FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TONJA AMES,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

KING COUNTY, Washington,

Defendant,

and

HEATHER R. VOLPE, member of

the King County Sheriff’s

Department; CHRISTOPHER

SAWTELLE, member of the King

County Sheriff’s Department;

DANIEL L. CHRISTIAN, member

of the King County Sheriff’s

Department,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 14-36035

D.C. No.

2:13-cv-01030-RSM

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Ricardo S. Martinez, Chief Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 7, 2016

Seattle, Washington

Filed January 13, 2017
2 AMES V. KING COUNTY

Before: M. Margaret McKeown, Richard C. Tallman,

and Morgan B. Christen, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Tallman

SUMMARY*

Civil Rights

The panel reversed the district court’s denial, on summary

judgment, of qualified immunity to King County Sheriff’s

Deputies in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in which plaintiff

alleged, among other things, that deputies violated her Fourth

Amendment rights by using excessive force during an arrest

and unlawfully searching her truck.

The panel held that the deputies were entitled to qualified

immunity because their actions were objectively reasonable

in light of the urgent need to deliver life-saving care to an

overdose victim, and to ensure the safety of everyone at the

scene.

COUNSEL

David J. Hackett (argued), Senior Deputy Prosecuting

Attorney; Daniel T. Satterberg, Prosecuting Attorney; King

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
AMES V. KING COUNTY 3

County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office, Seattle, Washington;

for Defendants-Appellants.

Darryl Parker (argued), Civil Rights Justice Center PLLC,

Seattle, Washington, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

TALLMAN, Circuit Judge:

This interlocutory appeal requires us to address the

reasonableness of actions taken by King County Sheriff’s

Deputies functioning in their community caretaking

capacities during a life-and-death medical emergency. We

reverse the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on

Appellee’s excessive force and unlawful search claims

because we conclude the deputies’ actions were objectively

reasonable in light of the urgent need to deliver life-saving

care to an overdose victim, and to ensure the safety of

everyone at the scene.

I

The events leading up to the use of force and search at

issue in this case are largely undisputed.1 On February 6,

2013, at 6:30 p.m., Tonja Ames called 911 to summon an

ambulance for her 22-year-old son, Colin Briganti. Briganti

lived in a converted garage apartment attached to his

mother’s home and suffered from heart and lung problems as

1 Where the details are disputed, we rely on Ames’s account as the

non-moving party for purposes of our review. See Wilkinson v. Torres,

610 F.3d 546, 550 (9th Cir. 2010).
4 AMES V. KING COUNTY

a result of prior drug abuse. Upon arriving home from work

that day, Ames found Briganti in his bedroom “slumped over

on the couch drooling” and incoherent. She also found what

appeared to be a suicide note and feared Briganti may have

overdosed on one of his medications. Ames called her

neighbors, William and Linda Eby, who came over to help.

The 911 operator classified the call as a Priority 1 suicide

attempt and dispatched a firefighter/EMT aid crew and a

police officer to Ames’s residence. According to the County,

it is common practice for police officers to respond to

attempted suicide calls in order to secure the scene and ensure

the safety of the aid crew. King County Sheriff’s Deputy

Heather Volpe, who is an expert instructor in drug

recognition, arrived at Ames’s house within approximately

four minutes of Ames’s 911 call, pulling up at virtually the

same time as an aid car from Woodinville Fire and Rescue. 

The aid car was manned by Lieutenant Drago Nevistic and

Firefighter/EMTs Chris Mezzone and Larry Laurent. Ames

met Deputy Volpe and the aid crew in her driveway by the

front right corner of the house and told them about Briganti’s

medical history, his current condition, and the suicide note. 

Ames then directed Deputy Volpe and the aid crew around to

the garage apartment entrance at the back of the house. 

Firefighter/EMTs Mezzone and Laurent were in the lead and

entered the apartment, with Ames, Deputy Volpe, and

Lieutenant Nevistic following behind.

As Ames, Deputy Volpe, and Lieutenant Nevistic arrived

at the doorway, Ames refused entry to Deputy Volpe. Ames

told Deputy Volpe that only the aid crew could enter the

apartment. According to Ames, Deputy Volpe replied, “If I

can’t enter the home, then you get no service,” and directed

the aid crew to exit the apartment. Firefighter/EMTs
AMES V. KING COUNTY 5

Mezzone and Laurent withdrew from the apartment; they had

not yet engaged with Briganti but Laurent had observed that

he was sitting in a chair, “semi-conscious” and “lethargic,”

and that he “barely could keep his eyes open.”

