1 NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0643n.06 No. 08-5293 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA , Plaintif f-Appellee , v. CH RI STOP HER

L. SI M P SON , Defendant-

Appellant
. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEA L F RO M THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT C O U R T F O R

T H E M ID D LE DI STRI CT OF TEN

NESSEE O P I N I O N

BEF ORE: CO LE, CL AY , a nd K ETHL ED G E, C ir c uitJudg e s. COLE, Circuit Jud ge. Christopher L
. S i m pson appea ls the district court’s judg ment sentenc ing him to 84 months of imprisonment after he p leade d g uilty to one count of posse ssing a fire arm a s a convic ted fe lon in violation of 18 U. S
. C. §§ 922(g )(1) and 924(a )(2) and one c ount
o f poss essing a fire arm a fter be ing c onvicted of the misdemeanor of fense of domestic violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g )(9) and 924(a) (2). On appea l, Simpson argues t h at the sentenc e imposed wa s proce durally and substantively

unrea sonable. F or the re as o n s t hat follow,
we c onclude that the district c ourt committed proce dural e rror , and we VA CA TE Simps on’s sentenc e and REMAND for r esente ncing
.No. 08-5293

United States v. Simpson

2 I. BACKG ROUND A. P roce dural h istory Simp so n plea de d guil ty

to o ne c ount o f p os se ssi nga fi re arm a s a c on vic te d f

e lon in
v io lati o n o f 1 8 U
. S. C. § § 9 2 2 ( g ) ( 1 ) an d 9 2 4 ( a ) ( 2 ) an d o n e c o u n t o f p o s s e s s in g a f irea rm afte r beingconvicted of

the misdemeanor

offe nse of domestic violen ce i n v i olation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g )(9) and 924(a) (2). On September 10, 2007, the district c ourt held a sen t en ci n g h earing
an d i m p o sed a se ntence of 84 months of imprisonment on eac h count, to run conc urre ntly , and thr ee y e ars of

su pe rv ise d r e le a se on

e a c h c ount, a lso to r

un c on c ur re ntl y . T he c ourt

fi le d it s judgme nt on Febr

uary 14, 2008, and Simpson ti mely appea led. B. Sub stantive facts After Simps on pleade d g uilty , the United States Probat i o n and Pretria l Services depar tment prepa

red a Presentenc e Investig ation Report in which it ca l culated Sim pson’s
a dv iso ry se ntenc ing ra

ng e un de r t

he Un ite d St a te s Se nte nc ingGu ide lin e s ( the “ Gu ide lin e s” ) t o be 9 2 t o 1 1 5 m o nths’ imprisonment. Si mpson filed a sente ncingposition st atement a nd a sentenc ing me morandum in which he reque sted a sente nce sig n i fi cantly below the a dvisory Gu ide lin e s ra

ng e ba se d on e mot ion a l and ph y sic a l a bu se he su ff

e re d a s a c hil d, the lack o f adult male role models in his fo rm at i v e y ea rs, and the severe handica p of his infant son. The Gover nment opposed a de parture or var iance and re quest ed a s entenc e within the advisory Guid eli nes ra

ng e. The district court conc luded that Simpson’s difficult childhood was “e x treme” and “e x trao rd i n ary” and a pplied a one- level downwa rd depa rture unde r Guidelines § 5K2.0.No. 08-5293

United States v. Simpson

“ R._ _” re fe rs to t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

do c ke t e ntr

y numbe r o f d oc ume nts ava ila ble 1 elec tronically

throug h the district court doc ket re port. 3 (R .4 2, Se nt’ g Tr . 1 78 -7 9, 18 5. ) Th is res ult e d in a ne w Guid e lin e s r ang e of 84 to 1 05 months , 1 and the d i s t ri ct court sentenced Simpson to 84 months of im prisonment on eac h of the two counts, to run conc urre ntly , and thre e y ear s of supervise d rele ase. II. AN AL YSI S A. Stand ard of review We r e v ie w s e n te n c e s f

o r r e a s o n a

b le n e s s u n d e r an a

b u s e - o f

- d is c r e ti o n s ta

n d ar d
. See G all

v. Un i ted States , 1 28 S. Ct . 5 86 , 5 94 (2 00 7) ; United States v. Book er , 543 U.S. 220, 260-61 (2 00 5) ; Un ite d S

