(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2017 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

RUBIN ET AL. v. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 16–534. Argued December 4, 2017—Decided February 21, 2018 

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) grants foreign 

states and their agencies and instrumentalities immunity from suit

in the United States and grants their property immunity from attachment and execution in satisfaction of judgments against them,

see 28 U. S. C. §§1604, 1609, but with some exceptions. Petitioners 

hold a judgment against respondent Islamic Republic of Iran pursuant to an exception that applies to foreign states designated as state

sponsors of terrorism with respect to claims arising out of acts of terrorism. See §1605A. To enforce that judgment, petitioners filed an

action in the District Court to attach and execute against certain Iranian assets—a collection of ancient clay tablets and fragments 

housed at respondent University of Chicago. The District Court concluded that §1610(g)—which provides that certain property will be

“subject to attachment in aid of execution, and execution, upon [a 

§1605A] judgment as provided in this section”—does not deprive the

collection of the immunity typically afforded the property of a foreign 

sovereign. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. 

Held: Section 1610(g) does not provide a freestanding basis for parties 

holding a judgment under §1605A to attach and execute against the

property of a foreign state; rather, for §1610(g) to apply, the immunity of the property at issue must be rescinded under a separate provision within §1610. Pp. 4–15.

(a) Congress enacted the FSIA in an effort to codify the careful balance between respecting the immunity historically afforded to foreign 

sovereigns and holding them accountable, in certain circumstances,

for their actions. As a default, foreign states have immunity “from

the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States,” 

§1604, but there are express exceptions, including the one at issue 
 

 

 

 

2 RUBIN v. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN 

 Syllabus 

here, for state sponsors of terrorism, see §1605A(a). The FSIA similarly provides as a default that “the property in the United States of

a foreign state shall be immune from attachment arrest and execution.” §1609. But §1610 outlines certain exceptions to this immunity. For example, §1610(a)(7) provides that property in the United

States of a foreign state that is used for a commercial activity in the 

United States shall not be immune from attachment and execution 

where the plaintiff holds a §1605A judgment against the foreign 

state. Before 2008, the FSIA did not expressly address under which 

circumstances a foreign state’s agencies or instrumentalities could be

held liable for judgments against the state. The Court had addressed 

that question in First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U. S. 611, 628 (Bancec), and held that, as a default,

agencies and instrumentalities of a foreign state are separate legal

entities that cannot be held liable. It recognized the availability of

exceptions, however, and left the lower courts to determine whether 

an exception applied on a case-by-case basis. The lower courts coalesced around five relevant factors (the Bancec factors) to assist in 

those determinations. In 2008, Congress amended the FSIA, adding 

§1610(g). Subparagraphs (A) through (E) incorporate almost verbatim the Bancec factors, leaving no dispute that, at a minimum, 

§1610(g) serves to abrogate Bancec where a §1605A judgment holder

seeks to satisfy a judgment held against the foreign state. The question here is whether, in addition to abrogating Bancec, it provides a

freestanding exception to property immunity in the context of a

§1605A judgment. Pp. 4–8.

(b) The most natural reading of §1610(g)(1)’s phrase “as provided in

this section” is that it refers to §1610 as a whole, so that §1610(g)(1)

will apply to property that is exempted from the grant of immunity as

provided elsewhere in §1610. Those §1610 provisions that do unambiguously revoke the immunity of a foreign state’s property employ 

phrases such as “shall not be immune,” see §1610(a)(7), and 

“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law,” see §1610(f)(1)(A).

Such textual markers are conspicuously absent from §1610(g). Thus, 

its phrase “as provided in this section” is best read to signal only that

a judgment holder seeking to take advantage of §1610(g)(1) must

identify a basis under one of §1610’s express immunity-abrogating

provisions to attach and execute against a relevant property. This 

reading provides relief to judgment holders who previously would not 

have been able to attach and execute against property of an agency or 

instrumentality of a foreign state in light of Bancec. It is also consistent with the basic interpretive canon to construe a statute so as to 

give effect to all of its provisions, see Corley v. United States, 556 

U. S. 303, 314, and with the historical practice of rescinding attach-
 

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 3 

Syllabus 

ment and execution immunity primarily in the context of a foreign 

state’s commercial acts, see Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U. S. 480, 487–488. Pp. 8–11.

