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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

ERNEST CULBREATH :

APPELLANT :

:

: No. 1076 EDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order February 23, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0000192-1976

BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. *

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 18, 2016

Appellant, Ernest Culbreath, appeals from the Order entered by the 

Chester County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his pleading titled 

“Collateral Relief Encompassing Writ of Error Coram Nobis and State Federal 

Habeas Corpus,” which the court treated as Appellant’s third Petition 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA),42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.1

We affirm.

 

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1Any Petition for post-conviction collateral relief will generally be considered 

a PCRA Petition, regardless of how the applicant captions the Petition, if the 

petition raises issues cognizable under the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. 

Peterkin, 554 Pa. 547, 722 A.2d 638 (1998); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (stating 

PCRA shall be sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all 

other common law and statutory remedies for same purpose).
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A recitation of the facts is unnecessary for our disposition; however, 

the relevant procedural history, as gleaned from the record, is as follows. 

On December 7, 1977, the court sentenced Appellant to life in prison after 

his conviction of second-degree murder. This Court affirmed Appellant’s 

Judgment of Sentence on December 3, 1979. 

Appellant filed his first Petition for post-conviction relief on August 7, 

1980. After a long period of inactivity, on April 7, 1989, the trial court 

permitted Appellant to file a Petition for Allowance of Appeal with the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court nunc pro tunc. On March 16, 1990, the 

Supreme Court denied Appellant’s Petition without prejudice to Appellant’s 

right to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims in a subsequent 

PCRA Petition. 

On June 22, 1990, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA Petition, and on 

August 2, 1996, counsel filed a “First Amended Post Conviction Relief Act 

Petition.” Following a hearing, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s Petition on 

April 30, 1998. This Court affirmed, and the Supreme Court denied 

Appellant’s Petition for Allowance of Appeal. 

On July 24, 2001, Appellant filed a pro se pleading entitled “Collateral 

Relief Encompassing Writ of Error Coram Nobis and Habeas Corpus,” seeking 

entry of an order reversing and vacating the PCRA court’s order denying his 

PCRA Petition. The PCRA court took no action. On March 28, 2014, 

Appellant filed a pro se pleading entitled “Actual and Constructive Notice.” In 
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this pleading, Appellant appears to assert that he was an unwilling 

participant in his post-conviction proceedings, and that the Uniform 

Commercial Code provides a remedy where, as here, a party is “compelled 

to perform under an unconstitutional statute or any commercial agreement 

that [he] did not enter knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally.” See “Actual 

and Constructive Notice,” 3/25/14, at 1-2. He sought an order 

“recogniz[ing] the Common Law, re-sentenc[ing him] for 2

nd degree murder 

and discharg[ing him] with fair damages.” Id. at 2. 

On June 9, 2014, Appellant filed a pro se “Petition to Have Rule Made 

Absolute,” in which Appellant sought an order granting him the relief 

requested in his “Actual and Constructive Notice” pleading. 

On January 21, 2016, the PCRA court, having discovered on the docket 

Appellant’s outstanding “Collateral Relief Encompassing Writ of Error Coram 

Nobis and Habeas Corpus,” treated it as a third PCRA Petition, and issued an 

Order and Notice of Intent to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. 

In its Order and Notice, the PCRA Court also determined that it would 

not take any action on Appellant’s “Actual and Constructive Notice” pleading 

because “the Rules of Criminal Procedure do not provide for the filing of such 

a pleading[,]” and because, in it, Appellant “did not seek any relief” 

cognizable under the PCRA. Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 Notice, 1/21/16, at 2. The 

court did not explicitly address Appellant’s “Petition to Have Rule Made 

Absolute;” however, owing to the nature of that pleading, and the PCRA 
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court’s disposition of Appellant’s “Actual and Constructive Notice” pleading, 

we agree that no further action was required.

Appellant filed a response to the Pa.R.Crim P. 907 Notice on February

12, 2016. On February 23, 2016, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s 

Petition as untimely. Appellant timely appealed. Both Appellant and the 

Court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional requisite. 

Commonwealth v. Hackett, 598 Pa. 350, 956 A.2d 978 (2008). A PCRA 

petition must be filed within one year of the date the underlying judgment 

becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment is deemed final at 

the conclusion of direct review or at the expiration of time for seeking 

review. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). The three statutory exceptions to the 

PCRA’s timeliness provisions allow for limited circumstances under which the 

late filing of a petition will be excused. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-

(iii). “The petitioner has the burden to plead in the petition and 

subsequently to prove that an exception applies.” Commonwealth v. 

Fowler, 930 A.2d 586, 591 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted); accord 

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 468 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

In his Brief to this Court, Appellant does not argue that any of the 

enumerated time-bar exceptions applies. Accordingly, the PCRA court 

lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of Appellant’s Petition.
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As noted supra, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s 

Judgment of Sentence on March 16, 1990. Accordingly, Appellant’s 

Judgment of Sentence became final on June 14, 1990. See 

Commonwealth v. Harris, 972 A.2d 1196, 1200 (Pa. Super. 2009); U.S. 

Sup. Ct. R. 13. Appellant filed the instant petition on July 24, 2001, more 

than eleven years after his Judgment of Sentence became final. Therefore, 

it is patently untimely. 

Based on the foregoing, we conclude the PCRA court properly 

dismissed Appellant’s third PCRA Petition as untimely filed. Accordingly, we 

affirm the PCRA court’s February 23, 2016 Order.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/18/2016