In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Nos. 14-2442 & 14-2597

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

KENNETH W. LEWIS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Central District of Illinois.

No. 1:12-cr-10082-JES-JEH — James E. Shadid, Chief Judge.

ARGUED APRIL 11, 2016 — DECIDED APRIL 20, 2016

Before BAUERandWILLIAMS,Circuit Judges, and ADELMAN,

*

District Judge.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant, Kenneth Lewis,

appeals his conviction and sentence for wire fraud and money

 Of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin,

*

sitting by designation.
2 Nos. 14-2442 & 14-2597

laundering. The district court sentenced him to 151 months’

imprisonment for the four-count wire fraud conviction, and

120 months for the eleven-count money laundering conviction.

The district court ordered Lewis to serve the sentences consecutively. 

Lewis represented himself at trial. He appeals pro se as well,

raising sundry challenges to his conviction and sentence. We

appointed an amicus curiae to argue on his behalf. The amicus

focused on Lewis’ challenges to the money laundering conviction and the severity of his sentence; it did not posit any

argument regarding Lewis’ wire fraud conviction.

After the parties filed their respective briefs, but prior

to oral argument, the government conceded that it had not

presented sufficient evidence that Lewis had in fact laundered

money; there was no evidence that he had “engage[d] or

attempt[ed] to engage in a monetary transaction using criminally derived property.” 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a); see United States v.

McClellan, 794 F.3d 743, 753 (7th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, the

government agreed that we should vacate the money laundering conviction, and remand the case for resentencing only on

the wire fraud conviction. Because the record is devoid of

evidence that Lewis laundered money, we oblige. See, e.g.,

United States v. Reed, 744 F.3d 519, 527 (7th Cir. 2014) (appellate

court will “overturn a verdict for insufficiency of the evidence

... if ... the record is devoid of evidence from which a rational

trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”

(citations omitted)).
Nos. 14-2442 & 14-2597 3

In response to the second argument of the amicus, we add

that Lewis’ litigation tactics cannot serve as a basis for his

sentence. See United States v. Purnell, 701 F.3d 1186, 1191–92

(7th Cir. 2012). The record demonstrates that Lewis was an

irritant during the trial process. But it “would not be appropriate or permissible” to lengthen his sentence because of such

vexatiousness, particularly given his pro se status. Id. at 1191;

see also, e.g., Edwards v. Cross, 801 F.3d 869, 873 (7th Cir. 2015)

(noting the leniency that courts afford pro se litigants). The

district court’s frustration, however understandable, cannot

permeate sentencing. See Purnell, 701 F.3d at 1191.

We reject Lewis’ remaining arguments as waived, underdeveloped, frivolous, or otherwise without merit. See United

States v. Morris, 775 F.3d 882, 886–87 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting

United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 678 (7th Cir. 2005))

(“Arguments clearly without merit can, and for the sake of

judicial economy should, be passed over in silence.” (Brackets

omitted)). Because Lewis has not presented a sustainable

argument against his wire fraud conviction, we affirm it

without further discussion.

Thus, we AFFIRM Lewis’ conviction for wire fraud,

VACATE his conviction for money laundering, and

REMAND the case for resentencing consistent with this

opinion.