(c) Petitioners’ counterarguments are unpersuasive. They assert

that the phrase “as provided in this section” might refer to the procedures in §1610(f)(1), which permits §1605A judgment holders to attach and execute against property associated with certain prohibited 

financial transactions, but which was waived by the President before

it could take effect. However, it is not logical to read the phrase as 

indicating a congressional intent to create §1610(g) as an alternative

to §1610(f)(1), particularly since Congress knows how to make clear 

when it is rescinding immunity. Nor could Congress have intended 

“as provided in this section” to refer only to §1610(f)(2)’s instruction

that the Federal Government assist in identifying assets, since that

provision does not provide for attachment or execution at all. Finally,

there is no basis to conclude that “this section” in §1610(g) reflects a

mere drafting error.

The words “property of a foreign state,” which appear in the first

substantive clause of §1610(g), are not rendered superfluous under 

the Court’s reading. Section 1610(g) serves to identify in one place 

all the categories of property that will be available to §1605A judgment holders for attachment and execution, and commands that the 

availability of such property will not be limited by the Bancec factors. 

Also, without the opening clause, §1610(g) would abrogate the Bancec 

presumption of separateness in all cases, not just those involving terrorism judgments under §1605A. Although petitioners contend that 

any uncertainty in §1610(g) should be resolved by giving full effect to 

the legislative purpose behind its enactment—removing obstacles to

enforcing terrorism judgments—they offer no real support for their 

position that §1610(g) was intended to divest all property of a foreign 

state or its agencies or instrumentalities of immunity. Bank Markazi 

v. Peterson, 578 U. S. ___, ___, n. 2, distinguished. Pp. 12–15. 

830 F. 3d 470, affirmed. 

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other

Members joined, except KAGAN, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

 

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 16–534 

JENNY RUBIN, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. ISLAMIC 

REPUBLIC OF IRAN, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
 

[February 21, 2018]

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) 

grants foreign states and their agencies and instrumentalities immunity from suit in the United States (called 

jurisdictional immunity) and grants their property immunity from attachment and execution in satisfaction of 

judgments against them. See 28 U. S. C. §§1604, 1609.

But those grants of immunity are subject to exception. 

Petitioners hold a judgment against respondent Islamic

Republic of Iran pursuant to one such exception to jurisdictional immunity, which applies where the foreign state 

is designated as a state sponsor of terrorism and the

claims arise out of acts of terrorism. See §1605A. The 

issue presented in this case is whether certain property of 

Iran, specifically, a collection of antiquities owned by Iran

but in the possession of respondent University of Chicago,

is subject to attachment and execution by petitioners in

satisfaction of that judgment. Petitioners contend that the 

property is stripped of its immunity by another provision 

of the FSIA, §1610(g), which they maintain provides a

blanket exception to the immunity typically afforded to 
 

2 RUBIN v. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN 

Opinion of the Court 

the property of a foreign state where the party seeking to

attach and execute holds a §1605A judgment. 

We disagree. Section 1610(g) serves to identify property

that will be available for attachment and execution in 

satisfaction of a §1605A judgment, but it does not in itself

divest property of immunity. Rather, the provision’s

language “as provided in this section” shows that §1610(g) 

operates only when the property at issue is exempt from

immunity as provided elsewhere in §1610. Petitioners 

cannot invoke §1610(g) to attach and execute against the

antiquities at issue here, which petitioners have not established are exempt from immunity under any other provision in §1610. 

I 

A 

On September 4, 1997, Hamas carried out three suicide 

bombings on a crowded pedestrian mall in Jerusalem,

resulting in the deaths of 5 people and injuring nearly 200

others. Petitioners are United States citizens who were 

either wounded in the attack or are the close relatives of 

those who were injured. In an attempt to recover for their 

harm, petitioners sued Iran in the District Court for the 

District of Columbia, alleging that Iran was responsible 

for the bombing because it provided material support and 

training to Hamas. At the time of that action, Iran was 

subject to the jurisdiction of the federal courts pursuant to 

28 U. S. C. §1605(a)(7) (1994 ed., Supp. II), which rescinded 

the immunity of foreign states designated as state sponsors of terrorism with respect to claims arising out of acts

of terrorism. Iran did not appear in the action, and the

District Court entered a default judgment in favor of 

petitioners in the amount of $71.5 million.1 

—————— 

1Congress amended the FSIA in 2008 and replaced 28 U. S. C.

§1605(a)(7) with a separate, more expansive provision addressing the

foreign sovereign immunity of foreign states that are designated as 
 

 

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

When Iran did not pay the judgment, petitioners

brought this action in the District Court for the Northern

District of Illinois to attach and execute against certain 

Iranian assets located in the United States in satisfaction 

of their judgment. Those assets—a collection of approximately 30,000 clay tablets and fragments containing 

ancient writings, known as the Persepolis Collection—are

in the possession of the University of Chicago, housed at 

its Oriental Institute. University archeologists recovered

the artifacts during an excavation of the old city of Persepolis in the 1930’s. In 1937, Iran loaned the collection 

to the Oriental Institute for research, translation, and 

cataloging.2 

Petitioners maintained in the District Court, inter alia, 

that §1610(g) of the FSIA renders the Persepolis Collection subject to attachment and execution. The District 

Court concluded otherwise and held that §1610(g) does not 

deprive the Persepolis Collection of the immunity typically

afforded the property of a foreign sovereign. The Court of 

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 830 F. 3d 470 

(2016). As relevant, the Seventh Circuit held that the text 

of §1610(g) demonstrates that the provision serves to

identify the property of a foreign state or its agencies or 

—————— 

state sponsors of terrorism, §1605A. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (NDAA), §1083(a), 122 Stat. 338–341.

Shortly thereafter, petitioners moved in the District Court for an order

converting their judgment under §1605(a)(7) to one under the new 

provision, §1605A, which the District Court granted. See Rubin v. 

Islamic Republic of Iran, 563 F. Supp. 2d 38, 39, n. 3 (DC 2008). 2Petitioners also sought to execute the judgment against three other 

collections that are no longer at issue in this case: the Chogha Mish

Collection, the Oriental Institute Collection, and the Herzfeld Collection. The Chogha Mish Collection has been removed from the territorial 

jurisdiction of the federal courts, and the Court of Appeals for the 

Seventh Circuit determined that the Oriental Institute Collection and 

Herzfeld Collection are not property of Iran. See 830 F. 3d 470, 475– 

476 (2016). Petitioners do not challenge that decision here. 
 

 

 

4 RUBIN v. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN 

Opinion of the Court 

instrumentalities that are subject to attachment and 

execution, but it does not in itself divest that property of 

immunity. The Court granted certiorari to resolve a split

among the Courts of Appeals regarding the effect of 

§1610(g).3 582 U. S. ___ (2017). We agree with the conclusion of the Seventh Circuit, and therefore affirm. 

B 

We start with a brief review of the historical development of foreign sovereign immunity law and the statutory 

framework at issue here, as it provides a helpful guide to 

our decision. This Court consistently has recognized that 

foreign sovereign immunity “is a matter of grace and 

comity on the part of the United States.” Verlinden B. V. 

v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U. S. 480, 486 (1983); 

Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116, 136 

(1812). In determining whether to exercise jurisdiction 

over suits against foreign sovereigns, courts traditionally 

“deferred to the decisions of the political branches . . . on

whether to take jurisdiction over actions against foreign

sovereigns.” Verlinden, 461 U. S., at 486. 

Prior to 1952, the State Department generally held the

position that foreign states enjoyed absolute immunity 

from all actions in the United States. See ibid. But, as 

foreign states became more involved in commercial activity

in the United States, the State Department recognized 

that such participation “makes necessary a practice which

will enable persons doing business with them to have their 

rights determined in the courts.” J. Tate, Changed Policy 

—————— 

3Compare Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 825 F. 3d 949, 959 

(CA9 2016) (holding that §1610(g) provides a freestanding exception to

attachment and execution immunity); Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of 

Iran, 831 F. 3d 470, 483 (CADC 2016) (same); Kirschenbaum v. 650 

Fifth Avenue and Related Properties, 830 F. 3d 107, 123 (CA2 2016)

(same), with 830 F. 3d, at 481 (concluding that §1610(g) does not create 

a freestanding exception to immunity). 
 

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

Concerning the Granting of Sovereign Immunity to Foreign Governments, 26 Dept. State Bull. 984, 985 (1952).

The Department began to follow the “restrictive” theory of 

foreign sovereign immunity in advising courts whether 

they should take jurisdiction in any given case. Immunity

typically was afforded in cases involving a foreign sovereign’s public acts, but not in “cases arising out of a foreign

state’s strictly commercial acts.” Verlinden, 461 U. S., at 

487. 

In 1976, Congress enacted the FSIA in an effort to codify 

this careful balance between respecting the immunity

historically afforded to foreign sovereigns and holding 

them accountable, in certain circumstances, for their 

actions. 90 Stat. 2891, as amended, 28 U. S. C. §1602 

et seq. “For the most part, the Act” tracks “the restrictive

theory of sovereign immunity.” Verlinden, 461 U. S., at 

488. As a default, foreign states enjoy immunity “from the 

jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the

States.” §1604. But this immunity is subject to certain

express exceptions. For example, in line with the restrictive theory, a foreign sovereign will be stripped of jurisdictional immunity when a claim is based upon commercial

activity it carried out in the United States. See, e.g.,

§1605(a)(2). The FSIA also provides that a foreign state 

will be subject to suit when it is designated as a state

sponsor of terrorism and damages are sought as a result of 

acts of terrorism. See §1605A(a).

With respect to the immunity of property, the FSIA

similarly provides as a default that “the property in the 

United States of a foreign state shall be immune from

attachment arrest and execution.” §1609. But, again, 

there are exceptions, and §1610 outlines the circumstances

under which property will not be immune. See §1610. For 

example, subsection (a) expressly provides that property 

“shall not be immune” from attachment and execution 

where, inter alia, it is “used for a commercial activity in the 
 

 

6 RUBIN v. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN 

Opinion of the Court 

United States” and the “judgment relates to a claim for 

which the foreign state is not immune under section 

1605A or section 1605(a)(7) (as such section was in effect 

on January 27, 2008), regardless of whether the property

is or was involved with the act upon which the claim is 

based.” §1610(a)(7). 

Prior to 2008, the FSIA did not address expressly under

what circumstances, if any, the agencies or instrumentalities of a foreign state could be held liable for judgments 

against the state. Faced with that question in First Nat. 

City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 

462 U. S. 611 (1983) (Bancec), this Court held that “government instrumentalities established as juridical entities 

distinct and independent from their sovereign should 

normally be treated as such.” Id., at 626–627. Thus, as a 

default, those agencies and instrumentalities of a foreign 

state were to be considered separate legal entities that

cannot be held liable for acts of the foreign state. See id., 

at 628. 

Nevertheless, the Court recognized that such a stringent

rule should not be without exceptions. The Court suggested 

that liability would be warranted, for example, “where

a corporate entity is so extensively controlled by [the

state] that a relationship of principal and agent is created,” 

id., at 629, or where recognizing the state and its

agency or instrumentality as distinct entities “would work

fraud or injustice,” ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). See id., at 630. But the Court declined to develop a 

“mechanical formula for determining” when these exceptions should apply, id., at 633, leaving lower courts with 

the task of assessing the availability of exceptions on a

case-by-case basis. Over time, the Courts of Appeals 

coalesced around the following five factors (referred to as 

the Bancec factors) to aid in this analysis: 

“(1) the level of economic control by the government; 
 

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

“(2) whether the entity’s profits go to the government; 

“(3) the degree to which government officials manage

the entity or otherwise have a hand in its daily 

affairs; 

“(4) whether the government is the real beneficiary of 

the entity’s conduct; and 

“(5) whether adherence to separate identities would

entitle the foreign state to benefits in United States 

courts while avoiding its obligations.” Walter Fuller 

Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Republic of Philippines, 965 

F. 2d 1375, 1380, n. 7 (CA5 1992); see also Flatow v. 

Islamic Republic of Iran, 308 F. 3d 1065, 1071, n. 9 

(CA9 2002). 

In 2008, Congress amended the FSIA and added 

§1610(g). See NDAA §1083(b)(3)(D), 122 Stat. 341–342.

Section 1610(g)(1) provides: 

“(g) Property in Certain Actions.—

“(1) In general. [T]he property of a foreign state

against which a judgment is entered under section

1605A, and the property of an agency or instrumentality of such a state, including property that is a separate juridical entity or is an interest held directly or 

indirectly in a separate juridical entity, is subject to 

attachment in aid of execution, and execution, upon

that judgment as provided in this section, regardless

of— 

“(A) the level of economic control over the property 

by the government of the foreign state; 

“(B) whether the profits of the property go to that 

government; 

“(C) the degree to which officials of that government

manage the property or otherwise control its daily

affairs; 

“(D) whether that government is the sole beneficiary in interest of the property; or 
 

 

 

8 RUBIN v. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN 

Opinion of the Court 

“(E) whether establishing the property as a separate 

entity would entitle the foreign state to benefits in 

United States courts while avoiding its obligations.” 

Subparagraphs (A) through (E) incorporate almost 

verbatim the five Bancec factors, leaving no dispute that,

at a minimum, §1610(g) serves to abrogate Bancec with 

respect to the liability of agencies and instrumentalities of 

a foreign state where a §1605A judgment holder seeks to

satisfy a judgment held against the foreign state. The 

issue at hand is whether §1610(g) does something more;

whether, like the commercial activity exception in 

§1610(a)(7), it provides an independent exception to immunity so that it allows a §1605A judgment holder to 

attach and execute against any property of the foreign

state, regardless of whether the property is deprived of 

immunity elsewhere in §1610. 

II 

We turn first to the text of the statute. Section 

1610(g)(1) provides that certain property will be “subject 

to attachment in aid of execution, and execution, upon [a

§1605A] judgment as provided in this section.” (Emphasis 

added.) The most natural reading is that “this section”

refers to §1610 as a whole, so that §1610(g)(1) will govern 

the attachment and execution of property that is exempted

from the grant of immunity as provided elsewhere in

§1610. Cf. Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 

Comm., 525 U. S. 471, 487 (1999) (noting that the phrase 

“[e]xcept as provided in this section” in one subsection 

serves to incorporate “the rest of ” the section in which the

subsection appears).

Other provisions of §1610 unambiguously revoke the

immunity of property of a foreign state, including specifically where a plaintiff holds a judgment under §1605A,

provided certain express conditions are satisfied. For 

example, subsection (a) provides that “property in the 
 

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

United States . . . used for a commercial activity in the 

United States . . . shall not be immune” from attachment 

and execution in seven enumerated circumstances, including when “the judgment relates to a claim for which the

foreign state is not immune under section 1605A . . . .”

§1610(a)(7). Subsections (b), (d), and (e) similarly set out 

circumstances in which certain property of a foreign state

“shall not be immune.”4 And two other provisions within

§1610 specifically allow §1605A judgment holders to attach and execute against property of a foreign state, 

“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law,” including 

those provisions otherwise granting immunity, but only

with respect to assets associated with certain regulated

and prohibited financial transactions. See §1610(f)(1)(A); 

Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA), §201(a), 116 

Stat. 2337, note following 28 U. S. C. §1610. 

