IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-19-00309-CV

KRISTIN L. PERRYMAN,

Appellant

v.

COTTONWOOD BEND RANCH LLC, WELDON W. ALDERS, AND 

TRINITY MATERIALS, INC.,

Appellees

From the County Court at Law

Navarro County, Texas

Trial Court No. C17-26187-CV

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On June 30, 2021, this Court issued an opinion and judgment reversing the trial 

court’s final judgment and dismissing the case. See generally Perryman v. Cottonwood Bend 

Ranch, LLC, No. 10-19-00309-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 5228 (Tex. App.—Waco June 30, 

2021, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). Appellees, Cottonwood Bend Ranch, LLC, Weldon W. 

Alders, and Trinity Materials, Inc., have filed a motion for rehearing. Appellant, Kirstin 

L. Perryman Sr., filed a response to appellees’ motion for rehearing. After reviewing the 
Perryman v. Cottonwood Bend Ranch LLC, et al. Page 2

motion for rehearing and response thereto, we grant the motion for rehearing with 

respect to appellees’ request to modify the judgment to reflect that the dismissal in this 

case is not with prejudice.1 Accordingly, we withdraw our memorandum opinion and 

judgment issued on June 30, 2021, and substitute this opinion and judgment.

In four issues, Perryman challenges a final judgment entered in favor of appellees. 

Because we sustain Perryman’s first issue, we reverse and dismiss the case.

BACKGROUND

This dispute pertains to Perryman’s use of a levee roadway to access property he 

and his family own. In their first amended petition, appellees alleged that:

On or about August 31, 2010, or at some unknown time thereafter, Kristin 

Perryman, purporting to act as the President of the Levee Improvement 

District, attempted to give himself the right to use a levee that runs on the 

Property in order to obtain access to property that he or his family owned. 

That right was memorialized in a written document (“the Authorization”), 

a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A. Plaintiffs 

didn’t learn about the existence or contents of the Authorization until very 

recently.

Appellees sought to remove a cloud on title to the property and requested declarations 

from the trial court that: (1) “[t]he Authorization is not valid or enforceable because the 

Levee Improvement District was not authorized by its easement to grant Perryman the 

1 Appellees argue that the case can be transferred to the district court in Navarro County and should not 

be dismissed with prejudice. While we agree it should not be dismissed with prejudice, nothing herein 

should be construed as holding or commenting upon whether the matter is or can be properly filed in 

Navarro County. Moreover, we express no opinion regarding appellees’ contention that the jurisdictional 

issue can be remedied by an order of the court without jurisdiction ordering the case transferred to another 

court.
Perryman v. Cottonwood Bend Ranch LLC, et al. Page 3

Authorization”; (2) “[t]he Authorization is not valid or enforceable because it was not 

obtained in connection with a properly noticed and called meeting under Texas Open 

Meetings Act”; (3) “[t]he Authorization is not valid or enforceable because there [sic] no 

meeting of the Levee Improvement District where the Authorization was approved. It is 

a forged government document”; (4) “[t]he Authorization is not valid because Perryman, 

acting on behalf of Levee Improvement District, didn’t have the express or implied 

authority to execute the Authorization”; (5) “[t]he Authorization is not valid or 

enforceable because it violated the Statutes of Frauds”; and (6) “[t]he Authorization is not 

valid or enforceable because it was improperly obtained.” Appellees also requested 

temporary and permanent injunctions to prevent Perryman, his successors, assigns, and 

others associated with him from entering on or upon appellees’ property.

After close to a year of litigation, Perryman disclaimed any right or benefit from 

the Authorization, and the disclaimer was adopted by the Levee District Board. 

Thereafter, appellees filed a traditional motion for summary judgment, arguing that the 

Authorization was not valid or enforceable. In their motion, appellees also sought to 

permanently enjoin Perryman from using their property to access his property.2

 

2 In their motion for injunctive relief, appellees noted that: “The attached affidavits identify the properties 

owned by each of the Plaintiffs and over which the Levee runs that was referenced in the Authorization. 

Since the Authorization is no longer valid or enforceable, the purported right to use the Levee located on 

the Plaintiffs’ properties is non-existent.”
Perryman v. Cottonwood Bend Ranch LLC, et al. Page 4

Perryman filed a response to appellees’ summary-judgment motion, as well as a motion 

to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or, in the alternative, a plea in abatement.3

The trial court denied Perryman’s motion to dismiss and plea in abatement. 

Subsequently, Perryman filed an unverified motion to recuse. Perryman amended his 

motion to recuse three days prior to the hearing on appellees’ summary-judgment motion 

and request for injunctive relief.

The trial court denied Perryman’s motion to recuse and, in its final judgment, 

granted summary judgment in favor of appellees and permanently enjoined Perryman 

from traveling on or upon appellees’ property. 

JURISDICTION

In his first issue, Perryman asserts that the trial court was without jurisdiction to 

hear this matter for two reasons. Perryman alleges that jurisdiction lies in Henderson 

County, Texas, because this matter concerns the Henderson County Levee District No. 3. 

Perryman also argues that the county court at law from which this case is appealed does 

not have jurisdiction over matters involving title to real estate.

3 In response to the motion for summary judgment, Perryman asserted various facts and theories under 

which he, and others, had the authority to use the levee road to access private and public property, 

including that it was a public road, an easement by necessity, and an easement by prescription. Because of 

our disposition of Part 2 of the first issue, we do not reach the issue which challenges the ruling on the 

motion for summary judgment. 
Perryman v. Cottonwood Bend Ranch LLC, et al. Page 5

Standard of Review

In this issue, Perryman complains about the trial court’s denial of his motion to 

dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Essentially, what Perryman filed was a plea to the 

jurisdiction. A plea to the jurisdiction seeks dismissal of a case or a cause of action for 

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Harris County v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 

2004); Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). Subject-matter 

jurisdiction involves a court’s power to hear a case or cause of action. Tellez v. City of 

Socorro, 226 S.W.3d 413, 413 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam). We review the trial court’s ruling 

on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 

217, 228 (Tex. 2004). When such a plea challenges the pleadings, we determine if the 

pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hear 

the case. Id. at 226; see Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 

1993). If the plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we 

consider the relevant evidence submitted by the parties when necessary to resolve the 

jurisdictional issues raised. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227. If the evidence creates a fact 

question regarding the jurisdictional issue, then the trial court cannot grant the plea to 

the jurisdiction, and the fact issue will be resolved by the fact finder. Id. at 227-28. If the 

relevant evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact question on the jurisdictional issue, 

the trial court rules on the plea to the jurisdiction as a matter of law. Id. Further, we take 
Perryman v. Cottonwood Bend Ranch LLC, et al. Page 6

as true all evidence favorable to the non-movant and indulge every reasonable inference 

and resolve any doubts in the non-movant’s favor. Id. at 228. 

Jurisdiction of the County Court at Law of Navarro County

In his second argument in this issue, Perryman contends that the County Court at 

Law of Navarro County lacked jurisdiction over this dispute because statutory county 

courts do not have jurisdiction over matters involving title to real estate. This contention 

requires us to examine several provisions of the Government Code, which establish the 

jurisdiction of statutory county courts like the County Court at Law of Navarro County.

In construing a statute, we give effect to the Legislature’s intent, which requires us 

to first look to the statute’s plain language. Lippincott v. Whisenhunt, 462 S.W.3d 507, 509 

(Tex. 2015); Leland v. Brandal, 257 S.W.3d 204, 206 (Tex. 2008). If that language is 

unambiguous, we interpret the statute according to its plain meaning. Lippincott, 462 

S.W.3d at 509; Leland, 257 S.W.3d at 206. We presume the Legislature included each word 

in the statute for a purpose and that words not included were purposefully omitted. 

Lippincott, 462 S.W.3d at 509; see In re M.N., 262 S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tex. 2008).

“Navarro County has one statutory county court, the County Court at Law of 

Navarro County.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 25.1771. As stated above, the jurisdiction of 

the County Court at Law of Navarro County is in dispute here.

Because the jurisdiction of the County Court at Law begins with the jurisdiction of 

the county court, our analysis must also begin there. The general provision for 
Perryman v. Cottonwood Bend Ranch LLC, et al. Page 7

jurisdiction of a county court, sometimes referred to as a constitutional county court, is 

section 26.042 of the Government Code. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 26.042. That section 

provides jurisdiction over general civil and juvenile matters. See id.

More important, however, to our analysis are matters over which the 

constitutional county courts do not have jurisdiction. In that regard, section 26.043 of the 

Government Code sets out, “Civil Matters in Which County Court is Without 

Jurisdiction.” Id. § 26.043. Specifically, section 26.043 provides that: “A county court 

does not have jurisdiction in . . . a suit for the recovery of land.” Id. § 26.043(8). This 

provision has long been determined to prevent the county court from trying any case in 

which the title to land is at issue. See Coughran v. Nunez, 133 Tex. 303, 308-09, 127 S.W.2d 

885, 888 (1939); Stewart v. Rockdale State Bank, 124 Tex. 431, 434-35, 79 S.W.2d 116, 117 

(1935); Bradley v. Love, 60 Tex. 472, 476 (1883); see also Benavides v. Benavides, 174 S.W. 293, 

294 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1915, no writ).

To understand the county court’s jurisdiction is important because it is referenced 

in section 25.0003(a) of the Government Code, which is the general jurisdiction statute for 

all county courts at law. Specifically, section 25.0003 of the Government Code provides, 

in relevant part:

(a) A statutory county court has jurisdiction over all causes and proceedings, 

civil and criminal, original and appellate, prescribed by law for county courts.

(b) A statutory county court does not have jurisdiction over causes and 

proceedings concerning roads, bridges, and public highways and the 
Perryman v. Cottonwood Bend Ranch LLC, et al. Page 8

general administration of county business that is within the jurisdiction of 

the commissioners court of each county.

(c) In addition to other jurisdiction provided by law, a statutory county court 

exercising civil jurisdiction concurrent with the constitutional jurisdiction 

of the county court has concurrent jurisdiction with the district court in:

(1) civil cases in which the matter in controversy exceeds $500 but does 

not exceed $250,000, excluding interest, statutory or punitive 

damages and penalties, and attorney’s fees and costs, as alleged on 

the face of the petition . . . .

Id. § 25.0003 (emphasis added). 

But the Legislature may also grant more expansive or restrictive jurisdiction, as 

they did when creating the County Court at Law for Navarro County. Section 25.1772 of 

the Texas Government Code further expands the jurisdiction of the County Court at Law 

of Navarro County to include the following, among other things:

(a) In addition to the jurisdiction provided by Section 25.0003 and other law, 

and except as limited by Subsection (b), a county court at law in Navarro 

County has concurrent jurisdiction with the district court in:

. . .

(6) disputes ancillary to probate, eminent domain, condemnation, or 

landlord and tenant matters relating to the adjudication and 

determination of land title and trusts, whether testamentary, inter vivos, 

constructive, resulting, or any other class or type of trust, regardless of 

the amount in controversy or the remedy sought . . . .

Id. § 25.1772(a)(6). The Legislature also limited the court’s jurisdiction over some matters. 

Section 25.1772 lists four types of cases that the Navarro County Court at Law does not 

have jurisdiction of: “(1) suits on behalf of this state to recover penalties or escheated 
Perryman v. Cottonwood Bend Ranch LLC, et al. Page 9

property; (2) felony cases involving capital murder; (3) misdemeanors involving official 

misconduct; or (4) contested elections.” Id. § 27.1772(b). Moreover, section 26.275 of the 

Government Code states that: “The County Court of Navarro County has the general 

jurisdiction of a probate court, general criminal jurisdiction, and juvenile jurisdiction as 

provided by Section 26.042(b) but has no other civil jurisdiction.” Id. § 26.275 (emphasis 

added). 

In the instant case, appellees sought: (1) to remove a cloud on title to the property 

in question; and (2) various declarations that the Authorization granting an easement was 

invalid and unenforceable. Based on appellee’s allegations, it is clear that this suit 

involves a question of title to real property over which the County Court at Law of 

Navarro County does not have jurisdiction. This is because a plain reading of section 

25.1772 of the Texas Government Code limits the County Court at Law of Navarro

County’s authority to adjudicate and determine land title to landlord and tenant matters, 

which are not at issue in this case. See id. § 25.1772(a)(6). Appellees do not cite, nor are 

we aware of, authority granting jurisdiction to the County Court at Law of Navarro 

County to adjudicate a title dispute or to quiet title in these circumstances. Therefore, 

even taking as true all evidence favorable to the non-movant and indulging every 

reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in the non-movant’s favor, we conclude 

that the trial court erred by failing to dismiss appellees’ suit for lack of jurisdiction. See 

Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228. Accordingly, we sustain Perryman’s first issue.
Perryman v. Cottonwood Bend Ranch LLC, et al. Page 10

CONCLUSION

Because we have sustained Perryman’s first issue, which affords him the greatest 

relief, we need not address his remaining issues. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1, 47.4. 

Furthermore, having sustained Perryman’s first issue, we reverse the trial court’s order 

denying Perryman’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and the trial court’s final 

judgment in favor of appellees and render a judgment of dismissal of the entire case for 

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

TOM GRAY

Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Johnson,

and Justice Davis4

Reversed and dismissed

Opinion delivered and filed December 22, 2021

[CV06]

4 The Honorable Rex Davis, Senior Justice (Retired) of the Tenth Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of 

the Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 74.003, 75.002, 75.003.