This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. NO. 30,961 4 MOSES EARL INGRAM, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF QUAY COUNTY 7 Albert J. Mitchell, Jr., District Judge 8 Gary K. King, Attorney General 9 Sri Mullis, Assistant Attorney General 10 Albuquerque, NM 11 for Appellee 12 Law Offices of Nancy L. Simmons, P.C. 13 Nancy L. Simmons 14 Albuquerque, NM 15 for Appellant 16 MEMORANDUM OPINION 17 GARCIA, Judge. 182 Defendant appeals his convictions for kidnapping, attempted murder, 1 aggravated fleeing, criminal damage to property, and unlawful taking of a motor 2 vehicle. On appeal, Defendant challenges the jury selection process, the district 3 court’s denial of his request for changeof venue, the jury instructions, various 4 evidentiary rulings, and his sentence. We affirm. 5 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 6 The charges were based on a July 24, 2009, domestic incident where Defendant 7 demanded to talk to Victim about her relationship with Defendant’s brother. 8 Defendant confronted Victim on her front porch and began to hit her in the head when 9 she refused to speak with him. When Defendant asked Victim for her car keys, 10 Victim set off the car alarm and threw the keys. When Victim’s neighbor (Neighbor) 11 heard Victim’s car alarm and some yelling, he opened his front door and saw 12 Defendant dragging Victim by her hair toward the street . Defendant dragged Victim 13 to her car and drove away. Neighbor called 911. 14 Officer Pete Vargas was th e responding officer. Officer Vargas was familiar 15 with both Defendant and Victim . When Officer Vargas arri ved at Victim’s residence, 16 he saw Victim’s car backing out of the driv eway, so he blocked the driveway with his 17 patrol unit. Officer Vargas saw Defendant in Victim’s car when it sped over the curb 18 and drove off. Officer Vargas and Officer Clay Cullison, who was driving a second 193 patrol unit, both pursued Victim’s car. During the pursuit with the police, Defendant 1 continued to beat Victim and repeatedly toldher that he intended to kill her. Victim’s 2 car ultimately came to a stop after it was driven off the road, through a barbed wire 3 fence, and crashed into a tree. Defendant fled on foot, and was arrested in Clovis, 4 New Mexico on August 10, 2009. 5 Prior to trial, Defendant unsuccessfullymoved for change of venue. During 6 jury selection, Defendant unsuccessfully raised a due process objection to two of the 7 empaneled jurors. Defendant declined to challenge these jurors for cause. 8 Throughout the course of trial, Defendant raised numerous unsuccessful evidentiary 9 objections to the State’s evidence. Defendant did not raise any objections to the jury 10 instructions, and the jury was not instructed pursuant to UJI 14-141 NMRA, the 11 general intent instruction. In his defense, Defendant’s th eory of the case was that of 12 mistaken identity by the witnesses. 13 The jury convicted Defendant of ki dnapping, attempted murder, aggravated 14 fleeing, criminal damage to property, and unlawful taking of a motor vehicle. During 15 sentencing, Defendant argued that the district court could only sentence Defendant to 16 second-degree kidnapping because the State did not tender and the jury was not 17 instructed pursuant to UJI 14-6018 NMRA. Attrial, Defendant had agreed with the 18 State that UJI 14-6018 was unnecessary becausenone of the elements listed in UJI 14- 194 6018 were at issue. The district court se ntenced Defendant to first-degree kidnapping, 1 and found that Defendant had committed a serious violent offense not eligible for 2 standard day-for-day good time credit. De fendant timely filed an appeal of his 3 conviction and sentence. 4 DISCUSSION 5 Defendant raises eight issues on appeal . He challenges the jury selection 6 process, the district court’s denial of his request for change of venue, the jury 7 instructions, various evidentiary rulings, and his sentence. Defendant also claims 8 ineffective assistance of counsel. Wewill address each issue as necessary. 9 Evidence of Prior Bad Acts 10 We first address Defendant’s argument that the district court erred in allowing 11 the admission of Defendant’s order setting conditions of release and appearance bond 12 (the Order) stemming from a different case, and Victim’s testimony that she was a 13 witness in a third case against Defendant. On appeal, Defendant argues that this 14 evidence of his prior bad acts was admitte d contrary to Rules 11-404(B) and 11-403 15 NMRA because “[t]he jury could logical ly decide that because Defendant had 16 apparently engaged in prior criminal behavior in relation to [V]ictim,” that he was 17 guilty of the most recent criminal charges as well. 18 We review the district court’s d ecision to admit evidence under Rules 11- 195 404(B) and 11-403 for an abuse of discretion. State v. Otto , 2007-NMSC-012, ¶ 9, 1 141 N.M. 443, 157 P.3d 8; State v. Martinez , 1999-NMSC-018, ¶ 31, 127 N.M. 207, 2 979 P.2d 718. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the ruling is clearly against the 3 logic and effect of the facts and circumstances of the case. We cannot say the trial 4 court abused its discretion by its ruling unless we can characterize it as clearly 5 untenable or not justified by reason.” Otto , 2007-NMSC-012, ¶ 9 (internal quotation 6 marks and citation omitted). 7 Before admitting evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts pursuant to Rule 11- 8 404(B), the district court must find that the evidence is relevant to a material issue 9 other than the defendant’s character or propensity to commit a crime. See State v. 10 Gaitan , 2002-NMSC-007, ¶ 26, 131 N.M. 758, 42 P. 3d 1207. In addition, the court 11 must determine that the probative value of the prior bad acts evidence substantially 12 outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant. Rule 11-403. In this case, the 13 district court found that the prior bad actevidence was not unduly prejudicial because 14 it was relevant evidence of fleeing, and it could provide a motive for Defendant to 15 batter, kidnap, and attempt tomurder Victim. We shall first address the district 16 court’s finding that the evidence was relevant , other than as proof of Defendant’s bad 17 character, and then discuss whether the evidence was unduly prejudicial to Defendant. 18 Rule 11-404(B)(1) prohibits the intr oduction of prior bad act evidence when 196 used “to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the 1 person acted in accordance withthe character.” Evidence of prior bad acts, however, 2 “may be admissible for another purpose, su ch as proving motive, opportunity, intent, 3 preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Rule 4 11-404(B)(2). “The list of permissible uses of evidence of other wrongs in Rule 11- 5 404(B) is intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive, and evidence of other 6 wrongs may be admissible on alternative rele vant bases so long as it is not admitted 7 to prove conformity with character.” Martinez , 1999-NMSC-018, ¶ 27. We conclude 8 that the district court did not abuse its di scretion in finding a re levant basis under Rule 9 11-404(B) to admit both the Order and Victim’s testimony. 10 The Order prohibited Defendant from leav ing Tucumcari. The restriction from 11 leaving Tucumcari is a relevant basis for admission under Rule 11-404(B) because 12 Defendant left Tucumcari after the in cident despite the restriction. State v. Trujillo , 13 95 N.M. 535, 541, 624 P.2d 44, 50 (1981) (“Evidence of flight or an aborted plan of 14 flight is admissible and relevant becauseit tends to show consciousness of guilt.”). 15 In addition, the Order was entered days be fore the incident in the present case and 16 required Defendant to be on house arrest and not associate with Victim. Victim’s 17 testimony demonstrated that she was also a witness in a third case against Defendant. 18 Both pieces of evidence are highly probative of Defendant’s difficult relationship with 197 Victim. See State v. Flores , 2010-NMSC-002, ¶ 32, 147 N.M. 542, 226 P.3d 641 (“In 1 determining [a d]efendant’s guilt, the jury may consider the relationship of the parties 2 and the animus of the accused toward the [victim].” (internal quotation marks and 3 citation omitted)). The cumulative effect of this challenged evidence demonstrates the 4 deteriorating relationship between Victim and Defendant, and it is particularly 5 relevant to both a motive and the identity of the assailant in light of Defendant’s 6 theory at trial, that the witnesses mist akenly identified Defendant as the assailant. 7 State v. Rojo , 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 47, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829 (upholding the 8 introduction of evidence of a defendant’s prio r violent acts against a victim and of his 9 deteriorating relationship with the victim to support the state’s theory that the 10 defendant had a motive for killing the victimafter she broke off their relationship). 