tates v . S e do re , 5 12 F .3 d 8 19 , 8 22 (6t h Ci r. 2008 ). Re a so na ble ne ss i n th is context has both procedur al and substantive c omponents. Se do re , 512 F.3d at 822. A d istri c t c ourt

c omm its pr oc e dura l e rr or and a bu se s it s se nte nc ingdis c re tio n b y : failing to calculate (or i m proper ly calc ulating) the Guidelines ra ng e, tre ating the Gu ide lin e s a s ma

nd a tor y , f a ili ngto c on sid e r t

he [18 U .S. C.] § 35 53 (a ) f act or s, se le c tin g a

se nte nc e ba se d o n clea rl y e rr on e ou s f

a c ts, or fa ili ngto a de qu a te ly explain the chosen sentenc e—includingan explanation for a ny deviation from the Guidelines ra

ng e. Ga ll , 128 S. Ct . at 597. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), a

sentenc ing c ourt must consider: (1) the nature a

nd circ umstance s of the off ense a nd the history

and cha rac teristics of the de fe nd ant; (2) the ne ed for

the sentenc e imposed-- (A) to r efle ct the seriousne ss of the off ense, to promote r espec t for the law, a nd to provide just punishment for the off ense; (B ) t o a ff or d a de qu a te de te rr e nc e to c ri min a l c on du c t; (C) to protec t the public from fur ther c rimes of the de fenda nt; and (D) to pr ovide the def

endant with nee ded educa tional or vocational tr a ini ng , m e d i c a l c ar e , o r o t h e r c o r r e c t i o n a l t r e a t m e n ti nt h e m o st eff ective ma nner; . . . .No. 08-5293

United States v. Simpson

4 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) -(2)
. A re viewingcourt must also consider t h e subst antive re asonable ness of the se ntence
. Ga ll , 128 S. Ct . at 597. A sente nce m ay b e s u b s tantively unrea sonable if the se ntencingcourt “sele ct[ed] t he sente nce a rbi t ra ri l y , b as[ed] t he sente nce on imper missibl e fa ctors, . . . or [g ave]
an u n re as o n able amount of weig ht to any pertinent fa ctor.” United States v. Fe rguson , 4 5 6 F
. 3d 660, 6 64 (6th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted). How ever , the “touchstone ” of substantive
rea sonablene ss is “whether the leng th of the senten ce is re asonable in light of the § 3553( a) fac tors.” Un ite d S

tates v . Ta te , 5 16 F .3 d 4 59 , 4 69 (6 th Ci r. 20 08 ). Th is C ourt g ra nts a rebuttable p re s umption of substantive reasona bleness to sentenc es within the advisory Guidelines ra

ng e. United S t a t es v. W

illiams , 4 36 F .3 d 7 06 , 7 08 (6 th C ir . 2 00 6) ; see also Rita v. United States , 551 U.S. 338, 354 (2007) (pe rm i tting cour ts of appea ls to adopt such a presumption). Although Simpson did not raise an obje ction at s en t encing a sserting the claim he now makes o na

p p e a l, p la in

- e r

r o r r e v ie w d o e s n o t a

p p ly in th is c a s e . Wh il e w e ty p ic a ll y r e view claims of proc edura l unrea sonablene ss for plain er ror unless the y we re p rese rved by an objec tion at sentenc ing, s e e U

n ite d S ta te s v . Vonner , 5 1 6 F.3d 382, 385- 86, 390-91 (6th Cir. 2008) (e n banc) , we have not f

ollowed this c ourse when considering claims that the sentenc i n g court misunderstood the scope of its authority

in light of re cent c han ges i n t he law of sentenc ing. See Uni ted States v. He rrera-Zuniga , 5 7 1 F
. 3 d 5 6 8 , 5 7 9

