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i 

96–237 2016

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–46] 

POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS IN THE 

REGION OF THE IRAN DEAL 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JULY 29, 2015 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

THOMAS MACARTHUR, New Jersey 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

PETE AGUILAR, California 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

ALEX GALLO, Professional Staff Member 

MIKE CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

MICHAEL TEHRANI, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac,’’ a Representative from Texas, Chairman, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Alterman, Jon B., Senior Vice President and Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in 

Global Security and Geostrategy, Center for Strategic and International 

Studies .................................................................................................................. 8 

Eisenstadt, Michael, Kahn Fellow and Director, Military and Security Studies 

Program, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy ............................... 6 

Singh, Michael, Lane-Swig Senior Fellow and Managing Director, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy ................................................................. 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Alterman, Jon B. .............................................................................................. 82 

Eisenstadt, Michael .......................................................................................... 70 

Singh, Michael .................................................................................................. 59 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 56 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ ............................................................... 55 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Shuster ....................................................................................................... 97 

Mr. Walz ............................................................................................................ 99 

(1) 

POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS IN THE REGION OF THE 

IRAN DEAL 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, July 29, 2015. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ 

Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. 

The committee meets today to consider potential implications of 

the Iranian nuclear agreement for the Middle East and for the 

world. Last week most of us attended a classified session where the 

administration negotiators explained and argued for approval of 

the agreement. They have also been testifying in front of other 

committees in the Congress in open session. 

Today we have the opportunity to hear perspectives from a distinguished panel of experts. One point on which the supporters and 

opponents of the agreement concur is that this agreement will have 

wide-ranging, far-reaching consequences. Of course, they differ on 

whether those consequences will be positive or negative. 

It seems to me the issues of concern can be broken down into 

three areas. One are the variety of issues about verification and enforcement. And I would point members to an in-depth report by the 

Wall Street Journal last week that details how Syria has successfully thwarted and defied inspectors who have now concluded that 

Assad did not give up all his chemical weapons as he promised. 

How will Iran be different? 

A second basket of issues is whether, even if the inspections go 

perfectly and Iran stays in full compliance with the letter and spirit of the agreement, whether it is a good deal or not. As Secretaries 

Shultz and Kissinger wrote back in April, negotiations that began 

as an effort to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear arsenal are 

ending with an agreement that concedes that very capability, although several years down the road. The administration argues, of 

course, that a better agreement was not possible. 

The third basket are Iran’s other activities beyond its nuclear 

program to include long-range missile development, support for terrorism, and instigating regional instability. 

Put it all together, we have huge stakes, long-lasting consequences, and a vote that this Congress must take shortly when we 
2 

return in September. All of that combines to make it a weighty 

issue for us all. 

I yield to the ranking member for any comments he would like 

to make. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in the 

Appendix on page 55.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for having 

this very important hearing. 

This is an issue that Congress will have to vote on; one we cannot avoid. So although Lord knows we have avoided a whole lot of 

others, this one is coming at us. And I think that is a very good 

thing. It gives us a chance to be deliberative, to listen to experts, 

like the ones we have before us today, and to have a really robust 

debate about what exactly the agreement does. 

And right off the bat, to just disagree a little bit with a couple 

of things that the chairman said, explicitly in the agreement is 

Iran agreeing to never build a nuclear weapon. They had to agree 

to that. Now, they can obviously lie, cheat, and steal, but it is 

wrong to say that the agreement says, you know: You, after 15 

years, have permission to do whatever you want. I think that is 

one of the perceptions that is out there. They don’t. 

Second of all, there has been some comments about how, you 

know, after 15 years, we legitimize the Iranian nuclear program. 

There is one thing that has never really been clear in the U.N. 

[United Nations] protocols on nuclear programs. It has been clear 

that you don’t have a right to build a nuclear weapon. What hasn’t 

been clear is the right to enrich. That lack of clarity really doesn’t 

change. Now, yes, the agreement does allow Iran to then go back 

to the number of centrifuges or more than they have right now, but 

it doesn’t have this big huge open door post-15 years that a lot of 

people have been talking about. At the 15-year point, we will have 

a challenge, no question, but look at the challenge that we have 

right now. Iran has 19,000 centrifuges. Prior to the short-term 

agreement, they had a large amount of uranium enriched at 20 

percent. 

What this agreement does clearly do for at least the next 15 

years is significantly degrades Iran’s ability to enrich uranium. It 

takes them down to about 5,000 centrifuges, 5,000 and some odd. 

They face regular inspections, and I will point out that one difference between Iran and Syria is Iran is not a war zone. It is a 

little bit of a clearer picture for the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] to go in and do the inspections. It forces Iran to get 

rid of almost all of its enriched uranium, down to, I believe, and 

I am going to get my—300-something. I forget the amount. Vastly 

less than what they have right now. It takes them back much further from where they are right now. And that more or less lasts 

for 15 years. 

I think the other thing to consider and comments that I would 

be interested in, if we reject this, there are a couple of issues. One, 

a number of people have suggested that we can go back and get 
3 

a better deal. I don’t think that is even really plausible when you 

look at Russia, China, the EU [European Union], the fact that the 

U.N. has already approved the deal, you know, that all those players would come back to the table, let alone Iran, I think, is a bit 

of an assumption. But the other question is, you know, so we don’t 

come back to the table, we reject the deal, what happens then? 

Well, we know that Iran is able to keep everything they have got. 

You know, basically, at that point, there are no restrictions on 

them whatsoever. 

So what happens if we reject the deal? One of the things I am 

interested in hearing, and I am, you know, relatively new to this 

issue, there may be—we are all relatively new to this issue, since 

the agreement was just passed a few weeks ago. You know, what 

are the possible scenarios? What are the good scenarios if we reject 

this agreement that put us in a better place in terms of controlling 

Iran or controlling Iran’s nuclear program. 

And I freely admit that Iran is a horrific actor in the Middle East 

and not to be trusted, but the stated goal of these negotiations was 

to try to halt their nuclear program, to try to make sure that Iran 

did not have a nuclear weapon. And judged on that, as I have mentioned, I think some progress was made. 

Now, I still have concerns about what happens after 15 years, 

and I still want to hear some experts play out, you know, okay, 

here is what happens if we do the agreement, here is what happens 

if we don’t because, as I said, we are all relatively new to this. 

There are scenarios we may not have thought of, but I do think 

that there have been some erroneous comments out there about 

what this agreement does and doesn’t do, and I hope we can clear 

that up as well. 

With that, I yield back and look forward to the testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 56.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

I hope our witnesses can clear up a variety of issues for us today. 

We are pleased to have Mr. Michael Singh with the Washington Institute [for Near East Policy]; Mr. Michael Eisenstadt also with the 

Washington Institute; and Dr. Jon Alterman with the Center for 

Strategic and International Studies—CSIS. 

Without objection, your full written statements will be made part 

of the record. And so each of you will now be recognized to summarize your comments as you like. 

Mr. Singh, we will start with you. Thanks again for being here. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL SINGH, LANE–SWIG SENIOR FELLOW 

AND MANAGING DIRECTOR, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE 

FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 

Mr. SINGH. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Smith, members of the committee. The nuclear agreement with 

Iran has both strong and weak points, and it is worthy of careful 

consideration. However, my judgment is that the deal not only 

leaves Iran with a significant nuclear weapons capability, but arguably allows it to improve that capability over the life of the deal 

while providing Iran with broad sanctions relief, which I believe 

has been Iran’s twofold objective throughout the talks. 
4 

Making a nuclear weapon requires three things: weapons-grade 

fuel, weaponization, and a delivery vehicle. It would also presumably require secrecy because U.S. officials believe it is not in declared facilities but in covert facilities that Iran would make a nuclear weapon. 

So what does the agreement do on these three key fronts? On 

fuel fabrication, the agreement permits Iran to continue R&D [research and development] on advanced centrifuges and begin deploying them in 81⁄2 years. As these are far more efficient than 

Iran’s existing centrifuges, they are well suited for a clandestine 

nuclear program. What is more, the deal’s restrictions will phase 

out after 10 to 15 years, which you mentioned, Ranking Member 

Smith, which means that after that time Iran’s breakout time that 

we have talked about quite a bit will go down to about zero, frankly, if Iran chooses to make it that at its declared facilities. 

On weaponization, the second plank here, the agreement doesn’t 

appear to require Iran to disclose the full extent of its past 

weaponization work or provide the IAEA with access to the facilities’ personnel and documents involved in that weaponization work, 

which would be vital to ensuring that the work isn’t resumed in the 

future. And, indeed, I would say it is simply not clear from the text 

of the agreement what is required from Iran when it comes to what 

we call PMD, possible military dimensions, of its nuclear program. 

On delivery vehicles, the third prong of the nuclear weapons program, the agreement not only does not restrict Iran’s ballistic missile activities, but it appears to remove previous bans on such activity. So ballistic missile launches, which were banned previously 

prior to this agreement, will now appear to be permitted under this 

agreement as of implementation day. And it also permits after no 

more than 8 years critical foreign assistance to Iran’s mediumrange and long-range ballistic missile programs. 

So having left Iran with this nuclear weapons capability, the 

agreement’s success will depend on detecting and responding to 

cheating. But the deal does not allow, as far as I can tell, for timely 

access to suspect sites. If inspectors suspect diversion from the declared facilities, their tools for following up on it are limited and 

weak. If Iran continues to refuse access under this accord, or otherwise violates the deal, the only remedy proscribed in the deal is the 

accord’s termination. Concern over such an outcome likely means 

that our allies will hesitate to punish small violations, and IAEA 

inspectors may hesitate even to demand access in the first place for 

fear of causing the accord’s collapse. 

We have witnessed this dynamic in situations which the members here are well aware of: the Russian violations of the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty; as you mentioned, Mr. 

Chairman, Syrian violations of its chemical weapons pledges. Not 

only have these violations, these reported violations, gone unpunished, from my perspective, U.S. officials have been loathe even to 

acknowledge the violations. The leverage in these situations tends 

to be with the less risk-averse party. 

In terms of the broader implications of the deal, the agreement 

seems likely to lead to further instability in the Middle East. I believe Iranian behavior is likely to worsen, not improve, in the deal’s 

wake for reasons I outline in my written statement. And the deal 
5 

seems likely to facilitate that increase in regional troublemaking by 

Iran. Iran is going to gain a financial windfall from this agreement, 

which it can use to help some financially squeezed proxies, like 

Hezbollah or Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and expand its influence in 

other places, like Iraq. It will face fewer impediments on arming 

those proxies because the agreement removes the ban on Iran’s export of arms. And it will also face fewer impediments to building 

up its own atrophied military capabilities because in 5 years, the 

ban on the import of arms into Iran is lifted and, frankly, for practical purposes may go away before that. 

This is likely going to spur a counterreaction by our allies in the 

region who perceive Iran as their chief threat, and I would say we 

are already seeing this dynamic play out in places like Yemen and 

Syria and elsewhere. And it could even in the future take the form 

of our allies seeking nuclear weapons capabilities of their own to 

match and guard against a potential nuclear breakout in Iran. 

In addition, I would say the deal could also lead to a strengthening of ties between Iran and Russia, and especially between Iran 

and China, which have been expanding their military ties in recent 

years, and both expressed a desire to expand them even further. 

Now, some of these regional implications I would say would be 

the inevitable consequence of any nuclear agreement which isn’t 

preceded by an Iranian strategic shift, which is why it is important 

to get a strong deal whose benefit outweighs these costs and to 

more robustly counter Iranian regional behavior, which, frankly, is 

something we should have been doing long before this, not waiting 

for this deal to do that. 

But having failed to do either of these things, it is not surprising 

that our allies suspect that we are engaged either in a strategic reversal or a realignment of some kind in the region, and our reassurances to them are not likely to be compelling in part because 

they conflict with our actions and our policies in the region and in 

part because they see sort of the fate of previous reassurances, I 

would say, to Ukraine, for example, in 1994, which we gave in the 

pursuit of a different arms control treaty at that time. 

Folks advocating the deal quite appropriately ask what the alternative is, as you mentioned, Ranking Member Smith. I have little 

doubt that a stronger agreement could have been negotiated. Ironically, it is our downplaying of the alternatives which I think most 

contributed to the weakness of our negotiating position and to this 

deal. Continuing to play down the alternatives, I fear, will only 

weaken the deal’s enforcement mechanisms even further. If this 

deal doesn’t move forward, the other parties will either have to implement the deal without us or walk away from it. If they walk 

away from it, I think we and our allies will essentially be back to 

the drawing board. That’s my assessment. 

Even if the deal moves forward, because its restrictions expire 

over 5 to 15 years, the next President will have to devise a new 

approach to prevent an Iranian nuclear breakout. He or she will be 

doing so without the benefit of the strong sanctions and international unanimity which we have enjoyed in the past several 

years. 

So I would argue that the question is not whether we need an 

alternative policy, but when we will need an alternative policy, and 
6 

whether it is better to strengthen the constraints on Iran now or 

to try to do so later. The agreement is going to buy time for us, 

but it also buys time for Iran, which Iran will use to its advantage. 

So I see this ultimately as a deferral, not a resolution of the nuclear crisis, and a costly one. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Singh can be found in the Appendix on page 59.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Eisenstadt. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL EISENSTADT, KAHN FELLOW AND 

DIRECTOR, MILITARY AND SECURITY STUDIES PROGRAM, 

THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 

Mr. EISENSTADT. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, 

distinguished committee members, thank you for inviting me to 

testify on the potential regional implications of the nuclear deal 

with Iran. It is an honor for me to be here to testify regarding this 

fateful, historic agreement. 

The nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 [China, France, 

Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, plus Germany] will have a major impact on Iran’s role in the Middle East, 

America’s role in the world, and the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The agreement has major shortcomings, and absent steps to 

mitigate these—and I am not sure it will be possible to do so—the 

deal will be a game-changer that enables Iran to meet its growing 

regional military commitments, bolster its regional alliance system, 

and eventually become a nuclear weapons state. 

Today I would like to provide an initial assessment of the impact 

of the deal with Iran on the latter’s ability to project influence in 

the Middle East by looking at what the agreement says about conventional arms transfers, ballistic missiles, and its nuclear program. 

Regarding conventional arms transfers, remarkably, the agreement is not clear whether it actually bans Iranian arms transfers. 

At any rate, Iran has been transferring weapons to its regional allies for years in violations of previous U.N. resolutions and has 

vowed to continue to do so. The U.S. says it will interdict future 

transfers, but this seems unlikely because doing so could cause 

Iran to blow up the deal. The deal does ban the transfer of major 

weapons systems to Iran for 5 years, though Iran claims that this 

prohibition lacks the legal basis, and it will fight it. 

At any rate, the ban does not apply to ammunition, small arms 

and light weapons, and light tactical vehicles, the kinds of arms 

that Iran and its regional allies need most at this time. 

In terms of ballistic missiles, the deal calls upon Iran to avoid 

testing and developing ballistic missiles designed to deliver nuclear 

weapons for 8 years. Iran claims that none of its missiles are designed for this purpose so this article is null and void. The deal is 

silent about cruise missiles, a major omission. Because the deal 

does not require the monitoring of labs and personnel involved in 

alleged past efforts to modify missile warheads to accommodate nuclear payloads, Iran will presumably be able to continue such work. 
7 

Nuclear weapons. The agreement imposes important constraints 

on Iran’s declared nuclear program and its known facilities. For 

this reason, should Iran decide to acquire nuclear weapons, it 

would likely attempt to break out using clandestine facilities. This 

may not be possible now, but Iran might be able to create such an 

option in the course of the coming decade. At any rate, the monitoring system created by the deal cannot prevent low signature activities associated with nuclear weapons research, such as computer simulations and the manufacture of non-nuclear weapons 

components. 

That is the baseline situation today. Future developments, however, may negatively impact our ability to detect and respond to a 

clandestine program in Iran. For instance: intelligence. While Iran 

is a prime target of U.S. intelligence today, future crises in the 

Ukraine, East Asia, or elsewhere could force the U.S. to divert intelligence assets, degrading its ability to follow developments in 

Iran. 

P5+1 unity. The success of IAEA monitoring will depend on the 

unity of the P5+1. Political differences among them could undermine inspections, as occurred in Iraq in the late 1990s. 

Snapback. There has been much talk about sanctions snapback, 

but it is still not clear exactly how this would work in practice. At 

any rate, snapback could provide Iran with a pretext to blow up the 

entire agreement, and for that reason, the U.S. is unlikely to resort 

to sanctions snapback except in extremis. 

Centrifuges. The deal allows Iran to research and build more advanced efficient centrifuges which could someday enable Iran to 

build a small clandestine enrichment plant that would be hard to 

detect. 

Hardening and protection. The deal will allow Iran to eventually 

acquire advanced air defenses, raising the cost of potential preventive action down the road. And 10 to 15 years hence, the U.S. military may no longer have the ability to destroy Iran’s hardened buried facilities by conventional means. And the agreement commits 

the parties to help Iran counter sabotage, possibly limiting our nonkinetic options in Iran in the future. 

And then, finally, past weapons work or PMD. If Iran proves able 

to get sanctions lifted without answering the IAEA’s questions 

about PMD, it may opt to cheat again in the belief that if caught, 

it can once again negotiate its way out of the crisis. So the deal 

may set a bad precedent for the future and encourage future cheating. 

