www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 274 1 

The United States and Russia have sought to reduce the danger of 

nuclear war by limiting offensive strategic capabilities through negotiated agreements, relying on mutual deterrence based on reciprocal 

threats and the corresponding fear of retaliation. Although nuclear arsenals have 

been pared, this is fundamentally the same way the United States and Soviet 

Union sought to reduce the danger of nuclear war during the Cold War, when 

both were impelled to do so because they were adversaries and able to do so 

despite being adversaries. It is ironic—not to say unimaginative—that although 

the two are no longer adversaries, they stick to a path chosen when they were. 

This current approach is inadequate given new strategic vulnerabilities brought 

on by technological change. Both the opportunity and the need now exist for a 

different, more ambitious approach to avoiding strategic conflict—one designed 

for new possibilities as well as new vulnerabilities. The United States and Russia 

can and should raise their sights from linear numerical progress to qualitative 

transformation of their strategic relationship. 

Accordingly, while not discarding mutual deterrence or nuclear arms control, this paper calls for three basic changes in approach:1

◆ The scope of the effort to prevent strategic conflict should be widened to 

include two additional domains: space and cyberspace.

◆ The aim of the effort should shift from controlling capabilities to eliminating threats and dangers of those capabilities being used.

◆ The effort’s political premise should be that because both countries now 

truly seek a nonadversarial relationship, each can agree not to be the 

Raising Our Sights: RussianAmerican Strategic Restraint 

in an Age of Vulnerability

By David C. Gompert and Michael Kofman

Strategic Forum

National Defense University

About the Authors

David C. Gompert is a Distinguished 

Research Fellow in the Center for 

Strategic Research (CSR), Institute 

for National Strategic Studies, at the 

National Defense University. Michael 

Kofman is a Program Manager and 

Researcher in CSR.

Key Points

◆ With the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in place, the United 

States and Russia should expand 

negotiations to include cyberspace 

and space.

◆ Further, the United States and 

Russia should agree not to be the 

first to use nuclear or antisatellite 

weapons against the other or the 

first to attack the other’s critical 

computer networks. In view of 

its NATO obligations, the United 

States must insist that Allies be 

covered. Such strategic restraint 

would rely on mutual deterrence 

in all three domains, buttressed by 

cooperative measures.

◆ By reducing the utility of nuclear 

weapons and mitigating vulnerabilities in space and cyberspace, 

mutual strategic restraint would 

serve U.S. interests, and Russia 

should be receptive.

◆ The undemocratic character of 

Russia’s government should not 

prevent the United States from 

seeking an understanding that 

serves its interests, though it will 

have to be satisfied that its partner 

is a reliable one.

January 2012

Cent

e

r for Strat

egic ReS

EARCH
2 SF No. 274 www.ndu.edu/inss

first to attack the other or its allies in any of 

these strategic domains. 

In brief, the United States and Russia should seek to 

achieve comprehensive mutual restraint in the use of strategic capabilities. The first half of this paper explains why

Russian-American strategic restraint is important; the second half explains how to structure and achieve it, as well as 

raising some issues that have to be resolved along the way.

The need to broaden the scope of the effort to reduce strategic risks stems from: 

◆ the large and growing vulnerability of the United 

States and, in time, of Russia to serious national 

harm if denied use of space or cyberspace

◆ the dominance of offense over defense in space and 

cyberspace, as well as in the nuclear domain

◆ potentially weak inhibitions against attack in space 

and especially cyberspace because of modest costs 

and minimum casualties.

While the destructive force of just a single nuclear 

explosion need not be detailed here, growing reliance 

on space and cyberspace is creating vulnerabilities of 

strategic significance in those domains. To illustrate, 

table 1 shows an estimate of the economic damage the 

United States could suffer in important sectors in the 

event of multiple severe, yet technically feasible, attacks on critical computer networks.2

While it is hard to conceive of a wave of cyber attacks that would cause such damage simultaneously in 

all these sectors, these figures strongly suggest that unrestricted cyber war with a capable state—for example, 

China or Russia—could have devastating effects on the 

health of the U.S. economy and the functioning of U.S. 

society. Although Russia’s economy is much smaller 

than the U.S. economy and Russia’s use of computer 

networking lags that of the United States, Russia can no 

more afford strategic cyber war than the United States 

could, especially as its economic and social reliance on 

networking increases.

The scale of harm from loss of the use of space 

could be of the same order. The United States and 

Russia depend on satellites for crucial purposes such 

as voice and data links, global positioning and navigation, violent weather preparedness, resource discovery 

and management, strategic warning, routine intelligence, and military operations. Wherever telecommunications landlines are infeasible, uneconomic, or 

inadequate, movement of information for all of the 

sectors in table 1 transits space. The first sentence of 

the U.S. National Security Space Strategy states that access to space is vital—a term with obvious (no doubt 

intended) strategic connotations.3

For both countries, all three strategic domains 

have in common the dominance of offense over defense—technologically, economically, and operationally.4

 Defenses against nuclear, antisatellite (ASAT), 

and cyber weapons are technologically unpromising, 

yield diminishing returns on investment as offensive capabilities are increased or improved, and cannot prevent grave harm from attack by large, able, 

and determined states, including the United States 

and Russia.5

Nuclear weapons are offense dominant because of 

both their destructive force and the difficulty of intercepting missiles in flight, particularly if a missile 

arsenal is large in number and equipped with countermeasures. Figure 1 plots the cost of missile defense 

(based on the U.S. SM–3 interceptor) against the cost 

of offense (based on the U.S. Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile [ICBM]).6

 If each interceptor 

cost the same as each ICBM, each ICBM carried one 

warhead, and it took only one interceptor to destroy 

each ICBM, the relationship between offense and defense would be represented by the Equal Cost Line. 

But each interceptor (in this example) costs about $3 

million more than each ICBM; so the cost advantage of offense grows as a function of the number of 

ICBMs, represented by the line just below the Equal 

Cost Line. If ICBMs carry multiple independently 

targetable reentry vehicles, the cost gap is even worse 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 274 3 

for defense—the next line down. In reality, it takes 

more than one interceptor on average to destroy an 

incoming missile—the next line shows the cost gap 

if it takes on average two interceptors to destroy each 

incoming missile. Moreover, the odds of intercepting a missile worsen as the size of an attack increases 

because missile defenses can be overwhelmed by the 

complexity of trying to locate, track, target, and strike 

large attacks. This is illustrated by the lowest line in 

figure 1, which indicates the added cost of interceptors required in response to a substantial increase in 

the scale of attack. Overall—even before taking into 

account countermeasures to trick defenses—we see 

sharply declining returns for investment in defense 

and rewards for investing in offense.7

In sum, missile defense may work, and be worth the 

cost, against small, simple threats like Iran, but not against 

large, complex, and sophisticated ones like Russia. 

The plain and persistent dominance of nuclear offense over defense is germane to the prospects for U.S.-

Russia strategic restraint in this domain, since any advantage of using nuclear weapons first is negated by the 

futility of defense and exposure to retaliation. Although 

the Russians worry about U.S. ballistic missile defense 

(BMD), the United States would need to massively increase its commitment to this capability—far beyond 

what it takes to defend against the likes of Iran and 

North Korea—to be able to destroy an entire Russian 

retaliatory attack, especially if Russia were to introduce 

measures to defeat defenses.8

 There are no signs that U.S. 

leaders, defense planners, or taxpayers are prepared to 

make such a commitment, especially in light of much 

higher U.S. defense priorities, such as in the Middle East 

and East Asia, and the need to cut defense spending.9

Yet despite the continued dominance of offense in the 

U.S.-Russia nuclear relationship, the Russians oppose 

U.S. BMD—above all NATO BMD near Russian territory from which Russia is excluded (a pivotal issue to 

which we will return).

