N IN

CENTAL AN AERIC THECARIBEA

Atlantic Ocean

Miami;

Gulf of Mexic The Bhama

GutmaaH CaAtlanticnOcea

Gulf Mexco f - ThPanaama

Pacificibea SeanCoomi

Ij

2ND PRINTING EET

APRIL 1985 IAX

Originai contains ooloo

plates: All DTIC reproduotd

Ions Will be In black and771

white'

*% %
CONTENTS

Introduction1

-~Cubvit The Key Soviet Proxy) 3

Grenada, A Failed Revolution1 '

Nlcaragual A Betrayed Revolutioni, 19

El SalvadorAz A Demrtic Revolution2 31

CastroA Subversive Catalyst, 37

The Challenge and the Response., 41

F Actesele For

btIlC TAB

Ihnmounced El

justification

0i Distribution/

Availability Codes

Avail and/or

0

Di(1 Spca

.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing office, Washington, D.C. 20402
0-

,.-.-*..

We Americans should be proud of what we're trying to do in Central America, and

proud of what, together with our friends, we can do in Central America, to support .. -

4 democracy, human rights, and economic growth, while preserving peace so close to . 4.

home. Let us show the world that we want no hostile, communist colonies here in

the Americas: South, Central, or North.

RONALD REAGAN

May 1984

This booklet provides information about Soviet principal threats to democracy in Central America. In

and Cuban military power and intervention in Cen- El Salvador, the guerrillas are fighting the reforms of

tral America and the Caribbean. The threats result- President Jose Napoleon Duarte and his elected

ing from this factor are as much a part of the region's government with arms channeled through Nicaragua

crisis as are better known indigenous and historic with the active support of the Sandinistas. Since 1979,

factors. , guerrilla actions have cost the Salvadoran people endUntd 2 4less suffering and their economy more than $1 billion.

United States policy in the area is based on four The goal of the guerrillas, acting in concert with

mutually supportive elements that are being pursued Havana and Managua, is to establish a Marxistsimultaneously: Leninist government in El Salvador.

S To assist in the development of democratic in- Marxist-Leninists promise freedon, national destitutions and to encourage creation of velopment, and a classless society. In reality, they

representative governments accountable to their deliver repressive governments that are unable to

citizens. produce economically, but are ever ready to give assistance to foreign groups trying to seize power in other

To address on an urgent basis the economic and countries. Castro's Cuba has been the prime example

social problems of the region by providing eco- of this form of government in the Western Heminomic assistance to stimulate growth, create op- sphere. Sandinista Nicaragua is following the Cuban

portunity, and improve the quality of life of the example. Grenada was on the same path until October

people. 1983.

To provide security assistance to enable the Soviet interest in exploiting the economic, politicountries to defend themselves against Soviet- cal, and social problems of Central America and the

bloc, Cuban, and Nicaraguan supported insur- Caribbean is evidefit in a document found by U.S.-

gents and terrorists intent on establishing Caribbean security forces during the Grenada rescue

Marxist-Leninist dictatorships. mission. In A 15 April 1983 meeting with Grenadian

Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, Soviet Foreign

To promote peaceful solutions through negoti- Minister Andrei Gromyko was quoted as describing

ation and dialogue among the countries of the the region as "boiling like a cauldron" and saw Cuba

region and among political groups within each and Nicaragua as "living examples for countries in that

country. part of the world." Cautious opportunism was evident

in Gromyko's words, advising Bishop that "imperiThis policy is working. Democracy is now emerg- alism" should not be "agitated," to avoid alerting the

ing as the rule, not the exception. Five of the six coun- United States prematurely. At the same time he urged

tries in Central America have conducted elections Grenada to continue revolutionary operations in the

widely judged free and fair. Only in Nicaragua did region.'

people go to the polls with no real choice, due to Sandinista harassment of the democratic opposition. Over the last five years, the Soviet Union has

sought to exploit this "boling cauldron" by providCuba, Nicaragua, and the Soviet Union are the ing more military assistance to Cuba and Nicaragua

:-' -'?"1
than the United States has provided to all of Latin President Reagan outlined the challenge faced by

America. The Sandinista military buildup began in the United States in his 9 May 1984 televised speech

*1980, two years before there was any significant armed to the nation:

opposition to the Managua regime. From July 1979

through April 1981, the United States was providing As the National Bipartisan Conmmission on

generous economic assistance to Nicaragua (SV 18 mil- Central America, chaired by Henry Kis- ~ ~ lion) and providing only small amounts of military as- singer, agreed, if we do nothing or if we ~ sistance to Nicaragua's neighbors. Subsequent continue to provide too little help, our

increases in U.S. military assistance to these neighbor- choice will be a Communist Central Ameniing countries has been a direct reaction to the military ca with additional Communist military

build-up and support for guerrillas undertaken by bases on the mainland of this hemisphere,

*Nicaragua, Cuba, and the Soviet bloc.' and Communist subversion spreading

southward and northward. This CoinThe Soviet Union sees in the region an excellent munist subversion poses the threat that 100

and low-cost opportunity to preoccupy the United million people from Panama to the open

States-the "main adversary" of Soviet strategy-thus border on our south could come under the

gaining greater global freedom of action for the USSR. control of pro-Soviet regimes.

While the Soviets are not likely to mount a direct military challenge to the United States in the Caribbean If we come to our senses too late,

Basin, they are attempting to foment as much unrest when our vital interests are even more

as possible in an area that is the strategic crossroads directly threatened, and after a lack of

of the Western Hemisphere. Working through its key American support causes our friends to

proxy in the region, Cuba, the Soviet Union hopes to lose the ability to defend themselves, then -

force the United States to divert attention and mili- the risks to our security and our way of life

*tary resources to an area that has not been a serious will be infinitely greater.

security concern to the United States in the past.

2
to

CUBA: THE KEY SOVIET PROXY

The 1959 revolution carried out by Fidel Castro and To protect their military investment in Cuba, the

his 26th of July Movement has been of inestimable Soviets are making a sizeable economic investment as

value to the Soviet Union. The first proof that the well. Each year the Soviets provide more than $4

USSR understood the strategic advantages it could billion to the Cuban economy. During the last four

gain from Cuba came in the early. 1960s. At that years alone, they have given the Cubans almost $3

time, the USSR lagged behind the United States in billion in military aid. In fact, since the early 1960s,

long-range nuclear systems, and in 1962, the oppor- Cuba has not paid for any of the military assistance it

tunistic Soviets secretly introduced medium- and has received from the Kremlin.

intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Cuba. Had

they succeeded in keeping the missiles in Cuba, the This substantial investment in Cuba gives the

Soviets would have controlled a nuclear base only 90 Soviet Union both military and intelligence

miles from the Florida coast. capabilities in an area that is a lifeline for the U.S.

economy. The Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico

The Soviets now have in Cuba 7,000 civilian ad- maritime routes carry about 550o0 of imported visers, a 2,800-man combat brigade, another 2,800 petroleum to the U.S., as well as approximately 45 %

military advisers, plus about 2,100 technicians at the of all U.S. seaborne trade. Furthermore, in any

Lourdes electronic intelligence facility. Since 1969, NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation, more than half

" the Soviet navy has deployed task forces to Cuba and of all NATO resupply would be shipped from Gulf

the Caribbean 24 times. Soviet long-range naval ports and would have to pass by Cuba.

reconnaissance aircraft are also deployed to Cuba.

. From there, they operate along the U.S. East Coast Cuba's strategic location makes it an ideal site

and in the Caribbean, shadowing carrier battle for an intelligence facility directed against the United

groups and spying on other U.S. military forces and States. The Soviet Union established such a site at

installations. The Soviets also use Cuba as a stopover Lourdes near Havana in the mid-1960s. Lourdes topoint for reconnaissance aircraft enroute to Angola. day is the most sophisticated Soviet collection facility Is

•* ...

Soviet naval combatants in Caribbean waters during their March-April 184 deployment. Since 199, the

Soviet navy has deployed task forces 34 times to participate in training exercises with the Cuban navy

and to establish a periodic naval presence in the Caribbean.

- * - . **.*****..-.. == 

..-o °:* -. . ,**% . ... . . .. '° " *2* .-
70

0

an Antonio De Los Banos Airfield Cuba

-0

U.S. Navy F-4 intercepts Soviet BEAR D Io-gwran '

reconnaissance aircraft 42 miles off the Virginia -

coast. The Soviet aircraft, operating out of Cuba, hadin

just penetrated the U defense IS. zone during sea tri- tic

als of the nuclear aircraft carrier, the USS Car Vin- lt C a son. in January 1982.

