[Cite as State v. Baker, 2024-Ohio-2856.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

FAYETTE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

Appellee,

 - vs -

MARCOS BAKER,

Appellant.

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CASE NO. CA2023-11-015

O P I N I O N

7/29/2024

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM FAYETTE COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

Case No. CRI 20230096

Jess C. Weade, Fayette County Prosecuting Attorney, and Rachel Martin, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Caleb Johnson, and Anthony Maiorano, for appellant.

HENDRICKSON, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Marcos Baker, appeals his conviction in the Fayette County 

Court of Common Pleas for aggravated trafficking in drugs with a major drug offender 

specification. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

{¶ 2} On October 11, 2022, police met with a confidential informant (CI) who had 
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arranged a meeting with Baker to purchase one pound of methamphetamine for $2,000. 

In preparation for the transaction, the police searched the CI and her vehicle to confirm 

she possessed no drugs. Police then provided the CI with money for the purchase and 

outfitted her with a surveillance device to record and live-stream audio and video of the 

transaction. The device could only be activated and deactivated by the police.

{¶ 3} The CI and police then drove to Baker's residence in Jeffersonville, Ohio. 

While the CI executed the transaction, the police monitored the live feed from the 

surveillance device. Officers were able to hear the CI knock on the front door of Baker's 

residence, and call out for "Cos," Baker's nickname. A female voice from inside the home 

asked, "Who is it," and the CI replied with her name. Baker's wife, Shelby, then appeared 

in the doorway. The CI said to her "Sorry I'm late," and Shelby replied "You're good."

{¶ 4} The CI then entered the home, and the CI and Shelby walked into the living 

room where Baker was seated. Baker and the CI discussed the drug transaction and the 

agreed $2,000 purchase price, the CI handed the money to Baker, and Baker handed the 

CI a tied-off black bag containing methamphetamine. The CI then departed and gave the 

police the black bag. The police then searched the CI and her vehicle again, and once 

again found no contraband.

{¶ 5} Upon return to the Fayette County Sheriff's Office, a detective weighed the 

drugs on the office's scales and then forwarded them to BCI for official weighing and 

analysis. A BCI forensic scientist weighed and analyzed the drugs, finding it to be 450.13 

grams of methamphetamine, and prepared a report of his findings.

{¶ 6} As a result of the forensic scientist's report, Baker was indicted on April 7, 

2023, with two counts of aggravated trafficking in drugs, felonies of the first degree. Count 

One was based upon the October 11, 2022 drug transaction. Count Two, was based 

upon a separate drug transaction alleged to have occurred on November 11, 2022. Both 
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counts were accompanied by a major drug offender specification.

{¶ 7} On June 26, 2023, Baker filed a motion to suppress the video and audio 

recordings of the CI entering his house, his recorded statements, and the drugs obtained 

from his home, asserting that the CI did not have permission to enter his home and the 

meeting was equivalent to a warrantless search. A hearing was held on July 31, 2023, 

and the trial court denied Baker's motion in an entry journalized on August 1, 2023, finding 

that the transaction between Baker and the CI was prearranged and not a warrantless 

search.

{¶ 8} On April 20, 2023, Baker filed his first demand for discovery. In response, 

the state provided a photograph of a set of scales alongside the confiscated drugs. On 

June 26, 2023, Baker filed a motion to compel discovery seeking, in part, an order to 

compel the state to produce records of the calibration of the scales in the photograph 

along with "any other scales used to weigh the substances." The photograph of the scales 

and drugs was taken at the sheriff's office before the drugs were forwarded to BCI. In an 

entry journalized on July 18, 2023, the trial court denied the motion to compel, reasoning 

that the scales at the sheriff's office were not used for the official weighing of the drugs, 

which was instead conducted on scales at BCI. However, the trial court did not address 

whether production of calibration documents for the BCI scales could be compelled.

{¶ 9} The matter proceeded to a jury trial on August 31, 2022. The jury returned

a guilty verdict on Count One of the indictment and the accompanying major drug offender 

specification. However, the jury was unable to reach a verdict on Count Two of the 

indictment and a mistrial was declared on Count Two. On the state’s motion, Count Two 

of the indictment was ultimately dismissed without prejudice by the trial court. On Count 

One, the trial court sentenced Baker to a prison term of 11 to 16.5 years.