11 The evidence of Defendant’s prior bad act s was not admitted solely as proof of 12 Defendant’s bad character and propensity to act in conformity therewith. As such, the 13 district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that Victim’s testimony 14 and the Order were admissible evidence under Rule 11-404(B). 15 Next, Defendant argues on appeal that th e probative value of the prior bad acts 16 evidence “was far outweighed by [its] prejudi cial effect on the jury.” We disagree. 17 The purpose of Rule 11-403 is not to guardagainst any prejudice whatsoever, rather 18 Rule 11-403 guards against the danger of unfair prejudice. See Rojo , 1999-NMSC- 198 001, ¶ 48 (“[T]he fact that some jurors might find this evidence offensive or 1 inflammatory does not necessarily require its exclusion[.]”). Ev idence is not unfairly 2 prejudicial simply because it inculpates a defendant, but instead prejudice is 3 considered unfair when it “goes onlyto character or propensity.” State v. Ruiz , 119 4 N.M. 515, 519, 892 P.2d 962, 966 (Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis added); State v. Everitt , 5 80 N.M. 41, 46, 450 P.2d 927, 932 (Ct. App. 1969) (holding that evidence admissible 6 to show intent and preparation was not to be excluded ev en if it “may have had some 7 inflammatory effect”). 8 In the present case, the evidence was properly admitted as probative of 9 Defendant’s motive to harm Victim and hi s consciousness of guilt. Given the strong 10 probative value of the evidence for thes e other purposes, the admission of the 11 evidence was not illogical, untenable, or contrary to the facts and circumstances of this 12

case. Otto , 2007-NMSC-012, ¶ 9 ( setting out the basis for an abuse of discretion 13 analysis when prior bad acts evidence must be weighed against the prejudice to a 14 defendant under Rule 11-404( B)). Therefore, any prejudice suffered by Defendant 15 was substantially outweighed by the significant probative value of this evidence, and 16 the district court did not abuse its discre tion in admitting this prior bad acts evidence. 17 Jury Instructions 18 We next address Defendant ’s argument that the failure to instruct the jury 199 pursuant to UJI 14-141 automatically requires reversal because the use note for this 1 instruction provides that it must be given. Defendant asserts that he is entitled to a 2 new trial on the charges for which no instruction on intent wa s otherwise provided. 3 Defendant asks this Court to review this claim de novo, arguing that the district 4 court’s failure to submit UJI 14-141 was jurisdictional error. 5 In the instant case, the statutory el ements for the crimes of kidnapping, 6 attempted murder, and aggravated fleeing all require specific proof of intent. See 7 NMSA 1978, § 30-4-1(A) (2003) (kidnappi ng); § 30-28-1 (1963) (attempted murder); 8 § 30-22-1.1(A) (2003) (aggravated fleeing). However, the State concedes that the 9 remaining charges, criminal damage toproperty and unlawful taking of a motor 10 vehicle, are general intent crimes. As such, we assume without deciding that 11 Defendant would have been entitled to a UJI 14-141 instruction for the two general 12 intent crimes if he had requested it. See UJI 14-141 (Use Note) (excepting only 13 crimes which specify the inte nt in the statute or instruction and crimes which require 14 no criminal intent from the mandatory use of the instruction). However, Defendant 15 did not tender the UJI 14-141 instruction or otherwise object to the district court’s 16 failure to submit this instruction to the jury. See State v. Doe , 100 N.M. 481, 483, 672 17 P.2d 654, 656 (1983) (holding that the failure to follow a use note stating that a UJI 18 instruction for general crimin al intent must be given to the jury is not automatic 1910 grounds for reversal absent a defendant’s request or objection during trial); State v. 1 Gee , 2004-NMCA-042, ¶ 19, 135 N.M. 408, 89 P. 3d 80 (“[A] failure to follow a use 2 note does not require automatic reversal, and would require preservation for review 3 on appeal.”). As such, we will not reverse for jurisdicti onal error but will only review 4 for fundamental error. Doe , 100 N.M. at 483-84, 672 P.2d at 656-57; Gee , 5 2004-NMCA-042, ¶¶ 8, 19. 6 The doctrine of fundamental error is applied under exceptional circumstances 7 and only to prevent a mis carriage of justice. State v. Barber , 2004-NMSC-019, ¶ 8, 8 135 N.M. 621, 92 P.3d 633. We will revers e for fundamental error when the 9 foundation or basis of a defendant ’s case or an essential right in a defense is affected. 10 State v. Cunningham , 2000-NMSC-009, ¶ 13, 128 N.M . 711, 998 P.2d 176. “When 11 reviewing jury instructions for fundamentalerror, we apply the fundamental error 12 standard of review to the same inquirywe perform for re view for reversible 13 error—whether the instruction or instructi ons would confuse or misdirect a reasonable 14 juror due to contradiction, ambiguity, omission, or misstatement.” Gee , 15 2004-NMCA-042, ¶ 8. 16 The relevant facts are not in dispute. The State presented evidence sufficient 17 to establish the essential elements of each crime, including the intent of the 18 perpetrator. Defendant conced ed at trial that the crimes occurred and at no point did 1911 he argue that the perpetrator lacked the requi site criminal intent at the time of their 1 commission. Instead, Defendant asserted a mistaken identity defense and argued that 2 he was not the person who committed the crimes . As such, the disputed issue at trial 3 was the identity of the perpetrator, not wh ether the crimes in fact occurred. Even 4 though the jury was not provided with UJI 14-141, the jury’s verdict against 5 Defendant necessarily included a finding that Defendant po ssessed the requisite 6 mental state because that element was not disputed in this case. See State v. Lopez , 7 1996-NMSC-036, ¶ 24, 122 N.M. 63, 920 P.2d 1017 (finding the failure to include an 8 essential element in an instruction for a crime did not constitute fundamental error 9 where the element that was omitted from the instruction was not at issue). 10 We conclude that the instructions, as a whole, were sufficient to allow the jury 11 to find that every element of the crimes occurred and address the defense of whether 12 Defendant was in fact the perpetrator. As such, in the absence of an objection from 13 Defendant regarding an undisputed issue dealing with the two general intent crimes, 14 we find no error in the district court’s failure to submit UJI 14-141 to the jury. See 15 Doe , 100 N.M. at 484, 672 P.2d at 657 (holding th at “a defendant cannot sit back and 16 insert error into a trial by his or her inac tion and receive an au tomatic reversal when 17 the crime has been fairly instructed on”). 18 Sentencing 1912 We now address Defendant’s argument that the district court committed 1 fundamental error when it failed to instruct the jury on the various elements of first2 degree kidnapping under UJI 14-1680, but proceeded to sentence Defendant to the 3 penalty imposed for first-degree kidnapping. We find no error. 4 “The propriety of jury instructions give n or denied is a mixed question of law 5 and fact. Mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed de novo.” State v. Salazar , 6 1997-NMSC-044, ¶ 49, 123 N.M. 778, 945 P.2d 996. We must also determine 7 whether a reasonable juror would have beenconfused or misled by the instruction. 8 State v. Benally , 2001-NMSC-033, ¶ 12, 131 N.M. 258, 34 P.3d 1134. “ Fundamental 9 error only applies in exceptional circumstan ces when guilt is so doubtful that it would 10 shock the judicial conscience to allow the conviction to stand.” Cunningham , 2000- 11 NMSC-009, ¶ 13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Sentencing by the 12 district court is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Bonilla , 2000-NMSC-037, 13 ¶ 6, 130 N.M. 1, 15 P.3d 491. 14 Initially, we address the district court’s failure to instruct the jury regarding 15 every element of first degree kidnapping pursuant to UJI 14-6018. Generally, “a 16 failure to include an essential element in th e elements section of an instruction is not 17 fundamental error if other instructions gi ven to the jury adequately address the 18 excluded element.” State v. Swick , 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 53, 279 P.3d 747 (citations 1913 omitted). During trial, the district court alerted the parties to a proposed amendment 1 to UJI 14-6018 and its relationship to the standard kidnapping instruction under UJI 2 14-403 NMRA. The district court had prepar ed proposed instructions that included 3 a special verdict form (the district court’s proposed instruction) because it was 4 concerned about the various elements of kidnapping and the need for a unanimous 5 verdict regarding all the elements. Th e State indicated that UJI 14-6018 included 6 elements not in the first-degree kidnappi ng statute and only operated to lower a 7 kidnapping to second-degree kidnapping if those particular findings were made. It 8 claimed that the UJI 14-6018 instruction wa s only required where an issue existed as 9 to whether the elements of second-degree kidnapping were applicable. Defendant 10 responded that he did not “see the use or n eed for [the special verdict form] but that 11 would be [the State’s] decision” because there was not a dispute regarding “what the 12 basic facts were” dealing withthe injuries in this case. At the end of the jury 13 instruction discussion, the State and Defe ndant’s counsel both agreed that a special 14 verdict form would not be usedregarding the issues set forth in the district court’s 15 proposed instruction. See Lopez , 1996-NMSC-036, ¶ 24 (dealing with whether an 16 element that was omitted from the instructions was at issue). 