is the chairmen of Ways and Means 

and Finance to want to get this done, to see that some of their own 

political interests are served by getting this done. And Bob mentioned Dan Rostenkowski. In 1981, we passed a bill which President Reagan put forward the first year cutting rates 30 percent, 

and Dan Rostenkowski ended up being labeled as the king of special interests. 

And so I think that what he saw in this was an opportunity to 

seize the good government mantle and push forward with a challenge that would make him a historic chairman of Ways and 

Means. I think the Senate was very fortunate to have Bob Packwood as the chairman, because I do not know specifically what 

12 

your political interests were, but I sense that it was that you wanted to do something that no other chairman of the Finance Committee had ever done before, and you wanted to do something that 

would affect 100 million Americans in a positive way and potentially change the way we think about taxes. 

Without Bob Packwood and Dan Rostenkowski and Jim Baker 

and President Reagan, this would never have happened. You have 

to have those parts in place, and then you have a chance. 

Then the fifth thing you need is maybe a zealot. That is the role 

I played in 1986. I did nothing but talk about tax reform for 4 

years. Every speech would be about tax reform. It got so bad—I remember I was on a Sunday morning interview show that was recorded on a Thursday night and rebroadcast on Sunday. 

At that time, my daughter was about 8 or 9 years old and she 

had a girlfriend of hers staying with us, and I said, ‘‘Hey, Teresa, 

dad is going to be on TV,’’ because the guy said, ‘‘Eyewitness News 

conference with Senator Bill Bradley.’’ ‘‘Stick around, dad is going 

to be on TV.’’ So she elbowed her friend and said, ‘‘Come on, let’s 

go; all he is going to talk about are loopholes.’’ [Laughter.] 

And, indeed, that was all I talked about for 4 years. And I also 

tried—I recognized I did not have the power. The power was with 

Bob Packwood and Dan Rostenkowski. So I had to be supportive 

in any way I could, and I tried to play that role. 

The sixth thing that you need if you are going to get it passed 

is, you need a committed, knowledgeable staff. I remember Bob’s 

staff—absolutely first rate. And the key thing in this is that they 

can cut the deal on a lot of issues, and everybody knows they speak 

for the chairman, and they say the same thing to everybody. They 

do not say one thing to one person and another thing to another. 

But they keep their word, just like the Senator keeps his or her 

word. 

So I think that those are the six things that you need. You need 

a President who is committed, you need a Treasury Secretary who 

is committed and knowledgeable, you need the chairman of the 

Ways and Means Committee and the chairman of the Finance 

Committee, you maybe or maybe not need a zealot, and then you 

need to have a staff that is competent and honorable and has absolute integrity. 

The last thing I think you need, and this is probably the most 

important—it was epitomized by a visit that we made to the White 

House to meet President Reagan. I was a Democrat, kind of a junior member, and I was not invited a lot to the White House to meet 

with President Reagan, but there I was seated around the table in 

the West Wing. 

If you recall, each of us around the table could tell the President 

what we thought about tax reform. He was listening mainly, not 

talking. So when it came to me, even though he had made his commitment and even though he had made his position clear, I said, 

‘‘Mr. President, I know you are interested in tax reform which 

means lower rates, because, when you were an actor, the rates 

were 90 percent.’’ 

He kind of nodded. And I said, ‘‘Mr. President, I am interested 

in tax reform because, when I was a basketball player, I was a depreciable asset.’’ [Laughter.] 

13 

Which, in fact, I was. In other words, what that story says is, 

there has to be something for each party in a deal. It cannot be 

all one-sided. There has to be something for each party. Each party 

has to know what they want, and then, if they do, there is a chance 

to get something done. 

I will only make two other quick comments. Bob talked about 

writing the bill in a short period of time with seven people. Again, 

the only reason that happened is because Bob Packwood wanted it 

to happen. He was the chairman. If I had called seven people, they 

would have said, ‘‘Yes, okay, meet you in the cafeteria tomorrow or 

the next day or 2 years from now.’’ But when the chairman called, 

you showed up. 

So it was because of him that that committee, that small committee of committees, worked. But he also mentioned that when we 

were headed down the path the House took for a long period of 

time, we had 30 hearings about tax reform. Bob presided over 

every one. I was at every one. And we asked questions of every witness, and the question that he mentioned was one of them, which 

was, ‘‘How low would the rate have to go before you would give up 

this, that, or the other thing?’’ And I asked, ‘‘How low would the 

rate have to go before you give up capital gains exclusion?’’ 

In the latter, the answers came back—if you were from Silicon 

Valley, the witness would say, ‘‘I do not care if the rate is 10 percent, we still need a differential for capital gains, because that will 

affect capital appreciation and capital formation.’’ 

But a lot of other people came in—I do not want to say just Silicon Valley—but there was a certain kind of person who said, ‘‘No 

matter what, you have to have a differential.’’ 

Other people said, ‘‘Well, you know, if you got the rate down to 

about 28 percent, 29 percent, we would give up that differential for 

capital gains.’’ And that is indeed what we did. We got the rate to 

28, and that 28 percent was the rate that applied to both capital 

and earned income. 

So, Mr. Chairman, with those thoughts, I would thank the committee for the opportunity to come back to the room once every 25 

years. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bradley appears in the appendix.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we are honored to have both of you here, 

and I think anybody listening to this has to realize that you went 

through a very trying time—very difficult. Congress was split. You 

had a Republican President. 

I just want you both to know how much I respect and appreciate 

both of you. 

Let me just ask this question. According to CBO, revenues as a 

percentage of GDP have averaged 17.4 percent over the past 50 

years. Revenues in 2014 were 17.5 percent of GDP, trending up to 

18.3 percent of GDP by 2025. 

In other words, taxes are higher now than their historical average and headed even higher. Since taxes are already higher than 

average and raising revenue in tax reform makes enacting it less 

likely, should we not do tax reform on a revenue-neutral basis? 

We will start with you, Senator Packwood. 

14 

Mr. PACKWOOD. I would much prefer you do it on a revenueneutral basis, although I would combine both corporate and individual into one bill, and then you have a little more wiggle room 

using either side of that equation to be able to reach your revenue 

neutrality. 

The CHAIRMAN. Bill? Senator? 

Mr. BRADLEY. We, of course, did it revenue-neutral. I think the 

times today probably might require some additional tax, but I believe that that is something that the committee has to work out 

itself. 

If you really do thorough tax reform, what you find is—at least 

we found that upper-income Americans will pay a higher percent. 

For example, we cut the rate from 50 to 28, and yet the top 5 percent paid a higher percent of the total tax revenue after that reduction than before. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the U.S. is one of five major economies operating on a worldwide tax system, meaning it currently taxes the 

income of its companies wherever that income is earned, even if it 

is not in our country. 

Currently, companies have the option of bringing the profits they 

earn back to the U.S., but they face a tax of 35 percent, minus foreign tax credits. Those businesses would rather not pay these additional taxes, so they keep their earnings abroad, deferring the additional tax. Current U.S. law allows companies to defer the tax indefinitely. 

President Obama’s proposal released in this year’s budget would 

substantially limit deferral, since it imposes a minimum tax of 19 

percent. 

Now, do you think we should go to a territorial tax system with 

base-erosion protections like almost all other major countries or 

not? 

Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I have thought so for the last 30 

years. We are often saying we have to compete overseas, and there 

are advantages they have. And one of the advantages they have is 

territorial taxation. I think we ought to go to the system that the 

rest of the principal industrial countries use, which is, if you invest 

overseas and you make profits overseas and you pay your taxes 

overseas, you can bring back whatever profits you have to this 

country and they are not taxed. I think that is a good system. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Bradley? 

Senator BRADLEY. Of course, when you have profits overseas and 

you are taxed in a particular country at the rate that that country 

charges, all of those taxes are deducted against your liability in the 

United States—the tax credit. So I think you have a clear view of 

how this works. 

The President has proposed two things, I think. One is a 19- 

percent tax on the deferred income going forward and a 14-percent 

tax as a toll on the tax if it is paid abroad. I think that the committee will have to work its will on that. 

I think that the territorial tax makes sense in terms of the overall picture, but in reality you are going to have to figure out, is 

there some other way—because I do not think that is going to happen—is there some other way that you could bring the money 

back? And I think embodied in the President’s proposal of the 14 

15 

percent is the possibility that maybe it is not 14, maybe it is 10. 

Maybe it is not 19, maybe it is less. 

But somewhere in there—like where do you give up capital 

gains, at what rate—there is a willingness to bring the capital 

back. 

The CHAIRMAN. My time is up. Senator Wyden? 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The two of you have told an inspiring story this morning about 

bipartisanship on a major economic issue, and, colleagues, we just 

looked up the vote that attests to what happened. It was 97–3, the 

original vote coming in the Senate, and then on the conference report it was 74–23, and in the House it was more than two-thirds. 

So this kind of work paid off. 

What I would like to start with is asking you about the process, 

because as far as I can tell, in this effort to promote bipartisanship 

every step of the way, you said, we are going to use the normal 

process, because the normal process in the Senate really promotes 

bipartisanship. And you have to have 60 votes, and certainly neither side today has 60 votes. So you use the normal process, and 

it really forces bipartisanship. 

The alternative is to use what is called reconciliation, which, in 

effect, is 51 votes. If one side now has 51 votes, they could have 

their way on tax reform. 

My question to both of you is, either one who wants to start, is 

it your view that using the normal process, which you all used in 

1986, was helpful, and is it your assessment that using the normal 

process helps promote bipartisanship? Either one of you. 

Mr. PACKWOOD. Absolutely, but for a variety of reasons. One, 

every member of this committee ought to have misgivings about 

reconciliation and using it to jam as many things into a bill as the 

majority wants because they are not sure they can get it passed 

any other way. What that lends itself to is, more and more, the decisions moving up to the leadership. 

In my era, let alone now, even in Lyndon Johnson’s era, no Majority Leader would have ever thought of taking a bill away from 

committee. Reconciliation just holds out that plum and says, ‘‘Use 

it this way.’’ 

No. I would much prefer the regular order, for a couple of reasons. One, it stilled the arguments against it. We had no chance. 

We did not get to offer the amendments. There was a time limit. 

And if you win it in the normal process, you have a lot better credibility than if you have jammed it through in reconciliation. 

Senator WYDEN. Senator Bradley, can you top that? 

Mr. BRADLEY. No. But I will have a comment or two. Your question was what, Senator Wyden? 

Senator WYDEN. Normal process. The normal process inviting bipartisanship, reconciliation going more of a partisan track. 

Mr. BRADLEY. I think the way that we did it, I would agree with 

Senator Packwood 100 percent that the normal process is better. It 

also has to do with what is the clout of the committee in the larger 

Senate. 

We had agreement among members of the committee that whenever a vote would come up on the floor, none of the committee 

16 

members would break from the bill that was reported out of the Finance Committee and would stay with the committee bill. 

And that was a point of personal anguish for me, because in the 

committee, as it related to what Senator Packwood referred to as 

the oilies, Senator Packwood was the chair at that time and Senator Russell Long of Louisiana was the ranking member, and he 

had a few interests in the oil patch. 

I, of course, was going to go after it. We had to go after that. We 

could not leave that out. We were meeting in secret back there and 

we had a vote in the back room, and it was 11–9 against me. And 

I viewed that—this was in the back room. If there was one Senator 

who was taking it public, he would not vote that way. 

So I did not raise the issue in the committee, the full committee, 

and I saw Senator Long’s head go like that, and I called for the 

vote, and the person whom I thought would switch did not switch. 

And right up there against that wall afterwards, Russell Long got 

a hold of me and said, ‘‘If you ever do that again.’’ [Laughter.] 

But life went on, and the screw turned. We got to the Senate 

floor, and then Republican Senator Lowell Weicker offered the 

exact amendment that I had offered in the Finance Committee. But 

because we had a deal that we were all going to stay together, I 

voted against my own amendment. 

So the clout of the Finance Committee in the Senate as a whole 

is instrumental in getting a bill passed, because most of the other 

Senators do not know a whole lot about taxes. They have a few 

opinions about this, that, and the other thing, but to the extent 

that you can speak clearly, authoritatively and hang together, you 

will not need to have any kind of reconciliation. 

Senator WYDEN. Senator Hatch said I could ask one other question, because this was a remarkable feature of the 1986 bill, and 

I think it would be helpful for the committee to know how you two 

got to common ground in 1986. 

In 1986, you were able to say that income from wages and income from capital were treated equally. Senator Bradley talked a 

little bit about his views on that. But I think it would be very helpful to know how you two reached that judgment that by today’s 

standards would be remarkable. In fact, today people say that if 

you could just reduce the difference between the way income from 

capital and the income from wages are treated, that would be a 

huge reform. 

How did you two in 1986 get to common ground on treating wage 

income and capital income the same? 

Mr. PACKWOOD. Well, realize we wanted to keep the same progressivity that we had in the existing law, but we were going to 

lower the rates tremendously. So in order to make sure that the 

very wealthy still were roughly in the same progressivity incline, 

we had to get rid of capital gains at a differential. It was as simple 

as that. 

In fact, it did not even really bother the committee that much. 

It was a small issue. Malcolm Wallop had some misgivings about 

it, and I would say to his credit, we agreed. Remember, Bill, we 

made the rate the same, but we did not put it as a separate section 

of the bill because Malcolm Wallop said if we put that in the bill 

and got rid of the words capital gains, then pretty soon Congress 

17 

was going to start to raise the rates, and capital gains would go 

right up with them. 

Now, it turns out he was right. But it was to make sure our progressivity was the same. 

Mr. BRADLEY. Just a little addition to that. I exactly agree with 

what Senator Packwood said. There was a provision in the bill— 

since we got to the magic number of 28 for both capital and earned 

income—that said if the general rate ever went higher than 28 percent, the capital gains rate would be 28 percent. In other words, 

you would never tax capital higher than 28 percent. 

I remember, it might have been 4 months after the passage of 

that bill, people were in saying, we need a differential in capital 

gains. And my point was, if you take a differential in capital gains, 

you are going to end up with a much higher general rate, and, indeed, that is precisely what happened when President Clinton 

came in. The capital gains differential went back in, and the rates 

went to 39 percent. 

It seems to me that there is a lot more coherence in a bill with 

a lower rate that treats capital and labor the same. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Grassley? 

Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you both for coming. I want to start 

with something you both touched on in your opening statements, 

but I want to get more specific. So I will start with Senator Packwood, but I will ask Senator Bradley a similar question. 

It deals with the process and presidential involvement. 

Senator Packwood, do you think tax reform would have happened if President Reagan had not made tax reform a priority in 

his administration? And a follow-on then: is it not going to take at 

least that much commitment or involvement from President Obama 

with his own party in Congress to get a tax reform bill enacted? 

Then for Senator Bradley, could you share your thoughts on the 

importance of presidential leadership in accomplishing tax reform? 

Senator Packwood? 

Mr. PACKWOOD. Well, President Reagan was immensely helpful. 

If you are asking me, is it absolutely essential that the President 

be there from day 1 and pushing, I do not know. It is like saying 

this committee could not reach its own conclusion without the 

President. But it was very helpful. 

One morning there was a small breakfast at the White House. 

It was just Danny and me and the President, the Vice President, 

and Jim Baker. It was before the bill—the bill had passed here, but 

before conference. And the President took Danny and me aside 

right at the end, and he said, ‘‘If you can keep this bill revenueneutral and you can get the rates that you have got,’’ he says, ‘‘you 

may count on my support no matter how you get to those rates.’’ 

So that is how critical it was. We knew we had his backing, absolutely. But Bill touched on something, and that was about the 

Treasury. Jim Baker was up to his neck in the negotiations with 

us, as was especially his Assistant Treasury Secretary Dick Darman, because in the last 7 days that I talked about where this was 

all done, Baker was not here. He was in Tokyo with the President 

on one of those economic multinational meetings, and all of the 

final negotiations for the administration were done by Darman. 

18 

In the last paragraph of my testimony, you will see an interesting exchange on the phone with Darman calling Baker in Tokyo 

and telling him what to tell the President. 

So is it critical? I do not know if it is critical. Is it immensely 

helpful, and was it immensely helpful? Yes. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Senator Bradley? 

Mr. BRADLEY. I think presidential leadership is essential. I believe that there are so many times when things happen where you 

need to be able to get the White House’s clout, and that can be 

manifested through the Treasury Secretary. It is not you talking to 

the President all the time. 

