### In the 

# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

____________________ No. 17

- 1998
R ODRIGO R AMOS

- B RAGA , Petitioner ,

v. J EFF ERSON B. S ESSIONS III , Attorney General of the U nited States, Respondent

.

____________________
Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. No. A 097

- 837

- 809

____________________ A RGUED J ANUARY 24, 2018

— D ECIDED M AY 21, 2018

____________________
Before B AUER , K ANNE , and B ARRETT , Circuit Judges

. P ER C URIAM

. Rodrigo Ramos

- Braga, a citizen of Brazil, petitions for review of the denial of his second motion to reopen proceedings on his applications for special

- rule cancellation of removal, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) . His motion was both numerically barred and untimely filed with the Board of Immigration Appeals, but Ramos

- Braga argued that these limits2 No. 17

- 1998
should be excused under the doctrine of equitable tolling for i neffective assistance of counsel or under a statutory exception based on changed country conditions. The Board determined that neither exception applied and that t he time and numerical limit s therefore barred his motion. Because the Board did not abuse its discretion, we deny the petition.
I.
Ramos

- Braga was raised in a neighborhood of São Paulo, Brazil that came to be controlled by a multi

- national gang named the Primero Comando Capital (PCC). His father dealt drugs for the gang and was one of its managers, until he had a falling out with the gang ’ s leader. Starting when Ramos

Braga was 13, the PCC tried repeatedly to recruit him, but he refused to join. Unrel enting, PCC members caught Ramos

Braga at school and around town, physically attacked him atleast ten times, and eventually threatened him with death. Initially, Ramos

- Braga reported these attacks to Brazilian officials, but local police did nothing in re sponse and eventually, officers would beat him when he made reports , claiming thathe was a suspected gang member. At age 16 he stopped reporting his PCC encounters to police because in one instance officers beat him until he spat blood, and he came to bel ievethat the police were paid by the PCC to harm him. When Ramos

- Braga was about 18 years old, PCC members offered him

one “ last chance ” to join; after he refused they assaulted him with pipes

— severely injuring him and hospitalizing him for two weeks. He stopped attending college and spent months moving between homes of his family members in other parts of the city and another town. When he returned to São Paulo, a PCC member shot him from behind, putting him back in the hospital for days.No. 17

- 1998 3
In January 1999 , t hree months after being shot, Ramos

Braga was admitted to the United States on a student visa. Heeventually married a U.S. citizen, but the two had a tumultuous relationship. Ramos

- Braga estimated that his wife physically abused him over 100 times.
Se ven years after he arrived , the Department of Homeland Security issued a Notice to Appear charging Ramos

- Bragawith overstaying his visa and therefore being removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B). Ramos

- Braga conceded his removability and eventually soug ht special

- rule cancellation of removal for battered spouses and withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) and CAT. While removal proceedings were pending, Ramos

- Braga and his wife got into a fight. H e was convicted of battery under Wisconsin law and, after he used a jailhouse phone to ask his wife not to testify, intimidation of a witness, WIS. STAT. §§ 940.19(1), 940.42. DHS added a charge that he was removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) for having been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude. He challenged removability on this ground

. At his removal hearing, Ramos

- Braga testified about the beatings by PCC members and police officers

. H e also said that the gang recruited young men and that he believed he specifically was recruited because of something his father had done, but he did not know what. The IJ found Ramos

- Braga credible but denied his applications for special

- rule cancellation and withholding and ordered him removed to Brazil. To obtain special

- rule cancellation, Ramos

- Braga had to prove, among other things, that he had been battered by his wife and was not subject to certain disqualifying grounds of4 No. 17

- 1998
removability or inadmissib ility. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2). The IJ concluded that Ramos

- Braga was disqualified on two grounds: his convictions for battery and witness intimidation were crimes of moral turpitude , and he had been confined in excess of five years total for past convi ctions

. S ee 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(b)(2)(A)(iv), 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 1182(a)(2) (B), 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).
Ramos

- Braga could receive withholding of removal in two ways: either under statute or under CAT. To receive withholding of removal under statute, he had to prove that it was morelikely than not that, if he were removed, he would be persecuted in Brazil on account of his membership in a particular social group. See id. § 1231(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b). The IJ concluded that Ramos

- Braga suffered past persec ution but presented “ little proof ” that this persecution was on accountof his particular social group, namely his family ties to his father. Instead, “ the greater weight of the evidence support[ed] the conclusion that he was persecuted because he refused the PCC ’ s recruitment efforts. ” To merit withholding under CAT, Ramos

- Braga had to demonstrate that it was more likely than not that , if removed to Brazil , he would be tortured by or with the acquiescence of a public official. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). The IJ determined that he did not carry hisburden to prove that he was more likely than not to be tortured by either the police or PCC

. Ramos

- Braga, who was represented by counsel, appealedthe denial of his applications for withholding but not the deni al of special

- rule cancellation. The Board affirmed the IJ ’ s decision on December 18, 2014. In January 2015, Ramos

- Braga petitioned this court for review and moved to stay his removal. H is attorney ended theNo. 17

- 1998 5
representation over a fee dispute, however, and Ramos

- Braga continued pro se , filing motions in this court and, after his petition was denied, another petition for review that was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction for having been filed more than 30 days after the final order of removal.
R amos

- Braga, still pro se, moved the Board to reopen proceedings on his applications for relief from removal and to reconsider its dismissal order. The Board denied his motion asuntimely in June 2015, but he maintains he never received notice of this decision.
Ramos

- Braga filed a second pro se motion to reopen or reconsider on August 31, 2015, and at issue here is the Board ’ s denial of that motion on the grounds that it was untimely and successive. Ramos

- Braga explained that his motion to reopen was late because his f ormer attorney had promised repeatedlyto file a timely motion, but he never did. He also said that conditions in Brazil had gotten worse since the hearing, and he offered evidence to that effect

. A year later, in August 2016, Ramos

- Braga retained his pres ent attorney, who filed a supplemental brief supporting the still

- pending second motion to reopen. T hrough counsel, Ramos

- Braga argued that his second motion to reopen should not have been barred because the exceptions for equitable tolling for ineffective assistance of counsel and changed conditions in the country of removalexcused his noncompliance. Regarding the first exception, Ramos

- Braga said that his attorney in the original appeal to the Board had waived meritorious arguments for special

- rule

cance llation and withholding under CAT. The Board denied the second motion to reopen based on its conclusion that Ramos

- Braga did not meet either exception. Equitable tolling could not benefit him, the Board said,6 No. 17

- 1998

because he did not file his motion as soon as possible after learning of his former attorney ’ s alleged errors, nor was he pre judiced by any possible error. The Board also concluded that he did not offer evidence of conditions in Brazil that had changed since the removal hearing; his evidence of “ ongoing ” PCC threats were a “ continuation ” of past har ms he experienced in Brazil

. II
N oncitizens can file just one motion to reopen immigration proceedings, and that motion must be submitted within 90 days of the final order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1 229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i). These time and numerical limits are, ho wever, non

- jurisdictional claim

- processing rules, subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling and statutory exceptions

. See Mata v. Lynch , 135 S. Ct. 2150, 2154 (2015); Ji Cheng Ni v. Holder , 7 15 F.3d 620, 623 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii)); Pervaiz v. Gonzales , 405 F.3d 488, 490 (7th Cir. 2005). The question here is narrow : we must decide only wheth er the Board wrongly conclud ed that neither equitable tolling nor change d conditions excuse the limits on Ramos

- Braga ’ s second motion to reopen. 1 This court reviews the Board ’ s denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion, and an

1 Ramos

- Braga also argues that the Board wrongly denied his motion to reconsider the Board’s order d ismissing his original appeal. T he Board denied t his motion also for being inexcusably untimely and numerically barred, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(A), (B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) , without consider ing whether the underlying dismissal order required reconsideration. W e therefore have no merits decision to review on the issue o f reconsideration

.No. 17

- 1998 7

abuse occurs if the decision lacks a “ rational explanation, inexplicably depart[s] from established policies, or re st[s] on [either] an impermissible basis , ” Marinov v. Holder , 687 F.3d 365, 368 (7th Cir. 2012) , or legal error, Habib v. Lynch , 787 F.3d 826, 831 (7th Cir. 2015)

. A. Equitable Tolling
Ramos

- Braga contends that the Board wrongly refused to equitably toll the limits on his second motion to reopen his applications for special

- rule cancellation and wit hholding of removal under CAT. Equitable tolling applies if the noncitizen demonstrates pr ejudice from counsel ’ s deficient performance and exhibits diligence by seeking relief as soon as reasonably possible

. See Yusev v. Sessions , 851 F.3d 763, 767 (7th Cir. 2017). Even if we assum e the Board erred in its analysis of diligence, Ramos

- Braga has failed to show that he was prejudiced by his former attorney ’ s errors. Ramos

- Braga argues that he

was prejudiced by the attorney ’ s failures to appeal (1) the denial of his application for special

- rule cancellation and (2) the IJ ’ s conclusion , in denying C AT relief, that the PCC was not likely to torture him with the government ’ s acquiescence upon his return to Brazil.
1

. Special

- Rule Cancellation
Ramos

- Braga contends that his former attorney should have appealed the denial of special

- rule cancellation and argu ed that he remained eligible for this relief because , contrary to the IJ ’ s conclusion, his battery conviction is not a crime involving moral turpitude.
But Ramos

- Braga overlooks the IJ ’ s other reason for concluding that he was ineligible for special

- r ule cancellation

— his confinement in excess of 5 years, see 8 U.S.C.8 No. 17

- 1998

§§ 1229b(b)(2) (A)(iv), 1182(a)(2)(B) , on convictions for battery,witness intimidation, disorderly conduct, and multiple occasions of operating a vehicle while intoxicated

. T his was one

re ason the Board decided that Ra mos

- Braga was not prejudiced . The Board said t his disqualifying ground could not be waived , and rest ed this conclusion on its statutory interpretation in Matter of Y

- N

- P

- , 26 I. & N. Dec. 10 , 17 (BIA 2012) (deciding that the o nly waiver applicable to special

- rule cancellation is located in 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(5) , which excuses certai n domestic

- violence convictions ). Two other circuits have deferred to the Board ’ s interpretation

. See Arevalo v. U.S. Att ’ y Gen. , 872 F.3d 1184, 1190 (11th Cir. 2017); Garcia

- Mendez v. Lynch , 788 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015). Ramos

- Braga has not argued that the Board ’ s interpretation is unreasonable. Without such an argument, the petition fails to address the Board ’ s conclusion that Ramos

- Braga is ineligible for special

rule cancellation , even if his battery conviction is not a crime involving moral turpitude

. Because Ramos

- Braga would remain ineligible for special

rule cancellation even if his former attorney had raised the argument he presses now, the attorney ’ s omission of this argument could not have prejudiced his appeal . The Board reasonably concluded , therefore , that Ramos

- Braga suffered no prejudice by his former attorney ’ s failure to appeal the denial of special

- rule ca ncellation.
2. Withholding under CAT
Ramos

- Braga argues next that he was prejudiced in the appeal of his denied CAT application

. He contends that his former attorney should have argued that the IJ failed to consider evidence that , if he is removed to Brazil, the PCC would torture him without intervention by public officials

. In denyingNo. 17

- 1998 9
the second motion to reopen, t he Board said this potential error could no t have prejudice d Ramos

- Braga because the evidence he offered, to the IJ originally and in suppo rt of reopening , could not establish that official torture or acquiesce nce
was more likely than not

.

“ CAT protection requires evidence that the Petitioner will be tortured by the government, or with the government ’ s acquiescence. ” Lopez v. Lynch , 810 F.3 d 484, 492 (7th Cir. 2016). A cquiescence means “ the public official, prior to the activity constituting torture, ha [d] awareness of such activity and thereafter breach [ed] his or her legal responsibility to interv ene to prevent such activity. ” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7) ; Lopez , 810 F.3d at 49 3

. We will reverse the Board ’ s conclusion that Ramos

- Braga ’ s evidence is insufficient only if the evidence compels the conclusion that official acquiescence is more likely than not. See Orellana

- Arias v. Sessions , 865 F. 3d 476, 490 (7th Cir. 2017)

. Relying on our precedent in Rodriguez

- Molinero v. Lynch , 808 F.3d 1134 (7th Cir. 2015), Ramos

- Braga argues that there is a “ substantial risk ” that the Brazilian government will acquiesce to his torture by the PCC if he is remo ved to Brazil. But his evidence does not compel that conclusion.

Ramos

- Braga relies heavily on the violence he experienced at the hands of the police and the PCC when he was a teenager. Yet t he fact that Ramos

- Braga was beaten by police roughly twenty years ago does not show that he is likely to be tortured by officials today

. See Lopez , 810 F.3d at 493 ( noting that man who stabbed petitioner twenty

- five years earlier may no longer seek to harm p etitioner )

. Moreover , Ramos

Braga has offered nothing more than his own speculation that10 No. 17

- 1998
the police a c t ed at the PCC ’ s urging when they attacked him

. See Lhanzom v. Gonzales , 430 F.3d 833, 845 (7th Cir. 2005) (reversing IJ ’ s decision that rested on testimony for which witness had no personal knowledge). The evide nce of his beatings by the PCC in the late 1990s is similarly stale. Even if the Brazilian government acquiesced to that violence , its conduct twenty years ago is not compelling evidence of how the government would respond to such violence today.
Ramos

- Braga introduced more current evidence as well. His strongest evidence is an affidavit from his mother. In 2016 , his mother complained to police after PCC members, allegedly acting on a vendetta against Ramos

- Braga, robbed his grandfather at home in 2015 and threaten ed his mother in 2016. According to Ramos

- Braga ’s mother , PCC members stated over the internet that they “will be waiting” for Ramos

Braga when he returns home. Officers in one district referred his mother to another district, which promis ed to investigate the 2016 threats, but the investigation has not been resolved. Ramos

- Braga takes the referral of the complaint from one office to another and the lack of resolution as evidence that the police are unwilling to protect his family

— and, ulti mately, him

— from the PCC.
The PCC’s threats to Ramos

- Braga’s family do offer support for his contention that the PCC is likely to torture him ifhe returns to Brazil. But CAT offers protection from government torture , not private conduct. Thus, Ramos

- Braga cannot secure relief simply by showing a substantial risk that the PCC will torture him ; he must demonstrate that there is a substa ntial risk that Brazilian officials will acquiesce in the torture. This is where Ramos

- Braga’s claim founders.No. 17

- 1998 11
The police department’s response to the complaint lodged by Ramos

- Braga’s mother falls far short of establishing that the police are indifferent to or complicit in the PCC’s threats to Ramos

- Braga’s family. For one thing, the police promised to investigate

— they neit her ignored nor denied his mother’s request for help. Ramos

- Braga contends that the police gave his mother the run

- around, but the evidence does not support that inference

. Referring a complaint from one district to another is more consistent with bureaucr acy than animosity , and the fact that the investigation is not yet resolved does not mean that the police are turning a blind eye to the PCC

. Again, we will only disturb the B oard ’ s determination if substantial evidence on the record compels a contrary conclusion. When reviewing a claim that the government acquies ced to torture , w e have required much more evidence of official complicity or corruption to satisfy that standard than Ramos

Braga has offered

. For example, in Rodriguez

- Molinero , we granted a p etition for review because the petitioner demonstrated a substantial risk that the Mexican government wouldacquiesce to, or even collaborate in, his torture by a drug cartel. 808 F.3d at 1138

– 1140. This conclusion was based on the fact that the petitioner had been previously tortured by the police at the behest of the drug cartel, as well as unchallenged expert testimony that the Mexican government is rife with corruption and helpless to prevent gang violence throughout the country. Id. at 1136

– 37. In Wanj iru v. Holder , 705 F.3d 258 (7th Cir. 2013) , we remanded a CAT claim because the IJ brushed over “ extensive evidence ” that police and government officials abetted and directed a gang that posed a threat of torture to the petitioner. Id. at 266. Indeed, the International Criminal Court had “ confirmed charges (a step similar to finding probable cause) ” against two senior Kenyan officials12 No. 17

