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97–193 2016

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–51] 

USAF BOMBER FORCE STRUCTURE— 

CURRENT REQUIREMENTS AND 

FUTURE VISION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND 

PROJECTION FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

SEPTEMBER 29, 2015 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Vice Chair 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

BRUCE JOHNSON, Professional Staff Member 

PHIL MACNAUGHTON, Professional Staff Member 

KATHERINE REMBER, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces ........................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Bunch, Lt Gen Arnold W., USAF, Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, U.S. Air Force ............................... 3 

Rand, Gen Robin, USAF, Commander, Air Force Global Strike Command ....... 2 

Walden, Randall G., Director, Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office, Office 

of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force .................. 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Bunch, Lt Gen Arnold W., joint with Randall G. Walden ............................. 36 

Courtney, Hon. Joe, a Representative from Connecticut, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces ............................ 25 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 23 

Rand, Gen Robin ............................................................................................... 27 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Two charts titled Air Force Availability, Bombers ........................................ 51 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 55 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 55 

(1) 

USAF BOMBER FORCE STRUCTURE—CURRENT 

REQUIREMENTS AND FUTURE VISION 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, September 29, 2015. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:30 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. FORBES. Good afternoon. And today the subcommittee is 

going to meet to discuss the future of Air Force long-range strike— 

current requirements and future vision. We thank you all for being 

here. 

We know that we are going to have some votes that are going 

to come up relatively soon, so Mr. Courtney and I have both agreed 

that we are going to submit our opening statements for the record 

to save that amount of time and go right to our testimony from our 

witnesses. 

So let me thank you, all three, for being here and all of your staff 

for the hard work that they continually do. 

Before we start, I need to just get a motion on the record. I ask 

unanimous consent that non-subcommittee members be allowed to 

participate in today’s hearing after all subcommittee members have 

had an opportunity to ask questions. Is there an objection? 

Seeing none, the members will be recognized at the appropriate 

time for 5 minutes, the non-subcommittee members. 

And, with that, we are delighted to have with us General Robin 

Rand, the Commander of the Air Force Global Strike Command; 

Lieutenant General Arnold W. Bunch, Jr., the Military Deputy to 

the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition; and Mr. 

Randall G. Walden, Director of the Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office. 

So, gentlemen, thank you all for being here. 

Mr. Courtney, do you have any comments you would like to 

make? 

Mr. Courtney says no. 

So, with that, General, are you going to start off, or how are we 

going to proceed? 

General RAND. Sir, that is great. I would be happy to. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. Then we thank you, and the floor is yours. 
2 

[The prepared statements of Mr. Forbes and Mr. Courtney can 

be found in the Appendix beginning on page 23.] 

STATEMENT OF GEN ROBIN RAND, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR 

FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND 

General RAND. Thank you. 

Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Courtney, distinguished 

members of the committee, thank you very much for allowing me 

to appear before you to represent the men and women of Air Force 

Global Strike Command. 

First, let me say that our airmen of the Air Force Global Strike 

Command are doing a fantastic job providing effective nuclear and 

conventional global strike forces for our combatant commanders 

and our Nation. A key to our success will be our ability to modernize, sustain, and recapitalize our bomber forces. 

In addition to our ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] forces, 

Air Force Global Strike is currently responsible for the B–52 and 

the B–2 bombers. As you know, the B–52 serves as the Nation’s 

most versatile and diverse weapons system in the command by providing precise and timely long-range strike capabilities. Meanwhile, 

the B–2 can penetrate an adversary’s most advanced integrated air 

defense system to strike heavily defended targets. 

And I am happy to report that in 2 days Air Force Global Strike 

Command will assume responsibility for the B–1 Lancer mission 

and the airmen who operate, maintain, and support this proven 

warhorse. The B–1s have been actively engaged in the Southwest 

Asia theater, flying over 14,000 combat missions since September 

11, 2001. We look forward to incorporating this important platform 

in the Air Force Global Strike Command so we can learn from their 

recent experience and share best practices across our forces. 

However, modernization and sustainment can take us only so 

far, so we look forward. And with the LRS–B [Long-Range Strike 

Bomber], that future looks promising. The LRS–B will extend 

American air dominance against next-generation capabilities in an 

anti-access environment by its long range, significant payload, and 

survivability. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you again for the opportunity to 

appear before the committee to discuss Air Force Global Strike 

Command and our bomber force structure. And I look forward to 

your questions. 

And, sir, with your permission, I would like to have my written 

testimony entered into the record. 

[The prepared statement of General Rand can be found in the 

Appendix on page 27.] 

Mr. FORBES. Without objection, all of the written testimony of 

our witnesses will be made part of the record today. 

So thank you, General, and—— 

General RAND. Yes, sir. Thank you. 

Mr. FORBES [continuing]. Thank you for your service to our country. 

General Bunch. 
3 

STATEMENT OF LT GEN ARNOLD W. BUNCH, USAF, MILITARY 

DEPUTY, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE 

AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION, U.S. AIR FORCE 

General BUNCH. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Courtney, and 

the rest of the distinguished ladies and gentlemen of the committee, thank you for this opportunity. And thank you for your support of the United States Air Force, and thank you for your service. 

We look forward to discussing with this subcommittee the modernization of the current bomber fleet and our efforts to bring the 

Long-Range Strike Bomber into our Air Force inventory. 

As I begin, because the Long-Range Strike Bomber is a classified 

program and is in source selection, there will be matters that we 

will not be able to discuss today. Source selection specifics, detailed 

design or capability information, and anything deemed classified or 

that could potentially jeopardize the integrity of the ongoing source 

selection will not be discussed. Thank you in advance for your understanding. 

As the military deputy to the Air Force’s service acquisition executive, I would like to highlight that the Long-Range Strike Bomber 

is the foundation of the Air Force’s future long-range strike capability. 

As we develop this advanced Long-Range Strike Bomber capability, we are and will continue to modernize the legacy bomber 

fleets—the B–1, the B–2, and B–52—to ensure they remain viable 

platforms, providing critical warfighting capabilities to the combatant commanders in support of the national military strategy far 

into the future. It is crucial that we continue the modernization of 

our current platforms until such time as we have sufficient numbers of Long-Range Strike Bomber aircraft in the inventory. 

The Air Force has invested heavily in a number of advanced capabilities over the past 30 years as we have pushed to keep a technology advantage across the spectrum of conflict. We are capitalizing on those investments to enable the development and fielding 

of the Long-Range Strike Bomber to be executed with reasonable 

risk and at an affordable cost. In short, the Long-Range Strike 

Bomber program is leveraging our technological achievements and 

lessons learned to reduce risks and achieve affordability. 

And when we discuss affordability, we are not simply focused on 

developing and procuring the Long-Range Strike Bomber. Our 

focus throughout the program has been on the lifecycle cost of the 

platform. It is not enough to simply acquire them; we must also be 

able to afford to operate and sustain them. 

Additionally, we have built in an appropriate level of adaptability 

through design margin and open systems. The threat and the state 

of technology are not stationary. The steps we have taken to build 

in margin and open systems up front will allow us to address the 

evolving threat and embrace technological advancements. 

As we establish the initial capability, we have, are, and will continue to carefully balance the art of the possible with the art of the 

practical. We are and will continue to keep a watchful eye towards 

the future and adapt the platform to meet emerging and evolving 

threats. This balance has been at the forefront of the program from 

the very beginning and remains a cornerstone of the strategy 

today. 
4 

The Long-Range Strike Bomber is crucial to our ability to execute the national military strategy in the future and ensure national command authorities have viable military options in the face 

of a technologically advanced adversary. 

I would now like to turn this over to Mr. Randy Walden to speak 

about the Long-Range Strike Bomber program, given his perspective as the program executive officer. 

Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to address 

you and the committee today, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Bunch and Mr. Walden 

can be found in the Appendix on page 36.] 

Mr. FORBES. General, thank you. 

Mr. Walden, it is good to see you here, and thank you. The floor 

is yours. 

STATEMENT OF RANDALL G. WALDEN, DIRECTOR, AIR FORCE 

RAPID CAPABILITIES OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 

Mr. WALDEN. Thank you, sir. It is good to be back, and good to 

see you. 

Mr. Chairman, Representative Courtney, and members of the 

subcommittee, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to address the subcommittee on the Long-Range Strike Bomber program, the future leg of the Air Force’s long-range strike capability. 

As the program’s executive officer, I would like to highlight some 

of the things the Air Force has done to ensure the success of the 

LRS–B program. 

From the very start, we have had Secretary of Defense guidance 

on the fundamental capabilities required for the Nation, and our 

Chief of Staff continues to serve as the requirements owner. 

Additionally, the program office and the user personnel have 

been working side by side in the same office since the very beginning of the program. This unique teaming has helped define the 

trade space and formed the right requirements for the program and 

capability. We drastically slashed the bureaucracy normally involved in getting a program to stable requirements—a key component in allowing us to snap the chalk line on the requirements 

early in the program planning. 

From an acquisition oversight standpoint, the program is important enough to this Nation where the program manager and his 

team continue to work directly with Air Force and DOD [Department of Defense] acquisition senior leaders at the highest level to 

set and execute the program strategy from day one. 

Overall, the LRS–B will provide a key capability to the joint 

fight. Often we start new programs and overreach when it comes 

to the number of new capabilities and, quote, ‘‘bleeding-edge technology’’ that must come together in development. Early on, we recognized that LRS–B is a part of a larger family of systems, and we 

put only mature capabilities on LRS–B as opposed to every-goodidea technology. In short, it does not have to be everything for everyone. 

More succinctly, we have a family of systems in the joint arena 

that serves as the centerpiece for the joint warfighting capability. 

As such, we have crafted the LRS–B program strategy and capa-
5 

bility to complement those capabilities while keeping affordability 

at the forefront. 

Finally, the Long-Range Strike Bomber program will be built as 

a capability for today with an eye on tomorrow, both from a threat 

and evolving technology perspective. The Open Mission Systems 

[OMS] approach that General Bunch brought up not only introduces evolving capability with greater ease and lower integration 

cost, it serves as the catalyst for greater competition throughout 

the life of the LRS–B program. This, in turn, presents a greater 

value for our Air Force and our Nation. 

It is an honor to serve alongside our great airmen and this great 

Nation. Thank you for the opportunity to be with you here today, 

and I look forward to addressing your questions. Thank you, sir. 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Walden and General Bunch 

can be found in the Appendix on page 36.] 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Walden, thank you so much for being here. 

And, General Rand, two questions for you, one a little more difficult than the other one. But the first one, I thought it would be 

good for our record if you could take just a moment and tell us 

what Global Strike Command does, you know, under your authority. 

And then the second part of that is, according to the Quarterly 

Readiness Report—and we are going to have a slide up here in just 

a moment—bomber force aircraft availability is around 50 percent. 

Can you explain to the committee what the contributing factors 

to this low level of readiness are and what your plan is to regain 

higher levels of readiness and when we can expect that? 

[The slides referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning 

on page 51.] 

General RAND. Yes, sir. Thank you. 

The first thing, the Global Strike Command started in 2009, and 

it was an effort to, again, refocus our attention back on nuclear deterrence in the nuclear enterprise. 

And so, when Strategic Air Command was put to rest back in 

1990, we made a decision then to put our bombers in Air Combat 

Command; we put our missiles, our ICBM missiles, in Space Command; we put our air refueling tankers in Air Mobility Command. 

