COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Humphreys and Clements 

Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia 

JOSEPH GOODWIN, III 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 BY 

v. Record No. 2006-04-1 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR. 

 JULY 12, 2005 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 

Charles D. Griffith, Jr., Judge 

 Fay F. Spence, Public Defender for the City of Newport News 

(Office of the Public Defender, on brief), for appellant. 

 Deana A. Malek, Assistant Attorney General (Judith Williams 

Jagdmann, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

 The trial judge convicted Joseph Goodwin, III, for carrying a concealed knife in violation of 

Code § 18.2-308.2. Goodwin contends the trial judge erred because the knife was not prohibited by 

the statute. We agree and reverse the conviction. 

I. 

 The basic facts are undisputed. A police officer went to a restaurant’s parking lot to assist 

paramedics who were treating a man bleeding from a head wound. The injured man told the officer 

he had been hit with a 2-by-4 board. A person who apparently witnessed the attack upon the injured 

man pointed to Joseph Goodwin, III, standing across the street. When the police officer approached 

Goodwin, he noticed bloodstains on Goodwin’s pants. As the officer talked to Goodwin and 

prepared to frisk him for weapons, he asked Goodwin if he had any sharp objects on his person. 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 
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Goodwin said he had a knife in his pocket, which the officer retrieved. The officer learned that 

Goodwin was a convicted felon and arrested him for carrying a concealed weapon in violation of 

Code § 18.2-308.2. 

 The officer described the knife as follows: 

 It’s approximately a steak knife, approximately eight to ten 

inches long in length, approximately six-inch blade, wooden 

handle, non-serrated. 

* * * * * * * 

 The dull side is straight all the way to the point it’s rounded, 

kind of convex direction. It’s sharp all the way to the point. The 

tip appears to be a little bit broken off. 

He further described the blade as having “a pretty sharp point” and identified it when the 

prosecutor offered it as an exhibit. 

 At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial judge examined the knife and convicted 

Goodwin of possessing a concealed weapon in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2. 

II. 

 Code § 18.2-308.2 provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for [a convicted felon] . . . to 

knowingly and intentionally carry about his person, hidden from common observation, any 

weapon described in subsection A of [Code] § 18.2-308.” Pertinent to this case, Code 

§ 18.2-308 describes “any dirk, bowie knife, switchblade knife, ballistic knife, machete, razor, . . 

. or . . . any weapon of like kind of those enumerated in this subsection.” Thus, although the 

statute designates specific types of knives and knives “of like kind,” it “does not prohibit 

generally the carrying of knives hidden from common observation.” Ricks v. Commonwealth, 

27 Va. App. 442, 444, 499 S.E.2d 575, 576 (1998). 

Interpreting Code § 18.2-308(A), the Supreme Court held that “a pocketknife is neither a 

dirk, bowie knife, switchblade knife, ballistic knife, nor a weapon of like kind.” Wood v. Henry 
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County Public Schools, 255 Va. 85, 94-95, 495 S.E.2d 255, 261 (1998). The Court reached this 

conclusion by applying the following principles of statutory interpretation: 

“Under the rule of ejusdem generis, when a particular class of 

persons or things is enumerated in a statute and general words 

follow, the general words are to be restricted in their meaning to a 

sense analogous to the less general, particular words. Likewise, 

according to the maxim noscitur a sociis (associated words) when 

general and specific words are grouped, the general words are 

limited by the specific and will be construed to embrace only 

objects similar in nature to those things identified by the specific 

words.” 

Id. (citations omitted). Interpreting the same statute, we have also held that “the physical 

characteristics of the knife determine whether the knife is a weapon contemplated by the statute.” 

Ricks, 27 Va. App. at 445, 499 S.E.2d at 576. 

 The knife entered into the record was measured against a ruler; it is ten inches long, and 

has a blade length of five and a half inches. The officer described the knife to be a steak knife. 

The prosecutor argued the knife “is of a like kind weapon to a dirk.” The trial judge agreed with 

the Commonwealth and found that the knife has a “sharp end on the bottom edge, extremely 

sharp on the bottom end and extreme point that would certainly cut straight through flesh if 

propelled with any type of force.” This is not a description of physical characteristics that is 

sufficient to bring the knife within the statutory definition of prohibited knives or of a “weapon 

of like kind of those enumerated” in Code § 18.2-308(A). 

A “dirk” is defined as “a long straight-bladed dagger formerly 

carried [especially] by the Scottish Highlanders[,] 2. a short sword 

formerly worn by British junior naval officers.” Webster’s Third

New International Dictionary, 642 (1981). A “bowie knife” is 

defined as “a large hunting knife adapted [especially] for 

knife-fighting and common in western frontier regions and having 

a guarded handle and a strong single-edge blade typically 10 to 15 

inches long with its back straight for most of its length and then 

curving concavely and sometimes in a sharpened edge to the 

point.” Id. at 262. A “switchblade knife” is defined as “a 

pocketknife having the blade spring-operated so that pressure on a 

release catch causes it to fly open.” Id. at 2314. A “ballistic knife” 
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is defined as “any knife with a detachable blade that is propelled 

by a spring-operated mechanism.” Code § 18.2-308(N). 

Wood, 255 Va. at 95 n.6, 495 S.E.2d at 261 n.6.1 

 In Ricks, we held that a knife that “has the appearance and characteristics of an ordinary 

household steak knife” does not satisfy the definition of the knives prohibited by Code 

§ 18.2-308.2. Ricks, 27 Va. App. at 445, 499 S.E.2d at 576. Indeed, in view of the statutory 

description of the knives, we noted in Richards v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 242, 246 n.2, 

443 S.E.2d 177, 179 n.2 (1994), that the legislature “intend[ed] to exclude . . . innocuous 

household . . . knives.” 

 Our decision in Delcid v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 14, 526 S.E.2d 273 (2000), does 

not require a different result. It did not involve a common kitchen steak knife, as did Ricks and 

this case. Instead, the Delcid decision concerned “a butterfly knife,” which has a blade 

concealed within “a two part hinged handle” that can be “flip[ped] . . . open, leaving the blade 

exposed and locked, thus creating a straight-bladed knife.” 32 Va. App. at 17, 526 S.E.2d at 274. 

 1

 Consistent with this definition, we earlier had defined the terms as follows: 

The terms “dirk” and “bowie knife” are not defined by the statute, 

nor has any appellate decision in this Commonwealth clarified the 

difference. We assume that the two terms have their usual 

meaning. A “dirk” or weapon of like kind is any stabbing weapon 

having two sharp edges and a point, including daggers, short 

swords and stilettos. A “bowie knife” or weapon of like kind is 

any stabbing weapon having a single sharp edge, a dull or serrated 

flat edge and a point, such as a hunting knife, a fishing knife or a 

survivalist’s knife. It is generally agreed that in using such terms, 

legislatures intend to exclude from concealed weapons statutes 

innocuous household and industrial knives which may be carried 

for legitimate purposes. 

Richards v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 242, 246 n.2, 443 S.E.2d 177, 179 n.2 (1994). Given 

its ordinary meaning, a dirk is a straight-bladed double-edged knife, historically designed as a 

military weapon. Goodwin carried a single-edged steak knife. It would strain the holdings of 

Wood and Ricks to define a steak knife as a dirk. 
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In addition, the circumstances surrounding Goodwin’s possession of the knife, a factor that 

Delcid mentions, id. at 18, 526 S.E.2d at 275, does not support the conclusion that it was in fact 

intended as a weapon. The evidence proved the injured man was hit with a 2-by-4 board, and it 

does not prove Goodwin used the knife in any manner. 

 The knife that Goodwin possessed does not fall within the prohibited class of knives. 

True, it has a sharp point, a sharp edge, and a sturdy blade. But so do many pocketknives, which 

Wood held to be excluded from the coverage of this statute. A properly maintained knife is 

sharp and intrinsically is capable of being used for either cutting or stabbing. However, as 

explained in Ricks and Wood, simply because a knife is sharp does not mean it is included 

within the statutory class prescribed by Code § 18.2-308.2. 

For these reasons, we reverse the conviction. 

 Reversed.