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v

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

LETHAL AND LEGAL?

THE ETHICS OF DRONE STRIKES

Dr. Shima D. Keene

December 2015

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and 

do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the 

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Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be 

copyrighted.
vi

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ISBN 1-58487-713-8
vii

FOREWORD

The use of drones, or unmanned aerial vehicles, 

has increased exponentially in the last 10 years, and 

this trend is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. But with this increased use has come increased 

controversy, in particular closer scrutiny of the legal 

and ethical dimensions of the use of armed drones.

In this monograph, British academic and practitioner Dr. Shima Keene provides a comprehensive 

assessment of the lethal use of drone technologies, 

measured in terms of their legality, morality, and 

overall effectiveness in the fight against terrorism and 

counterinsurgency operations. Dr. Keene is a subject 

matter expert in the field of asymmetric warfare and 

counterterrorism, and a former Director of the Security Technology Short Course at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, where she conducted 

research into both technical and ethical aspects of the 

deployment of UAV technologies. In her monograph, 

she explores the legal and ethical bases for lethal use 

of drones, both from a U.S. and an international perspective. Dr. Keene also highlights knowledge gaps 

that must be filled in order to be able to make an accurate assessment of the success or failure of operations 

where drones have been deployed, and argues that 

greater transparency is needed to obtain broad public 

support for their use.

The Strategic Studies Institute considers that this 

monograph provides a useful assessment of the key 

issues relating to the legality, morality, and effectiveness of drone use, and is a valuable addition to the 
debate on how to plan and shape future U.S. 

operations involving unmanned and autonomous 

technologies.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

viii
ix

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

SHIMA D. KEENE is a British academic and practitioner specializing in matters relating to national and 

international security. She is a Director of the Conflict 

Studies Research Centre, Oxford, as well as Director 

of the Security Economics Programme at the Institute 

for Statecraft, London, United Kingdom (UK). Dr. 

Shima is also a Deployable Civilian Expert (DCE)1 and 

a member of the UK Government’s Civilian Stabilisation Group (CSG)2

 specializing in Intelligence and Security Sector Reform which sits under the Security and 

Justice Function of the CSG. She is a former Senior Research Fellow and Advisor at the Advanced Research 

and Assessment Group, Defence Academy of the UK, 

and Special Advisor to the UK Ministry of Defence 

(MoD), where she had responsibility for assessment 

and recommendations for the development of financial counterinsurgency strategies in Afghanistan. Dr. 

Keene advises and works closely with several British 

and international organizations on a number of topics 

relating to national and international security including the MoD, various UK Government departments 

and law enforcement agencies, the Organization for 

Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Council of 

Europe, the Global Futures Forum, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), U.S. Government 

departments and law enforcement agencies, and various global private sector organizations. Dr. Shima has 

25 years of practitioner experience in a number of 

industries to include finance, defense, security, and 

telecommunications in both the public and private 

sectors, to include with government departments, law 

enforcement, telecommunications, and finance. She 

is also a former British Army reservist soldier with 7 
years military service, most of which was spent with 

4th Battalion, the Parachute Regiment. Dr. Keene has 

published numerous internal and external MoD and 

NATO reports as well as award winning academic 

journal articles. She is the author of “Threat Finance: 

Disconnecting the Lifeline of Organized Crime and 

Terrorism.” Dr. Shima graduated from the University 

of Buckingham with honors in business studies and 

holds an M.Phil. in defence and security studies from 

the Defence College of Management and Technology, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, and a 

Ph.D. in international criminal law from the Institute 

of Advanced Legal Studies, University of London. 

ENDNOTES - BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

1. In the UK system, DCEs are nongovernment civilians who 

are available for deployment, often at short notice, for assignments in countries affected by or at risk of violent conflict. They 

are part of the Civilian Stabilisation Group (CSG) which is a pool 

of skilled individuals who are deployed to fragile and conflictaffected countries to assist the UK Government in addressing 

instability.

2. The Stabilisation Unit (SU) is a civil-military operational 

unit based in Whitehall, London, which supports UK Government efforts to tackle instability overseas. It is an internationally 

recognized center of excellence on stabilization, conflict, and security and home of the UK Government’s lessons learned on stabilization work. Formed in 2007 as an interdepartmental agency, 

jointly owned by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), 

Ministry of Defence (MoD), and the Department for International 

Development, the SU became an independent unit in 2015, funded through the Conflict Stability and Security Fund and governed

through the National Security Council.

x
xi

SUMMARY

With greatly increased lethal use of unmanned 

aerial vehicles (UAVs) comes greater scrutiny and 

controversy. This monograph lays out the ethical and 

legal landscape in which drone killings take place and 

makes key recommendations not only for ensuring legality and a sound moral basis for operations, but also 

for ensuring those operations are effective. 

While supporters claim that drone warfare is not 

only legal but ethical and wise, others have suggested 

that drones are prohibited weapons under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) because they cause, 

or have the effect of causing indiscriminate killings 

of civilians, such as those in the vicinity of a targeted person. The main legal justification made by the 

Barack Obama administration for the use of armed 

drones is self-defense. However, there is ambiguity 

as to whether this argument can justify a number of 

recent attacks by the United States. In order to determine the legality of armed drone strikes, other factors 

such as sovereignty, proportionality, the legitimacy of 

individual targets, and the methods used for the selection of targets must also be considered.

The ethical landscape is also ambiguous. One justification is the reduced amount of collateral damage 

possible with drones relative to other forms of strike. 

Real-time eyes on target allow last-minute decisions 

and monitoring for unintended victims, and precise 

tracking of the target through multiple systems allows further refinements of proportionality. But this 

is of little benefit if the definition of “targets” is itself 

flawed and encompasses noncombatants and unconnected civilians.
This monograph also provides a number of specific recommendations intended to ensure that the benefits of drone warfare are weighed against mediumand long-term second order effects, so as to measure 

whether targeted killings are serving their intended 

purpose of countering terrorism rather than encouraging and fueling it.

xii
1

LETHAL AND LEGAL?

THE ETHICS OF DRONE STRIKES

Dr. Shima D. Keene

INTRODUCTION

No aspect of modern warfare is as controversial as the 

use of armed drones. Everything about drone technology is contested: its novelty, legality, morality, utility, 

and future development. Even the choice of what to 

call such systems is value-laden.1

 Professor Sir David Omand GCB

 Former United Kingdom Security 

 and Intelligence Coordinator

In the years since the attacks of September 11, 2001 

(9/11), the United States has developed the use of unmanned aircraft (UA)—drones—to locate, target, and 

eliminate individuals overseas considered to pose a 

threat to the United States. Although the program was 

initially kept secret, in recent years the U.S. Government has acknowledged that drones are used to target members of al-Qaeda and associated forces within 

theaters of conflict, as well as outside it. In the last 10 

years, this use of drones has increased exponentially.2

The overall use of armed drones by the United 

States is reported to have grown by 1,200 percent 

between 2005 and 2013.3 More drone strikes were authorized by the Barack Obama administration in 2009 

than by that of George W. Bush during his entire time 

in office,4 and by early-2012, the Pentagon was reported to have 7,500 drones under its control, representing 

approximately one-third of all U.S. military aircraft.5

Furthermore, this trend is expected to continue, with 
2

many viewing unmanned vehicles as the future of 

warfare.6

Key rationales for the use of armed drones are 

that they are legal, effective, and ethical. According 

to White House spokesman James Carney speaking in 

February 2013, the current U.S. administration views 

strikes by drones to be “legal, ethical, and wise.” However, the simple fact that examination of the ethics 

of drone strikes has been included in the 2014 Army 

Priorities for Strategic Analysis testifies to the moral 

ambiguity that persists surrounding their use as a tool 

of policy.

WHAT IS A DRONE?

The term “drone” refers to any UA controlled remotely by an operator on the ground. Historically, the 

term “unmanned aerial vehicles” (UAVs) was used, 

although this is now seen by many as misleading since 

there is a pilot, albeit on the ground as opposed to in 

the aircraft itself.7 Consequently, the term “remotely 

piloted aircraft” (RPA) has become the preferred term 

for some as it provides a more accurate description as 

to what a drone is. 

The term “drone” dates from the 1930s. It is believed to originate with the “Queen Bee” radio controlled aircraft,8

 the first returnable and reusable UAV 

developed in the United Kingdom (UK) and designed 

for use in air and naval gunnery practice.9 Today, the 

desire to avoid use of the term “drone” by some governments outside of the United States reflects that the 

word has come to imply morally dubious “killing machines” responsible for the murder of innocent civilians. This is a direct result of media reporting on the 

U.S. weaponized drones program. 
3

Media representation of armed drones generally 

has been negative, which is partly the reason why the 

British Ministry of Defence (MOD) has rejected the 

term in favor of RPAs. The search for an alternative 

term for “drone” is also representative of a desire to 

remind people of other uses for drones which are often forgotten. Even within a military context, drones 

are used in a nonkinetic as well as a kinetic capacity, 

including for surveillance and intelligence gathering. 

In addition, their use is not restricted to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, 

but extends to humanitarian peacekeeping and peace 

enforcement operations as well. 

Drone technologies offer many benefits, including 

significant economic value and social benefits, and are 

increasingly being exploited by civil authorities responsible for safety, security, and policing.10 Outside 

defense and security, the technology is also utilized 

by a number of industries for civilian applications including agriculture, media,11 catering, private security, law enforcement, conservation, and environmental 

monitoring. Several of these domains—most notably 

the media—are also subject to ongoing debates on ethics and legality, focusing on privacy and the need for 

regulation. Recent examples include use by the Police 

Service of Northern Ireland during the G8 summit in 

2013,12 by German national railway company Deutsche 

Bahn to track graffiti artists on its property,13 and by 

the Japanese restaurant chain Yo!Sushi, which recently introduced the “ITray,”14 a custom built flying platter, in its Soho branch in London, UK.15 Drones have 

also been used in South Africa for tracking poachers, 

resulting in a reduction in rhinoceros deaths.16 Further 

potential applications under consideration include 

the airborne distribution of pesticides, fire investiga-
4

tions in unsafe buildings, search and rescue missions 

in treacherous conditions, police searches for missing 

or wanted persons, traffic management, public order 

situations, and evidence gathering.17

The potential benefits of drone technologies for 

military and nonmilitary applications are considerable. The first benefit is cost. As the aircraft does not 

have to be built around a human, it can be of any size. 

The lack of a pilot and passengers also negates the need 

for support systems such as pressurized cabins, further reducing cost. The second benefit is the improved 

duration of flying times, which can be increased from 

hours to weeks. The third benefit is the ability to risk 

dangerous conditions such as extreme poor weather, 

which would be outside minima if there were a pilot 

on board. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the use of drone 

technology is expected to continue to increase across 

all applications.

For the advocates of drone warfare, the evolution 

of drones represents a natural advancement in technology which is regarded as both logical and welcome. 

Many also accept drones as an inevitability given that 

we live in an era of rapidly evolving technological advancement, coupled with a climate of economic austerity where there is a constant requirement to deliver 

more for less cost. This cost refers not only to financial 

cost, but also cost in lives. The latter criterion is also 

attractive in policy terms, because it reduces or eliminates the risk of friendly casualties. In casualty-averse 

Western societies, this can be a key determinant of the 

sustainability of military engagement. 

At the same time, for others, the use of drones 

signals a dangerous decline in morality and accountability. The use of drones for targeted killings has 

been described as a step change in warfare, not only 
5

in terms of technological capabilities, but in terms of 

the ethical and legal frameworks that have governed 

the use of force for decades. Critics argue that the normalization of the use of drones represents a slippery 

slope that intrudes upon human rights, and increases 

the temptation to use force while diminishing the accountability of those engaged in such actions. 

There are clearly a number of considerations regarding the armed use of drones. The purpose of this 

monograph is to explore the answers behind three key 

questions: First, is it legal? Second, is it ethical? Third, 

is it effective? Each will be examined in turn.

Is It Legal?

The main legal justification made by the Obama 

administration for the use of armed drones is selfdefense. It is argued that following the 9/11 attacks 

in 2001, the United States is defending itself against 

enemies who are constantly contemplating and planning deadly attacks against it. Furthermore, according to State Department legal advisor Harold Hongju 

Koh in a public statement made in March 2010, the 

U.S. practice of targeted killing complies fully with all 

applicable law.18 The U.S. position is that as part of 

the ongoing war on terror, the circumstances and the 

level of implied threat from terrorism is such that terrorists should be denied protection from International 

Humanitarian Law (IHL). 

However, there is ongoing debate as to whether 

these actions are, in fact, legal. Warnings from critics 

such as Christof Heyns, the United Nations (UN) special rapporteur on extrajudicial killings, that the use 

of armed drones could constitute war crimes,19 are 

clearly of concern, requiring further investigation.20
6

Determining the legality of the use of armed drones 

to international standards is far from straightforward. 

First and foremost, there is no central legislative body 

or controlling authority for international law.21 International treaties and state practices generally are 

considered to be the most authoritative sources of 

international law. But the breadth of factors that can 

be considered as sources of international law result 

in a profusion of authority, which can be problematic 

in establishing precedence. Furthermore, there is no 

obviously applicable international court to determine 

the legality or otherwise of drone strikes. 

A further challenge is the ambiguous treatment 

of irregular warfare in international law. Under 

IHL, wars are recognized as armed conflicts fought 

between two or more states or high contracting parties.22 Where this is not the case, existing international 

law only recognizes the existence of armed conflict in 

the context of civil or internal wars, and not between 

states and substate entities, namely irregular forces. In 

other words, international law is not fully equipped to 

tackle the 21st century security environment, characterized by asymmetric warfare, where nonstate actors 

typically take center stage. 

This in many ways is central to the debate on the 

war on terror, and the role of armed drones within it. 

This war is not conventional warfare in that the enemy 

is not a state, but also because combatting the threat 

has both military and law enforcement elements. This 

is particularly true with the use of armed drones, 

which are used extensively by the Central Intelligence 

Agency (CIA) for counterterrorism purposes. Regardless of the extent to which the CIA may be considered 

a law enforcement agency, the tactics adopted have a 

closer resemblance to those used by law enforcement 
7

to tackle criminal gangs than to those of the military in 

conventional warfare. 

However, even the distinction between law enforcement and military activities is often unclear as a 

result of the close cooperation between the CIA and 

the military. This is particularly true in counterterrorism operations, where a shift from “boots on the 

ground” to that of more discreet and deniable attacks 

has been observed.23 According to Admiral William 

McRaven, former commander of Joint Special Operations Command and head of U.S. Special Operations 

Command:

American military and intelligence operatives are virtually indistinguishable from each other as they carry 

out classified operations in the Middle East and Central Asia. 24

This results in an ambiguity between the applicability of the law of armed conflict (LoAC) and the 

criminal justice approach. While the legality of drone 

attacks conducted by the military can be assessed 

under LoAC, when the attacks are carried out by 

law enforcement the assessment of legality becomes 

more complex. As a result, a number of existing legal 

sources and guidance must be used in attempting to 

determine the legality of armed drone attacks. A good 

starting point is to make an assessment on the legality of the military use of armed drones, which is governed by the LoAC. As such, a brief discussion of the 

legal concepts of jus ad bellum and jus in bello, which 

underpin the law of armed conflict, is essential. 
8

Jus ad bellum versus jus in bello.

Under international law, two aspects of warfare are 

considered. The first relates to why you are fighting, 

referring to whether the reasons for fighting can be 

justified. The second consideration is how you fight, 

which examines whether warfighting is conducted in 

a legitimate manner. In terms of the first, the reasons 

as to “why” you are fighting falls under the doctrine 

of “just war” theory, governed by jus (or ius) ad bellum, which is the title given to the branch of law that 

defines the legitimate reasons a state may engage in 

war. This is also referred to as the law of international 

armed conflict. It focuses on certain criteria, including; 

authority, just cause, right, and intention, which must 

be considered prior to engaging in war to determine 

whether it is a just war. 

Jus in bello, on the other hand, is the set of laws that 

govern the way in which warfare is conducted and 

come into effect once a war has begun.25 Its purpose 

is to regulate how wars are fought, without prejudice 

to the reasons as to how or why they had begun, and 

whether or not the cause upheld by either party is just. 

Jus in bello is also referred to as international humanitarian law, and the two terms are used interchangeably by the International Committee of the Red Cross 

(ICRC) as well as scholars who wish to emphasize 

their goal of mitigating the excesses of war and protecting civilians and other noncombatants. As its purpose is to limit the suffering in war by protecting and 

assisting victims as much as possible, IHL regulates 

only those aspects of conflict which are of humanitarian concern. 

The theoretical separation between jus ad bellum

and jus in bello is also important, and should be noted. 
9

In theory, it is possible to be engaged in an “unjust” 

war while adhering to the laws of armed conflict, or 

to be breaking the laws of armed conflict while fighting a just war. In addition, it is also often difficult to 

determine which state is guilty of violating the UN 

Charter that underpins jus ad bellum.

26 The application 

of humanitarian law does not involve the denunciation of guilty parties as that would be bound to arouse 

controversy and paralyze implementation of the law, 

since each adversary would claim to be a victim of 

aggression. This is why the two branches of law are, 

and should remain, completely independent of one 

another with the purpose of guaranteeing the application of jus in bello, irrespective of whether the war 

meets the jus ad bellum criteria.27 At the same time, this 

necessity for separation also results in the inevitable 

tension between the two bodies of law. Each has its 

own historical origins and has developed in response 

to different values and objectives. Also, the fact that 

most of the principles of jus in bello predate the prohibition of the indiscriminate use of force28 has led some 

to conclude that “modern” jus ad bellum has rendered 

IHL superfluous. 

The distinction and the need to satisfy criteria set 

out by jus in bello and jus ad bellum has also been challenged by the view that, in some cases, a situation of 

self-defense may be so extreme and the threat to the 

survival of the state so great, that violations of jus in 

bello may be justified.29 However, the humanitarian argument is that victims on both sides of a conflict are 

equally worthy of protection. As such, the need for 

separation of the two bodies of law based on humanitarian grounds is equally convincing.30 While there is 

no clear consensus as to which should take priority, 

there are additional considerations that should be examined in determining the legality of armed drones. 
10

The first factor to consider is the legitimacy of targets and targeting methods, referring to the process 

used to identify, prioritize and select or eliminate targets which are considered to be of operational and strategic value. Targets can be mobile targets such as individuals or groups of individuals, or stationary targets 

such as lines of communications or hardened facilities. 

Although damage to stationary targets can also have 

considerable negative impact on local populations, 

which must be taken into consideration when assessing proportionality, this monograph will focus on the 

more emotive question of directly targeting humans.

Determining the Legitimacy of a Target.

For an armed attack to be deemed legitimate, the 

individual targeted must also be a legitimate target in 

the eyes of the law. Legal guidance is available through 

UN and other rulings as to what constitutes a valid 

target. However, the reality is not always clear cut. 

The media reported that the Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List produced by the U.S. Department of 

Defense (DoD) in 200931 contained just over 400 names 

of individuals described as “known terrorists,” who 

are deemed to be legitimate targets.32 However, many 

argue that the definition of “terrorist” used is far too 

broad to be legally defensible for targeting decisions.33

The inclusion of Taliban financiers on the so-called 

“kill list” is a case in point. Although terrorist financiers may be classified as terrorists, there is debate as 

to whether they can be deemed a legitimate target for 

a kill list under IHL. According to ICRC guidance, IHL 

stipulates that the decisive criterion as to whether an 

individual is a member of an organized armed group, 

terrorist or otherwise, is to prove a continuous combat 
11

function. Furthermore, any individual falling outside 

this category would be classified as a civilian. In other 

words, unless a Taliban financier can be proved to be a 

combatant on a continual basis, it would be unlawful 

to target him under IHL.

The next factor that must be taken into consideration is distinction, referring to the ability to differentiate between an individual who is a terrorist and 

who is not. This can be particularly challenging when 

attempting to isolate the target from his or her family. Under IHL, if family members fall victim, it is not 

considered to be a legal kill, unless it can be proved 

that the family members were also part of a targeted 

organization and causing real harm. Unfortunately, 

reporting on U.S. drone strikes to date gives the impression that this criterion has been ignored. If this is 

true, greater attention to legality is necessary. If it is 

false, greater attention to media and perception management is needed. 

