## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Appellate Court

People v . Craigen , 2013 IL App (2d) 111300

Appellate Court Caption THE PEOPL E OF THE STATE OF I L L I NOI S, Plaintiff-Appe l lee, v. CHAPPELCRAI GEN, De fenda nt-Appellant.

District & N o. Second District Docke t No. 2-11-1300

Filed September 27, 2013

Held (Note : Thi s syl lab us

con s t it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed b y the Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) Def endant’ s conviction for first-degree murder under a theory of

acc ountability was upheld over his contentions that the evidenc e was insufficient to e stablish his guilt beyond a rea sonable doubt a nd that the trial court abused its discretion in ref using to admit an audio rec ording of

an in terview in which he denied being at the murder scene , since the evidenc e that defe ndant knew of a common criminal desig n to kill a rival
g ang member in r etaliation and that he fac ilitated the offe nse by driving the car used in the shooting would allow a rational trier of fac t to find the elements of the offe nse beyond a rea sonable doubt, and the interview that

was ex cluded m ere ly contra dicted the later recorded int ervie w t hat was admitted and did not contain any thing that would have preve nted the jury from beingmisled or that shed lig ht on the later inter view.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of L ake County
, No. 08-CF- 263; the Hon. Fr ed L . For eman, Judge , presiding

.

J udg ment Affir med.Counsel on

Appea l Thomas A. L ilien and Ker ry Goettsch, both of State Appellate Def ender ’s Offic e, of Elg in, for appe llant.

Michae l G

. N e r

h e im
, St a te ’s Attorney
, of Waukeg an (L awr ence M. Ba uer and Kathry

n E. Khols, both of State’s Attorney s Appellate Prosecutor’ s Offic e, of c ounsel), for

the People.

Panel J USTI CE Z ENOF F de livered the judgme nt of the cour t, with opinion.
J ustices Hudson and B irkett conc urre d in the judgme nt and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 Following a jury trial, defe ndant, Chappel Craig en, was convicted of first-degree murder (7 2 0 I L CS 5/9-1(a) (2) (West 2006)) for the shooting death of J immie L ewis, J r., i n Waukeg an, I llinois
, on Octobe r 1 8
, 2007. Def endant was sentenc ed to 36 y ear s’ imprisonment. On appea l, he argues that (1) the evidenc e was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a re asonable doubt of first-de g ree murder unde r a theory of ac countability , and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing him to introduce an audio rec ording of his October 27, 2007, interview with police in Milwaukee
, Wis consin, during which he denied being in Waukeg an on the night of the shooting. Acc ording to defe ndant, pursuant to I llinois Rule of Evidenc e 106 (e ff. Jan. 1, 2011), t he audio recor ding should have bee n introduced contempora

neously with the video rec ording of his J anuar y 16, 2008, interview with police in Clarksdale, Mississ ippi, during which he confe ssed to dri v i n g t h e vehicle from which L ewis wa s shot. For the f ollowing r easons, we aff

irm.

¶ 2 BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 On October 18, 2007, around 11 p.m., L ewis was fata lly shot as he rode in the passeng er seat of a Cadillac driven by Daniel Wil liams (a.k.a

. Kee ko). The Cadillac was trave ling west

on 14th Street, which forms the border betwee n the cities of Waukeg an and North Chicag o, I llinois

. Three bullets wer e rec overe d from L ewis’s body during an autopsy

. Other than the Cadillac’s driver and two backse at passeng ers, police located no eyewitnesses. A sear ch of the scene produce d fi v e spent shell casing s. Two more bullets wer e rec overe d from the Cadillac, which had seven bullet holes on the passeng er side. Ba llist ics evidenc e reve aled that all five shell casing s and all five bullets wer e fired from the same 9-millim eter wea pon, which wa s never

rec overe d. ¶ 4 Waukeg an p o l i ce obtained their first lead on October 22, 2007, when North Chicag o police informed them that an individual in the North Chicag o jail had information about the shooting. Waukeg an police interviewe d Br andon Sledge
, who identified the ty pe of gun used in the shooting, the ty

pe of car , the individuals involved, and their seating arr ang ement in the

-2-car

. Waukeg an police arr ang ed to have Sledge rele ased from jail so that he could attempt to

rec ord a c onversation with the alleg ed off ender s, but the attempt was unsucc essful. ¶ 5 On October 26
, 2 0 0 7
, W au k ega n p olice rec eived a phone call from a Milwauke e, Wis consin, police detec tive, who informed them that two suspects in the investigation wer e in custody in Milwa

ukee on unrelated char g es. Milwaukee police also had rec overe d a tan, four- door Saturn, which had been repor ted stolen in I llino i s an d which Waukeg an police suspected had been used i n the s hooting. W aukeg an detectives trave led t o Milwaukee and interviewe d defe ndant and J abril Har mon. During an audio-re corde d interview, defe ndant denied having any connec tion to the t hef t o f t h e Saturn and denied being in Waukeg an on October 18, 2007, the day of the shooting and t h e day the Saturn was repor ted stolen. Def endant r efuse d to acc ompany the detectives back to Waukeg an and was not arr ested at that time. ¶ 6 On J anuar

y 15, 2008, a Clarks d a le
, M ississi ppi, police detec tive contac ted the Waukeg an police and informed them that defe ndant and Donnell Gre en wer e in custody in Mississ ippi

on unrelated char ges

. W aukega n police detec tives Scott Thomas and Domenic Cappelluti
trave led t o Clarksdale to inte rv iew defenda nt and Green. Gree n was int ervie wed first, and approximately one hour later defe ndant was inte rvi ewe d. During the video-re corde d interview, defe ndant stated that he was the driver of the four- door Saturn from which the gun

was fired. Gre en was the front seat passeng er, Har mon was seate d behi n d defe ndant, and Emmanuel (also known as E-Man) was seate d behind Gre en. The g roup had been driving to

a liquor store when they spotted a beig e C ad i l l ac being driving by a rival g ang member–a “Moe,” which wa s a member of the Bla ck P Stone g ang

