Filed 4/3/14 In re J.S. CA2/8 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT
In re J.S., Jr., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. B250808 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK83807) LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
J.S., Sr.,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Margaret Henry, Judge. Affirmed in part; revers ed in part and remanded with directions. Suzanne Davidson, under appointment by th e Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance by Plaintiff and Respondent. Aida Aslanian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor.

* * * * * * * * *2 J.S., Sr. (father) appeals the juvenile cour t’s orders denying hi s petition pursuant to
Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 1 and terminating his parental rights to his minor son J.S., Jr. (J.S.). Father contends the court abused its discretion because he demonstrated both changed circumstances and th at it was in the best interests of J.S. to grant the petition, reinstate services and libera lize visitation so that he could reunify with J.S. Father also contends the juvenile cour t failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (IC WA). (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) We agree that ICWA notice was inadequate and th erefore conditionally reverse the order terminating parental rights and remand with directions to the juvenile court to order the Los Angeles Department of Children and Fam ily Services to make reasonable inquiry regarding possible Indian ancestry, and to re-serve all requisite ICWA notices. We otherwise affirm the juve nile court’s orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCED URAL BACKGROUND
J.S. first came to the at tention of the Department in August 2010, as a newborn, when D.W. (mother), was placed in juvenile ha ll and failed to make plans for his care.
The court ordered J.S. removed from mother’s custody and placed with father. J.S.
remained in father’s care for al most a year. Mother failed to reunify with J.S. and her
reunification services were te rminated in April 2011. In October 2011, several emergency referrals were made to the Department alleging general neglect of J.S. by P.S. (pat ernal grandmother), as well as possible sexual
abuse. It was determined father had been incarcerated on a robbery conviction and had left J.S. in the care of paternal grandmother. The Department filed a petition pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g), alleging, as to father, that father was inca rcerated and failed to protect and to make appropriate provisions for J.S.’s support by leaving him in the care and custody of paternal grandmother, despite the fact she wa s regularly under the influence of marijuana