I also would say, going back to my anecdote, I think the President was viscerally in favor of lowering tax rates because, when he 

was an actor, he had a 90-percent rate—90 percent. And I was viscerally in favor of this because I was a depreciable asset as a basketball player. 

In other words, closing loopholes had traditionally been what 

Democrats were for. Lowering rates was traditionally what Republicans were for. The question is, can you bridge that divide and 

bring something together? The answer is ‘‘yes.’’ But if Ronald 

Reagan had not said, ‘‘I put my imprimatur on this,’’ it would not 

have happened. 

Mr. PACKWOOD. And Bill has touched on something right there, 

Senator Grassley. Democrats wanted to get rid of unjustifiable deductions. Republicans were not adverse to going along with that if 

they could use the money to lower the rates. And as President 

Reagan had said, ‘‘I am not signing unless it is revenue-neutral.’’ 

If you got rid of a lot of deductions and produced a pot full of 

money, you could not raise revenues with this bill; you had to use 

it to lower rates. 

But you had a willingness on both sides for different reasons to 

want to reach the same conclusion. 

Senator GRASSLEY. My last question deals with something we 

have to tackle here in a basic way. So both of you, in your view, 

how important was it in getting support for its passage that the 

1986 bill was a comprehensive tax reform package rather than focusing only on business or, on the other hand, individual reform? 

Mr. PACKWOOD. For us, it was critical, because we needed a lot 

of the money we raised from business—do not confuse rates with 

revenue. We raised an immense amount of revenue, more than we 

were raising from businesses before. But we lowered the rates and 

we used a lot of their money to lower rates for individuals, and we 

mixed the two of them up. 

I would have misgivings about trying to do just business and 

then later on try to do just individual. I think you are better off 

to try to do both of them at once in one big bill. And I want to use 

the word ‘‘grandeur’’ again. You come out with a big bill that you 

have agreed upon, and if you do—and it touches the point Bill and 

I have talked about—before the bill ever gets to the floor of the 

Senate, you are going to have immense newspaper support, academic support across the board, liberal or conservative, and you 

will be glad, in retrospect, that you combined it all in one. 

19 

Mr. BRADLEY. I agree you should combine both corporate and individual, because if you just do corporate, it is not like you are 

going to have an easy path if you do anything that is serious. 

For example, when we did the individual and corporate, essentially the business community split. A large percentage of the business community was for the reform. Another segment of the business community was against reform. 

Guess what was the dividing line? What tax rate they paid. If 

they paid less taxes because the rate went from 50 to 28 percent, 

they were for it. If they paid up more, they were against it. But 

the key was constructing a coalition that included a significant part 

of business, and this is where Bob was brilliant. So I would argue 

that that is very important. 

You also might get to a point where you have more flexibility if 

you do individual and corporate, because they both are essentially 

two sides of the same coin. For example, you might decide that you 

want to cut the corporate rate to 10 percent or 15 percent and you 

might want to offset that by increasing the taxes on the individual 

side, on dividends and capital gains. That is what they do in Denmark, for example. 

You would not have that flexibility if you did not have both individual and corporate put together in the same bill. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Isakson? 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks, both of you, for being here. I was a real estate guy in 

1986 and had a development company and a brokerage company. 

So I have a question for both of you. 

First of all, thanks for being on the nine who voted against selected treatment in terms of passive loss. I think that is right. Both 

of you voted against that, if I am not mistaken. Oil and gas won; 

real estate kind of lost. 

But looking in a rearview mirror, could some transition have 

been applied to those investments made prior to 1986 so that the 

tax treatment could have continued and the tax treatment on passive loss been prospective rather than a claw-back? Did you ever 

think about doing that, or, if we go into something like that again, 

could we do it that way? 

Mr. PACKWOOD. We did not think about it at the time. And he 

is absolutely right. If there was an industry that we hit, it was real 

estate. And we drove the S&Ls out of business, which were one of 

the principal financers of real estate. And we did it retroactively. 

We found passive losses such a grievous way for rich people to 

shield their money and pay very little taxes, we got rid of them. 

But, Senator, you are absolutely right. The real estate industry 

was hit hard, and the oil industry got a particular favor because 

of a deal that I made because I was going to need their votes later 

on on the floor on a particular issue. 

Senator ISAKSON. Senator Bradley? 

Mr. BRADLEY. I agree that the real estate industry paid more. If 

you phase it in, of course, you have not as much revenue and you 

also skew the distributional tables. But in regard to real estate, 

keep in mind, that was at a time when there was, I would say, real 

estate investment that was not based on the need for apartments 

20 

or office space, but was based upon the individual taxpayer getting 

a tax deduction offset against all his other income or her other income. 

I had a call sometime in this period from Paul Volcker, who was 

then the Federal Reserve Chairman, and he said, ‘‘You know, I 

really like what you guys are doing up there.’’ And I said, ‘‘Why 

is that?’’ And he said, ‘‘Because I cannot get at these banks who 

are simply throwing money at uneconomic real estate investments, 

and it has to be through the tax code.’’ 

So I think that is one of the reasons, at least for me, that I felt 

we were on strong ground. 

Senator ISAKSON. I think you did the right thing, because there 

was abuse. My point was, if you could have transitioned prospectively in terms of the treatment of passive loss rather than clawback, you might have prevented the collapse of the savings and 

loans and the creation of the REITs, which is basically what the 

ramifications were. 

Mr. PACKWOOD. I think you are right. 

Senator ISAKSON. One other question I have—— 

Mr. BRADLEY. Well, I would not say that the savings and loans 

collapsed because of the Tax Reform Act. 

Senator ISAKSON. No. It was the last straw, I guess. 

Mr. BRADLEY. Yes, maybe that is a better way to say it. 

Senator ISAKSON. My other question is, did you consider in 1986 

or have you thought since about going to a retail sales tax or a consumption tax instead of a progressive income tax? 

Mr. PACKWOOD. I have, and I have often thought to myself, what 

kind of a deal could be made between the Republicans and the 

Democrats that would result in some increased revenue? And I 

thought, what happens if the Democrats were to offer this to the 

Republicans? We will go to an electronic funds transaction tax, 

which I prefer to a VAT or a retail sales tax, and we will cut in 

half the corporate and individual income tax, and you will allow 

the tax, however, to produce an additional $500 billion in revenue. 

And now the Republicans are thinking, wow, cut the income tax 

in half and the corporate tax in half, and we have always kind of 

supported a consumption tax anyway. Is that kind of a deal possible? 

We will go to it one day, there is no question in my mind. The 

danger of any kind of a consumption tax is—and this is where Republicans are more afraid of it—it is so easy to raise. Need a little 

more money? You raise it half a percent. 

Take a look at your sales taxes in different States that started 

at 1 percent or 2 percent 30 years ago, and they are now at 8 percent or 9 percent. Look at the European value-added taxes. I do not 

know if any major country in Europe is less than 20 percent on the 

value-added tax. 

But to answer your question, yes. If you could combine it, I think 

there is a possibility that—I can maybe see the Republicans shaking their heads—you could possibly make an argument for some increased revenue in exchange for dramatic reductions in corporate 

and individual taxes. 

Senator ISAKSON. I am out of time. But really quickly, Senator 

Bradley, I would love to hear your comment. 

21 

Mr. BRADLEY. I think that what Senator Packwood said about an 

electronic transfer tax is extremely interesting. If I were the chairman, I would task the Joint Tax Committee to do an analysis of 

that in terms of revenue that could be generated, because you have 

to know what revenue you are going to generate before you decide 

how you want to spend it. 

On the consumption tax issue, in my testimony, I make a suggestion. Basically, the point is that we should tax less those things we 

like, such as wages, and tax more those things which are bad for 

us or dangerous, such as pollution, for example. And I think here, 

there could be a very interesting tradeoff between employment 

taxes, Social Security, Medicare, and unemployment, and a gasoline tax, or a tax on things like volatile organics, or sulfur dioxide, 

or lead, or nitrous oxide, or whatever. 

It is just a numbers game. And if you did that, it would have profound impact. For example, if you were able to dramatically cut 

both individual and corporate Social Security employment taxes, 

you would, in essence, be giving individuals a tax cut and corporations a tax cut at a time when jobs are needed. 

The fact that there is this 15-percent hurdle is—it affects different industries in different ways. For example, if you are a 

McKinsey, or Microsoft, or Google, and you want to hire real talent, 

you pay more because you really need that talent. So you pay more 

to offset the employment tax. 

If you work in a lumber yard in Oregon or somewhere where 

there is a surplus of labor, you do not pay them more to offset. So 

the irony is that it ends up hitting the lower-paid guy in the struggling industry more than it hits the person who is in the consulting 

or technology industry. 

So reducing those employment taxes has many benefits. For example, the 24 million people or 25 million people who are working 

part-time now could very well be brought into the workforce. You 

could find people who were not working, who could be brought into 

the workforce. So that is the good news. 

The question is, what are you going to use to provide the money 

to do that? And I know the committee has looked at it. It is probably not possible, but who knows. They said tax reform was not 

possible in 1986. 

You could take a $1 gasoline tax or you could take a carbon tax 

and use all that money to reduce those employment taxes, and I 

think the net benefit would be greater job creation and economic 

growth. 

It would hit certain sectors more than others, obviously, but let 

us just take the $1 gasoline tax. Never, could it be offered, would 

be a better time to do it than now when prices are where they are. 

But let us say you phase it in, as you suggested you do on the other 

things. If you phased in a gasoline tax over 5 years and the automobile industry was going to improve the auto mileage efficiency, 

at the end of that 5 years, since the individual would be getting 

more miles with less gasoline, they would be paying no more for 

gasoline with a $1 tax that could be used to reduce Social Security 

taxes and employment taxes than they are paying now without 

that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nelson? 

22 

Senator NELSON. And we could also, Senator Bradley, improve 

the roads and bridges that are crumbling. 

This has been a fascinating discussion for me, and thank you 

very much. I take your ideas and try to put them into today’s politics. 

Offsetting, lowering employment taxes, and going after something like nitrous oxide, that is much more difficult today because 

of the climate debate that is going on, getting the votes. 

I think about what you said, Senator Packwood, that President 

Reagan was so critical in tamping down the opposition among Republicans in the House. Well, how are you going to get President 

Obama to tamp down that opposition today just over the kneejerk 

reaction of some Republicans to the word ‘‘tax’’? 

So it is hard for me to make the transition from your success in 

1986 to today, and it really puts a real burden on the shoulders of 

our chairman and ranking member. 

Mr. PACKWOOD. Well, that is why this committee—at least in 

Bill’s and my era, there was much more nonpartisanship in the 

Senate than there apparently is today. 

I cannot tell you whether or not you can put it together, but in 

1986 it appeared to us just as difficult to put it together as it appears to you now. There are different issues than we had then. And 

nobody can make the right circumstances. You cannot buy them, 

you cannot wish them, you cannot coerce them. 

All you can do is be around when the circumstance comes and 

hope you can take advantage of it. As I say, maybe there is a possibility. But if, at the start, we are going to have the Republicans say 

no bill if there are any revenue increases total, and if the Democratic position is no bill unless there are some revenue increases, 

then you might as well spend your time working on the Asia Pacific Trade Agreement or something like that. 

Senator NELSON. Our problem thus far, since a lot of your success, has been we are in this kind of herky-jerky, patch at the 11th 

hour mode. Tax extenders are an example. 

Do you want to give us your thought about how we overcome this 

illogical approach to taxes? Do you have to do it in the overall global kind of big deal in order to get it done? 

Mr. BRADLEY. Tax extenders are a lobbyist’s Full Employment 

Act. 

Senator NELSON. Yes. 

Mr. BRADLEY. You have to bite the bullet and make some decisions. What should be permanent and what should not be permanent? And there are always questions of revenue, so you want it 

to go out 1 year or 2 years, but not 3 years or 4 years, because that 

would affect the revenue. 

I just think that the practical reality is that people would probably say extenders are necessary, but they are necessary only because fundamental choices are not made about the tax code. What 

kind of tax code do you want? What do you want in, what do you 

want out—— 

Senator NELSON. Right. 

Mr. BRADLEY [continuing]. Not what do you want in this year, 

because then we all know that means you are lobbied every year 

23 

about the same thing and, quite frankly, it becomes boring, I would 

think. You know the arguments before they come in. 

On your earlier point about nitrous oxide, you would be cutting 

some taxes, like Social Security. Recall a couple of years ago you 

cut the Social Security tax, and then there was a quiet deal where 

you let it go back up, and nobody said anything about it. Not one 

party attacked the other party. Well, that is the kind of thing you 

could get here with the employment tax reduction and the increased taxes on essentially pollutants or gas or carbon. 

Mr. PACKWOOD. I have mixed feelings about extenders. If you 

make some of these permanent, you are going to play hell ever getting rid of them when the time comes you think you ought to get 

rid of them. 

At least with extenders you are forced to look at them and think, 

should this be kept, and then, of course, everything falls apart and 

you extend them all. But let us say you made them all permanent. 

Now, you do not have to look at them until somebody says, ‘‘I wonder if we should look at this one.’’ So you kind of pay your money 

and take your chance on it. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Next is Senator Coats. 

Senator COATS. Well, Mr. Chairman, this has been fascinating 

for me. I am a rookie Senator sitting—I cannot use the basketball 

analogy, but I can use a baseball analogy—in the left-field bleachers here with my friend from Nevada. They had to extend the rostrum here to accommodate the three of us. 

The CHAIRMAN. That is the right-field bleachers. 

Senator COATS. Well, if you are at home plate, I figure I am in 

left field. [Laughter.] Although I would prefer to be in the right 

field. 

Nevertheless, having had the opportunity to serve with these two 

distinguished former Senators, just sitting here listening to them 

talk through the process has been fascinating. 

So often we take an issue and we start with the substance of the 

issue, and nobody pays attention to the process until everything 

comes to a grinding halt because the process was not set at the beginning in terms of, what is it going to take to get from here to 

there? So it was fascinating to me that both of you outlined the 

principles of the process that you had to work through in order to 

accomplish the goal. 

It occurs to me, Mr. Chairman, that a buy-in of the committee 

with the principles up front would prevent us from being seduced 

away either through ideology or through special interest group 

pressure on particulars. Well, all right, I can get behind you unless 

you exclude this or include that—that traps us from getting from 

the batter’s box all the way around to home plate. 

So I just thought it was a fascinating lesson in history here. And 

I had the great pleasure of serving with both of you, being in the 

House in 1986, but watching what was happening there as a somewhat neophyte member of the House. And now all of a sudden we 

have this opportunity, sitting here thinking, could this really be 

done, and what you have left with us is ‘‘yes.’’ 

If we as a committee can avoid the pitfalls of making prejudgments as to what ought to be in and what ought to be out and look 

24 

at how we could accomplish something of enormous impact for the 

future of America, for a whole generation—I think that is what we 

are looking at here—what a legacy that would be to you, Mr. 

Chairman, to the ranking member, to all of us on this committee. 

It appears to me that there are some stars lining up here between the House and the Senate, given the personalities, the experience, and the background of the leadership of the Ways and 

Means Committee, as well as the Finance Committee here. 

There is a question mark in terms of where the occupant of 1600 

Pennsylvania Avenue is starting from, relative to their situation, 

and relative to their income level and the things that cause them 

the eureka moment to say, yes, I want to get on board that. 

To me, it seems like—I am just going on here—but it seems like 

the real challenge here is to address the question of how a lower 

rate and cleaner product can result in the kind of growth and the 

dynamic economic impact from something that we would do, and 

where that money should go. 

Should it go back into government for expenditures, perhaps, appealing as that might be? How many roads could we pave and how 

many bridges could we fix, or do we let the market determine how 

that capital is better invested? 

It is really not asking the question. If the panelists want to comment on that, I was actually making a statement. I am over my 

time here. 

Mr. PACKWOOD. A comment only in one sense. Senator Wyden, 

you may remember my predecessor, for whom you worked at one 

time, used to use the expression, ‘‘Give me control of the procedures of democracy, and I will control the substance of democracy.’’ 

Dan, this process in 1986 was not really a planned procedure. 

The House pretty much ceded us the right to go ahead and write 

the bill, and if we wrote it the way Danny liked it, they would 

adopt it. But I was not making any progress following normal procedures. It was only when the thing was not moving at all that I 

came up with this idea about half a dozen of us getting together 

in secret as quickly as possible. 

