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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. YUSEF L.*

(AC 43612)

Elgo, Cradle and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted, on guilty pleas of the crimes of violation of a protective order

and strangulation in the second degree and on an admission to violation

of probation, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming that the

trial court improperly denied his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas

because they were not made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.

Held:

1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly

denied his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas because it failed to

determine whether he fully understood the maximum possible sentence

that could result from consecutive sentences: the court informed the

defendant that, if he were to plead guilty, he could receive up to five

years in prison and five years of probation for each charge, and, although

the defendant gave one word responses, they still represented a clear

communication from the defendant to the court that he understood the

maximum possible sentence before him; moreover, the defendant had

prior experience with criminal proceedings, and, by his own admission,

received adequate representation by counsel; accordingly, the court

substantially complied with the applicable rule of practice (§ 39-19 (4)).

2. The trial court properly rejected the defendant’s unpreserved claims

seeking review pursuant to State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), which

challenged the court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas:

a. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court

incorrectly advised him that a mandatory minimum sentence applied:

although the defendant was correct that no mandatory minimum sentence applied with respect to the charges of strangulation in the second

degree and violation of a protective order, his claim failed under the

third prong of Golding because no constitutional violation occurred; the

court never informed the defendant of the application of any mandatory

minimum sentence, rather, the court explained the structure of the sentence to be imposed, and the record indicated that the defendant understood that explanation; thus, because the court did not misinform the

defendant of a mandatory minimum sentence, the defendant’s due process rights were not implicated.

b. The defendant’s claim that the trial court failed to determine whether

he fully understood that he had the right to plead not guilty and the

right to the assistance of counsel was unavailing: the court explicitly

informed the defendant that if he did not plead guilty he would proceed

to trial, at which time he potentially could be found guilty, and the

defendant indicated to the court that he understood that he had a right

to plead not guilty; moreover, the defendant’s familiarity with the criminal

justice system supported the conclusion that he knew that he had the

right to plead not guilty, and the court reasonably could have relied on

the fact that the defendant was represented by counsel in all pretrial

proceedings in the present case in concluding that the defendant understood the role of counsel and that he had the right to the assistance

of counsel.

Argued May 25—officially released September 14, 2021

Procedural History

Information, in the first case, charging the defendant

with violation of probation, and information, in the second case, charging the defendant with the crimes of

breach of the peace in the second degree and strangulation in the second degree, and information, in the third

case, charging the defendant with the crime of violation

of a protective order, brought to the Superior Court

in the judicial district of Waterbury, geographical area
number four, where the defendant was presented to

the court, Doyle, J., on an admission of guilt to violation

of probation and pleas of guilty to strangulation in the

second degree and violation of a protective order; thereafter, the state entered a nolle prosequi as to the charge

of breach of the peace in the second degree; subsequently, the court denied the defendant’s motion to

withdraw and vacate his guilty pleas, and rendered judgment revoking probation and judgments of guilty in

accordance with the pleas, from which the defendant

appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Raymond L. Durelli, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Christopher W. Iverson, certified legal intern, with

whom, on the brief, was Michele C. Lukban, senior

assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

DiPENTIMA, J. The defendant, Yusef L., appeals from

the judgment revoking his probation and the judgments

of conviction, rendered after his admission to a violation of his probation in violation of General Statutes

§ 53a-32 and after pleas of guilty, pursuant to the Alford

doctrine,1 of violation of a protective order in violation

of General Statutes § 53a-223 and strangulation in the

second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a64bb. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial

court improperly denied his motion to withdraw his

guilty pleas because they were not made knowingly,

voluntarily, and intelligently. Specifically, the defendant

claims that the court (1) failed to determine whether

he fully understood the maximum possible sentence

that could result from consecutive sentences, (2) incorrectly advised him that a mandatory minimum sentence

applied, and (3) failed to determine whether he fully

understood that he had the right to plead not guilty and

the right to the assistance of counsel.2 We affirm the

judgments of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. On January 11, 2019, the defendant,

while represented by counsel, admitted that he violated

his probation and entered guilty pleas pursuant to North

Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27

L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970), to the charges of violation of a

protective order and strangulation in the second degree

with an agreed on sentence of ‘‘four years and two days

to serve, followed by 2184 days of special parole.’’ After

conducting a plea canvass, the court, Doyle, J., found

that the defendant’s admission and pleas were made

knowingly and voluntarily, and accepted each of them.

