,' --'.

cW

U. S. Marine Corps

Officer Professional Military Education

2006 Study and Findings

General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC (Ret), Chairman

Lieutenant General Wallace C. Gregson, Jr., USMC (Ret)

Lieutenant General Bruce B. Knutson, Jr., USMC (Ret)

Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper, USMC (Ret)

Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.

Dr. Williamson Murray

Marine Corps University

2076 South Street, Quantico, Virginia 221 34-5067

PCN 50100121000

U. S. Marine Corps

Officer Professional Military Education

2006 Study and Findings

General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC (Ret), Chairman

Lieutenant General Wallace C. Gregson, Jr., USMC (Ret)

Lieutenant General Bruce B. Knutson, Jr., USMC (Ret)

Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper, USMC (Ret)

Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.

Dr. Williamson Murray

Marine Corps University

2076 South Street, Quantico, Virginia 221 34-5067

PCN 50100121000

29 September 2006

To: Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command

Via.: Chair, Board of Visitors, Marine Corps University

Subj: FINDINGS OF THE OFFICER PROFESSIONAL MILiTARY EDUCATION STUDY

Within the lifecycle of this study, the nation paused to remember the tragic events of 11

September 2001. This served as a cogent reminder to the members of the study group that the

world of this young century is markedly different from the world of the last. Change is the order

of the day, and the Professional Military Education Institutions of the Marine Corps must keep

pace.

The study group.. .four retired Marines, three of whom are former MCCDC

Commanders...and two distinguished military scholars and authors, worked on this project from

July through September. During those three months of deliberation the members shared thoughts,

experiences and philosophies. As a result of these exchanges the group reached some

fundamental conclusions. We readily agreed that during times of great change, learning and

professional development are essential. We also agreed that a truly world class Professional

Military Education program must have a number of attributes. Foremost among these are a

world class faculty, world class students, world class curricula, and world class facilities. In the

our judgment, the Marine Corps is well down the road on the first three, but is lagging badly on

the fourth.

This study contains many recommendations. Some can be executed quickly with

minimum resources. Others will cause the Marine Corps to do some soul searching, make hard

choices, and ask itself what is really important.. .on the strategic time line spanning today,

tomorrow, and the day after tomorrow.

As we pursued this task, we profited enormously from the day-to-day involvement of

Major General Don Gardner, President of the Marine Corps University. We never wanted for

access to the University faculty, staff and school directors thanks to the diligence of Dr. Jerre

Wilson, and last, but certainly not least, we owe a large debt of gratitude to Major Philip

Cushman who not only provided responsive administrative support, but also served as our

"Napoleon's Corporal."

44

Charles E. Wilhelm Wallace C. 9v€gson, Jr. Bruce B. Knutson,

Gen USMC (Ret) LtGen USMC (Ret) LtGen USMC (Ret)

Chairman

Paul

&4H.U

K. Van Riper Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.,hD

LtGen USMC (Ret)

1

29 September 2006

To: Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command

Via.: Chair, Board of Visitors, Marine Corps University

Subj: FINDINGS OF THE OFFICER PROFESSIONAL MILiTARY EDUCATION STUDY

Within the lifecycle of this study, the nation paused to remember the tragic events of 11

September 2001. This served as a cogent reminder to the members of the study group that the

world of this young century is markedly different from the world of the last. Change is the order

of the day, and the Professional Military Education Institutions of the Marine Corps must keep

pace.

The study group.. .four retired Marines, three of whom are former MCCDC

Commanders...and two distinguished military scholars and authors, worked on this project from

July through September. During those three months of deliberation the members shared thoughts,

experiences and philosophies. As a result of these exchanges the group reached some

fundamental conclusions. We readily agreed that during times of great change, learning and

professional development are essential. We also agreed that a truly world class Professional

Military Education program must have a number of attributes. Foremost among these are a

world class faculty, world class students, world class curricula, and world class facilities. In the

our judgment, the Marine Corps is well down the road on the first three, but is lagging badly on

the fourth.

This study contains many recommendations. Some can be executed quickly with

minimum resources. Others will cause the Marine Corps to do some soul searching, make hard

choices, and ask itself what is really important.. .on the strategic time line spanning today,

tomorrow, and the day after tomorrow.

As we pursued this task, we profited enormously from the day-to-day involvement of

Major General Don Gardner, President of the Marine Corps University. We never wanted for

access to the University faculty, staff and school directors thanks to the diligence of Dr. Jerre

Wilson, and last, but certainly not least, we owe a large debt of gratitude to Major Philip

Cushman who not only provided responsive administrative support, but also served as our

"Napoleon's Corporal."

44

Charles E. Wilhelm Wallace C. 9v€gson, Jr. Bruce B. Knutson,

Gen USMC (Ret) LtGen USMC (Ret) LtGen USMC (Ret)

Chairman

Paul

&4H.U

K. Van Riper Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.,hD

LtGen USMC (Ret)

1
11
Distribution List

Marine Corps Combat Development Command

Marine Corps University Board of Visitors

Marine Corps Training and Education Conmiand

Marine Corps Training Command

Marine Corps Education Command/Marine Corps University

Marine Corps War College

Marine Corps Command and Staff College

Expeditionary Warfare School

School of MAGTF Logistics

The Basic School

Marine Corps College of Continuing Education

Marine Corps Institute

111

Distribution List

Marine Corps Combat Development Command

Marine Corps University Board of Visitors

Marine Corps Training and Education Conmiand

Marine Corps Training Command

Marine Corps Education Command/Marine Corps University

Marine Corps War College

Marine Corps Command and Staff College

Expeditionary Warfare School

School of MAGTF Logistics

The Basic School

Marine Corps College of Continuing Education

Marine Corps Institute

111
iv
Contents: Page

Executive Summary 1

Introduction 5

Objective 5

Assumptions 5

Questions 5

Approach 6

Section I — Concept 7

Strategic Environment 7

Background 7

Radical Islamists 7

The Nuclear Arc of Instability 8

China 9

Implications for the Marine Corps 10

The Future Marine Corps Officer 11

Implications for Professional Military Education 15

The Questions 17

Question #1: PME Structure and Content 17

Question #2: Leader Development 21

Question #3: Thinking, Planning, and Acting 23

Section II— Assessment 27

General 27

Question #4: Combination of Resident and Non-Resident PME 27

Question #5: Balance of PME Responsibilities 28

Question #6: Reserve Officer PME Methodology 30

Question #7: Changes: Faculty, Students, Curriculum, and

Facilities 32

Question #8: Length and Difficulty of Current PME Courses 33

Question #9: Inclusion of Military History; Policy and Strategy;

Traditional vs. Irregular Warfare; and Language and Culture 36

Question #10: Value of the OFEC, C2 T&E in Resident and

Non-Resident EWS 38

Section III — Conclusions 41

Appendix I, Glossary 43

Appendix II, Biographies 45

V

Contents: Page

Executive Summary 1

Introduction 5

Objective 5

Assumptions 5

Questions 5

Approach 6

Section I — Concept 7

Strategic Environment 7

Background 7

Radical Islamists 7

The Nuclear Arc of Instability 8

China 9

Implications for the Marine Corps 10

The Future Marine Corps Officer 11

Implications for Professional Military Education 15

The Questions 17

Question #1: PME Structure and Content 17

Question #2: Leader Development 21

Question #3: Thinking, Planning, and Acting 23

Section II— Assessment 27

General 27

Question #4: Combination of Resident and Non-Resident PME 27

Question #5: Balance of PME Responsibilities 28

Question #6: Reserve Officer PME Methodology 30

Question #7: Changes: Faculty, Students, Curriculum, and

Facilities 32

Question #8: Length and Difficulty of Current PME Courses 33

Question #9: Inclusion of Military History; Policy and Strategy;

Traditional vs. Irregular Warfare; and Language and Culture 36

Question #10: Value of the OFEC, C2 T&E in Resident and

Non-Resident EWS 38

Section III — Conclusions 41

Appendix I, Glossary 43

Appendix II, Biographies 45

V
vi
Executive Summary

The study group finds the Marine Corps' Officer Professional Military Education (PME)

system to be generally sound. However, left unchanged, this system will be increasingly unable

to meet the needs of our officers, the Marine Corps and the nation.

The Changing Environment

The United States and its Marine Corps confront an environment of accelerating political,

economic, technological, social and military change. The world is becoming progressively more

dangerous, and our nation's security is increasingly at risk. In addition to the ongoing war with

radical Islaniists, nuclear proliferation is proceeding apace. North Korea has declared its

possession of nuclear weapons, while Iran is hastening its efforts to develop such a capability.

Finally, China's continued rise has yet to be matched by an increase in confidence that Beijing

will seek to resolve its outstanding strategic objectives through peaceful means. These security

challenges will dominate U.S. defense planning for years, and perhaps decades. Consequently,

Marine officers will find themselves deploying to many different parts of the world, confronting

different challenges, and operating among vastly different cultures.

Marine officers also face a technological revolution characterized by rapid advances in

information-related technologies. Moreover, it seems likely that, with breathtaking advances

projected in the areas of the biosciences and nanotechnologies, the pace of change will only

quicken. The ongoing geopolitical and military-technical revolutions are fundamentally altering

not only the conduct of military operations, but the political and social context within which they

take place.

These changing times demand major adjustments to—and investments in—Professional

Military Education. The Professional Military Education system has never failed the Marine

Corps, or the nation. It cannot fail them now. Professional Military Education represents the

most important investment the Marine Corps can make in addressing the challenges of this

young century.

The Marine Corps Officer

The dangerous and uncertain world in which we live demands innovative thinking from

the Marine Corps in general, and from the Marine Corps University in particular, to support the

efforts of officers to acquire the necessary skills to succeed. This is best accomplished in an

atmosphere that welcomes independent thinking and encourages spirited professional debate.

Marine officers will need a greater variety of skills and a wider breadth of knowledge to

meet the challenges they confront, both in peace and in war. Today's officers must: • Think critically, whether confronting concrete or abstract problems; • Express themselves, both orally and in the written form, clearly and effectively in a

diverse set of circumstances and before a wide range of audiences;

1

Executive Summary

The study group finds the Marine Corps' Officer Professional Military Education (PME)

system to be generally sound. However, left unchanged, this system will be increasingly unable

to meet the needs of our officers, the Marine Corps and the nation.

The Changing Environment

The United States and its Marine Corps confront an environment of accelerating political,

economic, technological, social and military change. The world is becoming progressively more

dangerous, and our nation's security is increasingly at risk. In addition to the ongoing war with

radical Islaniists, nuclear proliferation is proceeding apace. North Korea has declared its

possession of nuclear weapons, while Iran is hastening its efforts to develop such a capability.

Finally, China's continued rise has yet to be matched by an increase in confidence that Beijing

will seek to resolve its outstanding strategic objectives through peaceful means. These security

challenges will dominate U.S. defense planning for years, and perhaps decades. Consequently,

Marine officers will find themselves deploying to many different parts of the world, confronting

different challenges, and operating among vastly different cultures.

Marine officers also face a technological revolution characterized by rapid advances in

information-related technologies. Moreover, it seems likely that, with breathtaking advances

projected in the areas of the biosciences and nanotechnologies, the pace of change will only

quicken. The ongoing geopolitical and military-technical revolutions are fundamentally altering

not only the conduct of military operations, but the political and social context within which they

take place.

These changing times demand major adjustments to—and investments in—Professional

Military Education. The Professional Military Education system has never failed the Marine

Corps, or the nation. It cannot fail them now. Professional Military Education represents the

most important investment the Marine Corps can make in addressing the challenges of this

young century.

The Marine Corps Officer

The dangerous and uncertain world in which we live demands innovative thinking from

the Marine Corps in general, and from the Marine Corps University in particular, to support the

efforts of officers to acquire the necessary skills to succeed. This is best accomplished in an

atmosphere that welcomes independent thinking and encourages spirited professional debate.

Marine officers will need a greater variety of skills and a wider breadth of knowledge to

meet the challenges they confront, both in peace and in war. Today's officers must: • Think critically, whether confronting concrete or abstract problems; • Express themselves, both orally and in the written form, clearly and effectively in a

diverse set of circumstances and before a wide range of audiences;

1
• Understand national security strategy and policy as well as the responsibilities of other

agencies of the federal government; • Be proficient in their military specialty, Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF)

operations and how they fit into joint, international, and interagency operations; • Appreciate the roles that international organizations, non-governmental agencies, and the

private sector play in military operations, especially in the emerging security environment; • Coordinate, where needed, the employment of military capabilities with the other

elements of national power; • Understand and appreciate the value of their profession's history; • Master counterinsurgency operations, and operations in nuclear and biological

environments; and

• Understand the principles of communications and network theory, system architectures,

and the effective use of information management tools that enable such mastery.

The Central Role of Professional Military Education

The burden of fostering these competencies rests principally on our Professional Military

Educational institutions. But it also requires a major and enduring effort on the part of Marine

officers themselves, and emphasis and encouragement from Marine commanders at all levels.

When General Gray founded Marine Corps University, he sought to create "a worldclass" educational institution for the study of war and the profession of arms. This study group

believes that four essential elements comprise world-class status: a world-class faculty, worldclass students, a world-class curriculum, and world-class facilities and resources. But MCU is by

no means a world-class university. To realize General Gray's vision, the Marine Corps must

support and sustain these four core elements with the resources that a world-class institution

requires. We find that the scope and scale of needed change exceeds the resources allocated for

this purpose. Nor can the Marine Corps take refuge in the old adage that it will "do more with

less." Simply stated, substantial additional human and material resources are needed to meet this

challenge.

The Way Ahead

The study group believes the Marine Corps cannot field a world-class fighting force

without a world-class educational institution. In the course of its deliberations, the study group

formulated a total of 63 recommendations. Among the most important are:

2

• Understand national security strategy and policy as well as the responsibilities of other

agencies of the federal government; • Be proficient in their military specialty, Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF)

operations and how they fit into joint, international, and interagency operations; • Appreciate the roles that international organizations, non-governmental agencies, and the

private sector play in military operations, especially in the emerging security environment; • Coordinate, where needed, the employment of military capabilities with the other

elements of national power; • Understand and appreciate the value of their profession's history; • Master counterinsurgency operations, and operations in nuclear and biological

environments; and

• Understand the principles of communications and network theory, system architectures,

and the effective use of information management tools that enable such mastery.

The Central Role of Professional Military Education

The burden of fostering these competencies rests principally on our Professional Military

Educational institutions. But it also requires a major and enduring effort on the part of Marine

officers themselves, and emphasis and encouragement from Marine commanders at all levels.

When General Gray founded Marine Corps University, he sought to create "a worldclass" educational institution for the study of war and the profession of arms. This study group

believes that four essential elements comprise world-class status: a world-class faculty, worldclass students, a world-class curriculum, and world-class facilities and resources. But MCU is by

no means a world-class university. To realize General Gray's vision, the Marine Corps must

support and sustain these four core elements with the resources that a world-class institution

requires. We find that the scope and scale of needed change exceeds the resources allocated for

this purpose. Nor can the Marine Corps take refuge in the old adage that it will "do more with

less." Simply stated, substantial additional human and material resources are needed to meet this

challenge.

The Way Ahead

The study group believes the Marine Corps cannot field a world-class fighting force

without a world-class educational institution. In the course of its deliberations, the study group

formulated a total of 63 recommendations. Among the most important are:

2
General • Request the Commandant of the Marine Corps issue a policy statement on Professional

Military Education. This statement must elevate the importance of PME within the

institution and place it on an equal or higher plane with other priorities such as physical

conditioning. Further, the Commandant's guidance should clearly define the roles and

responsibilities of the individual officer, commanding officers, and the Marine Corps as

an institution in the overall PME equation. • Craft an MCU Campaign Plan that integrates initiatives across PME's four essential

elements. The plan must reflect an appreciation that the four elements' contribution is not

the sum of their efforts, but rather the product of their efforts. Thus a lagging effort in one

area will undermine the effectiveness of the other three. • Establish unity of command over officer PME under the Marine Corps University. The

University must be responsible for establishing requirements for the College of

Continuing Education, the Basic School and pre-commissioning education. • Radically change the Expeditionary Warfare School's (EWS) framework and construct.

All captains should receive the majority of EWS instruction via non-resident distance

learning, followed by attendance at an in-residence program at Quantico.

Faculty

• Increase faculty size for both resident and non-resident PME while sustaining quality in

order to meet current and emerging requirements. This will improve instruction while

facilitating the expansion of the various curricula to support the development of new

skills.

Students

• Ensure officers understand that they are responsible for their professional development,

and that they actively seek opportunities to meet this responsibility, to include pursuing

self-study programs. • Increase enrollments in the School of Advanced Warfighting and the Marine Corps War

College. The Marine Corps University is equipping officers with superior skills in

strategic planning and decision-making, and in operational art and science. However, it is

not producing sufficient numbers of graduates to satisfy the demands of Marine Corps

and Combatant Commanders for officers possessing these skills. To align supply with

demand and meet requirements created by global contingencies and proliferation of joint

task forces, enrollments in both schools must be increased.

3

General • Request the Commandant of the Marine Corps issue a policy statement on Professional

Military Education. This statement must elevate the importance of PME within the

institution and place it on an equal or higher plane with other priorities such as physical

conditioning. Further, the Commandant's guidance should clearly define the roles and

responsibilities of the individual officer, commanding officers, and the Marine Corps as

an institution in the overall PME equation. • Craft an MCU Campaign Plan that integrates initiatives across PME's four essential

elements. The plan must reflect an appreciation that the four elements' contribution is not

the sum of their efforts, but rather the product of their efforts. Thus a lagging effort in one

area will undermine the effectiveness of the other three. • Establish unity of command over officer PME under the Marine Corps University. The

University must be responsible for establishing requirements for the College of

Continuing Education, the Basic School and pre-commissioning education. • Radically change the Expeditionary Warfare School's (EWS) framework and construct.

All captains should receive the majority of EWS instruction via non-resident distance

learning, followed by attendance at an in-residence program at Quantico.

Faculty

• Increase faculty size for both resident and non-resident PME while sustaining quality in

order to meet current and emerging requirements. This will improve instruction while

facilitating the expansion of the various curricula to support the development of new

skills.

Students

• Ensure officers understand that they are responsible for their professional development,

and that they actively seek opportunities to meet this responsibility, to include pursuing

self-study programs. • Increase enrollments in the School of Advanced Warfighting and the Marine Corps War

College. The Marine Corps University is equipping officers with superior skills in

strategic planning and decision-making, and in operational art and science. However, it is

not producing sufficient numbers of graduates to satisfy the demands of Marine Corps

and Combatant Commanders for officers possessing these skills. To align supply with

demand and meet requirements created by global contingencies and proliferation of joint

task forces, enrollments in both schools must be increased.

3
Curriculum

• Rebalance the curricula of the respective schools to place appropriate and proportionate

emphasis between the art and science of warfare. While the study of military history and

histOrical analyses underpin the curricula of all Professional Military Education, current

programs place a premium on art at the expense of science. • Encourage the study of languages by young men and women who demonstrate an interest

in becoming Marines, while providing opportunities for language instruction by those

who demonstrate a peculiar aptitude for such study. Expand universal cultural education.

Infrastructure

• Develop and implement a new facilities master plan to remedy the University's

antiquated physical plant and information technology (IT) infrastructure. • Overhaul the University's information technology infrastructure to support best

communications practices.

The emerging security environment will challenge Marine officers' ability to maintain

their traditional core skills, and to develop new ones as well. Professional Military Education has

been, and will remain, central to meeting this challenge. While professional learning is a lifelong responsibility of all Marine officers, they, along with their commanders and the Marine

Corps as an institution, share a collective responsibility for its success. But success also requires

major changes in the Marine Corps' military education system, and a substantial increase in

resources. This challenge is one that cannot be deferred, and must be met, if the Marine Corps is

to maintain its heritage of service to the nation.

4

Curriculum

• Rebalance the curricula of the respective schools to place appropriate and proportionate

emphasis between the art and science of warfare. While the study of military history and

histOrical analyses underpin the curricula of all Professional Military Education, current

programs place a premium on art at the expense of science. • Encourage the study of languages by young men and women who demonstrate an interest

in becoming Marines, while providing opportunities for language instruction by those

who demonstrate a peculiar aptitude for such study. Expand universal cultural education.

Infrastructure

• Develop and implement a new facilities master plan to remedy the University's

antiquated physical plant and information technology (IT) infrastructure. • Overhaul the University's information technology infrastructure to support best

communications practices.

The emerging security environment will challenge Marine officers' ability to maintain

their traditional core skills, and to develop new ones as well. Professional Military Education has

been, and will remain, central to meeting this challenge. While professional learning is a lifelong responsibility of all Marine officers, they, along with their commanders and the Marine

Corps as an institution, share a collective responsibility for its success. But success also requires

major changes in the Marine Corps' military education system, and a substantial increase in

resources. This challenge is one that cannot be deferred, and must be met, if the Marine Corps is

to maintain its heritage of service to the nation.

4
Introduction

Objective: This study was conducted at the direction and under the supervision of the

President of the Marine Corps University (MCU). The members of the study group have

undertaken a comprehensive independent review of the Marine Corps' Officer Professional

Military Education program, its processes, and procedures. The study's findings will help in the

revision of Marine Corps Orders related to Professional Military Education (PME) and the

curricula of the various PME educational institutions. The framework and parameters of the

study rest on seven key assumptions and ten questions posed in the study directive.

Assumptions

1. The study will be completed within three months.

2. Distributed education will remain an important component of the Marine Corps Officer PME

program.

3. Recommended changes must consider the impact on distance learning (DL) programs.

4. USMC PME must continue meeting joint requirements and receive joint accreditation via the

Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE).

5. MCU will continue to maintain its accreditation with the Southern Association of Colleges

and Schools (SACS).

6. USMC PME must maintain participation by other services, civilian agencies, and

international fellows.

7. Officers must be able to complete individual PME courses within a reasonable period of time.

Questions

1. Does the basic structure and content of USMC officer PME require change? If so, why?

2. How can the USMC develop leaders who can recognize and adapt to the changing character

and form of conflict, and operate confidently and effectively within it, at the tactical, operational,

and strategic levels of war?

3. How can the USMC develop leaders who think critically and creatively, plan, assess risks -

then act decisively?

4. What is the optimum combination of resident and non-resident officer PME?

5. What is the best way to share USMC officer PME responsibilities among the institution,

commands, and individuals?

5

Introduction

Objective: This study was conducted at the direction and under the supervision of the

President of the Marine Corps University (MCU). The members of the study group have

undertaken a comprehensive independent review of the Marine Corps' Officer Professional

Military Education program, its processes, and procedures. The study's findings will help in the

revision of Marine Corps Orders related to Professional Military Education (PME) and the

curricula of the various PME educational institutions. The framework and parameters of the

study rest on seven key assumptions and ten questions posed in the study directive.

Assumptions

1. The study will be completed within three months.

2. Distributed education will remain an important component of the Marine Corps Officer PME

program.

3. Recommended changes must consider the impact on distance learning (DL) programs.

4. USMC PME must continue meeting joint requirements and receive joint accreditation via the

Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE).

5. MCU will continue to maintain its accreditation with the Southern Association of Colleges

and Schools (SACS).

6. USMC PME must maintain participation by other services, civilian agencies, and

international fellows.

7. Officers must be able to complete individual PME courses within a reasonable period of time.

Questions

1. Does the basic structure and content of USMC officer PME require change? If so, why?

2. How can the USMC develop leaders who can recognize and adapt to the changing character

and form of conflict, and operate confidently and effectively within it, at the tactical, operational,

and strategic levels of war?

3. How can the USMC develop leaders who think critically and creatively, plan, assess risks -

then act decisively?

4. What is the optimum combination of resident and non-resident officer PME?

5. What is the best way to share USMC officer PME responsibilities among the institution,

commands, and individuals?

5
6. What is the appropriate methodology to ensure Marine Reserve Officers receive PME?

7. What major faculty, student, curricula and facility changes should be considered?

8. Are the length and difficulty level of current PME courses appropriate for the subject matter

and majority of student population?

9. To what extent should the following be included in the curricula?

• Military history

• Policy and strategy

• Traditional vs. irregular warfare

• Language and culture

10. What is the value of the Occupational Field Enhancement Course (OFEC) and Command

and Control Training and Education (C2 T&E) curriculum currently provided by the resident

Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS)? Should these programs be available to non-resident

students and other Marines along the T&E continuum?

Approach

After reviewing the study directive and following discussions with the MCU President

and key members of the university staff and faculty, the study group determined that the purpose

and intent for this project could best be met by addressing study requirements in two ways. The

members concluded that the first three questions have a conceptual orientation and focus on

long-term factors and conditions. Section I of the study, entitled "Concept," addresses these

issues. To provide a framework for the report, this section begins with a succinct description of

the evolving strategic environment, and the attributes an officer will need to operate successfully

in the postulated environment. The section continues with a general discussion of the

implications of the evolving environment on PME programs and training needs, and concludes

with responses to the first three questions of the study directive.

Section II, titled "Assessment," answers the remaining seven study directive questions.

This segment has a more immediate focus, concentrates on specific elements of the existing

officer PME program, and addresses factors, conditions, and requirements that the President,

MCU, and the Marine Corps as an institution should address within the next two to three years to

preserve the program's quality and ensure its continued relevance.

The third and final section of the report, "Conclusions," summarizes the study group's

overall assessment of the Marine Corps PME program and the steps that can be taken to elevate

the program to the next level to make it relevant and responsive to the challenges of the 21st

century. During its deliberations the study group examined situations and conditions that affect

officer PME, but which are beyond the scope of the questions posed by the study directive.

Because these situations and conditions are not trivial, additional recommendations are

incorporated in this section of the study.

6

6. What is the appropriate methodology to ensure Marine Reserve Officers receive PME?

7. What major faculty, student, curricula and facility changes should be considered?

8. Are the length and difficulty level of current PME courses appropriate for the subject matter

and majority of student population?

9. To what extent should the following be included in the curricula?

• Military history

• Policy and strategy

• Traditional vs. irregular warfare

• Language and culture

10. What is the value of the Occupational Field Enhancement Course (OFEC) and Command

and Control Training and Education (C2 T&E) curriculum currently provided by the resident

Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS)? Should these programs be available to non-resident

students and other Marines along the T&E continuum?

Approach

After reviewing the study directive and following discussions with the MCU President

and key members of the university staff and faculty, the study group determined that the purpose

and intent for this project could best be met by addressing study requirements in two ways. The

members concluded that the first three questions have a conceptual orientation and focus on

long-term factors and conditions. Section I of the study, entitled "Concept," addresses these

issues. To provide a framework for the report, this section begins with a succinct description of

the evolving strategic environment, and the attributes an officer will need to operate successfully

in the postulated environment. The section continues with a general discussion of the

implications of the evolving environment on PME programs and training needs, and concludes

with responses to the first three questions of the study directive.

Section II, titled "Assessment," answers the remaining seven study directive questions.

This segment has a more immediate focus, concentrates on specific elements of the existing

officer PME program, and addresses factors, conditions, and requirements that the President,

MCU, and the Marine Corps as an institution should address within the next two to three years to

preserve the program's quality and ensure its continued relevance.

The third and final section of the report, "Conclusions," summarizes the study group's

overall assessment of the Marine Corps PME program and the steps that can be taken to elevate

the program to the next level to make it relevant and responsive to the challenges of the 21st

century. During its deliberations the study group examined situations and conditions that affect

officer PME, but which are beyond the scope of the questions posed by the study directive.

Because these situations and conditions are not trivial, additional recommendations are

incorporated in this section of the study.

6
Section I-Concept

Strategic Environment

Background: The United States and its military confront a period of great uncertainty and

ambiguity. The emerging threats range from potential peer competitors to radical nonstate

entities. None of these threats are open to easy solutions. Countering them will require more

than combat capabilities; it will require mental agility as well. Sir Michael Howard has

described the military profession as not only the most demanding physically, but also the most

demanding intellectually. This is true now, more then ever before.

The world has changed dramatically since the attacks of 9/11. As they did after the

surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, Americans now see the world as a very different place, with

profound implications for U.S. security. The 9/11 attacks made clear what most Americans had

failed to appreciate: the country is at war; indeed, by the declarations of a! Qaeda, it has been at

war at least since 1998, and no matter what happens to Osama bin Laden and his organization,

this war will likely continue for decades.

Following 9/11, the United States undertook major military operations to unseat the

Taliban in Afghanistan and the Ba'athists in fraq. Washington now seeks to stabilize those states

sufficiently to enable the development of some form of democracy. Correspondingly, U.S.

defense budgets have increased substantially. Yet, it is by no means certain that such increases

will continue into the future.

In addition to the war with radical Islamists, we find the "nuclearization" of Asia has

proceeded apace. Both India and Pakistan have tested nuclear weapons and built nuclear arsenals.

North Korea has declared its possession of nuclear weapons, while Iran has accelerated its efforts

to develop such a capability. Finally, China's continued rise has yet to be matched by an increase

in confidence that Beijing will seek to resolve its outstanding strategic objectives through

peaceful means. These enduring security challenges are likely to dominate U.S. defense planning

for years, and perhaps decades.

Historians have noted that as the ways of creating wealth change, so do the ways of war.

The agricultural revolution and the industrial revolution both brought about enormous changes in

how humans waged war. The current "knowledge-based revolution" is having a similar impact.

The processes of globalization that drive the current methods of wealth creation through the

empowerment of individuals and entrepreneurial business will drive new ways of war just as

surely.

Radical Islamists: Radical Islamists present the first and most obvious long-term challenge.

They constitute a transnational, theologically based insurgency that seeks to overthrow regimes

in the Islamic world friendly to the United States, and to evict American presence from parts of

the world vital to America's interests. Moreover, they aim at no less than to negate the past 900

years of history that has seen the rise of the West to a position of unparalleled power and

influence.

7

Section I-Concept

Strategic Environment

Background: The United States and its military confront a period of great uncertainty and

ambiguity. The emerging threats range from potential peer competitors to radical nonstate

entities. None of these threats are open to easy solutions. Countering them will require more

than combat capabilities; it will require mental agility as well. Sir Michael Howard has

described the military profession as not only the most demanding physically, but also the most

demanding intellectually. This is true now, more then ever before.

The world has changed dramatically since the attacks of 9/11. As they did after the

surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, Americans now see the world as a very different place, with

profound implications for U.S. security. The 9/11 attacks made clear what most Americans had

failed to appreciate: the country is at war; indeed, by the declarations of a! Qaeda, it has been at

war at least since 1998, and no matter what happens to Osama bin Laden and his organization,

this war will likely continue for decades.

Following 9/11, the United States undertook major military operations to unseat the

Taliban in Afghanistan and the Ba'athists in fraq. Washington now seeks to stabilize those states

sufficiently to enable the development of some form of democracy. Correspondingly, U.S.

defense budgets have increased substantially. Yet, it is by no means certain that such increases

will continue into the future.

In addition to the war with radical Islamists, we find the "nuclearization" of Asia has

proceeded apace. Both India and Pakistan have tested nuclear weapons and built nuclear arsenals.

North Korea has declared its possession of nuclear weapons, while Iran has accelerated its efforts

to develop such a capability. Finally, China's continued rise has yet to be matched by an increase

in confidence that Beijing will seek to resolve its outstanding strategic objectives through

peaceful means. These enduring security challenges are likely to dominate U.S. defense planning

for years, and perhaps decades.

Historians have noted that as the ways of creating wealth change, so do the ways of war.

The agricultural revolution and the industrial revolution both brought about enormous changes in

how humans waged war. The current "knowledge-based revolution" is having a similar impact.

The processes of globalization that drive the current methods of wealth creation through the

empowerment of individuals and entrepreneurial business will drive new ways of war just as

surely.

Radical Islamists: Radical Islamists present the first and most obvious long-term challenge.

They constitute a transnational, theologically based insurgency that seeks to overthrow regimes

in the Islamic world friendly to the United States, and to evict American presence from parts of

the world vital to America's interests. Moreover, they aim at no less than to negate the past 900

years of history that has seen the rise of the West to a position of unparalleled power and

influence.

7
This insurgency has exploited elements of globalization, to include financial networks,

the internet, and porous borders, to form a networked organization whose reach is global. It

differs from most insurgencies in that its leaders seek to employ advanced technology—in the

form of telecommunications and weapons of mass destruction—to cause maximum destruction.

The radical Islamists' global network, their lack of respect for the lives of innocents, combined

with their apparent willingness to employ weapons of mass destruction and disruption, should

they acquire them, makes this insurgency especially threatening.

No one should be under the illusion that this war will be won quickly, or that the price of

victory will be cheap. Insurgencies tend to be protracted affairs and, particularly in the case of

religious-centered wars, bloody. As with most insurgencies, victory rests less in military action

than in the successful treatment of political, economic and social ills, and in winning the "war of

ideas" against those advancing a perverse and dangerous distortion of the Islamic faith. Success

will take years, perhaps decades. In the interim, the military's job will be to support efforts to

stabilize countries threatened by radical Islarnists attempting to subvert them.

The problems in the Islamic World stem from the past nine centuries of history, which

witnessed the "rise of the West" and solidification of Western values in governance and human

relations. In effect, the Islamic World confronts the need to adapt to a world of global

interdependence created by the West. Often led by despotic leaders, denied political

participation, shackled to commOdity-based economies that offer little prospect of supporting the

development of a broad middle class, and bombarded by Western media, many Islamic states

have fallen further and further behind not only the West, but South Asian and East Asian

countries as well. Their rage feeds on the lies of their corrupt leaders, the rhetoric of their radical

imams, the falsifications of their own media, and the images of the prosperous developed world.

If the tensions between the Islamic World's past and the present were not enough, the Middle

East, the heartland of Islam, is riven with tribal, religious, and political divisions, creating an

explosive mixture that makes continued instability and conifict all but inevitable.

The Nuclear Arc of Instability: A second major enduring challenge to U.S. security is the

spread of nuclear weapons to unstable and/or hostile states in Asia. Since 1998, India and

Pakistan have tested nuclear weapons and created nuclear arsenals. North Korea apparently has

nuclear weapons, while producing the fissile material necessary to fabricate more such devices.

fran, no doubt aware of the very different treatment accorded North Korea by the United States

as compared to Saddam's non-nuclear Iraq, is pressing forward vigorously with its nuclear

weapons program. It is conceivable that before the decade ends, a solid front of nuclear armed

states will stretch from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Japan, running through Iran, Pakistan,

India, China and North Korea, while Russia looms to the north—a five-thousand mile "nuclear

arc of instability," in a part of the world that has become increasingly important to U.S. security

and economic well-being.

These states may not view nuclear weapons in the same way that America's political

leadership has viewed them over the years, i.e., as weapons of last resort. In particular, it is far

from certain that Iran, North Korea, or Pakistan, whose cultures are quite distinct from that of the

United States, and whose regimes are either unstable or unremittingly hostile (or both), view the

role of nuclear weapons in such a fashion.

8

This insurgency has exploited elements of globalization, to include financial networks,

the internet, and porous borders, to form a networked organization whose reach is global. It

differs from most insurgencies in that its leaders seek to employ advanced technology—in the

form of telecommunications and weapons of mass destruction—to cause maximum destruction.

The radical Islamists' global network, their lack of respect for the lives of innocents, combined

with their apparent willingness to employ weapons of mass destruction and disruption, should

they acquire them, makes this insurgency especially threatening.

No one should be under the illusion that this war will be won quickly, or that the price of

victory will be cheap. Insurgencies tend to be protracted affairs and, particularly in the case of

religious-centered wars, bloody. As with most insurgencies, victory rests less in military action

than in the successful treatment of political, economic and social ills, and in winning the "war of

ideas" against those advancing a perverse and dangerous distortion of the Islamic faith. Success

will take years, perhaps decades. In the interim, the military's job will be to support efforts to

stabilize countries threatened by radical Islarnists attempting to subvert them.

The problems in the Islamic World stem from the past nine centuries of history, which

witnessed the "rise of the West" and solidification of Western values in governance and human

relations. In effect, the Islamic World confronts the need to adapt to a world of global

interdependence created by the West. Often led by despotic leaders, denied political

participation, shackled to commOdity-based economies that offer little prospect of supporting the

development of a broad middle class, and bombarded by Western media, many Islamic states

have fallen further and further behind not only the West, but South Asian and East Asian

countries as well. Their rage feeds on the lies of their corrupt leaders, the rhetoric of their radical

imams, the falsifications of their own media, and the images of the prosperous developed world.

If the tensions between the Islamic World's past and the present were not enough, the Middle

East, the heartland of Islam, is riven with tribal, religious, and political divisions, creating an

explosive mixture that makes continued instability and conifict all but inevitable.

The Nuclear Arc of Instability: A second major enduring challenge to U.S. security is the

spread of nuclear weapons to unstable and/or hostile states in Asia. Since 1998, India and

Pakistan have tested nuclear weapons and created nuclear arsenals. North Korea apparently has

nuclear weapons, while producing the fissile material necessary to fabricate more such devices.

fran, no doubt aware of the very different treatment accorded North Korea by the United States

as compared to Saddam's non-nuclear Iraq, is pressing forward vigorously with its nuclear

weapons program. It is conceivable that before the decade ends, a solid front of nuclear armed

states will stretch from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Japan, running through Iran, Pakistan,

India, China and North Korea, while Russia looms to the north—a five-thousand mile "nuclear

arc of instability," in a part of the world that has become increasingly important to U.S. security

and economic well-being.

These states may not view nuclear weapons in the same way that America's political

leadership has viewed them over the years, i.e., as weapons of last resort. In particular, it is far

from certain that Iran, North Korea, or Pakistan, whose cultures are quite distinct from that of the

United States, and whose regimes are either unstable or unremittingly hostile (or both), view the

role of nuclear weapons in such a fashion.

8
The acquisition of nuclear weapons by hostile rogue regimes threatens to disrupt the

military balance. All things being equal, the willingness of the United States to project power

against nuclear-armed adversaries would likely be considerably more constrained than against

those who do not possess them. Washington may be compelled to alter its strategic aims when

confronted by rogue states armed with nuclear weapons, e.g., abandoning the objective of regime

changes. This seems to be a principal motive for North Korea to expand its nuclear arsenal and

Iran to acquire a similar arsenal of its own. If they succeed, it will reduce U.S. freedom of action

in two regions of vital interest substantially and perhaps precipitously. It may also make it far

more difficult to deal effectively with ambiguous forms of aggression, such as Iran's support for

the insurgency in Iraq, or potential North Korean trafficking in fissile materials.

The proliferation of nuclear-armed states increases the likelihood that these weapons will

be used. It is not clear that the regimes possessing such weapons will take the kinds of

precautions to secure them against unauthorized use that the mature nuclear powers have put in

place. Owing to the relative instability of states like fran and North Korea, these weapons could

potentially fall into the hands of nonstate entities, either as a consequence of corruption, e.g., the

unauthorized sale of a nuclear weapon to a nonstate actor, or state failure, e.g., possession by a

faction in a civil war. Nor can one discount the possibility that North Korea, which proliferates

ballistic missile technology, could consciously provide, for a price, nuclear weapons or fissile

material to other states, or even nonstate groups.

One can make the case that the United States is now in an era best characterized as a

"Second Nuclear Regime," with the First Regime, which began in 1945 with the attacks on

Hiroshima and Nagasaki, having passed into history. Two principal elements defined that earlier

regime: first, a few great powers possessed nuclear weapons, with all but China having a

common European heritage. Second, during that period, which lasted until the early 90s, there

developed a tradition of the non-use of such weapons. Now, the former no longer holds, while

the latter remains open to debate.

One might also expand the above definition to include state and nonstate actors

possessing biological weapons. By all accounts, such weapons are becoming progressively easier

to fabricate — certainly easier than nuclear weapons—and, under the right conditions, they could

produce mass casualties, economic disruption, and terror on the scale of a nuclear strike. Yet,

there are virtually no resthctions on the knowledge associated with developing biological

weapons, while the infrastructure costs for producing them are modest compared to those

associated with nuclear weapons. For nonstate entities, this combination of comparatively low

cost and high destructive potential may make the pursuit of biological weapons irresistible.

China: The third enduring challenge to the United States involves major countries which find

themselves at "strategic crossroads." While this group includes India and Russia, China is the

country with the greatest potential to challenge U.S. security interests.

China does not represent the type of threat posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold

War. Unlike the Soviets, the Chinese do not possess an aggressive, expansionist ideology.

However, this does not guarantee that China will not pose serious challenges to the United States.

Rather, if it does, such challenges are likely to take different forms and employ different means.

Moreover, China presents problems for the U.S. military quite different from those posed by

9

The acquisition of nuclear weapons by hostile rogue regimes threatens to disrupt the

military balance. All things being equal, the willingness of the United States to project power

against nuclear-armed adversaries would likely be considerably more constrained than against

those who do not possess them. Washington may be compelled to alter its strategic aims when

confronted by rogue states armed with nuclear weapons, e.g., abandoning the objective of regime

changes. This seems to be a principal motive for North Korea to expand its nuclear arsenal and

Iran to acquire a similar arsenal of its own. If they succeed, it will reduce U.S. freedom of action

in two regions of vital interest substantially and perhaps precipitously. It may also make it far

more difficult to deal effectively with ambiguous forms of aggression, such as Iran's support for

the insurgency in Iraq, or potential North Korean trafficking in fissile materials.

The proliferation of nuclear-armed states increases the likelihood that these weapons will

be used. It is not clear that the regimes possessing such weapons will take the kinds of

precautions to secure them against unauthorized use that the mature nuclear powers have put in

place. Owing to the relative instability of states like fran and North Korea, these weapons could

potentially fall into the hands of nonstate entities, either as a consequence of corruption, e.g., the

unauthorized sale of a nuclear weapon to a nonstate actor, or state failure, e.g., possession by a

faction in a civil war. Nor can one discount the possibility that North Korea, which proliferates

ballistic missile technology, could consciously provide, for a price, nuclear weapons or fissile

material to other states, or even nonstate groups.

One can make the case that the United States is now in an era best characterized as a

"Second Nuclear Regime," with the First Regime, which began in 1945 with the attacks on

Hiroshima and Nagasaki, having passed into history. Two principal elements defined that earlier

regime: first, a few great powers possessed nuclear weapons, with all but China having a

common European heritage. Second, during that period, which lasted until the early 90s, there

developed a tradition of the non-use of such weapons. Now, the former no longer holds, while

the latter remains open to debate.

One might also expand the above definition to include state and nonstate actors

possessing biological weapons. By all accounts, such weapons are becoming progressively easier

to fabricate — certainly easier than nuclear weapons—and, under the right conditions, they could

produce mass casualties, economic disruption, and terror on the scale of a nuclear strike. Yet,

there are virtually no resthctions on the knowledge associated with developing biological

weapons, while the infrastructure costs for producing them are modest compared to those

associated with nuclear weapons. For nonstate entities, this combination of comparatively low

cost and high destructive potential may make the pursuit of biological weapons irresistible.

China: The third enduring challenge to the United States involves major countries which find

themselves at "strategic crossroads." While this group includes India and Russia, China is the

country with the greatest potential to challenge U.S. security interests.

China does not represent the type of threat posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold

War. Unlike the Soviets, the Chinese do not possess an aggressive, expansionist ideology.

However, this does not guarantee that China will not pose serious challenges to the United States.

Rather, if it does, such challenges are likely to take different forms and employ different means.

Moreover, China presents problems for the U.S. military quite different from those posed by

9
adversaries in other post-Cold War conflicts. To begin with, the scale of military effort the

Chinese can generate far exceeds that of any rogue state. China's anti-access .and area-denial

capabilities are far more mature than any other potential rival of the United States, while its

enormous size provides it with great strategic depth, a problem U.S. defense planners have not

had to address since the Cold War.

China may emerge as a major threat to U.S. security in the manner that Germany was to

Britain a century ago. Like Germany in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, China is a rapidly

rising power. It is dealing with challenges of political legitimacy, growing ecological problems;

an economy that has enjoyed remarkable growth, but which soon may wane; potentially serious

demographic problems, societal instabilities; a rapidly growing dependence on foreign energy

supplies; and outstanding territorial issues over Taiwan, the Spratley Islands, Tibet, and perhaps

portions of the Russian Far East.

There is evidence that China seeks to displace the United States as the principal military

power in East Asia, and to establish itself as the region's dominant power. If this were to occur

naturally, stemming from the evolution of Chinese economic power with a corresponding

increase in influence, the United States would probably accept the outcome. However, if China

attempted to achieve preeminence through coercion or aggression, such an approach would serve

neither U.S. interests in the region, nor the stability of the international system and rule of law.

The challenge, then, for the United States is to encourage China to cooperate in the areas

of common security interests and to convince Beijing that the two nations should achieve the

resolution of their outstanding geopolitical issues within accepted international legal norms. This

would mean creating and maintaining a military balance in East Asia favorable to the United

States and its allies against the kinds of contingencies that might tempt Chinese aggression.

Implications for the Marine Corps: It appears likely that most of the wars and military

interventions of the early 21st century will find the Marine Corps operating in many different

parts of the world, among vastly different cultures and against a spectrum of threats. In some

instances, knowledge of local cultures and understanding of the cultural and religious

motivations that animate the enemy will be essential in determining the success or failure of

American efforts, especially in the era of omnipresent media and round-the-clock programming.

American military leaders—from lieutenant to general—will have to appreciate not only their

own cultural framework, but those of others as well. They will have to be familiar and at ease

with people who have very different attitudes and different perspectives.

This is not to say that the extraordinary tactical and operational competencies that the

Marine Corps has developed over the past thirty-five years are no longer relevant. But it is also

well to remember that the Marine Corps has developed those competencies through its

intellectual efforts as well as through its blood, sweat, and tears. Given the dramatic changes in

the form and the origins of the threats that now confront the United States, the intellectual

challenges of the profession of arms will be even greater than in the past.

Exacerbating the difficulties confronting the officer corps is the fact that a technological

and scientific revolution is occurring in the world outside the American military, one

10

adversaries in other post-Cold War conflicts. To begin with, the scale of military effort the

Chinese can generate far exceeds that of any rogue state. China's anti-access .and area-denial

capabilities are far more mature than any other potential rival of the United States, while its

enormous size provides it with great strategic depth, a problem U.S. defense planners have not

had to address since the Cold War.

China may emerge as a major threat to U.S. security in the manner that Germany was to

Britain a century ago. Like Germany in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, China is a rapidly

rising power. It is dealing with challenges of political legitimacy, growing ecological problems;

an economy that has enjoyed remarkable growth, but which soon may wane; potentially serious

demographic problems, societal instabilities; a rapidly growing dependence on foreign energy

supplies; and outstanding territorial issues over Taiwan, the Spratley Islands, Tibet, and perhaps

portions of the Russian Far East.

There is evidence that China seeks to displace the United States as the principal military

power in East Asia, and to establish itself as the region's dominant power. If this were to occur

naturally, stemming from the evolution of Chinese economic power with a corresponding

increase in influence, the United States would probably accept the outcome. However, if China

attempted to achieve preeminence through coercion or aggression, such an approach would serve

neither U.S. interests in the region, nor the stability of the international system and rule of law.

The challenge, then, for the United States is to encourage China to cooperate in the areas

of common security interests and to convince Beijing that the two nations should achieve the

resolution of their outstanding geopolitical issues within accepted international legal norms. This

would mean creating and maintaining a military balance in East Asia favorable to the United

States and its allies against the kinds of contingencies that might tempt Chinese aggression.

Implications for the Marine Corps: It appears likely that most of the wars and military

interventions of the early 21st century will find the Marine Corps operating in many different

parts of the world, among vastly different cultures and against a spectrum of threats. In some

instances, knowledge of local cultures and understanding of the cultural and religious

motivations that animate the enemy will be essential in determining the success or failure of

American efforts, especially in the era of omnipresent media and round-the-clock programming.

American military leaders—from lieutenant to general—will have to appreciate not only their

own cultural framework, but those of others as well. They will have to be familiar and at ease

with people who have very different attitudes and different perspectives.

This is not to say that the extraordinary tactical and operational competencies that the

Marine Corps has developed over the past thirty-five years are no longer relevant. But it is also

well to remember that the Marine Corps has developed those competencies through its

intellectual efforts as well as through its blood, sweat, and tears. Given the dramatic changes in

the form and the origins of the threats that now confront the United States, the intellectual

challenges of the profession of arms will be even greater than in the past.

Exacerbating the difficulties confronting the officer corps is the fact that a technological

and scientific revolution is occurring in the world outside the American military, one

10
characterized by rapid advances in information-related technologies. Moreover, it seems likely

that, with breathtaking advances in the areas of the biosciences and nanotechnologies projected

by many, the pace of change will only accelerate.

This ongoing revolution is fundamentally altering the conduct of tactics and operations,

and the political and social context within which wars will occur as well. At a minimum, this

emerging new world demands that officers not only become literate in the fundamental nature of

war, but also understand and adapt to the technological revolution occurring throughout society.

The implications of that focus for the Marine officer of 2020 and for how the Marine Corps

should think about Professional Military Education in the coming decade, are the subject of

sections I and III.

The Future Marine Corps Officer

Marine officers stand atop the profession of arms, renowned for their honor, courage, and

commitment. Through the decades they have embodied the ethos of the Corps, remaining

always faithful to fellow Marines and the nation they serve. Their soldierly skills are unmatched.

Imbued with a love of Corps and country, these officers have willingly placed themselves in

danger on freedom's frontiers, leading their Marines in battle, outfighting the toughest foes, and

using their intellects to solve intractable problems, all while assuming a range of other

responsibilities. Their stories are legendary, and their accomplishments enrich the Marine

Corps' heritage.

Yet, the coming decades will demand even more from Marine Corps officers. In the

rapidly emerging strategic environment, the Marine Corps—as a body and as individuals—must

not only posses the attributes long associated with the Corps' leaders, but also develop new and

unique qualities as well.

The strength of the officer corps rests on its moral and ethical values. A deep

understanding of the importance of spiritual awareness buttresses those values. They are the

elements upon which Marine officers build their code of honor. Officers in the future will need

to continue to incorporate these values and awareness into the fabric of their being if they are to

master the challenges of the coming world: a world where they are likely to face trials their

predecessors could hardly have imagined. In their most difficult times, Marine officers must rely

on these traits as a source of strength and guidance.

Marine officers have always had a special empathy with their Marines and felt privileged

to lead them. This natural caring has been a singular strength of the Corps. In this regard, the

future cannot be different. Marine officers must continue to have a love for their Marines as

deep and abiding as the love they have for their children, while always remembering that the

mission must be accorded ultimate priority.

A profound knowledge of the history of the Corps and the military profession have

inspired and informed Marine officers. History's practical utility will not lessen in the coming

years—if anything, its worth will only increase. While history does not repeat itself, it can

11

characterized by rapid advances in information-related technologies. Moreover, it seems likely

that, with breathtaking advances in the areas of the biosciences and nanotechnologies projected

by many, the pace of change will only accelerate.

This ongoing revolution is fundamentally altering the conduct of tactics and operations,

and the political and social context within which wars will occur as well. At a minimum, this

emerging new world demands that officers not only become literate in the fundamental nature of

war, but also understand and adapt to the technological revolution occurring throughout society.

The implications of that focus for the Marine officer of 2020 and for how the Marine Corps

should think about Professional Military Education in the coming decade, are the subject of

sections I and III.

The Future Marine Corps Officer

Marine officers stand atop the profession of arms, renowned for their honor, courage, and

commitment. Through the decades they have embodied the ethos of the Corps, remaining

always faithful to fellow Marines and the nation they serve. Their soldierly skills are unmatched.

Imbued with a love of Corps and country, these officers have willingly placed themselves in

danger on freedom's frontiers, leading their Marines in battle, outfighting the toughest foes, and

using their intellects to solve intractable problems, all while assuming a range of other

responsibilities. Their stories are legendary, and their accomplishments enrich the Marine

Corps' heritage.

Yet, the coming decades will demand even more from Marine Corps officers. In the

rapidly emerging strategic environment, the Marine Corps—as a body and as individuals—must

not only posses the attributes long associated with the Corps' leaders, but also develop new and

unique qualities as well.

The strength of the officer corps rests on its moral and ethical values. A deep

understanding of the importance of spiritual awareness buttresses those values. They are the

elements upon which Marine officers build their code of honor. Officers in the future will need

to continue to incorporate these values and awareness into the fabric of their being if they are to

master the challenges of the coming world: a world where they are likely to face trials their

predecessors could hardly have imagined. In their most difficult times, Marine officers must rely

on these traits as a source of strength and guidance.

Marine officers have always had a special empathy with their Marines and felt privileged

to lead them. This natural caring has been a singular strength of the Corps. In this regard, the

future cannot be different. Marine officers must continue to have a love for their Marines as

deep and abiding as the love they have for their children, while always remembering that the

mission must be accorded ultimate priority.

A profound knowledge of the history of the Corps and the military profession have

inspired and informed Marine officers. History's practical utility will not lessen in the coming

years—if anything, its worth will only increase. While history does not repeat itself, it can

11
provide the context for virtually every decision the Corps calls upon its officers to make,

especially during combat operations. It will be no different in the future.

History is least relevant when "tomorrow" is like "today." Yet there is considerable

evidence that we live in a period of high uncertainty, where the future is likely to be quite

different from recent events. Therefore, the range of experiences that historical depth provides is

crucial. For this reason, the Marine Corps must encourage its officers to develop a penchant for

historical study, while ensuring history permeates its professional education. As the noted

military pundit Basil Liddell Hart once wrote, "There is no excuse for any literate person to be

less than 3,000 years old in his mind." Historical literacy will remain vital to Marine Corps

officership.

For more than 230 years, the nation has called on Marines to execute a wide variety of

tasks, not all directly related to confronting its enemies. Masters of military operations, Marine

officers have shown an uncanny ability to be jacks of many other trades. Along the way, they

have served as diplomats, teachers, police officers, public officials, relief workers, builders,

astronauts, peacekeepers, and peace enforcers.

All evidence points to the need for officers to posses a greater variety of skills and a

wider breath of knowledge if they are to meet new demands both on and off the battlefield.

Developing intellectual capability depends on the willingness of Marine officers to "cast their

nets widely." The Corps must strive to commission officers with this quality, while encouraging

those in its ranks today to expand their fields of interest, while at the same time identifying

officers who need to focus on specific skills. Professional Military Education provides one of

the essential means for creating that sense of and thirst for knowledge in Marine officers, while

widening their vistas. For Marine officers, learning must be a continuous and life-long endeavor.

Scientists have long known that any closed system—a system not connected to others—is

incapable of receiving energy, thus inevitably tending toward entropy, a state of disorder or

uncertainty. In a real sense, a corps of officers not open to the energy provided by new ideas and

concepts tends to stagnate. Thus, Marine officers must study areas well beyond the profession of

arms. They must travel, immerse themselves in foreign cultures, learn to appreciate the arts,

explore the humanities, and grasp the implications of scientific discoveries. They must also look

for adventures and welcome situations that regularly test their physical, mental, and emotional

abilities. Over time, every Marine officer, to the extent possible, should take on the mantel of

the "Renaissance man," integrating the conthbutions of multiple intellectual disciplines.

Professional Military Education is central to this learning. With every new experience, officers

will increase their capacity to adapt to the unexpected. In the end, they will see possibilities

where others see obstacles.

Although officers understand that few, if any, individuals naturally like to fight, they

recognize that someone must know how to fight, and do so as effectively as possible. Therefore,

every officer must possess an appreciation of the skills needed to lead a Marine unit in combat.

Moreover, officers must maintain the individual combat skills characteristic of Marines.

Whether leading or supporting, officers must display an innate desire to move willingly to the

sound of the guns. The Greek historian Thucydides once wrote, "The secret of happiness is

12

provide the context for virtually every decision the Corps calls upon its officers to make,

especially during combat operations. It will be no different in the future.

History is least relevant when "tomorrow" is like "today." Yet there is considerable

evidence that we live in a period of high uncertainty, where the future is likely to be quite

different from recent events. Therefore, the range of experiences that historical depth provides is

crucial. For this reason, the Marine Corps must encourage its officers to develop a penchant for

historical study, while ensuring history permeates its professional education. As the noted

military pundit Basil Liddell Hart once wrote, "There is no excuse for any literate person to be

less than 3,000 years old in his mind." Historical literacy will remain vital to Marine Corps

officership.

For more than 230 years, the nation has called on Marines to execute a wide variety of

tasks, not all directly related to confronting its enemies. Masters of military operations, Marine

officers have shown an uncanny ability to be jacks of many other trades. Along the way, they

have served as diplomats, teachers, police officers, public officials, relief workers, builders,

astronauts, peacekeepers, and peace enforcers.

All evidence points to the need for officers to posses a greater variety of skills and a

wider breath of knowledge if they are to meet new demands both on and off the battlefield.

Developing intellectual capability depends on the willingness of Marine officers to "cast their

nets widely." The Corps must strive to commission officers with this quality, while encouraging

those in its ranks today to expand their fields of interest, while at the same time identifying

officers who need to focus on specific skills. Professional Military Education provides one of

the essential means for creating that sense of and thirst for knowledge in Marine officers, while

widening their vistas. For Marine officers, learning must be a continuous and life-long endeavor.

Scientists have long known that any closed system—a system not connected to others—is

incapable of receiving energy, thus inevitably tending toward entropy, a state of disorder or

uncertainty. In a real sense, a corps of officers not open to the energy provided by new ideas and

concepts tends to stagnate. Thus, Marine officers must study areas well beyond the profession of

arms. They must travel, immerse themselves in foreign cultures, learn to appreciate the arts,

explore the humanities, and grasp the implications of scientific discoveries. They must also look

for adventures and welcome situations that regularly test their physical, mental, and emotional

abilities. Over time, every Marine officer, to the extent possible, should take on the mantel of

the "Renaissance man," integrating the conthbutions of multiple intellectual disciplines.

Professional Military Education is central to this learning. With every new experience, officers

will increase their capacity to adapt to the unexpected. In the end, they will see possibilities

where others see obstacles.

Although officers understand that few, if any, individuals naturally like to fight, they

recognize that someone must know how to fight, and do so as effectively as possible. Therefore,

every officer must possess an appreciation of the skills needed to lead a Marine unit in combat.

Moreover, officers must maintain the individual combat skills characteristic of Marines.

Whether leading or supporting, officers must display an innate desire to move willingly to the

sound of the guns. The Greek historian Thucydides once wrote, "The secret of happiness is

12
freedom and the secret of freedom is courage." Marine officers who have been in combat know

that the secret of courage is professional competence. Such competence results from study as

well as experience. The Corps must ensure its officers receive a healthy mix of both.

In addition to being fully qualified in a military occupational field, Marine officers must

be proficient in the use of combined arms, especially Marine Air-Ground Task Force operations.

Furthermore, at an early stage in their careers, they must begin to acquire competency in joint

and combined operations. They must ensure that as senior field grade officers they have fully

developed this competency. Helping to build and then function as members of a joint or

coalition force must become second nature.

Today's Marine officers must possess greater expertise in counterinsurgency and stability

operations and a more extensive knowledge of nuclear and biological defense operations than is

currently the case. Both types of operations have been outside the practice of many Marine

officers in the recent past; this cannot continue.

Today's Marine officers must also have the knowledge required to coordinate the

employment of all elements of national power. Increasingly, they will see the manifestations of

these elements at lower levels of command. Officers must be especially adept in understanding

how military force can accomplish political goals and strategic aims. In this regard, it is well to

recall Clausewitz on this subject:

war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.

We deliberately use the phrase 'with the addition of other means' because we also want

to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into

something entirely different.

Today's Marine officers must be familiar with national security strategy and policy as

well as the responsibilities of other federal departments and agencies. Similarly, they must

understand the roles that international organizations and non-governmental agencies play in

military operations, especially at the lower end of the conifict spectrum.

Since the end of the Second World War, frequent routine deployments and occasional

involvement in contingency operations have enabled most career Marine officers to become

familiar with other parts of the world. Many have served repeated tours in the Mediterranean,

the Far East, and Southwest Asia. A small number have even acquired the ability to speak the

languages of these areas. Current operational trends suggest that the Marine Corps will need

officers with cultural and language expertise in other regions as well.

The Marine Corps needs to ensure that the civilian and military education of officers

reflects this expanded international focus, to include instilling an appreciation of cultural

anthropology and geography. To achieve this capability, the Corps may have to adjust policies

for the accession of officers, emphasizing the selection of those with a proficiency in cultural

knowledge and language skills. Such skills and knowledge might eventually become a

requirement for commissioning. Moreover, Professional Military Education programs should

aim at enhancing these skills and knowledge as officers progress through their careers.

13

freedom and the secret of freedom is courage." Marine officers who have been in combat know

that the secret of courage is professional competence. Such competence results from study as

well as experience. The Corps must ensure its officers receive a healthy mix of both.

In addition to being fully qualified in a military occupational field, Marine officers must

be proficient in the use of combined arms, especially Marine Air-Ground Task Force operations.

Furthermore, at an early stage in their careers, they must begin to acquire competency in joint

and combined operations. They must ensure that as senior field grade officers they have fully

developed this competency. Helping to build and then function as members of a joint or

coalition force must become second nature.

Today's Marine officers must possess greater expertise in counterinsurgency and stability

operations and a more extensive knowledge of nuclear and biological defense operations than is

currently the case. Both types of operations have been outside the practice of many Marine

officers in the recent past; this cannot continue.

Today's Marine officers must also have the knowledge required to coordinate the

employment of all elements of national power. Increasingly, they will see the manifestations of

these elements at lower levels of command. Officers must be especially adept in understanding

how military force can accomplish political goals and strategic aims. In this regard, it is well to

recall Clausewitz on this subject:

war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.

We deliberately use the phrase 'with the addition of other means' because we also want

to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into

something entirely different.

Today's Marine officers must be familiar with national security strategy and policy as

well as the responsibilities of other federal departments and agencies. Similarly, they must

understand the roles that international organizations and non-governmental agencies play in

military operations, especially at the lower end of the conifict spectrum.

Since the end of the Second World War, frequent routine deployments and occasional

involvement in contingency operations have enabled most career Marine officers to become

familiar with other parts of the world. Many have served repeated tours in the Mediterranean,

the Far East, and Southwest Asia. A small number have even acquired the ability to speak the

languages of these areas. Current operational trends suggest that the Marine Corps will need

officers with cultural and language expertise in other regions as well.

The Marine Corps needs to ensure that the civilian and military education of officers

reflects this expanded international focus, to include instilling an appreciation of cultural

anthropology and geography. To achieve this capability, the Corps may have to adjust policies

for the accession of officers, emphasizing the selection of those with a proficiency in cultural

knowledge and language skills. Such skills and knowledge might eventually become a

requirement for commissioning. Moreover, Professional Military Education programs should

aim at enhancing these skills and knowledge as officers progress through their careers.

13
Over the past half-century, the Marine Corps has sought to diversify the racial and ethnic

makeup of its officer corps to support larger social goals. In the years ahead, it may need to

focus such efforts on acquiring those knowledgeable of certain cultures.

To overcome the complex, dynamic, and unique problems that arise from interactions in

the emerging international security environment, Marine officers must hone their intellectual

skills. Foremost among such skills is the ability to think critically when faced with either

concrete or abstract problems. Knowing when and how to ask the right questions is essential,

particularly when confronted with an over abundance of information, much of which is

conflicting. This is especially true when an officer is trying to establish exactly what the

problem is, since formulating a problem is necessary before one can attempt to solve it. In its

approach to military planning, the Marine Corps must emphasize the skills required to

accomplish such problem setting. They are skills that allow officers to plan effectively.

Developing such skills requires incorporating instruction in system theory, operational design,

and critical thinking into curricula.

There is an old adage that, "If you have not written about a subject you have not truly

thought about it." The difficult and multifaceted problems Marine officers confront call for

development of written and oral communication skills that permit officers to engage in rich

discourses. A university degree no longer assures that those applying for and earning an officer

commission possess superior writing and speaking talent. The burden to foster these crucial

competencies will increasingly rest on Professional Military Education.

Marines have always recognized that the science of war supports the art of war. Though

its importance was acknowledged, technology has seldom been at the center of Marine Corps

thinking. However, as information technology becomes ubiquitous, supplanting the common

pen and paper with the word processor, and the map and grease pencil with an electronic display,

it is incumbent that Marine officers possess an understanding of that technology, if technology

is not to master an officer, he or she must master it. Understanding the basic principles of

communications and network theory, system architectures, and the effective use of information

management tools enables such mastery. The Corps' Professional Military Education must

provide the foundation and then keep officers abreast of the latest information technology that

allows them to be proficient in its use.

The demands on the time of Marine officers have increased dramatically in recent years.

An officer can easily find his or her life out of balance due to conflicting professional and

personal responsibilities. Alleviating such conflicts requires the concerted effort of individual

officers and their commanders. Ignoring the tensions inherent in these demands will undermine

the effectiveness of the individual officer and the organization.

In most ways, Marine officers of the future will resemble a long line of predecessors —

they will truly be Old Corps. In other ways, though, they must represent a New Breed. So it has

always been and must always be.

14

Over the past half-century, the Marine Corps has sought to diversify the racial and ethnic

makeup of its officer corps to support larger social goals. In the years ahead, it may need to

focus such efforts on acquiring those knowledgeable of certain cultures.

To overcome the complex, dynamic, and unique problems that arise from interactions in

the emerging international security environment, Marine officers must hone their intellectual

skills. Foremost among such skills is the ability to think critically when faced with either

concrete or abstract problems. Knowing when and how to ask the right questions is essential,

particularly when confronted with an over abundance of information, much of which is

conflicting. This is especially true when an officer is trying to establish exactly what the

problem is, since formulating a problem is necessary before one can attempt to solve it. In its

approach to military planning, the Marine Corps must emphasize the skills required to

accomplish such problem setting. They are skills that allow officers to plan effectively.

Developing such skills requires incorporating instruction in system theory, operational design,

and critical thinking into curricula.

There is an old adage that, "If you have not written about a subject you have not truly

thought about it." The difficult and multifaceted problems Marine officers confront call for

development of written and oral communication skills that permit officers to engage in rich

discourses. A university degree no longer assures that those applying for and earning an officer

commission possess superior writing and speaking talent. The burden to foster these crucial

competencies will increasingly rest on Professional Military Education.

Marines have always recognized that the science of war supports the art of war. Though

its importance was acknowledged, technology has seldom been at the center of Marine Corps

thinking. However, as information technology becomes ubiquitous, supplanting the common

pen and paper with the word processor, and the map and grease pencil with an electronic display,

it is incumbent that Marine officers possess an understanding of that technology, if technology

is not to master an officer, he or she must master it. Understanding the basic principles of

communications and network theory, system architectures, and the effective use of information

management tools enables such mastery. The Corps' Professional Military Education must

provide the foundation and then keep officers abreast of the latest information technology that

allows them to be proficient in its use.

The demands on the time of Marine officers have increased dramatically in recent years.

An officer can easily find his or her life out of balance due to conflicting professional and

personal responsibilities. Alleviating such conflicts requires the concerted effort of individual

officers and their commanders. Ignoring the tensions inherent in these demands will undermine

the effectiveness of the individual officer and the organization.

In most ways, Marine officers of the future will resemble a long line of predecessors —

they will truly be Old Corps. In other ways, though, they must represent a New Breed. So it has

always been and must always be.

14
The Implications for Professional Military Education

The accelerating rate of change in our world will demand the sharpest and most original

thinking from the Marine Corps in general, and from the Marine Corps University in particular.

The University atmosphere must welcome independent thinking and be tolerant of divergent

positions. In other words, the Marine Corps University must nurture and protect the future

"Young Turks" and the mavericks that will help prod our doctrinal development in new and

unanticipated directions.

The Marine Corps confronts a number of daunting challenges in preparing the officer

corps to meet a complex and difficult future. These challenges demand that Professional

Military Education begin before officers come on active duty and continue throughout their

careers to retirement. This requires attention at all levels of command, not just from Marine

Corps University. Selection and promotion of officers must emphasize Professional Military

Education along with performance in the field. Even more importantly, mentoring and

individual responsibility must play crucial roles in an officer's Professional Military Education.

The in-residence schooling that officers receive can only point the way toward future

professional and intellectual development. Yet, it inevitably must play a major role in setting the

Marine Corps' intellectual standards and the culture. Here, the quality of students as well as the

size and academic standards of in-residence schools themselves demand the highest attention

from senior Marine leaders. This is not an easy task, because the results of educational efforts

are often not apparent for years, if not decades. Nevertheless, Marine Corps University and other

institutions of Professional Military Education provide the intellectual seed corn on which

success of the U.S. military in the future will depend.

There are three clear components to Professional Military Education: the efforts of

individual officers; the emphasis and encouragement provided by Marine commanders at all

levels; and the contribution that the schools make to the intellectual development of officers. Of

these three elements the first is the most important, because in the end, it is a duty of each officer

to educate him or herself in the profession. But the Marine Corps also has responsibilities. It

must guide, encourage, and support its officers in their self-education efforts. Moreover, it must

provide real inducements, such as graduate education, to those who have shown exceptional

intellectual talents.

The goal of Marine Corps University in the processes of Professional Military Education

must be to raise the vision and understanding of officers either through its non-resident courses

or through the challenging curriculum presented to those in residence. As Admiral Stansfield

Turner commented in the mid 1980s:

War colleges are places to educate the senior officer corps in the large military and

strategic issues that confront America . . . . They should educate these officers by a

demanding intellectual curriculum to think in wider terms than their busy operational

careers have thus far demanded. Above all the war colleges should broaden the

intellectual and military horizons of the officers who attend, so that they have a

conception of the larger strategic and operational issues that confront our military and

our nation.

15

The Implications for Professional Military Education

The accelerating rate of change in our world will demand the sharpest and most original

thinking from the Marine Corps in general, and from the Marine Corps University in particular.

The University atmosphere must welcome independent thinking and be tolerant of divergent

positions. In other words, the Marine Corps University must nurture and protect the future

"Young Turks" and the mavericks that will help prod our doctrinal development in new and

unanticipated directions.

The Marine Corps confronts a number of daunting challenges in preparing the officer

corps to meet a complex and difficult future. These challenges demand that Professional

Military Education begin before officers come on active duty and continue throughout their

careers to retirement. This requires attention at all levels of command, not just from Marine

Corps University. Selection and promotion of officers must emphasize Professional Military

Education along with performance in the field. Even more importantly, mentoring and

individual responsibility must play crucial roles in an officer's Professional Military Education.

The in-residence schooling that officers receive can only point the way toward future

professional and intellectual development. Yet, it inevitably must play a major role in setting the

Marine Corps' intellectual standards and the culture. Here, the quality of students as well as the

size and academic standards of in-residence schools themselves demand the highest attention

from senior Marine leaders. This is not an easy task, because the results of educational efforts

are often not apparent for years, if not decades. Nevertheless, Marine Corps University and other

institutions of Professional Military Education provide the intellectual seed corn on which

success of the U.S. military in the future will depend.

There are three clear components to Professional Military Education: the efforts of

individual officers; the emphasis and encouragement provided by Marine commanders at all

levels; and the contribution that the schools make to the intellectual development of officers. Of

these three elements the first is the most important, because in the end, it is a duty of each officer

to educate him or herself in the profession. But the Marine Corps also has responsibilities. It

must guide, encourage, and support its officers in their self-education efforts. Moreover, it must

provide real inducements, such as graduate education, to those who have shown exceptional

intellectual talents.

The goal of Marine Corps University in the processes of Professional Military Education

must be to raise the vision and understanding of officers either through its non-resident courses

or through the challenging curriculum presented to those in residence. As Admiral Stansfield

Turner commented in the mid 1980s:

War colleges are places to educate the senior officer corps in the large military and

strategic issues that confront America . . . . They should educate these officers by a

demanding intellectual curriculum to think in wider terms than their busy operational

careers have thus far demanded. Above all the war colleges should broaden the

intellectual and military horizons of the officers who attend, so that they have a

conception of the larger strategic and operational issues that confront our military and

our nation.

15
There are two crucial elements to a successful program in Professional Military

Education. The first is imparting an ability to think critically and creatively, both in operations

and in acquisition or resource allocation. The second is the ability to draw from a breadth and

depth of education in a range of relevant disciplines to include history, anthropology, economics,

geopolitics, cultural studies, the 'hard sciences,' law, and strategic communications. A

significant difficulty that staff colleges and war colleges have confronted over the past half

century lies in their attempts to teach everything—the "Pecos River approach," a mile wide and

an inch deep. Even that approach has still missed major subjects such as Islamic studies and

culture. Thus, at the highest level, the Marine Corps needs to determine what subjects officers

must study and learn, discarding what is superfluous or only nice to know.

When General Gray, the 29th Commandant, founded Marine Corps University almost two

decades ago, his aim was to create "a world-class" educational institution for the study of war

and the profession of arms. Marine Corps University has made considerable progress since then.

Yet at present, it is not a world-class university. To realize General Gray's vision, the Marine

Corps must have access to the resources that a world-class institution requires. It currently does

not possess that access. "Doing more with less" in educational terms is simply a recipe for

mediocrity.

The study group recognized early on that to have a world class university, you must have

a world-class faculty, world-class students, a world-class curriculum, and world-class facilities

and resources. This means recruiting a faculty that combines outstanding scholarship and

outstanding teaching. Accomplishing the former requires providing faculty with the time needed

to engage in scholarly pursuits. Achieving the latter requires frequent and enduring contact

between the schoolhouse and the operating forces in ways that link scholarship to 'real-world'

concerns.

An equally important element is the students. With few seats available in the residence

programs, the Marine Corps must fill them with those officers who have demonstrated the

highest potential. Schools must not be places that manpower managers populate with those who

are easiest to move or who need breaks in "their busy Marine Corps careers." The Marine Corps

must insure only its most promising and deserving officers enter the institutions of Professional

Military Education.

Another major element in Professional Military Education is the curriculum. An

academic year is a very short period of time. There are only a limited number of subjects on

which students can study in depth to establish the intellectual base for continuing their selfeducation efforts. A first-class curriculum must rest on case studies and theoretical and historical

analyses that enable an understanding of the past and encourage thinking about the future. That

demand, in turn, requires a balanced curriculum, leaving sufficient time for reading and

reflection as well as for seminar participation and writing assignments. Graduate education that

inculcates both creative and critical thinking demands an approach that does not spoon-feed the

students. The idea that real learning does not require hard work is a product of the 1960s

revolution in education, the unsatisfactory results of which are only too clear.

16

There are two crucial elements to a successful program in Professional Military

Education. The first is imparting an ability to think critically and creatively, both in operations

and in acquisition or resource allocation. The second is the ability to draw from a breadth and

depth of education in a range of relevant disciplines to include history, anthropology, economics,

geopolitics, cultural studies, the 'hard sciences,' law, and strategic communications. A

significant difficulty that staff colleges and war colleges have confronted over the past half

century lies in their attempts to teach everything—the "Pecos River approach," a mile wide and

an inch deep. Even that approach has still missed major subjects such as Islamic studies and

culture. Thus, at the highest level, the Marine Corps needs to determine what subjects officers

must study and learn, discarding what is superfluous or only nice to know.

When General Gray, the 29th Commandant, founded Marine Corps University almost two

decades ago, his aim was to create "a world-class" educational institution for the study of war

and the profession of arms. Marine Corps University has made considerable progress since then.

Yet at present, it is not a world-class university. To realize General Gray's vision, the Marine

Corps must have access to the resources that a world-class institution requires. It currently does

not possess that access. "Doing more with less" in educational terms is simply a recipe for

mediocrity.

The study group recognized early on that to have a world class university, you must have

a world-class faculty, world-class students, a world-class curriculum, and world-class facilities

and resources. This means recruiting a faculty that combines outstanding scholarship and

outstanding teaching. Accomplishing the former requires providing faculty with the time needed

to engage in scholarly pursuits. Achieving the latter requires frequent and enduring contact

between the schoolhouse and the operating forces in ways that link scholarship to 'real-world'

concerns.

An equally important element is the students. With few seats available in the residence

programs, the Marine Corps must fill them with those officers who have demonstrated the

highest potential. Schools must not be places that manpower managers populate with those who

are easiest to move or who need breaks in "their busy Marine Corps careers." The Marine Corps

must insure only its most promising and deserving officers enter the institutions of Professional

Military Education.

Another major element in Professional Military Education is the curriculum. An

academic year is a very short period of time. There are only a limited number of subjects on

which students can study in depth to establish the intellectual base for continuing their selfeducation efforts. A first-class curriculum must rest on case studies and theoretical and historical

analyses that enable an understanding of the past and encourage thinking about the future. That

demand, in turn, requires a balanced curriculum, leaving sufficient time for reading and

reflection as well as for seminar participation and writing assignments. Graduate education that

inculcates both creative and critical thinking demands an approach that does not spoon-feed the

students. The idea that real learning does not require hard work is a product of the 1960s

revolution in education, the unsatisfactory results of which are only too clear.

16
The last vital elements of a world-class educational system are resources and facilities.

Without sufficient resources one cannot hire a "world-class" faculty, or maintain a first-class

library. Equally significant is the IT infrastructure, particularly given the importance of the

internet and war gaming. The current IT infrastructure at the University is appalling.

The Marine Corps needs to address a number of issues to achieve the goals of a worldclass system of professional education. Some of these will require fundamental alterations to the

legal framework and the personnel system within which the services work. Marine Corps

University can easily address some issues in the short term, provided it receives major increases

in funding. In some areas, such as faculty manning and IT, the Marine Corps is simply not

providing the University the resources it requires. Other problems can only be alleviated in the

long term. Sections II and ifi lay out paths the study group believes the Marine Corps leadership

needs to follow to create the system that the challenges of the 21St century require.

The Questions

Having characterized the strategic environment, described the Marine officer prepared to

operate successfully within that environment, and identified the implications for the Professional

Military Education program, the study group: (1) examined the basic structure and content of the

current officer PME program; (2) considered the approaches the Marine Corps might take to

develop leaders capable of recognizing and adapting to the changing character and form of

conifict; and (3) assessed how the Marine Corps could go about the task of developing officers

who think critically and creatively, plan, calculate risks, and then act decisively. The outcomes

of the group's study and deliberations and its recommendations follow.

Question #1: Does the basic structure and content of USMC officer

PME require change? If so, why?

The rapidly changing nature of the threats to U.S. national security and correspondingly

sharp changes in the character of conifict demand the highest degree of professionalism and

adaptability within the Marine Corps' Professional Military Education system. Marine officers,

from the newest lieutenant to the most seasoned general, require the most responsive, relevant,

and imaginative educational programs that the Marine Corps can provide them.

The basic structure and content of Marine Corps' officer Professional Military Education

barely meet current requirements, and left unchanged will increasingly be unable to meet the

needs of the Marine Corps and its officers. America's national security establishment and the

Marine Corps confront a world of accelerating political, economic, technological, social and

military change. Correspondingly, the Marine Corps must periodically make changes in its

education and training structure, to include its instructors, curricula, infrastructure, command

involvement, and individual officer commitment. In the past, the Professional Military

Education system has never failed the Marine Corps, and the Marine Corps has never failed, the

nation, in large part because it was able to change. The need for change is even more important

now. The Marine Corps must make adapting and improving its PME program a high priority

investment.

17

The last vital elements of a world-class educational system are resources and facilities.

Without sufficient resources one cannot hire a "world-class" faculty, or maintain a first-class

library. Equally significant is the IT infrastructure, particularly given the importance of the

internet and war gaming. The current IT infrastructure at the University is appalling.

The Marine Corps needs to address a number of issues to achieve the goals of a worldclass system of professional education. Some of these will require fundamental alterations to the

legal framework and the personnel system within which the services work. Marine Corps

University can easily address some issues in the short term, provided it receives major increases

in funding. In some areas, such as faculty manning and IT, the Marine Corps is simply not

providing the University the resources it requires. Other problems can only be alleviated in the

long term. Sections II and ifi lay out paths the study group believes the Marine Corps leadership

needs to follow to create the system that the challenges of the 21St century require.

The Questions

Having characterized the strategic environment, described the Marine officer prepared to

operate successfully within that environment, and identified the implications for the Professional

Military Education program, the study group: (1) examined the basic structure and content of the

current officer PME program; (2) considered the approaches the Marine Corps might take to

develop leaders capable of recognizing and adapting to the changing character and form of

conifict; and (3) assessed how the Marine Corps could go about the task of developing officers

who think critically and creatively, plan, calculate risks, and then act decisively. The outcomes

of the group's study and deliberations and its recommendations follow.

Question #1: Does the basic structure and content of USMC officer

PME require change? If so, why?

The rapidly changing nature of the threats to U.S. national security and correspondingly

sharp changes in the character of conifict demand the highest degree of professionalism and

adaptability within the Marine Corps' Professional Military Education system. Marine officers,

from the newest lieutenant to the most seasoned general, require the most responsive, relevant,

and imaginative educational programs that the Marine Corps can provide them.

The basic structure and content of Marine Corps' officer Professional Military Education

barely meet current requirements, and left unchanged will increasingly be unable to meet the

needs of the Marine Corps and its officers. America's national security establishment and the

Marine Corps confront a world of accelerating political, economic, technological, social and

military change. Correspondingly, the Marine Corps must periodically make changes in its

education and training structure, to include its instructors, curricula, infrastructure, command

involvement, and individual officer commitment. In the past, the Professional Military

Education system has never failed the Marine Corps, and the Marine Corps has never failed, the

nation, in large part because it was able to change. The need for change is even more important

now. The Marine Corps must make adapting and improving its PME program a high priority

investment.

17
The good news is that the necessary changes rest on a solid foundation. The basic

structure of Marine Corps officer Professional Military Education is sound. The predecessors of

today's leaders created a system that provides opportunities for Marine officers to be educated in

a continuous and progressive fashion throughout their careers. The Marine Corps' PME program

has supported professional and intellectual development within its deliberate and emergency

deployment rhythms and personnel rotation practices.

Over the last fifteen years, the addition of new educational venues has vastly expanded

professional educational opportunities for officers, increasing overall effectiveness and

professionalism across the Corps. These enhancements include, among others, the School of

Advanced Warfighting, the Marine Corps War College, the Commanders' Course, the School of

MAGTF Logistics, the Senior Leader Development Program for General Officers and the

College of Continuing Education. These initiatives are testimony to the high priority the Marine

Corps has traditionally placed on improving the quality of Professional Military Education. The

accreditation of Marine Corps University schools and courses lends testimony to this, enabling

the University to award well-earned advanced degrees to its officers and recruit superb civilian

faculty from a variety of disciplines. In summary, the basic structure of the Marine Corps' PME

program, while in need of increased resources and a commitment to adapt to rapidly changing

circumstances, provides a solid foundation to meet the varied demands of a dynamic future

security environment.

The content of Marine Corps officer Professional Military Education is varied, flexible,

and wide-ranging. The students rotating through the education system bring fresh perspectives

on current issues and problems. The faculty, a mix of military practitioners and civilian

professors from a wide range of disciplines, is adapting to meet the new challenges facing the

Marine Corps and other national security institutions.

However, the scale and scope of needed change threatens to outstrip the resources

allocated for this purpose. Marine Corps University has done an admirable job in adapting to

new and emerging requirements within available resources. Nevertheless, the strain on people

and fiscal resources is showing; the institutional tachometer is at the red line. The University is

at the point where it confronts an unacceptable choice between increasing focus on today's

urgent requirements at the expense of future vision, innovation, and timely adaptation.

While the University is thin in all resources, it is critically thin in qualified faculty and

supporting infrastructure. A reduced faculty means less research and preparation time, and a

reduced capability to respond to dynamic conditions. Consequently, the educational horizon

reduces to current operations. Moreover, the University's antiquated physical infrastructure and

thoroughly inadequate information technology (IT) infrastructure make it difficult to provide

even a minimum level of support, let alone keep abreast of changes in joint commands and the

broader defense establishment. The sad state of current infrastructure compromises the

University's ability to exploit advanced education techniques. Its graduates are becoming

progressively less prepared for the challenges of their future duties. Furthermore, the

infrastructure must be able to support current and future operational C2 systems. Starved of

resources, Marine innovation efforts are increasingly ad hoc and short-term focused; University

18

The good news is that the necessary changes rest on a solid foundation. The basic

structure of Marine Corps officer Professional Military Education is sound. The predecessors of

today's leaders created a system that provides opportunities for Marine officers to be educated in

a continuous and progressive fashion throughout their careers. The Marine Corps' PME program

has supported professional and intellectual development within its deliberate and emergency

deployment rhythms and personnel rotation practices.

Over the last fifteen years, the addition of new educational venues has vastly expanded

professional educational opportunities for officers, increasing overall effectiveness and

professionalism across the Corps. These enhancements include, among others, the School of

Advanced Warfighting, the Marine Corps War College, the Commanders' Course, the School of

MAGTF Logistics, the Senior Leader Development Program for General Officers and the

College of Continuing Education. These initiatives are testimony to the high priority the Marine

Corps has traditionally placed on improving the quality of Professional Military Education. The

accreditation of Marine Corps University schools and courses lends testimony to this, enabling

the University to award well-earned advanced degrees to its officers and recruit superb civilian

faculty from a variety of disciplines. In summary, the basic structure of the Marine Corps' PME

program, while in need of increased resources and a commitment to adapt to rapidly changing

circumstances, provides a solid foundation to meet the varied demands of a dynamic future

security environment.

The content of Marine Corps officer Professional Military Education is varied, flexible,

and wide-ranging. The students rotating through the education system bring fresh perspectives

on current issues and problems. The faculty, a mix of military practitioners and civilian

professors from a wide range of disciplines, is adapting to meet the new challenges facing the

Marine Corps and other national security institutions.

However, the scale and scope of needed change threatens to outstrip the resources

allocated for this purpose. Marine Corps University has done an admirable job in adapting to

new and emerging requirements within available resources. Nevertheless, the strain on people

and fiscal resources is showing; the institutional tachometer is at the red line. The University is

at the point where it confronts an unacceptable choice between increasing focus on today's

urgent requirements at the expense of future vision, innovation, and timely adaptation.

While the University is thin in all resources, it is critically thin in qualified faculty and

supporting infrastructure. A reduced faculty means less research and preparation time, and a

reduced capability to respond to dynamic conditions. Consequently, the educational horizon

reduces to current operations. Moreover, the University's antiquated physical infrastructure and

thoroughly inadequate information technology (IT) infrastructure make it difficult to provide

even a minimum level of support, let alone keep abreast of changes in joint commands and the

broader defense establishment. The sad state of current infrastructure compromises the

University's ability to exploit advanced education techniques. Its graduates are becoming

progressively less prepared for the challenges of their future duties. Furthermore, the

infrastructure must be able to support current and future operational C2 systems. Starved of

resources, Marine innovation efforts are increasingly ad hoc and short-term focused; University

18
investments are "penny-wise and pound foolish." Simply put, the current course and speed of

PME are no longer viable.

The Marine Corps' educational establishment must reinforce its traditional emphasis on

intellectual rigor, fostering a habit of thinking critically and creatively, and promoting a culture

of continuous, progressive Professional Military Education from the most junior to most senior

officer grades. At the same time, Professional Military Education must not only adapt to the

ongoing changes along the spectrum of conflict, but also anticipate and adjust to coming changes

in the security environment. The University must recruit a faculty that reflects the new

circumstances in which the Marine Corps finds itself, as well as where the future may take it.

The need is especially acute with respect to this latter issue. During a "long era of

tranquility at home" in the "interwar" years of the previous century, the Schools at Quantico

embarked on a study of a signal failure in the Great War — amphibious warfare —in response to

the hazy outlines of emerging requirements. Their efforts paid incalculable benefits in the

Second World War. Today, the Marine Corps confronts a much greater degree of change coming

at a much faster rate. Its educational establishment must lead the way in supporting the debates

over how best to define the new environment, and undertake the necessary changes that will

enable officers to succeed against the demands of this very different world.

Among the greatest emerging challenges are the products of globalization and the related

information revolution, with its dizzying advances in information technology. Both promise to

affect changes in the form of conflict just as profound as the changes in the ways the world does

business. It's not enough to passively accept these changes; the Marine Corps must be ahead of

the curve, just as the founders of its educational system anticipated new requirements and

explored emerging technologies prior to the Second World War.

Unity of command will be necessary to accomplish the necessary changes in PME. The

essential educational elements of organizations like The Basic School and the College of

Continuing Education must be directly responsive to the President of Marine Corps University.

Themes of enduring importance must be introduced to the officer corps as early as precommissioning, and continue to be reinforced through Officer Candidate School and The Basic

School. Coordinating responsibility for these themes should be assigned to the University.

Resources must be commensurate with requirements. Requirements, in turn, must be

linked to approved operational concepts that are linked to both existing and anticipated

challenges, and detailed in a Marine Corps University campaign plan. The responsibility for

Marine Corps University's requirements and resource programming must be appropriately

designated at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command or at Training and Education

Command, or at the University, and appropriate staff and resources assigned in support.

In almost every case, the University's infrastructure is as "seasoned" as the venerable

traditions of the schools which depend on it. The current infrastructure will not support

necessary changes to curricula or building the IT backbone characteristic of modern education

institutions. The Marine Corps needs to pace — or even lead - current changes in the best

19

investments are "penny-wise and pound foolish." Simply put, the current course and speed of

PME are no longer viable.

The Marine Corps' educational establishment must reinforce its traditional emphasis on

intellectual rigor, fostering a habit of thinking critically and creatively, and promoting a culture

of continuous, progressive Professional Military Education from the most junior to most senior

officer grades. At the same time, Professional Military Education must not only adapt to the

ongoing changes along the spectrum of conflict, but also anticipate and adjust to coming changes

in the security environment. The University must recruit a faculty that reflects the new

circumstances in which the Marine Corps finds itself, as well as where the future may take it.

The need is especially acute with respect to this latter issue. During a "long era of

tranquility at home" in the "interwar" years of the previous century, the Schools at Quantico

embarked on a study of a signal failure in the Great War — amphibious warfare —in response to

the hazy outlines of emerging requirements. Their efforts paid incalculable benefits in the

Second World War. Today, the Marine Corps confronts a much greater degree of change coming

at a much faster rate. Its educational establishment must lead the way in supporting the debates

over how best to define the new environment, and undertake the necessary changes that will

enable officers to succeed against the demands of this very different world.

Among the greatest emerging challenges are the products of globalization and the related

information revolution, with its dizzying advances in information technology. Both promise to

affect changes in the form of conflict just as profound as the changes in the ways the world does

business. It's not enough to passively accept these changes; the Marine Corps must be ahead of

the curve, just as the founders of its educational system anticipated new requirements and

explored emerging technologies prior to the Second World War.

Unity of command will be necessary to accomplish the necessary changes in PME. The

essential educational elements of organizations like The Basic School and the College of

Continuing Education must be directly responsive to the President of Marine Corps University.

Themes of enduring importance must be introduced to the officer corps as early as precommissioning, and continue to be reinforced through Officer Candidate School and The Basic

School. Coordinating responsibility for these themes should be assigned to the University.

Resources must be commensurate with requirements. Requirements, in turn, must be

linked to approved operational concepts that are linked to both existing and anticipated

challenges, and detailed in a Marine Corps University campaign plan. The responsibility for

Marine Corps University's requirements and resource programming must be appropriately

designated at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command or at Training and Education

Command, or at the University, and appropriate staff and resources assigned in support.

In almost every case, the University's infrastructure is as "seasoned" as the venerable

traditions of the schools which depend on it. The current infrastructure will not support

necessary changes to curricula or building the IT backbone characteristic of modern education

institutions. The Marine Corps needs to pace — or even lead - current changes in the best

19
Recommendations: Question #1

1. Increase faculty size to better support current requirements. The enlarged faculty will permit

improved current instruction, provide opportunities for more research and allow faculty menibers to

represent the University at various academic seminars, conferences, and faculty education; engage in

professional development; provide counseling and mentoring support to students; and support

anticipation of requirements and adaptation of our education efforts. This will also serve as an effective

incentive to attract high quality professors to join the University faculty.

2. Establish unity of command over officer PME. The University must be responsible for the College of

Continuing Education and assume cognizance over the educational components of The Basic School and

pre-commissioning education efforts.

3. Fix the responsibility for the University's resource programming efforts, and provide the staff

resources to perform these duties properly. These responsibilities may be executed by the Marine Corps

Combat Development Command, the Training and Education Command, or the University.

4. Develop an integrated facility and information technology infrastructure plan to support officer

education requirements in the current and the future information systems environment. The facility arid

information technology infrastructure must support day to day academic learning and be able to host

current and future C2 systems for planning and wargaming.

operational command and control procedures. The University must be able to replicate current

advances in command and control, and connect with Marines and joint commands around the

globe. This requires a holistic approach to avoid wasteful expenditures and repeated purchases

of new equipment. Faculty and student research resources must reflect the demands of the

current and anticipated operational environment, as well as those of a world-class education

infrastructure. This means transforming the information technology backbone of the

University's educational establishment. In most cases, this will require replacing current brick

and mortar facilities. Consequently, the new facilities and information infrastructure plans must

be developed concurrently.

Professional Military Education curricula must reinforce the elements of a classic

education while maintaining their relevance to existing and emerging requirements. Challenging,

rigorous, dynamic and responsive curricula are as necessary to recruit a superb civilian and

military faculty as are financial incentives, such as a competitive salary and compensation

package.

High priority must be given to recruiting a first-class faculty with sufficient range and

depth to meet growing educational requirements. As the University expands its faculty, it must

give priority to hires that will support the necessary adaptation of the PME curricula stemming

from changes in the existing and emerging security environment. In this manner, the Marine

Corps can increase its return on investment. Sufficient time must be set aside for the faculty to

undertake research, anticipate new PME requirements, and support the development of a vision

of the Marine Corps' contribution to meeting future security challenges. This means the faculty

must have adequate range and depth to meet current operational demands and to anticipate future

security challenges.

The success of the Corps always rests with the individual Marine. But the educational

foundation is key to preparing Marines, and the Corps, for the challenges of the future.

20

operational command and control procedures. The University must be able to replicate current

advances in command and control, and connect with Marines and joint commands around the

globe. This requires a holistic approach to avoid wasteful expenditures and repeated purchases

of new equipment. Faculty and student research resources must reflect the demands of the

current and anticipated operational environment, as well as those of a world-class education

infrastructure. This means transforming the information technology backbone of the

University's educational establishment. In most cases, this will require replacing current brick

and mortar facilities. Consequently, the new facilities and information infrastructure plans must

be developed concurrently.

Professional Military Education curricula must reinforce the elements of a classic

education while maintaining their relevance to existing and emerging requirements. Challenging,

rigorous, dynamic and responsive curricula are as necessary to recruit a superb civilian and

military faculty as are financial incentives, such as a competitive salary and compensation

package.

High priority must be given to recruiting a first-class faculty with sufficient range and

depth to meet growing educational requirements. As the University expands its faculty, it must

give priority to hires that will support the necessary adaptation of the PME curricula stemming

from changes in the existing and emerging security environment. In this manner, the Marine

Corps can increase its return on investment. Sufficient time must be set aside for the faculty to

undertake research, anticipate new PME requirements, and support the development of a vision

of the Marine Corps' contribution to meeting future security challenges. This means the faculty

must have adequate range and depth to meet current operational demands and to anticipate future

security challenges.

The success of the Corps always rests with the individual Marine. But the educational

foundation is key to preparing Marines, and the Corps, for the challenges of the future.

20
Question #2: How can the USMC develop leaders who can recognize

and adapt to the changing character and form of conflict, and operate

confidently and effectively within it, at the tactical, operational, and

strategic levels of war?

Developing leaders who can recognize the changing character and form of conflict, adapt

accordingly, and achieve proficiency in tactics, operational art, and strategy, requires creating

and sustaining an environment that encourages personal and professional growth through

rigorous, relevant, and challenging training and education. The Marine Corps must buttress its

educational efforts with assignment policies and procedures that afford officers the opportunity

to gain practical experience while applying the skills they acquire and the attributes they develop

through Professional Military Education.

Education programs must be broad-based and balanced, embracing not only military

matters, but, also history, economics, geography, geopolitics, contemporary issues, and other

subjects necessary to give Marine officers a genuinely global perspective. A liberal approach to

education will widen the intellectual apertures of officers, enable them to anticipate changes in

the character and form of conflict, adapt to those changes, and make timely and informed

decisions - decisions that reflect a genuine understanding of and appreciation for all the elements

of power and the appropriate role for military forces in the calculus of national power.

Marine Corps University must place particular emphasis on the study of history,

complemented by the development of skills needed to think critically and the ability to

geographically, temporally, and culturally transpose and translate the lessons that history offers.

The Marine Corps must view acquisition of these skills as a shared enterprise where the

individual officer, unit commanders, the institution, and the PME establishment all bear

responsibility. The motivation and inquisitiveness of an officer, the wholehearted acceptance by

commanders of their mentorship roles, the imperative need for thoughtful assignment policies

and procedures, and the requirement for relevant curricula and supremely qualified teachers are

crucial factors that merit close attention at every level.

Finally, the University must expose officers to a learning environment that enables them

to progressively hone their tactical skills, master operational art, and acquire the knowledge,

wisdom and experience that are prerequisites for strategy formulation and strategic decisionmaking. Initial military occupation skills (MOS) training and the Expeditionary Warfare School

are meeting the mark insofar as imparting tactical skills is concerned.

Mastery of operational art is a demanding proposition. A collective, collaborative effort

between and among Marine Corps Command and Staff College, the School for Advanced

Warfighting, and Marine Corps War College is needed to meet this challenge. The 'study group

believes that of these three institutions, the philosophy and orientation of the School of

Advanced Warfighting provides the most promising pathway for development of masters of

operational art. However, while this school is equipping officers with superior skills in

operational art and science, it is not producing sufficient numbers of graduates to satisfy current

demands stemming from commitments of Marine Corps forces to global contingencies and the

21

Question #2: How can the USMC develop leaders who can recognize

and adapt to the changing character and form of conflict, and operate

confidently and effectively within it, at the tactical, operational, and

strategic levels of war?

Developing leaders who can recognize the changing character and form of conflict, adapt

accordingly, and achieve proficiency in tactics, operational art, and strategy, requires creating

and sustaining an environment that encourages personal and professional growth through

rigorous, relevant, and challenging training and education. The Marine Corps must buttress its

educational efforts with assignment policies and procedures that afford officers the opportunity

to gain practical experience while applying the skills they acquire and the attributes they develop

through Professional Military Education.

Education programs must be broad-based and balanced, embracing not only military

matters, but, also history, economics, geography, geopolitics, contemporary issues, and other

subjects necessary to give Marine officers a genuinely global perspective. A liberal approach to

education will widen the intellectual apertures of officers, enable them to anticipate changes in

the character and form of conflict, adapt to those changes, and make timely and informed

decisions - decisions that reflect a genuine understanding of and appreciation for all the elements

of power and the appropriate role for military forces in the calculus of national power.

Marine Corps University must place particular emphasis on the study of history,

complemented by the development of skills needed to think critically and the ability to

geographically, temporally, and culturally transpose and translate the lessons that history offers.

The Marine Corps must view acquisition of these skills as a shared enterprise where the

individual officer, unit commanders, the institution, and the PME establishment all bear

responsibility. The motivation and inquisitiveness of an officer, the wholehearted acceptance by

commanders of their mentorship roles, the imperative need for thoughtful assignment policies

and procedures, and the requirement for relevant curricula and supremely qualified teachers are

crucial factors that merit close attention at every level.

Finally, the University must expose officers to a learning environment that enables them

to progressively hone their tactical skills, master operational art, and acquire the knowledge,

wisdom and experience that are prerequisites for strategy formulation and strategic decisionmaking. Initial military occupation skills (MOS) training and the Expeditionary Warfare School

are meeting the mark insofar as imparting tactical skills is concerned.

Mastery of operational art is a demanding proposition. A collective, collaborative effort

between and among Marine Corps Command and Staff College, the School for Advanced

Warfighting, and Marine Corps War College is needed to meet this challenge. The 'study group

believes that of these three institutions, the philosophy and orientation of the School of

Advanced Warfighting provides the most promising pathway for development of masters of

operational art. However, while this school is equipping officers with superior skills in

operational art and science, it is not producing sufficient numbers of graduates to satisfy current

demands stemming from commitments of Marine Corps forces to global contingencies and the

21
proliferation of joint task forces, and attendant requirements for large numbers of accomplished

operational planners.

As the Marine Corps' top level school, Marine Corps War College is the appropriate

focal point for development of strategic thinkers. However, MCWAR' s greatest asset is also its

principal limitation. While small enrollment maximizes opportunities for travel and interaction

between students and faculty, it does not allow sufficient output to meet the growing demand for

strategic thinkers at high level service, joint, and combined staffs and commands. This shortfall

is aggravated by the demand the institution places on MCWAR to prepare officers to serve on

the faculty of the Command and Staff College.

MCWAR is at a crossroads. On one hand, the argument can be made that the output of

the institution (fewer than 20 graduates per year, approximately half of whom are Marines) is too

small to justify its continued existence, and there are a number of alternatives available to

generate qualified faculty for the Command and Staff College. On the other hand, a case can be

made that the strategic thinkers who emerge from the halls of MCWAR have a different outlook

than their peers from the other service war colleges. As opposed to Air War College graduates

whose strategic orientation will understandably have an aerospace focus, graduates of the Army

War College who will tend to view strategic challenges through a continental lens, and Naval

War College students who will have a maritime orientation, MCWAR graduates emerge with a

more general, holistic outlook with balanced emphasis on continental, maritime, and aerospace

operations. Moreover, small class size, in comparison with counterpart institutions, affords

students more extensive international travel, and opportunities for closer and more personal

interaction with guest lecturers and senior strategists and policy makers.

The study group believes that these are unique attributes with national value that argue

strongly for the perpetuation of MCWAR, reexamination of the utilization of its graduates, and

an increase in its enrollment. These views are amplified in the study recommendations.

22

proliferation of joint task forces, and attendant requirements for large numbers of accomplished

operational planners.

As the Marine Corps' top level school, Marine Corps War College is the appropriate

focal point for development of strategic thinkers. However, MCWAR' s greatest asset is also its

principal limitation. While small enrollment maximizes opportunities for travel and interaction

between students and faculty, it does not allow sufficient output to meet the growing demand for

strategic thinkers at high level service, joint, and combined staffs and commands. This shortfall

is aggravated by the demand the institution places on MCWAR to prepare officers to serve on

the faculty of the Command and Staff College.

MCWAR is at a crossroads. On one hand, the argument can be made that the output of

the institution (fewer than 20 graduates per year, approximately half of whom are Marines) is too

small to justify its continued existence, and there are a number of alternatives available to

generate qualified faculty for the Command and Staff College. On the other hand, a case can be

made that the strategic thinkers who emerge from the halls of MCWAR have a different outlook

than their peers from the other service war colleges. As opposed to Air War College graduates

whose strategic orientation will understandably have an aerospace focus, graduates of the Army

War College who will tend to view strategic challenges through a continental lens, and Naval

War College students who will have a maritime orientation, MCWAR graduates emerge with a

more general, holistic outlook with balanced emphasis on continental, maritime, and aerospace

operations. Moreover, small class size, in comparison with counterpart institutions, affords

students more extensive international travel, and opportunities for closer and more personal

interaction with guest lecturers and senior strategists and policy makers.

The study group believes that these are unique attributes with national value that argue

strongly for the perpetuation of MCWAR, reexamination of the utilization of its graduates, and

an increase in its enrollment. These views are amplified in the study recommendations.

22
Recommendations: Question #2

1. Monitor and evaluate the curriculum review process closely to ensure that PME programs keep pace

with globalization and the constantly evolving international security environment. Provide officers with

balanced opportunities to enhance their leadership skills through mastery not only of military subjects,

but history, economics, geography, geopolitics, contemporary issues and other subjects required to give

them a genuinely global outlook and perspective.

2. Solicit a policy statement from the Commandant of the Marine Corps emphasizing the importance of

the mentorship role that commanding officers must play in the overall professional development of

Marine officers.

3. Collaborate with the Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs to ensure that the

Professional Military Education and development process is complemented by thoughtful assignment

policies and procedures that afford officers timely opportunities to apply knowledge and skills acquired

through PME in the crucible of real world operations and events.

4. Improve the performance of the PME system in developing masters of operational art by

incorporating selected portions of the School of Advanced Warfighting's superior curriculum in

Command and Staff College and Marine Corps War College curricula.

S. Increase significantly enrollment in the School of Advanced Warfighting in order to meet growing

service and joint demands for planners skilled in operational art and science.

6. Increase the enrollment of Marine Officers in MCWAR, expand the faculty and increase funding to

support two seminars.

7. Collaborate with the Deputy Commandants for Manpower and Reserve Affairs and Plans, Policies

and Operations; assess strategic planning positions within the Department of Defense. Identify and staff

key billets that can best be filled by graduates of MCWAR.

Question #3: How can the USMC develop leaders who think critically

and creatively, plan, assess risks — then act decisively?

The Marine Corps has a proven method for developing exceptional leaders that blends

training, experience, and education. The actual mix varies as an officer advances in grade and

time in service. All officers are a product of their natural talents, their early life experiences and

education, and the combination of training, experience, and education they gain during their

Marine Corps careers.

Training of Marine officers is accomplished in a well-defined and executed system of

institutional training. It consists of recruit training and entry-level training. Post entry-level

training varies, but in most cases an officer receives some advanced military occupation specialty

(MOS) training. From there, an officer receives training through attending advanced schools and

courses. Although participation in the Marine Corps' formal education program, either by

residence or distance learning, involves primarily classroom education, each school has some

training component.

23

Question #3: How can the USMC develop leaders who think critically

and creatively, plan, assess risks — then act decisively?

The Marine Corps has a proven method for developing exceptional leaders that blends

training, experience, and education. The actual mix varies as an officer advances in grade and

time in service. All officers are a product of their natural talents, their early life experiences and

education, and the combination of training, experience, and education they gain during their

Marine Corps careers.

Training of Marine officers is accomplished in a well-defined and executed system of

institutional training. It consists of recruit training and entry-level training. Post entry-level

training varies, but in most cases an officer receives some advanced military occupation specialty

(MOS) training. From there, an officer receives training through attending advanced schools and

courses. Although participation in the Marine Corps' formal education program, either by

residence or distance learning, involves primarily classroom education, each school has some

training component.

23
Education of Marine Officers is accomplished in a similarly well-defined system. During

officers' pre-cornmission years, they are educated at whatever college-level course of study they

choose. Education after commissioning is accomplished through a combination of individual

study and attendance at Marine Corps formal schools, (either in residence of by distance

learning). There are three levels of schooling after initial entry-level school (The Basic School

and MOS-producing schools); career-level schools (CLS: Expeditionary Warfare School);

intermediate level schools (ILS: Command and Staff College); and top level schools (TLS:

Marine Corps War College). In addition, many Marine officers attend equivalent-level schools

run by other services or the joint community.

The Marine Corps has neither the seats in its schools nor the officer population to provide

resident education for all officers; therefore, a majority of officers receive their education

through a good and improving distance learning program. While the distance learning program

cannot replicate a 9-10 month in-residence program, it does fulfill minimum educational

requirements. Additionally, self-study is encouraged throughout the Marine officer's career.

However, except for the Commandant's reading list, there is no effort to guide self-study.

Experience gained by officers is instrumental in their development. Gaining hands-on

experience in the field provides the officer with the confidence needed to make informed

decisions and take appropriate action. The experience gained by serving in different billets and

units is fundamental to a Marine officer's development. Prior service as a platoon leader,

company commander, and battalion commander is critical to success as a regimental commander

or a division commanding general. Sadly, there is not enough time in a Marine's career to gain

all the knowledge and wisdom that training and hands-on experience might provide. This is

especially true when we consider the attributes and skills essential for the officers of this century.

Figure 1 graphically depicts the training and education continuum.

24

Education of Marine Officers is accomplished in a similarly well-defined system. During

officers' pre-cornmission years, they are educated at whatever college-level course of study they

choose. Education after commissioning is accomplished through a combination of individual

study and attendance at Marine Corps formal schools, (either in residence of by distance

learning). There are three levels of schooling after initial entry-level school (The Basic School

and MOS-producing schools); career-level schools (CLS: Expeditionary Warfare School);

intermediate level schools (ILS: Command and Staff College); and top level schools (TLS:

Marine Corps War College). In addition, many Marine officers attend equivalent-level schools

run by other services or the joint community.

The Marine Corps has neither the seats in its schools nor the officer population to provide

resident education for all officers; therefore, a majority of officers receive their education

through a good and improving distance learning program. While the distance learning program

cannot replicate a 9-10 month in-residence program, it does fulfill minimum educational

requirements. Additionally, self-study is encouraged throughout the Marine officer's career.

However, except for the Commandant's reading list, there is no effort to guide self-study.

Experience gained by officers is instrumental in their development. Gaining hands-on

experience in the field provides the officer with the confidence needed to make informed

decisions and take appropriate action. The experience gained by serving in different billets and

units is fundamental to a Marine officer's development. Prior service as a platoon leader,

company commander, and battalion commander is critical to success as a regimental commander

or a division commanding general. Sadly, there is not enough time in a Marine's career to gain

all the knowledge and wisdom that training and hands-on experience might provide. This is

especially true when we consider the attributes and skills essential for the officers of this century.

Figure 1 graphically depicts the training and education continuum.

24
SEAM

0

z

0z

I—

C/)

uJ

az

SEAM SEAM

TBS MOSJ

PRE-COMMISSIONING_I

TCOM

£LS TLS

EDCOMIMCU

YEARS IN SERVICE

GENERAL

OFFICER

COURSES

Figure 1. Training and Education Continuum

25

The key points depicted in this figure are:

- The immediate pre-commi.csioning education requirement is fulfilled primarily through college-level studies with a sinai! component

of training in the form of dnlls, summer camps and cruises.

- initially, after commissioning an officer receives mostly training with a small component of 'education.' But as an officer advances in

time in service and grade, the percentage of the training component decreases and the education percentage increases.

- The study group believes that certain themes and general areas of study should begin in college and continue throughout an officer's

career, both in Marine Corps PMI? schools and through self study.

- The responsibility for a Marine officer's training and education is spread across several commands. Commands responsible for

formal training and education include the USV4: the Commander for Naval Education and Training (CNET)for NROTC; the Marine

Corps Training and Education Command (CCE), the Marine Corps Training Command (OCS and TBS); and the Marine Corps

University (EWS, ('SC, £1 W, MC WAR, SOML). However sensible these responsibility arrangements are, they create seams disrupting

the continuums of the themes and general areas of study.

- Marllie Corps lieutenant colonels and colonels attend other institutional andother services' staff and war colleges, and National

Defense University's (ND U) colleges, wherein the Marine Corps has no formal curricula input or oversight.

-however valid and proper the above arrangements may be, there exist 'seams' in regard to oversight of needed lifelong themes.

Figure 1. Training and Education Continuum

25
Recommendations: Question #3

1. Conduct a thorough review of courses, classes, and activities to identify those that need to be

strengthened in light of the new officer requirements. Identify and then eliminate legacy courses no

longer relevant.

2. Identify the themes or general areas of study that are essential to developing the 21 century officer

and then use these themes for curricula development throughout the education continuum. Figure 1

depicts some suggested themes or general areas of study, in the horizontal arrows.

3. Create a process for coordination of curricula development across all command with cognizance over

any portion of Marine Officer PME. This will ensure a rational and consistent approach to educating a

Marine officer throughout his or her career. This process may include the ability to influence (or direct)

the study of certain electives in undergraduate studies.

4. Develop and implement IT and C2 instruction in every PME course. The embedded C2 curriculum at

EWS impressed the study group. And we see a need at all officer levels for a deeper understanding of

information technology and C2 systems. In addition, we recommend the development of a short course

on IT and C2 systems for mandatory attendance by general officers.

5. Change radically the overall framework and construct of EWS. All captains would receive the

majority of EWS material via non-resident distance learning, including regional seminars in the new

model. After completing this requirement, they would attend a relatively short (8-10 weeks) in-residence

period of instruction at Quantico. The program of study at Quantico would concentrate on those

subjects best suited for residence learning. Conversely, the nonresident learning portion would

emphasize instruction most appropriate for distance learning. Conceivably, four to five EWS courses a

year could be conducted with nearly all captains attending in a TAD status. Each captain would also

incur a much shorter interruption in his or her early company grade "MOS experience learning" during

their formative years.

6. Develop a roadrnap (perhaps a handbook) to guide Marine Officers in their career long self-study.

Moreover, we recommend the University create forums such as virtual book clubs and wargames where

officers can exchange ideas.

As the world becomes increasingly complex, so too is warfighting becoming more

complex. Consequently, 21St century Marine officers require a more rigorous and better focused

education system, one that delivers experience vicariously and provides the knowledge and

confidence necessary to make critical decisions. As examples, one can learn about the risks of

night river crossings by studying history without ever having performed a night river crossing.

And one can understand how the internet works without having to work on servers and routers.

Similarly, one can also understand much about the Iraqi culture without living in Iraq for many

years. Therefore, it is critical the Marine Corps education program be robust.

26

As the world becomes increasingly complex, so too is warfighting becoming more

complex. Consequently, 21St century Marine officers require a more rigorous and better focused

education system, one that delivers experience vicariously and provides the knowledge and

confidence necessary to make critical decisions. As examples, one can learn about the risks of

night river crossings by studying history without ever having performed a night river crossing.

And one can understand how the internet works without having to work on servers and routers.

Similarly, one can also understand much about the Iraqi culture without living in Iraq for many

years. Therefore, it is critical the Marine Corps education program be robust.

26
Section II - Assessment

Question #4: What is the optimum combination of resident and nonresident PME?

The best mix of resident and non-resident PME must balance what is desirable with what

is required. One desirable combination of resident and non-resident PME would see every

officer attending resident Professional Military Education at every level, and participating in

non-resident courses to augment and supplement the formal resident education. This would be

the ideal educational experience, but it would be possible only if the Marine Corps could suspend

the requirements of active service in the joint arena, the operating forces, and the supporting

establishment. Clearly this is impractical.

Another desirable combination would find every officer having at least one resident

Professional Military Education experience beyond The Basic School, at either Expeditionary

Warfare School or Command and Staff College, or the equivalent at other-service or Defense

Department schools. This may be more realistic, but will still be subject to many variables

affecting personnel assignment. A more realistic proposition would be to ensure that the

relevance and quality of our non-resident officer Professional Military Education program

remains as close to the resident program as possible, and that every officer completes his or her

education at every level, through either a resident or non-resident program.

The programs should be complementary, offering the same material, as required, while

adding unique opportunities as circumstances permit. The non-resident program should provide

follow-on educational experiences for graduates of resident programs. This will ensure the

greatest number of officers realize the highest possible educational experience, at a pace that

accommodates the widest range of students. Ideally, graduates of the resident program should

supplement their education through participation, as both mentors and students, in the nonresident program. This approach challenges the College of Continuing Education to offer

material in addition to that provided in the resident schools' curricula.

A major advantage of the resident program—given equivalent curricula and the

University's location within the National Capital Region—lies in the rich experience of learning

in the company of other accomplished officers from various U.S. and foreign military services,

and the government agencies. Resident students also benefit from their exposure to a wide range

of visiting defense intellectuals, serving senior government officials, and other distinguished

guests..

Properly executed, the non-resident program's seminar format can approximate the

resident program's learning environment. Marine Corps University's current efforts to

emphasize seminar programs should be sustained and enhanced. Some of the non-resident

programs are located in areas where guest lecturers, instructors, participants and speakers are

available. Some selected programs—for example, those in Japan and Hawaii—have access to

guest lecturers that are not easily available to the resident program. Upgrading the University's

information technology infrastructure could make lectures and commentary available to all,

27

Section II - Assessment

Question #4: What is the optimum combination of resident and nonresident PME?

The best mix of resident and non-resident PME must balance what is desirable with what

is required. One desirable combination of resident and non-resident PME would see every

officer attending resident Professional Military Education at every level, and participating in

non-resident courses to augment and supplement the formal resident education. This would be

the ideal educational experience, but it would be possible only if the Marine Corps could suspend

the requirements of active service in the joint arena, the operating forces, and the supporting

establishment. Clearly this is impractical.

Another desirable combination would find every officer having at least one resident

Professional Military Education experience beyond The Basic School, at either Expeditionary

Warfare School or Command and Staff College, or the equivalent at other-service or Defense

Department schools. This may be more realistic, but will still be subject to many variables

affecting personnel assignment. A more realistic proposition would be to ensure that the

relevance and quality of our non-resident officer Professional Military Education program

remains as close to the resident program as possible, and that every officer completes his or her

education at every level, through either a resident or non-resident program.

The programs should be complementary, offering the same material, as required, while

adding unique opportunities as circumstances permit. The non-resident program should provide

follow-on educational experiences for graduates of resident programs. This will ensure the

greatest number of officers realize the highest possible educational experience, at a pace that

accommodates the widest range of students. Ideally, graduates of the resident program should

supplement their education through participation, as both mentors and students, in the nonresident program. This approach challenges the College of Continuing Education to offer

material in addition to that provided in the resident schools' curricula.

A major advantage of the resident program—given equivalent curricula and the

University's location within the National Capital Region—lies in the rich experience of learning

in the company of other accomplished officers from various U.S. and foreign military services,

and the government agencies. Resident students also benefit from their exposure to a wide range

of visiting defense intellectuals, serving senior government officials, and other distinguished

guests..

Properly executed, the non-resident program's seminar format can approximate the

resident program's learning environment. Marine Corps University's current efforts to

emphasize seminar programs should be sustained and enhanced. Some of the non-resident

programs are located in areas where guest lecturers, instructors, participants and speakers are

available. Some selected programs—for example, those in Japan and Hawaii—have access to

guest lecturers that are not easily available to the resident program. Upgrading the University's

information technology infrastructure could make lectures and commentary available to all,

27
Recommendations: Question #4

1. Increase the staffing of professor and instructor positions within the non-resident program.

2. Provide incentives to ensure the most qualified and experienced personnel seek teaching and

administrative positions within the non-resident program.

3. Ensure that the relevance and quality of the non-resident program are as close to the resident

program as possible. Sustain the initiative transitioning the non-resident Command and Staff College to

exclusively seminar-based instructiOn.

4. Accelerate transitioning the non-resident Expeditionary Warfare School course to exclusively

seminar-based instruction.

5. Expand the distance learning program to provide additional education opportunities for graduates of

both resident and non-resident programs.

6. Establish an effective interactive information technology infrastructure to link non-resident and

resident programs. Lectures, instructor presentations, conferences, discussions and consultations must

be readily available across the entire PME environment through high capacity video and audio

teleconference means.

7. Assign responsibility for non-resident instruction to include curricula and staff to the President,

Marine Corps University.

regardless of location and time, either live or via electronic media. A quality video

teleconference capability would significantly enhance the resident and non-resident programs.

Realizing this combination requires a higher level of resident faculty availability than is

currently possible. Recruiting additional faculty will allow more faculty visits and exchanges

between the resident and non-resident programs, and provide badly needed opportunities for

research, enhancing both programs.

This combination of resident and non-resident education requires a clear chain of

command and responsibility. All non-resident curricula and staff must be placed under the

President, Marine Corps University. Unity of effort, the rationalization of curricula, and the

management of resources to best support the common effort requires effective management and

continuous attention.

Question #5: What is the balance of responsibilities between the

institution, commands, and individuals for USMC officer PME?

Professional learning is a life-long activity for Marine Corps officers. The individual

officer, the officer's commander, and the Marine Corps as an institution are collectively

responsible for ensuring the effectiveness of an officer's Professional Military Education. The

form of that responsibility is different for each.

28

regardless of location and time, either live or via electronic media. A quality video

teleconference capability would significantly enhance the resident and non-resident programs.

Realizing this combination requires a higher level of resident faculty availability than is

currently possible. Recruiting additional faculty will allow more faculty visits and exchanges

between the resident and non-resident programs, and provide badly needed opportunities for

research, enhancing both programs.

This combination of resident and non-resident education requires a clear chain of

command and responsibility. All non-resident curricula and staff must be placed under the

President, Marine Corps University. Unity of effort, the rationalization of curricula, and the

management of resources to best support the common effort requires effective management and

continuous attention.

Question #5: What is the balance of responsibilities between the

institution, commands, and individuals for USMC officer PME?

Professional learning is a life-long activity for Marine Corps officers. The individual

officer, the officer's commander, and the Marine Corps as an institution are collectively

responsible for ensuring the effectiveness of an officer's Professional Military Education. The

form of that responsibility is different for each.

28
The Marine Corps must determine what competencies it expects of officers during the

various stages of their careers. It must decide how and where officers are to acquire these

competencies, be it through formal schooling, distance education, self-study, or experience

gained in a variety of duty assignments. In addition, the Marine Corps must provide the

resources necessary to achieve these Professional Military Education goals. It must also

establish clear and appropriate metrics for measuring the performance of Professional Military

Education providers as well as officer students' success in meeting specific learning outcomes.

Commanding officers and officers holding similar leadership positions are responsible for

the professional development of those officers they lead. This requires, first, that they become

familiar with what competencies the Marine Corps expects its officers to master, and through

what methods and means. Commanding officers should tailor their officer educational programs

to meet individual needs. Owing to the many demands made on today's officer, this will require

allocating time and resources as efficiently and effectively as possible.

Tough choices will have to be made. How many of the available duty hours can an

officer devote to his or her Professional Military Education? When can a unit spare an officer

for professional educational opportunities, such as battlefield staff rides or professional seminars?

Finally, commanding officers must evaluate how well each officer has mastered required skills

and knowledge. At times, they can accomplish this objectively while evaluating staff work.

However, they will frequently need to exercise subjective judgments, while observing tactical

decision making. Of all the things commanding officers do to support Professional Military

Education, none is more important than personal mentoring.

Ultimately, Marine Corps officers are responsible for their own professional development.

Officers must be thoroughly familiar with what the Corps expects them to accomplish in terms of

intellectual growth as they advance in their careers, and to establish well conceived plans to meet

these obligations. Moreover, officers should strive to enhance these plans whenever possible in

order to expand their intellectual horizons. As with any good plan, there must be contingencies

to compensate for events such as unanticipated deployments, early change of station orders, and

assignment of new duties. There may also be times when the Corps or a commanding officer is

unable to meet an officer's Professional Military Education needs. If this happens, the officer

affected must be prepared to step in and fill the vacuum. In the final analysis, Marine Corps

officers should nourish and exercise their minds as naturally and frequently as they nourish and

exercise their bodies.

Before the proper balance of Professional Military Education responsibilities can be

established among the Marine Corps, commanding officers, and the individual officer, the

Marine Corps and the University must first determine the desired learning outcomes that will

enable officers to function effectively in the emerging security environment. This is no simple

task. While a learning outcomes/task analysis approach to Professional Military Education has

great value, there are no "cookie-cutter" solutions that can be applied to this challenge. Thus, the

Corps must apply judgment in designing and implementing its Professional Military Education

programs. Put another way, a Marine Corps officer's skill and intellect are more than the sum of

29

The Marine Corps must determine what competencies it expects of officers during the

various stages of their careers. It must decide how and where officers are to acquire these

competencies, be it through formal schooling, distance education, self-study, or experience

gained in a variety of duty assignments. In addition, the Marine Corps must provide the

resources necessary to achieve these Professional Military Education goals. It must also

establish clear and appropriate metrics for measuring the performance of Professional Military

Education providers as well as officer students' success in meeting specific learning outcomes.

Commanding officers and officers holding similar leadership positions are responsible for

the professional development of those officers they lead. This requires, first, that they become

familiar with what competencies the Marine Corps expects its officers to master, and through

what methods and means. Commanding officers should tailor their officer educational programs

to meet individual needs. Owing to the many demands made on today's officer, this will require

allocating time and resources as efficiently and effectively as possible.

Tough choices will have to be made. How many of the available duty hours can an

officer devote to his or her Professional Military Education? When can a unit spare an officer

for professional educational opportunities, such as battlefield staff rides or professional seminars?

Finally, commanding officers must evaluate how well each officer has mastered required skills

and knowledge. At times, they can accomplish this objectively while evaluating staff work.

However, they will frequently need to exercise subjective judgments, while observing tactical

decision making. Of all the things commanding officers do to support Professional Military

Education, none is more important than personal mentoring.

Ultimately, Marine Corps officers are responsible for their own professional development.

Officers must be thoroughly familiar with what the Corps expects them to accomplish in terms of

intellectual growth as they advance in their careers, and to establish well conceived plans to meet

these obligations. Moreover, officers should strive to enhance these plans whenever possible in

order to expand their intellectual horizons. As with any good plan, there must be contingencies

to compensate for events such as unanticipated deployments, early change of station orders, and

assignment of new duties. There may also be times when the Corps or a commanding officer is

unable to meet an officer's Professional Military Education needs. If this happens, the officer

affected must be prepared to step in and fill the vacuum. In the final analysis, Marine Corps

officers should nourish and exercise their minds as naturally and frequently as they nourish and

exercise their bodies.

Before the proper balance of Professional Military Education responsibilities can be

established among the Marine Corps, commanding officers, and the individual officer, the

Marine Corps and the University must first determine the desired learning outcomes that will

enable officers to function effectively in the emerging security environment. This is no simple

task. While a learning outcomes/task analysis approach to Professional Military Education has

great value, there are no "cookie-cutter" solutions that can be applied to this challenge. Thus, the

Corps must apply judgment in designing and implementing its Professional Military Education

programs. Put another way, a Marine Corps officer's skill and intellect are more than the sum of

29
Recommendations: Question # 5

1. Determine the joint and service professional competencies the Marine Corps expects its officers to

master during each stage of their careers.

2. Once developed, apply joint and Marine Corps competencies to guide the development of

Professional Military Education curricula.

3. Require commanding officers to monitor and support the professional education of officers in their

commands to include scheduling time for individual and unit conducted Professional Military

Education.

4. Require commanding officers to mentor officers in their professional development.

5. Require commanding officers to evaluate progress by their officers in mastering required

professional competencies.

6. Ensure officers understand that ultimately they are responsible for their professional development;

therefore, they must seek opportunities for Professional Military Education and develop self-study

programs.

a list of learning outcomes. There are many aspects of education and knowledge that defy easy

measurement, but which are nonetheless vital to the makeup of the complete professional officer.

Question #6: What is the appropriate methodology to ensure Marine

Reserve Officers receive PME?

The requirements for Marine reserve officer PME are derived from the mission assigned

to the reserve component:

.to augment and reinforce the Active force seamlessly by providing qualified units and

individuals in time of war or other national emergency. In the augmentation role, the

Marine Reserve provides trained and equipped units, detachments or individuals to

active commands to bring their force structure to the level required for war or other

national emergency. In the reinforcing role, the Marine Reserve provides similar assets

to provide depth, replacements or capabilities not readily available in the Active force.

Current contingency operations and future requirements related to the Global War on

Tenor have underscored the crucial need for trained, ready and highly responsive reserve forces.

Moreover, the heavy reliance on reserves to provide a sustaining base and fill key positions on

combined, joint, and service staffs has given new meaning to the term "seamless." To augment

and reinforce active forces seamlessly, reserve officers must achieve levels of tactical and

operational proficiency that are on par with active component officers. These requirements have

validated the Marine Corps' long-standing philosophy that active and reserve component officers

should be indistinguishable, one from the other; a philosophy that is fully embraced by Marine

PME programs.

30

a list of learning outcomes. There are many aspects of education and knowledge that defy easy

measurement, but which are nonetheless vital to the makeup of the complete professional officer.

Question #6: What is the appropriate methodology to ensure Marine

Reserve Officers receive PME?

The requirements for Marine reserve officer PME are derived from the mission assigned

to the reserve component:

.to augment and reinforce the Active force seamlessly by providing qualified units and

individuals in time of war or other national emergency. In the augmentation role, the

Marine Reserve provides trained and equipped units, detachments or individuals to

active commands to bring their force structure to the level required for war or other

national emergency. In the reinforcing role, the Marine Reserve provides similar assets

to provide depth, replacements or capabilities not readily available in the Active force.

Current contingency operations and future requirements related to the Global War on

Tenor have underscored the crucial need for trained, ready and highly responsive reserve forces.

Moreover, the heavy reliance on reserves to provide a sustaining base and fill key positions on

combined, joint, and service staffs has given new meaning to the term "seamless." To augment

and reinforce active forces seamlessly, reserve officers must achieve levels of tactical and

operational proficiency that are on par with active component officers. These requirements have

validated the Marine Corps' long-standing philosophy that active and reserve component officers

should be indistinguishable, one from the other; a philosophy that is fully embraced by Marine

PME programs.

30
To meet the needs of reserve officers, PME programs must satisfy four fundamental

requirements: first and foremost, they must meet the professional training and education needs of

reserve officers and prepare them for the roles envisioned by the mission statement; second, they

must be structured in ways that are compatible with the personal and career requirements that

confront reserve officers; third, they must permit completion within reasonable periods of time;

and, finally, they must be supported by meaningful incentives.

The first requirement is met. The decision that reserve officer PME courses will mirror

those provided to members of the active component is a wise one. This is not purely a matter of

standardized curricula. Courses must enrich the educational process and maximize personal and

professional development. Ongoing initiatives at the College of Continuing Education to

transition the Staff College Distance Education Course immediately to an exclusively seminarbased approach and to follow suit with the Expeditionary Warfare School Distance Education

Course in Academic Year 2011 or 2012 are commendable. Insofar as course content is

concerned, it is imperative that course content review boards (CCRB) take a dynamic and

rigorous approach to their responsibilities. The CCRB members must ensure that what is taught

is relevant to the changing form and character of conflict, and the emergence of non-traditional

missions. This is particularly crucial for members of the reserve who may not have the same

opportunities as their active duty counterparts to compare and contrast theories learned in PME

with real-world experience gained through participation in, or preparation for, actual contingency

operations.

With the Command and Staff College Distance Education Course as a model, there is

convincing evidence that the PME establishment has thoughtfully considered the many and

varied requirements that compete for the time and attention of reserve officers. The initiative to

convert the Command and Staff College Distance Education seminar program from a 12

month/12 seminar design to a 24 month/16-17 seminar construct is a case in point. This

approach will provide students and seminar coordinators with the opportunity to prepare for each

seminar more thoroughly. It affords greater flexibility in balancing family and civilian career

obligations, while enabling officers to complete a rigorous course of study within a reasonable

period of time. The inclusion of reserve officers in the Security Cooperation and Education

Training Center (SCETC) initiative to provide Intermediate Level PME to Marines and

International Officers through a one-year program that entails both resident and on-line

instruction is another indicator that reserve officer PME needs are being addressed thoughtfully

and creatively by the institution.

A number of initiatives have been undertaken to provide incentives to reserve officers to

pursue PME. Awarding credit for a "satisfactory year" and authorization for paid drill periods

for participation in the seminar program are examples. However, more can—and should— be

done. Strengthening the linkages between PME completion, promotion and command selection

should be considered. Steps should be taken to increase participation in Expeditionary Warfare

School Distance Education Course by captains leaving active duty. Aggressive action should be

taken to increase graduate credits for PME. Opportunities should be sought to provide additional

pay and recognition incentives for PME completion. These matters are addressed in greater

detail in the recommendations that follow.

31

To meet the needs of reserve officers, PME programs must satisfy four fundamental

requirements: first and foremost, they must meet the professional training and education needs of

reserve officers and prepare them for the roles envisioned by the mission statement; second, they

must be structured in ways that are compatible with the personal and career requirements that

confront reserve officers; third, they must permit completion within reasonable periods of time;

and, finally, they must be supported by meaningful incentives.

The first requirement is met. The decision that reserve officer PME courses will mirror

those provided to members of the active component is a wise one. This is not purely a matter of

standardized curricula. Courses must enrich the educational process and maximize personal and

professional development. Ongoing initiatives at the College of Continuing Education to

transition the Staff College Distance Education Course immediately to an exclusively seminarbased approach and to follow suit with the Expeditionary Warfare School Distance Education

Course in Academic Year 2011 or 2012 are commendable. Insofar as course content is

concerned, it is imperative that course content review boards (CCRB) take a dynamic and

rigorous approach to their responsibilities. The CCRB members must ensure that what is taught

is relevant to the changing form and character of conflict, and the emergence of non-traditional

missions. This is particularly crucial for members of the reserve who may not have the same

opportunities as their active duty counterparts to compare and contrast theories learned in PME

with real-world experience gained through participation in, or preparation for, actual contingency

operations.

With the Command and Staff College Distance Education Course as a model, there is

convincing evidence that the PME establishment has thoughtfully considered the many and

varied requirements that compete for the time and attention of reserve officers. The initiative to

convert the Command and Staff College Distance Education seminar program from a 12

month/12 seminar design to a 24 month/16-17 seminar construct is a case in point. This

approach will provide students and seminar coordinators with the opportunity to prepare for each

seminar more thoroughly. It affords greater flexibility in balancing family and civilian career

obligations, while enabling officers to complete a rigorous course of study within a reasonable

period of time. The inclusion of reserve officers in the Security Cooperation and Education

Training Center (SCETC) initiative to provide Intermediate Level PME to Marines and

International Officers through a one-year program that entails both resident and on-line

instruction is another indicator that reserve officer PME needs are being addressed thoughtfully

and creatively by the institution.

A number of initiatives have been undertaken to provide incentives to reserve officers to

pursue PME. Awarding credit for a "satisfactory year" and authorization for paid drill periods

for participation in the seminar program are examples. However, more can—and should— be

done. Strengthening the linkages between PME completion, promotion and command selection

should be considered. Steps should be taken to increase participation in Expeditionary Warfare

School Distance Education Course by captains leaving active duty. Aggressive action should be

taken to increase graduate credits for PME. Opportunities should be sought to provide additional

pay and recognition incentives for PME completion. These matters are addressed in greater

detail in the recommendations that follow.

31
Recommendations: Question #6

1. Sustain the initiative transitioning the reserve non-resident Command and Staff College course to

exclusively seminar-based instruction.

2. Accelerate the initiative transitioning the reserve non-resident Expeditionary Warfare School

course to exclusively seminar-based instruction.

3. Include completion of Professional Military Education among precepts to boards considering

ieserve officers for promotion and assignment to command.

4. Engage the American Council on Education to increase graduate level credits for completion of the

non-resident Command and Staff College course.

S. In coordination with the Deputy Commandant, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, seek legislative

action to award reserve officers special pay for completion of Professional Military Education

requirements.

6. In coordination with the Deputy Commandant, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, seek legislative

action to include completion of career level PME as an entry level contractual requirement for reserve

officers If this alternative is not supportable make enrollment in PME a prerequisite for assignment

to any Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) unit, Department of Military Affairs (DMA)

detachment, or for return to voluntary active duty.

7. Recognize reserve officer completion of PME with a personal letter from the Commandant of the

Marine Corps. Consider authorizing a distinguishing device for the Organized Marine Corps Reserve

(OMCR) or Mobilizations ribbon connoting academic achievement.

Question #7: What are the major faculty, student, curricula, and

facility changes that should be considered?

Change and adaptation mark the history of Marine Corps Professional Military Education.

These qualities are needed now and in the coming years as Marine officers strive to keep pace

with rapidly shifting challenges to U.S. national security. Meeting these challenges requires

expanding the faculty, rebalancing the curriculum, and upgrading dramatically the University's

PME infrastructure, especially with respect to information technology.

The Marine Corps must expand the University's faculty. The current level of staffing

allows the faculty neither the time nor the opportunity to stay abreast of events or do the research

necessary to enhance the educational experience of their students. Moreover, current staffing

levels do not permit the recommended interaction between the resident and non-resident

programs.

The accelerating pace of change in information technology has a profound effect on how

the Marine Corps conducts operations in the field. Weapons employment is heavily dependent

on position location technology. Multiple C2 systems are now fielded at the lowest levels.

32

Question #7: What are the major faculty, student, curricula, and

facility changes that should be considered?

Change and adaptation mark the history of Marine Corps Professional Military Education.

These qualities are needed now and in the coming years as Marine officers strive to keep pace

with rapidly shifting challenges to U.S. national security. Meeting these challenges requires

expanding the faculty, rebalancing the curriculum, and upgrading dramatically the University's

PME infrastructure, especially with respect to information technology.

The Marine Corps must expand the University's faculty. The current level of staffing

allows the faculty neither the time nor the opportunity to stay abreast of events or do the research

necessary to enhance the educational experience of their students. Moreover, current staffing

levels do not permit the recommended interaction between the resident and non-resident

programs.

The accelerating pace of change in information technology has a profound effect on how

the Marine Corps conducts operations in the field. Weapons employment is heavily dependent

on position location technology. Multiple C2 systems are now fielded at the lowest levels.

32
Recommendations: Question #7

1. Overhaul the University information technology infrastructure. The infrastructure rnut support best

communications practices and modern gaming techniques. Replicate software variants used by the

Marine Corps and unified commanders. The University staff and students must be able to keep pace

with command and control and information technology developments and protocols in the Marine Corps

and the joint community.

2. Develop and implement a new facilities master plan in conjunction with information technology

infrastructure modernization. A modern education effort requires a modern physical and information

technology infrastructure. It will also serve to attract a high quality faculty.

3. Update University curricula to ensure University graduates are well prepared in the technical aspects

of modern command and control.

4. Enhance curricula through academic chair agreements and guest speaker partnerships with private

sector leaders. High executive officials from major corporations recognized for industry best practices

must provide students their perspectives on leadership, IT utilization, distribution of goods and services,

risk management, international presence and organizational structure.

Complex automated warfighting simulation systems are fully embedded in planning practices.

Each presents important advantages and disadvantages; each separate system requires specialized

knowledge and techniques. At higher levels multiple command and control systems are fielded

across the combatant commands, requiring similar familiarity and learning. The University must

modify its curricula to teach more of the fundamental knowledge necessary for Marine officers

to operate effectively in this type of environment.

Antiquated buildings and an IT infrastructure that is limited to basic email are major

impediments to meeting the University's goals for the future. Modifying current buildings and

patching together separate IT systems is no longer an acceptable option. It epitomizes a "pennywise and pound-foolish" approach of pouring more resources into a fundamentally flawed

system. A comprehensive facilities and information technology study must be done to provide a

vision of the future Marine Corps University's configuration and capabilities. Such a study

would support the University's efforts to develop a facilities master plan.

Question #8: Is the length and degree of difficulty of current PME

courses appropriate to the subject matter and majority of student

population?

Marine Corps officers achieve required professional competency through formal

education at schools, distance learning courses, and self-study programs. Field assignments

enhance and expand upon these educational experiences. Ideally, the Marine Corps would

provide all officers with their Professional Military Education in a formal school environment,

and would base the length of instruction solely on the time required to attain desired

competencies. The Marine Corps would also tailor these courses to the needs of the individual

33

Complex automated warfighting simulation systems are fully embedded in planning practices.

Each presents important advantages and disadvantages; each separate system requires specialized

knowledge and techniques. At higher levels multiple command and control systems are fielded

across the combatant commands, requiring similar familiarity and learning. The University must

modify its curricula to teach more of the fundamental knowledge necessary for Marine officers

to operate effectively in this type of environment.

Antiquated buildings and an IT infrastructure that is limited to basic email are major

impediments to meeting the University's goals for the future. Modifying current buildings and

patching together separate IT systems is no longer an acceptable option. It epitomizes a "pennywise and pound-foolish" approach of pouring more resources into a fundamentally flawed

system. A comprehensive facilities and information technology study must be done to provide a

vision of the future Marine Corps University's configuration and capabilities. Such a study

would support the University's efforts to develop a facilities master plan.

Question #8: Is the length and degree of difficulty of current PME

courses appropriate to the subject matter and majority of student

population?

Marine Corps officers achieve required professional competency through formal

education at schools, distance learning courses, and self-study programs. Field assignments

enhance and expand upon these educational experiences. Ideally, the Marine Corps would

provide all officers with their Professional Military Education in a formal school environment,

and would base the length of instruction solely on the time required to attain desired

competencies. The Marine Corps would also tailor these courses to the needs of the individual

33
student. However, such an ideal world does not exist. Limited resources in the form of time,

funds, and people require the Corps to employ alternatives like distance learning and limit the

length of all instruction, including individualized instruction.

The Expeditionary Warfare School, Command and Staff College, School of Advanced

Warfighting, and Marine Corps War College all limit their "academic year" to ten-months. This

is a function of the traditional lengths of elementary and high school terms, and the summer

rotation of personnel that it encourages, and is designed to enable officers with families to

transfer duty stations when their children are out of school. Whether the traditional academicyear is the proper length for Professional Military Education in a formal school setting remains

an open question.

The determination of the proper length of formal schooling for Marine Corps officers

requires: first, identifying the professional competencies required for each grade. Second, with

insights derived from the learning sciences, the Corps would then decide which competencies

officers can best acquire in a formal academic setting, and which they can acquire least through

distance learning or self-study. Finally, the Corps would determine the most effective

combination of course length, student body size, and methods of instruction required for the

education of officers in each grade. If resources prove inadequate to institute the optimum

educational experience, which is likely, the Corps would need to substitute distance learning for

some percentage of officers, recognizing that these courses are necessarily longer than courses

conducted in resident programs.

The study group's review of officer Professional Military Education determined that

there is no identified set of competencies for Marine Corps officers. Marine Corps University

did provide the group with a February 23, 2006 copy of a Caliber Associates' study titled

Identification of Competencies Required of Joint Leaders. Though there is a real risk of getting

caught up in the systems approach to training and its emphasis on quantification, it does seem

that the University needs baseline descriptions of what competencies the Marine Corps expects

from its officers for at least the grades captain through colonel before it can accurately decide on

the proper venues for achieving each competency. Even more important, the University needs

these to assess the proper course length for those competencies taught in formal schools. The

study group collectively judges that the schools at Quantico, with the possible exception of the

Expeditionary Warfare School, are at about the right length.

Difficulty refers to being "not easily or readily done; requiring much labor, skill, or

planning to be performed successfully; hard." Is there any inherent reason that Professional

Military Education must be intentionally "difficult?" Would the Marine Corps not rather this

education be challenging: defined as "testing one's ability, endurance, etc.?" Perhaps even better

is a second definition of the word: "stimulating, interesting, and thought-provoking."

Regardless of which word one chooses, the real measure of success is not a course's

difficulty; rather, it is the course's capacity to maximize the amount of learning that a Marine

officer can derive from the educational experience. Again, the degree of difficulty or challenge

of any course derives from the determination of required professional competencies; the learning

34

student. However, such an ideal world does not exist. Limited resources in the form of time,

funds, and people require the Corps to employ alternatives like distance learning and limit the

length of all instruction, including individualized instruction.

The Expeditionary Warfare School, Command and Staff College, School of Advanced

Warfighting, and Marine Corps War College all limit their "academic year" to ten-months. This

is a function of the traditional lengths of elementary and high school terms, and the summer

rotation of personnel that it encourages, and is designed to enable officers with families to

transfer duty stations when their children are out of school. Whether the traditional academicyear is the proper length for Professional Military Education in a formal school setting remains

an open question.

The determination of the proper length of formal schooling for Marine Corps officers

requires: first, identifying the professional competencies required for each grade. Second, with

insights derived from the learning sciences, the Corps would then decide which competencies

officers can best acquire in a formal academic setting, and which they can acquire least through

distance learning or self-study. Finally, the Corps would determine the most effective

combination of course length, student body size, and methods of instruction required for the

education of officers in each grade. If resources prove inadequate to institute the optimum

educational experience, which is likely, the Corps would need to substitute distance learning for

some percentage of officers, recognizing that these courses are necessarily longer than courses

conducted in resident programs.

The study group's review of officer Professional Military Education determined that

there is no identified set of competencies for Marine Corps officers. Marine Corps University

did provide the group with a February 23, 2006 copy of a Caliber Associates' study titled

Identification of Competencies Required of Joint Leaders. Though there is a real risk of getting

caught up in the systems approach to training and its emphasis on quantification, it does seem

that the University needs baseline descriptions of what competencies the Marine Corps expects

from its officers for at least the grades captain through colonel before it can accurately decide on

the proper venues for achieving each competency. Even more important, the University needs

these to assess the proper course length for those competencies taught in formal schools. The

study group collectively judges that the schools at Quantico, with the possible exception of the

Expeditionary Warfare School, are at about the right length.

Difficulty refers to being "not easily or readily done; requiring much labor, skill, or

planning to be performed successfully; hard." Is there any inherent reason that Professional

Military Education must be intentionally "difficult?" Would the Marine Corps not rather this

education be challenging: defined as "testing one's ability, endurance, etc.?" Perhaps even better

is a second definition of the word: "stimulating, interesting, and thought-provoking."

Regardless of which word one chooses, the real measure of success is not a course's

difficulty; rather, it is the course's capacity to maximize the amount of learning that a Marine

officer can derive from the educational experience. Again, the degree of difficulty or challenge

of any course derives from the determination of required professional competencies; the learning

34
outcomes required; and the skill of the faculty and quality of instructional methods and materials

used to achieve these learning outcomes.

What makes a course of instruction difficult or challenging? The desired competency

may simply be hard for some officers to attain, which in turn makes mastering instruction

designed to develop that competency demanding. An officer's background may be weak in a

certain subject, challenging his or her ability to master it. A poor learning environment might

make realizing the expected outcomes unintentionally difficult in some circumstances. Faculty

may want to make students stretch their abilities and expand their minds; to achieve this goal

they may deliberately make instructional material challenging.

Intuitively, there seems to be value in having challenging courses of instruction, though

simply making a course difficult for the sole purpose of it being difficult is absurd. Nonetheless,

in one case—developing new officers' physical abilities—The Basic School has purposely

heightened the Marine Corps' standard obstacle course and its confidence course so that officers

arriving at their first commands will have no problem running these courses with their Marines.

However, many of the cognitive skills required of officers are fundamentally different from those

of enlisted Marines. Thus, there is no standard that the Corps can arbitrarily expect its officers to

exceed, as it does with some physical skills.

In the physical realm—running, rappelling, climbing, swimming, etc.—the inherent

difficulty or challenge is easy to see and measure, and so are the standards of success tied to such

physical skills. For the acquisition of knowledge and its subsequent demonstration, this often is

not the case.

Anecdotal evidence provided to the study group indicated that Marine Corps University's

courses of instruction are challenging. Included in this evidence were references to the amount

of required reading, length and quality of writing assignments, and difficulty of oral

examinations. The fact that a small fraction of students has failed to achieve at least some

academic goals—masters degrees being the most frequent—indicates that there is a degree of

rigor in the courses of instruction. The letter grading system—as opposed to other systems such

as "mastery statements"—and the identification of honor students provide further evidence of

standards. Accreditation by the Commission on Colleges, Southern Association of Colleges and

Schools (SACS) is another indication of rigor.

In addition to meeting long-term competency requirements, the curriculum should

emphasize current operational needs as well as requirements expected to arise from the emerging

security environment. Marine Corps University appears to be adjusting its curriculum in

recognition of these needs. Incorporation of language instruction, increased cultural studies, and

new courses covering insurgency and counterinsurgency, and stability operations provide

examples. However, owing to the rapid pace of change, Marine Corps University finds itself

playing catch up. In the future, the University must develop techniques that will enable it to

anticipate emerging requirements early enough to adapt its curricula proactively, rather than

after-the-fact. Ten years ago, General Krulak's insights on the "three-block war" and the

"strategic corporal" gave more than a hint that change was upon the U.S. military. The challenge

for Marine Corps University is to make better use of such insights in the future.

35

outcomes required; and the skill of the faculty and quality of instructional methods and materials

used to achieve these learning outcomes.

What makes a course of instruction difficult or challenging? The desired competency

may simply be hard for some officers to attain, which in turn makes mastering instruction

designed to develop that competency demanding. An officer's background may be weak in a

certain subject, challenging his or her ability to master it. A poor learning environment might

make realizing the expected outcomes unintentionally difficult in some circumstances. Faculty

may want to make students stretch their abilities and expand their minds; to achieve this goal

they may deliberately make instructional material challenging.

Intuitively, there seems to be value in having challenging courses of instruction, though

simply making a course difficult for the sole purpose of it being difficult is absurd. Nonetheless,

in one case—developing new officers' physical abilities—The Basic School has purposely

heightened the Marine Corps' standard obstacle course and its confidence course so that officers

arriving at their first commands will have no problem running these courses with their Marines.

However, many of the cognitive skills required of officers are fundamentally different from those

of enlisted Marines. Thus, there is no standard that the Corps can arbitrarily expect its officers to

exceed, as it does with some physical skills.

In the physical realm—running, rappelling, climbing, swimming, etc.—the inherent

difficulty or challenge is easy to see and measure, and so are the standards of success tied to such

physical skills. For the acquisition of knowledge and its subsequent demonstration, this often is

not the case.

Anecdotal evidence provided to the study group indicated that Marine Corps University's

courses of instruction are challenging. Included in this evidence were references to the amount

of required reading, length and quality of writing assignments, and difficulty of oral

examinations. The fact that a small fraction of students has failed to achieve at least some

academic goals—masters degrees being the most frequent—indicates that there is a degree of

rigor in the courses of instruction. The letter grading system—as opposed to other systems such

as "mastery statements"—and the identification of honor students provide further evidence of

standards. Accreditation by the Commission on Colleges, Southern Association of Colleges and

Schools (SACS) is another indication of rigor.

In addition to meeting long-term competency requirements, the curriculum should

emphasize current operational needs as well as requirements expected to arise from the emerging

security environment. Marine Corps University appears to be adjusting its curriculum in

recognition of these needs. Incorporation of language instruction, increased cultural studies, and

new courses covering insurgency and counterinsurgency, and stability operations provide

examples. However, owing to the rapid pace of change, Marine Corps University finds itself

playing catch up. In the future, the University must develop techniques that will enable it to

anticipate emerging requirements early enough to adapt its curricula proactively, rather than

after-the-fact. Ten years ago, General Krulak's insights on the "three-block war" and the

"strategic corporal" gave more than a hint that change was upon the U.S. military. The challenge

for Marine Corps University is to make better use of such insights in the future.

35
Recommendation: Question #8

Once developed, use officer core competencies as the basis for a methodology that: • Determines the most effective combination of course length, student body size, and methods

of instruction required for tbe education of officers in each grade for those competencies

identified as best mastered in a formal academic setting and then structure curricula

accordingly. • Then determines the most effective combination of course length, seminar size, and methods

of instruction required for the education of officers in each grade for those competencies

identified as best mastered through distance learning and then structure curricula

accordingly. • Then creates a handbook to assist officers in developing and undertaking individual selfstudy programs for those competeacies identified as best mastered in such programs.

Question #9: To what extent should the following be included in the

curricula?

a. Military History

b. Policy and Strategy

c. Traditional vs. Irregular Warfare

d. Language and Culture

These four subjects must be emphasized in Marine officer's Professional Military

Education. All are critical to an officer's ability to adapt to the unexpected, the unforeseen, and

the ambiguous—in other words, to the inherent nature of conflict. The philosophy and direction

of professional education must never lose sight of the distinction between what is essential in

education and what is nice to know. Far too much of the latter—the "Pecos River approach"—a

mile wide and an inch deep—has crept into the education of American officers.

Serious education requires deep familiarity with the subject matter at hand; and only such

familiarity can lead to real learning and knowledge. As Clausewitz suggests about the purpose

of education:

It is an analytic investigation leading to a close acquaintance with the subject; applied to

experience—in our case military history—it leads to thorough familiarity with it. The

closer it comes to that goal, the more it proceeds from the objective form of a science to

the subjective form of a skill, the more effective it will prove in areas where the nature of

the case admits no arbiter but talent... [Theoretical analysis] then becomes a guide to

anyone who wants to learn about war from books; it will light his way, ease his progress,

train his judgment, and help him to avoid pitfalls.

36

Question #9: To what extent should the following be included in the

curricula?

a. Military History

b. Policy and Strategy

c. Traditional vs. Irregular Warfare

d. Language and Culture

These four subjects must be emphasized in Marine officer's Professional Military

Education. All are critical to an officer's ability to adapt to the unexpected, the unforeseen, and

the ambiguous—in other words, to the inherent nature of conflict. The philosophy and direction

of professional education must never lose sight of the distinction between what is essential in

education and what is nice to know. Far too much of the latter—the "Pecos River approach"—a

mile wide and an inch deep—has crept into the education of American officers.

Serious education requires deep familiarity with the subject matter at hand; and only such

familiarity can lead to real learning and knowledge. As Clausewitz suggests about the purpose

of education:

It is an analytic investigation leading to a close acquaintance with the subject; applied to

experience—in our case military history—it leads to thorough familiarity with it. The

closer it comes to that goal, the more it proceeds from the objective form of a science to

the subjective form of a skill, the more effective it will prove in areas where the nature of

the case admits no arbiter but talent... [Theoretical analysis] then becomes a guide to

anyone who wants to learn about war from books; it will light his way, ease his progress,

train his judgment, and help him to avoid pitfalls.

36
The primary purpose of education for officers is to inculcate within the officer corps an

understanding of the fundamental nature of war. A careful and thoughtful use of history,

military history in particular, represents one of the most effective tools. Since military

organizations engage in war only episodically, it represents the most effective tool available.

History provides innumerable insights at every level of war, significant understanding of

leadership, and glimpses of the fog and friction that are integral to war. The insights and

perspectives one can gain from the use of history can also illuminate ways of meeting new and

emerging challenges. Complex case studies dealing with the issues of strategy and policy,

campaign planning, and leadership can and do provide an analytic guide for officers later in their

careers. To be sure, history offers no "silver bullets" or fixed solutions. Rather, it helps officers

to ask the right questions and challenge the superficial PowerPoint briefings that characterize so

much of current strategic and operational analyses.

