SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3541-17T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

EL-AMIN BASHIR,

f/k/a LAURENCE JONES,

Defendant-Appellant.

_____________________________

Submitted January 24, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Alvarez and Mawla.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Somerset County, Indictment No. 99-04-

0217.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Karen A. Lodeserto, Designated Counsel, on 

the brief). 

Michael H. Robertson, Somerset County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Lauren R. Casale, Assistant 

Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). 

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

February 19, 2019
2

A-3541-17T4

Defendant El-Amin Bashir appeals from an October 6, 2017 order denying 

his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). We affirm for the reasons set forth 

in the thorough and well-reasoned opinion of Judge Kevin M. Shanahan. 

By way of background, in April 1999, a Somerset County grand jury 

indicted defendant on third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous 

substance (CDS), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1), and third-degree possession of CDS 

with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and (b)(3). In July 1999, 

defendant pled guilty to both counts of the indictment and was sentenced to four 

years imprisonment. 

In May 2000, defendant was released to intensive supervision parole. 

However, he violated the terms of his release, was returned to custody, and 

paroled again in April 2002. After defendant's release, he was detained in 

Florida on federal drug distribution charges. He received a 142-month sentence

for the federal charge. 

Defendant filed a PCR petition in February 2016. The petition was filed 

twelve years after the five-year time limit prescribed in Rule 3:22-12(a), and 

three and one half years after his release from prison in Florida. Defendant's 

petition asserted he had been deprived of effective assistance by plea counsel 

because his attorney did not advise him there would be greater penal 
3

A-3541-17T4

consequences if he were convicted of another offense in the future. He also 

asserted his attorney was ineffective because he failed to adequately investigate 

the matter and file motions to suppress evidence seized by police. Defendant 

argued his plea was involuntary because he entered into it under duress and had 

not been advised of future penal consequences. Defendant also filed a pro se 

brief raising additional points in support of his petition. In pertinent part, he

argued the merits of his petition should be considered and should not be time -

or procedurally-barred. 

Judge Shanahan considered defendant's arguments and issued a 

comprehensive thirty-seven page written decision addressing each argument 

raised in the petition. The judge concluded defendant's petition was time-barred. 

The judge also reached the merits of the petition and found no basis for an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim to either grant PCR relief or hold an 

evidentiary hearing. The judge also thoroughly analyzed defendant's plearelated claims and "agree[d] with the State that his bare allegations of asserted 

threats and narcotics use amount to an 'attempted manipulation of the criminal 

justice system.'" This appeal followed. 

Defendant raises the following points on this appeal.

POINT ONE – DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO 

POST-CONVICTION RELIEF BECAUSE HIS PLEA 
4

A-3541-17T4

WAS NOT KNOWINGLY GIVEN DUE TO PLEA 

COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO ADVISE HIM OF THE 

FUTURE PENAL CONSEQUENCES OF HIS 

GUILTY PLEA.

POINT TWO – THE FIVE-YEAR TIME BAR 

SHOULD BE RELAXED DUE TO PETITIONER'S 

EXCUSABLE NEGLECT AND/OR THE INTERESTS 

OF JUSTICE.

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must satisfy a 

two-prong test:

First, the defendant must show that counsel's 

performance was deficient. This requires showing that 

counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 

functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant 

by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must 

show that the deficient performance prejudiced the 

defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors 

were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair 

trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant 

makes both showings, it cannot be said that the 

conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the 

adversary process that renders the result unreliable. 

[State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 52 (1987) (alteration in 

original) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 687 (1984)).]

Counsel's performance is evaluated with extreme deference, "requiring 'a 

strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance[.]'" Ibid. "To rebut that strong presumption, 

a [petitioner] must establish . . . trial counsel's actions did not equate to 'sound 
5

A-3541-17T4

trial strategy.'" State v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 314 (2006) (quoting Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 689). "Mere dissatisfaction with a 'counsel's exercise of judgment' 

is insufficient to warrant overturning a conviction." State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 

542 (2013) (quoting State v. Echols, 199 N.J. 344, 358 (2009)).

The Supreme Court has stated:

When a guilty plea is part of the equation, we have 

explained that "[t]o set aside a guilty plea based on 

ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 

show that (i) counsel's assistance was not 'within the 

range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal 

cases'; and (ii) 'that there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not 

have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to 

trial.'" 

[State v. Nunez-Valdez, 200 N.J. 129, 139 (2009)

(alterations in original) (quoting State v. DiFrisco, 137 

N.J. 434, 457 (1994)).]

To demonstrate prejudice, "'actual ineffectiveness' . . . must [generally] be 

proved[.]" Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692-93). 

Defendant must show the existence of "a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome." Ibid. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
6

A-3541-17T4

Trial judges should grant evidentiary hearings only if defendant has 

presented a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. 

Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462 (1992). "If the court perceives that holding an 

evidentiary hearing will not aid the court's analysis of whether the defendant is 

entitled to post-conviction relief, or that the defendant's allegations are too 

vague, conclusory, or speculative to warrant an evidentiary hearing, then an 

evidentiary hearing need not be granted." State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 

(1997) (citations omitted); see also Rule 3:22-10(e).

"[W]here the [PCR] court does not hold an evidentiary hearing, we may 

exercise de novo review over the factual inferences the trial court has drawn 

from the documentary record." State v. O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super. 351, 373 

(App. Div. 2014) (citing State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 420-21 (2004)). Thus, if 

warranted, we may "conduct a de novo review of both the factual findings and 

legal conclusions of the [trial] court[.]" Harris, 181 N.J. at 421 (emphasis 

omitted).

Guided by these principles and having reviewed the record, we conclude 

defendant's arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a 

written opinion and affirm for the reasons set forth in Judge Shanahan's October 

6, 2017 decision. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). 
7

A-3541-17T4

Affirmed.