alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 15

















August 4, 2009








Securities and Exchange Commission


100 F. Street, N.W.


Washington, D.C. 20549














Commissioners:





We are aware that our report dated August 4, 2009 on our review of interim financial information of Unit Corporation for the three and six month periods ended June 30, 2009 and 2008 and included in the Company’s quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2009 is incorporated by reference in its Registration
Statements on Form S-8 (File No.’s 33-19652, 33-44103, 33-49724, 33-64323, 33-53542, 333-38166, 333-39584, 333-135194 and 333-137857).





Very truly yours,





/s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP





PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP


Tulsa, Oklahoma
# United States Court of Appeals **For the Eighth Circuit**

___________________________ No. 17-1615

___________________________ Jesse Tyler Smith lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v. Aqua-Care Marketing, LLC, et al. lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri - Springfield

____________ Submitted: November 7, 2017 Filed: December 18, 2017 [Unpublished]

____________ Before LOKEN, MURPHY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

____________ PER CURIAM. Jesse Smith brought this pro se divers ity action against Aqua-Care Marketing, LLC and three of its officers and employees, asserting, inter alia , three breach of contract claims and a claim of malicious prosecution. Ruling on cross motions forsummary judgment at the conclusion of discovery, the district court 1 denied Smith’s motion as untimely, denied defendants su mmary judgment on the breach of contract claims, and granted summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim. Some weeks later, the court entered a final order declining to exercise jurisdiction over the state law breach of contract claims and dismissing those claims without prejudice because the amount in controversy was far below the minimum required for federal diversity jurisdiction. See28 U.S.C. § 1332. Smith appeals the gran t of summary judgment dismissing his malicious prosecution claim. He does not appeal the district court’s decision to dismiss the breach of c ontract claims without prejudice. Thus, those claims have not been finally resolved. Having carefully reviewed the record and the argumen ts on appeal, we conclude that summary judgment dismissing the malicious prosecution claim was properly granted. The record does not include evid ence that would allow a reasonable jury to find that law enforcement would not have brought criminal charges that were ultimately dismissed in the absence of false information knowingly supplied by defendants, or that defe ndants engaged in actions beyond merely supplying false information or making an accusation. See Peterson v. Kopp , 754 F.3d 594, 598 (8th Cir. 2014) (de novo review); see also Fisher v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 619 F.3d 811, 823 (8th Cir. 2010); Linn v. Montgomery , 2017 WL 4847687, at *6-7 (Iowa Oct. 27, 2017). Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

______________________________

1 The Honorable Brian C. Wimes, United St ates District Judge for the Western District of Missouri. -2-
FutureFuel Corp. 8235 Forsyth Blvd., 4 th Floor, Clayton, Missouri 63105

Direct Line: (805) 565- 9800 Fax: (8 05) 565-0800 August 10, 2012

Mr. Karl Simon, Director Transportation and Climate Division U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, D.C. 20004

Re: RFS2

Dear Mr. Simon:

The record setting drought in the central part of the country is generating significant concerns
across the nation and around the worl d regarding the price and availability of food and feed. As a result Congress is cons idering what action shoul d be taken to ensure the availability and affordability of food and feed.

There is a significant ongoing discus sion regarding the impact that the use of ethanol for fuel is having on the price and availability of corn. Much of the discussion is in regard to suspending or reducing the fuel use requirements for corn et hanol established under the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA). EISA establ ished a second set of Renewable Fuel Standards (RFS2) for use of corn ethanol a nd several types of “advanced biof uels” as transportation fuel. Biodiesel is defined by the RFS2 as an advanced bi ofuel. It is extremely important for the members of Congress and to distin guish corn ethanol from biodiesel both in terms of the final product and the feedstock used. Biodiesel is produced from fats and oils, a significant portion
of which are inedible. Biodiesel produced by Fu ture Fuel and other bi odiesel manufacturers has no direct impact on the demand for or the consumption of corn.

The current discussions regarding RFS2 are nega tively affecting Future Fuel’s customers and business. Many of our customer s are starting to question the need to continue purchasing biodiesel if a suspension of the RFS2 or a change to EISA is imminent.

It is important to FutureFuel a nd the biodiesel industry that disc ussions in Congress regarding the suspension or modification of the corn etha nol blending requirements are accompanied by statements that changes to the advanced biofue l (biodiesel) blending requirements are not being contemplated by Congress or requested of the EPA. It must be clearly communicated that any possible suspension of or modification to corn ethanol blending requirements will not have any impact on biodiesel blending requirements.Page 2

FutureFuel is one of the larg est producers in the nation. FutureFuel produces biodiesel from inedible feedstocks such as yellow grease, cr ude corn oil, inedible tallow, choice white grease, and poultry fat.

Biodiesel has been and continues to be a major component of the U.S. effort to lower its reliance on foreign oil and improve the environmen tal impact versus carbon based fuels . It is vital to FutureFuel and the employees of FutureFuel th at the biodiesel consumption required by the
RFS2 continues.

Best regards,

Lee E. Mikles

President & CEO

LEM/mc
#### TRAUTWINE v. THE STATE.

(Decided June 17, 1915.)

Appeal from Houston Circuit Court.

Heard before Hon. J. J. Curtis.

No counsel marked for appellant. W. L. Martin, Attorney General, and" W. H. Mitchell, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

*678Pelham, P. J.

Appeal dismissed, on the authority of *Rivers v. State, infra,*69 South. 387.
EXHIBIT 10.6









SI 50.000.00
              LOS
      ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
              AUGUST
    21.2008




FOR VALUE
RECEIVED, I PROMISE TO PAY TO THE ORDER OF ROBERT LEVY, AT 3550 WILSHIRE
BOULEVARD, SUITE 840, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA THE SUM OF ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND DOLLARS AND 00/100 ($150,000.00) IN LAWFUL MONEY OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA, WITH INTEREST FROM AUGUST 21,2008, AT THE RATE OF 7% PER ANNUM UNTIL
PAID. IN THE EVENT THERE IS A SUIT OR ACTION TO ENFORCE PAYMENT OF THIS NOTE OR
ANY PORTION THEREOF, I PROMISE TO PAY SUCH ADDITIONAL SUM AS THE COURT MAY
ADJUDGE REASONABLE AS ATTORNEY FEES IN SAID ACTION OR SUIT, AND BE MADE A PART
OF THE JUDGMENT, OR IF PLACED IN THE HANDS OF ATTORNEYS FOR COLLECTION IF
EFFECTUATED WITHOUT SUIT, I PROMISE TO PAY ALL COSTS AND EXPENSES INCLUDING
REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES.


















DUE DATE


SEPTEMBER
4,2008
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

136 

CA 11-00868 

PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., FAHEY, CARNI, SCONIERS, AND GORSKI, JJ. 

 

RAUL RIVERA, CLAIMANT-APPELLANT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

STATE OF NEW YORK, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. 

(CLAIM NO. 110682.) 

 

THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY, NEW YORK CITY (MILTON ZELERMYER OF COUNSEL),

FOR CLAIMANT-APPELLANT. 

ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ALBANY (OWEN DEMUTH OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Court of Claims (Renee Forgensi

Minarik, J.), entered July 28, 2010. The order granted the motion of

defendant for leave to amend its answer and for summary judgment and

dismissed the claim. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously modified on the law by denying those parts of defendant’s

motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the claims for negligence

and medical malpractice and reinstating those claims, and as modified

the order is affirmed without costs. 

Memorandum: Claimant, an inmate at Auburn Correctional Facility,

previously commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to annul the

determination of the Department of Correctional Services (DOCS)

denying him medical treatment for hepatitis C based upon his refusal

to participate in the residential substance abuse treatment (RSAT)

program. Claimant also sought judgment directing DOCS to provide him

with such medical treatment. Supreme Court dismissed the petition,

concluding that, inter alia, the determination of DOCS requiring

claimant to participate in RSAT as a condition to receiving medical

treatment for hepatitis C was not arbitrary and capricious or an abuse

of discretion (Matter of Rivera v Goord, 10 Misc 3d 302).

Claimant thereafter commenced the instant action seeking damages

for injuries allegedly resulting from defendant’s denial of medical

treatment for hepatitis C. The Court of Claims erred in granting

those parts of defendant’s motion seeking summary judgment dismissing

the claims for negligence and medical malpractice on the ground that

those claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata or collateral

estoppel. “In the prior CPLR article 78 proceeding[, claimant] could

not have sought the relief [he] seek[s] in this action” (Margerum v
-2- 136 

CA 11-00868 

City of Buffalo, 63 AD3d 1574, 1580). Moreover, whether defendant was

negligent or deviated from accepted standards of care “was not

actually and necessarily decided” in that proceeding (Reynolds v

Krebs, 81 AD3d 1269, 1271). We therefore modify the order

accordingly.

Entered: January 31, 2012 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
Chapter 2: Alternatives and Proposed Action

Ke U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service
ALTERNATIVE D / “Public Use"
iky Rocky Flats National Wildlife Refuge

Restoration Map
Resource Management Zones

Xeric Tallgrass Prairie
©) Riparian Corridor and Wetlands
Mixed Prairie Grasslands

Targeted Restoration Areas
= Removed & Revegetated Road*

Restored Stream Crossing
Restored to Xeric Tallgrass
Disturbed Area (planted with
mixed grasses)

onm*

Other Areas

DOE Retained Area

Permitted Mining Use

=~ Unpaved Maintenance Road
(retained for administrative,
easement & fire access)

“Only primesyroad coiatrs are mapped
akftional removal and revegetation may occur
con secondary roads

Sa

h
— ae ee ee

@ n= Visitor Use Map
oo Public Uses
Use Trail (equestrian,
hiking & biking)

© © Pedestrian Trail
ADA Accessible Trail
SE © Off Tail Use (seasonally, in
southern half of site only)
q Service Refuge Lands
Area Retained by DOE

Public Use Facilities
Interpretation & Environmental
Education Facility
Photography Facility
@ Observation Facility
Outdoor Education Center
‘3 Regional Trail Connection
‘itor Center

© Overlook

Other Fat
‘ai Refuge Entrance
{@ Maintenance
ex Gravel Road

“Main parking area by Rock Creek indsay Ranch
trailtead wil accommodate horse trailers.

Figure no. 7

Draft Comprehensive Conservation Plan and EIS 9
The State of



# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

January 12, 2015

N o. 04

- 14

- 00383

- CR

Sean LEBO

,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 14, Bexar County, Tex as Trial Court No. 413956 Honorable Bill C. White, Judge Presiding



### ORDER

At the request of defen dant’s appointed appellate attorney, Pat Montgomery, we ab a ted this appeal and remanded the case for the trial court to determine whether there is a conflict of

interest that precludes counsel from continuing to represent appellant in this matter . The trial

court held a he aring at which defendant, his appellate attorney, and the State’s attorney appeared. The trial court concluded that there is not presently a conflict of interest requiring Mr. Montgomery to withdraw. A reporter’s record of the hearing and a supplemental clerk’s record containing the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law have been filed.

We reinstate the appeal on the docket of this court. We order appellant’s brief due February 11, 2015

.

_________________________________ Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 12th day of January, 2015

.

___________________________________ Keith E. Hottle

Cler k of Court
§ 135.621 Briefing of medical personnel. ( a ) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, prior to each helicopter air ambulance operation, each pilot in command, or other flight crewmember designated by the certificate holder, must ensure that all medical personnel have been briefed on the following— ( 1 ) Passenger briefing requirements in § 135.117(a) and (b); and
( 2 ) Physiological aspects of flight;
( 3 ) Patient loading and unloading;
( 4 ) Safety in and around the helicopter;
( 5 ) In-flight emergency procedures;
( 6 ) Emergency landing procedures;
( 7 ) Emergency evacuation procedures;
( 8 ) Efficient and safe communications with the pilot; and
( 9 ) Operational differences between day and night operations, if appropriate.
( b ) The briefing required in paragraphs (a)(2) through (9) of this section may be omitted if all medical personnel on board have satisfactorily completed the certificate holder's FAA-approved medical personnel training program within the preceding 24 calendar months. Each training program must include a minimum of 4 hours of ground training, and 4 hours of training in and around an air ambulance helicopter, on the topics set forth in paragraph (a)(2) through (9) of this section.
( c ) Each certificate holder must maintain a record for each person trained under this section that— ( 1 ) Contains the individual's name, the most recent training completion date, and a description, copy, or reference to training materials used to meet the training requirement.
( 2 ) Is maintained for 24 calendar months following the individual's completion of training.
[Doc. No. FAA-2010-0982, 79 FR 9975, Feb. 21, 2014; Amdt. 135-129A, 79 FR 41126, July 15, 2014]
#### § 212.1 Scope.

This part applies to all charter flights, and all other flights carrying charter passengers or cargo, in interstate and/or foreign air transportation by U.S. certificated air carriers or in foreign air transportation by foreign air carriers. It does not apply to any flights performed by a commuter air carrier, air taxi operator, or certificated air carrier operating “small aircraft” under part 298 of this chapter. Nothing in this part gives authority to operate a type or level of service not authorized by certificate, foreign air carrier permit, or exemption, except that a certificated air carrier authorized to conduct scheduled operations may conduct charter flights, in interstate and/or foreign air transportation, without limitation as to the points served.
#### Campbell et ux. *v.*Bohannon.

[No. 21,975.

Filed June 6, 1912.]

*Appeau.—Briefs.—Failure to Comply With Court*Rule.—Where there is an entire failure by appellant to comply with Rule 22 of the Supreme Court, no question is presented on appeal.

From Clinton Circuit Court; *Joseph Combs,*Judge.

*79Action by George Bohannon against Oleland C. Campbell and another. Prom a judgment for plaintiff, the defendants appeal. (Transferred from the Appellate Court under §1405 Burns 1908, Acts 1901 p. 590.)

