COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, Bumgardner and Lemons 

PATRICK N. CLINE 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 0359-98-3 PER CURIAM 

 SEPTEMBER 22, 1998 

DONNA K. CLINE 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF AUGUSTA COUNTY 

Thomas H. Wood, Judge 

 (Walter F. Green, IV; Green and O'Donnell, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 (C. Lynn Lawson; Franklin, Denney, Ward & 

Lawson, on brief), for appellee. 

 Patrick N. Cline (father) appeals the decision of the 

circuit court denying his request for genetic testing to disprove 

his paternity of a child born to his former wife, Donna K. Cline 

(mother), during their marriage. Father contends that the trial 

court erred in finding that he was barred from relitigating the 

issue of paternity. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the 

parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. 

Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. 

See Rule 5A:27. 

 In 1991, father filed a bill of complaint seeking a divorce 

from mother. In his bill, father acknowledged that one child was 

born of the marriage. In its final decree of divorce entered in 

1991, the trial court found that there was one child born of the 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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parties' marriage. In 1994, father sought custody of the child, 

but subsequently sought genetic testing to confirm he was the 

child's father.1

 Father relies upon Commonwealth ex rel. Comptroller o/b/o 

Overby v. Flaneary, 22 Va. App. 293, 469 S.E.2d 79 (1996), and 

Dunbar v. Hogan, 16 Va. App. 653, 432 S.E.2d 16 (1993), for the 

proposition that a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity does 

not preclude litigation on the issue of paternity. His reliance 

upon those cases is misplaced. In those cases, unlike the case 

at bar, there was no previous litigation resulting in judgment. 

In Dunbar, the putative father signed a "Declaration of 

Paternity" before learning through a paternity test that he was 

not the genetic father. No previously-entered court order or 

judgment ever found Dunbar to be the father. We held that, in 

the absence of any previous judicial determination of paternity, 

the provision of Code § 20-49.2 that an acknowledgement of 

paternity "shall have the same legal effect as a judgment entered 

pursuant to Code § 20-49.8" did not preclude Dunbar from having 

the opportunity to litigate the issue of his paternity. 

Similarly, in Flaneary, in the absence of any previous 

litigation, another man's acknowledgment of paternity did not 

 

 1While the parties stipulated to the record in the divorce 

case, the record of that case was not included in the record 

filed with this Court on appeal. However, the relevant facts 

were set forth by the trial court in its letter opinion, its 

order, and in the written statement of facts, without objection 

by father. 
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preclude a judicial finding that Flaneary was the genetic father. 

 In this case, the trial court found that the issue of 

paternity was fully litigated in the divorce case, that the 

divorce decree stated that there was one child born of the 

marriage, and that father was barred from relitigating the issue 

of paternity. In Slagle v. Slagle, 11 Va. App. 341, 398 S.E.2d 

346 (1990), we held that collateral estoppel barred relitigation 

of paternity which was necessarily decided in the 

previously-entered unappealed divorce decree finding the child to 

have been born of the marriage and setting child support. The 

panel decision in Slagle is binding upon this Court unless the 

issue is further considered by this Court en banc, overruled by 

the Virginia Supreme Court or legislatively modified. 

Commonwealth v. Burns, 240 Va. 171, 395 S.E.2d 456 (1990). For 

the reasons set out in Slagle, we find that the trial court did 

not err in ruling that the issue of father's paternity may not be 

relitigated. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.