So for the deal to succeed, the U.S. needs an implementation 

strategy that mitigates the agreement’s flaws. And in my paper 

that I submitted, I outline the major elements of such a strategy, 

including working with our allies to eliminate ambiguities in the 

deal; to push back against Iranian influence in order to deter 

cheating in the framework of the nuclear agreement; taking steps 

to strengthen our ability to deter a breakout by military means; 

strengthening the military—the credibility of our military threats 

against Iran; and then also realizing that since our military capabilities are a wasting asset against this program, working on nonmilitary means of deterrent in the future. 
8 

So I will conclude by saying that Congress should ask the administration to explain how it plans to deal with the shortcomings of 

the nuclear deal with Iran and the challenges it is likely to give 

rise to. The President’s willingness to commit to the kind of mitigating measures in implementing strategy that I outlined in my 

submitted remarks will be an indicator of whether the deal will 

stand a chance of achieving its intended goals or will further destabilize the Middle East, further undermining America’s standing in 

the region and eventually pave the way for an Iranian bomb. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Eisenstadt can be found in the 

Appendix on page 70.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Dr. Alterman. 

STATEMENT OF JON B. ALTERMAN, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT 

AND ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI CHAIR IN GLOBAL SECURITY 

AND GEOSTRATEGY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Dr. ALTERMAN. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for having me today. I am honored to be with you. 

My testimony that I submitted explores the current regional reaction to the agreement; likely scenarios if the agreement is implemented; and likely scenarios if Congress blocks its implementation. 

If implemented, I don’t think this agreement is going to end tensions between the U.S. and Iran or end Iranian misbehavior in the 

Middle East. Iran will remain a focus of U.S. foreign policy and the 

United States will remain a focus of Iranian foreign policy. 

But fixing all of the problems of Iranian behavior is not a prerequisite to supporting this agreement. This agreement is important as much because it is among the P5+1 as it is with Iran. The 

prospect of Iranian misbehavior means that it is important that the 

world stands with the United States to confront what I think is 

likely to be Iranian misbehavior. And my fear is that blocking this 

agreement will not leave things as they are but make things much, 

much worse. If blocked, I foresee worse Iranian behavior on both 

the nuclear front and the asymmetrical warfare front. I see far 

weakened U.S. tools to deal with it, partly because countries will 

be less willing to work with the United States, and partly because 

some of these extraordinary international financial tools developed 

in the Bush administration to reach out and disrupt terrorist financing and deny their ability to access banking and all those 

kinds of tools, the kinds of tools that allowed us to reach out and 

arrest FIFA [Fe ́de ́ration Internationale de Football Association] for 

corruption, are going to wither because there will be an entire global financial system which will be insulated from the U.S. financial 

system, and I don’t think that is good for U.S. national security. 

The question before you isn’t if this is the best deal. It is not 

even, is this a good deal? The question before you, I think, is 

whether it is an adequate deal to hold Iran to account. And my 

judgment is that it is adequate, partly because it has clearly 

spelled out enforcement mechanisms judged by a panel that tilts 

toward the United States—the panel is stacked in favor of us and 
9 

our allies—and partly because this agreement does absolutely nothing to prevent the U.S. and its allies from punishing Iran for all 

of the malfeasance that they have been carrying out in the Middle 

East for the last several years. 

It seems to me that the proper focus of congressional attention 

is not perfecting the deal, but instead making clear to the world 

that Congress will insist on strict implementation and act against 

those who deviate from this agreement. Congress can also do a 

great deal to reassure American allies and to secure American allies in the wake of this agreement. 

There is a tendency in this debate that we are having in this 

country to build up Iran to something it is not. Iran is not a near 

peer of the United States. It is not a global hegemon. This is a 

country whose economy has shrunk for each of the last 5 years. 

The GDP [gross domestic product] of Iran is somewhere between 

my home State of Maryland and the home State of the ranking 

member, Washington. This is not a huge country. It is not a huge 

power. The inflation is almost at 20 percent. High unemployment. 

This is a country that is writhing in pain, and that gives us all 

sorts of ways to shape the economic drivers that guide the Iranian 

Government’s decisionmaking. We should seize the opportunity 

now to capitalize on these drivers, maintaining close ties with the 

world’s leading powers, to hold Iran to account. Even if we can’t 

solve all the problems with Iran, this agreement gives us powerful 

tools to manage those problems from a position of strength that 

arises not only from the strength of our economy and our military, 

but also from the strength that arises from our leadership in the 

world. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Alterman can be found in the Appendix on page 82.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

I want to follow up on strict implementation for just a second. 

Earlier this year, a group of us were in Ukraine where we talked 

with some of the folks who are charged with conducting inspections 

in the eastern part of that country with the Minsk Agreement. And 

one of the things we heard was that sometimes the inspectors just 

get turned around. You know, they say: You can’t go here; it’s too 

dangerous today. But they don’t want to pitch too big of a fit because they don’t want to lose the access they have. 

And so I was struck in the reporting that the Wall Street Journal 

did about Syria that the inspectors didn’t want to rock the boat too 

much even when they were turned away because they would lose 

the good part that they did. And it just makes me wonder whether 

inspectors, given what they are asked to do and given the mentality of those they are asked to inspect, whether you can ever really get the verification that an agreement like this would demand. 

We hear lots about the agreement says, ‘‘You can do this, you can’t 

do that,’’ but if it is not enforced, if it is not implemented that way, 

then there is not much to the agreement, and, again, using the 

Syria example, I agree with Mr. Smith it is a war zone. On the 

other hand, Syria is not as sophisticated as Iran in hiding things. 

They have very close relations, obviously, but it was a great triumph of the Obama administration that they removed all the 
10 

chemical weapons from Syria. It turns out scientists were continuing to work on new weapons. It turns out they had these mobile labs disguised as trucks with billboards along the side. It turns 

out that they continue to use chemical weapons to kill people. And 

the bottom line was the inspectors were just not able to do the job 

that was asked of them. And so even the administration admits 

now that all the weapons were not removed. 

Now, their argument also, by the way, is we got a lot of it out, 

and so it is better than it was, which may be true. On the other 

hand, if what you don’t see is all the activity of a nuclear program, 

then, obviously, it has huge implications for the deal. 

Mr. Singh, you mentioned it. Am I my barking up the wrong tree 

here? Are there lessons to be learned from Ukraine, INF, and Syria 

inspections, which have not worked as well as we hoped? 

Mr. SINGH. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think you do raise a valid 

point. You know, when you look at arms control treaties during the 

Cold War, when you look at Libya’s disarmament in the 2000s, 

they were based on sort of mutual interests in seeing the accords 

work. The U.S. and U.S.S.R. [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics], 

obviously, there was some reciprocity built into those agreements. 

Libya and some other countries that disarmed their nuclear programs in the past had made a sort of strategic shift in advance of 

the agreement of the sort that we haven’t seen from Iran. And so 

there was a mutual interest in seeing them work. It wasn’t that 

you had one party that, you know, like in this case, refuses to 

admit that it even ever had a nuclear weapons program. 

Also I would say that we can overestimate what we already know 

about these programs. One thing, Mr. Chairman, which you didn’t 

mention about the Syria case that is mentioned in the Wall Street 

Journal article you referenced is that the Intelligence Community 

felt they had a full picture of Syria’s chemical weapons program, 

which turns out not to have been the case. And according to this 

report, they have now reassessed that picture, and unfortunately, 

it shows that Syria still possesses significant chemical weapons capabilities. 

So I do think that we tend to put too much weight on the inspectors’ shoulders. You know, the inspectors in this agreement that 

has been reached with Iran will have to go through a lengthy back 

and forth if they suspect that there might be some undeclared activity to try to clarify that with Iran. And I do think there is a possibility that they will hesitate to make a formal request for access 

because they know that that starts that 24-day clock ticking, which 

could lead to the unraveling of the entire agreement. And so there 

will be that sort of psychological barrier of ‘‘how sure are you really?’’ Is it worth risking the entire agreement for this request for access. And, again, if they don’t have U.S. intelligence, if they don’t 

have the sort of weight of the international community behind 

them backing them up, I do question whether they will be willing 

to go forward with that. 

Mr. EISENSTADT. If I could just build on Mike’s comment. I mentioned in my presentation the whole issue of P5+1 unity because 

in the mechanism for dealing with situations where there is a suspect site and they can’t get resolution with Iran for access, there 

is a procedure whereby you have five of the eight members of the 
11 

joint commission agree—they have to agree on a way forward and 

recommendations. And that is based on the assumption that the 

Russians and the Chinese and the Iranians might not agree, but 

the rest of the other five will maintain unity on this. But we saw 

in the course of our inspections in Iraq in the 1990s is that in the 

course of the decade, the French and the Russians eventually fell 

off and the P5 were no longer united, and this hindered the inspections towards the latter years. Although, of course, by then, Iraq 

had more or less been functionally disarmed, but in terms of tying 

up loose ends, it really hindered their efforts. So this will be an intensely political process and we can’t assume that the unity that 

exists today might not shatter in coming years and hinder our ability to, you know, deal with this problem down the road. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Dr. Alterman, do you have a comment on this? 

Dr. ALTERMAN. Just briefly, sir. 

When I worked in the Senate 25 years ago for Senator Moynihan, we had a law professor in the office, and we were going 

through the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] II negotiations. I asked him a very similar question about, well, how do you 

make sure that people are actually following international law? 

And he said it is like speed limits. The goal is not always 100 percent compliance of 100 percent of the people 100 percent of the 

time, but you certainly shape what people are able to do. 

Mike mentioned Iraq. The fact is we had inspectors. Saddam 

Hussein played all sorts of stupid games. But he didn’t have a nuclear program. We thought he had a nuclear program, but in fact 

he wasn’t able to sustain a nuclear program in part because he 

never knew what the inspectors did; he never knew where the inspectors would go. We combined the inspections with all sorts of intelligence from all over the world. And it seems to me that while 

Iraq was frustrating in any number of ways, the arms control community, of which I am not a member, but the arms control community feels Iraq was generally successful because the goal was to 

keep Saddam Hussein from getting a nuclear bomb. And he was 

really far away—really far away. 

The CHAIRMAN. Interesting question, why that he made that decision. 

But I will yield to Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Yeah, just a couple quick points. 

First of all, on the arms transfer issue from Iran, there is a separate U.N. law against that. So blaming this agreement for not stopping Iran from being able to transfer arms outside is completely beside the point. It is illegal now under international law for Iran to 

transfer those arms. That is why we occasionally and Israel and 

other places are able to seize ships that are doing that. This agreement doesn’t affect that. 

Now, certainly, Iran has found ways around that international 

agreement. I won’t disagree with that in the least bit. But to blame 

this agreement for not stopping those arm shipments completely 

misses the point that there is a separate international law that is 

trying to do that, however difficult that may be. 

The other point is to emphasize what Dr. Alterman said about 

how inspections can clearly work, and Iraq is the best example. 
12 

They can work even where the country in question does not wish 

to cooperate. And I can’t say anything better than Dr. Alterman 

did. You know, in that instance, it clearly did prove effective. 

The other big question is, you know, if in fact the P5+1 is going 

to unravel over the course of this deal, one of my big concerns 

going into this is if the status quo could be held, if the P5+1 was 

going to hold those sanctions and continue to punish Iran in that 

way, and we knew that was going to happen, that would be one 

thing. But if you are saying that this is going to unravel even with 

the agreement, the concern that a lot of people had is that China 

and Russia in particular, but even Europe, I mean, keep in mind 

Europe was doing business with Iran early on, that if we simply 

say: Look, we are just going to keep sanctioning them forever and 

use that as our approach, the concern was that Russia and China, 

in particular, that would unravel, and eventually you would have 

fewer and fewer restrictions on transfers of money to Iran as the 

rest of the world moved away from us. And as Dr. Alterman pointed out, the United States likes to think that we are the only ones 

that can have a banking community, but the world is changing. 

And if we tell the rest of the world: Look, you can’t do business 

with us if you do business with Iran, a good chunk of the rest of 

the world is going to set up a separate system as China, by the 

way, was already doing a couple years ago before they stopped and 

entered into these negotiations. So the concern is if we keep things 

where they are at, that too will unravel, particularly if we reject 

an agreement that the whole rest of the world has agreed to. And 

that unravelling will leave Iran, not 10 years from now or 15 years 

from now, but now with 19,000 centrifuges, with a great deal more 

uranium, with a great deal more enrichment capability. 

So I still haven’t really heard the alternative approach. And one 

question I do have is, you know, I believe, Mr. Singh, you said we 

need to do, quote, ‘‘more,’’ end quote, to check Iran’s aggression in 

the region. What would that be exactly? 

Mr. SINGH. Thank you, Ranking Member Smith. Some of the 

points you raised, let me just give you my clarifications. The arms 

export ban on Iran, the ban which prohibits Iran from exporting 

any arms whatsoever, was part of Resolution 1747. That has been 

lifted now. 

I think what you are referring to are bans on the receipt on any 

country shipping arms to certain groups which are terrorist groups 

and so forth. Those are separate authorities. And so the arms ban 

which was in place on Iran is lifted as far as I can tell under this 

agreement. They still couldn’t ship arms to these proscribed groups 

that nobody can ship arms to under, say, Resolution 1701, which 

addresses Hezbollah. I would say that, from my perspective having 

worked very closely on these issues, it is a lot easier if we can stop 

the arms from getting to Iran in the first place because interdictions are hard. You need to have intelligence. You need to have 

the will and capability of the local partners and so forth. And those 

things often are where we fall down. 

The Iraq inspections, the main point about the Iraq inspections 

I would say here is that these are not Iraq-style inspections. And 

so whatever point you may make about how it worked in the 1990s, 
13 

these won’t be the same. And so it is not an apt analogy from my 

point of view. 

The P5+1, I don’t—— 

Mr. SMITH. I am sorry. They won’t be the same how exactly? 

Mr. SINGH. These are not Iraq-style inspections. These are not 

the sort of anytime, anywhere inspections. These are inspections 

were you have continuous monitoring at a list of declared sites. If 

you have suspect activity elsewhere, the IAEA has to make a request to the Iranians which starts that clock. So you have a separate, quite a different inspection regime under this agreement than 

I think Dr. Alterman was referring to, although he can clarify that 

if he chooses. 

Was the P5+1 in danger of unravelling prior to this accord? I 

don’t think so. I don’t see signs of that. I didn’t hear too many estimates saying that that was happening. In fact—— 

Mr. SMITH. Well, what about the fact that 2 years ago China was 

setting up this separate banking system to try to get around doing 

business with—if they had to live with the sanction regime, they 

would set up a separate banking system to do business with the 

U.S. and do business with Iran. 

Mr. SINGH. So I think that Secretary Kerry was actually quite 

explicit in saying that he felt that Russia and China were being 

more helpful in the talks recently than they had been in the past. 

Our EU partners certainly weren’t threatening to walk away—— 

Mr. SMITH. More helpful to get an agreement. 

Mr. SINGH. Yes. Absolutely. They wanted to—— 

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. Not going to be an agreement—— 

Mr. SINGH. But I don’t think there was a threat from those members to walk away if it wasn’t this deal. I think, frankly, this was 

mainly a negotiation at the end between Iran and the United 

States with the support of the P5+1 members. The banking system—— 

Mr. SMITH. So you feel if we reject this deal, that Russia, China, 

the P5, will hold onto the sanctions just as strongly, will go right 

back in there, will not be looking for ways to break away from the 

U.S. position. 

Mr. SINGH. So the situation obviously has changed now. Because 

normally these countries really couldn’t do this deal without U.S. 

participation because they would need the United States to stay 

with the U.N. Security Council sanctions. 

The new U.N. Security Council resolution sort of locks that in. 

And so, from my point of view, there are no easy scenarios here by 

any means. But there is really sort of two paths that could be 

taken. If the deal is disapproved here, they could either try to implement it anyway. The text of the agreement doesn’t make it clear 

whether that could happen or not. But they could choose to simply 

go forward with it without U.S. participation when it comes to the 

sanctions waivers. 

They could also choose to walk away. I guess I would argue, Congressman, that if they walk away, if the Iranians walk away and 

choose to resume their nuclear activities, our allies were motivated 

to do this by their desire not to see Iran develop a nuclear weapon. 

I don’t think that desire will suddenly go away out of pique at the 

Congress. And so I think they will have little choice but to then get 
14 

back together with us and figure out what do we do now. And I 

think that would look a lot like diplomacy and pressure in the way 

that it did before. Not that they will be happy with us. Remember, 

we have had this situation in the past where we have walked away 

or another party has walked away, whether from these negotiations or another arms control agreement, like SALT II, for example, where generally the trend is if there is still the same interests 

at play, ultimately you resume a process of diplomacy. 

The banking system I don’t think is in danger from China. I 

think that our prominence in the international financial system depends a lot on the role of the dollar as a sort of global reserve currency. And, frankly, I don’t see that as being under significant 

threat at this time. And so I don’t think it is a matter of good will. 

I think it is a matter of the fact that the U.S. dollar enjoys that 

status. And so I don’t think that the two things are quite as explicitly linked as that suggests. 

Mr. SMITH. All right. Anybody else? 

Dr. ALTERMAN. Mr. Ranking Member, it is true that the dollar 

has an unusual position of prominence now. I don’t think that is 

guaranteed. I think the rise of the Asian Infrastructure Investment 

Bank with 50 founding members, including many close allies of the 

United States, is the sign of a potential for a different global financial role, and I think that in the event that the United States were 

seen to be going rogue to seeking its own agreements above and beyond the international agreements, I think that would certainly 

drive China and other countries to devise some alternative way 

around the centrality that the U.S. enjoys. 

I think one of the things that also is underappreciated in all of 

this is that the Russians and the Chinese have been unusually 

good team players since 2003 with the United States on the nuclear negotiations. We can talk about the possibility that this whole 

coalition would fray and fragment and everybody would go their 

own way. But it seems to me notable that we have actually been 

able to get quite good cooperation from countries with which we 

don’t cooperate on a whole range of things. But on the Iranian nuclear deal, we have been working side by side with them for 12 

years. I think we can count on continued support, and I worry that 

if we were to turn away, we were to turn away, then we wouldn’t 

have that support, and we wouldn’t be able to pick it up the way 

we have been building it for a dozen years. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. I have taken up a lot of time. 

I will yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I want to thank you for 

having this hearing. Thank our witnesses for being here. But it is 

amazing to me, you know, we are a Nation that put a man on the 

moon. We built the Panama Canal. We revolutionized the computer 

technology, and what a low bar we now set for ourselves. We no 

longer have as our goal to have winning strategies. We no longer 

have as our goal to have the best deal we can get. We no longer 

have as our goal even to have a good deal. We seem to settle for 

a new standard, which is just the deal isn’t as bad as it could be. 

And I know we have people that actually believe the government 

when our government says, ‘‘if you want to keep your healthcare 
15 

plan, you can keep your healthcare plan,’’ and then when they 

don’t, we just say, ‘‘Whoops, live with it.’’ I know there are people 

that believe when the Syrian Government says they are going to 

dispose of their chemical weapons and then they don’t do it, and 

we just say, ‘‘Whoops, you have to live with it.’’ I know there are 

people that believe when China says, ‘‘Give us your technology, we 

are going to use it for civilian purposes, we are not going to use 

it for the military,’’ when we find out they use it for the military, 

they just say, ‘‘Whoops, you are going to live with it.’’ 

Well, I firmly believe we are going to say ‘‘whoops’’ on this deal. 

You know, probably shorter time period rather than longer. 

So, Mr. Singh and Mr. Eisenstadt, can you tell me what the 

world is going to look like 5 years from now with Iran in terms of 

this deal? Is it going to strengthen their economic situation or 

weaken their economic situation, and how is it going to strengthen 

it if it does? What with these assets can they do militarily to increase their military capabilities? And then the third thing, for our 

allies in that region, what concerns them most about this deal, and 

what kind of implications is it going to have on them? So if you 

would just respond to any of those three. 

Mr. SINGH. Well, thank you, Congressman. 

I think that there is no doubt that Iran economically is better off 

with the deal than without the deal because of the lifting of sanctions or because of the unfreezing of their assets. It won’t be a silver bullet for Iran. They still have economic problems related to 

mismanagement of the economy and so forth. But this will free up 

the space that they need to repair their economy, essentially. 

I think Dr. Alterman was right. The Iranian economy was in a 

very difficult state as a result in part of American and international sanctions. This relieves that pressure. 

In terms of how will they use this to now build up, say, their 

military capabilities and the implications for the region, I do think 

that it is very significant that, within 5 years, the ban on imports 

of arms by Iran will be lifted. And then, remember, under this 

agreement there is a mechanism to actually allow arms transfers 

to Iran before that time. And so we are talking about Russia and 

China being with us. Russia and China are the largest providers 

of arms to Iran. 

One question I have is if the Russians, as they have already said 

that they intend to, want to provide arms to Iran before that 5 

years is up, it is up to the United States, essentially, to veto that 

in the Security Council. And so one question will be, are we willing 

to sort of brook these confrontations with Russia and China and 

the U.N. Security Council to stop literally every arms transfer to 

Iran within these 5 years? I don’t know that the answer is an absolute yes. I would hope that we would do that, but I think that it 

will depend upon the circumstances at the time. 

And then if you look at the question of arms exports, where Mr. 

Eisenstadt is a bigger expert than I am on the question, there have 

been reports that groups like Hezbollah, groups like Palestinian Islamic Jihad, have felt a financial squeeze in recent years in part 

as a result of reduced Iranian assistance. I think that there is 

every prospect that that assistance could now grow under this 

agreement. While those arms transfers are proscribed, because 
16 

those are terrorist groups and there is various laws proscribed—or 

I should say international resolutions proscribing such arms transfers, Iran hasn’t abided by those in the past. And so, again, it is 

a question of our will and our allies’ will to address those types of 

things. And right now my fear is that not only have we signed up 

to a deal that our allies will find insufficient, but we are not projecting that kind of will to stand up to Iranian activity in the region. 

Mr. EISENSTADT. The only thing I will add to that is, first of all, 

with the influx of unfrozen funds, keep in mind Iran has a pretty 

robust defense arms industry, and they will probably increase procurement of the kind of weapons that they and their allies in Syria 

and Iraq and their proxies in Yemen need right now, and they will 

increase exports of those weapons to enhance their allies’ ability to 

prosecute the conflicts they are in now. 

The additional money also will enable them to probably enhance 

or expand recruitment of proxies. Keep in mind, Iran’s approach to 

warfare is what in the military realm is referred to as economy of 

force. They prefer to fight to the last proxy. Their last Arab proxy 

or now they have been recruiting Afghan Shiites and Pakistani 

Shiites. So more money will enable them to do more of that. 

And then, finally, in terms of arms imports, the first thing I suspect they will want to do is get the S–300 [ground-to-air] missiles 

when they can from Russia in order to provide an umbrella over 

their nuclear program to create the foundation so that if they want 

to go down the path of creating a clandestine parallel program, it 

will be protected from preventive strike. And they will also bury it 

and harden it as well. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you all for being here. As you can tell, obviously, everybody is very serious and intense in looking at these issues, and 

I appreciate your help. 

Dr. Alterman, one of the questions that the ranking chair asked 

initially was this issue of legitimizing Iranian nuclear potential. 

Could you respond to that? And also in terms of the standing, both 

among our P5+1 partners and in the Middle Eastern countries as 

well, what do you see is the really problematic role around that, 

and what in the implementation plan that you spoke about we 

might be doing to ameliorate some of that? 

Dr. ALTERMAN. I am sorry. I am not sure I understand the question of standing. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Pardon me? 

Dr. ALTERMAN. I am not sure I understand the question of standing. Do you mean Iran’s standing in the region? 

Mrs. DAVIS. No, the U.S. standing among P5+1 and also the 

countries within the Middle East. 

Dr. ALTERMAN. Okay. 

Mrs. DAVIS. But, first, on the legitimizing by virtue of the process 

that we have come to in this agreement. 

Dr. ALTERMAN. Well, Iran is allowed by international law, by the 

treaties it has signed, by the treaties we are a party to, also to 
17 

have a domestic nuclear program. It is not allowed to have a nuclear weapons program. And what this agreement does is it brings 

Iran into fuller coordination with all of the international safeguards and standards of having a domestic program which is not 

a weapons program. What I have heard directly from Secretary 

Moniz several times, who I think has probably forgotten more 

physics today than I will ever know in my life, is that we have 

spectacular capabilities to detect cheating, that nuclear products 

leave all sorts of remnants that we will be able to detect. We understand a tremendous amount about the way the Iranian system 

works because we have been trying to understand the system along 

with our allies for decades. And he has relative confidence as a nuclear physicist that a combination of having an allowed pathway 

with all sorts of international standards and safeguards and processes that the world has developed over decades, combined with the 

inspections, combined with our covert capabilities, that we are 

going to retain a very good understanding of where the Iranians 

are, where the Iranians are cheating. 

The question which Mr. Singh and Mr. Eisenstadt raised, which 

is an absolute valid one, is what happens when they cheat? And 

I can’t imagine there is not going to be some effort to see is anybody really serious about this. And to my mind, that is really 

where the role of Congress comes in. The goal of this is to have the 

best agreement possible. The goal of this is to keep Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. The decision before Congress is, is this 

adequate to meet that goal. And it seems to me that it is adequate 

to meet the goal, and this is something that we have worked very 

closely with our allies on that they have trusted us to follow 

through, and I am really worried that if we in their minds abdicate 

the leadership that we have taken in this agreement, that we are 

going to be fighting the very same problems from a much, much 

weaker position than we would have. And the job of Congress, the 

decisions Congress will face, will be much more difficult decisions 

than we face now. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. On the standing issue, it sounds like, 

then, you would refute the notion that somehow by creating—you 

know, the question here really is, is there a pathway, or is there 

not, or is it something that is so problematic that it, after 5 years 

or 10 years and certainly into the 15-year period, that something 

that certainly Israel is going to be very, very fearful of. 

Dr. ALTERMAN. It seems to me that if there comes a point where 

the Iranians decide that all their commitments don’t mean anything, that they really do want to have a bomb, that any of those 

negative possibilities, let’s say we get to that point, then what position do we want to be at that point? Do we want to be alone? Do 

we want to be in a head-to-head confrontation with the Iranians, 

or do we want to be standing with the world, with all the economies, all the people Iran trades with, and say, ‘‘If you go down that 

road, there will be severe consequences for everything you care 

about, or you can continue to comply’’? I think there is partly a bet 

in this that over time, as the Iranians decide they like being integrated with the world, they will want to continue to be integrated 

with the world. But even if that bet doesn’t play out, even if it 

doesn’t produce better Iranian behavior, to my mind, we want the 
18 

world with us and not the world saying: You guys are maximalists, 

and we can’t—you are both maximalists. We don’t want to deal 

with either one of you. Doesn’t matter. 

I don’t think that is the position the United States wants to be 

in. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Chairman Miller. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you to the witnesses. We appreciate your testimony. You 

are obviously very well educated, and I hope you will allow me to 

ask because I am a pretty simple guy—not a doctor—some pretty 

simple questions. And yes or no, I think, will answer most of them. 

Would unfettered access have made this a better deal? 

Mr. SINGH. Well, sure. Absolutely. Unfettered access would make 

it a better deal. 

Mr. EISENSTADT. Yes. 

Dr. ALTERMAN. If one could get that deal, that would be great. 

Mr. MILLER. Dr. Alterman, you said that Iran is not a near peer, 

and I concur. But my question is, would this agreement elevate 

them closer to near-peer status? And what if China and Russia infuse conventional military capabilities? Does that move them closer 

to a near-peer status? 

Dr. ALTERMAN. Sir, as I said, they are somewhere right now in 

GDP between Maryland and Washington State. That still leaves 

them a considerable way to go. As I said, it is remarkable over the 

last dozen years how much Iran has been an issue of cooperation 

between the U.S., Russia, and China. And I am not sure, as an analytical point, it is wise to make a premise that Russia and China 

will seek to use Iran as a club against the United States rather 

than continue the path that they have been following for a dozen 

years. 

Mr. MILLER. Can any of you think of a way that the administration can guarantee that the lifted sanctions would not be used to 

finance international terrorism? 

Mr. SINGH. Well, Congressman, let me also address the previous 

question. 

Mr. MILLER. No. If you would, just answer my question. 

Mr. SINGH. Of course, although I think that is a wrong way to 

look at it, the way that Dr. Alterman put it. Because I think that 

the question isn’t, will Iran somehow match the United States? Of 

course not. Iran is not going to reach that level. There is no doubt. 

But can Iran use, as you suggested, the considerable amount of 

money that it is going to receive as a result of this agreement in 

increased oil exports to further finance proxies? It could certainly 

spend more than the United States is willing to spend in Iraq, for 

example, the billion plus that we have spent right now in the Iraq 

train-and-equip mission. For example, Iran could easily spend far 

more than that. And we do have, absolutely, sanctions and laws 

against that would target Iranian support for terrorism, and those 

aren’t being lifted under this accord. But, practically speaking, the 

effect of the sanctions mean that Iran will have a lot more money 
19 

to use, and it will be up to us to try to plug those holes. And that 

will be difficult. 

Mr. MILLER. Okay. Could you answer the question I asked? 

Mr. SINGH. That last part was the answer to your question, sir, 

that Iran will have far more assets to use. 

Mr. MILLER. Let’s go to this. Would it be easier for Iran to get 

weapons to Hamas and Hezbollah or easier for them to get money 

for them to buy weapons? 

Mr. EISENSTADT. Yeah. Well, right now, the Israelis enforce a 

blockade of Gaza. So getting in weapons, they can’t. Money is a lot 

easier, and many times there are reports [of] people coming in with 

suitcases and the like. And also Iran provides them with, you 

know, blueprints for, you know, how to use—how to make better 

rockets and the like. 

Hezbollah, they have more options. They are able to get both 

arms and money to Hezbollah, and both are important for Hezbollah. 

So our ability to, you know, even though, despite the fact that 

there is a U.N. Resolution 1701, which proscribes Iran from arming 

Hezbollah, Hezbollah started the last war in 2006 with, I think, 

20,000, 25,000 missiles and rockets. They have now 80,000 to 

100,000, and that is largely due to Iranian largesse. So our efforts 

have not been succeeding. And it is going to only get worse in the 

future now. 

Mr. MILLER. And I apologize. My time is very short. And I would 

like any of you to answer this question. And, again, I apologize, it 

is a very simple question. Secretary Kerry is quoted in the press 

saying, ‘‘I am absolutely convinced beyond any doubt this deal 

makes Israel safer.’’ If that is a true statement, why is Israel opposed to the deal? 

Mr. EISENSTADT. Yeah. I would just note that it is not just the 

government, but it is also the opposition in Israel which is opposed. 

And there is wide, I think, consensus on that. And I guess it is a 

matter of where you stand depends upon where you sit. And they 

are a lot closer to the problem. 

Mr. MILLER. Dr. Alterman. 

Dr. ALTERMAN. Parts of my testimony talks somewhat about 

Israeli politics. It seems to me there is a political opposition that 

is very strong in Israel for Israeli political reasons, and in my judgment, the Israeli security establishment is much more mixed, and 

several senior retired heads of Mossad, Shin Bet, and other organizations have argued in favor of the agreement. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to underscore Dr. Alterman’s last point about the variety of opinion in Israel. I think within the government and opposition, there isn’t variety. Outside of the government and the official opposition there is a wider variety of opinion on the deal, none 

of which we have a lot of influence over, which is why we are having this discussion here about what our opinions are. 

Dr. Alterman, the issue about Syrian and Iranian weapons inspections has come up. Some of us have an opportunity later this 

afternoon to meet with the former weapons inspector. Can you give 
20 

us your assessment of an apples-to-apples comparison, and what 

the apples-to-orange comparison is? Do you have a view on that? 

Dr. ALTERMAN. I have tremendous respect for all the weapons inspectors I have met. They tend to be spectacular scientists. They 

are meticulous in what they do. It makes all of the investigators 

I have ever met in the United States pale by comparison, because 

this really is about getting every detail down. I, therefore, do not 

feel comfortable telling you how much of this is apples, how much 

is oranges, how much is a combination. 

It certainly matters that you have a war zone versus not a war 

zone. It certainly matters that, I think, the intelligence communities have spent much more time trying to understand the Iranian 

program than trying to understand the Syrian program. It certainly matters that there are more trace elements involved in a nuclear program than there are in a chemical weapons program. 

But if you are interested, I can certainly put you in touch with 

some tremendous people who are arms control experts, both at 

CSIS and at other institutions, who can help prep you for this afternoon’s meeting. 

Mr. LARSEN. I value that. I don’t have time before the meeting, 

but we have another several—many days and weeks before we 

have to make a decision on this so. 

Dr. Singh, is it Dr. or Mr.? 

Mr. SINGH. Mr. 

Mr. LARSEN. Can you be clear a little bit more about what you 

assess Iran’s options are for use of additional revenue, beyond supporting terrorism, but including supporting terrorism? And then assess what the likelihood, if you can give me a likelihood about how 

they might use that? 

Mr. SINGH. Well, so money is fungible. They will get somewhere between $50- to $150 billion. Secretary Lew, the Treasury Secretary, has said that a good portion of that is already tied up in 

some overseas projects. So let’s say it is $50 billion for the sake of 

this answer, my expectation is that like just about every other 

country, given additional revenue, Iran will spend it in a variety 

of ways, and these aren’t mutually exclusive. I would expect they 

would use some for domestic purposes, and some for foreign policy 

concerns. 

If you look at the 2013 budget that President Rouhani put in, 

there were some increases on domestic accounts, but also very substantial increase on military spending, security spending, the 

IRGC’s [Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps] budget went up considerably, and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security’s budget 

went up considerably. 

There is a good reason not to repatriate all the funds right away, 

because that would have an inflationary effect inside Iran, if suddenly, in a $400 billion economy, you added $50 billion. So there 

is a macroeconomic reason to keep some of it overseas. That could 

either then be used for regional, sort of foreign policy concerns, or 

you could use it to purchase investments overseas or any other 

number of things. 

I don’t think we can know with certainty exactly what Iran will 

do, but we have to assume it will be a variety of things. And a little 

goes a long way when it comes to the regional stuff. 
21 

Mr. LARSEN. Mr. Eisenstadt. 

Mr. EISENSTADT. If I can just make a comment about the applesand-oranges comparison. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah. Great. 

Mr. EISENSTADT. And I just wanted to get back to the Iraq inspections. I think it is important to mention why I think in many 

ways there are some aspects of the Iraqi inspections that are relevant, but many that are not. First, Iraq in the 1990s was a defeated country, and the international community had a lot of leverage. Iran sees itself now as a rising power. 

We were willing to use force to support weapons inspections in 

the 1990s in Iraq. We are not willing to really put out the threat 

of the military option and to articulate it in a way that I think is 

credible in Iranian eyes today. And back then, Iraq was sanctioned 

and they were not able to rebuild their industrial infrastructure, so 

you had pretty much a static baseline that you were trying to inspect. 

