J-S25004-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE MATTER OF: M.S.S., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: A.L.F., JR., FATHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 11 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Decree Entered December 4, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County 

Orphans’ Court at No: 100-AD-2018

BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JULY 05, 2019

A.L.F., Jr. (“Father”), appeals from the decree entered December 4, 

2018, terminating involuntarily his parental rights to his minor son, M.S.S. 

(“Child”), born in March 2014.

1 After careful review, we affirm. 

We glean the facts and procedural history of this case from the certified 

record. Child has an extensive history of involvement with the child welfare 

system, beginning with an adjudication of dependency in Lancaster County in 

2014. Reportedly, Father did not learn that Child existed until approximately 

December 2016. Father obtained custody of Child in May 2017, ending his 

dependency. However, Dauphin County Social Services for Children and Youth 

(“the Agency”) took Child into protective custody in October 2017, after Father 

beat Child and caused severe and extensive bruising all over his body. The 

____________________________________________

1 The trial court entered a separate decree terminating the parental rights of 

L.A.S. (“Mother”) that same day. Mother did not appeal the termination of 

her parental rights, nor did she participate in this appeal. 
J-S25004-19

- 2 -

trial court adjudicated Child dependent for a second time on November 29, 

2017, and the Agency placed him in the same foster home where he resided

during his prior adjudication of dependency in Lancaster County. On February 

22, 2018, the court found aggravated circumstances against Father, on the 

basis that he had committed physical abuse against Child resulting in serious 

bodily injury, and relieved the Agency of its obligation to provide reunification 

services. 

Meanwhile, Father faced felony criminal charges for aggravated assault 

and endangering the welfare of children resulting from the same incident. He 

pleaded guilty in August 2018 and later received a sentence of nine to twentythree months of incarceration at the Dauphin County Work Release Center for 

the aggravated assault conviction. He received a concurrent sentence of nine 

months of incarceration at the Work Release Center followed by twenty-seven 

months of probation for the endangering the welfare of children conviction.

The Agency filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights to Child 

involuntarily on September 19, 2018. The trial court conducted a hearing on 

December 4, 2018, at the conclusion of which it dictated a decree terminating 

Father’s rights.2 The court entered a written decree memorializing its decision 

____________________________________________

2 The trial court granted the motion of Child’s dependency guardian ad litem

in which she averred that no conflict existed between Child’s legal interests 

and best interests, and requested that the court permit her to serve as Child’s 

legal counsel during the proceedings.
J-S25004-19

- 3 -

later that day. On December 28, 2018, Father timely filed a notice of appeal, 

along with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. 

Father now presents the following claims for our review: 

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in changing the 

goal to adoption?

2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by 

terminating [Father’s] parental rights?

Father’s Brief at 10 (unnecessary capitalization and suggested answers 

omitted).3

We review these claims mindful of our well-settled standard of review: 

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

____________________________________________

3 While Father purports to appeal from the order changing Child’s permanent 

placement goal from reunification to adoption, the certified record indicates 

that he filed a notice of appeal from the termination decree only. As a result, 

this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the goal change order. We also observe 

that, because Father failed to appeal from the goal change order, this Court 

did not receive Child’s dependency record. Thus, we cannot confirm whether 

a goal change order even exists. While Father indicates in his brief that he is 

appealing the “Order for Goal Change to Adoption and Decree of Involuntary 

Termination of Parental Rights,” the actual text of the document states that it 

is a “Decree of Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights” only and does not 

mention a goal change. See Father’s Brief at 6 (unnecessary capitalization 

omitted). Because of Father’s procedural missteps, we do not address his goal 

change claim on appeal. 
J-S25004-19

- 4 -

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Section 2511 of the Adoption Act governs involuntary termination of 

parental rights. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. It requires a bifurcated analysis. 

. . . . Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

In the instant matter, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights 

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (9), and (b). We need only agree 

with the court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 

2511(b), to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en 

banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). Here, we analyze the court’s 

decision pursuant to Section 2511(a)(9) and (b), which provides as follows:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

***
J-S25004-19

- 5 -

(9) The parent has been convicted of one of the 

following in which the victim was a child of the parent:

***

(ii) a felony under 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2702 

(relating to aggravated assault);

***

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

***

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(9)(ii), (b).

