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i 

95–319 2016

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–44] 

UPDATE ON FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 2014 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NUCLEAR 

ENTERPRISE REVIEW 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JUNE 25, 2015 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri, Chairwoman 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

HEATH BOPE, Professional Staff Member 

MIKE AMATO, Professional Staff Member 

ABIGAIL P. GAGE, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Hartzler, Hon. Vicky, a Representative from Missouri, Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations ...................................................... 1 

Speier, Hon. Jackie, a Representative from California, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations ...................................................... 2 

WITNESSES 

Benedict, VADM Terry, USN, Director, Strategic Systems Programs, United 

States Navy .......................................................................................................... 5 

Brumer, Dr. Yisroel, Director, Strategic, Defensive, and Space Programs, 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation ........................................................................................................................ 4 

Clark, Maj Gen Richard M., USAF, Commander, 8th Air Force, United States 

Air Force ............................................................................................................... 7 

Weinstein, Maj Gen Jack, USAF, Commander, 20th Air Force, United States 

Air Force ............................................................................................................... 6 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Benedict, VADM Terry ..................................................................................... 40 

Brumer, Dr. Yisroel .......................................................................................... 33 

Clark, Maj Gen Richard M. ............................................................................. 56 

Weinstein, Maj Gen Jack ................................................................................. 50 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Air Force Global Strike Command ICBM Force Improvement Program 

(FIP) Recommendations ............................................................................... 69 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Ms. Speier ......................................................................................................... 85 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mrs. Hartzler .................................................................................................... 89 

Ms. Speier ......................................................................................................... 92 

(1) 

UPDATE ON FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF 

THE 2014 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE REVIEW 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, Washington, DC, Thursday, June 25, 2015. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:04 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vicky Hartzler (chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VICKY HARTZLER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Welcome. I am delighted to convene this meeting. 

Nuclear deterrence remains the foundation of national security 

for the United States and our allies. It is also fundamental to preserving international stability. Our nuclear deterrent not only 

keeps potential adversaries at bay, it also assures and comforts our 

allies. This central, but often not immediately visible role has prevented both nuclear war and large-scale conventional war between 

the world’s great powers for 70 years. 

Seven months ago, in an open letter to the men and women who 

serve with U.S. nuclear forces, then-Secretary of Defense Hagel declared that ‘‘our nuclear deterrent plays a critical role in assuring 

U.S. national security.’’ He also said, ‘‘no other capability we have 

is more important.’’ I agree. 

I am honored to represent the officers and enlisted personnel assigned to Whiteman Air Force Base. Among these are the very talented and capable members of the 509th Bomb Wing and 131st 

Bomb Wing who fly and maintain the B–2 Spirit bomber. Theirs 

is a demanding and challenging job, carried out away from the 

limelight but with dedication and perseverance. 

These Air Force personnel form a critical part of the U.S. nuclear 

triad that carries out this priority mission. Yet, we are at a critical 

inflection point for our nuclear forces. 

As the age of U.S. nuclear weapons increases and some of our 

bombers, submarines, and intercontinental missiles become older 

than the personnel who maintain and operate them, potential adversaries are fielding newer and more advanced nuclear arms. 

Many prospective foes are also making nuclear weapons more, not 

less, central to their national strategies. 

Chairman Thornberry has turned his committee’s attention to 

these vitally important topics this week. The committee is con-
2 

vening a series of open hearings and classified briefings to learn 

more details of the challenges facing our nuclear enterprise. Today’s oversight hearing is part of that broader effort. 

Not long ago, then-Secretary of Defense Hagel called on both internal and external teams of specialists to consider the various 

deep-seated problems confronting our nuclear enterprise. The report of the Nuclear Enterprise Review was sobering. 

It set forth many important recommendations to fix serious 

shortcomings which inhibited work of those at Whiteman Air Force 

Base and its Air Force and Navy counterparts in the ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] fields and across the submarine force. 

This afternoon, we will hear from the Defense Department’s Cost 

Assessment and Program Evaluation [CAPE] office. The Deputy 

Secretary of Defense, who we heard from at a hearing earlier 

today, charged this office with the responsibility for assessing and 

measuring implementation of the recommendations contained in 

the Nuclear Enterprise Review. 

We will also hear testimony from the senior commanders responsible for the Air Force bomber and missile units and for the Navy’s 

sea-based nuclear weapons carried by submarines. The subcommittee seeks to know what has been accomplished. We also 

seek to know which recommendations of the Nuclear Enterprise 

Review remain problematic. We must solve the challenges confronting our nuclear enterprise in a long-term and sustainable fashion. 

So before I introduce the witnesses, I turn to Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee ranking member for her introduction. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JACKIE SPEIER, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you to all of 

the witnesses here today. 

The Congressional Budget Office estimates that we spend approximately $350 billion over the next decade to sustain and modernize our nuclear arsenal. Over the next 30 years, this bill could 

add up to $1 trillion. 

A letter sent to this committee last year by STRATCOM [U.S. 

Strategic Command] Commander Admiral Haney suggested nuclear weapons could consume close to 10 percent of the defense 

budget for a period of time, though he has since walked back from 

that statement before this committee. 

Under Secretary Frank Kendall stated earlier this year and I 

quote: ‘‘We do have a huge affordability problem with nuclear modernization,’’ end quote. But even as we spend vast sums to modernize, there has been extreme troubling lapses in the leadership 

underpinning our system of nuclear weapons. 

At the highest levels of leadership, the former deputy commander 

of STRATCOM was removed after revelations that he was spending 

30 hours a week gambling at an Iowa casino using fake poker 

chips. 

A two-star general in charge of all U.S. intercontinental ballistic 

missiles was drunk and offensive while he partied with Russian 

women during an official trip to Moscow. 
3 

In 2013, 76 enlisted sailors were involved in cheating at a naval 

reactor training facility. Similarly, in the officer ranks of the ICBM 

force, over 90 missileers were implicated in cheating on tests and 

several were prosecuted on narcotics charges. Furthermore, one 

missileer was charged with having been a gang leader. 

A 2013 RAND study warned that morale was low judging from 

these recent incidents. I can see why. In 2007, six nuclear weapons 

were loaded on a B–52 bomber and flown across the country before 

anyone realized the mistake. We are beyond lucky that nothing has 

happened. And as all of you know, we cannot rely on luck when 

it comes to our nuclear arsenal. 

Surprisingly, this is the first hearing that our committee has 

held to examine these more recent problems and what is being 

done to address them. I am encouraged that Secretary Hagel and 

now Secretary Carter are taking these issues seriously and have 

put in place a system to remedy these issues. 

I look forward to hearing from CAPE about progress on implementing the recommendations of the Nuclear Enterprise Reviews 

and hearing from the Navy and the Air Force on what challenges 

remain and what improvements are still needed. 

These problems must be detected early. And more importantly, 

we must restore a culture of effective leadership and integrity 

throughout our nuclear forces. 

I am concerned that several of these problems such as the cheating in the Air Force missileer ranks may have been commonplace 

for years and perhaps decades. This significant lapse in integrity 

was never surfaced or corrected and was simply accepted. 

Moreover, many of the problems surfaced in the press by AP [Associated Press] reporter Bob Burns and the Air Force first minimized these issues. Moving forward, Congress must be informed of 

any ongoing or new problems as well as the progress to correct 

these issues. 

Effective change in leadership and culture may take time, but 

must begin immediately. We cannot accept risks when it comes to 

our nuclear arsenal. 

I would like to thank Chairman Thornberry and Chairwoman 

Hartzler for holding this hearing and look forward to hearing from 

our witnesses. Thank you. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Ms. Speier. 

Members of the committee who are not assigned to this subcommittee could be with us today. Therefore, pursuant to committee procedure, I ask unanimous consent that non-subcommittee 

members be permitted to participate in today’s hearing after all 

subcommittee members have had an opportunity to ask questions. 

Is there objection? Without objection, non-subcommittee members, will be recognized at the appropriate time for 5 minutes. 

Now, I am happy to introduce our witnesses. Dr. Yisroel Brumer 

is the director for Strategic, Defensive and Space Programs at the 

Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office in the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense. The office is tasked with tracking, monitoring, and independently assessing the implementation of the recommendations of the Nuclear Enterprise Review. 

Vice Admiral Terry Benedict is the director of the U.S. Navy 

Strategic Systems Programs. He directs the training, systems, 
4 

equipment, facilities, and personnel of the Navy’s strategic weapons. 

