1 (Slip Opini o n) OCTOBER T ERM , 20 06 Sy llabu s N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a rt of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detro it Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
Sy llabu s 

### N O RF OL K S O UT HE RNRAI LWAY C O

. v . SORREL L

CERTIORARI TO THE COU R T OF APPEALS OF M I SS OURI No. 05–7 46. Ar g u ed Oc tober10, 2006— D e c i ded Jan uar y10, 2007 Res p ondentSorrell wa s injured while wo rking for t h e pet i t i oner ra il

road (Norfolk), and sought damages for his inj uries in Mis s o uri s t at e court under th e Federa l Employers ’ Liab ilit yAct(FELA), which ma kes ara ilroa d liab l e for an employee’s inj uries “ r es ulting in whole or in pa rtfrom [t he ra ilroad’s ] negligence ,” S e ct ion 1

. FELA reduces an ydamag e s aw ar ded to a nemploy ee “i npr opor tiont oth e a m ou n t [of negligence] attribut able to” the emplo y ee, Section 3. Missouri’s jury instructions apply different causation stan dards to railroad neg

ligence a n d employee cont rib u t o ry neglig ence in FELA a c t i ons . An employee will be found contributorilynegligent if his negligence “di

rect ly co nt rib u t e d t oca us e” t h e inj u ry , w h ile ra ilroa d negligen ce is mea s ured b y whet h er t h e r a ilroa d’s negligence “ c o n t r ib ut ed in whole or in pa rt” t oth e inj u ry . Aft e r t h e t r ia l co urtove rruled Norfolk’s ob

j e ct ion t h a tthe ins t ruct ion on cont rib u t o ry neglige n c econt a i ned a different stan dard than the railroad negligence instruct ion, the jury a w a r ded S o rrell $ 1

. 5 million. The Mis s o uri Courtof Appea l s a f

firmed, rej e ct ing Norfolk’s cont ent i on t h a tt h e sa me ca u s a t i on s t a n da rd s h ould a pply t ob o t hpa rt ies ’ negligence. Held: 1. Nor folk’s at tempt to ex pa n dth e qu esti onpr esen ted to en c o m pass whatth e FELA c a u s ations tan dar dsh ou ld be, n o t si mply whet h er t h e s t a n da rd s h ould b et h e sa me for ra ilroa d negligence a n d employee cont rib u t o ry negli g ence , is rej e ct ed. This Cou r tis t y pica lly r e lu c tan t to per m it par t ie s to smu g gl e addition al qu es tion s in to a ca s ea f t e r t h e gra n tof cert iora ri. Alt h ough t h e Courtcould cons ider th e qu estion of w h at s tan d a r dappl ies a s an ter i orto th e qu estion whether the standards may differ, th e substantive conte n t of the cau

sationst an dar dis asig n ific an t en ou ghissu e th atth e Cou r tpr efer s n o t to addr ess it w h e nit h a s n o t beenfu lly pr esen ted. Pp. 4–6.2 NORFOLK SOUTHERN R. CO. v. SORRELL Sy llabu s 2

. The s a me c a us a t ion s t a n da rd a pplies to ra ilroa d negligence un

der FELA S e ct ion 1 as t o employeecont rib u t o ry negli g ence u n der S e ct ion 3

. Abs e ntexpres s la ngua ge t ot h e cont ra ry, t h eelement s of a FELA claim are determined by reference to the common law, Urie v. Thompson , 337 U. S. 16 3, 1 8 2 , an d u n l ess c o mmon - lawp r in c i ples ar e ex pr esslyr ejec t ed inFELA’s tex t , th eyare en titled to gr eat w e igh t , Consolidated Rail Corporati o nv. Gott shal l , 512 U. S. 53 2, 544. Th e prevailing common-law view at the ti me FELA was en acted was tha t t h e ca us a t i on s t a n da rds for negligen ce a n d cont rib u t o ry negligen ce were the sam e , and FELA did not expressly dep a rt f r om this ap

proa ch. This is s t rong evid ence a g a i ns tMis s o uri’s pra c t i ce of a pply

ing different standards, which is app a rently unique among the S t at es . Depa r t ing from t h e common-la w pra c t i ce would in a n y event have b een ap e culia r a pproa ch fo r Con gre s s t ot a k e in FELA: As a pr ac tic a l ma tt er , it is diffic u lt to r e du c edamag e s “inp r opor tion” to t h e employee’ s negligen ce if t h e rele va nceof ea ch pa rt y’ s negligence is measured by a different causation stan dard. TheCourt thinks it fa r s i mpler for aj ury t oco n d uctt h e a pport ionmentFELA ma ndat es if t h e j ury co mpa r es like wit hlike. Contra ry t oS o rrell’s a r gument , t h e us e of t h e la ngua ge “i n whole or in pa rt” wit hres p ectt ora ilroad negligen ce in FELA S e ct ion1 , b u tnot wit hres p ectt oe m ployee con

t r ib ut ory negl igence in S e ct ion 3 , does notj u s t ify adepa rt ure from t h e common-la w pra c t i ce of a pplying as i ngle ca us a t i on s t a n da rd. It would have ma de lit t l e s e nse t o incl ude t h e “i n whole or in pa rt” la n gua g e in S e ct ion 3 ; if t h e employee’s cont rib u t o ry ne gligence cont rib

ut ed “i n whole” t ohis inj ury , t h ere would b eno re cove rya g a i ns tt h e ra ilroa d in t h e firs tpla c e. The la ngua g ema de s e ns e in S e ct ion 1 , h o w e v e r , to c l ar ifyth at th e r e c o u l d be r e c o v e ryag ain s t th e r a ilr oa d even if itwereonlypa rt ia llyres p ons ib l e for t h e i n j ury . I na n yeve n t , th er e is n or e a s onto r e adth e st atu te as a w h o le to en c o mpas s d i ffer

entca us a t i on s t a n da rds , s i nce S e ct ion 3 s i mply does not a ddres s ca u s a t i on. Fina lly, FELA’s remedia lpurpos e ca nnotcompens a t efor t h e lac kof statu t o r ytex t : FELA does n o t abr og ate th e c o mmon - lawap proa ch. A re vi ew of FELA model ins t ruct ions indica t e s t h a tt h ere a r e ava riet y of w a ys t oins t ructaj uryt oa pply t h e s a me ca us a t i on s t a n da rd t ora ilroa d negligencea n d employee cont rib u t o rynegligen ce. Mis s o uri ha s t h e s a me flex ib ilit ya s ot her j uris d ict i ons in deciding how t odo s o , s olong a s itnow j o ins t h em in a pplying as i ngle s t a n da rd. On re ma nd, t h e Mis s o uri Courtof Appea l s s h ould a ddress S o rrell’s a r gu mentt h a ta n y erro r in t h ej uryins t ruct ions wa s ha rm less, an d sh ou ld deter m in e wh eth e ra n e wt r ial is r e qu ir ed. Pp. 6–14. 170 S. W. 3d 3 5 , v a c ated an d r e man d ed.

R OBERTS , C. J

. , delivered t h e opinion of t h e Court , in whi ch S TEVENS ,3 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Sy llabu s S CALIA , K ENNEDY , S OUTER , T HOMAS , B REYER , and ALI TO , JJ., joined. S OUTER , J ., filed aconcu rrin gopinion, in which S CALIA an d ALITO , JJ., joined. G IN SB U R G , J ., filed a nopinion conc urrin gint h e j u dgment

._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt
NOTICE: This op i n ion is subjec t to f o rmal revi si on bef o r e publicat ion in the p r eli m in ary p rin t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts
. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o rt e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u rt of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on sm a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp rin t go es t o p r es s . 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
No. 05–7 46 

### N O RF OL K S O UT HE RNRAI LWAY C O MPANY, P E T I TIONE R v. TIMOT H Y SOR R E LL ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COU R T OF APPEALS OF M I SSO URI 

### , E A STER N DIS T RICT [Jan u a r y10, 2007] 

### C HIEF 

### J U S TICE 

### R OBER TS

### delivered the opinion of the Court. Timothy S o rrell, respondent in this Court, sustained neck and back injuries while working as a trac k man for petitioner Norfolk Southern Railway Compa n y. He filed suit in Mis s ouri state court under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 3 5 Stat. 65, as amended , 45 U. S. C. §§51–60, which makes railroads liable to their employees for injuries “resulting in whole orin part from the negli

gence” of the railroad, §51. Contributory negligence is n o t a bar to re covery un d e r FELA , b u t damages are reduce d “in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to” the employee, §53. Sorrell was awarded $1 .5 million i n damages by a ju ry; N o rfolk objects that the jury inst ruc tions reflected a more lenient causation standard for railroad negligence than for empl oyee contributory negli

gence. We conclude t hat the causation sta n dard under FELA should be the same fo r both categories of negli

gence, andaccordingl y va cate t h e decision below and remand for further proc eedings.2 NORFOLK SOUTHERN R. CO. v. SORRELL Opinion of t h eCourt 

### I On Novem b er 1, 1999, while working for Norfolk i n Indiana, Sorrell was driving a dump tru ck loaded with asphalt to be used to repair railr oad crossings. While he was dri ving between crossings on a gravel road alongside the trac k s, another Norfolk truc kapp r oach ed, driven by fellow empl oyee Keith Woodin. The two men provided very differe nt accounts of what ha ppened next, but some

how Sorrell’s truc kvee r ed off the road and tipped on its side, injuring him. Accord in g to Sorrell’s testimony, Woodin for c ed Sorrell’s truc koff the road; according t o Woodin, Sorrell drove his truck in to a ditch. On June 1 8 , 2002, So rrell filed suit against Norfolk in Missouri state court u n der FELA, alleging that Norfolk failed to provide him with areasonably safe place to wo rk and that its negligence caused hi s injuries. Norfolk re

sponded that Sorrell’s own negligence caused the accident. Missouri purports to ap ply differen tstandar ds of causa

tion to railroad and employee contributory negligence in its approve djury instructions for FELA lia bility. Th e instructions direct a ju ry to find an employee contributo

rily negligent if the em ployee was negligent and his negli

gence “directly contrib u ted to cause” the inj u ry, Mo. Ap

proved Jury Instr., Civ., No. 32.07 (6th ed. 2002), while allowing a finding of railroad negligence if the railroad was negligent and its negligence contributed“in whole or in part” to t h e injury, id. , No. 24.01. 1

——————

1 Mis s o uri in th e pa s tdirect ed aj uryt ofi nd ara ilroa d liable if t h e railroad’s negligence “directl y resulted in whole or in p a rt in injury t o plain t iff.” M o . Appr ov ed Ju r yIn str ., Civ ., No. 24.0 1 (1 964). Th i s la ngua ge pers is t e d unt il 1 978 , when t h e in s t ruct ion wa s modified t oits present version. Ibid. (2d ed. 19 69, Su pp. 19 80). Th e c o mmen tar y expla i ns t h a t t h e word “ d irect” wa s excis e d b e ca us e, under FELA, “t he tr adition a l do c t r i n eof pr ox i m ate (d ir ec t) c a u s e is n o t a pplic able.” Id. , No. 24.01, p. 187 (Co mmi tt ee’s Commen t(197 8 n e w)). Cf. Leakev. Burling t on No rthe rn R. Co. , 892 S. W. 2d 3 59, 36 4– 36 5 (M o. App. 1995 ).3 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### When Sorrell propose dthe Missouri approved instruc

tion for employee contributory ne gligence, Norfolkobjected on the ground that it provided a “different” and “much more exacting” standa r d for causa t ion than that applica

ble with respect to th e railroad’s negligence under the Missouri in structions. App. to Pet. for Cert. 2 8a–29a. Th e trial court overruled the obje ction. App. 9–10. After the jury return ed a verdic t in favorof Sorrell, N o rfolk move d for a new t r ial, repeating its conte n tion that t h e different standards were improper because FELA’s comparati v e fault system requires that the s a me causation standard apply to both categories of negligence. Id. , at 20. The trial court denied the motion. The Mi ssouri Court of Ap peals affirmed, rejecting Norfolk’s cont ention that “the causa

tion standard should be the same as to the plaintiff an d the defendant.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 7a, judgt. ord e r reported at 170 S. W. 3d 35 (2005) (per cu riam )

. The court explained that Missouri procedural rules require tha t where an approved instruction exists, it must be given to the exclusion of other instructio n s. Ibid.; see Mo. Rule Civ. Proc. 7 0 .02(b) (2006). After the Missouri Supreme Court denied discretionar y review, App. to Pet. for Cert. 31a, Norfolk sought certio

rari in thi s Court, as king wheth e r the Missouri court s erred in determining that “the causation standard for employee contributorynegligenceunder [F ELA] diffe rs from the causation standard for railroad negligence .” Pet. for Cert. i. Norfolk stated that Missouri was the only jurisdiction to apply different st andards, a n d that th is conflicted with several federa l court of appeals decisions insisting ona single standar d of causation for both rail

road and e m ployee ne gligence. See, e.g., Pa gev. St. Lou i s

—————— The cont rib u t o ry ne gligenc eins t ruct ion, on t h e ot her ha nd, ha s re ma ined uncha nged. Mo. Approved J ury Ins t r., Civ., No. 3 2

. 07 (B) (6 th ed. 2002).4 NORFOLK SOUTHERN R. CO. v. SORRELL Opinion of t h eCourt 

### Southwestern R. Co. , 349 F. 2d820, 823 (CA5 1965) (“[T]he better rule is one of a single standard”); Ganoti sv. New Yo rk Central R. Co. , 342 F. 2d 767, 76 8–769 (CA6 1965) (per curiam)(“We do n o t beli eve that [FELA] in

tended to mak e a distinction between proximate cause when considered in connection with the c a rrier’s negli

gence and proximate cause when considered in connection with the e m ployee’s contributor y negligen ce”). In r e sponse, Sorrell did not dispute th at Missouri courts ap p l y “different causation standards

. . . to plaintiff’s and defen

dant’s negligence in FELA actions: The defendant is sub

ject to a mo re relaxed c ausatio n standard, but the plaintiff is subject o n ly to the traditi onal common-la w standa rd.” Brief in Opposition 2. We granted certiorari. 547 U. S. _

_ (2006). In briefing and argum e nt before this Court, Norfolk has attempted t o expand th e question presented t o encompass whatthe standard of causation un der FELA s h ould be, n o t simply whe t her the st andard sho u ld be the same for ra il

road negligence and employee contributory negligence. In particular, Norfolk c o ntends that the proximate cause standard reflected inthe Mi ssouri instruction for em

ployee contributory ne gligence should apply to the rail

road’s negligence as well. Sorrell raises both as ubstantive and procedural objec

tion in response. Substantively, h e argues th at this Cou rt departed from a proximate cause standard for railroad negligence under FELA in Rogersv. Missou r i Pacifi c R. Co. , 352 U. S. 500 (1957). There we stated: “Under [F ELA] the t e st of a jury case is simply whether th e proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producin g the inju ry or death for which damages are sought.

