* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should n ot be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances

set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 96-40698

Summary Calendar

_______________

VICKI MAJOR,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

HOECHST CELANESE CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(C-95-CV-382)

_________________________

February 5, 1997

Before SMITH, DUHÉ, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge: *

Vicki Major appeals a summary judgment on her claim of

intentional infliction of emotional distress (“i.i.e.d.”) against

Hoechst Celanese Corporation (“HCC”). Finding no error, we affirm.

I.2

Major was employed by HCC as a technical document entry clerk

in the company's library. She was instructed by her supervisor,

Marsha Wilson, to destroy a reel of microfilm that Wilson indicated

did not contain technical information and therefore was no longer

needed pursuant to HCC’s document retention policy. Major

expressed concern about the destruction of the film, disbelieving

Wilson’s conclu sion that the film contained no technical information.

At an HCC meeting two months later, Ruth Umfleet, Major’s

second supervisor, asked Major wh ether she had complied with

Wilson’s instruction. Major indicated that she had not, but rather

that she had placed the film in a safe place SS her home. Wilson

informed Major that it was theft to take company property home and

instructed her to return the film to HCC. Major complied and was

not disciplined in any manner.

Major filed suit in Texas state court, alleging i.i.e.d. The

gravamen of her complaint was that she was ordered erroneously to

destroy documents containing technical information and that she was

accused by Wilson of theft following her refusal to comply. HCC

removed the case to federal court. The district court granted

summary judgment for HCC.

II.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo

. See Hanks v.2 See, e.g.

, Mac Arthur v. University of Texas Health Ctr. , 45 F.3d 890,

898-99 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that employer’s intemperate and rude reprimand

and overreaction in falsely accusin g plaintiff of sabotaging laboratory

experiment did not demonstrate outrageous conduct); Diamond Shamrock Refining &

Marketing Co. v. Mendez

, 844 S.W.2d 198, 202 (Tex. 1992) (holding that employer’s

falsely depicting plaintiff as a thief was not outrageous conduct). The parties

disagree as to whether Wilson told Major that it was company policy not to steal

(continued...)

3 Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. , 953 F.2d 996, 997 (5th Cir.

1992). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to i nterrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled

to a judgment as a matter of law.” F ED

. R. C IV

. P. 56(c).

To recover for i.i.e.d., a plaintiff must prove that

(1) defendant acted intentionally or reckle ssly; (2) defendant’s

conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) defendant cau sed the

plaintiff emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress was

severe. See Randall’s Food Mkts. v. Johnson , 891 S.W.2d 640, 644

(Tex. 1995). Extreme and outrageous conduct is that which is “'so

outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond

all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious,

and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.'” I d. (citing

Twyman v. Twyman

, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621-22 (Tex. 1993)). An ordinary

employment dispute is not actionable as i.i.e.d. See Atkinson v.

Denton Publishing Co. , 84 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1996).

Assuming arguendo that Wilson accused Major of st ealing HCC

property, such conduct is not extreme and outrageous. 2 Further2 (...continued)

or actually accused Major of stealing. We need not resolve this factual dispute.

3 See, e.g., A tkinson

, 84 F.3d at 151 (holding that superiors’ allege d

displays of disrespect and rudeness toward plaintiff are not extreme and

outrageous); MacArthur , 45 F.3d at 899 (holding that employer’s intemperate and rude

reprimands are not extreme and outrageous); Horton v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 827

S.W.2d 361, 368-70 (Tex. App. SS San Antonio 1992, writ denied) (holding that “an

exchange of insults, indignities, annoyances, and other trivialities,” including

defacing plaintiff’s family pictures and frightening her by placing rattlesnake

rattlers on her desk, did not rise to the level of “extreme and outrageous”).

4 more, Major’s reliance upon Dean v. Ford Motor Credit Co.

, 885 F.2d

300, 307 (5th Cir. 1989), is misplaced. We explained in D ean that

it was the defendant’s intentional placing of checks in the

plaintiff’s purse in an effort to frame her for theft that took

“this case beyond the realm of an ordinary employment dispute and

into the realm of an outrageous one.” Id.

Major next alleges th at, in addition to the microfilm

incident, her employment conditions at HCC were so “unreasonable”

and “horrible” that the condition s themselves support her intentional infliction claim. According to Major, she was subject to

constant criticism, stressful conversations, mistrust, and even a

co-worker’s looking thr ough her desk for documents and other

materials that had not been filed. Complaints regarding ordinary

employment disputes do not give rise to claims for i.i.e.d. 3

AFFIRMED.