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YEAR IN REVIEW: U.S. POLICY TOWARD A

CHANGING WESTERN HEMISPHERE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

DECEMBER 9, 2015

Serial No. 114–129

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Roger Noriega, visiting fellow, American Enterprise Institute 

(former Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State) ....................................................................................................... 6

The Honorable Mary Beth Long, founder and chief executive officer, Metis 

Solutions (former Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, 

U.S. Department of Defense) .............................................................................. 23

Cynthia J. Arnson, Ph.D., director, Latin American Program, Woodrow Wilson 

International Center for Scholars ....................................................................... 30

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Roger Noriega: Prepared statement ............................................. 9

The Honorable Mary Beth Long: Prepared statement ......................................... 26

Cynthia J. Arnson, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ..................................................... 32

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 52

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 53

(1)

YEAR IN REVIEW: U.S. POLICY TOWARD A 

CHANGING WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 9, 2015

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:04 p.m., in room 

2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jeff Duncan (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. DUNCAN. We will go ahead and call the meeting to order. 

Take your time, Dr. Arnson. That is fine. We are going to have 

votes shortly. So I want to try to get as far along as we can. And 

a quorum being present, the subcommittee will come to order. 

And I would like to recognize myself for an opening statement. 

This year, we have seen many changes in the Western Hemisphere, 

economic and security factors, migration, natural disasters, and 

deepening ties with Iran, China, and Russia have greatly impacted 

the region. Elections in multiple countries have shifted governments and political power. The Organization of American States 

has a new Secretary General who has affirmed a commitment to 

revitalizing the organization, and his public statements related to 

Venezuela have underscored that commitment. Panama hosted the 

Seventh Summit of the Americas. And it had the inclusion of Cuba 

for the first time. And the United States began its 2-year chairmanship of the Arctic Council. Furthermore, Colombia has made 

progress in its peace talks with the FARC. And both houses of its 

legislature voted this month to approve a proposal for a referendum on an eventual peace deal. In Brazil, economic woes continue. And impeachment proceedings against a sitting President 

have begun. Moreover, crime and violence in the region have also 

risen with an ever-proliferating network of transnational criminal 

organizations. This year, Latin America has also experienced its 

worst economic performance since 2009. 

The purpose of today’s hearing is to examine the Obama administration’s policies and programs in the Western Hemisphere, to assess their impact, and to consider the progress of the countries in 

the region in furthering democracy, freedom of religion, and of the 

press; strengthening the rule of law and judicial institutions; growing economic prosperity; and providing a safer and more secure region. 

As a side note, I would like to congratulate the ranking member 

on passage, in the Foreign Affairs Committee, of a bill dealing with 

2

freedom of the press. Hopefully that bill will make it to the floor, 

and we will get to vote on it. I was a proud cosponsor, no doubt. 

This subcommittee has held 16 hearings this year to provide 

oversight of the Obama administration’s efforts in the hemisphere 

and bring public awareness to key developments in the region. Of 

the hearings this subcommittee has held this year, two have focused on the budgetary issues and the $1 billion request for Central America. Two have examined the energy opportunities in the 

Western Hemisphere, focusing on Canada and Mexico in particular. 

Three highlighted the challenges to press freedoms, religious liberties, and human rights abuses in Cuba and Venezuela. Two focused on the U.S.-Cuba policy shift, the impact on U.S. citizens and 

national security, and the unresolved property claims issue. And 

one hearing explored the opportunities the United States has on 

arctic issues in the region. 

In January, the death of special prosecutor Alberto Nisman in 

Argentina raised questions about Iran’s networks in the region and 

the Kirchner government’s relationship with Iran and Venezuela. 

This subcommittee has maintained a focus on Iran and Hezbollah’s 

activities in the region and expanded our oversight to include hearings on China and Russia’s growing presence, as well. Whereas 

these countries have shown great attention to the Western Hemisphere, the Obama administration’s own response has been minimal. With the exception of altering the U.S. relationship with Cuba 

without requiring any substantive changes from the Castro regime 

in return, a tactical response to the migration crisis in Central 

America, and an emphasis on LGBTI and climate change initiatives, the Obama administration has shown little strategic vision 

for United States leadership and has failed to make an effective 

case for why countries in the region should make the United States 

their partner of choice. That has got to change. 

In my view, the United States should be prioritizing relations 

with the democratic free countries in the region instead of 

capitulating to leftist governments in Cuba, Venezuela, Ecuador, 

Nicaragua, and Brazil. Rather than rejecting the Keystone pipeline 

with Canada, limiting U.S. economic potential, and ignoring important security dimensions in the U.S. relationship with Mexico, the 

United States should recognize that North America’s greatest potential lies within even stronger relations with Canada and Mexico. 

In Central America, we have seen no changes in the root causes 

of migration to the United States. And I remain concerned with the 

high levels of migrant flows we have seen within the last few 

months into Mexico from Central America and at the U.S. southern 

border. In addition, we are seeing, from my understanding of a 

meeting with the Panamanians today, a large number of Cubans 

also transiting. The $1 billion request from the Obama administration will not solve these problems without active U.S. leadership 

and tight oversight of U.S. taxpayer dollars; real and measurable 

political will from the countries themselves to address the rampant 

corruption; and strong and independent national institutions that 

are transparent and accountable to the people. 

In addition, I believe we are missing opportunities to create 

stronger partnerships on trade and energy issues in the hemisphere. In particular, we ought to consider ways to more highly 

3

prioritize U.S. relations with the Pacific Alliance countries of Chile, 

Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, which reportedly represent 36 percent 

of Latin America’s economy, 50 percent of its international trade, 

and 41 percent of all incoming foreign direct investment. In addition, energy cooperation in North America, Central America, the 

Caribbean, and South America should be more foundational for 

U.S. policy and underscore our efforts in the region. With the Western Hemisphere home to nearly a third of the world’s oil, U.S. reserves of oil and natural gas and shale gas resources, and the 

growing investment opportunities for U.S. businesses in multiple 

countries in the region, energy is a positive area for cooperation 

that we simply have not explored enough. 

Indeed, with this year’s elections in the hemisphere, I am hopeful 

that we will see greater economic and security partnerships between the United States and many more countries. Longtime ruling parties were kicked out in Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Saint 

Kitts and Nevis. Mexico saw several surprise victories from independent, nonparty candidates in its June legislative and local elections. And Guatemala saw a rare victory against corruption with 

the unseating of a sitting President, the resignation of a Vice President, and the election of a political outsider as the President in October, one who promised to clean up corruption. After years of 

delay and extended political crisis, Haiti has had two rounds of 

elections this year, with a final round scheduled for later this 

month. Even our best partner on trade and energy issues, Canada, 

saw the turning out of the incumbent government, after several 

years of consecutive leadership. With the results of center-right 

Mauricio Macri’s victory in Argentina last month and the first-ever 

runoff election in Argentina’s history, I am excited about the possibilities of improved bilateral relations and greater Argentine leadership in the hemisphere. In addition, this past weekend’s election 

in Venezuela marked an important turning point for that country 

with the opposition’s landslide victory over Chavismo or the 

Maduro government. 

So we are going to see—and I look forward to you guys talking, 

Ambassador, about that a little bit more, by the way. 

Our subcommittee began this year by engaging with regional 

Caribbean leaders over the issue of finding better ways to partner 

on energy issues and looking at how the energy boom in the United 

States could benefit our friends who have historically depended on 

Venezuela to meet their energy needs. Next year, I look forward to 

deepening U.S. engagement in the region and maintaining our attention on Iran, China, and Russia’s actions in the hemisphere and 

particularly focusing on energy, business, and trade opportunities, 

terrorism, border security threats, and counterdrug efforts in the 

region. 

As we take time today to assess the Obama administration’s approach to the Western Hemisphere and the status of specific countries in the region, I look forward to using the perspective shared 

here today by our panel of witnesses in order to help shape and 

sharpen U.S. engagement in the region next year. 

So, with that, I look forward to the hearing. 

And I will turn to the ranking member from New Jersey, Mr. 

Sires, for any opening statement he may have. 

4

Mr. SIRES. Good afternoon. 

Thank you, Chairman, for holding this timely hearing. And 

thank you to the witnesses for joining us today. 

The Western Hemisphere has seen a significant change over the 

past year. The region has undergone multiple elections at both the 

head of states and legislative level. Elections are bringing about 

change in Argentina, Guatemala, Haiti, and Venezuela, just to 

name a few. In Argentina, voters went to the polls on November 

22 and voted for change by electing Mauricio Macri of the opposition. Macri’s election ends the rule of the so-called ‘‘Kirchnerismo,’’ 

which has been the ruling ideology for 12 years. In Guatemala, 

massive corruption schemes uncovered by the United Nations’ 

International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala led to 

the resignation and indictment of both the President and Vice 

President. 

Most recently, Venezuela’s opposition coalition, known as Democratic Unity Roundtable, MUD, triumphed in the country’s December 6, 2015 legislative elections, despite Maduro’s efforts to imprison and eliminate the opposition and intimidate voters. The 

MUD Party won a decisive victory by capturing a supermajority 

over Maduro’s ruling party. The elections represent a major defeat 

for Chavismo and signal a potential shift away from the failed and 

oppressive socialist policies to a more progressive society. Despite 

these agents for change, there are still troubling changes facing the 

region. Cuba still remains as oppressive and dictatorial as ever, imprisoning innocent civilians at an alarming rate and making no effort to shift its attitude to more equitable policies. The administration’s misguided effort to reengage with the island has prompted 

record numbers of Cubans to flee the island, spurring a migrant 

crisis in Central America as thousands await passage. 

Additionally, Central America is continuing to deal with its own 

crisis as children and women continue to flee to the northern triangle to escape violence engulfing their home states. Mexico has 

greatly increased its enforcement efforts on the southern border. 

And we must help build that capacity so they can adequately 

screen and process these people, who are overwhelmingly eligible 

for asylum. We must stay committed to addressing the root causes 

of this crisis and ensure Central America is making strident efforts 

to reform its institutions and absorb a potential increase in U.S. 

funding through the Alliance for Prosperity proposal. 

These are just a few examples of changes undergoing in the 

hemisphere over the past year. I have always said that the U.S. 

must prioritize engagement with our neighbors. And I look forward 

to hearing from our witnesses on this year’s activities and how we 

can improve relations in the coming year. 

Thank you. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I will allow a brief opening statement if any other 

members would like to. 

Mr. DeSantis from Florida is recognized for a brief statement. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The title of the hearing is the ‘‘Changing Western Hemisphere,’’ 

but the one place still stuck in its totalitarian past is Cuba. It was 

almost a year ago when the President announced major, major 

changes in our policy toward the Castro regime. I think we can see 

5

now that these were essentially a list of unilateral concessions that 

really represent an unprecedented surrender to an anti-American 

regime that continues to oppress its own people. 

Think about it. Cuba got a massive influx of cash that really 

props up the intelligence services and the regime. It provided legitimacy to the Castro regime by opening the Embassy, as if they are 

just one of a community of nations. We released the last members 

of the Cuban Five terrorists and, of course, removed Cuba from the 

list of state sponsors of terrorism. Those were major concessions. 

And, yet, a year later, what have we gotten in return? Cuba released 53 political prisoners. Most of them have been re-arrested 

now. There has been no extradition for terrorists like Joanne 

Chesimard, who remains on the FBI’s Most Wanted Terrorists list. 

No political reforms. In fact, the crackdown is probably worse today 

than it was prior to this deal. 

So there are a lot of changes in the Western Hemisphere. I appreciate all the subjects you brought, Mr. Chairman, before us. But 

freedom in Cuba is not a change that we have seen. And this is 

not a policy that has succeeded. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Absolutely. Thanks for recognizing that. I will now 

recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Meeks, for an opening statement. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, a few decades ago, Latin America and the Caribbean 

was a region known more for political turmoil and dictatorship 

than for political and economic advancements. Times have changed 

in my estimation. There have been sustained democratic advancements in the region for years now. And I think that we should acknowledge that and applaud that shift. It is also important that we 

adjust our policies to reflect these advancements. I commend the 

Obama administration for demonstrating to the region that our Nation is interested in a real partnership, a partnership with mutual 

interests and benefits on security, trade, immigration, human 

rights, and so much more. 

While Cuba is the one exception to the democratic trend, the 

Obama administration’s decision to formally engage Cuba, in my 

estimation, is promising. And it puts America in sync with our allies in the region that have long urged more mature U.S. policy in 

the Western Hemisphere. I also appreciate the administration’s 

commitment to diplomatic engagement, even where there have 

been challenges in our relationship. For example, as I was just 

talking with my good friend, the ranking member, here, and recent 

elections in Venezuela confirm that the democratic process in that 

nation remains very much alive. And it is good to see that there 

is change happening there. And I think that is important. And it 

reinforces the need for the United States to stay engaged. That is 

the key. We must be engaged. There are many elections ahead in 

the coming months. And there are notable challenges remaining. 

Haiti held elections in October rather peacefully. But subsequent 

violence and protest over the election results is deeply concerning. 

But we have got to stay focused on it. 

Democracy is not just about elections. Citizens of any nation 

don’t just want to vote; they want to feel that their representatives 

6

are making a difference in their lives and livelihoods. For that reason, focus on poverty reduction and now on the equality gap is 

similarly an important regional trend. I have seen for myself the 

success that dedicated governments in Brazil, Peru, Mexico, Chile, 

Jamaica, and others have had on this front. It has been remarkable. Economic reforms, trade liberalization, and innovative and 

cost-cutting approaches are making positive change for vulnerable 

populations. The most affected communities for too many generations have suffered benign and deliberate neglect and discrimination. 

The progress I have seen can and has been instructive to our 

struggle to eliminate poverty and achieve a more equal and just society here in the United States. Our hemisphere is more consequently connected than ever before in both our struggles and successes. 

And I look forward to hearing the perspectives of our witnesses. 

And I want to thank the chair and the ranking member for holding this timely and critical review. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I want to thank the gentleman from New York for 

his participation in the hearings this year. A lot of times in Congress, we have subcommittee hearings that members just don’t 

show up for. So I appreciate your participation, and as well as Ron 

and some of the others. 

So we are going to go ahead and get started. They are going to 

call votes at some point in time. We will get as far as we can. And 

I want to thank the witnesses for being here today. We don’t have 

a lighting system. I am going to ask you to try to stay within 5 

minutes. I will be timing here. If I start tapping the gavel, that is 

just to try to wrap up as soon as possible. And we will try to stick 

to that 5-minute rule. Then members will be able to ask questions. 

The witnesses are the Honorable Roger Noriega, visiting fellow 

with the American Enterprise Institute and former Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere at the U.S. Department of State; 

the Honorable Mary Beth Long, founder and chief executive officer 

of Metis Solutions, a former Assistant Secretary for International 

Security Affairs at the U.S. Department of Defense; and Dr. Cynthia J. Arnson, director of Latin America Program at the Woodrow 

Wilson International Center for Scholars. 

So, Ambassador, I will recognize you for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROGER NORIEGA, VISITING 

FELLOW, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE) 

Ambassador NORIEGA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and 

members of the committee. I thank you for this opportunity to review an eventful year in the Americas and to discuss the future of 

our policy. I believe we have a significant opportunity to recapture 

the initiative where our priorities are at stake: Democracy, security, and prosperity. 

In the last 15 years, representative democracy has been undermined by authoritarian populism, statist economic policies, and 

unsustainable government spending. In some very dramatic cases 

in the last year, some of our neighbors have decided to change 

7

course. Sunday’s parliamentary elections in Venezuela gave the 

democratic opposition a landslide victory and a supermajority in 

the national assembly beginning in January. President Maduro had 

no choice but to accept the results of those elections. But his history suggests that his regime will resort to any means necessary 

to deny the opposition its rightful authority. That is why friends 

of democracy must do what we can to help. 

And to get straight to the point, for example, some of the same 

men who menace Venezuela’s democratic opposition today also 

shovel tons of cocaine into the United States. And I believe we 

should move quickly to identify and punish these thugs to put 

them on the defensive. In Argentina, a majority of the voters rejected the statist, authoritarian, and economically ruinous policies 

of the Kirchners. As a result, the pro-free-market candidate, 

Mauricio Macri, was elected to a 4-year term. He has pledged to 

lift currency and price controls, to lower taxes, to restore Argentina’s credit worthiness, and to pursue a positive relationship with 

the United States. And I note that just today, his Foreign Minister 

said that she would be open to the renewal of a regional trade 

agreement, like was pushed 10 years ago. Argentina’s new President has an opportunity to show that free market remedies can 

right size government and jump start stagnant economies. 

In Brazil, the decision last week to impeach Dilma Rousseff, impeach the President reflects the anxiety about the future that permeates South America’s most populous country and largest economy. Several parallel investigations are continuing as well, which 

are being led by independent prosecutors and judges. This political 

crisis is, obviously, not good for Brazilians. However, the fact that 

they are confronting their challenges by relying on the rule of law 

and checks and balances shows that when it comes to answering 

to popular will, constitutions are more reliable than caudillos. 

A second major point, one of the greatest threats to U.S. security 

in the Americas today is the breakdown of regional consensus to 

confront illegal drugs and transnational organized crime. In the 

last 15 years, key drug-producing and transit countries, among 

them, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, have effectively ended their 

cooperation with U.S. antidrug efforts. Now, Colombia intends to 

make peace with the guerilla group that is the world’s largest producer of cocaine. It has already, at the peace process, gutted the 

government’s coca eradication program and ended extraditions to 

the United States. For the first time in memory, if not ever in history, Colombia refused to extradite someone sought by the United 

States. In the face of this crumbling regional alliance, U.S. foreign 

policy has failed to respond effectively, leaving us more vulnerable 

to the onslaught of illegal drugs than we have been in decades. 

On a related front, the deadly terrorist attacks in San 

Bernardino and Paris underscore the vital contribution of neighboring governments to our own security. In the last several weeks, 

including in the last day or so, border officials in the region have 

interdicted at least a dozen Syrian nationals with false or stolen 

documents bound for the United States. These particular people 

are not suspected of being terrorists, but they relied on a criminal 

network that terrorists can use to enter the United States. 

8

One of our biggest vulnerabilities in this regard in this hemisphere emanates from Venezuela, which supports Syria’s Assad regime and provides resources, recruits, and safe haven to Hezbollah 

and Iranian operatives, groups that have vowed publically to carry 

their asymmetrical war to our homeland. Venezuela also has provided thousands of phony IDs, passports, and visas to persons of 

Middle Eastern origin. 

Mr. Chairman, U.S. security demands much more vigorous efforts to confront that criminal regime as well as, in general, 

transnational organized crime that is destabilizing our neighborhood. The President must use all of his tools in his toolkit, including investigative cooperation, intelligence sharing, and sanctions to 

identify, isolate, and prosecute traffickers, money launderers, 

complicit officials, and corrupt businesses. To help put the region 

back on the road to prosperity, we should invigorate the positive, 

proactive partnerships that encourage countries to adopt policies 

that bring spending under control, incentivize private sector led development, root out corruption, and put capital in the hands of innovative entrepreneurs. 

One final point, Mr. Chairman. None of our pressing priorities in 

this region—democracy, security, and free market prosperity—are 

advanced, in my opinion, by the ongoing U.S. capitulation to the 

Castro dictatorship. Arguably, things have gotten worse for the 

Cuban people on the island since President Obama moved to normalize diplomatic ties with Castro. Reasonable terms for restoring 

normal economic relations with a post-Castro Cuba were approved 

by a three-fourths majority of this House and our Senate and 

signed by President Clinton. The awful reality is that Cuba is the 

only country in the Western Hemisphere that cannot meet any of 

those standards in terms of the defense of democracy, human 

rights, and labor rights. The benefits of normal economic ties with 

the United States should be used to encourage a post-Castro government to treat its people decently, not to reward a government 

that refuses to do so. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Noriega follows:]

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Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you. 

And we will get to the questions and be able to elaborate a little 

bit more. 

Ms. Long, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARY BETH LONG, FOUNDER AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, METIS SOLUTIONS 

(FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE) 

Ms. LONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, members of the committee. I appreciate being invited to be here today. 

A stable if not more peaceful, democratic, and prosperous Western Hemisphere is in the interest of all the citizens of the Americas 

and is in our interest. Unfortunately, in the last year, by having 

failed to consistently and meaningfully engage our hemispheric 

neighbors, we have managed to make the United States and our 

neighbors neither more secure, nor more prosperous. 

This has been a challenging year for our near and far hemispheric neighbors. Just in November, an unanticipated surge in immigration of Cubans through Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador has nearly overwhelmed our Customs and Border officials 

and made the United States and its neighbors even more vulnerable to the problems that these individuals represent and bring 

with them. The economic ills and lack of stability suffered by many 

of our southern neighbors are, and will continue to be, transmitted 

to the United States in the form of child immigrants and refugees, 

violence, the spread of criminal activities, and opportunities for terrorists and state rivals from undergoverned or ungoverned spaces, 

who could operate there in order to do us harm. 

It is not much of a stretch, and certainly not as much of a long 

possibility, as it used to be. Just in 2010, Abdul Kadir, a Guyanese 

convert to Islam, under the guidance of the Iranian cultural attache in Argentina, Mr. Rabbani, was sentenced to life for planning 

to detonate bombs in pipes lines leading to the JFK network. 

Rabbani was the leader of the recruiters for the Iranian Islamic 

radicals and was one of those people that was responsible for the 

1994 bombing of the cultural center in Argentina. The sudden 

death of Argentine special prosecutor Mr. Nisman the day before 

he was scheduled to testify on this matter remains unsolved and 

certainly hints to continued Iranian involvement in Argentina. 

Mexico’s Zetas employ drug traffickers and launderers Mr. Harb 

and Ayman Joumaa, both of whom have channeled some of the proceeds to Hezbollah. And don’t forget that the Zetas were involved 

in a nexus with terrorist planning and threatened the life, in the 

United States, of the Ambassador from Saudi Arabia. 

More recently, Muamad Armadar, a Guyanese arrested in Lima 

just in October of last year, was identified as a likely Hezbollah operative, who was stockpiling explosives in his apartment. This 

year, Argentina arrested six Syrians who arrived on a flight bearing false Greek passports. And before that, five Syrian men were 

also carrying passports and were detained in Honduras on the way 

to the U.S. having already passed through Brazil, Argentina, and 

Costa Rica on their way north. 

