II 

116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 3936 

To maintain the ability of the United States Armed Forces to deny a fait 

accompli by the People’s Republic of China against Taiwan, and for 

other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JUNE 10, 2020 

Mr. HAWLEY introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Armed Services 

A BILL 

To maintain the ability of the United States Armed Forces 

to deny a fait accompli by the People’s Republic of 

China against Taiwan, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Taiwan Defense Act’’. 

5 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 

6 In this Act: 

7 (1) DENY.—The term ‘‘deny’’ means to use 

8 combined joint operations to delay, degrade, and ul9 timately defeat an attempt by the People’s Republic 


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1 of China to execute a fait accompli against Taiwan, 

2 resulting in— 

3 (A) the termination of hostilities or, at a 

4 minimum, the termination of the attempted fait 

5 accompli; or 

6 (B) the neutralization of the ability of the 

7 People’s Republic of China to execute a fait 

8 accompli against Taiwan. 

9 (2) FAIT ACCOMPLI.—The term ‘‘fait accompli’’ 

10 means the strategy of the People’s Republic of 

11 China designed to allow the People’s Republic of 

12 China to use military force to seize control of Tai13 wan before the United States Armed Forces are able 

14 to respond effectively, while simultaneously deterring 

15 an effective combined joint response by the United 

16 States Armed Forces by convincing the United 

17 States that mounting such a response would be pro18 hibitively difficult or costly. 

19 SEC. 3. FINDINGS. 

20 Congress makes the following findings: 

21 (1) Taiwan is— 

22 (A) a beacon of democracy in Asia; and 

23 (B) a steadfast partner of the United 

24 States in the common pursuit of a free and 

25 open Indo-Pacific region in which— 


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1 (i) all societies enjoy sovereign auton2 omy; 

3 (ii) people live securely, prosperously, 

4 and with dignity; and 

5 (iii) the societies of the region rise 

6 and fall not by coercion but on the basis 

7 of peaceful competition. 

8 (2) If the Government of the People’s Republic 

9 of China were to use military force to compel the 

10 unification of Taiwan with the People’s Republic of 

11 China— 

12 (A) the world would lose one of the great 

13 champions of freedom and democracy; 

14 (B) the United States and allies and part15 ners of the United States would face severe dif16 ficulty in maintaining favorable balances of 

17 power relative to the People’s Republic of China 

18 in Northeast and Southeast Asia; and 

19 (C) as the balance of power in the Indo20 Pacific region shifted in favor of the People’s 

21 Republic of China, the Government of the Peo22 ple’s Republic of China would possess an in23 creasing ability— 

24 (i) to impose its will throughout the 

25 Indo-Pacific region; and 


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1 (ii) to prevent United States access to 

2 key trade routes and markets in the Indo3 Pacific region, thereby imposing severe 

4 economic hardship on middle-class and 

5 working-class people of the United States 

6 and undermining the American way of life. 

7 (3) In January 2019, the Defense Intelligence 

8 Agency assessed that the ‘‘longstanding’’ intent of 

9 the Government of the People’s Republic of China to 

10 compel the unification of Taiwan with the People’s 

11 Republic of China, and deter any attempt by Taiwan 

12 to declare independence, was the ‘‘primary driver for 

13 China’s military modernization’’. 

14 (4) The Department of Defense Indo-Pacific 

15 Strategy Report released in June 2019, states that 

16 the Government of the People’s Republic of China is 

17 ‘‘preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with 

18 the mainland by force, while simultaneously deter19 ring, delaying, or denying any third-party interven20 tion on Taiwan’s behalf’’. 

21 (5) Department of Defense statements and pub22 lications indicate that the Government of the Peo23 ple’s Republic of China is developing the plans and 

24 capabilities required to employ the fait accompli 


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1 strategy to compel the unification of Taiwan with 

2 the People’s Republic of China, including— 

3 (A) the assessment by the Defense Science 

4 Board in 2017 that the Government of the Peo5 ple’s Republic of China had adopted a theory of 

6 victory whereby once conflict with the United 

7 States appeared inevitable, as might be the case 

8 if the Government of the People’s Republic of 

9 China attempted to use military force to compel 

10 the unification of Taiwan with the People’s Re11 public of China, then the Government of the 

12 People’s Republic of China ‘‘will attempt to 

13 achieve a decisive outcome very quickly, pre14 senting the United States and its allies with a 

15 fait accompli’’ and ‘‘then seek to demonstrate 

16 that the United States and its allies will incur 

17 significant costs in seeking to reverse that out18 come’’; 

19 (B) the assessment in the Indo-Pacific 

20 Strategy Report that, if the Government of the 

21 People’s Republic of China or another compet22 itor in the Indo-Pacific region decides ‘‘to ad23 vance their interests through force, they are 

24 likely to enjoy a local military advantage at the 

25 onset of conflict. In a fait accompli scenario, 


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1 competitors would seek to employ their capabili2 ties quickly to achieve limited objectives and 

3 forestall a response from the United States and 

4 its allies and partners’’; 

5 (C) testimony by then Acting Secretary of 

6 Defense Patrick Shanahan in March 2019 

7 that— 

8 (i) the Government of the People’s 

9 Republic of China ‘‘has made investments 

10 specifically intended to offset U.S. advan11 tages’’; and 

12 (ii) if deployed in the initial stages of 

13 a conflict, ‘‘these capabilities could seek to 

14 achieve a ‘fait accompli’ that would make 

15 reversing Chinese gains more difficult, 

16 militarily and politically’’; and 

17 (D) testimony by then Commanding Gen18 eral of Marine Corps Combat Development 

19 Command Lieutenant General David Berger in 

20 April 2019 that peer adversaries of the United 

21 States seek ‘‘to create strategic dilemmas 

22 through fait accompli scenarios’’. 

23 (6) In March 2019, then Acting Secretary of 

24 Defense Patrick Shanahan testified that the imple25 mentation of the 2018 National Defense Strategy 


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1 would ensure the United States has ‘‘the capabili2 ties, posture, and employment of forces’’ required to 

3 prevent a fait accompli by the People’s Republic of 

4 China. 

5 (7) According to the Indo-Pacific Strategy Re6 port, ‘‘[t]he National Defense Strategy implicitly ac7 knowledges the most stressing potential scenarios 

8 will occur along our competitors’ peripheries’’. An 

9 attempted fait accompli by the People’s Republic of 

10 China against Taiwan should therefore be expected 

11 to constitute a ‘‘most stressing’’ potential scenario 

12 for the United States Armed Forces. 

13 (8) The National Defense Strategy Commission 

14 found that the United States Armed Forces must be 

15 postured ‘‘to deter and prevent a fait accompli by an 

16 agile opportunistic adversary’’ in order to compete 

17 effectively in the Indo-Pacific region and stated that 

18 ‘‘the United States must develop new operational 

19 concepts to achieve strategic advantage, including by 

20 addressing the ability of aggressive regimes to 

21 achieve a fait accompli against states on their pe22 riphery,’’ in recognition of— 

23 (A) the unique challenges to the United 

24 States Armed Forces posed by the employment 

25 of the fait accompli strategy by the Government 


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1 of the People’s Republic of China or another 

2 strategic competitor; and 

3 (B) the consequent urgent need for new 

4 thinking and steady focus by the Department of 

5 Defense on ensuring the ability of the United 

6 States Armed Forces to prevent an adversary 

7 from using the fait accompli strategy to ad8 vance its interests at the expense of those of the 

9 United States. 

10 (9) Department of Defense strategic guidance 

11 and official statements underscore the essential role 

12 that denial operations will play in preventing a fait 

13 accompli by the People’s Republic of China against 

14 Taiwan, including— 

15 (A) the incorporation in the National De16 fense Strategy of the Global Operating Model 

17 that includes a ‘‘blunt layer’’ of combat-credible 

18 forward forces postured and employed to 

19 ‘‘delay, degrade, or deny adversary aggression’’; 

