x 

 

 

 

 ice 

 

 

 of 

The Task Force on 

Controlled Unclassified Information 

Under the leadership of: 

Janet Napolitano

Secretary of Homeland Security 

Eric H. Holder, Jr.

Attorney General 

Matthew L. Kronisch

Co-Chair 

Department of 

Homeland Security 

Candace Kelly

Co-Chair 

Department of Just

Dr. Josh Weerasinghe

Program Manager for the 

Information Sharing Environment 

Patricia Mantoan

Department of Health and 

Human Services 

Janice C. Haith

Department of Defense 

Michael A. Fitzpatrick

Office of Management 

and Budget 

Marguerite R. Coffey 

Department of State 

John W. Vardaman 

Department of Justice 

Greg Gardner 

Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence 

 

William J. Bosanko

National Archives and 

Records Administration

John J. Young

Department

Homeland Security 

Roland J. Corvington 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

 

Edwin J. McCeney 

Department of the Interior

Keith McElfresh

Department of Agriculture

Patricia K. Hammar 

Executive Secretary 
ii 
 

iii 

Table of Contents 

Letter from the CUI Task Force Leadership 

Executive Summary 

CUI Task Force Recommendations 

Part 1. Overview 

1.1 The CUI Task Force 

1. Membership 

2. Methodology 

Part 2.The SBU Challenge 

2.1 Assessment of Current SBU Procedures 

2.2 The 2008 CUI Framework 

Part 3. Recommendations 

3.1 Expanding the Scope of the Current CUI 

Framework 

3.2 Measures to Enhance the Current CUI Framework 

1. Designation and Identification 

2. Marking 

3. Safeguarding 

4. Dissemination 

5. Life Cycle 

6. Exceptions 

7. Training 

8. Incentives and Accountability 

9. Standardization, Oversight, and Dispute Resolution 

10. Implementation Timeline and Resources 

3.3 Measures to Track Progress in Implementation of CUI 

Part 4. Conclusion 

Appendix 1 Entities Consulted by the CUI Task Force 

Appendix 2 SBU Markings Currently in Use 

Appendix 3 List of Acronyms 
iv 
                                                               

 

August 25, 2009 

The President 

The White House 

Washington, DC 20500 

Dear Mr. President: 

As directed by your May 27, 2009 Memorandum, we established an Interagency 

Task Force to review current procedures for categorizing and sharing Sensitive but 

Unclassified (“SBU”) information. The Task Force conducted a 90-day review of the 

Controlled Unclassified Information (“CUI”) Framework for terrorism-related 

information within the information sharing environment established by Presidential 

Memorandum in 2008, and considered whether that Framework should be expanded to 

apply to all SBU information under the control of the Executive Branch. Enclosed are 

the Report and Recommendations resulting from this review. 

In addition to analyzing previous studies of SBU and the efforts of the CUI 

Council, the Task Force met with representatives from federal agencies both within and 

outside the information sharing environment; State, local, and tribal partners; privacy and 

open government organizations; and Congress. Informed by these consultations, a 

significant majority of the Task Force concluded that expanding the CUI Framework to 

encompass all SBU information will best strike the appropriate balance among the goals 

of Standardization, Information Sharing, and Government Transparency. 

The recommendation of a vastly expanded scope for CUI necessitates a careful 

and coordinated effort to attain the benefits of standardization without adversely affecting 

agencies’ missions or the security of sensitive information. Accordingly, the report 

recommends a phased approach to implementation of the proposed CUI Framework that 

prioritizes training, marking, and oversight. 

Taken as a whole, the Task Force’s recommendations seek to further information 

sharing among Executive Branch agencies as well as State, local, tribal and foreign 

partners by establishing a standard system for designating, marking, and handling all 

SBU information. The recommendations also enhance government transparency by 

establishing clear rules that protect information only when there is a compelling need to 

do so. 

v 
 

We recommend adoption of the Task Force Report and Recommendations, as 

well as the issuance of a new Executive Order rescinding the 2008 Memorandum on CUI 

and clearly setting forth the President’s intention for this complex but important subject. 

Respectfully, 

Eric H. Holder, Jr.

Attorney General 

 Janet Napolitano 

 Secretary of Homeland Security 

vi 
 

 

Executive Summary 

The President's Memorandum of May 27, 2009 on Classified Information and Controlled Unclassified 

Information, directed a Task Force, led by the Secretary of Homeland Security and the 

Attorney General, to review the Controlled Unclassified Information (“CUI”) Framework 

established in 2008 for the management of Sensitive but Unclassified1 (“SBU”) terrorismrelated information. The Task Force undertook a 90-day study of the CUI Framework, the 

current regimes for managing SBU information in the Executive Branch, and, by extension, 

the sharing of that information with our non-federal information-sharing partners. 

The Task Force concluded that Executive Branch performance suffers immensely from 

interagency inconsistency in SBU policies, frequent uncertainty in interagency settings as 

to exactly what policies apply to given SBU information, and the inconsistent application 

of similar policies across agencies. Additionally, the absence of effective training, 

oversight, and accountability at many agencies results in a tendency to over-protect 

information, greatly diminishing government transparency. 

Although the CUI Framework is intended to improve the sharing of only terrorism-related 

information, the Task Force concluded that a single, standardized framework for marking, 

safeguarding, and disseminating all Executive Branch SBU is required to further the goals 

of: 

 standardizing currently disparate terminology and procedures (represented by over 

107 distinct SBU regimes); 

 facilitating information-sharing through the promulgation of common and 

understandable rules for information protection and dissemination; and 

 enhancing government transparency through policies and training that clarify the 

standards for protecting information within the Framework. 

A simple, concise, and standardized CUI Framework, with effective centralized governance 

and oversight has the best chance of both wide acceptance within the federal government 

and broad adoption throughout our State, local, tribal, and private sector partner 

communities. The successful expansion of the scope of the CUI Framework requires 

careful consideration of agency missions, requirements, and the processes by which SBU 

information is currently managed. 

1

 Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU) information refers collectively to the various designations used within 

the Executive Branch for documents and information that are sufficiently sensitive to warrant some level of 

protection but that do not meet the standards for classification. CUI Framework refers to the single set of 

policies and procedures established by the Presidential Memorandum of May 7, 2008, governing the 

designation, marking, safeguarding, and dissemination of terrorism-related SBU information, which 

pursuant to that Memorandum, is renamed as “Controlled Unclassified Information.” Expanding the scope 

of the CUI Framework refers to the extension of the CUI Framework governing the designation, marking, 

safeguarding, and dissemination of CUI to all SBU information in possession or control of the Executive 

Branch. 

vii 
Building upon the CUI Framework established in 2008, the Task Force has proposed 40 

Recommendations intended to enhance Standardization, Information Sharing, Government 

Transparency, and the Protection of Information only where there is a compelling 

requirement to do so, including simplifying the definition of CUI; expanding the scope of 

the CUI Framework; clarifying that CUI markings have no bearing on releases either under 

the Freedom of Information Act or to Congress; and phasing implementation of the 

expanded scope of CUI. 

viii 
CUI Task Force Recommendations
 

Recommendation #1 Simplify the Definition of CUI 

Recommendation #2 Expand the Scope of the CUI Framework 

Recommendation #3 Make the Expanded CUI Framework the Exclusive Means of 

Protecting SBU 

Recommendation #4 Adjust the CUI Council Membership and Roles to Reflect the 

Expanded Scope 

Recommendation #5 Moratorium on New SBU Regimes 

Recommendation #6 Engagement of Non-ISE Agencies 

Recommendation #7 Phase Implementation of Scope Expansion 

Recommendation #8 Designation of CUI 

Recommendation #9 Identification of CUI 

Recommendation #10 Agency CUI Programs 

Recommendation #11 Simplification of Categories and Markings 

Recommendation #12 Executive Agent to Establish Standard Markings and Guidance 

Recommendation #13 Flexible Marking of CUI 

Recommendation #14 Clarify that CUI Has No Bearing on FOIA 

Recommendation #15 Safeguarding 

Recommendation #16 Consultation on Threat 

Recommendation #17 CIO Council as Advisor on Information Standards and 

Safeguards 

Recommendation #18 Standardize Specified Dissemination 

Recommendation #19 Dissemination to Congress and the Courts 

Recommendation #20 Clarify Decontrol 

Recommendation #21 Establish Life Cycle 

Recommendation #22 Establish Exception Process 

Recommendation #23 Delay in Incorporation of Exceptions into the CUI Framework 

Recommendation #24 Amending Regulations or Statutes 

Recommendation #25 Establish Training 

Recommendation #26 Incentives 

Recommendation #27 Accountability and Sanctions 

Recommendation #28 Internal Oversight 

Recommendation #29 Challenges to Designation and Identification 

Recommendation #30 Federal Acquisition Guidance 

Recommendation #31 Phase Implementation of Training, Marking, Oversight and 

Reporting 

Recommendation #32 Phase Implementation of Technical Safeguards 

Recommendation #33 Marking Initiation 

Recommendation #34 Ensure Adequate Resourcing of Executive Agent 

Recommendation #35 Synchronize CUI Implementation with Government Processes 

 and Cycles 

Recommendation #36 Impact of CUI on the Federal Enterprise Architecture 

Recommendation #37 Incorporate CUI into Federal Grant Guidance 

Recommendation #38 Annual Report of the Executive Agent 

Recommendation #39 Establish a Baseline Measurement of Current SBU Efforts 

Recommendation #40 Measure Implementation 

ix 
x 
 

 

 

Part 1. Overview
 

In furtherance of the Administration’s commitment to openness and transparency in 

government, the President’s Memorandum of May 27, 2009, entitled Classified Information and 

Controlled Unclassified Information (the “2009 Memorandum”) directed that the Attorney 

General and the Secretary of Homeland Security lead an Interagency Task Force on 

Controlled Unclassified Information (“CUI”)(the “Task Force”). The mission of the Task 

Force was to review current procedures for categorizing and sharing Sensitive But 

Unclassified (“SBU”)2 information in order to determine whether such procedures strike 

the proper balance among certain imperatives. These imperatives include protecting 

legitimate security, law enforcement, and privacy interests as well as civil liberties; 

providing clear rules to those who handle SBU information; and ensuring that the handling 

and dissemination of information is not restricted unless there is a compelling need. 