{¶ 10} Baker now appeals, raising five assignments of error for our review.
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II. Legal Analysis

{¶ 11} Assignment of Error No. 1:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED 

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO [SUPPRESS].1

{¶ 12} In his first assignment of error, Baker argues that the trial court erred by not 

granting his motion to suppress. Baker contends that the CI's entry into his home was an 

illegal search because the CI was working on behalf of the police and the state failed to 

establish that the CI entered the home with the express consent of Baker or Shelby. 

Therefore, Baker argues that the recording of the transaction, his recorded statements, 

and the drugs that were purchased from his home should have been suppressed. We 

disagree.

{¶ 13} "Appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed 

question of law and fact." State v. Gray, 2012-Ohio-4769, ¶ 15 (12th Dist.). When 

considering a motion to suppress, the trial court, as the trier of fact, is in the best position 

to weigh the evidence in order to resolve factual questions and evaluate witness 

credibility. State v. Hensgen, 2017-Ohio-8793, ¶ 16 (12th Dist.). In turn, this court is 

bound to accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, 

credible evidence. Id. If the trial court's findings of fact are so supported, "the appellate 

court must then independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial 

court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard." State v. Burnside, 2003-

Ohio-5372, ¶ 8.

{¶ 14} Baker asserts that there was no evidence the drug transaction was 

prearranged to take place in his house as neither the CI nor the police indicated in the 

1. The first assignment of error in the Baker's brief reads "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED 

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS," but Baker's argument is regarding the denial of his motion to 

suppress.
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recording that the meeting was prearranged, and the CI did not testify at the suppression 

hearing. However, the detective who worked with the CI on this operation testified that 

he met with her "to discuss a prearranged deal." Furthermore, the circumstances 

surrounding the transaction indicate it was prearranged. When the CI initially appeared 

at Baker's door and no one answered her knock, she called out for Baker by his nickname, 

"Cos," indicating familiarity with Baker. When Shelby came to the door, Shelby excused 

the CI for being late, establishing that there was a prearranged time for the CI to have 

arrived. There was no objection made by Baker or Shelby to the CI's entrance into the 

home as would be expected if she was an uninvited and unwelcome guest. The 

discussion between the CI and Baker confirming a $2,000 purchase price indicated a 

prearranged transaction. Finally, Baker had the agreed upon quantity of 

methamphetamine packaged and ready for delivery to the CI.

{¶ 15} Within his assignment of error, Baker argues that the trial court erred in 

excluding Shelby's affidavit which he claims clarifies the circumstances of the CI's entry 

into the home. "The Court may adjudicate a motion based upon briefs, affidavits, the 

proffer of testimony and exhibits, a hearing, or other appropriate means." Crim.R. 12(F). 

"A trial court considering a motion to suppress may accept affidavits or hold a hearing at 

which witnesses testify." State v. Swazey, 2023-Ohio-4627, ¶ 21. Even though the rules 

of evidence may not apply to "[d]eterminations prerequisite to rulings on the admissibility 

of evidence" under Evid.R.101(D)(1), pursuant to Crim.R. 12(F), a trial court may require 

that evidence be presented in accordance with the rules of evidence or decline to accept 

evidence it determines to be unreliable.

{¶ 16} Baker did not proffer Shelby's affidavit and it is not part of the record on 

appeal. Baker asserts that Shelby's affidavit avers that she did not open the door for the 

CI to enter the home, never signaled for the CI to enter the home, and never invited the 
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CI to enter the home. As Shelby's affidavit is not part of the record, we are unable to 

determine whether there was any prejudice resulting from the trial court's refusal to admit 

the affidavit into evidence. Even if we accept Baker's unsupported assertions as to the 

contents of Shelby's affidavit, these assertions do not directly contradict the CI having 

entered Baker's home consensually. 

{¶ 17} The trial court declined to admit Shelby's affidavit because Baker had not 

demonstrated that Shelby was unavailable to testify, Baker had not subpoenaed Shelby, 

and Shelby did not appear and decline to testify. The trial court also determined that 

Shelby's affidavit was inadmissible hearsay. Pursuant to Crim.R. 12(F), the trial court 

had discretion to refuse admission of the affidavit.

