# Official Journal L 248/2014

| | ISSN 1977-0677 |
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| Official Journal
  of the European Union | L 248 |
| | |
| English edition | Legislation | Volume 5722 August 2014 |

ISSN 1977-0677

Official Journal

of the European Union

L 248

English edition

Legislation

Volume 5722 August 2014

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| Contents | | II   Non-legislative acts | page |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | | REGULATIONS |
| | * | Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 913/2014 of 21 August 2014 laying down temporary exceptional support measures for producers of peaches and nectarines | 1 |
| | * | Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 914/2014 of 21 August 2014 amending for the 217th time Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with the Al Qaida network | 7 |
| | | Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 915/2014 of 21 August 2014 establishing the standard import values for determining the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables | 10 |
| | | DECISIONS |
| | | 2014/536/EU |
| | * | Commission Decision of 14 August 2014 granting the Hellenic Republic a derogation from certain provisions of Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council | 12 |

Contents

II   Non-legislative acts

page

REGULATIONS

*

Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 913/2014 of 21 August 2014 laying down temporary exceptional support measures for producers of peaches and nectarines

1

*

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 914/2014 of 21 August 2014 amending for the 217th time Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with the Al Qaida network

7

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 915/2014 of 21 August 2014 establishing the standard import values for determining the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables

10

DECISIONS

2014/536/EU

*

Commission Decision of 14 August 2014 granting the Hellenic Republic a derogation from certain provisions of Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council

12

| EN | Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.
  The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk. |
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EN

Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.

The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk.

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II Non-legislative acts

REGULATIONS

| 22.8.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 248/1 |
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22.8.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 248/1

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COMMISSION DELEGATED REGULATION (EU) No 913/2014

of 21 August 2014

laying down temporary exceptional support measures for producers of peaches and nectarines

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007 (1), and in particular Article 219(1) in conjunction with Article 228 thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | The seasonally high supply levels in peaches and nectarines and the slowdown in consumption due to adverse weather conditions at the peak of the harvest created a difficult market situation with significant price falls for those fruits. The limited storage possibility for those perishable fruits does not allow for a rapid improvement in such a situation. Furthermore, the ban announced by Russia on imports of fruits and vegetables from the Union to Russia risks to aggravate the situation in the peach and nectarine markets. Accordingly, a situation has arisen on the market which the normal measures available under Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 appear to be insufficient to address. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

The seasonally high supply levels in peaches and nectarines and the slowdown in consumption due to adverse weather conditions at the peak of the harvest created a difficult market situation with significant price falls for those fruits. The limited storage possibility for those perishable fruits does not allow for a rapid improvement in such a situation. Furthermore, the ban announced by Russia on imports of fruits and vegetables from the Union to Russia risks to aggravate the situation in the peach and nectarine markets. Accordingly, a situation has arisen on the market which the normal measures available under Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 appear to be insufficient to address.

| (2) | In order to prevent the existing market situation from turning into a more severe or prolonged market disturbance, urgent action is needed to provide for exceptional support measures for producers of peaches and nectarines at this stage of the harvest. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

In order to prevent the existing market situation from turning into a more severe or prolonged market disturbance, urgent action is needed to provide for exceptional support measures for producers of peaches and nectarines at this stage of the harvest.

| (3) | Market withdrawals are an effective crisis management measure in case of surplus of fruit and vegetables due to temporary and unpredictable circumstances. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Market withdrawals are an effective crisis management measure in case of surplus of fruit and vegetables due to temporary and unpredictable circumstances.

| (4) | In order to mitigate the impact of a sudden drop in prices this summer, the existing Union financial assistance for market withdrawals to be freely distributed to certain organisations, such as charitable organisations and schools, should be temporarily increased. Union financial assistance should therefore be granted up to a maximum of 10 % of the volume of marketed production of each producer organisation. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

In order to mitigate the impact of a sudden drop in prices this summer, the existing Union financial assistance for market withdrawals to be freely distributed to certain organisations, such as charitable organisations and schools, should be temporarily increased. Union financial assistance should therefore be granted up to a maximum of 10 % of the volume of marketed production of each producer organisation.

| (5) | In the light of the exceptional market disturbances and in in order to ensure that all producers of peaches and nectarines are supported by the Union, Union financial assistance should be extended to producers of peaches and nectarines who are not members of a recognised producer organisation. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

In the light of the exceptional market disturbances and in in order to ensure that all producers of peaches and nectarines are supported by the Union, Union financial assistance should be extended to producers of peaches and nectarines who are not members of a recognised producer organisation.

| (6) | Producers who are not members of a producer organisation should receive 50 % of the amounts provided for under the existing Union financial assistance. However, they should fulfil the same or similar conditions as producer organisations. Therefore, in this context, they should be subject, like recognised producer organisations, to the relevant provisions of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011 (2). |
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(6)

Producers who are not members of a producer organisation should receive 50 % of the amounts provided for under the existing Union financial assistance. However, they should fulfil the same or similar conditions as producer organisations. Therefore, in this context, they should be subject, like recognised producer organisations, to the relevant provisions of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011 (2).

| (7) | Moreover, increased consumption of peaches and nectarines should help to stabilise the market situation more rapidly. Promotion campaigns should be used to encourage consumption. Therefore, additional Union support should be given to producer organisations as regards promotion campaigns. |
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(7)

Moreover, increased consumption of peaches and nectarines should help to stabilise the market situation more rapidly. Promotion campaigns should be used to encourage consumption. Therefore, additional Union support should be given to producer organisations as regards promotion campaigns.

| (8) | That additional support for promotion activities should be distributed between the Member States on the basis of their production of peaches and nectarines in 2012. Most production is concentrated in four Member States. Twenty-four Member States together account for only 3,7 % of the Union production of peaches and nectarines. In order to ensure an efficient use of the available budget, no allocation should be granted to Member States with a share of the Union production below 1 %. |
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(8)

That additional support for promotion activities should be distributed between the Member States on the basis of their production of peaches and nectarines in 2012. Most production is concentrated in four Member States. Twenty-four Member States together account for only 3,7 % of the Union production of peaches and nectarines. In order to ensure an efficient use of the available budget, no allocation should be granted to Member States with a share of the Union production below 1 %.

| (9) | It should be left to the Member States concerned to determine how they will allocate the additional support provided for in this Regulation in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 and Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011, except where derogations to those Regulations are provided in this Regulation. |
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(9)

It should be left to the Member States concerned to determine how they will allocate the additional support provided for in this Regulation in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 and Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011, except where derogations to those Regulations are provided in this Regulation.

| (10) | In order to have an immediate impact on the market and to contribute to stabilise prices, the temporary exceptional support measures provided for in this Regulation should apply as of the date of the announcement of those measures by the Commission on 11 August 2014, |
| --- | --- |

(10)

In order to have an immediate impact on the market and to contribute to stabilise prices, the temporary exceptional support measures provided for in this Regulation should apply as of the date of the announcement of those measures by the Commission on 11 August 2014,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Subject matter and scope

1.   This Regulation lays down rules for temporary exceptional support measures for peaches and nectarines of CN code 0809 30 intended for fresh consumption.

2.   The support measures referred to in paragraph 1 shall cover:

| (a) | withdrawal operations carried out from 11 August until 30 September 2014 by producer organisations in the fruit and vegetable sector recognised in accordance with Article 154 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 as well as by producers who are not members of such organisations; and |
| --- | --- |

(a)

withdrawal operations carried out from 11 August until 30 September 2014 by producer organisations in the fruit and vegetable sector recognised in accordance with Article 154 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 as well as by producers who are not members of such organisations; and

| (b) | promotion activities as referred to in Article 33(3)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 carried out from 11 August until 31 December 2014 by producer organisations in the fruit and vegetable sector recognised in accordance with Article 154 of that Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

promotion activities as referred to in Article 33(3)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 carried out from 11 August until 31 December 2014 by producer organisations in the fruit and vegetable sector recognised in accordance with Article 154 of that Regulation.

Article 2

Financial assistance to producer organisations for withdrawals

1.   For the withdrawal operations referred to in Article 1(2)(a), Union financial assistance for market withdrawals for free distribution under Article 34(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 shall be available for a maximum of 10 % of the volume of marketed production of each producer organisation.

2.   The Union financial assistance referred to in paragraph 1 shall be available to producer organisations even if they do not provide for such market withdrawal operations in their operational programmes. Article 32(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 shall not apply in relation to Union financial assistance under this Article.

3.   The Union financial assistance referred to in paragraph 1 shall not be taken into account for the purpose of calculating the ceilings referred to in Article 34(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.

4.   The ceiling of one third of expenditure referred to in the fourth subparagraph of Article 33(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 and the 25 % maximum ceiling for the increase of the operational fund referred to in Article 66(3)(c) of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011 shall not apply in respect of expenditure incurred for withdrawal operations referred to in Article 1(2)(a) of this Regulation.

5.   Expenditure incurred in accordance with this Article shall form part of the operational fund of the producer organisations.

Article 3

Financial assistance to producers not being members of producer organisations

1.   Union financial assistance of 50 % of the amounts set out in Annex XI to Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011 shall be granted in accordance with this Article to producers of fruit and vegetables who are not members of a recognised producer organisation.

2.   The Union financial assistance referred to in paragraph 1 shall be available for the delivery of products which are subsequently withdrawn from the market by a producer organisation in accordance with Article 34(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013, subject to respecting the lower of the ceilings set out in the first subparagraph of paragraph 3 of this Article.

3.   Producers shall conclude a contract with a recognised producer organisation for the entire quantity of products to be delivered under this Article. Producer organisations shall accept all reasonable requests from producers who are not members of a recognised producer organisation. Before signing the contract, the producer organisation shall verify that the quantity to be delivered under the contract does not exceed the lower of the following ceilings:

| (a) | 10 % of the producer's total production in 2012, on the basis of written documents of probative value to be provided by the producer; and |
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(a)

10 % of the producer's total production in 2012, on the basis of written documents of probative value to be provided by the producer; and

| (b) | the producer organisation's and its members' average production yield per hectare for peaches and nectarines respectively in 2012, multiplied by 10 % of the area used by the producer for the production of peaches and nectarines respectively in 2014 on the basis of written documents of probative value to be provided by the producer. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the producer organisation's and its members' average production yield per hectare for peaches and nectarines respectively in 2012, multiplied by 10 % of the area used by the producer for the production of peaches and nectarines respectively in 2014 on the basis of written documents of probative value to be provided by the producer.

Member States shall establish a production yield for peaches and nectarines respectively to be used by producer organisations which did not market peaches and/or nectarines in 2012. In case Member States establish regional yields, the regions shall be the ones defined under Article 91(4) of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011, if applicable.

4.   The Union financial assistance shall be paid to producers not being members of producer organisations by the producer organisation with which the non-member producer signed a contract in accordance with paragraph 3.

5.   The amounts that correspond to the real costs incurred by the producer organisation for withdrawing the respective products shall be retained by the producer organisation. Evidence of the costs shall be provided by means of invoices.

6.   Where the recognition of a producer organisation has been suspended in accordance with Article 114(2) of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011, its members shall be deemed to be producers not being members of a recognised producer organisation for the purpose of this Article.

7.   The conditions for market withdrawal and the corresponding penalties for non-compliance with those conditions as laid down in Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 and Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011, as well as Article 2(2) to (5) of this Regulation shall apply mutatis mutandis for the purposes of this Article.

Article 4

Checks on withdrawal operations

The withdrawal operations referred to in Articles 2 and 3 shall be subject to first-level checks in accordance with Article 108 of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011. The checks shall cover at least 10 % of the quantity of products withdrawn from the market and 10 % respectively of producer organisations and producers who are not members of a producer organisation who benefit from the support measures.

Article 5

Additional support to producer organisations for promotion activities

1.   Union expenditure incurred for the additional support for promotion activities referred to in Article 1(2)(b) shall not exceed EUR 3 000 000.

This amount shall be allocated to Member States in accordance with the Annex.

2.   Producer organisations shall submit initial requests for the additional support referred to in paragraph 1 to the Member States by 15 October 2014. Member States shall decide on the requests and on the distribution of the additional support to producer organisations as follows:

| (a) | in case the approved requests exceed the maximum amount allocated to a Member State in accordance with the Annex, the Member State shall set an allocation coefficient on the basis of received requests; |
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(a)

in case the approved requests exceed the maximum amount allocated to a Member State in accordance with the Annex, the Member State shall set an allocation coefficient on the basis of received requests;

| (b) | in case the approved requests do not exceed the maximum amount of support, the allocation coefficient shall be set at 100 %. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

in case the approved requests do not exceed the maximum amount of support, the allocation coefficient shall be set at 100 %.

3.   The additional support referred to in paragraph 1 shall be available to producer organisations even if they do not provide for such promotion activities in their operational programmes. Article 32(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 shall not apply to additional support under this Article.

4.   The additional support referred to in paragraph 1 shall not be taken into account for the purpose of calculating the ceilings referred to in Article 34(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013.

5.   The ceiling of one third of expenditure referred to in the fourth subparagraph of Article 33(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 and the 25 % maximum ceiling for the increase of the operational fund referred to in Article 66(3)(c) of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011 shall not apply in respect of expenditure incurred for promotion activities referred to in Article 1(2)(b) of this Regulation.

6.   Expenditure incurred in accordance with this Article shall form part of the operational fund of the producer organisations.

Article 6

Application for and payment of Union support

1.   Producer organisations shall apply for the payment of the Union financial assistance to be paid to them and/or to producers not being members of a producer organisation and for the payment of the additional support to be paid to them as follows:

| (a) | by 31 October 2014 for the Union financial assistance for the withdrawal operations referred to in Article 1(2)(a); and |
| --- | --- |

(a)

by 31 October 2014 for the Union financial assistance for the withdrawal operations referred to in Article 1(2)(a); and

| (b) | by 30 January 2015 for the additional support for the promotion activities referred to in Article 1(2)(b). |
| --- | --- |

(b)

by 30 January 2015 for the additional support for the promotion activities referred to in Article 1(2)(b).

2.   By way of derogation from the first and second paragraphs of Article 72 of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011, producer organisations shall apply for the payment of the total amounts of the Union financial assistance and additional support referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article by the respective dates referred to in that paragraph.

3.   The ceiling of 80 % of the initially approved amount of aid in respect of an operational programme laid down in the third subparagraph of Article 72 of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011 shall not apply.

Article 7

Notifications and declarations of expenditure

1.   Member States shall notify the Commission:

| (a) | by 28 November 2014 of the total quantities withdrawn and the applications for total Union financial assistance for the withdrawal; and |
| --- | --- |

(a)

by 28 November 2014 of the total quantities withdrawn and the applications for total Union financial assistance for the withdrawal; and

| (b) | by 27 February 2015 of the promotion activities and the applications for the total additional support for the corresponding promotion activities. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

by 27 February 2015 of the promotion activities and the applications for the total additional support for the corresponding promotion activities.

2.   Member States shall declare to the Commission by 27 February 2015 the expenditure incurred for the withdrawal operations and/or promotion activities referred to in Article 1.

Article 8

Entry into force and application

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Official Journal of the European Union

It shall apply from 11 August 2014.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 21 August 2014.

For the Commission

The President

José Manuel BARROSO

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(1)  
  OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 671.

1

(2)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011 of 7 June 2011 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 in respect of the fruit and vegetables and processed fruit and vegetables sectors (OJ L 157, 15.6.2011, p. 1).

