alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
180606 ORDER DENYING RETIREE'S MOT RE PREPA REPRESENTATION VERSION JUNE 6, 2018 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

-------------------------------------------------------------x

In re:

THE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND 

MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO,

 as representative of 

THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO,

et al.,

 Debtor.1

-------------------------------------------------------------x

PROMESA

Title III

Case No. 17-3283 (LTS)

(Jointly Administered)

In re: PROMESA

Title III

THE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND

MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO,

as representative of No. 17 BK 4780-LTS

PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC POWER 

AUTHORITY (PREPA), This Order shall be filed in both the 

Lead Case No. 17-BK-3283-LTS 

Debtor. and Case No. 17-BK-4780-LTS.

----------------------------------------------------------x

ORDER DENYING MOTION OF THE OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF 

RETIRED EMPLOYEES REGARDING REPRESENTATION OF PREPA RETIREES 

 1 The Debtors in the underlying Title III Case, along with each Debtor’s respective Title III 

case number listed as bankruptcy case number due to software limitations and the last four 

(4) digits of each Debtor’s federal tax identification number, as applicable, are the (i) 

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (Bankruptcy Case No. 17 BK 3283-LTS) (Last Four Digits 

of Federal Tax ID: 3481); (ii) Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation (“COFINA”) 

(Bankruptcy Case No. 17 BK 3284-LTS) (Last Four Digits of Federal Tax ID: 8474); 

(iii) Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (“HTA”) (Bankruptcy Case No. 

17 BK 3567-LTS) (Last Four Digits of Federal Tax ID: 3808); (iv) Employees Retirement 

System of the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (“ERS”) (Bankruptcy 

Case No. 17 BK 3566-LTS). (Last Four Digits of Federal Tax ID: 9686); and (v) Puerto 

Rico Electric Power Authority (“PREPA”) (Bankruptcy Case No. 17 BK 4780-LTS) (Last 

Four Digits of Federal Tax ID: 3747). (Title III case numbers are listed as Bankruptcy 

Case numbers due to software limitations).

Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:3270 Filed:06/06/18 Entered:06/06/18 18:11:43 Desc: Main

Document Page 1 of 2
180606 ORDER DENYING RETIREE'S MOT RE PREPA REPRESENTATION VERSION JUNE 6, 2018 2

On May 14, 2018, the Official Committee of Retired Employees filed its Motion 

of the Official Committee of Retired Employees of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Regarding 

Representation of PREPA Retirees (Docket Entry No. 3056 in Case No. 17-3283, the “Motion”). 

For the reasons stated on the record at the Omnibus Hearing heard on June 6, 2018, the Motion is 

hereby denied without prejudice. This Order hereby resolves Docket Entry No. 3056 in Case 

No. 17-3283 and Docket Entry No. 824 in Case No. 17-4780. 

SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 6, 2018

 /s/ Laura Taylor Swain 

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN

United States District Judge

Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:3270 Filed:06/06/18 Entered:06/06/18 18:11:43 Desc: Main

Document Page 2 of 2
#### § 25.851 Fire extinguishers.

(a) *Hand fire extinguishers.*

(1) The following minimum number of hand fire extinguishers must be conveniently located and evenly distributed in passenger compartments:

| Passenger capacity | No. of extinguishers |
| --- | --- |
| 7 through 30 | 1 |
| 31 through 60 | 2 |
| 61 through 200 | 3 |
| 201 through 300 | 4 |
| 301 through 400 | 5 |
| 401 through 500 | 6 |
| 501 through 600 | 7 |
| 601 through 700 | 8 |

(2) At least one hand fire extinguisher must be conveniently located in the pilot compartment.

(3) At least one readily accessible hand fire extinguisher must be available for use in each Class A or Class B cargo or baggage compartment and in each Class E or Class F cargo or baggage compartment that is accessible to crewmembers in flight.

(4) At least one hand fire extinguisher must be located in, or readily accessible for use in, each galley located above or below the passenger compartment.

(5) Each hand fire extinguisher must be approved.

(6) At least one of the required fire extinguishers located in the passenger compartment of an airplane with a passenger capacity of at least 31 and not more than 60, and at least two of the fire extinguishers located in the passenger compartment of an airplane with a passenger capacity of 61 or more must contain Halon 1211 (bromochlorodifluoromethane CBrC1 F2), or equivalent, as the extinguishing agent. The type of extinguishing agent used in any other extinguisher required by this section must be appropriate for the kinds of fires likely to occur where used.

(7) The quantity of extinguishing agent used in each extinguisher required by this section must be appropriate for the kinds of fires likely to occur where used.

(8) Each extinguisher intended for use in a personnel compartment must be designed to minimize the hazard of toxic gas concentration.

(b) Built-in fire extinguishers. If a built-in fire extinguisher is provided—

(1) Each built-in fire extinguishing system must be installed so that—

(i) No extinguishing agent likely to enter personnel compartments will be hazardous to the occupants; and

(ii) No discharge of the extinguisher can cause structural damage.

(2) The capacity of each required built-in fire extinguishing system must be adequate for any fire likely to occur in the compartment where used, considering the volume of the compartment and the ventilation rate. The capacity of each system is adequate if there is sufficient quantity of agent to extinguish the fire or suppress the fire anywhere baggage or cargo is placed within the cargo compartment for the duration required to land and evacuate the airplane.

[Amdt. 25-74, 56 FR 15456, Apr. 16, 1991, as amended by Doc. No. Docket FAA-2014-0001, Amdt. 25-142, 81 FR 7703, Feb. 16, 2016]
#### FIDELITY INVESTMENT ASSOCIATION v. UNITED STATES

[78 C.Cls. 333; 291 U.S. 685]

Petition for writ of certiorari *denied*by the Supreme Court March 19, 1934.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

793 

KA 14-00513 

PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., PERADOTTO, CARNI, VALENTINO, AND WHALEN, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ALBERT J. WEBBER, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

JAMES S. KERNAN, PUBLIC DEFENDER, LYONS (RICHARD W. YOUNGMAN OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

RICHARD M. HEALY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, LYONS (BRUCE A. ROSEKRANS OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Wayne County Court (John B. Nesbitt,

J.), entered January 15, 2014. The order directed defendant to pay

restitution in the amount of $10,330.

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously vacated.

Memorandum: Defendant was convicted upon his plea of guilty of,

inter alia, criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree

(Penal Law § 165.40). County Court sentenced him to a term of

incarceration and scheduled a hearing to determine the amount of

restitution to be imposed. Defendant did not appeal from the original

judgment of conviction and now appeals from the order of restitution

entered following a hearing. We note at the outset that, because the

court bifurcated the sentencing proceeding by severing the issue of

restitution for a separate hearing, defendant properly appeals as of

right from the order of restitution (see People v Connolly, 100 AD3d

1419, 1419; People v Brusie, 70 AD3d 1395, 1396). 

We agree with defendant that the court erred in imposing

restitution based on the evidence presented at the restitution

hearing. “Restitution may be based only on ‘the offense for which a

defendant was convicted, as well as any other offense that is part of

the same criminal transaction or that is contained in any other

accusatory instrument disposed of by any plea of guilty’ ” (People v

Visser, 256 AD2d 1106, 1107, quoting Penal Law § 60.27 [4] [a]). Upon

our review of the record, we conclude that the testimony of the owner

of the stolen property that was the subject of the restitution hearing

was insufficient to establish that such stolen property was part of

the same criminal transaction as the stolen property that was the

subject of defendant’s plea of guilty, i.e., two pieces of blue

painted steel. Indeed, no evidence was presented at the hearing
-2- 793 

KA 14-00513 

establishing that defendant’s acquisition of the two pieces of blue

painted steel found in his possession was part of the same criminal

transaction involving the theft of numerous other items for which

restitution was ordered. We conclude that “the court erred in

imposing restitution arising from a charge of [larceny] because that

charge was not contained in the indictment, nor was it related to an

offense that was ‘part of the same criminal transaction or . . .

contained in any other accusatory instrument disposed of by’

defendant’s plea of guilty to the offense on appeal” (People v Moore,

124 AD3d 1386, 1387). We therefore vacate the order on appeal. 

Entered: June 19, 2015 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
Exhibit
10.4


 


AMENDMENT
NO. 1


TO


EMPLOYMENT
AGREEMENT


This AMENDMENT NO.
1 TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (the “Amendment”),
dated as of April 15, 2003, is by and among Elgar Holdings, Inc., a
Delaware corporation (“Holdings”),
Elgar Electronics Corporation, a California corporation and a wholly owned
subsidiary of Holdings (“EEC”),
and John P. Mei (“Executive”).


RECITALS


WHEREAS,
Executive, Holdings and EEC are party to an Employment Agreement, dated as of
December 30, 2002 (the “Employment
Agreement”);


WHEREAS, Section 4.5
of the Employment Agreement obligates Executive to purchase from Holdings, and
Holdings to issue and sell to Executive, 150,000 shares of the common stock of
Holdings at a purchase price of $0.05 per share, with such sale and purchase to
take place on or about February 28, 2003;


WHEREAS, by
agreement of Executive, Holdings and EEC, the sale and purchase of those shares
has not yet occurred; and


WHEREAS,
Executive, Holdings and EEC desire to amend the Employment Agreement to delete
therefrom Section 4.5 in its entirety.


AGREEMENT


NOW THEREFORE, in
consideration of the premises and the mutual agreements hereinafter set forth,
the parties hereto hereby agree as follows:


1.             Amendment of Section 4.5.  Section 4.5 of the Agreement is hereby amended,
superseded and replaced in its entirety by the following:


“4.5.       [intentionally
omitted]”


2.             Waiver. 
Each of the parties hereto expressly acknowledges and agrees that no
other party hereto was in breach of the Employment Agreement because the sale
and purchase of shares pursuant to Section 4.5 of the Employment Agreement
was not consummated prior to the date of this Amendment.


3.             Governing Law. 
This Agreement shall be interpreted, construed, governed and enforced in
accordance with the laws of the State of Delaware.


4.             Counterparts.  This Agreement may be executed in one or more
counterpart copies, each of which shall be deemed to be an original and all of
which taken together shall be deemed one and the same instrument.


5.             No
Further Amendment.  Except as amended hereby, the Employment
Agreement shall continue in full force and effect.


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Holdings and EEC have caused this Agreement to be
executed on their behalf by their duly authorized officers and Executive has
executed the same as of the day and year first above written.


ELGAR
HOLDINGS, INC.


	
  By:

  	
  /s/ Donald Glickman

  
	
   

  	
  Donald Glickman

  Chairman of the Board and Vice President

  



ELGAR
ELECTRONICS CORPORATION


	
  By:

  	
  /s/ Donald Glickman

  
	
   

  	
  Donald Glickman

  Chairman of the Board and Vice President

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
  /s/ John P. Mei

  
	
  John P. Mei
regan 

John A. Kitzhaber, MD, Governor 

March 10,2011 

Dennis McLerran, Regional Administrator 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 

Region 10 

1200 Sixth Avenue, Suite 900 

Seattle, WA 98101 

Department of Environmental Quality 

Headquarters 

811 SW Sixth Avenue 

Portland, OR 97204-1390 

(503) 229-5696 

FAX (503) 229-6124 

TTY: 711 

RE: Oregon SIP Infrastructure for Addressing the Interstate Transport of zondlffi!:Qf 00iti.lf£ EXECUTIVE 

Particulate. 

Dear Mr. McLerran: 

Pursuant to EPA's request, we wish to clarify that DEQ's recent SIP revision entitled "Oregon 

SIP Infrastructure for Addressing the Interstate Transport of Ozone and Fine Particulate," 

submitted by ODEQ on June 23, 2010, and supplemented on December 22,2010 was intended to 

meet interstate transport requirements of section 110(a)(2)(D)(i) of the Clean Air Act for the 

1997 PM2.S NAAQS, the 1997 8-hour ozone NAAQS, the 2006 PM2.S NAAQS and the 2008 8-

hour ozone NAAQS. Our interstate transport document focused chiefly on the more stringent 

2006 PM2.S NAAQS and the 2008 8-hour ozone NAAQS; however, DEQ believes its 

conclusion that Oregon does not cause or contribute to exceedances ofNAAQS in other states 

applies equally to the earlier and less stringent PM2.S and ozone standards. Therefore, we affirm 

that the conclusions in the June 23, 2010, SIP submission and December 22,2010 supplement 

specifically apply to the interstate transport standards for the 1997 PM2.S and 1997 8-hour ozone 

NAAQS, as well as the 2006 PM2.S NAAQS and the 2008 8-hour ozone NAAQS. 

If you have further questions, please contact David Collier, Manager of Air Quality Planning, 

at (S03) 229-S177. 

Dick Pedersen 

Director 

cc: Donna Deneen, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 10 

Paul Koprowski, EPA Oregon Operations Office 

Andrew Ginsburg, DEQ Air Quality Administrator 

Margaret Oliphant, DEQ Air Quality SIP Coordinator 

-- - --------
Chapter 2: Alternatives and Proposed Action

U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service
ALTERNATIVE € / "Ecological Restoration"

GE Ti Rocky Flats National Wildlife Refuge

Restoration Map

Resource Management Zones
Xeric Tallgrass Prairie

1 Riparian Corridor and Wetlands
Mixed Prairie Grasslands

Targeted Restoration Areas
Removed & Revegetated Road*TM

red Stream Crossing

Other Areas

§@ DOE Retained Area

% Permitted Mining Use

== Unpaved Maintenance Road
(retained for administrative,
easement & fire access)

“Only primary road corridors are mapped,

additonal removal and revegetation may occur

on secondary roads

Visitor Use Map
Pul ses
Public access is by arrangement
only and limited to guided tours

@® ADA Pedestrian Trail
Service Refuge Lands
i Area Retained by DOE

© Developed Area
& Overlook

Other Facilities
ane Entrance
Maintenance
@pRestrooms
= Gravel Road

Figure no. 6

18 Rocky Flats National Wildlife Refuge
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-2000
<CASH>                                          49,337
<SECURITIES>                                     9,247
<RECEIVABLES>                                   24,533
<ALLOWANCES>                                       804
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                83,741
<PP&E>                                          25,103
<DEPRECIATION>                                  10,953
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 113,034
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           19,258
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             1
<OTHER-SE>                                      92,261
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   113,034
<SALES>                                         86,056
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                86,056
<CGS>                                            6,172
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   88,954
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (4,627)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     (783)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (3,844)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (3,844)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.07)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.07)


</TABLE>
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 17-1615

___________________________

Jesse Tyler Smith

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Aqua-Care Marketing, LLC, et al.

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Springfield

____________

 Submitted: November 7, 2017

Filed: December 18, 2017

[Unpublished]

____________

Before LOKEN, MURPHY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM.

Jesse Smith brought this pro se diversity action against Aqua-Care Marketing,

LLC and three of its officers and employees, asserting, inter alia, three breach of

contract claims and a claim of malicious prosecution. Ruling on cross motions for
summary judgment at the conclusion of discovery, the district court1

 denied Smith’s

motion as untimely, denied defendants summary judgment on the breach of contract

claims, and granted summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim. Some

weeks later, the court entered a final order declining to exercise jurisdiction over the

state law breach of contract claims and dismissing those claims without prejudice

because the amount in controversy was far below the minimum required for federal

diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Smith appeals the grant of summary

judgment dismissing his malicious prosecution claim. He does not appeal the district

court’s decision to dismiss the breach of contract claims without prejudice. Thus,

those claims have not been finally resolved.

Having carefully reviewed the record and the arguments on appeal, we conclude

that summary judgment dismissing the malicious prosecution claim was properly

granted. The record does not include evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to

find that law enforcement would not have brought criminal charges that were

ultimately dismissed in the absence of false information knowingly supplied by

defendants, or that defendants engaged in actions beyond merely supplying false

information or making an accusation. See Peterson v. Kopp, 754 F.3d 594, 598 (8th

Cir. 2014) (de novo review); see also Fisher v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 619 F.3d 811,

823 (8th Cir. 2010); Linn v. Montgomery, 2017 WL 4847687, at *6-7 (Iowa Oct. 27,

2017). Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

______________________________

1

The Honorable Brian C. Wimes, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

-2-
Editorial Note on Part 1251
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 1251 appear at 81 FR 3709, Jan. 22, 2016.

§ 1251.110 Direct threat. ( a ) This part does not require a recipient to permit an individual to participate in or benefit from the services, programs, or activities of that recipient when that individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others.
( b ) In determining whether an individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others, a recipient must make an individualized assessment, based on reasonable judgment that relies on current medical knowledge or on the best available objective evidence, to ascertain: The nature, duration, and severity of the risk; the probability that the potential injury will actually occur; and whether reasonable accommodations in policies, practices, or procedures or the provision of auxiliary aids or services will mitigate the risk.
[81 FR 3711, Jan. 22, 2016]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

ADRIAN CARLOS PADILLA,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 110 MAL 2022

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 11th day of July, 2022, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED.
<PAGE>
         EXHIBIT 99(B) CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER (SS.906)

      I, Albert A. Canosa, Chief Executive Officer of Raytech Corporation (the
"Company"), pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, do hereby
certify as follows:

      1.    The quarterly report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the period
            ended September 29, 2002 fully complies with the requirements of
            Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      2.    The information contained in such Form 10-Q fairly presents, in
            accordance with United States generally accepted accounting
            principles, in all material respects, the financial condition and
            results of operations of the Company.

      IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have executed this Certification this 13th day of
November, 2002.

                                                         /s/ALBERT A. CANOSA
                                                         -----------------------
                                                         Albert A. Canosa
                                                         President and
                                                         Chief Executive Officer


                                      -55-