A further point of legal debate relates to the circumstances in which a terrorist is killed, in particular with reference to “rescuer attacks” or “follow-up 

strikes.” One example is the killing of senior al-Qaeda 

leader Abu Yahya Al-Libi on June 4, 2012. Following 

an initial drone strike which killed five people and 

injured four others, a group of 12 people, including 

local residents, came to the assistance of the victims. 

Al-Libi was reported to have been overseeing the rescue efforts and was killed in the second strike, along 

with between 9 and 15 other people, including six 

local tribesmen. In other words, six civilians were 

killed working in a humanitarian capacity alongside a 

group of al-Qaeda operatives under a senior al-Qaeda 

official. 
12

The follow-up strike has been described as a potential war crime both because it constituted an attack 

on civilian rescuers, and also because al-Libi may not 

have been directly participating in hostilities at the 

time of the strike. However, the question as to whether al-Libi was directly participating in hostilities and 

therefore deemed as a legitimate target does not depend on what he was doing at the time he was killed.34

What really matters in terms of determining the legality of the attack is whether the attack was carried out 

as part of an actual armed conflict (such as the noninternational armed conflict [NIAC]35 in Afghanistan) 

and his role in that conflict.36 There is an additional 

argument that even suspected terrorists should have 

the right to surrender and defend themselves in court. 

The right to surrender and defense in court is equally 

applicable in relation to selecting targeted killing by 

drones over the option of capture. This argument put 

aside, to qualify as a target of a kill list, the individual must be considered to pose a direct threat to the 

United States for the act to be deemed legitimate. 

Furthermore, a kill list is not the only way the 

United States targets individuals using drones. A significant proportion of the individuals killed in drone 

strikes are not, even by the U.S. Government’s account, 

militant leaders and thus are unlikely to be on a kill 

list. As such, the method by which a target is selected 

becomes highly relevant. In other words, how someone is killed is considered to be as important as who 

is killed, as this will determine whether a killing can 

be deemed a targeted killing or an assassination.37 The 

significance of the differentiation from a legal standpoint is that targeted killings are legitimate whereas 

assassinations are not viewed as legitimate under 

either domestic or international law.38 Furthermore, 
13

targeted killings must be executed using conventional 

military means only.39 When treachery is deemed to 

exist, where targets have been misled, and deception 

is used, a targeted killing cannot be justified40 and may 

be considered to be an assassination. 

Sovereignty.

The geographical location where the drone attacks 

are taking place, and consideration of sovereignty, 

together with possible violation of the territorial integrity of the countries where targeted killing takes 

place, are also key factors in determining the legality 

of a drone strike. As a threshold matter, the jus ad bellum inquiry depends on whether the “host state” has 

consented to the drone strike. If there is consent, there 

is no infringement on sovereignty. Publicly available 

literature suggest that many of the states where the 

drone attacks are taking place, such as Iraq, have provided consent to the United States, thus making the 

attacks legal from the perspective of sovereignty. 

However, the situation in jurisdictions such as 

Pakistan is less clear. On the one hand, the United 

States has claimed that it is acting with the consent 

of Pakistan.41 At the same time, Pakistan has publicly 

denied this.42 According to the United States, this is 

because the Pakistani government believes that the 

decision to give consent would be unpopular with the 

Pakistani people.43 In other words, they are covertly 

supportive of U.S. action, but for political reasons feel 

that they must be seen to be opposing it. As such, a 

definitive answer to this factual question is impossible 

without access to confidential material. As a result of 

the lack of explicit consent, alternative justifications 

to provide a legal basis for the continued U.S. drone 
14

strikes in Pakistan become necessary. Here, the United States has turned to Article 51 of the UN Charter, 

which preserves each state’s “inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack 

occurs.”

The Law of Self-Defense.

In June 2014, the New York City Bar Committee 

on International Law published a report entitled “The 

Legality under International Law of Targeted Killings 

by Drones launched by the United States.”44 In determining the applicability of the law of self-defense, the 

Committee concluded that the right to self-defense 

was available against nonstate actors provided there 

is an actual or threatened “armed attack” by the nonstate actor, and that acts of violence by nonstate actors can rise to the level of an “armed attack” within 

the meaning of Article 51, if they are of sufficient scale 

and effect. Although not all acts of terrorism justify the 

use of armed force, as opposed to a law enforcement 

response, a single act of terrorism may constitute an 

“armed attack” if it is of sufficient intensity. 

The committee found that the 9/11 attacks in 2001 

constituted an “armed attack” by al-Qaeda on the U.S., 

giving rise to a right of armed self-defense against alQaeda pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Charter. Consequently, the invasion of Afghanistan was deemed 

to be a legitimate exercise of force in self-defense. 

However, the committee concluded that the 9/11 attacks alone no longer supply a self-defense legal basis 

for additional measures taken against al-Qaeda. For 

the continued use of force to be justified on the basis 

of self-defense, it must be defensible through current 

“armed attacks,” and therefore the use of force world-
15

wide against organizations that are not al-Qaeda core, 

including any alleged “affiliates” of al-Qaeda, cannot 

be justified as a jus ad bellum matter by the attacks of 

9/11 alone. However, under some circumstances, the 

accumulation of smaller acts of violence committed 

by a nonstate actor may constitute an “armed attack,” 

provided that the use of force in self-defense is constrained by the principles of necessity and proportionality. As such, another factor in determining the 

legality of a targeted killing is that the action must be 

deemed to be proportionate. 

Proportionality.

Proportionality is a fundamental principle of jus in 

bello,

45 which is codified in the First Additional Protocol to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The principle 

prohibits: 

an attack which may be expected to cause incidental 

loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 

excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 

advantage anticipated.46

The killing of civilians in itself does not make an 

attack unlawful. However, in determining proportionality, anticipated collateral damage must be taken into 

consideration. This is conducted as an ex ante analysis, 

as opposed to an ex post measure of the actual outcome. 

In addition, an assessment of the expected military 

advantage that the attack will confer on the attacker 

is needed. However, attempting to determine the direct military advantage needed to justify the attack is 

not straightforward as there is debate with respect to 

whether the specific benefit of the attack should be 

viewed in isolation47 or in light of the attack’s role in 
16

the overarching military objective.48 Finally, the anticipated collateral damage must be weighed against the 

military benefit to ensure that the former is not excessive compared to the latter.49 The key challenge here is 

the lack of facts, either on the projected collateral damage or on the expected military benefit, let alone how 

to balance the two, making the analysis of the proportionality of individual drones strikes impossible.50

Also, for a targeted killing to be legitimate, the target must represent a direct and imminent threat to the 

United States. However, some analysts believe that, 

today, al-Qaeda constitutes more of an ideological 

influence than a genuine direct threat.51 According to 

Brian Jenkins of the Rand Corporation:

The architects of 9/11 have been captured or killed. 

Al Qaeda’s founder and titular leader is dead. Its remaining leadership has been decimated. The group’s 

wanton slaughter of Muslims has alienated much of 

its potential constituency. Cooperation among security services and law enforcement organizations 

world-wide has made its operating environment more 

hostile. Al Qaeda has not been able to carry out a significant terrorist operation in the West since 2005, although, as demonstrated on the tenth anniversary of 

9/11, it is still capable of mounting plausible, worrisome threats.52

The general consensus is that in 2015, 9/11 can no 

longer be used as a justification for self-defense. However, as a threat from affiliate Islamic militant groups 

clearly persists, the legal position with respect to 

groups such as the Islamic State (IS) remains unclear. 

This is particularly true as regards the use of armed 

drones. As the International Review of the Red Cross

observed:
17

Armed drones pose a major threat to the general prohibition on the inter-state use of force and to respect 

for human rights. On the battlefield, in a situation of 

armed conflict, the use of armed drones may be able 

to satisfy the fundamental international humanitarian law rules of distinction and proportionality. Away 

from the battlefield, the use of drone strikes will often 

amount to a violation of fundamental human rights. 

Greater clarity on the applicable legal regime along 

with restraints to prevent the further proliferation of 

drone technology are urgently needed.53

What is also clearly much needed is greater transparency and accountability in order that an informed 

debate can take place in the public domain in relation 

to the legality of armed drone attacks. The subject of 

legality is related to ethics and morality which form 

the basis of legislation. The subject of ethics relating to 

drone attacks will be examined next.

Is it Ethical?

Advocates of drone warfare argue that the use of 

drones is ethical, especially when the alternative is the 

use of airstrikes—a blunt instrument which will result 

in greater collateral damage, as well as risking the lives 

of U.S. military personnel. Some go even further to argue that the United States is not only legally entitled 

to use drones, but is morally obliged to do so on the 

grounds of safety and accuracy. According to Bradley J. Strawser,54 an assistant professor in the defense 

analysis department at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate 

School and a research associate with Oxford’s Institute for Ethics, Law, and Armed Conflict:
18

. . . It’s all upside. There’s no downside. Both ethically 

and normatively, there’s a tremendous value. You’re 

not risking the pilot. The pilot is safe. And all the 

empirical evidence shows that drones tend to be more 

accurate. We need to shift the burden of the argument 

to the other side. Why not do this? The positive reasons are overwhelming at this point. This is the future 

of all air warfare. At least for the U.S. 55

Others do not share this view. For example, former 

President Jimmy Carter has expressed his unease with 

reference to the White House kill lists claiming that: 

“. . . the U.S. can no longer speak with moral authority 

on human rights.”56

Strawser’s viewpoint may be correct to the extent 

of the safety of the drone pilot, but the subject of accuracy is disputed,57 especially when dynamic targeting 

methods are adopted. However, as a starting point on 

the debate on ethics of drone strikes, the ethical argument can only be made if the correct targets have been 

identified and the killing has been carried out with 

minimal collateral damage. 

Are the drones targeting the right people?

