**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 09**  **- 4879** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. THELBERT GRAINGER, JR. , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the East ern District of North Carolina , at Wilmington
. James C. Fox , Senior District Judge. ( 7:02

- cr - 00037

- F

- 1 )

Submitted : January 27, 2011 Decided: February 17 , 2011

Before GREGORY and WYNN , Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirme d by un published per curiam opinion
.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Jennifer P. May

- Pa rker, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Thelbert Grainger, Jr., appeals the district court’s judgment revoking supervised release and i mposing a twenty

- four month sentence. We affirm. Grainger pled guilty to one count of false statement
to a firearms deal er during acquisition of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) (2000) in 2002 . He was sentenced to 87 months’ imprisonment to be followed by 36 months’ supervised release. His term of supervision commenced on January 13, 2009. His short tenure of supervised release was characterized by significant violations, including testing positive for marijuana, failing to pay court

- im posed fines, and absconding from supervision. The Probation Office ultimately petitioned the district court for revocation. After a hearing, the court found that Grainger had six supervised release violations and imposed a twenty

- four month sentence. Hi s advisory Guidelines range was seven to thirteen months. On appeal, Grainger argues that the twenty

- four month sentence imposed by the district court was plainly unreasonable. We do not agree. This c ourt reviews the district court’s revocation of

su pervised release for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Pregent , 190 F.3d 279, 282 ( 4th Cir. 1999). A sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release should be affirmed if it3 is within the applicable statutory maximum and is not plainly

unr easonable. United States v. Crudup , 461 F.3d 433, 437, 439

- 40 ( 4th Cir. 2006). This c ourt first reviews the sentence for reasonableness, “follow[ing] generally the procedural and substantive considerations that [are] employ[ed] in [the] review of origina l sentences, . . . with some necessary modifications to take into account the unique nature of supervised release revocation sentences.” Id. at 438

- 39; see United States v. Finley , 531 F.3d 288, 294 ( 4th Cir
. 2008) (“In applying the ‘plainly unreasonable’ standard, we first determine, using the instructions given in Gall [v. United States , 552 U.S. 38 (2007)], whether a sentence is ‘unreasonable.’”). Although the district court must consider the Chapter 7 policy statements and the requirements of § 3553( a) and
§ 3583, “the sentencing court retains broad discretion to revoke a defendant’s probation [or supervised release] and impose a term of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum.” United States v. Moulden , 478 F.3d 652, 657 ( 4th Cir. 2007) (citing
Cru dup , 461 F.3d at 439). In this case, the statutory maximum revocation sentence was two years ’ imprisonment. A sentence is reviewed for reasonableness under an abus e of discretion standard. Gall , 552 U.S. at 51 . This review requires consideration of bo th the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence. Id. ; see United4 States v. Lynn , 592 F.3d 572, 575 ( 4th Cir. 2010). After determining whether the district court properly calcu lated the defendant’s advisory G uideline range, this c ourt must decide whether the district court considered the § 3553(a) factors, analyzed the arguments presented by the parties, and sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Lynn , 592 F.3d at 575

- 76; see United States v. Carter , 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) . Properly preserved claims of procedural error are subject to harmless error review. Lynn , 592 F.3d at 576. If the sentence is free of significant procedural error, the appellate court reviews the substantive reasonableness of the
sentence. Id. at 575 ; United States v. Pauley , 511 F.3d 468, 473 ( 4th Cir. 2007). Grainger neither objected to his sentence, nor did he request a sentence different in duration or manner from that which he received. Accordingly, our initial reasonableness review is for pla in error. Lynn , 592 F.3d at 577. To establish plain error, “ [ Grainger ] must show that an error occurred, that the error was plain, and that the error affected his substantial rights.” United States v. Muhammad , 478 F.3d 247, 249 ( 4th Cir. 2007). Even i f Grainger satisfies these requirements, “correction of the error remains within [the c o urt’s] discretion, which [the c ourt] should not exercise . . . unless the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public5 reputation of judicial proceedings .” Id. (internal quotation

m arks and citation omitted). With regard to Grainger’s claim that the court did not provide an adequate explanation of his sentence and should have further considered the Chapter 7 policy statements and the
§ 3553(a) factors, we have reviewed the record and we do not agree. The district court clearly discussed Grainger’s lengthy criminal history, the seriousness of his violations, and the need for Grainger to receive substance abuse treatment. We conclude that the court did n ot err, let alone plainly so. Consequently, we need not decide whether the sentence was plainly procedurally unreasonable within the meaning of Crudup
. Grainger also challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. We again note the broad d iscretion afforded to district courts in imposing a sentence within the statutory maximum on violations of supervised release. In light of this discretion, and after review of the record, we conclude that the sentence impose d was substantively reasonable. Again, we need not reach the issue of whether it was plainly unreasonable. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials6 befo re the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED