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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 45672

ANTHONY MICHAEL MATNEY,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

STATE OF IDAHO,

Respondent.

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Filed: August 8, 2019

Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Canyon County. Hon. Gene A. Petty, District Judge. 

Judgment summarily dismissing petition for post-conviction relief, affirmed. 

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Erik H. Lehtinen, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Mark W. Olson, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

LORELLO, Judge 

Anthony Michael Matney appeals from the district court’s judgment summarily 

dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. Matney contends the district court erred in 

summarily dismissing his petition because he alleged a genuine issue of material fact entitling 

him to an evidentiary hearing. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Matney was charged with felony driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and a 

persistent violator enhancement based on three prior felony DUI convictions. Matney pled guilty 

to the felony DUI and admitted the enhancement. Although represented by counsel, prior to 
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sentencing, Matney filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.1 The motion was based 

on allegations related to the persistent violator enhancement. After consulting with counsel and 

being questioned by the district court, Matney withdrew his motion. The district court sentenced 

Matney to a unified term of twenty-five years, with a minimum period of confinement of six and 

one-half years. Matney subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging several 

claims including claims that his trial counsel was ineffective. The district court appointed 

counsel to represent Matney. The State filed a motion for summary dismissal, which the district 

court granted. Matney appeals. 

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal from an order of summary dismissal, we apply the same standards utilized by 

the trial courts and examine whether the petitioner’s admissible evidence asserts facts which, if 

true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925, 

929 (2010); Sheahan, 146 Idaho at 104, 190 P.3d at 923. Over questions of law, we exercise free 

review. Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 250, 220 P.3d at 1069; Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 370, 33 

P.3d 841, 844 (Ct. App. 2001). 

III.

ANALYSIS

Although Matney alleged numerous claims in his post-conviction petition, his argument 

on appeal is limited to a single ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim--Claim 9(k). In 

Claim 9(k), Matney alleged that trial counsel misrepresented the law relative to Matney’s pro se 

motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Specifically, Matney alleged that, when he discussed his 

pro se motion with trial counsel prior to sentencing, trial counsel advised Matney that it was “too 

late” to withdraw his guilty pleas and that withdrawal of his pleas was “absolutely not allowed.” 

Matney asserts that the district court’s summary dismissal of this claim was erroneous because 

the dismissal was based on Matney’s failure to prove his ineffective assistance of counsel claim

rather than the correct legal standard, which only required Matney to allege a genuine issue of 

 

1 Matney’s request to withdraw his guilty pleas was in the form of a letter to the district 

judge. The district court in this case took judicial notice of that letter. As a result, the letter 

(characterized as a motion) has been augmented into the record on appeal in this case. 
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material fact. The State responds that, although Matney’s allegations were adequate with respect 

to deficient performance, summary dismissal was appropriate because Matney failed to allege 

facts demonstrating he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s alleged deficiency. The State also 

contends that, although the district court’s language may have been imprecise, nothing about its 

decision indicates it disregarded the summary dismissal standards it accurately identified in its 

written order. In reply, Matney contends this Court should reject the State’s prejudice argument 

for two reasons: (1) it is not preserved because it is made for the first time on appeal and

(2) affirming summary dismissal on this basis would deprive Matney of the notice required by 

I.C. § 19-4906(b). We hold that Claim 9(k) was properly dismissed without an evidentiary 

hearing because Matney failed to allege prejudice and he had adequate notice of this deficiency. 

Claims in a post-conviction petition may be summarily dismissed if the petitioner’s 

allegations are clearly disproven by the record of the criminal proceedings, if the petitioner has 

not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element of the claims, or if 

the petitioner’s allegations do not justify relief as a matter of law. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 

521, 236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010); DeRushé v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152 

(2009). In Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 624, 226 P.3d 1269, 1271 (2010), the Idaho 

Supreme Court articulated the standard for summary dismissal of an ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim as follows:

For an application for post-conviction relief based on a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel to survive summary dismissal, the petitioner 

must establish that: (1) a material issue of fact exists as to whether counsel’s 

performance was deficient; and (2) a material issue of fact exists as to whether the 

deficiency prejudiced the [petitioner’s] case.

Thus, the petitioner has the burden of showing both that the attorney’s representation fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness and a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984). A reasonable probability is one that is sufficient 

to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at 694. 

