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SECURING THE MARITIME BORDER: THE FUTURE 

OF CBP AIR AND MARINE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

BORDER AND 

MARITIME SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 14, 2015 

Serial No. 114–25 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Vice Chair 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

JOHN KATKO, New York 

WILL HURD, Texas 

EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia 

MARK WALKER, North Carolina 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director 

JOAN V. O’HARA, General Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

WILL HURD, Texas 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (ex officio) 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (ex officio) 

PAUL L. ANSTINE, Subcommittee Staff Director 

DEBORAH JORDAN, Subcommittee Clerk 

ALISON NORTHROP, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Candice S. Miller, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Michigan, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable Filemon Vela, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime 

Security ................................................................................................................. 4 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5 

WITNESSES

Mr. Randolph D. Alles, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Air and Marine, 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 8 

Mr. John Roth, Inspector General, Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 15 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 16 

(1) 

SECURING THE MARITIME BORDER: THE 

FUTURE OF CBP AIR AND MARINE 

Tuesday, July 14, 2015 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Candice S. Miller [Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Miller, Vela, and Torres. 

Mrs. MILLER. The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security will come to order. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to examine the future of 

CBP’s Office of Air and Marine. In the interest of time, and though 

we don’t have too many other Members here, we are going to begin. 

The Democratic conference, I think, has Hillary Clinton there and 

our conference is just concluding, so we are waiting on some folks 

to get here, but—our Ranking Member has got another committee 

hearing I know as well, and so we want to accommodate his schedule. 

But we are very pleased to be joined today by General Randolph 

Alles, who is the assistant commissioner for the Office of Air and 

Marine, and Mr. John Roth, who is the inspector general for the 

Department of Homeland Security. We welcome both you gentlemen. I will more formally introduce them in just a moment. 

But among the CBP’s missions and responsibilities, maritime security is not often front-page news. Nonetheless, this does not 

mean that it is not an important part of their overall border security efforts. Our coastal and maritime borders are long and they 

cover millions of square miles. My home State of Michigan alone 

has over 3,000 miles of Great Lakes coastline and shares many, 

many miles of maritime border. We call it our long liquid border 

with Canada. 

Illicit drug and migrant flows remain principal concerns of our 

border security agencies, and rightly so. However, as we have seen 

on our Nation’s California coast as we strengthen security along 

the southern land border, the cartels adapt, sending Panga boats 

as far north now as San Francisco. 

From the Great Lakes to the coast of California to the Gulf of 

Mexico, Caribbean and Central American transit zones, the maritime security components of the Department of Homeland Security 

have a lot of sea to cover, and as a result, they must coordinate 

effectively, share intelligence to understand the threat, and smartly 
2 

position resources to stop it. The need for maritime domain awareness or the ability to understand where illicit traffic is most likely 

to occur cannot be understated. Without this understanding, drugs 

will continue to transit the maritime corridors and migrants will 

make the perilous journey to this country. 

Radar coverage of the Great Lakes and other areas along the 

border is far from complete, which could allow low-flying aircraft, 

it does actually allow, low-flying aircraft and vessels to move drugs 

and other contraband with ease. Within Customs and Border Protection, CBP’s Office of Air and Marine has a fleet of over 280 marine vessels and more than 250 aircraft, making it essentially the 

largest civilian law enforcement air force in the world. They have 

enormous responsibility to interdict drugs and migrants using the 

sea as a means to enter the country. 

So today we want to explore how CBP Air and Marine, a relatively small operational component of CBP, fits into the larger 

maritime security strategy of DHS and how Air and Marine’s authorities support and complement the Coast Guard’s security and 

interdiction missions. Border Patrol’s responsibilities provide aviation support to other components like ICE and FEMA and, most 

importantly, examine the security value that American taxpayers 

are getting for the roughly $750 million that they spend every year. 

Without question, the work that the men and women of Air and 

Marine do is very dangerous. Last month one of their helicopters 

was struck by two bullets fired from the Mexican side of the border. Thankfully, our agents were not harmed. Air and Marine as 

well has had other serious incidents over the last few years, including the complete loss of a maritime variant of the Predator on a 

maritime mission off the coast of California. There was an incident 

where a smuggler fired multiple rounds from an AK–47 at our 

agents near the Virgin Islands. Then we had a recent collision with 

another vessel off the coast of California that resulted in the capsize of the vessel and loss of life. 

The vessels and aviation assets that our agents use to perform 

this dangerous work are aging. Recapitalization of the aging CBP 

Air and Marine fleet has long been a priority and a significant 

budgetary challenge as well for our Nation. For example, Air and 

Marine has experienced difficulty procuring a new coastal interceptor vessel to replace the Midnight Express, which is a boat that 

they first acquired long before the creation of the Department of 

Homeland Security. 

While I am pleased that CBP has awarded a contract to procure 

up to 52 coastal interceptor vessels just 2 weeks ago, this award 

does come after a series of delays and nearly 5 years from the time 

that CBP initially announced its intent to purchase new marine 

vessels to replace the aging fleet, which has been in service, again, 

since the 1980s. 

Better planning between the Office of Air and Marine and the 

Coast Guard has the potential to save taxpayers’ dollars, especially 

when components conduct similar missions and have recently procured similar boats, fixed-wing aircraft, and helicopters. The Department needs to ensure components are working together to ensure efficiencies can be gained both operationally and with procurement of additional assets. 
3 

In addition, this subcommittee and committee has been on record 

multiple times calling for robust border security metrics that measure the state of border security, and they are largely absent in the 

border security debate, and a valuable tool to help CBP deploy resources appropriately or come to Congress with additional needs. 

Finding the right set of metrics to gauge performance is not an 

easy task, but it must be done. 

Air and Marine, as the inspector general has recently reported, 

has struggled to develop clear, concrete performance metrics that 

will help Congressional decision makers and the American people 

understand how they contribute to border security at the air and 

maritime domain and at what costs. 

So we look forward certainly to hearing from Mr. Roth on the 

two controversial inspector general reports that cast some doubt on 

the true cost of the UAV program and missed opportunities to save 

the taxpayers’ dollars by leveraging existing DHS resources to upgrade Air and Marine helicopters. I am sure that the general has 

his own views on these reports as well. 

When it comes to outlining the future of this agency, I certainly 

understand that Air and Marine strategy is currently in its final 

stages of approval, but was not yet ready in time for this hearing. 

So I hope the general will be able to share key aspects of his new 

strategy with Members to help us understand where he sees this 

organization going and present his vision for the future of CBP Air 

and Marine. 

Finally, last month the House passed for the second time CBP 

authorization language that I actually authored, and this clearly 

demonstrates that this committee is keenly interested in the future 

of this organization and the maritime security value that it provides to the Nation. 

So we look forward to hearing from our witnesses today. I want 

to thank you both for appearing here today as well. 

[The statement of Chairman Miller follows:] 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN CANDICE MILLER

JULY 14, 2015 

Amongst CBP’s missions and responsibilities, maritime security is not often frontpage news. Nonetheless, this does not mean it is not an important part of their overall border security efforts. Our coastal and maritime borders are long and cover millions of square miles. My home State of Michigan alone has over 3,000 miles of 

Great Lakes coastline and shares many miles of maritime border with Canada. 

Illicit drug and migrant flows remain principle concerns of our border security 

agencies, and rightly so. However, as we have seen on our Nation’s California coast, 

as we strengthen security along the southern land border, the cartels adapt—sending panga boats as far north as San Francisco. 

From the Great Lakes, to the coast of California, to the Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean 

and Central America transit zones, the maritime security components of the Department of Homeland Security have a lot of sea to cover. As a result, they must coordinate effectively, share intelligence to understand the threat, and smartly position 

resources to stop it. 

The need for maritime domain awareness, or the ability to understand where illicit traffic is most likely to occur, cannot be understated. Without this understanding, drugs will continue to transit the maritime corridors and migrants will 

make the perilous journey to this country. Radar coverage of the Great Lakes, and 

other areas along the border, is far from complete, which could allow low-flying aircraft and vessels to move drugs and other contraband with ease. 

Within Customs and Border Protection, CBP’s Office of Air and Marine has a fleet 

of over 280 marine vessels and more than 250 aircraft, making it essentially the 
4 

largest civilian law enforcement air force in the world. They have an enormous responsibility to interdict drugs and migrants using the sea as a means to enter the 

country. 

Today, I want to explore how CBP Air and Marine, a relatively small operational 

component of CBP, fits into the larger maritime security strategy of DHS. How Air 

and Marine’s authorities support and compliment the Coast Guard’s security and 

interdiction missions, Border Patrol’s riverine responsibilities, provide aviation support to other components like ICE and FEMA, and most importantly, examine the 

security value that American taxpayer is getting for the roughly $750 million dollars 

they spend every year. 

Without question, the work that the men and women of Air and Marine do is dangerous. Last month, one of their helicopters was struck by two bullets fired from 

the Mexican side of the border. Thankfully our agents were not injured. And Air 

and Marine has had other serious incidents over the last few years including: The 

complete loss of a maritime variant of the Predator on a maritime mission off the 

coast of California, an incident where a smuggler fired multiple rounds from an AK– 

47 at our agents near the Virgin Islands and a recent collision with another vessel 

off the coast of California that resulted in the capsize of the vessel and the loss of 

life. 

The vessels and aviation assets our Agents use to perform this dangerous work 

are aging. Recapitalization of the aging CBP Air and Marine fleet has been a longterm priority and a significant budgetary challenge. For example, Air and Marine 

has experienced difficulty procuring a new Coastal Interceptor Vessel to replace the 

Midnight Express, a boat they first acquired long before the creation of DHS. 

While I am pleased CBP awarded a contract to procure up to 52 Coastal Interceptor Vessels just 2 weeks ago, this award comes after a series of delays, and nearly 5 years from the time CBP initially announced its intent to purchase new marine 

vessels to replace the aging fleet, which has been in service since the ’80s. 

Better planning between the Office of Air and Marine and the Coast Guard has 

the potential to save taxpayer dollars, especially when components conduct similar 

missions and have recently procured similar boats, fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. The Department needs to ensure components are working together to ensure efficiencies can be gained both operationally and with the procurement of additional assets. 

In addition, this subcommittee and committee has been on record multiple times 

calling for robust border security metrics that measure the state of border security. 

They are largely absent in the border security debate, and a valuable tool to help 

CBP deploy resources appropriately or come to Congress with additional needs. 

Finding the right set of metrics to gauge performance is not an easy task, but it 

must be done. 

Air and Marine, as the Inspector General has recently reported, has struggled to 

develop clear, concrete performance metrics that will help Congressional decision 

makers and the American people understand how they contribute to border security 

in the air and maritime domain, and at what cost. 

I look forward to hearing from Mr. Roth on the two controversial Inspector General Reports that cast some doubt on the true cost of the UAV program and missed 

opportunities to save the taxpayer dollars by leveraging existing DHS resources to 

upgrade Air and Marine helicopters. And I’m sure General Alles has his own views 

on these reports. 

When it comes to outlining the future of this agency, I understand Air and Marine 

strategy is currently in its final stages of approval, but was not yet ready in time 

for this hearing. I hope General Alles will be able to share key aspects of his new 

strategy with Members to help us understand where he sees this organization going 

and present his vision for the future of CBP Air and Marine. 

Finally, last month the House passed, for the second time, CBP authorization language I authored. This clearly demonstrates that this committee is keenly interested 

in the future of this organization and the maritime security value it provides to the 

Nation. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and thank you both for appearing 

before us today. With that I recognize the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, 

the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Vela, for any opening statement he may have. 

Mrs. MILLER. With that, I would like to recognize the Ranking 

Member from the subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. 

Vela, for his statement. 

Mr. VELA. Thank you. The purpose of today’s hearing is to examine the future of U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Office of Air 
5 

and Marine. Air and Marine’s mission covers both aerial and maritime surveillance of our borders as well as interdiction of people 

and goods crossing illegally into our country in the areas between 

the ports of entry. 

As the Ranking Member of this subcommittee and representing 

a district along the Texas-Mexico border, I have a strong interest 

in Air and Marine’s efforts to better secure our Nation’s borders. 

Indeed, Air and Marine has a marine unit based out of Brownsville, Texas, the largest city in my Congressional district, right on 

the Gulf of Mexico. 

Given that Air and Marine provides specialized air and marine 

support to various Federal, State, and local law enforcement partners, I believe today’s discussion should help us all better understand Air and Marine’s specific role in border security. 

Certainly the Southwest Border is a very active region in terms 

of both legitimate trade and with respect to security concerns. As 

the Chairman mentioned, just last month we know that one of 

OAM’s helicopters was patrolling the river near Laredo, Texas, and 

was hit by gunfire. Today I hope that we are able to have a rigorous and thorough discussion on Air and Marine’s overall operations and how they fit in with the Department of Homeland Security’s broader border security strategy. 

In particular, I would like to learn more about how the marine 

and air assets under Air and Marine’s purview are being used to 

support DHS’s border security operations. Last year’s report by the 

DHS Office of Inspector General on CBP’s unarmed aircraft system 

program underscores the need to ensure that our limited border security resources are being used in the most effective way possible. 

Lastly, I would be interested in hearing how Air and Marine 

works with other components within the Department of Homeland 

Security to meet the Department’s border security mission; specifically, learning how Air and Marine partners with the Coast Guard 

on marine patrols and interdictions would be very beneficial. On 

the surface, it would seem there is some overlap in these sorts of 

operations, and gaining a clear understanding of how the two DHS 

components complement each other will help our committee’s border security oversight and legislative work. 

I would like to close by thanking the Chair for holding this hearing and our witnesses for joining us today, and I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mrs. MILLER. I thank the gentleman from Texas very much for 

his opening statement. Other Members are reminded that opening 

statements may be submitted for the record. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

JULY 14, 2015 

In order to fulfill its mission, Office of Air and Marine (OAM) uses its integrated 

air and marine force to detect and interdict the unlawful movement of people, illegal 

drugs, and other contraband moving toward or crossing the borders of the United 

States. As Ranking Member of the Committee on Homeland Security, I am aware 

of the varied border security surveillance and interdiction operations OAM carries 

out both on the water and in the air. 

OAM’s authorities also allow it to provide specialized air and marine support to 

various Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, such as assisting FEMA 
6 

in response to natural disasters. Unfortunately, various reviews conducted by DHS’s 

Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and the Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) have raised concerns about certain OAM programs. 

In response, the OIG and GAO have made a number of recommendations over the 

past several years to ensure OAM’s assets and personnel are best positioned to effectively meet mission needs and address border security threats. For instance, in 

December 2014, the OIG published a report on CBP’s unmanned aircraft system 

(UAS) or ‘‘drone’’ program. 

The report concluded that despite spending 8 years and hundreds of millions of 

taxpayer dollars on its UAS program, CBP cannot prove the program is effective 

and that its impact in stemming illegal immigration has been minimal. 

The report also concluded there are serious questions about whether the program 

has led to a greater number of apprehensions, reduced border surveillance costs, or 

increased efficiency by the U.S. Border Patrol along our Southwest Border. 

The Inspector General summarized their findings saying, ‘‘Notwithstanding the 

significant investment, we see no evidence that the drones contribute to a more secure border, and there is no reason to invest additional taxpayer funds at this time.’’ 

Among the OIG’s recommendations was for OAM to establish attainable performance measures to determine the effectiveness of the UAS program at enhancing border security. 

Additionally, the OIG recommended the development of ‘‘policies and procedures 

to ensure that [the Office of Air and Marine] accumulates and reports all costs associated with the UAS program and other OAM flight programs.’’ I know OAM vehemently disagrees with the OIG report, and I am aware that Members of this committee have asked the GAO to look at many of the same issues. Today, I would like 

to hear about what steps OAM has taken, if any, to respond to the OIG’s recommendations, given the UAS program’s significant cost and its purported benefits 

to border security. 

Lastly, I am concerned about use of force issues within CBP generally, and would 

like to hear today about how these issues are handled within OAM in particular. 

I am aware that the CBP commissioner has begun implementing new policies and 

procedures regarding use of force incidents. 

Given that in the past few months OAM has been involved in two fatal use of 

force incidents—one off the California coast and another near the British Virgin Islands—I would like to know more about OAM’s use of force protocols and whether 

they are being modified as a result of the commissioner’s recent initiatives. Finally, 

I hope to hear about what this committee can do to assist the Office of Air and Marine in meeting its mission as effectively and efficiently as possible. 

Mrs. MILLER. At this time, again, we are pleased to be joined by 

our two distinguished witnesses to discuss this very important 

topic today. 

General Randolph Alles is the assistant commissioner for CBP’s 

Office of Air and Marine. It is a position that he has held since 

January 2003. In this role, the general is charged with overseeing 

the OAM mission of using aviation and maritime assets to detect, 

interdict, and prevent acts of terrorism and the unlawful movement 

of drugs and other contraband from entering the United States. Before joining OAM, he spent 35 years in the United States Marine 

Corps, retiring in 2011 as a major general. 

Mr. John Roth became the inspector general for the Department 

of Homeland Security in March 2014. He has a long record of public service, which includes time at the Food and Drug Administration, where he served as director of the Office of Criminal Investigations, and the Department of Justice, where among many other 

positions, he served as the assistant U.S. attorney for the Eastern 

District of Michigan. Glad to note that as well. 

Their full statement, full written statement will appear in the 

record. 

The Chair now recognizes General Alles for his testimony. 
7 

STATEMENT OF RANDOLPH D. ALLES, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF AIR AND MARINE, U.S. CUSTOMS AND 

BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Mr. ALLES. Good morning, ma’am, Chairman Miller, and Ranking Member Vela. It is great to appear before you this morning and 

to see you again, and also the distinguished Members of the committee. 

I would like to discuss this morning the role of U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection’s Office of Air and Marine, OAM, as I will abbreviate it during my discussion here, in securing our Nation’s maritime border, since that is the focus of our conversation today. 

So I realize the intent today is to assess operations and organization of OAM to ensure we are effectively and efficiently serving the 

American people. I support the committee’s effort to do this in its 

oversight. I appreciate the opportunity to share with you the important mission set and capabilities OAM brings to CBP’s border 

security effort and also the larger homeland security effort. 

The threat in the maritime environment is dynamic. Smugglers 

continually adjust their tactics in order to counter our latest efforts 

to apprehend them. Increasingly smugglers exploit normal traffic 

patterns to conceal their intent, often mimicking a legitimate recreational or commercial voyage. Small vessels in particular are 

ideal conveyances for this tactic, because they operate in a largely 

unregulated environment, while providing opportunity for concealing people or cargo. 

Addressing this dynamic maritime threat requires a specialized, 

agile, and adaptive law enforcement organization with a cadre of 

professional agents empowered to investigate complex cases and a 

unique blend of the authorities and expertise to pursue investigations across multiple environments, the sea, the air, or the land, 

and jurisdictional boundaries. 

So OAM thrives by being adaptive and efficient. Our unique authorities and specialized capabilities enable us to bridge border environments and jurisdictions, providing important continuity to investigations. 

OAM’s maritime interdiction agents have a singular law enforcement mission. They are empowered to take necessary action, including conducting searches and investigations, obtaining and serving warrants, and making arrests and seizures. Our agents undergo intense training in maritime tactics in order to swiftly and safely interdict smuggling threats and mitigate the dangers of prolonged pursuits. Additionally, they are experts in interview technique and they are well-versed in applicable laws. 

Our professional law enforcement agents in their broad investigative authorities are critical to maritime border security efforts. 

OAM agents, sometimes in plain clothes or undercover, routinely 

collaborate with investigative partners, some of which you have already mentioned, on covert surveillance and enforcement operations in the maritime domain. This capability is essential in combatting a threat that thrives on concealment in legitimate traffic, 

which is one of our biggest threats. 

OAM’s specialized fleet of vessels, particularly our next generation coastal interceptors, are built from the hull up for interdiction. 
8 

These high-performance vessels enable our agents to respond 

quickly and effectively to incursions to our territorial waters. 

With limited number of agents and assets, OAM has a substantial impact on efforts to protect our Nation’s borders. OAM efforts 

have resulted in the seizure of significant quantities of contraband 

and disrupted considerable illicit activity before it reaches our 

shores. In fiscal year 2014, OAM efforts resulted in nearly 5,000 arrests of suspects, 80,000 apprehensions, the seizure of nearly 800 

weapons, $148 million in currency, and more than 1 million pounds 

of illegal drugs. 

Ultimately, maritime security requires a unity of effort, something already discussed. No single entity has the capability or capacity to address all aspects of maritime security. Information 

sharing and strong partnerships are critical to understanding and 

addressing maritime threats. 

We frequently participate in joint operations with a variety of 

Federal partners, including the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Navy; 

we work closely with multiple investigative components, particularly the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. We are the 

leading provider of airborne detection and monitoring to the Joint 

Interagency Task Force South. There are counternarcotic efforts in 

the Southeast coastal, and the source and transit zones where maritime radar is necessary to detect threats moving towards the 

United States. 

The recently implemented Southern Border approaches campaign 

leverages the various roles and responsibilities and capabilities of 

multiple DHS agencies to comprehensively address border and 

maritime threats. OAM has been extensively involved in the planning and development of all three of the campaigns’ joint task 

forces. The JTF East deputy commander is actually an OAM employee, Mr. Merton Cox. 

So moving forward, we will continue to enhance our detection, investigation, and interdiction capabilities to address emerging 

threats and adapt to changing conditions in the maritime domain. 

We will fully network our fleet and operational centers to share 

critical information in real time. OAM is an integral part of CBP’s 

border security mission. We blend specialized interdiction capabilities, skilled investigators, a modern domain awareness network, 

and seamlessly apply them all across multiple environments and 

jurisdictions. In doing so, we add a critical layer of cohesion and 

coordination to maritime border security that no other agency is 

providing. 

Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Vela, and distinguished 

Members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify 

today. I look forward to your questions. Thank you again. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Alles follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANDOLPH D. ALLES

JULY 14, 2015 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Vela, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, it is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP) Office of Air and Marine (OAM) efforts to secure our Na-
9 

tion’s maritime borders. OAM is a Federal law enforcement organization dedicated 

to serving and protecting the American people. 

As America’s front-line border agency, CBP is responsible for securing America’s 

borders against threats while facilitating the lawful flow of people and goods entering the United States. OAM is a critical component of CBP’s border security mission 

and the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) risk-based and multi-layered approach to homeland security. We apply advanced aeronautical and maritime capabilities and employ our unique skill sets to protect our Nation’s borders and preserve America’s security interests. 

OAM’s mission falls into four broad categories that reflect our core competencies: 

Interdiction, Investigation, Domain Awareness, and Contingencies and National 

Taskings. These competencies are interdependent and complementary and leverage 

our expertise in the air and maritime environments. We prioritize the development 

of this organizational expertise throughout our recruitment and training, material 

acquisitions and program development, and we tailor our law enforcement capabilities and assets to our specialized mission. 

A relatively small organization, OAM thrives by being extremely efficient and 

adaptive. Additionally OAM leverages its capabilities by empowering its operational 

units to forge crucial partnerships. 

In the maritime environment, we operate effectively with a variety of Federal, 

State, and local partners, including frequent joint operations with the United States 

Coast Guard (USCG) and the United States Navy. Through our integration with 

CBP, as well as our legacy history with U.S. Customs, we enjoy a close working relationship with other investigative components within DHS, particularly U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). These relationships, coupled with our 

broad authorities, allow OAM to follow cases wherever they lead—from the air, to 

the sea and on to land, or from an investigative lead to an interdiction at sea. We 

also frequently cooperate directly with foreign governments. In this way, OAM lends 

critical capabilities and cohesion to an array of border security and maritime law 

enforcement efforts. 

One example of these efforts is a recent operation conducted by OAM Marine 

Interdiction Agents (MIAs) based in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. After boarding and 

searching a sailing vessel arriving from the Bahamas, the team discovered approximately 220 pounds of cocaine concealed in a bilge area. The agents elected to pursue 

the investigation further, and asked the suspect if he would facilitate a ‘‘controlled 

delivery,’’—a ruse whereby a smuggling suspect agrees to deliver the contraband as 

planned, but under observation by law enforcement. The suspect agreed, and the 

agents contacted their partners on the local Border Enforcement Security Task 

Force (BEST) to help coordinate the delivery. OAM and other BEST agents completed the delivery successfully, resulting in the arrests of two suspects and the seizure of the cocaine, one sailboat, one truck, and $1,650 in cash. The exploitation of 

the initial seizure was only possible due to the authorities and expertise of the OAM 

agents, and close working relationships with other investigators. 

Our greatest resources are the sound judgment and experience of our agents, who 

average 17 years of law enforcement experience with OAM. Over 60 percent of these 

sworn agents are veterans of the Armed Services, and many have prior experience 

in law enforcement. All agents receive intensive training in applicable law, use of 

force, investigative techniques, Spanish language, and more upon entrance into 

service. Soon after, they undergo additional advanced training in tactics and the 

safe operation of vessels and aircraft. All agents are empowered to apply the full 

range of their legal authorities when conducting interdictions or investigations, in 

strict accordance with the law. This high level of training and experience allows us 

to empower our agents to make critical, real-time decisions on-scene, allowing for 

an informed, rapid response to exigent scenarios. 

OAM is uniquely positioned—organizationally, via broad enforcement authorities 

and jurisdiction, and with unequaled specialized training, equipment, and domain 

awareness capability—to protect America’s security interests beyond the Nation’s 

border in source and transit zones, between ports of entry, in our coastal waters, 

and within the Nation’s interior. 

A SECURE MARITIME BORDER

Thousands of vessels enter or operate in U.S. territorial sea daily. Though the 

vast majority do so for purposes of recreation or legitimate commerce, a small percentage engage in smuggling and other illegal activity. Apprehending these smugglers can be daunting, as many mimic legitimate traffic while others elude detection 

altogether. 
10 

1 ‘‘Small vessels’’ are characterized as any watercraft, regardless of method of propulsion, less 

than 300 gross tons. Small vessels can include commercial fishing vessels, recreational boats 

and yachts, towing vessels, uninspected passenger vessels, or any other commercial vessels involved in foreign or U.S. voyages. DHS, Small Vessel Security Implementation Plan Report to 

the Public, January, 2001, page 1. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-uscg-small-vesselsecurity-strategy-report-to-public-012011.pdf. 2 While the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) and the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) require many commercial, passenger, and commercial fishing vessels to operate with an Automatic Identification System (AIS), a tracking system 

to, among other things, increase maritime awareness, the requirement does not cover many 

small vessels. 

This challenge is similar to one faced by the United States in the 1970s and 

1980s, as air smugglers exploited known gaps in offshore radar coverage to deliver 

narcotics, often by air-drop or by ‘‘popping up’’ inside U.S. airspace and emulating 

a domestic flight. The United States response in those situations included increasing 

air domain awareness by deploying and linking additional air surveillance radars, 

and increasing its coordinated response capability via air interceptors and other assets. With increased awareness and response, U.S. Customs was able to leverage a 

highly-regulated air environment to identify evasive or non-compliant aircraft and 

target them for enforcement. The result was an unprecedented state of air security 

that persists today, with OAM maintaining air domain awareness via the 

functionality at the Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) and an air intercept 

capability in its present-day fleet. 

A secure maritime border presents additional challenges. Unlike air traffic, small 

vessels 1 inbound to the United States are generally not required to announce their 

arrivals in advance, nor are they required to make their initial landing at a designated port of entry. Additionally, small vessels have no requirement to continually 

broadcast their position via transponder.2 Therefore, many of the tools used to sort 

legitimate air traffic from the illegitimate are not available in the maritime environment. A secure maritime border is one where there is an effective understanding 

of the maritime domain, with awareness of traffic moving in or toward U.S. waters, 

and the ability to infer intent and interdict as necessary. Achieving this state requires: 

• Maritime Domain Awareness.—Detection capability in the form of fixed and mobile sensors, an effective distribution network, and current information that facilitates evaluation and decision making, such as track history and projected 

movements. 

• Law Enforcement Information.—Knowledge of criminal intent or practices typically gained through law enforcement activity, such as case information, confidential human sources, undercover work, covert surveillance, classified intelligence, etc. 

• Response Capability and Capacity.—The ability to interdict quickly and effectively in the maritime domain. This is a function of personnel, equipment, training, and expertise. 

• Unity of Effort.—The various attributes of maritime security and law enforcement agencies are complimentary by design. No single entity has the capability 

or capacity to address all aspects of maritime security. Unfettered information 

sharing is critical to understanding the nature of maritime threats. Effective coordination must occur across organizational and jurisdictional lines. 

• Small Vessel Accountability.—Increased accountability of small vessel arrivals 

from foreign countries and transmission of position via beacon or transponder 

while underway. This will dramatically improve maritime domain awareness 

and result in non-compliant vessels self-selecting for further investigation. 

OAM believes that a secure maritime border is achievable. We are focusing our 

strategic planning efforts to this end, with emphasis on domain awareness, investigations, enhanced interdiction capabilities and a networked approach to coordination with our partners. 

OAM OVERVIEW

Prior to the establishment of DHS, the assets and personnel that comprise OAM 

were distributed between multiple legacy agencies, including the U.S. Customs 

Service and the U.S. Border Patrol. Under DHS, these resources were consolidated 

and integrated into CBP to realize greater operational effectiveness and efficiencies 

in executing the new homeland security mission. Today, OAM operates in accordance with the Secretary’s Unity of Effort memorandum, with goals aligned to those 

delineated in the DHS 2014–2018 Strategic Plan, the DHS Southern Border and Approaches Campaign and CBP’s Vision and Strategy 2020. 
11 

3 OAM owns and maintains CBP’s 283 vessels, including riverine vessels that are operated 

by the U.S. Border Patrol. 4 See 19 U.S. Code § 1589a. 5 See 19 U.S. Code § 1401. 6 See 19 U.S. Code § 1581. 7 See 19 CFR 162.3. 8 See Title 46, 46 U.S. Code § 70501–70502 ‘‘vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United 

States’’ includes—a vessel without nationality; a vessel assimilated to a vessel without nationality under paragraph (2) of article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas; a vessel registered in a foreign nation if that nation has consented or waived objection to the enforcement 

of United States law by the United States; a vessel in the customs waters of the United States; 

a vessel in the territorial waters of a foreign nation if the nation consents to the enforcement 

of United States law by the United States; and a vessel in the contiguous zone of the United 

States, as defined in Presidential Proclamation 7219 of September 2, 1999 that—is entering the 

United States; has departed the United States; or is a hovering vessel as defined in section 401 

of the Tariff Act of 1930. 9 See Title 8, Aliens and Nationality. 

One immediate benefit gained through the merger was consolidated aircraft maintenance. OAM integrated maintenance and logistics for its aircraft under a single 

contract to provide standard support across locations, improve accountability and 

aircraft safety, and ensure common configurations. 

OAM operations are divided into three regions: The Southwest Region, the Northern Region, and the Southeast Region. Each region is split into Air and Marine 

Branches, and then further divided into Air and/or Marine Units. OAM also operates two unique operational entities: National Air Security Operations (NASO) and 

AMOC. NASO, operating out of six centers Nation-wide, coordinates operational activities, long-range planning and project oversight for the P–3 Long Range Tracker 

aircraft and unmanned aircraft system (UAS) programs. AMOC is a state-of-the-art 

law enforcement operations coordination and domain awareness center that conducts air and marine surveillance operations and fuses numerous sources of intelligence. 

OAM’s 1,272 law enforcement personnel operate 257 aircraft, 283 vessels,3 and a 

sophisticated domain awareness network across the United States. These assets provide critical aerial and maritime surveillance, interdiction, and operational capability in support of OAM’s maritime border security mission. OAM continues to modernize its fleet and sensor systems to enhance our operational performance in diverse marine environments and increase our ability to adapt to the challenges of 

securing the maritime border and approaches to the United States. 

OAM LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES

An integral part of CBP’s border security mission, OAM agents are credentialed 

law enforcement officers with a broad range of authorities that enable them to transcend land, air, and sea domains and jurisdictions, providing a critical layer of continuity in enforcement efforts. First and foremost, OAM agents are sworn Federal 

law enforcement agents. They are authorized to carry firearms, obtain and serve 

warrants, subpoenas and summons, make arrests for any offense committed in their 

presence and make felony arrests without warrant.4

Within the ‘‘customs waters’’5 of the United States, or at any place within the 

United States, OAM agents may board a vessel for the purpose of enforcing customs 

law, and to use all necessary force to compel compliance.6 Additionally, OAM enforces laws on any American vessel on the high seas,7 and vessels subject to U.S. 

jurisdiction under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act 8 which concerns the 

trafficking of controlled substances aboard vessels in extraterritorial waters. These 

authorities enable OAM to extend our zone of security surrounding our maritime 

border and littorals of the United States. 

In their capacity as CBP law enforcement agents, OAM agents also enforce immigration laws in the territorial sea, on land, and in the air. Agents within OAM have 

the same broad immigration authority 9 as the U.S. Border Patrol; however, OAM 

is in the unique position to enforce this authority in the maritime environment. 

Similar to other investigative agencies, our agents recruit confidential sources, develop criminal cases, support prosecutors, and testify in court in addition to their 

enforcement actions in the air, land, and maritime domains. 

This combination of authorities enables OAM to conduct successful investigations 

in the maritime domain. 

MARITIME ASSETS AND CAPABILITIES

OAM’s unique maritime law enforcement mission requires the use of marine assets and capabilities—including fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, as well as patrol 
12 

and interdiction vessels and a sophisticated domain awareness network across the 

United States. OAM’s maritime assets are tailored to the conditions of the threat 

environment in which we operate, and equipped with the capabilities required to 

interdict illicit smuggling attempts of drugs and undocumented aliens. 

Often, there is little time to interdict inbound suspect vessels, and OAM has 

honed its maritime border security response capability around rapid and effective 

interception, pursuit, and interdiction of these craft. OAM employs high-speed 

Coastal Interceptor Vessels (CIV) that are specifically designed and engineered with 

the speed, maneuverability, integrity, and endurance to intercept and engage a variety of suspect non-compliant vessels in offshore waters, as well as the Great Lakes 

on the Northern Border. 

Our vessels are manned by highly-trained and experienced OAM crews authorized 

to deploy any required use of force, including warning shots and disabling fire to 

stop fleeing vessels. Over the last decade, OAM has evolved to counter the egregious 

threat of non-compliant vessels. OAM has developed capabilities to disable non-compliant vessels and to bring dangerous pursuits to a conclusion and prevent these 

vessels from reaching our shores. Since 2003, OAM has engaged in 123 cases involving marine warning and/or disabling rounds, and three cases involving air to vessel 

warning and disabling rounds. 

OAM often works in partnership with ICE–HSI, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) conducting covert operations in the maritime border environment; utilizing unmarked and undercover 

vessels when situations dictate that the surveillance of drug loads or transnational 

criminal organization (TCO) activity can yield larger seizures as a part of on-going 

investigations. Some of these covert missions involve OAM agents facilitating controlled deliveries with partner agencies through the utilization of undercover vessels 

and the incorporation of undercover or plainclothes agents. OAM has a number of 

unmarked vessels typical to local traffic, which are used for this purpose. 

OAM specializes in the installation of covert trackers aboard suspect vessels and 

often conducts these covert missions under hours of darkness using plainclothes or 

undercover tactics. Additionally, OAM periodically augments vessel crews from investigative partner agencies when a specific vessel certification coupled with investigative authority and experience is needed when operating these assets. OAM develops and retains confidential human sources in the maritime environment, which 

have been instrumental in effecting significant seizures. 

Although OAM routinely makes seizures through maritime border patrols, the 

majority of arrests and seizures are the result of actionable information or detection 

by aircraft. CBP’s P–3 Long Range Tracker and Airborne Early Warning aircraft are 

multi-role high-endurance aircraft capable of performing border security mission 

sets in the air and maritime environments. Equipped with a multitude of highly sophisticated communications equipment, radar and imagery sensors, operated by 

highly-trained professional sworn law enforcement agents and officers, the P–3 is 

accredited with the interdiction of 122,427 pounds of cocaine and 5,918 flight hours 

within the Western Hemisphere Transit Zones in fiscal year 2014, which equated 

to 20.7 pounds of narcotics interdicted per flight hour. 

The integration of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) have provided critical enhancements to OAM’s air, land, and maritime border domain awareness and capabilities. UAS provide high-endurance intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

of land borders, inland waters, littoral waters, and high seas with multiple advanced sensor arrays. The use of UAS in the maritime environment has increased 

OAM’s ability to effectively detect, monitor, and track both personnel and conveyances involved in illegal activity. 

Another important maritime security asset is the DHC–8 Maritime Patrol Aircraft 

(MPA). It is a medium-range airplane that bridges the gap between the strategic 

P–3 and UAS, and smaller aircraft operating in the littoral waters. It is outfitted 

specifically for maritime patrol with state-of-the art sensors and systems. The DHC– 

8 has provided game-changing detection capability in the Caribbean, Florida, and 

the Gulf of Mexico. 

CBP’s aerial surveillance capabilities in the maritime environment have been enhanced through recent investments and deployments of a Multi-Role Enforcement 

Aircraft (MEA). The MEA provides OAM a replacement for several of its older maritime patrol aircraft, enhancing OAM’s ability to maintain domain awareness of the 

U.S. littorals and coastline. Additionally, the multi-role function of the aircraft provides OAM agents the ability to continue investigations seamlessly into the interior 

of the United States, landing at small remote airports to interdict suspected air 
13 

10 CBP assumed responsibility of TARS from the U.S. Air Force in 2013, but the aerostat surveillance system had been used by the Department of Defense since 1978. 

smugglers. OAM’s Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS)10 is an effective surveillance asset providing radar detection and monitoring of low-altitude aircraft and 

surface vessels along the U.S.-Mexico border, the Florida Straits, and a portion of 

the Caribbean. With eight aerostat sites—six along the Southwest Border, one in 

the Florida Keys, and one in Puerto Rico—the TARS elevated sensor mitigates the 

effect of the curvature of the earth and terrain-masking limitations associated with 

ground-based radars, greatly increasing long-range radar detection capabilities. The 

eight TARS sites represent approximately 2 percent of the total radars integrated 

by OAM, yet they account for over 50 percent of all suspect target detections. 

Perhaps the most important advancements come in the area of data integration 

and exploitation. Downlink technology, paired with the BigPipe system, allows OAM 

to provide video feed and situational awareness in real-time. In addition, the 

Minotaur mission integration system will allow multiple aircraft and vessels to 

share networked information, providing a never-before-seen level of air, land, and 

sea domain awareness. 

A vital component of DHS’s domain awareness capabilities, the AMOC integrates 

multiple sensor technologies and sources of information to provide comprehensive 

domain awareness in support of CBP’s border security mission. Utilizing extensive 

law enforcement and intelligence databases and communication networks, AMOC’s 

operational system, the Air and Marine Operations Surveillance System (AMOSS), 

provides a single display that is capable of processing up to 700 individual sensor 

feeds and tracking over 50,000 individual targets simultaneously. 

AMOC coordinates with the Department of Defense (DoD), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), 

and international law enforcement partners in the governments of Mexico (GoM), 

Canada, and the Bahamas, to detect, identify, track, and support interdiction of suspect aviation and maritime activity in the approaches to U.S. borders, at the borders, and within the interior of the United States. This relationship, enhanced 

through the deployment of shared surveillance technology has allowed GoM to focus 

aviation and maritime enforcement efforts to better combat transnational criminal 

organization (TCO) operations in Northern Mexico and the contiguous U.S./Mexico 

border. For example, this past January, officers working at the AMOC detected a 

suspicious aircraft travelling north towards the United States. AMOC subsequently 

alerted GoM, via the AMOSS, of the activity, and both the Mexican Federal Police 

(PF) and Air Force (SEDENA) responded to investigate. The abandoned aircraft was 

located by Mexican officials a short time later, where 27 bags containing approximately 389 kilos methamphetamine, 79 kilos of cocaine, 79 kilos of white heroin, 

and 1.5 kilos of black tar heroin were discovered and seized. 

OPERATIONAL COORDINATION

Secretary Johnson’s Unity of Effort initiative has put in place new and strengthened management processes to enable more effective DHS component operations. In 

addition, DHS-wide border and maritime security activities are being strategically 

guided by the new Southern Border and Approaches Campaign. Aimed at leveraging 

the range of unique Department roles, responsibilities, and capabilities, the Campaign enhances our operational approach to working together in a more unified way 

to address comprehensive threat environments. OAM has been extensively involved 

in the planning and development of all Joint Task Forces, particularly Joint Task 

Force—East (JTF–E), where OAM holds the Deputy Director position. Working 

closely with the USCG, ICE and others, we have played a key role in developing 

the Concept of Operations, the DHS Force Management plan and led the critical 

Mission Analysis planning efforts, which are all vital to meet the objectives outlined 

in the SBACP. OAM will continue to invest in and fully support the Joint Task 

Forces and looks forward to playing a key role in the unity of effort outlined by the 

Secretary in the SBACP. 

In 2011, the CBP commissioner, the USCG commandant and ICE assistant secretary signed the cross-component Maritime Operations Coordination (MOC) plan. 

The plan addresses the unique nature of the maritime environment and sets forth 

a layered, DHS-wide approach to homeland security issues within the maritime domain, ensuring integrated planning, information sharing, and increased response capability in each area of responsibility. In accordance with the MOC plan, OAM has 

been a key stakeholder in the implementation of the Regional Coordinating Mechanism (RECOM). Through this mechanism, OAM coordinates maritime operational 
14 

activities through integrated planning, information sharing, and intelligence integration. 

OAM agents participate in ICE HSI-led BEST task forces across the Nation. This 

practice has multiple benefits. OAM agents provide maritime law enforcement expertise and ready access to OAM assets and capabilities. In turn, information 

shared through the BEST refines OAM operations and enables more targeted enforcement. OAM recently became a member of the BEST in San Juan, Puerto Rico. 

Working in conjunction with the San Juan BEST, OAM operations have yielded 24 

arrests, 1,453 pounds of narcotics, and $948,953 in currency over the current fiscal 

year. 

CBP OAM is the largest aviation contributor to the Joint Interagency Task Force 

South (JIATF–S), and is an integral part to their aviation capability and success to 

counter illicit trafficking within the maritime environment. P–3s patrol in a 42-million-square-mile area that includes more than 41 nations, the Pacific and Atlantic 

Oceans, Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea, and maritime approaches to the United 

States. 

JOINT TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT

OAM has identified Domain Awareness as a core competency and an essential element of a secure border. To that end, we will fully-network our fleet and centers 

to share critical information in real time. We are pursuing that vision through joint 

efforts with technological partners. 

OAM is engaged with the USCG and DoD to identify and deploy technologies that 

expand overall maritime domain awareness and integrates information and sensor 

data throughout DoD and DHS. AMOC has begun to integrate data from airborne 

DOD assets and seeks to expand further into the maritime domain. With the support of DHS S&T and the USCG Research and Development Center, prototype technologies such as the Integrated Maritime Domain Enterprise have been deployed to 

the AMOC, USCG Sectors San Diego and Los Angeles/Long Beach, and are currently under evaluation. This network is being developed to manage and coherently 

integrate maritime sensors and data sources, such as Minotaur and the Coastal Surveillance System, into a user-defined operating picture, which can be then shared 

between stakeholders. 

OAM works closely with the Science & Technology Directorate (S&T) to identify 

and develop technology to improve our maritime surveillance and detection capabilities, including low-flying aircraft detection and tracking systems and data integration/data fusion capabilities. Currently under development is Coalition Tactical 

Awareness and Response (CTAR), a space-based system which can be used tactically 

against maritime threats. OAM is also working with the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) to develop and field radiological and nuclear (R/N) detection and 

nuclear forensics systems. For example, DNDO and OAM are collaborating in the 

development of technology to detect R/N threats aboard small vessels. 

INDICATORS OF SUCCESS

OAM efforts have resulted in the seizure of significant quantities of contraband, 

and disrupted considerable illicit activity before it reaches our shores. 

In fiscal year 2014, OAM conducted 90,739 flight hours and 42,859 underway 

hours, resulting in the arrest of 4,725 suspects, the apprehension of more than 

79,672 illegal migrants, the seizure of 763 weapons, $147,805,097 in currency, and 

the interdiction of more than 1,155,815 pounds of illegal drugs, including 155,143 

pounds of cocaine. 

OAM recognizes the need for relevant, verifiable performance measures that point 

towards outcomes as well as output, and has initiated an effort to develop them. 

This is a new process for us. We have engaged a Federally-funded research and development center to assist in developing metrics particular to domain awareness. 

We plan to refine a methodology for developing such measures, and apply it to operations across our organization. 

CONCLUSION

Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Vela, and Members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for this opportunity to testify today. OAM is a critical component of 

CBP’s border security mission. Our highly-trained agents, together with our authorities, specialized assets, and tactics comprise a well-rounded, experienced, and established law enforcement organization, fully engaged in protecting the United States’ 

maritime borders from threats to the homeland. 

I look forward to answering any questions you may have at this time. 
15 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you very much, General. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Roth for his testimony as well. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN ROTH, INSPECTOR GENERAL, OFFICE 

OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Mr. ROTH. Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss our 

work at the U.S. Customs and Border Protections Office of Air and 

Marine. We have conducted a number of audits which I believe illustrate several persistent challenges facing the Department of 

Homeland Security. Specifically, DHS components do not engage in 

the kinds of basic management practices, such as analyzing mission needs and deciding best how to meet those needs before completing an acquisition that would better ensure the components are 

able to carry out their missions effectively. 

Second, many complicated and expensive programs lack performance measures, which are vital in ensuring the effectiveness of 

those programs and operations. 

Lastly, many programs fail to capitalize on efficiencies by integrating their efforts with other DHS components, thus hindering 

the Department’s mission to achieve unity of effort. 

CBP’s unmanned aircraft program is an example of the challenges the Department faces. In December 2014, we published an 

audit report regarding the effectiveness and the cost of the unmanned aircraft program. We found that the aircraft did not fly as 

much as CBP had anticipated. The unmanned aircraft logged a 

total of only about 5,100 hours in fiscal 2013. That means each of 

the 10 aircraft available to CBP flew an average of only 1.4 hours 

per day. 

According to CBP, the aircraft do not fly more primarily because 

of budget constraints, which prevented them from obtaining the 

personnel, spare parts, and other infrastructure for operations and 

maintenance necessary for more flight hours. Other contributing 

factors included flight restrictions and weather-related cancellations. 

Although the program is about 10 years old, CBP has never established formal metrics, which greatly impedes any effort to determine whether the program has been successful. This lack of relevant metrics is a barrier to fully understanding whether the taxpayers’ investment is a good one. 

Our report did note that according to CBP’s own figures, the program was responsible for less than 1 percent of all apprehensions 

in the sector in which it operated, which is only about 170 miles 

of the 2,000-mile Southwest Border. 

Additionally, at the beginning of the program, CBP expected unmanned aircraft to reduce border surveillance costs by between 25 

and 50 percent per mile. However, CBP does not currently track 

this metric, so we have no way of evaluating whether they have 

met that. Additionally, by our measures, CBP was not recognizing 

all the costs of operating the program. 

To determine the full costs of the unmanned aircraft program, we 

took an approach that is standard within Government and private 

industry, managerial cost accounting, which really requires an-
16 

swering a very simple question: How much does it cost to do something? What is the total cost of ownership of a specific program? 

