B ecause t he st at ut o ry language ha s no t c hanged , c i t at i o ns i n thi s o p i ni o n wi l l ref er t o t he current vers i o n of t he 1 Publ i c Rec or ds Act wh i ch appe ar s i n 1999 Repl ac eme n t V ol u me 3A of t h e T en n es s ee Code An n ot at ed or i n t h e 2006
s u pp l e me n t t o Vol u me 3A

. -1-



### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE

AT JAC KSON Apr il 3, 200 7 S es sio n
RICHARD SCHNE IDE R ET AL 

### . v. THE C ITY O F JA CKS ON Appeal by Per m ission from the Court of Appeals, Wester n Section

Chancery Court

for Madison County No. 62846 Jam es F . Butler, Chancellor

No. W2005-01234-SC- R11-CV- F iled on May 25, 2007

We gr anted this appe al primarily t o deter mine whether

Tenne ssee c ommon law includes a la w enfor ceme nt investigative privileg e (“la w enfor ceme nt pr ivilege ”) which oper ates to exempt from dis c los ur e go ve rnme nta l r e c or ds that w ou ld o the rw ise be a c c e ssi ble via the Te nn e sse e Pub lic Records A ct (“ Public Records Ac t”). See Tenn. Code Ann. § 10- 7-503 (Supp. 2006). We hold that 1 Tenne ssee c ommon law does not include the la w enf orce ment privileg e and that i t s h o u ld not be adopted he rein. Ac cording ly , we r ever se t he judgment of the C ourt of Appeals, which adopte d the law enf orce ment privileg e and a

pplied it as an exception to the Public Records Ac t. Howeve r, we rema nd this c ase to the trial court to determine whether any of the police depar

tment rec ords at issue
ar e p art o f a p e n d in g , o p e n , o r

o n g o in gc r im in a l i n v e s ti g ati o nan d th u s e xe mp t f

r o m d is c lo s ur e
. We also reve rse the Court of

Appea ls’ judgme nt and re instate the judg ment of the trial c ourt permitting Petitioners to recove r their attorney s’ fe es p u rsuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sec tion 10-7- 505(g ) (1999)

. On re mand, the trial c ourt shall calc ulate and a war d Petitioners the attorney s’ fe es the y have inc ur

re d o n a pp e a l. F ina lly , w e re ve rs e the jud g me nt of the Court of Ap pe a ls a

nd re ins tate the per manent inj unction issued by the t rial court requiring the C ity of J ackson ( “City”) to re spond in writing to futur e Public Records A ct re quests of The Jack son Sun or

its a g e nts

. Tenn. R. App . P . 11; Judgme nt of th e Courtof Ap peals Rever sed; Judgme nt of th e Trial Court Re instated; Case R em anded to the Trial Court for Furt her P roce edings
W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , C.J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which, J ANI CE M. H OL DER , C OR NE L I A A. C LARK , and G AR Y R. W ADE , JJ.-2

-

Charles M. Purce ll and Matt S. S hepher d, J ackson, Te nnessee , for a ppellants, RichardSchneider , Tajuana Cheshier, J amie P ag e, and The Gannett Satellite Information Ne twork, d/b/a The Jack son Sun

. L ewis L . Cobb and Sara E . Ba rnett, Jackson, Tennesse e, for appellee , City

of Jackson.

Do ug la s R. Pie rc e , N a shvil le , T e nn e sse e , f o r a mic us c ur ia e , T e nn e sse e As so c iatio n o f B ro a dc a ste rs
. Alfre d H. Knig ht and Alan D. J ohnson, Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or amicus c uriae , The Tennessean.
Richard L . Hollow, Knoxvi lle, Tenne ssee, f or amicus c uriae , The Te nnessee Press Association.

OP IN ION

I

. BACK GR OUND

In 2004, repor

ters with The Jack

son Sun , a local newspa

per in Jackson, Tenne ssee, asked the City for a cce ss to two cate g ories of rec ords: (1) field interview car ds g ener ated by police off

icer s of th e Ci ty ; a

n d ( 2 ) f in an c ia l r e c o r d s c o n c e r

n in gth e o p e r ati o no f

th e We s t T e nn e s s e e D ia

mo n d Ja xx ( “ D i am o n d J ax x ” ) , a c l a s s “ A A ” m i n o r l e a gu e p r o f e s s i o n a l b a s e b a l l t e am
. T h e D i am o n d Ja xx, throug h its owner, L ozinak Base ball Properties (“ L ozinak Baseball”), le ased a nd o p er at ed in a stadium the City

owned. The reque sts for acce ss wer e grounde d upon the Public Records Ac t, which provides, in per

tinent part, that “a ll state, county and municipal rec ords

. . . shall at all times, during business hours, be ope n for pe rsonal ins pection by any citizen of Tennesse e, and those in char g e of such re cor d s s h all not refuse such right of inspection to any citizen, unless otherwise provide d by state law.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 10- 7-503(a ) (Supp. 2006) The City rec eived the f

irst reque st for the fie ld interv i ew ca rd s on J uly 30, 2004, from repor ter Ta juana Cheshier , who soug ht acc ess to “photos taken since J anuar y 2004 of pede s t rians and motorists in which office rs applied the pr actice of ‘r easona ble suspicion’ in order

to photogr aph them, althoug h they wer e not a rre sted for a crime.” The City ’s police chief verba lly confirme d the exis tence of these r ecor ds, but the City declined to grant Cheshier acc ess to them.
On Octobe r 26, 2004, leg al counsel for Cheshier a

nd The Jack

son Sun wrote a

letter to the City ’s attorne y , reiter atingCheshier’s r equest a nd seeking a cce ss to “all photogr aphic or digital ima g e s and

/or c op ie s of any do c ume nts in the po sse ssi on of the City of Jac ks on
. . . o f a ny and a ll persons photographe d or i nterview ed by the J ackson Pol ice officer s as part of all ‘field interviews.’” Couns e l e xpla ine d th at The Jack son Sun had re ason to believe that City police off

icer s had conducte d 369 field interview s since January of 2004, photog raphe d the interview ees, a nd prepa red field interview

car ds containingboth the photogr aphs an d t h e officer s’ handwr itten notes about information obtained dur ing the field interview s an d t h at n o ne of the persons intervie wed we reT en ne ssee C o d e A nn o t ated sec t i o n 1 0

- 7

- 5 0 5 (a) p ro vid es: 2
Any c i t i ze n of

T en n es s ee w h o s h al l r equ es t t h e r i g h t of pe r s on al i n s pec t i on of a n y s t at e, c ou n t y or muni ci pal r ecor d as provi ded i n § 10

- 7- 50 3, and whos e reque s t has b een i n whol e o r i n par t deni ed

. . . s hal l be ent i t l ed t o pe t i t i o n f o r access t o any s uch reco rd and t o ob t ai n judi ci al revi ew o f t he
ac t i o ns take n to d en y t he ac ce ss.

P et i t i o ners al so sought access t o aud i o t ap es o f cert ai n 91 1 em ergency t el ep ho ne cal l s res ul t i ng f rom a s ho o t i ng 3 i n ci den t

. T h e t r i al c ou r t de n i ed t h i s re qu es t , f i n di n g t h at t h e t ape s wer e pa r t of a pe n di n g c r i mi n al i n v es t i g at i on a n d n ot subject t o dis cl o sur e und er t he P ub l i c R eco rds A ct

. P et i t i o ners have no t ap p eal ed t hi s rul i ng. -3

- subsequently

arr ested or c harg ed with a criminal offe nse. Also in this October 26, 2004 letter, leg al counsel a sked the City

to provide The J

a c k s o n S un acces s to Dia

mon d Jaxx fi na

nc ia l r e c or ds , including a

ny “notices of

reloc ation” and “ any

related documents” which the City had alr eady
rec eived or

would later r ece ive from the D iamond J axx
. On Dec ember

14, 2004, J amie Pag e, anothe r re porter w ith The Jack son Sun , se nt a

le tte r t o the City ’s Mayor re quest i n g “a cce ss to all financial stateme nts betwee n the West Tennessee Diamond J axx and the City of Jackson, or any

financ ial d o cu m en t at ion relatingto the financ ial
a g re e me nt b e tw e e n th e tw o p art ie s, inc lud ingbut no t limi ted to, any fi na nc ia l st ate me nt( s) demonstratinghow the Jax x have lost at lea st $150,000 a y ear over the last two baseba ll seasons as indicated by

[L ozinak Base ball Properties].” The City failed e ither to provide a cce ss t o t h e re quested re cords or to provide a written response to the repe ated r equests. Thus, on J an uary 26, 2005, the Ganne tt Satellit e Information Networ k, d/b/a The Jack

son Sun, Richard Schneider, ex ecutive editor of The Jack son Sun , Cheshier, and Pag e (c ollectively

“Petitioners”) filed a pe tition i n the Madis on County Chance ry Court pursuant to Tennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 10-7-505(a ) (1999) seekingacc ess t o the field intervie w ca rds 2
and to the Di amon d Jaxx f ina nc ia l re c or ds

. Pe tit ion e rs a lso so ught t o r e c ov e r t he ir atto rn e y s’ fe e s, 3
asser ting that the City knew the r ecor ds were public and willfully ref used to disclose them. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505( g ) (1999) (allowing the t rial cour t to assess ag ainst the nondisclosing g ov e rnmen tal e nti ty

“ a ll r e a so na

ble c os ts i nv olv e d in

ob ta ini ngthe re c or d, inc lud ingre a so na ble attorney s’ fe es” upon a

findingthat the g overnme ntal entity “knew that such re cord w as public and willfully ref used to disclose it”).
Consist ent with the provisions of the Public Records A ct, the trial c ourt set an ex pedited hear ing on the matter for

Fe bruar y 7, 2005, and orde red the City to appea r and to show cause why the petit ion s h o u ld

n o t b e g r an te d

. Se e T e nn
. Co d e A nn
. § 1 0

- 7

- 5 0 5 ( b ) ( 1 9 9 9 )

. Ina d d it io n , the Chance llor directe d t h e City immediately

to provide him the reque sted documents for in c am e ra inspection. Despite this order , the City failed to provide the records to the Chance llor prior to the hear ing. H oweve r, a f

ew hour s befor e the he aring , the City filed a written response to the petition, alleg ing that the field interview car ds were “privileg ed docume nts” not subject to disclosure unde r the Public Records Ac t beca use they conce rned “ police tac tics on investigations.” The City further argued that the f

inancial rec ords wer e “conf idential proper

ty” belong ing to L ozinak Base ball and,T he co nfi d en t i ali t y cl au se in t he l ea se p ro vid es: 4

N

. B o o ks, R eco rds, and A cco unt i ngs
. . . . T he C i t y s hal l have t he ri ght t o m ake i nspectio n s o f t he book s a n d r ec or ds of

[ Loz i n ak B as eba l l ] f

r om t i me t o t i me f

or pu r pos es of

v er i f y i n g t h e ac cu r ac y of t he acco unt i ng pro ced ures and revenues t o b e d eri ved b y the C i t y f rom t he Stadium. T he C i t y ’ s ri ght of i ns pect i on s hal l be s ubj ect t o i t s ag r eement t o (i ) r ef r ai n f r om maki ng copi es o f

an y of [ Lozi nak B a se b a ll’ s] re c o rd s e x c e p t as p e rm itt e d b y [L o z ina k B a se b a ll], suc h p e rm issio n no t to b e re a so n a b ly wi t h h el d, de l ay ed or c on di t i on ed an d ( i i ) h ol d al l i n f or mat i on obt ai n ed as a r es u l t of s u ch i n s pec t i on conf i dent i al and t o n ot di s s emi nat e any s uch i nf ormat i on t o a ny t hi r d par t y wi t ho ut [Lo zinak B a se b a ll’ s] a p p ro v a l e x c e p t a s o th e rw ise re q u ire d u n d e r th e T e n n e sse e O

p e n R e c o rd s L a w

. (E m p h a sis a d d e d .)

T h e N ot i ce a n d a cc ompan y i n g f i n an ci al r ec or ds w er e h an d- del i v er ed t o t h e Ci t y ’ s M ay or on J an u ar y 28, 2005, 5 tw o d a ys af

t er P et i t i o ners f

i l ed sui t and several m o nt hs af t er P et i t i o ners subm i t t ed t hei r wri t t en reque st s f o r acces s in O c to b e r a n d D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 4

.

-4

- as such, not subject to disc losure under the Public Rec ords Act. As support for this proposition the City re lie d u po n a c on fi de nti a lity

c la us e in i ts l e a se a g re e me nt w ithL ozin ak B a se ba ll. 4
At the hea

ring , t h e C i t y p roduced the stadium lease and a notice of termination letter (“N otice”) from the President of L ozinak Ba seball. In the letter, a ddresse d to the City ’s Mayor and 5 dated January

28, 2005, L ozinak Base ball advised that it planned to ter minate the stadium lease afte r the 2005 baseba ll se ason, explaining that the Diamond Jax x had incur red a “Signif icant Ope rating L oss” duringthe 2004 fisca l y ear and had sustaine d operating losses in excess of $150,000 for two
consec utive y ear s, constituting grounds for termination under the lease

. Attache d to the Notice w ere the Di amon d J axx fi na

nc ia l r e c or ds su

bs tanti atin gthe se a sse rt e d gro un ds fo r t e rm inatio n. Th e City agree d to provide Petitioners ac cess to the Notice , conce ding that it qualified as a public r ecor d; howeve r, the City argued that the attache d financ ial rec ords wer e not public re cords a nd rema ined exempt from disclosure d u ri nga for ty -five- day

period in which the City reta ined its contrac tual op tio n to purc ha se the Di amon d Jaxx. Th e City a sse rt e d that be c a us e it h a d th e op tio n to purc ha se the Diamond Jax x , these fina ncial re cords we re e x empt from disclo s u re as st ate a g ency rec ords
co n c e r n in g th e v a lu e o f p r o p e rty th at a g o v e r nme n ta l e n ti ty is c o n s id e r in g a c qu ir in g
. Se e Te nn. Code Ann. § 10-7- 504(a) (6) (Supp. 2006). The City also submitt ed a F ebrua ry 3, 2005 letter to the Chance llor

i nwh i chL o z i n akBa s eb al l i n v o k edth e c o n tra ctu al co n fi dentiality clauseand admonished the City not to disclose the Diamond J axx financ ial rec ords attac hed to the Notice

. As for the field interview car ds, the City prese nted a “ repr esentative sampling” at the hea ring consisting of sevente en field interview car ds that had been g ener ated since J anuar y 1, 2 0 0 5

. The City e xpre sse d it s w ill ingne ss t o p ro du c e a ll o f t he fi e ld i nte rv ie w card s for the Cha nc e llo r’ s in
c am e ra ins pe c tio n, but th e Cha nc e llo r d e c lin e d, fi nd ingthe re pr e se ntativ e sampl e su ff ic ie nt t o enable him to decide the c ase.
In ad d i t i o n , th e C i ty ca l l ed fo ur wi tn es s es t o t es t i fy ab o utth e f

i el d i n t erv i ew card s , i n cl u d i n g: Commander De nnis May s, division commander, licensed attorney , and leg al advisor f or the City ’s-5

-

police depa

rtment; L ieutenant Mike H olt, commander of the violent c rimes unit of the City ’s police depar tment; L ieutenant Patric k Wil lis, commander of the g angenfor ceme nt unit for t h e City ; and Richard Staples, the City ’s Chief of Police. I n s u m mary , these witnesse s testified that the City ’s police off icer s have be en pre paring fie ld interview c ards since 1993 or 1994 and that the car ds memorialize the contac t a n office r has “while conducting some kind of investigation with a citiz en.” The c ards a

re intende d to be a “ centr al rep o s i t o ry fo r information” the of fice rs ac quire while on patrol, and the car ds allow “Of fice r A to use Offic er B’s work product .

. . to work his or her own
case s.”
The fie ld inter

view car ds are “ente red into the computer data base” and stored by “date and time.” Eac h car d includes blank lines on which of fice rs m ay rec ord t he date, time, and reason for the inv e sti g ativ e sto p, the inv e sti g atin gof fi c e r’ s n ame and

numbe r, the int e rv ie we e ’s name , a dd re ss, te le ph on e numbe r, date of bir th, ra c e , se x, he ight, we ight, dr ive r’ s li c e ns e numbe r, so c ia l se c ur ity
numb er , ey e c o l o r, h ai r c o l o r , l o ca t i o no f t h e i n t erv i ew , d es cr i p t i o no f t h e i n t erv i ew ee ’s cl o th i n g, inf or matio n a bo ut t he int e rv ie we e ’s ve hic le , if a pp lic a ble , in c lud ingy e ar, ma

ke , mo de l, l ic e ns e numbe r, lic e ns e ty

pe , li c e ns e y e ar, lic e ns e state , and ve hic le c olo r. Ty

pic a lly , b ut n ot a lw ay s, fi e ld interview c ards include photogr aphs of the interviewe es. Howeve r, as L ieutenant Willis explained, fi e ld i nte rv ie w c ard s d o n ot i nc lud e oth e r i nf or matio n o ff

ic e rs ob ta in f

ro m th e ir c onve rs atio ns wi th interviewe es. Offic ers ge nerated 369 field i nterview car ds in 2004, and approx imately 80 perc ent of the pe rsons interviewe d wer e Af rica n-Amer ican. All of the City ’s witnesses testified that field interview c ards a re va luable tools which allow the City ’s po lic e to i nv e sti g ate and to s olv e c ri me s. F or

e xamp le , b e c a

us e su sp e c ts o ft e n u se inc or re c t na me s, and mul tip le g ang me mbe rs of te n us e the same str e e t name , fi e ld int e rv ie w c ard s, complete with photographs a nd other biographic al information, ar e ex tremely valuable to the police for i d en t i fi cation purposes. In addition, the City ’s police of fice rs investig ate c rimes and identify potential suspects and w itnesses by revie wing field i nterview car ds from the a rea wher e the c rimes
occur red. Commander

Mayes and L ieutenant Holt rec alled a specific incident of a serial r apist being appre hended a s a re sult of a lead g ained from field interview car ds, and these witnesses also opined that ma ny oth e r c ri me s h ave be e n s olv e d a s a re su lt o f l e a ds ob ta ine d f ro m f ie ld i nte rv ie w c ard s.
Al l of the City ’s wi tne sses ex press e d c on c e rn tha t a ff or din gpu bli c a c c e ss t o th e fi e ld int e rv ie w c ard s w ill c omp ro mis e c on fi de nti a l poli c e te c hn iqu e s and str ate g ie s, e na ble c ri min a ls t o avo id d e te c tio n, re ve a l th e ide nti tie s o f a nd thereb y endan g e r w itn e sse s and inf or mants , in c re a se g angre ta liatio n a g a ins t c iti zen s who sp e ak w iththe po lic e , a nd c hil l th e pu

bli c ’s wi lli ngne ss t o c o o p e r at e w i thth e p o l i c e
. N o tw i th s t an d i n gth e s e c o n c e r n s , C h i e f S t a p l e s a dm i tt e d

o nc r os sexamination that field interview ca rds “ver y rar ely” have been r eturne d to interviewe es, only “two
or thr e e tim e s” that he c ou ld r e c a ll.

No n e o f t h es e w i tn es s es a c tu a l l y re v i ew edth e f

i el d i n t erv i ew card s p ri o r t o th e h eari n g; howeve r, all of them believed and opined t hat t he field interview cards were exempt from disclosure by the law e n fo rc em ent privileg e. Conce rningthe per ceive d brea dth of the law e nforc ement privileg e, Commander May s, a li cense d attorney who consulted with the City ’s chief of police a

bout-6

-

Petitioners’ J uly

and Oc tober 2004 re quests for a cce ss to the field interview c ards, state d: [A] s far as I ’m conc erne d, [t he field interview c ards] are privileg ed, period. Even the fac t . . . th at an o ff

i cer stopped and talke d to a par ticular individual at a pa

rticular pla c e is p ri vil e g e d

. . . . Th e inf or matio n in the se fi e ld i nte rv ie w c ard s is no t pu bli c rec ord, as f

ar a s I ’m conc erne d, beca use of the f

act i t i d en t i fi es and ex poses the tactics a nd techniques that we use a nd the people that we talk to in order to conduct
c ri min a l inve sti g atio ns
. Subsequently , Commander May s clarif ied: My position i s the law e nforc ement privileg e trumps that statute [the Publi c Rec ords Act] beca use of the fac t the s tatute doesn’t take into consideration the privileg es that the Courts have longrec og nized that say [] , “You don’t have to re lease any thing related to how you do your job; the results, yes, but not how you do it.”
The Chanc ellor re

jected the City ’s ar guments that Tennesse e law r eco gn i z es the law enfor ceme nt privilege as an exception to the Public Rec ords Act a nd held that the law e nforc ement privileg e does not e x empt the field intervie w ca rds from disclosure

. Additionally , the Chance llor reje cted the City ’s arguments that the contractual confidentiality clause and the statutory exception to the P ub l i c R ecor ds Act pre clude disclosure of the Dia mond J axx financ ial rec ords. The Chance llor issued a per

manent injunction requiringthe City to respond in writingto all future wr itten pu bli c re c ord s requ est s fr om The Jack son Sun or

its a g e nts and

to e xpla in i n it s wri tte n r e sp on se whether the re cord sought would be produc ed and, i f n o t, the basis for nondisclosure . The Chance llor awa

rded Petitioners’ attorney s’ fe es i n the t otal amount of $6,170, allocating one half of this amount to each c ateg ory of re cords r equeste d. The City appea led, asser

ting that the law enfor ceme nt privilege prec luded disclosure of the fiel d inte r

v ie w c ar d s
. A s f

o r th e D ia

mo n d Jaxx f

in an c ia l r e c o r d s , th e Ci ty c o n te s te d only the Chance llor’s awa

rd of attorney s’ fees. Although the Court of Appeals agree d with the trial court that
no statut e or

ru le sh ie lde d the fi e ld i nte rv ie w c ard s f ro m di sc los ur e un de r t

he Pub lic Re c or ds Ac t, the Court of Appea ls c anvasse d decisions of other jurisdictions, a dopted the l aw en forcement pr ivi le g e , a

nd he ld t hat it pre c lud e s d isc los ur e of re c or ds wi thi n it s sc op e . T he Court of Ap pe a ls then re manded the c ase to the trial court to de termine whether the field interview car ds are protec ted by the l aw e nforc ement privileg e. In light of the se holding s, the Court of Appea ls rever sed the trial court’s judgment awa

rding attorney s’ fees t o Petitioners based on the City ’s fa ilure to disclose the field interview

car ds. The Court of Appea ls also vacated the aw ard of attorney s’ fe es stemming f rom the City ’s fa ilure t o d i s cl o se the Diamond J axx financ ial rec ords, re manded to the tria l court, and instructed the tria l c ourt to de termine which of these fina ncial re cords the City

had in its possession when Pet i t i o n er s submitt ed their r equests. F inally , the Court of Appe als vac ated the pe rmane nt injunction requiringthe City to respond in writingto future public rec ords requests, finding that the Public Records Ac t did not authoriz e such a n injunction.As t h i s Cour t h as n ot ed, an ot h er def i n i t i on of “ r ec or ds ” appe ar s i n Par t 1 of t h e Act , h owe v er , “ t h e def i n i t i on 6 pr ov i ded by t h i s pr ov i s i on w as n ot i n t en ded t o a ppl y t o ot h er pa r t s of t h e Act , an d i n dee d, i t i s pos s i bl e t h at t h e i n cl u s i on o f t hat s t at u te a s p a rt o f

t he A ct m ay b e ‘ a co m p i l er’ s error, oc curri ng i n t he renumb eri ng of t he 1 9 8 0 ed i t i o n of t he C o d e .’” M e m p h is P u b l’g C o . v. C h e ro k e e C h ild re n & F a m ily S e rv s., In c ., 8 7 S .W .3 d a t 7 5 n.6 (q u o ting C re a tive R e sts., Inc. v. C i t y of M em p hi s, 79 5 S.W

. 2 d 67 2 , 67 5 (T enn. C t

. A p p
. 19 9 0 ))

.

-7

- Pe tit ion e rs fi le d a

n a pp lic atio n f

or pe rm iss ion

to a pp e a l, c ha lle ng ingthe Cou rt of Ap pe a ls’
ru lin gon e a c h of the se iss ue s. We g ra nte d pe rm iss ion

to a pp e a l pr ima

ri ly to c on sid e r P e tit ion e rs ’ argument that the Court of Appea ls e rre d in adopting the law enf orce ment privileg e and in holding that it ope rate s as an exception to the Public Rec ords Act; howeve r, we will he reina fter addre ss eac h of the issues ra ised.

II

. P UBLIC RECORDS ACT

Te nn e sse e c ourt s h ave lon g re c ognize d the pu bli c ’s ri g ht t o e xami ne g ov e rnme nta l r e c or ds

. See, e.g

. , S t at e ex re l

. Wellford v. Wil liams, 75 S.W . 948 (Tenn. 1903) . In 1957, the Gene ral Assembly codified this public ac cess doc trine by enac ting th e P ublic Records A ct. B allard v. Herzke, 924 S.W .2d 652, 661 (Tenn. 1996) . The P ub lic Records A ct now “g overns the right of
acc ess to rec ords of g overnme nt ag encie s in this s tat e. ” C o l e v
. Campbell, 968 S.W .2d 274, 275 (Tenn. 1998)

. Fa ci litating ac cess to g overnme ntal rec ords promotes public aw are ness and kn ow le dg e of

g ov e rnme nta l a c tio ns and e nc oura g e s g ov e rnme nta l of fi c ia ls a nd a g e nc ie s to re ma in
a c c ounta ble to t he c iti zen s o f T e nn e sse e . M e mph is Pu bl’ gCo. v. Ch erok ee Chi ldr e n & F amil y Servs., Inc., 87 S.W.3d 67, 74-75 (Tenn. 2002).
The Public Recor ds Act broa d l y define s “[p] ublic rec ord or r ecor ds” or “ state re cord or
re c o rd s ” to i nc lud e “ a ll d oc ume nts , p a pe rs , le tte rs , ma

ps , b oo ks , p ho togra

ph s, mic ro fi lms , e le c tr on ic data pr ocessingfiles and output, films, sound recor dings, or other material, re g ardle ss of phy sical form or c hara cter istics made or re ceive d pursuant to law or ordinanc e o r i n co n n ection with the transac tion of officia l business by any g overnme ntal ag ency .” Te nn. Cod e Ann
. § 1 0 -7-301( 6) (Supp. 2006). Given this definition, the Public Rec ords Act has been descr ibed as an “ ‘all enc ompassing

6 leg islative attempt to cover a ll printed matter cr eate d o r re ceived by g overnme nt in its officia l capa city .’” Griff

in v. City of Knox ville, 821 S.W .2d 921, 923 (Tenn. 1991) (quotingBd. of Educ. of Memphis City

Schools v. Memphis P ubl’gCo. , 5 8 5 S

. W

. 2 d 629, 630 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979))

. F ur the rm or e , th e Pub lic Re c or ds Ac t mand ate s that “ a ll state , c ounty and mun ic ipa l r e c or ds

. . . s ha ll at all times, duringbusiness hours, be ope n for persona l inspe ction by any citizen of Tennesse e, and tho se in c ha

rg e of su ch re c or ds sh a ll n ot r e fu se su c h r ight o f i ns pe c tio n to any c iti zen , unle ss otherwise pr ovided by

state law.” Tenn. Cod e Ann. § 10-7-503(a) ( Supp. 2006). These statutes
cre ate a presumption of openne ss and express a c lear leg islative mandate f

avoringdisclosure of g overnme ntal rec ords. See State v. Caw ood, 134 S.W .3d 159, 165 (Tenn

. 2 0 0 4 ); Tenne ssean v. Elec. Powe r Bd., 979 S.W .2d 297, 305 (Tenn. 1998) ; Arnold v. City of Chattanoog a, 19 S.W.3d 779, 785 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).T he cat ego ri es excep t ed were m ed i cal record s o f p at i ent s i n st at e ho spi t al s and m i l i t ary reco rds i nvo l vi ng t he 7

s ec u r i t y of

t h e U n i t ed St at es or t h e St at e of T en n es s ee
. Act of

M ar
. 18, 1957, c h

. 285 § 2, 1957 T en n
. Pub. Act s 932, 9 3 2 (c o d ifi e d a s a m e n d e d a t T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 1 0 -7 -5 0 4 (a )( 1 ), (3 ))

.