The previous section on legality has already highlighted a number of targeting legitimacy challenges, 

including locating and isolating the target, as well as 

establishing legitimacy in principle. A further problem relates to the assumptions made about the identity of the target. U.S. estimates of extremely low or 

no civilian casualties appear to be based on a narrowed definition of “civilian,” and the presumption 

that, unless proven otherwise, individuals killed in 

strikes are militants. In May 2012, The New York Times

reported that according to unnamed Obama adminis-
19

tration officials, the United States “. . . in effect counts 

all military-age males in a strike zone as combatants 

. . . unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously 

proving them innocent.”58

As such, there is a strong likelihood that many 

casualties could be civilians incorrectly categorized 

as combatants, especially where information on the 

ground may be limited. Although collateral damage 

is often regarded as an unfortunate side effect of war, 

the ethical argument of the use of drones is that it minimizes the risk of civilian casualties. As such, the truth 

behind the level of collateral damage is of paramount 

importance when endorsing the use of drones from an 

ethical standpoint.

Collateral Damage.

Drone strikes are widely criticized for causing undue civilian casualties. A recent study estimates that 

of the overall number of those killed in drone strikes 

since 2004, 21 percent have been civilians, and only 

6 percent during 2010,59 although these numbers are 

highly disputed. One analysis based on open source 

data reported that attempts to kill 41 men resulted in 

the deaths of an estimated 1,147 people.60

Collateral damage occurs when high value individuals (HVIs) are wrongly identified or located among 

noncombatants. The question of how many civilians 

are killed in drone strikes remains highly polarized.61

Recent UN reporting suggests that drone strikes have 

resulted in considerably more civilian deaths than 

U.S. officials have publicly acknowledged. According to UN Special Rapporteur Ben Emmerson, at least 

400 civilians have been killed in Pakistan alone. In his 

interim report, Emmerson criticizes the United States 
20

for creating “an almost insurmountable obstacle to 

transparency,” stating that: 

The single greatest obstacle to an evaluation of the civilian impact of drone strikes is lack of transparency, 

which makes it extremely difficult to assess claims of 

precision targeting objectively.62

As collateral damage minimization is a key justification for the lethal use of drones, information as 

to who has been killed and how many of those were 

intended targets is essential. Furthermore, this information needs to be publicly available if political 

buy-in is to be ensured not only within the United 

States but more widely. In addition, it should also be 

remembered that even where local populations escape 

death or injury directly through drone attacks, there 

are other negative security effects which need to be 

addressed.63

Other Negative Effects on Local Populations.

One such example is retaliation from militant 

groups. In northern Pakistan, civilians have been 

caught in a dangerous position between local militant 

groups and U.S. drones. Militant groups, such as the 

Khorasan Mujahedin in Waziristan, pursue retaliatory 

attacks against local civilians they suspect of being 

U.S. informants.According to one report, tribal elders 

in North Waziristan say that most of the people killed 

by such militant attacks have never acted as informants, though they usually confess after beatings.64 A 

further negative effect on victims is the psychological 

toll caused by drone attacks. Civilian deaths, injuries, 

displacement, and property loss caused by conflict are 

always traumatic for the population. Covert drone 
21

strikes take a particular toll, striking unannounced 

and without any public understanding of who is, and 

importantly, who is not a target. For victims, there is 

no one to recognize, apologize for, or explain their sorrow; for communities living under the constant watch 

of surveillance drones, there is no one to hold accountable for their fear.65 While the United States had a 

practice of offering amends in the form of recognition, 

explanations, and monetary payments to civilians 

suffering losses as a result of U.S. combat operations 

in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, no such amends 

exist for civilians harmed by U.S. drones in Pakistan, 

Yemen, or Somalia.66 Furthermore, when the Center 

for Civilians in Conflict conducted interviews of Pakistani drone victims in 2010, all the victims believed the 

Pakistani or U.S. Government owed them compensation for harm resulting from drones, although not one 

had received any form of assistance.67 This has and 

will continue to foster anti-U.S. sentiment and other 

second-order effects, which will be discussed later.

Perception of “Push Button Warfare” and 

“PlayStation Mentality.” 

A further ethical consideration relates to the perception of the psyche of the drone operator, who is 

typically based thousands of miles from the battlefield 

and undertakes operations entirely through computer 

screens and remote audio feed.68 The operators/drone 

pilots face no risk of physical harm as a result of their 

geographical distance from the battlefield. Furthermore, media reporting has suggested that drone pilots 

are increasingly recruited by the military on the basis 

of their previous gaming skills,69 hence the reason they 

reportedly are referred to colloquially as “cubicle war-
22

riors.”70 One public concern is that such cubicle warriors are likely to develop a “PlayStation” mentality to 

killing.71 Such concerns are strongly denied by drone 

pilots. According to a former student at the U.S. Air 

Force 6th Reconnaissance Squadron, 2nd Lt. Zachary 

(last name withheld): 

Flying RPAs is nothing like playing a video game. 

Anyone who thinks that couldn’t be more incorrect. 

We fly real aircraft and employ real weapons. There’s 

nothing fake about that.72

Nevertheless, the terminology reportedly used 

deepens public concern. For example, the term “bugsplat” which is used to denote a successful attack,73 has 

become official terminology used by U.S. authorities 

to refer to the individuals killed by a drone,74 as the 

dead bodies resemble squashed bugs when rendered 

as pixels on a screen.75 Another term, “squirter,” refers 

to a person observed to run for cover in fear of a drone 

attack.76 Allegedly, in the words of one drone pilot: 

“It’s like a video game. It can get a little bloodthirsty. 

But it’s . . . cool.”77

Whether accurate or not, it is reporting of this 

kind which shapes public perception of drone strikes 

both within the United States and abroad. It has been 

argued that comments such as this emphasize the 

dehumanization of targets, enemy or otherwise, in 

drone attacks, as operators view the targets as mere 

objects which are expendable.78 Critics argue that the 

use of such terminology, coupled with the act of killing which is remote and technology based, result in 

further advancing moral disengagement of those with 

the power to make a life and death decision.79 However, some argue the reverse, claiming that drone operators are acutely aware of the impact of their actions 
23

as a result of technology which enables clear visual 

monitoring. In addition, it is argued that the high resolution images accentuate the realities on the ground, 

causing operators to suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress 

Disorder (PTSD).80

. . . the carnage close-up, in real time—the blood and 

severed body parts, the arrival of emergency responders, the anguish of friends and family. Often he’s been 

watching the people he kills for a long time before 

pulling the trigger. Drone pilots become familiar with 

their victims. They see them in the ordinary rhythm 

of their lives—with their wives and friends, with their 

children. War by remote control turns out to be intimate and disturbing.81

As of March 2015, there were approximately 1,000 

drone pilots against a demand of at least 1,700. Currently, drone pilots are required to attend a year-long 

training program at Holloman and Randolph Air 

Force bases in New Mexico and Texas, respectively, 

before they can fly operationally. Approximately 180 

pilots graduate to become drone pilots a year. However, 240 trained pilots are leaving during the same 

period, raising concern as to how supply can keep up 

with demand.82 Although the U.S. Air Force has provided overwork and the perception of drone pilots as 

second rate compared to pilots of manned aircraft as 

reasons, PTSD is also reported to be a factor in the accelerating dropout rate of drone pilots.

It is also likely that the inappropriate language allegedly used is a coping mechanism on the part of the 

drone operators. Although this in itself does not justify the act of trivializing the deaths of individuals targeted by armed drones, consideration should be given 

that individuals who are exposed to extreme circum-
24

stances often use inappropriate humor83 or language84

as a defense or coping mechanism.85 However, the 

U.S. military needs to raise awareness of the offense 

such language causes and counter the perception of 

trivialization, as well as provide adequate support to 

drone pilots who are traumatized by events on screen. 

Is it Effective?

One of the arguments in favor of the use of drones 

is that they are effective mainly in terms of technical 

ability to strike intended targets. However, it is essential that the longer term impact of second and third 

order effects is considered fully, to ensure that they do 

not undermine the wider counterterrorism and COIN 

missions conducted by the United States. Three further key desired effects of targeted drone attacks have 

therefore been identified for discussion: accuracy, 

winning the fight, and cost.

Accuracy.

For the purpose of this discussion, accuracy should 

be taken to mean the ability to strike the right target 

while minimizing collateral damage. Precision targeting requires technological ability supported by good 

intelligence. There are two ways in which an individual target may be identified, located, and eliminated. 

The first is via a method known as HVI targeting, also 

known as personality targeting, where an individual 

whose identity is known is specifically targeted. According to one study, the process involves the development of target packets based on human intelligence 

(HUMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) which 

are then submitted and reviewed by a joint military 
25

board. If approved, the HVI is placed on an approved 

targeting list called the Joint Priority Effects List, after 

which concepts of operations (CONOPs) involving 

the HVI are developed. Once a CONOP has been approved by senior military officials, steps can be taken 

to remove the HVI from the battlefield.86

The second method is signature strikes, where unknown individuals often in groups are targeted. As 

the precise identity of these individuals is unknown, 

the individuals targeted must match a pre-identified 

“signature” of behavior that the United States links to 

militant activity or association. In other words, signature strikes differ from personality strikes in that, with 

the former, the specific individual targeted is known; 

whereas with the latter, patterns of behavior are used 

to determine the target. For example, if an insurgent 

group is suspected or known to be operating in a certain area, criteria are determined to identify and detect suspicious activities. If the activities match those 

criteria, the target group is eliminated. 

Signature strikes are the more controversial of the 

two methods, but make up a significant proportion of 

the covert drone campaign, constituting the majority 

of strikes in Pakistan. Indeed, according to one unnamed U.S. official, the United States has killed twice 

as many “wanted terrorists” in signature strikes than 

in personality strikes. U.S. officials have also reported 

that most of the people on the CIA’s kill list have been 

killed in signature strikes.87 While signature strikes are 

clearly effective, the concern is that casting this wider 

net will result in other unwanted consequences, such 

as an increase in collateral damage.

Also, the criteria for determining suspicious 

behavioral patterns/signatures have come under 

criticism. For example, The New York Times quoted a 
26

senior State Department Official as saying that “three 

guys doing jumping jacks” would be interpreted as a 

possible terrorist camp.88 Where targeting is based on 

biological factors, such as males between the age of 

20 and 40,89 there will always be a concern as to how 

many of those individuals are, in fact, civilians and 

whether the lack of women in the group is sufficient 

to assume that they are a group of insurgents. Recent 

experience in Afghanistan and Iraq has highlighted 

that insurgents and terrorists often hide among civilian populations, with many disguising themselves as 

women.90 Even with on the ground in-country intelligence, identifying the right target is challenging. The 

challenge becomes even more so when human intelligence is lacking, and decisions need to be made based 

on aerial intelligence alone. 

