MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 2017 ME 186 Docket: Cum

- 16

- 305 Argued: May	9, 2017 Decided: August	29,	2017 Revised : November 30 ,	2017
Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER , MEAD, GORMAN ,	JABAR , HJELM , and HUMPHREY, JJ.

THERESA	L.	ALLOCCA	et	al.

v. YORK	INSURANCE CO MPANY	OF	MAINE et	al.

HJELM ,	J. [¶1] In	January	2014, Timothy	Austin	Davison,	who	was	known	as	Asti, was	fatally	shot	while operating a	vehicle	that	an	assailant , operating another vehicle, had	 forced	 onto	 a	 median	 on	 an	 interstate	 highway. Asti’s	 parents, Theresa L. Allocca	 and	 Timothy Alle n	 Davison , filed this	 action	 in	 their individual	capacities,	and	Davison	also	filed	as	personal	representative	of	the Estate	 of	 Timothy	 Austin	 Davison, 1 seeking	 to	 recover	 uninsured	 motorist (UM)	 benefits based	 on several	 automobile	 insurance	 policies	 issued	 by
defendants York	 Insurance	 Company	 of	 Maine,	 Allstate	 Insurance	 Company, and	 Horace	 Mann	 Teachers	 Insurance	 Company. The	 Superior	 Court

1 Except	where	indicated	otherwise,	we	refer	to	the	plaintiffs	collectively	as	“Davison”	because Timothy	Allen	Davison	is	the	party,	either	individually	or	in	his	representative	capacity,	who	seeks recovery	in	most of	the	claims	in	the	complaint.2 (Cumberland	County, Warren,	J. ) granted	a	summary	judgment	in	favor	of	the insurers,	 concluding	 that neither	any of	 the	 policies n or	Maine’s	UM	 statute , 24

- A	M.R.S.	§	2902	(2016), provides UM	coverage	for	the	loss associated	with Asti’s	death

. On	this	appeal	by	Davison ,	we	affirm.
I. BACKGROUND [¶ 2 ] The	 following	 facts	 are	 undisputed. See Cote	 Corp.	 v.	 Kelley Earthworks,	Inc. , 2014	ME	93,	¶	8,	97	A.3d	127 .		On	January	4,	2014, Asti was driv ing to	Maine	in	his	father’s	sport utility	vehicle

. While on	Interstate	81	in Maryland , an assailant 2 driving a	pick

- up	truck began	pursuing Asti and	fired
shots	 at	 Asti’s	 vehicle.	 	 The	 two	 vehicles	 crossed	 the	 state	 line	 into Pennsylvania,	 and	 the	 assailant	 rammed	 his	 truck	into	 the	 SUV,	 pushing the
SUV off	the	road	o nto	the	median.		The	assailant	then reverse d direction	and approached Asti from	 t he southbound side	 of	 the	 highway .	 	 The	 assailant pulled	up	next	to Asti’s SUV	in	the	median ,	and,	f rom	his	truck,	fired	multiple
shots	at Asti and	drove	away. Asti died	of the gunshot wounds.

2 In	i ts	statement	of	material	facts, see M.R.	Civ.	P.	56(h),	Allstate	made	a factual	assertion	that included the	 name	 of	 a	 person	 charged	 with	 murdering	 Asti.	 	 Davison’s opposing statement	 of material	fact s objected	to	that	assertion	on	evidentiary	grounds,	and the	court	correctly	concluded that	the	assertion	ha d	not	been	properly	established. S ee M.R.	Civ.	P.	56(e)

. Further,	as	the	court observed	in	its	order,	the	identification	of	the	assailant	could	be	material	to	the	claims	in	this	case because	 Davison	 see ks	 UM	 benefits	 based	 on	 the	 characterization	 of	 the	 criminal	 incident	 as	 a hit

- and

- run.	 	None	 of	 the	 parties	argued	in	 the	 trial	 court or	 here ,	 however,	 that	 the	existence	 of coverage	turns	on	that	factual	issue,	and	so	we	do	not	address	it.3 [¶ 3 ] Four	i nsurance	 policies issued by the	 defendants	 are	 re levant	 to
this	case. [¶ 4 ] First, Asti was	 the	named	insured on an	auto mobile policy and a
motor cycle	 policy	issued	 by	Allstate.	 	 Each	 policy	insured	a	 vehi cle	 that	 had been	owned	by	Asti and provided	the	following	UM	coverage : We	will	pay	damages	for	bodily	injury	which	an	insured	person	is legally	 entitled	 to	 recover	 from	 the	 owner	 or	 operator	 of	 an uninsured	motor	 vehicle. Injury	must	be caused	 by	 accident and arise	 out	 of the ownership,	maintenance	 or	 use	 of	 an	 uninsured mot or	vehicle. (Emphasis	added.) [¶ 5 ] Next,	 A sti’s father was	 the	 named	 insured	 on	 a	 York	 Insurance

auto mobile policy covering the	SUV that	Asti	was	driving at	 the	 time he	was killed

. The	definition	of	an	 “insured”	in	 the	York	policy	includes	any	 “famil y member”	 and	 “[a]ny	 other	 person	 ‘occupying’	 ‘your	 covered	 auto,’”	 thereby rendering both Asti and	his	 father insured s within	the	meaning	of	the	policy. The	York	policy	included	the	following	statement	of UM coverage: We	will	pay	compens atory	damages which	an	“insured” is	legally entitled	 to	 recover	 from	 the	owner	or	operator of	an	 “uninsured motor	vehicle” becau se	of	“bodily	injury” : 1.	Sustained	by	an	“insured” ;	and 2. Caused	by	an	accident

.4 The	 owner’ s	 or	 operator’ s	liability	 for	 these	 damages	must arise out	of the	ownership,	maintenance or	use	of the	“uninsured	motor vehicle [.] ” (Emphasis	added.) [¶ 6 ] Finally,	Asti’s mother was	 the	 named	insured	 on	 a Horace	Mann policy covering	 her	 vehicle

. That policy	included	 the	 following	 statement	 of
UM coverage: W e	 will	 pay	 damages	 for	 bodily	 injury	 an	 insured	 is	 legally entitled	to	collect	from	the	owner	or	driver	of	an	uninsured	motor vehicle. The	bodily	injury	must	be caused	by	accident arising	out of the	operation	or	ownership	of the	uninsured	moto r	vehicle. (Emphasis	added.) [¶ 7 ] In	August	2015, Timothy	and	Theresa individually ,	and Timothy as the	personal representative	of Asti’s estate,	filed	a	complaint	against	Allstate, York,	 and	 Horace	 Mann. The	 E state sought	 payment	 of UM	 ben efits	 from
Allstate	and	 York. Asti’s	 parents	alleged	 that	 they	are	entitled	 to	 recover	in their	 own	 right	 as statutory	 beneficiaries	 under the wrongful	 d eath statute , 18

- A	 M.R.S.	 §	 2

- 804	 (2016) , based	 on the UM coverage	 of their	 York	 and Horace	 Mann	 polic ies,	 respectively. All	 of	 these cla ims	 were based	 on	 an allegation	that	Asti’s	death	was	caused	by	a	hit

- and

- run driver

. [¶ 8 ] Each	 of	 the defendants moved for	 summary	 judgment,	 asserting that	the	losses	arising	from	Asti’s	death	are	not	covered	by	the	UM	provisions5 in	the	policies because his death	was	not caused	by an “ accident ” and	did	not
arise	out	of	the “ use ” of	a	vehicle	within	the	meaning	of	the	poli cies	or	the UM

statute. Davison	opposed	the	defendants’	motions. [¶ 9 ] In June	2016,	 the	court entered	an	order granting	each	summary judgment	motion	based	on	its	conclusion that UM	coverage	applies	only	to the “reasonable	and	proper	use”	of	an	uninsur ed	or	hit

- and

- run	vehicle	and	 that
the way	 the	assailant	used	 the	 vehicle	he	was	 operating did	not	constitute a
proper	use. Adjudicating	the	issue	on	that	ground,	t he	court	did	not	reach	the question	of	whether Asti’s	death was	“caused	by an accident” pursuant	to	the
uninsured	motorist policies	and	the	UM statute

. [¶1 0 ] Davison timely	appeal ed

. II. DISCUSSION [¶1 1 ] W hen	the	material	facts	are	not	in	dispute,	w e	review the	grant	of a	motion	 for	 summary	 judgment	 de	 novo. See Grant	 v.	 Foster	Wheele r,	 LLC , 2016	ME	 85,	 ¶ ¶ 12

- 13 ,	 140	 A.3d	 1242

. On	 appeal, Davison	 argues	 that the court	 erred	 by	 entering	 a summary	 judgment	 in	 favor	 of	 the defendants because	 the	 terms	 of	 UM	 coverage	 in	 the	 policies themselves allow for recovery	 here, or ,	 alternatively,	 if	 the	 loss	 caused	 by	 Asti’s	 death	 is	 not6 covered by the	 policies,	 the	 UM	 statute nonetheless	 entitles	 them	 to	 UM
coverage . See 24

- A	M.R.S.	§	2902(1). [¶1 2 ] We first	address	whether	Asti’s	death	is	a	covered	loss	under	the UM	provisions	of	the	policies.		Because	we	conclude	that	it	is	not,	we	proceed to	address	whether	such	coverage exists as	a	requirement of section	2902(1)

. S ee Tibbetts	v.	Me.	Bonding	&	Cas. Co. ,	618	A.2d	731,	732	(Me.	1992) (stating that	“ when	the	terms	of	an	insurance	policy	conflict	with	mandatory	statutory provisions,	the	st atutory	provisions	must	prevail ”).
A

. U ninsured	Motorist Coverage	Pursuant	to	the	Insurance	Policies [¶1 3 ] Each of	 the	UM	provisions in	 the	policies at	issue	here	requires that,	to	be	covered, the	loss must	be	caused	by	“an	accident.” 3 To	det ermine the	applicability	of	the UM provisions ,	we	must therefore determine	whether Asti’s	death	was	caused	by	an	accident	within	the	meaning	of	the	policies

. In construing	 the	 terms	 of an	 insurance	 contract,	 we “ interpret	 unambiguous policy	 language	 consist ent	 with	 its	 plain	 meaning	 and construe	 ambiguous policy	langu age	strictly	against	 the	insurance	company	and	liberal ly	in	 favor

3 To	qualify	for	UM	coverage,	the York	policy require s that	an	i njury	be “ caused	by	an	accident ,” and	in	 the Allstate	 and	Horace	 Mann	 policies an	injury must	 be “ caused	 by	 accident .” See	 supra ¶¶ 4

- 6

. Notwithstanding	Horace	M ann’s	argument	 to	 the	contrar y ,	we	see	no	material	difference between	the	two	phrases	and	therefore analyze	them	identically.7 of	the	policyholder.” Langevin	v.	Allstate	Ins.	Co. ,	2013	ME	55,	¶	9,	66	A.3d	585 (quotation	marks	omitted)

. [¶1 4 ] Applying	 these	 principles	 of	 construction	 to	 the	 policies,	 w e conclude that	Asti’ s	murder	was not	a n	“accident”	and	therefore	that	the loss
is	not covered	by the UM	protection included	in	any	of the policies	issued	by
the	defendants

. [¶1 5 ] W e	 recently	 concluded	 that	 the	 term	 “auto	 accident”	 in	 a n automobile	 insurance policy , although undefined by	 the	 policy , i s unambiguous	and	thus must	be	given its	plain	meaning. Kelley	v.	N.	E.	Ins.	Co. , 2017	 ME	 166,	 ¶	 7,