24

In October, Brazil detained eight Iraqi nationals also bearing 

Greek passports. And while there is no open information indicating 

that these individuals were either involved in terrorism or had violent thoughts, the fact is the networks that have long been used 

by drugs and illicit activities are now open and smuggling people, 

weapons, and drugs, and are available to terrorists. 

In the last decades, Latin America and the Caribbean have experienced generally positive trajectories in internal reconciliation, 

interstate peace, and growing democratic processes and institutions. Regrettably, this progress is counterbalanced—and perhaps 

even threatened—by worsening problems. Most notably, in the last 

months alone, Cuban migration that represents approximately 

three times the Cuban migration of 1994 and perhaps the largest 

since the Mariel boatlift has come across the borders and have 

overwhelmingly threatened Panama, Ecuador, and other Central 

American states. Relations with key allies, such as Mexico and 

Canada in particular, have been strained. At one point, in fact, one 

observer describing the upcoming meeting between the administration and Mexico said, ‘‘There is really not much to talk about,’’ in 

relation to U.S. policy. The escape of Mexican drug cartel leader 

Joaquin ‘‘El Chapo’’ Guzman exasperated the existing chill. In extraditions, President Pena Nieto’s government is proceeding at a 

rate that will be substantially less than half of the extraditions of 

his predecessors. 

In Canada, our largest trading partner is increasingly looking to 

Asian markets. And although Canada no doubt remains a steadfast 

military ally, its newly elected Prime Minister, Mr. Justin Trudeau, 

recently followed through with early indications that he would end 

Canada’s participation in airstrikes against ISIS targets and restrict its military efforts to training alone. 

Sadly, what stands out in many observers’ minds as symbols of 

American engagement in the hemisphere in the last few years are 

our executive order on immigration; outreach to anti-American governments, such as Cuba, with very little to show for it, and Venezuela; the Department of Justice welcomed investigation of FIFA; 

and, with few exceptions, not much else. The region simply has not 

been a priority for U.S. efforts or U.S. engagement. 

Meanwhile, from a security perspective, China and Russia have 

joined Iran in reaching out to countries in the hemisphere, seeking 

its allies and its markets. These interactions go well beyond the 

interactions of those countries with the Cuba regime. They are, in 

fact, actively engaged in anti-U.S. activities and rhetoric. While 

China has been busy undercutting the region’s multilateral organizations, they have moved to take a naval flotilla across the Pacific, 

where for the first time, it conducted combat exercises with bilateral nations. 

Moving forward to security cooperation, while Colombia has long 

been the recipient of rigorous U.S. security assistance and related 

support, SOUTHCOM is limited in its ability to engage. Furthermore, as to resettlement, disarmament, and reintegration of the 

FARC, many of whom, even if they reconcile from a political perspective, are criminals and will continue to engage in criminal activity. 

25

Meaningful engagement from the United States is necessary to 

mitigate the impact of these and other threats. Security cooperation should be enhanced. It promotes cooperation in the hemisphere, encourages transparency, and even interoperability. And 

we need to do more along these lines, particularly through the 

Combating Terrorist Fellowship Program, the drug interdiction and 

other programs, the Ranger School training, and the training of additional Colombian and Mexican military to engage in more U.S. 

support. Looking ahead, the biggest issue is to immediately reinvigorate our national engagement and signal unwavering support and 

attention to our continental partnerships. 

Thank you. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Long follows:]

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Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you. 

They have called votes. We will go ahead and try to get Dr. 

Arnson—welcome back—and probably one question per side. 

And then we will go—Ron, if you want to stay, I am going to 

defer to you first because I am coming back. So if you want to hang 

and ask a question after Dr. Arnson, whatever you want to do. 

Okay. 

Dr. Arnson. 

STATEMENT OF CYNTHIA J. ARNSON, PH.D., DIRECTOR, LATIN 

AMERICAN PROGRAM, WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL 

CENTER FOR SCHOLARS 

Ms. ARNSON. Thank you, Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member 

Sires, other members of the subcommittee, for this opportunity to 

testify about the challenges in the Western Hemisphere over this 

past year and per U.S. policy. 

I share and identify myself with the comments of others that 

have spoken before me that the recent elections in Argentina and 

Venezuela are historic and represent a fundamental change in the 

region. They have a common denominator of the failure of populist 

economics, which sustained generous but inefficient social programs, that were based on high commodity prices. Now that those 

prices have plummeted, along with other macroeconomic imbalances, the economic distress has had a major impact on the pocketbooks of average households, leading to the vote to punish existing 

leaders. 

The fall in commodity prices has had different effects across the 

hemisphere. But it has contributed to an overall economic slowdown in most parts of the region. Regional growth projections have 

dropped, now for the fifth consecutive year, to under 1 percent this 

year and next. There is, therefore, the deep concern over the ability 

of people who left poverty over the last decades to remain out of 

poverty; little chance that those who are still impoverished, the 

tens of millions of people who are still in poverty, to leave poverty; 

and there will be a reversal of the modestly improving patterns of 

social mobility. And I think these trends will have important political consequences. 

It should not be surprising that the countries that have fared 

best over the last 2 years, Mexico, Colombia, Chile, and Peru, precisely the countries that are part of the Pacific Alliance, are those 

that have pursued economic opening and liberal international trade 

among themselves and with other partners in North America, in 

Europe, and especially in Asia. 

Economic and social change in the region has contributed to 

higher living standards. But it has also contributed to civil societies 

that increasingly demand more of their political leaders and institutions. From Chile to Guatemala, Brazil, Peru, we have seen millions taking to the streets in recent years to demand better quality 

education, improvements in public services, from transportation to 

garbage collection. What would appear as a negative—the seeming 

epidemic of corruption scandals in numerous countries in the region—I think can also be viewed positively as a reflection of citizens’ demands for higher ethical standards and more accountable 

and transparent government. 

31

The free press has played a critical role in bringing these scandals to light. In looking at the challenges ahead, I would note that 

U.S. relations with the hemisphere—and here I think I differ with 

those who have spoken before me—have improved significantly 

over the last year. Part of that has to do with the normalization 

of U.S.-Cuban relations, which removed what many countries in 

the hemisphere saw as an outdated relic of the Cold War. I think 

this was seen most dramatically at the Summit of the Americas in 

Panama in April, a meeting that many heads of state had actually 

threatened to boycott if Cuba was excluded one more time. 

The Obama administration’s commitment to working multilaterally on a range of issues, from protecting the environment to promoting Venezuelan democracy, has also been viewed favorably. 

There is a recent poll by the Public Opinion Project, LAPOP, based 

at Vanderbilt University, which demonstrates that 51 percent of 

citizens in the region believe that the United States is the most influential country in Latin America. The comparable figure for 

China is 12 percent. 

I want to briefly highlight three areas where I think U.S. policy 

and engagement are critical. One has to do with relations with Colombia. If there is a peace accord that is signed early next year, 

whether or not it coincides with the deadline that has been announced, there will be a need for continued U.S. assistance and engagement. This is something that did not happen after the end of 

the Central American wars. And I believe that once the FARC has 

demobilized and has transformed itself as a political actor subject 

and under Colombian law, it would be appropriate for the U.S. 

Government, the Congress, and the executive branch to review the 

FARC’s designation as a terrorist organization. 

Several of you have mentioned the Central American policy. I 

agree that more border enforcement is necessary. But there must 

also be a concerted effort to improve the conditions on the ground, 

the insecurity, and lack of opportunity that continue to impel Central American youth, in particular, to take this perilous journey. 

