alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 87 (Thursday, May 4, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Pages 25948-25949]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-11117]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Employment and Training Administration

[NAFTA--02738A]


Talon, Inc., Division of Coats North America, Lake City, SC; 
Including Temporary Workers of Will Staff Personnel Services, 
Greenville, SC; Amended Certification Regarding Eligibility To Apply 
for NAFTA-Transitional Adjustment Assistance

    In accordance with Section 250(a), Subchapter D, Chapter 2, title 
II, of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 USC 2273), the Department of Labor 
issued a Certification for NAFTA Transitional Adjustment Assistance on 
December 11, 1998, applicable to workers of Talon, Inc., Division of 
Coats North America, Lake City, South Carolina. The notice was 
published in the Federal Register on December 23, 1998 (63 FR 71166).
    At the request of the States agency, the Department reviewed the 
certification for workers of the subject firm. New information provided 
by the State shows that some workers separated from employment at 
Talon, Inc. had their wages reported under a separate unemployment 
insurance (UI) tax account at Will Staff Personnel Services. Workers 
from Will Staff Personnel Services produced zippers at the Lake City, 
South Carolina location of Talon, Inc.
    Based on these findings, the Department is amending the 
certification to include workers from Will Staff Personnel Services, 
Greenville, South Carolina who were engaged in the production of 
zippers at Talon, Inc., Lake City, South Carolina.
    The intent of the Department's certification is to include all 
workers of Talon, Inc, Division of Coats North America adversely 
affected by the shift of production to Mexico.
    The amended notice applicable to NAFTA--02738A is hereby issued as 
follows:

    ``All workers of Talon, Inc., Division of Coats North America, 
Lake City, South Carolina (NAFTA--2738A), including temporary 
workers of Will Staff Personnel Services, Greenville, South 
Carolina, engaged in employment related to the production of zippers 
for Talon, Inc., Division of Coats North America, Lake City, South 
Carolina who became totally or partially separated from employment 
on or after November 16, 1997 through December 11, 2000 are eligible 
to apply for NAFTA-TAA under Section 250 of the Trade Act of 1974.



[[Page 25949]]


    Signed at Washington, D.C. this 27th day of April, 2000.
Grant D. Beale,
Program Manager, Office of Trade Adjustment Assistance.
[FR Doc. 00-11117 Filed 5-3-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-30-M
**Exhibit
      32.2**


**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. § 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**§
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**





In
      connection with the filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission of the
      Quarterly Report of Lakeland Industries, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for
      the period ending October 31, 2006 (the “Report”), I, Gary Pokrassa, Chief
      Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as
      adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of
      my knowledge:





(1)  The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)  The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.







/s/Gary
      Pokrassa


Gary
      Pokrassa,


Chief
      Financial Officer





December
      7, 2006








25
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-2316

CAROL H. ABERCROMBIE,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

ROBERT M. WALKER, Secretary, Department of the

Army,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. Marvin J. Garbis, District Judge. (CA-98-

3082-MJG)

Submitted: January 20, 2000 Decided: January 28, 2000

Before WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Carol H. Abercrombie, Appellant Pro Se. Roann Nichols, OFFICE OF

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Carol H. Abercrombie appeals the district court's order granting summary judgment to the Defendant on Abercrombie's reprisal

discrimination claim. We have reviewed the record and the district

court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we

affirm on the reasoning of the district court. See Abercrombie v.

Walker, CA-98-3082-MJG (D. Md. Aug. 30, 1999). We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Exhibit
23.1





CONSENT
OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM





We
consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement on Form
S-3 (No. 333-138736), the Registration Statements on Form S-8 (Nos. 333-128647,
333-132679, 333-138758, 333-145404 and  333-150834) pertaining to the
1998 Stock Plan, 2001 Stock Plan, 2005 Equity Incentive Award
Plan,  Amended and Restated 2006 Employment Commencement Incentive
Plan and Employee Stock Purchase Plan of Sunesis Pharmaceuticals, Inc., of our
report dated March 30, 2009, except for Note 17, as to which the date
is March 31, 2009 with respect to the financial statements of Sunesis
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year
ended December 31, 2008.




/s/
ERNST & YOUNG, LLP




San Jose,
California


March 30,
2009
Exhibit 32.1

                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
                                (18 U.S.C. 1350)

     In connection with the Report of HST Global, Inc. (the "Company") on Form
10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2009, as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Ron Howell, Chief
Executive Officer and Chairman of the Company, certify, pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350), that to my knowledge:

     1.   the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
          or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2.   the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Company.

