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THE IMPACTS OF FEDERAL 

POLICIES ON ENERGY PRODUCTION AND ECONOMIC 

GROWTH IN THE GULF 

OVERSIGHT FIELD HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

Tuesday, September 15, 2015, in New Orleans, Louisiana 

Serial No. 114–19 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Natural Resources 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

or 

Committee address: http://naturalresources.house.gov 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES 

ROB BISHOP, UT, Chairman 

RAU ́ L M. GRIJALVA, AZ, Ranking Democratic Member 

Don Young, AK 

Louie Gohmert, TX 

Doug Lamborn, CO 

Robert J. Wittman, VA 

John Fleming, LA 

Tom McClintock, CA 

Glenn Thompson, PA 

Cynthia M. Lummis, WY 

Dan Benishek, MI 

Jeff Duncan, SC 

Paul A. Gosar, AZ 

Rau ́l R. Labrador, ID 

Doug LaMalfa, CA 

Jeff Denham, CA 

Paul Cook, CA 

Bruce Westerman, AR 

Garret Graves, LA 

Dan Newhouse, WA 

Ryan K. Zinke, MT 

Jody B. Hice, GA 

Aumua Amata Coleman Radewagen, AS 

Thomas MacArthur, NJ 

Alexander X. Mooney, WV 

Cresent Hardy, NV 

Vacancy 

Grace F. Napolitano, CA 

Madeleine Z. Bordallo, GU 

Jim Costa, CA 

Gregorio Kilili Camacho Sablan, CNMI 

Niki Tsongas, MA 

Pedro R. Pierluisi, PR 

Jared Huffman, CA 

Raul Ruiz, CA 

Alan S. Lowenthal, CA 

Matt Cartwright, PA 

Donald S. Beyer, Jr., VA 

Norma J. Torres, CA 

Debbie Dingell, MI 

Ruben Gallego, AZ 

Lois Capps, CA 

Jared Polis, CO 

Wm. Lacy Clay, MO 

Jason Knox, Chief of Staff 

Lisa Pittman, Chief Counsel 

David Watkins, Democratic Staff Director 

Sarah Parker, Democratic Deputy Chief Counsel 

(III) 

CONTENTS 

Page 

Hearing held on Tuesday, September 15, 2015 ..................................................... 1 

Statement of Members: 

Bishop, Hon. Rob, a Representative in Congress from the State of Utah ... 2 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 4 

Statement of Witnesses: 

Cassidy, Hon. Bill, a United States Senator from the State of Louisiana ... 8 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 10 

Davis, Lori, President, RIG-CHEM ................................................................. 38 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 40 

Henderson, Jonathan, JD, MBA, Manager of Gulf of Mexico Field 

Operations, Gulf Restoration Network ........................................................ 33 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 35 

Herbst, Lars, Regional Director, Gulf of Mexico OCS Region, Bureau 

of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, U.S. Department of the 

Interior ........................................................................................................... 12 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 14 

Questions submitted for the record ......................................................... 19 

Leimkuhler, Joseph, Vice President, Drilling, LLOG Exploration 

Company, LLC .............................................................................................. 25 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 27 

Mason, Joseph R., Hermann Moyse, Jr./Louisiana Bankers Association, 

Endowed Professor of Banking, Louisiana State University; and Senior 

Fellow, The Wharton School ........................................................................ 41 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 43 

Vitter, Hon. David, a United States Senator from the State of Louisiana .. 5 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 7 

Additional Materials Submitted for the Record: 

International Association of Drilling Contractors, Houston, Texas, 

Prepared statement of .................................................................................. 69 

(1) 

OVERSIGHT FIELD HEARING ON THE IMPACTS OF FEDERAL POLICIES ON ENERGY 

PRODUCTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN 

THE GULF 

Tuesday, September 15, 2015 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Committee on Natural Resources 

New Orleans, Louisiana 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:00 a.m., at Louisiana 

Supreme Court, 400 Royal Street, New Orleans, Louisiana, Hon. 

Rob Bishop [Chairman of the Committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Bishop, Fleming, Westerman, Graves, 

Rice, and Smith. 

The CHAIRMAN. This committee will come to order. 

I appreciate the opportunity of being here. I also appreciate our 

hosts here, and I would like to recognize at the beginning 

Representative Graves for an introduction of one of our hosts. 

Mr. GRAVES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am honored that we have with us today a local artist and 

Harley rider who has joined us this morning. He also happens to 

be a justice of the Supreme Court, Justice John Weimer, who is a 

graduate of Nicholls State University and Louisiana State 

University Law School, the father of three great daughters; and, of 

course, his wife Penny. We are very much honored to have Justice 

Weimer here. 

Justice, thank you very much for your efforts to raise the court 

for us today. 

Justice WEIMER. Thank you, Congressman. 

Bonjour, and bienvenue. That is Cajun French for ‘‘good day’’ and 

‘‘welcome.’’ 

My name is John Weimer. I serve on the court here, and on 

behalf of the Chief Justice and my fellow associate justices, we 

welcome you. 

Over 200 years ago, one of the Founding Fathers of our Nation 

recognized the economic and strategic significance of Louisiana to 

the destiny of our Nation. Thomas Jefferson signed the Louisiana 

Purchase just over 200 years ago. 

One who had become president recognized the economic and strategic significance of Louisiana to the destiny of our Nation. Andrew 

Jackson risked his life on the plains of Chalmette at the Battle of 

New Orleans. 

What Jefferson and Jackson recognized over 200 years ago has 

been realized. Louisiana fuels this Nation’s economy with oil and 

gas. Louisiana feeds this Nation with seafood, the crabs, shrimp, 

oysters, fish, crawfish, and I understand an occasional alligator 

harvested here in Louisiana. 

2 

Now, in the spirit of full disclosure, Congressman Graves and I 

have a relationship. Our nephew, David Clavell, serves on his staff, 

and in south Louisiana, that is considered a relationship. David 

was involved in ensuring that we were here today, and I commend 

him for his efforts in that respect. 

We are very pleased to have you in this historic venue, in this 

historic city, in our state of Louisiana. Again, bienvenue and merci 

beaucoup. 

Mr. GRAVES. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Justice. I appreciate that, appreciate being in this historic building, and for your kindness in 

letting us in here. 

Before you go, how do you say ‘‘you all’’ in French? 

Justice WEIMER. ‘‘Y’all.’’ 

The CHAIRMAN. OK, fine. 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. You did that very well. Thank you so much. 

The committee is meeting today to hear testimony on the impact 

of Federal policies on energy production and economic growth in 

the Gulf, and under Committee Rule 4(f), all opening statements in 

the hearing will be limited to the Chairman, the Ranking Member, 

the Minority Member, and the Vice Chair and designees. Therefore, 

I am going to ask unanimous consent that all other Members’ opening statements be made part of the hearing record if they are submitted to the Clerk by 5:00 p.m. today. Hearing no objection, that 

is so ordered. 

I am also asking unanimous consent that the gentleman from 

South Carolina, Mr. Rice, and the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. 

Smith, be allowed to sit with this committee and participate in 

today’s hearing. 

And last, should their schedules permit, I ask unanimous consent 

that former House Members Vitter and Cassidy, who have now 

moved over to the dark side, be allowed to sit with the committee 

and participate as well. Hearing no objections, once again, so ordered, and we appreciate all of you for being here with us, with our 

committee. 

I now recognize myself for a quick opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF THE HON. ROB BISHOP, A REPRESENTATIVE 

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF UTAH 

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to first begin by thanking the state 

of Louisiana for hosting us in this Supreme Court building. 

Today’s hearing will focus on the current state of the Gulf 

offshore energy production. 

Energy production in the Gulf of Mexico is the energy lifeline for 

our entire Nation, providing 17 percent of our domestic crude and 

5 percent of our natural gas. Those percentages, though, are insignificant. The amount that is being produced is important. The bottom line is we could be doing better, we should be doing better, and 

this Nation must have us do better. 

While production in the Gulf has remained relatively stagnant, 

skyrocketing oil and natural gas production on state and private 

lands has propelled the United States to surpass Saudi Arabia and 

Russia to become a global leader in energy production. This 

3 

newfound role for our country could not be achieved, though, 

without the Gulf. Yet, we cannot take this position for granted. If 

we indeed are going to be a permanent leader in the area of energy 

production, so that we can be an asset to our allies and we can actually not be bullied by OPEC, we need to produce more on Federal 

lands and offshore. Both of those are the purview of this committee, and that is why I am happy to be here for this hearing. 

Each Gulf state manages some acreage off the coast, but the vast 

majority of the acreage in the Gulf of Mexico is managed by the 

Federal Government, which has massive amounts of energy resources. So, the question is: Is it being managed well? And that is 

precisely the question we are here today to explore. 

Are there examples of how the Interior Department has been 

dead wrong in their so-called ‘‘management’’ of Federal lands and 

offshore? For example, the Obama administration’s 2010 moratorium, which shut down all drilling in the Gulf for months after the 

Macondo incident. Thankfully that mistake was eventually overturned by the court, but not without having some severe economic 

consequences. 

Agency regulations such as the proposed Well Control Rule 

threaten another virtual shutdown. Some provisions of this rule 

would actually undermine safety, rather than enhance it. If we indeed have rules that are prospective, prescriptive, and preclude the 

ability of having new innovations to promote safety, we are not actually helping the situation at all. 

Interestingly, after announcing this hearing, the Bureau of 

Safety and Environmental Enforcement scheduled meetings in 

Washington for today to discuss these onerous provisions. That is 

quite a coincidence. 

It is important to note that all Gulf offshore operators, even the 

agencies, have undergone significant regulatory reforms to ensure 

operations are safer than ever before. Earlier this year, our committee explored that specific issue. The conclusion was clear: overly 

prescriptive regulations such as the Well Control Rule wouldn’t 

just harm the Gulf economically, it would impact our Nation as a 

whole. A performance-based approach will allow for increased safety, regulatory certainty, and will allow agencies to keep pace with 

the technology curve. Our hearing, I hope, will support that 

premise today. 

Other Federal measures, such as the crude export ban, limit new 

market opportunities and U.S. production potential. EIA reported 

recently that they found that lifting the crude export ban would result in higher wellhead prices for domestic producers, who would 

respond with additional production, while potentially lowering gas 

prices for American families. 

The same is true for LNG exports. We should encourage the production of affordable energy, not continue policies that force companies to shut down those resources because they are not economic 

to bring to market. It is important for our economy that we encourage affordable energy, and it is important for people and their lives 

that we have affordable energy. 

What we have seen recently is two offshore lease sales that yielded the lowest number of bids in over 20 years, natural gas production is falling, offshore crude production only now is showing signs 

4 

of recovery since the moratorium, and the Interior Department 

continues to require nonsensical regulations. This is not the path 

that will keep our Nation on a path forward through a position of 

energy strength. 

There are thousands of employees who work off these coasts, and 

they deserve better. Day in and day out, the Gulf Coast residents 

go to work to support this critical energy infrastructure. They are 

vested in keeping these operations safe and to protect the beaches 

and the Atlantic waterways that they visit with their families. This 

industry is their livelihood. That is significant. 

I look forward to hearing from witnesses on the significant 

impact of the Federal Government’s regulations and recognize the 

importance of the Gulf’s energy to the economic lifeline of our 

Nation. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bishop follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. ROB BISHOP, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON

NATURAL RESOURCES

I’d like to first begin by thanking the great state of Louisiana for hosting us in 

their Supreme Court building. Today’s hearing will focus on the current state of 

Gulf offshore energy production. Energy production in the Gulf of Mexico is an energy lifeline for our Nation—today providing 17 percent of our domestic crude and 

5 percent of our natural gas. 

While production in the Gulf has remained relatively stagnant over the past several years, skyrocketing oil and natural gas production on state and private lands 

has propelled the United States to surpass Saudi Arabia and Russia to become the 

global leader in energy production. This newfound role for our country could not be 

achieved without the Gulf. Yet, we cannot take this position for granted. 

While each Gulf state manages some acreage off their coasts—the vast majority 

of acreage in the Gulf of Mexico is managed by the Federal Government, and it contains a massive amount of energy resources. The question is: Is it being managed 

well? That is precisely the question we’re here today to explore. 

Many examples demonstrate how the Interior Department has been dead wrong 

in their so-called ‘‘management’’ of Federal lands. For example, the Obama administration’s 2010 moratorium, which shut down all drilling in the Gulf for months after 

the Macondo incident. Thankfully, that costly mistake was eventually overturned by 

the courts—but not without severe economic consequences. 

Agency regulations such as the proposed well-control threaten another moratorium by shutting down the majority of the Gulf rig fleet. Some provisions of this 

rule could actually undermine safety, rather than enhance it. Interestingly, after we 

announced this hearing, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement 

scheduled meetings in Washington for today to discuss these onerous provisions. 

That is quite the coincidence. 

It is important to note that all Gulf offshore operators—even the agencies—have 

undergone significant regulatory reforms to ensure operations are safer than ever 

before. Earlier this year, our committee explored that specific issue. The conclusion 

was clear: overly prescriptive regulations such as the Well Control Rule wouldn’t 

just harm the Gulf economically—it would impact our Nation as a whole. A performance-based approach will allow for increased safety and regulatory certainty, and 

will allow agencies to keep pace with the technology curve. 

Other Federal measures, such as the crude export ban, limit new market opportunities and U.S. production potential. An EIA report released earlier this month 

found that lifting the crude export ban would result in higher wellhead prices for 

domestic producers, who would then respond with additional production—all while 

potentially lowering gas prices for American families. 

The same is true for LNG exports. We should encourage the production of affordable energy, not continue decades-old policies that force companies to shut-in those 

resources because they are not economic to bring to market. 

What we have seen recently is two offshore lease sales yielding the lowest number 

of bids in over 20 years, natural gas production is falling, offshore crude production 

only now showing signs of recovery since the moratorium, and the Interior 

Department continues to issue nonsensical regulations. This is not the path that 

will keep our Nation on a path forward through a position of energy strength. 

5 

The thousands of employees who work off these coasts deserve better. Their hard 

work has helped decrease our dependence on foreign oil. Day in, day out—Gulf 

Coast residents go to work on rigs, vessels or small businesses that support this 

critical energy infrastructure. They are vested in keeping these operations safe—to 

protect the beaches and inland waterways they visit with their families. This 

industry is their livelihood. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on the Federal Government’s 

harmful regulations and to recognize how important the Gulf’s energy and economic 

lifeline is to our Nation. 

Now I would also like to introduce our first panel who is with 

us today. We have both Senators from the great state of Louisiana 

who are here, The Honorable Bill Cassidy and The Honorable 

David Vitter. 

Mr. Cassidy, on my script I have you actually going first. Do you 

two care? Do I go on seniority? Do I go on who can give me the 

most money? 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Seniority, then, it is. 

Senator Vitter, Representative Vitter, we are happy to have you 

here. We would ask you for your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID VITTER, A UNITED STATES 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 

Senator VITTER. Thank you very much, Chairman Bishop and 

members of this committee, for being here—welcome to 

Louisiana—and for holding this important hearing on the impacts 

of Federal policies on energy production and economic growth in 

the Gulf. And a special thanks to Congressmen Fleming and 

Graves for inviting me here and hosting me here. 

Mr. Chairman, in the spirit of your earlier comments, just for the 

record, don’t drink from the water fountains on the Senate side. I 

try to maintain a strong, vibrant House personality. So, in that 

spirit, I would love to join the committee after our testimony, but 

unfortunately I have to go immediately to the airport to return for 

votes. 

It has been nearly 51⁄2 years since the BP disaster devastated the 

Gulf region. Beyond the economic and environmental consequences—which were major, and of course we will talk about 

those—I want to begin by acknowledging the human tragedy and 

the loss of 11 fine men who were working on the rig: specifically 

Jason Anderson, 35, of Midfield, Texas; Aaron Dale ‘‘Bubba’’ 

Burkeen, 37, of Philadelphia, Mississippi; Donald Clark, 49, of 

Newellton, Louisiana; Stephen Ray Curtis, 40, of Georgetown, 

Louisiana; Gordon Jones, 28, of Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Roy Wyatt 

Kemp, 27, of Jonesville, Louisiana; Karl Dale Kleppinger, Jr., 38, 

of Natchez, Mississippi; Keith Blair Manuel, 56, of Gonzales, 

Louisiana; Dewey Revette, 48, of State Line, Mississippi; Shane 

Roshto, 22, of Liberty, Mississippi; and Adam Weise, 24, of 

Yorktown, Texas. I think it is very important to acknowledge that 

horrible human loss and remember them, and their families, in our 

prayers. 

For 3 months after that horrendous explosion, more than 200 

million gallons of crude oil spilled into the Gulf of Mexico, resulting 

6 

in billions of dollars of economic and environmental damages that 

the Gulf region is still recovering from. 

But, Mr. Chairman, there was additional great loss, and that 

additional great loss was completely avoidable. That came from the 

Obama administration’s short-sighted and knee-jerk reaction, particularly in the way they imposed a 6-month drilling moratorium, 

and after that a de facto moratorium or ‘‘permatorium’’ that only 

compounded and multiplied the devastation of the spill. 

That is important to note because I think that is the continuing 

context that some of these overly onerous regulations are part of. 

It is part of a devastating pattern. This initial moratorium was 

particularly noteworthy because President Obama’s White House 

put out statements saying, suggesting that the panel of experts 

they immediately empaneled after the spill recommended the 

moratorium. 

That was a lie, a flat-out lie, and the experts eventually said that 

and made that clear. So the Administration just used that to justify 

a needless moratorium and all of the economic costs that it brought 

with it. 

In the years since, I have worked with many others to ensure 

that this kind of tragedy and subsequent economic loss never happens again. Certainly as a state and a Nation, we need a clear and 

a strong regulatory scheme that promotes stringent safety standards while allowing the industry to thrive and do its business. 

While many important reforms have been made, there is still important work to be done. 

Louisiana’s offshore oil and gas development isn’t just one of the 

state’s largest economic drivers; it is a way of life for so many, providing careers and livelihoods for so many in the region. The industry has operated harmoniously alongside other critical offshore and 

coastal industries, like commercial and recreational fishing and 

tourism. 

While the recent energy boom of the last few years in the United 

States has helped Louisiana recover from President Obama’s drilling moratorium with a dramatic dip in price, I am particularly concerned now about the continuing regulatory avalanche coming from 

the Obama administration aimed at oil and gas. 

I know that this committee and others are examining the 

Department of the Interior’s proposed Well Control Rule, and I encourage those determined efforts. Some stakeholders have conveyed 

to me that that proposal could have substantial economic impacts 

throughout the offshore oil and gas supply chain, which our state 

and region cannot afford. So, we must get to the bottom of that. 

President Obama’s attack on the oil and gas industry is not 

restricted to offshore exploration and development. There are a 

myriad of regulations coming our way that will have disastrous effects on onshore oil and gas businesses, such as the recently proposed methane rules for upstream oil and gas operations and the 

pending proposal to reduce the standard for ground-level ozone. 

These proposals, and many others that this and other committees 

have looked at, are likely to impose dramatic new economic burdens on the industry, which has been one of the few bright spots 

in the economy under President Obama. 

7 

So again, Mr. Chairman, I think the key point is that this is part 

of a pattern. It is a pattern we saw starting with the moratorium 

which was based on lies out of the White House about the 

recommendations of the panel of experts. It is a pattern that includes many, many regulatory overreaches, significant new burdens being placed on the economy with little or no positive health, 

safety, or environmental impact. 

Protecting the health of the oil and gas industry is critical for all 

of us, for Louisiana and for the Nation. So, Mr. Chairman, thank 

you for this opportunity to testify and for this committee coming 

to the Gulf, coming to Louisiana as part of that important effort. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Vitter follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. DAVID VITTER, A UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM

THE STATE OF LOUISIANA

Thank you Chairman Bishop and members of this committee for holding this important hearing on ‘‘The Impacts of Federal Policies on Energy Production and 

Economic Growth in the Gulf.’’ 

It has been nearly 51⁄2 years since the Deepwater Horizon explosion and subsequent oil spill, which killed 11 men who worked on the rig. Their names were: Jason 

Anderson, 35, Midfield, Texas; Aaron Dale ‘‘Bubba’’ Burkeen, 37, Philadelphia, 

Mississippi; Donald Clark, 49, Newellton, Louisiana; Stephen Ray Curtis, 40, 

Georgetown, Louisiana; Gordon Jones, 28, Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Roy Wyatt 

Kemp, 27, Jonesville, Louisiana; Karl Dale Kleppinger, Jr., 38, Natchez, Mississippi; 

Keith Blair Manuel, 56, Gonzales, Louisiana; Dewey Revette, 48, State Line, 

Mississippi; Shane Roshto, 22, Liberty, Mississippi; and Adam Weise, 24, Yorktown, 

Texas. 

The leak went on for about 3 months, dumping more than 200 million gallons of 

crude oil into the Gulf and resulting in untold billions of dollars in economic 

damages. Our economy and environment are still recovering from it today. 

Worse than the spill itself, however, was the way in which the Administration 

reacted to it by imposing a 6-month drilling moratorium and, after that, a de-facto 

moratorium that had devastating economic impacts throughout Louisiana and the 

Gulf Coast. 

Despite the tragic events of 51⁄2 years ago, offshore oil and gas development has 

played a huge role in our economy for decades and has operated extremely well 

alongside other critical offshore and coastal industries like fishing and tourism. For 

example, in 2013 there were nearly 130,000 direct and indirect jobs in Louisiana 

supported by the offshore energy industry. At the same time, our state set an alltime record for tourism, attracting 27.3 million visitors who spent $10.8 billion and 

contributed $800 million in state tax revenues. On top of all that, one-third of the 

fish caught in the Lower 48 are landed right here in Louisiana. 

While the recent energy boom in the United States has helped Louisiana recover 

from President Obama’s disastrous drilling moratorium and de-facto moratorium, I 

am deeply concerned about a regulatory avalanche coming from the Obama administration, aimed toward oil and gas. 

This committee is familiar with the Department of the Interior’s proposed Well 

Control Rule. After Deepwater Horizon, a number of changes were made by industry 

and the Federal Government to improve offshore safety, and much progress has 

been made in ensuring that such a disaster never happens again. 

But what has been conveyed to me about this well control proposal is that it will 

have substantial economic impacts throughout the offshore oil and gas supply chain 

and could lead to another offshore drilling moratorium. That would obviously be 

crippling to Louisiana and its economy. 

But there are also threats to industry onshore, such as the recently proposed 

methane rules for upstream oil and gas operations, and the pending proposal to reduce the standard for ground level ozone, both of which are EPA regulations. 

These proposals, and several others that this and other committees have looked 

at, are going to impose substantial economic burdens on the oil and gas industry, 

which has been one of the few bright spots in the Obama economy. A healthy oil 

and gas industry—both onshore and offshore—is critical to having a vibrant 

economy in Louisiana and throughout the Gulf Coast. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for inviting me to testify today. 

8 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. We appreciate you being 

here and giving us your testimony. We also wish you could stay 

with us. We realize you have to go, but thank you for what you are 

doing for the Nation, as well as for your home state. Thank you 

very much. 

Next we turn to Congressman-turned-Senator Cassidy. You are 

recognized for your opening statement as well. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BILL CASSIDY, A UNITED STATES 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 

Senator CASSIDY. Mr. Bishop, thank you for your testimony, 

which I found excellent. 

Representative Smith, I am glad to see you survived your gator 

hunt. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CASSIDY. I hope it was productive. 

I thank you all for being here and for holding this hearing today, 

bringing greater attention to the energy production and its economic impact along the Gulf Coast. 

The energy activities in the coastal Gulf states and the adjacent 

offshore waters have produced billions of barrels of oil and trillions 

of cubic feet of natural gas. They have been an important contributor to the domestic energy production which is critical for our 

country’s energy independence and security. Every barrel of oil and 

cubic foot of natural gas produced in the Gulf of Mexico eliminates 

the need for energy from foreign sources. 

Unfortunately, the actions and policy of this Administration are 

counter-productive, literally. For example, one thing that is of particular importance to us in Louisiana is the Administration’s proposal to redirect coastal restoration funds, or GOMESA funds, that 

are scheduled to come to Louisiana beginning in 2017. A little ironically, a few weeks ago President Obama visited New Orleans to 

commemorate the region’s rebirth on the 10th anniversary of 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Yet, the sustainability of Louisiana’s 

recovery is being placed in jeopardy by the President’s Fiscal Year 

2016 budget proposal. This proposal would redirect revenue derived 

from the energy production off Louisiana’s coast toward unrelated 

projects. Louisiana is relying upon this revenue because, by our 

state constitution, it will be used to restore Louisiana wetlands. 