Satellites, being conspicuous, targetable, and fragile, 

are inherently vulnerable. Destroying or disabling them 

is easier and cheaper than protecting them.10 Moreover, 

as figure 2 shows, ASAT interceptors cost a small fraction of high-value satellites, giving offense a huge potential advantage.11 Some degree of space security can be 

gained through redundancy, but replicating satellites is 

Table 1. Preliminary Estimates by U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit

Sector Estimated Cost (Billions USD) 

Electric power 300–400 

Oil and gas 100–400 

Telecom/Internet 400–700 

Banking and finance 900–1,300 

Water and sanitation 100–100 

Chemical industries 300–600 

Air transport 100–300 

Ground transport 300–600

Health care 1,000–2,200

Total 3,700–6,900 

Source: David C. Gompert and Phillip C. Saunders, The Paradox of Power: Sino-American 

Strategic Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2011), 119.
4 SF No. 274 www.ndu.edu/inss

far more expensive than multiplying interceptors, each of 

which can rely on a common targeting system. 

Likewise, defending computer networks gets 

harder and more costly as the scale and sophistication of the attacker and the attack increase. Networks 

designed to facilitate access, sharing, collaboration, 

and new applications are in great demand and deliver 

significant economic benefits but also are inherently 

hard to secure. Efforts to defend them yield diminishing returns against increasingly capable cyber attackers. Figure 3 depicts a widely accepted model of the 

benefit of investment in defense in terms of prevented 

economic losses from attack.12 The diagonal line represents that an increment of investment in defense 

will prevent an equal increment of loss from attack; 

the curved line represents the amount of prevented 

loss that can be expected for every increment of investment in defense. It shows that network defense pays 

Figure 1. Cost of Offense Dominance in Missile and Intercept Systems

Cost of Defense

Cost of Offense

Equal Cost Line

Interceptors VS MRVed ICBMs

Interceptors VS Single Warhead ICBMs

Interceptors with 50 percent success rate VS MRVed

Interceptors VS Large ICBM Attack

Key:
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 274 5 

off well against threats of relatively modest losses but 

then offers declining benefits relative to the investment required. While the model is meant for corporations, the underlying logic and technical relationships 

can apply no less to other large enterprises, including governments. After decades of expanding work 

on defenses, computer networks are, on balance, less 

secure from those who would enter, corrupt, rob, and 

degrade them. 

The diminishing returns on investment in cyber defense relative to offense are especially striking 

when considering the disparity between “hacking” 

and “patching” in complexity, cost, and time required. 

Advanced network defense software contains between 

5 and 10 million lines of code; malware contains an 

average of 170 lines of code.13 Protection of U.S. Government networks typically requires regulated public 

competition and acquisition, which can consume years 

before solutions are contracted for and installed; an 

attack can be designed and launched in weeks. No 

sooner are effective defenses finally in place than cyber 

weapons to defeat them are in the works. 

In all three strategic domains, defenses may be effective, economic, and justified against little and simple 

threats but not against big and complex ones from such 

well-resourced actors as the United States and Russia. 

Figure 2. Cost Per Launch Cost in Millions USD

Number of launches

Satellite

ASAT

Key:

$16,000.00

$14,000.00

$12,000.00

$10,000.00

$8,000.00

$6,000.00

$4,000.00

$2,000.00

$

1 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
6 SF No. 274 www.ndu.edu/inss

Offense dominance thus increases the incentives of each 

competing side to invest in offense, which in turn stimulates the other to keep pace. Accordingly, the United 

States and Russia will likely maintain large and modern 

strategic nuclear forces and continue to improve cyber 

warfare capabilities. The United States is developing, 

and Russia may try to develop, a set of ASAT capabilities, both “hard kill” (for physical interception) and “soft 

kill” (for performance degradation). Although Russia 

does not currently have an operational ASAT capability, 

it has the technical competence and economic resources 

to acquire one, against which defense of U.S. satellites 

would be difficult.14 In general, neither country can be 

confident of its ability to field adequate defenses against 

attack by the other in any of these strategic domains. 

Neither one can buy and build its way out of its vulnerability to the other. 

Besides causing offense dominance, the advance of 

technology has dramatically cut the costs in lives and 

treasure of strategic attack to bring about an enemy’s 

capitulation—from mass invasion, to heavy bombing, to 

nuclear weapons, to space and cyber war. Table 2 shows 

the decline in the costs and casualties of strategic attack with the advance of technology, from mass invasion 

(pre–World War II) to heavy bombing (World War II) 

to nuclear attack (post–World War II) to space and cyber 

attack (21st century).15

Unsurprisingly, technology is making strategic 

attack less costly and less bloody. As vulnerability is 

increasing, means of attack are being refined. The most 

Figure 3. Diminishing Returns on Investment in Cyber Security

Investment in Cyber Security ($)

Reduction in Expected Annual Losses ($)
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 274 7 

striking decline is in casualties—those of the attacker 

as well as of the attacked—from millions to virtually 

none.16 Taking into account only the immediate effects of disabling satellites and computer networks, 

they could even be considered nonviolent strategic 

attacks—notwithstanding the devastating ensuing effects (and even loss of life) they could cause. With expected casualties plummeting, world opprobrium and 

resulting inhibitions on decisionmakers could also 

be greatly reduced. Yet the advantage to the attacker 

comes from the potential economic and societal harm 

and resulting blow to the will of the enemy, which 

grow as vulnerabilities do. Under conditions in which 

strategic attack might be contemplated, such as crisis, 

war, or faulty intelligence, the calculus may be shifting in favor of attack. As offenses improve, thresholds 

for war in space and especially cyberspace—though 

not nuclear war—could become perilously low, 

absent deterrence.

The main reasons to concentrate on restricting the 

use of capabilities are the difficulty and limited value of 

controlling capabilities in these domains. The danger of a 

U.S.-Russia nuclear arms race is now negligible; if anything, both will continue to trim their offensive forces to 

save money. At the same time, substantially deeper negotiated reductions in Russian and U.S. nuclear forces 

are obstructed by Russian concern about U.S. missile 

defense, by U.S. concern about Russian tactical nuclear 

weapons, and by mutual concern about other large nuclear powers, notably China.17 Even if deeper cuts were 

made, they would not in themselves reduce the risk of 

nuclear war.18

Meanwhile, trying to limit or ban ASAT capabilities would founder on problems of definition and 

verification, as well as the need, at least for the United 

States, for ASAT capabilities to deter Chinese ASAT 

attack. ASAT missiles are not readily distinguishable 

from missiles with other missions. The problems with 

ASAT arms control are compounded by the advent of 

soft-kill ASAT, whereby directed energy and electronic 

attacks can degrade performance (denying use of space 

without physical destruction of satellites).19 It is not 

possible to monitor and control such capabilities with 

any confidence.

If arms control is difficult in the case of ASAT 

weapons, it is patently impossible for cyber war capabilities, in which defensive and offensive technologies 

are interconnected, subject to continuous and rapid 

change, increasingly pervasive, largely in nongovernmental hands, and embodied less in hardware than in 

software. In sum, for cyberspace as well as space, restricting use is far more promising than attempting to 

restrict capabilities, while in the nuclear domain further efforts to reduce numerical ceilings on missiles and 

Table 2. Human and Economic Costs of Strategic Warfare Compared 

Invasion Heavy 

Bombing Nuclear ASAT Cyber

Own 

Deaths HIgh Medium Low Low Low

Cost High High Medium Medium Low

Enemy 

Deaths High High High Low Low

Source: David C. Gompert and Phillip C. Saunders, The Paradox of Power: Sino-American 

Strategic Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2011), 11.
8 SF No. 274 www.ndu.edu/inss

weapons will neither be easy nor reduce the risks that 

nuclear weapons will be used. 