Major General Jack Weinstein is the commander of the 12th Air 

Force and is responsible for the Nation’s intercontinental ballistic 

missile force. 

Major General Richard Clark is the commander of the 8th Air 

Force which oversees the Air Force nuclear bombers. 

So, Dr. Brumer, we will start with you for your opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF DR. YISROEL BRUMER, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC, DEFENSIVE, AND SPACE PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF THE 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM EVALUATION 

Dr. BRUMER. Thank you. Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking Member Speier, and distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to join you today. And I do appreciate the opportunity to testify about how my team is executing the tasks resulting from the 

recent internal and external reviews of the nuclear enterprise directed by former Secretary Hagel. 

These reviews concluded that without intervention, issues relating to resourcing, personnel, organization, and culture have put the 

nuclear enterprise on a path to more frequent and greater problems than we have previously witnessed. 

Former Secretary Hagel directed the Department to place a renewed emphasis on the nuclear force. He specifically charged the 

director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation to track, monitor, and independently assess the implementation of the review’s 

recommendations with particular focus on assessing the health of 

the nuclear enterprise. He also tasked us to provide monthly updates to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and regular updates to 

the Secretary. 

Our team includes current and former Active Duty military 

members as well as scientists and data experts to support technical 

assessments. This team has shown unwavering dedication to improving the enterprise by delivering the most honest and objective 

analysis, data, and assessments possible. 

Senior leadership has been keenly interested in comprehensive 

and sustainable solutions rather than short-term efforts that merely check boxes without placing the enterprise on more solid footing. 

This charge has proven to be the most important and the most 

difficult aspect of our task. It is easy to verify an instruction has 

been modified to relieve the force of an unnecessary burden or that 

needed equipment and gear has been delivered. It is much more 

difficult to measure changes in culture or personal attitudes toward 

the mission. We believe this kind of analysis is important to facilitate real change while also remaining vigilant to identify unintended second- and third-order effects. 

Our team has made significant strides in a short time. Since September, we have distilled every possible recommendation from the 

reviews. We have held meetings with all the stakeholders and formulated problem statements identifying the root cause of each 

issue. We have worked with each responsible organization to develop detailed approaches, metrics, and milestones. 
5 

Finally, to go beyond box-checking, we developed metrics to determine whether we are achieving the desired intent to improve 

the overall health of the enterprise. 

Additionally, we are visiting key locations to become more familiar with unique mission and quality-of-life challenges as well as to 

hold non-attributional discussions to gather empirical data and 

learn what issues are most pressing. 

Assessing the overall health will prove challenging and we recognize it will take years of dedicated effort to restore the risk margin 

that has been lost. We intend to provide leadership with our best 

analysis and advice to help them guide these efforts to completion. 

Our team has embraced this challenge and they are proud to 

have been entrusted with the role of ensuring issues are addressed 

to provide the Nation with the safe, secure, and effective strategic 

deterrent that is so critical to our national security. 

I will continue to report our progress on a regular basis. You 

have my assurance we will remain vigilant and we will maintain 

our honesty and integrity for as long as the Secretary of Defense 

and this committee deem our services worthy and necessary. 

Thank you for your time and I do welcome your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Brumer can be found in the Appendix on page 33.] 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Dr. Brumer. 

Admiral Benedict, now we turn to you. 

STATEMENT OF VADM TERRY BENEDICT, USN, DIRECTOR, 

STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES NAVY 

Admiral BENEDICT. Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking Member 

Speier, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for 

the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee on Oversight 

and Investigations. I represent the men and women of our Navy’s 

Strategic Systems Programs or SSP. Your continue support of our 

deterrence mission is appreciated, and I thank you. 

As the director of SSP, it is my responsibility to design, develop, 

produce, support, and ensure the safety and the security of our 

Navy’s sea-based strategic deterrent capability, the TRIDENT II 

(D5) Strategic Weapons System. 

My written statement, which I respectfully request be submitted 

for the record, addresses the Navy’s top priorities for maintaining 

a credible, effective, and safe sea-based strategic deterrent. 

The Department of Defense Nuclear Enterprise Review or NER 

incorporated input on the nuclear forces as well as the supporting 

infrastructure to build, maintain, and control these assets. 

The NER provided the Navy an unbiased look and ultimately 

found that the nuclear enterprise is safe, secure, and effective 

today. However, as we all know, it found evidence of systemic problems that, if not addressed, could undermine the safety, security, 

and effectiveness of elements of the nuclear forces in the future. 

The Navy has taken significant steps to implement corrective action for the recommendations. The Navy will continue to actively 

work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and with Congress 

to implement solutions across the fleet to ensure safety and reliability. The Navy’s investments will include infrastructure sustainment and improvements in personnel, training, and accountability. 
6 

Additionally, the Secretary of the Navy has nominated me to be 

the regulator for oversight of the Navy nuclear deterrent mission 

in order to sharpen our operational focus. As the Navy’s regulator, 

I report directly to the Chief of Naval Operations on nuclear force 

readiness. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I am pleased 

to answer your questions when appropriate. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Benedict can be found in the 

Appendix on page 40.] 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Admiral. 

General Weinstein. 

STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN JACK WEINSTEIN, USAF, 

COMMANDER, 20TH AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE 

General WEINSTEIN. Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking Member 

Speier, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for 

allowing me to appear before you and represent the over 10,000 

intercontinental ballistic missile professionals of 20th Air Force. 

Every day, across 33,600 square miles in Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Wyoming, more than 900 airmen are 

deployed to launch facilities and missile alert facilities to provide 

our Nation a credible around-the-clock nuclear deterrent, poised 

and ready when called upon by the President. 

I am immensely proud of the fine Americans serving in the 

ICBM mission as I know you are and I share in your view that we 

must continue to provide them the training, professional development, and resources they need to accomplish this critical national 

mission. 

The airmen of 20th Air Force are benefiting greatly from improvements we have implemented based on the recommendations 

of the Nuclear Enterprise Review and Air Force reviews. 

The support we have received from Congress, the highest levels 

of the Department of Defense, and senior leaders of the United 

States Air Force has allowed us to address shortfalls and reaffirm 

the Air Force’s commitment to the nuclear mission as the number 

one priority. 

As commander of the operational ICBM force, I continue to focus 

on the Nuclear Enterprise Review recommendation to rebuild culture and improve morale. The actions we have taken over the last 

18 months are moving us in the right direction, providing our airmen with the proper equipment and empowering them to make decisions, developing each of them not just as technical experts but 

as leaders. 

As we fully implement resource and programmatic improvements 

to the ICBM mission, we will continue to rebuild a culture that is 

foundational to continuing and enduring improvement. 

We will remain attuned to our frontline airmen for their feedback and to our commanders and enlisted leaders in the missile 

fields to ensure we make informed decisions to execute our mission 

exceptionally well and develop tomorrow’s nuclear leaders. 

Madam Chairwoman, I want to thank you again for the opportunity to appear before the committee to discuss 20th Air Force 

and the ICBM mission. I look forward to your questions. Thank 

you. 
7 

[The prepared statement of General Weinstein can be found in 

the Appendix on page 50.] 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, General. 

And now last but not least, General Clark. 

STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN RICHARD M. CLARK, USAF, 

COMMANDER, 8TH AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE 

General CLARK. Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking Member Speier, 

and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for allowing me to appear before you today to represent the men and women 

of the 8th Air Force. 

Let me say first that the men and women are of the Mighty 8th 

are doing a fantastic job every day providing a safe, secure, and effective nuclear force for our Nation while assuring we are prepared 

to execute our conventional mission any time, anywhere on the 

planet. 

Over the last year, we implemented many changes based on feedback from airmen carrying out the nuclear mission and we are constantly assessing where we still need to improve. 

The numerous changes we have instituted are completely in line 

with the internal and external Nuclear Enterprise Reviews conducted last year. With the support of the Secretary of the Air Force 

and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force as well as the leadership 

of the Secretary of Defense, we restored our nuclear focus, are pursuing essential modernization efforts, and are making key quality 

of life enhancements for our airmen. 

We are funding 156 manpower positions across our 3 bases, providing relief to our most understaffed specialties, and will soon 

open a 34-person operations and maintenance detachment in Anderson Air Force Base Guam to provide needed support to the continuous bomber presence mission. 

We recently conducted a headquarters force improvement program and will begin addressing the findings in the coming days 

and weeks. Our airmen have a voice and we are listening. Maintaining readiness is a testament to our airmen’s dedication, commitment, and expertise. But we are operating 50-year old aircraft 

and are now at the point where we can no longer postpone upgrades. 