Neither Deputy Volpe nor any member of the aid crew

had ever encountered a situation where the person who called

911 would not allow police to enter with the emergency

medical personnel responding to the call. Because Ames’s

refusal was unusual, and because the call involved a possible

suicide attempt, Deputy Volpe became concerned for the

safety of the responders on the scene and what might have

happened inside the apartment. Together, Deputy Volpe and

the aid crew retreated to their vehicles parked at the curb. 

Deputy Volpe radioed to inform dispatch and her patrol

supervisor, Sergeant Kevin Johannes, that Ames was refusing

to let police enter and the aid crew was refusing to work on

Briganti inside the apartment. Deputy Volpe requested

backup and waited, further advising dispatch that Briganti

had overdosed on pills and was semi-conscious and very

lethargic. Deputy Volpe had specialized training as a Drug

Recognition Expert Instructor with knowledge of various

medications and their effects. She was concerned that

Briganti would die. Ames had listed Briganti’s medications

for Deputy Volpe when the aid crew first arrived, and Deputy

Volpe recognized most of them as Central Nervous System

depressants.

Before leaving Briganti’s apartment, the aid crew did not

tell Ames that they could treat her son outside the apartment

or that they would wait outside for him. When the first

responders withdrew, Ames and her neighbors had remained

in Briganti’s apartment. Ames panicked—thinking the aid

crew was going to leave—and enlisted her neighbors to help
6 AMES V. KING COUNTY

her carry Briganti outside and load him into her pickup truck

parked in the driveway so she could drive him to the nearest

hospital. Deputy Volpe watched as Ames and her neighbors

carried Briganti, apparently unconscious, out from behind the

house. She assumed Ames would now let the aid crew work

on Briganti in the driveway but, once she observed their

efforts to load Briganti into Ames’s truck, Deputy Volpe

radioed her patrol supervisor: “Looks like they’re trying to

load him up into a truck and leave. . . . Should Istop them[?]” 

Sergeant Johannes replied: “Yeah, if you have aid there they

need to work on him. So, yeah.” Deputy Volpe then moved

her patrol car to block the truck’s exit from the driveway and

approached Ames as she was climbing into the driver’s side

of the truck cab. Ames’s neighbors had finished buckling

Briganti into the passenger seat, where he remained slumped

over and unresponsive during the events that followed.

Deputy Volpe yelled at Ames as she approached the

truck, telling Ames that she needed to let the EMTs take

Briganti and that it was unlawful for Ames to leave with him. 

When Deputy Volpe refused to move her patrol car, Ames

became angry, pointed her finger at Deputy Volpe, and

yelled: “Move your f-ing vehicle. I’m taking my son to the

hospital. You guys left. You won’t help him. Get out of my

way.” She continued climbing into the driver’s seat, then

placed the suicide note she had retrieved from the apartment

in between the truck seats and put the keys in the ignition

while reaching out with her left arm to close the driver’s-side

door. Simultaneously, Deputy Volpe reached the driver’s

side of the truck and used her body to block the door from

closing. She then attempted to pull Ames from the truck cab. 

Ames grabbed the steering wheel tightly with her right hand

and Deputy Volpe employed a hair hold to distract Ames and

loosen her grip so the officer could remove Ames from the
AMES V. KING COUNTY 7

truck. Deputy Volpe took Ames down to the ground into a

prone handcuffing position. According to the County’s

police practices expert, a hair hold is a low-level distraction

and minor pain compliance technique that is at the lower end

of takedown options in relative level of force. Essentially,

DeputyVolpe grasped Ames’s hair close to her scalp, causing

Ames to release the steering wheel and reach up towards her

scalp, whereupon Deputy Volpe was able to pull Ames out of

the cab of the truck and down to the ground.

Ames landed on the ground with her right arm pinned

under her body. Deputy Volpe held onto Ames’s hair with

one hand and pushed her knee into Ames’s back while she

handcuffed Ames’s left arm. She ordered Ames to provide

her right arm for cuffing and, according to Ames, slammed

Ames’s head into the ground three times as Ames tried to

explain that her arm was pinned and that she suffered from a

back injury. DeputyVolpe was then able to pull Ames’s right

arm behind her back, handcuff her, and radio that she had her

pinned on the ground. In all, 97 seconds elapsed between

Sergeant Johannes’s instruction that Deputy Volpe keep

Ames from leaving the scene and Deputy Volpe’s report that

she had Ames subdued on the ground. The first backup unit

did not arrive on the scene until a little under a minute after

Deputy Volpe had subdued Ames.

