J-S09041-15 & J-S09042-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: C.F., MINOR CHILD IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: G.M., BIRTH MOTHER No. 1594 WDA 2014

Appeal from the Order entered September 2, 2014, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, 

Orphans’ Court, at No(s): TPR 075 of 2014

IN RE: L.F., MINOR CHILD IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: G.M., BIRTH MOTHER No. 1714 WDA 2014

Appeal from the Order entered September 2, 2014, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, 

Orphans’ Court, at No(s): TPR 074 of 2014

IN RE: L.F., MINOR CHILD IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: E.J.F., FATHER No. 1595 WDA 2014

Appeal from the Order entered September 2, 2014, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, 

Orphans’ Court, at No(s): TPR 074 of 2014

IN RE: C.F., MINOR CHILD IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: E.J.F., FATHER No. 1715 WDA 2014

Appeal from the Order entered September 2, 2014, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, 

Orphans’ Court, at No(s): 75 of 2014

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BOWES, and ALLEN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 23, 2015
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G.M. (“Mother”) and E.J.F. (“Father”) appeal from the orders which 

granted the petitions of Allegheny County Children, Youth and Families 

(“CYF”) to involuntarily terminate Mother and Father’s parental rights to L.F. 

(born in January of 2000) and C.F. (born in June of 2004) (collectively “the 

Children”), and changed their permanency goals to adoption. We affirm.

The family became known to CYF in 2011 due to concerns regarding 

the parents’ extreme hoarding and deplorable living conditions. Specifically, 

Animal Control had investigated a report that Mother was attacked by a dog 

in the family’s home, and found six feet tall debris in the home and front 

porch, and the Children sleeping without beds amid debris on the living room 

floor. 

On March 25, 2011, CYF went to meet with the family and could only 

open the front door six inches due to massive clutter obstructing the 

entrance. CYF could not get to the second floor of the home due to the 

collection of clothing at the base of the stairs. CYF reported that the living 

room was packed with clothing and family belongings piled approximately 

five feet high. The Children slept on mounds of debris in the living room. 

CYF also found that the home smelled of dog urine. CYF implemented a 

“safety plan” following their visit, with the Children to remain in the home 

under the care of C.L., (“Paternal Aunt”), and the parents to clear the debris 

from the home and make it safe. On April 21, 2011, CYF implemented inhome services through Family Group Decision Making, but found the parents 
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had made no progress in clearing the home. The home continued to be rife 

with piles of dirty clothing and mounds of personal items. CYF was unable to 

move throughout the home due to the excessive debris. 

On May 19, 2011, CYF filed petitions for dependency relative to the 

Children. On June 7, 2011, the Children were adjudicated dependent, 

removed from their parents care and placed with Paternal Aunt. On August 

25, 2011, a Family Service Plan (“FSP”) was implemented for Mother and 

Father. Mother and Father’s FSP goals were: (1) to clean and maintain a 

safe and livable home for the Children; (2) to meet and maintain basic 

financial demands of daily living; (3) to address mental health issues that 

lead to their hoarding; (4) to meet the medical and dental needs of the 

Children; (5) to visit the Children consistently; (6) to obtain and maintain 

jobs; and (7) to maintain contact with CYF caseworkers and providers. N.T., 

8/27/14, at 111. 

Thereafter, Mother and Father attended therapy with Dr. Lawrence 

Glanz, a psychologist who used Cognitive Behavioral Therapy to treat Mother 

and Father’s compulsive hoarding. Dr. Glanz found it would take at least 

two years of continuous therapy to treat the parents’ hoarding and for them 

to achieve a safe and livable home. Dr. Glanz recommended continued 

treatment, but Mother and Father abandoned the therapy. 
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In the meantime, the conditions in Paternal Aunt’s home deteriorated 

due to Paternal Aunt’s hoarding, and on September 4, 2013, the Children 

were placed with A.E. (“Foster Mother”), where they have remained. 

On April 29, 2014, CYF filed termination petitions, seeking to terminate 

Mother and Father’s parental rights to the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b) of the Adoption Act. The trial court held 

hearings on August 27, 2014 and September 2, 2014. At the hearings, CYF 

presented the testimony of Stacey Good, a CYF caseworker; Dr. Lawrence M. 

Glanz, a licensed psychologist; Dr. Neil Rosenblum, a licensed psychologist; 

Foster Mother; Father; and Mother. By orders entered September 2, 2014, 

the trial court terminated Mother and Father’s parental rights to the 

Children.

On October 1, 2014, Mother and Father filed notices of appeal, along 

with concise statements of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). This Court consolidated the cases sua 

sponte.

Mother raises the following issues:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter 

of law in concluding that CYF met its burden by clear and 

convincing evidence that involuntary termination of Mother’s 

parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the 

Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in terminating Mother’s 

parental rights when a more appropriate and less restrictive 

option of Subsidized Permanent Legal Custodianship (“SPLC”) 

was available?
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3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in the consideration and 

weight given to the wishes of the [C]hildren?

Mother’s Brief at 7.

Father raises the following issues:

1. Did the [t]rial [court] abuse its discretion and err in granting 

the Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) of the Adoption Act? 

2. Did the [t]rial [court] abuse its discretion and err in finding by 

clear and convincing evidence that the Children would not be 

adversely affected by severance of the strong bond extant 

between [Father] and [the C]hildren?

3. Did the [t]rial [court] abuse its discretion and err as a matter 

of law in determining that Foster Mother in this case (and 

adoptive resource) would permit post adoption contact 

between Father and [the C]hildren when Foster Mother had 

previously begun to limit all contact between Father and [the 

C]hildren?

4. Did the [t]rial [court] abuse its discretion and err as a matter 

of law in determining that the termination of parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8) serves 

the needs and welfare of [the C]hildren?

5. Did the [t]rial [court] abuse its discretion and err as a matter 

of law in determining that there was clear and convincing 

evidence that termination of parental rights is in the best 

interest of the [C]hildren? 

Father’s Brief at 5.

We review the orders involuntarily terminating Mother and Father’s 

parental rights according to the following standard: 

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard 

when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for 

termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our 

standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the 
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findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if 

they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9 

A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are 

supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court 

made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., 36 

A.3d [567,] 572 [(Pa. 2011) (plurality)]. As has been often 

stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because 

the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. 

Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., 

34 A.3d 1, 51 ([Pa.] 2011); Christianson v. Ely, 838 A.2d 630, 

634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.

As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying 

an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We 

observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not 

equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold 

record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during 

the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other 

hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d 

at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an 

opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and 

termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to 

second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility 

determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial 

judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the 

record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an 

error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of 

Atencio, 539 Pa. 161, 165, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826–827 (Pa. 2012).

Termination of parental rights is governed by section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis:

Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court 

must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating 

parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the 

parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the 

statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). 

Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 
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termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511). The burden is on the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of 

parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 

2009).

This Court must agree with only one subsection of 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(a), in addition to subsection 2511(b), in order to affirm the 

termination of parental rights. See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. 

Super. 2004) (en banc). In the instant case, Mother and Father do not 

challenge the trial court’s analysis as it relates to their conduct under 

Section 2511(a); rather, Mother and Father focus their appellate argument 

on the trial court’s analysis of the best interests of the Children under 

Section 2511(b). See Krebs v. United Refining Co., 893 A.2d 776, 797 

(Pa. Super. 2006); Dietrich v. Dietrich, 923 A.2d 461, 463 (Pa. Super. 

2007). 

Mother and Father assert that the trial court abused its discretion in 

concluding that termination of Mother and Father’s parental rights would 

best serve the needs and welfare of the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 
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2511(b). Mother also argues that the trial court abused its discretion 

because the trial court did not consider the Children’s wishes. Additionally, 

Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that 

Foster Mother would permit post-adoption contact with the Children because 

Foster Mother had previously begun to limit all contact between Father and 

the Children. 

Section 2511(b) provides, in pertinent part:

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) (bold in original).

Pursuant to Section 2511(b), the trial court must take into account 

whether a natural parental bond exists between child and parent, and 

whether termination would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial 

relationship. In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1202 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc).

In In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), 

this Court stated, “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, 

and stability are involved in the inquiry into needs and welfare of 

the child.” In addition, we instructed that the orphans’ court 

must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, 

with utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently 

severing that bond. Id. However, the extent of the bond-effect 

analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of the 

particular case. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 763 (Pa. Super. 

2008).
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While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a 

major aspect of the Subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it 

is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the 

court when determining what is in the best interest of the child. 

The mere existence of an emotional bond does not preclude the 

termination of parental rights. Rather, the orphans’ court must 

examine the status of the bond to determine whether its 

termination “would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial 

relationship.” As we explained in In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 483 

(Pa. Super. 2010): 

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can 

equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and 

should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, 

comfort, security, and stability the child might have 

with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated 

that the trial court should consider the importance of 

continuity of relationships and whether any existing 

parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental 

effects on the child.

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted).

Here, the trial court found that the Children’s best interests are served 

by termination of Mother and Father’s parental rights. Trial Court Opinion 

“Exhibit A,” 9/2/14, at 9. The trial court made the following findings of fact: 

This family has struggled with a dysfunctional family structure. 

In many respects [C.F.], the youngest child, was crippled with 

emotional dependency on [M]other and [F]ather.

On the surface, [L.F.] appeared to be productive and resilient in 

her behavior. She is the healthiest functioning member of the 

family. However, [L.F.] has engaged in concerning behaviors 

such as cutting, and suicidal ideations, resulting in 

hospitalization and engagement in a partial hospitalization 

program. As it turns out she was NOT thriving; she was only 

surviving.

Trial Court Opinion, “Exhibit A,” 9/2/14, at 8.

With respect to the Children in their foster home, the trial court found:
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[C.F.] and [L.F.] are currently placed in an excellent foster home

with [Foster Mother]. This is a pre-adoptive foster home. 

[Foster Mother] possesses an intuitive understanding of the 

children’s needs and demonstrates an ability to help both [C.F.] 

and [L.F.] move forward in improving in their emotional 

adjustment and social development.

[C.F.] is now participating in several social programs that are 

clearly helping her build an improved self-concept and greater 

confidence in her ability to function independently. Both girls 

have made progress in their mental health functioning and 

personal adjustment, and are moving forward with their lives in 

an increasingly healthy and productive manner since being 

placed with [Foster Mother].

Trial Court Opinion, “Exhibit A,” 1/3/14, at 8.

Regarding the Children’s bond with Mother and Father, the trial court 

found: 

[The Children] love their parents and miss aspects of their 

former family life. However, [the Children] have now been 

removed from parents’ care for more than three years and need 

an opportunity to move forward in their lives in a different 

direction. [The Children] have confidence in [F]oster [M]other. 

Birth parents do try to pull the girls back by reinforcing their 

desire to return home and be a family again. Yet on some level 

the girls, particularly [L.F.], seem to recognize that [M]other and 

[F]ather also hold them back from pursuing more ageappropriate experiences and accomplishments.

Given the current mental health status and dysfunction of 

parents, reunification is no longer a viable goal. Mother and 

Father are overwhelmed with too many psychiatric impairments 

and mental health concerns, making their ability to function as 

effective or suitable parents for the girls severely compromised. 

They have made limited progress in improving the physical 

conditions in their home that led to the girls’ removal in the first 

place.
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[The Children] would like to return to the care of their parents. 

If they cannot return, they wish to remain with [Foster Mother]. 

[L.F.] would prefer adoption as opposed to SPLC.

The real issue in this case is the needs and welfare of the 

[C]hildren. Admittedly, this is a difficult issue as we have two 

children who love their parents and wish to return to their care. 

We also have two parents who dearly love [the C]hildren and 

who have made [the C]hildren the focus of their lives.

However, [the Children] have been in care for more than [three] 

years and need permanence. For the first time in their lives, 

they are functioning normally. They live in a clean and safe 

home. The have friends and social lives. They now have a 

home where friends can visit. Their caregiver understands their 

bond with their parents and the importance of continued contact 

with their parents if the children are adopted by her.

Trial Court Opinion, “Exhibit A,” 9/2/14, at 8. 

Stacey Good, the CYF caseworker, stated, “there is no doubt that this 

family loves each other,” and they “show a great deal of affection towards 

each other.” N.T., 8/27/14, at 130-31. However, Ms. Good also testified 

that Mother and Father are not meeting any of the Children’s educational, 

psychological, and developmental needs. Id. at 131. Ms. Good testified 

that the Children are very comfortable with Foster Mother, who is “willing to 

adopt.” Id. at 130-131. Ms. Good testified that “the girls are in dire need of 

permanency. The girls have been left in care for 38 months, which has left 

their lives in limbo at this point.” Id. at 132. 

Furthermore, Dr. Rosenblum testified about the bond between Mother 

and Father and the Children. He testified: 

The emotional connection to the parents is very strong. And in 

the past, their reliance on the parents to guide them and provide 
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safety and security for the Children was particularly strong, but 

as I’ve tried to explain, there are aspects of the bond and the 

attachment that are not healthy: Parents are overprotective 

parents. Parents are enmeshed. Parents had prevented the 

Children, you know, more so [C.F.] than [L.F.], from developing 

healthy self-esteem and a healthy sense of developmental 

maturation to the point that I believe that it has particularly 

affected [C.F.], and to some degree [L.F.] as well. 

