FILED

October 20, 1997

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appe llate Court C lerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

FOR PUBLICATION

JAMES DAVID CARTER, ) Filed: October 20, 1997

)

Appellant, ) Hon. James E. Beckner

) Judge

Vs. )

) GREENE COUNTY

STATE OF TENNESSEE, )

) Supreme Court

Appellee. ) No. 03-S01-9612-CR-00119

)

APPELLANT FOR APPELLEE:

Gary C. Shockley, Esq. John Knox Walkup

Baker, Donelson, Bearman & Caldwell Attorney General & Reporter

Nashville, Tennessee

Michael E. Moore

Solicitor General

Kathy Morante

Deputy Attorney General

John P. Cauley

450 James Robertson Pkwy.

Nashville, Tennessee

C. Berkeley Bell

District Attorney General

Eric Christiansen

Assistant District Attorney General 

O P I N I O N

TRIAL COURT AND

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. DROWOTA, J. 
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We granted the petitioner, James David Carter, permission to appeal to

consider whether the lower courts erred by dismissing Carter’s petition for postconviction relief upon the grounds that his claims alleging violations of State v.

Middlebrooks 840 S.W.2d 317 (Tenn. 1992) (Drowota, J. and O’Brien, J.,

dissenting), and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215

(1963), have been previously determined by the federal district court, and that his

claim challenging the constitutionality of the reasonable doubt instruction given at

his trial, is without merit.

We agree with the lower courts that the reasonable doubt jury instruction

given at Carter’s trial did not violate Cage v. Louisiana, 489 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct.

328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990) and its progeny and that the Brady claim was

previously determined by the federal district court. Moreover, even though

Carter’s Middlebrooks claim was not previously determined since the federal

district court was not a “court of competent jurisdiction” to resolve the state law

issue, we hold that in the context of this case, Middlebrooks does not preclude

reliance upon the felony murder aggravating circumstance as a basis for

imposition of the death penalty. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of

Criminal Appeals upholding the trial court’s dismissal of Carter’s petition is

affirmed as modified.

BACKGROUND

The petitioner, James David Carter, was tried on a one count indictment

charging both premeditated and felony first degree murder. The jury returned a
1

The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with or preventing a

lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant and was committed while the defendant was engaged

in comm itting larceny and kidn aping. Te nn. Cod e Ann. § 39-2-20 3(i) (6) & (7) (1982 R epl.)

(repeale d), now codified at T enn. Co de Ann . § 39-13 -204(I)(6 ) & (7) (19 91 Re pl. & 1996 Supp.). 

2

The 1982 statute required only a showing that there were no mitigating circumstances

sufficiently substantial to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-

203(g)(2) (1982 Repl.) The statute now requires that aggravating circumstances outweigh

mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(f) & (g) (1991

Repl). 

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general verdict of first degree murder and sentenced Carter to death by

electrocution upon finding that there were two statutory aggravating

circumstances,1 and no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for

leniency.2 On direct appeal, the conviction and sentence were affirmed by this

Court. State v. Carter, 714 S.W.2d 241 (Tenn. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1046,

107 S.Ct. 910, 93 L.Ed.2d 860 (1987). Carter then filed his first post-conviction

petition, which was unsuccessful. James David Carter, No. 304 Greene County,

(Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, filed Sept. 14, 1989). Following a second

unsuccessful petition for post-conviction relief, Carter v. State, 802 S.W.2d 223

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1990), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 1991), this Court granted the

State’s motion to set an execution date and designated April 3, 1991.

Thereafter, on March 13, 1991, Carter filed his original petition seeking a

writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court of middle Tennessee. That court

issued a stay of execution, appointed counsel, and subsequently transferred the

case to the federal district court in east Tennessee. After the transfer, the petition

for habeas corpus was amended. In the federal action Carter claimed that when a

defendant has been convicted of felony murder, the use of the felony murder

aggravating circumstance to support the sentence of death is unconstitutional. 
3Certiorari was granted in Tennessee v. Middlebrooks, 507 U.S. 1028, 113 S.Ct. 1840, 123

L.Ed.2d 466 (19 93), and a motion to dismiss on the ba sis that ad equate and inde pende nt state

ground s supp orted this C ourt’s dec ision was denied. Tennessee v. Middlebrooks, 510 U.S.

805,114 S.Ct. 48, 126 L.Ed.2d 19 (1993). The case was argued and subsequently, before the

United States Supreme Court had rendered its decision, this Court’s opinion in How ell was

release d. There after, certiora ri was dis misse d as imp roviden tly granted . Tennessee v.

Middlebrooks, 510 U.S. 124, 114 S.Ct. 651, 126 L.Ed.2d 5 55 (1993).

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When the habeas corpus petition was filed in 1991, Middlebrooks had not been

rendered. In that case, a majority of this Court specifically held that “when the

defendant is convicted of first degree murder solely on the basis of felony murder,”

use of the felony murder aggravating circumstance is not permissible because it

“does not narrow the class of death-eligible murderers sufficiently under the Eighth

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and Article I, § 16 of the Tennessee

Constitution because it duplicates the elements of the offense.” Id., 840 S.W.2d at

346. The decision in Middlebrooks was considered to be based on federal

constitutional law3 until this Court’s subsequent decision in State v. Howell, 868

S.W.2d 238, 259, n. 7 (Tenn. 1993), clarified that the Middlebrooks holding was

independently based on Article 1, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution.

Despite the independent state constitutional basis for the decision in

Middlebrooks, the federal district court considered the claim in the habeas corpus

action while ruling on the State’s motion for summary judgment. By orders

entered in November and December of 1994, the district court concluded that

since the jury returned a general verdict of first degree murder, Middlebrooks does

not apply to Carter’s case because he was not convicted “solely on the basis of

felony murder.” The federal district court also granted the State’s motion for

summary judgment on Carter’s alleged Brady violations.
4

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-112(a) (1990 & Supp. 1994)(Repealed). By a law effective May

10, 1995 , the Pos t-Conv iction Proc edure Act was comp letely rewritten. 1995 P ublic Cha pter 207 , §

1. Th e petition fo r pos t-con victio n relie f whic h is the sub ject of this a ppeal wa s dism issed on A pril

12, 1995, prior to the effective date of the law as amended. However, the new law also provides

that “[a] ground for relief is previously determined if a court of competent jurisdiction has ruled on

the merits after a full and fair hearing.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-206(h) (1996 Supp.). Therefore,

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Following this disposition in federal court, Carter filed his third petition for

post-conviction relief in state court on January 30, 1995. As grounds for relief,

Carter alleged that the trial court instructions on reasonable doubt at his trial

violated Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990),

that the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady and that

his sentence of death violated Middlebrooks. The trial court dismissed Carter’s

post-conviction petition, finding that the asserted violations of Middlebrooks and

Brady had been previously determined by the federal district court and that the

alleged error in the reasonable doubt jury instructions was without merit. The

Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal, and also found, as

did the federal district court, that Middlebrooks does not apply unless the

defendant is convicted of first degree murder “solely on the basis of felony

murder.” Id., 840 S.W.2d at 346. Thereafter, we granted Carter’s application for

permission to appeal and now affirm the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

PREVIOUSLY DETERMINED

A. Court of Competent Jurisdiction - Middlebrooks

The statutory provision relevant to the defense of previous determination

provides that “[a] ground for relief is ‘previously determined’ if a court of competent

jurisdiction has ruled on the merits after a full and fair hearing.”4

 In this Court,
our holding in this case applies with equal force to the new law since the statutory provisions are

identical.

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Carter argues that the jurisdiction of federal district courts in habeas corpus

proceedings does not extend to questions of state law. Since the federal district

court was not a “court of competent jurisdiction,” to consider his Middlebrooks

claim, Carter argues that the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals erred

by concluding that the claim was previously determined. The State responds that

the federal district court necessarily and appropriately considered the state

constitutional issue when it decided the federal constitutional question. In

addition, the State says that Carter chose to assert his Middlebrooks claim in the

federal forum and should be bound by that court’s decision on the claim.

It is well-settled that federal courts have the power under Article III of the

United States Constitution to exercise pendent jurisdiction over state law claims. 

United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130,

1138, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). However, Gibbs delineated only the constitutional

boundaries of federal judicial power. The jurisdiction of federal courts over a

particular controversy may be limited by federal statutes. Aldinger v. Howard, 427

U.S. 1, 13-14, 96 S.Ct. 2413, 2419-20, 49 L.Ed.2d 276 (1976). Indeed, the

United States Supreme Court described the jurisdictional hierarchy as follows:

It is apparent that Gibbs delineated the constitutional limits of

federal judicial power. . . . Constitutional power is merely the first

hurdle that must be overcome in determining that a federal court has

jurisdiction over a particular controversy. For the jurisdiction of

federal courts is limited not only by the provisions of Art. III . . . but

also by Acts of Congress.

Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 371-72, 98 S.Ct. 2396,