Iraq—Iran, as a result of all the funds they are going to be getting, will be able to have all kinds of industrial projects in which 

they can hide a clandestine program. 

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. How much more clearer can we be when we 

say we keep all options on the table? 

Mr. EISENSTADT. It is a very passive formulation, I would just 

argue. And the Iranians mock it all the time. And so I—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Anyone’s free to mock that, I am pretty sure. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. EISENSTADT. But it comes in against the background of the 

Syrian CW [chemical weapons] red line. That is all. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership. And 

thank you for your very thoughtful presentation earlier today on 

Fox News explaining the issues that we are facing right now. 

And, I appreciate the panel being here today. 

Mr. Singh, there is bipartisan opposition to the nuclear deal. I 

was grateful 2 weeks ago at a Foreign Affairs Committee meeting 

to be present with Senator Joe Lieberman of Connecticut, where he 

expressed opposition to the deal, and then, in fact, he indicated 

that there needed to be an override in the event of a veto. 

I expressed to him my concern, quote, that, ‘‘The Secretary of 

State designated Iran a state sponsor of terrorism January 23, 

1984, over 30 years ago. This was in response to the October 1983 

bombing of the U.S. Marine Barracks in Beirut, killing hundreds 

of U.S. Marines,’’ end of quote. 

Subsequently, I asked Senator Lieberman, has there been any 

change of course by this regime leading up to the negotiations? 

Senator Lieberman made a chilling response, I believe. Quote, 

‘‘This Iranian Government, the Islamic Republic of Iran, has the 

blood of a lot of Americans on its hands. The Marines in the barracks in Beirut, the soldiers at Khobar Towers. I could go on and 

on. Incidentally, hundreds of American soldiers were killed in Iraq 

by Shia militias that were trained in Iran by the IRGC. Sir, your 

question is a good one. Has the government changed? There is no 

evidence of it,’’ end of quote. 
22 

Mr. Singh, do you believe there has been any change prior to the 

execution of this agreement? 

Mr. SINGH. I don’t see that change, Congressman. I don’t see any 

evidence to suggest that there has been a kind of strategic shift. 

We still see Iran actively supporting proxies in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, 

and elsewhere. We still see them funding terrorism. That was clarified by the State Department recently when it released its terrorism report. 

Mr. WILSON. And then incredibly, yesterday, Congressman Berman indicated that support of terrorism continues with the 

Houthis, with Hezbollah, with Hamas. And as he correctly stated, 

that is just terrorist groups that begin with the letter H, and so 

people should know this. 

Additionally, Mr. Eisenstadt, what role do you believe the esti- mated $150 billion infusion to the Iranian economy will play in 

their well-documented support of terrorist activities in Syria, in 

Gaza, in Lebanon, in Yemen, and worldwide? And what type of 

beneficial impact will $150 billion have on the Iranian economy, 

and what mechanisms instituted by the U.S. prevent any use of the 

funds for destabilization or terrorist activities? 

Mr. EISENSTADT. Yeah. Well, again, I think they will be able to 

provide money to their allies throughout the region, which they can 

use, in turn, to buy arms, for patronage networks, for—in the case 

for those who are involved in politics, such as Hezbollah, you know, 

to provide additional funds for their support base, which ensures 

their popularity. 

And also, you know, we have seen at least reports recently that 

as a result of sanctions over the last 2 years, they have had to cut 

back financing or aid to groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas, and 

that will be able to reverse that trend of the last few years. 

Mr. WILSON. And as we look at Hamas and Hezbollah, could you 

give an estimate of the number of rockets that have been provided 

to those terrorists directed at Israel? 

Mr. EISENSTADT. Yeah. Hamas, a lot of the rockets are homemade, although they are supplemented by both Syrian and, I think, 

Iranian rockets; although, I don’t have the number of the breakdown between the two. And I think Hamas, at the end of the last 

war, they started the war with 10,000, and the Israelis believe they 

destroyed about two-thirds of it. But we know they have been 

showing videos that they have been rebuilding. 

Hezbollah, the estimate is about 80,000 to 100,000. A lot of those 

are Iranian or Syrian. Again, I don’t have really a breakdown of 

that. But to a large extent, Iran has been providing the wherewithal for the way of war, as practiced by these parties. 

Mr. WILSON. And Dr. Alterman, according to Human Rights 

Watch, in 2014, Iran had the second highest number of executions 

in the world and executed the largest number of juvenile offenders. 

The country remains one of the biggest jailers in the world. Journalists, bloggers, and social-media activists, 46 behind bars now. 

What message does this deal send to human rights violators 

around the world? 

Dr. ALTERMAN. Congressman, I have friends who have been imprisoned in Iran. I take that all very seriously. I take the human 

rights considerations very seriously. The goal of some people in 
23 

Iran is if Iran becomes more integrated in the world, then the 

world’s standards will get more integrated into Iran. There will be 

incentives for Iran to behave. There will be incentives for Iran not 

to be in an area of instability because companies won’t want to invest in areas of instability. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you to the witnesses for being here today. 

Dr. Alterman, I particularly appreciate in your testimony on 

pages 2 and 3, you directly sort of focused on this committee’s jurisdiction in terms of obviously arming our national security system 

and the role that this Congress can play if, let’s just hypothetically 

agree that the agreement does go into effect as far as shaping the 

perception of our Gulf Arab states, in particular, that we are committed to their security and also to restraining Iran. 

And you talked about, in your testimony, that ‘‘overall force 

structure, basing, arms sales, and training all have a profound effect on these countries’ estimates of U.S. intentions and U.S. commitments, and I would argue that a very large number of these decisions come through this committee.’’ 

So looking today, where we have got the 5th Fleet in Bahrain, 

the 6th Fleet in Mediterranean, we have bases in Qatar, you know, 

we actually did intercept an Iranian arms shipment on its way to 

Yemen last April with the USS Theodore Roosevelt. I mean, are 

these sort of some of the components of trying to shape that perception of our commitment to pushing back against Iranian aggression 

in the region? 

Dr. ALTERMAN. Sir, we have bases not just in Manama for the 

5th Fleet, and in Qatar for CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command]. 

We have U.S. military bases in all of the GCC [Gulf Cooperation 

Council] countries, save Saudi Arabia. We have requests from allies 

for all kinds of weapons systems. And their argument to us is, we 

are fighting alongside you in Syria. We are fighting alongside you 

in Iraq. Why is it so hard to get resupplied for the fight that we 

are in together? 

The Emirates will tell you, as they have told me, that we fought 

alongside you in 11 wars, and we would like more signs of friendship as we try to defend ourselves. It is not my role to give you 

a list of what the allies have requested to show that we are committed to them or to love them. But it seems to me that if you are 

looking at the U.S. position in the Middle East, our allies fear that 

we are looking to get out. 

I got emails from Chinese scholars this week who said we think 

you cut a soft deal on Iran because you want to get out of the Middle East and pivot to Asia, and that makes us worry. I told him, 

of course, that if all of our Asian allies weren’t so concerned about 

China, they would be less concerned with getting us out there. 

But I think that there are any number of things we can do to 

send signals of what we care about, to send signals of what we are 

committed to. A tremendous number of those come through this 

committee. I think it is a very constructive area of engagement for 

this committee to discuss. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And Secretary Kerry, as he testified yesterday, 

I mean, he is on his way to Doha in a few days to really sort of, 
24 

I guess, enhance that discussion or dialogue, which, again, I think 

almost regardless of what Congress does, that is something that we 

need to sort of be focused on, particularly, again, in this committee. 

Last question I just have is, nothing in this agreement takes the 

military alternative off the table for this Congress or this country 

today, or 15 years from today. 

Dr. ALTERMAN. Sir, not only does it not take it off the table, but 

it also doesn’t excuse any Iranian behavior. It doesn’t give the Iranians any carte blanche to do anything in the region. All those 

things remain on the table. This is a narrowly derived agreement 

to focus on the threat of Iran developing a nuclear weapon, with 

which it would both threaten U.S. allies, and kick off proliferation 

throughout the region, which, in the judgment of many people, 

would not contribute to regional stability. 

Mr. COURTNEY. I mean, it seems like a fairly obvious point, but 

sometimes I think it is sort of lost in some of the discussion here. 

And I would just say, again, that I checked the DOD [Department 

of Defense] manifest over the last couple of days where we have 

been flying about 30 to 40 air strikes a day, just this week, off, 

again our carrier that is stationed over there, and now with Turkey, there is going to be more. 

So the notion that somehow this country is just sort of standing 

by in the Middle East and wringing its hands, passive, I think was 

the quote that was used earlier, I frankly just think people should 

sometimes sort of check the basic facts about what our military is 

actually doing and where it is stationed. 

And I would yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Chairman Kline. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you to the witnesses. 

We hear the term, and we have heard it here today and we use 

it all the time, ‘‘in the region.’’ And I was in the region back in 

March, right before Easter, and had a wonderful opportunity to 

visit with leaders in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, for example, earlier 

to visit with leaders in the Emirates. And in this trip—remember, 

this is March timeframe when the deal was much being talked 

about but when it wasn’t ‘‘the deal’’—what I heard repeatedly from 

our Arab friends was a great deal of concern about what Iran was 

doing. 

And as we know—we don’t know, but when I was there, this was 

the fourth day, when I was in Riyadh, it was the fourth day of the 

bombing strikes that the Saudis and others were conducting in 

Yemen against the Houthis. So there was a great deal of distrust 

everywhere we went about Iran and what their activities were and 

what this deal might yield. 

When we were in Riyadh and talking to the minister of defense, 

who happens to be the King’s son, he said to us as we were leaving 

this meeting, ‘‘When you see the Israelis, tell them they’re right.’’ 

And this is in the context of Iran. And you look at this deal, which 

allows an infusion of some unspecified amount of money between 

$50- and $150 billion, I think Mr. Singh, you said, and I think I 

heard Secretary Lew use some number like $56 billion or something like that, that is a lot of money in the region. 
25 

I guess, I am looking for some sort of sense, for those of you in 

Near East policy, I guess, Mr. Singh and Mr. Eisenstadt, what are 

our friends—what are the Arabs, what are the Egyptians, the 

Saudis, the Emirates, the Jordanians—what are they now saying, 

thinking about this deal? Are they safer? Are they less safe? Is 

Israel safer? Less safe? Please. 

Mr. SINGH. Well, Congressman, I think that the concerns that 

our allies in the region have are not just about this deal, but they 

are about our overall policy in the region predating the deal. I 

think they worry that we are no longer strategically on the same 

page. 

And that is why when we talk about what do we do from here, 

it is fine to talk about assistance in tangible ways to allies; it’s fine 

to talk about a robust American military presence in the region; it’s 

fine to talk about sort of intel resources and making sure that, you 

know, we are keeping a close eye on the Iranians. But none of 

those are really, I think, get at the core concern of allies, which is 

that strategically we are not in the same place, because they see 

us countering ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria], and, of course, 

they welcome that, but they don’t see us countering Iranian proxies, whether in Iraq or in Syria, for example. 

You see, for example, this recent story about a safe zone in 

northern Syria where it looked like we might be willing to sort of 

more actively take on the Assad regime, and then it seems like we 

are backing off of that. Although, maybe that is just sort of a garbling of a news story. And so I think they feel that we are just not 

strategically on the same page. 

And so they will accept this assistance, absolutely. They will accept the increase in exercises. But they worry about fundamentally, 

are we going in different directions, as Dr. Alterman said. Are we 

looking to simply disengage or realign ourselves? And I think that 

is what we need to convince them that, in fact that is not happening. 

And that is why I have written that one of the problems with 

this agreement is that it is not nested in any sort of coherent strategy for the region and, in fact, it seems at odds with our stated 

strategy of the region that gives rise to suspicions. 

Mr. EISENSTADT. If I could just add to that and build on it. I 

agree. It comes against the background of the perception among 

many of our friends in the region that we invaded Iraq, and either 

through, by design or incompetence, we handed it over to, you 

know, the Shiites in Iran and perception that we threw President 

Mubarak under the bus, although, frankly, I am not sure what 

other option we had at that point, you know, but to switch horses. 

So some of the problems are, you know, longstanding, you know, 

the rebalancing to Asia and then this with, you know, creating the 

perception that we have a tacit kind of arrangement with the Islamic Republic to empower them in order to create some kind of 

balance in the region. So it just kind of feeds these kind of fears 

and perceptions. 

But let me just also say, look, one of the things that our allies 

are most concerned about, because they are dealing with proxy 

wars and the like around them, and from the point of view of both 

Israel and our Gulf allies, they see themselves being encircled by 
26 

Iran and their proxies, is that this agreement, again, as we have 

talked, frees up a lot of funds which will enable these activities. 

Plus, as I mentioned before, 5 years from now, as the arms embargo on transfers to Iran is lifted, they will be able to get S–300 

missiles, if not sooner, that will foreclose, or at least constrain 

some of our military options, so that even though maybe the military option is technically on the table, it will be much harder as 

a result of things that we have agreed to. 

And the final point I just wanted to make is that no agreement 

is self-implementing. You have to have a conducive policy context 

in order for it to succeed. And that is why, you know, Mr. Singh 

and myself have argued that we need to push back against Iranian 

activities in the region in order to show them that they will be less 

inclined to cheat in the nuclear part. If there was a more permissive regional environment, they will be more inclined to cheat. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for pulling together this set of people to testify. 

And I appreciate your testimony, because I think we all recognize 

that we are at a real crossroads, that it is a historic moment reflective of a deep commitment this country has made to finding a way 

forward to constrain Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. And 

so it is very important, I think. And I think you see here that we 

are all taking advantage of your testimony to really ask some of 

the hard questions that I think we all have to be comfortable with 

as we make our decisions going forward. 

And so, number one, I think much of the discussion has sort of 

strayed away from the goal of the agreement. And the goal of this 

agreement as set out by Secretary Kerry, President Obama, Secretary Moniz, who is so much a part of it, was to prevent Iran from 

developing a nuclear weapon, at least for the next 10 to 15 years. 

And I think much of our discussion has sort of strayed from that 

to focus more on the impact of sanctions relief, the kind of funding 

opportunities that it will present. 

And in that context, Mr. Singh, I appreciate that you sort of validated the $50 billion figure that Secretary Lew has put out there 

as a reasonable number that might be made available to Iran. Not 

a small one, but we have heard much larger numbers. So as we 

have this discussion, I think it is good that it is rooted in what 

really is possible. 

But I wanted to get to you, Mr. Alterman, because you have said 

that it is an adequate deal. That in the context of preventing Iran 

from developing a nuclear weapon for the next 10 to 15 years, that 

it is adequate to holding Iran accountable. But you have also said 

in your written statement, the success or failure of the agreement 

hinges on implementation, and I think we all know that. Many of 

our questions do resolve around that. 

So can you tell me, in your mind, what the key factors are to a 

successful implementation, what that would look like? We have 

heard some concerns about the human dimension, that in the end, 

it is up to people, part of the IAEA sort of making decisions as to 

how to move forward, where they suspect that there is some she-
27 

nanigans going on. So we can never get away from that altogether. 

That is the nature of this agreement in general, any agreement in 

general. 

But what do you see successful implementation hinging upon, 

going forward? 

Dr. ALTERMAN. Congresswoman, it seems to me there are two aspects. One is that you can keep the countries that are enforcing 

this agreement, intent on enforcing the agreement; that if somebody sees something that is distressing, that the countries will act 

together to investigate something distressing and be determined to 

hold the Iranians to account for that. 

That, of course, comes in a whole complex set of relationships 

that we all have with each other and other kinds of interests. But, 

again, I think the last dozen years we have worked reasonably 

closely on this. The Russians and the Chinese haven’t gone their 

own way. And so I am cautiously optimistic, although certainly not 

certain that we can keep this inspection side moving. 

The other piece, of course, is what the Iranians decide to do. In 

my studies of Iran, it seems to me that we often assume that they 

don’t really have politics; that we assume that they don’t have factions; that we assume there is one guy with a beard in a room 

making all decisions. And the more I understand about Iran, the 

more I understand they have brutal politics: People fighting for resources, people fighting for power, people fighting for influence. 

I think one of the uncertainties in all of this is, are there ways 

that this deal would lead to more constructive Iranian politics that 

would lead to more constructive Iranian behavior? And that is certainly the hope of this deal. I am not sure it is necessary. But I 

think one of the promises of the deal is that you can create enough 

incentives for people who want Iran to be much more of a normal 

state, much less of a revolutionary cause, to have more influence 

in Iran. 

Ms. TSONGAS. What do you see Congress’ role being in encouraging the successful implementation of this? 

Mr. SINGH. And I think also making clear that if Iran is to improve its behavior, that American companies would feel much freer 

to go into Iran. And if Iran is playing games, then Congress would 

be very serious about not allowing American companies to go in 

there. 

In my conversations with people in oil companies, one of the interesting things is just how conscious they are of exactly where the 

legal line is for what they can talk about what they would want 

to do in Iran. And they keep that line very bright and very far 

away from anything they want to say or do. And I think that is 

helpful. And the Iranians should know that we are paying attention to what they do, and we will act accordingly. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you. My time is up. 

Mr. FRANKS [presiding]. I thank the gentlelady. 

Thank all of you for being here today. 

