UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

In re:

THE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND 

MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO,

as representative of

THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, et al.,

Debtors. 1

PROMESA

Title III

No. 17 BK 3283-LTS

(Jointly Administered)

HON. RICARDO ANTONIO ROSSELLÓ 

NEVARES (in his official capacity), and THE 

PUERTO RICO FISCAL AGENCY AND 

FINANCIAL ADVISORY AUTHORITY,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND 

MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO, 

JOSÉ B. CARRIÓN III, ANDREW G. BIGGS, 

CARLOS M. GARCÍA, ARTHUR J. GONZÁLEZ, 

JOSÉ R. GONZÁLEZ, ANA J. MATOSANTOS, 

DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., and NATALIE A. JARESKO 

(in their official capacities),

Defendants.

Adv. Pro. No. 18- -LTS

ADVERSARY COMPLAINT FOR 

DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

 

1 The Debtors in these Title III Cases, along with each Debtor’s respective Title III case number and the last four (4) 

digits of each Debtor’s federal tax identification number, as applicable, are the (i) Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 

(Bankruptcy Case No. 17 BK 3283-LTS) (Last Four Digits of Federal Tax ID: 3481); (ii) Puerto Rico Sales Tax 

Financing Corporation (“COFINA”) (Bankruptcy Case No. 17 BK 3284-LTS) (Last Four Digits of Federal Tax 

ID: 8474); (iii) Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (“HTA”) (Bankruptcy Case No. 17 BK 3567-

LTS) (Last Four Digits of Federal Tax ID: 3808); (iv) Employees Retirement System of the Government of the 

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (“ERS”) (Bankruptcy Case No. 17 BK 3566-LTS) (Last Four Digits of Federal 

Tax ID: 9686); and (v) Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (“PREPA”) (Bankruptcy Case No. 17 BK 4780-

LTS) (Last Four Digits of Federal Tax ID: 3747). (Title III case numbers are listed as Bankruptcy Case numbers 

due to software limitations).

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Plaintiff Hon. Ricardo Antonio Rosselló Nevares, in his official capacity as the Governor 

of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (the “Governor”), and Plaintiff the Puerto Rico Fiscal 

Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (“AAFAF,” together with the Governor, the 

“Plaintiffs”), hereby bring this Adversary Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (the 

“Complaint”)2against Defendants (i) the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto 

Rico (the “Oversight Board” or “Board”), (ii) each of its members, and (iii) its Executive Director 

(collectively, the “Defendants”), solely in their official capacities, and allege as follows:

NATURE OF THE ACTION

1. By this Complaint, Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief to foil the 

Oversight Board’s unlawful attempts to usurp the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico’s political and 

governmental powers and right to home rule. Over the past several months, the Oversight Board 

has used the fiscal plan and budget certification processes contemplated by the Puerto Rico 

Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, 48 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2241 (“PROMESA”), in 

an attempt to impose its policy preferences on Puerto Rico’s people, micromanage every aspect of 

budget expenditures, and exercise legislative power the Board does not have, all over the 

objections of Puerto Rico’s elected Government. The Board’s efforts exceed its lawful powers 

and should be enjoined by this Court. 

2. PROMESA established the Oversight Board to help Puerto Rico “achieve fiscal 

responsibility and access to the capital markets.” PROMESA § 101(a); 48 U.S.C. § 2121(a). The 

Oversight Board derives its power solely from the statutory authority Congress granted it under 

PROMESA. While Congress gave the Board certain powers, Congress respected the people of 

 

2 As used in this Complaint, (i) “Government” means the government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, but 

not the Oversight Board; (ii) “Commonwealth” means the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; and (iii) “Legislature” 

means the Legislative Assembly of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Unless otherwise specified, all emphasis 

is added, and all citations and quotations are omitted.

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Puerto Rico’s right to self-government and home rule. In recognition of these rights, Congress 

created an Oversight Board of limited power and preserved the democratically-elected 

Government’s autonomy. While PROMESA grants the Oversight Board the power to certify fiscal 

plans and budgets (either proposed by the Government, developed cooperatively, or developed by 

the Board on its own) and to monitor compliance with them, PROMESA preserves to the 

Government the political and governmental power to make policy decisions. PROMESA gives 

the Oversight Board the power to make policy “recommendations” to the Government regarding 

a wide range of issues. But no one can dispute that the Governor is free to reject those 

recommendations. See PROMESA § 205; 48 U.S.C. § 2145.

3. To be sure, PROMESA granted the Oversight Board authority to establish 

parameters to bring fiscal responsibility to Puerto Rico and monitor Puerto Rico’s progress, such 

as the power to approve and certify proposed fiscal plans and budgets for both the Commonwealth 

and territorial instrumentalities. See PROMESA §§ 101(d)(1), 201(c)(3), (e), 202(c)–(f); 48 

U.S.C. §§ 2121(d)(1), 2141(c)(3), (e), 2142(c)–(f). The Oversight Board also has authority to 

monitor and review government actions for compliance with certified fiscal plans and budgets, 

although these compliance powers are much more closely circumscribed for the Commonwealth 

itself than for Commonwealth instrumentalities, such as public corporations. See PROMESA 

§§ 203(a)-(c), 204(a); 48 U.S.C. §§ 2143(a)–(c), 2144(a). But one consistent principle is that the 

Oversight Board cannot impose its policy preferences on the Government both for the 

Commonwealth or individual instrumentalities. See PROMESA §§ 205(a) (permitting only 

specific policy recommendations), 303; 48 U.S.C. §§ 2145(a), 2163. 

4. Congress specifically considered—but resoundingly rejected—granting the 

Oversight Board the broad power to impose its policy preferences over Government objections. 

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PROMESA discussion drafts in the House and Senate included provisions similar to those under 

the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Act of 1995, Pub. 

L. No. 104-8, 109 Stat. 97 (1995), which granted unilateral power to the District of Columbia 

Financial Control Board to nullify legislative acts and compel the mayor and city council to adopt 

its policy recommendations. But Congress discarded these “anti-democratic” provisions, which 

appear nowhere in PROMESA as enacted. Instead, Congress established a supervisory Oversight 

Board to assist and guide the elected Government, rather than a control board that would 

functionally supplant it.

5. PROMESA section 205 allows the Oversight Board to make policy 

“recommendations” to the Government “at any time,” such that recommendations can be proposed 

as standalone policy considerations or as part of a fiscal plan. But even if submitted through a 

fiscal plan, Oversight Board policy recommendations are still “recommendations” under 

PROMESA section 205, which the Government is free to reject. If the Governor declines to adopt 

a Board recommendation, PROMESA’s only requirement is that the Governor explain his decision 

to the President of the United States, Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, and 

Majority Leader of the United States Senate. See PROMESA § 205; 48 U.S.C. § 2145. The 

Oversight Board cannot compel the Governor to comply with its policy recommendations, whether 

those recommendations are free-standing or advanced in a fiscal plan. And the Board certainly 

cannot force those recommendations on the Commonwealth via a budget.

6. Specifically, the Oversight Board cannot do what it is attempting to do: impose 

mandatory workforce reductions, change the roles and responsibilities of certain government 

officials, criminalize certain acts under Puerto Rico law and otherwise seek to micromanage Puerto 

Rico’s government.

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7. This Court has already recognized the limitations on the Oversight Board’s power 

vis-à-vis the duly elected Government of Puerto Rico. See In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for 

Puerto Rico, Case No. 17 BK 3283-LTS, 2017 WL 7160982 at *14 (D. P.R. Nov. 16, 2017) (“CTO 

Op.”) (“Congress did not grant the [Oversight Board] the power to supplant, bypass, or replace the 

Commonwealth’s elected leaders and their appointees in the exercise of their managerial duties 

whenever the Oversight Board might deem such a change expedient.”); CTO Op. at 12 (“Although 

the [Board’s] fiscal plan and budgeting powers give it a strong and substantially determinative 

voice in overall strategy regarding the Commonwealth’s revenues, expenses, and general direction 

for responsible management, they do not imply that the [Board’s] role includes . . . direct executive 

authority over implementation of those plans or budgets.”); CTO Op. at 18 (“PROMESA requires 

a debtor to work alongside the [Board] and divides the debtor’s authority by putting key 

restructuring tools in the hands of the [Board], while preserving the elected government’s 

operational control and voice in management and strategic decisions. . . . PROMESA leaves the 

elected government in place and does not suspend it in favor of direct management by the 

[Board].”).

8. The Oversight Board has the responsibility to review and certify a fiscal plan for 

the Commonwealth. PROMESA § 201; 48 U.S.C. § 2141. To be clear, the Government is not 

challenging certification. But the Board cannot expand its legal powers by using its fiscal plan to 

impose policy initiatives on the Government that the Board cannot otherwise implement on its 

own. Nor can the Oversight Board use its budget approval powers to bootstrap its fiscal plan 

recommendations to specific expenditure line items as it has done.

9. If the Oversight Board’s improper actions are not checked, the people of Puerto 

Rico will be disenfranchised because their locally elected Government will be stripped of its 

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policymaking powers. This would deprive United States citizens living in Puerto Rico of their 

democratic rights. The Oversight Board’s improper usurpation of the Government’s role will also 

bring with it a host of ill-conceived measures that may irreversibly increase outmigration, thereby 

reducing the tax base and worsening Puerto Rico’s economic and humanitarian problems. This 

Court must—again—prevent the Oversight Board from overstepping its carefully delineated, 

statutory bounds.

