## United States Court of Appeals
**For the Eighth Circuit**

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No. 22

- 1763

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Estate of De ’ Angelo Brown, Deceased through Bryce Brewer, Special Administrator

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

E.C. West, Chief, West Memphis Police Department; Prince Bohanon, Member, West Memphis Police Department; Michael Clark, Member, West Memphis Poli ce

Department; John Buford, Member, West Memphis Police Department; Matthew

McKee, Member, West Memphis Police Department; Daniel Magill, Member, West Memphis Police Department; James Presley, III, Member, West Memphis Police Department

Defendants - Appellees

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Northern

____________

Submitted: February 21, 2023 Filed: August 10, 2023

____________ Before SMITH, Chief Judge, STRAS and KOBES, Circuit Judges.

____________ KOBES, Circuit Judge.

De’Angelo Brown was a passenger in a car that led West Memphis Police Department (WMPD) officers on a dangerous chase

. He was shot and killed when-2- officers tried to stop the car , and his estate sued the m under 42 U.S .C. § 1983 for
excessive force and state

- created danger . The district court 1 granted summary judgment to the officers , and we affirm.

I.

An officer tried to stop a car for having improperly lit high beams. Instead of pulling over, the driver led police on a lengthy and dangerous high

- speed chase

. Police tried to end the pursuit using stop sticks and multiple vehicle maneuvers but were unsuccessful. Finally, after hitting a p olice car head on , the car stopped.

Brown sat in the p assenger seat with his hands up

. A s an officer pull ed the passenger door handle , t he driver put the car in reverse. T he officer’s hand got stuck in the door, causing him to get dragged alongside the car. T he driver then backed
into a police car and rolled forward over the officer’s legs. The officer on the ground started shooting at the driver , and a s the car move d toward other officers

, they also
started to shoot

. Ultimately, 14 bullets hit the driver and 3 hit Brown, killing both.

Brown’s estate sued WMPD officers and the chief of police under § 1983 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, alleging excessive force and state

- created danger, among other things

. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers

, concluding that Brown wasn’t seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
and that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the state

- created danger
claim . Brown ’s estate appeals

.

II.

W e review the grant of summary judgment de novo

. Rynders v. Williams , 650 F.3d 1188, 1194 (8th Cir. 2011) . “ Summary judgment is proper if, after viewing the

1 The Honorable Kristine G. Baker, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas.-3- evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the

nonmov ant, no genuine issues of material fact exist and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ” Rau v. Roberts , 640 F.3d 324, 327 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted)

.

A.

W e first turn to the e state’s excessive force claim. To determine whether the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, we “ ask
whether the amount of force used was objectively reasonable under the particular
circumstances.” 2 Banks v. Hawkins , 999 F.3d 521, 525 (8 th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).
W e analyze reasonableness “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight

, ” and “balanc[e]

. . . the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individua l’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Plumhoff v. Rickard , 572 U.S. 765, 774

− 75 (2014) (citation s omitted).

Here, i t is undisputed that Brown had his hands up. And we have no doubt
that shooting into the car posed a substantial risk of serious bodily harm to him

. But

t he driver had just led police on a reckless, high

- speed chase, which involved swerving into oncoming traffic , hitting a police car, and resisting efforts to stop the

car by other means

. By the time officers started shooting, the car had run over one officer’s legs and was headed toward other s

. All things considered, officers acted reasonably in using deadly force, and the district court didn’t err in granting summary judgment

. See id. at 776

− 77 ( holding that officers acted reasonably where they shot the plaintiff at the end of a high

- speed chase and where the plaintiff evaded and posed “a grave public safety risk” at the time of the shooting).

2 We assume without deciding that Brown was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.-4- B.

We turn now to the estate’s state

- created danger claim. “We have held the Due Process Clause imposes a duty on state actors to protect or care for citizens

. . . when the state affirmatively places a particular individu al in a position of danger the
individual would not otherwise have faced.” Gregory v. City of Rogers , 974 F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 1992).

Brown suggests that officers violated his d ue p rocess r ights by failing to protect him from the danger they created. But a s the district court explained, the “defendant officers did not place Mr. Brown in a position of danger that he would
not otherwise have faced.” It was the driver who put Brown in extreme danger, not
the police officers

. See generally Plumhoff , 572 U.S. at 778 (noting that a driver put

a passenger “in danger by fleeing and refusing to end the chase”) . For this reason,
Brown’s state

- created danger claim fails.

III.

We affirm the judgment of the district court.

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