THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Supreme Court

The State, Respondent, 

v.

Timothy Ray Jones Jr., Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2019-001008

Appeal from Lexington County

Eugene C. Griffith Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 28145

Heard November 9, 2021 – Filed March 29, 2023

AFFIRMED

Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, 

Appellate Defender Susan Barber Hackett, Appellate 

Defender David Alexander, Appellate Defender Lara 

Mary Caudy, and Appellate Defender Taylor Davis

Gilliam, all of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy Attorney 

General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant Deputy 

Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, and Assistant 

Attorney General Tommy Evans Jr., all of Columbia, and 

Solicitor Samuel R. Hubbard III, of Lexington, for 

Respondent.

JUSTICE JAMES: Appellant Timothy Ray Jones Jr. admitted to killing his five 

young children and was indicted for five counts of murder. He was convicted by 
jury and sentenced to death. In this direct appeal, Jones raises eight issues centering

on three points: juror qualification, requested voir dire and a related jury instruction, 

and evidentiary rulings made during the guilt and sentencing phases. We affirm the 

juror qualification, voir dire, and jury instruction rulings. We hold the trial court 

erred in certain evidentiary rulings; however, we hold the errors were harmless and

affirm Jones's conviction and death sentence. 

Background

This background summarizes the details surrounding the murders and Jones's 

actions in the succeeding days.

Jones and his wife were divorced and had five children. They had an informal 

joint custody agreement, with Jones being the children's primary caretaker. 

Throughout the day of August 28, 2014, Jones smoked spice—a form of synthetic 

marijuana—at work to cope with the stress of an impending project. Jones left work 

in the late afternoon and went to his home in Lexington County. He smoked more 

spice before leaving home to pick up his children. Abigail (age 1) and Gabriel 

(age 2) were staying at a neighbor's house, and Nahtahn (age 6), Elias (age 7), and 

Merah (age 8) were participating in an after-school program. Jones retrieved the 

children and purchased takeout from a local restaurant.

After Jones and the children returned home with their supper, Jones 

discovered an electrical outlet in the house was not working. He accused Nahtahn 

of tampering with the outlet because Nahtahn had an unusual interest in electricity. 

To get Nahtahn to admit he played with the outlet, Jones forced Nahtahn to do one 

hundred pushups, one hundred situps, and two hundred squats, all in sets of ten. 

Nahtahn never admitted to playing with the outlet, but Jones later heard 

Nahtahn telling his mother over the phone, "It was an accident, Mommy." Enraged, 

Jones sent Nahtahn to bed. Later that night, Jones went to check on Nahtahn. He

shook Nahtahn by the shoulders and again demanded to know what happened to the 

outlet. Nahtahn collapsed to the floor. Jones told Elias and Merah he thought 

Nahtahn was dead, and Merah confirmed Nahtahn was not breathing. 

Jones then searched the internet for a violent male-on-male rape scene from 

the movie American History X and began to fear the things he would endure in prison 

as a "baby killer." At approximately 2:00 a.m., Jones took Merah with him to 

purchase ten packs of cigarettes at a nearby convenience store. Jones claimed that 

on the way home, he heard voices in his head telling him to kill his other four 

children because they would be better off in Heaven than without parents.
When Jones and Merah returned home, Merah went to bed. Jones smoked 

two bowls of spice and walked to the living room where Elias and Merah were

sleeping. Jones wrapped his hands around Elias' neck and strangled him to death 

while Elias begged, "Dad, take me with you." Jones then turned toward Merah, who 

pleaded, "Daddy, I love you," and strangled her to death. Jones proceeded to strangle

Abigail and Gabriel to death using a belt because his hands were too big to wrap 

around their tiny necks.

Jones next tried to kill himself by smoking seven or eight more bowls of spice. 

He woke up the following day and became paranoid. Thinking it was a matter of 

time before he was arrested, Jones decided he would go to Las Vegas. He wrapped 

each of the five bodies in bedsheets and stacked them in the back seat of his Cadillac 

Escalade. For the next eight days, Jones kept the bodies in his vehicle and drove 

back and forth through South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi. At 

various points along the way, Jones purchased spice, trash bags, chemicals, goggles, 

a dust mask, and a jab saw.1

 During the trip, he searched online for applicable 

extradition laws and local dumpsites, landfills, and campgrounds.

On September 6—eight days after the murders—Jones placed his children's

bodies in trash bags and dumped them in a rural area near Pine Apple, Alabama. 

Later that day, Jones was stopped at a safety checkpoint in Smith County, 

Mississippi. Officer Charles Johnson testified that as Jones approached the 

checkpoint, he smelled a strong odor of burnt marijuana and garbage coming from 

the vehicle. Officer Johnson noticed Jones's eyes were red and glassy and his speech 

was slurred. Officer Johnson asked Jones to pull to the side of the road. Jones 

consented to a search of his vehicle, which revealed bleach stains on the floorboard;

synthetic marijuana; drug paraphernalia; bleach; muriatic acid; charcoal fluid; and a 

scribbled note reading in part, "Head to campground," "Melt bodies," "Sand to dust 

or small pieces," and "Day 1: Burn up bodies. Day 2: Sand down bones. Day 3: 

Mexican Border☺, dissolve, and discard." Jones was arrested for driving under the 

influence, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug 

paraphernalia. A dispatcher advised the officers of a hit on Jones's vehicle for five 

missing children. Jones confessed to the murders soon after his arrest, and on 

September 9—eleven days after the murders—Jones led law enforcement to his 

children's bodies. The bodies were still in trash bags, and the children were 

unrecognizable due to severe decomposition and animal activity. 

 

1 A jab saw is a long, narrow saw typically used to cut building material.
Jones was extradited from Mississippi to South Carolina, where he was

indicted for five counts of murder. The State sought the death penalty, claiming the 

following aggravating circumstances applied: (1) the murder of two or more persons 

by one act or pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct and (2) the murder of a 

child eleven years of age or under. S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(9)-(10) (2015). 

Jones entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) pursuant to South 

Carolina Code subsection 17-24-10(A) (2014).2

 The jury rejected the insanity 

defense, returned five guilty verdicts, and recommended a death sentence. The trial 

court adopted the jury's recommendation and sentenced Jones to death. Jones raises

the following issues in this direct appeal: 

(1) Did the trial court err in qualifying Juror #156?

(2) Did the trial court err in disqualifying Juror #338?

(3) Did the trial court err in denying Jones's request for voir dire and a jury 

instruction detailing the consequences of an NGRI verdict? 

(4) Did the trial court err in denying Jones's motion to suppress evidence 

obtained as a result of the safety checkpoint?

(5) Did the trial court err in excluding Dr. Adriana Flores' expert testimony

during the sentencing phase? 

(6) Did the trial court err in limiting testimony pertaining to Jones's future 

dangerousness, remorse, and social history during the sentencing phase? 

(7) Did the trial court err in excluding Cynthia Turner's pre-recorded testimony

during the sentencing phase? 

 

2

 Subsection 17-24-10(A) sets forth the affirmative defense of insanity: 

It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution for a crime that, at the time 

of the commission of the act constituting the offense, the defendant, as 

a result of mental disease or defect, lacked the capacity to distinguish 

moral or legal right from moral or legal wrong or to recognize the 

particular act charged as morally or legally wrong. 

A defendant has the burden of proving insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. 

S.C. Code Ann. § 17-24-10(B). 
(8) Did the trial court err in admitting autopsy photographs of the child victims

during the sentencing phase? 

Discussion

A. Guilt Phase

1. Qualification of Juror #156

The determination of whether a prospective juror is qualified to serve on a 

capital trial jury is "within the sole discretion of the trial judge and is not reversible 

on appeal unless wholly unsupported by the evidence." State v. Evins, 373 S.C. 404, 

418, 645 S.E.2d 904, 911 (2007). When reviewing an alleged error in the 

qualification of a juror, we conduct a three-step analysis, giving particular deference 

to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror. State v. Green, 301 S.C. 347, 352, 

392 S.E.2d 157, 159-60 (1990); Evins, 373 S.C. at 418, 645 S.E.2d at 911. First, we

must find the appellant exhausted all of his peremptory challenges. Second, we must 

determine the disputed juror was erroneously qualified. Third, we must conclude 

the erroneous qualification deprived the appellant of a fair trial. 

We have repeatedly held that to determine whether a juror was erroneously 

qualified, the challenged juror's responses must be examined "in light of the entire

voir dire." Evins, 373 S.C. at 418, 645 S.E.2d at 911; Green, 301 S.C. at 354, 392 

S.E.2d at 161; State v. Woods, 382 S.C. 153, 159, 676 S.E.2d 128, 131 (2009). A 

juror is erroneously qualified when "his or her views on capital punishment would 

prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance 

with his instructions and his oath." Woods, 382 S.C. at 159, 676 S.E.2d at 131; see

Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(E). "The

ultimate consideration is that the juror be unbiased, impartial, and able to carry out

the law as explained to him." State v. Sapp, 366 S.C. 283, 291, 621 S.E.2d 883, 887

(2005). 

Jones exhausted all ten of his peremptory challenges before Juror #156 was 

seated, thus satisfying step one of our analysis. Step two—whether the trial court 

erroneously qualified Juror #156—is the crux of Jones's challenge. Jones argues 

Juror #156 was erroneously qualified because (1) he was unwilling to consider social 

history evidence that did not involve the facts or circumstances surrounding the 

murders and (2) he could not consider voting for a life sentence on the basis of 

mercy. We disagree. 

During voir dire, the trial judge questioned whether Juror #156 could consider 

the facts of Jones's case in an unbiased manner. Juror #156 told the trial judge, "I 
believe that all the evidence and the facts should be presented and taken into 

consideration when you are talking about somebody's life[,] especially what this case 

deals with." 

Moments later, the trial judge asked Juror #156 to identify himself as one of 

three types of capital jurors: Type 1 jurors, who believe the death penalty is 

appropriate when a defendant is convicted beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated 

murder; Type 2 jurors, who believe life without parole is appropriate when a 

defendant is convicted beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated murder; and Type 

3 jurors, who believe the death penalty or life without parole may be appropriate 

when a defendant is convicted beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated murder. 