Act of M ar
. 18, 1957, c h

. 285, § 1, 1957 T en n
. Pub. Act s
. 932, 932. 8

A c t o f M a y 1 7 , 1 9 8 4 , ch . 9 2 9 , § 1 , 1 9 8 4 P u b . A c ts 8 9 0 , 8 9 0

. 9

T h e lan g u a g e o f cu rr e n t R u le 1 6 (a )( 2 ) is su b sta n tially the sa m e a s the la n g u a g e o f the R u le a t i ssu e in H o lt. 10 C urre ntl y, R ule 1 6 (a)(2 ) p ro vid es:

-8

- Mo re ov e r, Te nn e sse e c iti zen s d e nie d a c c e ss t o g ove rnme nta l r e c or ds have the ri g ht t o f ile a petition in court and “ to o b t ai n j udicial re view of the actions take n to deny the ac cess.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505(a) (1999). At the hearing on such a pe tition, t he g overnme ntal entity bear s the burden of proof a

nd must just ify

nondisclosure of the rec ord by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. I d. § 10-7-505( c). Fi n al l y , the Gene ral Asse mbly has direc ted the cour

ts to construe broa dly

the Public Records Ac t “so as to g ive t he fullest possible acc ess t o public rec ords.” I d. § 10-7-505( d). Thus, unless an exception is established, w e m u s t re qu ire disclosure “eve n in the fac e of se rious counter vailing c onsiderations

. ” M emphi s Publ’g Co. v. City of Memphis, 871 S.W .2d 681, 684 (Tenn. 1994)

. Pe tit ion e rs argue that th e Pub lic Re c ords Ac t e nti tle s th e m to have a c c e ss t o th e fi e ld int e rv ie w c ard s and

ma int a in th at the C ourt

of Ap pe a ls e sse nti a lly

a do pte d a

nd a pp lie d a pu bli c p o l i cy ex ce p t i o nt o th e P u

b l i c R ec o rd s Ac t

. T h e C i ty re s p o n d s th atth e l aw en fo rc em en tp ri v i l ege has longbeen r ecognized in the United States a nd for this rea son, the Court of Appea ls was cor rec t to adopt it as Tennesse e law e ven t h o ug h the law e nforc ement privileg e had not pr eviously been adopted in Tenne ssee. Moreove r, the City contends, be cause it is “state law,” the law enf orce ment pr ivi le g e op e rate s a s an e xce pti on to t he Pub lic Re c or ds Ac t. We beg in our anal y s i s by consideringhow the languag e of the Public Records Ac t has develope d and evolve d. As orig inally enac ted i n 1957, the Public Records Ac t specifica lly excepted from disclosure only

two cate g ories of r ecor ds; howeve r, it cre ated a g ener al exception from 7 d i s cl o s u re f

or public re cords whose confide ntiality was “ provided by

law or r egulations made pursuant ther eto.” Although the specific statutory ex ce p t i o ns increa sed over time, in 1984 the 8 Gene ral Asse mbly

amende d the s tatute to narr ow the g ener al exception to only those rec ords made confide ntial by

“state statute.” 9

Tw o ye ar s l at e r , th i s C o urtw a s c a l l e d u p o nt o a p p l y th e 1 9 8 4 am e n dm e n t

. InM e mph is Publ’g Co. v. Holt, 710 S.W.2d 513 (Tenn. 19 8 6 ), a n ewspa per r equeste d acc ess to closed inv e sti g ativ e fi le s o f t

he Me mph is p oli c e de part men t. I d. at 51 5. Th is C ourt he ld t hat th e Pub lic Records A ct re quired disclosure beca use “no statute exempt[ ed] the file in c ontroversy .” I d. at 518. The Court re

jected the police depa

rtment’s asser

tion that Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 (a )( 2) pr e c lud e d d isc los ur e of the re c or ds , n oti ngthat

Rul e 16 (a )( 2) on ly

lim ite d a c c e ss t o 10Exc ept a s pro vi d ed i n pa r ag r aph s ( A) , ( B ) , ( E), a n d ( G ) of s u bdi v i s i on ( a) ( 1) , t h i s r u l e does n ot
au t h or i ze t h e di s cov er y or i n s pec t i on of r epor t s , memor an da, or ot h er i n t er n al s t at e docu men t s ma de b y the d istric t atto rn e y ge n e ra l o r o the r sta te a g e n ts o r la w e n fo rc e m e n t o ff ic e r s in c o n n e c tio n w ith i n v es t i g at i n g or pr os ec u t i n g t h e ca s e. N or does t h i s r u l e au t h or i ze di s cov er y of s t at eme n t s ma de by st ate w i t ne sses o r p ro sp ec t i ve st ate w i t ne sses.

A ct of M ay 6 , 19 9 1 , ch. 36 9 , § 7 , 19 9 1 T enn. P ub

. A ct s 5 9 8 , 5 9 8 (cod i f i ed as amend ed at T enn. C o d e A nn. 11 § 1 0 -7 -5 0 3 (a ))

. -9

- re c or ds re le va

nt t o a pen din g or c onte mpl ate d cr imi na l ac tio n an d did not “ c ome int o play” to l imi t acc ess to the closed investigative file, which was “not rele vant to a ny pending or co n t em p lated criminal ac tion.” I d. at 517.
On e y e ar l ate r t

his Court wa s c a lle d u

po n to reconci le the lim itatio n p ro vid e d b y Rul e 16(a) (2) with the disclosure require d by the Public Records Ac t. In Appman v. Worthington, 746 S.W .2d 165 (Tenn. 1987) , lawyers r epre sentingprisoners c harg ed with killing a f ellow prisoner invoked the Public Records Act t o o b t ai n rec ords of the D epar tment of Correc tion’s internal investigation into t he murde r. I d. at 165-66. Acknowle dg ing that no statute specif ically exempted these recor ds from dis closure, the Appman Court nonethele ss held that Rule 16(a) (2) e x empted fr om dis c los ur e un de r t

he Pub lic Re c or ds Ac t a ll “ op e n” c ri min a l inve sti g ativ e fi le s th at “ are re le va nt t o pendingor conte mplated cr iminal action.” I d. at 166. In so holding, the Appman Court stressed that the Rules of Criminal Procedur e “be came eff ective . . . upon the [G] overnor ’s appr oval of a joint resolution of the [L ]egislature adopting the rules, ” a proce dure ne arly identical to the proc edure by which statutes ar e ena cted, a nd emphasized that the Rules “have the fo rc e o f law” thr oug hout the state I d. at 166. The Court e x pressly rea ffirme d Holt, howeve r, ex plaining that the Rule 16(a) (2)

“ e xce pti on

to d isc los ur e and

ins pe c tio n d oe s n ot a

pp ly to i nv e sti g ativ e fi le s in

poss e ssi on

of state ag ents or law e nforc ement off icer s, w h er e t h e fi les have been c losed and a re not re levant to any pendingor conte mplated cr iminal action.” I d.

Four y ear s later, in 1991, the G ener al Assembly amende d the Public Records Ac t by repla cingthe phra se “state statute” with the phrase “state law.” This Court has si nce held that the 11 phrase “state la

w,” a dded by

the 1991 amendme nt, encompasse s the Rules of C ivil P roce dure suc h that documents shielded by the Rules need not be dis closed pursuant to the P ublic Records A ct. See Ba llard, 924 S.W.2d at 662 (holding that the Public Recor ds Act does not mandate disclosure of documents sea led by

a prote ctive orde r ente red pur suant to the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedure );
see a lso Swift v. C ampbell, 159 S.W.3d 565, 576 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), perm. a ppeal de nied (Te nn. 2005) (holdingthat the Public Records Ac t does not mandate disc l o s u re o f rec ords protec ted by Te nn e sse e Rul e of

Cr imi na l Pr oc e dure 16 ); Ar no ld, 1 9 S.W. 3d

at 78 6 ( ho ldi ngthat th e Pub lic Records A ct does not manda t e dis closure of documents protec ted by

the work pr oduct doctrine , codified a s Tennesse e Rule of Civil Procedure 26.02).

