Docket No. 108038.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

KENNETH W. SCHULTZ, Appellee, v. ILLINOIS FARMERS

INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant.–ILLINOIS FARMERS

INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. BARBARA WEGLARZ

e t

al., Appellees.

Opinion filed March 18, 2010.

JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Chief Justice Fitzgerald and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride,

Garman, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

Before us in this appeal are two actions for declaratory judgment

presenting a single issue: does Illinois law permit insurers to issue

motor vehicle liability policies in which occupants of a covered

vehicle are afforded uninsured motorist (UM) coverage but excluded

from underinsured (UIM) coverage? Both actions involved motor

vehicle liability policies containing provisions which purported to

eliminate UIM coverage for occupants by defining “insureds” more

narrowly under the policies’ UIM provisions than they did for

purposes of liability and UM coverage. In the first case, Schultz v.
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Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., the circuit court of Cook County

upheld the exclusion of occupants from UIM coverage and granted

summary judgment in favor of the insurance company. In the second

case, Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. v. Weglarz, the court found that

the attempt to exclude occupants from UIM coverage was rendered

ineffective by ambiguity in the policy. On appeal, the appellate court

held that the policy provisions excluding occupants from UIM

coverage contravene section 143a–2 of the Illinois Insurance Code

(215 ILCS 5/143a–2 (West 2002)) and are therefore void and

unenforceable. Based on this conclusion, it reversed the judgment in

favor of the insurance company in the Schultz case and affirmed the

judgment in favor of the insured in the Weglarz case. 387 Ill. App. 3d

622. We granted the insurance company’s petition for leave to appeal.

210 Ill. 2d R. 315. For the reasons that follow, we now affirm the

appellate court’s judgment and remand to the circuit court for further

proceedings.

BACKGROUND

The Schultz litigation arose from an automobile accident which

occurred in August of 2005. In the accident, a vehicle driven by

Kathleen O’Conner and owned by Herbert and Alvina Hummelberg

was struck by a vehicle driven by Alexandria Fotopoulos. Patricia

Smetana was a passenger in O’Conner’s car. Neither she nor

O’Conner was related to the Hummelbergs. Both were injured.

Smetana ultimately died of her injuries. Following Smetana’s death,

the circuit court appointed Kenneth Schultz independent

administrator of her estate.

At the time of the accident, Fotopolous’ vehicle was covered by

a motor vehicle liability policy issued by Illinois Farmers Insurance

Company (Farmers) and governed by the laws of Illinois. The policy

contained liability limits of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per

accident. Farmers settled with both O’Conner and Smetana’s estate

for the policy limits. 

The Hummelbergs’ vehicle was also insured by Farmers, but had

higher coverage limits of $250,000 per person and $500,000 per
 

1Both the Hummelbergs’ policy and the Farmers policy involved in the

Weglarz litigation contained “step-down” provisions which reduced

liability coverage for permissive users of covered vehicles to the minimums

required by Illinois law. Although we previously held that such step-down

provisions did not offend the public policy of this state (State Farm Mutual

Automobile Insurance Co. v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 226 Ill. 2d

395 (2007), legislation which took effect January 1, 2008, now requires that

all policies for private passenger automobiles provide “the same limits of

bodily injury liability, property damage liability, uninsured and

underinsured motorist bodily injury, and medical payments coverage to all

persons insured under that policy, whether or not an insured person is a

named insured or permissive user under the policy.” 215 ILCS 5/143.13a

(West 2008).

 

2Though not relevant here, the UM and UIM provisions also both

covered any other person “for damages that person is entitled to recover

because of bodily injury” to individuals who qualified as “insureds” under

the respective provisions. That is also true of the policy in the Weglarz

case.

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accident for bodily injury, UM coverage, and UIM coverage.1

O’Conner and Smetana’s estate each filed claims against Farmers

requesting additional compensation under the policy’s UIM

provisions. Those claims were denied based on policy language

pertaining to UIM coverage. For purposes of UM coverage, the policy

defined an “insured person” as the person to whom the policy was

issued, a family member, or “[a]ny other person while occupying the

car described in the policy.” With respect to UIM coverage, however,

the definition of “insured person” omitted occupants of the car. The

policy purported to limit UIM coverage to the person to whom the

policy was issued or a family member.2 Because O’Connor and

Smetana were not among the persons to whom the Hummelbergs’

policy had been issued and were not members of the family of any

such person, they could not meet the UIM provision’s more restrictive

definition. For this reason, their claims were denied. 

