II 

116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 4045 

To reduce and eliminate threats posed by nuclear weapons to the United 

States, and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JUNE 23, 2020 

Mrs. FEINSTEIN (for Mr. MARKEY (for himself and Mrs. FEINSTEIN)) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

A BILL 

To reduce and eliminate threats posed by nuclear weapons 

to the United States, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Hastening Arms Limi5 tations Talks Act of 2020’’ or the ‘‘HALT Act of 2020’’. 

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

7 Congress makes the following findings: 

8 (1) The use of nuclear weapons poses an exis9 tential threat to humanity, a fact that led President 

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1 chev to declare in a joint statement in 1987 that a 

2 ‘‘nuclear war cannot be won and must never be 

3 fought’’. 

4 (2) On June 12, 1982, an estimated 1,000,000 

5 people attended the largest peace rally in United 

6 States history, in support of a movement to freeze 

7 and reverse the nuclear arms race, a movement that 

8 helped to create the political will necessary for the 

9 negotiation of several bilateral arms control treaties 

10 between the United States and former Soviet Union, 

11 and then the Russian Federation. Those treaties 

12 contributed to strategic stability through mutual and 

13 verifiable reciprocal nuclear weapons reductions. 

14 (3) Since the advent of nuclear weapons in 

15 1945, millions of people around the world have stood 

16 up to demand meaningful, immediate international 

17 action to halt, reduce, and eliminate the threats 

18 posed by nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons testing, 

19 and nuclear war, to humankind and the planet. 

20 (4) In 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera21 tion of Nuclear Weapons done at Washington, Lon22 don, and Moscow July 1, 1968 (21 UST 483) (com23 monly referred to as the ‘‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation 

24 Treaty’’ or the ‘‘NPT’’) entered into force, which in25 cludes a binding obligation on the 5 nuclear-weapon 


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1 states (commonly referred to as the ‘‘P5’’), among 

2 other things, ‘‘to pursue negotiations in good faith 

3 on effective measures relating to the cessation of the 

4 nuclear arms race . . . and to nuclear disar5 mament’’. 

6 (5) Bipartisan United States global leadership 

7 has curbed the growth in the number of countries 

8 possessing nuclear weapons and has slowed overall 

9 vertical proliferation among countries already pos10 sessing nuclear weapons, as is highlighted by a more 

11 than 85-percent reduction in the United States nu12 clear weapons stockpile from its Cold War height of 

13 31,255 in 1967. 

14 (6) The United States testing of nuclear weap15 ons is no longer necessary as a result of the fol16 lowing major technical developments since the Sen17 ate’s consideration of the Comprehensive Nuclear18 Test-Ban Treaty (commonly referred to as the 

19 ‘‘CTBT’’) in 1999: 

20 (A) The verification architecture of the 

21 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty Orga22 nization (commonly referred to as the 

23 ‘‘CTBTO’’)— 

24 (i) has made significant advance25 ments, as seen through its network of 300 


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1 International Monitoring Stations and its 

2 International Data Centre, which together 

3 provide for the near instantaneous detec4 tion of nuclear explosives tests, including 

5 all 6 such tests conducted by North Korea 

6 between 2006 and 2017; and 

7 (ii) is operational 24 hours a day, 7 

8 days a week. 

9 (B) Since the United States signed the 

10 CTBT, confidence has grown in the science11 based Stockpile Stewardship and Management 

12 Plan of the Department of Energy, which forms 

13 the basis of annual certifications to the Presi14 dent regarding the continual safety, security, 

15 and effectiveness of the United States nuclear 

16 deterrent in the absence of nuclear testing, 

17 leading former Secretary of Energy Ernest 

18 Moniz to remark in 2015 that ‘‘lab directors 

19 today now state that they certainly understand 

20 much more about how nuclear weapons work 

21 than during the period of nuclear testing’’. 

22 (7) Despite the progress made to reduce the 

23 number and role of, and risks posed by, nuclear 

24 weapons, and to halt the Cold War-era nuclear arms 

25 race, tensions between countries that possess nuclear 


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1 weapons are on the rise, key nuclear risk reduction 

2 treaties are under threat, significant stockpiles of 

3 weapons-usable fissile material remain, and a quali4 tative global nuclear arms race is now underway 

5 with each of the countries that possess nuclear 

6 weapons spending tens of billions of dollars each 

7 year to maintain and improve their arsenals. 

8 (8) The United States and the Russian Federa9 tion are both pursuing the development of desta10 bilizing types of nuclear weapons, including new 

11 lower-yield nuclear weapons that are more usable, 

12 and the People’s Republic of China, India, Pakistan, 

13 and North Korea have each taken concerning steps 

14 to diversify their more modest, but nonetheless very 

15 deadly, nuclear arsenals. 