. . . . .5 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### “[F]or practical purposes the inqui ry in these cases to

day ra rely presents more than the single question whether negligence of the employer played any part, however small, in the injury or death which is the subject of the suit.” Id

. , at 506, 508. Sorrell argues that these passage s from Rogershave been interpreted to mean that a plain t iff’s burde n of proof on the question whether the railroa d’s negligence caused his injury is less onerous than the proximate cause standar d prevailing at common law, citin gcases suchas Consoli

dated Rail Corpora t ionv. Gottsha l l , 512 U. S. 532, 542– 543 (1994); Holbrookv. Norfolk So uthernR. Co. , 414 F. 3d 739, 741–742 (CA7 2 005); Hern andez v. T rawl er Mis s Verti eMa e, Inc. , 187 F. 3d 432, 436 (CA4 1999); and Summers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co. , 132 F. 3d 599, 60 6– 607 (CA10 1997). Norfolk co unters that Rogers di d not alterthe estab

lished common-law rule of proximate caus e, but rather simply rejected a flawed and unduly stringe n t version of the rule, th e so-called “sole pr oximate cause” test. Accord

ing to Norfo l k, while m o st courts o f appeals may have read Rogersas Sorrell does, several state supre m e courts dis

agree, see, e. g . , Chapm anv. UnionPacific R. Co. , 237 Neb. 617, 626–6 29, 467 N. W. 2d 388, 395–396 ( 1991); Maraz

zato v. Burlington No rthern R. Co. , 249 Mont. 487, 490– 491, 817 P. 2d 672, 674 (1991), and “there is a deep conflict of authority on precisely that issue.” Reply Br ief for Peti

tioner 20, n

. 10. Sorrell’s procedural objection is that we did not grant certiorari t o determine the pr oper standard of causation for railroad negligence under FE LA, but rat h er to deci de whether di fferent standards for railroad and employee negligence were permissible under the Ac t. What is more, Norfolk is not only en larging the question p r esented, but taking a position on t hat enlarged question that is con

-6 NORFOLK SOUTHERN R. CO. v. SORRELL Opinion of t h eCourt 

### trar yto th e position it litigated below. In the Missour i courts, Norfolk argued that Missouri appl ies differen t standards, and that th e less rigorous standard applied to railroad negligence should also a pply to employee con

tributoryn e gligence. Thus, Norf olk did notobject below on causation grounds to the railroad liability instruction, but only to the employee contributory negligence instruc

tion. App. 9–10. Now Norfolk wants to argue the oppo

site—that the disparity in the standards should be re

solved by applyingthe mor e rigorous contribut or y negligence standard to the ra ilroad’s negligence as well. We agree w i th Sorrell t hat we sho u ld stick to the ques

tion on which certiora r i was sough tand granted. We are typically reluctant to p e rmit parti es to smuggl e additional questions into a case b e fore us after the g r antof certiorar i. See IzumiSeimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaishav. U. S. Philips Corp. , 510 U. S. 27, 31– 34 (1993) ( p er curi am )

. Although N o rfolk is doubtle ss correct that we could con

sider the question of what standard applies as anterior to the question whether the standards may differ, the is su e of the substantive con t ent of the causation standard is significant enough that we prefer not to address it when it has not been fully pres ented. We also agree with Sorrell that it would be unfai r at this point to al low Norfolk to switch gears and seek a ruling from us that the standard should be p r oximate cause across the board. What Norfolk didargu e throughout is that the instruc

tions, when given together, impermissibly created differ

ent standards of causation. It chose to present in its petition for certiorari the mo re li mited question whether the courts below erred in appl yin gstanda r ds that differ. That is the question on which we granted certiorari an d the one we decide today. II In response to mountin g concern about the number and7 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### severity of railroad employees’ injuries, Congress in 1908 enacted FELA to pr ovide a compensation scheme for railroad workplace inj u ries, pre-empting stat e tort reme

dies. Second Employers ’ Liabili ty Case s , 223 U. S. 1, 53– 55 (1912). Unlike a typical workers’ compensation scheme, which provides relief w i thout regard to fault, Section 1 of FELA provides a statutory cause of actio n sounding in negligence: “[E]ver yco mmon carrier by railroad .

. . shall be liable in damages to any person su ffering injury wh ile he is employed by such car r i er . . . for such injury or death resulting in whole or i npart fro m the negl igence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of s u ch car

rier . . . .” 45 U. S. C. §51. FELA prov ides for concurrent ju risdiction of the state and federal courts, §56, although substan t ively FELA actions are governed b yfederal law. Ch esa p e ake & Ohi o R. Co. v. S t apleton , 2 79 U. S. 58 7, 590 (1929). Absent express language to the contrary, the element s of a FELA claim are determined by reference to the c o mmon law. Urie v. Tho m pson , 337 U. S. 163, 182 (1949). One notabl e deviation from the common law is the abolition of t h e railroad’s common-law defenses of assumptio nof the ris k , §54; Tillerv. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. , 318U. S. 54, 5 8 (1943), and, at issue inthis case, c o ntributory negligence, §53. At common law, of course, a plaintiff’s contributor y negligence operated as an absolute bar to relief. W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts §65, pp. 461–462 (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter Prosser & Keeton); 1 D. Dobbs, Law of Torts §199, p. 49 4 (2001) (hereinafter Dobbs). Under Section 3 of FELA, however, an employee’ s negligence does not bar relief but i n stead diminishes re covery in pro p ortion to his fault:8 NORFOLK SOUTHERN R. CO. v. SORRELL Opinion of t h eCourt 

### “[In all actions underFELA], th e fact thatthe em

ployee may have been guilty of contributory negli

gence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be diminish ed by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attribut able to such employee.

. . .” 45 U. S. C. §53. Both parties agree that at common law the causation standards for negligence and contributory ne gligence we re the same. Brief for Respondent 40–41; Tr. of Oral Arg. 46–48. As explained in the Second Restatement of Torts: “The rules which dete rmine the causal relation be

tween the plaintiff’s negligent conduct and the harm resulting to him are t h e same as those determining the causal relation bet w een the defendant’s negligent conduct an d resulting harm to oth e rs.” §465(2), p. 51 0 (1964). See also Prosser & Ke eton §65, at 456; Dobbs §199, at 497 (“The same rules of proximate cause that apply on the issue of negligence alsoapply on the issue of contributory negligence” (footnote omitted)). This was the prevailin g view when FELA was enacted in 1908. See 1 T. Shearman & A. Redfield, A Treatise on the Law of Negligence §94, pp. 143–14 4 (5th ed. 1 898) (“The plaintiff’s fault .

. . must be a proximate cause, in the sa me sense i nwhich th e defendant’s negligence must have been a proximate cause in order to give any righ t of action”). Missouri’s practice of applying di fferent causation stan

dards in FELA a ction s is apparently unique. Norfolk claims that Missouri is the only ju risdiction t o allow such a disparity, and Sorrell has not identified another. 2 

### Itis of

——————

2 A review of model a n d pat t e rn j ury ins t ruct ions in FELA a c tions revea l s ava riet y of a pproa ches

. S o me j uris d ict i ons recommend us ing th e “inw h o le orinpar t” or “inan ypar t” f o r m u l ationforbothr a ilr oa d negligen ce a n d plaint iff cont rib u t o ry ne gligence , b yus ing t h e s a me9 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### course possible that e v eryone is out of step except Mis

-

—————— language in the respective patte rn instructions, incl uding a third ins t ruct ion t h a tt h e sa me caus a t i on st a n da rd is a p plied t ob o t hpa rties, orin c l u d ingi nc o mmen tar y anadmon i tio nto th at effec t
. See, e. g., 5 L. San d , J. Siffe r t , W. Lou gh lin , S. Reiss, & N. Bat t er ma n , M o dernFed

eral Jury Instructions—Civil ¶¶89. 02–89. 03, pp. 89–7, 89–44, 89–53 (3d ed. 2 0 0 6); 4 Fla. For m s o f Ju r yIn str u c tion§§16 1.02, 161.4 7 , 1 61.6 0 (2006); Cal. Jury I n str., Civ ., Nos. 11.07, 11.14, an d Co mmen t(20 05); 3 Ill. Forms of J uryIns t ruct io n §§9 1

. 0 2 [ 1 ] , 91 .5 0 [ 1 ] (20 0 5 ) ; 3 N. M. Rules An n . , Un iform Ju r yIn str
. , Civ ., Nos. 13–90 5, 13– 909, 13–9 15 (20 0 4 ) ; M o del UtahJ u r yIn str
. , Civ ., Nos. 14.4, 1 4 .7, 14.8 ( 1 9 9 3 ed.); M a n u a l of Model Civil Jury Ins t ru ct ions for t h e Dis t rictCourt s of t h e Eight h Circuit §7.03, and n. 7 (2005); Elev enth Circuit Patter nJury Instruc

tion s (Civ i lC a ses) §7.1 ( 2 0 05). O t h e rju r i sdic tion s u s e th e st atu tor y formulation (“in whole ori npa rt” ) for ra ilroa d negligen ce, a n d do not cont a i n apa tt ern ins t ruct ion for co nt rib u t o ry ne glige nce. S e e, e.g . , Mich. Non-S t a n da rd J ury Ins t r., Civ., § 1 2 : 5 3 (S upp. 2 0 0 6 ). Both Alab am a an dVir gin ia u s e for mu lation s c o n tain i n gla n g u a g eof both pr ox imate c a u s e an d inw h o le orinpar t
. 1 Ala. Patter nJu ryIn str
. , Civ ., Nos. 17.01, 17.0 5 (2d ed. 1993) (r ail r oad n e glig enc e“pr o x i matel y ca us ed, in whole or in pa rt” ; pla i ntiff cont rib u t o ry ne gligence “ p rox i

ma t e ly cont rib u t e d t o ca use” ); 1 Va

. J ury Ins t ruct ions §§4 0

. 01 , 40 .02 (3d ed. 1998) (railroad negligence “i n who le or in pa rt wa s t h e proxi

ma t e ca us e of or proxima t e ly cont rib u t e d t oca us e,” pla i nt iff negligenc e “contributed to cause”). I n New York , thepattern instructions provid e th at r a ilr oad c a u s ationis measu r e d byw h e th erth e i n ju r y r e su lts “i n whole or in pa rt” from t h e ra ilroa d’s negligence, a n d apla i nt iff’s con

t r ib ut ory negl igence diminis h es recoveryif it“ c ont r ib ut ed t oca us [e]” th e in ju r y . 1B N. Y

. Patter nJu r yIn str ., Civ ., No. 2:18 0 (3d ed. 200 6 )

. Mont a n aprovides only agenera l FELA ca us a t ion ins t ruct ion. Mont

. Patter nIn str ., Civ ., No. 6.05 (199 7) (“[A]n ac t ora fai l u r eto ac t i s th e c a u s e of ani n ju r yif it play s a par t , n om atterh o wsmall, inbr in gi ng ab o utt h e injury” )

. Ka ns a s ha s codified ins t ruct ions s i mila r t oMis

sou r i ’s, K a n . Patter nIn str
. 3d, Civ ., No. 132.0 1 (2 00 5) (r ailr oad li abl e when inj u ry “r es ult s in wh ole or inpa rt” from ra ilroa d’s negligen ce); id., No. 132.2 0 (c on tr ibu t or yn e glig enc eis n e glig enc eonth e par tof th e plain t iff th at “c on tr ibu t es a s a dir e c tc a u s e” of th e i n ju r y), bu t th e comment a r y t ot h es e ins t ruct ions cit e s ca s e s a n d ins t ruct ions a pplying a sin gle stan d a r d , id., No. 132.01, an d Co mmen t , an d inpr ac tic eth e Ka ns a s court s have us ed t h e la ngua ge of in whole or inpa rtfor b o t h pa rt ies ’ negligence. S ee Merandov. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. , 23 2 K a n . 404, 406–40 9, 656 P. 2 d154, 15 7– 15 8 (198 2).10 NORFOLK SOUTHERN R. CO. v. SORRELL Opinion of t h eCourt 

### souri, but w e find n o ba sis for concl u ding that Congress in FELA mea n t to allow disparate causation standards. We have explained that “although common-l aw princi

ples are n o t necessaril ydispositive of questi o ns arising under FELA, unless they are expressly rejected in the te xt of the statute, they are enti tled to g r eat weight in ou r analysis.” Gottshall , 512 U. S., at 544. In Go ttshall we “cataloged” the wa ys i nwhich F E LA e x pre ssly depart ed from the co mmon law: it abolished the fellow servant rul e , rejected contributory negligence in favor of comparati v e negligence, prohibited employ ers from contra cting aroun d the Act, a n d abolished the assumption of risk defense. Nor f

olk & W e st er n R. Co. v. Ayers , 538 U. S. 135, 145 (2003); Gottshall , supr a , at 542–543. The fact that the common la w applied the same causation standard to defendant and plaintiff negligence, and FELA did n o t expressly depart from that a ppr oach, is strong evidence against Missouri’s disparate stan dards. See also Mones

sen South w estern R. Co . v. Morgan , 486 U. S. 330, 337– 338 (1988) (holding that, because FELA abrogated some common-la w rules explicitly but did not address “the equally well-established doctrine barring the recovery of prejudgmen t interest, .

. . we are unpersuaded that Con

gress intended to abrogate that do ctrine sub silentio ”). Departing f r om the common-law practice of applying a single standard of causation for negligence and contribu

tory neglig ence would have been a peculiar approach f o r Congress to take in F E LA. As one court ex plained, under FELA, “[a]s to both attack or defense, there are two common elements, ( 1 ) negligence, i.e., the s t andard of care, and (2) causation, i.e., the relation of the negligence to the injury. So far as negli g ence is co ncerned, th at stan

dard is the same—ordinary prud ence—for both Em

ployee and Railroad ali k e. Unless a contrary result is11 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### imperative, it is, at best, unfortun a te if two st andards of causationare used.” Page , 349 F. 2d, at 823. As a practical matter, it isdiffic u lt to reduce damage s “in proportion” to the employee’ s negligence if the rele

vance of ea ch party’ s negligence to the injury is measured by a different standard of causation. Norfolk argue s , persuasively we think, thatit is f a r simpler for a ju ry t o conduct th e apportionment FELA mandate s if the ju r y compares like with like

— apples to apples. Other cour ts to add r ess this question concur. See Fashau erv. New Jers e yTransi t R a il Op era ti ons, Inc. , 57 F. 3d 1269, 1282–1283 (CA3 1995); Caplingerv. Nor t hern Pacific Terminal , 244 Ore. 289, 290–292, 418P. 2d 34, 35– 36 (1966) (in banc); Pa ge , su pra , a t822–823; Ganotis , 34 2 F. 2d, at 768–769. 3 

### The most thoughtful treatment comes in Page , in which the F i fth Circuit stated: “[W] e think that from the ve ry nature of comp arati v e negligence, the stan

dard of causation shou ld be single.

. . . Use of the terms ‘ i n proportion to’ and ‘ne gligence attr ibutable to’ the injured workerinescapably call s for a com p arison.

. . . [I]t is obvi

ous that for a system of comparative fault to work, th e basis of comparison has to be th e same.” 349 F. 2d, at 8 24. See alsoRestatement (Third) of Torts: Appo rtionment of Liability §3, Reporters’ Note, p. 37, Comment a(1999) (“[C]omparative responsibility is difficult to administ er

——————

3 See also Bunting v. S un Co. , Inc

. , 434 Pa. Su per . 404, 40 9–4 11, 64 3 A. 2d 1085, 1 088 (1 994); Hi ck ox v. Seab oard System R. Co. , 183 Ga. App. 330, 331 –33 2, 35 8 S. E

. 2d 889, 8 9 1

– 892 ( 198 7). Anex c e ptionis a Texa s ca s e t h a tno courtha s s i nce cit e d for t h e propos it ion, Misso uri

Kansas-T exas R. Co. v. H. T. Shelton , 383 S. W. 2d 8 42, 844–8 46 (C iv

. App. 1 9 6 4) , and t h a tt h e Texa s model j u ry ins t ruct ion s , which ins t r uct t h e j ury t odet e rmine pla i nt iff or ra ilroa d negligen ce us i n g as i ngle “i n whole or in p a rt” ca us at ion s t a n da rd, a t least impl icitl ydisavow. See 10 We st’s Tex a s For m s: Civ i l Tr ialan d Ap pellate Pr ac tic e§23.3 4 , p. 27 (3d ed. 2000) (“D i d th e n e gl ig en c e , if an y, of th e [plain tiff orr a ilr oad] ca us e, in w h ol e or inpa rt , t h e occ urre ncein q u es t i on?” ).12 NORFOLK SOUTHERN R. CO. v. SORRELL Opinion of t h eCourt 

### when different rules govern different parts of the same lawsuit”). We appreciate that the r e may well be reason to “doubt that such casuistries have any practical signifi

cance [for] the jury, ” Pa ge , supr a , at 823, but it seems to us that Missouri’s idiosyncratic approach of applyi ng different standards of causation unduly m u ddies what may, to a jury, be already mur k y w a ters. Sorrell argues that FELA d oes contain an explicit statu

tory alterat i on from the common-law rule: Section 1 of FELA—addressin g rail roa d ne gligence—uses the la ngua ge “in whole or in part,” 45 U. S. C. §51, while Section 3— covering employee co ntributory negligence—does not, §53. This, Sorrell contends, evinces an intent to depart fro m the common-law causation standard with re spect to rail

road negligence under Section 1, but not wit hrespect t o any employee contributory negligence under Section 3. The inclusi o n of this la nguage in one section a n d not the other does not alone ju stify a departure from the common

law pra ctice of applyin ga single s t andard of causation. It would have made little sense to include the “i n whole or in part” langu a ge in Section 3, bec ause if the employee’s contributor y negligence contributed “in whole” to his injury, ther e would be no reco veryagainst the railroad in the fi rs t pl ace. Th e l a ngua ge m a de sense i nSection 1 , howe ve r, to ma ke clea r tha tthe r e c o uld be re co very a g ai ns t the railroad even if it were onl y pa rtiall y negli g ent. Even if the language in Section 1 is understood to ad

dress the st andard of causation, and not sim p ly to reflect the fact th at contribu tory neglig ence is no longer a com

plete bar to recovery, there is no r e ason to read the statute as a whole to encompass different causation standards. Section 3 simply does not address causation. On the question whether a different stan dard of cau s ation applies as between the two par t ies, the statutory te xt i s silent. Finally, in urging that a higher s t andard of causation for plaintiff contributo r y negligen ce is accept able, Sorrell13 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### invok e s FELA’ s remedial purpose and our history of lib

eral construction. We are not persuaded. FELA w a s indeed ena cted to benefit railroa d employee s, as the e x press abrogation of such common-law defenses as assump

tion of risk, the contrib utory neglig ence bar, and the fellow servant rule make clear. See Ayers , 538 U. S., at 145. It does not follow, however, that thi s remedial purpose re

quires us to interpret e v ery uncer t a inty in the Act in fa vor of employe e s. See Rodriguez v. UnitedStates , 480 U. S. 522, 526 (1987) (per c u riam)(“[I] tfrustra tes rather tha n effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that whateve r furthers the statute’ s primary objective must be the law”). FELA’s tex tdoes not support the proposition that Con gress meant to take the unusual step of appl ying different ca usation standards in acomparative negligence regime, and the statu t e’s remedial purpose cannot com

pensate for the lack of a statutory basis. We conclude that FELA does not abrogate the commonlaw approach, and that the same standard of causati o n applies to r a ilroad negl igence under Section 1 as to plain

tiff contrib u tory negligence und er Section 3. Sorrell does not dispute that Missouri applies different standards, see Brief for Respondent 40–41; see also Mo. Approved Ju ry Instr., Civ., No. 24.01, Committee’s Comment (1978 New), and accordi n gly we va cate the ju dgment below and re

mand the case for further proceedings. The question presented in this case is a narrow one, and we see no need to do more than answer tha tquestion i n today’s deci sion. As a review of F E LA modelinstructions indicates, n. 2, supra , there are a variety of ways to in

struct a ju ry to apply the same causation standard to railroad ne gligence and employee contributory negligence. Missouri has the sam e flexibility as the oth e r Sta t es in deciding how to do so, so lo ng as it now joins them in applying a single standard. Sorrell maintains thateven if the instruction s improp

-14 NORFOLK SOUTHERN R. CO. v. SORRELL Opinion of t h eCourt 

### erly contained different caus ation standards we should nonetheles s affirm because anyerror was h a rmless. H e argues that the evidence of his n e gligence presented at trial, if credited by the jury, could only have been a “di

rect” cause, so that even with r e vised instructions th e result would not change. This argument i s better ad

dressed by the Missou r i Court of Appeals, and we leave it to that court on remand to determine whether a new trial is required in this case. The judgment of the Missouri C o urt of Appeals is va cated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with th is opinion. It is so orde red._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) S OUTER , J ., co ncu rrin g 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
No. 05–7 46 

### N O RF OL K S O UT HE RNRAI LWAY C O MPANY, P E T I TIONE R v. TIMOT H Y SOR R E LL ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COU R T OF APPEALS OF M I SSO URI 

### , E A STER N DIS T RICT [Jan u a r y10, 2007] 

### J USTICE 

### S OUTER 

### , wi th whom J USTICE 

### S CALIA 

### an d J USTICE 

### ALI T O 

### join, concurring. I agree th at the sam e standard of causal connection controls th e recognition of both a defendant-employer’s negligence and a plaintiff-employee’s contri butory negl i

gence in Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) suits, and I share the Court’s caution in remanding for the Mis

souri Court of Appeals to determine in the first instanc e just what that common causal relationship must be, if it should turn out that the differen c e in possib l e standards would affect jud g me nt on the verdictin this case. The litigation in the Missouri courts did not focus on the issue of what the shared standard should be, and the submissions in this Court did not explore the matte r comprehensively. The briefs a n d argume nts here did, however, adequately address the case of our s with which exploration will begin , and I think it is fair to say a word about th e holding in Rogersv. Missouri P a cific R. Co. , 352 U. S. 500 (19 57). Despite some courts’ v i ews to the contrar y ,* Rogersdid no t

——————

* Recent ly, s o me court s havet a k en t h e view t h a t Rogers s m uggled proximate cause out of the c o ncept of defendant liabili ty under FELA. See, e.g. , Holb rookv. NorfolkSouther n R. Co. , 414 F. 3d 739, 7 4 1 –74 2 (CA7 2 0 0 5 ) (concluding t h a t“ apla i nt iff’s burden whe n s u ing unde rt h e FELA i s sig n ific an tlyligh t erth an in a nordina ry n e gligence ca s e ”2 NORFOLK SOUTHERN R. CO. v. SORRELL S OUTER , J ., co ncu rrin g 

### address, much less alter, existing law governing the de

gree of causation necessary fo r redressing negligence as the cause of negligently inflicted harm; the case merely instructed c o urts how t o proceed w h en there are multiple cognizable causes of an injury. Prior to FE LA, it was clear common law that a plaintiff had to prove that a defendant ’s negligence caused hi s injury p r oxi m ately, not indirectly or remotely. See, e. g ., 3 J. Lawson, Rights, Remedies, a n d Pra ctice 1740 (1890) (“Natural, proximate, and legal r e sults are all that da m ages can be recovered for, even under a statute entitling one ‘ t o recover anyda mage’ ”); T. Cooley, Law of Torts 73 (2d ed. 188 8) (same). Defendants were held to the sam e

—————— because “a railroad will be held liable where ‘employer negligence pla y ed a n y pa rt , event h e s light es t , in pro d ucing t h einj ury ’ ” (qu o tin g Rogers , 352 U. S., at 506)) ; Summersv. MissouriPacific R. Co. , 132 F. 3d 599, 60 6–60 7 (CA 10 1 997) (h oldin gth at, in Rogers , the Suprem e Cou r t“defin i ti v e lyaban don e d” th e r e qu ir emen t of pr ox imate c a u s e in FELA suits); Ogle sbyv. Southern Pacific Transp . Co. , 6 F. 3d 6 03, 60 6– 609 (C A9 1 9 93) (sa m e). Bu t sev e r a l Sta t e Su pr em e Cou r t s h ave explicitly or i m plicitly espo used the opposite view. See M a r azzatov. Burlington No. R. , Co., 24 9 M o n t
. 487, 49 0–4 91, 81 7 P. 2d 6 72, 67 4– 6 7 5 (199 1) (Rogers addressed multiple caus ation only, leaving FELA pla i nt iffs wit h“t h e b urden of provin g t h a tdefenda n t ’ s negligen ce wa s the proximate cause in wholeor in pa rt of p l aintiff’s [death]” (alteration in original)); see also Gardnerv. CSX Transp. , Inc. , 201 W. Va. 49 0 , 500, 4 98 S. E. 2d 473, 483 (199 7) (“[T]o pr ev ail ona c l aim u n d er [FELA], a plaintiff employee must establish that th e defendant em

ployer a c t e d negligent l y a n d t h a ts uch negligen ce co nt rib u t e d proxi

mately, in whole or in part, to plaintiff’s injury”); Sni p esv. Ch i c a go Central & Pa cific R. Co. , 484 N. W. 2d 16 2, 164 (Iow a 1 992) (“ Rec o v e ry undert h e FE LA req u ires a ninj ure demployee to provethat the defe n dan temploy e rw a s n e gligen t an d th atth e n e glig enc epr ox imately ca us ed, in wh ole or in pa rt , t h e a ccident”); Chapmanv. Union Pacific R. Co. , 237 N e b. 61 7, 62 7, 467 N. W. 2d 388, 395 (1 99 1) (“To r e c o v e r under [FELA], an employee must pr ove the employer’s negligence and th at th e a lleg e d n e glig en c eis a pr ox im ate c a u s e of th e employ ee’s inj ury” )

.3 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) S OUTER , J ., co ncu rrin g 

### standard: u n der the law of that day, a plaintiff’s contrib u tory negligence was an absolute bar to his rec o very if, but only if, it was a proximat e cause of his harm. See Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Ives , 144 U. S. 408, 429 (1892). FELA chan ged some r u les but, a s we have said more than once, when Congress abroga t ed common law rules in FELA, it did so expre ssly. Norf olk & W e s t ern R. Co. v. Ayers , 538 U. S. 135, 1 45 (2003); Consolidated Rail Corp o rationv. G o ttshall , 51 2 U. S. 53 2, 544 (1994); see al so Second Em ployers’ Li ability Cases , 223 U. S. 1, 49–5 0 (1912) (cataloguing FELA’s depa rtures from the comm on law). Amo n g FE LA’s explicit co mmon law targets, t h e rule of contributoryn e gligence as a categor i cal bar to a plaintiff’s recovery wa s dro pped and replaced with a com

parative ne gligence regime. 45 U. S. C. §5 3; see Gra nd Trunk Western R. Co. v. Lindsay , 233 U. S. 42, 49 (1914)

. FELA said nothing, however, abou tthe familiar pro x imate cause standard for claims either of a defendant-employer’s negligence or a plaintiff-e mployee’s contributory negli

gence, and throughou tthe half-century between FELA’s enactment and the de cision in Rogers , we c o nsistently recognized and applie d proximate cause as the prope r standard inFELA suits. See, e.g ., Tennan tv. Peori a& Pekin Union R. Co. , 3 21 U. S. 29, 32 (1944) ( F ELA plain

tiff must prove that “negligen ce was the proximate cause in whole or in part” of his injury); see also Uriev. Thomp

son , 337 U. S. 163, 195 (1949) (recognizing proxim ate cause as the appropriate standard in FELA suits); St. Louis-San Franci sco R. Co. v. Mills , 271 U. S. 344 (1926) (judgment as a matter of law owing to FE LA plaintiff’s failure to prove proximate cause). Rogers left this law where it was. We granted certiorar i in Rogers to establish the test for submitting a case to a jury when the evidence would permit a finding that an injury had multiple causes. 352 U. S., at 501, 506. We rejected M i ssouri’s “language of proximate causation4 NORFOLK SOUTHERN R. CO. v. SORRELL S OUTER , J ., co ncu rrin g 

### which ma[de] a jury q u estion [ab o ut a defendant’s liabil

ity] dependent upon whether the jury ma y fi nd that the defendant’s negligence was the sole, efficient, producin g cause of injury.” Id ., at 506. Th e notion that proximate cause mus tbe exclusive proximate cause undermi ned Congress’s chosen scheme of comparative negligence by effectively r e viving the old ru le of contributory negligence as barring any relief, and we held that a FELA plaintiff may recove r even when the defendant’s actio nwas a pa r tial cause of injury but not the sol e one. Recovery unde r the statute is possibl e, we said, even when an employer’ s contribution to injur ywas slightin relation to all other legally cognizable causes. True, I wou l d have to s t ipulate tha tclarit y wa s not well served by the stateme n t in Rogersthat a cas e must go to a jurywhere “the proofs justify withreason the conclusion that employer negligence play ed any part, eve nthe slight

est, in producing the injury or de ath for which damages are sought.” Ibid

. But that statem ent did not address and should not be read as affecti ng th e necessary directness of cognizable causation, as distinct from the occasional mul

tiplicity of causations. It spoke to apportioning liabili ty among parties, each of whom was understood to have had some hand in causing damage directly enough to be what the law tra ditionally called a proximate cause. The absence of any intent to wat e r down th e common law requirement of proximate cause is evid ent from the prior cases on which Rogersrelied. To begin with, t h e “any part, even the slightest” excerpt of the op inion (cited by respondent in arguing that Rogers cre ated a mo re “relaxed” s t andard of causat ion than proximate cause) itself cited Corayv. So uthern P a cific Co. , 3 35 U. S. 52 0 (1949). See Rogers , su pra , at 506, n. 11. The r e, just eight years before Rogers , J u stice Black unambiguously recog

nized proxi m ate cause as the stan dard applicable in FELA suits. 335 U. S., at 523 (“[P]etitioner was entitled to re