I think it is probably important at times to just back up and consider just the sweep of military history and the fact that we are 

over 70 years into the nuclear age now, and we find ourselves in 

a moment when one of our primary foundations for security in this 

country is our nuclear deterrent. It is based on a principle that if 
28 

someone should attack us, that the response would be unacceptable 

to them. In other words, the fact that our military capability is on 

the table if someone attacks us. 

And in this situation, I feel like that is probably the fundamental 

mistake that was made in this agreement; that Iran never really 

feared a military—being on the table, a military response. And I 

am convinced that that was because they had to watch this President as ISIS beheaded its way across Iraq, and they knew they had 

nothing to fear from him. 

With that in context, I would suggest that whatever the cost is 

of preventing Iran from gaining nuclear weapons, it will pale in insignificance, or pale in comparison to the cost of dealing with Iran 

once it has a nuclear weapons capability. 

Mr. Alterman, you suggested that Iran was ‘‘writhing in pain,’’ 

to use your words, and that this situation was not going to really 

change that a great deal. But I would suggest that North Korea, 

when we dealt with them, they were even more economically disadvantaged. And yet, we made a deal with them that, it occurs to 

me, was much more robust than this one, much more favorable, 

and the result was that Korea gained nuclear weapons a few years 

later. 

Mr. Singh, I want to point my question directly to you, sir. You 

laid out three prime components to the nuclear weapons capability: 

One was the fissile material, the ability to enrich and have fissile 

material; the second was to weaponize; and the third was to have 

a delivery system. Given that two and three in circumstances could 

be accomplished in fairly rudimentary ways, the real fundamental 

mechanism here is the gaining of fissile material, the ability to 

have indigenous enrichment or plutonium production. 

And under this agreement, where the Iranians now have 19,000 

centrifuges, mostly IR–1s, they would back off to 5- to 6,000 centrifuges. Yet, they have, under a protected protocol, the ability to 

enhance to IR–8s. Would you tell this committee how much more 

capable an IR–8 is compared to an IR–1, how much that then 

would compare to their existing capability? And also, would you tell 

us if one part of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure has been or will be 

destroyed under this agreement? 

Mr. SINGH. Well, thank you, Congressman. 

The IR–8 centrifuge you referred to, the Iranians have claimed 

it is 16 times more powerful than their existing IR–1 centrifuges. 

The IR–1 centrifuge is an antiquated design. It would take far 

more of them operating for longer, compared to the IR–8, to make 

one bomb’s worth of uranium. 

How efficient it will actually be in practice, we don’t know, because we haven’t seen it in practice yet. But one concern that you 

might have about this agreement is that it actually creates a safe 

space for the Iranians to continue the testing of the IR–6 and the 

IR–8, and then after 81⁄2 years, begin deploying those centrifuges 

in cascades, and after 10 years, totally swapping out the IR–1s. 

As I said, this is tremendously concerning, because if you wanted 

to have a clandestine nuclear facility that was small, you would 

want to use these more advanced centrifuges to do that. I am also 

concerned about them getting international assistance with the 

centrifuges. There are various stop-gaps against that, but that is 
29 

going to be something we are going to have to pay a lot of attention 

to in this agreement. 

Is anything dismantled in this agreement? I would say they are 

left in possession of their entire nuclear infrastructure. Their heavy 

water reactor is going to be modified with a new core. Their centrifuges will be deactivated in parts. But those are limits which expire after a period of 10 to 15 years. So you are talking about temporary freezes on certain parts of it, but not really dismantling. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, I guess, my time is almost up. So I would just 

suggest that the great concern that some of us have is not only the 

danger to Israel, but the utter unenforceability of this agreement. 

And I hope that somehow the American Congress will respond in 

a way that would give us the best chance going forward to seeing 

our children walk in the light of freedom. 

And with that, I am going to recognize Mr. Veasey for his questions. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I wanted to ask Dr. Alterman and Mr. Singh specifically about 

stretching out the inspections. There has been some concerns 

raised that perhaps these inspections could be stretched out. Like 

for instance, let’s say that there is a—and Mr. Eisenstadt, I would 

definitely like your opinion as well, if you would like to weigh in— 

if there is a site that inspectors feel need to be examined, of course, 

you know, going with the 24-day rule that is put in place. 

Will the Iranians be able to, you know, offer any sort of explanations, or any sort of delay mechanisms to stop that 24 days from 

being, you know, fully enforced? And the reason I was wanting to 

know that was because, as someone that is thinking about, you 

know, how I am going to ultimately vote on this, I want to know, 

is this 24-day number something that is firm? 

Dr. ALTERMAN. Congressman, my understanding from the briefings I have gotten from Secretary Moniz and others is that it is 

adequate because the radioactivity and the traces that these materials leave behind cannot be eliminated within 24 days, or even a 

little bit longer. I think they have repaved the Parchin site six 

times in order to try to cover up evidence of what they have done 

before. They have done that over years. 

What I have heard from the nuclear experts I have spoken to is 

that this window is sufficiently small that if something prohibited 

has been going on, there will be sufficient residue that our capabilities will pick up. 

Mr. VEASEY. But—I mean, but absent any sort of, you know, 

them trying to clean up a particular site that may have contained 

radioactive materials, do you feel that the 24-day rule that is in 

place, that it means 24 days and that it can’t be stretched out? The 

Iranians can’t say, Oh, well, wait. Hold on a second. We want you 

to send us something in writing. We want to have an opportunity 

to go and look at this a little bit longer. 

Dr. ALTERMAN. Every arms control expert I have spoken to, and 

there have been more than a dozen, have all told me that they feel 

that that provision is sufficiently specific and rigorous enough to 

give people clarity. 

Mr. SINGH. Well, I have a different view, and I have—actually, 

Olli Heinonen, who was in charge of verification for the IAEA has 
30 

said the same thing. So there are arms control experts who have 

said this isn’t sufficient. Part of the reason is that the 24-day period is proceeded by a back and forth between Iran and the IAEA. 

The IAEA needs to ask Iran to clarify any suspect activity. That 

is an indefinite process. We don’t know exactly how long that lasts. 

If the IAEA is not satisfied, then the formal access request is 

made. That starts a 24-day clock. If after 24 days that joint commission says, Iran, you have got to give access, Iran could still say 

no and we would have to take them to a dispute resolution mechanism. That dispute resolution mechanism could last anywhere from 

30 to 35 days, and could be extended by consensus of the joint commission, which would have to include the United States, bear in 

mind. 

If Iran still says no at the end of that, then it goes to the Security Council. And the question is, do you want to collapse the entire 

agreement over this issue? And I think everyone, including the 

United States, is going to have to look real hard at that request 

of access and say, is it worth it? 

Now, when it comes to radioactive elements, here, look, the question is, is the work in question work that was being done with nuclear material? There is nuclear weapons design work that could be 

done without nuclear weapons material, in which case, this issue 

is not relevant to this question. And even if you detect traces of 

material, if they have had that time to demolish the site, the question is, what specifically can you actually tell about what was going 

on at that site beyond the fact that there was nuclear material 

there? 

And so I don’t think we should take that as sort of a silver bullet. 

It certainly hasn’t been in the past, when it comes to inspections. 

Mr. EISENSTADT. If I could just add to that, to build on Mr. 

Singh’s comments, I do agree with Jon in that we have very, very 

sensitive technologies to deal—to detect nuclear materials. It is 

something like a billionth of a billionth of a part can be detected, 

and very often years and sometimes decades later, and it is very 

hard to sanitize those sites. But that is only one subset of the type 

of nuclear activities that we would want to prevent. 

Now, if somebody is doing nuclear computer modeling stuff, you 

know, they could get rid of the evidence in as long as it takes to 

pull out the hard drive and take it home and put it in a different 

hard drive. And it would be very hard to stop that. If we are dealing with the manufacturer of non-nuclear components for a weapon, well, that would take a bit longer. That might take maybe a 

couple of days to clean up or so. 

It all depends on exactly what kind of activity you are talking 

about. So it would have been preferable to have a much smaller 

time window to be able to detect more than just stuff related to, 

you know, radioactive materials. 

Mr. VEASEY. Interesting. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to thank our witnesses for joining us today. 

Mr. Singh, Mr. Eisenstadt, I would like to propose to you three 

questions to get you to give us your perspective. We have been told 
31 

that this choice is between the deal before us versus going to war. 

I want to get your perspective. Is that truly the only choices that 

we have in this? And we are also told that this is the best deal we 

can get. Is this truly the case? Is this the best deal that we can 

get? 

Dr. Alterman also said, in his testimony, that it was an adequate 

deal, and that Congress could subsequently go back and fix things 

that might be a problem from the adequate deal. Can you give us 

your perspective on how Congress has performed in fixing things 

that it has put in place that are less than adequate? 

Mr. SINGH. Well, look, on the first question, is this really a choice 

between the deal and war, the deal on the table and war, I think 

that is a false choice, frankly. The United States, ultimately, obviously, we decide when we go to war. I don’t see any preparations 

for doing that. I didn’t detect that in President Obama’s policy. If 

it was really a choice between this deal and war, the Iranians may 

still reject this deal, which means we should all be preparing ourselves for some pretty nasty options. 

I think that that underestimates that deterrent power of the 

United States. Yes, the Iranians could rush forward for a weapon 

if we walk away from this, or they could in any circumstance. In 

the past, they haven’t done that. They have been deliberate. They 

have been slow, in part, I think, because of the deterrent power of 

the United States. We have said if they do that, there will be this 

military option. 

In fact, I would say that the downplaying of our deterrent option 

and the alternatives and the consequences for Iran helped us get 

into what was a relatively weak negotiating position. 

Is this the best deal we can get? As I said in my written testimony, I think that we could have gotten a stronger agreement. I 

think you could argue, well, that is water under the bridge now. 

We have the deal that we have. And so could we get a stronger 

agreement in the future? I think that there is no easy scenario for 

that. I think now it is quite difficult having gone to the U.N. Security Council to endorse this particular deal. 

But, you know, frankly, I would say the question is really, do it 

now or do it later, because once these restrictions start expiring, 

we are going to need to have some sort of new policy anyway. Unless the Iranian strategy changes, which, as I said, we haven’t seen 

any evidence for, we are going to be worrying about this in 5 to 

10 to 15 years and confronting this problem, yet again, without 

those constraints. 

Mr. EISENSTADT. The only thing I would add to that is, first of 

all, I don’t know if we could have gotten a better deal but, you 

know, because that is kind of counterfactual. But I could point to— 

and, in fact, I wrote a whole monograph about how the U.S. could 

better marshal all the instruments of national power to increase leverage over Iran in the negotiations. And there were a lot of—I 

think there is a number of instruments that we didn’t use as effectively as we could have. 

So it stands to measure—you know, stands to reason that had we 

more effectively used the leverage we had—in particular, you 

know, one of those had to do with a credible military threat, which 
32 

I don’t think really was on the table—I think we may have come 

out with a better deal. Again, it is counterfactual. 

In terms of can Congress fix it, I mean, actually, you know, I 

think it is probably too late to do intrusive kind of surgery, because, as Mr. Singh has said, you know, there is already a U.N. 

Security Council resolution, and I don’t think politics will allow 

that. But I think the role that Congress can play is forcing the administration to create, as I mentioned, for that conducive political 

context, whereby, again, if Iran believes that the regional environment it is operating in is permissive, it will also believe that it will 

have more latitude to perhaps push back in terms of its observance 

of the agreement and perhaps cheat. 

And if the regional environment is less conducive, and we are 

pushing back at Iranian activities throughout the region, that will 

be a signal to them that—and hopefully will deter them from challenging the agreement, because there is a lot of ambiguity. If you 

look at this text, I never read—I read U.N. Security Council resolutions all the time; I read these kind of documents all the time. It 

is the most convoluted, opaque document I have ever read in my 

life. 

And there will be differences in interpretation. And that is why 

it is very important that the United States and its partners in this 

agreement clarify, this is our understanding of what Iran has committed to so that they cannot engage in wedge strategies to play 

us off against each other down the road when people have moved 

on from the jobs and nobody remembers exactly what it was agreed 

to. We have got to nail this down now. 

And that is where Congress can, I think, be constructive. That 

is one area. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Mr. Singh, within that context, give me your historical perspective about how successful Congress has been in coming back to these issues where there has been these problems with 

the accuracy of what has been passed here, and the Congress’ 

record of coming back and truly fixing those things. Just give me 

your perspective on that, or maybe an example about where you 

have seen that either successful or not successful. 

Mr. SINGH. Well, I am not an expert when it comes to the history 

of arms control agreements. I will say, though, that obviously, revising them after the fact can be difficult. Look at the conventional 

forces in Europe treaty where we have tried to fix it in the face of 

Russian aggression in Georgia and Ukraine, that hasn’t been terribly successful. And I think it is quite tough to change these 

things after the fact, once we are in them. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. O’Rourke. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Alterman, I would like to continue the conversation about the 

credibility of a military threat from the U.S. One, I would like to 

know how you think Iran would respond if we were more explicit 

about sign this deal with a more ideal standard than the one we 

currently have, or else we will invade. 

And then I would like you to address this concern that our military threat is not credible enough. It is hard for me to understand, 

considering that we invaded the country to Iran’s immediate west 

and changed that regime. We invaded the country to Iran’s imme-
33 

diate east and changed that regime at the cost of hundreds of billions of dollars, thousands of U.S. service member lives, and hundreds of thousands of lives lost in those two countries. So I would 

like you to begin by addressing that credibility of a military threat. 

And then I would just add that this President has made it clear 

that no option, including a military one, is off the table. There is 

not a single Member of Congress who would say that the military 

option is off the table, and not a single Presidential candidate in 

the current primaries who would say that. So tell me how this message is being lost on Iran, if that is, in fact, the case. 

Dr. ALTERMAN. My reading from talking to Iranians is they don’t 

doubt Americans’ capabilities do anything anywhere around the 

world. The question they are confronting is the American will to do 

things. The question they are confronting is after an open-ended 

war in Iraq, which accomplished a fraction of American goals, after 

the longest war in American history in Afghanistan, is the U.S. 

really prepared to invade Iran, to occupy the country, and impose 

a different regime? 

Members of this committee may have different views on that. I 

assume that your constituents all have different views on that. But 

if that is what people think we should be telling the Iranians, that 

if you don’t make this deal, we are going to occupy your country, 

throw out your government, impose somebody we would like better, 

I think the Iranians would judge whether the United States really 

wants to do that or not. 

The other side to the spectrum is the U.S. can strike anything 

anywhere at any time with impunity, and we have been doing it 

in Syria and Iraq for the last year. And the question is, if you do 

that, how much difference does that make? And then in between 

those things, how to use military instruments to get political objectives? 

And I think any country struggles with the challenge of how to 

use military tools for political outcomes, and we have done it sometimes successfully; we have done it sometimes unsuccessfully. But 

the Iranians, I think, look at all these questions with a fair degree 

of sophistication. I think they evaluate the threats. They evaluate 

what they think our intentions are. And they do it with a remarkable degree of sophistication that we don’t apply to their system. 

There are a lot of Iranians who live in the United States. There 

are a lot of Iranians who report back. I spoke at a small synagogue 

in Rockville, Maryland, on a Sunday, and then 2 months later, I 

saw somebody from the Iranian U.N. Mission who said, ‘‘Oh, I 

thought your presentation in August was really interesting.’’ Because somebody had reported on it. 

So this idea that we are going to be able to bluff the Iranians, 

I think, is a mistake. The idea that we are going to occupy Iran 

is not something I see a lot of American support for. And I agree 

very much with many of the things that my friends Michael and 

Michael have said, this doesn’t obviate our need for a genuine 

strategy. It doesn’t remove our need for a regional strategy. 

Whatever we do here, we are going to have to have a 5-year plan, 

a 10-year plan, where Iran will play an important role. But I also 

agree with Mike Eisenstadt that the time to fix this is probably 

passed, and the question we have to deal with is going forward 
34 

with an Iran, which I think we are going to continue to have trouble with, what is the best position to do that from, with the world 

or against the world? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. I think that is a really compelling point. And I 

think if the collapse of a deal makes war not certain, but, perhaps, 

more likely, I would want to be with the world community if we 

are to reimpose even harsher sanctions, or if we have to go to war. 

I think it is preferable if we have to make that choice that we go 

in with allies and with a higher standing in the global community. 

And the alternative is one that we have lived through before and 

I think is unthinkable going forward. 

So appreciate your comments. 

Mr. EISENSTADT. May I clarify a point with permission? 

The CHAIRMAN. Just briefly. 

Mr. EISENSTADT. Thank you, sir. 

Just want to make a point. Nobody wants invasion, and we are 

not talking about that. But in 2003, the U.S. presence on the 

ground in Iraq and Afghanistan did apparently cause Iran to suspend their weapons work, and it did help bring them to the negotiations with Europeans at the time, I would argue. But since then, 

our credibility, I think, has slipped. 

And I would argue, we don’t want to threaten them in their face. 

This should not be an ultimatum. It should be subtle, because that 

works better in this part of the world, and indirect threats and 

telegraphed threats are much more effective, I think. So nobody’s 

talking about getting in their face and threatening invasion. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Fleming. 

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, I, for one, do not believe that a bad deal is ever better than no deal, and I am very disappointed about what we have. 

I see this as a terrible agreement, and we should not support it, 

and it is a high water mark. It can only go down from here. I would 

say that it is equivalent to the 1938 Munich Agreement. I think it 

will lead to not peace, but to more war. 

We are already hearing that neighbors in the region of the Middle East are planning to build their own nuclear facilities, develop 

nuclear weapons in a very bad neighborhood. And certainly, our 

closest friends and allies, Israel, I think, are virtually unanimous 

in their belief that this is a bad deal, and I think we should listen 

to what they have to say. 