--- A.3d

--- . We	 stated	 that	 t he	 commonly	 understood meaning	 of	 an	 “accident”	 i s	 “a n	 event	 that	 is	 without	 apparent	 ca use	 or

une xpected;	an	 unfortunate	event, especially one	 causing	injury	 or	 damage

. ”
Id

. (alterations	 omitted) ( citing 1 Shorter	 Oxford	 Engli sh	 Dictionary	 14 (6th ed.	 2007)). Based	 on	 this,	 w e	 interpreted	 the	 term	 “auto	 accident”	 to mean	 “an	 unintended	 and	 unforeseen	 injurious	 occurrence	 involving	 an
automobile.” Id. Here, as	 in Kelley , the	 policies	 a t	 issue	 do	 not	 define “accident, ” 2017	ME	166,	¶ 7,

--- A.3d

--- , and the	summary	judgment	r ecord
establishes	 that	Asti’s	death	was	not	unintended	but	rather	was	 the	result	of8 the	assailant’s	deliberate	and	purposeful	conduct. The	loss	occasioned	by	his death	is	therefore	not	an	accident	that	would	invoke	UM	coverage. [¶1 6 ] We recognize	 that	 some	 courts	 have	 adopted	 the	 view	 that	 the question	 of	 whether	 a	 loss	 results	 from	 an	 “accident”	 is	 answered	 from	 the perspective	of	the	insured. See Am.	Family	Mut.	Ins.	Co.	v.	Petersen ,	679	N.W.2d 571,	581

- 82	 (Iowa	2004) ; Wendell	v.	Stat e	Farm	Mut.	Auto.	 Ins.	Co. , 974	P.2d
623 ,	 635	 (Mont.	 1999) ; State	 Farm	 Mut.	 Ins.	 Co.	 v.	 Pitman ,	 809	 A.2d	 1280,
1282

- 83	(N.H.	2002) ; State	Farm	Mut.	Auto.	Ins.	Co.	v.	Langan ,	947 N.E.2d	124,
127

- 29	(N.Y.	2011)

. A lthough	 the	conduct of	 the	person	who	killed Asti was indisputably	deliberate	and	not	accidental,	there	is	no	evidence	in	the	record
that	 it	 was	 foreseeable	 to	 Asti	 himself ,	 and	 so , based	 on	 that	 approach, his death	would	be	viewed	as	“accidental

. ” [¶1 7 ] We conclude ,	however,	 that	describing	an	intentional	act

— such as	an	intentional	killing

— as	an	“accident”	stretches	the plain meaning	of	that
word	too	far. Instead,	we	find	more	persuasive the	contrary	view, consistent with	 our	 holding	in Kelley , 2017	ME	 166,	 ¶ 7,

-- - A.3d

--- , that	 the	 plain	 and commonly	understood	meaning	of	an	“accident” is	an	unexpected	event. That
the insured himself may	 have	 been	 unsuspecting	 does	 not	 transform	 the
intentional	 act

— something	 as	 heinous	 as the	 murder	 of Asti

— into	 an9 accident. Ot her	jurisdictions	have	held,	and	we	agree, that “ an	injury	resulting
from	 a	 willful	 act	 was	 no	 accident	 because	 the	 harm	 had	 been	 intended. ” Landry	v.	Dairyland	Ins.	Co. ,	701	A.2d	1035,	1036	(Vt.	1997) ; see	also Austin	v.
State	Farm	Mut.	Auto.	Ins.	Co. , 625	N.W.2d	213,	217	(Neb.	2001) ( holding	that, in	an	uninsured	motorist	coverage	provision	of	an	automobile	liability	policy, “the	word	‘accident’ does	not	cover	intentional	torts ”) ; Roller	v.	Stonewall	Ins.
Co. ,	801	P.2d	207,	210	 ( Wash. 1990) (explaining that	 “ an	intentiona l	act	can never	be	an	accident”	because a “loss	is	accidental when	it	happens	without design,	 intent,	 or	 obvious	 motivation ” (quotation	 marks	 omitted)) , partially overruled	 on	 other	 grounds by Butzberger	 v.	 Foster ,	 89	 P.3d	 689,	 6 93

- 96 ( Wash. 2004)

. [¶1 8 ] For	 this	 reason,	 without addressing the	 court’s conclusion that the UM	 coverage in	 the	 policies was	 not applicable because	 the	loss	 did	 not arise	 from	 the	 “use”	 of	a	motor	 vehicle,	we	 conclude	as	a	matter	 of	law	 that
Asti’s	death	was	n ot	caused	by	an	“ accident. ” T he condition	of	coverage that the	loss	must	be	the	product	of	an	accident is therefore not satisfied here,	and UM	coverage	is	not	available	 to	Davison	pursuant	 to	 the	 terms	 of any	 of	 the policies issued	by	the	defendants

.10 B. Uninsured	Motorist Coverage	as	Required	by	Statute [¶1 9 ] We next	consider	Davison’s	alternative	argument	 that	if

— as	we have conclude d

— the terms	of	 the UM	protection	provisions in the insurance
contracts do not	 provide coverage	 for	 the	 loss,	 that	 coverage still exists	 by statutory	prescription. [¶ 20 ] The	 statute	 at	 issue	 is 24

- A	 M.R.S.	 § 2902(1 ),	 which states ,	 in relevant	part : A	 policy	 insuring	 against	 liability	 arising	 out	 of	 the	 ownership, maintenance	or	use	of	any	motor	vehicle	may	not	be	delivered or issued	 for	 delivery	in	 this	State	with	 respect	 to	any	 such	 vehicle registered	or	principally	garaged	in	 this	State,	unless	coverage	is provided	 in	 the	 policy	 or	 supplemental	 to	 the	 policy	 for	 the protection	 of	 persons	 insured	 under	 the	 policy	 who	 are	 le gally entitled	 to	 recover	 damages	 from	 owners	 or	 operators	 of uninsured,	underinsured	or	hit

- and

- run	motor	vehicles,	for	bodily injury,	 sickness	 or	 disease,	 including	 death,	 sustained	 by	 an insured	person	resulting	from	the	ownership,	maintenance	or	use of such	uninsured,	underinsured	or	hit

- and

- run	motor	vehicle. [¶ 2 1] Davison	 asserts	 that section	 2902(1)	 requires	 UM coverage	 to provide	indemnification that the insured	is “legally	entitled” to	recover	 from the	operator	of	a	hit

- and

- run	vehicle, even	if	the	underlying loss	is	not “caused by	 an	 accide nt ”

— a	 limitation created by	 the policies at	 issue	 here

. The
defendants ,	in	contrast, argue	that	the	purpose	of	the	UM	statute is to	mirror11 the	 scope	 of	 existing	 liability	 coverage,	 rather	 than to bro aden	 the scope	 of
covered	losses

. [¶ 22 ] This	 issue	 calls	 for	 us	 to c onstrue	 section	 2902(1). “[T]he fundamental	 rule in	 statutory	 construction	 is	 that	 the	 legislative	 intent	 as divined	from	the	statutory	language	controls	the	interpretation	of	the statute. ”
Tibbetts ,	618	A.2d at	733 (quotation	marks	omitted). [¶ 23 ] Although	 Davison	 contends	 that	 section	 2902(1)	 requires	 UM coverage	 to	 extend	 to	 nonaccidental	 losses for	 which	 the	 uninsured	 or
hit

- and

- run	vehicle operator would	be	liable,	we	have	s tated	that	in	enacting that	 statute,	 the	 Legislature	 intended	 to	 provide	 compensation	 to	 insureds when	 they	sustain	losses	resulting	 from accidents