2

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ANNEX

Maximum amounts allocated to Member States for the additional support for promotion activities as referred to in Article 5(1):

| Member State | Maximum support (EUR) |
| --- | --- |
| Greece | 317 215 |
| Spain | 1 132 495 |
| France | 262 089 |
| Italy | 1 288 201 |
| Total | 3 000 000 |

Member State

Maximum support (EUR)

Greece

317 215

Spain

1 132 495

France

262 089

Italy

1 288 201

Total

3 000 000

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| 22.8.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 248/7 |
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22.8.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 248/7

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COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 914/2014

of 21 August 2014

amending for the 217th time Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with the Al Qaida network

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with the Al-Qaida network, (1) and in particular Article 7(1)(a), 7a(1) and 7a(5) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 lists the persons, groups and entities covered by the freezing of funds and economic resources under that Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 lists the persons, groups and entities covered by the freezing of funds and economic resources under that Regulation.

| (2) | On 15 August 2014 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) approved the addition of six natural persons to the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee's list of persons, groups and entities to whom the freezing of funds and economic resources should apply. Furthermore, on 4 August, the Sanctions Committee of the UNSC decided to amend two entries on the list. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

On 15 August 2014 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) approved the addition of six natural persons to the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee's list of persons, groups and entities to whom the freezing of funds and economic resources should apply. Furthermore, on 4 August, the Sanctions Committee of the UNSC decided to amend two entries on the list.

| (3) | Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 should therefore be updated accordingly, |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 should therefore be updated accordingly,

| (4) | In order to ensure that the measures provided for in this Regulation are effective, it should enter into force immediately, |
| --- | --- |

(4)

In order to ensure that the measures provided for in this Regulation are effective, it should enter into force immediately,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Regulation.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 21 August 2014.

For the Commission,

On behalf of the President,

Head of the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments

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(1)  
  OJ L 139, 29.5.2002, p. 9.

1

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ANNEX

Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 is amended as follows:

| (1) | The following entries shall be added under the heading ‘Natural persons’:






  (a) | ‘Abdelrahman Mouhamad Zafir al Dabidi al Jahani (alias (a) Abd Al-Rahman Muhammad Zafir Al-Dubaysi Al-Juhni, (b) Abd Al-Rahman Muhammad Zafir al-Dubaysi al-Jahni, (c) Abd Al-Rahman Muhammad Zafir al-Dubaysi al-Jahani, (d) Abd Al-Rahman Muhammad Zafir al-Dubaysi al-Juhani, (e) Abdulrhman Mohammed D. Aljahani, (f) Abu al-Wafa', (g) Abu Anas, (h) Abd al-Rahman Muhammad Zafir al-Dabisi al-Jahani, (i) Abu Wafa al-Saudi, (j) Abu al-Wafa, (k) Abd al-Rahman Muhammad Thafir al-Jahni, (l) Abd al-Rahman Muhammad al-Juhani, (m) Abdelrahman Mouhamad Zafir al Dabissi Juhan, (n) Abdelrahman Mouhamad Zafir al Dabissi Juhani, (o) Abou Wafa al Saoudi). Date of birth: (a) 4 Dec. 1971 (b) 1977. Place of birth: Kharj, Saudi Arabia. Nationality: Saudi Arabian. Passport number: F50859. National identification number: Saudi Arabian national identification number 1027508157. Date of designation referred to in Article 2a(4)(b): 15.8.2014.’ |
| --- | --- | --- |

(1)

The following entries shall be added under the heading ‘Natural persons’:

(a)

‘Abdelrahman Mouhamad Zafir al Dabidi al Jahani (alias (a) Abd Al-Rahman Muhammad Zafir Al-Dubaysi Al-Juhni, (b) Abd Al-Rahman Muhammad Zafir al-Dubaysi al-Jahni, (c) Abd Al-Rahman Muhammad Zafir al-Dubaysi al-Jahani, (d) Abd Al-Rahman Muhammad Zafir al-Dubaysi al-Juhani, (e) Abdulrhman Mohammed D. Aljahani, (f) Abu al-Wafa', (g) Abu Anas, (h) Abd al-Rahman Muhammad Zafir al-Dabisi al-Jahani, (i) Abu Wafa al-Saudi, (j) Abu al-Wafa, (k) Abd al-Rahman Muhammad Thafir al-Jahni, (l) Abd al-Rahman Muhammad al-Juhani, (m) Abdelrahman Mouhamad Zafir al Dabissi Juhan, (n) Abdelrahman Mouhamad Zafir al Dabissi Juhani, (o) Abou Wafa al Saoudi). Date of birth: (a) 4 Dec. 1971 (b) 1977. Place of birth: Kharj, Saudi Arabia. Nationality: Saudi Arabian. Passport number: F50859. National identification number: Saudi Arabian national identification number 1027508157. Date of designation referred to in Article 2a(4)(b): 15.8.2014.’

| (b) | ‘Hajjaj Bin Fahd al Ajmi (alias (a). Hijaj Fahid Hijaj Muhammad Sahib al-Ajmi, (b) Hicac Fehid Hicac Muhammed Sebib al-Acmi, (c) Hajjaj bin-Fahad al-Ajmi, (d) Sheikh Hajaj al-Ajami, (e) Hajaj al-Ajami, (f) Ajaj Ajami). Date of birth: 10 Aug. 1987. Place of birth: Kuwait. Nationality: Kuwaiti. Date of designation referred to in Article 2a(4)(b): 15.8.2014.’ |
| --- | --- |

(b)

‘Hajjaj Bin Fahd al Ajmi (alias (a). Hijaj Fahid Hijaj Muhammad Sahib al-Ajmi, (b) Hicac Fehid Hicac Muhammed Sebib al-Acmi, (c) Hajjaj bin-Fahad al-Ajmi, (d) Sheikh Hajaj al-Ajami, (e) Hajaj al-Ajami, (f) Ajaj Ajami). Date of birth: 10 Aug. 1987. Place of birth: Kuwait. Nationality: Kuwaiti. Date of designation referred to in Article 2a(4)(b): 15.8.2014.’

| (c) | ‘Abou Mohamed al Adnani (alias (a). Yaser Khalaf Nazzal Alrawi, (b) Jaber Taha Falah, (c) Abou Khattab, (d) Abou Sadeq Alrawi, (e) Tah al Binchi, (f) Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, (g) Taha Sobhi Falaha, (h) Yasser Khalaf Hussein Nazal al-Rawi, (i) Abu Baker al-Khatab, (j) Abu Sadek al-Rawi, (k) Taha al-Banshi, (l) Abu Mohamed al-Adnani, (m) Abu-Mohammad al-Adnani al-Shami, (n) Hajj Ibrahim). Date of birth: Approximately 1977. Place of birth: Binnish, Syrian Arab Republic. Nationality: Iraqi. Other information: Official spokesman of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq. Date of designation referred to in Article 2a(4)(b): 15.8.2014.’ |
| --- | --- |

(c)

‘Abou Mohamed al Adnani (alias (a). Yaser Khalaf Nazzal Alrawi, (b) Jaber Taha Falah, (c) Abou Khattab, (d) Abou Sadeq Alrawi, (e) Tah al Binchi, (f) Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, (g) Taha Sobhi Falaha, (h) Yasser Khalaf Hussein Nazal al-Rawi, (i) Abu Baker al-Khatab, (j) Abu Sadek al-Rawi, (k) Taha al-Banshi, (l) Abu Mohamed al-Adnani, (m) Abu-Mohammad al-Adnani al-Shami, (n) Hajj Ibrahim). Date of birth: Approximately 1977. Place of birth: Binnish, Syrian Arab Republic. Nationality: Iraqi. Other information: Official spokesman of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq. Date of designation referred to in Article 2a(4)(b): 15.8.2014.’

| (d) | ‘Said Arif (alias (a). Said Mohamed Arif, (b) Omar Gharib, (c) Abderahmane, (d) Abdallah al-Jazairi, (e) Slimane Chabani, (f) Souleiman). Date of birth: (a) 25 Jun. 1964 (b) 5 Dec. 1965. Place of birth: Oran, Algeria. Nationality: Algerian. Date of designation referred to in Article 2a(4)(b): 15.8.2014.’ |
| --- | --- |

(d)

‘Said Arif (alias (a). Said Mohamed Arif, (b) Omar Gharib, (c) Abderahmane, (d) Abdallah al-Jazairi, (e) Slimane Chabani, (f) Souleiman). Date of birth: (a) 25 Jun. 1964 (b) 5 Dec. 1965. Place of birth: Oran, Algeria. Nationality: Algerian. Date of designation referred to in Article 2a(4)(b): 15.8.2014.’

| (e) | ‘Abdul Mohsen Abdallah Ibrahim al Charekh (alias (a). Abdul Mohsen Abdullah Ibrahim Al-Sharikh, (b) Sanafi al Nasr). Date of birth: 13 Jul. 1985. Place of birth: Saqra, Saudi Arabia. Nationality: Saudi Arabian. Date of designation referred to in Article 2a(4)(b): 15.8.2014.’ |
| --- | --- |

(e)

‘Abdul Mohsen Abdallah Ibrahim al Charekh (alias (a). Abdul Mohsen Abdullah Ibrahim Al-Sharikh, (b) Sanafi al Nasr). Date of birth: 13 Jul. 1985. Place of birth: Saqra, Saudi Arabia. Nationality: Saudi Arabian. Date of designation referred to in Article 2a(4)(b): 15.8.2014.’

| (f) | ‘Hamid Hamad Hamid al-'Ali. Date of birth: 17 Nov. 1960. Place of birth: (a) Kuwait, (b) Qatar. Date of designation referred to in Article 2a(4)(b): 15.8.2014.’ |
| --- | --- |

(f)

‘Hamid Hamad Hamid al-'Ali. Date of birth: 17 Nov. 1960. Place of birth: (a) Kuwait, (b) Qatar. Date of designation referred to in Article 2a(4)(b): 15.8.2014.’

| (2) | The entry ‘Khalid Abd Al-Rahman Hamd Al-Fawaz (alias (a) Al-Fauwaz, Khaled, (b) Al-Fauwaz, Khaled A., (c) Al-Fawwaz, Khalid, (d) Al Fawwaz, Khalik; (e) Al-Fawwaz, Khaled, (f) Al Fawwaz, Khaled, (g) Khalid Abdulrahman H. Al Fawaz). Address: London, United Kingdom. Date of birth: 24.8.1962. Place of birth: Kuwait. Nationality: Saudi Arabian. Passport No: 456682 (issued on 6.11.1990, expired on 13.9.1995). Date of designation referred to in Article 2a(4)(b): 24.4.2002.’ under the heading ‘Natural persons’ shall be replaced by the following:

  ‘Khalid Abd Al-Rahman Hamd Al-Fawaz (alias (a) Khaled Al-Fauwaz,, (b) Khaled A. Al-Fauwaz, (c) Khalid Al-Fawwaz, (d) Khalik Al Fawwaz, (e) Khaled Al-Fawwaz, (f) Khaled Al Fawwaz, (g) Khalid Abdulrahman H. Al Fawaz). Address: United States of America. Date of birth: 24.8.1962. Place of birth: Kuwait. Nationality: Saudi Arabian. Passport No: 456682 (issued on 6.11.1990, expired on 13.9.1995). Date of designation referred to in Article 2a(4)(b): 24.4.2002.’ |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The entry ‘Khalid Abd Al-Rahman Hamd Al-Fawaz (alias (a) Al-Fauwaz, Khaled, (b) Al-Fauwaz, Khaled A., (c) Al-Fawwaz, Khalid, (d) Al Fawwaz, Khalik; (e) Al-Fawwaz, Khaled, (f) Al Fawwaz, Khaled, (g) Khalid Abdulrahman H. Al Fawaz). Address: London, United Kingdom. Date of birth: 24.8.1962. Place of birth: Kuwait. Nationality: Saudi Arabian. Passport No: 456682 (issued on 6.11.1990, expired on 13.9.1995). Date of designation referred to in Article 2a(4)(b): 24.4.2002.’ under the heading ‘Natural persons’ shall be replaced by the following:

Al-Fawaz

alias

‘Khalid Abd Al-Rahman Hamd Al-Fawaz (alias (a) Khaled Al-Fauwaz,, (b) Khaled A. Al-Fauwaz, (c) Khalid Al-Fawwaz, (d) Khalik Al Fawwaz, (e) Khaled Al-Fawwaz, (f) Khaled Al Fawwaz, (g) Khalid Abdulrahman H. Al Fawaz). Address: United States of America. Date of birth: 24.8.1962. Place of birth: Kuwait. Nationality: Saudi Arabian. Passport No: 456682 (issued on 6.11.1990, expired on 13.9.1995). Date of designation referred to in Article 2a(4)(b): 24.4.2002.’

Al-Fawaz

alias

| (3) | The entry ‘Mostafa Kamel Mostafa Ibrahim (alias (a) Mustafa Kamel Mustafa, (b) Adam Ramsey Eaman, (c) Kamel Mustapha Mustapha, (d) Mustapha Kamel Mustapha, (e) Abu Hamza, (f) Mostafa Kamel Mostafa, (g) Abu Hamza Al-Masri, (h) Al-Masri, Abu Hamza, (i) Al-Misri, Abu Hamza). Address: (a) 9 Aldbourne Road, Shepherds Bush, London W12 OLW, United Kingdom; (b) 8 Adie Road, Hammersmith, London W6 OPW, United Kingdom. Date of birth: 15.4.1958. Place of birth: Alexandria, Egypt. Nationality: British. Date of designation referred to in Article 2a(4)(b): 24.4.2002.’ under the heading ‘Natural persons’ shall be replaced by the following:

  ‘Mostafa Kamel Mostafa Ibrahim (alias (a) Mustafa Kamel Mustafa, (b) Adam Ramsey Eaman, (c) Kamel Mustapha Mustapha, (d) Mustapha Kamel Mustapha, (e) Mostafa Kamel Mostafa, (f) Abu Hamza Al-Masri, (g) Abu Hamza, (h) Abu Hamza Al-Misri). Address: United States of America. Date of birth: 15.4.1958. Place of birth: Alexandria, Egypt. Nationality: British. Date of designation referred to in Article 2a(4)(b): 24.4.2002.’ |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The entry ‘Mostafa Kamel Mostafa Ibrahim (alias (a) Mustafa Kamel Mustafa, (b) Adam Ramsey Eaman, (c) Kamel Mustapha Mustapha, (d) Mustapha Kamel Mustapha, (e) Abu Hamza, (f) Mostafa Kamel Mostafa, (g) Abu Hamza Al-Masri, (h) Al-Masri, Abu Hamza, (i) Al-Misri, Abu Hamza). Address: (a) 9 Aldbourne Road, Shepherds Bush, London W12 OLW, United Kingdom; (b) 8 Adie Road, Hammersmith, London W6 OPW, United Kingdom. Date of birth: 15.4.1958. Place of birth: Alexandria, Egypt. Nationality: British. Date of designation referred to in Article 2a(4)(b): 24.4.2002.’ under the heading ‘Natural persons’ shall be replaced by the following:

Ibrahim

alias

‘Mostafa Kamel Mostafa Ibrahim (alias (a) Mustafa Kamel Mustafa, (b) Adam Ramsey Eaman, (c) Kamel Mustapha Mustapha, (d) Mustapha Kamel Mustapha, (e) Mostafa Kamel Mostafa, (f) Abu Hamza Al-Masri, (g) Abu Hamza, (h) Abu Hamza Al-Misri). Address: United States of America. Date of birth: 15.4.1958. Place of birth: Alexandria, Egypt. Nationality: British. Date of designation referred to in Article 2a(4)(b): 24.4.2002.’

