Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-32 | September 3, 2020 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Christopher Taylor-Price

Marion County Public Defender Agency

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Tina L. Mann

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Love Barefield,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

September 3, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A-CR-32

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Grant Hawkins, 

Judge 

Trial Court Cause No.

49G05-1807-F6-23881

May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-32 | September 3, 2020 Page 2 of 6

[1] Love Barefield argues the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him 

to pay a $100 public defender fee following his convictions of Level 6 felony 

obstruction of justice1 and Class B misdemeanor public nudity.

2

 We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On July 18, 2018, Barefield stood behind a female patron in the checkout line at 

an Indianapolis Wal-Mart. The woman felt something brush against her 

buttocks, and she turned around to investigate. She looked down and saw 

Barefield holding his exposed penis, which was sticking out of a hole near the 

pocket area of his sweatpants. She yelled to get the attention of Wal-Mart 

employees, and Barefield quickly walked toward the rear of the store. A WalMart employee followed Barefield. A second Wal-Mart employee went outside 

of the store and alerted Officer John Reichle, an off-duty Indianapolis 

Metropolitan Police Department (“IMPD”) officer working security at the WalMart, that there was a man inside the store exposing himself. The employees 

directed Officer Reichle to Barefield, and Officer Reichle detained him. Officer 

Reichle asked for a sex crimes detective to be sent to the scene, and IMPD 

Detective Michelle Floyd responded. 

1 Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-2.

2 Ind. Code § 35-45-4-1.5.
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[3] A short while later, Officer Reichle transported Barefield to a police station and 

put him in an interview room. Detective Floyd monitored Barefield in the 

interview room using video surveillance. She applied for and received a search 

warrant for Barefield’s pants. Detective Floyd then told Barefield that she had 

received a search warrant for his pants and that an evidence technician was 

going to photograph and collect the sweatpants. Once Detective Floyd left the 

interview room, Barefield started ripping his pants. An officer then entered the 

room and collected the pants from Barefield. 

[4] On July 23, 2018, the State charged Barefield with Level 6 felony obstruction of 

justice, Class B misdemeanor public nudity, Class A misdemeanor public 

indecency3 and Class B misdemeanor battery.4

 Barefield requested the 

appointment of counsel. In his petition, Barefield indicated that he did not 

receive any public assistance, was employed, and made $446.00 a week. He 

also indicated that he did not own his own home, nor did he have a savings or 

checking account. On August 22, 2018, the court issued an order, stating:

Based on the foregoing Petition for Appointment of Counsel and 

on a thorough examination of defendant’s total financial picture 

and the nature of the criminal charges, the Court finds and 

orders: This petition is GRANTED, as the Court finds that the 

defendant is currently indigent. An attorney shall be appointed 

3 Ind. Code § 35-45-4-1.

4 Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-32 | September 3, 2020 Page 4 of 6

to represent the defendant as follows: Public Defender fee of 

$100.

(App. Vol. II at 36) (emphasis in original). The court held a bench trial on

November 26, 2019. At the conclusion of trial, the court found Barefield guilty 

of obstruction of justice and public nudity. The court found Barefield not guilty 

of battery and public indecency. On December 6, 2019, the court sentenced 

Barefield to concurrent terms of two years for the obstruction of justice count 

and 180 days for the public indecency count. After pronouncing the sentence, 

the judge stated, “No fines or costs. He’s indigent.” (Tr. Vol. II at 64.) The 

court awarded Barefield credit for 341 days spent in pretrial incarceration and 

ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in the Marion County Jail. 

Discussion and Decision

[5] Sentencing decisions, including those imposing costs or fees, are generally left 

to the sound discretion of the trial court. Cleveland v. State, 129 N.E.3d 227, 237

(Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. We review such decisions for an abuse of 

discretion, and we will reverse only if the decision “is clearly against the logic 

and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.” Id. “If the fees imposed by 

the trial court fall within the parameters provided by statute, we will not find an 

abuse of discretion.” Langdon v. State, 71 N.E.3d 1162, 1163 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2017). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-32 | September 3, 2020 Page 5 of 6

[6] Barefield argues the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to pay 

a $100 public defender fee without making a specific finding that Barefield 

could pay such a fee. Indiana Code section 35-33-7-6 (2004)5 states:

(a) Prior to the completion of the initial hearing, the judicial 

officer shall determine whether a person who requests assigned 

counsel is indigent. If the person is found to be indigent, the 

judicial officer shall assign counsel to the person.

* * * * *

(c) If the court finds that the person is able to pay part of the cost 

of representation by the assigned counsel, the court shall order 

the person to pay the following:

(1) For a felony action, a fee of one hundred dollars 

($100).

Barefield notes that in Banks v. State, we held the trial court abused its discretion 

in imposing a $200 public defender fee without finding the defendant had the 

ability to pay the fee. 847 N.E.2d 1050, 1051 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. 

We stated that “[u]nder Ind. Code § 35-33-7-6 and Ind. Code § 33-9-11.5-6, a 

court must explicitly find a defendant can pay the fees imposed. We are 

directed to no such finding in the record.” Id. at 1052. 

5 This statute was amended effective July 1, 2020.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-32 | September 3, 2020 Page 6 of 6

[7] However, Barefield’s case differs from Banks in two respects. First, Indiana 

Code section 33-9-11.5-6 has since been repealed, and therefore, the statute is 

not applicable to this case. P.L. 98-2004, Sec. 164. Second, unlike the trial 

court in Banks, the record here indicates the trial court determined Barefield had 

the ability to pay the public defender fee. In Barefield’s petition seeking 

appointment of counsel, he indicated he received $446.00 a week in income. 

The court thoroughly reviewed Barefield’s petition and made its decision after 

considering Barefield’s “total financial picture and the nature of the criminal 

charges.” (App. Vol. II at 36.) While Barefield was indigent, he possessed 

some income that could be used to partially offset the cost of his representation. 

Therefore, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered

Barefield to pay a $100 public defender fee. See Cleveland, 129 N.E.3d at 238 

(holding trial court took necessary steps to determine defendant’s ability to pay 

public defender fee by asking about defendant’s employment, working hours, 

financial status, and custody arrangements).

Conclusion

[8] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Barefield to pay a 

$100 public defender fee because the court evaluated Barefield’s financial status, 

income, and other factors before imposing the fee. Accordingly, we affirm.

[9] Affirmed.

Robb, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.