DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE WARWICK CORPORATION, ALL SUNNY HOTELS, INC., and 

H.E.S. HOTELS CORP.,

Appellants,

v.

MATTHEW TURETSKY, ALLIANT INSURANCE SERVICES, INC., 

SWETT & CRAWFORD OF ILLINOIS, INC., CHUBB CUSTOM 

INSURANCE COMPANY, and LANDMARK AMERICAN INSURANCE 

COMPANY,

Appellees.

No. 4D16-2567 

[August 16, 2017]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Jack Tuter, Judge; L.T. Case No. 10-47258 CACE (07).

Joel D. Eaton of Podhurst Orseck, P.A., Miami, and Blaut Weiss Law 

Group, Plantation, for appellants.

Lauren D. Levy of Levy Law Group, Coral Gables, for appellee Landmark 

American Insurance Company.

LEVINE, J.

Appellants have two insurance policies for their four hotels. The 

primary policy limit is $5,000,000 per occurrence and the excess policy 

limit is $21,035,000 per occurrence, with the excess policy payout not to 

exceed the listed value of each of the four insured hotels. Appellants argue 

the excess policy is ambiguous because the “statement of values,” which 

includes the listed insured value of each of the four hotels, is not attached 

to the excess insurance policy and is not titled “Statement of Values.”

Appellants also claim the excess policy is “illusory” because one of the four 

insured hotels is valued at $5,000,000, which would equal the total value 

covered and payable under the primary policy.

We conclude that the policy is unambiguous because the “Statement of 

Values” was incorporated by reference in the excess policy and sufficiently 

authenticated. We also conclude that the excess policy is not illusory 
2

because the terms of the excess policy do not “completely contradict” each 

other, and does not completely negate the entirety of coverage it 

purportedly provides. We affirm the trial court’s summary judgment to 

that effect.

Appellants, The Warwick Corporation, All Sunny Hotels, Inc., and 

H.E.S. Hotels Corp. (collectively “Warwick”), had a primary insurance 

policy with Chubb Insurance Company for $5,000,000, which covered 

three hotels in New Orleans, Louisiana; Fort Lauderdale, Florida; and 

Deerfield Beach, Florida. 

Warwick also had an excess insurance policy with Landmark American 

Insurance Company. The excess policy insured the three hotels referenced 

above as well as an additional hotel located in St. Thomas in the Virgin 

Islands. The excess policy insured the four properties for “$21,035,000 

Per Occurrence not to exceed values reported,” and covered “All Risk 

Excluding Flood, Earth Movement and Windstorm/Hail.” The excess 

policy also contained the following Schedule Limit of Liability 

endorsement: 

It is understood and agreed that the following special terms 

and conditions apply to this policy:

1. In the event of loss hereunder, liability of the Company shall 

be limited to the least of the following in any one “occurrence”:

. . . .

b. 100% of the individually stated value for each scheduled 

item of property insured at the location which had the loss as 

shown on the latest Statement of Values on file with this 

Company, less applicable deductibles and primary and 

underlying excess limits. If no value is shown for a scheduled 

item then there is no coverage for that item . . . .

No “statement of values” was attached to the Landmark Policy. 

However, when Warwick’s insurance agent marketed the policy to 

insurers, the agent used a spreadsheet titled “Property Spreadsheet” to 

represent the value of the four properties and transmitted the spreadsheet 

to wholesale brokers and Landmark. The agents, brokers, and Landmark 

all agreed the spreadsheet was a statement of values. The latest version 

of the alleged statement of values on file with Landmark stated the total 

value of the New Orleans hotel was $5,000,000; the value of the Fort 

Lauderdale hotel was $7,035,000; the value of the Deerfield Beach hotel 
3

was $2,000,000; and the value of the St. Thomas hotel was $12,000,000. 

The total value of the properties was $26,035,000. The excess coverage 

for the New Orleans hotel was “shell coverage,” as requested by Warwick,

that covered only the building. 

Landmark used the alleged statement of values to calculate the 

Landmark Policy’s premium. Landmark decided to charge the minimum

premium, $2,625, to insure the New Orleans property because triggering 

the policy would require that a single occurrence damage both the New 

Orleans property and at least one other property.1

Warwick subsequently suffered a loss at the New Orleans hotel that it 

alleged was in excess of the primary policy. Landmark claimed it was not 

liable because the policy stated Landmark was liable only for the property’s 

value, $5,000,000, less the primary insurance, also $5,000,000. 

Warwick sued Landmark for a declaratory judgment and breach of 

contract, claiming Landmark was liable under the excess policy.2 Both 

Warwick and Landmark moved for summary judgment. Warwick argued 

the Landmark Policy was ambiguous because the property spreadsheet 

used as the statement of values was not titled “Statement of Values,” and 

Landmark could not cure this ambiguity with extrinsic evidence. Warwick 

alternatively argued the Landmark Policy was illusory because it did not 

provide coverage for the New Orleans hotel. Landmark argued that it had 

sufficiently authenticated the latest statement of values, which was 

incorporated by reference, and that it was not liable under the 

unambiguous terms of the excess policy.

The trial court granted Landmark’s motion for summary judgment. The 

trial court found that Landmark’s policy incorporated the statement of 

values by reference and that the unambiguous terms of the policy 

indicated that Landmark was not liable. The trial court refused to rewrite

the policy to create liability. 

On appeal, Warwick reiterates the argument it made at trial and states 

the trial court erred in considering extrinsic evidence to resolve the

1 Including taxes, Warwick paid $6,654.50 to insure the New Orleans hotel. 

Landmark claims that Warwick received a discount on the policy by lumping the 

New Orleans hotel with the other insured properties. 

2 Warwick also sued the primary insurer, Chubb, and Warwick’s insurance 

agents and brokers. Warwick settled with Chubb, and the trial court stayed 

proceedings against the agents and brokers. 
4

allegedly ambiguous policy.

We review the trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. See 

Volusia Cty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 

2000).

Landmark’s policy is clearly unambiguous. A contract is ambiguous 

where the language at issue “is reasonably susceptible to more than one 

interpretation.” Lambert v. Berkley S. Condo. Ass’n, 680 So. 2d 588, 590 

(Fla. 4th DCA 1996). The terms of Landmark’s policy are not “reasonably 

susceptible to more than one interpretation.” See id. The policy states 

that the “Limit Insured” is “$21,035,000 Per Occurrence not to exceed 

values reported.” (emphasis added). An endorsement to the policy states 

Landmark’s liability is limited to “100% of the individually stated value for 

each scheduled item of property insured at the location which had the loss 

as shown on the latest Statement of Values on file with [Landmark], less 

applicable deductibles and primary and underlying excess limits.” 

(emphasis added). Thus, the policy has a total limit of liability of 

$21,035,000, but liability for each scheduled item is limited to that item’s 

individual value. 

The fact that the “statement of values” is not titled as such and is not 

attached to the policy does not render the policy ambiguous. An outside 

document may be incorporated by reference into a contract. See BGT Grp.,

Inc. v. Tradewinds Engine Servs., LLC, 62 So. 3d 1192, 1194 (Fla. 4th DCA 

2011). This outside document must be authenticated, and authenticity is 

a question of fact. See § 90.901, Fla. Stat. (2016). (stating that 

authentication requires the proponent of the evidence to offer evidence “to 

support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent 

claims”); Sunbelt Health Care v. Galva, 7 So. 3d 556, 559-60 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2009). Thus, we find no error in the trial court using extrinsic evidence to 

resolve the factual question of whether the document titled “Property 

Spreadsheet” was the latest statement of values on file with Landmark.3

We next consider whether the Landmark Policy is illusory because it 

does not provide the coverage that Warwick claimed it obtained. 

“When limitations or exclusions completely contradict the insuring

provisions, insurance coverage becomes illusory.” Purrelli v. State Farm 

Fire & Cas. Co., 698 So. 2d 618, 620 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). Thus, “[a]n 

insurance policy cannot grant rights in one paragraph and then retract 

3 Warwick does not argue the trial court erred when it concluded no questions of 

fact existed towards the statement of values’ authenticity.
5

the very same right in another paragraph called an ‘exclusion.’” Tire 

Kingdom, Inc. v. First S. Ins. Co., 573 So. 2d 885, 887 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). 

Where a policy contains internally inconsistent language, a court must 

“adopt[] . . . the construction [of the policy] that will afford the most 

coverage.” Id. See also Zucker For BankUnited Fin. Corp. v. U.S. Specialty 

Ins. Co., 856 F.3d 1343, 1352 (11th Cir. 2017) (“So when a policy exclusion 

does swallow up an insuring provision, the Florida Courts conclude that 

the policy is ambiguous, and resolve that ambiguity by ignoring the 

exclusion.”) (citations omitted). 

A policy is illusory only if there is an internal contradiction that 

completely negates the coverage it expresses to provide. For example, in 

Purrelli, the policy purported to cover certain intentional torts, but 

excluded intended acts. 698 So. 2d at 619. This policy was illusory as it 

was effectively “complete nonsense.” Id. at 620 (citation omitted); see also 

Princeton Express v. DM Ventures USA LLC, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1252, 1260 

(S.D. Fla. 2016) (stating a policy was illusory where it stated it covered 

advertising injury and also stated advertising injury was excluded); Certain 

Underwriters at Lloyds, London Subscribing to Policy No. SA 10092-11581 

v. Waveblast Watersports, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 3d 1311, 1318-19 (S.D. Fla. 

2015) (finding policy illusory where it covered parasailing but excluded 

watercrafts).

On the other hand, where a limitation on coverage does not “completely 

swallow[] the insuring provision,” the policy is not illusory. See AutoOwners Ins. Co. v. Christopher, 749 So. 2d 581, 582 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). 

For example, in Interline Brands, Inc. v. Chartis Specialty Insurance Co., 

749 F.3d 962 (11th Cir. 2014), the insured, a product distribution and 

marketing corporation, purchased a policy that covered advertising injury. 

However, the policy excluded advertising injury “arising out of or resulting 

from, caused directly or indirectly, in whole or in part by, any act that 

violates any statute, ordinance or regulation of any federal, state or local 

government.” Id. at 964. The insured was sued for sending junk faxes in 

violation of federal law and the insurer denied coverage. The Eleventh 

Circuit held the policy was not illusory because

the Exclusion only excludes from coverage violations of a 

statute, ordinance, or regulation (i.e. not common law) and 

only in relation to “sending, transmitting or communicating of 

any material or information.” While this is a significant 

Exclusion (especially in light of Interline’s business), it does 

not render the policy absurd or completely contradict the 

insuring provisions. 
6

Id. at 967; see also Colony Ins. Co. v. Total Contracting & Roofing, Inc., No. 

10-23091-CIV, 2011 WL 4962351, *5 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2011) (stating that 

for the policy in that case to be illusory it “would need to expressly cover 

damages from hazardous materials and simultaneously exclude damages 

arising from hazardous materials”).

In the instant case, the policy’s terms do not “completely contradict” 

one another like the terms in Purrelli. See Purrelli, 698 So. 2d at 

619. Although the limitations on triggering the excess policy are 

“significant,” these limitations do not “render the policy absurd or 

completely contradict the insuring provisions.” See Interline Brands, Inc., 

749 F.3d at 967.

We recognize that Landmark will not, barring extraordinary 

circumstances, normally be liable for damages to the New Orleans hotel

because significant distances separate it from the other insured properties 

and the policy excludes wind, water, and earth movement. Nevertheless, 

Landmark proposed at oral argument several examples for which it could 

be liable under the policy. For example, arson, riots, or any of the covered 

actions committed by a conspiracy could damage multiple properties and 

invoke coverage. Although such circumstances are unlikely, Warwick, a 

sophisticated business entity, paid a minimal premium for such minimal 

coverage. Warwick also purchased coverage for the New Orleans hotel as 

part of an umbrella insurance policy that insured and covered the four 

listed hotels. Warwick “chose to buy the policy that it bought. It cannot 

change that choice now . . . .” See Zucker, 856 F.3d at 1353. 

In summary, we affirm the trial court’s entry of summary judgment, 

and conclude the policy was unambiguous and was not illusory.

Affirmed.

CONNER, J., and SMALL, LISA, Associate Judge, concur. 

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.