. Someone in the Saturn told defe ndant t o make a U-turn, which he did. Def endant followed t h e C adil lac. Gree n pulled

a gun out of a compar

tment of the Saturn and handed it to Har mon. As defe ndant drove the Saturn west on 14th Street along side the Cadillac, Har mon fired four to eight shots into the
passeng er side of the Cadillac. The shots wer e meant for Wil liams, not L ewis. Def endant told the detec tives that he had been a member of the Four Corner Hustlers g ang since ag e 14 and that the motive for th e s hooting was an incident at an I HOP sever al months ear lier during which he had been outnumbered by Bla ck P Stone g ang members during a fig ht. Def endant also told the detec tives that he had obtained the Saturn in exchang e for drug s. Following the shooting, the g roup wen t t o E m m an u el’s house, wher e they hid the gun. They trave led to Milwaukee the next morning and de fenda nt subsequently

fled to Mississippi

. ¶ 7 On J anuar

y 30, 2008, a g rand jury indicted defe ndant and Gre en for first-degree murder. Prior to trial, defe ndant filed a motion to suppress the video of his Clar ksdale, Mississ ippi, interview. At the hear ing on the motion to suppress, Detec tives Cap pelluti and Thomas testified that their entire interview of defe ndant was captur ed on the video. Def endant testified that the re corde d interview was s tag ed and that, befor e the c amer a wa s turned on, the detec tives had verba lly and phy sically assaulted him and told him what to say during the interview. The trial court de nied the motion. ¶ 8 Also prior to trial, defe ndant filed a motion in limine to admit, pursuant to I llinois Rule of Evidence 106 (ef

f. J an. 1, 2011), the audio rec ording of his interview wi t h p o lice in Milwaukee

. Def

endant contende d that the State planned t o i n t ro duce the video of his Clarksdale interview an d t hat the Milwaukee interview should be admitted

-3-contempora neously to put the C l arksdale interview in context. Def endant argued that the Milwaukee interview was “cr itical t o d em o n strating that his second statement was not voluntary .” The trial court deter mined that the Milwaukee interview was self-se rvin g h e a r s a y and was not admissible under I llino i s Ru l e of Evidence 106. Def endant filed a motion to

rec onsider, arguing that the audio rec ording was not hear say , beca use i t was being offered
not for the truth of the matter asser ted but, rathe r, “to show the eff ect that the audio rec ording had on the officers who listened to it and used it to prepa re f or, and ulti mately interrog ate, the [d] efe ndant.” The trial court de nied the motion to reconsider

. ¶ 9 T h e fol lowing evidence was adduced at defe ndant’s trial. Tiffa ny Bishop testi fied that

on October 18, 2007, she went with three other individuals to Chicag o. Wil liams drove the
g roup in his Cadillac. L ewis wa s seated in the front passeng er se at, and B ishop was seated behind him. As the g roup was returning to Waukeg an and driving along 14th Street with loud music playing, the passeng er window shattere d and L ewis slumped over in his seat. Bishop did not hear any gunshots. The g roup drove to Vista East Medica l Center, wher e L ewis was pronounce d dead. On cross-e x amination, Bishop testified that she never saw who was in the other c ar. ¶ 10 The State called sever al investiga ting office rs and detec tives from the Waukeg an police depar tment, who testified to the bullets a nd shell casing s rec overe d at the sce ne, as w ell as
to the ballistics evidenc e. The State also called a L ake County deputy corone r, who testified
reg ardingthe bullets rec overe d from L ewis’s body and the c ause of

death. ¶ 11 Detec tive Thomas testified to his interview with Sledge on October 22, 2007, as well as
to Sledge ’s unsucce ssful attempt to rec ord a conver sation with the suspects in the investigation. Detec tive Thomas trave led to Mil wa u kee on October 27, 2007, but did not interview defe ndant. Detec tives Reed and Holman interviewe d defe ndant in Milwaukee

. Detec tive Thomas then discussed interviewing defe ndant with Detec tive Cappelluti in Clarksdale on J anuar

y 16, 2008. The vid eo o f t h e C larksdale interview was pl ayed for the jury

. On cross-e x amination, Detec ti v e T homas denied having any conver sations with defe ndant befor e the video started, and he denied being awa re of any pre- video conver sations betwee n Detec tive Cappelluti and defe ndant

. P ri or to the Clarksdale interview, Detec tive Thomas knew that defe ndant had been interviewe d in Milwaukee
, and he also knew that the audio-re corde d inte r

v ie w perta ined to the events of October 18, 2007. Detec tive Thomas also knew that defe ndant had been uncooper ative during the Milwaukee interview. When defe nse counsel attempted to ask whether
, during the Milwaukee interview, defe ndant had denied being in Waukeg an on October 18, 2 0 0 7
, the State objected on the basis that the court alre ady had rule d the audio re cordinginadmissible, and the cour t sustained the objection. ¶ 12 Charles Smith testified that, on October 18, 2007, around 10:27 p.m., he le ft his house in Waukeg an and went outside to his car , which was the tan, four- door Saturn subsequently

rec overe d by Milwaukee police. As he was sitti ng in the car , smoking a cig are tte and waiting for the car to war

m up, someone tapped on the window. The individual pointed a black gun at him and told him to g et out of the car

. Smit h exit ed the car , and the individual g ot in and drove awa

y

. Smit h called the police. On cross-e x amination, Smit h denied that he trade d the

car for dr ug s.

-4-¶ 13 During a brief recess, defense counsel ag ain ask ed the court to rec onsider it s rulingon

the audio rec ording of the Milwaukee interview. Def ense counsel asser

ted tha t d e f e n d a nt was withdrawing h i s ali bi defe nse, so that he could not be offe ring the audio rec ording for the truth of the matter asser

ted ( i.e.
, that defe ndant was not in Waukeg an on October 18, 2007). Def ense counsel further argued that the audio rec ording supported the defe nse’s theory that “something happene d” in Clarksdale befor e the video came ra wa s turned on, beca use the detec tives knew that defe nda nt h a d b e e n b e ll ig e r e nt, f

o u l- mo uthed, and uncooper ative during the Milwaukee interview, y et the video of the Clarksdale interview beg an with the office rs “s i mply walk[ing] into” the room with defe ndant in a “def eate d posture.” Def

enda n t contende d that it was “a logic al infere nce that these office rs, knowing what they knew, might have acte d differ ently than it appea rs that t h ey d i d

. ” T he court ag ain ruled that the audio

rec ordingwas inadmissible self-se rvinghear say

. ¶ 14 The State then ca l l ed S ledg e, who testified that he was incar cer ated in the L awr ence Correc tional Fa cility and that he had p ri o r convictions of arme d robber y , theft, forg ery , unlawful possession of a controlled substance, and u n l aw fu l u s e of a wea pon by a felon. During October 2007, Sledge was living with Emmanuel in North Chicag o. Sledge admitted that he knew defe ndant, Ha rm o n , and Green, but he denied that the t hree men came t o his house around midnight on October 18, 2007. He also deni ed that defe ndant said to him, “ ‘Chil l, Fo e, we just g ot at t he Moes,’ ” or that, when asked who they “g ot at,” defenda nt said “ ‘Ke eko [(W illiams)] and them.’ ” He further denied that defe ndant had asked him to hide a black 9- milli meter ha ndgun that night. Sledg e admitted that police ha d arr ang ed his rele ase fr o m t h e L ak e County jail on October 23, 2007, so that he could wea r a wire and
att em p t to rec ord a conver sation with either defe ndant or Har mon. Sledge was then impeache d with his written statement to police, dated October 23, 2007, in which he stated that defe ndant, Har

mon, a nd Gre en came to his house, that de fenda nt sa id to him, “ ‘Chill, Foe
, we just g ot at the Moes,’ ” and that, wh en as ked who they “g ot at,” defe ndant said “ ‘Ke eko [(W illiams)] and them.’ ” Sledge also repor ted in the statement that defe ndant had asked him to hide a black 9-millim eter handgun. Sledge explained that the written statement

was a lie, that it “just came to [hi s] head,” and that he hear d all of it “through the streets.” On

cross-e x amination, Sledge admitted that he had two case s ag ainst him dismiss ed aft er he
agree d to wear

the wire and that he ha d had disagree ments with defenda nt in the past. ¶ 15 Be fore the S t at e ca l led its next witness, defe nse counsel made an offe r of proof with
respe ct to the audio re cordingof def endant’ s Milwaukee inter view. ¶ 16 The State then called Detec tive Cesar Gar cia, who testified that, on October 7, 2007, at 2:52 a.m., he responde d to a re port of a la rg e fight outside the I HOP on Be lvidere Road in Waukeg an. When he arr ived, a larg e g roup of 20 or more individuals was fig hting. When he exit ed his car , the group scattere d, except for two individuals who remained fighting

. One of those individuals was Gre en, who was arr ested. On cross-e x amination, Detec tive Gar cia testified that def

endant’ s name did not appe ar in the police repor t from the I HOP incident. ¶ 17 Due to scheduling problems, defendant then called Detec t i v e C ap p elluti out of turn as

a defe nse witness. Detec tive Cappelluti testified that he was one of the lead investigators into the shooting dea t h o f L ewis. He testified that, when he and Detec tive Thomas trave led to Clarksdale to interview defe ndant, he was awa re that Waukeg an detec tives had interviewe d

-5-defe ndant in Milwaukee

. Howeve r, the interview had perta ined only to the stolen Saturn, not

to the homicide. During the drive to Mississ ippi, Detec tives Cappelluti and Thomas did not discuss the Milwaukee int erv i ew

. In fac t, Detec tive Cappelluti had not listened to the Milwaukee interview. Upon further questioning, Detec tive Cappelluti testified that, during the drive to Miss i ssippi, Detec tive Thomas told him that defe ndant had not allowed detec tives to bring him bac k to Waukeg an fr om Milwaukee f or questioning

. ¶ 18 Reg arding the Clarksdale interview, Detec tive Cappelluti initially testif ie d th a t h e did not have any conver sations with defe ndant befor e the video came ra was turned on. Upon further
q u e s tioning, he clar ified that there wer e no ear lier, unrec orded interviews with defe ndant, b ut that he did say “wor ds” to defe ndant and defe ndant said “wor ds” to him. Detec tive Cappellu t i t h en admi tted to discussing the fac ts of the case with defe ndant outside of the video, but said that the discussion lasted only “sec onds.” Def endant al s o asked Detec tive Cappelluti for a cig are tte whil e t h ey wer e in the hallway befor e they enter ed the interview

room. W h en as k ed why his police repor t stated that the video was set up at 6:15 p.m., Detec tive Cappelluti explained that he mistakenly wrote down that time beca use he misheard himself saying on the video that the interview beg an at 6:58 p.m. He was impeache d with his testimony from the hear ing on defe ndant’s mot ion to suppress, during which the detective stated that he should have written that the video w as set up at 7:15 p.m. ¶ 19 On cross-e x amination by the State, Detec tive Cappelluti testified that he did not disc uss the homicide with de fenda nt of f came ra. He further testified that he and Detec tive Thomas waited approximately one hour for defe ndant to be brought into the room afte r they finished interviewing Gre en. When the detec tives saw that defe ndant was being transporte d down the hallway
, Detec tive Cappelluti exit ed the room to use the restroom. He ran into defe ndant and the Clarksdale office rs in the hallwa y , at which time defe ndant asked him for a cig are tte. Def endant also told him that “he knew what this was all about and he was g oing to cooper ate beca use he f***ed up, but he didn’t pull the trig g er.” Detec tive Cappelluti stopped defe ndant and told him that the detec tives wanted to speak with him on came ra. The detec tive testified that he memorialized this hallway conver sation in his police repor t. He further testified that, betwee n the time he stated on the video that he was leaving to use the restroom, and the time he enter ed the room with defe ndant, approximately 50 seconds passed. It was during this 50 seconds that the e x chang e with def endant took plac e in the hallwa y