'Sov.0[ Naival ,

Reocormais s,-Hce Aircraftl •

~~~Soviet naval long-range reconnaissance aircraft deployed to Cuba. These aircraft collect intelligence on •-'

~U.S. military Installations on the East Coast and U.S. naval activities In the Atlantic and Caribbean.

" outside the Soviet Union itself From this key listen- Castro and Communism

ing post, the Soviets monitor U.S. commercial

satellites, U.S. military and merchant shipping corn- It is sometimes asserted that Fidel Castro took Cuba

munications, and NASA space program activities at into the Soviet orbit because the United States turned

Cape Canaveral. Lourdes also enables the Soviets to a cold shoulder to his 1959 revolution. This is a

eavesdrop on telephone conversations in the United double distortion.

States.

It is no surprise that a 1983 article in Forbes The United States was ready to discuss foreign

asked, "Why do the Russians pump $4 billion to $5 aid with Castro's government. In April 1959, when

billion a year into Cuba's collapsing economy? Fidel Castro made his first visit to the United States,

Because they know it is their best buy when it comes he privately forbade his economic minister to consent

to making trouble for the U.S. For less than the an- to even preliminary discussions with the United

nual cost of supporting a single aircraft carrier task States on the topic of economic aid.' During a TV in- S

force, the Soviet Union has developed a wondrous terview in Spain in January 1984, Castro confirmed

weapon."' that U.S. hostility was not a major factor in his deci4

-S
.- -. .. -. ~ -v - - -. -- .. ... -~ t -. -7- - -. - - - -

UNTE STTE

The Caribbean sea lanes are viewed by the Soviets as the "strategic rear" of the United States. I

i'MI,

Soviet intelligence collection faciity at Lourdes near Havana, Cuba. This listening post enables the Soviets

*to monitor sensitive U.S. maritime, military, and space communications, as well as telephone conversations in the United States.

%0
-7. . . -7 * - v .. ,-r '.

VA Garrison State

Under Soviet tutelage, Cuba's armed forces have expanded steadily. They now include 160,000 active

duty military personnel, plus up to 135,000 welltrained and experienced reservists who can be

mobilized in two to three days. This total force exceeds that of the active duty armed forces of Brazil, a

country with 13 times Cuba's population. Through

its operations in Africa over the past decade, Cuba

has gained more extensive and more recent foreign

combat experience than any other country in the

Western Hemisphere.

Cuba has more than 950 tanks and more than

200 jet fighters, principally the MiG-21 but also the

MiG-23, a front-line fighter of the Soviet Union's air

force. In addition, the Soviets have given Cuba an

improved naval capability with frigates, submarines,

and missile/torpedo firing patrol boats. The Cuban

air force and civil air fleet could transport at least

15,000 combat soldiers anywhere in the Caribbean

-. . Basin within two to three weeks. Important elements

of this force could be in place within a few hours. No

single country in the basin, except the United States, Cuban President Fidel Castro, after as years, is still has the means to repel such an attack without extercommitted to violent revolution and a close align- nal assistance.

ment with the Soviet Union.

Cuba has developed the capability, through the

. sion to take Cuba into the Soviet camp, adding that recent addition of two amphibious landing ships,

"inexorably, we considered ourselves to be Marxist- together with smaller amphibious craft of the Cuban

Leninists."s navy, of placing an initial assault force of about

1,000 men, with either tanks or artillery support, on

During the first years of Sandinista rule in nearby island nations. The Cuban merchant marine

Nicaragua, Castro advised the Sandinistas to hide could transport personnel to any country in the

their adherence to Marxism-Leninism. This is the Caribbean area as well. This ability, sharpened by exsame pattern that Castro had followed in Cuba. To tensive training exercises in recent years, is an

obtain and hold the support of moderates in Cuba ominous threat to Cuba's small island neighbors.

and abroad, Castro portrayed himself as a democrat

while the struggle against Batista was underway. The capability of Cuban MiG-23s to support

After his own dictatorship was firmly established, operations throughout the Caribbean cannot be overCastro changed his tune. In a 2 December 1%1 looked. These planes have the range to attack targets

speech, he told the Cuban people that he had been an in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico, including key

apprentice Marxist-Leninist" for years, that he had oil fields and refineries. Its operations in Africa,

disguised his true political beliefs, and that he would especially those in Angola and Ethiopia, have shown

remain a Marxist-Leninist until he died.' In a May that Cuba can project its military power over great

1977 interview with Barbara Walters of ABC televi- distances.

sion, Castro said that he had made the decision to

become a communist while he was a student in law

school in the late 1940s. 7

The Soviet-made MIG-21 shown here, along with the

even more advanced MIG-2, give Cuba the most

powerful air force in the Caribbean region.

r.'. '"-6

• .. . . - . - .A- . . ," . . _ * - , o * . - • . . - . , . , . . .. . . . ' ' - ' . . . .. ' . .. . * .. .. . . ' . ' . . . . " , ° ' . . ; .

1-,,;
Practically Every Member of Society Is Required To Undergo Military Training in Castro's Cuba.

- -

Cuban children training with Soviet-supplied AK-47

assault rifles.

o.,4.

Members of the Cuban Women's Antiaircraft Ar- The caption for this photograph, taken from the

tillery Regiment demonstrate their skills. Cuban magazine Verde Olivo, reads, "The activities

of SEPMI ensure that the new generation learns,

among other things, to shoot, and shoot well!!" SEPMI is the patriotic military education society that

promotes military activities among Cuban chilt2ren.

San Julian Airfield, Cuba

eS

44 , 4 A J

- .,...g

MiG-21

7 - .

.A \'\

•, d .'Z' "* 4"'"-
-4~

One of the three FOXTROT-Class submarines supplied to Cuba by the Soviet Union.

4"-

Cuban troops carry out amphibious landings in Cuban commandos deploying from a Soviet-built

training exercise. Cuban air force AN-26 transport plane during trainOne more submarine, one more plane, one more ing exercises.

ship at a time may not seem important. However, by

gradually increasing every aspect of its military rived there, Castro still has a force of 30,000 soldiers

*power, Cuba has made itself a potential military in Angola. Since 1975, Castro has sent military forces

* threat to its Caribbean and Central American and/or advisers to Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, *neighbors. South Yemen, Congo, Ghana, Mali, Guinea-Bissau.

as well as Grenada and Nicaragua. Although the

propaganda focus is on such ideals as "socialist A Strong Supporter of solidarity," Castro is known to charge many of these

Communist Expansion countries for Cuban troops, "construction workers,"

and other "internationalists," draining scarce foreign

There are now about five times as many Cuban exchange from local economies. According to

*soldiers in Africa alone as there were in the Cuban reliable sources, recipient governments must pay

armed forces that Castro defeated in coming to Cuba a fixed sum per month for each Cuban soldier

power in 1959. Ten years after Cuban troops first ar- and each civilian technician. Thus, Castro is

. ..- .. . . . .
W. W

SOVIET MILITARY DELIVERIES TO CUBA

THOUSANDS OF METRIC TONS

56.0*

55.0

70 71 72 7374 75 7677 78 798081 8283 8485 8687 8889 9091 92

YEAR*Estimate D-ata still being compiled.

The tonnage of Soviet military deliveries to Cuba in each of the last tour years has been greater than

in any year since the 1962 missile crisis.

.........................................
.7

p.

simultaneously playing the world revolutionary role extent of Castro's efforts to train and supply urhe has always desired, supporting Soviet foreign ban and rural terrorists. 9

policy goals, and acquiring hard currency. Cuban and Soviet efforts to gain influence are

not limited to the military realm. One of their goals is . Cuba needs the money it gains from foreign yentures. The state-controlled economy of Cuba has who are poical ats ofori stdns are provided scholarships. Since the mid- 1970s, shown little growth in the 26 years Castro has been in more than 20,000 students- pre-school through

power. ht has become heavily dependent on the university-have studied at Cuba's Isle of Youth

Soviet Union. As Hugh Thomas, the noted British educational complex. Students have come from

historian of Cuba, has written: several countries, principally Ethiopia, Angola,

The Revolution has preserved, even Mozambique, Namibia, and Nicaragua. In addition

heightened, the extent to which the country to this Cuban effort, the Soviets and their Eastern .'-

depends on one crop [sugar]. For that European allies are providing thousands of

reason, if no other, Cuba's foreign policy is government-sponsored scholarships specifically to

as dependent on the Russians as it used to Latin American and Caribbean students.. i~be on the U.S. Most of the Russo-Cuba -O

bercthe U.onernst ofgr th Russ a The Soviet Union and Cuba have worked effeccommerceconcerns sugar whtively toward the objective of establishing additional

buys at a price formally about three-times Marxist-Leninist regimes in Central America and the

higher than present world market prices.' Caribbean. Although Castro has become more

Castro's assistance is indispensable for guerrilla calculating in his export of violence and exploitation r

movements in Latin America. Since the early 1960s, of poverty, his aims remain as they were in the 1960s.

Cuba has attracted guerrillas from virtually every He publicly proclaimed in the 1976 constitution

country in the region. Castro has given logistical and Cuba's right and duty to support revolutionary and

financial support to thousands of these guerrillas as national liberation movements. For its part, the

S-well as providing them military training, usually in Soviet Union has intensified its efforts to create

courses lasting three to six months. The alumni of chaos or conflict near the United States to divert U.S.

Castro's guerrilla training range from most of attention and resources from Soviet challenges in

Nicaragua's current Sandinista leadership to the other critical areas of the world. . -

demolition experts sabotaging the economy of El

Salvador. A 1981 State Department analysis of

Cuba's support for violence in Latin America showed

U.S. AND SOVIET BLOC GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED EXCHANGES,

LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN,

BY NUMBER OF STUDENTS AND YEAR

10000

*SOVIET BLOC

NUMBER 8000

OF

STUDENTS

6000

4000

**UNITED STATES

2000

0

1972 1977 1982

- EXCLUDES CUBA

** THIS GRAPH DOES NOT INCLUDE THE LARGE NUMBER OF NON-GOVERNMENT

SPONSORED STUDENTS STUDYING IN THE UNITED STATES

" 10
7 e,

, I _ It _m P _ . ... *, fie,

md6

GRENADA: A FAILED REVOLUTION

Grenada turned toward the Cubans and the Soviet ,"m, .

bloc in 1979 when Maurice Bishop led a coup to

depose the unpopular prime minister, Eric Gairy. -. ..,"

Contrary to Bishop's promise that his revolution

would modernize the economy, improve living standards, and promote democracy, life in Grenada N-" -M

deteriorated steadily during his four-year regime, M'-UTI1979-1983. Bishop secretly planned to impose a

single-party dictatorship while promising a pluralistic

democracy. The Soviets and Cubans were party to

*. the entire deception."

A basic objective of Bishop was to consolidate

power in his New Jewel Movement. The NJM was

organized along classic Marxist-Leninist lines, with

power concentrated in a single leader and exercised

through a small central committee and political

-'" bureau. Bishop called his regime the People's Revolu- r

"" tionary Government and established close ties with the

Soviet Union and Cuba and, to a lesser extent, Libya,

North Korea, and Vietnam.

*: Grenada Followed Cuba's Model

Following Castro's strategy, the NJM first established a broad coalition. It was led by the radical left, ".

but it also included non-communist elements. "This This poster, distributed by the New Jewel Movement

was done," Bishop explained in his 13 September 1982 (NJM), exemplified Grenada's close ties with Cuba

"Line of March" speech, "so imperialism won't get and Nicaragua. Left to right, Daniel Ortega,

too excited."' Later, he removed the moderates from Maurice Bishop, Fidel Castro.

government, as Castro had done 20 years before in

Cuba. Elections were never held. Opposition was dealt

with firmly, often through imprisonment. The media

was controlled. Church leaders were denied access to dians and foreigners was routinely violated.

radio since they were seen as a principal impediment Telephones were tapped and mail intercepted as were

to the goals of the NJM. personal records and private bank accounts. The

People's Revolutionary Army was given police funcAs in Cuba, Bishop adopted the control and tions, conducting searches and detaining suspects

'4surveillance measures normally found in totalitarian without warrants. Human rights violations included

regimes. The Ministry of the Interior kept Western torture, beatings, imprisonment, and psychological

diplomats, businessmen, and local opposition groups intimidation. Opposition political parties were forced

under surveillance. The right to privacy of Grena- to disband or go underground. Some opposition

. ..-

*. --- - -,- .. 4 . U .** .**,d*UJ* *

... : . ... . ; =.= ._',:, -,',", -".'-"- " "",. :" ,", . .-.-. :- .U. .. ' -" ,*
.9

.VO "

" 0

NJM photo of political indoctrination of young Grenadians.

NJM political meeting. In background are portraits of (left to right) Maurice Bishop, Daniel Ortega, and

Castro. (NJM photo) .Fide

leaders left. Independent churches were seen as a special target. In many respects, Bishop was

threat. The so-called "People's Laws" gave Bishop repeating the steps taken by Castro in consolidating

and his top lieutenants nearly unlimited power. An power in the early 1960s.

* important step in assuring Bishop and the NJM total

control was a propaganda and indoctrination campaign. Children and adults were required to attend

political orientation classes. Ideological training was

given to virtually all Grenadians, with the army a

* 12

imotatstpi asrigBshpan heNMtoa "'.

.. . . Children .. .. and conro 

. adults ana .. ws we.e.required ndin popa . octintin ... am - ". - *o.attend....
The Soviet-Grenadian Connection of Grenada. The Point Salines airport project was a

key issue for Maurice Bishop in his 15 April 1983 meetCubans and Soviets were key actors in Bishop's ing with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.

Grenada, but the extent of Soviet-Grenadian rela- Bishop's "Outline of Presentation" for this meeting _

tions after the 1979 coup was not made known until emphasized the economic benefits of the project, but

after the Bishop visit to Moscow in July 1982, and also included the revealing phrase, "There is also the

even then key details were kept from the public, strategic factor which is well known!! '

"'"

Among the 35,000 pounds of documents collected in Once completed, Point Salines could have pro- : -

October 1983 were five secret military agreements vided a stopover point for Cuban flights to Africa,

signed by Grenada-three with the Soviet Union, one an additional facility for Soviet long-range recon- with Cuba, and one with North Korea. naissance aircraft, and possibly a transshipment

The Soviet Union used Cuba to funnel military, point for arms and supplies for Latin American ineconomic, and technical assistance to Grenada. This surgents and for the Sandinistas. Had the Point

included Soviet and Cuban material and equipment to Salines airport been operational in April 1983, for exbuild the Point Salines airport. This airport, ostensi- ample, the Libyan aircraft detained in Brazil, while

bly for civilian use, was built primarily by armed clandestinely ferrying a cargo of military supplies to

Cubans, despite the high unemployment on the island Nicaragua, could have refueled in Grenada instead of

in Brazil.

C orA i A E HA E

mexqy rlpaBHTeAbcTBom rpenajiw m npa9RTeJbcT8ou"

Com3a COseTCXKcX CO L4aJIHCTH4ecKx Pecnyoc o. IIOCTaBxax m3 Comaa CCP B rpeHaJU cneuWmAbHoro., m Apyroro xmyueCraa

4°

CLletl + t M C~eN t'.' 1. L!of t JI AIr N 0 AJ 4 q 

- CosepItam~o CexPeTuc

ITP 0 TO K 0 nx CornpawueHRnO memny flpasmtenbcTs3OM rpeman.

m npaNTenbCTaoM CCCP OT 27 oxTxpx

1980 rora o nocTa3Xax H3 CCCP 8 'peHany

Cne.,anbHOrO x rpyroro Hm4eCTSa,

fPASHenhc7,o rPeHa=J H nPa3HenmcTao Cojo3a C0oeCXx COU4,-

FINC7X'M0CXNX PecnyOJTAx

* =CTCCCL

C7 T': T.LIT.AY COLLABCFATiC:: BET'.'ZEN T.- GGV!L'.--NT OF TREF'-LIC OF CUFA AiD T '

= FEOFLE' S REVOLUTICNAaY GOVER. TfT0 GP. NADA

The Coverntent of the Reputlic of Cuba and People's Revolutio

nary Government of Grenada, in full exercise of their sovereign

ri ght as free end independent State, based on the fraternal

Pages from Soviet, North Korean, and Cuban secret military agreements with Grenada.

13

.... . --. "'-. 

..... . . . . .. . *. .. * **.. *... . .*.* . .. .. . .* * .* . . . . . . . . 'o
V7.~ W. o or 

P

Military Assistance

The Soviets and Cubans were quick to exploit the

potential of Grenada. Only a month after Bishop

seized power, the first large shipment of Eastern-bloc

manufactured arms arrived from Havana. This included 3,400 rifles, 200 machine guns, 100 heavier

weapons, and ammunition. 14-

Cuban military advisers were assigned by Fidel

Castro to organize and train the Grenadian military

Point Salines airfield under construction in and internal security forces. Hundreds of young

Grenada. Cuban workers in foreground. (NJM Grenadians were sent to Cuba for military training.

photol

POINT SALINES AIRFIELD, GRENADA

A0

The Point Salines airfield was scheduled to be inaugurated on 13 March 1984. Its runway length would

* have enabled it to serve as a stopover point for Cuban and Soviet aircraft.

41

14_

....... . . "
Some of the Soviet-supplied PK 7.62MM general purpose mnacblue guns found in Grenadian warehouses.

4W.

*Grenadian troops riding Soviet-built BTR-60 ar- NJM photo of Grenadian soldiers marching. The

* mored personnel carriers. (NJM photo) NJM had militarized Grenadian society in the clas-.

sic pattern of a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship.

The Grenadian Army Chief of Staff and both of Ocoe193tiyGnaahdmrmnudr

Grenada's Deputy Secretaries of Defense went to the . -.

USSR for raining.arms and more weapons and military supplies than .~.

all of its Eastern Caribbean neighbors comThe covert nature of much of this assistance was bined -with plans to give Grenada one of the largest

exemplified by boxes of ammunition labeled "Cuban military forces in proportion to population of any

%P

Ecnmi ffc""hppdtoGend y ua.B"cutr n h wrd

5. . 5.5.-. . . . - . -. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. .. . . . ... . . . .. . .. . . . . .. . .. . . . ..
In addition to signing a secret military agreement with Grenada, Cuba disguised the delivery of 7.62mm

ammunition in crates marked "Cuban Economic Office."

Support for Soviet/Cuban Policies e

Leads to Instability

Under Bishop and the NJM, Grenada fully supported Soviet/Cuban policies, including the Soviet

invasion and occupation of Afghanistan.

From the beginning, Bishop and his followers

were anxious to prove their usefulness to the Soviet

Union. In July 1983, the Grenadian Ambassador to

Moscow sent a message to his Foreign Minister

reviewing Grenadian-Soviet relations. He emphasized the continuing need to convince the Soviets that S

the Grenadian revolution was part of a

world wide process with its original roots in

the Great October Revolution [a reference

to the Russian Revolution of October

19171. For Grenada to assume a position of

By October 1983, tiny Grenada had more men under arms and more weapons than all of Its Eastern

Caribbean neighbors combined. Shown here is a

,* U.S. officer of the U.S.-Caribbean security forces

with a crate of Soviet AK-47 assault rifles discovered

on the island.

0 ..
increasingly greater importance, we have to of the NJM. All ports of entry and departure were

be seen as influencing at least regional closed and a 24-hour shoot-on-sight curfew was

- events. We have to establish ourselves as the declared.

authority of events in at least the English- The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States

speaking Caribbean, and be the sponsor of made a formal request to the United States for

revolutionary activity and progressive assistance. In addition, the sole remaining source of "- ~~developments in this region at least." "'' o demtnhrialtgovernmental legitimacy, the Governor-General of

To further Grenada's regional ambitions, the Grenada, Sir Paul Scoon, made an urgent and conBishop government adopted an active program of fidential appeal to the regional states to restore order

meeting with "progressive and revolutionary parties on the island. The United States, responding to these

in the region" twice a year to heat up Gromyko's requests and concerned over the safety of 1,000

"boiling cauldron." Belize and Suriname were seen American citizens on the island, participated in a

as particularly ripe for exploitation. Bishop apparently combined U.S.-Caribbean security force that landed

saw such meetings as a means to convince the Soviets on Grenada on 25 October 1983. Peace and public

of the pivotal role Grenada could play as the Soviets' order were restored.

Eastern Caribbean agent. The meetings had cost the The reaction of the Grenadian people to the

Grenadians S50,000 by April 1983, and they requested U.S.-Caribbean security force was overwhelmingly - addtional Soviet financial assistance." ' ' adoloefaclssn.supportive. A CBS News poll of 3 November 1983

Ultimately, of course, it was the Grenadian found that 91% of the Grenadian people expressed

* government that disintegrated when a power struggle strong approval for the actions taken by the United

erupted within the NJM during the fall of 1983. The States. On 3 December 1984, the people of Grenada

. assassination of Bishop, three of his closest deputies, formally closed the books on the failed Marxist-

- and the killing of scores of innocent persons by troops Leninist revolution by successfully holding the

of the People's Revolutionary Army led to the collapse island's first election in eight years.

Townspeople of Grenville, Grenada, welcome the arrival of the U.S.-Carlbbean security forces. In spite

of four years of Marxist-Leninist indoctrination by the Bishop regime, the people of Grenada welcomed the U.S-Caribbean troops as liberators. A CBS news poll In Grenada found 91% approval of the rescue

operation.

17

%' ?iii
.

...

S

A

.4~.

~ ~0

'p

4 0

.... &.

S0

...*

* 

.... * .. * . . . . . .
I

0:

NICARAGUA:

A BETRAYED REVOLUTION

In July 1979, a broad and popular coalition led By words and deeds, the Sandinista leaders have

*militarily by the Sandinista National Liberation demonstrated that they are, in fact, dedicated

Front (FSLN) overthrew the government of General Marxist-Leninists. On 25 August 1981, Comandante

Anastasio Somoza and ended a family dynasty that Humberto Ortega, the Minister of Defense, told his

Nhad ruled Nicaragua for more than four decades. The subordinates that "Marxism-Leninism is the scientific OP

: I

new government owed much of its success to interna- doctrine that guides our revolution.... We cannot

tional support for the anti-Somnoza forces. The be Marxist-Leninist without Sandinismo, and

Organization of American States had even adopted a without Marxism-Leninism, Sandinismo cannot be

resolution calling for the "definitive replacement" of revolutionary. . .. Our doctrine is MarxismSomoza and free elections as soon as possible. " In Leninism."' 9

gaining this support, the Sandinistas had pledged to

have free elections, political pluralism, a mixed Tomas Borge, the powerful Minister of the Ineconomy, and a non-aligned foreign policy. The first tnrwoersosblte nld nenlscrt

*junta formed after Somoza fled appeared to confirm and censorship, stated in a September 1983 interview

the Ncaraua elif tht as o th roa to that he was a communist. 20 According to an article

dh lemocracy.aagaws nteodt on 24 December 1984, he reconfirmed his views in democacy.Cuba: "You cannot be a true revolutionary in Latin

* Since those hopeful early days, Nicaragua has America without being Marxist-Leninist .""' Borge

* moved not toward democracy, but toward a new dic- controls the feared turbas divinas, or "divine-mobs,"

tatorship tied ever more closely to Cuba and the composed of Sandinista militants used by the governSoviet Union. ment to raid Catholic churches, break up political

The Sandinistas' betrayal of the ideals of the ralies, and otherwise harass opponents of the

revolution and the establishment of a closely con- regime. The furbas were used in the government's efforts to intimidate potential voters for opposition * ~trolled society have driven many of their key allies prsdnilcddaeAtoCuzbfeth

and thousands of their former rank-and-file supportrs th coutry ut o Forer untamemers November 1984 elections. This contributed to Mr..--

Arturo Cruz and Alfonso Robelo, and even the Cr'sdcionttounfrpedn.

legendary "Comandante Cero" (Eden Pastora, who Revealing statements of the Sandinista political

served as Deputy Defense Minister), left Nicaragua philosophy were made in May 1984 by Comandante

to take up the fight against their former colleagues. Bayardo Arce, who had been assigned to run the SanIn a 1984 interview, Pastora explained his reasons for dinista election campaign. Speaking in what he

leaving the Nicaraguan government. Speaking of the thought was a private and off-the-record meeting

Sandinista leaders he said: "They isolated themselves with one of the Marxist-Leninist parties "competing"

from what Sandinismo is supposed to be about. with the Sandinistas, Arce stated that the upcoming

Violations of human rights, Cuban troops in elections were a "nuisance" and should be used "to

Nicaragua, the alignment toward the Soviet bloc, the demonstrate that ... the Nicaraguan people are for

moral deviations, it's a long list."" ~ Marxism-Leninism." He further stated that "if we did -

not have the war situation imposed upon us by the I'

Portrait of Marx and Lenin held high at a Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) rally marking

the first anniversary of the revolution against Somoza, 19 July 1940.

19

- . ..-. -
.. 7

Arturo Cruz after government-controlled divine mobs (turbas divinas) attacked his vehicle In September

1984. Mr. Cruz is now a leader of the democratic opposition to the Sandinista government. He was a member of the ruling Sandinista junta and Nicaraguan ambassador to the United States. He resigned to protest the increasingly totalitarian control of the Sandinista party over Nicaraguan society.

United States, the electoral problem would be totally 1979, the Sandinistas have consolidated control over

out of place in terms of its usefulness." He concluded the government and the armed forces. They have

his lengthy remarks by stating that the election process placed under direct state control nearly half of

*could have "positive benefits: the unity of the Nicaragua's industry and 4007 of its agriculture. By

Marxist- Leninists of Nicaragua.""2 This speech was the selective application of monetary and labor laws,

*not reported in the Nicaraguan press. they exert pressure against the remainder of the indusIn the view of many former supporters of the trial and agricultural sectors. The Sandinistas control

Sandnisas, anaga he rgimehasdemenedthe all media outlets through censorship. La Prensa the onyisas majo oppositio newsaper iss censored every

name of their patron, Cesar Augusto Sandino. This onymjrpostnneparicnoedvrfervent nationalist of the 1920s and 1930s was opposed dyadiswiesadeioshrse.Nihoho

* ~~~to all forms of foreign intervention, by international wthcmiteifratntokrtoigo

many basic necessities, and enforced participation in communism as well as the United States. The Salvado- Sniit raiain r l sdt oto n

ran guerrilla leader Augustin Farabundo Marti, com- Sniit raiain r l sdt oto n

menting on Sandino, said: "(Sandino) did not wish intimidate the people.

to embrace the Communist program which I supported. His banner was only for independence, a banner The Sandinistas' economic mismanagement,

of emancipation, and he did not pursue the ends of human rights violations, and abuse of governmental

social rebellion."-" authority have driven more than 120,000 Nicaraguans

into exile (somec estimates range far higher). An even

Today in Nicaragua, the banner of Sandinismo greater reflection of popular discontent has been the

is giving way to the reality of communism. Since number of Nicaraguan citizens who have taken up

20

. , . . '

. .*. *. *. . . . . . - .

.. ...........
Daniel Ortega. with raised fist. Is sworn In as President of Nicaragua as Fidel Castro looks on--IS January

1985. Castro was the only foreign head of state to attend the inauguration of Ortega.

arms against the Sandinistas. The armed opposition, In discussing the security situation, the document

which began in 1982, has now grown to a strength of stated that "at present there is no clear indication that

some 15,000, most of whom were sympathetic to the an armed counter-revolution by Somocista forces

ideals of the 1979 revolution, It is interesting to corn- beyond our borders is going to take place and jeoparpare this strength with that of the Sandinistas in their dize our stability."2 6 Nevertheless, they began to

long struggle against Somoza. As of late 1978, the San- build a large and well-equipped military. In February

dinista guerrillas numbered fewer than 1,000.24 By the 1981, the Sandinistas announced that they would

July 1979 victory, they had no more than 5,000 in their build a 200,000-man militia to "defend the revoluranks."5 tion" against "counter-revolutionaries." But, as the

20 February 1981 New York Times article reporting

this announcement pointed out, there was "surprisThe Sandinista Military Machine: ingly little counter-revolutionary activity" faced by

Cental eria's A argst Amedthe Sandinista government at that time. 27

Forces

rO

* The comandantes realized from the outset that they

would need a large, politicized military to pursue

their revolutionary objectives and maintain

themselves in power once the bloom of the revolution

had worn off and their true political orientation was

exposed. In their five years in power, the Sandinistas

have followed Cuba's example in developing a

massive military establishment. Nicaragua today has

the largest, most powerful armed forces in the history

of Central America. A unit of the Sandinista army passes in review, Sep- tember 1964. The militarization of Nicaraguan soOn 5 October 1979 the Sandinistas distributed to ciety has led to the building of armed forces nearly

their followers the results of a three-day meeting held half the size of those of Mexico, a country with more

the previous month for the Sandinista political cadre. than 25 times the population of Nicaragua.

21
0

The lightly armed Sandinista guerrilla force of small arms fire. It has a heavy machine gun, can fire

about 5,000 in 1979 has now grown to a 62,000-man anti-tank missiles, and can drop bombs. The HIND

active duty force, with an additional 57,000 in the D adds a new dimension to warfare in Central Amerireserves and the militia. In late 1983, the Sandinistas ca since areas of Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa 0

instituted the first draft in Nicaragua's history. This Rica would be within range of these flying "tanks"

action has caused strong popular resentment, with as they are described in Jane's All the World's Airthousands of young Nicaraguans fleeing their craft."

homeland to avoid the draft. In rural areas of The first Soviet-made armor arrived in

Nicaragua, there has been open, active resistance by Nicaragua in 1981, shortly after the 200,000-man

the people against conscription." militia build-up was announced, but still about a year

In their struggle against Somoza, the FSLN before significant anti-Sandinista armed opposition

guerrillas had no tanks or other armored vehicles, no had developed. The mainstay of this armored force is

artillery, no helicopters. After their victory in July some 110 Soviet-made T-55 medium tanks. The T-55

1979, they inherited from the Somoza National was the main battle tank of the Soviet army for years.

Guard three tanks, 25 armored cars, seven Although now of limited value on a European bathelicopters, and three artillery pieces. They now have tlefield against modern anti-tank weapons, it is a

at least 340 tanks and armored vehicles, more than 70 powerful weapon in Central America. None of

long-range howitzers and rocket launchers, and 30 Nicaragua's neighbors have tanks with the T-55's firehelicopters, including a half dozen of the world's power. Moreover, the Sandinistas have received in the

fastest, best armed attack helicopter, the Mi-24/HIND past year nearly 30 PT-76 light tanks. With their riverD. This is the principal attack helicopter of the Soviet crossing capability, these amphibious tanks provide

army and holds the world helicopter speed record. Its more flexibility than the T-55s. An added potential

heavy underside armor makes it less vulnerable to capability of tanks is to inhibit popular dissent.

Sandino Airport, Nicaragua

HIND Helicopter

MI-24IHIND D attack helicopter.

HIND Helicopter

, .' HIP Helicopler

eliopr Crate M

Sandino International Airport, from which both civil and military aircraft operate, Is located just outside

of Managua. Shown here are four Soviet-made MI-4HIND D and one MI--HIP helicopters. AS
;r 0_

1.10

Corinto, located on the Pacific coast, has been a principal port through which Soviet-bloc military equipment has been delivered to Nicaragua. Soviet-bloc countries use merchant ships for both military and

commerical deliveries.

The Soviets have considered the Central routing could prove difficult for the Sandinista tanks

American terrain in tailoring the Sandinista armed if the Honduran Air Force retains the air superiority

forces. They have provided about 40 flatbed trucks, it currently enjoys. But, if this Honduran deterrent

* which are designed to carry the T-55 tank. The San- capability is sufficiently neutralized by a strength-. -

dinistas have also been provided with six large fer- ened Sandinista air force and an effective air defense

ries, which will enable the tanks to be shuttled across system, then the disadvantage of a restricted route inrivers to fighting zones, a significant capability given to Honduras would be appreciably reduced.

the fact that long stretches of the borders with Hon-ThreienNcaguposbthaelada

dura Rca an Cosa re rver. Te PT76s of psychological threat to the countries of Central

course, can cross rivers and be used to secure a beach- America. This fact is readily perceived by the citizens

head ~~~ whletehicleeshutedaros ~ ~ iitr 

hed while then delisred shutled cros. oof Nicaragua's neighboring countries as was revealed

The Sandininistas have also been provided with in a public opinion poll conducted by Gallup Internamore than 1,000 field kitchens, a number of mobile tional in 1983. This poll showed that Nicaragua's

maintenance workshops, and about 75 gasoline growing military strength and support for subversive .

tankers, all requirements for an offensive-minded movements in other countries was a source of conarmy. On balance, however, logistics support con- cern throughout the region. In Honduras, for examtinues to be a problem for the Sandinistas, but one they pne, about 80% of the respondents saw Nicaragua as

are working to correct, the principal cause of instability and as the primary

Honduras shares a 570-mile border with military threat faced by their country. 

*Nicaragua. Should the Sandinistas decide to launch Panama played a key role in providing military

offensive operations against Honduras, the most ob- support to the Sandinistas in 1978 and 1979. After

vious avenue of approach would be through the area the Sandinistas came to power, however, they reeknown as the Choluteca Gap, in the northwest jected Panama's advice and offers of assistance.

coastal plain of the Honduran/Nicaraguan border. Recently, General Manuel Noriega. Commander of

The Sandinistas have conducted training with tanks, Panama's Defense Force, told the editors of Costa

armored personnel carriers, and long-range artillery Rica's principal nespaper. La Nacion. that the Sanin areas close to the Choluteca Gap. This narro% dinista arms escalation posed a danger to the entire

23

areworingto orrctthepricipl cuseof nstbilty nd s te pimay S

--------------------------- mil bodrwih mltaytratfcd yter onr.. "'

Nicraua•Shul th SndnisasdeidetolanchPaam S* . o plyd eyrlei roiin-iltry•.
0

SOVIET-BLOC MILITARy

To increase its mobflity, the Sandinista army has

been provided almost 30 PT-76 light amphibious S

tanks by the Soviet bloc.

T.55 tank at Eduardo Contreras Military Training

Center, Nicaragua. This is one of approximately 110

Soviet-made T-35 tanks in the Sandinista armor inventory. In contrast, the Somoza National Guard .

had three U.S.-made tanks.

The Sandinistas have acquired Soviet-bloc river

crossing equipment. The heavy amphibious ferry, -shown here, can carry the T-55 tank.

region. In the article reporting Noriega's view, La Cubans in Nicaragua

Nacion's editors, reflecting widespread preoccupation in that most democratic of Latin American Fidel Castro clandestinely provided weapons and

countries about the militarization of Nicaragua, other aid to the Sandinistas during their struggle

wrote that "Sandinista militarism has to be halted against Somoza. The first military advisers to the

before it produces a holocaust in the entire Carib- new government were Cuban, arriving on 19 July

bean region." 3

' 1979, the day the Sandinistas took over.

The Honduran army is striving to modernize This was the beginning of the Sandinista military

and professionalize, but it lags behind the rapid ex- alliance with the Soviet bloc. Between 30 to 40 Soviets

pansion of the Sandinista army. Costa Rica has no and over 60 East Germans have followed the Cubans

army. The Salvadoran armed forces are fully oc- as advisers to the Sandinsta military. Members of the

cupied with combating Sandinista-supported in- armed forces of Libya and members of the Palestine

surgents. Clearly, Nicaragua's military power Liberation Organization (PLO), which has collaborat- threatens-and is not threatened by-its neighbors. ed with the Sandinistas since at least 1970, are also playing a minor role in the development of the Sandinista armed forces.

24

.................. . ... .... .... .... .... .... ....

. .. . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p . 71 ....7 a.. .. 

j&QUIPMENT PROVIDED TO NICARAGUA.

While logistics remain a problem for the SandinisThis BTR-60 armored personnel carrier is among the ta armed forces, the acquisition of 75 fuel tankers

some 340 armored vehicles and tanks in the San- Wl etreal hmt uti prtos

dinista arsenal.

The 152mm howiter can hit targets 17 kilometers

away. The Sandinistas have more than 70 longrange artillery piece and multiple rocket launchers. Somoza's National Guard had three artillery

pieces.

SOVIET-BLOC MILITARY DELIVERIES TO NICARAGUA

_____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 1___000

118,00

18000 1,0

15000_ _____4__ 000

METRIC

TONS 12000

9000

6000

3000

850 900

0

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984

25
IMAGE OF NICARAGUA

PERCENT IN EACH COUNTRY DESCRIBING NICARAGUA IN THESE TERMS

100

90

PERCENT -

S O PUIC s

70

* AVAO L I ILTRYOSTELIE ITRFRSsooMC

THRATOU GVENMET N . MEIC

~ s 4UTEAL

Thi ~ Gallu 40 ulcoiinpl a odcedI 4n0ntoa ao ra ra ftefu onre

0

THOUSAND 40 OENET NC MRC

20 14,2062,030

30

1977 1984

*NICARAGUA UHONDURAS UGUATEMALA UEL SALVADOR

* 26

%9
, . -, , -'-, .,. \ .; - \ -, ..-.. •-. .- - - • ', , . , ', r . . . .•" ".. ., . . . . - . - ., -. . -. .. .. .. , - -T -.

Although there have been upwards of 9,000 40 new military facilities. In addition, Bulgaria, East

Cubans in Nicaragua, recent reports indicate that Germany, and Cuba are building critical infrastrucabout 1,500 teachers have returned to Cuba. Out of ture facilities which will have important military uses.

the approximate 7,500 Cubans now present in The 10,000-foot runway at the Punta Huete air- -

Nicaragua, some 3,000 are military or security person- field, when completed, will be the longest military

nel attached to the armed forces, internal security, and

runway in Central America. As the base took on the

intelligence organizations. vises pssibe hae mde These te raid military dvelpmen security ad- of unmistakable signs of a military air base, such as pro- ..... visers have made possible the rapid development of teiveahnmods(reemns)frigeriNicaragua's military and security machine. The other tective earthen mounds (or revetments) for fighter airCubans are involved in construction, teaching, medi- craft, the Sandinista Air Force Commander admitted

" cine, and similar programs. The bulk of these civilians that it would be a military air base." ..

are younger men who have received some military When Punta Huete becomes operational, it will

training. be able to accommodate any aircraft in the SovietThe disproportionate presence of Cuban military bloc inventory. The potential threat to Nicaragua's

and security personnel is resented by many neighbors would then increase dramatically. The reNicaraguans and is often cited by refugees fleeing cent acquisition of Mi-24/HIND D attack helicopters,

Nicaragua as a factor contributing to their decision to along with the existing inventory of Mi-8 troop-

* leave their homeland. carrying helicopters, provides the Sandinistas with a

powerful helicopter force. The Sandinista regime has

declared repeatedly its intention to acquire combat airNicaragua- Growing Soviet craft, and Punta Huete would be a logical base from

Investment which such aircraft could operate. Nicaraguan jet pilots and mechanics have been trained in Eastern

" Several huge construction projects backed by the Europe and are reportedly now flying in Cuba. SanSoviet bloc represent the investment of hundreds of dinista acquisition of such jet aircraft would further

millions of dollars, including $70 million for nearly destabilize the regional military balance; the United

AIRCRAFT REVETMENTS"'"

r'AIGFOR FUEL 'NIARC

AST REA

FANTTAIRCRAFT SITE

When Punta Huete Is completed, it will be able to accommodate any aircraft in the Soviet-bloc inventory,

to Include the long-range BEAR-D reconnaissance aircraft.

°.%. -..

27

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. 't-'.....-X ._......................€"........... 'I6I''kl111~l"I ...... 1 " "..... .. .. .. ...
7. .7 .,.. 

The fall 1984 delivery by the Soviets of their top-of-the-line attack helicopter, the Mi-24IHIND D, has considerably strengthened the striking capability of the Sandinista air force. This flying "tank" has devastating

firepower and Is being used by the Soviets in Afghanistan against civilian and military targets.

States has consistently made clear in diplomatic chan- flying out of Cuba.

waony its cocenabusc /el 

nelsitsconernabou suh wapory.The decisions of the Soviet Union and Cuba to

The Soviets could decide in the future that it is to make this investment in Nicaragua indicate that

* their advantage to fly long-range reconnaissance air- Soviet leaders consider Nicaragua an important corncraft from Punta Huete along the West Coast of the plement to Cuba in the Soviet strategy to increase

United States, just as they currently operate such pressure on the United States in the Caribbean Basin.

* flights along the East Coast of the United States by

0

The first of the Soviet-made armed MI- troop-carrying helicopters arrived in Nicaragua in 1981, well

before the Sandinistas faced significant armed opposition.

28

S. *.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....- * *--."..*---.-
NICARAGUAN PRESIDENT DANIEL ORTEGA, PICTURED BELOW ON JUNE 1984 VISIT TO THE SOVIET

UNION, BULGARIA, EAST GERMANY, AND POLAND.

Daniel Ortega with Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko and Foreign Minister

Andrei Gromyko in Moscow. Ortega's first trip to Moscow took place in April 1980, only nine months after

the Sandinistas came to power, and at a time when the United States was providing Nicaragua with extensive economic aid. One month earlier, a number of agreements were reached between the USSR and

Nicaragua, cementing the close relationship that continues today.

Daniel Ortega with East German Communist Party

General Secretary and Chief of State, Erich Daniel Ortega pictured with Woiciech Jaruzelski,

Honecker. East Germany has provided military First Secretary of the Polish United Workers Party

equipment, as well as internal security and military and Chairman of the Counsel of National Defense.

advisers to the Sandinista regime.

Daniel Ortega with Bulgarian Communist Party

I General Secretary and Chief of State. Todor Zhlvkov ion far right). Bulgaria has trained Nicaraguan

U jlet pilots and mechanics, and has also provided the

4". Sandinistas with large quantities of military

equipment.

29

.. . . . . . . .. . . . . ...

- "J "' "u "' """ ' "l, " .................... ""'- "' alln. ..... ... . . .. . . """""
300
7I T- TV

EL SALVADOR:

A DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION

*For more than five years, El Salvador has been a ble to vote did so. They repeated their strong support

target of Cuban and Nicaraguan violence, with the for democracy in the 1984 presidential elections.

support of the Soviet Union. With a population den- Again impartial international observers and joursity greater than India, a feudal land tenure system, nalists saw these elections as a true expression of the

*and a violent history, in 1979 El Salvador seemed a popular will, and a repudiation of the guerrillas.

logical place for communist exploitation. An in- Commenting on the electoral process, the official

digenous guerrilla force, which developed in the publication of the Archdiocese of San Salvador said:

* mid-1970s in reaction to government -sponsored poliica rceivng absesbegn xtesivesuportone can say with absolute certainty that

prolitica abues be oante recevin dxtnisias e up or three elections in a two-year period have

fromNicraga son fte theSaninitascam to consituted to a true plebiscite in which the

powe 979.people in uly have expressed their will, their faith

Having seen the Somoza regime in neighboring in democracy, their desire for peace, their

*Nicaragua resist social change and subsequently col- rejection of violence, and their intrinsic

lapse in the face of a popular uprising, reform- condemnation of the guerrillas.3

minded Salvadoran military officers overthrew the Among numerous economic reforms, the most

authoritarian government of General Carlos Romero

in October 1979. Romero was replaced by a civilian- sweighsbnarranefm.Atohex

military junta that tremists at both ends of the political spectrum pledged social and economic rsse hs hnemr hn2%o h ua

* reorm an deocraic lecion. Th sucesive population now either own their land outright or pargovernments of El Salvador have worked to follow ticipate as co-owners of agricultural cooperatives. through on these pledges and Eli Salvador has begun These people have a personal stake in seeing a10;

to build a democracy for the first time."IIA democratic system flourish in their country.

Since 1982, the people of El Salvador have

shown their support for the democratic process by El Salvador is, in fact, moving toward the goal

going to the polls three times in the face of threats of establishing a government that is accountable to

*and harassment by the guerrillas. In March 1982, its citizens. This is being carried out behind the shield

they selected a constituent assembly in an election of the much improved armed forces, whose initiative

considered fair and free by the many distinguished on the battlefield, combined with President Duarte's

observers and journalists from Western democracies popular mandate, moved the guerrillas to accept Presithat monitored the process. Jose Napoleon Duarte, a dent Duarte's call to participate in a dialogue with the

reform-minded Christian Democrat previously jailed government. It began on 15 October 1984, in the town

and sent into exile by the military, was elected presi- of La Palma. .-

dent in the spring of 1984.

*The guerrillas had initially attempted to en- The Guerrillas

courage the people of El Salvador to boycott the 1982

election. When it became apparent that this tactic Lacking broad popular support, the guerrillas con-

*would not succeed, they resorted to violence, burning tinue to be a potent military force because of the exbuses, and otherwise trying to intimidate the people tensive support they receive from Nicaragua, Cuba,

to prevent them from voting. The response of the other communist countries such as Vietnam, and

people was dramatic; more than 80% of those eligi- radical regimes such as Libya. The unification of the

31
[ " , . X ANIVEJMARIO

* n ,. rrr- . r r - . - " 

me ieee~ i

The Salvadoran guerrillas are open about their Marxist-Leninist leanings, as shown by the flag in this

* poster. The poster proclaims "Revolution or Death! The Armed People Will Triumph!"

*Salvadoran guerrillas was coordinated by Fidel tional Liberation Front (FMLN), in which five previ-

*Castro. Shortly after General Romero was over- ously separate guerrilla military factions banded

*thrown, Castro brought Salvadoran guerrilla leaders together. Along with the FMLN, the Democratic

to Havana, promising them increased support if they Revolutionary Front (FDR), a parallel political arm,

*would forget past rivalries and forge a united front. was established.

* This led to the creation of the Farabundo Marti Na-

* 32

* . *.

'7- 7:-:

7-5 i.
'O

try. They later openly acknowledged this decision in

an April 1983 guerrilla radio broadcast when they

declared: "Our forces will start sabotage against the

dictatorship's war economy during the next days."" This sabotage has included the destruction of bridges

and electrical towers, as well as the cash crops so vital

to the Salvadoran economy. The government's budget has been severely strained to repair the damage

caused by this systematic sabotage. The armed forces

have been stretched thin to defend vital facilities and

areas of agricultural productivity.

Through mid-1984, the war was a military

stalemate. But the Salvadoran army now has the iniThe Puente do Oro bridge, or Golden bridge, was tiative.This has been made possible by the expanded

destroyed by Nicaraguan-trained Salvadorn guerr- training and additional mobility permitted by inillas on 15 October 1081. Through such economic creased U.S. military assistance.

sabotage, the guerrillas hope to undermine the peopie's confidence In the government's ability to protect them.

The Logistics Network

The newly united guerrillas attempted a

Nicaraguan-style "final offensive" in January 1981. The guerrillas depend on an elaborate logistics

Their defeat by the Salvadoran army was made possi- pipeline to support their military operations. The mable by the Salvadoran people's refusal to respond to jority of the U.S.-made M-16 rifles captured from

the guerrillas' call to rise up against the government, the guerrillas by the Salvadoran military have been

After this defeat, the guerrillas shifted their tactics to traced, by individual serial numbers, to shipments

destroying the economic infrastructure of the coun- made by the United States to South Vietnam, and

GUERRILLA IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY OF EL SALVADOR

1980-1984

$1.OB

1000 $927.0M

900

800

MILLIONS 700 0

OF

DOLLARS 600

500

400

300

200 " -."

100 %".

0

GUERRILLA COST U.S. ASSISTANCE

TO THE ECONOMY TO THE ECONOMY

33 '"
Soviet-bloc countries have played a key role in

sending weapons to Cuba and Nicaragua, which in

turn have moved them into El Salvador through a

A complex land, sea, and air infiltration network.

The principal land route for supplying the guerrillas originates in Nicaragua and passes through

Honduras into El Salvador. A road and trail network

has been developed, with the actual flow of ammuniA& tion, supplies, and weapons varying to meet the tactical requirements of the guerrillas.

Seaborne delivery of arms and supplies is carried

out largely by ocean-going canoes powered by outboard engines. These canoes are difficult to detect on

radar because of their low profile and wooden construction. Leaving Nicaragua after sundown, the canoes make their drop at predetermined points along

the southeast coast of El Salvador and return to

Nicaragua by dawn.

Aerial deliveries are also employed by the guerrillas. Light planes fly at low altitudes across the Gulf

Salvadoran guerrilla holds of Fonseca Airvdropsearegalso]used from Nicaragua, landing at isolated "--

rocket launcher, airstrips and unloading their cargo of arms and am- munition. Air drops are also used. .'..

subsequently captured by communist forces after the Within El Salvador, pack animals, and vehicles

1975 fall of Saigon. But guerrilla propaganda efforts with compartments designed to conceal their conseek to create the impression that virtually all of their tents, are used to move supplies to more than 200

weapons are taken from government troops. In fact,

only a small portion have been captured from

Salvadoran forces. Alejandro Montenegro, a former

high ranking guerrilla leader, has stated that it was The Salvadoran guerrillas receive the bulk of their

guerrilla policy, directed from Managua, to mislead arms, ammunition, and supplies from Nicaragua.

international media on the true source of guerrilla Shown here are the principal land and sea routes . for this infiltration.

arms. 1

ARMS INFILTRATION

Guatemala

K: Honduras

El Salvador

4- OVERLAND INFILTRATION

-SEABORNE INFILTRATION POINT

TRADITIONAL GUERRILLA BASE

AREA

34

.

,'S...' -"b -' .;...-' '' .';.. ...'''.--..':- " '.... ..... *. . .. . ;./ 3 : . . "'"; 7 '"
7. 7. 7"...7./7

camps, which are linked by an elaborate series of cor- insurgent goal. However, this "dissent paper,"

ridors. Within these corridors, guerrillas select multi- originally accepted as genuine by the news media,

" pie routes and patrol them frequently to assure their was checked carefully and found to be a forgery."

security. Soviet front groups have accused the United

- Government forces are having some success States of conducting chemical and biological warfare

slowing the arms infiltration, but geography favors in Central America. Moscow's Radio Peace and

the insurgents: a 200-mile coastline, 6,000 miles of Progress, a well-known disinformation outlet, has

roads, 150 airstrips, and a mountainous, ill-defined broadcast such inflammatory allegations as:

northern border. The CIA kidnaps children of Salvadoran

refugees in Honduras .... Some are sent

to special schools for brainwashing. Others, Disinformation and Propaganda because they are inept for these activities,

are sent to CIA research centers. Here they

Another aspect of the FMLN's "total war" effort is are used as guinea pigs. 39

the utilization of classic Soviet disinformation, ,p

.- propaganda, and deception techniques. The guerr- U.S. military advisers participate in tortur- -

" illas' goal in applying such measures is to gain sym- ing Salvadoran rebels and prisoners....

pathy for their cause. At the same time they wish to Everything that is known, up to the present

Ssway international and United States public opinion time, indicates that the Yankee CIA, coragainst the Salvadoran government and U.S. poration of murderers, is implicated in the

economic and military assistance. The political death of Torrijos. 4 1 _.

leaders of the guerrilla movement realize the importance of the media in shaping political attitudes in the Broadcasting by the guerrillas follows this Soviet

United States. In February 1982, one of the FDR's disinformation pattern. One such example occurred " ~in November 1984 in Suchitoto, a small town 50 " political leaders, Hector Oqueli, told the New York i v 1 n to m w

Times: "We have to win the war in the United kilometers northeast of San Salvador. The guerrillas 3States."37 attacked the town in the early morning hours of 9 November. Their Radio Farabundo Marti anThe guerrillas back up their disinformation nounced that the Salvadoran air force had indiscrimioperations with constant propaganda, flowing from nately bombed the town to include "the church, the

their own radio stations (Radio Venceremos and hospital, the kindergarten and the central market in

Radio Farabundo Mart), friendly embassies, and Suchitoto."' 2 In reality, as reported by the

solidarity committees formed to provide propaganda Washington Post the following day, "The quaint,

outlets within the United States, Latin America, and whitewashed central Catholic church, the hospital ,

Europe.

The Soviet Union also contributes to the guerrilla cause through its extensive "active measures"

program. This is a term used by the Soviet KGB for

its program of overt and covert deception operations,

including use of forged documents, front groups,

agents of influence, and clandestine broadcasting.

One example that follows the pattern of Soviet active -

measures targeted on Central America is the forged

"State Department dissent paper," which surfaced in

1981. The paper purported to be the thoughts of

State Department, National Security Council, and

CIA staff officers who disagreed with U.S. policy.

Actual "dissent papers," in fact, are used within the

government to allow expression of views at variance

with current policy. The paper in question warned Salvadoran guerrillas surrender under the govern- 4a that further U.S. aid to El Salvador would soon ment's amnesty program In fall 1982. The guerrillresult in U.S. combat involvement. The paper also as enjoy far less support today than at any time In

supported U.S. recognition of the guerrillas, long an the last five years.

35

• - .' . -.
and the kindergarten, which rebel broadcasts had This, then, is the great question the guerrillas

said were bombed by the government, were found have to ask themselves. No matter how often

undamaged. Residents of the city denied that govern- they attempt to justify their actions of

ment forces had bombed the city during the fighting sabotage with arguments that they fight . today. ." 4 against the government, against oppression

and what they call the oligarchy, it is the peopie who ultimately pay the price. It is the peoThe Future of the Guerrillas ple who suffer when the guerrillas down the

towers that carry the cables of electric powThe future does not appear bright for the guerrillas. er; it is the people who suffer when the guerrThey now enjoy far less support from the Salvadoran illas dynamite telephone installations; it is the

people than at any time in the last five years. It has people who suffer when the guerrillas recruit

become increasingly obvious that they represent only youths by force.... Therefore, I ask myself,

a small segment of the population. in whose favor are they really fighting?" 

The 1981 guerrilla decision to resort to the tactic

of destroying the economy, as a means of undermining the confidence of the people in the legitimate

government, has failed. The guerrillas continue to

operate as a viable military force largely because of

the support they are receiving from Nicaragua,

Cuba, and ultimately the Soviet Union.

The Salvadoran Catholic Church has been in the

forefront in the battle for social and economic

change. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, church

leaders were critical of the government's unwill- 4

ingness or inability to implement required changes.

By 1984, however, Salvadoran church leaders noted

that the political and economic conditions for the

people had improved significantly. San Salvador

Auxiliary Bishop Rosa Chavez argued this way in a

July 1984 sermon:

The Cuscatlan bridge, a key link of the PanARural school food and nutrition program. Because

It was destroyed by the Salvadoran guerrillas on oftecssfthwaagittegurlate

-n Yar's ic y u .he leadesno the Salvado- government of El Salvador has been unable to inScrease health and education expenditures as it had

Mas for such economic destruction, stating, "It Is the pand

people who ultimately pay the price." p.

* 36

Ameicn hreina igwa, I2 i hoo. sow Rual cholfod ndnutitonprgrm. ecus -'-".
CASTRO: SUBVERSIVE CATALYST

Acting to fulfill his own revolutionary ambitions as Castro has also had to adapt to the changing

well as being an agent of Soviet influence, Fidel popular perception of his revolution. Where once

Castro is working closely with subversive elements Castro was a folk hero to most Latin Americans, tothroughout Central America and the Caribbean. day he is seen as having converted Cuba into a

Castro's goal in the 1980s remains much as it was bankrupt and oppressive state beholden to a foreign

when he assumed power: to oppose the United States power. 4 5

and create Marxist-Leninist regimes that mirror hisAlhuhCsr'imghadledwtCnrl

own Bu icttorhip th mens o ahiee tis oal Americans at large, he continues to be popular with

have become more sophisticated, in part because of vilnrdclgopthuhutheein.Ts

the lessons he learned from guerrilla failures in the suprLrvieIatowihpltclPn sco

* reiondurig te 190s.logical capital. The governments of the region are

PERCEPTION OF CUBA AS TOOL OF SOVIETS

100

90 86

PERCENT 70

60

s0

CUBA IS:

*TOOL OF 3

SOVIETS 3

20

*INDEPENDENT

107-

* PNINOPINION O IN OPINION IN OPINION IN OPINION IN

COSTA RICA HONDURAS EL SALVADOR GUATEMALA

A 193 Gallup International poll indicates that an overwhelming majority of Central Americans view Castro

As an instrument of the Soviet Union.

37

*~ : .~~.**- ~ -*g ~ -U- 4'.*.-.... -, -..- 
- . o

40 Z0

Guerrilla weapons, posters, and flags captured by the Guatemalan armed forces. The guerrillas make

no attempt to disguise their ties to International communism.

acutely aware of Castro's ability to orchestrate events ranking Cuban officials have provided protection for

in their countries. When the brother of President planes and small ships carrying drugs. The drugs

Betancur of Colombia was kidnapped by guerrillas in move northward from Colombia to the United

November 1983, it was largely the efforts of Castro States, at times via Cuba and on at least one occasion

that eventually gained his release. It was obvious that via Nicaragua. In 1981, the Colombian government

Castro could also have influenced the guerrillas to discovered that the Cubans had been using a nar- A

keep the President's brother. This case was a vivid ex- cotics ring to smuggle both arms and funds to Colample of how Castro has perfected the techniques of ombian M-19 guerrillas. When the Colombian armed

political blackmail. forces and National Police entered the town of

In ElSalado, aditon o Gatemla nd on- Calamar in February 1984, they discovered that the

duras have been targets of Castro's subversion. In gurlad Rmevioltitnar Anredocs of hcolombiaf * ~~Guatemala, he has provided training and some finan- hacmisnscutvighndesohcarsf

cial support to three guerrilla factions, although he cc lns

has not succeeded in unifying them to the extent heRentUidSaesCgrsoalhrns

did~~~ inE-Sladr

* inEl di Slvaor.have established the linkage of Cuba, narcotics, and

Honduran teiritory is used principally as a con- guerrillas .

4 6 U.S. arrest warrants have been issued

duit of support for the Salvadoran guerrillas, but for one Nicaraguan and several Cuban officials in- 0

*Honduras has also been a target of Cuban destabliza- volved in drug trafficking from Colombia. Reacting

tion. In June 1983, although Honduras did not have to an all-out anti-drug campaign by the Colombian

an active insurgency, about 100 Hondurans trained in government, the Colombian drug criminals have

*Cuba infiltrated into eastern Honduras from murdered Colombian government officials, bombed

Nicaragua. The would-be guerrillas were totally defeat- the U.S. embassy, and issued death threats against

ed, in great measure because of the Honduran peo- U.S. diplomats and their families, Colombian Presipie's support of the government forces. A year later dent Betancur and his cabinet, and members of the

another group of Cuban-trained guerrillas entered Colombian supreme court.

Honduras and many of them met the same fate. Teeegn linebtendu mglr

A disturbing aspect of the current Castro offen- and arms dealers in support of terrorists and guerrsive is the apparent use of money generated by nar- illas is a troublesome new threat to the Western

*cotics to supply arms for guerrillas. Several high- Hemisphere.

38

..S
44

Federico Vaughn (front, left, with mustache), described as the "right-hand man" of Nicaraguan Interior

Minister Tomas Borg*. loading cocaine on a U.S.-bound plane at Lee Drasilee mi~liary airfiel In Nicaragua.

A Nicaraguan soldier can be seen in the background. This cocaine, seized by US. Drug Enforcement Agency

officials after the plane landed In the United States, was part of the evidence used to indict Vaughn on

13 counts of narcotics trafficking. This photo was released during U.S. Congressional Hearings In August

- 1964.

39
U.S. Aid

to

Central Amen a

Soviet and Cuban subversion seeks to worsen the serious political, economic, and social tensions that plague

the region. The United States Is responding to this challenge by supporting efforts to develop democratic

institutions, increase political dialogue, address the economic deterioration, and provide the capability

* for the countries to defend themselves. U.S. economic assistance to the countries of Central America is

more than three times that of military assistance.

40

.%
t'S

THE CHALLENGE AND THE RESPONSE

*The countries of Central America and the Caribbean, face of Soviet pressures even close to home.

* ~struggling to defend or develop pluralistic political *Frmr opiae ees lnigb

systems, are confronted with Soviet-backed guerrilla keep moere spiea lthroghnwih s fne e pao

moveent o attmptng seze owe. Th Soietalmost half of U.S. trade, more than half of0

* ~Union's interest in Central America and the Carib- US motdptoem n lotto

bean was indicated in a 10 March 1983 "Memoran-thrsotersupyadeifcmnsneS dum of Conversation" between Grenadian Army

Chief of Staff Einstein Louison and the Soviet Army e yNT ntm fwr

Chief of General Staff Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov. e Expanded centers for terrorist operation..,

The Soviet military leader was quoted as saying, against the United States and its neighboring

*"Over two decades ago, there was only Cuba in Latin countries.