17 Defendant made a strategic decision to exclude the UJI 14-6018 questions set 18 forth in the district court’s proposed instruction. It was undisputed that two of the 1914 required elements for first-degree kidnappi ng were established by the facts and were 1 not contested issues at trial. We will not allow Defendant to second-guess his decision 2 to remove this factual issue from the jury’s consideration and then claim error after 3 the verdict is rendered. See State v. Watchman , 2005-NMCA-125, ¶ 13, 138 N.M. 4 488, 122 P.3d 855 (“To allow a de fendant to invite error and to subsequently complain 5 about that very error would subvert th e orderly and equitable administration of 6 justice.” (alteration, internal quot ation marks, and citation omitted)). 7 “[F]undamental error has no application where [the d]efendant, by [his] own 8 actions, invites the error.” Id. Because Defendant specifically agreed to exclude from 9 the jury’s consideration the UJI 14-6018 ques tions set forth in the district court’s 10 proposed instruction and did not dispute the factual elements presented to establish 11 first-degree kidnapping, we will not addre ss his fundamental error arguments any 12 further. Cunningham , 2000-NMSC-009, ¶ 13 (limiting reversal for fundamental error 13 to situations where “guilt is so doubtful th at it would shock the judicial conscience to 14 allow the conviction to stand” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 15 Remaining Claims of Error 16 Defendant raises several cl aims of error pursuant to State v. Franklin , 78 N.M. 17 127, 129, 428 P.2d 982, 984 (1967) (advising appellate counselto advance a 18 defendant’s arguments even if their merits are questionable) and State v. Boyer , 103 1915 N.M. 655, 659, 712 P.2d 1, 5 (Ct. App. 1985) (recognizing that an attorney should 1 present a client’s contentions even if couns el has no faith in them). Defendant claims 2 that it was error for the district court to deny his motion for change of venue, raises 3 several challenges to the jurypanel, and to evidentiary rulings made by the district 4 court during trial. We have considered Defendant’s arguments and determine that 5 they are not supported by the record in this case or would be contrary to established 6 precedent. 7 Defendant challenged the district court’s denial of hi s request for a change in 8 venue. However, Defendant failed to supplement his writte n motion with the affidavit 9 required by NMSA 1978, § 38-3-3(B) (2003). In stead, he stated that he would reserve 10 the change of venue motion until after voir dire. Following voir di re, Defendant orally 11 requested a change of venue, arguing only that the selected jurors did not represent a 12 broad-based selection of De fendant’s peers. The district court inquired whether 13 Defendant’s oral motion was directed at the issue of racial balance and Defendant 14 responded that it did. No other argument was made regarding the ability of the jury 15 to render a fair and impartial determination in this particul ar case. The district court 16 denied Defendant’s oral motion for change of venue and stated that Defendant failed 17 to make any arguments regarding the manner in which jury excusals were used or the 18 racial balance of the entire jury pool. Because there is no indication that Defendant 1916 preserved his arguments regarding any allege d deprivation of his right to a fair and 1 impartial jury in this particular venue, wefind no error in the district court’s ruling. 2 See State v. Riley , 2010-NMSC-005, ¶¶ 24-25, 147 N.M. 557, 226 P.3d 656 3 (recognizing that review by an appellate court must be predicated upon a timely 4 objection by a defendant that alerts th e trial court to the claimed error); see also State 5 v. Pacheco , 2007-NMSC-009, ¶ 10, 141 N.M. 340, 155 P.3d 745 (concluding that the 6 defendant waived his right to argue his f undamental right to a trial by a fair and 7 impartial jury by “failing to timely invoke the ruling of the trial c ourt”). A change of 8 venue based upon other potential factors was not sufficiently developed in the record 9 below. 