Modernization efforts aimed at our existing B–2 and B–52 aircraft and associated weapons as well as the new long-range strike 

bomber are critical to preserving our dominance against next-generation capabilities. 

Modernization is also a means of bridging the say-do gap and 

showing our airmen that the mission they perform day in and day 

out is important to their Nation. We realize these upgrades come 

at a cost and we are working with our ICBM and Navy partners 

to find areas of intelligent commonality. 

Madam Chairwoman, I want to thank you again for the support 

of your committee and for the opportunity to appear before you to 

discuss 8th Air Force. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Clark can be found in the 

Appendix on page 56.] 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, General. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your statements and your comments. 
8 

I guess I want to just start with Dr. Brumer, my questions. Over 

the last 9 years, 24 unclassified and classified reports sanctioned 

by the Department have assessed, identified, and proposed remedies to issues within our nuclear enterprise. Yet, you still describe 

in your written testimony that the two most recent reviews concluded that without interruption issues relating to resourcing, personnel, organization, and culture have the nuclear enterprise on a 

path to more frequent and greater problems that we have previously witnessed. So what additional unacceptable events need to 

occur in order for the Department to wholeheartedly implement 

and sustain the recommendations in the two most recent reports 

on the nuclear enterprise? 

Dr. BRUMER. Thank you, Chairwoman. That is an extremely important question. When we started this effort, we spent a fair bit 

of time asking how do we ensure that this is not just the latest in 

a series of attempts to fix the problem and, you know, that we are 

not having these conversations again in a few years. 

Our assessment is that what has happened in the past, there 

were a number of reviews, they made hundreds of recommendations, and the services took those recommendations seriously but 

implemented them with more of a box-checking mentality. There is 

a set of things to do, I have done them, I can now close them out 

rather than having an enduring focus on the mission and followon assessments, you know, whether we are having the intended effect. We are all committed to making sure that doesn’t happen this 

time. And that is very much at the heart of what we are doing. 

So there are recommendations from the reviews. We are tracking 

to make sure that those [are] implemented. We are also paying 

very close attention to whether we are achieving the desired effect, 

whether we are having unintended consequences that are creating 

new risks or whether new risks that we simply haven’t seen before 

are arising to make sure we are aware of them before a review is 

required. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. I read your testimony as well as part of the report and it seems like you have got a lot of the matrixes in place 

for process as well as product and you have got a process to monitor in place. But what have you seen so far of actually recommendations that have been made that you can say have been 

achieved? Can you give us some of the successes that have occurred 

that you have monitored? 

Dr. BRUMER. Yes, absolutely. What I would say is at the moment 

there is a comprehensive effort across the Department to address 

all of the review’s recommendations. 

By far, the most important thing that has occurred has been the 

involvement by the senior leadership in the Department personally, 

the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of 

the Air Force, Secretary of the Navy, have been very personally involved holding regular meetings to hold the senior leadership accountable. That is without question what is most different this 

time and that has been very much the engine for a different atmosphere this time around. 

There are a number of other recommendations that have already 

been implemented, the Air Force elevating Global Strike Command 

from a three-star to a four-star, as example, standing up a senior 
9 

leadership forum to have discussions. And maybe the services want 

to talk more specifically about what is happening, but there has 

been money spent, actions taken, people held accountable. It has 

been significant. 

That said, it is early in the process and we are continuing to 

monitor the impact, but we expect this to take years before we will 

be able to say that the risk margin has been regained. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you very much. 

Major General Clark, this committee has been very supportive of 

Air Force efforts to recapitalize the bomber fleet with the new longrange strike bomber. Knowing that operational fielding of the new 

bomber is still a decade away, what is the Air Force’s philosophy 

on how it will approach which bomber fleet will be recapitalized 

first? And given the Air Force’s goal to procure 80 to 100 new 

bombers, will the long-range strike bomber eventually replace all 

types of bombers in a single peer fleet? 

General CLARK. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. We are developing a bomber roadmap that will address the concerns that you 

are discussing. And the bottom line to that is it is going to take 

all three of these—all three of our current bombers in our bomber 

fleet to get us to the point where we have the LRSB, the long-range 

strike bomber in order. 

So what it is going to require is modernization and sustainment 

of the B–52 and the B–2 in particular for the nuclear mission. And 

we do have plans in place, the President’s budget does address 

those. Now it is a matter of committing to the roadmap that we develop to get us to that next step for the LRSB. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Once it comes online, will it replace eventually 

all three with one? 

General CLARK. Yes, ma’am. Eventually, it will replace. It will be 

the long-range strike bomber for us at a point. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Very good. I will withhold my other questions, 

give my colleagues and my ranking member a chance to ask questions. 

Ranking Member Speier. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Madam Chair. Let me just ask each of 

you briefly. I would like you to respond briefly to the affordability 

issue. We don’t have the willingness to tax ourselves to properly 

support defense. So how would you—how do we deal with this affordability issue? 

Dr. BRUMER. Thank you. I think the Deputy Secretary put it the 

best this morning he said this is the number one priority. We are 

going to have to fund it. That means either additional funds will 

be required or there will be very difficult choices made about mission risk in other important areas. 

Admiral BENEDICT. Ma’am, I think there are two ways to address 

affordability. One is to very carefully and diligently scrutinize requirements and I will tell you in the Ohio replacement program, 

we have spent the last number of years ensuring that that scrub 

has been done. 

The second aspect and it is one that we are working within the 

Navy very closely with the Air Force is the issue of commonality. 

As we look at the systems and we are both on this—on the path 

to modernize the systems, where could we, where should we strive 
10 

for commonality between the SLBMs, the submarine-launched ballistic missile, and the ICBMs, the land-based. That is an effort that 

is being championed at the RDA level, the Assistant Secretary level 

with the support of OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] so, I 

think those two aspects address affordability. 

General WEINSTEIN. We are working really closely with the 

United States Navy as Admiral Benedict talked about when it 

comes to commonality. We are fortunate that Admiral Haney, the 

combatant commander holds stakeholder meetings. 

The most recent ICBM stakeholder meeting where we talked 

about sustainment issues in the force as well as modernization 

issues in the force, we have Admiral Benedict to attend to the 

stakeholder meetings on ICBM so we can address corporately what 

resource needs we have in the future and what components using 

commonality in a smart manner can you use for both the SLBM 

force and the ICBM force. 

And I believe by working together as a team you can look at this 

commonality whether it is in the propulsion system, whether it is 

in the guidance system, and I think by looking at commonality is 

where you can find a common ground in order to do what is best 

for the American taxpayer to provide a capability that this Nation 

greatly needs. 

Ms. SPEIER. Major General Clark, do you have anything to add? 

General CLARK. Ma’am, I don’t have anything really to add other 

than what was already said. 

Ms. SPEIER. All right. Thank you. 

General Weinstein, Congress was alerted to the cheating and morale problems through press articles. We weren’t informed by any 

of the executives within the military. Why were we not alerted to 

the problem initially? Did you not know about it either? 

General WEINSTEIN. I knew completely about it and I will tell 

you when I found out about it exactly and then who I notified. And, 

we were hosting, it was early January, hosting the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Hagel was there. I found out on that day that 

there was a drug investigation ongoing and that drug investigation, 

besides touching other Air Force installations, touched crew members at one of my installations at Malmstrom. 

I told the Secretary of Defense immediately when I found out 

and then we informed our senior leadership at that time. As the 

operational—— 

Ms. SPEIER. How about the Congress? 

General WEINSTEIN. Well, as the operational commander, I 

worked for the Commander of Global Strike Command of the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command and those people were told immediately that there was a problem. 

Ms. SPEIER. That doesn’t respond to Congress not being told 

about it until they read about it in the paper. All right. One of the 

recommendations was to guarantee one of the missileers the top 

three choices for next assignment. Has the Air Force been able to 

fulfill that promise? 

General WEINSTEIN. We are working diligently on that promise. 

Ms. SPEIER. Does that mean you are executing it or not? 

General WEINSTEIN. We are executing—let me first—if I—if you 

please give me time—what we are executing is a change to the way 
11 

we do training and evaluation in the ICBM business, to empower 

our airmen to give them proper training. And that was one of the 

issues that the Secretary of the Air Force explained immediately 

after visiting the bases. 

Because of that, we have changed our crew force structure from 

a 4-year crew tour into a ‘‘3+3’’ crew tour which is 3 years at an 

operational base where you are a deputy or a missile combat crew 

commander and then over to being an instructor, evaluator, or a 

flight commander. 

By changing that 3+3 structure, we have seen a decrease in the 

last two developmental teams and those are the teams that get together to vector crew members after their first 3-year assignment 

because based on the 3+3 structure, we require additional crew 

members for that. 

So, we have fallen below that 90 percent on two development 

teams and we are going to work on that. The one data point that 

I think is extremely important is we assign people to their assignments based on two factors. Factor one is how well are you doing 

in your current assignment because it is a merit-based process. 

And number two is where are there openings in the new career 

field because not every career field has an opening at the same 

time every single year. 

When we look at the top 50 percent of ICBM crew members receiving their top three preferences one, two, or three, in the last 

board, 100 percent got—of the top 50 percent, got one of their three 

assignments. So, we are striving hard to make sure we can meet 

the needs of the individual, at the same time meet the needs of the 

service. 

Ms. SPEIER. So, you are saying the top 50 percent, so the bottom 

50 percent didn’t get their choices, is that what you are saying? 

General WEINSTEIN. No. When I looked at the data for that one, 

for the top three preferences overall, it is above 80 percent. 

Ms. SPEIER. Okay. 

General WEINSTEIN. So, we are taking care of everyone in the enterprise. 

Ms. SPEIER. So, there is a huge morale problem, correct? 

General WEINSTEIN. No, ma’am, I disagree. There was—— 

Ms. SPEIER. But there has been a huge morale problem. 

General WEINSTEIN. There was a huge morale problem before we 

started the changes. 

Ms. SPEIER. Okay. Is there anything that requires this 24-houron system? I mean, why not 12 hours? 

General WEINSTEIN. Over the years, we have looked at the best 

way to man an operational force that requires to be on alert 24 

hours a day, 7 days a week. By looking at the 24-hour schedule, 

that was the best schedule that supports the ability to man the 

mission as well as to take care of the people. 

One thing we have implemented which has been a great morale 

booster is a change in the alert schedule. The previous alert schedule had an individual that would go on alert, for example, on a 

Monday. They would come back on a Tuesday and would have to 

work again on Wednesday. 
12 

That doesn’t work at a place like Malmstrom Air Force Base 

which has the largest missile field and especially in the winter people would be coming back at 3, 4, 5 o’clock at night. 

We have introduced a schedule that we are calling ATOX which 

is they are on alert on a Monday. They travel back on Tuesday. 

They have Wednesday as a day off. And then on Thursday, they 

can either pull alerts or go into training. 

In February of this year, the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of 

the Air Force brought all the four-stars and directors from the Air 

Staff to Minot Air Force Base for a nuclear oversight board and one 

of the many boards that we have to make sure that we keep on 

track with all the changes. 

And then in the launch control center, one of the four-stars in 

the United States Air Force asked a crew member what was the 

best part about her job. And she answered it was the schedule. So, 

we have improved morale greatly by changing the schedule which 

allows us to maintain the mission for Admiral Haney at the same 

time taking care of the airmen. 

Ms. SPEIER. All right. My understanding is that there used to be 

an annual competition between the Navy and Air Force but that 

has been discontinued. My understanding was that it used to build 

team spirit and lift the morale and help the nuclear enterprise officers to hone their skills throughout the year. Is this something that 

is worthy of being reinstated? 

General WEINSTEIN. We have reinstated. Personally, I have been 

a missileer for over 32 years and I don’t recall a competition combined with the United States Navy but we have instituted—my 

boss, Lieutenant General Wilson, Global Strike Challenge, that is 

a competition. We did one last year. We are doing one this year. 

We took a gap for a year or two based on sequestration and not 

having the available funds. But we have instituted a competition. 

That competition includes ICBM forces and as well as bomber 

forces and it is a great camaraderie-builder as well as improving 

the mission. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Representative. 

We will go to another member of the subcommittee, Representative Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman and thank you 

for hosting this hearing today. 

And let me get back to my notes. The Nuclear Enterprise Review, the NER, stated that prior reviews had taken place and that 

many key recommendations from those reviews had only marginal 

impact. 

The NER also stated that expectations are high that this time 

the response would be both sustained and effective. How can you 

assure the subcommittee that the necessary focus will remain on 

implementing the recommendations and how will you keep sustained attention on the issues within each of your respective services. And I would like to get a response to that from all of the witnesses but starting from Major Clark and then General Weinstein. 

General CLARK. Sir, I think the—as Dr. Brumer mentioned in his 

opening statement—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. And I am sorry, Major General. I am sorry. 
13 

General CLARK. Yes, sir, I understood. I have been called Major 

before, too. That is okay. 

Mr. JOHNSON. We will just keep it at General. 

General CLARK. Yes, sir. Well, thank you. I appreciate that. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

General CLARK. As Dr. Brumer mentioned in his statement I 

think that the last time we went through this type of effort in the 

enterprise it was somewhat of a box-check mentality. What we see 

this time and what I see as a new commander is that this really 

is a—it is a top-down effort because we are getting a significant 

amount of support from the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of 

the Air Force, our Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Wilson, who 

is the Air Force Global Strike Commander, top-down attention on 

the issues that we are facing. 

But we are also getting bottom-up attention. And our airmen are 

empowered this time to actually have a voice to help us to determine where the areas that we need to look at, areas that we need 

to improve upon. And when you have the top-down coupled with 

the bottom-up approach, I think that breeds a recipe for success for 

us. So, that is one major change that I think is along the way. 

And ultimately what I think happens here is we are going to get 

a culture change. And it is something that is going to be woven 

throughout the command because people believe it, people own it. 

They understand the purpose and they are empowered to do something about it. So, I think this time is different than before because 

it is not just a box-check mentality. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Thank you. 

General CLARK. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. JOHNSON. General Weinstein. 

General WEINSTEIN. Thank you for the question. This review is 

different than previous ones. I would like to talk about what we did 

based on the cheating scandal at Malmstrom. We did three separate investigations because of the cheating scandal internal to the 

United States Air Force before the Secretary of Defense did the 

Nuclear Enterprise Review. 

The first thing we did was the commander directed an investigation that looked at the leadership at Malmstrom. The second item 

we did was a group that had an organizational behavior specialist 

on it to find out how did we get that way and that was the senior 

operational training and evaluation group, had an ICBM person 

and a bomber person on it. 

Just like Admiral Benedict talked about commonality, there is 

commonality on how to solve problems. And my boss, Lieutenant 

General Wilson, worked with the commander of SUBLANT [Submarine Force Atlantic] and a fellow task force commander Vice Admiral Mike Connor and developed a program called the Force Improvement Program that General Clark just talked about. 

The Force Improvement Program then went out and talked to 

the airmen. And we broke it up into many different subspecialties. 

We broke it up into operations, maintenance, support, helicopters, 

and operations. We received numerous items, over 350 recommendations. Those were 350 recommendations that came from the airmen. 
14 

The only two people that were allowed to say no to one of those 

recommendations were myself and General Wilson. We spent 3 

days at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana to review all those 

items. From those items, we came up with how we are going to improve the culture and the commitment in the ICBM force. 

When you look at the Nuclear Enterprise Review, there is 90 percent congruence between what the Nuclear Enterprise Review 

came and then what occurred during the Force Improvement Program. And then, as we have talked about before, it is leadership 

commitment; myself, General Clark, Vice Admiral Benedict, we attend meetings with the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the 

SECDEF [Secretary of Defense]. 

The Secretary of Air Force has visited our bases more than any 

other bases so it is the leadership commitment and it is the commitment from the airmen and the leaders that are making a difference this time. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Madam Chair, if I could hear from Admiral Benedict on this also. 

Thank you. 

Admiral BENEDICT. Congressman, thank you. Sir, I will reiterate 

what my Air Force counterpart has said. I think, first and foremost, it is the attention by senior leadership. Going back to 2007 

when Secretary Schlesinger and Admiral Donald conducted internal reviews of the Navy’s position, we have implemented 100 percent of those findings. 

We continually assess ourselves every 2 years. We knew that we 

had issues with infrastructure and personnel before the SECDEF 

reviews last summer. But the senior commitment not only in attention to detail but also financially has allowed us to move those two 

areas at a much more rapid pace to ensure that we are fully in 

support of this mission. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. And with that, I will yield back. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Now, we will go to Representative Zinke. 

Mr. ZINKE. I want to thank you, Madam Chairman. As you know, 

I represent Montana, the sole Congressman from the great State 

that has Malmstrom. And thank you, sir. And I am also a former 

SEAL [Sea, Air, Land forces] commander and I have concerns as 

I have been through multiple hearings about one, is there is this 

wave that would think that the triad is no longer relevant given 

that the bombers face enormous challenges, that our diminishing 

submarine force and disruptive technology, which makes them 

more difficult in that mission. 

