INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

ANALYSIS

OFTHE

REMOTE MANIPULATOR

SYSTEM

12 JAN UARY 1987

MCDONNELL DOUGLAS ASTRONAUTICS COMPANY

HOUSTON DIVISION

SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM ENGINEERING AND OPERATIONS SUPPORT

WORKING PAPER NO. 1.0-WP-VA86001-23

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

ANALYSIS OF THE REMOTE MANIPULATOR SYSTEM

12 January 1987

This Working Paper is Submitted to NASA under

Task Order No. VA86001, Contract NAS 9-17650

PREPARED BY :_

/F. T _n _a_ ---

RMS Le_-K_alyst

Independent Orbiter

Assessment

R. F ./Grasmeder

RMS Subsystem Lead

Independent Orbiter

Assessment

PREPARED BY:

A.D. Montgg_er_7 _-

Analyst 6/ _/

Independent Orbiter

Assessment

APPROVED

"_G.W. Knori ....

Technical Manager

Independent Orbiter

Assessment

APPROVED BY: /_/__

W.F. Hu-ning _-

Deputy Program Manager

STSEOS

CONTENTS

1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

2.0 INTRODUCTION

2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4

Purpose

Scope

Analysis Approach

RMS Ground Rules and Assumptions

3.0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION

3.1

3.2

3.3

Design and Function

Interfaces and Locations

Hierarchy

4.0 ANALYSIS RESULTS

4.1

4.2

4.3

Analysis Results - End Effector

Analysis Results - Displays & Controls

Analysis Results - Manipulator Controller

Interface Unit

Analysis Results - Arm Based Electronics

Analysis Results - ARM

5.0 REFERENCES

APPENDIX A ACRONYMS

APPENDIX B DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS

B.I

B.2

B.3

Definitions

Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions

Subsystem Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions

APPENDIX C DETAILED ANALYSIS

APPENDIX D POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS

Page

1

4

4

4

4

5

6

6

9

9

16

17

17

17

17

17

18

A-I

B-I

B-2

B-4

B-6

C-I

D-I
Figure

Figure

Figure

Figure

Figure

Figure

Figure

Table

Table

List of Figures

1 - RMS OVERVIEWANALYSIS SUMMARY

2 - RMS SUBSYSTEMOVERVIEW

3 - END EFFECTOR SUBCOMPONENTS

4 - DISPLAY AND CONTROLSPANEL SUBCOMPONENTS

5 - MANIPULATOR CONTROLLERINTERFACE UNIT

SUBCOMPONENTS

6 - ARM BASED ELECTRONICS SUBCOMPONENTS

7 - ARM SUBCOMPONENTS

List of Tables

I - SUMMARY OF IOA FAILURE MODES

AND CRITICALITIES

II - SUMMARY OF IOA POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS

Page

3

i0

ii

12

13

14

15

Page

16

16

ii
Independent Orbiter Assessment

Analysis of the Remote Manipulator System

1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in

June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of

the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items

List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE

Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the

instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions

for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, i0 October 1986. The IOA

approach features a top-o_n analysis of the-_dware to

determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical

items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished

without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA

FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents (Appendix C) the

independent analysis results for the Orbiter Remote Manipulator

System (RMS).

The RMS hardware and software are primarily required for

deploying and/or retrieving up to five payloads during a single

mission, capture and retrieve free-flying payloads, and for

performing Manipulator Foot Restraint operations. Specifically,

the RMS hardware consists of the following components:

o End Effector

o Displays and Controls

o Manipulator Controller Interface Unit

o ARM Based Electronics

o ARM

The IOA analysis process utilized available RMS hardware

drawings, schematics and documents for defining hardware

assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of

hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes

and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of

the effect for each failure mode.

Figure 1 presents a summary of the failure criticalities for each

of the five major divisions of the RMS. A summary of the number

of failure modes, by criticality, is also presented below with

Hardware (HW) criticality first and Functional (F) criticality

second.

Summary of IOA Failure Modes By Criticality (HW/F)

Criticality: I 1/l I 2/IRI 2/2 1 3/IR 1 3/2R 1 3/3 I TOTAL Number : 240 112 25 24 12 161 574

1
For each failure mode identified, the criticality and redundancy

screens were examined to identify critical items. A summary of

Potential Critical Items (PCIs) is presented as follows:

+- +

Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items (HW/F)

Criticality:

Number

2/IR 2/2

112 25

3/1R 3/2R

24 12

TOTAL

413

+ +

Of the 574 failure modes analyzed, 413 were determined to be PCIs.

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2.0 INTRODUCTION

2.1 Purpose

The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress

safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the

National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has

undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space

Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment

of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and technical accuracy.

2.2 Scope

The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity

encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware

identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment

Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses

hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and

operational requirements for all mission phases.

2.3 Analysis Approach

The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis utilizing available drawings, schematics and documents to breakdown the

respective subsystem into components and low-level hardware

items. Each hardware item is evaluated for failure mode,

effects, and criticality. These data are documented in the

respective subsystem analysis report, and are used to assess the

NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL reevaluation results. The IOA

analysis approach is summarized in the following Steps 1.0

through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the assessment of the NASA and

Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs that is to be performed and

documented at a later date.

Step 1.0 Subsystem familiarization

i.i Define subsystem functions

1.2 Define subsystem components

1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and

assumptions

Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram

2.1 Define subsystem

2.2 Define major assemblies

2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations

Step 3.0 Failure events definition

3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes

3.2 Document IOA analysis results

4

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Step 4.0 Compare I0A analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL

4.1 Resolve differences

4.2 Review in-house

4.3 Document assessment issues

4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager

2.4 Ground Rules and Assumptions

The RMS ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are

defined in Appendix B. The subsystem specific ground rules were

defined to provide necessary additions and clarifications to the

ground rules and assumptions contained in NST____SS2220_____66.

5
3.0 SYSTEMDESCRIPTION

3.1 Design and Function

The RMS is a major component of the Payload Deployment and

Recovery System (PDRS) of the Space Shuttle Orbiter. It is used

primarily for the deployment of payloads in orbit or the

retrieval of payloads from orbit for return to earth or

redeployment in orbit. The RMS is also used in conjunction with

the Manipulator Foot Restraint (MFR) for various Extra Vehicular

Activity (EVA) tasks.

The RMS is an Anthropomorphic Man-machine System that consists of

six servocontrolled rotary joints and an end effector all

connected together by structural boom members. The RMS is

attached to the orbiter longeron (port, starboard, or both)

through a roll-out mechanism. The arm is operated by a crew

member using direct viewing and closed circuit television (CCTV),

from the Display and Control (D&C) station located on the aft

flight deck.

The primary components of the RMS are:

o Backup Drive Amplifier (BDA)

o Display and Control Panel (D&C)

o End Effector (EE)

o End Effector Electronics Unit (EEU)

o Joint Power Conditioner (JPC)

o Manipulator Controller Interface Unit (MCIU)

o Motor Module/Slgnal Conditioning Unit (MM/SCU)

o Rotational Hand Controller (RHC)

o Servo Power Amplifier (SPA)

o Translation Hand Controller (THC)

o Thermal Protection Kit (TPK)

3.1.1 Backup Drive Amplifier - There is only one BDA for

each RMS and it is located in the shoulder Joint's

electronics housing. The BDA is a backup unit to any of

the SPAs, in the event of a SPA failure or its

associated power source (JPC). The main functions of

the BDA are to provide drive to any one Joint motor as

selected from the D&C panel and to provide for power

conditioning from the backup +28 V bus.

3.1.2 Display and Control - The D&C panel provides

primary/backup control on display functions, and

contains D&C electronics and Orbiter/THC/RHC wiring

interfaces. All of the displays and the majority of the

controls are used to control and monitor the RMS in its

prime modes of operation. Three control functions,

located on a separate section of the D&C panel, form the

backup channel of the D&C panel and use separate wiring

and connectors.

6
3.1.3

3 .i.4

3.1.5

3.1.6

3.1.7

End Effector - The standard EE is designed to effect

the capture or release of a previously captured payload

by means of capture/release and rigidize/derigidize

operations. The capture/release sequences are achieved

by rotating internal rings located at the open end of

the EE body to open or close three wire snares around

the payload grapple fixture. The rigidize/derigidize

sequences withdraw the snare assembly towards the rear

of the EE body thereby tensioning the snare wires and

pulling the snared payload into full and keyed

orientation and contact with the end effector, or

extend the snare assembly to release tension on the

payload. The EE consists essentially of the EE body,

prime channel drive chain, EEEU, EE wiring harness,

Backup release system, and seven microswitches for

status of the EE.

End Effector Electronics Unit - The EEEU is located

within the EE body and controls and monitors the

operation of the EE as commanded by the operator from

the D&C panel. This includes power conditioning,

command decoding, detects failures in decoding and

commutator logic, outputs signal flags, and conditions

the EE status signals which are sent to the MCIU via the

data bus.

Joint Power Conditioner - There are two JPCs per

manipulator arm. One of which is located in the shoulder

Joint electronics compartment serving the shoulder and

elbow Joints, and the second is located in the wrist

electronics compartment serving the three wrist Joints.

The JPCs convert the +28 v dc bus to provide secondary

regulated supply voltages of +15 v and +i0.i v dc to the

SPA's motor commutators and position encoders.

Overvoltage and undervoltage protection circuits are

provided to shut off the JPC if preset threshold values

are exceeded or not achieved.

Manipulator Controller Interface Unit - The MCIU handles

the exchange of information between the Orbiter GPC and

the RMS and other entities of the system. The MCIU

performs manipulation of data but does not have any

significant data processing function. In addition to

GPC/MCIU communication the MCIU has data communication

with the Arm Based Electronics (ABE) and the D&C, does

data gathering from the THC, RHC, and temperature

sensors, does hard wired fault detection and

annunciation, performs auto saflng, brake drive control,

auto braking, EE drive commands in EE auto mode, and

power conditioning for MCIU and D&C.

Motor Module/Signal Conditioning Unit - The Motor Module

(MM) functions as a servo motor providing the mechanical
3.1.8

3.1.9

3.I.i0

3.1.11

drive for Joint movement in response to commands from

the MCIU via the SPA, and in response to the feedback

signal from the tachometer. This tachometer feedback

signal is low level and is amplified by the SCU for use

by the MM.

Rotational Hand Controller - The RHC is a three axis

manual controller which provides electrical control

signals for the RMS point of resolution (POR) in the

pitch, yaw, and roll degrees of freedom. These control

signals are proportional to the manual input

displacement of the RHC handgrip in each of the three

mutually perpendicular axis. The RHC handgrip also has

three secondary switch inputs for rate hold,

vernier/coarse, and capture/release. The gimbal

assembly is the main mechanism that obtains the manual

commands input into the handgrip. Transducers provide

the appropriate signals to the MCIU.

Servo Power Amplifier - Each RMS has six SPAs, one for

each Joint. Each SPA provides a drive signal to it's

Joint motor in response to MCIU control signals or

direct drive commands from the D&C panel. The SPA also

provides an excitation signal to the tachometer,

transmits data back to the MCIU, releases the joint

brake in response to a MCIU command, performs selftesting, switches the motor drive from MDA to BDA on

command, and transmits external flags to the MCIU.

Translation Hand Controller - The THC allows the

operator to control the three-dlmensional linear motion

of the end effector by means of manual inputs through

the controller handgrip. The POR velocity commands are

proportional to the deflection of the handle. Three

independent electrical signals are provided, by the THCs

gimbal assembly transducers, to the MCIU, one for each

control axis. This gimbal mechanism, located within the

THC assembly, is the main mechanism for obtaining the X,

Y, and Z axis commands.

Thermal Protection Kit - The RMS uses active and passive

thermal control systems both to keep the RMS within

proper operating temperatures and to isolate the manipulator arm from the space environment. This TPK

essentially consists of thermal blankets, white paint,

heaters and thermostats, and thermistors. The thermal

blankets primarily provide the space environment

isolation function. The white paint minimizes external

heat input while maximizing heat radiation due to

internal dissipation of electronics. The heaters and

thermostats control the temperature within limits while

the thermistors provide the temperature monitoring

function.
3.2 Interfaces and Locations

The components of the RMS are located on the aft flight deck of

the crew compartment and within the payload bay of the Orbiter.

The items in the crew compartment are the RHC, THC, D&C Panel,

MCIU and the GPC. The manipulator arm, SPAs, JPCs, BDA, MM/SCU,

EE, and EEEU are located in the payload bay along the port

longeron (or starboard longeron or both).

3.3 Hierarchy

Figures 2 through 7 illustrate the hierarchy of the RMS

components and their corresponding subcomponents.

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Figure 3 - END EFFECTOR SUBCOMPONENTS

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Figure 4 - DISPLAY & CONTROLS PANEL SUBCOMPONENTS

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Figure 5 - MANIPULATOR CONTROLLER INTERFACE UNIT SUBCOMPONENTS

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Figure 6 - ARM BASED ELECTRONICS SUBCOMPONENTS

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Figure 7 - ARM SUBC0MPONENTS

15
4.0 ANALYSIS RESULTS

Detailed analysis results for each of the identified failure

modes are presented in Appendix C. Table I presents a summary of

the failure criticalities for each of the five major subdivisions

of the RMS. Further discussion of each of these subdivisions

and the applicable failure modes is provided in subsequent

paragraphs. The RMS analysis hierarchy is illustrated in

Figure i.

TABLE I Summary of IOA Failure Modes and Criticalities

Criticality:

D&C

ABE

MCIU

EE

MECHARM

TOTAL

1/1

59

68

46

66

1

240

2/IR

41

23

45

3

i

112

2/2

19

3

3/1R

18

- 3

3 3

25 24

3/2R

12

I

12

3/3 TOTAL

120 269

ii 105

6 97

20 92

4 Ii

161 574

+ +

Of these 574 failure modes analyzed, 413 were determined to be

PCIs. A summary of the PCIs is presented in Table II. Appendix

D contains a cross reference between each PCI and analysis worksheet in Appendix C.

TABLE II Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items

Criticality: I/I 2/IR TOTAL

D&C

ABE

MCIU

EE

MECH ARM

59

68

46

61

1

41

23

45

3

2/2

19

3

3

3/IR

18

3

3

3/2R

12 149

94

91

72

7

J TOTAL

4

124oI 1212512 I 2 413

16
4.1 Analysis Results - End Effector

The End Effector analysis considered five subcomponents as shown

in Figure 3. Most criticalities were I/i and 2/IR. There are

seventy-two PCIs.

4.2 Analysis Results - Displays and Controls

The Displays and Controls were divided into three subcomponents

as shown in Figure 4. There are one hundred forty-nine PCIs.

4.3 Analysis Results - Manipulator Controller Interface Unit

The Manipulator Controller Interface Unit was divided into six

subcomponents as shown on Figure 5. Most criticalities were

found to be 2/IR. There are ninety-one PCIs.

4.4 Analysis Results - ARM Based Electronics

The Arm Based Electronics were divided into twelve subcomponents

as shown on Figure 6. Most criticalities were i/i due to

uncommanded motion. There are ninety-four PCIs.

4.5 Analysis Results - ARM

The ARM was divided into thgee subcomponents as shown on Figure

7. 0nly seven significant criticalities were found.

17
5.0 REFERENCES

Reference documentation available from NASA and Rockwell was used

in the analysis. The documentation used included the following:

i , Space Shuttle Programs Orbiter Avionics Software

OPS Detailed Design Specification, Vol. III -

Applications Part 2 - System Management, 12/20/83

2. SPAR/RMS/PA.1067 Issue A

3. PDRS Console Handbook,, vol. II, 3/21/84

4. JSC-II174, Space Shuttle Systems Handbook Rec. C

5. SPAR Wirelists and Schematics (33)

18
APPENDIX A

ACRONYMS

ABE

AC

AOA

APU

ASSY

ATO

BFS

BOA

CIL

CIRC

CNTL

CRIT

CRT

C&W

DC

DISTR

DPS

DU

D&C

EE

EEEU

EPD&C

F

FA

FF

FM

FMEA

GFE

GN2

GPC

GPM

GSE

HW

HYD

H20

IOA

JPC

JSC

LCA

LH2

L02

MCIU

MDAC

MDM

MEC

MN

- Arm Based Electronics

- Alternating Current

- Abort Once Around

- Auxiliary Power Unit

- Assembly

- Abort to Orbit

- Backup Flight System

- Backup Drive Amplifier

- Critical Items List

- Circulation

- Control

- Criticality

- Cathode Ray Tube

- Caution and Warning System

- direct current

- Distribution

- Data Processing System

- Display Unit

- Display & Control

- End Effector

- End Effector Electronics Unit

- Electrical Power Distribution and Control

- Functional

- Flight Aft

- Flight Forward

- Failure Mode

- Failure Mode and Effects Analysis

- Government Furnished Equipment

- Gaseous Nitrogen

- General Purpose Computer

- Gallons Per Minute

- Ground Support Equipment

- Hardware

- Hydraulics

- Water

- Independent Orbiter Assessment

- Joint Power Conditioner

- Johnson Space Center

- Load Control Assembly

- Liquid Hydrogen

- Liquid Oxygen

- Manipulator Controller Interface Unit

- McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company

- Multiplexer/Demultiplexer

- Main Engine Controller

- Main

MN/SCU - Motor Module/Signal Conditioning Unit

A-I
MONIT

MPS

NA

NASA

NSTS

OMRSD

PBI

PCA

PCI

PDRS

POR

PSI

RHC

RI

RM

RMS

RPC

RTLS

SM

SPA

SRB

SSME

STS

SW

TAL

TD

THC

TPK

TVC

WSB

- Monitoring

- Main Propulsion System

- Not Applicable

- National Aeronautics and Space Administration

- National Space Transportation System

- Operational Maintenance Requirements and

Specifications Document

- Push Button Indicator

- Power Control Assembly

- Potential Critical Item

- Payload Deployment and Recovery System

- Point of Resolution

- Pounds Per Square Inch

- Rotation Hand Controller

- Rockwell International

- Redundancy Management

- Remote Manipulator System

- Remote Power Controller

- Return to Launch Site

- Systems Management

- Servopower Amplifier

- Solid Rocket Booster

- Space Shuttle Main Engine

- Space Transportation System

- Software

- Transatlantic Abort Landing

- Touch Down

- Translation Hand Controller

- Thermal Protection Kit

- Thrust Vector Control

- Water Spray Boiler
APPENDIX B

DEFINITIONS, GROUNDRULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS

B.I

B.2

B.3

Definitions

Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions

Subsystem-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions

B-I
APPENDIX B

DEFINITIONS, GROUNDRULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS

B.1 Definitions

Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation

of FMEA/CIL, I0 October 1986, were used with the f--_lowing

amplifications and additions.

INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:

RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition

to OPS 9, post-flight

T;_ - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at

transition to OPS 9, post-flight

A0A - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at

t-_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight

ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at

transition to OPS 9, post-flight

CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in

anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an

event where multiple failures must first occur to result in

environmental extremes

CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond

the standard m--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue

cards

EARLY MISSION TERMINATION = termination of onorbit phase prior to

p-l-_ed end of mission

EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the

highest criticality

HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality

determined in the phase-by-phase analysis

MAJOR MODE iMM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence

(ops)

MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System

(PASS)

MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with

payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and

altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,

middeck P/L, etc.)

B-2
MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single

cause or eve---_ of all units which perform a necessary (critical)

function

OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond

the standard m--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue

cards

OPS - software operational sequence

PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objectives are equal to mission objectives

PHASE DEFINITIONS:

PRELAUNCH, PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter

power-up an--_ds at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)

LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and

ends at transitio-n out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)

ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS _ or OPS 8 and

ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8

DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode

301 and en-_at first main landing gear touchdown

LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear

touchdown and ens_ith the completion of post-landing

safing operations

B-3
APPENDIX B

DEFINITIONS, GROUNDRULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS

B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions

The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for

Preparation of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, was employe--d-with the

following amp-[ifications _d addition-{.

i •

•

•

•

.

The operational flight software is an accurate

implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements

(FSSRs).

RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of

this task.

After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system

management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and

Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy

Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.

RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability

and/or the actual monitoring by the crew

is beyond the scope of this task.

Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be

functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission

being flown•

RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of

this task.

All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and

assembled to the design specifications/drawings.

RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is

designed to detect and identify problems

before the item is approved for use.

All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed

performed as written, and will not include human error in

their performance.

RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error

are out-of-scope of this task.

B-4
•

•

•

•

i0.

ii.

All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at

the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor

Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater

hardware detail levels but not lesser•

RATIONALE: Comparison of I0A analysis results with

other analyses requires that both analyses

be performed to a comparable level of

detail.

verification that a telemetry parameter is actually

monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not

required.

RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry

availability and/or the actual monitoring of

applicable data by ground-based personnel is

beyond the scope of this task.

The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the

worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.

The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in

any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case

effects for the phase of interest.

RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a

thorough and complete analysis•

Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors

to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed

nor FMEAs assessed•

RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior

to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.

Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected

will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.

RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior

to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.

Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and

will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure

relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics•

RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to

ensure consistency throughout IOA project.

B-5
APPENDIX B

DEFINITIONS, GROUNDRULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS

B.3 RMS-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions

The IOA analysis was performed to the component or assembly

level• The analysis considered the worst case effects of the

hardware or functional failure on the subsystem, mission, and

crew and vehicle safety.

i B ARMS mission is considered to be uncradling,

grappling a berthed payload, unberthing it, deploying

it and then retrieving a rotating payload, berthing it

and performing MFR operations. Any failure that

prevents the completion of any of these tasks is loss

of mission (i.e. loss of manual augmented modes).

RATIONALE: This is the most demanding nominal RMS

mission possible. This causes the worst

case criticalities for certain failures

because they will prevent the completion of

this mission. If the mission was simpler,

many failures would be a lower criticality.

• Consistency checking and safing is not considered

redundancy for failures that cause uncommanded motion.

RATIONALE: The consistency check and safing are not

redundant for the hardware that when fails

causes uncommanded motion. They are also

only designed to stop the RMS in 2 feet,

which may not prevent collision.

, A Criticality 1 failure is considered to be any failure

that causes uncommanded motion, uncommanded release,

uncommanded derigidization, or loss of capability to

move a joint or any number of joints. It also includes

the loss of the ability to release a payload, and the

payload hanging up in the snares.

RATIONALE: Uncommanded motion in its worst case can

cause the loss of vehicle if the arm or

payload struck a window or damaged the

payload bay doors so they could not close.

Uncommanded release could cause the payload

to hit the Orbiter, uncommanded

derigidization or a payload hanging up in

the snares can cause the unrestrained

payload on the end effector to swing into

the Orbiter. The loss of the ability to

move a joint or release a payload would

mean the RMS could not be cradled which

wQuld prevent the doors from closing.

B-6
•

•

•

•

The loss of primary modes will cause loss of mission

(Criticality 2) but backup is considered redundancy for

release of the payload and cradling the RMS for some

failures• Therefore, loss of primary modes is a

criticality 2 as long as backup is available.

RATIONALE: Without primary modes the RMS mission

cannot be accomplished• Backup mode does

not provide enough redundancy to accomplish

the task mentioned in rule I. Backup does

provide some redundancy for failures that

cause loss of payload release or loss of

joint drive. Therefore, the failures that

backup provides redundancy for will be

classified as loss of mission•

For ascent, entry and aborts, the RMS is assumed to be

cradled, latched, and unpowered. Only failures that

can occur while the RMS is in this mode are considered

for those flight phases.

RATIONALE: The RMS is designed for use while onorbit.

During ascent and entry the RMS is latched

and unpowered. No consideration will be

given to failures unless they have an

effect during ascent and entry.

Failure modes are assumed to occur during two arm

operations• If a failure can effect two arms, then the

worst case result of that effect will determine the

criticality.

RATIONALE: The Orbiter is capable of supporting dual

arm operation. If this configuration

proves to be the worst case for a

particular failure, then that will drive

the criticality•

Failures of wire harnesses and bundles (structural

failures, wire to wire shorts, incorrect attachment)

are not considered. Failures of a single wire are

covered by considering loss of input or output from a

component•

RATIONALE: The failure of wire harnesses and bundles

are not being considered because of the

magnitude of possible failures•

B-7

APPENDIX C

DETAILED ANALYSIS

This section contains the IOA analysis worksheets generated

during the analysis of this subsystem. The information on these

worksheets is intentionally similar to the NASA FMEAs. Each of

these sheets identifies the hardware item being analyzed, and

parent assembly, as well as the function. For each failure mode,

the possible causes are outlined, and the assessed hardware and

functional criticality for each mission phase is listed, as

described in the NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of FMEA

and CIL, i0 October 1986. Finally, effects are entered at'the

b-o-ttom of Each sheet, and the worst case criticality is entered

at the top.

LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS

Hardware Criticalities:

1 = Loss of life or vehicle

2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item

(llke or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle

3 = All others

Functional Criticalities:

IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,

if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.

2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,

if failed, could cause loss of mission.

Redundancy Screen A:

1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight

2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight

3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight

NA = Not Applicable

Redundancy Screens B and C:

P _ Passed Screen

F = Failed Screen

NA = Not Applicable

C-I
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

8/13/86

_S

101

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 2/2

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

ENTER PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3)

4)

5)

6)

V)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.ENT.I

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

ONCE MODE SWITCH IS MOVED SOFTWARE REMAINS IN IDLE MODE.

COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODE WHICH IS LOSS OF MISSION.

LOSS OF

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-2
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

8/z3/a6

_S

102

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 2/2

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

ENTER PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

S)

6)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.ENT. 1

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT ENTER COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES WHICH IS LOSS OF MISSION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-3
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

s/12/s6

1_S

103

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

10V CONTACT

SHORTED

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/i

ABORT: /

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

4)

5)

6)

?)

S)

9)

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3) CAPTURE/RELEASE TRIGGER

CAPTURE POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.CR.I

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

WILL CAUSE ARM TO LIMP WHEN END EFFECTOR MODE SWITCH MOVED FROM

OFF. EE WILL CAPTURE AS SOON AS EE MODE SWITCH IS PLACED IN

AUTO. UNCOMMANDED LIMPING CAN CAUSE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.

UNCOMMANDED CAPTURE CAN CAUSE SNARE HANGUP.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-4
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 104 ABORT:

HDWIFUNC

3/2R

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

10V CONTACT

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3) CAPTURE/RELEASE TRIGGER

4) CAPTURE POSITION

5)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:

DEORB IT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.CR. 1

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE •

CANNOT CAPTURE IN AUTO EE MODE. LOSS OF REDUNDENT CAPABILITY TO

CAPTURE. MANUAL MODE IS REDUNANT CAPABILITY TO CAPTURE. ARM

WILL NOT LIMP DURING MANUAL CAPTURE RE DAMAGE MAY RESULT IN CRIT

z/z.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-5
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

8/13/86

_S

105

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/i

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

6.2V CONTACT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

?)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

CAPTURE/RELEASE TRIGGER

RELEASE POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.CR. 6

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

EE WILL RBLEASEWHEN EE MODE SWITCH IS PLACED IN MANUAL.

UNCOMMANDEDRELEASE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-6
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/13/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 106 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

312R

I

ITEM: 6.2V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

CAPTURE/RELEASE TRIGGER

RELEASE POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.CR. 6

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT RELEASE PAYLOAD IN MANUAL MODE. LOSS OF REDUNDANT PATH TO

RELEASE PAYLOAD. EE AUTO MODE AND BACKUP MODE ARE REDUNDANT TO

MANUAL FOR RELEASING PAYLOADS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-7
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/13/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 107 ABORT:

HDWIFUNC

311R

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

6.2V CONTACT

OPEN DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

CAPTURE/RELEASE TRIGGER

RELEASE POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.CR. 6

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

EE WILL CLOSE WHEN MANUAL OPEN IS COMMANDED. LOSS OF REDUNANT

PATH TO RELEASE PAYLOAD. EE AUTO MODE AND B/U MODE ARE REDUNDANT

TO MANUAL FOR RELEASING PAYLOAD.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-8
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

8/05/86

108

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

CAUTION AND WARNING TONE

FAILS ON

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING_ /

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION" DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SW.2

CAUSES: BISTABLE OUTPUT FAILS HIGH.

SHORTS TO GROUND.

TRANSISTER DRIVER COLLECTOR

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CONSTANT AUDIO TONE.

LIGHT ON.

BISTABLE FAILURE ALSO FAILS MASTER ALARM

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-9
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

8/05/86

_S

109

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

CAUTION AND WARNING TONE

FAILS OFF

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3)

4)

s)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SW.2

CAUSES: BISTABLE OUTPUT FAILS LOW. TRANSISTOR DRIVER FAILS OPEN

CIRCUIT. LOSS OF 12V POWER SUPPLY.

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

AUDIO ALARM WILL NOT COME ON.

ALARM LIGHT OFF.

BISTABLE FAILURE ALSO FAILS MASTER

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-10
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

8/o6/86

RMS

110

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

MODE LIGHT

FAILS ON

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I)

2)

3)

4)

S)

7)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

 mw/ mc

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.MD.3

CAUSES: ELECTRICAL DRIVER FAILS ON.

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

FAILED LIGHT REMAINS ON WHEN PANEL IS POWERED.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-ll
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

8/o6/86

_S

111

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/ 3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

MODE LIGHT

FAILS OFF

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3)

4)

5)

6_

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [SA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.MD.3

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

C [NA ]

CAUSES: ELECTRICAL DRIVER FAILS OFF.

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

FAIL LIGHT WILL NOT COME ON.

BULBS BURN OUT {2).

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-12
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID:

8/06/86

RMS

112

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

BRAKE TALKBACK

FAILS TO "ON"

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3)

4)

5)

6)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD. BRK. 5

CAUSES: MECHANICAL JAM. ELECTRICAL DRIVER FAILS HIGH.

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

WRONG INDICATION OF BRAKE STATUS. NO EFFECT ON OPERATIONS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-13
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/06/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 113

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: BRAKE TALKBACK

FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO "OFF"

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] . C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.BRK.5

CAUSES: MECHANICAL JAM. ELECTRICAL DRIVER FAILS LOW.

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

WRONG INDICATION OF BRAKE STATUS. NO EFFECT ON OPERATIONS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-14
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/05/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 114

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: SOFTWARE STOP TALKBACK

FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO BARBERPOLE

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3)

4)

5)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: /

LIFTOFF: /

ONORBIT: 3/3

DEORBIT: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

ABORT HDW/FUNC

RTLS: /

TAL: /

AOA: /

ATO: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA" ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SS.I

CAUSES: MECHANICAL JAM. DRIVER CIRCUIT FAILS HIGH.

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

TALKBACK REMAINS BARBERPOLE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-15
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID"

8/05/86

RMS

115

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT" /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

SOFTWARE STOP TALKBACK

FAILS TO GRAY

LEAD ANALYST-" B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SS.I

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: MECHANICAL JAM. DRIVER CIRCUIT FAILS LOW.