10 Defendant also challenged several members of the jury from serving on the jury 11 panel in this case. Defense counsel objected to these jurors on due process grounds. 12 However, defense counsel declined to challenge the jurors for cause and questioned 13 whether he might be able to use a perempto ry challenge. The district court found that 14 there was no due process violation becau se Defendant was gi ven ample opportunity 15 during voir dire to question the jury about familial relationships and there was no 16 reason to excuse the juror for cause. Because Defendant failed to develop any 17 recognized basis regarding how any member of the jury panel c ould not serve fairly 18 and impartially, we conclude that the matters about which Defendant complains were 1917 not prejudicial. See generally State v. Vasquez , 2010-NMCA-041, ¶ 38, 148 N.M. 1 202, 232 P.3d 438 (holding that where the de fendant did not identify any individual 2 selected to serve on the jurywho indicated an inability to be impartial, the defendant 3 failed to demonstrate actual prejudice). 4 Defendant also argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because 5 of defense counsel’s failure to effectively raise Defendant’s objections to the jury 6 selection process. “For a successful in effective assistance of counsel claim, a 7 defendant must first demonstrate error on the part of counsel, and then show that the 8 error resulted in prejudice.” State v. Bernal , 2006-NMSC-050, ¶ 32, 140 N.M. 644, 9 146 P.3d 289. “Counsel is presumed competent.” State v. Jacobs , 2000-NMSC-026, 10 ¶ 48, 129 N.M. 448, 10 P.3d 127. “On appeal , we will not sec ond guess the trial 11 strategy and tactics of the defense counsel.” Lytle v. Jordan , 2001-NMSC-016, ¶ 43, 12 130 N.M. 198, 22 P.3d 666 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Again, 13 Defendant has not developed or articulated any error made by his counsel in the jury 14 selection process. Defendant’s claims of ineffectiveness during the jury selection 15 process also implicate counsel’s strategy and overlap into the realm of legitimate trial 16 tactics. Based on these factors and the lack of a record to address these issues, we 17 conclude that Defendant has not estab lished a prima facie case of ineffective 18 assistance of counsel on direct appeal. 1918 Defendant also challenged the districtcourt’s rulings to admit Defendant’s 1 jailhouse statements and witness testimony regarding blood found on Victim’s porch 2 and in her car. As Defendant’s appellatebrief has not demonstrated that the 3 introduction of this evidence prejudiced him, we hold that any error was harmless. See 4 Rule 5-113(A) NMRA (“Error in either th e admission or the exclusion of evidence 5 and error or defect in any ru ling, order, act or omission by the court or by any of the 6 parties is not grounds for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict, for 7 vacating, modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take 8 any such action appears to the court inc onsistent with substantial justice.”). 9 Finally, Defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his 10 convictions. “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must view the evidence 11 in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, indulging all reasonable inferences 12 and resolving all conflicts in the ev idence in favor of the verdict.” Cunningham , 13 2000-NMSC-009, ¶ 26. In this case, Defendant did not deny the incident, but relied 14 on his mistaken identity theory as a defens e. Defendant has failed to identify any 15 defect and articulate how any element of a particular crime was not established by the 16 actual evidence submitted. The jury was free to reject his version of events. See State 17 v. Sutphin , 107 N.M. 126, 131, 753 P.2d 1314, 1319 (1988). As such, the evidence 18 was sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions. 1919 CONCLUSION 1 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the verdict reached by the jury in this case 2 and the sentence imposed by the district court. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4

___________________________________ 5 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 6

WE CONCUR: 7

___________________________________ 8 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Chief Judge 9

___________________________________ 10 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 11