As the trial court explained in its opinion, Father was convicted of felony 

aggravated assault against Child. Trial Court Opinion, 2/15/19, at 5. Father 

does not attempt to challenge the existence of this conviction on appeal.4It 

was undisputed during the hearing that Father pleaded guilty to aggravated 

assault, graded as a felony of the second degree, and endangering the welfare 

____________________________________________

4

In the argument section of his brief, Father does not acknowledge that the 

trial court terminated his rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(9). Father does 

not mention that section at all and focuses the substance of his argument on 

Section 2511(a)(2). See Father’s Brief at 19-20. 
J-S25004-19

- 6 -

of a child, graded as a felony of the third degree. N.T., 12/4/18, at 9, 34. He

admitted to the plea during his testimony, and the Agency entered related 

documents into evidence, including a docket sheet and written plea colloquy.

Id. at 28, 33-34; Exhibits 19, 23. Accordingly, the record supports the court’s 

decision to terminate pursuant to Section 2511(a)(9).

We next consider if the trial court abused its discretion by terminating 

Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). 

. . . . Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has 

explained, Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding 

analysis and the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. 

Case law, however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, 

if any, between parent and child is a factor to be considered as 

part of our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or 

her child is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest 

analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be 

considered by the court when determining what is in the best 

interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can 

equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and 

should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, 

comfort, security, and stability the child might have 

with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated 

that the trial court should consider the importance of 

continuity of relationships and whether any existing 

parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental 

effects on the child.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting 

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted).
J-S25004-19

- 7 -

The trial court found that Child has spent only five months of his life 

living with Father. Trial Court Opinion, 2/15/19, at 7. The court found that 

Child has spent the majority of his life in foster care, and that he receives 

safety, stability, and love in his current foster home. Id. The court concluded 

that it would “not disrupt the permanency and stability which [Child] enjoys 

based upon the hope that Father can acquire and maintain the necessary skills 

to properly parent [Child].” Id.

In response, Father contends that he has a bond with Child and that the 

trial court failed to consider the impact that severing that bond would have on 

Child. Father’s Brief at 21. He further contends that the court erred by failing 

to consider that his lack of visits with Child resulted from the no-contact order 

imposed in his criminal case. Id.

Father is not entitled to relief. As the trial court discussed, Child spent 

only five months of his life living with Father, from May 2017 to October 2017.

N.T., 12/4/18, at 4-5, 8, 28. Father testified that he has not seen Child at all 

since October 30, 2017, due to his no-contact order. Id. at 30-31. Notably, 

the court heard the testimony of psychologist, Howard S. Rosen, Ph.D., who 

conducted a psychological evaluation of Father. Id. at 17. Dr. Rosen did not 

conduct a bonding evaluation of Child and Father, but noted that, given their 

lack of contact, “it would be remarkable if there was a bond[.]” Id. at 20; 

see In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“In cases where 

there is no evidence of any bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable 

to infer that no bond exists.”).
J-S25004-19

- 8 -

In contrast, Child had been living with his foster family for thirty-eight 

months at the time of the termination hearing. N.T., 12/4/18, at 10. Agency 

caseworker, Jerri Swavely, testified that Child is “very bonded” to his foster 

family, including his pre-adoptive foster parents and the other children in the 

home. Id. at 10-11. Dr. Rosen agreed that Child was more likely to have a 

bond with his foster parents than with Father, observing that they are his 

“consistent caregivers who show nurturing and attention to his needs[.]” Id.

at 20, 23; see Matter of Adoption of M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 449 (Pa. Super. 

2017) (“[A] child develops a meaningful bond with a caretaker when the 

caretaker provides stability, safety, and security regularly and consistently to 

the child over an extended period of time.”).5 Therefore, the record supports 

the decision of the trial court to terminate Father’s parental rights involuntarily 

pursuant to Section 2511(b).

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion by terminating Father’s parental rights to Child involuntarily. 

Therefore, we affirm the court’s December 4, 2018 decree. 

Decree affirmed. 

____________________________________________

5 While Father suggests that the trial court should have excused his lack of a 

bond with Child due to his no-contact order, this argument is meritless. The 

existence of Father’s no-contact order is unquestionably his fault, and does 

not outweigh the safety, permanence, and stability that Child will receive by 

remaining with his foster parents. 
J-S25004-19

- 9 -

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 07/05/2019