And in that group we had four Republicans and three Democrats. 

We had an agreement. If any four of us could agree on something, 

it would be put in the chairman’s mark. I recall no vote that was 

four Republicans, three Democrats. I recall a number of votes 

where I was on the three side of a vote. But we had that agreement. It was that bipartisan, in that sense, but it was not planned. 

Nothing else had worked, and yet the circumstance was there to 

make something work, and that is how it happened. 

I do not know if the circumstance is here. You feel it. You do not 

plan for it. It arrives, and I am not sure I know how to make it 

arrive. 

The CHAIRMAN. I am trying to get that feeling. [Laughter.] 

Senator Carper, you are next. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Wyden. 

To Chairman Packwood, to my friend Bill Bradley, it is great to 

see you. It is just great to see you. I was talking with Brian 

Selander the other day, whom you graciously sent to me when you 

withdrew from the presidential race, sent him to Delaware, signed 

him up to my Senate race. And one of the reasons why I am here 

25 

today is because of that kind of gift, along with Sean Barney and 

a couple of others who came as well. So thank you for all of them. 

Now I serve on this committee where you both once provided great 

leadership. 

A couple of years ago, we had a hearing on the issue of deficit 

reduction, and we had a bunch of really smart people here to talk 

to us that day too. One of them was Alan Blinder. He had previously been Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve, as you may recall. He is back now teaching economics at some school in New Jersey; it starts with a ‘‘P.’’ [Laughter.] 

In his testimony, he said to us, he said, in terms of deficit reduction, ‘‘The 800-pound gorilla in the room on deficit reduction is 

health care costs.’’ He said, ‘‘If we do not get our arms around that, 

we are doomed.’’ And he said more than that, but that was the sum 

and substance of what he said. 

We had a chance to ask questions. It came to be my time to ask 

a question. I said, ‘‘Dr. Blinder, you say health care costs are the 

800-pound gorilla in the room. If we do not get our arms around 

that, then we are doomed.’’ And I said, ‘‘What is your advice to us?’’ 

He sat there for a while and thought, and then he finally said, 

‘‘I am not a health economist, I am not an expert on that stuff, 

but,’’ he said, ‘‘this would be my advice to you.’’ He said, ‘‘Find out 

what works. Do more of that.’’ That is all he said. ‘‘Find out what 

works, and do more of that.’’ I said, ‘‘You mean, find out what does 

not work and do less of that?’’ And he said, ‘‘Yes.’’ 

We are happy you are here, and we are looking to find out—and 

you have given us some ideas of what worked all those many years 

ago. And one of the keys is, it is clear to me in what you are saying 

here, leadership is the most important ingredient in any organization. Whether it is a basketball team; whether it is a military unit 

in the Navy, Army, Air Force, Marine Corps; whether it is a college 

or university or business, the most important ingredient is leadership. 

And we cannot pass laws to create leadership, but every now and 

then people come along and provide great leadership. 

Just talk about leadership, the importance of leadership here, 

and what our leaders in this committee and in the Senate especially, what we need to be doing, please. 

Mr. BRADLEY. Well, as I said earlier, leadership starts from the 

President, the Treasury Secretary, the chairman of Ways and 

Means, and the chairman of the Finance Committee. That is the 

leadership structure. If any one of those is not on board, it is not 

going to happen. 

I would also make the point, when Senator Packwood talked 

about the seven people in the room, voting 4–3, whoever voted— 

he lost sometime, I lost sometime—but four Republicans, three 

Democrats, that was fun. Legislating is fun with the right people. 

You can do something very important, and you can enjoy what you 

are doing because you never know what is coming around tomorrow, if you are in that kind of negotiation. 

It requires you to know what you are talking about, and I just 

hope you guys are having that much fun. 

Senator CARPER. Fun would be good around here. 

26 

Mr. PACKWOOD. I have to tell a humorous story about Bill, because—— 

Senator CARPER. Remember I only have a little bit of time. So 

I hope it is a short story. 

Mr. PACKWOOD. I am sorry. Go ahead. 

Senator CARPER. No, no. Go ahead. If you could, just answer— 

I would love to hear the story about Bill—the question about leadership. I think what Senator Bradley told us is very important, 

right on. 

Mr. PACKWOOD. Well, all of us in politics have seen natural leaders. Some of them are inside leaders, like Lyndon Johnson. Some 

are outside leaders, like Ronald Reagan. But everybody in the Senate—this is a small fraternity. We all know who are the standout 

leaders. 

We knew in my era that Scoop Jackson and Sam Nunn on defense were good for 7 or 8 votes in a tight vote anytime. We knew 

that Dick Lugar on foreign policy was good for 6 or 7 votes. They 

were leaders in their area. 

All of you on this committee know who the half a dozen leaders 

of this committee are. I do not know who they are, but you know, 

and certainly the ranking member and chairman know who they 

are, and a coalition of those can be put together. 

But the key is not, do you have the leadership, but does the little 

leadership group agree on the goal that they want to reach? If they 

do not agree on the goal, no quantity of leadership is going to make 

any difference. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. The second question deals with— 

you did all this work in 1986. No sooner was the ink dry on the 

legislation that you labored on for all those years, then we started 

changing it. We started changing it a whole lot over time. 

Did you ever think at the time that we would see this kind of 

change that quickly and to such an extent? And did you ever think 

at the time about, what can we do to sort of preserve what we 

have, at least for a while? 

I do not know how many changes we have seen, but I am told 

like 15,000 or something, maybe more, since 1986. But should we 

be thinking about—should we be looking for some way to preserve 

for a while at least what work we are going to do, or is that just 

a fool’s errand? 

Mr. BRADLEY. Tom, that was a real lesson for me. Obviously, one 

Congress cannot buy another Congress. You can pass something— 

which I thought and I think Bob did and people generally—as significant as tax reform, and it can be like a sandcastle on the edge 

of the sea. It could be washed away the next year, which means 

you have to be humble when you do these things. I do not think 

there is an institutional fix to make things permanent. 

Maybe the reason this was not permanent was that this was not 

something that bubbled up from the country saying, you must do 

this. This was something that happened because people who had 

responsibility on this committee assessed what was the right thing 

for the country. 

Senator CARPER. My time has expired, I am afraid. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Heller? 

27 

Senator HELLER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Thanks for holding 

this hearing. 

I want to begin by thanking our distinguished guests for being 

here today. As a relatively new member of the Senate and a new 

member of this committee, it is great to get this historical perspective. So thank you very much for taking time. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to also thank you and the ranking member for being committed to this effort. I know it is not going to be 

easy, but it is good to see that there is real work, real work moving 

forward, and I appreciate your seven priorities, and I share those 

with you and look forward to getting that done. 

To our witnesses, the further you get out here in left field, the 

more general the questions. But the good news is, it is good to 

know that both of you started where I am today. So there is hope 

for the future. 

I want to move to 5 years ago and the Bowles-Simpson proposal. 

Did either of you testify or have an opportunity to have any input 

on that particular proposal? 

Mr. PACKWOOD. I did not. I was not called as a witness. I followed it very carefully in the press, but I was not a witness before 

that commission. 

Senator HELLER. Can you give me any perspective on what you 

thought of that report? 

Mr. PACKWOOD. Well, I thought the report was excellent in the 

sense of, here is where this country is going if we do not do something. I have often put it—when I speak, I put it in a different 

version. 

I am less concerned about the deficit than I am about the increased spending. If you are rich enough, you can afford a deficit. 

As long as you stay rich, you can afford to pay the interest on the 

debt. But I look at spending, and the figures are not necessarily 

good from a century ago, but as best we can tell, a century ago, all 

of the governments in this country—Federal, State, local, water 

districts, fire districts—spent about 10 percent of the gross domestic product. 

Today the same governments spend around 40 percent of the 

gross domestic product, and that same pattern has been true, by 

the way, in all the major industrial countries. They just started at 

a higher point a century ago than where we were. 

But, if you look at the Simpson-Bowles report and you see what 

is coming in Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, that 40 percent 

figure is going to go up, and the debate we ought to be having in 

this country is, not is there a deficit, of course there is. You can 

debate, if you want, can we afford to carry it? I think we can. But 

do you want this country to eventually spend 45 percent, 50 percent, 55 percent of all the available assets in this country on government? 

That debate does not get discussed very often, because it gets 

mixed up with the deficit. 

Senator HELLER. Thank you. 

Senator Bradley, I would pose the same question to you. 

Mr. BRADLEY. No, I was not—I did not testify. I always talked 

to my buddy, Al Simpson, but we did not spend a lot of time talking about taxes. 

28 

Senator HELLER. He is one of my favorites, Alan Simpson. When 

I was in the House, I was on the Ways and Means Committee, and 

Dave Camp was my chairman. As you know, Bowles-Simpson was 

dead on arrival. Camp came up with a proposal last year and, as 

you are well-aware, it got no hearings and, frankly, was dead on 

arrival. 

What did we learn? What lesson did we learn from these efforts? 

Mr. PACKWOOD. You are discouraged. I have read the Camp proposal. I thought it was a good proposal. I thought it covered a lot 

of the bases that needed to be covered. And you are right: it was 

dead on arrival. 

I am not going to badmouth the President, but it irritated me 

that he appoints this commission, and, as soon as its report comes 

out, he just gives it the back of his hand. Well, that practically kills 

it right there. But I thought the commission did a first-rate job. 

Mr. BRADLEY. I think Camp had some interesting ideas. What 

happened? He kind of started too late. People knew he was going 

out the door, and he did his own thing and put something specific 

forward, which is a necessary prerequisite. Remember Treasury I, 

Treasury II, the two bills I put in, you have to put out something 

specific, because then the interests chew it up and you figure out 

what can be swallowed and what cannot. 

So I just think that you need to see the total picture. I think he 

did a very good job of thinking through tax policy and coming out 

with a coherent package. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Bennet, you are next. 

Senator BENNET. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

What a great privilege to have both of you here. I was thinking 

back, actually, as Senator Packwood was talking, to, believe it or 

not, John McPhee’s book ‘‘A Sense of Where You Are,’’ a book about 

Senator Bradley when he was playing basketball at Princeton. 

He sort of asked the question, how could this, maybe not the best 

athlete that we have, maybe not the best of this or that, succeed 

so well at what he was doing? And I think, in terms of tax reform, 

Senator Packwood interestingly said, the opportunity appears to do 

it. 

So with that in mind, I took a look at ‘‘Showdown at Gucci 

Gulch’’ in advance of your arrival, the first chapter, and I think it 

is worth the historical perspective. 

The authors wrote—and I would just sort of ask you to respond 

to it for us: ‘‘The groups with an interest in the existing tax system 

were well-organized and ready to defend their tax breaks at a moment’s notice. The populous who stood to benefit from lower rates 

were unorganized and diffuse. Furthermore, Congress was a slow 

and cumbersome institution’’—that is not true anymore, of course 

[laughter]—‘‘that usually made only piecemeal incremental 

changes. Tax reform proposed something very different—a radical 

revamping of the entire tax structure. There was a tremendous inertia in Congress that resisted any such sweeping change. As a result, the conventional wisdom in Washington held that tax reform 

was destined to lose, and the conventional wisdom had plenty of 

history to back it up. Tax breaks, after all, had always been part 

of the currency of Congress.’’ 

29 

This passage, I would say, is even truer today than it was 30 

years ago as a description of where we are. Just in 2014, Federal 

lobbying totaled over $3.2 billion. 

I wonder if you could take us inside that room that you talked 

about and tell us a little bit, as Senators, how you were able to 

overcome these interests and the pressures that you faced, and how 

we as Senators should think about that in the arc of our careers 

on this committee. 

Mr. PACKWOOD. Well, if you are talking about the little cabal of 

seven of us, the pressures were not really that great on us. We 

knew what had to be done. We wondered, can we swing it, will it 

work? But I do not recall any one of us saying, I am not going 

along with this if X is in this bill or if X is not in this bill. 

So those pressures were not on us. I know what you mean about 

the interest groups, and that is what happened to the House bill. 

They had a lot of individual votes on each of those little parts, and 

if it is your part and you hate that, you are against the bill. You 

do not care what is in the rest of it, you hate the bill, and there 

was enough of that. 

That was not the case in the Senate. The Senate bill just did not 

happen that way. That Senate bill was written in those 7 days, and 

we did not have any hearings. Suddenly it was like Minerva, born 

fully formed. Here on the last night does the committee see the 

whole bill for the first time and vote for it 20–0. 

But had they had to vote on individual little sections—in fact, I 

will give you this. The reason I made this deal—I never told Bill 

why I did this. The reason I made the deal with the oilies and gave 

them what they wanted when nobody else got it and we had taken 

it away from everybody else and I gave it back to them—Bill was 

furious, George Mitchell was furious, because I had not bounced 

this off my little group because it was the night we were voting 

anyway. 

The reason I did it is because the biggest issue I was going to 

face on the floor—when this came out of committee 20–0, it was 

going to pass, but there was one issue, and it was the IRAs. 

On the IRAs, there were not two sides. There was not a great 

clamor about tightening up the IRAs. The clamor was on the other 

side about more, more. And, as you will see listed in my testimony, 

the IRAs, as I recall, were about a $24-billion pickup. 

Well, on the Senate floor, this IRA amendment came up, and I 

won it 51–48, and 19 out of the 20 oily Senators voted with me. 

And had I not made that deal, I would have lost a couple of them. 

And had I lost a couple, I would have lost on the IRAs and lost the 

bill. 

Senator BENNET. Senator Bradley? 

Mr. BRADLEY. The reality is that tax reform was failing until the 

Packwood counteroffensive. And it was not like this just sprung 

forth from the head of Zeus, right? We had had 30 hearings. The 

substance had been thoroughly chewed over by the committee. 

So it was familiar territory. It was just put together in a different way. 

Senator BENNET. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

30 

Senator Thune? Wait a minute. Let me just see here. I am sorry. 

It is Senator Menendez first. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Thank you both for your testimony, which I read at length. 

I think we all agree we need to simplify the tax code and make 

it more economically efficient. But I always think that before we 

go about the task of comprehensive tax reform, we need to agree 

what are the end goals that we are trying to achieve so that we 

can direct our focus. 

I mean, I know that some of my friends here argue that we 

should focus solely on corporate tax reform and profits and stock 

market gains, and I think I have heard you both say that you really need to do it all at the end of the day in order to make it effective. 

Senator Bradley, do you believe it is enough for tax reform to be 

focused on increasing GDP, on the stock market, on corporate profits, or should we also have the goal of ensuring economic growth 

as part of it, particularly if it is felt by as many Americans as possible? Is that the type of goal we should be looking forward to? 

Mr. BRADLEY. Yes. You want the economy to grow, and you want 

everybody to benefit from that. And when we did this bill, as I said 

earlier, we had four principles, and these are the things you should 

consider. 

First, that the market is a more efficient allocator of resources 

than we are or the Ways and Means Committee or Finance is, in 

figuring out whether we ought to do this activity or that activity. 

Second, equal incomes should pay equal tax. It is not fair to have 

your neighbor pay less because they have a particular tax benefit. 

Third, those who have more should pay more—the progressive 

principle. And fourth, if you can simplify it, please simplify it. 

To me, those are the four principles: the economic issues; economic growth, obviously; progressivity would say you would want 

people to move up; and you would want to say to the people at the 

top, ‘‘You have to pay a little bit more.’’ 

So I think those are the principles that I would use going forward. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I think that my question suggests—at least 

I view it that it is not an either/or proposition. In fact, fairness and 

equity in the code actually help reduce the burden on low- and 

middle-class working families. 

It is not only morally desirable, but economically good policy, because about two-thirds of our economy is fueled by consumer 

spending, and certainly low- and middle-income families have a 

higher percentage of their income that they need to spend on goods 

and services. 

So in that respect, I think that it makes eminent sense to be 

looking at how the consequences of reform deal with them, not just 

with the corporate taxes, because I think it will fuel spending that 

will help private-sector profits. 

Senator Packwood, at the end of your testimony, you included a 

statistic that in 1983, at least 1,900 people who earned $1 million 

or more paid no Federal tax, and that fact was due to a myriad of 

special interest loopholes that were clogging the arteries of the tax 

code before 1986. 

31 

As you noted in your testimony, the product that passed the Finance Committee 20–0 and would later become law raised the 

taxes significantly on corporations and rich individuals. They would 

pay more, middle-income people and the poor would pay less. 