Re lying up on B a lla

rd , th e City

argue s th at th e Cou

rt of Ap pe a ls c or

re c tly he ld t hat th e phra se “state la w ” e n c o mp a s s e s c o mm o n la w p r iv il e g e s , s u c h a s th e la w e n f o r c e me n t p r iv il e g e , as exceptions to the Public Records Act. As the parties to this appea l a nd the amici cur iae r ecognize,T h e C ity is c o rr e c t tha t “T e n n e sse e c o m m o n la w re c o g n iz e s the g o v e rn m e n t’s p riv ileg e , su b je c t to c e r ta in 12 lim itatio n s, t o w i t hh ol d f r om t he accuse d t h e i den t i t y of a con f i den t i al i n f

or man t

. ” H ou s e v
. St at e, 44 S. W

. 3d 508, 512 (T enn. 2 0 0 1 ) (em p hasi s a d d e d ). “[A ] def endant ha s n o c o n stitutio n a l righ t t o re q u ire d isc lo su re o f t h e info rm a n t’s i d ent i t y , a nd the d eci si o n is l ef t t o t he d i scr et i o n of t he t ri al co urt

. ” Id. (emp hasi s ad d ed ). H o use was rendered i n t he cont ext of

a c r i mi nal ca s e. T hi s C o urt h as not pre vi ous l y cons i dere d whet her t he com mo n l aw “ i nf ormant pri vi l ege ” op er at es as an ex cept i on t o di s cl osu r e u nder t he P ubl i c Records Act

. W e n eed n ot cons i der t hi s i s s ue i n t hi s appeal b ecause the C ity d id n o t r a i se t hi s i ss ue i n t he co urt s b el o w. T heref o re t he i ss ue has been wa i ved

. See, e. g. , D y e v. W i t co C o rp., 21 6 S.W

. 3 d 31 7 , 32 2 (T enn. 2 0 0 7 ) (“ W e ho l d that D y e’ s argum ent c o ncerni ng the date he d i scovered t he p erm anency and c o m p e n sa b ili t y of hi s i njury i s waived b ecause i t was not rai sed b ef o re t he t ri al co urt

. ”); C i vi l Serv. M er i t B d. of

Ci t y of K noxv i l l e v
. B ur s on, 8 16 S

. W

. 2d 7 25 , 7 35 (T enn
. 1 99 1) (“ T her e i s no i ndi cat i on i n t he r ecor d t hat t he i ssue wa s eve r arg ue d b efo re t he tri al c o urt. It ha s, t he refo re, b ee n w aive d .”). In ad d i t i o n, t he rec o rd f ail s t o estab l i sh t h at t h e f i el d i n t er v i ew c ar ds a ct u al l y i den t i f y i n f or man t s
. N on e of t h e Ci t y ’ s w i t n es s es r ev i ew ed t h e f i el d i n t er v i ew c ar ds p rio r to the sh o w c a u se he a rin g a n d thu s w e re no t ab le to tes tif y sp e c ific a ll y c o n c e r n in g this issu e . N o n e o f t h e fi e ld inte rv ie w c a rd s in th e re p re se n ta tive sa m p le the C ity su b m itt e d inc lud e inf o rma t i o n i d ent i f

y i ng i nt erview e e s a s info rm a n ts
o r n o n -info rm a n ts.

A compa r i s on of

ope n r ec or ds an d open mee t i n g s l aw s may be f ou n d a t T h e Repor t er s Commi t t ee f or Fr ee dom 13

o f t h e P re ss, O p e n G o v e rn m e n t G u id e , http :// w w w .rc fp .o rg /o g g /ind e x .p h p (la st visite d M a y 2 2 , 2 0 0 7 ).
-1 0

- this Court has not previously been c alled upon to de termine whether the Gene ral Assembly intended by us e of the phrase “ state law” to i nc lud e c omm on law p ri vil e g e s a s e xce pti on s to the Pub lic Re c or ds Ac t. Add ition a lly , a lth ou g h th e Cou rt of Ap pe a ls h a d p re vio us ly

op ine d th at th e phra se “state la w” include s common law privileg es, the Court of Appe als had n ot previously applied a common law privileg e as a n exception to the Publi c Rec ords Act. See Swift, 159 S.W .3d at 571-72 (stating that the 1991 Amendment “broa dened the permissible source s of exceptions from disclosure to include not only

statutes, but also the C o n s t i t u t i o n of Tenne ssee, the c ommon law, the rules of court, a nd administrative rules a

nd regulations beca

use ea ch of these has the forc e and e ffe ct of law in Tenne ssee” ) (footnote omitted); Eldridg e v. Putnam County , 86 S.W .3d 572, 575 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (r efusingto rec og nize the “ ‘informe r privileg e’” but a llowing the County on rema nd to argue that exceptions provided by the “Rules of Civil Procedure ” or othe r exceptions “foun d i n the common law” justified nondisclosure under the Public Records Ac t); Arnold, 19 S.W.3d at 785 12 (statingthat the cour

t would look to “the Rules of Civil P roce dure a nd t he Common L aw” for
e xce pti on s to the Pub lic Re c or ds Ac t)

. Al tho ugh thi s is an int e re sti ng iss ue , we ne ed n ot in thi s appea l prec isely

define the scope of the phrase “state law.” Even a ssuming the phr ase e ncompasses common law privileg es, the lawenfor ceme nt privileg e has n e ver be en adopte d in Tennesse e and thus is not a “state law ” exception to the Public Records Ac t.
In adoptingthe law e nforcem ent privileg e, the Court of A ppeals re lied exclusively

upon fe de ra l c ourt

de c isi on s and

de c isi on s o f o the r s ta

te c ourt s. Ho we ve r, the Court of Ap pe a ls f

a ile d to
acc ount for the distinctions betwee n the Public Re cords Act and the open rec ords laws of these othe r jurisdictions. For

example, the fede ral g overnme nt’s open re cords law , th e F r e e d o m o f Information 13 Act (“ FOIA”) , has nin e b ro ad and g ener al exceptions to disclosure that nec essar ily require substantial judicial interpretation. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 5 5 2 (b ) (West 2007). The I llinois and Ma ssa c hu se tts c ourt s d e c isi on s u po n whic h th e Cou

rt of Ap pe a ls r e lie d w e re int e rp re tin gstate statut e s p atte rn e d u

po n F OIA. Se e Rou le tte v. De p’ t of Cent. Mg mt. Se rv s. , 4 90 N. E. 2d 60 , 6 4 ( I ll.Se e, e
. g. , T en n
. C ode Ann

. §§ 10- 7- 503( e) , - 504( a) ( 2) , ( 5) , ( 8) , ( 13) , ( 14) , ( g ) , ( h ) ( Su pp. 2006) , 37- 1- 153, 14

- 154 ( Su pp. 2006) , - 155,

- 409( a) ( 2005) , - 506 ( Su pp. 2006) , - 612( a) ( 2005) , 40- 6- 304 ( 2006) , 40- 12- 209 ( 2006) , 56- 53- 1 0 9 (c ) (S u p p . 2 0 0 6 ), 6 2 -2 7 -1 2 4 (c ) (S u p p . 2 0 0 6 ), 6 2 -3 5 -1 3 1 (S u p p . 2 0 0 6 ).
-1 1

- Ap p. Ct. 19 86 ); Gl ob e News pa pe r C o. v. B os ton

Re t. B oa rd , 4 46 N. E. 2d

10 51 , 1 05 5 n .1 1 ( Ma ss. 1983). One of the primar y fede ral c ases upon whic h the Court of Appe als relied obse rved that the law enf orce ment privileg e is “lar g ely incorporated” into FO IA. United States v. Myerson, 856 F .2d 481, 483-84 (2d Cir. 1988).

In contra st, the P ublic Records Act is not patterne d upon FOIA. It provides spec ific statutory exceptions to disclosure, with more than a doz en such e x ceptions for the re cords of

law enf orce ment age n ci es
. S i g n i f

i c an t l y , n o n e o f

th e s e e x p r e s s e x c e p t i o n s i n c o r p o r at e th e l awen fo rc em ent p ri v i l ege 14 or otherw ise bar disc losure of the field interview car ds at issue in this appeal. Not only is the Publi c Rec ords Act distinct from F OIA and the ope n rec ords laws of othe r state s , th e M id d le Se c ti o n o f th e Co urt o f Ap p e a ls h a s e xp r e s s ly r e f u s e d to r e c o g nize the law enfor ceme nt privileg e as an exception to the P ublic Records Act, commentingthat it lacks “log ic and leg al support.” Swift, 159 S.W.3d at 576. Admittedly , the C ourt of Appeals’ refusal to adopt the law enf orce ment privileg e in Swift was not the primary basis for its decision. The Swift c ourt had alre ady c o n c lu d e d

th at t h e f il e s w e r e p r o te c te d

b y Ru le 1 6 ( a ) ( 2 )

. N o n e th e le s s , th e f o ll owing rationale provided by

the Swift court to explain its reje ction of the privileg e is persua sive: [Th e State ] poi nts to n o T e nn e sse e law, statut or y or oth e rwise , th at pur

po rt s to re c ognize thi s p ri vi lege, and it l ike wi se do e s n ot e xpla in h owthe c ontou rs of thi s privileg e diffe r fr om the provision s o f T en n
. R. Crim. P . 16(a) (2) whic h we have alre ady discussed at len g th in Section V. Weighed a g ainst the clea r state policy fa vo ri ngthe op e nn e ss of g ov e rnme nta l re c or ds , the State ’s e ff or ts to c onvin c e us to re c ognize thi s n e w p ri vil e g e fa ll s ho rt

. I d. at 57 8 ( fo otn ote omi tte d) . In a do pti ngthe law e nf or c e me nt p ri vil e g e , the Court of Ap pe a ls i n th is
case did not refute the convincingrationale Swift provided for its re jection.