Ibrahim

alias

---

| 22.8.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 248/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

22.8.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 248/10

---

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 915/2014

of 21 August 2014

establishing the standard import values for determining the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products (Single CMO Regulation) (1),

Having regard to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011 of 7 June 2011 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 in respect of the fruit and vegetables and processed fruit and vegetables sectors (2), and in particular Article 136(1) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011 lays down, pursuant to the outcome of the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations, the criteria whereby the Commission fixes the standard values for imports from third countries, in respect of the products and periods stipulated in Annex XVI, Part A thereto. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011 lays down, pursuant to the outcome of the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations, the criteria whereby the Commission fixes the standard values for imports from third countries, in respect of the products and periods stipulated in Annex XVI, Part A thereto.

| (2) | The standard import value is calculated each working day, in accordance with Article 136(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011, taking into account variable daily data. Therefore this Regulation should enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union, |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The standard import value is calculated each working day, in accordance with Article 136(1) of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011, taking into account variable daily data. Therefore this Regulation should enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The standard import values referred to in Article 136 of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 543/2011 are fixed in the Annex to this Regulation.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 21 August 2014.

For the Commission,

On behalf of the President,

Jerzy PLEWA

Director-General for Agriculture and Rural Development

---

(1)  
  OJ L 299, 16.11.2007, p. 1.

1

(2)  
  OJ L 157, 15.6.2011, p. 1.

2

---

ANNEX

Standard import values for determining the entry price of certain fruit and vegetables

| (EUR/100 kg) |
| --- |
| CN code | Third country code (1) | Standard import value |
| 0707 00 05 | TR | 81,4 |
| ZZ | 81,4 |
| 0709 93 10 | TR | 101,7 |
| ZZ | 101,7 |
| 0805 50 10 | AR | 190,7 |
| TR | 145,8 |
| UY | 174,8 |
| ZA | 166,0 |
| ZZ | 169,3 |
| 0806 10 10 | BR | 182,2 |
| EG | 205,5 |
| MA | 170,3 |
| TR | 137,4 |
| ZZ | 173,9 |
| 0808 10 80 | AR | 128,9 |
| BR | 76,1 |
| CL | 98,4 |
| CN | 120,3 |
| NZ | 131,8 |
| PE | 21,0 |
| US | 130,6 |
| ZA | 108,5 |
| ZZ | 102,0 |
| 0808 30 90 | AR | 35,0 |
| CL | 88,5 |
| TR | 126,4 |
| ZA | 106,7 |
| ZZ | 89,2 |
| 0809 30 | MK | 62,9 |
| TR | 121,8 |
| ZZ | 92,4 |
| 0809 40 05 | BA | 41,0 |
| ZA | 205,1 |
| ZZ | 123,1 |

(EUR/100 kg)

CN code

Third country code (1)

Standard import value

0707 00 05

TR

81,4

ZZ

81,4

0709 93 10

TR

101,7

ZZ

101,7

0805 50 10

AR

190,7

TR

145,8

UY

174,8

ZA

166,0

ZZ

169,3

0806 10 10

BR

182,2

EG

205,5

MA

170,3

TR

137,4

ZZ

173,9

0808 10 80

AR

128,9

BR

76,1

CL

98,4

CN

120,3

NZ

131,8

PE

21,0

US

130,6

ZA

108,5

ZZ

102,0

0808 30 90

AR

35,0

CL

88,5

TR

126,4

ZA

106,7

ZZ

89,2

0809 30

MK

62,9

TR

121,8

ZZ

92,4

0809 40 05

BA

41,0

ZA

205,1

ZZ

123,1

---

(1)  Nomenclature of countries laid down by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1833/2006 (OJ L 354, 14.12.2006, p. 19). Code ‘ZZ’ stands for ‘of other origin’.

---

DECISIONS

| 22.8.2014 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 248/12 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

22.8.2014

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 248/12

---

COMMISSION DECISION

of 14 August 2014

granting the Hellenic Republic a derogation from certain provisions of Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council

(notified under document C(2014) 5902)

(2014/536/EU)

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC (1), and in particular Article 44(1) and Article 48 thereof,

Having regard to the applications by the Hellenic Republic of 17 January 2012 and of 5 December 2003,

After informing the Member States of this application,

Whereas:

1.   PROCEDURE

PROCEDURE

| (1) | On 17 January 2012, the Greek Ministry of Environment, Energy and Climate Change (‘YPEKA’) submitted an application (the ‘application’) to the Commission, pursuant to Article 44(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC for a derogation from Chapters III and VIII of Directive 2009/72/EC for certain Greek islands that are not interconnected to the electricity system of mainland Greece (the non-interconnected islands or ‘NIIs’). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 17 January 2012, the Greek Ministry of Environment, Energy and Climate Change (‘YPEKA’) submitted an application (the ‘application’) to the Commission, pursuant to Article 44(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC for a derogation from Chapters III and VIII of Directive 2009/72/EC for certain Greek islands that are not interconnected to the electricity system of mainland Greece (the non-interconnected islands or ‘NIIs’).

| (2) | On 12 September 2012, the Commission requested the Greek Regulatory Authority for Energy (‘RAE’) to comment on the application. RAE responded to this request on 16 November 2012 (the ‘RAE opinion’). |
| --- | --- |

(2)

On 12 September 2012, the Commission requested the Greek Regulatory Authority for Energy (‘RAE’) to comment on the application. RAE responded to this request on 16 November 2012 (the ‘RAE opinion’).

| (3) | RAE made further submissions to substantiate the application on 17 December 2013, 23 December 2013, 4 February 2014, 28 February 2014 and 17 March 2014. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

RAE made further submissions to substantiate the application on 17 December 2013, 23 December 2013, 4 February 2014, 28 February 2014 and 17 March 2014.

| (4) | On 14 March 2014 (with an addendum sent on 20 March 2014), the Commission informed the Member States of the application in accordance with Article 44(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC, with a request to submit observations, if necessary, by 25 March 2014. No observations were submitted. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

On 14 March 2014 (with an addendum sent on 20 March 2014), the Commission informed the Member States of the application in accordance with Article 44(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC, with a request to submit observations, if necessary, by 25 March 2014. No observations were submitted.

| (5) | With its application YPEKA renewed the request submitted by the Ministry of Development on 5 December 2003 in accordance with Article 26(1) of Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (2) (the ‘initial application’) for a derogation from certain provisions of Directive 2003/54/EC. Although preliminary steps were taken to investigate the initial application, the derogation pursuant to Article 26(1) of Directive 2003/54/EC was neither granted nor refused. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

With its application YPEKA renewed the request submitted by the Ministry of Development on 5 December 2003 in accordance with Article 26(1) of Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (2) (the ‘initial application’) for a derogation from certain provisions of Directive 2003/54/EC. Although preliminary steps were taken to investigate the initial application, the derogation pursuant to Article 26(1) of Directive 2003/54/EC was neither granted nor refused.

2

2.   THE APPLICATION SUBMITTED BY YPEKA

THE APPLICATION SUBMITTED BY YPEKA

2.1.   SCOPE OF THE REQUESTED DEROGATION

| (6) | The application requests derogation from Chapters III and VIII of Directive 2009/72/EC. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

The application requests derogation from Chapters III and VIII of Directive 2009/72/EC.

| (7) | Chapter III of Directive 2009/72/EC refers to the authorisation procedure and tendering for new capacity. Chapter VIII refers to third party access, market opening and direct lines. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Chapter III of Directive 2009/72/EC refers to the authorisation procedure and tendering for new capacity. Chapter VIII refers to third party access, market opening and direct lines.

2.2.   CURRENT ORGANISATION OF THE ELECTRICAL SYSTEM ON THE NIIs

| (8) | The Greek energy markets are primarily governed by Greek Law 4001/2011 which transposes Directive 2009/72/EC. Law 4001/2011 has entered into force on 22 August 2011. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

The Greek energy markets are primarily governed by Greek Law 4001/2011 which transposes Directive 2009/72/EC. Law 4001/2011 has entered into force on 22 August 2011.

| (9) | DEDDIE SA (‘DEDDIE’) is the Greek distribution system operator, which is 100 % owned by, but legally and functionally unbundled from, the Public Power Corporation (‘PPC’), the incumbent Greek electricity producer and supplier. The network assets operated by DEDDIE are owned by PPC. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

DEDDIE SA (‘DEDDIE’) is the Greek distribution system operator, which is 100 % owned by, but legally and functionally unbundled from, the Public Power Corporation (‘PPC’), the incumbent Greek electricity producer and supplier. The network assets operated by DEDDIE are owned by PPC.

| (10) | Pursuant to Article 127 of Law 4001/2011, DEDDIE is responsible for developing, operating and maintaining the Greek electricity distribution system, which includes the electricity distribution system on the NIIs. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Pursuant to Article 127 of Law 4001/2011, DEDDIE is responsible for developing, operating and maintaining the Greek electricity distribution system, which includes the electricity distribution system on the NIIs.

| (11) | In addition, DEDDIE is responsible for operating the electricity systems on the NIIs. These tasks include: (i) the preparation of a generation development plan for micro isolated systems, including a programme to interconnect them with other NIIs (ii) ensuring that the necessary sites are available to install new production capacity, to extend existing capacity or delivery components and to expand the Greek electricity distribution system to non-interconnected islands and micro isolated systems (iii) entering into contracts with licence holders governing deliveries of electricity to and from the system, the provision of ancillary services to the distribution systems of NIIs and the remuneration of the producers of electricity, of charges to customers and suppliers for the electricity delivered to them and of other credits and debits on the special accounts, such as those for remunerating public service obligations. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

In addition, DEDDIE is responsible for operating the electricity systems on the NIIs. These tasks include: (i) the preparation of a generation development plan for micro isolated systems, including a programme to interconnect them with other NIIs (ii) ensuring that the necessary sites are available to install new production capacity, to extend existing capacity or delivery components and to expand the Greek electricity distribution system to non-interconnected islands and micro isolated systems (iii) entering into contracts with licence holders governing deliveries of electricity to and from the system, the provision of ancillary services to the distribution systems of NIIs and the remuneration of the producers of electricity, of charges to customers and suppliers for the electricity delivered to them and of other credits and debits on the special accounts, such as those for remunerating public service obligations.

| (12) | Article 137(1) of Law 4001/2011 stipulates that all electricity consumers shall be classified as eligible customers, with the exception of consumers established in micro isolated networks, subject to Article 139 of the same law. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Article 137(1) of Law 4001/2011 stipulates that all electricity consumers shall be classified as eligible customers, with the exception of consumers established in micro isolated networks, subject to Article 139 of the same law.

| (13) | Pursuant to Article 133(3) of Law 4001/2011:

  ‘With the exception of cases in which electricity is produced using renewable energy sources or by high-efficiency cogeneration or hybrid plants and in the case of auto producers, if a derogation has been granted in accordance with the provisions of Article 139, a generation licence shall only be granted to PPC SA in accordance with certain licensing regulations. PPC SA shall be responsible for the uninterrupted supply to micro isolated systems for which it obtains a licence and for safeguarding the long-term financial operation of the electricity systems on those islands.’ |
| --- | --- |

(13)

Pursuant to Article 133(3) of Law 4001/2011:

‘With the exception of cases in which electricity is produced using renewable energy sources or by high-efficiency cogeneration or hybrid plants and in the case of auto producers, if a derogation has been granted in accordance with the provisions of Article 139, a generation licence shall only be granted to PPC SA in accordance with certain licensing regulations. PPC SA shall be responsible for the uninterrupted supply to micro isolated systems for which it obtains a licence and for safeguarding the long-term financial operation of the electricity systems on those islands.’

| (14) | Pursuant to Article 134 Law 4001/2011:

  ‘Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 139 of the present law, supply licences for micro isolated networks shall be granted solely to PPC SA in accordance with the requirements of the Licensing Regulations. PPC SA must supply non-eligible customers with electricity on request.’ |
| --- | --- |

(14)

Pursuant to Article 134 Law 4001/2011:

‘Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 139 of the present law, supply licences for micro isolated networks shall be granted solely to PPC SA in accordance with the requirements of the Licensing Regulations. PPC SA must supply non-eligible customers with electricity on request.’

| (15) | According to Article 139 of Law 4001/2011 derogations from the provisions of Law 4001/2011 may be granted in accordance with the provisions of Article 44 of Directive 2009/72/EC. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

According to Article 139 of Law 4001/2011 derogations from the provisions of Law 4001/2011 may be granted in accordance with the provisions of Article 44 of Directive 2009/72/EC.

| (16) | The Ministerial Decision no PD5/EL/B/F IB/12924 adopted pursuant to Article 28 of Greek Law 3426/2005, establishes that the supply of electricity to consumers in NIIs by any electricity producer constitutes a public service obligation (‘the NII PSO’) in the general economic interest. On the grounds of social cohesion, electricity suppliers in the NII must supply electricity at a price equal, per category of consumer, to those on the Greek interconnected system. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

The Ministerial Decision no PD5/EL/B/F IB/12924 adopted pursuant to Article 28 of Greek Law 3426/2005, establishes that the supply of electricity to consumers in NIIs by any electricity producer constitutes a public service obligation (‘the NII PSO’) in the general economic interest. On the grounds of social cohesion, electricity suppliers in the NII must supply electricity at a price equal, per category of consumer, to those on the Greek interconnected system.

| (17) | Article 52 of Greek Law 4001/2011 stipulates that customers on non-interconnected islands are entitled to special services both in terms of price and in terms of quality and security of supply as well as transparency of contractual terms and conditions. Providers of the NII PSO receive, in return for discharging the PSO, a financial compensation calculated on the basis of a methodology established by RAE Decision 24/2014/EC (3). This methodology is based on the difference between the full production costs on the non-interconnected islands (variable and fixed) and the full market price suppliers are facing in the interconnected system (system marginal costs plus all other mechanisms in the Greek interconnected system). The NII PSO compensation is calculated on a monthly basis and per autonomous island system, and is subject to control by RAE. The NII PSO compensation is raised through a levy on all customers, including those on the NIIs (4). The NII PSO mechanism is administered by LAGIE, the Greek state-owned market operator. Ministerial Decision D5-EL/B/F1/oik.27547 of December 2011 (5), based on the provisions of Article 55(3) of Law 4001/2011, established that the NII PSO is to be offered by all suppliers, therefore all suppliers are eligible for NII PSO compensation. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

Article 52 of Greek Law 4001/2011 stipulates that customers on non-interconnected islands are entitled to special services both in terms of price and in terms of quality and security of supply as well as transparency of contractual terms and conditions. Providers of the NII PSO receive, in return for discharging the PSO, a financial compensation calculated on the basis of a methodology established by RAE Decision 24/2014/EC (3). This methodology is based on the difference between the full production costs on the non-interconnected islands (variable and fixed) and the full market price suppliers are facing in the interconnected system (system marginal costs plus all other mechanisms in the Greek interconnected system). The NII PSO compensation is calculated on a monthly basis and per autonomous island system, and is subject to control by RAE. The NII PSO compensation is raised through a levy on all customers, including those on the NIIs (4). The NII PSO mechanism is administered by LAGIE, the Greek state-owned market operator. Ministerial Decision D5-EL/B/F1/oik.27547 of December 2011 (5), based on the provisions of Article 55(3) of Law 4001/2011, established that the NII PSO is to be offered by all suppliers, therefore all suppliers are eligible for NII PSO compensation.

3

4

5

all

| (18) | Secondary legislation regulates more in detail the supply and production of electricity on the NII. In particular, by its decision No 39/2014 of 28 January 2014, RAE adopted the Code of Management of Electric Power Systems on the Non-Interconnected Islands (the ‘NII Code’) which regulates many issues with respect to the operation of the isolated systems on the NIIs, including market opening, market settlement and electricity production. The NII Code entered into force on the day of its publication, i.e. 17 February 2014. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

Secondary legislation regulates more in detail the supply and production of electricity on the NII. In particular, by its decision No 39/2014 of 28 January 2014, RAE adopted the Code of Management of Electric Power Systems on the Non-Interconnected Islands (the ‘NII Code’) which regulates many issues with respect to the operation of the isolated systems on the NIIs, including market opening, market settlement and electricity production. The NII Code entered into force on the day of its publication, i.e. 17 February 2014.

2.3.   SUBSTANTIAL PROBLEMS FOR THE OPERATION OF ISOLATED SYSTEMS

| (19) | The application highlights the following problems for the operation of the Greek isolated electricity systems:






  (a) | the large variation in electricity demand in micro isolated systems, accentuated by:(i) the tourism aspect of the economic development of the islands; and (ii) the increased penetration of Renewable Energy Sources (‘RES’).
  Those factors negatively affect both the load factor of thermal or conventional generation capacity and the possibility to recover costs from investments in such generation capacity; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(19)

The application highlights the following problems for the operation of the Greek isolated electricity systems:

(a)

the large variation in electricity demand in micro isolated systems, accentuated by:(i) the tourism aspect of the economic development of the islands; and (ii) the increased penetration of Renewable Energy Sources (‘RES’).

Those factors negatively affect both the load factor of thermal or conventional generation capacity and the possibility to recover costs from investments in such generation capacity;

| (b) | the large variation in weather conditions on the islands which affects demand and causes malfunctions of the generation systems, and as a result requires extensive reserves. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the large variation in weather conditions on the islands which affects demand and causes malfunctions of the generation systems, and as a result requires extensive reserves.

| (20) | The application highlights the following problems for the development of conventional generation on the Greek small isolated electricity systems:






  (a) | the difficulties or even impossibility to find suitable sites for new conventional generating stations in the micro isolated systems, primarily due to public resistance; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(20)

The application highlights the following problems for the development of conventional generation on the Greek small isolated electricity systems:

(a)

the difficulties or even impossibility to find suitable sites for new conventional generating stations in the micro isolated systems, primarily due to public resistance;

| (b) | the small size of the NIIs that gives rise to large reversals in the long-term development planning of thermal production due to unforeseeable investments by electricity consumers (such as large tourist complexes or craft facilities) which requires expediency and flexibility in the response to electricity demand; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the small size of the NIIs that gives rise to large reversals in the long-term development planning of thermal production due to unforeseeable investments by electricity consumers (such as large tourist complexes or craft facilities) which requires expediency and flexibility in the response to electricity demand;

| (c) | electricity demand in the NII isolated systems is expected to increase by 2 % per year until 2017. Although the authorisations have been granted to PPC for the installation of the additional required capacity and its installation has already been scheduled (which is expected to cover the demand of all NIIs, along with the necessary reserve margins, by 2017), it has not always been possible to comply with the time schedule; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

electricity demand in the NII isolated systems is expected to increase by 2 % per year until 2017. Although the authorisations have been granted to PPC for the installation of the additional required capacity and its installation has already been scheduled (which is expected to cover the demand of all NIIs, along with the necessary reserve margins, by 2017), it has not always been possible to comply with the time schedule;

| (d) | the small load size, large variations in load and increased RES penetration in most micro isolated systems limits the available technological solutions for conventional generation, restricting the choice to small generating installations fuelled with heavy oil of low content in sulphur or with light oil; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

the small load size, large variations in load and increased RES penetration in most micro isolated systems limits the available technological solutions for conventional generation, restricting the choice to small generating installations fuelled with heavy oil of low content in sulphur or with light oil;

| (e) | the procedures for the procurement of new power generation are time consuming. Two and a half to three years pass from the time authorisation is granted until the power generators enter into service; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

the procedures for the procurement of new power generation are time consuming. Two and a half to three years pass from the time authorisation is granted until the power generators enter into service;

| (f) | the development of plans to construct interconnectors between the Greek interconnected system and the micro isolated systems on the NIIs undermines the interest for investing in conventional generation capacity on the NIIs. Interconnection projects with the Cyclades and Crete are scheduled. |
| --- | --- |

(f)

the development of plans to construct interconnectors between the Greek interconnected system and the micro isolated systems on the NIIs undermines the interest for investing in conventional generation capacity on the NIIs. Interconnection projects with the Cyclades and Crete are scheduled.

| (21) | As a result, resort has to be taken on a regular basis to emergency solutions, such as the rental of mobile diesel-fuelled power generators or gas turbines. The need for case-by-case authorisation for emergency generation needs is undesirable as it gives rise to the uneconomical renting of equipment instead of purchasing. The application provides several examples where unforeseen events gave rise to the longer term use of mobile power generators. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

As a result, resort has to be taken on a regular basis to emergency solutions, such as the rental of mobile diesel-fuelled power generators or gas turbines. The need for case-by-case authorisation for emergency generation needs is undesirable as it gives rise to the uneconomical renting of equipment instead of purchasing. The application provides several examples where unforeseen events gave rise to the longer term use of mobile power generators.

| (22) | The application highlights the following problems for the market opening on the isolated electricity systems on the NIIs:






  (a) | in order to allow for market opening, specific infrastructure will need to be developed and installed in the isolated systems on the NIIs. This infrastructure entails the installation of control centres to manage: (i) the daily scheduling of generation; and (ii) the market settlement in each isolated system by repartitioning the production cost in each isolated system to the suppliers active therein.
  The necessary infrastructure is costly and the cost is borne by consumers; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(22)

The application highlights the following problems for the market opening on the isolated electricity systems on the NIIs:

(a)

in order to allow for market opening, specific infrastructure will need to be developed and installed in the isolated systems on the NIIs. This infrastructure entails the installation of control centres to manage: (i) the daily scheduling of generation; and (ii) the market settlement in each isolated system by repartitioning the production cost in each isolated system to the suppliers active therein.

The necessary infrastructure is costly and the cost is borne by consumers;

| (b) | due to the NII PSO, electricity retail prices are the same for each consumer category throughout the Greek territory. The higher production cost in the NIIs, as compared to the production cost in the interconnected system, must therefore be recovered from suppliers active in the NIIs by repartitioning the respective part of the PSO compensation as a function of the electricity sales to their customers.
  It is claimed that the large variation in the values of the average annual variable production cost per NII would render the settlement mechanism for the market complicated. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

due to the NII PSO, electricity retail prices are the same for each consumer category throughout the Greek territory. The higher production cost in the NIIs, as compared to the production cost in the interconnected system, must therefore be recovered from suppliers active in the NIIs by repartitioning the respective part of the PSO compensation as a function of the electricity sales to their customers.

It is claimed that the large variation in the values of the average annual variable production cost per NII would render the settlement mechanism for the market complicated.

| (23) | Consequently, YPEKA takes the view that developing the necessary infrastructure for the operation and supervision of the electricity market in conjunction with market opening on the isolated systems on the NIIs entails costs that outweigh the benefits that may accrue to consumers from market opening. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

Consequently, YPEKA takes the view that developing the necessary infrastructure for the operation and supervision of the electricity market in conjunction with market opening on the isolated systems on the NIIs entails costs that outweigh the benefits that may accrue to consumers from market opening.

| (24) | The application does not contain a date by which the requested derogation would expire. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

The application does not contain a date by which the requested derogation would expire.

3.   THE RAE OPINION

THE RAE OPINION

3.1.   SCOPE OF THE DEROGATION

3.1.1.   Derogation from Chapter III of Directive 2009/72/EC

Derogation from Chapter III of Directive 2009/72/EC

| (25) | RAE takes the view that the derogation from Chapter III, in accordance with Article 44(1), should not concern the installation of new power capacity that can be developed in an isolated system, but only the refurbishing, upgrading or expanding of the existing production capacity. Existing generation capacity consists of the power plants that already operate or are under construction on the NIIs. Any new power plant that will be installed on those islands is considered new generation capacity. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

RAE takes the view that the derogation from Chapter III, in accordance with Article 44(1), should not concern the installation of new power capacity that can be developed in an isolated system, but only the refurbishing, upgrading or expanding of the existing production capacity. Existing generation capacity consists of the power plants that already operate or are under construction on the NIIs. Any new power plant that will be installed on those islands is considered new generation capacity.

only

| (26) | RAE notes that independent power producers (‘IPPs’) (i.e. other than PPC) have demonstrated a strong interest for developing RES and cogeneration power plants in all micro isolated systems during the last two decades. Consequently, third-party access to the power systems of all NIIs concerning RES and combined heat and power (‘CHP’) development should not be restricted. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

RAE notes that independent power producers (‘IPPs’) (i.e. other than PPC) have demonstrated a strong interest for developing RES and cogeneration power plants in all micro isolated systems during the last two decades. Consequently, third-party access to the power systems of all NIIs concerning RES and combined heat and power (‘CHP’) development should not be restricted.

| (27) | RAE states that it does not oppose granting a derogation for the activation of new conventional power plants, provided certain conditions are met. However, Article 44(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC does not provide for the possibility of derogation for new capacity. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

RAE states that it does not oppose granting a derogation for the activation of new conventional power plants, provided certain conditions are met. However, Article 44(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC does not provide for the possibility of derogation for new capacity.

| (28) | RAE deems that capacity expansion of existing conventional plants concerns mainly a short-term lack of capacity in the NIIs arising from unexpected damages on existing capacity or delayed installation of new capacity, especially during high-demand periods (e.g. summer peaks). These expansions are subject to an open tendering procedure according to Article 8 of Directive 2009/72/EC. Such a procedure is time-consuming and not suited to the urgent nature of emergency situations. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

RAE deems that capacity expansion of existing conventional plants concerns mainly a short-term lack of capacity in the NIIs arising from unexpected damages on existing capacity or delayed installation of new capacity, especially during high-demand periods (e.g. summer peaks). These expansions are subject to an open tendering procedure according to Article 8 of Directive 2009/72/EC. Such a procedure is time-consuming and not suited to the urgent nature of emergency situations.

| (29) | RAE accepts that PPC, should cover any such emergency situations. Taking into account that PPC is able to move mobile conventional units from islands in which there is a capacity surplus to those with a capacity deficit, this solution might also be the most economical one. |
| --- | --- |

(29)

RAE accepts that PPC, should cover any such emergency situations. Taking into account that PPC is able to move mobile conventional units from islands in which there is a capacity surplus to those with a capacity deficit, this solution might also be the most economical one.

| (30) | RAE stresses that any derogation must allow specifying the appropriate licensing procedure for emergency case situations, and, specifically, which of the criteria mentioned in Article 7 of Directive 2009/72/EC must be examined by the competent licensing authorities. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

RAE stresses that any derogation must allow specifying the appropriate licensing procedure for emergency case situations, and, specifically, which of the criteria mentioned in Article 7 of Directive 2009/72/EC must be examined by the competent licensing authorities.

| (31) | RAE deems that derogation should be granted with a limited duration such as a maximum of 10 years. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

RAE deems that derogation should be granted with a limited duration such as a maximum of 10 years.

3.1.2.   Derogation from Chapter VIII of the Directive

Derogation from Chapter VIII of the Directive

| (32) | According to RAE, the supply of electricity in the NIIs is connected in practical terms to the NII PSO and the NII PSO compensation because (i) the cost of electricity generation in the NIIs is significantly higher than that in the mainland and (ii) the Greek State requires a uniform pricing, per customer category, throughout its territory. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

According to RAE, the supply of electricity in the NIIs is connected in practical terms to the NII PSO and the NII PSO compensation because (i) the cost of electricity generation in the NIIs is significantly higher than that in the mainland and (ii) the Greek State requires a uniform pricing, per customer category, throughout its territory.

| (33) | The NII Code foresees the installation of certain metering and recording equipment on the NIIs for hourly measuring, energy management and control centres, monitoring and related IT systems. RAE maintains that this infrastructure is indispensable for:






  (a) | ensuring that the PSO costs are transparent, non-discriminatory and can be verified; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(33)

The NII Code foresees the installation of certain metering and recording equipment on the NIIs for hourly measuring, energy management and control centres, monitoring and related IT systems. RAE maintains that this infrastructure is indispensable for:

(a)

ensuring that the PSO costs are transparent, non-discriminatory and can be verified;

| (b) | the proper operation and sound management of the electrical systems themselves so as to achieve the most economical operation mode and, therefore, a larger reduction of NII PSO charges for electricity consumers; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the proper operation and sound management of the electrical systems themselves so as to achieve the most economical operation mode and, therefore, a larger reduction of NII PSO charges for electricity consumers;

| (c) | accomplishing a higher RES and cogeneration penetration, including RES technologies with complex and special requirements for their management, such as RES with storage, solar-thermal plants, etc.; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

accomplishing a higher RES and cogeneration penetration, including RES technologies with complex and special requirements for their management, such as RES with storage, solar-thermal plants, etc.;

| (d) | guaranteeing the necessary transparency in the management of the isolated systems, thereby ensuring non-discriminatory treatment of all market participants, in particular producers. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

guaranteeing the necessary transparency in the management of the isolated systems, thereby ensuring non-discriminatory treatment of all market participants, in particular producers.

| (34) | RAE consequently argues that, regardless as to whether one or more suppliers are licensed to be active within a micro isolated system, this infrastructure must be installed in the isolated systems on the NIIs. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

RAE consequently argues that, regardless as to whether one or more suppliers are licensed to be active within a micro isolated system, this infrastructure must be installed in the isolated systems on the NIIs.

| (35) | The estimated cost for installing this infrastructure is not expected to exceed EURO 20 to 30 million for all NIIs, including Crete and Rhodes. RAE deems this amount reasonable, especially when considering the expected benefits i.e. securing transparency and verification of the NII PSO as well as the sound and controlled operation of the isolated electricity systems. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

The estimated cost for installing this infrastructure is not expected to exceed EURO 20 to 30 million for all NIIs, including Crete and Rhodes. RAE deems this amount reasonable, especially when considering the expected benefits i.e. securing transparency and verification of the NII PSO as well as the sound and controlled operation of the isolated electricity systems.

| (36) | Contrary to YPEKA, RAE takes the view that licensing more than one supplier to be active in a given isolated system on the NIIs will not entail substantial additional cost of the infrastructure required as the same infrastructure is in any event already necessary for the daily scheduling of NII located generation units, market settlement and for providing for the NII PSO. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

Contrary to YPEKA, RAE takes the view that licensing more than one supplier to be active in a given isolated system on the NIIs will not entail substantial additional cost of the infrastructure required as the same infrastructure is in any event already necessary for the daily scheduling of NII located generation units, market settlement and for providing for the NII PSO.

| (37) | Furthermore, RAE deems that additional significant benefits for NII consumers exist in allowing more than a single supplier to be active. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

Furthermore, RAE deems that additional significant benefits for NII consumers exist in allowing more than a single supplier to be active.

| (38) | Consequently, RAE takes the view that the permanent exclusion of alternative suppliers in NII markets is not warranted. The installation of the necessary infrastructure as described above is expected to be completed in a time period of three to five years. RAE would not oppose a possible derogation strictly for this time-period, without any further extension. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

Consequently, RAE takes the view that the permanent exclusion of alternative suppliers in NII markets is not warranted. The installation of the necessary infrastructure as described above is expected to be completed in a time period of three to five years. RAE would not oppose a possible derogation strictly for this time-period, without any further extension.

| (39) | RAE further notes that in case the status of any isolated system on the NIIs changes so that it no longer falls into the category of small or micro isolated systems, the derogation should automatically cease to apply. This could arise where the isolated systems on the NIIs are interconnected with the Greek interconnected system. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

RAE further notes that in case the status of any isolated system on the NIIs changes so that it no longer falls into the category of small or micro isolated systems, the derogation should automatically cease to apply. This could arise where the isolated systems on the NIIs are interconnected with the Greek interconnected system.

4.   ASSESSMENT

ASSESSMENT

4.1.   LEGAL BASIS OF THE APPLICATION

| (40) | Article 44(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC provides for the possibility to derogate from certain provisions of the Directive, where the derogation applies to small isolated systems and micro isolated systems. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

Article 44(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC provides for the possibility to derogate from certain provisions of the Directive, where the derogation applies to small isolated systems and micro isolated systems.

| (41) | According to Article 2(26) of Directive 2009/72/EC, a small isolated system is any system with consumption of less than 3 000 GWh in the year 1996, where less than 5 % of annual consumption is obtained through interconnection with other systems.' |
| --- | --- |

(41)

According to Article 2(26) of Directive 2009/72/EC, a small isolated system is any system with consumption of less than 3 000 GWh in the year 1996, where less than 5 % of annual consumption is obtained through interconnection with other systems.'

| (42) | According to Article 2(27) of Directive 2009/72/EC a micro isolated system is any system with consumption less than 500 GWh in the year 1996, where there is no connection with other systems. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

According to Article 2(27) of Directive 2009/72/EC a micro isolated system is any system with consumption less than 500 GWh in the year 1996, where there is no connection with other systems.

| (43) | The isolated systems identified in the application consist of one and, occasionally, several NIIs (see columns 1 and 2 of the Table). Even if an isolated system consists of several NIIs that are interconnected between them, the electricity system constituted by those interconnected NIIs is isolated, in the sense that it is not connected to any other electricity system. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

The isolated systems identified in the application consist of one and, occasionally, several NIIs (see columns 1 and 2 of the Table). Even if an isolated system consists of several NIIs that are interconnected between them, the electricity system constituted by those interconnected NIIs is isolated, in the sense that it is not connected to any other electricity system.

| (44) | The application claims that 31 of the 32 isolated systems are micro isolated systems, the largest of which is Rhodes. The micro isolated systems for which the application has been made represented 5,24 % of the total sales of electricity in Greece in 2010. The isolated system of Crete is considered a small isolated system. Crete represented in 2010 3,01 % of Greek electricity demand.

  Annual demand by Isolated System | | Annual demand (MWh) | Annual demand in 1996 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Name of IS | NIIs that are part of the IS | 1996 | 2003 | 2010 | 2013 | < 3 000 GWh | < 500 GWh |
| Crete | | 1 562 300 | 2 444 543 | 3 014 392 | 2 825 132 | Yes | No |
| Rhodes | Rhodes
  Chalki | 386 630 | 650 115 | 764 401 | 760 658 | Yes | Yes |
| Kos-Kalymnos | Kos
  Kalymnos
  Lipsi
  Leros
  Nisyros-Giali
  Tilos
  Telendos
  Pserimos | 156 340 | 281 574 | 351 959 | 352 984 | Yes | Yes |
| Lesvos | Lesvos | 153 650 | 259 552 | 308 454 | 288 230 | Yes | Yes |
| Chios | Chios
  Psara
  Oinousses | 110 480 | 180 868 | 214 449 | 200 042 | Yes | Yes |
| Paros | Paros
  Antiparos
  Naxos
  Iraklia
  Koufonisia
  Schinousa
  Ios
  Sikinos
  Folegandros | 95 340 | 164 761 | 208 206 | 194 740 | Yes | Yes |
| Samos | Samos
  Fournoi
  Thymena | 90 170 | 136 283 | 151 017 | 137 315 | Yes | Yes |
| Syros | Syros | 56 920 | 100 429 | 107 270 | 95 302 | Yes | Yes |
| Thira | Thira
  Thirasia | 47 680 | 88 073 | 117 957 | 120 199 | Yes | Yes |
| Mykonos-Dilos | Mykonos-Dilos | 45 740 | 78 049 | 115 071 | 112 978 | Yes | Yes |
| Limnos | Limnos | 35 650 | 55 340 | 62 710 | 59 672 | Yes | Yes |
| Karpathos | Karpathos
  Kasos | 26 580 | 30 397 | 37 829 | 36 931 | Yes | Yes |
| Milos | Milos
  Kimolos | 15 460 | 37 331 | 45 819 | 45 402 | Yes | Yes |
| Ikaria | Ikaria | 13 110 | 24 359 | 28 845 | 27 613 | Yes | Yes |
| Skyros | Skyros | 9 380 | 14 053 | 16 150 | 14 782 | Yes | Yes |
| Patmos | Patmos | 8 770 | 13 988 | 16 738 | 17 020 | Yes | Yes |
| Sifnos | Sifnos | 6 540 | 13 180 | 17 966 | 16 521 | Yes | Yes |
| Symi | Symi | 5 250 | 9 819 | 15 054 | 14 662 | Yes | Yes |
| Amorgos | Amorgos | 3 840 | 7 284 | 9 816 | 9 072 | Yes | Yes |
| Kythnos | Kythnos | 3 610 | 7 089 | 8 309 | 7 991 | Yes | Yes |
| Serifos | Serifos | 2 830 | 6 793 | 8 162 | 7 654 | Yes | Yes |
| Astypalea | Astypalea | 2 470 | 5 283 | 6 997 | 6 670 | Yes | Yes |
| Megisti | Megisti | 770 | 1 863 | 2 751 | 3 005 | Yes | Yes |
| Ag. Efstratios | Ag. Efstratios | 540 | 937 | 1 058 | 1 075 | Yes | Yes |
| Anafi | Anafi | 400 | 858 | 1 110 | 1 179 | Yes | Yes |
| Othoni | Othoni | 330 | 588 | 674 | 632 | Yes | Yes |
| Erikousa | Erikousa | 220 | 452 | 710 | 746 | Yes | Yes |
| Agathonisi | Agathonisi | 190 | 388 | 522 | 642 | Yes | Yes |
| Donousa | Donousa | 180 | 417 | 676 | 690 | Yes | Yes |
| Aktikithyra | Aktikithyra | 70 | 199 | 228 | 241 | Yes | Yes |
| Arkii-Marathi | Arkii-Marathi | 0 | 175 | 248 | 312 | Yes | Yes |
| Gavdos | Gavdos | 0 | 0 | 365 | 471 | Yes | Yes |

(44)

The application claims that 31 of the 32 isolated systems are micro isolated systems, the largest of which is Rhodes. The micro isolated systems for which the application has been made represented 5,24 % of the total sales of electricity in Greece in 2010. The isolated system of Crete is considered a small isolated system. Crete represented in 2010 3,01 % of Greek electricity demand.

Annual demand by Isolated System

Annual demand by Isolated System

Annual demand (MWh)

Annual demand in 1996

Name of IS

NIIs that are part of the IS

1996

2003

2010

2013

< 3 000 GWh

< 500 GWh

Crete

1 562 300

2 444 543

3 014 392

2 825 132

Yes

No

Rhodes

Rhodes

Chalki

386 630

650 115

764 401

760 658

Yes

Yes

Kos-Kalymnos

Kos

Kalymnos

Lipsi

Leros

Nisyros-Giali

Tilos

Telendos

Pserimos

156 340

281 574

351 959

352 984

Yes

Yes

Lesvos

Lesvos

153 650

259 552

308 454

288 230

Yes

Yes

Chios

Chios

Psara

Oinousses

110 480

180 868

214 449

200 042

Yes

Yes

Paros

Paros

Antiparos

Naxos

Iraklia

Koufonisia

Schinousa

Ios

Sikinos

Folegandros

95 340

164 761

208 206

194 740

Yes

Yes

Samos

Samos

Fournoi

Thymena

90 170

136 283

151 017

137 315

Yes

Yes

Syros

Syros

56 920

100 429

107 270

95 302

Yes

Yes

Thira

Thira

Thirasia

47 680

88 073

117 957

120 199

Yes

Yes

Mykonos-Dilos

Mykonos-Dilos

45 740

78 049

115 071

112 978

Yes

Yes

Limnos

Limnos

35 650

55 340

62 710

59 672

Yes

Yes

Karpathos

Karpathos

Kasos

26 580

30 397

37 829

36 931

Yes

Yes

Milos

Milos

Kimolos

15 460

37 331

45 819

45 402

Yes

Yes

Ikaria

Ikaria

13 110

24 359

28 845

27 613

Yes

Yes

Skyros

Skyros

9 380

14 053

16 150

14 782

Yes

Yes

Patmos

Patmos

8 770

13 988

16 738

17 020

Yes

Yes

Sifnos

Sifnos

6 540

13 180

17 966

16 521

Yes

Yes

Symi

Symi

5 250

9 819

15 054

14 662

Yes

Yes

Amorgos

Amorgos

3 840

7 284

9 816

9 072

Yes

Yes

Kythnos

Kythnos

3 610

7 089

8 309

7 991

Yes

Yes

Serifos

Serifos

2 830

6 793

8 162

7 654

Yes

Yes

Astypalea

Astypalea

2 470

5 283

6 997

6 670

Yes

Yes

Megisti

Megisti

770

1 863

2 751

3 005

Yes

Yes

Ag. Efstratios

Ag. Efstratios

540

937

1 058

1 075

Yes

Yes

Anafi

Anafi

400

858

1 110

1 179

Yes

Yes

Othoni

Othoni

330

588

674

632

Yes

Yes

Erikousa

Erikousa

220

452

710

746

Yes

Yes

Agathonisi

Agathonisi

190

388

522

642

Yes

Yes

Donousa

Donousa

180

417

676

690

Yes

Yes

Aktikithyra

Aktikithyra

70

199

228

241

Yes

Yes

Arkii-Marathi

Arkii-Marathi

0

175

248

312

Yes

Yes

Gavdos

Gavdos

0

0

365

471

Yes

Yes

| (45) | The table above contains the isolated systems as identified in the application and provides certain information on each of them. From this information it can be derived that all isolated systems, except Crete, had in 1996 an electricity demand that qualifies them as micro isolated systems within the meaning of Article 2(27) of Directive 2009/72/EC. With regard to Crete it needs to be mentioned in addition that, as Crete was and still is not interconnected to any other electricity system, the percentage share of demand satisfied through interconnectors was and still is zero, i.e. lower than 5 %. Crete is thus a small isolated system within the meaning of Article 2(26) of Directive 2009/72/EC. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

The table above contains the isolated systems as identified in the application and provides certain information on each of them. From this information it can be derived that all isolated systems, except Crete, had in 1996 an electricity demand that qualifies them as micro isolated systems within the meaning of Article 2(27) of Directive 2009/72/EC. With regard to Crete it needs to be mentioned in addition that, as Crete was and still is not interconnected to any other electricity system, the percentage share of demand satisfied through interconnectors was and still is zero, i.e. lower than 5 %. Crete is thus a small isolated system within the meaning of Article 2(26) of Directive 2009/72/EC.

| (46) | The RAE opinion did not comment on the isolated systems identified in the application. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

The RAE opinion did not comment on the isolated systems identified in the application.

| (47) | The Commission thus concludes that isolated systems as identified in column 1 of above table are all micro isolated systems within the meaning of Article 2(27) of Directive 2009/72/EC, except for Crete, which is a small isolated system within the meaning of Article 2(26) of Directive 2009/72/EC. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

The Commission thus concludes that isolated systems as identified in column 1 of above table are all micro isolated systems within the meaning of Article 2(27) of Directive 2009/72/EC, except for Crete, which is a small isolated system within the meaning of Article 2(26) of Directive 2009/72/EC.

4.2.   SUBSTANTIAL PROBLEMS FOR THE OPERATION OF CONVENTIONAL POWER PLANTS IN THE MICRO ISOLATED SYSTEMS

| (48) | The Commission considers that substantial problems for the operation of conventional power plants in the micro isolated systems exist. This is due in particular to the following elements:






  (a) | The size of the load that needs to be served on the islands does not allow for larger, more efficient and cost effective conventional power plants to be installed, also because in order for an isolated system to be able to operate within acceptable safety margins, it cannot rely on a single power plant.
  The annual peak on none of the micro isolated systems surpassed 188,5 MW in 2013. The average and median peak load, with 20,8 and 4,2 MW respectively, are much smaller.
  None of the conventional plants currently installed on the micro isolated systems have a capacity larger than 27 MW. The average and median plant size are, with 3,9 and 1,1 MW respectively, much smaller.
  The small size of the load to be served, the strong variation in demand, further affected by the increasing penetration of RES, reduces also the choice of technologies of the conventional powers plants that can be employed within the micro isolated systems.
  All conventional generation capacity on the NII isolated systems is fuelled by diesel or fuel-oil. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(48)

The Commission considers that substantial problems for the operation of conventional power plants in the micro isolated systems exist. This is due in particular to the following elements:

(a)

The size of the load that needs to be served on the islands does not allow for larger, more efficient and cost effective conventional power plants to be installed, also because in order for an isolated system to be able to operate within acceptable safety margins, it cannot rely on a single power plant.

The annual peak on none of the micro isolated systems surpassed 188,5 MW in 2013. The average and median peak load, with 20,8 and 4,2 MW respectively, are much smaller.

None of the conventional plants currently installed on the micro isolated systems have a capacity larger than 27 MW. The average and median plant size are, with 3,9 and 1,1 MW respectively, much smaller.

The small size of the load to be served, the strong variation in demand, further affected by the increasing penetration of RES, reduces also the choice of technologies of the conventional powers plants that can be employed within the micro isolated systems.

All conventional generation capacity on the NII isolated systems is fuelled by diesel or fuel-oil.

| (b) | The annual load factors in all micro isolated systems are low. The load factor did not surpass 0,54 in 2012 in any of the micro isolated systems. The average and median peak load of both 0,38 are even smaller. In view of the priority access of RES and the fact that the load factors used here reflect the entire electricity system of the micro isolated system, the load factor for conventional power plants on NIIs is even lower.
  The annual load factor in the Greek interconnected system is normally about 50 % for all units and 65 % for thermal units (6).
  The annual load factor is indicative of the actual use that is made of power plants during a given year and hence their ability to earn revenue.
  The increasing penetration of RES will reduce the load to be served by conventional power plants further. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

The annual load factors in all micro isolated systems are low. The load factor did not surpass 0,54 in 2012 in any of the micro isolated systems. The average and median peak load of both 0,38 are even smaller. In view of the priority access of RES and the fact that the load factors used here reflect the entire electricity system of the micro isolated system, the load factor for conventional power plants on NIIs is even lower.

The annual load factor in the Greek interconnected system is normally about 50 % for all units and 65 % for thermal units (6).

6

The annual load factor is indicative of the actual use that is made of power plants during a given year and hence their ability to earn revenue.

The increasing penetration of RES will reduce the load to be served by conventional power plants further.

| (c) | Several projects exist that aim to interconnect the NIIs, in particular the Cyclades and Crete, with the main Greek interconnected system. As explained above, conventional power plants on the NIIs are not as efficient as the power plants installed in the interconnected system and are therefore unlikely to be economically viable once the NIIs on which it is located is interconnected.
  The possibility that an isolated system will be interconnected is thus a serious disincentive for investing in conventional capacity on the NIIs. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

Several projects exist that aim to interconnect the NIIs, in particular the Cyclades and Crete, with the main Greek interconnected system. As explained above, conventional power plants on the NIIs are not as efficient as the power plants installed in the interconnected system and are therefore unlikely to be economically viable once the NIIs on which it is located is interconnected.

The possibility that an isolated system will be interconnected is thus a serious disincentive for investing in conventional capacity on the NIIs.

| (d) | The relatively small load to be served means that relatively small reversals in demand are likely to affect the generation capacity required within a given isolated system. The lack of interconnection capacity means that all changes in demand by necessity must be matched by generation capacity located within the micro isolated system.
  This factor increases the need for expediency and flexibility in responding to longer term demand reversals.
  This need for flexibility is further enhanced by the perceived difficulties to find suitable sites for conventional power plants on the NIIs and the duration of licensing and permitting procedures. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

The relatively small load to be served means that relatively small reversals in demand are likely to affect the generation capacity required within a given isolated system. The lack of interconnection capacity means that all changes in demand by necessity must be matched by generation capacity located within the micro isolated system.

This factor increases the need for expediency and flexibility in responding to longer term demand reversals.

This need for flexibility is further enhanced by the perceived difficulties to find suitable sites for conventional power plants on the NIIs and the duration of licensing and permitting procedures.

| (e) | The ratio of maximum over minimum annual demand in 2012 (7) in all micro isolated systems is at least 3,35 but is higher, often much higher, for a given micro isolated system. Indeed, the average and median ratio of maximum over minimum demand are 6,27 and 5,98.
  The ratio of maximum over minimum demand in 2010 in the Greek interconnected system is about 3.
  The higher ratio of maximum over minimum demand reflects the degree of flexibility and reserves that, even within a given year, need to be available within the generation capacity installed in an isolated system.
  It is noteworthy in this regard that in 2012 on about 60 % of the micro isolated systems use is made of mobile power generators. |
| --- | --- |

(e)

The ratio of maximum over minimum annual demand in 2012 (7) in all micro isolated systems is at least 3,35 but is higher, often much higher, for a given micro isolated system. Indeed, the average and median ratio of maximum over minimum demand are 6,27 and 5,98.

7

The ratio of maximum over minimum demand in 2010 in the Greek interconnected system is about 3.

The higher ratio of maximum over minimum demand reflects the degree of flexibility and reserves that, even within a given year, need to be available within the generation capacity installed in an isolated system.

It is noteworthy in this regard that in 2012 on about 60 % of the micro isolated systems use is made of mobile power generators.

| (49) | The Commission therefore concludes that substantial problems exist for the operation of conventional power plants within the NII isolated systems as identified in the table above. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

The Commission therefore concludes that substantial problems exist for the operation of conventional power plants within the NII isolated systems as identified in the table above.

4.3.   ASSESSMENT OF THE DEROGATION REQUESTED FROM CHAPTER III

4.3.1.   The derogation from the provisions in Chapter III cannot apply to new capacity

The derogation from the provisions in Chapter III cannot apply to new capacity

| (50) | Pursuant to Article 44(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC derogations from the provision of Chapter III can only be granted as far as refurbishing, upgrading and expanding existing capacity is concerned. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

Pursuant to Article 44(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC derogations from the provision of Chapter III can only be granted as far as refurbishing, upgrading and expanding existing capacity is concerned.

| (51) | Consequently, derogation from the provisions in Chapter III of Directive 2009/72/EC cannot be granted for new capacity. |
| --- | --- |

(51)

Consequently, derogation from the provisions in Chapter III of Directive 2009/72/EC cannot be granted for new capacity.

| (52) | Instead, given that the isolated systems on the NIIs are distribution networks, should the authorisation procedure for new capacity fail to provide for the satisfactory authorisation of new capacity for the isolated systems on the NIIs, the Greek authorities may consider using the provisions of Article 7(3) of Directive 2009/72/EC also for new small conventional capacity. Such new small conventional capacity may for instance include temporary generation capacity that may be made available on a long term basis without permanent attribution to a specific location. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

Instead, given that the isolated systems on the NIIs are distribution networks, should the authorisation procedure for new capacity fail to provide for the satisfactory authorisation of new capacity for the isolated systems on the NIIs, the Greek authorities may consider using the provisions of Article 7(3) of Directive 2009/72/EC also for new small conventional capacity. Such new small conventional capacity may for instance include temporary generation capacity that may be made available on a long term basis without permanent attribution to a specific location.

4.3.2.   The derogation from the provisions of Chapter III cannot apply to Crete

The derogation from the provisions of Chapter III cannot apply to Crete

| (53) | As stated above, all NIIs are micro isolated systems, with the exception of Crete, which is a small isolated system. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

As stated above, all NIIs are micro isolated systems, with the exception of Crete, which is a small isolated system.

| (54) | Consequently, derogation from the provisions in Chapter III of Directive 2009/72/EC cannot be granted for Crete. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

Consequently, derogation from the provisions in Chapter III of Directive 2009/72/EC cannot be granted for Crete.

4.3.3.   The derogation from the provisions in Chapter III does not cover RES and CHP plants

The derogation from the provisions in Chapter III does not cover RES and CHP plants

| (55) | The application does not explicitly mention that the requested derogation regards conventional plants only. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

The application does not explicitly mention that the requested derogation regards conventional plants only.

| (56) | Article 133(3) of Law 4001/2011 however expressly excludes electricity produced by using renewable energy sources, by high-efficiency cogeneration or hybrid plants and in the case of auto producers from the scope of exclusive production licence that may be awarded to PPC. The same follows from Article 225 of the NII Code. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

Article 133(3) of Law 4001/2011 however expressly excludes electricity produced by using renewable energy sources, by high-efficiency cogeneration or hybrid plants and in the case of auto producers from the scope of exclusive production licence that may be awarded to PPC. The same follows from Article 225 of the NII Code.

| (57) | Moreover, the provided justification relates to substantial problems with the operation of conventional power plants only. In fact, it is reasoned that those power plants are confronted with substantial problems as a result, inter alia, of the increase in RES penetration. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

Moreover, the provided justification relates to substantial problems with the operation of conventional power plants only. In fact, it is reasoned that those power plants are confronted with substantial problems as a result, inter alia, of the increase in RES penetration.

| (58) | Consequently, even if the application should seek to request derogation from the provisions of Chapter III of Directive 2009/72/EC for generation plants other than conventional power plants, the derogation cannot be granted, as no grounds justifying it were provided. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

Consequently, even if the application should seek to request derogation from the provisions of Chapter III of Directive 2009/72/EC for generation plants other than conventional power plants, the derogation cannot be granted, as no grounds justifying it were provided.

4.3.4.   The derogation for the authorisation of refurbishing, upgrading and expanding existing capacity can be granted

The derogation for the authorisation of refurbishing, upgrading and expanding existing capacity can be granted

| (59) | In view of the above-mentioned substantial problems for the operation of conventional power plants within the small isolated systems, derogation can be granted for the authorisation of existing conventional capacity to the extent that this concerns the refurbishing, upgrading and expanding of existing conventional capacity. Such authorisation can be directly granted to PPC. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

In view of the above-mentioned substantial problems for the operation of conventional power plants within the small isolated systems, derogation can be granted for the authorisation of existing conventional capacity to the extent that this concerns the refurbishing, upgrading and expanding of existing conventional capacity. Such authorisation can be directly granted to PPC.

| (60) | For the purpose of this derogation:






  (a) | existing conventional generation capacity comprises projects for the construction of conventional generation capacity for which a license by RAE has already been granted and has not been cancelled on the date this Decision takes effect; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(60)

For the purpose of this derogation:

(a)

existing conventional generation capacity comprises projects for the construction of conventional generation capacity for which a license by RAE has already been granted and has not been cancelled on the date this Decision takes effect;

| (b) | the full demolishment of the main generation capacity on an existing site and its replacement by a new electricity generation installation is considered as construction of new capacity; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the full demolishment of the main generation capacity on an existing site and its replacement by a new electricity generation installation is considered as construction of new capacity;

| (c) | the placement of temporary generation capacity within the perimeter of the existing capacity constitutes expanding existing capacity. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

the placement of temporary generation capacity within the perimeter of the existing capacity constitutes expanding existing capacity.

| (61) | However, there are no grounds for a derogation from the criteria and conditions, such as those laid down in Article 7(2) of Directive 2009/72/EC, under which an authorisation is granted to PPC. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

However, there are no grounds for a derogation from the criteria and conditions, such as those laid down in Article 7(2) of Directive 2009/72/EC, under which an authorisation is granted to PPC.

| (62) | Moreover, in case the derogation is granted directly to PPC, it is important that the terms stipulate the obligations as regards the time by which the authorised conventional power plant must be fully operational and include provisions ensuring full and effective compliance with such obligations. Upon expiry, on RAE's sole discretion, such direct authorisation can be prolonged but only if it expired for reasons fully beyond the control of PPC. Upon expiry, RAE should organise an authorisation procedure in full compliance with Article 7(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC, thus including the participation of third parties. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

Moreover, in case the derogation is granted directly to PPC, it is important that the terms stipulate the obligations as regards the time by which the authorised conventional power plant must be fully operational and include provisions ensuring full and effective compliance with such obligations. Upon expiry, on RAE's sole discretion, such direct authorisation can be prolonged but only if it expired for reasons fully beyond the control of PPC. Upon expiry, RAE should organise an authorisation procedure in full compliance with Article 7(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC, thus including the participation of third parties.

4.3.5.   The derogation cannot cover tendering for new capacity

The derogation cannot cover tendering for new capacity

| (63) | By definition, tendering within the meaning of Article 8 of Directive 2009/72/EC concerns the capacity that remains to be constructed and authorised and, hence, constitutes new capacity. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

By definition, tendering within the meaning of Article 8 of Directive 2009/72/EC concerns the capacity that remains to be constructed and authorised and, hence, constitutes new capacity.

| (64) | For the reasons already set out above, derogation for new capacity should not be granted pursuant to Article 44(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

For the reasons already set out above, derogation for new capacity should not be granted pursuant to Article 44(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC.

4.4.   ASSESSMENT OF THE REQUESTED DEROGATION FROM CHAPTER VIII

4.4.1.   The derogation from the provisions of Chapter VIII does not cover Article 32 on third party access

The derogation from the provisions of Chapter VIII does not cover Article 32 on third party access

| (65) | The application concerns the derogation from Chapter VIII of Directive 2009/72/EC and, hence, may be deemed to include a request for derogation from the provisions of Article 32 regarding third party access (‘TPA’). |
| --- | --- |

(65)

The application concerns the derogation from Chapter VIII of Directive 2009/72/EC and, hence, may be deemed to include a request for derogation from the provisions of Article 32 regarding third party access (‘TPA’).

| (66) | The application does not specify whether the requested derogation also covers Article 32 of Directive 2009/72/EC nor does it provide any grounds justifying such a derogation. Instead, Law 4001/2011 and the NII code oblige DEDDIE to provide non-discriminatory third party access to the distribution system as operated by DEDDIE (e.g. Article 127 of Law 4001/2011). Consequently, such a derogation cannot be granted. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

The application does not specify whether the requested derogation also covers Article 32 of Directive 2009/72/EC nor does it provide any grounds justifying such a derogation. Instead, Law 4001/2011 and the NII code oblige DEDDIE to provide non-discriminatory third party access to the distribution system as operated by DEDDIE (e.g. Article 127 of Law 4001/2011). Consequently, such a derogation cannot be granted.

4.4.2.   Derogation from Article 33 on market opening and reciprocity

Derogation from Article 33 on market opening and reciprocity

4.4.2.1.   No grounds for permanent derogation from Article 33 of Directive 2009/72/EC

No grounds for permanent derogation from Article 33 of Directive 2009/72/EC

| (67) | The application essentially argues that PPC should remain the sole supplier licensed to supply customers on the NII on the grounds that developing the necessary infrastructure for the operation and supervision of the electricity market in micro isolated systems together with those necessary for market opening for third party suppliers entails operating costs to the NII operator that outweigh the benefits that may accrue to consumers from market opening. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

The application essentially argues that PPC should remain the sole supplier licensed to supply customers on the NII on the grounds that developing the necessary infrastructure for the operation and supervision of the electricity market in micro isolated systems together with those necessary for market opening for third party suppliers entails operating costs to the NII operator that outweigh the benefits that may accrue to consumers from market opening.

| (68) | As becomes apparent from the RAE opinion, the infrastructure installed on the NIIs seeks to ensure that the NII PSO can be administered, in compliance with existing law, in a transparent, verifiable and non-discriminatory manner. Moreover, the infrastructure is required for operating the NII isolated systems from a technical and economical point of view. Consequently, as the infrastructure is necessary in any event to meet those requirements, regardless as to the number of suppliers that are licensed on the NIIs, market opening does not increase the cost of the infrastructure. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

As becomes apparent from the RAE opinion, the infrastructure installed on the NIIs seeks to ensure that the NII PSO can be administered, in compliance with existing law, in a transparent, verifiable and non-discriminatory manner. Moreover, the infrastructure is required for operating the NII isolated systems from a technical and economical point of view. Consequently, as the infrastructure is necessary in any event to meet those requirements, regardless as to the number of suppliers that are licensed on the NIIs, market opening does not increase the cost of the infrastructure.

| (69) | Even if similar infrastructure is required, market opening is not intrinsically connected to the technical operation of the isolated systems on the NIIs or the NII PSO as there is no causal link between the technical and economical operation of these isolated systems and the operation of the NII PSO in accordance with the relevant legal requirements on the one hand and the question as to whether one or several suppliers are licenced to supply NII electricity consumers on the other hand. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

Even if similar infrastructure is required, market opening is not intrinsically connected to the technical operation of the isolated systems on the NIIs or the NII PSO as there is no causal link between the technical and economical operation of these isolated systems and the operation of the NII PSO in accordance with the relevant legal requirements on the one hand and the question as to whether one or several suppliers are licenced to supply NII electricity consumers on the other hand.

| (70) | It is correct that the higher production costs in the NIIs as compared to the production costs in the interconnected system must be recovered from suppliers active in the NIIs by repartitioning the respective part of the NII PSO compensation as a function of the electricity sales to their customers. However, establishing the production costs on the NIIs is in any way required to determine the financial compensation for the NII PSO, regardless as to the number of suppliers active on the NIIs. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

It is correct that the higher production costs in the NIIs as compared to the production costs in the interconnected system must be recovered from suppliers active in the NIIs by repartitioning the respective part of the NII PSO compensation as a function of the electricity sales to their customers. However, establishing the production costs on the NIIs is in any way required to determine the financial compensation for the NII PSO, regardless as to the number of suppliers active on the NIIs.

| (71) | The sole additional requirement for market opening is the repartitioning to each supplier of the respective parts of the NII PSO compensation as a function of the electricity sales of their customers. Even the related customer data, in particular metering data, are required regardless as to whether one of more than one supplier is licensed to supply NII based customers. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

The sole additional requirement for market opening is the repartitioning to each supplier of the respective parts of the NII PSO compensation as a function of the electricity sales of their customers. Even the related customer data, in particular metering data, are required regardless as to whether one of more than one supplier is licensed to supply NII based customers.

| (72) | Consequently, granting the NII PSO compensation to suppliers merely entails the ability to attribute customers' metering data to a particular licenced supplier, which is primarily an administrative process based on information entirely or to a very large extent collected regardless as to whether market opening on the NIIs exists or not. Secondly, this ability is a precondition for the proper operation of any electricity supply market. Such costs can therefore not be accepted as providing grounds for derogation for market opening, as they are not specific to the operation of the isolated systems on the NIIs and connected to a substantial problem in the operation thereof. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

Consequently, granting the NII PSO compensation to suppliers merely entails the ability to attribute customers' metering data to a particular licenced supplier, which is primarily an administrative process based on information entirely or to a very large extent collected regardless as to whether market opening on the NIIs exists or not. Secondly, this ability is a precondition for the proper operation of any electricity supply market. Such costs can therefore not be accepted as providing grounds for derogation for market opening, as they are not specific to the operation of the isolated systems on the NIIs and connected to a substantial problem in the operation thereof.

| (73) | It is important to note that drawing up registers to attribute metering information to suppliers is part of the infrastructure to be put in place. Whereas putting in place the full envisaged infrastructure will facilitate the optimal operation of isolated electricity systems, the full realisation of the related investments is not a necessary condition for market opening to take place. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

It is important to note that drawing up registers to attribute metering information to suppliers is part of the infrastructure to be put in place. Whereas putting in place the full envisaged infrastructure will facilitate the optimal operation of isolated electricity systems, the full realisation of the related investments is not a necessary condition for market opening to take place.

| (74) | The fact that a large variation in the values of the average annual variable production cost per NII may exist is immaterial. Indeed, even if substantiated, such variation concerns the cost of producing electricity within the NII isolated systems. Establishing this amount is already required for administrating the NII PSO in accordance with the legal requirements and, moreover, is not affected in any way by the number of suppliers licenced to supply NII based customers. Moreover, in view of the fact that the administration of the NII PSO is already based on a monthly system for each isolated system separately, it is difficult to conceive that large annual variations per NII can give rise to material problems. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

The fact that a large variation in the values of the average annual variable production cost per NII may exist is immaterial. Indeed, even if substantiated, such variation concerns the cost of producing electricity within the NII isolated systems. Establishing this amount is already required for administrating the NII PSO in accordance with the legal requirements and, moreover, is not affected in any way by the number of suppliers licenced to supply NII based customers. Moreover, in view of the fact that the administration of the NII PSO is already based on a monthly system for each isolated system separately, it is difficult to conceive that large annual variations per NII can give rise to material problems.

| (75) | It follows from the above that the number of suppliers licensed to supply customers on the NIIs is neither intrinsically linked to the technical and economic operation of the isolated systems nor to the operation of the NII PSO in accordance with the relevant legal requirements. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

It follows from the above that the number of suppliers licensed to supply customers on the NIIs is neither intrinsically linked to the technical and economic operation of the isolated systems nor to the operation of the NII PSO in accordance with the relevant legal requirements.

| (76) | It can moreover be noted that market opening has benefits that outweigh the costs, should those exist, of market opening. As RAE notes, alternative suppliers in the NIIs could provide additional significant benefits to the NII based customers by combining the provision of other services with that of electricity supply. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

It can moreover be noted that market opening has benefits that outweigh the costs, should those exist, of market opening. As RAE notes, alternative suppliers in the NIIs could provide additional significant benefits to the NII based customers by combining the provision of other services with that of electricity supply.

| (77) | Consequently, the request for derogation on a permanent basis from Article 33 should not be granted. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

Consequently, the request for derogation on a permanent basis from Article 33 should not be granted.

4.4.2.2.   Limitation in duration for an isolated system from Article 33 of Directive 2009/72/EC

Limitation in duration for an isolated system from Article 33 of Directive 2009/72/EC

| (78) | In view of the above, it must be recognised that market opening requires setting up practical arrangements to enable the NII isolated systems to be operated fully in line with the NII Code. Practical problems related to market opening may entail either the unavailability of the registers required to attribute meters and metering data to suppliers or the fact that the optimal infrastructure configuration is not yet in place On this basis, granting a derogation from Article 33 of Directive 2009/72/EC that is limited in time can be envisaged. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

In view of the above, it must be recognised that market opening requires setting up practical arrangements to enable the NII isolated systems to be operated fully in line with the NII Code. Practical problems related to market opening may entail either the unavailability of the registers required to attribute meters and metering data to suppliers or the fact that the optimal infrastructure configuration is not yet in place On this basis, granting a derogation from Article 33 of Directive 2009/72/EC that is limited in time can be envisaged.

| (79) | In assessing the duration of such a derogation from Chapter VIII, the following two considerations are relevant:






  (a) | as already pointed out, the most important element required for enabling market opening on the NIIs is the availability of a register on the NIIs allowing the attribution of metering data to a given supplier. Article 327(4) of the NII Code stipulates that the register required for this purpose is finalised at the latest 2 years after the entry into force of the NII Code. The availability of the register is a necessary condition for market opening in practical terms; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(79)

In assessing the duration of such a derogation from Chapter VIII, the following two considerations are relevant:

(a)

as already pointed out, the most important element required for enabling market opening on the NIIs is the availability of a register on the NIIs allowing the attribution of metering data to a given supplier. Article 327(4) of the NII Code stipulates that the register required for this purpose is finalised at the latest 2 years after the entry into force of the NII Code. The availability of the register is a necessary condition for market opening in practical terms;

| (b) | the full completion of the investment programme for the infrastructure to be installed on the NIIs would certainly facilitate the practical operation of market opening on the NIIs. However, this is however not a necessary requirement. Article 237(7) of the NII Code lays down a schedule by which all the current NIIs are supposed to be equipped with the additional infrastructure to be installed on the NIIs at the latest 5 years following the entry into force of the NII Code. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the full completion of the investment programme for the infrastructure to be installed on the NIIs would certainly facilitate the practical operation of market opening on the NIIs. However, this is however not a necessary requirement. Article 237(7) of the NII Code lays down a schedule by which all the current NIIs are supposed to be equipped with the additional infrastructure to be installed on the NIIs at the latest 5 years following the entry into force of the NII Code.

| (80) | Consequently, a derogation from market opening should be granted for at least 2 years after the entry into force of the NII Code, i.e. until 17 February 2016, in order for the registers, that are a necessary requirement for market opening, to be established. As the full infrastructure has to be installed at the latest 5 years after the entry into force of the NII code, the validity of the derogation should in any event be limited to 5 years after the entry into force of the NII code, i.e. until 17 February 2019 for any of the NII isolated system. However, as the derogation can only be justified where substantial and material problems remain for market opening that are directly attributable to the non-completion of the infrastructure investment programme on the NIIs, it should be verified regularly whether such problems persist on a given NII isolated system. Such verification should use as a benchmark an investment plan by DEDDIE, approved by the competent Greek authorities, for the installation of the required infrastructure on the NIIs. This plan should therefore be finalized and approved by 17 February 2015. |
| --- | --- |

(80)

Consequently, a derogation from market opening should be granted for at least 2 years after the entry into force of the NII Code, i.e. until 17 February 2016, in order for the registers, that are a necessary requirement for market opening, to be established. As the full infrastructure has to be installed at the latest 5 years after the entry into force of the NII code, the validity of the derogation should in any event be limited to 5 years after the entry into force of the NII code, i.e. until 17 February 2019 for any of the NII isolated system. However, as the derogation can only be justified where substantial and material problems remain for market opening that are directly attributable to the non-completion of the infrastructure investment programme on the NIIs, it should be verified regularly whether such problems persist on a given NII isolated system. Such verification should use as a benchmark an investment plan by DEDDIE, approved by the competent Greek authorities, for the installation of the required infrastructure on the NIIs. This plan should therefore be finalized and approved by 17 February 2015.

| (81) | In order not to delay market opening unnecessarily, the infrastructure investment plan of DEDDIE should be approved by RAE and should prioritise the isolated systems of Crete and Rhodes, as those are the most populous NIIs. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

In order not to delay market opening unnecessarily, the infrastructure investment plan of DEDDIE should be approved by RAE and should prioritise the isolated systems of Crete and Rhodes, as those are the most populous NIIs.

| (82) | From 17 February 2016, and thereafter on an annual basis until 17 February 2019, DEDDIE should draw-up a report, which should be approved by RAE, specifying on what grounds market opening has not yet occurred in a given NII isolated system. This report should be published and notified to the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

From 17 February 2016, and thereafter on an annual basis until 17 February 2019, DEDDIE should draw-up a report, which should be approved by RAE, specifying on what grounds market opening has not yet occurred in a given NII isolated system. This report should be published and notified to the Commission.

4.4.3.   The derogation from the provision of Chapter VIII does not cover Article 34

The derogation from the provision of Chapter VIII does not cover Article 34

| (83) | The application concerns derogation from Chapter VIII of Directive 2009/72/EC and, hence, may be deemed to include a request for derogation from Article 34 regarding direct lines within the meaning of Article 2(15) of Directive 2009/72/EC. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

The application concerns derogation from Chapter VIII of Directive 2009/72/EC and, hence, may be deemed to include a request for derogation from Article 34 regarding direct lines within the meaning of Article 2(15) of Directive 2009/72/EC.

| (84) | The application does not specify whether the requested derogation also covers Article 34 of Directive 2009/72/EC. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

The application does not specify whether the requested derogation also covers Article 34 of Directive 2009/72/EC.

| (85) | Consequently, even if the application is meant to request derogation from Article 34 of Directive 2009/72/EC, such a derogation should not be granted as no grounds justifying it were provided. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

Consequently, even if the application is meant to request derogation from Article 34 of Directive 2009/72/EC, such a derogation should not be granted as no grounds justifying it were provided.

4.4.4.   Interconnectors — application of the derogation from Chapters III and VIII

Interconnectors — application of the derogation from Chapters III and VIII

| (86) | The present derogation concerns micro isolated systems that are precisely characterised by the fact that they are not or, in the case of small isolated systems, only to a very limited degree, interconnected with other electricity systems. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

The present derogation concerns micro isolated systems that are precisely characterised by the fact that they are not or, in the case of small isolated systems, only to a very limited degree, interconnected with other electricity systems.

| (87) | However:






  (a) | according to the recently approved Ten-Year Development Plan of the Greek transmission system operator, the Independent Power Transmission Operator, or ‘ADMIE’) S.A], ADMIE, the interconnection of the Cyclades islands is expected to be completed by 2018 in three phases, with certain Cyclades islands being interconnected with the Greek interconnected system well before this date; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(87)

However:

(a)

according to the recently approved Ten-Year Development Plan of the Greek transmission system operator, the Independent Power Transmission Operator, or ‘ADMIE’) S.A], ADMIE, the interconnection of the Cyclades islands is expected to be completed by 2018 in three phases, with certain Cyclades islands being interconnected with the Greek interconnected system well before this date;

| (b) | moreover, the interconnection of Crete is expected to be completed by 2020. The relevant parts of the project for the first three years have been included in the 2013 approved Ten-Year Development Plan of ADMIE. The final plan must be included in the Ten–Year Development Plan that will be approved in 2014. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

moreover, the interconnection of Crete is expected to be completed by 2020. The relevant parts of the project for the first three years have been included in the 2013 approved Ten-Year Development Plan of ADMIE. The final plan must be included in the Ten–Year Development Plan that will be approved in 2014.

| (88) | It is necessary to explicitly provide that the present derogation for a given isolated system ceases automatically as soon as an interconnection between a given isolated system and the Greek interconnected system has become fully operational. |
| --- | --- |

(88)

It is necessary to explicitly provide that the present derogation for a given isolated system ceases automatically as soon as an interconnection between a given isolated system and the Greek interconnected system has become fully operational.

| (89) | DEDDIE, even if legally and functionally unbundled, is 100 % owned by PPC. Contrary to a distribution system operator within the meaning of Directive 2009/72/EC, DEDDIE also has extensive tasks in the operation of the NII isolated systems and the operation of generation on the NIIs, including the conventional generation capacity owned by PPC and, hence, its economic remuneration. As set out above, interconnection affects the economic viability of the conventional power plants currently installed within the isolated systems on the NIIs. |
| --- | --- |

(89)

DEDDIE, even if legally and functionally unbundled, is 100 % owned by PPC. Contrary to a distribution system operator within the meaning of Directive 2009/72/EC, DEDDIE also has extensive tasks in the operation of the NII isolated systems and the operation of generation on the NIIs, including the conventional generation capacity owned by PPC and, hence, its economic remuneration. As set out above, interconnection affects the economic viability of the conventional power plants currently installed within the isolated systems on the NIIs.

| (90) | Derogations should only be granted if they are proportional and do not go beyond what is strictly necessary. It is therefore necessary to provide clear incentives and transparency as regards decisions whether to interconnect the NII isolated systems. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

Derogations should only be granted if they are proportional and do not go beyond what is strictly necessary. It is therefore necessary to provide clear incentives and transparency as regards decisions whether to interconnect the NII isolated systems.

| (91) | Article 108 of Law 4001/2011 provides that:

  ‘
  ADMIE SA shall submit a ten-year Greek electricity transmission system development plan to the RAE by 31 March each year [...] The ten-year Greek electricity transmission system development plan shall in particular: [...] (c) provide a technical and financial cost-benefit study for important transmission works [...], especially for [...] connectors between islands and the transmission system, including a timeframe, estimated cash flow and financing requirements for all investment projects
  ’
  . |
| --- | --- |

(91)

Article 108 of Law 4001/2011 provides that:

‘
  ADMIE SA shall submit a ten-year Greek electricity transmission system development plan to the RAE by 31 March each year [...] The ten-year Greek electricity transmission system development plan shall in particular: [...] (c) provide a technical and financial cost-benefit study for important transmission works [...], especially for [...] connectors between islands and the transmission system, including a timeframe, estimated cash flow and financing requirements for all investment projects
  ’

ADMIE SA shall submit a ten-year Greek electricity transmission system development plan to the RAE by 31 March each year [...] The ten-year Greek electricity transmission system development plan shall in particular: [...] (c) provide a technical and financial cost-benefit study for important transmission works [...], especially for [...] connectors between islands and the transmission system, including a timeframe, estimated cash flow and financing requirements for all investment projects

| (92) | In order to ensure that clear incentives and transparency as regards decisions whether to interconnect the NII isolated systems exist, the Greek authorities should ensure that:






  (a) | when authorising or tendering for existing or new capacity for a given isolated system on a NII, ADMIE, DEDDIE and RAE systematically consider the alternative of interconnecting the isolated system of which the given NII is part. Such authorisation for existing or new capacity should be refused if constructing an interconnector is more cost effective. Costs should comprise all costs to supply electricity to end-customers within the isolated system, including NII PSO compensation; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(92)

In order to ensure that clear incentives and transparency as regards decisions whether to interconnect the NII isolated systems exist, the Greek authorities should ensure that:

(a)

when authorising or tendering for existing or new capacity for a given isolated system on a NII, ADMIE, DEDDIE and RAE systematically consider the alternative of interconnecting the isolated system of which the given NII is part. Such authorisation for existing or new capacity should be refused if constructing an interconnector is more cost effective. Costs should comprise all costs to supply electricity to end-customers within the isolated system, including NII PSO compensation;

| (b) | the cost-benefit study for important transmission works by ADMIE as provided for in Article 108 of Law 4001/2011 only considers efficient costs of investing and operating the interconnection. In particular, it should not consider revenues lost by or depreciation in value of the conventional generation assets already installed on the NIIs; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the cost-benefit study for important transmission works by ADMIE as provided for in Article 108 of Law 4001/2011 only considers efficient costs of investing and operating the interconnection. In particular, it should not consider revenues lost by or depreciation in value of the conventional generation assets already installed on the NIIs;

| (c) | RAE publishes in conjunction with ADMIE's ten-year investment plan as provided for in Article 108 of Law 4001/2011, the overall costs, including the NII PSO compensation, of supplying electricity customers in each of the NII isolated systems. Unless the construction of an interconnector is integrated in ADMIE's ten-year investment plan as provided for in Article 108 of Law 4001/2011 as approved by RAE, RAE will, upon its own initiative or upon simple request by a third party, organise a tender as provided for in Article 22(7)(b) of Directive 2009/72/EC for the construction of an interconnector connecting one or several NII isolated systems. An interconnector should be constructed if its construction lowers the overall costs, including the NII PSO compensation, of supplying electricity to customers located on the NIIs; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

RAE publishes in conjunction with ADMIE's ten-year investment plan as provided for in Article 108 of Law 4001/2011, the overall costs, including the NII PSO compensation, of supplying electricity customers in each of the NII isolated systems. Unless the construction of an interconnector is integrated in ADMIE's ten-year investment plan as provided for in Article 108 of Law 4001/2011 as approved by RAE, RAE will, upon its own initiative or upon simple request by a third party, organise a tender as provided for in Article 22(7)(b) of Directive 2009/72/EC for the construction of an interconnector connecting one or several NII isolated systems. An interconnector should be constructed if its construction lowers the overall costs, including the NII PSO compensation, of supplying electricity to customers located on the NIIs;

| (d) | RAE sets a clear deadline for the completion of the construction of an interconnector. If the interconnector is not constructed or not within the time frame set by RAE, damages should be sought for the non-realized costs savings. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

RAE sets a clear deadline for the completion of the construction of an interconnector. If the interconnector is not constructed or not within the time frame set by RAE, damages should be sought for the non-realized costs savings.

4.5.   DURATION

| (93) | It is necessary to review the facts on which the present derogation is based, in particular after the plans for interconnecting certain isolated systems are due to be completed and the deadlines for installing the infrastructure as provided for in Article 237 of the NII Code have expired. |
| --- | --- |

(93)

It is necessary to review the facts on which the present derogation is based, in particular after the plans for interconnecting certain isolated systems are due to be completed and the deadlines for installing the infrastructure as provided for in Article 237 of the NII Code have expired.

| (94) | Consequently, any derogation shall be valid until 1 January 2021. |
| --- | --- |

(94)

Consequently, any derogation shall be valid until 1 January 2021.

4.6.   RETROACTIVE EFFECT

| (95) | As stated above, the application of 17 January 2012 renewed the initial application that was submitted in 2003. |
| --- | --- |

(95)

As stated above, the application of 17 January 2012 renewed the initial application that was submitted in 2003.

| (96) | Article 26(1) of Directive 2003/54/EC, repealed by Directive 2009/72/EC, also contained provisions allowing Member States to apply for derogations from certain provisions of that Directive in case of substantial problems with the operation of small and micro isolated systems. Pursuant to article 48 of Directive 2009/72/EC references to the repealed Article 26(1) of Directive 2003/54/EC shall be construed as references to Article 44(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC. |
| --- | --- |

(96)

Article 26(1) of Directive 2003/54/EC, repealed by Directive 2009/72/EC, also contained provisions allowing Member States to apply for derogations from certain provisions of that Directive in case of substantial problems with the operation of small and micro isolated systems. Pursuant to article 48 of Directive 2009/72/EC references to the repealed Article 26(1) of Directive 2003/54/EC shall be construed as references to Article 44(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC.

| (97) | The definitions of small isolated system and micro isolated system employed in Article 2(26) and (27) of Directive 2003/54/EC are identical to those used in Article 2(26) and (27) of Directive 2009/72/EC. |
| --- | --- |

(97)

The definitions of small isolated system and micro isolated system employed in Article 2(26) and (27) of Directive 2003/54/EC are identical to those used in Article 2(26) and (27) of Directive 2009/72/EC.

| (98) | Both these definitions refer to the demand for electricity in isolated systems in 1996, which did not change. Moreover, Crete was not interconnected to the Greek interconnected system neither in 2003 nor in 2012, or at the moment at which the present derogation decision takes effect |
| --- | --- |

(98)

Both these definitions refer to the demand for electricity in isolated systems in 1996, which did not change. Moreover, Crete was not interconnected to the Greek interconnected system neither in 2003 nor in 2012, or at the moment at which the present derogation decision takes effect

| (99) | Consequently, all micro and small isolated electricity systems that qualify as micro or small isolated system in the application, qualified as such when the initial application was made and when the present derogation decision takes effect. |
| --- | --- |

(99)

Consequently, all micro and small isolated electricity systems that qualify as micro or small isolated system in the application, qualified as such when the initial application was made and when the present derogation decision takes effect.

| (100) | Consequently, no legal or factual changes have occurred with regard to the small and micro isolated systems that may qualify for derogation under Directive 2003/54/EC and Directive 2009/72/EC. |
| --- | --- |

(100)

Consequently, no legal or factual changes have occurred with regard to the small and micro isolated systems that may qualify for derogation under Directive 2003/54/EC and Directive 2009/72/EC.

| (101) | Article 26(1) of Directive 2003/54/EC allowed granting derogation from its Chapter III, which contains provisions, as those of Chapter III of Directive 2009/72/EC regarding authorisation procedures for new capacity and tendering for new capacity. |
| --- | --- |

(101)

Article 26(1) of Directive 2003/54/EC allowed granting derogation from its Chapter III, which contains provisions, as those of Chapter III of Directive 2009/72/EC regarding authorisation procedures for new capacity and tendering for new capacity.

| (102) | Article 26(1) of Directive 2003/54/EC allowed granting derogation from its Chapter VII which contains provisions, as those of Chapter VIII of Directive 2009/72/EC, concerning third party access, market opening and direct lines. |
| --- | --- |

(102)

Article 26(1) of Directive 2003/54/EC allowed granting derogation from its Chapter VII which contains provisions, as those of Chapter VIII of Directive 2009/72/EC, concerning third party access, market opening and direct lines.

| (103) | Had the Commission granted derogation in response to the initial application, it could have done so on the same terms as under the present derogation under Directive 2009/72/EC. |
| --- | --- |

(103)

Had the Commission granted derogation in response to the initial application, it could have done so on the same terms as under the present derogation under Directive 2009/72/EC.

| (104) | Moreover, no change in the factual circumstances has occurred since 2003. Indeed, the geographical situation of the NIIs, the economic factors governing the operation of the electrical systems within NII isolated systems and the nature of the substantial problems that exit with the operation of conventional power plants within the NII isolated systems have not materially changed since 2003. |
| --- | --- |

(104)

Moreover, no change in the factual circumstances has occurred since 2003. Indeed, the geographical situation of the NIIs, the economic factors governing the operation of the electrical systems within NII isolated systems and the nature of the substantial problems that exit with the operation of conventional power plants within the NII isolated systems have not materially changed since 2003.

| (105) | The initial application has been pending since 2003. The non-action of the Commission should not be to the detriment of the Hellenic Republic. The Hellenic Republic has complied with its obligations under Article 26(1) of Directive 2003/54/EC and Article 44(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC and submitted a duly justified request for derogation under those Articles for the isolated systems on the NIIs. |
| --- | --- |

(105)

The initial application has been pending since 2003. The non-action of the Commission should not be to the detriment of the Hellenic Republic. The Hellenic Republic has complied with its obligations under Article 26(1) of Directive 2003/54/EC and Article 44(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC and submitted a duly justified request for derogation under those Articles for the isolated systems on the NIIs.

| (106) | It is therefore appropriate that the present derogation decision takes effects from the date of notification of the initial application, i.e. from 5 December 2003, |
| --- | --- |

(106)

It is therefore appropriate that the present derogation decision takes effects from the date of notification of the initial application, i.e. from 5 December 2003,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

This decision applies to small and micro isolated systems as identified in the Table.

For the purpose of this Decision, Crete is a small isolated system whereas all other isolated systems are micro isolated systems.

Article 2

1.   A derogation is granted from the provisions of Article 33 of Directive 2009/72/EC for small and micro isolated systems.

2.   This derogation shall be valid until 17 February 2016 or the full installation of the infrastructure as provided for in Article 237(7) of the NII Code, whatever comes later. In any event, this derogation shall cease to apply on 17 February 2019.

3.   The Greek authorities shall by 17 February 2015 draw up a plan for the infrastructure investments as provided for in Article 237(7) of the NII Code, specifying, separately for each NII isolated system, by which date the infrastructure shall be fully installed. This plan shall prioritise Crete and Rhodes.

4.   From 17 February 2016, and thereafter on an annual basis until 17 February 2019, the Greek authorities shall draw-up a report specifying, for each NII isolated system: (a) whether market opening has occurred; (b) the status of the infrastructure investments with relation to the relevant plan (c) the substantial and material problems that persist for market opening; and (d) whether those problems can be directly attributed to the non-completion of the infrastructure investment as provided for in Article 237(7) of the NII Code.

Article 3

1.   A derogation is granted from the provisions of Article 7(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC according to which authorisations for refurbishing, upgrading and expanding existing conventional capacity within micro isolated systems can be granted directly to PPC.

2.   For the purpose of this derogation:

| (a) | existing conventional generation capacity shall include projects for refurbishing, upgrading and expanding conventional generation capacity for which a valid license issued by RAE exists on the date of notification of this Decision; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

existing conventional generation capacity shall include projects for refurbishing, upgrading and expanding conventional generation capacity for which a valid license issued by RAE exists on the date of notification of this Decision;

| (b) | the full demolishment of the main generation capacity on an existing site and its replacement by a new electricity generation installation shall not constitute existing capacity but construction of new capacity; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the full demolishment of the main generation capacity on an existing site and its replacement by a new electricity generation installation shall not constitute existing capacity but construction of new capacity;

| (c) | the placement of temporary conventional generation capacity within the perimeter of existing capacity shall constitute expanding existing capacity. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

the placement of temporary conventional generation capacity within the perimeter of existing capacity shall constitute expanding existing capacity.

3.   Upon expiry of the authorisation granted in accordance with the first paragraph, such authorisation can be prolonged, on RAE's sole discretion, provided the delays are due to reasons entirely beyond the control of PPC.

4.   This derogation shall no longer apply to authorisations granted pursuant to the first paragraph that have expired or cancelled.

5.   All other provisions of Article 7 Directive 2009/72/EC continue to apply in full.

6.   This derogation is valid until 1 January 2021.

Article 4

1.   The derogations provided for in this Decision shall no longer apply to small and micro isolated systems once they are interconnected with the interconnected system.

2.   The Greek authorities:

| (a) | when authorising or tendering for new capacity within a given NII isolated system, shall systematically consider the alternative of interconnecting the isolated system of which the given NII is part. An authorisation for new capacity shall be refused if constructing an interconnector is more cost effective. Costs shall comprise all costs to supply electricity to end-customers within the isolated system, including NII PSO compensation; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

when authorising or tendering for new capacity within a given NII isolated system, shall systematically consider the alternative of interconnecting the isolated system of which the given NII is part. An authorisation for new capacity shall be refused if constructing an interconnector is more cost effective. Costs shall comprise all costs to supply electricity to end-customers within the isolated system, including NII PSO compensation;

| (b) | shall ensure that the cost-benefit study for important transmission works by ADMIE as provided for in Article 108 of Law 4001/2011 shall only consider efficient costs of investing and operating the projected interconnection. It shall not consider revenues lost by or depreciation in value of the conventional generation assets already installed on the NIIs; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

shall ensure that the cost-benefit study for important transmission works by ADMIE as provided for in Article 108 of Law 4001/2011 shall only consider efficient costs of investing and operating the projected interconnection. It shall not consider revenues lost by or depreciation in value of the conventional generation assets already installed on the NIIs;

| (c) | shall publish, in conjunction with ADMIE's ten-year investment plan as provided for in Article 108 of Law 4001/2011, the overall costs, including the NII PSO compensation, of supplying electricity customers in each of the NII isolated systems. Unless the construction of an interconnector is integrated in ADMIE's ten-year investment plan as provided for in Article 108 of Law 4001/2011 as approved by RAE, the Greek Authorities shall, upon their own initiative or upon simple request by a third party, organise a tender as provided for in Article 22(7)(b) of Directive 2009/72/EC for the construction of an interconnector connecting one or several NII isolated systems. An interconnector shall be constructed if its construction lowers the overall costs, including the NII PSO compensation, of supplying electricity to customers located on the NIIs; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

shall publish, in conjunction with ADMIE's ten-year investment plan as provided for in Article 108 of Law 4001/2011, the overall costs, including the NII PSO compensation, of supplying electricity customers in each of the NII isolated systems. Unless the construction of an interconnector is integrated in ADMIE's ten-year investment plan as provided for in Article 108 of Law 4001/2011 as approved by RAE, the Greek Authorities shall, upon their own initiative or upon simple request by a third party, organise a tender as provided for in Article 22(7)(b) of Directive 2009/72/EC for the construction of an interconnector connecting one or several NII isolated systems. An interconnector shall be constructed if its construction lowers the overall costs, including the NII PSO compensation, of supplying electricity to customers located on the NIIs;

| (d) | shall set a clear deadline for the completion of the construction of an interconnector. If the interconnector is not constructed or is not constructed within the set time frame, the Greek Authorities shall seek damages for the non-realised costs savings. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

shall set a clear deadline for the completion of the construction of an interconnector. If the interconnector is not constructed or is not constructed within the set time frame, the Greek Authorities shall seek damages for the non-realised costs savings.

Article 5

The Decision shall apply as from 5 December 2003.

Article 6

This Decision is addressed to the Hellenic Republic.

Done at Brussels, 14 August 2014.

For the Commission

Michel BARNIER

Vice-President

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(1)  
  OJ L 211, 14.8.2009, p. 55.

1

(2)  Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC (OJ L 176, 15.7.2003, p. 37).

2

(3)  Government Gazette 270/B/7.2.2014.

3

(4)  Article 36 Law 4067/2012 has shifted the burden of covering the extra costs from suppliers to consumers. According to this Article, the system applies pending the attribution of the PSO in accordance with Article 55 Law 4001/2011 and following the conclusion of the NII code pursuant to Article 130 of Law 4001/2011.

4

(5)  Government Gazette 2783/B/2.12.2011.

5

(6)  Currently, in view of the exceptional circumstances created by the Greek economic crises, they are reduced to 37 % for all units and 42 % for thermal units.

6

(7)  The figures refer to 2012 for nearly all isolated systems with few exceptions, where the year 2011 is used as these were the latest figures available.

7

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