The aid crew rushed to assist Briganti as soon as Deputy

Volpe removed Ames from the truck. They first moved

Briganti from the truck into the aid car and then drove

approximately 100 yards down the street for initial

assessment because they were concerned about the potential

for further confrontations. Based on their assessment of the

severity of Briganti’s condition and the shallowness of his

breathing, the aid crew called for a nearby advanced life
8 AMES V. KING COUNTY

support medic unit to transport Briganti to the hospital in case

airway support was required en route to keep him alive.

Deputy Christopher Sawtelle, the first backup officer to

reach the scene, arrived shortly after the aid crew had begun

to treat Briganti. Deputy Sawtelle observed Ames

handcuffed on the ground near the open driver’s-side door of

the truck. He got out of his vehicle and approached Deputy

Volpe to ask whether she needed assistance securing the

scene. Deputy Volpe moved Ames to the back seat of her

patrol car. Deputy Sawtelle did not speak with the aid crew

treating Briganti, but understood from Deputy Volpe’s radio

transmissions and information he received on the scene that

Briganti had been in the truck and that the suicide note was in

the truck. As a result, Deputy Sawtelle believed the truck

was a possible overdose scene and he searched the cab, glove

compartment, and truck bed, assisted by Deputy Daniel

Christian. Deputy Sawtelle found a loaded gun in the glove

compartment (legally registered to Ames) as well as bottles

of prescription drugs, at least one of which was prescribed to

Briganti. He also retrieved the suicide note. Deputy Sawtelle

did not specifically recall communicating the note and the

medications he found to the medical personnel on the scene,

but swears it would have been his standard practice to

communicate any relevant information to the treating EMTs

and paramedics, including the nature of medications or

relevant portions of a suicide note.

Briganti was transported in the advanced life support unit

to the emergency room at Evergreen Hospital Medical

Center, located some distance away. Ames was released

from her handcuffs and gave a statement to Sergeant

Johannes, who had by then arrived at the scene. A

photograph of Ames taken by Sergeant Johannes at the time
AMES V. KING COUNTY 9

of her statement shows abrasions on Ames’s right palm. 

Ames reported to Sergeant Johannes that she was

experiencing pain in her right palm, her wrist, her right knee,

and her rib cage.2 Ames then followed Briganti to the

hospital to have her injuries checked. Briganti survived his

overdose and no charges were filed against Ames or Briganti.

II

Ames brought a number of claims against King County

and Deputies Volpe, Sawtelle, and Christian under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Ames alleged that Deputy Volpe violated her Fourth

Amendment rights by arresting her without probable cause,

conducting an unreasonable seizure, using excessive force

during the arrest, and conducting an unlawful search of her

truck.3 Ames asserted that Deputy Volpe violated her First

Amendment rights by retaliating against her after she refused

entry to Deputy Volpe. Finally, Ames alleged that King

County acted with deliberate indifference to her rights by

failing to adequately train its deputies, and brought pendant

state law claims of assault, battery, false arrest, and false

imprisonment against Deputy Volpe and King County (under

a respondeat superior theory).

On summaryjudgment, the district court granted qualified

immunity to Deputy Volpe on all but the excessive force

claim (and the related state law assault and battery claims),

2

 During her subsequent deposition, Ames described her injuries as: 

“My head, my right wrist, my palms were bleeding, my right knee, . . .

[m]y left side of my ribcage, all the way over into my back. My neck.”

3 Deputies Sawtelle and Christian also were named in the unlawful

search claim.
10 AMES V. KING COUNTY

denied qualified immunity to Deputies Sawtelle and Christian

on the unlawful search claim, and dismissed the deliberate

indifference claim against King County.

4 Specifically, the

district court ruled that it could not resolve as a matter of law

whether the amount of force used during Ames’s arrest and

the scope of the search of her truck were reasonable. The

court also dismissed the state law false arrest and false

imprisonment claims against DeputyVolpe and the remaining

state law claims against King County.

Deputies Volpe, Sawtelle, and Christian timely appealed

the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on the

excessive force and unlawful search claims. The district

court stayed the case pending resolution of the deputies’

appeal now before us. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. We reverse.

III

We review a denial of qualified immunity de novo,

viewing the facts and drawing reasonable inferences in the

light most favorable to the party opposing summary

judgment. Wilkinson, 610 F.3d at 550 (citing Scott v. Harris,

550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007)). Where the district court has

determined the parties’ evidence presents genuine issues of

material fact, such determinations are not reviewable on

interlocutory appeal. See Lee v. Gregory, 363 F.3d 931, 932

(9th Cir. 2004). However, we may adjudicate “legal”

interlocutory appeals; that is, we may properly review a

denial of qualified immunity where a defendant argues—as

the deputies argue here—that the facts, even when considered

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show no violation

4

 Ames did not oppose the dismissal of this claim.
AMES V. KING COUNTY 11

of a constitutional right, or no violation of a right that is

clearly established in law. See A.K.H. v. City of Tustin,

837 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 2016) (“A defendant who

appeals a denial of qualified immunity on the ground that his

conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment and, in any

event, did not violate clearly established law has raised legal

issues that may be properly heard in an interlocutory appeal.”

(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting

Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 (2014))).

IV

“In determining whether an officer is entitled to qualified

immunity, we consider (1) whether there has been a violation

of a constitutional right; and (2) whether that right was

clearly established at the time of the officer’s alleged

misconduct.” Lal v. California, 746 F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th

Cir. 2014) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232

(2009)). We may exercise discretion in deciding which of the

two prongs to address first. Id.

“A clearly established right is one that is ‘sufficiently

clear that every reasonable official would have understood

that what he is doing violates that right.’” Mullenix v. Luna,

136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting Reichle v.

Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012)). “We do not require

a case to be directly on point, but existing precedent must

have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond

debate.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). The “clearly

established” inquiry, however, “‘must be undertaken in light

of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general

proposition,’” and factual specificity is “especially important

in the Fourth Amendment context.” Id. (quoting Brosseau v.
12 AMES V. KING COUNTY

Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per curiam)). “Qualified

immunity gives government officials breathing room to make

reasonable but mistaken judgments,” and “protects ‘all but

the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the

law.’” Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 5 (2013) (quoting

Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 743).

With these principles in mind, we review whether

Deputies Volpe, Sawtelle, and Christian are entitled to

qualified immunity in this case. We conclude that they are.

A

Use of force is a seizure that is subject to the Fourth

Amendment’s reasonableness requirement. Wilkinson,

610 F.3d at 550. Under the Fourth Amendment, officers may

use only such force as is “objectively reasonable” under the

circumstances. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397

(1989). Accordingly, we must determine, in light of the

particular facts and circumstances Deputy Volpe faced at the

scene of Briganti’s apparent suicide attempt, whether the

actions she took in subduing Ames were objectively

reasonable. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 381. We make this

determination “from the perspective of a reasonable officer

on the scene” and not “with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” 

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Additionally, we recognize “that

police officers are often forced to make split-second

judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and

rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary

in a particular situation.” Id. at 396–97. “Not every push or

shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of

a judge’s chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at

396 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
AMES V. KING COUNTY 13

In order to determine whether a use of force was

objectively reasonable, courts balance “the nature and quality

of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment

interests” against the “countervailing government interests at

stake.” Id.; see also Scott, 550 U.S. at 383. Proper

application of the test “requires careful attention to the facts

and circumstances of each particular case, including the

severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an

immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and

whether [the suspect] is actively resisting arrest or attempting

to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. The

second of these so-called Graham factors—whether there is

an immediate threat to the safety of the arresting officer or

others—is the most important. See Smith v. City of Hemet,

394 F.3d 689, 702 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc).

For purposes of our analysis, we accept Ames’s

description of Deputy Volpe’s use of force. Wilkinson,

610 F.3d at 550. Accordingly, we must determine whether,

in preventing Ames from obstructing efforts to save Briganti,

it was objectively reasonable for Deputy Volpe to execute

three head slams and use her knee to pin Ames to the ground. 

Applying the Graham factors to the particular facts and

circumstances of this case, we conclude that Deputy Volpe’s

use of force was objectively reasonable.