                                   Date: August 14, 2009

                                   \s\ Ron Howell
                                   --------------
                                   Ron Howell
                                   Chief Executive Officer and Chairman
#### R. J. Bolles, *Appellant,*v. William O’Brien, *Appellee. Original Bill.*R. J. Bolles, *Appellant,*v. William O’Brien, *Appellee. Cross Bill.*

On Rehearing.

Per Curiam.

— Mr. Bolles in explaining that he did not understandingly sign the agreement in question, testified that previous to the signing he talked with Mr. O’Brien about a one-fourth interest O’Brien was to take and pay for in lands with Bolles and two others, and that the proposition was abandoned as to the two other persons, “but had not been called off in relation to Mr. O’Brien; and this was a continuation of that.” Bolles also testified that the instrument was kept in a safe place and when more than a year after the signing someone mentioned to him the existence of an agreement between Bolles and O’Brien and its probable future effect, he “got the agrément out of the safety vault and looked at it, and was much surprised as to its nature and contents, and I made up my mind I had better speak to Mr. O’Brien about it at the first opportunity I had. In a few days he came in, and when he came in I did speak to him about it, and that was the first time my attention was called as to the character and language of the agreement.”

*355There are apparent inconsistencies in the evidence on both sides which is not surprising in a case of this character, but it is clear that Mr. O’Brien, the attorney, has not met the burden cast upon him by law, of establishing .by convincing evidence that Mr. Bolles, the client, acted with full warning and perfect knowledge of the consequences of his act, or that the agreement purporting to confer a property right upon O’Brien from his client, was fair and based upon full and adequate consideration. Because of the relation of attorney and client as to the subject matter and of the circumstances under which the instrument was signed, it was not binding on Bolles, the client, when he signed it; and as its terms were not thereafter ratified or confirmed or in any way put in operation, the conduct and statements of the parties subsequent to the signing of the instrument are immaterial and do not constitute a contract relation between the parties. See Keenan v. Scott, 61 W. Va. 137; 61 S. E. 806; Boyle v. Read, 138 Ill. App. 163; Crocheron v. Savage, 75 N. J. Eqr. 589, 73 Atl. Rep. 33; 23 L. R. A. (N.S.) 679;18 Ann. Cas. p. 123 notes.

Eehearing denied.

Whitfield, C. J., and Taylor and Hocker, J. J., concur.

Shackleford and" Cockrell, J. J., dissent.
No. 17,275.

#### Forsythe et al. *v.*The City of Hammond.

*Injunction.*— Supreme *Gourt.*— Appeal.—Annexation *to Gity.*— Injunc*tive Belief, When not Granted.*— Imminent *Necessity.*— Where appellants, in an action annexing territory to a city, petition the Supreme Court for an injunction restraining the consideration of the judgment appealed from in the elections, taxation, and internal improvements of the city, none of the acts sought to be restrained being alleged to be imminent, except that of voting, the injunction will not be granted; for the fullest effect may be given to the decision of this court, notwithstanding the act of voting, and injunctive relief will not be awarded unless immediate and imperious necessity appears.

From the Porter Circuit Court.

*W. H. H. Miller, F. Winter, J. B. Elam, A. L. Jones*and *J. W. Youche,*for appellants.

*E. D. Crumpacker,*for appellee.

Hackney, J.

The appellants have filed and presented for our consideration their verified petition to stay the exercise, by the appellee, of any of the functions of government over the lands of the appellants, adjudged by the circuit court, in this case, to have been annexed to said city, and to restrain the consideration of said judgment of annexation in the elections, taxation and internal improvements of said city.

The threatened exercise of none of the acts so sought to be restrained is alleged to be imminent, excepting that *427of the voting by residents upon the annexed territory, at an approaching election in said city. The act of voting will not render any judgment of this court less effectual, and it is a question with the voters whether they will take the chances of illegal voting or of waiving their right to insist that their property has not been legally annexed to said city. With these questions we are not concerned, since the action of voters within the alleged annexed territory could only have the effect to confirm an affirmance of the judgment below, and would not obstruct the fullest operation of a judgment of reversal.

Filed April 27, 1894.

With respect to the allegations of threatened taxation, street improvements, etc., as affecting the lands annexed, there is not, as we have said, any showing of immediate and imperious necessity for interference, and the extraordinary power of injunction will not be exerted unless such necessity appears. This much we may say without committing ourselves to the question of the existence of power in the court to restrain any of such acts if they were imminent. But when not essential to enable the fullest effect to be given to any decision we may make upon the merits of the main case, we seriously doubt the existence of that power.

The petition, therefore, is overruled.
II 

116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 3839 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 

2719 South Webster Street in Kokomo, Indiana, as the ‘‘Opha May 

Johnson Post Office’’. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MAY 21, 2020 

Mr. YOUNG (for himself and Mr. BRAUN) introduced the following bill; which 

was read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs 

A BILL 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 2719 South Webster Street in Kokomo, Indiana, as the ‘‘Opha May Johnson Post Office’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. OPHA MAY JOHNSON POST OFFICE. 