-5 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) S OUTER , J ., co ncu rrin g 

### cover if thi s defective equi pment was the sole or a con

tributory proximate cause of the decedent employee’ s death”). Second, the RogersCou rt’s discuss i on of causa tion under “safety-appl iance statutes” contained a crossreference to Corayand a citation to Carterv. Atlanta & St. Andrew s B a y R. Co. , 338 U. S. 4 30 (1949), a case which likewise held there was liabil i ty only if “the jury dete r mines that the defen d ant’s bre a ch is a ‘contributory proximate cause’of injury,” id ., at 435. Rogers , su pra , at 507, n. 13. If more were needed to confirm the limited scope of what Rogersheld, the Court’s quotati on of the Missouri trial court’s ju rycharge in that case would supp ly it, for th e instructions covered the requi rement to show proximat e cause connecting negligence and harm, a point free of controversy :

“ ‘[I]f you fu rther find that the plaintiff .

. . did not ex

ercise ordinary care forhis own sa fety and wa s guilty of negligen ce and that such negli g ence, if an y[,] was the sole proximate cause of his injuries, if any, and that such alleged injuries, if any, were notdirectly contributed to or caused by any n e gligence of the de

fendant .

. . then, in that event, th e plaintiff is not en

titled to recover against the defendant, and you will find your verdict in favor of th e defendant.’ ” 352 U. S., at 50 5, n. 9. Thus, the trial judge spok e of “proximate cause” by plain

tiff’s ownn e gligence, and for defe ndant’s negligence used the familiar term of art for prox ima t e cause, in referring to a showing that the defendant “directly contributed to or caused” the plaintiff’s injuries. We took no issue with the trial court’s instructionin th is respect, but a ddressed th e significance of multiple causations, as explained above. Whether FELA is pro p erly read today as req u iring proof of proximate causationbefore recognizing negligence is up6 NORFOLK SOUTHERN R. CO. v. SORRELL S OUTER , J ., co ncu rrin g 

### to the Missouri Court of Appeals to determine in the first instance, if necessary for the res o lution of this case on remand. If the state court decides to take on t hat issue, i t will necessa rily deal with Rogers , which in my judgment is no authority for anything less tha nproximate causation in an action u n der FELA. The state court may lik ewise need to address post- Rogers cases (including some of our own); I do not mean to sugges tany view of them except for the misreading of Rogersexpressed here and there._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) G IN SB U R G , J ., conc urri ng inj u dgment 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
No. 05–7 46 

### N O RF OL K S O UT HE RNRAI LWAY C O MPANY, P E T I TIONE R v. TIMOT H Y SOR R E LL ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COU R T OF APPEALS OF M I SSO URI 

### , E A STER N DIS T RICT [Jan u a r y10, 2007] 

### J USTICE 

### G IN S B UR G 

### , concurring in the judgme nt. The Court today holds simply and only that in cases under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), rail

road negligence and employee contributory negligence are governed by the same causation standard. I concur in th at judgment. It should be reca lled, however, th at the Court has several times stated what a plaintiff must prove to warran tsubmission of a FELA ca se to a jury. That ques

tion is long settled, we have no cause to reexamine it, and I do not read the Court’s decisi onto cast a sha d ow of doub t on the matter. In Consolidated Rail Corporationv. Gottshall , 512 U. S. 532, 543 (1994), we acknowledged that “a rel a xed causa

tion standard applies under FELA.” De cades earlier, i n Cranev. Cedar Rapids & Iowa Cit yR. Co. , 3 95 U. S. 164 (1969), we s a id that a FELA pl aintiff need prove “only that his injury resulted in whole or in part from the railroad’s violation.” Id ., at 166 (internal quotation marks omitted). Both decisions referred to the Court’s oft-ci t e d opinion in Rogersv. Missouri P a cific R. Co. , 352 U. S. 500 (19 57), which decla r ed: “Under[FELA] th e test of a jury case is simply whe t her the pr oofs justify with reason the conclu

sion that e m ployer negligence played any part, even the slightest , in producing the injury or death for which dam

ages are sought.” Id ., at 506 (emphasis added). Rogers , i n2 NORFOLK SOUTHERN R. CO. v. SORRELL G IN SB U R G , J ., conc urri ng inj u dgment 

### turn, d r ew upon Corayv. Southern Pacif i c Co . , 335 U. S. 520, 524 (1 949), in which the Court observed: “Congres s

. . . impos e d extraordi nary safety obligation s upon rail

roads and has commanded that if a breach of these obliga

tions contributes in part to an employee’s death, the rail

road must pay damages.” These decis i ons answer the question Norfolk sought to “smuggle .

. . into” this case, see ante , at 5–6, i.e. , wha ti s the proper standard of causat ion for railroad negligence under FELA. Today’ s opinionle aves in pla c e precedent solidly establishing that th e causation standard in FELA actions is more “relaxed” t han in tort litigation generally. A few further points bear em phasis. First, it is some

times saidthat Rogerseliminated proximate cause i n FELA a ctio n s. See, e.g . , Crane , 39 5 U. S., at 1 66 (A FELA plaintiff “is not required to prove common-law pro x imat e causation.”); Summersv. Missouri Pacific R. Co. , 132 F. 3d 599, 606 (CA10 1997) (“Durin gth e first half of this cen

tury, it was customary for courts to analyze li ability unde r

. . . FELA in terms of proximate causation. However, the Supreme Court definitively abandoned this approach in Rogers .” (ci t ation omit ted)); O g lesbyv. Southern Pacifi c Tran sp. Co. , 6 F. 3d 60 2, 609 (CA9 1993) (“[Our] holding is consistent with the ca se law of several other circuits which have found [that] ‘pro ximate cau s e’ is not required to establish causation under the FE LA.”). It would be more accurate, as I see it, to recognize that Rogers describes the test for proximate causation applicable inFELA suits

. That test is whether “employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought.” 352 U. S., at 5 06. Whether a defendant’s negligence is a proxi m ate caus e of the plaintiff’s injury entails a judgment, at least in part policy based, as to how far down the chain of consequenc es a defendant should be held respon sible f o r its wrongdoing. See Palsgra f v. Long Island R. Co. , 248 N. Y. 3 39, 352, 16 23 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) G IN SB U R G , J ., conc urri ng inj u dgment 