And there are some that would suggest that the land-based 

ICBMs are no longer required. Given that disruptive technology 

can have a severe and overnight effect with our submarine force, 

our Air Force still is challenged with aging aircraft, it leads to the 

missile base. 

And do you share that opinion that without the missile base we 

are putting our country’s deterrence at great risk? 

General WEINSTEIN. I think the ICBM force like the bomber force 

and the sea-launched ballistic missile force are absolutely critical 

to the defense of our Nation. I think sometimes we need to look at 

the problems through the eyes of our adversary. And if you look at 
15 

some of our other nations—and if you look at other nations, other 

nations are investing in a new ICBM, whether it is a mobile ICBM 

or replacing all their other ICBMs. And other nations are trying to 

develop capability. 

I think the ICBM force provides a unique capability. It is an onalert force 24 hours a day, 7 days a week that is used every single 

day to protect this Nation. It is used every single day in a deterrent role. And I think this is not the Cold War. This isn’t a Cold 

War force. 

But if we look at the world environment today, it is more dangerous than the Cold War and more unpredictable, and the ICBM 

force is as valid today as it was in 1960s. 

Mr. ZINKE. And Admiral, I got in the Navy in 1984. And my assessment today is there are more threats, more asymmetrical 

threats than when I first came in. Do you also share the view that 

today we face a heightened threat as opposed to the Cold War? 

Admiral BENEDICT. Yes, sir, I do. And, in fact, that has been the 

topic of much discussion as we have gone through the requirement 

scrub that I alluded to earlier as we have gone through the design 

phase of the Ohio replacement. 

That platform will be in the water through approximately 2084. 

And so, as we try and project out the threats through that timeframe, the major focus of the requirements scrub was to ensure 

that we had technical margin to ensure that while we can’t predict 

the future, we can certainly ensure that we don’t find ourselves 

surprised in the future. And so, I would agree with you wholeheartedly, sir. 

Mr. ZINKE. And Major General Clark, as the last part of the 

triad, the aging B–52s, could you explain what the process is and 

how long you expect those aircraft to stay in service? 

General CLARK. Sir, we expect the B–52 to be in service for up 

to 25 more years. And through a series of sustainment and modernization programs that we have intact, we have a good plan to 

keep it viable. 

But I would like to address another point that you made about 

its relevance right now. The bomber fleet is the most flexible and 

the most visible part of the triad. That is what the bomber fleet 

offers. And I think from a flexibility standpoint, there is not a lot 

of argument there. It has certainly—delivers a wide array of weapons effects. 

It can do it in a wide array of timespan as well. But as far as 

the visibility, I just want to point one example to you. About 2 

weeks ago, we had B–52s in the United Kingdom participating in 

an exercise in the Baltics. And as the B–52s were flying in the Baltic region, one of our B–52s was intercepted by a Russian fighter. 

And that Russian fighter pulled in to an observation position to 

monitor the B–52’s activity. Our Swedish allies rejoined and the 

Russian fighter left. And what that shows is that the B–52 is still 

relevant because it is visible. 

Our allies see it. Our adversaries see it and it is in a deterrent 

role every day, so I strongly disagree with any notion that it is no 

longer relevant to our force. 
16 

Mr. ZINKE. We used to have B–52s in Glasgow, Montana, and 

you are welcome back anytime. And with that, Madam Chairman, 

I yield the rest of my time. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, gentlemen. 

The gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and I thank the witnesses for being here, for your service to our country. This is for 

any one of you. The changes per the Nuclear Enterprise Review, 

how are they going to be institutionalized? 

I am worried long-term after Deputy Secretary Work is gone, I 

am worried about continued leadership and culture focus because 

obviously, we know there is a new heightened awareness now that 

the problems and a new zeal for resolving them, but that can wane 

and atrophy over time, so what are your thoughts about that? 

And I would open that up to any one of you. 

Admiral BENEDICT. Thank you, sir. One of the benefits that I 

enjoy within the Navy is that my mission is performed by professional submariners who basically take their platform to sea. 

And so the fundamental professional aspects of attention to detail as you take a submarine and prepare to dive and then execute 

your mission underwater with the preparation to resurface, again 

drives a very strong culture of self-assessment in a different light. 

So I reap the benefits of that philosophy, that culture bleeding 

over to and supporting the Strategic Weapons System which is the 

sole purpose of an SSBN [ballistic missile nuclear submarine]. So 

from that aspect, I think we are strongly rooted in the overall culture of the submarine force. 

Going all the way back to 2007, one of the main objectives coming out of those two investigations was to develop within SSP a culture of self-assessment, and that is what instituted the biannual 

reviews that I conduct on myself and then those are reviewed as 

part of the larger Navy biannual assessment. 

So we don’t let it spike and wane. We are taking a constant 

strain on a biannual basis to ensure that that culture remains 

strong and growing in the right direction. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Weinstein, not everybody has the luxury of 

an 8-year assignment like Admiral Benedict which would help with 

long-term institutionalization and focus. What are your thoughts 

about how you are going to see that—this vigor remain present? 

General WEINSTEIN. Thank you, sir. And it is a—it was an honor 

to host you and Congressman Cooper to Minot in the winter. 

Mr. ROGERS. That is right. In December, let’s tell everybody. 

General WEINSTEIN. In December. As I mentioned earlier, the 

Force Improvement Program, which was the grassroots effort to get 

the lower ranking individuals in the organization and get their inputs. The key is leadership at the higher levels and we have talked 

about that, but to me it is the lower levels that believe in what we 

are doing is right. 

I had a captain in my office a few months ago and the captain 

looked at me and said, ‘‘General, you don’t have to tell me’’—this 

is before we made all the changes—‘‘General, you don’t have to tell 

me my job is important. I know it is important. Just let me do it.’’ 

And I was having dinner with some airmen at Minot Air Force 

Base and the senior airman looked at me and goes, ‘‘Sir, morale is 
17 

my problem not your problem.’’ A culture to change requires people 

at the lower levels to believe in what you are doing. And what I 

am seeing across the entire ICBM force is they believe in what we 

are doing and they are grabbing onto it themselves. 

So the concern—and my crew members have had the same concern about when leadership leaves. They don’t want to see this go 

the way of other reviews. But what is different this time is we listened to them at the very beginning on what their problems were 

and they can see concrete examples of what we are doing to fix it. 

When we told them they needed new crew vehicles to go to the 

field, within a matter of 4 months they all had new crew vehicles 

to go to the field. When we told the cops that they have an extremely important job and they need to be in the proper uniform, 

we got them the camouflage pattern that is in Afghanistan and 

every one of my deployed airmen has those when they go out to the 

missile field. They are seeing concrete items. And the one item—— 

Mr. ROGERS. They are seeing, they build that sense of enthusiasm because they see it from you. They see that you let them 

know what they do matters. I know Admiral Benedict does that. 

He is going to do it for a number of years, but you are going to 

move on to the next assignment pretty soon. And I am just worried 

about whoever follows in your shoes that they let that missileer 

know what you do is really doggone important, that B–52 pilot, so 

that is what I worry about. How is that going to be continued after 

your move on to your next assignment? 

General WEINSTEIN. Sir, I think it is the trust in the senior leadership of the secretary and chief for putting the right people in 

command of my organization. Just like putting General Rand in 

command of Global Strike Command is the right for the United 

States Air Force for the first four-star. It is senior leaders picking 

the right commanders and then it is empowering and trusting your 

airmen, that they can see that they have a voice and they have an 

impact. 

Mr. ROGERS. But they get that from the top. That is the thing. 

And I agree about the flag officer. I think that is a good move. It 

shows commitment by the Secretary of the Air Force, the Secretary 

of Defense. 

But this has to be continued. And that is what I worry about 

long-term. I yield back. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to follow up 

on a question that Representative Speier had, bringing up the incident of the cheating. And was wondering if Admiral and General 

Weinstein, if you could explain about some of the changes that you 

are doing with testing and with evaluation of the airmen and the 

sailors. 

General WEINSTEIN. I appreciate the question. What we have 

done is we have completely restructured the way we have done 

training and evaluation in the ICBM force. The way we used to do 

training—training was evaluation, so a crew member would take 

47 tests per year and every test was a certification. 

Every time they went into the missile procedure trainer, our simulator, they were being evaluated. Well, that is not the right way 

to want to motivate a force. It is not the right way to train a force. 
18 

We also, opposed to the aviation community, the less alerts you 

pulled the better crew member you were, which makes no sense. 