We estimated that in fiscal 2013, it cost at least $62.5 million to 

operate the program, or over $12,000 per flight hour. CBP’s estimates of the costs of operating the aircraft were significantly lower, 

because it did not include the full maintenance costs, depreciation, 

operation support, base personnel, payment of rented air bases, 

and the cost of the personnel to operate the program, as well as 

other costs. 

The results for the 2015 audit were very similar to an audit we 

did on the program 3 years before that. Given the costs of the program as well as its current lack of performance measures, we believe that CBP’s decision not to expand the program is a wise one. 

Several other audit reports that we have conducted have highlighted the need for renewed focus on management fundamentals. 

For example, in January 2015, we issued a management advisory 

describing the deficiencies in OAM’s management of its national 

aviation maintenance contract. Unfortunately, we were unable to 

complete a detailed review of the contract costs. This is a series of 

contracts worth in excess of $930 million. We were unable to complete a detailed review of the contract costs because of inconsistent 

and unreliable data. This unreliable data precluded further analysis. In essence, the state of the record-keeping within CBP and its 

contractors made the program unauditable. 

Likewise, in 2013, we reported that CBP was unwilling to coordinate with the Coast Guard to upgrade its H–60 helicopters even 

though both components were converting the same helicopters. As 

a result, CBP may have missed an opportunity to save significant 

taxpayer money. 

Chairman Miller, this concludes my prepared statement. I welcome any questions that you or other Members of the committee 

may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Roth follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN ROTH

JULY 14, 2015 

Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Vela, and Members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for inviting me here today to discuss our work at U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Office of Air and Marine (OAM). 

In my testimony today, I will focus on our recent report on CBP’s unmanned aircraft systems, as well as other reports, which I believe illustrate several persistent 

issues facing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Specifically: 

• DHS components often do not engage in the kinds of basic management practices—such as analyzing mission needs and deciding how best to meet those 

needs before completing an acquisition—that would better ensure the components are able to carry out their missions effectively. 

• Many complicated and expensive programs lack performance measures, which 

are vital to ensuring the effectiveness of those programs and operations. Components also continue to use poor business practices that often result in less than 

ideal stewardship of taxpayer dollars. 

• Finally, many programs fail to capitalize on efficiencies that may be gained by 

integrating their efforts with those of other components, thus hindering the Department’s mission to achieve a unity of effort. 

UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM (UAS)

From fiscal years 2005 to 2013, CBP invested about $360 million on its Unmanned Aircraft System (i.e., ‘‘drone’’ program), which includes Predator B aircraft, 
17 

1Government Auditing Standards, 2011 Revision, section 6.37. 

related equipment such as ground control stations, as well as personnel, maintenance, and support. In 2014, we conducted an audit to determine the effectiveness 

and cost of the UAS program. 

Unfortunately, despite its 8-year effort and significant investment of taxpayer dollars, CBP could not demonstrate how much the program has improved border security, largely because the program lacks performance measures and CBP was unaware of the true cost of the program. 

Anticipated usage of the aircraft 

When CBP established its UAS Concept of Operations in 2010, it expected that 

by fiscal year 2013, it would be flying four 16-hour unmanned aircraft patrols every 

day of the year, or 23,296 total flight hours. However, the unmanned aircraft logged 

a combined total of 5,102 flight hours, or about 80 percent less than what OAM anticipated. According to OAM, the aircraft did not fly more primarily because of budget constraints, which prevented OAM from obtaining the personnel, spare parts and 

other infrastructure for operations, and maintenance necessary for more flight 

hours. Other contributing factors included flight restrictions and weather-related 

cancellations. 

Performance metrics 

Although the UAS program is about 10 years old, OAM has never established formal metrics, which greatly impedes any effort to determine whether the program 

has been successful. OAM’s failure to establish relevant metrics is a barrier to fully 

understanding whether the taxpayers’ investment is a good one. 

When OAM stood up the program, however, it did establish performance expectations in order to justify the cost of the program. These expectations are contained 

within the 2007 UAS Mission Need Statement, Concept of Operations, and Acquisition Plan. Government auditing standards permit us to compare such expectations 

against current performance.1 The performance expectations included: 

• Increased apprehensions.—CBP anticipated that UAS support would increase 

apprehensions. For example, according to the UAS Mission Need Statement, 

‘‘This investment expects to improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and safety of 

Border Patrol agents . . . by reducing response to false motion sensor alerts, 

increasing the number of apprehensions of illegal border crossings, and raising 

the agent’s situational awareness when moving towards and making arrests.’’ 

Although it is not possible to determine whether the specific use of unmanned 

aircraft increased apprehensions of illegal border crossers, we can compare the 

United States Border Patrol’s total number of reported apprehensions to the 

number of apprehensions OAM attributed to the use of unmanned aircraft. For 

example, in the Tucson and Rio Grande Valley Sectors, where UAS operations 

were concentrated, the Border Patrol reported 275,392 apprehensions; yet, CBP 

attributed only 2,272 of those apprehensions, or less than 1 percent, to the UAS 

program. Moreover, according to Border Patrol Agents and intelligence personnel we interviewed in Arizona, the Border Patrol probably would have detected the same people using ground-based assets, without the assistance of unmanned aircraft. 

• Reducing border surveillance costs.—According to the UAS Mission Need Statement, OAM expected unmanned aircraft to reduce border surveillance costs by 

25 to 50 percent per mile. However, because OAM does not track this metric, 

it cannot demonstrate that the unmanned aircraft have reduced the cost of border surveillance. 

• Responding to sensor alerts.—According to the UAS Mission Need Statement, 

unmanned aircraft would improve the Border Patrol’s efficiency by responding 

to sensor alerts, allowing the Border Patrol to determine whether any action 

was necessary before sending an agent to the location. However, we identified 

only six instances in fiscal year 2013 of unmanned aircraft responding to 

ground sensor alerts. 

• Border coverage.—According to DHS’ Annual Performance Report, Fiscal Years 

2012–2014, the UAS program expanded unmanned aircraft coverage to the entire Southwest Border. However, unmanned aircraft do not currently cover the 

entire Southwest Border. The Federal Aviation Administration permits OAM to 

fly its unmanned aircraft over the Southwest Border from California to the 

Texas Gulf Coast. Yet, of the 1,993-mile Southwest Border, UAS operations focused on only about 100 miles of the Arizona border and 70 miles of the Texas 

border. 
18 

True cost of the program 

By our measure, CBP was not recognizing all operating costs. To determine the 

full cost of the UAS program, we took an approach that is standard within the Government and private industry: Managerial cost accounting. This requires answering 

a simple question—how much does it cost to do something? In the case of unmanned 

aircraft, we wanted to know how much it cost to own, operate, and maintain the 

aircraft and sensors. Specifically, how much did it cost DHS, and the taxpayer, to 

provide the capabilities of the Predator B unmanned aircraft? 

We estimate that, in fiscal year 2013, it cost at least $62.5 million to operate the 

unmanned aircraft system program, or about $12,255 per flight hour. CBP’s estimates of the cost of operating the aircraft were significantly lower because it did 

not include: 

• Full maintenance costs.—Our estimate, based on the amount stated in the contract, was that all of the maintenance and support of the aircraft would cost 

more than $24 million. OAM’s calculation of $9.4 million did not include the 

costs paid to the contractor when mechanics were not performing maintenance 

activities. 

• Depreciation.—The unmanned aircraft have a 20-year life span, and based on 

ordinary straight-line depreciation, cost about $7.6 million per year. OAM’s lack 

of accounting for depreciation is inconsistent with all generally accepted accounting practices, both in the Government and the private sector. 

• Operations support.—OAM paid a contractor for program management and 

flight operations support services, including flight operations support at four 

airbases and an operations center in California, as well as incidental materials, 

travel, training, and data deliverables. It did not include this in its total cost 

calculation. 

• Base overhead.—OAM houses the unmanned aircraft at bases around the country, and pays for services such as rent and utilities, but does not recognize these 

services as costs of doing business. 

• OAM personnel.—OAM does not count the cost of the pilot or support personnel 

in its calculations—more than $11 million per year—because they are funded 

through a separate appropriation. However, according to OMB Circular A–126 

and General Services Administration requirements, a proper accounting for 

costs must include these costs, which is why we included them in our report. 

Specifically, OMB and GSA require that agencies accumulate operations and 

ownership costs of aircraft programs, as well as account for the cost of acquiring, operating, and supporting their aircraft. In addition, according to the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board, ‘‘the full cost of a program’s output 

is the total amount of resources used to produce the output... regardless of 

the funding sources.’’ 

Given the cost of the UAS program, as well as its current lack of performance 

measures, we believe CBP’s decision not to expand the program at this time is a 

wise one. We are concerned about the equivocal nature of their decision, however. 

Recent OAM documents regarding the UAS program state that there is a $34 million shortfall in funding and that OAM does not support program expansion without 

additional funding. 

As we said in our report, OAM’s comments indicate that if it did receive additional funding, it would support program expansion. We recognize that ‘‘at this 

time’’ or ‘‘currently’’ OAM does not plan to expand the program. To be clear, our 

recommendation addresses OAM’s long-term plan and requires an independent 

study to determine whether the $443 million associated with the long-term plan 

could be put to better use by investing in the current program or in alternatives. 

We would encourage CBP to explore investing in alternatives, such as manned aircraft and ground surveillance assets. 

We are pleased to report that, as a result of our audit, CBP agreed to establish 

program goals and performance measures, and the Department agreed to conduct 

an independent study before acquiring more unmanned aircraft, as well as establish 

a DHS-wide policy for accumulating all program costs. The Department recently informed us that it expects to complete its study to determine whether additional unmanned aircraft are needed and justified by December 31, 2015. CBP is also in the 

process of revising the UAS Concept of Operations to ensure it contains attainable 

goals and verifiable performance measures. Additionally, the Department has established a charter for the Flight Hour Program Working Group, which is committed 

to transparent cost accounting for all DHS aviation programs. We believe the Department, specifically, the Office of the Chief Readiness Support Officer, was very 

responsive to the report and is especially committed to addressing two of our recommendations. (U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Unmanned Aircraft System 
19 

Program Does Not Achieve Intended Results or Recognize All Costs of Operations, OIG–15–17) 

The results of our 2015 UAS report—that CBP logged only about 20 percent of 

its anticipated flight hours, could not demonstrate performance, and had not accounted for all of its costs—were predictable. Three years earlier, we assessed the 

drone program and found that CBP’s inadequate planning and project management 

resulted in performance shortfalls. Specifically, in our May 2012 report, CBP’s Use 

of Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Nation’s Border Security, we reported: • CBP had not achieved its anticipated number of flight hours. CBP desired 

13,328 flight hours; however, staffing and equipment shortages, coupled with 

FAA and other restrictions, limited actual flight hours to 3,909; • CBP’s lack of a specific operations and maintenance budget request for the UAS 

program resulted in a $25 million budget shortfall. From fiscal years 2006 

through 2011, CBP reported it spent $55.3 million for operations and maintenance, but it had not made a specific operations and maintenance budget request for the UAS program. As a result, CBP needed to transfer about $25 million from other programs in fiscal year 2010 to address the shortfall; and • CBP had not adequately planned to fund unmanned aircraft-related equipment, 

such as ground control stations, cameras, and navigation systems, which resulted in insufficient equipment to perform UAS missions. 

OTHER AUDIT WORK

Several other audit reports have highlighted the need for a renewed focus on 

management fundamentals. Congress and the public must be confident that CBP’s 

financial practices and operations minimize inefficient and wasteful spending, and 

that it is making informed decisions to manage its programs and implement its policies. 

Insufficient and unreliable data prevents analysis and accountability 

Sound financial practices and related management operations are critical to 

achieving the Department’s mission and to providing reliable, timely information 

that supports management decision making. However, CBP has not consistently 

documented the analysis justifying programs or conducted thorough needs assessments before moving forward with acquisitions. In addition, it does not always collect the right information and the data it does collect is too often inconsistent and 

unreliable. 

