Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-261 | July 24, 2018 Page 1 of 21

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTFATHER

Rebecca L. Gray

The Law Offices of Rebecca Gray, LLC

Carmel, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTMOTHER

Cara Schaefer Wieneke

Wieneke Law Office, LLC

Brooklyn, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

David E. Corey

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination 

of the Parent-Child Relationship 

of S.L., A.E., and D.E.;

C.E. (Father) and M.L. 

(Mother),

Appellants-Respondents,

v.

Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

July 24, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-JT-261

Appeal from the Shelby Superior 

Court

The Honorable R. Kent Apsley, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

73D01-1705-JT-4

73D01-1705-JT-5

73D01-1705-JT-6
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-261 | July 24, 2018 Page 2 of 21

Appellee-Petitioner.

Najam, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] C.E. (“Father”) and M.L. (“Mother”) (collectively “Parents”) appeal the trial 

court’s termination of their parental rights over their minor children A.E. and 

D.E., and Mother also appeals the termination of her parental rights over her 

minor child by another father, S.L.1 Parents present the following issues for our 

review:

1. Whether the trial court erred when it concluded that the 

Indian Child Welfare Act does not apply to this 

proceeding.

2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support 

the termination of Father’s parental rights.

[2] We affirm.

 

1

 S.L.’s father, S.B., does not participate in this appeal.
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Facts and Procedural History

[3] Mother gave birth to S.L. on October 5, 2011. Thereafter, Mother met and 

married Father, and they had two children together, A.E. and D.E., born in 

2013 and 2015, respectively.2 At some point prior to D.E.’s birth, Father, a 

foreign national, left the United States to live in Spain, but he remained married 

to Mother.

[4] On July 1, 2015, Mother sought emergency medical treatment because she 

“believed herself and [the C]hildren [to be] covered with bedbugs.” Appellants’ 

App. Vol. 2 at 64. After health care providers determined that Mother and the 

Children were not covered in bedbugs and were medically fine, Mother 

continued to insist that “bedbugs were crawling all over her and [the 

C]hildren.” Id. Accordingly, the Indiana Department of Child Services 

(“DCS”) took emergency custody of the Children and placed them in foster 

care. Thereafter, DCS filed petitions alleging that the Children were children in 

need of services (“CHINS”), and the trial court found the Children to be 

CHINS by order dated February 12, 2016. After Parents failed to fully comply 

with services, on May 1, 2017, DCS filed petitions to terminate their parental 

rights over A.E. and D.E., as well as a petition to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights over S.L.

 

2

 For ease of discussion, we will refer to the three children, collectively, as “the Children.” We will also, 

however, refer to A.E. and D.E. as “the Children” where our discussion is relevant only to them, as will be 

obvious from the context.
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[5] Following a hearing, the trial court granted the petitions on December 26, 2017. 

In support of its order, the trial court entered the following findings and 

conclusions:

9. Father . . . is a foreign national, educated from middle school 

through high school in the United States, but due to a violation 

of the United States law cannot return to the United States at this 

time or for the next seven and one-half (7 1⁄2) years. He continues 

to be married to [M]other. . . .

10. Father . . . had left the United States prior to the beginning of 

the CHINS cases concerning [the C]hildren, and [he] is currently 

in Spain with no current possibility for return to the United 

States.

* * *

12. All three [C]hildren were in the custody and control of

[M]other . . . on July l, 2015[,] and were removed by DCS 

without court order on an emergency basis. A hearing was 

timely held on July 2, 2015. The Court found that the emergency 

removal and detention was necessary to protect the [C]hildren.

The Court further found that on July l, 2015[,] [M]other . . . was 

hysterical and believed herself and her [C]hildren were covered 

with bedbugs. She believed one of her children had a seizure due 

to the bedbugs digging into his skin and that the child had 

stopped breathing. When medics arrived the child was pink, 

warm and dry. No bedbugs or evidence of bedbugs was

observed. Mother and the [C]hildren were examined at W.S. 

Major Hospital. There were no bite marks or any evidence of 

bedbugs. Mother stated that she was not crazy and continued to 

state that bedbugs were crawling all over her and her [C]hildren.
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13. All three [C]hildren were detained by Court Order at the 

hearing held on July 2, 2015, [and they were] placed in foster 

care[,] where they remain.

14. Mother appeared with counsel on September 24, 2015[,] and 

admitted that her [C]hildren were CHINS.

15. The Court held a Dispositional Hearing on February 11, 

2016[,] and issued a written order on February 12, 2016.

16. As a part of the Dispositional Order, [M]other was ordered 

to inpatient drug treatment and to contact her Family Case 

Manager every week.

17. Mother resisted all help from DCS and failed to visit [the 

C]hildren.

18. DCS attempted to provide visitation with the [C]hildren and 

[M]other from the day the [C]hildren were detained.

19. DCS provided transportation for [M]other to visit [the 

C]hildren, however [M]other repeatedly failed to visit [the 

C]hildren.

20. Father . . . remained married to [M]other and communicated 

with her by phone after his [C]hildren were detained.

21. Father . . . called the Family Case Manager on August 6, 

2015[,] and again on August 7, 2015, asserting he was the father 

of two of the children. DCS asked him to confirm his identity 

and relationship with the children. In his conversation with the 

Case Manager, he was told of the next court date and he

informed the Case Manager that his lawyer would be 

representing him at the hearing.
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22. Father . . . did attempt to send a [facsimile] to DCS with his 

identifying information, however, the photograph of his 

ID/passport was illegible.

23. As of February 8, 2016, neither DCS nor the Court had any 

additional information concerning either father [S.B. or C.E.]

and the Court authorized service on the fathers by publication.

24. Fathers, [S.B. and C.E.], were defaulted at a hearing held 

May 12, 2016.

* * *

27. As of September 8, 2016, over a year since the [C]hildren 

were detained, [M]other had failed to participate in services.

Mother, however at that time was in jail on an unrelated criminal 

matter and substance abuse treatment was provided to her while 

in jail and DCS arranged for inpatient treatment upon her

release.

28. The DCS Family Case Manager drove [Mother] to her 

inpatient treatment program and [M]other did complete the 

program. However, [M]other failed to attend the first meeting 

after her release. Mother also tested positive for 

methamphetamine upon her release from inpatient treatment and 

promptly relapsed.

29. Services offered to [Mother] included:

a. Take Back Control (substance abuse);

b. Gallahue Community Mental Health Center;

c. Home-based case management;

d. Physical health/disease testing:

e. Three (3) referrals to in-patient substance abuse treatment, 

including Volunteers of America and Wheeler Mission;

f. Visitation services; and

g. Home-based services (including employment, housing).
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30. Mother showed little interest in any services including 

visiting [the C]hildren since the beginning of the case. By the 

time of the termination hearing, [M]other had not visited [the 

C]hildren for [more than] a year. Service providers made 

multiple efforts to facilitate [M]other’s visitation, including 

arrangements to pick up both [M]other and the [C]hildren and

take them wherever [M]other wanted to go. When [Mother]

would fail to be where she was supposed to be for pick up, the

[C]hildren would become upset, screaming and crying. Providers 

attempted a “Visitation Contract,” [and] they made up a 

visitation calendar. After twenty-three (23) missed visits,

[Mother’s] visitation ended.

31. [A.E. and D.E.] have spent the majority of their lives in

foster care. Their CHINS cases have been going on for the 

majority of their young lives.

32. [A.E. and D.E.] no longer have any emotional attachment to 

their biological parents and view the foster placement as their 

parents. The older sibling, [A.E.], has no recollection of either of 

her biological parents. The younger child, [D.E.], has never

met his biological father.

33. [S.L.] has now been in foster care for a third of her life.

* * *

36. Father . . . voluntarily left the country prior to the birth of his 

child[ D.E.] and has had no consistent contact with either of his 

[C]hildren since. When [Father] left the United States[,] the 

pregnant [Mother] and [S.L. and A.E.] could have gone with 

him, but all stayed behind. Since leaving the United States, 

[Father] has undertaken no legal or other action to attempt to

reunite with his family. [Father] is not eligible to reenter the 

United States of America for seven and one-half (7 1⁄2) more

years.
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37. Father . . . had actual knowledge that his [C]hildren had 

been detained by DCS and called DCS in August 2015 and 

informed DCS he would be appearing by counsel. However, he 

didn’t appear by counsel until March l7, 2017.

38. Counsel for [F]ather . . . then withdrew several months later 

on July 12, 2017.

39. Father . . . notified the Court at a hearing held July 17, 

2017[,] that he would be rehiring counsel. [Father]’s prior 

counsel did not reenter his appearance.

40. Despite evidence that [F]ather . . . and his family are 

financially well-off, [Father] never did hire counsel. The Court, 

sua sponte, appointed counsel at public expense to protect 

[Father]’s interest.

41. Despite this Court’s order in the CHINS case that he have

weekly contact with DCS,[3] Father . . . has failed to stay in 

contact with the CASA or his Family Case Manager.

* * *

43. Since the filing of the underlying CHINS case, [Father] has 

not communicated with [the C]hildren. No letter, no birthday or

Christmas cards. [Father’s] mother has on occasion expressed an 

interest in being involved in the [C]hildren’s lives. The Court 

allowed the paternal grandmother to intervene in the underlying

CHINS cases. Nevertheless, other than a visit, no substantial 

steps have been taken to become actively involved with the 

[C]hildren.

 

3

 Father notes, and DCS concedes, that the trial court did not order him to maintain weekly contact with 

DCS. But Father does not contend that this error requires reversal. We address below Father’s general 

contentions regarding his contact with DCS.
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44. On July 1, 2015, when these [C]hildren were detained,

a. Mother . . . was unable to provide the [C]hildren with the

necessities of life and supervision due to her use of illegal drugs.

* * *

c. Father . . . had been out of the country prior to the birth of his 

youngest child and was unable to return due to his violation of

his visa.

Two and one-half years later the situation remains virtually 

unchanged.

45. This matter was set for fact-finding hearing on the combined 

petitions for termination of parental rights on October 26, 2017. 

Mother . . . had actual notice of the termination hearing, but 

failed to show up for the hearing. The Court made arrangements

for both fathers to appear telephonically for the hearing. . . . 

Father [C.E.] was present for a period of time telephonically, but 

the call “timed out” at some point. The Court set the matter for

further hearing on the petitions to terminate the parental rights of 

[both fathers] in order to allow the fathers a fair opportunity to 

further participate and offer additional evidence and testimony. 

Sometime prior to the hearing Mother’s counsel was able to 

locate [Mother] and managed to get her to the second hearing. 

[Both f]athers . . . did . . . participate in the November 14th

hearing by telephone.

46. Despite not appearing for the original fact-finding hearing, 

the Court allowed Mother . . . to testify. For the first time in the 

history of any of the Termination of Parental Rights cases or the 

underlying [CHINS] cases, [M]other stated that she “recently 

learned from my grandmother I have Indian heritage . . . 

Cherokee . . . .” She testified she was not involved in any Native 

American tribe or tribal activity.
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47. The foster parents testified that they intend to adopt all three 

[C]hildren as the permanency plan for the children.

48. The [C]hildren’s Court Appointed Special Advocate

[(“CASA”)] testified that termination of parental rights and 

adoption by the foster parents is in the best interest of the 

[C]hildren. Further, [sic] that none of the parents have a 

significant relationship with their children. The [C]hildren are 

strongly bonded with their foster family.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

* * *

3. The Indian Child Welfare Act defines an “Indian child” as 

“any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either

(1) a member of an Indian tribe or (2) is eligible for membership 

in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an 

Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903). Under federal law, individual 

tribes have the right to determine eligibility, membership, or 

both. However, in order for ICWA to apply, the child must be

a member of, or eligible for membership in, a federally

recognized tribe. The child must be either: (1) a member of an 

Indian tribe; or (2) eligible for membership AND is the

biological child of a member of a tribe.

a. No tribal membership documents, evidence of tribal

membership or membership eligibility was introduced.

b. The Indian Child Welfare Act has not [sic] applicability to this 

cause.