PARTIES

10. Plaintiff Governor Ricardo Rosselló Nevares is the duly elected Governor of Puerto 

Rico.

11. Plaintiff AAFAF is a public corporation created under section 5(a) of the Enabling 

Act of the Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority, Law No. 2 of January 18, 2017 (“Law 

2-2017”), “for the purpose of acting as fiscal agent, financial advisor, and report agent of all entities 

of the Government of Puerto Rico and to assist such entities in facing the serious fiscal and 

economic crisis that Puerto Rico is currently undergoing.”

12. Defendant Oversight Board is an entity within the Government that Congress 

created under PROMESA. See PROMESA § 101(b)(1), (c)(1); 48 U.S.C. § 2121(b)(1), (c)(1). 

Under PROMESA, the Oversight Board must maintain (and it does in fact maintain) an office in 

Puerto Rico. The Plaintiffs do not seek damages with respect to the Oversight Board.

13. Defendant José B. Carrión III (the “Oversight Board Chairman”) is the Chairman 

of the Oversight Board. The Oversight Board Chairman participated in the Oversight Board’s 

certification of the Board Fiscal Plan and Board Budget (each as defined below). The Oversight 

Board Chairman is empowered, together with the Oversight Board Members (defined below) and 

the Oversight Board Executive Director (defined below), to oversee and monitor the 

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implementation of the Board Fiscal Plan and Board Budget. The Plaintiffs sue the Oversight Board 

Chairman, and any successors thereto, solely in their official capacities. The Plaintiffs do not seek 

damages with respect to the Oversight Board Chairman.

14. Defendants Andrew G. Biggs, Carlos M. García, Arthur J. González, José R. 

González, Ana J. Matosantos, David A. Skeel, Jr. (collectively, the “Oversight Board Members”)

are each members of the Oversight Board. The Oversight Board Members participated in the 

Oversight Board’s certification of the Board Fiscal Plan and Board Budget. The Oversight Board 

Members are each empowered, together with the Oversight Board Chairman and Oversight Board 

Executive Director, to oversee and monitor the implementation of the Board Fiscal Plan and Board 

Budget. The Plaintiffs sue the Oversight Board Members, and any successors thereto, solely in 

their official capacities. The Plaintiffs do not seek damages with respect to the Oversight Board 

Members.

15. Defendant Natalie A. Jaresko (the “Oversight Board Executive Director”) is the 

Executive Director of the Oversight Board. The Oversight Board Executive Director participated 

in the Oversight Board’s certification of the Board Fiscal Plan and Board Budget. The Oversight 

Board Executive Director is empowered, together with the Oversight Board Chairman and 

Oversight Board Members, to oversee and monitor the implementation of the Board Fiscal Plan 

and Board Budget. The Plaintiffs sue the Oversight Board Executive Director, and any successors 

thereto, solely in their official capacities. The Plaintiffs do not seek damages with respect to the 

Oversight Board Executive Director.

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JURISDICTION AND VENUE

16. This Court has federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because the 

action arises under PROMESA, a federal statute. In addition, PROMESA section 106(a) vests 

federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction to hear disputes against the Oversight Board, or any 

action otherwise arising out of PROMESA. See 48 U.S.C. § 2126(a). This Court also has 

jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to PROMESA section 306(a)(2) because this action relates 

to the Commonwealth’s PROMESA Title III case, which has the principal purpose of adjusting 

the financial liabilities of the Commonwealth, see 48 U.S.C. § 2166(a)(2), and because any plan 

of adjustment in the Commonwealth’s Title III case must be consistent with a certified fiscal plan, 

see PROMESA § 314(b)(7); 48 U.S.C. § 2174(b)(7).

17. This Court has personal jurisdiction over the Oversight Board and its members 

because the Board is an entity within the Government, which must maintain, and does in fact 

maintain, an office in Puerto Rico. This Court also has personal jurisdiction over the Oversight 

Board and its members under PROMESA section 306(c).

18. Venue is proper in this District under PROMESA sections 106(a) and 307, and 28 

U.S.C. § 1391. See 48 U.S.C. §§ 2126(a), 2167.

19. This is an appropriate action for declaratory and injunctive relief under the federal 

Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and 2202. Declaratory relief is proper here because 

there exists an actual, justiciable controversy between the parties concerning the Oversight Board’s 

efforts to impose certain operational decisions on the Government that have been expressly 

reserved to the Commonwealth under PROMESA section 205(a).

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20. The Court may grant temporary and preliminary injunctive relief pursuant to Rule 

65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (applicable in this Title III case under Rule 7065 of the 

Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure as incorporated pursuant to PROMESA section 310).

FACTS

I. PROMESA’s Carefully Balanced Division of Powers

21. Effective June 30, 2016, the U.S. Congress enacted PROMESA to stabilize Puerto 

Rico’s economy by establishing oversight of the Government’s budget and fiscal policies and by 

providing a mechanism for the Commonwealth to restructure its debts. See PROMESA 

§ 201(b)(2); 48 U.S.C. §2141(b)(2). 

22. To that end, PROMESA created the Oversight Board, whose express purpose is “to 

provide a method for [Puerto Rico] to achieve fiscal responsibility and access to the capital 

markets.” PROMESA § 101(a), (b)(1); 48 U.S.C. § 2121(a), (b)(1). The Board is structured to 

provide oversight to help Puerto Rico achieve these goals, but the details of the steps necessary to 

achieve these goals and the execution of these steps is reserved to the governmental and political 

discretion of Puerto Rico’s Government.

23. Consistent with its purpose, the Oversight Board’s powers include:

• collecting information from the federal government, the Puerto Rican Government, 

and creditors, see PROMESA § 104(c)–(d), 48 U.S.C. § 2124(c)–(d); 

• subpoenaing information from others, see PROMESA § 104(f), 48 U.S.C. § 

2124(f); 

• investigating disclosure and sales practices for Puerto Rico government bonds, see 

PROMESA § 104(o), 48 U.S.C. § 2124(o); 

• certifying voluntary agreements under Title VI, filing Title III petitions on behalf 

of the Commonwealth or any of its instrumentalities, or submitting plans of

adjustment in a Title III case, see PROMESA § 104(i)–(j), 48 U.S.C. § 2124(i)–

(j); 

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• enforcing Puerto Rico’s laws barring public sector employees from striking, see

PROMESA § 104(h), 48 U.S.C. § 2124(h); and 

• various other administrative powers, see PROMESA §104(a), 48 U.S.C. § 2124(a) 

(hold hearings, receive evidence and administer oaths), (e) (receive gifts and 

bequests), (g) (enter into contracts), (k) (institute litigation to enforce its powers),

and (n) (use administrative support services from the federal government), among 

others. 

In addition, the Oversight Board has certain limited powers to participate in the Commonwealth’s 

fiscal planning and budgeting process, described in more detail below.

24. Despite granting the Oversight Board significant powers, PROMESA strikes a 

careful balance designed to preserve the Government’s political and governmental powers. In a 

section entitled “Reservation of Territorial Power to Control Territory and Territorial 

Instrumentalities,” Congress explicitly provided that “subject to Title I and Title II of this Act,” 

PROMESA “does not limit or impair the power of [Puerto Rico] to control, by legislation or 

otherwise, [Puerto Rico] or any territorial instrumentality thereof in the exercise of political or 

governmental powers of [Puerto Rico] or [its] territorial instrumentality, including expenditures 

for such exercise . . . .” PROMESA § 303; 48 U.S.C. § 2163. 

25. PROMESA’s legislative history makes clear that Congress intended for the 

Government to retain its political and governmental powers, including primary control over critical 

aspects of fiscal planning and budgeting. A side-by-side analysis of the original bill Congress 

considered and the law it ultimately enacted confirms Congress’s intent to circumscribe the 

Oversight Board’s power. While the original bill would have granted the Oversight Board 

expansive powers to command and control the Government, the final version of PROMESA 

removed the Board’s authority to impose dictates on the Government and greatly curtailed the 

Oversight Board’s power over political and governmental decisions. H.R. Rep. 114-602(I), 2016 

WL 3124840, at *111 (“After intensive negotiations, the bill establishes a board that is robust but 

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reasonable. Its powers are far less potent than the powers that Congress conferred upon the board 

that it established for the District of Columbia . . . .”). 

26. This balance was intended to protect all stakeholders, but primarily the people of 

Puerto Rico, who are entitled to a functioning government that can provide essential services and 

preserve their “life, health and general welfare.” P.R. CONST., art. II § 19. As PROMESA’s 

legislative history makes clear, “In general, the oversight board . . . will provide guardrails for the 

Puerto Rico government, but will not supplant or replace the territory’s elected leaders, who will 

retain primary control over budgeting and fiscal policymaking.” H.R. Rep. 114-602(l), 2016 WL 

3124840, at *112 (2016).

27. Congress could have empowered the Oversight Board to impose its policy 

preferences on the Government by including provisions similar to those under the District of 

Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-8, 

109 Stat. 97 (1995), which granted unilateral power to the District of Columbia Financial Control 

Board to declare significantly inconsistent legislative acts null and void, to pre-review every 

contract the D.C. government proposed to execute, and to compel the mayor and city council to 

adopt its recommendations. Even though the House and Senate entertained discussion drafts of 

precursor bills to PROMESA that contained such provisions, Congress expressly declined to 

include such provisions in the final law.

28. In addition, the Board’s attempt to usurp power is inconsistent with Congress’s 

affirmative intent. In PROMESA section 405, Congress states that the Board’s purpose is to 

“provide the Government of Puerto Rico with the resources and the tools it needs to address an 

immediate existing and imminent crisis,” PROMESA § 405(n)(1), “provide an oversight 

mechanism to assist the Government of Puerto Rico in reforming its fiscal governance and support

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the implementation of potential debt restructuring,” id. § 405(n)(3), and “benefit the lives of 3.5 

million American citizens living in Puerto Rico by encouraging the Government of Puerto Rico to 

resolve its longstanding fiscal governance issues and return to economic growth.” Id. § 405(n)(5). 

The plain language of Congress’ intent under PROMESA makes clear that the Oversight Board’s 

role is to assist, support, and encourage the Government, not to supplant or control it.

29. Reflecting this intent, PROMESA contemplates a three-part scheme for Oversight 

Board involvement in the Government’s fiscal and budgeting affairs. First, PROMESA requires 

the development of a fiscal plan covering at least a five-year period that includes (i) projections of 

anticipated future government revenues and (ii) a broad plan for future government expenditures 

in various areas. See PROMESA § 201(b)(1); 48 U.S.C. § 2141 (b)(1). Second, PROMESA 

contemplates that each fiscal year the Government will develop a budget, based on the Oversight 

Board’s revenue forecasts, that sets forth in greater—but not complete—detail Government 

expenditures that comply with the approved fiscal plan. See PROMESA § 202; 48 U.S.C. § 2142. 

Third, PROMESA empowers the Oversight Board to make recommendations at any time “on 

actions the territorial government may take to ensure compliance with the Fiscal Plan.” 

PROMESA § 205; 48 U.S.C. § 2145.

30. Consistent with PROMESA’s reservation of “political or governmental powers” to 

Puerto Rico, “including expenditures” for the exercise of those powers, PROMESA § 303, 

48 U.S.C. § 2163, the Oversight Board has differing levels of power and discretion with respect to 

each of these three mechanisms. The Oversight Board Chairman has acknowledged that the 

Board’s powers are far from absolute and that the Government retains important and meaningful 

discretion to manage its affairs and operations. For example, the Oversight Board Chairman has 

stated that “[the Oversight Board] provides the room; [the Government] provide[s] the furniture.” 

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José A. Delgado Robles, “Rosselló Needs More Than 2 Years for His Fiscal Plan,” El Nuevo Dia

(Feb. 27, 2017), available at https://www.elnuevodia.com/english/english/nota/rosselloneedsmore 

than2yearsforhisfiscalplan-2295579/ (last visited July 5, 2018) (a true and correct copy as retrieved 

on July 5, 2018 is attached as Exhibit 1). The Oversight Board Chairman explained that the 

“room” is the amount of overall Government revenues; the Board is empowered to determine the 

amount of overall expenditures permitted to achieve savings, but the Government retains authority 

to determine the means by which those savings will be achieved. See id. Through the Board Fiscal 

Plan and Board Budget, the Oversight Board is vastly exceeding the limitations on its powers—it 

is not only creating the size of the room (i.e., establishing revenues and expenditures), but it is 

attempting to select and place every piece of furniture in it (i.e., imposing policy through granular 

line-item expenditures and related measures to achieve those expenditures). 

A. PROMESA’s Fiscal Plan Certification Process

31. PROMESA section 201 establishes a detailed procedure for adopting a fiscal plan. 

Under this procedure, the Governor is entitled in the first instance to develop and submit a 

proposed fiscal plan to the Oversight Board. See PROMESA § 201(c)(2); 48 U.S.C. § 2141(c)(2). 

After reviewing the Governor’s proposed fiscal plan, the Oversight Board must determine whether 

it “provide[s] a method to achieve fiscal responsibility and access to the capital markets” and 

satisfies 14 mandatory requirements of PROMESA section 201(b)(1). 48 U.S.C. § 2141(b)(1). 

Only if the Governor’s fiscal plan submissions—including any revisions within the time specified 

by the Board—fail to satisfy PROMESA’s enumerated fiscal plan requirements may the Oversight 

Board propose and certify its own fiscal plan. See PROMESA § 201(d)(2); 48 U.S.C. § 

2141(d)(2).

32. PROMESA sets forth 14 criteria the Oversight Board must use in determining 

whether a proposed fiscal plan should be approved and certified. See PROMESA § 201(b)(1); 48 

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U.S.C. § 2141(b)(1). Importantly, none of these criteria involves specific policy pronouncements 

or limitations on particular categories of expenditures. Rather, the criteria are limited to certain: 

(i) financial requirements;3(ii) informational requirements;4and (iii) other broad directives.5

Although PROMESA section 201(b)(1)(a)(ii) requires a fiscal plan to identify any specific bills 

the Board believes are necessary to achieve compliance with the fiscal plan, PROMESA does not 

grant the Oversight Board authority to compel the Legislature to enact legislation.

B. PROMESA’s Budget Certification Process

33. The budget certification process is similar to the process for fiscal plans under 

which the Oversight Board must review the Government’s proposed budget to determine whether 

it complies with the certified fiscal plan. See PROMESA § 202; 48 U.S.C. § 2142. As with fiscal 

plans, the Oversight Board may develop and certify its own budget only if the Governor fails 

timely to submit a compliant budget. PROMESA § 202(e)(3); 48 U.S.C. § 2142(e)(3). If a Boardimposed budget is certified, such budget is “deemed to be approved” by the Governor and 

Legislature under PROMESA section 202(e)(3). 

34. The Oversight Board’s budget powers to certify a budget that is “deemed approved” 

by the Government do not include the power to pass a joint resolution implementing substantive 

policy measures of the sort the Legislature would pass. PROMESA does not authorize the Board 

 

3 The financial requirements include: (i) ensuring adequate funding for essential public services, pension systems, 

and investments necessary to promote economic growth; (ii) providing for the elimination of structural deficits, 

and (iii) establishing sustainable debt burdens. See PROMESA § 201(b)(1)(B)-(E), (J); 48 U.S.C. 

§ 2141(b)(1)(B)-(E), (J).

4 The informational requirements include: (i) estimates of revenues and expenditures in conformance with agreed 

accounting standards; (ii) independent forecasts of revenue; (iii) a debt sustainability analysis; and (iv) additional 

information that the Oversight Board determines is necessary. See PROMESA § 201(b)(1)(A), (H), (I), (L); 48 

U.S.C. § 2141(b)(1)(A), (H), (I), (L).

5 These broad directives include that the proposed fiscal plan “improve fiscal governance, accountability, and 

internal controls” and “enable the achievement of fiscal targets” or creditor-protection mechanisms that prohibit 

transferring funds from an instrumentality to the Government (or another instrumentality) or eliminating relative 

lawful priorities or liens. See PROMESA § 201(b)(1)(F)-(G), (M)-(N),; 48 U.S.C. § 2141(b)(1)(F)-(G), (M)-(N).

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to usurp the legislative function; to the contrary, PROMESA section 204 gives the Board the 

authority to review and only under certain limited circumstances—i.e., with respect to aggregate 

expenditures and revenues, and only after the applicable Government entity fails to issue a 

certificate that the estimated costs are “not significantly inconsistent” with the applicable fiscal 

plan pursuant to PROMESA section 204(a)(2)—to invalidate new laws, rules, regulations, 

executive orders, and contracts, leaving the power to legislate with the Legislature. If Congress 

had wanted the Oversight Board to have the power to enact substantive legislation through the 

budget process, Congress would have said so. It did not. Moreover, Congress would not have 

created the elaborate and carefully balanced structures set forth in PROMESA sections 204(a)(2) 

and 202(d)(1) if the Oversight Board could simply legislate as it wished. The Board’s budgetary 

powers are therefore limited to the ordinary interpretation of the term “budget,” i.e., an itemization 

of revenues and expenses.

35. A Board-imposed budget that includes substantive mandates far exceeds the 

Board’s power under section 204 and overstates the Board’s role in PROMESA’s “dual regulatory 

scheme.” See Centro De Periodismo Investigativo v. Financial Oversight and Management Board 

for Puerto Rico, Case No. 17-1743 (D.P.R. May 4, 2018) [ECF No. 36]. In fact, the Oversight 

Board Executive Director has acknowledged that if the Legislature fails to implement labor reform 

as required under the Board Budget, the Board will “have to revise the revenue numbers [and] . . . 

[t]hose revenues that are generated would have to be eliminated from the plan.” PROMESA 

Oversight Board Certifies Its Own Versions of Fiscal Plans for Commonwealth, PREPA, PRASA; 

Matosantos Does not Support Either Version of Commonwealth Plan, REORG RESEARCH (Apr. 19, 

2018, 7:59 PM), https://platform.reorg-research.com/app#company/1869/intel/view/52996 (last 

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visited July 5, 2018) (a true and correct copy as retrieved on July 5, 2018 is attached as Exhibit 

2).

