F OR P UB LIC AT ION 

### U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT

R OS A D EL I C I A G AL I NDO D E R ODRI GUEZ , Petitioner ,

v. E RI C H. H OL DER , J R ., Attorney Ge ne ra l, Respondent

. No. 08-73477 Ag ency No. A076-217-735

R OS A D EL I C I A G AL I NDO D E R ODRI GUEZ , Petitioner ,

v. E RI C H. H OL DER , J R ., Attorney Ge ne ra l, Respondent

. No. 09-71264 Ag ency No. A076-217-735

OPI NI ON

On Petition for Review of a n Orde r of the B oa rd of I mmi g ratio n App e a ls Argued and Submitted June 5, 20 13 —Pa sa de na , Ca lif or niaG AL I NDO V
. H OL DER

2

T he H onorable Si dney H

. St ei n, D i s t r i ct Ju dge f or t he U

. S. D i s t r i ct * C o urt f o r t he So ut hern D i st ri ct of N ew Y o rk, s i t t i ng by desi gnat i o n.
T hi s s ummary cons t i t ut es no part o f the o pi ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s ** b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. Filed July 30, 2013
Be fore : Stephen S. Trott and Wil liam A. Fletc her, Circuit J udg es, and Sidney H. Stein, District J udg e. * Op ini on by Judg e Ste in

SUMMAR

Y **

Im m igration The panel g rante d Rosa Galindo de Rodriguez’s petition for r eview of

the B oard of

I mmigra tion App ea l s’ dec ision finding her ine ligible f

or ca ncellation of remova l, but de nied her pe tition from the denial of he r motion to reopen. The pa nel held that the B I A erred in conc luding that Galindo’s re sid en ce “af

ter having be en admitted in any status ” wa s n ot c on tin uo us a s r equ ir ed b y

8 U .S. C. § 1229b(a) (2) beca

use she took a thirteen-da y trip to Mex ico purs ua nt t o a g ra nt o f a dv anc e pa

ro le . T he panel a lso he ld that § 1229b(a) (2) only

require s seven year s of continuous residenc e; it does not require continuous status of any particula r kind, and the la

wfulness of he r pre s en ce in the United States is immaterial to th e co n tinuity of re sidence

. Th e pa ne l he ld, ho we ve r, tha

t th e B I A d id n ot a

bu seG AL I NDO V
. H OL DER 3

dis c re tio n in de nyingGa lin do ’s mot ion to r e op e n s e e kin g to r e tr a c th e r

a dm i s s i o n s an d

c o n c e s s i o n s o f

r e m o v a b i l i ty.

CO UN SEL Phili ppe M. Dwelshauver s, Fr esno, C alifornia, for Petitioner.
J onathan Aa

ron Robbins ( ar g ued), Tr ial Attorney , Tony W e s t , A s s i s t an tA t t o r

n e y G e n e r a l , W i l l i amC

. P e a c h e y, Assistant Director , and R ebecca Hoffbe rgPhill ips, Trial Attorney , Un it e d

St a te s D e p artment of Justice, Civil Division, Offic e of Immigra

ti o n L itigation, Washing ton, D.C., for Re sp on de nt.

OP IN ION STEI N, District J udg e: Rosa Delicia G alindo de Rodriguez (“Ga lindo”) petitions for r eview of

two final orde rs of the B oard of I mmigration Ap p e a ls ( “ B I A ” ) , th e f ir s t f in d in g h e r

in e li g ib le f

or ca n cellation of removal and the second de nying he r motion t o r e o p e n . In h e r

f i r s tp e t i t i o n , G a l i n d o c o n t e n d s th a tth e B IA err ed in finding that she had not “ resided in the United States continuously

for 7 year s after

havingbeen a dm i t t ed in any status ” —a

re qu ir e me nt f

or c e rt a in le g a l pe rm ane nt r e sid e nts (“L PRs”) to be elig ible for c an ce l lation of remova l. See I mmigrati o n and Nationality Act (“ I NA”) § 240A(a )(2) , 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2) . The B I A found that he r thirteen- day trip to Mex i co , p u rsuant to an a uthorization of advance parole , sever ed the continuity of her United S tates re sidence

