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OAR Box 1147 

Prepped by Ollie Stewart 

Document Number: 

210)IV-E-84 

Docket Number: 

A-87-11 

Printed 4/22/2008 2:42:58 PM Sheet 210 of 242 
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MEMORANDUM 

'i UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 

A N N ARBOR. MICHIGA N 48105 

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OFFICE OF 

AIR AND RADIATION 

SUBJECT: 

FROM: 

TO: 

THRU: 

Conversation with Dr. Merritt Birky of 

Regarding Onboard Safety Comments 

NTSB 

Glenn W. Passavant, Senior Project Manage 

Standards Development and Support Branch 

The Record 

^JLmtoiU^ 

Chester J. France, Chief 

Standards Development and/S'up.jzfaftt Branch 

Charles L. Gray, Jr., Di recto i/^^/c^-^-//"^ /'^-

Emission Control Technology D-irvision / »-' 

On December 13, 1988 I spoke with Dr. Merritt Birky of the 

National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to seek 

clarification and more detail on his comments on our draft 

revised safety analysis, "Summary and Analysis of Comments 

Regarding the Potential Safety Implications of Onboard Vapor 

Recovery Systems," and Battelle's failure modes and effects 

analysis (FMEA) draft report entitled, "Fuel System Comparative 

Risk Assessment." These comments were conveyed to EPA as part 

of a November 30, 1988 letter to EPA from Congressman Dingell. 

The purpose of this memo is to summarize the key points of our 

conversation. 

The first topic of conversation was Dr. Birky's overall 

impression of the onboard safety issue. Dr. Birky explained 

that there were two points to his "bottom-line". First, it was 

his belief that onboard systems could be made safe given 

sufficient leadtime for demonstration and testing. Second, he 

thought that we should lower fuel volatility levels as soon as 

possible. 

The next area that we discussed was Dr. Birky's impression 

that our draft revised safety analysis "lacked objectivity." 

This impression was based on his review of the fire and recall 

data analysis contained in the draft revised safety analysis. 

I wanted to discuss the particular items in the revised safety 

analysis which led him to this conclusion, however, he did not 

have a copy of the report readily available, and consequently 

\-ic\s not prepared to discuss the specifics cf his comments. 
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Nevertheless, I made several points to Dr. Birky about the 

data used and our analysis of it. First, the data was supplied 

to us by NHTSA and was characterized by them as the best 

available. Second, the data was used by NHTSA to support their 

concerns regarding onboard/evaporative system safety, and the 

data was also used by commenters in the same way. Third, our 

use of this data was primarily in analysis of and response to 

the safety comments which were based on the same data. 

I explained that the revised safety report clearly 

explains our reservations about using the data (see pages 2-6, 

2-8, and 2-11). However, better data were not available, and 

our conclusion after analyzing the data was not that onboard 

systems would improve safety, but rather that it was not 

possible to conclude that evaporative control systems have 

degraded safety. He agreed to further discuss this point at a 

later date when he had a chance to retrieve a copy of the 

report again and review the material. 

I went on to ask Dr. Birky about his statement that the 

Battelle FMEA does not address either driveability or 

collision/rollover issues. We agreed that the Battelle study 

did not consider driveability, but that collision/rollover was 

addressed in their analysis. After some discussion, Dr. Birky 

agreed that the Battelle study conceptually addressed 

collision/rollover, but felt that it should be considered from 

an experimental perspective as well. 

We went on to discuss the potential safety improvements of 

onboard vapor recovery systems. It was Dr. Birky's opinion 

that with the exception of the vapor containment safety 

benefit, all of the other potential improvements cited in the 

revised safety study could be made to current systems with 

minor modifications and are not inherent to onboard controls. 

I explained that while this may be true, manufacturers are not 

likely to make those changes absent some external motivating 

factor such as an onboard requirement. Dr. Birky went on to 

state that even an onboard requirement could not guarantee that 

manufacturers would actually implement onboard designs which 

have the safety features claimed in the revised safety report. 

I explained that while it was true that we could not force 

manufacturers to implement any one particular design 

configuration, we see several reasons (such as cost, packaging, 

and test procedure requirements) why manufacturers would choose 

design approaches which would include the improved safety 

features discussed in the revised safety report. 
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Dr. Birky concluded the discussion of this topic by 

stating the only way he sees to put an end to the safety 

concerns is to build an onboard-equipped vehicle that works 

properly. However, he also stated that it was not necessarily 

EPA's role to do so. He said that he would be satisfied that 

onboard systems, need not be unsafe if he were presented with an 

onboard-equipped vehicle which performed the refueling control 

function (i.e., captures the refueling vapors) without causing 

finability or driveability problems. If this onboard-equipped 

vehicle also successfully passed an actual collision/rollover 

test, Dr. Birky said his present concerns would be addressed, 

Dr. Birky stated his view that once a properly functioning 

onboard-equipped vehicle was developed, the burden regarding 

collision and rollover concerns would tend to lie with the 

vehicle manufacturers. 

The final issue that I discussed with Dr. Birky involved a 

clarification of a matter in the aforementioned letter from 

Congressman Dingell. This letter stated that NTSB had received 

a briefing on the Battelle report without NHTSA personnel being 

present, even though they asked that NHTSA be included. Dr. 

Birky indicated that he did not request that NHTSA personnel be 

present. He simply suggested that he would be willing to 

"double-up" with another group that was to receive the 

presentation for the sake of efficiency, and that the 

interaction with another safety group might have been helpful 

from a technical viewpoint. 

cc* Docket A-87-11 

Docket A-85-21 

6622W