{¶ 18} Whether this drug transaction was prearranged and the CI's entry into 

Baker's home was therefore consensual is a factual question. The trial court resolved 

this factual issue in favor of the state based upon the circumstances detailed above. This 

factual finding is supported by competent, credible evidence and we are thus bound to 

accept it.

{¶ 19} Baker's first assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 20} Assignment of Error No. 2:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED 

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL CALIBRATION DATE 

OF SCALES.

{¶ 21} In his second assignment of error, Baker argues that the trial court erred in 

denying his pretrial motion to compel the state to produce the calibration records of any 

scales used to weigh the drugs he was charged with selling. Even though the motion did

not make reference by name to which specific calibration records were being sought, it is 

clear Baker was seeking calibration records from the sheriff's Office and BCI. In his 

motion, Baker asserted that the calibration records were subject to discovery pursuant to 
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Crim.R. 16(B)(5), as "evidence favorable to the defendant and material to guilt or 

punishment." Baker argues that he could have used the BCI calibration records for the 

weighing scales to impeach the BCI forensic analyst who weighed the drugs. He further

contends that if the BCI calibration records were produced, there is a "reasonable 

probability . . . that the jury may not have believed or relied upon his determination that 

the weight was, in fact, over 100 times the bulk amount." If so, Baker contends he would 

have not been found guilty of the major drug offender specification and he would have 

been convicted of only a fourth-degree felony as opposed to a first-degree felony.

{¶ 22} At the hearing on the motion, the state argued that it was not going to use 

the sheriff's scales at trial and therefore those calibration records were not relevant. As 

to the BCI calibration records, the state noted that Baker did not demand the analyst's

testimony within the time period required by R.C. 2925.51(C) and was thus prevented 

from receiving it. 

{¶ 23} The trial court denied Baker's motion to compel in an entry journalized on 

July 18, 2023, but only explained why the state could not be compelled to produce the 

calibration records for the scales at the sheriff's Office. The trial court did not address the 

calibration records for the BCI scales that were used for the official drug weight.2 

{¶ 24} Baker sought the calibration records for both the sheriff's scales and BCI's

scales. We agree with the trial court's finding that the sheriff's calibration records were 

not relevant as the state did not intend to use this evidence at trial. Further, Baker did 

not specifically state how the sheriff's scales would be favorable to him or be material to 

his guilt or punishment.

2. The state's answer brief fails to address whether production of the BCI calibration records could have 

been compelled, and merely reiterates the trial court's reasoning regarding the sheriff's office scales.
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{¶ 25} However, we do not agree with the state's reason for denying Baker 

discovery of the BCI calibration records because he failed to timely demand the analyst's

testimony under R.C. 2925.51(C). Failure to demand an analyst's testimony under the 

statute does not prevent a defendant from obtaining via discovery the calibration records 

of the scales used by BCI. The purpose of R.C. 2925.51(C) is to allow a defendant to 

require the state to call as a trial witness the lab analyst who authored the lab report. If 

the defendant fails to make this demand within seven days from receiving the lab report, 

then the state can present the lab report as evidence at trial without the analyst's

testimony. The lab report is then considered to be "prima facie evidence of the contents,

identity, and weight or the existence and number of unit dosages of the substance." R.C.

2925.51(C).

{¶ 26} In its judgment entry, the trial court failed to address whether Baker was

entitled to BCI's calibration records. We find that this was error. The trial court should

have addressed this part of Baker's motion because the state indicated at the hearing it

intended to use the weight measurement from BCI's scales as evidence at trial and BCI's

scales were the "any scales used to weigh the drugs" in question.

{¶ 27} Even though this was error, we also find that the error was harmless under

the circumstances presented here. First, Baker failed to articulate how this evidence

would be favorable to him. Since he was not aware of any issues with the calibration of

the BCI scales, it was speculative that obtaining these records would have been favorable

on cross-examination at trial in an attempt to discredit the BCI lab analyst's findings.