In addition to reviewing current procedures for SBU, the Task Force was charged with 

considering: 

 measures to track agencies’ progress with implementing the “CUI Framework”3 

 other measures to enhance implementation of an effective information sharing 

environment across agencies and levels of government,4 and 

 whether the scope of the CUI Framework should remain limited to terrorismrelated information within the Information Sharing Environment (“ISE”) or be 

expanded to apply to all SBU information. 

2 As reflected in the 2009 Memorandum, SBU refers collectively to the various designations used within 

the Federal Government for documents and information that are sufficiently sensitive to warrant some level 

of protection, but that do not meet the standards for National Security Classification. A process created in 

2005 for establishing a single, standardized, comprehensive categorical designation within the Executive 

Branch for most SBU information culminated with the adoption of the phrase “Controlled Unclassified 

Information” (CUI) in the Presidential Memorandum of May 7, 2008, entitled Designation and Sharing of 

Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) (the “2008 Memorandum”). CUI was defined in the 2008 

Memorandum as: 

a categorical designation that refers to unclassified information that does not meet the standards 

for National Security Classification under Executive Order 12958, as amended, but is (i) 

pertinent to the national interests of the United States or to the important interests of entities 

outside the Federal Government, and (ii) under law or policy requires protection from 

unauthorized disclosure, special handling safeguards, or prescribed limits on exchange or 

dissemination. 

The 2008 Memorandum directs that CUI be used in place of SBU as the single categorical designation for 

information within the scope of the CUI definition to refer generally to such information.

3

 The “CUI Framework” refers to the single set of policies and procedures governing the designation, 

marking, safeguarding, and dissemination of terrorism-related CUI, as established in the 2008 

Memorandum. 

4

 Pursuant to the Memorandum of July 2, 2009, Strengthening Information Sharing and Access, the 

Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism initiated a comprehensive review of 

the Information Sharing Environment. The Task Force was advised that it need not report on these 

measures. 

1 
 

 

 

 

1.1 The CUI Task Force 

1. Membership 

Led by the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General, and co-chaired by 

their senior representatives, the CUI Task Force was comprised of senior representatives of 

twelve federal agencies. This included representatives of following nine ISE agencies: 

 Department of State (“State”) 

 Office of the Director of National Intelligence (“ODNI”) 

 Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) 

 Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) 

 Department of Defense (“DoD”) 

 Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) 

 Program Manager, Information Sharing Environment (“PM-ISE”) 

 Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), and 

 Department of Justice (“DOJ”). 

The Task Force also included the following three non-ISE agencies: 

 Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) 

 Department of the Interior (“DOI”), and 

 National Archives and Records Administration (“NARA”). 

2. Methodology 

The Task Force assessed current procedures for categorizing and sharing SBU, both within 

and outside of the ISE, in light of the imperatives specified in the 2009 Memorandum. 

The Task Force also analyzed the most significant issues thus far encountered by the 

Executive Agent (“EA”) and the CUI Council in developing the CUI Framework while 

recognizing the Task Force goals of standardization, information sharing, and government 

transparency. The Task Force drew upon SBU efforts dating back to 2006, as well as the 

CUI Council’s analysis, findings, draft policy statements, and implementation guidance as 

the foundation for much of its effort. 

The Task Force met with representatives of multiple government entities to assess the 

many issues raised by implementation of the CUI Framework as described in the 2008 

Memorandum, including its impact on agencies outside of the ISE, on the current 

exceptions to the CUI Framework,5 on the ability of certain specific and discrete 

5

 Four regimes for the safeguarding of infrastructure protection information were granted “excepted” status 

under the May 2008 Memorandum, including Protected Critical Infrastructure Information, Sensitive 

Security Information, Chemical Vulnerability Information, and Safeguards Information. Excepted status 

requires that the CUI Framework be used to the maximum extent possible, including the most applicable 

safeguarding marking, and that any additional safeguarding requirements beyond that specified under the 

CUI Framework shall be appropriately registered in the CUI Registry. Regulatory markings are to follow 

CUI markings and a specified dissemination instruction is to articulate any additional regulatory 

requirements. 

2 
communities of interest to support CUI implementation, and on the interests and concerns 

of Congress. The Task Force also met with representatives of a number of nongovernment entities to assess various aspects of CUI implementation on entities outside of 

the federal government, including private sector owners and operators of critical 

infrastructure, industrial security contractors, open government and privacy advocacy 

organizations, and our State, local, and tribal information sharing partners. (For a 

complete list of entities consulted, see Appendix 1.) These consultations were 

extraordinarily valuable in understanding the concerns of CUI constituents and were 

critical in developing the Task Force’s recommendations. 

3 
4 
 

 

 

Part 2. The SBU Challenge 

All federal agencies6 routinely generate, use, store, and share information that, while not 

appropriate for “classification” under Executive Order 12958,7 as amended, or other 

authority,8 nevertheless requires some level of protection from unauthorized access and 

release. Protection may be required due to privacy concerns, law enforcement sensitivities, 

the business proprietary nature of the information, or for other reasons. Currently, across 

the Executive Branch, this information is identified by over 100 unique markings and at 

least 130 different labeling or handling regimes, such as “Law Enforcement Sensitive,” 

“For Official Use Only,” “Sensitive Security Information,” and “Limited Official Use.” (A 

partial listing of SBU markings is attached at Appendix 2.) Although SBU regimes or 

markings are typically derived from an identifiable authority, be it a statute, regulation, or 

agency policy, collectively they reflect a disjointed, inconsistent, and unpredictable system 

for protecting, sharing, and disclosing sensitive information. 

2.1 Assessment of Current SBU Procedures 

The Task Force reviewed current policies and procedures for categorizing and sharing SBU 

information to assess these processes against the imperatives identified by the President. 

The Task Force found that performance under these categories varied greatly. The factors 

influencing performance included the scope of subject matter and personnel covered; the 

intended purpose for control; the type of information protected; the process for 

developing policy and procedure; the clarity of policy and procedure; the availability of 

policy and procedure to persons handling subject information; the quality and frequency 

of employee training; and the existence of meaningful oversight. For some of these 

regimes, such as the widely utilized “Law Enforcement Sensitive” or “LES,” few of these 

factors are currently implemented. 

Regardless of any individual regime’s performance, it is clear that as a whole, Executive 

Branch performance under these measures suffers immensely from interagency 

inconsistency in SBU policies, frequent uncertainty in interagency settings as to exactly 

what policies apply, and inconsistent application of similar policies across agencies. 

6

 As used here and throughout the remainder of this report and its recommendations, the terms “agency,” 

“Agency,” or “agencies,” shall be deemed to refer to all Executive Branch departments, agencies, offices, 

components, and entities. 

7

 See Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,823 (Apr. 20, 1995), reprinted as amended by Exec. Order 

13292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 28, 2003) (prescribing a uniform system for classifying, safeguarding, 

and declassifying national security information, including information relating to defense against 

transnational terrorism). 

8 See e.g., Atomic Energy Act of 1954, §§ 4 & 142, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014(y) & 2162 (2009) (automatically 

classifying as “Restricted Data” all data concerning (1) the design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic 

weapons; (2) the production of special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the 

production of energy; and automatically classifying as “Formerly Restricted Data” all data the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission and the Department of Defense jointly determine relates primarily to the military 

utilization of atomic weapons and can be adequately safeguarded as defense information). 

5 
 

 

 

 

 

Additionally, the absence of effective training, oversight, and accountability at many 

agencies results in a tendency to over-protect information as SBU, thus greatly diminishing 

government transparency. 

Clarity as to what policies apply, as well as access to those policies, is essential to ensuring 

that a recipient properly handles SBU. Across the Executive Branch, the same type of 

information may be governed by entirely different, and often unclear, requirements. As a 

result, even where two agencies use the same marking, such as For Official Use Only 

(“FOUO”), and separately provide similar information to a recipient, that recipient must 

distinguish between the FOUO policies of each providing agency. 

The Task Force recognized that sharing terrorism-related and other intelligence and law 

enforcement information with local law enforcement is critical to our national and 

homeland security.9 Current SBU policies are generally ill-suited to this purpose. One 

example is when a State, local, or tribal official properly receives information from the 

federal government marked as “sensitive,” but does not receive any indication of the 

applicable safeguarding or dissemination policies. This situation can often result in the 

official’s reluctance to further share the information with other local law enforcement or 

first responders who may also have a need for it. 

Another challenge presented by inconsistent, agency-specific SBU regimes is the incidental, 

yet often unintended effect some markings have on the processing of requests for public 

release of information under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”). While a number 

of SBU regimes are based upon, or at least recognize, a specific statute or other legal 

authority for properly withholding information from public release under FOIA, many do 

not. Regardless, the markings are sometimes misunderstood as providing an independent 

basis for withholding documents from the public, Congress, or the courts, which in turn 

can undermine transparency, as well as public trust in government. 

The lack of standardized Executive Branch procedures for governing SBU information is 

well-established,10 the need for those standards well-documented,11 and the interest of 

Congress to address the challenge, proven.12 

9

 Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, www.9-

11commission.gov. 10 See e.g., The Constitution Project, Reining in Excessive Secrecy: Recommendations for the Reform of the 

Classification and Controlled Unclassified Information Systems (2009) available at 

http://www.constitutionproject.org/manage/file/178.pdf; U.S. Gov't. Accountability Off., Information 

Security: Federal Agencies Show Mixed Progress in Implementing Statutory Requirements, GAO-06-527T 

(Mar. 16, 2006); U.S. Gov't. Accountability Off., Information Sharing: The Federal Government Needs to 

Establish Policies and Processes for Sharing Terrorism-Related and Sensitive but Unclassified 

Information, GAO-06-385 (Mar. 17, 2006); U.S. Gov't. Accountability Off., Managing Sensitive 

Information: DOE and DOD Could Improve Their Policies and Oversight, GAO-06-531T (Mar. 14, 

2006); U.S. Gov't. Accountability Off., TSA: Clear Policies and Oversight Needed for Designation of 

Sensitive Security Information, GAO-05-677 (Jun. 29, 2005); U.S. Gen. Acct. Off., Selected Agencies' 

Handling of Personnel Information, GAO-02-1058 (Sep. 30, 2002); Cong. Res. Serv., 'Sensitive but 

Unclassified Information' and Other Controls Policy and Options for Scientific and Technical Information, 

CRS Rep. RL31845 (Feb. 15, 2006), as updated by CRS Rep. RL33303 (Dec. 29, 2006); Cong. Res. Serv., 

Secrecy vs. Openness: New Proposed Arrangements for Balancing Competing Needs, CRS Rep. 21895 

(Aug. 26, 2004), as updated (Oct. 12, 2004). 

