IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 13-1200 

Filed July 16, 2014

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

CORNELL A. FIELDS,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Des Moines County, Mary Ann 

Brown (plea) and Michael J. Schilling (sentencing), Judges.

A defendant appeals the district court’s imposition of consecutive 

sentences. AFFIRMED.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Dennis D. Hendrickson, 

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Heather R. Quick, Assistant Attorney 

General, Patrick C. Jackson, County Attorney, and Tyron Rogers and Lisa 

Schaeffer, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., Bower, J., and Goodhue, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2013). 
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TABOR, P.J.

This appeal involves a consecutive sentencing challenge. Because we 

find no abuse of discretion by the district court, we affirm. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

On the morning of January 6, 2013, police officers found a man, later 

identified as Thomas Wolf, lying in a field behind the West Burlington ball 

diamonds. The officers noticed blood on the ground and swelling to Wolf’s face. 

Wolf was unable to speak with officers. Wolf later confirmed his wallet, keys, and 

cell phone had been stolen. Cornell Fields admitted stealing these items after 

assaulting Wolf. 

The State charged Fields with robbery in the first degree, in violation of 

Iowa Code sections 711.1 and 711.2 (2013), a class “B” felony, and later 

amended the trial information to include a charge of willful injury, in violation of 

Iowa Code section 708.4(1). Both counts involved the same victim. The State 

agreed to reduce the robbery charge from first to second degree in return for 

Fields’s plea of guilty to both counts. In pleading guilty, Fields agreed to 

consecutive sentences. The district court accepted Fields’s pleas and sentenced 

him to two consecutive, indeterminate prison terms of ten years for the class “C”

felonies. 

Fields now appeals his sentences, arguing the court abused its discretion 

in imposing consecutive terms for crimes arising from a single transaction. Fields 

asked the Iowa Supreme Court to retain this appeal to overturn State v. Criswell, 
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242 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1976). See Iowa R. App. 6.1102(2)(f). But the Iowa 

Supreme Court reviewed the appellate briefs and transferred Fields’s appeal to 

this court. 

II. Standard of Review 

We review the sentence ordered for an abuse of discretion. State v. 

Barnes, 791 N.W.2d 817, 827 (Iowa 2010). We find an abuse of discretion when 

the sentencing court exercises its discretion on grounds clearly untenable or to 

an extent clearly unreasonable. Id.

A district court generally has discretion to impose concurrent or 

consecutive sentences for convictions on separate counts. Iowa Code § 901.8; 

State v. Delaney, 526 N.W.2d 170, 178 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). 

III. Analysis

Fields seeks resentencing on the limited question of whether he deserves 

consecutive or concurrent sentences. He claims the district court erred in 

imposing consecutive sentences because the robbery and the willful injury 

involved the same victim and constituted “a single event of inseparable acts.”

As an initial point, Fields claims his negotiated plea agreement to 

consecutive sentences does not bar his challenge on appeal. He contends his 

sentence was illegal and can be corrected at any time.

“[A] challenge to an illegal sentence includes claims that the court lacked 

the power to impose the sentence or that the sentence itself is somehow 

inherently flawed, including claims that the sentence is outside the statutory 

bounds or that the sentence itself is unconstitutional.” State v. Bruegger, 773 
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N.W.2d 862, 871 (Iowa 2009). “An illegal sentence is void and ‘not subject to the 

usual concepts of waiver, whether from a failure to seek review or other 

omissions of error preservation.’” Tindell v. State, 629 N.W.2d 357, 358 (Iowa 

2001) (quoting State v. Ohnmacht, 342 N.W.2d 838, 843 (Iowa 1983)); see also

Iowa R. Crim P. 2.24(5)(a) (“The court may correct an illegal sentence at any 

time.”). Even though Fields negotiated an agreement to consecutive sentences, 

a “guilty plea does not waive challenges that do not affect the validity of the 

conviction.” State v. Mann, 602 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Iowa 1999). Notably, Fields is 

not challenging the validity of his two convictions.1 

The State argues Fields did not receive an illegal sentence because the 

consecutive terms were authorized by statute. Iowa Code section 901.8 

provides, “[I]f a person is sentenced for two or more separate offenses, the 

sentencing judge may order the second or further sentence to begin at the 

expiration of the first or succeeding sentence.” Fields contends the district court 

erred in imposing consecutive sentences under section 901.8 because the two 

criminal offenses arose out of the same transaction. He recognizes the success 

of his position rests on abandoning decades of precedent.

Fields relies on cases from three different jurisdictions to demonstrate why 

Criswell should be overturned. In Criswell, the Iowa Supreme Court ruled: 

 

1 Our supreme court recently decided a series of cases addressing the appropriate unit 

of prosecution in cases involving a single altercation or transaction. State v. Ross, 845 

N.W.2d 692, 700-01 (Iowa 2014); State v. Gines, 844 N.W.2d 437, 441-42 (Iowa 2014); 

State v. Copenhaver, 844 N.W.2d 442, 447-49 (Iowa 2014); State v. Velez, 829 N.W.2d 

572, 579-84 (Iowa 2013). Fields does not invoke these cases in his sentencing 

challenge.
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[When a defendant] is convicted on several counts of an indictment, 

and each count is for a separate and distinct offense, a separate 

sentence may be pronounced on each count, and the court may 

pronounce separate and distinct sentences which are cumulative, 

and are to run consecutively. This is true, even though the several 

offenses were committed in the course of a single transaction. 

Criswell, 242 N.W.2d at 260 (quoting 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1567(3), at 424-

28) amended by 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 2099, at 149-50 (2006). 

Criswell predated the legislature’s adoption of section 901.8. 

Nevertheless, since the enactment of section 901.8, Iowa courts have cited and 

followed Criswell. For example, in State v. Taylor, 596 N.W.2d 55, 57 (Iowa 

1999), the Iowa Supreme Court upheld Criswell while rejecting the defendant’s 

claim that consecutive sentences “were inappropriate inasmuch as the two 

charges were so factually intertwined as to essentially constitute one.” The court 

ruled it is appropriate to issue “consecutive sentences on multiple convictions 

arising from the same transaction.” Taylor, 596 N.W.2d at 57. Further, statutory 

interpretations of sentencing provisions from other states are not controlling. See 

Stradt v. State, 608 N.W.2d 28, 29-30 (Iowa 2000) (finding both the Florida and 

West Virginia cases cited by the defendant were inapposite to Iowa’s case law 

concerning consecutive sentences).

Thus, Iowa precedent allows consecutive sentences under section 901.8 

even when the defendant committed the offenses during a single transaction. As 

the defendant acknowledges, reconsideration of this principle would have to 

come from our supreme court. See State v. Hastings, 466 N.W.2d 697, 700 

(Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (stating the court of appeals is “not at liberty to overturn 
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Iowa Supreme Court precedent”). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in imposing consecutive sentences. 

AFFIRMED.