UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4273

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

BRUCE ALAN DAVIDSON, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of West Virginia, at Elkins. John Preston Bailey, 

Chief District Judge. (2:09-cr-00014-REM-JSK-2)

Submitted: February 24, 2011 Decided: March 18, 2011

Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Deanna L. Pennington, Morgantown, West Virginia, for Appellant. 

Betsy C. Jividen, United States Attorney, Stephen D. Warner, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Elkins, West Virginia, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Bruce Alan Davidson pled guilty to conspiracy to 

possess with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of 

methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006), and was sentenced to a 

term of 235 months imprisonment. Davidson appeals his sentence, 

contending that the district court clearly erred by increasing 

his sentence for obstruction of justice, U.S. Sentencing 

Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1 (2009), and for an offense that 

created a substantial risk of harm to human life or the

environment, USSG § 2D1.1(b)(10(C)(ii).*

Davidson participated in a conspiracy that lasted 

several years, involved a large number of people, and produced a 

large quantity of methamphetamine. Davidson was initially 

released on bond after his arrest, but his bond was revoked 

after he tested positive in a field test for methamphetamine 

use. At the revocation hearing before a magistrate judge, 

Davidson testified that he had not used methamphetamine, had not 

admitted using methamphetamine to the probation officer or a 

deputy marshal on the day he was tested and the day he was 

 He also maintains that 

the sentence is unreasonable. We affirm.

 * The government asserts that plain error review applies to 

Davidson’s first two issues. However, Davidson preserved both 

issues for appeal by objecting to the enhancements in the 

district court. United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 577 (4th 

Cir. 2010).
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returned to custody, and did not check a box indicating that he 

admitted using methamphetamine on the admission form. The 

magistrate judge found Davidson’s testimony less credible than 

the probation officer’s testimony to the contrary.

Davidson acknowledged when he subsequently entered his 

guilty plea that he and co-defendant Jeremy Brown both cooked 

methamphetamine, often at a farm owned by Brown’s mother. A few 

days later, although his plea agreement required him to give 

truthful testimony, Davidson was called to testify at Brown’s 

trial. Out of the presence of the jury, Davidson denied 

conspiring with Brown to manufacture methamphetamine, denied 

ever seeing Brown with methamphetamine or seeing a 

methamphetamine lab on Brown’s property, and denied that he had 

ever known Brown to use methamphetamine or that anyone obtained 

it from him. 

At the sentencing hearing, Davidson argued that his 

perjured testimony at the revocation hearing should not be the 

basis for an obstruction of justice adjustment because his 

subsequent guilty plea had given him “a clean slate.” He also 

argued that he should not be held responsible for creating a 

hazard to human life or the environment because he had no 

control over what happened on Brown’s property, where much of 

the methamphetamine was manufactured. The district court 

overruled both objections and imposed sentence at the bottom of 
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the advisory sentencing guideline range, finding that Davidson’s 

arguments for a below-guideline sentence so that he could spend 

time with his children were at odds with his prior conduct and 

that a within-guideline sentence was necessary to reflect the 

seriousness of the offense, instill a proper respect for the 

law, and provide for Davidson’s rehabilitation. The 235-month 

sentence was at the bottom of the guideline range.

On appeal, Davidson argues that the court failed to 

make adequate findings to support the adjustment for obstruction 

of justice, failed to consider properly the factors relevant to 

the enhancement for creating a risk of harm, thus improperly 

calculating the guideline range, and failed to consider 

adequately the 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2010) 

factors. We review a sentence for procedural and substantive 

reasonableness. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). 

We must first ensure that the district court did not commit any 

“significant procedural error,” such as failing to properly 

calculate the applicable guidelines range, failing to consider 

the 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) factors, or failing to adequately 

explain the sentence. Id.

An adjustment for obstruction of justice is warranted 

if “the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted 

to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with 

respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the 
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instant offense of conviction[.]” USSG § 3C1.1. The 

application notes for § 3C1.1 specifically include perjury by 

defendant and providing materially false information to a judge 

or magistrate. USSG § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(b), (f). For purposes of 

§ 3C1.1, the Supreme Court has defined perjury as “false 

testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent 

to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of 

confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.” United States v. 

Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993). Application Note 6 defines 

“material evidence” as “evidence, fact, statement, or 

information that, if believed, would tend to influence or affect 

the issue under determination.” Under Dunnigan, “it is 

preferable for a district court to address each element of the 

perjury in a separate and clear finding[,]” 507 U.S. at 95, but 

it is sufficient if the district court makes a determination 

“that encompasses all of the factual predicates for a finding of 

perjury.” Id. Davidson contends that the district court failed 

to identify the statements he made at the revocation hearing 

that were false, whether they concerned a material matter, and 

whether they were willfully made. 

However, Davidson did not assert at sentencing that 

his testimony at the detention hearing was not perjured or not 

material or not given with the willful intent to influence the 

outcome of the detention hearing. He thus conceded that it was 
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all of the above. We conclude that it was not clear error for 

the district court to base its finding of perjury on the 

magistrate judge’s implied, and undisputed, finding that 

Davidson’s testimony at the revocation hearing was not credible, 

and the probation officer’s recommendation that the testimony 

was material and willful. See United States v. Terry, 916 F.2d 

157, 162 (4th Cir. 1990) (without defendant’s affirmative 

showing that information in presentence report is inaccurate, 

district court may adopt findings without more explicit 

explanation). 

Application Note 20(A) to § 2D1.1 sets out four 

factors relevant to the court’s determination that, in an 

offense involving the manufacture of methamphetamine, an 

enhancement for creation of a substantial risk of harm to human 

life or the environment is warranted. In the presentence 

report, the probation officer discussed these factors in detail 

and explained how they supported application of the enhancement 

in this case. At the sentencing hearing, Davidson argued only 

that he was not responsible for any hazard created by the 

manufacture of methamphetamine on Brown’s property. He did not 

contend that no substantial risk of harm was created there, 

again conceding the point. The district court held that 

Davidson was responsible for the actions of his co-conspirators 

in furtherance of the conspiracy, see USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), but 
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did not make detailed findings concerning the enhancement, since 

none were called for under Terry. We conclude that the district 

court did not clearly err in applying the enhancement for 

creation of a substantial risk of harm.

Davidson maintains that the district court’s alleged

errors in calculating his guideline range resulted in a sentence

above the guideline range that, in his view, should have been 

used and, therefore, the sentence should not be afforded a 

presumption of reasonableness. However, we conclude that the 

district court did not err in calculating the guideline range.

Davidson also claims that the district court failed to 

consider adequately the § 3553(a) factors, resulting in a 

sentence greater than necessary. This claim also fails. The 

court “must place on the record an individualized assessment 

based on the particular facts of the case before it [which] 

. . . provide[s] a rationale tailored to the particular case at 

hand and [is] adequate to permit meaningful appellate review.” 

United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks, footnote, and citation omitted). 

This is true even when the district court sentences a defendant 

within the applicable guidelines range. Id. 

At the same time, a sentence imposed within a properly 

calculated guidelines range enjoys a presumption of

reasonableness on appeal. United States v. Go, 517 F.3d 216, 
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218 (4th Cir. 2008); see Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 

346-56 (2007) (upholding appellate presumption of reasonableness 

for within-guidelines sentence). Thus, an extensive explanation 

is not required as long as the appellate court is satisfied 

“that [the district court] has considered the parties’ arguments 

and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal 

decisionmaking authority.” United States v. Engle, 592 F.3d 

495, 500 (4th Cir.) (quoting Rita, 551 U.S. at 356), cert. 

denied, 131 S. Ct. 165 (2010) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

Although Davidson did not object to the alleged 

inadequacy of the district court’s ruling at sentencing, he 

preserved the issue for appeal simply by requesting a belowguideline sentence. Lynn, 592 F.3d at 577-78. We are satisfied 

that the court adequately considered the § 3553(a) factors, made 

an individualized assessment of the relevant facts, and stated 

its reasons for imposing a within-guideline sentence in a manner 

sufficient to permit appellate review. 

Thus, the district court did not commit procedural 

error and we exercise our discretion to “apply a presumption of 

reasonableness” to Davidson’s within-guideline sentence. United 

States v. Wright, 594 F.3d 259, 268 (4th Cir.) (quoting Gall, 

552 U.S. at 51), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 507 (2010) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 
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We therefore affirm the sentence imposed by the 

district court. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED