Rel: May 3, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 

Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, 

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Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024

_________________________

CR-2022-1234

_________________________

Steven Brad Mulkey 

v. 

State of Alabama

Appeal from Calhoun Circuit Court

(CC-18-1367.71)

COLE, Judge.

Steven Brad Mulkey appeals the Calhoun Circuit Court's judgment 

revoking his probation based on his failing to complete a required 

rehabilitation program.1 We affirm.

1Section 15-22-54(e)(1)(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides that probation 

shall be revoked for a technical violation "[i]f the underlying offense was 
CR-2022-1234

2

Facts and Procedural History

Mulkey was convicted of first-degree burglary, a violation of § 13A7-5, Ala. Code 1975, and was sentenced to 120 months in prison. That 

sentence was split and Mulkey was ordered to serve 18 months' 

imprisonment, and the balance of the sentence was suspended for 

Mulkey to serve 102 months of probation. Mulkey began serving 

probation on January 16, 2021, and, on May 23, 2022, he received a 25-

day "dunk" for violating his probation by failing to report as directed. On 

August 18, 2022, Mulkey's probation officer filed a delinquency report, 

alleging that Mulkey had again violated his probation by failing to 

submit to treatment and monitoring, another technical violation. In 

2021, Mulkey was "being prosecuted on a new criminal charge" and was 

ordered to complete the "Seven Springs" rehabilitation program as a 

condition of reinstatement of his probation. Mulkey, however, left the 

program before completion, resulting in "Mulkey's third delinquency 

a violent offense as defined in Section 12-25-32 and a Class A felony." 

Because Mulkey's underlying offense was a first-degree burglary, a Class 

A felony under § 13A-7-5, Ala. Code 1975, and a violent offense under §

12-25-32(15)(a)(22), Ala. Code 1975, Mulkey was subject to revocation 

upon the circuit court's finding to a "reasonable satisfaction" that he 

committed a technical violation.
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3

report since being placed on probation." (C. 5.) Mulkey was arrested on 

August 25, 2022, for absconding. 

At Mulkey's initial appearance before the circuit court, he was 

advised of his "rights to and under [a] probation revocation hearing." (C. 

11.) Mulkey stated that he understood his rights and that he wanted a 

revocation hearing. The circuit court appointed counsel to represent 

Mulkey and set Mulkey's revocation hearing for September 21, 2022. 

Mulkey was present with counsel at his revocation hearing. The 

circuit court asked Mulkey's counsel if he and Mulkey had reviewed the 

report. Mulkey's counsel acknowledged looking at the report and stated: 

"I would like to present, you know, Mr. Mulkey was in rehab at one point, 

and he did leave that rehab. However, [Mulkey] has been accepted to 

another rehab ... That's correct." (R. 3 (emphasis added).) Mulkey's 

counsel then asked the circuit court to give Mulkey another opportunity 

to comply with probation and asked that Mulkey be "release[d] on the 

condition that he does go to Seven Springs and he does mandatorily 

complete that program." (R. 3.) Mulkey's counsel also told the circuit 

court that, if Mulkey is given another chance and again "leaves" the 

program, "then he needs to be right back where he is right now wearing 
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4

this jump suit." (R. 3.) Mulkey's probation officer volunteered that after 

Mulkey left the court-ordered program at "Seven Springs," Mulkey 

"showed up in [his] office saying he was given permission by his attorney 

to leave." (R. 4.) Mulkey's counsel vehemently denied giving "such 

advice." The circuit court stated its understanding that "there's no 

question [Mulkey] did not submit to treatment and monitoring in terms 

of violation of [probation] condition number 10." (R. 4.) Mulkey's counsel 

again responded with an admission that "[Mulkey's] learned his lesson, 

Judge." (R. 4.) Both Mulkey and his counsel proceeded to inform the 

court how many days Mulkey had spent in jail since his arrest. The 

circuit court asked Mulkey whether "you still feel like you need a hearing 

for the record because the probation officer is still recommending 

[Mulkey] be revoked." (R. 4.) The State's counsel responded "[t]hat would 

be their [Mulkey's and his counsel's] decision," but that he was "ready to 

go forward." (R. 4.) Mulkey's counsel immediately responded with yet 

another admission that "[Mulkey's] owned up to [not completing the 

program], Judge. We're not trying to duck responsibility." (R. 5 

(emphasis added).) Mulkey's counsel then instructed Mulkey to 

"apologize right now for telling them I said something I absolutely did 
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5

not say." (R. 5.) Mulkey immediately responded, "I apologize for that. 