Believing the policy’s disparate definitions of “insured persons”

failed to meet the requirements of Illinois law, Schultz, as

administrator of Smetana’s estate, and O’Conner brought an action in

the circuit court of Cook County pursuant to section 2–701 of the
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Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2–701 (West 2002)) to obtain

a declaration that the UIM provision’s more restrictive definition

violated Illinois law and was unenforceable and that the $250,000 in

UIM coverage should therefore be available to them under the policy.

Farmers filed a counterclaim, asking that the policy provisions be

upheld. 

Smetana’s estate and O’Conner moved for summary judgment

(735 ILCS 5/2–1005 (West 2002)) on their claim. Farmers, in turn,

moved for summary judgment on its counterclaim. Before the court

ruled on those motions, Farmers voluntarily agreed to recognize the

UIM claim submitted by O’Conner, leaving only the claim submitted

by Smetana’s estate in dispute. Following a hearing, the circuit court

granted summary judgment in favor of Farmers and against

Smetana’s estate. In the court’s view, omission of a vehicle’s

occupants from the definition of “insured” for purposes of UIM

coverage did not violate Illinois law and precluded the estate from

recovering under the UIM provisions of the Hummelbergs’ policy.

With respect to the Weglarz case, the record shows that in January

of 2005, Barbara Weglarz was riding in a sport utility vehicle owned

by Krysztof and Jolanta Majchrowicz and driven by Jolanta. The

vehicle, which was insured by Farmers, was struck by a car driven by

Galyna Kovalyz. Kovalyz’s car was insured by Allstate pursuant to

a policy that carried a bodily injury liability limit of $25,000 per

person.

Weglarz suffered serious injuries as a result of the collision, and

Allstate tendered Kovalyz’s policy’s full $25,000 policy limits to her.

Believing this sum was insufficient to full compensate her for her

injuries, Weglarz made a claim to Farmers under the UIM provisions

of the policy it had issued on the Majchrowicz’s vehicle. That policy

provided UIM coverage in the amount of $50,000 per person and

$100,000 per occurrence, the same limits specified in the policy for

liability and UM coverage. 

As with the Farmers insurance policy at issue in the Schultz

litigation, the definition of an “insured” in the UM provisions of the

policy relevant to Weglarz’s claim included occupants of the vehicle.

With respect to the UIM provisions, however, occupants were

omitted. The UIM provisions limited “insureds” to the person to

whom the policy was issued or a member of that person’s family.
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There is no dispute that Weglarz did not fall within this definition.

While she was Jolanta’s mother, the policy limited covered family

members to those persons related to the policy holders by blood,

marriage or adoption who also resided in the policyholder’s

household. Weglarz did not live with the Majchrowiszes. 

Because Weglarz did not qualify as an “insured” as defined by the

UIM provisions of the Majchrowiczes’ policy, it denied her claim for

underinsured motorist coverage. It then brought an action in the

circuit court of Cook County to obtain a judicial declaration that,

under the terms of the policy it had issued to the Majchrowiczes, it

had no duty to provide UIM coverage to Weglarz.

Weglarz and the Majchrowiczes filed an answer to Farmers’

complaint in which they asserted that the language in the body of the

policy and policy endorsements rendered the document ambiguous,

that the ambiguity should be resolved against Farmers, and that under

the policy as so construed, Weglarz qualifies as an insured under the

policy’s UIM provisions. Weglarz and the Majchrowiczes argued, in

the alternative, that if Farmers’ construction is accepted and a

vehicle’s occupants are excluded from the definition of who

constitutes an insured under the UIM provisions, the denial of

coverage to Weglarz would nevertheless be improper because (1) the

exclusion would violate the Illinois Insurance Code and Illinois

public policyand (2)Farmers implemented the exclusion without first

obtaining authorization from the Department of Insurance.

Following various developments not pertinent to this appeal, the

parties subsequently filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The

circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Weglarz and the

Majchrowiczes and against Farmers. It based its decision on the claim

of ambiguity in the policy’s language. The court did not reach the

question of whether Farmers’ attempt to limit the scope of its UIM

coverage violated state law or offended public policy concerns, nor

did it address the issue of whether the challenged provisions were

fatally defective because they had not been approved in advance by

the Department of Insurance.

Farmers appealed the circuit court’s judgment. In the Schultz

litigation, where Farmers had prevailed, an appeal was taken by

Smetana’s estate. The appeals were consolidated by the appellate

court. The appellate court reversed the judgment in favor of Farmers
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in the Schultz litigation and affirmed the judgment against Farmers

in the case brought by Weglarz and the Majchorwiczes. The basis for

the court’s ruling was the same with respect to both cases. It believed

that exclusion of a vehicle’s occupants from the definition of an

insured in the UIM provisions of the policies issued by Farmers

violated the requirements of Illinois law and was therefore void and

unenforceable. Because this holdingwas dispositive in both cases, the

court did not reach the questions of whether the policy involved in the

Weglarz litigation was ambiguous or whether its restrictive UIM

provisions were invalid because they had not been submitted to the

Department of Insurance for approval. 387 Ill. App. 3d at 628-29.

ANALYSIS

Both of the consolidated cases before us were decided in the

context of motions for summary judgment. Such motions are

governed by section 2–1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735

ILCS 5/2–1005 (West 2008)). Pursuant to that statute, summary

judgment should be granted only where the pleadings, depositions,

admissions and affidavits on file, when viewed in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, show that there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact and that the moving party is clearly entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2–1005(c) (2008).

Construction of the terms of an insurance policy and whether the

policy comports with statutory requirements are questions of law

properly decided on a motion for summary judgment. See Librizzi v.

State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 236 Ill. App. 3d 582, 587 (1992).

Where an order granting summary judgment is before us on appeal,

our review is de novo. Adams v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 211 Ill. 2d

32, 42-43 (2004).

In undertaking our review, we begin with the familiar principle

that a court’s primary objective in construing an insurance contract is

to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties as expressed

in the agreement. If insurance policy terms are clear and

unambiguous, they must be enforced as written unless doing so would

violate public policy. Nicor, Inc. v. Associated Electric & Gas

Insurance Services, Ltd., 223 Ill. 2d 407, 416-17 (2006). The public

policy of this state is reflected in its constitution, statutes, and judicial

decisions. Terms of an insurance policy that conflict with a statute are
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void and unenforceable. Similarly, terms of an insurance policy

cannot circumvent the underlying purpose of a statute in force at the

time of the policy’s issuance. State Farm Mutual Automobile

Insurance Co. v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 226 Ill. 2d at 400-

01. 

As we have indicated, the appellate court concluded that Farmers’

attempt to exclude occupants of insured vehicles from UIM coverage

under the policies at issue in this case cannot be squared with

governing Illinois law and is therefore unenforceable. A similar result

was recently reached on analogous facts by a different panel of the

appellate court from a different district. See Desaga v. West Bend

Mutual Insurance Co., 391 Ill. App. 3d 1062 (2009). To our

knowledge, no reported decision in Illinois has upheld the validity of

the type of exclusion from UIM coverage challenged in this case. We

find this unsurprising, for the exclusion plainly violates Illinois law.

With certain exceptions not relevant here, all motor vehicles

operated or registered in this State and designed for use on a public

highway must be covered by a liability insurance policy. 625 ILCS

5/7–601(a) (West 2004)). By statute, the policy is required to provide

certain minimum liability amounts. 625 ILCS 5/7–203, 7–317(b)(3)

(West 2004). It must also meet specific coverage requirements.

Among these are that the policy insure not only the persons named in

the policy, but also “any other person using or responsible for the

use” of the subject vehicle with the express or implied permission of

the insured. 625 ILCS 5/7–317(b)(2) (West 2004); State FarmMutual

Automobile Insurance Co. v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 226 Ill.

2d at 402; Progressive Universal Insurance Co. of Illinois v. Liberty

Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 215 Ill. 2d 121, 137 (2005). 

In interpreting the foregoing statutory provision, which treats

permissive users the same as named insureds for purposes of liability

coverage, it is important to note the language chosen by the

legislature. The law does not refer to permissive drivers. It speaks in

terms of permissive users. The statute itself does not define the term

user. We must therefore must give it its plain and ordinary meaning.