America, today there are Nicaragua, Grenada, and a 1147 The human costs of communism should not be

serius is oinbttl on n ElSalador" 47 forgotten. History shows that the establishment of 'i

Ideology plays an important role in Soviet communist regime brings with it severe and permamotivations, as the creation of additional communist nent suppression of basic human rights; the outpourstates validates the tenets of Marxism-Leninism and ing of refugees as exemplified in Eastern Europe,

bolsters the Soviet Union itself. Most importantly, Cuba, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Ethiopia; militariKremlin leaders hope that ultimately the United zation of the affected society; and economic deterioStates could become so preoccupied with turmoil in ration.

the Central American and Caribbean region that it

would be less able militarily and politically to oppose The countries of Central America and th CaribSoviet goals in other key areas of the world, bean are at a critical juncture. But this can be the impetus for the United States to devote the attention

The Soviets are using Cuba and Nicaragua to ex- and resources necessary to assist the countries of the

ploit the instability and poverty in the area. There is a region. As the National Bipartisan Commission on

high degree of congruence in Soviet, Cuban, and Central America stated:

* Nicaraguan foreign policy goals. These three countresar wringa in concert to rai ad sport- Our task now, as a nation, is to transform

guerrilla organizations in countries throughout the thisis in CenralAmerian rinorant nd-"

area. Should these guerrillas succeed in coming toednyNe'

power, they undoubtedly will establish regimes A cornerstone of United States policy is the

similar to those of their patrons- one-party com- belief that the best means to assure the failure of

munist dictatorships maintained in power by military communist expansionism is the development of

force and political and psychological intimidation, democratic institutions, leading to governments that

The consequences of a Soviet-aligned Central are accountable to the people and not imposed on 7

America would be severe and immediate. The United them by either left or right extremes. The basic social

States would be faced with: and economic inequities which breed frustration and

its offspring - insurgent movements -must be adS Additional platforms for regional subversion dressed if this policy is to succeed.

and Communist expansion, north to Mexico hJ

and south toward Panama, and a perception U.S. aid is designed to improve the quality of

of U.S. ineptitude and powerlessness in the life of the people of Central America. In the last four

41
7" TV,"o- 7

years, 78% of U.S. aid to Central America has been If the United States and the countries of the

economic. But the 22% devoted to military assistance region can marshal the necessary will and resolve to

is essential if these sovereign nations are to have the respond to this challenge, then, in the words of the

capability to defend themselves against the onslaught President's National Bipartisan Commission on Cen- .

of Soviet/Cuban-backed guerrillas. tral America:

The Caribbean Basin Initiative, the Central The sponsors of violence will have done the

America Democracy, Peace and Development In- opposite of what they intended: they will

itiative, and U.S. security assistance programs will have roused us not only to turn back the .-

help to check Soviet and Cuban aggression in this tide of totalitarianism but to bring a new

region. But this is only the beginning. The long-term birth of hope and of opportunity to the peogoal is to lay a foundation-a truly bipartisan pie of Central America. 49

policy-on which to help build a future for all the

people of the region.

42

% 4%
* .. ~ * * ~. ~ °'--* 

Notes

1. This document, found by the U.S.-Caribbean 9. U.S., Department of State, Cuba's Renewed

security forces in the October 1983 Grenada res- Support for Violence in Latin America, Specue mission, was not included in the U.S. cial Report No. 90, December 14, 1981.

Department of State/Department of Defense,

Grenada Documents: An Overview and Selec- 10. U.S., Comptroller General, "U.S. and Soviettion, September 1984 publication because it bloc Training of Latin American Students:

could not be reproduced legibly. A microfiche Considerations in Developing Future U.S. Procopy is available for examination in the Nation- grams," Report to the Congress, August 16,

al Archives, Washington, D.C., Document 1984, p. 1.

Number DSI-83-C-004845.

11. U.S., Department of State, Maurice Bishop's

2. For detailed information on Sandinista military "'Line of March Speech, " September 13, 1982, activities and support for guerrillas in the region Grenada Occasional Papers-No. 1, August

see U.S. Department of State/Department of 1984.

- Defense, Background Paper: Nicaragua's Mili-

". tary Build-Up and Support for Central Ameri- 12. Ibid.

can Subversion, July 18, 1984, and News

Briefing on Intelligence Information on Exter- 13. A microfiche of this document, found by the

nal Support of the Guerrillas in El Salvador, U.S.-Caribbean security forces in the October . August 8, 1984. 1983 Grenada rescue mission, is available for

-- examination at the National Archives,

3. Jerry Flint, "Cuba: Russia's Wondrous Washington, D.C., Document Number

Weapon," Forbes, March 28, 1983, p. 39. DSI-83-C-004708.

4. Rolando Bonachea, "United States Policy 14. Details of this April 1979 delivery, and subseToward Cuba, 1959-1961," unpublished Doc- quent military ties with the Soviet bloc are in-

" toral Dissertation, Georgetown University, cluded in U.S. Department of State/Depart1974. ment of Defense, Grenada: A Preliminary

- Report, December 16, 1983.

5. Broadcast on Madrid Domestic Service, January 5, 1984. Foreign Broadcast Information 15. U.S., Department of State/Department of

Service (FBIS), Latin America, January 9, Defense, Grenada Documents: An overview

1984, p. Q4. and Selection, September 1984, p. 26-6.

6. Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom 16. Ibid., For information on Bishop's request for

* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 1373. additional financial assistance from the Soviets,

see Bishop's "Outline of Presentation" for his

7. Barbara Walters, "An Interview with Fidel 15 April 1983 meeting with Gromyko. (NationCastro," Foreign Policy, Fall 1977, No. 28, p. al Archives, Washington, D.C., Document ..

32. Number DSI-83-C-004708.)

8. Hugh Thomas, The Revolution on Balance 17. Organization of American States, Seventeenth

(Washington D.C.: The Cuban American Na- Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Fortional Foundation, 1983), p. 7.

'a,'a'43

*'. . • . . a~. *~*a~ , ** • % . '.% '-.",
7:6 _X37 0- 7T. -. 

eign Affairs, Resolution 11, Document 40/79, 29. Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1984-1985, pp.

Rev. 2, Washington, D.C., June 23, 1979. 233-234.

18. "Sandinista Hero Now Called Traitor," 30. For a more complete analysis of this poll, see

Washington Times, April 17, 1984, p. 12A. La Nacion Internacional (San Jose, Costa !Pop

Rica), November 20-24, 1983.

19. This speech was carried in Spanish in its entirety

in La Prensa (San Pedro Sula, Honduras), Oc- 31. "Noriega's Statement," La Nacion (San Jose,

tober 27, 1981, pp. 16-19. Costa Rica), October 16, 1984, Editorial.

* 20. Claudia Dreifus, "Playboy Interview: The San- 32. "Nicaragua Confirms It Is Building Military

dinistas," Playboy, September 1983, p. 60. Airport," Washington Post, August 17, 1984

p. A4.

21. "A Sandinista Comes Clean," Newsweek, December 24, 1984, p. 13. 33. The turbulent 1979-81 years are detailed in U.S.

Department of State, El Salvador: The Search

22. Joaquim Ibarz, "El Comandante Bayardo Arce For Peace, Background Study, September

afirma que se va a implantar el marxismo- 1981.

leninismo y el partido unico" ("Comandante

Bayardo Arce affirms that they are going to es- 34. "On U.S. Economic-Military Assistance,"

tablish Marxism-Leninism and a single party"), Orientacion (weekly newspaper of the ArchdiLa Vanguardia (Barcelona, Spain), July 31, ocese of San Salvador, El Salvador), May 20,

1984. 1984, Editorial. The editorial described the

guerrilas as the "enemy," saw them as obstruct23. Carlos Ripoll, "Sandinismo y Comunismo," ing the democratic process, and said that "to

(Miami, Fl.: Ideal, September 1, 1974), p. 17. fight the enemy we must have money to generate work and arms to defend the people's

24. "Rebels Train To Overthrow Somoza," rights."

Washington Post, October 15, 1978, p. Al.

35. Broadcast on Radio Venceremos, April 5, 1983. . 25. "Nicaraguan Junta Assumes Rule in Jubilant Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS),

Managua," Washington Post, July 21, 1979, Latin America, April 6, 1983, p. P7.

p. Al.

36. Interview with Alejandro Montenegro at U.S.

26. This 36-page document, formally titled "Anal- Department of State, March 12, 1984.

ysis of the Situation and Tasks of the Sandinista

Peoples' Revolution," dated October 5, 1979, 37. "Salvadorans' U.S. Campaign: Selling of

is also known as the "72-Hour Document." It Revolution," New York Times, February 26,

reported in detail on an extraordinary meeting 1982, p. AIO.

September 21-23, 1979, of the top leadership

of the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional 38. "Keeping Us Honest," New York Times,

(FSLN). It outlined the situation in Nicaragua March 27, 1981, p. A27.

and the world as the Sandinista leaders saw it

and set forth their plans for consolidating the 39. Broadcast on Moscow's Radio Peace and

revolution. Progress, February 4, 1982. U.S. Department

of State, Foreign Affairs Note, Publication

27. "Fearful Nicaraguans Building 200,000 Strong 9292, August 1982.

Militia," New York Times, February 20, 1981,

p. A2. 40. Ibid., Broadcast on January 12, 1982.

- 28. "Teen Draft Dodgers Flee from Fighting 41. Ibid., Broadcast on August 10, 1981.

Nicaragua War," Christian Science Monitor,

January 5, 1985, p. 1. 42. Broadcast on Radio Faribundo Marti, November 9, 1984. Foreign Broadcast Information

44

¢. - .J -. i .. 

€ : - .> " %, ' : " - , . -: a -.
7 7 W lc*,

Service (FBIS), Latin America, November 13, 47. A microfiche of this document, found by the

1984, p. P6. U.S.-Caribbean security forces in the October

1983 Grenada rescue mission, is available for

43. "Salvadoran Rebels Attack Town," Washing- examination at the National Archives,

* ton Post, November 10, 1984, p. Al. Washington, D.C, Document Number

DSI-83-C-004844.

* 44. Homily delivered by Auxiliary Bishop Gregorio

Rosa Chavez, in the Cathedral of San Salvador, 48. Report of the National Bipartisan Commission

El Salvador, on July 8, 1984. on Central America, prepared for the President. Henry A. Kissinger, Chairman. Washing45. La Nacion Internacional (San Jose, Costa ton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,

Rica), November 20-24, 1983. January 1984, p. 127.

46. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor 49. Ibid., p. 127.

and Human Resources, Drugs and Terrorism,

98th Cong., 1st Sess., August 8, 1984.

-"°-

45

I- ? l e ii