RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4865-18T3

NEW JERSEY DIVISION 

OF CHILD PROTECTION 

AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

E.M.,

Defendant,

and

J.B., 

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE 

GUARDIANSHIP OF A.N.M.,

Minor.

_________________________

Submitted April 1, 2020 — Decided April 23, 2020

Before Judges Whipple, Gooden Brown and Mawla.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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A-4865-18T3

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Mercer County, 

Docket No. FG-11-0003-19.

Jeffrey E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Robyn A. Veasey, Deputy Public Defender, 

of counsel; Richard A. Foster, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, on the briefs).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Sookie Bae, Assistant Attorney General, of 

counsel; Kathryn E. Talbot, Deputy Attorney General, 

on the brief).

Jeffrey E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, 

attorney for minor (Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy 

Public Defender, of counsel; James Joseph Gross, 

Designated Counsel, on the brief). 

PER CURIAM

J.B.1, the father of four-year-old A.N.M., appeals from a June 24, 2019 

judgment terminating his parental rights.2 We affirm for the reasons Judge 

Wayne J. Forrest expressed in his thorough, and well-written, fifty-five-page 

decision.

We summarize the facts, which are set forth in greater detail in the judge's 

opinion. The trial in this matter occurred over four days, during which the 

1

 We utilize initials pursuant to Rule 1:38-3(d)(12).

2

 The child's mother, E.M., did not appeal from the judgment.
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Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) presented six 

witnesses, including a caseworker, adoption caseworker, caseworker supervisor, 

resource supervisor, resource caseworker, and expert psychologist Dr. Amy 

Becker-Mattes. E.M. neither appeared for trial, nor presented witnesses, and the 

law guardian supported the entry of a judgment of guardianship and presented 

no witnesses. J.B., who was incarcerated at the time of trial, attended trial and 

testified on his own behalf, as did C.B.-K., his former stepmother. The judge 

found all the witnesses testified credibly and J.B. "somewhat credible" because 

his testimony lacked knowledge of certain facts. The judge also considered 

thirty-one exhibits, which were moved into evidence. 

The evidence revealed the Division was involved with the family since 

A.N.M.'s birth in December 2015, primarily because of E.M.'s substance abuse 

and mental health problems. The evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated J.B. 

also had substance abuse problems, committed domestic violence, and was in 

and out of incarceration for much of A.N.M.'s life related to drug distribution 

charges, car-jacking, and other offenses. 

Notwithstanding, during its lengthy involvement, the Division provided 

both parents and A.N.M. with a myriad of services, offered visitation with 

A.N.M., considered relative placement options, and conducted bonding 
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evaluations. However, as relates to this appeal, J.B. missed several substance 

abuse evaluations, treatment sessions, and parenting classes, did not keep in 

contact with the Division, and did not request visitation with the child until 

October 2018. A.N.M. bonded with her resource parents, who wished to adopt 

her. 

Judge Forrest concluded the Division clearly and convincingly proved all 

four prongs of the best interests test, codified in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). He 

found because of J.B.'s chronic criminality, incarceration, and failure to comply 

with services and visitation, the Division proved the first prong. When J.B. did 

exercise visitation or comply with services in between his incarcerations, the 

judge found the evidence showed

before and after the visits with [J.B.], [A.N.M.] had 

separation anxiety issues and aggression issues towards 

her resource parents . . . Dr. Becker-Mattes testified to 

the fact that the resource parents had to take turns 

sleeping in [A.N.M.]'s room in order to assist [her] with 

her anxiety issues. On November 28, 2018, [J.B.] 

attended a substance abuse evaluation and tested 

positive for THC [and was] referred to an intake 

appointment with Project Free in December 2018[, 

which] . . . [he] attended . . . but was discharged due to 

his impending incarceration. 

. . . . 

[A]fter being sentenced . . . on January 11, 2019, 

[J.B.] returned to incarceration[, and] . . . at a court 
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ordered mediation, [J.B.] requested that he have 

visitation. . . . On April 16, 2019, the Division began 

monthly visitation with [J.B.] and [A.N.M.] at his 

correctional facility . . . . Before the visit, [A.N.M.] 

was upset[,] . . . did not want to get into the 

caseworker's vehicle[,] . . . [and] [d]uring the visit, 

[she] slept on [J.B.]'s lap. . . . 

In January 2019, after a psychological evaluation 

of [J.B.], Dr. Becker-Mattes diagnosed him with adult 

antisocial behavior[,] . . . [and] explained that 

[J.B.]'s . . . diagnosis raises serious concerns about 

[J.B.] and his ability to parent appropriately. . . . 

Based on . . . [J.B.]'s consistent incarceration, 

lack of compliance with services and lack of 

involvement with [A.N.M.], [A.N.M.]'s safety, health 

or development has been and will continue to be 

endangered by a parental relationship with . . . 

[J.B.] . . . .

The judge found the Division proved prong two, and concluded J.B. was 

unwilling or unable to parent A.N.M. The judge stated:

[J.B.] has a long criminal history and has been 

incarcerated repeatedly since [A.N.M.]'s birth[, 

and] . . . ha[s] a history of unstable employment and

housing . . . [J.B. is] unwilling or unable to eliminate 

the harm that has endangered [A.N.M.]'s health and 

development and [has] failed to provide a safe and 

stable home for [A.N.M.] At three years old, [A.N.M.] 

has separation anxiety and attachment issues with her 

resource parents due [to] . . . [J.B.]'s instability and 

inconsistency in [her] life. Therefore, further delay in 

permanent placement will harm [A.N.M.] 

. . . . 
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On August 22, 2016, the caseworker met [J.B.] . . . 

where [E.M.] was staying . . . [h]owever, [J.B.] knew 

about the Division's involvement prior because he was 

writted in from prison for the court hearing on July 19, 

2016. . . . By the end of 2016 . . . [J.B.] had not 

complied with substance abuse referrals or parenting 

classes. . . . 

Between January and April 2017, the Division 

did not know of [J.B.]'s whereabouts and he was not 

making himself available to the Division. . . . 

Although, [J.B.] was not incarcerated from June 4, 2017 

until September 15, 2017, and from October 2017 until 

May 4, 2018[,] . . . [J.B.] did not contact the Division 

during those periods that he was not incarcerated. . . . 

In April 2018, [J.B.]'s paternity was established as to 

[A.N.M.,] [and] . . . [J.B. was] served with the 

guardianship complaint in July 2018 . . . but did not 

contact the Division in regards to [A.N.M.] until the 

caseworker contacted and spoke to [J.B.] in September 

2018. 

. . . . 

[J.B.] expects [A.N.M.]'s permanency needs to be put 

on hold for two to three more years until he is released 

from incarceration. 

During [J.B.]'s psychological evaluation . . . he 

[informed] [Dr. Becker-Mattes] that he had two other 

children who were not in his care[,] . . . was unable to 

recount the names or ages of some of his children or 

their mothers[,] [and] he did not have his own home . . . 

[J.B.] provided . . . a few jobs that he had held, but did 

not provide dates or lengths of the employment.

. . . . 
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[I]t is evident that . . . [J.B.] [is] unwilling or unable to 

nurture and care for [A.N.M.] . . . [J.B.] has shown this 

through his lack of involvement in [A.N.M.]'s life due 

to his repeated incarcerations throughout the litigation 

and his own unwillingness to engage in services or 

visitation. . . . [D]elaying permanent placement will 

add to the harm that the child has already suffered, as 

[A.N.M.] has been in placement since February 2, 

2017[,] and deserves permanency, which can be 

achieved with her current resource parents. 

The judge concluded the Division proved prong three because it made 

reasonable efforts to reunify A.N.M. with her parents and explored alternatives 

to a termination of parental rights. In this regard, the judge found 

the Division referred [J.B.] to parenting classes, 

substance abuse evaluations and treatment, a 

psychological and bonding evaluation, supervised 

visitation while he was and was not incarcerated, a 

DNA paternity test, and conducted a search for [J.B.] in 

2017. . . . Additionally, the Division provided [A.N.M.] 

with three resource placements, a bonding evaluation 

with [J.B.] and her resource parents, regular [minimum 

visitation requirements], an Early Intervention 

Evaluation, a DNA paternity test with [J.B.], 

counseling, and visitation with both of her parents. 

. . . .

In April 2019, the Division began providing [J.B.] 

visitation with [A.N.M.] at Southern State Correctional 

Facility. . . .

. . . .
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[J.B.] ha[s] failed to sufficiently take advantage of the 

Division's offered services, despite the Division's 

reasonable efforts to provide them. . . . [J.B.] ha[s] also 

not demonstrated the necessary stability or commitment 

to care [for his] child . . . .

The judge detailed the Division's efforts to secure a placement with a 

relative resource. He noted the Division first contacted C.B.-K. as a possible 

placement option for A.N.M., allowed her to attend J.B.'s visits with A.N.M.,

but eventually ruled her out because she lacked the mental health to care for 

A.N.M. Additionally, the Division considered J.B.'s girlfriend, A.N.M.'s 

paternal and maternal grandmothers, and her maternal great aunt—all of whom 

were ruled out because they were unwilling or unable to care for her. 

The judge concluded the Division proved prong four and that termination 

of parental rights would not do more harm than good because the child was 

bonded to her resource parents, who could ameliorate the harm caused by 

severance of the parental relationship. Moreover, the judge found

there is no realistic likelihood that . . . [J.B.] will be 

able to safely and appropriately care for [A.N.M.] now 

or in the foreseeable future. . . . [J.B.] has been 

repeatedly incarcerated since [A.N.M.]'s birth, and did 

not start visiting with [A.N.M.] until October 2018. 

. . . Despite being out of incarceration on multiple 

occasions in 2017 and 2018, [J.B.] did not make himself 

available for visitation with [A.N.M.] prior to October 

2018. 
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. . . [J.B. is] unable to provide [A.N.M.] with a safe and 

stable home and the permanency she so desperately 

needs and deserves. The termination of the parental 

rights of . . . [J.B.] would certainly not result in more 

harm than good for the child. Based on all the evidence 

and testimony presented, there is no probable 

expectation in the ability of . . . [J.B.] to make the 

changes necessary to provide [A.N.M.] with 

permanency given [his] untreated substance abuse 

issues, inability to obtain stable housing and 

employment, lack of involvement in [his] daughter's 

life and [J.B.]'s incarcerations. 

On appeal, J.B. raises the following points for our consideration:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT 

EACH PRONG OF N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) HAD 

BEEN SATISFIED IN THIS CASE, AND THE 

TERMINATION OF THIS APPELLANT FATHER'S 

PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO HIS DAUGHTER 

MUST BE REVERSED. 

A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 

THE PARENTAL RELATIONSHIP WOULD CAUSE 

ENDURING HARM OR RISK OF HARM TO THE 

CHILD, BECAUSE DCPP'S EVIDENCE FAILED TO 

ESTABLISH ANY CAUSAL LINK BETWEEN 

WILLFUL ACTS OR OMISSIONS OF THIS FATHER 

AND ANY HARM OR RISK TO HIS DAUGHTER.

B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 

THE FATHER WAS UNWILLING OR UNABLE TO 

CEASE CAUSING HARM TO HIS DAUGHTER, 

SINCE NO ENDURING HARM OR RISK HAD BEEN 

ENGENDERED IN THE FIRST PLACE, AND THE 

DIVISION FAILED TO PROVIDE THIS FATHER 

ANY MEANS TO EVINCE HIS WILLINGNESS AND 

ABILITY IN ANY CASE. 
10 A-4865-18T3

C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 

DCPP HAD SATISFIED THE THIRD PRONG, AS 

DCPP'S WILLFUL AND UNEXPLAINED DELAY IN 

IDENTIFYING AND ASSESSING AVAILABLE 

RELATIVES UNDERMINED THE COURT'S 

ABILITY TO MAKE A FULL AND VALID 

CONSIDERATION OF EVERY ALTERNATIVE TO 

TERMINATION, AND THE COURT ITSELF 

EFFECTIVELY AND IMPROPERLY RELIEVED 

DCPP OF ITS REASONABLE-EFFORTS 

OBLIGATION TOWARD J.B. AS AN 

INCARCERATED PARENT. 

D. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT 

TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS WOULD 

NOT DO MORE HARM THAN GOOD IS 

UNSUPPORTABLE AS A MATTER OF LAW, 

BECAUSE THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 

THE OTHER STATUTORY PRONGS HAD BEEN 

SATISFIED.

Having reviewed the record, we conclude these arguments are without 

sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

We add only these comments.

In striking a balance between a parent's constitutional rights and a child's 

fundamental needs, courts employ the four-part guardianship test articulated in 

N.J. Div.of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 604-11 (1986), and 

codified as N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), which states:

The division shall initiate a petition to terminate

parental rights on the grounds of the "best interests of 

the child" pursuant to subsection (c) of section 15 of 
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P.L. 1951, c. 138 (C. 30:4C-15) if the following 

standards are met:

(1) The child's safety, health or development has been 

or will continue to be endangered by the parental 

relationship;

(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the 

harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to 

provide a safe and stable home for the child and the 

delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. 

Such harm may include evidence that separating the 

child from his resource family parents would cause 

serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm 

to the child;

(3) The division has made reasonable efforts to provide 

services to help the parent correct the circumstances 

which led to the child's placement outside the home and

the court has considered alternatives to termination of 

parental rights; and

(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more 

harm than good.

In their application, the four factors above "'are not discrete and separate, but 

relate to and overlap with one another to provide a comprehensive standard that 

identifies a child's best interests.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. I.S.,

202 N.J. 145, 167 (2010) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L., 

191 N.J. 596, 606-07 (2007)).

In reviewing Judge Forrest's decision, we must defer to his factual 

findings unless they "'went so wide of the mark that a mistake must have been 
12 A-4865-18T3

made.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007) 

(citation omitted). So long as "they are 'supported by adequate, substantial and 

credible evidence,'" a trial judge's factual findings will not be disturbed on 

appeal. In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 188 (App. Div. 1993) 

(citation omitted). We owe special deference to the trial judge's expertise in 

handling family issues. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-13 (1998).

Having reviewed the record, we conclude the judge's factual findings are 

based on sufficient credible evidence, and in light of those findings, his legal 

conclusions are unassailable. The record amply supports his decision that 

termination of J.B.'s parental rights is in A.N.M.'s best interests.

Affirmed.