Section 1610(g) conspicuously lacks the textual markers,

“shall not be immune” or “notwithstanding any other 

provision of law,” that would have shown that it serves as

an independent avenue for abrogation of immunity. In 

fact, its use of the phrase “as provided in this section”

signals the opposite: A judgment holder seeking to take

advantage of §1610(g)(1) must identify a basis under one

of §1610’s express immunity-abrogating provisions to 

attach and execute against a relevant property. 

Reading §1610(g) in this way still provides relief to 

judgment holders who previously would not have been

able to attach and execute against property of an agency 

or instrumentality of a foreign state in light of this Court’s 

decision in Bancec. Suppose, for instance, that plaintiffs

obtain a §1605A judgment against a foreign state and seek 

—————— 

4Section 1610(b), for example, provides that “any property . . . of [the]

agency or instrumentality of a foreign state engaged in commercial

activity in the United States shall not be immune” from attachment 

and execution in satisfaction of a judgment on a claim for which the 

agency or instrumentality is not immune under §1605A. §1610(b)(3). 
 

10 RUBIN v. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN 

Opinion of the Court 

to collect against the assets located in the United States of

a state-owned telecommunications company. Cf. Alejandre v. Telefonica Larga Distancia de Puerto Rico, Inc., 183 

F. 3d 1277 (CA11 1999). Prior to the enactment of 

§1610(g), the plaintiffs would have had to establish that 

the Bancec factors favor holding the agency or instrumentality liable for the foreign state’s misconduct. With 

§1610(g), however, the plaintiffs could attach and execute 

against the property of the state-owned entity regardless

of the Bancec factors, so long as the plaintiffs can establish 

that the property is otherwise not immune (e.g., pursuant

to §1610(a)(7) because it is used in commercial activity in

the United States).

Moreover, our reading of §1610(g)(1) is consistent “with

one of the most basic interpretive canons, that [a] statute 

should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, 

void or insignificant.” Corley v. United States, 556 U. S. 

303, 314 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 1610 expressly references §1605A judgments in its

immunity-abrogating provisions, such as 28 U. S. C. 

§§1610(a)(7), (b)(3), (f)(1), and §201 of the TRIA, showing

that those provisions extend to §1605A judgment holders’

ability to attach and execute against property. If the 

Court were to conclude that §1610(g) establishes a basis 

for the withdrawal of property immunity any time a plaintiff holds a judgment under §1605A, each of those provisions would be rendered superfluous because a judgment

holder could always turn to §1610(g), regardless of whether 

the conditions of any other provision were met.5 

—————— 

5To the extent petitioners suggest that those references to §1605A 

were inadvertent, see Brief for Petitioners 41–44, the statutory history 

further supports the conclusion that §1610(a)(7) applies to §1605A

judgment holders, as the reference to §1605A was added to §1610(a)(7)

in the same Act that created §§1605A and 1610(g). See NDAA 

§§1083(a), (b)(3), 122 Stat. 338–342. 
 

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

The Court’s interpretation of §1610(g) is also consistent

with the historical practice of rescinding attachment and

execution immunity primarily in the context of a foreign 

state’s commercial acts. See Verlinden, 461 U. S., at 487– 

488. Indeed, the FSIA expressly provides in its findings 

and declaration of purpose that 

“[u]nder international law, states are not immune 

from the jurisdiction of foreign courts insofar as their

commercial activities are concerned, and their commercial property may be levied upon for the satisfaction of judgments rendered against them in connection with their commercial activities.” §1602. 

This focus of the FSIA is reflected within §1610, as subsections (a), (b), and (d) all outline exceptions to immunity 

of property when that property is used for commercial 

activity. The Court’s reading of §1610(g) means that 

individuals with §1605A judgments against a foreign state 

must primarily invoke other provisions revoking the grant 

of immunity for property related to commercial activity, 

including §1610(a)(7), unless the property is expressly 

carved out in an exception that applies “[n]otwithstanding 

any other provision of law,” §1610(f)(1)(A); §201(a) of the

TRIA. That result is consistent with the history and

structure of the FSIA. 

