### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00 245 -CV

Shir le y Ha r r is , A ppe lla nt

v. Tom as Vazquez , Appellee

FR OM T HE C OU N T Y C OU R T A T L A W N O. 2 OF T R A V IS C OU N T Y NO. C-1- CV-05 -28 7328 , HO NORAB LE ORLI NDA NARAN JO , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
Shir le y H ar r is a p p e a ls f r o m a ta k e - n o th in g ju d g me n t i nh e r s u it f o r d a ma g e s she alleg edly incurre d in a

n automobile collision with Tomas Va zquez. The judgment wa s based on a j u ry fi n d i n g t h at Va z qu ez ’s n egl i gen ce h ad n o t b ee n a pr o x i m at e cau s e o f t h e c o l l i s i o n . Ha rr i s b ri n gs two issues on appea l challeng ing the fac tual sufficie ncy of the e vidence supporting the jury ’s ver dict and the trial court’s submis sion of an “una voidable ac cident” instruc tion with the neg lige nce issue. We w ill a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt.
BACK GR OUND The jury hear d evidenc e that the c oll i sion occurr ed on Austin’s Oak Springs Road
near its int erse ction with Airport Boulevar d. I t is undisputed that Har ris’s vehicle, while trave ling westbound on Oak Springs Road, struc k Vazquez’s vehicle a s Vazquez was exiti ng a re staurantI t is unclea r from the record ex actly wher e in the road Harr is was locate d when the c ollisi on 1 occur red. Har ris desig nated only

a par tial rec ord for

revie w, see Te x. R. A

pp . P. 34 .6 (c ), and

mos t of t he trial ex hibits, i ncluding photogr aphs and dia g rams of the road, w ere not included. The r ecor d is also unclear

as to whethe r Oak Springs Road at the acc ident site has t wo lanes, two la nes in ea ch direc tion, or two throug h lanes plus a turn la ne. 2 parkinglot on the north side of Oak Springs Road a n d at t empt ing to turn le ft so as to trave l
ea s t b o u n d
. T h e c o l l i s i o no cc u rr edat ap p ro x i m at el y 1 1 : 0 0 o na S u n d ay

m o rn i n g. Both Ha rris and V azquez testified at trial and provide d conflicting acc ounts of how the collision occurr ed. Ac cordingto Ha rr i s, as she wa s driving w estwar d on Oak Spring s and approa ching the i ntersec tion with Airport Boulevar d, “ther e was nothing in the road” bloc king he r vie w. Th e re we re “ no ob str uc tio ns ,” and

the ro a d w a s “ smo oth” and “f la t.” F ur the rm or e , H a rr is testified that t he weather was sunny and vis ibilit y was good. Har ris estimated that she wa s traveling betwee n 20 to 25 miles per hour in a 30- miles-per- hour zone.

Har ris rec ounted that, as she w as appr oachingthe intersec tion, [T] here was a

vehicle, a truck, pull ing out of the resta urant [parking lot] . Icould see him, because like I say , there was nothi ng blocking my view. .
. . He was—he looked to his right. I

was coming from his le ft. He did not turn and look to his left. So as he ca me out in front of me, my car —we c ollided on the—on the driver ’s side. . . .
Har ris added, “ He wa s making his turn. He wa s making his left-hand turn in f ront of me, a

nd that’s when I jammed on m y

brake s. He wa s . . . turning le ft in front of me, a nd Ihit his l eft bumper , left—above his left tire.” H arr is further te stified that she wa s not awar e of a ny other ve hicles trying to e x it the parking lot. Harris a lso observed a male pa s s en ger i n Va zquez’s truck. On
c ro ss- e xami natio n, Ha

rr is te sti fi e d that wh e n the c oll isi on oc c ur re d, sh e wa s tr a ve lin g on

the “ le ft ” of the we stbound lane of Oa k Springs Road. 13 I n contra st to Ha

rris, Vazquez te stified that when he was pulling out of the re staurant parkinglot, there we re two c ars be hind his vehicle, and, to his left, “ there was a big tr uck” pa rked on the stree t that was obstructing his view. When asked to descr ibe the truc k that was obstruc ting his vie w, Va zqu e z re c ounte d, “ I t w a s a bigtr uc k. Th e on e s th a t ha

