II 

116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 3843 

To establish a positive agenda and framework for the future of arms control 

with the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MAY 21, 2020 

Mr. MENENDEZ introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 

referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

A BILL 

To establish a positive agenda and framework for the future 

of arms control with the Russian Federation and the 

People’s Republic of China. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Future of Arms Con5 trol Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 

7 In this Act: 

8 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT9 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com10 mittees’’ means— 


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1 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, 

2 the Committee on Armed Services, and the Se3 lect Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; 

4 and 

5 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 

6 Committee on Armed Services, and the Perma7 nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 

8 House of Representatives. 

9 (2) NEW START.—The term ‘‘New START’’ 

10 means the Treaty between the United States and the 

11 Russian Federation on Measures for the Further 

12 Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive 

13 Arms, signed April 8, 2010, and entered into force 

14 February 5, 2011 (commonly known as the ‘‘New 

15 START Treaty’’). 

16 SEC. 3. FINDINGS. 

17 Congress makes the following findings: 

18 (1) Since the end of World War II, the United 

19 States has relied on a robust and effective nuclear 

20 deterrent as part of its national defense, particularly 

21 against the Soviet Union and its successor state, the 

22 Russian Federation. 

23 (2) In tandem with its nuclear deterrent, the 

24 United States pursued a number of arms control, 

25 disarmament, and nonproliferation agreements with 


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1 the Soviet Union as a means of ensuring strategic 

2 stability, providing transparency into the Soviet 

3 Union’s nuclear forces, reducing United States nu4 clear expenditures, and defending the United States, 

5 including the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and 

6 the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. 

7 (3) After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 

8 the United States continued to pursue arms control 

9 with the Russian Federation along with a credible 

10 nuclear deterrent as a means of ensuring United 

11 States security from nuclear attack. 

12 (4) The New START Treaty, ratified with bi13 partisan support on December 22, 2010, remains an 

14 important tool for limiting and verifying the Russian 

15 Federation’s strategic nuclear arsenal. 

16 (5) The New START Treaty, which expires in 

17 February 2021, can be extended until February 

18 2026 if both parties agree to such an extension. 

19 (6) The United States engages in robust, 

20 verifiable arms control because it fundamentally pro21 tects United States and allied security interests. 

22 (7) On April 17, 2020, Secretary of State Mike 

23 Pompeo met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey 

24 Lavrov, and in those talks asserted that any future 


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1 arms control talks must include the People’s Repub2 lic of China. 

3 (8) The Government of the People’s Republic of 

4 China has signaled that it has no intention of engag5 ing in trilateral arms control talks with the United 

6 States and the Russian Federation. 

7 (9) Since 1964, the People’s Republic of China 

8 has been a nuclear weapons state and has developed 

9 strategic and tactical systems capable of threatening 

10 the United States, United States allies and partners, 

11 and United States and alliance assets in the Indo12 Pacific region. 

13 (10) Today, the People’s Republic of China re14 tains a limited but survivable nuclear deterrent with 

15 an extensive modernization program which, accord16 ing to the Defense Intelligence Agency’s 2019 China 

17 Military Power Report, will make its arsenal ‘‘more 

18 mobile, responsive, and accurate’’. 

19 (11) It is in the security interests of the United 

20 States to engage with the People’s Republic of China 

21 on relevant arms control issues, whether in a bilat22 eral or multilateral format, through a coherent, co23 ordinated strategy. 

24 SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

25 It is the policy of the United States that— 


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1 (1) unless the President determines and so in2 forms Congress that the Russian Federation is not 

3 in material compliance with New START such that 

4 the object and purpose of the Treaty is significantly 

5 undermined, and that efforts to resolve any such 

6 material noncompliance have been undertaken and 

7 not resolved such noncompliance, the United States 

8 shall extend New START from its initial termi9 nation date in February 2021 to February 2026, as 

10 permitted under Article XIV of the Treaty; 

11 (2) if the President has not extended New 

12 START by November 3, 2020, the United States 

13 Government should encourage the Government of 

14 the Russian Federation not to exceed or prepare to 

15 exceed the limitations of the New START Treaty 

16 prior to the expiration of the Treaty on February 5, 

17 2021, providing an opportunity from January 20, 

18 2021, until February 5, 2021, for the United States 

19 and the Russian Federation to negotiate an exten20 sion to and continued implementation of the treaty; 

21 (3) if the President does not extend the New 

22 START Treaty by November 3, 2020, no action or 

23 activity should be taken by any United States offi24 cial, agency, or department that would violate or 


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1 lead to the violation of the treaty while the treaty re2 mains in force; 

3 (4) the United States must maintain a credible 

4 nuclear deterrent capable of defending the homeland 

5 and United States allies covered under extended de6 terrence; 

7 (5) the United States, in conjunction with New 

8 START’s extension, should pursue additional arms 

9 control frameworks with the Russian Federation 

10 that limit the possibility of purposeful or accidental 

11 nuclear war and advance United States security, in12 cluding— 

13 (A) further reductions to the Russian Fed14 eration’s strategic nuclear arsenal, including the 

15 number of its warheads and deployed delivery 

16 systems; 

17 (B) limitations or elimination of the Rus18 sian Federation’s tactical and intermediate 

19 range systems that directly threaten United 

20 States allies and partners in Europe and the 

21 Indo-Pacific; 

22 (C) control, limitation, or elimination of 

23 the Russian Federation’s novel nuclear weap24 ons, such as hypersonic weapons, undersea nu25 clear weapons, or other delivery systems; 


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1 (D) transparency and confidence-building 

2 measures to avoid, manage, or control nuclear, 

3 conventional, and unconventional military esca4 lation between the United States and the Rus5 sian Federation; 

6 (E) areas of potential dialogue between the 

7 governments of the United States and the Rus8 sian Federation on space, cyberspace, and con9 ventional forces, as well as other strategic do10 mains, which could reduce the likelihood of war, 

11 limit escalation if a conflict were to occur, and 

12 constrain a destabilizing arms race; and 

13 (F) rigorous inspection and monitoring 

14 mechanisms to verify compliance with any fu15 ture arms control framework; and 

16 (6) the United States Government should for17 mulate a coherent strategy to engage the Govern18 ment of the People’s Republic of China on relevant 

19 bilateral issues that lays the groundwork for bring20 ing the People’s Republic of China into an arms con21 trol framework, including— 

22 (A) fostering bilateral dialogue on arms 

23 control leading to the convening of bilateral 

24 strategic stability talks; 

25 (B) negotiating norms for outer space; 


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1 (C) developing pre-launch notification re2 gimes aimed at reducing nuclear miscalculation; 

3 and 

4 (D) expanding lines of communication be5 tween both governments for the purposes of re6 ducing the risks of conventional war and in7 creasing transparency. 

8 SEC. 5. RESTRICTION ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY. 

9 (a) IN GENERAL.—If the President does not extend 

10 the New START Treaty by November 3, 2020, no action 

11 or activity may be taken by any United States official, 

12 agency, or department that would violate or lead to the 

13 violation of the treaty until March 1, 2021. 

14 (b) WAIVER.— 

15 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President may waive 

16 the restriction in subsection (a) 15 days after certi17 fying to the appropriate congressional committees 

18 that the Government of the Russian Federation has 

19 materially violated the New START Treaty such 

20 that the security of the United States has been 

21 gravely threatened. The certification shall include 

22 the reasons for making such determination. The cer23 tification shall be unclassified to the maximum ex24 tent possible, but may include a classified annex. 

25 (2) EFFECTIVENESS.— 


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1 (A) IN GENERAL.—A waiver under sub2 section (a) shall take effect if, at the end of 15 

3 days after the President makes the certification 

4 described under such subsection, Congress has 

5 not enacted a joint resolution of disapproval. 

6 (B) CONSIDERATION OF JOINT RESOLU7 TION OF DISAPPROVAL.—A joint resolution in8 troduced pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be 

9 considered in the Senate in accordance with the 

10 provisions of section 601(b) of the International 

11 Security Assistance and Arms Export Control 

12 Act of 1976 (Public Law 94–329; 90 Stat. 

13 765). 

14 SEC. 6. REPORTS. 

15 (a) IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED STATES POL16 ICY.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enact17 ment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination 

18 with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appro19 priate congressional committees a report, and a separate 

20 classified annex, detailing the United States Government’s 

21 plans for implementing the policy of the United States 

22 stated in section 4 with respect to the Russian Federation. 

23 (b) ARMS CONTROL TALKS WITH THE RUSSIAN

24 FEDERATION AND THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.— 

25 Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 


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1 of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with 

2 the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate 

3 congressional committees a report that describes— 

4 (1) a concrete plan for arms control talks that 

5 includes both the People’s Republic of China and the 

6 Russian Federation; 

7 (2) if trilateral arms control dialogue does not 

8 arise, what alternative plans the Department of 

9 State envisages for ensuring United States security 

10 from Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons; 

11 (3) efforts at engaging the People’s Republic of 

12 China to join arms control talks, whether on a bilat13 eral or multilateral basis; and 

14 (4) the interest level of the Government of the 

15 People’s Republic of China in joining arms control 

16 talks, whether on a bilateral or multilateral basis. 

17 (c) EXTENSION OF NEW START.—Not later than 90 

18 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec19 retary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of De20 fense and the Director of National Intelligence, shall sub21 mit to the appropriate congressional committees a report, 

22 and a separate classified annex, that includes the following 

23 elements: 

24 (1) The strategy behind the decision to extend 

25 or not extend New START. 


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1 (2) If New START is set to expire, an assess2 ment whether such an expiration is in the national 

3 security interests of the United States, including the 

4 specific reasons for such conclusion. 

5 (3) An examination of the effects of the expira6 tion of New START on— 

7 (A) strategic stability with the Russian 

8 Federation; 

9 (B) the United States nuclear budget; 

10 (C) spending on United States conven11 tional forces as a result of increased nuclear 

12 spending; and 

13 (D) international nuclear nonproliferation 

14 efforts. 

15 (4) An assessment of how the Government of 

16 the Russian Federation will modify its nuclear forces 

17 in an unconstrained environment and how the 

18 United States Government will respond if the Gov19 ernment of the Russian Federation expands its arse20 nal. 

21 (5) An assessment of how the United States 

22 Government will need to alter intelligence capabili23 ties and spending to regain, if possible, the knowl24 edge of the Russian Federation’s arsenal that is curVerDate Sep 11 2014 03:41 Jun 14, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3843.IS S3843

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1 rently provided by the inspection and verification 

2 mechanisms inherent to New START. 

Æ 


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