1 Rule 10 (Co ur t of Appe als). Memorandum O pinion . -- (b) The Cou rt, with the c onc urre nce of all

judges partici pating i n the case, may affirm, rev

erse or modify the acti ons of the tr ial cour t by memorandum opinion when a formal opini on would have no pr ecedential

value. When a case is deci ded by memorandum opinion it shal l be designa ted “MEMORANDUM OPINION,” shall not be publi shed, and shall not be cited or relied on for any r

eason in a subsequent unrelated case. 

# FILED
May 6, 1998 Cecil W. Crowson Appellate Cou rt Clerk

IN THE COURT OF A

PPEALS OF TENN ESSEE AT NASHVILLE
HELEN COOKSEY, ) From the Wilson County Circuit Court ) at Lebanon, Tennessee Plaintiff/Appellee, ) ) The Hon. Bobb y Capers, Judge vs. ) ) Trial Court No. 9846 ) Appeal No. 01A01-9708-CV-00378 ) JERRY AND LOTTIE SHELLEY, ) AFFIRMED ) Defendants/Appellants. ) ) JASON S. MANGRUM ) CHRISTOPHER R. FOX ) Lebanon, Tennessee ) Attorney for Appellants ) ) HELEN K. COOKSEY, p ro se ) Lebanon, Tennessee )
MEMORANDU M OPINION 1 HIGHERS, J. Defendants/Appell ants, Jerry and Lottie Shelley (“d efendants”), appeal the judgmen t of the trial court affirming the decision of the W ilso n County General Sessions Court in favor of plaintiff/appellee, Helen C ook sey (“plain tiff”). For reason s state he reinaft er, we affirm the judgment of the trial cour t.

Facts and Procedural His tory Judgment was awarded to plaintiff in the Wilson County General Sessions Cour t on September

3 0 , 1996. Defendants appealed the case to t he Circuit Court for Wilson County. The trial was set for D ecember 9, 1996. Defendants were not p re sent at this proceeding and as a consequence of their nonapp earance, the trial court di smissed the action. Defendants were informed of the date of the proceedi ng by a letter sent to them2

via U.S. mail. This letter w as received by Jer

ry S helley. Defendants contend that Jerry Shelley suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder. Defendants further contend that

this illness was t he basis for many episodes of fantasy and confu sion in Mr. Shelley. As a result of these episodic encounters with fantasy and confusion, defendants assert that Mr. Shelley failed to inform Mr s. Shelley of the trial da te which resulted in t heir absence.

After the dis missal, defendant s filed a n Applic

ation for Writ of C ertior ari and Supersedeas with the tr ial c ourt together with a medi cal affidavit of Mr. Shelley ’s mental condition and the affidavit of Mrs. Shelle y asserting that she had not been informed of the original December 9, 1996, trial date.

This matter

was heard before the Honorable Bobby Caper s on March 5, 1997, upon defendants’ Application for Writ of Certiorari and Superse deas. At the hearing after granting defendants’ Application for Writ of Certiorar i and Supersedeas, the trial judge stated that if the defendants wanted a trial, he would conduct one that day . The witnesses
were sworn and the

trial was conducted at

the bench. Defendants contend that they were denied the opportunity to be heard, to cross examine, a nd to present any evidenc e. Plainti ff contends that defendants were not denied th ese rights but rather s tated that defendants chose not to proffer any evidence. Plaintiff fu rther asserts that defendants wanted t he trial court to set a new tri al date. Due to repeated continuanc es in General Sessions and one nonappearance in the trial court, Judge Capers deni ed the request for continuance and heard only the proof submitted, which w as that of the plaintiff. Part and parcel of this p roof wa s that of plaint iff stating the amount of the balance ow ed on the General Sessions judgment. Con s equently, the trial c ourt denied the Application and affirmed the General

Sessio ns Cour

t decis ion gra nting j udgment to plai ntiff. This appeal ensued.
The sole issue raised on appeal is as follows: Did the trial court err in not granting defendants a trial de novo on appe al after

granting the Application for Writ of Certiorari and Supersedeas?3 Discussion Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-729 (1997 supp.) provides: No civil case, orig inating in a general sessions court and carried to a higher court, shall be dismissed by such court for any informality whatever, but shall be tried on its merits; and the court shall allow

all amendments in the form of action, the parties thereto, or the statement of the cause of action, necessary to reach the mer its, upon such terms as may be deemed just and proper. The trial shall be de novo , including damages. Defendants strenuously argue that they were denied their right to a trial de novo as specifically provi ded by Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-729 ( 1997 supp.). We disagree.

At oral argument, conver sation betwee n the court and counsel for defendants concerning the March 5, 1997, court date helps to shed some light on this ma tter.

Questio n: Could yo u have pre sented p roof on t hat day? Answer: My clients we re there yo ur honor. We co uld’ve present ed proof. Question: The trial judge didn’t forbid you from presenting any evidence you wanted t

o present? Answer: Not in that respect . . . He forbade me to present it the way I wanted to pr

esent it,

. . . in a more reasonable manner, less hurried. I felt we w ere not going to be given a fair hearing. In the opinion of this court, thi s does not evinc e a d enial of the defendants right to a de
novo trial on the merits. On the contrar y, defendants were provided w ith an opportunity to present proof several times but chos e no t to d o so. We note that this matter was
c onti nued several times in Gener al Sessions and was set for trial in December of 1996. As such, counsel

for defen dants ha

d ample t ime to pr

epare hi s proof. At oral argument, he stated that

he was able to put

on his proof on March 5, 1997, but felt hurried in doing
so. The trial court did not deny defendants their right to a de novo trial. Rather, defendants
were presented with this r ight and rejected the

opportunity to invoke it

. They did so to their own peril.

Accordin gly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Costs o f this appeal are taxed to defendants, for which execut ion may issue if necessary

.4 HIGHERS, J.

CONCUR:

CRAWFORD, P.J., W.S.

FARMER, J.