And, in 2009, we brought back Air Force Global Strike Command. And we are responsible for the bombers now—I told you the 

B–1 has become part of that—so all our bombers, conventional and 

nuclear, Global Strike, and our ICBM, intercontinental ballistic 

missiles, are now in Global Strike Command. And so we work—our 

top priority is to support Admiral Haney and Strategic Command 

at Offutt and his priorities. 

So I think that is a thumbnail sketch of what Global Strike Command does. 

The other thing, sir, that I will tell you, our refocus is to help 

to, I think, reinvigorate the nuclear command and control communications that are an integral part of providing nuclear command 

and control for the President and our senior leaders. And Global 

Strike will be the lead for the Air Force on those systems that support nuclear command and control, and so that will be an increasingly top priority for this command. 
6 

The question you asked about aircraft availability, if I can make 

a distinction between aircraft availability and mission capable rate. 

In aircraft availability, it is all the planes in a weapons system, 

whether they are on the flight line or they are in some type of 

depot status. And that is important to note. It is all the planes, 

those that are—the maintainers and the flyers have access to and 

those that are out of our pocket for whatever reason. 

Mission capable rate is the planes that are on station that, actually, you have your availability to. And those rates are different. 

Our mission capable rates are decent and comparable with most of 

the other weapons systems that we have. 

But aircraft availability, as you said, languishes a little bit. And 

part of the major reason for that is our relatively small fleet size 

that we have of our three bombers. Sir, we have 159 total bombers. 

Break that down to 76 B–52s, we have 63 B–1s, and we have 20 

B–2s. At any time—and, oh, by the way, the newest of the three 

bombers is the B–2, and it is 25 years old. 

So, at any time, there is going to be a number of your aircraft 

that are in heavy maintenance depot status. And when you take 

those away, and then you are doing modifications, a 50 percent aircraft available rate is what—you know, is the result of that small 

number. In the B–2 example, we have about 11 or 12 airplanes at 

any time that we really can have our hands on. 

Some of the steps that we are taking, sir, to work this will be— 

long range will be the LRS–B, because that will help our numbers 

and we will have a larger number of airplanes. The other thing 

that we are working with is, some of these modernization and recapitalization efforts are directly looking to be more efficient and 

to address some of the challenges that we have with obsolete weapons systems platforms—the radar, the avionics. And by modernizing these, we are going to be able to have a much higher mean 

time between failures, if you will. 

And so those are the steps that we are taking. And I am working 

those right now, and I will be able to address some of those later 

on, if you would like, in the hearing, what are some of the modernization efforts that are currently underway in all three platforms. And I have a laundry list of things that I can share with 

you, if you would like. 

Mr. FORBES. General Bunch, the committee has been expecting 

an announcement on the new long-range strike aircraft for over 6 

months. The delay already resulted in a $460 million reduction 

from the program in the fiscal year 2016 President’s budget. 

Can you explain the continued delay for the down-select announcement? And when can the committee expect reasonably that 

that decision is going to be made? 

General BUNCH. Yes, sir. So this is a case, sir, where we need 

to go slow to go fast. 

We have a fair, deliberate, disciplined, and impartial process 

anytime that we do a competition. And we have been transparent 

in working with industry and trying to get this thoroughly done 

and documented so that we can make that decision. 

It is coming soon. That is about as good as I can give you. The 

way we are approaching this: it is not schedule-driven. It is fact- 
7 

and decision-point-driven based on the information we have and 

the review that we have of the proposals. 

We are being very thorough. I am very proud of the team. I believe when this comes out it will be a very good news story for how 

our acquisition workforce has done this, despite the fact that it has 

taken us longer to get here. 

And then, as the announcement approaches, sir, we will inform 

committee leadership just prior to when we make the announcement so everyone is aware. 

Mr. FORBES. Do we have any idea whether that is going to be 

2 months, 10 years? What do we think? 

General BUNCH. Sir, my hope is it is within the next couple of 

months. But we have details that we still have to work through to 

make sure we are doing it fair and make sure we are going through 

the process so that—we have to get the start right. If we get the 

start right, we set the program up for success the rest of the way. 

That is the part we are so focused on, is trying to get that right, 

right now, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. 

Mr. Walden, one more question I need to get on the record. The 

Air Force misstated the 10-year cost for research, procurement, and 

support of its long-range bomber in its annual report to Congress. 

Last year, the Air Force estimated the cost of the Long-Range 

Strike Bomber at $33.1 billion from fiscal year 2015 through fiscal 

year 2016. This year, it reported the fiscal year 2016 through fiscal 

year 2026 cost is $58.4 billion. Air Force stated both were incorrect 

and posited that $41.7 billion is the real number. 

How confident are you that we have the cost in control for this 

platform now? 

Mr. WALDEN. Sir, very confident. The program office has estimated over the handful of years, and fiscal year 2015 was the start 

of that. And that program office estimate was at $41.4 billion, and 

fiscal year 2016 was at $41.7 billion. So the overall cost estimating 

of the program has been very stable, and I am very confident in 

the ability for us to do that estimating. 

On top of that, we have been working closely with the non-advocate folks within the Air Force, as well as OSD [Office of Secretary 

of Defense], on doing independent cost estimates. And that is the 

foundation of that overall estimate. 

For the air portion, General Bunch has been working closely with 

the Air Staff to get to the process and the air story, and he is probably best suited to answer that question. 

General BUNCH. So, Mr. Chairman, that is a regrettable error, 

that we submitted inaccurate information to Congress in a report. 

We take that very seriously. We know the importance of providing 

decision makers accurate information. 

And, as a result of that, Secretary James ordered a review of the 

process that we have within the Air Force and to do a thorough review of our processes and how those databases and how those information were collected. 