Juror #156 replied, "I find myself torn between, I see myself as type three but 

depending on the facts I can quickly bring myself to type one, depending on the facts 

and evidence." Throughout his testimony, Juror #156 continually emphasized he 

could meaningfully consider the testimony and evidence presented in light of the 

trial court's instructions and the four verdict forms, all while being fair and impartial 

to both sides.

When the trial judge questioned Juror #156 about the sentencing phase of trial, 

Juror #156 said he understood the death penalty is not automatic and reiterated, "I 

believe you have to take [into] consideration all evidence when you are talking about 

somebody's life." Juror #156 continued, "If the evidence . . . calls for the death 

penalty then I feel like as human beings we have to determine whether . . . to 

take . . . that person's choice to live or not." Finally, Juror #156 told the trial judge

he could recommend either the death penalty or life without parole depending on the 

facts presented. 

During the State's examination, the solicitor asked Juror #156,

So if you were to sit on a jury . . . and [reach] with your colleagues, 

your co-jurors, the decision he is guilty of murder, . . . . [w]ould you 

already have your mind made up coming in that second phase or would 

you want to hear additional stuff of the good and the bad, the 

aggravating and the mitigating, before you made that big decision?

Again, Juror #156 reiterated: 

Every ounce of information, evidence, facts, mitigation, everything, 

needs to be taken into consideration before the final decision . . . . If the 

evidence at the end of all of this, mitigation, aggravation, all of that, if 
it constitutes for the death penalty then what is right is right, what is 

wrong is wrong.

At the conclusion of the State's examination, Juror #156 told the solicitor he had not 

made up his mind; instead, he wanted to hear all of the facts before making a final 

decision. 

During defense counsel's examination, Juror #156 explained he wanted to hear 

everything—the defendant's good, bad, past, and future—before coming to a 

sentencing decision. Juror #156 stated he understood and respected that jurors have 

the right to decline imposing the death penalty solely based on mercy, but he also 

expressed his belief that based on the facts presented, jurors should be able to explain 

why they made a particular sentencing decision. Defense counsel then asked, 

"Somebody might say, I can't explain it to you, this is what I feel is right. . . . Can 

you respect a juror's right to say, I don't have a reason, this is my moral judgment, 

this is what is right for me, I have got to do it?" Juror #156 replied, "It might sound 

harsh when I say this. But if they say that after being presented the facts, I don't 

believe they should be here." Soon after, Juror #156 stated,

I think after you are presented the evidence and the facts, you have a 

reason of the way you feel and . . . the decision you make. . . . I don't 

see how you can be here and be fair to both parties if some[one] says, 

well, I feel merciful. What is right is right and what is wrong is wrong. 

During the State's final examination, the solicitor questioned whether Juror 

#156 could consider mitigating factors before recommending a sentence. Juror #156 

responded,

I am thinking, it needs to be within a reason timetable . . . . But when 

we are here for . . . the murders of these kids, [it] needs to be involved 

around this. . . . The mitigating factors that have something to do with 

the case. But also, I mean, when you are talking about somebody's 

life, . . . . there is nothing wrong to me with getting all the facts, all the 

evidence.

The solicitor then asked whether Juror #156 could consider mitigation evidence 

presented by the defense that went "way back." Juror #156, again emphasizing the 

facts, stated,

Yes, I don't see why it could do any wrong. But, like I said, for me 

personally, you know, what happened twenty years ago when you are 

in elementary school doesn't have anything to do with your decision 
making now. . . . But like I said, I will be willing to, I mean when you 

are talking about somebody's life, like I said, if the Defense wants to 

give up their facts, the Prosecutors want[] to give their facts, I am 

willing to listen to both before making an ultimate decision.

Finally, the solicitor asked whether the ultimate sentence Juror #156 recommended 

"would depend on facts or just feelings." Juror #156 responded, "Facts." 

After Juror #156 left the courtroom, Jones moved to excuse him as being 

"substantially impaired in his ability to follow the law." Essentially, Jones argued 

Juror #156 was (1) mitigation-impaired in that he could only consider mitigation

evidence within a recent timetable and (2) unable to respect the rights of other jurors 

to decline imposing the death penalty based on mercy alone. The State responded 

that Juror #156 was a "facts guy" who was willing to listen to all mitigation evidence 

even though he had a difficult time understanding how distant evidence could relate

to a present crime. Based on the totality of Juror #156's testimony, including him 

stating "repeatedly he wanted to hear all the facts . . . before mak[ing] a huge 

decision of taking someone's life," the trial court qualified Juror #156. Jones 

objected under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, again claiming Juror #156 

was mitigation-impaired and unable to consider mercy. We agree with the trial 

court's qualification.

Juror #156 repeatedly stressed throughout voir dire the importance of facts. 

He never indicated he would automatically impose the death penalty and instead 

stated his sentencing recommendation would be wholly determined by the evidence 

set forth at trial. When asked questions regarding preconceived notions about the 

death penalty, Juror #156 reiterated, "I go back to the evidence." Although Juror 

#156 initially expressed doubt about how mitigation evidence from a defendant's 

childhood could affect the defendant's present decision-making, he completed his 

response with, "but like I said, . . . . I am willing to listen to both [sides] before 

making an ultimate decision." 

Juror #156 never rejected the possibility of a "mercy sentence." Rather, Juror 

#156 stated his belief that even if a mercy sentence was imposed, a juror should be 

able to articulate why he or she chose mercy. Jones improperly isolates Juror #156's 

statement, "I don't see how you can be here and be fair to both parties if some[one] 

says, well, I feel merciful." That statement must be considered in light of Juror 

#156's entire voir dire, including his preceding statement, "I think after you are 

presented the evidence and the facts, you have a reason of the way you feel

and . . . the decision you make." Together, these responses reflect Juror #156's 

desire for jurors to specify the reason for their decisions, but they do not insinuate 
Juror #156 was unable to impose a life sentence based on mercy alone. For these 

reasons, we affirm the trial court's qualification of Juror #156. 

2. Disqualification of Juror #338 

"On review, the trial court's disqualification of a prospective juror will not be 

disturbed where there is a reasonable basis from which the trial court could have 

concluded that the juror would not have been able to faithfully discharge his 

responsibilities as a juror under the law." Green, 301 S.C. at 355, 392 S.E.2d at 161; 

see State v. Wise, 359 S.C. 14, 23-24, 569 S.E.2d 475, 479 (2004). We must be 

particularly deferential to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror, keeping in 

mind that in certain situations, the trial judge may disqualify a juror based on a 

"definite impression" that he or she would be unable to return a verdict according to 

law. Evins, 373 S.C. at 418, 645 S.E.2d at 911; see S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(E).

When defense counsel examined Juror #338, he questioned whether Juror 

#338 could fairly consider an NGRI verdict. Particularly, defense counsel inquired,

"If in your mind you thought [expert witnesses] present[ed] enough information to 

support that verdict, is that a verdict you could really consider or would you still 

have some hesitation because it would kind of be letting someone off still?" Juror 

#338 responded, "It would depend on the information provided and the plan of action 

after that. So obviously you, claimed insanity, you wouldn't just become part of 

society again. What would then be that plan[?] So you have been declared insane 

and then what, now what, essentially." Around this time, the State objected and 

Juror #338 was briefly excused from the courtroom. 

After discussing this line of questioning, the trial judge ruled defense counsel 

could ask Juror #338, "Not knowing what would happen, would that cause you to 

perhaps not consider [an NGRI] verdict?" Juror #338 answered, "I would need to 

know what happened to consider that verdict." Soon after, the State objected again. 

The trial judge clarified, "The end result plan is not allowed to be given in a trial. 

Okay. It is not. So he is asking you, if that were the case then would that affect your 

ability to consider [an NGRI verdict]." The following exchange took place: 

Juror #338: Can I ask a question?

The Court: You may.

Juror #338: So in the case of the death penalty, you know death is the 

result.

The Court: That is the result. 
Juror #338: And if you know the life sentence without parole, you 

know that is a result. 

The Court: Correct. 

Juror #338: But in the case of not guilty by insanity, you don't know 

the result. 

The Court: Don't know the result.

Juror #338: I don't understand. 

The Court: That is just the Court rules. So the result of that you would 

always be in the dark with regard to the result of a not guilty by reason 

of insanity verdict. Knowing you would always be in the dark about 

that, not knowing what would happen, would that cause you to maybe 

not consider that verdict as a true verdict. Would you vote for it not 

knowing what would happen?

Juror #338: I have no words honestly because without knowing what 

the result is how can you choose that option.

The Court: So it sounds like you do have some reservations about 

choosing that option, not knowing the result.

Juror #338: It is just not knowing the result. You know the result of 

the other options but you don't know the result of that option.

The Court: Okay. She has answered that sufficiently. Move on. 

(emphasis added).

At the conclusion of voir dire, the State argued Juror #338 was unqualified 

because she would have unanswered questions about the consequences of an NGRI 

verdict. In response, defense counsel contended that although Juror #338 expressed 

concern and confusion about not knowing the consequences of an NGRI verdict, she 

did not express a complete inability to consider that verdict. Ultimately, the trial 

judge excused Juror #338, noting: "Since I can't answer your question and that is a 

big concern of you being able to go forward and make a decision I am going to 

excuse you from jury service . . . ." Defense counsel objected, asserting that "just 

having concerns doesn't disqualify somebody." We agree with the trial court's 

ruling.
Jones argues Juror #338 should have been qualified because her responses 

indicated she could meaningfully consider an NGRI verdict. In Jones's view, Juror 

#338 was simply "concern[ed] about not knowing the outcome of such a verdict" 

and "confus[ed] as to why jurors were told the outcome of the two potential verdicts 

during the penalty phase . . . but not the outcome of a[n] NGRI verdict." Jones 

alleges Juror #338 "never indicated she would be unwilling to return a verdict of not 

guilty by reason of insanity . . . ." 

Much like the juror's responses in Sapp, 366 S.C. at 291-92, 621 S.E.2d at

887, Juror #338's responses reflected her complete inability to render a verdict 

according to law. When asked if she could consider an NGRI verdict without 

knowing its consequences, Juror #338 unequivocally stated, "I would need to know 

what happened to consider that verdict." Thereafter, she expressed confusion as to 

why the jury was informed of the consequences of a guilty verdict (i.e., life without 

parole or death) but not informed of the consequences of an NGRI verdict. The trial 

judge explained he was bound by court rules, which do not permit such an 

instruction, and then asked Juror #338 whether she could consider an NGRI verdict 

knowing she would be in the dark as to its consequences. Juror #338 again stated

she could not. 