- 8 1 ( 6 th Ci r . 2 0 0 9 ) ( h o ld in g th a t pla in-err or revie w did not apply

to claim that the district court misunderstood the sc ope of its sentenc ing
a uth or ity , e ve n w he n th e de fe nd ant f a ile d to ob

je c t at se nte nc ing ); see also United States v

.No. 08-5293

United States v. Simpson

5 Gu est , 5 64 F .3 d 7 77 , 7 79 (2 00 9) (e xami nin g wh e the r a tr ia l c ourt

un de rs too d it s a

uth or ity to
va ry fr om t he c ra c k c oc a ine Gu ide lin e s w ith out a pp lyingpla in- e rr or

re vie w) ; United States v. Johnson , 553 F.3d 990, 995- 96 (6th Cir. 2009) (same ). In Herrera- Zuniga , w e de te rm ine d th a t i tw o u l d b e i n a

p p r o p r i a t e t o a

p p l y Vonner’s forf

eiture r ule to . . . Her

rer aZ uniga ’s claim that the district cour t lacked the authority

to categ orical ly

reje ct t h e [ ap plicable] base of

fense level pre scribed unde r [the Guidelines] given the ling e r in g c o n f

u s io nin th e c ir c u it

a s to w h e th e r

s u c hc la im s ar e “ p r o c e d u r a l” or “ su bs tanti ve ” c ha lle ng e s. Herrera- Zuniga , 571 F.3d at 579. We also noted that the Vonner ru le is a c ourt -d e ve lop e d r ule that “ wa s a do pte d e nti re ly fo r p ra c tic a l r e a so ns ” and that Vonner

“expressly

encour aged ‘ a
common-se n s e application of the plain-er ror doc trine,’ a

nd instructed future courts to apply the rule ‘w ith an ey e to the re alities of the fa cts and c ircumstance s of eac h sentenc ing pr ocee ding.’ ” Id
. at 5 8 0 (q u o t i n g Vonner , 516 F.3d at 391). As in Herrera- Zuniga , the iss ue be fo re us is whe the r t he dis tr ic t c ourt

c or re c tly understood the sc ope of its authority to rejec t the Guidelin es . S i mpson raises this as both a pr oc e dura l and

a su bs tanti ve c la im, but we c on c lud e tha t it is a pp ro pr iate ly

fr ame d a s a proce dural-unr easona

bleness cla im. Se e Ga ll , 128 S
. Ct. at 597 (stating that a district court commits p r o c e d

u r a l e r r o r w h e nit “ tr e a t[ s ] th e G u id e li n e s a s ma n d a to r y ” )
. Si mp s o n ’ s c o n f

u s ion about how to fra

me his claim is understanda ble g iven t h e “o v erla

p” betwe en proc edura l and substantive rea sonablene ss considerations, an area of la w that this Court has continued to clar ify in rec ent y ear s. S

e e H e rr e r a -Zuniga , 571 F .3 d at 57 9- 80 . Rathe r t ha n p e na lize Simp so n f

or his f a i l u r e t o r e c o g n i z e h i s c l a i ma s a p r o c e d u r a l o n e , w e w i l l n o ta

p p l y V onner’s for feitur e ru le here
. See id. a t 579-8 1. Ac c or din g ly , d e sp ite the fa c t Sim ps on did no t ob je c t be low , w e wi llNo. 08-5293

United States v. Simpson

6 revie w his claim under the normal abuse -of-d i s cr et i o n s tandar d. Se e Ga ll , 128 S. Ct . at 591; Herrera- Zuniga , 571 F.3d at 581. Addit i onally , in case s in which an a ppellant claims that the sente ncingcourt misunderstood its authority , we will only rema nd based upon a

n “i ndication of e rror

in the
rec ord,” not upon “ mere conjec ture” that the cour t felt improper ly constraine d. Gu est , 564 F.3d
a t 77 9, 78 1. Th e re c or d in thi s c a se ind ic a te s an erro r in the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s un de rs tand ingof its authority to vary from the Guide lines. B. The dist r ic t c our t’ s m isun de r st andi ng o f i ts au th orit y pr e ve nt e d itfro m c ons ide r ing Simpson’s request for a variance Simps on argu es that his sentenc e wa s proce durally unrea sonable be cause the district court treated the Guidelines’ re strictions on de pa rtu re s a s ma nd a tor y and did no t r e c og nize its
au thority to vary o u ts id e o f th e G u id e li n e s r an g e . I n h is s e n te n c in g p o s it io n s tatement and sentencing me morandum he r equeste d both a depa rture a nd a var iance based on a number of miti g a ti n g f

a c to r s an d

e mp h a s iz e d

th a t t h e d is tr ic t c o u rt h a d

d is c r e ti o nto v ar

y b e lo w the advisory rang e base d on fac tors prohibited or dis co u rage d by the Guidelines’ disc ussion of de pa rt ur e s. Simp son cla im s th at th e dis tr ic t c ou rt ig no re d h is r e qu e st f

or a va ri anc e and

on ly
c on sid e re d w he the r h e wa s e nti tle d to a de pa rt ur e un de r § 5K2. 0 o f t

he Gu ide lin e s. W e hav e stat e d th a t th e a c tua l te rm ino logy us e d b y a c ourt wh e n im po sin g a se nte nc e is not critical. See Herrera- Zuniga , 571 F.3d at 5 8 6 (explaining that this Court has “not re quired that district courts ca

ref ully distinguish betwee n whether the dec ision to deviate from theNo. 08-5293

