alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Charles Sommers *vs.*Max Adelman.

Third Judicial District.

Submitted on briefs June 16th

decided June 27th, 1916.

Plea in Abatement by the defendant (appellee) to an appeal by the plaintiff (appellant) from a decision of the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County, *Simpson, J.,*upon the alleged ground that said appeal was not taken within ten days after the rendition of such decision; to the plaintiff’s answer to this plea *714the defendant demurred.

*Demurrer overruled, answer held sufficient, and plea in abatement overruled.*

*Philip Pond,*in support of the plea in abatement.

*Robert J. Woodruff,*in opposition to the plea in abatement.

Per Curiam.

Our statutes prescribing the proqedure in the case of appeals under conditions here presented, direct that they shall be taken within ten days from the rendition of judgment. General Statutes, §§ 791, 806. The last of the ten days after the rendition of judgment in this case, reckoning by the calendar, fell upon Sunday. Upon that day the plaintiff was powerless to take an appeal. We have adopted the rule that where the last day of a period within which an act may be done, which may not be done Sunday, falls upon such day, performance may be made on the following day. That rule is applicable to and governs the situation here presented. *Avery*v. *Stewart, 2*Conn. 69; *Sands*v. *Lyon,*18 Conn. 18, 31. Other courts have so held in respect to matters of court procedure. *Cock*v. *Bunn,*6 John. Rep. (N. Y.) 326; *Borst*v. *Griffin,*5 Wend. (N. Y.) 84; *Marks’ Executors*v. *Russell,*40 Pa. St. 372, 373; *Clink*v. *Russell,*58 Mich. 242, 243, 25 N. W. 175; *Kinney*v. *Heuring,*42 Ind. App. 263, 85 N. E. 369.

Whether or not the rule is subject to limitation where periods prescribed by statute for the creation or determination of rights are concerned, we have no occasion to inquire. Those limitations would not in any event extend to include mere regulations of court procedure..

Demurrer overruled, answer held sufficient, and plea in abatement overruled.
# Supreme Court of Florida

____________ No. SC17

- 1242

____________ SAMUEL JASON DERRICK,

Appellant,

vs. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. [February 2, 2018]

PER CURIAM. We have for review Samuel Jason Derrick’s appeal of the circuit court’s order denying Derrick’s motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Derrick’s motion sought r elief pursuant to the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida , 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and our decision on
remand in Hurst v. State ( Hurst ), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied , 137 S. Ct. 2161 (2017). This Court stayed Derrick’s app eal pending the disposition of
Hitchcock v. State , 226 So. 3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied , 138 S. Ct. 513 (2017)

.- 2

-

After this Court decided Hitchcock , Derrick responded to this Court’s order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive i n this case. After reviewing Derrick’s response to the order to show cause, as well as the State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Derrick is not entitled to relief. Derrick was sentenced to death following a jury’s recommendation for death by a

vote of seven to five. Derrick v. State , 641 So. 2d 378 , 379 (Fla. 1994). Derrick’s
sentence of death became final in 1995. Derrick v. Florida , 513 U.S. 1130 (1995). Thus, Hurst does not apply retroactively to Derrick’s sentence of death. See
Hitchcock , 2 26 So. 3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Derrick’s
motion. The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Derrick , we caution that any rehearing motion containing reargument will be stricken. It is so
ordered. LABARGA, C.J., and POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur. PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion. LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result. QUINCE, J., recused. PARIENTE, J., concurring in result. I concur in result because I recognize that this Court’s opinion in Hi tchcock
v. State , 226 So. 3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied , 138 S. Ct. 513 (2017), is now final. However, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Hitchcock

.- 3

-

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for P as co County, Stanley Richard Mills , Judge

- Case No. 511987CF001775CFAXWS Linda McDermott of McClain & McDermott, P.A. , Estero, Florida; and Harry P. Brody, Sarasota, Florida, for Appellant Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and C. Suzanne Bechard, A ssistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Appellee
#### Marjorie WOODMAN *v.*Oscar Leonard WOODMAN

5-5994

482 S.W. 2d 629

Opinion delivered July 17, 1972

*Jackson County Legal Services Inc.,*by: *Monroe L. Bethea,*for appellant.

*Pickens, Boyce ir McLarty,*by: *Tim F. Watson,*for appellee.

George Rose Smith, Justice.

In 1970 the appellant obtained a divorce from the appellee, who was ordered to pay $25 a week as alimony and $25 a week for the support of the couple’s eight-year-old son. Woodman faithfully made the payments for child support, but he made no payments of alimony.

After about a year the appellant filed the present petition to have the alimony delinquencies reduced to judgment and to have Woodman punished for contempt of court for having failed to pay alimony. The trial court entered judgment for the past-due installments of alimony, but he found that Woodman had been unable to make the payments. The court accordingly refused to hold Woodman in contempt and modified the original decree by relieving Woodman of the duty of making further payments of alimony.

*1089We do not find the decree to be clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. According to Woodman’s testimony, before the divorce decree was entered the federal Government took his home and all his other assets to satisfy a tax assessment of about $30,000. About $4,200 of the assessment is still unpaid. Woodman has been working as a car salesman, earning from $85 to $105 a week. He has remarried. He states that he has been and is now unable to pay the alimony specified in the decree. His testimony is uncontradicted; in fact, Mrs. Woodman did not see fit to testify at the hearing.

We have held that remarriage is a change of circumstances that may be considered as a basis for a reduction in alimony. *Barnes*v. *Barnes,*246 Ark. 624, 439 S.W. 2d 37 (1969); *McCutcheon*v. *McCutcheon,*226 Ark. 276, 289 S. W. 2d 521 (1956). Here there is also Woodman’s testimony that when the divorce decree was entered he hoped to salvage some equity from the property taken by the government, but that expectation has not been realized. The chancellor was justified in concluding that if the decree were left unchanged the delinquencies would simply continue to accumulate, subjecting Woodman to a burden that, as a practical matter, might eventually impair his ability to continue to make even the payments for the support of the child. Upon the record as a whole we are not convinced that the chancellor’s decree is contrary to the weight of the evidence. Our affirmance, however, is without prejudice to the appellant’s right to seek a reinstatement of alimony if conditions should change.

Affirmed.

Byrd, J., concurs.
EXHIBIT 31.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



I, Anthony Servidio, certify that:



1. I have reviewed this Amendment
No. 1 to the Annual Report on Form 10-K of ITXC Corp.;



2. Based on my
knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect
to the period covered by this report;



3. Based on my knowledge, the financial
statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;



4. The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:



a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure
that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;



b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls
and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of this period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and



c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially
affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and



---

5. The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal
control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial
reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control
over financial reporting.



Date: April 27,
2004



|                        |  |                        
|----------------------- |  | -----------------------
|                       
|/s/    Anthony Servidio
|Name:                   |  | Anthony Servidio       
|Title:                  |  | Chief Financial Officer
§ 198.7 Amount of insurance coverage available. ( a ) For each aircraft or insurable item, the amount insured may not exceed the amount for which the applicant has otherwise insured or self-insured the aircraft or insurable item against damage or liability arising from any risk. In the case of hull insurance, the amount insured may not exceed the reasonable value of the aircraft as determined by the FAA or its designated agent.
( b ) Policies issued without premium may be revised from time to time by the FAA with notice to the insured, to add aircraft or insurable items or to amend amounts of coverage if the insured has changed the amount by which it has otherwise insured or self-insured the aircraft or itself.
Certification by Chief Financial Officer
 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
 as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
 
 In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Capital Bank Corporation (the “Company”) for the period ended September 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Michael R. Moore, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to my knowledge that:
 
 The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
 
 The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 
 
 /s/Michael R. Moore
 Michael R. Moore
 Chief Financial Officer
 November 15, 2010
 
 This Certification is being furnished solely to accompany the Report pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed “filed” by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and shall not be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, whether made before or after the date of this Report, irrespective of any general incorporation language contained in such filing.
 
 A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
§ 16.31 Director's Determinations after investigations. ( a ) After consideration of the pleadings and other information obtained by the FAA after investigation, the Director will render an initial determination and serve it upon each party within 120 days of the date the last pleading specified in § 16.23 was due.
( b ) ( 1 ) The Director's Determination shall include findings of fact and conclusions of law, accompanied by explanations and based upon all material issues of fact, credibility of the evidence, law and discretion presented on the record, together with a statement of the reasons therefor.
( 2 ) The Director shall issue a determination or rule in a party's favor only if the determination or ruling is in accordance with law and supported by a preponderance of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence contained in the record.
( c ) A party adversely affected by the Director's Determination may appeal the initial determination as provided in § 16.33. However, if the Director's Determination that is appealed contains a Corrective Action Plan, the Director has the discretion to suspend the Corrective Action Plan until the appeal is resolved.
( d ) If the Director's Determination finds the respondent in noncompliance and proposes the issuance of a compliance order, the initial determination will include notice of opportunity for a hearing under subpart F of this part if a hearing is required by statute or otherwise provided by the FAA. A hearing may be required by statute if the FAA determination would terminate eligibility for grants under 49 U.S.C. 47114(c) or (e), or terminate payments on a grant agreement under 49 U.S.C. subchapter 471. The respondent may elect or waive a hearing, as provided in subpart E of this part.
( e ) The Director will not consider requests for rehearing, reargument, reconsideration, or modification of a Director's Determination without a finding of good cause.
[Amdt. 16-1, 78 FR 56145, Sept. 12, 2013]
§ 250.10 Report of passengers denied confirmed space. ( a ) Each reporting carrier as defined in § 234.2 of this chapter and any carrier that voluntarily submits data pursuant to § 234.7 of this chapter shall file, on a quarterly basis, the information specified in BTS Form 250. The reporting basis shall be flight segments originating in the United States operated by the reporting carrier. The reports must be submitted within 30 days after the end of the quarter covered by the report. The calendar quarters end March 31, June 30, September 30 and December 31. “Total Boardings” on Line 6 of Form 250 shall include only passengers on flights for which confirmed reservations are offered. Data shall not be included for inbound international flights.
( b ) For air transportation taking place on or after January 1, 2018, each reporting carrier and voluntary reporting carrier shall file a separate BTS Form 250 for all flight segments originating in the United States marketed under only the reporting carrier's code, and operated by a code-share partner that is a certificated air carrier or commuter air carrier using aircraft that have a designed passenger capacity of 30 or more seats.
[Docket No. DOT-OST-2014-0056, 81 FR 76827, Nov. 3, 2016, as amended by Docket No. DOT-OST-2020-0251, 86 FR 41381, Aug. 2, 2021]
EXHIBIT C

SUMMARY OF COMPENSATION DURING FEE PERIOD BY PROJECT CATEGORY AND BY MATTER

Matter Number Matter Name Fees Costs Total

396-00002 General $54,391.50 $17,815.58 $72,207.08

396-00003 COFINA Dispute Analysis $217,380.50 $3,067.85 $220,448.35

396-00004 Communications w/ Creditors/ Website (other than 

Committee Members)

$1,630.00 $0.00 $1,630.00

396-00006 PREPA $7,722.50 $0.10 $7,722.60

396-00007 HTA $1,032.00 $0.00 $1,032.00

396-00008 ERS $433.50 $0.00 $433.50

396-00009 Other Adversary Proceedings $13,675.50 $116.10 $13,791.60

396-00010 Mediation $1,158.00 $0.00 $1,158.00

396-00012 Discovery $146,010.00 $68.70 $146,078.70

396-00013 GDB $102.00 $91.80 $193.80

396-00014 PBAPR $68.00 $0.00 $68.00

396-00015 Fee Application $ 990.00 $0.00 $990.00

TOTAL $444,593.50 $21,160.13 $465,753.63

Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:2757-5 Filed:03/19/18 Entered:03/19/18 22:02:46 Desc:

Exhibit C Page 1 of 1
230801 SCH ORD RE EMPRESAS OMAJEDE MOT VERSION AUGUST 1, 2023 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

----------------------------------------------------------x

In re: PROMESA

Title III

THE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND

MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO,

as representative of No. 17 BK 3283-LTS

THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, (Jointly Administered)

et al.,

Debtors.1

----------------------------------------------------------x

ORDER SCHEDULING BRIEFING OF MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND EMPRESAS OMAJEDE’S 

PROOF OF CLAIM (KROLL CLAIM #70324), FOR LEAVE TO FILE SPANISH LANGUAGE 

DOCUMENTS, AND FOR ORDER GRANTING 30 DAYS TO OBTAIN CERTIFIED TRANSLATIONS

The Court has received and reviewed the Motion for Leave to Amend Empresas 

Omajede’s Proof of Claim (Kroll Claim #70324), for Leave to File Spanish Language 

Documents, and for Order Granting 30 Days to Obtain Certified Translations (the “Motion”) 

filed by Empresas Omajede, Inc. (the “Movant”). (Docket Entry No. 24818.) Responses to the 

Motion, if any, must be filed by August 10, 2023. Movant’s reply papers must be filed by

August 15, 2023. The Court will thereafter take the Motion on submission, unless the Court 

1 The Debtors in these Title III Cases, along with each Debtor’s respective Title III case 

number and the last four (4) digits of each Debtor’s federal tax identification number, as 

applicable, are the (i) Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (Bankruptcy Case No. 17-BK3283-LTS) (Last Four Digits of Federal Tax ID: 3481); (ii) Puerto Rico Sales Tax 

Financing Corporation (“COFINA”) (Bankruptcy Case No. 17-BK-3284-LTS) (Last Four 

Digits of Federal Tax ID: 8474); (iii) Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation 

Authority (“HTA”) (Bankruptcy Case No. 17-BK-3567-LTS) (Last Four Digits of 

Federal Tax ID: 3808); (iv) Employees Retirement System of the Government of the 

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (“ERS”) (Bankruptcy Case No. 17-BK-3566-LTS) (Last 

Four Digits of Federal Tax ID: 9686); (v) Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority 

(“PREPA”) (Bankruptcy Case No. 17-BK-4780-LTS) (Last Four Digits of Federal Tax 

ID: 3747); and (vi) Puerto Rico Public Buildings Authority (“PBA”) (Bankruptcy Case 

No. 19-BK-5523-LTS) (Last Four Digits of Federal Tax ID: 3801) (Title III case 

numbers are listed as Bankruptcy Case numbers due to software limitations).

Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:24823 Filed:08/01/23 Entered:08/01/23 10:32:34 Desc: Main

Document Page 1 of 2
230801 SCH ORD RE EMPRESAS OMAJEDE MOT VERSION AUGUST 1, 2023 2

determines that a hearing is necessary.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 1, 2023

 /s/ Laura Taylor Swain 

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN

United States District Judge

Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:24823 Filed:08/01/23 Entered:08/01/23 10:32:34 Desc: Main

Document Page 2 of 2
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 22 - 0107 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. SHANE THOMPSON FREIBURG,

Defendant and Appellant.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including August 22, 2022, within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

July 15 2022

07/15/2022

Case Number: DA 22-0107
Exhibit
10.6


 


RESTRUCTURING
BONUS AGREEMENT


This RESTRUCTURING
BONUS AGREEMENT (“Agreement”),
dated as of March 31, 2003, is by and between Elgar Holdings, Inc., a
Delaware corporation (“Holdings”),
and John Mei (“Executive”).


RECITALS


WHEREAS, Holdings
is contemplating a financial restructuring that will involve exchanging up to
$90 million of its Senior Notes due 2008 for a combination of new senior
notes, preferred stock and common stock (the “Restructuring”), in order to reduce its annualized cash
interest expense; and


WHEREAS, Holdings
desires to incentivize Executive to use his reasonable best efforts to
facilitate the Restructuring by paying him a restructuring bonus, as described
herein, if the Restructuring is completed.


AGREEMENT


NOW THEREFORE, in consideration
of the premises and the mutual agreements hereinafter set forth, the parties
hereto hereby agree as follows:


1.             Restructuring Bonus.  If the Restructuring is completed on or prior to
August 2, 2003, Executive shall be entitled to receive $40,000 (the “Restructuring Bonus”), payable as
follows:  Executive shall be entitled to
receive $6,670 during the month the Restructuring is completed, and shall be
entitled to receive an additional $6,666 in each of the five successive months.  All compensation paid to Executive under
this Agreement shall be subject to customary withholding and employment taxes
as required by federal and state law, and shall be paid in accordance with
Holdings’ standard payroll procedures. 
If there is a question as to whether the Restructuring has been
completed so as to give rise to the Restructuring Bonus, the good faith
determination of the Board of Directors of Holdings will be conclusive.


2.             Successors and Assigns. 
The rights and obligations of Holdings under this Agreement shall inure
to the benefit of and shall be binding upon the successors and assigns of
Holdings.  Executive shall not be
entitled to assign any of his rights or obligations under this Agreement.


3.             Governing Law. 
This Agreement shall be interpreted, construed, governed and enforced in
accordance with the laws of the State of Delaware.


4.             Amendments. 
No amendment or modification of the terms or conditions of this
Agreement shall be valid unless in writing and signed by the parties hereto.


5.             Counterparts.  This Agreement may be executed in one or more
counterpart copies, each of which shall be deemed to be an original and all of
which taken together shall be deemed one and the same instrument.


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Holdings has caused this Agreement to be executed
on its behalf by its duly authorized officer and Executive has executed the
same as of the day and year first above written.


ELGAR
HOLDINGS, INC.


	
  By:

  	
  /s/ Donald Glickman

  
	
   

  	
  Donald Glickman

  Chairman of the Board and Vice President

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
  /s/ John P. Mei

  
	
  John P. Mei
# L_2013252EN.01S00301.xml

| 24.9.2013 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 252/s3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.9.2013

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 252/s3

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NOTE TO READERS — WAY OF REFERRING TO ACTS

As of 1 July 2013 the way of referring to acts has changed.

During a transitional period this new practice will coexist with the previous one.

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