We first address Matney’s assertion that the district court applied an incorrect legal 

standard. In its written decision, the district court accurately quoted the law applicable to 

summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition. However, Matney asks this Court to conclude 
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that the district court did not follow those standards because the district court used the word 

“established” in concluding that Matney failed to satisfy either prong of the Strickland standard 

in relation to Claim 9(k). According to Matney, “established” means “proved” and, although the 

district court did not use the word “proved,” its use of the word “established” demonstrates it 

required Matney to prove his claims at the summary dismissal stage. We decline to construe the 

district court’s decision in the manner Matney urges. The Idaho Supreme Court has used the 

word “established” in articulating the standard for summary dismissal of an ineffective assistance 

of counsel claim, as reflected in the legal standards set forth above. The district court’s use of 

the same word in its analysis of Claim 9(k) does not demonstrate that it departed from the 

standards applicable to its summary dismissal decision even though the word was not used in 

conjunction with the phrase “genuine issue of material fact.” We therefore decline Matney’s 

request to vacate and remand on this basis. 

We now examine whether Matney presented admissible evidence establishing a genuine 

issue of material fact that trial counsel was deficient with respect to his representations regarding 

Matney’s pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea and whether he was prejudiced as a result of 

the alleged deficiency. On appeal, the State concedes that Matney’s allegation that trial counsel 

advised Matney that motions to withdraw a guilty plea are “absolutely not allowed” was 

sufficient to establish a prima facie case of deficient performance because such a comment, if 

made, would be a misstatement of the law. Thus, whether summary dismissal of Claim 9(k) was 

appropriate turns on whether Matney alleged a genuine issue of material fact as to the prejudice 

prong. 

Prejudice in relation to Claim 9(k) required Matney to allege a genuine issue of material 

fact that, but for trial counsel’s alleged deficiency (advising Matney that withdrawal of his plea 

was “not allowed”), there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have 

been different. At a minimum, the different result would have been that Matney pursued his 

pro se motion to withdraw his guilty pleas prior to sentencing. Claim 9(k) contains no 

allegations of this nature. The claim only alleges that trial counsel provided erroneous 

information regarding Matney’s ability to file the motion; that trial counsel did so in order to 

“keep his secret unwritten ‘agreement’ with the Prosecutor;” that Matney’s attempt to withdraw 

his plea is “evidence” that he was not a party to the agreement; and that his motion to withdraw 
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his plea demonstrates the plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Matney did not 

allege that, but for counsel’s erroneous statement, he would have pursued his motion. 

On appeal, Matney contends that specific allegations of prejudice were not required 

because the only reasonable inference from the allegations he did make was that he relied on trial 

counsel’s misstatement when Matney decided to withdraw his motion and that the district court 

was required to draw that inference. We disagree. Although the district court was required to 

accept Matney’s uncontroverted facts as true, the district court was not required to draw 

inferences regarding unalleged prejudice because it was Matney’s burden to present such 

allegations in the first instance. Whether counsel’s statement regarding the law actually caused 

Matney to withdraw his motion was squarely within Matney’s personal knowledge and, as an 

element of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, he was required to allege as much in order 

to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to prejudice. See Kelly, 149 Idaho at 521, 236 

P.3d at 1281 (noting requirement that petitioner must verify facts within his personal 

knowledge); DeRushé v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 601, 200 P.3d 1148, 1150 (2009) (noting 

requirement that petitioner must make a prima facie case by presenting admissible evidence on 

each essential element of his claim); see also Schoger, 148 Idaho at 626, 226 P.3d at 1273 

(affirming summary dismissal of ineffective assistance of counsel claim because petitioner failed 

to meet her burden of proving causation element of her ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 

i.e., failing to show prejudice). Because Matney failed to allege prejudice in Claim 9(k), this 

claim was properly dismissed without an evidentiary hearing as long as Matney had notice that 

the claim was subject to dismissal on this basis. 

Idaho Code Section 19-4906(b) entitles a petitioner to twenty days’ notice of the reasons 

his claims are subject to summary dismissal. The district court dismissed Claim 9(k) pursuant to 

the State’s motion for summary dismissal. In its motion, the State identified the standards 

applicable to summary dismissal of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim and asserted that 

Matney failed to support his claims with admissible evidence and failed to show “how his 

counsel’s actions were deficient, and more importantly, how that deficiency prejudiced [him].”

Addressing Matney’s claim regarding “his ability to withdraw his guilty plea[s],” the State 

asserted that the transcript of the sentencing hearing included a discussion regarding Matney’s 

pro se motion and noted that he never indicated during that hearing that he was “being forced to 
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withdraw” his motion. Rather, the transcript reflected Matney insisted on proceeding to 

sentencing. 

Matney, through post-conviction counsel, filed a response to the State’s motion. With 

respect to Claim 9(k), Matney asserted: “Not only does the allegation that a guilty plea cannot 

be withdraw[n] misstate the law, but in light of the allegation that underlying counsel allegedly 

accused [Matney] of being illiterate, it would have been appropriate to move for a withdrawal of 

a plea on this basis.”2 Matney then requested an “expanded hearing” to “offer testimony and 

evidence.” 

The State filed a reply to Matney’s response, stating its primary argument was that 

Matney “failed to provide admissible evidence that his [trial counsel] was ineffective and that the 

outcome would have been different.” The State further asserted:

[Matney] has requested that summary dismissal be denied so that he can 

explore the issue of whether his trial counsel’s acknowledgment of his illiteracy 

should have been an issue to be explored, is without merit. It is [Matney’s] 

responsibility to provide admissible evidence to prove his case with the Petition, 

not wait for some discovery excursion during an evidentiary trial. Furthermore, 

the transcripts of the change of plea which were attached to the [State’s] Answer 

clearly indicate that [Matney] was well aware of the issues, and made a reasoned 

decision to plead guilty. 

Additionally, the State cited the sentencing transcript as evidence that Matney represented to the 

district court that he did not want to withdraw his guilty pleas. The State concluded its reply 

with its position that Matney failed to allege any genuine issue of material fact. 

At the summary dismissal hearing, post-conviction counsel characterized Claim 9(k) as a 

“side issue” and noted it was “clear error” for trial counsel to tell Matney he could not file a 

motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Post-conviction counsel then argued that the “problem” was 

that it was a “mystery” what Matney understood or what his trial counsel told him, and therefore

a hearing was appropriate to “determine those issues.” The State responded:

[T]he evidence is not there. Counsel indicated that it was a mystery what 

[Matney] was told, a mystery what [Matney] understood. Well, that’s exactly the 

 

2 There is no allegation in Claim 9(k) that relates to Matney’s literacy. That allegation 

appears in Claim 9(a) in which Matney alleged that trial counsel “used derogatory and 

demeaning language (calling Matney ‘illiterate’) to intimidate him.”
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type of information that needs to be in this record. That’s why it’s talking about 

admissible evidence in the record to support that. 

And so based on--on summary dismissal standards, this petition fails to 

carry with it admissible evidence to show what would have happened, what the 

result would have been. Could, maybe, perhaps the result would have been 

different is not the standards. There has to be admissible evidence to show that 

the outcome would have been different. 

We reject Matney’s assertion that the State’s argument regarding the absence of evidence 

of prejudice is being raised for the first time on appeal. We also reject Matney’s related assertion 

that he did not receive notice that Claim 9(k) was subject to dismissal on this basis. The State’s 

motion for summary dismissal, its reply, and its argument at the summary dismissal hearing all 

noted Matney’s failure in this regard.3

 See Kelly, 149 Idaho at 522, 236 P.3d at 1282 (holding 

that State’s motion for summary dismissal of ineffective assistance of counsel claim provided 

adequate notice by identifying Strickland standard, asserting there was no evidentiary basis for 

petitioner’s claims, and citing law supporting proposition that petitioner had burden to identify 

deficient acts or omissions of counsel). To the extent Matney asserts the State’s arguments in the 

district court did not adequately communicate its position that Matney failed to allege prejudice, 

such an argument may not be considered for the first time on appeal. See Kelly, 149 Idaho at 522 

n.1, 236 P.3d at 1282 n.1; DeRushé, 146 Idaho at 601-02, 200 P.3d at 1150-51. Matney has 

failed to show error in the summary dismissal of Claim 9(k). 

IV.

CONCLUSION

Matney has failed to show the district court applied an incorrect legal standard in 

summarily dismissing the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim alleged in Claim 9(k). 

 

3 On appeal, Matney suggests that, if he had received notice that Claim 9(k) failed to allege 

prejudice, he would have amended his petition to cure this deficiency. This assertion is 

inconsistent with post-conviction counsel’s decision not to amend the petition despite its obvious 

defects. Rather, post-conviction counsel elected not to waive any of Matney’s pro se claims and 

pursued only the three claims counsel deemed to have merit. Even as to those claims it appears 

post-conviction counsel construed them as essentially one claim that was based on trial counsel 

believing Matney was illiterate because he alleged trial counsel called him illiterate and trial 

counsel’s failure to pursue a motion to withdraw Matney’s guilty pleas based on that alleged 

illiteracy. The district court, which also appears to have conflated Matney’s claims as a result, 

found that Matney is not illiterate and that his guilty pleas were not invalid on this basis. 
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Because Matney failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact on the prejudice prong of 

Claim 9(k) and, because he received adequate notice that Claim 9(k) was deficient in that regard, 

summary dismissal of Claim 9(k) was appropriate. We therefore affirm the district court’s 

judgment summarily dismissing Matney’s petition for post-conviction relief. 

Judge HUSKEY and Judge BRAILSFORD, CONCUR.