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

TALKBACK REMAINS GRAY.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-16
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/05/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 116

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

CAUTION AND WARNING LIGHTS

FAILS ON

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.CW.I

HDWlnmC

I

I

I

I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: ELECTRICAL DRIVER FAILS ON.

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LIGHT REMAINS ON.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01127187 C-17
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

8/05/86

RMS

117

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

CAUTION AND WARNING LIGHTS

FAILS OFF

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

4)

5)

4)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.CW. 1

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

C [NA ]

CAUSES: ELECTRICAL DRIVER FAILS OFF.

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LIGHT WILL NOT COME ON.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-18
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/05/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 118

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: SAFING TALKBACK

FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO BARBERPOLE

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3)

4)

S)

6)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SF.7

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: MECHANICAL JAM. DRIVER CIRCUIT FAILS LOW.

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

TALKBACK REMAINS BARBERPOLE.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-19
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/05/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 119

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: SAFING TALKBACK

FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO GRAY

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3)

4)

s)

6)

v)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]

HDWlFONC

I

/

I

/

B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SF.7

CAUSES: MECHANICAL JAM. DRIVER CIRCUIT FAILS HIGH.

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

TALKBACK REMAINS GRAY.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-20
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/07/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 120

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: EXTENDED

FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO BARBERPOLE

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTOR TALKBACK

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUN_ ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EET.6

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

TALKBACK REMAINS BARBERPOLE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-21
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

8/o7/86

l_fS

121

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

EXTENDED

FAILS TO GRAY

LEAD ANALYSTz B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTOR TALKBACK

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF_ / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EET.6

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

c [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

TALKBACK REMAINS GRAY.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-22
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/07/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 122

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: OPEN

FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO BARBERPOLE

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I)

2)

3)

4)

S)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCKES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTOR T_CK

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS :

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EET.5

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

C [NA ]

CAUSES: MECHANICAL JAM. DRIVER CIRCUIT FAILS LOW.

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

TALKBACK REMAINS BARBERPOLE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87" C-23
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/07/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 123

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT • /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

OPEN

FAILS TO GRAY

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3) END EFFECTOR TALKBACK

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

S)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EET.5

HDWlnmC

/

/

/

/

C [NA ]

CAUSES: MECHANICAL JAM. DRIVER CIRCUIT FAILS LOW.

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

TALKBACK REMAINS GRAY.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-24
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID:

8/o7/8_

RMS

124

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

CLOSED

FAILS TO BARBERPOLE

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCKES/DISPLAYS

3) END EFFECTOR TALKBACK

4)

S)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE NDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SEREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EET. 4

SDWlnmC

I

I

I

I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: MECHANICAL JAM. DRIVER CIRCUIT FAILS LOW.

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

TALKBACK REMAINS BARBERPOLE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-25
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

HDAC ID:

e/oT/se

RMS

125

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

CLOSED

FAILS TO GRAY

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTOR TALKBACK

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EET. 4

C [NA ]

CAUSES: MECHANICAL JAM. DRIVER CIRCUIT FAILS HIGH.

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

TALKBACK REMAINS GRAY.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-26
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/07/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 126

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: CAPTURE

FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO BARBERPOLE

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

3)

4)

S)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTOR TALKBACK

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EET. 3

_U_WlnT_TC

I

I

I

I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: MECHANICAL JAM. DRIVER CIRCUIT FAILS LOW.

EFFECTS/RATIONALE :

TALKBACK REMAINS BARBERPOLE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-27
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: S/O7/S6

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 127

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: CAPTURE

FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO GRAY

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTOR TALKBACK

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: /

LIFTOFF: /

ONORBIT: 3/3

DEORBIT: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

ABORT HDW/FUNC

RTLS: /

TAL: /

AOA: /

ATO: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A _NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EET. 3

CAUSES: MECHANICAL JAM. DRIVER CIRCUIT FAILS HIGH.

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

TALKBACK REMAINS GRAY.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-28
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

e/o7/86

_S

128

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

DERIGID

FAILS TO BARBERPOLE

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTOR TALKBACK

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: /

LIFTOFF: /

ONORBIT: 3/3

DEORBIT: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

DC.SD.EET.2

LOCATION:

PART NUMBER:

ABORT HDW/FUNC

RTLS: /

TAL: /

AOA: /

ATO: /

C [NA ]

CAUSES: MECHANICAL JAM. DRIVER CIRCUIT FAILS LOW.

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

TALKBACK REMAINS ARBERPOLE.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-29
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8107186

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 129

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: DERIGID

FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO GRAY

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2)

3)

4)

s)

6)

7)

8)

9)

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTOR TALKBACK

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EET.2

CAUSES: MECHANICAL JAM. DRIVER CIRCUIT FAILS HIGH.

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

TALKBACK REMAINS GRAY.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-30
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

8/o?/86

_S

130

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

RIGID

FAILS TO BARBERPOLE

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I)

2)

3)

4)

S)

6)

?)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTOR TALKBACK

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EET.I

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: MECHANICAL JAM. DRIVER CIRCUIT FAILS LOW.

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

TALKBACK REMAINS BARBERPOLE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-31
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/07/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 131

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: RIGID

FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO GRAY

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTOR TALKBACK

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EET. 1

CAUSES: MECHANICAL JAM. DRIVER CIRCUIT FAILS HIGH.

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

TALKBACK REMAINS GRAY.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-32
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBS YSTEM:

MDAC ID:

8/06/86

RMS

132

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 2/2

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

10V CONTACT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

MODE SWITCH

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE NDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.MD.I

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

WHEN ENTER PBI IS PUSHED, MODE WILL BE ENTERED ACCORDING TO

HIEARCHY ASSUMING MODE ENTRY CONDITIONS ARE MET. COULD LOSE EE

MODE WHICH IS REQUIRED FOR ROTATING TRACK AND CAPTURE OF DEFINED

MISSION.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-33
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/06/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 133

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 2/2

ABORT: /

ITEM: 10V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I)

2)

_)

4)

S)

6)

_)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

MODE SWITCH

.CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / HTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.MD.I

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT ENTER FAILED MODE(S). DIRECT MODE LIGHT WILL NOT WORK.

COULD USE EE MODE WHICH IS REQUIRED FOR ROTATING TRACK AND

CAPTURE OF DEFINED MISSION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-34
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/07/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 134

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: 6.2V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTOR MANUAL CONTROL

DERIGID POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EMC. 6

CAUSES" PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

EE WILL DERIGIDIZEWHEN EE MODE SWITCH IS PLACED IN MANUAL MODE.

UNCOMMANDED DERIGIDIZATION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-35
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

n, .TE: 8/07/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 135

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

6.2V CONTACT

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTOR MANUAL CONTROL

DERIGID POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B C F ] C [ F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EMC. 6

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT DERIGIDIZE EE IN MANUAL MODE. LOSS OF REDUNDANT PATH TO

DERIGIDIZATION. EE AUTO MODE IS REDUNDANT PATH TO MANUAL MODE.

LOSS OF DERIGIDIZATION IS LOSS OF MISSION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-36
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

8/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

136 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

3/2R

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

6.2V CONTACT

OPEN DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

S)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTOR MANUAL CONTROL

DERIGID POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] BCF] C[F]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EMC.6

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

EE WILL RIGIDIZE WHEN MANUAL DERIGIDIZATION IS COMMANDED. LOSS

OF REDUNDANT PATH TO RIGIDIZATION. EE AUTO MODE IS REDUNDANT

PATH TO MANUAL MODE. LOSS DERIGIZATION IS LOSS OF MISSION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-37
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

8/o7/88

_S

137

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

10V CONTACT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTOR MANUAL CONTROL

DERIGID POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF" / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EMC.5

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO EFFECT ON OPERATIONS. DERIGIDIZATION CHECK IS INHIBITED.

RIGIDIZE COMMAND WILLOVERRIDE.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-38
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/07/86

SUBSYSTEM- RMS

MDAC ID: 138

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

10V CONTACT

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

Z)

3)

4)

5)

6)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTOR MANUAL CONTROL

DERIGID POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LKNDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EMC.5

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

UNCOMMANDED DERIGIDIZATION MESSAGE ON MANUAL DERIGIDIZATION.

EFFECT ON OPERATIONS.

NO

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-39
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/07/8 6

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 139

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: 12.4V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTOR MANUAL CONTROL

RIGID POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUND.ANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B C F ] C C F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EMC.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

EE WILL RIGIDIZE AS SOON AS EE MODE SWITCH IS PLACED IN MANUAL.

LOSS OF REDUNDANT PATH TO OPERATE EE. EE AUTO MOSE IS REDUNDANT

PATH TO MANUAL MODE. LOSS OF EE IS LOSS OF MISSION SINCE PAYLOAD

CANNOT BE CAPTURED.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-40
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID:

8/o?/86

_S

140

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

12.4V CONTACT

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

3)

4)

55

65

85

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTOR MANUAL CONTROL

RIGID POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EMC.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT RIGIDIZE IN MANUAL EE MODE. LOSS OF REDUNDANT PATH TO

RIGIDIZATION. EE AUTO MODE IS REDUNDANT PATH TO MANUAL MODE.

LOSS OF RIGIDIZATION IS LOSS OF MISSION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-41
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

8/07/86

141

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

12.4V CONTACT

SHORTED DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I)

2)

3)

4)

S)

6)

_)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTOR MANUAL CONTROL

RIGID POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [HA ] C [HA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EMC.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO EFFECT. EE WILL RIGIDIZE FROM 28V AS WELL AS 12 V.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-42
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/07/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 142

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: 12.4V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

4)

5)

6)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTOR MANUAL CONTROL

RIGID POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EMC.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

END EFFECTOR WILL DERIGIDIZE WHEN RIGIDIZATION IS COMMANDED.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-43
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

8/07/86

m_ts

143

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

10V CONTACT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

11

21

31

41

5)

61

71

81

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTOR MANUAL CONTROL

RIGID POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT P_ASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: I/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION" DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EMC. 1

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE •

WILL CAUSE ARM TO LIMP IF END EFFECTOR MODE NOT IN OFF.

UNCOMMANDED LIMPING CAN CAUSE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-44
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/07/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 144

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

10V CONTACT

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

3)

4)

5)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTORMANUALCONTROL

RIGID POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlFUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EMC. 1

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

ARM WILL NOT LIMP DURING MANUAL RIGIDIZATION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-45
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

 TE: 8/05/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 145

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 2/2

ABORT: /

ITEM: 10V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

4)

S)

6)

V)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SAFING SWITCH

SAFE POSITION

CRITI_TIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SF.5

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

MCIU COMMANDED SAFINGALWAYS PRESENT. DIRECT AND BACKUP MODES

ONLY AVAILABLE. DEFINE MISSION CANNOT BE DONE WITH DIRECT AND

BACKUP MODES ONLY.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-46
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/05/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 146 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

3/ZR

/

ITEM: 10V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SAFING SWITCH

SAFE POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SF.5

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT COMMAND MCIU COMMANDED SAFING. LOSS OF REDUNDANTABILITY

TO STOP ARM WITH SAFING SWITCH IS UNCOMMANDED MOTION. HARDWIRE

SAFING STILL WORKS. MCIU COMMANDED ANDHARDWIRED SAFINGARE

REDUNDANT PATHS OF OPERATOR COMMANDED SAFING.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-47
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/05/8 5 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 147 ABORT:

HDWIFUNC

3/IR

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

28V CONTACT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I)

Z)

3)

4)

5)

6)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SAFING SWITCH

AUTO POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD, SF.4

cCF]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO HARDWIRED SAFING FROM SWITCH. LOSS OF REDUNDANT ABILITY TO

STOP ARM WITH SAFING SWITCH IS UNCOMMANDED MOTION. MCIU

COMMANDED SAFING STILL WORKS. MCIU COMMANDED AND HARDWIRED

SAFING ARE REDUNDANT PATHS OF OPERATOR COMMANDED SAFING.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-48
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/05/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 148

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 2/2

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

28V CONTACT

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

l)

2)

3)

4)

S)

_)

7)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SAFING SWITCH

AUTO POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SF.4

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

HARDWIRE SAFING OCCURS WHEN SAFING SWITCH IN AUTO POSITION.

DIRECT AN BACKUP MODES ONLY AVAILABLE. DEFINED MISSION CANNOT BE

DONE WITH DIRECT AND BACKUP MODES ONLY.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-49
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

8/o5/86

RMS

149

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

28V CONTACT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SAFING SWITCH

CANCEL POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT_ 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S IRA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SF.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO HARDWIRED SAFING FROM SWITCH.

WORKS.

MCIUCOMMANDED SAFING STILL

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-50
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID:

e/o5/86

I_S

150

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

28V CONTACT

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SAFING SWITCH

CANCEL POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B CNA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SF.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO EFFECT ON OPERATIONS. ARM WILL HARDWIRE SAFE WHEN SAFING

SWITCH IS TAKEN TO CANCEL (TB WILL GO/REMAIN BP). MCIU SAFING

WILL STILL BE CANCELLED AND HARDWIRED SAFING WILL BE REMOVED WHEN

SWITCH IS RETURNED TO AUTO.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-51
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

8/05/86

RMS

151

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

SAFING SWITCH

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

a)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SAFING SWITCH

CANCEL POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAYING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD,SF.I

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

MCIU COMMANDED SAFING IS CANCELLED WITHSAFING SWITCH IN AUTO

POSITION. NO EFFECT ON OTHER OPERATIONS.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-52
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/05/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 152

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 2/2

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

SAFING SWITCH

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

V)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SAFING SWITCH

CANCEL POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT NDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SF.I

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

MCIUCOMMANDED SAFINGCANNOT BE CANCELLED. MCIUCOMMAND SAFING

OCCURS EACH TIME MCIU IS TURNED ON. DIRECT ANDBACKUP MODES

REMAIN. CANNOT COMPLETE DEFINED MISSION WITH DIRECT AND BACKUP

ONLY.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-53
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDACID: 153 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

28V CONTACT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

MODE SWITCH

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

I

/

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [ F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.MD. 2

CCF]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

IN DIRECT MODE ANYTIME BRAKES ARE ON WITH PRIMARY POWER AND ARM

SELECTED. LOSS OF REDUNDANT PATH IN ABILITY TO INHIBIT

UNCOMMANDED JOINT DRIVE. LIGHT WILL ONLY INDICATE DIRECT MODE

WHEN 10V CONTACT IS MADE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-54
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/06/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 154

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: 28V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

MODE SWITCH

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.MD.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT COMMAND IN DIRECT MODE. MODE LIGHT WILL STILL COME ON.

DIRECT MODE IS NOT REQUIRED FOR DEFINED MISSION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-55
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 155 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/1R

/

ITEM: RIGIDIZE/DERIGIDIZE CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD" G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

4)

S)

e)

V)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTOR MODE SWITCH

MANUAL POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EEM.3

C[F]

CAUSES" PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. LOSS OF REDUNDANT PATH IN ABILITY TO

INHIBIT UNCOMMANDED DERIGID. FAILURE OF MANUAL CONTROL SWITCH

BECOMES CRIT 1 FOR UNCOMMANDED DERIGIDIZATION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-56
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID:

e/o6/s6

I:LMS

156

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

RIGIDIZE/DERIGIDIZE CONTACT

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTOR MODE SWITCH

MANUAL POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: I/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

HDWIFUNC

I

I

I

I

A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EEM.3

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT RIGIDIZE OR DERIGIDIZE IN MANUAL EE MODE.

RIGIDIZATION IS LOSS OF MISSION.

LOSS OF

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-57
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 157 ABORT:

HDWIFUNC

2/IR

/

ITEM: RIGIDIZE/DERIGIDIZE CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

Z)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTOR MODE SWITCH

AUTO POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EEM.9

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. LOSE ONE REDUNDANT PATH INABILITY TO

INHIBIT UNCOMMANDED DERIGIDIZATION. FAILURE OF MCIUEE AUTO

LOGIC BECOMES CRIT 1 FORUNCOMMANDED DERIGIZATION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-58
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

8/06/8(;

RMS

158

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

RIGIDIZE/DERIGIDIZE CONTACT

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

4)

5)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTOR MODE SWITCH

AUTO POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: I/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F] CCF]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EEM.9

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT RIGIDIZE OR DERIGIDIZE IN AUTO EE MODE.

RIGIDIZATION IS LOSS OF MISSION.

LOSS OF

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-59
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDACID: 159 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/1R

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

CAPTURE/RELEASE CONTACT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

S)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTOR MODE SWITCH

AUTO POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EEM.8

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. LOSE ONE REDUNDANT PATH IN ABILITY TO

INHIBIT UNCOMMANDED CAPTURE OR RELEASE. FAILURE OF MCIUEE AUTO

LOGIC BECOMES CRIT 1 FOR UNCOMMANDEDRELEASE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-60
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDACID: 160 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

3/IR

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

CAPTURE/RELEASE CONTACT

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

Z)

3)

4)

5)

6)

_)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTOR MODE SWITCH

AUTO POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] D[F] C[F]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EEM.8

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT _ OR RELEASE rS AUTO _ MODZ.

CRIT I_

LOSS OF RELEASE IS

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-61
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

8/06/86

RMS

161

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/i

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

10V CONTACT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

_)

4)

5)

s)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTOR MODE SWITCH

AUTO POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EEM.7

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. LOSE ONE REDUNDANT PATH INABILITY TO

INHIBIT LIMPING. FAILURE OF CAPTURE TRIGGER BECOMES CRIT 1 FOR

UNCOMMANDEDLIMPINGWHICHISUNCOMMANDED MOTION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01127187 C-62
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/06/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 162

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: 10V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

Z)

3)

4)

5)

6)

_)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTOR MODE SWITCH

AUTO POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LI FTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

KDWI a C

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EEM.7

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF EE AUTO MODE.

RELEASE.

LOSE ONE REDUNDANT PATH OF PAYLOAD

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-63
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 163 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/1R

/

ITEM: CAPTURE/RELEASE CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTOR MODE SWITCH

MANUAL POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / HTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAYING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EEM. 2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. LOSE ONE REDUNDANT PATH IN ABLILITY TO

INHIBIT UNCOMMANDED CAPTURE/RELEASE. FAILURE OF CAPTURE/RELEASE

TRIGGER BECOMES CRIT 1 FOR UNCOMMANDEDRELEASE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-64
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/06/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 164

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: CAPTURE/RELEASE CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTOR MODE SWITCH

MANUAL POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL"

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] CCF]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EEM.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT CAPTURE OR RELEASE IN MANUAL EE MODE.

CRIT I.

LOSS OF RELEASE IS

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-65
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 165 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

211R

/

ITEM: 10V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAEL_I

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

_)

4)

S)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTOR MODE SWITCH

MANUAL POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER- DC.SD.EEM. 1

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. FAILURE OFT HE CAPTURE TRIGGER OR MANUAL

CONTROL. SWITCH NOW BECOMES CRIT 1 FOR UNCOMMANDED MOTION.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/06/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 166

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT" I/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: 10V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTOR MODE SWITCH

MANUAL POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EEM.I

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

ARM WILL NOT LIMP DURING NORMAL MANUALEE OPERATIONS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-67
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/06/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 167

HIGHEST CRITICALITY

FLIGHT:

ABORT:

HDWIFUNC

3/2R

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

10V CONTACT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

BRAKE SWITCH

ON POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC, SD, BRK, 1

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

SOFTWARE ALWAYS SEES BRAKE COMMAND. BRAKES STILL WORKS.

CONSISTENCY CHECK PARAMETERS WILL NOT RESET WHICH MAY CAUSE FALSE

CONSISTENCY CHECK ALARMWHEN BRAKES ARE REMOVED. FALSE

CONSISTENCY CHECKS WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-68
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 168 ABORT:

HDWln C

312R

I

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

10V CONTACT

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

_)

4)

S)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

BRAKE SWITCH

ON POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [ F ] C [ Y ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.BRK.I

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

SOFTWARE NEVER SEES BRAKE COMMAND. BRAKES STILL WORK.

CONSISTENCY CHECK PARAMETERS WILL NOT RESET WHICH MAY CAUSE FALSE

CONSISTENCY CHECK ALARMWHEN BRAKES ARE REMOVED. FALSE

CONSISTENCY CHECKS WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-69
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/06/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 169

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: 10V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

BRAKE SWITCH

OFF POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA"

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.BRK.3

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

DIRECT LIGHT WILL NOT ILLUMINATE WHEN DIRECT MODE IS SELECTED AND

BRAKES ARE ON. DIRECT DRIVE STILL WORKS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-70
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

8/06/86

RMS

170

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

10V CONTACT

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

BRAKE SWITCH

OFF POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.BRK. 3

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-71
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 171 ABORT:

HDWIFUNC

3/2R

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

STOP CONTACT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

AUTO SEQUENCE SWITCH

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/ 2R AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [SA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.AS.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

AUTO MODES CANNOT BE ENTERED.

STOP.

IF SEQUENCE IN PROGRESS IT WILL

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-72
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/06/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 172

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: STOP CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

_)

$)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

AUTO SEQUENCE SWITCH

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.AS.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT STOP ARM WITH AUTO SEQUENCE SWITCH WHICH IS UNCOMMANDED

MOTION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-73
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/06/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 173

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: PROCEED CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

AUTO SEQUENCE SWITCH

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: i/I AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.AS. 1

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

AUTO MODES CANNOT BE ENTERED. IF IN AUTO MODE WILL PROCEED

WITHOUT SWITCH THROW AND WILL NOT STOP AT PAUSE POINTS WHICH IS

UNCOMMANDED MOTION.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-74
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID:

8/06/86

_S

174

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

PROCEED CONTACT

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

S)

6)

7)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

AUTO SEQUENCE SWITCH

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.AS.I

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT PROCEED AUTO MODES.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-75
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID:

8106186

RMS

175

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

MASTER ALARM PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

•2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3)

4)

S)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATIONz DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.MA.I

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

WOULD NOT RECEIVE MASTER ALARM TONE ORLIGHT.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-76
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8106186

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 176

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/ 3

ABORT: /

ITEM: MASTER ALARM PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3)

4)

s)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] .

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.MA.I

HDWI_C

I

I

I

I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT CANCEL MASTER ALARM AND TONE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-77
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

s/12/es

177

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

BACKUP CONTACT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

])

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

RMS SELECT SWITCH

STARBOARD POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/nn C

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SEL.6

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

STARBOARD ARM WILL MOVEWHENPORTARM IS COMMANDED IN BACKUP.

PORT EE WILL OPENWHEN B/U PAYLOAD RELEASE IS COMMANDED.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-78
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDACID: 178 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/1R

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

BACKUP CONTACT

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

RMS SELECT SWITCH

STARBOARD POSITION

CRITICAX_TIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SEL.6

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT OPERATE STARBOARD ARM IN BACKUP POWER. LOSS OF REDUNDANT

METHOD TO DRIVE JOINT AND RELEASE PAYLOAD. PRIMARY DRIVE

FAILURES AND EE FAILURES BECOME CRIT I.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-79
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM"

MDAC ID:

8/12/86

l_S

179

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

BACKUP CONTACT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I)

2)

4)

5)

6)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

RMS SELECT SWITCH

PORT POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SEL.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

PORT ARM WILL MOVE WHEN STARBOARDARM IS COMMANDED IN BACKUP.

PORT EE WILL OPEN WHEN B/U PAYLOAD RELEASE IS COMMANDED.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-80
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDACID: 180 ABORT:

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

BACKUPCONTACT

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

RMS SELECT SWITCH

PORT POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SEL.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT OPERATE PORT ARM IN BACKUP POWER. LOSS OF REDUNDANT

METHOD TO DRIVE JOINT ANDRELEASE PAYLOAD. PRIMARY DRIVE

FAILURES AND EE FAILURES NOW BECOME CRIT i.

HDW/FUNC

2/1R

/

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-81
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

8/12/s6

R_tS

181

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

PRIMARY CONTACT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

RMS SELECT SWITCH

STARBOARD POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SEL.5

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

STARBOARD ARM REMAINS POWERED REGARDLESS OF SWITCH POSITION.

STARBOARD ARM COULD MOVE WHEN PORT IS COMMANDED. STARBOARD EE

WILL ALSO RECEIVE PORT EE COMMANDS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-82
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDACID: 182 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/IR

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

PRIMARY CONTACT

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

RMS SELECT SWITCH

STARBOARD POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SEL.5

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT OPERATE STARBOARD ARM IN PRIMARY POWER. LOSS OF REDUNDANT

METHOD TO DRIVE JOINT AND RELEASE PAYLOAD. DEFINED MISSION

CANNOT BE COMPLETED IN BACKUP.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-83
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/12/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 183

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: PRIMARY CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

])

4)

S)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

RMS SELECT SWITCH

PORT POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SEL.I

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

PORT ARM REMAINS POWERED REGARDLESS OF SWITCH POSITION. PORT ARM

COULD MOVE WHEN STARBOARD IS COMMANDED. PORT EE WILL ALSO

RECEIVE STARBOARD EE COMMANDS.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-84
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 184 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/IR

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

PRIMARY CONTACT

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

_)

7)

s)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

RMS SELECT SWITCH

PORT POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE NDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SEL.I

HDWIFUNC

I

I

I

I

CCF]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT OPERATE PORT ARM IN PRIMARY POWER.

METHOD TO DIRVE JOINT AND RELEASE PAYLOAD.

CANNOT BE COMPLETED IN BACKUP.

LOSS OF REDUNDANT

DEFINED MISSION

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-85
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID:

s/12/s6

RMS

185

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/i

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

12.4V CONTACT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

_)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

CAPTURE/RELEASE TRIGGER

CAPTURE POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS= A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.CR.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

EE WILL CAPTURE AS SOON AS EE MODE SWITCH IS PLACED IN MANUAL.

UNCOMMANDED MOTION CAN CAUSE SNARE HANGUP.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-86
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDACID: 186 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

3/2R

/

ITEM: 12.4V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

_)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

CAPTURE/RELEASE TRIGGER

CAPTURE POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: /

LIFTOFF: /

ONORBIT: 3/2R

DEORBIT: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

ABORT

RTLS:

TAL:

AOA:

ATO:

HDW/nmc

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C[F]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.CR.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT CAPTURE IN MANUAL EE MODE.

CAPTURE.

LOSS OF REDUNDANT PATH TO

REFBRENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-87
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/12/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 187

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/ 3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

12.4V CONTACT

OPEN DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

3)

4)

S)

6)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

CAPTURE/RELEASE TRIGGER

CAPTURE POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

NDw/n Tc

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.CR.2

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE_

NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-88
DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID:

INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

8/12/86

188

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

12.4V CONTACT

SHORTED DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

S)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

CAPTURE/RELEASE TRIGGER

CAPTURE POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [-NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.CR.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT CAPTURE IN MANUAL EE MODE. LOSS OF REDUNDANT PATH TO

CAPTURE. END EFFECTOR WILLRELEASE WHEN CAPTURE IS COMMANDED FOR

MANUAL EE MODE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-89
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/12/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 189

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

10V CONTACT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

S)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

CAPTURE/RELEASE TRIGGER

RELEASE POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.CR.5

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

SNARE WILL OPEN AS SOON AS EE MODE SWITCH IS PLACED IN AUTO.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-90
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/12/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 190 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

3/IR

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

10V CONTACT

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

CAPTURE/RELEASE TRIGGER

RELEASE POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/IR • AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWIFUNO

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B C F ] CCF]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.CR.5

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT RELEASE EE IN AUTO EE MODE.

TO RELEASE.

LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-91
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/11/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 191

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: DC CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

RMS POWER SWITCH

BACKUP POSITION

CRITICA/_TIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.PWR.5

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

BDA REMAINS POWERED.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-92
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE" 8/1 I/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 192 ABORT:

HDWIFUNC

2/1R

/

ITEM: DC CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

4)

5)

6)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

RMS POWER SWITCH

BACKUP POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/ru'NC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.PWR.5

C[F]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT DRIVE JOINT(S) IN BACKUP. LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO

DRIVE JOINT. PRIMARY MODE FAILURES BECOME CRIT i.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-93
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/11/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 193

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: AC CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3) RMS POWER SWITCH

BACKUP POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.PWR. 6

HDWlFUNC

/

/

/

/

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

BACKUP EDGE LIGHTING REMAINS ON.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-94
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/11/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 194

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/ 3

ABORT: /

ITEM: AC CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

s)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

RMS POWER SWITCH

BACKUP POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.PWR.6

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

BACKUP EDGE LIGHTING WILL NOT WORK.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-95
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/11/86

SUBSYSTEM" RMS

MDAC ID: 195

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: AC CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

RMS POWER SWITCH

PRIMARY CONTACT

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] . B IRA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.PWR. 2

HDW/FUNC

I

I

I

I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

PANEL LIGHTING IS ALWAYS POWERED.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-96
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/11/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 196

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 2/2

ABORT: /

ITEM: AC CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9_

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

RMS POWER SWITCH

PRIMARY CONTACT

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF_ / TAL: /

ONORBI T: 2/ 2 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.PWR.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT RELEASE SHOULDER BRACE WHICH IS LOSS OF MISSION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-97
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/11/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 197 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/IR

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

ENABLE CONTACT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

_)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

BACKUP DRIVE SWITCH

NEGATIVE POSITIVE

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[r] C[F]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.BD.4

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO PREVENT UNCOMMANDED JOINT MOTION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-98
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/ii/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBS YS TEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 198 ABORT:

ITEM: ENABLE CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

9)

1) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3) BACKUP DRIVE SWITCH

NEGATIVE POSITIVE

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTI_OL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.BD.4

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT DRIVE ANY JOINT IN NEGATIVE DIRECTION IN BACKUP.

HDW/FUNC

2/ZR

/

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-99
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

811118_

RMS

199

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

DC CONTACT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD" G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

RMS POWER SWITCH

PRIMARY POWER

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.PWR.I

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE •

CANNOT REMOVE POWER FROM MCIU OR DC POWER TO PANEL.

REFERENCES •

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-100
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/11/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 200 ABORT:

HDW/n C

2/1R

/

ITEM: DC CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

RMS POWER SWITCH

PRIMARY POWER

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: I RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.PWR. 1

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATI ONALE:

CANNOT OPERATE RMS IN PRIMARY POWER. LOSS OF REDUNDANT ABILITY

TO DRIVE JOINTS. BACKUP FAILURES BECOME CRIT 1.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-101
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

a/11/86

201

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

ENABLE CONTACT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

BACKUP DRIVE SWITCH

POSITIVE POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.BD.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO PREVENTUNCOMMANDED JOINT MOTION.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-102
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/1 i/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 202

HIGHEST CRITICALITY

FLIGHT:

ABORT:

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

ENABLE CONTACT

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

Z)

3)

4)

5)

6)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

BACKUP DRIVE SWITCH

POSITIVE POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.BD.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT DRIVE ANY JOINT IN POSITIVE DIRECTION IN BACKUP.

HDW/FUNC

2/IR

/

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-103
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

e/11/s6

RMS

203

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

28V CONTACT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

s)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

BACKUP PAYLOAD RELEASE SWITCH

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.BPR.I

HDWI_NC

I

I

I

I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

SNARES COMMANDED OPEN WHEN BACKUP POWER SELECTED.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-104
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/11/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDACID: 204 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/1R

/

ITEM: 28V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3) BACKUP PAYLOAD RELEASE SWITCH

4)

5)

6)

"i)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlYU_C

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.BPR. 1

C[F]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT OPEN SNARES IN BACKUP.

RELEASE PAYLOAD.

LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-105
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/11/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 20S ABORT:

ITEM: COMMAND CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

HDWlFUNC

2/1R

/

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3) BACKUP DRIVE SWITCH

NEGATIVE POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL" /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.BD.3

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO PREVENT UNCOMMANDED JOINT MOTION.

CANNOT DRIVE POSITIVE DIRECTION IN BACKUP MODE.

REFERENCES :

Q

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-I06
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/11/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 206 ABORT:

ITEM: COMMAND CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

51

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

BACKUP DRIVE SWITCH

NEGATIVE POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT NDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.BD.3

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT DRIVE ANY JOINT IN POSITIVE DIRECTION IN BACKUP.

HDW/FUNC

211R

/

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-107
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/11/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDACID: 207 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/IR

/

ITEM: COMMAND CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

_)

4)

5)

_)

s)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

BACKUP DRIVE SWITCH

POSITIVE POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: I TAL: I

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.BD.I

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO PREVENT UNCOMMANDED JOINT MOTION.

CANNOT DRIVE NEGATIVE DIRECTION IN BACKUP MODE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-10S
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/11/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 208

HIGHEST CRITICALITY

FLIGHT:

ABORT:

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

COMMAND CONTACT

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

4)

S)

6)

7)

8)

9)

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3) BACKUP DRIVE SWITCH

POSITIVE POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.BD. 1

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT DRIVE ANY JOINT IN POSITIVE DIRECTION IN BACKUP.

HDW/FUNC

2/1R

/

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-109
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/11/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 209

HIGHEST CRITICALITY

FLIGHT:

ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/IR

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

28V CONTACT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I)

2)

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

BACKUP JOINT SELECT SWITCH

FLIGHT PHASE

PRELAUNCH:

LIFTOFF:

ONORBIT:

DEORBIT:

LANDING/SAFING:

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

CRITICALITIES

HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

I RTLS: I

I TAL; I

2/IR AOA: /

/ ATO: /

B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.BJS. 1

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

ONLY JOINT RELATED TO FAILED CONTACT WILL DRIVE IN BACKUP. LOSE

REDUNDANT PATH TO DRIVE JOINT. PRIMARY DRIVE FAILURE BECOMES

CRIT i.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-110
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8111186

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 210

HIGHEST CRITICALITY

FLIGHT:

ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/1R

/

ITEM: 28V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

S)

e)

V)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

BACKUP JOINT SELECT SWITCH

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.BJS.I

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

JOINT RELATED TO FAILED CONTACT WILL NOT DRIVE. LOSE REDUNDANT

PATH TO DRIVE JOINT. PRIMARY DRIVE FAILURES BECOME CRIT 1.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-111
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

HDAC ID:

8/11/86

RMS

211

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

DIGITAL DISPLAYS

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3)

4)

5)

6)

8)

9)

SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

FLIGHT PHASE

PRELAUNCH:

LIFTOFF:

ONORBIT:

DEORBIT. _

LANDING/SAFING:

CRITICALITIES

HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

/ RTLS: I

I TAL: I

3/3 AOA: /

/ ATO: /

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS_ A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.DD.I

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE :

ELEMENT(S) ALWAYS REMAINS ON WHEN PANEL POWERED.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-I12
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

8/11/86

l_vlS

212

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

DIGITAL DISPLAYS

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE NDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.DD.I

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

ELEMENT(S) DOES NOT DISPLAY.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-i13
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/11/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 213 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

311R

/

ITEM: 28V ENABLE CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

4)

5)

6)

?)

8)

9)

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3) SINGLE/DIRECT DRIVE SWITCH

NEGATIVE POSITION

CRITICA/_TIES

rLZGHT PS_S_ _W/nn;C ABORT SDW/_C

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.9

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO PREVENT UNCOMMANDED JOINT MOTION.

NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-114
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/1 i/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 214

HIGHEST CRITICALITY

FLIGHT:

ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

3/1R

/

ITEM: 28V ENABLE CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

:3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SINGLE/DIRECT DRIVE SWITCH

NEGATIVE POSITION

CRITI CALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONOREIT: 3/ IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.9

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT DRIVE ANY JOINT IN NEGATIVE DIRECTION IN DIRECT MODE.

LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO DRIVE JOINT.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-I15
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 215 ABORT:

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

28V ENABLE CONTACT

SHORTED

HDW/FUNC

3/IR

/

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SINGLE/DIRECT DRIVE SWITCH

POSITIVE POSITION

FLIGHT PHASE

PRELAUNCH:

LIFTOFF:

ONORBIT:

DEORBIT:

LANDING/SAFING:

CRITICALITIES

HDW/FUNC ABORT

/ RTLS-

/ TAL:

3/IR AOA:

/ ATO:

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.3

HDWlFUNC

I

/

I

/

C[F]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO PREVENT UNCOMMANDED JOINT MOTION.

NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-116
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 216 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

3/IR

/

ITEM: 28V ENABLE CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

S)

7)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SINGLE/DIRECT DRIVE SWITCH

POSITIVE POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.3

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT DRIVE ANY JOINT IN POSITIVE DIRECTION IN DIRECT MODE.

LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO DRIVE JOINT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-117
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 217 ABORT:

HDWIFUNC

3/IR

/

ITEM: 12V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

3)

4)

s)

6)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SINGLE/DIRECT DRIVE SWITCH

POSITIVE POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.2

C[F]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO PREVENTUNCOMMANDED JOINT MOTION.

NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 0112_18_ C-118
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 218 ABORT:

HDWIFUNC

311R

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

12V CONTACT

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

4)

S)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SINGLE/DIRECT DRIVE SWITCH

POSITIVE POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [ F ] C [ F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT DRIVE ANY JOINT IN POSITIVE DIRECTION IN DIRECT MODE.

LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO DRIVE JOINT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-I19
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/08/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 219

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: 12V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

9)

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3) SINGLE/DIRECT DRIVE SWITCH

POSITIVE POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / HTLS:. /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.2

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-120
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/08/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 220

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: 12V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

s)

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3) SINGLE/DIRECT DRIVE SWITCH

POSITIVE POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

JOINT WILL DRIVE IN NEGATIVE DIRECTION WHEN POSITIVE SELECTED,

RESULTING IN UNCOMMANDED MOTION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-121
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/11/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 221

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: 6V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SINGLE/DIRECT DRIVE SWITCH

NEGATIVE POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAONCH: / HTLS: /

LIFTOFF: I TAL: I

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.8

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO PREVENT UNCOMMANDED JOINT MOTION.

NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-122
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/1 i/86 HIGHEST CRITI CALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 222 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

3/1R

/

ITEM: 6V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

z)

3)

4)

5)

6)

a)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SINGLE/DIRECT DRIVE SWITCH

NEGATIVE POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE NDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.8

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT DRIVE ANY JOINT IN NEGATIVE DIRECTION IN DIRECT MODE.

LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO DRIVE JOINT.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-123
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/1 I/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 223

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

6V CONTACT

OPEN DIODE

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

9)

1) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3) SINGLE/DIRECT DRIVE SWITCH

NEGATIVE POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.8

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

JOINT WILL DRIVE IN POSITIVE DIRECTION WHEN NEGATIVE SELECTED,

RESULTING IN UNCOMMANDED MOTION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-124
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

8/11/86

RMS

224

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLI GHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

10V CONTACT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SINGLE/DIRECT DRIVE SWITCH

NEGATIVE POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT" I/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]- C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER_ DC.SD.SD.7

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALEz

SELECTED JOINT WILL DRIVE WITHOUT DEFLECTING SWITCH WHEN IN

SINGLE MODE. CANNOT ENTER SINGLE MODE IF NOT IN IT WHEN FAILURE

OCCURS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01127187 C-125
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/11/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 225 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

3/IR

/

ITEM: 10V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3) SINGLE/DIRECT DRIVE SWITCH

4) NEGATIVE POSITION

5)

6)

"I)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT NDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORB IT: 3/ 1R AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.7

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT COMMAND ANY JOINT INNEGATIVE DIRECTION WHILE IN SINGLE

MODE. LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO DRIVE JOINT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-126
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/08/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 226

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: 10V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SINGLE/DIRECT DRIVE SWITCH

POSITIVE POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.I

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

SELECTED JOINT WILL DRIVE WITHOUT DEFLECTING SWITCH WHEN IN

SINGLE MODE. CANNOT ENTER SINGLE MODE IF NOT IN IT WHEN FAILURE

OCCURS.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01127187 C-127
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 227 ABORT:

HDWIFUNC

3/IR

/

ITEM: 10V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3) SINGLE/DIRECT DRIVE SWITCH

POSITIVE POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.I

C[F]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT COMMAND ANY JOINT IN POSITIVE DIRECTION WHILE IN SINGLE

MODE. LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO DRIVE JOINT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-12S
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/08/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 228

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

10V CONTACT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

_)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

JOINT SELECT SWITCH

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.JS.I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

IN SINGLE MODE JOINT WILL DRIVE (AND DATA DISPLAYED ACCORDING TO

HIEARCHY). COULD RESULT IN WRONG JOINT BEING DRIVEN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-129
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/08/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 229

HIGHEST CRITICALITY

FLIGHT:

ABORT:

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

10V CONTACT

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

4)

.5)

6)

s)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

JOINT SELECT SWITCH

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] BEF] C[F]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.JS.I

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT DRIVE (OR DISPLAY DATA FOR) FAILED JOINT CONTACT.

REDUNDANT PATH TO DRIVE JOINT.

HDW/FUNC

3/IR

/

LOSS OF

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-130
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/08/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 230

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: 12V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

S)

7)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

JOINT SELECT SWITCH

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: I/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.JS.2

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

JOINT RELATED TO FAILED CONTACT WILL DRIVE WHEN ANY JOINT IS

COMMANDED IN DIRECT MODE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-131
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 231 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

311R

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

12V CONTACT

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I)

2)

3)

4)

5)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

JOINT SELECT SWITCH

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL" /

ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F] CEF]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.JS.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

JOINT RELATED TO FAILED CONTACT WILL NOT DRIVE IN DIRECT MODE.

LOSS OF REDUNDANT CAPABILITY TO DRIVE JOINT.

REFERENCES,

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-132
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

8/08/86

232

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

12V CONTACT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

4)

5)

6)

7)

e)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

PARAMETER SELECT SWITCH

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.PS.2

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LAMP ON CONTINOUSLY IF ACTIVATED.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-133
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/08/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 233

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: 12V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

S)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

PARAMETER SELECT SWITCH

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT'- 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.PS.2

HDWlnmC

I

/

I

/

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT DO A LAMP TEST.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-134
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/08/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 234

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: 10V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

Z)

3)

4)

s)

6)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

PARAMETER SELECT SWITCH

CRITI CALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.PS.I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

DATA WILL BE DISPLAYED ACCORDING TO HIEARCHY OF CONTACT MADE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-135
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/08/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 235

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: 10V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

3)

4)

S)

6)

V)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

PARAMETER SELECT SWITCH

CRITICA/_TIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.PS.I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT DISPLAY DATA RELATED TO FAILED CONTACT.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-136
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID"

8/1s/s6

_S

236

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLI GHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

D & C ADDRESS DECODER INPUT LINES

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) DATA BUS

3)

4)

5)

6)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

L_FTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [4_A ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.DB.AD. 1

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE •

ERRATIC DATA FROM PANEL. ERRATIC DISPLAYS, UNCOMMANDED MOTION OR

UNCOMMANDED PAYLOAD RELEASE. SOFTWARE WILL RECEIVE WORDS FROM D

& C IN WRONG SLOTS AND TRY TO INTERPRET THEM AS IF THEY WERE IN

THE PROPER SLOTS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-137
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

s/is/s6

_S

237

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

D & C ADDRESS DECODER INPUT LINES

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) DATA BUS

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBZT: I/i AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.DB.AD. 1

CAUSESz PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

ERRATIC DATA FROM PANEL. ERRATIC DISPLAYS, UNCOMMANDED MOTION OR

UNCOMMANDED PAYLOAD RELEASE. SOFTWARE WILL RECEIVE WORDS FROM D

& C IN WRONG SLOTS AND TRY TO INTERPRET THEM AS IF THEY WERE IN

THE PROPER SLOTS.

REFERENCES •

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-138
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID"

8/18/86

_S

238

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

D & C ADDRESS DECODER OUTPUT LINES

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) DATA BUS

3)

4)

5)

s)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.DB.AD.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE :

ERRATIC DATA FROM PANEL. ERRATIC DISPLAYS, UNCOMMANDED MOTION OR

UNCOMMANDED PAYLOAD RELEASE. SELECTED D & C RECEIVE WORD WILL BE

ORED WITH WORD OF FAILED ADDRESS.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-139
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 239 ABORT:

ITEM: D & C ADDRESS DECODER OUTPUT LINES

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

HDW/FUNC

_/1R

/

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) DATA BUS

4)

5)

6)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS : /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/ IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.DB.AD.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO SAFE ARM, RELEASE PAYLOAD OR DRIVE JOINT.

FAILED WORD WILL NOT BE RECEIVED FROM PANEL.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-140
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID:

8/18/86

_S

24O

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

D & C ADDRESS DECODER OUTPUT LINES

LOSS OF WORD 0

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) DATA BUS

3)

4)

5)

6)

v)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORB I T: I/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.DB.AD.2

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF EE MODE.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-141
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 241 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

i/I

/.

ITEM: D & C INVERTOR NETWORK

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) DATA BUS

4)

s)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

•_ PHASE _w/_mc _aORT _w/nmc

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT z / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.DB.I

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

ERRATIC DATA FROM PANEL. UNCOMMANDED MOTION OR UNCOMMANDED

PAYLOAD RELEASE. BIT RELATED TO FAILED INVERTOR IS OPPOSITE OF

NORMAL STATUS FOR ALL WORDS FROM PANEL.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-142
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 242 ABORT:

_DW/FUNC

211R

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

D & C INVERTORNETWORK

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) DATA BUS

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.DB. 1

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO SAFE ARM, RELEASE PAYLOAD OR DRIVE JOINT.

LOSS OF EE MODE POSSIBLE. BIT RELATED TO FAILED INVERTOR WILL

ALWAYS BE A 0 STATE FOR ALL WORDS FROM PANEL.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-143
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 243 ABORT:

ITEM: D & C TEST WORD SELECTOR

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

DATA BUS

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH" / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] a[F] C[F]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER- DC.DB.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

ALL DATA FROM PANEL IS SHIPPED TO SOFTWARE AS FALSE STATE.

OF REDUNDANCY TO SAFE ARM, RELEASE PAYLOAD AND DRIVE JOINT.

OF EE MODE.

HDW/FUNC

2/1R

/

LOSS

LOSS

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-144
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 244 ABORT:

ITEM: D & C TEST WORD SELECTOR

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) DATA BUS

3)

4)

5)

6)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C C F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.DB.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

ALL DATAFROM PANEL IS SHIPPED TO SOFTWARE AS FALSE STATE.

OF REDUNDANCY TO SAFE ARM, RELEASE PAYLOAD AND DRIVE JOINT.

OF EE MODE.

HDW/nmc

2/IR

/

LOSS

LOSS

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-145
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

8/2o/86

RMS

245

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

D & C TEST WORD SELECTOR

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) DATA BUS

3)

4)

s)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRZLAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.DB.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

ERRATIC DATAFROM PANEL. UNCOMMANDED MOTION. ASSUMES SIGNAL TO

INVERTER STILL GOOD. INPUT WORD TO D & C GETS ORED WITH OUTPUT

WORD FROM PANEL RESULTING IN ERRATIC DATA TO SOFTWARE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-146
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID:

8/20/86

92_S

246

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

D & C TEST WORD SELECTOR

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

DATA BUS

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.DB.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

D & C DATA ALARM. ASSUMES SIGNAL TO INVERTER STILL GOOD.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-147
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORXSHEET

DATE: 8/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 247 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

211R

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

CLOCK PULSE

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

3)

4)

S)

6)

7)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

DATA BUS

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] "B[P] C[F]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.DB.3

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO DATA IS TRANSFERED TO OR FROM D & C PANEL. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY

TO DRIVE JOINT, SAFE ARM AND RELEASE PAYLOAD. D & C TEST WORD

CHECK WILL ANNUNCIATE IMMEDIATELY IN TEMP MONITOR MODE OR HIGHER.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-148
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 248 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/1R

/

ITEM: STROBE PULSE

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) DATA BUS

3)

4)

s)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ P ] C [ F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.DB.4

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO DATA IS TRANSFERED TO OR FROM D & C PANEL. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY

TO DRIVE JOINT, SAFE ARM AND RELEASE PAYLOAD. LOSS OF EE MODE

POSSIBLE. D & C TEST WORD CHECK WILL ANNUNCIATE IMMEDIATELY IN

TEMP MONITOR MODE OR HIGHER.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-149
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID:

e/19/86

_S

249

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

SERIAL TO PARALLEL CONVERTER

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G, RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) DATA BUS

3)

4)

5)

6)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH" / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TALl /

ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /

DEORBITi / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.DB.5

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

ERRATIC DATA FROM PANEL. ERRATIC DISPLAYS. UNCOMMANDED MOTION

OR UNCOMMANDED PAYLOAD RELEASE. SOFTWARE WILLRECEIVE WORDS FROM

D & C IN WRONG SLOTS AND TRY TO INTERPRET THEM AS IF THEY WERE IN

PROPER SLOTS.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-150
DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID:

INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

8/19/86

P_IS

250

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

SERIAL TO PARALLEL CONVERTER

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) DATA BUS

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: /

LIFTOFF: /

ONORBIT: i/1

DEORBIT: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

ABORT HDW/FUNC

RTLS: /

TAL: /

AOA: /

ATO: /

A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.DB.5

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

ERRATIC DATA FROM PANEL. ERRATIC DISPLAYS. UNCOMMANDED MOTION

OR UNCOMMANDED PAYLOAD RELEASE. SOFTWARE WILLRECEIVE WORDS FROM

D & C IN WRONG SLOTS AND TRY TO INTERPRET THEM AS IF THEY WERE IN

PROPER SLOTS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-151
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID:

8/19/86

RMS

251

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

SERIAL TO PARALLEL CONVERTER

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) DATA BUS

3)

4)

5)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.DB.5

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

DATA RELATED TO FAILED BIT IS ALWAYS DISPLAYED AT TRUE STATE.

& C DATA ALARM.

D

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-152
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID:

8/19/86

_S

252

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

SERIAL TO PARALLEL CONVERTER

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) DATA BUS

3)

4)

s)

6)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.DB.5

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

DATA RELATED TO FAILED BIT IS ALWAYS DISPLAYED AT FALSE STATE.

& C DATA ALARM.

D

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-153
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/19/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 253

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

PARITY GENERATOR

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) DATA BUS

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALI_IES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlFUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.DB.6

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO EFFECT ON OPERATIONS. D & C DATA ALARM. SOFTWARE WILL

CONTINUE TO USE DATA EVEN THOUGH IT FAILS PARITY CHECK.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-154
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/19/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 254

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: PARITY GENERATOR

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) DATA BUS

3)

4)

5)

6)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

KDWln_C

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.DB.6

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO EFFECT ON OPERATIONS. D & C DATA ALARM. SOFTWARE WILL

CONTINUE TO USE DATA EVEN THOUGH IT FAILS PARITY CHECK.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-155
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/19/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 255

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: PARITY GENERATOR

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) DATA BUS

3)

4)

3)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRBLAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.DB.6

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO EFFECT ON OPERATIONS. D & C DATA ALARM. SOFTWARE WILL

CONTINUE TO USE DATA EVEN THOUGH IT FAILS PARITY CHECK.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-156
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

8/19/86

_S

256

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/i

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

PARALLEL TO SERIAL CONVERTER

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) DATA BUS

3)

4)

s)

6)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORB I T: i/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWIFUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.DB.7

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

DATA RELATED TO FAILED BIT WILL BE SHIPPED TO SOFTWARE AS TRUE

STATE. D & C DATA ALARM. UNCOMMANDED MOTION OR UNCOMMANDED

PAYLOAD RELEASE. WILL FAIL TEST WORD CHECK BUT SOFTWARE WILL

CONTINUE TO USE DATA FROM PANEL.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-157
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 257 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/1R

/

ITEM: PARALLEL TO SERIAL CONVERTER

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

_)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

DATA BUS

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[P] C[F]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.DB.?

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

DATA RELATED TO FAILED BIT WILL BE SHIPPED TO SOFTWARE AS FALSE

STATE. D & C DATA ALARM. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO DRIVE JOINT,

SAFE ARM OR RELEASE PAYLOAD. LOSS OF EE MODE POSSIBLE.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 ° C-158
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/19/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 258

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

F LIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: PARALLEL TO SERIAL CONVERTER

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) DATA BUS

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.DB.7

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

ALL DATA FROM PANEL IS SHIPPED TO SOFTWARE AS TRUE STATE.

UNCOMMANDED CAPTURE IF IN EE AUTO FOR POSSIBLE SNARE HANGUP. D &

C ALARM. WILL FAIL TEST WORD CHECK BUT SOFTWARE WILL CONTINUE TO

USE DATA FROM PANEL.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01127187 C-159
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/19/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 259 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/IR

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

PARALLEL TO SERIAL CONVERTER

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) DATA BUS

3)

4)

s)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICA/_TIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS : /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ P ] C [ F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.DB.7

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

ALL DATA FROM PANEL IS SHIPPED TO SOFTWARE AS FASLE STATE. LOSS

OF REDUNDANCY TO SAFE ARM, RELEASE PAYLOAD AND DRIVE JOINT. LOSS

OF EE MODE. D & C DATA ALARM. WILL FAIL TEST WORD CHECK BUT

SOFTWARE WILL CONTINUE TO USE DATA FROM PANEL.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-le0
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

e/2o/e6

RMS

26O

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

INPUT TRANSISTOR DRIVER CIRCUIT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) DATA BUS

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.DB.8

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

DATA RELATED TO FAILED BIT WILL DISPLAY TRUE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-161
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

8/2o/a6

_tS

261

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITSM:

FAILURE MODE:

INPUT TRANSISTOR DRIVER CIRCUIT

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) DATA BUS

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.DB.8

HDW/FUNC

I

I

I

I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

DATA RELATED TO FAILED BIT WILL DISPLAY FALSE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-162
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/20/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 262

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: INPUT TRANSISTOR DRIVER CIRCUIT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) DATA BUS

4)

5)

6)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.DB.8

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

ERRATIC DATA DISPLAYED. DISPLAYS RELATED TO FAILED ADDRESS WILL

BE DRIVEN BY ALL DATA WORDS TO PANEL.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-163
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID:

8/20/86

RMS

263

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/_/NC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

INPUT TRANSISTOR DRIVER CIRCUIT

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) DATA BUS

3)

4)

5)

s)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: /

LIFTOFF: /

ONORBIT: 3/3

DEORBIT: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

_DU_CY SCREWS: A [NA ]

LOCATION:

PART NUMBER:

ABORT

RTLS:

TAL:

AOA:

ATO:

B [NA ]

DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

DC.DB.8

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

INCORRECT DATA DISPLAYED.

WILL DISPLAY FALSE STATE.

DISPLAYS RELATED TO FAILED ADDRESS

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-164
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/20/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 264

HIGHEST CRITICALITY

FLIGHT:

ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/1R

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

OUTPUT TRANSISTOR DRIVER CIRCUIT

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) DATA BUS

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlmmC

/

/

/

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.DB. 9

C[F]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

DATA RELATED TO FAILED BIT IN TWO WORDS (0-1,2-3,ETC.) ALWAYS IS

SEEN BY SOFTWARE AS FALSE. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO SAFE ARM,

RELEASE PAYLOAD, OR DRIVE JOINT. LOSS OF EE MODE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-165
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/20/86

•SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID- 265

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: OUTPUT TRANSISTOR DRIVER CIRCUIT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2 ) DATA BUS

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.DB.9

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAIILVRE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

DATA RELATED TO FAILED BIT IN ALL OUTPUT WORDS ALWAYS SEEN AS

TRUE. UNCOMMANDED MOTION ORUNCOMMANDED PAYLOAD RELEASE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-166
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBS YS TEM:

MDAC ID:

8/20/86

RMS

266

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/I

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

OUTPUT TRANSISTOR DRIVER CIRCUIT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

DATA BUS

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT "

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: I/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlnmC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.DB.9

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

ERRATIC DATA FROM PANEL. UNCOMMANDED PAYLOAD RELEASE OR MOTION.

WORD RELATED TO FAILED ADDRESS GET ORED WITH OTHER WORDS FROM

PANEL.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-167
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/20/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 267

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: OUTPUT TRANSISTOR DRIVER CIRCUIT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) DATA BUS

3)

4)

5)

_)

a)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: I/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWIFUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.DB.9

CCF]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO SAFE ARM, RELEASE PAYLOAD, OR DIRVE JOINT.

WORD FROM D & C PANEL RELATED TO FAILED ADDRESS IS SEEN BY

SOFTWARE AS ALL 0 - FALSE STATE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-168
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID:

8/20/86

_S

268

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

OUTPUT TRANSISTOR DRIVER CIRCUIT

LOSS OF WORD 0

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

e)

9)

HIERARCHY:

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

DATA BUS

SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.DB.9

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF EE MODE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-169
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

9/29/86

RMS

269

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 2/2

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

VERNIER CONTACT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

_)

4)

5)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

COARSE/VERNIER

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.CV.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT SELECT COARSE RATE MODE. IN A TIME CRITICAL TIMELINE THE

SLOWER RATE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-170
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 9/29/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 270

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 2/2

ABORT: /

ITEM: COARSE CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

V)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

COARSE/VERNIER

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.CV. 1

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT SELECT VERNIER RATE MODE. SLOWER RATE CANNOT BE USED.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-171"
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 9/29/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 271

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: 10V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

_)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

RATE HOLD SWITCH

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlFUNC

/

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] C[F]

LOCATION: ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.RH.I

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

THE SHORT WOULD CONTINOUSLY ENABLE RATE HOLD.

UNCOMMANDED MOTION.

THIS COULD LEAD TO

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-172
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 9/24/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 272 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

3/2R

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

LINKAGE

PHYSICAL BINDING, LINKAGE DISCONNECTS

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

HAND CONTROLLERS

TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER

MECHANICAL

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: _ [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER

PART NUMBER: DC.HC.THC. 1

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, LINKAGE BREAKS/SLIPS FOR

X-AXIS (FORWARD/BACK9 OR Z-AXIS (UP/DOWN) MOTION.

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER LOSES THE ABILITY TO TRANSMIT

FORWARD/BACK OR UP/DOWN MOTION.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-173
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE" 9/30/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID" 273

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: COMMANDED

FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPERATE

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

RATE METER

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.RM.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

UPON FAILURE COMMANDED RATES CANNOT BE OBSERVED ON THE METER.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-174
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 9/30/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 274

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: ACTUAL

FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPERATE

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

S)

_)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

RATE METER

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.RM.I

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

UPON FAILURE ACTUALRATES CANNOT BE OBSERVED ON THE METER.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-175
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID:

9/3o/86

_S

275

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

XI0 TALKBACK

FAILS TO OPERATE

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD- G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

RATE METER

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL" /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT" / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.RM.3

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

UPON FAILURE OF THE TALKBACKTHE COARSE/VERNIER INDICATION CANNOT

BE OBSERVED ON THE CONSOLE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-176
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 9/30/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 276

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: 10V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SHOULDER BRACE RELEASE

SWITCH

PORT POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SB.I

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

MCIU WILL ALWAYS RECEIVE SHOULDER BRACE RELEASE COMMAND.

SHOULDER BRACE WILL STILL RELEASE.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-177
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 9/30/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 277

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: 10V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

S)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SHOULDER BRACE RELEASE

SWITCH

PORT POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B CNA ] C CNA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SB.I

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

MCIU WILL NEVERRECEIVE SHOULDER BRACE RELEASE COMMAND.

BRACE WILL STILL RELEASE.

SHOULDER

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-178
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

9/3o/86

_S

278

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 2/2

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

IISV CONTACT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SHOULDER BRACE RELEASE

SWITCH

PORT POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_JNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SB.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

SHOULDER BRACE WILL RELEASE AS SOON AS THE PRIMARY POWER IS

APPLIED TO THE ARM. SHOULDER BRACE SOLINOID COULD OVERHEAT AND

OPEN THE CIRCUIT BREAKER DUE TO CONTINOUS POWER ON IT. LOSS

PANEL LIGHTING IS ALSO POSSIBLE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-179
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 9/30/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 279

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 2/2

ABORT: /

ITEM: IISV CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I)

2)

3)

4)

5)

e)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SHOULDER BRACE RELEASE

SWITCH

PORT POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORB I T: 2/ 2 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] BCF]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SB.2

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

C[F]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

WILL NOT BE ABLE TO RELEASE SHOULDER BRACE.

REDUNDANCY FOR RELEASE OF SHOULDER BRACE.

EVA IS THE ONLY

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-180
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 9/30/86

SUBS YSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 280

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: 10V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

3)

4)

S)

_)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SHOULDER BRACE RELEASE

SWITCH

STARBOARD POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlnmC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SB.5

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

MCIU WILL ALWAYS RECEIVE SHOULDER BRACE COMMAND.

WILL STILL RELEASE.

SHOULDER BRACE

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-181
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 9130l 86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 281

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: 10V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

S)

6)

a)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SHOULDER BRACE RELEASE

SWITCH

STARBOARD POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL"

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlFUNC

I

/

/

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SB.5

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

MCIUWILLNEVERRECEIVE SHOULDER BRACE COMMAND.

WILL STILL RELEASE.

SHOULDER BRACE

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-182
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

9/30/86

RMS

282

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 2/2

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

IISV CONTACT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

s)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SHOULDER BRACE RELEASE

SWITCH

STARBOARD POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SB.6

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

SHOULDER BRACE WILL RELEASE AS SOON AS THE PRIMARY IS APPLIED TO

THE ARM. SHOULDER BRACE SOLINOID COULD OVERHEAT AND OPEN THE

CIRCUIT BREAKER DUE TO CONTINOUS POWER ON IT. LOSS OF PANEL

LIGHTING IS ALSO POSSIBLE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-183
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 9/30/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 283

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 2/2

ABORT: /

ITEM: IISV CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I)

2)

3)

4)

5)

_)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SHOULDER BRACE RELEASE

SWITCH

STARBOARD POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SB.6

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

WILL NOT BE ABLE TO RELEASE SHOULDER BRACE.

REDUNDANCY FOR RELEASE OF SHOULDER BRACE.

EVA IS ONLY

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-184
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 9/30/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 284

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: TALKBACK

FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPERATE

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

s)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SHOULDER BRACE RELEASE

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRBLAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SB.7

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

TALKBACK FAILURE WILL NOT ALLOW SHOULDER BRACE STATUS TO BE

OBSERVED.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-185
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/01/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 285

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: K1

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3) RELAYS

4) PORT

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION" DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.RL. 1

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

WILL NOT BE ABLE TO INITIATE AUTO SAFING.

RIGIDIZE OR DERIGIDIZE.

WILL NOT BE ABLE TO

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-186
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: I0/01/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 286

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/i

ABORT: /

ITEM: K1

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3) RELAYS

4 ) PORT

5)

6)

7)

8)

9;

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.RL.I

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-187
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID:

lO/Ol/86

_S

287

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

K2

OPEN, DIRECT DRIVE CIRCUIT

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3) RELAYS

4) PORT

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.RL.2

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF DIRECT DRIVE CAPABILITY. RETAINS BACKUP DRIVE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-188
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10101186

R.-_S

288

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

K2

OPEN, CAPTURE CIRCUIT

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3) RELAYS

4) PORT

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO" /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.RL.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL CAPTURE CAPABILITY. LOSE AUTO AND MANUAL RELEASE

CAPABILITY. RETAINS BACKUP RELEASE.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-189
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/01/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 289

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: K2

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3) RELAYS

4) PORT

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICAL_,TIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RT LS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.RL.2

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-190
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/01/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 290

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLI GHT: I/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: K3

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

_)

4)

5)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

RELAYS

STARBOARD

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

IIDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.RL.3

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

WILL NOT BE ABLE TO INITIATE AUTO SAFING.

RIGIDIZE OR DERIGIZE.

WILL NOT BE ABLE TO

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-191
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/01/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 291

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: K3

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

RELAYS

STARBOARD

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.RL.3

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-192
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

zo/oz/86

RMS

292

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 2/2

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

K4

OPEN, DIRECT DRIVE CIRCUIT

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

g)

I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3) RELAYs

STARBOARD

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: /

LIFTOFF: /

ONORBIT: 2/2

DEORBIT: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

ABORT

RTLS:

TAL:

AOA:

ATO:

HDWI_mZC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] c[r]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.RL. 4

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF DIRECT DRIVE CAPABILITY. RETAINS BACKUP DRIVE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-193
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/01/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

293 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/IR

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

K4

OPEN, CAPTURE CIRCUIT

LEAD ANALYST" B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

4)

S)

7)

S)

9)

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3) RELAYS

STARBOARD

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.RL.4

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL CAPTURE CAPABILITY. LOSE AUTO AND MANUALRELEASE

CAPABILITY. RETAINS BACKUP RELEASE.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-194
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/01/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 294

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: K4

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

4)

S)

S)

S)

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3) RELAYS

STARBOARD

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.RL.4

m_W/FUNC

/

/

/

/

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-195
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/01/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 295

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: K6

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3 ) RELAYS

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS"

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA:

DEOREIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] a [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.RL.5

HDW/FUNC

I

I

I

I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

WILL NOT BE ABLE TO INITIATE AUTO SAFING.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-196
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/01/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 296

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 2/2

ABORT: /

ITEM: K6

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

S)

6)

_)

s)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

RELAYS

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.RL.5

HDW/FUNC

I

I

I

I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

PERMANENT SAFING WILL OCCUR.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-197
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE" 10/02/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 297

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 2/2

ABORT: /

ITEM: 28V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3) BRAKE

4) SWITCH

5) ON POSITION

6)

7)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] S IF]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.BRK.2

HDWIFUNC

/

/

/

/

C[F]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.

BACKUP DRIVE CAPABILITY.

RETAIN DIRECT DRIVE AND

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-198
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/02/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 298

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 2/2

ABORT: /

ITEM: 28V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3) BRAKE

4) SWITCH

5) ON POSITION

6)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FONC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.BRK.2

CCF]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF DIRECT DRIVE CAPABILITY.

BACKUP REMAIN.

COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES AND

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-199
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/02/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 299

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 2/2

ABORT: /

ITEM: 28V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

4)

S)

_)

7)

8)

9)

I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3) BRAKE

SWITCH

OFF POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / HTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.BRK.4

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

CCF]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF DIRECT DRIVE CAPABILITY.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-200
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/02/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 300

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: 28V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

3)

4)

S)

6)

7)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

BRAKE

SWITCH

OFF POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.BRK.4

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-201
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

9/24/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

RMS FLIGHT: 1/1

301 ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

LINKAGE

PHYSICAL BINDING, LINKAGE DISCONNECTS

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

s)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

HAND CONTROLLERS

ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER

MECHANICAL

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER

PART NUMBER: DC.HC.RHC.I

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER LOSES THE ABILITY TO TRANSMIT PITCH

SIGNALS.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-202
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/02/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 302

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: 10V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

S)

6)

7)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SAFING

SWITCH

AUTO POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SF.4

HDW/FUNC

I

I

I

I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01127187 C-203
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

zo/o2/86

RMS

303

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

10V CONTACT

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

?)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SAFING

SWITCH

AUTO POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SF.4

HDW/FUNC

I

I

I

I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-204
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

lO/O2/86

RMS

304

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

28V CONTACT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SAFING

SWITCH

SAFE POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT" / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SF.5

HDW/FUNC

I

I

I

I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-205
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

1o/o2/e6

Z_[S

305

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

28V CONTACT

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

_)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SAFING

SWITCH

SAFE POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH- / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SF.5

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPOR_ DATE 01/27/87 C-206
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/02/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 306

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: PRIMARY CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3) RMS SELECT

4) OFF POSITION

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlFUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SEL.3

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-207
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

lo/o2/86

RMS

307

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

PRIMARY CONTACT

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

3)

4)

5)

e)

V)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

RMS SELECT

OFF POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SEL.3

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-208
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10102186

RMS

308

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

BACKUP CONTACT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

RMS SELECT

OFF POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/ C

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SEL.4

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-209
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/02/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 309

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: BACKUP CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

RMS SELECT

OFF POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDTNG/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SEL.4

HDWlFUSC

/

/

/

/

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-210
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/02/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 310

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: 10V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

_)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

CAPTURE/RELEASE

DETENT POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

SDWln C

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.CR.3

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-211
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/02/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 311

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: 10V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST" B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

3}

4)

S)

7}

s)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWZTCHES/DISPLAYS

CAPTU_/RELEASE

DETENT POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBITz / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.CR.3

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-212
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/02/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 312

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: 6.2V/12.4V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

CAPTURE/RELEASE

DETENT POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.CR.4

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-213
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/02/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 313

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: 6.2V/12.4V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

CAPTU /RELEASE

DETENT POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS= A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.CR. 4

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-214
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/02/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 314

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: DC CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

RMS POWER

OFF POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH" / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.PWR.3

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-215
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/02/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 315

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: DC CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

3)

4)

5)

4)

v)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

RMS POWER

OFF POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.PWR. 3

HDW/FUNC

I

I

I

I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-216
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/02/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 316

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: AC CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

S)

7)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

RMS POWER

OFF POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.PWR.4

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-217
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/02/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 317

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: AC CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

3)

4)

S)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

RMS POWER

OFF POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.PWR.4

SDW/n_C

I

I

I

I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-218
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID:

lOlO21S6

RHS

318

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/ 3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

10V CONTACT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD" G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SHOULDER BRACE RELEASE

SWITCH

OFF POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [S_ ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SB. 3

"_IF_TC

I

I

I

I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-219
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/02/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC IDz 319

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: 10V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

4)

5)

6)

"1)

8)

9)

1) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3) SHOULDER BRACE RELEASE

SWITCH

OFF POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SB.3

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-220
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/02/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 320

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: 28V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SHOULDER BRACE RELEASE

SWITCH

OFF POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: /

LIFTOFF: /

ONORBIT: 3/3

DEORBIT: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

ABORT

RTLS:

TAL:

AOA:

ATO:

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SB.4

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-221
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBS YS TEM:

MDAC ID:

lo/o2/e6

RMS

321

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

28V CONTACT

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

3)

4)

S)

7)

e)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SHOULDER BRACE RELEASE

SWITCH

OFF POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SB.4

HDWlnmC

I

I

/

I

c [_A ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-222
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

lO/O2/S6

RMS

322

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

OFF CONTACT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

4)

5)

7)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

AUTO SEQUENCE

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [N_ ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER- DC.SD.AS.3

HDW/_C

I

I

I

I

C [NA )

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-223 "
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBS YS TEM:

MDAC ID:

lO/O2/86

RMS

323

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

OFF CONTACT

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

z)

3)

4)

s)

6)

7)

s)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

AUTO SEQUENCE

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

NDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.AS.3

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-224
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10102/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 324

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: 10V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTOR MODE

OFF POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EEM.4

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-225
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10102186

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 325

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: 10V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

1) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3) END EFFECTOR MODE

OFF POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlFUSC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EEM.4

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-226
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10102186

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 326

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: CAPTURE/RELEASE CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

"BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

V)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTOR MODE

OFF POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EEM.5

HDWlF C

I

I

I

I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-227
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/02/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 327

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/ 3

ABORT: /

ITEM: CAPTURE/RELEASE CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I)

2)

])

4)

5)

6)

V)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTOR MODE

OFF POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONOREIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EEM.5

HDW/nmC

/

/

/

/

C IRA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-228
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

1o/o2/ee

1_tS

328

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

RIGIDIZE/DERIGIDIZE CONTACT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTOR MODE

OFF POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EEM,6

HDW/FUNC

I

I

I

I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-229
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: I0102186

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 329

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: RIGIDIZE/DERIGIDIZE CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3) END EFFECTOR MODE

OFF POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EEM.6

HDW/FUNC

I

I

I

I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-230
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/02/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 330

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: 10V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTOR MANUAL MODE

OFF POSITION

FLIGHT PHASE

PRELAUNCH:

LIFTOFF:

ONORBIT:

DEORBIT:

LANDING/SAFING:

CRITICALITIES

HDW/FUNC" ABORT

/ RTLS:

/ TAL:

3/3 AOA:

/ ATO:

/

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EEC.3

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-231
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE" 10/02/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 331

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: 10V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

4)

5)

6)

?)

8)

9)

1) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3) END EFFECTOR MANUAL MODE

OFF POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EEC.3

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-232
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/02/86

SUBS YSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 332

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: 12/6V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTORMANUALMODE

OFF POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [SA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EMC.4

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-233
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: lO/O2/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 333

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: 12/6V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

END EFFECTORMANUALMODE

OFF POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.EMC.4

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-234
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/02/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 334

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: 10V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

l)

2)

4)

S)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SINGLE/DIRECT DRIVE

OFF POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.4

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-235
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/02/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 335

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: 10V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

S)

6)

V)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SINGLE/DIRECT DRIVE

OFF POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEOREIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

NDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] .B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.4

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-236
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10102186

R_tS

336

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

6/12V CONTACT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

a)

4)

S)

6)

7)

e)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SINGLE/DIRECT DRIVE

OFF POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA"

DEORBITI / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.5

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE_

NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-237
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

io/o2/s6

1_tS

337

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

6/12V CONTACT

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

9)

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3) SINGLE/DIRECT DRIVE

OFF POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: /

LIFTOFF: /

ONORBIT: 3/3

DEORBIT: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

ABORT

RTLS:

TAL:

AOA:

ATO:

HDW/FUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] a [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.5

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-238
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10102186

RRS

338

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

28V CONTACT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SINGLE/DIRECT DRIVE

OFF POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.6

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-239
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/02/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 339

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/ 3

ABORT: /

ITEM: 28V CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

4)

5)

6)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

SINGLE/DIRECT DRIVE

OFF POSITION

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.SD.6

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION. NO EFFECT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-240
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 9/24/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDACID: 340 ABORT:

ITEM: TRANSDUCER

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYSLEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

S)

6)

7)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

HAND CONTROLLERS

TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER

ELECTRICAL

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] BCF] CCF]

LOCATION: TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER

PART NUMBER: DC.HC.THC. 3

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

FAILURE OF TRANSDUCER WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF 1.5 KHZ OUTPUT

SIGNAL. THEREFORE LOSS OF TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER

OPERATION o

HDW/ ¢

2/IR

/

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-241
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 9/24/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 341 ABORT:

ITEM: TRANSDUCER

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

3)

4)

s)

6j

7)

s)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER

ELECTRICAL

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]

LOCATION: TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER

PART NUMBER: DC.HC.THC. 3

CCF]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

FAILURE OF TRANSDUCER WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF 1.5 KHZ OUTPUT

SIGNAL. THEREFORE LOSS OF TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER

OPERATION.

HDWIFUNC

2/IR

/

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-242
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANAL¥SIS WORKSHEET

 ,TE: 9/24/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 342

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: TRANSDUCER

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) HAND CONTROLLERS

3) ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER

ELECTRICAL

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 2 ] B [ F] C [ F]

LOCATION: ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER

PART NUMBER: DC.HC.RHC. 3

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

FAILURE OF TRANSDUCER WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF 1.5 KHZ OUTPUT

SIGNAL. THEREFORE LOSS OF ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER OPERATION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-243
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 9/24/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 343 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/1R

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

TRANSDUCER

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I)

2)

3)

4)

S)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

HAND CONTROLLERS

ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER

ELECTRICAL

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT NDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER

PART NUMBER: DC.HC.RHC.3

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

FAILURE OF TRANSDUCER WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF 1.5 KHZ OUTPUT

SIGNAL. THEREFORE LOSS OF ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER OPERATION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-244
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 9/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDACID: 344 ABORT:

HDWlFUNC

2/1R

I

ITEM: SIGNAL CONDITIONING DEMODULATOR

FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

4)

5)

6)

?)

s)

9)

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) HAND CONTROLLERS

3) ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER

ELECTRICAL

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] CCF]

LOCATION: ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER

PART NUMBER: DC.HC.RHC.4

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

FAILURE OF SIGNAL CONDITIONING DEMODULATOR WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF

DC CONTROL OUTPUT SIGNALS. THEREFORE LOSS OF ROTATIONAL HAND

CONTROLLER OPERATION.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-245
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 9/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 345 ABORT:

HDWlFUNC

211R

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

SIGNAL CONDITIONING DEMODULATOR

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

_)

4)

s)

6)

v)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

HAND CONTROLLERS

ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER

ELECTRICAL

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER

PART NUMBER: DC.HC.RHC.4

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

FAILURE OF SIGNAL CONDITIONING DEMODULATOR WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF

DC CONTROL OUTPUT SIGNALS. THEREFORE LOSS OF ROTATIONAL HAND

CONTROLLER OPERATION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-246
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 9/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 346 ABORT:

HDWlnn c

211R

I

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

SIGNAL CONDITIONING DEMODULATOR

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

7)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

HAND CONTROLLERS

ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER

ELECTRICAL

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER

PART NUMBER: DC.HC.RHC. 4

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

FAILURE OF SIGNAL CONDITIONING DEMODULATOR WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF

DC CONTROL OUTPUT SIGNALS. THEREFORE LOSS OF ROTATIONAL HAND

CONTROLLER OPERATION.

REFERENCES:"

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-247 "
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 9/25/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 347

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: SIGNAL CONDITIONING DEMODULATOR

FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

])

4)

5)

6)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

HAND CONTROLLERS

TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER

ELECTRICAL

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORB IT: i/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] s[F] C[F]

LOCATION: TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER

PART NUMBER: DC.HC.THC.4

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

FAILURE OF SIGNAL CONDITIONING DEMODULATOR WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF

DC CONTROL SIGNALS OUTPUT. THEREFORE LOSS OF TRANSLATIONAL HAND

CONTROLLER OPERATION.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-248
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 9/25/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 348

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: SIGNAL CONDITIONING DEMODULATOR

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

_)

4)

S)

6)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

HAND CONTROLLERS

TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER

ELECTRICAL

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL= /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS : AC2 ] BCF] C[F]

LOCATION: TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER

PART NUMBER: DC.HC.THC.4

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

FAILURE OF SIGNAL CONDITIONING DEMODULATOR WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF

DC CONTROL SIGNALS OUTPUT. THEREFORE LOSS OF TRANSLATIONAL HAND

CONTROLLER OPERATION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-249
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 9/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 349 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/IR

/

ITEM: SIGNAL CONDITIONING DEMODULATOR

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

4)

5)

6)

:,)

s)

9)

1) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) HAND CONTROLLERS

3) TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER

ELECTRICAL

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER

PART NUMBER: DC.HC.THC. 4

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

FAILURE OF SIGNAL CONDITIONING DEMODULATOR WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF

DC CONTROL SIGNALS OUTPUT. THEREFORE LOSS OF TRANSLATIONAL HAND

CONTROLLER OPERATION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-250
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 9/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 350 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/IR

/

ITEM: OSCILLATOR

FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) HAND CONTROLLERS

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] CCF]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.HC.XX. 1

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

FAILURE OF OSCILLATOR WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF 1.5 KHZ SIGNAL TO

BOTH HAND CONTROLLERS. THIS RESULTS IN A LOSS OF DC CONTROL

SIGNALS FROM BOTH HAND CONTROLLERS. THEREFORE LOSS OF BOTH HAND

CONTROLLER OPERATIONS.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-251
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 9/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDACID: 351 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/IR

/

ITEM: OSCILLATOR

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) HAND CONTROLLERS

3)

4)

s)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] BCF] CCF]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.HC.XX. 1

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

FAILURE OF OSCILLATOR WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF 1.5 KHZ SIGNAL TO

BOTH HAND CONTROLLERS. THIS RESULTS IN A LOSS OF DC CONTROL

SIGNALS FROM BOTH HAND CONTROLLERS. THEREFORE LOSS OF BOTH HAND

CONTROLLER OPERATIONS.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-252
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 9/25/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 352

HIGHEST CRITICALITY

FLIGHT:

ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/1R

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

OSCILLATOR

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) HAND CONTROLLERS

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] BCF] C[F]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.HC.XX.I

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

FAILURE OF OSCILLATOR WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF 1.5 EHZ SIGNAL TO

BOTH HAND CONTROLLERS. THIS RESULTS IN A LOSS OF DC CONTROL

SIGNALS FROM BOTH HAND CONTROLLERS. THEREFORE LOSS OF BOTH HAND

CONTROLLER OPERATIONS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-253
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 9/26/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 353

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: RHEOSTAT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

7)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

LIGHTING

PANEL/INSTRUMENT

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.LTG.I

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

MOVEMENT OF THE RHEOSTAT DOES NOT VARY LIGHTING BRIGHTNESS.

LIGHTING WILL STAY BRIGHT OR OUT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-254
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 9/26/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 354

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: RHEOSTAT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

4)

5)

6)

"S)

8)

9)

1) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3) LIGHTING

PANEL/INSTRUMENT

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC " ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING" /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.LTG. 1

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

MOVEMENT OF THE RHEOSTAT DOES NOT VARY LIGHTING BRIGHTNESS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-255
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 9/26/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 355

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: BRIGHT CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

4)

S)

6)

7)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

LIGHTING

ANNUNCIATOR/NUMERIC SWITCH

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: /

LIFTOFF: /

ONORBIT: 3/3

DEORBIT: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

ABORT

RTLS:

•TAL:

AOA:

ATO:

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] s [SA ] C [NA ] .

LOCATION: DISPLAYAND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.LTG.3

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

DISPLAY PANEL IS WASHED OUT DUE TO BRIGHT LIGHTING.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-256
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

9/26/86

_S

356

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

BRIGHT CONTACT

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

LIGHTING

ANNUNCIATOR/NUMERIC SWITCH

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.LTG.3

C [NA ]

CAUSESz PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

DISPLAY PANEL IS DARK DUE TO THE INABILITY TO DIM LIGHTING.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-257
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

9/26/86

]_tS

35"7

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

VARIABLE CONTACT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

LIGHTING

ANNUNCIATOR/NUMERIC SWITCH

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.LTG.4

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

MOVEMENT OF SWITCH FROM VARIABLE SELECTION DOES NOT GIVE BRIGHT

SELECTION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-258
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 9/26/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 358

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: VARIABLE CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST_ B, GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

9)

I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3) LIGHTING

ANNUNCIATOR/NUMERIC SWITCH

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD, LTG.4

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE :

MOVEMENT OF SWITCH TO VARIABLE SELECTION DOES NOT GIVE VARIABLE

CONTROL.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 • C-259
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID:

9/26/86

RMS

359

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

RHEOSTAT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

LIGHTING

ANNUNCIATOR/NUMERIC SWITCH

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.LTG.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

MOVEMENT OF THE RHEOSTAT DOES NOT VARY LIGHTING BRIGHTNESS.

LIGHTING WILL STAY BRIGHT OR OUT.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-260
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 9/26/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 360

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: RHEOSTAT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

LIGHTING

ANNUNCIATOR/NUMERIC SWITCH

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B rNA ]

Q

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.LTG.2

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

MOVEMENT OF THE RHEOSTAT DOES NOT VARY LIGHTING BRIGHTNESS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-261
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 9/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT: 3/3

MDAC ID: 361 ABORT: /

ITEM: RETURN SPRING

FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE) SPRING ROTATIONAL

HAND CONTROLLER DOES NOT RETURN TO CENTER

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

4)

S)

6)

S)

9)

1) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) HAND CONTROLLERS

3) ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER

MECHANICAL

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER

PART NUMBER: DC.HC.RHC.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, SPRING BREAKS/LOSS OF

ELASTICITY

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

ROTATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER LOSES THE ABILITY TO RETURN BACK TO

CENTER, MUST BE MOVED BACK TO CENTER.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-262
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 9/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 362 ABORT:

HDWlFUNC

312R

I

ITEM: AUTO CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

HEATERS

B SWITCH

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] BCF] CCF]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.HTR. 3

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

SHORTED CONTACT WILL RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO TURN B HEATERS

OFF. A AND B HEATERS ARE BOTH TURNED ON DURING OPERATIONS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-263
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 9/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 363 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

3/2R

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

A_OCONTACT

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

.)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

HEATERS

B SWITCH

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE EDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlnmC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.HTR. 3

ccF]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

OPEN CONTACT WILL RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO TURN B HEATERS ON.

A AND B HEATERS ARE BOTH TURNED ON DURING OPERATIONS.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-264
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 9/29/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 364

HIGHEST CRITICALITY

FLIGHT:

ABORT:

HDWIFUNC

3/2R

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

AUTO CONTACT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

4)

S)

6)

_)

"8)

9)

I) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3) HEATERS

A SWITCH

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LI FTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ F ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.HTR.I

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

SHORTED CONTACT WILL RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO TURN A HEATERS

OFF. A AND B HEATERS ARE BOTH TURNED ON DURING OPERATIONS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-265
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 9/29/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 365 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

3/2R

/

ITEM: AUTO CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

9)

i) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

2) SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

3) HEATERS

A SWITCH

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.HTR.I

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

OPEN CONTACT WILL RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO TURN A HEATERS ON.

A AND B HEATERS ARE BOTH TURNED ON DURING OPERATIONS.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-266
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE'- 9/29/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 366

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: OFF CONTACT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED, OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

_)

4)

S)

6)

8)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

HEATERS

A SWITCH

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE" HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

 DWln C

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.HTR.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO EFFECT. NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION TO OFF CONTACTS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-267
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 9/29/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 367

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

OFF CONTACT

SHORTED, OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i)

2)

4)

5)

e)

7)

a)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

SWITCHES/DISPLAYS

HEATERS

B SWITCH

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA 3 B [NA ]

LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL

PART NUMBER: DC.SD.HTR.4

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO EFFECT. NO ELECTRICAL CONNECTION TO OFF CONTACTS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-268
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 9/25/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 368

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

RETURN SPRING

STRUCTURAL FAILURE

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

9)

DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS

HAND CONTROLLERS

TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER

MECHANICAL

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT NDW/FUNC

PRBLAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER

PART NUMBER: DC.HC.THC.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

TRANSLATIONAL HAND CONTROLLER MUST ME MOVED BACK TO CENTER.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-269
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/14/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 401

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: ENCODER PHOTO DETECTORS

FAILURE MODE: ERRATIC OUTPUT

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) ENCODER

3)

4)

s)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B CN/A] C [N/A]

LOCATION" MCIU

PART NUMBER: ABE.EN. 1

CAUSES: CIRCUITRY FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

UNCOMMANDED MOTION DUE TO ERRONEOUS JOINT ANGLE DATA INPUT TO

S/W. ONE (OR MORE) OF THE 15 PHOTO SENSORS COULD FAIL, RESULTING

IN ERRATIC OUTPUT.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-270
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/14/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 402

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/I

ABORT: /

ITEM: ENCODER PHOTO DETECTORS

FAILURE MODE: FAIL OFF

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) ENCODER

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [N/A] C [N/A]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: ABE.EN. 2

CAUSES: LOSS OF +5.1V INPUT, CIRCUITRY FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

UNCOMMANDED MOTION DUE TO ERRONEOUS JOINT ANGLE DATA INPUT TO S/W

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-271
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE" 8/14/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 403

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: ENCODER ROTATING DISK

FAILURE MODE: ERRATIC OUTPUT

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) ENCODER

4;

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT z i/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B CN/A] C CN/A]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: ABE.EN.4

CAUSES: CONTAMINATION OF DISK

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

UNCOMMANDED MOTION DUE TO ERRONEOUS JOINT ANGLE DATA INPUT TO S/W

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-272
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE_

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID:

e/13/86

RMS

404

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

MOTOR-STATOR

MOTOR FAILS OFF

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) MOTOR

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B (N/A 3 C IN/A]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: ABE.MTR. 1

CAUSES: SHORT CIRCUIT TO STATORWINDINGS OR VOLTAGE TOO LOW

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

UNCOMMANDED PDR MOTION. JOINT MAY BE BACKDRIVEN

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-273
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/15/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 405

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/i

ABORT: /

ITEM: MOTOR BEARINGS

FAILURE MODE: MOTOR FAILS DUE TO SEIZED BEARINGS

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) MOTOR

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] s IN/A] C IN/A]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: ABE.MTR. 2

CAUSES: HIGH FRICTION DUE TO CONTAMINATION, GALLING, LACK OF

LUBRICATION

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

UNCOMMANDED PDR MOTION. JOINT IS FROZEN (i.e., MECHANICAL JAM),

JOINT CANNOT BE BACKDRIVEN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-274
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID:

8/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

RMS FLIGHT: i/1

406 ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

COUPLER

MOTOR SHAFT

MOTOR FAILS DUE TO BROKEN MOTOR SHAFT OR QUILL

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) MOTOR

3)

4)

5)

6)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: I/i AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B IN/A]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: ABE.MTR.3

m_WlnmC

I

I

I

I

C IN/A]

CAUSES: FATIGUE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

UNCOMMANDED PDR MOTION.

OPERABLE.

JOINT MAY BE BACKDRIVEN. BRAKE IS STILL

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-275
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE"

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

8/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

RMS FLIGHT: i/i

407 ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

GEAR

MOTOR SHAFT AND PININON GEAR

MOTOR FAILS DUE TO BROKEN DRIVE SHAFT OR PINION

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) MOTOR

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: ABE.MTR. 4

B IN/A] C [N/A]

CAUSES: FATIGUE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

UNCOMMANDED PDR MOTION. BRAKE WILLNOT HOLD JOINTTHEREBY MAKING

BACKDRIVE TECHNIQUES QUESTIONABLE. THE ONLY THING HOLDING THE

JOINT IS THE FRICTION IN THE GEAR TRAIN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-276
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/06/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 408

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: COMMUTATOR ROTATING DISK

FAILURE MODE: ERRATIC OUTPUT

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) COMMUTATOR

4)

5)

6)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORB I T: i/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B IN/A] C [N/A]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: ABE.COM. 1

CAUSES: CONTAMINATION OF DISK

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

UNCOMMANDED MOTION AS MOTOR IS NOT ABLE TO RUN PROPERLY. NO B/U

COMMUTATOR DISK. LOSS OF JOINT DRIVE BOTH IN PRIMARY AND B/U

MODES.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-277
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

8/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

RMS FLIGHT: i/i

409 ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

COMMUTATOR BUFFER AMPLIFIER ELECTRONICSELECT

NO OUTPUT. ALL THREE CHANNELS FAIL OFF

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) COMMUTATOR

3)

4)

5)

6)

_)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: ABE.COM.2

B CN/A] C CN/A]

CAUSES: LOSS OF 10.0V INPUT RAIL OR CIRCUITRY FAILURE OR

LOSS OF GROUND

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

UNCOMMANDED PDR MOTION.

TORQUE.

MOTOR IS UNABLE TO RUN OR PROVIDE

"REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-2_8
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

8/06/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

RMS FLIGHT: i/I

410 ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

COMMUTATOR BUFFER AMPLIFIER ELECTRONICSELECT

LOSS OF ONE CHANNEL

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) COMMUTATOR

3)

4)

s)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS : /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: ABE.COM.2

CAUSES: OP AMP FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

MOTOR WILL OPERATE IN A DEGRADED FASHION DUE TO A REDUCTION IN

MOTOR TORQUE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-279
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

_TE: 8/06/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 411

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: COMMUTATOR LED

FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) COMMUTATOR

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: /

LIFTOFF: /

ONORBIT: 1/1

DEORBIT: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

ABORT HDW/FUNC

RTLS: /

TAL: /

AOA: /

ATO: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: . A [NA ] B CN/A] C ON/A]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: ABE.COM.3

CAUSES: LOSS OF +5.1V INPUT RAIL.

SHORTED LEAD.

BURNED OUT LED. OPEN LEAD.

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

UNCOMMANDED MOTION. MOTOR IS UNABLE OT RUN OR PROVIDE TORQUE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-280
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/06/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 412

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/i

ABORT: /

ITEM: COMMUTATOR PHOTO SENSOR

FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF ONE CHANNEL

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) COMMUTATOR

3)

4)

s)

v)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]

LOCATION" MCIU

PART NUMBER: ABE.COM.4

CAUSES: CIRCUITRY FAILURE, OPEN OR SHORTED PHOTO SENSOR

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

MOTOR WILL OPERATE IN A DEGRADED FASHION DUE TO A REDUCTION IN

MOTOR TORQUE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-281
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/06/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 413

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/I

ABORT: /

ITEM: COMMUTATOR PHOTO SENSOR

FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF 2 OR MORE CHANNELS

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2 ) COMMUTATOR

3)

4)

S)

6)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [N/A] C [N/A]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: ABE.COM.4

CAUSES: CIRCUITRY FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

UNCOMMANDED PDR MOTION. MOTOR IS UNABLE TO RUN OR PROVIDE

SUFFICIENT TORQUE FOR OPERATION.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-282
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/06/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 414

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

COMMUTATOR OUTPUT DRIVER

NO OUTPUT

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) COMMUTATOR

3)

4)

5)

6)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS"

LIFTOFFt / TAL:

ONORBIT: i/i AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [N/A] C [N/A]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: ABE.COM.5

CAUSES: LOSS OF +I0VINPUT RAIL

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

UNCOMMANDED MOTION.

TORQUE.

MOTOR IS UNABLETO RUN OR PROVIDE SUFFICIENT

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-283
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM"

MDAC ID:

s/o6/86

RMS

415

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

COMMUTATOR OUTPUT DRIVER

LOSS OF ONE CHANNEL

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) COMMUTATOR

3)

4)

s)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBZT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B IN/A] C IN/A]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: ABE.COM.5

CAUSES: CIRCUITRY FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

MOTOR WILL OPERATE IN A DEGRADED FASHION DUE TO REDUCED TORQUE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-284
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/14/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 416

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: GEARBOX (GI)

FAILURE MODE: SHAFT FRACTURES

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) GEARBOX

3)

4)

s)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS : /

LIFTOFF" / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B IN/A] C IN/A]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: ABE.GB. 1

CAUSES: FATIGUE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE :

UNCOMMAND PDR MOTION. JOINT IS ESSENTIALLY FAILED UNRESTRAINED

(i.e.,) THERE IS SOME FRICTION IN G2 GEAR TRAIN). WON'T ATTEMPT

BACKDRIVE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-285
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 0/14/06

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 417

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

GEARBOX (G1)

GEARBOX JAM

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) GEARBOX

4)

S)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

I

/

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S IN/A] C [N/A]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: ABE.GB. 1

CAUSES: BEARING SEIZURE, GEAR FRACTURES, FATIGUE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

UNCOMMANDED PDR MOTION. JOINT IS FAILED FROZEN.

TECHNIQUES WILL NOT WORK.

BACKDRIVE

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-286
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 8/14/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 418

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: GEARBOX (G2)

FAILURE MODE: SHAFT FRACTURES

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) GEARBOX

:3)

4)

S)

6)

_')

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF" / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B IN/A] C IN/A]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: ABE.GB.2

CAUSES: FATIGUE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

UNCOMMANDED PDR MOTION.

ATTEMPT TO BACKDRIVE.

JOINT IS FAILED UNRESTRAINED. WONIT

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-287
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

8/14/86

RMS

419

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

GEARBOX (G2)

GEARBOX JAMS

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) G_OX

3)

4)

5)

6)

_)

e)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: ABE.GB. 2

B IN/A] C IN/A]

CAUSES: BEARING SEIZURE, GEAR FRACTURES, FATIGUE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE :

UNCOMMANDED PDR MOTION. JOINT IS FAILED FROZEN.

TECHNIQUES WILL NOT WORK.

BACKDRIVE

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-288
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

8/o6/86

42O

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/i

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

TACHOMETER ROTOR

NO OUTOUT OR ERRATIC OUTPUT

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) G_BOX

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B CN/A] C IN/A]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: ABE.TCH. 1

CAUSES: SHORTED ROTOR OR OPEN ROTOR

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

RUNAWAY. WORST CASE FAILURE. RUNAWAY COULD CAUSE DAMAGE TO

ORBITER OR INJURY TO CREW. NOTE: DIRECT DRIVE AND B/U MODE ARE

STILL AVAILABLE TO DRIVE THEARM.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-289
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

s/o6/86

RMS

421

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

TACHOMETER ROTOR

ERRONEOUS OUTPUT

LEAD ANAL¥ST_ R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

z) GEARBOX

3)

4)

5)

6)

'7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC " ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT z / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] s IN/A] C IN/A]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: ABE.TCH. 2

CAUSES: OPEN CIRCUIT OF COIL, LOSS OF EXCITATION TO COIL.

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

RUNAWAY. WORST CASE FAILURE. RUNAWAY COULD CAUSE DAMAGE TO

ORBITER OR INJURY TO CREW. NOTE: DIRECT DRIVE AND B/U MODE ARE

STILL AVAILABLE TO DRIVE THEARM.

REFERENCES •

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-290
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

8/o /e6

_S

422

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

COMMUTATOR BITE LOGIC

FAIL ON

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) TACHOMETER ELECTRONICS

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS : /

LIFTOFF: / TAL" /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA" /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: ABE.TE. 8

CAUSES: BITE CIRCUIT FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

BITE LOGIC INCORRECTLY ANNUNCIATES COMMUTATOR FAILURE.

BITE LOGIC. BITE DOESN'T INHIBIT JOINT DRIVE.

NO B/U

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-291
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

8/06/86

RMS

423

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

COMMUTATOR BITE LOGIC

FAIL OFF

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) TACHOMETER ELECTRONICS

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: ABE.TE.8

CAUSES: FAILED BITE CIRCUIT OUTPUT. FAILED 25 KHZ CLOCK SIGNAL.

EFFECTS/RATIONALE :

BITE LOGIC WILL NOT ANNUNCIATE COMMUTATOR FAILURE. NO B/U BITE

LOGIC.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-292
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

1o/21/86

RMS

424

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

POWER-ON RESET CONTROL

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) TACH ELECTRONICS

3)

4)

5)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.TE. 14

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

THE POR RESETS (ZEROIS) THE DATA LATCHES, SHIFT REGISTERS, ETC.

(ESSENTIALLY SAFING ON ONE JOINT). THIS COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED

MOTION OF THE POINT OF RESOLUTION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-293
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

io/21/s6

1_tS

425

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/i

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

POWER-ON RESET CONTROL

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) TACH ELECTRONICS

3)

4)

5)

6)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAYING: /

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.TE. 14

B [NA ] C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

THE LATCHES, SHIFT REGISTERS, ETC., WOULD NOT BE RESET WHEN THE

ARM IS SELECTED. THEREFORE, OLD DATA WOULD STILL BE PRESENT;

HOWEVER SINCE MCIU-ABE COMMUNICATIONS OCCURS ONCE EVERY 42 MSEC.,

THE "OLD" DATA WOULD BE PRESENT FOR ONLY 42 MSEC.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 ° C-294
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/21/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 426

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: CONTROLLER, POWER CONDITIONER

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) JPC

3)

4)

s)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: , /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.JPC.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

FAILURES OF THE CONTROLLER WILL HAVE THE SAME RESULT AS CONVERTER

FAILURES. FOR EXAMPLE, FAILURE OF THE 30 KHZ TRIANGULAR WAVE

GENERATOR CIRCUIT WOULD INHIBIT THE PWM OUTPUT OF THE CONTROLLER

WHICH IS REQUIRED FOR CONVERTER OUTPUT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-295
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/21/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 427

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: CONTROLLER, POWER CONDITIONER

FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) Jpc

4)

5)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFFZ / TAL: /

ONORBIT: I/I AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.JPC.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

SIMILARLY, FAILURE OF THE CURRENT BALANCE COMPARATOR STAGE OR

VOLTAGE FEEDBACK COMPARATOR STAGE COULD RESULT IN ERRATIC OUTPUT

OF THE CONVERTER OR AN OVERVOLTAGE/UNDERVOLTAGE/OVERCURRENT

CONDITION.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-296
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/21/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 428

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: CONVERTER, POWER CONDITIONER

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD= G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) JPC

3)

4)

s)

6)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.JPC. 1

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

THE LOSS OF +IOV OR +5.1V WILL "SHUTDOWN" THE ENCODER AND THE

COMMUNTATOR. LIKEWISE, THE LOSS OF +I0V OR +-ISV WILL SHUTDOWN

THE MDA. THESE FAILURES WILL AFFECT THREE JOINTS CAUSING

UNCOMMANDED POR MOTION DUE TO 3 JOINTS STOPPING.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-297
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/21/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 429

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: CONVERTER, POWER CONDITIONER

FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) JPC

3)

4)

5)

_)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT EDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.JPC.I

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

FAILURE OF A FULL WAVE RECTIFIER TO A HALF WAVE RECTIFIER COULD

CAUSE ERRATIC OUTPUT FROM THE ENCODER, COMMUTATOR, MDA, AND ABE

DATA BUS. WORST CASE-UNCOMMANDED POR MOTION.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-298
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

lo/21/86

RMS

430

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

CONVERTER, POWER CONDITIONER

ERRONEOUS OUTPUT

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) JPC

3)

4)

5)

6)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.JPC. 1

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

AN OVERVOLTAGE/UNDERVOLTAGE OR OVERCURRENT CONDITION WILL BE

SENSED IN THE PROTECTOR MODULE AND SHUT DOWN THE JPC. THIS

ACTION COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED POR MOTION.

REFERENCES_

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-299
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/21/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 431

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM" 28V BITE LOGIC

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) TACH ELECTRONICS

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

9)

SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.TE.9

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

THE BITE DOESNIT "DRIVE" ANYTHING WHICH COULD STOP THE ARM.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-300
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/21/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 432

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: 28V BITE LOGIC

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) TACH ELECTRONICS

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF" / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.TE.9

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

BITE DOESN'T PROVIDE ANY SAFETY FEATURES, THEREFORE ONLY THE

ANNUNCIATION (OF A SPA +28V SOURCE BELOW TOLERANCE LEVEL) WILL BE

LOST.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-301
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

lo/21/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 433

ITEM: TACH BITE

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 2/2

ABORT: /

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) TACH ELECTRONICS

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE • HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFIHG: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.TE.5

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

THE TACH BITE IS WHAT "DRIVES" AUTO BRAKES. THEREFORE, THE TACH

BITE FAILING "ON" WOULD CAUSE THE BRAKES TO BE APPLIED TO ALL SIX

JOINTS. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-302
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/21/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 434

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: TACH BITE

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) TACH ELECTRONICS

3)

4)

5)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA" /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.TE.5

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE :

BASED ON OUR GROUND RULES, FAILURE OF ANY BITE "OFF" IS 3/3.

THAT IS, AN ACTUAL TACH FAILURE IS ALREADY A i/i.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-303
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: lO/21/86

SUBSYSTEM" RMS

MDAC ID: 435

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: PROTECTOR, POWER CONDITIONER

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) ARM RASED ELECTRONICS

2) JPC

4)

5)

6)

v)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.JPC.3

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

A FAILURE WITHIN ANY ONE OF THE THREE PROTECTION CIRCUITS WILL

CAUSE THE JPC TO SHUTDOWN. THIS COULD RESULT IN UNCOMMANDED

MOTION OF THE POR.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-304
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

lO/21/86

RMS

436

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

PROTECTOR, POWER CONDITIONER

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) JPC

3)

4)

s)

s)

7)

e)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.JPC.3

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

FAILURE OF THE PROTECTION CIRCUIT TO DETECT A PROBLEM IS IN

ITSELF A 3/3. AN ACTUAL FAILURE OF THE JPC, IN CONJUCTION WITH

THIS FAILURE, IS REALLY NO WORSE THAN JUST THE ACTUAL JPC

FAILURE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-305
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE" 10/21/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 437

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: PROTECTOR, POWER CONDITIONER

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) JPC

3)

4)

s)

6)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFIHG: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.JPC. 3

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

THE JPC BITE FLAG DOES NOT "DRIVE" ANYTHING WHICH COULD STOP THE

ARM.

REFERENCES :

REPORT °DATE 01/27/87 C-306
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/2 i/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 438

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: PROTECTOR, POWER CONDITIONER

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) JPC

3)

4)

5)

6)

v)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.JPC.3

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

THE JPC BITE FLAG DOES NOT "DRIVE" ANYTHING WHICH COULD STOP THE

ARM.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-307
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATZ: 10/21/S6

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 439

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/i

ABORT: /

ITEM: SCU

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.SCU.I

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF FEEDBACK TO THE PLL COULD CAUSE A RUNAWAY/UNCOMMANDED

MOTION OF THE POR.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-308
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/21/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 440

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: SCU

FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.SCU.I

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

BIASED FEEDBACK TO PLL COULD CAUSE A RUNAWAY/UNCOMMANDED MOTION

OF THE POR IN THE BIASED LOW CASE AND SLUGGISHNESS OF JOINT

MOTION (AND POR) IN THE BIASED HIGH CASE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-309
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

lo/21/86

RMS

441

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/i

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

POSITION ENCODER DATA PROCESSING

ERRONEOUS OUTPUT

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) ZNCODER

4)

S)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.EN. 3

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

UNCOMMANDED MOTION DUE TO ERRONEOUS JOINT ANGLE DATA INPUT TO GPC

SOFTWARE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-310
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

io/21/86

1_tS

442

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

POSITION ENCODER DATA PROCESSING

ERRATIC OUTPUT

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) _CODF,R

4)

5)

6)

:')

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.EN. 3

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

UNCOMMANDED MOTION DUE TO ERRONEOUS JOINT ANGLE DATA INPUT TO GPC

SOFTWARE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/S7 C-311
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

Io/21/86

IU_S

443

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

POSITION ENCODER DATA PROCESSING

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) ENCODER

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCE: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.EN. 3

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

UNCOMMANDED MOTION DUE TO ERRONEOUS JOINT ANGLE DATA INPUT TO GPC

SOFTWARE.

REFERENCES •

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-312
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

444 ABORT:

ITEM: + 10V

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) TACH ELECTRONICS

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] BCF] CCF]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.TE. 1

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE

CAPABILITIES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

HDW/FUNC

2/IR

/

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-313
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/21/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

445 ABORT:

ITEM: + 10V

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: O. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) TACH ELECTRONICS

3)

4)

5)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] C[F]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.TE. 1

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE

CAPABILITIES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

HDW/FUNC

211R

/

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-314
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

446 ABORT:

ITEM: + 28V

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) TACH ELECTRONICS

3)

4)

S)

6)

7)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL" /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] DCF] C/F]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.TE.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

SETS POWER FAIL BIT. LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.

OF AUTO EE CAPABILITIES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

HDW/FUNC

2/IR

/

LOSS

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-315
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

447 ABORT:

ITEM: + 28V

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) TACH ELECTRONICS

3)

4)

S)

6)

7)

a)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE NDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] BC ] cCF]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.TE.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

SETS POWER FAIL BIT. LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.

OF AUTO EE CAPABILITIES. DIRECT AND BA_ REMAIN.

HDWlFUNC

211R

/

LOSS

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-316
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/22/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 448

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: D/A CONVERTER

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) TACH ELECTRONICS

3)

4)

S)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: I/I AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO=

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWln C

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.TE.3

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

JOINT WILL MOVE AT AN ERRATIC SPEED.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-317
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

449 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/1R

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

D/A CONVERTER

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) TACH ELECTRONICS

4)

S)

6)

7)

a)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION- ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.TE. 3

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-318
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/22/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 450

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: ENCODER FEEDBACK

FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) TACH ELECTRONICS

3)

4)

S)

6)

S)

9)

CRITI C2LLITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.TE. 4

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-319
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 451 ABORT:

HDWIFUNC

2/1R

I

ITEM: ENCODER FEEDBACK

FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBS¥S LEAD" G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) TACH ELECTRONICS

3)

4)

S)

S)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE. TE. 4

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-320
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/22/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 452

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: I/P CLOCK OR SYNCH SIGNAL

FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) TACH ELECTRONICS

3)

4)

s)

6)

a)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.TE.6

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-321
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

453 ABORT:

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

I/P CLOCK OR SYNCH SIGNAL

LOSS OF OUTPUT

HDW/FUNC

2/IR

/

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) TACH ELECTRONICS

4)

5)

6)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: /

LIFTOFF: /

ONORBIT: 2/1R

DEORBIT: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

ABORT

RTLS:

TAL:

AOA:

ATO:

HDWI_mC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.TE. 6

B [NA ] C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-322
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/22/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 454

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: O/P CLOCK OR SYNCH SIGNAL

FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) TACH ELECTRONICS

3)

4)

5)

7)

a)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE NDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.TE.7

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-323
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

455 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/IR

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

O/P _CK OR SYNCH SIGNAL

LOSS OF OUTPUT

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) TACH ELECTRONICS

4)

S)

6)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBXT; / ATO; /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS; A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.TE.7

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALLCOMPUTERAUGMENTED MODES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-324
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/22/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 456

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: 3.2 MHZ OSC

FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) TACH ELECTRONICS

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS" A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.TE.10

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-325
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

457 ABORT:

HDW/FUN¢

2/IR

/

ITEM"

FAILURE MODE:

3.2 MHZ OSC

LOSS OF OUTPUT

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) TACH ELECTRONICS

3)

4)

s)

6)

v)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: /

LIFTOFF: /

ONORBIT: 2/1R

DEORBIT" /

LANDING/SAFING: /

ABORT

RTLS:

TAL:

AOA:

ATO:

HDW/FUNC

/

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]

LOCATION" ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.TE. i0

B [NA ] C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-326
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/22/86

l_S

458

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

SHIFT REGISTERS

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) TACH ELECTRONICS

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO" /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] . C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.TE. ii

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE :

POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-327
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

459 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/1R

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

SHIFT REGISTERS

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) TACH ELECTRONICS

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9_

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / HTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.TE. ii

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-328
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/22/86

RMS

460

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

DIGITAL F/B (ENCODER)

ERRONEOUS OUTPUT

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) TACH ELECTRONICS

3)

4)

5)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO- /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C _NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.TE.12

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-329
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 461 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/1R

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

DIGITAL F/B (ENCODER)

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) TACH ELECTRONICS

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.TE. 12

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-330
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/22/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 462

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/i

ABORT: /

ITEM: ANALOG F/B (COMMUTATOR)

FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) TACH ELECTRONICS

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: I/i AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.TE.13

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-331
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 463 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/1R

/

ITEM: ANALOG F/B (COMMUTATOR)

FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) TACH ELECTRONICS

3)

4)

S)

6)

7)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

/

I

I

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.TE.13

B [NA ] C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALLCOMPUTERAUGMENTED MODES. DIRECT AND BACKUPREMAIN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-332
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

464 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/IR

I

ITEM: + 10V

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) MDA

_)

4)

S)

6)

'7)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH, / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: _ / TAL,

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA,

DEORBIT, / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING, /

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]

LOCATION" ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA. 4

B [NA ] C CNA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALLCOMPUTERAUGMENTED MODES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-333
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 465 ABORT:

ITEM: + 28V

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) MDA

4)

5)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA.13

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

WILL NOT ALLOW BRAKES TO BE RELEASED. LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER

AUGMENTED MODES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

HDW/FUNC

2/1R

/

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-334
_NDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

466 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/IR

/

ITEM: + 5.1V

FAILURE MODE- OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) MDA

3)

4)

5)

7)

8)

9)

FLIGHT PHASE

PRELAUNCH:

LIFTOFF:

ONORBIT:

DEORBIT:

LANDING/SAFING:

CRITICALITIES

HDW/FUNC ABORT

/ RTLS:

/ TAL:

2/IR AOA:

/ ATO:

/

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA.16

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-335
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

467 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/IR

/

ITEM: - 15V

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) MDA

3)

4)

5)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF= / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA. 6

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE_

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-336
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 468 ABORT:

HDW/nm¢

2/IR

/

ITEM: + 15V

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) MDA

3)

4)

5)

6)

v)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT NDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA. 8

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-337
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/23/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

469 ABORT:

HDW/nn_C

2/1R

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

MDA INHIB

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) MDA

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

FLIGHT PHASE

PRELAUNCH:

LIFTOFF:

ONORBIT:

DEORBIT:

LANDING/SAFING:

CRITICALITIES

HDW/FUNC ABORT

/ RTLS:

/ TAL:

2/IR AOA:

/ ATO:

/

HDW/FU_C

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B CNA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA.15

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

WILL NOT BE ABLE TO DRIVE JOINT.

MODES.

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-338
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/23/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 470

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: MDA INHIB

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) MDA

3)

4)

5)

6)

v)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH" /

LIFTOFF: /

ONORBIT: 3/3

DEORBIT: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

ABORT

RTLS:

TAL:

AOA:

ATO:

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA. 15

B [NA ] C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CONSTANT "BRAKES OFF" SIGNAL TO SCU.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01127/87 C-339 "
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/23/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

471 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/IR

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

MTR TRANSFER RELAY

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) MDA

3)

4)

5)

6)

V)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlFUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALLCOMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.

MODE.

BACKUP IS ONLY REMAINING

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-340
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

zo/23/s6

RMS

472

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 2/2

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

MTRTRANSFERHELAY

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

Z) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) MDA

3)

4)

5)

s)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: /

LIFTOFF: • /

ONORBIT: 2/2

DEORBIT: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

ABORT

RTLS:

TAL:

AOA:

ATO:

HDW/FUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA. 2

B [NA ] C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF BACKUP MODE. ALL OTHERS REMAIN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-341
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/24/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

473 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/1R

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

PWMGENERATOR

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) MDA

3)

4)

s)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT= 2/IR AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

KDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S IRA] C [NA ]

LOCATION= ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA.II

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALLCOMPUTERAUGMENTED MODES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-342
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/24/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

474 ABORT:

HDW/nmC

2/1R

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

PWMSWITCHDRIVERS

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) MDA

3)

4)

s)

6)

v)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA. 9

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE :

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-343
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID"

10/24/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

475 ABORT:

HDW/nmC

2/LR

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

COMMUTATOR I/P SIGNAL

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) MDA

_)

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

9)

FLIGHT PHASE

PRELAUNCH: /

LIFTOFF: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR

DEORBIT: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

CRITICALITIES

HDW/FUNC ABORT

RTLS:

TAL:

AOA:

ATO:

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A (NA ] B [NA ] C (NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA.9

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-344
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

lO/24/86

RMS

476

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

DIR/ B/U /BRAKE SWITCHING LOGIC

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) MDA

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS"

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

HDW/FUNC

I

I

I

I

C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA. 3

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF BRAKES.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-345
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE"

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

Io/24/86

RMS

477

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

DIR/ B/U /BRAKE SWITCHING LOGIC

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) MDA

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

FLIGHT PHASE

PRELAUNCH:

LIFTOFF:

ONORBIT:

DEORBIT:

LANDING/SAFING:

CRITICALITIES

HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

/ RTLS: /

/ TAL. /

i/I AOA: /

/ ATO: /

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA.3

B [NA ] C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF DIRECT MODE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-346
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/24/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 478

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 2/2

ABORT: /

ITEM: MDA BITE LOGIC

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) MDA

3)

4)

5)

6)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC " ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

_DW/_U_C

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA.5

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

POSSIBLE ERRONEOUS CONSISTANCY CHECK MESSAGES.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-347
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/24/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 479

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/i

ABORT: /

ITEM: MDA BITE LOGIC

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) MDA

3)

4)

s)

6)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ] .

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA.5

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

FAILS TO ANNUNCIATE OVERCURRENT CONDITION IN CURRENT LIMIT

CIRCUIT. POSSIBLE UNEXPECTED JOINT SPEED.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-348
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/27/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 480

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: MTR CURRENT SENSE RESISTOR

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) .ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) MDA

a)

s)

s)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBI T: i/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA. 1

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE :

POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-349
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

lo/2_/86

RMS

481

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

MTR CURRENT SENSE RESISTOR

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) MDA

3)

4)

5)

6)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: /

LIFTOFF: /

ONORBIT: I/I

DEORBIT: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

ABORT

RTLS:

TAL:

AOA:

ATO:

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA. 1

s rNA ] c [NX ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-350
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/27/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 482

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: POWER "ON" RESET

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) MDA

3)

4)

5)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA. i0

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 " C-351
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE"

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

lO/27/86

RMS

483

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

PO_ nON tt RESET

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) MDA

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

e)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH" / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C (NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA. I0

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-352
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE; 10/27/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 484

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLI GET: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: CURRENT LIMITER

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) MDA

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: I/i AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA.12

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-353
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/27/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 485

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: CURRENT LIMITER

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) MDA

_)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA.12

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-354
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/27/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 486

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: MTR TRANSFER RELAY

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) BDA

3)

4)

5)

s)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.BDA. 1

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF DIRECT MODE. ARM

WILL HAVE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. ARM WILL MOVE AS SOON AS JOINT IS

SELECTED.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-355
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBS ¥STEM:

MDAC ID:

lo/27/86

l_tS

487

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

MTR TRANSFER RELAY

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) BDA

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT NDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE. BDA. 1

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL MODES.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-356
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/27/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 488

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: PWM

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2 ) BDA

3)

4)

s)

v)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: I/i AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.BDA.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.

REFERENCES:

J

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-357
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE- 10/27/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 489

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: PWM

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) BDA

])

4)

5)

6)

V)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: i/i AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] c [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.BDA.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF JOINT. ALL OTHER MODES REMAIN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-358
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10127186

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 490

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLI GNT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: PWM SWITCH ELECTRONICS

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD" G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) BDA

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE " HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

_._I_TC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [s_ ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.BDA. 3

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. ALL OTHER MODES REMAIN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-359
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID:

lO/27/s6

RMS

491

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

PWM SWITCH ELECTRONICS

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) ARM RASED ELECTRONICS

2 ) BDA

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFIMG: /

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[S%] c [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER" ABE.BDA. 3

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF JOINT. ALL OTHER MODES REMAIN.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-360
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10127186

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 492

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: + 28V

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) BDA

3)

4)

s)

6)

7)

e)

9)

FLIGHT PHASE

PRELAUNCH:

LIFTOFF:

ONORBIT:

DEORBIT:

LANDING/SAFING:

CRITICALITIES

HDW/FUNC ABORT

/ RTLS:

I TAL:

i/I AOA:

/ ATO:

/

HDWlnmC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.BDA. 4

B [NA ] O [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF JOINT. ALL OTHER MODES REMAIN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-361
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID:

lo/2_/s6

RMS

493

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/i

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

BDAPWRCONDITIONER

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) BDA

4)

s)

_)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FU_C

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] c [_A ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.BDA. 5

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. ALL OTHER MODES REMAIN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-362
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

lO/2_/86

RMS

494

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

BDA PWR CONDITIONER

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) BDA

3)

4)

5)

6)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

RDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE. BDA. 5

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF JOINT. ALL OTHER MODES REMAIN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-363
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

lo/2v/s6

RMS

495

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

ANALOG PROCESSOR

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) BDA

3)

4)

5)

6)

v)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH" / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] D CRA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.BDA. 5

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. ALL OTHERMODES REMAIN.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-364
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/27/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 496

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: ANALOG PROCESSOR

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) BDA

3)

4)

s)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: I/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.BDA. 5

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF JOINT. ALL OTHER MODES REMAIN.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-365
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

lo/2_/86

RMS

497

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

POWER SIGNAL CONDITIONER

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) BDA

4)

5)

6)

_)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.BDA.6

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

POSSIBLE UNCOMMMANDED MOTION. ALL OTHER MODES REMAIN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-366
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10127185

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 498

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: POWER SIGNAL CONDITIONER

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) BDA

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDZNG/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.BDA.6

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF JOINT. ALL OTHER MODES REMAIN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-367
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

Io/27/s6

RMS

499

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/i

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

B/U COMMUTATOR

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2)

3)

4)

5)

_)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL"

ONORBIT: i/I AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAF ING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE. BCM

SDW/n._C

/

I

/

/

A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF JOINT. ALL OTHER MODES REMAIN.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-368
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/27/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 500

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: ELECTRICAL

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) BRAK_

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: /

LIFTOFF: /

ONORBIT: 1/1

DEORBIT: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

ABORT

RTLS:

TAL:

AOA:

ATO:

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B CNA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.BRK.I

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT PUT BRAKES ON.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-369
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/2_/S_

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 501

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: ELECTRICAL

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) BRAKE

4)

S)

6)

7)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

_DW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.BRK.I

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT TAKE BRAKES OFF.

DIRECT DRIVE REMAINS.

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.

.REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-37_
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/27/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 502

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: MECHANICAL

FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) BRAKE

3)

4)

5)

6)

_)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: /

LIFTOFF: /

ONORBIT: I/1

DEORBIT: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

ABORT

RTLS:

TAL:

AOA:

ATO:

_DWlnmC

/

/

I

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.BRK.2

B [NA ] C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF BRAKES.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-371
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/27/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDACID: 503 ABORT:

ITEM: MECHANICAL

FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYSLEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) BRAKE

3)

4)

5)

6)

v)

s)

9)

FLIGHT PHASE

PRELAUNCH"

LIFTOFF:

ONORBIT:

DEORBIT:

LANDING/SAFING:

CRITICALITIES

HDW/FUNC ABORT

/ RTLS:

/ TAL;

2/IR AOA:

/ ATO:

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: _ [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.BRK.2

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

/

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

BRAKES CANNOT OPEN.

DRIVE REMAINS.

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODE.

HDW/FUNC

2/1R

/

DIRECT

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-372
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/27/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 504

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: FWD/BACKDRIVE FLAG

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) MDA

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS : /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA. 14

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CONSISTANCY CHECK IS DISABLED. WILL HAVE NO EFFECT AS LONG AS

EVERYTHING ELSE WORKS CORRECTLY.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-373
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10127186

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 505

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: FWD/BACKDRIVE FLAG

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: R. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARM BASED ELECTRONICS

2) MDA

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] a IRA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ABE.MDA. 14

HDW/FUNC

I

I

I

I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CONSISTANC¥ CHECK IS ENABLED.

IF JOINT IS BACKDRIVEN.

WILL GET FALSE CONSISTANCY CHECKS

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01127/87 C-374
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE" 10/07/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 601

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: 16 CHANNEL ANALOG MULTIPLEXOR (3)

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) MCIU

2) MADC

3)

4)

5)

6)"

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.AD.I

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

MULTIPLEXOR WILL OUTPUT ERRONEOUS RHC AND THC COMMANDS.

RHC AND THC CAPABILITIES OR POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.

ERRONEOUS TEMPERATURE DATA COULD BE DISPLAYED.

LOSS OF

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-375
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID:

10/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

602 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/IR

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

16 CHANNEL ANALOG MULTIPLEXOR (3)

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MC_

2) MADC

4)

5)

s)

7)

s)

9)

FLIGHT PHASE

PRELAUNCH:

LIFTOFF:

ONORBIT:

DEORBIT:

LANDING/SAFING:

CRITICALITIES

HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

/ RTLS: /

I TAL: I

211R AOA: I

I ATO: I

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F) C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.AD. 1

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

MULTIPLEXOR WILL NOT OUTPUT RHC AND THC COMMANDS. LOSS OF RHC

AND THC CAPABILITIES. ALSO NO TEMPERATURE DATA WILL BE

DISPLAYED.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-376
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID:

10107186

I_IS

6O3

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

BINARY COUNTERS (2)

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) MCIU

2) M_Dc

3)

4)

5)

6)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.AD. 2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

COUNTER WILL OUTPUT ERRONEOUS DATA. LOSS OF RHC AND THC

CAPABILITIES OR POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. ERRONEOUS

TEMPERATURE DATA COULD BE DISPLAYED.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-377
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

604 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/IR

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

BINARY COUNTERS (2)

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCZU

2) mu_c

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW'/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.AD.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

COUNTER WILL NOT OUTPUT DATA. LOSS OF RHC AND THC CAPABILITIES.