36. In addition, any interpretation of PROMESA section 202(e)(3) that would permit 

the Board to impose joint resolutions on the Legislature would also implicitly amend the Puerto 

Rico Constitution, which requires that joint resolutions be passed under the ordinary legislative 

process for bills. See P.R. Const., art. III § 18 (“every joint resolution shall follow the same 

legislative process as that of a bill”). If Congress intended for the Oversight Board—in 

contravention of the Puerto Rico Constitution—to impose legislation through the budget approval 

process, Congress would have stated so expressly. 

37. Significantly, with respect to territorial budgets (such as that of the 

Commonwealth), PROMESA includes no provision empowering the Oversight Board to 

implement specific policy decisions or direct Government operations. See PROMESA 

§ 203(d)(1); 48 U.S.C. § 2143(d)(1). This omission is no accident; PROMESA expressly 

authorizes certain limited Oversight Board intervention in personnel decisions for 

instrumentalities, but not for the Commonwealth itself. For example, PROMESA allows the 

Oversight Board to institute automatic hiring freezes to bring the actual fiscal performance of a 

government instrumentality that has its own separate Title III petition into line with its certified 

budget. See PROMESA § 203(d)(2)(B)(i); 48 U.S.C. § 2143(d)(2)(B)(i). But PROMESA does 

not empower the Oversight Board to reduce personnel spending by the territorial Government.

C. Oversight Board Recommendations

38. PROMESA section 205(a) authorizes, but does not require, the Oversight Board to 

make non-binding “recommendations” to the Government “on actions the territorial government

may take to ensure compliance with the Fiscal Plan, or to otherwise promote the financial stability, 

economic growth, management responsibility, and service delivery efficiency of” the 

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Government.” 48 U.S.C. § 2145(a). The use of the term “may”—as opposed to “shall” or “must,” 

as used in PROMESA sections 201(a), 201(b)(1), and 201(b)(2)—establishes a discretionary, 

rather than mandatory, duty.

39. PROMESA also includes a non-exhaustive list of subject matters appropriate for 

recommendations. See PROMESA § 205(a); 48 U.S.C. § 2145(a). Unlike the broad criteria that 

PROMESA requires for a fiscal plan, the list of subject matters Congress deemed appropriate for 

recommendations is far more granular.6

40. Consistent with this language, PROMESA section 205(b) establishes procedural 

mechanisms for the Government to adopt or reject such recommendations within 90 days, which 

underscore the Government’s full discretion as to which recommendations should be implemented. 

See PROMESA § 205(b)(1), 48 U.S.C. § 2145(b)(1). On the one hand, the Governor is authorized 

not to adopt an Oversight Board recommendation, as long as such rejection is accompanied by a 

written statement to the U.S. President and U.S. Congress explaining the Government’s decision. 

See PROMESA § 205(b)(3); 48 U.S.C. § 2145(b)(3). On the other hand, even if the Governor

decides to adopt a recommendation, he retains discretion as to the extent to which the Government

is adopting the recommendation and the means by which it will implement the recommendation. 

See PROMESA § 205(b)(2); 48 U.S.C. § 2145(b)(2) (requiring the Government only to provide a 

written implementation plan that includes “specific performance measures to determine the extent 

to which the [Government] has adopted the recommendation.”). Beyond this, PROMESA contains 

no mechanism to compel the Governor to accept an Oversight Board recommendation.

 

6 For example, appropriate subjects for recommendations include, among others: (i) “placing controls on 

expenditures for personnel,” PROMESA § 205(a)(1), 48 U.S.C. § 2145(a)(1); (ii) modifying “the structural 

relationship of departments, agencies, and independent agencies” of the Government, PROMESA § 205(a)(2), 48 

U.S.C. § 2145(a)(2); (iii) “the effects of the [Commonwealth’s] laws and court orders on the operations” of the 

Government, PROMESA § 205(a)(7), 48 U.S.C. § 2145(a)(7); (iv) establishing a “personnel system . . . based 

upon employee performance standards,” PROMESA § 205(a)(8), 48 U.S.C. § 2145(a)(8); and (v) “the adjustment 

of staffing levels,” PROMESA § 205(a)(9), 48 U.S.C. § 2145(a)(9).

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41. Congress made a conscious decision to grant the Government broad discretion 

regarding recommendations. The March 29, 2016 discussion draft of House Bill 5278, which 

ultimately evolved into PROMESA, would have empowered the Oversight Board to impose its 

recommendations over a Government rejection, stating that “the [Oversight Board], by a majority 

vote of the members of the [Oversight Board], may take such action concerning the 

recommendation as the [Oversight Board] determines to be appropriate . . . .” H.R. 5278, 

§ 207(c) (Mar. 29, 2016). That “anti-democratic” provision was revised to ensure that the 

Oversight Board’s recommendations under section 205(a) are non-binding. H.R. Rep. 114-602(I), 

2016 WL 3124840, at *114. At the same time, PROMESA section 201(b)(1)(K) was included, 

providing that fiscal plans should “adopt appropriate recommendations submitted by the 

Oversight Board under section 205(a).” 48 U.S.C. § 2141(b)(1)(K).

42. Taken together, the revision to section 205(a) and inclusion of section 201(b)(1)(K) 

indicate that Congress did not intend to empower the Oversight Board to impose its 

recommendations on the Government. Instead, PROMESA granted the Oversight Board the 

power to make recommendations to the Government and, in the fiscal plan context, provided that 

the Government should adopt recommendations where appropriate. The requirement that the fiscal 

plan include “appropriate recommendations,” however, does not give the Board the power to 

impose its policy recommendations through the fiscal plan. Rather, it permits the fiscal plan to 

include Board recommendations that are “appropriate”—i.e., only those recommendations that the 

Government has agreed to adopt under PROMESA section 205(a). If the Oversight Board could 

compel the Government to adopt its policy initiatives by imposing a Board-developed fiscal plan 

or budget that included such measures, it would nullify PROMESA section 205. See U.S. ex rel. 

Eisenstein v. City of New York, New York, 556 U.S. 928, 933 (2009) (rejecting a statutory 

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construction that “would contradict well-established principles of statutory interpretation that 

require statutes to be construed in a manner that gives effect to all of their provisions”). Thus, any 

section 205(a) recommendation in a certified fiscal plan that the Government rejects as 

inappropriate is void and is not part of the certified fiscal plan.

43. If Congress had wanted to grant the Board the power to impose binding policy 

initiatives—and to change substantive laws—through the Board’s fiscal-plan certification powers, 

Congress could have said so, clearly and directly. It did not.

II. Certification Process for the Commonwealth’s Fiscal Plan and Budget

A. The Oversight Board Rejects the Governor’s Fiscal Plan Proposals and 

Certifies its Own Fiscal Plan

44. On March 13, 2017, the Oversight Board certified a Governor-proposed fiscal plan 

for the Commonwealth under PROMESA section 201(e)(1), which was subsequently corrected on 

April 26, 2017 and updated with a revised fiscal plan model on August 29, 2017 (as corrected and 

updated, the “2017 Certified Commonwealth Fiscal Plan”).

45. During September 2017, Hurricanes Irma and María caused widespread damage 

throughout Puerto Rico. On October 31, 2017, in light of the new reality facing Puerto Rico as a 

result of the devastating effects of these historic storms on the Commonwealth’s infrastructure and 

economy, the Oversight Board requested the Governor to submit a new Commonwealth fiscal plan 

to replace the 2017 Certified Commonwealth Fiscal Plan.

46. On January 24, 2018, the Governor submitted to the Oversight Board a revised 

Commonwealth fiscal plan (the “January 24, 2018 Commonwealth Fiscal Plan Submission”). On 

February 5, 2018, the Oversight Board sent the Governor a notice of violation under PROMESA 

section 201(c)(3)(B)(i), asserting that the January 24, 2018 Commonwealth Fiscal Plan 

Submission required further revisions in order to meet the certification criteria under PROMESA 

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section 201(b)(1). This notice of violation required the Governor to submit a revised fiscal plan 

that included certain changes to baseline projections,7structural reforms,8and fiscal measures.9

47. On February 12, 2018, the Governor submitted to the Oversight Board a second 

revised Commonwealth fiscal plan (the “February 12, 2018 Commonwealth Fiscal Plan 

Submission”), which responded to the Oversight Board’s February 5 notice of violation. The 

February 12, 2018 Commonwealth Fiscal Plan Submission was also rejected by the Oversight 

Board.

48. After several weeks of intense negotiation between the Governor and Oversight 

Board, on March 23, 2018, the Governor submitted to the Oversight Board a third revised 

Commonwealth fiscal plan (the “March 23, 2018 Commonwealth Fiscal Plan Submission”). On 

March 28, 2018, the Oversight Board again sent the Governor a notice of violation under 

PROMESA section 201(c)(3)(B)(i), which asserted that the March 23, 2018 Commonwealth Fiscal 

Plan Submission required additional changes to baseline projections, structural reforms, and fiscal 

measures before the Board could certify it.

49. On April 2, 2018, the Governor sent a response letter to the Oversight Board, stating 

that certain of the Board’s suggested revisions in its March 28 notice of violation were in fact 

 

7 The Oversight Board’s required changes to “baseline projections” in a revised fiscal plan included, among other 

things: (i) any federal disaster relief appropriations for Puerto Rico; (ii) specific backup data for general fund 

revenue projections on a line-by-line basis; (iii) sufficient capital expenditures of $400 million per year; and 

(iv) emergency reserves of $650 million over the next five years and building to a total of $1.3 billion over the 

next ten years.