### N. E. 99, 103 (1928) (Andrews, J ., dissentin g) (“What we do mean by the word ‘proximate’ is, that because of con

venience, of public pol i c y, of a rou gh sense of justice, th e law arbitra rily declines to tra ce a series of events beyond a certain point.”). In FELA ca ses, strong policy considera

tions infor m the causation calculus. FELAwas prompted b yconc erns about the welfare of railroad work ers. “Co g nizant of the physical dangers of railroading that resulted in the de ath or mai m ing of tho u sands of workers ever y year,” an d dissatisfied with th e tort remedies available under st ate common law, “Con

gress craf t ed a feder a l remedy that shifte d par tof t h e human overhead of doing business from employees to their employers.” Go ttshall , 512 U. S., at 542 (int ernal quota

tion marks omitted); see also Wilkersonv. McC a rt h y , 336 U. S. 53, 68 (1949) (Douglas, J., concurring) (FELA “was designed to put on the railroad in dustrysome of the cos t for the legs, eyes, arms, and lives which it consumed in its operations.”). “We have liber ally construed FELAto fu r ther Congress’ remedi al goal.” Gottshall , 512 U. S., a t 543. With the motivation for FELA center sta g e in Rogers , we held th at a FELA plaintiff can get to a jury if he ca n show that his employer’ s negligence was even the slightest cause of his injury. The “slightest” cause sounds fa r less exac ting tha n “proximate” cause, which may acc o unt for the statements in judicial opinions th at Rogers dispensed with proximate cause for FELA actions. These s t atements seem to me reflective of pervasive confusion engendered by the ter m “proximate cause.” As Prosser and Keeton explains: “The word ‘proximate’ is a l e gacy of Lord Chancellor Bacon, who in his time committed other sins. The word means nothing more than near or immediate; and when i twas fi rst taken up b ythe cour t s it had connotations of proxi m ity in ti me and sp ace which4 NORFOLK SOUTHERN R. CO. v. SORRELL G IN SB U R G , J ., conc urri ng inj u dgment 

### have long since disap p eared. Itis anunfortunate word, whic h places anentirely w r ong emph asis upon the factor of physical or me chan ical closen ess. For this reason ‘ l egal cause’or perhaps even ‘ r e s ponsibl e cause’ would be a more appropriate term.” W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts §42, p. 273 (5th ed. 1984) (f ootnotes omitted). If we take up Prosser and Keeton’s suggestion to substi

tute “legal cause” for “proximat e cause,” we can state more clearly what Rogers held: Whenever a railroad’ s negligence i s the slightest cause of the plaintiff’ s injury, it is a legal cause, for which the ra ilroad is properly held responsible. 1 

### If the term “proximate cause” is confounding to jurists, it is even more bewil d ering to jurors. Nothing in today’s opinion should encourage courts to use “proxi mate cause,” or any term like it, in j u ry instru c t ions. “[L]egal concept s such as ‘proximate ca use’ and ‘foreseeabil i ty’ are best left to argume nts between attorneys for consideration by judges or justices; they are not terms which are properly submitted to a lay ju ry, and wh en submitted can onl y serve to confuse jurors and distr a ct them fr om decidin g cases based on their merits.” Busta v. Columbus Hospita l Corp. , 276 Mont. 342, 371, 916P. 2d 122, 139 (1996). Accord Mitchell v. Go nzales , 54 Cal. 3d 10 41, 1050, 819 P. 2d 872, 877 (1991) (“It is reas onably likel y that whe n jurors hear the term ‘proximate cause’ theymay misun

derstand its meaning.”). 2

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1 I do not read J US TI CE S OUTER ’s concur rin gopinion a s ta king apos i

tiononth e a ppr opr i ate c a u s ationst an dar das ex pr essed in Consol i

dated Rail Corporationv. G o ttshall , 512 U. S. 532 (19 9 4), an d Cranev. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City R. Co. , 395 U. S. 164 (19 69). See sup ra , a t 1–2.

2 See also Stap leton , Leg a l Cau s e: C a u s e - in -Fac t an d t h e Sc ope of Liabi lityforCon s equ e n c e s, 54 Van d . L. Rev

. 941, 987 (2001) ( “ [T]h eCite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2007) 5 G IN SB U R G , J ., conc urri ng inj u dgment 

### Sound juryinstructions in FELA cases would resemble the model federal charges cited in the Court’s opinion. Ante , at 8, n. 2. As to railroad negligence, the relevant instruction tells the jury: “The fourth element [of a FELA action] is whether an injury t o the plaint iff resulted in whole or in part from the ne gligence of the railroad or its employees or agents. In other words , did such n e gligence play any part, even the slightest, in bringing about an injury to the plaintif f?” 5 L. S and, J. Siff ert, W. Lou ghlin, S. Reiss, & N. Batterman , Modern F e deral JuryInstruc

tions—Civil ¶89.02, p. 89–44 (3d ed. 2006). Regarding contributor y neglig ence, the relevant instru c tion reads: “To determi n e whether the plaintiff was ‘contri buto

rily negligent,’ you . . . apply the same rule of causa

tion, that is, did the pl aintiff’s negligence, if any, play any part inbringing about his inj u ries.” Id ., ¶89.03, p. 89–53. Both instru ctions direct jurors inplain terms that th ey can be expected to understand. Finally, as the Court n o tes, ante , at 13–14, on remand, the Missou r i Court of Appeals will determine whether a new trial is required in this case, owing to t h e failure of the trial judge properly to a lign the charges on negligen ce and contrib u tory negli g ence. Th e trial cour t instruc t ed the jury to find Norfolkliable if t h e railroad’ s negligence “resulted in whole or in part in i n jury to pl aintiff.” App.

—————— ina d eq ua cy a n d va gue n es s of j ury ins t ru c t ions on ‘proxi ma t eca us e’ is notorious.”); Cork, A Better Orien tation for Jury I n structions, 54 Merce r L. Rev

. 1 , 53

– 5 4(2 00 2 ) (crit i cizingGeorgia ’ s j ury ins t ruct ion on proxima t eca us e a s incomprehens ib le); S t eele & Thornb u r g, J u ry Ins t ruct ions : A Pers is t e nt Failu r eto Commu n i c ate, 67 N. C. L. Rev

. 7 7(1 98 8) (demons t ra t i ngj uror confu s ion ab o utproxima t eca us e ins t ruct ions ).6 NORFOLK SOUTHERN R. CO. v. SORRELL G IN SB U R G , J ., conc urri ng inj u dgment 

### 14. In contrast, the c o urt told t h e jury to find Sorrell contributori l y negligent only if h e engaged in negligen t conduct tha t “ dire ct lycontributed to cause his injury.” Id., at 15 (emphasis added). At trial, Norfolk sought a differ

ent contrib u tory negli g ence instr u ction. Its proposed charge would have informed the ju ry tha tSor r ell could be held responsible, at l e ast in part, if his own negligence “contribute din whole or in part t o cause his injury.” I d ., at 11. Norfolk’s p r oposal was superior to the co ntributor y negligence instruction in fact delivered by the trial court, for the railr oad’s phrasing did not use the word “direc tly.” 3 

### As Sorrell points out, however, the instructional error wa s almost certainly harmless. Norfolk alleged that Sorre ll drove his t r uck negligently, causing it to flip on its side. Under the facts of this case, it is difficult to imagine that a jury could find Sorrell negligent ina mannerthat contrib

uted to his injury, but o n ly indirect ly. Norfolk ur ged in this Co urt, bel a tedly and unsuccess

fully, that the charge on negligence was erroneous and should have been revised to conform to the c harge in fact delivered on contributory negligence. See ante , at 4. Th at argument cannot be r e conciled with our precedent. See supra , at 1 –2. Even if it could, it would be u navailing in the circum s tances here presented. Again, t h ere is little likelihood t hat a jury could fi nd that Norfolk’s negligence contributedto Sorrell’s injury, but only indirectly. * * * With the above-described qualific ations, I concur in th e Court’s jud g ment.

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3 Norfolk’s prop os ed ins t ruct ion wa s , ne ver t heles s , imper fect

. As t h e Courtnot e s , if t h e employee’ s negligen ce “c ont r ib ut ed ‘in whole’ t o his inj ury, t h ere would b eno recove ry a g a i ns tt h e ra ilroa din t h e first plac e.” Ant e , at 12.