Throughout the FSIA, special avenues of relief to victims of terrorism exist, even absent a nexus to commercial 

activity. Where the FSIA goes so far as to divest a foreign

state or property of immunity in relation to terrorismrelated judgments, however, it does so expressly. See 

§§1605A, 1610(a)(7), (b)(3), (f)(1)(A); §201(a) of the TRIA.

Out of respect for the delicate balance that Congress

struck in enacting the FSIA, we decline to read into the

statute a blanket abrogation of attachment and execution 

immunity for §1605A judgment holders absent a clearer 

indication of Congress’ intent. 
 

 

12 RUBIN v. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN 

Opinion of the Court 

III
 

A 

Petitioners resist that the phrase “as provided in this 

section” refers to §1610 as a whole and contend that Congress more likely was referencing a specific provision 

within §1610 or a section in the NDAA. That explanation

is unpersuasive.

Petitioners first assert that “this section” might refer to

procedures contained in §1610(f). Section 1610(f) permits

§1605A judgment holders to attach and execute against 

property associated with certain regulated and prohibited

financial transactions, §1610(f)(1), and it provides that the 

United States Secretary of State and Secretary of the

Treasury will make every effort to assist in “identifying, 

locating, and executing against the property of [a] foreign 

state or any agency or instrumentality of such state,”

§1610(f)(2). Petitioners point out that paragraph (1) of 

subsection (f) has never come into effect because it was

immediately waived by the President after it was enacted, 

pursuant to §1610(f)(3).6 So, the argument goes, it would 

make sense that Congress created §1610(g) as an alternative mechanism to achieve a similar result.7 

This is a strained and unnatural reading of the phrase 

“as provided in this section.” In enacting §201(a) of the

TRIA, which, similar to 28 U. S. C. §1610(f), permits

attachment and execution against blocked assets, Congress signaled that it was rescinding immunity by permitting attachment and execution “[n]otwithstanding any 

other provision of law.” See §201(a) of the TRIA. Had 

—————— 

6Section 1610(f)(3) authorizes the President to waive paragraph (1) of

subsection (f) “in the interest of national security.” President Clinton 

immediately waived the provision, and the waiver has never been 

withdrawn. See Pres. Determ. No. 99–1, 63 Fed. Reg. 59201 (1998);

Pres. Determ. No. 2001–03, 65 Fed. Reg. 66483 (2000). 7Petitioners reference the decision of the Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit in Bennett, 825 F. 3d 949, in support of this position. 
 

 

Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

Congress likewise intended §1610(g) to have such an 

effect, it knew how to say so. Cf. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 578 U. S. ___, ___, n. 2 (2016) (slip op., at 4, n. 2) 

(noting that “[s]ection 1610(g) does not take precedence

over ‘any other provision of law,’ as the TRIA does”).

Petitioners fare no better in arguing that Congress may

have intended “this section” to refer only to the instruction

in §1610(f)(2) that the United States Government assist in 

identifying assets. Section 1610(f)(2) does not provide for 

attachment or execution at all, so petitioners’ argument

does not account for the lack of textual indicators that 

exist in provisions like §§1610(a)(7) and (f)(1) that unambiguously abrogate immunity and permit attachment and

execution. 

Finally, petitioners assert that “this section” could 

possibly reflect a drafting error that was intended to 

actually refer to §1083 of the NDAA, the Public Law in

which §1610(g) was enacted. This interpretation would

require not only a stark deviation from the plain text of

§1610(g), but also a departure from the clear text of the 

NDAA. Section 1083(b)(3) of the NDAA provides that

“Section 1610 of title 28, United States Code, is amended 

. . . by adding at the end” the new subsection “(g).” 122 

Stat. 341. The language “this section” within (g), then,

clearly and expressly incorporates the NDAA’s reference 

to “Section 1610” as a whole. There is no basis to conclude 

that Congress’ failure to change “this section” in §1610(g) 

was the result of a mere drafting error. 