For example, in January 2015, we issued a management advisory describing deficiencies in OAM’s management of its national aviation maintenance contract. In 

2009, CBP awarded a $938 million contract to Defense Support Services, LLC to 

maintain about 265 aircraft to fly approximately 100,000 hours per year. Even 

though the number of CBP aircraft maintained, annual flight hours, and the average age of the aircraft fleet decreased from fiscal years 2010 through 2013, contract 

costs increased an average of nearly 9 percent per year. 

Unfortunately, we were unable to complete a detailed review of the contract costs 

because of inconsistent and unreliable data. Specifically, we could not verify whether the contractor correctly charged CBP for the maintenance labor hours it completed. The contractor and CBP used two separate data systems for recording maintenance labor hours. We tried to compare CBP’s labor hour data to labor hour data 

provided by the contractor, but the data was inconsistent and did not match. This 

unreliable data precluded further analysis. In essence, the state of the recordkeeping made the program unauditable. CBP told us that it planned to improve 

verification and tracking of maintenance labor hours. (U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection’s Management of National Aviation Maintenance Activities, Management 

Advisory) 

Unity of effort and leveraging other Department programs 

Likewise, we have observed that, despite similar responsibilities and challenges, 

DHS components are not always willing to work together to realize economies of 

scale, which hinders the Department’s overall cost-effectiveness and efficiency. For 

example, in 2013, we reported that CBP was unwilling to coordinate with the Coast 

Guard to upgrade its H–60 helicopters, even though both components were converting the same helicopters. In March 2010, DHS’ Acquisition Review Board directed the Coast Guard to collaborate with CBP and present a joint review on possible helicopter program synergies. The Coast Guard hosted CBP officials at its 

Aviation Logistics Center, but according to Coast Guard and CBP officials, a senior 

CBP executive canceled any reciprocal visits by Coast Guard officials and instructed 

CBP staff not to have any further contact with Coast Guard H–60 personnel. Without CBP’s cooperation, the Coast Guard could not complete the joint review, and 
20 

2 According to the initial DHS H–60 Helicopter Business Case Analysis (February 28, 2014), 

CBP estimated the recapitalization costs at $25.6 million per aircraft (including modification requirements). This would have equated to a total cost of $256 million for the remaining 10 CBP 

H–60As. After further discussions with DHS, we calculated that DHS could save as much as 

$132 million to convert and modify the remaining 10 CBP H–60s if done at the Coast Guard’s 

Aviation Logistics Center. 

neither the Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management nor the Acquisition Review Board followed up. 

As a result, CBP may have missed an opportunity to save significant taxpayer money. In fact, we determined that DHS could have saved about $126 million if the 

two components had successfully coordinated the conversion of CBP’s H–60 helicopters at the Coast Guard’s Aviation Logistics Center. Instead, CBP chose to continue its conversion program with the Army. When we contrasted the cost and number of helicopters the Army converted and modified for CBP with Coast Guard’s efforts, we found that the Coast Guard was able to convert many more helicopters 

at less cost and in a shorter period of time: • Between September 2008 and July 2012, the Army converted and modified two 

CBP H–60s at an average cost of $22.3 million each; the conversions took about 

3.5 years. • In contrast, between January 2007 and July 2012, the Coast Guard converted 

27 of its H–60s; the last 7 conversions cost about $5.3 million each and took 

an average of less than a year to complete. At that time, we estimated that each 

future CBP conversion would cost about $18.3 million and would take about 1.7 

years to complete. 

A subsequent H–60 Business Case Analysis by DHS’ Office of Chief Readiness 

Support Officer, the Aviation Governing Board, the Coast Guard, and CBP confirmed the cost savings of having the Coast Guard convert the helicopters but it was 

too late.2 CBP would not have additional funds for its H–60 efforts until fiscal year 

2017 and, based on the condition of its H–60 helicopters, it had to remove many 

of them from operations. Ultimately, the program simply ran out of money because 

of mismanagement. 

In response to one of our other recommendations, CBP is coordinating with the 

U.S. Army to trade its older H–60As for newer H–60Ls that the Army is decommissioning. This project is on-going. All aircraft acquisitions and other significant investments must now be submitted through the Department’s Joint Requirements 

Council, which was established to make better-informed investment decisions, particularly as it relates to supporting a unified Department acquisition strategy. One 

of the Council’s emphasis areas is to ensure better integration of aviation assets. 

We hope that this process, which was created only a year ago, will assist in avoiding 

future acquisition mismanagement. (DHS’s H–60 Helicopter Programs (Revised), 

OIG–13–89) 

CBP’s acquisition of an aviation management tracking system provides another 

example of missed opportunities to improve performance and cut program costs. In 

August 2012, we reported that despite CBP’s and the Coast Guard’s joint strategy 

to unify their aviation logistics and maintenance systems, CBP planned to purchase 

a new aviation management tracking system that would not be coordinated with the 

Coast Guard’s already operational system. We concluded that if CBP transitioned 

to the Coast Guard’s system instead, it would improve tracking of aviation management and cost less. CBP did not concur with our recommendations, but the former 

acting CBP Commissioner directed OAM to stop the acquisition of the new system. 

Subsequently, OAM directed the development of a new web-based program under 

the current National Aviation Maintenance contract, which will allow it to continue 

to use its existing aviation maintenance tracking system. We closed this recommendation because the web-based program, which is expected in March 2016, is 

not considered a new computer system. Nevertheless, we continue to believe that 

CBP should migrate to the Coast Guard’s aviation management tracking system 

rather than continuing with their current plan, which should only be considered a 

stopgap measure. (CBP Acquisition of Aviation Management Tracking System (Revised), OIG–12–104) 

In its 2012 report on DHS’s Air and Marine Assets, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that DHS could improve certain types of coordination, 

such as co-locating proximate OAM and Coast Guard units, to better leverage existing resources, eliminate unnecessary duplication, and enhance efficiencies. GAO also 

reported that OAM had not documented its analyses to support its resource mix and 

placement decisions for its air and marine assets across all locations. (Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Ensure More Effective Use of DHS’s Air and Marine Assets, GAO–12–518, March 2012) 
21 

CONCLUSION

The Department, CBP, and OAM have taken steps to implement our recommendations, yet OAM’s basic management practices continue to fall short. Sound 

planning and strategies for efficiently acquiring, using, and maintaining aviation assets that operate at full capacity, for example, would go a long way toward improving overall operations. Additionally, OAM should take advantage of every opportunity to coordinate with the Coast Guard to eliminate duplication and leverage assets. Finally, better performance measures and calculation of costs would help enhance security, as well as safeguard taxpayer dollars. 

Chairman Miller, this concludes my prepared statement. I welcome any questions 

you or other Members of the subcommittee may have. 

APPENDIX.—OIG REPORTS REFERENCED IN THIS TESTIMONY

U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Unmanned Aircraft System Program Does Not 

Achieve Intended Results or Recognize All Costs of Operations, OIG–15–17, December 2014 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Management of National Aviation Maintenance Activities, CBP Management Advisory, January 2015 

DHS’ H–60 Helicopter Programs (Revised), OIG–13–89, May 2013 

CBP’s Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Nation’s Border Security, OIG–12– 

85, May 2012 

CBP Acquisition of Aviation Management Tracking System (Revised), OIG–12–104, 

August 2012 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you. 

General, I am sure you want to respond to that. I had some other 

questions, but I think I will just start right out after listening to 

Mr. Roth talk about some of the findings from the—let’s start with 

the UAV program. 

Honestly, I can remember about 10 or 11 years ago my first trip 

to the Southern Border when I came to Congress, and there 

weren’t really UAVs being utilized at that time, and how important 

everybody determined that it would be to use UAVs as a critical 

component for border security, surveillance, et cetera. Then the last 

time I had been down to the Southern Border again was just recently, well, this year, and we looked at a number of the UAVs and 

the drones, et cetera, and their effectiveness and et cetera, et 

cetera. 

But that being said, what is your response, I guess, to this saying that drones and the resources that you have there only being 

used 1 hour a day, or 1-point-whatever hours a day out of a 24- 

hour day, and—— 

Mr. ALLES. I would address the averaging across 365 days a year 

for an aircraft fleet when you have limitations in terms of how 

many hours you can operate on a maintenance contract, how many 

employees you have, I think, is not a great comparison of the program itself. 

The program has delivered good returns for us year over year. 

I will just mention the year that they did the audit for us, as I 

have provided these numbers to the staff and also to the Senate 

staff. The aircraft flew 5,100 flight hours, as Mr. Roth indicates, 

that year. I would acknowledge the airplane is not flying as many 

hours as it wanted to. It is never going to fly the 23,000 hours that 

they put in the report. In fact, it would be irresponsible of me to 

actually try to do that, as I would wear the airframes out in probably 3 to 5 years. That is about 2,500 hours for airframe per year 

with the current number of airplanes I am operating, which is 8. 
22 

But in that year he talks about, we had substantial contraband seizures in the amount of $341 million of contraband at street 

value. That as a return on investment is $66,000 per flight hour 

that the UAV flew. That is a pretty good return on investment. 

Using his numbers of $12,000 per hour, that gave me an ROI in 

that year of 444 percent. This year—— 

Mrs. MILLER. Not to interrupt, but what was it—did you say that 

it was only 1 percent of the interdictions that were done by UAVs? 

Mr. ALLES. Well, he said 1 percent of the apprehensions, which 

is a true statement, but it also detected 18,000 people moving 

across the border in that same year, which is 15 percent of the apprehensions made in the Tucson sector. So, I mean, it depends on 

how you want to work the numbers. 

The fact is for a platform using the VADER system that was borrowed from the Army that year, we had one system borrowed from 

the Army that was able to fly a limited amount of hours per day, 

no more than 8, it got 18,000 detections of people walking across 

the border. Those were used to bring Border Patrol agents into apprehensions, I think with substantial results. 

So I would say we have to be careful about characterizing the 

platform, not recognizing how much domain awareness it actually 

provides us overall. It allows us to see the border in ways we could 

never see it before with the systems on-board the aircraft, and actually recognize where we don’t need technology and personnel, because there is nothing occurring in certain sections of the border. 

So it helps us risk reduce and provide an efficiency across CBP 

and the Department, because I don’t waste money in locations that 

I don’t need to put cameras and Border Patrol agents and aircraft, 

because I can look and see if I have movement across those borders. So that would be how I would respond to it overall, ma’am. 

Mrs. MILLER. I appreciate that. 

Mr. Roth. 

Mr. ROTH. Thank you. A couple things just to make sure we actually understand. The 23,000 hours was not the number that we 

came up with. That is what CBP Air and Marine in their concept 

of operations said. They said that they wanted to have four patrols 

up 16 hours a day 365 days a year. That is the calculation we use. 

We are not in the business of determining what metrics CBP Air 

and Marine need to use. We simply took the metrics that they had 

at the beginning of the program and sort of juxtaposed that against 

what is currently occurring. 

Some of the metrics that have been mentioned here today, I 

think, are probably pretty good ones, but to have a formal sort-of 

metric program, you need to sort-of publish those and you need to 

sort-of state what those metrics are, and more importantly, you 

need to compare sort-of the metrics for, for example, the unmanned 

systems against some of your other aircraft. 

One of the things that we would be advocating is, No. 1, understand the true cost of ownership, which I know is a different issue 

that we probably will talk about, but No. 2, compare different kinds 

of aircraft. So is a drone, an unmanned vehicle, more cost-effective 

than, say, a long-range fixed-wing aircraft? We don’t have the answer to that question, because that calculation has never been 

done. 
23 

So what we advocate in all these is to have transparent sort-of 

performance measures put upfront, not in response to an audit or 

any other reason, but to put it upfront so we understand, you 

know, when you talk about bang for the buck, you need to talk 

about what the bucks are, so you have to have accurate accounting, 

and then two, the bang, in other words, what is it that you are trying to do. 

But I will have to say that the performance measures, for example, of seized narcotics, I mean, that is one of those things that we 

can certainly talk about, either using the retail value of those 

seized narcotics might not be appropriate or it may, depending on 

sort-of how they decide to sort-of judge effectiveness. But what we 

did was we simply took what it is that they thought they were 

going to do and compare it against current performance. 

Mrs. MILLER. You know, just following up on that, if I could, and 

I know the Ranking Member—do you have to go right now? 

Mr. VELA. I will wait. 

Mrs. MILLER. Okay. All right. Good. I know you got to—— 

Mr. VELA. I don’t want to leave you alone. 

Mrs. MILLER. All right. 

In regards to the performance metrics, and I guess I would just 

like you to talk a little bit about that, General, because, as you 

know, this subcommittee, our full committee actually has passed a 

border security bill, which unfortunately we have not gotten floor 

time on yet, but I am hopeful that we will do so sometime during 

this calendar year, and a very big part of that is accountability, is 

using metrics so that we can assure, obviously not just the Congress, but the American people that we have operational control of 

the various sectors of border around our Nation. 

I think everyone that is involved in the border security business 

is going to be—we are going to be looking at everyone to assist us 

with making sure that we have those kinds of metrics. 

So as Mr. Roth is pointing out here, what is your thought about 

performance metrics and what you might be able to put out there 

for us? 

Mr. ALLES. So I think on the metrics side, that is an area that 

we have struggled in overall. The Border Patrol is working on new 

metrics for their organization in terms of how they characterize the 

border. We are working on metrics, which have never been done 

before, on how you characterize—how do you characterize air support? So, you know, how do you characterize the effectiveness of an 

aircraft for surveillances, how do you put a dollar value on it, how 

do you do that? We don’t have good answers for that. 

So we currently are engaging one of these Federally-funded research and development organizations to help us try to develop air 

metrics specifically for our organization, which would hopefully address part of the issues that Mr. Roth is bringing up. I think also 

we can work better with the IG in terms of staff to staff on trying 

to figure out what these metrics are. 

I would acknowledge that ConOps, you know, lays out a very ambitious and unattainable level of attainment for the UAV, given the 

frictions of operating that. So I don’t want to—I want to be careful 

here to not say that, you know, that is not in there, because that 

was in there, but, you know, it is an unrealistic value. 
24 

But I think on the metrics, I think we have to acknowledge that 

we need to do considerable work on that. For me, my part of it is 

the air piece of this, how I characterize the use of my air assets 

and how I value those air assets, you know, across CBP, and that 

is what we are working on currently. 

Mrs. MILLER. Right. Obviously as you do those metrics, flying 

hours are utilizing the resource is going to be an important part 

of that metrics as well. 

Mr. ALLES. Yes, ma’am. We understand what we get. We understand what the apprehensions are, we understand what we see 

with the aircraft, we understand what the seizures are in terms of 

cash, drugs, arrests. All those data I have, you know, and we can 

look at that year over year and see how it has gone up, gone down, 

and up slightly, and then down again this year. All that information we have. Beyond that, in terms of the information we don’t 

know, the unknown movements, that is our major struggle. 

Mrs. MILLER. All right. Thank you very much. 

I would ask the Ranking Member to have his questions. 

Mr. VELA. Commissioner Alles—are we pronouncing that right? 

Mr. ALLES. Yes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. VELA. Okay. What can you tell us about the incident in Laredo, and if you could elaborate on the commissioning of the two 

Blackhawks. I am curious, you know, do you think that is sufficient, and then how is all that working now in light of the episode? 

Mr. ALLES. I am not sure I understood the Blackhawk part, sir. 

Mr. VELA. Well, after the helicopter incident, two Blackhawks 

were sent to Laredo, right? 

Mr. ALLES. Yes, sir. 

Mr. VELA. I am just curious, I would like for you to assess how 

you think that is working and whether you think that is sufficient. 

Mr. ALLES. So in that particular instance there, that was obviously a drug movement that was occurring across the Rio Grande, 

our helicopter had moved in basically on a call from the local police 

department that there was an event occurring and they were 

watching it. As they came in over the top of the smugglers, I think 

on the second trip they were fired at from the Mexican side of the 

border by a member that is kind of, I will call him a contractor, 

I hate to say it that way, but he basically contracts his services out 

to different cartels at different times. 

He fired at the aircraft, we think a number of rounds, probably 

10 to 15 rounds, we have never recovered the weapon to this point, 

but he struck the aircraft twice. We do know that we were able to 

identify who he was. He has been apprehended at this time by the 

FBI, so we are confident about that. 

But one thing we did want to especially reinforce both on the investigative side and also on the appearances side is we want to 

make—we don’t want to encourage cartel members to be firing at 

our aircraft. So part of that is making sure that we catch the cartel 

member and, if necessary, putting equipment down there that is 

more heavily reinforced. 

So a Blackhawk helicopter is obviously a military helicopter. It 

can be armored. It has a ballistic armor kit that goes on the aircraft. A recent Mexican helicopter, Blackhawk just was shot up, 

seven bullets hit it, and it flew just fine. So it is a much more sur-
25 

vivable helicopter. We put it down there really to emphasize that, 

you know, we are serious about doing border security, we don’t 

want our aircraft fired at from the Mexican side. 

So we are somewhat trying to send a message to the cartels that 

this is not a good thing to do. I think it is important for us to reinforce that for the protection of our own people that are operating 

down on the border. 

Mr. VELA. But were those two Blackhawks sent just to the Laredo area or were they sent down to patrol the entire region 

from—— 

Mr. ALLES. Primarily the Laredo area. They did do wider patrols, 

but primarily to the Laredo area where the shooting occurred. 

Mr. VELA. Are your personnel that are using helicopters elsewhere, I assume they are not as protected? 

Mr. ALLES. I think if your question is—most of my helicopter 

fleet, light enforcement helicopters cannot be armored. The AS– 

350, the EC–120 do not have enough lifting capacity to put armor 

on those aircraft. They just won’t operate. So the only aircraft I 

have that has that kind of capacity is the Blackhawk. 

Mr. VELA. When you—— 

Mr. ALLES. Now—— 

Mr. VELA. I am sorry. When you say, ‘‘armored,’’ you mean defensively armored? Right? 

Mr. ALLES. Right. Yes, sir. They can actually put armor—there 

is an armor kit that actually goes on the Blackhawk helicopter. So 

the other ones cannot be armored. We traditionally have not had 

them fired at on the border. I mean, it is a very rare instance. 

Mr. VELA. Now, did I hear you say that the FBI captured him? 

He was captured in Mexico, though, right, by Mexican—— 

Mr. ALLES. Yeah. My understanding is they were working with 

Mexican authorities, obviously. I mean, they had to work with 

Mexican authorities in capturing him. 

Mr. VELA. Can you tell us where that is in the adjudicative process? 

Mr. ALLES. I do not know, sir. I haven’t heard anything. I have 

not gotten any updates on the investigation here since about a 

week ago. 

Mr. VELA. So just in general, can you tell us why it makes sense 

to keep the Office of Air and Marine as a distinct entity? 

Mr. ALLES. Well, I think it allows the commissioner of CBP to 

basically enforce customs and immigration law in a holistic way 

across, you know, the United States. Without that, he would—you 

know, he would lack enforcement capability both on the air and the 

marine side to effectively discharge their responsibilities. 

I mean, really as you all are aware, it was a 9/11 creation that 

brought CBP into be a unified border agency. We are frequently 

visited by other countries to look at the model that was created 

really by the Congress in forming CBP, because that is not what 

they have typically in their countries where they have a holistic approach to both customs, immigration, and border protection all in 

one agency, all with one responsibility. 

So from that standpoint, if you start pulling sections out, I mean, 

it would leave the commissioner unable to really enforce the laws 

that he has been given responsibility for. 
26 

Mr. VELA. How would you distinguish what you do from the 

Coast Guard? 

Mr. ALLES. I think the main ways I would distinguish us from 

the Coast Guard is really in terms of the types of organizations we 

are. Now, like in many situations, I mean, things look like they 

overlap. So you have the Navy operates obviously in the maritime, 

the Coast Guard operates in the maritime. There are areas where 

their missions look like—or where they look like they overlap. They 

both operate down in the transit zone. But we distinctly recognize 

that between the Navy and the Coast Guard, they have distinct 

mission sets. 

So the Coast Guard really is a military—is a military organization. It is primarily working on the high seas. It uses different 

equipment and different training from CBP, and it is not focused 

entirely in the areas that we are. So its mission set is different. 

CBP is a law enforcement organization. Each of my agents has 

on average 17 years of law enforcement experience. So that is the 

average throughout the agency. We work primarily not on the high 

seas; we work in U.S. customs water, so within 12 miles of the 

coast, and we have specifically equipped ourselves to counter the 

threat that we are going after, which is basically your small boat 

traffic, not so much your commercial traffic, your go-fast type of 

vessels, which we have high-speed interceptors to actually interdict 

those. 

We work really in a law enforcement realm. So we are doing unmarked operations, we are doing plain clothes operations. We 

sometimes work with ICE in undercover operations to do law enforcement work. We are working on investigations. We are performing covert tracking in some cases, you know, via court permission. We will do forensics. We obtain and execute warrants. We are 

actually arresting U.S. citizens in a law enforcement function. 

So there is really a lot of differences between what the Coast 

Guard is doing and ours. I really don’t so much want to speak to 

the Coast Guard, because I am not—you know, I am kind-of talking out of school when I am talking about their mission set, but 

as a law enforcement organization, we are structured entirely differently from the Coast Guard, not as a military organization, and 

our responsibilities and authorities are much different from that 

regard. 

Mr. VELA. Well, I look forward to speaking to you about this in 

more depth at a future date. I am going to have to ask both of you 

to excuse me, because I have got another hearing I have got to attend to. 

With that, I yield the balance of my time. 

Mrs. MILLER. I thank the gentleman very much. I think I am 

going to pick up a little bit on his question. 

Pardon me? 

Oh, Mrs. Torres, excuse me. Would you like to take the seat here 

or—— 

Mrs. TORRES. Yes. 

Mrs. MILLER. Actually, I will yield your time to ask your questions. 

Mrs. TORRES. Thank you very much, Chairman Miller. 

Mr. Alles? Alles. 
27 

Mr. ALLES. Yes, ma’am. 

Mrs. TORRES. Fiscal year 2014, the Department of Homeland Security appropriations bill provided the Office of Air and Marine 

with 55 additional positions. Can you tell me what the status of 

that is? 

Mr. ALLES. So those are to our Air and Marine Operations Center, which is a key part of our domain awareness across the United 

States. It pulls in all of the FAA radar feeds, all the military radar 

feeds, all of our TARs radar feeds, and also coordinates all of our 

Air and Marine activity—— 

Mrs. TORRES. Out of Riverside, correct? 

Mr. ALLES. That is in Riverside, yes, ma’am. Those positions are 

going to the Air and Marine Ops Center so they can get better coverage. We had a lot of uncovered positions where we were receiving 

information, and we can’t actually—we could not process the information due to lack of personnel. 

So those 55 positions have been very beneficial. Currently 45 of 

those positions have been selected. A high density of veterans have 

been selected in those positions, so we are well on our way to getting to the 55 number overall. So 45, 55 selected; not actually onboard yet, but they are well into the process of being on-boarded 

at this time. 

Mrs. TORRES. In training, how long before they are actually in 

the field? 

Mr. ALLES. Honest, I will have to check that. I know that a number of them already have radar expertise coming out of the military 

service, will not require so much training, but I don’t have an exact 

figure on that once they start down that training rack. 

Mrs. TORRES. Did the 2014 Border Patrol Pay Reform Bill have 

any impact on the Office of Air and Marine, and are there any pay 

challenges within the Office of Air and Marine? 

Mr. ALLES. So the Border Patrol Act was, you know, as you are 

probably aware, for the Border Patrol itself. One of our primary 

pay challenges inside of Air and Marine is the diverse pay set that 

we have. So we have members that are working on your normal 

Federal overtime, FIFA; we have members that are working on law 

enforcement AUO pay; goodness, also LEAP. I am drawing a blank 

on what AUO means. Administrative Uncontrollable Law of Overtime, and then the LEAP pay, the Law Enforcement Availability 

Pay. 

