Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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### MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

A TTORNEY FOR A PPELLANT

F ATHER Rebecca L. Gray The Law Offices of Rebecca Gray, LLC Carmel, Indiana
A TTORNEY FOR A PPELLANT

M OTHER Cara Schaefer Wieneke Wi e neke Law Office, LLC Brooklyn, Indiana A TTORNEY S FOR A PPELLEE Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Attorney General of Indiana David E. Corey Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana



### I N T H E 

# COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent

- Child Relationship of S.L., A.E., and D.E.; C.E. (Father) and M.L. (Mother) , Appellant s - Respondents

,

v. 

### Indiana Department of Child Services , July 2 4, 2018 Court of Appeals Ca se No. 18A

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- 261 Appeal from the Shelby Superior Court The Honorable R. Kent Apsley, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 73D01

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Appellee

- P etitioner.

Najam , Judge
.


### Statement of the Case

[1] C.E. (“Father”) and M.L. (“Mother”) (collectively “Parents”) appeal the trial
court’s termination of t h eir parental rights over t h eir minor child ren A.E. and D.E., and Mother also appeals the termination of her parental rights over her
minor child by another father, S.L. 1 Parents present the following issues for our
review:

1. Whether the trial court erred wh en it concluded that the Indian Child Welfare Act does not apply to this proceeding

.
2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support the termination of Father’s parental rights.

[2] We affirm.

1 S.L.’s father, S.B., does not participate in this appeal.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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### Facts and Procedural History

[3] Mother gave birth to S. L. on October 5, 2011. Thereafter, Mother met and
married Father , and they had two children together, A.E. and D.E., born in
20 13 and 2015, respectively. 2 At some point prior to D.E.’s birth , Father, a foreign national, left the United States to live in Spain , but he remained married
to Mother

.

[4] On July 1, 2015, Mother sought emergency medical treatment because she “believed herself and [the C]hildren [to be] covered with bedbugs.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 64. After health care providers determined that Mother and the
Children were not covered in bedbugs and were medically fine, Mother continued to insist that “bedbugs were crawling all over her an d [the C]hildren.” Id. Accordingly, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) took emergency custody of the Children and placed them in foster

care

. Thereafter, DCS filed petitions alleging that the Children were children in need of services (“CH INS”) , and the trial court found the Children to be CHINS by order dated February 12, 2016 . After Parents failed to fully comply with services, on May 1 , 2017, DCS filed petitions to terminate their parental rights over A.E. and D.E., as well as a petitio n to terminate Mother’s parental rights over S.L.

2 For ease of discussion, we will refer to the three children, collectively, as “the Children.” We will also, however, refer to A.E. and D.E. as “the Children” where our discussion is relevant only to them, as will be obvious from the context.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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[5] Following a hearing, the trial court granted th e petition s on December 26 , 2017. In support of its order, the trial court entered the following findings and
conclusions:

9. Father

. . . is a foreign national, educated from middle school through high school in the United States, but due t o a violation of the United Stat es law ca nn ot ret urn to the United States at this time or for the next seven and o ne - half (7 1⁄2) years. He continues to b e married t o [M] other

. . . .
10

. Father

. . . had l ef

t the United S t ates prior t o th e beginning of the CHINS cases conce rn ing [the C]h ildren , and [he] is currently in Spain with n o current possibility for return to the United States.

* * *

12. All three [C] hildren were in the custody and control of [M] oth er . . . o n July l, 2015 [,] and were removed by D C S without court order on an e merge nc y basis. A hearing was t imely held on July 2, 2015. The Court found that the emergency removal a nd de t enti on w as necessary to p rotec t the [C] hildren. The Court f

urthe r found that on July l , 2015 [,] [M]other . . . was hysterical and believed herself and her [C] hildren were covered with bedbugs. She believed o ne of her children had a seizure due to the bedbugs digg i ng into his skin and that the child had stopped breathing. When medics a rrive d the child was pink,
wa rm and dry. No bedb u gs or e vidence of bedbugs was observed. Mother and the [C] hildren were ex amined at W.S. Major Hospital

. There were no bite marks or any ev id e nce of bedbugs. Mother stated that she was not crazy and continued to state that bedbugs were crawling all over her and h er [C] hildren.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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13. All three [C] hildren were detained by Court Order at the hearing held on July 2, 20 1 5, [and they were] placed in foster
care [,] where they remain.

14. Mo ther appeared with counsel on September 24, 2015 [,] and admitted that her [C]hildren were CHINS.

15. Th e Court held a Dispos itional Hearing o n February 11, 2016 [,] and issued a written o rder on February 12, 2016.

16

. As a part of the Dispositiona l Order, [M] oth er was ordered to inpatient drug treatment and to contact her Family Case Manager every week

.
17. Mother resisted all help from D CS and failed to visit [the C] hildren.

1 8. DCS att e mpted to provide visi t ation with th e [C] hildren and [M] other from the d ay the [C] hi l dren we re detained.

19. DCS provided t ransportation f or [M] other to visit [the C] hildren, however [M] o t her repeatedly failed to visit [the C] hildren.

2 0

. Fathe r

. . . remained married to [M] other and communicated

w ith her by phone af

t er his [C]hildren were detained.

21. Father

. . . called the Family Case Manager on August 6, 2 0 15 [,] and again o n A u gust 7, 2015, asserting he was th e father of two o f the childr en

. D CS asked him to confirm his id e ntity and relationship with the children. I n hi s conv ersation with the Case Manager, he was told of the next court date and he informed the Case Manager that his lawyer w ould be representing him at the hea r ing.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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22. Father

. . . did attempt to send a [facsimile] t o DCS with his iden t ifying information, however, the photograph of his ID/ passport was illegible.

23. As of February 8 , 2016, neither DCS nor the Court had any additi o nal information concerning either fathe r [S.B. or C.E.] and the Court authorized service o n the fathers by publication

.
24. Fathers, [S.B. and C.E.] , were defaulted at a hearing held May 12, 2 0 16.

* * * 27

. As of September 8 , 2016, over a year since the [C] hildren

w ere detained, [M]other ha d failed to pa rt icipate in services. Mo the r, however at that time was in jail on an unrelated criminal matter and substance abuse treatment was provided to her while in jail and DCS arranged for inpatient treatment upon her release.

28. The DCS Family C ase Manager drove [Mother] to her inpatient treatmen t program and [M] other did complete the program. How ev er, [M] other failed to attend t he first meeting after her release

. Mother als o tested positive for

m ethamph eta mine upon her release f r om inpatient treatment and promptly relapsed.

29. S e rvic e s offered to [Mother] included:

a. Take Ba ck Control (substance abuse); b. Gallahue C o mmunity M e ntal Health C e nter; c. Home

- based case ma n agement; d. Physical heal th/ disease testing: e. Three (3) referrals to in

- patient substance abuse treatment, including Volunteers of America and Wheeler Mission; f

. Visitation services; and g. Home

- based services (including employment, housing )

.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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30. Mother showed little int ere st in any services including visiting [the C] hil dr en sinc e t he be ginn ing of the case. By the time of the termination hearing, [M]other had not visited [the C] hildren for [more than] a year

. Service providers made multiple ef

f orts to facilitate [M]o ther ’ s visitation, inclu ding arrangements to pick up b oth [M] other an d the [C] hildren and take them wherever [M]other wanted to go. When [Mother] would fail to be where she was supposed to be f o r pick up, t he [C] hildren would become upset, screaming and crying. Providers attempted a “Visitation Contract , ” [ and] they made up a visitation calendar. Af

t er twenty

- three (23 ) missed visits, [Mother’s] visi t a t ion e n d e d.

31. [A.E. and D.E.] have spent the majority of their lives in foster care. T hei r CHI NS cases have been going on for the majority of their young lives.

32. [A.E. and D.E.] no longer have any emotion al attach m ent to their biological par e nts and view the foster p l acement as their pa r ents. The older sibling, [A.E.] , has no recollection of either of her biological parents. The younger child, [D.E.], has never

m et his biological fa ther

.
33. [S.L.] has now been in foster care for a third o f her life.

* * *

36. Father . . . v o luntarily lef t the count r

y prior to th e birth of his child [ D.E.] and has had no consistent contact with either of his [C] hildr en since. When [Father] left the United Stat es[,] the pregnant [Mother] and [S.L. and A.E.] could ha ve gone with him, but all stayed behind. Since le aving the Unit e d States , [ Father ] has undertak en no legal o r other action to attempt to reuni te with his family. [ Father ] is not e ligibl e to reenter the Uni ted States of America for seven a nd o ne - half (7 1⁄2) more years.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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37. Father

. . . had actual knowledge that hi s [C] hildren had bee n detained by D CS a nd cal led D CS in August 2015 and informed DCS he would be appea r ing by counsel. However, he di dn’t appear b y c oun sel until March l 7 , 2017.

38. Counse l f

o r [F] ather

. . . then withdr e w several months later on July 12, 2017.

39. Fath e r

. . . notified the Court at a hearing held Ju l y 1 7 , 201 7[,] that he would be rehi ring couns el. [Father] ’s prior counsel did not r ee nt e r his appearance.

40. Despite evidence that [F] ather . . . and his f amily are financially well

- off, [Father] never did hire counsel. The Court, sua spo nte , appointed counsel at public expense to protect [Father]’s interest

. 41. Despite this Court’s order in the CHIN S case that he ha ve weekly contact with DCS, [ 3 ] Father

. . . has failed t o stay in contact with the CASA or his Family Ca se Manager

.
* * *

43. Since the filing of the u n derlying CHIN S case, [Father] has not communicated with [the C]hildren

. No letter, n o birthday or Christmas cards. [Father’s] mother has on occasion e xpressed an i nteres t in being involved in the [C] hild r en’s lives. The Court
a l low e d the paternal grandmother to intervene in the underlying CHINS cases. Nevertheless , other than a visit, no substantial steps have been taken t o become actively involved wit h the [C]hildren.

3 Father n otes, and DCS concedes, that the trial court did not order him to maintain weekly contact with DCS. But Father does not contend that this error requires reversal. We address below Father’s general contentions regarding his contact with DCS.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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44. On July 1, 2 0 15, when these [C] hildren were detained,

a. Mother

. . . was unable to provide the [C] hildren with the necessities of life and supervis ion due to her use of illegal drugs.

* * *

c. Father

. . . had b e en out of the count r y prior to the birth of his youngest child and was unabl e to return due to his violation o f his visa.

Two and one

- ha l f years later the situa tio n remains virtua lly unchanged.

45. This matter was set f o r f act

- finding hea rin g on the combined p e ti t ions for termination of parental rights on October 2 6 , 2017. Mo th er

. . . had actual notice of the termination hearing, but failed to show up f

o r the hearing. The Court made arrangements for both fathers to appear teleph o nically for the hearing

. . . . Father [C.E.] was present for a period of time telephonical l y, but th e cal l “timed out” at some p o int. The Court set the matter f o r f urthe r hearing on the petitions to termi n ate the parental rights of [both fathers] in o rder to allow the fathers a fair opportunity to f ur ther participate and offer additional evid e nc e and testimony. Sometime prior to th e h earin g Mother ’ s co uns el was able to locate [Mother] and managed to get her t o the second hearing. [Both f]athers . . . did . . . participate in the November 14 th hearing by telephone.

46. Desp ite not appearing for the original fact

- f in ding hearing, the Court a llowed Mother . . . to testify. For the first time in the history of any of the Termi na tion o f P aren tal Rights cases or the underlying [CHINS] cases , [M]other stated that sh e “re c ently learned f r om my grandmother I have Indian heritage

. . . Cherok ee . . . .” She testified she was not involved i n any Native American tribe or tribal activity.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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47

. The foster parents testified that they intend t o adopt all three [C] hildren as the permanency plan for the children.

48. The [C] hildren ’ s Court Appointed Special Advocate [(“CASA”)] testified that terminati on of parental r ights and ad op tion by the fos te r pare nt s is in the best interest of the [C] h i ld r en. F ur th e r, [sic] that none of the parents have a significant relationship with their ch i ldren. The [C] hildren are str o ngly b o nded with th eir f o ster family.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

* * *

3

. The Indian Child W e lf a re Act defines an “I ndian child ” as “any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is eith e r (1) a m e mb e r of an Indian tribe or (2) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child o f a member o f an I ndian tribe .” (25 U.S