B 

In an effort to show that §1610(g) does much more than

simply abrogate the Bancec factors, petitioners argue that 

the words “property of a foreign state,” which appear in

the first substantive clause of §1610(g), would otherwise 

be rendered superfluous because the property of a foreign

state will never be subject to a Bancec inquiry. By its 
 

14 RUBIN v. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN 

Opinion of the Court 

plain text, §1610(g)(1) permits enforcement of a §1605A 

judgment against both the property of a foreign state and 

the property of the agencies or instrumentalities of that 

foreign state. Because the Bancec factors would never 

have applied to the property of a foreign state, petitioners

contend, those words must signal something else: that

§1610(g) provides an independent basis for the withdrawal 

of immunity. 

The words “property of a foreign state” accomplish at 

least two things, however, that are consistent with the

Court’s understanding of the effect of §1610(g). First, 

§1610(g) serves to identify in one place all the categories of 

property that will be available to §1605A judgment holders for attachment and execution, whether it is “property

of the foreign state” or property of its agencies or instrumentalities, and commands that the availability of such

property will not be limited by the Bancec factors. So long

as the property is deprived of its immunity “as provided in

[§1610],” all of the types of property identified in §1610(g)

will be available to §1605A judgment holders. 

Second, in the context of the entire phrase, “the property

of a foreign state against which a judgment is entered 

under section 1605A,” the words “foreign state” identify

the type of judgment that will invoke application of 

§1610(g); specifically, a judgment held against a foreign

state and entered under §1605A. Without this opening 

phrase, §1610(g) would abrogate the Bancec presumption

of separateness in all cases, not just those involving terrorism judgments under §1605A. The words, “property of a

foreign state,” thus, are not rendered superfluous under

the Court’s reading because they do not merely identify a

category of property that is subject to §1610(g) but also 

help inform when §1610(g) will apply in the first place. 

Indeed, §1610(g) would make no sense if those words were 

removed. 
Cite as: 583 U. S. ____ (2018) 15 

Opinion of the Court 

C 

All else aside, petitioners contend that any uncertainty

in §1610(g) should be resolved by giving full effect to the 

legislative purpose behind its enactment. Petitioners posit 

that Congress enacted §1610(g) “with the specific purpose 

of removing the remaining obstacles to terrorism judgment enforcement.” Brief for Petitioners 26. In support of

that position, they reference a brief discussion of §1610(g) 

in a footnote to the Court’s decision in Bank Markazi, 578 

U. S. ___, that notes that Congress “expand[ed] the availability of assets for postjudgment execution” when it added 

§1610(g) by making “available for execution the property 

(whether or not blocked) of a foreign state sponsor of

terrorism, or its agency or instrumentality, to satisfy a 

judgment against that state.” Id., at ___, n. 2 (slip op., at 

4, n. 2). But Bank Markazi’s characterization of §1610(g) 

simply mirrors the text of §1610(g) and is entirely consistent with the Court’s holding today that §1610(g) expands the assets available for attachment and execution 

by abrogating this Court’s decision in Bancec with respect 

to judgments held under §1605A. Beyond their citation to 

Bank Markazi, petitioners have not directed us to any

evidence that supports their position that §1610(g) was

intended to divest all property of a foreign state or its

agencies or instrumentalities of immunity. 

IV 

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that 28 U. S. C.

§1610(g) does not provide a freestanding basis for parties

holding a judgment under §1605A to attach and execute

against the property of a foreign state, where the immunity

of the property is not otherwise rescinded under a separate provision within §1610. The judgment of the Seventh 

Circuit is affirmed. 

It is so ordered. 
 

16 RUBIN v. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN 

Opinion of the Court 

JUSTICE KAGAN took no part in the consideration or 

decision of this case.