Now, just to put this in perspective, Louisiana is experiencing 

unparalleled land loss due to Federal engineering decisions made 

nearly a century ago that have channeled the lower Mississippi 

River system for the benefit of the rest of the Nation. Louisiana’s 

2,300 square miles of land loss is largely attributed to this channelization, which was abetted by the placement of levies along the 

river system, and this has converted a once-growing delta plain to 

the greatest source of wetlands loss in our history. 

Louisiana is counting on the revenues derived from offshore 

energy production to fund a portion of the projects necessary to restore our coast. Close to 18 percent of Louisiana’s oil production 

and about 24 percent of its natural gas production originates, is 

transported through, or is processed in Louisiana’s coastal wetlands. This is important not just for us but, as this shows, also for 

9 

the rest of the Nation, and Congressman Graves is the expert on 

this. 

Over 500 tons of water-borne cargo passes through Louisiana’s 

system of deep draft ports and navigational channels each year. If 

the present land loss rates continue, more than 155 miles of waterways and several ports will be exposed to open water within 50 

years. This is important not just for Louisiana, but for all those 

farmers in the Mississippi Valley system who rely upon these ports 

to send their products to international markets. 

Now, related to this, Louisiana depends upon the revenue from 

production in the Gulf of Mexico, as does the Nation, to restore our 

wetlands. A second way the Obama administration’s policies negatively affect this revenue stream is by locking up the Outer 

Continental Shelf’s acreage which could be leased. Under this 

Administration, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, less than 2 percent 

of the 1.71 billion Federal Outer Continental Shelf acreage is under 

lease. Over 63 million acres in the Gulf of Mexico alone remain 

locked up. This lost opportunity results in fewer jobs, less government revenue, and a greater reliance upon foreign sources of oil. 

If the draft proposed plan for offshore production is finalized in 

2016, the Obama administration will have effectively controlled a 

decade of offshore oil and gas lease planning. The draft 5-year plan 

for 2017 to 2022 lists 14 sales. As you noted, this is the lowest 

number of lease sales in the 42-year history of the planning 

process. 

Now, the second issue is supply constraints or access. Despite the 

Obama administration’s policies, according to the Energy 

Information Administration, in the short term the Gulf of Mexico 

is expected to defy the overall trend of decreased production domestically because of lower oil prices, et cetera, and will continue to 

produce oil. 

However, these offshore fields require both surface and subsea 

production equipment, and if the low oil price persists and operators cannot develop unique ways to decrease the capital required 

for these new projects and/or improve recovery rates, production 

will slip, and that in turn will negatively impact both jobs, Federal 

revenue through lease sales, as well as the amount of revenue 

Louisiana has to rebuild its coastline. 

This is exacerbated by the excess regulations that you noted and 

that Senator Vitter also noted. The estimates of the cost of these 

would be as much as $10–$30 million, in addition to the increased 

expenditures required under previously issued regulations. The industry estimates the 10-year cumulative cost of these rules to be 

approximately $32 billion. 

In response to this problematic regulatory climate, I, along with 

Senator Vitter, drafted a bill that became Title 1 of the OPENS 

Act, legislation that was reported out of the Senate Energy and 

Natural Resources Committee last month. As from the title, the 

OPENS Act opens up more acreage for energy production offshore. 

For example, some would open up the Eastern Gulf of Mexico by 

redefining the Eastern Gulf moratoria of 2017. 

In addition to expanding energy supply, according to a 2014 

study, by 2035, Eastern Gulf offshore natural gas development 

would produce nearly 1 million barrels of oil equivalent per day, 

10 

generating nearly 230,000 jobs, contributing over $18 billion per 

year to the U.S. economy, and generating $70 billion in cumulative 

government revenue. 

So, to conclude, the rise in production in the Gulf of Mexico is 

occurring due to large reserves and production efficiencies that 

streamline operational drilling costs. Although the long lead time 

and significant capital investment required to drill somewhat insulates production activity from short-term price volatility, the 

Obama administration’s offshore drilling plan and proposed regulations could erode the economic viability of future well production 

in the Gulf of Mexico. 

We must provide a regulatory environment to produce offshore 

oil and gas in a safe, economical way, while allowing access to the 

large undiscovered, technically recoverable oil and gas revenues on 

the Federal lands offshore. It is critical that production continue to 

grow in the Gulf of Mexico to protect and sustain our energy independence and to create the good jobs with good benefits for which 

there are far too few in today’s economy. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cassidy follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. BILL CASSIDY, A UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM

THE STATE OF LOUISIANA

Thank you Chairman Bishop and members of the House Natural Resources 

Committee for holding this field hearing today in Louisiana and bringing greater 

attention to the energy production and economic growth occurring along the Gulf 

Coast. 

Energy activities in coastal Gulf states and adjacent offshore waters have 

produced billions of barrels of oil and trillions of cubic feet of natural gas. 

Domestic energy production is critical for our country’s energy independence and 

security. Every barrel of oil and every cubic foot of natural gas produced in the Gulf 

of Mexico eliminates the need for energy from foreign sources. According to the 

Energy Information Administration, about 27 percent of U.S. oil is imported. 

Unfortunately, the actions and policies of this Administration are 

counterproductive. 

I. REDIRECTION OF COASTAL RESTORATION FUNDS

A few weeks ago, President Obama visited New Orleans to commemorate the region’s rebirth on the 10th anniversary of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Yet, the sustainability of Louisiana’s recovery was placed in jeopardy by the President’s Fiscal 

Year 2016 budget proposal. His budget proposed to redirect revenue derived from 

energy produced off of Louisiana’s coast toward unrelated projects. This money, as 

prescribed by Louisiana’s State Constitution, would be used to restore Louisiana’s 

wetlands. 

Louisiana is experiencing unparalleled land loss due to Federal engineering decisions for nearly a century that have channeled the lower Mississippi River System 

for the benefit of the entire country. Louisiana’s 2,300 square miles of land loss is 

largely attributed to this channelization, which abetted by the placement of Federal 

levees along the river system, has converted a once-growing delta plain to the greatest source of wetlands loss in the history of the United States. 

Louisiana is counting on the revenues derived from offshore energy production to 

fund a portion of the projects necessary to restore our coast. This is important not 

just for Louisiana but also for the Nation. Close to 18 percent of U.S. oil production 

and about 24 percent of U.S. natural gas production originates, is transported 

through, or is processed in Louisiana’s coastal wetlands. 

Over 500 million tons of waterborne cargo passes through Louisiana’s system of 

deep-draft ports and navigational channels each year. If present land loss rates continue, more than 155 miles of waterways and several of the ports will be exposed 

to open water within 50 years. Farmers and manufacturers in the Mississippi, 

Missouri, and Ohio valley will lose ability to get their products exported to international markets as this occurs. 

11 

Related to this, if Louisiana and the Nation depends upon revenue from production in the Gulf to restore our wetlands, a second way the Obama administration’s 

policies negatively affects the revenue stream is by locking up OCS acreage which 

could be leased. America cannot afford policies that put our wetlands, economic and 

energy infrastructure at risk. 

Under this Administration, less than 2 percent of the 1.71 billion Federal OCS 

acreage is under lease. Over 63 million acres in the Gulf of Mexico, alone, remains 

locked up. This lost opportunity results in fewer jobs, less government revenue, and 

a greater reliance on foreign sources of oil. 

If the Draft Proposed Plan for offshore production is finalized in 2016, the Obama 

administration will have effectively controlled a decade of offshore oil and gas lease 

planning. The draft 5-year plan for 2017–2022 lists 14 lease sales—the lowest 

number of lease sales in the 42-year history of the planning process. 

II. SUPPLY CONSTRAINTS (ACCESS)

Despite this headwind, counter-cyclical growth is occurring along the Gulf Coast. 

According to the Energy Information Administration, in the short term, the Gulf of 

Mexico is expected to defy the overall trend and increase production in the lower 

oil price environment, but if oil prices remain depressed for an extended period, the 

long-term outlook of the region changes drastically. 

Development of offshore fields requires both surface and subsea production 

equipment. The high cost of surface structures limits their application to large 

fields. 

Now, the Obama administration is proposing complex rules that will increase the 

cost of development and erode away the economic viability of well production, which 

combined with depressed oil prices, will further hamper future production in the 

Gulf of Mexico. 

III. EXCESS REGULATION

As an example, drilling in the Gulf of Mexico may shut down for over 12 months 

until all requirements are met. The Well Control Rule could drive up the cost per 

well by $10–$30 million. Industry studies estimate that the 10-year cumulative cost 

of the rule to be approximately $32 billion. 

In response to this problematic regulatory climate, I, along with Senator Vitter, 

drafted a bill that became Title 1 of the OPENS Act—legislation that was reported 

out of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee last month. As one 

could tell from its title, the OPENS Act opens up acreage for energy production 

offshore. 

Our portion of the bill provides new access to frontier acreage in the Gulf of 

Mexico in areas 50 miles outside the Florida coastline by redefining the Eastern 

Gulf moratoria in 2017. According to current law, the moratoria is scheduled to expire in 2022. 

In addition to expanding energy supply, according to a 2014 economic study 

(http://www.noia.org), by 2035, Eastern Gulf offshore oil and natural gas development could produce nearly 1 million barrels of oil equivalent per day, generate nearly 230,000 jobs, contribute over $18 billion per year to the U.S. economy, and 

generate $70 billion in cumulative government revenue. 

So to conclude, the rise in production in Gulf of Mexico is only occurring due to 

large reserves and production efficiencies that streamline operation and drilling 

costs. Although, the long lead time and significant capital investment required to 

drill helps insulate production activity from short-term price volatility. 

The Obama administration’s lackluster offshore drilling plan and proposed regulations could erode away the economic viability of future well production in the Gulf 

of Mexico. We must provide a regulatory climate to produce offshore in a safe, economical manner, while allowing access to the largest undiscovered, technically recoverable oil and gas resources on Federal lands offshore in the Gulf of Mexico. It 

is critical that production continues to grow in the Gulf of Mexico in order to protect 

and sustain our American energy independence and to help create good jobs with 

good benefits, of which there are too few of in today’s economy. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

I thank both of you for being here and for giving us your testimony. I realize the two branches of the Congress, each have different schedules, so the longer you can stay with us, I would be 

12 

happy to welcome you here to be a part of this panel. But with 

Chairman Fleming and Congressman Graves, your state is well 

represented on our committee anyway. 

Once again, we appreciate your testimony. We appreciate working with you on the wrong side of the Capitol Building. Thank you 

for being here. 

With that, I will now call the second panel up who will be here 

to testify. 

I would like to call Mr. Lars Herbst, who is the Regional 

Director, Gulf of Mexico OCS Region for the Bureau of Safety and 

Environmental Enforcement, the U.S. Department of the Interior 

to join us. 

Can we also have Mr.—actually, why don’t we switch those 

around? Let’s have Mr. Leimkuhler being the second one, who is 

the Vice President of Drilling, LLOG Exploration Company; then 

Mr. Jonathan Henderson, who is the Manager of the Gulf of Mexico 

Field Operations for the Gulf Restoration Network; Ms. Lori Davis, 

who is the President of RIG-CHEM; and also Dr. Joseph Mason, 

who is the Endowed Professor of Banking at Louisiana State 

University. 

If we could have you take your places up there. We appreciate 

your willingness to come and speak to us about this important 

issue, as we are very happy to be here in New Orleans. 

Let me remind the witnesses that under our Committee Rules, 

you are limited in your oral testimony to just 5 minutes, but your 

entire statement and anything you actually have that you want 

printed and added to the record will be included in the hearing 

record. 

So, to help out, you have the timer in front of you. As you begin 

speaking, the green light is there. The yellow light goes on when 

you have a minute left. The red light comes on when your 

5 minutes have ended. Obey that red light, if you would, please. 

Once again, we appreciate you taking the time to be with us here 

today. 

Mr. Herbst, I would like to recognize you first to begin your 5- 

minute testimony. 

STATEMENT OF LARS HERBST, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, GULF 

OF MEXICO OCS REGION, BUREAU OF SAFETY AND 

ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

THE INTERIOR 

Mr. HERBST. Thank you, Chairman Bishop and the Members 

present here. Thank you for the opportunity to appear today to 

present testimony. 

My name is Lars Herbst. I am the Gulf of Mexico Regional 

Director for the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement. 

I am a native of Louisiana, a graduate of LSU Petroleum 

Engineering Program, and a registered professional engineer. 

My public service began in 1983 in BSEE’s predecessor agency, 

the MMS. I now lead a staff of 350 engineers, geologists, and environmental scientists committed to promoting safety, protecting the 

environment, and serving our Nation’s offshore resources. 

Over the past 4 years, the Bureau has made a significant effort 

to update its regulations to ensure safe and environmentally 

13 

responsible operations offshore. These updates reflect the latest 

technological advancements and recommendations resulting from 

the Macondo blowout. Sustained production and robust culture of 

safety are not mutually exclusive. By promoting safety and reducing risk offshore, we are helping to safeguard the long-term viability of production in the Gulf of Mexico. 

In 2014, oil production in the Gulf region was at its highest level 

since the Macondo blowout. More than 510 million barrels of oil 

were produced, the third highest production since 2005. In 2016, 

the Bureau expects Gulf production to continue increasing, with 

several large projects expanding and other new projects coming online. The Bureau estimates nearly 1.7 million barrels of oil per day 

will be produced in the Gulf, bringing annual production to about 

620 million barrels, the highest in a decade. 

Keeping in mind that deepwater production projects often take 

10 to 12 years from discovery to first oil, the production trends you 

see in Figure 1 are expected to increase in the years ahead as a 

number of projects are already sanctioned and well into advanced 

planning stages. We expect two to three large floating production 

projects and eight subsea tie-back projects to come on-line in 2016. 

There is a tendency to focus on oil price trends and their effect 

on production levels. The market price of oil may affect permit 

numbers and rig counts in some areas of the United States, such 

as onshore and shallow water. However, deepwater production, 

which accounts for more than 75 percent of the offshore production, 

is less affected by short-term market fluctuations or new 

regulations. 

Low oil prices often do not have a direct impact on deepwater 

exploration and development drilling. These prospects generally involve long-term rig contracts or development drilling of sanctioned 

projects. Likewise, in production, large facilities like Shell’s 

Olympus or Chevron’s Jack-St. Malo, are already on-line and 

remain economically viable. Therefore, assumptions about the connection between deepwater production and short-term market 

conditions should be avoided. 

Even as rig activity in shallow water has decreased over the 

years, deepwater production remains high, as shown in Figure 2. 

Since the Macondo blowout in 2010, we have worked with Gulf 

Coast states and industry to mitigate consequences of blowouts by 

requiring immediate access to well containment systems. Now, almost 5 years later, we must ask ourselves: Has safety improved? 

In some areas, it clearly has. Yet, a significant challenge still 

faces the Bureau with respect to blowout prevention. These issues 

are addressed by the Well Control Rule, which we are finalizing. 

It closes gaps in blowout preventive requirements to reflect industry’s best practices, standards, and recommendations arising from 

the Macondo blowout investigations. The proposed rule helps to 

move the Bureau closer to a hybrid regulatory approach, both prescriptive and performance based, allowing for greater flexibility 

and a more holistic approach. 

This week, the Bureau is meeting with key industry stakeholders 

to discuss their comments. We need the Well Control Rule as loss 

of well control instances are still occurring at the same frequency 

as before the Macondo blowout, as shown in Figure 3. One such 

14 

incident involved Walter Oil and Gas that occurred in 2013. There 

was a blowout of natural gas which subsequently caused a fire on 

the rig. Shortly after the blowout, all 44 workers safely evacuated. 

The fire lasted 72 hours and destroyed the rig, at a cost approaching $60 million. The situation could have been far worse, but fortunately this did not happen. 

Our ability to successfully accomplish our mission depends heavily on recruiting and retaining qualified technical experts. 

Currently, we are the leading employer of students from LSU’s 

Petroleum Engineering Department. Our mission is to safeguard 

the people and environment of our coastal states and ensure that 

all personnel make it safely home at the end of each shift. 

It is my belief as a regulator that our Bureau’s work, on behalf 

of the American people, is never finished. My commitment and 

duty is to remain vigilant and ensure that lessons learned from offshore incidents are integrated into our work to prevent similar 

incidents in the future. The Bureau will continue to work with the 

regulated community to promote best practices and support a robust culture of safety offshore. 

This concludes my formal statement. I am happy to answer 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Herbst follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LARS HERBST, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF SAFETY

AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT

Chairman Bishop, Ranking Member Grijalva, and members of the committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to appear here today to discuss the impacts of Federal 

regulatory activity on oil and gas exploration and production on the Outer 

Continental Shelf (OCS) in the Gulf of Mexico. 

Over the past several years, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental 

Enforcement (BSEE) has made a significant effort to update its regulations to reflect technological advancements, recommendations in response to the blowout of 

the Macondo well and resulting Deepwater Horizon disaster, and the challenges 

posed by exploratory activities on the Arctic OCS. These updates are a critical part 

of our efforts to ensure safe and environmentally responsible operations offshore and 

our recent rulemaking activities constitute a substantial step toward safe and sustainable exploration and production of Gulf of Mexico oil and gas resources. Safe 

and responsible exploration remains our top priority. By doing things safely and ensuring that incidents do not cause significant damage to the entire region, we are 

helping to safeguard the long-term viability of production in the Gulf of Mexico. Sustained production and a robust culture of safety are not mutually exclusive. 

In calendar year 2014, OCS leases in California, Alaska, and the Gulf of Mexico 

provided 528 million barrels of oil and 1.3 trillion cubic feet of natural gas; the vast 

majority of this production came from the Gulf of Mexico. In 2014, oil production 

in the Gulf of Mexico region was at its highest level since the Macondo blowout. 

Over 510 million barrels of oil were produced from the Gulf of Mexico in 2014, making this the third highest production year in the span of 2005–2014. Even with the 

expansion and strengthening of offshore oil and gas regulations prompted by the 

Macondo blowout, the 10-year average production rate has increased annually since 

2005 (see Figure 1). Since 2010, OCS leases have provided nearly 2 billion barrels 

of oil and 6.2 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, fueling economic growth and accounting for more than 19 percent of the Nation’s oil production and about 5 percent of 

domestic natural gas production. BSEE will continue to support domestic energy 

production from the Nation’s offshore resources, while actively working to reduce 

risk in order to ensure safe and environmentally responsible operations on the OCS. 

15 

Figure 1—Total Oil Production for the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf 2005–2014 

In 2016, BSEE expects production in the Gulf of Mexico to continue increasing, 

with several large projects expanding and other new projects coming on-line. The 

Shell-operated Olympus facility is one example of project expansion. When production began in 2014, it produced 35,000 barrels of oil per day (BOPD). By 2016, production is expected to increase to 80,000 BOPD. Another example is Anadarko’s 

Lucius field which reported first oil production on January 19, 2015 and quickly 

ramped up to 80,000 BOPD in the second quarter of 2015. Lucius is also processing 

gas for subsea wells operated by ExxonMobil’s Hadrian South subsea project which 

reported first production on March 30, 2015 with production estimated to ramp up 

to 300 million cubic feet of gas per day (MMcfpd) and 3,000 barrels of liquid (condensate). The Bureau estimates that in 2016 nearly 1.7 million barrels of oil per 

day will be produced from the Gulf of Mexico alone, putting annual oil production 

near 620 million barrels per year—110 million barrels higher than in 2014, and the 

highest rate in 10 years. 

A deepwater floating production project often takes approximately 10 to 12 years 

to come on-line from discovery to first oil. As such, BSEE evaluates information 

provided by operators many years in advance of new production coming on-line. The 

production trends you see in Figure 1 are expected to increase in the years ahead 

as a number of projects are already sanctioned and well into the advanced planning 

stages. We expect two to three large floating production projects and eight subsea 

tie-back projects to come on-line in 2016 and start first production. In fact, BSEE 

just last week completed a pre-production inspection of the Heidelberg production 

SPAR that will be operated by Anadarko and is expected to begin production in 

2016. You can view photos from the production and inspection on our Flickr®

Web site (https://www.flickr.com/photos/bseegov/). 

There is a tendency to focus on overall trends in energy commodity prices—such 

as the price of oil—and to try to tie those trends to current production levels. Oil 

prices and market expectations about future prices have varying degrees of impact 

on permitting demands and production levels in different areas. For example, permit requests and rig counts in some areas of the United States can be affected significantly by sharp changes in oil prices. However, deepwater production, which 

accounts for over 75 percent of OCS production, is not affected in the same way by 

short-term market fluctuations or other policy drivers. Deepwater prospects are 

planned and sanctioned many years in advance and involve long-term rig contracts 

to allow the operator to drill within the lease term. The same concept applies to production. Large production facilities, like Shell’s Olympus or Chevron’s Jack-St. Malo, 

are already on-line and remain economically viable to produce for a long period of 

time (years) even when oil prices are lower for a period of time. Therefore, assumptions about the interconnectivity of deepwater production and short-term market 

conditions should be avoided. Even as the number of wells has decreased, production has remained high due to technological advancements (see Figure 2). 


96241.001.eps
16 

1 Bromwich, Michael. Statement to House Natural Resource Committee, March 30, 2011. 

Figure 2—Gulf of Mexico Outer Continental Shelf Oil Production, Total vs. 

Deepwater (Numbers Reflect Average Daily Oil Production) 

Immediately following the Deepwater Horizon disaster, the Department of the 

Interior and BSEE issued a series of regulations and notices to improve safety offshore. Former BSEE Director Michael Bromwich discussed the importance of safety 

and change before the House Committee on Natural Resources in March 2011: 

‘‘Regulatory and industry reform in the wake of significant offshore disaster 

has happened before. The United Kingdom and Norway substantially 

changed their oversight of offshore drilling and production following the 

Piper Alpha and Alexander Kielland incidents respectively. Australia is currently facing many of the same issues we are confronting following the 

Montara well blowout, which occurred only 8 months before the Deepwater 

Horizon disaster . . . . 

The major challenge facing the country is to continue to improve the safety 

of drilling in the GOM, particularly in deepwater, while continuing with 

operations, keeping production flowing and keeping people working.’’ 1

Nearly 5 years have passed since former Director Bromwich’s remarks and his 

points are as relevant today as they were then, which is why we must continue to 

ask whether the fundamental changes discussed have occurred. In some areas, they 

have. BSEE discusses these changes at length in its Annual Report. Federal regulators, state governments, and the oil and gas industry have worked together to 

make significant strides in mitigating the consequences of blowouts by implementing requirements for immediate access to containment systems. However, the 

most significant challenge facing the agency is to make similar strides in prevention, which includes blowout prevention and well control. BSEE and industry 

worked tirelessly to develop the well containment screening tool which, along with 

the development of new well containment equipment, allowed drilling to resume 

after the Deepwater Horizon tragedy. These issues we addressed in the proposed 

rule entitled Blowout Preventer Systems and Well Control, which was published on 

April 17, 2015 (74 FR 21504). 

Understanding the importance of reforming well control practices, BSEE is reviewing public comments and developing the final rule. This rule closes gaps in 

blowout preventer requirements and updates BSEE regulations to reflect industry 

best practices. The proposed rule also incorporates the latest industry standards as 

well as recommendations that resulted from investigations into the Macondo blowout, the resulting fire and loss of life onboard the Deepwater Horizon, and the environmental disaster that followed. Specifically, the proposed rule includes provisions 

that increase requirements for equipment reliability and build upon industry standards for blowout preventers. In a comprehensive way, the proposed rule addresses 

the multiple systems and processes critical to well control operations. The proposed 

rule includes more stringent design requirements for critical well control safety 


96241.002.eps
17 

system equipment and requirements concerning the generation of traceable records 

regarding the manufacture, use, maintenance, and decommissioning of blowout preventers and other well control equipment. The proposed rule helps to move BSEE 

closer to a hybrid regulatory approach—one that is both prescriptive and performance-based. A hybrid approach grants BSEE greater flexibility and allows for a 

more holistic approach to regulation. The comment period on the proposed rule has 

closed and BSEE is currently meeting with key stakeholders and industry leaders— 

which started yesterday and continues today—to discuss their comments. As with 

all new rule adoption, BSEE employs a robust process of public engagement and 

considers all comments and feedback. 

