1 The Honorable Joan N. Ericksen, United St ates District Judge for the District of Minnesota. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 09-1574

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * District of Minnesota. Donald Leonard Sturgis, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: February 16, 2010 Filed: February 23, 2010

___________ Before WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Donald Leonard Sturgis challenges the sentence imposed by the district court 1 following two prior remands by this c ourt for resentencing. We affirm.
After a jury found him guilty of drug char ges, Sturgis was sentenced in October 2004 to 360 months in prison. We affi rmed the conviction, but remanded for resentencing based on advisory Guide lines under United States v. Booker , 543 U.S. 220 (2005). At his October 2006 resentenci ng, Sturgis was again sentenced to 360-2- months in prison. On appeal, we found that the district court had adequately considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors a nd adequately explained its reasons for imposing the sentence and that the sentence it imposed was reasonable. We found, however, that it was unclear whether the district court had declined to use its discretion to consider the crack/powder cocai ne sentencing disparity because of thencurrent Eighth Circuit precedent that did not authorize such consideration; thus, we remanded to the district court to reconsider the sentence in light of Kimbrough v. United States , 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
At his February 2009 resentencing, the di strict court sentenced Sturgis to 336 months in prison, finding that it was appr opriate to sentence him below the advisory Guidelines range--which was based on hi s career-offender status--because of the crack/powder cocaine disparity. Sturgis ar gues on appeal that the district court applied an improper presumption of reas onableness to the career-offender Guideline, and to the Guidelines in gene ral. Assuming the issue is properly before us, we see no indication that the district court failed to understand its authority to vary from the career-offender Guideline, or the Guidelines in general. SeeUnited States v. Gray , 577 F.3d 947, 950 (8th Cir. 2009) (“the districtcourt gave no indication that it failed to understand its authority to vary from the career-offender guideline” on the basis of “policy considerations, including disagreem ents with the guidelines”). The court stated at this resentencing that Sturgis had “earned [career-offe nder status] fair and square,” and we found in the prior appeal that the district court had properly considered the section 3553(a) factors.
Sturgis also argues that the district court did not consider his rehabilitation efforts since his earlier sentencings. This court has held, however, that evidence of post-sentence rehabilitation is not permitted at resentencing. SeeUnited States v. Pepper , 570 F.3d 958, 965 (8th Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed , (U.S. Sept. 29, 2009) (No. 09-6822). We have carefully c onsidered the remaining arguments raised in Sturgis’s four pro se briefs and in th e brief filed by Sturgis’s counsel, and we find-3- that they are not properly be fore us, as they are outside the scope of our limited remand. See United States v. Kendall , 475 F.3d 961, 964 (8th Cir. 2007) (scope of remand must be determined by reference to analysis in opinion; on remand for resentencing, all issues decided by appellate court become law of the case); United States v. Walterman , 408 F.3d 1084, 1085 (8th Cir. 2005) (where remand is limited to resolution of specific issues, any issues outside scope of re mand will generally not be considered in subsequent appeal).
Accordingly, Sturgis is granted leave to file the additional pr o se briefs he has submitted, the judgment is affirmed, and Sturgis’s pending motion is denied as moot.

______________________________