United States v. Simpson

“A Gu i d el i n es ‘d ep ar tu re ’ r ef er s t o t h e i mp o s i t i o no f as en t en ce o u t s i d e t h e a dv i s o ry ra n ge 2 o r ana s s i g n m e n to f

a c r i m i n a l h i s t o r

y c a t e g o r y d i f f e r e n tt h ant h e o t h e r

w i s e a p p l i c a b l e c a t e g o r y . . . result[ing] from the district court’s a ppli ca tion of a par

ticular Guide lines provision, such as § 4A1.3 or § 5 part K.” United States v. Grams , 566 F.3d 683, 686 ( 6th Cir. 2009). “A ‘va rianc e’ ref ers to the selec tion of

a sente nce outside of

the advisory

Guidelines ra

ng e base d upon the district court’s weig hing of one or more of the sentenc ing f actor s of § 3553(a ).” Id
. at 686-87. “ Whil e the same fa cts and a

naly ses ca n, at t imes, be used to justi fy both a Guidelines de parture and a va rianc e, the conc epts are distinct.” Id . at 687. 7 advisory Guidelines ra

ng e is based on a

depar ture or va rianc e.”)
. The salient issue is whether

2 the se nte nc ingc ourt

re c og nize d th e a dv iso ry natur e of

the Gu ide lin e s and

its fu ll a uth or ity to impose a sentenc e outside the Guide lines rang e. Se e Ga ll , 1 2 8 S
. C t
. a t 5 9 6 -9 7 (r eq u i ri n g j u d ge to “consider

all of the § 3 553(a) fac tors to determine whether they support the sentenc e reque sted by

a par ty ,” to “make an individualized assessment based on the fa ct s prese nted,” a nd to refr ain from pr es u m i n g t hat the Guidelines r ang e is rea sonable or tr eatingthe Guidelines a s
m an d atory); United States v. Stephe ns , 5 4 9 F
. 3 d 4 5 9 , 4 6 6

- 6 7 ( 6 t h C i r . 2 0 0 8 ) ( e xp l a i n i n g t ha t a
s en t en ci n g co u rt h as d i ff er en t , b ro ad er

au t h o ri t y t o v ary fr o mt h e s u gge s t edGu i d el i n es ra n ge based on the § 3553(a) fac tors than to depar t from it based on § 5 of the Guidelines). I n this case, the district c ourt beg an its pronounce ment of sentenc e by noting, “ [b] efor e I state the sente nce, the Court has consider ed the de fenda nt’s motion for downwar d depar ture based pr imarily

on h i s background and c ircumstance s.” (R.43, Sent’gTr. 176.) The court then d i s cu s s edS i mp s o n ’s t ro u b l edu p b ri n gi n g an d

fa m i l y ci rc u m s t an ce s , s t at i n g: [T] he family ties and responsibilities is a cate g ory that’s rec og nized i n t he g uidelines, as we ll as h i s o t h er responsibiliti es. I mean his bac kg round and upbring ing c an be c onsidered. All of these must exist to [s ic ] an extraor d inary way . The guidelines say that ne ith e r of th ese matt e rs sh ou ld o rd ina ri ly be c on sid e re d b y

the Court ,No. 08-5293

United States v. Simpson

8 ho we ve r, in d e pa

rt ingdo wnwa

rd . They , o f c ours e , c an b e c on sid e re d in d et erm i n i n g where in the guidelines range the def endant should be se ntence d. ( Id. at 177 (e mphasis added) .) The c ourt explained that i t was “move d by the re port of the defe ndant’s upb ri n gi n g,” that it believed that it was “an e x traordina ry circ umstance” that took the ca se “out of the hear

tlan d of ca ses,” a

nd that it would gr ant a one -leve l downwar d depar ture based upon this fa ctor. ( Id. at 178-79.) T here afte r, the Court stated that “ [c] ontrary to the reque s t o f t he Gove rnment, I ’m g oing to se ntence Mr. Simpson t o the low end of the g uidelines
ra ng e ” and stated th at it bel ie ve d th e se nte nc e wo uld be “ jus t, b ut n ot gre a te r t

ha n n e c e ssa ry to meet the se ntenci n g go al s i n t he ca se.” ( Id. at 180.) Othe r than brie f statements at the end of the sentenc ing he aring , the district court made littl e re fer ence to the fac tors set fo rt h in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) or the a dvisory

nature of the Guide lines, althoug h it noted that “[t] he Guidel i n es ar e not mandatory , of cour se. They ’re simply advisory .” (R.43, Sent’gTr. 186.) The district cour

t also prepa

red a stat em en t o f rea sons (“STR”) that f urther e x plained the sentenc e imposed. (R.48, STR 1-5.) Af t er summarizing the mitigating c ircumstance s prese nted by Simp so n, the c ourt

state d: Def endant’ s rea sons for re questing a downwa rd depa rture a re factor s not or din ari ly re le va nt i n c on side ri ng a

mot ion fo r d ow nw ard

de pa rt ur e , a nd , in fa c t, depar tu r e s f o r th e r e a s o n s r e qu e s te d

h e r e in ar e d is f av o r e d
. H o w e v e r , s u c hf actor s may be conside red if the y

exis t in an extraordinary way . Havingconsidere d Def endant’ s unfortunate upbring ing by his mother
. . . the Court finds c ir cums tanc e s are pr e se nt t o a n unu su a l de g re e and

are so e xtre me a s to make thi s c a s e e x t r a o r d i n ar

y. ( Id. at 5.) The court used this ana ly sis to jus tify a one-l evel Guidelines depar ture. The court then conc luded its STR

with a brief

discussion of the fa ctors set for th in 18 U.S.C . § 3553(a)
.No. 08-5293

United States v. Simpson

9 Both at sentencingand in the STR, the court followe d the s am e m o d el of (1) ca lculating the Guidelines ra

ng e; (2) de termining if any of t h e m i tigating f

actor s prese nted “e x traordina ry circ umstances” s u ff

i cient to justify

a Guidelines de parture ; and (3) de termining what sente nce wi thi n t h e r e l e v an t r an g e w a s j u s t i f i e d i n l i g h t o f t h e f

a c t o r s s e t f

o rt h i n § 3 5 53 (a ). Th is
a pp ro a c h is imp e rm iss ibl e fo r s e ve ra l r e a so ns . F i r s t , t h e c o u r t p r o c e e d e d a s i f t h e G u i d e l i n e s r e s t r i c t i o n s o nd e p artu r e s ar e m an d a t o r y,
and a s if the § 3 55 3( a ) f

a c tor s are on ly

re le va nt i f t he y rise to th e le ve l of

“ e xce pti on a l” circ umstances a s stated in § 5 of the Guide lines. SeeU.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (depa rtures ba sed on offe nder c hara cter istics are only war rante d if the cha

rac teristic is “pre sent to an exceptional deg ree ”). This a

pproac h was e rrone ous beca us e m i t i gati ng fac tors—even those that are not “exceptional” or

“extraordinar

y ”—ar e prope r consider ations i n d eter mining whe ther a

sentenc e should fall outside of the Guidelines r ang e. See G rams , 56 6 F. 3 d at 686-87 (disc ussing the court’s a uthority to select “ a s en t en ce outside of the advisory

Guidelines ra

ng e base d upon the . .

. we ig hin g of on e or mor e of the se nte nc ing fa c tor s of § 3553( a )” ); see also United States v

. He nr y , 545 F.3d 367, 3 8 5 (6th Cir. 2008) (“ Ga ll reje cts the notion . . . that ext raor dinary ci rc u m s t an ce s ar e r eq u i re d ‘t o j u s t i fy

a s en t en ce o u t s i d e t h e G u i d el i n es ra n ge. ’” ) ( qu o t i n g Ga ll , 128 S. Ct . at 595). Th is m ist ake sig ni fi cant ly a ff e c te d th e se nte nc ingc ourt ’s un de rs tand ingof its a uth or ity because “‘ v ar ia

n c e s f r o m Gu id e li n e s r an g e s th a t a D is tr ic t C o u rt m ay

f in d ju s ti f ie d u n d e r the sentenc ing f

actor s set forth in 1 8 U. S
. C. § 3553(a)’ include a mu c h b ro ad e r rang e of discretionar

y decisionmaking ” than de parture s. Stephens , 549 F.3d at 466-67 (empha sis added)No. 08-5293

United States v. Simpson

10 (q u o t i n g Irizarry v. United States , 128 S. Ct . 2198, 2202-03 (2008) ); Un ite d S tates v . D av is , 537 F .3 d 6 11 , 6 17 (6t h Cir. 2 00 8) (“ [A] tr ia l ju dg e ’s a uth or ity to e xer c ise ind e pe nd e nt j ud g me nt i n g rantinga var iance afte r ap p l y i ng the § 3553(a ) fa ctors diffe rs from his authority to gr ant depar tures.”) ; se e als o U

n ite d S ta te s v . B u c h anan , 449 F.3d 731, 740 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (Sutton, J ., concur ring ) (“ [T] he guidelines’ re str i ct ions on gr anting depar tures do not circ umscribe a trial
c ourt ’s decis io n to gra

nt a [§ 35 53 (a )] v ari anc e ” ). Th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s state me nts ind ic a te that it felt “bound by

the pre

- Ga ll

standard of

revie w” a

nd t h e Gu i d elines’ r estrictions on depa rtures that require extraordinary or exceptional circ umstances to jus tify a below- Guidelines sentenc e. S e e G u e st , 564 F.3d at 780. As a re sult, the court dismissed some of Simpson’s mi tigation evidenc e as unw orthy

of consider ation when, in fa ct, the cour t was required to consider that evidenc e. Se e Ga ll , 128 S. Ct . at 596-97. Second, both the sente ncinghear ing tr an s cript and STRmake c lear that the cour

t considere d the re levant § 3553(a ) fa ctors in the conte x t of dec iding w h at sentenc e with in the advisory Guidelines ra

ng e wa s appropr iate. (R.43, Sent’gTr. 177 (“ Al l o f t h ese [ mitigating fac tors] m ust ex ist to [ sic] an ext raor dinary way . The guidelines say that neither of

these matter s sh o u ld ordinarily

be conside red by

the Court, howeve r, in depa rting downwar d. They , of cour se, can be considere d in d et er m i n i n g wher e in the guidelines rang e the de fenda nt should be sentenced.”); R.48, STR6 (“The Court has discussed some of the rele vant fa ctors which the C o u rt consider ed in deter mining the a

ppropriate sentenc e withi n th e g u id e li n e r an g e , inc luding the nature and cir cumstance s of the o ff en s e, as well as the history and cha rac teristics of the De fe nd ant. ” ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) .) As e xpla ine d a bove, a se nte nc ingc ourt

e rr s if it l imi ts i tsNo. 08-5293

United States v. Simpson

11 consideration of the § 3553(a) fac tors to where withi n the Guidelines ra nge t o impose the sentenc e. Third, the cour

t’s repe ated r efe renc es to Simpson’s “reque st for a dow n wa rd depa rture” and its failure to ackno wl ed ge S i mpson’s reque st for a va rianc e support the view

that the district
c ourt mis un de rs too d it s a

uth or ity to v ary fr om t he Gu ide li nes ra

ng e , r a the r t

ha n me re ly to gra nt a Guidelines d ep ar t u re . To be sure , the sentenc ing c ourt was not re quired to use the te rm “var iance ” whe n addre ssing S i m pson’s arguments, and its failure to do so is not err or per se. See Herrera- Zuniga , 571 F.3d at 586-87. Howe ver, th e court’s failure to acknowle dg e Simpson’s reque st for a va

rianc e, in the conte x t of the other statements it m ad e, s ug g ests that it did not
rec og nize its authority

to vary from the Guide lines absent extraordina ry circ umstances. See Stephens , 5 49 F .3 d at 46 6- 67 (f ind ingit “ pa

rt ic ula rl y tr ou bli ng ” that th e c ourt

“ fo llo we d d e fe ns e
c ouns e l’ s le a d a

nd us e d th e te rm

‘d e pa rt ur e ’ e xclusi vel y in r e je c tin g [de fe nd ant’ s] arguments . . . .”). Th e Go ve rnme nt a

rgue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt pr op e rl y un de rs too d the sco pe of its authority for se vera l rea sons. First, the cour t refe re n ce d the advisory nature of the Guide lines
sever al times. (R
. 4 3, Sent’g Tr. 186 (“ The Guide lines are not mandatory , of cour se. They ’re simply advisory .”); R.48, STR 4 (“[T] he Supreme Court made c l ear that the g uidelines pr omu lg a te d b y

the Un ite d St a te s Se nte nc ingCom mis sio n a re me re ly a dvis ory .”). ) While the se statements support the Gove rnment’s a rgument when c onsidered in isolation, the substance and structure of the district cour t’s analy sis show that it effec tively treated the Guideli n es’ lim itations on depar tures as ma

ndatory . The Gove rnment notes that the district cour t discussed the § 3553(a )No. 08-5293

United States v. Simpson

12 fac tors, stating in the STR that it had “c onsidered a ll the fac tors set fo rt h i n 1 8 U.S.C. § 3553(a)” and conc luded that “[b]ased on the fac ts and circ umstances in this case , . . . the sentenc e imposed [would] be just punishment fo r this particular offe nse and . . . in the be st interest of the public.” ( Id. at 5-6.) T his argument fails bec ause, a s discussed above , the re cord indicates that the cour t considere d the § 3553(a) fa ctors for the improperly

narr ow purpose of

decidingwhat sente nce within the advisory

Gu i delines ra

ng e wa s appropr iate. F inally , the district court a lso ex plained duri ngthe se nte nc ing heari ngthat it wo uld on ly g ra nt a on e -l e ve l G uid e lin e s d e pa rt ur e be c a us e Simps on has an e x tensive cr iminal hist ory —a history

that the c o u rt descr ibed at leng th in both the
se nte nc inghe ari ngand

STR . T his cann ot be c on str ue d a s in dic a tin g that th e c ourt re c og nize d it s broad a uthority to vary from the Guide lines range rather than mer ely to depar t from it based on exceptional circ umstance s . W hile we r ecognize that the conce pts of varia nces a nd depar tures have some times blurred in re cent y ear s, and whil e this district court has c onsiderable experience in a dmi nis te ri ngse nte nces in the po st- Booke r e ra , th e ratio na le se t f

or th o n th e re c or d is in conflict with our r ece nt prec edent, a nd we must g rant Simpson’s reque st for a r emand. III . C ON CL USI ON For the re asons stated a

bove, we conclude that th e d i strict court c ommitt ed proc edura l
err or. Ther efor e, we VA CA TE Simps on’s sentenc e and REMAND for r esente ncingto allow the court to consider

Simps on’s mitigation ar g uments with full recog nition of its auth ority to vary from the Guide lines rang e.No. 08-5293

United States v. Simpson

13 KETHLEDGE, Circ uit Jud ge, d i s s enting. Our task in this appea l would have be en g rea tly s im

p li f ie d , if n o t e li mi n a te d

e n ti r e ly , h a d

Si mp s o nme r e ly

to ld to th e d is tr ic t c o u rt wh a t he te lls us no w—na

me ly , th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt fa ile d to c on sid e r h is r e qu e st f or a va ri anc e . T hat is a g oo d in dic a tio n th a t p lai n-er ro r r e vie w o ug ht t o a

pp ly he re . A nd

Ithi nk our c a se law, no ta

bly United Stat es v. V

o nner , 516 F.3d 382 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (en ba nc), be ars out that indication. The
m a j o r i t y d e c l i n e s t o a

p p l y Vonner , sug g esting there is sufficient co n fu s i o n reg ardingthe nature of Simp so n’ s c la im ( i. e . , whether it is subs tantive or proc edura l) that we should apply the nar row exception to Vo nn e r set forth in United States v. He rrera-Zun i ga , 571 F.3d 568 ( 6th Cir. 2009). I do not ag ree that there can pla usibly be any such conf

usion. Si mpson’s claim is that the distr ict
c ourt fa ile d a lto g e the r t o c onsi der hi s c la im f or a va ri anc e . T hat c la im i s q uinte sse nti a lly proce dural, whic h bring s it withi n the hea rtland of Vonner , a

nd wh ic h in tu rn make s th e c la im subject to plain-er

ror r eview. I

do ag ree with the majority that the district co u rt er re d by failing separ ately to consider Simpson’s req u es t for a varia nce; but under

the circ umstances pr esent he re, Ido not think the error

was plain. I

there fore respe ctfully

dissent.