alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
----

(2004/C 88 E/0289)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-1110/04

by Christine De Veyrac (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(14 April 2004)

Subject:   Transeuropean transport networks

The list of priority projects stemming from transeuropean transport networks is currently being finalised by the Council and the European Parliament.

With which authority does the decision to determine the exact course of these projects lie?

Is it the European Commission on the grounds of its power to implement the decision?

Is it the Parliament and Council, as co-legislators and holders of the power of codecision in this case?

Or is it for each Member State to decide for the part of the project situated on its territory?

Will local authorities be consulted?

Finally, to what extent will local community associations and citizens be made partners in the process of determining the guidelines?

Answer given by Mrs de Palacio on behalf of the Commission

(30 April 2004)

The determination of the exact route alignment of a priority project falls under the responsibility of the project promoter, which can be the State, a region or a local administration depending on the legal framework applicable in the Member State concerned. Directive 2001/42/EC of the Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001, on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment (1) and 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (2) apply to these projects. These lay down requirements for the consultation of all relevant stakeholders. In addition, national procedures for granting development consent or building permits are applicable and foresee consultation of concerned stakeholders.

----

(1)OJ L 197, 21.7.2001.

(2)OJ L 175, 5.7.1985 as amended by Council Directive 97/11/EC of 3 March 1997, OJ L 73, 14.3.1997.

----
###### Editorial Note on Part 21

#### Editorial Notes:

1. For miscellaneous amendments to cross references in this 21 see Amdt. 21-10, 31 FR 9211, July 6, 1966.

2. Nomenclature changes to part 21 appear at 74 FR 53384, Oct. 16, 2009.

#### § 21.121 Applicability.

This subpart prescribes rules for production under a type certificate.
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3733 Engrossed in House (EH)]

  2d Session

                               H. R. 3733

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 410 Huston Street in Altamont, Kansas, as the ``Myron V. George Post 
                               Office''.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
108th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 3733

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 410 Huston Street in Altamont, Kansas, as the ``Myron V. George Post 
                               Office''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DESIGNATION.

    The facility of the United States Postal Service located at 410 
Huston Street in Altamont, Kansas, shall be known and designated as the 
``Myron V. George Post Office''.

SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

    Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper, or other 
record of the United States to the facility referred to in section 1 
shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Myron V. George Post 
Office''.