1 All further undesignated section refere nces are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.3 while caring for J.S., and had a criminal re cord for use and possession of controlled
substances.
Initial interviews with th e family members, includin g paternal gr andmother who admitted to suffering from depression and back problems and regularly medicating with marijuana pursuant to a prescr iption, supported concerns by the Department about J.S.’s safety in paternal grandmother’s home. Moth er, who had lived for over a year with J.S. and paternal grandmothe r (in violation of the court’s re moval order concerning mother), reported that paternal grandmother regularly smoked marijuana in front of J.S. and had driven drunk with him in the car. The Departme nt reported that in light of mother’s prior failure to reunify with J.S., he could not be placed in her care. Father remained incarcerated. The Department detained J.S. The detention report referenc ed that, in the initial depe ndency proceeding opened in 2010, notice was given to the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians and the United States Department of Interior, Bure au of Indian Affairs (BIA), and that, from responses received March 3, 2011, and Fe bruary 28, 2011, respectively, it was
determined J.S. was not an Indian child. Attachments A and B were identified in the report as consisting of the relevant notices and responses, but those attachments are not
contained in the record. At the detention hearing on November 7, 2011, the juvenile court found a prima facie case for detaining J.S. and ordered him removed from fa ther’s custody. The court also ordered the Department to make appropr iate inquiry and investigate the claim of possible Indian heritage and provide the cour t with a report of the investigation detailing who was interviewed and the dates and places of birth of relevant rela tives as far back as could be ascertained. J.S. was placed with a foster family, Mr. and Mrs. D., in midNovember 2011. In the jurisdiction and disp osition report, the Department reiterated its reference from the detention report concerning the ICWA notices sent in the earlier proceedings. The Department further reporte d that paternal grandmother had no information regarding her claim of Cherokee heritage, other than to pr ovide the first and last names of her father4 and her great-grandmother. She told the Depa rtment to speak with her sister, U.S., for possible additional biographical and family in formation. The Department reported that efforts to speak with paternal grandmothe r’s sister had not yet been successful. Telephone messages had apparently not been re turned. As w ith the detention report, the earlier notices and responses were referenced but not attached, and exist nowhere in the
record. Both father and mother signed Parental Notification of Indian Status forms denying any Indian heritage to the best of their knowledge. At the pretrial conference hearing on D ecember 2, 2011, the court inquired about ICWA notices. Counsel for the Departme nt reminded the court it had found notice adequate on April 29, 2011 , in the earlier proceeding. The court responded by acknowledging that father had filed a form denying Indian heritage. Counsel for the Department stated the Cherokee heritage clai m had come from the paternal grandmother. Paternal grandmother and a pa ternal aunt were present at the hearing and advised the court their parents were deceased, and they ha d no additional inform ation to provide the court. The court made a finding ICWA did not apply and continued the jurisdiction and disposition hearing to December 16, 2011. At the jurisdiction and disposition heari ng, the Department filed a first amended petition that substantially restat ed the original count b-1, b- 2, and g-1 allegations. The amended petition also added the fo llowing allegation as count b- 3: “The [child’s] father [violated] the previous court order by leaving the child . . . in the care of mother . . . in the home of paternal grandmother. . . . The fa ther’s inappropriate plan endangered the child’s physical health and safety, create d a detrimental home environment and placed the child at risk of physical harm and damage.” Father submitted on the Department’s repor t and mother plead no contest to the amended petition. The court dismissed the original petition and sustained the am ended petition as to all three counts pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b), and dism issed the count g-1 allegation in the interest of justice. Father was ordered to complete a parenting class and5 to participate in counseling to address ca se issues. Father was granted monitored visitation. Mother was also granted servic es and monitored vis itation, despite having previously failed to reunify with J.S. in the earlier proceeding. In the six-month status review report, th e Department reported J.S. interacted well with Mrs. D. and her biological children, and ap peared to be “thriving” in the placement.
Mrs. D. told the social worker J.S. was an “easygoing child” who hardly ever cried. It was noted Mrs. D. had expressed her desire to adopt J.S. The report further indicated father was released from prison on Marc h 29, 2012, had comp leted 30 hours of a parenting class while incarcerated, had st arted counseling upon his release and was starting to visit with J.S. Mrs. D. repor ted the visits went well and father acted appropriately. Father’s counselor informed the Department it was too early to comment on father’s progress or prognosis. At the review hearing in June 2012, the court found both mother and father to be in partial compliance with their respective case plans and granted the Department
discretion to liberalize the monitored visitation. In September 2012, the Department repor ted father had been arrested again and was housed at the North County Correctional Facility. Mother had also been arrested and was in custody. In preparation for the 12-month review hearing, the Department reported father had been released on November 6, 2012, a nd had contacted the De partment about his
case. Father told the social worker he wo uld do everything necessary to reunite with his son, would look for a part-time job and woul d re-enroll in counse ling sessions. It was further reported J.S. was continuing to do well in the home of Mr. and Mrs. D., that their biological children were “very lo ving” towards J.S., and J.S. had started to call Mrs. D. “ ‘mommy.’ ” At the time of the report, mother’s whereabouts were unknown and she was reported as noncompliant with her case plan. By the time of the January 4, 2013 review hearing, father was once again found to be only in partial compliance w ith his case plan. Father’s arrest had interrupted his visits with J.S., as well as his counseling sessions . The Department reported that father’s6 inability “to maintain a crim e free lifestyle” had resulted in continuing noncompliance with the case plan and hamper ed the development of a quality bond with J.S. Mother’s
whereabouts remained unknow n. The Department reco mmended the termination of
services for both mother and fa ther. The court terminated re unifications services for both father and mother on January 4, 2013. The Department submitted a last minute information for the court in preparation for the February 1, 2013 progress hearing th at noted, among other things, that Mr. and Mrs. D. had an approved home study. Due to the emergency medical leave of the social worker handling the case, the Department requested a delay in the setting of the permanency planning hearing pursuant to section 366.26 to allow for completion of the requisite report. The hearing was scheduled for July 12, 2013. On July 10, 2013, father filed a section 388 petiti on requesting reinstatement of services, liberalized visitation, and to ta ke the section 366.26 hearing off calendar. Father’s therapist submitted a letter explai ning he had been atte nding, since March 25, 2013, twice weekly counseling sessions that he was paying for himself. The counselor stated father “for the most part is consis tent with treatment.” The counselor noted father’s “therapy prognosis seems good.” Th e court continued the permanency planning hearing to August 1, 2013, and set the same date as the hear ing on father’s petition. The court ordered the Department to re spond to father’s petition. The July 12, 2013 status report stated J.S. was “demonstrating comfort and satisfaction in the home” of the D. family ; that J.S. was bonded to his prospective adoptive family; and that adoptio n by Mr. and Mrs. D. remained in the best interests of
the child. The section 366.26 report stated the home study for Mr. and Mrs. D. had been approved almost two years earlier and ther efore a supplement was required. The Department’s written response to fath er’s petition stated that father had been forthcoming about his past be havior and expressed a strong desire to make amends and reunify with J.S. The Depart ment acknowledged father’s criminal history and his failure7 to show motivation to comply with court-ordered services until after the court terminated services in January 2013. But, the Depa rtment said father had recently shown a “tremendous” effort to reunify despite a limited support system, and therefore the Department recommended granting father’s petition. On August 1, 2013 , the court heard father’s secti on 388 petition. Father did not offer any live testimony, but relied solely on the petition. Father’s counsel argued that father established both of the prongs require d to obtain relief under section 388. Counsel said father, since termination of his reunification services in January 2013, had returned to therapy on his own initiativ e and had been in therapy since June 2013 seeking to address case issues, primarily parenting go als and skills. Father was paying for the counseling himself. Father had also consistently been visiti ng with J.S. and the visits were going well. Counsel argued it was in th e best interests of J.S. to maintain a relationship with his biological father and have a chance to reunify. Counsel for J.S. opposed the petition. Co unsel argued J.S. had been in his current placement for over a year and a half and had developed a strong bond w ith his caregivers.
Counsel conceded father’s visits with J.S. went well but that father had claimed he would change before, and had failed to do so. Coun sel said the record di d not support that it
would be in the best interests of J.S. to grant the petition. The juvenile court denied father’s petition, explaining: “The report just goes over
what I knew from the first time the case came in. I gave the father a ch ance when the first petition was filed. And at that time I did not need to place with father, didn’t need to go to that step, but he did make the same arguments to me that he had a football scholarship and blew it. He was going to ch ange everything, going to be different. I’m just hearing the exact same thi ng now that I heard before[.] No, I don’t believe it. [¶] It definitely would not be in the child’s best interest, so I don’t see that [father] changed. . . . Hopefully, with therapy he co uld change, but it would not be in the child’s best interest to be moved after a year a nd a half with the same family regarding somebody else as his mother as he does.”8 The court proceeded with the permanency planni ng hearing. Mother’s
whereabouts remained unknown at the time. Counsel for mother asserted an objection on her behalf to the termination of her parental rights. Father contended the parent-child exception applied and therefore terminati on of his rights would be improper.
The court stated it had read and consider ed the reports and evidence. The court found clear and convincing evidence supp orted a finding J.S. was adoptable and terminated mother’s and father’s parental ri ghts. The court found no exception applied
and that it would be detrimenta l to J.S. to return him to the custody of his biological parents. The court ordered J.S. freed for adoption, found adoption to be the preferred permanent plan, and Mr. and Mrs. D. to be the prospective adoptive parents. This appeal followed. On October 31, 2013, this court r eceived a letter from counsel for the Department that it would not be opposing father’s appeal relative to the section 388 petition since the Department ha d not opposed the petition in the juvenile court. This court subsequently granted a re quest for appointment of appellate counsel for the minor as the responding pa rty to father’s appeal. On November 26, 2013, co unsel for the Department se nt another letter brief, supported by a declaration of counsel, sta ting the Department’s position that it agreed ICWA notice was required based on counsel’s re view of the relevant case files which did not disclose any prior notices served, or res ponses received, in the earlier proceeding, nor any record the court made ICWA findings in that proceeding. The Department requested,
in the event the court affirmed on the section 388 issue, a limited reversal and remand for the purpose of allowing the Department to properly effectuate ICWA notice.
DISCUSSION
1. The Section 388 Petition Father contends the juvenile cour t erred in denying his section 388 2 petition.

2 Section 388, subdivision (a)(1) provides in relevant part: “Any parent or other person having an interest in a child who is a dependent child of the juvenile court . . . may, upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the court in the same action . . . for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any order of court9 Resolution of a section 388 pe tition is committed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court, and a ruling will not be overturned on appeal “in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.” ( In re Jasmon O . (1994) 8 Cal.4th 3 98, 415-416.) “ ‘ “The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the [juven ile] court exceeded th e bounds of reason.
When two or more inferences can reasonabl y be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its d ecision for that of the [juvenile] court.” ’ [Citations.]” ( In re Stephanie M . (1994) 7 Cal.4t h 295, 318-319.) The gist of father’s petition was that th e section 366.26 heari ng should have been delayed, and the court should have granted father renewed reunif ication services and
liberalized visitation so that he could continue to forge a bond with J.S. and ultimately reunify with him. “For a parent ‘to revive the reunification issue,’ the parent must prove that circumstances have changed such that reun ification is in the child’s best interest.” ( In re D.R . (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1512.) Once reunification services to a parent have been terminated, the parent’s “interest in the car e, custody and companionship of the child [is] no longer paramount.” ( In re Stephanie M
., supra , 7 Cal.4th at p. 317; accord, In re Angel B . (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 464.) Instead, the court’s focus, given the stage of the proceedings, is on th e dependent child’s need for stability and permanency. ( Ibid .; see also In re Marilyn H . (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) Here, father had been given reasonable tim e and appropriate services to maintain and strengthen his role as a parent. Followi ng the filing of the initial petition, the court placed J.S. with father. Father nonetheless continued to e ngage in crimin al behavior, precipitating the circumstances that brought about the fili ng of the current petition. Father was granted services, but failed to fu lly complete his case plan, and, as the Department conceded, did not appear to show any motivati on to comply until after
services were terminated in Ja nuary 2013. The law is well established that “[t]he parent