. ¶ 20 The Sta t e n ex t called North Chicag o police office r Micah Cress, who testified to his
p er s o n al kn o wledg e of g ang s as a member of the g ang investigation unit. Offic er Cress testified that, in October

2007, Wil liams was a known me mber of the Bla ck P Stone ga ng

. At that time, de fenda

nt, Gree n, Har

mon, a nd Emmanuel wer e known members of the Four Corner Hustlers g ang

. Since approximately 2004, there had been a war g oing on betwee n the Bla ck P Stones and the F our Corner Hustlers. ¶ 21 Milwaukee police office r Russell Ewer t was next to testify

. He testified that, on October 26, 2007, arou n d 7 p .m., he attempted to conduct a traff ic stop of a tan Saturn with one headlight out. The Saturn drove off at a high rate of speed and, afte r a short chase
, cra shed. Two individuals exit ed the car and fled. Offic er Ewer t and his partne r chase d down the driver

on foot. Whil e the office rs wer e attempting to place handcuf fs on the driver, who was later identified as Wil liam Craig en, a g roup of 5 to 10 individuals approa ched them and beg an

-6-y elling. The office rs arr ested the two most boisterous individuals, who wer e later identified

as defe ndant and Har

mon. After Waukeg an detec tives interviewe d defe ndant that night, he

was rele ased with a citation for disorderly conduct at around 3:39 a.m. on October 27, 2007. ¶ 22 The State next re ad a s t i p u l at ion into the rec ord. I f called to testify as an expert in the fore nsic examination of latent fing erpr ints, Anthony Spadafor a would have testified that he examined 24 latent fing erpr ints collecte d from t h e Saturn by the Waukeg an police depar tment. Eleven fing erpr ints wer e suitable for compar ison. The fing erpr ints of Har mon’s rig ht index fing er and right middle fing er matched the latent fing erpr ints discove red on the

rea r driver’ s-side door. The sample known fing erpr ints of defe ndant and Gre en wer e in poor condition an d
, as a result, no compar ison with the fing erprints obtained from the car was possible. ¶ 23 The State’s last witness was Corporal J oseph Wide of the Clarksdale, Mississ ippi, police depar tment. Corporal Wide testif i ed t h at he booked defe ndant and that defe ndant initially
g ave his name as Melvin Walker. On the day that Waukeg an detec tives arr ived to interview defe ndant and Gre en, the police depar tment was very busy

. Another office r transporte d defe ndant and Gre en from the jail to the booking room, wher e they waited to be taken to the inte rv i ew room. Gre en was interviewe d first, and defe ndant was interviewe d second. The Waukeg an detec tives wer e not able to walk fre ely around the police depar tment, beca

use the interior doors require d a key car d to open. Howeve r, the detec tives wer e able t o l ea v e t h e interview room and g o to the bathroom next to the interview room. The detec tives wer e alone when they

interviewe d defe ndant and Gr een. ¶ 24 The State rested. De fe n d an t ’s o n l y evidenc e was a stipulation that Clarksdale police office rs picked up defe ndant an d Gr ee n from the Coahoma County jail at 3:57 p.m. on J anuar y 16, 2007, transporte d them to the C larksdale police depa rtment, then pi cked them back up f rom the police department at 9:07 p.m. that evening . The de fense rested. ¶ 25 In rebuttal, the State rea d a stipulation that, if called to testify
, Detec tive Thomas would have testified that the interview of Gre en beg an at ap p ro x i m ately 5:20 p.m. and that Clarksdale police office rs picked up Gree n from the inter view room at 6:05 p.m. ¶ 26 During closing argument, defe nse counsel urg ed the jury to believe t h at t h e v i d eo

re corde d interview was stag ed and untrue. Counsel argued that it was unbelievable that, knowing that defe ndant had been uncooper ative in Milwaukee
, Detec tiv es Thomas and Cappelluti went to Clarks d al e and “just walked in and turned on the video came ra, introduced themselves, and in 20 minutes had ever y thing they neede d.” He urg ed the jury to infer that “somethinghappene d befor e that video c amer a wa s turned on.” ¶ 27 The jury returne d a verdic t finding defe ndant guilty o f fi rs t -degree murder. D efe ndant filed a p o s t t rial m otion in which he ag ain raised the i ssue of the admis sibili ty of t he audio

rec ording of the Milwaukee interview. The trial court denied the mot i o n , and, following
sentenc ing, de fenda

nt timely appea led.

¶ 28 ANALYSI S ¶ 29 Def

endant argues that h i s conviction should be reve rsed beca use (1) the evidenc e wa s insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a rea sonable doubt of first-degree murder under a

-7-theory of acc ountability and (2) the trial court err ed in not allowing him to introduce pursuant

to I llinois Rule of Evidenc e 106 the a udio rec ordingof his Milwaukee interview.

¶ 30 Sufficienc y of the Evidenc e ¶ 31 Def

endant argues that the evidenc e w a s in s u f f ic ient b e c ause the State offe red no evidenc e that defe ndant share d Har mon’s intent to shoot L ewis or that there was a common criminal desig n amongdefe ndant, Gre en, Ha rmon, and Emmanue l. Defe ndant admit s that he drove
t h e S at u rn , m ade the U-turn, was awa re of the presence of the gun, and fled following th e shoot i ng , but argues that this was insufficient beca use he did not intend to aid the commission of a crime. Def endant asser

ts that “at most the evidenc e showed that [he] drove his car ne x t to Wil liams’s.” He further contends that “ [t ]here wa s no evidenc e that anyone in [defendant’ s] car procla imed an intent to shoot at the other car , that [defendant’ s] actions

wer e desig ned to fac ilitate the shooting, or that [defendant] knew what Har mon’s intent was prior to the shooting .” ¶ 32 When prese nted with a challeng e to the sufficie ncy of the evidenc e, it is not the func tion of the revie wing court to retry the defe ndant. People v. Colli ns , 106 I ll. 2d 237, 261 (1985). Rather, “ ‘the rel ev ant question is whether
, afte r viewing the evidenc e in the light most favor able to the prosec ution, any rational trier of fac t could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a rea sonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in orig inal.) Colli ns , 106 I ll. 2d at 261 (quoting Jack

son v. V irginia
, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979))