But there are some interesting points here. This deal provides 

Iran with a signing bonus of $50 billion to $150 billion of assets 

in overseas accounts and provides economic growth associated with 

sanctions relief. And I am particularly concerned about how the regime might use these funds to build up conventional capabilities of 

its own military, as well as those of its allies and terrorist proxies 

in the region, such as Hezbollah. 

General Dunford, the President’s nominee to be the next Chairman of Joint Chiefs really recently testified, and I quote, ‘‘I think 

it is reasonable to assume that if sanctions are lifted, the Iranians 

would have more money available for malign activities,’’ end quote. 

So my question to Mr. Singh and Mr. Eisenstadt, could you describe how Iran might prioritize its money to support such malign 

military activities in the region? 
35 

Mr. SINGH. Well, Congressman, as I mentioned before, my anticipation is that Iran will use whatever financial windfall it gets for 

a variety of purposes. And they have shown in the past that even 

under sanctions, even when they were under duress, they increased 

the amount they were willing to spend on security accounts, for the 

IRGC, the Revolutionary Guards, the Ministry of Intelligence and 

Security, and overall military spending. So, I don’t see why that 

would change under these new circumstances, except they will 

have a lot more money to spend, frankly. 

We care about this stuff because the things that Iran does, supporting proxies, like Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, 

undermining the sovereignty of governments in the region directly 

threaten our interests and objectives in the region. Iran also—I 

think, General Dempsey recently pointed out—is engaged in cyber 

activities, which we perceive as a threat. They have invested in 

sea-based mines and other means of sort of compromising freedom 

of navigation in regional waterways that are a threat. 

I don’t think we should assume that this strategy will change; in 

fact, I think there is every reason to believe this strategy will continue. And all we can say for certain is that they will have more 

resources at their disposal, and fewer sanctions impediments for 

pursuing that strategy. 

And I should just point out as a corollary that, to me, the nuclear 

weapons program was not a standalone thing, not a lark. I think 

it was part of this strategy. And so that determination also remains there. And my big concern about the agreement is not that 

we shouldn’t have a negotiated agreement—I think we should—I 

just don’t believe that this one is sufficient to reliably prevent them 

from continuing to pursue that. 

Dr. FLEMING. Mr. Eisenstadt. 

Mr. EISENSTADT. The only thing I would add is that they would 

probably prioritize proxies over their conventional military capabilities except for the SAMs, which I think are important for them 

to provide an umbrella over their nuclear programs going forward. 

And then among the proxies, it is Syria, Hezbollah, then Iraq, then 

probably the Houthis. 

Dr. FLEMING. And doesn’t this agreement also allow over the 

course of the first 8 years or so, or maybe the first 10 years, for 

Iran to import more ballistic technology, which could not only enhance the threat regionally, but also even to the U.S.? 

Mr. EISENSTADT. This is something which I have not been able 

to get my arms around looking at this agreement. I mean, in the 

annex where they discuss ballistic missiles, there is a paragraph 

which discusses a continued ban on the importation of technologies 

that could be used for the production of delivery systems for nuclear weapons. So that remains in place. You still have other sanctions related to missiles and the Missile Technology Control Regime [MTCR]. 

But we know, because they have published pictures of their missile production facilities, they are still able to get stuff which they 

should not have been able to get under the MTCR, and very large 

pieces of equipment and special materials and the like. So, it is a 

leaky system before this agreement. I don’t think the agreement 

will change anything in that regard. 
36 

And, in fact, after 8 years with the missiles, in some ways, it 

might become a little bit easier for them and they will have more 

money, which you need to facilitate smuggling and violation of export controls and the like. Money helps a lot in that area. 

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Duckworth. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to continue this line of questioning. I think we can 

all agree that Iran is unlikely to change its regional behavior in the 

wake of this agreement, and I think that we have sort of talked 

about that—they will have more funds—in addition to expending 

the funds in other places, they will have more funds to expend for 

their proxies in the region. 

But I want to know what post-deal confrontation looks like. What 

should the U.S. response be? Are we more involved in getting more 

engaged in Syria? Are we going to end up having to spend more 

time holding the Gulf States back from their attempts to now develop nuclear weapons themselves? 

What is the U.S. involvement in the region? Are we going to be 

more involved in places like Lebanon, Yemen, and will we need to 

do that in order to reassure our Gulf State allies? Mr. Singh. 

Mr. SINGH. I do think that as a result of the agreement, but also 

as a result of just the chaotic regional situation and Iran’s involvement in these conflicts, we will need to be more involved, not less 

involved, in the Middle East going forward. And I think that will 

take any number of forms. Jon talked about some of them. I mentioned some of them. 

It will take the form of assistance and exercises and things like 

that with allies. It will take the form of intelligence focus on Iran 

and on its proxies and so forth to keep a close eye. It will mean 

a robust, forward presence in the region, which we have now, 

maintaining that or even enhancing it so that we can respond 

quickly, if, for example, there is an Iranian breakout attempt or 

some conflict flares up far worse than we see now. 

But I do think it will also mean trying to do more to counter Iranian regional ambitions. And exactly what that looks like, it could 

be any number of things. It could be more involvement in the situation in Syria, getting finally a little bit more serious about trying 

to bring that conflict to an end, putting more pressure on the Assad 

regime. It could look like responding more forcefully to Iranian 

provocation through the Strait of Hormuz. 

Remember, one thing that we saw just a few months ago was a 

more aggressive posture by Iranian fast ships in the Strait of 

Hormuz, taking some cargo ships captive. We didn’t really respond 

to that. And so I think one thing we will need to think about is 

responding more forcefully in such situations. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. So if the deal fails, what does U.S. involvement 

look like? And specifically, I want to know what the Gulf States 

will—how will they react? And then are we then dealing with the 

Gulf States attempting to amp up their nuclear ambitions and feeling the need that with no restraints on Iran, they need to develop 

nuclear weapon capability themselves? What is that alternative? 

Mr. SINGH. So I don’t think that if this deal doesn’t go forward, 

for any number of reasons, I don’t think it is right to say there are 
37 

no restraints on Iran. In the sense that, remember, Iran still was 

careful in the past because of the U.S. military threat not to rush 

forward, not to cross certain lines. Iran still has to worry about 

American deterrence. We shouldn’t sort of factor that out of the 

equation. It is not as though the deal—the deal doesn’t limit them 

at all, in fact, in these areas. It is our deterrence, our posture in 

the region that deters them. 

I think all the deal does, is number one, in this front, send conflicting signals to allies and cause them to worry more about what 

is our strategy in the region; and number two, it lifts some key 

sanctions on Iran and provides Iran with more financial assets to 

pursue that strategy. So I don’t think the regional situation looks 

dramatically different except for the U.S. standing and the Iranian 

capability in that circumstance. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. I don’t know who wants to answer this one. 

What is the Gulf States’ reaction to no deal? 

Dr. ALTERMAN. I don’t think they can contemplate it, to be honest. They are used to having governments that make executive 

agreements. The idea of powerful legislators who tell the princes 

you are not going to do this is not something they think a lot 

about. What they are thinking mostly about is what does this mean 

for American intentions, American commitment, American assurances. They will try to read that. 

I think they will see a less-constrained Iran as more menacing, 

and they will want to feel us even more, and they will want to feel 

other countries even more, because they will want an array of support. I think they also will get increasingly concerned that the 

White House doesn’t speak for the U.S. Government, and they will 

want to deemphasize the United States to the extent they can in 

their strategies because of a lack of confidence that when U.S. Government officials tell them something, it will represent U.S. Government policy. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. And would that carry out over to whichever 

party controls the White House? 

Dr. ALTERMAN. I think it would. You know, one of the concerns 

in the Gulf States that I have heard, I have sort of picked up reading between the lines, is their concern sometimes that Americans 

don’t always understand there are evil people in the world, and we 

should really have enemies. And I think the Gulf States, on the one 

hand, understand they really have enemies, but they also talk to 

their enemies. 

For all the UAE [United Arab Emirates] is staunchly opposed to 

the Iranian nuclear program, there is billions of dollars in trade between the UAE and Iran. And I think that they want us to figure 

out what we were really trying to do. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you all for being here today and for sharing your expertise with us. 

Can you reflect on why the President of the United States took 

this agreement before the United Nations for a vote prior to allow-
38 

ing Congress to vote on the agreement? Anybody like to comment 

on that? 

Mr. EISENSTADT. Well, I suspect you know the answer. I suspect 

he wanted to be unencumbered and, you know, I mean, if possible, 

to present Congress with a fait accompli. I mean, I think that is 

kind of the logic of executive prerogative. 

Mr. COFFMAN. It seems to me that the President has a view 

about foreign policy and national security based off sort of a peacethrough-diplomacy approach. But I had met in 2009, went to Israel 

and met separately with Prime Minister Netanyahu, President 

Peres, and the chief of staff of the IDF [Israeli Defense Force]. And 

I asked them the same question. And I said: Well, how would you 

best propose to stop Iran? What is your recommendation for stopping Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon? And they all actually had 

the same answer in separate meetings, and they said that you 

should impose economic sanctions that are harsh enough to where 

the government of Iran worries about a collapsing economy and losing power, political power, as a result of that. 

I wonder if you all would comment on that. 

Mr. SINGH. Well, I think that that is right, and that was the U.S. 

approach for a long time. It was to combine diplomacy with these 

coercive elements to try to produce a sort of cost-benefit analysis 

by Iran that it had no choice but to sort of give up its nuclear 

weapons ambitions and maybe to embark on a broader strategic 

shift. 

I think that when we get ourselves into trouble is when we sort 

of just choose one tactic over the others and sort of reject all the 

other tools in our tool kit. And I think what happened here was 

that we lost the coercive element to it. You know, in negotiations, 

you have got the deal, and then you have got, what are the consequences for not accepting the deal? It is sort of what we talk 

about here. What are the alternatives? 

But I think when we posed the alternatives to Iran, they simply 

weren’t very threatening because the language that we were using 

was simply that we needed a deal, that we didn’t have good alternatives to the deal, and this gets to the question of the credibility 

of the military threat. And so I think that what was coercive diplomacy lost the coercive element. And if we had kept that in play, 

if we had used that more smartly, I think we could have gotten a 

stronger agreement. 

Dr. ALTERMAN. Congressman, I think the Iranians—certainly 

Hassan Rouhani—thinks that if this doesn’t go through, he will be 

out of power. I think his strategic view has been for about 15 years 

that the level of animus between Iran and the world harms Iranian 

national security. He argued when he was the Secretary General 

of the Supreme Council on National Security back in about 2000, 

2001, that we should knock down the walls of mistrust between 

Iran and the West with bulldozers. That is not because he doesn’t 

think that the West has malign intent toward Iran—and a lot of 

Iranians give you a whole litany of Western offenses against Iran— 

but because he thinks that level of antagonism, a level of violence 

between our societies undermines Iranian national security, and I 

think that he has made the decision not that the West is really a 

warm and friendly place that is going to respect Iranian interests, 
39 

but that level of hatred and animus is harmful, and this deal provides a way to lower the temperature. I would argue that would 

also serve American security interests and stability—— 

Mr. COFFMAN. And let us not pretend that this is a democracy. 

There is a vetting process for anybody to run that is through the 

Supreme Leader. And so I think that one of the problems with 

American foreign policy is we want to believe that everybody is 

really, at the end of the day, just like us, and if given the opportunity, they will be like us and—let me finish here—I think that 

is a fundamental flaw in this agreement, in this agreement because 

I think that was the basis of the President’s view when he came 

into the White House, it was that he didn’t believe in sanctions, he 

didn’t believe in economic sanctions. He believed that if we treat 

Iran just like any other country, they will behave like any other 

country, and that is a very high-risk strategy with a very low probability of success. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Wenstrup. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, I do appreciate you being here and having frank discussion with us today. 

Mr. Alterman, you mention that this deal is adequate. And, 

frankly, I think it is far less than adequate. And the notion of no 

deal, to me, is actually more adequate than the deal that is on the 

table. What we are doing today does more to keep us safe than 

what this deal does. 

And you mentioned Iranians writhing in pain, and I would like 

to point out, as a surgeon in Iraq, what writhing in pain looks like. 

And when you see an American soldier that has been hit by an IED 

[improvised explosive device] provided by Iran, that is writhing in 

pain. And if they are writhing in pain, it is because of the actions 

of their government and their people. And I can’t find anything 

since 1979 that would give us any indication that we should trust 

in this government, in these people. 

You mention Rouhani. He is not the leader. Khamenei is. And he 

has publicly stated before and after this agreement that they will 

continue to be an adversary of the United States and attack the 

United States. This agreement allows them to be more capable of 

that. It enhances their opportunity for weapons to kill Americans. 

And the other thing that has been said is it is this deal or war. 

I would like to ask you a question. What is war? Is war going to 

battle? Is that what war means to you? I am just trying to get your 

opinion of what that statement might mean. 

Dr. ALTERMAN. First, I don’t agree with the idea that it is this 

agreement or—— 

Dr. WENSTRUP. I am asking a different question. 

Dr. ALTERMAN. No, but I don’t agree that—I don’t agree with the 

formulation that it is this deal or war. I think it is this deal with 

the world behind us, or it is this deal with us sailing against the 

world. And I think that makes a whole—— 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Okay. Let me point something out. You mentioned how cooperative Russia and China have been. They are not 

being threatened by this government. We are. Russia and China is 

not hearing ‘‘Death to Russia,’’ ‘‘Death to China.’’ It is a lot easier 
40 

for them to be cooperative and to give in on this stuff. But I asked 

you the question: So this deal or war, what does war mean to you? 

Dr. ALTERMAN. So you talked about the writhing in pain. And I 

know veterans, and I am sure you do, and I live right behind Naval 

Medical Center, and I have seen unspeakable injuries. So I don’t 

diminish that at all. 

I have also met Iranian veterans of the war with Iraq who they 

believe have been crippled for life by chemical weapons that the 

U.S. turned a blind eye to. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. My question right now—thank you very much for 

your comments on my comment. 

My question right now is, what do you conceive to be war? We 

have heard the statement, ‘‘It is this deal or war.’’ What do you 

perceive that as? Going to battle? What does that mean to you? 

Dr. ALTERMAN. War can be any number of covert actions, overt 

actions, limited war, unlimited war, efforts to depose the government, efforts to punish the government. We could see any number 

of things with any number of people on our side and any number 

of people on their side. 

I think what we are sometimes missing about Iran, not that Iran 

is a democracy, but Iran has genuine politics. I think Iran has genuine politics. It is hard to be serious about the history of Iran since 

1979 from Ayatollah Khomeini, who had dominant control because 

of his spiritual position, to Ayatollah Khamenei, who has much less 

of the gravitas that his leader did. He sort of got a cheap promotion 

up to being Ayatollah to make things work. It is a country of politics. 

And I think what the administration has tried to do is to see if 

there is something to unlock in the politics that will make Iran less 

of a threat. But I think the whole spectrum of war is available to 

us. The whole spectrum of war is available to the Iranians. I think 

we will win. I don’t think the Iranians can beat us, but what does 

that look like in the alternatives to—— 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Well, the point I am trying to make is we have 

given up so much that down the road liberates the Iranians to do 

what they say they want to do, which is to kill Americans. Okay? 

And so when it comes to war, there are other components. And I 

think that when we hear that statement coming from a high level 

in our government, people in America perceive that as going to battle. These gentlemen talked about it. I believe they understand all 

the components of war, which is diplomacy; military sometimes is 

a deterrent, often is a deterrent like the Cold War; sanctions, 

which we are giving up; and sharing of intelligence and building 

a relationship with our allies that also look at this enemy as an 

adversary. And I’d like maybe you to comment on some of the other 

components of war that we could be using and are not, if you 

would. 

Mr. SINGH. Well, look, I think the question of deterrence is a 

very important question. And I think that the idea that we had no 

choice but to make this deal does discount the role that deterrence 

plays in shaping the decisions of other countries, of adversaries. 

And I think that going forward, maintaining that deterrence is 

going to be awfully important to any successful U.S. policy in the 

region. 
41 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you. 

And, unfortunately, my time is expired. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Walorski. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. 

And I guess, Mr. Alterman, I think just—and we have sat here 

for two hours, and I appreciate you indulging us. But I think to 

your point that you have just been talking about for the last couple 

of minutes here about Iran being a country of politics and alluding 

to the fact that one of the issues is, from the world’s point of view 

and from an Iranian point of view, they are used to dealing with 

other nations that have princes, that don’t have a legislative body. 

And I think that is one of the reasons why there is such a disconnect in this country because we are talking about—you know, 

we are not talking about little treaties and little things about tanks 

and small arms. The American people in the United States of 

America do understand this is an existential threat we’re talking 

about. It is an existential threat. Now, we’re talking about nuclear 

weapons. We’re talking about an existential threat to Israel, and 

we’re talking about an existential threat to our homeland. That is 

what we are talking about, or we would not be involved in this, 

quote-unquote, ‘‘agreement.’’ 

And, you know, that is where I think a lot of the issue comes 

down to. We do have a separation of powers. Before we enter into 

something like this, which existentially is a threat to all of us, the 

American people do have a right to know through their representatives sitting here today and having a look at that document and 

being allowed to vote. 

My question is on the perception of what is going to happen after 

this vote, and whether we have enough votes to override a Presidential veto. I happen to think it is going to be very close, or what 

the President has been up to he wouldn’t have been up to, and he 

is really calling everybody, and he needs every single vote. 