As we discuss immediately below, South Carolina law does not permit a juror 

to know the consequences of an NGRI verdict. To discharge her responsibilities as 

a juror, Juror #338 must have been able to fully consider each of the verdicts before 

her and decide upon a verdict in accordance with the law. Because Juror #338

unambiguously stated she could not consider an NGRI verdict unless she was 

informed of its consequences and because the trial court is forbidden from informing 

the jury of those consequences, we affirm the disqualification of Juror #338. 

3. Denial of Jones's Request for Voir Dire and a Jury Instruction 

Detailing the Consequences of an NGRI Verdict 

The trial court denied Jones's request for voir dire and a jury instruction 

detailing the consequences of an NGRI verdict. We affirm the trial court's ruling on 

this issue. 

In State v. Poindexter, the defendant was charged with murder. 314 S.C. 490, 

491, 431 S.E.2d 254, 254 (1993). Potential verdicts in the case were guilty, not 

guilty, NGRI, and guilty but mentally ill. The jury found the defendant guilty but 

mentally ill. The defendant appealed, arguing the trial court erred in refusing to 

inform the jury of the consequences of each verdict either during voir dire, opening 
statements, closing arguments, or special instructions. We affirmed the trial court's 

ruling, noting: 

[V]oir dire is not to be used as a means of pre-educating or 

indoctrinating a jury or as a means of impaneling a jury with particular 

predispositions. In our view, the discovery and elimination of biased 

or prejudiced jurors during voir dire does not require that they first be 

informed of the consequences of each potential verdict.

Id. at 492 n.2, 431 S.E.2d at 255 n.2 (citation omitted). 

With respect to jury instructions after a jury is seated and sworn, the trial judge 

shall instruct the jury on the "current and correct law." State v. Taylor, 356 S.C. 227, 

231, 589 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2003). "To warrant reversal, a trial judge's charge must be 

both erroneous and prejudicial." Id. 

On several occasions, we have considered whether trial courts should instruct 

jurors on the consequences of an NGRI verdict. We have held that in noncapital 

trials, absent agreement by the parties, a consequences instruction is improper unless

it would be curative under the facts of a particular trial or it is required to clarify a 

misstatement of law and would not prejudice either party. See State v. Huiett, 271 

S.C. 205, 208, 246 S.E.2d 862, 864 (1978). The justification for this rule is that in 

a noncapital trial, the jury has no sentencing responsibility and sentencing is 

irrelevant to the determination of guilt. Poindexter, 314 S.C. at 492, 431 S.E.2d at 

255; see State v. Pulley, 216 S.C. 552, 555, 59 S.E.2d 155, 157 (1950); State v.

Valenti, 265 S.C. 380, 388, 218 S.E.2d 726, 729 (1975); State v. McGee, 268 S.C. 

618, 620-21, 235 S.E.2d 715, 716 (1977). In a capital trial, which is uniquely 

bifurcated, the same rule applies but for different reasons: (1) NGRI is a verdict 

during the guilt phase, not the sentencing phase, and (2) if an NGRI verdict is 

rendered, the jury has no sentencing responsibilities. See State v. Bell, 293 S.C. 391, 

399, 360 S.E.2d 706, 710 (1987). 

We granted Jones's motion to argue against the foregoing precedent. 

Although we acknowledge there is a trend toward requiring a consequences 

instruction,3 we decline to join that trend. Therefore, we hold the trial court did not 

 

3 Some states require the instruction notwithstanding objection or request. See

Alaska Stat. Ann. § 12.47.040(c) (West 2022); People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172, 184 

(Colo. App. 1999); Roberts v. State, 335 So. 2d 285, 288-89 (Fla. 1976); Ga. Code 

Ann. § 17-7-131(b)(3)(A) (West 2022); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3428(f) (West 2022);

Kuk v. State, 392 P.2d 630, 634-35 (Nev. 1964); State v. Blair, 732 A.2d 448, 451 
err in denying Jones's request for voir dire and a jury instruction detailing the 

consequences of an NGRI verdict. 

4. Denial of Jones's Motion to Suppress

Quite by chance, on the same day Jones disposed of the children's bodies, he

was apprehended at a safety checkpoint in Smith County, Mississippi. Deputy 

Charles Johnson, one of the two officers conducting the checkpoint, testified that 

"because things were quiet" on the night of September 6, 2014, he and Deputy 

Robert Thompson asked Smith County Under-Sheriff Marty Patterson for 

permission to conduct a safety checkpoint. Sheriff Charlie Crumpton testified safety 

checkpoints were intended to check for driver's licenses, seatbelt violations, proper 

child restraints, and proof of insurance. Sheriff Crumpton estimated approximately

ten percent of drivers are ticketed or arrested at safety checkpoints. He also testified 

the department's verbal policy required that checkpoints be approved by a supervisor

and conducted at a safe location by two or more officers who wear reflective vests

and stop all vehicles. Deputy Johnson testified he and Deputy Thompson followed 

the department's policy. Deputy Johnson further testified he was normally equipped 

with a portable device to conduct breathalyzer tests on suspected drunk drivers. 

Jones moved to suppress all evidence stemming from the Smith County 

checkpoint, arguing the checkpoint violated the Fourth Amendment because its 

 

(N.H. 1999); State v. Krol, 344 A.2d 289, 304-05 (N.J. 1975); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 

§ 300.10(3) (McKinney 2023); Commonwealth v. Mulgrew, 380 A.2d 349, 351 (Pa. 

1977); Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-7-303(e) (West 2023); State v. Nuckolls, 273 S.E.2d 

87, 90 (W. Va. 1980). One state requires the instruction "unless the defendant 

affirmatively objects[.]" Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-89a (West 2023). Other states 

require the instruction only upon request. Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 704-402(2) (West 

2022) (required when requested by the defendant); Georgopulos v. State, 735 N.E.2d 

1138, 1143 (Ind. 2000) (same); Commonwealth v. Chappell, 40 N.E.3d 1031, 1042-

43 (Mass. 2015) (same); Erdman v. State, 553 A.2d 244, 249-50 (Md. 1989) (same); 

Mo. Ann. Stat. § 552.030(6) (West 2022) (same); State v. Hammonds, 224 S.E.2d 

595, 604 (N.C. 1976) (same); State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 297-98 (Utah 1988) 

(same), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997); 

People v. Dennis, 215 Cal. Rptr. 750, 753 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (requiring an 

instruction when requested by the jury or the defendant); State v. Leeming, 612 So. 

2d 308, 315 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (same); Ky. RCr 9.55 (requiring an instruction when 

requested by either party). 
primary purpose was general crime prevention. The trial court denied Jones's 

motion, and he contends the denial was improper. We disagree. 

"[A]ppellate review of a motion to suppress based on the Fourth Amendment 

involves a two-step analysis. This dual inquiry means we review the trial court's 

factual findings for any evidentiary support, but the ultimate legal conclusion . . . is 

a question of law subject to de novo review." State v. Frasier, 437 S.C. 625, 633-

34, 879 S.E.2d 762, 766 (2022).

The United States Supreme Court has considered the constitutionality of 

checkpoints on several occasions. The Supreme Court has unequivocally held

checkpoints constitute Fourth Amendment seizures, even though their purpose is 

limited and the time of detention is brief. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 

543, 556 (1976).

In Delaware v. Prouse, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of

random spot checks designed to verify driver's licenses and vehicle registration. 440 

U.S. 648, 650 (1979). The issue in Prouse arose when an officer on routine patrol 

decided to randomly stop a vehicle despite observing no traffic or equipment 

violations. The officer was not acting under law enforcement guidelines or 

procedures pertaining to spot checks. The Supreme Court noted there was no 

empirical data suggesting spot checks produced anything more than a marginal 

contribution to highway safety. Balancing "the State's interest in discretionary spot 

checks" and the "resulting intrusion on the privacy and security of the persons 

detained[,]" the Supreme Court held the "incremental contribution to highway 

safety" ensured by a random spot check is insufficient to justify a warrantless seizure

under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 655, 659. The Supreme Court clarified, 

however, that its holding did not prohibit states "from developing methods for spot 

checks that involve less intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise 

of discretion." Id. at 663. Critically, the Supreme Court suggested "[q]uestioning 

of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative." Id.

In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, the Supreme Court considered

the constitutionality of highway sobriety checkpoints. 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990). 

The law enforcement policy in Sitz required all vehicles to be stopped at sobriety 

checkpoints; if an officer suspected intoxication, he was required to direct the driver 

to pull over and produce a driver's license and vehicle registration. Data showed that 

during the challenged checkpoint, two out of 126 drivers (1.6%) were arrested for 

drunken driving. The Supreme Court distinguished Prouse, noting that "[u]nlike 

Prouse, this case involves neither a complete absence of empirical data nor a

challenge to random highway stops." Id. at 454. Balancing "the State's interest in 
preventing drunken driving, the extent to which this system can reasonably be said 

to advance that interest, and the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who 

are briefly stopped," the Sitz Court held mandatory sobriety checkpoints survive

Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Id. at 455. 

In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the Supreme Court addressed "the 

constitutionality of a highway checkpoint program whose primary purpose [wa]s the 

discovery and interdiction of illegal narcotics." 531 U.S. 32, 34 (2000). The 

Supreme Court observed the stops in Sitz and Prouse were concerned with highway 

safety, which is a significant Fourth Amendment interest. However, because the 

primary purpose of the Edmond program was not to ensure highway safety but 

instead "to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing," the Supreme Court 

held the program violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 41-42. Importantly, the 

Supreme Court repeated the suggestion it made in Prouse that "a similar type of 

roadblock with the purpose of verifying drivers' licenses and vehicle registrations 

would be permissible." Id. at 37-38. 

Here, the checkpoint was precisely the type of checkpoint suggested by the 

Supreme Court in Prouse and Edmond. The State presented evidence sufficient to 

prove the primary purpose of the Smith County checkpoint was highway safety, not 

general crime prevention. Four officers testified the checkpoint was intended to 

check for driver's licenses, vehicle registrations, and proof of insurance. At no point 

did any witness suggest a contrary purpose. As in Sitz, the Smith County Sheriff's 

Department had a policy requiring that all vehicles passing through checkpoints be 

stopped in a safe, structured manner. Officers did not have unbridled discretion as 

was the case in Prouse; instead, stops were brief and minimally intrusive. For these 

reasons, we hold the trial court did not err in denying Jones's motion to suppress. 

B. Sentencing Phase

1. Exclusion of Dr. Adriana Flores' Expert Testimony

The South Carolina Code provides jurors must consider several mitigating

circumstances in a capital trial, including whether "[t]he murder was committed 

while the defendant was under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance"; 

whether "[t]he capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct 

or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired"; 

and "[t]he age or mentality of the defendant at the time of the crime." S.C. Code 

Ann. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(2), (6)-(7). Additionally, the Eighth Amendment, which 

applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, "requires that the jury [in 

a capital case] be able to consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence 
offered by [the defendant]." Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 377-78 (1990); see

Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978). This is particularly due to the "qualitative 

difference" between ordinary criminal trials and capital trials—where there is a 

"corresponding difference in the need for reliability . . . ." Woodson v. North 

Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).

"Generally, the admission of expert testimony is a matter within the sound 

discretion of the trial court." State v. Whaley, 305 S.C. 138, 143, 406 S.E.2d 369, 

372 (1991). We will not reverse the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony unless 

the exclusion resulted from a prejudicial abuse of discretion. State v. Cope, 405 S.C. 

317, 343-44, 748 S.E.2d 194, 208 (2013). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the 

conclusions of the trial court either lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an 

error of law." State v. Kromah, 401 S.C. 340, 349, 737 S.E.2d 490, 495 (2013)

(quoting State v. Douglas, 369 S.C. 424, 429-30, 632 S.E.2d 845, 848 (2006)). 

During the guilt phase of trial, Jones presented testimony from several experts 

in an attempt to establish his NGRI defense. Their testimony is summarized below. 

In reply, the State called neuropsychologist4 Dr. Kimberly Kruse. Because the 

testimony from Jones's insanity witnesses and Dr. Kruse was also relevant to the 

foregoing statutory mitigation circumstances, it was incorporated into the sentencing 

phase. 

Dr. Kruse testified she was asked by Dr. Richard Frierson, the court-appointed 

evaluator, to evaluate Jones. Dr. Kruse interviewed Jones on February 19, 2019, 

approximately two months before trial. Dr. Kruse testified about several tests she 

administered during the evaluation and explained how she scored the raw data. The

tests included the M-FAST, SIMS, SIRS, MMPI, and PAI.5

 Dr. Kruse testified her 

scoring of the raw data led her to conclude Jones was malingering symptoms of 

mental illness. She testified malingering is voluntary, conscious, and self-directed 

behavior aimed at exaggerating symptoms or creating symptoms that do not exist. 

 

4 Neuropsychology focuses on understanding the relationship between one's brain 

and behavior.

5 These acronyms stand for the Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test, the 

Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomology, the Structured Interview of 

Reported Symptoms, the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, and the 

Personality Assessment Inventory, respectively.
As noted above, Dr. Kruse's testimony was incorporated into the sentencing 

phase. During that phase, Jones provided the State with an affidavit from forensic 

psychologist Dr. Adriana Flores. Dr. Flores was new to the case and was prepared

to testify "regarding errors and incorrect conclusions" on the part of Dr. Kruse, 

specifically with regard to Dr. Kruse's scoring of the raw data that led her to conclude

Jones was malingering. In her affidavit, Dr. Flores stated she was obligated under 

the American Psychological Association's ethical principles to confront Dr. Kruse 

about her concerns.

The solicitor lodged three basic objections to Dr. Flores' testimony. First, he 

argued Dr. Flores' affidavit and purported testimony were "an attack on Dr. Kruse." 

The solicitor argued that allowing Dr. Flores to testify would "permanently 

stain . . . [Dr. Kruse's] personal and professional integrity" and intimidate Dr. Kruse 

to the point that she would be afraid to testify in response to Dr. Flores' allegations. 

Second, the solicitor argued Dr. Flores would improperly pit her testimony against 

that of Dr. Kruse. Third, the solicitor argued the State would suffer unfair prejudice 

if Dr. Flores were allowed to testify without any notice to the State.

The trial judge noted trial had been underway for six weeks, Dr. Flores was 

not on the witness list, and numerous expert witnesses had already testified for both 

parties. Defense counsel informed the trial judge that he discovered Dr. Flores' 

concerns the preceding weekend when defense witness Dr. Julie Dorney asked Dr. 

Flores to review Dr. Kruse's testing methodology and conclusions. Defense counsel 

stated that as soon as he became aware of Dr. Flores' interest in testifying, he 

informed the State. The trial judge considered these arguments and ruled, "I've got 

to draw the line somewhere . . . . We're too far in the game to call new players. I 

presume you'll have to proffer her, but I don't think she should be allowed to testify."

The record is not clear on this point, but apparently, the defense had Dr. Kruse's 

report and raw data in advance of trial yet did not secure its own expert to review 

them. 

During her proffer, Dr. Flores testified she was concerned Dr. Kruse had 

"omitted a validity section" from one of the tests she conducted, and in turn, Dr. 

Flores "had the feeling that something was being hidden from [Dr. Kruse's] report." 

The trial judge noted what he termed "improper pitting of witnesses" and warned 

defense counsel, "Just be careful not to pit the witnesses. . . . If [Dr. Flores] took the 

raw data and scored it herself, that's rescoring the data. But if she's going to testify 

to the mistakes Dr. Kruse made, that's pitting witnesses. So characterize your 

question properly." Dr. Flores explained in detail several tests that Dr. Kruse 

performed on Jones. Dr. Flores explained the M-FAST and SIMS were screening 

tests for malingering, and if the scores on those tests are above a certain level, the 
SIRS should be administered. Dr. Flores testified she reviewed the raw data and 

determined Jones's scores on the M-FAST and SIMS were below the cut-off levels 

for malingering; therefore, in Dr. Flores' opinion, Dr. Kruse should not have 

administered the SIRS. Dr. Flores testified as to her own scoring of the raw data and 

concluded, "Just looking at the data, I don't think there's enough information there 

to say that [Jones] was malingering." 

In its brief, the State argues the trial court properly excluded Dr. Flores' 

testimony. The State repeats its grounds for exclusion as witness intimidation;

"improper pitting of witnesses"; and Rule 403, SCRE (i.e., the probative value of 

Dr. Flores' testimony was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice 

to the State). The State also presents an additional argument that Dr. Flores'

testimony would have amounted to needless presentation of cumulative evidence 

under Rule 403.

First, we reject the State's argument Dr. Kruse would have been so intimidated 

by Dr. Flores' accusations that she would have been afraid to testify in reply. As the 

State notes in its brief, at the time of trial, Dr. Kruse had served as Chief 

Neuropsychologist at Prisma Health for eleven years and had been qualified as an 

expert in the field of neuropsychology over seventy-five times. There is no evidence

Dr. Kruse would have been afraid to return to the courtroom and testify in reply. 

Even if she had been, we question how this would be germane to the admissibility 

of Dr. Flores' testimony. 

Second, as the trial court concluded and as the proffer transcript bears out, Dr. 

Flores' testimony could have been tailored to avoid any purported "improper pitting 

of witnesses." The trial court had a firm grasp of the issue and could have resolved 

all related objections. We therefore reject the State's argument on this ground.

Citing Rule 403, the State claims Dr. Flores' testimony would have been 

needlessly cumulative in light of the testimony of eight defense experts. Rule 403 

provides in part that relevant evidence "may be excluded if its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . or by considerations 

of . . . needless presentation of cumulative evidence." The State did not argue Dr. 

Flores' testimony was needlessly cumulative at trial, and the trial court did not 

consider this ground when excluding Dr. Flores' testimony. We review evidentiary 

rulings for an abuse of discretion, and on this particular ground, we cannot review a 

nonexistent ruling.

The State did, however, raise unfair prejudice at trial. The State claims the 

trial court properly excluded the testimony because under Rule 403, the probative 
value of Dr. Flores' testimony was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 

prejudice to the State. Of course, the "unfair prejudice" cited by the State is the 

surprise arising from Jones's late disclosure of Dr. Flores. The State claims this 

surprise left the State unable to appropriately prepare for and respond to Dr. Flores'

testimony. Jones argues he should have been able to use Dr. Flores' testimony to 

argue before the jury that Dr. Kruse's scoring was faulty and perhaps misleading. 

Jones, as the proponent of Dr. Flores' testimony, had to establish its probative value; 

if the evidence had probative value, the State, as the opponent of the evidence, had 

to establish its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 

prejudice. We agree with Jones that Dr. Flores' testimony had probative value 

because it included her rescoring of Dr. Kruse's raw data in a way that purported to 

rebut Dr. Kruse's conclusions of malingering. 

Having determined the evidence had probative value, we next review the trial 

court's ruling on three fronts. First, was the State prejudiced by the evidence? Here, 

the prejudice cited by the State was "surprise." There is no question Dr. Flores' 

testimony was prejudicial to the State; after all, most evidence offered by one party 

is prejudicial to the other. Second, was this prejudice to the State unfair? Probably

so because Jones obtained Dr. Kruse's report before trial and could have secured a 

qualified individual to review the raw data before Dr. Kruse entered the fray in the 

eleventh hour. Third, was the probative value of Dr. Flores' testimony substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the State? This is always a difficult 

question. We recognize trial courts necessarily process and rule upon objections in 

a rapid-fire setting, and we applaud the trial judge's immediate grasp of the State's 

objections to Dr. Flores' testimony. The trial judge quickly moved to the most 

pertinent objection: whether Jones presented Dr. Flores' testimony too late in the 

game. Implicit in the trial judge's exclusion of Dr. Flores' testimony is that the 

probative value of that testimony was substantially outweighed by the danger of 

unfair prejudice to the State. It is on this point we conclude the trial court erred. 