And for the record I didn't say that he told me I could leave. I said I called 

him after I left." (R. 5 (emphasis added).) Counsel confirmed that 

Mulkey "did do that," i.e., telephone counsel after he left the program. 

(R. 5.) 

The circuit court summarized what had been said at the hearing, 

noting that Mulkey "is present in the courtroom ... and he's represented 

by counsel, ... and there has been an admission that he has, in fact, failed 

to submit to treatment and monitoring in violation of condition number 

19, charge number one." (R. 5.) Mulkey and the court then discussed 

how much time Mulkey had already spent in prison. The circuit court 

concluded, based on "the stipulations by counsel for the defendant and 

the defendant himself being present in court," that the court was 

"reasonably satisfied [Mulkey] violated condition number 19, failure to 

submit to treatment and monitoring, of ... his probation"; therefore, the 

circuit court revoked Mulkey's probation. (R. 7.) Neither Mulkey nor 

his counsel made any additional statement, and the circuit court's 

written order revoking Mulkey's probation again expressly noted that 

Mulkey had admitted violating the condition of his probation. 
CR-2022-1234

6

On October 18, 2022, Mulkey moved the circuit court to reconsider 

the revocation of his probation. Mulkey's motion never alleged any error 

in his probation-revocation proceeding but only offered "mitigating 

factors and circumstances" as to why his "exit of '7 Springs Rehabilitation 

Program' should not result in his incarceration," namely that he "ha[d]

been punished enough" and that, "with the exception of the twenty-five 

day 'Dunk' pursuant to this Court, [he] had proven himself an exemplary 

patient at 7 Springs." (C. 25, 30.) In short, Mulkey merely asked the 

circuit court, as he did at the hearing, to give him another opportunity to 

comply with the conditions of probation. This appeal follows. 

Standard of Review

"The general rules of preservation apply in probation revocation 

proceedings." Singleton v. State, 114 So. 3d 868, 870 (Ala. Crim. App. 

2012 (citing Puckett v. State, 680 So. 2d 980 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996)). It 

is well settled that "'to preserve an issue for appellate review the issue 

must be timely raised and specifically presented to the trial court and an 

adverse ruling obtained.'" Cochran v. State, 111 So. 3d 148, 153-54 (Ala. 

Crim. App. 2012) (quoting Mitchell v. State, 913 So. 2d 501, 505 (Ala. 

Crim. App. 2005)). That a revocation hearing be held is a recognized 
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7

exception to the general rules of preservation. See Singleton v. State, 114 

So. 3d 868, 870 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012) (recognizing only four exceptions 

"to the preservation requirement in probation-revocation proceedings: (1) 

that there be an adequate written or oral order of revocation,[]; (2) that a 

revocation hearing actually be held,[] (3) that the trial court advise the 

defendant of his or her right to request an attorney[, and] ... [(4)] that the 

circuit court erred in failing to appoint counsel to represent the defendant 

during probation-revocation proceedings") (emphasis added) (internal 

citations omitted). 

In addition, a probation violation need not be proven "beyond a 

reasonable doubt." Rather, the circuit court need only be "reasonably 

satisfied" that a condition was violated. Singleton v. State, 209 So. 3d 

529, 533 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015). Moreover, we will not disturb a circuit 

court's decision in a probation-revocation proceeding unless the circuit 

court has abused its discretion. See, e.g., Mantez v. State, 83 So. 3d 583, 

584 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011). A circuit court "abuses its discretion only 

when its decision is based on an erroneous conclusion of the law or where 

the record contains no evidence on which it could have rationally based 

its decision." Id. at 585 (citations omitted).
CR-2022-1234

8

Analysis

Mulkey argues on appeal that the circuit court erred by failing to 

hold a revocation hearing because, he says, a proper waiver was not made 

and, moreover, that the circuit court failed to comply with Rules 27.5(b) 

and 27.6(c), Ala. R. Crim. P., in finding that Mulkey waived his right to 

a hearing. The State argues that Mulkey's arguments are not preserved 

for appellate review because, it says, Mulkey never argued below that he 

was deprived of a hearing, that he did not waive his right to a hearing, or 

that the waiver rules were not followed. The State also contends that 

this Court has ceased recognizing a "distinction between no hearing and 

an 'inadequate' hearing" in determining whether an argument is 

preserved for appellate review. (State's brief, p. 19.) The State further 

contends that a circuit court's failure to comply with the waiver 

requirements of Rule 27 is not a recognized exception to the rules of 

preservation. In sum, the State argues that, if a hearing "was actually 

held," any infirmities in that hearing, including the validity of a waiver, 

are not subject to appellate review unless preserved below. (State's brief, 

pp. 19-20.) The State then asks us to "return to [] long established 

jurisprudence and recognize that alleged inadequacies" in Mulkey's case 
CR-2022-1234

