If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

SCOTT ABRAMS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

May 23, 2024

v No. 366397

Oakland Circuit Court

MARTIN YONO, LC No. 2021-191292-CH

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: FEENEY, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and RICK, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff, Scott Abrams, appeals as of right the trial court’s entry of a judgment of no cause 

of action in favor of defendant, Martin Yono. On appeal, Abrams challenges both the trial court’s 

decision following a bench trial, and the trial court’s earlier order denying his motion for summary 

disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm for the reasons stated in this opinion.

I. BASIC FACTS

In September 2015, Abrams and Yono entered into a four-year residential lease with an 

option to purchase. Under the terms of the lease, Abrams had the option to purchase the property 

for $346,600 “at any time during his tenancy.” The option could only be exercised if (1) Abrams 

was not in default and (2) the lease had not been terminated under paragraphs 19 or 20 of the lease 

agreement. In March 2019, Abrams, through his lawyer, gave Yono written notice that he intended 

to exercise the option and purchase the property. At that time, Abrams was not in default and the 

lease had not been terminated under paragraphs 19 or 20 of the lease agreement. Abrams presented 

evidence showing that he was ready to close.

Ultimately, however, the parties were unable to close because there was a cloud on the title 

as a result of the United States Attorney’s Office recording an affidavit relating to a matter 

affecting real property. The affidavit was recorded against the property in August 2017; the 

affidavit states that “the United States of America is aware of certain fact(s), condition(s), and 

event(s), proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 1956; 18 U.S.C. § 1957; and/or 21 U.S.C. § 841 which may 
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terminate an estate or an interest in the real property . . . .”1 As a result, the property was subject 

to forfeiture. At trial, the parties stipulated that the United States Attorney’s Office affidavit was 

never removed from the chain of title.

On November 23, 2021, Abrams filed a complaint against Yono, alleging that Yono 

breached the lease agreement by “refusing and/or failing to close on the sale of the Property.” He 

requested specific performance and monetary damages related to the delay caused by the alleged 

breach of the lease agreement. Yono denied the allegations, and cursorily raised several 

affirmative defenses, including estoppel, laches, and unclean hands. Following discovery, Abrams 

moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). The trial court denied summary 

disposition because questions of material fact remained as to whether Abrams’ claim was barred 

by the doctrine of laches or whether Yono was precluded from raising laches as a defense because 

he had unclean hands.

The matter subsequently proceeded to trial. The parties testified extensively regarding the 

reason that the United States Attorney Office’s affidavit was recorded against the property. 

Neither party, however, could point to any language in the affidavit indicating whose actions had 

caused the affidavit to be filed. Indeed, having reviewed in full the affidavit, it is clear that Yono 

is identified only as the owner of the property, that Abrams is not mentioned at all, and that the 

person or persons who allegedly committed the federal offenses identified in the first paragraph is 

not identified at all. Nevertheless, both parties presented testimony suggesting that the other party 

was responsible for the affidavit being filed.

Additionally, regardless of whose actions caused the affidavit to be filed, it is undisputed 

that the affidavit was the reason that they did not close. Abrams moved out in June 2019 following 

unsuccessful negotiations between the parties. Thereafter, Abrams did not take any action to 

enforce his option to purchase until he filed suit in November 2021.2 Indeed, he admitted that he 

had no communications with Yono regarding the option to purchase (or any other matter) between 

June 2019 and November 2021. Several months after Abrams moved from the property, Yono 

refinanced the property, encumbering it with two mortgages and making substantial, expensive 

updates to the house.

Following the presentation of proofs, the trial court found that Abrams had failed to 

establish the breach element of his contract claim. Alternatively, the court found that the wrongfulconduct rule precluded Abrams from prevailing given that Abrams had admitted to illegally 

growing marijuana and selling it to Yono. The court found that both Abrams and Yono had 

unclean hands. Finally, the court found that it was impossible to grant Abrams’ relief because he 

 

1 Generally, 18 USC 1956 prohibits money laundering, 18 USC 1957 prohibits engaging in 

monetary transactions for property derived from specified unlawful activity, and 21 USC 841

prohibits conduct related to the manufacture, distribution, dispensation, or possession with the 

intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense controlled substances.

2 We note that Abrams had his lawyer record a notice of an interest in the property in November 

2018. That notice, however, was filed before Abrams attempted to purchase the property in March 

2019 and before he moved from the property in June 2019.
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had requested specific performance, but stipulated that the United States Attorney’s Office 

affidavit that prevented the sale in the first instance was still in place. This appeal follows.

II. SUMMARY DISPOSITION

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Abrams argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for summary disposition. 

We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition. Barnard Mfg 

Co, Inc v Gates Performance Engineering, Inc, 285 Mich App 362, 369; 775 NW2d 618 (2009). 

In reviewing a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), a court considers 

“affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence submitted by the 

parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Greene v A P Prods, Ltd, 

475 Mich 502, 507; 717 NW2d 855 (2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The motion 

for summary disposition “tests the factual support for a claim and should be granted if there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” MEEMIC Ins Co v DTE Energy Co, 292 Mich App 278, 280; 807 NW2d 407 (2011). A 

genuine issue of material fact exists if the record, viewed in a light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party, establishes a matter in which reasonable minds could differ. Allison v AEW 

Capital Mgt, LLP, 481 Mich 419, 425; 751 NW2d 8 (2008).

B. ANALYSIS

A party can prevail on a breach of contract claim by establishing “by a preponderance of 

the evidence that (1) there was a contract, (2) the other party breached the contract, and (3) the 

breach resulted in damages to the party claiming breach.” Bank of America, NA v First American 

Title Ins Co, 499 Mich 74, 100; 878 NW2d 816 (2016). In his motion for summary disposition, 

Abrams presented evidence supporting that there was a valid contract between the parties, that he 

was not in default at the time that he exercised his option, and that the parties did not close. He 

asserted that Yono breached the lease agreement by “refusing” to close or provide marketable title. 

He did not, however, provide any support for his assertion that Yono “refused” to close. Rather, 

he only submitted evidence showing that the parties were unable to close as a result of the United 

States Attorney’s Office recording an affidavit in the property’s chain of title. Further, Yono stated 

in an affidavit that he was never informed of the closing date. Thus, viewing the facts in the light 

most favorable to Yono, there is a question of fact as to whether Yono refused to close and whether 

the failure to close was a result of the United States Attorney’s Office’s affidavit.

The trial court also found that summary disposition was improper because there were 

questions of fact regarding the applicability of the doctrine of laches. “Laches is an equitable tool 

used to provide a remedy for the inconvenience resulting from [a party’s] delay in asserting a legal 

right that was practicable to assert.” Knight v Northpointe Bank, 300 Mich App 109, 115; 832 

NW2d 439 (2013). In order for laches to apply, “inexcusable delay in bringing suit must have 

resulted in prejudice.” Tenneco Inc v Amerisure Mut Ins Co, 281 Mich App 429, 457; 761 NW2d 

846 (2008). Therefore, the passage of time alone is insufficient to trigger laches. Knight, 300 

Mich App at 114. Because laches is an equitable doctrine, it is only available to individuals with 

“clean hands.” Attorney Gen v PowerPick Club, 287 Mich App 13, 52; 783 NW2d 515 (2010). 

“A party with unclean hands may not assert the equitable defense of laches.” Id.
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Yono asserted that Abrams claim was barred by laches. The trial court found that there 

were questions of fact that precluded it from making a finding as to whether there was prejudice 

as a result of Abrams’ delay in filing his complaint. The summary disposition record reflects that 

in March 2019, Abrams gave notice to Yono that he intended to exercise the option to purchase. 

The closing did not occur. Yono was not, in fact, ever notified of the date that the closing was 

scheduled with funds. Abrams moved from the property in June 2019, and did not have any 

communications between June 2019 and November 2021 when he filed his complaint for breach 

of contract. Thus, Yono did not believe that Abrams intended to purchase the property after 

Abrams had moved out. Viewed in the light most favorable to Yono, given the absence of 

communication from when Abrams moved out until he filed suit, Yono’s belief was reasonable. 

Based upon that belief, Yono encumbered the property with two mortgages and expended money 

on costly improvements to the property.

Moreover, even if there were prejudice, the court also found that there was a question of 

fact with regard to whether Yono had unclean hands. To show that Yono’s hands were unclean, 

Abrams presented two pieces of evidence (1) the United States Attorney’s Office affidavit and (2) 

a pretrial diversion agreement between Yono and the federal government. Both the affidavit and 

the pretrial diversion agreement refer to the violation of federal statutes related to the manufacture 

and distribution of controlled substances. Further, both documents refer to Yono. Based upon 

that, it can be inferred that Yono was engaged in drug-related offenses that resulted in an affidavit 

being filed against the property he was leasing to Abrams.

However, that is not the only inference available based upon the two documents. The 

affidavit was filed in 2017, but the pretrial diversion agreement was not filed until 2021, which 

suggests that the two documents are unrelated. Moreover, the affidavit refers to money-laundering 

related offenses as well as a controlled-substance related offense, whereas the pretrial diversion 

agreement only references offenses related to controlled substances. Further, the pretrial diversion 

agreement does not state when the offenses Yono was taking responsibility for were committed. 

And the affidavit only reflects that Yono is the owner of the property at issue. The paragraph 

detailing the offenses which caused the affidavit to be filed is silent as to the identity of the person 

or persons who committed the offenses. For those reasons, it is reasonable to infer that the affidavit 

and the pretrial diversion agreement are not for the same conduct.

In sum, although it is reasonable to infer that Yono had engaged in unlawful conduct in 

2021, viewing the record in the light most favorable to Yono, it is also reasonable to infer that his 

2021 pretrial diversion agreement is not proof that he was engaging in unlawful conduct in 2017. 

Moreover, the fact that unlawful conduct occurred at a home he owned—and rented to Abrams—

in 2017, does not mean that he was engaged in any illegal conduct at that time. Because there are 

questions of fact as to whether Yono had unclean hands, the trial court did not err by denying 

summary disposition.

III. JUDGMENT OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Abrams next argues that the trial court erred by entering a judgment of no cause of action. 

“We review a trial court’s findings of fact in a bench trial for clear error and its conclusions of law 
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de novo.” Chelsea Investment Group, LLC v City of Chelsea, 288 Mich App 239, 250; 792 NW2d 

781 (2010). “A finding is clearly erroneous if there is no evidentiary support for it or if this Court 

is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. at 251.

B. ANALYSIS

The trial court found that Abrams did not meet his burden of showing that Yono breached 

the lease agreement. Abrams does not directly challenge that finding on appeal. Nevertheless, we 

conclude that the court’s finding was not clearly erroneous.

The trial court judgment reflects that there was a valid contract between the parties and that 

Abrams was not in default when he exercised the option to purchase in March 2019. The closing 

did not occur because of the affidavit recorded by the United States Attorney’s Office. To show 

breach, Abrams presented evidence suggesting that Yono’s conduct was the reason that the 

affidavit was filed. In contrast, Yono presented testimony suggesting that it was Abrams’ conduct 

that led to the affidavit being filed. Either scenario, however, is equally likely based upon the 

record.

The house was raided in 2017. Abrams was the sole individual living at the property. He 

was growing and selling marijuana from the home. The marijuana was confiscated and he was 

charged with a federal offense. He entered into a pretrial diversion, which he completed 

successfully. Abrams admitted that the raid was because of his “collaboration” with the Yono 

family. That collaboration included getting marijuana “cuts” from Yono to grow marijuana, 

selling marijuana to Yono, and unspecified work for other members of Yono’s family. This 

testimony suggests that it was Abrams’ conduct that led to the affidavit being recorded in 2017.

On the other hand, although Abrams had possession of the house, Yono owned it. Indeed, 

he owned three properties in 2017. All three were raided. Yono admitted that he was selling 

marijuana between 2014 and 2017. Some of that marijuana was purchased from Abrams. As a 

result of the raids, Yono and several of his family members were charged with drug-related federal 

offenses, including conspiracy. Yono’s testimony allows for an inference that the 2021 pretrial 

diversion agreement was a result of his actions in 2017. This provides the link between the 2017 

affidavit and the 2021 pretrial diversion agreement that was missing at the summary disposition 

stage of the proceedings. Based upon this evidence, it can be inferred that the affidavit was filed 

as a result of Yono’s conduct.

Additionally, a third inference exists based upon the testimony: both parties actions’ caused 

the affidavit to be filed. The trial court found that this was the case, and that finding was not 

clearly erroneous. Both Yono and Abrams had a connection with the property in 2017. Abrams 

lived there and was growing and selling marijuana. Yono owned the property and was providing 

“cuts” to Abrams and purchasing the marijuana he was growing. Further, it can be inferred that 

Abrams and Yono were part of the same criminal enterprise. Abrams had dealings with Yono and 

other members of Yono’s family and other members of the Yono clan were raided and charged

with crimes in relation to the sale of marijuana. Yono testified that they were all part of the same 

group.
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Given the above evidence, therefore, the trial court’s finding that the record was 

insufficient to show that Yono’s conduct caused the affidavit to be filed is not clearly erroneous. 

Each scenario was factually supported and was equally likely. Abrams, therefore, did not meet his 

burden of establishing that Yono breached the contract.

On appeal, Abrams argues that the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proving that 

Yono was the cause of the affidavit from being filed from Yono to him. We disagree. Whether 

Yono engaged in wrongful conduct leading to the affidavit being filed was relevant to Yono’s 

affirmative defense of laches. Yono, therefore, had the burden of proving that his hands were 

clean. Yet, Abrams still had the burden of proving that Yono breached the contract. He alleged 

that the breach was caused by Yono’s conduct in causing the affidavit to be filed. Thus, he had 

the burden of proving that fact.

Finally, Abrams complains that the trial court improperly used the wrongful conduct rule 

to bar his claim. He maintains that the wrongful-conduct rule is an affirmative defense and that, 

by not raising it, Yono waived it. Yet, the trial court sua sponte raised the wrongful conduct rule 

as a result of the proofs admitted at trial.3 Abrams has pointed to no authority precluding a court 

sitting in equity from sua sponte considering equitable principles before rendering judgment. “It 

is not enough for an appellant in his brief simply to announce a position or assert an error and then 

leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate 

for him his arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his position.” 

Mitcham v Detroit, 355 Mich 182, 203; 94 NW2d 388 (1959). Consequently, because Abrams has 

not directed this Court to any authority indicating that a court may not raise an issue sua sponte 

when sitting in equity, we consider this issue abandoned on appeal and decline to consider it.

Affirmed. Yono may tax costs as the prevailing party. MCR 7.219(A).

/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney

/s/ Michael J. Kelly

/s/ Michelle M. Rick

 

3 On appeal, Yono argues that by raising unclean hands as a defense, he also raised the wrongfulconduct rule as a defense. Even if that were the case, his affirmative defense stated “unclean 

hands” but, in contravention of MCR 2.111(F), he did not state the “the facts constituting” that 

affirmative defense. Thus, the defense was not adequately raised.