The court then ordered a presentence investigation

report and continued the case for sentencing.

On January 12, 2019, the defendant sent a letter to

the court seeking to withdraw his guilty pleas because

he was ‘‘confused [as] to what [he] plead[ed] guilty to.’’

On January 14, 2019, the defendant sent a second letter

to the court, again stating that he wanted to withdraw

his guilty pleas, and stating that he was not satisfied

with the representation that he had received and that

he was prepared to go trial. The court construed these

letters as a motion by the defendant to withdraw his

guilty pleas. On March 18, 2019, the defendant and his

counsel appeared before the court. At that time, the

defendant stated that he ‘‘was confused’’ and ‘‘didn’t

know what was going on’’ during the January 11, 2019

plea hearing. The court ordered a copy of the transcript

from the January 11, 2019 hearing and informed the

defendant that they would discuss its contents at a

hearing on April 1, 2019.

At the April 1, 2019 hearing, the court stated to the

defendant: ‘‘I reviewed the transcript [from the January
11, 2019 plea hearing] and I think it’s pretty clear to

me that, at the time, you understood everything that I

asked you based on your responses. In the letter you

seem to be more interested in just—you’re not happy

with the sentence, which I get, but that’s not a basis

for changing a plea. So what I’m inclined to do is I’ll

give you a copy of the transcript and I’ll give you a new

date to look it over.’’ The defendant persisted in his

claim that he did not understand what had happened

at the January 11, 2019 plea hearing, and the court

responded that the defendant would receive a copy of

the transcript so that he could ‘‘tell [the court] where

[he] . . . [didn’t] understand . . . .’’

On April 26, 2019, the defendant sent a third letter

to the court, this time requesting to represent himself

in future proceedings. At a hearing on May 22, 2019,

concerning his request for self-representation and after

a lengthy canvass of the defendant, the court found:

‘‘[T]he defendant has knowingly and intelligently

waived his right to counsel . . . he wants to represent

himself or get a private attorney.3

I’m going to continue

the case one month to see if he gets a private attorney

. . . [then] we are going forward on [the defendant’s]

motion to vacate if [he] wants to pursue it, or we are

going to be going to sentencing.’’ (Footnote added.) The

court also ordered that the defendant’s former attorney,

Christopher J. Molyneaux, act as standby counsel for

the defendant if he did not retain a private attorney.

On June 26, 2019, the self-represented defendant,

with standby counsel present, argued that he should

be permitted to withdraw his guilty pleas because the

sentence ‘‘exceed[ed] the specified agreement [to]

which [he] pleaded . . . .’’ Specifically, the defendant

stated that he understood that he was accepting five

and one-half years of special parole, and that he did

not agree to ‘‘shy of six years’’ of special parole. The

defendant further argued that he should be permitted

to withdraw his guilty pleas because the court never

used the word ‘‘ ‘consecutive’ ’’ when it canvassed him

with regard to the charges to which he was pleading

guilty. The defendant gave no other reasons to withdraw

his plea. The court denied the defendant’s motion to

withdraw his guilty plea, stating: ‘‘I don’t think that

you’ve provided a sufficient factual basis that requires

a further evidentiary hearing. You’ve basically made

some vague and conclusory allegations that you weren’t

sure about the sentence and exceeding it. It does not

exceed the proposed agreement. You did not carry your

burden to put forth sufficient facts that would warrant

a further hearing . . . to address your motion to withdraw [your guilty plea].’’