6 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2.2 The 2008 CUI Framework 

Although the problems associated with SBU have existed for many decades, addressing 

them assumed greater urgency following the information sharing failures preceding the 

9/11 attacks. The 9/11 Commission reported that in the months leading up to the attacks: 

Information was not shared, sometimes inadvertently or because of legal 

misunderstandings. Analysis was not pooled . . . . Often the handoffs of 

information were lost across the divide separating the foreign and domestic 

agencies of government.13 

In response to these challenges, in 2004, Congress passed and the President signed the 

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, Pub. L. 108-458, which mandated the 

development of an Information Sharing Environment (“ISE”) to facilitate the sharing of 

terrorism-related information among federal, State, local, tribal, private sector, and foreign 

partner entities. On December 16, 2005, President Bush directed federal agencies to 

recommend procedures for standardizing the marking, handling, and safeguarding of SBU 

information.14 The resulting recommendations15 were largely reflected in the 2008 

Memorandum, which adopted CUI as the single Executive Branch designation for all SBU 

within the scope of the ISE, and established a corresponding new framework for 

designating, marking, safeguarding, and disseminating terrorism-related CUI, which 

became known as the CUI Framework.16 

The 2008 Memorandum designated the National Archives and Records Administration 

(NARA) as the Executive Agent (EA) for the CUI Framework and directed that a CUI 

Council17 perform an advisory and coordinating role for the development of policy 

11 Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, www.9-

11commission.gov, 416-419. 12 See e.g., the “Reducing Over-Classification Act of 2009,” H.R. 553, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009) (as 

introduced by Rep. Harman, Jan. 15, 2009); the “Reducing Information Control Designations Act,” H.R. 

1323, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009) (as introduced by Rep. Driehaus, Mar. 5, 2009); the “Implementing the 

Controlled Unclassified Information Framework Act of 2008,” S. 3662, 110th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2008) (as 

introduced by Sen. Lieberman, Oct. 1, 2008); the “Reducing Overclassification Act of 2008,” H.R. 4806, 

110th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2008) (as introduced by Rep. Harman, Dec. 18, 2007); the “Improving the Public 

Access to Documents Act of 2008,” H.R. 6193, 110th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2008) (as introduced by Rep.
 

Harman, Jun. 5, 2008); and the “Reducing Information Control Designations Act,” H.R. 6576, 110th Cong.
 

(2nd Sess. 2008) (as introduced by Rep. Waxman, Jul. 23, 2008). 

13 Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, www.9-

11commission.gov, 353. 14 Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on the Guidelines and Requirements in 

Support of the Information Sharing Environment, December 16, 2005. This Memorandum requires the 

development of recommendations, first, for homeland security information, law enforcement information, 

and terrorism information and then for all types of information not previously addressed. 15 Presidential Guideline 3 Report, Standardized Procedures for Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) 

Information, (Fall 2007).

16 2008 Memorandum, at 4-6. 

17 The CUI Council was established by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in
 

accordance with the 2008 Memorandum, as a subcommittee of the Information Sharing Council (ISC) 

created by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458) (IRTPA). 

Guidance issued separately by the PM-ISE on July 9, 2008, directed each ISC agency to designate a
 

7 
 

 

 

standards and implementation guidance for the CUI Framework. With a May 2013 

deadline for full implementation of the CUI Framework, the Archivist of the United States 

established the CUI Office, which hosted the first monthly meeting of the CUI Council in 

August 2008. 

In the ensuing 12 months, the EA, in consultation with the CUI Council, has conducted 

data calls and analyses, initiated the development of an implementation plan along with 

draft guidance in key policy areas, including: designation, marking, dissemination, 

safeguarding, dispute resolution, life cycle, oversight, and exceptions. As a result of these 

efforts, the emerging CUI Framework is intended to include: a standing Governance 

Structure under the current EA; two possible levels of safeguarding;18 two possible levels of 

dissemination controls;19 a procedure for designating specific dissemination requirements 

or limitations, when appropriate; three unique markings to reflect the three combinations 

of safeguarding and dissemination controls;20 a publicly available, web based “Registry” of 

markings that apply to CUI information and certain associated policies; and standardized 

training requirements across the federal government. 

Although implementation of the CUI Framework will be required only within the 

Executive Branch, it is intentionally being developed to be as accessible as possible to nonfederal information sharing partners, such as State, local, tribal, and foreign governments 

and the private sector. Thus, the promulgation and publication of standard rules across the 

Executive Branch should not only ease the handling of CUI by our non-federal partners, 

but it could also encourage the adoption of these rules and facilitate compliance with 

similar rules by partners outside the Executive Branch. Although adoption by non-federal 

partners may require modifications to accommodate applicable State, local and tribal law, 

in meeting with the Task Force, State, local and tribal representatives nonetheless expressed 

their desire to see the CUI Framework achieve the same broad acceptance and adaptation 

experienced by the Rules for Criminal Intelligence System Operating Policies promulgated 

by the Department of Justice.21 

representative to the CUI Council. The CUI Council effectively represents the needs and equities of ISE 

participants, providing the EA with advice and recommendations on CUI policies. The membership of the 

CUI Council currently includes: Department of Commerce, Department of Defense (Office of the 

Secretary and Joint Staff), Office of the Director of National Intelligence (on behalf of the Intelligence 

Community), Department of Energy, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Health and Human 

Services, Department of Homeland Security, Department of the Interior, Office of Management and 

Budget, Department of Justice, Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment, Department of 

State, Department of Transportation, Department of The Treasury, Environmental Protection Agency, and 

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In addition, non-federal participation on the CUI Council includes 

two members from State, local, and/or tribal government, two members from the private sector, and 

consultation with the ISC’s State, Local, Tribal, and Private Sector Subcommittee, as appropriate. 18 “Safeguarding” means measures and controls to protect CUI from unauthorized access resulting from 

theft, trespass, or carelessness. The current safeguarding levels are “Controlled” and “Controlled 

Enhanced.” 

19 Dissemination controls are instructions governing the extent to which dissemination is permitted or 

limited. The current dissemination controls are “Standard Dissemination” and “Specified Dissemination.” 

20 The markings include “CONTROLLED WITH STANDARD DISSEMINATION”, “CONTROLLED 

WITH SPECIFIED DISSEMINATION”, and “CONTROLLED ENHANCED WITH SPECIFIED 

DISSEMINATION.” At this time, there is no anticipated marking category that would couple “Controlled 

Enhanced” safeguards with “Standard Dissemination” controls. 

21 See “Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies,” 28 C.F.R. pt. 23 (2009). 28 C.F.R. part 23 is a 

guideline for federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies to follow in implementing standards for 

8 
 

 

 

 

 

 

Part 3. Recommendations 

3.1 Expanding the Scope of the Current CUI Framework 

The CUI Task Force was specifically directed to consider whether the scope of the CUI 

Framework should remain limited to terrorism-related information within the ISE, or, be 

expanded to apply to all SBU information, and by extension, apply beyond the realm of 

the ISE. 

Eleven of the 12 Task Force members concurred in the recommendation to expand the 

scope of the CUI Framework beyond the ISE and to all SBU information.22 Even prior to 

the establishment of the Task Force, DHS and DOD, as well as the FBI and ODNI (on behalf 

of the National Intelligence Community) had already committed to extending the current 

CUI Framework to all SBU within their control. It was the consensus of the 11 concurring 

agencies that maintaining multiple regimes for managing SBU information would be 

inconsistent with the goals of the Task Force, and that expanding the scope of the current 

CUI Framework would provide for specificity and consistency in the marking and 

identification of various types of sensitive information. 

A number of Task Force members also endorsed expanding the scope of the current CUI 

Framework as a means of providing greater clarity in implementation. For example, 

although the 2008 Memorandum’s definition of “CUI” is not limited to terrorism-related 

information, the scope of the CUI Framework it established is limited to terrorism-related 

information. Maintaining this discrepancy would force agencies to perform the often 

difficult task of segregating terrorism-related from non-terrorism-related information, a 

distinction that is not always clear or static. 

The Task Force believes the first step in improving the CUI Framework is to simplify the 

definition of CUI. CUI should be defined as “All unclassified information for which, pursuant to 

statute, regulation, or departmental or agency policy, there is a compelling requirement for safeguarding and/or 

dissemination controls.” Next, the scope of the CUI Framework should be expanded to include 

all information falling within the definition of CUI in the possession or under the control 

of the Executive Branch. As directed in the 2008 Memorandum, CUI should be used in 

operating federally grant-funded multi-jurisdictional criminal intelligence systems. It was written to both 

protect the privacy rights of individuals and to encourage and expedite the exchange of criminal 

intelligence information between and among law enforcement agencies of different jurisdictions. It 

provides specific guidance in five primary areas: submission and entry of criminal intelligence information, 

security, inquiry, dissemination, and the review-and-purge process. Only information technology systems 

operating under or funded through the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 

3711, et seq., as amended, must comply with the 28 C.F.R. part 23; however, the underlying “framework” 

has been widely applied to other activities involving the collection, maintenance, and dissemination of 

criminal intelligence information.

22 The Department of State opposes scope expansion out of concern that it would dilute the terrorismrelated focus of the Framework envisioned in the 2008 Memorandum and the ability to use the CUI 

marking as a means of identifying solely terrorism-related information. 

9 
 

place of SBU as the single categorical designation for all information falling within the 

scope of the definition of CUI. 