I see that people are looking to head out. I would say that it 

would be critical to maintain high-level but very discreet U.S. engagement on Venezuela. There are important new allies in the effort in the hemisphere, including OAS Secretary General Luis 

Almagro, President-elect Macri, who will be inaugurated tomorrow. 

They have demonstrated that they will take a leading role in pushing for respect for human rights and democratic freedoms. 

The U.S. administration and Congress, and here I conclude, 

should speak out publicly and frequently on important matters of 

principle but also be mindful that the Venezuelan Government currently thrives on confrontation and has used accusations of foreign 

interference to its own political advantage. 

Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Arnson follows:]

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Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you. 

And the committee looks forward to asking some questions and 

digging into this a little bit more. But, unfortunately, we are going 

to recess and go vote and come back. It is a two-vote series. It 

shouldn’t take long. They are already into the time for the first 

one. 

So we are going to stand in recess pending call of the chair. And 

we will be back shortly. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. DUNCAN. All right. 

The subcommittee will come back to order. 

I thank the witnesses for your patience. 

And we will enter into the questioning phase. Each member will 

be given 5 minutes to ask questions. Since there are only two of 

us right now, we may exceed that a little bit. 

I have to figure out what I want to ask you here a little bit. 

There has been a series of recent large-scale and high-profile corruption scandals in Latin America, whether it is Petrobras in 

Brazil or whether it is Guatemala and the deposing of the President and Vice President and regime change there. So the question 

I have is this: Is corruption getting worse in the region? And is it 

spiraling out of control? Let’s talk about corruption. And I will 

start with Ambassador Noriega. 

Ambassador NORIEGA. Well, Mr. Chairman, when governments 

settle in for a long spell, when they are undemocratic, for example, 

as in the case of Venezuela or in Brazil, where the PT managed 

to stay in power for a considerable period of time and then in Argentina where the Kirchners handed the Presidency between them, 

the culture becomes about satisfying the President and the President’s inner circle or the President’s political party. So, yes, I think 

corruption, when there isn’t this alternating of power, alternancia, 

corruption tends to build up and become a bigger problem. Certainly the oil revenues—I mean $1.3 trillion in oil revenue since 

Chavez took power in Venezuela. Where did all that money go? 

When you look at the disintegrating infrastructure and about $250 

million in the central bank reserves looted. Astronomical levels of 

corruption in Venezuela. And then the involvement also in 

narcotrafficking precisely because there are no checks and balances. There is no Congress that can hold officials accountable. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Ms. Long, do you think just changing the guy at 

the top or the female at the top, the President in Guatemala or 

President in Argentina, possibly in Brazil, you think that is enough 

to change corruption in these countries? 

Ms. LONG. No, I don’t. And I think one of the things that we do 

as Americans is we tend to look at corruption at the top of a government. And one of the changes probably in the last decade, I believe, is that because of a lack of U.S. involvement and lack of emphasis on the traditional drug or counternarcotics or 

counternarcoterrorism activities, that the corruption at the top, for 

all the reasons the Ambassador explained, has gotten worse. But 

the types of corruption have gotten worse. It is not just drugs any 

more. It is all kinds of movements of transnational crimes. It is involvement of Russian mafia. It is involvement of Hezbollah. It is 

involvement of Chinese triads in addition to Chinese markets. And 

39

then they have spread, as well. I think there is a study, actually 

from the Mexicans, that some 75 percent of Mexican municipalities 

are either totally corrupt or unreliable to the central government. 

So because of the frustrations of the economic—lack of economic opportunities, the constant flow across borders, the sieve that has become at least Central America, you have worse corruption at the 

top; you have the spread of corruption throughout the bureaucracy; 

you have got the types of corruption that has gotten worse. And all 

of that bears very ill. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Let me ask you this just as a quick followup. Do 

you think the economic situation exacerbates that or doesn’t 

change it any? 

Ms. LONG. It certainly exacerbates it. And one of the good things 

about some of the changes that we have been talking to at the top 

is there are opportunities. But those opportunities have got to be 

pushed all the way down. And they are going to have to have U.S. 

support. But as the doctor mentioned, even with the economic opportunities, the expectations have really risen where there has 

been change. I think there is going to be tremendous expectations 

of advancements in Argentina with Macri and in Venezuela. And 

being able to deliver that is going to be a challenge. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Dr. Arnson, with what you have heard, knowing 

that changing the person at the top isn’t dramatically going to affect anything, what are some of the solutions as you answer this 

question? 

Ms. ARNSON. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Duncan. 

With respect to your question about whether corruption is getting worse, I think the answer is yes and no. I don’t think the 

world has seen anything on the scale of the Petrobras scandal, the 

billions of dollars that have been—that were not accounted for or 

used for purposes other than the correct ones. So that is—I think 

my colleague in the Brazil Institute has described that as a corruption scandal of biblical proportions. And I think that is an accurate 

statement. I also think that it is true for all the good reasons that 

I pointed out in my testimony, that we are finding out more about 

corruption now than almost ever before because of the demands 

from civil society, because people are fed up, especially at a time 

when they feel that the quality of the services or the amount of 

benefits that they are receiving is extremely poor. 

The check, or the improvement in combating inequality, has to 

do with what I think political scientists call mechanisms of horizontal accountability. Vertical accountability is from the voters to 

the people that they elect. Horizontal accountability is within a 

government and refers to having checks and balances and institutions within a state that can serve to monitor and control and investigate. The bodies, such as the Congress, asking the executive 

branch for information, whether voluntarily or by subpoena, the 

Congress has that power. The GAO also can investigate and is an 

investigative arm of the Congress. So reinforcing those kinds of institutional mechanisms—and I think people have referred to them 

earlier today—to the sort of pervasive weakness of institutions of 

democracy, that has to be a fundamental focus of our efforts in the 

region. 

40

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you all for that. The new President of Argentina, who gets sworn in and takes office tomorrow at night, won 

51.4 percent of the vote. His party doesn’t have a majority in the 

Argentine Congress. So he is going to have some challenges. How 

long do you think the Argentine people will give him to turn things 

around? 

Ambassador NORIEGA. I think there will be a honeymoon of some 

duration because the dissatisfaction comes, as well, from others in 

Peronism. He could not have won unless there was a good part of 

Peronism that was disgusted by the levels of corruption and the 

authoritarian ways of the Kirchners. So he will have some who are 

within Peronism who are willing to cooperate with him. He will 

have to cobble together sort of ad hoc coalitions in order to have 

initiatives move through the Congress. But it was a closer than expected result. And so the Peronists bounce back pretty quickly. 

They already took steps to sort of pass some Kirchner-supported 

measures through the lower house in defiance of what the President-elect had asked. So the Peronists have the bit in their teeth, 

and they are going to put up a fierce level of opposition, that is to 

say, those that are particularly loyal to Kirchner and the outgoing 

government. But there are some, for example, Mr. Massa, who competed in the first round, was a rebel within the—or a dissident 

within Peronism. So I think people from his bloc will be looking for 

opportunities to cooperate with Macri and get the economy moving 

again. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Ms. Long, do you want to chime in on that? 

Ms. LONG. I don’t really have much to add except for I think a 

little bit of time may have been bought to the extent that the population that voted for Macri are disgusted by the latest 2 days of 

machinations of money transfers and other measures that have at 

least attempted to tie his hands from a fiscal and other sense. Perhaps there will be some sympathy there. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Before Dr. Arnson answers, so I traveled for the 

first time to Argentina in 2002, March, early April. The day before 

I got there, they devalued their currency, went from 1 to 1, to 3 

to 1 with the dollar. I know they have done it at least one other 

time since 2002. Inflation is extremely high in Argentina. Anyone 

that has traveled there prior to 2002 and traveled there now has 

experienced that. Plus, there are a lot of dead issues out there with 

bondholders and what not. So how do you think—and maybe this 

was a campaign issue during the Presidential campaign. I don’t 

know. I didn’t follow it that closely. So we have got this bond issue 

that Argentina needs to really pay, and we have got rampant inflation. So how do you think, from an economic standpoint, does 

President-elect Macri address that? 