On July 9, 2019, after reviewing the presentence investigation report, the court sentenced the defendant as

agreed. The defendant then appealed from the judgments of conviction, claiming that the court improperly
denied his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

‘‘Our standard of review for the trial court’s decision

on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under Practice

Book § 39-27 is abuse of discretion. . . . After a guilty

plea is accepted but before the imposition of sentence

the court is obligated to permit withdrawal upon proof

of one of the grounds in [§ 39-27]. An evidentiary hearing

is not required if the record of the plea proceeding

and other information in the court file conclusively

establishes that the motion is without merit. . . .

‘‘In considering whether to hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea the court may

disregard any allegations of fact, whether contained in

the motion or made in an offer of proof, which are either

conclusory, vague or oblique. For the purposes of

determining whether to hold an evidentiary hearing, the

court should ordinarily assume any specific allegation

of fact to be true. If such allegations furnish a basis for

withdrawal of the plea under [Practice Book § 39-27]

and are not conclusively refuted by the record of the

plea proceedings and other information contained in

the court file, then an evidentiary hearing is required.

. . . We further [note] that the burden [is] on the defendant to show a plausible reason for the withdrawal.’’

(Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Warner, 165 Conn. App.

185, 191–92, 138 A.3d 463 (2016).

I

The defendant’s first claim challenging the court’s

denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas is that

the court failed to determine whether he fully understood the maximum possible sentence that could result

from consecutive sentences.4 Specifically, the defendant argues that ‘‘[n]othing in the record suggests [that]

[he] was aware of the actual sentencing possibilities,’’

and that ‘‘[t]here was no substantial compliance with

Practice Book § 39-19 (4).’’5 The state counters that the

record shows substantial compliance with § 39-19 (4),

and that the defendant was aware of the maximum

possible sentence that would result from consecutive

sentences. We agree with the state.

It is well established that ‘‘[a] defendant can voluntarily and understandingly waive [his] rights without literal compliance with the prophylactic safeguards of

Practice Book §§ [39-19 and 39-20]. Therefore . . . precise compliance with the provisions [of §§ 39-19 and

39-20] is not constitutionally required.’’ (Citations omitted.) State v. Badgett, 200 Conn. 412, 418, 512 A.2d 160,

cert. denied, 479 U.S. 940, 107 S. Ct. 423, 93 L. Ed. 2d

373 (1986). Accordingly, ‘‘[o]ur courts repeatedly have

held that only substantial compliance is required when

warning the defendant of the direct consequences of a

. . . plea pursuant to . . . § 39-19 in order to ensure
that the plea is voluntary pursuant to . . . § 39-20.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hanson,

117 Conn. App. 436, 444, 979 A.2d 576 (2009), cert.

denied, 295 Conn. 907, 989 A.2d 604 (2010), cert. denied,

562 U.S. 986, 131 S. Ct. 425, 178 L. Ed. 2d 331 (2010).

‘‘[W]hen determining whether there has been substantial compliance with Practice Book § 39-14 (4), we

must conduct a two part inquiry. Our first inquiry is to

determine whether the court accepted the defendant’s

pleas without first determining whether he was aware

of and understood the maximum possible sentence to

which he was exposed. . . . Next, if we conclude that

the court failed to determine whether the defendant

was aware of and understood the maximum possible

sentence, we examine the record to determine whether,

despite the court’s failure, he nevertheless had actual

knowledge of the maximum possible consequences of

his pleas. . . . If either prong is satisfied, the pleas

were accepted with substantial compliance with Practice Book § 39-19 (4).’’ (Citations omitted.) State v. Carmelo T., 110 Conn. App. 543, 552–53, 955 A.2d 687, cert.

denied, 289 Conn. 950, 960 A.2d 1037 (2008).

During the court’s plea canvass of the defendant, the

following exchange took place:

‘‘The Court: [D]id [defense counsel] explain to you

for each of [the] charges you could get up to five years

in prison [and] five years of probation . . . ?

‘‘The Defendant: Yes.

‘‘The Court: Do you understand everything he

explained to you about the court’s offer?

‘‘The Defendant: Yes.

‘‘The Court: Are you satisfied with how your attorney

represented you, sir?

‘‘The Defendant: Yes.

‘‘The Court: Counsel, did you go over all of this with

your client?

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: I did, Your Honor.

‘‘The Court: And did he have any trouble understanding you?

‘‘[Defense Counsel]: He did not, Your Honor.’’

(Emphasis added.)

Our Supreme Court has held that, in the context of

a plea canvass, ‘‘[a]lthough some form of meaningful

dialogue is preferable to monosyllabic responses by the

defendant . . . single-word responses [do not] require

an automatic vacation of a guilty plea.’’ State v. Torres,

182 Conn. 176, 179–80, 438 A.2d 46 (1980). Moreover, it

is well established that a court may rely on a defendant’s

responses during a plea canvass in determining whether

the guilty plea is knowing and voluntary. See, e.g., State

v. Young, 186 Conn. App. 770, 780, 201 A.3d 439, cert.
denied, 330 Conn. 972, 200 A.3d 1151 (2019).

In the present case, as the exchange referenced

reflects, the court informed the defendant that, if he

were to plead guilty, he could face up to five years

in prison and five years of probation for each charge.

Furthermore, although the defendant gave one word

responses, they still represented a clear communication

from the defendant to the court that he understood

the maximum possible sentence before him. This is

especially true considering that the defendant had prior

experience with criminal proceedings—prior to the

charges in the present case, he had pleaded guilty to a

variety of charges, including a charge of possession of

narcotics—and, by his own admission, received adequate representation by counsel with respect to the

maximum possible sentence that he faced in the present

case. See, e.g., State v. Claudio, supra, 123 Conn. App.

293 (holding that prior experience with criminal proceedings and adequate representation by counsel are

factors to be considered in determination of whether

plea canvass was constitutionally sufficient); see also,

e.g., State v. Lage, 141 Conn. App. 510, 524–25, 61 A.3d

581 (2013) (same). These facts, considered as a whole,

demonstrate that the court correctly determined that

the defendant was aware of and understood the maximum possible sentence to which he was exposed and

thus, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of Practice Book § 39-19 (4).6

II

We now turn to the defendant’s claims that were not

properly preserved. The defendant claims that the court

(1) incorrectly advised him that a mandatory minimum

sentence applied and (2) failed to determine whether

he fully understood that he had the right to plead not

guilty and the right to the assistance of counsel. The

defendant acknowledges that these claims are unpreserved, and seeks review pursuant to State v. Golding,

213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified

by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188

(2015).

‘‘Under Golding, a [party] can prevail on a claim of

constitutional error not preserved at trial only if the

following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate

to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of

constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation

. . . exists and . . . deprived the [party] of a fair trial;

and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state

has failed to demonstrate the harmlessness of the

alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable

doubt. In the absence of any one of these conditions,

the [party’s] claim will fail. The appellate tribunal is free,

therefore, to respond to a [party’s] claim by focusing on

whichever condition is most relevant in the particular

circumstances.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In
re Madison C., 201 Conn. App. 184, 190, 241 A.3d 756,

cert. denied, 335 Conn. 985, 242 A.3d 480 (2020).

A

The defendant’s first unpreserved claim is that the

court ‘‘incorrectly advised [him] that a mandatory minimum sentence was required on the two [charges] [he]

was pleading [guilty] to . . . [because] [s]trangulation

in the second degree and violation of a protective order

have no mandatory minimums . . . [a]nd neither . . .

mandates probation or special parole.’’ According to

the defendant, this claim should be reviewed under

Golding because it is of ‘‘constitutional dimension

. . . .’’ In response, the state argues that this claim fails

under the third prong of Golding, because the court

‘‘never mistakenly stated that either of the defendant’s

two criminal charges carried a mandatory minimum

sentence.’’ We agree with the state.

It is well established that ‘‘[t]o ensure that a defendant

is accorded due process . . . [a] plea must be voluntarily and intelligently entered.’’ State v. Domian, 235

Conn. 679, 686, 668 A.2d 1333 (1996). To this end, Practice Book § 39-19 provides in relevant part that ‘‘[t]he

judicial authority shall not accept [a] plea without first

addressing the defendant personally and determining

that he or she fully understands . . . (2) [t]he mandatory minimum sentence, if any . . . .’’