The government interest in subduing Ames here was

substantial. The first Graham factor speaks of the “severity

of the crime at issue,” but we think the district court applied

this factor too narrowly when it focused on Ames’s

misdemeanor obstruction of Deputy Volpe rather than the

nature of the ongoing emergency exacerbated by Ames’s

resistance. Deputy Volpe was acting in her community

caretaking capacity, “totally divorced from the detection,
14 AMES V. KING COUNTY

investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the

violation of a criminal statute,” when she responded to the

911 call for help. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441

(1973); see also United States v. Stafford, 416 F.3d 1068,

1073 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that the “emergencydoctrine

is based on and justified by the fact that, in addition to their

role as criminal investigators and law enforcers, the police

also function as community caretakers”). Thus, we believe

the better analytical approach here under the first Graham

factor should be to focus our inquiry not on Ames’s

misdemeanor crime of obstruction but instead on the

serious—indeed, life-threatening—situation that was

unfolding at the time. Ames was prolonging a dire medical

emergency through her disregard of Deputy Volpe’s lawful

commands, and her actions risked severe consequences. 

Because the gravity of DeputyVolpe’s community caretaking

responsibilities under these circumstances must be factored

into the analysis, we conclude that the first Graham factor

weighs in Deputy Volpe’s favor.

The second—and most important—Graham factor

examines whether Ames presented an immediate danger to

Deputy Volpe or others. On this record, we have no

difficulty in concluding that she did. In Deputy Volpe’s

words, as Ames and the Ebys loaded Briganti into Ames’s

truck, Deputy Volpe “continued to be highly concerned for

Mr. Briganti’s immediate survival” because he “appeared

completely unconscious” and “needed immediate help.” 

Deputy Volpe, still waiting for backup, and acting on

instructions from her patrol supervisor to prevent Ames and

Briganti from leaving so that the aid crew could commence

treating Briganti at the scene, faced a rapidly escalating

situation. After DeputyVolpe blocked Ames’s truck with her

vehicle, commanded Ames to stop, and declined to move her
AMES V. KING COUNTY 15

vehicle, Ames yelled at the Deputy to “Move your f-ing

vehicle” and “Get out of my way” as she started to put her

keys in the ignition and reached to close the truck door.

Ames admitted she was “panicked,” and testified that she

“got angry” when Deputy Volpe told her she could not leave

with Briganti. Deputy Volpe was concerned that Ames

would further delay Briganti’s access to urgently needed

medical care. In light of these circumstances, a reasonable

officer on the scene could conclude, as Deputy Volpe did

here, that Ames presented an immediate danger. As a result,

the second Graham factor weighs in favor of Deputy Volpe.

The third Graham factor also favors Deputy Volpe

because undisputed evidence in the record demonstrates

Ames was actively interfering with Briganti’s medical

treatment, physically resisting arrest, and attempting to evade

Deputy Volpe by flight. Ames admits Deputy Volpe told her

it was unlawful to leave with Briganti and that Ames

responded by yelling obscenities and indicating her intent to

drive away with him. Ames also testified she grabbed the

steering wheel with her right hand when Deputy Volpe began

pulling her out of the truck. Finally, Ames described being

unable to give Deputy Volpe her right arm to be cuffed

despite Deputy Volpe’s repeated requests. Even if this was

because Ames’s arm was pinned beneath her body, from

DeputyVolpe’s perspective it reasonablyappeared that Ames

was still refusing to comply with her requests as part of her

ongoing resistance to the officer’s commands. On these facts,

the use of force to effect her arrest may have been mistaken,

but was not unreasonable.

On balance, we conclude the government interests at

stake—here, Briganti’s urgent need forlife-saving emergency
16 AMES V. KING COUNTY

medical care and the need to protect the first responders and

other motorists from potential harm—outweighed any

intrusion on Ames’s Fourth Amendment rights. We think

Deputy Volpe’s use of force in this case was reasonable in

response to the totality of the circumstances. She needed to

make a split-second decision during rapidly evolving

circumstances to disable Ames. Deputy Volpe did not know

whether Ames had access to a weapon in the truck. Ames

refused Deputy Volpe’s commands, resisted being pulled

from her truck, and (whether or not by choice) was not

submitting to being handcuffed. Even were we to conclude

Deputy Volpe was mistaken in the judgments she made as to

the amount of force required, as a matter of law her actions

did not rise to the level of plain incompetence or a knowing

violation of clearly established law regarding police actions

in response to this serious medical emergency. See Stanton,

134 S. Ct. at 5, 7. Accordingly, Deputy Volpe is entitled to

qualified immunity from Ames’s excessive force claim.

B

Deputies Sawtelle and Christian are also entitled to

qualified immunity from Ames’s unlawful search claim under

the “emergency doctrine.” We previously have recognized

that officers acting in their community caretaking capacities

and responding to a perceived emergency may conduct

certain searches without a warrant or probable cause. See

Stafford, 416 F.3d at 1073–74. To determine whether the

emergency exception applies to a particular warrantless

search, we examine whether: “(1) considering the totality of

the circumstances, law enforcement had an objectively

reasonable basis for concluding that there was an immediate

need to protect others or themselves from serious harm; and

(2) the search’s scope and manner were reasonable to meet
AMES V. KING COUNTY 17

the need.” United States v. Snipe, 515 F.3d 947, 952 (9th Cir.

2008). Here, the deputies’ search of Ames’s truck falls

within the emergency exception.

Deputy Sawtelle had an objectively reasonable basis for

concluding Ames’s truck needed to be searched in order to

protect Briganti from serious harm—in this instance, the lifethreatening harm Briganti faced as a result of his drug

overdose.5 When Deputy Sawtelle arrived on the scene in

response to Deputy Volpe’s request for backup, he

understood the truck to be a possible overdose scene based on

the fact that Briganti had been in the pickup prior to Deputy

Sawtelle’s arrival and his knowledge of the presence of the

suicide note inside the truck. Deputy Sawtelle explained that

it is common practice for officers responding to an attempted

suicide call involving a drug overdose to search locations

associated with the suicide victim in order to find out what

drugs were used in the suicide attempt. The County’s expert

further explained: “When a patient has ingested an unknown

drug or combination of drugs the need to identify toxins and

other potential health hazards is a top priority and is very time

sensitive.” We agree with the district court that, given what

Deputy Sawtelle knew when he first arrived at the scene, he

had an objectively reasonable basis for concluding there was

an immediate need to search the truck to find the medications

Briganti took in his overdose.

5 The record demonstrates Deputy Christian assisted in the search of

the truck at Deputy Sawtelle’s direction, and does not indicate Deputy

Sawtelle instigated the search in response to a request by Deputy Volpe. 

Accordingly, the relevant inquiry is whether Deputy Sawtelle had an

objectively reasonable basis to conclude the truck needed to be searched

for evidence of what Briganti had ingested.
18 AMES V. KING COUNTY

We part ways with the district court on the question

whether the scope of the truck search was reasonable to meet

the need Deputy Sawtelle identified. We conclude it was

reasonable for Deputy Sawtelle to search the glove

compartment of the truck, given that the specific purpose of

the search was to assist in Briganti’s medical care by finding

any medications or drugs he had taken, and that medications

and drugs easily can be stored in a glove compartment. 

Significantly, Deputy Sawtelle stated that he was not

“investigating a crime, nor operating to gather evidence of a

crime” when he conducted his search of the truck, nor did the

search lead to any charges against either Ames or Briganti. 

Moreover, although Deputy Sawtelle has no specific memory

of informing the aid crew of the prescription medications and

suicide note he found in the truck, he testified it was his

standard practice to do so.

Ames has put forward no evidence to contradict Deputy

Sawtelle’s testimony, nor to suggest he was searching her

truck for any purpose other than to assist the emergency care

for Briganti’s suicide attempt. Instead, Ames claims that if

Deputy Sawtelle were really motivated by such a purpose, he

would have searched Briganti’s apartment as well. This

argument—in essence, that the deputies’ search was

unreasonably narrow in scope—is insufficient to defeat

summary judgment because it is not evidence that creates a

genuine dispute of material fact. The deputies’ search of the

truck in furtherance of their duties to assist in resolving an

active medical emergency, including the search of the glove

compartment, did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
AMES V. KING COUNTY 19

V

Deputy Volpe’s use of force while discharging her

community caretaking function was objectively reasonable in

light of the unfolding emergency with which she was faced. 

As the lone law enforcement officer on the scene, responsible

for assuring the safety of Briganti, Ames, the first responders,

and other motorists, Deputy Volpe needed to act quickly to

disable the clearly panicked mother from leaving with her

gravely ill son and enable the aid crew immediately to treat

Briganti. The level of force Deputy Volpe employed to

remove Ames from the truck and apply handcuffs did not rise

to the level of a constitutional violation under these

circumstances. Likewise, Deputies Sawtelle and Christian

did not violate Ames’s Fourth Amendment rights when they

searched her truck in an attempt to find the medications

Briganti had ingested in his overdose. The deputies’ actions

were reasonable under the emergency doctrine and they are

entitled to qualified immunity from suit.

That portion of the district court’s order denying qualified

immunity on Ames’s excessive force and unlawful search

claims is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED to the

district court for entry of an order of dismissal.

Each party shall bear its own costs.