In addition, a further differentiation should be 

made between pre-planned attacks and dynamic targeting. Pre-planned or “deliberate” drone operations 

are where attacks are conducted at a scheduled time 

and after elaborate processes of collateral damage estimation and other steps to reduce the risk of harming 

civilians have taken place. In contrast, “dynamic” targeting occurs when targeting decisions are made during a short window of time, on the basis of recently received or time-sensitive information. Due to the quick 

turnaround time from intelligence to strike, dynamic 

targeting may occur without the benefits of a full collateral damage estimation and mitigation process.91

It should also be noted that recent reporting has 

shown that unsurprisingly, one negative side effect of 

dynamic targeting is that the risk of collateral damage 

increases significantly. According to one study, most 

collateral damage in U.S. operations occurs when collateral damage mitigation is not observed—presum-
27

ably, primarily when operations are not pre-planned.92

Even when adopting the less controversial HVI targeting methods, there are assumptions about identity 

which may not be correct. 

The issue of target identity raises problems on 

several levels. Whether targeting is derived from HUMINT or SIGINT, reliability of intelligence is an issue. 

Faulty intelligence has sometimes led to the wrong 

target being struck altogether. For example, on February 21, 2010, 23 Afghan civilians were wrongly identified by a U.S. operated drone as enemy combatants 

and killed in airstrikes. U.S. commanders were criticized for being less than forthcoming about reporting 

the civilian casualties until an official investigation 

was launched.93 Such incidents, again unsurprisingly, 

create resentment within the indigenous populations 

toward the United States and local governments.94

Furthermore, strikes can be carried out with no 

objective demonstration of target validity, often as a 

result of the challenging nature of oversight.95 This 

and the adversary’s demonstrated ability to replace 

its commanders create powerful arguments against 

the use of drone strikes. In fact, these types of secondorder effects raise legitimate concerns about the contribution to the U.S. strategy of lethal targeting as an 

entire concept.

Winning the Fight.

Although there is evidence to suggest that lethal 

targeting may be effective in terms of disrupting the 

enemy in the short term, the medium- and longerterm impacts of the attacks are often not fully appreciated. Short-term successes such as the killing of an 

enemy commander can often be short-lived as these 
28

individuals can be replaced.96 Perhaps of more concern is that as the deaths of militants are glorified as 

they achieve martyr status; this, in turn, attracts new 

recruits to join the “cause,” further exacerbating the 

problem. According to Mohammed al-Ahmadi, a legal coordinator for a local human rights group: “The 

drones are killing al-Qaeda leaders, but they are also 

turning them into heroes.”97

This is particularly prevalent in the social media 

dominated 21st century where potential sympathizers can be mobilized from all over the globe. Targeted 

killings by U.S. drones play into the hands of enemy 

propagandists justifying their war against the United 

States by arguing that the use of drone strikes is an injustice from which they need to defend themselves. In 

2014, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Homeland Security distributed a bulletin to 

law enforcement officials warning that U.S. airstrikes 

(to include drone attacks) could provoke retaliatory 

attacks on U.S. soil by IS sympathizers. IS militants 

have already claimed that the execution of American 

journalist James Foley in August 2014 was in retaliation for U.S. airstrikes in Iraq.98

These medium- and long-term second order effects 

caused by lethal targeting have often been neglected, 

although this is partly due to the lack of publicly available data. Too often, second order effects are cast aside 

as being beyond the control of friendly forces or those 

who conducted the strike, who are not in the location 

where the attacks are occurring. One reason given is 

that as the strikes occur in hard-to-reach places, this 

results in the difficulty in managing perceptions, especially over a period of time.However, this challenge 

does not justify taking action based on a lack of understanding. 
29

When questioning the effectiveness of targeted 

killing, it is also necessary to make a distinction between counterterrorism and COIN, since they are 

two different policies and imply different strategies. 

This difference often means that what can be effective 

and useful as a counterterrorism tactic can be harmful from a counterinsurgency perspective. Although 

the two are blurred in reality, the latter traditionally 

involves an understanding of hearts and minds where 

Psychological Operations (PSYOPs) plays a key part. 

In other words, counterterrorism strategies, such as 

the elimination of a terrorist target, may prove to be 

counterproductive in a COIN scenario. Second order 

effects such as deep resentment caused among local 

populations for the killing of family members is a case 

in point.99 With reference to U.S. drone strikes in Yemen, a lawyer in Yemen tweeted: “Dear Obama, when 

a US drone missile kills a child in Yemen, the father 

will go to war with you, guaranteed. Nothing to do 

with al-Qaeda.”100

Other Yemeni observers have also argued that U.S. 

drone strikes create or contribute to anti-U.S. opinions 

and violence in general.101 “If young men lose hope 

in our cause they will be looking for an alternative. 

And our hopeless young men are joining al-Qaeda.”102

In May 2012, a study based on interviews with government officials, tribal elders, and others in Yemen 

carried out by the Center for Civilians in Conflict concluded that: “. . . an unintended consequence of the 

attacks has been a marked radicalization of the local 

population.”103

As David Kilcullen, former COIN adviser to General David Petraeus, and Andrew Exum a former U.S. 

Army officer in Iraq and Afghanistan then with the 

Center for a New American Security, noted:
30

Imagine, for example, that burglars move into a neighborhood. If the police were to start blowing up people’s 

houses from the air, would this convince homeowners 

to rise up against the burglars? Wouldn’t it be more 

likely to turn the whole population against the police? 

And if their neighbors wanted to turn the burglars in, 

how would they do that, exactly? Yet this is the same 

basic logic underlying the drone war.104

As such, potential second-order effects must be 

considered in a complex irregular warfare environment where the differentiation between counterterrorism and COIN is often unclear. Armed drone strikes 

cannot be conducted or evaluated in isolation, which 

adds to the challenge of determining their overall 

effectiveness. 

Cost.

Cost in the context of the use of armed drones 

can be measured in terms of both fiscal and political 

cost. In terms of the first, drones are an inexpensive 

option compared to other types of aircraft used in airstrikes which require a pilot to be on board. In terms 

of the aircraft itself, as configuration of the drone is 

not dictated by the human, it can be of any size. The 

lack of a pilot and passengers also negates the need for 

support systems such as pressurized cabins, further 

reducing cost. 

Drones also satisfy the political dimension by reducing or eliminating the need for U.S casualties. One 

desired result is to achieve the mission with minimal 

casualties, referring both to military personnel and to 

innocent civilians caught in the crossfire. Here, one advantage of “remote” warfare is that the lack of soldiers 
31

on the ground results in the prevention of military casualties, which will be politically popular within the 

United States in that it can be seen to be saving U.S. 

lives. This may be particularly relevant when engaged 

in irregular warfare, a concept that is complex and one 

which the general public does not always fully understand or support.

An added practical operational benefit, which has 

both financial and political implications, is access. 

Ground operations, even small tactical strikes using 

Special Forces, are not only costly in monetary terms 

but extremely dangerous to troops. As drones are 

able to penetrate the most remote locations through 

their ability to fly for long hours without the need to 

refuel, as well as to access air space and terrain that 

would not be considered safe for a piloted aircraft to 

approach, this can be attractive from both a financial 

and political viewpoint. At first glance, the benefits 

are self-evident. However, remote warfare incurs 

other costs which also need to be considered. For example, the “cowardly” nature of drone warfare resulting from the lack of risk of physical harm to the drone 

pilots works against U.S. efforts to maintain a positive 

image.105 Adversary groups such as ISIS have commented: “Don’t be cowards and attack us with drones. 

Instead, send your soldiers, the ones we humiliated in 

Iraq.”106

Importantly, this perception is not limited to adversary organizations. David Kilcullen has also expressed his concern that “. . . using robots from the 

air . . . looks both cowardly and weak.”107 Kilcullen’s 

comment is based purely on practical grounds, as he 

warned of the use of drone strikes backfiring with the 

potential to create more enemies than they eliminate. 

For example, in the tribal areas of Pakistan, where U.S. 
32

drone strikes have significantly weakened al-Qaeda’s 

capabilities, an unintended consequence of the attacks 

reported has been a marked radicalization of the local 

population.108 The evidence of radicalization emerged 

in more than 20 interviews with tribal leaders, victims’ 

relatives, human rights activists, and officials from 

four provinces in southern Yemen where U.S. strikes 

have targeted suspected militants. They described a 

strong shift in sentiment toward militants affiliated 

with the transnational network’s most active wing, alQaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).109

Other critics, notably remote from the battlefield, 

describe the use of technology driven warfare over 

conventional face-to-face methods as not only “cowardly” but also unfair and dishonorable.110 Peter Singer of the New America Foundation has questioned 

whether drone warfare can even be described as war 

and raises concerns regarding accountability. Singer 

argues that a president who sends someone’s son or 

daughter into battle has to justify it publicly, as does 

the congress responsible for appropriations and a declaration of war. But, if no one has children in danger, 

Singer questions whether drone warfare can be considered to be warfare at all.111

This perception of drone pilots as “cowards” and 

second rate compared to their manned pilot counterparts is reported to be another factor affecting their 

retention.112 Taking all these factors into account, the 

political benefits to the United States, namely that 

drone warfare negates the need to justify human losses to voters, are not straightforward, and require more 

careful consideration. 
33

FUTURE USE OF DRONES FOR 

TARGETED KILLINGS

Despite the controversies surrounding drone warfare, in particular targeted killings by armed drones, 

demand for drone operations continues to increase 

in the United States. According to Air Force statistics, 

Predators and Reapers flew 369,913 flight hours in 

2014, a figure six times higher than in 2006.113 Furthermore, the Pentagon is asking Congress for $904 million in 2016 to buy 29 Reapers, more than double the 

number it sought in 2015.114

Speaking at a defense conference in Washington 

in March 2015, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert 

O. Work confirmed that “Commanders’ appetite for 

drones remains very, very high and continues to outstrip our supply.”115 Furthermore, in a prepared statement in March 2015 to the House Armed Services Committee, General Lloyd Austin, the overall commander 

of U.S. forces in the Middle East and Afghanistan, also 

highlighted the reliance of the U.S. military on drones 

and the need to address shortages in supply, stating 

that drones, and in particular the video footage they 

provide “. . . had become fundamental to almost all 

battlefield maneuvers.”116 In addition to the continued 

demand for drones, technological advancements will 

inevitably lead to further development and increased 

proliferation of drone technology, in the absence of direct intervention to prevent such development. There 

is currently no indication that such intervention can 

be expected in the near future.

However, there are two areas of concerns in relation to future drones. The first relates to the development of Nano drones and the second, autonomous 

drones. Nano drones the size of insects could be used 
34

for targeted killings using poison or other methods 

which do not require a large payload.117 A prototype 

“hummingbird drone,” capable of flying at 11 miles 

per hour and perching on a windowsill, was unveiled 

in February 2011.118 In the same year, media reporting 

warned of fully autonomous drones, capable of identifying and eliminating a target without direct human 

intervention, which were being prepared for deployments by the United States.119 Some have expressed 

concern that such autonomous drones potentially represent “. . . the greatest challenge for jus in bello since 

the development of chemical warfare.”120

Proposals for autonomous UAVs in general are 

fraught with ethical dilemmas. At present, the technology is insufficiently developed to be operationalized. However, it is likely that sometime in the future 

autonomous UAVs will become a reality as advancements in facial recognition technologies reach the stage 

where target recognition without human intervention 

becomes possible. It is essential that the ethical implications of the use of such technologies are debated in 

full and resolved, including issues surrounding accountability. For example, if an autonomous drone 

were to target a school bus instead of a tank, systems 

must be in place to ensure that responsibility will not 

simply be devolved and blame placed exclusively on 

systems failures and technology.

CONCLUSION

Drones make warfare cheaper and easier, as well 

as more efficient, by transcending human limitations. 

Furthermore, a drone is dispensable and incurs much 

less political cost when shot down or “killed” than a 

conventional aircraft with pilot. But the use of drones 
35

for targeted killings has generated significant controversy. While supporters claim that drone warfare is 

not only legal but ethical and wise, others have suggested that drones are prohibited weapons under IHL 

because they cause, or have the effect of causing indiscriminate killings of civilians, such as those in the 

vicinity of a targeted person.121 Questions have also 

been raised over the methods used for locating and 

eliminating targets. The use of signature strikes in 

particular has been criticized for being unable to distinguish sufficiently between a legitimate target and 

an innocent civilian, as methods used only take into 

consideration basic biological factors such as age and 

gender in identifying a potential militant. 

Leaving aside technical aspects of accurate targeting, there is doubt as to the medium and longer term 

overall effectiveness of conducting drone missions, 

because they cause resentment among local populations and give fuel to the enemy cause. In particular, 

they provide the enemy with freshly-converted supporters who previously might have been undecided, 

neutral or even positively disposed toward the United 

States. 

This anti-American sentiment is not necessarily 

confined to the victims of drone attacks in countries 

affected by the strikes. Following the attacks of 9/11, 

cooperation between the United States and its allies 

on counterterrorism has increased substantially. This 

cooperation appeared based on shared objectives and 

values. For example, in 2004, the European Union 

(EU) and the United States adopted a Declaration on 

Combating Terrorism that spelled out the objectives 

of their counterterrorism cooperation. The declaration stated that U.S.-EU counterterrorism cooperation 

would be in keeping with human rights and the rule 
36

of law. Since then, however, the United States has 

expanded its counterterrorism tactics beyond what 

many in the EU would consider the limits of international law.122

The use of armed drones is now added to a list of 

controversial U.S. counterterrorism tactics such as the 

maintenance of the detention center in Guantanamo 

Bay, Cuba, where suspected terrorists have been held 

on an often dubious legal basis; the use of interrogation systems bordering torture, such as waterboarding; and extraordinary renditions, whereby terrorist 

suspects abducted in third countries were then transferred to states where a lax legal system and oversight 

providing no guarantee against torture or inhuman 

treatment could be exploited.123 The benefit of these 

tactics must be weighed against the reputation of the 

United States among its allies, as well as the key question of the extent to which they are having a positive 

impact in countering terrorism, or whether they are, 

in fact, doing more to fuel terrorism.

There are no easy answers. Given the enormously 

complex and multidimensional nature of terrorism, 

any action to counter it must be considered with extreme caution, since action taken to address one aspect of the problem in isolation may reveal or create 

additional problems. As for drones, while further 

advancement in relevant technologies is inevitable, it 

must also be recognized that technology in general is

advancing at a pace that outstrips the political, legal 

and ethical frameworks upon which coexistence and 

cooperation with global partners is built. 

In tackling the threat of global terrorism, it is often 

too easy for practitioners to become focused on their 

specific problem set to the point where the wider consequences of their action are forgotten or put aside. This 
37

is dangerous, as such second order effects may undo 

well-intentioned actions and exacerbate the original 

problem. Targeting methods such as signature strikes 

are a case in point, where casting a wider net to eliminate a terrorist or a group of terrorists may result in 

significant collateral damage and be detrimental to the 

wider mission. It must be remembered that methods 

used by terrorists include sacrificing “parts” for the 

benefit of the “whole.” The U.S. administration must 

be careful to ensure that it cannot be accused of doing 

the same. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations include the following:

1. Investigate. Conduct a review of civilian casualties both in and out of declared theaters of armed 

conflict. The review should contain information on 

the number of civilian deaths and injuries, specifying 

whether the victim was male or female, adult or child. 

In addition, the larger impact on civilian communities, 

including destruction of homes and displacement, and 

retaliatory violence by local groups must be included 

as part of the analysis.

2. Transparency. The outcome of the fact-finding 

investigations should be made public, except where 

operational considerations preclude this. In such situations, the government should at a minimum explain 

its decision.

3. Consequence Management. Best practices and 

lessons from Afghanistan regarding civilian casualty 

consequence management should be applied to other 

U.S. Government efforts, including operations outside 

declared theaters of armed conflict.
38

4. Targeting (Intelligence). Conduct a review to 

determine the adequacy of standards for the identification of targets, including the reliability of “signatures,” and the sufficiency of intelligence sources and 

analysis especially where there is limited U.S. ground 

presence.

5. Targeting (Classification). Review the process 

for classifying casualties as enemy combatants versus 

civilians in operations outside declared theaters of 

armed conflict.

6. Pilots. Continue to verify the validity and relevance of drone pilot education in the legal and ethical 

dimension of armed attacks. Ensure continued provision of psychological support to personnel where 

necessary.

7. Perception Management. In addition to creating 

transparency, ensure that the message (namely why, 

what, and how) is effectively communicated both domestically and abroad, to illustrate that U.S. armed 

drone strikes are indeed legal, ethical, and accurate.

ENDNOTES

1. The Security Impact of Drones: Challenges and Opportunities 

for the UK, Birmingham Policy Commission Report, Birmingham, 

UK, October 2014.

2. “US Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap (Fiscal Years 

2009–2034),” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 

2009, p. 2, available from www.acq.osd.mil/sts/docs/UMSIntegrated

Roadmap2009.pdf, accessed December 17, 2014.

3. Alain De Neve, “Armed drones: What technical revolution? 

What political and ethical implications?” Brussels, Belgium: Centre for Security and Defence Studies of the Royal Higher Institute 

for Defence, October 22, 2013, available from www.irsd.be/website/

images/livres/enotes/en/eNote11EN.pdf, accessed December 18, 2014.
39

4. Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, “Hidden 

war, there were more drone strikes—and far fewer civilians 

killed,” Washington, DC: New America Foundation, December 22, 

2010, available from newamerica.net/node/41927, accessed January 

2, 2015.

5. W. J. Hennigan, “New drone has no pilot anywhere, so 

who’s accountable?” Los Angeles Times, January 26, 2012, available 

from www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-auto-drone-20120126,0,740306.

story, accessed December 20, 2014.

6. Afsheen John Radsan, “Loftier standards for the CIA’s 

remote-control killing,” Statement for the House Subcommittee 

on National Security & Foreign Affairs, in Legal Studies Research 

Paper Series, Accepted Paper No. 2010–11, St Paul, MN: William 

Mitchell College of Law, May 2010, available from papers.ssrn.com/

sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1604745, accessed December 20, 2014.

7. Birmingham Policy Commission Report, p. 15.

8. Based on the design for the ubiquitous DH82 Tiger Moth 

trainer, the Queen Bee first flew in 1935. It was capable of flying at 

17,000 feet, and had a range of 300 miles at over 100 mph. A total 

of 380 Queen Bees served as target drones in the Royal Air Force 

and the Royal Navy until they were retired in 1947. 

9. House of Commons Defence Committee, “Remote Control: Remotely Piloted Air Systems—Current and Future UK 

use—Tenth Report of Session 2013-14,” Vol. 1, London, UK: The 

Stationery Office Limited, 2014, p. 11.

10. Birmingham Policy Commission Report.

11. “Drone Journalism and the Law,” Chapel Hill, NC: UNC 

Centre for Media Law and Policy, available from https://medialaw.

unc.edu/resources/drone-journalism/, accessed May 14, 2015. See 

also Jennifer O’Mahony, “The brave new world of ‘drone journalism’,” The Telegraph, June 13, 2013, available from www.telegraph.

co.uk/technology/news/10129485/The-brave-new-world-of-dronejournalism.html, accessed May 14. 2015.
40

12. “Northern Ireland police to use drones at G8 summit: Police force want to buy two remote-controlled aircraft to assist with 

security at this summer’s economic summit,” The Guardian, March 

15, 2013, available from www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/mar/15/

northern-ireland-drones-g8-summit, accessed January 10, 2015.

13. “German railways to test anti-graffiti drones,” BBC 

News, May 27, 2013, available from www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldeurope-22678580, accessed January 10, 2015.

14. “Yo! Sushi: The world’s first flying waiter—the 

‘iTray’,” June 12, 2013, available from https://www.youtube.com/

watch?v=y9RKXO1rr7g and metro.co.uk/2013/06/11/video-worldsfirst-flying-tray-at-sushi-restaurant-yo-sushi-3836390/, accessed 

January 10, 2015.

15. “Take Off For Sushi Restaurant’s Flying Tray,” Sky News, 

June 10, 2013, available from news.sky.com/story/1101379/take-offfor-sushi-restaurants-flying-tray, accessed January 10, 2015.

16. “Saving the rhino with surveillance drones,” The Guardian, December 25, 2012, available from www.theguardian.com/

environment/2012/dec/25/saving-the-rhino-with-surveillance-drones, 

accessed January 10, 2015.

17. Winnie Agbonlahor, “The Secret Life of Drones,” Civil 

Service World, July 5, 2013.

18. Harold Hongju Koh, legal adviser of U.S. Department of 

State, The Obama Administration and International Law, speech at 

the annual meeting of the American Society of International Law, 

Washington, DC, March 25, 2010, available from www.state.gov/

s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm, accessed January 11, 2015.

19. United Nations General Assembly, Sixty-eighth Session, 

Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, 

or Arbitrary Executions, “Protecting People: the right to life,” 

A/68/382, September 13, 2014, Sec. Para. 30.

20. Rory Carroll, “The Philosopher Making the Moral 

Case for US Drones,” The Guardian, available from www.theguardian.com/world/2012/aug/02/philosopher-moral-case-drones, accessed

December 20, 2014.
41

21. New York City Bar, “The Legality under International Law 

of Targeted Killings by Drones Launched by the United States,” 

Committee on International Law, June 2014.

22. Geneva Convention III, Art. 2.

23. Paul Rogers, “America’s military: failures of success,” 

Open Democracy, May 12, 2011.

24. Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, Counterstrike: The Untold 

Story of America’s Campaign Against al-Qaeda, New York: Times 

Books, 2011, p. 245.

25. International Committee of the Red Cross Website, 

available from https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/ihl-other-legalregmies/jus-in-bello-jus-ad-bellum, accessed December 20, 2014.

26. International Committee of the Red Cross, “International 

Humanitarian Law: Answers to your Questions,” October 2002, 

available from www.redcross.org/images/MEDIA_CustomProductCatalog/m22303661_IHL-FAQ.pdf, accessed May 14, 2015. 

27. Jasmine Moussa, “Can ‘jus ad bellum’ override ‘jus in bello’? Reaffirming the separation of the two bodies of law,” International Review of the Red Cross, Article No. 852, December 31, 2008.

28. Francois Bugnion, “Guerre juste, guerre d’aggression et 

droit international humanitaire” (“Just war, war of aggression, 

and international humanitarian law”), International Review of the 

Red Cross, Vol. 84, 2002, p. 528.

29. Moussa.

30. Ibid.

31.S. Casey-Maslen “Pandora’s box? Drone strikes under 

jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and international human rights law,” 

International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 94, No. 886, Summer 

2012, p. 597.

32. Jane Mayer, “The Predator War: What are the risks of 

the C.I.A.’s covert drone program?” The New Yorker, October 26, 
42

2009, available from www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/10/26/thepredator-war, accessed May 5, 2015.

33. Avery Plaw, Targeting Terrorists: A License to Kill? Aldershot, UK, and Burlington, US: Ashgate Publishing, 2008; Jens 

David Ohlin, Is Jus in Bello in Crisis? No. 3, Ithaca, NY: Cornell 

Law Faculty Publications, 2013, available from scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2475&context=facpub, accessed 

April 23, 2015.

34. If the attack that killed al-Libi was part of an armed conflict, the lawfulness of the attack depends on its compliance with 

the rules of IHL. What al-Libi was doing at the time he was killed 

(and who was with him) would be relevant in assessing whether 

the attack was proportionate,and whether the second strike complied with the prohibition of targeting civilians not directly participating in hostilities who are involved in rescuing the wounded 

and the prohibition of targeting the wounded themselves.

35. Non-International Armed Conflict. In situations of NIAC, 

the relevant bodies of law that come into play are LoAC/IHL, 

international human rights law (IHRL) and each State’s domestic 

law. See “Procedural Safeguards for Security Detention in NonInternational Armed Conflict,” London, UK: Chatham House & 

ICRC, September 22-23, 2008, available from https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/Meeting%20

Summary%20Procedural%20Safeguards%20for%20Security%20

Detention%20in%20Non-International%20Armed%20Conflict.pdf.

36. Benjamin Wittes, “Amnesty International Responds,” Lawfare, October 25, 2013, available from www.lawfareblog.com/2013/10/

amnesty-international-responds/, accessed January 20, 2015.

37. See section, in this monograph, that follows on efficacy 

entitled, “Is it Effective?” for methods used for targeting.

38. Assassinations generally refer to the elimination of political officials, and were banned in the United States in 1981. In 

1975, the U.S. Senate Select Committee chaired by Senator Frank 

Church (the Church Committee) reported on several CIA assassinations, including efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro. Criticism in 

this report resulted in a proposal banning assassinations. This was 
43

later incorporated into Executive Order 12333 signed by President 

Ronald Reagan in 1981, which is still in effect today. Executive Order 12333 is available at https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/eo12333.html.

39. Whitley R. P. Kaufman, “Rethinking the ban on assassination: just war principles in the age of terror,” In Michael Brough, 

John Lango and Harry van der Linden, eds., Rethinking the Just 

War Tradition, New York: State university of New York, 2007, 

pp. 171-182.

40. Yael Stein, “By any name illegal and immoral,” Ethics & 

International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2003, pp. 127-136.

41. Greg Miller and Bob Woodward, “Secret memos reveal 

explicit nature of U.S., Pakistan agreement on drones,” The Washington Post, October 24, 2013, available from www.washingtonpost.

com/world/national-security/top-pakistani-leaders-secretly-backed-ciadrone-campaign-secret-documents-show/2013/10/23/15e6b0d8-3beb11e3-b6a9-da62c264f40e_story.html, accessed May 5, 2015.

42. Asif Shahzad and Steven R. Hurst, “Pakistan’s Drone 

Strike Victims Accuse U.S. Of Double Standard,” Huffington Post, 

May 1, 2015, available from www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/01/

pakistan-drone-strike-double-standard_n_7188644.html?utm_hp_

ref=politics&ir=Politics, accessed May 3, 2015. See also William 

Helbling, “Pakistan top court denies petition challenging US 

drone strikes,” The Jurist, April 13, 2015, available from jurist.org/

paperchase/2015/04/pakistan-top-court-denies-petition-challenging-usdrone-strikes.php, accessed May 3, 2015.

43. John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland 

Security and Counterterrorism, “The Ethics and Efficacy of the 

President’s Counterterrorism Strategy,” speech, Wilson Center, 

Washington, DC, April 30, 2012, available from www.wilsoncenter.

org/event/the-efficacy-and-ethics-us-counterterrorism-strategy.

44. New York City Bar, “The Legality under International Law 

of Targeted Killings by Drones launched by the United States,” 

New York City, June 2014, p. 3.

45. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 

Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 41, July 8.
44

46. The Geneva Convention 1949, Additional Protocol I, Art. 

51, 5(b).

47. Helen Duffy, The “War on Terror” and the Framework of 

International Law, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 

2005, pp. 18-19, 231-235. 

48. Noam Neuman, “Applying the Rule of Proportionality: 

Force Protection and Cumulative Assessment in International 

Law and Morality,” 7 Y.B. International Humanitarian Law, 2004, 

pp. 79, 81, 98-99.

49. In Prosecutor v. Galić, the Trial Chamber observed that proportionality should be considered under the lens of “whether a 

reasonably well-informed person in the circumstances of the actual perpetrator, making reasonable use of the information available 

to him or her, could have expected excessive civilian casualties to 

result from the attack,” Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, 

Judgement and Opinion, 58, ICTY, December 5, 2003. 

50. “The Legality under International Law of Targeted 

Killings by Drones Launched by the United States,” p. 170.

51. Ibid.

52. Testimony of Brian Michael Jenkins of RAND Corporation, Al Qaeda After Bin Laden: Hearing Before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, 

112th Cong., 2011. 

53. Casey-Maslen, p. 597.

54. Bradley Strawser is the author of Killing by Remote Control: 

The Ethics of an Unmanned Military.

55.Bradley J. Strawser in Rory Carroll, “The philosopher 

making the moral case for US drones,” The Guardian, August 2, 

2012, available from www.theguardian.com/world/2012/aug/02/

philosopher-moral-case-drones, accessed April 23, 2015.

56. Ibid.
45

57. See section, in this monograph, that follows, “Is it Effective?” with respect to the accuracy of drone strikes.

58. Jo Becker and Scott Shane, “Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a 

Test of Obama’s Principles and Will,” The New York Times, May 

29, 2012.

59. Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, The Year of the 

Drone, Washington, DC: New America Foundation, available 

from foreignpolicy.com/2010/04/23/the-year-of-the-drone/, accessed

December 14, 2014.

60. Spencer Ackerman, “41 men targeted but 1,147 people 

killed: US drone strikes—the facts on the ground,” The Guardian, November 24, 2014, available from www.theguardian.com/

us-news/2014/nov/24/-sp-us-drone-strikes-kill-1147, accessed April 

23, 2015. 

61. Chris Woods, “Analysis: CNN expert’s civilian drone 

death numbers don’t add up,” London, UK: Bureau of Investigative Journalism, July 17, 2012, available from www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/07/17/analysis-cnn-experts-civilian-drone-deathnumbers-dont-add-up/, accessed December 15, 2014.

62. UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur 

on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, September 18, 2013. p.

11, available from msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/UN_

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63. “The Civilian Impact of Drones: Unexamined Costs, Unanswered Questions,” New York: Columbia Law School, Center 

for Civilians in Conflict, p. 21.

64. Alex Rodriguez, “Pakistani Death Squads Go after Informants to US Drone Program,” The Los Angeles Times, December 

28, 2011; Jane Mayer, “The Predator War: What are the risks of 

the C.I.A.’s covert drone program?” The New Yorker, October 

26, 2009.

65. “The Civilian Impact of Drones,” p. 24.
46

66. Ibid., p. 26.

67. Ibid.

68. “UN official criticises US over drone attacks,” BBC 

News, June 2, 2010, available from www.bbc.co.uk/news/10219962, 

accessed May 14, 2015.

69. “War Games: Documentary shows how U.S. recruited gamers to fly drones into Pakistan,” New York Times Tribune, 

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70. Tonje Schei, Lars Løge, Jonathan Lie, Charlie Phillips, Noah 

Payne-Frank, and Jacqui Timberlake, “Drone wars: the gamers 

recruited to kill”—video, The Guardian Documentary, available 

from www.theguardian.com/news/video/2015/feb/02/drone-wars-gamers-recruited-kill-pakistan-video, accessed May 3, 2015; Dan Pearson, 

“War Games: the link between gaming and military recruitment,” 

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71. “UN official criticises US over drone attacks.”

72. Second-Lieutenant Logan Clark, 49th Wing Public Affairs, 

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accessed May 14, 2015. See also Leo Benedictus, “The artists who 

are giving a human face to the US’s ‘bug splat’ drone strikes,” 

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74. Rob Williams, “Giant ‘Not A Bug Splat’ art installation 

takes aim at Pakistan’s predator drone operators,” The Independ-
47

ent, April 8, 2014, available from www.independent.co.uk/news/

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76. J. Mayer, “The Predator War—What are the risks of the 

CIA’s covert drone program?” The New Yorker, 2009.

77. P. W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution 

and Conflict in the 21st Century, London, UK: Penguin, 2010a, 

pp. 308-309.

78. Sikander Ahmed Shah, International Law and Drone Strikes 

in Pakistan: The Legal and Socio-political Aspects, London, UK: 

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79. Ann Rogers, “Investigating the Relationship Between 

Drone Warfare and Civilian Casualties in Gaza,” Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 7, No. 4, 2014, pp. 94-107, available from scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol7/iss4/8, accessed May 14, 2015. See also 

Tyler Wall and Torin Monahan, “Surveillance and violence from 

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80. Statement of Rosa Brooks, “The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of Targeted Killings,” Hearing Before 

the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil 

Rights, and Human Rights, 113th Cong., 2013.

81. Mark Bowden, “The Killing Machines,” The Atlantic, August 14, 2013, available from www.theatlantic.com/

magazine/print/2013/09/the-killing-machines-how-to-think-aboutdrones/309434/, accessed January 23, 2015.

82. Pratap Chatterjee, “American Drone Operators Are 

Quitting in Record Numbers,” The Nation, March 5, 2015, available from www.thenation.com/article/200337/american-drone-operators-are-quitting-record-numbers, accessed May 17, 2015.
48

83. Jon Kelly, “Why do people tell sick jokes about tragedies?” 

BBC News, March 18, 2011, available from www.bbc.co.uk/news/

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84. P. R. McCrae, “Situational determinants of coping responses: Loss, threat and challenge,” Journal of Personality and 

Social Psychology, Vol. 46, 1984, pp. 919-928.

85. Raija-Leena Punamäki, Katri Kanninen, Samir Qouta, 

and Eyad, “The role of psychological defences in moderating between trauma and post-traumatic symptoms among Palestinian 

men,” International Journal of Psychology, Vol. 37, Issue 5, 2002, 

pp. 289-296.

86. Luke A. Olnet, “Lethal Targeting Abroad: Exploring longterm effectiveness of armed drone strikes in overseas contingency 

operations,” Georgetown University MA Thesis, Washington, 

DC, March 11, 2015. 

87. Greg Miller, “C.I.A. Seeks New Authority to Expand 

Yemen Drone Campaign,” The Washington Post, April 18, 2012.

88. Adrianna Huffington, “‘Signature strikes’ and the President’s Empty Rhetoric on Drones,” Huffington Post, July 10, 2013, 

available from www.huffingtonpost.com/arianna-huffington/signature-strikes-and-the_b_3575351.html, accessed May 30, 2015. See 

also Jo Becker and Scott Shane, “Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test 

of Obama’s Principles and Will,” The New York Times, May 29, 

2012, available from www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamasleadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html?pagewanted=all, accessed May 

31, 2015. 

89. Tara McKelvey, “A Former Ambassador to Pakistan 

Speaks Out,” The Daily Beast, November 20, 2012, available 

from www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/11/20/a-former-ambassador-to-pakistan-speaks-out.html, accessed May 31, 2015.

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Afghanistan, 2010-07-CA-195, available from www.rs.nato.int/

article/isaf-releases/afghan-led-force-captures-taliban-commandersuspected-insurgents-dressed-as-women.html, accessed June 1, 2015. 
49

91. “The Civilian Impact of Drones,” p. 11.

92. Gregory S. McNeal, “US Practice of Collateral Damage 

Estimation and Mitigation,” Social Science Research Network, 

November 9, 2011, available from papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.

cfm?abstract_id=1819583, accessed February 20, 2015.

93. Robert H. Reid, “Officers reprimanded in fatal drone 

strike,” Army Times, May 29, 2010, online edition, available 

from www.armytimes.com/news/2010/05/ap_afghanistan_airforce_

drone_052910/, accessed November 7, 2014.

94. George C. Wilson, “The True Cost of Assassinations,” 

Congress Daily, September 13, 2010.

95. Micah Zenko, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” 

Council Special Report No. 65, New York: Council on Foreign 

Relations, Center for Preventive Action, January 2013. 

96. “The Civilian Impact of Drones,” p. 23.

97. Theodore Karasik, “The Drone Doctrine in Yemen—Understanding the Whole Picture,” Arabian Aerospace, July 24, 2012.

98. Catherine Herridge, “FBI, DHS bulletin warns of retaliation for airstrikes against ISIS,” Fox News, August 26, 2014, available from www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/08/26/fbi-dhs-bulletinwarns-retaliation-for-airstrikes-against-isis/, accessed April 23, 2015.

99. “The Civilian Impact of Drones,” p. 23.

100. Haykal Bafana, Twitter post, May 11, 2012, available 

from https://twitter.com/BaFana3/statuses/200930818816880640; 

Mothana, “How Drones Help Al Qaeda,” The New York Times, 

June 13, 2012.

101. “The Civilian Impact of Drones,” p. 23.

102. Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, “Yemenis Choose Jihad over Iranian Support,” The Guardian, May 10, 2012; Micah Zenko, “Escalating America’s Third War in Yemen,” Washington, DC: Council on 

Foreign Relations, May 14, 2012.
50

103. Sudarsan Raghavan, “In Yemen, US Airstrikes Breed 

Anger, and Sympathy for Al Qaeda,” The Washington Post, 

May 29, 2012. See also commentary in “The Civilian Impact of 

Drones,” p. 23.

104. David Kilcullen and Andrew McDonald Exum, “Death 

from Above, Outrage Down Below,” The New York Times, May 

16, 2009; Noah Shachtman, “Call Off Drone War, Influential 

US Adviser Says,” Wired, February 10, 2009 Civilian Conflict 

Report, p. 23.

105. George Monbiot, “With its deadly drones, the US is 

fighting a coward’s war,” The Guardian, January 30, 2012, available from www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jan/30/deadlydrones-us-cowards-war, accessed May 14, 2015. 

106. Andres Johnson, “ISIS to U.S.: “Don’t be Cowards and 

Attack us With Drones. Send your Soldiers,” National Review, August 8, 2014, available from www.nationalreview.com/corner/384981/

isis-us-dont-be-cowards-and-attack-us-drones-send-your-soldiersandrew-johnson, accessed May 17, 2015.

107. Doyle McManus, “U.S. drone attacks in Pakistan ‘backfiring,’ Congress told,” The Los Angeles Times, May 3, 2009, available from articles.latimes.com/2009/may/03/opinion/oe-mcmanus3, 

accessed May 17, 2015.

108. Sudarsan Raghavan, “In Yemen, U.S. airstrikes breed 

anger, and sympathy for al-Qaeda,” The Washington Post, May 

29, 2012, available from www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/in-yemen-us-airstrikes-breed-anger-and-sympathy-for-al-qaeda/2012/05/29/gJQAUmKI0U_story.html, accessed May 17, 2015. 

109. Ibid. 

110. Steven John Thompson, “Global Issues and Ethical Considerations in Human Enhancement Technologies,” IGI Global, 

2014, Hershey, PA, p. 147.

111. “Robots at War: Drones and Democracy,” The Economist, 

October 1, 2015, available from www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2010/10/robots_war, accessed May 17, 2015.
51

112. Pratap Chatterjee, “American Drone Operators Are 

Quitting in Record Numbers,” The Nation, March 5, 2015, available from www.thenation.com/article/200337/american-drone-operators-are-quitting-record-numbers, accessed May 17, 2015.

113. Craig Whitlock, “How crashing drones are exposing secrets about U.S. Operations,” Washington Post, 

March 25, 2015, available from www.washingtonpost.com/world/

national-security/how-crashing-drones-are-exposing-secrets-about-uswar-operations/2015/03/24/e89ed940-d197-11e4-8fce-3941fc548f1c_

story.html?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_

term=%2ASituation%20Report&utm_campaign=Sit%20Rep%20

March%2026%202015, accessed April 8, 2015.

114. Ibid.

115. Ibid.

116. Ibid.

117. Nils Melzer, “Targeted Killings in International Law,” 

Oxford Monographs in International Law, Oxford, UK: Oxford 

University Press, 2008, pp. 3–4.

118. Elisabeth Bumiller and Thom Shanker, “War evolves 

with drones, some tiny as bugs,” The New York Times, June 19, 

2011, available from www.nytimes.com/2011/06/20/world/20drones.

html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&ref=unmannedaerialvehicles.

119. W. J. Hennigan, “New drone has no pilot anywhere, so who’s accountable?” The Los Angeles Times, January 26, 2012, available from www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-autodrone-20120126,0,740306.story, accessed January 14, 2015.

120. Emma Slater, “UK to spend half a billion on lethal drones 

by 2015,” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, November 21, 2011, 

available from https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2011/11/21/

britains-growing-fleet-of-deadly-drones/, accessed December 29, 

2014.

121. Philip Alston, Study on Targeted Killings (A/HRC/14/24/

Add.6), Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Sum-
52

mary, or Arbitrary Executions to the UN Human Rights Council, 

May 28, 2010, p. 24, available from www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf, accessed April 

23, 2015.

122. Nathalie Van Raemdonck, “Vested Interest or Moral 

Indecisiveness? Explaining the EU’s Silence on the US Targeted 

Killing Policy in Pakistan,” Istituto Affari Internazionali Working 

Papers 12-05, Rome, Italy: Istituto Affari Internazionali, March 

2012, p. 2.

123. Ibid.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William E. Rapp

Commandant

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STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

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