The necessity of the Well Control Rule is demonstrated by the fact that the number of loss of well control incidents has increased in the last 2 years and thus, these 

incidents are still occurring with a frequency that is comparable to that which existed prior to the Macondo blowout. Six of the last seven investigations completed 

by BSEE for loss of well control incidents found that the root cause of each incident 

was tied to equipment difficulties, in particular the design specifications of wells. 

Figure 3 shows the continued occurrence of loss of well control incidents on Gulf 

of Mexico facilities (see Figure 3). The proposed Well Control Rule addresses these 

issues. 

Figure 3—Losses of Well Control Incidents in the Gulf of Mexico from 2008–2014 

New regulations are designed to prevent blowouts like the Walter Oil and Gas incident that occurred in 2013 when a blowout and explosion caused a fire on the rig. 

All 44 workers were safely evacuated, but the fire lasted over 72 hours and the rig 

was completely destroyed, resulting in a financial loss approaching $60 million. 

Blowouts like these can easily lead to much larger incidents that pose a significant 

risk to human life and can cause serious damage to the environment. The Incident 

Report published about the Walter blowout discusses numerous points where things 

could have gone tragically wrong. Fortunately, this did not happen, but the risk remains high in the region. By strengthening oversight and encouraging a culture of 

safety within the industry, BSEE is helping safeguard the long-term viability of 

drilling in the Gulf of Mexico. 

Well control is not the only area in which BSEE has proposed significant improvements. Another major area of safety reform includes an update to our production 


96241.003.eps
18 

2Proposed Rule: Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations on the Outer Continental Shelf—Oil 

and Gas and Production Safety Systems. Published on Thursday, August 22, 2013 (78 FR 

52240). 3 BSEE Annual Report 2014—http://www.bsee.gov/uploadedFiles/BSEE/BSEE_Newsroom/ 

Publications_Library/Annual_Report/BSEE%202014%20Annual%20Report.pdf. 4 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer 

Continental Shelf (OCS); Helideck and Aviation Fuel Safety for Fixed Offshore Facilities. 

Published on Wednesday, September 24, 2014 (79 FR 57008). 5Proposed Rule: Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf—Update 

of Incorporated Cranes Standard. Published on Monday, June 15, 2015 (80 FR 34113). 

safety systems regulations.2 The section of BSEE’s regulations related to production 

safety systems has not been updated since 1988 and significant technological advancements have been made in that time. The proposed regulation addresses production safety systems, subsurface safety devices, and provides specification for 

safety device testing. BSEE is currently working to finalize this rule. 

As noted in BSEE’s 2014 Annual Report,3 there continue to be issues related to 

aviation as well as crane safety. BSEE has issued an Advanced Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking for Helideck and Aviation Fuel Safety for Fixed Offshore Facilities.4

Public comments have been received and we will be reviewing them. 

Lifting incidents involving cranes or personnel and material handling operations 

are increasing. From 2007 to 2014, the average number of lifting incidents reported 

per year was 167. While the lowest number of incidents was reported in 2010, incidents have increased since then (see Figure 4). BSEE is currently working to finalize a Crane Safety Rule 5 to reduce lifting incidents based on the increased number 

of lifting incidents observed on the OCS. 

Figure 4—Lifting Incidents per Outer Continental Shelf Installation from 2007–2014 

We are also working to strengthen our offshore oversight by considering the use 

of real-time monitoring technologies and voluntary near-miss reporting to improve 

and increase the regulatory oversight of critical offshore operations and equipment. 

The real-time monitoring program is intended to enhance the existing inspection 

and enforcement program by using innovative technologies and risk-based inspection criteria to supplement BSEE’s current inspection program. The voluntary nearmiss reporting system, SafeOCS, was formally launched in May 2015. It is a 

completely confidential system whereby the Bureau of Transportation Statistics collects and aggregates data on behalf of BSEE. The aggregated data will be shared 

with the general public through the BTS Web site and be used to identify safety 

trends and increase the understanding of offshore risk. When used in conjunction 

with existing methods of collecting data and assessing risk, this amalgamated data 

can be used to identify trends that will help to reduce the risk of major incidents, 

loss of life, injury and negative impacts on the environment. 


96241.004.eps
19 

Our people continue to be our greatest asset and the most essential component 

of our operations. BSEE’s ability to successfully accomplish its mission depends 

heavily on our ability to recruit and retain a workforce of qualified technical experts. Currently, BSEE is the No. 1 employer of students from Louisiana State 

University’s Petroleum Engineering program—both as summer interns and as fulltime employees. We are proud of our local connections and have found that our message of safety and responsible exploration resonates with young petroleum engineers 

from the state of Louisiana. These engineers, like BSEE, are interested in helping 

safeguard the people of their state and ensure that future blowouts do not catastrophically impact the region and their homes. At the end of the day, our mission 

is to safeguard the people and the environment of our coastal states and ensure that 

all offshore personnel make it safely home at the end of each shift. 

It is our belief that our work as regulators—on behalf of the American people— 

is never finished. As our commitment and duty to the American people, we will 

remain vigilant in instituting reform efforts and benefiting from lessons learned 

from activities and incidents on the OCS. We will continue to work cooperatively 

with the regulated community to promote best practices and to support a robust culture of safety within the offshore oil and gas industry, which produces these 

resources that are so valuable and essential to our economy. 

This concludes my formal statement, and I am happy to answer any questions you 

have about the proposed rules or the current state of BSEE’s regulation and 

oversight of oil and gas operations in the Gulf of Mexico. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD TO LARS HERBST, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, 

BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT

Questions Submitted by Chairman Bishop 

Question 1. The committee is concerned that this extremely technical and 

prescriptive rule was written without a complete understanding of modern drilling 

practices. As a result, there are multiple provisions in the draft rule that many in 

the industry would argue are technically flawed and would actually make drilling 

operations offshore less safe. In-depth conversations and workshops with industry 

experts in this very technical field are necessary to create a rule that meets everyone’s goal of a safer offshore environment, while also maintaining the ability to 

efficiently produce oil and natural gas. 

Answer. BSEE disagrees with the assertion that the Well Control Rule is flawed. 

The proposed rule contains a variety of prescriptive and performance-based 

requirements and adopts 10 current industry standards that pertain to well control. 

The rule was also drafted to address recommendations from numerous investigations and reports issued following the Deepwater Horizon disaster by the following 

entities: 

• Department of the Interior (DOI)/Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

Joint Investigation Team (JIT) 

• National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore 

Drilling 

• Chief Counsel for National Commission 

• National Academy of Engineering 

• BSEE Blowout Preventer (BOP) Forum 

• Ocean Energy Safety Advisory Committee 

• Chemical Safety Board 

Additionally, the rule addresses issues arising out of recent blowouts in the Gulf 

of Mexico and other ‘‘near miss’’ events and incorporates many provisions that have 

been longstanding Gulf of Mexico policy. The Bureau has engaged industry, nongovernmental organizations, and other stakeholders throughout the rulemaking 

process and has provided opportunities for those entities to voice questions, concerns, and other input. The Bureau is currently working to address industry’s questions and concerns and giving careful consideration to comments that could improve 

the quality of the rule. 

20 

Question 1a. Who wrote the Well Control Rule? And what were the qualifications 

and experience of these people? Please list BSEE staff and outside consultants who 

contributed to the writing of the rule, as well as their relevant experience. 

Answer. Subject matter experts from the entire organization—some having more 

than 30 years of industry related experience—helped draft the proposed rule, including staff from the program offices as well as the field offices. To supplement BSEE’s 

in-house expertise, BSEE held a public workshop, listening sessions, and over 50 

meetings with industry, trade associations, regulators, and other stakeholders to obtain technical input. The proposed rule is also informed by the several investigations 

conducted after Deepwater Horizon, which utilized the expertise of many acclaimed 

engineers, scientists, and other highly qualified professionals. 

Question 1b. When and how do you plan to further engage industry technical 

experts in order to correct technical flaws and create a rule that meets the intended 

goal of a safer offshore environment? 

Answer. BSEE disagrees that the proposed regulation is flawed. As mentioned in 

the hearing, BSEE held follow-up meetings for 2 days with entities that submitted 

comments during the comment period to obtain additional clarification on comments 

that addressed specific provisions of the rule. These meetings were held on 

September 15 and 16. Additionally, stakeholders will have the opportunity for further engagement during listening sessions that will be held after the rule is sent 

to the Office of Management and Budget for interagency review under E.O. 12866. 

Question 1c. What is the Bureau’s rationale for including additional provisions 

beyond API 53 pertaining to Blowout Prevention Equipment Systems? 

Answer. The API process results in the development of baseline performance 

standards based on the consensus process. This process often requires compromises 

to address domestic and international technical and legal issues from various sectors of the industry. BSEE staff members attended many of these meetings and discussions and were able to identify the provisions that potentially did not provide a 

sufficient level of safety for U.S. offshore operations. For the proposed rule, BSEE 

requested comments on these supplemental requirements and will consider any data 

or recommendations provided by industry or third parties. 

Question 2. In the hearing you mentioned that if companies commented on the 

rule, they were invited back for meetings with appropriate BSEE staff. Has BSEE 

reached out to all companies that have submitted comments? What is BSEE’s plan 

to continue to engage industry on these technical matters? When will the next 

round of meetings take place? Has BSEE considered holding workshops to gain further information and technical expertise in a setting that allows sufficient time and 

discussion to help improve the rule before it is finalized? 

Answer. Bureau staff are working to finalize the rule based on comments submitted during the comment period. BSEE staff members have worked to ensure 

broad stakeholder engagement throughout the drafting process. As mentioned in the 

hearing, BSEE held additional follow-up meetings with parties that had commented 

on the rule to provide Bureau staff with clarification on these comments. However, 

not all commenters participated in follow-up meetings, as a majority of comments 

submitted were very clear and required no further explanation or clarification. We 

do not feel that further engagement is required at this time based on the input that 

BSEE received during the drafting process, the public comment period, and the 

follow-up meetings with commenters. 

Question 3. In many comments submitted, companies stated the proposed rule 

contains provisions, specifically in regards to drilling margins as mentioned by Mr. 

Leimkuhler during the hearing that could potentially undermine the safety mission 

through unintended consequences. Do you believe the proposed rule contains such 

provisions and what evaluations have been conducted by BSEE’s technical staff to 

ensure safe operating procedures? 

Answer. The Bureau does not agree that the proposed rule undermines safety. 

The language related to drilling margins is based on recommendations arising out 

of the various investigations and reports that followed the Deepwater Horizon tragedy. The Bureau received a multitude of comments on the sections of the rule that 

pertain to safe drilling margins and is examining those comments. Specific comments related to drilling margins are being reviewed carefully by BSEE technical 

staff and other options for maintaining safe drilling margins are being evaluated. 

21 

Question 4. The comment period for the Well Control Rule closed in July. What 

is the timing for the Department moving forward? When do you anticipate it will 

be finalized? Is there a deadline either internally or externally by which the 

Department must meet? 

Answer. The Bureau is giving thoughtful consideration to all input that was 

received during the comment period. BSEE is moving forward with the rule in a 

timely manner and, once this process is completed, will proceed to issuance of the 

rule. 

Question 5. A study commissioned by the American Petroleum Institute and referenced in their public comments on the Well Control Rule estimated that the rule 

will cost approximately $32 billion which is significantly higher than the $883 million cost estimated by BSEE. Can you please explain how BSEE staff arrived at 

that figure and why it is so profoundly different than the independent analysis 

conducted by Blade Energy Partners and Quest Offshore? 

Answer. BSEE arrived at its cost estimate by employing a careful section-bysection analysis of the rule to identify provisions that would result in compliance 

costs outside of those already incurred by industry in conforming to the latest industry standards. BSEE disagrees with many of the key assumptions made in the 

American Petroleum Institute (API) study, which are the foundation for the higher 

cost estimate of that report. Specifically, the API cost study accounts for lost drilling 

activity due to the effects of the regulations pertaining to drilling margins, which 

is the major cost-driver in the API study. The BSEE economic analysis does not account for decreases in drilling activity due to the uncertainty associated with predicting industry’s activities and advancements in technical capabilities and the 

ability of operators to apply for alternative compliance. The API study also does not 

include in its analysis the many benefits of the rule, including reduced fatalities, 

reductions in the likelihood of oil spills, and the significant cost savings arising out 

of reduced testing of equipment. 

Question 6. There are some who suggest that some of the equipment requirements 

in the draft rule will require sizable changes to existing infrastructure with little 

to no impact on increasing the efficacy or ability for that equipment to operate effectively. As Murphy Oil Company noted in their comments, ‘‘the lack of availability 

of upgrade equipment and the time estimated to manufacture and install the same 

will result in a shutdown of the majority of the Gulf of Mexico rig fleet for a substantial period of time.’’ How do you respond to those assertions? 

Answer. The implementation periods for various aspects of the rule are being 

analyzed based on the comments received. The proposed rule employs a phased implementation schedule that delays the effective dates of certain requirements. By 

phasing in certain requirements over time, the rule will not have the effect of shutting down the Gulf of Mexico rig fleet. 

Questions Submitted by Rep. Fleming 

Question 1. When discussing BSEE’s engagement and how BSEE can put forward 

regulations that don’t cause a reduction in production, you stated, ‘‘if we can accomplish the same objective by another means which industry has brought up I think 

there will be flexibility.’’ How is BSEE pursuing these alternatives and the flexibility you mentioned during the hearing? 

Answer. Each comment is analyzed to determine if the suggestion provides an 

equal or better level of safety than the proposed rule language. If it does, the rule 

may be modified. Furthermore, alternative compliance is allowed under the alternative compliance section of the existing rules, and would continue to be allowed 

under the proposed rule. 

Question 2. When discussing the drilling margin issue you mentioned that BSEE 

often incorporates industry standards as part of BSEE regulations. How have you 

fully taken into account industry standards (such as API 92–L)? 

Answer. BSEE is taking API 92–L into consideration; however, this standard was 

drafted after the proposed rule went out. We are reviewing comments related to the 

drilling margin issue and considering whether or not the rule should require compliance with an industry standard or allow for performance-based assessment. 

Question 3. During the hearing Mr. Leimkuhler identified examples of the 

proposed rulemaking that may make drilling operations less safe by diverging from 

industry standards, such as the requirement for a 5-year demonstration of the 

blowout preventer. Are you taking into account real-world feedback on safety 

22 

implications of your proposals? Are you willing to modify the rule to account for this 

feedback? 

Answer. BSEE is taking into consideration all feedback received pursuant to the 

rulemaking process. The 5-year inspection of the blowout preventer is currently contained within API Standard 53. In this case, we proposed to adopt an industry recommended standard. The comments received during the comment period as well as 

the input received from BSEE’s various outreach activities constitute ‘‘real-world 

feedback.’’ BSEE is considering input from all sources and will modify the rule in 

response to comments where doing so will improve the quality of the rule. 

Questions Submitted by Rep. Garret Graves 

Question 1. BSEE is proposing new requirements for accumulator volumes, 

beyond those of industry standards, which will require additions to and reconfiguration of the BOP. Accommodating these new requirements will add to the complexity 

of the BOP system and could have an impact on the safety and functionality of the 

BOP. Has BSEE looked at the safety implications that might result from this increased accumulator volume on the other safety mechanisms contained within the 

BOP? If so, please provide the analysis? If not, please explain why not? 

Answer. This section did receive considerable comment. BSEE is still in the deliberative stages of the rulemaking process and evaluating the comments received to 

ensure that safety-critical functions have proper accumulator volumes to ensure 

actuation. 

Question 2. How did BSEE come to the decision that the proposed rule’s quinquennial inspection scheme will produce a result superior to that which will result 

from adherence to a sequential application of the periodic maintenance and inspection requirements of API 53? Can BSEE point to any safety data that supports its 

decision? 

Answer. BSEE believes that the proposed language will result in a comprehensive 

and traceable inspection scheme. The lack of an industry-wide database related to 

equipment reliability has made assessing the effectiveness of current inspection 

schemes difficult. BSEE will review the information and data received during the 

comment period before making any decisions. 

Question 3. In the Well Control Rule, BSEE Approved Verification Organizations 

(BAVOs) will be charged with interpretation of the BSEE regulations, such industry 

standards as are incorporated by reference, and recognized engineering practices. 

However, no indication is given as to how BSEE would provide the BAVOs with the 

guidance and oversight necessary for rendering such interpretations. Just as there 

is a need for consistency among BSEE Regional and District offices, there will be 

a need for consistency among BAVOs. How does BSEE plan to ensure there is a 

transparent system for provision of interpretations as needed? 

Answer. BSEE has initiated a formal process for issuing interpretations on regulations that will help to ensure consistent application of the requirements across the 

agency, industry, and third-party verification organizations. BSEE will also certify 

that BSEE-approved verification organizations (BAVO) have previous experience 

with BSEE requirements and procedures as well as the technical expertise to 

perform verifications based on the regulations as written. 

Continued Engagement 

Question 4. During the hearing I asked you why interested parties were only 

provided a total of 3 months (initial 2 months with a 1 month extension) to comment on a proposal that BSEE took several years to write and you explained that 

that decision was outside your call but that BSEE is still working with industry. 

You also mentioned that with the proposed provisions outside of the codification of 

industry standards that BSEE is ‘‘continuing to work with those commenters.’’ As 

I also stated at the hearing, I’m very concerned that this rule is done right, which 

is why I am particularly concerned that this technical engagement continues and 

I asked BSEE to commit to public meetings so we can get this rule right. Please 

explain how BSEE will continue its engagement with industry through the end of 

the year. 

Answer. BSEE staff are working to finalize the rule and to address the over 5,000 

pages of comments submitted during the comment period. BSEE staff have worked 

to ensure broad stakeholder engagement throughout the drafting and comment 

process. The Bureau conducted over 50 meetings with various companies, trade 

23 

associations, regulators, and other stakeholders during the open comment period as 

part of the process of moving from proposed to final rule. The Bureau also met with 

organizations after the closure of the comment period in those cases where the Bureau required clarification of the written comments that were submitted within the 

comment period. Those discussions were restricted to the substance of those timely 

submitted comments. We do not feel that additional technical engagement is required at this time, based on the input that BSEE received during the drafting process and in the public comment period. The Bureau is currently working to address 

industry’s questions and concerns and giving careful consideration to comments that 

could improve the quality of the rule. 

Our current regulations do not account for the more than 160 recommendations 

that the Bureau received following the tragic events of the Deepwater Horizon disaster or reflect lessons learned from other loss of well control events that occurred 

thereafter. It took several years for the studies and investigations to be concluded. 

The proposed Well Control Rule incorporates the findings of those studies and 

investigations. 

BSEE Regional Office Expertise 

Question 5. To what extent have you and your staff been involved in the development of new regulations by BSEE headquarters and to what extent were you 

involved in the development of the proposed Well Control Rule? 

Answer. We utilize the collective experience of all of our BSEE subject matter experts, regardless of their location, for any new rule or regulation that is being developed and finalized. GOM Regional Office staff have been thoroughly involved 

throughout the entire process, including drafting the rule, reviewing technical comments from industry, and meeting with commenters at BSEE Headquarters in 

Washington, DC. 

Question 6. Please describe the amount of input that headquarters requested from 

the Gulf Region on offshore regulatory matters, and please describe if and how 

much this has changed since 2010. 

Answer. BSEE regulations are developed by subject matter experts throughout 

the Bureau, regardless of their being in a regional or headquarters location. We 

utilize the collective expertise of a range of experts to develop regulations. Subject 

matter teams were specifically engaged to assess the technical comments that were 

received. The GOM Regional Office was thoroughly involved in drafting the proposed rule and was a part of the subject matter expert team assembled to review 

technical comments from industry. Content development and participation in each 

rule is different based on the topic and expertise needed for each individual rule. 

Question 7. Is it safer for drilling decisions to be made by the drilling personnel 

on the rig or offshore facility or by onshore based personnel? 

Answer. All urgent decisions related to safety should be made by qualified competent personnel on the rig. However, real-time monitoring can elevate safety by 

having a ‘‘second set of eyes’’ to catch something that one person may miss. The proposed rule would not change current industry or operator practices regarding 

decisionmaking. 

Questions Submitted by Rep. Westerman 

Question 1. BSEE’s pending well control regulation has been under consideration 

within the Department of Interior for over 4 years. The scope of this Federal rule 

has expanded over the years from a focus on blowout preventer systems to the 

broader issue of well control. In the Agency’s own words, this regulation represents 

‘‘one of the most substantial rulemakings in the history of the BSEE and its predecessor organizations.’’ Given the extremely technical nature of this regulation, there 

is a limited number of industry experts who fully understand the consequences and 

feasibility of many provisions included in the rulemaking. 

Question 1a. Who did the Bureau consult with during the drafting of this rule? 

Answer. We utilize the collective experience of our BSEE subject matter experts— 

which includes engineers with over 30 years of industry experience—for any new 

rule or regulation that is being developed and finalized. BSEE also held over 50 

meetings with external stakeholders including technical experts, industry groups, 

academia, and the members of the regulated industry. The rule also incorporates 

24 

technical recommendations from numerous investigations and reports issued 

following the Deepwater Horizon incident including: 

• Department of the Interior (DOI)/Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

Joint Investigation Team (JIT) 

• National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore 

Drilling 

• Chief Counsel for National Commission 

• National Academy of Engineering 

• BSEE Blowout Preventer (BOP) Forum 

• Ocean Energy Safety Advisory Committee 

• Chemical Safety Board 

Question 1b. More specifically, within BSEE, who was tasked with writing the 

technical provisions of this rule? 

Answer. The rule was developed by BSEE subject matter experts throughout the 

Bureau from both regional and headquarters locations. We utilize the collective expertise of a range of experts to develop regulations. Subject matter teams were specifically re-engaged for assessment of technical comments that were received. 

Question 1c. Were outside consultants and/or drilling engineers familiar with the 

latest technologies and drilling processes involved in drafting the rule? 

Answer. The Bureau has engaged extensively with external stakeholders and 

technical experts, beginning as early as 2012 with the blowout preventer public 

workshop. Additional sessions were held following that workshop with members of 

the regulated community, including the American Petroleum Institute and many of 

its members. Since then, engagement has continued with numerous meetings (over 

50) with industry, academia, and other technical experts prior to publishing the 

rule. More recently, additional meetings were held after the closure of the comment 

period in cases where the Bureau required clarification of the written comments 

that were submitted within the comment period. Those discussions were restricted 

to the substance of those timely submitted comments. Since we have held many 

meetings and a public workshop in the past 4 years, we do not feel that there have 

been any time constraints placed on our stakeholder engagement. 

Question 1d. I am concerned that a regulation this technical—with significant 

safety, production, and cost impacts—may not have been exposed to the level of engineering expertise necessary to draft the best possible, and technically feasible, 

rule. 

Answer. The provisions in the rule have been fully discussed and carefully considered. We utilize the collective experience of our BSEE subject matter experts— 

which includes engineers with over 30 years of industry experience—for any new 

rule or regulation that is being developed and finalized. BSEE also held over 50 

meetings with external stakeholders including technical experts, industry groups, 

academia, and the members of the regulated industry. The rule also incorporates 

technical recommendations from numerous investigations and reports issued following the Deepwater Horizon incident including: 

• Department of the Interior (DOI)/Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

Joint Investigation Team (JIT) 

• National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore 

Drilling 

• Chief Counsel for National Commission 

• National Academy of Engineering 

• BSEE Blowout Preventer (BOP) Forum 

• Ocean Energy Safety Advisory Committee 

• Chemical Safety Board 

Question 2. During the hearing you stated that BSEE is trying to push the bar 

as it relates to the provisions in the proposed rule beyond API Standard 53. What 

analysis did BSEE use to determine when and how the bar should be raised above 

API 53? The API uses an open and transparent process to set industry standards 

following the requirements of the American National Standards Institute (ANSI). 

Did BSEE use a similar process when determining the rule’s proposed requirements 

above and beyond API 53? Please explain how BSEE determined these 

requirements. 

25 

Answer. Differences between the proposed rule and API 53 can be attributed to 

specific recommendations arising from the Deepwater Horizon investigations and 

analyses. The proposed Well Control Rule represents an effort by the Bureau to codify the recommendations of the several investigative bodies commissioned to determine the causes of the Macondo blowout. In contrast, the API employs a consensus 

process that results in the development of minimally acceptable performance standards. This process often requires compromises to address domestic and international 

technical and legal issues from various sectors of the industry. BSEE staff members 

attended many of these meetings and discussions and were able to identify the provisions of API 53 that potentially did not provide a sufficient level of safety for U.S. 

OCS operations. In the proposed rule, BSEE requested comments on these supplemental requirements and is considering the data and recommendations provided by 

industry or third parties. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, I appreciate that. 

