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i 

97–493 2016

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–59] 

COUNTERING ADVERSARIAL PROPAGANDA: CHARTING AN EFFECTIVE 

COURSE IN THE CONTESTED 

INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS 

AND CAPABILITIES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

OCTOBER 22, 2015 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina, Chairman 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona, Vice Chair 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska 

PETE AGUILAR, California 

KEVIN GATES, Professional Staff Member 

LINDSAY KAVANAUGH, Professional Staff Member 

NEVADA SCHADLER, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island, Ranking 

Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities ..................... 2 

Wilson, Hon. Joe, a Representative from South Carolina, Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities ............................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Armstrong, Hon. Matthew C., Broadcasting Board of Governors ....................... 3 

Haas, MG Christopher K., USA, Director, Force Management and Development Directorate, U.S. Special Operations Command ...................................... 6 

Lumpkin, Hon. Michael D., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict ...................................................................... 5 

Moore, Brig Gen Charles L., USAF, Deputy Director for Global Operations, 

Joint Staff ............................................................................................................. 8 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Armstrong, Hon. Matthew C. .......................................................................... 29 

Haas, MG Christopher K. ................................................................................ 54 

Lumpkin, Hon. Michael D. .............................................................................. 40 

Moore, Brig Gen Charles L. ............................................................................. 64 

Wilson, Hon. Joe ............................................................................................... 27 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Wilson ......................................................................................................... 73 

(1) 

COUNTERING ADVERSARIAL PROPAGANDA: CHARTING 

AN EFFECTIVE COURSE IN THE CONTESTED INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES, Washington, DC, Thursday, October 22, 2015. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:08 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Joe Wilson (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE WILSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Mr. WILSON. Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to call this 

meeting of the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of 

the House Armed Services Committee to order. 

I am pleased to welcome everyone here for today’s hearing on information operations and counter-propaganda capabilities. This 

hearing will focus on the challenges faced by the Department of 

Defense [DOD] and the Federal Government when dealing with the 

insidious propaganda and social media messaging coming from 

groups like Daesh, and sadly, from countries like Russia, China, 

and others. Not only do they recruit members, raise money, and 

sway the opinion of potential allies with this propaganda, but they 

sow doubt and dissension as a means of preventing or discouraging 

U.S. military action to protect American families. 

Last month, our subcommittee held a closed roundtable discussion with outside industry and academic experts to explore this 

topic. That discussion helped our members better understand some 

core challenges and concerns, including what are our current capabilities for information operations and counter-propaganda, and 

how are they being integrated into larger strategies to deal with 

specific actors like Daesh, Russia, Iran, China, and others. 

How can new techniques and concepts improve our ability to 

sense, detect, analyze, and respond to propaganda in the 21st century media environment? What policy changes impair our ability to 

realize the full potential of these new technologies and concepts? 

These questions and issues remain relevant in today’s hearing. 

Our panel of expert witnesses will proceed from that starting 

point and provide us with their thoughts from a governmental perspective on this important topic. 

Our witnesses before us today are Mr.—the Honorable Michael 

Lumpkin, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations 

and Low-Intensity Conflict [SO/LIC]; the Honorable Matthew Arm-
2 

strong, Broadcasting Board of Governors [BBG]; Major General 

Christopher K. Haas, Director of Special Force Management and 

Development, United States Special Operations Command, 

SOCOM, and also a very grateful dad of a Citadel cadet, which I 

respect very much; and Brigadier General Charles Moore, Deputy 

Director for Global Operations, Joint Staff. 

I would like now to turn to my friend and ranking member, Jim 

Langevin from Rhode Island, for any comments he would like to 

make. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson can be found in the Appendix on page 27.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our 

witnesses for being here, for your service to the country, and for 

all you are doing to keep us safe. The Department of Defense’s ability to work in concert with other U.S. Government agencies and 

international entities to effectively counter propaganda is an issue 

that the members of this subcommittee have been concerned with 

for some time, and I am glad, Mr. Chairman, that again you are 

holding this hearing. 

DOD has a long history of countering adversary propaganda and 

influence in order to further our national security objectives, and 

it has met with great success. However, unlike World War II or in 

the 1980s, today’s state and non-state actors disseminate their 

messages far and wide instantaneously, crossing multiple combatant command areas of responsibility and reaching audiences all 

over the world, including U.S. citizens. 

Unfortunately, time and distance are no longer on our side. This 

evolution of the information environment forces us to think about 

how to approach this issue. Should decisionmaking within the military chain of command be decentralized so efforts can be more effective in time and space? If so, how do we maintain oversight and 

synchronization of efforts? 

Further, how do we take into account privacy, freedom of speech, 

and other issues as they pertain to U.S. persons and nonadversaries in an environment without boundaries? Essentially, how can 

we more effectively employ capabilities? 

As the chairman mentioned, the subcommittee held a roundtable 

with independent witnesses on the issue several weeks ago, setting 

the stage for a deeper discussion of the aforementioned issues. 

Today, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses as to how 

they are working to more effectively employ capabilities that we do 

have and developing even better capabilities and tactics, techniques, and procedures for the future. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to our witnesses’ testimony, and I yield back. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Langevin. I would like 

to remind our witnesses that your written statements will be submitted for the record, so we ask that you summarize your comments to 5 minutes or less, and then after that, we will proceed 

with each member having 5 minutes to ask questions. 
3 

We have a person who is above reproach, Kevin Gates, as we 

maintain the 5-minute rule, and then this is a unique hearing, and 

so we will actually begin with questionings in reverse order of how 

the seating, and we will begin with Congresswoman Elise Stefanik 

when we begin questions. 

So I would like to thank again all of you for being here today, 

and we begin with Mr. Armstrong. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MATTHEW C. ARMSTRONG, 

BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to speak to the unique role 

of the Broadcasting Board of Governors and the United States 

international media, and the role we play in advancing our national interest. I am pleased to join today’s panel alongside my colleagues from the Department of Defense. I have a longer written 

statement for the record, and I will summarize that here. 

This committee knows well that while today’s increasingly interconnected world offers us a plethora of opportunity, it also provides 

challenges. From Crimea, to Syria, Northern Nigeria, and Southeast Asia, propaganda and censorship have used our increasingly 

networked world to not just seek to win the news cycle, but to 

shape the very choices of statecraft. 

U.S. foreign policy cannot be effective if we do not appreciate 

how information shapes the actions of policymakers, institutions, 

and the public. The Broadcasting Board of Governors is a unique 

tool within this broader context. We are a 24/7 global media organization that oversees nonmilitary international media support supported by the U.S. Government, including the Voice of America 

[VOA], the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, BBG-funded grantees 

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, and Middle 

East Broadcast Network. 

Our ultimate goal is to inform, engage, and connect people 

around the world in support of freedom and democracy through 

topnotch fact-based reporting. We broadcast in 61 languages and 

reach more than 215 million people each week. We are unique, 

however, in that we prioritize our contact to impact strategic audiences. Many of our reporters are not only from our target markets, 

but they also maintain extensive networks in them. They speak as 

locals. They know their audiences deeply. 

We are called upon to operate in markets until private information dissemination is found to be adequate. Virtually, by definition, 

we target markets that are hard to reach, and at best, underserved 

by accessible, reliable, independent media. In short, there is no 

other agency or corporation like us that puts the audience first, 

that actively builds true independent media markets in order to 

one day not be needed. 

By unleashing the power of professional journalism, we not only 

inform foreign publics, we allow individuals to aspire to freedom by 

offering them a platform to make decisions based on information 

that is verifiably true. When we cover the successes of free and 

open elections, as we have recently in Nigeria, for instance, we educate the audiences on how opposition parties can seek power 

through the ballot. 
4 

We serve as a key explainer of U.S. policy as well. VOA’s charter 

mandates that our programs present the policies of the United 

States clearly and effectively, and also present responsible discussions and opinion on these policies. When we train the lens on our 

policy discussions, for example, by covering different views on recent negotiations with Iran, we allow the world to see democracy 

as a constantly evolving work in progress guided by the rule of law. 

Even simply talking about how Americans go about paying a 

parking ticket can open the eyes of our audiences. Allow me to use 

some terms that are not usually associated with the BBG, but are 

familiar to the committee and to my colleagues at the table. The 

BBG is actively involved in foreign internal defense through empowering the people with the truth and giving them a voice 

through transparency and accountability. We work by, with, and 

through local populations by training and equipping local media 

and individuals to be better journalists. We actively work with 

some 3,000 affiliate news organizations around the world, including 

400 radio stations in Indonesia alone. 

We are a force multiplier for broader U.S. public diplomacy. We 

open markets and closed societies for fact-based journalism so the 

audience can see an alternative future. Our media provide a platform on which the Department of State, the Department of Defense, Agency for International Development, Agriculture, and others can build their own success. 

As I had mentioned earlier, we face an increasingly networked 

world filled with challenges and opportunities. Let me mention five 

core—a couple of the core areas we are focused on. One, we are accelerating our shift toward engaged audience and digital platforms, 

video, mobile, social. Second, we are concentrating efforts in issue 

areas such as Russia, violent extremism, Iran, China. Third, we are 

focusing on impact overreach, putting the audience first. 

We are focused—and last, we focus on challenging information 

and Internet freedom worldwide, which is an enduring and central 

role. Through our Internet Anti-Censorship Program and Open 

Technology Fund, we seek to support journalists, bloggers, civil society actors, and activists to use the Internet safely and without 

fear of interference. We underwrite apps and programs for computers and mobile devices that help encrypt communications and 

evade censorship. These efforts have been successful, and we look 

forward to expanding them. 

As I close, let me say, journalism is a powerful force for change. 

By acting as the foreign domestic media, the BBG plays a critical 

role in the lives of the audiences by providing them with news and 

information in their local language that is relevant to their daily 

lives. Voice of America’s first broadcast stated, ‘‘The news may be 

good or bad. We will tell you the truth.’’ At BBG, we continue to 

operate with that in mind. Because truth builds trust and credibility, delivering credible news is the most effective counter to 

propaganda and ignorance, and provides the audience with information that will affect their daily lives and their daily decisionmaking. 

And with that, I am happy to take questions. Thank you for your 

time and thank you for your attention. 
5 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Armstrong can be found in the 

Appendix on page 29.] 

Mr. WILSON. And thank you, Mr. Armstrong. We now proceed to 

Secretary Lumpkin. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL D. LUMPKIN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW– 

INTENSITY CONFLICT 

Secretary LUMPKIN. Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Langevin, and distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate this 

opportunity today to discuss the Department of Defense’s role in direct support of the Department of State’s efforts in the contested 

information environment. 

I would like to thank the committee for your support in this critical field. I am pleased to be joined today by Brigadier General 

Moore and Major General Haas. It is good to have the—my counterparts here, and in proper reflection of the need of a whole-of-government response to this challenge, I am honored to sit next to 

Governor Matt Armstrong from the Broadcasting Board of Governors. 

I am here to discuss an aspect of our information operations capabilities that has received special attention from this committee, 

and that is, our military information support operations force 

which requires—which provides a critical capability in support of 

tactical and operational needs of military requirements, as well as 

providing support to the overall strategic messages effort led by the 

State Department. 

The scope of our current challenge in the informational space is 

unprecedented. In a Washington Post editorial on the threat posed 

by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL, Under Secretary 

of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Richard Stengel, 

estimated that only 1 percent of a potential audience of 1.6 billion 

people who could be targeted by ISIL’s messaging will actually support ISIL’s actions. 

This 1 percent, while small at first blush, equates to approximately 16 million potential supporters of ISIL’s actions around the 

globe. Even that startling number conceals a critical difference, 

which is the unfettered geographic and virtual dispersion of this 

new adversary. 

Social media and other communications technologies has enabled 

the virtual, and in some cases, actual mobilization of dispersed and 

demographically varied audiences around the world. Non-state actors can reach across the globe with multiple, simultaneously targeted and tailored approaches to motivate or manipulate a spectrum of audiences. 

They do this in numerous languages with messaging designed to 

specifically influence or motivate them according to their personal 

beliefs or perceptions, all conducted through smartphone, computer, and an Internet connection. In this environment, technology 

is not limited to one-way broadcast like television or radio, it allows 

interactive discussion any time in almost any location with virtually unlimited reach. 

This hyper-connected world has many positive benefits, but the 

rise of ISIL and the ability for other state and non-state actors to 
6 

conduct recruitment operations and spread propaganda almost certainly and with minimal cost highlights the dark side, one that requires the whole-of-government response. 

In this challenging environment, I see two main implications for 

the Department of Defense. First, the Department does not lead 

the U.S. Government effort or possess the only capabilities in this 

space. All other civilian departments and agencies have their own 

roles and missions as part of the government’s strategic communications efforts. This demands close interagency coordination and 

clear understanding of the appropriate roles and complementary 

nature for each piece of the U.S. Government’s communication and 

engagement framework with global audiences. 

The bottom line is that the Department’s efforts alone cannot 

solve the challenge of this contested information environment and 

adversary propaganda, but we do have a critical role to play as a 

contributor of our unique military capabilities and a partner to the 

whole-of-government effort led by the State Department. 

Second, the complexity of this environment demands that we use 

a thoughtful, strategic approach to achieve success against differing 

adversaries. Simply trying to master adversaries tweet for tweet, 

or Web site for Web site, is both fiscally irresponsible and operationally ineffective. Instead, we must rely on the skills of our talented workforce to develop thoughtful, well-constructed plans, partnerships with interagency and our international friends, and the 

use of a variety of means to disrupt the adversary’s narrative. 

We need to expose its contradictions and its falsehoods, and ultimately bring credible, persuasive, and truthful information to audiences who have often have significantly different perceptions and 

cultural norms than our own. We acknowledge and are appreciative 

of the intent of the language of section 1056 of the pending NDAA 

[National Defense Authorization Act]. 

Thank you for your support of the Department’s efforts in this 

critical space, and I look forward to answering any questions you 

may have. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Lumpkin can be found in 

the Appendix on page 40.] 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Secretary Lumpkin. We now proceed to 

General Haas. 

STATEMENT OF MG CHRISTOPHER K. HAAS, USA, DIRECTOR, 

FORCE MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT DIRECTORATE, 

U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 

General HAAS. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss U.S. Special Operation Command’s manning, training, and equipping of the military 

information support operations, MISO, force. 

Preparing our MISO forces for current and future conflict is a 

critical role for USSOCOM [U.S. Special Operations Command]. 

The extensive propaganda efforts employed by both ISIL and Russia makes USSOCOM’s role in manning, training, and equipping 

even more critical. 

We have made significant improvements in all three areas over 

the last decade, but there is considerable work remaining, particularly improving our MISO force’s capability to influence on the 
7 

World Wide Web. Now I would like to address SOCOM’s role in 

manning, training, and equipping. 

The overall end strength of the two Active Duty groups is approximately 1,050 officers and enlisted MISO soldiers. The active 

officer and NCO [non-commissioned officer] core is appropriately 

manned with the exception of sergeants at the E–5 level, which is 

below authorized levels. Our projections for recruitment and retention indicate we should have our Active Duty MISO groups fully 

manned by fiscal year 2019. 

The complexity of the mission, and the expertise required to 

carry out MISO missions, has shaped an extended selection and 

training program for our MISO soldiers. They now attend a 2-week 

selection, and 42-week qualification course. This is different from 

other U.S. Government training, because it focuses on language, 

culture, and influence principles. This ensures our soldiers know 

how to design persuasive arguments, use the right symbols, and 

identify the best media. This training makes MISO a distinct asset 

within the Department of Defense. 

As you well know, our adversaries use the Internet to recruit followers, gain financial support, and spread propaganda and misinformation. The current conflicts have identified our need to expand 

MISO training on the World Wide Web. Through the joint requirements process, multiple combatant commands have identified capability gaps in regards to MISO’s use of the Web. SOCOM is now 

in the process of developing a comprehensive plan to expand MISO 

training into social media use, online advertising, Web design, and 

other areas. 

Maintaining a current MISO equipment capability to meet our 

operational requirement is also an ongoing effort, but one 

USSOCOM is well-positioned to meet. We have a state-of-the-art 

media production center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, with the 

capability to provide for print, audio, and video production. We are 

also constantly exploring and developing future MISO capabilities 

to ensure that we meet the emerging needs of the combatant commanders. 