In sum, a strong majority of the Task Force believes that limiting the scope of the CUI 

Framework to terrorism-related information within the ISE: (1) risks overlooking 

information with a terrorism nexus that may not be apparent until some later time; 

(2) fails to address the inefficiencies and confusion in continuing to maintain over 100 

discrete SBU markings across the federal government; (3) could result in unintended 

inefficiencies, such as where agencies that handle sensitive terrorism-related and nonterrorism-related information would have to maintain at least two separate systems for 

handling SBU; and (4) creates confusion as to the true scope of CUI. 

Expanding the scope of the CUI Framework is not intended to provide agencies with 

unfettered access to all the sensitive unclassified information within the Executive Branch; 

rather, it is meant to facilitate appropriate sharing of sensitive unclassified information. It 

would also promote increased accountability in how information is shared by allowing 

agencies and the public to know what kind of information is maintained by federal 

agencies. 

Moreover, because of its uniformity, standardized training requirements, and the public 

availability of the registry, the expanded scope of the CUI Framework can be expected to 

significantly increase the openness and transparency of government by improving the 

efficiency of information sharing, where otherwise authorized, between and among 

federal, State, local, tribal, private sector, and foreign partners. By eliminating the overuse 

of SBU designations, an expanded CUI Framework would enhance the protection of 

personal privacy and civil liberties, while continuing to protect sensitive information as 

appropriate. 

The Task Force believes that the efforts of the EA and the CUI Council are enhanced when 

taking into consideration the perspectives of a wide range of information-sharing partners 

and incorporating those perspectives into policy development efforts. The EA could 

achieve this by periodically inviting public interest or private sector entities to attend 

meetings for the purpose of providing their insights, experiences, observations or opinions 

on relevant matters. 

The Task Forces believes that expansion of the CUI Framework necessitates an expansion of 

the CUI Council membership, which, under the 2008 Memorandum, was limited to 

members of the Information Sharing Council,23 as well as to its roles and functions. 

Composition of the CUI Council should be adjusted to reflect the scope of CUI under an 

expanded CUI Framework. To accommodate that expanded scope while optimizing 

effective representation, the Task Force believes the core composition of the Council 

should primarily include “capstone” agencies. For example, ODNI would represent all 

intelligence community agencies; DOD would represent each of the military services and 

all other DOD elements; DHS would represent all of the component agencies of DHS; DOJ 

would represent its subordinate agencies, etc. The expanded CUI Council should be 

recognized as a consensus body for developing CUI policy and should retain the 

23 The Information Sharing Council has been merged into the Information Sharing and Access Interagency 

Policy Committee. 

10 
responsibilities and authorities identified in the 2008 Memorandum, including resolving 

disputes among agencies concerning the proper designation or marking of CUI. In 

addition, the Task Force believes that the CUI Council should be empowered to hear 

appeals from agency dispute/challenge mechanisms. 

The majority of developments in post 9/11 information sharing have impacted terrorismrelated information within the context of the ISE. Agencies outside of the ISE have 

generally had only limited exposure to the CUI Framework directed by the 2008 

Memorandum. Task Force outreach to those agencies identified the steeper learning curve 

many of them would face in implementing the CUI Framework as compared to their peers 

within the ISE. To begin to understand non-ISE agency requirements, the Task Force 

believes that the EA should reach out to these agencies and inform them of efforts to 

implement the Framework in light of the 2008 Memorandum and the recommendations 

contained herein. The EA should solicit from them any agency-specific needs or 

considerations relevant to their implementation of the CUI Framework. 

11 

Recommendation #1 Simplify the Definition of CUI 

The definition of “Controlled Unclassified Information,” or CUI, should be simplified to: 

All unclassified information for which, pursuant to statute, regulation, or departmental or agency policy, there is a 

compelling requirement for safeguarding and/or dissemination controls. 

 

Recommendation #2 Expand the Scope of the CUI Framework 

The scope of the CUI Framework should be expanded to include all information falling 

within the definition of CUI in the possession or under the control of the Executive Branch 

of the Federal Government. 

Recommendation #3 Make the Expanded CUI Framework the Exclusive Means of 


Protecting SBU
 

The expanded CUI Framework should be the single categorical designation used to 

identify, safeguard, and disseminate unclassified information for which, pursuant to 

statute, regulation, or departmental or agency policy, there is a compelling requirement 

for safeguarding and/or dissemination controls, except where a particular regime has been 

approved by the EA as a temporary exception to the CUI Framework. 

Recommendation #4 Adjust the CUI Council Membership and Roles to Reflect the 


Expanded Scope 


CUI Council membership should be adjusted to reflect the expanded scope of the CUI 

Framework, and membership reassessed to prioritize representation through “capstone” 

agencies. Additionally, the CUI Council should be empowered to address appeals of 

agency dispute/challenge mechanisms. 
Recommendation #5 Moratorium on New SBU Regimes 

Consistent with the imperatives listed in the 2009 Memorandum, the President should 

impose a moratorium on efforts within the Executive Branch to define or develop new SBU 

categories outside of the CUI Framework. 

Recommendation #6 Engagement of Non-ISE Agencies 

The EA should develop a 120-day outreach plan to engage all non-ISE agencies in CUI 

Framework efforts and the EA should solicit from them any agency-specific needs or 

considerations relevant to their implementation of the CUI Framework. 

Recommendation #7 Phase Implementation of Scope Expansion - Scope 

Implementation of the CUI Framework should begin with all ISE agencies, and consistent 

with the 2008 Memorandum, they should complete implementation by May 2013. All 

other agencies (other than the excepted regimes) should complete implementation by May 

2015. The excepted regimes should complete implementation by May 2016. If the 

excepted regimes believe that implementation by May 2016 would cause serious and 

demonstrable harm, they may petition the EA, upon identification of their specific 

concerns and proposals for their remediation, for an extension of time to ensure that 

exception implementation does not negatively impact those regimes. 

3.2 Measures to Enhance the Current CUI Framework 

The discussions and recommendations which follow are intended to improve the current 

CUI Framework, as established in the 2008 Memorandum. 

1. Designation and Identification 

Since issuance of the 2008 Memorandum, the EA, in coordination with the CUI Council, 

has worked to define the concepts of “Designation” and “Identification.” Designation is 

currently defined as the determination that a general category of information (e.g. 

personally identifiable information, law enforcement information, etc.) may be protected 

as CUI and, if so, the level of protection required and dissemination authorized. It is each 

agency’s responsibility to evaluate its data holdings to determine what information should 

be designated as CUI. It is foreseeable, based on the revised definition and scope of CUI 

recommended herein, that some information currently treated as “sensitive” may be found 

not to warrant CUI designation. Designation may be initiated by the President, statute, 

regulation, agency head, or appropriately designated senior agency official. Identification is 

currently defined as recognition by an authorized individual that specific information fits 

within a general category of information which has been previously designated as CUI. 

A key goal of the expanded CUI Framework is reducing the number of existing SBU 

regimes into the minimum appropriate number of CUI designations. The EA, in 

12 
coordination with the CUI Council, has already begun the process for designating various 

general categories of information common to most agencies, including: 

● Acquisition-Related Information 

● Law Enforcement 

● Export Controlled 

● Business Proprietary 

● Intellectual Property Controls 

● Privacy Protected Information 

● Restrictions on Non-U.S. Citizens 

● Legal Privileges and Restrictions 

● Security Information 

Accommodation and Flexibility 

In exercising their respective responsibilities, the EA and CUI Council should fully consider 

the mission and requirements of the agency recommending a designation and make all 

appropriate efforts to accommodate those requirements in the harmonization effort. 

Similarly, senior officials of agencies recommending designations should be flexible in 

working with the EA to ensure that harmonization of their designation recommendations 

with the CUI Framework is achieved. 

Recommendation #8 Designation of CUI 

CUI designation by the EA should reflect the following four-step process: 

Step 1: The agency head, or other appropriately designated senior-level official, 

determines that there exists a compelling requirement to protect a category of 

information that the agency routinely handles, and which has not already been 

designated by the EA. 

Step 2: The official submits a designation recommendation, along with supporting 

and accompanying materials (e.g., statute, regulation, or policy), to the EA for 

review and consideration. 

Step 3: In consultation with the CUI Council, the EA reviews the designation 

recommendation for the purpose of ensuring that: 

a.	 the description of, authority and justification for, and requested 

standards for safeguarding and dissemination are clearly 

articulated; 

b.	 the requested designation is consistent with standards applicable 

to any similar types of information and harmonized, as 

appropriate, with those designations; and 

13 
c.	 the submitting agency is aware of and understands any concern 

of the EA, or of any other agency, that a prospective designation 

does not warrant the protection levels selected and/or the 

ensuing loss of government transparency accompanying 

designation. 

Step 4: Upon approval by the EA, designations and supporting information are 

published, as appropriate, to a public CUI Registry, from which the public and 

official users of CUI markings may identify the categories of information 

designated as CUI. To the extent that any of the information supporting a particular 

designation is, itself, CUI, it will be maintained separately from the public registry 

by the EA. 

Recommendation #9 Identification of CUI 

Each agency should establish standards for personnel possessing the authority and/or 

necessary qualifications for identifying information as CUI. At a minimum, all individuals 

authorized to identify CUI should meet standardized CUI training requirements, as 

implemented within that agency. 

Recommendation #10 Agency CUI Programs 

Each agency should establish a program to manage its CUI. The program should include, 

at a minimum, Senior Officials responsible on behalf of the agency head for 

recommending CUI Designations, providing training, CUI management, and oversight of 

agency CUI activities. 

2. Marking 

Standardization of Markings 

Standardization is one of the goals of CUI implementation. The EA should provide the 

standardized markings and marking requirements with which agencies will comply. The 

decision regarding how to apply the standardized CUI markings to the various forms of 

CUI should be left to agency discretion. CUI intended for dissemination must be marked, 

but agency mission, intended data usage, access policies, established information exchange 

processes, and means or purposes for disseminating should all inform the agency decision 

regarding the most appropriate means of marking. 

