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Foreword by Andrew W. Marshall

Henry D. Sokolski

Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future

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UNDERESTIMATED:

OUR NOT SO PEACEFUL NUCLEAR FUTURE

Henry D. Sokolski

January 2016

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DEDICATION

To Victor Gilinsky, a mentor and a friend.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

When I first set out to write this book in fulfillment 

of an overly ambitious proposal I made years ago 

(and that, to my astonishment, got fully funded), I had 

something much longer in mind. After having published various bits of this original project elsewhere,1 

though, I became convinced that, with such a complex 

topic, brevity was the best way to reach busy professionals;2

 hence, this short volume. Its aim, to spotlight 

the potential dark spots in our nuclear future, is less 

academic than it is practical.

Among those who lent material and moral support 

were my key funders and my wife, Amanda, who designed the book’s cover. They humored me well beyond any reasonable requirement of civility. My staff 

at the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center also 

deserve acknowledgement, particularly my research 

assistant, Kate Harrison, whose reminders and research support were all too necessary. I also would 

like to thank John Mearsheimer of the University of 

Chicago, who kindly invited me to present the first 

of this book’s three chapters before the University’s 

Program on International Security Policy workshop 

series.

The University of Utah’s Hinckley Institute of Politics and the Tanner Center for Human Rights; The Institute of World Politics, where I teach; The University 

of San Diego and the University of California at San 

Diego; Arizona State University; Sandia, Lawrence 

Livermore, and Los Alamos National Laboratories; 

the Naval Postgraduate School; Colorado State University; and the Carnegie Endowment in Washington, 

DC, were also kind enough to host my presentation 

of earlier versions of the materials finalized in this 

volume.

ix
x

Additional support for this volume came from 

several individuals over a much longer period. These 

include Thomas Blau, Fred Iklé, James Lilley, Andrew Marshall, Harry Rowen, and Marin Strmecki. 

Finally, Victor Gilinsky, whom I have had the privilege of knowing for 35 years, has made everything I 

have pursued in the field of nuclear policy far more 

interesting than it would be otherwise. I would like to 

think that if I have gotten anything right in this book, 

it is his fault.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS - ENDNOTES

1. See the following publications by Henry Sokolski: “Taking Proliferation Seriously,” Policy Review, October and November 2003, available from www.npolicy.org/article_file/Taking_Proliferation_Seriously-Policy_Review.pdf; “Too Speculative: Getting 

Serious About Nuclear Terrorism,” The New Atlantis, Fall 2006, 

available from www.npolicy.org/article_file/Too_Speculative-Getting_Serious_About_Nuclear_Terrorism.pdf; Falling Behind: International Scrutiny of the Peaceful Atom, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, March 2008, pp. 3-61, available from npolicy.org/thebook.

php?bid=5&intro; “Avoiding a Nuclear Crowd: How to Resist the Weapon’s Spread,” Policy Review, June 1, 2009, available 

from www.hoover.org/research/avoiding-nuclear-crowd; Henry Sokolski and Victor Gilinsky, “Locking down the NPT,” Bulletin of 

the Atomic Scientists, June 17, 2009, available from www.npolicy.

org/article_file/Locking_down_the_NPT.pdf; “The High and Hidden 

Costs of Nuclear Power,” Policy Review, August 1, 2010, available 

from www.hoover.org/research/high-and-hidden-costs-nuclear-power;

“Missiles for Peace,” Armed Forces Journal, August 1, 2010, available from www.armedforcesjournal.com/missiles-for-peace/; Controlling the Further Spread of Nuclear Weapons, New York: The Council 

on Foreign Relations, April 26, 2010, available from npolicy.org/

article.php?aid=134&rt&key=council%20on%20foreign%20

relations&sec=article&author; “The Untapped Potential 

of the NPT,” The New Atlantis, November 1, 2010, available from 

www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-untapped-potential-of-thenpt; “The Post Fukushima Arms Race,” Foreign Policy, July 29, 
xi

2011, available from foreignpolicy.com/2011/07/30/the-post-fukushima-arms-race/; “Ten Regrets: America’s Nonproliferation Efforts 

Against Iran,” in Joachim Krause, ed., Iran’s Nuclear Program, London: Routledge, 2012, pp. 69-83, available from npolicy.org/article_

file/Ten_Regrets-Americas_Nonproliferation_Efforts_against_Iran.pdf;

and “Serious Rules for Nuclear Power without Proliferation,” The 

Nonproliferation Review, February 18, 2014, pp. 77-98, available 

from www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1203&rt&key=serio

us%20rules&sec=article&author.

2. See Mary Keeley, “Word Confusion,” Books and Such (blog), 

February 27, 2014, available from www.booksandsuch.com/blog/

word-count-confusion/.

xiii

CONTENTS

Figures ...........................................................................xv

Foreword .................................................................... xvii

Andrew W. Marshall

About the Contributors ......................................xix

List of Acronyms .................................................xxi

Introduction ............................................................1

What We Think .......................................................4

Reservations .............................................. .10

Optimists All ............................................ ..25

Where We Are Headed ..........................................28

Looking Backward ....................................28

Why Worry? ................................................36

Going Ballistic ...........................................39

War Scenarios .............................................42

China and the Nuclear Rivalries Ahead.........44 

Other Interested Parties ...............................49

What Might Help ................................................62

Thinking Ahead ........................................80

xv

FIGURES

Figure 1. Nuclear Proliferation: What We Think.

Figure 2. From U.S. Strategic Dominance to a 

Compressed Nuclear Crowd.

Figure 3. National Stockpiles of Separated Plutonium.

Figure 4. National Stockpiles of Highly Enriched 

Uranium.

Figure 5. Four Nuclear Weapons States in 1962.

Figure 6. How the United States Views the World 

Today.

Figure 7. Possible Proliferated Future.

Figure 8. Russian Underground Nuclear Complex at 

Yamantau.

Figure 9. China’s Underground Great Wall.

Figure 10. Nuclear-Capable Missile Countries Today.

Figure 11. The Next Decade: Nuclear Weapons 

Uncertainties.

Figure 12. Japanese Plutonium Stocks and Projected 

Production.

Figure 13. Current and Projected East Asian Uranium 

Enrichment Capacities.

Figure 14. States Planning to Have Their First 

Nuclear Power Reactor by or before 2035.

xvii

FOREWORD

Henry Sokolski has written an excellent, short 

book about what he sees as our not so peaceful nuclear future. While short in length, it covers a lot of 

ground, and because it is extensively footnoted, it can 

lead readers to the broader literature.

The book provides a good picture of the growing 

stockpiles of separated plutonium and the stockpiles 

of highly enriched uranium, as well as the likely expansion of nuclear power programs in additional 

countries. When reading the book, my thoughts turned 

to the Per Bak book, How Nature Works, and the concept of self-organized criticality and its descriptions 

of computer simulations and experiments leading to 

avalanches in sandpiles. This may be a useful way of 

thinking about the possible consequences for nuclear 

weapon proliferation as the stockpiles of fissile material grow. Also, as we think about the likelihood 

of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, we should 

be aware that developing nuclear weapons may be 

easier as time passes and computing power increases, high energy explosives improve, and diagnostic 

technology advances.

Sokolski includes a discussion of the question, 

does it matter if more countries have nuclear weapons? He points out that a number of respected people 

say it does not; some say it would be a more stable 

world. Sokolski disagrees; I am with him, for two 

reasons. First, those who say it will not matter, I believe, tend to assume that deterrence of attacks by 

others is almost automatic. There is little discussion 

of the vulnerability of the weapons, delivery systems, 

command and control systems, and more. Having a 

well-protected second-strike capability historically 
was not automatic; it took time and effort, changed 

operational practices, etc. Second, the Russians have 

been writing for at least 15 years of the need they have 

for tactical nuclear weapons to defend their large territory, because they say they do not have the resources 

to defend conventionally. They call for a new generation of nuclear weapons that would be easier to use. 

They more recently developed an interest in the early 

use of tactical nuclear weapons to quickly de-escalate 

a conflict.

If such use occurred, especially if it led to the successful de-escalation of a conflict on their borders, it 

might be a trigger for an avalanche of proliferation, a 

la Per Bak’s sandpiles, a much larger avalanche than, 

in the case of Iran, getting nuclear weapons, which has 

been the subject of several studies in recent years. The 

successful Russian use would be the first operational 

use of nuclear weapons in many decades and would 

revive consideration of the value of tactical nuclear 

weapons. In any case, it is not clear that this would be 

a very peaceful world.

The problems arising from the growing stockpiles are addressed in the book and some ideas are 

put forward—a good start on how to limit the dangers 

that may flow from that growth. The author raises important questions that deserve continued attention.

 Andrew W. Marshall

xviii
xix

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

HENRY D. SOKOLSKI is the executive director of the 

Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. He previously served in the Senate as a nuclear and military 

legislative aide and in the Pentagon as Deputy for 

Nonproliferation Policy and as a full-time consultant 

on proliferation issues in the Secretary of Defense’s 

Office of Net Assessment. Mr. Sokolski also served as 

a member of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Senior 

Advisory Group, on two congressional nuclear proliferation commissions, and has authored and edited 

numerous volumes on strategic weapons proliferation, including Best of Intentions: America’s Campaign 

against Strategic Weapons Proliferation and Moving 

Beyond Pretense: Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation.

ANDREW W. MARSHALL is the former director of 

the U.S. Department of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment. Appointed to the position in 1973 by President 

Richard Nixon, Mr. Marshall was re-appointed by 

every president that followed. He retired in 2015. In 

the 1950s and 1960s, Mr. Marshall conducted strategic 

research at the RAND Corporation.

xxi

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ANZUS Australia, New Zealand, United States 

 Security Treaty

CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

DF Dongfeng, Chinese for “East Wind,” 

designation for ballistic missiles

DPRK Democratic People's Republic of Korea

FBR fast breeder reactor

FMCT Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty

GWe Gigawatt-Electric 

HEU highly enriched uranium

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile

INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

LEU Low Enriched Uranium

MIRV multiple independently targetable re-entry 

vehicles

MOX mixed oxide fuel

MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime 

NPT Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 

SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile 

START Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty 

UAE United Arab Emirates

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

1

UNDERESTIMATED:

OUR NOT SO PEACEFUL NUCLEAR FUTURE

INTRODUCTION

It was curious and sad that after his death, Albert 

Wohlstetter, a former professor of mine and a major force in American strategic planning for nearly a 

half-century, was criticized for not having written a 

book. His apologia, albeit unspoken, was that he had 

more important things to do with guiding U.S. and 

international policy, which he did effectively in so 

many ways, including framing the debate over what 

should be done about nuclear proliferation. His work, 

and that of his wife and chief collaborator, Roberta 

Wohlstetter, are best understood through the many 

policy and economic studies they wrote and the profound impact they had on U.S. and allied security and 

energy policies.1

Although I served 11 years in the Pentagon and as 

a staffer on Capitol Hill, I have no such excuse. The 

clearest proof of this is this slim volume, the sequel 

to my first book, Best of Intentions: America’s Campaign 

against Strategic Weapons Proliferation.

2

 That volume 

was largely historical and written in support of a graduate-level course I teach on nuclear energy policy. The 

thinking behind Best of Intentions was straightforward: 

Determining where we are necessarily requires familiarity first with where we have been. I wrote that volume because, at the time, there was no critical history 

of nonproliferation available to dispatch my students 

in any practical direction.

As I continued to teach, though, I noticed another 

gap in the literature. The arguments policymakers 

and academics were making on how nuclear weap-
2

ons reductions related to preventing further nuclear 

proliferation were, at best, uneven. Each of the basic 

views—official, hawkish, and academic—spotlighted some important aspect of the truth, but each was 

incomplete and surprisingly optimistic.

The current official U.S. view, shared by most arms 

control proponents, is that any state that has nuclear 

weapons is obliged to make further nuclear weapons 

reductions under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 

(NPT). The superpowers promised to make such reductions, they contend, to get nonweapons states to 

accept intrusive nuclear inspections and to abstain 

from acquiring nuclear arms. Most who hold this 

view also believe that nuclear weapons are only useful to deter others’ use of these weapons, that this mission can be accomplished with relatively few nuclear 

weapons, and that, as such, we can make significant 

additional strategic arms reductions at little or no cost 

to our national security. Pursuing such reductions and 

strengthening existing nuclear security measures also 

are desirable, they argue, because nuclear weapons 

and their related production infrastructures are vulnerable to unauthorized or accidental firings, terrorist 

seizure, sabotage, and possible use.

Most of those holding these views also argue that 

states with advanced “peaceful” nuclear technology 

are obliged to share it with nonweapons states as a 

quid pro quo to get these states to uphold their NPT 

nonproliferation pledges. Thus, civilian nuclear sharing, nonproliferation, and strategic arms reductions 

are viewed as three equally critical “pillars” of an NPT 

“bargain.”3

A second, more hawkish view rejects these positions, arguing that the link between nuclear reductions and proliferation is negative: Further significant 
3

nuclear weapons cuts could well encourage America’s 

adversaries to “sprint to nuclear parity.”4 Such efforts, 

in turn, could easily spook Washington’s allies who 

lack nuclear weapons (e.g., Turkey, Saudi Arabia, 

South Korea, and Japan) to hedge their security bets 

by going nuclear themselves. To avoid such proliferation, this group contends that keeping or increasing 

U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities (especially vis-à-vis 

China and Russia) is our best bet.

Finally, some academics are skeptical of both of 

these views. They identify themselves as “neorealists.” The most radical and thought-provoking of 

these are divided roughly into two camps—those that 

believe nuclear deterrence works and those that do 

not. This difference is significant but not as great 

as what unifies their thinking—a shared disbelief that there is an important link between nuclear 

weapons reductions, nonproliferation, and international security.

Those in the more established of these two camps 

emphasize what they believe to be the automaticity 

of nuclear deterrence. They contend that the further 

spread of nuclear weapons is far less harmful to the 

world’s security than is commonly assumed and that, 

because nuclear weapons are so effective in deterring 

wars, their further proliferation could actually help 

keep the peace.

A recent offshoot from this established neorealist 

school rejects this faith in nuclear deterrence. It sees 

little military value in nuclear weapons but (for this 

reason) also concludes that their further spread is 

largely inconsequential. As for trying to prevent proliferation, this newer camp argues this can be far more 

dangerous and provocative—they spotlight the invasion of Iraq—than letting these weapons spread.5
4

Each of these views—official, hawkish, and radically academic—is intellectually attractive. Each is concise. All, however, are incomplete. None fully explore 

the regional insecurities that arise with threatened nuclear weapons breakouts or ramp-ups. Instead, they 

dwell on the security impacts of nuclear proliferation 

after states actually have broken out or ramped up. 

Nor do they have much to say about the significant 

overlaps between civilian and military nuclear activities or the risk that “peaceful” nuclear facilities or 

materials might be diverted to make bombs. Instead, 

they focus almost exclusively on nuclear weapons and 

their impact on international security (albeit in differing time frames).6

 Finally, none adequately consider 

the discontiguous view that fewer nuclear weapons in 

fewer hands is desirable but that rushing to achieve 

such reductions without first getting key nuclear 

states to reduce in a transparent, coordinated fashion 

could easily make matters worse.

This brief volume covers each of these points. 

First, it reviews the key popular views on nuclear 

proliferation. Second, it considers how much worse 

matters might get if states continue with relatively 

loose nuclear constraints on civilian and military 

nuclear activities. Finally, it offers several policy

recommendations.

WHAT WE THINK

For the last half-century, the task of limiting nuclear arsenals has been viewed as being related to, but 

different from, preventing proliferation. Nuclear arms 

restraints are “fostered” through nuclear weapons negotiations, agreements, and norms as well as by states 

deploying “stable” strategic weapons forces—i.e., 
5

ones that can readily survive even if they are struck 

first and that are themselves incapable of totally destroying a key opponent’s nuclear forces in a first 

strike. In contrast, one “fights” or “combats” the further spread of nuclear weapons by imposing export 

controls, economic sanctions, international inspections, preventative and preemptive military strikes; 

and by conducting covert intelligence and military 

operations.7 The most significant nuclear arms control 

efforts historically have been undertaken by the most 

heavily nuclear-armed states—principally the United 

States and Russia. Preventing nuclear proliferation, in 

contrast, is generally a global undertaking.

The Barack Obama administration is noteworthy 

among recent presidencies for consciously having 

tried to integrate U.S. nuclear arms control efforts 

with its nonproliferation policies. Following Obama’s 

2009 appeal in Prague, the Czech Republic,8 to eliminate nuclear weapons, the U.S. Government made 

reducing nuclear arms a prerequisite for preventing 

their further spread. If we expect other nations to repress their own nuclear weapons aspirations, administration officials argue that the nuclear superpowers 

have to demonstrate a greater willingness to disarm 

themselves. Such disarmament is feasible, they insist, 

because nuclear weapons are, in their view, only useful to deter other hostile nuclear weapons states. This 

basic mission, they argue, can be accomplished with a 

relatively small stockpile of nuclear weapons. On the 

other hand, maintaining large stockpiles of nuclear 

weapons and nuclear weapons-usable fuels only increases the prospects for instability, nuclear terrorism, 

and accidental or illicit use.

Hawkish supporters of nuclear weapons have 

a very different view.9 They argue that reducing 
6

American and Russian nuclear arms has little or no 

impact on reducing others’ nuclear weapons activities or holdings (e.g., North Korea and Iran). In fact, 

reducing America’s nuclear arsenal might only entice 

China to build up to America’s current nuclear numbers and encourage America’s key non-nuclear allies 

and friends—e.g., South Korea, Japan, Saudi Arabia, 

and Turkey—to hedge their bets against decreasingly 

credible U.S. nuclear security alliance guarantees by 

developing nuclear weapons options of their own. Finally, they argue, nuclear weapons, especially in U.S. 

and allied hands, have helped keep the peace, whereas 

letting U.S. and allied nuclear arsenals decline quantitatively or qualitatively only increases the prospects 

for war.10

The most radical of academic nuclear skeptics, 

who identify themselves as neorealists, also question 

whether nuclear weapons reductions are needed to 

reduce further proliferation. Although they concede 

that further nuclear weapons proliferation may be inevitable, they argue that it is unlikely to be destabilizing and that a credible nuclear deterrent force needs 

only to be able to hold several major cities at risk, and 

therefore, it need only be a relatively small, “finite” 

force. The earliest proponents of such “finite deterrence” (Pierre Gallois and his French colleagues,11

Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, and other original supporters of the U.S. Polaris nuclear missile submarine 

fleet12) and, much later, Kenneth Waltz and his academic associates,13 all emphasized what they saw as 

the virtual automaticity of nuclear deterrence between 

any two rival nuclear-armed states. As such, French 

proponents of finite deterrence insisted that the further proliferation of nuclear weapons to smaller states 

was more likely to prevent military aggression than to 
7

prompt it. Central to their thinking was the disturbing 

notion that credibly threatening to destroy an adversary’s major cities (what Charles de Gaulle referred to 

as “tearing off an arm”14) would deter hostile actions 

by other states, both large and small.

A second, more recent version of such thinking 

has been made popular by such scholars as Dr. John 

Mueller, who takes a different tack but reaches similar 

conclusions. He argues that nuclear weapons actually 

do a poor job of deterring small or major wars.15 Citing the popular scholarship of such writers as Ward 

Wilson,16 supporters of this view contend that nuclear 

weapons were unnecessary to secure Japan’s surrender in 194517 or to deter World War III since North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Warsaw 

Pact nations were haunted by fears of suffering a yet 

deadlier conventionally armed version of World War 

II.18 Also, smaller wars—e.g., the Israeli War of 1973, 

the Korean and Vietnam wars—Mueller notes, clearly were not deterred by anyone’s nuclear weapons. 

Nor were the terrorist attacks in the United States of 

September 11, 2001 (9/11) or the terrorist attacks on 

Mumbai in 2008. The implication is that nuclear weapons are so ineffective at deterring aggression and their 

use is so unlikely that their further spread is not all 

that consequential.19

Each of these schools also differ on the military 

utility of nuclear weapons and differ on the impact 

and desirability of sharing dual-use nuclear technology for civilian applications. Administration officials 

insist that nuclear supplier states have an NPT obligation to transfer as much “peaceful” nuclear technology to nonweapons states as possible so long as it is 

for a declared civilian project that is internationally 

inspected. Failure to do so “without discrimination,” 

in their eyes, risks unraveling the NPT.20
8

Most hawks, on the other hand, object to civilian 

nuclear cooperation with hostile states (e.g., Iran and 

North Korea) but otherwise support the global expansion of civilian nuclear power. They certainly are willing to share such technology with close friends even 

if such transfers might enhance existing or potential 

weapons options (e.g., India, South Korea, or Japan). 

As for the neorealists, some have faulted nuclear 

nonproliferation policies for unnecessarily inhibiting 

nuclear power’s beneficial development domestically 

and overseas, but most have no set view.21 Several 

have argued that letting nuclear weapons spread to 

selected countries would bolster U.S. security.22

For administration officials and arms control advocates, then, the superpowers must reduce their arsenals (“vertically”) to encourage nonweapons states 

not to proliferate (“horizontally”). Failure at this risks 

instability or, worse, nuclear use. Hawkish critics, 

meanwhile, believe that reducing U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities is more likely to risk nuclear proliferation and war than otherwise would be the case 

if one augmented U.S. and allied strategic weapons 

capabilities or, at least, kept them from declining. Finally, radical academic skeptics deny that vertical reductions and horizontal nonproliferation are all that 

closely linked and suggest that more nuclear weapons in more hands may actually reduce the prospects 

for war or, at the very least, that nuclear weapons 

and their proliferation are not all that significant (see 

Figure 1).
9

Figure 1. Nuclear Proliferation: What We Think.

View Selected 

Representatives

Favor 

Relying on 

Nuclear 

Weapons for 

Security

Believe 

Nuclear 

Weapons 

Deter

Willing 

to Go to 

Zero

Support 

Sharing 

Civil 

Nuclear

Energy

Support 

Sharing 

Nuclear 

Weaponsrelated 

Technology

Official/Arms 

Control 

Perspective

Most Western 

governments (e.g., 

the United States, 

France, 

the United Kingdom 

[UK], Japan, etc.)

International 

forums (e.g., IAEA, 

NPT Review 

Conference)

No Yes Yes Yes No

Hawkish 

Supporters of 

Nuclear 

Weapons

Nuclear weapons 

enthusiasts

Reagan-era Hawks 

(e.g., Donald 

Rumsfeld, Dick 

Cheney)

Yes Yes No

Yes

(for friends)

No

(for

enemies)

Yes

(to some 

friends)

No

(for enemies)

Radical Academic 

Skeptics/Finite 

Deterrence

Enthusiasts

French proponents 

of force de frappe

and early backers 

of U.S. SLBM force 

(e.g., Pierre Gallois, 

Arleigh Burke)

Neorealists (e.g., 

Ken Waltz)

Yes Yes No Unclear Yes

Radical Academic 

Skeptics/Finite 

Deterrence Critics

Post-neorealists 

(e.g., John Mueller) No No Yes Yes No
10

Reservations.

These three views on how nuclear weapons reductions and nonproliferation relate are clear, plausible, 

and popular. They dominate the current debate over 

nuclear weapons policies. There is only one problem: 

In practice, none of them make nearly as much sense 

as their supporters claim.

One can see this most readily by examining how 

each school addresses the simplest and most popular 

of policy questions: Should one be for or against nuclear weapons? Add to this question (for the purposes 

of this inquiry) the matter of nuclear weapons proliferation, and the query admits to two easy answers—

yes (in support of nuclear weapons and additional 

proliferation) or no against both.

Let us take the against-side first. Those opposed to 

nuclear weapons and their further proliferation—i.e., 

those who want to move toward zero nuclear weapons as soon as possible—go to great lengths explaining 

why a world without nuclear weapons is preferable 

to our current world. They emphasize Ronald Reagan’s observation that a nuclear war can never be won 

and so should never be waged. They also detail how 

a world with zero nuclear weapons might work and 

how one might prevent a relapse into a nuclear-armed 

world once nuclear weapons have been eliminated.23

Unfortunately, these same analysts are far less articulate on how one might persuade existing nuclear 

weapons states to give their weapons up or how exactly one would get to zero. So far, the United States 

and Russia have reduced their nuclear holdings 

from over 70,000 deployed nuclear weapons24 to several thousand on each side.25 This begs the question, 

though: How easy would it be to reduce further to 
11

a few hundred warheads if other states (e.g., China, 

Israel, France, the United Kingdom [UK], North Korea, Pakistan, and India) acquire or deploy as many 

or more? Would this not encourage increased military 

competitions, nuclear arms racing, miscalculation, 

and unnecessary and potentially disastrous wars?

Of course, securing clear answers to such questions 

is difficult. Nonetheless, analysts backing zero nuclear 

weapons offer a general picture of how things might 

work. According to their narrative, the more the U.S. 

Government increases its support for nuclear weapons reductions and reduces its own arsenals with Russia, the more other nuclear-armed states (e.g., China, 

India, and Pakistan) are likely to fall into line. To help 

promote this more restrained nuclear future, it is argued, the United States and Russia should also abandon plans to ever use or defend their nuclear strategic 

forces in an effort to achieve military advantage over 

one another or other nations. Rather than aim their 

nuclear weapons against countless military targets, 

the superpowers should adopt finite nuclear deterrence strategies that hold each other’s population and 

industrial centers at risk. This would reduce the need 

for ever larger, more accurate, quick-alert nuclear arsenals and make deep cuts in existing nuclear stockpiles 

more feasible. With increasing nuclear restraint by the 

major nuclear states, states lacking nuclear weapons 

would become more willing to eschew nuclear weapons and support nuclear nonproliferation.26

This is the upbeat narrative, but there also is a 

downbeat one. It has us clinging to our bombs. The 

more we maintain our nuclear stockpiles, we are 

warned, the more it will undermine our claim that 

we want to rely less on nuclear arms to assure our security. This, in turn, risks encouraging other states to 
12

acquire nuclear weapons (i.e., promoting more North 

Koreas, Irans, and Pakistans), which will only strain 

existing security relations and tempt America’s allies 

(e.g., South Korea, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, etc.) 

to acquire nuclear weapons options of their own.

Those backing nuclear reductions also offer historical analysis to challenge the presumed security utility of nuclear weapons. Nuclear arms, they note, have 

failed to deter important conventional wars (e.g., the 

Korean or Vietnam wars or the Egyptian strike against 

Israel in 1973) or terrorist attacks (e.g., 9/11 and the 

Pakistani-backed terrorist attacks against targets in 

India and Afghanistan).

Attempts to acquire nuclear weapons, as well as 

mere possession, also have prompted military strikes 

(e.g., Iran, Israel, and the United States against Osirak 

in 1980, 1981, 1991, and 2002; Iraq against Bushehr in 

repeated attacks from 1984-1988; Iraq’s failed Scud 

missile strike against Dimona in 1991; and Israel’s 

strike against Syria’s reactor in 2007). In addition, attacks were seriously considered against new nuclear 

states (e.g., the United States against the Soviet Union 

in 1949 and the Soviet Union against China in 1969).27

Bottom line: The possession and spread of nuclear 

weapons generally undermines security. What, then, 

are nuclear weapons good for? Only the peculiar 

task of deterring other states from using their nuclear 

weapons.

This last reflection, of course, is intended to further demonstrate how little value nuclear weapons 

have and why their early elimination is desired. This 

conclusion, though, is triple-edged. Certainly, if nuclear weapons truly are not all that militarily valuable, 

what is the urgency to eliminate them? Some states 

held on to their horse cavalry after World War I and 
13

their battleships long after World War II, but that 

hardly encouraged their rivals to acquire them, and, 

by mid-century, these military instruments hardly 

posed a strategic threat to anyone. On the other hand, 

if nuclear weapons can effectively deter other nucleararmed states, would that not make their acquisition by 

nonweapons states all but irresistible? The refrain of 

security analysts after the first Gulf War against Iraq 

was that the United States would never have tried to 

remove Saddam Hussein if he actually had the bomb. 

In what way were they wrong?

Finally, is it reasonable to think that no one will 

ever use their nuclear weapons first? Do states that 

believe in nuclear deterrence presume that, if they 

lacked a survivable nuclear deterrent, their nuclear 

adversaries might strike their or their allies’ vulnerable forces in an attempt to gain some clear advantage? 