8 The Oversight Board’s required changes to “structural reforms” included, among other things: (i) improvements 

in specific World Bank Ease of Doing Business measures; (ii) labor market and welfare reforms; (iii) tax reforms; 

(iv) infrastructure reforms and capital investment; (v) human capital targets (such as improvements to test scores 

related to Spanish, Math, and English proficiency and a target for retention of new employees); and (vi) power 

sector reforms.

9 The Oversight Board’s required changes to “fiscal measures” included, among other things: (i) details regarding 

municipal subsidies and transition to a county structure; (ii) long-term reductions in pension liabilities; 

(iii) detailed explanations for achieving healthcare savings by initiative; (iv) detailed reduction of agency costs; 

(v) tax compliance measures; and (vi) the establishment of an Office of the CFO to establish centralized 

management and operational control over all Government fiscal agencies.

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policy “recommendations” as addressed in PROMESA section 205(a), which the Board cannot 

mandate the Government to adopt. In particular, the Governor noted that the suggested revisions 

were inappropriate because they would: (i) require legislative or executive action (such as labor 

reform and pension reform); (ii) alter existing law or contracts (such as removing the annual cap 

on the Crudita petroleum tax, changing the flow of Government funds, and eliminating Christmas 

bonuses); or (iii) attempt to control day-to-day Government operations (such as imposing specific 

traffic initiatives and rejecting the Government’s proposal to transition to a county government 

model). Through his April 2 letter, the Governor communicated to the Oversight Board that the 

Government’s further revised fiscal plan would not include these recommendations, which exceed 

the scope of the Oversight Board’s powers under PROMESA.

50. On April 5, 2018, the Governor submitted to the Oversight Board a fourth revised 

Commonwealth fiscal plan (the “April 5, 2018 Commonwealth Fiscal Plan Submission”), which 

did not incorporate the Board’s recommended policy initiatives as discussed in the Governor’s 

April 2 letter.

51. On April 19, 2018, the Oversight Board held its 12th public meeting at which it 

rejected the Governor’s April 5, 2018 Commonwealth Fiscal Plan Submission and instead certified 

its own fiscal plan for the Commonwealth under PROMESA sections 202(d)(2) and 202(e)(2) (the 

“April 19, 2018 Board Fiscal Plan”). The April 19, 2018 Board Fiscal Plan was substantially 

similar to the Governor’s April 5, 2018 Commonwealth Fiscal Plan Submission. Although the 

two fiscal plans incorporated different revenue and expense assumptions, both projected a surplus 

of approximately $1.4 billion by fiscal year 2023. In fact, the two fiscal plans differed only as to 

$152 million in annual anticipated savings (out of $25 billion total), such that the April 19, 2018 

Board Fiscal Plan included only 1.7 percent more of incremental savings as compared to the 

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Governor’s April 5, 2018 Commonwealth Plan Submission. Importantly, the Oversight Board’s 

rejected policy recommendations largely accounted for that difference.

52. At the Board’s April 19, 2018 public meeting, the Oversight Board praised the 

Governor and AAFAF for their cooperation in seeking consensus throughout the fiscal plan 

process. For example, Oversight Board Member Carlos García stated that:

I want to start, first of all, by applauding both the Governor, Mr. 

[Christian] Sobrino, Mr. [Gerardo] Portela, and their teams.10 It is 

always easy just to focus on all the things [on which] we have 

disagreed, but we have walked together a long walk in many 

months and now over a year that this board has been established and 

we have agreed on a very substantial amount of items that are 

critical and very difficult. And working to seek consensus, 

working to understand the measures, to see how we can achieve all 

the conflicting sometimes objectives that PROMESA has of 

achieving fiscal balance and sustainability, revitalizing the 

economy, a reasonable solution to the debt crisis and regaining 

access to the capital market. 

Carlos M. Garcia, Remarks at 12th Public Meeting of the Financial Oversight and Management 

Board for Puerto Rico at 3:38:20 (Apr. 19, 2018), available at https://www.youtube.com/

watch?v=JhfzYNOATLY.

53. Also at the Board’s April 19 public meeting, Mr. Sobrino asked the Oversight 

Board Executive Director how the April 19, 2018 Board Fiscal Plan could be implemented if the 

recommended labor reform measures were not ultimately adopted by the Legislature and signed 

into law by the Governor. See Christian Sobrino Vega, Remarks at 12th Public Meeting of the 

Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico at 1:50:20 (Apr. 19, 2018), available 

at https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=JhfzYNOATLY. The Oversight Board Executive Director 

responded that “[t]o enforce the fiscal plan [the Board] would have to revise the revenue numbers 

 

10 Mr. Sobrino is the Governor’s designated ex officio member of the Oversight Board. Mr. Portela is the Executive 

Director of AAFAF.

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because the fiscal plan includes the revenues projected with that growth [attributable to labor 

reforms] and we would have to revise the reinvestment that came out of that revenue growth.” 

Natalie Jaresko, Remarks at 12th Public Meeting of the Financial Oversight and Management 

Board for Puerto Rico at 1:50:27 (Apr. 19, 2018), available at https://www.youtube.com/

watch?v=JhfzYNOATLY. Thus, the Oversight Board Executive Director has acknowledged that 

the Board has no power to force the Government to adopt the recommended measures contained 

in its certified fiscal plans.

54. The April 19, 2018 Board Fiscal Plan was not certified unanimously. Oversight 

Board Member Ana Matosantos objected to the Board’s certification because the Board’s proposal 

“cuts too deeply” and “insufficiently capitalizes on federal funding,” while imposing austerity 

measures “that generate near term surpluses but may return to fiscal cliffs.” PROMESA Oversight 

Board Certifies Its Own Versions of Fiscal Plans for Commonwealth, PREPA, PRASA; 

Matosantos Does not Support Either Version of Commonwealth Plan, REORG RESEARCH (Apr. 19, 

2018, 7:59 PM), https://platform.reorg-research.com/app#company/1869/intel/view/52996 (last 

visited July 5, 2018). Ms. Matosantos also noted that the April 19, 2018 Board Fiscal Plan would 

threaten the safety net for too many people. See id. She further noted that fiscal plans generally 

should provide a “clear feasible path to plans of adjustment” and avoid the prospect of a future 

default. See id.11

 

11 See also Ana J. Matosantos, Remarks at 12th Public Meeting of the Financial Oversight and Management Board 

for Puerto Rico at 3:43:34 (Apr. 19, 2018) (“I am simply not willing to support massive cuts to the safety net of 

low income seniors, children, and people with disabilities. Slashing funding to the Universidad de Puerto Rico, 

making the largest cutbacks to public pensions in the United States, and imposing innumerable additional austerity 

measures only is a beginning of more pain to come. I understand deep cuts are necessary, and have been and will 

continue to support what is needed to right the fiscal ship. But I cannot do that when that is all there is. I cannot 

support too much pain with too little promise. Austerity measures that generate near term surpluses but may very 

well lead to another fiscal cliff are not in the best interest of Puerto Rico, its retirees, creditors, or its future. I also 

heed the caution of experts who believe that growth assumptions under both plans are overly optimistic. In my 

view, there is simply too much risk, too much downside for the people of Puerto Rico and its future under these 

plans.”), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JhfzYNOATLY.

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55. On April 24, 2018, the Oversight Board delivered a compliance certification letter 

and a copy of the certified April 19, 2018 Board Fiscal Plan to the Governor, the President of the 

Senate of Puerto Rico, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives of Puerto Rico as required 

under PROMESA section 201(e)(2).

B. Post-Certification Budget Developments and Rejection of Recommendations

56. On April 26, 2018, the Oversight Board sent the Governor a letter dated April 24, 

2018 under PROMESA section 202 setting forth (i) a proposed schedule for developing and 

certifying the Commonwealth’s fiscal year 2019 budget and (ii) a revenues forecast for fiscal year 

2019.

57. On May 2, 2018, the Oversight Board sent AAFAF a letter describing detailed 

expense reductions and right-sizing measures that the Board sought to impose on the Government 

to achieve $345 million of savings in fiscal year 2019. The Board also submitted a draft budget 

resolution for adoption by the Legislature, which included provisions that would restrict the 

Government’s use of budgeted funds. The Board’s May 2 letter also proposed detailed expense 

measures that set forth line-by-line amounts for expense items such as right-sizing measures, 

healthcare measures, and subsidy reductions. The expense measures included specific personnel 

and non-personnel expenditure amounts for each relevant Government agency or instrumentality 

covered by the Commonwealth budget.

58. On May 4, 2018, the Governor submitted a proposed Commonwealth budget for 

fiscal year 2019 (the “May 4 Budget Proposal”).

