After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is *

unnecessary. Accordingly, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See FED. R.

APP. P. 34(a)(2). 

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted October 30, 2008*

Decided October 30, 2008

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

No. 08-2121

ROBERT C. BRENNEMAN JR.,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

WENDY KNIGHT,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Indiana,

Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:07-cv-1553-LJM-TAB

Larry J. McKinney,

Judge.

O R D E R

Indiana inmate Robert Brenneman appeals from the denial of his petition for a writ

of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He claims that he was denied due process at a

disciplinary hearing because, he insists, he did not receive adequate notice of the charge or

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 08-2121 Page 2

a sufficient opportunity to present witnesses, and the evidence did not support the finding

of guilt. We affirm. 

 On August 29, 2007, Brenneman received a Report of Conduct accusing him of

“engaging in sexual acts with another or making sexual proposals, gestures, or threats” in

violation of section B-216 of the Adult Disciplinary Procedures governing inmates. The

report explains that Brenneman had reached over the shoulder of Reverend Donna Olsen, a

volunteer instructor at the facility, and touched her bra strap below the collarbone. 

Brenneman opted to contest the allegation and told the screening officer that he wished to

call as witnesses inmates Brosius, Santistevan, and Hensley. At the disciplinary hearing on

September 5, the Board received into evidence an e-mail from Olsen in which she alleges

that Brenneman, after arriving late to a class she was conducting in the chapel, walked

behind the chair where she was seated, reached over her shoulder, and through her blouse

touched her bra strap and the soft area below her clavicle. Olsen said she was sitting in the

front row at the time, and that 15 of the roughly 30 men in the class were sitting behind her. 

Brenneman asserted that he simply tapped Olsen on the shoulder. His three witnesses

submitted statements attesting to his good character but did not describe Brenneman’s

contact with Olsen. The Board found Brenneman guilty and revoked 90-days good-time

credits, demoted him in credit-class, and ordered him to serve 90 days in segregation. 

Two weeks later Brenneman filed an administrative appeal. Among several

contentions, he asserted that when the Report of Conduct was screened, he had asked that

all of the inmates in the class be interviewed, but was forced to select three. He was

segregated awaiting hearing, Brenneman explained, so he could not conduct any further

investigation on his own. But after the disciplinary hearing, Brenneman continued, he

obtained statements from three other inmates, all of whom maintain that Brenneman

tapped Olsen on the shoulder and that nothing inappropriate occurred. The warden

rejected Brenneman’s appeal, as did the final reviewing authority. 

In his § 2254 petition Brenneman alleged, among other things, that because he was

in segregation before the disciplinary hearing, he could not identify the witnesses who

actually saw the incident, and that first the screening officer and later the Board dismissed

as redundant or irrelevant his requests for additional testimony. Brenneman also claimed

that he did not get adequate notice of the charge and that the Board did not have sufficient

evidence to find him guilty. The district court explicitly rejected the last two contentions

but did not specifically address Brenneman’s claim that he was denied his right to present

testimony from additional witnesses. Our review is de novo. Moore v. Battaglia, 476 F.3d

504, 506 (7th Cir. 2007). 

 
No. 08-2121 Page 3

Brenneman’s claims about the notice he received and the evidence underlying the

Board’s decision can be quickly rejected. Brenneman contends that the notice of the charge

was inadequate because, he insists, he did not receive a written copy of Olsen’s e-mail

when the charge was screened. Brenneman lost good-time and was demoted in creditclass, so he had a right to due process at his hearing. See Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 939

(7th Cir. 2007); Montgomery v. Anderson, 262 F.3d 641, 644-45 (7th Cir. 2001). Thus he was

entitled to written notice of the rule he allegedly violated and a summary of the conduct

underlying that charge. See Northern v. Hanks, 326 F.3d 909, 910 (7th Cir. 2003); Whitford v.

Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 534 (7th Cir. 1995). Over a week before the hearing, Brenneman

received the Report of Conduct informing him of the charge by name and section number. 

That report also summarizes the alleged incident. Moreover, Brenneman concedes that

Olsen’s e-mail was read to him when the charge was screened. Nothing more was

required. See Northern, 326 F.3d at 910; Whitford, 63 F.3d at 534. 

As to the evidence, due process was satisfied if the Board had “some evidence” to

support its findings. See Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 662 (7th Cir. 2003); Webb v. Anderson,

224 F.3d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 2000). Brenneman argues that no evidence supports the Board’s

conclusion that he intended to touch Olsen in a sexual manner. A disciplinary board’s

resolution of two competing stories need only have some factual support, and a brief

description of the events in a disciplinary report can satisfy that standard. Johnson v.

Finnan, 467 F.3d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 2006); McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786, (7th Cir.

1999). Olsen recounts in her e-mail that Brenneman reached over her shoulder and through

her blouse touched her bra strap with his middle finger and the area below her clavicle

with another finger. Olsen’s description is enough to support the Board’s finding. 

Brenneman’s remaining contention is that he was not permitted to call the inmate

witnesses who told him after the hearing that they saw him tap Olson on the shoulder but

do nothing inappropriate. Brenneman says these witnesses were not located before the

hearing because the screening officer would not offer to let staff interview the entire class

and he could not do so himself while in segregation. Courts must exercise caution in

overturning the judgment of a prison official who concludes that an inmate’s request to call

witnesses will compromise the needs and objectives of the institution or otherwise impose

an onerous burden on prison staff. See Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 496 (1985); Wolff v.

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566-67 (1974); Whitlock v. Johnson, 153 F.3d 380, 386 (7th Cir. 1998). 

Brenneman’s claim fails because he demanded that prison staff interview Olsen’s entire

class—over 30 inmates—to determine who saw the incident. The outcome may have

differed had Brenneman instead requested that prison staff give him a roster of the class so

that he could name other witnesses that he wanted to call, see Kingsley v. Bureau of Prisons,

937 F.2d 26, 30-31 & n.6 (2d. Cir. 1991), or if prison officials had refused his request to

obtain statements from a select number of specific witnesses, see Pannell v. McBride, 306

F.3d 499, 503-04 (7th Cir. 2002). But requiring the staff to conduct a fishing expedition,
No. 08-2121 Page 4

particularly of the magnitude Brenneman requested, would have imposed too great a

burden. Moreover, the prison staff’s refusal to find Brenneman’s witnesses did not

prejudice him, and thus did not violate due process, because Brenneman’s appeal was

denied even after he submitted statements from the three inmates who asserted that they

saw Brenneman do nothing inappropriate. See Piggie, 342 F.3d at 666-67 (explaining that

due process was not violated where decision of purportedly biased disciplinary board was

upheld on administrative review). 

AFFIRMED.