In State v. Mercer, we considered a similar challenge to the trial court's 

exclusion of expert testimony about a capital defendant's brain scan. 381 S.C. 149, 

160, 672 S.E.2d 556, 561 (2009). Although a prior witness testified the scan showed 

a "questionable abnormality[,]" defense expert Dr. John Steedman planned to 

"render a stronger finding of an abnormality." Id. at 160, 672 S.E.2d at 562. The 

trial court excluded Dr. Steedman's testimony during the sentencing phase, finding 

he was a surprise witness and his testimony was unduly prejudicial. On appeal, we 

concluded, "The probative value of Dr. Steedman's excluded testimony was, as a 

matter of law, not substantially outweighed by its potential for prejudice, as a result 

of the purported late disclosure or otherwise." Id. at 161, 672 S.E.2d at 562. Our 
conclusion rested on two grounds. First, the trial court never issued a formal 

discovery order. Second, both Dr. Steedman and the substance of his testimony were 

disclosed to the State before he was set to testify. Although we found the exclusion 

of Dr. Steedman's testimony error, we held the error was harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt because the brain scan was admitted into evidence; another expert 

testified as to its abnormality; and Dr. Steedman was allowed to testify "at length" 

about the defendant's "cognitive deficiencies" and "learning disorder." Id. at 161-

62, 672 S.E.2d at 562-63.

We emphasize that our holding in Mercer does not stand for the black-letter 

proposition that in every criminal or civil case, a trial court's exclusion of tardy 

evidence is error under Rule 403. However, in this case, we hold as a matter of law 

that the probative value of Dr. Flores' testimony was not substantially outweighed 

by the danger of unfair prejudice to the State. The trial court should have allowed

Dr. Flores to testify about her rescoring of Dr. Kruse's raw data. 

i. Harmless Error

Having determined the exclusion of Dr. Flores' testimony was error, we must 

determine whether the error was harmless. We hold it was harmless. During the 

guilt phase, Jones presented seven expert witnesses to testify in support of his NGRI 

defense. This testimony was incorporated into the sentencing phase and was before 

the jury as mitigation evidence. Additionally, Jones called Dr. Donna SchwartzMaddox as a mitigation witness during the sentencing phase. A summary of these 

witnesses' testimony is important, and this summary reveals that each defense 

witness who gave an opinion as to whether Jones was malingering stated quite 

unequivocally he was not. 

Richard Frierson, M.D., is a general and forensic psychiatrist and a professor 

of psychiatry at the University of South Carolina School of Medicine. The medical 

school has a contract with the South Carolina Department of Mental Health (DMH), 

so Dr. Frierson regularly performs forensic evaluations at DMH's request. Dr. 

Frierson testified he interviewed Jones six times for a total of nineteen hours and 

reviewed information from 295 sources. Dr. Frierson opined that at the time of the 

murders, Jones was sane, or criminally responsible (i.e., Jones could distinguish 

moral right from moral wrong and could recognize his actions as legally and morally 

wrong). Dr. Frierson testified that at the time of the murders, Jones had substanceinduced psychotic disorder from smoking spice. Jones knew he had a family history 

of schizophrenia and was convinced the drug-induced "anxious thoughts" he was 

having were, in fact, schizophrenia. Dr. Frierson testified he has practiced forensic 

psychiatry for thirty years; he has examined individuals who were malingering and 
was rather surprised the tests he conducted did not indicate Jones was malingering. 

Dr. Frierson testified Jones "was trying to convince himself he had schizophrenia so 

he could live with what he did." 

Julie Dorney, M.D., testified for the defense as an expert in forensic 

psychiatry. Dr. Dorney provided exceedingly detailed testimony on the issue of 

insanity. She met with Jones eight times before trial—the first time being on the 

three-year anniversary of the murders. Dr. Dorney testified that at the time of the 

murders, Jones "suffered from psychotic symptoms, specifically delusional thinking 

and hallucinations." She testified this was "a major mental illness," and Jones was 

insane because he did not recognize the legal wrongfulness of his conduct and did 

not have the capacity to distinguish moral right from moral wrong. She further 

testified that after Jones killed Nahtahn, he felt the other four children would be 

better off in Heaven than without parents.

Dr. Dorney testified she always looks for signs of malingering and saw none 

in Jones. She testified that although a staff member from the South Carolina 

Department of Corrections (SCDC) questioned whether Jones was malingering, the 

hundreds of pages she reviewed did not support a finding of malingering. During 

cross-examination, the State questioned Dr. Dorney about Dr. Kruse's testing. Dr. 

Dorney stated Jones was not displaying symptoms of schizophrenia at the time of 

Dr. Kruse's evaluation, so she questioned why anyone would conduct malingering 

tests at that time. Dr. Dorney stated the malingering tests conducted by Dr. Kruse 

"are tools that you use if someone is actively reporting symptoms. At the time 

[Jones] saw [Dr. Kruse], he didn't have any symptoms." Dr. Dorney characterized 

Dr. Kruse's employment of the tests as "a misuse of the tests." Again, she testified 

nothing would support the conclusion that Jones was malingering. 

April Hames, Ph.D., Jones's marriage therapist, testified for the defense as an 

expert in marriage and family therapy. Jones's therapy sessions with Dr. Hames took 

place three to four years before the murders. Dr. Hames testified that during Jones's 

first session, Jones said he had a "monster" inside of him. Jones repeatedly

referenced the monster in subsequent sessions. Dr. Hames testified Jones came to

her for help with anxiety, depression, and feelings of inferiority. She diagnosed 

Jones with recurrent major depressive disorder and unspecified nonpsychotic mental 

disorder.

Bhushan Agharkar, M.D., testified for the defense as an expert in adult and 

forensic psychiatry. Dr. Agharkar testified Jones suffered from schizophrenia and 

minor neurocognitive disorder, the latter of which is commonly referred to as "brain 

damage." Dr. Agharkar was very informative and detailed how schizophrenia 
manifests itself in those stricken with the disorder. He noted Jones's mother is

schizophrenic, which createsin Jones a "significant genetic loading" for the disorder. 

Dr. Agharkar testified he always considered the prospect of malingering but

determined Jones was not malingering based on his history, brain damage, symptom 

presentation, and response to medications. Dr. Agharkar also testified that he 

requested neuropsychologist Erin Bigler, Ph.D., to review Jones's brain imaging 

studies. 

Dr. Bigler testified for the defense as an expert in neuropsychology. Dr. 

Bigler testified he had particular expertise "in looking at brain imaging methods and 

how to use those findings to relate to the behavior of the individual." Evidence 

introduced at trial established that Jones was involved in a car accident at age fifteen. 

The accident left Jones with a brain injury and visible indentation on his forehead. 

After reviewing Jones's brain imaging studies, Dr. Bigler testified he could 

immediately tell Jones had "a significant traumatic brain injury and . . . skull defect." 

Dr. Bigler testified there is a connection between traumatic brain injury and

schizophrenia. Ultimately, Dr. Bigler recommended Jones's brain imaging studies 

be reviewed by a neuroradiologist. 

Travis Snyder, M.D., testified for the defense as an expert in neuroradiology. 

Dr. Snyder examined MRI scans of Jones's brain and found a large left frontal 

depressed skull fracture, indicating Jones sustained a severe traumatic brain injury 

at some point in his life. Among other abnormalities, Dr. Snyder found thinning of 

the cortex and corpus collosum, which he testified are associated with schizophrenia 

and schizoaffective disorder. Dr. Snyder testified frontal lobe injuries—such as the 

one Jones sustained—often result in cognitive problems, personality changes, risk 

taking, disinhibition, and behavior spontaneity. 

Donna Schwartz-Maddox, M.D., testified for the defense as an expert in 

forensic psychiatry. Her testimony was very detailed on the subject of schizophrenia

and its causes and treatment. Dr. Schwartz-Maddox testified she first saw Jones in 

an SCDC hospital on September 13, 2014, just fifteen days after the murders. She 

testified "there was no question in [her] mind" Jones "was clearly psychotic" that 

day. She testified Jones "me[t] the diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia." On the 

issue of whether Jones's condition was substance induced—in his case, whether it 

was caused by smoking spice—Dr. Schwartz-Maddox testified most instances of 

substance-induced psychosis resolve within a month when the patient is hospitalized

and properly medicated. She testified Jones remained in the hospital until trial and 

was properly medicated but still had symptoms of psychosis. Dr. Schwartz-Maddox 

testified that before trial began, Jones was housed at SCDC and was prescribed a 

very high dose of Geodon, an antipsychotic drug. However, when trial began, Jones 
was moved to the Lexington County Detention Center, and his Geodon dosage was

reduced to a much lower level. According to Dr. Schwartz-Maddox, this caused 

Jones's psychotic symptoms to worsen, which lent legitimacy to her conclusion that 

he was not malingering. Dr. Schwartz-Maddox testified she had "not seen [Jones]

intentionally fake his symptoms," and if anything, Jones underreported his 

symptoms.

Beverly Wood, M.D., Chief of Psychiatry at SCDC, testified for the defense 

as an expert in psychiatry. Dr. Wood diagnosed Jones with schizoaffective disorder 

and prescribed a medication regimen that included the aforementioned Geodon. Dr. 

Wood testified as to Jones's family history of schizophrenia. Jones told Dr. Wood

he had been hearing voices since he was twelve years old. Dr. Wood noted Jones 

displayed "flight of ideas," "pressured speech," and disregard for personal hygiene, 

all of which indicate mental illness. Dr. Wood testified that in the SCDC setting, a 

number of inmates fake mental illness for various reasons, but nothing led her to 

believe Jones was malingering. 

Jones admits in his brief that he "presented significant evidence to prove he 

was not sane at the time he killed his children." According to Jones, Dr. Frierson, 

Dr. Dorney, Dr. Hames, Dr. Agharkar, Dr. Schwartz-Maddox, and Dr. Wood

"presented significant evidence" that he was mentally ill and not malingering. 

Additionally, the detailed explanations of Jones's brain damage given by Dr. Bigler 

and Dr. Snyder were front and center for the jury as mitigation evidence. In light of 

the extensive testimony that Jones was not malingering, we hold any error in the trial 

court's exclusion of Dr. Flores' testimony was harmless. In fact, the only witness 

who suggested Jones was malingering was Dr. Kruse. Dr. Dorney directly 

challenged the propriety of Dr. Kruse administering malingering tests because Jones 

was not displaying symptoms of schizophrenia at the time. While only Dr. Flores 

rescored Dr. Kruse's data, we hold the issue of malingering was exhaustively and 

fully addressed. 

Although Dr. Flores' testimony would have purportedly cast doubt on Dr. 

Kruse's scoring and allegedly flawed approach to concluding Jones was malingering, 

Jones presented a wealth of evidence that he had brain damage, was schizophrenic, 

and was not malingering. We hold it is not reasonably likely Dr. Flores' testimony 

would have affected the jury's decision to impose a death sentence. See Skipper v. 