previously made or to term inate the jurisdiction of the court. The petition shall be verified and . . . shall state th e petitioner’s relationship to or in terest in the child . . . and shall set forth in concise langua ge any change of circumstance or new evidence that is alleged to require the change of or der or termination of jurisdiction.”10 is given a reasonable period of time to reunify a nd, if unsuccessful, the child’s interest in permanency and stability takes priority.” ( In re Marilyn H
., supra , 5 Cal.4th at p. 309;
see also In re D.R ., supra , 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 1513 [“ Once a case has advanced to the permanency planning stage, it is important no t only to seek an appropriate permanent solution, but also to implement that solution promptly to mini mize the time th e child is in legal limbo.”].) The juvenile court did not abuse its discre tion in finding it was not in J.S.’s best interest to delay the permanency planning he aring and reinstate reunification services to father for some indefinite peri od of time. J.S., just shy of his third birthday at the time of the hearing, had been in th e care of Mr. and Mrs. D. for almost two years and was thriving in that placement. The caregivers wanted to adopt and had been ap proved to do so, with the exception of need ing to complete supplemental paperwork supportive of the originally approved home study. The record shows father had started to make some commendable efforts to get his life on the right track since his release from prison. But, nothing in the record supports a finding the court abused its discretion in denying the petition.
2. ICWA Notice The notice requirements of ICWA serve th e salient purpose of protecting Indian children and providing a mechanis m for the maintenance of tr ibal and familial ties for
those Indian children faced with the prospect of placement in the foster care system. (25 U.S.C. § 1901; see also In re Desiree F . (2000) 83 Cal.App. 4th 460, 469.) The threshold of information necessary to trig ger ICWA notice requirements is low. ( In re
Gabriel G . (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1165 [ICWA triggere d where mother denied heritage, but father claimed possible Cherok ee tribal membership through paternal grandfather, with no biographical data other than grandfather’s name].) At the December 2, 2011 pretrial conf erence, the juvenile court found ICWA did not apply. We review the juvenile c ourt’s ruling for substantial evidence. ( In re J.T

. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 986, 991. ) Substantial compliance with the notice provisions of11 ICWA may be sufficient in certain circumstances. ( In re Christopher I. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 533, 566; accord, In re I.G . (2005) 133 Cal.Ap p.4th 1246, 1252.) There is nothing in the record here to de termine whether notices were ever served, or whether any purported notices served in the earlier pro ceeding complied, substantially or otherwise, with ICWA. There were disc ussions on the record asserting notice had been previously given and that the BIA and the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma had been served and resp onses showed J.S. was not an Indian child, but nothing is in the record showing those notices, what information was contained in them, proof of mailing or any of the responses . The Department submitted a letter brief, supported by a declaration of counsel, stati ng that a review of the earlier file did not reveal copies of any such notices or responses. Paternal grandmother’s identification of po tential Cherokee her itage, even though it consisted of minimal family informati on, was sufficient to trigger ICWA notice requirements. ( In re Gabriel G
., supra , 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 1165.) Requisite notices had to be served. ( In re Desiree F ., supra , 83 Cal.App.4th at pp. 469-470 [the statute, as well as cases interpreting ICWA , “unequivocally require” actu al notice to the tribe of both the proceedings a nd of the right to intervene].) Whether the Department served
some form of notice in the ea rlier proceeding or not (of wh ich there is apparently no documentation), proper notice must be effect uated here, as the Department concedes. We therefore conditionally reverse the Au gust 1, 2013 order terminating parental rights and remand for the limited purpose of allowing the Department to make and document reasonable inquiry regarding J.S.’s po ssible Indian heritage and to re-serve all requisite ICWA notices. In th e event no timely response is re ceived or responses indicate
J.S. is not an Indian child w ithin the meaning of ICWA, the juvenile court shall reinstate the order terminating parental rights. If re sponses are received raising a substantial question J.S. is an Indian child, the court sh all hold further proceedings consistent with the statutory scheme.12 DISPOSITION The juvenile court’s Augu st 1, 2013 order de nying father’s sec tion 388 petition is affirmed. We conditionally reve rse the court’s August 1, 2013 order terminating parental rights and remand with directions to the juveni le court to order the Department to make and document reasonable inquiry regarding possi ble Indian ancestry, and to re-serve all requisite ICWA notices. If, af ter receiving proper notice, no timely response is received
or no tribe indicates J.S. is an Indian child within the meaning of IC WA, then the juvenile
court shall reinstate its order terminating parental rights. If however, any response raises a substantial question the child is an Indian child, the juvenile co urt shall hold further proceedings consistent with the statutory scheme.

GRIMES, J.

We concur:

BIGELOW, P. J.

FLIER, J.