What are we going to look like to the rest of the world as a split 

nation? There is no mandate. There is no giant majority. There is 

a couple of votes over the top that gets this bill through, which is 

where I think we are going to be. 

What perception, then, does the world take on that, a President 

that doesn’t even have a majority of agreement in his own nation? 

Dr. ALTERMAN. What I have read in foreign newspapers in the 

last week is something of surprise that there is the debate going 

on in the United States that is not going on in other places. We 

have people invoking the Holocaust. We have all sorts of things 

that in the rest of the world, is just considered to be strange. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Because the rest of the world is not a superpower. The rest of the world doesn’t dictate peace and freedom and 

fight for those things, and fight for the freedom of people. The rest 

of the world are apples to us being an orange. So, in the peer level 

that we had with Russia and China, and to my Representative colleague’s point, they are not victims or targets of this aggression. 

We are the victim and the target of the aggression. We are the 

ones that have watched Iran operate in Iraq, killing Americans, involving themselves in Yemen, involving themself as the largest 

state sponsor of terrorism with Hezbollah and Hamas. We are the 
42 

ones that have watched that. We are ones that sent American 

blood and money to free these countries from the oppression of 

these terrorist regimes. Largest state sponsor of terror. No changing the mind of the Ayatollah. And here we sit. That is why the 

American people are so divided. And I think we are going to see 

a divided answer to this question on the agreement. It may lose by 

a couple. It might win by a couple. But at the end of the day, the 

perception, then, doesn’t change. 

Dr. ALTERMAN. The perception that we are—— 

Mrs. WALORSKI. The perception of the world. The perception of 

Iran doesn’t change. There is no major majority. 

Mr. SINGH. If I could just weigh in here, I think you—there is 

an important point here I think which is it is an open secret that 

I think a lot of folks on both sides of the aisle are concerned about 

whether this agreement is sufficient. So what I anticipate will happen going forward as we look ahead is that whoever comes into office next as President, regardless of party, may find that this is insufficient, may find themselves wanting to strengthen the nuclear 

constraints on Iran. And that is going to be very tough to do. It is 

going to be very tough to get allied support for that, frankly, because, you know, when we talk are the P5+1 with us, you know, 

I was working on this in the mid-2000s, and I remember how hard 

it was to get even European support when they had the business 

deals they had with Iran. And I think getting support to strengthen the nuclear constraints in the future, which I think any President is inevitably going to want to do, is going to be quite hard. 

And then if you look at the agreement itself, it is clear that there 

are ambiguities over other relevant issues, like does the agreement 

give us the authority, give us the ability, to impose sanctions on 

Iran for terrorism and human rights that sort of mirror the effects 

of the sanctions we are now relieving? We think that it does. And 

I think Secretary Kerry has testified to that point. It is not clear 

to me, though, that our allies agree with that. And so that sets up 

a very difficult situation for us because, you know, who knows if 

we will have that support. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Can I ask you one quick question before I run 

out of time? Other than Iran, I think in this agreement, personally 

I think the United States is a loser, and I think Israel is a loser. 

Who are the other winners in this agreement besides Iran? Who 

gains the most? 

Mr. SINGH. Well, I think those who gain the most are anyone 

who wants to do business with Iran, anyone who sees Iran as a 

strategic partner, frankly. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. I yield back. 

Thanks, Mr. Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Stefanik. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to follow up on Dr. Fleming’s questions. This deal 

does not shut down or even limit the production of Iran’s ballistic 

missile program. Iran will continue to maintain a ballistic missile 

capability that is the largest inventory in the Middle East as well 

as develop an ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] capable of 

reaching the U.S. So, as you know, this type of capability is a very 

real threat to our national security. And we need all possible tools 
43 

available to deter and protect ourselves and our allies from the 

devastation potentially from Iranian ballistic weapons. So given 

that this deal rolls back the missile embargo on Iran, how will increased ballistic missile cooperation by Russia and China impact 

Iran’s ICBM program? 

And I will start with you, Mr. Singh. 

Mr. SINGH. Well, Congresswoman, I think this is a big gap in the 

agreement. And if you will remember with the [1994] Agreed 

Framework, what happened after the Agreed Framework was suddenly the conversation turned to missiles and the North Korean 

missile launches, which happened in the second part of the 1990s. 

And my concern is that that is what will happen here because, as 

you said, the ban on launches, especially, goes away with this 

agreement. It turns from a binding ban to nonbinding hortatory 

language in the new resolution. I think we need to be concerned 

with Iran’s medium-range ballistic missiles, which could put our 

bases and our forces within range, which are inherently, according 

to what I have seen reported, nuclear capable. And I think we need 

to worry about those ICBMs. And if you look at past testimony, 

open testimony, by U.S. intelligence officials, the sort of timelines 

for ICBMs always specify ‘‘with critical foreign assistance.’’ That 

critical foreign assistance becomes a lot easier as sanctions are lifted in 8 years, or if sanctions are lifted before 8 years under certain 

stipulations here. And so, again, my worry is that this is inherently 

part of a nuclear weapons program. You need a delivery vehicle. 

My worry is that the deal will actually allow them to perfect this 

relatively underdeveloped component of their nuclear weapons program. 

Ms. STEFANIK. And one more follow-up, Mr. Singh, before we go 

to the other witnesses. 

Can you give me your full personal assessment on the threat to 

U.S. soil today from the Iran ICBM at its current stage in development? 

Mr. SINGH. I don’t know that I have the details to do that. I don’t 

think that we have seen anything to indicate the Iranians have 

reached that capability yet. They have engaged in space launch activities and so forth. That is out in the open, but I couldn’t tell you 

sort of a timeline as to when will they get there and so forth. I 

think it depends on a lot of variables. But in a classified setting, 

I am sure that is a question that should be posed to U.S. officials. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you. 

Mr. Eisenstadt. 

Mr. EISENSTADT. I will just add a few points. 

First of all, as I mentioned before, they already seem to be able 

to get, despite the restrictions that have been on them in the form 

of U.N. resolutions and Missile Technology Control Regime constraints, they still have been able to get technology and move forward slowly but surely with their program. So the addition—their 

access to frozen funds will, I think, enable them to ramp up the 

smuggling activities. Again, money facilitates kind of, you know, 

shell companies and the activities of middle men who are engaged 

in this kind of smuggling. So I assume they will be able to ramp 

that up. 
44 

Secondly, I will mention that there is no mention of cruise missiles in this—in the deal. And they recently unveiled in the last 

year a cruise missile they call the Soumar, which is based on the 

old Soviet Kh-55 air-launch cruise missile. They modified it to 

make it a land attack cruise missile. If it has the range of the original Soviet system, that is 2,500 to 3,000 kilometers. That is a 

very—that is a long-range cruise missile. We don’t know how successful they were with the reverse engineering. But I am very concerned that this is—this was in the Soviet inventory their primary 

air force—their air force’s primary nuclear delivery system. And 

now the Iranians are producing their own version of it. And there 

is absolutely—the agreement says nothing about that. So that is 

something I am very concerned about. 

In terms of their ability to reach the U.S., they are not here yet. 

I mean, they have been working on—they have missiles that have 

2,000-kilometer range which means they could range southeastern 

Europe from their part of the world. If they were to put them on 

a ship, on a—and people have speculated about this possibility, put 

it on a civilian transport ship and put it off the coast of the U.S., 

they could reach us conceivably, or if they were to get a land base 

in this hemisphere. 

And then, finally, this will just simply complicate our missile defense challenge. We have been selling a lot of missile defenses to 

our allies in this part of the world, and as they move forward with 

their capabilities in this area, we are going to have to do more. But 

there is a lot more we need to do with our allies in terms of interoperability and sharing of information that they are not doing right 

now to ensure that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you. 

Dr. Alterman. 

Dr. ALTERMAN. In the last 7 seconds, I will tell you I grew up 

in Poughkeepsie, and your district is one of my favorite places in 

the whole world. 

Ms. STEFANIK. I am happy to hear that. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. McSally. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, 

for your testimony today. 

Mr. Singh, you mentioned that it seemed like, you know, this is 

fait accompli, like, you know, Congress can’t change this, and there 

has been a lot of discussion on that really in the media, but, you 

know, the reality is this isn’t a treaty like the CFE [Conventional 

Armed Forces in Europe] treaty. Now, maybe perhaps it should 

have been, but it is not. And if you look back in history, there has 

been, according to Mark Dubowitz, who talked to us yesterday, 

over 200 occasions where there has been a treaty or an agreement 

that came to Congress and Congress provided amendments to that 

treaty or international agreement and said: Look, we are going to 

vote on this thing, but you need to go back to the table, and you 

need to make this a better deal. And over 200 times this has happened. 

So all of sudden there is this dynamic going on like we have forgotten that this is the way the three branches of the government 

work, and we have got to either take this deal; it is up or down; 
45 

it is, you know, Chicken Little; it is we go with this deal only because, you know, this administration has negotiated this deal or 

bad deal are we even in this situation; and somehow Congress really can’t do anything about it. So why can’t we go back and say, we 

will potentially agree to this deal if it has the following, you know, 

five, six, or seven amendments? Go back to the table. That is what 

leaders do. That is what leaders of the free world do, bring our allies back together and say, Congress will approve this under the 

following restraints. Why can’t we do that? Why is this narrative 

continuing to, you know, perpetuate that Congress is, you know, we 

are just spectators in this whole thing as opposed to demanding we 

have a better deal like we have done in the past? 

Mr. SINGH. Well, Congresswoman, look, I think in terms of the 

premise, I agree with you. If you look at the history of arms control 

agreements, there have been agreements that Congress didn’t accept. For example, I mentioned before the SALT II agreement was 

withdrawn from consideration. We had other arms control agreements with the Soviets that never went forward because of opposition or because the situation on the ground changed, and we didn’t 

think that it was any longer the appropriate agreement for what 

we were trying to accomplish. And certainly if this were considered 

a treaty and the administration couldn’t muster the two-thirds support that it needed, then the logical option would be to go back and 

try to renegotiate the points that need to be renegotiated. You 

could argue that that also means that those who oppose it need to 

be specific in their opposition, say: Here is what isn’t strong 

enough, and here is what we need to see improved. And I do think 

that is important here. And, you know, if you look at what we have 

written, and I know this is true of many of you as well, there are 

specific points which are not deemed sufficient. 

I think the trouble here is the mechanism is obviously quite different. And you have acknowledged that. This has already been 

blessed by the U.N. Security Council. The adoption date is 90 days 

from when it was voted on, which is just 30 days, then, past when 

Congress will get to review it. And the question is what will happen. If Congress disapproves, could the parties go ahead and implement anyway, and then that sort of puts us in this position of opposing the agreement that we are ourselves negotiated. Or would 

the other party simply walk away and say, ‘‘This doesn’t work 

without U.S. participation,’’ in which case, as I have argued, because our allies still will oppose Iran developing a nuclear weapon, 

I think that they may not like the situation, but I think we are still 

then back to the drawing board and trying to renegotiate a stronger deal. 

Look, under any other circumstance, if a deal doesn’t have the 

sufficient domestic support, you go back and renegotiate it. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Exactly. Thank you. I only have a little bit of time 

left, but another consideration—I was in the military. I deployed 

six times to the region. I, you know, put my life on the line as with 

many of my colleagues in order to defend our interests in this region. We have many dead American soldiers because of Iran and 

what they did in Iraq, what they have done in Lebanon as a state 

sponsor of terror. 
46 

This is very personal for those of us who served in uniform. We 

are deeply concerned that with the influx of cash that they are 

going to have, they are going to continue to grow their conventional 

capability, increase their air defenses, increase their ability to 

shoot down our pilots, close the Straits of Hormuz, do all the 

things—I mean, I have been briefed—I am well aware of the military option as it exists rights now. It becomes much more dangerous in the future, 10 years from now, for those of us who are 

like: Well, at least we buy time. So we buy time with a state sponsor of terror with an influx of cash to build their conventional and 

nonconventional capability that is going to kill more Americans if 

we actually have to do a military option later and the increase of 

risk to American lives. Could you just comment on that? 

Mr. SINGH. Well, I do think that that is right. And my worry is 

that when you do a deal like this with a party which hasn’t had 

any kind of strategic shift, if we know that Iran is still determined 

to carry out that strategy, then my worry is that we will be finding 

ourselves encountering those things in the future and that the military option does get more difficult as you go forward, as Iran arms 

itself, as you have international folks inside those nuclear facilities, 

and as they have been granted sort of international legitimization. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you. And I would say ‘‘difficult’’ is a clinical 

word. More Americans are going to die. That is what it comes down 

to. 

Mr. EISENSTADT. I will just add as I see we are out of time, that 

given—I see the possibility that 10 years down road, 15 years down 

the road now, next time they will be—if they build another clandestine facility like they did at Fordow and Natanz those are relatively 

shallow. Next time it will be much deeper; they have world-class 

expertise in superhardened concrete and in tunneling, and I am not 

sure we a military option with our current conventional capabilities 

10 or 15 years down the road. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thank you. 

My time is expired. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. You all have been very patient through a variety 

of questions. I am going to impose on you just a moment longer because—and you kind of talked around these things, but I just want 

to get each of your brief thoughts. 

One of the things that concerns lots of people around the world 

is the growing conflict between Sunni and Shia. We see it in Iraq. 

We see it in Yemen. And the concern that that spreads to a, you 

know, even more violent, even more widespread sort of conflict, 

does this agreement have any effect on the likelihood of a Sunni 

versus Shia open war? 

Mr. SINGH. Well, Congressman, you know, you have heard some 

folks say that in the wake of this agreement, maybe Iran would be 

a partner against ISIS. I think that is misguided because I think 

the more Iran is active in the region, the more it is engaged in 

these conflicts in places like Syria and Iraq and so forth—and in 

Syria, there is a very strong indication that Iran is really at the 

forefront of the battle that the regime is waging. I think that exacerbates sectarian conflict. I think that that feeds movements like 

ISIS rather than sort of diminishing them. 
47 

And so I think looking at Iran as a partner, when in fact Iran 

has been filling the same vacuum that some of these other groups 

are trying to fill, is mistaken. And I worry that that will get worse, 

not better, in the wake of the deal. 

Mr. EISENSTADT. I will just add, I mean, I agree with that, and, 

you know, the idea that we partner with Iran as part of this campaign just will feed the impression that our idea of the best way 

to counter Sunni jihad is by partnering with Shia jihadists. And, 

again, that simply is a lethal combination that exacerbates the conflict in the region. 

But even if we don’t, you know, overtly partner with Iran, there 

is the perception that we are tacitly partnered with them. And 

even if we successfully, you know, parry those perceptions, you 

know, the fact is that the additional money that is available under 

this agreement will enable Iran to, you know, ramp up support for 

its allies and partners in the region that are key actors in the sectarian conflicts. So, I think we should expect further intensification. And also just the perception that Iran is coming out of this 

as, you know, if this from their point of view feeds into their narrative of a rising Iran that is, you know, triumphant in the region, 

and that will simply only further exacerbate the fears of the Sunnis 

in this part of the world and feed recruiting for ISIL [Islamic State 

of Iraq and the Levant] and Al Qaeda affiliates. 

Dr. ALTERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I think we have gotten a little fixated on how fixed sectarian identity is and how important it is. It 

is not very long ago that there was lots of intermarriage between 

Sunnis and Shia throughout the region. There were mass conversions to Shia Islam in Iraq in the late 19th century. We are not 

really sure why. These categories have gotten more fixed, and it is 

partly because people have seen this as a proxy for a state battle, 

and they have used religious terms, religious categories, in order 

to fight between Saudi Arabia and its allies, on one hand, and Iran 

on the other. 

I think the goal of this agreement, in part, is that it creates incentives for Iran to try to be like a more normal country, a country 

which wants to have investors come in. It needs tens of billions, 

hundreds of billions of dollars invested in its oil industry, its gas 

industry. They want trade. I mean, there are a lot of signs that 

there are parties in Iran who want Iran to be a much more normal 

place. Try going somewhere on an Iranian passport as a tourist. 

There aren’t a lot of places to go. And you don’t have money to 

spend. And so there, I think, there is the possibility of incentives 

that Iran will cease to be the kind of country Congresswoman 

McSally described, in many cases very accurately, that the long 

history of antagonism between us and Iran will diminish. They talk 

about how we helped overthrow Mossadegh in 1953, and we were 

involved supporting Saddam Hussein in the 1980s and so on. And 

they can be more normal. And a more normal Iran is not going to 

be an Iran that is feeding the flames of this sectarian violence. A 

more normal Iran is going to act like a more normal state. I am 

not sure that will happen. I hope it happens. And if it happens or 

if it doesn’t, I think we want the world with us. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah. 
48 

Mr. SINGH. If I could—Mr. Chairman, if I could just comment on 

that because I think that if you look at the deal, I don’t think it 

does provide that incentive. The sanctions are rolled back maybe 

to where they were in, say, 2006 or 2007. I was working on Iran 

policy at the time, and I can tell you before these sanctions were 

imposed, Iran was not being helpful. Before the sanctions were imposed in the mid-1990s, on preventing U.S. oil companies from 

going in, Iran was not acting as a sort of more helpful, more normal state. 

And so I think, yes, we would all like to see Iran shift its strategy. We would all like to see Iran change its behavior in the region, 

but I think that actually we are not confronting Iran with that 

strategic choice. My worry is that we have allowed them to escape 

that strategic choice by sort of having their cake and eating it too; 

keeping their current strategy, their current nuclear weapons capability, and getting the sanctions relief on top of that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Well, I guess some people describe this as 

the big bet, whether more contact with Iran, the investment and 

so forth, will lead to a different sort of regime or not. 

One more, right quick, and you all talked about this kind of, but 

nuclear proliferation, does this make it more or less likely? You 

know, you can argue it from both sides, which is why I ask the 

question. 

Dr. Alterman, I will start with you this time. 

Dr. ALTERMAN. I think creating a structure of rigorous inspections creates anticipation that the world will take any nudge toward nuclear weapons capability from any state very seriously. Deciding that this is just too hard, that we are not going to ask intrusive questions, I think, will send a signal for people that the Iranians are likely to go their way, and if the Iranians go their way, 

if they are going to have a bomb, I want a bomb. 

The CHAIRMAN. So, on balance, you think that signal to the world 

outweighs the pressure that will be on the Gulf States and other 

Sunni Arabs to have some sort of capability? 

Dr. ALTERMAN. So if we go forward with this agreement will the 

Gulf States feel they need—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah, yeah. 

Dr. ALTERMAN. No. I think if we go forward with the agreement, 

the Gulf States will be whispering in our ear every day saying: 

Make sure you are serious. Make sure you enforce it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah, okay. 

Mr. EISENSTADT. If I could just—actually in a way the kind of 

the cat’s out of the bag because we have already started seeing, 

since around 2005 or so, a series of contracts that have been concluded by—I think the Turks have their contracts with Russian 

companies. The Egyptians have some contracts. And the Gulf GCC 

decided I think in 2005 as well to kind of enhance their civilian nuclear infrastructure. So we are already seeing hedging behavior, 

and it—this is a long-term process. It’ll last decades. 

So I think this will perhaps reinforce this trend, but the trend 

really is already underway. But, again, it’s in the form of creating 

civilian infrastructures which are inherently dual-use, and then, 

down the road, you know, countries have options. But this is going 

to be a very long-term thing, and I think the administration made 
49 

a mistake in thinking that if you prevent Iran from getting the 

bomb, then you can prevent a proliferation cascade. But the problem is, you know, people hedge before that. They don’t wait until 

you already got the bomb. And if you have a robust infrastructure, 

that is the trigger for kind of a proliferation cascade of similar infrastructures throughout the region. And that is already underway. 

So—— 

Mr. SINGH. And, you know, Mr. Chairman, right now, the United 

States seems to love timetables. We set a timetable for withdrawal 

from Afghanistan. We set a timetable in Iraq. This agreement has 

a timetable as well. It has these sunset clauses. After 10 years, you 

know what restrictions are going to be lifted from Iran. After 15 

years, you know what restrictions are going to be lifted. And so if 

you are another country in the region, those restrictions being lifted isn’t based—they are not based on Iranian performance. It’s not 

based on the IAEA having a finding that Iran’s program is exclusively peaceful. It is just based on the passage of time. And so you 

have got to circle that date on your calendar and say: By this date 

I have to make certain assumptions about where Iran will be and 

what it might do. And you have got to then plan against that. 

And my worry is, look, there is no impediment, really, to them 

doing that. There is no impediment to them starting up their own 

programs. And they certainly have the means and the resources to 

do that. It is not easy, but they have a lot of resources at their disposal, as Secretary Kerry has noted. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. All very helpful. 

Obviously, this is a big vote for all Members, and I really appreciate your all’s insights in helping us work our way through many 

of these issues. So thank you, again, for being here. 

With that, the hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER 

Mr. SHUSTER. The unfortunate reality of this deal is that it does nothing to slow 

down Iran’s development of ballistic missiles. This is a country that has managed 

to develop advanced missile technology even under the weight of U.S. sanctions, 

which makes it even more likely that they will speed development once those barriers are lifted, creating a direct threat to Israel regardless of whether Iran possesses nuclear weapons. Given this danger, how do you believe the United States 

should better support our allies in the region in the area of missile defense? 

Mr. SINGH. The U.S. approach to missile defense in the Middle East should comprise four broad elements: • Ensuring our allies exploit their existing capabilities in early warning and missile defense and have access to any additional required technological training 

or support necessary to counter missile threats from Iran, its proxies, and elsewhere; 

• Coordinating the integration of regional missile defenses to enhance the capability and deterrent effect of those defenses; 

• Using sanctions and other tools to prevent Iran and other potential adversaries 

from developing advanced missile capabilities, especially intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); 

• Preventing the proliferation of missile and rocket technology from Iran to proxies such as Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Hamas, and others; 

The nuclear deal does not require Iran to refrain from missile and proliferation 

activities. Instead, the deal in-fact eases the arms and missile sanctions on Iran in 

five and eight years, respectively, making the above efforts all the more important 

and urgent. They should be undertaken with renewed vigor in the context of sensible investments in the U.S. global defense posture and in the advancement of our 

own missile defense technology. 

Mr. SHUSTER. For years, Israel has been defending itself from rocket attacks 

launched by terror groups that receive support from Iran. Indeed, Hamas has been 

directly assisted by Iran with the provision of technology to develop Fajr-5 missiles, 

which have been fired at civilians in Tel Aviv. Under this agreement, Iran will have 

free reign to continue building their arsenal of conventional munitions and missiles, 

which they can then continue providing to terror groups like Hamas for the purpose 

of attacking Israel. To date, Israel has relied on the Iron Dome system, which makes 

use of Patriot Missile batteries, to defend itself, but it is going to face an even greater challenge under this deal. Would the provision of additional Patriot batteries help 

Israel in the face of heightened rocket attacks? 

Mr. SINGH. Congress has demonstrated leadership on this issue by consistently 

providing funding for Israeli missile defense. This includes the Iron Dome system, 

which targets short-range rockets, artillery, and mortars; the David’s Sling system, 

which targets medium-range rockets and missiles; and the Arrow missile system, 

which targets longer-range and higher-altitude ballistic missiles. 

The United States should continue to engage in continuous dialogue with the Government of Israel to ensure that together we are countering the existing threats 

posed by Iran, its proxies, and other adversaries in addition to anticipating future 

threats. This will require further investments in existing and new technologies as 

well as inintelligence on the threats that we jointly face. Our bilateral dialogue 

should also be conducted in the context of a broader effort to ensure Israel’s security, integrate regional missile defenses and promote regional security cooperation 

to counter the missile and proliferation threats posed by Iran and others. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Sanctions imposed on the Islamic Republic of Iran have had a dramatic effect on the nation’s economy: revenue from oil exports have plummeted; its 

currency value has eroded, and disruptions to trade have resulted in business closures and inflation. In the face of this turbulent economic situation, Tehran has still 

managed to speed missile development and shore up their conventional munitions, 

with the intended aim of revitalizing their military in the coming decades. Without 

sanctions, it is likely that they will be able to achieve both these goals in a shortened amount of time. Do you believe this deal will result in Iran being able to more 

easily divert weapons and material to regional terror groups? 
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Mr. SINGH. As noted in my written testimony, I am concerned that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) could worsen Iran’s destabilizing regional activities in three respects: 

• Providing Tehran with new financial resources with which it can support proxies and boost its security spending; 

• Easing sanctions on the transfer of arms from and to Iran, and on the provision 

of missile technology to Iran, potentially paving the way for greater cooperation 

between Iran and international partners such as Russia and China; 

• Emboldening those elements of the Iranian state, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) which are most directly involved in destabilizing 

regional activities and provoking reactions by Iran’s regional rivals which serve 

to deepen the region’s existing conflicts. 

In the wake of the JCPOA’s adoption, it will be vital that the United States not 

merely adopt a strategy of hoping these things do not just come to pass, but to ensure that Iran faces steep costs for pursuing destabilizing activities and supporting 

terrorism in efforts to incentivize Iranian leaders to choose more constructive approaches to the region. 

Mr. SHUSTER. The Department of Defense has steadily transitioned to an expeditionary force over the last 20 years, significantly reducing our overseas steady-state 

footprint. What impacts will a nuclear-capable Islamic Republic of Iran and a missile-saturated region have on future U.S. force posture? Do you foresee a necessary 

growth in defense spending to field a differently shaped or equipped force? 

Mr. EISENSTADT. One of the ironic consequences of the nuclear deal with Iran is 

that it will likely deepen America’s involvement in the region as a security provider 

for years to come. In the wake of the deal, the U.S. has pledged to become more 

actively involved in assisting its partners in interdicting destabilizing Iranian arms 

transfers to its proxies and allies, and the growing missile threat will result in increased U.S. transfers of missile defenses to the region, and its continued involvement as an integrator of regional missile defenses. 

Moreover, in the long run, the likelihood that countries in the region will engage 

in nuclear hedging—building their own civilian nuclear infrastructure—to counter 

Iran’s declared nuclear infrastructure, will also likely cause the United States to 

offer these countries ever larger conventional arms packages or other types of security assurances to dissuade them from moving forward with nuclear programs of 

their own. Thus, the deal is likely to accelerate the conventional arms race now underway in the region, and perhaps eventually lead to a nuclear arms race there. 

Finally, Iran’s growing missile capabilities will make the Persian/Arabian Gulf a 

much more challenging environment for the U.S. military—the Navy in particular— 

which will be operating in an environment saturated by Iranian low- and high-end 

anti-access/area denial capabilities. And as the accuracy of Iranian missiles increases, the U.S. will have to spend a lot more on hardening and dispersing its infrastructure in the region, to protect it from this growing threat. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Buried within Annex 3 of the nuclear deal, sections 10.1 and 10.2 

commit the P5+1 parties to cooperate with Iran in strengthening the protection of 

their nuclear program. To what extent do you believe the P5+1 parties should assist 

in this capacity and what are the implications to the United States should Iran fail 

to comply with the mandates of this agreement? Does strengthening Iran’s defenses 

disadvantage the U.S. in the long-term? 

Mr. EISENSTADT. The nuclear deal envisages the possibility of EU and P5+1 assistance to Iran to protect its nuclear infrastructure against sabotage. This may help 

Iran entice world-class information technology (IT) consultants, firms, and state entities to help it thwart the kind of cyber spying that is necessary prelude for hostile 

offensive cyber operations. Indeed, it was a Belarus-based firm working for an Iranian state entity that discovered the Stuxnet malware. The nuclear accord may thus 

enable Iran to more effectively counter one of the most effective means of gathering 

information available to its adversaries, greatly complicating U.S. and allied efforts 

to detect future Iranian clandestine activities. This may also deny the United States 

and its allies of one of the few non-kinetic means of disrupting an attempted Iranian 

breakout, at a time when U.S. kinetic options may be increasingly limited, for a variety of political and military reasons. (On the other hand, the employment of foreign consultants, firms, or state entities creates security risks for Iran, and opportunities for foreign intelligence services, though Iran will undoubtedly try to manage 

this risk, if they continue to rely on foreign consultants for IT trouble-shooting.) For 

these reasons, it would be highly desirable that the EU and P5+1 not assist Iran 

in these areas. Even if the parties to the agreement act with restraint, it may be 

very hard to keep unscrupulous private IT consultants from offering their services 

to Tehran, and helping it improve its counter-cyber capabilities. 
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALZ 

Mr. WALZ. In your view, what are the shortcomings and risks associated with the 

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action? What benefits to the United States and our 

allies do you believe this agreement offers? 

Mr. SINGH. In my written testimony, I offer a thorough analysis of the JCPOA’s 

likely implications. To summarize: • The JCPOA contains provisions which will result in enhanced monitoring at 

Iran’s declared nuclear facilities and of its nuclear supply chain; • It also offers a provision to ‘‘snap back’’ previous UN sanctions on Iran that is 

not subject to veto by a member of the P–5 in the UN Security Council, and 

does not require that U.S. sanctions be lifted for the first eight years of the accord; 

• It also requires Iran to recommit not to acquire nuclear weapons (having already done so by signing up to the NPT), or to engage in certain specified activities applicable to developing a nuclear explosive device; 

• However, the agreement does not require Iran to dismantle any of its nuclear 

fuel fabrication infrastructure, apart from swapping out the core of the Arak 

heavy water reactor. Key facilities, including Arak, Natanz, and Fordow, remain 

operational; 

• Nor does the agreement apparently require Iran to make a full declaration of 

its past or current weaponization activities, or provide related access to facilities, personnel, and documentation; 

• Not only does the agreement fail to impose any limitations on Iran’s nuclearcapable ballistic missile activities, it additionally drops the previous ban on Iranian missile activities and pledges the lifting of missile-related sanctions on 

Iran in eight years; 

• The agreement does not, in my opinion, provide sufficient or timely access to 

suspect (undeclared) nuclear sites, nor does it stipulate any punishment for Iranian violations besides the full snapback of sanctions, which parties to the 

agreement are likely to be reluctant to exercise except in the case of major violations; 

• Even the restrictions that the JCPOA does place on Iran expire in five to fifteen 

years, leaving open the prospect that by 2030 Iran would face no limits on its 

nuclear activities short of its broad NPT pledge not to pursue nuclear weapons. 

This would nevertheless enable Iran to expand its nuclear activities so that it 

is poised at the cusp of a nuclear weapon with near-zero breakout time; 

• The agreement does not address Iran’s regional behavior. It will provide Iran 

with tens of billions of dollars in cash and meanwhile, in five years it will lift 

sanctions on the provision of arms to Iran. This is likely to be destabilizing in 

itself and produce a reaction from Iran’s regional rivals that may prove further 

destabilizing; 

• Finally, from the point of view of U.S. policy, the agreement is not seemingly 

connected to a comprehensive American strategy for the Middle East or nonproliferation. 

It is essential that the Obama Administration or the next administration devise 

policies to address these shortcomings, given the likelihood that the deal will be 

adopted and implemented on schedule. 

Mr. WALZ. In your opinion, do you believe this agreement will ‘‘tip the balance 

of power’’ toward the Islamic Republic of Iran and create a nuclear arms race in 

the Middle East? 

Mr. SINGH. Iran’s regional strategy has long focused on cultivating asymmetric 

and anti-access/area denial capabilities to counter regional rivals, the United States, 

and our allies. This strategy has included funding, training, and equipping proxy 

non-state actors such as Hizballah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and partnering 

with the Syrian regime. It has also comprised the development of missile, fast boat, 

and other capabilities that put freedom of navigation and regional security in the 

Gulf at risk. Iran’s nuclear capabilities—which the JCPOA permits and which may 

be expanded upon the expiration of the JCPOA’s restrictions—leave open the possibility that in the future it will possess a nuclear weapon, which would give Tehran 

additional resources to pursue its regional strategy with impunity. The agreement 

also provides an influx of funds to Iran and pledges to alleviate sanctions on arms 

and missile in five and eight years, respectively. 

It is likely that the deal will therefore strengthen Iran in its neighborhood—both 

the Middle East and South and Central Asia. This could incentivize its rivals to 

take action to counter Iranian regional activities and perhaps pursue nuclear capabilities that at least match Iran’s. It is essential that the United States work with 

our allies to devise a common approach to countering Iran and other regional 
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threats so that these responses to the JCPOA do not themselves further contribute 

to regional instability. 

Mr. WALZ. There is an ongoing debate if this agreement truly does allow for ‘‘24/ 

7’’ monitoring and inspections. Do you believe that this agreement will truly permit 

the P5+1 to monitor and inspect Iran facilities and programs to prevent the proliferation of a nuclear weapon? 

Mr. EISENSTADT. I believe that the provisions of the nuclear agreement provide 

very robust monitoring of declared Iranian nuclear facilities. My main concern concerns possible covert facilities related to a clandestine nuclear program. While it 

would be very difficult for Iran to build a parallel clandestine program now without 

getting caught, I think its prospects improve greatly in the out years—10–15 years 

from now, and after. 

And the provisions of the agreement will make it hard to investigate possible covert sites related to a potential clandestine program. For instance, if the U.S. or 

other countries obtain information regarding possible covert facilities in Iran, it will 

be necessary to conduct inspections to verify these reports. The elaborate procedures 

outlined in the agreement for visits to suspicious sites, and repeated statements by 

Iranian officials that International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) inspectors will 

not be allowed to visit military facilities, could create substantial obstacles to timely 

access. And by repeatedly stating that IAEA inspectors will not be allowed to visit 

military sites (which have in the past been used to host nuclear facilities), Iran has 

set a very high bar for access. As a result, the U.S. and the IAEA will likely demand 

access to such facilities only rarely, given the potential for friction and tension this 

could entail, potentially creating sanctuaries where proscribed activities can occur 

beyond the prying eyes of inspectors. 

Moreover, the ability of the IAEA to follow up intelligence reports regarding clandestine activities will be greatly diminished if disunity or diverging interests among 

the EU and the P5+1 undermine the efficacy of the monitoring arrangements described in the nuclear agreement. For instance, in the event that IAEA inspectors 

are denied access to a site, five of eight members of the Joint Commission established by the agreement need to agree on a means to resolve the IAEA’s concerns 

(Article 78). If they are unable to do so, due to political differences, the inspection 

effort will languish. This is what happened in Iraq in the late 1990s, when diverging 

interests among the P5 eventually hamstrung UN weapons inspections and efforts 

to resolve remaining questions about possible residual Iraqi WMD capabilities (e.g., 

possible stocks of the chemical agent VX). 

And if Iran decides to build an industrial scale nuclear program 15 years from 

now, it will be even harder at that time to detect possible covert sites and clandestine activities, given all the permitted nuclear activities that will be occurring in the 

country by then. 

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