It was both a process and a human error. We have counseled the 

individuals who were involved in the creation of the report. We 

have put new business guidelines in place for how we use the databases and how the program office estimates are rolled into those 
8 

databases for how business is done in the future and what we provide. And we have also established new processes to ensure that 

those numbers are reviewed by additional parties that have an interest in that to minimize the possibility that we will provide again 

inaccurate information. 

And, again, a regrettable error, one that we are not happy about. 

We take it very seriously, and we understand the critical importance of providing the proper information to Congress. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

And, as we talked about earlier, they have called some votes at 

this particular point in time. We are going to have to take a recess 

in just a minute and come back. 

But, Mr. Courtney, did you want to start some of your questions? 

Or would you rather wait and get them all in when we come back? 

Go ahead. 

We will let Mr. Courtney begin—— 

Mr. COURTNEY. Great. 

Mr. FORBES [continuing]. And then we will take a recess and 

come back afterwards. 

Mr. COURTNEY. So thank you to the witnesses for being here and 

your outstanding testimony. 

General Rand, you just mentioned briefly in your opening remarks the 14,000 missions that have been flown in Southwest Asia. 

I was wondering, just for the sake of members who, you know, 

maybe aren’t as familiar with the type of missions that the longrange bomber provides in terms of, you know, support for ground 

forces or whatever, what would be the harm or, you know, what 

impact would it be if we didn’t have that capability and just had 

to rely on other fixed-wing types of planes that the Air Force flies? 

Because, obviously, there is a big investment we are looking at 

here, and I think it is important to establish, you know, what is 

the value here—— 

General RAND. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COURTNEY [continuing]. That we are really talking about, 

very specifically. 

General RAND. Absolutely. 

The three bombers, as you mentioned, two of the three are 

nuclear- and conventional-capable. The B–1 is conventional only. 

But, in general, the purpose of long-range strike with a bomber is 

to be able to hold any target in the planet at risk, not in weeks 

or months, but in hours. And that is the beauty of what a longrange bomber can do. 

We don’t have to be as concerned with some of the basing options 

that you would have to be. We can go a long way with a decent 

payload, and we can—and hold targets at risk. We also are recallable. We also are flexible in their surge capability. 

So long-range strike gives combatant commanders and our senior 

leaders in this Nation great flexibility to make sure that we are 

able to, when necessary, deter and, equally important, to assure 

many of our partner nations that we are there with them. 

Some recent examples, if I may, sir. The B–1s right now are 

fighting and have been fighting over the skies of Afghanistan, Iraq, 

and Syria for the last 12, 13 years, nonstop, 24/7, doing a remarkable job at a low threat, not much of an anti-access environment, 
9 

and working very closely with our Army, Navy, Marines, and the 

airmen on the ground who are engaged in ground combat. And they 

have done that very successfully. 

They also have the capability to go long ranges. And a recent example of that was March of 2011 when they took off from Ellsworth in a driving snowstorm and flew nonstop to Libya and were 

able to do some very, very serious damage to the Libyan regime at 

the time; as well as exactly what the B–2s did in 2011 against Qadhafi. 

Most recently, in North Korea, when there was a flare-up back 

in August, we had our six B–52s that have been on a continuous 

bomber presence at Guam for the last decade nonstop. And we 

were in the middle of a swap-out; six were going in to replace the 

six that were there. And the PACOM [Pacific Command] commander immediately contacted the Joint Staff and Air Force Global 

Strike and said, ‘‘Could we leave those six additional B–52s longer? 

We really like the presence.’’ 

In addition, the B–52s and B–2s two years ago flew a nonstop 

trip from their bases to the Republic of Korea, released training 

ordnances on one of the ranges, and flew back nonstop. 

I think that gives a perspective on how we can hold enemies at 

risk in, again, hours versus weeks. Did I answer your question? 

Mr. COURTNEY. Yes. Thank you. 

General RAND. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Members, we are going to take a recess till after the 

votes. We will come back, we will pick up with Mr. Courtney’s 

questions, and then move on to the other questions we have. 

Gentlemen, again, we apologize, but thank you for your patience. 

And, with that, we stand in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. FORBES. We thank you for your patience in allowing us to 

get through those votes. 

And when we left, Mr. Courtney was in the process of asking 

some of his questions, so we yield the floor once again to Mr. 

Courtney for any questions he might have. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, General, for your answers. 

And so one other question. Our subcommittee actually has been 

dealing a lot with the Air National Guard modernization in terms 

of trying to comply with the 2020 international, you know, flight 

restrictions that are going into effect. And I was just sort of wondering if you could talk about that, whether that is an issue. I 

mean, obviously, these are old planes which long predate some of 

these new rules going into effect. 

And is that something that you have already started to change, 

in terms of the avionics? Or is that something that, sort of, is still 

out there in the future? 

General BUNCH. So, sir, I will take the first stab at that. 

I think one of the ones you are talking about there is the 130 

modernization, C–130 modernization, and the AMP [Avionics Modernization Program] program. 

And where we are at on the AMP program is that we have reinvigorated and revived it. We have built a roadmap ahead that is 

funded through the Air Force, through the FYDP [Future Years 
10 

Defense Program]. It is focused on three main areas. The first area 

is focused on safety. The second—and obsolescence. The second 

area is focused on compliance with those mandates that you have 

talked about. And the last of those is focused on modernization. 

The program that we have laid out, the Guard, Reserve, and the 

Active are all on board. And we have a program that—— 

Mr. COURTNEY. And I apologize. So I guess my question is, is this 

something that the bomber fleet has to deal with, as well? 

General BUNCH. There are certain things that we have to look 

at in a roadmap for what we do with our IFF, information friend 

or foe, activities. Those are all laid in to what we are looking at 

for the plan, sir. We don’t see a roadblock there for what we are 

trying to do. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentlelady from Missouri is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen. 