USSOCOM welcomes this committee’s support regarding technology demonstrations to assess innovative and new technologies 

for MISO. The Web-based technologies we are exploring will be 

more flexible in nature and provide support to on-site commanders. 

In closing, SOCOM is committed to meeting the challenges of 

training and equipping the force, while simultaneously addressing 

our current manning issues. I also want to thank you for your continued support of our SOF [special operations forces] personnel and 

their families. The tremendous demands we have placed on them 

requires a continued commitment to provide for their well-being 

and combat readiness. This concludes my opening remarks, and I 

welcome your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Haas can be found in the 

Appendix on page 54.] 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, General Haas. We will now 

proceed to General Moore. 
8 

STATEMENT OF BRIG GEN CHARLES L. MOORE, USAF, DEPUTY 

DIRECTOR FOR GLOBAL OPERATIONS, JOINT STAFF 

General MOORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and distinguished members of the committee. I appreciate the 

opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the actions we 

and the Department of Defense are taking to counter the propaganda campaigns of our enemies. 

In order to effectively achieve our military objectives and end 

states, information operations must be inherently integrated with 

all military plans and activities in order to influence and ultimately 

alter the behavior of our adversaries and their supporters. To accomplish that goal, there are several capabilities available to commanders, the most common being employment of our military information support operation forces, or MISO forces. 

MISO personnel have the training and cultural understanding to 

assess enemy propaganda activities and propose unique solutions 

that directly support our ability to achieve our military objectives. 

MISO forces operating from a U.S. embassy and operational task 

force, or component headquarters, are employed to execute DOD 

missions that support named operations, geographic combatant 

commander, theater security cooperation efforts, and public diplomacy. How combatant commanders employ their MISO operation 

capabilities to counter adversarial propaganda is what I understand you want to focus on today. 

MISO forces are currently deployed to 21 U.S. embassies working 

with country teams and interagency partners to challenge adversary IO [information operations] actions and support broader U.S. 

Government goals. To perform their missions, MISO forces use a 

variety of mediums, including cyber, print, TV, and radio, to disseminate information in a manner that will change perceptions, 

and subsequently, the behavior of the target audiences. 

Unfortunately, as this is an unclassified hearing, the specific examples that I can discuss are limited, but I do want to provide you 

some brief examples of the efforts our MISO forces are currently 

undertaking around the world. In Central Command, MISO efforts 

are focused on challenging the actions of violent extremist organizations. 

For example, in Iraq, MISO forces are conducting an advise-andassist role, to help Iraqi forces learn to develop indigenous military 

information support operations and counter-propaganda activities. 

Central Command’s online influence strategy is used to counter adversary narratives, shape conditions in the AOR [area of responsibility], and to message specific target audiences. These operations 

include using existing Web and social media platforms such as 

Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, support military objectives by 

shaping perceptions while highlighting ISIL atrocities, coalition responses to ISIL activities, and coalition successes. 

European Command’s efforts include exposing Russian mistruths 

and their concerted efforts to mislead European audiences as to 

their true intentions. We are in the final stages of staffing European Reassurance MISO program, which will provide expanded authorities to conduct MISO training, and in some cases, messaging 

support to our partners in the region. 
9 

EUCOM [European Command] is also looking to expand their engagement with the Broadcasting Board of Governors to further improve their information dissemination capabilities. 

Ultimately, regardless of the enemies that we face, the Department of Defense understands the criticality of countering an adversary supporter’s confidence, conviction, will, decisionmaking, while 

shaping behavior supportive of our military objectives. We understand that these actions must be taken while not exceeding the authorities that we have been granted, while always operating within 

the boundaries the Department has been given, and with the close 

coordination of our interagency partners. 

Finally, I also want to express my deep appreciation for the committee’s unwavering support of our men and women in uniform, to 

thank you, again, for the opportunity to appear this afternoon, and 

I look forward to answer any questions that you might have. Thank 

you. 

[The prepared statement of General Moore can be found in the 

Appendix on page 64.] 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, General Moore, and we now 

will proceed with the members’ questions, and Kevin is going to 

make sure the clock is properly maintained. And so we will begin, 

of course, with Congresswoman Elise Stefanik. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your 

testimony today. 

Secretary Lumpkin, my first question is for you. In October of 

2014, the Department submitted a report to this committee on future military information operations capabilities as a result of section 1096 of the fiscal year 2014 NDAA. Can you give this committee an update on what progress has been made in implementing 

the findings and recommendations of that report? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. Yes, ma’am. As mentioned in 2014, we answered that report, and we continue to develop and do this holistic 

review of how we do business, from everything from the authorities 

that we have in place, to the pieces of how we man, train, and 

equip, and to actually how we operate—operationalize our MISO 

efforts. 

So this is part of our ongoing process, as we are always looking 

and reevaluating in dialogue with our interagency partners and 

with this committee and others to make sure we have the right 

oversight and we have the right capabilities in place. 

So I think we are making good strides. Again, it is a continual 

challenge to work through, but I think we are doing the right 

things as we provide oversight and evaluate our capabilities. 

Ms. STEFANIK. I wanted to follow up on the point you made about 

the authorities. 

Secretary LUMPKIN. Uh-huh. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Since we are operating in a very complex IO environment. At a previous hearing, we heard from the witnesses about 

the lack of clarity of the rules of engagement and of those authorities. Can you talk about some specific improvements that we 

should be making in order to clarify that? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. I firmly believe that title 10 under U.S. Code 

gives DOD the authorities it needs to do the information operations 

that we are required to do to support our current mission, and the 
10 

way—so I am very comfortable with our authorities in this space. 

We continue to work with our interagency partners to make sure 

that we are supporting them in the fullest and most robust way 

possible. And I—again, I do believe we have the authorities in 

place to do what we need to do. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you. My next question is for General Haas. 

Based on the current projections to reduce Army personnel by 

about 40,000 people, could you describe what effect these reductions could potentially have on the military information support operations community? 

General HAAS. I would respond to that question this way, Congresswoman, is that the command is very concerned about the reduction in the overall size of the United States Army, from which 

we draw our pool of candidates for our MISO forces. It would be 

difficult for me to fully quantify that because the Army is currently 

in that process. 

But as my commander has expressed in other forums, he is concerned about that drawdown, because that does reduce the pool of 

available candidates and qualified soldiers that would want to— 

that we could recruit, select, and train for our MISO force, and so 

we continually look and try to analyze, you know, exactly what 

that impact will be over time. 

As I stated in my opening remarks, we are trying to mitigate 

some of these concerns through more active recruiting, directed 

specifically at the E–5 level, to fill our current shortages, and we 

are looking at other management tools in order to ensure that we 

retain our best qualified MISO soldiers in order to offset the potential impact of a smaller Army on our community. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you very much, and I yield back. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. And we now proceed to Congressman Ashford of Nebraska. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a couple of 

questions. One general one, and that is, in this area of recruiting 

individuals who can engage in this activity, General, how do you 

see, going forward with the authorities you have and some of the 

work that has been done in the NDAA, how do you see the private 

sector’s expertise being tapped to raise the level of activity in this 

area? What is your vision of that? 

General HAAS. Thank you for the question, Congressman. So 

SOCOM is exploring and is working on new relationships, not only 

with the private sector but with academia in general, trying to certainly garner the—and understand the skill sets that they can help 

in provide to—certainly to our community. 

So that is an ongoing effort, and we are also partnering, as best 

we can, I think, with the interagency and we are looking for areas 

in which to improve that, so that we not only have a whole-of-government approach, but we have maybe a whole-of-society approach 

towards improving the quality of our MISO skills, knowledge, and 

abilities. 

Mr. ASHFORD. And you believe you have adequate legislative authority to undertake those partnerships, I assume. Is that—— 

General HAAS. I would describe it this way: We have— 

USSOCOM has the adequate authorities to do our current man, 

train, and equip mission. 
11 

Mr. ASHFORD. Okay. So we can—having—well, let me give you 

an example. And maybe I misinterpreted what Admiral Rogers 

said, but I think I understood what he was saying in a committee 

hearing we had, that—so, for example, the—on the military side, 

we could reach out to the private sector, bring in expertise from the 

private sector to fill out the—some of these responsibilities on an 

interim basis or a short-term basis. Is that something—assuming 

that the standards are adequately adhered to, is that something 

that you all think could happen? 