4. The minor [C]hildren have been removed from Mother for at 

least six (6) months under the dispositional decree.

5. The minor children have been removed from Mother and 

their respective Fathers and have been under the supervision of 
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the DCS for at least fifteen (15) of the most recent twenty-two 

(22) months at the time that DCS filed its Verified Petition for 

Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights.

6. There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in the minor children’s removal will not be remedied.

7. The parents of these children are either unable or unwilling to 

meet their responsibilities as parents.

8. The minor children are not required to wait indefinitely for 

their parents to take some substantial step toward becoming a 

responsible parent. The children should not be required to wait 

any longer to enjoy the permanency that is essential to their 

development and overall well-being.

9. There is a reasonable probability that the reasons for 

placement outside the home of Mother and [both] Fathers will 

not be remedied.

10. There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the

parent-child relationship[s] poses a threat to the well-being of the

minor children.

11. Termination of the parent child relationship[s] is in the best 

interests of the minor children.

12. DCS has a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the 

minor children, which is adoption by their current placement.

13. If any of the foregoing Conclusions of Law should be more 

properly denominated as Findings of Fact, then they are so 

denominated.

JUDGMENT
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 

DECREED: That DCS’ petition for termination of Mother’s 

parental rights is granted; and that the parent-child

relationship[s] between the [C]hildren . . . and their Mother . . . is 

hereby terminated.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 

DECREED: That DCS’ petition for termination of 

Father[’s] . . . parental rights is granted; and that the parent-child 

relationship[s] between [A.E. and D.E.] and their Father, [C.E.] 

is hereby terminated. . . .

Id. at 63-70. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Indian Child Welfare Act

[6] Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that “the termination order is invalid and 

should be reversed” because “the court failed to comply with the notice 

requirement of the Indian Child Welfare Act.” Appellant Mother’s Br. at 7-8. 

In particular, Mother maintains that, 

[o]nce [she] testified that she had discovered information that 

Children may be of Indian ancestry, the court had “reason to 

know” Children were of Indian ancestry and was required [under 

federal law] . . . to ensure that DCS undertook due diligence to 

determine whether in fact the Children were eligible to be 

members of a certain Indian tribe.

Id. at 12. We cannot agree.
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[7] The Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”) was enacted “to protect the best 

interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian 

tribes and families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards for the 

removal of Indian children from their families[.]” 25 U.S.C.A. § 1902. A party 

who seeks to invoke a provision of the ICWA has the burden to show that the 

Act applies in the proceeding. Thompson v. Elkhart Ofc. of Fam. and Child. (In re 

S.L.H.S.), 885 N.E.2d 603, 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Following an evidentiary 

hearing, the trial court concluded that the ICWA does not apply here. Thus, 

Mother appeals from a negative judgment, see, e.g., Romine v. Gagle, 782 N.E.2d 

369, 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied, and she must show that the 

evidence points unerringly to a conclusion different from that reached by the 

trial court, or that the judgment is contrary to law. Wilder-Newland v. Kessinger, 

967 N.E.2d 558, 560 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.

[8] Applicability of the ICWA depends on whether the proceeding involves an 

“Indian child,” which is defined as “any unmarried person who is under the age 

of eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for 

membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an

Indian tribe.” 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). Here, at the conclusion of the termination 

hearing, Mother testified that her “grandma” had recently told her that Mother 

has “Indian heritage,” specifically that Mother has Cherokee heritage. Tr. at 

161. And Mother testified that, accordingly, the Children have “Indian 

heritage,” too. Id. But Mother also testified that her grandmother does not 

have any “involvement” with a Native American tribe, and there is no evidence 
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that Mother has ever identified as a Native American or has been involved with 

a Native American tribe in any way. Id. Thus, there is no evidence that either 

Mother or the Children are members of a Native American tribe or have any

“tribal status.” See In re S.L.H.S., 885 N.E.2d at 613. Thus, Mother has failed 

to provide any evidence that the Children are Indian children within the 

purview of the ICWA, and we conclude that the ICWA did not apply to the 

proceedings to terminate Parents’ parental rights to the Children. See id.