ve —th e on e that ha s e ig ht t ir e s, four in the ba ck and [four] in the front.” When a sked if he co u l d re ca l l t h e color of the parke d truck, Va z q u ez testified, “Well, no. I t was kind of g ree n. Ijust saw the big , y ou know, bulk.” Vazquez did not see any one inside the truc k, and he te stified that he assumed the truck’s ow ner w as ins ide the re sta

ur ant. Refer ring to a p h o t o gra ph of the location where the collision occurr ed, Va zquez
rec ounted: [M] y truck wa s rig ht here , and I was pulling out slowly . And I was makingthe ef

fort to see towa

rds there . And then whe n I pulled just a litt le bit more like that, I saw the c ar c omi ng . Be hin d me the re wa s the oth e r one , an d th e n I jus t st ay e d th ink ing , w e ll, Iho pe thi s o ne wi ll s top so it w on ’t hit me . A nd tha t’ s it
. Vazquez added:
Iwa s lo ok ingbe c a

us e Iwa nt t o tu rn le ft , y e s. B ut I wa s p ull ingou t st ra ig ht l ike thi s. Iwa s p ull ingou t ve ry

slo wl y be c a

us e I wa nte d to see , b e c a

us e that tr uc k w a s in

my way , and I

couldn’t see . And when I pull out just a little bit more, that’s when I saw t h e c ar co m i n g. Vazqu ez d en i ed Harris’s a lleg ation that he did not look to his l eft whe n he wa s pulling out. He a dded that he was wea ring his g lasses, was not e ating or drinking any thing, a nd was not using his ce ll phone. He f urther e x plained that he was on his way home from the r estaura

nt and4

was “ rested” and not i n any ty pe of hurry
. Vazquez also testified, contrary to Har ris’s t estimony , that he wa s alone in his truck.

Va zqu e z furt

he r t e sti fi e d th a t, a s H arr is’ s c ar c a me to ward him, h e ha d w ante d to back up but wa s unable “ beca use t here wer e two other cars rig ht behind me. I couldn’t move ba ck.” On c ro ss- e xami natio n, Va zqu e z te sti fi e d th a t he ha d p ull e d o ut in the ro a d on ly to t he e xten t th a t hi s fr on t t ir es we re in t

he str e e t, a

nd no fu rt he r. Ac c or din g to V a zqu e z, h is v e hic le wa s c omp le te ly sto pp e d w he n H arr is’ s v e hic le c oll ide d w ithit.

Vazquez also testified that beca use Har ris applied her brake s when she saw him, the collisio n o cc u rre d “ver

y slowly ” and “ hardly

did any damag e” to his truck, be nding a portion of his f r o n t b u mp e r

n e ar th e w h e e l o nth e dr iv e r ’ s s id e o f h is v e h ic le b u t n o t d a ma g in g h is tir es
or a lig nme nt. Va zqu e z ag re e d w ithhis c ouns e l’ s c ha ra c te ri zat ion

of the c oll isi on

a s a “minor ac cident.” I n fac t, there was e vidence that the appr ox imate amount of damag e to Vazquez’s
ve hic le wa s $ 30 0, wh ile the a pp ro xima te a mou

nt o f d a ma g e to H arr is’ s v e hic le wa s $ 80 0. B oth vehicles w ere drivea

ble af ter the c ollisi on. Af te r V a zqu e z te sti fi e d, Ha

rr is w a s r e c a lle d t o th e sta nd . H arr is “ too k is su e ” wi th “eve ry thing that Mr. V azquez said.” I n particula r, she e x plained:
I ’m g oing w estbound. I ’m in the ce nter lane . I f Mr. Vazquez w as pulling out of that parkinglot, like he stated, an d h e s t o p p ed, ther e is no way that Icould have g one from the cente r l ane to my rig ht lane to hit his vehicle. .
. . There was no wa y that he c ou ldn ’ t h a v e s e e n m e c o m i n g w e s t b o u n d , h a d h e l o o k e d t o h i s l e f t
. Th is i s a bs olute ly ri dic ulo us .This instruction track s t h e u navoidable a ccide nt instruction in the Tex as Pattern Jury 2 Charges. See Comm. on P attern Jury Charg es, State B ar of Tex., Tex as Pattern Jury Charg es—Ge nera l Neg lige nce & I ntentional Personal Torts PJ C 3.4 (2003). 5 There was also a dis pute during trial as to the location of damag e to Har ris’s vehicle
. No photogr aphs had bee n taken of Har ris’s vehicle following the collision. I nstead, the pa rties used wh at co u n s el t er m ed“r

