NO. 07-04-0474-CR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TE XAS

AT AMARILLO PANEL A DECEMBER 28, 2005

______________________________ JEREMY LEE WARREN, APPELLANT

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLE E

_________________________________ FROM THE 251 ST DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY; NO. 49,14 8-C; HONO RABLE PATRICK P IRTLE, JU DGE

_______________________________ Before REAVIS and CAMPBELL and H ANCOCK, JJ. MEMORAND UM OPINION Appella nt, Jeremy Le e Warren, a ppeals his conviction for the offense of robbery. Appellant

was sentenced to ten years incarceration in the Institutional Division of the Texas Departmen t of Crimi nal Justi ce. We af firm. Background A United Supermar ket empl oyee saw appellant reaching into shelvi ng containing s inus medication. As the employee had recently stocked the sinus medications , sh e2

notice d that mos t of what she had stocked wa s missing . Being suspicio us of app ellant, who wa s wearing a jacket in early Ma y, the emp loyee re ported he r observa tions to manageme nt. Appe llant wa s seen le aving th e store w ithout pa ying for anything

. Two members of United’ s managem ent, Trey Fun derburg and David Parker, began following appellant. They observed appellant take off his jacket an d attempt to stuff some sinus medication into his pants. The managers asked appellant to come back into th e store. Appellant ran from the managers and, upon reaching the other side of an adjacent street, began taunting them. Ap pellant stated tha t, since he was off of United’s property, the managers

could n ot touch h im. At this point, one of the managers told another Uni ted employee to phone the police. The managers

crossed the street and began following appellant. T hey repeatedly asked appellant

to return what he had taken. Appellant responde d by threatening to fight the managers if they continued to follow him. Durin g the next few minutes , appellant obtained a beer bottle, ran at the managers, and threw the b ottle striking Parker. Parker picked up the bottle to keep a ppellan t from reacquiring the weap on. The managers continued to follow appe llant who “dar ted” into a st airwell at a nea rby apartm ent complex. Funderbu rg went into another stairwell in an attempt to cut off appellant’sescape. Parker pursued appella nt into th e stairwe ll that he had ta ken. Upon rounding the corner of the stairwell, appella nt charge d Parker, knocking the bottle from his hand. A struggle ensued with both appellant and Parker attempt ing to obtai n the bottle. Parker was successful in keeping appellant from the bottle but, during the struggle, appellant grabbed Parker by the shirt and threwhim to the ground causing Parker a minor scrape to his elbow. Appellant1 Further reference

to provisions of the Texas P enal Cod e will b e by refer ence to “§ __.” 3 then w alked away. The managers continued to follow appe llant until police arrived and arrested a ppellan t. Bytwo issues, appellant contends that the evidencesupporting his conviction was legallyand factually insufficient. Specifically, appell antc hallenges the sufficiency of the evidence that he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused another bodily injury in the course of commit

ting thef t, an esse ntial el ement of t he offens e of robb ery. SeeT EX . P EN . C ODE A NN . §§ 29.0 1(1), 29.0 2 (Vernon 2003). 1 Standards of Review Evidence is legally sufficient if, viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdi ct, a rati onal fac t finder could have found t he essen tial ele ments of th e crime beyond a reason able dou bt. See King v. S tate , 29 S.W.3 d 556, 56 2 (Tex.C rim.App. 2 000). A convicti on will be susta ined unl ess it is irration al or u nsupported b y more tha n a mere modicum of eviden ce. Moreno v. State , 755 S.W. 2d 866, 8 67 (Tex. Crim.App . 1988). Evidence is factua lly suff ici ent if, vi ewing al l of the evidence in a neu tral lig ht, a rational fact finder would be j ustified in finding the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Zuniga v . State , 144 S.W

. 3d 477, 484 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). There are two ways in which the evid ence may be factua lly insu fficient. First, wh en consi dered by itself, evidence supporting the verdict may be too weak to support thefi nding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id . Second, consid er ing all of the evidence, both for and agai nst the4

verdict, the contr

ary evide nce may b e so str o ng that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have be en met. Id . at 484-85. Law A person commits the offense of robbery if, in the cours e of committing theft and with intent to

obtain o r m aintain control of the property, he intentionally, knowingly, or reckle sslyc auses bodily injury to another. § 29.02(a)(1). The phrase “in the course of committing theft” is statutorily defined to include conduct that occurs i n immedi ate flight after the attempt or commission of theft. § 29.01(1). However, neither the penal code nor case law defi nes “imme diate flight.” Oggletreev. State , 851 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tex.App.–Houston [1 stDist.] 1993, writ ref’d). Whether bodily i njury wa s caused in the immediate

flight from a theft mustbe determined by comparin g the fact

s of the ca se with case law addressi ng the is sue. Id

. Analysis Appellant

does not dispute that he committed the ft nor tha t he inju red Parke r. However, appellant

contends that he did not commit robbery because the bodily injury he caused Parker d id not occur in the co urse of co mmitting t heft. App ellant contends t hat, since he subjectively believed that the managers could not pursue him once he left the store’s property, he was not in immediate flight from the commission of the theft when he injured Parker. While appellant presents both legal and factual sufficiency issue s, the argument for each i ssue is i dentical

.5

We initial ly note t hat appe llant ci tes no ca se law n or pro vides any substantive argumentto suppo rt his contenti on that h is subjec tive bel ief that t here wasno reaso n to flee negates a determination that subsequent bodily injury was caused in immediate flight from a the f

t. This failure to adequately brief the issues presen ted precludes us from adequatelyevaluat ing thes e issues

. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 38.1(h ); Lagrone v. State , 942 S.W.2d 602, 614(Tex.Cri m.App. 19 97). However, in an abund ance of cauti on, we will address e ach of ap pellant’ s issues

. We construe appellant’s sufficiency challenge to contend that appellant’s subjective belief that he could not be pursued by the managers negated the essential robbery element thathe cause d anothe r bodily injury while in immediate flight from the commission of the theft. In Oggletree , the appellant challenged the sufficiencyof the evidence supporting his aggravated robbery convictio n contend ing that the bodily injury that he caused upon his return to the scene of the theft was separate and distinct from his immediate flight from the at tempted theft. Oggletree , 851 S.W. 2d at 369 . The cou rt rejected this con tenti o n determining instead that, because the appellant had engag ed in one continuous criminal episode uninterrupted by intervening circumsta nces, a ra tional ju rycould have found that the appellant caused bodily injury in theimmediate flight from the a ttempted t heft. Id . 369- 70. Thus, in Oggletree , the appellant’s subjective belief that he had successfully fled from the theft prior to his return to the scene of the crime had no bearing on the determination of whether appella nt caused another bodily i njury in immediate flight from the theft. Based on the reaso ning of Oggletree , we are no t p ersuaded by appellant’s main argument that6

his s ubje ctive belief negates a determination that he caused a nother bodily injury in the commissio n of theft

. See Sims v. S tate , 99 S.W.3 d 600, 60 3 (Tex.C rim.App. 2 003). V iewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude thatthe evidence wa s suffici ent to enable a rational jury to find, beyond a reasona ble doubt, that app ellant cau sed Parke r bodily injury w hile in immediate flight from the th eft. See King , 29 S.W.3d at 562. We overrule appellant’s first issue. Further, having rejected appellant’s contention regarding the effect of his subjective belief, we conclude that the remaining evidence, when viewed in a neutral light, is not so wea kthata rational jury could not have found appell ant guilty of robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. Evidence was presented that appellant alternated between walking an d running from the pursuing managers, threatened the managers in an attempt to dissuade them from following him, threw a bottle at the ma nagers to halt the ir pursui t, attempte d to evade their

pursuit by da rting into a s tairwell at a nearby apar tment com plex, and attacked Parker to elude apprehension. We conclude that this evidence issufficient to establish that appell antact ed in one continuous criminal episode uninterrupted by intervening circumstances and, therefore, the jury was rationally justified in concluding that appellant injured Parker while i n i mmediate flight from the theft. We overrule appellant’s second issue.7 Conclusion Concluding that the evidence supporting appel lant’s conviction for robbery was both legally and factu ally suf

ficient, we affirm the judgme nt of the trial cou rt.

Mackey K. Hancock Justice Do not pu blish.