- 1998
for allegedly using the gang to murder thousands of citizens. Id. In Mendoza

- Sanchez , 808 F.3d 1182 (7th Cir. 2015), we rem anded (at the government ’ s request) and said that an applicant had a “ strong ” CAT claim because he had evidence thatpolice officers in Mexico routinely collaborated with and protected a nationwide gang that had targeted him. Id. at 1184

– 85. A human

- right s report from the State Department detailed widespread corruption of Mexican police, who, at both the city and state level, were directly involved in the activities of drug organizations by “ kidnapping, extort[ing], and providing protection for, or acting directly on behalf of, organized crime and drug traffickers. ” Id. at 1184

. In each of these cases , the petitioner showed that the government is utterly indifferent or downright complicit in the face of violen ce and torture by gangs

. Ramos

- Braga arguesthat the PCC wields similar influence in the Brazilian governm ent, but his evidence belies that argument.
Ramos

- Braga contends that the PCC has “ infiltrated ” the Brazilian police forces , and he offers a news article reporting that PCC members “ may have pa rticipated ” in explosives trainings for police officers in São Paulo. If gang members had infiltrated police forces, this would indeed be evidence that the government is unable to protect people targeted by the gang. See Mendoza

- Sanchez , 808 F.3d at 118 3, 11 85. But the report Ramos

- Braga offers falls well short of showing that PCC members are within the ranks of Brazilian police. Accordingto the report, some of the explosives training courses were offered by private contractors who failed to perform backgr ound checks

–– possibly allowing PCC members to register for the course without the knowledge of the São Paulo police department. Evidence of a poorly planned explosives traini ngNo. 17

- 1998 13
does not demonstrate that the Brazilian police have been infiltrated by the PCC

. In fact, Ramos

- Braga ’s own evidence undermine s his argument that officials and the PCC cooperate. Th e article about explosive trainings discloses that in 2012 the PCC frequently attacked police forces, and that the two sides committed around 200 “revenge killings” within a couple months. A 2014article from a Brazilian newspaper shows that Brazilian officials initiated a new operation against the PCC and detained members attempting to smu ggle drugs out of the country. Other reports he offered show that po lice have arrested dozens of PCC members and that Brazilian authorities are in a “bloody struggle” to subvert the PCC. Ramos

- Braga did offer a report from the Australian government showing that some Brazilian officials were corrupt as of 2012 ; police offic ers were
ar rested for selling information to the PCC about investigations of the gang’s drug trafficking, while other officers extracted bribes from the PCC through kidnapping and abusing the family of PCC members. However, t he report does not show , as Ram os

- Braga asserts , that corrupt police physically harm ed citizens to assist the PCC

. Finally, Ramos

- Braga presents n ews articles and a country report issued in 2013 by the U.S. Department of State that, taken together, show that police officers in Brazil “ r outinely ” kill criminal suspects, targeting men from the “ slums. ” These reports do not suggest police complicity with the PCC; Ramos

- Braga introduces them to show that the police may target him because he is from the slums, and police in his hometownmay attack him for resembling his father, a criminal. But reports that police officers target men from the slums generally14 No. 17

- 1998
is not evidence that they would torture Ramos

- Braga specifically

. See Orellana

- Arias , 865 F.3d at 490 (concluding that country reports of government ’ s acquiescence to violence against citizens was not evidence that government would acquiesce to torture of petitioner specifically); Lopez , 810 F.3d at 493 (deciding that petitioner, a gay ma n, did not show threat of violence specific to him by submitting reports that gay men have been victims of violence); Rashiah v. Ashcroft , 388 F.3d 1126, 1133 (7th Cir. 2004) (concluding that CAT relief was unavailable to applicant who offered country repo rt describing instances of torture but no evidence that he would be specifically targeted). Twenty years ago p olice officers knew Ramos

Braga lived in the slums and suspected he was a criminal, but there is no evidence that these officers remain with the f orce or that they would recognize him today

. In sum, Ramos

- Braga ’ s past experiences are troubling , but his evidence does not com pel the conclusion that Brazilian officials today would torture him or permit the PCC to do so. Thus w e will not disturb the Bo ard ’ s conclusion that Ramos

Braga offered insufficient evidence of official acquiescence. And b ecause Ramos

- Braga ’ s evidence is insufficient , he was not prejudiced by any possible attorney error in the appeal of his CAT application. The Board therefore did not abuse its discretion in deciding that equitable tolling did not apply to Ramos

- Braga ’ s second motion to reopen

. B. Changed Conditions
Ramos

- Braga also contends that changed conditions in Brazil warrant reopening his applications for withholding ofNo. 17

- 1998 15

re moval. 2 No time or numeric limits apply to a motion to reopen that is based on “changed circumstanc es arising ... in the country to which deportation has been ordered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). For this exception to apply, Ramos

- Braga need s evidence of a changed country condition that is “material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented” at the removal hearing. See id .; Ji Cheng Ni , 715 F.3d at 623. This court’s task is to determine whether the Board abused its discretion in deciding that changed country conditions do not excus e the limits on Ramos

- Braga’s motion to reopen

. See Kebe v. Gonzales , 473 F.3d 855 , 85 7 (7th Cir. 2007)

. We conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion

. To show that conditions in Brazil have changed, Ramos

Braga offered evidence that: (1) the PCC has “marked” him to die because the gang’s leader believes his brother and two cousins were killed by Ramos

- Braga’s father in 1997; (2) the PCC has “barbarically murdered” eight of Ramos

- Braga’s cousi ns, most recently in 2013; (3) the PCC has offered a reward for Ramos

- Braga’s whereabouts; (4) after the PCC learned that Ramos

- Braga might return to Brazil, they robbed his grandfather at home using a gun in 2015 and threatened his mother over the interne t in 2016; (5) one police district referred his mother’s request to investigate the 2016 threats , and the other district promised to investigate the threats , but the investigation has not been resolved ; and (6) Brazilian police

2 Ramos

- Braga also incorporates into his withholding arguments his view that changed conditions in Brazil warrant reopening proceedings so that he can apply for asylum. But the Board never had an opportunity to consider arguments related to asylum because Ramos

- Braga did not develop them in his motion to reopen at issue here . We therefore express no opinion on this portion of his petition

.16 No. 17

- 1998

have routinely committed ext rajudicial killings of men from the slums whom they suspect to be criminals

. 1

. Withholding under CAT Pertaining to his CAT application, Ramos

- Braga argues that the PCC ’ s recent growth and threats are a changed condition that the Board “ irrationally ” dis counted as a “ continuation ” of dangers that he previously experienced in Brazil. He relies on a n out

- of

- circuit decision, Malty v. Ashcroft , 381 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2004) , in which the Ninth Circuit said “ changed circumstances will almost alwa ys relate to [ an] initial claim

.... The critical question is

... whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim

... now has a well

- founded ” claim. Id. at 945

. A worsening PCC threat i s , however, im material to whether Ramos

- Braga ’ s CAT application must be reopened. As discussed above, he needed but failed to offer evidence that compels finding that Brazilian officials would acquiesce to his torture by the PCC

. Ramos

- Braga also argues that the Board ignored new evidence that he would face torture directly from public officials if he is removed to Brazil

. H e a gain points to the recent news articles reporting that Brazilian police have targeted men from the slums and criminal suspects for extrajudicial killings

. He stresse s that police in his hometown beat him , possibly susp ecting he was a criminal because he lived in the slums

. He says that his evidence , together, establishes a substantial likelihood that police officers will torture him. Th e Board , while conside ring Ramos

- Braga ’s argument for equitable tolling, said that the evidence he offered

— initially and with his second motion to reopen

— did not show that officials were more likely than not to torture him.No. 17

- 1998 17

We will reverse the Board’s conclusion that Ramos

Braga’s evidence is insufficient only if the evidence compels a contrary conclusion

. See Lopez , 810 F.3d at 492

– 93

. As explained above, t he articles Ramos

- Braga recently offered do not compel the conclusion that public official s are more likely than not to torture him

. We have said that reports that officials have tortured members of a certain group do not necessarily demonstrate that a petitioner who belongs to that group would face a substantial risk of torture if removed

. Bernard v. Sessions , 881 F.3d 1042, 104 7

– 48 (7th Cir. 2018)

. To show a risk specific to him , Ramos

- Braga needed evidence that Brazilian police would recognize him as part of the groups targeted for torture

. S ee Lopez , 810 F.3d at 493; Rashiah , 388 F.3d at 1133. Yet h e offer ed no evidence that Brazilian police today would suspect him of crime or would know, roughly twenty years later, that he lived in the slums in 1998

. To the extent he fears police torture because he would be forced to live in the slums if remove d to Brazil , this fear of generalized violence is insufficient to establish that he in particular is more likely than not to be tortured

. See Lozano

- Zuniga v. Lynch , 832 F.3d 822, 830

– 31 (7th Cir. 2016).
Because Ramos

- Braga did not present evidence that conditions in Brazil have changed such that he now may have a CAT claim, t he Board did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to reopen proceedings on that form of relief

. 2. Withholding under Stat ute
Ramos

- Braga next argues that changed conditio ns in Brazil excuse the limits on his motion to reopen his application for withholding under statute, but again he is wrong. He first points to new evidence that the PCC ’ s intent to kill him stems from the g ang leader ’ s desire to avenge the murders of his18 No. 17

- 1998
family members. But this motive has not changed since the killings of the gang leader ’ s family in 1997, well before the2014 removal hearing, and thus the motivation, though recently discovered, is not a cha nged condition. Second, Ramos

- Braga argues that the PCC ’ s offer of a reward for his whereabouts is a changed condition, but he has not carried his evidentiary burden. To show that the reward offer is a changed condition, Ramos

- Braga needed evidence that t he offer was made after the removal hearing. See Xiu Zhen Lin v. Mukasey , 532 F.3d 596, 59 6

– 97 (7th Cir. 2008). In hispetition he sidesteps his burden and contends the Board speculated that the reward offer might date back to 199 8 . But that i s not what th e Board said; it observed that the gang ’ s intent to harm him dated that far back and said that no evidence, including an affidavit from his mother ’ s neighbor who reported the reward offer, showed the offer was made after the removal hearing. Instead of clarifying when the reward was offered, Ramos

- Braga says tha t the offer could not be from 1998 because the neighbor learned of it through her 19

- year

old son, a current PCC member who would have been an i nfant then. But th is reasoning is flawed; the offer may have been old when the neighbor ’ s son learned of it. As difficult as it might have been for Ramos

- Braga to gather evidence while detained, he has never represented that he exhaustively investigated when this offer was made. Last, Ramos

- Braga disputes t he Board ’ s conclusion that recent dangers posed by the PCC a re a continuation of conditions that existed before the removal hearing

. Although worsening conditions in the country of removal may constitute a change that requires reopening, s ee id. ; Ji Cheng Ni , 715 F.3d at 627; Mekhael v. Mukasey , 509 F.3d 326, 327 (7th Cir. 2007) ,No. 17

- 1998 19

the PCC ’ s recent threats , robbery, and murders are immaterial to whether R amos

- Braga ’ s application for withholding under statute should be reopened

. T he IJ denied t his application not for lack of evidence of past persecution , but because Ramos

- Braga did not establish a nexus between his likely persecution by the PCC and his particular social group. Thus to present evidence that conditions have degenerated so that he now has a claim for withholding under statute, Ramos

- Braga needed to show a change related to th is nexus between the PCC ’ s persecution and his social group based on ties to his father . He did present new ly found evidence of the PCC ’ s motive for harming him, but again , tha t motive has not changed since 1997. In sum, Ramos

- Braga failed to offer new, material evidence that conditions in Brazil have ch anged since the removal hearing.
I II The Board did not abuse its discretion by denying Ramos

Braga ’ s second motion to reopen as numerically barred and untimely. Ramos

- Braga neither experienced prejudice from his former attorney ’ s potential errors nor presented new, material evidence that conditions in Brazil have changed since the removal hearing

. Accordingly, t he petition for r eview is DENIED.