. See Dickau	v.	Vt.	Mut.	 Ins.
Co. ,	 2014	 ME	 158,	 ¶	 43,	 107	 A.3d	 621 ; Beal	 v.	 Allstate	 Ins.	 Co. ,	 2010 ME	 20, ¶ 34,	 989	 A.2d	 733 ; Wescott	 v.	 Allstate	 Ins. ,	 397	 A.2d	 156,	 167	 (Me.	 1979)

. Because	Asti’s	death	was	not	 the	 result	 of	an	accident,	 section	2902 (1)	does not	require	the	insurer s	to compensate Davison	to any	extent	 further	than	is provided	in the	UM	provisi ons	of	the	policies. [¶ 24 ] Additionally, “ [w] e	h ave	consistently	held	that	the	[L] egislature’ s purpose	in	enacting	section	2902	was to	provide	an	injured	insured the	same recovery	which would	have	been	available had	the	tortfeasor	been	insured	to12 the	 sa me extent	 as	 the	 injured	 party.” Jipson	 v.	 Liberty	 Mut.	 Fire	 Ins.	 Co. , 2008 ME	 57,	 ¶	 8,	 942	 A.2d	 1213 (alteration	 omitted)	 (quotation	 marks omitted); see	also Wallace	v.	State	Farm	Mut.	Auto.	Ins.	Co. ,	2017	ME	141,	¶	12,

--- A.3d

--- ; Farthing	v.	Allstate Ins.	Co. ,	2010	ME	131,	¶	6,	10	A.3d	667 ; Molleur v.	Dairyland	 Ins.	 Co. ,	 2008	ME	 46,	¶	 10,	 942	A.2d	 1197

. In	 other	words,	UM coverage	 provides	 the	 insured	 with	 the	 same recovery that the	 policy’s liability	coverage would	provide to a	third	person	to	whom t he	insured cause s

a compensable loss. See Wallace ,	2017	ME	141,	¶	12,

--- A.3d

--- . Thus, with exceptions	not	applicable	here 4 and	for	purposes	of	this	case, t he liability	and
UM coverage created	 in an	 automobile	 insurance	 policy are	 symmetrical. Accordingly, we	 have	 “ characteriz ed	UM	insurance	as	gap	 coverage	 that fills the	 gap	 left	 by	 an	 underinsured	 tortfeasor. ” Id. (citing Tibbetts v.	 Dairyland
Ins.	 Co. , 2010	 ME	 61,	 ¶ ¶	 17,	 21 ,	 999	 A.2d	 930). Although section	 2902 requires	 automobile	 policies to	 include	 UM	 protection to	 fill	 gaps	 in the

amount of	 the	 tortfeasor’s liability	 insurance available	 to	 cover	 the	 UM insured’s	damages ,	it	does	not create	a	new	and broader	coverage,	as	Davison
argues. See	 Tibbetts ,	 2010	ME	 61,	 ¶	 17,	 999	A.2d	 930	 (“In	 en acting	 the	UM statute,	 the	 Legislature intended	 to	 permit	 the	 injured	 party	 to	 recover	 the

4 For	example,	UM	 coverage	 provided	 by	 the	 policies	 relevant	 to	 this	 case	 doe s	not	extend	 to property	damage,	which	is covered	by	liability protections

.13
amount he	would	have	received	had	 the	 tortfeasor	been	insured	 to	 the	same extent	as	the	injured	party.” ( e mphasis	added ) (quotation	marks	omitted) ). [¶ 25 ] None of	 the	 automobile	 policies	 relevant	 to	 this	 action	 would have	 provided	liability	 coverage	 for a	loss	 arising	 from the	 conduct at	issue here .		Each	policy	contains	an	exclusion	 from	coverage	 for	liability	based	 on
intentional	acts. 5 We	have	held	that	an	i ntentional	act	exclusion	in	a	liability policy	 “ applies	 only	 when	 the	 insured	 has	 acted	 with	 the	 intention	 or expectation	that	anothe r	will	be	harmed	by	the	insured’ s intentional act , ”	and
that the exclusion	applies,	for	example,	where	the	insured	defendan t	shot	and killed	 three	 people	 and	 those	 “injuries	 . .	 .	 were	 intended.” Royal	 Ins.	 Co.	 v.
Pinette ,	 2000	ME	 155,	 ¶¶	 8,	 11,	 756	 A.2d	 520 ; see	 also State	 Mut.	 Ins.	 Co.	 v. Bragg ,	589	A.2d	35 ,	38 (Me.	1991)