            Passed the House of Representatives March 16, 2004.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
```
§ 145.205 Maintenance, preventive maintenance, and alterations performed for certificate holders under parts 121, 125, and 135, and for foreign air carriers or foreign persons operating a U.S.-registered aircraft in common carriage under part 129. ( a ) A certificated repair station that performs maintenance, preventive maintenance, or alterations for an air carrier or commercial operator that has a continuous airworthiness maintenance program under part 121 or part 135 must follow the air carrier's or commercial operator's program and applicable sections of its maintenance manual.
( b ) A certificated repair station that performs inspections for a certificate holder conducting operations under part 125 must follow the operator's FAA-approved inspection program.
( c ) A certificated repair station that performs maintenance, preventive maintenance, or alterations for a foreign air carrier or foreign person operating a U.S.-registered aircraft under part 129 must follow the operator's FAA-approved maintenance program.
( d ) The FAA may grant approval for a certificated repair station to perform line maintenance for an air carrier certificated under part 121 or part 135 of this chapter, or a foreign air carrier or foreign person operating a U.S.-registered aircraft in common carriage under part 129 of this chapter on any aircraft of that air carrier or person, provided- ( 1 ) The certificated repair station performs such line maintenance in accordance with the operator's manual, if applicable, and approved maintenance program;
( 2 ) The certificated repair station has the necessary equipment, trained personnel, and technical data to perform such line maintenance; and
( 3 ) The certificated repair station's operations specifications include an authorization to perform line maintenance.
[Docket No. FAA-1999-5836, 66 FR 41117, Aug. 6, 2001, as amended by Docket FAA-2016-8744, Amdt. 145-31, 81 FR 49163, July 27, 2016]
Editorial Note on Part 21
Editorial Notes: 1. For miscellaneous amendments to cross references in this 21 see Amdt. 21-10, 31 FR 9211, July 6, 1966. 2. Nomenclature changes to part 21 appear at 74 FR 53384, Oct. 16, 2009.

§ 21.605 Organization. ( a ) Each applicant for or holder of a TSO authorization must provide the FAA with a document— ( 1 ) Describing how its organization will ensure compliance with the provisions of this subpart;
( 2 ) Describing assigned responsibilities, delegated authorities, and the functional relationship of those responsible for quality to management and other organizational components; and
( 3 ) Identifying an accountable manager.
( b ) The accountable manager specified in paragraph (a) of this section must be responsible within the applicant's or production approval holder's organization for, and have authority over, all production operations conducted under this part. The accountable manager must confirm that the procedures described in the quality manual required by § 21.608 are in place and that the production approval holder satisfies the requirements of the applicable regulations of subchapter C, Aircraft. The accountable manager must serve as the primary contact with the FAA.
[Doc. No. FAA-2013-0933, Amdt. 21-98, 80 FR 59032, Oct. 1, 2015]
#### § 204.6 Certificated and commuter air carriers proposing a change in operations, ownership, or management which is not substantial.

Carriers proposing to make a change which would not substantially affect their operations, management, or ownership, such as certificated carriers applying for additional authority which would not substantially change their operations, will be presumed to be fit and need not file any information relating to their fitness at time of the change. However, if the Department concludes, from its own analysis or based on information submitted by third parties, that such change may bring the carrier's fitness into question, the Department may require the applicant carrier to file additional information.
#### Oliver H. Rudd *vs.*William Rudd, Alias William M. Chapel et ux.

Second Judicial District, Norwich,

October Term, 1915.

Prentice, C. J., Thayer, Roraback, Wheeler and Beach, Js.

Under a general denial the defendant is not restricted in his evidence to a mere formal negation of the allegations of the complaint, but may affirmatively prove any state of facts which is inconsistent with the truth of the plaintiff’s averments.

Proof that property conveyed to the defendants was an absolute gift to them necessarily disproves an allegation that it was transferred to them in trust and upon their promise to reconvey upon request.

Argued October 19th

decided December 17th, 1915.

Action to set aside a conveyance of real estate, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New London County, *Bennett, J.;*facts found and judgment rendered for the defendants, and appeal by the plaintiff.

*No error.*

*Charles W. Comstock,*for the appellant (plaintiff).

*Charles V. James,*with whom was *Arthur M. Brown,*for the appellees (defendants).

Prentice, C. J.

This action was brought to set aside a conveyance of real estate made by the plaintiff to the defendants, husband and wife, the wife being the daughter of the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that the conveyance was one made without consideration, and upon an agreement that the defendants should hold *6the title in trust to and for the use of the plaintiff, who was to remain the real owner, and that upon request the defendants were to reconvey it. The defendants denied this allegation.

The court found that there was no trust connected with the conveyance, but that, on the contrary, the transaction was a gift, and rendered judgment for the defendants.

The plaintiff’s appeal claims that the court erred in that it found a fact outside of'the issues, and rested its judgment upon such fact, to wit: that the conveyance was made as a gift. In this the plaintiff is mistaken. He alleged that the conveyance was made in trust for him, and that he was to remain the beneficial owner of the property. That allegation, expressly denied, it was incumbent upon him to prove. It was disproved by the establishment of an inconsistent state of facts, and the defendants, under the issues, were privileged to estabfish such state of facts. Rules under the Practice Act, §160 (p. 250). They were not restricted to a mere direct denial of that which was alleged, but had the right to show by appropriate evidence that the fact was other than as alleged. *Morehouse*v. *Remson,*59 Conn. 392, 395, 22 Atl. 427. By establishing that the transaction was a gift from father to daughter and son-in-law, the plaintiff’s assertion, which lay at the foundation of his case, was effectually negatived.

The court, therefore, did not go outside of the issues when it found that there was a gift. Neither did it when it found the existence of the essentials of a good gift, to wit, a sound mind and lack of improvidence on the part of the giver, which findings are also complained of as not being within the issues.

There is no error.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.
#### EVERAGE v. HUDSON & THOMPSON.

(Decided January 21st, 1915.)

Appeal from. Andalusia City Court.

Heard before Hon. Ed. T. Albritton.

No counsel marked for either party.

Per curiam.

Appeal dismissed.
Exhibit 32.1

                            Certification pursuant to
                             18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
                             as adopted pursuant to
                  Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002


Aubrey L.  Dunn,  Jr.,  President  and Chief  Executive  Officer  and  George A.
Rosenbaum,  Jr.,  Executive Vice President and Chief Financial  Officer of First
Federal  Banc of the  Southwest,  Inc.  (the  "Company")  each  certify in their
capacity as officers of the Company that they have  reviewed the amendment no. 1
to the annual  report of the  Company  on Form  10-KSB/A  for the  fiscal  ended
September 30, 2006 and that to the best of their knowledge:

1.       the report fully complies with  the requirements of  Sections 13(a) of
         the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.       the  information  contained  in  the  report  fairly  presents,  in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
         the Company.



January 26, 2007                           \s\ Aubrey L. Dunn, Jr.
------------------------------------       -------------------------------------
Date                                       Aubrey L. Dunn, Jr.
                                           President and Chief Executive Officer


January 26, 2007                           \s\ George A. Rosenbaum, Jr.
------------------------------------       -------------------------------------
Date                                       George A. Rosenbaum, Jr.
                                           Executive Vice President and
                                           Chief Financial Officer


The purpose of this  statement  is solely to comply  with Title 18,  Chapter 63,
Section  1350 of the United  States  Code,  as  amended  by  Section  906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.

A signed  original of this  written  statement  required by Section 906 has been
provided to First  Federal Banc of the  Southwest,  Inc. and will be retained by
First Federal Banc of the  Southwest,  Inc. and furnished to the  Securities and
Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
[Federal Register Volume 65, Number 86 (Wednesday, May 3, 2000)]
[Notices]
[Page 25745]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 00-10974]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Bureau of Land Management

[NV-920-1990-NJ]


Notice of Availability of the Programmatic Environmental 
Assessment for Selected Actions Taken for Mining Claim Use and 
Occupancy in Nevada, and the Finding of No Significant Impact

AGENCY: Bureau of Land Management, Interior.

ACTION: Notice of availability.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: In accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 
1969 (NEPA), and Use and Occupancy Under the Mining Laws regulations 
(43 CFR 3715), the Bureau of Land Management has prepared an 
environmental assessment (EA) that evaluates the impacts of typical 
mining claim and/or mill site occupancies. This EA describes and 
analyzes the proposed action, consisting of six typical occupancy 
scenarios, and the no occupancy option. The actions analyzed in this EA 
involve operations that disturb 5 acres or less. This notice is 
intended to inform the public of the analysis of impacts presented in 
the EA and the performance measures developed for the proposed action.

DATES: Copies of the EA and the Finding of No Significant Impact 
(FONSI) will be provided to any person or agency, or to other 
interested parties, upon written request.

ADDRESSES: Send requests for the EA to: Bureau of Land Management, 
Nevada State Office, P.O. Box 12000, Reno, NV 89520-0006.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Bob Gibson, Geologist, Nevada State 
Office. Telephone: (775) 861-6564.

Robert V. Abbey,
State Director.
[FR Doc. 00-10974 Filed 5-2-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4310-HC-M
§ 14.22 Answer to application. ( a ) Within 30 days after service of an application, counsel representing the agency against which an award is sought may file an answer to the application. Unless agency counsel requests an extension of time for filing or files a statement of intent to negotiate under paragraph (b) of the section, failure to file an answer within the 30-day period may be treated as a consent to the award requested.
( b ) If the FAA's counsel and the applicant believe that the issues in the fee application can be settled, they may jointly file a statement of their intent to negotiate a settlement. The filing of this statement shall extend the time for filing an answer for an additional 30 days, and further extensions may be granted by the ALJ or adjudicative officer upon request by the FAA's counsel and the applicant.
( c ) The answer shall explain in detail any objections to the award requested and identify the facts relied on in support of agency counsel's position. If the answer is based on any alleged facts not already in the record of the proceeding, agency counsel shall include with the answer either supporting affidavits or a request for further proceedings under § 14.26.
[54 FR 46199, Nov. 1, 1989, as amended by Amdt. 14-03, 64 FR 32936, June 18, 1999]
Editorial Note on Part 21
Editorial Notes: 1. For miscellaneous amendments to cross references in this 21 see Amdt. 21-10, 31 FR 9211, July 6, 1966. 2. Nomenclature changes to part 21 appear at 74 FR 53384, Oct. 16, 2009.

§ 21.613 Duration. ( a ) A TSO authorization or letter of TSO design approval is effective until surrendered, withdrawn, or otherwise terminated by the FAA.
( b ) If a TSO is revised or canceled, the holder of an affected FAA letter of acceptance of a statement of conformance, TSO authorization, or letter of TSO design approval may continue to manufacture articles that meet the original TSO without obtaining a new acceptance, authorization, or approval but must comply with the requirements of this chapter.
#### Charles E. Thomas *et al., Plaintiffs in Error,*v. Louis J. Nathan, *et al., Defendants in Error.*

Opinion Filed April 27, 1913.

On Rehearing.

1. Where there is in fact a default, the omission to make an entry thereof may be a merely technical and harmless error.

2. Where there is a default in fact and it does not affirmatively appear that a default judgment was not entered, and it may be inferred from the record that such an entry was made but was not included in the transcript on writ of error, the final judgment will not be reversed because no default judgment is in the transcript of the record.

3. A party in default may make a motion for a new trial in a cause in due course if the proceedings justify it.

Rehearing Denied.

Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Duval County.

*Gibbons, Maxwell, MoGarry*& *Darnel,*for Plaintiffs in Error;

*Coelerell*& *Coclvrell,*for Defendants in Error.

*392Per Curiam.

A petition for rehearing suggests that the court did not consider the first three assignments of error ; that the court failed to note that neither Thomas nor Perry appeared in the trial court and that variances as to them could not have been set up in a motion for new trial; “that the judgment as against Perry and Thomas was by default” and variances as to them should be considered without motion for new trial or motion in arrest of judgment; and that “there can be no motion for new trial by defendants against whom judgment is rendered by default.”

The first assignment of error is that “there was no judgment by default ever made and entered against the defendants, Charles E. Thomas and E. A. Perry, upon which to base the final judgment.” It does not affirmatively appear by the record that no judgment by default was entered, and the failure to note of record a default in fact, is “a merely technical and hariless error.” 6 Ency. Pl. & Pr. 56. In the directions given by counsel under the rules for making the transcript of the record brought here on writ of error, the judgment by default is not among the enumerated papers to be included in the transcript, and counsel directed the clerk to “omit all other papers, pleadings, orders and judgments.” There is nothing here to show that a default entry was not in fact made and omitted from the transcript under the directions given to the clerk. The assignments of error and the petition for rehearing clearly show “that the judgment against Perry and Thomas was by default.”

The second and third'assignments of error relate to asserted variance between the allegations and proofs. If there is anything in the proceedings on which to base a motion for new trial the defaulting defendants could *393have had a motion for new trial, even though they were in default. If there is nothing on which to base a motion for new trial the defaulting defendants cannot justly complain. In Baker & Holmes Co. v. Indian River State Bank, 61 Fla. 106, 55 South. Rep. 836, it Avas held that the “judgment must IoIIoav the verdict and conform to the pleadings.”

Rehearing denied.

All concur, except Cockrell, J., who takes no part.
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 10.1

                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS


We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statement on Form F-3 (No. 333-7140) of POSCO and subsidiaries (the "Company")
of our report dated March 6, 2003 relating to the consolidated balance sheets as
of December 31, 2001 and 2002 and the related consolidated statements of income,
statements of changes in shareholders' equity and cash flows for the three-year
period ended December 31, 2002, which appears in this Form 20-F.




Samil Accounting Corporation, member firm of PricewaterhouseCoopers


Seoul, Korea
May 6, 2003
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANDREA CLAIRE WOOD,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

and

TP, a minor child; LIZA LEANO, guardian ad litem for minor child TP,

Plaintiffs,

v.

COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA, a government entity; KELLIE CASE, in her

official and in di vidual capacity; EDYTH WILLIAMS, in her official and individual capacity ; CECELIA GUTIERREZ, in her official and individual capacity; ERICA BAINS, in her individual capacity; STATE OF CALIFORNIA, a government entity; RAVINDER BAINS, in his indiv i dual capacity; CONTRA COSTA COUNTY OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF; DAVID O. LIVINGSTON; ACA DIA CHIDI; KIM JOHNSON; CALIFORNIA HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; MARK GHALY,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 21

- 15085

D.C. No. 3:19

- cv

- 07597

- MMC

MEMORANDUM *

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3. 

# FILED

FEB 24 2022

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 21

- 15085 Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California Maxine M. Chesney, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 15, 2022 * *

Before: FERNANDEZ, TASHIMA, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

Andrea Claire Wood appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying

her motion for relief from the judgment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion the denial of a motion under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty

. , Or. v.

ACandS, Inc. , 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir. 1993). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Wood’s post

judgment Rule 60(b) motion because Wood failed to establish any grounds for

relief. See id. at 1263 (setting forth factors for relief from judgment under Rule

60(b)).

We rej ect as meritless Wood’s contentions regarding the merits of her case

and that the district court was required to state findings of fact and conclusions of

law in its post

-

judgment order. See Molloy v. Wilson , 878 F.2d 313, 315 (9th Cir.

1989) (“An appeal from a denial of a Rule 60(b) motion brings up only the denial

of the motion for review, not the merits of the underlying judgment.”); see also

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).3 21

- 15085

Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(3) (“The court is not required to state findings or conclusions

when ruling on a motion un der Rule 12 or 56 or, unless these rules provide

otherwise, on any other motion.”).

Defendants’ motion (Docket Entry No. 18) is granted in part. The Clerk is

directed to place under seal the exhibits attached to Wood’s opening brief (Docket

Entry No. 8). All other pending motions and requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.