And it was so nice to meet you, General Rand, the other night 

at the Evening Tattoo, the celebration of the birthday of the Air 

Force. I highly recommend that to any member of HASC [House 

Armed Services Committee] and certainly was very proud to get to 

be a part of that and proud of the Air Force. And, of course, we 

are so proud of what is going on in Whiteman [Air Force Base] and 

appreciate your support of that. 

Just wanted to—you were talking about parts sustainability. And 

this has been, of course, a huge issue ever since I have been in office with the B–2, with only having 20. And I know that there have 

been many gains made in that, but we still have a ways to go 

there. 

And this is just, kind of, outside the box. I was reading in your 

testimony about the difficulty in trying to keep manufacturers and 

others interested in carrying out those contracts. I was just reading 

last week, being a part of this subcommittee, some information the 

chairman and others provided about the Navy and how they are integrating 3D parts building in their naval vessels to help address 

some of their things. 

I recently toured the National Security Campus in Kansas City. 

That is a pretty amazing place. And they were showing me the 3D 

parts development and manufacturing that they are doing there 

and how it is producing lighter, cheaper, faster parts. 

So I was just wondering, are you aware if this has been tried any 

in the B–2, as we look at manufacturers that are dropping out from 

being willing to—you know, maybe having our own production in 

certain parts? 

General BUNCH. So, ma’am, I will—we are looking and the Air 

Force Sustainment Center does look at adaptive manufacturing or 

3D manufacturing, and we have not found a lot of applicability to 

what we are trying to do—— 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. 

General BUNCH [continuing]. At this particular moment. 

You do raise a very good point that I think is important as we 

look at the Long-Range Strike Bomber. One of the issues we have 

had with the B–2 fleet is the small size of the fleet and trying to 
11 

get people to bid when you are trying to build parts for those 

things. 

And I think we have come out and said we need 100 of the LongRange Strike Bombers. That is the position that we bid on with. 

And as we have tried to do competitions to get people to bid on 20, 

it is often hard to do when manufacturing companies want to bid 

on hundreds or thousands. 

We believe keeping the right Long-Range Strike Bomber fleet 

size will make that more easily competed and more sustainable in 

the longer term, ma’am. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Absolutely. And I support that. I think most of 

us understand the mistake that was made in dropping down those 

numbers to only 20. So I am hopeful we will be able to carry out 

those larger numbers. 

Are there ever incentives paid to those companies, I mean, to 

get—you know, to stay in business, to keep those parts? 

General BUNCH. We do those. Sometimes we will do life-of-aircraft buys. So we will go look at certain components, and we will 

figure out how many we think we will go through through the life 

of the platform. And we may even buy larger quantities and put 

them back on the shelf so that we can do it. 

Another area that we are looking at in the B–2 to try to improve 

the parts flow is we are trying to bring some things in organic. 

And the other one that we talked about earlier and we have referenced is the Open Mission Systems. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Right. 

General BUNCH. As we move to more Open Mission Systems— 

and that is a focus area that we have across our inventory. As we 

move to the more Open Mission Systems, that will allow us, even 

at the some of those subcomponent levels, to be able to compete additional—more than we can today. 

So we think there are some avenues we are doing where we try 

to do it organically within our workforce. We are also trying to 

open it up to more competition as we go to more Open Mission Systems. And sometimes, ma’am, we get to the point we have to do 

a life-of-the-platform buy. We estimate what the economic service 

life of the aircraft is, and we will buy the number of parts we think 

we will run through for the life of the program. 

That is the efforts that we have, ma’am, on—— 

Mrs. HARTZLER. I appreciate you, General Bunch, for sharing 

that. 

I want to switch gears real quickly, but, as you know, reportedly, 

China and Russia are developing new radars or defense systems 

that—other capabilities—to counter our stealthy aircraft. And, certainly, that is a concern. 

So how do you see the Air Force maintaining this ability to penetrate A2/AD [anti-access/area denial] environments to perform 

long-range strike operations as anti-stealth technologies mature 

over time? 

General BUNCH. So, ma’am, the adaptability that we built in, 

with the Open Mission Systems and the innovative design that we 

have envisioned and the requirements we put in place for the 

Long-Range Strike Bomber, we have the adaptability we need with 

the Open Mission System. 
12 

So if we run into it—and we realize the enemy is going to evolve, 

and they are going to try to get—they watch us, and they are 

adapting to address what we are trying to do. 

So the Open Mission System allows us, as that changes, we can 

add in new capabilities that are not in the platform today, or we 

can replace the capabilities or the subsystems that we have in the 

aircraft today with more advanced ones to try to—to ensure—not 

try to—to ensure that we have the ability to address those future 

threats. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Great. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Graham, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you very much for being here today. 

As we discuss and we have been discussing in quite a few hearings the challenges we face with our aging fleets, is there a way 

to possibly consider the weapons themselves and using technology 

to modernize the weapons systems that could potentially help with 

this challenge that we face? 

General BUNCH. So, ma’am, we are looking at the longer term for 

what we are doing with our weapons inventories. 

One of the programs that is in—not even officially—it is one we 

have talked about but it has not fully been formed as a program— 

is a long-range standoff weapon [LRSO]. That is to replace our airlaunched cruise missiles. The air-launched cruise missiles were 

weapons systems that were bought and procured in the 1980s with 

a 10-year life expectancy that we have done service-life extension 

programs for multiple years. Now what we are focused on is how 

do we replace that, because we are not going to be able to extend 

them much longer. So we are initiating a program to allow us to 

be able to hold targets at risk in that manner. 

That is one thing, but it is not fully capable of doing what we 

need the Long-Range Strike Bomber to do, which is to penetrate 

and hold all those targets at risk and give our national command 

authorities the flexibility to execute military options if needed. 

Ms. GRAHAM. General Rand, did you have anything to add? 

General RAND. Yes, ma’am. The LRSO is one example, but another would be on the B–52. It is carrying all the newest and latest 

and greatest weapons that we have now, and, in fact, it is currently 

undergoing an upgrade and modification to an internal weapons 

bay. It is called the 1760 Integrated Weapons Bay Upgrade. That 

is going to allow to carry internally our most modern weapons that 

we have—our JASSM [Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile], our 

JDAM [Joint Direct Attack Munition]. That will help carry a larger 

payload and also reduce the drag from having it externally hanging 

on the airplane. 

So those are some of the very things that we are modernizing. 

Even though it is a 60-year weapons frame, we are putting the best 

weapons that we have on it, and it is capable of carrying it. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Well, thank you. 

And I just want to thank all of you. And I am so proud to represent Tyndall Air Force Base and a small little piece of Eglin, as 
13 

well, in north Florida. And thank you very much for what you all 

do to serve our country. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. 

General RAND. You are welcome. Thank you. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentlelady yields back the balance of her time. 

The gentlelady from Hawaii is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I wonder if you can speak to how the LRS–B acquisition program, as you see it, differs from other programs that we have seen 

in the past that have experienced really massive cost overruns. 

And what have you learned from the past that will prevent that 

from occurring with this? 

Mr. WALDEN. So two big things up front: one, stable requirements; and then the mature technology out there. 

The most important thing now is to be able to integrate that 

technology that would be the highest risk to the overall program, 

and I think we have that pretty much under control. 

The overall program’s engineering and manufacturing development program would buy down that risk. For the past 4 years, we 

have been working closely with the offerors, contractors, and industry on buying down that risk and investing heavily and making 

sure that we are not putting any immature technology in there and 

adding more risk than we need or cost to the overall program. 

General BUNCH. Ma’am, can I add to that just one item? I think 

there are a couple of other things that, through ‘‘Better Buying 

Power’’ and ‘‘Bending the Cost Curve,’’ those are initiatives within 

the OSD and within the Air Force that plays into this. And one of 

those is our open and transparent relationship with our industry 

partners. 

We have had a very open discussion with them about what the 

requirements are, how we were going to grade, what was going to 

be looked at in the source selection. And I believe that openness 

and sharing of information has allowed them to fully understand 

what we are trying to do, what risks we are willing to take, and 

has allowed them to give us ideas as to where we are taking risks 

and be a better informed buyer. 

So I think that one is another one, ma’am, that sets us up a little 

differently on this one. 

The other one that I would say is, as the technologies mature, 

we are structuring the contract so that we have incentives in place 

to keep the costs from going too high, to the point that we will limit 

the amount of profit if it goes too high. 

And when we go into the production, one of the things we are 

doing different on this program that we have not done on other 

programs, we are going to get a firm, fixed price for production for 

the first five sets to get us up to one-fifth of the inventory. And we 

have not done that on any development program we have done in 

quite some time, where it is a brand new aircraft that is coming 

out. That is a strategy that we have done to ensure we lock in the 

prices and we make sure we have a firm way to control the costs 

as we go forward. 

I think those are a couple of other things we have done a little 

differently on this program, ma’am. 

Ms. GABBARD. Yeah. 
14 

You spoke of maturing technology, and I think one of the issues 

that is most often brought up when we look at not only our capabilities but the capabilities of those in the environments around us 

is the increasing A2/AD environments. 

Can you speak to how you see these long-range strike operations 

developing and how they could be carried out in the future in order 

to penetrate those environments? 

General RAND. Yes, ma’am. 

The family of systems is what we refer to with the Long-Range 

Strike Bomber. And I would just—if you would look at what we 

currently have today in terms of electronic warfare, electronic attack, suppression of anti-air defenses, our way to combat, you 

know, cyber and communication concerns, I would think that, when 

we are fielding the LRS–B, those grandsons of what current systems we have today will be an integral part of the LRS–B. 

And it will be a combined effort, so the LRS–B won’t be going 

it alone. And that is the beauty of being able to parlay the technologies that we have and that we are already advancing in these 

families of systems that we have. And that is a very, very important part. 

And then the weapons that the LRS–B will also carry, it is very 

incumbent that it has a standoff capability. And that is why I think 

when Mr. Walden talked about the long-range standoff, LRSO, why 

that is such an important part—or General Bunch did—why it is 

so important that we modernize and recapitalize on that capability. 

Mr. WALDEN. Just to add to that, in the early days, I mentioned 

about the technology development. We did look at what the threat 

was doing, with an eye on the technology we would want to put on 

the platform not only in the near future but into the far future. 

General Bunch kind of touched on the ability first to try to modernize and keep up with the changing threat. That is what we are 

talking about. 

Ms. GABBARD. Yeah. 

Mr. WALDEN. So hopefully that helped. 

Ms. GABBARD. Great. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. That concludes all of our subcommittee members 

who had questions. And based on the motion we had at the beginning of the hearing, we now recognize Mr. Fleming for 5 minutes 

for any questions he might have. 

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to sit 

in on subcommittee, even though you did make me sit at the kids’ 

table. That is okay. 

Mr. FORBES. We were putting you up front. 

Dr. FLEMING. Oh, I see. I get that. I get that. Thanks. 

Well, let’s see, General Rand, great to see you. Welcome, again, 

to Barksdale Air Force Base, Bossier City-Shreveport, that is in my 

district. That is where we have the headquarters of Air Force Global Strike Command. And we are excited about having you, and you 

are going to be a great addition to our community. 

I did have some questions for you regarding the Long-Range 

Strike Bomber. Regarding that mission, what are the factors that 

drive the total bomber requirement? And how many bombers will 
15 

the Air Force need to meet combatant commander needs once the 

LRS–B procurement is complete? 

General RAND. Yes, sir. That is a fair question, and it is one that 

we haven’t firmed up yet. 

We currently have 159 bombers, of which 96 are combat-coded. 

I certainly can’t imagine a situation where we could ever be less 

than that, in my humble opinion. 

As we get the LRS–B in production and we procure them and 

start fielding them, that we will have to have a very healthy discussion of the requirements. What is the end state for then, they 

will be, the four bombers that we will have? 

It would be premature to have that discussion right now, but I 

think that going in with the 100 as a requirement and knowing 

that several of the other bombers will be augmenting our LRS–B 

for quite a long time, our LRS–B for a significant time, we are 

going to be in that 159 range. 

Dr. FLEMING. All right. Great. Thank you. 

General RAND. Yes, sir. 

Dr. FLEMING. Assuming a full LRS–B procurement of that 80 to 

100 that you are referring to, can you discuss the value of B–52 

modernization—specifically, re-engineering, new radar, beyondline-of-sight communications, regional data link systems, et cetera? 

General RAND. Absolutely, I can, sir. Thank you for that opportunity. 

The B–52 still does things that are unique to that weapon system. It is the only system we have in our Air Force that do some 

of the things it does. And, as I mentioned earlier, it has the nuclear 

and conventional capability—very important to us. It has a longrange standoff capability—very important to us. It has an enormous payload, great range. The airplane is an amazing workhorse 

despite being 60 years old. So it is incumbent to me that we modernize and continue to modernize the B–52 because we are going 

to be relying on its service for many years to come. 

And some of the things we are doing as we speak are the Combat 

Network Communications Technology. That is going to really help 

the situational awareness of the aircrews, the ability to do a lot 

better management of how things are coming into the cockpit, moving map, machine-to-machine technology, if you will. 

I mentioned already, earlier, about our 1760 Integrated Weapons 

Bay Upgrade. That is very important to us because we will be able 

to carry a larger payload, and we will be able to go farther because 

we will reduce the drag by not having the external weapons on 

board. 

Dr. FLEMING. Right. 

General RAND. I am very interested, and I am going to work with 

my counterparts here and certainly the Air Staff to have good discussions in procuring Link 16 for the B–52. It is currently the only 

combat airplane that we don’t have that is on the network of Link 

16. And that is really important for other—Navy, our joint partners, and our Air Force to be able to see where the B–52s are and 

for them to see where other assets are. 

I mentioned earlier to you, sir, the importance that I think—we 

have a 1980s radar that still has 1960s technology that we are 

using. And as we address the A2/AD environment, radar is still 
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very important to be able to, that last place where we are at, to 

give that last guidance to the weapons. And so I would like to do 

what we can to procure a new radar. 

And, finally, I would like to have some good discussions with the 

Air Staff on the possibility of re-engining the B–52 to reduce the 

fuel requirements efficiency, increase our range—we can go higher, 

we can go farther—reduce the tanker requirements. There are 

many benefits of a possible re-engining. But that would be premature. It also has a considerable—— 

Dr. FLEMING. Right. 

General RAND [continuing]. Cost that goes with it. 

Dr. FLEMING. So it is going to be a good while before we get the 

Long-Range Strike Bomber off the assembly line. There are a lot 

of opportunities to enhance and improve what we already have in 

our fleet and our inventory, to kind of bridge that gap. 

General RAND. Sir, you are spot-on; 2025 was what we are hopeful for IOC, the initial operation capability, of LRS–B. It will take 

several years to procure whatever buy we end up with. We are easily talking, the B–52, into the 2040s is, I think, a more than viable 

platform for us. 

So any moneys that we invest today, we will get our return on 

this. This won’t be something that we won’t be using in 5 years 

from now. 

Dr. FLEMING. Right. Thank you. 

And I—— 

General BUNCH. Can I add? 

Dr. FLEMING. If the chairman will allow—— 

General BUNCH. We need to do that. We talked about the B–52. 

We also need to do that on the B–1 and the B–2. We have to keep 

all of those relevant so that we have our options open as we get 

beyond and we get the Long-Range Strike Bomber on board so that 

we can decide how we need to shape our force to face that challenge that may be out there in the future. 

General RAND. And that is a great point. Right now, in all three 

bombers, there are fiscal year 2016 dollars that we are aggressively 

using to make modifications and modernization on every one of our 

platforms. And I would be happy to share the B–1 and the B–2 initiatives we have, as well. 

Dr. FLEMING. Great. Great. Thank you. 

And I yield. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Fleming. 

And as we said at the outset, also, we want to give you any opportunity you need to take a few minutes. If there is something 

that we didn’t include in the transcript that you think is important 

to get in there or something that was mischaracterized or you 

might want to change now, this is your time to do it. 

And we will start with you, General Rand. 

General RAND. Sir, I will just foot-stomp what I said earlier. I 

think it is incumbent upon us to realize that the long-range strike 

capability is something that our Nation absolutely has to have. To 

do that, we have to be able to modernize our current bomber fleet 

and we have to acquire a new LRS–B, and I think we are on the 

path to doing that. 
17 

I think it is critical that we are able to hold our enemies at bay 

and keep them at risk anywhere at any time. And I appreciate the 

support that you are providing us to be able to, one, advocate and, 

two, endorse, and be our cheerleaders as we go down this road. Because while some of these bombers are mature, they are very capable, and our Nation needs them. 

So thank you. 

Mr. FORBES. General, thank you. 

General Bunch. 

General BUNCH. Sir, I just want to talk one more moment about 

the section 1047 error that we, the Air Force, made as we submitted our report. Again, that is a regrettable error, and we understand fully the importance of providing accurate information to 

Congress. 