Granite City Division of National Steel Co. v. Illinois Pollution

Control Board, 155 Ill. 2d 149, 181 (1993). A user, in the generic

sense, is simply one who makes use of a thing. “Use,” in turn, is

synonymous with “EMPLOY, UTILIZE, APPLY, [and] AVAIL[. It]
 3Some courts have concluded that one can be “using” a motor vehicle

even when one is not occupying it as either a driver or passenger at the time

the injury is sustained. See, e.g., Georgeson v. Fidelity & Guaranty

Insurance Co., 48 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1267-68 (D. Mont. 1998) (applying

Montana law). It has been held, for example, that one is “using” a vehicle,

for purposes of insurance coverage, when loading personal belongings into

it or unloading personal belongings from it. See, e.g., Travelers Insurance

Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 491 S.W.2d 363, 365 (Tenn. 1973).

The concept of use does, however, have its limits. For example, one Illinois

appellate decision held that an individual who was acting as a spotter and

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is general and indicates any putting to service of a thing ***.”

Webster’s Third International Dictionary 2524 (1976).

Consistent with this definition, the use of an automobile has been

held to denote its employment for some purpose of the user. As the

New Jersey Supreme Court has explained, “ ‘ “operation” denotes the

manipulation of the car’s controls in order to propel it as a vehicle[,

but ‘use’] is *** broader than operation.’ [Citation.]” (Emphasis

omitted.) Jaquez v. National Continental Insurance Co., 178 N.J. 88,

96, 835 A.2d 309, 314 (2003). One uses an automobile whenever

such use “is rationally connected to the vehicle for the purpose of

providing transportation or satisfying some other related need of the

user.” Jaquez v. National Continental Insurance Co., 178 N.J. at 96,

835 A.2d at 315. 

Courts in other jurisdictions have followed this reasoning and

concluded that for purposes of motor vehicle insurance policies, “use”

is not limited to operating or driving a motor vehicle. It also includes

riding in one as a passenger. See 7 Am Jur 2d Automobile Insurance

§93 (1997) (“[a] passenger in an automobile is ‘using’ the

automobile, where the passenger has authorization for the use of the

automobile and it is being driven by another person with his or her

permission”); Marchand v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America, 2

S.W.3d 826, 828-29 (Mo. App. 1999); Nationwide Mutual Insurance

Co. v. Cummings, 438 Pa. Super. 586, 600, 652 A.2d 1338, 1345

(1994); State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Francis, 669

S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tex. App. 1984) (collecting cases); see also Unisun

Insurance Co. v. Schmidt, 339 S.C. 362, 366, 529 S.E.2d 280, 282

(2000).3 No principle of statutory construction supports a more
directing the movement’s of the truck’s driver at the time the truck struck

and killed a pedestrian at a construction site was not, himself, using the

truck within the meaning of the insurance policy’s provisions. See Apcon

Corp. v. Dana Trucking, Inc., 251 Ill. App. 3d 973 (1993). Because none

of these circumstances are before us here, we express no view on them. 

 4By way of comparison, an example of statutory language which can be

construed to exclude passengers from the definition of “users” is the

California Insurance Code, which specifically states that (1) “the term ‘use’

when applied to a motor vehicle shall only mean operating, maintaining,

loading, or unloading a motor vehicle,” and that (2) “the term ‘operated by’

or ‘when operating’ shall be conclusively presumed to describe the conduct

of the person sitting immediately behind the steering controls of the motor

vehicle.” Cal. Ins. Code §§11580.06(f), (g).

 

5That was not done in either of the cases involved in this appeal, and

there is no dispute that, in both cases, the amount of UM coverage is

identical to the coverage amount for bodily injury liability.

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limited interpretation.4 We therefore construe Illinois’ mandatory

liability coverage requirements to extend to permissive passengers as

well as permissive drivers. Both must be treated as insureds for

purposes of liability coverage.

