SIGAR Audit-11-2 Strategy and Oversight/Civilian Uplift

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

U.S. Civilian Uplift in Afghanistan Is Progressing but 

Some Key Issues Merit Further Examination as 

Implementation Continues

October 26, 2010
SIGAR Audit-11-2 Strategy and Oversight/Civilian Uplift Page i 

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

October 26, 2010 

The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton

Secretary of State

The Honorable Robert Gates 

Secretary of Defense

The Honorable Karl W. Eikenberry 

U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan

The Honorable Thomas J. Vilsack 

Secretary of Agriculture

Dr. Rajiv Shah, Administrator

U.S. Agency for International Development

Earl Gast

USAID Mission Director to Afghanistan

This report presents the results of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction’s (SIGAR) review of the implementation of the civilian uplift in support of U.S. 

reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. It includes two recommendations to examine key issues that have 

been raised over the initial stages of the uplift and to develop a mechanism for collecting, analyzing, and 

implementing best practices and lessons learned during the uplift.

A summary of this report is on page ii. This performance audit was conducted by SIGAR under the 

authority of Public Law No. 110-181 and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. When 

preparing the final report, we considered comments from the U.S. Embassy Kabul, which generally 

concurred with the report’s recommendations and indicated that U.S. agencies were taking actions to 

implement them. These comments are reproduced in appendix III. 

 John Brummet

Assistant Inspector General for Audits

Office of the Special Inspector General 

for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SIGAR Audit-11-2 Strategy and Oversight/Civilian Uplift Page ii

SIGAR

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

SIGAR Audit-11-2 October 2010

U.S. Civilian Uplift in Afghanistan Is 

Progressing but Some Key Issues Merit Further 

Examination as Implementation Continues

What SIGAR Reviewed

Announced in March 2009, the U.S. civilian uplift is a key element of the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. Its purpose is to 

increase the amount of civilian resources, including personnel, available to implement efforts to enhance Afghan 

governance capacity, improve rule of law, and initiate sustainable economic growth. The strategy also focuses on 

advancing these efforts at the sub-national, or field, level. Given the large influx of U.S. government civilian personnel 

into Afghanistan, it is essential for agencies to ensure that these civilians have the support needed to achieve U.S. 

strategic goals in Kabul and at the field level. This report identifies (1) the types and number of personnel provided to 

implement the civilian uplift and the extent to which the life and operational support needs of these personnel have 

been met, and (2) key areas of concern raised during the initial stages of the uplift. SIGAR conducted this performance 

audit in Kabul and selected field sites in Afghanistan from April to September 2010 in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards.

What SIGAR Found

U.S. agencies have deployed nearly 67 percent of the personnel identified as part of the civilian uplift, and to date, have 

largely met life and operational support needs in the field. Sixteen agencies, representing 8 departments, are providing 

personnel to fill 626 new positions identified as part of the civilian uplift. The uplift will be implemented over two 

phases and contributes to an increase from 320 personnel in January 2009 to approximately 1500 personnel by January 

2012, according to current estimates. The first phase of the uplift ended in December 2009; the current phase began in 

January 2010 and will be completed in December 2011. Of the new positions, 294 will be located in Kabul, with the 

remaining positions distributed across locations throughout the country, such as provincial reconstruction teams and 

district support teams. As of September 9, 2010, a reported 418 personnel have deployed to Afghanistan, including 227 

personnel in the field. Based on SIGAR’s review of Embassy documents and discussions with officials in Kabul and the 

field, civilian life and operational support needs have generally been met across the field locations. However, 

Afghanistan’s operating environment presents challenges to providing this support, including the lack of adequate 

security, which affects civilians’ mobility.

Several key areas merit further examination as the U.S. Embassy implements the second phase of the civilian uplift. 

During our review, we identified several topics of concern that field staff at all levels raised over the course of the uplift, 

including the effectiveness of training; level of agency guidance on working in the field; and the application of models 

for civilian-military integration. In late July 2010, the Embassy in conjunction with State department headquarters

initiated an interagency review of the uplift; however, plans currently do not include a comprehensive examination of 

these areas. By including a review of current training and the guidance necessary for working in the field, agencies can 

better prepare civilian personnel for their assignments and provide them with the guidance they need to carry out their 

duties. In addition, the application of standardized models for civilian-military integration is necessary to move 

personnel in the field from a reliance on ad hoc arrangements and individual personalities. Further, the Embassy lacks a 

formal mechanism for collecting and implementing best practices and lessons learned at the field level. A mechanism to 

monitor and evaluate the results of various efforts and identify corrective actions would enable the Embassy to make 

changes that could increase the effectiveness of civilian personnel working in the field.

What SIGAR Recommends

To ensure that the interagency review of the civilian uplift is comprehensive, SIGAR recommends that the U.S. 

Ambassador to Afghanistan include the following items as part of the interagency review: training, required guidance 

for working in the field, and standardized models for civilian-military integration. In addition, to formally monitor 

civilians’ effectiveness in the field, identify shortfalls, and take corrective actions, SIGAR recommends that the U.S. 

Ambassador to Afghanistan develop a mechanism for collecting, analyzing and applying lessons learned and best 

practices, to include the design and implementation of a series of comprehensive field surveys. In commenting on a 

draft of this report, the U.S. Embassy Kabul generally concurred with SIGAR’s recommendations and outlined actions 

taken to implement them. 

For more information contact: SIGAR Public Affairs at (703) 602-8742 or PublicAffairs@sigar.mil
SIGAR Audit-11-2 Strategy and Oversight/Civilian Uplift Page iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background ................................................................................................................................................... 2

U.S. Agencies Have Deployed Nearly 67 Percent of Civilian UPlift Personnel and 

Have Generally Met Life and Operational Support Needs in the Field.................................................. 5

Several Key Areas Warrant Further Examination as the Civilian Uplift Progresses....................................11

Conclusion...................................................................................................................................................17

Recommendations......................................................................................................................................17

Comments...................................................................................................................................................18

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology.........................................................................................................19

Appendix II: U.S. Agency Roles in Reconstruction Efforts in Afghanistan..................................................21

Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. Embassy Kabul .............................................................................22

TABLES

Table 1: Authorized and Filled Positions by Civilian Uplift Phase, as of 

September 9, 2010 ................................................................................................................................. 8

Table 2: Filled Uplift Positions in Kabul and the Field, as of September 9, 2010......................................... 9

Table I: U.S. Departments and Agencies Contributing Personnel to the Civilian 

Uplift in Afghanistan.............................................................................................................................21

FIGURES

Figure 1: U.S. Mission in Afghanistan Field Structure.................................................................................. 3

Figure 2: Map of Regional Commands and Provincial Reconstruction Teams in 

Afghanistan............................................................................................................................................. 5

Figure 3: Estimated Growth of Chief of Mission Personnel in Afghanistan, May 

2009 to January 2012 ............................................................................................................................. 7

Figure 4: Percentage of Filled Uplift Positions by Agency, as of 

September 9, 2010 ................................................................................................................................. 9
SIGAR Audit-11-2 Strategy and Oversight/Civilian Uplift Page iv

ACRONYMS

CALL Center for Army Lessons Learned

COIN Counterinsurgency

COM Chief of Mission

COTR Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative

DST District Support Team

IPA Office of Interagency Provincial Affairs

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

MOA Memorandum of Agreement

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team

RC Regional Command

State Department of State

SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture

USFOR-A U.S. Forces-Afghanistan
SIGAR Audit-11-2 Strategy and Oversight/Civilian Uplift Page 1 

U.S. Civilian Uplift in Afghanistan Is Progressing but Some Key Issues Merit 

Further Examination as Implementation Continues

On March 27, 2009, the President of the United States announced a comprehensive new U.S. strategy 

for Afghanistan with the core objective of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-Qaeda and its safe 

havens. In addition to calling for an increase in military personnel, the new strategy announced the 

civilian uplift, an increase in civilian-led efforts to build Afghan governance capacity, improve the rule of 

law, and initiate sustainable economic growth, primarily through agricultural development. The strategy 

also focuses on advancing these efforts at the sub-national, or field, level. Given the large influx of U.S. 

government civilian personnel into Afghanistan and the importance of achieving U.S. strategic 

reconstruction goals, agencies must ensure that these civilians have the support needed to achieve the 

agencies’ strategic goals, particularly in the field. 

This report identifies (1) the types and number of personnel provided to implement the civilian uplift 

and the extent to which the life and operational support1 needs of these personnel have been met, and 

(2) key areas of concern raised during the initial stages of the uplift. We limited the scope of our audit to 

civilian personnel 2

deploying under chief of mission (COM) authority.3 In addition, given the strategic 

focus on expanding governance and development efforts at the sub-national level and the substantial 

increase in civilians expected to deploy to the field, we focused primarily on Department of State (State), 

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and Department of Agriculture (USDA) personnel 

assigned to regional platforms, brigade task forces, provincial reconstruction teams (PRT), and district 

support teams (DST) throughout Afghanistan.4

To accomplish these objectives, we reviewed U.S. policies and key strategies for Afghanistan and various 

agency documents including State and U.S. Embassy Kabul cables, staffing requests, and agreements

with military and coalition partners. We analyzed Embassy Kabul Management Office data, as recent as

September 9, 2010, and Office of Interagency Provincial Affairs (IPA) data, as of July 12, 2010 on current 

and projected numbers of positions created within U.S. Mission Afghanistan and personnel deployed to 

Afghanistan as part of the uplift. In addition, we reviewed key practices for interagency collaboration 

 

1 For the purposes of this report, life support refers to the items needed to sustain personnel such as lodging, food, 

water, sanitation, basic utilities, and medical services. Operational support refers to items required for personnel 

to carry out their duties, including office space and supplies, communications equipment, site security, and 

mobility.

2 We did not include contractor personnel in our review.

3 The chief of mission, also referred to as the U.S. Ambassador to a certain country or other specified entity, has full 

responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all U.S. government executive branch employees 

in that country, except for Voice of America correspondents on official assignment and employees under the 

command of a U.S. area military commander. See 22 U.S.C. § 3927.

4 For the purposes of this audit, the field, or sub-national level, refers to the regional platform, brigade task force, 

PRT, and DST levels.
SIGAR Audit-11-2 Strategy and Oversight/Civilian Uplift Page 2 

and strategic workforce planning. During June and July 2010, we conducted site visits to 12 field 

locations in Regional Commands (RC) East and South to interview U.S. COM civilian, military, and 

coalition personnel. These included the two regional platforms, two brigade task forces, four PRTs, and 

four DSTs. We interviewed officials in Embassy Management, IPA, State, USAID, USDA, and the 

Departments of Justice and the Treasury at the Embassy. In August and September 2010, we provided 

briefings on our preliminary findings to the Assistant Chief of Mission at the Embassy and the IPA 

Coordinator, and obtained information on current efforts and State’s planned internal review of the 

civilian uplift. We conducted our work at various locations in Afghanistan from April to September 2010 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. A discussion of our scope and 

methodology is in appendix I.

BACKGROUND

In March 2009, the President of the United States outlined a new U.S. strategy for Afghanistan, which 

was accompanied by a new policy for Afghanistan.5

 

5 The U.S. strategy for Afghanistan refers to the strategy announced in March 27, 2009 and December 1, 2009 

speeches delivered by President Obama.

In support of this strategy, U.S. Embassy Kabul and 

U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) released the United States Government Integrated Civilian-Military 

Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan in August 2009, and the Secretary of State signed the 

Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy in February 2010. With the core goal of 

disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, these documents 

delineate efforts to improve security, build Afghan governance capacity, enhance rule of law, and 

initiate sustainable development as part of the overall reconstruction of Afghanistan. The strategies 

dictate the need to provide additional support at the sub-national level, with a focus on the more 

unstable eastern and southern regions of the country. To complement the increased military presence, 

the strategies call for a substantial increase in the number of civilian personnel and associated resources 

for civilian-led assistance efforts.
SIGAR Audit-11-2 Strategy and Oversight/Civilian Uplift Page 3 

U.S. Mission Afghanistan Field Structure

The U.S. Mission in Afghanistan is a joint civilian and military effort. Figure 1 shows the structure of this 

effort under both the COM and Command ISAF authority. 

Figure 1: U.S. Mission in Afghanistan Field Structure

Regional Commander Regional 

Senior Civilian Rep

COMISAF Ambassador

Commander Civilian Team Lead

Task Force Staff State, USAID, USDA

Civilian Team Lead

State, USAID, USDA

Commander

PRT Staff

Agribusiness 

Development 

Team

Regional 

Command

Brigade 

Task Force

Provincial 

Reconstruction 

Team

District 

Support 

Team State, USAID, USDA

Civilian Team Lead

Military elements include security 

forces, ANSF mentors and civil 

affairs teams

DST Staff Commander

U.S. MISSION AFGHANISTAN

UNITY OF EFFORT

Source: U.S. Embassy, 10/19/10.

At the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, IPA, which falls under the purview of the Office of the Coordinating 

Director for Development and Economic Affairs,6

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 

oversees coalition military operations in Afghanistan, from Kabul to the district level. Outside of Kabul, 

the primary elements of the military field structure are five regional commands (RC), which are 

responsible for commanding military forces in their respective regions. These are RC-East, RC-South, RCNorth, RC-Southwest, and RC-West.

is the main Embassy section in charge of overseeing 

COM civilian personnel programmatic efforts at the regional platforms, brigade task forces, PRTs, and 

DSTs in the field. IPA provides strategy and policy guidance on sub-national governance, stabilization 

issues, Afghan capacity-building programs, and civilian-military integration. IPA also manages field 

staffing requests and assignments. The Embassy Management Office is responsible for providing 

logistical support for all COM civilians deployed to the field. For example, the Management Office 

oversees civilian life and operational support. 

7

 

6 The Coordinating Director for Development and Economic Affairs is responsible for ensuring that all interagency 

economic and development assistance programs are fully integrated and working to meet the U.S. and Afghan 

governments’ goals for Afghanistan.

Because U.S. COM civilians in the field are collocated with military 

personnel, U.S. Embassy Kabul established five civilian-led regional platforms parallel to the five RCs to 

7 The United States commands RC-East and RC-Southwest, Great Britain leads RC-South, Germany leads RC-North, 

and Italy leads RC-West.
SIGAR Audit-11-2 Strategy and Oversight/Civilian Uplift Page 4 

facilitate greater civilian-military integration in the field.

8

In RC-East, brigade task forces form the next supervisory and support level for COM civilians in the field. 

The United States leads four of these task forces while France and Poland lead the remaining two task 

forces; however, COM civilians are only assigned to the U.S. task forces. RC-South, RC-Southwest, and 

RC-West each have one brigade task force. However, these task forces are equal in authority to and do 

not provide supervision over the PRTs. The PRTs follow the brigade task forces, or regional platforms

depending on the region, in the Mission field structure. PRTs are civilian-military organizations that 

implement efforts to build the capacity of the host nation to govern, enhance economic viability, and 

deliver essential public services, such as security, rule of law, justice, health care, and education. Of the 

27 PRTs in Afghanistan, ISAF coalition partners lead 15 PRTs, the United States leads 11 PRTs, and U.S. 

and coalition personnel co-lead one PRT. Figure 2 shows the locations and lead nations of PRTs in 

Afghanistan.

A senior civilian representative leads each 

regional platform and oversees COM personnel in his or her respective region. The senior civilian 

representative serves as the counterpart to the military commander of the regional command, senior 

coalition civilians, and senior local Afghan officials in the region. The senior civilian representative

ensures that all U.S. civilian efforts are integrated with ISAF efforts throughout their respective region 

and coordinates the work of all U.S. COM civilians within the region, ensures coherence of political 

direction and development efforts, and executes U.S. policy and guidance.

 

8 ISAF RC-Capital, the sixth ISAF RC, has responsibility for Kabul and is not included in the COM civilian field 

structure. Turkey leads RC-Capital.
SIGAR Audit-11-2 Strategy and Oversight/Civilian Uplift Page 5 

Figure 2: Map of Regional Commands and Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan

Source: ISAF and U.S. Embassy Kabul IPA.

The DSTs form the newest level in the U.S. Mission Afghanistan field structure, with the first DSTs 

established in 2009. DSTs are subordinate to the PRTs in their respective provinces. These combined 

civilian-military teams conduct security, governance, and development activities in their assigned 

districts. DSTs are embedded with a military element. There are 35 total DSTs, 20 of which are located in 

RC-East. 

U.S. AGENCIES HAVE DEPLOYED NEARLY 67 PERCENT OF CIVILIAN UPLIFT PERSONNEL AND 

HAVE GENERALLY MET LIFE AND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT NEEDS IN THE FIELD

Sixteen U.S. agencies, representing eight departments, are providing personnel as part of the civilian 

uplift in Afghanistan. The uplift will create an estimated 626 new positions over two phases and will 

contribute to increasing the number of personnel under COM from 320 in January 2009 to 

1,516 by January 2012. Nearly half of these positions will be located in Kabul with the remaining half 

distributed across the various field locations throughout Afghanistan, including PRTs and DSTs. As of 

September 9, 2010, 418 personnel have deployed to Afghanistan, filling close to 67 percent of the total 

positions for both phases. Mechanisms are in place to address civilians’ life and operational support 

needs in the field and have generally been met or addressed across the field locations. However, the 

operating environment in Afghanistan presents some challenges to providing this support.
SIGAR Audit-11-2 Strategy and Oversight/Civilian Uplift Page 6 

Sixteen Agencies Have Provided Almost 67 Percent of the 626 Personnel Expected to Deploy 

as Part of the Civilian Uplift in Afghanistan

Sixteen U.S. agencies are contributing personnel as part of the civilian uplift in Afghanistan.9 These 

personnel represent eight departments, including State, USDA, Homeland Security, Justice, the Treasury, 

Transportation, Health and Human Services, Commerce, and USAID. These personnel are implementing 

multiple programs to advance governance, rule of law, and development, which are three key lines of 

effort in U.S. reconstruction strategies (see appendix II). For example, both State and USAID are engaged 

in programs to advance governance and rule of law, such as mentoring Afghan government officials at 

both the national and sub-national levels. In addition, the U.S. Marshals Service and Federal Bureau of 

Investigation10

In January 2009, prior to the March announcement of the civilian uplift, 320 U.S. civilians were assigned 

to the COM in Afghanistan.

are mentoring, training, and equipping Afghan law enforcement entities in an effort to 

promote rule of law.

11 By January 2012, the civilians under chief of mission are expected to 

increase in number to approximately 1,516 U.S. personnel. According to planning documents, 626 

positions were created for the uplift.12

 

9 While SIGAR is considered to be part of the overall increase in the size of U.S. Mission Afghanistan, the office and 

its staff are not included as part of the civilian uplift.

 The total size of personnel under COM and the exact number of 

uplift positions are in flux and subject to change. An Embassy Management official stated that, as of 

September 16, 2010, the projected size of the Mission in January 2012 may be closer to 1,400 U.S. 

personnel, as positions are currently being reassessed. Figure 3 shows the expected growth of COM

personnel in Afghanistan from May 2009 to January 2012 based on U.S. Embassy Kabul projections as of 

August 26, 2010. 

10 The U.S. Marshals Service and Federal Bureau of Investigation are both agencies under the Department of 

Justice.

11 In January 2009, 320 of the Chief of Mission’s 531 authorized base positions were filled. 

12 The civilian uplift is part of an overall increase in the number of civilian personnel assigned to the U.S. Mission in 

Afghanistan. In addition to the 626 personnel filling uplift positions, 211 personnel will fill the remaining

authorized base positions and another 359 positions will be created. 
SIGAR Audit-11-2 Strategy and Oversight/Civilian Uplift Page 7 

Figure 3: Estimated Growth of Chief of Mission Personnel in Afghanistan, May 2009 to 

January 2012

Source: SIGAR analysis of U.S. Embassy Kabul data. 

Note: The data reflect U.S. Embassy Kabul staffing projections as of August 26, 2010.

The first phase of the uplift began in June 2009 and ended on December 31, 2009. This phase created 

411 positions, and as of September 9, 2010, almost 96 percent of them have been filled by deployed 

personnel. The second phase of the uplift began in January 2010 and will conclude in December 2011 

after adding approximately 215 more positions. Only 11 percent of these positions have been filled; 

however, this phase is expected to last for two years. Of the 626 new positions, it is estimated that 

294 will be located in Kabul while 332 will be distributed across the various field locations. See table 1 

for the number of positions authorized and filled as of September 9, 2010.

13

 

13 We did not include data on base positions under COM beyond those positions identified to be part of the civilian 

uplift. As a result, the agencies listed may have more positions and personnel in Afghanistan than are reflected in 

the following tables. For example, on September 9, 2010, Department of Justice agencies had a total of 186 

personnel in country; however, only 21 of them deployed to Afghanistan as part of the civilian uplift.

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

May 2009 September 

2009

December 

2009

March 

2010

June 2010 September 

2010

June 2011 January 

2012

Number of Personnel
SIGAR Audit-11-2 Strategy and Oversight/Civilian Uplift Page 8 

Table 1: Authorized and Filled Positions by Civilian Uplift Phase, as of September 9, 2010 

Positions Authorized Positions Filled Filled as a 

Percentage 

of Total 

Authorized

Phase I Phase II Total Phase I Phase II Total

Total Chief of Mission Afghanistan 411 215 626 394 24 418 67%

By Location

Kabul 168 126 294 167 24 191 65%

Field 243 89 332 227 0 227 68%

By Department/Agency

Department of State 146 134 280 161 18 179 64%

U.S. Agency for International 

Development 178 45 223 152 0 152 68%

Department of Agriculture 50 13 63 44 0 44 70%

Department of Homeland 

Securitya 11 0 11 11 0 11 100%

Department of Justiceb 18 12 30 17 4 21 70%

Department of the Treasury 4 8 12 8 1 9 75%

Department of Transportationc 3 2 5 0 0 0 0%

Department of Health and Human 

Servicesd 1 0 1 1 0 1 100%

Department of Commerce 0 1 1 0 1 1 100%

Source: SIGAR analysis of U.S. Embassy Kabul data.

a Department of Homeland Security positions include Customs and Border Patrol, Immigration and Customs Enforcements, and 

Transportation Security Administration.

b Department of Justice positions include the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration, and U.S. 

Marshals Service.

c Department of Transportation positions include the Federal Aviation Administration.

d Department of Health and Human Services position is filled by an official from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 

State, USAID, and USDA contribute the greatest number of civilians to the uplift, accounting for almost 

91 percent of the total number of uplift positions identified. Personnel from these 3 agencies have filled 

375 positions, or 90 percent, of the total 418 positions filled as of September 9, 2010 (see figure 4).
SIGAR Audit-11-2 Strategy and Oversight/Civilian Uplift Page 9 

Figure 4: Percentage of Filled Uplift Positions by Agency, as of 

September 9, 2010

Source: SIGAR analysis of U.S. Embassy Kabul data.

State, USAID, and USDA personnel accounted for all filled positions in the field as of September 9, 

2010.

14

Table 2: Filled Uplift Positions in Kabul and the Field, as of September 9, 2010 

Table 2 shows the breakdown of filled positions by department and location.

Department/Agency Kabul Field Total

Department of State 103 76 179

U.S. Agency for International Development 36 116 152

Department of Agriculture 9 35 44

Other departments 43 0 43

Total 191 227 418

Source: SIGAR analysis of U.S. Embassy Kabul data.

As of July 12, 2010, approximately 51 percent of personnel in the field were located in RC-East, while 35 

percent were assigned to locations in RC-South or RC-Southwest. 

 

14 The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Drug Enforcement Administration also have personnel located in the 

field. However, the Embassy’s staffing records count them as based in Kabul.

State

43%

USAID

36%

USDA

11%

Other 

Agencies

10%
SIGAR Audit-11-2 Strategy and Oversight/Civilian Uplift Page 10

Mechanisms Are in Place to Meet Civilian Life and Operational Support Needs in the Field and 

Needs Have Generally Been Addressed 

Mechanisms are generally in place to meet civilian life and operational support needs at the various field 

platforms across Afghanistan. These mechanisms include status documents that track key life and 

operational support requirements and formal agreements with U.S. military and coalition partners.

Based on our review of Embassy documents, discussions with officials both in Kabul and at various levels 

in the field, and site visits to locations in RC-South and RC-East, civilian life and operational support 

needs generally appear to have been met or have been identified and are being addressed.

In June 2009, U.S. Embassy Kabul initiated an effort to track the status of life and operational support at 

the various field platforms. Status documents track 26 key requirements across four categories: 

communications, security, work, and service. Our review of documents for five locations in RC-South

determined that there were no substantial deficiencies in the level of life and operational support 

provided in the field in that RC.

15

To ensure that the life and operational support needs of field personnel are met, U.S. Embassy Kabul 

signed formal agreements with U.S. military and coalition partners for the provision of life and 

operational support for civilians at field platforms. In August 2009, the Embassy signed two memoranda 

of agreement (MOA) with USFOR-A

 For example, COM civilians had housing, access to medical care, and 

some level of communications, such as internet access. In most instances where support needs had not 

yet been met, Embassy Kabul was taking steps to address them. In addition, many of the civilians we 

spoke to in the field from all five regions reported that they were receiving sufficient life and operational 

support. Further, civilian and military personnel participating in interagency life support working groups, 

which have been established at the national and regional levels to address concerns about life and 

operational support in the field, stated that there have not been any substantial issues with life and 

operational support in the field.

16 and the ISAF Commander to provide life support, security, and 

mobility for COM civilians at U.S.-led platforms. In addition, the Embassy has memoranda of 

understanding (MOU) with the United Kingdom, Lithuania, Sweden, Norway, Canada, Hungary, and 

Germany to obtain this support for COM civilians assigned to coalition-led platforms. Under the MOAs 

and MOUs, U.S. military and coalition partners agreed to provide U.S. COM civilians with residential 

housing, food, office space, emergency medical care, and on-site security. Further, U.S. military and 

coalition partners agreed to provide mobility support at platforms that are not self-drive.

17

While most civilian life and operational support needs have been met, the unique operating 

environment in Afghanistan makes it challenging to provide some types of support to civilians in the 

field. For example, in April 2010, IPA conducted a survey of all PRTs and DSTs to obtain information on 

Currently, 

the Embassy is negotiating additional MOUs with Italy, Spain, France, and New Zealand. In addition to 

the agreements with U.S. military and coalition partners, the Embassy concluded an interagency MOA 

with agencies that have a civilian presence in the field. The MOA specifies how the Embassy and 

participating agencies will fund the costs of supporting agency personnel in the field. Currently, USAID 

and USDA are the only agencies included, but other agencies may be added as the civilian presence in 

the field increases.

 

15 We reviewed status tracking documents for the following sites in RC-South: PRTs Zabul and Kandahar, and DSTs 

Maiwand, Panjway’i, and Spin Boldak. The three DSTs are located in Kandahar province. 

16 USFOR-A is the command that oversees all U.S. military facilities in Afghanistan.

17 At self-drive locations, U.S. civilians can drive themselves to locations outside of the platform without direct 

military support. Civilians must adhere to specific Embassy Kabul security requirements during self-drive 

movements. The COM determines whether a field location is self-drive.
SIGAR Audit-11-2 Strategy and Oversight/Civilian Uplift Page 11

the status of mobility at each location. The results indicated that, among other factors, lack of adequate 

security, limited military assets, and low priority for missions at certain coalition-led locations limit 

mobility in some field locations. In some less secure areas, military assets are prioritized for securityrelated missions rather than governance and development missions; however, officials noted that 

sufficient security is necessary before civilians can implement governance and development efforts. In 

addition, the survey indicated that a lack of armored vehicles at self-drive locations limits civilian 

movements, and civilians we spoke to echoed this. To address this concern, Embassy Kabul is in the 

process of acquiring additional vehicles to send to the field. 

Senior Embassy officials from the management office and IPA noted that COM civilian engagement with 

Afghan officials is more important than the number of movements personnel make outside of their 

platforms. For example, some PRTs and DSTs are collocated with provincial and district centers, 

respectively, allowing civilians to interact with local officials without leaving the platform. In other 

locations, Afghans frequently travel to the platform to meet with civilians. As a result, a senior IPA 

official stated that the office is drafting an engagement strategy to shift the focus on metrics that 

measure the number of civilian movements outside of platforms to metrics that provide data on how 

often civilians engage with Afghan officials at the platform or a different venue. This action should help 

the Embassy monitor whether personnel in the field are effectively engaging with their Afghan 

counterparts.

SEVERAL KEY AREAS WARRANT FURTHER EXAMINATION AS THE CIVILIAN UPLIFT 

PROGRESSES

A number of key areas merit further examination during the second phase of the civilian uplift. These 

areas include the effectiveness and quality of training for personnel in the field; the level of agency 

guidance for working in the field; the application of models for civilian-military integration; and civilians’ 

ability to oversee implementing partners. In addition, the uplift’s long-term sustainability is a concern. 

Although an interagency review of the uplift has been initiated to reportedly include an evaluation of 

recruitment, hiring, sustainability, and incentives, tentative plans for the review do not include a

comprehensive examination of training needs, required guidance for working in the field, and 

standardized models for civilian-military integration. Furthermore, the Embassy lacks a formal and 

systematic mechanism for collecting and implementing best practices and lessons learned in the field 

over the course of the uplift.

Field Staff Have Raised Several Areas of Concern Over the Course of the Civilian Uplift 

During our review, we identified several topics of concern including training; guidance, civilian-military 

collaboration, oversight of implementing partners, and the uplift’s long- term sustainability.

Limitations in Agency-Specific and Field-Related Training

Agency officials at all levels acknowledged that the process for hiring and placing field staff has evolved 

and improved over the course of the civilian uplift. Many of these officials stated, however, that existing 

training, although quite beneficial in many respects, should place more emphasis on agency-specific 

processes and procedures, and how to work under COM authority with military counterparts under field 

conditions.

According to agency officials, the focus during the uplift’s earlier stages was to meet deadlines for 

getting personnel into the field. However, they pointed out that, over time, agencies have focused more 

on matching people to the appropriate positions and field locations. In addition, senior civilian officials 
SIGAR Audit-11-2 Strategy and Oversight/Civilian Uplift Page 12

at the regional platforms stated that Embassy Kabul has made greater efforts to obtain feedback from 

the senior civilian representatives at the regional platforms during the hiring and placement process.

While some field personnel reported positive feedback on some aspects of the required training, they 

also stated that improvements were needed in such areas as agency-specific procedures, working within 

an interagency setting, field conditions, and civilian-military dynamics. Numerous officials from both 

USAID and State said that many civilians are new to the U.S. government or their current agencies, 

although they are technically qualified and experienced. As a result, they lack complete understanding 

of their agencies’ missions and operating procedures. USAID field personnel indicated that more 

agency-specific training would have been helpful in program design or implementation; grants and 

cooperative agreements; or ways to work with implementing partners. 

Several civilians from State, USAID, and USDA stated that the Embassy needs more realistic training on 

working under COM authority in an interagency context, at field locations, and with military personnel. 

Both civilian and military personnel have stated that they would benefit from further training on the 

precise dynamics and best practices of the civilian-military relationship, as well as more integrated 

civilian-military training. For example, one official stated that training should include more exercises 

and scenarios requiring conflict resolution between civilian and military personnel. 

Furthermore, some Embassy officials expressed the opinion that there should be a requirement for field 

personnel to attend a 2-day introductory training at the Counterinsurgency Training Center-Afghanistan 

(CTC-A or COIN Academy) outside of Kabul either before or shortly after beginning their assignments. 

According to these officials, field personnel would benefit from a better understanding of how 

counterinsurgency concepts are implemented and how to work under field conditions. According to a 

senior Embassy management official, the Embassy has decided to make COIN Academy training required

for field personnel, although it has not been decided whether to hold the Kabul-based training before or 

shortly after deployment to field locations. Logistics of transporting personnel to and from the training 

after deployment to the field is one factor to be considered in this decision, according to the official. On 

September 5, 2010, Ambassador Eikenberry signed an action memorandum directing all Chief of Mission 

field staff to attend training at the COIN Academy training center at Camp Julien. According to the U.S. 

Embassy, IPA and USAID are working with the COIN Academy training center to review the program of 

instruction and are prepared to provide support to a five day COIN leaders course and a three day 

follow-on district stability framework course. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the U.S. Embassy reported that a number of changes to the 

USAID training process have been made or are underway to address concerns expressed by field staff 

and by SIGAR. Reported changes include:

• increased emphasis on orientation with USAID programs in Afghanistan and clarification of 

the roles of USAID COTRs;

• initiation of USAID-specific training programs to include COTR/AOTR certification, democracy 

and governance fundamentals, and project development;

• enhancement of in-country orientation to ensure staff assigned to the field are aware of 

program and project activities implemented at the DST and PRT levels; 

• development of on-line training to familiarize USAID employees with military structures, 

organizations, and systems; and
SIGAR Audit-11-2 Strategy and Oversight/Civilian Uplift Page 13

• development of district stability framework training to be conducted at the COIN Academy for 

all incoming field personnel.

Limited Guidance for Personnel on Some Aspects of Field Work

Many of the officials we spoke to pointed to a lack of clarity from their agencies on various aspects of 

their work in the field, including position roles and responsibilities; reporting and supervisory 

relationships within the field structure; the implementation of national development programs in the 

field; and IPA’s role as it applies to work at field locations. Personnel received limited information on 

their roles and responsibilities before arriving at their assigned locations. Several officials noted that 

they were not provided full explanations of their expected functions in the field or, in the case of USAID, 

the locations of their assignments before they arrived in Kabul. Others pointed to unclear roles within an 

interagency structure, stating that field personnel from all agencies have broad, undefined job 

descriptions. To resolve some of these issues, officials in RC-East and RC-South are taking steps to draft 

more detailed position descriptions to provide more guidance to field personnel. As for advance 

notification of assignments for USAID personnel, IPA and USAID officials stated that the agency is 

addressing this issue and providing personnel earlier notification of their assigned locations.

Civilians we spoke with also pointed to unclear reporting and supervisory chains, with some civilians 

reporting directly to their agency counterparts in Kabul and others reporting through field-level 

platforms. In particular, these officials stated that the role of the civilian team leads in the field is unclear 

and should be better defined. For example, one RC-East guidance memo defines the roles of brigade 

task force and PRT civilian leads as coordinating and shaping stability operations within their areas of 

responsibility. However, according to several officials we spoke with in RC-East, this role should not 

include formal supervision of team members who are not within their agency. In addition, these officials 

stated that this guidance is not always implemented as intended. Alternatively, some management 

personnel stated that the civilian leads should be able to assume a more supervisory role in relation to 

personnel in their platforms from other agencies. To address this issue, according to senior IPA officials, 

IPA will soon issue guidance to help further clarify the reporting and supervisory chains and 

responsibilities among senior field personnel at different levels within the field structure. In addition, 

personnel have noted bottlenecks and inconsistencies in information flow between Kabul and the field. 

For example, on a 2-day site visit conducted in May 2010, senior USAID officials noted concerns about 

gaps in information flow between a regional platform and field program officers at the DST level. 

Civilians in the field often lack information on national development programs that are implementing in 

their areas of operation. According to a 2006 interagency assessment of PRTs in Afghanistan, “...many 

DOS and USAID PRT representatives indicated that they did not have reliable access to information 

about national projects in their province. Their inability to provide comprehensive information about 

U.S. activities to PRT and regional commanders undermined civilian credibility and limited their ability to 

integrate their activities with national programs.” During the course of this review, senior civilian 

officials stated that, in many instances, USAID field officers have no visibility over national funds 

available for the programs implemented in their areas. According to one USAID official, civilians in the 

field need knowledge of national programs and other development activities occurring in their areas to 

aid in the military’s planning. When civilians cannot provide quick responses to their military 

counterparts, they are viewed as being ineffective, which can strain efforts at civilian-military 

integration. This lack of information is also deemed to compromise effectiveness on program oversight.

Further, civilians we met with in the field stated that they do not understand IPA’s role and function as it 

relates to their work. IPA was criticized for not doing an adequate job of communicating with staff in the 

field and not being responsive to issues and problems. Others stated they would encourage IPA to do 
SIGAR Audit-11-2 Strategy and Oversight/Civilian Uplift Page 14

more to demonstrate that it is providing useful operational support to field personnel. According to the 

U.S. Embassy, as of the first week of October 2010, the Embassy approved the new IPA mission 

statement and organizational structure and, on October 4, 2010, IPA issued guidance to the field 

defining IPA’s roles and functions.