. [¶ 26 ] The	 parties	 do	 not dispute	 that	 the	 hit

- and

- run	 driver	 pursued
Asti’s	 SUV ; fired	 shots at	 it; rammed	 the SUV	 off	 the	 road; and	 then	 circled
back	in	his	own	vehicl e	and	 fatally	shot	Asti

. Because	 the	assailant’s	actions would	not	have	been	covered	under	 the	liability	protec tions	provided	in	 the

5 The	York	policy	does	not	provide	liability	coverage	“for	any	‘insured’	who	intentionally	causes bodily	 injury	 or	 property	 damage.”	 	 The	 Allstate	 policy	 excludes	 coverage	 for	 “bodily	 injury	 or property	 damage	intended	 by,	 or	 reasonably	 expected	 to	 result from,	 the	intentional	 or	 criminal acts	 of	 an	 insured	 person.”	 	 The	 Horace	 Mann	 policy	 excludes	 covera ge	 “for	 any	 bodily	 injury

. . . caused	intentionally	by	the	insured.” These	intentional	act	exclusions	are	common,	since	“[t] he language	 of	liability insu rance policies	is	standardized	 throughout	 the insurance industry .” Mass. Bay	Ins.	Co.	v.	Ferraiolo	Constr.	Co. ,	584 A.2d	608,	609	(Me.	1990)

.14 policies	issued	by	York,	Allstate,	or	Horace	Mann,	 the	loss	arising	 from	Asti’s death	is	not	covered	by	the	UM	provisions	of	those	policies. Therefore, se ction 2902	 does	 not	 require the	 defendants	 to	 provide UM coverage	 arising	 from Asti’s	death.
III. CONCLUSION [¶ 27 ] We	 therefore	 conclude	 that	 the	 UM provisions included	 in	 the policies	issued	by	the	defendants	do	not	provide	coverage	for	losses	caused	by Asti’s	 death.	 	 Additionally,	 section	 2902(1)	 does	 not	 mandate that	 the	 UM protections	 in	 those	 policies	 provide such	 coverage. The	 court	 therefore correctly	granted a	summary	judgment	for	the	insurers. 6 The	entry	is: Judgment	affirmed.

6 We	 need	 not	 and	 do	 not	 reach Horace	 Mann ’s	 separate	 arguments,	 unique	 to	 the	 claims brought	by	Allocca, that she is	not	entitled	to	UM	coverage because Asti was	not	an	insured	on	her policy	and	because UM	recovery	cannot	arise	based on her	independent wrongful	death	claim.1 5

Jeffrey	T.	Edwards,	Esq. (orally) ,	and	Timothy	D.	Connolly,	Esq.,	Preti Flaherty Beliveau	 &	 Pachios,	 LLP,	 Portland,	 for appellants Theresa	 L.	 Allocca	 and Timothy	Allen	Davison John	 S.	 Whitman,	 Esq. (orally) ,	 Richardson,	 Whitman,	 Large	 &	 Badger, Portland,	for	appellee	York	Insurance	Company	of	Maine Martica	S.	Douglas,	Esq. (orally) ,	Douglas,	Denham,	Buccina	&	Ernst,	Portland, for	appellee	Allstate	Insurance	Company James	 D.	 Poliquin,	 Esq. (orally) ,	 and	 Jonathan	 W.	 Brogan,	 Esq.,	 Norman, Hanson	 &	 DeTroy,	 LLC,	 Portland,	 for	 appe l lee	 Horace	 Mann	 Teachers Insurance	Company

Cum berland	County	Superior	Court docket	number	CV

- 2015

- 375 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY