alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 263.38 Recommended decision and filing of record. ( a ) *Filing of recommended decision and record.* Within 45 days after expiration of the time allowed for filing reply briefs under § 263.37(b), the ALJ will file with and certify to the Board, for decision, the record of the proceeding. The record must include the ALJ's recommended decision, recommended findings of fact, recommended conclusions of law, and proposed order; all prehearing and hearing transcripts, exhibits, and rulings; and the motions, briefs, memoranda, and other supporting papers filed in connection with the hearing. The ALJ will serve upon each party the recommended decision, findings, conclusions, and proposed order.
( b ) *Filing of index.* At the same time the ALJ files with and certifies to the Board for final determination the record of the proceeding, the ALJ will furnish to the Board a certified index of the entire record of the proceeding. The certified index must include, at a minimum, an entry for each paper, document, or motion filed with the ALJ in the proceeding, the date of the filing, and the identity of the filer. The certified index must also include an exhibit index containing, at a minimum, an entry consisting of exhibit number and title or description for: each exhibit introduced and admitted into evidence at the hearing; each exhibit introduced but not admitted into evidence at the hearing; each exhibit introduced and admitted into evidence after the completion of the hearing; and each exhibit introduced but not admitted into evidence after the completion of the hearing.
§ 121.331 Supplemental oxygen requirements for pressurized cabin airplanes: Reciprocating engine powered airplanes. ( a ) When operating a reciprocating engine powered airplane pressurized cabin, each certificate holder shall equip the airplane to comply with paragraphs (b) through (d) of this section in the event of cabin pressurization failure.
( b ) *For crewmembers.* When operating at flight altitudes above 10,000 feet, the certificate holder shall provide enough oxygen for each crewmember for the entire flight at those altitudes and not less than a two-hour supply for each flight crewmember on flight deck duty. The required two hours supply is that quantity of oxygen necessary for a constant rate of descent from the airplane's maximum certificated operating altitude to 10,000 feet in ten minutes and followed by 110 minutes at 10,000 feet. The oxygen required by § 121.337 may be considered in determining the supplemental breathing supply required for flight crewmembers on flight deck duty in the event of cabin pressurization failure.
( c ) *For passengers.* When operating at flight altitudes above 8,000 feet, the certificate holder shall provide oxygen as follows: ( 1 ) When an airplane is not flown at a flight altitude above flight level 250, enough oxygen for 30 minutes for 10 percent of the passengers, if at any point along the route to be flown the airplane can safely descend to a flight altitude of 14,000 feet or less within four minutes.
( 2 ) If the airplane cannot descend to a flight altitude of 14,000 feet or less within four minutes, the following supply of oxygen must be provided: ( i ) For that part of the flight that is more than four minutes duration at flight altitudes above 15,000 feet, the supply required by § 121.327(c)(3).
( ii ) For that part of the flight at flight altitudes above 14,000 feet, up to and including 15,000 feet, the supply required by § 121.327(c)(2).
( iii ) For flight at flight altitudes above 8,000 feet up to and including 14,000 feet, enough oxygen for 30 minutes for 10 percent of the passengers.
( 3 ) When an airplane is flown at a flight altitude above flight level 250, enough oxygen for 30 minutes for 10 percent of the passengers for the entire flight (including emergency descent) above 8,000 feet, up to and including 14,000 feet, and to comply with § 121.327(c) (2) and (3) for flight above 14,000 feet.
( d ) For the purposes of this section it is assumed that the cabin pressurization failure occurs at a time during flight that is critical from the standpoint of oxygen need and that after the failure the airplane will descend, without exceeding its normal operating limitations, to flight altitudes allowing safe flight with respect to terrain clearance.
[Doc. No. 6258, 29 FR 19205, Dec. 31, 1964, as amended by Amdt. 121-132, 41 FR 55475, Dec. 20, 1976]
Editorial Note on Part 21
Editorial Notes: 1. For miscellaneous amendments to cross references in this 21 see Amdt. 21-10, 31 FR 9211, July 6, 1966. 2. Nomenclature changes to part 21 appear at 74 FR 53384, Oct. 16, 2009.

§ 21.189 Issue of airworthiness certificate for limited category aircraft. ( a ) An applicant for an airworthiness certificate for an aircraft in the limited category is entitled to the certificate when— ( 1 ) He shows that the aircraft has been previously issued a limited category type certificate and that the aircraft conforms to that type certificate; and
( 2 ) The FAA finds, after inspection (including a flight check by the applicant), that the aircraft is in a good state of preservation and repair and is in a condition for safe operation.
( b ) The FAA prescribes limitations and conditions necessary for safe operation.
[Doc. No. 5085, 29 FR 14570, Oct. 24, 1964, as amended by Amdt. 21-4, 30 FR 9437, July 29, 1965]
§ 155.5 Property and releases covered by this part. This part applies to— ( a ) Any real or personal property that is subject to the terms, conditions, reservations, or restrictions in an instrument of disposal described in § 155.1; and
( b ) Any release from a term, condition, reservation, or restriction in such an instrument, including a release of— ( 1 ) Personal property, equipment, or structures from any term, condition, reservation, or restriction so far as necessary to allow it to be disposed of for salvage purposes;
( 2 ) Land, personal property, equipment or structures from any term, condition, reservation, or restriction requiring that it be used for airport purposes to allow its use, lease, or sale for nonairport use in place;
( 3 ) Land, personal property, equipment, or structures from any term, condition, reservation, or restriction requiring its maintenance for airport use;
( 4 ) Land, personal property, equipment, or structures from all terms, conditions, restrictions, or reservations to allow its use, lease, sale, or other disposal for nonairport purposes; and
( 5 ) Land, personal property, equipment, or structures from the reservation of right of use by the United States in time of war or national emergency, to facilitate financing the operation and maintenance or further development of a public airport.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-6786

WILLIAM LEWIS SMITH, JR., Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus RICHARD LANHAM, Commissioner of the Department of Correction and Correctional Services; RONALD MOATS, Warden; WILLIAM SMITH, Warden, Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District ofMaryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, District Judge. (CA96-3600-PJM) Submitted: March 31, 1998 Decided: April 28, 1998 Before MURNAGHAN and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Christina Northern, Silver Spring, Maryland, for Appellant. J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General, Wendy A. Kro nmiller, Assistant Attorney General, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM:William Lewis Smith appeals from the district court's dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Smith alleges that the Circuit Court for Prince George's County violated his constitutional rights when, without notice, the court issued an amended commitment order in 1985, andthat the denial of his Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence without a hearing violated his due process and equal protection rights. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court as to those claims. See Smith v. Lanham , No. CA-96-3600-PJM (D. Md. May 7, 1997). Appellant's contention that the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment was not presented in the district court, and therefore, it is not reviewable by this Court. See Muth v. United States , 1 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir. 1993). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
State of California 

AIR RESOURCES BOARD 

EXECUTIVE ORDER R-13-005 

Relating to the Heavy-Duty Onboard Diagnostic System Requirements 

WHEREAS, on August 23, 2012, the Air Resources Board (ARB or Board) conducted a 

public hearing to consider the adoption of amendments to California's On-Board 

Diagnostic System Requirements for Passenger Cars, Light-Duty Trucks, and MediumDuty Vehicles and Engines (OBD II) and Heavy Duty Engine On-Board Diagnostic 

System Requirements (HD OBD) requirements to update the diesel monitoring 

requirements, to make some requirements consistent between the HD OBD and OBD II 

regulations, and to clarify and improve the regulation where necessary, as set forth in 

the Initial Statement of Reasons released to the public on July 5, 2012; 

WHEREAS, following the public hearing on~ August 23,2012, the Board adopted 

Resolution 12-29, in which the Board approved amendments to sections 1968.2, 

1968.5, 1971.1, and 1971.5, title 13, California Code of Regulations (CCR), as set forth 

in Attachments A, B, C, and D, as modified by suggested modifications as set forth in 

Attachment E; 

WHEREAS, Resolution 12-29 directed the Executive Officer to take final action to adopt 

the regulatory amendments set forth in Attachments A, B, C, and D to Resolution 12-29, 

as modified by suggested modifications set forth in Attachment E to Resolution 12-29, 

along with such other conforming modifications as may be appropriate, to make the 

modified regulatory language and any additional supporting documents and information 

available to the public for a period of at least 15 days, to consider such written 

comments as may be submitted during this period, and to make such modifications as 

may be appropriate in light of the comments received, or to present the regulatory 

amendments to the Board for further consideration if he determines that this is 

warranted; 

WHEREAS, on January 4, 2013, the modified regulations, reflecting the amendments 

approved by the Board and other changes made to best reflect the intent of the Board at 

. the hearing, were made available for public comment for a period of 15-days, with the 

changes to the originally proposed text clearly indicated, in accordance with the 

provisions of title 1, California Code of Regulations, section 44; and 

WHEREAS, written comments were received during the 15-day comment period and 

those comments have been considered by the Executive Officer. 

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the recitals and findings contained in 

Resolution 12-29 are incorporated by reference herein. 
Executive Order R-.13-005 -2-

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that amendments to secti~ns 1968.2, 1968.5, 1971.1, and 

1971.5, title 13, CCR, are adopted as. set forth in Attachment 1 hereto. 

Executed. this 261

h day of Jllne2013? at Sacramento, California. 

', ... ' 

Attachment 

-_i. 

I;, 

.. "'·
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-7604

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

EKERE INYANGETTE, a/k/a Michael Thomas, a/k/a Uduak 

Inyangette,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, District 

Judge. (1:09-cr-00260-LO-1)

Submitted: December 18, 2012 Decided: December 28, 2012

Before AGEE, DAVIS, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ekere Inyangette, Appellant Pro Se. Andrew Lamont Creighton, 

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Newport News, Virginia, 

Dennis Michael Fitzpatrick, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Ekere Inyangette seeks to appeal his conviction and 

132-month sentence following his guilty plea to one count of 

possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of 

cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006). We 

dismiss the appeal.

In criminal cases, a defendant must file his notice of 

appeal within fourteen days after the entry of judgment.1 Fed. 

R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i). With or without a motion, upon a 

showing of excusable neglect or good cause, the district court 

may grant an extension of up to thirty days to file a notice of 

appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(4); United States v. Reyes, 759 

F.2d 351, 353 (4th Cir. 1985).

The district court entered the criminal judgment on 

October 26, 2009. Inyangette filed his notice of appeal on

September 13, 2012.2

 Because Inyangette failed to file a timely 

notice of appeal or obtain an extension of the appeal period, we 

 1 At the time judgment was entered, the appeal period was 

ten days. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i) (2008). On December 1, 

2009, the period was extended to fourteen days. Fed. R. App. P. 

4(b)(1)(A)(i) (2009). Inyangette’s notice of appeal is untimely 

under either period.

2 For purposes of this appeal, we assume that the date 

appearing on the notice of appeal is the earliest date it could 

have been properly delivered to prison officials for mailing to 

the district court. Fed. R. App. P. 4(c); Houston v. Lack, 487 

U.S. 266, 276 (1988).
3

dismiss the appeal.3 We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

DISMISSED

 3 We note that the appeal period in a criminal case is not a 

jurisdictional provision, but rather a claim-processing rule. 

Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209-14 (2007); United States v. 

Urutyan, 564 F.3d 679, 685 (4th Cir. 2009). However, because

Inyangette’s appeal is inordinately late, and its consideration 

is not in the best interest of judicial economy, we exercise our 

inherent power to dismiss it. United States v. Mitchell, 518 

F.3d 740, 744, 750 (10th Cir. 2008).
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ELECTRONIC RECORD

COA# 05-14-01073-CR OFFENSE: 19.04

Warren Ray Patton, Jr. v. The State

STYLE: ofTexas COUNTY: Kaufman

H3-/4>

COA DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED TRIAL COURT: 422nd Judicial District Court

DATE: 01/06/16 Publish: NO TC CASE #: 14-00353-422-F

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

Warren Ray Patton, Jr. v. The State

STYLE: ofTexas

APPZUAHT^ Petition

FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW IN CCA IS:

Reverb

DATE: is/vi/o

JUDGE: A2

\^0/4

^yl^L^^L

CCA#: i/a-;&

CCA Disposition:

DATE:

JUDGE:

SIGNED:

PUBLISH:

REHEARING IN CCA IS:

JUDGE:

PC:_

DNP:

MOTION FOR

ELECTRONIC RECORD
Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:24893-2 Filed:08/14/23 Entered:08/15/23 17

Envelope Page 1 of 1
Exhibit 32.1   CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350)   In connection with the Report of HST Global, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2015, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Ron Howell, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Company, certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350), that to my knowledge:  1. the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  2. the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.  Dated: May 15, 2015By:\s\ Ron HowellRon HowellChief Executive Officer
#### WEST *v.*STANDARD ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY.

No. 9211.

November 21, 1932.

*Eldon Haldane,*for plaintiff. *Harry L. Greene,*for defendant.

Russell, C. J.

The plaintiff as the transferee of an execution against T. B. West Sr., for alimony, in the statutory proceeding provided by law procured the issuance of a summons of garnishment, which was served upon the Standard Accident Insurance Company. That company filed an answer admitting an indebtedness to West, but alleged that the funds in its hands were the weekly payments awarded by the State Industrial Commission as compensation to West, and therefore were not subject to process of garnishment. The plaintiff filed the following demurrer: *“1.*That part of garnishee’s answer setting up section 22 of the Georgia ivorkmen’s compensation act (Ga. L. 1920, p. 167) as a bar to the plaintiff’s right to maintain his garnishment suit should be stricken, for the following reasons: Section 22 of said act . . is void as being contrary to public policy. 2. Said section of said act is void and unconstitutional, for the reason that it is violative of article 14, section 1, of the constitution of the United States, in that it deprives plaintiff and others of due process of law, and in that it unlawfully restricts the right to contract, in violation of article 14, section 1, of the constitution of the United States.” The plaintiff filed also the folloAving traverse of the answer of the *916garnishee: “Garnishee knew that plaintiff’s suit was based on an execution for alimony, and section *22*of the Georgia workmen’s compensation act did not contemplate the barring of the right of garnishment to the holder of an execution for alimony. Said section is void as being contrary to the public policy of this State, in so far as it attempts to bar the right of garnishment to the holder of an execution for alimony, even though the liability of the garnishee to the defendant arise by virtue of the provisions of the Georgia workmen’s compensation act” (Ga. L. 1920, p. 167). After argument and consideration, separate judgments wer.e entered, the one overruling the demurrer, and the other finding against the traverse. In the bill of exceptions error is assigned upon both of these rulings, but there is no exception to any final judgment in the cause, nor does the record disclose that any judgment has been rendered making final disposition of the case in the lower court. It is obvious, therefore, that the bill of exceptions was prematurely brought, and the writ of error must be dismissed. Though the traverse was overruled following the overruling of the demurrer, the case still pends in the superior court until there has been a final judgment directing the garnishee as to the payment of the funds in its hands, and discharging it from liability upon its obedience to the judgment which the superior court may enter in accordance with the preliminary rulings to which reference has been made, which fixed the law of this case.

*Writ of error dismissed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
Exhibit 32.1  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  In connection with this Annual Report of Cephas Holding Corp., on Form 10-K for the year ending December 31, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Peter Klamka, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify to the best of my knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Sec. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  (1) Such Annual Report on form 10-K for the year ending December 31, 2009, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  (2) The information contained in the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ending December 31, 2009 fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of Cephus Holding Corp.  /s/ Peter Klamka --------------------- Peter Klamka Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer) October 6, 2010
§ 120.125 Waivers from 49 CFR 40.21. An employer subject to this part may petition the Drug Abatement Division, Office of Aerospace Medicine, for a waiver allowing the employer to stand down an employee following a report of a laboratory confirmed positive drug test or refusal, pending the outcome of the verification process. ( a ) Each petition for a waiver must be in writing and include substantial facts and justification to support the waiver. Each petition must satisfy the substantive requirements for obtaining a waiver, as provided in 49 CFR 40.21.
( b ) Each petition for a waiver must be submitted to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Aerospace Medicine, Drug Abatement Division (AAM-800), 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591.
( c ) The Administrator may grant a waiver subject to 49 CFR 40.21(d).
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-1467

DOREEN SHING,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

and

MAY SHING,

Plaintiff,

v.

MD DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES ADMINISTRATION; MD DEPT OF 

HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge. 

(1:16-cv-00683-RDB)

Submitted: January 9, 2017 Decided: January 19, 2017

Before DIAZ and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Doreen Shing, Appellant Pro Se. William G. Dunlap, OFFICE OF 

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for 

Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Doreen and May Shing (“the Shings”) seek to appeal the 

district court’s order dismissing their civil complaint without 

prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This court 

may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291 (2012), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 

28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. 

Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1949). 

Because it is possible that the Shings could cure the defects in 

their complaint through amendment, the order they seek to appeal 

is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or 

collateral order. See Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc’y, 807 

F.3d 619, 623-25 (4th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, we deny as moot 

Appellees’ motion to submit on the briefs, dismiss the appeal 

for lack of jurisdiction, and remand the case to the district 

court with instructions to allow the Shings to file an amended 

complaint. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

DISMISSED AND REMANDED