. That conc lusion cannot be squar ed with the plain text of theG AL I NDO V
. H OL DER

4
statut e , wh ic h de fi ne s a

pe rs on ’s re sid e nc e a s h e r “ pr inc ipa l, actua l dwelling pla ce.” SeeI NA§ 1 01 (a )( 33 ), 8 U .S. C. § 1101(a) (33).
Be fore this Court, t he g overnme nt also argues that she was re quired to maintain a la wful admit ted s tatus throug hout he r s e ve n y e ars of re sid e nc e . B ut t he pr ov isi on

a t is su e on ly require s seven year s of continuous reside nce; it does not require continuou s s tatus of any particula

r kind. The lawfulne ss of her pr esenc e in the United States “ afte r having been a dmitted in any status” i s immaterial to the continuity of her r esidenc e. See8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2)

. Inh e r s e c o n d p e t i t i o n , G a l i n d o c o n t e n d s t h a tt h e B IA should have re opened the case to al low her to re trac t her conce ssion of removability and ar g u e based on intervening case law that the Immigration J ud ge (“I J ”) should have suppressed he r initial confession to h er alien-smug g ling crime. This pe tition i s meritless. Galindo pre sents no authority to support her a

rgument that s h e may

retra ct her binding c oncessions of r emovability . Acc ording ly , the Court g rants her first petition, vacates the B I A’s dismissal of her a p p e a l, an d r e ma

n d s to th e B I A f

o r f urth e r p r o c e e d in g s . We deny Galindo’s sec ond petition.
I. Bac kgr ound A. G al in d o’ s 1 99 0 A dm iss ion and R e side nc e in t he United S tate s Galindo, a Mexi can national, entere d the United S tates on M ay 1 2 , 1 9 9 0 b y

p re s en t i n g h er s el f f

o r i n s p ec t i o nu s i n g a border crossingcar d. Although the border crossingcar d lim ite d he r to a bri e f sta

y in the vic ini ty

of the Un ite d S tate s-G AL I NDO V
. H OL DER 5

Mexi co borde r, she immediately moved north t o the Fr esno are a and marr ie d A dr ian Ro dr igue z. In 1 99 6, Ad ri an b e c ame a natur a lize d U nit e d S tate s c iti zen , th e c ou ple ha d th e ir

fi rst child toge ther, and Ga lindo applied for a n adjustm ent of status based on Adr ian’s cit izenship. Galindo was g rante d L PR st atus on May

24, 2000. Duringthe seve n y ear s afte r Galindo moved to the United S tates in May

1990, she took only

one trip outside the c ountr y . The si gnif

ic anc e of that tr ip i s th e fo c us of thi s appea l. Shortly

afte r commencing her a pplication for adjustment of status in fall 1996, Galindo appl i ed for a nd rec eived a

g rant of a dvance parole t o v i s i t her a iling mother in T ijuana, Mexic o . Advance par ole was grante d on Dec ember

23, 1996, all o wi n g h er to tra vel to Mexi co and back. G alindo crosse d into M ex i co on De cembe r 24, 1996, visited her mother, and re turned t h irteen da y s later, on Janu ary 5, 19 97 . Upo n h e r r e tur

n, Ga lin do was pa

ro le d into the country

to continue her

then-pe ndin g ap plication for a dju stm e nt o f s tatus

. B. Galindo’s Arr est and Rem oval P r ocee din gs Approxim ately nine y ear s later, on November 16 , 2005, Galindo was de tained at the San Y sidro border station when sh e a tte mpt e d to us e her da ug hte r’ s U nit e d S tate s b ir th cer tificate to brin g an undocumented minor c hild across the border . G a lin do ha d a g re e d to dr ive the g ir l f ro m T iju ana

to a location in C alifornia in ex chang e for $500. Galindo and another individu al h ad picked the g irl up in T ijuana and pr oc e e de d to the bo rd e r. Duri ng ins pe c tio n, the bo rd e r a g e nt, su sp e c tin g that th e bir

th c e rt if ic a te did no t be lon g to t

he g ir l, took the occupa

nts inside for a

seconda ry inspection. When questioned, ea ch of the three occupa nts admitted that the g irlG AL I NDO V
. H OL DER

6 was not Ga lindo’s dau gh t er , and Ga lindo admitted that she ha d ag re e d to tr ans po rt

he r f or pa y . G a lin do wa s se rv e d w ith a n o t i ce t o ap p ea r a n d

d et ai n edp en d i n g a r em o v al h ea ri n g. Af te r a n in iti a l he ari nga t w hic h a n I J expla ine d h e r r ig hts an d conti nued the c ase to a llow her to find an attorney , Ga lin do a pp e are d p ro se and de c lin e d the of fe r o f m or e tim e to find counsel. T he I J then re cited the a lleg ations in her notice to ap p ear

, and Ga lindo admitted that each f actua l a lle g a tio n w a s tr

ue and a dmi tte d the c ha

rg e of re mov a bil ity

. Galindo ex plained that she w ished to apply for c ance llation of re moval, and the I J continued the hearing . By the time the hear ing r esum ed , Galindo had f ound pro bono counse l who obtained a n o t her c ontinuance. A t the next appeara nce, counsel e x plained that Ga lindo und er s t o od the cha rg es and th at s h e st ill admitt ed the f actua l alleg ations and conc eded re mo v a b il it y , b u t w a s s u

b mi tt in g an a

p p li c a ti o nfor c anc e llatio n o f r e mov a l. On Marc h 7, 2007, the I J held a mer its hearingon Galindo’s applicati o n for c ance llation and focuse d on wh e the r G a lin do c ou ld d e mon str a te the re qu ir e d s e ve n y e ars ’ continuous residenc e in t he United S tates af ter a n admission “in any status.” S pecif

ically , the I J acc epted c ounsel’s prof fer that Galindo had be en lawf ully admitted in 1990, but found that her Dece mber 1996 trip ended her continuous residenc e, and that her

parole into the country in January 1997 could not qualify as an a dmission. C. Galindo’s Appeal to the BIA and Motion to Reopen Gal i n do timely

appea led to the B I A, contestingonly the denial of he r ca

ncellatio n ap plication, not the finding ofG AL I NDO V
. H OL DER 7

remova bility . She con t en d ed that she was admitted in 1990 and that, d e sp ite sh ort tr ips to M e xico , s he c on tin uo us ly resided in the country until November 16, 2005, when se rvice of the no tic e to a

pp e ar c ut o f

f t he accru al of r e sid e nc e tim e pursuant to I

NA § 240A( d)(1) , 8 U.S

. C

. § 1229b(d)( 1). Alternatively

, she ar g u ed t h at her parole into the c ountry on J anuary 5, 1997, was a

n “admission” and the start of he r period of co ntinuous residence . The B I A dismissed her appea l in an unpublished decisio n d at ed Jul y 15, 2008, concluding that she could not demonstrate the re quired seve n y ear s of continuous residenc e after having been a dmitted. The BIA found that he r De cembe r 1996 depa rt u re br oke the continuity of her residenc e after he r 1990 admission and that her pa role wa s not a qualifying a dmission. Galindo then mo v ed the B I A to reope n her r emoval proce eding s on the g round that i n t er v ening ca se law , de Rodriguez-Ec heve rria v

. Mukase y , 5 34 F .3d 1 04 7 ( 9th

Cir

. 2008), re quired the I J t o exclude the re cord of her interrog ation and thus entitled her to withdrawher c oncession of re movabili t y

. T he B I A denied the motion in an unpublished decision, finding that Galindo had prese nted no new e vidence to sugg est t h at t he g overnme nt had not complied with the per tinent regulations reg ardi n g her interrog ation at the bord er , an dthat in any event, she had prese nted no authority

to exclude her subseque nt fac tual a dm i s s i o n s an d

c o n c e s s i o n s o f

r e m o v a b i l i ty b e f o r e th e I J. II. Jurisdi ction and S tandard of Review W e have jurisdiction pursuant to I NA § 242(a )(1) , 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) . W e re vi ew t he B IA’s leg al c on c lus ion s d e no vo , “ e xce pt t o th e ex tent that de fe re nc e is owed to its interpre tation o f t h e g overningstatutes andG AL I NDO V
. H OL DER