4 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

5 Postal Service located at 2719 South Webster Street in 

6 Kokomo, Indiana, shall be known and designated as the 

7 ‘‘Opha May Johnson Post Office’’. 

8 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg9 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 3839 IS

1 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

2 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Opha May Johnson 

3 Post Office’’. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
#### § 201.6 Applicability.

Unless the certificate or the order authorizing its issuance shall otherwise provide, such terms, conditions and limitations as are set forth in this part, and as may from time to time be prescribed by the Department, shall apply to the exercise of the privileges granted by each certificate issued under section 41102 or section 41103 of 49 U.S.C. Subtitle VII.

[Doc. No. 47582, 57 FR 38765, Aug. 27, 1992, as amended at 60 FR 43523, Aug. 22, 1995; Doc. No. DOT-OST-2014-0140, 84 FR 15924, Apr. 16, 2019]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 21

-0326 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. TIMOTHY JOHNSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including March 14, 2022, within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

February 4 2022

02/04/2022

Case Number: DA 21-0326
Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:23876 Filed:03/20/23 Entered:03/27/23 14:10:50 Desc: Main

Document Page 1 of 2
Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:23876 Filed:03/20/23 Entered:03/27/23 14:10:50 Desc: Main

Document Page 2 of 2
1. The plat of the survey of an island in Cedar Lake, Township 117 North, Range 30 West, Fifth Principal Meridian, Minnesota, accepted on January 6, 2000, will be officially filed in Eastern States, Springfield, Virginia at 7:30 a.m., on February 22, 2000. The tract shown below describes the island omitted from the original survey.

## Fifth Principal Meridian, Minnesota 

T. 117 N. R. 30 W. 

Tract No. 42.

2. Tract No. 42 is firm land rising 10-15 ft. above the ordinary high water mark. The soil has evolved from glacial till parent material and is similar to the soil found on the adjacent uplands. Numerous stones were located along the northerly and westerly shore line and at the highest points of the island. Tree species consist of ash, basswood, cedar, cottonwood, elm, oak and willow, ranging in size from 3 to 20 inches in diameter, with a maximum age of 120+ years. The ground cover consists of hazel, willow, cattails and native grasses along the southerly shore line. 

3. The present water level of the lake compares favorably with that of the lake at the time of the original survey; therefore, the elevation and upland character of the island along with the depth and width of the lake between the adjacent upland and the island are considered evidence that the island did exist in 1858, the year Minnesota was admitted to the Union. The original survey in 1857 did not note the presence of this island. 

4. Tract No. 42 is more than 50 percent upland in character within the interpretation of the Swamp and Overflow Act of September 28, 1850 (9 Stat. 519) as extended to the State of Minnesota under the Act of March 12, 1860 (12 Stat. 3). Therefore, the island is held to be public land. 

5. The survey was requested by the Assistant Field Manager, Division of Natural Resource Management, under the authority of Section 211 of FLPMA (43 U.S.C. 1721) and the Minnesota Public Lands Improvement Act of 1990, Public Law 101-442 (104 Stat. 1020). 

6. Except for valid existing rights, this island will not be subject to application, petition, location or selection under any public law until February 22, 2000. 

7. Interested parties protesting the determination that these islands are public land of the United States, must present valid proof showing that the island in question did not exist at the time of statehood or that it was attached to the mainland at the time of the original survey. Such protests must be submitted in writing to the Chief Cadastral Surveyor, Eastern States, Bureau of Land Management, 7450 Boston Boulevard, Springfield, Virginia 22153, prior to 7:30 a.m., February 22, 2000. 

Copies of the plat will be made available upon request and prepayment of the appropriate fee. 

Dated: January 6, 2000.

Stephen G. Kopach,

Chief Cadastral Surveyor.

[FR Doc. 00-1115 Filed 1-14-00; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4310-GJ-P
#### E. B. Drumright, Appellant, v. Archie Aitchison, *Appellee.*

Opinion Filed June 9, 1913.

A right to redeem lands from a mortgage may be lost by laches and acquiescence of the plaintiff and adverse possession by the defendant.

Appealed from the Circuit Court of Pinellas County.

Decree affirmed.

*F. M.*Simonion, for Appellant;

*McMullen*& McMullen, and *Davis*& Sellars, for Appellee.

Whitfield, J.

