J-S02002-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

MARQUIS JACKSON

Appellant No. 1292 EDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 11, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0007141-2011

BEFORE: MUNDY, J., OLSON, J., and WECHT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED MAY 29, 2015

Appellant, Marquis Jackson, appeals from the April 11, 2013 aggregate 

judgment of sentence of 18 to 36 years’ imprisonment, imposed after being 

found guilty by a jury of attempted murder, aggravated assault, possessing 

an instrument of crime, carrying a firearm on public streets in Philadelphia, 

simple assault, and recklessly endangering another person.1 After careful 

review, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the relevant factual and procedural history 

of this case as follows.

The Commonwealth presented evidence that 

Appellant shot the complainant, Mr. Donzel Murril, 

multiple times at close range. The complainant 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901, 2702, 907, 6108, 2701, and 2705, respectively.
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testified that on May 31, 2011, at approximately 

9:40 p.m., he was sitting in a parked vehicle with his 

girlfriend near the 7400 block of Edmund Street, 

Philadelphia. The complainant was sitting in the 

driver’s seat and his girlfriend, Verdell Goodman, 

was positioned in the passenger seat. The 

complainant observed Appellant emerge from an 

alleyway and walk to a nearby corner. Street lights 

illuminated the area and Appellant was not wearing 

clothing around his head or face. Appellant then 

walked to the driver’s side of the complainant’s 

vehicle, holding a firearm in his hand. The 

complainant verbally greeted the Appellant, whom 

he knew for five or six years. Appellant then 

discharged his firearm multiple times, striking the 

complainant in the leg, back and elbow. The 

complainant then started his vehicle and drove 

briefly before stopping to permit Ms. Goodman to 

assume control. Ms. Goodman transported the 

complainant to the hospital for medical treatment. 

When presented with a photo-array at the hospital, 

the complainant immediately identified Appellant. 

Ms. Goodman also testified to the 

circumstances surrounding the shooting, providing a 

substantially similar account as the complainant. 

Ms. Goodman initially observed the shooter, whom 

she identified in court as Appellant, emerge from a 

nearby driveway and walk to a street corner. After 

peeping around the corner, Appellant walked back in 

the direction of their vehicle. A street light activated 

at that point in time and Ms. Goodman observed 

Appellant holding a gun, his arm extended 

downward. Appellant approached the driver’s side of 

the vehicle prompting the complainant to greet him 

and identify himself. Appellant responded to the 

verbal identification by raising the gun and 

discharging it toward the vehicle from a distance of 

approximately twenty-five to thirty feet. The 

complainant then complied with Ms. Goodman’s 

demand to drive away. Ms. Goodman assumed 

control of the vehicle shortly thereafter. Ms. 

Goodman subsequently made a photo-array 

identification of Appellant. Before viewing the photo-
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array, Ms. Goodman initially misidentified an 

individual shown to her approximately forty-five 

minutes after the shooting as looking like the 

shooter.

The Commonwealth also presented evidence 

relating to the intimidation of witnesses. The 

complainant’s mother, Ms. Dolly Evans testified that 

she was approached by two individuals on June 30, 

2011 at a store located at Loring and Torresdale 

Avenue, Philadelphia. Ms. Evans recognized one of 

the individuals and knew him as “Rob.” After a brief 

verbal exchange, the second individual struck Ms. 

Evans on the jaw, stating “take this message to your 

son.” The two individuals immediately entered their 

vehicle and left the area. The complainant testified 

that he was also approached by Rob on the same 

date at the same location. The complainant knew 

Rob as a local resident and frequently observed him 

in Appellant’s company. The complainant further 

characterized Rob as Appellant’s “right-hand man.” 

Rob inquired “why you go to court on my young 

boy?” and followed up, stating “suppose I come and 

shoot your house up.”

Trial Court Opinion, 12/18/13, at 1-3 (citations to notes of testimony 

omitted).