We would like to get the—we would like as an efficiency to get 

all of our agents onto the LEAP statute. That would actually be a 

budget efficiency for us, it would save us money, it would help correct the very diverse pay sets that we have inside of OAM overall. 

So I think getting our members onto—the remaining members we 

have in OAM onto the LEAP statute would be very helpful for us 

overall and would actually save us some money. 

Mrs. TORRES. What does your rank-and-file feel about that? 

Mr. ALLES. They are overall are in favor of that. It provides more 

predictability for them since it is an availability pay and not on 

overtime pay. So it is more predictable in terms of the pay coming 

each year than when you are working in the AUO and the AUO 

area. 

Mrs. TORRES. How does that impact their retirement? 
28 

Mr. ALLES. It would actually—whether it is AUO or LEAP, I 

mean, that is all going to factor into their retirement pay. It would 

really depend on if the LEAP pay was higher than the AUO pay 

as whether that would make it better or worse for retirement. I 

think overall it is generally neutral, as I talk to folks about the effect it would have on them. 

Mrs. TORRES. Okay. Thank you. I yield back my time. 

Mrs. MILLER. I thank the gentlelady very much. 

General and Mr. Roth, I am going to go back to what Mr. Vela 

was talking about in regards to the authorities between the Air 

and Marine and the Coast Guard, and I want to sort-of follow up 

on that, because—and I know we always talk about the Southern 

Border, but on the Northern Border, actually in my district, we 

have—at Selfridge Air National Guard Base, we have an Air and 

Marine division there who are very, very effective, I think. 

Let me just take this opportunity to thank everybody that works 

at the Air and Marine, all of your brave men and women that are 

out on our front lines each and every day. They just do remarkable, 

remarkable work, and we all have the utmost gratitude and respect 

for the work that they do. 

But at the Air and Marine in our area, you know, they have got 

obviously all the personnel and then the air assets, the water assets. Air assets, they both have fixed wings and rotor, et cetera. 

Also on the same Air National Guard base actually as Air and Marine as a tenant, we also have under the Homeland Security umbrella, Coast Guard Air Station Detroit is there. 

Then in addition to that, the Border Patrol is actually operating 

something that we call the Operational Integration Center, which 

is all the high-tech bells and whistles of really trying to analyze all 

the information that they are fed from the various stakeholders 

about assessing the threat, responding to the threat, and so on and 

so forth. 

But I will tell you with all of that, sometimes I am a bit confused 

myself about the overlap of the Air and Marine and the Coast 

Guard, and whether or not the missions are so different, and the 

type of equipment that they need and you need is so different. I 

will just tell you that because the Coast Guard right now in the 

Great Lakes doesn’t have any ability to have their helicopters with 

de-icing equipment on it, so they are looking for some Blackhawks 

also as opposed to the equipment that they have. 

But anyway, it just sort-of always leads to conversations about 

the kind of equipment that Air and Marine has and the kind of 

equipment that the Coast Guard has, and in the Great Lakes sector and along the Northern Border there, the two of you operating 

in a similar—in the identical environment, quite frankly. 

So if you could, could you just talk a little bit more about your 

mission being so different that you do have to have specialized 

equipment different than the Coast Guard, just for my own clarification? 

Mr. ALLES. So one thing I should point out is that when it comes 

to the maritime equipment, there is a Boat Commodities Council 

inside of DHS that helps us coordinate equipment purchase between ourselves and what the Coast Guard is doing. So in the 

areas that we can get commonality with the Coast Guard because 
29 

the mission set matches closely, we do. For instance, we have received a number of safe boats from the Coast Guard that we are 

using in our operations on the Riverine that the Coast Guard had 

accessed that have gone right into our inventory and have performed well for us. So that BCC, as we call it, is actually coordinating these activities. 

We do the small engine repair for the Coast Guard down at our 

National Marine Center in St. Augustine, so we—that, again, is an 

efficiency that we perform for the Coast Guard. We have to do engine repair ourselves anyways, because we have a lot of small—I 

would call them small boats. They are fairly large for you know, 

for pleasure boats, but they are a smaller asset compared to what 

the Coast Guard operates. 

But I would say beyond that, as I think about the Northern Border, the main difference is, as I think about the maritime and 

Northern Border is, how do you tackle these open spaces? I think 

the issue for us is that we have to develop information of what I 

will call law enforcement intelligence, and that really involves casework with ICE or other Federal and State and local agencies task 

force that we participate in, that is strictly law enforcement type 

of work. 

It also involves a use of Classified intelligence in some situations, 

it involves potentially buying criminal sources through the confidential human source program. All these kinds of things along 

with maritime domain awareness and patrols and the capability to 

respond are all necessary to actually enforce the laws of the United 

States in these open areas. 

Now, in the areas where we are operating with the Coast Guard, 

we cooperate in a very high manner. I would say this probably is 

probably less apparent in the Great Lakes area, we do cooperate 

with the Coast Guard, but when you start talking about operating 

on the high seas, I have no capacity to do anything really outside 

territorial waters. That is not so much of a legal issue, although 

that is a factor for us, it is really equipment that I am operating. 

The Coast Guard operates equipment such as cutters that can do 

these kinds of interdictions out there, and we are frequently coordinating now through these joint task forces east and west of our operations with the Coast Guard so that we don’t have overlap in patrol. When we have detections out there, we are at actually coordinating the response for the local Coast Guard sector or local Coast 

Guard district if we don’t have an asset to respond to it or if it is 

too far out for us to actually get to. 

So I think the degree of cooperation is very impressive from that 

standpoint. I think there is a good synergy between the two organizations. I don’t see it so much as an overlap in missions here. I 

think there would be substantial problems here if we thought we 

were going to try to drive this all one direction or the other in 

terms of how you would actually characterize it, what CBP does as 

a mission set. 

But, again, I think this aspect that we are talking about in terms 

of our law enforcement kind of primary mission set is important to 

securing both the maritime and the Northern Border overall, because the areas are so large and there is such a low density overall 
30 

of assets, whether it is Coast Guard or Air and Marine, to actually 

address such a large and open area. 

Mrs. MILLER. Mr. Roth, do you have any comment on that? 

Mr. ROTH. I think you raise a very good point. I think one of the 

Secretary’s signature efforts in his time in office has been to try to 

do a unity of effort. Really what that means is that you have to 

step back from what the roles currently are to understand what 

problem you are solving and what sort of tools you can bring to 

that problem. 

So as a result of that, I think for the first time in DHS’s history, 

we have a Joint Requirements Council, for example, that drives 

components into the table, into the sort of bargaining table to understand, okay, Coast Guard, you are doing this, we are going to 

be doing this. So there has been a lot of coordination that has occurred. One of the terrific developments, I think, in the last year 

is the fact the Air and Marine program is now part of, for example, 

an acquisitions review process in which they had never been before. 

So there was a higher degree of jointness at least in sort of acquisition management. 

As far as the mission set, I would agree, you raise a very good 

question as to if the purpose is to protect the U.S. border, and both 

components have that mission, is this really the best way to do it? 

Historically we have grown up with Customs as one single entity 

and Coast Guard obviously is a separate one in two different cabinet departments. So asking those questions, I think, is fair. I don’t 

have an answer for you, but it is certainly an interesting question 

to explore. 

Mrs. MILLER. Well, you did mention in your report, talking about 

Coast Guard assets and work that they can do, and perhaps 

jointness in sharing the taxpayer—with the best bang for the buck 

for the taxpayers, et cetera, what you mentioned in your opening 

comments about the Blackhawks and whether or not Air and Marine should have had the Coast Guard refurbish them. Do you 

want to talk about that? 

Mr. ROTH. Sure. That was, I think, a lesson that the Department 

learned with regard to unity of effort. It happened before any of the 

efforts that have happened the last year, but, you know, we did an 

audit that said it was in the neighborhood of hundreds of millions 

of dollars that could have been saved if CBP had used the Coast 

Guard Elizabeth City station to do the refurbishing. Likewise, the 

Office of Management within DHS commissioned an independent 

study, independent of ours, which basically confirmed what it is 

that we found. 

As a result of those two things, I am gratified to say that these 

kinds of things are now being forced into the Department for highlevel decision making. There is, for example, an aviation governance board that both Coast Guard and CBP participate in to try 

to hash out these problems. So there is a unity of effort and we can 

save some money as we go. 

Mrs. MILLER. You know, the last question I want to ask here, because, again, not to go into the Northern Border, and I appreciate 

all the challenges we have at the Southern Border, but because the 

Northern Border gets, I think, short-changed on resources for the 

kinds of challenges that we have there. I know that Air and Marine 
31 

had done a pilot program on the Great Lakes with using a radar 

surveillance to a much greater degree. I think you did that in 2013 

and then into 2014, actually. I don’t know if you are familiar with 

what I am talking about, but I know our locals were very, very enthusiastic about all of that, not just the local Air and Marine wing 

or the Coast Guard, but, I mean, our local Marine, sheriff patrols, 

and everybody else amongst an entire swath of area there. 

I am just wondering if you have any comment on that or what 

your thought was. I think it was a pilot program that—— 

Mr. ALLES. Right, it was a pilot program, ma’am. It was the sea 

speed radar that we utilized up there. We did do a demonstration 

with it last year for air targets. It looked promising in that area. 

We would like to do another demonstration in the maritime possibly in the San Diego area. 

Right now the issue is, you know, most things are, is funding for 

it. There are a number of unfunded requirements inside CBP. This 

one did not break high enough to get funding for that demonstration. It does compete with a number of other efforts that we have 

underway, one being SEATAR, which is a satellite-based, commercial satellite-based system we have been using in the maritime for 

detection, and then also an effort that was done by Science and 

Technology called the coastal surveillance system that was also 

looked at in San Diego. 

It is not so much of a radar system like Sea Speed is; it is really 

a system that integrates existing feeds together and to bring a picture together overall. So that is kind-of where we are in that program there. It just didn’t break high enough on the unfunded list 

to get funding for this next demo phase. 

Mrs. MILLER. Okay. I appreciate that. 

Well, I want to thank both the witnesses for being here this 

morning. Mr. Roth, I don’t know, did you have any additional comment on that or—— 

Mr. ROTH. I did not. Thank you. 

Mrs. MILLER. Okay. All right. I certainly thank you for being 

here. As I say, we certainly honor the brave men and women in the 

Air and Marine. I see them every day back in my district and certainly around the entire Nation. 

That being said, I think because of the Department of Homeland 

Security coming into existence after 9/11 and sort-of cobbling together all of these various agencies, we always want to have the 

unity of purpose, as the Secretary keeps talking about. So the purpose of this hearing was to look at some of those kinds of things, 

not in an adversarial way, obviously, but in a way that we are able 

to always—I always say that the largest room is the room for improvement in any agency. 

Another thing with this subcommittee and this committee, we always look for is your suggestions to us, being proactive to this committee on the kinds of things that we need to be doing and to be 

aware of to make sure that you are resourced properly and then 

that you are using your resources as we need you to do so. 

So we are looking forward to some of those things. As we talked 

about, the metrics. This border security bill as it is moving through 

is obviously critically important. We will be looking for everybody 

in the environment there for assisting us as this border security 
32 

bill moves through, everybody that is involved in border security, 

and metrics, performance metrics, et cetera, so that we are able to 

satisfy the American public about operational control of all of our 

borders. So we appreciate that. 

Any other questions that any of the other Members may have, 

we are going to leave the committee record open, and so you may 

be getting some additional questions, and we will appreciate any 

answers that you may have to that. 

Before I conclude, is there anything else that either of you would 

like to add or questions that you think we should have asked that 

we did not? Mr. Roth? 

Mr. ROTH. No. Thank you. 

Mrs. MILLER. All right. 

Mr. ALLES. No, ma’am. 

Mrs. MILLER. No? 

Mr. ALLES. Just appreciate the opportunity to appear before you 

all and appreciate the committee’s overall support to CBP and Air 

and Marine has been very helpful to us over the years and has 

been fundamental in the capabilities we now have. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you very much. With that, the hearing is 

adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 10:56 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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