We have a reversal here, where [L.F.] in particular, had to worry 

about Mother and Father and not feel free to just focus on 

herself and her own personal needs. So she started stuffing 

those feelings and pretending to the outside world that she was 

fine, when in fact she was not fine. So there is a bond and there 

are aspects, as I said, in which these parents, they adore [the 

C]hildren and they live for [the C]hildren, but there are also a 

number of very unhealthy psychological aspects to their 

relationship. 

The second part of the question, as I understand it is, how this 

will affect the Children if that relationship is changed, because I 

don’t believe the bond is going to change. I think the 

relationship is going to change. The relationship has changed. 

The Children no longer depend on [Mother] and [Father] to be 

their primary people who they look to meet their needs. That 

has changed slowly with [C.F.] much more rapidly with [L.F.], 

who had a much easier time developing a good relationship with 

Foster Mother than [C.F.] did, because Foster Mother doesn’t 

baby [C.F.] and Foster Mother has encouraged [C.F.] to develop 

her own sense of self-worth and her ability to feel good about 

herself, which I believe was long overdue. 

Like I said, I think it will sadden the [Children] if termination is 

the outcome here or [when] the Court makes that decision. But 

I also believe that it will remove some things that are shackling 

the Children and troubling them, and that is the confusion of will 

they come back, will they not come back? How are Mother and 

[Father] doing? Are they stressed? Are they agonizing? Are 

they depressed? Are they anxious? And those are not good 

dimensions, developmentally. Those are not appropriate 

dimensions for the Children to have to deal with. 
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N.T., 8/27/14, at 77-90. See In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251 (Pa. 2013) (stating 

that the strong parent-child bond was an unhealthy one that could not by 

itself serve as grounds to prolong foster care drift). We have stated that the 

mere existence of a bond or attachment of a child to a parent will not 

necessarily result in the denial of a termination petition. See In re K.K.R.-

S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008). This Court will not prolong 

instability for children when it is clear that their biological parents are unable 

to provide for their basic needs in the near future. See In re T.S.M., 71 

A.3d at 270. 

Given the foregoing, we find that the trial court gave adequate 

consideration to the developmental, physical, and emotional needs of the 

Children in terminating Mother and Father’s parental rights pursuant to 

section 2511(b), including consideration of the Children’s wishes, and that 

the record supports the trial court’s best interest analysis. In re N.A.M., 

supra. We find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in terminating Mother 

and Father’s parental rights to the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 

2511(a) and (b).

Mother additionally argues that the trial court abused its discretion in 

terminating Mother’s parental rights when a more appropriate and less 

restrictive option of a subsidized permanent legal custodianship (“SPLC”) 

was available. Mother’s Brief at 23. Mother observes that Dr. Rosenblum 
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considered a recommendation of SPLC, but rejected it in favor of adoption. 

Id. 

Initially, our standard of review of an order regarding a 

placement goal of a dependent child is the abuse of discretion 

standard. In reviewing the court’s denial of permanent legal

custody, we are bound by the facts as found by the trial court 

unless they are not supported in the record. Once a child is 

adjudicated dependent, the court may order the family goal to 

be return home; it may terminate parental rights and place the 

child for adoption; or it may order the child be placed with a 

permanent legal custodian. 

In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 982 (2008) (citations and quotations omitted).

Section 6351(f.1) of the Juvenile Act lists the court’s options in 

determining a dependent child’s placement:

§ 6351. Disposition of dependent child

* * *

(f.1) Additional determination.—Based upon the 

determination made under subsection (f) and all relevant 

evidence presented at the hearing, the court shall determine one 

of the following:

(1) If and when the child will be returned to the child’s parent, 

guardian or custodian in cases where the return of the child is 

best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental and 

moral welfare of the child.

(2) If and when the child will be placed for adoption, and the 

county agency will file for termination of parental rights in cases 

where return to the child’s parent, guardian or custodian is not 

best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental and 

moral welfare of the child.

(3) If and when the child will be placed with a legal custodian in 

cases where the return to the child’s parent, guardian or 

custodian or being placed for adoption is not best suited to the 
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safety, protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the 

child.