On June 1, 2011, Appellant was charged with the aforementioned 

offenses.2 Appellant was arrested the following day. On March 29, 2012, 

the Commonwealth filed a motion to consolidate Appellant’s trial with that of 

Demaris Robinson, who was charged with witness intimidation against the 

complainant in the instant matter. Commonwealth’s Motion for 

____________________________________________

2 Appellant was also charged with one count of firearms not to be carried 

without a license which was nolle prossed. See generally 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 6106(a)(1). 
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Consolidation, 3/29/12, at 2 (unnumbered). On May 2, 2012, the 

Commonwealth’s motion was granted.

Following a four-day trial commencing on January 14, 2013, Appellant 

was found guilty on January 17, 2013 of the aforementioned crimes. On 

April 11, 2013, Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 18 to 36 

years’ imprisonment. Thereafter, on April 16, 2013, Appellant filed a timely 

post-sentence motion, asserting the verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence and that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Appellant’s 

Post-Sentence Motion, 4/16/13, at 1-3. On April 29, 2013, the trial court 

denied Appellant’s motion without a hearing. That same day, Appellant filed 

a timely notice of appeal.

On August 16, 2013, the trial court ordered Appellant to file, within 21 

days, a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to 

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b). On September 7, 2013, 

Appellant complied, albeit, untimely.3 On December 18, 2013, the trial court 

filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion.

____________________________________________

3 We note that September 7, 2013 was a Saturday. Curiously, said 

document is stamped “Filed 09/07/2013 09:35:29 PM Post Trial Unit.” 

Nevertheless, Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement was due the prior day on 

September 6, 2013, therefore, Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement was filed 

one day late. We note that the untimely filing of a concise statement on 

direct appeal is the equivalent of a complete failure to file, which constitutes 

per se ineffective assistance of counsel. Commonwealth v. Burton, 973 

A.2d 428, 432-433 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc). Generally, such failure 

would compel remand. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(3) (requiring remand for 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review.

1. Whether the trial court committed error first by 

granting a motion for consolidation, and second by 

proceeding to admit evidence against Appellant of 

[the] Commonwealth’s motion to consolidate an 

unrelated victim intimidation case initially creating a 

co-defendant matter with Appellant’s current case 

when the case involved a totally different defendant, 

victim, incident and facts, and where the codefendant was no longer facing trial because he 

entered a guilty plea before trial?

2. Whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to 

sustain the charges of Attempted Murder, 

Aggravated Assault, Simple Assault, VUFA § 6108, 

Possessing an Instrument of Crime, and REAP?

Appellant’s Brief at 5.

In his first issue, Appellant argues the trial court erred by granting a 

motion to consolidate his trial with that of Robinson, and further by ruling to 

admit evidence that Robinson approached the complainant for the purpose 

of intimidating him to not attend Appellant’s preliminary hearing. Id. at 10-

12. 

We first address Appellant’s contention that the trial court erred in 

granting the Commonwealth’s motion to consolidate his trial with Robinson’s. 

In his brief, Appellant concedes that Robinson pled guilty before trial; 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

filing of a concise statement nunc pro tunc in instances of counsel’s per se 

ineffectiveness). However where, as here, the late filing did not prevent the 

trial court from addressing the merits of Appellant’s issues in its 1925(a) 

opinion, this Court may decide the appeal on the merits. Commonwealth 

v. Thompson, 39 A.3d 335, 340 (Pa. Super. 2012), citing Burton, supra.
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therefore there was no joint trial. Id. at 11. The trial court concluded that 

Appellant’s issue is moot based on Robinson’s decision to plead guilty. We 

agree.

Appellant claims that the trial court erroneously 

granted [the] Commonwealth’s motion to consolidate 

a victim intimidation case with his. The legality of 

the [trial] court’s decision to consolidate 

notwithstanding, Appellant’s challenge is moot as the 

co-defendant entered into a negotiated guilty plea 

prior to trial and Appellant was tried alone. 

Furthermore, the fact of co-defendant’s entrance into 

a guilty plea was not presented to the jury at 

Appellant’s trial. Appellant’s claim therefore does 

not warrant relief.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/18/13, at 10-11 (footnote omitted). 

Accordingly, we only need to address Appellant’s claim that the trial 

court erred in denying Appellant’s pretrial motion to exclude the intimidation 

testimony attributed to Robinson. Appellant’s Brief at 11. Specifically, 

Appellant argues the trial court erred in ruling that even after Robinson pled 

guilty “it would still admit testimony regarding the intimidation of the 

[c]omplainant.” Id. Additionally, Appellant argues that critical to this case 

is the fact that he was in custody at the time of Robinson’s arrest, and there 

was no evidence connecting him to the intimidation offense. Id. at 11-12. 

In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence, our 

standard of review is one of deference. Commonwealth v. Selenski, 18 

A.3d 1229, 1232 (Pa. Super. 2011), vacated in part on other grounds, 92 

A.3d 766 (Pa. 2014). Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence are 
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within “the sound discretion of the trial court, and its discretion will not be 

reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Id. (citation omitted). “An 

abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but is rather the 

overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is 

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality, 

as shown by the evidence of record.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 884 A.2d 

920, 924 (Pa. Super. 2005) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted), 

appeal denied, 928 A.2d 1289 (Pa. 2007). Furthermore, “if in reaching a 

conclusion the trial court over-rides [sic] or misapplies the law, discretion is 

then abused and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct the error.” 

Commonwealth v. Weakley, 972 A.2d 1182, 1188 (Pa. Super. 2009) 

(citation omitted), appeal denied, 986 A.2d 150 (Pa. 2009).

Instantly, Appellant does not point to a specific place in the trial where 

the evidence of Robinson’s intimidation of the complainant was admitted into 

evidence. At no point in Appellant’s brief does he direct this Court to the 

specific evidence he claims was admitted in error. Rather, his argument 

generally alleges that the trial court’s determination that the intimidation 

evidence was admissible was in error. Absent specific citations to the record 

we cannot review Appellant’s claim. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c) (stating, “[i]f 

reference is made to the pleadings, evidence, charge, opinion or order, or 

any other matter appearing in the record, the argument must set forth, in 

immediate connection therewith, or in a footnote thereto, a reference to the 
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place in the record where the matter referred to appears[]”). Accordingly, 

Appellant’s first issue is waived.

In Appellant’s second issue, he avers the evidence at trial was 

insufficient to sustain all six charges. Appellant’s Brief at 15-17. However, 

before addressing the merits of Appellant’s claim, we must determine 

whether Appellant has preserved his issues for appellate review. 

By its text, Rule 1925(b) requires that concise statements “identify 

each ruling or error that the appellant intends to challenge with sufficient 

detail to identify all pertinent issues for the judge.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii); 

see also Commonwealth v. Reeves, 907 A.2d 1, 2 (Pa. Super. 2006) 

(stating “[w]hen a court has to guess what issues an appellant is appealing, 

that is not enough for meaningful review[]”), appeal denied, 919 A.2d 956 

(Pa. 2007). Any issues not raised in accordance with Rule 1925(b)(4) will be 

deemed waived. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii). Our Supreme Court has made 

clear that Rule 1925(b) is a bright-line rule. Commonwealth v. Hill, 16 

A.3d 484, 494 (Pa. 2011). Additionally, with regard to claims pertaining to 

the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s evidence, we have stated as follows.

In order to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of 

the evidence on appeal, an appellant’s Rule 1925(b)

statement must state with specificity the element or 

elements upon which the appellant alleges that the 

evidence was insufficient. Such specificity is of 

particular importance in cases where, as here, 

the appellant was convicted of multiple crimes 

each of which contains numerous elements that 

the Commonwealth must prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt.
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Commonwealth v. Garland, 63 A.3d 339, 344 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted; emphasis added).

Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement baldy asserts, “whether the 

evidence at trial was sufficient to sustain the charges of attempted murder, 

aggravated assault, simple assault, VUFA § 6106, possessing an instrument 

of a crime, and REAP?” Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement, 9/7/13, at 1 

(capitalization corrected). Appellant fails to specify which elements of which 

crimes he is challenging. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that 

Appellant’s issue is waived for failure to sufficiently raise it in his Rule 

1925(b) statement. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/18/13, at 3 (finding waiver 

on the basis that “Appellant completely failed to indicate which element(s) 

he is challenging[]”); see Garland, supra. 

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that both of Appellant’s issues 

are devoid of merit or waived. Accordingly, the trial court’s April 11, 2013 

judgment of sentence is affirmed.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/29/2015