In this sense, the education of officers on military operations, and strategy and policy,

especially at the intermediate and senior level, must to a large extent rest on military history. As

an example, the 'strategy and policy' course at the Naval War College provides clear analysis of

the military factors affecting strategic choices. This course illustrates that the context of military

events is essential to an understanding of strategic decision making. To study contemporary

military operations without an understanding of military history and the political and strategic

constraints that have marked campaigns throughout the ages can be dangerous. There are no

such things as 'pure' military operations, because war is inextricably linked with its political and

strategic context. The emphasis on the nexus between the two should depend entirely on the

purposes and issues that the course of study aims to address.

In the view of the study group, there is no fundamental difference between "traditional

war" and "irregular war." The latter is war, as is the former. Whether a course of study

addresses the guerrilla war that arose in Spain in the first decade of the nineteenth century, the

German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, or the current situation in Iraq, one is still dealing

with war, and the fundamental determinants of politics, friction, and uncertainty remain similar.

Moreover, one should never lose sight of the fact that the future has a way of surprising

military prophets and pundits, who have often gotten the next war wrong. Therefore, what

matters most is the ability of the U.S. military institutions to adapt to the actual conditions that

the military leaders of the future will confront, and that, in turn, requires the ability to ask the

right questions. The purpose of Professional Military Education, then, is not to teach what the

next war will be, but rather to provide officers the analytic tools to address reality, no matter

how harsh and inconvenient it may prove to conventional thinking.

The final aspect of this question deals with the role of culture and language in

Professional Military Education. Each raises different questions. Cultural issues should form an

intimate part of the historical framework that informs and provides the context for the study of

military operations as well as strategy and policy.

Finally, language knowledge represents one of the most important, but at the same time,

one of the most intractable of the tools that officers in the 21st century will need. The study of

the mind has underlined that language proficiency is best addressed at young ages—the younger

37

The primary purpose of education for officers is to inculcate within the officer corps an

understanding of the fundamental nature of war. A careful and thoughtful use of history,

military history in particular, represents one of the most effective tools. Since military

organizations engage in war only episodically, it represents the most effective tool available.

History provides innumerable insights at every level of war, significant understanding of

leadership, and glimpses of the fog and friction that are integral to war. The insights and

perspectives one can gain from the use of history can also illuminate ways of meeting new and

emerging challenges. Complex case studies dealing with the issues of strategy and policy,

campaign planning, and leadership can and do provide an analytic guide for officers later in their

careers. To be sure, history offers no "silver bullets" or fixed solutions. Rather, it helps officers

to ask the right questions and challenge the superficial PowerPoint briefings that characterize so

much of current strategic and operational analyses.

In this sense, the education of officers on military operations, and strategy and policy,

especially at the intermediate and senior level, must to a large extent rest on military history. As

an example, the 'strategy and policy' course at the Naval War College provides clear analysis of

the military factors affecting strategic choices. This course illustrates that the context of military

events is essential to an understanding of strategic decision making. To study contemporary

military operations without an understanding of military history and the political and strategic

constraints that have marked campaigns throughout the ages can be dangerous. There are no

such things as 'pure' military operations, because war is inextricably linked with its political and

strategic context. The emphasis on the nexus between the two should depend entirely on the

purposes and issues that the course of study aims to address.

In the view of the study group, there is no fundamental difference between "traditional

war" and "irregular war." The latter is war, as is the former. Whether a course of study

addresses the guerrilla war that arose in Spain in the first decade of the nineteenth century, the

German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, or the current situation in Iraq, one is still dealing

with war, and the fundamental determinants of politics, friction, and uncertainty remain similar.

Moreover, one should never lose sight of the fact that the future has a way of surprising

military prophets and pundits, who have often gotten the next war wrong. Therefore, what

matters most is the ability of the U.S. military institutions to adapt to the actual conditions that

the military leaders of the future will confront, and that, in turn, requires the ability to ask the

right questions. The purpose of Professional Military Education, then, is not to teach what the

next war will be, but rather to provide officers the analytic tools to address reality, no matter

how harsh and inconvenient it may prove to conventional thinking.

The final aspect of this question deals with the role of culture and language in

Professional Military Education. Each raises different questions. Cultural issues should form an

intimate part of the historical framework that informs and provides the context for the study of

military operations as well as strategy and policy.

Finally, language knowledge represents one of the most important, but at the same time,

one of the most intractable of the tools that officers in the 21st century will need. The study of

the mind has underlined that language proficiency is best addressed at young ages—the younger

37
Recommendations: Question #9

1. Ensure the study of military history and historical analyses underpin the curricula of all Professional

Military Education.

2. Continue to provide instruction in policy and strategy based on the classical theorists.

3. Continue to ensure a proper balance of instruction on war that revolves around fire and maneuver

and on insurgent methods, i.e., guerrilla operations and terrorism.

4. Divest the curricula of universal language training in favor of targeted training for those with aptitude

and interest, while enhancing cultural training.

5. Ensure cultural education is an integral part of the historical framework that provides the context for

the study of military operations, strategy, and policy.

the better. Moreover, establishing proficiency in a language resembles a training exercise more

than analytic education. Here, it would seem that the Marine Corps would gain most by actively

encouraging the study of languages by college and university students interested in becoming

Marine officers and by providing specific opportunities for language study for those with

aptitude, rather than by taking study time in its Professional Military Education schools away

from the development of analytic skills required for military operations and strategic policy

making.

Question #10: What is the value of the Occupational Field

Enhancement Course (OFEC) and Command and Control Training and

Education (C2 T&E) curriculum currently provided by the resident

Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS)? Should these opportunities!

experiences be provided to non-residence students and similar type

opportunities be afforded to other Marines along the T&E continuum?

The study group sees the expansion of Occupational Field Enhancement Course (OFEC)

as a positive development and applauds Marine Corps University for undertaking this initiative.

Fundamentally, OFEC is an excellent dose of semi-customized training for resident

Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS) students embedded in the curriculum (but conducted

mostly offsite, e.g., Twenty-Nine Palms). This training is essential, given today's security

environment.

The fact that EWS provides this training, however, illustrates a deficiency in the Marine

Corps training scheme elsewhere. The Marine Corps skill progression training for officers for

some MOSs lacks the necessary mechanisms to provide what is being accomplished by OFEC.

For example, the Marine Corps' aviation community has a well-constructed and mature

system for developing aviation captains: the Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Training

38

the better. Moreover, establishing proficiency in a language resembles a training exercise more

than analytic education. Here, it would seem that the Marine Corps would gain most by actively

encouraging the study of languages by college and university students interested in becoming

Marine officers and by providing specific opportunities for language study for those with

aptitude, rather than by taking study time in its Professional Military Education schools away

from the development of analytic skills required for military operations and strategic policy

making.

Question #10: What is the value of the Occupational Field

Enhancement Course (OFEC) and Command and Control Training and

Education (C2 T&E) curriculum currently provided by the resident

Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS)? Should these opportunities!

experiences be provided to non-residence students and similar type

opportunities be afforded to other Marines along the T&E continuum?

The study group sees the expansion of Occupational Field Enhancement Course (OFEC)

as a positive development and applauds Marine Corps University for undertaking this initiative.

Fundamentally, OFEC is an excellent dose of semi-customized training for resident

Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS) students embedded in the curriculum (but conducted

mostly offsite, e.g., Twenty-Nine Palms). This training is essential, given today's security

environment.

The fact that EWS provides this training, however, illustrates a deficiency in the Marine

Corps training scheme elsewhere. The Marine Corps skill progression training for officers for

some MOSs lacks the necessary mechanisms to provide what is being accomplished by OFEC.

For example, the Marine Corps' aviation community has a well-constructed and mature

system for developing aviation captains: the Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Training

38
Recommendations: Question #10

1. Add an appropriately crafted course on Information Technology and Command and Control to every

formal Marine Corps PME school, including the non-resident courses.

2. Develop a short Information Technology and Command and Control course for mandatory

attendance by all Marine Corps General Officers.

3. Continue improvement of the OFEC portion of the EWS curriculum.

4. Training Command examine skill progression and other company grade training, e.g. MAGTF

integration, combined arms and planning, and then compare it to existing programs and devise new

training (schools and courses, etc.) to deliver that training.

Program. This program, however, does not cover all the OFEC material, and full participation by

all aviation captains in the Marine Corps is not achieved. The Marine Corps logistics community

has some structured courses in the School of MAGTF Logistics, which provide company grade

officer with two courses: the Tactical Logistics Operations Course and the Advanced Logistics

Operations Course. But, again, these courses do not cover all the OFEC material; nor are they

attended by all logistics officers. The ground combat arms company grade officers and other

MOSs, such as public affairs and administration, have a more patchwork skill progression

training scheme. What training is accomplished occurs at Army schools such as the Infantry

Captains Career Course. The study group does not consider it practical for EWS to expand the

OFEC to non-resident students. Rather, it believes this deficiency in company grade training

should be examined by the Training Command to determine the depth and breadth of the

deficiency, for the purpose of devising new training schemes.

The study group is convinced that the introduction of the Command and Control Training

and Education (C2 T&E) curriculum into EWS was a necessary step in the further education of

Marine officers. The information technology revolution is probably the most important

warfighting development for the Marine Corps since the introduction of aircraft. The Marine

Corps will fight in every conceivable scenario using modem-day and future command and

control systems, enabled by the revolution in information technology. A sound understanding of

the fundamentals of information technology and C2 systems is a prerequisite for effective

performance by an officer in today's Marine Corps.

39

Program. This program, however, does not cover all the OFEC material, and full participation by

all aviation captains in the Marine Corps is not achieved. The Marine Corps logistics community

has some structured courses in the School of MAGTF Logistics, which provide company grade

officer with two courses: the Tactical Logistics Operations Course and the Advanced Logistics

Operations Course. But, again, these courses do not cover all the OFEC material; nor are they

attended by all logistics officers. The ground combat arms company grade officers and other

MOSs, such as public affairs and administration, have a more patchwork skill progression

training scheme. What training is accomplished occurs at Army schools such as the Infantry

Captains Career Course. The study group does not consider it practical for EWS to expand the

OFEC to non-resident students. Rather, it believes this deficiency in company grade training

should be examined by the Training Command to determine the depth and breadth of the

deficiency, for the purpose of devising new training schemes.

The study group is convinced that the introduction of the Command and Control Training

and Education (C2 T&E) curriculum into EWS was a necessary step in the further education of

Marine officers. The information technology revolution is probably the most important

warfighting development for the Marine Corps since the introduction of aircraft. The Marine

Corps will fight in every conceivable scenario using modem-day and future command and

control systems, enabled by the revolution in information technology. A sound understanding of

the fundamentals of information technology and C2 systems is a prerequisite for effective

performance by an officer in today's Marine Corps.

39

Section III — Conclusions

Professional Military Education represents the most important investment the Marine

Corps can make to meet the challenges that the 2ls Century will bring. The Marine Corps has

traditionally believed that people and qualities such as honor, courage, commitment, and intellect

are more important than the material accouterments of war. Wars are won by the enduring

powers of human spirit and intelligence, as opposed to ephemeral technologies and the weapons

systems of the day.

This study group approached its tasks in this spirit. It is our feeling the American

military will soon confront a period of sustained belt-tightening, in which there will be relatively

few resources and in which the Marine Corps will have competing priorities and will have to

make difficult choices. In such an atmosphere, it will be all too easy to relegate Professional

Military Education to the end of the funding line. In our view, such an approach would represent

the worst of outcomes. Furthermore, the study group concluded that simply maintaining the

Professional Military Education status quo is unacceptable.

In no sense did the study group allow itself to be constrained by its charter. Instead, with

the support and encouragement of the President of the Marine Corps University, we examined in

a holistic way what we believe are the essential issues for the Marine Corps' approach to PME.

We adopted this holistic approach because the emerging strategic environment underlines that

the United States lives - and will continue to live - in a dangerous world. Uncertainty, ambiguity,

and chaos will characterize that environment, and the performance of Marine officers will

depend as much on their wits and education as on their ability to call on unlimited fire power.

We conducted this study from two perspectives. First, we drew on our experience to

identify the strategic, operational, and tactical demands that will challenge officers in the future.

Second, we spent considerable time examining the current program: its faculty, its resources, its

courses of study, and its deficiencies. Based,on our research, we concluded that the exceptional

spirit, dedication, and intellect of the members of the University faculty and staff have taken the

program as far as they can.

However, that 'success' is insufficient to meet the intellectual and military challenges

that confront the Marine Corps and the United States. If the Uthversit is to reach the status of a

"world-class" educational institution — as first envisioned by the 29 Commandant — then the

Marine Corps must make major investments in the human and capital resources dedicated to

Professional Military Education. This will require significant institutional commitments.

Investments must address shortfalls in faculty staffing, technical infrastructure, and facilities.

This will require continued generous support from institutions such as the Marine Corps

University Foundation. However, the Marine Corps, as an institution, must bear the larger share

of the burden. The old Marine saying of "doing more with less" is simply inappropriate.

Considering these and other factors, the group developed the following recommendations

that transcend the boundaries of the study directive, and which will profoundly influence the

Marine Corps' capacity to meet the nations' security needs.

41

Section III — Conclusions

Professional Military Education represents the most important investment the Marine

Corps can make to meet the challenges that the 2ls Century will bring. The Marine Corps has

traditionally believed that people and qualities such as honor, courage, commitment, and intellect

are more important than the material accouterments of war. Wars are won by the enduring

powers of human spirit and intelligence, as opposed to ephemeral technologies and the weapons

systems of the day.

This study group approached its tasks in this spirit. It is our feeling the American

military will soon confront a period of sustained belt-tightening, in which there will be relatively

few resources and in which the Marine Corps will have competing priorities and will have to

make difficult choices. In such an atmosphere, it will be all too easy to relegate Professional

Military Education to the end of the funding line. In our view, such an approach would represent

the worst of outcomes. Furthermore, the study group concluded that simply maintaining the

Professional Military Education status quo is unacceptable.

In no sense did the study group allow itself to be constrained by its charter. Instead, with

the support and encouragement of the President of the Marine Corps University, we examined in

a holistic way what we believe are the essential issues for the Marine Corps' approach to PME.

We adopted this holistic approach because the emerging strategic environment underlines that

the United States lives - and will continue to live - in a dangerous world. Uncertainty, ambiguity,

and chaos will characterize that environment, and the performance of Marine officers will

depend as much on their wits and education as on their ability to call on unlimited fire power.

We conducted this study from two perspectives. First, we drew on our experience to

identify the strategic, operational, and tactical demands that will challenge officers in the future.

Second, we spent considerable time examining the current program: its faculty, its resources, its

courses of study, and its deficiencies. Based,on our research, we concluded that the exceptional

spirit, dedication, and intellect of the members of the University faculty and staff have taken the

program as far as they can.

However, that 'success' is insufficient to meet the intellectual and military challenges

that confront the Marine Corps and the United States. If the Uthversit is to reach the status of a

"world-class" educational institution — as first envisioned by the 29 Commandant — then the

Marine Corps must make major investments in the human and capital resources dedicated to

Professional Military Education. This will require significant institutional commitments.

Investments must address shortfalls in faculty staffing, technical infrastructure, and facilities.

This will require continued generous support from institutions such as the Marine Corps

University Foundation. However, the Marine Corps, as an institution, must bear the larger share

of the burden. The old Marine saying of "doing more with less" is simply inappropriate.

Considering these and other factors, the group developed the following recommendations

that transcend the boundaries of the study directive, and which will profoundly influence the

Marine Corps' capacity to meet the nations' security needs.

41
Conclusion Recommendations:

1. Obtain from the Commandant of the Marine Corps, a policy statement on Professional Military

Education. This statement must elevate the importance of PME within the institution and place it on an

equal or higher plane with other priorities such as physical conditioning.

2. Ensure continuity in essential PME programs by stabilizing key positions. The practice of obtaining

the services of retired officers with special aptitudes in the regimes most necessary to build and sustain a

PME program of the highest quality and exploiting the flexibility that is inherent in Title X hiring

authorities should be sustained.

3. Unite all educational functions under a single officer of three-star rank or equivalent.

4. Enlarge the institutional vision of PME. Regard it as a continuum that begins before an officer enters

active service, persists as an essential part of his or her active duty daily lifestyle, and extends beyond

retirement.

5. Rebalance the curricula of the respective schools to place appropriate proportional emphasis on the

art and science of warfare. Current programs place a premium on art to the point that science is

underemphasized. This is in juxtaposition to the programs at counterpart institutions elsewhere in the

Department of Defense.

6. Initiate a coordinated, collaborative effort with the Department of Manpower and Reserve Affairs, to

ensure that post-PME assignment policies and practices sustain and enhance the personal and

professional development that occurs through the PME process. Moreover, these policies and practices

must ensure that the expanded skills and abilities acquired by PME graduates are fully exploited to

fulfill service and national needs.

7. Correct strategic communications deficiencies in PME curricula. Content of courses taught at the

university do not adequately address the emergence of information as a key strategic element in the 21's

century battle space.

8. Create a "publishing house" at the Marine Corps University.

42

Conclusion Recommendations:

1. Obtain from the Commandant of the Marine Corps, a policy statement on Professional Military

Education. This statement must elevate the importance of PME within the institution and place it on an

equal or higher plane with other priorities such as physical conditioning.

2. Ensure continuity in essential PME programs by stabilizing key positions. The practice of obtaining

the services of retired officers with special aptitudes in the regimes most necessary to build and sustain a

PME program of the highest quality and exploiting the flexibility that is inherent in Title X hiring

authorities should be sustained.

3. Unite all educational functions under a single officer of three-star rank or equivalent.

4. Enlarge the institutional vision of PME. Regard it as a continuum that begins before an officer enters

active service, persists as an essential part of his or her active duty daily lifestyle, and extends beyond

retirement.

5. Rebalance the curricula of the respective schools to place appropriate proportional emphasis on the

art and science of warfare. Current programs place a premium on art to the point that science is

underemphasized. This is in juxtaposition to the programs at counterpart institutions elsewhere in the

Department of Defense.

6. Initiate a coordinated, collaborative effort with the Department of Manpower and Reserve Affairs, to

ensure that post-PME assignment policies and practices sustain and enhance the personal and

professional development that occurs through the PME process. Moreover, these policies and practices

must ensure that the expanded skills and abilities acquired by PME graduates are fully exploited to

fulfill service and national needs.

7. Correct strategic communications deficiencies in PME curricula. Content of courses taught at the

university do not adequately address the emergence of information as a key strategic element in the 21's

century battle space.

8. Create a "publishing house" at the Marine Corps University.

42
Appendix I, Glossary

9/11 September 11, 2001

ACE American Council on Education

ALOC Advanced Logistics Operations Course

C2 Command and Control

C2 T&E Command and Control Training and Education

CAOCL Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning

CCE College of Continuing Education

CCRB Course Content Review Board

CLS Career Level School

CNET Commander for Naval Education and Training

CSC Command and Staff College

CSI Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

DMA Department of Military Affairs

DL Distance Learning

DOD Department of Defense

EWS Expeditionary Warfare School

EDCOM Education Command

EWTG Expeditionary Warfare Training Group

GOl Government of Iraq

GWOT Global War on Terror

ILS Intermediate Level Schools

IT Information Technology

IT-C2 Information Technology Command and Control

JFACC Joint Forces Air Component Commander

JFLCC Joint Forces Land Component Commander

JFMCC Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander

JIOWC Joint Information Operations Warfare Center

M&RA Manpower and Reserve Affairs

MAGTF Marine Air Ground Task Force

MAWTS-1 Marine Air Wing Training Squadron One, Yuma, Arizona

MCCDC Marine Corps Combat Development Command

MC WAR Marine Corps War College

MCU Marine Corps University

MCUF Marine Corps University Foundation

MMOA Manpower Management Officer Assignments

MOS Military Occupation Specialty

MSTP MAGTF Staff Training Program

NDU National Defense University

NROTC Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps

OFEC Occupational Field Enhancement Course

OMCR Organized Marine Corps Reserve

OCS Officer Candidate School

PAJE Process for Accreditation of Joint Education

PME Professional Military Education

43

Appendix I, Glossary

9/11 September 11, 2001

ACE American Council on Education

ALOC Advanced Logistics Operations Course

C2 Command and Control

C2 T&E Command and Control Training and Education

CAOCL Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning

CCE College of Continuing Education

CCRB Course Content Review Board

CLS Career Level School

CNET Commander for Naval Education and Training

CSC Command and Staff College

CSI Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

DMA Department of Military Affairs

DL Distance Learning

DOD Department of Defense

EWS Expeditionary Warfare School

EDCOM Education Command

EWTG Expeditionary Warfare Training Group

GOl Government of Iraq

GWOT Global War on Terror

ILS Intermediate Level Schools

IT Information Technology

IT-C2 Information Technology Command and Control

JFACC Joint Forces Air Component Commander

JFLCC Joint Forces Land Component Commander

JFMCC Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander

JIOWC Joint Information Operations Warfare Center

M&RA Manpower and Reserve Affairs

MAGTF Marine Air Ground Task Force

MAWTS-1 Marine Air Wing Training Squadron One, Yuma, Arizona

MCCDC Marine Corps Combat Development Command

MC WAR Marine Corps War College

MCU Marine Corps University

MCUF Marine Corps University Foundation

MMOA Manpower Management Officer Assignments

MOS Military Occupation Specialty

MSTP MAGTF Staff Training Program

NDU National Defense University

NROTC Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps

OFEC Occupational Field Enhancement Course

OMCR Organized Marine Corps Reserve

OCS Officer Candidate School

PAJE Process for Accreditation of Joint Education

PME Professional Military Education

43
PP&O Plans, Policies, and Operations

SACS Southern Association of Colleges and Schools

SAW School of Advanced Warfighting

SCETC Security Cooperation and Education Training Center

SMCR Selected Marine Corps Reserve

SOML School of MAGTF Logistics

SSI Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

TAD Temporary Additional Duty

TBS The Basic School

T&E Training and Education

TECOM Training and Education Command

TEECG Tactical Exercise Evaluation Control Group, Twentynine Palms, California

TLOC Tactical Logistics Operations Course

TLS Top Level School

U.S. United States

USMC United States Marine Corps

USNA United States Naval Academy

44

PP&O Plans, Policies, and Operations

SACS Southern Association of Colleges and Schools

SAW School of Advanced Warfighting

SCETC Security Cooperation and Education Training Center

SMCR Selected Marine Corps Reserve

SOML School of MAGTF Logistics

SSI Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

TAD Temporary Additional Duty

TBS The Basic School

T&E Training and Education

TECOM Training and Education Command

TEECG Tactical Exercise Evaluation Control Group, Twentynine Palms, California

TLOC Tactical Logistics Operations Course

TLS Top Level School

U.S. United States

USMC United States Marine Corps

USNA United States Naval Academy

44
Appendix II, Biographies

General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC (Retired), Chairman

General Charles E. Wilhelm was the former Commander, U.S. Southern Command, Miami,

Florida.

General Wilhelm graduated from Florida Southern College in 1964 and also holds an M.S.

degree from Salve Regina College. He is a graduate of the Army Infantry Officer's Advance

Course and the Naval War College.

General Wilhelm has held a variety of command positions. He commanded a rifle platoon and

Company during two tours in Vietnam; served as a Company Commander in Headquarters

Battalion and 3d Battalion, 8th Marines, 2nd Marine Division; was the Senior Advisor to a

Vietnamese Army Battalion; Inspector-Instructor, 4th Reconnaissance Battalion; Deputy Provost

Marshal, U.S. Naval Forces Philippines; and Commanded the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit.

General Wilhelm's staff assignments include Assistant Battalion Operations Officer; Operations

Officer and Executive Officer, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. He served on the staffs of Ill Marine

Amphibious Force; Logistics, Plans, and Policy Branch, Installations and Logistics Department,

HQMC, and J-3, Headquarters, U.S. European Command.

In August 1988, while assigned as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, II Marine

Expeditionary Force, he was promoted to brigadier general, and was subsequently assigned as

the Director of Operations, HQMC. In July 1990, he was selected to serve as Deputy Assistant

Secretary of Defense for Policy and Missions, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. During Operations Desert Shield and Desert

Storm, General Wilhelm relinquished his duties in the Pentagon and served as Deputy

Commander of Joint Task Force PROVEN FORCE. General Wilhelm assumed duties as

Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, in July 1992. He served as Commander Marine

Forces Somalia from December 1992 to March 1993 as part of the U.S. led coalition in

Operation RESTORE HOPE. General Wilhelm was confirmed for promotion to lieutenant

general and assumed duties as the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development

Command, Quantico, Va., July 15, 1994. In August 1995, he was assigned as Commander, U.S.

Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic/Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic/Commander,

U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Europe/Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, South/Commanding

General, II Marine Expeditionary Force/Commanding General, Marine Striking Force Atlantic,

Camp Lejeune, N.C. He was confirmed for promotion to general and assumed duties as the

Commander, U.S. Southern Command, Miami, FIa., September 25, 1997.

General Wilhelm's personal decorations include: the Defense Distinguished Service Medal; the

Distinguished Service Medal; Silver Star Medal; Defense Superior Service Medal with oak leaf

cluster in lieu of a second award; Bronze Star Medal with Combat "V"; Defense Meritorious

Service Medal; Meritorious Service Medal; Navy Commendation Medal with Combat "V";

Army Commendation Medal with Combat "V"; Joint Service Achievement Medal; Navy

Achievement Medal; and the Combat Action Ribbon.

45

Appendix II, Biographies

General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC (Retired), Chairman

General Charles E. Wilhelm was the former Commander, U.S. Southern Command, Miami,

Florida.

General Wilhelm graduated from Florida Southern College in 1964 and also holds an M.S.

degree from Salve Regina College. He is a graduate of the Army Infantry Officer's Advance

Course and the Naval War College.

General Wilhelm has held a variety of command positions. He commanded a rifle platoon and

Company during two tours in Vietnam; served as a Company Commander in Headquarters

Battalion and 3d Battalion, 8th Marines, 2nd Marine Division; was the Senior Advisor to a

Vietnamese Army Battalion; Inspector-Instructor, 4th Reconnaissance Battalion; Deputy Provost

Marshal, U.S. Naval Forces Philippines; and Commanded the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit.

General Wilhelm's staff assignments include Assistant Battalion Operations Officer; Operations

Officer and Executive Officer, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. He served on the staffs of Ill Marine

Amphibious Force; Logistics, Plans, and Policy Branch, Installations and Logistics Department,

HQMC, and J-3, Headquarters, U.S. European Command.

In August 1988, while assigned as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, II Marine

Expeditionary Force, he was promoted to brigadier general, and was subsequently assigned as

the Director of Operations, HQMC. In July 1990, he was selected to serve as Deputy Assistant

Secretary of Defense for Policy and Missions, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. During Operations Desert Shield and Desert

Storm, General Wilhelm relinquished his duties in the Pentagon and served as Deputy

Commander of Joint Task Force PROVEN FORCE. General Wilhelm assumed duties as

Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, in July 1992. He served as Commander Marine

Forces Somalia from December 1992 to March 1993 as part of the U.S. led coalition in

Operation RESTORE HOPE. General Wilhelm was confirmed for promotion to lieutenant

general and assumed duties as the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development

Command, Quantico, Va., July 15, 1994. In August 1995, he was assigned as Commander, U.S.

Marine Corps Forces, Atlantic/Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic/Commander,

U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Europe/Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, South/Commanding

General, II Marine Expeditionary Force/Commanding General, Marine Striking Force Atlantic,

Camp Lejeune, N.C. He was confirmed for promotion to general and assumed duties as the

Commander, U.S. Southern Command, Miami, FIa., September 25, 1997.

General Wilhelm's personal decorations include: the Defense Distinguished Service Medal; the

Distinguished Service Medal; Silver Star Medal; Defense Superior Service Medal with oak leaf

cluster in lieu of a second award; Bronze Star Medal with Combat "V"; Defense Meritorious

Service Medal; Meritorious Service Medal; Navy Commendation Medal with Combat "V";

Army Commendation Medal with Combat "V"; Joint Service Achievement Medal; Navy

Achievement Medal; and the Combat Action Ribbon.

45
Lieutenant General Wallace C. Gregson, Jr., USMC (Retired)

Lieutenant General Wallace C. Gregson retired from the United States Marine Corps in 2005

following a distinguished 37-year military career. Immediately prior to his retirement General

Gregson served as Commanding General of more than 70,000 U.S. military personnel assigned

to the Marine Forces Pacific, Marine Forces Central Command and Marine Corps Bases Pacific

units. Marines and sailors under his command were deployed at installations throughout Asia,

the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Djibouti. Earlier, from 2001 to 2003, while in Okinawa, Japan,

General Gregson was Commanding General of the ifi Marine Expeditionary Force based in

Japan and Hawaii.

Based at Camp Smith, Hawaii, Marine Forces Pacific is the largest field command in the Marine

Corps, extending from the West Coast of the United States to the Arabian Gulf. At the time of

his retirement General Gregson paid tribute to the Marine Corps and Navy personnel under his

command, noting that "They have a heavy deployment schedule. . .many Marines and sailors are

in their third tour in combat in the Middle East. . . and throughout they "have maintained the

watch out here in the Pacific."

After graduating in 1968 from the United States Naval Academy, General Gregson completed

The Basic School, and then served with the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, 1st Marine Division,

in the Republic of Vietnam from February 1969 to August 1970.

During more than two subsequent decades General Gregson held numerous positions of

increasing responsibility within the Marine Corps. He also served with the United Nations Truce

Supervision Organization in Egypt, as the Assistant Operations Officer for the Unified Task

Force in Somalia for Operation RESTORE HOPE, as well in the Department of Defense and the

U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters in Washington, D.C., and with the Central Intelligence Agency.

General Gregson received a master's degree in international relations from Salve Regina College,

and a second master's degree in strategic planning from the U.S. Naval War College. His

military awards include the Legion of Merit, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Bronze Star

Medal with Combat "V," and the Purple Heart.

He works as an independent consultant. He serves as a Trustee of the Marine Corps University

Foundation, a Director of the Injured Marine Semper Fi Fund, and as an Advisor to the Center

for Unconventional Security Affairs of the University of California Irvine. He is a member of

the Marine Corps Association, the US Naval Institute, and the Council on Foreign Relations.

Lieutenant General Bruce B. Knutson Jr., USMC (Retired)

At the time of his retirement, Lieutenant General Bruce B. Knutson, Jr., was serving as the

Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia.

Lieutenant General Knutson graduated from the University of New Mexico with a Bachelor of

Arts degree in economics during February 1969. Following commissioning as a second

lieutenant and attendance at The Basic School, he completed flight training at Williams Air

46

Lieutenant General Wallace C. Gregson, Jr., USMC (Retired)

Lieutenant General Wallace C. Gregson retired from the United States Marine Corps in 2005

following a distinguished 37-year military career. Immediately prior to his retirement General

Gregson served as Commanding General of more than 70,000 U.S. military personnel assigned

to the Marine Forces Pacific, Marine Forces Central Command and Marine Corps Bases Pacific

units. Marines and sailors under his command were deployed at installations throughout Asia,

the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Djibouti. Earlier, from 2001 to 2003, while in Okinawa, Japan,

General Gregson was Commanding General of the ifi Marine Expeditionary Force based in

Japan and Hawaii.

Based at Camp Smith, Hawaii, Marine Forces Pacific is the largest field command in the Marine

Corps, extending from the West Coast of the United States to the Arabian Gulf. At the time of

his retirement General Gregson paid tribute to the Marine Corps and Navy personnel under his

command, noting that "They have a heavy deployment schedule. . .many Marines and sailors are

in their third tour in combat in the Middle East. . . and throughout they "have maintained the

watch out here in the Pacific."

After graduating in 1968 from the United States Naval Academy, General Gregson completed

The Basic School, and then served with the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, 1st Marine Division,

in the Republic of Vietnam from February 1969 to August 1970.

During more than two subsequent decades General Gregson held numerous positions of

increasing responsibility within the Marine Corps. He also served with the United Nations Truce

Supervision Organization in Egypt, as the Assistant Operations Officer for the Unified Task

Force in Somalia for Operation RESTORE HOPE, as well in the Department of Defense and the

U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters in Washington, D.C., and with the Central Intelligence Agency.

General Gregson received a master's degree in international relations from Salve Regina College,

and a second master's degree in strategic planning from the U.S. Naval War College. His

military awards include the Legion of Merit, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Bronze Star

Medal with Combat "V," and the Purple Heart.

He works as an independent consultant. He serves as a Trustee of the Marine Corps University

Foundation, a Director of the Injured Marine Semper Fi Fund, and as an Advisor to the Center

for Unconventional Security Affairs of the University of California Irvine. He is a member of

the Marine Corps Association, the US Naval Institute, and the Council on Foreign Relations.

Lieutenant General Bruce B. Knutson Jr., USMC (Retired)

At the time of his retirement, Lieutenant General Bruce B. Knutson, Jr., was serving as the

Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia.

Lieutenant General Knutson graduated from the University of New Mexico with a Bachelor of

Arts degree in economics during February 1969. Following commissioning as a second

lieutenant and attendance at The Basic School, he completed flight training at Williams Air

46
Force Base, earning Air Force Wings in September 1969. Subsequently, he transferred to Marine

Combat Crew Readiness Training Group Ten (MCCRTG-1O), MCAS Yuma, where he

underwent further training and was designated a Naval Aviator in January 1971. He then did

initial training in the F-4 Phantom and on completion served with the Fleet Marine Force as an

F-4 pilot with Marine Fighter Attack Squadron-323 at MCAS El Toro from September 1971 to

April 1973. His next assignment with VMFA-1 15 included duty in Southeast Asia, Japan, and

the Philippines.

Upon returning to the United States in 1974, he served once again with Marine Aircraft Group

11 at MCAS El Toro. He transferred to Marine Fighter Attack Training Squadron-lOl at MCAS

Yuma during July 1976, where he served as an F-4 Phantom instructor. Upon the initial

activation of Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One during July 1978, he was

selected as an original MAWTS-1 instructor. During this tour, he served as F-4 division head and

as operations officer for the Joint Electronic Warfare/Close Air Support Project. During 1982 he

received the Cunningham Award as the Marine Aviator of the Year.

Following graduation as honor student at Marine Corps Command and Staff College during June

1983, he served with Headquarters, ifi Marine Amphibious Force, Okinawa, Japan. He returned

to the United States in July 1984 and served as the operations officer of MCCRTG-1O until

February 1986.

Lieutenant General Knutson became the first commanding officer of Marine Fighter Training

Squadron-401 on March 1, 1986. He commanded the squadron during its first two years as it

introduced the Israeli built KFIR aircraft, and stood up as the Marine Corps' first and only

adversary squadron.

In June 1988 he transferred to Washington D.C., where he attended the National War College.

After graduation, he reported to the U.S. Central Command at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla., and

served as chief of the Strategy Branch in the J-5 Plans and Policy Directorate, deploying to Saudi

Arabia at the beginning of Operation DESERT SHIELD.

Lieutenant General Knutson reported to MAWTS-1 during September 1991 and served as the

executive officer until assuming command during May 1992. In June 1994, General Knutson

transferred to Quantico, Va., where he served as the Director, Training and Education Division,

Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Following his tour at Quantico, General

Knutson commanded the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in Okinawa, Japan May 1996 to April 1998.

Lieutenant General Knutson reported to I MEF in May 1998 and served as the Commanding

General until assuming command of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command.

Personal decorations include the Legion of Merit, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal with

Oak Leaf, the Meritorious Service Medal with Gold Star, the Air Medal with Flight Numeral "3",

the Joint Service Commendation Medal, the Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal, and

the Navy Achievement Medal.

47

Force Base, earning Air Force Wings in September 1969. Subsequently, he transferred to Marine

Combat Crew Readiness Training Group Ten (MCCRTG-1O), MCAS Yuma, where he

underwent further training and was designated a Naval Aviator in January 1971. He then did

initial training in the F-4 Phantom and on completion served with the Fleet Marine Force as an

F-4 pilot with Marine Fighter Attack Squadron-323 at MCAS El Toro from September 1971 to

April 1973. His next assignment with VMFA-1 15 included duty in Southeast Asia, Japan, and

the Philippines.

Upon returning to the United States in 1974, he served once again with Marine Aircraft Group

11 at MCAS El Toro. He transferred to Marine Fighter Attack Training Squadron-lOl at MCAS

Yuma during July 1976, where he served as an F-4 Phantom instructor. Upon the initial

activation of Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One during July 1978, he was

selected as an original MAWTS-1 instructor. During this tour, he served as F-4 division head and

as operations officer for the Joint Electronic Warfare/Close Air Support Project. During 1982 he

received the Cunningham Award as the Marine Aviator of the Year.

Following graduation as honor student at Marine Corps Command and Staff College during June

1983, he served with Headquarters, ifi Marine Amphibious Force, Okinawa, Japan. He returned

to the United States in July 1984 and served as the operations officer of MCCRTG-1O until

February 1986.

Lieutenant General Knutson became the first commanding officer of Marine Fighter Training

Squadron-401 on March 1, 1986. He commanded the squadron during its first two years as it

introduced the Israeli built KFIR aircraft, and stood up as the Marine Corps' first and only

adversary squadron.

In June 1988 he transferred to Washington D.C., where he attended the National War College.

After graduation, he reported to the U.S. Central Command at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla., and

served as chief of the Strategy Branch in the J-5 Plans and Policy Directorate, deploying to Saudi

Arabia at the beginning of Operation DESERT SHIELD.

Lieutenant General Knutson reported to MAWTS-1 during September 1991 and served as the

executive officer until assuming command during May 1992. In June 1994, General Knutson

transferred to Quantico, Va., where he served as the Director, Training and Education Division,

Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Following his tour at Quantico, General

Knutson commanded the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in Okinawa, Japan May 1996 to April 1998.

Lieutenant General Knutson reported to I MEF in May 1998 and served as the Commanding

General until assuming command of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command.

Personal decorations include the Legion of Merit, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal with

Oak Leaf, the Meritorious Service Medal with Gold Star, the Air Medal with Flight Numeral "3",

the Joint Service Commendation Medal, the Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal, and

the Navy Achievement Medal.

47
Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper, USMC (Retired)

Lieutenant General Van Riper retired from the United States Marine Corps in October 1997 after

more than 41 years of commissioned and enlisted service. During those years, he served in a

variety of command and staff billets at posts and stations around the world, including seven tours

in the Fleet Marine Force where he commanded at every level from infantry platoon to division.

He participated in or observed combat operations during five tours. As a second lieutenant, he

commanded a platoon in Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic crisis. As a first lieutenant,

he was an advisor to the Republic of Vietnam's Marine Corps. As a captain, he led a rifle

company in Vietnam. As a major, he was a United Nations Observer in the Sinai Desert and

southern Lebanon. As a brigadier general, he served with I Marine Expeditionary Force in

Operation DESERT STORM.

He is a graduate of the Army's Airborne and Ranger Schools, the Marine Corps Amphibious

Warfare School, the Navy's College of Command and Staff, and the Army War College.

In retirement, he continues to participate in an array of defense and security related war games,

seminars and conferences, and he lectures frequently at professional military schools. He also

consults part time for a number of government agencies and commercial firms on defense and

operational matters.

A student of military history, Lieutenant General Van Riper spends his leisure hours reading,

writing, and visiting battlefields

Lieutenant General Van Riper held the Marine Corps University's Donald Bren Chair of

Innovation and Transformation during Academic Year 2005-2006.

Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.

Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. is Executive Director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary

Assessments, an independent policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking

about defense planning and investment strategies for the 21st century. Dr. Krepinevich also

served as a member of the Department of Defense's National Defense Panel.

An accomplished author and lecturer, Dr. Krepinevich has written extensively on a variety of

security related issues, to include articles published in The National Interest, Issues in Science

and Technology, Armed Forces Journal, Joint Forces Quarterly and Strategic Review, among

others. He is also the author of a number of monographs, including The Air Force of 2016, A

New Navy for a New Era, Missed Opportunities: An Assessment of the Roles and Missions

Commission Report, and The Bottom-Up Review: An Assessment.

Dr. Krepinevich has testified on numerous occasions before the Senate Budget Committee, the

House National Security Committee, and the Senate Armed Services Committee. He frequently

contributes to both national and local print and broadcast media, including The Washington Post,

48

Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper, USMC (Retired)

Lieutenant General Van Riper retired from the United States Marine Corps in October 1997 after

more than 41 years of commissioned and enlisted service. During those years, he served in a

variety of command and staff billets at posts and stations around the world, including seven tours

in the Fleet Marine Force where he commanded at every level from infantry platoon to division.

He participated in or observed combat operations during five tours. As a second lieutenant, he

commanded a platoon in Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic crisis. As a first lieutenant,

he was an advisor to the Republic of Vietnam's Marine Corps. As a captain, he led a rifle

company in Vietnam. As a major, he was a United Nations Observer in the Sinai Desert and

southern Lebanon. As a brigadier general, he served with I Marine Expeditionary Force in

Operation DESERT STORM.

He is a graduate of the Army's Airborne and Ranger Schools, the Marine Corps Amphibious

Warfare School, the Navy's College of Command and Staff, and the Army War College.

In retirement, he continues to participate in an array of defense and security related war games,

seminars and conferences, and he lectures frequently at professional military schools. He also

consults part time for a number of government agencies and commercial firms on defense and

operational matters.

A student of military history, Lieutenant General Van Riper spends his leisure hours reading,

writing, and visiting battlefields

Lieutenant General Van Riper held the Marine Corps University's Donald Bren Chair of

Innovation and Transformation during Academic Year 2005-2006.

Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.

Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. is Executive Director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary

Assessments, an independent policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking

about defense planning and investment strategies for the 21st century. Dr. Krepinevich also

served as a member of the Department of Defense's National Defense Panel.

An accomplished author and lecturer, Dr. Krepinevich has written extensively on a variety of

security related issues, to include articles published in The National Interest, Issues in Science

and Technology, Armed Forces Journal, Joint Forces Quarterly and Strategic Review, among

others. He is also the author of a number of monographs, including The Air Force of 2016, A

New Navy for a New Era, Missed Opportunities: An Assessment of the Roles and Missions

Commission Report, and The Bottom-Up Review: An Assessment.

Dr. Krepinevich has testified on numerous occasions before the Senate Budget Committee, the

House National Security Committee, and the Senate Armed Services Committee. He frequently

contributes to both national and local print and broadcast media, including The Washington Post,

48
The Wall Street Journal, The Los Angeles Times, and U.S. News & World Report, and has

appeared on each of the major networks and National Public Radio.

Dr. Krepinevich has lectured before a wide range of professional and academic audiences,

including those at Harvard University, Princeton University, Stanford University, the U.S.

Military Academy, the Naval War College, the George Bush Presidential Library at Texas A&M

University, Europe's Marshall Center, and the Defense Department's "Summer Study," among

many others.

Dr. Krepinevich received the 1987 Furniss Award for his book The Army and Vietnam, a critical

assessment of the service's performance during the war. He gained extensive strategic planning

experience in national security and technology policy through his work in the Department of

Defense's Office of Net Assessment, and by serving on the personal staff of three secretaries of

defense. During this period, Dr. Krepinevich wrote the Defense Department's seminal

assessment of the emerging revolution in military affairs.

He has taught a wide variety of national security and defense policymaking courses while on the

faculties of West Point and George Mason University, and currently lectures at The Johns

Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, and Georgetown University. In

1993, following an Army career that spanned twenty-one years, Dr. Krepinevich retired from

military service to assume the directorship of what is now CSBA.

A graduate of West Point, Dr. Krepinevich holds MPA and PhD degrees from Harvard

University. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. He is married to the former

Julia Ellen Milians. They have three children, Jennifer, Andrew, and Michael.

Dr. Williamson Murray

Williamson Murray graduated from Yale University in 1963 with honors in history. He then

served five years as an officer in the United States Air Force, including a tour in Southeast Asia

with the 314th Tactical Airlift Wing (C-130s). He returned to Yale University where he received

his Ph.D. in military-diplomatic history, working under Hans Gatzke and Donald Kagan. He

taught two years in the Yale history department before moving on to Ohio State University in fall

1977 as a military and diplomatic historian. He received the Alunmi Distinguished Teaching

Award in 1987. He took early retirement from Ohio State in 1995 as Professor Emeritus of

History.

Professor Murray has taught at a number of other institutions, including the Air War College, the

United States Military Academy, and the Naval War College. He has also served as a Secretary

of the Navy Fellow at the Navy War College, the Centennial Visiting Professor at the London

School of Economics, the Matthew C. Horner Professor of Military Theory at the Marine Corps

University, the Charles Lindbergh Chair at the Smithsonian's Air and Space Museum, and the

Harold K. Johnson Professor of Military History at the Army War College. At present he is a

49

The Wall Street Journal, The Los Angeles Times, and U.S. News & World Report, and has

appeared on each of the major networks and National Public Radio.

Dr. Krepinevich has lectured before a wide range of professional and academic audiences,

including those at Harvard University, Princeton University, Stanford University, the U.S.

Military Academy, the Naval War College, the George Bush Presidential Library at Texas A&M

University, Europe's Marshall Center, and the Defense Department's "Summer Study," among

many others.

Dr. Krepinevich received the 1987 Furniss Award for his book The Army and Vietnam, a critical

assessment of the service's performance during the war. He gained extensive strategic planning

experience in national security and technology policy through his work in the Department of

Defense's Office of Net Assessment, and by serving on the personal staff of three secretaries of

defense. During this period, Dr. Krepinevich wrote the Defense Department's seminal

assessment of the emerging revolution in military affairs.

He has taught a wide variety of national security and defense policymaking courses while on the

faculties of West Point and George Mason University, and currently lectures at The Johns

Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, and Georgetown University. In

1993, following an Army career that spanned twenty-one years, Dr. Krepinevich retired from

military service to assume the directorship of what is now CSBA.

A graduate of West Point, Dr. Krepinevich holds MPA and PhD degrees from Harvard

University. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. He is married to the former

Julia Ellen Milians. They have three children, Jennifer, Andrew, and Michael.

Dr. Williamson Murray

Williamson Murray graduated from Yale University in 1963 with honors in history. He then

served five years as an officer in the United States Air Force, including a tour in Southeast Asia

with the 314th Tactical Airlift Wing (C-130s). He returned to Yale University where he received

his Ph.D. in military-diplomatic history, working under Hans Gatzke and Donald Kagan. He

taught two years in the Yale history department before moving on to Ohio State University in fall

1977 as a military and diplomatic historian. He received the Alunmi Distinguished Teaching

Award in 1987. He took early retirement from Ohio State in 1995 as Professor Emeritus of

History.

Professor Murray has taught at a number of other institutions, including the Air War College, the

United States Military Academy, and the Naval War College. He has also served as a Secretary

of the Navy Fellow at the Navy War College, the Centennial Visiting Professor at the London

School of Economics, the Matthew C. Horner Professor of Military Theory at the Marine Corps

University, the Charles Lindbergh Chair at the Smithsonian's Air and Space Museum, and the

Harold K. Johnson Professor of Military History at the Army War College. At present he is a

49
Senior Fellow at the Institute of Defense Analysis and the Class of 1957 Professor of Naval

History and Heritage at the United States Naval Academy

Professor Murray has written a wide selection of articles and books. He is the author of The

Change in the European Balance of Power, 1938-1 939, The Path to Ruin (Princeton University

Press, 1984); Luftwaffe (Nautical and Aviation Press, 1985); German Military Effectiveness

(Nautical and Aviation Press, 1992); The Air War in the Persian Gulf (Nautical and Aviation

Press, 1995); and Air War, 1914-1 945 (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1999). He has edited with

Allan Millett a number of books on the implications of the past for current military thinking:

Military Effectiveness, three volumes (Allen and Unwin, 1988); Calculations, Net Assessment

and the Coming of World War II (Free Press, 1992); and Military Innovations in the Interwar

Period (Cambridge, 1996). Professor Murray has also edited with MacGregor Knox, The

Making of Strategy, Rulers, States, and War (Cambridge University Press, 1994) and The

Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050 (Cambridge, University Press, 2001). Professors

Murray and Millett have published (May 2000) an operational history of World War II, A War

To Be Won, Fighting the Second World War with Harvard University Press, which already has

received rave reviews from a number of newspapers and journals, including The Wall Street

Journal, The Times Literary Supplement, The Naval War College Review, The Journal of

Military History, and Strategic Review. Professor Murray's most recent books, The Iraq War, A

Military History (Harvard University Press, 2003), written with Major General Robert Scales, Jr.,

and The Past as Prologue, The Importance of Military History to the Military Profession, edited

with Richard Hart Sinnreich (Cambridge, 2006) and have also received excellent reviews.

Some of Professor Murray's most recently published articles include: "Clausewitz Out,

Computer In, Military Culture and Technological Hubris," The National Interest, Summer 1997;

"Air War in the Persian Gulf: The Limits of Air Power," Strategic Reviw, Winter 1998;

"Preparing to Lose the Next War?," Strategic Review, Fall 1998; "Does Military Culture

Matter?," Orbis, Winter 1999; "The Emerging Strategic Environment, An Historian's View,"

Strategic Review, Spring 1999; "Military Culture Matters," Strategic Review, Summer 1999; and

"Military Experimentation in the Interwar Period," Joint Forces Quarterly, spring 2000. At

present besides working as a defense consultant in Washington, he is working on a book dealing

with the military history of the American Civil War.

50

Senior Fellow at the Institute of Defense Analysis and the Class of 1957 Professor of Naval

History and Heritage at the United States Naval Academy

Professor Murray has written a wide selection of articles and books. He is the author of The

Change in the European Balance of Power, 1938-1 939, The Path to Ruin (Princeton University

Press, 1984); Luftwaffe (Nautical and Aviation Press, 1985); German Military Effectiveness

(Nautical and Aviation Press, 1992); The Air War in the Persian Gulf (Nautical and Aviation

Press, 1995); and Air War, 1914-1 945 (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1999). He has edited with

Allan Millett a number of books on the implications of the past for current military thinking:

Military Effectiveness, three volumes (Allen and Unwin, 1988); Calculations, Net Assessment

and the Coming of World War II (Free Press, 1992); and Military Innovations in the Interwar

Period (Cambridge, 1996). Professor Murray has also edited with MacGregor Knox, The

Making of Strategy, Rulers, States, and War (Cambridge University Press, 1994) and The

Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050 (Cambridge, University Press, 2001). Professors

Murray and Millett have published (May 2000) an operational history of World War II, A War

To Be Won, Fighting the Second World War with Harvard University Press, which already has

received rave reviews from a number of newspapers and journals, including The Wall Street

Journal, The Times Literary Supplement, The Naval War College Review, The Journal of

Military History, and Strategic Review. Professor Murray's most recent books, The Iraq War, A

Military History (Harvard University Press, 2003), written with Major General Robert Scales, Jr.,

and The Past as Prologue, The Importance of Military History to the Military Profession, edited

with Richard Hart Sinnreich (Cambridge, 2006) and have also received excellent reviews.

Some of Professor Murray's most recently published articles include: "Clausewitz Out,

Computer In, Military Culture and Technological Hubris," The National Interest, Summer 1997;

"Air War in the Persian Gulf: The Limits of Air Power," Strategic Reviw, Winter 1998;

"Preparing to Lose the Next War?," Strategic Review, Fall 1998; "Does Military Culture

Matter?," Orbis, Winter 1999; "The Emerging Strategic Environment, An Historian's View,"

Strategic Review, Spring 1999; "Military Culture Matters," Strategic Review, Summer 1999; and

"Military Experimentation in the Interwar Period," Joint Forces Quarterly, spring 2000. At

present besides working as a defense consultant in Washington, he is working on a book dealing

with the military history of the American Civil War.

50
Fathers of Marine Corps

Professional Military Education

I I General Alfred M. Gray

Major General James C.

Breckinridge

1