(holding ICWA did not apply despite parents’ allegations that they were 

members of Native American tribes where parents could not prove 

membership).

Issue Two: Sufficiency of the Evidence

[9] We begin our review of this issue by acknowledging that “[t]he traditional right 

of parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the 

Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Bailey v. Tippecanoe 

Div. of Fam. & Child. (In re M.B.), 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. 

denied. However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to 

those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a 

termination. Schultz v. Porter Cty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re K.S.), 750 N.E.2d 

832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Termination of a parent-child relationship is 

proper where a child’s emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. 

Although the right to raise one’s own child should not be terminated solely 

because there is a better home available for the child, parental rights may be 
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terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental 

responsibilities. Id. at 836.

[10] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS 

is required to allege and prove:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the 

conditions that resulted in the child’s removal or the 

reasons for placement outside the home of the 

parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the 

continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a 

threat to the well-being of the child.

* * *

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2018). DCS’s “burden of proof in termination of 

parental rights cases is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” R.Y. v. Ind. 

Dep’t of Child Servs. (In re G.Y.), 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009) (quoting 

I.C. § 31-37-14-2).

[11] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the 

evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Peterson v. Marion Cty. Off. of 

Fam. & Child. (In re D.D.), 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. 
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denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that 

are most favorable to the judgment. Id. Moreover, in deference to the trial 

court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside the court’s 

judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. 

Judy S. v. Noble Cty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re L.S.), 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.

[12] Here, in terminating Parents’ parental rights, the trial court entered specific 

findings of fact and conclusions thereon. When a trial court’s judgment 

contains special findings and conclusions, we apply a two-tiered standard of 

review. Bester v. Lake Cty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). 

First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, we 

determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly 

erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either 

directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). If 

the evidence and inferences support the trial court’s decision, we must affirm. 

In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208.

[13] On appeal, Father contends that the trial court erred when it concluded that: 

the conditions that resulted in the Children’s removal and the reasons for their 

placement outside of Mother’s home will not be remedied; there is a reasonable 

probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationships poses a threat 

to the well-being of the Children; and termination is in the Children’s best 

interests. Because the statute is written in the disjunctive, we need not address 
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the court’s conclusion that continuation of the parent-child relationships poses a 

threat to the Children’s well-being. I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2).

Conditions that Resulted in the Children’s Removal will not be Remedied

[14] In determining whether the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that 

Father is unlikely to remedy the reasons for the Children’s removal, we engage 

in a two-step analysis. E.M. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs. (In re E.M.), 4 N.E.3d 

636, 643 (Ind. 2014). “First, we identify the conditions that led to removal; and 

second, we determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those 

conditions will not be remedied.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). In the 

second step, the trial court must judge a parent’s fitness to care for his children 

at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of 

changed conditions. Id. However, the court must also “evaluate the parent’s 

habitual patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or 

deprivation of the child.” Moore v. Jasper Cty. Dep’t of Child Servs., 894 N.E.2d 

218, 226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quotations and citations omitted). Pursuant to 

this rule, courts have properly considered evidence of a parent’s prior criminal 

history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, 

and lack of adequate housing and employment. Id. Moreover, DCS is not 

required to rule out all possibilities of change; rather, it need establish only that 

there is a reasonable probability the parent’s behavior will not change. Id.

[15] Father contends that “many of the court’s findings are erroneous,” but he 

challenges only the following specific findings: that he failed to maintain 

contact with the Children, the CASA, and the family case manager, and that he 
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made no attempts to unify his family. Appellant Father’s Br. at 12. In support 

of his contention on this issue, Father first states that “Mother was Father’s sole 

source of communication with the [C]hildren. Once Mother ceased 

communicating with Father and changed her number, Father had no choice but 

to wait for Mother to call so that he could speak to his Children.” Appellant 

Father’s Br. at 13. The undisputed evidence shows that Mother stopped visiting 

the Children in March 2016, so Father has not spoken to the Children since 

then. And Father does not explain why he did not attempt to reach the 

Children by telephone through DCS or by petitioning the trial court for contact. 

Father does not suggest, and there is no evidence, that DCS would have 

thwarted his efforts to talk to the Children at any time.

[16] As for Father’s inconsistent communication with DCS and the CASA, Father 

asserts that DCS did not let him know there was a problem with the identifying 

information he had provided by fax (it was illegible) in August 2015. Father 

testified that he called DCS “every day for a week” and then stopped calling 

and tried to hire a lawyer. Tr. at 145. Father testified that he did not contact 

DCS again after that time. And Father spoke to the CASA by telephone one 

time, only a few weeks prior to the final hearing. Finally, Father asserts that he 

attempted to reunify his family by buying plane tickets for Mother and the 

Children to travel to Spain. Father’s arguments amount to a request that we 

reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. Father ignores the evidence that: 

he has not seen either of his Children since before D.E. was born in 2015; he 
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has not sent his Children cards or letters; and he has not talked to them on the 

telephone since March 2016, at the latest. 

[17] In any event, Father does not challenge the evidence supporting the trial court’s 

conclusion that the reasons for the Children’s removal from Mother’s home will 

not be remedied. The Children were removed from Mother’s care due to

Mother’s substance abuse and delusions about bedbugs crawling all over the 

Children. At that time, Father was not in the country, and, during the CHINS 

proceeding, Father made no efforts to take custody of the Children. At the time 

of the termination hearing, Mother had not visited the Children for over one 

year, she had failed to complete several court-ordered services, and she had not 

demonstrated sobriety. Father remained out of the country and had not taken 

meaningful steps to seek custody of the Children.

[18] Father’s arguments on appeal simply seek to have this court disregard the 

evidence most favorable to the trial court’s judgment and instead reweigh the 

evidence in his favor, which we cannot do. We cannot say that the trial court 

clearly erred when it concluded that the conditions that resulted in the 

Children’s removal will not be remedied.

Best Interests

[19] In determining whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of a 

child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. A.S. v. 

Ind. Dep’t. of Child Servs. (In re A.K.), 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). 

“A parent’s historical inability to provide adequate housing, stability and 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-261 | July 24, 2018 Page 20 of 21

supervision coupled with a current inability to provide the same will support a 

finding that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child’s best 

interests.” Castro v. State Off. of Fam. & Child., 842 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2006), trans. denied. “Additionally, a child’s need for permanency is an 

important consideration in determining the best interests of a child.” In re A.K., 

924 N.E.2d at 224.

[20] Father contends that termination is not in the Children’s best interests because

he and Mother are “still married,” and he has expressed “a willingness for 

Mother and [all three] Children to come to Spain to live” and “to help get 

Mother into substance abuse treatment[.]” Appellant Father’s Br. at 18. Again, 

Father’s contentions on this issue amount to nothing more than a request that 

we reweigh the evidence, which, again, we cannot do.

[21] The undisputed evidence shows that Mother had failed to participate in courtordered services, failed to keep in contact with her family case managers, and

failed to visit the Children for more than a year at the time of the termination 

hearing. Father has not seen the Children since before D.E.’s birth in 2015 and 

has not communicated with them since March 2016. Father’s Children do not 

know him. The Children need consistent and reliable care, and they need 

permanency. The Children’s CASA testified that removing the Children from 

their foster parents, the only parents they know, would be “traumatic.” Tr. at 

27. And the CASA testified that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the 

Children’s best interests. The totality of the evidence, including Father’s

historical inability to provide a safe and stable home for the Children and his
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-261 | July 24, 2018 Page 21 of 21

failure to maintain contact with the Children, supports the trial court’s 

conclusion that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Children’s best 

interests.

[22] Affirmed.

Crone, J., and Pyle, J., concur.