. The revie wing court should not

s ub s t i tute its judgme nt for that of the trier of fac t, who is responsible for weighing th e evidenc e, assessing the cred i b i l ity of witnesses, resolving conflicts in the evidenc e, and draw ing rea sonable infere nces and conclusions from the evidenc e. People v. Sutherland
, 223 I ll. 2d 187, 242 (2006). Howeve r, a revie wing court must set aside a defe ndant’s conviction i f a ca reful revie w of the evidenc e reve als that it was so unrea sonable, improbable, o r unsatisfac tory as to cre ate a rea sonable doubt of the defe ndant’s guilt. People v. Evans
, 209 I ll. 2d 194, 209 (2004). ¶ 33 A person is leg ally acc ountable for another ’s criminal conduct when “[e]it her befor e or during the commission of an o ff en s e, and with the intent to promote or fac ilitate such

comm i s sion, he solicits, aids, abets, agree s, or attempts to aid, such other person in the planning or commission of the offe nse.” 720 I L CS 5/5-2(c) (West 2006). “To prove that the defe ndant possessed the intent t o p ro m o t e or fac ilitate the crime, the State must prese nt evidenc e which establishes beyond a rea sonable doubt that either: (1) the defe ndant share d the cr iminal intent of the principal, or ( 2) there was a common criminal design.” People v

. Perez
, 189 I ll. 2d 254, 266 (2000). Words of agree ment are not nece ss ar y t o establish a

common criminal desig n or purpose. People v. Taylor
, 164 I ll. 2d 131, 141 (1995). Rather, knowledg e of and participation in the criminal s ch em e ar e sufficie nt. Perez
, 189 I ll. 2d at 267. E v i d en ce t h at a defe ndant was prese nt during the commission of the offe nse, that he maintained a close aff

iliation with his companions afte r the crime, that he failed to repor t the crime, and that he fled the s cene is rele vant t o deter mining accountability

. Taylor
, 1 6 4 I ll. 2d at 141. Where a common criminal desig n or purpose is established, any acts in further ance of the common design are considere d to b e ac t s of all parties to the desig n and “all are

-8-equally responsible for the conseque nces of the further acts.” Perez
, 189 I ll. 2d at 267.

Howeve r, mere prese nce at the scene of a crime and knowledg e that a crime i s being committed are insufficient to establish ac countability

. Taylor , 164 I ll. 2d at 140. ¶ 34 Def

endant’ s discussion of the ev i d en ce o n ap p ea l i s selec tive. Although de fenda nt char acte rizes his conduct as innocent–by ass erting that “at most the evidenc e showed that [he] drove his car next to Wil liams’s”–he ignor es that he t o l d t h e W aukega n detec tives during the Clarksdale interview that W i l l i am s , not L ewis, was the intended targ et of the shooting. Def

endant further informed the detec tives that the motive for attempting to shoot Wil liams was a fig ht outside an I HOP during which he and two other indiv i du al s wer e outnumbered by members of the Bla ck P Stone g ang

. The St ate offe red testimony from Detec tive Gar cia that corr oborate d defe ndant’s I HOP story

. Although defe ndant wa s not named in Detec tive Gar cia’ s police repor t, most of the fig ht’s participa nts fled the scene , and

one of the two individuals a rre sted following the fight was Gre en, who also participated in the shooting of L ewis. The State also prese nted evidenc e of an ong oing rivalry betwee n the Bla ck P Stone g ang , of which Wil liams was a known member, and the Four Corner Hustlers
gang, of which defe ndant admitted to being a member since ag e 14, which fu rt h er

corr oborate d defe ndant’s video- rec orded state ment. ¶ 35 Def

endant also ignor es that he was arr ested in Milwaukee in the prese nce of the Saturn that was used in the shooting. Fur ther, the State prese nted evidenc e that Har m o n ’s fing erpr ints wer e rec overe d from the rea r driver’ s-side door of the Saturn, which, acc ording
to defe ndant’s confe ssion, was the position from which Ha rm o n fired the gun into the Cadillac. Def

endant also ignor es that he told the detec tives that afte r the shooting he fled to Milwaukee and, subseque ntly , to Missi ssippi. ¶ 36 I n s u m , t h er e wa s substantial evidenc e that defe ndant had knowledg e of a common criminal design to reta li at e aga i nst a rival g ang member. There also was evidenc e that defe ndant intended to fac ilitate the scheme when he made the U -turn, pulled along side the Cadillac, and maintained speed while Har mon fired the gun, which Gre en had remove d from

a compar tment of the Saturn and handed to Har mon. Viewing the evidenc e in the light most favor able to the State, a rational trier of fac t could have found the essential elements of the crime be yond a re asonable doubt. ¶ 37 Def

endant’ s relianc e on Peo

p l e v. Estrada
, 243 I ll. App. 3d 177 (1993), and People v

. W ashington
, 375 I ll. App. 3d 1012 (2 007), is misplaced. In Estrada
, the defe ndant’s conviction of first-degree murder un d er a t h eo ry of accountability was rever sed where the evidenc e established that he had exit ed a car and brandished a tire iron befor e a codef endant fired shots from within the car , killing the victim. Estrada
, 243 I ll. App. 3d at 185. The court

rea soned that the defe ndant’s act of exit ing the car neg ated any infere nce that he was part of

a common desig n or plan t o s h o o t t h e victim. Estrada
, 243 I ll. App. 3d at 185. In W ashington
, a defe ndant’s conviction of attempted first-degree murder was reve rsed wher e the evidenc e ag ainst him consisted of testimony from alleg ed coconspirators that conflicte d

on critica l points. W

ashington
, 375 I ll. App. 3d at 1029. At t ri al
, the S tate had argued that
t h e d ef en d an t either fired the gun himself or drove the van from which the gun was fired. W ashington
, 375 I ll. App. 3d at 1024. On appea l, howeve r, the court rea soned that there was

no evidenc e reg arding who shot the gun or who drove the van, other than the inconsistent and

