*Peoples married and changed her name to Parra while her case was pending

before the district court, but this order adopts counsel’s convention and refers to her

by her former name.

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted June 2, 2005

Decided June 2, 2005

Before

 Hon. WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

 Hon. ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

 Hon. TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

No. 04-4178

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appeal from the United States District

Plaintiff-Appellee, Court for the Southern District of

Illinois

v.

No. 03-40061-002-JLF

NICOLE PEOPLES,*

Defendant-Appellant. James L. Foreman,

Judge.

O R D E R

Nicole Peoples and another woman distributed between 50 and 150 grams of

crack during February and March 2003. Peoples pleaded guilty to one count of

conspiracy to distribute, 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and three counts of

distributing crack, id. § 841(a)(1), and was sentenced to concurrent terms of 100

months’ imprisonment after a downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 for

substantial assistance. She filed a notice of appeal, but the government moved to

dismiss because her written plea agreement includes an appeal waiver. Counsel for

Peoples responded by seeking leave to withdraw and submitting what we have

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 04-4178 Page 2

construed as a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). See United

States v. Mason, 343 F.3d 893, 894–95 (7th Cir. 2003). We invited Peoples to

respond to counsel’s Anders brief, see Cir. R. 51(b), but she has not done so. 

Because counsel’s brief is facially adequate, we review only the potential issues that

counsel identifies. See United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 973–74 (7th Cir.

2002); United States v. Tabb, 125 F.3d 583, 584 (7th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).

The appeal waiver provides that Peoples will not “contest any aspect of her

conviction and sentence that could be contested under . . . any . . . provision of

federal law” whether on direct appeal or in collateral review (except for collateral

challenges based on retroactive amendments promulgated by the Sentencing

Commission or retroactive changes in the law that could prove her innocence). The

agreement explicitly waives Peoples’ right to challenge the constitutionality of the

guidelines and “any right to have facts that determine her offense level under the

Guidelines be alleged in an indictment and be found by a jury beyond a reasonable

doubt.”

Counsel informs us that Peoples has not expressed a desire to withdraw her

guilty pleas, and thus he has not explored any potential issues relating to the plea

colloquy or the voluntariness of those pleas. See United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d

667, 671–72 (7th Cir. 2002). And since Peoples does not wish to withdraw those

pleas (and thereby undo the benefit of a reduced sentence promised in return), she

is bound by the waiver of appeal. See United States v. Whitlow, 287 F.3d 638, 640

(7th Cir. 2002) (noting that an appeal waiver “stands or falls” with the plea); United

States v. Hare, 269 F.3d 859, 860–61 (7th Cir. 2001) (same). There is no exception

to the waiver’s enforceability for any argument under United States v. Booker, 125

S. Ct. 738 (2005). See United States v. Bownes, 405 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 2005).

Because we agree with counsel that raising the potential issues that he

identified would be frivolous, we GRANT his motion to withdraw and DISMISS the

appeal.