20 (B) the conclusion by the National Defense 

21 Strategy Commission that the Department of 

22 Defense must position ‘‘substantial capability 

23 forward’’ in the form of the ‘‘blunt layer’’ in24 cluded in the Global Operating Model to ‘‘deter 

25 and prevent a fait accompli’’; 


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1 (C) the statement for the record by the 

2 Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific 

3 Command, Admiral Phil Davidson, in April 

4 2018 in which he concludes, ‘‘[d]ue to the dis5 tances involved in the Indo-Pacific, we cannot 

6 rely solely on surge forces from the continental 

7 United States to deter Chinese aggression or 

8 prevent a fait accompli. PACOM must maintain 

9 a robust blunt layer that effectively deters Chi10 nese aggression in the Indo-Pacific’’; 

11 (D) the Joint Operating Concept for De12 terrence Operations, which states that forward13 deployed forces, such as those included in the 

14 blunt layer of the Global Operating Model and 

15 referenced by the National Defense Strategy 

16 Commission and the Commander of the United 

17 States Indo-Pacific Command, contribute to 

18 ‘‘denying benefits’’ and thereby reduce ‘‘the 

19 likelihood of an adversary achieving strategic or 

20 tactical surprise, thus helping to prevent adver21 sary decisionmakers from concluding they 

22 might achieve a military fait accompli that 

23 could be extremely costly for the [United 

24 States] to reverse by force’’; 


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1 (E) the United States Army Multi-Domain 

2 Operations concept document, which states that 

3 the Armed Forces must demonstrate the capa4 bility ‘‘to immediately deny a fait accompli at5 tack’’ in order to deter a near-peer adversary; 

6 and 

7 (F) the Marine Corps Force Design 2030 

8 report, which states that forward-deployed 

9 forces ‘‘that can continue to operate inside an 

10 adversary’s long-range precision-fire weapons 

11 engagement zone (WEZ) are more operationally 

12 relevant than forces which must rapidly maneu13 ver to positions outside the WEZ in order to re14 main survivable,’’ and that such ‘‘stand-in’’ 

15 forces possess the capability to ‘‘attrite adver16 sary forces, enable joint force access require17 ments, complicate targeting and consume adver18 sary [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais19 sance] resources, and prevent fait accompli sce20 narios’’. 

21 SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

22 It is the sense of Congress that— 

23 (1) the ability of the United States to uphold 

24 a free and open Indo-Pacific region would be se25 verely compromised if the Government of the PeoVerDate Sep 11 2014 04:35 Jun 25, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\S3936.IS S3936

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1 ple’s Republic of China were able to compel the uni2 fication of Taiwan with the People’s Republic of 

3 China, particularly if the People’s Republic of China 

4 were able to do so by military force; 

5 (2) the loss by the United States of the ability 

6 to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific region 

7 would result in the significantly increased vulner8 ability of the middle-class and working-class people 

9 of the United States and the allies and partners of 

10 the United States to economic coercion by the Gov11 ernment of the People’s Republic of China; 

12 (3) the fate of Taiwan is therefore crucially 

13 linked to the fates of all countries in the Indo-Pa14 cific region, including to the fate of the United 

15 States; 

16 (4) under the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 

17 3301 et seq.), it is the policy of the United States 

18 to consider any effort to determine the future of 

19 Taiwan by other than peaceful means to be of grave 

20 concern to the United States; 

21 (5) since 1979, the United States Government 

22 has consistently upheld the commitments of the 

23 United States under the Taiwan Relations Act (22 

24 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.); 


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1 (6) the National Defense Authorization Act for 

2 Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92) reaffirms 

3 that the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et 

4 seq.) and the ‘‘Six Assurances’’ are the cornerstones 

5 of United States relations with Taiwan; 

6 (7) the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 

7 et seq.) further establishes the policy of the United 

8 States ‘‘to maintain the capacity of the United 

9 States to resist any resort to force or other forms 

10 of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the 

11 social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan’’; 

12 (8) the Government of the People’s Republic of 

13 China appears to be developing the plans and capa14 bilities required to use the fait accompli strategy to 

15 compel the unification of Taiwan with the People’s 

16 Republic of China, thereby jeopardizing the security 

17 and the social and economic system of the people of 

18 Taiwan; 

19 (9) denial operations will have an essential role 

20 in any strategy to prevent a fait accompli by the 

21 People’s Republic of China against Taiwan; and 

22 (10) implementation of the Taiwan Relations 

23 Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) therefore requires the 

24 United States to maintain the ability to defeat a fait 


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1 accompli by the People’s Republic of China against 

2 Taiwan, especially by denial operations. 

3 SEC. 5. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

4 It shall be the policy of the United States to maintain 

5 the ability of the United States Armed Forces to deny a 

6 fait accompli by the People’s Republic of China against 

7 Taiwan. 

8 SEC. 6. REPORT ON PROGRESS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 

9 DEFENSE WITH RESPECT TO DENYING A FAIT 

10 ACCOMPLI BY THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 

11 CHINA AGAINST TAIWAN. 

12 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than April 30 each year, 

13 beginning in 2021 and ending in 2026, the Secretary of 

14 Defense shall submit to the congressional defense commit15 tees a report on the progress of the Department of De16 fense with respect to improving the ability of the United 

17 States Armed Forces to conduct combined joint operations 

18 to deny the ability of the People’s Republic of China to 

19 execute a fait accompli against Taiwan. 

20 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Each report under 

21 subsection (a) shall include the following: 

22 (1) An explanation of the objectives for the 

23 United States Armed Forces that would be nec24 essary to deny the fait accompli by the People’s Re25 public of China against Taiwan. 


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1 (2) An identification of joint warfighting capa2 bilities and current efforts to organize, train, and 

3 equip the United States Armed Forces in support of 

4 the objectives referred to in paragraph (1), includ5 ing— 

6 (A) an assessment of whether the pro7 grams included in the most recent future-years 

8 defense program submitted to Congress under 

9 section 221 of title 10, United States Code, are 

10 sufficient to enable the United States Armed 

11 Forces to conduct joint combined operations to 

12 achieve such objectives; 

13 (B) a description of additional investments 

14 or force posture adjustments required to main15 tain or improve the ability of the United States 

16 Armed Forces to conduct joint combined oper17 ations to achieve such objectives; 

18 (C) a description of the manner in which 

19 the Secretary of Defense intends to develop and 

20 integrate Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine 

21 Corps, and Space Force operational concepts to 

22 maintain or improve the ability of the United 

23 States Armed Forces to conduct joint combined 

24 operations to achieve such objectives; and 


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1 (D) an assessment of the manner in which 

2 different options for pre-delegating authorities, 

3 including authorities relating to kinetic strikes 

4 against targets on the mainland of the People’s 

5 Republic of China, may improve the ability of 

6 the United States Armed Forces to conduct 

7 joint combined operations to achieve such objec8 tives. 

9 (3) An assessment of the role of the nuclear 

10 forces of the United States in deterring or defeating 

11 a fait accompli by the People’s Republic of China 

12 against Taiwan, including concepts for— 

13 (A) deterring limited use of nuclear weap14 ons by the People’s Republic of China in the 

15 Indo-Pacific region without undermining the 

16 ability of the United States Armed Forces to 

17 maintain nuclear deterrence at the strategic 

18 and theater levels against the Russian Federa19 tion and the Democratic People’s Republic of 

20 Korea; and 

21 (B) ensuring the United States Armed 

22 Forces are able to continue combined joint op23 erations to defend Taiwan in a nuclear environ24 ment following nuclear weapons use by the Peo25 ple’s Republic of China or the United States. 


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1 (c) FORM.—Each report required by subsection (a) 

2 shall be submitted in classified form but may include an 

3 unclassified executive summary. 

4 (d) CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEES DE5 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘congressional defense 

6 committees’’ has the meaning given the term in section 

7 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code. 

Æ 


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