Illinois law also requiresmotor vehicleliability policies to include

UM coverage. See 625 ILCS 5/7–601(a) (West 2004); 215 ILCS

5/143a (West 2004). If the limits for liability coverage exceed the

minimum amounts required by law, as they did in the policies

challenged here, the UM provisions must provide the same higher

coverage amounts. That is so unless the insured makes a written

election to specifically reject UM coverage in excess of the statutory

minimums required for liability for bodily injury. 215 ILCS

5/143a–2(1) (West 2004).5 Moreover, the UM coverage must extend

to all who are insured under the policy’s liability provisions. If a

person constitutes an insured for purposes of liability coverage under

a policy, the insurance company may not, either directly or indirectly,

deny uninsured-motorist coverage to that person. Heritage Insurance

Co. of America v. Phelan, 59 Ill. 2d 389, 395 (1974). Farmers does

not dispute any of these requirements, and they are, in fact, integrated

into the terms of both of the policies which gave rise to this litigation.
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In addition to providing UM coverage, motor vehicle liability

policies in Illinois are also required to provide UIM coverage where,

as in the cases before us, the UM coverage exceeds the statutory

minimums required for liability for bodily injury. The UIM coverage

must be in an amount equal to the total amount of UM coverage

provided under the policy. As with UM coverage, UIM coverage must

also extend to all those who are insured under the policy’s liability

provisions. See 215 ILCS 5/143a–2(4) (West 2004). For the reasons

explained earlier in this opinion, the category of those insured under

a policy’s liability provisions must always include permissive users,

and permissive users includes permissive passengers as well as

permissive drivers. 

Under Illinois law, liability, UM and UIM provisions are thus

inextricably linked. See Lee v. John Deere Insurance Co., 208 Ill. 2d

38, 44-45 (2003); Mercury Indemnity Co. of Illinois v. Kim, 358 Ill.

App. 3d 1, 11 (2005). Once a person qualifies as an insured for

purposes of the policy’s bodily injury liability provisions, he or she

must be treated as an insured for UM and UIM purposes as well.

Accordingly, just as the governing statutes prohibit an insurance

company from directly or indirectly denying uninsured-motorist

coverage to someone who qualifies as an insured for purposes of

liability coverage (Heritage Insurance Co. of America v. Phelan, 59

Ill. 2d at 395), it likewise prohibits companies from directly or

indirectly denying underinsured coverage to such a person where, as

here, the basic liability coverage exceeds statutory minimums. 

Section 143a–2 of the Illinois Insurance Code (215 ILCS

5/143a–2 (West 2002)) does state that, for purposes of the Code, an

“underinsured motor vehicle” means a motor vehicle whose

ownership, maintenance or use has resulted in bodily injury or death

to an insured “as defined in the policy.” Contrary to the view taken by

Farmers, however, this language does not give insurers the right to

define insureds for UIM purposes differently than it does for purposes

of liability and UM coverage. Illinois law affords some latitude to the

parties to determine who will be insured under the liability provisions

of the policy, but as we have indicated, it does not give them the

option of excluding permissive users, a category which includes

permissive passengers as well as permissive drivers. Moreover, once

it has been determined who qualifies as an insured for purposes of
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liability coverage, that determination must be applied consistently for

purposes of UM and UIM coverage. See DeSaga v. West Bend

Mutual Insurance Co., 391 Ill. App. 3d 1062, 1070 (2009). 

Farmers cannot successfully argue that public policy

considerations warrant treating UM and UIM coverage differently.

That is so for several reasons. First, our court has specifically held

that UM and UIM coverage were mandated by the legislature for the

same reason, namely, to place an insured in the same position he or

she would have occupied had the tortfeasor carried adequate

insurance. Sulser v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 147 Ill. 2d 548,

555 (1992). Because “[u]ninsured and underinsured motorist policies

provide virtually the same coverage to the insured” (Sulser v. Country

Mutual Insurance Co., 147 Ill. 2d at 556), it would be anomalous to

declare insureds ineligible for any UIM benefits under circumstances

where they would be entitled to full UM benefits but for the

happenstance that the tortfeasor had minimal insurance rather than

none at all. Such a result would, in fact, be directly contrary to the

legislature’s intent when it enacted section 143a–2 of the Illinois

Insurance Code. See Cummins v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 178

Ill. 2d 474, 484 (1997) (through the statute’s provisions, “ ‘the

legislature avoided the absurdity of a situation where a policyholder

would receive fewer benefits in the fortuitous event of being injured

by an underinsured rather than an uninsured motorist’ “), quoting

Sulser v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 147 Ill. 2d at 557. 