Finally, the idea that the U.S.-Russia strategic relationship should be brought into line with nonadversarial 

relations is as important as it may be self-evident. Strategic capabilities and concerns aside, Russia and the United 

States find themselves increasingly on the same side in 

confronting global security challenges: dangers from the 

spread of nuclear weapons, instability and terrorist threats 

emanating from the Middle East and South Asia, disequilibrium in East Asia because of China’s rise. U.S. efforts 

to improve relations with Russia—trademarked as the 

“reset”—and Russian receptivity to this effort reflect not 

merely an urge for friendship but a converging of concrete 

objectives. The United States and (as we will argue) Russia 

increasingly take a hard-nosed view that the other can be 

instrumental in protecting and advancing practical interests. The era of organizing their relationship on the basis 

of threat and competition with each other is giving way to 

one shaped by the utility of cooperation. 

While U.S.-Russia relations as a whole have been 

through a revolution since the Cold War, the U.S.-Russia strategic relationship has barely evolved. Again, the 

primary way of avoiding nuclear war has been mutual 

deterrence based on credible threats of retaliation and 

fears of destruction. While deterrence will last to some 

degree as long as the United States and Russia have 

nuclear weapons, the two now can and should affirm 

that threats, aggression, escalation, and strategic war 

have no place in the kind of relationship both countries claim to want. Thus, the absence of any rationale 

for nuclear attack will allow dependence on threats and 

fears of retaliation to recede. 

This paper coincides with a political chill in RussianAmerican relations, at least on the U.S. side. Russia’s flawed 

parliamentary election of late 2011, triggering paroxysms 

of public anger—possibly lasting and expanding—about 

growing authoritarianism, confirm that politics within 

Russia are not just unsavory but also unsettled. In turn, 

American dislike for the Russian state limits what the U.S. 

Government can or would want to do to improve U.S.-

Russia relations, especially if it means counting on the 

Kremlin as a worthy security partner. Therefore, any new 

U.S. initiatives to mitigate strategic dangers must either 

be tempered by politics or else be so clearly advantageous 

for the United States that the character of the Russian 

state should be effectively ignored (as was the case in U.S.-

Soviet arms control). A presumption of this paper is that 

a new approach to managing Russian-American strategic 

relations holds sufficient promise for U.S. interests that it 

should be pursued despite the undemocratic instincts and 

practices of Vladimir Putin and his ilk. The United States 

does not need to admire Russian governing elites in order 

to see merit in eliminating the danger of strategic conflict 

or to enlist Russian cooperation in blocking the spread of 

nuclear weapons. Still, before the United States enters into 

any new strategic agreements, it will have to be satisfied 

that its partner is a reliable one, as well as that entering 

into such agreements would not reward and strengthen 

undemocratic forces in Russia.

Politically, mutual strategic restraint can both contribute to and benefit from a genuine normalization of 

U.S.-Russia relations. American and Russian publics are 

more likely to accept and support a cooperative relationship if the specter of nuclear war has been erased. Strategically, the United States can accept mutual strategic 

restraint because it has military superiority across the 

board. Yet mutual restraint is also in Russia’s interest because conflict of any kind with the United States would 

end in disaster.

Even as the United States and Russia develop a 

nonadversarial relationship, mutual deterrence remains 

a sine qua non of mutual strategic restraint. This relationship carries heavy baggage: lingering distrust 

born of old antagonism, plus fresher post–Cold War 

suspicions—on Russia’s part that the United States 

has exploited Russian weakness, and on America’s part 

that Russia still covets remnants of the Soviet empire. 

Moreover, the strategic nuclear forces of each are still 

structured—if largely from inertia—to deter the other 

(though this is gradually changing because of proliferation and the growth of Chinese capabilities). In time, 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 274 9 

reliance on mutual deterrence based on threat and fear 

should wane as benefits and habits of cooperation make 

mutual strategic restraint the natural new norm. Meanwhile, agreeing on such a norm would contribute to the 

pace and irreversibility of a nonadversarial general relationship—all the more reason to pursue agreed strategic restraint, starting now. While mutual deterrence is 

now indispensable for mutual restraint, the importance 

of deterrence could decline as relations improve and 

mutual restraint becomes natural. 

Even as the danger of nuclear conflict between Russia and the United States is declining, new vulnerabilities 

have arisen because of the criticality of space and cyberspace and the dominance of offense in both domains. 

The premise that any thought or threat of strategic attack would contradict the kind of relationship sought 

by both countries should apply to the use not only of 

nuclear weapons but also of ASAT and cyber weapons. 

Again, these weapons can produce grave harm, yet inhibitions against using them may be much weaker than 

with nuclear weapons. Moreover, failure to understand 

the full consequences of using counterspace weapons or 

large-scale cyber attacks may increase the risks of escalation in these new domains.20

Finally, NATO’s core principle of indivisible security requires the United States to insist that mutual strategic restraint apply no less to its Allies than to itself. This 

means, in essence, that Russia would have to pledge not 

to use nuclear, ASAT, or cyber weapons first against any 

member of NATO, and that the United States would be 

justified in retaliating in kind if it did. Alliance considerations are key to the design, negotiation, and success 

of U.S.-Russia strategic restraint, and we will return to 

this point. 

American and Russian Interests 

in Mutual Strategic Restraint

Based on this analysis of vulnerabilities and opportunities, the United States should seek agreed mutual strategic restraint with Russia to prohibit initial use 

of nuclear weapons, initial use of ASAT weapons, and 

initial attacks on critical computer networks, to include 

Allies. The reasoning behind prohibiting initial use of 

such strategic offensive capabilities could not be simpler: 

the less the danger of initial use, the less the danger of 

strategic conflict. While retaliatory capabilities would 

remain, to ensure deterrence, there would be no occasion to use them. Although elimination of the dangers 

of strategic war between the United States and Russia 

is not immediately realistic, it should be a stated goal of 

U.S.-Russia mutual strategic restraint. Ordinary Americans, Russians, and people everywhere can grasp what 

such a commitment means.

Agreement on strategic restraint would advance a 

number of key U.S. interests:

◆ further reducing the role of nuclear weapons in war 

and international politics

◆ improving Russian alignment with American efforts to counter the spread of nuclear weapons to 

hostile states, starting with Iran and North Korea

◆ reducing the danger of cyber attack by Russia

◆ reducing nuclear and cyber dangers to NATO 

Allies

◆ discouraging Russia’s interest in developing an operational ASAT capability

◆ setting a standard for strategic restraint that could 

apply also to China, especially in regard to cyber 

war and the use of ASAT weapons

◆ creating better conditions for development of 

U.S.-Russia relations in ways that serve U.S. international objectives

◆ setting the stage for deeper cuts in nuclear forces 

down the road.

This article was written with U.S. interests foremost 

in mind, but because mutual restraint requires Russia’s 

agreement, these ideas are tested against an analysis of 

Russia’s interests.21 On the whole, Russia should and likely 

would look favorably on a fair U.S. proposal to improve 

strategic relations and mitigate growing vulnerabilities. 
10 SF No. 274 www.ndu.edu/inss

But this depends largely on the wrenching problems and 

tough choices Russia now faces. 

Russia’s leaders, including once and future president 

Vladimir Putin, face certain inescapable realities: Russia’s 

political-economic system is too dependent on high energy prices, it has entered a stage of diminishing returns, 

it cannot keep up with external stresses (global competition, Islamist extremism, China), its human capital is 

wasting, and its critical condition dictates consideration 

of major course corrections. The course Russia’s leaders 

choose, internally and internationally, will affect their 

interest in U.S.-Russia relations in general and mutual 

strategic restraint in particular. 

While some Russians may still prefer their country 

to pose as a global power, there is a growing recognition that Russia should concern itself less with its relative 

standing and more with its real interests, including pressing national difficulties. The economy must be made less 

dependent on the extraction and export of energy and 

raw materials, which has relegated Russia to the role of 

a source of resources for more productive countries. Instead, the economy should leverage and develop Russia’s 

human talent, diversify, and become attractive to investment in value-added production that is integrated into 

the world economy and not plagued with corruption. 

In parallel, Russia’s national defense must become 

lean, economical, knowledge-based, professional, technologically adept, and suitable for responding to actual 

security risks. Russia’s military forces must be able to operate effectively in local and diverse contingencies along 

and within its borders. Meanwhile, the growth of Chinese 

power in East Asia requires a response that will safeguard 

Russian interests without causing Sino-Russian antagonism. Finally, having recently witnessed Iranian perfidy 

regarding nuclear capabilities, Russians now realize that 

Iran cannot be trusted with nuclear weapons, and the danger of an Iranian missile force has begun to rear its head.

Increasingly, Russia’s elites see that these challenges 

demand sweeping economic and military reforms. While 

the latter has begun in earnest (after many false starts), 

the former has been mainly lip service. Both economic 

and military reform would be facilitated by, as well facilitate, greater economic and technological cooperation 

with the West. Meanwhile, Russia’s security establishment now recognizes that a conventional conflict with 

the West is unlikely, and future threats will instead emanate from its periphery and the Far East. The fact that 

NATO, but not China, is named in Russia’s official statements as a potential danger is due to the reluctance to 

delete an old adversary and to name a new one. In this 

regard, Russia’s official documents lag Russian thinking.

Given Russian requirements for internal reform, and 

a shifting perception of external threats, Moscow could 

see the advantage in having productive relations with the 

United States and its allies. After all, the United States is 

as concerned as Russia with threats of Islamist violence 

and China’s growing power. At the same time, Russians 

observe American and European mounting debt, stubborn unemployment, political gridlock, and declining 

defense spending—further evidence that the Atlantic 

Alliance is not an actual threat to Russia. 

In recent years, Russia’s policy has evolved from 

fearing and opposing Western security arrangements 

to wanting to work with them—a trend that may become more pronounced as Russia contemplates its actual 

near-term security problems in the South and long-term 

security problem in the East. Russian sentiment toward 

NATO has shifted from hostility to disappointment. 

NATO has moved nearer geographically, through expanded membership and military infrastructure, yet has 

held Russia at arm’s length strategically. Russia’s frustration over exclusion from Western security arrangements 

will become deeper as its interest in cooperation becomes 

stronger. This, more than Russian fear of a U.S. nuclear 

threat, lies at the heart of the controversy with NATO 

over BMD. Conversely, progress toward Russia’s inclusion in BMD could open the way for a more cooperative 

relationship and toward mutual strategic restraint. 

This analysis of Russia’s interests reflects both the logic 

of its predicament and the drift of public opinion.22 Russian debate about domestic and foreign policies may not be 

entirely settled, but reality is constraining Russian options. 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 274 11 

Still, with another lengthy Putin presidency looming, it is 

not unreasonable to question whether Russia will in fact alter its course—whether it will, under his leadership, enact 

genuine reform domestically and seek a closer relationship 

with the United States and its allies. Given Putin’s popularity, power, and instincts, he and his inner circle may decide 

to maintain the status quo and select not to pursue energetically either reform or closer ties with the West. This, in 

turn, could diminish Russia’s receptivity to a U.S. proposal 

for comprehensive mutual strategic restraint. 

However, several factors suggest that the next Putin 

presidency will permit if not champion change in Russia:

◆ Evidence that Russia’s economy, absent reform, 

cannot produce steady progress in competitiveness 

and living standards is now irrefutable. However 

powerful and popular, office holders who ignore 

this evidence will lead Russia and Russians further 

into dependency on resource exports, declining 

standards of living and economic opportunities, 

and public disaffection.

◆ While Putin himself may not favor reforming and 

reorienting Russia, he will likely and increasingly 

be surrounded by and be reliant on officials, bureaucracies, experts, opinionmakers, and business 

executives who do—including foreign investors 

and financial institutions.

◆ Regardless of what is in his famous “soul,” Putin has displayed an ability to sense the practical 

dangers and opportunities facing Russia and to 

play the role of change agent in order to succeed 

in leadership. He is no captive of the status quo, 

which he largely created and has the power to 

change. Putin will understand that a failing Russia 

would preclude a successful presidency. 

Even without embarking on major internal reform, 

Putin should recognize that a more cooperative relationship 

with the United States serves the interests of Russia and 

its leader. Although Russians remain wary of the United 

States, perpetuating and accenting American-Russian differences is no longer the formula for political advantage it 

once was. Meanwhile, China will present a growing contrast 

to Russia and a potential challenge to its interests and influence—a prospect no leader can dismiss. This will argue in 

favor of giving U.S. proposals for mutual strategic restraint 

a fair hearing. More than that, such U.S. proposals could 

signal that security cooperation with the United States and 

NATO is not only desirable but possible for Russia. 

In sum, while far from certain, the authors foresee 

growing Russian acceptance of the imperatives of reform, 

integration, and cooperation with the West. Indeed, many 

Russian elites already see their current political system as 

unresponsive and the economic system as unsustainable. 

The growing budget deficit continues to drive this point 

home in Moscow. While the next president of Russia 

may or may not embrace this view, resisting those who do 

embrace it could lead to more primitive politics, domestic 

discontent, and instability and, in response, draconian rule. 

In contrast, the opportunity to join the United States in 

an ambitious new effort to eliminate the dangers of strategic conflict would refresh Russia’s international image as a 

progressive and significant power—and Putin’s image as a 

global mover and shaker. 

Agreed mutual strategic restraint with the United 

States would not only serve Russia’s political purposes but 

also mitigate growing Russian vulnerabilities. As economic 

and military reforms are pursued, Russia will become more 

successful in and reliant on information networking and the 

use of space. Table 3 shows the level and growth of American, Russian, and Chinese per capita Internet use. Note 

that Russia’s use is presently at the same level as China’s in 

2008−2009 but is growing much more slowly—a result not 

only of China’s faster economic growth but also of its more 

complex, integrated, and production-oriented economy. 

If and as Russia’s economy is reformed, oriented 

toward value-added production, and integrated internally and externally, growth should accelerate in the 

use of computer networking and related use of space. 

Russia’s urban society and business class are already 

dependent on the Internet for daily life, and its government is increasing the use of cyberspace for provision 
12 SF No. 274 www.ndu.edu/inss

of traditional services to the public. Russia also aspires 

not only to remain competitive as a provider of space 

services but also to increase its use of space for commercial and military purposes, as evidenced by its high 

hopes for establishing the Global Navigation Satellite 

System for commercial and military use.23

Military reform, which is under way but has far 

to go, will pattern Russian forces after the light, fast, 

networked style of operations and types of capabilities 

Western forces now stress. (Development of such forces 

is further evidence that Russia does not foresee much 

likelihood of conflict with NATO, just as NATO does 

not see much likelihood of conflict with Russia.) The 

need for rapid deployment, integration, and efficient logistical support corresponds to limited but intense operations on Russia’s periphery. With these capabilities 

will come growing dependence on advanced command, 

control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance networks—largely spacebased, given Russia’s sprawling territory. While such 

capabilities are far more useful for Russia than oldfashioned mass-mechanized forces, they will result in 

greater vulnerability to cyber and ASAT attacks.

Thus, as Russian economic and military reforms gain 

strength, so should Russian interest in avoiding conflict in 

both space and cyberspace. At the same time, Moscow’s interest in waging cyber war will be checked by its vulnerability 

and fear of retaliation. As for preserving Russia’s option of 

first use of nuclear weapons, it is neither credible, given U.S. 

deterrence, nor helpful, given the desire for improved relations with the West. While the Russians are not prepared 

to say so, the option of nuclear first use is more relevant to 

increased fears of China than to decreased fears of NATO. 

In sum, there should be a general and growing interest on both sides in mutual strategic restraint. At the 

same time, American and Russian situations and views 

differ sharply across the three domains:

◆ Russia’s conventional military weakness has made 

the country more interested and the United States 

less interested in reserving the option to use nuclear weapons first. 

◆ The United States is more reliant on space and 

therefore potentially more vulnerable than Russia to denial of access to space, though the United 

States has and Russia lacks ASAT capabilities.

◆ Likewise, the U.S. economy and military rely more 

on computer networking than Russia’s economy 

and military do; and while the United States has 

better cyber war capabilities, Russia also possesses 

and has used such capabilities. 

These asymmetries suggest that it could prove difficult to reach agreement on mutual restraint if pursued 

Table 3. Estimated Internet Users by Country (per 100 Inhabitants)

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

China 1.78 2.64 4.60 6.20 7.30 8.52 10.52 16.00 22.60 28.90

Russia 1.98 2.94 4.13 8.30 12.86 15.23 18.02 24.66 26.83 29.00

United 

States 43.08 49.08 58.79 61.70 64.76 67.97 68.93 75.00 74.00 78.00

Source: United Nations ITU World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators Database
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 274 13 

along separate and independent tracks. As well, the 

United States might need to persuade Russia that particular terms of mutual restraint are tied to a broader and 

fundamentally political commitment to bring strategic 

relations into line with the goal and growing reality of a 

nonadversarial, jointly productive relationship. 

Terms of Mutual 

Strategic Restraint

Under such conditions, the United States should 

propose an integrated approach—a package deal—to 

mitigate nuclear, space, and cyberspace vulnerabilities 

through agreed mutual strategic restraint. The approach 

should rest on three pillars: the belief that strategic relations should reflect nonadversarial relations; the fact that 

conditions of mutual deterrence exist and will persist in 

all three offense-dominant domains; and the need to redirect the American-Russian strategic agenda from the 

dangers of each other to the dangers of proliferation and 

other converging concerns. 

The terms of mutual restraint that should interest 

the United States include:

◆ an exchange of nuclear no-first-use (NFU) pledges

◆ agreements to develop a joint BMD system and 

to take other strong joint measures against hostile 

nuclear states

◆ pledges not to be the first to interfere with the 

other’s use of space

◆ pledges not to initiate attacks on computer networks critical to the other’s national economic and 

societal well-being

◆ application of all terms of restraint to allies

◆ measures to boost confidence that the terms will 

be honored.

The essence of mutual nuclear restraint would be 

American-Russian agreement that neither state would start 

a nuclear conflict against the other or its allies. Having once 

expressly reserved the option to use nuclear weapons first 

if conventional defense proved inadequate against massive 

Soviet aggression, the United States no longer needs to 

confront Russia with such a threat. With its aim of reducing 

the role of nuclear weapons in mind, the United States has 

stated that it intends to work toward conditions in which 

the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack.24 A nuclear NFU agreement with Russia would be 

an important, even dramatic step in that direction. If Russia used nonnuclear weapons of mass destruction, such as 

biological weapons, against U.S. forces or Allies, the United 

States would have unassailable grounds for declaring its nuclear NFU pledge—indeed, all terms of mutual restraint—

nullified by such a horrific Russian act.

Nuclear NFU should be negotiable on its own terms 

and in keeping with Russia’s (presumed) growing interest in 

a fundamentally nonadversarial relationship. Russia’s nuclear posture now states that it would use nuclear weapons first 

only if “the very existence of the state is under threat.” This 

constitutes a raising of the threshold for Russian nuclear 

first use and a more restricted approach compared to the 

previous policy.25 Surely informed Russians know that the 

United States and NATO will not threaten Russia itself, 

except in the extreme case of a Russian attack on NATO. If 

Russia were to attack a NATO member, it would invite not 

only defeat but also the possibility of a direct threat to itself, 

with or without agreement on nuclear restraint. 

With the desire to move closer to the United States 

and its European allies, and the offer of a reciprocal and 

contingent U.S. NFU pledge, Russia would have nothing 

to lose and much to gain by accepting such an offer. Russia does not need a nuclear first-use option to be safe from 

NATO attack. While Russian generals fear that their conventional forces could be defeated in the event of hostilities with NATO, the idea that the Kremlin would start a 

nuclear war in that instance ignores two important facts. 

First, the survival of the Russian state would not be threatened by NATO even if its forces were beaten. Second, if 

Russia used nuclear weapons first, NATO retaliation would 

be devastating—indeed, the only plausible NATO threat to 

the Russian state’s survival would be the result of Russia’s 

first use of nuclear weapons.26 Russia’s agreement to nuclear 
14 SF No. 274 www.ndu.edu/inss

NFU would signal its commitment to a lasting nonadversarial relationship with the United States. Conversely, for 

Russia to reject such an understanding would raise doubts 

about the value of mutual restraint in any strategic domains. 

For both countries, a nuclear NFU pledge would also signify a transformation of the strategic relationship.

Agreement to pursue a joint NATO-Russia BMD 

system would fit with a nuclear NFU agreement:

◆ Logically, if both states commit not to use nuclear 

weapons first, including against allies, it follows 

that the United States would not have reason 

to anticipate either a Russian first strike or a 

Russian retaliatory strike. (Under conditions of 

mutual restraint, U.S. confidence in Russia’s compliance would be undergirded by deterrence and 

bolstered by confidence-building measures, as addressed below.) 

◆ Strategically, both states could turn their full attention, including cooperative BMD, to the gathering 

danger of nuclear proliferation, especially the Iranian missile threat. Russia’s inclusion in BMD 

would give substance to U.S. insistence that Russia 

should be more concerned about Iranian nuclear 

intentions, which NATO’s current position tends 

to contradict by denying Russian participation 

in a joint system. Because it is unable to build a 

complete BMD system of its own, the alternatives 

for Russia are to participate in a joint system or 

be largely unprotected as Iran expands its missile 

force and acquires nuclear weapons. 

◆ Politically, the combination of NFU and Russia’s 

inclusion in NATO BMD would take NATORussia cooperation to a new level. It would also 

send an unmistakable signal that both Russia and 

the United States, along with their allies, are more 

concerned about the threat from Iran than from 

each other. 

NATO-Russia joint BMD would, of course, have to 

leave NATO no less secure and if possible more secure 

from an Iranian missile attack. While Russia lacks a suite 

of advanced warning-and-tracking sensors like those 

of the United States, it does have well-placed radars. If 

data from both NATO and Russian sensors were fused 

and shared, by definition both would benefit. Further, if 

both NATO and Russia relied on their own interceptors, by definition neither would be disadvantaged nor 

dependent on the other to destroy threatening missiles.27

While NATO could benefit somewhat from such a joint 

arrangement, Russia could benefit greatly, for it lacks the 

means to build a complete system on its own. 

The Russians are coming to appreciate that NATO 

BMD is designed against Iranian missiles, not theirs. Still, 

they worry that the system could someday be expanded 

or reoriented in a way that would weaken Russia’s intercontinental deterrent, such as by placement of interceptors in Europe’s northern waters.28 The best way for Russia to guard against such an improbable development is 

to participate in a joint NATO-Russia system.29 Given 

the political benefits of joining a major Western security 

initiative and the security benefits of defense against Iranian nuclear-armed missiles, Russia should seize the opportunity to participate in the NATO system.30 For the 

United States, Russia’s participation in joint BMD would 

facilitate agreement on strategic restraint, strengthen cooperation on nuclear proliferation in general and stop Iran 

in particular, and encourage the sentiment in Moscow that 

Russia should reorient toward the West.

In regard to the use of ASAT capabilities, the 

United States has less to gain by reserving the option 

to attack Russian satellites than by establishing an 

international precedent with Russia that unhindered 

access to space will be respected. While Russia does 

not have an operational ASAT capability, it might be 

dissuaded from acquiring one and would be prohibited from using it first if it were to acquire one. Both 

“hard” and “soft” interference with space systems must 

be precluded in order to discourage development of 

offensive capabilities that may be used.

U.S.-Russia agreement not to initiate attacks on the 

other’s critical computer networks would ease U.S. and Al-
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 274 15 

lied concerns with Russia’s growing interest in cyber war 

capabilities and operations. Such agreement would require 

agreed definitions of both “attack” (which would not include intelligence gathering) and “critical” (which would 

not include entertainment and the like). Recently, American and Russian experts have made progress on a common 

terminology in the cyber realm, the first step toward such an 

understanding.31 While it would require the United States 

to forego attacks on critical Russian networks, U.S. conventional military advantages and the risk of Russian cyber 

retaliation make this option neither essential nor attractive. 

To have integrity, the understanding on cyber war would 

need to cover attacks that originate in either country even 

if not by or at the behest of the state. Not to do so would 

be to create a tempting loophole and to concede that sovereigns are not responsible for preventing attacks on other 

states from their jurisdictions. Because total compliance 

with this standard is impossible—hacking being impossible 

to stop—agreement on this would signify a commitment 

to collaborate against third-party threats, including within 

each country.32 It should be understood that third-party attack, unless instigated by government, would not justify retaliation against the other state or its critical networks. 

The United States (and Russia) would retain the option to attack networks that enable enemy combat operations. Therefore, there would have to be an additional understanding that any such wartime actions would be strictly 

controlled by political authorities and kept from escalating 

to strategic cyber war on networks critical to each other’s 

economies and societies. In any case, with the risks of American-Russian armed conflict declining and the strength of 

deterrence based on the threat of retaliation, cyber war as an 

extension of military combat is increasingly unlikely.

As in the nuclear and space domains, mutual cyber 

war restraint would depend on mutual deterrence. While 

there is an active debate on the applicability of deterrence theory to cyber security, there are reasons to believe that the prospect of severe retaliation can and will 

deter strategic attacks on critical networks by large and 

capable states, which are themselves vulnerable (for example, Russia, the United States, and China).33 While 

certainty about the identity of an attacker may not be 

possible, there are only a few “high-end” candidates, and 

circumstantial evidence (for example, the existence of a 

crisis or conflict) may be strong. Moreover, for deterrence 

to work, the standard is not certainty of retaliation but 

a high enough likelihood to give a would-be attacker 

pause. Now that the U.S. Government has stated, in 

effect, that a cyber attack on itself or an ally would be 

taken as an act of war and grounds for retaliation, Russia 

has reason to fear for its own vulnerable networks before 

acting.34 Deterrence may not work against many cyber 

attackers, but if it can work in the U.S.-Russia case, it 

provides a basis for agreed mutual restraint. 

While American and Russian positions differ from 

domain to domain, there is something for each in this entire 

package of restraints. The primary specific benefit for the 

United States would be Russia’s agreement not to initiate 

attacks on critical computer networks, given U.S. vulnerabilities and Russian capabilities. The United States would 

also benefit from the chance to lock Russia into an active 

collaborative strategy to counter nuclear proliferation, starting with Iran. The primary specific benefit—and quid pro 

quo—for Russia would be its inclusion in NATO BMD 

(as described earlier). Russia’s international stature would 

also receive a needed boost by virtue of joining the United 

States in a major initiative to lessen the risks of strategic 

conflict. Over time, both would benefit from the mitigation 

of mutual vulnerabilities in space and cyberspace, from the 

contribution of such agreements to U.S.-Russia relations, 

and from having created more conducive conditions for further nuclear arms reductions down the road. 

As to negotiability, given its conventional military 

shortcomings, Russia may be hesitant to give up nuclear 

or cyber first-use options. However, Russia is confronted 

with strong deterrence in both domains, with or without 

agreement on mutual restraint. While nuclear weapons 

and cyber war may be theoretically interesting offsets to 

Western military advantages, for Russia actually to escalate in either domain would be to invite catastrophic retaliation.35 Moreover, by insisting on an integrated approach, 

pursuant to the “reset” in U.S.-Russia relations, the United 
16 SF No. 274 www.ndu.edu/inss

States would give Russia an incentive to accept even those 

terms about which it might be ambivalent. Establishing 

an understanding on NFU would alleviate Russia’s growing insecurity in space and cyberspace, where rules have 

yet to be established, and where it continues to view itself 

as considerably less capable than the United States.

The U.S.-Russia understandings proposed here might 

be taken as unfriendly by China, yet they also provide an 

incentive for the Chinese to consider such mutual strategic 

restraint with the United States (and perhaps Russia). The 

Chinese already espouse nuclear NFU, consistent with their 

doctrine of minimal deterrence, and would welcome American and Russian reciprocity. What both the United States 

and Russia have more to worry about is the interest of the 

Chinese military in ASAT and cyber war capabilities, possibly to include initial use. Added pressure on China to exercise or pledge restraint in these domains would be a collateral 

benefit for both Russia and the United States. In any case, 

Chinese policies on using strategic capabilities should not 

diminish U.S. or Russian interest in a bilateral understanding. 

U.S. Issues

Mutual restraint along these lines raises three issues 

for the United States: 

◆ the warfighting utility of nuclear, ASAT, or cyber 

weapons

◆ the interests of Allies and solidarity of NATO 

◆ confidence that the terms will be honored. 

Cyberspace is the only area where the warfighting 

utility of these strategic capabilities is a serious issue 

for the United States. The policies of the United States 

are to reduce if not end the warfighting use of nuclear 

weapons and to rely on ASAT capabilities only for deterrence (notably of China).36 But it will not rule out 

crashing computer networks that enable an opponent 

to target and attack U.S. military forces and operations. 

This consideration is less pertinent to possible combat 

contingencies with Russia, which does not rely heavily on military computer networking, than with China, 

which increasingly does.37 Because of China, the United States needs a “firebreak” to prevent military cyber 

war, in which it might have to engage, from escalating 

to general cyber war, which it wants to avoid. Although 

such a firebreak is not imperative in Russia’s case, for 

now, the United States should not pledge in any context to refrain from cyber war when it is integral and 

critical to combat operations. Thus, U.S.-Russia mutual 

restraint in cyberspace should apply to networks critical for national economic and societal well-being. Also, 

as noted, both should commit to ensure that military 

cyber operations are under the firm control of civilian 

authorities and that escalation is avoided. 

In all three domains, the United States would insist 

that Russia’s strategic restraint must apply to NATO as 

a whole, by agreement: anything less would run afoul of 

U.S. obligations under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.38 Still, some U.S. Allies, notably those bordering Russia and once part of the Soviet Union, may be concerned 

that for the United States to foreswear escalation beyond 

conventional defense, especially with nuclear weapons, 

could result in strategic “decoupling,” weaken deterrence, 

and expose them to Russian aggression or intimidation.39

In response, the United States can state that it can and 

would defeat any Russian attack on any NATO Ally, and 

also that Russian aggression, including cyber attack, would 

trigger a powerful response—conventional or in kind. 

Such assurances might not lay Baltic worries to rest. 

However, given its military superiority, the United States 

cannot allow unsupportable fears of Russia’s expansionism to abort an effort to mitigate real strategic vulnerabilities of its allies and itself. NATO already outspends 

Russia on defense by about 15 to 1, which should obviate 

the need to threaten or carry out strategic escalation.40

If European allies of the United States are so fearful of 

Russian aggression, they have the option of increasing 

their defense spending beyond the current average of 

under 1.5 percent of gross domestic product (compared 

to nearly 5 percent for the United States). In any case, 

U.S. allies would benefit from Russia’s nuclear and cyber 

restraint and from cooperation in counterproliferation. 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 274 17 

In particular, the understandings proposed here would 

prohibit and help deter Russia from conducting against 

any U.S. ally the types of cyber attacks its agents allegedly conducted against Estonia and Georgia. 

Confidence that the terms of mutual strategic restraint would be honored by Russia rests principally on 

strong deterrence, given the futility of Russia’s defense 

against retaliation—because of offense dominance—

in every domain. The United States has superiority 

not only in conventional military capabilities but also 

in nuclear, ASAT, and cyber capabilities. Presumably, 

it would not allow any of these advantages to erode 

because of having pledged to use them against Russia 

only in retaliation. 

Additionally, Russia and the United States should 

agree to supplement and buttress pledges of restraint with 

practical confidence-building measures (CBMs). The purpose of strategic CBMs would be to discourage, or through 

noncompliance, provide indications of intent to attack first 

in any of the three domains. In addition to NATO-Russia 

BMD cooperation (as already discussed), these could include the following, some of which are already in train or 

under discussion in the United States or bilaterally:

◆ sharing more information on nuclear forces, plans, 

and third-country threats

◆ de-alerting some nuclear forces to relieve any 

remaining concerns about first strike without impairing readiness for retaliation

◆ assurance that neither will use any capabilities, including conventional strike forces, to degrade the 

other’s nuclear deterrent41

◆ notification of all ballistic missile launches

◆ hotlines to discuss space and cyberspace attacks or 

incidents

◆ cooperation on third-party (state and nonstate) 

cyber threats.

Each of these measures would contribute to shifting 

U.S.-Russia strategic relations from the logic of threat 

and fear to a common effort to mitigate vulnerabilities 

and to confront dangers from the spread of nuclear and 

other strategic capabilities.

A Framework for 

Mutual Restraint

Taken together, CBMs would constitute a key tier 

of a framework of strategic restraint between the United 

States and Russia (see table 4). 

The framework’s premise is that strategic vulnerability, offense dominance, and the declining costs of 

mounting an attack demand restraint. It rests on a 

foundation of deterrence, without which mutual restraint would, for some time, be little more than expressions of good faith that might or might not withstand the stress of crisis. Building on deterrence, the 

framework includes explicit reciprocal pledges not 

to be the first to attack in any of the three strategic 

domains. By including CBMs as well as regular dialogue in the structure, the United States and Russia 

would begin institutionalizing mutual restraint, between them and within their own government and 

political systems.

How would this framework, taken as a whole, be 

viewed by Russians? As the gap between American 

and Russian military power grows, Moscow may become even more apprehensive of becoming formally 

locked into a position of inferiority, or of foreclosing 

options that Russia might need because of its military deficiencies—for example, the use of nuclear or 

cyber weapons. Yet as proposed here, mutual restraint 

does not constrain the strategic capabilities of either 

state. Russia will indeed find itself at a disadvantage 

in capabilities, but not because of agreement to exercise restraint in using them. It could even be argued 

that the side with inferior capabilities would benefit 

more by agreement that they should not be used. In 

any case, it is important for the United States to stress 

that proposed mutual strategic restraint would be 

based squarely on the principles of partnership and 

of equality in responsibilities, limitations, and rights. 
18 SF No. 274 www.ndu.edu/inss

For political reasons, Russia’s leaders would have it no 

other way.

These ideas can energize the next phase of U.S.-Russia efforts to reduce the dangers of strategic conflict as the 

United States, its allies, and Russia all become increasingly 

vulnerable. It is unclear how Russia’s leaders would react 

to a U.S. proposal along these lines: it depends on their 

assessment of Russia’s strategic vulnerabilities and how 

committed they are to reforming and reorienting their 

country. Nonetheless, the United States should frame the 

discussion by offering a concept and possible terms for a 

safer strategic relationship and safer world. 

Indeed, for the United States to present an ambitious, coherent set of proposals for lasting U.S.-Russia 

strategic restraint would send a powerful positive signal 

at an important juncture on the journey of U.S.-Russia 

relations. As it is, the U.S.-Russia strategic relationship 

has positive momentum but lacks a robust agenda. Admittedly, a positive response from Russia depends in part 

on whether its leaders are convinced of the need for reform and ever closer relations with the United States and 

its allies, which is uncertain. However, such uncertainty 

does not argue against a U.S. proposal along lines that 

serve U.S. interests, especially if making such a proposal could have a constructive effect on Russian strategic 

thinking and political direction. 

It could take years for these ideas to be agreed between Moscow and Washington. Moreover, the strateTable 4. Levels of Mutual Trust and Cooperation in Strategic Domains

Nuclear Space Cyberspace

Dialogue

Regular high-level contact to reinforce confidence-building 

measures, increase mutual understanding of these domains, and 

address new developments, concerns, and the participation of 

third parties.

Confidencebuilding 

Measures

Transparency about 

nuclear forces, plans, 

and third parties.

De-alerting.

Conventional global 

strike assurances.

BMD cooperation.

Launch notification.

Communication 

hotline for queries 

on suspicious actions.

Consultation and 

cooperation on 

third-party threats, 

including criminal.

Communication 

hotline for 

consultation on 

suspicious activities.

Transparency about 

cyber doctrine.

Mutual Restraint, 

applying to the 

two states 

and allies

NFU of nuclear weapons against the other.

No first interference 

with the other’s access to space.

NFU against critical 

networks.

Agreement to exercise tight political 

control over military 

cyber operations.

Mutual 

Deterrence Neither country can prevent strong retaliation by the other.

Strategic 

Vulnerability

Both countries are vulnerable to nuclear, cyber, and potentially 

ASAT attacks
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 274 19 

gic restraint they prescribe should be designed to last in 

perpetuity. Then why rush to put such a proposal forward, especially with presidential elections looming in 

both countries? The need to move expeditiously, though 

not hastily, stems from the debate in Russia about the 

country’s course and relations with the West. An offer 

to “raise the sights” of U.S.-Russia strategic relations, to 

mitigate growing vulnerabilities of both countries, and to 

include rather than exclude Russia from Western security efforts could help ensure that the debate’s outcome is 

in American interests.

Notes 1 This paper is a synopsis of a forthcoming book from NDU 

Press under the same title.

2 Scott Borg, “How Cyber Attacks Will Be Used in International Conflicts,” PowerPoint presentation at USENIX Security ’10 

Technical Symposium, Washington, DC, 2010.

3 Department of Defense (DOD), National Security Space Strategy (Washington, DC: DOD, January 2011).

4 Strategic offense dominance is explained in depth in David C. 

Gompert and Phillip C. Saunders, The Paradox of Power: Sino-American Strategic Restraint in an Age of Vulnerability (Washington, DC: 

National Defense University Press, 2011).

5 For further discussion on offense dominance in these strategic 

domains, see Gompert and Saunders.

6 Week in Review chart, The New York Times, March 3, 2011. 

Each interceptor costs about $3 million more than each intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), not including development, 

platforms, support costs, or sensors.

7 The advantages of offense over defense can be even more pronounced when taking into account measures to “fool” defense—such 

as with decoys, deception, and computer network interference—which 

are easier and cheaper to develop and field than is the improvement or 

expansion of defense required to neutralize them. On the whole, states 

that are most capable of fielding large missile forces (for example, the 

United States, Russia, and China) are also most capable of developing 

and employing countermeasures. 

8 This begs the question of whether U.S. leaders would be 

deterred from conducting a nuclear attack on Russia if they expected 

just a few Russian missiles to penetrate U.S. defenses. Apart from the 

sheer improbability of U.S. leaders contemplating a nuclear attack on 

Russia, it is hard to imagine stakes so high for the United States that 

its leaders would find even a single nuclear detonation on U.S. soil an 

acceptable price to pay. 

9 Leon E. Panetta, “Meeting our Fiscal and National Security 

Responsibilities,” speech, Washington, DC, August 3, 2011.

10 Contributing to this is a “targeting revolution,” whereby advances in sensing, data processing and sharing, and precision guidance 

combine to permit objects to be found, tracked, and destroyed.