The defendant is correct in his assertion that no mandatory minimum sentence applies with regard to the

crimes of strangulation in the second degree and violation of a protective order. The defendant’s claim fails,

however, under the third prong of Golding because, as

the record indicates, no constitutional violation

occurred. In claiming that the court incorrectly advised

him that a mandatory minimum sentence applied, the

defendant relies on the following language employed

by the court: ‘‘Right now, you’re going to plead [guilty]

to two class D felonies. One is strangulation in the

second degree and the other is violation of a protective

order. You have to, on each one, to get special parole,

get on the bottom part two years and [one] day. So

you’re going to get two years and [one] day on each,

okay, and then you’re going to get the remainder in

special parole.’’ According to the defendant, this language shows that the court, ‘‘in effect . . . incorrectly

advised [him] that two years and [one] day was a mandatory minimum on each felony and that just shy of three

years [of] special parole was also required on the bottom part of each felony.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) This,

however, is not the case.

The record reflects that the court never informed the

defendant, either explicitly or impliedly, of the application of any mandatory minimum sentence. From an

examination of the context of the language referenced

by the defendant, it is clear that the court was explaining
the structure of the sentence to be imposed and not

the existence of a mandatory minimum sentence.7 Moreover, the record shows that the defendant had a clear

understanding of that explanation. Because the record

clearly indicates that the court did not misinform the

defendant of a mandatory minimum sentence, we conclude that the defendant’s due process rights are not

implicated and no constitutional violation exists.

Accordingly, the defendant’s claim fails under the third

prong of Golding.

B

The defendant’s second unpreserved claim is that the

court failed to determine whether he fully understood

that he had the right to plead not guilty or to persist

in that plea if it already had been made, as well as the

right to the assistance of counsel. According to the

defendant, ‘‘there is nothing in the record that supports

a finding that [he] was aware . . . that he had the right

to plead not guilty . . . [or] that he had the right to

the assistance of counsel at trial.’’ The defendant further

argues that the court failed to comply with Practice

Book § 39-19 (5).8

In response, the state argues that this

claim fails because ‘‘the record shows that the defendant was aware of his right to plead not guilty and of

his right to the assistance of counsel at trial.’’ We agree

with the state.

The due process rights of a defendant are implicated

if his plea has not been voluntarily and knowingly

entered. See State v. Domian, supra, 235 Conn. 686. The

defendant argues that this claim qualifies for Golding

review because the court’s alleged failure to inform him

of his right to plead not guilty and of his right to the

assistance of counsel implicates his due process rights.

The record indicates, however, that such a failure did

not occur. During the court’s canvass of the defendant,

the following exchange took place:

‘‘The Court: On the criminal charges, you [pleaded]

[guilty] under the Alford doctrine. I need to make sure

you understand what that means. When you do that,

you’re telling me that you don’t agree with some or all

the facts put on the record about those incidents; is

that correct?

‘‘The Defendant: Yes.

‘‘The Court: Even though you don’t agree with some

or all the facts, you recognize you could be found guilty

of those or some other charges. After you’ve thought

about it and discussed it with your attorney, you, on

your own, have decided it’s in your best interest to

accept the proposed offer rather than risk going to

trial and getting a longer sentence if you’re found

guilty after trial; is that correct, sir?

‘‘The Defendant: Yes.

‘‘The Court: Even though you dispute the factual basis
of the pleas, once I accept them, I’ll be finding you

guilty. Do you understand that, sir?

‘‘The Defendant: Yes.

‘‘The Court: Are you entering these pleas of your own

free will?

‘‘The Defendant: Yes.’’ (Emphasis added.)

This exchange demonstrates that the court made it

clear to the defendant that he had the right to plead

not guilty. The court explicitly stated that if the defendant did not plead guilty he would proceed to trial, at

which time he potentially could be found guilty. Moreover, the defendant, through his responses, indicated

that he understood that he had the right to plead not

guilty. It is well established that ‘‘[a] court is permitted

to rely on a defendant’s responses during a plea canvass.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Young,

supra, 186 Conn. App. 780.