Second, even if we could formulate a valid rationale for treating

UM and UIM coverage differently, that would not justify the result

urged by Farmers in this case. We must interpret and apply statutes

in the manner in which they are written and cannot rewrite them to

make them consistent with our own idea of orderliness and public

policy. Roselle Police Pension Board v. Village of Roselle, 232 Ill. 2d

546, 558 (2009). The language of the UIM statute, section 143a–2(4)

of the Illinois Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/143a–2(4) (West 2004)),

makes clear that the legislature intended a policy’s UIM coverage to

parallel the coverage afforded by UM provisions where, as here,

coverage limits exceed statutory minimums. Indeed, our court has

specifically cited this statute as exemplifying how the legislature

expresses itself when it intends for different types of coverage in

excess of the minimum statutory requirements mandated by the
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Illinois Safety and Family Responsibility Law to be the same. State

Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Illinois Farmers

Insurance Co., 226 Ill. 2d at 403. 

Farmers argues that the disparity between the UM and UIM

provisions in its policies does not run afoul of section 143a–2(4) of

the Illinois Insurance Code because that statute applies only to

coverage amounts and does not prevent it from limiting the definition

of insureds who may avail themselves of coverage. This argument is

untenable. Even if the statute were taken as requiring only parity in

coverage amounts, that requirement would be violated here, for under

Farmers’ policies, the coverage amounts for one particular type of

insureds, occupants, is clearly not the same. Occupants are eligible to

receive substantial UM benefits. Their UIM benefits, by contrast, are

zero. 

We note, moreover, that if Farmers’ argument were accepted, it

would mean that the UIM provisions of a policy would pass statutory

muster so long as the dollar amount of coverage specified in those

provisions was the same as that specified in the policy’s UM

provisions, even if the UIM provisions were drafted in such a way

that no one could ever qualify to receive UIM benefits. Such a

construction would render our statutory UIM requirements

meaningless. 

Farmers’ argument must also be rejected because it overlooks the

more fundamental problem that it would require us to ignore the clear

statutory requirementsimposed by the General Assembly. As we have

discussed, Illinois law requires that UIM coverage must be offered to

all insureds where, as here, the UM coverage exceeds the minimum

amounts required for bodily injury liability. Under Illinois law all

motor vehicle liability policies, insureds must include permissive

users of covered vehicles (625 ILCS 5/7–317(b)(2), (b)(3) (West

2004)), and “users” include passengers as well as drivers. Smetana

and Weglarz were clearly using the insured vehicles with permission

at the time they were injured. As a result, they qualified for UIM

coverage as a matter of law. 

In the course of its argument, Farmers seems to accept that the

law bars it from excluding permissive users from UIM coverage. In

its view, however, permissive users are limited to drivers. Passengers

are not included. That, apparently, is why it ultimately recognized
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O’Conner’s UIM claim in the Schultz litigation. In response to this

argument, we simply note again that such a distinction cannot be

squared with the plain and ordinary meaning of the relevant statutory

language. To accept Farmers’ position would required us to adopt an

interpretation of the word “user” which has been consistently rejected

by courts in other jurisdictions. It would also necessitate that we read

into the governing statutes a distinction which the legislature itself

has not made. This we may not do. A court may not add provisions

that are not found in a statute, nor may it depart from a statute’s plain

language by reading into the law exceptions, limitations, or

conditions that the legislature did not express. Madison Two

Associates v. Pappas, 227 Ill. 2d 474, 495 (2008).

Finally, Farmers asserts that requiring it to provide UIM coverage

for the injuries sustained by Smetana and Weglarz will impermissibly

infringe on its rights of freedom of contract. This claim is without

merit. As indicated earlier in this opinion, the terms of an insurance

policy must comport with the statutory requirements in effect when

the policy is issued. Insurers have no right to depart from valid

statutory requirements. Farmers’ policies must therefore adhere to the

statutory provisions discussed in this opinion. The UIM provisions at

issue here fail to do so.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the appellate court correctly concluded

that the portions of the Farmers insurance policies which purported

to exclude occupants of covered motor vehicles from UIM coverage

violate Illinois law and are unenforceable. The judgment of the

appellate court is therefore affirmed.

Affirmed.