I want to stress to everybody that the program office estimates 

had absolutely and—nothing with the Long-Range Strike Bomber 

had anything to do with that error. The error was a process and 

a human error. Secretary James took it very seriously, and we 

have counseled the individuals, and we have changed our processes 

to minimize it. 

I just want to make sure we characterize it had nothing to do 

with what the LRS–B program office had done. They provided all 

the information, and it was internal to the Air Staff that the error 

occurred. 

I want to follow along with General Rand and stress that the 

Long-Range Strike Bomber is crucial to the Air Force’s ability to 

execute the national military strategy in the future, and particularly in an anti-access/area denial role. We need this capability in 

the field so that we can continue to give the national command authorities options to prosecute targets and continue to serve as a 

world power and execute our mission. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. General, thank you. 

And, Mr. Walden, we will give you cleanup. 

Mr. WALDEN. Yes, sir. Thanks. 

One, I think the team, the LRS–B team, has worked very hard 

to get to where we are today. We believe we are ready to execute 

the program. The source selection is almost over. We are ready to 

make that down-select and move on with building the next-generation bomber, a Long-Range Strike Bomber, for the Nation. 

So we look forward to working with you in the future. Thank 

you, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

And, once again, as we said at the outset, we just appreciate all 

three of you being here, but also all of your staffs. We know how 

hard your staffs work to get you the information and to help you 

do what you do. And to all the men and women who serve under 

you, we thank you for their efforts. 

And, with that, Ms. Graham, if you have nothing else, then we 

are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:56 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

SEPTEMBER 29, 2015 

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

SEPTEMBER 29, 2015 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. FORBES. Will B–1, B–2 and B–52 bombers be fully airspace compliant by the 

202 mandate? If not, how many and of which type will not be compliant? Furthermore, what steps will be taken to mitigate the impact of noncompliance? 

General RAND. Due to fiscal constraints within the Nuclear Deterrence Operations 

portfolio, current projections indicate that no AFGSC bomber will meet the FAA’s 

mandate of 2020 for ADS–B compliance. Partial solutions have been funded for each 

airframe, however all still require additional funding for programs and integration 

for complete ADS–B compliance. 

We are currently working within the Air Force corporate process to fund these 

programs and will continue work to develop a solution and aircraft installation. 

While we do not yet know what the FAA’s decision will be with regard to approval 

to fly in certain airspace, it is likely we will have to submit waivers for flight approval which would impact aircrew training and readiness. At a minimum, we expect increased routing around high density airspace that would drive increases to 

average sortie durations on training missions. We are unable to speculate the impact to contingency missions. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Ms. BORDALLO. The LRS–B is expected to be far more than just a bomber. It will 

link sensors and shooters across the battlespace while being a vital node in the combat cloud. How are we changing our concept of operations to ensure we take advantage of these capabilities? How are we implementing lessons learned from current 

conflicts regarding battlespace awareness and sensor fusion? 

General RAND. There are over three decades of lessons learned and operational 

experience that will inform the initial baseline of operations for LRS–B when it 

fields. Additionally, its operational and tactical employment will evolve as the system matures. LRS–B is one part of a ‘‘family of systems’’ portfolio including Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR); electronic warfare; prompt strike; 

communications; and weapons effects. LRS–B’s long range, significant payload, and 

survivability will contribute to the capability to hold future targets at risk; this will 

enable the nation’s ability to maintain dominance over evolving threats by adversaries employing advanced anti-access and area denial (A2AD) strategies. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Does the Air Force have plans to re-engine the B–52 to reduce 

the maintenance requirements and increase fuel efficiency? Have you performed a 

cost-benefit analysis of a re-engining compared to any alternatives? 

General RAND and General BUNCH. The Air Force does not currently have a requirement to re-engine the B–52; however, we are exploring the potential to reduce 

B–52 engine maintenance and increase efficiency by conducting a re-engine costbenefit analysis (CBA). Of note, the existing TF–33 engines are supportable through 

the projected service life of the aircraft. In support of the CBA, the AF released a 

Request For Information in Dec 14 to determine the benefits of existing engines in 

the commercial market place—there were five respondents. The CBA is still under 

development and, after review, is expected to be complete by 2Q FY16. Any plans 

to re-engine the B–52 will be informed by the outcome of the cost-benefit analysis, 

which will then enable us to make decisions on the best way ahead. 

Ms. BORDALLO. How are we developing the long-term strategy for procuring and 

sustaining the LRS–B while including planned upgrades over the life of the system? 

General BUNCH. In order to make sure that this was done right from the beginning, the program office team worked very successfully in lock-step with Air Combat 

Command (ACC) and Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) establishing the 

operational needs and requirements. The APUC of $550 million, in base year 2010 

dollars, is a key requirement for the program and drove the requirements and technology trades of the design. In May of 2013 General Welsh approved the program 

requirements. Over the past three years the program office has worked closely with 

industry to ensure designs and requirements remained stable. We have completed 

Preliminary Design Reviews and Manufacturing Readiness Reviews which demonstrate the program is at the highest level of technology maturity seen on a new 
56 

aircraft development at this stage. The platform design is at subsystem level and 

there is a very high fidelity for the structure, electronics, hydraulics, engines, air 

data systems, and the low-observable technology. 

Maintainability has been a key focus area. Numerous placement reviews have 

been accomplished to ensure components are accessible and access allows streamlined diagnostic testing. Additionally, the LRS–B is being designed to have an open 

architecture. The Air Force Open Mission Systems (OMS) standards establish an 

open architecture, provide streamlined processes for systems integration and encourage competition. The program has built-in an appropriate level of adaptability 

through design margin and open systems, allowing for affordable upgrades as technology advances and threats evolve. OMS sustains competition throughout the aircraft design and life cycle, and enables long-term affordability while enhancing 

supportability. 

Æ