16 (9) Since January 2017, President Donald 

17 Trump has taken the following actions, which have 

18 run counter to the objectives of the Creating an En19 vironment for Nuclear Disarmament (commonly re20 ferred to as ‘‘CEND’’) initiative that his administra21 tion launched in 2018: 

22 (A) The release of the 2018 Nuclear Pos23 ture Review on February 5, 2018, which low24 ered the threshold for nuclear weapons use and 


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1 called for the development of the following new 

2 nuclear weapons: 

3 (i) A low-yield warhead on a sub4 marine-launched ballistic missile, which 

5 was deployed before the date of the enact6 ment of this Act. 

7 (ii) A sea-launched cruise missile, still 

8 under development on the date of the en9 actment of this Act. 

10 (B) The unilateral United States with11 drawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 

12 Action (commonly referred to as the ‘‘JCPOA’’) 

13 announced on May 8, 2018, which may lead to 

14 the complete collapse of an agreement that had 

15 verifiably closed of each of Iran’s pathways to 

16 a nuclear weapon. 

17 (C) The unilateral United States with18 drawal, completed on August 2, 2019, from the 

19 Treaty Between the United States of America 

20 and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 

21 the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range 

22 and Shorter-Range Missiles, signed at Wash23 ington December 8, 1987, and entered into 

24 force June 1, 1988 (commonly referred to as 

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1 ty’’ or the ‘‘INF Treaty’’) in response to the 

2 material breach by the Russian Federation of 

3 its obligations under that Treaty, which has re4 moved all legal constraints on the testing, pro5 curement, and deployment of ground-based 

6 shorter-range and intermediate-range missiles, 

7 increasing the risk of a missile arms race in the 

8 Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions. 

9 (D) The unilateral United States with10 drawal, announced on May 22, 2020, from the 

11 Treaty on Open Skies, done at Helsinki March 

12 24, 1992, and entered into force January 1, 

13 2002 (commonly referred to as the ‘‘Open Skies 

14 Treaty’’), which is likely to deny to United 

15 States allies and partners a key confidence16 building measure and one of the few remaining 

17 operational diplomatic forums, through the 

18 Open Skies Consultative Commission, to engage 

19 with the Russian Federation. 

20 (10) During a May 15, 2020, National Security 

21 Council meeting, one or more senior officials of the 

22 Trump administration reportedly advocated that the 

23 United States conduct its first nuclear explosives 

24 test since 1992, as part of an effort to bring the 

25 Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of 


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1 China into negotiations on a trilateral arms control 

2 agreement. 

3 (11) A move by the United States to break its 

4 moratorium on nuclear explosives testing would con5 flict with United Nations Security Council Resolu6 tion 2310, led by the United States and adopted in 

7 2016, which states that any nuclear explosives test 

8 would defeat the ‘‘object and purpose’’ of the CTBT 

9 and called on all countries to maintain their respec10 tive moratoriums on such tests. 

11 (12) In light of moves by the United States and 

12 other countries to increase their reliance on nuclear 

13 weapons, the 21st century nuclear freeze movement 

14 would seek to halt the new nuclear arms race by 

15 seeking conclusion of a comprehensive and verifiable 

16 freeze on the testing, deployment, and production of 

17 nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles for such weap18 ons. 

19 (13) The United States would benefit from con20 clusion of a comprehensive nuclear arms agreement 

21 with each of the nuclear-weapon state parties to the 

22 NPT and potentially all countries that possess nu23 clear weapons. 

24 (14) In 2013, the report on a nuclear weapons 

25 employment strategy of the United States submitted 


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1 under section 492 of title 10, United States Code, 

2 determined that it is possible to ensure the security 

3 of the United States and allies and partners of the 

4 United States and maintain a strong and credible 

strategic deterrent while safely pursuing up to a 1 5 ⁄3

6 reduction in deployed nuclear weapons from the level 

7 established in the Treaty between the United States 

8 of America and the Russian Federation on Measures 

9 for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Stra10 tegic Offensive Arms, signed April 8, 2010, and en11 tered into force February 5, 2011 (commonly re12 ferred to as the ‘‘New START Treaty’’). 

13 SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

14 It is the policy of the United States that: 

15 (1) The United States should build upon its 

16 decades long, bipartisan efforts to reduce the num17 ber and salience of nuclear weapons by leading inter18 national negotiations on specific arms-reduction 

19 measures as part of a 21st century global nuclear 

20 freeze movement. 

21 (2) The United States should immediately agree 

22 to extend the New START Treaty for 5 years, until 

23 February 5, 2026, through mutual agreement with 

24 the Russian Federation to provide continued insight 

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1 tegic delivery vehicles and deployed warheads belong2 ing to the Russian Federation, which would be an 

3 important first step to building momentum for a 

4 multilateral arms control initiative. 

5 (3) Upon the successful extension of the New 

6 START Treaty, the United States should engage 

7 with all other countries that possess nuclear weapons 

8 to negotiate and conclude future multilateral arms 

9 control, disarmament, and risk reduction agree10 ments, which should contain some or all of the fol11 lowing provisions: 

12 (A) An agreement on a verifiable freeze on 

13 the testing, production, and further deployment 

14 of all nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles for 

15 such weapons. 

16 (B) An agreement that establishes a 

17 verifiable numerical ceiling on the deployed 

18 shorter-range and intermediate-range and stra19 tegic delivery systems (as defined by the INF 

20 Treaty and the New START Treaty, respec21 tively) and the nuclear warheads associated 

22 with such systems belonging to the P5, and to 

23 the extent possible, all countries that possess 

24 nuclear weapons, at August 2, 2019, levels. 


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1 (C) An agreement by each country to 

2 adopt a policy of no first use of nuclear weap3 ons. 

4 (D) An agreement on a proactive United 

5 Nations Security Council resolution that ex6 pands access by the International Atomic En7 ergy Agency to any country found by the Board 

8 of Governors of that Agency to be noncompliant 

9 with its obligations under the NPT. 

10 (E) An agreement to refrain from config11 uring nuclear forces in a ‘‘launch on warning’’ 

12 nuclear posture allowing a country to launch a 

13 ballistic missile attack in response to detection 

14 by an early-warning satellite or sensor of a sus15 pected incoming ballistic missile. 

16 (F) An agreement not to target or inter17 fere in the nuclear command, control, and com18 munications (commonly referred to as ‘‘NC3’’) 

19 infrastructure of another country through a 

20 cyberattack. 

21 (G) An agreement on transparency meas22 ures or verifiable limits, or both, on hypersonic 

23 cruise missiles and glide vehicles that are 

24 mounted on ballistic missiles. 


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1 (H) An agreement to provide a baseline 

2 and continuous exchanges detailing the aggre3 gate number of active nuclear weapons and as4 sociated systems possessed by each country. 

5 (4) The United States should rejuvenate efforts 

6 in the United Nations Conference on Disarmament 

7 toward the negotiation of a verifiable Fissile Mate8 rial Treaty or Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, or 

9 move negotiations to another international body or 

10 fora, such as a meeting of the P5. Successful conclu11 sion of such a treaty would verifiably prevent any 

12 country’s production of highly enriched uranium and 

13 plutonium for use in nuclear weapons. 

14 (5) The United States should convene a series 

15 of high level summits on nuclear disarmament mod16 eled on the Nuclear Security Summits process, 

17 which saw the elimination of the equivalent of 3,000 

18 nuclear weapons. 

19 (6) The President should seek ratification by 

20 the Senate of the CTBT and mobilize all countries 

21 covered by Annex 2 of the CTBT to pursue similar 

22 action to hasten entry into force of the CTBT. The 

23 entry into force of the CTBT, for which ratification 

24 by the United States will provide critical momentum, 

25 will activate the CTBT’s onsite inspection provision 


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1 to investigate allegations that any country that is a 

2 party to the CTBT has conducted a nuclear test of 

3 any yield. 

4 (7) The President should make the accession of 

5 North Korea to the CTBT a component of any final 

6 agreement in fulfilling the pledges the Government 

7 of North Korea made in Singapore, as North Korea 

8 is reportedly the only country to have conducted a 

9 nuclear explosive test since 1998. 

10 (8) The United States should— 

11 (A) refrain from developing any new de12 signs for nuclear warheads or bombs, but espe13 cially designs that could add a level of technical 

14 uncertainty into the United States stockpile and 

15 thus renew calls to resume nuclear explosive 

16 testing in order to test that new design; and 

17 (B) seek reciprocal commitments from 

18 other countries that possess nuclear weapons. 

19 SEC. 4. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR NUCLEAR 

20 TEST EXPLOSIONS. 

21 (a) IN GENERAL.—None of the funds authorized to 

22 be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 

23 2021 or any fiscal year thereafter, or authorized to be ap24 propriated or otherwise made available for any fiscal year 

25 before fiscal year 2021 and available for obligation as of 


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1 the date of the enactment of this Act, may be obligated 

2 or expended to conduct or make preparations for any ex3 plosive nuclear weapons test that produces any yield until 

4 such time as— 

5 (1) the President submits to Congress an ad6 dendum to the report required by section 4205 of 

7 the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2525) 

8 that details any change to the condition of the 

9 United States nuclear weapons stockpile from the 

10 report submitted under that section in the preceding 

11 year; and 

12 (2) there is enacted into law a joint resolution 

13 of Congress that approves the test. 

14 (b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Subsection (a) does 

15 not limit nuclear stockpile stewardship activities that are 

16 consistent with the zero-yield standard and other require17 ments under law. 

Æ 


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