In adoptingthe law e nforc ement privileg e, the Cou rt of Appe als in the instant case stated:

“ Gi ve n th e imp ortan c e of the int e re sts pr ote c te d b y the law e nf

or c e me nt p ri vil e g e , w e fi nd that it must be rec o gn i z ed under Te nnessee common law.” T his statement indicates that the Court of Ap pe a ls f a ile d to re c ognize the signif ic anc e of thi s Co ur t’ s p ri or de c isi on s re fu sin g to a do pt “ pu bli c policy” exceptions to t h e P ub l ic Recor ds Act. Indeed, in Holt, this Court rejec ted a public policy
e xce pti on that be ars a

str iki ngre se mbl anc e to t he law e nf

or c e me nt pr ivi le g e the Court of Ap pe a ls here in adopted. See H olt, 710 S.W .2d at 517; Memphis Publ’g Co. v. City of Memphis, 871 S.W. 2d at 68 5 ( de sc ri bin gHo lt a

nd statin gthat th e Cou

rt re je c te d the pu

bli c po lic y e xce pti on

de sp ite fo rc e fu l argume nts fr om the po lic e de pa rtme nt of the City

of Me mph is a

nd “ va ri ou s amicus curiae ” that subjectingclosed investig ative police f iles to public scrutiny

“would re sult in gre ater

reluc tance of witnesses to criminal activity to talk with authoriti es , an d t o a conc omitant reduction in theT h e Ci t y ma y w i s h t o pr es en t t h i s i s s u e t o t h e G en er al As s embl y , w h i ch , i n 2006, adopt ed a j oi n t r es ol u t i on 15

cr ea t i n g “ a s pec i al j oi n t c ommi t t ee t o s t u dy t h e open g ov er n men t l aw s i n t h e St at e of T en n es s ee
. ” Act of M ay 27, 2006,
c h . 8 8 7 , § 1 , 2 0 0 6 T e n n . P u b . A c ts 8 8 7

.

T he C i t y argu es in i t s b rief tha t “[t]he co nfi d en t i al f i eld i nterv i ew ca rd s ca nn o t b e d i sclo sed b ec au se the re l ea se 16

o f t h e info rm a tio n c o n ta ine d o n the c a rd s is c o n stitutio n a lly p ro h ib ited b e c a u se inte rv ie w e e s h a v e a c o n s ti tu tio n a lly prot ect ed pri vac y i nt er es t i n t he i nf ormat i on cont ai ned on t he car ds. ” T he C i t y f ai l ed t o advan ce t hi s ar gu ment i n e i t her the trial c o u rt o r t h e C o u rt o f A p p e a ls; thu s, this ar g u m e n t h a s b e e n w a ive d

. S e e D ye , 2 1 6 S .W .3 d a t 3 2 2

. A d d iti o n a lly, t he C i t y has no t est ab l i shed t hat i t has st and i ng t o ass ert t he co nst i t ut i o nal cl ai m s o f t he i nt ervi ewee s. In t he cases t he C ity re lies u p o n , t h e law su its we re fi le d b y the p e rs o n s a lleg ing c o n stitutio n a l vio la tio n s. S e e , e .g., K a llstro m v. C ity
o f C o lum b u s, 1 3 6 F .3 d 1 0 5 5 , 1 0 5 9 (6 th C ir. 1 9 9 8 ) (w h e re p la intiff s, un d e rc o v e r p o lice o ff ic e rs e m p lo ye d b y the C ity
-1 2

- eff ectivene ss of law e nforc ement”) ; cf. City of Ne w York v. My erson, 856 F.2d 481, 484 (2d Cir. 1988) (statingthat the law e nforc ement privilege i s i n t en d ed “to pr event disclosure of law
e nf or c e me nt t e c hn iqu e s and

pr oc e dure s, to p re se rv e the c on fi de nti a lity of so ur c e s, to p ro te c t w itn e ss and law e nforc ement per sonnel, to safe guard the privac y of i ndividuals involved in an investig ation, and other wise to preve nt interfer ence with an investig ation”).

More rec ently , we reiter ated our unwillingness to judicially adopt public policy

exceptions to the Public Records Ac t. In Cawood, we wer e urge d to hold that a def endant’ s constitutional right to priv ac y re quired re cognition of a public policy exception that would preve nt disclosure of
e v id e n c e intr o d

u c e d at t h e d e f e n d an t’ s c r im in a l t

r ia l o n char g e s o f

att e mp ti n gto p atr o n iz e pr os tit uti on . 1 34 S.W. 3d

at 16 6. We de c lin e d “to make a pu bli c po lic y

e xce pti on

fo r t he re c or ds ” but rec og nized that “it is wit hin the prer og ative of the leg islature to do so.” I d. at 167. Havingexamined the Public Records Act and prior Tenne ssee de cisions, we conc lude that the law e nf

or c e me nt p ri vil e g e ha s n ot p re vio us ly be e n a do pte d a s a com mo n law priv ile g e in Te nn e s s e e an d s h o u l d n o t b e a d o p t e d h e r e i n
. A s a r e s u l t , th e l aw e n f o r c e m e n t p r i v i l e g e is n ot a

“ state law” e xce pti on

to t he Pub lic Re c or ds Ac t. Although w e ar e sy

mpathetic to the City ’s conc erns a bout the potent ial conseque nces of dis c los ing t he fi eld inte rv ie w c ard s, the Ge ne ra l A sse mbl y , n ot t his Cou rt , e sta bli sh e s th e pu

bli c po lic y of Te nn e sse e . Ca

wo od , 1 34 S.W. 3d

at 16 7. Whe the r t

he law e nf

or c e me nt p ri vil e g e sh ou ld be adopte d as an exception to the P ublic Records Act is a question for the G ener al Assembly

. Cf. 15 Memphis Publ’g Co., 871 S .W.2d at 689 (“expressly invit[ ing] the L eg islature to re medy the
un d e r i n c l u s i v e n e s s o f

§ 1 0

- 7

- 5 0 4 b y e x c e p t i n g th e w o r k p r o d u c t o f c o un ty an d mun i c i p a l att o r n e ys from public view” ). Havingconclude d that the field intervie w ca rds ar e n o t p ro t ecte d by

the law e nforc ement pr ivi le g e , we mus t ne xt c on sid e r Pe tit ion e rs ’ a sse rt ion that the y are e nti tle d to fu ll a c c e ss to the fi e ld interview c ards be cause the City relied e x clusively upon the law enfor ceme nt privilege at the show
c a us e he ari ngand

fa ile d to of

fe r p ro of tha t th e fi e ld i nte rv ie w c ard s are pr ote c te d b y Te nn e sse e Rul e of Criminal Procedur e 16. The City responds that “ at least some of the conf idential field interview
car ds . . . are exempt from disclosure under Rule 16.” 16o f

C o l um b us, s ued t he C i t y of C o l um b us f o r di ss em i nat i ng t hei r personnel f i l es, co nt ai ni ng pe rs o nal i nf o rma t i o n, i n cl u di n g h ome addr es s es a n d t el eph on e n u mber s , t o t h e def en dan t s w h om t h ey h ad bee n i n v es t i g at i n g ) ; D ej a V u of N ash vil l e, Inc

. v. M etro

. G o v’t o f N ash vil l e & D av i d so n C o un t y, 2 7 4 F .3d 3 7 7 , 3 9 4 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 1 ) (wh ere p l ainti f f s, adul t en t er t ai ner s , s ued t he M et r op ol i t an G over nment chal l eng i ng an o r di nan ce t hat requi r ed t hem t o s ubmi t t hei r na mes a n d p a st a n d p re se n t a d d re sse s o n a p p lica tio n s tha t w o u ld b e su b je c t to d isc lo su re v ia the P u b lic R e c o rd s A c t). F ina lly,
we r e we t o as s u me t h at t h e Ci t y ha s s t an di n g t o as s er t t h e con s t i t u t i on al c l ai m, t h e Ci t y h as f ai l ed t o of

f er s pec i f i c pr oof t ha t d i sclo si ng t he f

i eld i nterv i ew ca rd s wo uld t hre aten t he p erso na l sec urit y and b o d i l y i nteg rit y of ce rtai n int erv i ew ee s, p roo f that is ne cess ary to est ab l i sh such a cl ai m
. Se e, e
. g. , K al l st rom , 1 3 6 F

. 3 d at 10 6 4 (s t at i ng t hat unde rcove r of f i cers h ad es t abl i s h ed a con s t i t u t i on al pr i v ac y i n t er es t i n t h ei r pe r s on n el f i l es by of

f er i n g pr oof

t h at r el ea s e of

t h e i n f or mat i on i n t he f i l es wo ul d “t hreat en[] t he p ers o nal securi t y and bo d i l y i nt egri t y of t he o f f i cers and t hei r f

am i l y m em b ers ”); D eja V u o f N ash vil l e, Inc ., 2 7 4 F .3d at 3 9 5 (ho l d i ng t ha t ad ult en t ertaine rs had estab l i she d a c o nsti t uti o na l p rivac y i ntere st b y off eri ng pro o f

t hat dis cl o si ng t hei r nam es and current and pa st res i d ent i al ad d res ses wo ul d po se s eri o us p o t ent i al ri sks t o t hei r phys i cal s af

et y and wel l

- b ei ng).
-1 3

- As the Court

of Ap pe a ls c or

re c tly no te d, the re c or d o n a

pp e a l is “ un dis pute d th at th e fi e ld interview c ards a

re separ ate from the files on matters under investigation.” Interview ees may or may no t be inv olv e d in an ong oin g c ri min a l inve sti g atio n in some c a pa c ity , e ith e r a s a

su sp e c t, a wi tne ss, or an infor

mant, and the f

ield interview c ards do no t i n d i ca t e the status of inter viewee s. As previously

explained, the field interview car ds are “ente red into the c omputer data base” and stored by “date and time.” Ea ch ca rd includes blank lines on which offic ers may rec ord the date, time, a nd
rea son for the inve stigative stop, the investigating of fice r’s n am e and number, the intervie wee ’s name, a ddress, telephone number, date of birth, rac e, sex, height, we ight, dr iver’s lice nse number, social sec urity

number, e y e colo r, h air color, location of the inter view, desc ription of the interviewe e’s c lothing, information about the interviewe e’s ve hicle, if a pplicabl e, i n cl uding year , m ak e , m o d e l , l i c e n s e numb e r , l i c e n s e typ e , l i c e n s e ye ar , l i c e n s e s t at e , an d v e h i c l e c o l o r
. T yp i c a l l y, field interview

car ds include photog raphs of the interview ees. H oweve r, ac cordingto L ieutenant Willi s, fi eld in ter vi e w c ard s d o n ot i nc lud e summa ri e s o f t he of fi c e rs ’ c onve rs atio ns wi th interviewe es.
Pe tit ion e rs are c or

re c t th at th e City

fa ile d to de mon str ate which , if any , o f t he 36 9 f ie ld interview c ar d s ar e inv o lv e d in ano n g o in gc r im in a l i n v e s ti g ati o nan d th e r e f o r e e xe mp t f

rom disclosure unde r Tenne ssee Rule of Cri m i n al P ro cedur e 16(a )(2) . Fur thermore , the City ’s fa ilure even to revie w the field interview car ds for the purpose of identifying those car ds or portions of car ds containinginformation re levant to an ong oing cr i m i nal investig ations is inex plicable, g iven that these c ards would c lear ly have be en exempt fro m disclosure under Rule 16(a) (2) a

nd this Court’s decision in Appman. We re alize the City had little time to conduct such a revie w af ter the pe tition was filed beca

use t he show cause hear ing was held less than t wo weeks later, in accor dance with the statute. Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505(b) (1999) (“U pon filing of

the petition, the court shall, upon reque st of the petitioning pa rty , issue an orde r re quiringthe def endant . .

. to immediately appea r and sh owc a us e , if the y have any , why

the pe tit ion

sh ou ld n ot b e g ra

nte d. ” ). Ho we ve r, Pe tit ion e rs fi rs t reque sted ac cess to the f ield interview c ards in Jul y of 2004, almost seven months prior to the Fe bruar y 2005 sh o w cause hea

ring . Thus, the City

had more than suffic ient time to conduct such
a re view.

No ne the le ss, re c ognizi ngthat ha rm fu l and ir re ve rs ibl e c on se qu e nc e s c ou ld p ote nti a lly re su lt-1 4

- fr om d isc los ingfi le s th at are inv olv e d in a pe nd ingc ri min al inv e sti g atio n, we c on c lud e that a rema nd to the trial court is a

ppropriate to a llow the City an opportunity

to reviewthe field intervie w car ds and to submit to t he trial c ourt for in c am e ra revie w those car ds or portions of car ds which the City maintains are involved in an ong oing c riminal investigation and exempt from disc l o s ure. Petitioners shall be g rante d immediate acc ess to a ll f ield interview car ds not submit ted to the trial court for in c am e ra revie w.
The trial c ourt shall determ i n e wh i ch of the field interview car ds or portions of them ar e e xemp t f ro m di sc los ur e . An e nti re fi e ld i nte rv ie w c ard sh ou ld n ot b e de e me d e x emp t simpl y be c a us e it c onta ins so me e xemp t in fo rm atio n. Rathe r, re dact io n of the e xemp t in fo rm atio n is appropr iate. Eldridg e, 86 S.W.3d at 574 (holding that County could redact from public rec ords any information made c onfidential by statute with “[a]ny

reda ction . . . subject to rev i ew by the chanc ellor”) . The trial c ourt has discre tion to prescribe additional proce dures as nece ssary to gove rn the proc eeding s on remand. T he entire proce s s should be conclude d as expeditiously as possible. Be cause almost three year s has passed since the f irst reque st for this information, we e ncoura g e the tr ia l c ourt to imp os e up on

the City an e xpe dit e d s c he du le fo r c omp le tio n o f i ts r e vie w o f t he fi e ld int e rv ie w c ard s.
III. AT TOR NE YS’ F EES
We must also consider whethe r Petitioners are entitled to re co v er the attorne y s’ fe es they have inc urre d i n s ee k i n g ac cess to the f ield interview c ards a

nd to the Diamond J axx financ ial
re c or ds . T he Pub lic Re c or ds Ac t pr ov ide s a s f oll ow s c on c e rn ingre c ov e ry of atto rn e y s’ fe e s:
I f t he c ourt fi nd s th at th e g ov e rnme nta l e nti ty , or a g e nt the re of , re fu sin gto d isc los e a re cord, kne w that such re cord w as publ ic and willfully ref used to disclose it, such court may , in its d i scre tion, assess all rea sonable c osts involved in obtaining the
rec ord, includingrea sonable attorney s’ fe es, aga inst the nondisclosing g overnme ntal
e n t i ty. Tenn. Code Ann. § 10- 7-505(g ) (1999). The element of “willfully” re quired by

this statute has been d e s c r i b e d a s s yn o nym o u s t o a b a d f a i th r e qu i r e m e n t

. A r

n o l d , 1 9 S

. W

. 3 d

at7 8 9

. S t at e d

d i f f e r e n t l y, the Public Records Ac t does not au thorize a rec overy of attorne y s’ fe es if the withholding g overnme ntal entity acts with a g ood faith belief that the re cords a

re e x cepte d from the disclosure

. I d. Mo re ov e r, in a sse ssi ngwi llf uln e ss, Te nn e sse e c ourt s mu st n ot i mpute to a g ov e rnme nta l e nti ty th e “ d uty to f o r e te ll an un c e rta in ju

r id ic a l f utu r e
. ” M e mp h is Pu

b l’ g Co

. v
. Ci ty o f M e mp h is, 871 S.W .2d at 689. Petitioners contend that the City ’s re liance upon a common law privil eg e that had not bee n a do pte d in

Te nn e ssee, its de c isi on

to i g no re Ho lt a

nd Ap pma n, its fa ilure e ve n to re vie w the fi e ld int e rv ie w c ard s to de te rm ine wh e the r a ny we re pa rt of an o ng oin g cri min a l inve sti g atio n, and its blanket asse rtion that the field interview car ds “ar e privileg ed, per iod,” show a blatant disreg ard f or the law a nd e vid e nc e the City ’s wi llf ul, ba d f a ithre fu sa l to fu lf

ill its ob lig atio ns un de r t

he Pub licP et i t i oner s ar e r ef er r i ng t o t wo l et t er s f

r om t he pres i dent of

Lozi nak B as ebal l t o the C i t y’ s m ay or dat ed 17 O c to b e r 1 8 , 2 0 0 4 , an d the “T ic k e t S a le s R e p o rt S h e e t” r e fer re d to in o n e o f th e lette rs . A d d iti o n a lly, P e tit io n e rs m a inta in t h a t t h e f

ol l ow i n g do c u me n t s w e r e a l l i n t h e Ci t y ’ s po s s e s s i on w h e n Pe t i t i on e r s r e qu e s t e d a c c e s s : a documen t t i t l ed

“ Lozi nak B as ebal l P r op er t i es LLC St at ement of O pera t i ons f

or t he Y ear E nded D ece mb er 31 , 20 03 ”; a do cumen t t i t l ed

“ Lozi nak B as ebal l P r op er t i es L LC B al anc e Sheet D ece mb er 3 1, 2 00 3”; a do cumen t t i t l ed “ Lozi nak B as ebal l P r op er t i es LLC St at ement o f

C as h Fl ows f

or t he Y ear E nded D ece mb er 3 1, 2 00 3”; a do cumen t t i t l ed “ Lozi nak B as ebal l P r op er t i es LLC St at ement of

O pera t i ng E xpens es f or t he Y ear E nded D ece mb er 31, 200 3”; an d t he f i ve do cumen t s en t i t l ed

“ Lozi nak B as ebal l P r op er t i es LLC N ot es t o Fi nan ci al St at ement s D ece mb er 31, 200 3. ”

-1 5

- Records A ct.
Pe tit ion e rs c la im that th e City ’s a c tio ns c on c e rn ingthe Di amon d Jaxx fi na nc ia l r e c or ds a lso evidenc e a w illful, bad faith re fusal to comply with the Public Records Act. Specifica lly , Petitioners
ma int a in t hat th e City ’s c la im that it did no t re c e ive the Di amon d Jaxx fi na nc ia l r e c or ds until sh or

tly be fo re the sh owc a

us e he ari ngis b e lie d b y

the date s a

pp e ari ngon

the do c ume nts the mse lve s. 17 The City responds that it had a g ood faith belief that the field intervie w ca rds wer e prote cted by the law e nf

or c e me nt pr ivi le g e and a g oo d fa ith be lie f that the Di amon d Jaxx fi na nc ia l do c ume nts wer e prote cted by

the conf identi al i t y clause of the stadium lease agree ment and the statutory
e xce pti on fo r “ [s]tate a g e nc y

re c or ds c onta ini ngop ini on s o f v a lue of re a l an d pers on al pr op e rt y intended to be a cquire d for a public purpose.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 10- 7-504(a )(6) (Supp. 2006).
We conclude that the rec ord supports the trial c ourt’s dete rmination t h at Petitioners are entitled to rec over attorney s’ fe es and the trial court’s awa rd of attorney s’ fee s. Petitioners reque sted the fi e ld i nte rv ie w c ard s o n tw o o c c a sio ns , ye t th e City ne ve r r e vie we d th e c ard s. Rathe r, the City
m ai n t ai n edth atth e f

i el d i n t erv i ew card s we re ex emp t “p er i o d , ” pu rs u an t t o a co m m o nl aw p ri v i l ege that had neither been adopted in Tenne ssee nor even me ntioned in a Tenne ssee c ase, a nd which had be e n im pli c itl y re je c te d in Ho lt. Mo re ov e r, the City a sse rt e d th e law e nf

or c e me nt pr ivi le g e a s if

it
wer e a bla

nket privileg e, yet the Court of Appe als, and other jurisdicti o n s i n wh i ch it is applied, emphasize that the law e nforc ement privileg e is a qua lified privilege an ddoes not under a ny circ umstances pr ovide blanket pr otection to g overnme ntal rec ords. See, e.g ., City of New York v. Be retta U .S.A. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 51, 66 (E.D.N.Y

. 2004). Thus, rec og nizi ngthat at least a portion of the fi e ld i nte rv ie w c ard s w e re su bje c t to dis c los ur e wo uld no t ha ve re qu ir e d th e City

“ to f or e te ll
an unce rtain juridical f

uture.” Memphis Publ’g Co. v. City of Memphis, 871 S.W .2d at 689. The
rec ord supports the trial c ourt’s findingthe City willfully ref used to disclose the fie ld interview
c ard s.
Petitioners also are corr ect that the dates appe aringon the Diamond J axx financ ial rec ords indicate that the City

had possession of them whe n Petitioners reque sted ac cess. The City ’s re liance up on the c ontr a c tua l c on fi de nti a lity claus e and statut or y e xce pti on

to t he Pub lic Re c or ds Ac t to support its refusal to disclose these documents is misplace d. As previously noted, the contr actua l
c on fi de nti a lity

c la us e pr ov ide d a s f

oll ow s:-1 6

- N. Boo k s , Re c o r d s , an d A c c o un ti n g s
. . . . T h e Ci ty s h a ll h av e th e r igh t t o ma ke inspections of the books and r ecor ds of [L ozinak Base ball] from tim e to time for purposes of ve rifying the acc urac y of t he ac countingproce dures a nd reve nues to be derive d by

the City from the Stadium. The Ci ty ’s right of i nspection shall be subject to i ts a g re e me nt t o ( i) re fr a in f ro m making cop ies of

any of [L ozin ak B a se ba ll’ s]
rec ords except as pe rmitted by [L ozinak Base ball], such p er m ission not t o be
rea sonab l y

withheld, delayed or c onditioned and (ii) hold all information obtained
as a r esult of such in s pection conf idential and to not disseminate any such inf or matio n to any

thi rd pa rt y wi tho ut [L ozinak B a se ba ll’ s] a pp ro va l exc ept as otherwise required under the Tenne ssee Ope n Rec ords Law

. (Emphasis adde d.) The c onfidentiality clause is expressly subject t o the P ublic Records A ct and may
no t se rv e a s a

ba sis fo r non dis c los ur e . T e nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d s e c tio n 1 0- 7- 50 4( a )( 6) e xemp ts from disclosure rec ords “c ontaining opinions of va lue of re al and pe rsonal prope rty intended to be
a c qu ir e d f

or a pu bli c purp os e ” and pro vi des th at su c h r e c or ds “ sh a ll n ot b e op e n f or pu bli c inspection until the acquisition thereof ha s been f inalized.” Howeve r, the Diamond Jax x fiana ncial
rec ords did not contain opinions a bout the value of proper ty

. At most these finan ci al re co rds contained inf

ormation that would likely have been required to deter mine the value of

the Diamond J axx ; the rec ords did not include opinions c on c e rn ingthe val ue of the Di amon d Jaxx. T hu s, thi s statutory exception clear ly

did not apply to the Diamond J axx financ ial rec ords. Ag ain, the re cord supports the trial cour

t’s findingthat the City

willfully ref used t o comply with the Public Records Ac t by dis c los ingthe se fi na

nc ia l r e c or ds

. Acc ordi n gl y , we hold that the rec ord supports both the trial cour t’s deter mination that Petitioners are entitled to r ecove r their attorney s’ fee s and the trial court’s a war d of attorne y s’ fe es in t he amou nt o f $ 6, 17 0. Ad dit io nal ly , we ins tr uc t th e tr ia l c ourt

on re mand to c a lc ulate and

to awa rd Pe tit ion e rs the atto rn e y s’ fe e s th e y have inc ur

re d o n a pp e a l.

IV . P ERM AN EN T IN JU NC TIO N

L astly we c onsider whe ther the tria l court er red by issuing a pe rmane nt injunction re quiring the C it y pro sp e c tiv e ly

to r e sp on d in

wr iti ngto a ll f

utu re wr itt e n p ub lic re c or ds re qu e sts fr om The Jack son Sun or

its a g e nts and to e xpla in wh e the r the re c or d s ou g ht w ou ld b e pr od uc e d a nd , if no t, the basis for nondisc losure. The Court o f Ap p eals va cate d this inj unction, stating that it was not authorized by the Public Rec ords Act. Petitioners a rgue that the per

manent injunction is authorized by Te nn e sse e Cod e Anno tate d s e c tio n 1 0- 7- 50 5( d) (1 99 9) , whic h p ro vid e s:
The c ourt, in ruling upon the petition of any party proce edinghere under, sha ll render written finding s of fact and conclusions of law and sh all bee mp owe re d to e

x e rc ise ful l in jun c tiv ere me die

s a nd re lie f to secur e thepu rp os es a nd inte nti on s o

f th is section , and thi s se c tio n sh a ll be br oa dly c on str ue d so a s to g ive the fu lle st p os sib le public acc ess to public rec ords.-1 7

- (Emphasis added.) We agree with Petiti oners that this statute authorizes the injunction issued by the tr ia l cou rt . Thi s st atut e pla inl y

and in u nambi guo us langua g e c on fe rs up on c ourt s b ro a d p ow e rs to g rant injunctive re medies that sec ure the purposes a nd intentions of the Pub l i c R ec o rd s Act. The pe rm ane nt i nju

nc tio n is su e d in

thi s c a se dir e c tly

re me die s th e City ’s fa ilure to r e sp on d to Pe tit ion e rs ’ multipl e re quests for public recor ds. Requiringthe City to provide a written response articulating its reasons for

nondisclosure will secur e the pur poses of the Public Recor ds Act by ensuringthat the City denies such reque sts only afte r thoughtf ul a nd car eful c onsideration. The perma nent injunction issued by the trial cour

t theref ore is re instated.

V. CO NC LU SION
We hold that the law enf orce ment privileg e is not p ar t o f T en nessee common law and there fore does not operate as a “state la w” e x ception to the Public Records A ct. Acc ording l y , we re ve rs e the jud g me nt o f t he Court of Ap pe a ls; ho wev e r, we re mand thi s c a se to t

he tr ia l c ourt

to deter mine whether

any field interview

car d or portion there of is ex empt from disclosure as par t of a pending , open, or ong oing criminal investigation. We also reve rse the Court of Appea ls’ judgme nt and re instate the trial cour t’s judgme nt f

inding that Petitioners are entitled to rec over attorney s’ fe es and the tria l court’s judg ment awa rdingPetitioners’ attorney s’ fe es of $6,170. On r emand the tr ial court shall ca lculate the r easona ble awa rd of attorney s’ fees wh i ch P etitioners incurr ed and a re entitled t o re co v er f

or the a ppellate pr ocee dings. F inally , we r einstate the pe rmane nt injunction issued by the trial cour

t. Costs of this a

ppeal are taxed to the City of Jackson, for whic h execution may issue if nec essar

y
.

______________________________________

WI L L IAM M. B ARKE R, C HI EF JUSTI CE