General HAAS. We obviously understand that the pace at which 

technology advances, we will probably have to reach out to the private sector in terms of contractors to bring that expertise into the 

force until we can appropriately train our soldiers, our men and 

women inside the MISO community to fully understand—operate 

and understand that new technology. And we are always working 

that balance between, you know, what is out there in the private 

sector and what we can then incorporate, gain into our community. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Right. I think—let me ask General Moore. Could 

I ask you a question specifically about language competency? Hopefully I am asking—I think you talked about that a little bit, but 

when we were in Iraq with the chairman, there was discussion 

about, you know, the language, knowing the language—not only 

knowing the language, but knowing the nuances of the language, 

the different—and hopefully I am asking the right, Mr. Secretary, 

the right person here. Anybody can answer it. But are we—are 

we—that sort of sophisticated nuanced language training, is that— 

do we have the adequate—do we have adequate resources? You 

mentioned that is a challenge. There is maybe—— 

General HAAS. Yes, sir, that is more in my lane. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Okay. 

General HAAS. We spend a significant amount of our time in the 

qualification course for our MISO soldiers focused on language and 

culture, so the—each one of the MISO soldiers is required to graduate with a—what we call a one-one capability in a targeted language. And so that allows them to speak conversationally and read 

the language. 

We are focused right now on a number of different languages, 

but we have adequate resources within the community to adjust 

that language, and then continually provide sustainment training. 

But as you know, mastering a language is sometimes a gift, and 

we look to target our soldiers with that gift in languages to—— 

Mr. ASHFORD. And do you recruit—sorry. 

General HAAS [continuing]. So beyond one-one. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Sorry. Do you recruit to that as well? 

General HAAS. Obviously, in order to attend our assessment selection courses, those soldiers have to have an aptitude high 

enough score on their language test to enter our courses, so we do 

test to that. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Thank you for your—for all your work. Thanks. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Ashford. We now proceed to Congressman Trent Franks of Arizona. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of 

you. I always want to acknowledge the folks that wear the uniform 
12 

and put themselves at risk for the rest of us in terms of even just 

putting your whole life to the cause of freedom, and I am grateful 

to you. 

Essentially, I guess we are discussing the Department’s capability today of, to use a quote here, ‘‘conducting operations to inform, influence, and shape adversarial behavior in the information 

environment.’’ That sounds pretty important to me, given the ideological nature of some of the enemy that we face. 

So I guess my first question is, what do you think represents the 

best bang for our buck, or the best strategic niche that we can pursue in order to actually change the behavior of our adversaries? 

And let’s see, Secretary Lumpkin, I will go ahead and begin with 

you, and if anybody else would like to take the question, that would 

be great. 

Secretary LUMPKIN. Yes. Thank you for the question. I think 

there is two principal aspects for us, is that one is that as part of 

DOD’s larger strategy, it is all operations, large or small, have an 

information operation component that supports that particular operation. So it is codified and actually integrated in all operations. 

So I think that, first of all, that is kind of the chapeau that—so 

everything we do. 

The other piece is that our relationships with the interagency 

where we look to how we can support our partners who have—and 

bring our unique military capabilities, whether it is print or it is 

working some other piece in order to help them in their effort. 

So once our—our principal role here outside of doing information 

operations on operations, per se, that are uniquely military, is how 

we support our partners, so I think that is key and I think that 

is a huge value we bring as a Department. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, I have seen a lot of research that shows that 

one of the challenges that we have with this ideological enemy is 

that when we try to measure their commitment to their cause, that 

we sort of have to break it down typically to whether it is a sacred 

value to them or not. In other words, is this something that they 

are joining the group just for sort of the adventure, or if this is 

something that is deeply held conviction that goes to the religious 

core of who they are. 

And it just—I am just wondering if these are really some of the 

leadership here is acting on sacred core values, and it doesn’t seem 

like anything we can say to them is going to have a lot of impact, 

but it—perhaps our efforts would be redirected at those less committed so that we sort of—sort of impact the support base of the 

true believers, as it were. 

Secretary LUMPKIN. All good points. It is very interesting. A 

study was recently done from a Lebanese-based company called 

Quantum, and it put ISIL, in particular, people into nine different 

bins of people who would join this organization, so it allows for better targeting. Just a quick list of them that I found were interesting. 

The first one was the status seeker, somebody looking for status; 

the second one was an identity seeker, somebody looking for an 

identity; revenge, revenge seeker; redemption seeker; responsibility 

seeker; the thrill seeker; somebody who is looking for ideology, 
13 

somebody who is looking for justice; and then a death seeker are 

the nine different bins. 

So as things are developed, just as our enemies target specific 

audiences, the—we have to, as a U.S. Government writ large, have 

to have unique messages directed towards each of these nine different bins. I thought this was very informative and very helpful 

in helping me understand the problem awhile back. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, actually, you know, that is the point I was 

really trying to get to, as you probably imagine, and it sounds like 

that last guy is going to be a little bit recalcitrant. The death seeker doesn’t sound to me like someone who is going to be open to a 

lot of, ‘‘well, you just had a bad childhood’’ approaches. 

So I guess then my final question to you is, with apologies for 

this sequester and what it has done to pretty much the entire military apparatus of this country, do you feel like—and General Haas, 

this goes to your testimony, do you feel like the Department has 

the appropriate resources—you sort of touched on it already, but 

the appropriate resources and programming personnel to successfully execute this current counter-ISIL strategy? Do you think— 

and if you don’t have something that you need, what could we do 

to make your life easier and more effective against these enemies 

of freedom? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. If I may actually take that question. What 

I don’t have is budget certainty. Where I am, I am trying to come 

up with a multiyear strategy, because this doesn’t happen overnight. In order to influence somebody to change their mindset, 

their viewpoints, there is a continual engagement, so I am trying 

to do this in a multiyear plan on 1-year money. 

Mr. FRANKS. Yeah. 

Secretary LUMPKIN. So it is hard for us to make sound and longterm investments in our programming, in our planning to execute 

information operations without that budget certainty. 

Mr. FRANKS. Yeah. 

Secretary LUMPKIN. And Matt, do you have—— 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Thank you. It is a similar situation. We are not 

sure what is happening. 

Mr. FRANKS. Yeah. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Is it possible to take a moment and answer 

your question as relates to—— 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, I guess, of course, as far as not knowing what 

is going to happen, given the potential veto, join the club, you 

know, we don’t know, any of us know what is happening. Go ahead, 

sir. I want to be sensitive to my time here. My time is expired. If 

the chairman wants to extend the time for you to answer, that is 

great. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Thank you. So you asked about the audience or 

the folks and the different ideological viewpoints and the realities. 

This is where I emphasize the particular nature of our toolkit, 

what we bring to the table. 

The adversaries, and there are a whole bunch of different adversaries we face unfortunately right now, and they tend to rely on 

the say-do gap, they tend to rely on propaganda and a mistelling 

of history and a mistelling of the present, and they rely on the audience not knowing what the reality is, and they squash the free-
14 

dom of speech and the freedom to listen, and that is where we are 

able to intervene and tell them what is actually going on, what is 

the truth. 

And then an important element, whether it is an IO, public diplomacy, what we do is the trusted communicator, and we empower 

the people on the ground that are familiar, whether it is an affiliate radio station, or it is an individual that is familiar with the 

particular potential extremist to communicate and actually have 

the truth so that this individual is being impacted from all angles 

with the reality, what is actually happening, so that is another element where we are coming in. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence 

here, and I think this gentleman could probably seek a career in 

political consulting at some point for campaigns afterwards. If you 

can change these guys’ mind and help people see the truth, you 

have got a real future, brother. 

Mr. WILSON. And thank you so much, Congressman Franks. We 

now proceed to Congressman Marc Veasey of Texas. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to ask specifically about some of the propaganda activities that we are seeing 

out there in different regions of the world, Russia, ISIL, and Iran, 

China. With there being such—with social media itself being such 

a challenge to counter, you know, rumors and innuendo and myths 

and what have you, how much can we reasonably expect to be able 

to challenge some of the things out there that we see from Russia 

or ISIL, or any of these actors that are using social media to really 

keep things stirred up? 