-9-contra dictory testimony of the de fenda nt’s three alleg ed acc omplices. W ashington
, 375 I ll. App. 3d at 1025-29. Wit h one justice dissenting, the court co n cluded that “ther e was no remotely consistent acc ount of the events *** or [t he] defe ndant ’ s r o le in them.” W ashington
, 375 I ll. App. 3d at 1029. ¶ 38 Her e, unlike the defe ndant in Estrada
, defe ndant did not act in a manner that neg ated a ny infere nce that he was part of a common criminal design or plan. To the contra ry , defe ndant
acte d in a way that supported the infere nce that he was part of a common criminal desig n to fire shots into the Cadillac. Def endant made a U-turn afte r spotting Wil liams’s Cadillac and,

as Gre en handed a gun to Har mon, defe ndant pulled along side the Cadillac and maintained speed as Har

mo n fi re d t h e gun. Nor does this case rese mble the fac ts of W ashington
, in which the primary evidenc e was the conflicting
, inconsistent, and uncorr oborate d testimony of three alleg ed acc omplices. Her e, the critica l evidenc e was defe nd ant’s own confe ssion, which the State c orrobor ated in key respe cts.

¶ 39 Admissibil ity of Milwaukee Interview ¶ 40 Def

endant’ s second contention on appea l is that the trial court abused its discretion in not admitting, pursuant to I llinois Rule of Evidence 106, the audio rec ording of his October 27, 2007, interview with Waukeg an detec tives in Milwaukee

. Def endant argues that his confr ontational and defia nt t o n e during the Milwaukee interview contra sted signific antly with his defe ated tone during his video-re corde d Clarksdale interview. Def endant contends
t h at, if admitted, the Milwaukee interview would have provided context to the Clarksdale interview and shown the s tates of mind of t he W aukeg an detectives during the C l ar k s d ale interview. ¶ 41 We revie w ev i d entiary ruling s for an abuse of discretion. People v. Garc ia-Cordova
, 2011 I L App (2d) 070550-B
, ¶ 82. A trial cour t ab u s es i t s discretion wher e its decision is

arb itrary
, fanc iful, or unrea sonable, or wher e no rea sonable person would take the tri al court’s view. Garcia-Cordova
, 2011 I L App (2d) 070550-B
, ¶ 82. To the extent that we must resolve the proper interpre tation of I llinois Rule of Evidence 106, which involves a question of law, our

revie w is de novo

. Lambert v. Coonrod , 2012 I L App (4th) 110518, ¶

18. ¶ 42 On September 27, 2010, the I llinois Supreme Court adopted t h e I l l i n o i s Ru l es o f Evidence
, which beca

me eff ective J anuar

y 1, 2011. The Special Supreme Court Commi ttee

on I llinois Evidence (Committ ee)
, which draf ted the rules, “incor

porate d into the I l l i n o i s Rules of Evidence the curr ent l aw o f ev i d ence in I llinois whene ver the I llinois Supreme Court or the I llinois Appellate Court had clea rly s p o k en o n a principle of evidentiar y law within t he last 50 or so y ear s.” I ll. R. Evid., Commi ttee Commentary (adopte d Sept. 27, 2010). I llinois Rule of Evidence 106 provides, “When a writing or rec orded statement or part there o f is introduced by a party , an adverse party may require the i ntroduction at t hat t ime of any other part or any other writing or rec orded statement which oug ht i n fairness to be considere d contempora

neously with it.” I ll. R. Evid. 106 (ef f. J an. 1, 2011). The rule codified, at least in part, the common-law “complete ness doctrine,” which provides that “ ‘if

one party introduces part of an utteranc e or writ i n g the opposing party may introduce the

rema inder or so much there of as is require d to place that part orig inally offe red in proper

-10-context so that a corr ect and true meaning is conveyed to the jury .’ ” People v. W illiams
, 109 I ll. 2d 327, 334 (1985) (quoting Lawson v. G.D. Searle &Co. , 64 I ll. 2d 543, 556 (1976))

. The ru l e did not codify the common-law doctrine in its entirety
, beca use t he common-law doctrine applies to oral statements as well as to writing s and rec orded statements (see
, e.g. , People v. Nolan
, 291 I ll. App. 3d 879, 885 (1997))
, while Rule 106 applies only to writing s and rec orded statements (I ll. R. Evid. 106 (ef f. J an. 1, 2011)). Fur

thermore
, many courts apply the common-law completene ss d o ct ri n e to permit an opposing party to question a witness on cross-e x amination about t he remainder of a wr iting or or al statement (se e, e.g. , Nolan
, 291 I ll. App. 3d at 885), while Rule 106 p erm i t s an opposing party to “re quire the introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing or rec orded statement which
oug ht in fairne ss to be considere d contemporane ously with it” (empha ses added) (Ill

. R. Evid. 106 (ef

f. Jan. 1, 2011)). ¶ 43 Rule 106 also varie s from the common-law completene ss doctrine in that it was 1 of 14 rules in which the C ommitt ee incorporated “uncontroversia l developments with respe ct to the law of evidenc e as ref lected in the Fe d er al Rules of Evidence and the 44 surveyed jurisdictions.” I ll. R. Evid., Commi ttee Commentary (adopte d Sept. 2 7
, 2 0 1 0 ). The Commi ttee ex plained the modernizati o n o f t h e rule as follows: “Prior I llinois law appear s to ha ve limit ed the conce pt of completene ss to other parts of the same writing or rec ording

or an addendum there to. The ‘ought in fairne ss’ require ment allows admissibili ty of
statem en t s m ade under separ ate circ umstances.” I ll. R. Evid., Commi ttee Commentary (adopte d Sept. 27, 2010). In People v. Brown
, 249 I ll. App. 3d 986 (1993), for example, which was decide d prior to the adoption of the I llinois Rules of Evidence
, the court held that the completene ss doctrine did not permi t ad m i s sion of a defe ndant’s oral statement to a serg eant and a detec tive that was made one hour befor e a second oral statement to the same detec tive and an assistant State’s Attorney

. Brown
, 362 I ll. App. 3 d at 9 91. The court

rea soned that the completene ss doctrine applied only “to what was said on the same subject
at the same time.” (Interna l quotation marks omitted.) Bro w n , 3 6 2 I l l. App. 3d at 990. By
contra st, Rule 106 allows admission of writing s or rec orded statements that wer e not made at the same time as the admitted evide nce. I ll. R. Evid. 106 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). ¶ 44 Be fore rea ching the merits of defe ndant’s argument, we addre ss his argument conce rning the proper interpre tation of I llinois Rule of Evidence 106. Def endant contends that, beca use the rule is near ly identical to Fe dera l Rule of Evidence 106, we should look to fede ral case 1 law to guide our interpre tation of the new rule. In particula r, defe ndant urg es us to adopt the
test used in the Seventh Circuit to deter mine whether evidenc e is admissible under the fede ral rule. Under that test, the writing or rec orded statement must be re l ev an t , and the writing or rec orded statement must (a) explain the admitted evidenc e, (b) place the admitted evidenc e in context, (c) avoid misleading the trier of fac t, and (d) ensure a fair and impartial understanding of all of the evidenc e. United States v. Velasco
, 953 F.2d 1467, 1475 (7th Cir. 1992). Whil e we agree with defe ndant that looking to fede ral case law as persua sive authority

Fede ra l Rule of Evidenc e 106 al lows int roduct ion of “an y oth er par t–o r any oth er wri ti ng 1

o r re cor ded st at ement–t hat in fa irnes s ought to be con si der ed at the same ti m e” as a wri ti ng o r

re cor dedst at ement i ntr oduc ed i nto evide nce . Fed . R. Evid. 106.

-11-when interpreting an I llinois rule of evidenc e may be appropriate i n ce rt ain circumstances

(see Citi bank, N.A. v. McG ladrey & Pullen, LLP
, 2011 I L App (1st) 102427, ¶ 21), doing so is unnece ssary

in this case. ¶ 45 Al t h o u gh I llinois Rule of Evidence 106 differ s from the common-law c omp l et en es s doctrine in the respe cts noted above, there is no indication that t h e ru l e alt ere d the other require m ents for admissibi lity under the completene ss doctrine, which are well developed in I llinois case law. Specif ically , under the common-law c ompleteness doctr ine in I llinois
, the rema inder of a writing
, rec ording
, or oral statement is admissible if nece ssary to preve nt the trier of fac t f

rom being misled (

People v. Caffey
, 205 I ll. 2d 52, 90-91 (2001))
, to place the admitted portion “in proper context so that a corr ect and true meaning is conveyed to the jury” ( Lawson
, 64 I ll. 2d at 556), or “to shed l ight on the m eaning o f t h e evidence already

rec eived” (

People v. Patte r

s on , 154 I ll. 2d 414, 453 (1992))

. Put another way , “ ‘[a] defe ndant has no right to introduce portions of a statement which are not nece ssary to enable the jury to proper ly evaluate the portions introduced by the State.’ ” Caffey
, 205 I ll. 2d at 91 (quoting People v. Olinger
, 112 I ll. 2d 324, 338 (1986))

. These requirem en t s fo r admissibili ty under the common-law completene ss doctrine are easily applied to writing s or

rec orded statements soug ht to be admitted under I llinois Rule o f Evidence 106, which rende rs looking to f

eder al ca se law unne cessa ry

. 2 ¶ 46 Turning to th e me rits of defe ndant’s argument, we disag ree with his asser tion that playing the audio rec ording of his Milwaukee interview for the jury somehow would have place d his Clarksdale interview in context or assisted the jury i n understanding it. During his Milwaukee interview, de fenda nt denied having knowledg e of the stolen Saturn or beingin Waukeg an on October 18, 2007. During his Clarksdale interview, which was n ea rl y three months later, defe ndant told Detec tives Thomas and Cappelluti that he trade d drug s for the Saturn and that he participated in the shooting of L ewis in Waukeg an on October 18, 2007. The former interview did not shed light on the latter interview or place it in context–it mere ly
contra dicted it. Consequently
, the rec ording of the Milwaukee interview was not admissible under I llinois Rule of E v i d en ce 106. See People v. Pietryzk
, 153 I ll. App. 3d 428, 438-39 (1987) (statements wer e inadmissible under completene ss doctrine wher e they did not explain or qualify admitted statements but mere ly contra dicted them). Ag ain, u n der the common-law completene ss doctrine, the rema inder of a writing
, rec ording
, or oral statement is admissible only if re qu i re d to preve nt the jury from being misled, to place the admitted portion in context so that a true meaning is conveyed, or to shed light on the meaning of the admitted portion, and the same holds true for admissibili ty of a writing or rec orded statement under I llinois Rule of Evidence 106. Simpl y beca use a writing or recorded statement is related to an admitted writing or rec orded statement, or perta ins to the same subject matter, does not mean that it satisfies the require ments for a dmissibi lity under Rule 106. ¶ 47 Def

endant’ s contention that the audio rec ording should have been admitted to show the

As a pra ct ic al m at te r, the re qui re m ent s for admissi on unde r the comm on- la w complet ene ss 2 doc tr ine in I ll ino is do not dif fe r si gnifi can tl y fr om the fa ct ors in the Sevent h Cir cui t’ s te st , and our

re sul t wo uldnotbe dif

fe re nt wer e we to app ly the fe der al te st

.

-12-contra st betwee n his confr ontational and def iant tone duringthe Milwaukee interview and his defe ated tone during the Clarksdale interview misses the mark. Acc ording to defe ndant, his c onfrontational and defia nt tone during the Milwaukee interview place d the Clarksdale interview in c ontext beca use it would have allowed the jury to inf er from his defe ated tone in Clarksdale that his statements wer e not voluntary

. This infere n ce is too tenuous and speculative to satisfy the require ments for admissibili ty under Rule 106. T h e Clarksdale interview was played in full for the jury
, and we cannot say that defe ndant’s calm and candid
statements on t h e video wer e misleading
, taken out of context, or misunderstood simply beca use defendant p reviously had energ etically denied being in Waukeg an on the ni g ht of the shooting. Def

endant’ s purported confr ontational and defia nt tone during the Milwaukee interview would not in any way have preve nted the jury from being misled, provided context, or assisted the jury

in understandinghis Clarksdale intervie w. ¶ 48 Fur

thermore
, defe ndant’s argument reg arding his tone during the Milwaukee interview

reve als a misunderstanding about the purpose of Rule 106. The rule is not a means to admit evidenc e that aids a defe ndant in proving his or her theory of the case

. For example, here
, defe ndant maintains that his contra sting tones during the two interviews would have tended
t o p ro ve that his statements i n Clarksdale were not voluntary

. Rather, the purpose of Ru l e 106 is to corr ect the misleading nature of a writing or rec orded statement or a portion there of that has been taken out of context or is difficult to understand on its own. Where, as here
, a defe ndant has not shown that the admitted writing or rec orded statement, standing alone, is misleading
, Rule 106 does not provide an avenue for admitting another writing or rec orded
statement. ¶ 49 Simi larly unavailing is defe ndant’s argument that admission of the Milwaukee interview would have put the “tec hniques and mind set” of Detec tives Thomas and Cappelluti befor e the jury

. L ike defe ndant’s argument reg arding his confr ontational and defian t t o n e, defe ndant’s argument reg arding the “tec hniques and mind set” of the Waukeg an detec tives is far too tenuous and speculative to satisfy the require ments for admi ssibili ty under Rule 106. Although both detec tives testified that they wer e awa re, at least to some degree , that defe ndant had been uncooper ative during the Milwaukee interview, the dete ctives appear 3

on the video of the Clarksdale interview calmly asking defe ndant a series of questions, which d ef en dant calmly answe rs. Moreove r, the only evidenc e of an off- came ra discussion wa s Detec tive Cappelluti’s testimo n y co ncer ning his brief encounte r with defe ndant in the hallway outside the interview room, during the 50 seconds afte r Detec tive Cappelluti left to

use the restroom. Ba sed on this evidenc e, we cannot say t h at t h e audio rec ording of the Milwaukee interview would have shown the dete ctives’ “tec hniques and mind set” in any meaning ful way , or in any way that was nece ssary to preve nt the jury from being misled, to provide context, or to a ssist the jury in unde rstanding the videotaped Clarksdale interview.

Det ect ive T homas te st if

ie d tha t he knew tha t def

end ant had bee n unc oope ra ti ve dur ing his 3 Mi lwa ukee int erview. Det ect ive Capp el lut i te st if ie d tha t he had not li st ene d to the aud io re cor din g of the Mi lwa ukee int erview pri or to int erviewin g def end ant in Cla rksdal e; however
, upon fur the r que st ion ing, he te st if

ie d tha t he knew tha t def

end ant had not al lowe d Wa ukeg an det ect ives to bri ng him fro m Mi lwa ukee t o W aukegan fo r ques ti oni ng.

-13-Any techniques the detec tives used to obtain defe ndant’s statement wer e on full display for

the jury

. ¶ 50 De fe n d an t ’s re l i ance on United States v. Haddad
, 10 F.3d 1252 (7th Cir. 1993), i s misplaced. I n Haddad, which invol ved Feder al R ule of Evidence 106, the S eventh Ci rcuit deter mined that the trial court err ed (although the err or was harmless) when it admitted the inculpatory portion of the defe ndant’s statement to police without allowing the defe ndant to admit the exculpatory portion of the same statement. Haddad
, 1 0 F. 3 d at 1259. The defe ndant was char g ed with knowing possessio n o f a semiautomatic handgun, having previously been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one y ear

. Haddad
, 10 F.3d at 1254. At trial, the g overnme nt i n t ro du ced the defe ndant’s admission to p o l i ce that he was awa re of the bag of marijuana found six inches from the handgun at issue. Haddad
, 10 F.3d at 1258-59. The trial court did not permit the defe ndant
to introduce the rema inder of his statement, in which he to l d office rs that he had no knowledg e of the gun. Haddad
, 10 F.3d at 1258. On appeal, t h e S ev en t h Circuit rea soned that admission of the inculpatory portion of the defe ndant’s statement, wi th o u t a ls o admitting the ex cu l p at o ry potion, might have misled the trier of fac t beca use it sug g ested that the defe ndant also knewof the gun. Haddad, 10 F.3d at 1259. ¶ 51 Her e, the Clarksdale interview bear s no simil arity to the inculpatory s ta te ment i ntr oduced by the gover

nment in Hadda d

. T h e C l arksdale i nterview
, taken alone, di d not mislead the jury into inferring that defe ndant had inculpated hims elf when in fac t he had not. Nor was the Clarksdale interview incomplete or taken out of context. Ag ain, the Milwaukee interview

mere ly contra dicted the Clarksdale interview; it did not contain any statements nece ssary to preve n t the j ury from being mis led, t o place the C larksdale interview in context so that its
true mea ning w as conve y ed, or to shed light on its m eaning

. ¶ 52 In sum, the t ri al court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the audio rec ordingof defe ndant’s Milwauke e intervie w.

¶ 53 CONCLUSI ON ¶ 54 For

the fore g oing r easons, we aff irm the judg ment of the c ircuit court of L ake County

.

¶ 55 Affir

med.

-14-