EA approved standardized markings should identify CUI designation, safeguarding and 

dissemination controls; originating agency; and life cycle, and should be the only markings 

used to convey this information. The Task Force reviewed the many variations of 

markings and marking schemes employed in the legacy SBU regimes and concluded that 

no marking scheme in current use can accommodate all requirements of the expanded 

scope. For example, some agencies – particularly those outside of the ISE – routinely 

process and transfer bulk form SBU (e.g., privacy, health, income, etc.) with other 

14 
 

agencies, but for a very limited purpose, to a known and limited audience, and under clear 

processes. In such circumstances, it is possible that simply using a “system-high”24 

marking may be adequate. Alternatively, in the case of finished intelligence products 

intended for dissemination to our State, local, and tribal partners, it may be irresponsible 

not to clearly identify the intelligence report as CUI, and to include any warranted portion 

marking. The Task Force recognized the value of some level of portion marking for specific 

formats of CUI in information sharing efforts to enable the ready identification of the CUI 

elements within appropriately marked documents. 

The Task Force believes that agencies should consider the full range of marking options – 

including, as appropriate, system-high, database, application, document, portion, 

paragraph, and data element identification25 - as required by mission and information 

protection and sharing requirements. When shared, all information should be marked 

consistent with EA issued standards. 

Given the likelihood that mission requirements may necessitate occasional deviations from 

the standards, the EA should be authorized to waive or modify these standards in such 

circumstances. 

Simplification of Markings 

The Task Force believes that the CUI Framework, not only across federal agencies, but in 

the potential for its adoption by State, local, tribal, private sector, and foreign partners, 

requires the use of terminology which is clear, simple and intuitive. It is likely that while 

the 2008 Memorandum’s categorizing scheme is appropriate, its supporting marking 

nomenclature (“CONTROLLED WITH STANDARD DISSEMINATION,” “CONTROLLED 

WITH SPECIFIED DISSEMINATION,” and “CONTROLLED ENHANCED WITH SPECIFIED 

DISSEMINATION”) can be improved. The Task Force encourages the EA to utilize input 

from a variety of CUI user focus groups, to try out variations of markings or labels and 

facilitate development of standard markings. The Task Force believes CUI markings should 

use plain language, and while abbreviations are appropriate, codes should be discouraged. 

Public Registry 

The Task Force views the public registry as an important source of government 

transparency and public insight into CUI designations. While the CUI registry would 

contain a full description of the requirements for safeguarding and disseminating CUI, the 

Task Force nonetheless believes it preferable that a given CUI document (such as an 

intelligence report) itself, to the extent possible, contain any safeguarding and 

dissemination information necessary to its proper handling. 

24System High is a means of marking an entire system at the level of the most restricted CUI within the 

system. 

25Database marking would identify the most restricted CUI at the database level. Application marking 

would identify the most restricted CUI at the application level. Document marking would identify the most 

restricted CUI within a document. Paragraph or portion marking would identify each paragraph or portion 

containing CUI at the most restricted level found in that paragraph or portion. Data element identification 

includes the marking only of those discrete data elements or segments of information that are deemed CUI. 

15 
 

 

Distinguish from FOIA 

Finally, the Task Force believes it is critical to recognize that the CUI Framework does not 

alter the requirements of FOIA, and that CUI implementation guidance and training make 

clear that the presence or absence of a CUI marking has no bearing on whether a record is 

releasable or exempt from release under FOIA. 

Recommendation #11 Simplification of Categories and Markings 

The 2008 Memorandum marking nomenclature should be replaced with succinct, 

informative overall markings, such as: 

● CONTROLLED-ENHANCED 

● CONTROLLED-SPECIFIED 

● CONTROLLED-STANDARD 

or 

● CONTROLLED-HIGH 

● CONTROLLED-MEDIUM 

● CONTROLLED-LOW 

Recommendation #12 EA to Establish Standard Markings and Guidance 

The EA should establish standardized CUI markings that identify CUI designation, 

safeguarding and dissemination controls; originating agency; and life cycle. The EA should 

publish the standardized markings and marking guidance to the agencies. Upon agency 

request, the EA may grant specific waivers or modifications to these standards, and the EA 

should work with agencies to ensure compliance with both the Framework and agency 

requirements. 

Recommendation #13 Flexible Marking of CUI 

CUI intended for dissemination must be marked in accordance with the standardized 

markings established by the EA. Agency decisions regarding how and when to apply 

standardized CUI markings should consider the full range of marking options and be 

driven by agency mission, the medium in which the CUI resides or is conveyed, and 

information protection and sharing requirements. 

Recommendation #14 Clarify that CUI Has No Bearing on FOIA 

CUI implementation guidance and CUI training should make clear that the CUI Framework 

and FOIA are entirely separate and that CUI markings have no bearing on whether records 

are exempt from release under FOIA. 

16 
 

3. Safeguarding 

“Safeguarding” refers to physical or electronic measures that ensure CUI is not accessed 

inadvertently or improperly. The two levels of safeguarding established in the 2008 

Memorandum, “standard”26 and “enhanced”,27 are believed adequate for the expanded 

scope of the CUI Framework proposed herein. The Task Force is concerned, however, that 

incorporating existing federal IT standards directly into the CUI Framework could pose a 

significant impediment to CUI implementation, as application and adherence have been 

inconsistent to date. The reasons for the inconsistency include cost, complexity, and some 

contradiction between overlapping rules. 

Mindful of the fact that agencies are obligated to comply with federal IT standards 

independent of those standards’ inclusion in the CUI Framework, the Task Force has 

concluded that the EA, in consultation with the Federal Chief Information Officer (CIO) 

Council, should develop IT safeguarding standards for the CUI Framework in a phased 

manner. 

The Task Force endorses the position of OMB that phased development of IT standards for 

the CUI Framework is neither authority for nor endorsement of non-compliance by 

agencies with federal IT standards. The Task Force believes that Federal CIOs, through the 

Federal CIO Council, could provide relevant, practical, and objective advice and 

perspectives given their current responsibilities across government for balancing security 

requirements with IT planning and implementation. Assistance in aligning metadata 

tagging and digital identity management with the CUI Framework to manage access to CUI 

is one goal for such advice. 

An additional safeguarding challenge arises when sensitive federal government information 

is shared with State, local, tribal, private sector, and foreign partners. As non-federal 

partners, these entities are neither required by law to comply with the same physical or IT 

safeguarding standards as the federal Executive Branch, nor are they necessarily funded to 

do so. Nonetheless, the Task Force believes that non-federal entities that receive CUI from 

the federal government should be encouraged to provide safeguarding protection 

consistent with the CUI Framework to the maximum extent possible. 

Recognizing the need to achieve the parallel goals of information protection and 

information sharing with these partners, the Task Force concluded that the CUI Framework 

would likely benefit from the establishment of standardized arrangements to address 

formal, recurring, and institutionalized information sharing settings as well as informal, 

irregular, or field conditions. Such means must be based on risk management as informed 

by operational requirements. 

26 “‘Standard Safeguarding’ is a handling instruction that means the information so designated is subject to 

baseline safeguarding measures that reduce the risks of unauthorized or inadvertent disclosure.” 2008 

Memorandum, at 3. 

27 “‘Enhanced Safeguarding’ is a handling requirement that means the information so designated is subject 

to measures more stringent than those normally required because inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure 

would create a risk of substantial harm.” 2008 Memorandum, at 2. 

17 
 

There are useful precedents for formal information sharing arrangements between the 

federal government and non-federal partners. Despite certain obvious distinctions between 

them and the CUI Framework, the Task Force was impressed by the procedures 

implemented by the Chemical-Terrorism Vulnerability Information (“CVI”)28 and 

Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (“PCII”)29 programs. Both of those programs 

have well developed guidelines, tailored to mission needs, providing safeguarding 

standards which can be achieved with reasonable and appropriate efforts by the nonfederal partners. The PCII program also contains an “Accreditation” process. The Task 

Force encourages the EA and CUI Council to review those procedures for any appropriate 

measures which may benefit the CUI Framework, taking proper account of situations in 

which non-federal partners may have severe resource constraints. 

Information sharing which is informal, irregular, or which occurs under field conditions 

presents its own set of safeguarding concerns, and in these circumstances, formal 

procedures, agreements, and compliance mechanisms may serve only to impede 

information sharing. The Task Force believes that in such circumstances, where 

information must be shared, but where there is no opportunity for formalizing 

procedures, federal employees and their non-federal partners should be enabled to identify 

“equivalent measures,” taking into account the sensitivity of the particular CUI and the 

risks thereto. In such circumstances, a federal employee’s training and understanding of 

the CUI Framework could be critical, both to ensure protection of the information, and to 

ensure that sharing is not impeded by “non-issues.” The Task Force would encourage 

agencies to develop pocket reference cards and short-form CUI Agreements for use by 

personnel in the field. 

Recommendation #15 Safeguarding 

The EA, in consultation with the CUI Council, should develop a means to address 

safeguarding in formal, recurring, and institutionalized information sharing settings, as 

well as in informal or irregular situations including field conditions. 

Recommendation #16 Consultation on Threat 

The EA, in consultation with the CUI Council, should consult with appropriate entities to 

determine the level at which certain unclassified information on federal government 

networks and systems is being targeted in order to best allocate resources to protect CUI. 

28 Procedures for the CVI program can be found in the CVI Manual, 

http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/chemsec_cvi_proceduresmanual.pdf 

29 Procedures for the PCII program can be found in the April 2009 Protected Critical Infrastructure 

Information Program Procedures Manual, found at 

http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/pcii_program_procedures_manual.pdf 

18 
Recommendation # 17 CIO Council as Advisor on Information Standards and 


Safeguards 


The EA should utilize the Federal CIO Council for advice and consultation on: 

a.	 appropriate measures to support a phased approach to the application of 

information technology standards to the CUI Framework, 

b.	 a balanced set of technology requirements for safeguarding CUI which 

are consistent with federal guidance and achievable by our non-federal 

information sharing partners, and 

c.	 metadata standards to promote transparency, facilitate IT functions, and 

support digital privilege management. 

4. Dissemination 

The CUI Framework currently contains two dissemination controls - “Standard” and 

“Specified.” Standard dissemination control allows an authorized holder, based on his/her 

discretion, to provide the CUI to federal, State, local, tribal, private sector, and foreign 

partners – provided that the dissemination furthers an official mission purpose. Specified 

Dissemination rules are used when there are compelling requirements to limit the 

authorized holder’s discretion. Specified dissemination requires additional markings 

describing those limits. These restrictions, based on law, regulation, interagency or 

intergovernmental agreement, or agency policy, should define a specified dissemination 

instruction clearly articulating the discretion authorized the holder, as approved by the EA 

at designation. Where CUI is marked only to identify it as CUI, without specifying 

dissemination instructions, standard dissemination applies. Where specified dissemination 

rules do not lend themselves to effective summarization, they will be maintained by the EA 

and made easily accessible to handlers of that category of CUI. 

Congress and the Judiciary 

While the CUI Framework may well include a designation for materials covered by 

Executive Privilege, the Task Force recognized that Executive accountability requires that 

CUI markings do not themselves interfere with the checks and balances provided by the 

legislative and judicial branches. Official activities by those branches constitute “official 

use” as it does for other authorized recipients of CUI. While those branches often must 

honor the safeguard and dissemination controls required for CUI of any other recipient, 

marking as CUI is not itself a basis for withholding information from Congress or the 

Judiciary. 

Recommendation #18 Standardize Specified Dissemination Requirements 

Agencies should work with the EA and CUI Council to standardize specified dissemination 

instructions. In reviewing agency requests for specified dissemination instructions, the EA 

should seek to harmonize instructions and thereby limit the total number of CUI specified 

dissemination instructions to the greatest extent possible. 

19 
Recommendation #19 Dissemination to Congress and the Courts 

Implementation guidance for the CUI framework should clarify that a CUI marking is not a 

basis for withholding information from Congress or the Judiciary. 

5. Life Cycle 

Life Cycle refers to the time period during which information identified as CUI would 

receive the safeguarding and dissemination controls of the CUI Framework. Appropriate 

life cycles support government transparency and ensure that resources are focused on 

protecting information as warranted by the level and anticipated duration of sensitivity. 

The Task Force members agreed that given the volume of CUI material within the federal 

government, it is impracticable to implement a review process prior to decontrol. Hence, 

the intent is to have the life cycle established as part of the CUI designation, and be tied to 

either specific events or a specific timeframe. 

The broad range of material covered by the CUI Framework poses difficult life cycle 

challenges. The Task Force believes CUI should be decontrolled as soon as it no longer 

warrants the safeguarding or dissemination controls of the CUI Framework. While in 

some cases this time frame would be foreseeable and reasonably short, in other instances, 

such as situations in which the Privacy Act or the Health Insurance Portability and 

Accountability Act apply, the timelines for protection may span the life of the protected 

individual, or longer. 

Agency officials who recommend designation of CUI are in the best position to judge how 

long CUI protection should be required. The designation decisions should therefore 

address decontrol. Each CUI designation recommendation should specify either the passage 

of a certain period of time or an event certain (for example, the death of the individuals 

named, conclusion of prosecution and expiration of appeal rights, etc.) after which the 

document would be decontrolled and lose its status as CUI. 

The Task Force believes that no document should remain subject to CUI controls 

indefinitely, and identified the requirement for a default lifecycle for any situation where 

no other life cycle is identifiable. Recognizing that the selection of such a generally 

applicable time period is both necessary and somewhat arbitrary, the Task Force 

considered the recommendations of both The Constitution Project (2-10 years)30 and 

OMB Watch (not more than 5 years).31 The Task Force considered these 

recommendations in light of the anticipated breadth of CUI designations, the significant 

administrative burden resulting from an overly aggressive decontrol cycle, and the 

enhanced transparency afforded by separating CUI status from releasability decisions 

(described below), and concluded that in circumstances where CUI lifecycle is otherwise 

 

30 The Constitution Project, Reining in Excessive Secrecy: Recommendations for the Reform of the 

Classification and Controlled Unclassified Information Systems (2009) at 9, available at 

http://www.constitutionproject.org/manage/file/178.pdf 31 OMB Watch, Controlled Unclassified Information: Recommendations for Information Control Reform 

(2009) at 10, available at http://www.ombwatch.org/files/info/2009cuirpt.pdf 

20 
undetermined, decontrol should occur 10 years following CUI identification. Any CUI 

whose decontrol is other than 10 years after identification should be clearly marked with 

the date or event certain upon which decontrol would take place. 

The Task Force recognizes that decontrol of CUI is distinct from release of CUI, and that 

mandatory, pre-release review procedures, particularly when conducted following 

decontrol, facilitate coordination with the document’s originator and awareness of any 

enduring requirement for control. At no time, pre- or post-decontrol, is a CUI marking 

itself determinative of whether it may be released. Similarly, the CUI Framework should 

not impact destruction timelines established through statute, regulation, or records 

management policy. 

Recommendation #20 Clarify Decontrol 

“Decontrol” should be identified as the act of removing information previously designated 

as CUI from the CUI Framework, and it should be made clear that while public release of 

CUI should be preceded by the CUI’s decontrol, decontrol is not itself authorization for 

public release. 

Recommendation #21 Establish Life Cycle 

All CUI information should be decontrolled after ten years unless (a) the CUI designation 

establishes an alternative decontrol requirement by date or event, (b) the alternative 

decontrol appears in the controlled registry, or (c) the alternative decontrol is clearly 

identified on the CUI. 

6. Exceptions 

The 2008 Memorandum lists four critical infrastructure information regimes which are 

specific exceptions to the CUI Framework. If the scope of CUI is expanded, as per 

Recommendation # 2, additional temporary exceptions may be required. To limit 

exceptions to those truly required, the Task Force believes it important that the EA identify 

specific criteria for establishing exceptions. Possible factors could include that the 

potential exception contains a significant amount of information not originated by the 

federal government and provided to the government based upon negotiated criteria that do 

not conform to the CUI regime, or that the provision of the information to the 

government is highly dependent on the existence of a trusted regime for data protection. 

With respect to the four exceptions listed in the 2008 Memorandum, the relationship 

between the federal government and the private sector has been negotiated through public 

rule making. Each of these systems was negotiated and tailored to a particular community 

and type of information. There is significant interest in these communities that their 

incorporation into the Framework not negate the currently established trust. A proposal by 

the excepted regime program offices is to establish and implement the CUI Framework 

with the intention of bringing the “exceptions” into the CUI Framework once its reliability 

and trust are established. 

21 
The Task Force believes that the exceptions should be incorporated into the CUI 

Framework in a manner which, to the maximum extent possible, preserves the 

fundamental elements of the exceptions, and neither harms the trusted relationships nor 

forces the excepted regimes out of compliance with statutory requirements. As the 

excepted regimes approach incorporation into the CUI Framework, the Task Force believes 

the EA should work with the relevant agencies and program offices to amend regulations 

and, if necessary, with Congress to amend relevant statutes. Incorporating the exceptions 

into the Framework is not intended to negate established FOIA exemptions. 

Any new exceptions should be considered in light of the ability to render them compliant 

either with existing CUI standards for safeguarding and dissemination or standards for the 

classification of information for national security or other authorized purposes. 

Recommendation #22 Establish Exception Process 

In addition to the four existing exceptions within the Presidential guidance on CUI, a 

process should be developed by the EA, in coordination with the CUI Council, to develop a 

means of evaluating whether additional categories of information that are covered by the 

expanded scope of CUI should be treated as temporary exceptions. 

Recommendation #23 Delay in Incorporation of Exceptions into the CUI Framework 

The CUI Framework should be established, running, and proven, prior to incorporation of 

the exceptions into the Framework. 

Recommendation #24 Amending Regulations or Statutes 

The EA should work with the agencies and program offices administering excepted 

regimes to amend relevant regulations and, if necessary, with Congress to amend relevant 

statutes, as the excepted regimes are incorporated into the CUI Framework. 

7. Training 

Effective implementation of the CUI Framework requires changing the way unclassified 

information protection and sharing is commonly understood. A dedicated, centralized 

training program is critical to that effort. CUI training is required at various levels of 

instruction, based upon agency mission and employee duties and seniority. Baseline 

training should be established by the EA, and agencies should coordinate development of 

intermediate and advanced level training with the EA. Each agency should be encouraged 

to create training that is tailored to its particular needs and mission. This is especially true 

in the ISE agencies, where the tension between sharing and protecting critical information 

is greatest. Training in this area requires a strong emphasis on the exercise of individual 

judgment in ensuring that the CUI Framework does not have a chilling effect on 

information sharing. Additionally, the EA should provide training to the senior officials 

responsible for CUI designation and agency CUI program management. 

22 
Recommendation #25 Establish Training 

The EA should establish a baseline training program sufficient to educate federal employees 

on the key principles underlying the CUI Framework, including the importance of 

government transparency and public trust in government. Intermediate and advanced level 

training should be developed by agencies, in consultation with the EA, to address increased 

requirements for expertise and sophistication in managing CUI. Basic CUI training should 

be the minimum requirement for an employee to be authorized to identify or disseminate 

CUI. Additionally, to promote consistency across the Executive Branch the EA should 

provide training directly to the senior officials responsible for CUI designation and agency 

CUI program management. 

8. Incentives and Accountability 

The Task Force believes that getting CUI designation and identification decisions right the 

first time is as important as ensuring compliance with CUI safeguards and dissemination 

controls. Like recent efforts with regard to the ISE, compliance with CUI policies should 

be viewed as routine elements of job performance and considered in employee evaluation, 

promotion, or award decisions. Moreover, administrative or other appropriate sanctions 

should be available for repeated non-compliance with CUI policies, or with CUI safeguard 

or dissemination control requirements. 

Recommendation #26 Incentives 

Agencies should consider employee performance under the CUI Framework in evaluation, 

promotion, and award decisions. 

23 

Recommendation #27 Accountability and Sanctions 

Agencies should be authorized to impose administrative sanctions for repeated noncompliance with CUI policies or with CUI safeguard or dissemination control 

requirements. 

9. Standardization, Oversight, and Dispute Resolution 

A simple, concise, and standardized CUI Framework, with effective centralized governance 

and oversight, has the best chance not only for the widest acceptance within the federal 

government, but for broad adaptation throughout our State, local, tribal, and private sector 

partner communities. 

The Task Force believes it is critical that the CUI Framework bring standardization to 

current SBU processes to reduce inconsistency and a tendency toward over-protection of 
information. To accomplish this goal, the Task Force determined that the EA should be 

appropriately empowered to harmonize and standardize designations across agencies. 

The Task Force considers that oversight should begin within the agency, based on 

procedures to be set out by the agency head. Agencies should establish an effective 

internal oversight approach, either as part of or parallel with the CUI program. 

The EA should maintain oversight authority and the ability to perform on-site reviews of 

agency CUI programs to support the implementation of an effective Framework across 

government, and to require of each agency any reports, information, and other 

cooperation that may be necessary to fulfill its responsibilities. In addition, each agency 

and the EA should also establish a mechanism for addressing challenges to CUI designation 

and identification by authorized holders of the information. 

CUI dispute resolution requires a balanced approach. The goal is to empower the EA to 

implement and manage the CUI Framework while recognizing the authority of the 

agencies to execute their missions. CUI is likely to be fully embedded throughout mission 

execution, and agencies require a means of assuring that decisions within the CUI 

Framework do not improperly impact mission execution. 

The Task Force also recognizes the significant costs imposed on private entities doing 

business with the federal government in order to comply with multiple, inconsistent SBU 

regimes. The Task Force believes the obligation under federal contracts to handle CUI 

information should be clear, consistent, and reflected in a single Federal Acquisition 

Regulation (FAR) provision that addresses the handling of CUI across the federal 

government. The language of this provision should be mirrored in agency-level acquisition 

regulations and guidance. 

Recommendation #28 Internal Oversight 

Each agency should identify an internal oversight program to assure the effective 

implementation of the CUI Framework within the agency. 

Recommendation #29 Challenges to Designation and Identification 

Each agency head or senior official should establish a mechanism for addressing challenges 

to CUI designation and identification, to include appeals to the CUI Council. The EA 

should establish a mechanism by which the CUI Council would address appeals of agency 

challenges as well as other interagency disputes based upon CUI designation or 

identification. 

24 
 

The Federal Acquisition Regulations should be revised to reflect one provision or clause 

that addresses compliance with the CUI Framework by private entities seeking to do 

business with the federal government. This provision or clause should be mirrored in 

agency specific acquisition regulations or guidance. 

25 

Recommendation #30 Federal Acquisition Guidance 

10. Implementation Timeline and Resources 

Full implementation of the CUI Framework requires significant resources, especially with 

respect to IT safeguards. Previously released safeguarding guidance required Federal IT 

systems to make use of encryption, two-factor authentication for remote access, and other 

secure system and data access procedures. Many agencies are still developing procedures 

to meet these requirements. Accelerating the implementation of the safeguarding 

requirements could impact resource constraints at certain agencies. 

Raising the level of IT safeguards, however, was not among the factors mandating the 

replacement of the existing 107 disparate SBU regimes, the development of the CUI 

Framework, or the expansion of the CUI Framework beyond its current scope. Those 

actions were mandated by the need to bring standardization, ease information sharing, and 

increase government transparency to the world of SBU information. If, in the alternative, 

implementation focuses on the core requirements of training, marking and oversight, 

while still requiring an extraordinary effort, the mandates of the CUI Framework can likely 

be achieved for a fraction of the cost anticipated by current planning. 

Therefore, to see more immediate improvements without requiring an inordinate and 

potentially impossible investment, the Task Force believes that implementation should 

begin with the foundational aspects of the CUI Framework – training, marking, and 

oversight, while the EA works to identify or develop appropriate IT safeguarding 

requirements and capabilities. Automated tools could greatly ease the burden of 

identifying and marking efforts by providing users with clear choices – such as are 

available through drop-down menus, as well as aiding oversight and CUI management 

efforts. 

Specifically, Federal agencies should prioritize: 

 Establishing agency CUI Programs. 

 Implementing an EA-provided training program on the fundamentals of CUI and 

the importance of maintaining public trust in government. 

 Adopting the CUI markings and dissemination controls, while phasing out the use 

of existing markings. 

 Deploying automated tools, such as the Intelligence Community’s Classification 

Management Tool, on unclassified networks to enable common and consistent 

markings. 

 Establishing oversight and reporting mechanisms. 
The Task Force recognizes that should the recommendation to expand the scope of CUI be 

accepted, the EA would need to provide extraordinary support to non-ISE agencies to 

ensure effective implementation of the CUI Framework, and the EA’s staffing and resource 

requirements would have to be addressed. Likewise, even with a phased implementation 

as recommended herein, successfully implementing the CUI Framework without impeding 

existing operations and programs would require that the agencies receive clear budgetary 

guidelines from OMB, and that the necessary resources be made available. 

Transitioning to the new markings under CUI will largely be a matter of change 

management, in which agency leadership should be held accountable for implementing 

plans and policies to ensure the workforce transitions to CUI in a timely manner. 

Implementing compliance and reporting processes and procedures would facilitate a 

clearer understanding of how much information is being protected, and for what reasons. 

Further, if made available to the public, the results of these reporting and oversight 

requirements will further government transparency. 

Recommendation #31 Phase Implementation of Training, Marking, Oversight and 


Reporting 


CUI implementation should prioritize: 

 

 Establishing agency CUI Programs. 

 Implementing EA-provided baseline training program as well as agency developed 

intermediate and advanced level training, 

 Adopting the CUI markings and dissemination controls, while phasing out the use 

of existing markings. 

 Implementing automated tools on unclassified networks to enable common and 

consistent markings. 

 Establishing oversight and reporting mechanisms. 

Recommendation #32 Phase Implementation of Technical Safeguards 

Information Technology safeguards should be phased into the CUI Framework pursuant to 

timelines established by the EA when, in coordination with the CIO Council, the EA 

determines that technical safeguards will enhance, and not degrade, the effectiveness of the 

CUI Framework. 

26 

Recommendation #33 Marking Initiation 

Marking in accordance with the CUI Framework should begin as directed by the EA. No 

CUI marking should be done prior thereto. Material previously developed and 

disseminated, printed, or otherwise memorialized should not be remarked. Information 

that continues to be disseminated should be remarked at agency discretion. 
Recommendation #34 Ensure Adequate Resourcing of Executive Agent 

The extraordinary efforts required of the EA to develop and implement the expanded scope 

CUI Framework, as well as the criticality of EA effectiveness in those efforts to the success 

of the CUI Framework, should be recognized and appropriately resourced to include 

funding, permanent staff, and agency detailees. 

27 

Recommendation #35 Synchronize CUI Implementation with Government Processes 

and Cycles 

CUI implementation should be incorporated into the appropriate policy, budgetary, and 

administrative cycles so that the implementation of the CUI Framework better aligns with 

current agency and Federal government business practices. 

Recommendation #36 Impact of CUI on the Federal Enterprise Architecture 

Members of the CUI Council should solicit feedback from their agency CIOs on how the 

CUI Framework can most effectively be incorporated into the Federal Enterprise 

Architecture (“FEA”), reflecting priorities which support business processes to enhance 

efficiency in implementation. This feedback should then be reviewed with OMB, and 

based on OMB feedback, the CUI Council – through agency CIOs and other appropriate 

policy officials – should work to develop specific input to the FEA within established 

guidance for review and possible incorporation into government-wide FEA guidance. 

Recommendation #37 Incorporate CUI into Federal Grant Guidance 

Federal grant guidelines for State, local and tribal government should be amended to 

facilitate federal grants utilization for implementation of the CUI Framework among our 

State, local and tribal information sharing partners, as appropriate. 

3.3 Measures to Track Progress in Implementation of CUI 

The 2009 Memorandum identifies three presumptive goals for implementation of the 

Framework: 

 standardization; 

 information sharing; and 

 government transparency 

Implementation of CUI will require significant cultural changes, including a more 

proactive balancing of security and openness. Given that an overemphasis of either 

security or openness will jeopardize these goals, ongoing assessment should be a 

prominent part of the implementation process. 
The Task Force identified three stages of CUI Framework implementation: 

 Planning – the Framework is developed, tested, and put in place, including EA 

and agency policies, the CUI Registry, and the CUI training program; 

 Transition – agencies modify existing practices to conform to the Framework; 

and 

 Sustainment – agencies consistently apply the Framework as standard practice 

The measures used to track progress will change based on the stage of implementation, but 

they will always support the overarching goals established by the 2009 Memorandum. In 

order to fully assess the Framework, the status quo must be understood and documented. 

It will be critical to perform baseline analysis and develop ongoing measurement programs 

that fully meet these complex goals. In addition, annual reporting will allow for 

independent public analysis as to the maintenance of the required balance, thereby 

improving accountability. The Task Force affirms the importance of measuring and 

tracking the implementation and effectiveness of the Framework. 

28 

Recommendation #39 Establish a Baseline Measurement of Current SBU Efforts 

Based on the system established above, the EA should immediately undertake to establish a 

baseline measurement of SBU activity to support future implementation and assessment 

efforts. 

Recommendation #38 Annual Report of the Executive Agent 

The EA should publish an annual report to the President, that is also made available to the 

Congress and the public, that provides the status of CUI implementation to include 

performance measurement data developed pursuant to Recommendation #40, and other 

information as deemed appropriate by the EA in consultation with the CUI Council. 

Recommendation #40 Measure Implementation 

The EA, in coordination with OMB (including the Chief Performance Officer and the 

Resource Management Office) and appropriate expert support, should develop a system to 

measure the implementation of CUI that addresses the various phases of implementation 

and is effectively tied to the federal budget cycle. 
Part 4. Conclusion 

Through its 90-day study, the CUI Task Force concluded that within the Executive Branch, 

information sharing and transparency suffer from inconsistency in SBU policies, 

uncertainty in interagency settings as to what policies apply to SBU information, and the 

inconsistent application of even similar policies across agencies. The general lack of 

effective, standardized training and oversight at many agencies results in a tendency to 

over-protect information. 

The Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) Framework provided a good start toward 

addressing these deficiencies, but was intended to do so only with regard to terrorismrelated information. The Task Force has concluded that a single, standardized framework 

for marking, safeguarding, and disseminating all Executive Branch SBU is required to 

further the goals of standardization, information sharing, and government transparency. 

