If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

MICHIGAN REPUBLICAN PARTY and 

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

FOR PUBLICATION

March 7, 2024

v No. 364048

Genesee Circuit Court

DAVINA DONAHUE, WILLIAM KIM, and 

STACEY KAAKE,

LC No. 22-118123-AV

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and JANSEN and GARRETT, JJ.

JANSEN, J. (dissenting).

For the following reasons, I respectfully dissent. I would vacate the trial court’s order 

granting summary disposition in favor of defendants, Davina Donahue, William Kim, and Stacey 

Kaake, because I believe plaintiffs, the Michigan Republican Party and the Republican National 

Committee, have standing to bring their claims under the Michigan Election Law, MCL 168.1 et 

seq. 

Plaintiffs’ action for declaratory relief and mandamus arise from their claims that during 

the 2022 election cycle, defendants violated the requirements in MCL 168.674 requiring the city’s 

board of election commissioners to “appoint an equal number, as nearly as possible, of election 

inspectors in each election precinct from each major political party” to work at the polling place,

MCL 168.674(2), and the absent voter counting board, MCL 168.765a. Plaintiffs alleged that the 

board of election commissioners appointed far less Republican election inspectors than Democrat, 

despite being provided applications and lists of names for prospective election inspectors by 

plaintiffs. The trial court granted defendants summary disposition on the basis that plaintiffs 

lacked standing to challenge the parity requirement of the election-inspector appointees. 

“The purpose of the standing doctrine is to assess whether a litigant’s interest in the issue 

is sufficient to ensure sincere and vigorous advocacy. Thus, the standing inquiry focuses on 

whether a litigant is a proper party to request adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the 

issue itself is justiciable.” Lansing Schs Edu Ass’n v Lansing Bd of Edu, 487 Mich 349, 355; 792 
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NW2d 686 (2010) (quotation marks and citations omitted). In Lansing Schs, the Michigan 

Supreme Court broadened the proper standing doctrine to be applied than what was previously 

applied by the Court: 

We hold that Michigan standing jurisprudence should be restored to a limited, 

prudential doctrine that is consistent with Michigan’s long-standing historical 

approach to standing. Under this approach, a litigant has standing whenever there 

is a legal cause of action. Further, whenever a litigant meets the requirements of 

MCR 2.605, it is sufficient to establish standing to seek a declaratory judgment. 

Where a cause of action is not provided at law, then a court should, in its discretion, 

determine whether a litigant has standing. A litigant may have standing in this 

context if the litigant has a special injury or right, or substantial interest, that will 

be detrimentally affected in a manner different from the citizenry at large or if the 

statutory scheme implies that the Legislature intended to confer standing on the 

litigant. [Id. at 372.]

Here, there is no express cause of action because neither MCL 168.674 nor MCL 168.765a 

confer standing on plaintiffs to enforce the parity requirement therein, as plaintiffs concede on 

appeal. I would hold, however, that plaintiffs have standing because they have a substantial 

interest in the enforcement of these statutes that will be detrimentally affected in a manner different 

from the public at large if the statutes are not enforced. 

MCL 168.674(1) provides that “[t]he board of election commissioners may appoint as an 

election inspector an individual on the list submitted by a major political party” under MCL 

168.673a, who is qualified to serve. In dismissing plaintiffs’ claims, the trial court concluded that 

only the county chairpersons have standing to challenge the appointment of partisan election 

inspectors. The statute provides the county chair of a major political party the authority to 

challenge an appointed election inspector based on that individual’s qualifications and party 

affiliation. MCL 168.674(3). This language does not, however, give the county chairperson the 

authority to challenge the parity requirement. Under the standing requirements provided in 

Lansing Schs, 487 Mich at 372, plaintiffs would not have standing to challenge the credentials of 

any individual election inspector; however, given the authority to provide lists of potential 

nominees, I believe they do have standing to challenge the parity requirement. Plaintiffs have 

unique interests in obtaining inspectors to assure that any Republican-designated candidate is fairly 

and equally treated during the counting process. This interest is unique and separate from the 

public at large. And it is particularly important today that parity and oversight be addressed in 

light of current challenges to the integrity of recent elections.

In White v Highland Park Election Comm, 312 Mich App 571, 573; 878 NW2d 491 (2015), 

this Court held that an individual citizen lacked standing to sue for an alleged violation of MCL 

168.674(2) because subsections (3) and (4) gave the county chairs “the ability to file administrative 

appeals to challenge certain inspector appointments.” The majority concludes that the holding of 

White indicates that chairpersons are delegated the authority to enforce the parity requirement on 

behalf of major political parties. I disagree. If we carry defendants’ argument to its logical 

conclusion that because the county chairperson may challenge credentials, that they have a right 

to challenge parity, we are met with the plain language of the statute which does not provide the 

county chairpersons with any explicit authority to challenge the parity requirement. Under the 
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majority opinion, this could leave no one with the authority to challenge the parity requirement 

under the statutes. Moreover, the Legislature, by specifically stating that a major political party 

could submit names for potential election inspectors, acknowledged, and it can be implied that it 

understood, the specific interest the major political party would have in making sure there is parity 

in appointing election inspectors. See Lansing Schs, 487 Mich at 372. 

As the statute provides plaintiffs the ability to submit names for appointment as election 

inspectors, and provides the county chairpersons only the authority to challenge individual 

appointment credentials, I believe plaintiffs have standing under Lansing Schs, id., to challenge 

the parity requirement. I would therefore vacate the trial court order granting defendants summary 

disposition on the basis that plaintiffs lacked standing, and remand to the trial court to consider 

whether plaintiffs are entitled to a writ of mandamus. 

/s/ Kathleen Jansen