NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Marriage of: 

MITCHELL GENE REYNOLDS, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

TAMARA LYNN WALKER, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 22-0711 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County

No. P1300DO202200152

The Honorable Cele Hancock, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED IN PART

APPEARANCES

Mitchell Gene Reynolds, Prescott Valley

Petitioner/Appellee

Tamara Lynn Walker, Prescott Valley

Respondent/Appellant

FILED 8-22-2023
REYNOLDS v. WALKER

Decision of the Court

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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the Court’s decision, in 

which Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

W I L L I A M S, Judge:

¶1 Tamara Walker (“Wife”) appeals two provisions of the 

superior court’s divorce decree: (1) the denial of her request for spousal 

maintenance and (2) the division of community debt. For the following 

reasons, we affirm the denial of spousal maintenance but remand the issue 

of a specific debt to allow the court to assign the remaining debt equitably 

between the parties. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

¶2 Wife and Mitchell Reynolds (“Husband”) married in 2007 and 

divorced in 2022 (though they had been together for more than four 

decades, have adult children together, and grandchildren). During the 

marriage, Husband was the primary breadwinner—working construction 

as a self-employed subcontractor installing marble. Wife worked for the 

State of Arizona for about a decade until she qualified for and began 

receiving Social Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) benefits in 2012. 

¶3 Before trial, the superior court awarded Wife temporary 

spousal maintenance of $600.00 monthly. Two months later, Husband was 

diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease and stopped working. 

¶4 At trial, Husband opposed Wife’s request for continued 

spousal maintenance, testifying that the Parkinson’s disease prevented him 

from working as a marble installer. Husband said that he “want[ed] to 

work” and had applied for a job driving “RVs back and forth” but had not

yet heard back. He also testified that Wife was “as capable [of working] as 

[him],” just “in a different field” like “computer work” because Wife had 

“been doing a lot of computer work with [Husband’s] accounts.”

1 Though Father did not file an answering brief, in our discretion we decline 

to regard this as a concession of error. Thompson v. Thompson, 217 Ariz. 524, 

526, ¶ 6 n.1 (App. 2008)
REYNOLDS v. WALKER

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¶5 Wife testified that, besides her SSDI benefits, she earned $100 

weekly babysitting her grandkids. With the grandkids starting back at 

school, however, Wife wasn’t sure how her income might change. When 

asked by the court whether she could work part-time, Wife stated, “I don’t 

think so. I really don’t.” Later in the trial, the court pressed the issue, and 

Wife responded, “I mean, I—I could probably try.” As for Husband’s ability 

to work with his recent Parkinson’s diagnosis, Wife testified that “with 

[Husband’s] experience on his job that he could get a—like a supervisor

. . . project manager [position or] something like that.” 

¶6 The superior court found that Wife was eligible for spousal 

maintenance under A.R.S. § 25-319(A)(1) (lacking “sufficient property . . . 

to provide for” her “reasonable needs”) but decided against any award 

because of Husband’s “Parkinson’s disease, which will preclude him from 

earning income in the marketplace,” and because “Wife has earning ability 

sufficient to support herself.” 

¶7 As for community debt, the court determined it was 

“unclear” which debts were incurred during the marriage and, therefore, 

treated all debts as community debt. The court chose not to divide the

delinquent debts that had gone to collections. But of the remaining 

community debts, the court ordered that “both parties are equally 

responsible” and that Wife provide Husband with all necessary 

information for him “to pay one-half the payments . . . each month until the 

debt[s] [are] paid off.” 

¶8 Wife timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Article 6, 

Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 

-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. Spousal Maintenance

¶9 We review the superior court’s denial of spousal maintenance 

for an abuse of discretion and will affirm the decision if reasonable evidence 

supports it. Helland v. Helland, 236 Ariz. 197, 202, ¶ 22 (App. 2014).

¶10 A court may award maintenance to either spouse after 

following a two-step process. First, the court must determine whether the 

requesting spouse is eligible for an award by analyzing five eligibility 

factors listed in A.R.S. § 25-319(A). The court considers each factor as it

applies to the spouse requesting maintenance. In Re Marriage of Cotter and 

Podhorez, 245 Ariz. 82, 85, ¶ 7 (App. 2018). If the court determines the 
REYNOLDS v. WALKER

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requesting spouse is eligible for maintenance, the court then considers the

factors in A.R.S. § 25-319(B) to determine whether the spouse is entitled to 

an award, including the amount and duration of the award. Id.; see also

Sherman v. Sherman, 241 Ariz. 110, 114, ¶ 17 (App. 2016); Helland, 236 Ariz. 

at 203, ¶ 28. The court need not consider every factor under A.R.S. 

§ 25-319(B), but neglecting to consider relevant factors can constitute an 

abuse of discretion. Rainwater v. Rainwater, 177 Ariz. 500, 502 (App. 1993). 

¶11 Here, the court determined that Wife was eligible for spousal 

maintenance under A.R.S. § 25-319(A)(1) because she lacked sufficient 

property, including property apportioned to her, to provide for her 

reasonable needs. The court also, apparently, considered Father’s eligibility 

for an award because the court found that “there is little property to be 

divided between [both] parties” and that “[n]either party ha[d] any 

property that would provide any passive income to either of them to assist 

in providing for their reasonable needs.” Record evidence supports the 

court’s finding as to both parties. 

¶12 Despite Wife’s eligibility for spousal maintenance, the court 

determined Wife was not entitled to an award. And while the court made 

no express findings under A.R.S. § 25-319(B), it impliedly considered at 

least some factors it was required to when it found (1) that Husband’s 

Parkinsons’ disease “preclude[d] [him] from earning his previous salary,”

from continuing “in his current profession,” or even “from earning income 

in the marketplace,” and (2) that “Wife ha[d] earning ability sufficient to 

support herself.” The court impliedly considered at least the following 

factors under A.R.S. § 25-319(B): subsection (B)(4) directing courts to 

consider the “ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to 

meet that spouse’s needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking 

maintenance”; subsection (B)(5) considering the “comparative financial 

resources of the spouses, including their comparative earning abilities in 

the labor market”; and subsection (B)(9) considering the “financial 

resources of the party seeking maintenance, including marital property 

apportioned to that spouse, and that spouse’s ability to meet that spouse’s 

own needs independently.”

¶13 Husband and Wife presented conflicting evidence on these

factors, and the superior court seemingly found Husband more credible.

Because “[w]e defer to the superior court’s ‘determination of witnesses’ 

credibility and the weight to give conflicting evidence,” Nia v. Nia, 242 Ariz. 

419, 423-24, ¶ 14 (App. 2017), on this record, Wife has not shown that the 

court abused its discretion.
REYNOLDS v. WALKER

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II. Community Debts

¶14 Wife also argues that the superior court erred in dividing 

community debts. Any debt obtained by one spouse during marriage is 

presumed to be community debt. Hammett v, Hammett, 247 Ariz. 556, 562, 

¶ 29 (App. 2019). We review the division of community debts for an abuse 

of discretion. Id. at 559, ¶ 13. A court abuses its discretion when its findings 

lack support from evidence in the record. Brucklier v. Brucklier, 253 Ariz. 579, 

582, ¶ 10 (App. 2022). 

¶15 Wife specifically challenges the court’s determination that a 

debt from the West Yavapai Guidance Clinic (“WYGC”) was in collections

and, consequently, not assigned to either party by the court. At trial, Wife 

testified she incurred the WYGC debt in 2018 and stated that she was still 

making payments at the time of trial. No contrary evidence was presented.

Thus, nothing in the record supports the court’s determination that this

debt was in collections. To the contrary, the only evidence presented was 

that the monthly debt payments were current and that the debt was 

incurred during the marriage. The court should have equitably assigned the 

debt to one or both parties. Failing to do so constituted an abuse of 

discretion. We therefore remand the matter to the superior court to treat the 

WYGC debt as a community debt and assign the remaining obligation 

between the parties equitably.

CONCLUSION

¶16 We affirm the superior court’s denial of spousal maintenance. 

We remand the issue of the WYGC debt to allow the court to assign the 

remaining debt equitably between the parties.