If so, would they constantly (and naturally) worry 

that their or their allies’ nuclear retaliatory capability 

might be knocked out or be seriously degraded in a 

first strike by their opponents? Would failing to attend 

to these matters and merely making bluffs to retaliate 

against a few targets of dubious military value (e.g., 

large population centers versus strategic weapons 

bases) be worth the risk of having a force that was unlikely to deter a first strike?28

If you allowed, as one should, that the answers to 

these questions might be unclear, you would expect 

lengthy, heated public debate about what the answers 

might be. What is telling, however, is how little debate 

there is. Instead, if these issues are raised at all, the 

subject of conversation invariably is shifted to a much 

less contentious set of concerns: the horrors of nuclear theft, nuclear accidents, unauthorized use, sabotage, and terrorism. Focusing on these issues quickly 
14

returns one to the desired conclusion that the immediate reduction of nuclear weapons would immediately make for a much safer world.29 In the interim, we 

need to do all we can to increase security over existing 

nuclear weapons assets and reduce the readiness and 

numbers of deployed nuclear forces to head off these 

possible threats.

Most of these nuclear security concerns raised here, 

again, are necessarily speculative. Neither accidental nor unauthorized nuclear use have yet occurred. 

There is plenty of near history (close calls of Russian, 

South African, French, Chinese, and American nuclear launches, tests, and thefts; broken arrow incidents; 

provocative nuclear tests; and “lost” warheads and 

nuclear weapons-usable materials gone unaccounted 

for).30 As for preventing acts of nuclear terrorism, 

though, such efforts are entirely anticipatory: Specific, 

validated intelligence regarding acts of nuclear terrorism has, so far, gone wanting.31

Despite this (or, perhaps, because of it), addressing 

these threats has become a public policy cause célèbre. 

Today, nuclear terrorism is viewed by both Republican and Democratic officials as the “most immediate 

and extreme” threat facing America and the world.32

Billions of dollars are appropriated annually on questionable nuclear weapons detection and forensics 

efforts and nuclear security and cooperative threat 

reduction programs.33 Meanwhile, broad intelligence 

sweeps, including of domestic phone and Internet 

communications, have been justified, in no small part, 

to prevent possible terrorist use of weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD).34

Far less controversial are the international nuclear 

security summits Obama launched in 2009. The third, 

held in The Netherlands in 2014, allowed scores of 
15

nations, including those acquiring or deploying nuclear weapons, to extol the virtues of keeping their 

nuclear weapons-related assets safe against seizure, 

sabotage, and illicit use. Details about how they might 

accomplish this, however, were kept, as with previous 

summits, to a minimum, lest hostile states learn what 

might be needed to attack or seize these holdings.

Although this set of nuclear security worries has 

been spotlighted to maximize alarm, many who voice 

them are nonetheless convinced that further progress 

on nuclear arms control, which would eliminate most 

of these problems, is all but inevitable. They celebrate 

the latest New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 

(START) agreement and are enthusiastic about reaching further unilateral and negotiated cuts as well as 

ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 

Treaty (CTBT).35 They also remain steadfast in their 

belief that negotiated settlements can be reached to 

roll back Iran’s and North Korea’s “aberrant” nuclear 

misbehavior. Yet, little is said about other nuclear or 

near-nuclear weapons states. Instead, there is selfcongratulation that President John F. Kennedy’s earlier warnings that there might be 20 or more nuclear 

weapons states by 1970 proved to be unfounded and 

insistence that pushing more arms control is our best 

hope to eliminate the nuclear threat.

What else must be pursued besides more START 

negotiations and nuclear security summits? Three 

things, all of which Obama announced in his 2009 

Prague speech: Bring the CTBT and Fissile Material 

Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) into force and share “peaceful” civilian nuclear technology under appropriate 

international safeguards. This roughly tracks the now 

popular “three-pillar” view of the NPT, that to get 

nonweapons states not to acquire nuclear weapons, 
16

the weapons states must reduce their nuclear arms 

and offer more “peaceful” nuclear energy transfers.

Putting aside the improbability of the U.S. Senate or Moscow backing the ratification of more arms 

control agreements any time soon, accomplishing this 

agenda is impossible without the unlikely support of 

reluctant states, including Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, India, Israel, and Egypt. More important, some 

of the objections to these agreements are not merely 

political, but substantive.36

As for sharing “peaceful” nuclear technology and 

disarming to secure continued nonproliferation, it 

is difficult to see how such an approach can prevent 

future Indias, Irans, Syrias, or North Koreas. Even if 

one ignores how little of the NPT’s diplomatic history 

actually supports today’s legalistic enthusiasm for 

the “three-pillar” view,37 promoting this bargain is, at 

best, problematic.

First, although encouraging nuclear weapons restraint can indirectly support nonproliferation, it is 

unclear how insisting on making nuclear disarmament a legally binding quid pro quo for adopting sound 

nonproliferation measures would work. In practice, 

nonweapons states have held their adoption of nonproliferation measures hostage, thereby attempting to 

force the superpowers to do more toward nuclear disarmament. While at the same time, the claim by nonweapons states that insufficient progress by the superpowers gives the nonweapons states a diplomatic 

pretext to threaten to acquire nuclear weapons themselves. From a nuclear control perspective, none of 

this is helpful. Backing off necessary nonproliferation 

controls only increases the prospects for more nuclear 

weapons proliferation. This, in turn, is only likely to 

increase demands for nuclear armament globally.
17

Second, it is unclear how supplying nonweapons 

states with the benefits of truly “peaceful” nuclear 

technology could assist in promoting more or tighter 

nonproliferation controls. If the technology in question is genuinely benign, by definition, it ought to be 

easy to safeguard effectively against military diversions and so be safe to share free of any apprehensions 

it might be diverted to make bombs. If, furthermore, 

the nuclear item in question is profitable to sell, it is 

difficult to understand why nuclear supplier states 

would need additional incentives, much less nonproliferation ones, to share it.

On the other hand, if what was being sold is proliferation-prone (i.e., close or essential to bomb making) 

and, therefore, dangerous to share, it is unclear why 

any state eager to promote nuclear nonproliferation 

would think it had an NPT obligation to transfer it. 

Again, effective nuclear nonproliferation presumes 

the sharing of only truly “peaceful” nuclear goods and 

technologies—i.e., of nuclear items and know-how 

that are so far from making bombs that attempts to 

divert them for this purpose easily could be detected 

early enough and reliably enough to intervene effectively to prevent any weapons from ever being built. 

The alternative would be that there is an NPT obligation to share dangerous nuclear technologies and 

goods that could bring a nonweapons state to the very 

brink of acquiring bombs. But how much nonproliferation sense would encouraging such commerce or 

mechanically holding adoption of sound nonproliferation measures hostage to further nuclear disarmament ever make? The answer is painfully clear.

This, then, brings us to those hawks who object to 

such wishful thinking—those who are “for” nuclear 

weapons. Their brief essentially is that nuclear weap-
18

ons have kept the peace. If you push for deeper nuclear 

reductions, they argue, it will do nothing to slow determined proliferators from acquiring nuclear weapons.38 More important, it could undermine our security alliance system, which, in turn, would increase the 

risks that our friends and allies might go nuclear.39 All 

of this, in turn, would only increase the prospects for 

war and the possible use of nuclear weapons.

This line of argument, like that of the zero nuclear 

weapons crowd, makes a number of sensible points. 

Yet, it is imperfect, too. First, as has already been noted, we know that nuclear weapons have not deterred 

all wars. Both North Korea and North Vietnam took 

the United States on in long-fought wars. Nor did U.S. 

nuclear weapons deter China and Russia from lending 

Hanoi and Pyongyang substantial military support. 

Then there is the Israeli war of 1973. Israeli possession 

of nuclear arms may have changed the way the war 

was fought (the United States finally came to Israel’s 

aid at the last moment for fear that the war might go 

nuclear). But Israeli nuclear weapons did not prevent 

the war.40 Finally, it is unclear how, if at all, nuclear 

weapons might deter nonstate actors from engaging 

in terrorism—nuclear or non-nuclear.41

Perhaps the point is nuclear weapons have prevented “major” (nuclear) wars or “major” defeats 

rather than all forms of military aggression. Certainly, the number of war casualties as a percentage 

of the world’s population has declined significantly 

since Hiroshima and Nagasaki.42 This seems more 

persuasive.

The first problem, here, though, is that any “proof” 

of why something did not happen can never be known 

with scientific certainty. As we have discussed, a good 

number of security experts question if nuclear deter-
19

rence ever really “worked” during the Cold War.43

Nor is the threat of nuclear escalation the only possible 

explanation for why post-World War II war casualties 

have declined so much (smaller wars usually follow 

large ones; new post-war alliances were created and 

kept strong; and, military science improved, lowering aiming inaccuracies and indiscriminate damage in 

war, etc.).

This, then, brings us to the second problem—this 

argument’s lack of qualification. If one allows that nuclear weapons have deterred major wars, what is one 

to make of the observation? If some nuclear weapons 

have deterred some wars, would more nuclear weapons that were more advanced or an ability to produce 

them quickly deter even more?44 Would such deterrence encourage increasing nuclear stockpiles and 

resuming nuclear testing?45 Also, what of other states 

that lack such arms? Should their acquisition of nuclear forces help deter wars as well? Would the further 

proliferation of weapons, at least to our friends then, 

be a good thing? Vice President Dick Cheney went out 

of his way to note that, if China failed to get North 

Korea to eliminate its nuclear weapons capabilities, it 

might well prompt Japan to acquire nuclear weapons 

of its own. One also hears hawkish American support 

for Israel maintaining its nuclear forces until there is 

peace in the Middle East and for India to build its nuclear capabilities to counter China’s nuclear forces.46

As logically consistent as these arguments may 

be, they are bound to cause unease. Here, an unspoken assumption is that nuclear deterrence will work 

perfectly (as it supposedly did with Russia during the 

Cold War) and that it can be counted upon to work 

forever into the future with every other nuclear-armed 

state. This is presumed no matter how many nuclear-
20

armed states there might be, how rash or reckless these 

countries’ leaders are, or how ill-prepared their forces 

might be to absorb a first strike. It also presumes, sub 

silentio, that the lack of truly disastrous nuclear weapons accidents, unauthorized firings, acts of nuclear 

terrorism, and thefts we have experienced so far is a 

permanent feature.47 All of this might well be correct 

in the near- and mid-term. But barring the adoption 

of new, more effective nuclear restraints and security 

controls that apply not just to the United States but to 

other nations, it is difficult to believe it is much more 

than a “bet against the house.”

Yet another unspoken assumption at play is that 

smaller nuclear weapons states and states eager to 

develop a nuclear weapons option are merely “lesser included threats.” The notion is that if the United 

States can deter or constrain Russia, the largest nuclear weapons state, the United States and its allies are 

safe (or much safer) against any other lesser nucleararmed state. This roughly was the message in the 2012 

presidential election campaign when candidate Mitt 

Romney described Russia as America’s number one 

geopolitical foe, and the Obama administration defended the primacy of working with Russia (versus 

China or other nuclear states) to limit its nuclear arsenal. Russia is our most important strategic competitor.48 Deal with it and you can deal with the others; 

fail to neutralize Moscow, and you are unlikely ever 

to prevail.49

But is this true? Russian President Vladimir Putin 

has yet to threaten to destroy the United States explicitly or American forces stationed overseas with a nuclear strike. North Korea, however, has. If North Korea followed through with its military threats against 

South Korea or Japan (two states the United States 
21

is bound by formal security agreements to defend), 

would that not threaten a general war that the United 

States would be loath to wage? What if Iran got nuclear weapons and deployed them to deter the United 

States and its Gulf allies against countering Iranian 

aggression and covert actions against its neighbors? 

Such aggression could drive the price of oil to levels 

that could strategically weaken both the United States 

and most of the world’s economies. Would nuclear 

strategic superiority over Russia enable Washington 

to counter such concerns?

This set of rhetorical questions brings us to the 

views of radical academic skeptics. As already noted, 

this school can be split into two groups. The first includes those who think that the further proliferation 

of nuclear weapons may be beneficial, and, that upon 

a state’s acquisition of nuclear arms, effective nuclear 

deterrence is automatically assured. The second includes those who question the deterrence value of nuclear arms but who also believe that preventing their 

proliferation is generally unnecessary or misguided.

What is appealing about the second group is its 

willingness to take on those who extol the virtues of 

nuclear deterrence (i.e., the academic skeptics’ first 

camp and hawkish supporters of nuclear weapons). 

Did nuclear weapons force Japan to surrender in 

World War II? No, Japan’s emperor only argued they 

surrendered because he knew Japan was destined for 

defeat by American and Soviet conventional arms. 

Did they deter the Soviet Union’s nuclear and conventional forces from invading Europe during the Cold 

War? No, what kept the peace after 1945 was the creation of effective East-West security alliance systems 

and the very real fears these military alliances fostered 

of a massive, conventional World War III breaking out 

if Cold War diplomacy failed.
22

This second group of academic skeptics also offers 

thoughtful rejoinders to the conventional wisdom that 

nuclear terrorism should be worry number one. Is the 

threat of nuclear terrorism the most imminent and extreme security threat we face? Not really. There are 

good reasons why no acts of nuclear terrorism have 

yet taken place and why these are likely to apply well 

into the future. Building or stealing nuclear weapons 

is too large and complex an operation for most terrorist organizations. A terrorist team tasked to build or 

seize such weapons constantly would have to worry 

about being penetrated and betrayed to authorities. 

Certainly, the high levels of trust and cooperation 

needed to pull off such operations would be difficult 

to maintain. Nor is it in the interest of states that possess such weapons to let anyone but the most trusted 

and loyal gain access to them.50

This pushback to what are now the most popular 

views on nuclear deterrence and terrorism is edifying. Yet, ultimately, one counterfactual on what might 

have prevented an event (in this case, various postWorld War II wars) can hardly trump another. Nor do 

negative projections on nuclear terrorism top positive 

ones if only because the future probability of events 

that have not yet occurred cannot be known statistically. In the end, all such projections are speculative.

Also, what the two skeptical camps do agree 

about—that the dangers associated with nuclear 

weapons proliferation are exaggerated—is rebuttable. 

First, both camps gloss over the serious military risks 

faced by nations acquiring nuclear weapons. One can 

see this most clearly by their inattention to the numerous historical cases of preventive military actions 

against states attempting to build their first bomb and 

serious plans countries have made to knockout the 
23

nuclear capabilities of new nuclear weapons states. In 

the first category are the British campaign against the 

Nazi-operated heavy water plant in Norway, Iran’s air 

strike against Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1980, Israel’s attack of the same reactor in 1981, Iraq’s repeated strikes 

against Bushehr between 1984 and 1988, America’s air 

strike against Iraq’s nuclear facilities in 1991, Saddam’s 

failed Scud missile strike against Israel’s Dimona reactor in the same year, an American Tomahawk strike 

against Iraq’s uranium enrichment plant at Zaafaraniyah, British and American strikes against a variety 

of suspect Iraqi nuclear sites in 1998, and Israel’s air 

strike against Syria’s covert nuclear reactor in 2007.

Just as numerous are the occasions that states 

planned or prepared to knockout the nuclear weapons capabilities of their adversaries. The U.S. military 

gave serious thought to using nuclear weapons to 

destroy the Soviet Union’s nuclear complex in 1949 

and China’s in 1964. It also made preliminary military preparations for attacking North Korea’s nuclear 

complex in 1994. The Russians, meanwhile, seriously 

considered attacking South African nuclear facilities 

in 1976 after detecting South African preparations to 

test. They even asked the United States for assistance 

in making the attack. In 1969, a major border dispute 

between China and Russia went hot, and Moscow 

gave serious consideration to attacking China’s nuclear complex. Two years before, Egypt planned to attack 

Israel’s production reactor at Dimona. Some believe 

it collaborated with Moscow in making these plans. 

Israel and India, meanwhile, cooperated in several 

schemes in the 1980s (one of which nearly was implemented) to knockout Pakistan’s nuclear weapons 

facilities at Kahuta.51
24

Second, either because they believe nuclear weapons automatically deter aggression nearly perfectly 

even in small numbers or because they believe nuclear 

weapons are militarily useless even if they are numerous and advanced, radical academic skeptics pay little 

attention to the security risks that may come with 

deep nuclear weapons reductions—i.e., the transitions 

from nuclear plenty to zero. These risks, which hawkish supporters of nuclear weapons emphasize, are 

potentially serious.

Finally, radical academic skeptics tend to ignore or 

gloss over the risks “upward” nuclear transitions present. These dangers are three-fold. First, as the number 

of nuclear weapons players increases, the gravity, 

complexity, and likelihood of ruinous nuclear incidents may increase within states (e.g., unauthorized 

or accidental use, terrorist theft, irredentist seizure, 

etc.) and between them (e.g., catalytic wars, misread 

nuclear signaling, etc.). Second, and closely related, 

are the numerous technical and managerial challenges 

each nuclear state faces to make their nuclear forces 

robust and survivable enough to have any hope of effectively deterring attacks. These challenges are most 

severe for new nuclear weapons forces but are hardly 

inconsequential for large, mature forces.52 Last, as the 

number of states possessing nuclear forces increases 

to include nations covered by nuclear security alliance guarantees, the continued viability and coherence of these security alliance systems is likely to be 

tested in the extreme, thereby increasing the prospects 

for war.53
25

Optimists All.

Putting aside the close calls during the various 

Cold War crises (e.g., the Cuban Missile Crisis54), the 

nuclear brinkmanship that has been conducted by India and Pakistan,55 and the nuclear preemption and 

dares of the Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973,56 none of the 

cases noted earlier seem to support the idea that nuclear proliferation is “inconsequential,” much less stabilizing; just the opposite. Of course, until and unless 

there is nuclear use, there is no proof in these matters: 

We cannot predict the future, and the causes of wars 

are always complex. All we know is that the United 

States fired nuclear weapons in anger on Hiroshima 

and Nagasaki, Japan, and the United States and Russia threatened to use them several times during the 

Cold War. However, for some reason, since 1945, they 

never have been used.

It would be nice to believe that they never will. Unfortunately, they might. Russia and Pakistan are quite 

explicit about the advantages of using nuclear weapons first against their adversaries.57 Some analysts 

also now believe China’s no first use policies may be 

undergoing revision.58 All of these states, plus Israel, 

North Korea, and India, are increasing or modernizing their nuclear arsenals. If these states are followed 

by Iran, South Korea, Japan, Turkey, the United Arab 

Emirates (UAE), or Saudi Arabia,59 the chances for 

nuclear miscalculations and war would likely go up, 

not down.60

Again, it may well be, as one recent analysis suggested, that the prospects for war will decline as soon 

as there is “symmetry” between any two nuclear 

states. This conclusion, however, begs the question 

of precisely when and how such “symmetry” might 
26

be achieved or perceived by each party. This matters since this same analysis concludes that, without 

such nuclear symmetry, the prospects for conflict are 

increased.61

Nor can we assume that the consequences of nuclear use will be minor. Total industrial wars may no longer be likely. But this hardly precludes the possibility 

of “limited” nuclear conflicts.62 Also, with advanced 

societies’ newfound distaste for protracted wars has 

come an increased intolerance for violence. America’s 

security state reaction to 9/11 certainly suggests the 

public desire for security has reached a new all-time 

high. A nuclear event almost anywhere, as a result, is 

likely to prompt even more security (i.e., repressive) 

governance; think 1984. For governments originally 

dedicated to the proposition of enlightened self-rule, 

this should be a concern.63 At the very least, it ought to 

inform our thinking about nuclear weapons and their 

possible use.

Yet, those eager to go to zero ultimately do not appear to be all that worried that states might intentionally use these weapons. They believe just the opposite. 

Most nuclear abolitionists acknowledge that nuclear 

weapons are “only” useful to deter nuclear attacks 

and assert that they do. For them, it would be “irrational” for states to use nuclear weapons to secure a military advantage. Nor do they seriously consider that 

Russia, Pakistan, or China might be developing their 

nuclear forces for purposes other than deterrence. 

Their worries instead focus optimistically on the yet 

unprecedented threats of nuclear terrorism and unauthorized use. Finally, they are convinced that deeper 

U.S. nuclear reductions will prompt others to do likewise and insist that, despite the not so peaceful past 

nuclear activities of India, Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Turkey, 
27

North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, and Syria, sharing 

more dual-use nuclear technology will help “strengthen” the NPT.

Nuclear hawks, meanwhile, may fear that our enemies might use nuclear weapons but are “cautiously” optimistic that the United States and its allies can 

be made safe against such threats so long as the right 

number of nuclear weapons of the right kind in the 

right hands are on the ready, and the United States 

and its friends are willing and able to knockout proliferators’ nuclear projects in a timely fashion through 

conventional military strikes and covert action. Regarding the nuclear security concerns of the abolitionists, they are confident: We have avoided accidental 

and illicit use so far; with due diligence, we can manage this problem into the future.

Finally, radical academic skeptics are perhaps the 

most optimistic of all: Further nuclear proliferation is 

either good or, at least, not a worry. Nuclear weapons 

deter nuclear wars completely or are so useless they 

never will be used.

Each of our current views of nuclear proliferation, 

then, ends up serving our highest hopes. The question is whether they adequately address what should 

be our biggest worry. Do they deal with the possible 

military diversion of “peaceful” nuclear energy—a 

dual-use technology sure to spread further? Do they 

adequately address the perils of making nuclear cuts 

as other states continue to hold or increase their arsenals? Do they assume that if we maintain our nuclear 

weapons force capabilities, we will forever deter the 

worst? Do they fully consider the military risks states 

run when they acquire their first nuclear weapon or 

try to ramp up existing arsenals significantly? Can any 

of them alone serve as a practical guide to reducing 

the nuclear challenges we face?
28

WHERE WE ARE HEADED

With most of the world’s advanced economies still 

stuttering in recession, Western support for increased 

defense spending at new lows, and a major emerging Asian power increasingly at military odds with 

its neighbors and the United States, it is tempting to 

view our times as rhyming with a decade of similar 

woes—the disorderly 1930s.64 Might we again be drifting toward some new form of mortal national combat? Or will our future more likely ape the near-halfcentury that defined the Cold War—a period in which 

tensions between competing states ebbed and flowed, 

but peace mostly prevailed by dint of nuclear mutual 

fear and loathing?

The short answer is, nobody knows. This much, 

however, is clear: The strategic military competitions 

of the next 2 decades will be unlike any the world has 

yet seen. Assuming U.S., Chinese, Russian, Israeli, 

Indian, French, British, and Pakistani strategic forces 

continue to be modernized and America and Russia 

freeze or further reduce their strategic nuclear deployments, the next arms race will be run by a much larger 

number of contestants with highly destructive strategic capabilities far more closely matched and capable 

of being quickly enlarged than in any other previous 

period in history.

Looking Backward.

To grasp the dimensions of this brave new world, 

one need only compare how capable states were of 

striking their adversaries suddenly a half-century 

ago, with what damage they might inflict today. In 
29

1962, Washington and Moscow engaged in the most 

significant of Cold War nuclear confrontations over 

the Soviet deployment of nuclear-capable missiles in 

Cuba. At the time, the United States had over 24,000 

operationally deployed nuclear weapons. Russia had 

nearly 2,500. The other nuclear powers—the UK and 

France—had an aggregate of no more than 50 (with 

France possessing few, if any, deployed nuclear weapons).65 The difference in nuclear weapons deployment 

numbers between the top and bottom nuclear powers—a figure equal to at least three orders of magnitude—was massive. America, moreover, was clearly 

dominant.

In contrast, today the United States has no more 

than 2,130 deployed strategic and tactical nuclear warheads, and Russia has 3,600.66 India, Pakistan, the UK, 

France, and Israel have 100 to 400 each, and China may 

have between 190 and 900.67 Putting aside North Korea’s nascent nuclear force (cf. France’s force of 1962), 

the difference in the numbers of nuclear deployments 

between the top and bottom nuclear powers, then, has 

fallen at least two full orders of magnitude and is projected to decline even further (see Figure 2).
30

Figure 2. From U.S. Strategic Dominance to a 

Compressed Nuclear Crowd.68

As tight as the nuclear deployments between the 

world’s nuclear-armed states has become, the potential for this nuclear balance to shift quickly and dramatically is far greater than it was a half-century ago. 

In 1962, the United States, Russia, the UK, and France 

had militarized nearly all of the nuclear weapons 

materials they had. They held little or nothing back 

in reserve. Nor could any of them militarize civilian 

stockpiles of separated plutonium or highly enriched 

uranium (HEU), as no such stockpiles were then 

available.

Today, things are quite different. First, the United 

States and Russia alone can redeploy thousands of 

reserve nuclear weapons and reconfigure stockpiled 

fissile materials into tens of thousands of additional 

nuclear weapons. Second, officials in Japan publicly 

have admitted that they have the means to militarize 

nearly 11 metric tons of “civilian” plutonium (i.e., 
31

enough to make more than 2,000 first-generation 

bombs)69 that they have stored domestically.70

India, meanwhile, has many hundreds of bombs’ 

worth of separated reactor-grade plutonium on tap, is 

planning on expanding its capacity to produce more 

of this material significantly over the next 3 to 10 

years, and has claimed to have tested a nuclear device 

using this “reactor-grade” material.71 Third, China has 

produced tons of nuclear material that it might yet 

militarize and is considering building a “civilian” plutonium reprocessing plant adjacent to one of its major 

military nuclear production sites that could produce 

over 1,500 bombs’ worth of plutonium annually.72

Also, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, South Korea, and North 

Korea either make or are planning to produce such 

nuclear fuels (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. National Stockpiles of Separated 

Plutonium.73
32

As for enriched uranium, the United States and 

Russia each still easily have more than 10,000 crude 

bombs’ worth of surplus weapons-grade uranium on 

hand (see Figure 4).

Figure 4. National Stockpiles of Highly Enriched 

Uranium.74

The amount China may have deployed in weapons 

is unclear, but a conservative estimate of the HEU it 

has produced is 16 metric tons—i.e., enough to make 

roughly 800 first-generation implosion weapons.75 India, meanwhile, has enough highly enriched uranium 

stockpiled to make several hundred additional crude 

nuclear implosion weapons, as do France and the UK 

(see Figure 4).
33

As for the future, both Japan and China plan 

on increasing their uranium enrichment capacity 

significantly. South Korea would like to enrich uranium as well. As will be discussed, all of these efforts are likely to be in excess of anything called for 

commercially.

This, then, brings us to the next qualitative strategic metric of interest, long-range missile delivery 

systems. In 1962, only the United States and the Soviet Union had missiles capable of delivering a firstgeneration nuclear weapon any distance. Today, 24 

states do.76 To be sure, many of these states only have 

theater-range systems. But most of these states are in 

hotspots like the Middle East, where missiles of such 

range are more than sufficient to strike several neighbors.77 Meanwhile, the rest of the world’s nuclear-capable missile states are able to target this same region 

with intercontinental or medium-range systems.

As for the total number of nuclear-armed states, 

this figure has increased as well. A half-century ago, 

only the United States, Russia, the UK, and France had 

nuclear arms, and an overwhelming number of these 

weapons were in the hands of the United States (see 

Figure 5). 
34

Figure 5. Four Nuclear Weapons States in 1962.

Now, there are nine nuclear-armed states. Two—

the UK and France—are within NATO and coordinate 

their nuclear plans. North Korea, meanwhile, is a state 

that the major powers hope will give up its few nuclear arms in negotiations. In this world, U.S. officials 

like to think that most of the current nuclear-armed 

states are U.S. allies, partners, or strategic stakeholders (see Figure 6).
35

Figure 6. How the United States Views 

the World Today.

This world, however, may not last. Certainly, Tehran may yet militarize its nuclear holdings; and Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, South Korea, and Japan 

must now all be viewed as possible near- or mid-term 

nuclear weapons-ready states. Unlike France, China, 

Russia, and the UK, these post-Cold War nuclear 

weapons aspirants may not announce their acquisition 

of their first nuclear weapon by testing it. Instead, they 

are likely to develop “peaceful” nuclear energy programs, as Iran, India, Iraq, and North Korea did, and 

then move toward nuclear weapons only when they 

conclude it is useful to do so. Whether or not “safety” 

and nuclear stability in this new world will be “the 

sturdy child of [mutual] terror” (Winston Churchill’s 

description of Cold War stability)78 remains to be seen. 
36

Certainly, the stool of nuclear deterrence will have 

many more legs that could give way in many more 

surprising ways than were possible a half-century ago 

(see Figure 7).

Figure 7. Possible Proliferated Future.

Why Worry?

As already noted, a fashionable rejoinder to such 

broodings is to insist that all of these states will be 

mutually deterred. Any intelligent state, it is argued, 

should know that using nuclear weapons is militarily 

self-defeating and that these weapons’ only legitimate 

mission is to deter military threats. According to this 

view, fretting about nuclear use and proliferation is 

mistaken or overwrought.79

But is it? Can states deter military threats with nuclear weapons if their actual use is universally viewed 

as being self-defeating? Which states, if any, actually 
37

believe they are militarily useless? As noted earlier, 

the Russians and Pakistanis clearly do not. Just the opposite: They have gone out of their way to develop 

battlefield nuclear weapons and plan to use them first 

to defeat opposing advanced conventional forces. As 

for the United States, France, and the UK, all have 

studiously refused to renounce first use. Israel, meanwhile, insists that, while it will not be first to introduce 

nuclear weapons in the Middle East, it will not be second. This leaves North Korea—a wild card—and India and China, whose declared no first use policies are 

either unclear or under reconsideration.80

But are not the days of highly destructive wars—

nuclear or non-nuclear—behind us? Certainly, with 

the events surrounding 9/11, this view has gained the 

support of an increasing number of U.S. and allied 

military analysts and pundits.81 Reflecting this outlook, the United States and its European allies have 

turned several Cold War nuclear “survival” bunkers 

into private real estate opportunities or historical 

tourist sites.82

The problem is that at least two states have not. 

U.S. intelligence agencies have determined that Russia invested over $6 billion to expand a 400-squaremile underground nuclear complex at Yamantau a 

full decade after the Berlin Wall fell. This complex is 

burrowed deep enough to withstand a nuclear attack 

and is large enough and provisioned sufficiently to 

house 60,000 people for months (see Figure 8). U.S. 

intelligence officials believe it is one of a system of as 

many as 200 Russian nuclear bunkers.83
38

Figure 8. Russian Underground Nuclear Complex 

at Yamantau.84

China’s nuclear passive-defense activities are no 

less impressive. In 2009, China’s strategic missile 

command, the 2nd Artillery Brigade, revealed that 

it had completed 3,000 miles of dispersed, deep, underground tunnels for the deployment of its nuclearcapable cruise and ballistic missile forces. China spent 

enormous sums to build this system and is still expanding the complex, which is known as the Underground Great Wall. The system is said to be designed 

and provisioned to house thousands of military staff 

during a nuclear exchange (see Figure 9).85
39

Figure 9. China’s Underground Great Wall.86

North Korea also has gone to extensive lengths to 

protect its strategic assets. Almost all of its nuclear and 

long-range military systems have underground tunneled bases or host areas. South Korean intelligence 

estimates that North Korea has in excess of 10,000 

underground facilities to protect its key military and 

civilian assets.87

Going Ballistic.

All of this suggests that several nuclear-armed 

states still believe they may have to endure or engage 

in a nuclear exchange. Fortifying this suspicion is the 
40

increasing capacity states have to deliver quickly both 

nuclear and non-nuclear payloads against one another. Back in 1962, only the United States and Russia 

had nuclear-capable missile systems—i.e., cruise or 

ballistic missile systems capable of delivering a firstgeneration nuclear warhead (which would weigh 500 

kilograms) 300 kilometers or farther.88 Now, no fewer 

than 24 countries have perfected or acquired such systems, and nine can launch a satellite into orbit—i.e., 

have all that is needed to deploy an intercontinental 

ballistic missile (ICBM). In addition, the United States, 

China, Iran, South Korea, Israel, and key NATO states 

are all working on precision conventional missiles capable of knocking out large military bases and major 

naval surface combatants that only a few decades ago 

were difficult or impossible to destroy without using nuclear weapons.89 More nuclear-capable missile 

states are likely to emerge (see Figure 10).

Figure 10. Nuclear-Capable Missile 

Countries Today.90
41

The strategic uncertainties these missile trends can 

generate are difficult to exaggerate. First, the proliferation of long-range missiles allows many more countries to play in any given regional dispute. One way 

to measure a state’s diplomatic shadow or potential 

to influence others militarily is simply to map out the 

range arcs of its deployed missiles. Today, increasingly, these arcs overlap. Consider Iran. The reach of its 

missiles now intersects with that of missiles based in 

Israel, Egypt, the UAE, Syria, Russia, Pakistan, France, 

Saudi Arabia, China, the UK, and the United States.

This is a very different world than that of a halfcentury ago. In 1962, when alliance loyalties within 

the Communist bloc and the free world were at their 

height, only Russia and America’s missiles were 

aimed at each other. Now, there is no Communist 

bloc, what remains of the free world alliance system 

(e.g., NATO; Australia, New Zealand, United States 

Security Treaty [ANZUS], etc.) is relatively weak, and 

nuclear-capable missiles in hotspots like the Persian 

Gulf could be fired from any number of states—both 

near and far. For nuclear-armed states, this situation places a long-term premium on securing nuclear 

weapons assets against surprise attack.91 It also raises 

first-order questions about nuclear escalation, which 

brings us to the second reason more missiles in more 

hands is a major worry: These missiles also can act as 

conventional catalysts for nuclear war.

Increasingly, with precision guidance and advanced munitions technologies, it is possible to destroy targets that once required nuclear weapons—

e.g., large airstrips and airfields, command centers, 

naval ports, and large, moving surface ships—with a 

handful of conventionally armed missiles instead. This 

has raised the prospect of states being able to knock- 
42

out a significant portion of an opponent’s key military 

forces without having to use nuclear weapons.92

The good news is that this should make the initial 

use of nuclear weapons far less likely. The bad news 

is that with enough precision guidance capabilities, a 

state might be tempted to initiate combat in the expectation of winning without ever having to go nuclear 

and end up miscalculating badly.

War Scenarios.

A real-world case, now taken seriously by Pakistani security analysts, is the mid-term prospect of an 

Indian conventional missile decapitation of Pakistani 

strategic command nodes. The Indians, in this scenario, would use precise, offensive, long-range missiles against Pakistan’s nuclear forces and command 

centers. Then, New Delhi could fend off any Pakistani 

retaliatory nuclear strike with India’s much larger nuclear forces and with Indian non-nuclear missile defenses. Finally, India could prevail against Pakistani 

armor and artillery, with superior Indian military conventional forces.

To hedge against this prospect, Pakistan has already ramped up its nuclear weapons production and 

is now toying with deploying its nuclear weapons in 

ways designed to complicate Indian opportunities to 

knock them out (e.g., delegation of launch authority 

under certain circumstances, forward deployment, 

dispersal, mobility, etc.). All of these methods only increase the prospects for nuclear use and have goaded 

India to develop nuclear ramp-up options of its own.

Beyond this, advanced conventional weapons 

might ignite a nuclear conflict directly. Again, consider India and Pakistan. After being hit by so many 
43

Pakistani-backed terrorist attacks, the Indian government has developed a conventional counterstrategy 

known as “Cold Start.” Under this approach, India 

would respond to Pakistan-backed terrorist attacks 

by quickly seizing a limited amount of Pakistani territory, with Indian forces deployed to march on command immediately (i.e., from a cold start). The idea 

here would be to threaten to take enough away from 

Pakistan that it holds dear, but not enough to prompt 

Pakistan to threaten India with its nuclear weapons. 

Unfortunately, India’s Cold Start plan has had nearly 

the reverse effect. Shortly after New Delhi broached 

this strategy, Pakistani military officials announced 

their intent to use tactical nuclear weapons against any 

invading Indian force and deployed new, short-range 

nuclear-capable tactical missiles along the PakistaniIndian border precisely for this purpose. India replied 

by deploying tactical missiles of its own. It is unclear 

just how serious either India or Pakistan are about carrying out these war plans, but this uncertainty is itself 

a worry.93

Of course, relying on nuclear weapons to counter 

conventional threats is not unique. Moscow, faced 

with advanced Chinese and NATO conventional 

forces, has chosen to increase its reliance on tactical 

nuclear weapons. For Russia, employing these weapons is far less stressful economically than trying to 

field advanced conventional forces and is militarily 

pragmatic, given Russia’s shrinking cohort of eligible 

military servicemen. China, in response, may be toying with deploying additional tactical nuclear systems 

of its own.94
44

China and the Nuclear Rivalries Ahead.

All of these trends are challenging. They also suggest what the next strategic arms race might look like. 

First, if the United States and Russia maintain or reduce their current level of nuclear weapons deployments, it is possible that at least one other nuclear 

weapons state may be tempted to close the gap. Of 

course, in the short- and even mid-term, Pakistan, Israel, and India could not hope to catch up. For these 

states, getting ahead of the two superpowers would 

take great effort and at least one to three decades of 

continuous, flat-out military nuclear production. It is 

quite clear, moreover, that none of these states have 

yet set out to meet or beat the United States or Russia 

as a national goal.

China, however, is a different matter. It clearly 

sees the United States as a key military competitor 

in the Western Pacific and in Northeast Asia. China 

also has had border disputes with India and historically has been at odds militarily with Russia as well. 

It is not surprising, then, that China has actively been 

modernizing its nuclear-capable missiles to target key 

U.S. and Indian military air and sea bases with advanced conventional missiles and is developing even 

more advanced missiles to threaten U.S. carrier task 

forces on the open seas. In support of such operations, 

China is also modernizing its military space assets, 

which include military communications, command, 

surveillance, and imagery satellites and an emerging 

anti-satellite capability.95

Then there is China’s nuclear arsenal. For nearly 30 

years, most respected Western security analysts have 

estimated the number of deployed Chinese nuclear 

warheads to be between 190 and 300.96 Yet, by any 
45

account, China has produced enough weapons-usable 

plutonium and uranium to make four or more times 

this number of weapons. Why, then, have Chinese 

nuclear deployments been judged to be so low?

First, China has experienced firsthand what might 

happen if its nuclear weapons fell into the wrong 

hands. During the Cultural Revolution, one of its 

nuclear weapons laboratories test fired a nucleararmed medium-range missile over heavily populated 

regions of China and exploded the device. Not long 

after, Mao ordered a major consolidation of China’s 

nuclear warheads and had them placed under much 

tighter centralized control. Arguably, the fewer nuclear warheads China has, the easier it is for its officials 

to maintain control over them.97

Second, and possibly related, is China’s declared 

nuclear weapons strategy. In its official military 

white papers since 2006 and in other forums, Chinese 

officials insist that Beijing would never be first to use 

nuclear weapons and would never use them against 

any non-nuclear weapons state. China also supports 

a doctrine that calls for a nuclear retaliatory response 

that is no more than what is “minimally” required for 

its defense. Most Western Chinese security experts 

have interpreted these statements to mean Beijing is 

interested in holding only a handful of opponents’ 

cities at risk. This, in turn, has encouraged Western 

officials to settle uncertainties regarding Chinese nuclear warhead numbers toward the low end.98

What China’s actual nuclear use policies might 

be, though, is open to debate. As one analyst recently 

quipped, with America’s first use of nuclear weapons 

against Japan in 1945, it is literally impossible for any 

country other than the United States to be first in using these weapons. More important, Chinese officials 
46

have emphasized that Taiwan is not an independent 

state and that, under certain circumstances, it may be 

necessary for China to use nuclear weapons against 

this island “province.” Also, there are the not-soveiled nuclear threats that senior Chinese generals 

have made against the United States if it should use 

conventional weapons against China in response to a 

Chinese attack against Taiwan (including the observation that the United States would not be willing to risk 

Los Angeles to save Taipei).99

Finally, as China deploys more land-mobile and 

submarine-based nuclear missile systems, there will 

be increased technical and bureaucratic pressures to 

delegate more launch authority to each of China’s 

military services. China’s ballistic missile submarines already have complete nuclear systems under 

the command of their respective submarine captains. 

As China deploys ever more advanced road-mobile 

nuclear missiles, its commanders are likely to want to 

have similar authority. Historically, such delegation 

of launch authority has come with increased nuclear 

weapons requirements.100

The second cause for conservatism in assessing 

China’s arsenal is the extent to which estimates of the 

number of Chinese warheads have been tied to the 

observed number of Chinese nuclear weapons missile 

launchers. So far, the number of these systems that 

have been seen is relatively low. Moreover, few, if any, 

missile reloads are assumed for each of these missile 

launchers, and it is presumed that only a handful of 

China’s missiles have multiple warheads. The numbers of battlefield nuclear weapons, such as nuclear 

artillery, are also presumed to be low or nonexistent.
47

All of this may be right, but there are reasons to 

wonder. The Chinese, after all, claim that they have 

built 3,000 miles of tunnels to hide China’s nuclearcapable missile forces and related warheads and that 

China continues to build such tunnels. Employing 

missile reloads for mobile missile systems has been 

standard practice for Russia and the United States. 

It would be odd if it was not also a Chinese practice, 

particularly given China’s growing number of landmobile solid-fueled rocket and cruise missile systems. 

With China’s recent development of the DF-41, a massive, mobile, nuclear-armed ICBM, and its deployment of multiple independently targetable re-entry 

vehicles (MIRVs) on its silo-based DF-5s, U.S. authorities believe China may deploy a new generation of 

mobile MIRV missiles.101 Also, as already noted, several experts believe China may be fielding battlefield 

artillery for the delivery of tactical nuclear shells.

Precisely how large is China’s nuclear arsenal, 

then? The answer is unclear. The Chinese say they are 

increasing the size of their nuclear weapons arsenal 

“appropriately.”102 They have not yet said by how 

much. In 2012, General Viktor Yesin, the former chief 

of Russia’s strategic rocket forces, told U.S. security 

experts that China may have more than 900 deployed 

nuclear weapons and another 900 nuclear weapons 

stored in reserve.103 This estimate, which is roughly 

seven times greater than most analysts believe Beijing 

possesses, would give China roughly as many warheads as the United States currently has deployed.104

Putting aside how accurate this Russian estimate 

might be, the first problem it and other larger estimates 

present is how sound long-term U.S. and Russian strategic plans might be. It hardly is in Washington’s or 

Moscow’s interest to let Beijing believe it could threat-
48

en Taiwanese, Japanese, American, Indian, or Russian 

targets conventionally because its nuclear forces were 

so large Beijing could assume they would deter any 

of these states from ever responding militarily (see 

Figure 11).

Figure 11. The Next Decade: Nuclear Weapons 

Uncertainties.105

Yet another question that a much larger Chinese 

nuclear strategic force would raise is how it might impact future U.S.-Russian strategic arms negotiations. 

As China has increased its deployments of highly 

precise, nuclear-capable missile systems, Moscow 

has chaffed at the missile limits that the IntermediateRange Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) imposes 

on it fielding similar systems. Since the conclusion 

of New START in 2011, Moscow has balked at making any further cuts unless China is included in the 

Number of Nuclear Warheads

1,660 Federation of American Scientists FAS)
49

negotiations. Shortly after several U.S. security analysts and members of Congress spotlighted Russian 

moves to break out of the INF Treaty,106 the State 

Department announced that Russia had, in fact, violated the treaty.107 American hawks, meanwhile, have 

warned against the United States making further nuclear cuts lest other states, like China, quickly ramp 

up their force levels to meet or exceed ours. All of this 

suggests the imperative for Washington and Moscow 

to factor China into their arms control and strategic 

modernization calculations. The question is how.

Other Interested Parties.

Unfortunately, getting a sound answer to this 

question may not be possible without first considering 

the security concerns of states other than the United 

States, Russia, and China. Japan, for one, is an interested party. It already has over 1,700 weapons’ worth 

of separated plutonium on its soil. This plutonium 

was supposed to fuel Japan’s light water and fast reactors, a fleet which, before the accident at Fukushima, 

consisted of 54 reactors. After the accident, Japan shut 

down all of these plants, decided to reduce its reliance 

on nuclear power as much as possible, and is projected in the mid-term to bring no more than one-third of 

its light water reactor fleet back online.108 Meanwhile, 

Japan’s fast reactor program has been effectively frozen since the 1990s due to a series of accidents. Japan, 

the United States, and France plan on cooperating on 

a renewed effort, but it is unlikely that a new fast reactor will be operating in Japan for decades.109

A related and immediate operational question 

is whether or not Japan will bring a $20-billion-plus 

commercial nuclear spent-fuel reprocessing plant 
50

capable of producing roughly 1,500 bombs’ worth of 

plutonium a year at Rokkasho online sometime after 

the spring of 2016. This plutonium recycling effort has 

been controversial. The original decision to proceed 

with it was made under Prime Minister Nakasone 

and can be tied to internal Japanese considerations of 

developing a plutonium nuclear weapons option. Although this plant is not necessary for the management 

of Japan’s spent fuel, the forward costs of operating it 

could run as high as $100 billion over its lifetime. Each 

year this plant operates, it is expected to produce eight 

tons of weapons-usable plutonium—enough to produce nearly as many first-generation nuclear weapons 

annually as is contained in America’s entire deployed 

nuclear force110 (see Figure 12).

Figure 12. Japanese Plutonium Stocks and Projected 

Production.111

Metric Tons of Separated Plutonium

Total if Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP) operates 

and MOX use delayed
51

In light of the questionable technical and economic 

benefits of operating Rokkasho, especially given the 

reduced number of reactors likely to be online in Japan, it would be difficult for Tokyo to justify proceeding with this plant’s operation unless it wanted to 

develop an option to build a large nuclear weapons 

arsenal.112 Given that Japan currently retains more 

than nine tons of mostly reactor-grade separated plutonium on its soil—enough to make over 1,700 firstgeneration nuclear warheads—there is no immediate 

need to bring Rokkasho online to assure a military 

nuclear option. However, Japan says it is committed 

to eliminating this surplus plutonium stockpile, and 

recently it promised to surrender roughly 800 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium and uranium to 

the United States in pursuance of this stated goal.113

In this context, keeping Rokkasho on the ready could 

be seen as a kind of national security insurance policy. 

Some leading Japanese figures clearly see it in this 

light114 and technically, there is little question that the 

plutonium could be used to make effective weapons.115

In this regard, even under a much less nationalistic, 

pro-nuclear government than the one just elected, in 

the fall of 2012, Japan’s National Diet felt compelled to 

clarify in law that the purposes of the country’s atomic 

energy program include supporting Japan’s “national 

security.”116 Many nuclear observers outside of Japan 

saw this as a not-so-veiled reference to Japan’s “civilian” plutonium-fuel cycle program.

Certainly, South Korean and Chinese officials and 

commentators spotlighted this prospect with concern.117 Their apprehensions, then, raise the question: 

What might happen if Japan ever decided to open 

Rokkasho? How could this avoid stoking South Korean ambitions to make their own nuclear fuels? What 
52

of China’s long-term efforts to modernize its own 

nuclear weapons systems and its “peaceful” scheme 

of building a copy of Rokkasho itself, adjacent to one 

of its earliest plutonium nuclear weapons production 

sites? Would starting up Rokkasho only catalyze these 

efforts? What if Japan’s startup of Rokkasho came after some Chinese or North Korean military provocation? Might this trigger an additional round of Chinese, North Korean, and South Korean military and 

nuclear hedging actions?

Yet another “peaceful” East Asian nuclear activity 

that bears watching is the substantial plans both Japan and China have to enrich uranium. Both countries 

justify these efforts as being necessary to fuel their 

light water reactor fleets. There are several difficulties 

with this argument, though. First, both countries already have access to foreign uranium enrichment services that are more than sufficient to supply current 

demand. Second, any effort to become commercially 

self-sufficient in enriching uranium in the name of 

“energy independence” is questionable for Japan and 

China, given their lack of economic domestic sources 

of high-grade uranium ore.

Even assuming China could stop importing enrichment services, as it now does from URENCO of 

Europe and Minatom/Tenex of Russia, it still would 

want to import most of its uranium ore from overseas. 

Of course, having commercial enrichment capacity 

could afford bargaining leverage to secure cheaper 

foreign enrichment service contracts. But in China’s 

case (and Japan’s and South Korea’s cases as well), 

such leverage can be had at enrichment capacities 

far below those they have or are planning to acquire. 

Again, both uranium ore and enrichment services are 

readily available globally at reasonable prices and 
53

are projected to remain so. In fact, uranium yellowcake spot prices are currently at historic lows. As for 

enrichment services, the World Nuclear Association 

pegs the world’s current surplus of uranium enrichment capacity to be well above international demand 

and projects supply will outstrip demand by nearly 

50 percent through 2020.118 In short, there is no lack 

of enrichment services internationally and, given 

China’s access to Russian and European enrichers, 

there is little or no immediate economic imperative for 

building more.

China, however, sees things differently. It currently has enough capacity to fuel a dozen large reactors 

and is building more than enough centrifuges to fuel 

58 gigawatts of nuclear capacity, optimistically projected to be online by 2020.119 Some of this projected 

capacity may be set aside for possible reactor exports 

beyond those China is making to Pakistan. Yet, again, 

given the foreign enrichment services glut, none of this 

enrichment expansion makes much economic sense. 

What is all too clear, however, is just how much of a 

military option this enrichment capacity affords. Currently, China could use its civilian enrichment plants 

to make weapons-grade uranium sufficient to build 

over 500 nuclear weapons annually; by 2020, China’s 

planned enrichment capacity could produce material 

sufficient for more than 2,500.120

Japan’s enrichment plans differ only in scale. Like 

China, it, too lacks domestic sources of high-grade uranium ore. As for Tokyo’s current enrichment capacity, 

it can fuel about eight reactors a year. On the other 

hand, it can make approximately 4,500 kilograms of 

weapons-grade uranium annually—enough to make 

at least 200 first-generation nuclear weapons.121 Japan’s plans to expand its enrichment capacity for 2020 
54

might enable Japan to fuel one-half or all of its projected reactor fleet (depending on just how many of 

its reactors it brings online in the next 6 years). The 

question, in light of the global surplus of commercial 

uranium enrichment capacity, though, is why Japan 

would bother. This same planned enrichment capacity, it should be noted, would be enough for Japan to 

make more than 300 first-generation nuclear weapons 

annually (see Figure 13).

Figure 13. Current and Projected East Asian

Uranium Enrichment Capacities.122

As noted, none of these Japanese nuclear fuel making activities and plans sit well with China or South 

Korea. Seoul, in a not-so-well-disguised security 

hedge, began to press Washington in 2009 for permission to separate “peaceful” plutonium from U.S.-

origin spent fuel and to enrich U.S.-origin uranium in 

Korea. These requests coincided with several other 

South Korean security-related demands. The first of 

these came after North Korea’s sinking of the Cheonan 
55

and the bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island. South 

Korean parliamentarians asked the United States to 

redeploy U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on Korean soil. 

Washington refused.123 Then, Seoul pushed Washington to extend the range of its nuclear-capable missiles 

from 300 to 800 kilometers and practically be freed 

from range limits on its cruise missile and space satellite launchers. Washington agreed.124 As for South 

Korea’s nuclear demands, Seoul is likely to continue 

to press its case.125

The question is, what is next? Will Japan start 

Rokkasho as planned after the spring of 2016? What 

commercial nuclear fuel making activities, if any, 

might Washington allow South Korea to engage in? 

Will North Korea or China continue to engage in provocations that will increase Japanese or South Korean 

demands for more strategic military independence 

from its American security alliance partner?

The two popular rejoinders to these questions are 

that there is no reason to worry. Most experts insist 

that neither Japan nor South Korea would ever acquire nuclear weapons. The reasons why are simple. 

It would not only undermine the nuclear nonproliferation regime that they have sworn to uphold and 

strengthen, but also it would risk their continued security ties with their most important ally, the United 

States.

Perhaps, but when it first doubted its American 

security guarantees in the 1970s, South Korea tried to 

get nuclear weapons.126 Those doubts continue today 

as North Korea builds up its nuclear and non-nuclear 

forces against the South.127 More recently, on May 29, 

2014, South Korea’s president noted that if North Korea tested another nuclear weapon, it would make it 

difficult “to prevent a nuclear domino from occurring 
56

in this area”—a clear warning not only to North Korea, but also the United States and China, that if they 

fail to prevent Pyongyang from further perfecting 

its nuclear force, Japan and South Korea might well 

acquire nuclear weapons of their own.128

Yet, another optimistic view argues that it may 

actually be in Washington’s interest to let Japan and 

South Korea go nuclear. Letting them arm might actually tighten America’ relations with these key allies 

while reducing what the United States would otherwise have to spend for their protection. Implicit to this 

argument is the hope that neither Seoul nor Tokyo 

would feel compelled to acquire many weapons—

i.e., that like the UK, they would eagerly integrate 

their modest nuclear forces with that of America’s 

larger force and share their target lists with Washington, and Washington would do likewise with them 

(as Washington already has with London).129

Again, this is plausible. But it is worth noting that 

Japan and South Korea are not the UK. Early on, the 

UK understood its nuclear weapons efforts ultimately 

would be subordinate to and in the service of maintaining its “special relationship” with Washington 

(and scaled down its nuclear efforts accordingly). 

With the Japanese and South Koreans, though, their 

nuclear efforts would unavoidably be seen as a vote 

of no confidence in Washington’s nuclear security 

guarantees. As such, these efforts would have to deal 

with demands by nationalists eager to build a truly 

independent national nuclear force of much more 

ambitious dimensions.130 More important (and more 

likely), even if Japan and South Korea wanted to keep 

their forces subordinate to those of the United States, 

they might both still be driven to acquire very large 

forces of their own given the likely military reactions 

of China, North Korea, and other nuclear states.
57

Consider the action-reaction dynamic Seoul or Tokyo going nuclear might set into motion with Beijing 

and Pyongyang. Presumably, in all cases (China included), each state would try to protect its strategic 

forces against possible attacks by building more passive defenses (hardening, mobility, tunneling, etc.). 

They also would focus on building up their offensive 

forces (both nuclear and non-nuclear) so they might 

eliminate as much of each other’s strategic forces as 

soon as any war began (this to “limit the damage” 

they would otherwise suffer). Finally, they would 

increase the number of nuclear weapons assets, missile portals, and other strategic aim points to prevent 

any of their adversaries from thinking they could 

“knockout” their retaliatory forces. This, roughly, is 

what unfolded during the Cold War rivalry between 

Washington and the Soviet Union. As was the case for 

Russia and the United States then, it could easily drive 

up East Asian nuclear weapons requirements well 

beyond scores or even hundreds of weapons.131

Potentially catalyzing this rivalry further are the 

actions China’s immediate nuclear neighbors might 

take. As has already been noted, the Russians are unlikely to reduce their nuclear weapons deployments if 

the Chinese increase theirs. As for India, it already has 

roughly 100 nuclear weapons and many hundreds of 

bombs’ worth of separated reactor-grade plutonium it 

claims it can fashion into nuclear weapons. It is hedging its nuclear bets even further with plans to build 

five unsafeguarded plutonium-producing breeder 

reactors by 2020 and build an enrichment plant that 

may double its production of weapons-grade uranium.132 Late in 2011, India announced it was working 

with Russia to develop a terminally guided ICBM in 

response to Chinese medium-range ballistic missile 

deployments near India’s borders.133
58

New Delhi has also pushed the development of 

a nuclear submarine force, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), missile defenses, long-range 

cruise missiles, and improved strategic command and 

control and intelligence systems. India has not yet 

competed with China weapon-for-weapon. But if China were to increase its nuclear weapons deployments 

significantly, Indian leaders might argue that they 

had no other choice but to increase their own nuclear 

holdings.

This then brings us back to Pakistan. It has done all 

it can to keep up with India militarily. Since Islamabad 

is already producing as much plutonium and highly 

enriched uranium as is possible, it would likely seek 

further technical assistance from China and financial 

help from its close ally, Saudi Arabia. Islamabad may 

do this to hedge against India, whether China or India build their nuclear arms up or not. There is also 

good reason to believe that Saudi Arabia may want 

to cooperate on nuclear weapons-related activities 

with Pakistan or China to help Saudi Arabia hedge 

against Iran’s growing nuclear weapons capabilities. 

It is unclear if either China or Pakistan would actually 

transfer nuclear weapons directly to Saudi Arabia or 

choose instead to merely help it develop all aspects of 

a “peaceful” nuclear program, including reprocessing 

and enrichment. They might do both.134

In this regard, Saudi Arabia has made it known that 

it intends to build up its “peaceful” nuclear energy capabilities and will not forswear its “right” to enrich 

uranium or to reprocess plutonium. This would constitute one of the most lucrative, best financed near- and 

mid-term nuclear power markets in the world. The 

reactors Saudi Arabia might build also could serve as 

the basis for development of a major nuclear weapons 
59

option. As Saudi Arabia’s former head of intelligence 

told NATO ministers, the kingdom would have to get 

nuclear weapons if Iran did.135

Saudi Arabia is not the only Muslim state to be 

pursuing a nuclear future. Turkey also announced an 

ambitious “peaceful” atomic power program shortly 

after Iran’s nuclear enrichment efforts were revealed 

in 2002 and expressed an interest in 2008 in enriching 

its own uranium.136 Given Turkish qualms about Iran 

acquiring nuclear weapons, the possibility of Ankara 

developing a nuclear weapons option (as it previously 

toyed with doing in the late-1970s)137 must be taken 

seriously. In addition, Algeria and Egypt (political rivals) and Syria (a historical ally of Iran) all have either 

attempted to develop nuclear weapons options or refused to foreswear making nuclear fuel, a process that 

can bring them within weeks of acquiring a bomb. 

Algeria now has enough plutonium and the skills to 

separate it from spent fuel to make several bombs’ 

worth.138 Egypt, which has long complained about 

Israeli nuclear weapons and previously attempted to 

get nuclear weapons, just announced its intention to 

tender bids for its first large power reactor.139 Israel, 

meanwhile, continues to make nuclear weapons materials at Dimona,140 and all of these states have nuclearcapable missile systems (see Figure 14).
60

Note: States in light gray already have established nuclear power 

programs.

Figure 14. States Planning to Have Their First 

Nuclear Power Reactor by or before 2035.

Very little of this rhymes with the world a half-century ago. In the early-1960s, the only countries with civilian nuclear power reactors were the United States, 

the UK, and Russia. The number now is 31 states. Most 

of these are in Eastern and Western Europe but, as the 

map in Figure 14 makes clear, other states in far less 

stable regions are hoping to bring their first nuclear 

power plants online before the year 2035. This trend, 

particularly in the Far and Middle East, has strategic 

implications.

As already noted, each of these plants—even the 

most proliferation-resistant light water reactor types—

can be regarded as “nuclear bomb starter kits.” Although the nuclear industry has consistently promoted 

the mistaken idea that the plutonium power reactors 
61

produce is unsuitable to make bombs, these reactors 

can be operated not only to produce large amounts 

of reactor-grade plutonium, but of weapons-grade 

and near-weapons-grade plutonium as well.141 In fact, 

in their first year or so of normal power production 

operation, these reactors can produce over 50 bombs’ 

worth of near-weapons-grade plutonium. If refueled 

every 10 months, they can produce over 30 bombs’ 

worth of weapons-grade plutonium.142 Also, the plants 

can and have been used as covers to acquire weaponsrelated technology, hardware, and training. In addition, the massive amounts of low-enriched fresh fuel 

stored at these reactors for safety reasons can afford a 

source of enriched uranium to jump-start a uranium 

enrichment weapons option.143 That is why efforts are 

made to control the export of these plants, and why 

they are routinely inspected to guard against military 

diversions.144

As for declared nuclear fuel making plants—uranium hexafluoride and enrichment facilities, plutonium reprocessing and fuel fabrication plants, etc.—

there is a deeper problem that relates to the limits of 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards themselves. Even under ideal circumstances, 

the agency allows that with commercial-sized plants, 

it can lose track of special nuclear material. The margins of statistical error associated with the inspection 

of these plants are egregiously large. Consider the reprocessing plant Japan wants to operate at Rokkasho. 

In this case, the agency can be expected to lose track of 

roughly 250 kilograms (i.e., roughly 50 first-generation 

bombs’ worth) a year. Another way to put this is that 

nearly 50 bombs’ worth of weapons-usable plutonium 

could possibly go missing from Rokkasho without setting off any international inspection alarms at all.145
62

Will the world be able to cope with the further 

spread of such “peaceful” nuclear facilities? Given the 

additional noted missile, fissile, and weapons trends, 

what, if anything, can be done to avoid their military 

diversions or worse—more widespread nuclear weapons competitions and, far worse, a possible accidental 

or intentional use of nuclear weapons?

WHAT MIGHT HELP

These trends invite disorder. How much depends 

on how well the United States, Russia, China, and 

other key states deal with them.

Despite its strained relations with Moscow over 

Ukraine, the United States is still committed to negotiating more nuclear weapons reductions with Russia.146 New START is supposed to be followed eventually by an agreement that will cover both strategic 

and theater nuclear arms in Europe. The Obama administration is committed to bringing the CTBT into 

force and is on record trying to secure an international 

agreement to end the production of fissile material for 

nuclear weapons. The United States has encouraged 

all countries to protect civilian and military nuclear facilities and stores of weapons-usable nuclear materials 

against theft or sabotage. It has tried to persuade nonweapons states to forgo reprocessing or enrichment to 

make their own nuclear fuels.

But these U.S. nuclear control initiatives, even if 

successful, still leave much to be done. Several related areas cry out for greater attention than they are 

currently receiving in Washington: nuclear and missile developments in China and East Asia, the global 

spread of “peaceful” nuclear technology, and the continued failure to develop a consistent, broad approach 
63

to preventing nuclear proliferation. This gives rise to 

three recommendations.

1. Clarify China’s strategic military capabilities 

and promote nonproliferation and arms control 

measures that limit strategic weapons proliferation 

in Asia. Most currently promoted arms control and 

nuclear nonproliferation proposals (e.g., the CTBT, 

FMCT, limits on missile defenses, START and INF) 

were originally designed to limit arms competitions 

between the United States and Russia, or the Soviet 

Union before it. The NPT was initially designed to reduce the prospects of nuclear proliferation in Europe. 

As the world’s economic and strategic center of gravity shifts toward Asia, it would make sense to tailor 

our control efforts to be more relevant to this region.

Wither Beijing?

This means, first of all, clarifying China’s strategic capabilities. Beijing’s recent revelations that it has 

built 3,000 miles of deep tunnels, to protect and hide 

its dual-capable missiles and related nuclear warhead 

systems, suggests we need to reassess our estimates of 

China’s nuclear-capable missile and nuclear weapons 

holdings. Are Beijing’s revelations about its tunnels 

just disinformation designed to intimidate? Or is it 

hiding more military assets than we currently assess it 

has? What is it planning to acquire and deploy? How 

much military fissile material—plutonium and highly 

enriched uranium—does China currently have on 

hand? How likely is it that China has or will militarize 

or expand its fissile material holdings? How many 

different types of nuclear weapons does it have or intend to deploy? How much fissile material does each 

type require? How many missile reloads does China 
64

currently have; how many is it planning to acquire? 

How extensive are Chinese deployments of multiple 

warheads for the country’s missiles, and how much 

further might China expand these deployments? For 

which missile types and in what numbers? How many 

nuclear and advanced conventional warheads is China deploying on its missiles, bombers, submarines, 

and artillery? What are its plans for using these forces? How might these plans relate to China’s emerging 

space, missile defense, and anti-satellite capabilities? 

All of these questions, and more, deserve review within the U.S. Government, with America’s allies, and, to 

the extent possible, in cooperation with India, Russia, 

and the Chinese.

As a part of this review, it also would be helpful 

to game alternative war and military crisis scenarios 

that feature China’s possible use of these forces. These 

games should be conducted at senior political levels 

in American and allied governments. Conducting 

such games should also inform U.S. and allied arms 

control policies and military planning. With regard 

to the latter, a key focus would have to be how one 

might defend, deter, and limit the damage that Chinese nuclear and non-nuclear missile systems might 

otherwise inflict against the United States, its bases in 

the Western Pacific, America’s friends and allies, and 

Russia.

This could entail not only the further development 

and deployment of active missile defenses, but also 

of better passive defenses (e.g., base hardening and 

improving the capacity to restore operations at bases 

after attacks; hardened command, control, and communication systems; etc.) and possibly new offensive 

forces—more capable, long-range conventional strike 

systems to help neutralize possible offensive Chinese 

operations.
65

Yet another focus for such gaming would be to 

clarify the likely consequences of Japanese or South 

Korean acquisition of nuclear weapons. These games 

should be held routinely, bilaterally, and multilaterally with our allies and friends and, at times, with all 

of the key states, including China, represented by informed experts and officials. The aim of such games 

would not only be to understand just how risky Japanese and South Korean nuclear proliferation might 

be, but also to clarify the risks China and North Korea 

will run if they continue to build up their missile and 

nuclear forces.

Nuclear Missiles.

Such gaming should also encourage a review of 

Washington’s current arms control agenda. Here, several specific ideas, particularly relevant to Asia, deserve attention. First among these is talks with China, 

Russia, and other states about limiting ground-based, 

dual-capable ballistic and cruise missiles. China possesses more of these systems than any other state. 

Counting American, Russian, Indian, Pakistani, North 

Korea, South Korean, and Chinese ground based missiles, Asia is targeted by more such missiles than any 

other region.

Unlike air and sea-based missiles, ground-launched 

systems can be securely communicated with and fired 

instantly upon command. As such, they are ideal for 

use in a first strike. These accurate, dual-capable missiles also can inflict strategic harm against major bases 

and naval operations when carrying conventional 

warheads.

Reagan referred to these weapons as “nuclear 

missiles,” and looked forward to their eventual 
66

elimination. Toward this end, he concluded the INF 

Treaty agreement, which eliminated an entire class of 

ground-based nuclear-capable missiles, and negotiated the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), 

which was designed to block the further proliferation of nuclear-capable systems (i.e., rockets and unmanned air-breathing systems capable of lifting over 

500 kilograms for a distance of at least 300 kilometers). 

With the promotion of space-based missile defenses, 

Reagan hoped to eliminate enough of such groundbased missiles to eliminate credible nuclear first strike 

threats.147

Which states have an incentive to eliminate these 

missiles? The United States eliminated all of its intermediate ground-launched missiles under the INF 

Treaty. Most of America’s shorter-range missiles are 

either air-launched or below MTCR range-payload 

limits. As for U.S. ground-based ICBMs, they are all 

based in fixed silos. To avoid being knocked out in any 

major nuclear exchange, these missiles may have to be 

launched on warning. Russia, on the other hand, has a 

large, road-mobile ICBM force. At the same time, it is 

worried about growing numbers of long-range precision missiles that both the United States and China are 

developing that it cannot easily defend against.148

India and Pakistan have ground-launched ballistic missiles, but some of their most seasoned military 

experts have called for the elimination of short-range 

missiles, arguing that these weapons are only likely to 

escalate border disputes.149 As for China, it has much 

to gain by deploying more ground-launched missiles, 

unless, of course, such deployment causes India, Russia, and the United States to react militarily. The United States has been developing hypersonic boost glide 

systems that could provide it with prompt global 
67

strike options. It could base these systems either in the 

continental United States or in forward bases in the 

Western Pacific.150 It also has hundreds of silo-based 

ICBMs that it could affordably convert to deliver advanced non-nuclear payloads, including hypersonic 

boost glide systems.151 Provoking the development of 

such U.S. weapons would not be in China’s interest, 

or Russia’s. Talks about reducing long-range, nuclear-capable ground-based missile systems should be 

explored.152

Forward Nuclear Deployments.

Another arms restriction that should be considered 

is keeping the world’s nuclear-armed states from deploying, beyond what is already in place, any nuclear 

weapons in peacetime on the soil of states that lack 

such weapons. An immediate concern is Saudi Arabia, 

which has been rumored to be interested in buying 

nuclear weapons either from China or Pakistan, or in 

getting either nation to deploy several of their warheads there. Under the NPT, it is permissible for nuclear weapons states to deploy their weapons in states 

that lack such weapons so long as these weapons stay 

under the “control” of the donor nuclear weapons 

state. This provision in the NPT was crafted in the 

1960s to allow the United States to continue to deploy 

tactical nuclear weapons to NATO countries and East 

Asia, and for the Soviet Union to do so in Warsaw Pact 

countries.

Although the United States continues to forward 

base some of its weapons in Europe, long-range 

bombers and missile systems have made it possible to 

remove all of the forward deployed U.S. tactical nuclear systems from East Asia. Given that Washington 
68

has no plans to reintroduce them or to increase existing deployments, it may be possible to broker some 

understanding to forbid any further deployments in 

exchange for Chinese and Pakistani pledges not to 

deploy any of their nuclear arms beyond their soil.

Given the turmoil in the Persian Gulf region, brokering such an understanding would be timely. It 

also would have the immediate advantage of engaging Pakistan, a non-NPT member, in some form of 

nuclear arms restraint. This is something that should 

be encouraged more generally with nuclear weaponsarmed non-NPT members. Given Pakistan’s rivalry 

with India, perhaps New Delhi could be persuaded 

to consider adopting such limits as well. Beyond this, 

other limits, including on nuclear fissile production, 

might be sought, not only by Pakistan and India, 

but Israel as well. In this manner, one could begin to 

view states that are now outside the NPT as being instead NPT members in noncompliance—i.e., as states 

that, by taking steps toward nuclear restraint, might 

improve their current noncompliant NPT status.

Fissile Limits, Starting with China.

Additional nuclear restraints should also be promoted among the nuclear weapons-armed states. Although there is no clear legally binding obligation for 

the nuclear-armed states to disarm, the NPT encourages all states to make good faith efforts to do so.153 If 

the United States could get other states to reduce their 

nuclear weapons capabilities in a verifiable fashion, it 

should be open to continuing to do so itself. Reaching new treaty agreements, though, ought not be the 

only measure of progress. Although it may not be possible to conclude a fissile material cutoff treaty any-
69

time soon, all of the other permanent members of the 

United Nations Security Council should press China 

to follow their lead in unilaterally forswearing making fissile material for weapons. This, in turn, could 

be helpful in pressing for moratoriums on “peaceful” 

nuclear fuel making of nuclear weapons-usable fuels 

as well.154

In this regard, an informal moratorium on commercial plutonium recycling would make sense. A 

good place to begin would be in East Asia and the 

Pacific, starting with China, the United States, Japan, 

and South Korea. Here, it is worth noting that the 

2012 report of the U.S. Blue Ribbon Commission on 

America’s Nuclear Future determined that dry cask 

storage would make more sense for the United States 

to pursue than commercial plutonium recycling in the 

near and mid-term.155 Meanwhile, America’s efforts to 

convert weapons plutonium into commercial mixed 

oxide fuel (MOX) have encountered difficulties.156 As 

for Japan’s planned plutonium reprocessing and fast 

reactor programs, Tokyo will have trouble implementing them, given its reduced reliance on nuclear power. 

South Korea wants to recycle plutonium in a prototype integrated fast reactor, but this program may 

well get pushed back considerably. Also, its planned 

first fuel loading will be low-enriched uranium, not 

plutonium-based fuel.157

China is currently negotiating with AREVA to 

build a commercial reprocessing plant nearly identical to the Rokkasho plant in Japan. Price remains a 

sticking point. According to nuclear analysts, Beijing 

might build this large commercial reprocessing plant 

by 2025, have it separate plutonium for 10 to 20 years, 

and stockpile this material to fuel a fleet of commercial breeder reactors.158 This view, in turn, is driven 

by the expectation that uranium yellowcake will be 
70

unavailable after 2050 for anything less than 130 (current) dollars per pound.159

This uranium price projection is speculative and 

rebuttable. What is not is the potential military utility of China’s civilian plutonium program. As already 

noted, the commercial-sized reprocessing plant the 

Chinese nuclear establishment may decide to build 

could produce enough plutonium for roughly 1,500 

first-generation bombs annually. Assuming China’s 

first breeder reactor came online by 2040, its first fueling with plutonium would come only after China had 

amassed well over 20,000 weapons’ worth of plutonium. The large reprocessing plant, if it is built, would 

be located close to China’s first military plutonium 

nuclear production site at Jiayuguan.

Of course, if any of the three East Asian states begins to reprocess plutonium commercially, the other 

two would almost certainly follow, as much as a security hedge against each other as for any commercial purpose. For similar reasons, each is interested in 

significantly expanding its capacity to enrich uranium. 

To head this off, it would be helpful to call for a freeze 

on the deployment of any further commercial uranium enrichment capacity in China, Japan, and Korea 

(North and South). At a minimum, the United States, 

France, and Russia should refrain from promoting 

large fast reactors in the region.160

As already noted, the United States and Russia 

maintain surplus nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons materials stockpiles; and India, Israel, Pakistan, 

China, Japan, France, and the UK hold significant 

amounts of nuclear weapons-usable plutonium and 

uranium. This fissile material overhang increases security uncertainties as to how many nuclear weapons 

these states might have or could fashion relatively 
71

quickly. Given the verification difficulties with the 

proposed fissile material cutoff treaty and the improbabilities of such a treaty being brought into force, it 

would be useful to consider control alternatives.161

One idea, backed by several analysts, is a voluntary initiative known as the fissile material control 

initiative.162 It would call on nuclear weapons-usable 

material producing states to set aside whatever fissile 

materials they have produced in excess of their immediate military or civilian requirements for either final 

disposition or internationally verified safekeeping. 

Russia and the United States have already agreed to 

dispose of 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium and 

have blended down 683 tons of weapons-grade uranium for use in civilian reactors. Much more could be 

done to dispose and end the production of such weapons-usable nuclear materials, not only in the United 

States and Russia, but also in other fissile-producing 

states, including those in Asia.163

2. Encourage nuclear supplier states to condition 

their further export of civilian nuclear plants upon 

the recipients forswearing reprocessing spent reactor fuel and enriching uranium, and press the IAEA 

to be more candid about what it can safeguard. Will 

Iran’s pursuit of “peaceful” nuclear energy serve as a 

model for Saudi Arabia (which says it wants to build 

several large power reactors before 2035), Turkey 

(which plans to build 20), Egypt (1), and Algeria (3)? 

When asked, none of these countries has been willing 

to forgo making nuclear fuel. So far, only Turkey and 

the UAE have ratified the IAEA’s tougher nuclear inspection regime under the Additional Protocol. There 

also is the outstanding issue of whether the United 

States will eventually authorize South Korea to 

recycle U.S.-origin nuclear materials.
72

All of this should be a worry, since, as already 

noted, the IAEA cannot find covert enrichment or 

reprocessing facilities or reactor plants with much 

confidence (cf. recent history regarding nuclear plants 

in Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Syria). Once a large reactor operates in a country, fresh enriched uranium becomes available and raises the possibility that it could 

be seized for possible further enrichment to weaponsgrade in a covert or declared enrichment plant. Alternatively, the reactor’s plutonium-laden spent fuel 

could be reprocessed to produce many bombs’ worth 

of plutonium. Unfortunately, IAEA inspections at declared, commercial-sized uranium hexafluoride and 

enrichment plants, plutonium reprocessing facilities, 

and plutonium fuel production plants could lose track 

of several scores of crude bombs’ worth of special 

nuclear material annually.

The Gold Standard.

Given these points and recognizing that the authority to inspect anywhere at any time without notice 

is not yet available to the IAEA (even when it operates 

under the Additional Protocol), any state’s pledge not 

to conduct reprocessing or enrichment could not be 

fully verified in a timely manner. Still, securing such 

a legal pledge would have some value: It would put a 

violating country on the wrong side of international 

law if and when it was found out, and it would make 

such action sanctionable. This may not be as much as 

one wants or needs, but it is far more of a deterrent to 

nuclear misbehavior than what current nonproliferation limits afford.

Other than the United States, no nuclear supplier state (i.e., Russia, France, Japan, China, or South 
73

Korea) has yet required any of its prospective customers to commit to not enrich uranium or reprocess spent 

fuel to extract plutonium or to ratify the Additional 

Protocol. Worse, the United States itself is backing 

away from insisting on these conditions (often labeled 

the nonproliferation “gold standard” for U.S. civilian 

nuclear cooperation).164

There is some support in the U.S. Congress for 

making it more difficult to finalize any future U.S. 

nuclear cooperative agreements with non-nuclear 

weapons states like Saudi Arabia unless they agree to 

the U.S.-UAE nuclear cooperative conditions.165 These 

congressmen believe that by taking the lead on imposing such nonproliferation conditions, the United 

States would be in a much better position to persuade 

other nuclear supplier states to do the same.

With the Japanese and South Koreans, close U.S. 

nuclear cooperation and security guarantees could be 

leveraged to secure these countries’ agreement to such 

conditions on their nuclear exports. They and the Chinese want to export reactors based on U.S. designs. It 

is unclear whether they can do so legally to states that 

do not have a nuclear cooperative agreement with the 

United States. China, meanwhile, needs all the help it 

can get from the United States to complete the Westinghouse reactors it is building and the Chinese variant on which it is basing much of its nuclear future. 

As for France, the U.S. Department of Energy is paying it significant sums to complete a mixed oxide fuel 

fabrication plant at Savannah River, South Carolina. 

Given technical and financial problems, France may 

have difficulty exporting reactors without significant 

Chinese support.166 With Russia as well as China, the 

United States may need to be more candid about the 

safety issues construction and operation of their reac-
74

tors present, and offer to renew nuclear cooperation 

to help resolve these concerns in exchange for upgrading the nonproliferation conditions on their nuclear 

exports.167 Each of these points constitutes nuclear leverage that Washington could apply to push broader 

supplier application of gold standard nonproliferation 

requirements with each of the nuclear supplier states.

Timely Detection.

It also would be helpful if the IAEA was more honest about what kinds of nuclear activities and material holdings it can actually safeguard effectively—i.e., 

which ones it can inspect so as to detect military diversions in a timely fashion and which ones it cannot. As 

it is, the IAEA is unwilling to make public its assessments of the agency’s ability to meet its own timeliness detection goals (which are by no means strict). 

Meanwhile, no state, including the United States, has 

yet assessed IAEA’s safeguards effectiveness.168

In the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, when only a 

handful of states lacking nuclear weapons were interested in enriching uranium or separating plutonium 

from spent reactor fuel, this lax approach may have 

been tolerable. Today, however, Japan, South Korea, 

Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Egypt, Turkey, Saudi 

Arabia, Iran, Vietnam, and Jordan are all either making enriched uranium or reprocessing spent reactor 

fuels or reserving their “right” to do so. All of these 

states are members of the NPT and have pledged not 

to acquire nuclear weapons. Should we assume that 

none of them will ever cheat? What confidence should 

we have that the IAEA would be able to detect possible 

diversions early enough for the other NPT members 

to prevent them from producing nuclear weapons?
75

Currently, the IAEA’s own nuclear safeguards 

guidelines set routine inspection intervals at 

roughly the time it estimates is needed to convert certain special nuclear materials into bomb cores. The 

IAEA’s ability to verify production figures at large 

reprocessing and enrichment facilities—e.g., uranium 

hexafluoride, reprocessing, uranium enrichment, plutonium, and mixed oxide fuel fabrication plants—is 

limited. Not only does the agency have difficulty detecting abrupt diversions in a timely fashion (i.e., it 

may only be able to learn of diversions after they have 

occurred), but the margins of error associated with the 

IAEA’s ability to detect small, incremental diversions 

are still equivalent to many bombs’ worth every year. 

In either case, once a state has enough fissile material to make a bomb, it could break out well before 

the IAEA or other states could intervene to prevent 

acquisition.

These facts are troubling. What makes them doubly so is that the IAEA has yet to share these specifics 

publicly in any detail. Worse, it continues to claim that 

it can safeguard (i.e., provide “timely detection” of 

possible military nuclear diversions) these materials 

and plants, when in many cases it cannot.

It is essential that inspectors and diplomats distinguish between what inspectors can merely monitor (i.e., inspect to build general confidence that diversions have not taken place sometime in the past) 

from what they can actually safeguard (i.e., inspect to 

assure detection of military diversions early enough 

so outside parties could have sufficient time to block 

actual bomb making). If this distinction were made 

clear, governments could fully appreciate and hopefully curtail nuclear activities and holdings that are 
76

not safeguardable and therefore dangerous.169 This, in 

turn, would make promoting tougher nonproliferation standards, like the gold standard, much easier.

3. Anticipate and ward off nuclear proliferation 

developments before recognized redlines have been 

clearly violated. One of the regrettable legacies of 

the Cold War is the habit U.S. and allied government 

officials have acquired of waiting for irrefutable evidence of undesirable, foreign nuclear weapons developments before taking action. This must change.

After the Soviet Union first acquired nuclear 

weapons in 1949, the West’s aim in competing against 

it was not so much to prevent it from acquiring more 

strategic weapons as it was to prevent it from establishing strategic superiority. For this purpose, it was 

sufficient that Western military forces remain modern 

and numerous enough to deter Soviet offensive capabilities—i.e., that Russia’s strategic technology stay 

one or more generations behind ours and that its strategic deployments never change the relative balance 

of power. If Russia deployed a new strategic nuclear 

rocket, Washington would focus on what the Soviets 

had built, build a bigger or better U.S. version, or develop some new passive or active defenses or counteroffensive forces that would neutralize the new Soviet 

weapon system.

After the United States and Russia ratified a 

number of strategic arms limitation agreements, any 

Russian strategic nuclear deployment that exceeded 

agreed limits became a matter for diplomatic adjudication. In either case, U.S. or allied action turned 

on detecting and verifying the violation of agreed or 

implicit redlines. Fortunately, in this competition, the 

Soviets ultimately failed to keep up with the United 
77

States, and its allies and Moscow’s attempts to do 

so helped bankrupt the Soviet Union financially and 

politically.170

Competitive Strategies.

That was the Cold War. In our current efforts to 

prevent horizontal proliferation, our objective is quite 

different. Instead of merely trying to stay ahead of a 

proliferating state militarily, our aim is to prevent it 

from acquiring certain weapons altogether. Being able 

to detect states’ possible violations of pledges not to 

acquire these weapons is necessary.

The problem today, however, is that verifying such 

detections is much more awkward than detecting Soviet strategic weapons developments. Whereas detecting violations of Soviet arms developments often was 

deemed to be an intelligence success that frequently 

promoted policy or military actions, detecting nuclear 

proliferation developments today is bad news—it 

only confirms that our nuclear nonproliferation policy 

has failed. Indeed, more often than not, by the time 

one verifies a nonproliferation violation, it is too late 

to roll it back unless one takes relatively extreme diplomatic or military measures. It is not surprising, then, 

that in more than a few proliferation cases—e.g., with 

Israel, Pakistan, North Korea, South Africa, and India—U.S. officials averted their gaze from, or denied, 

intelligence that these states had acquired or tested 

nuclear weapons.171

In some cases, though, the United States and its 

allies did succeed in preventing nuclear weaponsrelated proliferation. The most prominent successes 

included getting Taiwan, South Korea, South Africa, 

Ukraine, and Libya to give up their nuclear weapons 
78

programs or arsenals. In these cases, the United States 

and its allies had a long-term regimen of nonproliferation sanctions and export controls in place well before 

the state in question ever tried to acquire or acquired 

nuclear weapons (e.g., in the cases of Libya and South 

Africa) or acted well before there was clear proof that 

nuclear weapons were in hand or were going to be retained (e.g., with Taiwan, South Africa, South Korea, 

and Ukraine).172

What these and other less well-known nonproliferation successes suggest is the desirability of creating long-term, country-specific strategies that initially 

eschew dramatic actions. These strategies could be 

developed along several lines. In the case of Libya and 

South Africa, the West relied heavily on long-term, 

bureaucratically institutionalized economic sanctions 

and export controls as well as a vigilant proliferation 

intelligence watch on each country’s nuclear weapons-related programs.

An even more aggressive approach would create a 

set of tailored competitive strategies that would work 

backwards from nuclear futures U.S. officials want to 

avoid towards those that they believe are better. The 

aim here would be to set a series of mid-term (i.e., 10- 

to 20-year) goals that would drive and guide our diplomatic, economic, military, and intelligence efforts 

to shape more peaceful futures.173 Rather than wait to 

act until there is proof of a nuclear weapons program 

we do not want to see completed, officials would act 

earlier, taking modest steps to ward off such incipient 

nuclear weapons programs, or support positive policies that might reduce the targeted state’s interest in 

initiating such programs in the first place.174
79

Towards a More Hard-headed Form of Internationalism.

An integral part of working such competitive strategies would be a willingness to promote the kinds of 

nonproliferation and arms control proposals noted 

earlier. This would require a hard-headed kind of internationalism. Forty years ago, when U.S. and allied 

arms control policies were premised upon finite deterrence—i.e., on the evils of targeting weapons and defending against them, and on the practical advantages 

of holding innocents at risk in the world’s major cities—arms control rightly became an object of derision 

by serious security planners.175 Since then, it almost 

has become an article of conservative Republican faith 

that arms control is self-defeating. It also has become 

an article of faith among most liberal Democrats that 

it deserves unquestioned support.176

Any serious effort to reduce future nuclear threats 

will need to move beyond this ideological divide. Certainly, any nuclear threat reduction effort that supports U.S. and allied aims will be difficult to sustain 

unless it complements some larger diplomatic effort. 

The best way to start would be to put our Cold War 

fascination with mutual assured destruction theorizing aside and focus instead on what is most likely to 

reduce the chances of war, nuclear proliferation, and 

nuclear weapons use.177

International law also has become increasingly 

stylized to restrain states from taking military action. 

Its practical impact, however, has been to restrain 

those states least likely to take such action even when 

their action is called for. As a result, international law 

has lost its standing among those most concerned 

about the safety and security of their country. To be 

sure, there are limits to what any international legal 
80

structure can achieve without the backing of sovereign military power.178 But in the past, international 

law and the promotion of justifiable sovereign power 

were seen as being mutually supportive. We need to 

get back to this earlier understanding. Like maintaining peace, this is neither hopeless nor automatic.179

In any effort to return to this view, the given suggestions are a reasonable place to begin. It is clearly 

desirable to reduce the number of nuclear weapons, 

the amount of nuclear weapons-usable materials, 

the number of plants that make them, the number of 

long-range nuclear-capable missiles, and the number 

of states possessing these nuclear assets. It may be imprudent to make such cuts unilaterally or without effective verification, but we should be clear about our 

willingness to compete militarily and diplomatically 

to realize such reductions in a manner that avoids 

such risks. Indeed, on this last point, there should be 

no hesitation. Less, in this case, would be better.

Thinking Ahead.

Recently, a friend and former senior official under 

three presidents (both Republican and Democratic) 

quipped that with most nuclear weapons proliferation 

problems, officials initially are loath to act because 

they believe the problem is unclear, and, then when 

they finally are convinced that the problem is serious, 

they conveniently insist there is no solution. This is a 

pathology for inaction. It also is wrong. In fact, some 

of the toughest nuclear proliferation problems can be 

neutralized well before they are fully realized, and, in 

key cases, have been.
81

From 2013 through 2014, I held a series of workshops on alternative nuclear futures in East Asia. These 

meetings, which included Chinese, Korean, Japanese, 

U.S., and Russian security and energy experts and 

officials, focused on how each country would react if 

it or its neighbors either acquired nuclear weapons or 

ramped up the number of nuclear arms they already 

had. First, I was warned that no one would come to 

the meetings. Then, I was told that if they did come, 

no one would speak. Finally, I was advised, if they 

did speak, they would not get along. All of this advice 

turned out to be wrong. In fact, there were candid Chinese and Korean exchanges about Japan’s stockpiling 

of plutonium, and Japanese and Russian anxieties expressed about the opacity of China’s nuclear weapons 

program. Yet, there still was a problem: All of the participants, including government officials from each 

state (including the United States), confided that the 

discussions we were having could never be conducted 

by or within their respective governments—the topics 

simply were too sensitive.

This is bad enough. Unfortunately, the challenge 

of working difficult security issues (including nuclear 

weapons proliferation) runs even deeper than this. 

Operating outside of government, I have had the 

freedom not only to be vocal, but also to be consistent (two things that are difficult to do while in office). 

Yet, exercising this freedom too often draws criticism 

from those in or close to power as being dangerously 

radical or impractical. There is no easy response to 

this criticism. One strong possibility, however, is that 

too many government officials are failing to do their 

jobs, while too few analysts outside government are 

pointing this out. There is, after all, a strong temptation (particularly among officials who are ambitious 
82

or eager to please) to avoid issues that, if mishandled, 

could result in catastrophe (either for themselves or 

for others). Those outside of government, who wish to 

maintain and expand their network of contacts, share 

such caution.

Giving in to this temptation, however, risks backing into and compounding our most serious, avoidable problems. Thus, the nuclear crisis in Iran was 

made worse by more than 20 years of inattention and 

consistent downplaying of the risks this program 

posed. When U.S. officials finally began to focus on 

the Iranian nuclear threat in the early-2000s, it had 

become so mature and intractable that the available 

responses were limited either to acts of war or diplomatic backsliding. Not surprisingly, this only encouraged an unhealthy political polarization of the issue.180

With nuclear weapons proliferation, these pitfalls 

can be avoided, but only if those in and outside of government focus on proliferation problems earlier and 

more seriously than they have to date. Of course, some 

will object that we can ill afford to concentrate on anything but the most pressing nuclear crises—whether it 

be North Korea, Iran, or our relations with Moscow. 

“Solving” these matters, they will argue, is imperative 

to avoid immediate and certain nuclear disaster and, 

therefore, to assure nuclear restraint and peace for the 

long haul. Perhaps. But any honest assessment would 

suggest that our most urgent problems no longer allow for any simple solutions. If so, our optimism and 

hopes would be better directed more toward futures 

we can shape now than on correcting present crises 

our past neglect has all but determined.
83

ENDNOTES

1. See Robert Zarate and Henry Sokolski, eds., Nuclear Heuristics: Selected Writings of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, Carlisle, PA: 

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009.

2. Henry D. Sokolski, Best of Intentions: America’s Campaign 

against Strategic Weapons Proliferation, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001.

3. See U.S. Delegation to the 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 

of Nuclear Weapons, “The Three Pillars,” Washington, DC: U.S. 

Department of State, pp. 4-6, available from www.state.gov/

documents/organization/141503.pdf; Paul Kerr et al., The 2010 NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference: Key Issues and Implications, RL41216, Washington DC: U.S. Congressional Research 

Service, May 3, 2010, pp. 1-15, available from fas.org:8080/sgp/

crs/nuke/R41216.pdf; and Wikipedia, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, last modified October 6, 2014, available 

from en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_

Nuclear_Weapons#Treaty_.22pillars.22.

4. See Statement of Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, “National Security Implications of the Strategic Offensive 

Reductions Treaty,” Hearing before the Committee on the Armed 

Forces, Senate Hearing 107-806, 107th Cong., 2nd Sess., July 

25, 2002, available from www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/

congress/2002_hr/rumsfeld725.pdf.

5. The best single work reflecting the views of the first camp is 

Kenneth N. Waltz’s essay in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, 

The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995. The best work reflecting the views of the 

second camp is John Mueller, Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism 

from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda, New York: Oxford University Press, 

2010. As for the arguments made about the human costs of war 

against Iraq, there is no question that these were substantial. That 

the war was fought primarily as a nonproliferation campaign, 

however, is much more open to debate. See, e.g., Jamie McIntyre, 

“Pentagon Challenges Vanity Fair Report,” CNN, May 30, 2003, 

available from www.cnn.com/2003/US/05/30/wolfowitz.vanity.fair/.
84

6. The first school—the official arms control view—is both 

incremental and relatively short-term in its activities, goals, and 

approach. It generally views reaching any agreement, even an interim one, as being favorable over reaching no agreement. Further, if no agreement can be achieved, reaching a more modest 

“confidence building” measure may do. In contrast, hawkish supporters of nuclear weapons (as well as hard-headed security planners who might not be as enthusiastic about relying heavily on 

nuclear arms) generally focus on set goals and encourage actions 

for the mid-term—i.e., for the next 10 to 20 years. Finally, radical 

academic critics of these two other schools generally write as if 

their operational insights about nuclear weapons and deterrence 

immediately pertain and are permanent, i.e., immutable.

7. Sometime, roughly in the early-1990s, it became fashionable to talk about “combating” proliferation. A Google search 

of “combating proliferation” as of July 1, 2014, yielded 1,290,000 

results.

8. “Remarks by President Barack Obama,” Hradcany Square, 

Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009, available from www.

whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-BarackObama-In-Prague-As-Delivered.

9. The term “hawk” and “hawkish” in this book are used as 

shorthand for hawkish supporters of nuclear weapons. This is a 

concession to popular usage. It is hardly concise. The first use of 

the term “hawk” was made during the War of 1812. It referred to 

those who saw war as being the solution to America’s troubles 

with the United Kingdom (UK). Today, however, many support 

America’s maintenance of its nuclear arsenal and are anything but 

eager to go to war. There also are many security advocates and 

experts that may be willing to go to war in many cases but who 

hardly favor relying heavily on nuclear weapons for U.S. security.

10. See, e.g., Loren Thompson, “Nuclear Weapons: How Few 

Is Too Few,” Forbes, May 28, 2013, available from www.forbes.com/

sites/lorenthompson/2013/05/28/nuclear-weapons-cuts-how-few-is-toofew/; Congressman Doug Lamborn, “Six Reasons Obama’s Plan 

to Give Up Our Nukes Is a Really Bad Idea,” The Daily Signal, 

June 20, 2013, available from dailysignal.com/2013/06/20/guestpost-6-reasons-obamas-plan-to-give-up-our-nukes-is-a-really-bad-idea/,
85

and Robert Zarate, “Is Obama Pushing Unilateral Nuclear Cuts,” 

Time, February 12, 2013, available from nation.time.com/2013/02/12/

is-obama-pushing-unilateral-nuclear-cuts/.

11. See Pierre-Marie Gallois, Stratégie de l’âge nucléaire (Strategy of the Nuclear Age), Paris, France: Francois-Xavier de Guibert, 

1960; Bruno Tertrais, “‘Destruction Assurée’: The Origins and Development of French Nuclear Strategy,” in Henry Sokolski, ed., 

Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and 

Practice, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 

College, 2004, pp. 51-122, available from npolicy.org/books/Getting_MAD/Ch2_Tertrais.pdf; and David S. Yost, “France’s Nuclear 

Deterrence Strategy: Concepts and Operations Implementation,” 

in Getting MAD, pp. 197-237, available from npolicy.org/books/Getting_MAD/Ch7_Yost.pdf.

12. See Commander P. H. Backus, “Finite Deterrence, Controlled Retaliation,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 85, No. 

3, March 1959, pp. 23-29; David Alan Rosenberg, “The Origins 

of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy 1945-1960,” 

International Security, Vol. 7, No. 4, Spring 1983, pp. 3-71; William Burr, “‘How Much is Enough?’: The U.S. Navy and ‘Finite 

Deterrence,’” National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book, 

No. 275, May 1, 2009, available from nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/

ebb275/index.htm; and Oskar Morgenstern, “The Oceanic System: 

The Invulnerable Force,” The Question of National Defense, New 

York: Random House, 1959.

13. Kenneth Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More 

May Be Better,” Adelphi Papers, Number 171, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981, available from https://

www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm. John J. Mearsheimer, 

“The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent,” Foreign Affairs, Vol.

72, No. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 50-80, available from mearsheimer.

uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0020.pdf; Andrew Mack, “North Korea and the 

Bomb,” Foreign Policy, Vol. 83, Summer 1991, pp. 87-104; Michael 

D. Intriligator and Dagobert L. Brito, “Nuclear Proliferation and 

the Probability of Nuclear War,” Public Choice, Vol. 37, No. 2, 1981, 

pp. 247-259; and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H. Riker, 

“An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation,” 

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, No. 2, June 1982, pp. 283-306.
86

14. Pierre-Marie Gallois, “La dissuasion du faible au fort” 

(Weak-to-Strong Deterrence), in L’aventure de la bombe: de Gaulle 

et la dissuasion nucléaire (1958-1969) (The Adventure of the Bomb: 

de Gaulle and Nuclear Deterrence (1958-1969)), Paris, France: Plon, 

1985, p. 170.

15. See Mueller, Atomic Obsession.

16. See Ward Wilson, “The Winning Weapon? Rethinking 

Nuclear Weapons in Light of Hiroshima,” International Security, 

Vol. 31, No. 4, Spring 2007, pp. 162-179, available from belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/is3104_pp162-179_wilson.pdf; Ward Wilson, 

“The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol.

15, No. 3, November 2008, pp. 421-439, available from cns.miis.

edu/npr/pdfs/153_wilson.pdf; and Ward Wilson, “The Bomb that 

Didn’t Beat Japan . . . Stalin Did,” Foreign Policy, May 30, 2013, 

available from foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/30/the-bomb-didnt-beatjapan-stalin-did/.

17. Such revisionist views about the nuclear bombing of Japan, which now find favor with liberal opponents of nuclear 

weapons, are oddly adaptations of arguments made from 1945 

through the 1960s by some of the most hawkish and conservative of Americans. See Barton J. Bernstein, “American Conservatives Are the Forgotten Critics of the Atomic Bombings of Japan,” San Jose Mercury News, August 2, 2014, available from www.

mercurynews.com/opinion/ci_26253535/barton-j-bernstein-americanconservatives-are-forgotten-critics.

18. See John Mueller, “The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear 

Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World,” The Cold War and After: 

Prospects for Peace, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997, pp. 45-69, 

available from politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/ISESSIRR.

PDF; and Mueller, Atomic Obsession, pp. 29-48.

19. There, are, of course, more moderate views among those 

that might be lumped into this camp. This includes several prominent academics, such as Stephen M. Walt and Robert Jervis, who 

challenge the assumed high value of nuclear weapons in deterring attacks but do not believe their value is necessarily zero and, 

therefore, are not entirely comfortable with their further proliferation. See, e.g., Stephen M. Walt, “Rethinking the ‘Nuclear 
87

Revolution,’” National Public Radio, July 6, 2014, available from 

www.publicbroadcasting.net/kbia/.artsmain/article/1/1338/1684234/

Columns/Foreign.Policy.Rethinking.The’Nuclear.Revolution; and 

Robert Jervis, “Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn’t Matter,” Political 

Science Quarterly, Vol. 94, No. 4, Winter 1979-80, pp. 617-633. Also 

see Seth Carus, “Why U.S. Policy Makers Who Love the Bomb 

Don’t Think ‘More is Better’,” Arlington, VA: The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 2015, available from npolicy.org/

books/Carus_Ch2_Policymakers-Who-Love-Bomb.pdf.

20. See endnote 3.

21. See, e.g., Mueller, Atomic Obsession, pp. 138-141; and 

Steve Kidd, “Nuclear Proliferation Risk—Is It Vastly Overrated?” 

Nuclear Engineering International, July, 23 2010, available from 

www.neimagazine.com/opinion/opinionnuclear-proliferation-risk-is-itvastly-overrated/.

22. See, e.g., Harvey M. Sapolsky and Christine M. Leah, “Let 

Asia Go Nuclear,” The National Interest, April 14, 2014, available 

from nationalinterest.org/feature/let-asia-go-nuclear-10259; Elbridge 

Colby, “Choose Geopolitics over Nonproliferation,” The National Interest, February 28, 2014, available from nationalinterest.org/

commentary/choose-geopolitics-over-nonproliferation-9969; and Mark 

Helprin, “Why Israel Needs the Bomb,” The Wall Street Journal,

October 18, 2010, available from www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424

052748703673604575550020606362444. Regarding the cases of two 

close U.S. friends—Taiwan and Ukraine, see John Mearsheimer, 

“Taiwan’s Dire Straits,” The National Interest, No. 130, MarchApril 2014, pp. 29-39, available from political-science.uchicago.edu/

faculty-articles/Mearsheimer---Taiwans%20Dire%20Straits.pdf; and 

Mearsheimer, “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent.”

23. See, e.g., George Perkovich and James M. Acton, Abolishing 

Nuclear Weapons, Adelphi Paper No. 396, London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008; George P. Schultz, William 

J. Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” The Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007, available 

from www.wsj.com/articles/SB116787515251566636; and George P. 

Schultz, William J. Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “Toward a Nuclear-Free World,” The Wall Street Journal, January 15, 

2008, available from www.wsj.com/articles/SB120036422673589947.
88

24. See “Table of Global Nuclear Weapons Stockpiles, 1945-

2002,” New York: Natural Resources Defense Council, available 

from www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab19.asp, last updated November 25, 2002; and Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945-2013,” Bulletin of the Atomic 

Scientists, Vol. 69, No. 5, pp. 75-81, available from bos.sagepub.com/

content/69/5/75.full.

25. See “New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms,” Fact Sheet, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, January 1, 2015, available from www.state.gov/t/avc/

rls/235606.htm.

26. See, e.g., Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, Eliminating 

Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers, Canberra, Australia: International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, 2009, available from icnnd.org/Reference/

reports/ent/downloads.html; Bruce Blair et al., “Smaller and Safer,” 

Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 5, September-October 2010, available 

from www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2010-09-01/

smaller-and-safer; General (Ret.) James Cartwright et al., Global 

Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy Commission Report: Modernizing U.S. 

Nuclear Strategy, Force Structure and Posture, Global Zero, May 

2012, available from www.globalzero.org/files/gz_us_nuclear_policy_

commission_report.pdf; and Deep Cuts Commission, Preparing for 

Deep Cuts: Options for Enhancing Euro-Atlantic and International 

Security, First Report of the Deep Cuts Commission, Hamburg, 

Germany: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the 

University of Hamburg, April 2014, available from deepcuts.org/

files/pdf/First_Report_of_the_Deep_Cuts_Commission_English.pdf.

27. See Matthew Fuhrmann, “Preventive War and the Spread 

of Nuclear Programs,” Henry Sokolski, ed., Moving Beyond Pretense: Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation, Carlisle, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2014, pp. 91-115, available from www.npolicy.org/books/Moving_Beyond_Pretense/Ch4_

Fuhrmann.pdf.

28. For a discussion on the concept of no first use, see Sir Michael Quinlin, “Easements and Escape Routes,” Thinking About 

Nuclear Weapons, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009, 

pp. 99-111.
89

29. See, e.g., James E. Doyle, “Why Eliminate Nuclear Weapons?” Survival, Vol. 55, No. 1, February-March 2013, pp. 7-34, 

available from www.iiss.org/en/publications/survival/sections/2013-

94b0/survival-global-politics-and-strategy-february-march2013-3db7/55-1-02-%20doyle-a88b. Mr. Doyle actually challenges 

the security utility of nuclear deterrence and argues that the other 

risks including accidental use, nuclear terrorism, and the probability of deterrence failure recommend the elimination of nuclear 

weapons.

30. See Henry D. Sokolski and Bruno Tertrais, eds., Nuclear 

Weapons Security Crises: What Does History Teach? Carlisle, PA: 

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2013, available from www.npolicy.org/thebook.php?bid=27. For info about a 

broken arrow incident in North Carolina in 1961, see Ed Pilkington, “US Nearly Detonated Atomic Bomb over North Carolina—Secret Document,” Guardian (Manchester), September 20, 

2013, available from www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/20/usafatomic-bomb-north-carolina-1961; and Michael Winter, “Report: 

Nuke that Fell on N.C. in 1961 almost Exploded,” USA Today, 

September 20, 2013, available from www.usatoday.com/story/news/

nation/2013/09/20/north-carolina-atomic-bomb/2845381/. For additional examples, see the comprehensive account by Eric Schlosser, 

Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident and 

the Illusion of Safety, New York: Penguin Press, 2013. Also see Scott 

D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear 

Weapons, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993.

31. At least this was so up through 2010 when The Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, 

which I served on as a member, concluded its work. The commission originally set out to demonstrate that nuclear terrorism 

was the most pressing threat to the United States. After seeking 

and failing to find any validated, specific intelligence on any 

known nuclear terrorist threats, however, the commission shifted 

its focus to bioterrorism, which included the celebrated anthrax 

letter attacks of September 18, 2001. As for the possible hand off 

of nuclear arms to terrorists, even those most eager to focus U.S. 

efforts against nuclear terrorism downplay this threat. See, e.g., 

Travis Sharp and Erica Poff, “Understanding and Preventing 

Nuclear Terrorism,” Washington, DC: Center for Arms Control 

and Non-proliferation, December 3, 2008, available from research.
90

policyarchive.org/11818.pdf; and Keir A. Lieber and Daryl Press, 

“Why States Won’t Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists,” International Security, Vol. 38, No. 1, Summer 2013, pp. 80-104, available 

from belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3801_pp080-104.pdf. Much 

more plausible is the risk that governments might lose control 

of their nuclear weapons assets to illegitimate factions operating 

within their government or that civilian or military nuclear facilities might be sabotaged, particularly in unstable regions of the 

Middle and Far East. The first, though, is not a terrorist problem 

per se, and the second does not threaten nuclear use. On these 

risks, see Edwin Lyman, “Nuclear Plant Protection and the Homeland Security Mandate,” paper prepared for Institute of Nuclear 

Materials Management 44th Annual Meeting, Phoenix, AZ, July 

13-17, 2003, available from web.archive.org/web/20060525193207/

http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/nuclear_terrorism/nuclearplant-protection-and.html; and Bruno Tertrais, “The Unexpected 

Risk: The Impact of Political Crises on the Security and Control 

of Nuclear Weapons,” in Nuclear Weapons Security Crises, pp. 3-22, 

available from npolicy.org/books/Security_Crises/Ch1_Tertrais.pdf.

32. “Remarks by President Barack Obama.” President Bush 

said that nuclear weapons falling “in the hands of a terrorist 

enemy” is the single most serious threat to the security of the 

United States. See “The First Bush-Kerry Presidential Debate,” 

Washington, DC: The Commission on Presidential Debates, September 30, 2004, transcript available from www.debates.org/index.

php?page=september-30-2004-debate-transcript. Senator John Kerry, 

Democratic Presidential Nominee in 2004, remarked in a campaign speech that “the possibility of al Qaeda or other terrorists 

getting their hands on a nuclear weapon” was the “greatest threat 

we face today.” See “New Strategies to Meet New Threats: Remarks of John Kerry,” June 1, 2004, in Gerhard Peters and John 

T. Woolley, eds., The American Presidency Project, available from 

www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29697. Also see Graham Allison, 

“Nuclear Terrorism Poses the Gravest Threat Today,” The Wall 

Street Journal, July 14, 2003, available from www.wsj.com/news/

articles/SB105813273777796800.

33. See, e.g., Gina Page, “U.S. Borders Flunk Smuggling Test,” 

CBS News, March 27, 2006, available from www.cbsnews.com/news/

us-borders-flunk-smuggling-test/, Richard Weitz, “Nuclear Forensics: False Hopes and Practical Realities,” Political Science Quar-
91

terly, Vol. 126, No. 1, Spring 2011, pp. 53-75; U.S. Government 

Accountability Office, Nuclear Detection: Domestic Nuclear Detection 

Office Should Improve Planning to Better Address Gaps and Vulnerabilities, GAO-09-257, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 

Office (GPO), March 2, 2009, available from www.gao.gov/products/

GAO-09-257; Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Lessons Learned from 

Cancelled Radiation Portal Monitor Program Could Help Future Acquisitions, GAO-13-256, Washington, DC: GPO, May 2013, available from www.gao.gov/products/gao-13-256; and Anthony Kimery, 

“Risks Posed By Foreign Ports Shipping Cargo to US Not Adequately Assessed, GAO, Authorities Say,” Homeland Security 

Today, September 30, 2013, available from www.hstoday.us/index.

php?id=483&cHash=081010&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=32913.

34. See Eric Lichtblau, “In Secret, Court Vastly Broadens Powers of N.S.A.,” The New York Times, July 6, 2013, available from 

www.nytimes.com/2013/07/07/us/in-secret-court-vastly-broadenspowers-of-nsa.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; and Ken Dilanian, “Intelligence Leakers Post ‘Critical Threat’ to U.S., Say Spy Chiefs,” 

The Los Angeles Times, January 29, 2014, available from articles.

latimes.com/2014/jan/29/world/la-fg-wn-us-intelligence-snowden-leakers-threat-20140129. See also the reaction to the recommendations 

within a recent Defense Science Board Task Force Report in U.S. 

Department of Defense (DoD), Defense Science Board, Assessment 

of Nuclear Monitoring and Verification Technologies, Washington, 

DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics, January 2014, available from www.

acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/NuclearMonitoringAndVerificationTechnologies.pdf; Siobhan Gorman, “Panel Calls for More Spy Capability: 

NSA Cited as Model in Monitoring Nuclear Threats,” The Wall 

Street Journal, January 21, 2014, available from www.wsj.com/news/

articles/SB10001424052702304027204579335120352342540.

35. See, e.g., R. Jeffrey Smith, “Obama Administration Embraces Major New Nuclear Weapons Cut,” Washington, DC: 

Center for Public Integrity, February 8, 2013, available from 

www.publicintegrity.org/2013/02/08/12156/obama-administrationembraces-major-new-nuclear-weapons-cut; and Daryl G. Kimball, 

“Obama’s Second Chance,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 43, No. 1, 

January-February 2013, available from www.armscontrol.org/

act/2013_01-02/Focus.
92

36. Several arms control critics have noted that nuclear testing may not be necessary for initial weapons acquisition and that 

what precisely constitutes a test may be in disagreement among 

those that have signed the CTBT. See Jonathan Medalia, “Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Issues and Arguments,” 

CRS Report for Congress, RL34494, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 12, 2008, pp. 20-22, available from 

www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34394.pdf; U.S. Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, America’s 

Strategic Posture, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace 

Press, 2009, p. 83, available from oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord

&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA501604; Keith B. Payne and 

R. James Woolsey, “Reconsidering the Comprehensive Test Ban 

Treaty,” National Review Online, September 8, 2011, available from 

www.nationalreview.com/article/276530/reconsidering-comprehensivetest-ban-treaty-r-james-woolsey-keith-b-payne; and Kathleen Bailey et 

al., The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: An Assessment of the Benefits, 

Costs, and Risks, Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2010, available from www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/CTBT-3.11.11-

electronic-version.pdf. Several of these critics also note that the 

current versions of the FMCT do not address civilian production 

that could be easily diverted to make bombs nor does it address 

past fissile production. See, e.g., Christopher A. Ford, “Five Plus 

Three: How to Have a Meaningful and Helpful Fissile Material 

Cutoff Treaty,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 39, No. 2, March 2009, 

available from legacy.armscontrol.org/act/2009_03/Ford; and Idem., 

“The United States and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty,” paper 

presented to the “Preparing for 2010: Getting the Process Right” 

conference, Annecy, France, March 17, 2007, available from 2001-

2009.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/81950.htm.

37. See Albert Wohlstetter, “Spreading the Bomb without 

Quite Breaking the Rules,” Foreign Policy, No. 25, Winter 1976-

77, pp. 88-94, 145-179, available from www.npolicy.org/userfiles/file/

Nuclear%20Heuristics-Spreading%20the%20Bomb%20without%20

Quite%20Breaking%20the%20Rules.pdf; Arthur Steiner, “Article 

IV and the ‘Straightforward Bargain,’” PAN Heuristics Paper 78-

832-08, in Albert Wohlstetter et al., Towards a New Consensus on 

Nuclear Technology, Vol. II, Supporting Papers, U.S. Arms Control 

and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) Report No. PH-78-04-832-33, 

Marina del Rey, CA: PAN Heuristics, 1978, pp. 1-8; Eldon V.C. 

Greenberg, Application of NPT Prohibitions to “Civilian” Nuclear 
93

Equipment, Technology and Materials Associated with Reprocessing 

and Plutonium Use, Washington, DC: Nuclear Control Institute, 

1993, available from npolicy.org/books/Reviewing_NPT/Ch6_Greenberg.pdf; Henry Sokolski, “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 

and Peaceful Nuclear Energy,” Testimony before “Assessing 

‘Rights’ under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,” a hearing 

of the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 109th Cong., 2nd Sess., March 2, 2006, available from 

www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=392&rtid=8; Robert Zarate, 

“The Three Qualifications of Article IV’s ‘Inalienable Right’,” and 

Christopher Ford, “Nuclear Technology Rights and Wrongs: The 

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Article IV, and Nonproliferation,” Henry Sokolski, ed., Reviewing the NPT, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010, pp. 219-384, 

available from npolicy.org/books/Reviewing_NPT/Ch11_Ford.pdf.

38. See, e.g., Stephen Rademaker, “Blame America First,” The 

Wall Street Journal, May 7, 2007, available from www.wsj.com/news/

articles/SB117849961888494020/.

39. See Josh Rogin, “Exclusive: House Republicans Ding 

Obama on Nuke Treaty in Previously Unreported Letter,” Foreign Policy, September 16, 2009, available from foreignpolicy.

com/2009/09/16/exclusive-house-republicans-ding-obama-on-nuketreaty-in-previously-unreported-letter/.

40. Cf. Shlomo Brom, “Utility of Nuclear Deterrence in the 

Middle East,” and Karim Haggag, “Proliferation and Deterrence 

beyond the Nuclear Tipping Point in the Middle East” in George 

P. Shultz and James E. Goodby, eds., The War that Must Never Be 

Fought: Dilemmas of Nuclear Deterrence, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2015, pp. 221-223 and 235-243.

41. In the case of non-nuclear terrorism, Pakistani-backed terror strikes against India suggest nuclear deterrence against such 

threats is hardly effective. Hawkish defenders of nuclear deterrence insist that given the heavy state sponsorship of nonstate 

actors, though, nuclear threats properly focused could, in some 

cases, help deter WMD terrorism. See, e.g., Brad Roberts, “Deterrence and WMD Terrorism Calibrating Its Potential Contributions to Risk Reduction,” IDA (Institute for Defense Analyses) 
94

Paper P-4231, Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 

June 2007. That said, no act of terrorism involving the detonation 

of a nuclear weapon has yet been seriously attempted.

42. For a graphic analysis of this last point, see Admiral Richard Mies, U.S. Navy (Retired), “Strategic Deterrence in the 21st 

Century,” Undersea Warfare, No. 48, Spring 2012, pp. 12-19, available from www.public.navy.mil/subfor/underseawarfaremagazine/

Issues/PDF/USW_Spring_2012.pdf.

43. See Steven P. Lee, Morality, Prudence, and Nuclear Weapons, Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Public Policy, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993. It is well to keep 

in mind, however, that a nuclear deterrence effort might fail to 

prevent a particular act of aggression or some other undesirable 

event because of some deficiency in the nuclear deterrent force 

or the manner in which the nuclear threat itself was made. The 

challenge nuclear deterrence presents for security analysts, then, 

is determining what, if any, impact it has had in the past and is 

likely to have in the future. Unfortunately, posing this question 

is all too similar to the illicit mathematical operation of dividing 

an integer by zero: It immediately produces an infinite number 

of possible answers. This suggests two possibilities. The first is 

that nuclear deterrence is a myth that should be disregarded. The 

second is that, whatever people think the specific impact of nuclear deterrence is, in itself, a political-military reality that must 

be dealt with whether the view held is sound. In either case, the 

general concept of nuclear deterrence (as distinct from the key 

technical requirements for an effective, affordable, and survivable 

nuclear force) is something other than a science.

44. On the desirability of being able to “adapt” the size and 

character of one’s nuclear weapons force quickly and of redeploying U.S. tactical nuclear weapons overseas, see Keith B. Payne 

et al., Nuclear Force Adaptability for Deterrence and Assurance: A 

Prudent Alternative to Minimum Deterrence, Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2014, available from www.nipp.org/wp-content/

uploads/2014/12/MD-II-for-web.pdf; and Clark Murdoch et al., “Project Atom: A Competitive Strategies Approach to Defining U.S. 

Nuclear Strategy and Posture for 2025-2050,” Center for Strategic 

and International Studies (CSIS) Reports, Washington, DC: Center 

for Strategic and International Studies, May 2015, available from 

csis.org/files/publication/150601_Murdock_ProjectAtom_Web.pdf.
95

45. See, e.g., Frank Gaffney, “Fight Nuclear Provocation with 

Nuclear Provocation,” transcript, Secure Freedom Minute, April 24, 

2014, available from www.breitbart.com/video/2014/04/24/gaffneyfight-nuclear-provocation-with-nuclear-provocation/.

46. See endnote 22.

47. Analysis of past U.S. and Soviet nuclear accidents suggests the size of these two states’ arsenals hardly correlated to the 

number of nuclear accidents. In fact, historically, the correlation 

has been negative. What is unknown, however, is how well other 

countries have secured their arsenals against theft and accidents, 

what their history has been, and what it and the history of U.S. 

nuclear weapons accidents will be. In this regard, only one large 

accident is needed to change history forever. Thus, the number 

of “close calls” we have so far experienced is not necessarily dispositive. Compare endnote 30 with Keith Payne et al., Minimum 

Deterrence: Examining the Evidence, Fairfax, VA: National Institute 

Press, 2013, pp. 52-54, available from www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Final-Distro.pdf.

48. For a fulsome discussion of campaign comments made 

by Romney and Obama on these issues, see Molly Moorhead, 

“Obama: Romney Called Russia Our Top Geopolitical Threat,” 

October 22, 2012, available from www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/

statements/2012/oct/22/barack-obama/obama-romney-called-russiaour-top-geopolitical-fo/; Matt Spetalnick and Jeremy Laurence, 

“Obama Vows to Pursue Further Nuclear Cuts with Russia,” 

Reuters, March 26, 2012, available from in.reuters.com/article/2012/03/26/nuclear-summit-idINDEE82P02620120326. Also see 

Dan Lamothe, “Russia is greatest threat to the U.S., says Joint 

Chiefs chairman nominee Gen. Joseph Dunford,” The Washington 

Post, July 9, 2015, available from www.washingtonpost.com/news/

checkpoint/wp/2015/07/09/russia-is-greatest-threat-to-the-u-s-saysjoint-chiefs-chairman-nominee-gen-joseph-dunford/.

49. See e.g., Loren Thompson, “Why Putin’s Russia is the Biggest Threat to America in 2015,” Forbes, January 1, 2015, available 

from www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2015/01/02/why-putinsrussia-is-the-biggest-threat-to-america-in-2015/; and J.D. Leipold, 

“Milley: Russia No. 1 Threat to US,” WWW.ARMY.MIL: The Official Homepage of the United States Army, November 9, 2015, 

available from www.army.mil/article/158386/Milley__Russia_No_1_

threat_to_US/.
96

50. See, e.g., John Mueller, “The Atomic Terrorist: Assessing 

the Likelihood,” paper prepared for the Program on International 

Security Policy, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, January 15, 

2008, available from politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller//apsachgo.pdf; and Mueller, Atomic Obsession, pp. 181-215. Also see 

Francis J. Gavin, “Same As It Ever Was: Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation, and the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 3, 

Winter 2009/10, pp. 19-23, available from belfercenter.ksg.harvard.

edu/files/Gavin.pdf; and Lieber and Press, “Why States Won’t Give 

Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists.”

51. See Fuhrmann, “Preventive War and the Spread of 

Nuclear Programs.”

52. For the earliest and most accessible discussion of these 

technical hurdles, see Albert Wohlstetter, “The ‘Delicate’ Balance 

of Terror,” RAND Paper P-1472, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, November 6, 1958, available from www.rand.org/about/

history/wohlstetter/P1472/P1472.html. It should be noted that Mr. 

Wohlstetter goes to considerable lengths to spotlight how mastering the technical requirements for securing an effective nuclear 

deterrent force is essential to prevent preemptive, accidental, and 

unauthorized nuclear wars as well as nuclear accidents generally. 

This suggests that attention to these requirements is desirable 

whatever the merits of nuclear deterrence might be.

53. See Robert Zarate, “America’s Allies and Nuclear Arms: 

Assessing the Geopolitics of Nonproliferation in Asia,” Project 2049 Futuregram 14-002, Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, May 6, 2014, available from www.project2049.net/documents/

Zarate_America_Allies_and_Nuclear_Arms_Geopolitics_Non

proliferation; and Albert Wohlstetter, “Nuclear Sharing and the N 

+ 1 Country,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 3, April 1961, pp. 355-

387, available from npolicy.org/userfiles/file/Nuclear%20HeuristicsNuclear%20Sharing.pdf.

54. Although the debate over how close we came to blows 

during the Cuban Missile Crisis will never end, recent evidence 

suggests we came quite close. See “The Man Who Saved the 

World,” Secrets of the Dead, Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) video, directed by Eamon Fitzpatrick, produced by Bedlam Production Ltd., aired October 24, 2012, available from www.pbs.org/wnet/
97

secrets/the-man-who-saved-the-world-watch-the-full-episode/905/; and 

Robert S. Norris, “The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Nuclear Order of 

Battle October/November 1962,” paper presented at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC, October 24, 2012, available 

from www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/2012_10_24_Norris_

Cuban_Missile_Crisis_Nuclear_Order_of_Battle.pdf.

55. See Peter Lavoy, “Islamabad’s Nuclear Posture: Its Premises and Implementation,” in Henry Sokolski, ed., Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008, pp. 129-166, available from 

npolicy.org/books/Pakistans_Nuclear_Worries/Ch5_Lavoy.pdf.

56. See Ori Rabinowitz, Bargaining on Nuclear Tests: Washington and Its Cold War Deals, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 

2014, pp. 70-105.

57. See Yury E. Fedorov, “Russia’s Nuclear Policy,” paper 

presented before the National Institute for Defense Studies 12th 

International Symposium on Security Affairs, “Major Powers’ 

Nuclear Policies and International Order in the 21st Century,” 

Tokyo, Japan, November 18, 2009, available from www.nids.go.jp/

english/event/symposium/pdf/2009/e_04.pdf; Mark Schneider, The 

Nuclear Doctrine and Forces of the Russian Federation, Fairfax, VA: 

National Institute Press, 2006, available from www.nipp.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/12/China-nuclear-final-pub.pdf; Commander 

Muhammad Azam Khan, “India’s Cold Start Is Too Hot,” U.S. 

Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 137, No. 3, March 2011, available from www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-03/indias-coldstart-too-hot; and in Henry Sokolski, ed., Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: 

Worries Beyond War, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 

Army War College, 2008, pp. 129-166, available from npolicy.org/

thebook.php?bid=6.

58. See William R. Hawkins, “Nuclear Warfare Is Still Possible,” Fortuna’s Corner (blog), June 5, 2014, available from fortunascorner.com/2014/06/07/nuclear-warfare-is-still-possible/; John 

Chan, “Chinese Security Analyst Questions ‘No First Use’ Nuclear Policy,” World Socialist Watch, August 15, 2013, available from 

www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/08/15/nuke-a15.html; Michael Mazza and Dan Blumenthal, “China’s Strategic Forces in the 21st Century: The People’s Liberation Army’s Changing Nuclear Doctrine 
98

and Force Posture,” in Henry D. Sokolski, ed., The Next Arms Race, 

Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

2012, pp. 83-111, available from npolicy.org/books/Next_Arms_Race/

Ch3_Mazza-Blumenthal.pdf; and Stephanie Spies, “China’s Nuclear Policy: (No) First Use?” CSIS, October 20, 2011, available from 

csis.org/blog/chinas-nuclear-policy-no-first-use.

59. See Kidd, “Nuclear Proliferation Risk—Is It Vastly Overrated?” Mr. Kidd, a nuclear power proponent who subscribes to 

the optimistic view of the nuclear neorealist skeptics, projects that 

there will “only” be roughly six more nuclear-armed states by 

2030. He did not name them, and it is impossible to know which 

states might go nuclear next, but the six listed here are among the 

most frequently mentioned in the current literature.

60. See Thomas W. Graham, “Nuclear Weapons Stability 

or Anarchy in the 21st Century: China, India, and Pakistan,” in 

The Next Arms Race, pp. 262-304, available from npolicy.org/books/

Next_Arms_Race/Ch9_Graham.pdf.

61. Cf. Robert Rauchhaus, “Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis: A Quantitative Approach,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 

Vol. 53, No. 2, April 2009, pp. 258-277; and Erik Gartzke, “Nuclear 

Proliferation Dynamics and Conventional Conflict,” a paper originally presented at the 50th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, New York, February 15-18, 2009, available from pages.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/papers/nuketime_05032010.pdf.

62. See Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “No Longer Unthinkable: 

Should US Ready for ‘Limited’ Nuclear War?” Breaking Defense, May 30, 2013, available from breakingdefense.com/2013/05/

no-longer-unthinkable-should-us-ready-for-limited-nuclear-war/; and 

Arms Control Association, “Russia’s Military Doctrine,” Arms 

Control Today, May 1, 2000, available from www.armscontrol.org/

act/2000_05/dc3ma00.

63. See E. U. Condon; “The New Technique of Private War,” 

in Dexter Masters and Katherine Way, eds., One World or None, 

Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists, 2007, pp. 

107-115; Russell Hardin, “Civil Liberties in the Era of Mass 

Terror,” Journal of Ethics, Vol. 8, No. 1, March 2004, pp. 77-95, 

available from www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/faculty/hardin/
99

research/CivLiberties.pdf; David Bartoshuk, John Diamond, and 

Peter Heussy, “Nuclear Terrorism: Local Effects, Global Consequences,” Redwood City, CA: Saga Foundation, July 2008, 

available from www.sagafoundation.org/SagaFoundationWhitePaper

SAGAMARK7282008.pdf; James D. Fearon, “Catastrophic Terrorism and Civil Liberties in the Short and Long Run,” paper prepared for the symposium on “Constitutions, Democracy, and the 

Rule of Law,” New York: Columbia University, October 17, 2003, 

available from web.stanford.edu/group/fearon-research/cgi-bin/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Catastrophic-terrorism-and-civilliberties-in-the-short-and-long-run.pdf; and Matthew Fuhrmann, 

“After Armageddon: The Potential Political Consequences of the 

Third Use of Nuclear Weapons,” draft chapter prepared for a 

Nonproliferation Policy Education Center Workshop, Washington DC, July 15, 2014, available from nuclearpolicy101.org/wp-content/uploads/PDF/Fuhrmann-_After-Armageddon.pdf.

64. See, e.g., Matthew Continetti, “A World in Crisis: What 

the Thirties Tell Us about Today,” Weekly Standard, January 

3, 2011, available from www.weeklystandard.com/articles/worldcrisis_524865.html; “Briefing—Lessons of the 1930s: There Could 

Be Trouble Ahead,” The Economist, December 10, 2011, pp. 76-

78; Joe Weisenthal, “Tim Geithner Warns: The US is at Risk of 

a 1930s Repeat,” Business Insider, September 12, 2010, available 

from www.businessinsider.com/geithner-the-us-is-at-risk-of-a-repeatof-the-1930s-2010-9; Thomas Walkom, “Eurozone Crisis Signals a 

Repeat of the 1930s Crisis,” Star (Toronto, Canada), May 13, 2014, 

available from www.thestar.com/news/canada/2012/05/15/walkom_

eurozone_crisis_signals_a_repeat_of_the_1930s.html; and Roger Cohen, “Yes, It Could Happen Again,” The Atlantic, July 29, 2014, 

available from www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/08/yesit-could-happen-again/373465/.

65. See Natural Resources Defense Council, “Table of Global 

Nuclear Weapons Stockpiles, 1945-2002.”

66. As of early-2014, the official number of deployed strategic 

warheads as counted under the New START Treaty (which count 

heavy bombers as one warhead) places the number of U.S. warheads at 1,642 and Russia at 1,643. See U.S. Department of State, 

“New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive 

Arms.” Other sources count more than one warhead per bomber. 
100

An average of their estimates places the number of U.S. deployed 

strategic warheads at 1,930, plus 200 tactical warheads deployed 

in Europe, for a total of 2,130 deployed warheads. The average 

estimate of Russian deployed strategic warheads is 1,600. Russia 

is also estimated to have around 2,000 tactical warheads that the 

Russian government says are in central storage, which brings the 

total of Russian warheads to 3,600. The figures for each country do 

not include warheads considered to be nondeployed or awaiting 

dismantlement. See Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “US 

Nuclear Forces, 2014,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 70, No. 

1, January-February 2014, pp. 85-93, available from bos.sagepub.

com/content/70/1/85.full; Hans M. Kristensen, “Tac Nuke Numbers 

Confirmed?” FAS Strategic Security Blog, Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists (FAS), December 7, 2010, available 

from fas.org/blogs/security/2010/12/tacnukes; Hans M. Kristensen 

and Robert S. Norris, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2014,” Bulletin of the 

Atomic Scientists, Vol. 70, No. 2, March-April 2014, pp. 75-85, available from bos.sagepub.com/content/70/2/75.full; Hans M. Kristensen, 

“Status of World Nuclear Forces,” Washington, DC: Federation 

of American Scientists, updated April 30, 2014, available from fas.

org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/; and Shannon Kile and Phillip Schell, “Nuclear forces,” Stockholm, Sweden: 

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), January 

2014, available from www.sipri.org/research/armaments/nuclearforces.

67. The UK has 160 deployed warheads, and France has 290 

deployed warheads. India, Pakistan, Israel, and China do not 

distinguish between deployed and stored warheads. See “Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance,” Arms Control Association, updated June 23, 2014, available from www.armscontrol.

org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat; Kristensen, “Status of 

World Nuclear Forces”; Kristensen and Norris, “Global Nuclear 

Weapons Inventories, 1945-2013”; Shannon N. Kile and Hans M. 

Kristensen, “World Nuclear Forces,” SIPRI Yearbook 2013: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013, overview available from web.archive.

org/web/20130812064732/http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2013/files/

sipri-yearbook-2013-chapter-6-overview; and Timothy McDonnell, 

“Nuclear Pursuits: Non-P-5 nuclear-armed states, 2013,” Bulletin 

of the Atomic Scientist, Vol. 69, No. 1, January-February 2013, pp. 

62-70, available from bos.sagepub.com/content/69/1/62.full. For the 

UK, also see “Country Profile: United Kingdom,” Nuclear Threat 
101

Initiative, updated July 2014, available from www.nti.org/countryprofiles/united-kingdom/. For Israel, also see Warner D. Farr, “The 

Third Temple’s Holy of Holies: Israel’s Nuclear Weapons,” Counterproliferation Paper No. 2, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: USAF 

Counterproliferation Center, September 1999, available from 

www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cpc-pubs/farr.htm. For China, also 

see Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2013,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 69, No. 6, 

November-December 2013, pp. 79-86, available from bos.sagepub.

com/content/69/6/79.full; Bill Gertz, “The Warhead Gap,” Washington Free Beacon, November 9, 2012, available from freebeacon.

com/national-security/the-warhead-gap/; “Nuclear Weapons: China’s 

Nuclear Forces,” July 7, 2014, available from www.globalsecurity.

org/wmd/world/china/nuke.htm.

68. The information used to generate this graph was drawn 

from the sources in endnotes 65-67. Data for North Korea’s arsenal 

was drawn from David Albright and Christina Walrond, “North 

Korea’s Estimated Stocks of Plutonium and Weapons-Grade Uranium,” Washington, DC: Institute for Science and International 

Security, August 16, 2012, available from isis-online.org/uploads/

isis-reports/documents/dprk_fissile_material_production_16Aug2012.

pdf; and Siegfried S. Hecker, “Lessons Learned from the North 

Korean Nuclear Crises,” Daedalus, Winter 2010, pp. 44-56, available from iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22801/Hecker.pdf. In the case of 

the United States, Russia, UK, and France, only deployed warheads are shown. For all other countries, both deployed and 

stored warheads are shown.

69. The number of kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium 

required to make a first-generation Nagasaki bomb is set in this 

book conservatively at four kilograms—the number the U.S. 

Department of Energy (DoE) has used. See “DPRK: Plutonium 

Program,” GlobalSecurity.org, available from www.globalsecurity.

org/wmd/world/dprk/nuke-plutonium.htm; and “Nuclear Weapon 

Design,” Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists, October 21, 1998, available from fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/design.htm. 

The actual figure needed to fuel any given bomb may be more 

or less, depending on how advanced the weapons design. The 

Soviet Union, for example, tested a device in 1953 that used only 

two kilograms of plutonium. That weapon produced a yield of 

5.8 kilotons. The Soviet Union also tested a weapon in 1953 that 

used only 0.8 kilograms of plutonium. That weapon produced a 
102

yield of 1.6 kilotons. See Pavel Podvig, “Amounts of fissile materials in early Soviet nuclear devices,” International Panel on Fissile Materials Blog, October, 1, 2012, available from fissilematerials.org/blog/2012/10/amounts_of_fissile_materi.html; and Thomas B. 

Cochran and Christopher E. Paine, “The Amount of Plutonium 

and Highly-Enriched Uranium Needed for Pure Fission Nuclear 

Weapons” working paper, Washington, DC: Natural Resources 

Defense Council, April 13, 1998, available from www.nrdc.org/

nuclear/fissionw/fissionweapons.pdf. The amount of reactor-grade 

plutonium required to make a first-generation Nagasaki bomb is 

set in this book at 5.2 kilograms, or 30 percent more than the official DoE figure for weapons-grade plutonium. See Richard L. 

Garwin, “Reactor-Grade Plutonium Can be Used to Make Powerful and Reliable Nuclear Weapons: Separated Plutonium in the 

Fuel Cycle Must Be Protected as If It Were Nuclear Weapons,” 

Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists, August 26, 

1998, available from fas.org/rlg/980826-pu.htm.

70. See Katsuhisa Furukawa, “Nuclear Option, Arms Control, 

and Extended Deterrence: In Search of a New Framework for Japan’s Nuclear Policy,” Benjamin L. Self and Jeffrey W. Thompson, 

eds., Japan’s Nuclear Option: Security, Politics, and Policy in the 21st 

Century, Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2003, pp. 95-147, available from www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/56Policy_

Context.pdf; Frank von Hippel, “Plutonium, Proliferation and 

Radioactive-Waste Politics in East Asia,” in The Next Arms Race, 

pp. 111-140, available from npolicy.org/books/Next_Arms_Race/

Ch4_vonHippel.pdf; Takuya Suzuki, “Nuclear Leverage: Long an 

Advocate of Nuclear Energy, Nakasone Now Says Japan Should 

Go Solar,” Asahi Shimbun, July 7, 2011, available from ajw.asahi.

com/article/0311disaster/analysis_opinion/AJ201107214814; Douglas 

Birch, R. Jeffrey Smith, and Jake Adelstein, “Plutonium Fever Blossoms in Japan,” Washington, DC: Center for Public Integrity, May 

19, 2014, in which Japan’s former defense minister in 2012, Satoshi 

Morimoto, is quoted saying that the country’s nuclear power reactors have “very great defensive deterrent functions,” available 

from www.publicintegrity.org/2014/03/12/14394/plutonium-feverblossoms-Japan; and a radio interview of former Japanese Prime 

Minister Naoto Kan noted that having plutonium on hand to have 

an option to make bombs was one of the reasons why Japan under 

Nakasone originally backed nuclear power. See “Ex-Japanese PM 

on How Fukushima Meltdown was Worse Than Chernobyl and 

Why He Now Opposes Nuclear Power,” Democracy Now, March 
103

11, 2014, available from www.democracynow.org/2014/3/11/ex_

japanese_pm_on_how_fukushima.

71. See International Panel on Fissile Materials, “Plutonium 

Separation in Nuclear Power Programs: Status, Problems, and 

Prospects of Civilian Reprocessing Around the World,” July 

2015, pp. 58 ff., available from fissilematerials.org/library/2015/07/

plutonium_separation_in_nuclea.html; Zia Mian, A. H. Nayyar, R. 

Rajaraman, and M. V. Ramana, “Fissile Materials in South Asia 

and the Implications of the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal,” in Henry D. 

Sokolski, ed., Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War, pp. 

192-195, available from npolicy.org/books/Pakistans_Nuclear_Worries/Ch6_Mian-Nayyar-Rajaraman-Ramana.pdf; and Zahir Kazmi, 

“Normalizing the Non-proliferation Regime,” Survival, Vol. 57, 

No. 1, February-March 2015.

72. See World Nuclear Association, “China’s Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” updated December 2014, available from www.world-nuclear.

org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-A-F/China--Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/; 

and Global Fissile Material Report 2011, Princeton, NJ: International 

Panel on Fissile Materials, 2011, available from fissilematerials.org/

publications/2012/01/global_fissile_material_report.html.

73. Zia Mian and Alexander Glaser, “Global Fissile Material 

Report 2015. Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material Stockpiles 

and Production,” Presentation at NPT Review Conference, United Nations, New York, May 8, 2015, available from fissilematerials.

org/library/ipfm15.pdf. Also see International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), Global Fissile Materials Report 2013, p. 18, available 

from fissilematerials.org/library/gfmr13.pdf.

74. Mian and Glaser, “Global Fissile Material Report 2015.”

75. A 10- to 20-kiloton yield first-generation nuclear weapon 

would roughly require between 12 and 20 kilograms of weaponsgrade uranium. If the Chinese should choose to use the advanced 

nuclear weapons designs they clearly have on hand, the fissile requirements could drop to between 4 and 5 kilograms of weaponsgrade uranium per 10- to 20-kiloton yield device. It also should be 

noted that plutonium can be used with highly enriched uranium 

in a manner that would significantly reduce the amount of HEU 

required. Thus, the amount of weapons-grade uranium required 
104

for a given critical mass can be reduced by roughly 50 percent 

simply by using two kilograms of plutonium in the core. On these 

points and China’s estimated HEU holdings, see Cochran and 

Paine; Harold A. Feiveson, Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian, and Frank 

N. von Hippel, Unmaking the Bomb: A Fissile Material Approach to 

Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation, Cambridge, MA: MIT 

Press, 2014, pp. 38-39 and 54-56; Gregory S. Jones, “An Iran Nuclear Deal That Spreads Nuclear Weapons,” nebula.wsimg.com, 

August 10, 2015, available from nebula.wsimg.com/de41a0d1cf9f9c

51df7637d3b8df3d05?AccessKeyId=40C80D0B51471CD86975&dis

position=0&alloworigin=1; and H. C. Paxton, “Los Alamos Critical Mass Data,” Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory Report, LA3067-MS, Los Alamos, NM, December 1975, p. 51, available from 

www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/07/244/

7244852.pdf.

76. See Arms Control Association, “Worldwide Ballistic 

Missile Inventories,” updated July 2014, available from www.

armscontrol.org/factsheets/missiles; Nuclear Threat Initiative, 

“Country Profiles,” available from www.nti.org/country-profiles/; 

and Missilethreat.com, “Missiles of the World,” accessed August 

13, 2014, available from missilethreat.com/missiles-of-the-world/.

77. Aaron Stein, “A Gordian Knot: Missiles in the Gulf,” Arms 

Control Wonk (blog), April 30, 2014, available from guests.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/4372/a-gordian-knot-missiles-in-the-gulf.

78. Winston Churchill, “Never Despair,” text of a speech before the House of Commons, London, UK, March 1, 1955, available from www.winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/102-neverdespair.

79. See, e.g., Mueller, Atomic Obsession, pp. 129-142; John 

Mueller, Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry 

Inflate National Security Threats and Why We Believe Them, New 

York: Free Press, 2006; and Kidd, “Nuclear Proliferation Risk—Is 

It Vastly Overrated?”

80. See, e.g., endnotes 57 and 58; Anil A. Anthale, “Why 

Modi Wants to Change India’s Nuclear Policy,” Rediff News, May 

13, 2014, available from www.rediff.com/news/column/ls-electionwhy-modi-wants-to-change-indias-nuclear-policy/20140513.htm; and 
105

P. R. Chari, “India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Stirrings of Change,” 

Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 

June 4, 2014, available from carnegieendowment.org/2014/06/04/

india-s-nuclear-doctrine-stirrings-of-change/hcks.

81. This debate, however, is ongoing. C.f., Graham Allison, “Just How Likely Is Another World War?” The Atlantic, 

July 30, 2014, available from www.theatlantic.com/international/

archive/2014/07/just-how-likely-is-another-world-war/375320/; with 

Robert Taber, The War of the Flea, Washington, DC: Brassey’s Inc., 

2002; George and Meredith Friedman, The Future of War, New 

York: Crown Publishers, 1996; John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War, New York: Basic Books, 1989, 

available from politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/doom.pdf; 

and Evan Lard, War in International Society, New Haven: Yale 

University Press, 1987.

82. See Sharon Weinberg, “How To Visit A Secret Nuclear 

Bunker,” Wired, June 11, 2008, available from www.wired.

com/2008/06/how-to-visit-a/; 20th Century Castles, LLC, which sells 

decommissioned U.S. missile bases, including bases for Atlas, Titan, and Nike missiles, available from www.missilebases.com/properties; GCI Channel Solutions, Inc., which uses NATO bunkers to 

secure and host computer servers, available from gcichannelsolutions.com/products/data-centres/support-services.html; Siegfried Wittenburg, “A Warm Grave in a Cold War: East German Nuclear 

Bunker Opens to Tourists,” Spiegel Online International, August 

26, 2011 available from www.spiegel.de/international/germany/

a-warm-grave-in-a-cold-war-east-german-nuclear-bunker-opens-totourists-a-782755.html; Burlington Bunker in Corsham, Wiltshire, 

UK, was formally a Cold War NATO nuclear bunker and is now 

a tourist sight, available from www.burlingtonbunker.co.uk/; and 

guided tours of a missile launch facility and silo are offered by the 

National Park Service at the Minuteman Missile National Historic 

Site in South Dakota, available from www.nps.gov/mimi/index.htm.

83. See “Yamantau,” GlobalSecurity.org, available from www.

globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/yamantau.htm; and Viewzone.

com, “What’s Going on in the Yamantau Mountain Complex?” 

available from www.viewzone.com/yamantau.html.

84. Ibid.
106

85. See James R. Holmes, “China’s Underground Great 

Wall,” The Diplomat, August 20, 2011, available from thediplomat.

com/2011/08/chinas-underground-great-wall/; and Bret Stephens, 

“How Many Nukes Does China Have?” The Wall Street Journal, 

October 24, 2011, available from www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424

052970204346104576639502894496030.

86. William Wan, “Georgetown Students Shed Light on China’s Tunnel System for Nuclear Weapons,” The Washington Post, 

November 29, 2011, available from www.washingtonpost.com/world/

national-security/georgetown-students-shed-light-on-chinas-tunnelsystem-for-nuclear-weapons/2011/11/16/gIQA6AmKAO_story.html.

87. See Barbara Demick, “Thousands of North Korean Tunnels Hide Arms Secrets,” The Los Angeles Times, November 15, 

2003, available from community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?

date=20031115&slug=koreacaves140.

88. This definition of nuclear-capable missiles here is drawn 

directly from the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). 

See Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Annex Handbook, 2010, pp. 1-3, available from www.mtcr.info/english/MTCR_

Annex_Handbook_ENG.pdf.

89. See, e.g., Mark Stokes and Ian Easton, “China and the 

Emerging Strategic Competition in Aerospace Power,” in The 

Next Arms Race, pp. 141-175, available from npolicy.org/books/

Next_Arms_Race/Ch5_Stokes-Easton.pdf.

90. See endnote 76.

91. See, e.g., Bill Gertz, “Stratcom: China Continuing to Weaponize Space with Latest Anti-Satellite Missile Shot,” Washington Free Beacon, August 13, 2014, available from freebeacon.com/

national-security/stratcom-china-continuing-to-weaponize-space-withlatest-anti-satellite-missile-shot/; and Bruce Sugden, “China’s Conventional Strikes against the U.S. Homeland,” Washington, DC: 

Center for International Maritime Security, accessed August 18, 

2014, from cimsec.org/china-conventional-strike-us/11829.

92. There are, of course, limits to how far one can substitute 

conventional for nuclear munitions. See Steven Lukasik, “To 
107

What Extent Can Precision Conventional Technologies Substitute 

for Nuclear Weapons?” in The Next Arms Race, pp. 387-412, available from npolicy.org/books/Next_Arms_Race/Ch12_Lukasik.pdf.

93. See Zachary Keck, “India, ‘Cold Start’ and Pakistani 

Tactical Nukes,” The Diplomat, May 8, 2013, available from 

thediplomat.com/2013/05/india-cold-start-and-pakistani-tacticalnukes/; Ajai Shukla, “Army’s ‘Cold Start’ Doctrine Gets Teeth,” 

Business Standard, July 22, 2011, available from www.businessstandard.com/article/economy-policy/army-s-cold-start-doctrine-getsteeth-111072200071_1.html; Muhammad Aslam Khan Niazi, “India 

Toying with Dangerous Cold Start War Doctrine,” Eurasia Review, 

October 29, 2011, available from www.eurasiareview.com/29102011-

india-toying-with-dangerous-cold-start-war-doctrine-analysis/; Ali 

Ahmed, “India and Pakistan: Azm-e-Nau as a Response to the 

Cold Start,” New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 

July 28, 2013, available from www.ipcs.org/article/india/india-andpakistan-azm-e-nau-as-a-response-to-4056.html; Muhammad Azam 

Khan, “India’s Cold Start Is Too Hot”; Mike Mazza, “Pakistan’s 

Strategic Myopia: Its Decision to Field Tactical Nuclear Weapons Will Only Make the Subcontinent More Unstable,” The Wall 

Street Journal, April 2011, available from www.wsj.com/articles/SB

10001424052748704099704576288763180683774; “Pakistan Army 

to Preempt India’s ‘Cold Start Doctrine’,” Express Tribune, June 

16, 2013, available from tribune.com.pk/story/564136/pakistan-armyto-preempt-indias-cold-start-doctrine/; Dinakar Peri, “Nirbhay Will 

Be Backbone of ‘Cold-Start,’ Say Experts,” The Hindu, October 24, 

2014, available from www.thehindu.com/news/national/nirbhay-willbe-backbone-of-coldstart-say-experts/article6529087.ece; and Zahid 

Giskori, “LoC Skirmishes: Lawmaker Raises the Spectre of Nuclear War,” Express Tribune, October 23, 2014, available from tribune.

com.pk/story/779830/loc-skirmishes-lawmaker-raises-the-spectre-ofnuclear-war/.

94. See, e.g., Jacob W. Kipp, “Asian Drivers of Russian Nuclear Force Posture,” in The Next Arms Race, pp. 45-82, available from npolicy.org/books/Next_Arms_Race/Ch2_Kipp.pdf; Mark 

B. Schneider, “The Nuclear Forces and Doctrine of the Russian 

Federation and the People’s Republic of China,” Testimony at 

a hearing before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on the Armed Services, House of Representatives, 112th 

Cong., 1st Sess., October 14, 2011, available from www.worldaf-
108

fairscouncils.org/2011/images/insert/Majority%20Statement%20

and%20Testimony.pdf; Nikolai N. Sokov, “Why Russia Calls a 

Limited Nuclear Strike ‘De-escalation,” Bulletin of the Atomic 

Scientists, March 13, 2014, available from thebulletin.org/why-russia-calls-limited-nuclear-strike-de-escalation; Graham Ong-Webb, 

“Power Posturing: China’s Tactical Nuclear Stance Comes of Age 

(September 2010),” Jane’s Intelligence Review, September 2010, 

pp. 47-55, available from www.academia.edu/412039/Power_Posturing_Chinas_Tactical_Nuclear_Stance_Comes_of_Age_September_2010_; Nicolas Giacometti, “Could China’s Nuclear Strategy 

Evolve?” The Diplomat, October 16, 2014, available from thediplomat.com/2014/10/could-chinas-nuclear-strategy-evolve/; and Jonathan Ray, Red China’s “Capitalist Bomb”: Inside the Chinese Neutron 

Bomb Program, China Strategic Perspectives No. 8, Washington, 

DC: National Defense University Press, 2015, available from 

inss.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/China

Perspectives-8.pdf.

95. Ian Easton, China’s Evolving Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities, Arlington, VA: Project 2049, February 2014, available from 

www.project2049.net/documents/Chinas_Evolving_Reconnaissance_

Strike_Capabilities_Easton.pdf; Mark A. Stokes and Ian Easton, 

Evolving Aerospace Trends in the Asia-Pacific Region, Arlington, VA: 

Project 2049, May 27, 2010, available from project2049.net/documents/aerospace_trends_asia_pacific_region_stokes_easton.pdf; and Elbridge Colby, “Welcome to China and America’s Nuclear Nightmare,” The National Interest, December 19, 2014, available from 

nationalinterest.org/feature/welcome-china-americas-nuclear-night

mare-11891.

96. See Kristensen and Norris, “Chinese nuclear forces, 2013”; 

and Gertz, “The Warhead Gap.”

97. See Mark Stokes, “Security Nuclear Arsenals: A Chinese 

Case Study,” in Henry Sokolski, ed., Nuclear Weapons Security Crises: What Does History Teach? Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2013, pp. 65-85, available from www.

strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1156.

98. On China’s no first use policies, see China’s 2008 White 

Paper, “China’s National Defense in 2008,” available from fas.

org/programs/ssp/nukes/2008DefenseWhitePaper_Jan2009.pdf; also 

see analysis of this paper by Hans M. Kristensen, “China Defense 
109

White Paper Describes Nuclear Escalation,” FAS Strategic Security 

Blog, January 23, 2009, available from fas.org/blogs/security/2009/01/

chinapaper/; and M. Taylor Ravel and Evan S. Medeiros, “China’s 

Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear 

Strategy and Force Structure,” International Security, Vol. 32, No. 

2, Fall 2010, pp. 48-87, available from belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/

files/Chinas_Search_for_Assured_Retaliation.pdf.

99. Danny Gittings, “General Zhu Goes Ballistic,” The Wall 

Street Journal, July 18, 2005, available from www.wsj.com/news/

articles/SB112165176626988025; and Mark Schneider, “The Nuclear Doctrine and Forces of the People’s Republic of China,” 

Comparative Strategy, Vol. 28, No. 3, Spring 2009, pp. 244-270. Also 

see an earlier version dated 2007, available from www.nipp.org/

wp-content/uploads/2014/12/China-nuclear-final-pub.pdf.

100. See endnote 131 and Mark Stokes, “China’s Future Nuclear Force Infrastructure: A Notional Breakout Scenario,” draft 

paper prepared for the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center East Asian Alternative Nuclear Weapons Futures Conference, 

Honolulu, HI, February 21, 2014, available from npolicy.org/article_file/Stokes_-_CHINA_NUCLEAR_EXPANSION_SCENARIO.

pdf.

101. See Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to 

Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s 

Republic of China 2015, Washington, DC: DoD, 2015, available 

from www.defense.gov/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.

pdf; David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “China Making Some 

Missiles More Powerful,” The New York Times, May 16, 2015, available from www.nytimes.com/2015/05/17/world/asia/china-makingsome-missiles-more-powerful.html?_r=1; and Tong Zhao and David 

Logan, “What if China Develops MIRVs?” Bulletin of the Atomic 

Scientists, March 24, 2015, available from thebulletin.org/what-ifchina-develops-mirvs8133.

102. See “China ‘Increasing Number of Missile Warheads,’” 

South China Morning Post, August 4, 2014, available from www.

scmp.com/news/china/article/1566294/china-increasing-numbermissile-warheads.

103. See U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2012 Report to Congress, Washington, DC: GPO, November 
110

2012, pp. 170-214, available from origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/

files/annual_reports/2012-Report-to-Congress.pdf; Gertz, “The Warhead Gap”; and GlobalSecurity.org, “Nuclear Weapons: China’s 

Nuclear Forces,” July 7, 2014, available from www.globalsecurity.

org/wmd/world/china/nuke.htm.

104. As to how many nuclear weapons China actually has, 

no one knows. A sharp critic of recent estimates that China might 

have as many as 3,000 nuclear weapons, though, was hardly reassuring in emphasizing that China could only “theoretically” have 

as many as 1,660 nuclear weapons. For more on this controversy, 

see Hans Kristensen, “No, China Does Not Have 3,000 Nuclear 

Weapons,” FAS Strategic Security Blog, December 3, 2011, available from fas.org/blogs/security/2011/12/chinanukes/.

105. The numbers used to generate this chart came from 

the sources listed in endnotes 66-68, plus Robert Burns, “US 

weighing steep nuclear arms cuts,” Associated Press, February 

14, 2012, available from www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/

articles/2012/02/14/ap_newsbreak_us_weighing_steep_nuclear_arms_

cuts/; and Kristensen, “No, China Does Not Have 3,000 Nuclear 

Weapons.”

106. See Bill Gertz, “McKeon: State Department Ignores Major Russian Treaty Violation: Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces 

Treaty Breached,” Washington Free Beacon, July 15, 2014, available 

from freebeacon.com/national-security/mckeon-state-department-ignores-major-russian-treaty-violation/; and Jim Thomas, “Statement 

before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic 

Forces on the Future of the INF Treaty,” July 17, 2014, available 

from www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Thomas-INFtestimony1.pdf.

107. See Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Says Russia Tested Cruise 

Missile, Violating Treaty,” The New York Times, July 28, 2014, 

available from www.nytimes.com/2014/07/29/world/europe/us-saysrussia-tested-cruise-missile-in-violation-of-treaty.html.

108. See Mari Saito, Aaron Sheldrick, and Kentaro Hamada, “Japan may only be able to restart one-third of its nuclear reactors,” Reuters, April 2, 2014, available from www.

Reuters.com/article/2014/04/02/us-japan-nuclear-restarts-insightidUSBREA3020020140402. In private interviews with several lead-
111

ing Japanese nuclear experts, the range of restarts given is somewhat higher—between 15 and 25 light water reactors.

109. See NucNet, “France and Japan Announce Cooperation 

on Generation IV Astrid FBR,” May 6, 2014, available from www.

nucnet.org/all-the-news/2014/05/06/france-and-japan-announce-cooperation-on-generation-iv-astrid-fbr.

110. On these points, see von Hippel, “Plutonium, Proliferation and Radioactive-Waste Politics”; and Henry Sokolski, 

“The Post-Fukushima Arms Race?” Foreign Policy, July 29, 2011, 

available from foreignpolicy.com/2011/07/30/the-post-fukushimaarms-race/.

111. Frank von Hippel, “The Economics of Plutonium Recycle 

vs. Spent Fuel Storage,” brief given before a meeting at the New 

Diplomacy Initiative, Tokyo, Japan, November 6, 2015, available 

from npolicy.org/slides/von-Hippel_economics-plutonium-recycle_Tokyo.pdf.

112. By the Japanese Atomic Energy Commission’s own calculations made after the Fukushima accident, starting Rokkasho 

would only make sense over the next 20 to 30 years if more than 

15 percent of Japan’s electricity was produced by nuclear power 

reactors—i.e., 20 or more power reactors would have to be operating. As of October 2014, Japan had no reactors online, and it is 

unclear if the 15 percent criteria will ever be met. On this point, 

see endnote 108 and slides 24-30 from the presentation of former 

Japanese Atomic Energy Commission Vice Chairman, Tatsujiro 

Suzuki, “Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Fuel Cycle Policy Options, 

after the Fukushima Accident,” presentation at the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center East Asian Alternative Energy Futures Conference, Honolulu, HI, February 26, 2014, available from 

npolicy.org/article_file/Suzuki-Japan-energy-nuclear-policy.pdf.

113. See Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Civilian HEU: Japan,” 

April 23, 2014, available from www.nti.org/analysis/articles/civilianheu-japan/.

114. See endnote 70 and Peter Symonds, “Is Japan Developing a Nuclear Weapons Program?” Global Research, May 7, 2013, 

available from www.globalresearch.ca/is-japan-developing-a-nuclear-
112

weapons-program/5334227; Robert Windrem, “Japan Has Nuclear 

‘Bomb in the Basement,’ and China Isn’t Happy,” NBC News, 

March 11, 2014, available from www.nbcnews.com/storyline/fukushima-anniversary/japan-has-nuclear-bomb-basement-china-isnt-happyn48976; and Hiroko Tabuchi, “Japan Pushes Plan to Stockpile Plutonium, Despite Proliferation Risks,” The New York Times, April 

9, 2014, available from www.nytimes.com/2014/04/10/world/asia/

japan-pushes-plan-to-stockpile-plutonium-despite-proliferation-risks.

html, where a former senior Japanese Trade Ministry official touts 

the deterrent value of having Rokkasho and separated plutonium 

on the ready.

115. Reactor-grade plutonium’s tendency to spontaneously 

fission and to produce more heat than weapons-grade plutonium 

that has higher plutonium 239 and plutonium 241 isotopic content 

makes reactor-grade plutonium less than optimal for use in firstgeneration weapons designs of 1945. But as the U.S. Department 

of Energy noted in 1997, assuming one used the crudest weapons 

design and fueled it with reactor-grade plutonium, yields “of the 

order of one or a few kilotons” could be expected. See endnote 

69 and Robert Selden, “Reactor Plutonium and Nuclear Explosives,” a slide presentation made before the Director General of 

the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna and before the 

Atomic Industrial Forum in Washington DC, 1976, available from 

nuclearpolicy101.org/wp-content/uploads/PDF/Selden_Reactor-Plutonium_slides.pdf; “Bruce Goodwin, “Reactor Plutonium Utility 

in Nuclear Explosives,” brief given before a meeting of the New 

Diplomacy Initiative, Tokyo, Japan, November 6, 2015, available 

from www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1297&rtid=6; U.S. Department of Energy, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of 

Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Storage and Excess Plutonium Disposition Alternatives, DOE/NN-0007, January 1997, pp. 37-39, available from fissilematerials.org/library/doe97.pdf; and J. Carson Mark, 

“Explosive Properties of Reactor-Grade Plutonium,” Science and 

Global Security, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1993, pp. 111-128, available from scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs04mark.pdf. More important, 

weapons engineers today, however, could readily compensate 

for these deficiencies. First, with highly precise missile delivery 

systems, the need for high-yield warheads to destroy point targets is dramatically reduced. As for destroying city centers, the 

difference between a 5- to 10-kiloton weapon and a 20-kiloton 

Nagasaki weapon is relatively small (this because only a portion 
113

of the explosive power of any nuclear weapon exploded above a 

target impacts that target’s surface plane), and even much smaller 

yield weapons would be quite destructive. Even at the very lowest range—at one kiloton—the radius of destruction would still 

be roughly one-third that of the Hiroshima bomb. For a more detailed explanation of how increases in yield and aiming accuracies translate into increases in lethality, see Henry Sokolski and 

Kate Harrison, “Two Modern Military Revolutions: Dramatic Increases in Explosive Yields and Aiming Accuracies,” Arlington, 

VA: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, October 24, 2013, 

available from nuclearpolicy101.org/wp-content/uploads/PDF/TwoModern-Military-Revolutions.pdf. Second, weapons designers can 

significantly mitigate most, if not all, of the heat and high neutron emission downsides of reactor-grade plutonium by utilizing 

warhead designs that the United States and Russia perfected and 

deployed over a half-century ago—e.g., hollow cores, levitated 

pits, two-point ellipsoid designs, composite highly enriched uranium-plutonium cores, etc.—and using the latest high-explosive, 

heat management, and triggering technologies. These techniques 

would allow Japan to acquire relatively efficient, reliable yields 

using reactor-grade plutonium. Finally, more advanced designs 

that employ boosting with thermonuclear fuels, such as tritium, 

would entirely eliminate the neutron emission weapons design 

problems posed by reactor-grade plutonium.

116. See “Revisions to Japanese Atomic Law Cause Worry 

over Possible Weapons Aim,” Global Security Newswire, June 

22, 2012, available from www.nti.org/gsn/article/revisions-japaneseatomic-law-spark-concern-about-possible-weapon-development/.

117. See, e.g., The Star Online, “Alarm Over Nuke Stockpiles,” October 25, 2015, available from www.thestar.com.

my/News/Regional/2015/10/25/Alarm-over-nuke-stockpiles-Japanshould-respond-to-concerns-of-the-international-community/; Chinese 

Arms Control and Disarmament Association and the China Institute of Nuclear Information and Economics, “Study on Japan’s Nuclear Material,” September 2015, available from www.

cacda.org.cn/ueditor/php/upload/file/20151010/1444439848122903.

pdf; “S. Korea Could End Up Sandwiched Among Nuclear 

Powers,” Chosun Ilbo, November 14, 2012, available from english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2012/06/29/2012062901173.

html; Austin Ramzy, “China Complains about Plutonium in 
114

Japan,” Sinosphere (blog), The New York Times, June 10, 2014, 

available from sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/10/chinacomplains-about-plutonium-in-japan/; Liu Chong, “Japan’s Plutonium Problem,” Beijing Review, March 17, 2014, available from 

www.bjreview.com.cn/world/txt/2014-03/17/content_607155.htm; 

and Fredrick Dahl, “U.S. defends Japan against China’s plutonium criticism,” Reuters, March 5, 2014, available from www.

Reuters.com/article/2014/03/05/us-japan-plutonium-usa-idUSBREA2

421A20140305?irpc=932&irpc=932.

118. On these points, see World Nuclear Association, “Uranium Enrichment,” January 2015, available from www.world-nuclear.

org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Conversion-Enrichment-and-Fabrication/

Uranium-Enrichment/; Edward Kee and Jennifer Cascone Fauver, 

“ACP & World Enrichment Market,” draft report, Washington, 

DC: NERA Economic Consulting, September 5, 2013, 25, available 

from www.centrusenergy.com/sites/default/files/NERA_ACP_And_

World_Enrichment_Market_0.pdf; and and Hui Zhang, “Uranium 

Supplies: A Hitch to China’s Nuclear Energy Plans? Or Not?” 

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 4, 2015, available from 

thebulletin.org/2015/may/uranium-supplies-hitch-chinas-nuclear-energy-plans-or-not8296.

119. It should be noted that China is encountering considerable difficulties in achieving its 2020 reactor capacity goal. See 

Mycle Schneider, Antony Froggatt, et al., The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2014, Paris, France; London, UK; and Washington, DC: Mycle Schneider Consulting, July 2014, pp. 105-110, 

available from www.worldnuclearreport.org/IMG/pdf/201408mscworldnuclearreport2014-lr-v3.pdf; David Stanway, “China Says First 

Westinghouse Reactor Delayed until At Least End-2015,” Reuters,

July 18, 2014, available from www.Reuters.com/article/2014/07/18/

china-nuclear-ap-idUKL4N0PT0T820140718?irpc=932; and Stephen 

Chen, “As China’s Economy Matures, It Trades Speed for Build 

Quality on Big Projects,” South China Morning Post, September 

21, 2014, available from www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1596995/

chinas-economy-matures-it-trades-speed-build-quality-big-projects.

120. These estimates assume China would employ the advanced nuclear weapons designs it has clearly mastered and that, 

as such, only 12 kilograms of highly enriched uranium would be 

needed per Chinese weapon. See endnote 75. On China’s project-
115

ed 3 million SWU surplus enrichment capability and plans, see 

Hui Zhang, China’s Uranium Enrichment Capacity: Rapid Expansion 

to Meet Commercial Needs, Cambridge, MA: Project on Managing 

the Atom, Discussion Paper No 2015-03, August 2015, available 

from belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/chinasuraniumenrichmenntcapacity.pdf.

121. This set of uranium weapons estimates conservatively 

assumes Japan would need 20 kilograms of highly-enriched uranium per weapon. It is possible, however, that Japan might need 

as little as 12 or 13 kilograms per weapon. See endnote 75. On 

Japan’s enrichment capability and plans, see WISE Uranium Project, “World Nuclear Fuel Facilities”; Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited, 

“Operation Status (As of December 31, 2014),” available from 

www.jnfl.co.jp/english/operation/; and World Nuclear Association, 

“Uranium Enrichment.”

122. For the number of SWU (Separative Work Unit) to make 

one kilogram HEU or refuel a 1-GWe reactor, see Richard L. Garwin, “HEU Done It,” in Mitchell B. Reiss, Robert Gallucci, et al., 

“Red-Handed,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 2, March-April 2005, 

in response to an article by Selig S. Harrison, “’Did North Korea Cheat?” in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 1, January-February 

2005, available from fas.org/rlg/030005HDI.pdf; and “Separative 

Work Unit (SWU),” World Nuclear Association Glossary, updated 

March 2014, available from www.world-nuclear.org/Nuclear-Basics/

Glossary/. For China and Japan figures, see endnotes 120 and 

121. Reports from November 2014 indicate that North Korea 

began operating a new enrichment facility capable of doubling 

its existing 8,000 SWU/year enrichment capacity, but production of weapons-grade material at the new facility has not been 

confirmed. See David Albright and Robert Avagyan, “Recent 

Doubling of Floor Space at North Korean Gas Centrifuge Plant,” 

Washington, DC: Institute for Science and International Security, 

August 8, 2013, available from isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/

recent-doubling-of-floor-space-at-north-korean-gas-centrifuge-plant/10;

and “North Korea puts new uranium enrichment facility into operation—media,” Tass, November 5, 2014, available from tass.ru/

en/world/758055.

123. See Julian Borger, “South Korea Considers Return 

of U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” Guardian (Manchester), 
116

November 22, 2010, available from www.theguardian.com/

world/2010/nov/22/south-korea-us-tactical-weapons-nuclear; and 

David Dombey and Christian Oliver, “US Rules Out Nuclear 

Redeployment in South Korea,” Financial Times, March 1, 2011, 

available from www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e8a2d456-43b0-11e0-b117-00144

feabdc0.html#axzz1oCEG4jBm.

124. See Daniel Pinkston, “The New South Korean Missile Guidelines and Future Prospects for Regional Stability,” 

In Pursuit of Peace (blog), Washington, DC: International Crisis Group, October 25, 2012, available from blog.crisisgroup.org/

asia/2012/10/25/the-new-south-korean-missile-guidelines-and-futureprospects-for-regional-stability/; and Jeffrey Lewis, “RoK Missile 

Rationale Roulette,” Arms Control Wonk (blog), October 9, 2012, 

available from lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/5771/rok-missilerationale-roulette.

125. After more than 5 years of negotiations, the United States 

and South Korea finally agreed to a nuclear cooperative agreement in June 2015. This agreement initially prevents South Korea from reprocessing or enriching U.S.-origin nuclear materials. 

The agreement, however, also creates a consultative process that 

would allow South Korea to change this. There is good reason to 

believe that South Korea will continue to press its case for such 

a change. See James E. Platte, “Next Steps for U.S.-South Korea 

Civil Nuclear Cooperation,” Asia Pacific Bulletin, July 1, 2015, 

available from www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/apb316_0.

pdf?file=1&type=node&id=35218; and Soo Kim, Proliferation Fallout 

from the Iran Deal:The South Korean Case Study, Washington, DC: 

FDD Press, October 2015, available from www.defenddemocracy.

org/content/uploads/documents/Proliferation_Fallout_South_Korea.

pdf.

126. For the most recent and complete historiography of 

South Korea’s nuclear weapons program, see Alexander Lanoszka, “Seoul in Isolation: Explaining South Korean Nuclear Behavior, 1968-1980,” in Protection States Trust?: Major Power Patronage, Nuclear Behavior, and Alliance Dynamics, Ph.D. Dissertation, 

Princeton University, 2010, available from www.alexlanoszka.com/

AlexanderLanoszkaROK.pdf.

127. See, e.g., Ted Galen Carpenter, “South Korea’s Growing 

Nuclear Flirtation,” China-US Focus, April 24, 2013, available from
117

www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/south-koreas-growing-nuclearflirtation/.

128. See Gerald Baker and Alastair Gale, “South Korea President Warns on Nuclear Domino Effect,” Wall Street Journal, May 

29, 2014, available from www.wsj.com/articles/south-korea-president-park-geun-hye-warns-on-nuclear-domino-effect-1401377403; Ian 

Easton, “Japanese Weapons Programs and Strategies: Future 

Scenarios and Alternative Approaches,” Arlington, VA: The 

Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 2015, available from 

npolicy.org/books/East_Asia/Ch7_Easton.pdf; and Charles D. Ferguson, “How South Korea Could Acquire and Deploy Nuclear 

Weapons,” Arlington, VA: The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 2015, available from npolicy.org/books/East_Asia/Ch4_

Ferguson.pdf.

129. See endnote 22.

130. When polled, roughly 10 percent of the Japanese electorate now identify themselves as New Rightists. Yet an additional percentage of Japanese may be sympathetic to their views. 

Japanese New Rightists now have their own organized political 

parties; the age of those who identify with these organizations is 

dropping and now is much lower than it was a generation ago. 

More important, as Japan reforms its foreign and military policies, 

the political parties with the clearest views on these topics are on 

the right. See, e.g., Yuka Hayashi, “Tensions in Asia Stoke Rising 

Nationalism in Japan: Young Conservatives, Japan’s Version of 

U.S. Tea Party, Are Fast Gaining Clout,” The Wall Street Journal,

February 26, 2014, available from www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001

424052702304610404579403492918900378; Kathryn Ibata-Arens, 

“Why Japan’s Right Turn Could Be Trouble for the U.S.,” The 

Daily Beast, December 16, 2012, available from www.thedailybeast.

com/articles/2012/12/16/why-japan-s-right-turn-could-be-trouble-forthe-u-s.html; and Roland Kelts, “The Identity Crisis that Lurks Behind Japan’s Right-Wing Rhetoric,” Time, May 31, 2013, available 

from world.time.com/2013/05/31/the-identity-crisis-that-lurks-behindjapans-right-wing-rhetoric/.

131. At the height of the Cold War, the United States had over 

31,000 nuclear weapons; the Soviets, 40,000 (see endnote 24). Some 

senior military planners, however, considered even these high 

numbers to be insufficient. For example, in a recently declassified 
118

official DoD history, it was revealed that, in 1956 alone, the U.S. 

Army had a requirement for 151,000 nuclear weapons. This suggests how nuclear warhead requirements might trend upward in 

an unconstrained East Asian nuclear weapons competition. See 

Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy), History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons: 

July 1945 through September 1977, Washington, DC: DoD, February 

1978, p. 50, available from www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/

NCB/306.pdf. For a more detailed discussion of the demanding requirements for any state contemplating tactical weapons deployments today, see Jeffrey D. McCausland, “Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Operational Myths and Realities,” Washington, 

DC: Stimson Center, March 10, 2015, available from www.stimson.

org/summaries/pakistans-tactical-nuclear-weapons-operational-mythsand-realities/. 

132. See International Panel on Fissile Materials, Plutonium 

Separation in Nuclear Power Programs. Also see “India to Commission Breeder Reactor in 2013,” New Indian Express, February 20, 2012, available from www.newindianexpress.com/nation/

article322002.ece; Paul Brannan, “Further Construction Progress 

of Possible New Military Uranium Enrichment Facility in India,” 

Washington, DC: Institute for Science and International Security, 

October 5, 2011, available from www.isis-online.org/isis-reports/

isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/further-construction-progress-ofpossible-new-military-uranium-enrichment-f/. and Douglas Busvine, 

“India Nuke Enrichment Plant Expansion Operational in 2015—

IHS,” Reuters, June 20, 2014, available from www.Reuters.com/

article/2014/06/20/india-nuclear-idINKBN0EV0JR20140620. For a 

contrarian view, see Leonard Weiss, “On Fear and Nuclear Terrorism,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 71, No. 2, March 2015, 

pp. 75-87; and Brian Jenkins, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear, New York: 

Prometheus Books, 2008.

133. “Russia to Provide ‘Seeker’ Tech for Agni-V ICBM,” 

Asian Defence News, October 26, 2011, available from www.asiandefence.net/2011/10/russia-to-provide-seeker-tech-for.html; B. K. Pandey, “Agni-V to Be Launched By March End,” SP’s Aviation, available from www.sps-aviation.com/story_issue.asp?Article=900; and 

“Why Is This DRDO Official in Moscow?” Trishul (blog), October 

5, 2011, available from trishul-trident.blogspot.com/2011/10/why-isthis-drdo-official-in-moscow.html.
119

134. See, e.g., Jeff Stein, “Exclusive: CIA Helped Saudis in Secret Chinese Missile Deal,” Newsweek, January 29, 2014, available 

from www.newsweek.com/exclusive-cia-helped-saudis-secret-chinesemissile-deal-227283; Bill Gertz, “Saudi Arabia Shows Off Chinese 

Missiles,” Washington Free Beacon, May 2, 2014, available from 

freebeacon.com/national-security/saudi-arabia-shows-off-chinese-missiles/; Mark Urban, “Saudi nuclear weapons ‘on order’ from Pakistan,” BBC News, November 6, 2013, available from www.bbc.com/

news/world-middle-east-24823846; “Report: Saudi Arabia to Buy 

Nukes if Iran Tests A-bomb,” MSNBC, February 10, 2012, available from worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/02/10/10369793-

report-saudi-arabia-to-buy-nukes-if-iran-tests-a-bomb; Andrew Dean 

and Nicholas A. Heras, “Iranian Crisis Spurs Saudi Reconsideration of Nuclear Weapons,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 10, No. 4, 

February 23, 2012, pp. 4-6, available from www.jamestown.org/

programs/tm/%20single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39048&tx_

ttnews%5BbackPi%20d%5D=26&cHash=9aecde0ac8f6849d8877289

c07a49ad7#.VWdNLM9Viko; Mustafa Alani, “How Iran Nuclear 

Standoff Looks to Saudis,” Bloomberg View, February 15, 2012, 

available from www.bloombergview.com/articles/2012-02-16/howiran-nuclear-standoff-looks-from-saudi-arabia-mustafa-alani; and Ali 

Ahmad, “The Saudi Proliferation Question,” Bulletin of the Atomic 

Scientists, December 17, 2013, available from thebulletin.org/saudiproliferation-question.

135. See Jason Burke, “Riyadh Will Build Nuclear Weapons 

if Iran Gets Them, Saudi Prince Warns,” Guardian (Manchester), 

June 29, 2011, available from www.theguardian.com/world/2011/

jun/29/saudi-build-nuclear-weapons-iran.

136. See “Turkey Considers Uranium Enrichment for Own 

Nuclear Power Plants,” RIA Novosti, January 15, 2008, available 

from sputniknews.com/world/20080115/96832054.html; and “Japan’s 

Energy Pact with Turkey Raises Nuclear Weapons Concerns,” 

Asahi Shimbun, January 7, 2014, available from ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201401070060.

137. Turkish nuclear engineers in the late-1970s were asked 

by their government to investigate how plutonium from spent 

light water reactor fuel might be used to make nuclear explosives. 

They determined that it was quite feasible. See cf. Hans Rühle, 

“Is Turkey Secretly Working on Nuclear Weapons?” The National 
120

Interest, September 22, 2015, available from nationalinterest.org/feature/turkey-secretly-working-nuclear-weapons-13898; and U.S. DOE, 

Office of Nonproliferation and International Security, “International Safeguards: Challenges and Opportunities for the 21st Century,” National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) report 

NA-24, Washington, DC: National Nuclear Security Administration, October 2007, pp. 93-94.

138. See Bruno Tertrais, “Alternative Proliferation Futures for 

North Africa,” in The Next Arms Race, pp. 205-238, available from 

npolicy.org/books/Next_Arms_Race/Ch7_Tertrais.pdf.

139. See “Egypt to Launch Global Tender for Nuclear Power Plant by End of 2014,” Ahram Online, July 19, 2014, available 

from english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/106618/Business/Economy/Egypt-to-launch-global-tender-for-nuclear-power-pl.aspx; Rafael 

Ofek, “Egypt’s Nuclear Dreams,” IsraelDefense, February 11, 2013, 

available from www.israeldefense.co.il/en/content/egypts-nucleardreams; and Shaul Shay, “Will Egypt Go Nuclear?” Arutz Sheva, 

September 13, 2012, available from www.israelnationalnews.com/

Articles/Article.aspx/12181.

140. See Avner Cohen, “Paying Too Much for Insurance,” Haaretz, June 6, 2014, available from www.haaretz.com/

opinion/1.597240.

141. This point has long been understood in the nuclear weapons engineering community. See endnote 113. Thus, the Reagan 

administration formally proposed acquiring an unfinished Washington Power Supply System light water reactor in Washington 

State in 1987 to increase U.S. production of weapons plutonium 

and tritium. See Milton Hoenig, “Energy Department Blurs the 

Line Between Civilian, Military Reactors,” Bulletin of the Atomic 

Scientists, Vol. 43, No. 5, June 1987, pp. 25-27, available from books.

google.com/books?id=pQYAAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA25&dq=wppss+w

eapons+plutonium+production+doe&hl=en&sa=X&ei=yISkU7mvB9

froAS5_YKoCQ&ved=0CCQQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=wppss%20

weapons%20plutonium%20production%20doe&f=false; and U.S. 

Congress, “Potential Conversion of WPPSS 1 Commercial Nuclear Powerplant to a Production Reactor,” Oversight hearing before 

the Subcommittee on General Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, House of Representatives,
121

hearing held in Portland, OR, December 8, 1987, 100th Cong., 1st 

Sess., Ser. No. 100-42, Washington, DC: GPO, 1988, available from 

babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pst.000014315848;view=1up;seq=1.

142. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Stanford 

University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation 

determined that a standard one-gigawatt electrical light water 

reactor of the sort the United States pledged to North Korea as 

part of the 1994 Agreed Framework (which is similar to the light 

water reactor at Bushehr, Iran) would produce 300 kilograms of 

“fuel-grade” plutonium, which is nearly weapons-grade in the 

first 12 to 18 months of operation, and the reactor could be operated to continue to produce 150 kilograms of “essentially” weapons-grade plutonium every 9 to 10 months. See Michael May et

al., “Verifying the Agreed Framework,” report CGSR-2001-001, 

Livermore, CA: Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory, April 2001, p. 65, available from 

iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/12020/VAF-June.pdf. On the weapons utility of this “beginning of life” fuel-grade plutonium as compared 

to weapons- and super weapons-grade plutonium, see the analysis of former weapons designer Harmon Hubbard in Victor Gilinsky et al., A Fresh Examination of the Proliferation Dangers of Light 

Water Reactors, Arlington, VA: Nonproliferation Policy Education 

Center, October 22, 2004, available from www.npolicy.org/article_

file/A_Fresh_Examination_of_the_Proliferation_Resistance_of_Light_

Water_Reactors.pdf.

143. See Gilinsky et al., A Fresh Examination of the Proliferation 

Dangers of Light Water Reactors; Andrew Leask, Russell Leslie, and 

John Carlson, “Safeguards As a Design Criteria—Guidance for 

Regulators,” Canberra, Australia: Australian Safeguards and Nonproliferation Office, September 2004, available from www.iaea.org/

inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/44/007/44007604.pdf; and 

Susan Voss, “Scoping Intangible Proliferation Related to Peaceful 

Nuclear Programs: Tracking Nuclear Proliferation within a Commercial Nuclear Power Program,” in Henry Sokolski, ed., Moving 

Beyond Pretense: Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation, Carlisle, PA: 

Strategic Studies Institute, 2014, pp. 149-183, available from www.

npolicy.org/books/Moving_Beyond_Pretense/Ch6_Voss.pdf.

144. On the less than comprehensive character of these inspections and diversion worries this raises, see “Nuclear Safeguards: 

In Pursuit of the Undoable: Troubling Flaws in the World’s Nu-
122

clear Safeguards,” The Economist August 23, 2007, available from 

www.economist.com/node/9687869; and Henry Sokolski, “Assessing 

the IAEA’s Ability to Verify the NPT,” in Falling Behind: International Scrutiny of the Peaceful Atom, pp. 3-61, available from npolicy.

org/thebook.php?bid=5#intro.

145. See Marvin M. Miller, “Are IAEA Safeguards on Plutonium Bulk-Handling Facilities Effective?” reprinted in Nuclear 

Power and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, Paul Leventhal et al., eds., 

Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2002, p. 273.

146. See, e.g., U.S. Department of State, “U.S.-Russia Nuclear 

Negotiations: Ukraine and Beyond,” Remarks of Anita E. Friedt, 

Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification 

and Compliance, Testimony before a hearing of a Joint Subcommittee, House Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Representatives, Washington, DC, April 29, 2014, available from www.state.

gov/t/avc/rls/2014/225530.htm; and “U.S. Contributions towards A 

World Without Nuclear Weapons ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] Regional Forum,” Remarks of Frank A. Rose, 

Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification 

and Compliance, Tokyo, Japan, July 8, 2014, available from m.state.

gov/md228906.htm.

147. See Martin Anderson and Annelise Anderson, Reagan’s 

Secret War: The Untold Story of His Fight to Save the World from Nuclear Disaster, New York: Three Rivers Press, 2009.

148. See, e.g., Kipp, endnote 94; and “US Concerned by China’s New Hypersonic Missile,” Sputnik News, January 29, 2014, 

available from sputniknews.com/voiceofrussia/news/2014_01_29/USconcerned-by-Chinas-new-hypersonic-missile-1459/.

149. See, e.g., R. N. Ganesh, “Nuclear Missile-Related Risks in 

South Asia,” The Next Arms Race, pp. 305-356, available from npolicy.org/books/Next_Arms_Race/Ch10_Ganesh.pdf; and Feroz Hassan 

Khan, “Prospects for Indian and Pakistani Arms Control,” The 

Next Arms Race, pp. 357-386, available from npolicy.org/books/Next_

Arms_Race/Ch11_Khan.pdf; David Sanger, “U.S. Exploring Deal to 

Limit Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal,” The New York Times, October 

15, 2015, available from www.nytimes.com/2015/10/16/world/asia/

us-exploring-deal-to-limit-pakistans-nuclear-arsenal.html?_r=0.
123

150. See Tim Walton, “Why We Need the Advanced Hypersonic Boost Weapon,” War on the Rocks (blog), June 9, 2014, 

available from warontherocks.com/2014/06/why-we-need-advancedhypersonic-weapon/.

151. Neither of these options would violate the INF Treaty, 

which does not cover hypersonic boost glide systems. See Bill 

Gertz, “Inside the Ring: Pentagon goes hypersonic with longrange rapid attack weapon,” Washington Times, March 19, 2014, 

available from www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/mar/19/insidethe-ring-pentagon-goes-hypersonic-with-long/?page=al. Other options that have been discussed would cover these systems. See, 

e.g., Barry D. Watts, Long-Range Strike: Imperatives, Urgency and 

Options, Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, April 2005, pp. 62-68, available from www.bits.de/NRANEU/docs/R.20050406.LRPS.pdf.

152. For a fuller discussion, see Henry Sokolski, “Missiles 

for Peace,” Armed Forces Journal, July 2010, available from www.

npolicy.org/article_file/Missiles_for_peace-With_strong_convention

al_strike_options_the_US_can_lessen_nuclear_threats.pdf. Also listen 

to the audio of a panel discussion, “Missiles for Peace,” held at 

the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 

DC, September 13, 2010, available from d2tjk9wifu2pr3.cloudfront.

net/2010-09-13-Sokolski.mp3. Also see Rachel Oswald, “Russian Expert Urges Multilateral Ban on Ground-Based Strategic Missiles,” 

Global Security Newswire, February 13, 2014, available from 

www.nti.org/gsn/article/russian-expert-advises-getting-rid-icbmsencourage-multilateral-arms-control/.

153. On the hortatory (vice legally binding) character of the 

NPT Article VI call for disarmament, see Christopher A. Ford, 

“Debating Disarmament: Interpreting Article VI of the Treaty on 

the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 14, No. 3, November 2007, pp. 401-28, available from 

cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/143ford.pdf. Cf. Gilinsky and Sokolski, “Serious Rules for Nuclear Power without Nonproliferation,” in Henry 

Sokolski, ed., Moving Beyond Pretense: Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 

College, 2014, pp. 479-81, available from www.npolicy.org/books/

Moving_Beyond_Pretense/Ch16_SeriousRules.pdf.
124

154. For the latest discussion of need to reduce states’ production and stockpiles of civilian and military nuclear weaponsusable fuels, see Harold A. Feiveson et al., Unmaking the Bomb,

pp. 172-183.

155. See Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, Report to the Secretary of Energy, Washington, DC: Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, January 2012, pp. 

xii, xiv, 30, 98, 112, and 118, available from energy.gov/sites/prod/

files/2013/04/f0/brc_finalreport_jan2012.pdf.

156. See Steven Mufson, “Energy Secretary is Urged to End 

U.S. Nuclear Fuel Program at Savannah River,” The Washington Post, September 9, 2015, available from www.washingtonpost.

com/business/economy/energy-secretary-is-urged-to-end-us-nuclearfuel-program-at-savannah-river/2015/09/09/bc6103b4-5705-11e5-

abe9-27d53f250b11_story.html; Mycle Schneider, “Savannah River 

MOX Plant secures 2015 funding but future of program remains 

in doubt,” International Panel on Fissile Materials Blog, December 25, 2014, available from fissilematerials.org/blog/2014/12/savannah_river_mox_plant_.html; and Steven Mufson, “Why Obama 

wants to freeze a program turning weapons-grade plutonium 

into fuel,” Washington Post Wonkblog, March 5, 2014, available 

from www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/03/05/whyobama-wants-to-freeze-a-program-turning-weapons-grade-plutoniuminto-fuel/.

157. See Ferenc Dalnoki-Veress, Miles Pomper, Stephanie 

Lieggi, Charles McCombie, and Neil Chapman, The Bigger Picture: Rethinking Spent Fuel Management in South Korea, Occasional Paper No. 16, Monterey, CA: Center for the Nonproliferation 

Studies, 2013, pp. 23-25, 37-50, available from cns.miis.edu/opapers/

pdfs/130301_korean_alternatives_report.pdf.

158. The 2025 date was recently confirmed by the World 

Nuclear Association. See World Nuclear Association, “China’s 

Nuclear Fuel Cycle.” Neither a large reprocessing or fast reactor plant, however, has yet been approved or featured in any of 

China’s 5-year plans.

159. See, e.g., Gu Zhongmao, “Envision of Nuclear Energy 

Development in China,” April 2014, presentation at the Nonpro-
125

liferation Policy Education Center Alternative East Asian Nuclear 

Futures conference held February 25-27, 2014 in Honolulu, HI, 

available from npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1257&rid=2.

160. On this last point, see Henry Sokolski, “A PlutoniumRich Asia,” National Review Online, September 24, 2014, available 

from www.nationalreview.com/energy-week/388718/plutonium-richasia-henry-sokolski.

161. See Christopher A. Ford, “Five Plus Three,” and Ford, 

“The United States and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.”

162. For the earliest presentation of this concept, see Brian G. 

Chow, Richard H. Speier, and Gregory S. Jones, A Concept for Strategic Material Accelerated Removal Talks (SMART), DRU-1338-DoE, 

Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, April 1996, available 

from www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/drafts/2008/DRU1338.

pdf. Also see Robert J. Einhorn, “Controlling Fissile Materials and 

Ending Nuclear Testing,” presentation at an international conference on nuclear disarmament, “Achieving the Vision of a World 

Free of Nuclear Weapons,” held in Oslo, Norway, February 26-

27, 2008, available from www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/

External_Reports/paper-einhorn.pdf.

163. It should also be noted that, although China’s and South 

Korea’s fast reactor and plutonium recycling plans are ambitious, 

they are not yet locked in. China’s fast reactor program is not fully 

funded. There is money to build pilot facilities, but not enough to 

operate them year-round. Nor has the Chinese government yet 

agreed to a specific schedule for this program’s execution. It is not 

yet part of China’s five-year plan. As for South Korea’s program, 

it is still a matter caught up in the implementation of the U.S.-

South Korean civilian nuclear cooperative agreement. See International Panel on Fissile Materials, Plutonium Separation in Nuclear 

Power Programs, pp. 19-29, 73-79; and endnote 123.

164. See Victor Gilinsky, “‘Flexible’ Nuclear Trade,” National 

Review Online, February 10, 2014, available from www.nationalreview.com/article/370671/flexible-nuclear-trade-victor-gilinsky; Henry 

Sokolski, “Putting Security First: The Case for Amending the Atomic Energy Act,” prepared testimony for the hearing “Section 123: 

Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreements,” Senate Foreign Rela-
126

tions Committee, U.S. Senate, 113th Cong., 2nd Sess., January 30, 

2014, available from www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1244&rtid=8; 

and “Obama’s Nuclear Mistake: The President Converts Bush’s 

Anti-Proliferation ‘Gold Standard’ into Lead,” National Review 

Online, February 7, 2012, available from www.nationalreview.com/

article/290330/obamas-nuclear-mistake-henry-sokolski.

165. See Elaine M. Grossman, “U.S. Senate Panel Backs Vietnam Nuclear Trade Pact, But Tightens Conditions,” Global Security Newswire, July 23, 2014, available from www.nti.org/gsn/

article/us-senate-panel-backs-vietnam-nuclear-trade-pact-tightensconditions/; and “Bipartisan Bill Filed to Heighten Oversight of 

U.S. Nuclear Trade,” Global Security Newswire, December 13, 

2013, available from www.nti.org/gsn/article/bipartisan-bill-filedheighten-oversight-us-nuclear-trade/. Also see H.R. 3766, “A BILL 

To amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to require congressional approval of agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation 

with foreign countries, and for other purposes,” 113th Cong., 1st 

Sess., December 12, 2013, available from www.govtrack.us/congress/

bills/113/hr3766/text; H.R. 1280, “A BILL To amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to require congressional approval of agreements 

for peaceful nuclear cooperation with foreign countries, and 

for other purposes,” reported out of the House Foreign Affairs 

Committee, House of Representatives, during the first session 

of the 112th Congress, available from www.govtrack.us/congress/

bills/112/hr1280; and “Chairman Ros-Lehtinen Opening Statement: HR1280, The Atomic Energy Act of 1954,” April 20, 2011, 

available from www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qrvz2_gzik8.

166. See Energy Collective, “AREVA Struggles to Dig Out of 

Debt,” March 25, 2015, available from www.theenergycollective.com/

dan-yurman/2208496/areva-struggles-dig-out-debt; John Lichfield, 

“UK Nuclear Strategy Faces Meltdown As Faults Are Found in 

Identical French Project,” The Independent, April 18, 2015, available from www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/uk-nuclear-strategy-faces-meltdown-as-faults-are-found-in-identical-frenchproject-10186163.html; and Stephen Chen, “French Warnings on 

Nuclear Reactors Being Built in China’s Guangdong,” South China 

Morning Post, April 15, 2015, available from www.scmp.com/news/

china/article/1762861/french-warning-nuclear-reactors-being-builtguangdong.
127

167. The United States suspended all civilian nuclear cooperation with Russia shortly after it invaded the Crimea. China’s 

civilian nuclear cooperative agreement with the United States is 

due to expire by December 2015. On the questionable safety of 

Russian and Chinese reactor construction, see Tara Patel and Benjamin Hass, “China Regulators ‘Overwhelmed’ As Reactor Building Steams Ahead,” Bloomberg News, June 20, 2014, available from 

westhawaiitoday.com/news/nation-world-news/china-regulators-overwhelmed-reactor-building-steams-ahead; Luna Lin, “Concerns over 

China’s Nuclear Power Expansion,” Chinadialogue (blog), April 

24, 2014, available from www.chinadialogue.net/blog/6932-Concernsover-China-s-nuclear-power-expansion/en; Christina MacPherson,

“China’s Nuclear Safety Prospects Are Not Good,” nuclear-news, 

October 29, 2013, available from nuclear-news.net/2013/10/29/

chinas-nuclear-safety-prospects-are-not-good/; Eve Conant, “Russia’s Nuclear Reactors Could Take Over the World, Safe or Not,” 

Scientific American, October 2013, available from www.scientifi

camerican.com/article/russias-nuclear-reactors-could-take-over-theworld-safe-or-not/; and Quamrul Haider, “How Safe Are the Russian Civilian Nuclear Reactors?” Daily Star (Lebanon), June 12, 

2013, available from archive.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/how-safeare-the-russian-civilian-nuclear-reactors/.

168. See Bob Graham et al., World At Risk: The Report of the 

Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, 

New York: Vintage Books, pp. 49-50, available from www.cfr.org/

terrorism/world-risk-report-commission-prevention-wmd-proliferationterrorism/p17910.

169. See endnote 143, and Victor Gilinsky and Henry Sokolski, 

“Is the IAEA’s Safeguards Strategic Plan Sufficient?” a paper presented at the International Atomic Energy Agency Symposium on 

International Safeguards: Linking Strategy, Implementation and 

People, Vienna, Austria, October 22, 2014, available from npolicy.

org/article_file/IAEA_Safeguard_Strategic_Plan.pdf; Trevor Finlay, 

The IAEA and Noncompliance Reporting, Cambridge, MA: Project 

on Managing the Atom, Report No. 2015-04, October 2015, available from belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/proliferationalert-web.pdf.

170. On these points, see Octavian Manea, “Lessons from Previous Competitive Strategies,” Small Wars Journal, July 6, 2014, 

available from smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/lessons-from-previouscompetitive-strategies; and Octavian Manea, “The Art of Tailoring 
128

Competitive Strategies,” Small Wars Journal, March 24, 2014, available from smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-art-of-tailoring-competitive-strategies.

171. See Victor Gilinsky, “Sometimes Major Violations of Nuclear Security Get Ignored,” in Henry Sokolski, ed., Nuclear Materials Gone Missing: What Does History Teach? Carlisle, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2014, available from 

www.npolicy.org/books/Materials_Unaccounted_For/Ch4_Gilinsky.

pdf; and Robert Zarate, “The Nonuse and Abuse of Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence in the Cases of North Korea and Iran,” and 

Leonard Weiss, “The 1979 South Atlantic Flash: The Case for an 

Israeli Nuclear Test,” in Henry Sokolski, ed., Moving Beyond Pretense: Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation, Carlisle, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2014, pp. 345-371, 373-

409, available from www.npolicy.org/books/Moving_Beyond_Pretense/Ch14_Zarate.pdf and www.npolicy.org/books/Moving_Beyond_

Pretense/Ch13_Weiss.pdf.

172. Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain 

Their Nuclear Capabilities, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson 

Press, 1995, pp. 90-129; and Eugene Kogan, “Coercing Allies: 

Why Friends Abandon Nuclear Plans,” paper presented at the 

American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, 

IL, August 2013, available from live.belfercenter.org/files/kogan-apsaaug-2013.pdf.

173. See David J. Andre, “Competitive Strategies: An Approach against Proliferation” and Henry D. Sokolski, “Nonproliferation: Strategies for Winning, Losing, and Coping,” in Henry D. 

Sokolski, ed., Prevailing in a Well-Armed World: Devising Competitive Strategies against Weapons Proliferation, Carlisle, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2000, pp. 3-25, 51-64, 

available from www.npolicy.org/thebook.php?bid=16. Also see Henry D. Sokolski, “Fighting Proliferation with Intelligence,” ORBIS, 

Vol. 38, No. 2, Spring 1994, pp. 245-260, available from fas.org/irp/

threat/fp/b19ch16.htm.

174. For specific examples, see endnote 172 and Henry Sokolski, “Ending South Africa’s Rocket Program: A Nonproliferation 

Success,” Washington, DC: Nonproliferation Policy Education 

Center, August 31, 1993, available from www.npolicy.org/article.

php?aid=458&tid=2.
129

175. Although today there are virtually no respectable, hawkish or hard-headed works on what sorts of nuclear arms control 

might be useful; this was not always the case. Thirty or more years 

ago, before arms control practice became dominated by mutual 

assured destruction theorizing, several distinguished military scientists, including Fred Iklé, Albert Wohlstetter, Leon Sloss, Donald Brennan and Alain C. Enthoven, all believed unconstrained 

nuclear competitions and strategic weapons proliferation was less 

than optimal and seriously considered what sort of arms control 

might be practical. See, e.g., See Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, “On Arms Control: What We Should Look for in an Arms 

Agreement,” unpublished draft essay, May 20, 1985, available at 

the Hoover Institution Archive, Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter 

Papers, Notes, Box 118, Folder 16, available in Robert Zarate and 

Henry Sokolski, eds., Nuclear Heuristics: Selected Writings of Albert 

and Roberta Wohlstetter, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 

U.S. Army War College, 2009, pp. 472-500, available from www.

npolicy.org/userfiles/file/Nuclear%20Heuristics-On%20Arms%20

Control.pdf; Albert Wohlstetter and Brian C. Chow, “Arms Control that Could Work,” The Wall Street Journal, July 17, 1985, available from www.npolicy.org/article_file/Arms_Control_That_Could_

Work.pdf; Fred Charles Iklé, “Nth Countries and Disarmament, 

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 16, No. 10, December 1960, 

pp. 391-394, available from csis.org/images/stories/ikle/038.BulletinAtomicSc1960.pdf; Leon Sloss and M. Scott Davis, eds., Game for 

High Stakes: Lessons Learned in Negotiating with the Soviets, New 

York: Harper Business, 1986; Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne 

Smith, How Much Is Enough: Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-

1969, New York: Harper and Rowe, 1971; and Donald G. Brennan, 

ed., Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security, New York: 

George Braziller, 1969.

176. Cf., J. Peter Scoblic, US vs. Them: Conservatism in the 

Age of Nuclear Terror, New York: Penguin Books, 2009; and John 

Wohlstetter, “Nuclear Zero 2012: We Disarm While Others Arm,” 

Human Events, September 12, 2012, available from humanevents.

com/2012/09/12/nuclear-zero-2012-we-disarm-while-others-arm/.

177. See Henry D. Sokolski, “Preface,” in Henry D. Sokolski, ed., Getting MAD, pp. v-vi, available from npolicy.org/

books/Getting_MAD/Preface_Sokolski.pdf; and “Taking Proliferation 

Seriously.” 
178. See Henry R. Nau, “Conservative Internationalism: A 

Smarter Kind of Engagement in World Affairs,” September 30, 

2013, National Review Online, available from www.nationalreview.

com/nrd/articles/358318/conservative-internationalism; and Conservative Internationalism: Armed Diplomacy under Jefferson, Polk, Truman, and Reagan, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013.

179. Since George F. Kennan’s publication of American Diplomacy, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 1984, there has been a 

popular belief that international law that claims to promote international security is generally at odds with our national security. However, there are alternative views that could and have 

guided U.S. diplomacy and national security policies. Principal 

among these is the life work of Elihu Root, U.S. Secretary State 

under President Theodore Roosevelt, Secretary of War from 1899 

to 1904, Nobel Peace Prize winner, founding architect of the Permanent Court of International Justice, and founder of the American Society of International Law. On his career and advocacy of 

promoting international laws to promote and protect America’s 

national interests, see Erik A. Moore, “Imperial International 

Law: Elihu Root and the Legalist Approach to American Empire,” 

Essays in History, 2013, available from www.essaysinhistory.com/

articles/2013/172; and Robert E. Hannigan, The New World Power: 

American Foreign Policy, 1989-1917, Philadelphia, PA: University 

of Pennsylvania Press, 2002.

180. See Henry D. Sokolski, “Ten Regrets,” available from 

npolicy.org/article_file/Ten_Regrets-Americas_Nonproliferation_

Efforts_against_Iran.pdf.

130
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Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future

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