South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (stating that in the sentencing phase of a capital 

trial, an error is not harmless if "it appears reasonably likely that the exclusion of 

evidence . . . may have affected the jury's decision to impose the death sentence"); 

Chaffee v. State, 294 S.C. 88, 91, 362 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1987); State v. Key, 256 S.C. 
90, 93-94, 180 S.E.2d 888, 890 (1971). Therefore, the trial court's exclusion of Dr. 

Flores' testimony was harmless.

2. Limitation of Testimony Pertaining to Jones's Future 

Dangerousness, Remorse, and Social History 

As noted above, the admission of evidence is left to the sound discretion of 

the trial court, and generally, evidentiary rulings will not be reversed on appeal 

absent a prejudicial abuse of discretion. Whaley, 305 S.C. at 143, 406 S.E.2d at 372; 

Cope, 405 S.C. at 343-44, 748 S.E.2d at 208. 

Although the Eighth Amendment recognizes a capital defendant's right to 

present mitigation evidence, that right is limited by general evidentiary principles. 

See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271 (1976); Mercer, 381 S.C. at 161, 672 S.E.2d 

at 562. Specifically, to be admissible, mitigation evidence must be relevant. Lockett, 

438 U.S. at 604 n.12; Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 822 (1991); see State v.

Northcutt, 372 S.C. 207, 221, 641 S.E.2d 873, 880 (2007); State v. Dickerson, 395 

S.C. 101, 116, 716 S.E.2d 895, 903 (2011). "The meaning of relevance is no 

different in the context of mitigating evidence introduced in a capital sentencing 

proceeding" than it is in any other trial. McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 

440 (1990). Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of 

any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 

less probable than it would be without the evidence." Rule 401, SCRE. Evidence 

that is not relevant should be excluded. See Rule 402, SCRE. In the context of 

capital sentencing, "if the sentencer could reasonably find that [mitigation evidence] 

warrants a sentence less than death, . . . . the Eighth Amendment requires that the 

jury be able to consider and give effect to that evidence." Tennard v. Dretke, 542 

U.S. 274, 285 (2004) (cleaned up) (first quoting McKoy, 494 U.S. at 441; and then 

quoting Boyde, 494 U.S. at 377-78).

i. Future Dangerousness 

During the sentencing phase, defense counsel proffered the testimony of 

Sergeant Barry Sowards. Sergeant Sowards testified about an encounter he had with 

Jones while transporting Jones from Mississippi to South Carolina. According to 

Sergeant Sowards, when he and the extradition team stopped at a rest stop, the other 

team members went inside, and he remained in the vehicle with an automatic weapon 

on his lap. Noticing the weapon, Jones told Sergeant Sowards, "You guys don't need 

automatic weapons for me. I'm not going to hurt you." Sergeant Sowards replied, 

"These weapons are not for you, in particular, [they're] for everyone trying to kill 

you." 
Defense counsel sought to introduce Sergeant Sowards' response as mitigating 

evidence that Jones did not present a risk of future dangerousness. After hearing 

Sergeant Sowards' proffered testimony, the trial judge ruled, "You can get Tim's 

response in, but Detective Sowards' response, to me, is his personal opinion and not 

relevant to Mr. Jones character in any way. I think it goes to Mr. Sowards' training 

as an officer, that's his job to protect him, it is Mr. Sowards' character." 

We affirm the trial court's ruling that Sergeant Sowards' proffered testimony 

was not relevant to Jones's future dangerousness. The testimony reflected Sergeant 

Sowards' speculative opinion about how the public perceives Jones. It was not based 

on Sergeant Sowards' own perception and had nothing to do with Jones's actual 

dangerousness.

ii. Remorse

Before the jury, Sergeant Sowards testified he had been with Jones throughout 

the entire trial. Defense counsel classified Sergeant Sowards as Jones's "handler"

and then asked whether he witnessed Jones crying during trial. Sergeant Sowards 

replied, "Yes," upon which the following exchange took place: 

Defense Counsel: Do you believe that those are crocodile tears? 

Deputy Solicitor: Objection, Your Honor, speculation. 

The Court: I sustain the objection. 

Defense Counsel: When you've seen him crying, do you believe that 

his remorse is real?

Deputy Solicitor: Objection, speculation.

The Court: Sustained.

Defense counsel argued Sergeant Sowards' testimony demonstrated Jones's remorse. 

At no point, however, did defense counsel proffer Sergeant Sowards' responses to 

these questions. 

Even assuming Sergeant Sowards would have testified that he thought Jones's 

tears were real and Jones's remorse was genuine, we hold any error in excluding this 

testimony is harmless. A fleeting mention of Jones's remorse, if admitted, would not

have affected the jury's decision to impose a death sentence. See Skipper, 476 U.S. 

at 8; Chaffee, 294 S.C. at 91, 362 S.E.2d at 877; Key, 256 S.C. at 93-94, 180 S.E.2d 

at 890. 
iii. Social History 

When Roberta Thornsberry—Jones's paternal grandmother—testified during 

the sentencing phase, defense counsel inquired about her life before Jones was born. 

The State objected, upon which the trial court excused the jury. Noting that he 

consistently "directed the [d]efense to only ask questions from [Jones's] birth 

forward" in the guilt phase, the trial judge asked defense counsel why his ruling 

should differ in the sentencing phase. Defense counsel responded by requesting to 

proffer Thornsberry's testimony. The trial judge allowed the proffer. Thornsberry's 

testimony detailed a family history full of abandonment, incest, abuse, and 

exploitation. 

Although the trial judge recognized that evidence of Thornsberry's horrific 

childhood certainly "impacted [Jones] to some degree," he ruled such evidence

would be irrelevant to Jones's character and would, therefore, confuse the jury. 

Defense counsel objected to the ruling, and the trial judge clarified Thornsberry

would be allowed to testify generally about her "childhood from a broken home and 

traumatic history" but would not be allowed to testify about intimate details that

were irrelevant to Jones's character. 

Anticipating the trial court's ruling would equally apply to the testimony of 

Jones's father Timothy Ray Jones Sr. (Senior), defense counsel proffered Senior's 

testimony. Senior explained how his childhood was marked by fear, violence,

trauma, mental illness, physical abuse, and substance abuse. At the end of the 

proffer, defense counsel again requested the jury be permitted to hear testimony 

about events occurring before Jones's birth. The trial court did not allow this

testimony.

Defense counsel also proffered the testimony of Deborah Grey, a social 

historian. The disputed portion of Grey's proffer began with Thornsberry's 

childhood and continued until Jones's birth; it largely tracked Thornsberry's and 

Senior's proffers, albeit with more expansive details. At the conclusion of Grey's 

proffer, the trial judge made the following statement: 

I want to think of a way and I suggest you all come up with a way for 

this lady to say, this lady's summary of Ms. Thornsberry's mental 

history, Ms. [Turner] -- Cynthia [Turner's] history . . . -- without going 

through every single minute detail. . . . All of the social psychologists 

and psychiatrists said the Jones family . . . had a huge bunch of 

illnesses, medical, suicides, physical abuse, sexual abuse. I think she 
can say things like that without saying the grandma was sexually abused 

18 times by the time she was six . . . . 

The trial judge later instructed defense counsel to "use a broader brush rather than a 

detailed brush" and to "present some mitigating facts without becoming the Dr. Phil 

show." The trial judge continually advised defense counsel to give the facts but to 

avoid the details of each fact: "Put up some rails on the alley where you don't go in 

the gutter. . . . If you get too detailed, I'm going to say move on." 

Before the jury, Grey was permitted to testify extensively about Jones's family 

history. She testified that both the paternal and maternal sides of Jones's family were 

littered with attachment and protection issues. She recounted the rape, torture, 

abandonment, trafficking, substance abuse, domestic violence, and mental illness 

Jones's caretakers endured and opined this was the family dynamic into which Jones 

was born. Nonetheless, Jones argues the trial court erred in forcing him to deliver a 

"condensed and sanitized" social history and in repeatedly instructing Grey to "move 

on" when her testimony became too detailed. We disagree and, therefore, affirm the 

trial court's limitations. 

Although events occurring to Thornsberry and Senior before Jones's birth

undoubtedly shaped their parenting methods and family environment, these events 

were irrelevant to Jones's character. In our view, Jones disregards the requirement 

that evidence of a defendant's social history be relevant and concerned with the 

defendant's character or record. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604-05, 604 n.12; Eddings 

v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-15 (1982); United States v. Tsarnaev, 142 S. Ct. 

1024, 1038 (2022) ("[W]e have expressly held that 'the Eighth Amendment does not 

deprive' a sovereign 'of its authority to set reasonable limits upon the evidence a 

[capital] defendant can submit, and control the manner in which it is submitted." 

(alteration in original) (quoting Oregon v. Guzek, 546 U.S. 517, 526 (2006))). It 

would be far too remote to conclude external events impacting Jones's family 

members before his birth directly affected Jones's own character. If anything, these 

events affected the character of Jones's family members—an issue that was not 

before the jury during sentencing. 

Even assuming the trial court erred by limiting the testimony of Thornsberry 

and Senior, any error is harmless. Grey was permitted to testify considerably about 

Jones's family history, including all relevant details. For these reasons, we affirm 

the trial court's limitations. 
3. Exclusion of Cynthia Turner's Pre-Recorded Testimony

During the sentencing phase, defense counsel sought to publish the prerecorded testimony of Jones's mother—Cynthia Turner—as mitigation evidence of 

Jones's state of mind and mental illness. In the recording, Turner was unable to 

recall basic facts about her personal history and appeared detached from reality. 

When asked about her father, mother, and siblings, Turner said she did not know 

them well despite spending the majority of her childhood with them. Turner also 

claimed she did not know Senior, even though she dated and was married to him for 

five years. Turner was unsure why Senior was awarded primary custody of Jones 

after their divorce, and she did not remember giving birth to one of her other 

children. When asked how she felt about Jones, Turner replied, "He's a nice kid, but 

I don't understand how he did that about his kids." 

Noting numerous experts had already testified about Turner's mental illness,

the trial judge questioned the relevance of her testimony. Defense counsel 

responded, "It's his mother, his mother who is diagnosed with schizophrenia, in 

which a number of other people have diagnosed Tim with, and what condition Tim 

could end up in. . . . It's his future." The solicitor countered that Turner's testimony

was prejudicial because it was unclear whether her exhibited symptoms were signs 

of schizophrenia, manifestations of another disorder, or medicinal side effects. The

following exchange then took place: 

Defense Counsel: Mitigation is any reason not to give death. 