8
regulations.” Gar

cia- Qui nter

o v . Gonzales , 455 F .3d 1006, 10 1 1 (9 th Cir

. 20 06 ). “ Th e B I A’ s de c isi on re vie we d he re is un pu bli sh e d a nd iss ue d b y

a sin g le me mbe r o f t

he B I A; it do e s n o t c ar

r y th e f o r c e o f l aw, an d i t i s a c c o r d e d o nly S k i d m o rede fere nc e pr op or tio na l to its tho ro ughn e ss, rea soning, c onsistency

, and ability

to persuade .” MejiaHernande z v . Holder , 633 F .3d 818, 822 (9th Cir . 201 1). The BIA’s denia l of a motion to reopen is re viewed f or abuse of discretion. Ca no -Mer ida v . I NS , 3 1 1 F .3 d 9 60 , 9 64 (9 th C ir

. 2002).
III. Discussion A. G ali ndo “ r e side d in the Uni te d S ta te s c ont inuo usly for 7 y e ar s a fte r hav in g be e n adm it te d in a ny status” pursu ant to § 1229b(a)(2) . Th ere is n o d isp ute tha

t G a lin do wa s “ a dmi tte d” wi th no n- imm ig ra

nt “ status ” wi thi n th e me aning of the statut e wh en she e ntere d the country in May 1990. See8 U .S. C. § 1229b(a) (2). Instead, the g overnme n t ar g ues that she r an afoul of the statute twice in the seven year s that followed: (1) when she violated the terms of her entry and thus ce ased to be lawfully admitted and (2) when she left the c ountry on a thirteen-da

y trip to Mexi co to visit her mother . In essenc e, the g overnme nt rea ds the statute to require sev en y ear s of continuous lawful pre sence

—n o t seven y ear s of re sidence afte r a la wful entry

. The statutory

scheme simply

does not bear the g overnme nt’s interpre tation.G AL I NDO V
. H OL DER 9

1. Mai n te nanc e of la wful st at us a fte r th e adm iss ion is no t r e quir e d. An entry must be “lawf

ul” t o qualify

as an a dmission. 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a) (13)( A). B ut, c ontrary to the g overnme nt’s c on te nti on s, the a dmi ss io n in any status is a

sin g le e ve nt, afte r which r

esidenc e must be continuous. As the BIA has held and as this C ourt has agree d, an alien a ccr ues continuous re sid e nc e tim e “ a ft e r h avin g be e n a dmi tte d in any status ” purs ua nt t o 8 U. S.C. § 1 22 9b (a )( 2) de sp ite vio latin g the te rm s of a bor der-cr ossing c ard. S e e G u e v a r a v

. H o ld er , 6 49 F .3d 1 0 8 6 , 1 0 9 4

– 9 5 (9 th C i r. 2 0 1 1 ) ( d i s cu s s i n g In r e Blan c as Lara , 23 I . & N

. Dec

. 458 (B I A 2002)). That an a lien rema ins in the c o un tr

y u n la w f u ll y is immate r ia l t o th is r e q u ir e me nt beca use “Cong ress in 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2) did not include maintenanc e of status as a pre requisite for relief .” Gu e v ara , 649 F .3d at 1095. When Co n g r e s s inte n d s to r e qu ir e s e v e n y e ar s of c on tin uo us law ful residenc e, it doe s so ex plicitly

. Cf. I NA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1 182(h) ( “ law ful ly re sid e d c on tin

uo us ly in t he Un ite d S tate s f

or a pe ri od of no t less tha

n 7 y e ars ” (empha sis added) ). That Congre ss require d a per iod of lawful resident status in the immediately prec edingclause of the very same sente nce p lace s the issue beyond dispute. See 8 U.S .C. § 1229b(a)( 1) (“ lawfully admitted for pe rmane nt residenc e for

not less than 5 y ear s”). In sum, § 1229b(a)( 2) does not require co ntinuity of any status, let alone lawf

ul status

.G AL I NDO V
. H OL DER

10 2. Galindo’s brief trip to Mexic o o n advan ce

par ole did no t e nd h er pe r iod of c ont inuo us r esidence. Th e g ov e rnme nt’ s r e lia