*Affirmed.*

*Eli F. Ritter*and *F. C. Reagan,*for appellants.

*Higgins & Rogers,*for appellee.

Myers, J.

Suit by appellee against appellant to recover on a promissory note executed by appellant Cleland C. Campbell, and to set aside the conveyance of real estate by him to his wife, on the ground that it was executed on a colorable consideration, but without consideration in fact, for the purpose of cheating, hindering, delaying and defrauding his creditors, and involves the same conveyance referred to in *Campbell*v. *Tomlinson*(1912), *ante,*63, 98 N. E. 720.

The only error assigned is in overruling “appellants’ motion for a new trial”, a joint assignment, which, as pointed out in the case just cited, would be sufficient, in case of a husband and wife, if the record otherwise presented the question, yet here none of the evidence is set out in the briefs, and there is an entire failure to comply with Rule 22 of this court. The nearest approach to it is appellants’ conclusions as to what the evidence shows, and they are vehemently denied by appellee.

It only' remains to affirm the judgment, and it is so ordered.

Note.—Reported in 98 N. E. 721. See, also, 1913 Cyc. Ann. 222.
#### § 223.24 Transportation of empty mail bags.

Any carrier authorized to engage in foreign air transportation may transport in foreign air transportation empty air mail bags from any country to the country of origin of such bags, free of charge, on a voluntary space-available basis.
**EXHIBIT 12.1**
**CERTIFICATION**
I, Socrates Kominakis, Chief Executive Officer of TIM Hellas Telecommunications S.A., certify that:
1.  I have reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F of TIM Hellas Telecommunications S.A.,(the “company”); 2.  Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a materialfact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report; 3.  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,results of operations and cash flows of the company as of, and for, the periods presented inthis report; 4.  The company’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the company and have:
 (a)  designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the company, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is madeknown to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in whichthis report is being prepared;  (b)  evaluated the effectiveness of the company’s disclosure controls and proceduresand presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosurecontrols and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based onsuch evaluation; and  (c)  disclosed in this report any change in the company’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the period covered by the annual report thathas materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the company’sinternal control over financial reporting; and
5.  The company’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the company’s auditors andthe audit committee of the company’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunction):
 

 

 (a)  all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operationof internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adverselyaffect the company’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financialinformation; and  (b)  any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employeeswho have a significant role in the company’s internal control over financial reporting.   Date: June 1, 2005 /s/ SOCRATES KOMINAKIS        **Name: Socrates Kominakis** **Title: Chief Executive Officer**
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-6804

DAVID KYLE HAIRSTON,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Samuel G. Wilson, Chief District

Judge. (CA-98-682-7)

Submitted: August 5, 1999 Decided: August 11, 1999

Before MURNAGHAN and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

David Kyle Hairston, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
* We assume that the date indicated on the notice of appeal

was the date Hairston deposited the notice of appeal in the prison

institution’s internal mail system. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1).

2

PER CURIAM:

David Kyle Hairston seeks to appeal the district court’s final

order dismissing his habeas corpus petition without prejudice for

failing to exhaust state remedies. We dismiss the appeal for lack

of jurisdiction because Hairston’s notice of appeal was not timely

filed.

Parties are accorded thirty days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, see Fed.

R. App. P. 4(a)(1), unless the district court extends the appeal

period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal period

under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). This appeal period is “mandatory

and jurisdictional.” Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corrections,

434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 361

U.S. 220, 229 (1960)).

The district court’s final order was entered on the docket on

November 4, 1998. Hairston’s notice of appeal was filed on June 8,

1999.* Because he failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to

obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we deny a

certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
3

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
§ 25.1 Applicability. ( a ) This part prescribes airworthiness standards for the issue of type certificates, and changes to those certificates, for transport category airplanes.
( b ) Each person who applies under Part 21 for such a certificate or change must show compliance with the applicable requirements in this part.
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

(18 U.S.C. 1350)

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Wells Real Estate Fund II (the Registrant) for the period ended June 30, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), the
undersigned, Leo F. Wells, III, Chief Executive Officer of the corporate General Partner of the Registrant, and Douglas P. Williams, Chief Financial Officer of the corporate General Partner of the Registrant, hereby certify, pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350), that, to the best of our knowledge and belief:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| |  |                        
| |  | -----------------------
| |  | /s/ LEO F. WELLS, III  
| |  | Leo F. Wells, III      
| |  | Chief Executive Officer
| |  | August 8, 2008         



| |  |                        
| |  | -----------------------
| |  | /s/ DOUGLAS P. WILLIAMS
| |  | Douglas P. Williams    
| |  | Chief Financial Officer
| |  | August 8, 2008