The fact that his own mother couldn't come to his trial is likely a 

reason for a Juror not to give death. 

The Court: How are you prevented from arguing that right 

now? 

Defense Counsel: I'm not. 

. . . .

The Court: All right. I'm not letting it in then. You talked me in to it. 

Defense Counsel: We object under State v. Mercer and that relevant 

mitigation should be admitted and 403 shouldn't be used to exclude 

mitigation evidence. 
The Court: It's a broader 403. That video was done late, it was done 

during jury selection. There's too many things that are unknown with 

her medical condition. And the State has not challenged whatsoever 

that she has severe mental challenges, issues, is institutionalized. All 

that's free game for you to argue that she couldn't come for those 

reasons. She was not allowed to come. So you are certainly welcome 

to argue that. I think it's inflammatory and I don't think that it's a proper 

video to be introduced in this phase of the case. So I'm not going to 

allow it. 

We affirm the trial court's ruling that Turner's testimony had no probative 

value and risked confusing the issue to be decided—Jones's mental state—with the 

issue that was demonstrated by the testimony—Turner's own mental state. Jones 

claims Weik v. State, 409 S.C. 214, 761 S.E.2d 757 (2014), supports the recording's 

admission because Turner's "bizarre behavior . . . would have corroborated the 

defense mental health experts' description of schizophrenia." However, Jones's 

reliance on Weik is misplaced. In Weik, defense counsel conducted numerous pretrial interviews with the defendant's family members, coworkers, and acquaintances, 

all of whom "revealed [his] childhood was traumatic, filled with emotional and 

physical abuse at the hands of his psychotic father[.]" Id. at 217, 761 S.E.2d at 758. 

Despite abundant evidence, defense counsel presented only one mitigation 

witness—the defendant's sister—who provided "extremely limited testimony, which 

was general, vague, and offered no detail or insight into the degree of abuse [the 

defendant] suffered as a child." Id. at 235, 761 S.E.2d at 768. We remanded the 

case for a new sentencing trial because the evidence presented by defense counsel 

failed to sufficiently reveal the defendant's "abusive and dysfunctional childhood" 

as well as his "genetic predisposition to schizophrenia" and hallucinogenic 

symptoms at the time of the crime. Id. at 238-39, 761 S.E.2d at 769-70.

Unlike in Weik, where defense counsel presented minimal testimony about the 

defendant's abusive family background, Jones's extensive social history was elicited 

through the testimony of Thornsberry, Senior, and Grey. While the social history 

testimony in Weik spanned merely three pages of the trial transcript, the testimony 

here was set forth in more than one hundred pages in the sentencing phase alone. 

Jones argues that at the very least, Turner's testimony bore on mitigating factors 

related to his mental state; however, Turner's testimony was relevant to her mental 

state, not Jones's. Neither Turner's diagnosis nor the hereditary nature of 

schizophrenia was disputed. We therefore affirm the trial court's exclusion. 
4. Admission of Autopsy Photographs 

During the sentencing phase, the trial court admitted—over Jones's 

objection—ten autopsy photographs (two per child). The issue before us is whether 

the probative value, if any, of the photographs was substantially outweighed by the 

danger of unfair prejudice under Rule 403, SCRE. 

Jones argued at trial that the photographs were inadmissible under Rules 401 

and 403, SCRE, because the State had already proved the existence of statutory 

aggravating circumstances and the "absolutely horrific" and "nightmarish" 

photographs would do nothing more than "arise sympathy or prejudice." The 

solicitor responded that the photographs "show[] [Jones's] character, the work of his 

hands" because they "depict the bodies of the victims in the same condition he left 

them in -- or condition he left them to become in." The solicitor argued the 

photographs were relevant to show how Jones bagged up his children's bodies, drove 

them around for more than a week, and deliberately left them in the hot sun to 

accelerate decomposition. 

After reviewing cases cited by both parties, the trial judge allowed the State 

to admit two autopsy photographs per child, citing several cases along with Rules 

401, 402, and 403, SCRE. The trial judge determined the photographs, "even though 

very unpleasant," were probative of Jones's "conduct of packing the children in the 

bags and contorting the bodies in different fashions, putting them out there in the 

woods." Over Jones's objection, the photographs were admitted during the 

testimony of expert witness Dr. Janice Ross—the forensic pathologist who 

performed the autopsies and took the disputed photographs. Dr. Ross testified 

during the guilt phase and was recalled by the State during the sentencing phase for 

the purpose of having the photographs admitted into evidence. 

Although Dr. Ross described what was depicted in each photograph, the 

solicitor did not publish the photographs in open court—out of what the solicitor 

stated was his "respect for the jury." Dr. Ross testified Elias' cause of death was 

asphyxia due to strangulation; Gabriel's cause of death was homicidal violence with 

probable strangulation; and Merah's, Abigail's, and Nahtahn's causes of death were 

homicidal violence. Dr. Ross testified there was a wound to Nahtahn's knee—which 

was depicted in a photograph published during the guilt phase—that appeared to be 

caused by a sharp instrument "like a saw or a knife." 
After Dr. Ross's testimony, defense counsel noted, "[The State] needed the 

photographs to show Dr. Ross in testimony and they were not used for that purpose, 

which enhances the fact that they're just being used to create an emotional impact." 

Defense counsel then moved to have the photographs kept in the courtroom during 

jury deliberations so that a record could be made of any emotional impact the 

photographs evoked if a juror asked to see them. The trial court denied this request, 

and the photographs went into the jury room along with other trial exhibits. 

"The determination of the relevancy and materiality of a photograph is left to 

the sound discretion of the trial judge" whose "rulings will not be disturbed absent a 

showing of probable prejudice." State v. Kornahrens, 290 S.C. 281, 288, 350 S.E.2d 

180, 185 (1986); see Evins, 373 S.C. at 421, 645 S.E.2d at 912. In the sentencing 

phase of a capital trial, photographs may be offered as extenuating, mitigating, or 

aggravating evidence to "direct the jury's attention to the specific circumstances of 

the crime and the characteristics of the offender." State v. Haselden, 353 S.C. 190, 

199, 577 S.E.2d 445, 450 (2003) (quoting State v. Matthews, 296 S.C. 379, 390, 373 

S.E.2d 587, 594 (1988)). 

 "[I]t is well-established that photographs calculated to arouse the sympathies 

and prejudices of the jury are to be excluded if they are irrelevant or unnecessary to 

the issues at trial." State v. Middleton, 288 S.C. 21, 24, 339 S.E.2d 692, 693 (1986);

see Rule 401, SCRE; Rule 403, SCRE. Photographs are relevant if they "depict the 

bodies of the murder victims in substantially the same condition in which the 

defendant left them." Kornahrens, 290 S.C. at 289, 350 S.E.2d at 185. Even if 

relevant, photographs are unfairly prejudicial if they "create a 'tendency to suggest a 

decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional 

one.'" State v. Franklin, 318 S.C. 47, 55, 456 S.E.2d 357, 361 (1995) (quoting State 

v. Alexander, 303 S.C. 377, 382, 401 S.E.2d 146, 149 (1991)); see S.C. Code Ann. 

§ 16-3-25(C)(1) (2015). 

In several capital trials, we have considered the admissibility of autopsy 

photographs.6 We explained in Franklin, "The criteria is not . . . that photographs 

 

6 Notable cases outside of those discussed in this subsection include State v. Patrick, 

289 S.C. 301, 308-09, 345 S.E.2d 481, 485 (1986) (holding an autopsy photograph 

was "not substantially necessary" and was "highly prejudicial" because it showed 

the victim lying on an autopsy table with a "considerable amount of blood" and 

without any depiction of the crime scene or post-mortem abuse), overruled on other 

grounds by Brightman v. State, 336 S.C. 348, 520 S.E.2d 614 (1999); State v. 

Rosemond, 335 S.C. 593, 597, 518 S.E.2d 588, 590 (1999) (holding the probative 
become inadmissible because they graphically depict a gruesome scene. Rather, the 

question is whether the photographs are unfairly prejudicial so as to outweigh the 

probative value." 318 S.C. at 55, 456 S.E.2d at 361. We noted the autopsy 

photographs in that case were highly relevant to the issue of physical torture 

delivered upon the victim by the defendant. In Middleton, we considered a challenge 

to the trial court's admission of photographs showing the victim's scalp pulled away 

from her skull and her surgically opened vaginal cavity filled with semen. 288 S.C. 

at 24, 339 S.E.2d at 693. Because it was clear the facts were not in dispute and 

because the testimony of a forensic pathologist "negated any arguable evidentiary 

value of the photographs[,]" we held the "prejudice created by the photographs 

clearly outweighed any evidentiary value." Id. at 23-24, 339 S.E.2d at 693.

Nine months after deciding Middleton, we decided Kornahrens, 290 S.C. at 

281, 350 S.E.2d at 180. In Kornahrens, the trial court admitted several photographs 

during sentencing that depicted the autopsies of two murder victims. Photographs 

of one victim showed her lying on an autopsy table in the same condition her body 

was found, and photographs of the other victim showed knife wounds to his chest, 

back, and thigh. We concluded the photographs were properly admitted because 

"while not pleasant to look at, they showed what the defendant himself did to the 

bodies," and the bodies were not "altered by decomposition or by any other outside 

force." Id. at 289, 350 S.E.2d at 186 (cleaned up). 

More recently, we considered a challenge to the trial court's admission of 

several autopsy photographs during sentencing, each "graphically depict[ing] the 

injuries of the victim[.]" State v. Torres, 390 S.C. 618, 624, 703 S.E.2d 226, 229 

(2010). We acknowledged "some of the photographs were close-ups of the victims' 

injuries and were graphic in nature," but we concluded the "purpose of the close-ups 

was to help identify the nature of the particular injury" and "show what the defendant 

did to the victims, which goes straight to circumstances of the crime." Id. (cleaned 

up). We upheld the trial court's admission because although the crime was 

 

value of crime scene and autopsy photographs outweighed any prejudicial effect 

because they "served to corroborate the pathologist's testimony describing the 

position of the victims as they were dying and the wounds each received"); and State 

v. Johnson, 338 S.C. 114, 129-30, 525 S.E.2d 519, 526-27 (2000) (holding autopsy 

photographs that depicted the victim's nearly severed shoulder and her head wound 

were admissible because although "difficult to look at, they nevertheless revealed 

the true nature of the attack and would have permitted the jury to comprehend the 

precise damage inflicted by the [murder weapon]"). 
"particularly horrific[,] . . . the admission of the photographs did not unduly 

prejudice the jury." Id. Despite affirming the trial court's admission, we explained 

the photographs were "at the outer limits of what our law permits a jury to consider." 