ALSO NO TEMPERATURE DATA WILL BE DISPLAYED.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-378
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/07/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 605

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: SAMPLE AND HOLD GATED OPAMP

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) MCIU

2) MAOC

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

a)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] s[_] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.AD. 3

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

AMP WILL OUTPUT ERRONEOUS RHC AND THC COMMANDS.

THC CAPABILITIES OR POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.

TEMPERATURE DATA COULD BE DISPLAYED.

LOSS OF RHC AND

ERRONEOUS

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-379
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/0'7/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

606 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/1R

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

SAMPLE AND HOLD GATED OP AMP

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCrU

2) MADC

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] DCF] CCF]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.AD.3

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

AMP WILL NOT OUTPUT RHC AND THC COMMANDS. LOSS OF RHC AND THC

CAPABILITIES. ALSO NO TEMPERATURE DATA WILL BE DISPLAYED.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-380
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/07/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 607

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM" VOLTAGE COMPARATOR

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) _,DC

3)

4)

s)

s)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.AD.4

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

COMPARATOR OUTPUTS ERRONEOUS CURRENT. LOSS OF RHC AND THC

CAPABILITIES OR POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. ERRONEOUS

TEMPERATURE DATA COULD BE DISPLAYED.

REFERENCES=

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-381
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 608 ABORT:

HDWIFUNC

2/IR

I

ITEM: VOLTAGE COMPARATOR

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) MCIU

2) MADC

_)

4)

S)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.AD.4

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

COMPARATORWILLNOT OUTPUT ANY CURRENT. LOSS OF RHC AND THC

CAPABILITIES. ALSO NO TEMPERATURE DATA WILL BE DISPLAYED.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-382
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID:

1o/o7/s6

_S

6O9

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

ANALOG TO DIGITAL CONVERTER

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCZU

2) MADC

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF_ / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] CCF]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.AD.5

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

AD CONVERTER WILL OUTPUT ERRONEOUS RHC AND THC COMMANDS. LOSS OF

RHC AND THC CAPABILITIES OR UNCOMMANDED MOTION. ERRONEOUS

TEMPERATURE DATA COULD BE DISPLAYED.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-383
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

610 ABORT:

HDWlFUNC

211R

I

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

ANALOG TO DIGITAL CONVERTER

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) MCIU

2) MADC

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

e)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS •

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.AD.5

AC2] BCF] CCF]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

AD CONVERTER WILL NOT OUTPUT RHC AND THC COMMANDS. LOSS OF RHC

AND THC CAPABILITIES. ALSO NO TEMPERATURE DATA WILL BE

DISPLAYED.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-384
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID_

lO/O7/86

RMS

611

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

QUAD 3-STATE R/S LATCHES (2)

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) MC_U

2) m_DC

3)

4)

S)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / HTLS: /

LIFTOFFz / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENSz A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.AD. 6

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LATCH WILL OUTPUT ERRONEOUS RHC AND THC COMMANDS. LOSS OF RHC

AND THC CAPABILITIES OR UNCOMMANDED MOTION. ERRONEOUS

TEMPERATURE DATA COULD BE DISPLAYED.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-385
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

612 ABORT:

HDWlFUNC

211R

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

QUAD 3-STATE R/S LATCHES (2)

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) MCIU

2) MADC

3)

4)

S)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.AD. 6

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LATCH WILLNOT OUTPUT RHCAND THC COMMANDS. LOSS OF RHC AND THC

CAPABILITIES. ALSO NO TEMPERATURE DATA WILL BE DISPLAYED.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-386
DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

1o/o7/e6

RMS

613

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

MULTIWINDING OUTPUT TRANSFORMER

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MClU

2 ) M CPC

4)

5)

6)

v)

8)

9)

CRITICAI_TIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[2] B/F] CCF]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.PC. 1

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE

CAPABILITY. LOSS OF MANUAL SAFING. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-387
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 614 ABORT:

ITEM: MULTIWINDING OUTPUT TRANSFORMER

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCl"U

2) MCPC

3)

4)

5)

6)

v)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:

•DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.PC.I

_mWl_-Nc

I

I

I

I

C[F]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.

CAPABILITY. LOSS OF MANUAL SAYING.

LOSS OF AUTO EE

HDWIFUNC

2/1R

/

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-388
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/07/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 615

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: 2-PHASE PWM

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) MCPC

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO" /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.PC. 3

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE

CAPABILITY. LOSS OF MANUAL SAFINGANDPOSSIBLEUNCOMMANDED

MOTION.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-389
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: i0/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 616 ABORT:

ITEM: 2-PHASE PWM

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) MCIU

2) MCPC

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

9)

FLIGHT PEASE

PRELAUNCH:

LIFTOFF:

ONORBIT:

DEORBIT:

LANDING/SAFING:

CRITICALITIES

HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

I RTLS: I

I TAL: I

21_ _OA: I

/ ATO: /

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.PC.3

A[2 ] B[F] C[F]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.

CAPABILITY. LOSS OF MANUAL SAFING.

LOSS OF AUTO EE

HDW/FUNC

2/1R

/

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01127187 C-390
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

zo/o'7/s_

61"/

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

POWER SWITCHING TRANSISTORS

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) MCPC

3)

4)

5)

7)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.PC.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE

CAPABILITY. LOSS OF MANUAL SAFING. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-391
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 618 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/1R

/

ITEM: POWER SWITCHING TRANSISTORS

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) MCIU

2) MCPC

3)

4)

S)

6)

7)

8)

9)

FLIGHT PHASE

PRELAUNCH:

LIFTOFF:

ONORBIT:

DEORBIT:

LANDING/SAFING:

CRITICALITIES

HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

/ RTLS: /

I TAL: I

2/IR AOA: /

I ATO: I

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.PO.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.

LOSS OF MANUAL SAFING.

LOSS OF EE CAPABILITY.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-392
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

lO/07/86

RMS

619

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

30-KHZ TRIANGULAR WAVE GENERATOR

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) MCPC

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORB IT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING" /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.PC.4

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALLCOMPUTERAUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE

CAPABILITY. LOSS OF MANUAL SAFING. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01127187 C-393
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 620 ABORT:

ITEM: 30-KHZ TRIANGULAR WAVE GENERATOR

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) McPC

3)

4)

S)

S)

e)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] S[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.PC. 4

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

C(F]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.

CAPABILITY. LOSS OF MANUAL SAFING.

LOSS OF AUTO EE

HDWlFUNC

211R

I

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-394
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/07/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 621

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: DIFFERENTIAL AMPLIFIER PWM ADJUSTER

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) MCIU

2) MCPC

3)

4)

S)

7)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /

DEORBIT" / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.PC.5

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE

CAPABILITY. LOSS OF MANUAL SAFING. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-395
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDACID: 622 ABORT:

ITEM: DIFFERENTIAL AMPLIFIER PWMADJUSTER

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) MCPC

3)

4)

5)

S)

S)

9)

FLIGHT PHASE

PRELAUNCH:

LIFTOFF:

ONORBIT:

DEORBIT:

LANDING/SAFING:

CRITICALITIES

HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

/ RTLS: /

I TAL: I

211R AOA: I

/ ATO: /

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] BCF] CCF]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.PC.5

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALLCOMPUTERAUGMENTED MODES.

CAPABILITY. LOSS OF MANUAL SAFING.

LOSS OF AUTO EE

HDW/FUN¢

2/1R

/

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-396
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

RMS FLIGHT: I/1

623 ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

OP AMP, 30 KHZ TRIANGULAR WAVE WIDTH ADJUSTER

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) MCIU

2) MCPC

3)

4)

s)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.PC. 6

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE

CAPABILITY. LOSS OF MANUAL SAFING. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-397
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDACID: 624 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/iR

/

ITEMFAILURE MODE:

OP AMP, 30 KHZ TRIANGULAR WAVE WIDTH ADJUSTER

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCrU

2) MCPC

s)

4)

5)

e)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlFUNC

/

I

I

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.PC.6

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.

CAPABILITY. LOSS OF MANUAL SAFING.

LOSS OF AUTO EE

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-398
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

lO/O7/8_

RMS

625

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

RECTIFIER MODULES

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) MCPC

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[_]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.PC. 7

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE

CAPABILITY. LOSS OF MANUAL SAFING. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-399
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/07/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 626 ABORT:

ITEM: RECTIFIER MODULES

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYSTI B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) MCPC

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] S[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.PC.7

HDWlFUNC

/

/

/

/

C[F]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.

CAPABILITY. LOSS OF MANUAL SAFING.

LOSS OF AUTO EE

HDWlFUNC

211R

I

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-400
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/08/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 627

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: MIA

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) COMPUTER INTERFACE BOARD

3)

4)

s)

6)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: I/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlnn_C

I

I

I

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.CI. 1

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.

MOTION.

POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-401
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE"

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

628 ABORT:

ITEM: MIA

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) MC_U

2) COMPUTER INTERFACE BOARD

4)

S)

6)

7)

a)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF" / TAL:

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.CI.I

A[2] B[F] C[F]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.

HDWlFUNC

211R

/

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-402
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE"

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

lO/O8/86

l_tS

629

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

CLOCK DIVIDER CIRCUIT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFABLLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCl-_

2) COMZ_rr_ INTE_CE BOARD

3)

4)

5)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT" i/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[.F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.CI.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.

MOTION.

POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-403
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

630 ABORT:

ITEM"

FAILURE MODE:

CLOCK DIVIDER CIRCUIT

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MC_

2) COMPUTER INTERFACE BOARD

3)

4)

5)

s)

v)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.CI.2

AC2] B[F] CCF]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALLCOMPUTERAUGMENTED MODES.

HDW/n_C

2/IR

/

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-404
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

zo/oe/e6

RMS

631

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

16 MHZ CRYSTAL OSCILLATOR

ERRONEOUS OUTPUT

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) COMPUTER INTERFACE BOARD

3)

4)

S)

6)

7)

e)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: /

LIFTOFF: /

ONORBIT: 1/1

DEORBIT: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.CI.3

ABORT

RTLS:

TAL:

AOA:

ATO:

A[2 ] B[F]

HDW/FUNC

I

I

I

I

CCF]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.

MOTION.

POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-405
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDACID: 632 ABORT:

ITEM: 16 MHZ CRYSTALOSCILLATOR

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYSLEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) COMPUTER INTERFACE BOARD

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

a)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.CI.3

HDWlFUNC

I

I.

I

I

A[2] B[F] C[F]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.

HDWlFUNC

2/IR

/

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-406
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE"

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID"

10/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

RMS FLIGHT: i/I

633 ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

O/P PARALLEL TO SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER (3)

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) COMPUTER INTERFACE BOARD

s)

4)

s)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS :

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.CI. 4

A[2] B[F] C[F]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF DISPLAY AND CONTROL AND HAND CONTROLLER DATA INTO THE

MIA. LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED

MOTION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-407
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 634 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/1R

/

ITEM: O/P PARALLEL TO SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER (3)

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) Hera

2) COMPUTER INTERFACE BOARD

3)

4)

s)

_)

_)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] n[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.CI.4

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF DISPLAY AND CONTROL AND HAND CONTROLLER DATA INTO THE

MIA. LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-40S
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT: I/1

MDACID: 635 ABORT: /

ITEM: I/P SERIAL TO PARALLEL SHIFT REGISTER

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) MCIU

2) COMPUTER INTERFACE BOARD

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] BCF] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.CI.5

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE :

LOSS OF DISPLAY AND CONTROL AND HAND CONTROLLER DATA OUT OF THE

MIA. LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED

MOTION.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01127187 C-409
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

636 , ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/IR

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

I/P SERIAL TO PARALLEL SHIFT REGISTER

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) MCIU

2) COMPUTER INTERFACE BOARD

3)

4)

s)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.CI.5

A[2 ] B[F] C [F]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS DISPLAY AND CONTROL AND HAND CONTROLLER DATA OUT OF THE MIA.

LOSS OF ALLCOMPUTERAUGMENTED MODES.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-410
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

zo/o8/86

RMS

637

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

TRANSMIT TIMING CONTROL

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCZU

2) COMPUTER INTERFACE BOARD

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS :

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.CI. 6

A[2] B[F] C[F]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

ERRONEOUS TDA SIGNAL WILL REACH THE MIAWHICH PREVENTS DATA FROM

BEING SENT TO THE GPC. LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.

POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-411
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/08/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 638 ABORT:

HDWlFUNC

211R

/

ITEM: TRANSMIT TIMING CONTROL

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) COMPUTER INTERFACE BOARD

3)

4)

s)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS :

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.CI. 6

A[2 ] B(F] C[F]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

TDA SIGNAL WILLNOT REACH THE MIAWHICHPREVENTS DATA FROM BEING

SENT TOT HE GPC. LOSS OF ALLCOMPUTERAUGMENTED MODES.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-412
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID:

10/09/96

_S

639

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

RECEIVE TIMING CONTROL

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) COMPUTER INTERFACE BOARD

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.CI.7

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE :

PREVENTS GPC/MCIU COMMUNICATION. LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED

MODES. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-413
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID:

10/09/96 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

640 ABORT:

HDWIFUNC

2/IR

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

RECEIVE TIMING CONTROL

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCI"U

2) COMPUTER INTERFACE BOARD

3)

4)

5)

6)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFFz / TAL:

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.CI.7

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

PREVENTS GPC/MCIU COMMUNICATION.

MODES.

LOSS OF ALLCOMPUTER AUGMENTED

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-414
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/09/96 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 641 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

i/I

/

ITEM: BRAKE STATUS OPTO ISOLATOR

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) FAILURE DETECTION BOARD

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.FD.I

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL SAFING CAPABILITY. LOSS OF AUTO BRAKING. LOSS OF

CAPTURE/RELEASE CAPABILITY. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. LOSS

OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. DIRECT AND BACKUP CAPABILITY

REMAIN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-415
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/09/96 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 642 ABORT:

ITEM: BRAKE STATUS OPTO ISOLATOR

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) FAILURE DETECTION BOARD

3)

4)

S)

V)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] CEF]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER" MCU.FD. 1

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.

CAPABILITY REMAIN.

DIRECT AND BACKUP

HDW/FUNC

2/1R

/

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-416
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/09/96 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT: i/1

MDAC ID: 643 ABORT: /

ITEM: BRAKE DRIVE SWITCHES

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

/

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) MCXU

2) FAILURE DETECTION BOARD

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: /

LIFTOFF: /

ONORBIT: i/1

DEORBIT: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

ABORT

RTLS:

TAL:

AOA:

ATO:

HDWlnn_C

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F)

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.FD.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF BRAKES. LOSS OF DIRECT DRIVE.

CAPABILITY.

LOSS OF AUTO BRAKING

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-417
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/09/96 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 644 ABORT:

ITEM: BRAKE DRIVE SWITCHES

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

HDW/FUNC

2/1R

/

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) MC_U

2) FAILURE DETECTION BOARD

3)

4)

s)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.FD.2

A [ 2 ] B CF] C [ F]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT RELEASE BRAKES. LOSS OF ALLCOMPUTERAUGMENTED MODES.

ARM WILL NOT LIMP DURING CAPTURE/RIGIDIZATION PROCESS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01127187 C-418
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: i0/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 645 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/1R

/

ITEM: AUTO BRAKE CIRCUIT

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) FAILURE DETECTION BOARD

3)

4)

5)

6)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT "PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT" / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.FD.3

A[2] B[F] C[F]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

AUTO BRAKING FAILED ON. LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.

DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-419
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/10/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 646

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: AUTO BRAKE CIRCUIT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) MCIU

2)

3)

4)

5)

6)

.)

9)

FAILURE DETECTION BOARD

FLIGHT PHASE

PRELAUNCH:

LIFTOFF:

ONORBIT:

DEORBIT:

LANDING/SAFING:

CRITICALITIES

HDW/FUNC ABORT

/ RTLS:

/ TAL:

1/1 AOA:

/ ATO:

/

HDW/FUNC

/

I

I

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.FD.3

AC2] BCY] CCF]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO AUTO BRAKING CAPABILITY. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-420 °
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10110186

RMS

64,7

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

EE AUTO LOGIC

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCZ'U

2) FAILURE DETECTION BOARD

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: I/i AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlFU_C

.I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.FD.4

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF AUTO EE MODES.

RELEASE/DERIGIDI ZATION.

POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-421
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 648 ABORT:

ITEM: EE AUTO LOGIC

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) MCIU

2) FAILURE DETECTION BOARD

3)

4)

5)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.FD.4

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

C[F] Q

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE :

LOSS OF ALL AUTO EE CAPABILITIES. MANUAL EE MODE REMAINS.

HDW/FUNC

211R

I

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-422
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

lO/lO/86

649

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

DUAL 4-BIT LATCH

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) MCIU

2) FAILURE DETECTION BOARD

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] BCF] C [F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.FD.5

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE :

ERRONEOUS DATA IS OUTPUT. POSSIBLE LOSS OF COMPUTER AUGMENTED

MODES THROUGH PERMANENT AUTO SAFING OR AUTO BRAKING. LOSS OF

AUTO EE CAPABILITIES. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED RELEASE OR

DERIGIDIZATION.

REFERENCES :

• REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-423
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID:

lO/ZO/ee

650

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

DUAL 4-BIT LATCH

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCZ_

2) FAILURE DETECTION BOARD

3)

4)

s)

6)

7)

e)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS ."

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.FD.5

A[2] BCF] CCF]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF AUTO SAYING, AUTO BRAKING, AND AUTO EE CAPABILITIES.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-424
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

1o/1o/86

RMS

651

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

4-BIT MAGNITUDE COMPARATOR (2)

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) MCIU

2) FAILURE DETECTION BOARD

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS :

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.FD.6

A[2] B[F] C[F]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE :

ERRONEOUS DATA OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF AUTO SAFING.

REFERENCES •

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-425
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 652 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/1R

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

4-BIT MAGNITUDE COMPARATOR (2)

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCrU

2) FAILURE DETECTION BOARD

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH" / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.FD. 6

A[2] B[F] C[F]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

PERMANENT AUTO SAFING. LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-426
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID:

10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

653 . ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/IR

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

FRAME SYNC FAILURE DETECTOR TIMING CIRCUIT

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) XCr_

2) FAILURE DETECTION BOARD

3)

4)

s)

6)

_)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ 2 ] B [ F] C [F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.FD.7

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE :

PERMANENT AUTO SAFING. LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-427
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

RMS FLIGHT: i/i

654 ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

FRAME SYNC FAILURE DETECTOR TIMING CIRCUIT

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MC_U

2) FAILURE DETECTION BOARD

3)

4)

5)

6)

v)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

S_DW'/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.FD.7

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF AUTO SAYING CAPABILITIES.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-428
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE" 10110186

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 655

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: 7-BIT BINARY COUNTER

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) FAILURE DETECTION BOARD

3)

4)

5)

6)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: /

LIFTOFF: /

ONORBIT: 1/1

DEORBIT: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.FD.8

ABORT

RTLS:

TAL:

AOA:

ATO:

A[2] B[F]

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

C[F]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF AUTO SAFING. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-429
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 656 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

211R

/

ITEM: 7-BIT BINARY COUNTER

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCrU

2) FAILURE DETECTION BOARD

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/ IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.FD. 8

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

PERMANENT AUTO SAFING. LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-430
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/10/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT: i/1

MDAC ID: 657 ABORT: /

ITEM: READ IN/WRITE OUT MAGNITUDE COMPARATOR

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) FAILURE DETECTION BOARD

3)

4)

s)

6)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: I/i AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlFU_C

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.FD.9

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF AUTO SAFING. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-431
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/10/8G HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 658 ABORT:

HDWln.TNC

211R

I

ITEM: READ IN/WRITE OUT MAGNITUDE COMPARATOR

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) FAILURE DETECTION BOARD

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.FD.9

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

PERMANENT AUTO SAFING. LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-432 "
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/14/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT: I/1

MDAC ID: 659 ABORT: /

ITEM: LOWER SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER, ABE O/P

FAILURE NODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

z) MCZ'U

2) DIGITAL INTERFACE BOARD

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT_ / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.DI.I

A[ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ F]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

ERRONEOUS DATA TO THE ABE AND DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL.

POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-433
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/14/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

660 ABORT:

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

LOWER SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER, ABE O/P

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) DIGITAL INTERFACE BOARD

3)

4)

s)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlFUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]. _CF] CCF]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.DI.I

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.

HDW/FUNC

2/IR

/

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-434
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID:

10/14/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

RMS FLIGHT: 1/1

661 ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

UPPER SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER, ABE I/P

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) DIGITAL INTERFACE BOARD

3)

4)

5)

6)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT EDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.DI.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

ERRONEOUS DATA TO THE ABE AND DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL.

POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-435
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/14/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 662 ABORT:

ITEM: UPPER SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER, ABE I/P

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) DIGITAL INTERFACE BOARD

4)

5)

6)

v)

8)

9)

FLIGHT PHASE

PRELAUNCH:

LIFTOFF:

ONORBIT:

DEORBIT:

LANDING/SAFING:

CRITICALITIES

HDW/FUNC ABORT

/ RTLS:

/ TAL:

2/IR AOA:

/ 1,TO:

/

HDW/rm;C

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.DI. 2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.

HDW/FUNC

2/IR

/

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-436
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/15/85

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 663

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: ABE OUTPUT DRIVER

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) MCIU

2) DIGITAL INTERFACE BOARD

3)

4)

5)

6)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.DI. 3

A[ 2 ] B IF] C IF]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

ERRONEOUS DATA TO THE ARM. LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.

POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-437
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 664 ABORT:

ITEM: ABE OUTPUT DRIVER

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) MClU

2) DIGITAL INTERFACE BOARD

3)

4)

5)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE NDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS :

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.DI. 3

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

A[2] B(F] C[F]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.

HDW/FUNC

2/ia

/

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-438
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

RMS FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: / 665

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

LOWER SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER, D & C O/P

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) DIGITAL INTERFACE BOARD

3)

4)

s)

6)

_)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.DI.4

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

ERRONEOUS DATA TO DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL.

UNRELIABLE.

INDICATORS ARE

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-439
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT: 3/3

MDAC ID: 666 ABORT: /

ITEM: LOWER SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER, D & C O/P

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) DIGITAL INTERFACE BOARD

3)

4)

5)

_)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC • ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.DI.4

I

I

I

I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF SOME DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL INDICATORS.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-440
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATEI 10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT: 3/3

MDACID: 667 ABORT: , /

ITEM: UPPER SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER, D & C O/P

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) MCIU

2) DIGITAL INTERFACE BOARD

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]

LOCATION_ MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.DI. 5

S [_X ] C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

ERRONEOUS DATA TO DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL.

UNRELIABLE.

INDICATORS ARE

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-441
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

RMS FLIGHT: 3/3

668 ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE_

UPPER SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER, D & C O/P

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) DIGITAL INTERFACE BOARD

3)

4)

5)

s)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: /

LIFTOFF: /

ONORBIT: 3/3

DEORBIT: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

ABORT

RTLS:

TAL:

AOA:

ATO:

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [NA ]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.DI.5

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF SOME DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL INDICATORS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-442
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

IOllS186

RMS

669

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

D & C STROBE

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) MCIU

2) DIGITAL INTERFACE BOARD

3)

4)

s)

6)

v)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: I/i AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.DI. 6

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED RELEASE AND DERIGIDIZATION.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-443
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 670 ABORT:

ITEM: D & C STROBE

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) DIGITAL INTERFACE BOARD

4)

5)

s)

_)

s)

9)

FLIGHT PHASE

PRELAUNCH:

LIFTOFF:

ONORBIT:

DEORBIT:

LANDING/SAFING:

CRITICALITIES

HDW/FUNC ABORT

/ HTLS:

/ TAL:

2/IR AOA:

/ ATO:

/

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.DI. 6

AC2] BCF] CCF]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.

CAPABILITZES.

LOSS OF AUTO EE

HDW/FUNC

2/IR

/

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 ° C-444
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

1o/15/86

RMS

671

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/I

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

D & C CLOCK

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) DIGITAL INTERFACE BOARD

3)

4)

s)

6)

7)

e)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.DI.7

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED RELEASE AND DERIGIDIZATION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-445
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

672 ABORT:

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

D & C CLOCK

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCZU

2) DIGITAL INTERFACE BOARD

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A ( 2 ] B [ F ] C [ F ]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.DI.7

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.

CAPABILITIES.

LOSS OF AUTO EE

HDW/FUNC

211R

/

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-446
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10115186

RMS

673

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

ABE INPUT OPTO ISOLATORS

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) DIGITAL INTERFACE BOARD

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.DI.8

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE

CAPABILITIES. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-447
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/15/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

674 ABORT:

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

ABE INPUT OPTO ISOLATORS

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) DIGITAL INTERFACE BOARD

3)

4)

5)

6)

V)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.DI.8

AC2] BeY] CCF]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.

CAPABILITIES.

LOSS OF AUTO EE

HDW/FUNC

2/IR

/.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-448
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

RMS FLIGHT: i/1

675 ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

SERIAL-PARALLEL SHIFT REGISTERS (2) ABE I/P

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) DIGITAL INTERFACE BOARD

3)

4)

S)

6)

V)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.DI.9

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE :

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE

CAPABILITIES. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-449
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID:

10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

676 ABORT:

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

HDW/FUNC

2/1R

/

SERIAL-PARALLEL SHIFT REGISTERS (2) ABE I/P

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCrU

2) DIGITAL INTERFACE BOARD

3)

4)

S)

6)

7)

S)

9)

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[r] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.DI.9

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

LOSS OF AUTO EE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALLCOMPUTERAUGMENTED MODES.

CAPABILITIES.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-450
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID:

10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

677 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/iR

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

SERIAL-PARALLEL SHIFT REGISTERS (2) D & C I/P

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCrU

2) DIGITAL INTERFACE BOARD

3)

4)

5)

6)

_)

.)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.DI.10

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.

CAPABILITIES.

LOSS OF AUTO EE

REFERENCES •

REPORT DATE 0112_IS_ C-451
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/16/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 678 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/IR

/

ITEM: SERIAL-PARALLEL SHIFT REGISTERS (2) D & C I/P

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) DIGITAL INTERFACE BOARD

3)

4)

s)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 2/ IR AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlFUSC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] CCF]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.DI.10

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES.

CAPABILITIES.

LOSS OF AUTO EE

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-452
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

lo/le/s6

_S

679

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

PARITY CHECK LOGIC

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) MC_O

2) DIGITAL INTERFACE BOARD

3)

4)

5)

e)

7)

.)

9)

FLIGHT PHASE

PRELAUNCH:

LIFTOFF:

ONORBIT:

DEORBIT:

LANDING/SAFING:

CRITICALITIES

HDW/FUNC ABORT

/ RTLS:

/ TAL:

3/3 AOA:

/ ATO:

/

NDW/FUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.DI.II

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CONSTANT CHECK CRTAND MASTER ALARM ON DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL.

NORMAL SYSTEM OPERATION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-453
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATEz

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

lO/16/86

_S

680

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

PARITY CHECK LOGIC

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD, G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY"

1) MCIU

2) DIGITAL INTERFACE BOARD

3)

4)

5)

6)

_)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH, / RTLS,

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING, /

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS, A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.DI.II

CAUSES, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO DISPLAY AND CONTROL PARITY ERROR ANNUNCIATION.

REFERENCES,

REPORT DATE 01/27187 C-454
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10117/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 681

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: CPU

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) MICROCOMPUTER

3)

4)

s)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.MC. 1

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE

CAPABILITIES. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP

REMAIN.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-455
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

I0/17/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

682 ABORT:

ITEM: CPU

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1_ MCZU

2) MICROCOMPUTER

3_

4_

5)

8_

9_

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBERz MCU.MC.I

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE

CAPABILITIES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

HDW/FUNC

2/1R

/

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-456
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

1o/2o/86

_MS

683

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

200 KHZ CLOCK

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) MCIU

2) MICROCOMPUTER

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRE LAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.MC.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE :

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE

CAPABILITIES. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP

REMAIN.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-457
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 684 ABORT:

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

200 KHZ CLOCK

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCXU

2) MICROCOMPUTER

4)

5)

e)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF" I TAL: I

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.MC.2

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE

CAPABILITIES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

HDWIFUNC

2/IR

/

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-458
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID:

lo/2o/s6

RMS

685

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/I

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

PARALLEL DATA CONVERTER

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) MICROCOMPUTER

3)

4)

s)

6)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC " ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.MC. 3

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE

CAPABILITIES. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP

REMAIN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-459
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 686 ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/IR

/

ITEM: PARALLEL DATA CONVERTER

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) MICROCOMPUTER

3)

4)

5)

_)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: /

LIFTOFF: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR

DEORBIT: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

ABORT

RTLS:

TAL:

AOA:

ATO:

HDW/FUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.MC. 3

A[2 ] B[F] C(F]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS ALL COMPUTERAUGMENTED MODES.

DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

LOSS OF AUTO EE CAPABILITIES.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-460
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/20/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 687

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM" DIRECT MEMORY ACCESS CONTROLLER

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) MICROCOMPUTER

3)

4)

5)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: I TAL: I

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] S[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.MC.4

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE

CAPABILITIES. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BAKCUP

REMAIN.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-461
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

•688 ABORT:

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

DIRECT MEMOR¥ ACCESS CONTROLLER

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) MCIU

2) MICROCOMPUTER

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/ IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] BCF] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.MC.4

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE

CAPABILITIES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

HDW/FUNC

2/IR

/

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-462
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10120/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 689

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/i

ABORT: /

ITEM: POWER ON INIT ROUTINE LOGIC

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) MCIU

2) MICROCOMPUTER

3)

4)

5)

6)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.MC.5

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE

CAPABILITIES. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP

REMAIN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 " C-463
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

690 ABORT:

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

POWER ON INIT ROUTINE LOGIC

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) MCIU

2) MICROCOMPUTER

3)

4)

s)

6)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.MC.5

A(2] B[F] C(F]

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALLCOMPUTERAUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE

CAPABILITIES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

HDW/FUNC

2/IR

/

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-464
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATZ: 10/20/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 691

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM, RAM

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) MCIU

2) MICROCOMPUTER

3)

4)

5)

7)

s)

9)

CRITI CALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORB IT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] BCF] CCF]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.MC. 6

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE

CAPABILITIES. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP

REMAIN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-465
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

692 ABORT:

ITEM: RAM

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) MICROCOMPUTER

3_

4)

s_

6)

8)

9_

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT _ / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.MC.6

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE

CAPABILITIES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

HDWlFUNC

211R

/

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-466
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10120186

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDACID: 693

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: _/

ITEM: ROM

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) MCIU

2) MICROCOMPUTER

3)

4)

5)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.MC.7

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMEHTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE

CAPABILITIES. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP

REMAIN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-467
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

RMS FLIGHT:

694 ABORT:

ITEM: ROM

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) McIu

2) MICROCOMPUTER

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.MC. 7

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE

CAPABILITIES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

HDWlFUNC

211R

/

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-468
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID:

1o/2o/s6

695

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

O/P LATCH (2)

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MCIU

2) MICROCOMPUTER

s)

4)

s)

6)

_)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.MC.$

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE

CAPABILITIES. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP

REMAIN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-469
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC ID: 596 ABORT:

ITEM" O/P LATCH (2)

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYSTz B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MC_U

2) MICROCOMPUTER

3)

4)

s)

6)

7)

s)

s)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] BCF] CCF]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.MC.8

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE

CAPABILITIES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

HDW/FUNC

2/IR

/

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-470
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/20/86

SUBSYSTEM: RMS

MDAC ID: 697

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: I/P LATCH (2)

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: B. GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) MCIU

2) MICROCOMPUTER

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

rLi HDWlnn c ABO T KDWI SC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] s[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBERz MCU.MC.9

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTE AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE

CAPABILITIES. POSSIBLE UNCOMMANDED MOTION. DIRECT AND BACKUP

REMAIN.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-471
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: 10/20/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY

SUBSYSTEM: RMS FLIGHT:

MDAC IDz 698 ABORT:

ITEM: I/P LATCH (2)

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: B, GRASMEDER SUBSYS LEAD: G. RAFFAELLI

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MC_U

2) MICROCOMPUTER

3)

4)

S)

7)

8)

9)

FLIGHT PHASE

PRELAUNCH:

LIFTOFF:

ONORBIT:

DEORBIT:

LANDING/SAFING:

CRITICALITIES

HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FU_C

I HTLS: I

I TAL: I

2/IR AOA: /

i ATO: /

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: MCIU

PART NUMBER: MCU.MC.9

CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL COMPUTER AUGMENTED MODES. LOSS OF AUTO EE

CAPABILITIES. DIRECT AND BACKUP REMAIN.

HDW/FUNC

/

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-472
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID: 801

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: SNARE

FAILURE MODE: JAMMING

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) END EFFECTOR

2) MECHANISMS

3)

4)

5)

6)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCR: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBI T: i/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MCH.I

SDWlnmC

I

I

I

I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: OVERLOAD, DEBRIS

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF CAPTURE AND RELEASE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-473
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 802

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: SNARE

FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURE FAILURE

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) END EFFECTOR

2) MECHANISMS

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: •1/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MCH. 1

_DWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

C [NA.]

CAUSES: OVERLOAD, CORRISION

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

INADVERTANT RELEASE. POSSIBLE ORBITER PL CONTACT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-474
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 803

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: CARRIAGE

FAILURE MODE: JAMMING

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) END EFFECTOR

2) MECHANISMS

4)

5)

6)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MCH.2

B [NA ] C [NA ]

CAUSES: OVERLOAD, DEBRIS

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF RIGIDIZE DERIGIDIZE. IF FAILURE OCCURS DURING

RIGIDIZATION. PL CAN SWING INTO ORBITER

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-475
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBS YS TEM:

MDAC ID: 804

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

CARRIAGE

STRUCTURAL FAILURE

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) END EFFECTOR

2) MECHANISMS

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/n_rC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MCH.2

CAUSES: OVERLOAD, CORROSION

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

INADVERTANT DERIGIDIZATION.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-476
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 805

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE"

CAPTURE BRAKE

BRAKE FAILED ON

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) END EFFECTOR

2) MECHANISMS

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAYING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[Y]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MCH.3

CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF PRIMARY CAPTURE AND RELEASE. PL CAN SWING INTO ORBITER.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-477
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANAL¥SIS WORKSHEET

DATE"

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 806

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

BRAKE

FAILED OFF

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) END EFFECTOR

2) MECHANISMS

3)

4)

s)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: /

LIFTOFF: /

ONORBIT: i/i

DEORBIT: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

ABORT

RTLS:

TAL:

AOA:

ATO:

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MCH.3

HDW/FUNC

I

I

/

I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

INADVERTANT RELEASE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-478
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 807

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

• ABORT: /

ITEM: RIBIDIZE BRAKE

FAILURE MODE: FAILED ON

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) END EFFECTOR

2) MECHANISMS

4)

s)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE NDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MCH.4

CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT OR JAMMING

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF RIGIDIZE/DERIGIDIZE. PL COULD SWING INTO ORBITER.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-479
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 808

HIGHEST CRITICALITY

FLIGHT:

ABORT:

ITEM: RIBIDIZE BRAKE

FAILURE MODE: FAILED OFF

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) END EFFECTOR

2) MECHANISMS

4)

5)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDWlFUNC ABORT HDWlFUNC

PRELAUNCH: I RTLS: I

LIFTOFF: / TAL: I

ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS" A [NA ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MCH.4

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CAPTURE BRAKE WILL TAKE RIGIDIZE LOAD. IF CAPDTURE BRAKE OR

RIGIDIZE OR CAPTURE CLUTCH FAILS, PL WILL RELEASE.

HDW/FUNC

3/1R

/

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-480
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 809

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: CAPTURE CLUTCH

FAILURE MODE: FAILED ON ENGAGED

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) END EFFECTOR

2) MECHANISMS

3)

4)

s)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS : /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MCH.5

CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CLUTCH WILL SLIP WHEN MOTOR DRIVES RIGID OR DERIGID. MAY CAUSE

LONGER RIGIDIZE/DERIGIDIZE DRIVE TIME.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-481
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID: 810

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

CAPTURE CLUTCH

FAILED ON ENGAGED

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) END EFFECTOR

2) MECHANISMS

4)

s)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION_ ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MCH.5

CAUSES: JAMMING

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF RIGIDIZE DERIGIDIZE. PL CAN SWING INTO ORBITER.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-482
DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID:

INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

811

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT• 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: CAPTURE CLUTCH

FAILURE MODE: FAILED OFF DISENGAGED

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) END EFFECTOR

2) MECHANISMS

3)

4)

5)

6)

8)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MCH.5

CAUSES: STRUCTUAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF CAPTURE PL CAN SWING INTO ORBITER IF FAILURE OCCURS.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-483
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 812

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: RIGIDIZE CLUTCH

FAILURE MODE: FAILED ENGAGED

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) END EFFECTOR

2) MECHANISMS

3)

4)

5)

_)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MCH.6

CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NONE. CLUTCH WILL SLIP DURING CAPTURE/RELEASE, MAY BE SLUGGISH.

REFERENCES:

I%EPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-484
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 813

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT- /

ITEM: RIGIDIZE CLUTCH

FAILURE MODE: FAILED DISENGAGED

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) END EFFECTOR

2) MECHANISMS

3)

4)

5)

6)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MCH. 6

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF RIGID/DERIGIDIZE. PL COULD SWING INTO ORBITER.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-485
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM"

MDACID: 814

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: CAPTURE DRIVE TRAIN

FAILURE MODE: JAMMING

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) END EFFECTOR

2) MECHANISMS

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9}

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH. / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: I/I AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] SINAI

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MCH.7

HDW/FUNC

/

I

/

/

C [NA ]

CAUSES: OVERLOAD, CONTAMINATION

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF CAPTURE RELEASE.

REFERENCES •

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-486
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 815

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/I

ABORT: /

ITEM: CAPTURE DRIVE TRAIN

FAILURE MODE: FAILS FREE

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) END EFFECTOR

2) MECHANISMS

3)

4)

s)

_)

_)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: /

LIFTOFF: /

ONORBIT: i/I

DEORBIT: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

ABORT

RTLS:

TAL:

AOA:

ATO:

HDWIFUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]

0

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MCH.7

S [NA ] C [NA ]

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

INADVERTANT RELEASE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-487
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE=

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 816

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: RIGIDIZE DRIVE

FAILURE MODE: JAMMING

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) END EFFECTOR

2) MECHANISMS

3)

4)

5)

6)

?)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFI_OrF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAYING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MCR.8

CAUSES: OVERLOAD, CORROSION

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF RIGID/DERIGID FUNCTION. PL MAY CONTACT ORBITER, IF

FAILURE OCCURS.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-488
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE"

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 817

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLI GHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: RIGIDIZE DRIVE

FAILURE MODE: FAILS FREE

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) END EFFECTOR

2) MECHANISMS

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: I/I AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MCH.8

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

INADVERTANT DERIGIDIZATION.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-489
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 818

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

DERIGID MICROSWITCH

FAILS ON

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) END EFFECTOR

2) MICROSWITCHES

4)

S)

6)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAYING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MSW.6

B [NA ] C [NA ]

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

OPERATOR WILL NOT KNOW WHEN HE IS DERIGID. AUTO RELEASE WILL

RELEASE WITHOUT DERIGIZING.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-490
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID: 819

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

DERIGID MICROSWITCH

FAILS OFF

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) END EFFECTOR

2) MICROSWITCHES

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL" /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MSW. 6

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

OPERATOR WILL NOT KNOW WHEN HE IS DERIGID. AUTO RELEASE WILL

DERIGIDIZE TO THE EXTEND POSITION AND NOT RELEASE PLAYLOAD.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-491
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID_ 820

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

CLOSED MICROSWITCH

FAILS ON

LEAD ANALYST _ SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) END EFFECTOR

2) MICROSWITCHES

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIE_

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA_ /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MSW.5

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

OPERATOR WILL NOT KNOW WHEN SNARES ARE CLOSED. LOSS OF AUTO

CAPTUE.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-492
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 821

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/i

ABORT: /

ITEM: CLOSED MICROSWITCH

FAILURE MODEz FAILS OFF

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) END EFFECTOR

2) MICROSWITCHES

4)

s)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MSW.5

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

OPERATOR WILL NOT KNOW WHEN SNARES ARE CLOSED. LOSS OF AUTO

CAPTUE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-493
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 822

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: CAPTURE MICROSWITCH

FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) END EFFECTOR

2) MICROSWITCHES

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TALz /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING_ /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MSW.2

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CAPTURE WILL ALWAYS BE INDICATED. ONCE EE IS RIGIDIZED, LOADED

RATE FLAG WILL BE SET.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-494
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM

MDACID" 823

HIGHEST CRITICALITY

FLIGHT:

ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

3/IR

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

CAPTURE MICROSWITCH

FAILS ON

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) END EFFECTOR

2) MICROSWITCHES

3)

4)

5)

6)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/ 1R AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MSW. 2

CAUSES- STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CAPTURE WILL NEVER BE INDICATED. LOADED RATE FLAG WILL NOT BE

SET. PL MAY BE MOVED AT UNLOADED RATES.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-495
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 824

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

OPEN MICROSWITCH

FAILS ON

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) END EFFECTOR

2) MICROSWITCHES

3)

4)

5)

6)

v)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MSW.4

CAUSES: CONTAMINATION

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

OPERATOR WILL NOT KNOW IF SNARES ARE OPEN. AUTO RELEASE LOST.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-496
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 825

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: OPEN MICROSWITCH

FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) END EFFECTOR

2) MICROSWITCHES

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

9)

CRITIC2tLITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/ 3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MSW.4

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

OPERATOR WILL NOT KONW IF SNARES ARE OPEN. LOSS OF AUTO RELEASE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-497
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 826

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/ 3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

EXTEND MICROSWITCH

FAILS OFF

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) END EFFECTOR

2) MICROSWITCHES

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: /

LIFTOFF: /

ONORBIT: 3/3

DEORBIT: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

ABORT HDW/FUNC

RTLS: /

TAL: /

AOA: /

ATO: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MSW.I

B [NA ] C [NA ]

CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

UNABLE TO DETERMINE IF EE IS EXTENDED. LOSS OF AUTO RELEASE

BECAUSE EE WILL CONTINUE TO DRIVE DERIGID.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-498
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 827

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

EXTEND MICROSWITCH

FAILS ON

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) END EFFECTOR

2) MICROSWITCHES

3)

4)

5)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MSW. 1

CAUSES: CONTAMINATION

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

UNABLE TO DETERMINE IF EE IS EXTENDED. LOSS OF AUTO RELEASE

BECAUSE EE WILL NOT RESPOND TO AUTO RELEASE COMMAND.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-499
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 828

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: EXTEND MSW SIGNAL CONDITIONER

FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) END EFFECTOR

2) EE_

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B (NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU.3

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

C [NA ]

CAUSES: OP AMP FAILS ON OR SHORTED

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

EXTEND INDICATION FAILS TRUE. LOSS OF AUTO RELEASE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-500
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 829

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

EXTEND MSW SIGNAL CONDITIONER

FAILS OFF

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) END EFFECTOR

2) EEEU

3)

4)

s)

_)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: /

LIFTOFF: /

ONORBIT: 3/3

DEORBIT: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU.3

•ABORT

RTLS:

TAL:

AOA:

ATO:

A CNA ] B CNA ]

HDW/FUNC

I

I

I

I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: OP AMP OR RESISTOR FAILS OPEN

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF AUTO RELEASE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01127/87 C-501
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 830

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

RIGIDIZE MSW SIGNAL CONDITIONER

FAIL ON

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) END EFFECTOR

2) EEZU

])

4)

5)

_)

7)

S)

9)

CRITICAI_TIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [HA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU.3

CAUSES: OPAMP FAILS SHORTED

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

RIGIDIZE INDICATION FAILED TRUE. AFTER FIRST CAPTURE LOADED RATE

FLAG WILL BE SET.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-502
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID_ 831

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

RIGIDIZE MSW SIGNAL CONDITIONER

FAIL OFF

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) END EFFECTOR

2) EE_

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU.3

A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

CAUSES: OP AMP OR RESISTOR FAILS OPEN

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

RIGIDIZE INDICATION FAILED TRUE. AUTO CAPTT/RE IS LOST.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-503
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 832

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

DERIGIDIZED MSW SIGNAL CONDITIONER

FAIL ON

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) END EFFECTOR

2) EEEU

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE "HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU.3

CAUSES: OP AMP FAILS ON OR SHORTED CIRCUIT

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

DERIGIDIZE INDICATION FAILS FALSE. LOSS OF AUTO RELEASE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-504
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 833

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLI GHT: 3/ 3

ABORT: /

ITEM: DERIGIDIZED MSW SIGNAL CONDITIONER

FAILURE MODE: FAIL OFF

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) END EFFECTOR

2) EEEU

3)

4)

5)

s)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF" / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU.3

A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

CAUSES: OPAMP OR TRANSISTOR FAILS OPEN

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

DERIGIDIZE INDICATION FAILS TRUE. AUTO RELEASE WILL RELEASE

WITHOUT DERIGIDIZING.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-505
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 834

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

CLOSED MSW SIGNAL CONDITIONER

FAIL ON

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) END EFFECTOR

2) EE_U

_)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE RDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU. 3

A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

CAUSES: OPAMP FAILS SHORTED

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CLOSED INDICATION FAILS TRUE. LOSS OF AUTO CAPTURE.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-506
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 835

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM_

FAILURE MODE:

CLOSED MSW SIGNAL CONDITIONER

FAIL OFF

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) END EFFECTOR

2) EE_U

3)

4)

S)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU.3

A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

CAUSES: OP AMP OR RESISTOR FAILS OPEN

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CLOSED INDICATION FAILS FALSE. LOSS OF AUTO CAPTURE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-507
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 836

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

PL CAPTURE MSW SIGNAL CONDITONER

FAIL ON

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) END EFFECTOR

2) EEEU

3)

4)

5)

_)

7)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU.3

A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

CAUSES: OP AMP FAILS SHORTED

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CAPTURE INDICATION FAILS TRUE. LOSS OF AUTO CAPTURE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-508
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 837

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: PL CAPTURE MSW SIGNAL CONDZTONER

FAILURE MODE: FAIL OFF

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) END EFFECTOR

2) EEEU

3)

4)

S)

S)

V)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU.3

A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

CAUSES: OP AMP FAILS OPEN

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CAPTURE INDICATION FAILS OFF. LOADED RATE FLAG WILL NOT SET WHEN

PL IS CAPTURED. LOADED ARM WILL MOVE AT UNLOADED RATES.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-509
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID; 838

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: OPEN MSW SIGNAL CONDITIONER

FAILURE MODE: FAIL ON

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) END EFFECTOR

2) EEEU

3)

4)

S)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: /

LIFTOFF: /

ONORB IT: i/1

DEORBIT: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

ABORT

RTLS:

TAL:

AOA:

ATO:

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE,EU.3

HDWIFUNC

/

/

/

/

C [NA ]

CAUSES: OP AMP FAILS SHORTED

EFFECTS/RATIONALE;

OPEN INDICATION WILL FAIL 'Z_UE, AUTO RELEASE LOST.

REFERENCES;

REPORT DAT_ 01/27/87 C-510
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 839

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

OPEN MSW SIGNAL CONDITIONER

FAIL OFF

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) END EFFECTOR

2) EEEU

3)

4)

5)

_)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU.3

CAUSES: OPAMP FAILS OPEN

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

OPEN INDICATION WILL FAIL FALSE. LOSS OF AUTO RELEASE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-511
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 840

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

CAPTURE/RELEASE BRAKE/CLUTCH POWER SWITCH DRIVER

OPEN POWER SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) END EFFECTOR

2)

3)

4)

5)

S)

s)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONOREIT" 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU.2

A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

CAUSES: TRANSISTOR OR RESISTOR FAILS OPEN

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

SNARE BRAKE WOULD FAIL ON AND RIGIDIZE CLUTCH WOULD FAIL ENGAGED.

CAPTURE AND RELEASE LOST. ARM WOULD BE LIMP WHEN CAPTURE

COMMANDED.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-512
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID: 841

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

RIGID/DERIGID BRAKE/CLUTCH POWER SWITCH DRIVER

OPEN POWER SWITCH

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) END EFFECTOR

2) EEZ_

_)

4)

5)

6)

"i)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA" /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B (NA ] C (NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU.I

CAUSES: TRANSISTOR OR RESISTOR FAILS OPEN

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

SNARE CLUCH WOULD FAIL ENGAGED ANDRIGIDIZE BRAKE WOULD FAIL ON.

RIGIDIZE/DERIGIDIZE FUNCTION WOULD BE LOST, BUT ARM WOULD BE LIMP

WHEN RIGIDIZE COMMANDED.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-513
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 842

HIGHEST CRITICALITY

FLIGHT:

ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/IR

/

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

MOTOR POWER SIGNAL CONTROLLER

FAILS ON

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) END EFFECTOR

2) ZZ_

_)

4)

S)

6)

S)

S)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS :

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU. 6

A(2] B(F] C[F]

CAUSES: TRANSISTOR FAILS SHORTED

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

MOTOR PHASE ON CONTINOUSLY. MOTOR WILL RUN SLUGGISHLY. IF IT

STOPS IN A DEADZONE IT WILL NOT START AGAIN. PL CAN NOT BE

CAPTURED OF RELEASED.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-514
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID: 843

HIGHEST CRITICALITY

FLIGHT:

ABORT:

HDWI_C

211R

1

ITEM: MOTOR POWER SIGNAL CONTROLLER

FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) END EFFECTOR

2) EEEU

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO"

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlFUSC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU.6

A(2 ] B(F] C[F]

CAUSES: TRANSISTOR FAILS OPEN

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

MOTOR PHASE ON CONTINOUSLY. MOTOR WILL RUN SLUGGISHLY. IF IT

STOPS IN A DEADZONE IT WILL NOT START AGAIN. PL CAN NOT BE

CAPTURED OF RELEASED.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01127187 C-515
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 844

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: EEEU BITE

FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) END EFFECTOR

2) EEEU

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] c [_A ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU.5

CAUSES: INVERTOR OR GATE FAILS ON

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

BITE WILL NOT ANNUNCIATE FAILURES.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 0 I/27/S 7 C-516
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 845

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: EEEU BITE

FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) END EFFECTOR

2) EEEU

4)

5)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/nn_C

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] CNA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU.5

CAUSES: INVERTOR OR GATE FAILS OFF

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

BITE WILL BE ON WHILE ARM IS SELECTED.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01127187 C-517
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 846

HIGHEST CRITICALITY

FLIGHT:

ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

2/1R

/

ITEM: POWER SWITCH DRIVERS

FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) END EFFECTOR

2) EEEU

_)

4)

S)

6)

7)

S)

S)

CRITICALITIES

"FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] BCT] CCY]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU.4

CAUSES: TRANSISTOR SHORTED

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

EE MOTOR WILL NOT OPERATE IF IT HAS STOPPED IN THE DEAD ZONE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-518
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 847

HIGHEST CRITICALITY

FLIGHT:

ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

3/1R

/

ITEM: POWER SWITCH DRIVERS

FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) END EFFECTOR

2) EEl;

3)

4)

5)

6)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS :

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU.4

A[2] B[F] C[F]

CAUSES: TRANSISTOR FAILS OPEN

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

EE MOTOR WILL NOT OPERATE IF IT HAS STOPPED IN THE DEAD ZONE.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-519
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

•MDAC ID: 848

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/ 3

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

MULTIPLE ACTIVATE CMD INHIBIT

FAILS OFF

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) END EFFECTOR

2) EEEU

4)

5)

6)

V)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU.7

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

C [_A ]

CAUSES: NAND GATE UI8B FAILS ON

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

NO SAFEGUARD AGAINST TWO COMMANDS AT THE SAME TIME.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-520
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 849

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: MULTIPLE ACTIVATE CMD INHIBIT

FAILURE MODE: FAILS ON

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) END EFFECTOR

2) EEZU

3)

4)

5)

S)

S)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU.7

CAUSES: NAND GATE UI8B FAILS OFF

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

UNABLE TO CAPTURE OR RELEASE IN PRIMARY MODE. BACKUP RELEASE

AVAILABLE. PL COULD CONTACT ORBITER IF FAILURE OCCURED.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-521
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID: 85O

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

RIGIDIZE MICROSWITCH

FAILS ON

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) END EFFECTOR

2) MICROSWITCHES

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBITI i/i AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MSW. 3

CAUSES: CONTAMINATION

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

RIGIDIZE WILL NEVER BE INDICATED OPERATOR WILL NOT KNOW IF HE IS

RIGIDIZED. AUTO CAPTURE IS LOST BECAUSE RIGIDIZE COMMAND WILL NOT

SHUT OFF UNTIL THE EE MODE SWITCH IS TURNED OFF.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-522
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 851

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/i

ABORT: /

ITEM: RIGIDIZE MICROSWITCH

FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) END EFFECTOR

2) MICROSWITCHES

3)

4)

S)

_)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

•ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: _ [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MSW.3

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE DEBIS

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

RIGIDIZE WILLALWAYS BE INDICATED. AFTER FIRST CAPTURE LOADED

RATE FLAG WILL BE SET.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-523
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 852

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

BEARINGS

PHYSICAL BINDING

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) END EFFECTOR

2) MOTOR

3)

4)

5)

6)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAYING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MTR. 7

HDW/rUNC

/

/

/

/

C [NA ]

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE CONTAMINATION

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSE ALL EE CAPABILITIES EXCEPT FOR BACKUP RELEASE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-524
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 853

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

BU GEARTRAIN

STRUCTURAL FAILURE

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) END EFFECTOR

2) BU RELEASE SYSTEM

3)

4)

5)

6)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: /

LIFTOFF: /

ONORBIT: i/1

DEORBIT: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

ABORT

RTLS:

TAL:

•AOA:

ATO:

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.BRS. 3

HDW/FUNC

I

I

I

I

C[F]

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CAN NOT RELEASE PAYLOAD

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-525
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 854

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

BU GEARTRAIN

PHYSICAL BINDING

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) END EFFECTOR

2) BU RELEASE SYSTEM

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

FRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: I/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.BRS. 3

HDW/FUNC

I

I

/

I

C [ F ]

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE HIGH LOW TEMPERATURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CAN NOT RELEASE PAYLOAD

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-526
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 855

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: BU SPRING

FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) END EFFECTOR

2) BU RELEASE SYSTEM

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: i/i AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlFUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C[F]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.BRS.2

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CANNOT RELEASE PAYLOAD

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-527
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID: 856

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/I

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

BU SPRING

STRUCTURAL FAILURE

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) END EFFECTOR

2) BU RELEASE SYSTEM

3)

4)

5)

6)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: i/i AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

HDW/FUNC

I

I

I

I

A [NA ] B C F ] C C F ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.BRS.2

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CAN NOT RELEASE PAYLOAD

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-528
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 857

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

BU CLUTCH

FAILURE TO CLOSE

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) END EFFECTOR

2) BU RELEASE SYSTEM

4)

S)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF- / TAL:

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] • B [ F ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.BRS. 1

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

c[r]

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CAN NOT RELEASE PAYLOAD

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-529
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 858

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/i

ABORT: /

ITEM: BU CLUTCH

FAILURE MODE: FAILURE TO OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) END EFFECTOR

2) BURELEASE SYSTEM

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: /

LIFTOFF: /

ONORBIT: 1/1

DEORBIT: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

ABORT

RTLS:

TAL:

AOA:

ATO:

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.BRS.I

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

C[F]

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CAN NOT RELEASE PAYLOAD

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-530
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 859

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: BU CLUTCH

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) END EFFECTOR

2) BU RELEASE SYSTEM

3)

4)

S)

6)

7)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: /

LIFTOFF: /

ONORBIT: i/1

DEORBIT: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

ABORT

RTLS:

TAL:

AOA:

ATO:

A [NA ] B [ F ]

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

CCF]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.BRS. 1

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CAN NOT RELEASE PAYLOAD

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-531
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE"

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 860

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: BU CLUTCH

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) END EFFECTOR

2) BU RELEASE SYSTEM

3)

4)

S)

6)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.BRS. 1

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CAN NOT RELEASE PAYLOAD

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-532
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 861

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/1

ABORT: /

ITEM" STATOR

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST" SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) END EFFECTOR

2) MOTOR

3)

4)

5)

6)

v)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F]

HDWlFUSC

I

I

I

I

C[F]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MTR. 6

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSE ALL EE FUNCTIONS. BACKUP RELEASE WORKS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-533
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 862

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

STATOR

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) END EFFECTOR

2) MOTOR

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: i/i AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [ F ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MTR. 6

HDWlFUNC

/

/

/

/

C[F]

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSE ALL EE FUNCTIONS. BACKUP RELEASE WORKS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-534
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID: 863

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: ROTOR

FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) END EFFECTOR

2) MOTOR

4)

s)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAYING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B[F] C[F]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MTR.8

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE COMTAMINATION HIGH LOW TEMPERATURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSE ALL EE FUNCTIONS. BACKUP RELEASE WORKS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-535
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 864

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

PHOTO CELL (3)

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) END EFFECTOR

2) MOTOR

3)

4)

5)

e)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: i/i AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MTR. 2

nDW/_C

/

/

/

I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL EE CAPABILITIES EXCEPT BACKUP RELEASE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-536
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 865

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

LED

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) END EFFECTOR

2 ) MOTOR

3)

4)

5)

s)

v)

8)

9)

FLIGHT PHASE

PRELAUNCH:

LIFTOFF:

ONORBIT:

DEORBIT:

LANDING/SAFING:

CRITICALITIES

HDW/FUNC ABORT

/ RTLS:

/ TAL:

1/1 AOA:

/ ATO:

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MTR. 1

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL EE CAPABILITIES EXCEPT BACKUP RELEASE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-537
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: _66

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: LED

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) END EFFECTOR

2) MOTOR

3)

4)

5)

6)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MTR. 1

HDW/FUNC

I

/

I

/

C [NA ]

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL EE CAPABILITIES EXCEPT BACKUP RELEASE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-538
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 867

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: COMMUTATOR AMP

FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) END EFFECTOR

2) MOTOR

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B IN& ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MTR.3

_WllrO_c

I

I

I

I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL EE CAPABILITIES EXCEPT BACKUP RELEASE.

REFERENCES:

Q

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-539
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 868

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: COMMUTATOR AMP

FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) END EFFECTOR

2) MOTOR

4)

5)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/nrSC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MTR. 3

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL EE CAPABILITIES EXCEPT BACKUP RELEASE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-540
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID: 869

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: OUTPUT DRIVER

FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) END EFFECTOR

2) MOTOR

4)

5)

6)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MTR.4

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL EE CAPABILITIES EXCEPT BACKUP RELEASE.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-541
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 870

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

OUTPUT DRIVER

ERRONEOUS OUTPUT

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) END EFFECTOR

2) MOTOR

3)

4)

5)

_)

"i)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: I/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS. A [NA ] e IRA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MTR.4

HDWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

C [NA ]

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF ALL EE CAPABILITIES EXCEPT BACKUP RELEASE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-542
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 871

HIGHEST CRITICALITY

FLIGHT:

ABORT:

HDW/nn_C

1/1

/-

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

ROTATING DISK

PHYSICAL BINDING

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) END EFFECTOR

2) MOTOR

3)

4)

s)

6)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA- /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS- A [NA ] B [NA ] C IRA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.MTR.5

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE CONTAMINATION HIGH LOW TEMPERATURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE_

LOSS OF ALL EE CAPABILITIES EXCEPT BACKUP RELEASE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-543
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

SUBSYSTEM: FLIGHT: i/1

MDAC ID: 872 ABORT: /

ITEM: CAP/REL BRAKE & CLUTCH ACTIVATE CONTROL

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) END EFFECTOR

2) EEEU

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU.8

A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-544
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBS YSTEM:

MDAC ID: 873

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

CAP/REL BRAKE & CLUTCH ACTIVATE CONTROL

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) END EFFECTOR

2) ZEZU

3)

4)

5)

6)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU.8

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACEUPRELEASE REMAINS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-545
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

SUBSYSTEM: FLIGHT: i/1

MDAC ID: 874 ABORT: /

ITEM: RIG/DERIG BRAKE & CLUTCH ACTIVATE CONTROL

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) END EFFECTOR

2) EEEU

4)

S)

_)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: I/i AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU.4

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-546
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 875

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

RIG/DERIG BRAKE & CLUTCH ACTIVATE CONTROL

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) END EFFECTOR

2) ZZr_.T

3)

4)

S)

6)

7)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHAS_ . HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU. 4

A (NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-547
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

SUBSYSTEM: FLIGHT: i/1

MDACID: 876 ABORT: /

ITEM: CAP/REL BRAKE & CLUTCH FAIL SAFE ENABLE

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) END EFFECTOR

2) ZX_

])

4)

5)

7)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: /

LIFTOFF: /

ONORBIT: 1/1

DEORBIT: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

ABORT HDW/FUNC

RTLS: /

TAL: /

AOA: /

ATO: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU. i0

B [NA ] C [NA ]

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-548 °
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

SUBSYSTEM: FLIGHT: i/1

MDAC ID: 877 ABORT: /

ITEM: CAP/REL BRAKE & CLUTCH FAIL SAFE ENABLE

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) END EFFECTOR

2) EEEU

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU. i0

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-549
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

SUBSYSTEM: FLIGHT: I/i

MDAC ID: 878 ABORT: /

ITEM: RIG/DERIG BRAKE & CLUTCH FAIL SAFE ENABLE

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) END EFFECTOR

2) EEEU

3)

4)

s)

s)

?)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU.II

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-550
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANAL¥SIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 879

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

RIG/DERIG BRAKE & CLUTCH FAIL SAFE ENABLE

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) END EFFECTOR

2) EEEU

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU. ii

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-551
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 880

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: MOTOR POWER FAIL SAFE ENABEL

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) END EFFECTOR

2) E_'U

4)

5)

7)

e)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTI,_: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBI T: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU.12

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-552
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 881

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

MOTOR POWER FAIL SAFE ENABEL

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) END EFFECTOR

2) EEEU

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU.12

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-553
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 882

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

MOTOR POWERACTIVATE CONTROL

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) END EFFECTOR

2) EEZ_

3)

4)

s)

_)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION; ARM

PART NUMBER: EE,EU.13

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-554
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 883

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/i

ABORT: /

ITEM: MOTOR POWER ACTIVATE CONTROL

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) END EFFECTOR

2) rZZU

3)

4)

S)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: I/I AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU.13

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-555
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 884

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/i

ABORT: /

ITEM" CAP/REL/OFF TRISTATE LEVEL DETECTOR

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) END EFFECTOR

2) E_ZU

_)

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU.14

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-556
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 885

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

CAP/REL/OFF TRISTATE LEVEL DETECTOR

OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) END EFFECTOR

2) EENU

3)

4)

5)

6)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU.14

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-557
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 886

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

RIG/DERIG/OFF TRISTATE LEVEL DETECTOR

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST" SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) END EFFECTOR

2) Z_

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / HTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: I/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT. / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU. 15

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-558
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

SUBSYSTEM: FLIGHT: 1/1

MDAC ID: 887 ABORT: /

ITEM: RIG/DERIG/OFF TRISTATE LEVEL DETECTOR

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) END EFFECTOR

2) EEEU

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B CNA ] C CNA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU.15

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RBLEASEREMAINS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-559
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

SUBSYSTEM: FLIGHT: i/1

MDAC ID: 888 ABORT: /

ITEM: FAIL SAFE COMMAND ON/OFF LEVEL DETECTOR

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) END EFFECTOR

2) ZZ_

4)

5)

6)

7)

S)

9)

CRITICALITIES

"FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU.16

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-560
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

SUBSYSTEM: FLIGHT: i/1

MDAC ID: 889 ABORT: /

ITEM: FAIL SAFE COMMAND ON/OFF LEVEL DETECTOR

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) END EFFECTOR

2) E_TU

3)

4)

S)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU.16

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-561
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 890

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

EE POWER CONDITIONER

SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) END EFFECTOR

2) RE_u

_)

4)

5)

s)

7)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU. 17

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.