u d i m en t ary ” d ra wi n gs t o d ep i ct t h e d am age . Ha rr i s t es t i fi ed t h at t h e d am age
wa s o n th e dr ive r’ s si de of he r v e hic le , w hil e Va zqu e z te sti fi ed th at he r e c a lle d th e dama g e to Ha rr is’ s ve hic le be ingon

the pa sse ng e r’ s si de . O n c ro ss- e xami natio n, Va zqu e z qu e sti on e d H a rr is extensively as to how

only the driver ’s side of he r vehic le could have been da mag ed whe n Vazquez’s vehicle ha d pulled out from her passeng er’ s side. Har

ris explained that Vazquez’s vehicle ha d been in the proce ss of making a lef t turn in front of Harris and was not impacted until it had clea red he r passeng er side. At the conc lusion of trial, the trial cour t submit ted an issue inquiring as t o whether the ne g lig e nc e , if

any , o f V a zqu e z or Ha

rr is ha d be e n a pr oximate c a us e of the oc c ur

re nc e . I t a lso conditionally

submitt ed issues on compa rative f ault and dama g es. The trial court pr ovided the jury de fi nit ion s o f n e g lig e nc e , o rd ina ry c are , a nd pr oximate c a

us e , a s w e ll a s an “ un a vo ida ble a c c ide nt” in st ruct ion—“ an o c c ur

re nc e may

be an ‘ un a vo ida

ble a c c ide nt, ’ t

hat is , a n e ve nt n ot p ro xima te ly
cause d by the neg lige nce of

any party to it.” T h e j u ry fo und that neither H arr is’s nor Vazquez’s

2
ne g lig e nc e ha d be e n a pr oximate c a us e of the oc c ur

re nc e , and did no t re a c h the re ma ini ngis su es. Th e tr ia l c ourt

re nd e re d ju dg me nt on the jur y ’s ve rd ic t and

or de re d th a t H arr is t a ke no thi ng . H a rr is filed a motion for ne w trial, which the trial court de nied. This appea l followed.6 DI SCU SSIO N Har ris’s two issues on appea l are closely related. What she terms “the g rava men of this appeal” is her conte ntion that “[t ]he only evidenc e in this case tends to e stablish that one or the other p arty to th e c o ll is io n w a s n e g li g e n t ( o r b o th ) , b u t n o t n e it h e r . ” H ar

r is u r g e s that the unavoidable a ccide nt instruction “invited this error.” Charge e rror We will first address Ha rris’s issue c omplaining of the unavoidable acc ident instruction. We review a

trial court’ s decision to submit or refuse a particular inst ruction under an abuse of discretion standa rd. Shupe v. Lingafelter , 1 9 2 S. W. 3 d 5 7 7 , 5 7 9 ( T e x. 2 0 0 6 ). When submitt ing the jury

char g e, a tr ial court is af

forde d more discr etion when submitti n g instructions than when submitting que stions. Br y an v . W atu mu ll , 230 S. W
. 3 d 5 0 3 , 508 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet
. den ied ). A tri a l c ourt do e s n ot a

bu se its dis c re tio n in

su bmi tti ngan in str

uc tio n if the re is any support in the evidenc e for it. Louisi ana-Pacific Corp. v. Knighten , 976 S.W .2d 67 4, 67 6 ( Te x. 19 98 ); Banks v. Columbia Hosp. at M edical City D allas Subsi d i a r y, L.P. , 233 S.W .3d 64, 70 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pe t. denied).