Mr. Leimkuhler, I will recognize you for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH LEIMKUHLER, VICE PRESIDENT, 

DRILLING, LLOG EXPLORATION COMPANY, LLC 

Mr. LEIMKUHLER. Good morning. Chairman Bishop and members 

of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify on behalf of 

LLOG Exploration Company. LLOG welcomes this opportunity to 

provide what we see as improvements to Federal policies on oil and 

gas activity in the Outer Continental Shelf. 

LLOG is the largest privately-owned oil producer in the United 

States, headquartered in Covington, Louisiana. Our focus is the 

deepwater U.S. Gulf of Mexico, where we apply a targeted approach to subsea wells and floating production systems to safely 

and efficiently develop the Nation’s deepwater oil and gas 

resources. 

Unlike the major integrated oil and gas companies, our area of 

focus is limited. However, the level of expertise and capability we 

bring to those areas is state-of-the-art. There is additional information about our company in your addendum, but I would like to 

highlight two main points. 

The first is safety. At LLOG, we, and especially myself personally, hold it as a core value. Priorities change, but values do not. 

In scope, we have 16 deepwater developments to date, with 8 fields 

currently in the OCS under development. We are a small company 

that does big things. 

Depending upon where a subsea well is drilled in the Gulf of 

Mexico, anywhere from 9 to 11 permits or plan approvals are needed to move a prospect from leasing into production. These approvals come from BOEM, BSEE, and the EPA. In your slide pack is 

a simplified version of the process, which is shown on Slide 4. 

Within that regulatory protocol, I would like to highlight three 

areas where LLOG feels there are improvement opportunities, as 

well as other issues not addressed on the slide. 

The first improvement area is the appropriate balance of 

prescriptive- versus performance-based regulations. In the past, the 

technical regulatory staff at the regulators had an appropriate degree of professional judgment that they could apply to approve permits and operations. Over time, that balance has moved to a more 

prescriptive approach. Of particular note, based on our analysis 

and review of the proposed Well Control Safety Rule, the 

26 

application has become so prescriptive in the proposed rule, 

relative to well design and real-time monitoring, that it is likely to 

be counter-productive to safe operations. LLOG strongly encourages BSEE and BOEM to take a balanced approach to regulatory 

enforcement using prescriptive- as well as performance-based 

regulations, especially in those two areas. I would be more than 

happy to provide examples in the follow-up Q&A. 

Second is the exploration plan and well permit approval process. 

I have worked my entire career offshore in the Gulf of Mexico since 

1987, and the technical professionals and regional management at 

the regulatory agencies that I have worked with over that time 

were and are consistently professional, capable, and dedicated. In 

my opinion, the Bureau just needs more of them. We are now 

1 month away from the 5-year anniversary of the end of the moratorium, yet we continue to see our well-related permits and even 

exploration plans approved just in time. This is not due to a lack 

of effort by the staff but, in my opinion, an understaffed situation, 

despite the best efforts of district and regional management to recruit and retain good talent. I am encouraged that they appear to 

be taking advantage of the current downturn to add experienced 

staff, and that should be encouraged. 

Third is the commingling process. LLOG strives to make all the 

wells we drill commercial by utilizing smart well technology to 

open up multiple zones in adjacent reservoirs within the same well. 

We have never drilled an expendable well. As long as Mother 

Nature cooperates and we find the reservoirs in the expected location and depth, we can file for a commingling permit in advance. 

However, zones often do not come in as expected and we need to 

file an initial commingling permit or modify an existing one. With a rig on location costing $1 million a day in capital, we 

need to evaluate the ability and likelihood to obtain commingling 

permit approval in time, versus the impact of costly delays. Under 

such conditions, the added burden or risk of a regulatory delay has 

actually made some zones uneconomic to produce. This hinders the 

industry’s ability to bring American energy to U.S. consumers and 

provide a robust supply of affordable, reliable energy. 

Among the additional improvement opportunities are the impact 

of rigid application of the Jones Act to offshore facility installation, 

and the impact of obtaining Clean Air permits. 

With respect to the Jones Act and the heavy-lift vessels required 

to install offshore facilities, LLOG encourages the U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection to adhere to the prior historical application 

of the law with respect to the use of heavy-lift vessels. LLOG feels 

application of the Jones Act to the heavy-lift vessels forces us to 

possibly transfer jobs overseas and away from U.S. Gulf Coast fabrication yards. On this issue, LLOG commends a letter sent by 

BBSE Director Brian Salerno to the U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection earlier this month supporting the industry position to 

return to the historical application of the Jones Act with respect to 

heavy-lift vessels used in offshore construction. 

Regarding the air permits, the Clean Air Act compliance is incorporated into the exploration plan approval process, as required by 

BOEM, except for the Eastern Gulf of Mexico, where the EPA air 

permit protocol is quite different. The EPA permits take 12 to 18 

27 

months to secure and, in our view, relative to the BOEM protocol, 

adds operational complexity and delays with no actual benefit relative to Clean Air Act compliance. LLOG urges you to consider 

BOEM for the Clean Air Act compliance across the Gulf of Mexico. 

Thank you for the opportunity to present the views of LLOG and 

myself on these issues. The safe, efficient production and use of our 

Nation’s resources in the OCS continues to be critical for our 

Nation’s energy, and I am happy to answer any questions the 

committee may have or raise additional issues beyond which I 

could cover in my 5 minutes. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Leimkuhler follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSEPH LEIMKUHLER, VICE PRESIDENT, DRILLING, LLOG 

EXPLORATION COMPANY LLC 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Bishop and members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to 

testify today on behalf LLOG Exploration Company. LLOG welcomes this opportunity to provide what we see as improvements to Federal policies on oil and gas 

activity to further America’s energy, economic and national security by strengthening the development of America’s resources in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). 

My goal is to provide you a snapshot of LLOG’s current operations, how those operations are conducted within the regulatory processes of the Gulf of Mexico, and 

what we see as improvement opportunities. 

A SNAPSHOT OF LLOG

LLOG is one of the largest privately-owned oil and gas firms in the country and 

is the largest private oil producer in the United States. Our focus is the U.S. Gulf 

of Mexico where we apply a targeted approach using floating production systems 

and subsea wells to safely and efficiently develop the Nation’s deepwater oil and gas 

resources. 

Unlike the major, integrated oil and gas companies, our areas of focus are limited; 

however, the level of expertise and capability we bring to those areas is state-ofthe-art. There is additional information about LLOG in the addendum to my 

testimony, but I’d like to highlight two main points: 

• Safety—At LLOG we hold safety as a core value—priorities may change but 

values do not. Recognition of that value is LLOG being awarded the SOAR 

award in 2008, which was the last year this award was given for Safe 

Operations and Accurate Reporting. 

• Scope—We have 16 deepwater developments to date with 8 fields in the OCS 

currently under development. 

OFFSHORE PERMITTING PROCESS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENTS

To portray the various and numerous regulatory processes and permits a company 

must execute and achieve during the offshore exploration and production process, 

I have attached a diagram (Slide 4 in Attachment) called the Simplified Permit 

Process Overview for a Subsea Well Tie-In. This flow chart shows how the process 

of lease acquisition to first production plays out within the regulatory framework 

for a Subsea Well Tie-in. While this particular diagram is specific to the subsea well 

tie-in permit process, it is indicative of the types of approval processes that companies are required to go through before projects can begin or be altered in the Federal 

waters of the Gulf of Mexico (GOM). 

Subsea wells, tied back to a floating production platform, are LLOG’s basic focus 

area for our offshore operations. Depending on where a subsea well is drilled in the 

Gulf of Mexico, anywhere from 9 to 11 permits or plan approvals are needed to move 

a prospect from leasing to production. For most of the Gulf of Mexico, those permits 

and plan approvals are split between the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management 

(BOEM) (red text on Slide 4) and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental 

Enforcement (BSEE) (blue text), both within the Department of the Interior. However, for the eastern portion of the central gulf planning area, the Environmental 

Protection Agency (EPA) (bold black text) has that authority. Among all of these 

28 

approval processes, I wish to highlight three where LLOG feels there are improvement opportunities and address other issues not indicated on this process diagram. 

Application of Regulations—Prescriptive Versus Performance 

The first improvement area is achieving the appropriate balance of prescriptive 

versus performance based regulations and application of the regulations. In the 

past, the professional technical staff within BSEE (and before BSEE’s creation, its 

predecessor agency the Minerals Management Service) had a greater degree of professional judgment that they could apply to approve permitted operations. Permits 

were approved when the operator’s plans met the regulatory requirements, and for 

any gray areas, operators provided a justification for why the submitted plan met 

the intent of the regulations and provided the necessary safeguards to manage and 

mitigate hazards. 

Over time, that mixture of prescriptive and performance based regulatory approval protocol has moved to a more prescriptive based regulatory approach. Of 

particular note, based on our analysis and review, the proposed well control safety 

rule has become so prescriptive the actual application of that proposed rule to well 

design and real time monitoring is likely to be counterproductive to safe operations. 

LLOG strongly encourages BSEE and BOEM to take a balanced approach to regulatory enforcement using a balance of prescriptive as well as performance based regulations, especially in these two areas. I will be more than happy to follow up with 

examples in the follow-up Q&A. 

Drilling Permit Approval Process 

Second is the Application for Permit to Drill (APD), or generally, the drilling permit approval process. I have worked my entire offshore career since 1987 in the 

Deepwater Gulf of Mexico and the technical professionals and Regional Management at the MMS, BOEM, and BSEE that I have worked with over that time were 

and are consistently professional, capable and dedicated . . . in my opinion BSEE 

just needs more of them. 

We are now 1 month away from the 5-year anniversary of the end of the moratorium, yet we continue to receive our well related permits (drilling and well as completion and workover) just in time. This is not due to a lack of effort by the BSEE 

and BOEM staff, but in my opinion an understaffed situation at BOEM and BSEE, 

despite the best efforts of BSEE and BOEM district and regional management to 

retain and recruit talent. The overall approval cycle could be improved with an increase in agency technical capacity. 

We are finding that the more knowledgeable staff are retiring which leaves the 

current staff short-handed, and overworked, not to mention the lack of experience 

among the younger staff. This is part of the larger ‘‘Big Crew Change’’ and is a challenge not only for industry but also for BSEE’s District Managers and BOEM’s 

Regional Supervisors. Because of this situation, permits are being approved with a 

short window prior to commencement of operations, which makes it difficult for operators to conduct operations that require a long lead time for planning and sequential approvals. 

Additional capable agency staff = additional permit approvals, additional production revenue and additional economic development. An innovative compensation/ 

recruitment plan as well as the current industry downturn is likely to provide an 

opportunity for BSEE and BOEM to recruit experienced staff and should be leveraged to increase the permit approval capacity of the bureaus. 

Commingling Approval Process 

Third is the commingling approval process. LLOG strives to make all the wells 

we drill commercial by utilizing smart well technology to open up multiple zones 

in adjacent subsurface reservoirs within the same well. To make such projects economically viable we normally request to commingle downhole the production from 

those zones. Our deepwater rigs often drill development wells in subsea fields where 

the completion and subsequent production from the wells immediately follows the 

drilling and casing of the well in a continuous operation. As long as Mother Nature 

cooperates and we find the reservoirs in the expected location and depth, we can 

file for our commingling permit with plenty of time for approval. However, we often 

find zones that do not come in as expected and we need to either file for an initial 

commingling permit or modify an existing permit. With a rig on location consuming 

over $1 million a day in capital, we need to evaluate the ability and likelihood to 

obtain commingling permit approval versus the impact of costly delays to the project 

profitability. Under such conditions the added regulatory burden adds cost and actually makes some zones uneconomic to produce. This hinders industry’s ability to 

29 

bring American energy to U.S. consumers and provide a robust supply of affordable, 

reliable energy. 

ADDITIONAL REGULATORY IMPROVEMENT OPPORTUNITIES

Additional improvement opportunities related to operations are in the areas of 

Containment Response, the impact of rigid application of the Jones Act to offshore 

facility installation, the impact of revisions to supplemental bonding requirements, 

and the impact of Clean Air Act permits. 

In containment response, those needs are met by two providers: the Marine Well 

Containment Corporation (MWCC) and HWCG. Both are very capable organizations 

that together provide a diversity of suppliers, operator expertise, and response capabilities. This diversity of response should be encouraged and continued. However, 

in LLOG’s view, this response capability is at risk of being compromised if 

Responder Immunity is not improved. We urge the passage of the Senate Coast 

Guard Authorization Bill (S. 1611) covering improved Responder Immunity. 

With respect to heavy lifts associated with offshore facilities installations and the 

Jones Act, LLOG encourages the U.S. Customs and Border Protection to adhere to 

the historical application of the law with respect to transport and heavy lift vessels. 

Current rigid application of the Jones Act to heavy lift vessels for the minimal distances that these vessels move the suspended load (in most cases hundreds of feet 

or less) is resulting in increased lift complexity and scope and adding risk. In 

addition LLOG feels continued application of the Jones Act to heavy lift vessels has 

the potential to transfer work and jobs away from Gulf Coast Fabrication yards. On 

this issue LLOG commends the letter sent by BSEE Director Salerno to the U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection supporting the industry position to return to the 

historical application of the Jones act to heavy lift vessel use in offshore 

construction. 

With regard to the management of Plug and Abandonment liabilities, it is LLOG’s 

understanding that revisions to the supplemental bonding requirements are to be 

released in an upcoming Notice to Lessee (NTL). LLOG requests that serious consideration be given to the scope of the proposed changes. If the changes are more than 

a refinement or clarification of the existing regulations, then the rulemaking process 

should be followed. 

Regarding the issuance of air permits required to be compliant with the Clean Air 

Act (CAA). For wells drilled in the OCS in the Western Planning area, the CAA 

compliance is incorporated into the Exploration Plan approval process required by 

BOEM. This also applies to the majority of wells drilled in the Central Gulf 

Planning Area with the exception of the eastern portion of the Central Planning 

Area where EPA jurisdiction applies. The EPA air permit approval process and protocol is quite different from the BOEM protocol and takes from 12–18 months to 

secure. This EPA permit is actually individual rig specific versus rig type specific 

in the BOEM protocol, and in our view adds operational complexity and delays with 

no actual benefit relative to CAA compliance. LLOG urges you to allow BOEM to 

assume CAA compliance across the GOM and at a minimum allow BOEM to administer CAA compliance for the full western and central Gulf planning areas. 

Finally with regard to the interface between Regulators and Operators LLOG 

would like the Department of the Interior to perform an After Action Review—of 

the allocation of work scope between BOEM and BSEE. LLOG understands and 

supports the split of the revenue function to BOEM and the operational enforcement 

role to BSEE. However, in LLOG’s view the full permitting and plan approval function after the lease sale through the full operational cycle should fall to BSEE. 

Thank you for the opportunity to present the views of LLOG and myself on these 

issues. Safe, efficient production and use of our Nation’s resources from the OCS 

continues to be critical for our Nation’s energy, economic, and national security. I 

am happy to answer any questions the committee may have. 

Attachment: Powerpoint Slides 

30 

ATTACHMENT 

Slide 1 

Slide 2 


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Slide 3 

Slide 4 


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Slide 5 

Slide 6 


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Back-Up Slide 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Henderson. 

STATEMENT OF JONATHAN HENDERSON, JD, MBA, MANAGER 

OF GULF OF MEXICO FIELD OPERATIONS, GULF RESTORATION NETWORK 

Mr. HENDERSON. Thank you. We continue to hear about reducing 

our dependence on foreign oil, but we cannot import clean air, 

water, food, and soil. The BP disaster of 2010 and decades of oil 

extraction has led to severe environmental, social, and political 

impacts. 

To remind this committee of just a few, hundreds of millions of 

gallons of oil have leaked into the Gulf; the destruction of sensitive 

fish habitat like coral reefs; countless dead marine mammals and 

sea turtles; contaminated beaches and wildlife refuges; deployment 

of harmful dispersants; discharging of fracking chemicals; 27,000 

abandoned, unmonitored, and possibly leaking wells; the devastation of communities and loss of cultures; shrimp with no eyes, fish 

with lesions and tumors; destroyed family businesses and devastated families; suicides; sick, dead, and dying cleanup workers; 

and a distrust of our government. In addition, regulatory capture 

and the hijacking of our democracy, not to mention that roughly 

600 square miles of Louisiana’s wetlands have been destroyed by 

the oil and gas industry, which is very much a threat to the existence of my hometown of New Orleans, and the very building that 

we sit in today. 


96241.011.eps
34 

In the fall of 2010, I filed my first official pollution incident 

report with the National Response Center (NRC) for an oil slick 

leaking out of a wellhead in a bay known for very productive and 

economically important oyster beds. To date, I have filed approximately 100 NRC reports for leaks, including offshore and onshore 

platforms, pipelines, wellheads, and tank batteries—most recently, 

on August 17, 2015, for a suspected ruptured gas pipeline in 

Lafourche Parish, and that same day a roughly 15-mile-long 

rainbow sheen well offshore. 

There are very few people who do this kind of proactive monitoring work in this region, but the need is great. My reports to the 

NRC have led to numerous successful investigations by the U.S. 

Coast Guard, which in turn has led to mutual respect and trust between myself and the leaders of various sectors and their incident 

management personnel. 

Since July of 2010, the NRC has recorded approximately 10,000 

spills of crude oil, petrochemicals, and other contaminants into 

Gulf of Mexico waters. 

The BP disaster highlighted the flawed process by which oil discharges are reported and cleaned up, and for which companies are 

held accountable. It revealed how the official channels of reporting 

and cleaning up oil pollution rely on the polluters themselves. 

Little information is made available to the public, and the information that is presented could be considered untrustworthy. These 

massive reporting gaps make it impossible to determine how much 

oil pollution is actually being released into the Gulf. 

One particularly egregious example of underreporting involves 

the Taylor Energy leak. For over 10 years this chronic oil leak has 

been spewing oil into the Gulf waters every day, with no end in 

sight. The discharge began in 2004 when an undersea landslide 

caused by Hurricane Ivan damaged a Taylor platform and 28 wells. 

Our work monitoring the Taylor leak and a recent AP investigation 

published in April shed light on the underreported flow amount 

and led to revision of the estimates. 

In the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Isaac in 2012, I, along 

with my partners at the Gulf Monitoring Consortium, took several 

monitoring trips and documented leaks. Our findings, from a review of NRC reports, indicated that there were 130 accidents resulting from the storm that were reported to the NRC. 

Based on my experience in the Gulf region and my participation 

in the New Orleans area contingency plan meetings and exercises, 

I am greatly concerned that government and industry are not adequately prepared for a worst-case scenario. An ongoing blowout in 

the Gulf of Mexico hit by a Category 5 hurricane would cause the 

response to be put on hold, and we could very likely be hit by another hurricane shortly thereafter. This would be an environmentally chaotic situation that is not being planned for and that 

threatens our homeland security. 

This committee should introduce and pass a Gulf of Mexico 

Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council. Attached to my testimony is a 

draft bill that was attempted to be introduced in 2014. A Gulf of 

Mexico Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council will enhance engagement, communication, collaboration, and trust among the Gulf oil 

35 

industry, Federal and state governments, and citizen stakeholders 

potentially impacted by Gulf oil operations. 

Five years after the BP disaster, attempts are being made to 

open up the Eastern Gulf of Mexico and the Mid-Atlantic. This 

should not happen. At the same time these attempts are being 

made, investigations by New Orleans-based WLTV have raised serious concerns that the new post-BP safety standards may not be 

taken seriously enough at existing Gulf operations. 

The bottom line is that Congress needs to act. Congress needs to 

pass a Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council. It can raise the liability 

limit for offshore drilling, and it needs to make the Federal Oil 

Spill Liability Trust Fund available for Federal agencies when incidents occur. 

Congress must start taking our oil, air, and water seriously. It 

is our homeland security. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Henderson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JONATHAN HENDERSON, MANAGER, GULF OF MEXICO FIELD

OPERATIONS, GULF RESTORATION NETWORK

BRIEF BIO

Jonathan Henderson manages the Gulf Restoration Network’s field operations in 

the Gulf region. By air, sea and land, he searches for, documents and reports pollution incidents such as leaking pipelines, well heads, platforms, and ongoing BP 

disaster impacts. He also documents the extensive O&G industry destruction of 

Louisiana wetlands. Jonathan is a founding member of the Greater New Orleans 

Water Collaborative of which he serves on the interim steering committee and as 

co-chair of the Advocacy working group. Jonathan is the Founding President of 

Vanishing Earth, Advocacy + Consulting + Photography. Born and raised in New 

Orleans, Jonathan grew up fishing and canoeing in Louisiana’s bayous and creeks, 

visiting family along coastal Mississippi, and vacationing on beaches in Alabama 

and Florida. Jonathan has a Bachelor’s degree in Theater from LSU, a Master’s of 

Business Administration from the University of Louisiana at Lafayette, and a JD 

from Southern University Law Center. 

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF GULF RESTORATION NETWORK

Founded in 1994 and headquartered in New Orleans the Gulf Restoration 

Network is non-profit environmental conservation and advocacy organization committed to uniting and empowering people to protect and restore the natural resources of the Gulf of Mexico region for future generations. For more information 

about GRN, visit www.healthygulf.org. 

REPORTING POLLUTION INCIDENTS IN THE GULF

My work documenting pollution incidents began in late April, 2010 just a few 

days after the Deepwater Horizon exploded and sank. Throughout 2010, I took approximately 50 trips by air and sea to document the environmental impacts as they 

were unfolding offshore in the Mississippi Canyon and on barrier islands, beaches, 

bays and wetlands throughout the Gulf Coast. Given its exclusive focus on the Gulf 

region, GRN quickly became a go to source for information for the public, media, 

scientists and researchers. With my local knowledge and connection to the Gulf region, access to planes and boats to carry me into the field, many of the trips I took 

involved guiding and educating media about the situation. Today, much of my work 

involves doing the same thing though I have added to my focus areas many of the 

Gulf’s other environmental problems including but not limited to the extractive industry’s severe impact on Louisiana’s wetlands. 

In the Fall of 2010, I filed my first official pollution incident report with the 

National Response Center (NRC) for an oil slick leaking out of well-head in a Bay 

known for very productive and economically important oyster beds. To date, I have 

filed approximately 100 NRC reports for pollution incidents including leaks from 

offshore and onshore platforms, pipelines, well-heads, tank batteries, etc. Most recently, on August 17, 2015, I filed Incident Report #1125932 for a suspected ruptured gas pipeline in Lafourche Parish, and Incident Report #1125933 for a roughly 

15-mile-long rainbow oil sheen. There is rarely a trip that I take where I don’t find 

36 

1http://blog.skytruth.org/2015/04/the-other-gulf-oil-disaster.html. 

2http://www.cbsnews.com/news/27000-abandoned-gulf-oil-wells-may-be-leaking/. 

3http://skytruth.org/gmc/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Gulf-Monitoring-Consortium-Report.pdf. 

4https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3WHe0C9lj30. 

and report some sort of pollution incident. Knowing what to look for and how to document and report an Incident is a skill that I learned from having spent thousands 

of hours in the field; reading various oil spill response manuals; talking with leading 

government and industry experts; spending time in the field with some of the 

world’s top experts from the scientific, academic, and environmental NGO communities; flying with the most experienced pilots in the Gulf region; and, dozens of 

trips with captains of charter, shrimp, and oyster boat captains. Still, there are a 

lot of trainings that would assist this work and that I would pursue if they were 

not so cost-prohibitive. Moreover, financial constraints also limit the number of 

monitoring trips that I can take and thereby the number of NRC reports I am able 

to file. There are very few people that do this kind of proactive monitoring work 

in the Gulf region, but the need is great. My reports to the NRC have led to numerous successful investigations by the USCG which, in turn, has led to mutual respect 

and trust between myself and the leaders of various USCG sectors and their 

Incident Management personnel, and other response agencies. Especially in the immediate aftermath of hurricanes, as I was told by USCG Sector New Orleans, having extra eyes in the sky is a very valuable source for the Unified Command as I 

am able to provide direct intel to the Unified Command for any problems I discover, 

and what geographic areas I searched. 

CHRONIC OFFSHORE POLLUTION IN GULF

Since July of 2010, the National Response Center has recorded approximately 

10,000 spills of crude oil, petrochemicals, and other contaminants into Gulf of 

Mexico waters. This shocking animated map 1 created by Skytruth.org illustrates 

where each of these incidents occurred between July 2010 and April 2015. 

To make matters worse, a 2010 Associated Press investigation reported 27,000 

abandoned oil wells in the Gulf of Mexico—each a potential source of leaking oil.2

Very few of these abandoned wells are being monitored by Federal officials or industry for well-integrity and it is unknown how many are slowly leaking oil and/or gas 

into the marine environment on a daily basis. While natural seeps on the Gulf floor 

are known to exist and have been mapped out, an investigation into the cause of 

a leak should not be written off as naturally occurring given the high number of 

abandoned wells. 

LACK OF TRANSPARENCY

The BP disaster in 2010 highlighted the flawed process by which oil discharges 

are reported and cleaned up, and through which companies are held accountable. 

It revealed how the official channels of reporting and cleaning up oil pollution rely, 

to an inordinate degree, on the polluters themselves. Little information is made 

available to the public, and the information that is presented could be considered 

untrustworthy. Whenever oil, hazardous materials and other pollutants are released 

into a body of water, the Clean Water Act requires the responsible party to file a 

report with The National Response Center, a Federal communications center staffed 

by the Coast Guard. From October 2010 to September 2011, a total of 2,903 oil 

release reports were filed with the NRC from the Gulf region, but 77 percent of 

those reports did not include an estimate of the amount of oil spilled, according to 

a 2012 report 3 by the Gulf Monitoring Consortium (GMC), of which GRN is a member. The NRC reports that did include a spill estimate account for a combined 

250,000 gallons of crude released into the Gulf during the 1-year period. Consortium 

estimates the actual total amount spilled during the period to be between 

1.5 million and 2.2 million gallons. These massive reporting gaps make it impossible to determine how much oil pollution is actually released in the Gulf of Mexico. 

One particularly egregious example of underreporting involves the Taylor Energy 

leak, which I have documented and filed numerous NRC reports over the last few 

years. For over 10 years, this chronic oil leak has been spewing oil into the Gulf 

waters every day, with no end in sight. The discharge began in 2004 when an undersea landslide caused by Hurricane Ivan damaged an offshore platform and 28 

associated wells. Taylor has yet to stop the daily flow of oil from the site and oil 

is still leaking to this day. A recent AP investigation 4 published in April 2015 shed 

light on the underreported flow amount and led to the USCG revising its estimates 

significantly. The Taylor leak gives the impression of a broken system, where oil 

production is prioritized over concerns for the environment. Recently, a settlement 

37 

5http://www.gulfmonitor.org/taylor-settlement/. 

6http://www.gulfmonitor.org/gmc-isaac-report/. 

7http://www.gulfmonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Isaac.GMC_Pollution.Report.Final_ 

1.2.pdf. 8http://www.onwingsofcare.org/gomrcac/GoMRCAC-ProposedLegislation2013-07-29.pdf. 

agreement between Taylor and a group of GMC member organizations was 

announced. The lawsuit sought information about Taylor’s response efforts which 

have been hidden under a ‘veil of secrecy’ by Taylor.5

HURRICANES AND OIL DON’T MIX

In the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Isaac in 2012, I along with other GMC 

members took several monitoring trips by boat and plane to search for, document 

and report any possible resulting leaks. GMC announced our findings from a review 

of NRC reports that occurred during and immediately after Hurricane Isaac. A total 

of 130 accidents resulting from the storm were reported to the National Response 

Center. Those accidents dumped at least 12.9 million gallons of pollutants and contaminated water into the environment. You can read more about our Key Findings 6

or jump right in and read the full report.7

Based on my experience in the Gulf region and my participation in the 

New Orleans Area Contingency Plan meetings and exercises, I am gravely concerned that government and industry is not adequately prepared for a worst case 

scenario. Imagine for a moment a BP type blowout that has been gushing for 

months. Then, a Category 5 hurricane comes through disrupting the containment 

and response effort. If the hurricane hits port facilities where the response equipment was evacuated to, it could be weeks or months before the assets are fully 

resourced and redeployed. Then the process of trying to contain the leak would start 

again. Like Hurricane Rita followed Katrina in 2005, what if then we get hit by another major storm again? In this scenario, for months on end oil would be spewing 

unimpeded into the Gulf only to have that oil mercilessly pushed onshore with what 

would be a massive storm surge. The possibility of having oil completely washing 

over coastal communities is very real, especially given the loss of wetlands that act 

as a buffer. 

HNRC SHOULD INTRODUCE AND PASS A GULF OF MEXICO REGIONAL CITIZENS’ 

ADVISORY COUNCIL

Congress identified complacency on the part of the oil industry and government 

regulators as a root cause of the Exxon Valdez spill. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 

was passed by Congress in response to the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill. In it, 

Congress mandated citizens’ councils for Prince William Sound and Cook Inlet. The 

purpose of these councils is to promote partnership and cooperation among local citizens, industry and government, and to build trust and provide citizen oversight of 

environmental compliance by oil terminals and tankers 

A GoM RCAC will enhance engagement, communication, collaboration, and trust 

among the Gulf oil industry, Federal and state governments, and citizen stakeholders potentially impacted by Gulf oil operations. These citizen stakeholders include fishermen, tourism businesses, indigenous peoples, conservation groups, 

scientists, and local governments and communities. The GoM RCAC will fund its 

own research on issues of importance to citizens—spill prevention and response, 

dispersants and their alternatives, human health, ecosystem impacts, tanker safety 

and vessel traffic risks, fisheries protection, and more. Through its research, consultative, and deliberative process, the Council will provide informed advice to industry and government, and citizens will gain a better understanding of the complex 

realities of offshore oil. Importantly, the Council will operate autonomously, rather 

than under the direction of government or industry. 

In 2011, the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and 

Offshore Drilling endorsed the citizen call for a GoM RCAC. 

In 2013, citizens requested the introduction and passage by Congress of the Gulf 

of Mexico Regional Citizens’ Advisory Act of 2013.8

In September 2014, a letter was sent by citizens asking Secretary Jewel to use 

her administrative powers to establish a GoM RCAC. A copy of this letter is included. Also included with my testimony is a copy of our proposed legislation titled: 

Gulf of Mexico Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council Act of 2014. On behalf of Gulf 

citizens, I urge the members of this committee to introduce this bill and get it 

passed. 

38 

9http://www.wwltv.com/story/news/local/investigations/david-hammer/2015/04/20/5-years-laterindustry-responds-regulators-lag-behind/26108425/. 10http://www.peer.org/news/news-releases/shell-arctic-offshore-safety-data-still-under-wraps. 

html. 

FIVE YEARS LATER, SERIOUS CONCERNS REMAIN, SAFETY AUDITS, STAFFING

Although there have been improvements in offshore drilling safety and 

government oversight since 2010, we still have a long way to go to make it as safe 

as possible. At the same time attempts are being made by the oil industry to open 

up the Eastern Gulf, the Mid-Atlantic, and now the Arctic to drilling, investigations 

by New Orleans based WWLTV 9 raise serious concerns that the new post-BP safety 

standards may not be taken seriously enough at existing gulf operations, and a lack 

of transparency is impeding Gulf citizens’ ability to be informed. A similar problem 

is occurring in Alaska where a FOIA suit was brought against BSEE for failing to 

release safety documents for the Shell offshore drilling project currently underway 

in the Arctic Ocean.10 Also, a recent DOI Inspector General report determined that 

BSEE still does not have enough trained staff to conduct timely investigations into 

safety incidents and leaks. These issues need to be fixed immediately and further 

support the need for a GoM RCAC. 

CONGRESS NEEDS TO ACT

Although there have been improvements in offshore drilling safety and 

government oversight since 2010, we still have a long way to go to make it as safe 

as possible. Congress needs to get far more serious about this issue. While the 

Administration has taken positive steps in offshore safety post-Deepwater Horizon, 

Congress has done almost nothing (other than RESTORE Act). The Oil Spill 

Commission Review in 2013 gave the Administration actions a grade of ‘‘B’’, 

industry a ‘‘B–’’, and Congress a ‘‘D+’’. 

Congress needs to pass a GoM RCAC bill; it needs to raise the liability limit for 

offshore drilling (which a is still at only $75 million as per OPA90); and it needs 

to make the Federal oil spill fund—the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund—available to 

Federal agencies for spill prevention efforts, without having to go through the cumbersome appropriations process. The OSLTF is now at about $4 billion, gains about 

$500 million/year (from an 8 cent/barrel oil tax nationwide) and this money can and 

should be available to agency spill prevention needs. 

***** 

The following documents were submitted as supplements to Mr. Henderson’s 

testimony. These documents are part of the hearing record and are being retained 

in the Committee’s official files: 

—September 2014 letter sent by citizens to Secretary Jewel asking her to use 

her administrative powers to establish a GoM RCAC 

—Proposed legislation titled: Gulf of Mexico Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council 

Act of 2014 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Davis, can you pull that right up to your mouth so we can 

hear you? 

STATEMENT OF LORI DAVIS, PRESIDENT, RIG-CHEM 

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Chairman Bishop and committee 

members, for giving me the opportunity to share my comments. 

RIG-CHEM was formed in 1980 as a small oilfield service company that supported the energy industry. In 1984, my father, at 

the age of 50, was forced into early retirement by the downturn in 

the industry, much like what we are facing today. With his $25,000 

severance after 21 years of service with Schlumberger, he invested 

his and his family’s future in RIG-CHEM. By doing so, my parents 

created an opportunity for their children with the hope that the 

39 

company would grow and support our family for many years to 

come, which it has. The days of modest investment and hard work 

are not as easily come by. Times are different, and $25,000 will not 

afford the same opportunities that were possible in 1984. 

Our company employees 16 people across Louisiana and Texas, 

with an average tenure of 16 years of company service. We are 

proud to say that the average annual income of our dedicated employees is $66,000 per year. We also provide company-paid health 

insurance, 401(k) and profit sharing, and have never laid anyone 

off despite the cyclical highs and lows of the energy industry. 

Over the last 30 years, our company has weathered through 

tough times, business challenges, increased competition, industry 

fluctuation, hurricanes, a moratorium, the Great Crew Change, 

and now a terrifying revisit of the early 1980s with the decline in 

the price of oil. Many other small, family-owned companies face 

these same challenges, but today our battle is not just managing 

economic market fluctuations; we now also have the impending obstacles of continued tightening of government regulation. These 

regulations will limit opportunities and squeeze small businesses 

out of the market, out of business today. 

Our daily focus is to remain competitive, safe, and efficient in a 

shrinking industry, where the ability as a small, diverse company 

that has to compete against the majors is becoming increasingly 

difficult. There was a time that oil and gas operators welcomed 

small business to help develop new technology and keep competition healthy. Since Macondo, the moratorium, slow recovery, government interference, and record low oil prices, the value of diverse 

business is becoming extinct as companies do what is necessary to 

survive the times. 

Speaking on a local level, the community where RIG-CHEM is 

located, Terrebonne Parish in Louisiana, last February had the 

lowest unemployment rate, at 2.8 percent, in the country. This 

week we were advised that our parish has been added to a credit 

rating watch list due to the rising unemployment and reduced sales 

tax collections, which are down by 15 percent. These uncertain 

times are more reason to work closely on regulation to prevent this 

from becoming a grave reality for many energy municipalities. 

My plea to you is to allow industry to work collaboratively with 

government to address the needs of safety and responsibility together. Let the experts in their respective fields guide the decisions 

that impact our energy future and ultimately energy independence. 

When regulations are mandated, require that these burdens that 

are being leveraged upon our Gulf of Mexico operators be the same 

for those we import from into the United States, to level the global 

playing field. 

I am not a technical expert, but a business owner who is concerned about the impact that the proposed Well Control Rule will 

indirectly have on RIG-CHEM, our employees, and the many small 

companies like ours. Let us together protect our future. I stand behind the oil and gas operators and state that the proposed Well 

Containment Rule does not provide substantial improvements to 

safety or build on post-Macondo progress, will hinder offshore oil 

and gas development, will eliminate jobs and hurt our energy 

security in the future, and I advise that the rule be rewritten. 

40 

We cannot control OPEC or the forces of nature, but we can stop 

imposing more regulations that will drive us out of business. There 

was a saying back in the 1980s—‘‘the last person to leave should 

turn off the lights.’’ Folks, the lights are dimming, and we will have 

no one else to blame but government for refusing to work toward 

a reasonable solution. 

Let’s work together. Let’s work to keep the lights on. 

Thank you very much for your time. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Davis follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LORI DAVIS, PRESIDENT/CEO, RIG-CHEM, LLC 

Thank you Chairman Bishop and committee members for giving me the opportunity to share my comments with you today regarding ‘‘Economic Impact of Federal 

Policies on Energy Production and Economic Growth in the Gulf.’’ 

My company, RIG-CHEM has been impacted and will face more challenges should 

government continue to impose more regulations on an industry already burdened 

by challenging economic times. 

RIG-CHEM was formed in 1980 as a small oilfield service company that supported the energy industry. In 1984, my father at the age of 50 was forced into early 

retirement by the downturn in the industry much like what we’re facing today. With 

his $25,000 severance after 21 years of service with Schlumberger, he invested his 

and his family’s future in RIG-CHEM. By doing so, my parents created an opportunity for their children with the hope that the company would grow and support 

our family for many years to come, which it has. The days of modest investment 

and hard work are not as easily come by, times are different, and $25,000 will not 

afford the same opportunities that were possible in 1984. 

Our company employees 16 people across Louisiana and Texas with an average 

tenure of 16 years of company service. We are proud to say that the average annual 

income of our dedicated employees is $66,000. We also provide Company Paid 

Health Insurance, 401K and Profit Sharing and have never laid anyone off despite 

the cyclical highs and lows of the energy industry. 

RIG-CHEM is a longstanding member company supporting industry organizations 

that help educate, improve technology, and develop best practices. These organizations are: the Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE), American Association of 

Drilling Engineers (AADE), American Petroleum Institute (API), South Central 

Industrial Association (SCIA), Louisiana Oil and Gas Association (LOGA), Women’s 

Business Enterprise National Council (WBENC) and the Women’s Energy Network 

(WEN). 

Over the last 30 years our company has weathered through tough times, business 

challenges, increased competition, industry fluctuation, hurricanes, a Moratorium, 

The Great Crew Change, and now a terrifying revisit of the early 1980s with the 

decline in the price of oil. Many other small family owned companies face these 

same challenges but today our battle is not just managing economic market fluctuations, we now also have the impending obstacles of continued tightening of government regulation. These regulations will limit opportunities and squeeze small 

businesses, (the backbone and largest tax contributors of the United States) out of 

the market. Our daily focus is to remain competitive, safe and efficient in a shrinking industry, where the ability as a small-diverse company that has to compete 

against the majors is becoming increasingly difficult. There was a time that oil and 

gas operators welcomed small business to help develop new technology and keep 

competition healthy. Since Macondo, the Moratorium, slow recovery, government interference, and record low oil prices the once value of diverse business is becoming 

extinct as companies do what is necessary to survive the times. 

Speaking on a local level, the community where RIG-CHEM is located, 

Terrebonne Parish in Louisiana, last February had the lowest unemployment rate, 

at 2.8 percent, in the country. This week we were advised that our parish has been 

added to a credit rating ‘‘watch list’’ due to the rising unemployment and reduced 

sales tax collections which are down by 15 percent. These uncertain times are more 

reason to work closely on regulation to prevent this from becoming a grave reality 

for many energy municipalities. 

I support and defend the industry that is committed to a safe working environment where families and friends leave for their jobs that provide national energy 

and return home safely. This industry has been commanded to work safer, while 

working smarter and now more efficient. 

41 

My plea to you is to allow industry to work collaboratively with government to 

address the needs of safety and responsibility together. Let the experts in their respective fields guide the decisions that impact our energy future and ultimately 

energy independence. When regulations are mandated require that these burdens 

that are being leveraged upon our Gulf of Mexico operators be the same for those 

who export into the United States to level the global playing field. 

I am not a technical expert, but a business owner who is concerned about the impact that the proposed Well Control Rule will indirectly have on RIG-CHEM, our 

employees as well as many small companies like ours. Let us together protect our 

future. I stand behind the Oil and Gas Operators and state that the proposed Well 

Control Rule: 

1. Does not provide substantial improvements to safety or build on post-Macondo 

progress; 

2. Will hinder offshore oil and gas development; 

3. Will eliminate jobs and hurt our energy security and future; and 

4. Advise that the rule be rewritten. 

We can’t control OPEC or the forces of nature but we can stop imposing more regulations that will drive us out of business. There was a saying back in the 1980s, 

‘‘the last person to leave should turn off the lights’’—folks, the lights are dimming 

and we’ll have no one else to blame but government for refusing to work toward 

a reasonable solution. 

Let’s work together; let’s work to keep the lights on. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Our last witness, but certainly not the least, is Dr. Mason. 

You are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH R. MASON, HERMANN MOYSE, JR./ 

LOUISIANA BANKERS ASSOCIATION, ENDOWED PROFESSOR 

OF BANKING, LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY; AND SENIOR 

FELLOW, THE WHARTON SCHOOL 

Dr. MASON. Good morning, Chairman Bishop and members of the 

committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on this very 

important topic. 

Unfortunately, little has changed in the Gulf region since my 

July 2010 study on the economic costs of a moratorium to the Gulf 

region. That study predicted a roughly $2 billion slowdown in economic activity in the Gulf states following the 6-month drilling 

moratorium in May 2010. 

While it is difficult to disentangle the effect of just the moratorium after the fact, real GDP from oil and gas extraction in the 

four Gulf states measured in that study fell by $16 billion in 2009– 

2010, and remains $11 billion below 2009 real GDP in 2011. 

Not much has changed for Louisiana in recent years. In 2012– 

2013, Louisiana real GDP from oil and gas extraction fell 16 percent, and in 2013–2014, it fell another 6 percent. States with more 

onshore focus grew considerably in 2014, but even the states that 

did well in recent years can be expected to slow in 2015 due to persistent low oil prices. 

Amidst this industry difficulty, the Department of the Interior’s 

BSEE recently published new requirements and procedures related 

to blowout prevention systems and well control. In strict economic 

terms, those requirements pose new costs for the offshore oil and 

gas industry at a time when high-cost production is being pushed 

out of the industry. 

42 

It should come as no surprise, therefore, that a recent American 

Petroleum Institute study of the potential impact of the proposed 

rule concluded that, ‘‘Under the new regulations, approximately 

690 fewer wells are projected in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico between 

2017 and 2030, a 26 percent decline in drilling activity.’’ 

From a pure economic perspective, increased costs should result 

in lower supply. Regression results in my written testimony suggest, however, that production declines associated with additional 

regulation may be costlier if there already exists a significant regulatory burden. 

The direct results of production declines are, inevitably, fewer 

jobs, decreased wages, and lower economic growth. These effects 

will exacerbate competitive pressures in higher education as 

students, whether studying oil and gas, alternative energy, or compliance, are left without job prospects, and university programs 

without funding. Those funding shortfalls hurt research into new 

energy sources. The majority of Louisiana State University’s externally-funded energy research is not associated with fossil fuels, but 

renewables. Moreover, that energy research funding is nearly equal 

to the total budget provided to the relevant colleges by the state 

of Louisiana. That research money is plugged back into course 

development and student support for education and workforce 

training and related fields. 

LSU offers a number of degree majors and minors that are relevant to energy issues. Estimates suggest that almost 3,000 LSU 

undergraduate and graduate students study in energy-related 

fields. But program enrollment alone may severely understate the 

importance of workforce development to students in our region. 

For instance, even without a dedicated program, some 18 percent 

of LSU business school grads go on to work in the oil and gas and 

energy sectors. Moreover, the college reports that LSU business 

graduates boast the highest mid-career earnings among peer institutions largely due to that energy industry employment. As a result, the College of Business, like many other academic units at 

LSU, is launching a variety of programs to prepare students for the 

opportunities and challenges presented in today’s energy sector. 

LSU also provides energy-related workforce development in the 

form of worker safety, continuing education, and various energy 

specialization programs focused on fossil fuels, as well as renewables. As noted by Mr. Herbst initially, LSU’s workforce development programs are a vital component of safety and efficiency in 

today’s energy industry. 

In summary, LSU is inextricably intertwined with the energy industry and the Gulf of Mexico. Higher production costs will reduce 

grant funding, class offerings, and student placements. Further declines in higher education in Louisiana and similar states will be 

unavoidable. And ironically, a chief casualty of the slowdown will 

be research into clean and efficient energy sources to replace fossil 

fuels. I respectfully ask the Members present to please think hard 

about these dynamics before layering new offshore regulations on 

Gulf energy production. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Mason follows:] 

43 

1 Views expressed in this testimony are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect 

official positions of Louisiana State University. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSEPH R. MASON, LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY 1

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on this very important topic. 

Unfortunately, little has changed in the Gulf region since my initial study on the 

‘‘The Economic Cost of a Moratorium on Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration to the 

Gulf Region,’’ in July 2010. Economic activity in the region is still moribund and 

the outlook for exploration and development remains subdued. 

Now, more than 5 years after Deepwater Horizon, further restrictions are being 

considered for Gulf drilling operations. Those regulations, like the ones before them, 

will decrease production activity and the economic growth of the region. 

Families will be impacted by lost jobs and wages and students—whether studying 

oil and gas, alternative energy, or compliance—will be left without job prospects. 

Such effects will continue to drag down growth in the Gulf Coast region relative to 

the rest of the country during this crucial period or economic uncertainty when the 

Federal Reserve is trying to get the economy back on track. Thus, imposing any new 

regulations at this time will have to be undertaken in a careful and thoughtful fashion in order to preserve jobs and livelihoods during a period of tenuous economic 

uncertainty. 

THE STATE OF THE GULF OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY

My July 2010 study predicted a roughly $2 billion slowdown in economic activity 

in the Gulf states following the drilling moratorium in May 2010. While it is difficult to disentangle the effect of just the moratorium after the fact, real Louisiana 

GDP from Oil and Gas Extraction fell by $1.6 billion in 2010 remained another $1.3 

billion below 2009 real GDP in 2011. 

The reason for the slowdown is straightforward. The effects of regulatory actions 

taken after April 2010 were dramatic and long-lived. Pre-April 2010 rig counts in 

the Gulf of Mexico did not exceed April 2010 levels until July 2013, more than 3 

years later. 

Even after July 2013, however, rig counts in the Gulf of Mexico were not sustained and production has remained relatively flat. As a result, the Gulf of Mexico 

is still not back to pre-April 2010 production trend levels, measured relative to April 

2010 as the midpoint to today. 


96241.012.eps
44 

We continue to see the impact of the post-April 2010 slowdown and more recent 

trends in local economic activity. Louisiana real GDP from Oil and Gas Extraction 

fell 15.9 percent in 2012–13 and another 6.3 percent in 2013–14. 

Overall, states with offshore exposures are growing at a slower pace than those 

with more onshore focus. Preliminary 2014 GDP data from the Bureau of Economic 

Analysis shows that GDP from Oil and Gas Extraction slowed by 6.64 percent in 

Alaska and 6.30 percent in Louisiana, while activity grew by almost 10 percent or 

more in the other major oil-producing states with more onshore reserves. 

Even the states that did well in 2014, however, can be expected to slow 

considerably in 2015 due to persistent low oil prices. 

The Federal Reserve’s September Beige Book, released September 2, 2015, noted 

that the energy industry has been flat in all of the regions its surveyed. 

Since January 2015 to today, the Gulf of Mexico rig count has almost halved. 

In its most recent report, the International Energy Agency now forecasts that oil 

production outside OPEC can be expected to decline by nearly 500,000 barrels a day 

next year, with the United States bearing some 80 percent of that decline. According 

to the IEA, ‘‘Oil’s price collapse is closing down high-cost production from Eagle 

Ford in Texas to Russia and the North Sea . . . [The OPEC effort] to defend market 

share regardless of price appears to be having the intended effect.’’ 

Clearly, this is a difficult period for Louisiana and the U.S. Oil and Gas sector. 

ANTICIPATED EFFECTS OF NEW REGULATIONS

Amidst this difficulty, the U.S. DOI Bureau of Safety and Environmental 

Enforcement (BSEE) recently published new requirements and procedures related 


96241.013.eps 96241.014.eps
45 

2The states used in the model are Alaska, Colorado, Louisiana, New Mexico, North Dakota, 

Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Data from 2000–2014 yields 140 

observations. Data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 3 ‘‘Businesses engaged in the collection, treatment, and disposal of waste materials. Includes 

businesses engaged in collecting and/or local hauling of waste and/or recyclable materials; operating waste treatment or disposal facilities (except sewer systems or sewage treatment facilities); operating materials recovery facilities (those that sort recyclable materials from the trash 

stream); providing remediation services (those that provide for the cleanup of contaminated 

buildings, mine sites, and soil or ground water); and providing septic pumping and other miscellaneous waste management services, such as portable toilet rental services.’’ (See http:// 

www.bea.gov/industry/pdf/2012_industry_code_guide.pdf) 

to the proposed rule ‘‘Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental 

Shelf—Blowout Preventer Systems and Well Control.’’ In economic terms, those requirements pose new costs for the offshore oil and gas industry at time when highcost production is being pushed out of the industry. 

A recent American Petroleum Institute (API) study to evaluate the potential cost 

and economic impact effects of the proposed rule on oil and gas drilling operations 

in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico concluded that, ‘‘[u]nder the new regulations, approximately around 690 fewer wells are projected to be drilled from 2017 to 2030, a 26 

percent decline, with similar water depth distributions. Over the 10-year 2017 to 

2026 period the projected number of wells projected not to be drilled equals around 

470, with an average of 20 fewer exploration wells per year and 29 fewer development wells.’’ (‘‘BSEE Proposed Well Control Rule Cost and Economic Analysis,’’ API, 

July 2015, at p. 26) 

Such conclusions should come as no surprise. Quite simply, increased costs should 

result in lower supply. In order to demonstrate the universality of such a relationship, I regressed the percent growth in (real) state GDP from oil and gas extraction 

on the percent growth in (real) state GDP from waste management and remediation 

as a proportion of that from oil and gas extraction in the top 10 oil and gasproducing states annually, from 2000–2013.2

It is important to keep in mind that waste management and remediation comprises a wide range of activities, not just those related to oil and gas extraction.4

Such breadth, however, should make it more difficult to find a significant relationship with oil and gas extraction. 

The results, displayed below, are striking. On an annual basis, the growth in economic activity devoted to waste management and remediation has a strong and statistically significant negative effect on oil and gas production. The coefficient on 

waste management and remediation’s effect on oil and gas production is just over 

0.8, suggesting that an additional percent of economic activity related to waste management and remediation (as a percent of oil and gas extraction) reduces activity 

in oil and gas extraction by 0.8 percent. 


96241.015.eps
46 

One might expect, however, that if the source of growth in waste management 

and remediation is new regulation, then the effect on oil and gas extraction would 

strengthen with a longer time lag. That is exactly the result we see below, where 

instead of measuring the effect with annual changes to both variables I use changes 

over a 5-year period (resulting in 100 observations rather than 140). 

The results below show that the coefficient magnitude in the relationship from 0.8 

to just under 1.3, suggesting that a 5-year period captures more of the hypothesized 

effect. 

Last, I examine how the relationship between economic activity in waste management and remediation and oil and gas extraction may have changed over time. The 

last panel suggests that in recent years, the relationship may have strengthened 

considerably, with the coefficient rising from just under 1.3 to 3.1, so that an additional percent of economic activity related to waste management and remediation 

(as a percent of oil and gas extraction) reduces activity in oil and gas extraction by 

3.1 percent. 

The results above cannot be considered a complete analysis of regulatory dynamics, but may constitute a set of results suggesting that each dollar of regulatory cost 

imposed upon the oil and gas industry may result in a larger cost than the last. 


96241.016.eps 96241.017.eps
47 

In economic parlance, the marginal cost of additional regulation may rise with existing regulation, rather than remaining constant. If that is the case, policymakers 

would want to be cognizant of existing costs before adding new ones. 

HIGHER EDUCATION AND WORKFORCE IMPACTS

Like economic growth, employment growth in oil and gas extraction has lagged 

in Alaska and Louisiana relative to other oil-producing states. From 2009–2013, employment in oil and gas extraction has grown 27.84 percent in Louisiana and 30.76 

percent in Alaska, relative to 43.03 percent in the other major oil producing states 

(Colorado, North Dakota, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, Wyoming, 

and West Virginia). 

Still, the oil and gas extraction sector is an important employment base in all of 

these states. Such importance is heightened by educational programs devoted to 

energy and the environment in all such states, as well as elsewhere in the United 

States. 

Recently, Louisiana State University (LSU) reviewed the scope and extent of energy-related education and research at LSU. Like many universities, LSU’s energyrelated research spans a wide range of topics including upstream oil and natural 

gas drilling and production topics (including hydraulic fracturing), geology, solar, 

wind, biomass, geothermal, materials, efficiency, electrical conductivity, nuclear, environmental impacts, and socioeconomic impacts. 

Research 

While LSU is typically associated with oil and gas, the majority of LSU’s 

externally funded energy research is not associated with fossil fuels but renewables. 

LSU’s renewable energy research, estimated at close to $43 million over the past 

7 years, accounted for almost half (44 percent) of all energy-related research. 

Materials science-based energy research accounted for close to $19 million, or 19 

percent, of LSU’s total energy research funding over the past 7 years. Research 

associated with energy and the environment is estimated to be the third-largest 

research topic, accounting for close to $17 million in externally funded energy 

projects over the past 7 years. Fossil fuels research come in last, behind those three 

areas. 


96241.018.eps
48 

The academic units involved in such research vary widely, as well. LSU’s College 

of Agriculture accounted for 39 percent of energy-related research funds 

($38.6 million) in the past 7 years. The College of Engineering has generated the 

second-largest level of externally funded energy research. The School of the Coast 

& Environment generated the third-largest level of externally funded energy research at $12 million over the past 7 years. The College of Science is estimated to have generated over $6.3 million in external 

funding for research projects in the past 7 years, while the Center for Energy 

Studies has been awarded approximately $4.5 million in externally funded research. 

LSU’s School of Art & Design contributes to work on coastal sustainability and 

the E.J. Ourso College of Business maintains a variety of programs related to 

Environmental Economics and Emissions Trading. 

The table above also shows that external funding for energy research approximately equals all of the University funding, in the aggregate, for the colleges 

involved. 

Teaching 

Much of that money is plugged back into course development and student support 

for education and workforce training in those fields. LSU offers a number of degrees 

and minors/concentrations that are relevant to energy issues. Relevant degrees 

include those in engineering (petroleum, electrical, chemical, agricultural and biological, and mechanical), law, geology, basic sciences, environmental science, and 

oceanography/coastal sciences. 

Energy-relevant undergraduate and graduate courses are taught in the areas of 

fossil fuels, renewable sources, electricity, nuclear energy, and law. Most fossil fuels 

courses are taught in Engineering, Geology & Geophysics, and similar departments. 

Courses on renewables are taught in Agricultural Economics, Civil Engineering, 

Chemical Engineering, Economics, Environmental Sciences, Petroleum Engineering, 

and the School of Renewable Natural Resources. Electricity-related courses are offered in Chemical, Mechanical, and Electrical engineering. Nuclear classes are in 

the Department of Mechanical & Industrial Engineering and the Nuclear Science 

Minor in the College of Science. Finally, courses on energy law are taught at both 

Environmental Science and the Law Center. 

Enrollment in energy-related courses is strong. Estimates suggest that roughly 10 

percent (almost 3,000) LSU Undergraduate and Graduate students study energyrelated fields. About half of those engaged in such study do so through the 

Petroleum Engineering program, with the remainder distributed across Agriculture, 

Art & Design, Gulf Coast & Environment, Science, Law, and Business. 

Many new initiatives are taking shape at LSU, as well. The College of Business 

is launching a specialization in energy studies, including courses such as Energy 

Economics Policy, Petroleum Accounting, and Product Lifecycle Management, plus 

courses offered in the College of Engineering, College of Science, and School of the 

Coast & Environment. Similarly, the Law School offers a Graduate Certificate in 

Energy Law and Policy to officially recognize students who have demonstrated substantial competence in the study of energy law and related subject matter. 

Enrollment in energy courses and certificates and majors related to energy, however, may severely understate the importance of workforce development to students 

in our region. For instance, even though the College of Business energy courses are 

relatively new to the University, Bloomberg reports that 18 percent of LSU business 


96241.019.eps
49 

school grads go the oil & gas and energy sectors. In contrast, the next highest sectoral concentration, 15 percent, goes to financial services. The top recruiters of LSU 

business grads are reported to be Ernst & Young LLP, Postlethwaite & Netterville 

APAC, ExxonMobil, and Shell. The College of Business reports that their graduates 

boast the highest mid-career earnings among peer institutions, largely due to energy 

industry employment. 

Workforce Development 

LSU also undertakes many energy-related initiatives focusing on workforce 

development, worker safety, continuing education, and various energy 

specializations. 

For instance, the Petroleum Engineering Research and Technology Transfer 

(PERTT) Laboratory conducts training at an industrial-scale facility for future oil 

industry employees. The Donald and Gayle Keller Building provides a classroom 

and computer lab for professional training. In 2009, in partnership with Entergy 

Corporation, LSU initiated a Nuclear Power Workforce Development Program. The 

Nuclear Power Workforce Development Program works in conjunction with the 

Medical Physics and Health Physics program, which offers classes in radiation protection, exposure evaluation, and nuclear facility safety. 

LSU also offers continuing education programs to professionals in a variety of 

energy-related fields. For example, LSU’s Continuing Education office offers a 

Certified Occupational Safety Specialist program for which participants receive a 

10-hour Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) completion card. 

The Mineral Law Institute’s annual symposiums offer continuing education credits 

for lawyers and other professionals, such as certified engineers and city planners. 

A large number of sessions at conferences held by the Center for Energy Studies 

are also registered for continuing legal education. The Department of Petroleum 

Engineering works with the Society of Petroleum Engineers to offer short courses 

and continuing education credits, including Professional Ethics for Petroleum 

Engineers and Mechanical Tubing Forces: Temperature, Ballooning, Piston, and 

Buckling Effects. The Department of Chemical Engineering also offers an online 

course Essentials of Chemical Engineering for Non-Chemical Engineers. 

Thus, LSU is inextricably intertwined with the energy industry and the Gulf of 

Mexico. Higher production costs will reduce grant funding, class offerings, and student placements. Existing professionals who may be laid off will not need certifications or continuing education. Further declines in higher education in Louisiana 

and similar states will be unavoidable. 

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Energy production in the Gulf of Mexico is still hobbled by the drilling restrictions 

put in place after April 2010. Since then, OPEC’s competitive strategy continues to 

depress oil prices worldwide, resulting in the current state of the industry in which 

the economics of production are expected to break within the next year. 

As I have testified previously, any regulatory policy that raises pecuniary and/or 

nonpecuniary costs will slow production. Production will inevitably decline in response to higher costs and greater political uncertainty. In both cases, that means 

less jobs, lower wages, and lower GDP growth than would otherwise occur. Those 

immutable laws of economics will bind whether policymakers like them or not. And 

in today’s competitive environment, higher U.S. production costs will drive more 

market share to OPEC, just as their leaders hope. 

Slow economic growth hurts further development of clean energy. (After all, why 

make it if nobody can afford it?) The stress of higher costs put upon local economies 

like that of Louisiana actually hurts the development of new clean energy sources. 

University research like that at LSU is driving the next generation of clean energy. 

We need a smooth regulatory and research policy path to a clean energy world, lest 

we stay stuck in the mire of economic recession that prevents the conversion to the 

new energy sources we all hold dear. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

I appreciate the testimony of all the witnesses. I appreciate you 

coming here. I was going to say I appreciate you coming so far, but 

I realize I came a lot farther than all of you to be here. But I thank 

you for your testimony. 

50 

We are now going to turn to the committee for questions. The 

committee members, once again, each have 5 minutes to ask questions, and we will go through as many rounds as we can possibly 

fit in today. 

I will go last. I will start with Chairman Fleming, if you would 

like to ask the first series of questions. 

Mr. FLEMING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank the panel for being here today. 

Mr. Leimkuhler, I would like to ask you some questions. My personal background is that I am a physician from the private sector, 

but also I have been serving in Congress since 2009. I have observed that regulations, increased regulations, and more complicated or expensive regulations, don’t necessarily translate to 

more safety. 

So, what I would like to ask you about is this. In your testimony, 

you differentiated between performance-based regulations and 

prescriptive regulations. For example, real-time monitoring sounds 

like a good thing to have. But many of those who commented on 

the rule believe it will make operations less safe. 

What do you have to say about that? 

Mr. LEIMKUHLER. First off, I think that is a good point. When it 

comes to real-time monitoring, I fully support it. But I feel that all 

the companies should be challenged to perform and demonstrate to 

the regulator how do we effectively use real-time monitoring to ensure we are running a safe operation, and the current regulatory 

proposed rule has in it the mandate that you—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Leimkuhler, can I just ask you to pull that 

microphone right to your mouth? 

Mr. LEIMKUHLER. I’m sorry. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, it is much better to hear you that way. 

Mr. LEIMKUHLER. So, real-time monitoring I think is a great example to demonstrate how performance-based regulations should 

be applied, as opposed to prescriptive. The proposed Well Control 

Rule requires us within 3 years to build a brick-and-mortar, on-site 

center, or lease one, and staff that with staff who will monitor the 

data feed coming in from offshore. That absolutely should be done. 

Real-time monitoring I think should be a requirement. But the 

companies should be given the challenge to show the regulator how 

do you perform to meet that standard. 

At LLOG, we have real-time monitoring. We employ mud loggers 

offshore, on-site for every one of our—— 

Mr. FLEMING. Well, let me be clear. I want to clarify. Do you 

believe that real-time monitoring is better than prescriptive requirements, or do you think a combination? I just want to be clear 

where you stand on that. 

Mr. LEIMKUHLER. I am in favor of real-time monitoring, but I 

don’t like the prescriptive nature of how I am directed to achieve 

it. I should be given the latitude to demonstrate to the regulator 

that we monitor operations properly, we monitor continuously, we 

have back-up. We do that. But we don’t use a brick-and-mortar 

real-time center. We have data streams, feeds that come in to myself, my whole entire staff. We have the capability to properly monitor operations, and I would like to demonstrate that. 

51 

Mr. FLEMING. OK. Let me interrupt you because I have limited 

time, but I have other questions. I appreciate your answer there. 

Can you describe the current safety standards for blowout prevention and the BSEE new regulation? How does the BSEE regulation increase risk? 

Mr. LEIMKUHLER. Relative to BOPs, I feel one of the bigger impacts is at places that exceed API–53, which is the new BOP standard. I think that should be a requirement in the regulations. But 

in places where it exceeds it, with respect to BOPs, would be the 

5-year demonstration of integrity of the system. Right now, the way 

the regulation is written, we have to take the BOPs fully out of 

commission. And rather than ensure every single component in 

that system has a valid certificate of inspection from the original 

manufacturer within 5 years, we have to take the whole system out 

of service every 5 years, which could potentially take rigs out of 

service for up to 6 months to get that work done. 

Mr. FLEMING. The report I have is, if finalized as written, 110 

of the 175 wells, or 63 percent, that already have been safely 

drilled post-Macondo in the Gulf would fail to be in compliance 

with provisions. Is that what you are referring to? 

Mr. LEIMKUHLER. No, I am not. That is in reference to the drilling margin portion of the rule rather than in reference to the BOP 

systems themselves. With regard to the drilling margin rule, API 

has come up with a document called 92L, which was developed 

rather quickly in response to the request of the regulator to regulate drilling margins. It encompasses the best practices that industry experts have come up with as to how you drill safely in the Gulf 

of Mexico, which is a rather unique drilling environment, rather 

than the prescriptive margin of always maintaining a certain distance between the weight of your fluid and the strength of the rock. 

Mr. FLEMING. OK. Real quickly, I want to shift to Professor 

Mason. 

You said your research shows an economic impact of increased 

regulation in the Gulf following 2010. In your opinion, what actions 

were most devastating that were taken in terms of economic effect? 

The CHAIRMAN. And you have 15 seconds to do it. 

Dr. MASON. I only measured the shutdown and drilling activity 

as a result of the moratorium. I didn’t go beyond that. 

Mr. FLEMING. OK. Thank you. 

My time is up and I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. That was within 15 seconds. I am impressed. 

Let me turn to another co-host here today, Congressman Graves, 

for the next round of questioning. 

Mr. GRAVES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Herbst, thank you for being here. I have a couple of questions for you. But first of all, I want to talk briefly about the macro 

perspective. 

We have seen energy prices at record lows right now relative to 

previous performance, and obviously the cost of producing energy 

in the offshore is a substantial investment and one, as you noted, 

that is often determined in excess of a decade in advance of actual 

production. 

When you combine what is going on right now—OPEC nations, 

led by Saudi Arabia, are continuing to flood the market. When you 

52 

look at some of the other actions of this Administration, with 

regard to the Iran agreement, that is going to allow for hundreds 

of millions of barrels of additional oil to be put on the market. 

I want to make note, Mr. Chairman, that I don’t remember seeing a greenhouse gas evaluation by this Administration in regard 

to the Iran agreement, as was done with the Keystone Pipeline. 

The point here is you are seeing extraordinary price pressures. 

We are seeing right now folks getting pink slips all over the Gulf 

of Mexico, and Senator Vitter and Senator Cassidy noted all the associated employment opportunities related to offshore oil and gas 

production. Importantly, I have heard the statistic over and over 

again that offshore energy production is the second-largest revenue 

stream for the U.S. Treasury outside of taxes, a big revenue stream 

for the U.S. Treasury. And as I recall, we are approaching nearly 

$200 billion in funds for the U.S. Treasury from offshore energy 

production, the majority, the far majority of which, you are well 

aware, is produced offshore the coast of Louisiana. 

As Senator Cassidy noted, the implications of this are not limited 

to just taxpayers, not limited to the U.S. Treasury. The implications of this rule, if it continues to cause a reduction in offshore 

energy production—and I remind you, in 2009, 30 percent of all the 

domestic crude produced in the United States was produced in the 

Gulf of Mexico. Today, it is down to 17 percent. Historically, I believe it was 11 percent of all the domestic gas production was in 

the Gulf of Mexico. It is down to 5 percent today. 

As Senator Cassidy noted, these revenue streams are actually 

coming back to the state of Louisiana to restore our coast, to help 

protect our environment, our ecological productivity here. This rule 

is going to prevent those investments in the environment. As Dr. 

Mason noted, in addition it will prevent our investment in higher 

education. 

The first question I have for you is this. As I understand it, the 

offshore industry, on their own, voluntarily worked on over 100 

changes, updates, and safety procedures since the Macondo disaster. Can you just rattle off about five of those for me? 

Mr. HERBST. Again, it is a good question, and a big part of this 

rule is about adopting those changes that industry did move quickly on as far as making changes to API and—— 

Mr. GRAVES. Could you just rattle off about five of them for me? 

Mr. HERBST. The RP–53 went to Standard 53. That was a 

change. I believe the API–11 document was also changed. 

I have them right here—1 minute. 

Mr. GRAVES. My point is this, Mr. Herbst. I can pull out a 

document and rattle off all 100 of them if I wanted to. Here is the 

point I am trying to make. We have an industry that has hundreds 

of billions of dollars in investment. As was noted by one of the witnesses, in some cases, the rental rates of these platforms go for 

$1 million a day. These are the folks that are out there on the 

ground understanding the implications. 

If you have to pull out a list—and again, I can do it too, and read 

off all 100 of these things—it indicates a lack of intimate understanding or knowledge of what the industry is actually doing. My 

concern is that the Department of the Interior—and I know you 

didn’t do this, I know that this came from DC, I have known your 

53 

work for years and appreciate your service—but the frustration or 

the concern I have is that you have folks sitting in an ivory tower 

who are sitting and writing these regulations, that have no understanding of what is actually happening on the ground, the implication to our environment here in Louisiana, the implications to our 

workforce here in Louisiana. I think that disconnect is very, very 

dangerous, and I urge you to take that back. 

Mr. Henderson, I actually want to commend you. You may be 

surprised to hear that, but I want to commend you, because I actually agree that we need to ensure and we need to work with the 

Department of the Interior. We need to make sure that we have 

the safest regulatory environment that we can possibly have. I also 

think it is really important to point out, though, Mr. Henderson, 

that the judge in the case of the Macondo spill determined that 

there was gross negligence, willful misconduct, determined there 

was a climate of profit-driven decisions, OK? 

When you look historically at the trends, you have seen a trend 

of a decrease in the total number of spills that have occurred in the 

Gulf of Mexico, and you have seen a decrease in the total volume 

of oil that has been spilled. I agree with you that OPENS needs 

to be updated; a lot of changes from Macondo have resulted. But 

whenever you went out—you noted all the NRC filings that you 

did—when you went out and monitored these areas to find the 

spills, how did you get out there? 

Mr. HENDERSON. Sometimes by plane, sometimes by boat, and 

sometimes by foot. 

Mr. GRAVES. And those boats and planes were solar powered? 

Mr. HENDERSON. No, absolutely not. 

Mr. GRAVES. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HENDERSON. That is not my fault, though. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Westerman. 

Mr. WESTERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to 

the panel for the informative presentations today. 

I am from Arkansas. We don’t have much offshore exploration in 

Arkansas, but I am trying to get up to speed on this as much as 

possible. I have been reviewing the process, and I notice that BSEE 

has collaborative agreements with at least 12 other agencies 

through Memorandums of Understanding, Memorandums of 

Agreement, and interagency arrangements. It seems like a very 

cumbersome and complicated process in a lot of areas where regulation takes place on the industry. 

Mr. Herbst, you said you were a chemical engineer and a professional engineer. I am also a professional engineer, so I understand 

a little bit about how technology works. Also, I know as a professional engineer, one of our foremost objectives is to protect the public safety, health, and welfare. 

It has been interesting in committee meetings in DC when EPA 

comes in, who is one of your collaborators in the Federal agencies. 

They always talk about public health, safety, and welfare. Last 

week, we had a hearing on the Animus River chemical spill. 

Through the hearing it was pretty obvious that the EPA was very 

negligent of their responsibility in protecting the public health, 

safety, and welfare; and I believe had it been a private company 

54 

that was as negligent as EPA was, that there would be a huge 

outcry over that. 

When we look at this Well Control Rule, the blowout prevention 

regulations, they are very prescriptive. To my understanding, there 

is technology there that is not even proven yet, and these rules 

were developed by you guys. We heard testimony about how the industry has increased their safety requirements through API rules. 

When I was in engineering school, they taught us that when you 

are writing specifications, you specify results and you don’t get real 

descriptive in your specifications, because when you specify very 

descriptively, you are actually specifying the design of this equipment. It sounds like you are doing that on the blowout preventers. 

So with that, you take on the liability of the design. 

So, is BSEE prepared to fully warrant or fully back up the blowout preventer designs that they are proposing in the well, and to 

take full liability for those in case they are put into place and they 

happen to fail or there are problems with them? 

Mr. HERBST. Well, let me answer it this way. Again, the recommendations that came in after Macondo were from various 

groups—one of those was the National Academy of Engineers, various other groups, and industry input. This rule reflects that input. 

Much of the rule, again, reflects industry changes. We mentioned 

API Standard 53. Many of the requirements, if you think of them 

as prescriptive, come from that Standard 53. 

Now, clearly there are other ones where we are trying to push 

that safety bar a little bit further, realizing we deal with 80 different operators, everything from a super major to small—I call 

them mom and pop type organizations. It is important to set some 

bar, whether it is prescriptive or not, so that they can meet that 

bar. 

Now, again, some of the requirements in here have dates of implementation further out—3 years, 5 years, 7 years—and some of 

them are performance based. So, yes, we want a BOP stack to be 

able to center the pipe so it can be sheared properly. We did not 

tell them how to center the pipe. We did not tell them that another 

requirement is that you must shear everything in the hole. We 

didn’t tell them that that has to be a shear ram. It could be some 

other type of device, explosive device that can shear the pipe. 

So, we did leave areas open, and that is what my remarks said, 

that it is both prescriptive and performance. 

Mr. WESTERMAN. I am running short on time here. 

Mr. Leimkuhler, do you believe the industry or BSEE has more 

expertise in well design? And, can you briefly share some examples 

of how provisions in the Well Control Rule actually undermine safe 

operations rather than enhance the current safety culture that we 

see in the Gulf? Also, do you feel like BSEE has worked as closely 

with industry on these rules as they should? 

Mr. LEIMKUHLER. That’s quite a few questions there. To answer 

the first question—— 

Mr. WESTERMAN. Fourteen seconds. 

Mr. LEIMKUHLER. I feel like industry obviously has a greater 

level of expertise when it comes to well design. When it comes to 

how that design actually applies to the regulations that are in 

55 

place, they are certainly the experts there. We worked jointly 

together to really come up with, in my view, a very good product. 

With regards to the regulations and impacting our business, I 

think the drilling margin is probably a good example, whereby if 

we apply our conventional standards that we have applied throughout our learnings of deepwater drilling in the Gulf of Mexico, I 

think those have all been codified quite well in API–92 versus the 

prescriptive half-pound per gallon drilling margin rule. 

The CHAIRMAN. I do need to cut you off here. Your answer should 

have just been yes. 

Mr. LEIMKUHLER. OK. 

The CHAIRMAN. You are out of time. I am sorry. We will come 

back again here. 

Mr. Smith, it is good to have you back with our committee. You 

are recognized now for some questions. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be here. 

It is a pleasure to just be south of the river. I am up from just 

north of here, in southeastern Missouri. We are right along the 

Mississippi about 200 miles, so we just have to float down and we 

are right here. 

I am very curious, Mr. Herbst, what is the projected compliance 

cost of the proposed rule? 

Mr. HERBST. You are talking about BSEE’s cost in the rule? I believe, just under $1 billion was the estimate. 

Mr. SMITH. Just under $1 billion? 

Mr. HERBST. Yes. That is over a 10-year period, I believe. 

Mr. SMITH. Over a 10-year period? How do you respond to, I believe it was Senator Cassidy that started in the first panel that 

said, that industry has calculated a cost of nearly $32 billion over 

10 years? 

Mr. HERBST. Right. So, part of moving from proposed rule to 

final rule, we asked for comments specifically on costs. We are 

looking at those costs, and I can tell you that one of the costs for 

industry came up with $32 billion; $10 billion of that alone is tied 

to the drilling margin issue. So, obviously, that is one this week 

that we are meeting with industry in Washington to try to see if 

we can still meet that objective, but maybe in a less prescriptive 

manner. 

There are tremendous costs that industry has pointed out there, 

so we are working to see those costs. Again, they may be the experts on some of these costs. We will have to sit and look at that. 

We will have to look at the final rule. Again, I expect there will 

be some changes from proposed rule to final rule. When that occurs, we have to look at those cost impacts again. 

Mr. SMITH. To me, between $32 billion and $1 billion, that is a 

lot of billions that are out there in trying to figure out an estimated 

cost. 

Would you accurately say that the $1 billion proposal projected 

cost is appropriate and necessary for the rules that you are trying 

to implement? 

Mr. HERBST. Again, our $1 billion cost does take into account the 

benefits of the rule as well. Some of the costs are offset by the benefits. So, those safety benefits of a blowout incident such as 

Macondo and the lives lost and the environmental damage, that is 

56 

taken into account on the benefit side of our analysis. I don’t 

believe that industry’s analysis took that into account. 

Mr. SMITH. Would you say you do believe it is appropriate and 

necessary? 

Mr. HERBST. Again, we will have to look at the final rule and 

what the final costs are before we can make that determination, or 

I could make the call on that. 

Mr. SMITH. OK. So right now, we are trying to decide if it is between $880 million or $32 billion in the cost. 

I do want to point out to the agency that I would remind them 

to look at Justice Scalia’s opinion in Michigan v. EPA, which was 

a Supreme Court case this June. In that decision, Justice Scalia 

was writing the opinion of the court, and it stated, ‘‘The agency 

must consider cost, including, most importantly, cost of compliance, 

before describing whether regulation is appropriate and necessary.’’ 

That is the supreme law of the land that was decided in the last 

week in June of this year, and I hope your agency can decide and 

understand whether it is $880 million or whether it is $32 billion 

and whether it is appropriate and necessary when you are looking 

at the offshore production just here in the Gulf of Mexico being 

roughly 17 percent, as what my colleague, Mr. Graves from 

Louisiana, was saying. 

I have been here the last few days. We don’t have offshore oil 

drilling in Missouri, but we are very glad that we have it here in 

the Gulf of Mexico, because it drastically affects the economy for 

the Nation, and it affects the economy for the world, for that matter. We need to make sure that we have a fair balance between the 

environment and safety and industry. 

I can tell you just from a fishing perspective, being here over the 

weekend, I have not seen such a great production of fishing. Whenever you look at the No. 1 commercial fishing industry in the continental United States, right here next to the oil rigs, I would say 

environment and industry is going hand in hand. I would hope that 

your agency would promote that and not hinder that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Rice, good to have you here. You are recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. RICE. Thank you so much. It is my great honor to be here, 

Mr. Chairman. Thank you for having me. 

Mr. Graves, thank you for having me. 

I am not on this committee. I am from Myrtle Beach, South 

Carolina, which is a big tourism area, and we are considering opening the Atlantic offshore for drilling. My community is very concerned about it, which is why I am here, to learn a lot more. 

Mr. Henderson, I want to start with you. Is it your position that 

no offshore drilling is safe? A really quick answer. 

Mr. HENDERSON. No, sir, it is not. 

Mr. RICE. OK. 

Mr. HENDERSON. I am not naı ̈ve enough to dismiss the importance that oil and gas exploration has meant for the United States. 

Mr. RICE. Is there anybody who—— 

Mr. HENDERSON. My grandfather protected oil in World War II. 

I understand the importance of it. 

57 

Mr. RICE. All right. Is it your position that there is no 

deepwater—that we should shut off deepwater drilling? 

Mr. HENDERSON. Absolutely not. 

Mr. RICE. OK, good. 

Mr. Herbst, I want to talk to you for just a few minutes. You say 

that increased production and increased safety are not mutually exclusive. I think I heard you say that, right? 

Mr. HERBST. That is correct. 

Mr. RICE. So, you think we can do this, and we can do this in 

a safe manner. 

Mr. HERBST. Certainly. 

Mr. RICE. Ms. Davis, certainly you believe that there needs to be 

a little more control to prevent, I would think, the Macondo-type 

incidents from occurring. Would you not agree with that? 

Ms. DAVIS. I agree there was a loss of life, and that is something 

you can never get back. I think, respectively, we know we have to 

do things in a safer manner. But we have always worked in this 

industry and we have been very safe. When that occurred, it was 

a terrible, terrible accident. We hope we never have to do it again. 

Mr. RICE. Are you saying that we should just leave it to industry 

to self-impose additional safety measures, that the government 

should have no role in that? Is that what you are saying? 

Ms. DAVIS. No, sir. I think industry and government should work 

collaboratively together to come up with solutions that are going to 

be viable for the industry. 

Mr. RICE. So, you agree that there should be some additional 

level of oversight, but the proposed rule is far beyond what you 

agree with? 

Ms. DAVIS. I don’t know that it needs to be additional oversight. 

I think there needs to be some clarity in the ruling. 

Mr. RICE. OK. 

Mr.—I can’t say your name—Leimkuhler? 

Mr. LEIMKUHLER. That is closer than most get. 

Mr. RICE. Would you agree with that, that there should be some 

additional oversight after Macondo? 

Mr. LEIMKUHLER. I think so. I think, clearly, and it has 

happened. Clearly, it should have been, and it happened. 

Mr. RICE. OK. 

Mr. LEIMKUHLER. We have—— 

Mr. RICE. Do you think that we can do this drilling, and do it 

in a safe manner, protect the environment with reasonable protections for people, and still continue to increase production? 

Mr. LEIMKUHLER. Absolutely. 

Mr. RICE. Mr. Herbst, this Well Control Rule, is this your graph 

here—the losses of well control incidents in the Gulf of Mexico 

2008? Is this your graph? 

Mr. HERBST. Yes, that is BSEE’s graph from the annual report. 

Mr. RICE. That is a little scary to me. From 2008, we have eight 

loss of well control incidents. In 2013, we had eight; and in 2014, 

we have seven. Are you saying that even with these additional 

measures that have been imposed, that we are continuing to have 

loss of control of wells at the same rate as before? 

Mr. HERBST. Not to be too alarming, you have to look at the definition of loss of well control. That can be a very small release 

58 

where the well is not under control. We are not talking about the 

things like Macondo where there was only one—— 

Mr. RICE. So, when you are speaking of losses of well control, in 

orders of magnitude, there has been nothing that approaches 

Macondo; correct? 

Mr. HERBST. Nothing to the loss of life or pollution. 

Mr. RICE. OK. All right. 

Mr. HENDERSON. Mr. Rice, if I may clarify my response to your 

question, if I were in your position—— 

Mr. RICE. A very short time. 

Mr. HENDERSON. Yes, very short. I would absolutely not support 

deepwater drilling off the coast of South Carolina. 

Mr. RICE. OK. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Leimkuhler, do you agree with that? Do you think the 

Atlantic should be opened to offshore drilling? 

Mr. LEIMKUHLER. No, I do not agree with that. I think it should 

be opened to offshore drilling. I think there needs to be allowances 

made, given the population density on the coastline. There ought 

to be a certain offset that should be enforced. 

Mr. RICE. Ms. Davis, do you agree with that? Do you think the 

Atlantic should be opened to offshore drilling? Yes or no? 

Ms. DAVIS. I think opportunity should be allowed. 

Mr. RICE. Dr. Mason, I have 13 seconds left. 

Dr. MASON. Yes. 

Mr. RICE. Mr. Herbst, do you think the Atlantic should be opened 

to offshore drilling? 

Mr. HERBST. I believe with input from the states, yes. 

Mr. RICE. Thank you. 

Mr. HENDERSON. One last comment, if I may. 

Mr. RICE. I yield my time. My time has expired. Thank you. 

Mr. HENDERSON. All it takes is one disaster to destroy the 

beaches in Myrtle Beach. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask a couple of questions. 

Ms. Davis, if I can zero in on you—apologies for that, but there 

has been a general consensus from public comments we have had 

that a Well Control Rule could lead to another shutdown of the 

kind in the Gulf if it was enacted as it is currently written. 

You kept your business afloat during the last shutdown. What 

would be the business impact if there was another shutdown so 

close on the heels of the last one? 

Ms. DAVIS. Mr. Chairman, we lost 70 percent of our business as 

a result of the shutdown the last time with the moratorium, 70 percent, because we worked in deepwater primarily, and our company 

was a small business that felt that was a great place to work in 

the future. If you worked there, you were in a really good position. 

If that were to happen today with the low price of oil, compounded with a tragedy, I just don’t know what the implications 

would be. But we are survivors. We have worked through many, 

many challenges. I think we would still be here. We would find a 

way to work. 

The CHAIRMAN. In your testimony, you also talked about the diverse business environment that fosters small entrepreneurs and 

that could become extinct. Could you just expand on that? Explain 

59 

how Federal regulations could actually be threatening to small 

business. 

Ms. DAVIS. Well, in my experience, small business, we work 

under different programs because of government allowances for 

small, minority, women-owned business opportunities. It gives us a 

great leverage to be able to work in the industry. It is not the primary reason you work in the industry, but it is considered. Small 

business is a big part of this great country. 

So I think, from my perspective, we have to be able to continue 

to be allowed to work. We are reinventing ourselves today as things 

change. We are looking for new opportunities, new product lines to 

explore, and new ways to do business. We will continue to operate. 

Small businesses will suffer, but people are resilient. They will find 

a way to work through it. 

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate that optimism in what the future 

can bring. Unfortunately, sometimes when we have prescriptive 

rules that lock in a procedure, it doesn’t allow for change even if 

that change is positive. I know Dr. Mason realizes this. I am in 

education as well. Education is very slow to change. Government 

is a whole lot worse; so we need to do that. 

Mr. Leimkuhler, if I could ask you about these changes. 

By the way, it is a good German name. I understand it, a good 

German name. 

Offshore operators have undergone a myriad of changes and new 

safety requirements. How would the Well Control Rule be different 

from the other regulations you have had to go through in the last 

5 years? 

Mr. LEIMKUHLER. I think the biggest challenge would be, once 

again, to get us back to that drilling margin. If you take a look at 

that margin and you apply that to the operational procedures 

LLOG has used in our wells in the past, I apply that to the next 

5 years and I’ve gotten with the reservoir engineers and said, OK, 

if we can no longer drill these depleted zones, we can put a well 

into a zone as soon as it starts to deplete, putting in additional 

wells would be an extreme challenge to us. Our estimates are that 

that would remove 12 sidetracks from our approved plans, as well 

as four new wells. The total production of those five would be a 

reduction in Federal royalty money of about $900 million over 

5 years. 

The CHAIRMAN. What about the concept, though, of safety here? 

Could this rule undermine safe operations rather than enhance 

them? 

Mr. LEIMKUHLER. It is possible. You can, because what that is 

going to do, it is going to encourage operators to resist raising your 

mud weight to maintain that margin. In the past, when you would 

have gone into that area and ran it that close, you are going to increase the probability that you will take a kick, and decrease the 

probability you will take loss per turns. 

The CHAIRMAN. I have a limited amount of time here. I would 

like to talk about how OPEC is playing around in this area and the 

impact that it is having, both in the real world and the private sector. Dr. Mason, let me just talk to you very briefly here about what 

LSU is doing and what you were saying about the workforce. 

60 

As I understand it, the workforce off the coast is an aging workforce. It needs to be replaced. These are good-paying jobs, but we 

need to have Americans that are trained to be able to take this, 

and that is what you are trying to do. I understand part of your 

argument was if we cut the production by regulation, which is, as 

you said, as viable as market forces, what we are doing is stopping 

the amount of money that we can invest in education to produce 

that workforce. Is that what you are saying? This becomes a vicious 

cycle. 

Dr. MASON. Yes, it becomes a vicious cycle, and as you noted earlier, it creates an entire career track and industry in compliance, 

with compliance being the new growth industry rather than the 

actual production. 

The CHAIRMAN. I would just say, I have 15 seconds. You said the 

LSU funding comes from renewable energy sources? Did I mishear 

you? 

Dr. MASON. The funding goes primarily toward research in 

renewables. 

The CHAIRMAN. Goes to research. Thank you. 

Dr. MASON. Although it does come from renewable and other 

sources that are usually not fossil fuels. 

The CHAIRMAN. That is OK. I just misheard. 

We have time for another round of questions here. 

Dr. Fleming. 

Mr. FLEMING. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to drill down a bit on what we have learned, amalgamate the baseline of information today, and I want to focus on 

Mr. Leimkuhler and Mr. Herbst. 

Mr. Leimkuhler, based on the regulations as we know them to 

be today, and they are not finalized, at least we don’t know for certain that these are going to be the final rules, is this going to affect 

your ability prospectively to drill more wells productively and 

economically? 

Mr. LEIMKUHLER. I believe it will. I think it will probably take 

from 15 to 20 percent of the wells that are currently in my approved plans and restrict my ability to execute and drill those 

wells. 

Mr. FLEMING. OK. Do you see that having a negative impact on 

price; that is, causing increase in prices to consumers? 

Mr. LEIMKUHLER. In the past, to be honest with you, I don’t 

think it has. But what we are seeing right now is the U.S. oil price 

totally dominated by supply and demand, and if you are going to 

take that production off the market, then it is going to be oil that 

is not there. In the past, I thought that oil was dominated by 

OPEC, but that the rise in U.S. oil production, reaching the levels 

it has, that if we restrict U.S. production, I think we will see an 

increase in price. 

Mr. FLEMING. Mr. Herbst, we are really talking about prospective 

versus real-time evaluation and regulation. How flexible, how compliant do you think BSEE will be going forward to take the input 

from the industry’s real experts, the engineers who are expert in 

this, and to fashion those regulations in the final written draft in 

a way that is not going to cause 10 or 15 percent reduction in 

viable sites? 

61 

Mr. HERBST. Let me answer that this way. Since we have 

received the industry comments and other comments, I have assigned three staff members, two of those with over 30 years of experience, industry and regulatory experience, to work on those and 

try to understand those comments and see if there are other ways 

to accomplish the same thing through those industry comments. 

They have worked numerous meetings through this. I am getting 

that feedback. I am speaking directly with Director Salerno weekly 

on this. I think if we can accomplish the same objective by another 

means which industry has brought up, I think there will be that 

flexibility. 

Mr. FLEMING. How receptive are you to real-time rules and regulations—that is to say, constant input and adjustment to be both 

safe, protective of the environment, and safe for humans, especially 

people on the rigs; and then at the same time accommodating the 

viability of those sites that need to be drilled in order to maximize 

and exploit natural resources? 

Mr. HERBST. If I get your question right, an important part of 

our regulations, which this new rule does not impact at all, is alternative compliance. So again, if industry can come up with a better 

mouse trap, a better way of reaching that same objective, that regulation is there now and will continue. 

Mr. FLEMING. OK. 

That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Graves. 

Mr. GRAVES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Herbst, I want to highlight the chart that was referenced, 

the one on the right side there. Having spent several months every 

single day out on the Gulf of Mexico during some of the period covered here, would you agree that there was more vigilance in the 

Gulf of Mexico during the 2010–2014 period, where you see the 

spike, than any other period in our Nation’s history? 

Mr. HERBST. Are you talking about vigilance from—— 

Mr. GRAVES. In terms of the number of people that were simply 

out on the Gulf of Mexico in boats looking for oil. 

Mr. HERBST. Right. I am not sure if I get the question. Those reports are mandatory by regulation that they must report loss of 

well control events. 

Mr. GRAVES. My point is this: you had the moratorium, which 

froze some aspects of energy production; correct? 

Mr. HERBST. Yes. 

Mr. GRAVES. OK, and the permatorium as well. That spike, I am 

going to guess, also corresponds with when the spigot was turned 

back on, the moratorium/permatorium was largely lifted. In addition, you had more vigilance out there in the Gulf of Mexico, in 

that I have never in my life seen so many boats and people out 

there. I understand there are mandatory reporting requirements, 

but if people aren’t out there to see it, are they going to know that 

the things have actually spilled? So, I think it is an important distinction to make there. 

Number two, I also want to point out, and following up on 

Congressman Rice’s comments, you can look—I believe it is 1973. 

There were 2,200 separate spills in the United States related to 

waters, coastal and river waters in the United States—2,200. The 

62 

cumulative volume of oil that was spilled in those 2,200 spills was 

like one-tenth of the oil that was spilled in the Deepwater Horizon. 

This thing was absolutely one-of-a-kind, the only type scenario in 

its universe. I would remind you of what I said about the Judge’s 

comments—gross negligence, willful misconduct, and all sorts of 

other one-of-a-kind type scenarios. 

Dr. Mason, let me ask you a question. If this Well Control Rule, 

BOP rule, as anticipated, does cause a reduction, a continued reduction in the Gulf of Mexico’s production relative to the remaining 

public lands in the United States, is that going to cause a decrease 

in demand or utilization of oil and gas in the United States? 

Dr. MASON. No, absolutely not. 

Mr. GRAVES. So, we are going to end up supplying that, in some 

cases supplementing it with additional foreign oil. Would that 

be—— 

Dr. MASON. That is correct. 

Mr. GRAVES. One of the producers that is here, could you tell me, 

do you think that the United States has a more robust, a safer regulatory regime here than, for example, Venezuela, Nigeria, other 

countries? Or do you think those countries, that are some of the 

major suppliers to the United States, have a better or safer regulatory regime? 

Mr. LEIMKUHLER. Relative to the countries you mentioned, I 

think we absolutely have a better regulatory regime. 

Mr. GRAVES. OK, thank you. 

Mr. Henderson, are you a proponent of the global environment, 

or just the environment in Louisiana or the United States? 

Mr. HENDERSON. All three. 

Mr. GRAVES. All of them. OK, thank you. 

Mr. Herbst, let me go back and ask you a question. BSEE took, 

as I recall, 3 to 4 years to write this rule, and they initially proposed a 2-month comment period, and then a 3-month. I will say 

it again. The complexity of this—and I sat through briefing after 

briefing, I sat through the BP trial, trying to get my head around 

all this stuff—incredibly, incredibly complex activities here, and obviously getting it right is critical. 

In some of the meetings I have had with some of the operators, 

it has been said to me that they are concerned that some of the 

proposed rule implications could cause less safe—less safe— 

operating conditions than we currently have today. Do you think 

that, considering the fact that it took Interior 3 to 4 years to actually write this rule—that it is appropriate to have a rule that has 

such profound economic consequences, such profound potential impacts on our environment here in Louisiana, as Mr. Smith noted, 

the most productive commercial fisheries in the continental United 

States, one of the most productive ecosystems on the continent— 

Do you think it is appropriate to only give industry 3 months to 

comment on something that it took the Department 3 to 4 years 

to write? 

Mr. HERBST. That is personally outside of my call, but it is a very 

complex rule. It took a lot of input from a lot of different people. 

As mentioned before, standards were a big part of incorporating 

into this rule. Industry shouldn’t be surprised by that part of the 

63 

rule. The other pieces, that is why we are continuing to work with 

those commenters, to get the best—— 

Mr. GRAVES. I believe Interior asked the National Academy to 

look at the real-time monitoring to provide a report back to 

Interior, to BSEE, on that aspect of the connectivity, the real-time 

monitoring. Has that report from the National Academy been received by Interior? 

Mr. HERBST. I am not aware. I would have to get back to you 

on that question. 

Mr. GRAVES. I don’t believe that it has, and I am just wondering 

if you could follow up for the record, if you can please explain to 

the committee why you would ask for a report, not get it back, and 

yet go ahead and finalize or issue your proposed rule without being 

informed by the National Academy’s feedback on that issue, which 

could cause cyber threats and other safety issues in the Gulf. 

Mr. HERBST. I will get back to you on that. 

Mr. GRAVES. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Westerman. 

Mr. WESTERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As we have gone through this discussion and the things I have 

read about in the past, the term ‘‘drilling margin’’ comes up. It 

seems to be one of the key issues here, and obviously the safe drilling margin has to do with pressures in the drilling rig and in the 

pipe. But there is also another kind of margin that is an economic 

margin, that I think Dr. Mason has talked about, and it seems like 

this drilling margin may create such a small economic margin that 

it is going to hurt the industry in such a way that even the research at LSU can be affected into coming up with new renewable 

kinds of energy, which I am a big proponent of as long as they are 

economical. 

So, Dr. Mason, in your research, have you looked at the relative 

economics of fossil fuel energy versus renewable energy in our 

current state? 

Dr. MASON. That is something of tremendous interest to researchers like myself. We are trying to work that out right now. 

One thing that I do see from this type of proposed regulation, very 

large regulation coming through in big chunks, as Mr. Fleming referred to earlier, is that it creates an uncertainty on the part of 

companies bidding for lease rights in the Gulf, an uncertainty that 

the economics of what they are bidding on may change significantly 

after the fact. Those bidders will rationally bid down prices, potentially below reservation prices at which the Treasury and the 

Department of the Interior would be willing to grant such leases. 

In the meantime, we have Mexico becoming active in the same 

Gulf and looking for prices to exploit their own reserves, and it is 

fairly easy for companies to just move right across the line within 

that Gulf, within the same ecosystem to, as others noted, a less 

safe drilling environment. So, I think we are right on that margin. 

Mr. WESTERMAN. The last two Western Gulf and Central Gulf 

lease sales had the lowest number of bids in 20 years. What are 

the causes for such low industry interest in purchasing leases? 

64 

Dr. MASON. I think we are seeing the economics of the Gulf go 

south due to over-regulation and other influences, low oil prices, a 

confluence of factors right now; so this is probably a bad time to 

move. 

Mr. WESTERMAN. Mr. Leimkuhler, what do you believe are some 

reasons for the drop-off in interest? 

Mr. LEIMKUHLER. I think that basic economics is part of the driver in that respect. That is the primary driver, the overall economics 

and the projection forward of those not improving for some period 

of time. 

Mr. WESTERMAN. Do you think we will see similar results in the 

recently announced lease sale for next spring? 

Mr. LEIMKUHLER. I haven’t taken a look at what has actually 

been proposed. I am unfamiliar with that, so I can’t comment on 

it. 

Mr. WESTERMAN. OK. 

Ms. Davis, your company is not conducting any offshore drilling 

operations and would not fall under any of these regulatory provisions, yet you are adamant about the negative consequences this 

rule will have and how it will impact your business. I know in 

Arkansas it can even impact business. It can impact the economy 

across the whole country. 

Were you invited to meet with BSEE this year and share any of 

your views? 

Ms. DAVIS. No, I have not been. 

Mr. WESTERMAN. To your knowledge, did BSEE conduct any 

listening sessions in the Gulf region to hear about possible 

unintended consequences of the rule? 

Ms. DAVIS. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. WESTERMAN. Mr. Herbst, can you address that? 

Mr. HERBST. If you are talking about the invites for this week, 

those were for folks that commented on the rule. The rule as proposed is open to all for commenting. But if they commented on the 

rule, they were invited back, from what I understand, to clarify 

those points in their comments. 

Mr. WESTERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Herbst, as I understand it, the rule requires the establishment of the BSEE-Approved Verification Organization, or BAVO. 

Has that been defined? 

Mr. HERBST. It has not been finalized at this point, but the 

concept of having a verification organization is in the rule. 

Mr. SMITH. When will it be defined? 

Mr. HERBST. I am not certain on that. I will have to get back to 

you. 

Mr. SMITH. OK. How would industry or the public comment on 

something that hasn’t even been defined in a proposed rule? 

Mr. HERBST. Again, they can comment on how it is implemented. 

They can comment on the idea of having a verification organization, not having one, who may be the best to do that type of work, 

and those comments then would be taken into account. 

65 

Mr. SMITH. So, they can public comment based on what possibly 

might be in a rule, but not even suggested that is in a rule, but 

a possibility? 

Mr. HERBST. Again, the requirement of a verification organization to verify the BOPs is in the proposed rule, and again they 

could comment on how that is implemented. 

Mr. SMITH. Could this verification organization be industry 

leaders? 

Mr. HERBST. I believe, as it is written or intended, it is third 

party. 

Mr. SMITH. So, it could be environmentalists? 

Mr. HERBST. It would have to be someone with the expertise, 

that would have to have that expertise, especially around BOPs, to 

be that verifying organization. 

Mr. SMITH. But there is nothing in the proposed rule that 

explains possibly who this third party is? 

Mr. HERBST. No. We have similar rules in place now for thirdparty verification, and those areas are clearly defined. This is still 

open at this point. 

Mr. SMITH. How many other requirements established in the 

proposed rule may not be defined in various other provisions? 

Mr. HERBST. I am not sure how I would be able to answer that. 

If we think we have defined it, but again as we meet with industry, 

if there are questions or concerns, or it needs clarification, that is 

what would be built into the final rule. 

Mr. SMITH. All right. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Rice. 

Mr. RICE. Just a couple more questions. 

I am looking at the map here put out by LLOG of the Gulf, the 

coast of the Gulf, and this issue about Mexico piques my interest. 

How far offshore does our U.S. Government jurisdiction go in regulating this offshore oil, Mr. Herbst? 

Mr. HERBST. It is out to the economic exclusive zone. It is 200 

miles. With Mexico, the United States has a trans-boundary agreement, and we have worked through that. We have continued to 

work with the Mexican regulators, originally CNH, now SIA, as far 

as how operations along that border will proceed. 

Mr. RICE. All right. And that 200 miles would apply in the 

Atlantic as well? 

Mr. HERBST. Yes, it would. 

Mr. RICE. OK. So, a foreign country could come and drill 201 

miles off our shore? 

Mr. HERBST. I am not the expert on that, but I would believe so. 

Mr. RICE. OK. Mr. Herbst, I am going to pick on you for a little 

while. Is there more risk in deepwater drilling than there is in 

shallow water drilling? 

Mr. HERBST. The risks can be there for both depending on how 

the operations are conducted. 

Mr. RICE. Mr. Leimkuhler, would you say there was more or less 

risk in deepwater or the same? 

Mr. LEIMKUHLER. I would say the risk is very project dependent. 

The safest well I’ve ever drilled was in 9,000 feet of water, the 

66 

most risky was in 32,000 feet of water. It all depends upon the subsurface rocks you are drilling through in that environment, and 

that is not water—— 

Mr. RICE. These pressures that oil comes out, the pressure the 

oil is under, is that necessarily related to the depth of the water, 

or is it somewhat related to the depth of the water? 

Mr. LEIMKUHLER. It is related to the depth of the well and the 

regional geology in which it sits. 

Mr. RICE. OK. 

Ms. Davis, do you think deepwater drilling is less or more risky 

than shallow water drilling, or the same? 

Ms. DAVIS. I don’t think there is any more risk in deepwater. 

Mr. RICE. All right. 

What is deep, Mr. Herbst? How do you define what deepwater is? 

Mr. HERBST. It has been defined differently over the years. 

Currently it is 500 feet of water depth is deepwater, the way we 

define it. 

Mr. RICE. OK. 

I yield back my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

I have a couple of quick questions for a few people. 

Mr. Herbst, let me start with you. You said to one of the questions that if companies commented on the rule, they were invited 

back. So, all companies who made comments would be ensured of 

meeting with BSEE? 

Mr. HERBST. From what I understand, if there was interest, 

BSEE asked if they needed to clarify their comments. Again, you 

had to have commented before, and this was an opportunity to clarify those comments. 

The CHAIRMAN. So, all companies who commented are going to 

have a meeting, or at least be invited to a meeting? 

Mr. HERBST. I don’t know for sure. I was not the one who sent 

out the invites. 

The CHAIRMAN. All right. 

Look, I had a great Aunt Bessie. You guys need to change your 

acronym. I liked her. 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Mason, universities like LSU obviously 

adjust their curriculum. I was interested in your testimony that asserted that the Federal regulatory environment is essentially migrating the job opportunities to compliance, rather than exploration 

and production. Is that accurate, and can you expand on that for 

just a couple of minutes, or less? 

Dr. MASON. Sure. That is a well-known dynamic in regulated industries. We are seeing that in financial services now in response 

to Dodd-Frank, where we are not seeing banks lend to consumers 

or businesses. We are seeing them beef up compliance in all different areas to meet these thousands of pages of new, unknown 

regulations that are still not even written. So, we are bound to do 

the same thing here in oil and gas. It is pretty straightforward. 

The CHAIRMAN. So, traditionally then, market forces usually 

drive what the job market becomes. It seems like in the Gulf, the 

biggest market force now is the Federal Government. 

67 

Dr. MASON. Yes. The Federal Government and state governments 

can become part of the market force, creating job opportunities in 

what I would view as a somewhat perverse fashion at times, if it 

is not driving safety on the margin, and we have seen this before. 

The CHAIRMAN. All right. That could or could not be good. I 

would appreciate Mr. Herbst saying that you are actually going to 

be soliciting industry’s comments again. That is essential. That is 

very important. 

Maybe to Ms. Davis and Mr. Leimkuhler again. OPEC is purposely depressing oil prices with their policies, and it seems to me 

it is having a real impact on both small and large businesses, especially here in the Gulf. Ms. Davis, can you just tell me personally 

how this has impacted the current hiring trends and the business 

investments in the Gulf? 

Ms. DAVIS. It makes it very difficult to plan anything. To the 

point we talked of earlier, with all these regulations, things that 

are changing the environment, and all the things that are happening with OPEC, a company like RIG-CHEM can’t sustain for 

much longer. We will go away, and small business will be hurt. 

To your point about OPEC, we don’t know, we have no way to 

predict what is going to happen for the future. All I can do is tell 

my employees every day that we have to keep looking for new opportunities; but with more regulation, that will not happen. 

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate that. This area of discussion is so 

broad, we didn’t have a whole lot of time to go into a lot of things. 

We didn’t even go into the exporting ban. But it seems very obvious 

that OPEC has a unique strategy that they are using to see if they 

can drive our country into a particular pattern. What scares me is, 

I think they are successful right now, which is worrisome to me, 

especially for the potential this country has as far as energy production and the significance of affordable energy in the ability of 

the entire economy to go forward, as well as how it helps people 

in their daily lives. If we do not have affordable energy, we don’t 

have a lifestyle that is worth living, and that becomes extremely 

significant. 

Mr. Lukeheimer—Leimkuhler. I am sorry; I am dyslexic. Mr. 

Leimkuhler—I am not dyslexic, by the way. I just say that. 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. And I forgot the question. No, the same question. 

Mr. LEIMKUHLER. It creates that condition quite often. 

The CHAIRMAN. I am running down your time. Just OPEC’s 

impact on the business climate here in the Gulf. 

Mr. LEIMKUHLER. Right now, with the decline in oil prices, our 

net margins have been basically reduced by somewhere on the 

order of 70 percent. Therefore, right now, we are not really looking 

to expand. I currently manage the drilling contracts at LLOG. We 

are going to live up to the contracts we signed. But are we going 

out and looking to sign up more rigs? Not at this time. We need 

to see an improvement in the economic conditions to expand our rig 

count back to where it was about 2 years ago. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. That is not a positive sign, but I 

appreciate that answer very much. 

The committee does have a couple of other assignments here. If 

anyone wants a 2-minute final question? If not—— 

68 

Mr. GRAVES. Can I just do—— 

The CHAIRMAN. You can do a 2-minute wrap-up, and then let me 

do a wrap-up. 

Mr. GRAVES. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

I want to thank all of you for being here. I think that all your 

perspectives are certainly helpful; and I want to be clear, I have 

spoken to every Member here. I think that everyone wants to get 

this right, that we want to improve safety. Looking at BP alone, 

I believe they are going to end up spending in excess of $50 billion. 

There is a huge incentive for companies to get this right, a financial incentive, and I think that is important to keep in mind. 

Looking at it a little bit more parochially—this is part of our 

economy, it is part of our culture. Senator Vitter talked about that 

earlier. It is a big part of what we do here, and I am concerned 

about the global environment. I think it is important to keep in 

mind that you don’t just change rules here, and all of a sudden everywhere else the same thing happens. We are going to increase 

our dependence on foreign energy where it is produced less safely. 

So, we lose the jobs, you get an adverse impact to the environment, 

and I think that is wrong. 

We have to get this right. Showing the disparity that Congressman Smith talked about in the cost estimate, $800 million 

to $32 billion, there is a huge disparity there in terms of what 

industry is estimating and what the Federal Government is 

estimating. I think I even read something saying the Federal 

Government thought this could save money, which I don’t get. We 

have to reconcile these. 

Mr. Herbst, I want to ask you if BSEE would commit to doing 

public meetings and not just to meet with companies that have 

submitted comments, to meet with everyone who wants to meet on 

this. We have to get this right, and I think that is very, very 

important. 

Last, I just want to say that, ultimately, this is critical for the 

U.S. energy security, as the Chairman noted, so we are not subject 

to the whims of OPEC to the degree we are today; and I think it 

is critical for our environmental security. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you all. I want to thank everyone who has 

been involved in this particular hearing. The city and the state has 

been very kind and gracious to us in holding a hearing down here. 

I am happy we were able to be here. 

I appreciate the fact that the two Senators from Louisiana were 

able to be here as part of this hearing. 

The current Members who are here, thank you for your 

attendance and thank you for your thoughtful questions. 

I thank the witnesses who came here for your time and effort. 

I noticed I was able to meet former Congressman Johns, appreciate you being here as well. I think after this hearing you are 

grateful that you are no longer here, right? 

[Laughter.] 

The CHAIRMAN. You made the right choice there. 

With all of that, I thank the witnesses for your testimony, both 

written and oral testimony. 

Members of the committee may have additional questions for 

you. We are going to ask that you would respond to those in 

69 

1http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=22572. 

2http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=79687&p=irol-reportsother. 

writing. Under Committee Rule 4(h), the hearing record is open for 

10 business days for those responses to get to you and be returned 

to us. 

If there is no further business, without any objection, I just 

pounded the gavel and we are now in adjournment. 

[Whereupon, at 10:55 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

[ADDITIONAL MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF DRILLING

CONTRACTORS

Thank you for the opportunity to submit written comments for the record. The 

International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC) is a trade association representing the worldwide interests of the onshore and offshore drilling industry since 

1940. With over 1,800 members, IADC membership reaches nearly every state in 

the United States. Our members operate the vast majority of onshore rigs in the 

United States and offshore, our drilling contractor members operate all the Mobile 

Offshore Drilling Units (MODUs) operated in areas subject to the jurisdiction of the 

United States. These comments are offered without prejudice to communications 

that may be offered directly by IADC member companies. 

As a trade association, IADC’s purpose is to advance drilling and completion technology, improve industry health, safety, environmental and training practices; and 

champion sensible regulation and legislation which facilitate safe and efficient drilling. Through 17 Committees and 15 global Chapters, IADC creates the space for 

members to connect, collaborate and create solutions aimed at addressing the 

industry’s most critical issues. 

Current Industry Landscape and Industry Outlook for the Drilling 

Contractor 

At the leading edge of the oil and gas industry, only the drilling contractors build, 

own, and operate the rigs without which no well could be drilled, completed, produced or worked-over. The drilling industry is in the midst of a major recapitalization as currently 230 new offshore units are being built for future delivery. The 

costs of these units range from about $200 million for a shallow-water jack-up unit 

to nearly $1 billion for a deepwater drillship. Similar recapitalization has taken 

place with onshore drilling contractors in order to provide equipment to drill wells 

to be hydraulically fractured: these units cost from $20–$40 million. Both onshore 

and offshore, the latest design drilling units are more effective, safer and more 

environmentally efficient than earlier units. 

The demand for secure and affordable energy is clearly the driver for drilling activity. In August 2015,1 amid high uncertainty in the global oil market, the U.S. 

Energy Information Agency (EIA) lowered crude oil price forecasts in the ShortTerm Energy Outlook (STEO), anticipating benchmark West Texas Intermediate 

crude oil prices to average $49 per barrel (b) in 2015 and $54/b in 2016, $6/b and 

$8/b respectively lower than forecast in the previous month’s STEO. Such lackluster 

price forecasts reflect in a similarly lackluster demand for oil and gas, which in turn 

depresses current drilling activity and near-term outlook. 

Changing market conditions, both in the United States and internationally, have 

dramatically impacted the oil industry as a whole, creating an environment of caution and uncertainty for the drilling contractor. Baker Hughes has issued the rotary 

rig counts 2 as a service to the petroleum industry since 1944, when Hughes Tool 

Company began weekly counts of active U.S. and Canadian drilling activity. On 

September 4, 2015, Baker Hughes’ reported 33 offshore units in U.S. waters compared to 65 in October 2014; a market reduction of almost exactly 50 percent within 

a 12-month period. 

The decline in offshore rig count continues in spite of some stability in the oil 

price in the 2nd/3rd quarters 2015—albeit at a low level. The majority of drilling 

companies, both onshore and offshore, have been forced to decommission rigs and 

shift priorities from future investments to address internal financial constraints. 

One U.S.-headquartered offshore drilling contractor that has focused on the shallow 

water sector, where well productivity is lower than the deeper Gulf, filed for 

70 

bankruptcy this summer and the company’s stock has been delisted from the NYSE 

and is now trading on the OTC market. 

The reduced rig count is reflected in drilling-related employment. According to an 

August 19, 2015 Rig News Article, 50,000 energy jobs have been lost during the 

months of June, July, and August, on top of 100,000 employees laid off since oil 

prices started to decrease in fall of 2014. 

The U.S. Gulf is one of the highest cost basins in the offshore sector in which U.S. 

companies operate. Uncertainty in oil and natural gas markets, which will likely 

continue over the next several years, is clearly a major factor in declining rig count 

in U.S. waters. However, in addition to this market uncertainty, the U.S. oil and 

gas industry is contending with layers of new regulatory proposals that further 

increase uncertainties and, if implemented, will impose further costs on the 

U.S. industry, rendering it less competitive in the global marketplace. 

Harmful Regulations Impede Economic Growth and Threaten Survivability 

IADC will never object to regulations that are necessary or enhance safety and 

operational integrity. And, as in any business, drilling contractors require confidence in and consistency of new regulations, with sufficient lead time to fully 

implement them. 

Throughout IADC, our members share the belief that for the prevention of blowouts, explosions and fires, well control is the most critical area. IADC and member 

experts from across all areas of the industry are working together, and ahead of governments everywhere, on the improvement of competency programs and technical 

solutions in well control performance. 

A powerful example of this is the recent creation of the Well Control Institute 

(WCI). The WCI is a unique industry oversight body, comprising the most senior 

representatives from operators, drilling contractors and equipment manufacturers in 

the industry. The WCI is committed to developing solutions to issues such as blowout preventer equipment reliability and rig crew competency. 

Within the context of well control, IADC recently launched WellSharpTM, a root 

and branch overhaul initiated by industry to redefine how well control training and 

assessment is delivered with the goal of keeping wells in a safe state throughout 

their life span, and avoiding blowouts. IADC accredits training institutions, whether 

commercial or company in-house, to conduct training that meets or exceeds the curriculum requirements set forth in WellSharpTM. The new standard requires trainees 

to be more engaged in the learning process and to undergo individual skills assessments appropriate to their specific well control roles and responsibilities. The knowledge-assessment database identifies specific knowledge gaps and allows instructors 

to review and close these gaps with each trainee before the completion of training. 

The system provides metrics regarding the alignment between the course taken and 

the trainee’s job position and affords analysis of instructor performance. It is a truly 

unique, multifaceted program developed to accomplish a step-change in well control 

competency, enhancing crew capabilities and eliminating errors. 

A current joint industry effort is a blowout preventer (BOP) reliability and performance improvement program. IADC and the International Association of Oil and 

Gas Producers (IOGP) and their members are collaborating to develop significant 

and continuous enhancements to BOP operability and reliability. This is an unprecedented collaboration between oil and gas producers, equipment manufacturers and 

drilling contractors that began in the U.S. Gulf. It will give far greater assurance 

that BOP’s across the world will function on demand whilst also driving out cost 

related to equipment being out of service. 

U.S.-based offshore drilling contractors first initiated the data sharing project that 

underpins the BOP reliability program, supported by the recommendations for 

reporting of equipment malfunctions and failure in API Standard 53, Blowout 

Prevention Equipment Systems for Drilling Wells, Fourth Edition (API 53). The 

BOP reliability program establishes a permanent performance improvement tool 

that will track and capture performance of BOP equipment. 

The Macondo incident provoked the assemblage of the largest ever collaboration 

of well control subject matter experts and principals to create solutions to, and 

apply continuous improvement in, well control performance. A major focus of these 

efforts has been the API standards program and other international standardization 

platforms. IADC has connected its members to work collaboratively as subject 

matter experts on a vast number of standards committees. 

Industry has taken its own lead to fulfill the responsibility to secure safer, cleaner 

and more efficient drilling operations and IADC also strives to support and work 

with government agencies to develop regulations that are targeted, relevant and 

proportionate. Regrettably, recent U.S. offshore regulatory initiatives could actually 

lead to a less safe drilling environment. 

71 

3 Industry’s joint comments submitted to the Department of Interior in response to BSEE’s 

proposed rulemaking entitled, ‘‘Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental 

Shelf—Blowout Preventer Systems and Well Control.’’ Comments were submitted via electronic 

submission to: http://www.regulations.gov/. 

IADC believes the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement’s (BSEE) 

new proposed regulation on well control and blowout prevention is precisely the type 

of overly prescriptive regulation that restrains best industry safety practice and its 

subsequent benefits: innovation, jobs and economic growth. 

IADC readily acknowledges and commends the efforts of BSEE staff to produce 

such a major draft rule. We also appreciate the tremendous external pressures applied to the Bureau by opponents to the U.S. oil and gas industry, many of them 

uninformed and inexpert in the matters of well control and offshore operational integrity. However, the (undoubtedly) unintended consequences of BSEE’s inflexibly 

prescriptive Well Control Rule fails to account for and to encourage substantial industry improvements post-Macondo. In some cases, the requirements of the rule are 

simply unfeasible, requiring industry to operate sub-optimally. In addition, the 

measures in the rule differ widely from international standards and will negatively 

impact the market for U.S. MODUs. 

IADC’s formal response to the BSEE draft BOP rule, minus its detailed technical 

annexes, is attached to this statement for the committee’s convenience. The 

committee should note that IADC, and other key organizations and associations, 

have urged BSEE to continue to work with industry to jointly analyze ‘‘respective 

sections of the proposed rule in order to reach mutual understanding of the proposal, to correct fundamental flaws in the proposed rule, and allow constructive development of rules that are ultimately both workable and effective. We further 

request that the comment period be reopened during the workshops and that the 

presentation and discussion be part of the official record.’’ 3 We sincerely hope the 

Bureau will respond to the unanimous call from industry experts and leaders in this 

respect. 

Positive Policies to Spur Safer Energy Production: 

As this committee works to develop new policies and legislation, IADC 

recommends, among other things, the below changes to existing law to spur energy 

production: 

1. Narrowly targeted amendments to Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 

(OCSLA)—We urge, on behalf of both industry and the agencies involved, an 

amendment to OCSLA to allow BSEE & USCG more flexibility to undertake 

risk-based (rather than mandated annual) inspections in line with other leading jurisdictions in Europe, Canada and Australia. We encourage the proposed reforms by Director Salerno of BSEE to secure for the Bureau the goal 

of targeting risk and allocating scarce specialist resources where they are 

most needed. 

2. Increased offshore access—Based on the latest Federal estimate, the U.S. 

OCS contains approximately 90 billion barrels of oil and over 404 trillion 

cubic feet of natural gas. However, over 85 percent of the OCS remains off 

limits for leasing. The only areas open to OCS production lie in the west of 

the Gulf of Mexico, a few legacy leases off California, and areas in Alaska. 

New areas in the Atlantic off Virginia, the Carolinas and Georgia should be 

included in the 5-year plan for 2017–2022. In order to continue the development of our Nation’s offshore resources, Congress should ensure new areas 

are included for continued development on the OCS. 

In particular, it is important that all 26 OCS regions are made available for 

full exploration, utilizing the latest seismic technologies to delineate oil and 

gas potential. The Atlantic OCS contains an estimated 4.72 billion barrels of 

oil and 37.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, while the Eastern Gulf of Mexico 

holds an estimated 5.07 billion barrels of oil and 16.08 trillion cubic feet of 

natural gas. Those amounts represent more than 20 times the 2012 Federal 

offshore oil production and over 94 times the 2012 Federal offshore natural 

gas production. It is strategically important for the United States to confirm 

the availability of these resources and their potential for economic 

development. 

In the Arctic, it is vital that the United States maintain and accelerate opportunities to develop offshore oil and gas in the resource-rich Beaufort and 

Chukchi Seas. The region holds an estimated 23.6 billion barrels of oil and 

104 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. The United States must assert its 

72 

4http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=4d087117-d0ac-4446-9610- 

73f19c6592e8. 5http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/report/. 

economic interests in the Arctic at a level commensurate to the initiatives of 

its Arctic neighbors and competitors. 

3. Clarification of contractor liabilities/responsibilities under BSEE 

regulations—IADC has raised concern many times regarding uncertainty in 

contractor liabilities and responsibilities under BSEE’s regulations. These result from post-Macondo changes to agency policy reinterpreting assignment of 

regulatory responsibility for their entire suite of regulations, without the benefit of administrative rulemaking as provided for by the Administrative 

Procedure Act. IADC has addressed this situation in responding to rulemaking proposals issued after the policy change. Unfortunately, no rules have 

been made under APA and thus it is not possible to anticipate how the agency 

policy may have changed, particularly when anticipating the proposed BOP 

rule. 

4. Lifting the Crude Oil Export Ban—IADC lends its support to other organizations representing the oil and gas industry for lifting export restrictions on 

crude oil as it would bolster price growth for domestically produced oil and 

facilitate job creation. IADC wishes to emphasize that the oil and gas industry, which includes drilling contractors, accounts for 5.3 percent of total U.S. 

employment. The number of jobs supported by the upstream segment alone 

in 2010—2.2 million—is larger than the populations of 15 states. 

Every new oil and gas exploration and production job supports three new jobs 

in the supply chain and another six jobs in the broader economy. The supply 

chain extends beyond the oil producing regions into every state in the union. 

A new IHS study finds that lifting the ban would introduce an annual average 124,000 jobs into the supply chain and that 394,000 jobs annually would 

be created economy-wide between 2016–2030.4

The crude oil supply chain would add $26 billion to the GDP per year 2016– 

2013. Labor income would rise by more than $21 billion per year, on average, 

which translates to an additional $158 per household. Cumulative government revenues from corporate and personal taxes attribute to supply chain 

industries would increase by $429 billion. 

Closing 

Overall, the next 3 years will be challenging for the drilling contractor due to uncertainty over oil prices and Federal regulations. History shows that, with the ebb 

and flow of the oil market, industry should expect continued decline in U.S. crude 

oil production before it resumes growth again in late 2016 as EIA estimates.5 It remains to be seen how industry fares in the upswing as a result of the impacts of 

potentially deleterious regulation such as those that are currently proposed. The 

U.S. industry has, by its innovation and advanced technology, secured both an 

energy price miracle for Americans, and the world’s top spot in oil production. The 

question U.S. policymakers must decide is whether their ambition is for the United 

States to responsibly develop these resources and to continue to set an outstanding 

world example, or bequeath that to another jurisdiction. 

Submitted by: 

Stephen Colville 

***** 

The following document was submitted as an attachment to Mr. Colville’s testimony. 

This document is part of the hearing record and is being retained in the 

Committee’s official files: 

—IADC letter to BSEE 

Æ