9

-- whether a hearing was waived and whether the circuit court failed to 

comply with the waiver rules in Rules 27, Ala. R. Crim. P. -- were not 

preserved for appellate review. (State's brief, p. 20.) We now take this 

opportunity to clarify the application of the recognized exception to the 

rules of preservation that a probation-revocation hearing must occur.

I. Is Mulkey's argument that he did not waive a revocation hearing 

preserved?

The State contends that Mulkey's argument that he did not waive 

a revocation hearing is not preserved for appellate review. More 

specifically, the State argues that the following are not exceptions to the 

general preservation requirements: (1) the adequacy of a "hearing," (2) 

the adequacy of a waiver, and (3) the satisfaction of the Rule 27 waiver 

requirements. We address each of the State's contentions separately.

A. What constitutes a hearing?

The State first argues that there should be a "distinction between 

no hearing and an 'inadequate' hearing" and "only the complete failure 

to conduct a hearing" should be addressed on appeal when unpreserved 

below. (State's brief, pp. 17, 19.) Contrary to the State's contention, 

however, a probationer's mere appearance before a circuit court does not 
CR-2022-1234

10

constitute a "hearing" that would satisfy the "opportunity to be heard," 

which the minimum standards of due process require. 

The Alabama Supreme Court clearly settled this matter in Ex parte 

Anderson, 999 So. 2d 575, 578 (Ala. 2008), in which that Court recognized 

that, if a probationer appears before the circuit court (which is a hearing 

in only the most rudimentary understanding of that word) and denies 

committing a probation violation, he or she must be afforded counsel and 

a revocation hearing. The Alabama Supreme Court clarified that to 

constitute a revocation hearing, the proceeding must encompass the full

meaning of that word. In sum, when a probationer denies the factual 

basis of the charges that he or she violated probation, the minimum 

standards of due process require that a probationer be provided "'an 

opportunity to adduce proof and to argue (in person or by counsel) as to 

the inferences flowing from the evidence.'" Id. (emphasis added) 

(quoting Fiorella v. State, 121 So. 2d 875, 878 (Ala. 1960)). Indeed, this 

is how "[a] hearing ordinarily is defined." Id. (quoting Fiorella, 121 So. 

2d at 878). Without this opportunity, or a valid waiver of that 

opportunity, "'no hearing was held.'" Id. (quoting Anderson v. State, 999 

So. 2d 573, 575 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007) (Welch, J. dissenting)). This Court 
CR-2022-1234

11

has properly followed Anderson, repeatedly recognizing that if a 

probationer does not admit his violations, there is no waiver, and, if there 

is no waiver and no evidence is presented, then whatever "hearing" 

occurred is "no hearing" at all. See, e.g., Bailey v. State, 372 So. 3d 560

(Ala. Crim. App. 2022); Wilkerson v. State, 372 So. 3d 573 (Ala. Crim. 

App. 2022); Williford v. State, 329 So. 3d 86, 91-92 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020); 

Allen v. State, 285 So. 3d 864 (Ala. Crim. App. 2019); and Saffold v. State, 

77 So. 3d 178 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011). 

In sum, a "hearing" is a hearing only if it satisfies the minimum 

standards of due process -- an opportunity to adduce proof and make 

arguments.

B. Does the validity of a waiver constitute an exception to the 

rules of preservation? 

The State's second argument, that the lack of a valid waiver must 

be preserved to be addressed on appeal, also fails. The Alabama Supreme 

Court equally settled in Ex parte Anderson, supra, that the validity of a 

waiver necessarily constitutes an exception to the preservation rules. 

See Id. at 578 ("when he denied the charges, he was not afforded counsel 

and a revocation hearing for a later date was not set ... a revocation 

hearing was not held and [] Anderson did not waive a revocation 
CR-2022-1234

12

hearing"). In holding "that a revocation hearing was not held and that 

Anderson did not waive a revocation hearing," the Alabama Supreme 

Court reversed this Court's holding that Anderson's revocation was due 

to be affirmed because he had not preserved the issues he raised on 

appeal. Id. at 577-79. The Alabama Supreme Court expressly noted that 

"the failure to hold a revocation hearing is one of the exceptions to the 

general rule requiring a defendant to preserve his arguments for appeal 

by first raising them in the trial court." Id. at 578. The Court, thus, 

implicitly held that whether a valid waiver occurred was necessarily 

included within the preservation exception that a hearing occur. Clearly, 

under Anderson, the argument that a hearing was not waived equates to 

an argument that no hearing was held; and, it is well settled that 

whether a hearing was held need not be preserved for appeal because 

minimum standards of due process must be satisfied regardless of 

preservation. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (to satisfy 

minimum constitutional requirements before revoking parole, a parolee 

is entitled to, among other rights, the "opportunity to be heard in person 

and to present witnesses and documentary evidence" and "to confront 

and cross-examine adverse witnesses") (emphasis added), and Gagnon v. 
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13

Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (applying the principles established in 

Morrissey to probation revocations). 

In sum, whether the waiver of a revocation hearing satisfies 

minimum standards of due process must be addressed on appeal 

regardless of whether the argument was presented below because it falls 

within the preservation exception that a hearing be held. 

C. Does a waiver's compliance with the Rule 27 requirements 

also fall within the preservation exception that a hearing be 

held?

Although the Alabama Supreme Court's holding in Ex parte 

Anderson makes clear that the constitutional validity of a waiver falls 

within the exception to the preservation rules that a hearing be held, Ex 

parte Anderson did not address, implicitly or otherwise, whether a 

waiver's compliance with the Rule 27 requirements must be preserved 

for appeal. The Alabama Supreme Court prefaced its waiver 

consideration by noting that a revocation hearing may be waived if a 

probationer is "given 'sufficient prior notice of the charges and sufficient 

notice of the evidence to be relied upon' and if he 'admits, under the 

requirements of Rule 27.6(c), that he committed the alleged violation.'" 

Id. at 577 (quoting Rule 27.5(b), Ala. R. Crim. P.). However, although the 
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14

Alabama Supreme Court quoted Rule 27.5(b), it did not address whether 

those requirements had been met. Rather, it reversed this Court's 

holding that Anderson had not preserved his argument for appeal 

because Anderson denied the violations and never told the court that he 

was waiving his right to a revocation hearing. Id. at 577-78. The Court 

did not analyze Anderson's waiver based on his knowledge of the evidence 

relied upon, only his notice of the charges -- when he was presented with 

the charges, Anderson denied them. Id. at 576. Moreover, the Alabama 

Supreme Court did not analyze Anderson's waiver under the 

requirements of Rule 27.6(c) in holding that "a revocation hearing was 

not held and that Anderson did not waive a revocation hearing." Id. at 

578. Thus, Ex parte Anderson indicates only that Rule 27.5(b) 

memorializes the minimum due-process requirements -- notice of the 

violation and an admission -- for a waiver to be valid. 

The State argues, however, that our recent jurisprudence has 

created "confusion" regarding whether the failure of a waiver to comply 

with Rule 27 constitutes an exception to the preservation rules in a 

probation-revocation proceeding. According to the State, this Court 

appears to have extended the recognized preservation exceptions in 
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probation-revocation cases to "nonjurisdictional" infirmities, like the 

validity of a waiver. We acknowledge that the interplay between what is 

required by the minimum standards of due process and what is required 

by the rules governing probation revocations may have created some 

confusion in the application of the preservation rules and the recognized 

exceptions to those rules. Thus, we take this opportunity to review our 

recent cases regarding the preservation of a lack-of-proper-waiver 

argument. 

In Williford v. State, 329 So. 3d 86, 91-92 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020), 

this Court held that Williford did not waive her right to a revocation 

hearing because she did not admit to violating her probation. Rather, 

Williford admitted only "that she had been arrested, which is not a 

sufficient basis for the revocation of probation." Id. at 92. As did the 

Supreme Court in Ex parte Anderson, this Court in Williford cited Rule 

27.5(b) and noted that, despite Williford's expression that she wanted to 

"forgo a revocation hearing," "the record must reflect that Williford was 

given sufficient notice of the charges and evidence against her and that 

she admitted to a violation of the conditions of her probation." Id. 

Notably, this Court did not rely on the Rule 27.6(c) waiver requirements. 
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Moreover, in reversing the judgment and remanding the case for a 

hearing, we emphasized the most crucial aspect of waiver -- that Williford 

"refused to do that which is required in order to waive such a hearing, 

i.e., admit that she had violated a condition of her probation." Id. at 93. 

Our holding, like the Alabama Supreme Court's in Ex parte Anderson, 

recognized that to constitute a valid waiver, the probationer must admit 

the alleged violation, and, certainly, to admit a violation, the probationer 

must be aware of what the alleged violation is. Finally, Williford noted 

that "it is incumbent upon the circuit court to ensure" that any future 

waiver comply with Rules 27.5 and 27.6. Id.

In Bailey v. State, 372 So. 3d 560, 565 (Ala. Crim. App. 2022), this 

Court reversed a probation revocation "on the basis that the court failed 

to conduct a probation-revocation hearing." This Court noted that "the 

record does not indicate that Bailey waived his right to a probationrevocation hearing pursuant to Rule 27.5(b)." Id. Thus, this Court found 

that no hearing occurred because "Bailey explained why he did not 

believe he had absconded" and because "[t]he State presented no 

evidence." Id. 
CR-2022-1234

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In Wilkerson v. State, 372 So. 3d 573 (Ala. Crim. App. 2022), the 

probationer again argued that a revocation hearing was not held, a 

recognized exception to the general preservation rules, because he did not 

admit to violating his probation, he did not waive his right to a hearing, 

and the State presented no evidence. We agreed that no waiver occurred 

and, thus, no hearing had been held because Wilkerson did not admit a 

violation but, rather, "tried to present a defense to the failed drug tests." 

Id. at 579. Although this Court recognized that a person may waive his

or her right to a revocation hearing under Rules 27.5 and 27.6, our 

holding that no waiver occurred did not depend on any analysis of the 

specific Rule 27.6(c) requirements. Instead, we quoted from our earlier 

decision in Gann v. State, 337 So. 3d 1217 (Ala. Crim. App. 2021), in 

which we held that no valid waiver occurred because the probationer did 

not admit to a violation. 

"'[B]ecause there was not an admission of the truthfulness of 

the allegations, there was not a sufficient basis for the 

revocation of [Wilkerson]'s community-correction sentence. 

"Therefore, the right to a revocation hearing was not waived 

in this case. See Rule 27.5(b), Ala. R. Crim. P. (providing that 

a waiver of the right to a revocation hearing requires the 

probationer to admit that he or she committed a violation of 

the conditions of probation.). The circuit court was required 

to hold a revocation hearing at which it could receive evidence 

on the allegations contained in the delinquency report.'"
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Id. at 579 (quoting Gann, 337 So. 3d at 1223). 

Although Ex parte Anderson, supra, Williford, supra, Gann, supra, 

and Wilkerson, supra, all recognized that Rule 27.5(b) requires 

"sufficient prior notice of the charges and ... the evidence" as well as an 

admission that the probationer "committed the alleged violation," none 

of these cases addressed the "evidence" component of the rule, but, 

rather, considered only whether the probationer was aware of the alleged 

violations and admitted those violations. These cases all illustrate that 

the crux of a valid waiver is that there must be a sufficient admission of 

a specific probation violation, which necessarily includes notice of the 

alleged violation and an admission of the evidentiary basis for the 

violation, not that the specific requirements of Rules 27.5(b) and 27.6(c) 

be satisfied. 

Although we have often recognized and referenced the waiver 

requirements established in Rules 27.5(b) and 27.6(c) when addressing 

the validity of a waiver of a probation-revocation hearing, this Court has 

never held, expressly or implicitly, that compliance with the various 

specific waiver requirements constitutes an exception to the general rules 

of preservation applicable to probation-revocation proceedings. Our 
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holdings have merely recognized that to waive a revocation hearing, the 

minimum standards of due process require notice of the alleged violation 

and an admission of a violation. Moreover, our recent holdings recognize 

that whether a valid waiver of a revocation hearing occurred is 

inextricably intertwined with whether a probationer was 

unconstitutionally deprived of a revocation hearing. Thus, whether a 

probationer waived a hearing is necessarily included within the 

preservation exception regarding whether a hearing occurred. 

In sum, we hold that the failure to conduct a probation-revocation 

hearing when that hearing has not been waived within the minimal 

standards of due process qualifies for an exception to the application of 

the general rules of preservation. Accordingly, a probationer may argue 

on appeal, as Mulkey does, that he never waived a revocation hearing,

regardless of whether that argument was raised below. It does not follow, 

however, as Mulkey contends, that a probationer may argue for the first 

time on appeal that the circuit court failed to strictly comply with the 

Rules of Criminal Procedure in determining whether a valid waiver 

occurred. The waiver requirements established by Rules 27.5(b) and 

27.6(c), Ala. R. Crim. P., are not all "jurisdictional" or required by 
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minimum due-process standards. Thus, we hold that an argument that 

the waiver rules were not complied with must be preserved below to be 

addressed on appeal. However, if no Rule 27 argument was made below, 

due process requires only notice of the charged violation and an 

admission of that violation -- requirements memorialized in Rule 27.6(b). 

Thus, only the argument that a waiver fails to comply with due process 

may be addressed on appeal if not made below. 

We further note that our waiver determination has never depended 

upon a satisfaction of the element of Rule 27.5(b) that there be an 

understanding of the "evidence relied upon" -- in fact, this understanding 

is shown by the admission to the specific violation for which a probationer 

received notice -- much less that the five requirements listed in Rule 

27.6(c) be strictly satisfied. Moreover, even when a failure to comply with 

the waiver rules has been preserved, the Alabama Supreme Court has 

required only "substantial compliance" within the "spirit" of the rules. 

See Wagner v. State, 197 So. 3d 517 (Ala. 2015). 

With these principles in mind, we now consider whether Mulkey 

waived his right to a revocation hearing in compliance with the minimum 

due-process standards established by the United States Supreme Court 
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in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 

U.S. 778 (1973), and memorialized in Rule 27.5(b)(1)'s requirements that 

an admission be made only after the probationer "has been given 

sufficient notice of the charges."

II. Did Mulkey waive his right to a revocation hearing?

Mulkey's argument that he did not waive a revocation hearing is 

without merit because Mulkey's waiver satisfied minimum due-process 

standards.

In determining that Mulkey waived his right to a revocation 

hearing, we note that in Ex parte Anderson and subsequent cases have 

made clear that only two Rule 27.5(b) requirements must be considered 

in addressing the minimal constitutional adequacy of a waiver -- that 

"[t]he probationer has been given sufficient prior notice of the charges" 

and that the probationer "admits ... that he committed the alleged 

violation." Rule 27.5(b) further requires that the probationer have 

"sufficient notice of the evidence to be relied upon" and that "[t]he 

probationer admits under the requirements of Rule 27.6(c), that he 

committed the alleged violation." (Emphasis added.) Rule 27.6(c) then 

requires, even more specifically, that, "[b]efore accepting an admission by 
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a probationer that the probationer has violated a condition ... of 

probation ..., the court shall address the probationer personally." In 

addition, the circuit court

"shall determine that the probationer understands the 

following:

"(1) The nature of the violation to which an 

admission is offered;

"(2) The right under section (b) to be 

represented by counsel;

"(3) The right to testify and to present 

witnesses and other evidence on probationer's own 

behalf and to cross-examine adverse witnesses 

under subsection (d)(1); and

"(4) That, if the alleged violation involves a 

criminal offense for which the probationer has not 

yet been tried, the probationer may still be tried 

for that offense, and although the probationer may 

not be required to testify, that any statement made 

by the probationer at the present proceeding may 

be used against the probationer at a subsequent 

proceeding or trial.

"The court shall also determine that the probationer 

waives these rights, that the admission is voluntary and not 

the result of force, threats, coercion, or promises, and that 

there is a factual basis for the admission."

Rule 27.6(c), Ala. R. Crim. P. 
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Although we routinely caution circuit courts to adhere to the 

requirements of Rules 27.5(b) and 27.6(c) in determining whether a 

probation-revocation hearing has been waived, compliance with these 

rules is not required to satisfy the minimum standards of due process. 

Accordingly, any argument that the specific requirements of Rule 27.6 

were not met must be raised below to be preserved on appeal. However, 

as already noted, even if not raised below, a waiver of a revocation 

hearing must satisfy minimum due-process standards to be valid. Due 

process is satisfied when a probationer has been given "sufficient prior 

notice of the charges" and "admits ... that he committed the alleged 

violation." Rule 27.5(b). See e.g., Ex parte Anderson, supra, Williford, 

supra, Gann, supra, and Wilkerson, supra. Thus, because Mulkey did 

not preserve his argument that the circuit court's failed to comply with 

Rules 27.5(b) and 27.6(c), we consider only whether the circuit court 

complied with the minimum standards of due process in determining 

whether Mulkey's waiver was valid. 

The record indicates that Mulkey was provided notice of the 

charged violation and that he understood the alleged violation. Mulkey 

made an initial appearance and requested a hearing. Counsel was 
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24

appointed, and a hearing was scheduled. Mulkey was present and 

represented by counsel at the hearing. Mulkey's counsel informed the 

court that he and Mulkey had "looked at" the alleged violation (that 

Mulkey left the 7 Springs rehabilitation facility). Mulkey's counsel then 

admitted to that violation multiple times during the hearing. Mulkey 

also admitted leaving the rehabilitation facility in his dialogue with the 

court. The State was nonetheless ready to proceed with the hearing, and 

the court asked Mulkey several times what he wanted to do. Again, 

Mulkey, like counsel, admitted to the violation of leaving the 

rehabilitation facility before completing the program as required. 

Mulkey was provided opportunities to speak at the hearing, and he spoke 

freely with the court throughout the hearing. Mulkey continued to admit 

leaving the facility in his post-hearing motion for reconsideration, and 

Mulkey even attached to this motion the evidence of his failure to 

complete the program. (C. 34 ("This letter is written to inform you that 

[Mulkey] has exited the program on July 28, 2022.") and C. 43 ("This 

letter is written to inform you that [Mulkey] has entered the program on 

June 14, 2022, and has an expected graduation date of June 13, 2023.").) 
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25

Clearly, Mulkey had notice of the charged violation and admitted the 

violation. The minimum standards of due process were satisfied.

 We expressly reject Mulkey's contentions that his revocation must 

be reversed because of the circuit court's failure to comply with the 

requirements of Rules 27.5(b) and 27.6(c). As already noted, we have 

often referenced Rule 27 and cautioned circuit courts to comply with the 

waiver rules. However, in order for this Court to review whether a trial 

court has complied with the provisions of Rule 27, that issue must be 

preserved for appellate review. And, Mulkey never raised this argument 

below. 

Finally, we also note that, even when the argument that a court 

failed to adhere to Rule 27.6(c) requirements has been preserved, the 

Alabama Supreme Court has made clear that a waiver of a revocation 

hearing is valid if there is "substantial compliance" with the "the spirit" 

of the rule.

In Wagner v. State, 197 So. 3d 517 (Ala. 2015), Wagner raised the 

argument that his waiver did not comply with Rule 27.6(c), Ala. R. Crim. 

P., in his motion for a new hearing. Id. at 520. The Alabama Supreme 

Court recognized that Rule 27.6(c) provides that,
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"'[b]efore accepting an admission by a probationer that the 

probationer has violated a condition or regulation of probation 

or an instruction issued by the probation officer, the court 

shall address the probationer personally and shall determine 

that the probationer understands the following:

"'(1) The nature of the violation to which an 

admission is offered;

"'(2) The right under section (b) to be 

represented by counsel;

"'(3) The right to testify and to present 

witnesses and other evidence on probationer's own 

behalf and to cross-examine adverse witnesses 

under subsection (d)(1); and

"'(4) That, if the alleged violation involves a 

criminal offense for which the probationer has not 

yet been tried, the probationer may still be tried 

for that offense, and although the probationer may 

not be required to testify, that any statement made 

by the probationer at the present proceeding may 

be used against the probationer at a subsequent 

proceeding or trial.

"'The court shall also determine that the probationer 

waives these rights, that the admission is voluntary and not 

the result of force, threats, coercion, or promises, and that 

there is a factual basis for the admission.'" 

Id. at 521 (quoting Rule 27.6(c), Ala. R. Crim. P.). However, the Alabama 

Supreme Court did not require strict compliance with Rule 27.6(c) in 

finding that Wagner had waived his right to a hearing.
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The Alabama Supreme Court first determined that "[n]othing in 

the record shows that Wagner was not notified of the charges against him 

or that he did not understand the nature of those charges." Wagner, 197 

So. 3d at 522. The court read the charges, and Wagner's counsel admitted 

them. Id. As for the second requirement, "[i]t is without dispute that 

Wagner was present at the hearing and that he was represented by courtappointed counsel." Id. The Court found the third requirement satisfied 

because "Wagner, through counsel," stated that he had no witnesses and 

"the State called no witnesses." Id. at 522. Accordingly, "Wagner was 

not denied his right 'to testify and to present witnesses and other 

evidence on [his] own behalf and to cross-examine adverse witnesses." 

Id. Fourth, although the transcript did not show that Wagner was 

advised that any statement made could be used against him in a later 

proceeding, the Court found "that omission to be harmless error because 

... Wagner's probation violations do not involve criminal offenses." Id. 

Finally, the Court recognized that Wagner was provided opportunities 

"to address the trial court in some manner" even though "'Wagner never 

spoke.'" Id. at 523 (quoting Wagner's brief, p. 18). The Court further 

noted that "there certainly existed a factual basis for Wagner's 
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admission, even beyond Wagner's own admissions of guilt." Id. The 

Alabama Supreme Court thus held that "Wagner received a hearing that 

substantially conformed to the requirements of Rule 27.6(c), certainly to 

the extent that the spirit of the rule was fully complied with." Id. at 524 

(emphasis added). 

Based on Wagner, even had Mulkey preserved his argument that 

the circuit court failed to strictly comply with Rule 27.6(c), the circuit 

court "substantially" complied with the "spirit" of the rule in finding that 

Mulkey waived his right to a revocation hearing. First, Mulkey, through 

counsel, acknowledged viewing the delinquency report and admitted he

left the rehabilitation program. Second, Mulkey was represented by 

counsel. Third, Mulkey was informed of his "rights to and under" a 

probation-revocation hearing. Fourth, Mulkey's violation did not involve 

a criminal offense. Thus, it would be, at most, harmless error that he 

was not advised that an admission of his violation could be used against 

him in a subsequent proceeding. Finally, counsel admitted multiple 

times that Mulkey left the rehabilitation facility in violation of his 

probation. Mulkey's counsel's admissions were made in Mulkey's 

presence, and Mulkey, who spoke freely to the court throughout the 
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hearing, was provided multiple opportunities to speak. Indeed, Mulkey 

volunteered at the hearing that he telephoned his attorney "after [he] 

left" the rehabilitation facility. (R. 5.) Finally, Mulkey provided an 

additional factual basis for his violation by submitting letters from "7 

Springs Ministries" that he was not expected to complete the 

rehabilitation program until June 13, 2023, but that he left the program 

on July 8, 2022. (C. 34, 43.) 

In sum, unlike the probationers in the cases cited by Mulkey on 

appeal, he did not deny but, rather, repeatedly admitted the factual basis 

of the probation violation. The circuit court, thus, could be reasonably 

satisfied that Mulkey had violated the terms of his probation by leaving 

the "7 Springs" rehabilitation facility. Therefore, the circuit court did not 

abuse its discretion by finding that Mulkey admitted the factual basis for 

his probation violation and waived his right to a hearing. 

Conclusion

In conclusion, because minimum due-process standards require 

that a probationer receive a hearing before probation is revoked, 

Mulkey's argument that he was deprived of a hearing necessarily 

includes the argument that he did not waive a hearing. Simply put, 
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whether a revocation hearing is waived is encompassed within the 

exception to the general rules of preservation that a revocation hearing 

be held. To waive a hearing without violating the minimum standards of 

due process, the probationer must have received notice of the alleged 

violation and admitted that violation, two of the requirements listed in 

Rule 27.5(b). However, any argument that the probationer must have 

notice of the specific evidence relied upon under Rule 27.5(b) or that the 

probationer's admission must strictly satisfy all five additional 

requirements provided in Rule 27.6(c), Ala. R. Crim. P., must be 

preserved to be addressed on appeal. In this case, Mulkey was aware of 

the charged probation violation and admitted his violation -- leaving the 

rehabilitation facility before completion of the program. Thus, Mulkey's 

waiver of a revocation hearing satisfied due process. The circuit court's 

judgment is affirmed. 

AFFIRMED.

Windom, P.J., and Kellum, McCool, and Minor, JJ., concur.