[Cite as State v. Compton, 2021-Ohio-1513.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 MONTGOMERY COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

v. 

BRYON M. COMPTON 

Defendant-Appellant 

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Appellate Case No. 28912 

Trial Court Case No. 2020-CR-1185/1 

(Criminal Appeal from 

Common Pleas Court) 

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O P I N I O N 

Rendered on the 30th day of April, 2021. 

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MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by JAMIE J. RIZZO, Atty. Reg. No. 0099218, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, 

Montgomery County Courts Building, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422

 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 

 

HILARY LERMAN, Atty. Reg. No. 0029975, 249 Wyoming Street, Dayton, Ohio 45409 

 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

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WELBAUM, J. 
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{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Bryon M. Compton, appeals from his conviction in the 

Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas after he pled guilty to one count of 

aggravated robbery. In support of his appeal, Compton contends that the law under 

which he was sentenced—the Reagan Tokes Law (S.B. 201)—is unconstitutional. For 

the reasons outlined below, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed. 

Facts and Course of Proceedings 

{¶ 2} On May 12, 2020, a Montgomery County grand jury returned an indictment 

charging Compton with one count of aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 

2911.01(A)(1), a felony of the first degree, which included a three-year firearm 

specification. The indictment also charged Compton with one count of obstructing official 

business in violation of R.C. 2921.31(A), a felony of the fifth degree. 

{¶ 3} On August 28, 2020, Compton pled guilty to the aggravated robbery, in 

exchange for which the State agreed to dismiss the attendant three-year firearm 

specification and the charge of obstructing official business. After engaging Compton in 

the necessary plea colloquy, the trial court accepted Compton’s guilty plea and scheduled 

the matter for sentencing. 

{¶ 4} On September 11, 2020, the trial court sentenced Compton to serve a 

minimum term of four years in prison and a maximum term of six years in prison. The 

trial court then ordered Compton’s prison term to be served concurrently with a ninemonth prison term imposed for a drug offense in Montgomery C.P. No. 2019-CR-4159. 

Following the trial court’s sentencing decision, Compton immediately objected to the 

constitutionality of the law under which he was sentenced—the Reagan Tokes Law. 
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{¶ 5} Compton now appeals from his conviction, raising three assignments of error 

for review. Because Compton’s three assignments are interrelated, for ease of 

discussion, we will address them together.

Assignments of Error 

{¶ 6} Under each of his three assigned errors, Compton contends that the law 

under which his indefinite sentence was imposed—the Reagan Tokes Law (S.B. 201)—

is unconstitutional. Compton claims that the Reagan Tokes Law is unconstitutional 

because it violates the separation-of-powers doctrine and the right to due process. We 

disagree. 

{¶ 7} Pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law, qualifying first and second-degree 

felonies committed on or after March 22, 2019, are subject to the imposition of indefinite 

sentences. Indefinite sentences consist of a minimum term and a maximum term. The 

trial court selects the minimum term from a range of terms set forth in R.C. 2929.14(A). 

Once the minimum term is selected, the trial court calculates the maximum term using 

formulas set forth in R.C. 2929.144(B). 

{¶ 8} When an offender’s minimum term expires, there is a presumption that the 

offender shall be released from prison. R.C. 2967.271(B). The Ohio Department of 

Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”), however, may rebut the presumption for release 

and hold an offender in custody up to the maximum term. R.C. 2967.271(C). In order 

to do this, the ODRC must first hold a hearing and find that certain statutory factors apply 

to the offender. Id. The statutory factors relate to the offender’s conduct while in prison. 

See R.C. 2967.271(C)(1)-(3). 
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{¶ 9} “As with any statute enacted by the General Assembly, the Reagan Tokes 

Law is entitled to a ‘strong presumption of constitutionality.’ ” State v. Leet, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 28670, 2020-Ohio-4592, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Romage, 138 Ohio St.3d 

390, 2014-Ohio-783, 7 N.E.3d 1156, ¶ 7. “Thus, ‘if at all possible, statutes must be 

construed in conformity with the Ohio and the United States Constitutions.’ ” Id., quoting 

State v. Collier, 62 Ohio St.3d 267, 269, 581 N.E.2d 552 (1991). “A party challenging 

the constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of proving that it is unconstitutional 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., citing State v. Bloomer, 122 Ohio St.3d 200, 2009-

Ohio-2462, 909 N.E.2d 1254, ¶ 41, citing State v. Ferguson, 120 Ohio St.3d 7, 2008-

Ohio-4824, 896 N.E.2d 110, ¶ 12. 

Separation of Powers

{¶ 10} Under his first assignment of error, Compton contends that the sentencing 

scheme set forth in the Reagan Tokes Law violates the separation-of-powers doctrine 

because it usurps the role of the judiciary by giving the ODRC (the executive branch of 

government) authority to sentence offenders to a longer prison term. 

{¶ 11} We recently considered the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law in 

State v. Ferguson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28644, 2020-Ohio-4153 and concluded that 

it does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine. We reached this conclusion 

because we found that the Law’s scheme is consistent with established authority from the 

Supreme Court of Ohio, which held that “when the power to sanction is delegated to the 

executive branch, a separation-of-powers problem is avoided if the sanction is originally 

imposed by a court and included in its sentence.” Ferguson at ¶ 23, citing Hernandez v. 
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Kelly, 108 Ohio St.3d 395, 2006-Ohio-126, 844 N.E.2d 301, ¶ 18-20, citing State v. 

Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, ¶ 19, citing Woods v. Telb, 

89 Ohio St.3d 504, 512-513, 733 N.E.2d 1103 (2000). 

{¶ 12} As in Ferguson, the minimum and maximum prison terms in this case were 

originally imposed by the trial court and were included as part of the trial court’s sentence. 

See Judgment Entry of Conviction (Sept. 18, 2020). Because the Reagan Tokes Law 

does not allow the ODRC to lengthen an offender’s sentence beyond the maximum 

sentence imposed by the trial court, we once again hold that the Law does not violate the 

separation-of-powers doctrine. Ferguson at ¶ 23. See also State v. Barnes, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 28613, 2020-Ohio-4150, ¶ 36. 

Due Process 

{¶ 13} Under his second and third assignments of error, Compton contends that 

the Reagan Tokes Law violates due process because it: (1) does not provide sufficient 

notice of what conduct will cause the ODRC to rebut the presumption for release after 

expiration of the minimum term; and (2) provides the ODRC with a “high degree of official 

discretion” to rebut the presumption for release without sufficient guidance or safeguards 

to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 

{¶ 14} Just like Compton’s arguments regarding the separation-of-powers 

doctrine, in Ferguson, this court already determined that the Reagan Tokes Law does not 

violate due process. In this regard, we commented that: 

“[T]he fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity 

to be heard in a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” * * * The 
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Reagan Tokes Law satisfies these requirements. The Law states that, in 

order to rebut the presumption of the minimum term, the [ODRC] must make 

a particular statutory determination “at a hearing.” R.C. 2967.271(C) and 

(D). The Law does not give the [ODRC] unfettered discretion to require an 

offender to serve more than the minimum term. And it affords an offender 

notice and an opportunity to be heard before more than the minimum may 

be required. 

Ferguson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28644, 2020-Ohio-4153 at ¶ 25, quoting Woods, 89 

Ohio St.3d 504, 513, 733 N.E.2d 1103, citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267, 90 

S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970). 

{¶ 15} Similarly, the Eighth District Court of Appeals noted in State v. Simmons, 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109476, 2021-Ohio-939, that: 

[The ODRC] is constrained in its ability to hold an offender past the 

minimum term. R.C. 2967.271(C)(1), (2) and (3) set forth very specific 

factors for the [ODRC] to consider in determining whether an inmate may 

be imprisoned beyond his minimum release date, thereby limiting its 

discretion. Inmates are given adequate notice of the conduct that will lead 

to rule infractions or restrictive housing assignments, factors that trigger the 

[ODRC] to extend an inmate’s minimum term of incarceration. Ohio Adm. 

Code 5120-9-06 sets forth inmate rules of conduct. Ohio Adm. Code 5120-

9-08 provides detailed disciplinary procedures for inmate rule violations, 

with a hearing before the Rules Infraction Board and notice to the inmate of 

the hearing and an opportunity to appeal the decision of the board. Ohio 
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Adm. Code 5120-9-10 sets forth the procedures for when and under what 

circumstances an inmate may be placed in and/or transferred to a restrictive 

housing assignment. These provisions of the Reagan Tokes Law [R.C. 

2967.271(C)(1)-(3)] provide adequate notice and an opportunity to be 

heard. 

Id. at ¶ 21, citing State v. Wilburn, 2021-Ohio-578, --- N.E.3d ---, ¶ 36 (8th Dist.). 

{¶ 16} While Compton acknowledges that R.C. 2967.271(C) requires a hearing 

and statutory findings before additional prison time is imposed, he nevertheless contends 

that the statute is vague in that it provides no structure as to how the hearing will be 

conducted or what rights the defendant will have at the hearing. In so arguing, Compton 

suggests that when undergoing a hearing pursuant to R.C. 2967.271(C), an offender 

should be entitled to due process rights that are associated with criminal trials. 

However, “the fact that prisoners retain rights under the Due Process Clause in no way 

implies that these rights are not subject to restrictions imposed by the nature of the regime 

to which they have been lawfully committed.” (Citations omitted.) Wolff v. McDonnell, 

418 U.S. 539, 556, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). For example, “[p]rison 

disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of 

rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Id. 

{¶ 17} This court has noted that “[r]equiring a defendant to remain in prison beyond 

the presumptive minimum term is akin to the decision to grant or deny parole[.]” Leet, 

2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28670, 2020-Ohio-4592, at ¶ 17. “In the context of parole 

proceedings, the United States Supreme Court has held that the required due process 

procedures are minimal. Specifically, the court has found that a prisoner subject to 
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parole receives adequate due process when he is allowed an opportunity to be heard and 

is provided a statement of the reasons why parole was denied.” Wilburn at ¶ 30, citing 

Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 220, 131 S.Ct. 859, 178 L.Ed.2d 732 (2011), citing 

Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 16, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 

60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979). “ ‘The Constitution * * * does not require more.’ ” Id., quoting 

Swarthout at 220. 

{¶ 18} Because the procedures employed under the Reagan Tokes Law provide 

for notice of a hearing at which an offender has an opportunity to be heard, and because 

the Reagan Tokes Law does not give the ODRC unfettered discretion to decide when an 

offender must serve more than the minimum term, we once again hold that the Law does 

not violate an offender’s right to due process. 

{¶ 19} For the foregoing reasons, Compton has failed to prove that the Reagan 

Tokes Law is unconstitutional, and thus has not shown that his sentence is unlawful. 

Therefore, Compton’s first, second, and third assignments of error are overruled. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 20} Having overruled all of Compton’s assignments of error, the judgment of the 

trial court is affirmed. 

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TUCKER, P.J. and DONOVAN, J., concur. 

Copies sent to: 

Mathias H. Heck, Jr. 

Jamie J. Rizzo 

Hilary Lerman 

Hon. Mary Katherine Huffman 
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