. C. § 1 903). Under federal law, individual tribes have the right to d etermine eligibility, m e mb e rsh i p, or both. Ho weve r, i n order for ICWA to apply, th e child must be
a m e mber of, or eligible for membership in, a federally recognized tr ibe. The child must be either: ( 1 ) a member of an Indian tribe; or (2) eligible for membership AND i s the biological child of a member of a t ribe.

a. No tribal memb e rship docume nt s, evidence o f triba l membership or m e mbership eligibility was introduced.

b. The Indian Child Welfare Act has not [sic] applicability to this
cause

.
4

. The minor [C] hildren ha ve been removed f ro m Mother f

o r at least six ( 6) months under the d is positi onal d ecree.

5. The minor children have been removed f r om Mother and their respective Fathers and have been under the s upe rv ision ofCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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the DCS for at least fifteen (1 5) of the most recent tw e nty

- two (22) months at the time that DCS filed its Verified Petition for Invo lun tary Term ination of Pare n tal Rights.

6

. Ther e is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the minor children’s removal will no t be remedi e d.

7

. The parents of thes e children are either una ble o r unwilling to meet their responsibilities as parents.

8

. The minor children are not require d to wait indefi nitely for th eir pare n ts to t ake some substantial step towar d becoming a responsi bl e par ent

. The children should n ot be required t o wait any longer to enjoy the p ermane ncy tha t is es sential to their development and over all well

- bei n g.

9. There is a reasonable probability that the reasons for placement outside the home of Mo ther and [both] Fathers will not b e remedied.

10

. There is a reasonable probability that th e continuation of th e paren t

- child relationship [s] po ses a threat to the well

- being o f the minor ch i ldren.

11

. Te r mination of the parent child r e la t ionship [s] is in the best inter es ts of the minor children.

12. DCS has a satisfactory p l an for the care and treatment of the minor children, which is adoption by their current placement.

13. I f any of the foregoing Conclusions of Law should be more properly denominated as Findings of Fact, then t hey ar e so denominated.

JUD GMENTCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGE D AND DECREED: That DCS’ petition for termination of Mother ’ s parental rights is g rant ed; and tha t the pare nt

- chil d
r elationship [s] b e tw ee n the [C] hildren

. . . and t heir Mother

. . . is hereby terminated.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: That DCS’ petition f or termination of Fath e r [’s]

. . . parental rights is granted; and that the pa rent

- child relationship [s] between [A.E. and D.E.] and their Fath e r, [C.E.] is hereby terminated.

. . .

Id. at 63

- 70. This appeal ensued.



### Discussion and Decision Issue One: Indian Child Welfare Act

[6] Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that “the termination order is invalid and should be reversed” because “the court failed to comply with the notice requirement o f the Indian Child Welfare Act.” Appellant Mother’s Br. at 7

- 8. In particular, Mother maintains that,

[o]nce [she] testified that she had discovered information that Children may be of Indian ancestry, the court had “reason to know” Children were of Ind ian ancestry and was required [under federal law] . . . to ensure that DCS undertook due diligence to determine whether in fact the Children were eligible to be members of a certain Indian tribe.

Id. at 12. We cannot agree.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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[7] The Indian Child Welfare Act (“ ICWA”) was enacted “ to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards for the
removal of Indian children from their families [.]” 25 U. S.C.A. § 1902

. A party who seeks to invoke a provision of the ICWA has the burden to show that the
A ct applies in the proceeding. Thompson v. Elkhart Ofc. of Fam. and Child. (In re S.L.H.S.) , 885 N.E.2d 603, 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Following an evidentiary hearing, t he trial court concluded that the ICWA does not apply here. Thus, Mother appeals from a negative judgment, see, e.g. , Romine v. Gagle , 782 N.E.2d 369, 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied , and she must show that the evidence point s unerringly to a conclusion different from t hat reached by the
trial court , or that the judgment is contrary to law. Wilder

- Newland v. Kessinger

, 967 N.E.2d 558, 560 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied

.

[8] Applicability of the ICWA depends on whether the pr oceeding involve s an “Indian child , ” which is defined as “any unmarried person who is under the age of eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an
Indian tribe.” 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). Here, at the conclusion of the termination hearing, Mother testified that her “grandma” had recently told her that Mother has “Indian heritage,” specifically that Mother has Cherokee heritage. Tr. at
161. And Mother testified that, accordingly, the Children have “Indian heritage,” too. Id. But Mother also testified that her grandmother does not have any “involvement” with a Native American tribe, and there is no evidenceCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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that Mother has ever identified as a Native American or has been involved with a Native American tribe in any way. Id. Thus, there is no evidence that either
Mother or the Children are members of a Native American tribe or have any

“ tribal status. ” See In re S.L.H.S. , 885 N.E.2d at 613. Thus, Mo ther has failed to provide any evidence that the Children are Indian child ren within the purview of the ICWA, and we conclude that the ICWA did not apply to the proceedings to terminate Parents’ parental rights to the Children. See id. (h olding ICWA did n ot apply despite parents’ allegations that they were members of Native American tribes where parents could not prove membership).


### Issue Two: Sufficiency of the Evidence

[9] We begin our review of this issue by acknowledging that “[t]he traditional right of pa rents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Bailey v. Tippecanoe Div. of Fam

. & Child

. (In re M.B.) , 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied . However, a tri al court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a
termination. Schultz v. Porter Cty. Of f . of Fam

. & Child

. (In re K.S.) , 750 N.E.2d 832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Termination of a parent

- child relationship is proper where a child’s emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. Although the right to raise one’s own child should not be terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, parental right s may beCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities. Id. at 836.

[10] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS is required to allege and prove:
(B) that one (1) of the foll owing is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuatio n of the parent

- child relationship poses a threat to the well

- being of the child.

* * *
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child ; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

Ind. Code § 31

- 35

- 2

- 4(b)(2) (2018) . DCS’s “burden of proof in termination of parental rights cases is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” R.Y. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs. (In re G.Y.) , 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260

- 61 (Ind. 2009) (quoting I.C. § 31

- 37

- 14

- 2).

[11] When rev iewing a termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Peterson v. Marion Cty. Off. of
Fam

. & Child

. (In re D.D.) , 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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denied . Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. Moreover, in deference to the trial court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside the court’s judgment terminating a parent

- child relationship o nly if it is clearly erroneous. Judy S. v. Noble Cty. Off. of Fam

. & Child

. (In re L.S.) , 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied

.

[12] Here, in terminating Parents’ parental rights, the trial court entered specific findings of fact and conclus ions thereon. When a trial court’s judgment contains special findings and conclusions, we apply a two

- tiered standard of
review. Bester v. Lake Cty. Off. of Fam

. & Child

. , 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen , 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences support the trial court’s decision, we must affirm.
In re L.S. , 717 N.E.2d at 208.

[13] On appeal, Father contends that the trial court erred when it concluded that:
the conditions that resulted in the Children’s removal and the reasons for their placement outside of Mother’s home will not be remedied; t here is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent

- child relationshi p s poses a threat
to the well

- being of the C hild ren; and termination is in the Children’s best
interest s

. Because the statute is written in the disjunctive, we need not addressCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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the court’s conclusion that continuation of the parent

- child relationship s pos es a threat to the Child ren ’s well

- being. I.C. § 31

- 35

- 2

- 4(b)(2).



### Conditions that Resulted in the Children’s Removal will not be Remedied

[14] In determining whether the ev idence supports the trial court’ s finding that
Fa ther is unlikely to remedy the reasons for the Children’s removal, we engage
in a two

- step analysis. E.M. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs. (In re E.M.) , 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). “First, we identify the conditions that led to removal; and second, we determine whether there is a reasonable p robability that those
conditions will not be remedied.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). In the second step, the trial court must judge a parent’ s fitness to care for his children at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration e vidence of changed conditions. Id. However, the court must also “evaluate the parent’ s habitual patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child.” Moore v. Jasper Cty. Dep’t of Child Servs. , 894 N.E.2d 218, 226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quotations and citations omitted). Pursuant to this rule, courts have properly considere d evidence of a parent’ s prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and employment. Id. Moreover, DCS is not required to rule out all possibilities of change; rather, it need establish only that
there is a re asonable probability the parent’ s behavior will not change. Id.

[15] Father contends that “many of the court’s findings are erroneous,” but he challenges only the following specific findings: that he failed to maintain contact with the Children, the CASA, and the family case manager, and that heCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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made no attempts to unify h is family. Appellant Father’s Br. at 12. In support of his contention on this issue, Father first states that “Mother was Father’s sole source of communication with the [C]hildren. Once Mother ceased communicating with Father and changed her number, Fat her had no choice but to wait for Mother to call so that he could speak to his Children.” Appellant
Father’s Br. at 13. The undisputed evidence shows that Mother stopped visiting
the Children in March 2016, so Father has not spoken to the Children since then. And Father does not explain why he did not attempt to reach the Children by telephone through DCS or by petitioning the trial court for contact

. Father does not suggest, and t here is no evidence , that DCS would have
thwarted his efforts to talk to the Children at any time.

[16] As for Father’s inconsistent communication with DCS and the CASA, Father asserts that DCS did not let him know there was a problem with the identifying information he had provided by fax (it was illegible) in August 2015

. Father testified that he called DCS “every day for a week” and then stopped calling and tried to hire a lawyer. Tr. at 145. Father testified that he did not contact DCS again after that time. And Father spoke to the CASA by telephone one time, only a few weeks prior to the final hearing. Finally, Father asserts that he attempted to reunify his family by buying plane tickets for Mother and the Children to travel to Spain. F ather’s argument s amount to a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. Father ignores the evidence that: he has not seen either of his Children since before D.E. was born in 2015; heCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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has not sent his Children cards or letters; and he has not talked to them on the telephone since March 2016, at the latest.

[17] In any event, Fa ther does not challenge the evidence supporting the trial court’s
conclusion that the reasons for the Children’s removal from Mother’s home will
not be remedied. The Children were removed from Mother’s care due to
Mother’s substance abuse and delusions ab out bedbugs crawling all over the
Children

. At that time, Father was not in the country , and , during the CHINS proceeding, Father made no efforts to take custody of the Children . At the time of the termination hearing, Mother had not visited the Children for over one year, she had failed to complete several court

- ordered services , and she had not demonstrated sobriety . Father remained out of the country and had not taken meaningful steps to seek custody of the Children

.

[18] Fa ther’s arguments on appeal simpl y seek to have this court disregard the evidence most favorable to the trial court’s judgment and ins tead reweigh the
evidence in his favor, which we cannot do. We cannot say that the trial court clearly erred when it concluded that the conditions that resulted in the
Children’s removal will not be remedied.



### Best Interests

[19] In determining whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of a child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. A.S. v. Ind. Dep’t. of Child Servs. ( In re A.K. ) , 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). “A parent’s historical inability to provide adequate housing, sta bility andCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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supervision coupled with a current inability to provide the same will support a finding that termination of the parent

- child relationship is in the child’s best
interests.” Castro v. State Off. of Fam

. & Child

. , 842 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ind. Ct. Ap p. 2006), trans. denied . “Additionally, a child’s need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child.” In re A.K. , 924 N.E.2d at 224.

[20] Fa ther contends that termination is not in the Children’s best interests bec ause he and Mother are “still married,” and he has expressed “a willingness for Mother and [all three] Children to come to Spain to live” and “to help get Mother into substance abuse treatment[.]” Appellant Father’s Br. at 18. Again,
Fa ther’s contentions on this issue amount to nothing more than a request that we reweigh the evidence, which, again, we cannot do.

[21] The undisputed evidence shows that Mother had failed to participate in court

ordered services, failed to keep in contact with her family case man agers, and
failed to visit the Children for more than a year at the time of the termination hearing

. Father has not seen the Children since before D.E.’s birth in 2015 and
has not communicated with them since March 2016. Father’s Children do not
know him

. The Children need consistent and reliable care, and they need

permanency. T he Children’s CASA testified that removing the Children from their foster parents, the only parents they know, would be “traumatic.” Tr. at
27. And the CASA testified that ter mination of Fa ther’s parental rights is in the
Children’s best interests. The totality of the evidence, including Fa ther’s historical inability to provide a safe and stable home for the Children and hisCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A

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failure to maintain contact with the Children , suppo rts the trial court’s
conclusion that termination of Fa ther’s parental rights is in the Child ren ’s best
interest s

.

[22] Affirmed.

Crone, J., and Pyle, J., concur

.