Dr. Arnson. 

Ms. ARNSON. Sir, you have added a difficult question on top of 

a difficult question, but I will try my best. You were right in pointing out that President-elect Macri does not control the Congress. In 

point of fact, the Argentine Senate is dominated by the FPV, the 

ruling party of President Fernandez de Kirchner. But there are 

large areas of economic policymaking that are in the purview of the 

executive branch. 

41

And I think that is where, in conjunction with his advisers and 

his cabinet and his senior ministers, he will have to take some very 

prudent steps to control inflation, to unify the two exchange rates. 

The official exchange rate right now, if it was 3 to 1 back in 2002, 

the official rate now is about 9.5 to 1. But can you walk to any 

street corner and exchange dollars for 15 to 1? So that contributes 

to inflation. And one of his goals is to have a unified exchange rate 

and prevent that parallel black market. In bringing those together, 

he has also announced, as a way of restoring the confidence of the 

private sector and of the international investor community, that he 

would lift controls on repatriation of capital. He has to do that very 

carefully because to simply allow a mass exodus of dollars would 

create even more deflationary pressures on the currency. And if Argentines go through another massive devaluation as a product of 

the kind of adjustment that he trusts to put into place, he is very 

rapidly going to lose political support. And people like Scioli, the 

principal opposition candidate, will be pointing their fingers and 

saying: See, I told you so. We told you this was going back to the 

days when the IMF and neoliberalism ruled the day. So I think he 

has to be very careful. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Let me ask you this. You mentioned repatriation 

of capital. What is attractive about Argentina giving high inflation 

for Argentine investors to bring money back—maybe from U.S. investments, maybe from other investments—to Buenos Aires or to 

anywhere in Argentina? What is attractive? 

Ms. ARNSON. Well, there is a very extensive middle class. There 

is a consumer base in the country that is extremely broad. The levels of education in Argentina are really, I think, at the top of the 

list of the hemisphere. It is an extremely wealthy country in terms 

of natural resources, both land, oil and gas, which has been exploited only in the last few years. So there are enormous opportunities. Buenos Aires, for all of the things you could say, happens to 

be one of the most active tech and innovation hubs in Latin America, something that it shares with Santiago, Chile, Montevideo in 

Uruguay, and Guadalajara in Mexico. But there is enormous capacity and enormous human talent and human capital. So it is a very 

attractive country for investment. There is an internal market. 

There is also the ability to export within Mercosur, although Brazil’s ability to absorb exports from other countries is very limited. 

But the real question is that there is not only a pent-up demand 

for dollars but also a pent-up demand to get pesos out of the country because the current regime has made that very difficult. And 

so all of those capital controls and adjustments in the exchange 

rate are going to need to be done slowly so that you don’t see just 

a massive——

Mr. DUNCAN. My time has expired, but I agree with you that it 

is a very attractive country. If the government can get it right, I 

absolutely believe there will be investment coming back. I don’t believe you are going to see, at $40 a barrel, I don’t think you are 

going to see a whole lot of oil and gas. We can’t even get oil and 

gas investment at $40 a barrel in this country right now. So, as oil 

prices creep back up, assuming that they do over time, absolutely. 

There was oil and gas prospecting going on in Argentina in 2002, 

42

and I know it has probably continued. But it is hard for that at 

$40 a barrel. 

So I am going to yield to the gentleman from New Jersey for as 

much time as he needs. 

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, to continue this conversation, I just find it very difficult for people to invest in Argentina if they don’t pay their debt. 

Why would I, as a businessman, even consider going into some sort 

of a partnership when they have the issue that they don’t pay what 

they owe now? So I think it is almost a catch-22. You know, you 

want the investment, but you don’t want to pay. 

But my question really is toward Venezuela more because I was 

very excited about the elections. I am very concerned where we go 

from here. Actually, I was talking to my colleague, and I told him, 

I said: You know, I was very surprised how far away the army 

stood from this election. And I was wondering if you have any 

ideas? Because you know, as we know, usually the army controls 

a lot of the elections or the process. So why do you think it was 

an advantage to them to stay far away from this election? Although 

I had heard rumors that Maduro was trying to create problems 

there. 

Ambassador NORIEGA. Yes, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Sires, if I 

could jump in there, I believe that first off, a 2-to-1 margin, 67 percent of the vote going one way, even the most clever or sophisticated corruption couldn’t have overcome that deficit. But, having 

said that, the last several seats were settled by less than 100 votes. 

So the electoral apparatus was allowed to proceed in a normal fashion. But it didn’t just happen. The information I have from sources 

on the ground in Venezuela, all that day, the ruling party was expecting a massive defeat. And as it became more and more clear, 

there were some people—and one of them whose name I already 

mentioned, Diosdado Cabello, who is President of the National Assembly, who has perhaps the most to lose for various different reasons because he can’t withstand the kind of accountability that will 

come from an opposition Congress—was urging that the party put 

people on the street to stress the vote using these colectivos, these 

armed people that go around on motorcycles and shooting into 

crowds to disrupt the day and to sort of provoke some sort of a crisis. And the information I got was that the military establishment, 

particularly the Minister of Defense, Padrino Lo ́pez, said if that 

happens, the military will deal with those people who are trying to 

incite violence. And so there was sort of a tense standoff up until 

just after midnight, when they announced these devastating results. But Padrino Lo ́pez is no longer the Minister of Defense, from 

what I have been told, in the last 24 hours. He—along with the 

other Cabinet Ministers—he is being replaced in that case by someone—Reverol, General Reverol, who used to head the National 

Guard as Minister of Defense now. You know, in 2013 he did put 

National Guardsmen on the streets to attack these student demonstrators. So you already see this tug of war going on. The military did play a decisive role apparently by preventing the ruling 

party from putting sort of this thuggish apparatus on the street to 

suppress the vote. We will see now where that balance will be as 

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majority in the National Assembly can hold the executive more accountable, to call for the amnesty of these political prisoners and 

other moves. 

Mr. SIRES. Ms. Long, do you have anything to add to that? 

Ms. LONG. No. In fact, the one thing I would add is it really is 

a double-edged sword. And I think it is one of those places where 

U.S. active engagement, although in a subtle and productive way, 

is really needed. I agree with the Ambassador. I think the military 

is in very much a wait-and-see mode. I don’t think they wanted to 

go against the population where the politics were trending. I do 

think that with the recent changes, they will come out if there is 

violence in order to maintain the social order in their minds. But 

I think most people who actually know the individuals within the 

Venezuelan military will actually tell you that they are very interested in closer relationships with the United States. They have had 

them in the past. They have some U.S. equipment. They don’t believe they have been well supported over the years. They see themselves as having been deteriorating. And this could be under a new 

regime, if it gets legs underneath it, a real opportunity for us to 

engage them in a productive manner. 

Ms. ARNSON. If I could first address your question, your statement about Argentina and the holdouts, I think Mr. Macri has 

made it clear that he wants to move quickly early in the new year 

to begin to negotiate with the holdouts. Ninety-three percent of 

bond holders that held Argentine debt did settle with the Argentine 

Government. And it was 7 percent that have resisted that or refused to do it. And I think to come to an agreement is going to take 

some real compromise on both sides. It is just, I think, unrealistic 

to think that 100 percent of the face value of the bonds that were 

bought at very, you know, favorable rates and were seen as high 

risk, you know, which is part of the risk is that they are going to 

lose value, I think it is unrealistic to think that the holdouts, the 

so-called holdouts will get 100 cents on the dollar. 

Mr. SIRES. You don’t think they sell because they thought she 

was going to win? 

Ms. ARNSON. No, I think they decided that it was a deal they 

could accept, that there was some number—I haven’t spoken directly with people who took that buyout, but there was a sense that 

this was a government that went into default, that was destroyed 

economically back in 2001 and 2002, that it was unable to pay the 

face value of the debt. And so as you do with bad debts everywhere, 

you renegotiate and you come up with some terms that you can live 

with. And there was a certain number of people—again, a very 

small minority, 7 percent—who refused to do that. And it is a priority of the new government to come to some agreement precisely 

to be able to re-access international capital markets because they 

have been frozen out of financial markets over the holdout issue. 

If I could address the Venezuela issue just briefly, I think that 

it is important to understand that Chavismo has always depended 

for part of its legitimacy on the sense that it is an elected government. Elections have been a feature, in fact an all-too-frequent feature, referendums on this, that, and the other thing, something like 

12 elections between the time that Chavez was first elected and the 

time that he died, where people are called, and the elections serve 

44

as a way for the regime to almost hold a plebiscite on its own rule. 

So there is a sense that elections are ways that political change 

happens, but also the way things are legitimized. So I was, frankly, 

quite surprised to see the very prudent and moderate language 

that President Maduro used in accepting the electoral defeat. This 

was a man who only 10 days before had said, you know, we will 

see you at the ballot box or we will see you in the streets, raising 

this fear that there would be post-electoral violence and that an opposition victory would not be respected. 

I also think that the actions of the electoral council, the CNE, 

were in my view very surprising. I would have never imagined that 

the two-thirds majority would have been ratified so quickly. I expected that there would be prolonged protests, accusations of fraud 

between the opposition and the CNE. So I am not saying that Venezuelan institutions function, but I just would say the results and 

the way that they happened were, to me, a pleasant surprise. 

Mr. SIRES. Do you think that this populist ideology is dead? 

Ambassador NORIEGA. Absolutely not. But as a columnist—I will 

give him credit for this, although I should steal the line myself—

Andres Oppenheimer said, ‘‘Populism runs out of steam when the 

politicians run out of money.’’ And that is precisely what has happened in a couple of these countries. The tide has gone out, and 

now there are the repercussions as some of these institutions step 

up and point out corruption, as what has happened in Brazil, or 

the fact you have had an economic meltdown——

Mr. SIRES. It is always interesting to me because the President, 

the speaker—I don’t know what they call the speaker—he calls for 

the President to be——

Ambassador NORIEGA. Impeached. 

Mr. SIRES [continuing]. Impeached. Yet he is under investigation 

himself. He may wind up being kicked out. 

Ambassador NORIEGA. Right. There was some horse trading 

going on. That is why the decision took so long because the word 

was that he was trying to get people to sort of get off his back if 

he sort of didn’t go along with the impeachment of the President. 

So it is a political process. But as I mentioned in my statement, 

there are parallel investigations and various levels of corruption by 

the courts that will have ramifications no matter what happens 

with this impeachment. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I want to follow up on that. Brazil is going to be 

in the world’s spotlight—is in the world’s spotlight—due to the 

Olympics. We have got a terrorist attack in Paris, threatened to 

blow up—terrorists threatened to blow themselves up in a stadium. 

It has got to be a huge issue of concern for Brazil, as it is for all 

the countries attending the Olympics, sending their star athletes 

there in the wake of a corruption scandal that is going to possibly 

bring down the President and the speaker of the house. We see impeachments just hanging out there. Not been impeached yet, but—

and little things like the inability to clean up areas where swimmers and kayakers are going to be, the inability to provide water 

to a major city in Sao Paulo last year. 

So what does the Petrobras government corruption scandal and 

the impeachment mean for security? Let’s just focus on security. 

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mittee in the United States—or maybe even Spain or somewhere 

else—thinking about sending my athletes down to swim in the waters of Brazil, I would be concerned about their health. And I would 

be concerned about my soccer players and the fans that are going 

to attend the games in the stadiums. So we saw the World Cup. 

Did they learn anything from that? And how has that applied? 

Let’s delve into that for just a second. 

Ms. Long, I am going to start with you. 

Ms. LONG. Absolutely. I don’t think it bodes well. And I think, 

as a practical matter, the political maneuverings regarding the 

Petrobras and other scandals are on a much larger scale status 

quo. But it really doesn’t have any favorable outcome for security. 

There are two things, and you hit upon them both. While the U.S. 

is distracted a lot with ISIS and other Middle East events, the populations on the tri-border area, that have long been suspected as 

Hezbollah enclaves, have increased significantly. And, in fact, neither Argentina, Paraguay, nor Brazil can speak to exactly what is 

going on in those areas. We know that they have long served perhaps as resting areas for Hezbollah. They certainly have served as 

places where moneys and funds are laundered, if not transportation hubs. But there has been very little attention and almost no 

sincere ability on the part of Brazil to actually understand what is 

happening in that border area and to gauge what implications it 

will have for the Brazil games. 

As to the games, if you speak to any of the U.S. entities that are 

normally engaged at this period in time for internal security for 

helping with the favelas, with taking a look at immigration, the 

fact that these events will be taking in 12 or 16 different fora and 

require trains and significant airplane and other movement of athletes and spectators is a nightmare. And there is very little planning that has been done just on the transportational issues alone, 

not to mention the fact that there are health and other concerns. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Stadiums and that sort of thing. 

Ms. LONG. Yeah. At this point, I think they are housing or planning to house a number of the athletes offshore, with very little significant plans, upgrade in activity and coordination on the maritime security that will be required just to guard these—I think 

they are going to use former cruise ships in order to put the athletes on them. It is going to be a disaster, and it is going to go to 

the last minute, and then everyone is going to rush. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Anyone else like to—Ambassador? 

Ambassador NORIEGA. For example, the FIFA that they hosted, 

it was a bit of a carrier landing; that is to say a controlled crash: 

I mean, the Brazilians waiting to the very last minute until they 

took measures and involved some foreign advisers to get things up 

to snuff. But as you mentioned, the Petrobras corruption scandal, 

part of the problem is the fiscal crisis. The country is now in a 4-

percent contraction. A recession started a couple years ago. So the 

resources may not be there for this to—well, they are going to have 

to take extraordinary moves to find the resources to get the sort 

of advice, do the sort of physical improvements at some of these 

sites. But I think, again, it is going to be a bit of a carrier landing. 

46

Mr. DUNCAN. I think the Brazilians generally get security right. 

A little heavier hand than maybe the U.S., but generally, I think 

they do so. Everyone is holding out hope that we do. 

We could talk about Chile and their economy and the downturn 

in mining. We could talk about Peru and private property rights, 

civil society all over Latin America. You know, the GTMO six, attempted terrorist attack in Montevideo. 

I mean, there is so much we could delve into. I think our committee has done a good job this year talking about the FARC; and 

talking about energy; and talking about Venezuela and Cuba and 

changes there; and Mexico and energy opportunities there; but also 

the children that were killed. We have delved into so much. But 

there is so much left uncovered. 

We could talk about your trip to Colombia recently, Ms. Long, 

and the FARC, and what you think—let me ask you that. Just 

briefly, tell us your experience and what the U.S. can do with regard to the FARC negotiations just quickly because I know you 

were just there, right? 