General HAAS. I know from a SOCOM prospective, what we are 

looking at is how do we become more—much more proactive, and 

as I stated in my opening comments, we are undergoing an entire 

review based on combatant commanders requests that we take— 

that we take a closer look at what is happening on the Internet 

and social media sites, and then how do we help to influence that 

particular targeted audience via that media? And we’ve recognize 

that we are not on there constantly, and do we have the technology 

to be able to immediately respond and be a more—have a more persistent presence so that we can understand and then provide more 

comprehensive recommendations to our senior leaders and decisionmakers regarding the messages and other ways to counter this 

propaganda. 

And so that comprehensive review, and that look at technology 

to enable us to do it is ongoing right now, and we are hopeful that 

by the first quarter, fiscal year 2017, we will have a better picture 

of how we are actually going to get after that problem set of being 

able to be more proactive and be involved in the discourse, you 

know, continuously, rather than basically shooting behind the target, or being in a tweet-for-tweet as the Assistant Secretary said, 

which we see only validates the message that they are sending out. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. If I may add, yes, we have to be proactive. One 

of the other challenges, and I think the general was getting to this, 

is we actually have to pay attention to the impact rather. The existence of the propaganda itself doesn’t mean that there is impact. 

We have to look at what are they striving for and how do we 

counter that? How do we respond to that? 
15 

So often, the best counter is an indirect response. So we look at, 

for example, Iran, and much of the propaganda coming from Iran 

is trying to destabilize Iraq and Syria and wreak chaos, so if we 

are in there and talking about it or engaging on the subject matter 

of what we are actually doing, what is the reality on the ground 

there? That is helpful. 

With Russia, much of the propaganda that surfaces is aimed at 

destabilizing the West, undermining the trust and credibility of 

journalism, of government, of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], of EU [European Union], and all those things, and so we 

can have a conversation along this other pathway, and we don’t 

match propaganda. Certainly we don’t go tweet-for-tweet, but we go 

to the overarching issues where they are having an impact. 

And with Daesh, same thing, as I mentioned before, there is a 

say-do gap, and we start to hit them, hit the audience on what is 

the gap, what are they saying, but what is the reality? And this 

will help impact and reach the audience. And again, we empower 

that audience so that they start to recognize the propaganda for 

what it is. It is not effective to tell somebody that is propaganda. 

You have to get them to internalize, and then, again, have them 

be the communicator and share that experience. 

Mr. VEASEY. In the state of affairs today, with everything going 

on with Russia, with ISIL, with Iran trying to keep things stirred 

up in the region, where should we be focusing most of our efforts 

as far as it pertains to counter-propaganda and counter-social 

media tactics? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Well, sir, it is—that is a difficult question because each one of these is a unique threat, and it is a different environment. 

Mr. VEASEY. Who do you think is the most effective out of those 

players in using the social media to cause discord? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I suspect we would have different answers from 

different folks and the different marketplaces. I think each one of 

these are sowing a very critical threat. As I said, the Russian propaganda aimed at the non-Russian audiences aimed at undermining 

NATO, EU, government, media, and that is a very scary destabilizing influence if it is actually having the impact and it is a 

seeping impact onto the audience. 

With Daesh, we see the impact of that, and there are questions 

on the resourcefulness of that, but honestly, I am not sure that— 

I think that is a above my pay grade, on where we should be focused. They are each unique threats, and it is based on our foreign 

policy and where we want to go. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Veasey, and I will start my 5 minutes, and Kevin is pretty brutal about reminding me of this, which 

is good, and then we will proceed to Mr. Langevin. But as we 

begin, I want to indeed thank Mr. Armstrong, the Broadcasting 

Board of Governors. For you to have 61 languages, it is very impressive, too, for Voice of America to have persons who are actually 

proficient in the language, possibly even from—in their home community. That just comes across so positive and real world. I want 

to thank you for that. 
16 

And then General Moore, I was grateful to hear that at embassies, there are personnel, in a positive way, monitoring. I minored 

in journalism. I love print media. When I visit countries around the 

world, I enjoy picking up local newspapers and seeing what is 

available. I was in Islamabad, Pakistan, a couple of years ago and 

it was just a very positive newspaper that I read. It had dispatches 

from Reuters and from Associated Press. It had advertising giving 

an indication of a vibrant consumer society and competition. 

But then I got to the op ed page, and there was a hate-filled column, and it was ridiculous. It was insane. And it was specifically 

about how the American military spends all of its time targeting 

mosques, hospitals, schools to achieve the maximum number of civilian mass murder, and I thought this is so insulting. 

I mean, to the intelligence, in my reading it, who wrote it, and 

I looked: Fidel Castro. So it was somewhat discredited when I 

found out who the author was, but like entirely. But we have just 

got to be vigilant because somebody might believe the total and 

utter propaganda that I saw. 

With that in mind, Secretary Lumpkin, how closely are the activities of our information operations capabilities and people linked 

with the cyber operation capabilities and personnel? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. I am going to defer to General Moore on that 

question. 

Mr. WILSON. That is fine. Thank you. 

General MOORE. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question. They are 

extremely closely linked, as has been indicated several times so far 

in the discussions that we have been having. Organizations like 

ISIL are very, very dependent upon using cyber capabilities or the 

Internet, social media, through everything from command and control, disperse their propaganda, foreign fighter flow, and communications with regards to that, funding efforts, et cetera. So they 

are inherently linked. 

And as you are aware, Mr. Chairman, I know cyber is just one 

of the many information-related capabilities that is part of a broader information operation paradigm or structure, and so all those 

things occur simultaneously. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, we appreciate the effort very, very much. And 

General Haas, is there an overarching DOD, or Federal Government strategy to counter information operations and propaganda? 

How effective has it been? Or if not, what lack of strategy hindering our ability to take meaningful actions in the information environment? 

General HAAS. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman. I am 

going to defer to the Assistant Secretary. 

Mr. WILSON. Hey, this is great. I want the right person to answer 

the question. 

Secretary LUMPKIN. No, no, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the question. Again, the State Department is the lead for the 

whole of government—U.S. Government response in working in the 

information space. On the counterterrorism part, they have the 

CSCC [Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications], 

which is—manages that, and the rest is done through the bureaus 

at State. It is how they manage their regional messages, and we 

provide direct support again. And the CSCC, for example, there is 
17 

20-some-odd people who were working that particular mission set, 

and we are providing about 25 percent of them detailed over to the 

Department of State to assist them in that mission. 

So we are very closely linked within the interagency with our 

partners as we continue to work this, this challenging environment. 

And again, going back to the DOD’s strategy, not only is the interagency piece, but it is what I mentioned earlier is that piece where 

every one of our operations has an information operation component to it. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, thank you very much, and Secretary, I appreciate you pointing out that the ISIL target may be only 1 percent, 

but that is 16 million people, and sadly, in my home State, we had 

a shooting at Ebenezer AME [African Methodist Episcopal] Church. 

It was somewhat of a backhanded compliment to the people of my 

State that the murderer identified he could not find people locally 

who agreed with him. But what motivated him was going on the 

Internet and finding people. And so what I had hoped would be liberating of Internet can actually produce an extraordinary danger to 

American citizens. And I now proceed to Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, want to, again, 

thank our witnesses for your testimony. 

So if I could, Secretary, maybe we can do a little deeper dive on 

this the whole-of-government approach, how information is managed, and can you talk more specifically? You say from the strategic to the down to the tactical, how we are managing the information, and the way in which the State Department has input into 

this as well as the IC [Intelligence Community] in terms of messaging, and again, how the information flows and how it is managed? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. No, I appreciate the question, sir. Again, the 

State Department has the lead, so they set the conditions internationally, you know, as far as the messaging piece. We, at DOD, 

you know, we execute in support, you know, tactical- or operational-level military operations. We do that as we continue to 

work with the State Department in the larger message sets. 

Now, the Intelligence Community, what they are doing is they 

are continually watching our adversaries’ actions, and to see what 

they are doing and which feeds back into the process of we know 

what they are doing and how they are responding. 

You know, the two principal challenges we have in this space 

within the Department is that, one, the speed of technology and 

what our adversaries are able do with it, so we are always adjusting and shifting; and there is also the assessment piece that we do 

all the time, because we have to assess if our actions are actually 

working. 

And one of challenges we have that is kind of unique to this 

space is that when we—when something doesn’t happen, something 

bad doesn’t happen, that is frequently when we know we are successful. So we are trying to validate something that didn’t happen. 

So it is a challenge. But as we work in the overall structure within 

the whole-of-government approach, that is always feeding back in 

as far as the whole process as we work with the IC, the State, and 

then DOD’s component in there. 
18 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Is State properly resourced? And again, will they 

have some of the lead on this? But the capabilities are in the hands 

of DOD. Are they properly resourced to help to manage the information flow? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. I think it is outside of my lane to talk about 

State Department resourcing. That said, the fact that we have, you 

know, 25 percent of the CSCC detailed to fill critical positions over 

there tells me they don’t have the manpower to put against the 

mission like they would. That is my guess, but I would defer to 

State for a more satisfying answer. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. That insight is helpful. I appreciate the answer. 

So Secretary, ISIL is waging, obviously, an information operations 

campaign using social media that has proven effective in recruiting 

new fighters, obtaining financing, and generally strengthening 

their political and strategic goals while undermining U.S. and 

other regional partners’ objectives. 

ISIL also uses open sources for command and control, and their 

broad use of social media has reinvigorated a discussion, obviously, 

of DOD’s role and effectiveness in the information operations environment. 

So little more—drilling down a little bit more on this topic, are 

Department of Defense’s policies and directives keeping pace with 

the ever-evolving information environment? And what reviews and 

discussions are taking place within Department of Defense in 

whole of government to increase effectiveness of military operations 

to counter propaganda, and are new tactics, techniques, and procedures being developed? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. We are doing continual self-evaluation, not 

just within the Department of Defense, but the interagency writ 

large. As a matter of fact, I sat in a meeting yesterday with Secretary Carter and Secretary Kerry, and this was one of the topics 

that we discussed is that how we continue to work better to 

counter and show the true nature of ISIL, and to make sure we are 

leveraging every asset authority that we have collectively between 

our two organizations to continue to show the world what ISIL 

really is. 

So it is a continual process, and we look forward to our continued 

work with the committee here. If we do identify new needs or authorities, we will come to you asking for those. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Again, since my time is running out, I will wait 

to if we go to a second round of questions. But to Mr. Franks’ question, the topic that he raised, and Mr. Armstrong, you talked about 

these trusted partners and seeking them out and making sure that 

the message is communicated; and Secretary, your point of exposing ISIL for what they are, finding, identifying those credible 

voices, particularly, for example, President al-Sisi and the speech 

that he gave to the religious community and the admonition that 

he gave, those are the types of things that help to convey the message of a counterbalance to what the message an organization like 

ISIL is trying to convey. With that, I will yield back since my time 

has expired. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Ranking Member Langevin. We now 

proceed to Congresswoman Stefanik. 
19 

Ms. STEFANIK. My question is for Mr. Armstrong. We have talked 

a lot today about the importance of countering propaganda with a 

credible voice. And you mentioned that in your testimony. But during a CODEL [congressional delegation] I was on earlier this year, 

in Jordan specifically, much of the leadership discussed the importance of the fact that this is a long-term, generational struggle. 

And again, instead of talking about our strategies for being reactive, what do we need to be doing to make sure that our IO capabilities are more proactive? I know that is a broad question, but I 

think it is an important one looking 5, 10, and a generation down 

the line. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Thank you for the question. Because of the nature of my agency, I am going to restate the question slightly because we don’t do information operations, but the information environment. It is important that the value of information, the value 

of the conversation, the value of journalism, the freedom to speak 

and the freedom to listen, and that empowerment to the audience, 

is maintained over the years. This agency is Voice of America, it 

started in the 1940s, 1942. And it has always had a fundamental 

purpose of empowering people through the access to news and information. And that was a fundamental counter to propaganda was 

access to the truth. 

So I think the one answer is acknowledging that information 

matters. We forget that. It seems to come and go in waves. 

Two, appreciate that in the United States, we have a fundamental appreciation of the press. And there is a reason why, because it is fundamental to a democratic process and whatever flavor of democracy that is. They are very important, they’re a voice 

for the people. 

Three, that the people actually matter and that they need a 

voice, not just the, quote, ‘‘formal journalist.’’ And then I would add 

another is that our interagency partners can use us more, that they 

can be available to us to get on because of our access to the audience, they can come on and they can speak to a vast audience 

much greater than simply standing at a podium and hoping that 

a Western media will convey that story to a foreign domestic audience that is a target audience or that that local media, which often 

does not have a global reach and does not understand the context 

of the statement of say Secretary Kerry or the President or whoever it is going to be, and that they utilize us more because we can 

help unpack that story. 

Ms. STEFANIK. General Haas, did you want to comment on that 

question? 

General HAAS. Well, SOCOM specifically is working on not only 

the interagency aspect of this problem set, as the Secretary said, 

but we are also very focused on building reliable partnerships, 

which we see as critical to really informing us about this 

generational issue. And so we spend a lot of time at SOCOM and 

within our tactical forces building those important, reliable international partnerships that we will need to better inform us for the 

future. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you very much for those thoughtful answers. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 
20 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Ms. Stefanik. I think an unheralded 

positive story has been the military information support operations. 

And I think it would be very helpful for General Haas, General 

Moore, possibly Secretary Lumpkin, if you all could explain how 

these are developed and what has been the experience for the last 

14 years? 

General MOORE. As far as the training and equipping, et cetera, 

that I know General Haas can get into the specifics for you there. 

But I will tell you that they have been absolutely critical, especially 

as I mentioned in some of the opening statements, in our embassies to help advance the capabilities of a lot of the governments 

and a lot of the military organizations that we have been helping 

in terms of building their partnership capacities, so that they can 

deal with these problems on their own, which, of course, I know 

you understand, ties right into really what our goals are in places 

like Iraq right now, which is to let them work these issues from 

the inside out. 

So I think that they have been invaluable, and we will continue 

to use them whenever they are requested by the chiefs of mission, 

and supported by the relevant combatant commanders. General 

Haas. 

General HAAS. The successes, as well as the lessons learned, 

have helped us inform SOCOM in how do we adjust our assessment selection process as well as our qualification process for our 

MISO soldiers? So every 2 years, we do a detailed review based not 

only on the successes that we are seeing in the AFRICOM [U.S. Africa Command] AOR with hunting Joseph Kony, to what we are experiencing in the Pacific AOR or the Central Command AOR to 

help us refine the actual classes of instruction, and the skills and 

attributes that we want to build into our MISO force. 

So they have been very informative over the last decade, and 

they will continue to inform us in the future. So we are fielding a 

MISO force that meets the requirements of the specific combatant 

commanders. And if we have to, for example, adjust a language requirement based on an emerging requirement, then we have the 

capability to do that, and I think the flexibility within our system 

to adjust to meet that emerging requirement. 

Mr. WILSON. And as I conclude, I want to thank you all. And 

something that was meaningful to me, by getting proper information out, it promotes a level of stability and certainly robs people 

who have ill intent to their local community and us. And I think 

in coordination with the United States Agency for International 

Development. I wish more people knew about that too. What was 

so inspiring to me on my 11 visits—12 to Afghanistan, to see the 

number of signs that were by road signs next to buildings of the 

clasped hands, U.S. flag, the flag of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. 

And a point that always impressed me, many of these signs were 

rusty, they had been there a long time. And if people found that 

resentful of these schools being built, the hospitals being built, the 

bridges being built, they could take the signs down. And so much 

good. And I always quote Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee, and 

that is on my first visit to Afghanistan, that good news has no feet 

and bad news has wings. So good luck. And to the Board of Gov-
21 

ernors, please get all this corrected. I now go to Congressman 

Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just one final question, I would go to General Haas. General, can you please describe, 

to the extent that you can in an unclassified forum, current information related to capabilities to counter propaganda and social 

media? Which are most effective in your opinion and why? And 

what challenges do forces face in employment of these capabilities? 

And how are these challenges being addressed? And what capabilities are being developed in the future—for the future, I should say? 

General HAAS. Thank you for the question, sir. If I could break 

that down and answer it. Your first part was—— 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Which of the capabilities, to the extent that you 

can talk about it in an open forum, which are most effective and 

why? 

General HAAS. Thank you. So as I said in my opening comment, 

I think the most important capabilities that we bring is our language and cultural understanding, as well as the training that we 

provide to our MISO soldiers on how to conduct influence ops, particularly in the 21 deployed military information support teams 

that General Moore talked about. That is one of the distinct capabilities that we help bring to the country team and the interagency, 

is this cultural understanding and awareness, as well as this language capability. 

Now, as I stated, what we are looking to the future is addressing 

the Internet-based operations of the future. And we, in a different 

forum, we would be more than happy to discuss what we are determining in that current assessment of our capability gaps and 

where we see an opportunity to fill or close those gaps in our current capabilities. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. Thanks, General. And I guess, you know, 

related to this, the other part of my question was what challenges 

do forces face in employment of these capabilities? And how are the 

challenges being addressed? 

General HAAS. Well, I believe there is multiple challenges, depending upon which region of the world we are deployed. I think 

we have a great relationship with our interagency partners in this 

area. And I think our combatant commanders, without speaking for 

them, based on what they have identified, is that we are probably 

not capable or doing enough on the Internet or the Web. And that 

is what they have specifically asked us to address, those challenges. As to the other challenges, I would have to defer that to my 

Joint Staff partner or those specific combatant commands that are 

employing our MISO forces out there today. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Anybody else want to comment on the challenges? 

General MOORE. Sir, I think Major General Haas covered it quite 

well. But if we take a look, like he said, it really depends on what 

area of the world we are talking about. If we want to take ISIL, 

for example, like we have said, their abilities using social media, 

using cyber capabilities is really one of their centers of gravity. And 

it is the speed at which you can operate, an individual person can 

operate, it is the depth at which they can reach into a population. 

They can do it 24/7, 365 days a year. And so it is how do you keep 
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up and combat the speed at which that message may be getting 

out? 

So it is not just about the message itself, it is also tied into the 

speed at which they can get that message out and they can update 

it. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. How challenged are we with respect to the language barriers? I would imagine that this is something that we 

have accounted for. And I know we have folks working on developing and enhancing our linguistic capabilities. But how is that 

hampering our ability? 

General HAAS. Where we are not fluent in a language, sir, I 

think the challenge is we rely on interpreters. And we train our 

soldiers in how to work with interpreters, but once again, it could 

potentially be a foreign national, or a local national that is providing that data, and therefore, it is not that individual operator 

who has the fluency in the language to be able to provide those recommendations, options, courses of actions for how we should do 

counter-propaganda. It is coming through an interpreter. So we are 

always working on trying to improve our language skills within our 

MISO community. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Good. Thank you, General. Thanks, Chairman, I 

yield back. Thank you for your testimony. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Ranking Member. And again, for each 

of you, we are very, very grateful for your service. You make a difference to promote a level of stability, which is so important not 

just for American families, but for people around the world. With 

this, we now conclude and we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:19 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

OCTOBER 22, 2015 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

OCTOBER 22, 2015 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

OCTOBER 22, 2015 

(73) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON 

Mr. WILSON. How can COCOMs (and the United States Government in general, 

including DHS, Treasury, and State) better utilize BBG’s unique pathways to and 

relationships with audiences? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. The BBG’s reach—226 million according to Gallup research—is 

indeed significant. 

BBG broadcasters routinely cover all major press availabilities at the Pentagon 

and Department of State, and we have positive relationships with senior State and 

DOD leaders. 

That said, we continue to explore ways to expand cooperation. 

We work with DHS representatives through various inter-agency processes, and 

find DHS material on such topics as online recruiting useful material for our programs. 

We thank for the committee on their past support to revise the Smith-Mundt Act 

and permit domestic access to BBG content. Our content is easily accessible online. 

However, internal BBG procedures and (possible over-reliance on) the use of licensed content from AP and others, result in barriers for domestic media from 

reusing our content for rebroadcast. DHS and other inter-agency partners can promote our language services to specific immigrant communities, especially those underserved by reliable media. 

BBG receives regular updates on Treasury additions and deletions to sanctions 

listings, and we find them particularly useful regarding Iran. The listings provide 

story leads, especially involving sanctions violations and financing of sanctioned organizations. 

There are no regular, systematic meetings between BBG, DHS, and Treasury, 

however, and the idea bears consideration. 

Concerning the COCOMs, the BBG and Department of Defense have a generally 

positive working relationship. 

SOCOM’s Washington office acts as one of the principle gateways between DOD 

and the BBG. SOCOM facilitates rotation of videographers and technicians from Ft. 

Bragg through short-term assignments at the Voice of America. Soldiers have the 

opportunity to cover spot news in the Washington area and assist in story editing 

and production techniques. 

MIST deploying overseas typically visit BBG prior to deployment, where they receive assessments of the information and political environment. They often receive 

the latest audience research and public opinion studies from our Research Department. 

And when they want to know about media consumption habits in the target countries, we are more than happy to share our data. 

There is often technical collaboration as well. For example, BBG contributed both 

equipment and engineering expertise to SOCOM and other DOD elements helping 

to rebuild Ukraine’s heavily damaged broadcast infrastructure. 

BBG also contributed surplus broadcast equipment to National Guard units working to create the next-generation quick-deployment broadcast systems. 

We have worked with PACOM in the creation of a dedicated, special interest digital platform, BenarNews. 

This website replaces the former Khabar web site funded through the Trans Regional Web Initiative (TRWI). Funded by PACOM, BenarNews is managed and edited through BBG grantee Radio Free Asia. 

The result is a content-rich site that covers a number of Asian countries—Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and India—which have been the subject of intense online 

recruiting efforts by Daesh. 

We have had discussions with CENTCOM, EUCOM and AFRICOM regarding 

similar collaborations; those talks continue. 

Working with contracting support from DOD’s Countering Terrorism Technical 

Support Office (CTTSO), we created a prototype of a Content Exchange Platform. 

This digital platform would allow for easy exchange of content between various 

parts of the USG working on anti-Daesh and related efforts. 
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We believe there is merit in continuing the development efforts, as resources permit. 

Mr. WILSON. How do BBG and CSCC work together? Would you make any recommendations for improving that working relationship? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. BBG works routinely with CSCC. We provide a five-days-a-week 

digest of BBG coverage of Daesh and related issues to CSCC, which is then distributed to USG communicators along with CSCC’s daily thematic guidance. 

We are also a participant in the inter-agency effort on Line of Effort #6: Demonstrating ISIL’s True Nature, and we work with NCTC on Line of Effort 7: Impeding the Flow of Foreign Fighters. 

As for areas of improvement, BBG is somewhat impeded by the fact that it does 

not have ready access to the classified e-mail systems on which much of NSCC and 

CSCC’s business is conducted. I have been pushing for our senior leadership, especially our strategists, to get high-side accounts. At present, I am the only Governor 

and only one of a few individuals with a high-side account, plus one person designated as the ‘‘drop box’’ for receiving and sending classified email on behalf of others. 

In addition, much of the work product of these organizations would provide rich 

content for news reports if it could be safely and expeditiously declassified. 

Mr. WILSON. The U.S. must have counter propaganda with a credible voice, and 

do so proactively rather than reactively. a) How can we improve our own credibility? 

b) How can we amplify the voices of other trusted messengers? c) How do we expose 

the adversary’s propaganda for what it is, whether from non-state or state actors? 

How can we engage foreign audiences to do the same? d) How can the interagency 

move to a proactive posture, rather than reactive, to counter messaging? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. The nature of credibility has changed in the digital age. Even 

in highly filtered markets bombarded by domestic and foreign propaganda, audiences can access more sources of information. As a result, they often spend less time 

deliberating information and may select sources that conform to their personal bias. 

This increased competition for attention means the BBG must focus on being relevant to the audience. Our credibility stems from being accessible in the local language, using the local vernacular, being available on the platforms the audience use 

(i.e. radio, TV, mobile, Internet, or print) and providing verifiable and timely news 

and information the audience can use. Professional journalism goes beyond simply 

conveying facts; it also teaches the audience how to weight the different sides. 

In broader terms, the U.S. must understand that actions and words communicate 

and shape opinions. Often, it is the action that wins over the words. Where there 

is a ‘‘say-do gap,’’ our credibility suffers. This problem is magnified where our audiences have long memories. Perhaps worse, such gaps pose potential opportunities 

for adversarial propaganda by our opponents. 

As we have seen, the Russians, Daesh, and the Chinese actively use information 

to advance their foreign policy interests. They change the ‘‘facts,’’ alter perceptions, 

and shift blame. Exposing adversarial propaganda for what it is, and exposing the 

reality that propaganda seeks to gloss over requires agility, resources, and a strategy. 

Tactically, we must first understand whether, how, and why adversarial propaganda efforts are successful. The ‘‘counter’’ will often not be through a bullhorn, but 

through a change in policy, restating a policy, or bringing other resources, including 

communications resources, to bear on the underlying problems that propagandists 

seek to exploit. 

Propaganda succeeds most when it is uncontested and when audiences cannot 

turn elsewhere. The challenges posed by Russian, Daesh, Chinese, and Iranian 

propaganda, among others, may have common elements, but they will be specific in 

their targeting and impact. 

The BBG can help several ways here, beyond professional journalism that exposes 

the reality on the ground and potentially inoculates against propaganda. 

First, the BBG can undertake investigative journalism to expose realities our adversaries are trying to hide. The BBG does not have the resources to do this. During 

the Cold War, this was a focus of USIA and VOA and they had the capability to 

execute effectively in these areas. RFE/RL also was effective through their large 

staff dedicated to investigating abuses and corruption in Eastern Europe and in Soviet Russia. 

While there are successful programs and efforts scattered across the BBG, in particular at RFE/RL, RFA and VOA, there is not the capacity for sustained, long-term 

corruption and investigative reporting. The BBG would welcome conversations with 

Congress and the Administration on how to continue to increase our investment into 

this important resource. 
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Second, the BBG’s journalists are the ‘‘canary in the coal mine.’’ That is because 

of their deep networks in countries of interest to U.S. foreign policy. Because they 

grew up in these countries, lived and worked in them, they often have a ‘‘feel’’ for 

what is happening on the ground. The BBG should take their views into account, 

especially when planning broadcast ‘‘surge’’ in response to crises. 

It is critical that the BBG focus both its credibility and its tools to proactively 

counter misinformation in key audiences around the world. I look forward to working with this Committee, and the rest of the Congress, to ensure that we are coordinated in our efforts, and I would be happy to answer any additional questions you 

may have at any time. 

Mr. WILSON. In 2011, the Administration established the Center for Strategic 

Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC). Its charter is to ‘‘reinforce, integrate, 

and complement public communications efforts across the executive branch.’’ DOD 

currently has approximately six detailees assigned to the CSCC. a) How are DOD 

strategic, operational, and tactical plans and operations coordinated with the CSCC? 

b) Is the CSCC an effective organization to then integrate those plans and operations within the interagency? c) Is the CSCC appropriately resourced by DOD and 

other interagency partners? 

Secretary LUMPKIN. Aspects of DOD plans and operations that are relevant to 

counterterrorism communications are closely coordinated with the CSCC. The 

CSCC’s role is to integrate counterterrorism messaging of various U.S. Government 

departments and agencies. DOD detailees to the CSCC provide military expertise, 

including in planning which allows CSCC to be more effective in integrating DOD 

capabilities into U.S. Government counterterrorism messaging. DOD’s support to 

CSCC is at the level requested and is adequate for the tasks assigned. 

Mr. WILSON. Actions are a fundamental form of communication, and strategic 

communications can affect actions. It is therefore imperative that we make effective, 

credible, and timely communications a part of our operations and planning across 

all levels—strategic, operational, and tactical. Poorly integrated actions and messaging could degrade the mission, while simultaneously bolstering our adversary’s 

own propaganda. a) How, where, when, and at what levels does DOD incorporate 

strategic communications into military planning? b) How are those plans integrated 

with interagency partners at the COCOM and Joint Staff level? c) How are they integrated with coalition partners? d) Are we prepared to counter state and hybrid 

actors, as we do non-state actors? e) How are lessons learned shared within the 

Joint Staff, COCOMs, and interagency partners? 

Secretary LUMPKIN and General MOORE. DOD incorporates strategic communications throughout all phases of operations, from strategic to tactical levels. While acknowledging that Department of State has the lead for strategic communication outside designated areas of hostility, DOD plans for actions and activities that support 

USG strategic communication objectives. For example, military exercises in Eastern 

Europe are tangible actions that reinforce U.S. pledges of support to our partners 

in the region. All of our plans are shared with interagency partners for review and 

comment by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Additionally, the combatant command staffs have representatives from various interagency partners on the staff. 

These partners are vital to providing input and perspective of their parent agency. 

Additionally, they are able to keep their agencies informed regarding the direction 

of combatant command planning efforts. Our closest coalition partners often have 

representatives on the Joint Staff and at the COCOMs. Provided they possess the 

appropriate clearances, coalition partners are full participants in our planning processes. Absent those clearances, they are integrated to the fullest extent possible 

while protecting USG interests. Yes, although our adversaries and potential adversaries are taking advantage of new technologies, we are prepared to counter state, 

non-state, and hybrid actors alike. Our experiences over the last decade have shown 

us that we must become more adept at dealing with all actors in the information 

environment and has led us to develop capabilities and authorities tailored to meet 

that challenge. With the advent of new technologies, our adversaries will continue 

to evolve their efforts against us and we must continue to rapidly adapt our capabilities and responses to address all adversaries. All IO can be submitted into the 

Joint Lessons Learned Process (JLLP) overseen by the J7. Joint Lessons Learned 

Information System (JLLIS) is the automated solution supporting implementation 

of the Chairman’s Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP). JLLIS facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative resolution and dissemination 

of lessons learned to improve the development/readiness of the Joint Force. The validated information also enables actionable Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) and Policy 

changes to improve joint and combined capabilities. The outputs JLLP include 

changes to Joint Doctrine, Education, Concept Development, Joint Exercises and 
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Joint Capabilities. All COCOM’s, Functional Commands, Combat Support Agencies 

and Services participate. JLLP supports the interagency, multinational and non-governmental communities to foster mutual understanding and enhanced inter-operability. 

Mr. WILSON. What lessons related to MISO and IO have we learned from the past 

14 years of war? How do you think that will affect how the MISO/IO force of the 

future will need to change in the next 5 to 10 years? 

General HAAS. Based upon our experiences and lessons learned over the last 14 

years, we have adjusted our personnel selection, updated and enhanced our MISO 

training, and better integrated our force structure. We have implemented a new personnel assessment and selection program, which lasts two weeks, and is designed 

to test potential members of the MISO community to ensure they have the attributes necessary to conduct effective influence. We have expanded our MISO training with an increased focus on language, culture, and influence principles. Our 

MISO force structure now includes two active duty groups, which are combined with 

Special Forces and Civil Affairs Groups under one single command headquarters. 

This integration of capabilities allows for better fusion of all Army Special Operation 

Forces (ARSOF) skill sets in execution. 

With respect to the future, we have seen our adversaries, both nation-state and 

terrorist, increasingly turn to extensive use of misinformation and propaganda as 

their primary efforts. These efforts have frequently taken advantage of the open nature of the Internet with alarming results. We will need to master web-based operations and stay abreast of emerging advances in technology to meet this challenge. 

We have learned that we must remain committed to our Special Operations Forces 

truths and continue to invest in our people. We must remain focused on our long 

term objectives, rather than being reactive and trying to match each of the adversaries’ tweets/posts, etc. Our force needs to remain flexible in posture rather than 

settle into one operational paradigm (e.g. only deploying MISTs). We must be able 

to execute in a range of missions across the operational and tactical levels in evolving and ever-changing scenarios. 

Mr. WILSON. What lessons related to MISO and IO have we learned from the past 

14 years of war? How do you think that will affect how the MISO/IO force of the 

future will need to change in the next 5 to 10 years? 

General MOORE. The operational environment today contains a complex mixture 

of audiences, media platforms and communicators all with a great appetite for information. The last 14 years have provided with a greater understanding of the cultural aspects of a specific operational environment which factors local history, religion, culture, customs, and laws. This increased understanding allows us to better 

understand audiences, which is essential to effectively communicate to the right audience to achieve an effect in support of our government objectives. Another lesson 

learned is our increased U.S. interagency collaboration at the operational, tactical, 

and, embassy levels, which has expanded our whole of government efforts to synchronize messages with actions. However, with increased coordination comes a slower approval processes and one must maintain a balance to ensure actions and words 

send the intended message. 

Without a doubt, we’ll continue to garner more lessons learned as the information 

environment evolves. In the coming years, we’ll need to be more agile and flexible 

as our adversaries will also continue to do so, especially in the information space. 

Æ