UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-1464

MAUREEN E. GAGE,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

CORT BUSINESS SERVICES, a/k/a Cort Furniture Rental,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, Senior District 

Judge. (8:08-cv-03463-PJM)

Submitted: January 26, 2011 Decided: February 11, 2011

Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Anne Sampson Gbenjo, THE GBENJO LAW GROUP, Houston, Texas, for 

Appellant. Joseph A. Ciucci, DUANE MORRIS, LLP, Atlanta, 

Georgia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Maureen E. Gage appeals the district court’s judgment 

denying her motions to alter or amend and reconsider its 

judgment granting summary judgment to the Appellee, Cort 

Business Services (“Cort”), in her Title VII discrimination and 

retaliation suit. We affirm.

Gage raised claims in the district court that Cort 

violated her rights by failing to accommodate her disability, 

creating a hostile work environment, discriminating against her 

because of her age and race, and retaliating against her. She 

has confined her appeal only to the issue of retaliation. 

Accordingly, she has abandoned appellate review of her remaining 

claims.

This court reviews de novo a district court’s order 

granting summary judgment and views the facts in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party. Rowzie v. Allstate Ins. Co., 

556 F.3d 165, 167 (4th Cir. 2009). Summary judgment is 

appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and 

the moving party “is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Summary judgment will be granted 

unless “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 

nonmoving party” on the evidence presented. Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
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Absent direct evidence of intentional discrimination, 

Title VII claims are analyzed under the burden-shifting 

framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 

U.S. 792, 793 (1973). In order to state a prima facie claim of 

discrimination, a plaintiff in a retaliation case must show 

that: (i) she engaged in a protected activity; (ii) her

employer took an adverse action against her; and (iii) there is 

a causal connection between the protected activity and the 

adverse action. Ziskie v. Mineta, 547 F.3d 220, 229 

(4th Cir. 2008). To satisfy the second element, a plaintiff 

must show that a reasonable employee would have found the 

challenged action materially adverse, which . . . means it well 

might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or 

supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington N. & Santa 

Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006). If the plaintiff 

makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the employer 

to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the 

adverse action. Baquir v. Principi, 434 F.3d 733, 747 

(4th Cir. 2006). If the employer makes such a showing, the 

burden returns to the plaintiff to establish that this reason is 

a pretext for discrimination. Id.

The parties agree that Cort terminated Gage, and her 

termination constitutes an adverse employment action within the 

meaning of Title VII. Moreover, Gage clearly engaged in 
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protected activity by making complaints to Cort human resources 

officials that her supervisors were engaged in what she felt to 

be harassment related to her injuries following a series of car 

accidents. We have reviewed the record, however, and we 

conclude that Gage has not drawn a causal link between the 

protected activities and the adverse action. There was a 

significant lapse in time between when Gage made her complaints 

and when she was terminated, Cort has proffered a valid, nondiscriminatory rationale for her termination, and it is at least 

arguable whether the Cort employees who made the decision to 

terminate Gage were aware that she had engaged in protected 

activity. In light of this record, we conclude that Gage has 

not carried her burden to establish a prima facie case.

We therefore affirm the judgment of the district 

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED