THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Supreme Court

Amy Garrard and Lee Garrard, Guardians Ad Litem for 

R.C.G., a Minor; Dean Frailey and Kathryn Frailey, 

Guardians Ad Litem for C.F., a Minor; Richard Nelson 

and Cheryl Nelson, Guardians Ad Litem for D.G.N., a

Minor; Adam Olsen Ackerman; and A.E.P. III, Plaintiffs,

v.

Charleston County School District, Kevin Clayton, Axxis 

Consulting Company, and Jones Street Publishers, LLC, 

Defendants,

and

Eugene H. Walpole, Plaintiff,

v.

Charleston County School District, Kevin Clayton, Axxis 

Consulting Company, and Jones Street Publishers, LLC, 

Defendants,

of whom Eugene H. Walpole; Amy Garrard and Lee 

Garrard, Guardians Ad Litem for R.C.G., a Minor; Dean 

Frailey and Kathryn Frailey, Guardians Ad Litem for 

C.F., a Minor; Richard Nelson and Cheryl Nelson, 

Guardians Ad Litem for D.G.N., a Minor; Adam Olsen 

Ackerman; and A.E.P. III, are the Petitioners.

and

of whom Jones Street Publishers, LLC is the Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2020-000605
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

Appeal from Charleston County

Jean Hoefer Toal, Acting Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 28155

Heard December 14, 2022 – Filed May 31, 2023

AFFIRMED IN RESULT

John E. Parker and John Elliott Parker Jr., both of Parker 

Law Group, LLP; and William Franklin Barnes III, of 

Barnes Law Firm, LLC, all of Hampton, for Petitioners.

Wallace K. Lightsey and Meliah Bowers Jefferson, both 

of Wyche, PA, of Greenville, for Respondent.

ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE KITTREDGE: We granted a writ of certiorari to 

review the court of appeals' decision in Garrard ex rel. R.C.G. v. Charleston County 

School District, 429 S.C. 170, 838 S.E.2d 698 (Ct. App. 2019). We affirm in result.

We refer to the court of appeals' opinion for a full recitation of the facts and legal 

issues. In sum, Petitioners filed a defamation action against Respondent, alleging 

Respondent published a series of articles that included defamatory statements about 

Petitioners in connection with a controversial post-game ritual performed by 

members of the Academic Magnet High School football team during their 2014-

2015 season. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent, and 

the court of appeals affirmed.1

 

1 Rule 56(c), SCRCP (stating summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law"); see also Fleming v. 
Petitioners raise six challenges to the grant of summary judgment. Several of 

Petitioners' arguments have at least ostensible merit. For example, Petitioners 

correctly contend that calling someone a racist can be defamatory depending on the 

context. In this regard, we reject any suggestion that calling someone a racist can 

never be defamatory. See 50 Am. Jur. 2d Libel and Slander § 200 (2017) ("Courts 

have readily held allegations of racism . . . to constitute libel per se, at least when 

founded on specific incidents."); 3 Dan. B. Dobbs et. al., The Law of Torts § 572 (2d 

ed. 2011) ("While 'racist' is sometimes said to be mere name-calling and not 

actionable in some contexts, the term can be actionable where it plainly imputes acts 

based on racial discrimination." (footnote omitted)); MacElree v. Phila.

Newspapers, Inc., 674 A.2d 1050, 1055 (Pa. 1996) ("Although accusations of racism 

have been held not to be actionable defamation, it cannot be said that every such 

accusation is not capable of defamatory meaning as a matter of law.").

2

While we could review Petitioners' other challenges that call into question the grant 

of summary judgment, we decline to do so for the simple reason that Petitioners fall

short on the element of damages. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, 

Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (recognizing an appellate court 

need not address remaining issues when the resolution of one issue is dispositive). 

Even when the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to Petitioners, there is 

no genuine issue of material fact asto the element of damages. Because the allegedly 

libelous statement involved an issue of public controversy or concern and was 

 

Rose, 350 S.C. 488, 493–94, 567 S.E.2d 857, 860 (2002) ("When determining if any 

triable issues of fact exist, the evidence and all reasonable inferences must be viewed 

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.").

2 See also, e.g., La Liberte v. Reid, 966 F.3d 79, 93 (2d Cir. 2020) ("[The defendant] 

did not merely accuse [the plaintiff] of being 'racist' in some abstract sense. Rather, 

[the defendant's social media post] could be understood as an accusation of concrete, 

wrongful conduct, which can be proved to be either true or false. That makes it 

potentially defamatory." (cleaned up)); Taylor v. Carmouche, 214 F.3d 788, 793 (7th 

Cir. 2000) (holding a statement that a person is "a racist" is defamatory and 

acknowledging that whether someone is racist or practices racial discrimination in 

the workplace is a mundane issue of fact that is litigated every day); cf. Capps v. 

Watts, 271 S.C. 276, 281–83, 246 S.E.2d 606, 609–10 (1978) (recognizing that mere 

name calling and words of abuse are generally not considered defamatory but 

holding such remarks may be capable of libelous construction by reason of extrinsic 

facts).
published by a media defendant, the common law presumption of general damages 

did not apply, and it was incumbent on Petitioners to show actual injury attributable 

to Respondent's publications. Erickson v. Jones St. Publ'rs, L.L.C., 368 S.C. 444, 

466, 629 S.E.2d 653, 665 (2006) ("[I]n a case involving an issue of public 

controversy or concern where the libelous statement is published by a media 

defendant, the common law presumption[] . . . [that] the plaintiff suffered general 

damages do[es] not apply. Instead, [the plaintiff is required to] show 'actual injury' 

in the form of general or special damages." (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). 

Having carefully reviewed the record, the best that can be said of Petitioners'

evidence is that their damages are speculative and, therefore, insufficient as a matter 

of law.

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Petitioners, we affirm in result the 

decision of the court of appeals regarding the entry of summary judgment due to 

Petitioners' failure to present evidence (beyond mere speculation) in proof of their 

injuries. We affirm the court of appeals' decision on this basis alone, and we vacate 

the balance of the court of appeals' opinion.

AFFIRMED IN RESULT.

FEW, JAMES, JJ., and Acting Justices Kaye G. Hearn and Ralph K. Kelly, 

concur.