{¶ 28} As it turns out, the BCI lab analyst actually testified at trial and Baker had

the opportunity on cross-examination to challenge the calibration of the scales used to

weigh the drugs. The BCI lab analyst testified that the scales are calibrated weekly in 

accordance with BCI procedures, typically on Mondays. However, the Monday before 
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the drugs were weighed was the day before the Independence Day holiday, and the 

analyst testified that he could not remember if he worked that day. The analyst testified 

that if he did not work on Monday July 3, 2023, the scales would have been calibrated on 

Wednesday, July 5, 2023, the day after the holiday. This exchange only resulted in 

defense counsel arguing that if the lab analyst cannot remember which date the 

calibration was performed, what else might he have forgotten? Although this may have 

provided a marginal argument for defense counsel to use, there was no indication that 

any errors were made in calibrating the scales. This is not a case where there was an 

issue of whether the scales were calibrated at all, but only whether they were calibrated 

on one day or the other prior to weighing the drugs sold by Baker. Therefore, it was not 

established that BCI's calibration records were favorable to Baker. 

{¶ 29} Second, Baker could have subpoenaed the BCI lab records under Crim.R.

17(C). This would have allowed him to obtain a copy of the calibration records in order

to cross-examine the lab analyst at trial. He did not.

{¶ 30} Finally, it is highly speculative that the calibration records would have 

been favorable to Baker in his attempt to prove that the state failed to establish the weight 

requirement for the major drug offender specification. The bulk amount for 

methamphetamine is three grams. R.C. 2925.01(D)(1)(g). The major drug offender 

specification, R.C. 2929.01(W), requires that methamphetamine have a weight of 100 

times bulk or more. Thus, the threshold weight for the major drug offender specification 

in this case is 300 grams. BCI determined that the methamphetamine sold by Baker to 

the CI weighed 450.13 grams. Therefore, this was not a case where there was a marginal 

difference between more than 100 times the bulk amount and less than 100 times the 

bulk amount. The methamphetamine involved in this case is 50% greater than 100 times 

the bulk amount, making it very difficult for Baker to establish that the substance was less 
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than 300 grams.

{¶ 31} Nevertheless, there is no indication that the BCI calibration records would 

have been favorable to Baker, and therefore the state had no duty to produce those 

records in discovery pursuant to Crim.R. 16(B)(5). 

{¶ 32} Baker's second assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 33} Assignment of Error No. 3:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED 

DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR JUDGEMENT OF 

ACQUITTALS.

{¶ 34} In his third assignment of error, Baker argues that the trial court should have 

granted his Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal on Count Two because the state failed to prove 

his identity as the perpetrator. Nevertheless, there is no final appealable order upon 

which this assignment of error may be based. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on 

Count Two, resulting in a mistrial as to Count Two. Baker was neither convicted nor 

sentenced for this offense. The prospect that he may be recharged with this offense does 

not convert the denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal into a final appealable 

order. As this court has previously explained,

"Regardless of the sufficiency of the evidence at trial, a 

mistrial following a hung jury does not raise a colorable double 

jeopardy claim which would prevent the defendant's retrial. In 

the same manner, when a trial court, following a mistrial, 

denies a motion to dismiss which claims insufficient evidence, 

the denial is an interlocutory decree and not a final appealable 

order." 

(Citation omitted.) State v. Leece, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 1557, at *2 (12th Dist. Apr. 23, 

1990). 

{¶ 35} Baker's third assignment of error is dismissed for lack of a final appealable 

order.

{¶ 36} Assignment of Error No. 4:
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THE STATE COMMITTED PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT.

{¶ 37} In his fourth assignment of error, Baker argues that the state committed 

prosecutorial misconduct when the prosecutor made improper comments during closing 

arguments in an attempt to shift the burden of proof onto Baker to prove his innocence. 

As a remedy, Baker asserts that Count Two of the indictment should be dismissed with 

prejudice. We disagree.

{¶ 38} The test for prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments is whether the 

remarks were improper and, if so, whether they prejudicially affected the substantial rights 

of the defendant. State v. Elmore, 2006-Ohio-6207, ¶ 62. The focus of "an inquiry into 

allegations of prosecutorial misconduct is upon the fairness of the trial, not upon the 

culpability of the prosecutor." State v. Gray, 2012-Ohio-4769, ¶ 57 (12th Dist.). As such, 

prosecutorial misconduct "is not grounds for error unless the defendant has been denied 

a fair trial." State v. Olvera-Guillen, 2008-Ohio-5416, ¶ 27 (12th Dist.).