11 The cost of launching a new satellite is equivalent to launching 

3.75 antisatellite (ASAT) interceptors. The cost of placing a satellite 

in orbit was calculated by adding the average cost of a boost rocket 

and the average cost of a commercial payload. In reality, the cost of 

launching mission-critical satellites is probably far higher. The cost of 

launching an ASAT missile was derived from the Pentagon’s estimate 

of how much it would cost to destroy Satellite USA 193 in 2008. 

Costs include acquisition of the unit being launched.

12 Gordon-Loeb model in L.A. Gordon and M.P. Loeb, “The 

Economics of Information Security Investment,” ACM Transactions 

on Information and System Security 5, no. 4 (November 2002), 438–457. 

13 William J. Lynn III, “Defending a New Domain: The 

Pentagon’s Cyberstrategy,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 5 (September–October 2010); William J. Lynn III, “Remarks on Space 

Policy,” U.S. Strategic Command Space Symposium, Omaha, NE, 

November 2010, available at <www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.

aspx?speechid=1515>.

14 Pavel Podvig, “Russian Military Space Capabilities,” in Ensuring America’s Space Security, ed. Philip E. Coyle (Washington, DC: 

Federation of American Scientists, August 2004), 125−140.

15 The table is extracted from Gompert and Saunders. 

16 This analysis excludes the costs resulting from retaliation.

17 China’s nuclear arsenal is an order of magnitude smaller than 

those of the United States and Russia. Moreover, the Chinese appear 

to be satisfied with a smaller force so long as effective minimum 

deterrence exists. However, it might be argued that the lower Russian 

and U.S. force levels go, the more tempted China could be to increase 

its force and achieve parity. 

18 The relationship between the size of strategic nuclear forces 

and the risk of nuclear war is, in theory, heavily influenced by the 

strength of deterrence, which may vary directly with the expected 

scale of destruction and thus the scale of forces in being. To the 

degree that deterrence is weakened as force levels are lowered, the 

risks of nuclear weapons being used might not decline but rise, all 

else being equal. That said, most analysts would agree that such an 

effect would not appear unless forces dropped below, say, tripledigit levels.

19 One reason to expect growing interest in soft-kill ASAT is the 

concern about space debris resulting from hard-kill intercept. Another 

is the potential to evade responsibility for attack. 

20 See Vincent Manzo, Deterrence and Escalation in Cross-domain 

Operations: Where Do Space and Cyberspace Fit? INSS Strategic Forum 

273 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, forthcoming).

21 The analysis of Russian interests and perspectives is based on 

research of strategic and related literature and on intensive discussions of these ideas in Moscow with diverse interlocutors, both 

civilian and military.

22 Opinion polls indicate a steady and significant improvement 

in Russian attitudes about the United States in recent years. For example, the Pew Global Attitudes Project finds an increase in Russians’ 

favorable views of the United States from 41 percent in 2007 to 57 

percent in 2010. 

23 A major share of Russian space services and products are 

exported, revealing the weakness of domestic demand—from an 

economy heavily oriented toward resource extraction. 

24 DOD, Nuclear Posture Review (Washington, DC: DOD, 

2010).

25 Based on the Russian revision of the threshold for using 

nuclear weapons in its latest military doctrine, The Military Doctrine of 

the Russian Federation, approved by the president on February 5, 2010. 

The threshold is more restricted compared to the military doctrine 

previously used. A translated text of the new document is available at 

<http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Russia2010_English.pdf>.

26 Russian military chief Makarov observed in a November 2011 

interview that a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-Russia 

conflict (for example, over Georgia) could lead to nuclear war. What 

he failed to explain was, first, how such a conflict would meet Russia’s 
20 SF No. 274 www.ndu.edu/inss

first-use standard of a threat to the survival of the state; and second, 

why Moscow’s decisionmakers would ignore U.S. nuclear deterrence.

27 Although Russia’s missile interceptors are not at par with 

U.S. missile interceptors, Russia is attempting to upgrade air-defense 

systems for this mission. These could be adequate against an Iranian 

threat if Russia could use NATO warning and tracking data.

28 In general, the Russians are especially wary of U.S. sea-based 

missile defense because it could be positioned flexibly to intercept 

Russian ICBMs. 

29Russian insistence on a U.S. commitment not to develop 

or use missile defense against Russia’s nuclear deterrent could be 

interpreted and opposed by Congress as yet another Russian attempt 

to derail U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD).

30 While there are many other important details to be settled 

concerning NATO-Russia BMD—such as architecture, sharing of 

sensitive technical and operational information, interceptor ownership, command and control, geographic scope—they are not analyzed 

here because none of them should block nuclear no first use or mutual 

strategic restraint in general.

31 In April 2011, the EastWest Institute hosted a bilateral dialogue between American and Russian experts as part 

of a new initiative to achieve a common understanding on key 

terms in cyber security, producing the following document: 

“Russia-U.S. Bilateral on Cybersecurity: Critical Terminology Foundations,” available at <www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/DigitalLibrary/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-

a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=130080>.

32 The United States reportedly is seeking cooperation with Russia along these lines but Russia has resisted because it would amount 

to external interference in Russian law enforcement.

33 For both sides of this debate, see Martin Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009); and Gompert 

and Saunders.

34 National Security Council, The Comprehensive National 

Cybersecurity Initiative (Washington, DC: The White House, 2011), 

available at <www.whitehouse.gov/cybersecurity/comprehensivenational-cybersecurity-initiative>.

35 U.S. cybersecurity declaratory policy is increasingly clear that 

an attacker in this domain will face retaliation for what amounts to 

an act of war. National Security Council, The Comprehensive National 

Cybersecurity Initiative; National Security Council, The Cyberspace 

Policy Review, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/

Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf>.

36 DOD, National Security Space Strategy (Washington, DC: 

DOD, January 2011). 

37 An extensive discussion of the need for and possibility of cyber war firebreak can be found in Gompert and Saunders, The Paradox 

of Power. 

38 In effect, Article 5 calls for the United States (like all Allies) 

to join in the common defense of any Ally that is attacked. For the 

United States to rule out responding in kind if Russia attacked a U.S. 

Ally, but not the United States itself, in any of these domains would 

be to weaken the credibility and effectiveness of common defense.

39 Notably, official NATO declaratory policy on first use of 

nuclear weapons does not lean as far forward as U.S. declaratory 

policy. Nonetheless, few if any Allies would strenuously or successfully 

oppose a NATO stance that favors progress toward no first use.

40 Institute of International Strategic Studies, “Chapter Two: 

Comparative Major Defence Statistics,” The Military Balance (London: IISS, 2011), 111:1, 33−40.

41 Russia is particularly concerned that future U.S. conventional 

strike weapons could be used to destroy Russian nuclear retaliatory 

capabilities. 

The Center for Strategic Research within the Institute for 

National Strategic Studies provides advice to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

unified combatant commands through studies, reports, 

briefings, and memoranda. The center conducts directed 

research and analysis in the areas of strategic and regional studies and engages in independent and leading-edge 

research and analysis in related areas.

The Strategic Forum series presents original research 

by members of NDU as well as other scholars and 

specialists in national security affairs from the United 

States and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the 

contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 

Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. Visit NDU Press online at www.ndu.edu/press.

Nicholas Rostow

Director

Center for Strategic Research

Francis G. Hoffman

Director

NDU Press

Institute for National Strategic Studies

Hans Binnendijk

Director

INSS

Acknowledgments

This Strategic Forum benefited greatly from discussions with 

and comments by Dr. Phillip Saunders, from comments by 

peer reviewers Dr. John Parker, Col Jon Chicky, and Dr. Robert 

Nurick, along with research by Roxanne Bannon.

Phillip C. Saunders 

Director of Studies

Center for Strategic Research