An unavoidable acc ident is “an e vent not proxi mately cause d by th e n e g li g e n ce of

any party to it.” Reinhart v. Y

oung , 906 S.W .2d 471, 472 (Tex. 1995). “The instruction is most often used to inquire about the c ausal e ffe ct of some phy sical condition or circ umstance suc h as fog , snow, sleet, we t or slick paveme nt, or obstruction of view , o r t o r e so lve a c a se inv olv inga ve ry y oungc hil d wh o i s l egally

incapa ble of ne g lige nce.” Id
. ( e mp h a s is a d d e d )
. “ U n a v o id a b le a c c id e n t i s n o t a n alternative theory

of liability but is ‘an infere ntial rebuttal iss ue that require s plaintiffs to prove the7

nonexis tence of an a ffirmative defe nse’ or ‘see ks to disprove the existence of a n essential ele ment submitt ed in a

nother issue.’” Be d, Ba th & Be y on d, In c . v . U

ris ta , 211 S.W .3d 753, 756 (Tex. 2006) (interna l citations omit ted).

Although inf

ere ntial rebut t al instructions “do not alway s further the jury ’s understanding o f t h e def

ense or confor m to curre nt broad-f

orm prac tices,” the supreme c ourt has explained that “they

do serve a leg itimate purpose”:
The s t an d ar d broad- form question is structure d such that the jury is not asked whether any particula

r per son was neg lige nt, but whether ‘ the neg lige nce, if any ,’ of particula r per sons prox imatel y ca u s ed an occ urre nce. T here is at least a potential implication in thi s phrase ology t h at t h e occur

renc e wa s cause d by

someone’s neg lige nce. We se e no har m in ex plaining to the jury throug h an infe rential re buttal instruction that no such implication is int ended.
Dillard v. Texas Elec . Coop. , 157 S.W .3d 429, 433 (Tex. 2005) (interna l citation om i t ted). More
rec ently , the supreme court obser ved, “T he truth is, sometimes acc idents are no one’s f ault, and an unavoidable a ccide nt instruction, like the one in this case , simply explains t o the jury that they are not require d to find someone at f ault.” Bed, Bath &Bey ond, Inc. , 211 S.W .3d at 757. Har ris contends that, a s a m a

tt e r o f p u b li c p o licy , the unavoidable acc ident instruction should be applied only

with rega

rd to “nonhuman” conditions that are “ sudden” or “unexpected,”
no t “ c omm on ly

e nc ounte re d c ir c ums tanc e s” su c h a s a pa rk e d ve hic le
. I n the pa st, the un a vo ida ble
acc id e n t in s tr

u c ti o n h a s b e e n a s s o c iate d w it h “ n o n h u ma

n ” o r e n v ir o n me n ta l c o n d it io n s , a cts of very y oung children leg ally incapa ble of neg lige nce, or other “pec uliar” circ umstances. See H ill v. W inn Dixie Tex., I

nc. , 84 9 S.W. 2d 80 2, 80 3 ( Te x. 19 92 ); se e als o R e inh ar t , 906 S.W .2d at 472-73 (s ha ri ng the “ re se rv a tio ns ” of c ourt s in oth e r jur isd ic tio ns that ha d e ith e r pr oh ibi ted or “s eve re ly8

limit ed the c ircumstance s” under which unavoida

ble ac cident instruction may be g iven). More
re ce n t l y , h o we v er , t h e s u

p re m e c ourt has ex p l ai n edt h at “t h e i n s t ru ct i o n ’s l an gu age i s n o ts o l i m i t i n g. The instruction mere ly

informs the jury

that it may

consider cause s of t he occ urre nce othe r than the neg lige nce of

the par ties.” Di lla rd , 1 57 S.W. 3d a t 43 3; see a l

s o B ed , B a t h & Bey ond, Inc. , 211 S.W .3d at 760 (B rister, J., concurring ) (“ I t is true the u n av o i d able- acc ident instruction has historically

been a ssociated only

with defe ndants who blame c hildren or the w eathe r, but (as w e noted recently

) t hat i s not what it say s. All it say s is that acc idents may be nobody ’s ‘fa ult’ in the l ega l s en s e. ” ( ci t i n g D i lla rd , 157 S.W .3d at 433)). F ollowing r ece nt supreme c ourt g uidance , we reje ct Har ris’s nar row viewreg ardingthe unavoidable acc ident instruction. I n this case, Va zquez t estified that his view of onc oming tra ffic w as obstructe d by a truc k that was pa

rked on the side of the stre et. B eca use the e vidence shows that neither V azquez nor Ha rris we re r esponsible for this obst ruction, Vazquez ’s t estimony is at least some evide nce that the collision was “a

n event not proximately

caus ed b y t h e n egl ige nce of any party to it.” See Re inh ar t , 9 0 6 S
. W
. 2 d

at 4 7 2
. Aga i n , a t ri al co u rt d o es n o tab u s e i t s d i s cr et i o ni ns u b m i t t i n g a jury instruction if there is “ any support” in t h e evidence f or it. Knighten , 976 S.W .2d at 676. On thi s r e c or d, we ho ld that the tr ia l c ourt did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in su

bmi tti ngan unavo ida

ble
acc ident instruction.

Alternatively , any

err or in submitti ng the instruction was ha rmless. An incorr ect jury instruction require s reve rsal only if it “was r easona

bly calc ulated t o and proba

bly did cause the rendition of an imprope r judg ment.” B e d , B a th & B e

y o n d, Inc. , 2 11 S.W .3d at 757 (quoting Re inh ar t , 906 S.W .2d at 473). On this re cord, we cannot conclude that the unavoidable ac ci d ent9

instruction probably cause d an improper judgme nt, f or rea sons similar to the rea sons discussed by the supreme court in Bed, Bath &Bey ond, Inc. First, the instruction simply reminded the jury that it could consider the possibility that the vehicle s collided for r easons other than Har

ris’s or Vazquez’s neg lige nce ( for e x ample, the ne g lige nce of the owner of the truck alleg edly parke d on the side of t he st ree t). “That kind of a jury instruction does not by itself amount to harmful er ror.” Id
. Second, on this rec ord , i t i s rea sonable to conc lude that the jury simply found that Har ris had fa iled to car

ry her bur den of pr oof. L ike the def endant in Bed, B a t h & B ey o n d , Inc. , Vazquez defe nded this case larg ely by attackingHar

ris’s cred i bility
. Se e id . at 757-58. Va zquez extensively attempted to c ast doubt upon Har ris’s rec ollection of how the collision occurr ed and how he r v e hic le wa s d a ma g e d. Th e natur e , e xten t, a nd c a us e of Ha rr is’ s in jur ie s w ere als o vig or ou sly contested dur ing tr ial. For these a nd other re asons, the jury could have simply

reje cted Ha

rris’s version of the fac ts. Especially wher e Ha

rris’s c laim r ested larg ely on her ow n testimony , the jury could have found, without reg ard to the unavoidable acc ident instruction, that Harr is failed to prove by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e that Va zquez’s neglig ence was a p rox imate ca use of the
c o ll is io n . H ar

r is h a s n o t ma d e a s h o w in g th a t, w it h o u t th e u n a v o id a

b le a c c id e n t in s tr

u c ti o n , the
ve rd ic t w ou ld h a ve be e n in he r f a vor. We c on c lud e that th e e vid e nc e in t his c a se fa ils to i nd ic a te that “the unavoidable acc ident instruction in any way cause d the case to be decide d differ ently than it would have bee n without it.” Id
. (q u o t i n g Re inh ar t , 906 S.W .2d at 473).

We overrule Har

ris’s sec ond issue.See County of Dallas v. Poston , 104 S.W .3d 719, 723 (Tex. A pp.—Dallas 2003, no pet.) 3 (citing Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.256(3) (West 1999)) (e x plaini n g d u t y t o y ield rig ht-of-w ay to oncoming ve hicles whe n enter ing r oadwa y ). 10 F actual suf

fi ciency I n her first issue, Har

ris asser ts that the jury ’s ver dict is ag ainst the g reat weig ht and preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. As noted, H arr is contends t hat there is insufficient evidenc e that neither Vazquez nor Har

ris wer e neg lige nt. The g reat w eig ht a nd preponde ranc e of the evidenc e,
a c c o r d i n g t o H ar

r i s , e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t ei ther

Vazquez or Har

ris wer e neg lige nt. Howeve r, it is the jur y ’s f in di ng that Vazquez , the def endant, wa s not neg lige nt on which the trial c ourt’s judg ment rests. We will construe Ha rris’s issue to be a

challeng e to t h e fa ct u al sufficie ncy of the e vidence
su pp or tin g the jur

y ’s fa ilure to f

ind that V a zqu e z wa s n e g lig e nt. When a par

ty at t ac k s the fac tual sufficie ncy of an a dverse finding on an issue on wh ic h it ha s th e burd e n o f pr oo f, it mus t de mon str a te on a pp e a l that the a dv e rs e fi nd ingis a g a ins t the g reat weig ht and pre pondera nce of the evidenc e. Do w Ch e m. Co. v . F ra nc is , 46 S.W .3d 23 7, 24 2 ( Te x. 20 01 ); Te x as De p’ t of As sis tiv e & Re ha bil ita tiv e Se rv s. v . H owa rd , 182 S.W .3d 393, 407 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied). We consider a ll of the evidenc e and w ill set aside the ver dict o n l y i f the evidenc e is so weak or the findingso ag ainst the g reat weig ht and preponde ranc e of the evidenc e as to be clea rly wrongand unjust. Dow Chem. Co. , 46 S.W .3d at 243. T h e j u r y r e m a i n s t h e s o l e j u d g e o f w i t n e s s e s ’ c r e d i b i l i t y an d t h e w e i g h t t o b e g i v e nt h e i r t e s t i m o n y. Golden Eagle Arc hery, I

nc. v. J ackson , 116 S.W .3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003). H ar r is p o in ts to h e r

te s ti mo n y

th a t V a zq

u e z d id n o t l o o k to h is le f t b e f o r e e n te ring the str e e t f

ro m th e pa

rk inglot
. Vazquez testified that he looked in both direc tions before he pulled

311

out. I t was the jury ’s p ro v i n ce to assess the cr edibility of ea ch witness and r esolve this and other c onflicts in the evidenc e. Se e Mc Do na ld v . D an k

wor th , 212 S.W .3d 336, 345-46 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.). Vazquez rec ounted t hat t here was a truck obstructinghis view of oncoming traff

ic, re counting details about i ts appea ranc e, including t hat i t had eig ht wheels a nd was “ big,” “bu l k [ y ] , ” and “kind of g ree n.” Va zquez t estified that he pulled out of the par king lot

“ ve ry slo wl y .” Whe n h e saw H arr is’ s ve hic le a pp ro a c hin g , Va zqu e z e xpla ine d that he wa s una ble to back up be cause there wer e two car s immediately behind him. Vazquez added that he ha d been

“ re ste d ” an d n o t i n a h u r r y , w a s w e ar i n g h i s g l a s s e s , w a s n o t o n h i s c e l l p h o n e , w a s a l o n e in h is vehicle, and wa s not eating or drinking any thing while dr iving. On this re cord, w e ca nnot say that the jur y ’s fa ilure to f

ind tha t V a zqu e z’s negli gence w a s a pr oximate c a

us e of the c oll isi on

wa s so
a g a ins t th e g re a t w e ig ht a nd pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e a s to be c le arl y wr on g and

manif e stl y unjust. See W

aring v. W

ommack , 9 45 S.W. 2d 88 9, 89 4- 95 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin 19 97 , n o w ri t) (af firming jury ’s finding that defe ndant was not ne g lige nt in c as e i n v olving c ollisi on be tw e e n p la int if

f b ic y c lis t and

de fe nd ant m oto ri st atte mpt inglef t tur n) ; Gomez v . Adame , 940 S.W .2d 249, 252 (Tex
. Ap p . — S an Antonio 1997, no writ) ( aff irming jury ’s finding that defe ndant was not ne g lige nt in case involving alleg ation t h at d ef endant failed to m a int a in p ro pe r l oo ko ut p ri or to en te ri ngro a dw ay

); Ma da ra v . M

ar sh all , 578 S.W .2d 787, 791 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ ref ’d n.r.e.) (a ffirming jury ’s finding that defe ndant was not ne g lige nt in case involving collision be tween plaintiff motoris t t ra v eling westbound and de fenda

nt motorist attempti ng left turn). We overrule Har

ris’s first issue.12 CO NC LU SION Ha vin g ov e rr

ule d H arr is’ s is su e s on

a pp e a l, w e a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt
.

_____________

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and Pember

ton Affir med Filed: June 5, 2008