The Task Force recommendations are intended to overlay, and in some cases modify, the 

CUI Framework established by the 2008 Memorandum. Building upon that Framework, 

the Task Force has proposed 40 Recommendations, including simplifying the definition of 

CUI; expanding the scope of the CUI Framework; clarifying that limits of CUI markings – 

such as with regard to releases under FOIA or to Congress; and phasing implementation of 

the expanded scope of CUI to ensure no disruption to agencies’ mission performance or 

the security of information. 

29 
30 
31 

APPENDIX 1 

Entities Consulted by the CUI Task Force 

Government Entities 

 Controlled Unclassified Information Council 

 Department of Energy, Office of Classification 

 Deputy to the Director of the Federal CIO Council 

o Privacy Committee of the Federal CIO Council 

 Legislative Staff Representing: 

o Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee 

o House Committee on Homeland Security 

o House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

o House Committee on the Judiciary 

o House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
 

 Excepted Regime Program Offices 

 Concurrent Executive Order 12958 Review 

 Office of National Drug Control Policy 

 Non-ISE Agencies: 

o Department of Labor 

o Department of Agriculture 

o Department of Education 

o National Air and Space Administration 

o Consumer Product Safety Commission 

o Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 

 State, Local, and Tribal Government Partners 

o International Association of Chiefs of Police 

o Garden Grove, California Police Department 

o Minnehaha County, South Dakota Sheriff's Office 

o Florida Department of Law Enforcement 

o American Probation and Parole Association 

Non-Government Entities 

 Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council 

 National Industrial Security Program Policy Advisory Committee 

 Privacy and Open Government Advocacy Organizations 

o American Civil Liberties Union 

o The Constitution Project 

o Openthegovernment.org 

o Federation of American Scientists 

o National Security Archive 

o Public Citizen 

o OMB Watch 

o Electronic Frontier Foundation 
32 
APPENDIX 2 

SBU Markings Currently in Use 

1. SENSITIVE 

2. DO NOT DISSEMINATE 

3. SBU-NF 

4. SBU/ NOFORN 

5. UNLIMITED RIGHTS 

6. GOVERNMENT PURPOSE RIGHTS 

7. LIMITED RIGHTS 

8. RESTRICTED RIGHTS 

9. SPECIAL LICENSE RIGHTS 

10. PRE-EXISTING MARKINGS 

11. COMMERCIAL MARKINGS 

12. CLOSE HOLD 

13. RSEN 

14. PREDECISIONAL PRODUCT 

15. SOURCE SELECTION SENSITIVE 

16. DEA SENSITIVE (DEA S) 

17. SENSITIVE (SENS) 

18. COPYRIGHT (DATE) (OWNER) 

19. DELIBERATE PROCESS PRIVILEGE 

20. RELIDO 

21. EYES ONLY 

22. BANK SECRECY ACT INFORMATION 

(BSA) 

23. ACQUISITION SENSITIVE 

24. ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT 

25. LIMITED ACCESS 

26. RESTRICTED ACCESS 

27. MEDICAL RECORDS 

28. LAN INFRASTRUCTURE 

29. IT SECURITY RELATED 

30. LAN BACKUP SENSITIVE 

INFORMATION 

31. SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION 

32. TRADE SECRET 

33. ATTORNEY CLIENT 

34. BUDGETARY INFORMATION 

35. PRE-DECISIONAL, 

36. FOR INTERNAL USE ONLY 

37. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION SAFEGUARDS 

INFORMATION (SGI) 

38. AGENCY INTERNAL USE ONLY 

(U//AIUO) 

39. TRADE SENSITIVE INFORMATION 

40. SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED (SBU) 

41. HEALTH RELATED INFORMATION 

(EM) 

42. NO DISTRIBUTION (NODIS OR ND) 

43. LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE (LES) 

44. EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION (EXDIS OR 

XD) 

45. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO) 

46. SENSITIVE STUDENT RECORDS (STR) 

47. CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS 

INFORMATION (CBI) 

48. LIMITED OFFICIAL USE (LOU) 

49. LIMITED DISTRIBUTION 

50. LIMITED DISTRIBUTION (LIMDIS) 

51. SENSITIVE INFORMATION (SINFO) 

52. COVERED BY CONFIDENTIALITY 

AGREEMENT 

53. ORIGINATOR CONTROLLED (ORCON) 

54. CONTRACTUAL SENSITIVE 

INFORMATION 

55. ENFORCEMENT CONFIDENTIAL 

INFORMATION (ECI) 

56. LIMITED OFFICIAL USE INFORMATION 

(LOUI) 

57. SUBSTANCE ABUSE RECORDS (SAB) 

58. SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION 

(SSI) 

59. TITLE III COMMUNICATIONS (T3) 

60. FEDERAL TAXPAYER INFORMATION 

61. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 

INFORMATION 

62. BOMB TECH SENSITIVE (BTS) 

63. CFIUS INFORMATION (CFIUS) 

64. RESTRICTED BY COURT ORDER (CO) 

65. LIMITED USE ONLY (LUO) 

66. PRIVACY ACT PROTECTED 

INFORMATION (PAPI) 

67. PROPRIETARY INFORMATION 

(PROPIN) 

68. CHILD VICTIM/WITNESS (CH) 

69. FINANCIAL RECORDS (NON-NSL) (FR) 

70. FINANCIAL RECORDS NSL (NSLF) 

71. SOURCE SELECTION INFORMATION 

72. LIMITED CREDIT INFORMATION NSL 

(NSLC) 

73. SELECT AGENT SENSITIVE 

INFORMATION (SASI) 

74. CALEA COST RECOVERY 

INFORMATION (CALEA) 

75. INNOCENT IMAGES VISUAL 

INFORMATION (IIVI) 

76. SENSITIVE TREATY/MOU/NDA 

INFORMATION (STM) 

77. PRIVILEGED FBI ATTORNEY CLIENT 

78. OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SMALL BUSINESS 

79. OFFICIAL USE ONLY-PROTECTED 

COOPERATIVE CENSUS CONFIDENTIAL 

33 
80.	 SBU-GSA-BI 

81.	 OFFICIAL USE ONLY (OUO) 

82.	 ATTORNEY/ CLIENT PRIVILEGED 

83.	 GRAND JURY MATERIAL (FGJ) 

84.	 OFFICIAL USE ONLY-APPLIED 

TECHNOLOGY 

85.	 DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED 

NUCLEAR INFORMATION (DOD UCNI) 

86.	 OFFICIAL USE ONLY-PATENT 

CAUTION INFORMATION 

87.	 CONFIDENTIAL CONTRACT PROPOSAL 

INFORMATION (CCPI) 

88.	 CONTROLLED NUCLEAR 

INFORMATION (U//DCNI OR 

U//ECNI) 

89.	 CHEMICAL-TERRORISM 

VULNERABILITY INFORMATION (CVI) 

90.	 NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION 

INFORMATION (U-NNPI) 

91.	 OFFICIAL USE ONLY-EXPORT 

CONTROLLED INFORMATION 

92.	 NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION 

INFORMATION (NOFORN) 

93.	 SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED NONSAFEGUARDS INFORMATION (SUNSI) 

94.	 PROTECTED CRITICAL 

INFRASTRUCTURE INFORMATION 

(PCII) 

95.	 OFFICIAL USE ONLY - SENSITIVE 

INTERNAL INFORMATION 

96.	 TELEPHONE OR ELECTRONIC 

COMMUNICATIONS NSL (NSLT) 

97.	 JUVENILE - PROTECT IDENTITY IN 

ACCORDANCE WITH 18 USC 5031 (JI) 

98.	 SENSITIVE INFORMATION- SPECIAL 

HANDLING REQUIRED 

99.	 SENSITIVE WATER VULNERABILITY 

ASSESSMENT INFORMATION 

100. LIMITED OFFICIAL USE-LAW 

ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE (LOU-LES) 

101. EXPORT CONTROLLED INFORMATION 

(OR MATERIAL) (ECI) 

102. SENSITIVE HOMELAND SECURITY 

INFORMATION (SHSI) 

103. OPERATIONS SECURITY PROTECTED 

INFORMATION (OSPI) 

104. DISSEMINATION IS PROHIBITED 

EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY AR 20–1 

105. COMMUNICATION/ ATTORNEY 

WORK PRODUCT (PRV) 

106. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 

AGREEMENT INFORMATION 

107. INNOVATION RESEARCH 

INFORMATION AND SMALL BUSINESS 

108. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION 

PROTECTION AND STATISTICAL 

EFFICIENCY ACT OF 2002 (CIPSEA) 

109. WITNESS SECURITY PROGRAM - 

PROTECT IDENTITY IN ACCORDANCE 

WITH 18 USC 3521 (WS) 

110. SENSITIVE DRINKING WATER RELATED 

INFORMATION (SDWRI) 

111. CONTRACTOR ACCESS RESTRICTED 

INFORMATION (CARI) 

112. COMPUTER SECURITY ACT SENSITIVE 

INFORMATION (CSASI) 

113. SMALL BUSINESS INNOVATION 

RESEARCH (SBIR) PROGRAM 

114. PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE 

INFORMATION - PRIVACY ACT OF 

1974 

115. PERSONNEL DATA, PRIVACY ACT OF 

1974 (5 U.S.C. 552A) 

116. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY- LAW 

ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE (FOUO-LES) 

117. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 

SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA) 

34 
 

 

APPENDIX 3 


Acronyms used in this report 

CIO Chief Information Officer 

CUI Controlled Unclassified Information 

CVI Chemical-Terrorism Vulnerability Information 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DOD Department of Defense 

DOI Department of Interior 

DOJ Department of Justice 

EA Executive Agent 

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FEA Federal Enterprise Architecture 

FOIA Freedom of Information Act 

FOUO For Official Use Only (FOUO) 

HHS Department of Health and Human Service 

HIPAA Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 

ISE Information Sharing Environment 

IT Information Technology 

LES Law Enforcement Sensitive 

NARA National Archives and Records Administration 

ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

PCII Protected Critical Infrastructure Information 

PM-ISE Program Manager, Information Sharing Environment 

SBU Sensitive But Unclassified 

SGI Safeguards Information 

SSI Sensitive Security Information 

USDA Department of Agriculture 

35 
36 
x 
38