59. On May 6, 2018, the Governor submitted a written statement pursuant to 

PROMESA section 205(b)(3) to the Oversight Board, the U.S. President, and Congressional 

leaders, explaining that certain policy initiatives outlined by the Board in connection with the April 

19, 2018 Board Fiscal Plan constitute recommendations under PROMESA section 205, and that 

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the Board cannot impose these recommendations on the elected Government. A true and correct 

copy of the Governor’s May 6, 2018 statement is attached hereto as Exhibit 3. The Governor 

advised that the Government was rejecting certain recommendations, including, among other 

measures:

• Private-Sector Human-Capital and Labor Reforms. Under the Labor 

Transformation and Flexibility Act, Law No. 4 of January 26, 2017 (“Law 4-

2017”), the Government enacted measures to relax certain legal requirements for 

the hiring and retention of employees to improve Puerto Rico’s competiveness and 

foster economic development. The April 19, 2018 Board Fiscal Plan 

recommended supplanting Law 4-2017 by: (i) converting private-sector 

employees to “at-will” employees; (ii) reducing mandated sick leave and vacation 

pay; (iii) eliminating mandatory Christmas bonuses; and (iv) increasing the 

minimum wage for workers over 25 years of age. The Government rejected these 

labor-reform measures as inappropriate recommendations because each would 

require the Government to pass legislation to adopt.

• Pension Reforms. The April 19, 2018 Board Fiscal Plan recommended an average 

10 percent cut in all public sector pension benefits and an immediate freeze of 

certain defined benefit plan obligations. The Government rejected these 

recommendations as unsound because the proposed cuts would impose a 

disproportionate burden on Puerto Rico’s workers, retirees, and families. In 

addition, because the Government recently transitioned to a single “pay-as-yougo” system through the Law to Guarantee Payment to Our Pensioners and 

Establish a New Defined Contribution Plan for Public Employees, Law No. 106 

of August 23, 2017 (“Law 106-2017”) (as the 2017 Certified Commonwealth 

Fiscal Plan contemplated), reducing benefits to retirees today would not preserve 

any corpus to finance benefits in the future unless the law is modified.

• Government Agency Consolidations. Although the Government’s fiscal plan 

submissions proposed right-sizing government operations, the April 19, 2018 

Board Fiscal Plan attempted to dictate how the Government would organize itself 

to conduct day-to-day operations. Because these consolidations would require 

legislation to implement and would impose mandatory personnel cuts if the elected 

Government failed to meet efficiency targets, the Government rejected these 

policy recommendations as unsound.

• Compensation Related Initiatives. The April 19, 2018 Board Fiscal Plan also 

recommended additional measures affecting government-employee 

compensation, including (i) instituting a hiring freeze, (ii) limiting paid holidays 

to 15 days annually across all public employees, (iii) prohibiting carryover of sick

and vacation days between fiscal years, (iv) prohibiting any future liquidation of 

sick and vacation days, (v) eliminating the Christmas bonuses for all public 

employees, and (vi) standardizing employee healthcare benefits so that all

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employees receive a Government healthcare contribution of $100 per month. The 

Government rejected these policy recommendations because such measures would 

effectively reduce government employee compensation and increase outmigration 

when Puerto Rico could least afford it as working families continue to recover 

from Hurricanes Irma and María.

• Reductions in Appropriations to UPR. The April 19, 2018 Board Fiscal Plan 

recommended targets for reducing Commonwealth appropriations to the 

University of Puerto Rico (“UPR”) by $275 million by fiscal year 2023. Because 

the Board seeks to dictate precisely how UPR must endeavor to achieve those 

savings, the Government rejected these measures as inappropriate policy 

recommendations beyond the scope of the Oversight Board’s fiscal powers under 

PROMESA.

60. On May 10, 2018, the Oversight Board issued a notice of violation to the Governor 

under PROMESA section 202(c)(1)(B)(i), stating that the May 4 Budget Proposal was not 

compliant with the April 19, 2018 Board Fiscal Plan. The notice of violation claimed to identify 

several inconsistencies, including: (i) the failure to include UPR and workforce development 

reinvestments generated from comprehensive labor reform; (ii) the inclusion of Christmas bonuses 

for Government employees; and (iii) a number of informational deficiencies. In addition, the 

notice of violation requested the Governor to submit a revised fiscal year 2019 Commonwealth 

budget addressing the identified inconsistencies by May 18, 2018.

C. Oversight Board Certifies a Budget Attempting to Impose Rejected Policy 

Initiatives

61. Over the ensuing week, the Governor and Oversight Board engaged in negotiations 

to bridge the gap between the May 4 Budget Proposal and the Oversight Board’s required 

revisions. 

62. On May 15, 2018, the Oversight Board sent the Governor a letter granting the 

Governor’s request to extend the budget submission deadline from May 18, 2018 to May 25, 2018 

as the result of progress made during the prior week’s discussions.

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63. On May 20, 2018, the parties reached an agreement in which the Oversight Board 

would amend and recertify the April 19, 2018 Board Fiscal Plan to, among other things, (i) include 

a $101 million reduction to the projected annual surplus for fiscal year 2019, and (ii) exclude the 

Oversight Board’s prior requirements to reduce the minimum number of vacation and sick days 

for private sector employees and to eliminate Christmas bonuses. In exchange, the Governor 

agreed to present a bill to repeal of Puerto Rico’s Wrongful Termination Act, Law No. 80 of May 

30, 1976 (as amended, “Law 80”) for the Legislature to approve by June 27, 2018. See “Oversight 

Board to Amend Commonwealth Fiscal Plan to Ensure Timely Implementation of Critical 

Structure Reforms,” Press Release (May 20, 2018) (a true and correct copy of the May 20, 2018 

press release is attached at Exhibit 4).

64. On May 28, 2018, the Governor submitted to the Legislature a standalone bill to 

repeal Law 80.

65. On May 30, 2018, the Oversight Board certified an amended version of the April 

19, 2018 Board Fiscal Plan, which contained the revisions agreed to with the Government on May 

20, 2018 (the “May 30, 2018 Board Fiscal Plan”).

66. On May 31, 2018, the Oversight Board delivered a compliance certification letter 

and a copy of the certified May 30, 2018 Board Fiscal Plan to the Governor, the President of the 

Senate of Puerto Rico, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives of Puerto Rico as required 

under PROMESA section 201(e)(2).

67. On June 4, 2018, the Oversight Board submitted a letter to the Honorable Jorge 

Navarro Suárez, who is the President of the Government Commission of the Puerto Rico House 

of Representatives, stating that, if the Legislature failed to repeal Law 80, “the Oversight Board 

would revert to the [April 19, 2018 Board] Fiscal Plan . . . and would submit a budget to the 

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Governor and Legislature that is consistent with that Fiscal Plan.” June 4 Letter at 1. In addition, 

the Oversight Board threatened that “if the Government of Puerto Rico fails to comply exactly 

with the understanding reached with the Oversight Board concerning the repeal of Law 80,” the 

Oversight Board would impose a budget that:

• Eliminates the annual appropriation for the Christmas bonus for public sector 

employees;

• Eliminates the annual appropriation of $25 million for student scholarships at the 

University of Puerto Rico;

• Eliminates the annual appropriation of $50 million for economic development 

initiatives for municipalities;

• Eliminates the multiyear fund of $345 million for various economic development 

and reform implementation initiatives as requested by the Government;

• Maintains the elimination of the Christmas bonus for both public sector and private 

sector employees, as well as the reduction in sick days and paid leave for private 

sector employees; and

• Maintains the cuts to the budget of the Legislature and Judiciary.

68. On June 29, 2018, the Oversight Board certified a revised Commonwealth fiscal 

plan (the “Board Fiscal Plan”) that is substantially similar to the April 19, 2018 Board Fiscal Plan 

in light of the Legislature’s failure to repeal Law 80 by June 27, 2018. That same day, the 

Oversight Board delivered a compliance certification letter and a copy of the certified Board Fiscal 

Plan to the Governor, the President of the Senate of Puerto Rico, and the Speaker of the House of 

Representatives of Puerto Rico. A true and correct copy of the Board’s June 29, 2018 certification 

letter containing the Board Fiscal Plan is attached as Exhibit 5.

69. The Board Fiscal Plan includes the following objectionable provisions:

• Suspension of Reprogramming Authorization for Prior Fiscal Years. The Board 

Fiscal Plan seeks to suspend the Government’s authorization to seek 

reprogramming for prior fiscal years, stating that “[a]ny power of OMB, the Fiscal 

Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (“AAFAF”, by its Spanish acronym) or 

the Department of the Treasury, including the authorities granted under Act 230-

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1974, as amended, known as the “Puerto Rico Government Accounting Act” (“Act 

230”), to authorize the reprogramming or extension of appropriations of prior fiscal 

years is hereby suspended. Notwithstanding this section, the appropriations 

approved in the budget certified by the Oversight Board may be modified or 

reprogrammed with the approval of the Oversight Board.” Board Fiscal Plan 

§ 11.2.1.

• Imposed Government Agency Consolidations. The Board Fiscal Plan attempts to 

dictate how the Government will organize itself to conduct day-to-day operations, 

including through the creation of an Office of the Chief Financial Officer and to 

“right-size” the Government through agency consolidation and reduction and/or 

elimination of government services. See Board Fiscal Plan § 12. Some, but not all, 

of these consolidations were agreed to by AAFAF as part of the fiscal plan 

development process.

• Automatic Budget Reductions for Future Fiscal Years. The Board Fiscal Plan 

seeks to impose automatic budget reductions on the Government, stating that, “[i]f, 

after the third fiscal quarter of any fiscal year there remains unrealized agency 

efficiency savings for any grouping relative to the projected agency efficiency 

savings in the New Fiscal Plan for the applicable fiscal year, the Oversight Board 

will automatically reduce the budget for the corresponding grouping for the 

following fiscal year in the amount equal to the unrealized agency efficiency 

savings. In particular, if the Oversight Board determines that there is material 

underperformance in agency efficiency savings relative to the projections set forth 

in the New Fiscal Plan, intentional workforce reductions will be necessary to meet 

the agency efficiency savings targets set forth herein.” Board Fiscal Plan § 12.3.

• Elimination of Statutorily Mandated Christmas Bonuses. The Board Fiscal Plan 

sets forth several recommendations affecting government-employee compensation, 

including: (i) instituting a hiring freeze; (ii) limiting paid holidays to 15 days 

annually across all public employees; (iii) prohibiting carryover of sick and 

vacation days between fiscal years; (iv) prohibiting any future liquidation of sick 

and vacation days; (v) eliminating the Christmas bonuses for all public employees; 

and (vi) standardizing employee healthcare benefits so that all employees receive 

$100 worth of benefits per month. See Board Fiscal Plan § 12.4. The Christmas 

bonuses that the Board Fiscal Plan seeks to eliminate are statutorily mandated under 

Puerto Rico’s Christmas Bonus Act, Law No. 148 of June 30, 1969 (“Law 148-

1969”), as amended by Law 4-2017 and the Fiscal Plan Compliance Act, Law No. 

26 of April 29, 2017 (“Law 26-2017”).

70. On June 29, 2018, the House of Representatives and Senate of Puerto Rico both 

voted to approve a fiscal year 2019 Commonwealth budget (the “Legislature Budget”), which the 

Governor later signed. The Legislature has not repealed Law 80, and its budget does not provide 

for Law 80’s repeal.

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71. On June 30, 2018, the Oversight Board certified is own Commonwealth budget for 

fiscal year 2019 (the “Board Budget”) after determining that the Governor and Legislature failed 

to submit a budget that complied with the Board Fiscal Plan. Notably, the appropriations under 

the Board Budget are substantially the same as those approved under the Legislature Budget, 

except for the objectionable provisions set forth below that attempt to impose the Board’s policy 

preferences. That same day, the Oversight Board delivered a compliance certification letter and a 

copy of the certified Board Budget to the Governor, the President of the Senate of Puerto Rico, 

and the Speaker of the House of Representatives of Puerto Rico.

72. The Board Budget includes four joint resolutions (collectively, the “Budget 

Resolutions”): (i) a joint resolution authorizing expenditures from the General Fund (the “General 

Fund Resolution”); (ii) a joint resolution authorizing expenditures for special, permanent, or 

temporary programs (the “Special Resolution”); (iii) a joint resolution increasing available 

resources from the Crudita tax (the “Crudita Resolution”); and (iv) a joint resolution regarding the 

lottery (the “Lottery Resolution”). A true and correct copy of the General Fund Resolution with a 

certified translation is attached as Exhibit 6. A true and correct copy of the Special Resolution 

with a certified translation is attached as Exhibit 7.

73. The Budget Resolutions are not simply itemized budgets. Rather, the Oversight 

Board has used them to dictate substantive policy and effectively make new laws for Puerto Rico, 

including the following key provisions:

• Limitations on Government Reprogramming Rights. The Budget Resolutions 

include the following provisions limiting the Government’s reprogramming rights 

under PROMESA section 204(c):

o Section 7 of the General Fund Resolution and Special Resolution provide 

that: “Any power of OMB, AAFAF or the Department of the Treasury, 

including the authorities granted under Act 230-1974, as amended, known 

as the “Puerto Rico Government Accounting Act” (“Act 230”), to authorize 

the reprogramming or extension of appropriations of prior fiscal years is 

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hereby suspended. Notwithstanding this section, the appropriations 

approved in the budget certified by the Oversight Board may be modified 

or reprogrammed with the approval of the Oversight Board.” Notably, this 

language is identical to the language in section 11.2.1 of the Board Fiscal 

Plan.

o Section 10 of the General Fund Resolution provides that: “OMB may 

withhold from any of the allocations to the agencies of the Executive Branch 

the amounts necessary to pay for the pay-go contribution, unemployment 

insurance, or taxes withheld from their employees, when OMB determines 

that such a withholding is necessary to ensure compliance with these 

obligations by the agencies concerned. Any such amounts withheld by 

OMB shall solely be reprogrammed to pay the corresponding outstanding 

obligations related to pay-go contributions, unemployment insurance, or 

taxes withheld from employees as allowed in this Section.”

• Mandates for Corrective Action. Section 15 of General Fund Resolution and 

section 14 of the Special Resolution provide that: “If during the fiscal year the 

government fails to comply with the liquidity and budgetary savings measures 

required by the New Fiscal Plan for Puerto Rico certified by the Oversight Board, 

the Government shall take all necessary corrective action, including the measures 

provided in PROMESA sections 203 and 204.”

• Expansion of Board’s Punishment Powers for Budget Non-Compliance. Section 

16 of the General Fund Resolution and section 15 of the Special Fund Resolution 

provide that: “The Secretary of Treasury, the treasurer and Executive Directors of 

each agency or Public Corporation covered by the New Fiscal Plan for Puerto Rico 

certified by the Oversight Board, and the Director of the OMB (or their respective 

successors) shall be responsible for not spending or encumbering during fiscal year 

2019 any amount that exceeds the appropriations authorized for such year. This 

prohibition applies to every appropriation set forth in this Joint Resolution,

including appropriations for payroll and related costs. Any violation of this 

prohibition shall constitute a violation of this Joint Resolution and Act 230.”

• Funding of Oversight Board Members’ Favored Projects. The Special Resolution 

includes a line-item expenditure for the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture in the 

amount of $437,000 to fund the “operating expenses of the Luis Muñoz Marin 

Foundation.” Special Resolution § 1(23)(F). On information and belief, this 

expenditure was inserted on the express instructions of one of the Oversight Board 

Members. The inclusion of a pet project of an Oversight Board Member is 

inappropriate micro-managing, serves no discernable purpose, and aims to establish 

a public policy.

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74. None of the foregoing provisions in the Board Fiscal Plan and Budget Resolutions 

are proper exercises of the Board’s power under PROMESA or permitted by PROMESA itself. 

Instead, they represent overreach by the Board.12

COUNT I13

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT THAT THE OVERSIGHT BOARD CANNOT 

MANDATE IMPLEMENTATION OF REJECTED POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 

THROUGH ENFORCEMENT OF THE BOARD FISCAL PLAN

(PROMESA § 205)

75. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1–74 as 

if fully set forth herein.

76. As the statute that creates the Oversight Board, PROMESA defines the limits of the 

Oversight Board’s powers. While PROMESA grants the Oversight Board broad powers to 

approve fiscal plans, it limits the Oversight Board’s power with respect to policy-making matters. 

This prevents the Oversight Board from usurping the political and governmental power of the 

Government of Puerto Rico.

77. In attempting to control Government policy, the Oversight Board certified the 

Board Fiscal Plan, which contains policy initiatives that the Board seeks to impose on the 

Government. This use of the Board’s fiscal plan certification powers circumvents Congress’ 

express preservation of the Commonwealth’s political and governmental powers to the 

Government under PROMESA section 303. The Oversight Board exceeded its powers in seeking 

 

12 The Board’s actions infringe the powers reserved to the Commonwealth under PROMESA and the Puerto Rico 

Constitution, which is also federal law approved by Congress. See P.R. Const., Pub.L. 82–447, 66 Stat. 327 

(enacted July 3, 1952). Such rights cannot be preempted by the Board under PROMESA which merely states that 

PROMESA “shall prevail over any general or specific provisions of territory law, State law, or regulation that is 

inconsistent with [PROMESA].” Here, the Board is trying to usurp power that belongs to the Government and 

thereby exercise governmental and political powers that the Board itself lacks under PROMESA.

13 Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend this complaint, or to file additional complaints, to assert causes of action 

relative to instrumentality budgets certified by the Oversight Board on June 30, 2018, and which are included in 

the Board Fiscal Plan or for whom the Oversight Board certified their individual fiscal plans.

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to impose policy initiatives through the Board Fiscal Plan. Such policy initiatives therefore 

constitute no more than non-binding recommendations.

78. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to a judicial declaration under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, as 

well as further relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2202, that the rejected policy recommendations in the 

Board Fiscal Plan are non-binding recommendations and that the Government is not obligated to 

implement any of those policies, and the Oversight Board may not take any actions to force 

compliance with such recommendations. To be clear, the Government does not seek a declaration 

that the Board Fiscal Plan was improperly certified, or that the Board Fiscal Plan suffers from any 

legal infirmities except to the extent set forth with respect to specific policy recommendations that 

cannot be imposed by the Board.

79. Plaintiffs are entitled to a judicial declaration under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, as well as 

further relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2202, that the suspension of Act 230 and reprogramming 

authorization for prior fiscal years under Board Fiscal Plan section 11.2.1—which “places controls 

on expenditures” under PROMESA section 205(a)(1)—is a non-binding recommendation because 

(i) it is inconsistent with the reprogramming standard under PROMESA section 204(c), which 

does not prohibit reprogramming requests for prior fiscal years, (ii) inappropriately attempts to 

modify AAFAF’s powers under Law 2-2017 and Act 230, among others, without following 

PROMESA’s provisions for reviewing legislation, and (iii) is an inappropriate use of the Board’s 

budget power to shift responsibilities of Government officials.

80. Plaintiffs are entitled to a judicial declaration under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, as well as 

further relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2202, that the provisions seeking to impose Government agency 

consolidations under Board Fiscal Plan section 12—which affects “the structural relationship of 

departments, agencies, and independent agencies within the territorial government” under 

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PROMESA section 205(a)(2), and “modifi[es] or transfers the types of services that are the 

responsibility of, and are delivered by the territorial government” under PROMESA section 

205(a)(5)—are non-binding recommendations because the structure of Government agencies and 

roles are dictated by the Puerto Rico Constitution and Puerto Rico laws that were not preempted 

by PROMESA and are not within the purview of the Oversight Board to change through its 

enumerated powers under PROMESA section 104.

81. Plaintiffs are entitled to a judicial declaration under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, as well as 

further relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2202, that the provision requiring automatic budget reductions for 

future fiscal years (including intentional workforce reductions) under Board Fiscal Plan section 

12.3—which “places controls on expenditures” under PROMESA section 205(a)(1)—is a nonbinding recommendation because (i) the Board cannot mandate workforce reduction through the 

budget process, and (ii) nothing in PROMESA allows the Oversight Board to dictate personnel 

decisions for the Commonwealth.

82. Plaintiffs are entitled to a judicial declaration under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, as well as 

further relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2202, that the provision requiring the elimination of certain 

mandatory benefits under Board Fiscal Plan section 12.4—which “places controls on expenditures 

for personnel” and “reduc[es] benefit costs” under PROMESA section 205(a)(1)—is a non-binding 

recommendation that the Oversight Board cannot unilaterally alter through the Board Fiscal Plan 

and force on the Government.

83. Plaintiffs are further entitled to a judicial declaration under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, as 

well as further relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2202, that any matters that constitute recommendations 

(whether or not styled as recommendations) under the Fiscal Plan that the Government has rejected 

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or may rejected in the future (whether set forth herein or otherwise) are non-binding on the 

Government and do not need to be implemented by the Government.

COUNT II

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT THAT THE OVERSIGHT BOARD CANNOT 

MANDATE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REJECTED POLICY 

RECOMMENDATIONS THROUGH THE BOARD-CERTIFIED BUDGET

(PROMESA § 204)

84. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1–74 

and 76-83 as if fully set forth herein.

85. As the statute that creates the Oversight Board, PROMESA defines the limits of the 

Oversight Board’s powers. While PROMESA grants the Oversight Board broad powers to 

approve budgets, it limits the Oversight Board’s power with respect to policy-making matters. 

This prevents the Oversight Board from usurping the political and governmental power of the 

Government of Puerto Rico.

86. The Oversight Board’s policy recommendations under the Board Fiscal Plan that 

the Government rejected under PROMESA section 205 cannot be implemented via the Board 

Budget as a matter of law. Nor can the Oversight Board use its powers under PROMESA § 202 to 

enact substantive legislation. 

87. Plaintiffs are entitled to a judicial declaration under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, as well as 

further relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2202, that the elimination of Christmas bonuses under the Board 

Budget and Budget Resolutions—which “places controls on expenditures for personnel” and 

“reduc[es] benefit costs” under PROMESA section 205(a)(1), and would “modify the effects of 

the territory’s laws” under PROMESA section 205(a)(7)—is a non-binding recommendation that 

cannot be forced on the Government.

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88. Plaintiffs are entitled to a judicial declaration under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, as well as 

further relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2202, that the provision in the Board Budget limiting the 

Government’s reprogramming rights under General Fund Resolution sections 7 and 10 and Special 

Resolution section 7—which “places controls on expenditures” under PROMESA section 

205(a)(1)—is not enforceable because it is (i) inconsistent with the reprogramming procedure 

under PROMESA section 204(c), and (ii) attempt to modify AAFAF’s powers under Law 2-2017 

and Act 230, among others, without following PROMESA’s provisions for reviewing legislation.

89. The Plaintiffs are entitled to a judicial declaration under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, as well 

as further relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2202, that the provision in the Board Budget requiring the 

Government to take all necessary and corrective action to comply with the Board Fiscal Plan 

measures under General Fund Resolution section 15 and Special Resolution section 14—which 

“places controls on expenditures” under PROMESA section 205(a)(I) is not enforceable because 

such provisions are (i) an impermissible attempt to expand the Board’s limited budget enforcement 

powers under PROMESA section 203(d)(1), (ii) inconsistent with the reprogramming procedure 

under PROEMSA section 204(c), and (iii) an abuse of the Board’s budget powers as a backdoor 

attempt to legislate.

90. The Plaintiffs are entitled to a judicial declaration under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, as well 

as further relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2202, that the provision expanding the Board’s punishment 

powers for budget non-compliance under General Fund Resolution section 16 and Special Fund 

Resolution section 15 which would “effect the territory’s laws . . . on the operation of the territorial 

government” is not enforceable because (i) such provisions seek to impose Act 230 punishments 

on appropriation violations, which include criminal punishments that can only be established by 

the Legislature, and (ii) the Board’s punishment powers for budget non-compliance are limited to 

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PROMESA section 104(l), which does not include the power to apply criminal punishment to the 

actions of Government officials.

91. Plaintiffs are further entitled to a judicial declaration under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, as 

well as further relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2202, that any matters that constitute recommendations

(whether or not styled as recommendations) under the Fiscal Plan that the Government has rejected 

or may reject in the future (whether set forth herein or otherwise) are non-binding on the 

Government, do not need to be implemented by the Government, and cannot be imposed on the 

Government via the Board Budget.

92. Plaintiffs are further entitled to a judicial declaration under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, as 

well as further relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2202, that any provisions of the Board Budget that exceed 

the Board’s powers under PROMESA §202 are unlawful.

COUNT III

INJUNCTION PROHIBITING THE DEFENDANTS FROM IMPLEMENTING AND 

ENFORCING THE OVERSIGHT BOARD’S REJECTED POLICY 

RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE BOARD FISCAL PLAN AND BOARD BUDGET

(PROMESA § 303)

93. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1–74, 

76-83, and 85-92 as if fully set forth herein.

94. Plaintiffs seek equitable relief in the form of an injunction prohibiting the 

Defendants from implementing and enforcing the Oversight Board’s rejected policy 

recommendations contained in the Board Fiscal Plan and Board Budget while this action is 

pending. Additionally, the Plaintiffs request that, to the extent they seek a preliminary injunction, 

such preliminary injunction against the Defendants be converted to a permanent injunction upon 

the Court’s determination of this matter on the merits.

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95. The Plaintiffs will likely succeed on the merits of their claims or, alternatively, have 

raised sufficiently serious questions going to the merits. Without the requested injunctions, 

Plaintiffs would be irreparably harmed because the implementation of the Board Fiscal Plan and 

Board Budget would prevent them from freely exercising their political and governmental powers 

to allocate the Commonwealth’s limited resources at this critical juncture in Puerto Rico’s 

restructuring process.

96. Therefore, the Plaintiffs are entitled to equitable relief in the form of an injunction 

prohibiting the Defendants from implementing and enforcing the Board’s rejected policy 

recommendations, whether through the Fiscal Plan or Board Budget, and to prevent the Board 

from exceeding its powers under PROMESA Section 202.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE the Plaintiffs pray that judgment be entered for them and against the

Defendants as follows:

A. Declaring that the Oversight Board lacks the authority to impose policy initiatives 

on the Government through a fiscal plan and/or budget, including the Board Fiscal Plan and Board 

Budget;

B. Declaring that the substantive policy mandates contained in the Board Fiscal Plan 

and rejected by the Governor pursuant to PROMESA section 205 are null and void; 

C. Declaring that the substantive policy mandates contained in the Board Budget 

exceeds the Board’s powers and are null and void;

D. Enjoining the Defendants from implementing and enforcing the Oversight Board’s 

rejected policy recommendations (whether or not styled as recommendations) contained in the 

Board Fiscal Plan and Board Budget; and

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E. Granting such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Dated: July 5, 2018

San Juan, Puerto Rico

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ John J. Rapisardi 

John J. Rapisardi

William J. Sushon 

(Admitted Pro Hac Vice) 

O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP

7 Times Square

New York, New York 10036

Tel: (212) 326-2000

Fax: (212) 326-2061

-andPeter Friedman 

(Admitted Pro Hac Vice) 

1625 Eye Street, NW

Washington, D.C. 20006

Tel: (202) 383-5300

Fax: (202) 383-5414

-andElizabeth L. McKeen

(Admitted Pro Hac Vice)

610 Newport Center Drive, 17th Floor

Newport Beach, California 92660

Tel: (949) 823-6900

Fax: (949) 823-6994

Attorneys for Governor Rosselló Nevares 

and the Puerto Rico Fiscal Agency and 

Financial Advisory Authority

/s/ Luis C. Marini-Biaggi 

Luis C. Marini-Biaggi

USDC No. 222301 

Email: lmarini@mpmlawpr.com

Carolina Velaz-Rivero

USDC No. 300913

E:mail: cvelaz@mpmlawpr.com

MARINI PIETRANTONI MUÑIZ LLC

MCS Plaza, Suite 500

255 Ponce de León Ave.

San Juan, Puerto Rico 00917

Tel: (787) 705-2171

Fax: (787) 936-7494

Attorneys for Governor Rosselló Nevares 

and the Puerto Rico Fiscal Agency and 

Financial Advisory Authority

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