Id. In light of our growing concern in the admission of autopsy photographs, we

"strongly encourage[d] all solicitors to refrain from pushing the envelope on 

admissibility in order to gain a victory which, in all likelihood, was already assured 

because of other substantial evidence in the case." Id. 

After Torres, we again considered the admissibility of horrendous autopsy 

photographs, albeit in a noncapital trial. See State v. Collins, 409 S.C. 524, 531-34, 

763 S.E.2d 22, 26-28 (2014). In Collins, the defendant was indicted for several 

crimes arising from a ten-year-old boy being mauled to death by the defendant's 

unrestrained dogs. At trial, the State offered into evidence a group of pre-autopsy 

photographs taken by a forensic pathologist that demonstrated "the dangerous 

propensities of the dogs, the manner and extent of the attack, and [the defendant's]

criminal negligence[.]" Id. at 532, 763 S.E.2d at 27. The "nature and extent" of the 

victim's injuries were in dispute, and the photographs "show[ed] the boy's exposed 

jawbone and upper arm bone[] and the areas where his chest and face had been 

partially eaten during the dog attack." Id. at 532, 533 n.3, 763 S.E.2d at 27 & n.3. 

The trial court admitted the photographs, and the court of appeals reversed, holding 

the probative value of the "disturbing" and "gruesome" photographs was 

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. State v. Collins, 398 

S.C. 197, 202, 208-10, 727 S.E.2d 751, 754, 757-58 (Ct. App. 2012). 

In Collins, we acknowledged the photographs were graphic, but we concluded 

they were "highly probative, corroborative, and material in establishing the elements 

of the offenses charged; their probative value outweighed their potential prejudice; 

and the court of appeals should not have invaded the trial court's discretion in 

admitting this crucial evidence based on its emotional reaction to the subject matter 

presented." 409 S.C. at 535, 763 S.E.2d at 28 (cleaned up). We observed 

photographs should not be excluded just because they are gruesome. Id. at 535-36, 

763 S.E.2d at 28.

As we noted in Kornahrens, "The purpose of the bifurcated proceeding in a 

capital case is to permit the introduction of evidence in the sentencing proceeding 

which ordinarily would be inadmissible in the guilt phase." 290 S.C. at 289, 350 

S.E.2d at 185. With respect to photographs, we stated, "In determining whether to 

recommend a sentence of death, the jury may be permitted to see photographs which 

depict the bodies of the murder victims in substantially the same condition in which 

the defendant left them." Id. We also noted that even though the trial court must 

balance the probative value of evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice, the
scope of the probative value of evidence in the sentencing phase is "much broader" 

than in the guilt phase. Id. at 289, 350 S.E.2d at 186. An obvious takeaway from 

Kornahrens is that the evidence must still have at least some probative value for it 

to enjoy that "much broader" scope. 

Unlike the photographs admitted in Kornahrens, Torres, and Collins, the 

autopsy photographs in this case were of no probative value. The photographs here

do not depict the children's bodies in substantially the same condition in which Jones 

left them. The photographs depict the children's bodies in the advanced stages of 

decomposition occurring in the three days between the time Jones dumped the bodies 

to the time law enforcement discovered them. The bodies were so severely

decomposed that with the exception of one photograph, neither strangulation nor 

ligature marks were visible to corroborate Dr. Ross's testimony. The State does not 

claim Jones altered his children's faces or limbs, yet several photographs showed 

extensive tissue loss appearing as though an animal had eaten their faces and limbs. 

Even assuming the photographs had some probative value because they 

purport to show Jones's character through the method and manner in which he 

bagged and disposed of the bodies, we hold as a matter of law that under Rule 403,

such probative value—even in its "much broader" form as noted in Kornahrens—

was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to Jones. The 

photographs show the children's bodies in a state of complete discoloration; they 

were engulfed in maggots and contorted beyond recognition. Some of the children's 

faces were missing, a number of their limbs had been eaten by animals, and one 

child's head had decomposed to skeletal remains. 

The solicitor's statement that he was not going to publish the ten admitted 

photographs in open court "out of respect for the jury" is telling on the issue of 

whether any probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 

prejudice. Also, when Jones offered the photographs into evidence during the guilt

phase, the solicitor, after first objecting on relevance grounds, argued the 

photographs should be excluded under Rule 403: 

The photographs are far more prejudicial than probative. I think what 

Jones is trying to do is basically use shock value to diminish the shock

should there be a second half of this case. In the second phase of this 

case, we get to show the characteristics of the crime, the defendant, how 

the victims were found. The photographs become probative at that 

point, relevant at that point. Right now, they're not. 
(emphasis added) (cleaned up). The solicitor's words "to diminish the shock" are

even more indicative that the probative value of the photographs was substantially 

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. We observed in Torres that 

"[p]hotographs calculated to arouse the sympathy or prejudice of the jury should be 

excluded if they are irrelevant or not necessary to substantiate material facts or 

conditions." 390 S.C. at 623, 703 S.E.2d at 228. 

Based on the record before us, we hold the photographs had no probative 

value. We hold that even if the photographs had probative value, the broader 

probative value implicated by Kornahrens was substantially outweighed by the 

danger of unfair prejudice to Jones. 

i. Harmless Error

Having determined the autopsy photographs were admitted in error, we must 

determine whether the error was harmless. There is no question that the murders 

perpetrated by Jones were horrific—perhaps the most horrific imaginable. After 

running six-year-old Nahtahn to death, Jones strangled seven-year-old Elias to death 

while Elias begged Jones not to kill him. Jones strangled eight-year-old Merah to 

death while she pleaded, "Daddy, I love you." Jones strangled one-year-old Abigail 

and two-year-old Gabriel to death with a belt because their necks were too small for 

Jones to strangle with his bare hands. Jones then packed his children's bodies in 

plastic bags, stacked them in the back seat of his vehicle, and drove across several 

states, all while trying to decide what to do. As he drove, Jones bought spice, trash 

bags, chemicals, goggles, a dust mask, and a jab saw. He searched the internet for 

applicable extradition laws and local dumpsites, landfills, and campgrounds. He

wrote a note reading in part, "Melt bodies," "Sand to dust or small pieces," and "Day 

1: Burn up bodies. Day 2: Sand down bones. Day 3: Mexican Border☺, dissolve, 

and discard." His expression of happiness about escaping to Mexico is particularly 

compelling. While the autopsy photographs should not have been admitted, we 

properly take note of Jones's calculated efforts to dispose of his children's bodies in 

a remote area to evade responsibility for what he had done.

Were the autopsy photographs horrific? Absolutely. Were they inadmissible 

under Rule 403? Yes, for the reasons we have explained. However, after weighing 

the horrific facts of this case against the improper admission of the photographs, we 

hold the photographs did not contribute to the jury's sentence of death. See Skipper, 

476 U.S. at 8; Chaffee, 294 S.C. at 91, 362 S.E.2d at 877; Key, 256 S.C. at 93-94, 

180 S.E.2d at 890. 
C. Proportionality Review

Pursuant to South Carolina Code section 16-3-25, we must conduct a 

proportionality review of Jones's death sentence. We find the sentence was not the 

result of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor and was instead supported 

by the aggravating factors alleged by the State, as set forth in subsections 16-3-

20(C)(a)(9) (murder of two or more persons by one act or pursuant to one scheme or 

course of conduct) and (10) (murder of a child eleven years of age or younger). With 

the possible exception of State v. Wilson, 306 S.C. 498, 413 S.E.2d 19 (1992) in 

which the defendant was sentenced to death for murdering two eight-year-old girls 

on an elementary school campus, there is not a comparable case to the one before 

us. Frankly, the horrific murders perpetrated by Jones are incapable of comparison 

in this state. Cf. Kornahrens, 290 S.C. at 283-84, 290-91, 350 S.E.2d at 182-83, 

186-87; Moore v. Stirling, 436 S.C. 207, 229, 871 S.E.2d 423, 435 (2022); State v. 

Bell, 302 S.C. 18, 21-22, 39-40, 393 S.E.2d 364, 366-67, 376 (1990); State v. 

Passaro, 350 S.C. 499, 501-02, 508-10, 567 S.E.2d 862-64, 867-68 (2002). 

Therefore, Jones's death sentence is neither excessive nor disproportionate.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Jones's convictions and death sentence.

AFFIRMED.

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., concur. FEW, J., concurring 

in a separate opinion.
JUSTICE FEW: I concur in the majority opinion in all respects except as to 

subsection B.4. I would hold the trial court acted within its discretion to admit two 

autopsy photographs of the badly decomposed body of each child, and thus, the 

admission of the photographs was not error under Rule 403 of the South Carolina 

Rules of Evidence. The majority is correct the photographs are gruesome, and were 

certain to cause a forceful, emotional reaction from the jury. Like the other Justices, 

I have seen—and sat with—these photographs. It is not possible to describe them. 

They are literally unbearable. A death penalty trial, however—like a man's heinous 

murder of his own children—is itself a gruesome business, and even without 

photographs such as these, evidence of what this man did to his children certainly 

caused a forceful, emotional reaction from the jury. There is hardly anything 

"unfair" in allowing the jury to see—not just hear—what this man did to the bodies 

of his children. It is simply not possible to sanitize the murder of these five innocent 

children, nor for that matter the trial of the man who did it, nor certainly the evidence 

on which the State seeks to convince the jury to kill that man through the death 

penalty. Timothy Ray Jones Jr. took a long series of planned and deliberate actions, 

first to murder his own children, then to conceal his vicious crimes, and finally to 

leave the bodies of his own children for the purpose of having them deteriorate to 

the condition shown in the photographs. His crimes were unspeakable; his efforts 

to get away with his crimes were unconscionable; he is despicable. The photographs 

show all that, and thus, the photographs have probative value. In my view, the trial 

court's determination that the probative value of the photographs was not 

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice was a reasonable decision 

and within the trial court's discretion. I would find no error.