We again note the undisputed fact that the defendant

was familiar with the criminal justice system. As this

court has held, prior experience with criminal proceedings is a factor to be considered in determining whether

a defendant’s guilty plea is knowing and voluntary. See,

e.g., State v. Claudio, supra, 123 Conn. App. 293. The

defendant’s familiarity with the criminal justice system

further supports the conclusion that he knew that he

had the right to plead not guilty. He also conceded

that he had never gone to trial on a criminal charge,

indicating that he understood that he had right to plead

not guilty and to proceed to trial.

Additionally, the court reasonably could have relied

on the defendant’s familiarity with the criminal justice

system in determining that he understood that he had

the right to the assistance of counsel. The defendant

stated, in reference to his prior criminal charges while

being canvassed by the court regarding his request to

represent himself, that he had ‘‘[o]nce in [his] life’’ been

represented by an attorney from the public defender’s

office, and had been represented by private counsel

‘‘[a] majority of the time,’’ indicating that he clearly

understood both the role of counsel and his right to

the assistance of counsel. Furthermore, the court reasonably could have relied on the fact that the defendant

had been represented by counsel in all pretrial proceedings, through his entry of guilty pleas, in the present

case. See State v. Badgett, supra, 200 Conn. 420–21 n.7

(holding that ‘‘[i]t would defy reality to suppose that

[the defendant] had any doubts about his continued

right to assistance of counsel,’’ when defendant was

represented by counsel throughout pretrial proceedings

and his plea was ‘‘a tactical one and the product of

discussion . . . [with] his counsel’’ (internal quotation

marks omitted)). Accordingly, we conclude that the

defendant’s due process rights are not implicated and

no constitutional violation exists. Therefore, the defen-
dant’s claim fails under the third prong of Golding.

The judgments are affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of

victims of family violence, we decline to use the defendant’s full name or

to identify the victim or others through whom the victim’s identity may be

ascertained. See General Statutes § 64-86e.

Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3)

(2018); we decline to identify any party protected or sought to be protected

under a protective order or a restraining order that was issued or applied

for, or others through whom that party’s identity may be ascertained.

1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d

162 (1970). ‘‘A defendant who pleads guilty under the Alford doctrine does

not admit guilt but acknowledges that the state’s evidence against him is

so strong that he is prepared to accept the entry of a guilty plea.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Webb, 62 Conn. App. 805, 807 n.1, 772

A.2d 690 (2001).

2 For convenience, we have reordered the defendant’s claims as they are

set forth in his brief.

3 Although the court noted that the defendant’s April 26, 2019 letter indicated that the defendant sought to represent himself, at the May 22, 2019

hearing he requested time to retain a private attorney.

4 As the state acknowledges in its appellate brief, the defendant raised

this claim before the trial court, thereby preserving it.

5 Practice Book § 39-19 provides in relevant part: ‘‘The judicial authority

shall not accept the plea without first addressing the defendant personally

and determining that he or she fully understands . . . (4) [t]he maximum

possible sentence on the charge, including, if there are several charges, the

maximum sentence possible from consecutive sentences . . . .’’

6 We observe that, although the court’s explanation of the defendant’s

maximum sentence substantially complies with the requirements of Practice

Book § 39-19 (4), the best practice is for the court to state the maximum

sentence for each individual charge, and then state a total maximum exposure that is the sum of the maximum sentence for each individual charge.

7 We note that, in order for a defendant to be eligible for special parole,

‘‘a definite sentence of more than two years’’ must be imposed. General

Statutes § 54-125e (a).

8 Practice Book § 39-19 provides in relevant part: ‘‘The judicial authority

shall not accept the plea without first addressing the defendant personally

and determining that he or she fully understands . . . (5) [t]he fact that he

or she has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if it has

already been made . . . and the right to the assistance of counsel . . . .’’