(4) If and when the child will be placed with a fit and willing 

relative in cases where return to the child’s parent, guardian or 

custodian, being placed for adoption or being placed with a legal

custodian is not best suited to the safety, protection and 

physical, mental and moral welfare of the child.

(5) If and when the child will be placed in another living 

arrangement intended to be permanent in nature which is 

approved by the court in cases where the county agency has 

documented a compelling reason that it would not be best suited 

to the safety, protection and physical, mental and moral welfare 

of the child to be returned to the child’s parent, guardian or 

custodian, to be placed for adoption, to be placed with a legal

custodian or to be placed with a fit and willing relative.

(f.2) Evidence.—Evidence of conduct by the parent that places 

the health, safety or welfare of the child at risk, including 

evidence of the use of alcohol or a controlled substance that 

places the health, safety or welfare of the child at risk, shall be 

presented to the court by the county agency or any other party 

at any disposition or permanency hearing whether or not the 

conduct was the basis for the determination of dependency.

(g) Court order.—On the basis of the determination made 

under subsection (f.1), the court shall order the continuation, 

modification or termination of placement or other disposition 

which is best suited to the safety, protection and physical, 

mental and moral welfare of the child.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f.1)(1)-(5), (f.2), (g).

SPLC transfers permanent legal custody to the dependent child’s 

legal custodian without requiring the termination of natural 

parental rights. When deemed appropriate the [ ] court has the 

power to permit continued visitation by the dependent child’s 

natural parents. To be eligible for SPLC, the legal custodian 

must meet all of the requirements for foster parenthood, submit 

to an annual eligibility evaluation, and have the ability to provide 

for the child without court supervision.
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In re B.S., 861 A.2d 974, 977 (Pa. Super. 2004). The court may consider 

permanent legal custody, upon the filing of a petition that alleges the 

dependent child’s current placement is not safe, and the physical, mental, 

and moral welfare of the child would best be served if SPLC were granted. 

Id. Upon receipt of this petition, the court must conduct a hearing and 

make specific findings focusing on the best interests of the child. Id. The 

“court must find that neither reunification nor adoption is best suited to the 

child’s safety, protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the child”

for the court to name the custodian a “permanent legal custodian.” Id.

(holding Section 6351(f.1) governs appointment of permanent legal

custodian).

In the instant case, after more than three years of dependency, the 

trial court changed the family goal for the Children to adoption. The trial 

court found that reunification was no longer a viable goal due to the current 

mental health status and dysfunction of the parents. Trial Court, “Exhibit A,” 

9/2/14, at 9. The trial court found that Mother and Father are 

“overwhelmed with too many psychiatric impairments and mental health 

concerns, making their ability to function as effective or suitable parents for 

the [Children] severely compromised.” Id. While the Children do love and 

wish to return to their parents, the trial court found that they are functioning 

normally for the first time in their lives. Id. The trial court stated that 

Foster Mother “understands [the Children’s] bond with their parents and the 
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importance of continued contact with their parents, if the Children are 

adopted by her.” Id.

Dr. Rosenblum’s recommendations were: 

Well, I really grappled with that and struggled with it. On 

surfaces, I said many times, it is very difficult to make a 

recommendation that parents should lose their parental rights 

because of something like hoarding issues, you know. Again, I 

have tried to amplify a lot of the psychological dimensions of 

neglect and a lot of the concerns I have about the type of 

relationship and over-connectedness and enmeshment within the 

family, but as an evaluator, we are more accustomed to, and I 

believe it is likely with the Court as well, more accustomed to 

people losing parental rights for violating the law, using drugs, 

physical abuse of children. There was none of that within this 

family. And so, I do recognize that on some level it seems 

severe for Mother and Father to lose their parental rights. They 

are guilty perhaps of loving their children too much and not 

promoting a healthy psychological environment. But it is tough 

to take that stand, but I don’t believe that it is healthy for the 

Children to just continue living this way indefinitely, and, while I 

consider the permanency goal of SPLC, my concern was that it 

wouldn’t—the same message that “you are going to be coming 

home soon.” We are rectifying this and the guilt induction, and 

the unhealthy dimensions of the relationship between parents 

and the girls would continue. 

And I believe there has always been a need for healthier 

boundaries, and I have difficulty believing that a goal of 

SPLC would give the Children the sense of closure and the 

sense of permanence that they need. 

Even [C.F.] said because she knows she has a right to choose 

SPLC or adoption, . . . She is telling me she would choose 

adoption, because she doesn’t want the Court to continue to be 

involved and I think as much as she loves her parents—excuse 

me—[L.F.] is ready to move on with her life and accept that this 

is probably what it is going to be. And I think that is the issue 

that the Court should review in terms of making that decision, 

you know, what is going to be the permanency goal that 

gives the Children a clear message that their future is 

going in a certain direction as opposed to maintaining the 
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confusion, the anxiety, the doubt, and the worry, and 

been sort of the underlying sense of loss that the Children 

need closure, and in my opinion, it is likely that a goal of 

open adoption would give the Children a greater sense of 

certainty, a greater sense of finality. 

N.T., 8/27/14, at 71-73 (emphasis added). 

Dr. Rosenblum further testified: 

This is agonizing for everyone. And it is like a slow death. I said 

in my report an inevitable train wreck. And there has been no 

ability of the parents to take control of their lives. And the 

Children’s lives have lost control. As I said that was one of the 

reasons I believe that [L.F.] was cutting herself at one time. 

The Children need closure. They need a definition of how 

their lives are going to proceed. And I think that there have 

been three years now that have gone by. Or I know that three 

years have gone by without any improvement, without any 

clarity. 

N.T., 8/27/14, at 75 (emphasis added). 

Given the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial 

court’s decision to forego the option of SPLC in favor of 

termination/adoption. 

In a related claim, Father asserts that the trial court erred by finding 

that Foster Mother will allow post-termination contact between Children and 

the parents. We initially note that we will not disturb factual findings that 

are supported by the record. Here, Foster Mother testified that she would 

“absolutely” be willing to adopt the Children. Id. at 37. She also stated:

There is no doubt in my mind that the girls need to have a 

relationship with their birth parents. So I would absolutely be on 

board for an agreement to allow them to see their birth parents.
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Id. at 37. Father’s assertion regarding continued post-adoption parental 

contact with the Children is thus belied by the record.

Moreover, we recently determined that in termination proceedings, the 

termination analysis under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511 may not be conflated with 

the Adoption Act and an adopting parent’s willingness to enter into an 

agreement for continuing contact. In re K.H.B., --- A.3d ----, 2014 WL 

7331022 (Pa. Super.).1 

 

1 Act 101, which pertains to adoption, states in relevant part:

§ 2731. Purpose of subchapter.

The purpose of this subchapter is to provide an option for 

adoptive parents and birth relatives to enter into a voluntary 

agreement for ongoing communication or contact that:

(1) is in the best interest of the child;

(2) recognizes the parties’ interests and desires for ongoing 

communication or contact;

(3) is appropriate given the role of the parties in the child’s life; 

and

(4) is subject to approval by the courts.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2731. An agreement under Act 101 “shall be filed with the 

court that finalizes the adoption of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2735(a). The 

agreement shall not be legally enforceable unless approved by the court,

which the court shall approve when the statutory conditions are satisfied. 

The statute by its plain language makes an agreement optional, and such 

agreement is plainly not required by Section 2511. When amendments were 

made to the Adoption Act in 2010, effective in 2011, a voluntary agreement 

for continued contact was not added to Chapter 25. Chapter 25 Proceedings 

Prior to Petition to Adopt remain separate from Chapter 27 Petition for 

Adoption. See 23 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 2511-2558; 23 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 2701-2742; 

In re K.H.B., supra.
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In sum, the trial court in this case conducted a thorough review, 

hearing from the parties, Foster Mother, and expert witnesses, considering 

SPLC as an option, but concluding that termination and adoption best suited 

the safety and protection, physical, mental and moral welfare of the 

Children. The trial court, consistent with 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511, determined:

The circumstances that led to removal and placement of the 

[C]hildren continue. Although the agency is only required to 

make reasonable efforts to reunify children with their parents, in 

this case I find that Allegheny County OCYF has made 

EXTRAORDINARY EFFORTS in this case. Despite these 

extraordinary efforts, the parents have made no progress in this 

case. I find that continued services would not remedy the 

conditions the led to removal within a reasonable period of time, 

if ever.

Trial Court Opinion, “Exhibit A,” 9/2/14, at 9. The trial court “also found that 

termination of [M]other and [F]ather’s parental rights best served the needs 

and welfare of the [C]hildren.” Trial Court Opinion, 11/5/14, at 5. The 

competent evidence in the record supports the trial court’s determinations. 

Thus, we will not disturb them, and we affirm the trial court’s orders. See

In re S.B., 943 A.2d at 982. 

Orders affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/23/2015