nc e on Ga lin do ’s thi rt e e n- da

y tr ip to end her pe riod of continuous re sidence in the United S tates is inconsistent with t he de fi nition of “reside nce” in the statute. “The term ‘r esidenc e’ me ans the plac e of g ener al a bo de ; th e pla c e of

g e ne ra l a

bo de of a pe rs on mea ns his pr inc ipa l, act ual d

we lli ngpla c e in f

a c t, w ith out r e g ard

to intent.” 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a) (33). B y that or any

d efinition, a brief visit to f

amily does not c hang e a person’ s residenc e. The s t a tu t e d o e s n o tt r e a t

e v e r y dw e l l i n g i n w h i c hana l i e ns t ays as a ne w re sidence ; the text instructs courts to take a wider view , deeming the “

principal , actua l dwelling pla ce” and “the place of general

a b o d e ” to b e th e r e s id e n ce. Id. (e mph a sis a dd e d) . T he o bj ect iv e ci rcum st ances —au th ori z ati on of pa ro le alre ady secur ed and he r home in California a waiting her re tur n wh ile sh e vis ite d h e r a ili ngmot he r— do no t su g g e st a chang e in her

residenc e. Indeed, this Court applied the same def inition of “re sidence ” in the context of an application for natura liz ation and fo un d th a t an a lien wi th l on g e r a nd re g ula ri zed tr ips to his fo rm e r h ome in Me xico sti ll re sid e d in the Un ite d S tate s. Alc ar e z- Ga r c ia v . A sh c r oft , 2 93 F .3 d 1 15 5, 1 15 7– 58 (9 th C ir

. 20 02 ); see id. at 1 157 n.2 (obser ving that Congre ss codified the def inition applied in 8 U.S.C . § 1 101(a) (33)) . T h er e, the applicant ha d shown that his father ’s re sidence was in T exas even thoug h the father wa s constantly movi n g around the state fo r w or

k a nd spent thre e months e a c h y e ar w ithhis family in Mex ico. Id. at 1 157–58.G AL I NDO V
. H OL DER 11

For t he f

i r s t t i me at ora l ar gu ment , t he gover nment adva nce d a ne w 1 the o ry: tha t G a lind o ’s trip a c tua lly e n d e d ye a rs a fter sh e r e tur n e d h o m e to C a lif o rn ia b e c a u se , it c o n te n d s, th e le g a l fictio n o f he r re e n try p u rs u a n t t o p arole was t hat she rem ai ned a t the b o rder unt i l t he res o l ut i o n of her t henp e n d ing a p p lica tio n fo r L P R sta tus . T h e go v e r n m e n t’s p ro p o se d ru le woul d onl y f

avor al i ens wh o avoi d t he cons equen ces of t he as s er t ed l ega l f i ct i on by l ea v i ng a nd ree n t er i n g t h e cou n t y s u r r ept i t i ou s l y i n s t ea d of securi ng ad vance p arole and p res ent i ng t he m sel ves f o r i nspecti o n at t he Th e g ov e rnme nt’ s p ro pose d c on str uc tio n im pe rm iss ibl y conver ts a requir ement that an a li en “re side” in the United S tates for

seven y ea rs into a re quirement that she be

“ phy sic a lly

pr e se nt” in the c ountr

y e ve ry da y fo r s e ve n y e ars . Cf. Ro dr igu e

z-Ba ra jas v . I NS , 992 F .2d 94, 97 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding alien ha d continuously resided in United S tates de sp ite on e “ br ie f” and on e “ lon g e r tr ip to M e xico ” be c a us e statut e “ re qu ir e s c on tin

uo us r esidenc e in t he Unite d S tate s, n o tc o n t i nu o us pr

esenc e here ” (e mphasis in origina l)). Such a re wr iti ngis e sp e c ia lly

imp e rm iss ibl e he re be c a

us e Con g re ss used the ter

m “p h y sically

prese nt” in the same statutory section to impose more string ent elig ibilit y require ments on those without L PR st atus. See8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)( A).
Moreove r, the ver

y same sec tion goe s on to define “continuous phy sical pre sence ” i n a more flexibl e manne r th an t he g overnme nt would have the Court de fine “continuous re sidence .” “Phy sical pre sence ” is, as a matter of statute, continuous despite a trip out of the country lasting up to ninety day s. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(2). Plac ed in context, the g overnme nt would have the Court hold t h at , by visiti ng her ailing mother briefly

, Galindo as a

matter of la

w cha ng ed her re sid e nc e to M e xico wh ile re ma ini ngphy sicall y pr e se nt i n California. That construction ca nnot be square d with t he de fi nit ion of “ re sid e nc e ” or

the c on te xt in whic h th at te rm is used. 1G AL I NDO V
. H OL DER

12

b o rder. In any event , t he go vernm ent p rof f ers no supp o rt f

o r t hi s read i ng of t he cont i nu ous r es i dence r equi r ement , an d t he C our t f i nds none . Acc ording ly

, the B I A committed leg al er ror by concludingbased on the undisputed fac ts that Galindo had not resided in the Uni ted S tates continuously afte r her admission in 1990. The Court gra n t s the petition for re view of the B I A’s dismissal of her a ppea l, and re mands for co n s i deration of the merits of Ga lindo’s application for c anc e llatio n o f r e mov a l.
B. The BIA p r operly denied Galind o ’s m otion to r e ope n be c aus e she c anno t r e tr ac t h e r c onc e ssi ons of r em ovabili ty

. Galindo’s motion to r e o p e n —claiming that she ca

n retra ct her c oncessions of r emovability an d her a dmissions of the pertinent facts i n order to attack the evidentiar y bases f or her re mov a l on

re mand —w a s me ri tl ess, and

the B I A p ro pe rl y denied that motion. Galindo does not co ntest that she c o n ce d edre m o v ab i l i ty

h er s el f a n d

th en aga i nth ro u gh c ouns e l. N or

do e s sh e no w c la im that she was no t, in f a c t, remova ble as c har

g ed. S h e co ntends only that the law g overningher inter

rog ation might have chang ed, and that she s h o u l d thu s b e p erm i t t edt o re s t artth e r em o v al p ro ce ed i n gs with a clea

n slate.
B u tG a l i n d o ’ s c o n c e s s i o n s o f r e m o v a b i l i ty b e f o r e th e IJ are binding an d rende r the a sserted c hang e in the law imm a te ri a l; the B I A w a s thus well wi thin i ts d isc re tio n to deny her mo t i o n to reope n. Galindo contends that she may wi thd ra w h e r c on c e ssi on s p ur su ant t o thi s Court ’s de c isi on in Hu e rta -G ue v ara v

. A sh c r oft , 321 F .3d 883 (9th Cir

. 2003). There , we conclude d that the alien’s conce ssion wa s notG AL I NDO V
. H OL DER 13

“dispositive” bec ause the chang e in the law at issue potentially

chang ed the meaning of the a lien’s conc ession. Id. at 886. Her e, by contra st, there is no possibi lity that Galindo mistakenly

conce ded re movability based on a

nowquestionable rule of l aw . The lawg overningalien smug g ling has not cha

ng ed, and she admitted all of the fa cts o f that crime. A ccor dingly

, the Court denies the pe titi o n fo r re view of the B I A’s denia l of her motion to reope n. IV . Conclusion The B I A improperly conclude d that Galindo’s re sidence “af ter having be en admitted in any status” was not c ontinuous as re quired by

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2) be cause she took a thirteen-da

y trip to Mex ico pursuant to a gran t of adva nce parole . W e ther efor e g rant Ga lindo’s petition for re v i ew of the B I A’s dismissal of her appea l and re mand. Howe ver, the B I A a c te d w ith in i ts d isc re tio n in den y inghe r m oti on

to reope n; the Court denies the pe tition for r eview of that order

. Pe tit ion fo r rev ie w N o. 08 -7 34 77 is G RA NT ED . The J uly 15, 2008 order

of the B I A is theref

ore V AC A TED , and the c a se is RE M AN DE D

. Petition for reviewNo. 09-71264 is DE NI ED

.