REFERENCES :

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-562
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 891

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 1/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: CAPTURE COMMAND ENABLE LOGIC

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) END EFFECTOR

2) ZErU

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

e)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [_A ] C lea ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU.18

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-563
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 892

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT • i/1

ABORT: /

ITEM: CAPTURE COMMAND ENABLE LOGIC

FAILURE MODE: SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) END EFFECTOR

2) ZHEU

3)

4)

S)

6_

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: EE.EU.18

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF AUTO & MANUAL EE CAPABILITIES. BACKUP RELEASE REMAINS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-564
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 901

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: I/i

ABORT: /

ITEM: BOOM

FAILURE MODE: RUPTURED, FRACTURED

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) ARM

2)

3)

4)

5)

_)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: i/1 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] c[ ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ARM.BM. 1

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

ARM WILLHAVE INCORRECT PATH.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-565
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID: 902

HIGHEST CRITICALITY

FLIGHT:

ABORT:

ITEM: ELEMENTS, HEATER

FAILURE MODE: OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) ARM

2) THERMAL

3) ACTIVE, ELECT.

4)

5)

8)

9)

FLIGHT PHASE

PRELAUNCH:

LIFTOFF:

ONORBIT:

DEORBIT:

LANDING/SAFING:

CRITICALITIES

HDW/FUNC ABORT

/ RTLS:

/ TAL:

3/1R AOA:

/ ATO:

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S C F ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ARM.TH.I

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

C[F]

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

INABILITY TO HEAT ARM JOINT PLUS ELECTRONICS

HDW/FUNC

3/IR

/

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-566
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 903

HIGHEST CRITICALITY

FLIGHT:

ABORT:

ITEM: THERMOSTAT

FAILURE MODE: OPEN/SHORTED

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) ARM

2) THEm4AL

3) ACTIVE, ELECT.

4)

s)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / • RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ARM.TH. 2

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

MAY CAUSE LOSS OF BACKUP RELEASE, DUE TO CRITICAL HEAT

UNCONTROLLED.

HDWIFUNC

311R

/

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-567
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID: 904

HIGHEST CRITICALITY

FLIGHT:

ABORT:

HDW/FUNC

3/IR

/

ITEM: THERMISTOR

FAILURE MODE: FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) ARM

2) THERMAL

3) ACTIVE, ELECT.

4)

5)

6)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC " ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRE LAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [ F ] C [ F ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ARM.TH. 3

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

FALSE READING MAY CAUSE TEMPERATURE TO GO HIGHER THAN LIMITS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-568
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 9O5

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/ 3

ABORT: /

ITEM: BLANKETS

FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL SEPARATION OR DEGRADED

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) ARM

2) THERMAL

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

a)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /

LIFTOFF: / TAL: /

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /

DEORBIT: / ATO: /

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUSDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ARM.TH. 4

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF HEAT TRANSFER, MAY EFFECT TEMPERATURE REQUIREMENTS.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-569
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 906

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: MICROSWITCH

FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

I) ARM

2) SHOULDER BRACE

3) ELECTRICAL

4)

5)

6)

v)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ARM.SB. 1

HDWIFUNC

/

/

/

/

c[ ]

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

LOSS OF RELEASE INDICATION

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-570
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE •

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 907

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: MICROSWITCH

FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) ARM

2) SHOULDER BRACE

3) ELECTRICAL

4)

5)

6)

_)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] . B [ ] cc ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ARM.SB. 1

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

CONTINUOUS RELEASE INDICATION

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-571
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 908

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 2/2

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

LINEAR MOTOR (ACTUATOR)

BINDING

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

i) ARX

2) SHOULDER BRACE

3) ELECTRICAL

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS :

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] S[ ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ARM.SB. 2

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

cc ]

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

FAILURE TO RELEASE.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-572
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID: 909

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 3/3

ABORT: /

ITEM: PLUNGER

FAILURE MODE: RUPTURED, FRACTURED, BREAKAGE

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) ARM

2) SHOULDER BRACE

3) MECHANICAL

4)

5)

6)

8)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

T-mWlFUNC

I

I

I

I

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] S[ ] C[ ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ARM.SB. 3

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

POSSIBLE REDUCTION IN LIFE OF ARM/ARM JOINT.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-573
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDACID: 910

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 2/2

ABORT: /

ITEM:

FAILURE MODE:

SPLIT COLLET

RUPTURED, FRACTURED, BINDING

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) ARM

2) SHOULDER BRACE

3) MECHANICAL

4)

5)

6)

s)

9)

CRITICALITIES

FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT

PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:

LIFTOFF: / TAL:

ONORBIT: •2/2 AOA:

DEORBIT: / ATO:

LANDING/SAFING: /

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ]

LOCAT ION:

PART NUMBER: ARM.SB.4

HDW/FUNC

/

/

/

/

cC ]

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

FAILURE TO RELEASE SHOULDER BRACE

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-574
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

DATE:

SUBSYSTEM:

MDAC ID: 911

HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC

FLIGHT: 2/2

ABORT: /

ITEM: LOCKING STUB

FAILURE MODE: RUPTURED, FRACTURED, BINDING

LEAD ANALYST: SUBSYS LEAD:

BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:

1) MECH. ARM

2) SHOULDER BRACE

3) MECHANICAL

4)

5)

6)

7)

8)

9)

FLIGHT PHASE

PRELAUNCH:

LIFTOFF:

ONORBIT:

DEORBIT:

LANDING/SAFING:

CRITICALITIES

HDW/FUNC ABORT

/ RTLS:

I TAL:

2/2 AOA:

/ ATO:

/

REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ]

HDWlnmC

I

I

I

I

C[ ]

LOCATION: ARM

PART NUMBER: ARM.SB.5

CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE:

FAILURE TO RELEASE SHOULDER BRACE

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 01/27/87 C-575

MDAC

ID

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

132

133

134

135

136

137

139

140

142

143

144

145

146

147

148

152

153

155

156

157

158

159

160

161

162

163

164

165

166

167

168

171

172

173

177

178

179

180

181

182

183

APPENDIX D

POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS

ITEM

ENTER PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR

ENTER PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR

10V CONTACT

10V CONTACT

6.2V CONTACT

6.2V CONTACT

6.2V CONTACT

10V CONTACT

10V CONTACT

6.2V CONTACT

6.2V CONTACT

6.2V CONTACT

10V CONTACT

12.4V CONTACT

12.4V CONTACT

12.4V CONTACT

10V CONTACT

10V CONTACT

10V CONTACT

10V CONTACT

28V CONTACT

28V CONTACT

SAFING SWITCH

28V CONTACT

RIGIDIZE/DERIGIDIZE CONTACT

CONTACT

RIGIDIZE/DERIGIDIZE CONTACT

RIGIDIZE/DERIGIDIZE CONTACT

CAPTURE/RELEASE CONTACT

CAPTURE/RELEASE CONTACT

10V CONTACT

10V CONTACT

CAPTURE/RELEASE CONTACT

CAPTURE/RELEASE CONTACT

10V CONTACT

10V CONTACT

10V CONTACT

10V CONTACT

STOP CONTACT

STOP CONTACT

PROCEED CONTACT

BACKUP CONTACT

BACKUP CONTACT

BACKUP CONTACT

BACKUP CONTACT

PRIMARY CONTACT

PRIMARY CONTACT

PRIMARY CONTACT

FAILURE MODE

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

OPEN DIODE

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

OPEN DIODE

SHORTED

SHORTED

OPEN

OPEN DIODE

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

OPEN

SHORTED

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

D-I
MDAC

ID

184

185

186

188

189

190

192

196

197

198

2OO

201

202

203

204

205

206

207

2O8

209

210

213

214

215

216

217

218

220

221

222

223

224

225

226

227

228

229

230

231

236

237

238

239

240

241

242

ITEM

PRIMARY CONTACT

12.4V CONTACT

12.4V CONTACT

12.4V CONTACT

10V CONTACT

10V CONTACT

DC CONTACT

AC CONTACT

ENABLE CONTACT

ENABLE CONTACT

DC CONTACT

ENABLE CONTACT

ENABLE CONTACT

28V CONTACT

28V CONTACT

COMMAND CONTACT

COMMAND CONTACT

COMMAND CONTACT

COMMAND CONTACT

28V CONTACT

28V CONTACT

28V ENABLE CONTACT

28V ENABLE CONTACT

28V ENABLE CONTACT

28V ENABLE CONTACT

12V CONTACT

12V CONTACT

12V CONTACT

6V CONTACT

6V CONTACT

6V CONTACT

10V CONTACT

10V CONTACT

10V CONTACT

10V CONTACT

10V CONTACT

10V CONTACT

12V CONTACT

12V CONTACT

D & C ADDRESS DECODER INPUT

LINES

D & C ADDRESS DECODER INPUT

LINES

D & C ADDRESS DECODER OUTPUT

LINES

D & C ADDRESS DECODER OUTPUT

LINES

D & C ADDRESS DECODER OUTPUT

LINES

D & C INVERTOR NETWORK

D & C INVERTOR NETWORK

D-2

FAILURE MODE

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED DIODE

SHORTED

OPEN

OPEN

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED DIODE

SHORTED

OPEN

OPEN DIODE

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

LOSS OF WORD 0

SHORTED

OPEN
MDAC

ID

243

244

245

247

248

249

250

256

257

258

259

264

265

266

267

268

269

270

271

272

278

279

282

283

285

286

287

288

290

292

293

295

296

297

298

299

301

340

341

342

343

344

345

346

347

348

349

350

351

ITEM FAILURE MODE

D & C TEST WORD SELECTOR

D & C TEST WORD SELECTOR

D & C TEST WORD SELECTOR

CLOCK PULSE

STROBE PULSE

SERIAL TO PARALLEL CONVERTER

SERIAL TO PARALLEL CONVERTER

PARALLEL TO SERIAL CONVERTER

PARALLEL TO SERIAL CONVERTER

PARALLEL TO SERIAL CONVERTER

PARALLEL TO SERIAL CONVERTER

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

OUTPUT TRANSISTOR DRIVER CIRCUIT OPEN

OUTPUT TRANSISTOR DRIVER CIRCUIT SHORTED

OUTPUT TRANSISTOR DRIVER CIRCUIT SHORTED

OUTPUT TRANSISTOR DRIVER CIRCUIT OPEN

OUTPUT TRANSISTOR DRIVER CIRCUIT LOSS OF WORD 0

VERNIER CONTACT

COARSE CONTACT

10V CONTACT

LINKAGE

ll5V CONTACT

ll5V CONTACT

II5V CONTACT

II5V CONTACT

K1

K1

K2

K2

K3

K4

K4

K6

K6

28V CONTACT

28V CONTACT

28V CONTACT

LINKAGE

TRANSDUCER

TRANSDUCER

TRANSDUCER

TRANSDUCER

SIGNAL CONDITIONING DEMODULATOR

SIGNAL CONDITIONING DEMODULATOR

SIGNAL CONDITIONING DEMODULATOR

SIGNAL CONDITIONING DEMODULATOR

SIGNAL CONDITIONING DEMODULATOR

SIGNAL CONDITIONING DEMODULATOR

OSCILLATOR

OSCILLATOR

SHORTED

SHORTED

SHORTED

PHYSICAL BINDING, LINKAGE

DISCONNECTS

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

OPEN, DIRECT DRIVE CIRCUIT

OPEN, CAPTURE CIRCUIT

OPEN

OPEN, DIRECT DRIVE CIRCUIT

OPEN, CAPTURE CIRCUIT

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

PHYSICAL BINDING, LINKAGE

DISCONNECTS

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

LOSS OF OUTPUT

OPEN

SHORTED

LOSS OF OUTPUT

OPEN

SHORTED

LOSS OF OUTPUT

OPEN

D-3
MDAC

ID

352

362

363

364

365

401

402

403

404

405

406

407

408

409

410

411

412

413

414

415

416

417

418

419

420

421

424

425

426

427

428

429

430

433

435

439

440

441

442

443

444

445

446

447

448

ITEM FAILURE MODE

OSCILLATOR

AUTO CONTACT

AUTO CONTACT

AUTO CONTACT

AUTO _0NTACT

ENCODER PHOTO DETECTORS

ENCODER PHOTO DETECTORS

ENCODER ROTATING DISK

MOTOR-STATOR

MOTOR BEARINGS

MOTOR SHAFT

MOTOR SHAFT AND PININON GEAR

COMMUTATOR ROTATING DISK

COMMUTATOR BUFFER AMPLIFIER

ELECTRONICSELECT

COMMUTATOR BUFFER AMPLIFIER

ELECTRONICSELECT

COMMUTATOR LED

COMMUTATOR PHOTO SENSOR

COMMUTATOR PHOTO SENSOR

COMMUTATOR OUTPUT DRIVER

COMMUTATOR OUTPUT DRIVER

GEARBOX (GI)

GEARBOX (GI)

GEARBOX (G2)

GEARBOX (G2)

TACHOMETER ROTOR

TACHOMETER ROTOR

POWER-ON RESET CONTROL

POWER-ON RESET CONTROL

CONTROLLER, POWER CONDITIONER

CONTROLLER, POWER CONDITIONER

CONVERTER, POWER CONDITIONER

CONVERTER, POWER CONDITIONER

CONVERTER, POWER CONDITIONER

TACH BITE

PROTECTOR, POWER CONDITIONER

SCU

SCU

SHORTED

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

ERRATIC OUTPUT

FAIL OFF

ERRATIC OUTPUT

MOTOR FAILS OFF

MOTOR FAILS DUE TO SEIZED

BEARINGS

MOTOR FAILS DUE TO BROKEN

MOTOR SHAFT OR QUILL

COUPLER

MOTOR FAILS DUE TO BROKEN

DRIVE SHAFT OR PINION GEAR

ERRATIC OUTPUT

NO OUTPUT. ALL THREE

CHANNELS FAIL OFF

LOSS OF ONE CHANNEL

NO OUTPUT

LOSS OF ONE CHANNEL

LOSS OF 2 OR MORE CHANNELS

NO OUTPUT

LOSS OF ONE CHANNEL

SHAFT FRACTURES

GEARBOX JAM

SHAFT FRACTURES

GEARBOX JAMS

NO OUTOUT OR ERRATIC OUTPUT

ERRONEOUS OUTPUT

SHORTED

OPEN

OPEN

ERRONEOUS OUTPUT

OPEN

ERRONEOUS OUTPUT

ERRONEOUS OUTPUT

SHORTED

SHORTED

OPEN

ERRONEOUS OUTPUT

POSITION ENCODER DATA PROCESSING ERRONEOUS OUTPUT

POSITION ENCODER DATA PROCESSING ERRATIC OUTPUT

POSITION ENCODER DATA PROCESSING OPEN

+ 10V SHORTED

+ 10V OPEN

+ 28V SHORTED

+ 28V OPEN

D/A CONVERTER SHORTED

D-4
MDAC

ID

449

450

451

452

453

454

455

456

457

458

459

460

461

462

463

464

465

466

467

468

469

471

472

473

474

475

476

477

478

479

480

481

482

483

484

485

486

487

488

489

490

491

492

493

494

495

496

497

498

499

5OO

ITEM

D/A CONVERTER

ENCODER FEEDBACK

ENCODER FEEDBACK

I/P CLOCK OR SYNCH SIGNAL

I/P CLOCK OR SYNCH SIGNAL

0/P CLOCK OR SYNCH SIGNAL

0/P CLOCK OR SYNCH SIGNAL

3.2 MHZ OSC

3.2 MHZ OSC

SHIFT REGISTERS

SHIFT REGISTERS

DIGITAL F/B (ENCODER)

DIGITAL F/B (ENCODER)

ANALOG F/B (COMMUTATOR)

ANALOG F/B (COMMUTATOR)

+ 10V

+ 28V

+ 5.1V

- 15V

+ 15V

MDA INHIB

MTR TRANSFER RELAY

MTR TRANSFER RELAY

PWM GENERATOR

PWM SWITCH DRIVERS

COMMUTATOR I/P SIGNAL

DIR/ B/U /BRAKE SWITCHING LOGIC

DIR/ B/U /BRAKE SWITCHING LOGIC

MDA BITE LOGIC

MDA BITE LOGIC

MTR CURRENT SENSE RESISTOR

MTR CURRENT SENSE RESISTOR

POWER "ON" RESET

POWER "ON" RESET

CURRENT LIMITER

CURRENT LIMITER

MTR TRANSFER RELAY

MTR TRANSFER RELAY

PWM

PWM

PWM SWITCH ELECTRONICS

PWM SWITCH ELECTRONICS

+ 28V

BDA PWR CONDITIONER

BDA PWR CONDITIONER

ANALOG PROCESSOR

ANALOG PROCESSOR

POWER SIGNAL CONDITIONER

POWER SIGNAL CONDITIONER

B/U COMMUTATOR

ELECTRICAL

FAILURE MODE

OPEN

ERRONEOUS OUTPUT

LOSS OF OUTPUT

ERRONEOUS OUTPUT

LOSS OF OUTPUT

ERRONEOUS OUTPUT

LOSS OF OUTPUT

ERRONEOUS OUTPUT

LOSS OF OUTPUT

SHORTED

OPEN

ERRONEOUS OUTPUT

SHORTED

ERRONEOUS OUTPUT

LOSS OF OUTPUT

OPEN

OPEN

OPEN

OPEN

OPEN

SHORTED

SHORTED

OPEN

OPEN

OPEN

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

OPEN

SHORTED

D-5
MDAC

ID

501

5O2

5O3

601

602

603

604

6O5

606

607

608

609

610

611

612

613

614

615

616

617

618

619

620

621

622

623

624

625

626

627

628

629

630

631

632

633

634

635

636

637

638

ITEM FAILURE MODE

ELECTRICAL

MECHANICAL

MECHANICAL

16 CHANNEL ANALOG MULTIPLEXOR

(3)

16 CHANNEL ANALOG MULTIPLEXOR

(3)

BINARY COUNTERS (2 )

BINARY COUNTERS (2 )

SAMPLE AND HOLD GATED OP AMP

SAMPLE AND HOLD GATED OP AMP

VOLTAGE COMPARATOR

VOLTAGE COMPARATOR

ANALOG TO DIGITAL CONVERTER

ANALOG TO DIGITAL CONVERTER

QUAD 3-STATE R/S LATCHES (2)

QUAD 3-STATE R/S LATCHES (2)

MULTIWINDING OUTPUT TRANSFORMER

MULTIWINDING OUTPUT TRANSFORMER

2-PHASE PWM

2-PHASE PWM

POWER SWITCHING TRANSISTORS

POWER SWITCHING TRANSISTORS

OPEN

FAILS TO CLOSE

FAILS TO OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

30-KHZ TRIANGULAR WAVE GENERATOR SHORTED

30-KHZ TRIANGULAR WAVE GENERATOR OPEN

DIFFERENTIAL AMPLIFIER PWM

ADJUSTER

DIFFERENTIAL AMPLIFIER PWM

ADJUSTER

OP AMP, 30 KHZ TRIANGULAR WAVE

WIDTH ADJUSTER

OP AMP, 30 KHZ TRIANGULAR WAVE

WIDTH ADJUSTER

RECTIFIER MODULES

RECTIFIER MODULES

MIA

MIA

CLOCK DIVIDER CIRCUIT

CLOCK DIVIDER CIRCUIT

16 MHZ CRYSTAL OSCILLATOR

16 MHZ CRYSTAL OSCILLATOR

O/P PARALLEL TO SERIAL SHIFT

REGISTER (3)

O/P PARALLEL TO SERIAL SHIFT

REGISTER (3)

I/P SERIAL TO PARALLEL SHIFT

REGISTER

I/P SERIAL TO PARALLEL SHIFT

REGISTER

TRANSMIT TIMING CONTROL

TRANSMIT TIMING CONTROL

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

ERRONEOUS OUTPUT

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

D-6
MDAC

ID

639

640

641

642

643

644

645

646

647

648

649

65O

651

652

653

654

655

656

657

658

659

660

661

662

663

664

669

670

671

672

673

674

675

676

677

678

681

682

683

ITEM

RECEIVE TIMING CONTROL

RECEIVE TIMING CONTROL

BRAKE STATUS OPTO ISOLATOR

BRAKE STATUS OPTO ISOLATOR

BRAKE DRIVE SWITCHES

BRAKE DRIVE SWITCHES

AUTO BRAKE CIRCUIT

AUTO BRAKE CIRCUIT

EE AUTO LOGIC

EE AUTO LOGIC

DUAL 4-BIT LATCH

DUAL 4-BIT LATCH

4-BIT MAGNITUDE COMPARATOR (2)

4-BIT MAGNITUDE COMPARATOR (2)

FRAME SYNC FAILURE DETECTOR

TIMING CIRCUIT

FRAME SYNC FAILURE DETECTOR OPEN

TIMING CIRCUIT

7-BIT BINARY COUNTER

7-BIT BINARY COUNTER

READ IN/WRITE OUT MAGNITUDE

COMPARATOR

READ IN/WRITE OUT MAGNITUDE OPEN

COMPARATOR

LOWER SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER,

ABE O/P

LOWER SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER, OPEN

ABE O/P

UPPER SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER,

ABE I/P

UPPER'SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER, OPEN

ABE I/P

ABE OUTPUT DRIVER

ABE OUTPUT DRIVER

D & C STROBE

D & C STROBE

D & C CLOCK

D & C CLOCK

ABE INPUT OPTO ISOLATORS

ABE INPUT OPTO ISOLATORS

SERIAL-PARALLEL SHIFT REGISTERS

(2) ABE I/P

SERIAL-PARALLEL SHIFT REGISTERS OPEN

(2) ABE I/P

SERIAL-PARALLEL SHIFT REGISTERS

(2) D & C I/P

SERIAL-PARALLEL SHIFT REGISTERS OPEN

(2) D & C I/P

CPU

CPU

200 KHZ CLOCK

FAILURE MODE

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

SHORTED

SHORTED

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

SHORTED

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

D-7
MDAC

ID

684

685

686

687

688

689

690

691

692

693

694

695

696

697

698

801

802

8O3

804

8O5

806

8O7

8O8

810

811

813

814

815

816

817

819

821

823

824

831

837

838

84O

841

842

843

846

847

849

850

851

852

853

854

ITEM FAILURE MODE

200 KHZ CLOCK

PARALLEL DATA CONVERTER

PARALLEL DATA CONVERTER

DIRECT MEMORY ACCESS CONTROLLER

DIRECT MEMORY ACCESS CONTROLLER

POWER ON INIT ROUTINE LOGIC

POWER ON INIT ROUTINE LOGIC

RAM

RAM

ROM

ROM

O/P LATCH (2)

O/P LATCH (2)

I/P LATCH (2)

I/P LATCH (2)

SNARE

SNARE

CARRIAGE

CARRIAGE

CAPTURE BRAKE

CAPTURE BRAKE

RIBIDIZE BRAKE

RIBIDIZE BRAKE

CAPTURE CLUTCH

CAPTURE CLUTCH

RIGIDIZE CLUTCH

CAPTURE DRIVE TRAIN

CAPTURE DRIVE TRAIN

RIGIDIZE DRIVE

RIGIDIZE DRIVE

DERIGID MICROSWITCH

CLOSED MICROSWITCH

CAPTURE MICROSWITCH

OPEN MICROSWITCH

RIGIDIZE MSW SIGNAL CONDITIONER

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

JAMMING

STRUCTURE FAILURE

JAMMING

STRUCTURAL FAILURE

BRAKE FAILED ON

FAILED OFF

FAILED ON

FAILED OFF

FAILED ON ENGAGED

FAILED OFF DISENGAGED

FAILED DISENGAGED

JAMMING

FAILS FREE

JAMMING

FAILS FREE

FAILS OFF

FAILS OFF

FAILS ON

FAILS ON

FAIL OFF

PL CAPTURE MSW SIGNAL CONDITONER FAIL OFF

OPEN MSW SIGNAL CONDITIONER

CAPTURE/RELEASE BRAKE/CLUTCH

POWER SWITCH DRIVER

RIGID/DERIGID BRAKE/CLUTCH

POWER SWITCH DRIVER

MOTOR POWER SIGNAL CONTROLLER

MOTOR POWER SIGNAL CONTROLLER

POWER SWITCH DRIVERS

POWER SWITCH DRIVERS

MULTIPLE ACTIVATE CMD INHIBIT

RIGIDIZE MICROSWITCH

RIGIDIZE MICROSWITCH

BEARINGS

BU GEARTRAIN

BU GEARTRAIN

FAIL ON

OPEN POWER SWITCH

OPEN POWER SWITCH

FAILS ON

FAILS OFF

FAILS ON

FAILS OFF

FAILS ON

FAILS ON

FAILS OFF

PHYSICAL BINDING

STRUCTURAL FAILURE

PHYSICAL BINDING

D-8
MDAC

ID

855

856

857

858

859

860

861

862

863

864

865

866

867

868

869

870

871

872

873

874

875

876

877

878

879

880

881

882

883

884

885

886

887

888

889

890

891

ITEM

BU SPRING

BU SPRING

BU CLUTCH

BU CLUTCH

BU CLUTCH

BU CLUTCH

STATOR

STATOR

ROTOR

PHOTO CELL (3)

LED

LED

COMMUTATOR AMP

COMMUTATOR AMP

OUTPUT DRIVER

OUTPUT DRIVER

ROTATING DISK

CAP/REL BRAKE & CLUTCH ACTIVATE

CONTROL

CAP/REL BRAKE & CLUTCH ACTIVATE OPEN

CONTROL

RIG/DERIG BRAKE & CLUTCH

ACTIVATE CONTROL

RIG/DERIG BRAKE & CLUTCH OPEN

ACTIVATE CONTROL

CAP/REL BRAKE & CLUTCH FAIL

SAFE ENABLE

CAP/REL BRAKE & CLUTCH FAIL OPEN

SAFE ENABLE

RIG/DERIG BRAKE & CLUTCH FAIL

SAFE ENABLE

RIG/DERIG BRAKE & CLUTCH FAIL OPEN

SAFE ENABLE

MOTOR POWER FAIL SAFE ENABEL

MOTOR POWER FAIL SAFE ENABEL

MOTOR POWER ACTIVATE CONTROL

MOTOR POWER ACTIVATE CONTROL

CAP/REL/OFF TRISTATE LEVEL

DETECTOR

CAP/REL/OFF TRISTATE LEVEL OPEN

DETECTOR

RIG/DERIG/OFF TRISTATE LEVEL

DETECTOR

RIG/DERIG/OFF TRISTATE LEVEL OPEN

DETECTOR

FAIL SAFE COMMAND ON/OFF LEVEL

DETECTOR

FAIL SAFE COMMAND ON/OFF LEVEL OPEN

DETECTOR

EE POWER CONDITIONER

CAPTURE COMMAND ENABLE LOGIC

FAILURE MODE

STRUCTURAL FAILURE

STRUCTURAL FAILURE

FAILURE TO CLOSE

FAILURE TO OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

PHYSICAL BINDING

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

LOSS OF OUTPUT

ERRONEOUS

LOSS OF OUTPUT

ERRONEOUS OUTPUT

PHYSICAL BINDING

SHORTED

SHORTED

SHORTED

SHORTED

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

OPEN

SHORTED

SHORTED

SHORTED

SHORTED

OPEN

D-9
MDAC

ID

892

901

902

903

904

908

910

911

ITEM

CAPTURE COMMAND ENABLE LOGIC

BOOM

ELEMENTS, HEATER

THERMOSTAT

THERMISTOR

LINEAR MOTOR (ACTUATOR)

SPLIT COLLET

LOCKING STUB

FAILURE MODE

SHORTED

RUPTURED, FRACTURED

OPEN

OPEN/SHORTED

FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE

BINDING

RUPTURED, FRACTURED,

BINDING

RUPTURED, FRACTURED,

BINDING

D-10

MCDONNELL DOUGLAS ASTRONAUTICS COMPANY - HOUSTON

16055 SPACE CENTER BLVD, HOUSTON, TEXAS 77062
v

NASA SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DOCUMENT AVAILABIUTY AUTHORIZATION (DAA)

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