The bill seeking to redeem lands from a mortgage alleges that in 1881 Alfred Allen and Arthur C. Jackson, being seized in fee simple of described land, mortgaged it to Benjamin P. Barnard; that in 1886 Alfred Allen conveyed the land to Frederick Groover. It does not appear that Jackson had conveyed his interest to Allen. Subsequently Barnard foreclosed the mort*511gage, but did not make Groover a party to the foreclosure proceedings. At the foreclosure sale in 1889 Barnard purchased the land and subsequently conveyed it. In 1912 the heir of Frederick Groover conveyed to Drum-right the title received from Allen before the mortgage was foreclosed, and Drumright asks to be decreed a right to redeem from the defendants, appellees here, as the successors in title to Barnard, who was the mortgagee and who bought at the foreclosure sale. The court dismissed the bill and complainant appealed.

The bill alleges that neither of .the defendants, appellees here, “have been in actual possession and control of the premises, and adversely holding the same under their conveyances, and adversely to the interests of the said Frederick Groover; that they were charged by law with notice of the said conveyances to the said Frederick Groover duly made and filed of record as hereinbefore set forth, and that their chain of title traces through the said Alfred Allen and Arthur C. Jackson, whose conveyances vested title in the said Frederick Groover, and that the rights and interests of the said Frederick Groover have not been barred herein.”

The bill further alleges that the defendants “have been occupying said premises for a number of years, enjoying the use and rents thereof which has been of great value;” and an accounting is prayed.

If the defendants were adversely occupying the premises under claim of right when Drumright took his deed from Groover’s heir, the deed is inoperative as against them. Besides this the long delay in asking to redeem is not explained or excused; no fiduciary relation or duty is shown as against Barnard or his successors in title and the allegations of the bill indicate an ac*512quiescence in the defendants’ title and right to the lands relieved of the original mortgage lien.

The decree is affirmed.'

Shackleford, C. J., and Taylor, Cockrell and Hooker, J. J., concur.
# Official Journal C 341A/2012

| | ISSN 1977-091X
  doi:10.3000/1977091X.CA2012.341.eng |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 341A |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 559 November 2012 |

ISSN 1977-091X

doi:10.3000/1977091X.CA2012.341.eng

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 341A

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 559 November 2012

---

| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Information |
| | INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | European Commission |
| 2012/C 341A/01 | Common catalogue of varieties of vegetable species — 31st complete edition | 1 |

Notice No

Contents

page

II   Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

2012/C 341A/01

Common catalogue of varieties of vegetable species — 31st complete edition

1

---

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN
#### PENNSYLVANIA COAL & COKE CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES

[77 C.Cls. 594; 290 U.S. 661]

Petition for writ of certiorari *denied*by Supreme Court October 9, 1933.
§ 121.340 Emergency flotation means. ( a ) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, no person may operate an airplane in any overwater operation unless it is equipped with life preservers in accordance with § 121.339(a)(1) or with an approved flotation means for each occupant. This means must be within easy reach of each seated occupant and must be readily removable from the airplane.
( b ) Upon application by the air carrier or commercial operator, the Administrator may approve the operation of an airplane over water without the life preservers or flotation means required by paragraph (a) of this section, if the air carrier or commercial operator shows that the water over which the airplane is to be operated is not of such size and depth that life preservers or flotation means would be required for the survival of its occupants in the event the flight terminates in that water.
[Doc. No. 6713, 31 FR 1147, Jan. 28, 1966, as amended by Amdt. 121-25, 32 FR 3223, Feb. 24, 1967; Amdt. 121-251, 60 FR 65932, Dec. 20, 1995]
§ 25.173 Static longitudinal stability. Under the conditions specified in § 25.175, the characteristics of the elevator control forces (including friction) must be as follows: ( a ) A pull must be required to obtain and maintain speeds below the specified trim speed, and a push must be required to obtain and maintain speeds above the specified trim speed. This must be shown at any speed that can be obtained except speeds higher than the landing gear or wing flap operating limit speeds or *V* *FC* */M* *FC,* whichever is appropriate, or lower than the minimum speed for steady unstalled flight.
( b ) The airspeed must return to within 10 percent of the original trim speed for the climb, approach, and landing conditions specified in § 25.175 (a), (c), and (d), and must return to within 7.5 percent of the original trim speed for the cruising condition specified in § 25.175(b), when the control force is slowly released from any speed within the range specified in paragraph (a) of this section.
( c ) The average gradient of the stable slope of the stick force versus speed curve may not be less than 1 pound for each 6 knots.
( d ) Within the free return speed range specified in paragraph (b) of this section, it is permissible for the airplane, without control forces, to stabilize on speeds above or below the desired trim speeds if exceptional attention on the part of the pilot is not required to return to and maintain the desired trim speed and altitude.
[Amdt. 25-7, 30 FR 13117, Oct. 15, 1965]