So we have now a situation in which the average New Jersey 

family that makes $65,000 per year pays a higher rate than the 

wealthiest 400 Americans who make an average of about $270 million per year. 

So, from your experience, what impact does inequity have on the 

public’s perception of tax code fairness, and would you agree that 

a focus of reform should be to eliminate the loopholes and preferential rates that have allowed the wealthiest to steadily reduce 

their effective tax rate over the past 30 years? 

Mr. PACKWOOD. There is no question that the public is aware of 

the inequality. In 1986, they were not, and the issue was fairness. 

How did these people avoid paying any tax at all or how do major 

corporations that are making profits in the defense industry get 

money back? And that just irritated everybody, and that was a 

driving goal for us. 

Inequality today is obviously a much higher goal, preference, 

issue, than it was 30 years ago. What I am hesitant about is not, 

do you want to fix that? The longer I had been in life and the 

longer I had been in the Senate, the less confident I was that what 

we were going to do would necessarily get us to what we wanted. 

And that is why I agree with Bill, the market is a better allocator. If you want to somehow undo the inequality, I think that is 

legislatively doable. If you can get both sides to agree on that, that 

is perfect. But it was not what drove us in 1986. 

Mr. BRADLEY. I might say that, in terms of the middle class, we 

need good-paying jobs, more good-paying jobs. So that is tough to 

get at through the tax code, but not impossible. 

So I will share with you one of my hobbyhorses. Infrastructure 

investment is desperately needed. In a tough budget, you cannot do 

it in the size that we would like to do it. But there are people who 

have money—Chinese, Singaporeans, Koreans, in the Persian 

Gulf—large sovereign funds, I mean, hundreds and hundreds and 

hundreds of billions of dollars, and they have to decide what do 

they do with that money. 

I asked any number of them, ‘‘Why don’t you invest in infrastructure in the United States?’’ In other words, they would play the 

role the British played in the 19th century. And they would say, 

‘‘Well, there is this one provision in the tax code, and the provision 

in the tax code is section 892, and that says that if you are a foreign government and you invest in stocks or bonds, you do not pay 

tax on that.’’ Very simple—extend that to infrastructure and you 

could very well find a significant amount of money for infrastructure coming from sovereign funds. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Great. Senator Thune? 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all very much for being here. I was a staffer back in 

1986 when this was done last time and a great admirer of the hard 

work that went into it and the ultimate result. 

32 

There are some things that are very different. This is a different 

time. I think this is a different place probably than it was back 

then. And the one thing you already noted too that I think really 

made a difference was the involvement, active engagement of the 

President in the process. 

Remember Treasury I and Treasury II, the big books that they 

sent up here and how hard they worked to try to get that across 

the finish line. To me, it seems like to do anything really big and 

consequential in this town, you really need presidential leadership. 

So I hope that we will get that. 

I just want to ask a couple of quick questions with regard to a 

couple of the issues that you batted around back at that time. One 

had to do with whether lower rates or more favorable cost recovery 

provisions ought to be the focus of tax reform and which of the approaches is better for economic growth. I think that was a part of 

the debate. 

The question, I guess, is, do you believe lower rates paired with 

longer depreciation schedules was the right policy choice, and how 

do you suggest we ought to approach that question today? 

Mr. PACKWOOD. I do not know how you ought to approach it 

today. We clearly felt that lower rates were the most desirable 

thing we were doing. Depreciation was a major difference in interest between the House and the Senate on that when we had to go 

to conference. 

But I am not going to advise you as to what you ought to do on 

this. I would just say, lower rates, in my mind, keep it revenueneutral, but as I say, there might be something you can work out 

on that to increase revenues. But lower rates were what was driving me. 

Senator THUNE. How about the issue of cap gains at the time 

going at the same rate as ordinary income? And we have since then 

gone back to the differential. What do you think about that? In 

your view, as you look back on it, was that a good thing? 

Mr. PACKWOOD. Yes, I think it was. I remember Bill talking just 

a moment ago about the hearings we had, and that fellow would 

say you had to have a differential. If the regular rate was 30 percent, it had to be 15 percent, and if it was 20 percent, it had to 

be 10 percent. 

So I asked him, I said, ‘‘If there was no income tax, would you 

have to have a subsidy to invest, because there is no differential,’’ 

and he had never been asked that question and did not know how 

to answer it. 

But I think you could do very well if you have a low rate with 

capital gains being the same rate. 

Senator THUNE. This has been alluded to a little bit already 

today too, but there has been some discussion about what are the 

goals of tax reform. One of the things I think that separates us 

here, which makes it kind of hard, is that there are folks who look 

at this as an exercise to raise revenue. That is something the President obviously wants to do. 

A lot of us believe that the best way to get revenue is through 

greater growth and that the goal of tax reform ought to be, how 

do we generate economic growth in the economy, which lifts everyVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:15 Feb 10, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 R:\DOCS\98328.000 TIMD
33 

body’s boats and addresses a lot of those income disparity issues 

that were mentioned earlier as well? 

So speak a little bit about growth as an objective, a goal of tax 

reform and how you think that plays into the deliberations that 

should occur here. 

Mr. PACKWOOD. Growth—obviously everybody wants growth. But 

I remember Russell Long, who was chairman of this committee for 

16, 17 years, in one meeting going, ‘‘I have been here for 30 years.’’ 

He says, ‘‘Three times we have put the investment tax credit in in 

tax reform. Three times we have taken it out in tax reform. Now 

you tell me, when is it reform, and when does it work to help the 

economy?’’ 

I think a lot of us do not know exactly what works. I do know 

there are all kinds of industries that want things that say this will 

work, but I do not think we are necessarily smart enough to know. 

Senator THUNE. Senator Bradley, you have talked a lot about 

growth. Tell me your views on that. 

Mr. BRADLEY. Well, I think you can have growth and equity. I 

think growth you get, in part, through the lower rates, but also, in 

part, from clearing out the code of all of this underbrush that prevents the economy from growing because it subsidizes one segment 

as opposed to another. 

I think that if you are going to deal with the equity question, I 

think the way to do that is with the Earned Income Tax Credit. 

I think the President’s proposal on the second earner credit is pretty interesting. 

You can do things in the code that are structural, that are not 

special interest, that will allow you to deal with equity at the same 

time you are lowering the overall rate, and to me, that is the key. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Bradley, you are a credit to basketball players everywhere. 

Mr. BRADLEY. That is a big compliment coming from you, Senator. 

Senator THUNE. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Scott, you are up. 

Senator SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both for being here today with us and providing us 

insight from 1986 in how you brought together what at times 

seemed to be impossible. And I will tell you that sitting here, as 

a relatively new Senator, it seems relatively impossible for the two 

sides to come together as well. So your insight has been valuable 

to all of us. 

Just for a point of reference, I think this is Treasury II and this 

is Treasury I [holding up two thick, bound books] during the years 

that you guys found the will to make things happen, and these are 

about 6 years of the President’s proposals [holding up a stack of 

thin pamphlets]. 

My first question really for both of you all is, how do we find 

common ground, when finding a serious partner towards real tax 

reform appears to be missing in the seriousness of the presentations and the proposals, number one? And the second part of that 

is, we have heard from both our chairman, Senator Hatch, and 

Senator Thune about a revenue-neutral position. When you start 

34 

the conversation, as well, talking about achieving several hundred 

billion dollars more of revenue versus the position of neutrality, 

how do we bridge that chasm? 

Mr. PACKWOOD. I do not think Bill and I can tell you how to 

bridge that gap. If the positions are irrevocable—revenue/no revenue—that gap cannot be bridged. 

Senator SCOTT. I kind of agree. Senator? 

Mr. BRADLEY. If you cannot bridge that gap, then spend some 

time doing something else. I think, however, that the question is, 

can you put together a small group of people on this committee 

who have sufficient clout within the committee, as Bob said earlier, 

so that you could actually, if you chose, spend the time to come up 

with something that was pretty good? 

I mean, more taxes—you have to figure out which taxes. The 

tradeoffs that I offered with the consumption tax versus cutting the 

Social Security and employment taxes, that is not something we 

are going to decide. That is something that you have to decide. 

As I said earlier, all I know is that we did not have room with 

seven people—when you are making votes and doing things and affecting this part of the economy and that, that is a lot of fun. If 

you are just coming in and having your two sides make your statements, that cannot be too much fun. 

Senator SCOTT. It cannot be too much fun is correct. I am looking 

for other things to do with our time, so I thought about playing 

basketball, but I am too short and built for football. 

The good news is that Senator Hatch, on the other hand, has 

taken a fairly inventive and creative approach to making sure that 

we find some common ground, working across the aisle and looking 

for sweet spots, and he has put together some working groups that 

I think may be very beneficial going forward. 

One of the areas that I have a great passion and interest in, as 

an entrepreneur for the last 15 years, is why simplification of the 

tax code actually benefits all. I think, Senator Bradley, you said 

that tax loopholes are ways for politicians to spend money without 

having to go through the appropriations process, and the more opportunities that politicians have to spend money without going 

through the appropriations process, the more complicated and difficult the tax code becomes. 

When I started my business, I will tell you that I did not think 

about loopholes as they relate to starting a business. I thought 

about creating jobs and making a profit and changing the lives of 

family members and employees. 

I would love to hear you chat just a little bit about the notion 

of simplification—either of you esteemed gentlemen. Talk about the 

notion of simplification and the natural outcome of allowing money 

to find its best place through the private sector. 

Mr. BRADLEY. When I was speaking about this every day for 4 

years, I went on the David Letterman Show. That is when he was 

late, late. And I took out a card and said, ‘‘You ought to be able 

to do your income tax on this card.’’ Now, that is not quite true, 

but we do know that the vast number of Americans have income 

from wages, interest, or dividends. 

Guess who has all that information other than the individuals? 

The IRS. The IRS, for the bulk of Americans, could do the return 

35 

based on that, send it to the people, and the people could either 

sign it or they could say, ‘‘No, I want to have another accountant 

do it.’’ That would be a dramatic simplification. 

Mr. PACKWOOD. In 1986, I had a younger person on the Joint Tax 

Committee who is gone—I cannot remember who it was now—give 

me just a ballpark estimate, not spend time on it, what you could 

do with a flat tax, which is certainly simple. And he said, at that 

time—it took him a few days—you could have a flat tax—this is 

the individual side—of 11 percent and raise the same amount of 

money that we are now raising. 

But, of course, that meant that a widow with two kids who paid 

no taxes would now pay $1,100 in taxes. So I said, ‘‘What about if 

you exempt families of four under $30,000, just exempt them?’’ He 

came back in a couple of days and he said 19 percent, but it slightly tilts toward the rich. And I was curious about ‘‘slightly.’’ He said, 

‘‘You realize that when you are going to get rid of every deduction 

that mankind conceivably has, you are mainly talking about people 

who are rich, not the poor?’’ Just Sally who works at the mill who 

fills out a 1040–EZ and does not have any deductions is not adversely affected. 

He said, ‘‘But I think if 19 percent would be the norm, you could 

keep the same progressivity and do it at around 17 percent on the 

low end, 20 percent in the middle, and around 23 percent on the 

top.’’ 

Now, this is a top-of-the-head thought of his, but it is worth running if you want to see what you could do, and then, Senator, you 

have a simple tax. 

How much did you earn? You are in the 20-percent tax bracket. 

You do not get any deductions. That is simple. 

The CHAIRMAN. That is interesting. 

Senator SCOTT. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. 

By the way, we have had over 30 hearings on this over the last 

4 years. 

Mr. PACKWOOD. I do want to tell just one quick story about Bill, 

because it was cute. 

The CHAIRMAN. Sure. 

Mr. PACKWOOD. The President signed the bill. The signing ceremony was going to be, say, on a Wednesday. Bill was in Portland 

at a noontime luncheon, a fundraiser for a Democratic candidate 

for Governor. Then he was going to catch the plane back for the 

signing ceremony. 

My campaign manager was a tough woman. She says, ‘‘You are 

up for election this year. You are not going back. You will not get 

any publicity back there anyway.’’ But Bill was going. 

Well, Portland was socked in. He could not get a plane out in the 

afternoon. He called Seattle. ‘‘Can I drive to Seattle to get a plane 

out?’’ No. ‘‘Can I get a charter plane to San Francisco?’’ Nothing is 

flying out. 

And I was having a press conference the next day at 7:30, and 

the President was going to call me after he finished signing. I said, 

‘‘Well, Bill, we have a press conference tomorrow morning if you 

would like to come.’’ He said, ‘‘No, I am going to get out.’’ 

36 

Early the next morning, he calls my hotel and he says, ‘‘Where 

is that press conference?’’ And he comes and the President talks to 

me and the local network affiliates are there. And the President 

talks to me, and I chat a bit. 

And I said, ‘‘By the way, Mr. President, Bill Bradley is here, and 

you know how valuable he was for us on this. I kind of wonder if 

you could say a few words to him.’’ So he comes on, and he speaks 

to Bill. 

Now, the thing that irritates me, he makes national television 

from appearing on the local affiliate in Portland, and I do not get 

covered nationwide. [Laughter.] 

Mr. BRADLEY. The more relevant point is, it was because of my 

respect for Bob Packwood that I decided in the middle of his campaign to join him in a press conference about tax reform. [Laughter.] I think that has probably not happened a lot recently. 

Mr. PACKWOOD. That was well done. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I have a lot of respect for both of you. You 

have both been great Senators, and you both have done an awful 

lot for this country, and we are very proud of you. 

Senator Wyden has one more question. 

Senator WYDEN. I am going to be very brief. And thank you both 

for that simplicity discussion, because I have thought for a long 

time that this insanely complicated tax code plays right into the 

hands of the special interests and the lobbyists, and it is going to 

be even more challenging today than it was in 1986. We have been 

talking about ‘‘Gucci Gulch,’’ and there are these wonderful descriptions in ‘‘Gucci Gulch’’ about the lobbyists who would wait in line 

outside the Ways and Means room for a phone booth. 

Well, today a lobbyist is going to sit in the back of the room and 

set in motion a tweet that is, in effect, probably going to go to millions. Maybe they are going to be able to tweet directly to millions 

from the back of the room. 

So simplicity is going to be hugely important, and I think there 

are some contenders for how to do it, and Senator Bradley mentioned one in his testimony with respect to the information that the 

IRS has and giving the citizen an option of, in effect, having the 

IRS mail something. It would not be required, it would just be an 

option. 

The postcard concept, in effect, you can almost put a tax return 

on the back of a W–2, and that is something worth exploring. 

We will be following up with the two of you on the idea that if 

you triple the standard deduction—and a number of Senators of 

both political parties are interested in a significant increase in the 

standard deduction—people itemize. So that is another possibility. 

But just know we are going to follow up with you on the simplicity issue. 

I want to wrap up with one last question, and that is, is there 

one thing you regret about what happened in 1986 that you would 

counsel us on in terms of what to do for the future? In other words, 

it is always easy to kind of think about what is possible today in 

the abstract, but you two went through it. 

Is there anything you regret and you would like us to change? 

I know that one thing that I regret about 1986, and I was just a 

junior, junior Congressperson, is—Senator Bradley is right when 

37 

he says no current Congress can permanently bind a future Congress from unraveling it. But you can make it really hard. I mean, 

you can put people through multiple votes and the like. I can think 

of some things. 

But you two went through it. Is there anything you regret, one 

thing that you would tell us to be careful about? 

Mr. PACKWOOD. Well, I regret the odious deal I had to make with 

the oilies, which was totally unjustified and given to them when no 

other business got it, but I needed their votes on the floor. And 

what they wanted did not cost very much money, and the IRAs 

were $24 billion. 

But do I wish I did not have to put that in? You are right. But 

that is one of those decisions you make on the spur of the moment. 

I made it the night we were doing the final markup, and I did not 

bounce it off my group of six because I knew they would vote 

against it. 

So I would rather just put it in and have them mad than have 

them vote on it and put it in and think I had double-crossed them. 

Senator WYDEN. Senator Bradley? 

Mr. BRADLEY. Even in this world of great equality among Senators and among the group of seven that Senator Packwood talked 

about, there was still the chairman’s prerogative, and I think that 

nobody questioned that because we had been through the whole 

process. 

Do I regret anything? I regret that the bill lasted only a short 

period of time. As I said, it was a humbling experience, sandcastles 

at the edge of the ocean, and only a commitment from members of 

this committee and from Presidents, succeeding Presidents—I 

mean, President Clinton had a totally different idea of taxes. He 

liked to spend through the tax code, and, therefore, that helped unravel it. 

The differential on capital gains came back. We no longer treated 

capital and labor the same, which was what we did. The rate went 

up to 39 percent. There were infinite numbers of hiding places for 

little provisions, my favorite being the one that says if you rent 

your house for 2 weeks, you pay no tax on that income. 

There was once a Senator from Georgia on this committee who 

had a lot of friends who had big houses around the Masters Golf 

Tournament. These things happen, right? But I do not regret that, 

that was before my time. 

But I do think that you have to find some way—I regret that it 

did not last. That is what I would say. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you to both of you. Senator Packwood, you 

have one of your top staffers here—at least one I know—who was 

with you at the time, if you care to introduce—— 

Mr. PACKWOOD. Bill? 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. 

Mr. PACKWOOD. Bill Diefenderfer, stand up. 

Mr. DIEFENDERFER. I barely can, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. That is what tax reform does to you. [Laughter.] 

Mr. PACKWOOD. Bill was the chief of staff of the Finance Committee at the time, and I have often said that bill was not my bill, 

this was our bill. He was absolutely critical in this, and especially 

38 

critical in dealing with the administration and with Dick Darman. 

But it would not have passed but for him. 

Mr. BRADLEY. And I agree with that. 

The CHAIRMAN. He is still legendary. I want to thank both of 

you. This means a lot to me personally, and I have admired both 

of you for a long time as premier legislators, as people who really 

care for people, and who both are extremely intelligent. 

So this has meant a lot to me, and I appreciate it. 

With that, we will recess until further notice. 

[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the hearing was concluded.] 

(39) 

A P P E N D I X 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BILL BRADLEY, FORMER MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

The income-tax system is unfair (equal incomes don’t pay equal tax), inefficient 

(the market knows better where to put capital than do members of the Finance or 

Ways and Means Committees), and overly complex (few people fill out their own returns, and tax fraud has reached between $40 billion and $70 billion per year). By 

cutting tax rates and eliminating most of the nearly $1 trillion in individual and 

corporate tax loopholes, we do two things simultaneously. We allow people to keep 

more of each additional dollar they earn, and we deal a blow to the special interests. 

As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. said, ‘‘Taxes are the price we pay for civilization.’’ 

The government subsidizes many activities by allowing you to pay less tax if you 

do them. Buying a home is an example. There, the government allows you to reduce 

your taxable income by the amount of your mortgage interest and property taxes, 

which means you pay tax on less income. These tax savings are the government 

subsidy to home ownership. In any tax reform it would be possible to protect such 

middle-class ‘‘tax expenditures’’—that is, deductions, exclusions, and credits; besides 

mortgage interest, these include charitable contributions, state and local taxes, 

health insurance, and pension buildup—even as we lowered tax rates. In a system 

with just three rates, these items could be deductible only against the bottom two; 

everyone would thus get the subsidy, but for the wealthy it would be worth less. 

For example, if the rates were 10, 20, and 30 percent, a dollar’s worth of deductions 

would save, at the most, twenty cents in taxes for someone in the 20-percent bracket 

and ten cents in taxes for someone in the 10-percent bracket. Those in the 30- 

percent bracket would still get the deduction, but it would be worth only twenty 

cents. They could not deduct it against the top rate of 30 percent. 

In the 1986 tax reform, we cut rates to 15 and 28 percent and eliminated about $30 billion per year in loopholes, and the wealthy, even though the top rate was 

reduced from 50 percent to 28 percent, ended up paying a bigger percentage of the 

total income taxes collected. 

There are rates that everyone, including most of the wealthy, can agree are fair. 

I believe that the best tax rate is the lowest tax rate for the greatest number of 

Americans. Increasing the earned income tax credit assures lower-income working 

Americans that they, too, can keep more of each dollar they earn. By eliminating 

most of the tax deductions, exclusions, and credits (now worth $911 billion), we 

could reduce rates, make the system fairer, and raise revenue. By simply reducing 

these ‘‘expenditures,’’ or tax subsidies, in the tax code, we could spend more through 

appropriations for education, health, and pension security. 

In addition, by increasing the minimum wage and the Earned Income Tax Credit, 

we could further reduce inequality and give people incentives to work. And more 

IRS agents and better computer systems would increase tax collection from the 

wealthy. Commissioner Charles Rossoti says that for an investment of $296 million 

the service could collect $9 billion more annually. 

Another tax innovation would be aimed at people who have only wage, interest, 

or dividend income and take no itemized deductions. There is no reason for them 

to fill out tax returns; the IRS has all the information about them that it needs, 

and it can prepare individual tax returns from those W–2 and 1099 forms and send 

the returns to the taxpayers. If taxpayers wanted to fill out their own forms at that 

40 

point, they could; more likely, they would simply sign and return the prepared 

forms. Not having to pay a tax preparer would amount to a kind of tax cut. California put such an initiative on the ballot in 2004, but groups such as H&R Block 

with a vested interest in the current system managed to kill it. 

If one were bolder, they could take on an even more ambitious and complex tax 

reform—moving taxation away from work to pollution and natural resources. In 

general, we ought to tax less whatever we need, such as wages, and tax more whatever is dangerous to us, such as pollution, resource depletion, trans fats, and tobacco. In this vein, we could implement a $1-per-gallon gasoline tax (or an equivalent carbon tax, which is a tax on any energy source that emits carbon dioxide) or 

equivalent taxes on other major air pollutants: volatile organics, nitrogen oxide, 

lead, sulfurous dioxide, and particulates. These taxes could be phased in over five 

years, with the revenue going to reduce employment taxes (Social Security, Medicare, and unemployment insurance) for employees and employers alike. The gasoline 

or carbon tax would encourage the nation to reduce its dependence on insecure 

sources of foreign oil, and with payroll taxes now amounting to 15 percent of labor 

costs, the lower employment taxes would be an incentive for businesses to hire 

workers. Given where the price of oil is today, there never was a better opportunity 

to enact such a tax. 

Such a shift in taxation—away from jobs and toward pollution, energy, and natural resources—will draw many of the 24 million part-time employed into the fulltime workforce and millions more who are not in the labor force will now be more 

likely to find a job. After a few years of adjustment in the case of a gasoline or carbon tax, cars would be more fuel-efficient, so consumers would pay what they used 

to pay for the same amount of driving, and the broad middle class would continue 

to pay lower employment taxes. The result would be increasing demand for goods 

and services; shrinking dependency payments such as unemployment compensation 

or welfare; lowered social costs such as crime or avoidable illness; and a more equitable tax system—one that encourage rising employment. 

Reducing employment taxes also makes sense on grounds of competitiveness and 

equity. Employment taxes now hit our most successful companies hardest. A company such as Microsoft or McKinsey need talented people desperately. As a part of 

the company’s compensation package they have to pay enough salary to offset the 

employment taxes on the employee. If they don’t assume the tax costs, the employee 

can go somewhere else. Meanwhile at a lumber yard where there is an excess of 

labor the lumber company doesn’t have to pay higher wages and the bulk of the employer’s taxes hit the worker. Perversely, it is the lowest paid workers and the companies most essential to economic growth that are hit hardest by employment taxes. 

Better yet, if politicians wanted a comprehensive and fair way to reduce the deficit and invest in health care, education, and pension security, they could combine 

income tax reform and gasoline- or pollution-tax increases with a reduction in employment taxes, a 10-percent cut in defense spending, a 30-percent cut in what the 

federal government spends on corporate subsidies such as mining and digital spectrum, a limit on the corporate deduction for the most expensive medical plans, and 

a cut in farm subsidies—which today go to only 25 percent of American farmers, 

with $7 billion of the total $14 billion going to the richest 3 percent, including large 

agribusiness. 

In addition, the budget process should be governed by the pay-as-you-go budget 

rules that existed in the 1990s. Under those rules, any tax cut or spending increase 

had to be offset by a spending cut elsewhere in the budget. Finally, the entire federal budget should be on the Internet with keyword accessibility. For example, if 

you searched for ‘‘breast cancer’’ or ‘‘housing’’ you would be directed to all the places 

in the federal budget where money is spent for those purposes. That way, citizens 

could have the information with which to understand the trade-offs in taxes and 

spending and hold their legislators accountable. 

The key to passage of these measures would be to have them all in one package, 

so that choices—between more money for health care, education, and pension security, on the one hand, and spending cuts and higher taxes on the other—could be 

made clearer. If we included spending cuts or increases in one bill and tax reform 

in another, the connection between what we were giving up in tax increases would 

be lost and what we were getting in spending increases. The debate should be about 

the whole, not the parts. Issues such as sharing the burden fairly between the 

young and the old, and trade-offs between weapons systems and health care, or corporate welfare and human welfare, would be clearly set out. 

41 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ORRIN G. HATCH, 

A U.S. SENATOR FROM UTAH

WASHINGTON—Senate Finance Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch (R–Utah) today 

delivered the following opening statement at a committee hearing examining the 

lessons from the Tax Reform Act of 1986: 

The committee will come to order. 

Today’s hearing is about the need for tax reform and what lessons we can learn 

from the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the last successful overhaul of our nation’s tax 

code. 

We have before us today two former Senators who were key to that effort. I look 

forward to hearing their thoughts and advice during today’s hearing. 

Before we engage meaningfully in tax reform, we need a clear vision of what we 

want success to look like. A vision is not a specific system of rates, deductions, or 

credits. Instead, a vision is how we want to change the opportunities for American 

families and the rewards that Americans receive from their labor, entrepreneurship, 

and investment. 

A successfully reformed tax system will help make America the best place in the 

world to work, conduct business, invest, and prosper. A successfully reformed tax 

system will be one that promotes economic growth and is simple and fair. This, 

more than anything else, should be our vision for tax reform. 

The landmark Tax Reform Act of 1986 was developed by then-Chairman Bob 

Packwood through a careful and methodical bipartisan process that relied heavily 

on member input. Senator Bradley was a key part of that process. 

Over the last few weeks, we’ve begun a similar process that we hope will yield 

a similar result: tax reform legislation that both parties can support. 

The 1986 act, signed into law by President Reagan, reformed a costly and complicated tax system into a simpler one with lower tax rates for American households 

and businesses, affording them greater personal prosperity. Over time, our tax system has once again becomecostly and complex, impeding growth, standing in the 

way of shared prosperity, and placing American workers and businesses at a disadvantage. 

Put simply, it is past time for Congress to stand up once again to fix our broken 

tax system. 

If you’ve been around Washington over the last few years, chances are, you’ve already heard me talk about tax reform. I’ve been making the case for reform on the 

Senate floor, here in the Finance Committee, in public appearances, in written materials, and in private conversations. 

In December, the Republican staff of this committee produced a comprehensive report outlining the need for tax reform and providing some direction to our overall 

efforts. I’m sure everyone here has read that report—cover to cover. 

I’ve already publicly laid out seven principles that I believe should guide our tax 

reform efforts. 

I won’t go into much detail on each principle today. Instead, I’ll just talk about 

them briefly. 

The first principle is economic growth. Tax reform, if it’s done correctly, should 

promote growth and significantly reduce economic distortions that are present under 

the current income tax system. 

The second principle is fairness. The income tax base, which has become riddled 

with exclusions, exemptions, deductions, and credits, should be as broad as possible. 

Tax reform should broaden the tax base by eliminating or reducing a number of tax 

expenditures, along with lowering tax rates, and removing distortions. 

The third principle is simplicity. Taxpayers and businesses spend over six billion 

hours a year complying with tax-filing requirements, with annual compliance costs 

in excess of $170 billion, which is more than the gross domestic product of New Zealand. Simplifying the tax code will result in greater clarity and compliance and will 

free up resources for families, job creation, and other productive uses. 

42 

The fourth principle is revenue neutrality. Tax reform should be revenue neutral 

and not an occasion to raise taxes on American households or businesses. Federal 

revenues already exceed their historic average as a share of our economy, and greater revenue should not be an objective of reform. 

The fifth principle is permanence. The Joint Committee on Taxation lists almost 

100 provisions in the tax code that will expire over the next decade. This is unacceptable. Familiesand businesses should be able to plan for the future without wondering if the tax code is going to change from year to year. 

The sixth principle is competitiveness. The combination of a high corporate tax 

rate, worldwide taxation, and the temporary nature of some tax incentives makes 

American companies less competitive when compared to their foreign counterparts. 

Tax reform should reduce burdens on businesses, large and small, to allow them to 

more effectively compete on the world stage. 

The seventh principle is the promotion of savings and investment. Many aspects 

of our current tax system discourage savings and investment, thereby hindering 

long-term growth. Savings and investment help build the capital stock, providing 

fuel for economic growth that generates prosperity for American workers and businesses. 

These seven principles are the guideposts I will use when looking at tax reform 

proposals. 

I think we’re going to have an interesting hearing today. 

I look forward to hearing from Chairman Packwood and Senator Bradley to see 

what advice they can give us as we undertake our tax reform efforts in this Congress. 

I will now turn it over to Senator Wyden. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BOB PACKWOOD, FORMER CHAIRMAN, 

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

The concept of tax reform is quite simple. If you assume that a country has an 

income of $1,000 and that the government needs $100 to run on then a 10 percent 

tax will produce the $100 needed. But now suppose that the government also allows 

taxpayers to take all kinds of deductions for things like charitable contributions and 

home mortgage interest. After all of the deductions are taken what remains is called 

the ‘‘taxable income.’’ In our hypothetical country let’s say that’s now only $500. If 

the government still needs $100 to run on, the tax rate now has to be 20 percent 

to raise the needed funds. 

Early in 1985, the Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives 

started having extensive public hearings on tax reform. They were numerous and 

extended over a long period of time, giving opponents of tax reform plenty of opportunity to gather, plot, organize, and attempt to kill the bill. 

Almost all the Republicans were opposed to the bill, not so much on substance, 

but procedural. They felt they had been left out of the drafting of the bill. A fair 

number of individual Democrats were also opposed because of diverse provisions 

they thought adversely affected a particular interest in their state. As a result not 

long after the bill came to the floor of the House of Representatives it had to be 

pulled before it would fail. But President Reagan contacted the Republicans and 

urged them vote for the bill saying that while he’d veto it in its current form, the 

Senate should have a chance to work on it. Acquiescing to their party leader, Republicans rallied and the bill passed the House; albeit by a voice vote. No one wanted 

their fingerprints on it. 

In the spring of 1986, the Senate Finance Committee started working on the bill 

sent to us by the House of Representatives. There was no enthusiasm for what we 

were doing. It was not big enough. Not strong enough. There was no grandeur. Support dwindled to the point that at noon on Friday, April 18, 1986, I exercised the 

chairman’s prerogative and adjourned the committee saying that we were permanently done with this bill! 

Friday, April 18—1:30 p.m. 

I called David Brockway [Chief of Staff of the Joint Tax Committee—the fulltime 

professional group that advises Congress on taxes]. I asked him to come back with 

43 

a bill with a 25 percent top rate. He said we would have to get rid of the mortgage 

interest deduction. I said what about 26 or 27 percent. 

Friday, April 18—2:30 p.m. 

I met with Secretary of the Treasury Jim Baker and his principal aide Undersecretary of the Treasury, Dick Darman. . . . I had nothing but theory to give them at 

the moment. They, of course, liked the theory, but more or less said where do we 

go from here. 

Tuesday, April 22—6:00 p.m. 

David Brockway stopped at the office with his figures for 25, 26 and 27 percent top 

rate for individuals. His briefing gave me the outlines of what I needed to present 

to the committee. 

Thursday, April 24—7:30 a.m. 

Again and again I played with numbers balancing the attraction of the low rates 

versus the opposition we would get from eliminating certain deductions. I wanted 

a balance that would achieve the following: 

1. Bring Democrats on board by getting rid of loopholes. This would bring in lots 

of money. 

2. Bring the Republicans onboard by using the money raised to lower rates. 

3. Bring economists, editorialists, and others onboard who wanted to get rid of deductions and achieve lower rates. They would also applaud the simplicity of the 

plan, an added bonus. 

Thursday, April 24—9:30 a.m. 

I called the committee together and presented the outline of what was possible. I 

still had no bill to show them, just concepts. 

Diary, Thursday, April 24—9:30 a.m. 

’’Chafee thought it was wonderful. Bentsen spoke approvingly. Bradley spoke eloquently and forcefully. Danforth said it was the only chance for reform. Wallop said 

he liked the idea.’’ 

As I worked I recalled how the House of Representatives had almost floundered 

because of the yearlong public meetings allowing time for opponents to gather and 

oppose. They were already organized and I did not want to give them time to try 

and kill the Senate bill as well. If we wanted to pass this bill, it would have to be 

bipartisan, and work would need to be done in closed meetings and quickly. 

A small closed meeting with a bipartisan group of Senators was our only chance. 

I wanted the intellectual leaders of the committee on both sides. If I got them with 

me, I’d have the rest of the committee. 

I made some calls. On the Democratic side Pat Moynihan, of New York and my 

closest friend in the Democratic Party, Bill Bradley, of New Jersey, the guru of tax 

reform in the Senate, and George Mitchell, of Maine, a relatively newer member of 

the committee, but one I found so sharp that you could see ‘‘leadership’’ written all 

over him. On the Republican side Jack Danforth, of Missouri, John Chafee, of Rhode 

Island, both liberal Republicans, and Malcolm Wallop, of Wyoming, a very conservative Republican, and well regarded by other conservatives. Would they be willing 

to meet with me in closed meetings starting next Tuesday to see if we could fashion 

a bill acceptable to the President. To the man—they agreed. 

To stay ahead of the curve, starting Tuesday April 29, I met with staff every 

morning at 7:30. We discussed the details of whatever portion of the bill were to 

be discussed with the core group of the committee I’d put together. An hour later, 

at 8:30, the core group of Senators met and we strategized how to get the full Finance Committee on board with what we were planning. We would meet every 

morning thereafter, save Sunday, from Tuesday, April 29 to Tuesday, May 6. 

Tuesday, April 29—8:30 a.m. 

We agreed that from time to time we might invite some other Senator in if we wanted him for a specific purpose, but that the seven of us would form the loyal band. 

We decided that if any four of us could agree on something to be put in the bill 

all of us would agree. A smart decision, and one that was never used unfairly, I 

don’t recall that there was ever a vote that broke four Republicans and three Democrats. I do, however, remember a couple of votes where I fell in the minority. 

44 

Diary, Tuesday, April 29—6:45 p.m. 

‘‘Met with Baker and Dick Darman, Bill Diefenderfer [my Finance Committee Chief 

of Staff] . . . Darman loves the plan. Baker is worried about the elimination of passive losses and what about those oil rigs and what about those limited partnerships 

in drilling for oil. Bill and I in essence said, oh, Jim, shut up. Here we are talking 

to the Treasury Secretary—shut up. Here you’ve got a plan. All we need you to say 

is we think it is wonderful. We’ll get it to the President. Jim, we’re going to wrap 

this up by Sunday. 

. . . You put in one pro forma appearance before the Senate Finance Committee 

Republicans and get your little tail out to Tokyo or wherever it is the President is 

going to be meeting. And leave Darman here to take care of the strategy and the 

details and we’ll have this done before you get back, but don’t start niggling and 

quibbling over minuscule details. Well they left pretty happy because it is a victory 

if we get it. It is like Disraeli and the Corn Laws. ‘‘It doesn’t matter what you win. 

It is that you won.’’ 

Diary, Wednesday, April 30—8:30 a.m. 

‘‘I’ve still got to solve Bentsen’s [Senator Lloyd Bentsen of Texas] problem about 

passive losses. . . . With that I can get Lloyd.’’ 

Diary, Wednesday, April 30 

‘‘. . . Talked with Norm Winningstad [founder of Floating Point Systems] who is terribly upset about the elimination of capital gains and had a note from Tom 

Bruggere [founder of Mentor Graphics]. . . . He is terribly upset about the elimination of capital gains . . . two of our more successful high-tech firms. God, leadership exacts a toll, but I don’t mind the flak. I’ll mind it if I can’t get the result. 

I’m willing to stop the buck here, but I want to get a result.’’ 

Diary, Thursday, May 1—8:30 a.m. 

‘‘A downer—The core group. Boy, was it exciting. Moynihan, Bradley, Chafee, Danforth, Wallop, Mitchell—we’re on our way. We are agreed and with Bentsen onboard 

we were sensational. Lloyd came in and said he couldn’t agree to the passive income 

provisions. Nobody said a word. There were 20 seconds of silence. Lloyd said, boy 

I wished I had never come in. It did take all of the wind out of our sails. I went 

from Mt. Everest to Death Valley in 20 seconds.’’ 

The problem with what Lloyd Bentsen wants is two-fold: 

1. In this bill we have eliminated for everybody the very provision that Lloyd 

wants us to put back in solely for oil and gas. 

2. If we put it back in for oil and gas alone, it’s not a big revenue loser. If all 

the others who are losing this kind of provision get wind of it, they’ll want to 

be included again and that loses so much money that the bill would be dead. 

Thursday, May 1—2:00 p.m. 

If the Senate agreed on our bill, we would need to come together with the House 

of Representatives to create one document that could pass both chambers. There 

were vast differences between the two bills. Danny Rostenkowski was Chairman of 

the House Ways and Means Committee. We had tangled earlier over another bill 

in conference. I was unjustifiably belligerent. I wondered if that would make the 

conference on this tax bill difficult. He quelled some of my fears by making a generous gesture. 

Diary, Thursday, May 1—2:00 p.m. 

‘‘Back again to tax reform in closed session. Was interrupted by a phone call from 

Danny Rostenkowski. Bless his soul. He said, ‘Pal, I’ve been thinking of coming over 

there, without fanfare, without press, just to say I’ve been through it. I know every 

day you go through troughs and you’re on hills and I’ve been bleeding for you but 

I think what you’ve got in terms of tax reform is the best thing this Congress has 

seen in ten years. You get that through the Senate and between the two of us, we’re 

going to put out a bill that for a generation or longer America will look to as a pinnacle.’ God, I appreciated it.’’ 

Diary, Friday, May 2—7:30 a.m. 

‘‘Brockway, et al. God are these sessions valuable for me so I can be one jump ahead 

of the core group.’’ 

45 

Diary, Friday, May 2—8:30 a.m. 

‘‘The core group. And are these sessions valuable, so that the core group can be one 

jump ahead of everybody else.’’ 

The staff at 7:30 and the core group at 8:30 continued to meet in my office in 

closed meetings every morning. The open Finance Committee meetings followed 

later, but basically all the full committee did was mark time while the core committee worked. Even though we tried to keep our work secret, there are no secrets 

in Washington. Word was getting out. You could tell it by turnout of spectators at 

the committee meetings. On Monday, attendance was spare. By Friday, so many 

people jammed into the committee room that speakers had to be set up in the hallway so the overflow could hear. 

Diary, Friday, May 2—10:30 a.m. 

‘‘Back to the backroom with all of the members. . . . I ducked into Bill D’s office 

to call Jack Rosenthal at The New York Times. He is my old friend from Grant High 

School. I said, Jack, do you have any idea what we’re doing on tax reform. He said, 

well, kind of a vague idea and I sensed that the vague idea he had was where we 

were several weeks ago and he didn’t like what we were doing, but was polite 

enough he didn’t want to say it. I said, Jack I don’t know if you are up to speed, 

but as I recall from your editorials you like Bradley-Gephardt. What we are now 

working on is Bradley-Gephardt and I need some help from The New York Times 

with a good editorial. He said, well, I first need to find out from my people what 

it is you’re doing. I said fine. If you need to find out anything here, call Bill 

Diefenderfer and here’s the number. I then called Steve Rosenfeld at The Washington Post and told him roughly the same thing. He was a little more up to speed 

in what we’re doing, but not much more. He didn’t seem too receptive, but at least 

I made my pitch.’’ 

Shortly thereafter, ‘‘Bill D. had gotten back to me and said he had talked with 

Rosenthal. They are going to do a New York Times editorial Sunday, called 

Packwood-Bradley-Gephardt. I think even Bill was surprised that I was able to pull 

that off.’’ 

Late Friday afternoon, May 2, I announced to the committee and the lobbyists, 

‘‘We’re done for the day. In fact we’re done for the weekend. The Finance Committee 

is not going to meet this weekend. It’s too nice of a day. You all ought to be out 

sailing or playing golf.’’ Raucous cheers. I said, ‘‘We’ll see you all next week.’’ 

I told everyone, that is, except the core group. I told them we would meet Saturday. I didn’t want the other committee members, or anybody else, to know we 

planned to meet however. 

Not a lobbyist or committee member, other than the core group, showed up Saturday. A success. 

It was on that long, hot day that we made all the final decisions. Brockway needed two days to get the final draft back to us. We knew we could finish by Tuesday 

or Wednesday. I thought we were done—but not quite—the oilies wanted another 

bite of the apple. 

Diary, Tuesday, May 6—2:30 p.m. 

‘‘The oil state Senators led by Boren, Bentsen, Russell Long, and accompanied by 

Bob Dole and Heinz . . . joined together with Baucus, Pryor, and Malcolm Wallop. 

Just enough to demand that we give an exception for working interest for oil.’’ 

We’d worked hard to eliminate this type of exception for all other businesses. 

They wanted it back for oil and gas. 

I had no doubt I could beat the oilies in committee at worse 12 to 8, probably 

13 to 7, and if I leaned on people 14 to 6. 

Diary, Tuesday, May 6—10:00 p.m. 

‘‘. . . they were willing to give away immense quantities of money to get their little 

working interest provision which costs $700 million if you give it to those who are 

active in the oil industry or $1.4 billion if you allow non-active partners . . . I could 

see this whole thing becoming unraveled. We were going to give up great things for 

small things. We were going to give up closing loopholes worth $50 billion, lower 

rates, better corporate depreciation and a lower corporate rate. Everything for the 

sake of $1.4 billion and I resolved that at this stage the time for compromise had 

come. I called Lloyd Bentsen and said, ‘Lloyd, let me lay out a deal for you. You 

46 

get working interests and you support the rest of the package,’ He said it sounded 

like a good deal to him.’’ 

He then added as an aside, ‘‘If there’s a vote on this, Bob, I’m sure I can count 

on your vote.’’ I said, ‘‘Lloyd, you absolutely cannot count on my vote. I’m going to 

vote against it, but I will get you votes to pass it.’’ 

I knew—or at least sensed—something that the other members had not yet 

grasped. Our problem was not going to be in committee. The bill would pass. The 

problem would come on the floor. Our Achilles’ heel in this bill was going to be the 

individual retirement accounts—IRAs. Through several years of research, we had 

discovered that the IRAs did not increase the total savings in the country, they simply resulted in upper-middle and upper income people shifting their savings to the 

tax preferred individual retirement account. IRAs were immensely popular and I 

knew that on the floor there would be a very close vote to restore what we had 

taken out. If this happened and IRAs remained the same, our bill would lose so 

much money it would die. To keep IRAs out, I needed the oilies in. I made the trade. 

Diary, Tuesday, May 6—8:00 p.m. 

‘‘I called the members together at 8:00 p.m. in the backroom and we stayed in that 

backroom until 11:30 p.m.’’ 

It was in this three-and-half-hour period that all of the final important decisions 

were made. 

Diary, Tuesday, May 6—10:45 p.m. 

‘‘We gradually hammered it down to the end. It’s clear. We voted on working interest in the group. I voted with Bradley. The oil people won 11–9, fortunately, because 

we would have had no deal without them. I had the best of all possible worlds. I 

was opposed to them and yet they won so we could have the deal. I rapped the gavel 

and we went out to the committee room.’’ 

Just before the final vote started, however, George Mitchell—one of the strongest 

members of my cabal—wanted to make a statement. 

Senator Mitchell. 

‘‘Mr. Chairman, I think it ought to be clear that what we are doing here is establishing one rule for every American business, every American interest except oil and 

gas, and then a special rule for those in the oil and gas business. 

An American who invests in a project involving real estate, under legal circumstances identical to those with another person who invests in oil and gas, will 

be treated differently and to his disadvantage. 

An American who invests in an extractive industry, an American who invests in 

any other business but oil and gas, even though under identical circumstances, will 

be treated in a wholly different fashion, and those who invest in oil and gas will 

be treated in a preferential fashion even though the circumstances are identical. 

I can see no justification for that. No rational basis has been offered. No standards by which such a distinction can be made has been suggested. All we are saying 

is that we are going to give special treatment to one industry and one category of 

persons and everybody else will be treated differently.’’ 

Of course George Mitchell was right. Without speaking to any of the core group 

of six who so fully supported me I made a deal with Bentsen and I had yet to explain to the others why. They would later learn my reasons, but I couldn’t tell them 

yet. 

After eleven closed meetings over seven days, seven of the core group and four 

of the full committee—final passage came—20–0! We had raised the taxes significantly on corporations and rich individuals. They would pay more and middle income and the poor would pay less, and we accomplished all this while at the same 

time lowering the top corporate tax rate from 48 to 34 percent and the individual 

tax rate from 50 to 27 percent. The bill was revenue neutral and was as progressive 

as the existing tax law. 

Not a bad week’s work. 

We concluded with a champagne party in Bill Diefenderfer’s office. 

Dick Darman placed a phone call to Jim Baker who was in Tokyo with Ronald 

Reagan at one of those multi-nation economic meetings. I, of course, heard only 

Darman’s end of the conversation. 

47 

‘‘Jim, just tell him to shut up. He’s going to like this bill, but he’s got friends who 

aren’t going to like a lot of this bill. Don’t let them get to him before I have a chance 

to get to you and explain everything that has happened. Let me emphasize again. 

He is going to like this bill.’’ 

MAJOR AMERICAN COMPANIES PAYING ZERO OR LESS IN FEDERL INCOME TAX, 1981–83 

Company Profits 

(in millions) 

Federal Income Tax 

(in millions) Tax Rate 

General Electric $6,527.0 ¥$283.0 ¥4.3% 

Boeing $1,530.0 ¥$267.0 ¥17.5% 

Lockheed $1,085.0 $0 0% 

General Dynamics $930.8 ¥$70.6 ¥7.6% 

Time Magazine, November 26, 1984 

INDIVIDUALS 

‘‘A total of 230 of the nation’s wealthiest individuals paid no federal income taxes in 1975.’’ 

The Associated Press, March 3, 1977 

‘‘The Internal Revenue Service says 198 couples or individuals with incomes above $200,000 used deductions and credits to wipe out all their federal income-tax liability in 1980.’’ 

The Associated Press, November 16, 1982 

‘‘Almost 30,000 couples and individuals with income tax above $250,000 

paid little or no federal income tax in 1983, the Treasury Department said 

Thursday.’’ 

‘‘As many as 306 people who earned over $1 million paid no tax,’’ 

The Associated Press, August 1, 1985 

‘‘Consider the 28,000 persons whose 1983 incomes were $1 million or 

more. More than 300 of them paid not a dime in taxes.’’ 

The Los Angeles Times Mirror, August 6, 1985 

‘‘. . . 55,000 taxpayers with incomes exceeding $250,000 paid a lower percentage of their income in federal taxes than the average middle-income 

family or four.’’ 

‘‘Perhaps even more striking, 3,170 taxpayers who earned more than $1 

million in 1983 paid virtually no tax at all. At least 1,900 of these high earners paid no tax at all.’’ 

Time Magazine, August 12, 1985 

10 BIGGEST REVENUE RAISERS IN THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 

(revenue increase in $ billions) 

Provision 

Revenue Gain—FY 1987–1991 

Total Individual Corporate 

1. Repeal investment tax credit ...................................................................................... $143 $24 $119 

2. Impose uniform capitalization rules (e.g., require manufacturers to delay deductions for more of their expenses until they get paid for the goods they make) ....... $32 0 $32 

3. Strengthen minimum tax ............................................................................................. $30 $8 $22

4. Limit interest deductions (e.g., consumer interest) .................................................... $29 $29 0 

5. Repeal second earner deduction ................................................................................. $27 $27 0 

6. Limit IRA deductions ................................................................................................... $24 $24 0 

48 

10 BIGGEST REVENUE RAISERS IN THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986—Continued 

(revenue increase in $ billions) 

Provision 

Revenue Gain—FY 1987–1991 

Total Individual Corporate 

7. Eliminate passive loss deductions (the $23 total is a net of $36 increase for individuals and $13 cut for corporations) ........................................................................ $23 $36 ¥$13 

8. Repeal sales tax deduction ......................................................................................... $21 $20 $1

9. Impose 2% floor for deduction of employee business expenses (e.g., union and 

professional dues) ....................................................................................................... $19 $5 0 

10. Restrict depreciation .................................................................................................... $13 $5 $8 

Source: The Bluebook for the Tax Reform Act of l986 (published by Joint Committee on Taxation). 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD TO HON. BOB PACKWOOD

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. ORRIN G. HATCH

Question. I wanted to ask you about the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and in particular 

its suitability for today. Numerous commentators say that the Tax Reform Act of 

1986 was a wonderful piece of legislation, and it’s too bad that the tax code doesn’t 

look like that anymore. My question is: Should we indeed go back to that? That is, 

if the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was so great, should Congress just have an up or 

down vote on that? No amendments allowed? I am not necessarily advocating that, 

but it does make me wonder. I realize there is a lot both sides of the aisle would 

lose with the Tax Reform Act of 1986 simply being re-enacted, without any amendments. For example, most Republicans would not like losing the preferential tax 

rate for capital gains and some of the exceptions to the subpart F rules such as the 

Active Financing Exception. Most Democrats would not want to lose the 10 percent 

tax bracket or the many refundable tax credits that have worked their way into the 

tax code over the years. But there would be much that both sides could be happy 

about. For example: There would only be two individual tax rates, 15 and 28 percent. That would be a lot better than the six rates we have today, which effectively 

range into the mid-40s. The corporate rate would go down to 34 percent (not nearly 

enough, in my opinion, but slightly better at least than the current 35 percent). 

We would get rid of the deliberately hidden marginal tax rate increases known 

as PEP and Pease. Numerous tax expenditures that clutter and complicate the code 

would be eliminated. Again, I want to emphasize that I am not necessarily advocating this. But I would want to know why, if the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was so 

great, then why not simply re-enact here in 2015, word-for-word, the Tax Reform 

Act of 1986? 

Answer. Reenacting the 1986 Tax Reform Act is an interesting idea. First thing 

I would do is ask the Joint Tax Committee to do a revenue estimate. Remember 

that in 1986 we lowered the corporate tax rate from 48 to 34 percent and still managed, over a 5-year period, to increase taxes on business by $140 billion. We then 

used that money to lower individual rates. You can imagine how much fat there 

must have been in the corporate tax code at that time if you could lower their rates 

from 48 to 34 percent and still raise $140 billion. 

In any event, I don’t have now an exact idea of all of the major changes that have 

been made in the act since that time, but probably scores of minute ones that collectively might add up to some money. 

A perfect example: The 1986 act eliminated deduction of the state sales tax. Years 

later it was put back in. 

If you reenact the 1986 Tax Reform Act you will pick up a lot of money by eliminating deduction of the state sales tax. 

You see the questions I would have. For a matter of pride, I would love to have 

it reenacted. Please put my name on it as it the Packwood Re-Reform Tax Act of 

2015. 

49 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. DEAN HELLER

Question. In your witness testimony, Senator Packwood, you discuss the tough 

trades you and the committee had to make in order to keep tax reform moving forward. Looking back, is there anything significant you would have done differently? 

Answer. We had no choice but to follow the procedures we adopted. Without them 

there would have been no tax reform bill. The bill had almost died in the House. 

Only President Reagan’s personal intervention caused the bill to pass the House. 

And he promised he would veto it if it came to him in form that it passed the House. 

He said, however, give the Senate a chance to work on it and let’s see what happens. With that the House grudgingly passed it. Ironically, it was on a voice vote. 

No one wanted their fingerprints on it. 

In the Senate for the better part of a month I was making no progress. The bill 

wasn’t getting worse. It wasn’t getting better. We were more or less treading water. 

It was time for a Hail Mary. These were in the days when you could work across 

party lines. I asked six Senators—three Democrats and three Republicans—to join 

me in my office at 8:30 a.m. every morning in secret meetings to see if we could 

reach some kind of an agreed compromise. I picked the intellectual heavyweights 

of the committee on both sides. If I had them with me, they could bring the rest 

of the committee members. The Democrats were George Mitchell, of Maine—later 

Majority Leader—Pat Moynihan, of New York, and Bill Bradley, of New Jersey. The 

latter had been the Democratic guru on tax reform for a number of years. On the 

Republican side I picked Jack Danforth, of Missouri, John Chafee, of Rhode Island, 

and Malcolm Wallop, of Wyoming. We met for only seven days and in those seven 

days we worked out the bill that we wanted. 

The problem was the oil industry wanted a specific provision put back into the 

bill that had been taken out for every business in America. They controlled seven, 

maybe eight, votes on the committee. I could have beaten them in committee, but 

then would have lost their support and the bill would have passed committee 12– 

8 or 13–7 rather than 20–0. But more importantly I needed their vote on the floor 

of the Senate on what I knew would be the only amendment I might loose and if 

I lost it, the bill was dead. 

That amendment involved IRAs (Individual Retirement Accounts). We had severely limited eligibility for IRAs. As you can imagine, there wasn’t any overwhelming public constituency for limiting IRAs only fierce objection from every side. 

When the tax bill was on the floor, an amendment was offered to restore the IRAs 

to the present law. I defeated the amendment 52–48. Without the oil Senators that 

amendment would have passed. The revenue loss would have been so great that the 

bill was dead. 

So, yes, there is nothing different I could have done then. The key now is can you 

put together the same kind of bipartisan coalition—and especially a coalition of the 

leaders on the committee in both parties. If not, I see no hope of a bill becoming 

law that it passed through with purely Republican votes. It would either be filibustered or if passed, vetoed. 

Question. As you are aware, one of the great stories of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 

is when President Reagan came to the hill to make a personal plea to his own party 

to keep tax reform alive. The following day the House passes the bill by voice vote. 

In your opinion, can tax reform happen without presidential leadership? 

Answer. The President’s support was absolutely critical on the bill, but it was not 

necessarily his personal support. Jim Baker was his Secretary of the Treasury. Everyone knew he spoke for the President. He and his principal aide, Under Secretary 

of the Treasury Dick Darman, were heavily involved in the negotiations in the Senate as we were working on the Senate bill. The irony is, however, in that sevenday period when the bipartisan group was meeting in my office, the President and 

Jim Baker were overseas at one of those multi-nation economic meetings. Dick 

Darman carried all of the weight for the Administration during those seven days. 

But we all knew he spoke for the President. The support was critical. 

I see no likelihood of a bill passing without Presidential support. The support 

could be in the form of a powerful Treasury Secretary that could speak for him, and 

you knew the Treasury Secretary did speak for him. But if a President attempts 

to tell the Congress, ‘‘You folks work on it and I’ll take a look at what you pass.’’ 

Nothing will pass. You’re going to ask Members to make very tough votes. They’re 

not going to do it if they think in the end the President will not support the bill. 

50 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RON WYDEN, 

A U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON

If there’s one obvious similarity between 1986 and today, it’s that people are quick 

to say tax reform is impossible. They say Congress can’t organize a two-car parade— 

there’s no way they can come together on major economic legislation. So what happened three decades ago will need to happen again: turning the impossible into the 

possible. 

Congress and President Reagan came together to pass the 1986 Tax Reform Act 

based on what I call principled bipartisanship. One side wanted to flatten the tax 

structure. The other side wanted to close loopholes and guarantee the tax code 

treated everyone fairly. So they set aside the partisan attacks, looked for common 

ground, and each side came away with the feeling that it had upheld its principles. 

When President Reagan signed the bill into law, he called it an ‘‘historic overhaul 

of our tax code and a sweeping victory for fairness.’’ He continued, ‘‘. . . it’s also 

the best antipoverty bill, the best pro-family measure, and the best job-creation program ever to come out of the Congress of the United States.’’ Those same objectives 

should guide the committee and Congress as it again works to modernize our tax 

system. Reforming the tax code is always a Herculean task, but the same strategy 

of principled bipartisanship can work again today. Congress can turn the impossible 

into the possible. 

However, policymakers need to recognize that the process will look different. Not 

every part of a 30 year-old game plan for tax reform can work today. 

China and India are now superpowers in the global economy, which is a much 

bigger factor in reform. The gulf between wage earners and the top of the income 

ladder has widened. And America is at its best when a rising tide lifts all boats, 

and it should be obvious that making that a reality once again will take work. 

The status of the middle class in Oregon and across the country is at the top of 

the list of compelling issues for tax reform to address. It is fundamentally unfair 

that a middle-class wage earner could pay a higher tax rate than an affluent person 

whose earnings come entirely from investments. The tax code should never punish 

wage earners. And many tax incentives for college education and retirement savings 

are out of whack. The support those incentives provide doesn’t always get to people 

most in need, and that ought to change. 

Another challenge is making the U.S. more competitive in the global economy. 

Today, the U.S. is trying to win a road race in a thirty-year old car. Our competition, meanwhile, is trading up to more efficient models. America has not done 

enough to drive innovation at home, and worse, the tax provisions for R&D expire 

year after year. 

In 1986, there wasn’t a lot of talk about the tax code and a clean energy future 

in the United States. That has to change. 

And finally, modernizing our tax code must be done in a fiscally responsible way. 

Tax reform cannot become an exercise in slashing rates at any cost. 

The biggest lesson from 1986 is that tax reform is possible when Democrats and 

Republicans set partisanship aside, come together and focus on shared principles. 

Over the years, I’ve talked with Senator Bradley about how tax reform is totally, 

entirely, completely impossible—right up until it happens. The Finance Committee 

has two experienced, knowledgeable witnesses who will help us get closer to that 

point today. 

(51) 

COMMUNICATIONS

Statement for the Record for: 

Getting to ‘‘Yes’’ on Tax Reform: 

What Lessons Can Congress Learn From the Tax Reform Act of 1986? 

Tuesday, February 10, 2015 

ATTN: Working Group on Savings and Investment 

The following statement is submitted by The ESOP Association located at 1726 M 

Street, NW, #501, Washington, D.C. 20036, phone 202–293–2971. The person who 

drafted the following statement is J. Michael Keeling, President, The ESOP Association, email michael@esopassociation.org. 

The ESOP Association is a 501(c)(6) business trade association with approximately 

2,800 members. Its mission is to educate and advocate for broad-based employee 

ownership among U.S. Employees via the ESOP model. 

The statement begins below: 

For Chair Crapo and Ranking Member Brown, and members of the Tax Reform 

Working Group on Savings & Investment: 

This statement provides a brief history of employee stock ownership plans 

(ESOPs) and evidence that the ESOP model of employee ownership is spot on with 

six of Chair Hatch’s seven principles for comprehensive tax reform, and arguably 

exceeding the seventh principle. 

The seven principles for comprehensive tax reform are: 

1. Economic Growth; 

2. Fairness; 

3. Simplicity; 

4. Permanence; 

5. Competitiveness; 

6. Promoting Savings and Investments; and 

7. Revenue Neutrality. 

What Is an ESOP? 

Unique among ERISA plans, an ESOP, by law, must be primarily invested in the 

highest class of stock of the plan sponsor and the stock may be acquired with borrowed funds. In practical terms, the plan sponsor may take on ‘‘debt’’ to acquire 

shares of the sponsor, and not be engaged in a prohibited transaction if the shares 

are acquired by the ESOP trust at a price no greater than the fair market value. 

Brief History of ESOPs 

The ESOP model of employee ownership actually has its roots in a compensation 

practice from the 19th Century. (A recent book, The Citizen’s Share, Blasi, Freeman, and Kruse, Yale Press, wrote a very convincing case, pages 1–56, that our 

founding fathers, such as Washington, Jefferson, Adams, Hamilton, et al., believed 

in broad ownership of productive assets as being essential to the survival of a democracy. President Lincoln’s views, as evidenced by the Homestead Act, were also 

in sync with our founding fathers’ views.) 

As the U.S. economy moved into the industrial age, corporations with nationwide 

reach, and large numbers of employees emerged—Procter & Gamble, Montgomery 

52 

Ward, and others. Leaders of these companies realized that some employees would 

work for many years, reach an age requiring retirement, and retire with no income. 

There was no 19th Century safety net for retirees, and leaders of a number of national firms decided to set aside company stock for the employees to have when they 

retired, and to ‘‘cash in.’’ 

After World War I, and the ratification of the 16th Amendment to the Constitution authorizing a national income tax, Congress recognized that taxing income was 

not so simple, and that many issues had arisen because the basic definition that 

income is anything of value received by an individual, and the general rule that an 

income tax should tax anything of value. 

In response to questions of what income should be taxed, Congress developed the 

very first true income tax code, the Code of 1921. 

In developing the Code, those firms that were setting aside stock for their retiring 

employees came to the House Committee on Ways and Means and asked—‘‘Is the 

stock set aside for an employee’s retirement taxable when set aside, and is the value 

of the stock an employer’s compensation cost?’’ 

The Ways and Means Committee decided no, it was not current income to the employee, but would be taxed when the employee realized the previously deferred income; and yes, the set aside was compensation, and thus a cost of business for the 

employer and thus deductible for income tax purposes. 

Thus, the first deferred compensation plan recognized by Congress was the ‘‘stock 

bonus plan,’’ the forerunner of today’s ESOP. 

Fast forward to post War World II and owners of privately-held businesses began 

to consider how to ‘‘exit’’ their businesses and ‘‘cash’’ in their non-tradable stock in 

the company they started and which had become successful because of the hard 

work of the company employees. While somewhat lost in history due to the fact that 

until the mid-1970s private letter rulings were not public documents, an owner in 

Alaska, followed by others, obtained permission from the IRS, in a non-public letter 

ruling, that the company could ‘‘buy’’ his stock with borrowed money, have the stock 

placed in the company’s stock bonus plan, and have the stock allocated to the employees as the debt was paid off. 

A true visionary in San Francisco, California, Dr. Louis O. Kelso, developed a 

comprehensive economic philosophy in using such a method for funding stock bonus 

plans to expand ownership in a capitalistic society and to facilitate capitalization 

of for-profit businesses. He and his law firm colleagues led the way in expanding 

the use of this method blessed by the letter rulings, and many correctly note that 

the first ‘‘ESOP’’ was the sale by exiting shareholders of the Monterrey Press north 

of San Francisco in 1957 to an ESOP. 

By the mid-1950s, many, both conservative and liberals, were seeing abuses in the 

area of pensions, or tax qualified deferred compensation plans, which the tax laws 

sanctioned and encouraged. Evidence was overwhelming that some pension funds 

were investing in organized crime activities. Then there was the collapse of major 

U.S. employers, leaving employees with no retirement income as promised. As a result, a drive in Congress to ‘‘reform’’ the tax and labor laws governing tax qualified 

deferred compensation plans, or ‘‘retirement savings plans,’’ led to the enactment of 

ERISA in 1974. 

During Congressional work on these ‘‘tax qualified deferred compensation plans,’’ 

a major influence on tax policy of that era, Senator Russell B. Long, long time chair 

of the Senate Committee on Finance became a champion of the economic philosophy 

of Dr. Kelso, and made sure the new ERTSA law sanctioned ESOPs. 

His support for the ESOP model grew stronger with each passing year, and his 

leadership led to major enactment of tax laws promoting the creation and operation 

of ESOPs. The bulk of these laws passed in 1984, in legislation referred to as 

DEFRA, and the perfection of those laws was in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 

Many of these laws of the 1980s remain in the Code, and were evidenced and endorsed repeatedly by the Finance Committee members in hearings, and tax law legislation of the late 80s through the late 90s, even after Senator Long retired in 

1987. 

To be noted, a major partner with Senator Long promoting ESOPs in the 80s 

through 1988, was former President Ronald Reagan, who often spoke of his view 

53 

that widespread ownership of productive assets was the core of maintaining equitable wealth ratios in a capitalistic society. 

And, after Senator Long retired, his successor in the Senate, former Senator John 

Breaux, led the expansion of ESOP law in the 1996–1997 tax bills permitting S corporations to sponsor ESOPs. Since Senator Breaux’s work to expand ESOPs, the 

number of 100% ESOPs that are S corporations has exploded. (There are out of the 

estimated 10,000 ESOP companies, an estimated 3,000 are 100% ESOP.) 

In sum, the work you are doing is part and parcel of a long, supportive policy of 

the Finance Committee’s developing laws to have average pay employees, or workers if you will, be owners as being good for the employees, good for their employer, 

and good for the well-being of our economy and democracy. 

ESOPs and the Seven Principles 

1. Economic Growth: The laws, most originating in the Committee on Finance, 

that encourage the creation and operation of employee owned companies utilizing 

the ESOP model, are not industry specific; thus unlike many special tax rules that 

benefit certain taxpayers, there is no one area of the economy to claim, or discredit 

the claim that law x, or y, or z, caused the industry, or set of industries, to grow 

and provide more jobs. 

But there is considerable evidence that ESOP companies outperform similar conventionally owned businesses in terms of profitability, productivity, sales, job sustainability, with the jobs in the United States. 

One macro statistic that underlies the view that ESOP companies are more likely 

to be providing growth arises from data from the General Social Survey of 2010 that 

employee stock owned companies laid off employees at a rate of less than 4% during 

the Great Recession of 2008–2010, whereas conventionally owned companies laid off 

employees at a rate of greater than 12%. While one can do some speculation why 

as a rule employee stock owned companies were able to keep average pay employees 

on the payroll during the Great Recession, a common sense view would be that 

these companies were performing better than conventionally owned companies. 

Any economist would agree that the more people work and have income, the more 

the economy can grow, as people with money from their jobs, buy things—from big 

ticket items such as a car, to a small ticket item such as chewing gum. 

And, as Attachment 2 displays, there is a law, that originated in the Senate, 90 

Stat. 1520, Pub. L. 94–455, Section 803, that clearly states Congress has passed 

laws to encourage ESOPs in order to strengthen the free enterprise system because 

the method of creating ESOPs solves the problems of securing capital funds for necessary capital growth. Capital growth and economic growth are interchangeable. 

Attachment 1 summarizes the data that the reason Congress passed laws to encourage capital, or economic growth, has been met over the past 40 plus years. In 

fact, given the experience of this nation with the limited number of ESOP companies, a strong case can be made that there should be more employee owned companies via the ESOP model if the Congress wants to see more economic growth, particularly in the global economy in which we live. 

2. Fairness: The core attraction of ESOPs is having policy to increase the wealth 

of average pay employees, not just the already wealthy, without ‘‘taking’’ from those 

who have wealth and who may have done the most to create successful businesses 

that provide jobs and opportunity. The fairness attraction of ‘‘shared’’ ownership is 

a fact, as noted by leaders from George Washington to Abraham Lincoln to Ronald 

Reagan, and many others. 

3. Simplicity: The primary beneficiary of employee ownership via the ESOP 

model, the average pay employee, does not face complexity of any significance due 

to the fact she/he has a share of ownership of the company where she/he works because of participation in an ESOP. 

Certainly, when the employee owner cashes out of an ESOP, she/he faces the matter of paying taxes on his/her money. And to claim the ESOP model is too complex 

for the company sponsor of an ESOP compared to its benefits would be a stretch. 

4. Permanence: Congress, both House and Senate, have consistently maintained 

for over 40 years the core laws, and benefits of ESOP. Yes, during the second half 

of the 1980’s, Congress tweaked some of the 1984/1986 special tax benefits for 

ESOPs, but all the key benefits were maintained. In the late 1990’s, Congress added 

law to permit S corporations to maintain ESOPs. This 1996/1997 pro-ESOP law was 

54 

tweaked in 2001 to stop anyone from creating a flim flam S ESOP, but the S ESOP 

law’s intent is still maintained. 

And is the permanence of ESOP law an oversight by the Congressional tax committees? No, as evidenced by fact that the Tax Reform proposal released February 

26, 2014, by former Chair of the House Ways and Means Committee, Dave Camp 

after over a year of closed door review of current Federal tax law, did not alter any 

specific ESOP law. And evidence is strong that the majority members of Ways and 

Means were presented options by staff to diminish ESOP tax laws, as staff did so 

for all special tax laws, as is the standard procedure in a tax reform effort. 

5. Competitiveness: Years of research, by reputable academics and think tanks, 

make an overwhelming case that ESOPs are more competitive than conventionally 

owned companies. As already noted Attachment 1 provides more details about the 

macro data evidencing that employee owned companies are more competitive, but 

highlights are: In Shared Capitalism at Work, edited by two Rutgers University professors—Blasi and Kruse—and a Harvard professor—Freeman—it was evidenced 

that employee owned companies had harder working employees that work harder, 

had a low turnover, had greater job security, better labor management relations; 

work by Dr. Brent Kramer in his dissertation for City University of New York evidenced that majority employee-owned companies, using size and sales comparables, 

had an over 8% average of more sales per employee; and in the late 20th Century, 

in a review of closely held ESOP companies, which are the majority of American 

businesses, for over a decade, with 1,100 ESOP companies compared to similar 

1,100 conventionally owned companies, evidenced that the ESOP companies had 

better sales, and were more likely to remain in business over an eleven year period. 

6. Promoting Savings and Investments: Data collected by various researchers 

in the field of retirement savings indicated that on average, ESOP account balances 

are greater than other retirement savings, in defined contribution plans. Data collected from ESOP companies collected each year by The ESOP Association indicates 

the average account balances—keeping in mind averages are for those relatively 

‘‘new’’ employee with only a few years of allocations to their accounts, and, for example the balances of long-term employees of ESOP participants, is over $200,000, 

whereas data released by a variety of retirement savings researchers indicate average balances in the popular 401(k) plans to be approximately $85,000. (While anecdotal, and thus not impressive to ‘‘researchers’’ the author of this document, Michael 

Keeling, President of The ESOP Association has visited personally in over 500 

ESOP companies the past two decades, and has heard many, many times of distributions from ESOPs to average pay employees in the $500,000 to $1 million plus 

range.) 

7. Revenue Neutrality: There is no way, based on the historical methods used 

by government revenue estimators, by employees of the Executive and Congressional branch of our government, not to says special ESOP tax benefits are revenue 

losers to the tune of around $2 billion each year. 

But, once it became evident that during the Great Recession that employee stock 

owned companies laid off people at a rate of less than 4% compared to conventionally owned companies that laid of employees at a rate of more than 12% in the same 

time line, one had to step back and say, ‘‘Wait a second—what if there had been 

no employee stock owned companies during the Great Recession, and the companies 

all laid off employees at a rate of more than 12%, how much money would Uncle 

Sam not collect—in other words, how much money did ESOP companies save Uncle 

Sam during the Great Recession as ESOP companies had more people paying income taxes, Social Security taxes, and Medicare taxes in the 2010 period?’’ Using 

an average income tax rate of 8% for the average pay worker, the National Center 

for Employee Ownership calculated that these ESOP companies, by keeping people 

at work, because they are more competitive, put into Uncle Sam’s Treasury over 

$14.5 billion more than if they had worked for those companies with 12% plus lay 

off rates, or approximately seven times more revenue than the $2 billion revenue 

loss because of the ESOP laws encouraging the creation and operation of ESOP companies. 

Yes, ESOP tax benefits may not be revenue neutral, but the fact is that ESOP 

companies pay a lot more to Uncle Sam than conventionally owned companies because ESOP company employees are more likely to have sustainable jobs triggering 

tax payments to Uncle Sam. 

Thus to say ESOP laws are hurting Federal revenue collection is not supported 

by solid evidence gleaned from the General Social Survey of 2010. 

55 

Conclusion: Laws to promote the creation and operation of employee owned companies through the ESOP model are more than justified because ESOP laws meet 

the seven criteria set forth by Chair Hatch to use when judging, are the laws good 

for America? Bottom line, ESOPs are more productive, more sustainable, with jobs 

controlled by U.S. interests, providing better retirement savings for average pay 

workers than other savings plans, and making our nation more competitive. 

ATTACHMENT 1

Employee Owner Impact on Corporate Performance— 

Positively Overwhelming Evidence ESOP Companies 

More Productive, More Profitable, and More Sustainable, 

Providing Locally Controlled Jobs 

• During the Great Recession, employee stock owned companies laid off employees 

at a rate of less than 3%, whereas conventionally owned companies laid off at a 

rate greater than 12%. (Data source: 2010 General Social Survey.) 

• Because employees of ESOP companies were four times more likely to retain jobs 

during the Great Recession, Federal government recognized savings of over $14 

billion in 2010 compared to tax payments foregone by laid off employees of conventionally owned companies; in other words for every $1 in tax expenditures to 

promote employee stock ownership, the Federal Government collected $13 in 

taxes. (Data Source: 2010 General Social Survey analyzed by National Center for 

Employee Ownership.) 

• A survey of 1,400 ESOP companies in 2010 evidenced the average age of the companies’ ESOPs were 15 years, and the average account balances for employees 

were nearly $200,000, much higher than data reported for average 401(k) account 

balances. (The ESOP Company Survey, 2010, of The ESOP Association’s Corporate members.) 

• According to 2012 General Social Survey, 13% of employees of employee stockowned companies were thinking of seeking employment elsewhere, whereas 24% 

of the employees of conventionally-owned companies were considering leaving 

their current job. 

• In the summer of 2014, the Employee Ownership Foundation released results 

from the 23rd Annual Economic Performance Survey (EPS) of ESOP companies. 

Since the Employee Ownership Foundation’s annual economic survey began 23 

years ago, a very high percentage, 93% of survey respondents, have consistently 

agreed that creating employee ownership through an ESOP was ‘‘a good business 

decision that has helped the company.’’ It should be noted that this figure has 

been over 85% for the last 14 years the survey has been conducted. In addition, 

76% of respondents indicated the ESOP positively affected the overall productivity 

of the employee owners. In terms of revenue and profitability—70% of respondents noted that revenue increased and 64% of respondents reported that profitability increased. In terms of stock value, the majority of respondents, 80%, stated 

the company’s stock value increased as determined by outside independent valuations; 18% of the respondents reported a decline in share value; 2% reported no 

change. The survey also asked respondents what year the ESOP was established. 

Among those responding to this survey, the average age of the ESOP was 16 

years with the average year for establishment being 1998. 

• More than half of the ESOP companies have two retirement savings plan (primarily a 401(k)), whereas more than half of all companies have no retirement income savings plan. (Analysis of forms 5500, and Bureau of Labor Statistics by the 

National Center for Employee Ownership, funded by the Employee Ownership 

Foundation.) 

• The average ESOP company (less than 200 employees) has sales $9 million more 

per year than its non-employee owned comparable competition (June 2008 Dissertation, Dr. Brent Kramer, CUNY.) 

• A study of 1,100 ESOP companies over eleven years compared to 1,100 comparable conventional owned companies evidenced the 1,100 ESOP companies had 

better sales, more employment, and were more likely over the period to remain 

independent businesses by 16%. (Most detailed study of ESOP companies by Dr. 

Joseph Blasi, and Dr. Douglas Kruse, tenured professors, Rutgers University 

School of Labor and Management, 1999.) 

56 

1Taxes and Spending: Small Business Owner Opinions—NFIB Member Poll, NFIB Research 

Foundation. 2Taxes and Spending: Small Business Owner Opinions—NFIB Member Poll, NFIB Research 

Foundation, Washington, DC, March 2013. 3Tax Complexity and the IRS—NFIB Member Poll, NFIB Research Foundation, Washington, 

DC, Volume 6; Issue 6; 2006. 4 An Overview of Pass-Through Businesses in the United States—Tax Foundation Special Report No. 227, Tax Foundation, Washington, DC, January 2015. 

ATTACHMENT 2

This Is the Law! 

90 Stat. 1520, Pub. L. 94–455 

(h) INTENT OF CONGRESS CONCERNING EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS.—The 

Congress, in a series of laws (the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, and the Tax Reduction Act of 1975) 

and this act has made clear its interest in encouraging employee stock ownership 

plans as a bold and innovative method of strengthening the free private enterprise 

system which will solve the dual problems of securing capital funds for necessary 

capital growth and of bringing about stock ownership by all corporate employees. 

The Congress is deeply concerned that the objectives sought by this series of laws 

will be made unattainable by regulations and rulings which treat employee stock 

ownership plans as conventional retirement plans, which reduce the freedom of the 

employee trust and employers to take the necessary steps to implement the plans, 

and which otherwise block the establishment and success of these plans. (Pub. L. 

94–455, 90 Stat. 1520) 

NFIB 

The Voice of Small Business®

www.nfib.org 

STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD 

Senate Finance Committee 

February 10, 2015 

‘‘Getting to ‘Yes’ on Tax Reform: What Lessons Can Congress Learn from 

the Tax Reform Act of 1986?’’ 

Chairman Hatch and Ranking Member Wyden, thank you for the opportunity to 

submit this statement for the record regarding the importance of comprehensive tax 

reform that includes both corporations and pass-through entities. 

During the Senate Finance Committee hearing on February 10, 2015, the Honorable 

Bob Packwood and the Honorable Bill Bradley discussed their views on tax reform 

and whether Congress should focus on business-only reform, individual-only reform, 

or comprehensive reform that addresses corporations of all sizes as well as individuals. Both witnesses expressed the opinion that comprehensive tax reform is imperative due to the way the corporate and individual tax codes are intertwined. As Mr. 

Bradley rightfully acknowledged, they are two sides of the same coin. 

NFIB is the nation’s leading small business advocacy organization, representing 

350,000 small business owners, and we commend the Committee for starting the tax 

reform discussion and actively working to make reform a reality. According to an 

NFIB study of small business owners on taxes and spending, eighty-five percent of 

our members agree that Congress should reform the tax code.1 However, NFIB 

shares the views of Mr. Packwood and Mr. Bradley that tax reform should be accomplished in a comprehensive manner. 

Seventy-seven percent of NFIB members,2 and seventy-five percent of small businesses across America,3 are organized as pass-through entities and pay their taxes 

at the individual rates. These pass-through businesses employ a majority of the private sector workforce and comprise over half of all net businessincome.4 These busiVerDate Mar 15 2010 21:15 Feb 10, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 R:\DOCS\98328.000 TIMD
57 

5Long-run macroeconomic impact of increasing tax rates on high-income taxpayers in 2013, 

Ernst & Young, July 2012. 6This would rise to ten years without Congressional action on tax extenders. 

7 NFIB Member Ballot, volume 565, August 2014. 

nesses are critical engines in our nation’s economy and simply cannot be ignored 

in the tax reform process. 

Mr. Packwood and Mr. Bradley also mentioned the importance of Presidential leadership if tax reform is to be successful. While we agree, we also have concerns with 

President Obama’s recent comments surrounding ‘‘business’’ tax reform. This broad 

term does not provide much insight into what the President is willing to consider 

in a tax reform package. Moreover, we are concerned that this approach leaves 

America’s main street businesses behind. Given President Obama’s past reluctance 

to lower individual rates, one can only assume that his version of ‘‘business’’ tax reform is a package that solely addresses the corporate tax code. Given President 

Obama’s recent statements, as well as the tax writing committees’ presumed desire 

to produce legislation the President could support, we have concerns that the path 

to common ground will lead to tax reform that falls on the backs of small businesses. 

As you know, there are numerous credits and deductions in place that both corporations and pass-through entities can claim. Tax reform seeking to lower the corporate 

tax rate would likely eliminate most, if not all, of these credits and deductions in 

an effort to offset the lowered rate. In doing so, that endeavor would actually raise 

the effective tax rate on pass-through businesses by eight percent since they would 

lose these credits and deductions without receiving a lower rate.5 This would lead 

to an unlevel playing field in which pass-through entities would struggle to fight 

and compete with much larger corporations. While we do believe the corporate tax 

rate should be lowered, we do not believe Congress should be picking winners and 

losers in the business community. It is vital that tax reform benefit businesses of 

all sizes, not just the largest corporations. 

Supporters of corporate-only tax reform may argue that pass-through entities can 

simply switch their filing status to become a C corporation; however, that is not a 

viable solution for small businesses looking for both rate relief and simplicity. There 

are many administrative and operational costs that pass-through businesses could 

incur if they choose to change their filing status. Additionally, S corporations who 

opt to change their status and become C corporations generally must wait five years 

before being permitted to return to S election.6 According to an NFIB Member Ballot, eighty-nine percent of NFIB members oppose being required to convert to a C 

corporation in order to have the same tax rate as large corporations.7

We believe the best type of tax reform for small business owners and the economy 

is pro-growth reform that lowers both corporate and individual rates, simplifies the 

code, and enables business owners to keep more of their money to reinvest and grow 

their businesses. Small businesses are the backbone of our economy and the federal 

government should not hinder their abilities to hire new workers and create lasting 

jobs. As the tax reform discussion moves forward, we urge the Committee to take 

steps to ensure that small businesses have a seat at the table. We look forward to 

continuing to work with you on this issue. 

Æ