Inconsistent Models for Civilian-Military Integration

Some field locations have established and are implementing formal, integrated civilian-military 

collaboration structures, and some COM personnel we met with in the field advocated examining the 

extent to which such models can be applied to field platforms throughout Afghanistan. For example, 

Task Force Rakkasans within RC-East has adopted and implemented what they refer to as a “Board of 

Directors” model for civilian-military collaboration, both for the task force and the PRTs and DSTs in its 

area of operations. According to this model, military and civilian personnel jointly develop priorities, 

ensuring a balance between military and civilian missions. Military leadership, the civilian lead, and at 

least one civilian representing State, USAID, and USDA make joint decisions about what programs the 

platform will implement and set priorities for military and civilian missions requiring movement outside 

the platforms. Similarly, the civilian-led PRT in Uruzgan Province has employed a particularly strong 

emphasis on international integration as well as civilian-military integration, under the concept that 

security, development, and diplomacy are interlinked.18

Despite these models, the consensus among both civilian and military officials we spoke with is that 

civilian-military integration relies primarily on individual personalities even at platforms where more 

formal structures exist. Furthermore, an IPA summary of conclusions reached from interviews with 

approximately 50 State, USAID, and USDA personnel stationed throughout Afghanistan concluded that 

civilian-military integration is occurring because of personal tenacity rather than institutional planning. 

The summary added that there are no clear lines of communication for civilians in the field on how to 

act with the military portion of their PRTs, or how to delineate “taskings” from their military partners. 

 

Although many civilian and military officials stated that civilian-military integration is going well, some 

cited challenges in developing the relationship, stemming from differences in organizational cultures 

and perspectives. Several civilian officials we spoke with expressed concern that, in certain geographic 

areas, civilians who are embedded with the military at the platforms are tasked and absorbed into the 

military operations with little time to devote to development activities or to program oversight. Several 

officials within the RC-East area of operations have expressed their opinion that the Board of Directors 

model or some kind of clearer guidance on civilian-military integration should be implemented and 

applied universally in Afghanistan. In commenting on a draft of this report, the U.S. Embassy noted that 

the board of director model used in RC-East is a useful construct that they will explore further in better 

integrating civilian and military activities.

Inability to Fully Oversee USAID’s Implementing Partners

To ensure that its programs support the strategic goals of the U.S. government in Afghanistan and 

proper oversight is provided for projects across Afghanistan, USAID is undertaking a process to devolve 

some program oversight functions to field personnel. The process is ongoing and includes specific 

training to meet statutory and agency requirements. Nevertheless, certain factors, such as levels of 

expertise and mobility, present challenges to successfully transferring contract and program oversight to 

the field. 

 

18 PRT Uruzgan is currently led by an Australian diplomat after transitioning from Dutch civilian leadership on 

August 1, 2010. It consists of Australian, U.S., and Slovakian civilian personnel and military elements. Uruzgan 

Province transitioned from Dutch to U.S. military command on August 1, 2010.
SIGAR Audit-11-2 Strategy and Oversight/Civilian Uplift Page 15

Several USAID officials we spoke to stated that the authority of USAID field personnel to adequately 

oversee agency projects implemented in the field is limited.19

Because this process is still in its early stages, it is too soon to determine the extent to which USAID will 

devolve oversight authorities to the various levels in the field. However, civilian personnel have cited 

challenges to successfully increasing oversight. For example, many USAID field personnel, although they 

are technical experts, are new to the agency and have limited knowledge of program management 

processes and government contracting requirements. One senior USAID official stated that, because 

USAID has had difficulties recruiting senior officers for assignment in Afghanistan, there are few 

experienced, senior officers to provide new activity managers with leadership and guidance. 

Furthermore, poor security can limit the mobility of field officers, preventing them from providing 

necessary oversight of implemented projects. Another senior USAID official stated that many USAID field 

staff cannot get out of their compounds or bases because civilian movements for development purposes 

are considered a relatively low priority for military security details.

 To ensure that its programs support the 

strategic goals of the U.S. government in Afghanistan, USAID seeks to devolve greater program 

management and contract oversight authority to USAID representatives at the Regional Missions, PRTs,

and DSTs. Devolution of contract authority for the field is specified in a draft USAID Mission Order. 

According to the draft order, USAID would assign Contracting Officer’s Technical Representatives 

(COTRs) to Kabul and the regional platforms, while designating activity managers at field platforms to 

work with the COTRs and implementing partners. Activity managers are responsible for daily 

management of one or more specific activities and report to the COTR. USAID field program officers may 

be delegated by COTRs as activity managers for USAID programs operating at the provincial or district 

levels within their areas of responsibility. As part of such devolution, USAID anticipated the need for 

specialized training to ensure accountability and to satisfy U.S. government regulations and USAID 

contract and grant oversight policies. One series of such trainings was reportedly scheduled for July 

2010. 

Sustainability of the Civilian Uplift at Current Levels May Be Difficult

One goal of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy is to sustain increased civilian 

staffing levels in Afghanistan beyond July 2011. Nevertheless, concern has been expressed that the 

civilian presence in the field may not be sustainable at planned levels. This is particularly true for USAID, 

which is drawing personnel from a decreasing pool of qualified applicants, many of whom are recruited 

externally. Furthermore, USAID is already facing difficulties recruiting career personnel for assignments 

in Afghanistan as many have already completed tours in the country. A July 2010 Embassy cable 

expressed similar concerns about State’s limited pool of Foreign Service Officers, noting that 

approximately 20 percent of the Foreign Service Officers posted overseas are already serving in 

Afghanistan, Iraq, or Pakistan. In addition, the cable noted concerns with USDA’s reliance on its 

domestic workforce to fill its positions.

 

19USAID’s primary presence in Afghanistan is through its implementing partners in the field. These partners are 

directed by Contracting Officer’s Technical Representatives (COTRs) primarily located in Kabul, who administer and 

implement acquisition or assistance awards. 
SIGAR Audit-11-2 Strategy and Oversight/Civilian Uplift Page 16

An Interagency Review of the Civilian Uplift Does Not Include a Comprehensive Examination 

of Training, Guidance to the Field, and Standardized Models for Civilian-Military Integration

During the course of our review, the Embassy, in conjunction with State department headquarters, 

began an interagency evaluation of the civilian uplift that includes a review of the sustainability of the 

increased civilian presence both in Kabul and the field. As of late July 2010, tentative plans called for this 

review to examine such issues as personnel recruitment and hiring, staffing levels, tour lengths, and 

incentive packages. Discussion in anticipation of the review touched upon preparing staff for 

assignments to the field. However, the issues raised did not include a comprehensive examination of 

training and guidance provided to civilian personnel working in the field. A key practice for effective 

workforce planning is to develop programs and processes, such as training and staff development, to 

build workforces that are tailored to agencies’ unique needs. By including a comprehensive review of 

training and the guidance necessary for working in the field, agencies can better prepare civilian 

personnel for their assignments and provide them with the guidance they need to carry out their duties. 

Furthermore, the issues raised in anticipation of the review did not examine how standardized models 

for civilian-military integration could be more broadly applied in the field. Successful civilian-military 

integration is a core principle of the United States Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign 

Plan for Support to Afghanistan. Further, according to best practices for interagency collaboration, 

agencies should work together to define and agree on their respective roles and responsibilities, and to 

establish standards and procedures for operating across agency boundaries. The application of such 

standardized models for civilian-military integration is necessary to move personnel in the field away 

from relying on ad hoc arrangements and individual personalities. 

The Embassy Lacks a Formal Process for Collecting and Applying Lessons Learned and Best 

Practices

Another key practice for interagency collaboration is for agencies engaged in collaborative efforts to 

monitor and evaluate their efforts to enable them to identify areas for improvement. According to a U.S. 

Government Accountability Office report on strategic workforce planning, “Periodic measurement of an 

agency’s progress toward human capital goals and the extent that human capital activities contributed 

to achieving programmatic goals provides information for effective oversight by identifying performance 

shortfalls and appropriate corrective actions.”20

One of the roles of IPA’s Stabilization Tiger Team is to collect best practices and lessons learned from the 

field. Although the Tiger Team has responsibility for carrying out this task across all field platforms, it 

has a small staff and other competing priorities have prevented it from focusing on fulfilling this 

responsibility. For instance, starting in February 2010, the Tiger Team began a series of interviews with 

field personnel to learn about their experiences but then was tasked with other assignments that 

slowed the process. Although the team prepared and submitted a brief summary of issues stemming 

from some field interviews to the U.S. Embassy Kabul’s executive office, no formal and systematic 

framework for capturing and applying lessons learned exists.

Our discussions with civilian officials have revealed that 

the Embassy lacks a mechanism for formally and systematically collecting, analyzing, and implementing 

lessons learned at the field level. 

Officials in the field and at the U.S. Embassy Kabul advocated the creation of a larger team of individuals 

dedicated to lessons learned and best practices analysis and activities. Some have pointed to the Center 

 

20See GAO-06-15, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration 

Among Federal Agencies, October 2005.
SIGAR Audit-11-2 Strategy and Oversight/Civilian Uplift Page 17

for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) as a model for the Embassy’s own formal mechanism. CALL is an 

organization focused on the collection, analysis, dissemination, and integration of lessons learned to 

support combat readiness for soldiers around the world.

One way to systematically collect data is to develop comprehensive surveys on a variety of issues that 

can facilitate quantitative analysis. This is a strategy central to program evaluation methodology. As 

part of our audit work for determining the levels of life and operational support and revealing key issues 

and concerns as part of the civilian uplift, SIGAR had planned to conduct a survey of chief of mission 

personnel in the field. However, due to objections by State, we were unable to disseminate the survey. 

These objections included concern with the survey’s questions about life and operational support, the 

level of civilian-military integration, and challenges associated with working in the field as well as 

general demographic information, which State believed should not be part of SIGAR’s review. Although

we were able to talk to almost 40 civilians located in the field, the survey would have provided us, and 

the Embassy, with additional quantifiable information on issues in the field at a given point in time. A 

series of comprehensive field surveys over the course of the uplift would help monitor and evaluate the 

results of the civilian uplift and assist in identifying shortfalls and developing corrective measures. For 

example, such surveys could provide measurable indicators of effectiveness in the field and indicators 

that would help determine the magnitude of staff concerns about mobility. 

CONCLUSION

The U.S. civilian uplift has resulted in an unprecedented increase in the number of U.S. government 

civilians in Afghanistan. With 16 departments and agencies represented, ranging from State and USAID 

to the Departments of Commerce and Transportation, the uplift will create 626 new positions in Kabul 

and the field, and contribute to tripling the size of Chief of Mission personnel in Afghanistan. In the field, 

civilians’ life and operational support needs have largely been met, although Afghanistan’s operating 

environment presents challenges in providing certain types of support. As the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and 

State department headquarters conduct their interagency review of the uplift, officials may need to 

examine provisions for training, required guidance for working in the field, and standardized models for 

civilian-military integration to determine whether current processes are enabling U.S. government 

civilians to be effective in achieving U.S. strategic reconstruction goals. Further, a formal mechanism for 

collecting, analyzing, and implementing best practices and lessons learned over the course of the 

uplift—to include the design and implementation of a series of comprehensive field surveys—could help 

the Embassy to make the changes necessary to improve civilians’ effectiveness in achieving these goals.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To ensure that the interagency evaluation of the civilian uplift is comprehensive, SIGAR recommends 

that the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan:

1. Include the following items as part of the interagency review: training, required guidance for 

working in the field, and standardized models for civilian-military integration. 

To formally monitor civilians’ effectiveness in the field and identify shortfalls and necessary corrective 

actions, SIGAR recommends that the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan:

2. Develop a mechanism for collecting, analyzing, and applying lessons learned and best practices, 

to include the design and implementation of a series of comprehensive field surveys. 
SIGAR Audit-11-2 Strategy and Oversight/Civilian Uplift Page 18

COMMENTS

The U.S. Embassy Kabul provided comments on a draft of this report, which are included in appendix II. 

In its comments, the U.S. Embassy Kabul generally concurred with the report’s recommendations and

outlined actions it would take to address the report’s recommendations, including: 

• on-going curriculum reviews by IPA to meet the pre-deployment and field deployment training 

needs of field staff and plans to communicate the intent of civilian-military integration during 

training at the COIN Academy; 

• changes to USAID’s training program, in Washington D.C. and Afghanistan, including 

enhancements to in-country orientation and on-line training to familiarize USAID employees 

with military structures, organizations, and systems; and 

• examination of the most effective ways to collect data from field staff.

Although the U.S. Embassy Kabul agreed with our recommendation to include training and required 

guidance for working in the field as part of the interagency review, it noted that agencies’ headquarters 

in Washington, D.C. should be tasked to review training and analyze and apply lessons learned and best 

practices. Our recommendation states that these items as part of the interagency review, which 

includes members from the Department of State headquarters. We agree that the U.S. Ambassador 

alone is not responsible for developing and providing required training. However, we believe that the 

U.S. Embassy has a key role in this interagency review of the civilian uplift where these items should be 

addressed. 

The U.S. Embassy Kabul agreed to examine ways to obtain observations and collect data from personnel 

in the field, but indicated that it is not likely conduct comprehensive field surveys. We believe 

comprehensive surveys would be an effective means to gather reliable information to determine if 

problems expressed by personnel are wide-spread. For example, such surveys could quantify staff views 

of whether they are receiving adequate mobility to engage with Afghan officials. We provided the 

Embassy with the survey questionnaire we developed during the course of this audit, which may be 

useful to the Embassy in the event they decide to utilize this method of gathering information from the 

field.

In addition, the U.S. Embassy Kabul emphasized the unity of effort among civilian agencies under COM 

and its application to civilian-military relations and the ability to accomplish the civilian uplift. The 

comments also noted significant challenges the U.S. Embassy Kabul faced in the managing the civilian 

uplift. In particular, one year assignments for Foreign Service Offices and others assigned to the U.S. 

Embassy Kabul severely restrict the amount of training that can be accomplished in the field. Ideally, 

the U.S. Embassy Kabul recommends all employees serve an 18-month assignment in Afghanistan, with 

any required training preceding assignment. 
SIGAR Audit-11-2 Strategy and Oversight/Civilian Uplift Page 19

APPENDIX I: SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This report provides the results of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction’s (SIGAR) review of the implementation of the civilian uplift in support of U.S. 

reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. This report (1) identifies the types and number of personnel 

provided to implement the civilian uplift and assesses the extent to which the life and operational 

support needs of these personnel have been met, and (2) identifies key areas of concern raised during 

the initial stages of the uplift. We limited the scope of our audit to civilian personnel under chief of 

mission (COM) authority. Further, given the strategic focus on efforts at the sub-national level and the 

dramatic increase in civilian personnel expected to deploy to the field, we focused primarily on

Department of State (State), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and Department of 

Agriculture (USDA) personnel assigned to regional platforms, brigade task forces, provincial

reconstruction teams (PRT), and district support teams (DST) throughout Afghanistan. 

To identify the types and number of personnel provided to implement the civilian uplift, we analyzed 

U.S. Embassy Kabul Management Office data, current as of September 9, 2010, and Office of 

Interagency Provincial Affairs (IPA) data, as of July 12, 2010, on current and projected numbers of 

positions created under the U.S. Chief of Mission in Afghanistan and personnel deployed to Afghanistan 

as part of the uplift and provided overall totals and subtotals by phase of the uplift, by agency, and by

location. We also examined staffing data from the Regional Platforms. We reviewed U.S. policy and key 

strategies for Afghanistan, including the U.S policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, the U.S. strategy 

for Afghanistan and Pakistan, State’s Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy, and 

Embassy Kabul and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan’s (USFOR-A) United States Government Integrated CivilianMilitary Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan. We also reviewed State and Embassy cables, staffing 

requests, and various Embassy section notes. In addition, we interviewed officials in Embassy 

Management, IPA, State, USAID, USDA, and the Departments of Justice and the Treasury. To assess the 

extent to which the operational and life support needs were met for additional personnel at the field 

level, we analyzed Embassy life and operational support status documents for five locations in Regional 

Command (RC) South to assess the level of support provided for COM civilians at those locations. We 

also reviewed Embassy Kabul memoranda of understanding and memoranda of agreement (MOA) with 

USFOR-A, the Commander of the International Security Assistance Force, and coalition partners for the 

provision of life support, mobility, and security; an interagency MOA between State, USAID, and USDA 

for supporting agency personnel in the field; the results of IPA’s April 2010 survey of field mobility; and 

Embassy cables. During June and July 2010, we conducted site visits to the following field locations in 

RC-East and RC-South to interview U.S. civilian, military, and coalition personnel: Regional Platforms East 

and South; Task Forces Wolverine and Rakkasans; PRTs Panjshir, Gardez, Sharana, and Uruzgan; and 

DSTs Zormat, Orgun East, Jaji, and Zardan. In addition, we interviewed officials in Embassy Management, 

IPA, State, USAID, and USDA at Embassy Kabul; senior civilian representatives for Regional Platforms

East, North, South, and West; and field personnel transiting though Kabul. 

To identify key areas of concern raised during the initial stages of the uplift, we reviewed U.S. policy and 

key strategies for Afghanistan, Embassy Kabul cables, and USAID draft mission orders and documents 

describing contract and grant oversight responsibilities. We also reviewed U.S. Government 

Accountability Office reports on key practices for interagency collaboration and strategic workforce 

planning as well as information on the Center for Army Lessons Learned. We conducted site visits to 

various field locations and interviewed civilian, military, and coalition personnel. In addition, we 

interviewed officials in Embassy Management, IPA, and USAID at the Embassy; senior civilian 

representatives; and field personnel transiting through Kabul. In August and September 2010, we 

provided preliminary briefings for the Assistant Chief of Mission at Embassy Kabul and the IPA 

Coordinator, and obtained information on current efforts and State’s planned internal review of the 

civilian uplift. 
SIGAR Audit-11-2 Strategy and Oversight/Civilian Uplift Page 20

As part of our audit, we planned to conduct a survey of all COM civilian personnel located in the field at 

regional platforms, brigade task forces, PRTs, and DSTs. This survey would have included questions on 

life and operational support; coordination with the military and other partners; supervisory and 

reporting chains; guidance and training; and demographic information on the person’s agency, location, 

job title, and related prior work experience. This would have allowed us to obtain a comprehensive 

perspective with quantifiable data on issues that have arisen in the field during the initial stages of the 

uplift. However, due to objections by the Department of State, we were unable to disseminate the 

survey.

During the planning stage of the review, we considered whether the use of computer-processed data, 

internal controls, compliance with laws, regulations, or provisions of contracts and grant agreements, 

and fraud risk were significant to the audit objectives. We determined that none of these elements was

significant. 

We conducted work from April to September 2010 at various locations in Afghanistan in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and 

perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. The performance audit 

was conducted by SIGAR under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181, and the Inspector General Act 

of 1978, as amended.
SIGAR Audit-11-2 Strategy and Oversight/Civilian Uplift Page 21

APPENDIX II: U.S. AGENCY ROLES IN RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS IN AFGHANISTAN

Table I lists the various departments and agencies involved in the civilian uplift, the strategic lines of 

effort they are contributing to, and examples of programs supporting these lines of efforts.

Table I: U.S. Departments and Agencies Contributing Personnel to the Civilian Uplift in Afghanistan

Department/Agency Strategic Line 

of Effort Example of Supporting Programs

Department of State Governance, 

rule of law

Mentoring and advising Afghan government officials at the 

national and sub-national levels

U.S. Agency for International 

Development

Governance, 

rule of law, 

development

Mentoring and advising Afghan government officials at the 

national and sub-national levels; managing development 

programs, including the Local Governance and Community 

Development program and Afghanistan Vouchers for 

Increased Production in Agriculture

Department of Agriculture Governance, 

development

Mentoring Afghan government officials at the Ministry of 

Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock, and local officials

Department of Homeland Security Rule of law

Advising, mentoring, training, and equipping Afghan 

border, customs, and related entities to enforce Afghan 

customs and immigration law

 Customs and Border Patrol Rule of law

 Immigration and Customs

 Enforcement

Rule of law

 Transportation Security 

 Administration

Governance, 

development

Assisting with efforts to enhance airport and aircraft 

security by providing technical expertise to Afghan officials

Department of Justice Rule of law Mentoring Afghan prosecutors and judges in handling 

counternarcotics, corruption, and terrorism cases

 Drug Enforcement Administration Rule of law

Training and mentoring Afghan National Police and other 

law enforcement personnel Federal Bureau of Investigation Rule of law

 U.S. Marshals Service Rule of law

Department of the Treasury Governance, 

rule of law

Advising and mentoring Afghan officials in the Ministry of

Finance and line ministries on budget execution and audit 

capabilities

Department of Transportation Governance, 

development Advising Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation; assisting 

Afghan officials with a variety of issues, such as drafting 

civil aviation law and providing technical assistance on 

 Federal Aviation Administration surface transportation planning Governance, 

development

Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention Development

Overseeing Department of Health and Human Services 

programs, including initiatives to improve maternal and 

child health

Department of Commerce Development Assisting with efforts to promote economic development, 

trade, and commercial relations

Source: SIGAR analysis of U.S. strategies for Afghanistan, agency documents, and interviews with agency officials.
SIGAR Audit-11-2 Strategy and Oversight/Civilian Uplift Page 22

APPENDIX III: COMMENTS FROM THE U.S. EMBASSY IN KABUL
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(This report was conducted under the audit project code SIGAR-021A).
SIGAR’s Mission The mission of the Special Inspector General for 

Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) is to enhance 

oversight of programs for the reconstruction of 

Afghanistan by conducting independent and objective 

audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of 

taxpayer dollars and related funds. SIGAR works to 

provide accurate and balanced information, evaluations, 

analysis, and recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, 

U.S. agencies, and other decision-makers to make 

informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions to:

• improve effectiveness of the overall reconstruction 

strategy and its component programs; 

• improve management and accountability over funds 

administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies and their 

contractors;

• improve contracting and contract management 

processes;

• prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and 

• advance U.S. interests in reconstructing 

Afghanistan. 

Obtaining Copies of SIGAR 

Reports and Testimonies

To obtain copies of SIGAR documents at no cost, go to 

SIGAR’s Web site (www.sigar.mil). SIGAR posts all 

released reports, testimonies, and correspondence on its 

Web site.

To Report Fraud, Waste, and 

Abuse in Afghanistan 

Reconstruction Programs

To help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and 

reprisal contact SIGAR’s hotline:

• Web: www.sigar.mil/fraud

• Email: hotline@sigar.mil

• Phone Afghanistan: +93 (0) 700-10-7300 

• Phone DSN Afghanistan 318-237-2575 

• Phone International: +1-866-329-8893 

• Phone DSN International: 312-664-0378 

• U.S. fax: +1-703-604-0983 

Public Affairs Public Affairs Officer

• Phone: 703-602-8742 

• Email: PublicAffairs@sigar.mil 

• Mail: SIGAR Public Affairs

400 Army Navy Drive

Arlington, VA 22202