{¶ 39} Crim.R. 52(B) provides that plain errors "or defects affecting substantial 

rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court." Plain 

error means an obvious defect in trial proceedings that affected the defendant's 

substantial rights. State v. Knodel, 2007-Ohio-4536, ¶ 15 (12th Dist.). Notice of plain 

error is taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances, and only to 

prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice. State v. Grisham, 2014-Ohio-3558, ¶ 38 (12th 

Dist.). 

{¶ 40} Here, Baker did not object to the state's comments during closing 

arguments, but instead raised them in his post-trial motion for acquittal on Count Two of 

the indictment, therefore we review for plain error. In her closing, the prosecutor said:

The defense's entire theory of this case is dirty cops. That's 

all we've heard about . . . They want you to believe this entire 

investigation is dirty cops.
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. . .

You know what you never heard from defense counsel? 

Marcos Baker didn't sell drugs. You never heard it. You never 

hear defense counsel tell you at any point you never heard 

any witnesses take that stand and tell you that this defendant 

did not sell methamphetamine on October 11th of 2022 and 

November 15th of 2022. Don't let them take the focus off of 

what you're here today for.

{¶ 41} "It is long-standing precedent that the state may comment upon a 

defendant's failure to offer evidence in support of its case." State v. Collins, 89 Ohio St.3d 

524, 527 (2000). A prosecutor's observation that no witnesses have provided an alibi for 

the defendant is not a comment on the defendant's silence, nor is it an attempt to shift the 

burden of proof. See State v. Davis, 2008-Ohio-2, ¶ 260-261. Here, the prosecutor 

simply pointed out that the defense's strategy was to undermine the credibility of the 

police investigation, but the evidence of Baker's drug dealing was left uncontradicted.

{¶ 42} The prosecutor's comments were not an attempt to shift the burden of proof 

and were not improper. Baker's fourth assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 43} Assignment of Error No. 5:

DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL DUE TO 

CUMULATIVE ERRORS.

{¶ 44} In his fifth assignment of error, Baker argues that his conviction should be 

reversed due to cumulative error in his trial, presenting seven issues for our review. We 

do not find cumulative error.

{¶ 45} Pursuant to the cumulative error doctrine, "a conviction will be reversed 

where the cumulative effect of errors in a trial deprives a defendant of the constitutional 

right to a fair trial even though each of numerous instances of trial court error does not

individually constitute cause for reversal." State v. McClurkin, 2010-Ohio-1938, ¶ 105 

(12th Dist.). In order for the cumulative error doctrine to apply, "an appellate court must 
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find that multiple errors, none of which individually rose to the level of prejudicial error, 

actually occurred in the trial court." State v. Kaufhold, 2020-Ohio-3835, ¶ 63 (12th Dist.).

{¶ 46} First, Baker reiterates his argument that the prosecutor made improper 

remarks in her closing at trial. As we already explained in our treatment of Baker's fourth 

assignment of error, the prosecutor's remarks were not improper.

{¶ 47} Second, Baker argues that the trial court should have severed the trials for 

the two counts of aggravated trafficking in drugs, as Count One related to an offense 

occurring on October 11, 2022, and Count Two related to an offense occurring on 

November 15, 2022. Joinder of counts for trial is not prejudicial where the evidence 

relating to each count is simple and direct. State v. Matthews, 2023-Ohio-3482, ¶ 38 

(12th Dist.). In an entry on July 18, 2023, the trial court denied Baker's motion to sever 

these two counts for trial, holding that "Each offense is simple and direct and that 

evidence as to each offense is separate, uncomplicated, and sufficient to support a 

conviction if the jury were to convict, without necessitating the use of evidence relating to 

other offenses. There has been no showing that the defendant's rights would be 

prejudiced." The trial court was correct, the evidence relating to Counts One and Two 

was separate, and the offenses occurred more than a month apart. Further, that the jury 

did not reach a verdict on Count Two suggests that Baker was not prejudiced by joinder 

of the counts.

{¶ 48} Third, Baker argues the trial court should have granted his motion for a nonlawyer professional to meet privately in the Fayette County jail. In its July 18, 2023 

judgment entry, the trial court denied the motion because Baker had not identified the 

individual with whom he would meet, nor had Baker provided a basis for a "private" 

meeting. However, the trial court's denial was conditional as the trial court explained that, 

"[s]ubject to the defense lawyers identifying specific individuals and indicating what the 
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need for a confidential meeting would be based on said motion will not be granted." Baker 

never provided this information.

{¶ 49} Baker does not explain in his brief how he was prejudiced by the denial of 

this motion and it is not apparent why counsel could not have served as a liaison between 

Baker and this non-lawyer professional, or why Baker could not have met privately with 

counsel and had the non-lawyer professional present. It appears that the privacy Baker 

sought for this meeting conflicted with jail security procedures.

{¶ 50} Fourth, Baker argues that the trial court should have granted his request for 

a second continuance of the suppression hearing. Baker sought the continuance 

because Shelby had been indicted for her part in the October 11, 2022 drug transaction 

and was refusing to testify at Baker's suppression hearing because of the charges 

pending against her. The trial court denied the motion for continuance and the 

suppression hearing went forward on July 31, 2023 as scheduled. 

{¶ 51} Baker argues he was prejudiced by the trial court's denial of his motion for 

a continuance and its refusal to consider Shelby's affidavit at the suppression hearing. 

However, neither Shelby's affidavit nor proposed testimony was proffered into evidence, 

therefore we are unable to determine whether Baker suffered prejudice from the trial 

court's failure to continue the hearing to obtain her testimony. Additionally, there was no 

way for the trial court to know how long of a delay would have been necessary before 

Shelby would no longer be under indictment or have a change of heart about testifying.

{¶ 52} Fifth, Baker argues the trial court should have admitted two police narratives 

into evidence. During trial these narratives were used to refresh the police officers' 

recollection of events and for impeachment purposes. Baker's counsel moved to admit 

them into evidence at the close of trial, but the trial court denied admission. Nevertheless, 

Baker's counsel was given a full opportunity to cross-examine the officers concerning the 
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narratives. Neither of the police narratives were proffered into evidence, therefore, we 

cannot review whether Baker was prejudiced by the exclusion of the narratives from 

evidence, and Baker identifies no specific prejudice in his brief.

{¶ 53} Sixth, Baker argues that the trial court should have compelled the 

production of the metadata of the videos of the drug purchase. In his brief, Baker asserts 

the metadata "was essential to challenging the officers' claims of video integrity, 

especially the CI's request to delete segments." Baker offers no further explanation, 

citations to the record, or supporting arguments. App.R. 16(A)(7) provides that an 

appellant's brief shall contain, "[a]n argument containing the contentions of the appellant 

with respect to each assignment of error presented for review and the reasons in support 

to the contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on 

which appellant relies." App.R. 12(A)(2) provides, "[t]he court may disregard an

assignment of error presented for review if the party raising it fails to identify in the record 

the error on which the assignment of error is based or fails to argue the assignment 

separately in the brief, as required under App.R. 16(A)." We decline to consider this issue 

due to Baker's failure to comply with App.R. 16(A) and 12(A)(2).3

{¶ 54} Seventh, Baker argues he was denied a fair trial when the trial court 

admitted the CI's hearsay statements made in the recording of the drug transaction. 

However, Baker does not specify which portions of the recording and which statements 

contained hearsay. The state asserts that the CI's statements in the recording were not 

hearsay, as they were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted therein but to 

"provide meaning and context" to Baker's Statements. It is possible that some of what 

3. We note that apparently Baker failed to brief the necessity of the metadata to the trial court as well. In 

the trial court's judgment entry journalized on July 18, 2023, the trial court denied Baker's motion to compel 

discovery of the metadata, finding "the defense refers to metadata on the videos but fails to indicate how 

that is relevant or would aid in the defense of this case."
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the CI said on the recording is hearsay, however, it is not the duty of the court to scour 

the video and identify which statements are hearsay and whether they are prejudicial.

{¶ 55} Having reviewed the seven issues raised by Baker, we find Baker has not 

demonstrated that he was deprived of a fair trial due to cumulative error. Baker's fifth 

assignment of error is overruled. 

III. Conclusion

{¶ 56} For the reasons outlined above, having dismissed Baker's third assignment 

of error for lack of a final appealable order, and finding no merit to any of Baker's other 

four assignments of error, Baker's conviction for one count of aggravated trafficking in 

drugs is affirmed.

{¶ 57} Judgment affirmed.

S. POWELL, P.J., and M. POWELL, J., concur.