Ms. LONG. I think there is a lot of optimism in the government 

about the FARC negotiations, and expectations are high. And I 

think that certainly the will on the government’s side to get there 

will be—will get them there. I think that expectations are going to 

be very difficult to meet. And there will be resource strain on the 

government that will sort of pull from traditional security and 

other expenditures that may be significant. I worry, more importantly, about—the FARC has long since, I believe, been a theological bulwark for political organizations, and they are significantly criminal organizations. And those people are not going to lay 

down their arms, and they are not going to integrate, and they are 

not going to be willing to accept jobs. And what they are going to 

do is become a different kind of threat, a domestic threat that is 

basically either stealing the gold, or engaging in narcotrafficking, 

or basically running ungoverned areas. 

Mr. DUNCAN. But now they want to be part of the government. 

They want to have the opportunity to run for elections and be a 

viable political party. Is that being cut out of this deal? I don’t 

think the Colombian people will go along with that, personally. 

Ms. LONG. I don’t think the Colombian people will go along. And, 

frankly, why would they take that harder path to actually be elected and hold office when the path that they have right now, frankly, 

is working very well for them? 

Mr. DUNCAN. Is there going to be jail time for any of the FARC 

leaders? 

Ms. LONG. I don’t think that has been determined. I doubt it. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, we are looking forward to hearing more about 

that. The last question I have, and that is for each of you, going 

forward, you have heard all of the things we have done this year 

in this committee and things we have delved into, but we have got 

a whole nother year in this session of Congress. So give me just 

a brief, real brief, your ideas on what we should delve into going 

forward. I have got a year to plan here. 

Ambassador NORIEGA. Great. Two things. Focusing on the threat 

of transnational organized crime, the crosscutting impact that 

criminality has in the hemisphere and transit zones, weak states 

47

in Central America, even a strong state in Mexico, sorely tested to 

meet that international threat. And it is an asymmetrical threat 

that has asymmetrical responses; that is to say, rifle shots, executive sanctions, OFAC sanctions against individuals who are laundering money. You could have a dramatic impact with that sort of 

move. 

And then an emphasis on the economic revitalization. Start talking about how do you get—encourage countries to retool their 

economies? You know, we are not going to be talking about grand 

international trade agreements, but we have to get back to basics. 

All prosperity is local. These countries need to retool their economies so they can invite investment; they can incentivize sustainable private sector growth, create jobs, and start to meet the basic 

needs of their people. That happens, you know, with free market 

policies. And I think we should be unabashed advocates for that 

kind of program. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Ms. Long, your top one or two. 

Ms. LONG. I will adopt the Ambassador’s number one. 

Number two is we are quickly losing our role as the security cooperation partner of choice, in part because we haven’t engaged, 

and one would argue we can’t engage. But there is going to be real 

implications, not to what China is doing in the Pacific and not to 

what Russia is doing in Ukraine, but those two actors are moving 

in significant ways into the region. It is still nascent, and we 

haven’t seen the results of it yet, but when you have 140 or 170-

plus Russian advisers in Nicaragua, which we can all count on that 

being at least 10 times that amount—and it is not the numbers; 

it is the roles. One recent person just told me there are Spetsnaz. 

Whatever they are doing, we have got artillery delivered. We certainly know there are artillery advisers. Just having that in our 

backyard—with all of the problems that we have got with porous 

borders, corruption, money, and other flows—is really dangerous. 

And that chicken will come home to roost when it is too late. And 

we have an opportunity now to reengage and reengage effectively, 

and we need to do so. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Doctor? 

Ms. ARNSON. I would say that a key priority is to support the 

peace process in Colombia and the post-accord era. I think it is unrealistic to expect that a peace accord is going to mean the end of 

violence; it is going to mean that all FARC members are going to 

lay down his or her weapons. That did not happen with the AUC 

paramilitary demobilization, many of whom have recycled into the 

so-called bacrim, the criminal bands. And I think some portion of 

the FARC will do that. I also think that there is an ongoing threat 

from the ELN and that there will be an important role in trying 

to end the insurgency by the ELN. In a bipartisan way, the United 

States has provided approximately $9 billion to Colombia. A big 

mistake would be to reduce our assistance in the post-accord era 

to the current levels of maintaining a couple of hundred million a 

year. Colombia is going to face enormous challenges. The resources 

available to the state at a time of low oil prices are much diminished. And I think it will be incumbent on the international community, including the United States, to support, financially and politically, the peace process. 

48

I think another important issue for the committee will be to pay 

attention to what is happening to those who became middle class 

during the boom decade of the 2000s, those who remained as vulnerable, and what is happening to them both economically and, 

more importantly, politically in the coming year or two, in the foreseeable future. 

And then a third, if I might permit myself, is to continue to help 

with institutional strengthening, to bolster the ability of governments and civil societies to combat corruption through strengthening of institutions and independent mechanisms for control and 

oversight. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, I want to thank each of you for that. I mean 

how many committee chairmen ask for your input on what we 

should look at going forward? But I think it is important because 

of your expertise in the region. 

I look at Latin America this way. We spend a lot as a Nation, 

we spend a lot of time and money and effort in parts of the world 

where people don’t like us very much; where they don’t speak the 

language; we have different cultural backgrounds. I look at Latin 

America and I see a shared culture; I see a shared religion than 

I see in most countries; and I just see a lot of commonality and a 

lot of opportunity for America, not only American businesses, but 

for American Government to get reengaged in this region with our 

friends and our neighbors here. And that is really what I hope we 

will continue to push forward in this subcommittee. 

And so I appreciate your excellent testimony here today. I apologize more members weren’t here to ask questions because I think 

they missed a very prime opportunity to delve into some of the key 

issues in the region. 

But I will say the ranking member and I are focused. We work 

very well together, and I look forward to working with him going 

forward and each of you. 

And with there being no further business, we will stand adjourned. 

The ranking member. 

Mr. SIRES. Before we end, I just want to thank you, Chairman, 

for the work that we have done throughout the year. It has been 

a very bipartisan, very good relationship. I was very fortunate; I 

had Matt Salmon also as chairman. And it is the best times that 

I have had here in Congress, regardless of being in the minority, 

working with these two chairmen. 

And South America, Central America, and, obviously, being from 

Cuba, I am very concerned about what is happening in Cuba. You 

know, since all this—over 7,000 people put in jail, and everything 

that is going on on the island—it is becoming more oppressive than 

before. And it is funny, we mentioned Brazil, because I was in 

Brazil a month—we were in Brazil with the previous chairman and 

almost a month to the day when all the riots started. And they 

took us through Maracana Stadium, where they spent $500 million, to see the construction. And it was chaotic, but they got it 

done. But I think one of the things that ignited a lot of the people 

in the area was that they took away the ability of the common people to go to this Maracana Stadium and watch the football games 

because it became more expensive. Whereas, before, you had the 

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common people—I shouldn’t say ‘‘common people’’—but you had 

people able to afford to go into the football games. And, you know, 

they showed us everything. They showed us all the railroads and 

everything else. Then, when we came back, we were very excited. 

But a month later, all hell broke loose. People started demonstrating. I think it hasn’t stopped, quite frankly. 

But, again, Chairman, thank you very much. It has been a great 

year. 

And I look forward to having you in the future as panelists with 

us. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I assure the ranking member we aren’t going to 

take our eye off Cuba, and look forward to continuing to look into 

that. 

You know, you are talking about cutting the common man out of 

being able to go a sports game, a soccer or football game in Brazil; 

I would say the NCAA here is about to price the common person 

out of going to a college football game. It is crazy. 

With that, there being no further business, we will stand adjourned. And Merry Christmas to everyone. 

[Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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