In the flying side, the more flight hours you have the better aviator 

you are. 

That is why we have come up with the 3+3 construct which is 

the first 3 years you are a deputy missile combat crew commander 

then you are a missile combat crew commander, and the most important piece is being in the missile field. 

We have changed the way we do training. They have two trainer 

rides a month. One they select themselves to hone their skills. 

They take one closed-book test, it is called boldface for those most 

important things per year—excuse me per month and then we have 

gone to the aviation side which is instead of a 12-month evaluation 

we are in an 18-month evaluation. 

Another critical item we have done is we put leaders in the field 

to lead from the front. In our business, the only person that pulled 

alerts other than crew members were a squadron commander. We 

now have wing commanders, vice wing commanders, and group 

commanders, all pulling alerts so we have senior people, so we 

have completely restructured the way we have done training and 

put missile combat crew commanders in charge of training. And 

that whole concept of empowering our best and brightest lieutenants to lead is the way we have structured the entire force. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. No doubt that is an impact to the morale. 

Admiral. 

Admiral BENEDICT. Yes, ma’am. So in my discussions with Admiral Richardson who is head of Naval Nuclear Propulsion, the cheating scandal that occurred down in Charleston, and he spent an inordinate amount of personal professional time in personally understanding what happened down there. 

I think first and foremost, I can say with confidence that that is 

not a systemic problem down there. That was a group of—a very 

small cloistered group of individuals who chose to cheat. 

And in fact, it was the culture of self-assessment and honor, integrity, that allowed another instructor to identify that to the system that there was this small group of individuals. Admiral Richardson has chosen not just to address that problem but to look at 

the very nature of what would cause that, so he has gone through 

and looked at the rotation from sea duty to shore duty, to understand what was driving that behavior. 

He spent an excessive amount of time understanding the very 

nature of cheating, he has gone to I know the University of Notre 

Dame and talked to experts around the Nation trying to understand what drives people to break the ethics and integrity thresholds. 

And he has put in place, I think a strong measure that ensures 

that the aspects of coming off of arduous sea duty into instructive 

duty down in his prototypes does not drive—is not the causal factor 

for those young men and women to cheat. 

So I think that we have looked at not just the symptom, but I 

think Admiral Richardson to his credit has gone to the root cause 

to find the motivational factors and has taken concrete steps to ensure that he gets to that problem. 
19 

Mrs. HARTZLER. That is very encouraging. Sequestration over the 

past 2 years has obviously harmed efforts to organize, train, equip, 

modernize, and maintain readiness of our nuclear forces. This year 

both the House and the Senate have passed authorization bills that 

meet the President’s requested funding level by increasing the 

amount of authorized OCO [overseas contingency operations] 

funds. 

In your professional judgment, and this is for all of you, do you 

foresee any difficulties because of the mechanism by which funding 

is provided to the Department by Congress in implementing the 

recommendations of the Nuclear Enterprise Review? 

Dr. Brumer. 

Dr. BRUMER. Thank you. It is an important question. At the core 

of all of these discussions, and it has come up today and it comes 

up a lot in the Pentagon, is that this is an effort that requires enduring, sustained attention. 

And so last year in the Future Years Defense Program, the De- partment added $8 billion to address the recommendations of the 

reviews that will be reconsidered this year to see whether that was 

sufficient, whether there are additional ways to gain efficiency. But 

it is something that is going to require sustained attention; and the 

fiscal uncertainty associated with sequestration has, you know, it 

puts that at risk. 

Additionally, I will note that when I talk to the forces in the 

field, they are very aware of the things that are happening out 

here. They have been very encouraged by the activities in the Pentagon and hear these discussions as well as the additional funds 

that are coming, but that is a question that comes up a lot and 

somewhat undermines the message, the question of, you know, will 

this be sustainable given the fiscal uncertainty the Department of 

Defense faces. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Admiral. 

Admiral BENEDICT. Yes, ma’am. I would agree with Dr. Brumer. 

As I stated earlier, I have 69 more years of requirements to support the Strategic Weapons System, and as I think we have all 

stated here at the table, stability of and continuity of both personnel and resources is paramount to being able to execute that effectively. 

So while we truly appreciate the support of Congress, OCO funds 

is somewhat counter-culture to that stable platform that I think we 

would all desire. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you. 

General Weinstein. 

General WEINSTEIN. I completely agree with Admiral Benedict. It 

is really the consistency of funding; you know, as the operational 

commander, we need capability. And for the ICBM force, in the 

budget is a new payload transporter, which is the big white truck 

that brings the weapon as well as other capability out to the missile field. 

A new helicopter is absolutely critical to our ability to secure the 

force. And if you don’t have consistency of funding for our acquisition airmen that are trying to buy this new capability that we 

need, the lack of consistency is really concerning because to my airmen, they will view this lack of consistency of funding as stepping 
20 

back from the improvements to the Nuclear Enterprise Review because where the rubber meets the road is they want the new truck 

or they want to see the new helicopter and if we don’t have consistency, that will undermine the improvements to the enterprise. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. 

General Clark. 

General CLARK. Ma’am, I agree with what everyone else said. It 

does have an impact on culture. And when we have airmen flying 

bombers that their grandfathers flew and then they see that the 

LRSB, which is critical to our future and the long range standoff 

munition, another critical piece, when they see those at risk because of the inconsistency and the uncertainty it does have an impact on morale. 

And it makes them question just how important the mission really is. So we can do all we can do as leaders, but like General 

Weinstein said, where the rubber hits the road is what our country 

really puts forward for them to do their mission. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Ranking Member Speier. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

You had referenced, I think, it was you, General Weinstein, that 

you had some 350 recommendations from the airmen. Would you 

make that list available to us so we can review them? 

General WEINSTEIN. Yes, I will. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 85.] 

Ms. SPEIER. Okay. I just want to read—I want to ask you one 

question. Evidently, there are some court-martials underway right 

now that I am curious what the results have been. Let’s see, there 

are four court-martials for drug use, rape, assault, sexual assault 

on an unconscious person, and larceny. And then at Malmstrom, 

from there two missileers that are being court-martialed for using 

and selling bath salts, a synthetic substance that can render users 

psychotic. 

And at Warren three airmen have received—have recently been 

or are due to be court-martialed for drunk driving, using and selling pot, and indecent filming of the private areas of another person 

without consent. Are those cases ongoing right now? 

General WEINSTEIN. Some of those I am familiar with, others I 

am not. I can provide the committee information you need on ongoing military justice cases in my command. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 85.] 

Ms. SPEIER. All right, if you would do so, I am curious when this 

conduct was going on and to you, Admiral Benedict as well to the 

extent that you have—there is this belief that you all have that 

morale is much better. And we want to believe that as well, but 

the extent that this kind of conduct is—was going on by missileers 

is very troubling I think to all of us. 

There was one reference made that—I just want to read this to 

you. After 2 years at F.E. Warren [Air Force Base], so you could— 

one of the missileers said he ‘‘could complete a launch exercise in 

less than a minute, between scenes of Mad Men or bites of a burger. Once missileers learn their checklists by rote, many of them 

have hours of idle time on their hands. Some binge-watch TV or 
21 

read, a few study for advanced degrees. Inside the capsules little 

has changed since the Cold War, from the constant vibrations and 

foot odor to the 8-inch floppy disks in the consoles. ‘It is absolutely 

all the same whether it is Christmas Day or the Fourth of July. . . 

You are in a constant state of jetlag. You are up [at] 1 a.m. under 

fluorescent lights. After a year and a half I was never fully awake 

or fully asleep. You reach this zombie state.’ 

‘‘Sleep deprivation is known to induce hallucinations and impaired judgment. The CO2 levels in the silos don’t always meet 

OSHA [Occupational Safety and Health Administration] standards 

either. The combined effect may make missileers groggy and even 

impulsive and aggressive.’’ 

So that gets to that whole issue of 24-hour sets of duty and the 

impact that that has in creating fatigue. I could just tell you, I am 

one of those Members that flies from San Francisco to Washington 

every week. I am always on the wrong time zone and my body is 

always fatigued. Now, my responsibilities aren’t as serious as those 

of the missileers but I feel it, so I am curious. I know sometimes 

there is this sense that we have got to be tough. 

In medical school and upon graduating and being residents, 24 

hours, 36 hours in an emergency room was like a rite of passage, 

until we realized that people were dying because of it. I am just 

curious whether you have seriously looked at whether these issues 

are real and whether they should be adjusted. 

General WEINSTEIN. First of all, if you are referencing a recent 

article that was published, I find it interesting that it is one individual that makes a comment and we don’t discuss with other 

members of that F.E. Warren Air Force Base. Let me go into some 

facts. 

Some of the facts are that is why we have 350-plus recommendations on what we need to do to fix. One of the comments you made 

about the, I will say dirty capsules, we have program now where 

we are doing deep cleaning of launch control centers for the first 

time since we have had launch control centers. 

So when you walk into one of my launch control centers at any 

of the bases that have been deep cleaned, you do not smell anything other than a clean capsule. I discussed how we changed the 

crew force from going from an alert travel day to going right back 

to work. We have completely structured that. 

We have restructured training. And when I talked about the 3+3 

schedule, so some of the concerns from that one individual, all 

those problems are problems that do not exist in the force because 

we have attacked those problems. 

Also, we are hiring at all the bases physiologists that can help 

people when it comes to what is the proper diet you need to be on 

as well as the proper sleep schedule and that whole piece. So from 

that comment, that is not what I am seeing in the force. 

I am seeing a force that sees the changes we are making. The 

changes that they requested based on being the airmen and pulling 

the alerts, the changes in training and evaluation, the new vehicles, the new crew schedule, upgrades to the launch control center 

that is in work—that is why consistency of funding is important to 

get rid of the 8-inch floppy disks that you referenced—so there has 

been a massive change in how we treat our airmen. There has been 
22 

a massive change in how we are sustaining the weapon system, 

and some of those comments from previous people that were in the 

ICBM field are no longer valid. 

Ms. SPEIER. All right. Well, we would appreciate those 350 recommendations, thank you. 

General CLARK. Ma’am, can I add a point to General Weinstein? 

Ms. SPEIER. Certainly. 

General CLARK. I would just like to say in regards to the 24- 

hours in a launch control center, you can talk to General Tibbets 

or any other bomber pilot and you will find people flying sorties 

anywhere from 18 to 44 hours in a space a third as big as a launch 

control center in a seat, very confined quarters and it really is 

just—it is a part of what we do. It is a part of how we do business. 

But we prepare ourselves to do that just as the missileers do. So 

granted it is tough duty, but it is something that I think isn’t out 

of the ordinary in the nuclear business and it is something that our 

airmen are prepared to do. 

Ms. SPEIER. Major General, I recognize that and I could just substitute the chief of academics at a medical school saying exactly the 

same thing. And it wasn’t until there were deaths caused by emergency room interns and residents that were sleep deprived that we 

started to change that process. I think you should look at it. And 

I will leave it at that. Thank you. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Representative Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. For each one of you, I would like to 

ask which one of the NER recommendations poses the most significant challenge to implement and explain the factors that make implementation of that recommendation challenging. Starting with 

you again, General Clark. 

General CLARK. Sir, I think some of the recommendations that 

are associated with resources and garnering more resources to implement are the most challenging for us, because there is, as we 

talked about before, a bit of uncertainty as to what resources we 

are going to have to do these things. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay. Other than resources. 

General CLARK. Okay. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I thought you were going to go there. 

General CLARK. Yes, sir. Well, then I guess my next answer 

would be the cultural change because culture is hard to move. It 

is hard to move the ship and to make it stick. And I think that is 

the challenge for us as leaders as well as our airmen to really own 

this mission. 

We have to empower our airmen. We have to trust them and we 

have to give them that sense of purpose so that they really do take 

the culture and make it theirs. And that is something that is going 

to take some time. It is going to take some effort, but I think we 

are on the right path. 

General WEINSTEIN. Thank you, sir. I agree with General Clark, 

you know, the first two items as I look at the NER recommendations really is the resource challenges, consistency of budget is extremely important. 

That is the one piece and I won’t—we have already talked about 

that. And then just like—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Which did not lead to the morale problems. 
23 

General WEINSTEIN. No, it did not lead to the morale problems. 

But when you look at some of the—that is why to me, culture and 

I appreciated the question from Congressman Rogers that the culture piece is really important. 

When you look at what the changes we made in the ICBM force, 

those changes are really geared in really two main areas. Area one 

has to do with improvements in the force. And I will talk about 

things that you can buy—new vehicles, cleaning capsules, making 

sure they have the right mattresses, making sure they have the 

right gear for security forces, make sure they have the right weapons and the right scopes. 

The bigger issue to me that is the—where I am getting a lot of 

bang for the buck has to do with the changing of the culture. In 

the ICBM force, which really impacted the culture piece, was we 

didn’t empower our young officers. 

We took authority away from them. And when you take authority away from someone that wants to do a job, that is the worst 

thing for morale. By empowering our young airmen and our young 

officers to do the job, I think that is the most foundational thing 

that we are doing in order to improve the culture in the ICBM 

force. 

So when you look at the challenges, the challenges are continuing that culture change by trusting our airmen, giving them 

the right resources, giving the right training, and then when you 

do that, and you trust them and then if they make a mistake, there 

are two types of mistakes people will make. You will make an error 

of omission or error of commission. If you make an error of omission, you handle that one way, an error of commission you handle 

another way. 

So I think by really focusing on the culture changes is what is 

why if you were to visit one of my bases versus visiting them over 

a year ago, you would actually see a pep in people’s step. You 

would see people that like the mission more, all because we are 

changing the culture by trusting them. 

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. 

General WEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Admiral. 

Admiral BENEDICT. Sir, as I said, we are focused on two things— 

the infrastructure and personnel. So I would say that our greatest 

challenge right now is hiring and not just hiring but hiring and 

training personnel to do the mission of strategic deterrence whether it is in the shipyards, repairing the nuclear platforms, the submarines or whether it is in my strategic weapons facilities, hiring 

and training people to do the maintenance on the weapons and on 

the delivery system. 

So we are on track with doing that. But that is a two-faced effort—one is to hire them, the second one is to train and certify 

them to do the mission. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Dr. Brumer. 

Dr. BRUMER. Thank you, Congressman. Particular recommendations I think are mostly straightforward, you know, the resource 

challenges are real, the culture challenges are real. A lot of the rec-
24 

ommendations come down to trying to strike a balance, a balance 

between empowering your airmen and ensuring adherence to rigorous standards, balances within culture. 

Those are challenging. And the only way to achieve a balance, 

and it is one of the reasons I think that we have had difficulty in 

the past, we have gone too far one way, the reviews tell us to go 

the other way, and we go too far the other way, is sustained attention and recalibration over time and that is difficult. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, gentlemen. 

The gentleman from Montana, Mr. Zinke. 

Mr. ZINKE. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Getting back to when an incident occurs in a nuclear facility, the 

chain of command and whether to notify Congress or not. I assume 

the incident over cheating, was there an OPREP [operations report] 

that was released over it? 

General WEINSTEIN. I would have to verify, but I would assume 

there is, sir. 

Mr. ZINKE. And generally on the OPREP I will assume the addressees are Secretary of Defense. 

General WEINSTEIN. For the Air Force we provide it to the Air 

Force Operation Center, we provide it to National Military Command Center as well as Strategic Command. 

Mr. ZINKE. And then that would be—the chain of command 

would be ultimately the Commander in Chief, I would assume? 

General WEINSTEIN. I am not sure at what level it gets to. 

Mr. ZINKE. But as far as informing Congress, I would assume it 

would go up to the Secretary of the Air Force or Secretary of Defense and they would have the responsibility. And lastly, I recently 

visited Malmstrom and the morale is good, you know, I think the— 

went in the hunting season, I visited during the hunting season; 

the hunting season is, you know, makes morale go up. 

But one of the issues was the Humvees because it was pointed 

out that you are out there, the weather in Montana during the winter is bad, the distances are long, and in my experience the 

Humvees are not the best of vehicles going across the roads of 

Montana in the winter. 

Are you aware of the problem with the Humvees and are trying 

to look at different vehicles that would be better in the weather, 

because I understand they have a lot of accidents up there and 

safety is an issue? 

General WEINSTEIN. Yes, we agree that the Humvee is not the 

best vehicle. While it provides armor, up in Montana as well as 

North Dakota and Wyoming, it is not the best vehicle for the roads. 

We are working really closely with our major command—Air 

Force Global Strike Command, because we know that we need to 

provide the defenders, security force members with the proper vehicle for what they are doing. 

And I even had a discussion this week with the director of logistics at Global Strike Command on this very topic to replace the 

Humvees. My goal would be to replace the Humvees across the 

fleet to a vehicle that is better suited for the environment. 

You know, Humvees don’t have anti-lock brakes which makes it 

problematic driving on the roads as well as we need a vehicle in 
25 

the missile field that can—when it idles at minus 40 below can 

keep the airmen warm. And the Humvee does not do that. So we 

are looking at what is the best alternative to replace the security 

force vehicles with vehicles that our airmen need. 

Mr. ZINKE. Certainly, if Congress can be helpful and expedite in 

that, so we don’t go through another winter, even if it is a shortterm flexibility, you know? Just let us know and we would I am 

sure be glad to help them do whatever we can. 

General WEINSTEIN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. ZINKE. And Madam Chairman, I yield back. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, gentlemen. Now the chairman of the 

Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Curious, Admiral Benedict and General Weinstein, could you 

compare—you could compare and contrast for me the nuclear oversight between the Navy and Air Force? You talked about, Admiral 

Benedict, being a nuclear regulator. Do you all have a regulator, 

Admiral Weinstein? 

General WEINSTEIN. No, sir. We have—Admiral Benedict brought 

that up at a stakeholders meeting we had with Admiral Haney, 

and the United States Air Force is looking at it. I can talk briefly 

about the way the United States Air Force does it. 

On a roughly quarterly basis, we have something called the nuclear oversight board. That nuclear oversight board is chaired by 

the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, 

with all the four-stars going into issues that are nuclear. 

At a level below that, there is another organization that is 

chaired by the Air Force A–10, another position that the Air Force 

will be upgrading to a three-star position. That position goes 

through and reviews all the internal Air Force issues as well as 

issues that are going to be brought forward for the Nuclear Enterprise Review. 

So bottom line is that senior levels of the United States Air Force 

chair a meeting as well as the Air Force A–10 chairs a meeting to 

look at items. 

The other one—if I could say one more thing also. Internal to Air 

Force Global Strike Command we stood up something called the 

senior working group. That senior working group is—it is trichaired actually between the vice commander of Global Strike 

Command, myself, and General Clark. 

And we go through periodically all the recommendations and as 

the operational commanders, we can put pressure on the force in 

order to make sure our airmen get redux, so there are about three 

different layers of oversight that we are providing the nuclear enterprise. 

Admiral BENEDICT. Sir, I think as you know with—I am the single accountable flag officer within the United States Navy. So on 

the acquisition side, I am the only direct reporting program manager on the acquisition aspects of the Strategic Weapons System 

and in that I report to Mr. Stackley, the Assistant Secretary of the 

Navy. 

I am an Echelon II commander on the operational side and in 

that I am responsible for all the deployed assets. I report directly 

to the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations]. I am also the project offi-
26 

cer for the Polaris sales agreement and in that I am the one authorized to sell internationally to the United Kingdom. And then 

most recently the Secretary of the Navy has designated me the regulator for all nine Echelon IIs who have any role in supporting the 

Navy’s nuclear deterrent mission. 

So that allows me to integrate across all those functions and report directly to either the secretary for international, Mr. Stackley 

for acquisition, or directly for the CNO for any operational aspects. 

All of that comes together with us on a—about an every 6-week 

meeting of what is the called the Navy Nuclear Weapons Oversight 

Council which is chaired by the director of the Navy staff who reports directly to the CNO, and that group, which is all the N codes, 

all the three-stars within the OPNAV [Office of the CNO] staff, 

have total transparency into all aspects of the Navy’s mission here. 

Mr. ROGERS. Yes. Thank you. General Weinstein, we had a briefing, I think it was a week ago, Admiral Benedict was in that where 

General Harencak talked about the need for helicopters for security 

purposes. 

We just found out the appropriators have cut those. What does 

that mean for you and your mission, your ability to do your mission? 

General WEINSTEIN. I appreciate the question. You know, the 

current helicopters that we use in the missile field are 1960, 1970 

Hueys. They don’t have based on the DOD [Department of Defense] 

requirements for payload lifting capacity and range. 

So it is a—we know operationally, we need a new helicopter. We 

don’t have a helicopter that can move the security forces at the 

speed we need to get to the missile field. So any delay in a new 

helicopter from an operational consideration is really damaging to 

the security we have of the weapon system. 

Mr. ROGERS. General Clark, the B–52s, awesome, but you are 

right—they are really old. But you did testify a little earlier, you 

think they have got—or you all expect a life of 25 to 30 more years. 

Is that accurate? 

General CLARK. Sir, that is accurate. 

Mr. ROGERS. I talked with a new flag officer that we have got 

at Global Strike Command this week and told him about my interest in seeing a re-engining of the B–52s. And he explained to me 

the job leader General Wilson has been working on that. 

What are your thoughts about the viability of re-engining the B– 

52s with these new modern fuel efficient engines? 

General CLARK. Sir, my personal opinion is that it is critical. If 

we are going to fly this airplane for another 25 years, there is going 

to be a point that these engines will—they will need to be replaced, 

I believe. 

It doesn’t just impact us though from a business case, I mean it 

is fuel efficiency, as you mentioned. It is also maintainability; the 

maintenance on these engines is getting more expensive every 

year. Spare parts are becoming more scarce as we go, and they are 

only going to get—that situation is only going to get worse over the 

coming decades. 

But there is also an operational case. If we put these new engines on, it increases our range. It increases our opportunity for loi-
27 

ter capability. It increases the payload that the aircraft can carry, 

it increases the altitudes that it can climb to. 

It does everything that—or it enhances everything that we need 

a bomber to do, really. So I think that this is something that we 

should take a serious look at and try and take action on. 

Mr. ROGERS. We are. Thank you very much. Thank you, all, for 

your service. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Thank you to each of you for coming today. Thank you for all my 

colleagues who are participating today. Clearly, there have been 

several challenges over the last few years that have been identified 

in our most important mission that we have for a strong nuclear 

deterrent in our country. 

But I am encouraged by what we have heard today and encouraged by the systems that have been set up to make sure and monitor, Dr. Brumer, what is occurring and the recommendations, but 

also the positive steps and the leadership that is already being 

shown to address these issues and the improvements that we have 

already seen in a short amount of time. 

So I am very encouraged and feel like we are on the right track 

and we will get there under your leadership with the support here 

of Members of Congress. We are committed to working with you on 

that. And I would be remiss before we close the hearing not to introduce the new commander of Whiteman Air Force Base, General 

Paul Tibbets who is there as well. Do you want to wave here? 

And I have to say as far as the competition goes, you have talked 

about the Global Strike Challenge, I have to mention since—that 

we did win the Fairchild award, Trophy. And we did very well in 

that, so very, very proud of that. Thank you all for being here and 

this briefing is now closed. 

[Whereupon, at 2:24 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

JUNE 25, 2015 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JUNE 25, 2015 

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JUNE 25, 2015 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

JUNE 25, 2015 

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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER 

Admiral BENEDICT. 

• E7, attached to Naval Ordnances Testing Unit in Port Canaveral, FL stands accused of sexually assaulting another E7’s spouse. This case is being prosecuted 

by civilian courts. 

• E5, attached to Strategic Weapons Facility, Atlantic in Kings Bay, GA, stands 

accused of eight counts of child molestation and is in custody of civilian authorities. The command is processing the accused for an administrative separation 

from the Navy. 

• E3, attached to Strategic Weapons Facility, Pacific in Bangor, WA, is accused 

of violating Article 107 (false official statement) of the Uniform Code of Military 

Justice (UCMJ) and three specifications of Article 112a (two wrongful uses of 

a controlled substance and, an introduction of a controlled substance onto an 

installation used by the armed forces). Charges were referred to a Special 

Court-Martial on 2 June 2015 and arraignment is docketed for 17 August 2015 

with a proposed trial date of 30 September 2015. 

• E3, attached to Strategic Weapons Facility, Pacific in Bangor, WA, was accused 

of violating Article 90 (assaulting or willfully disobeying superior commissioned 

officer) of the UCMJ. This issue was handled at Non-Judicial punishment. 

• E3, attached to Strategic Weapons Facility, Pacific in Bangor, WA, was accused 

of violating Article 91 (insubordinate conduct toward warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, or petty officer) of the UCMJ. This issue was handled at 

Non-Judicial punishment. 

• E4, attached to Strategic Weapons Facility, Atlantic in Kings Bay, GA, was accused of violating Article 92 (failure to obey order or regulation) of the UCMJ. 

This issue was handled at Non-Judicial punishment. 

• E4, attached to Strategic Weapons Facility, Atlantic in Kings Bay, GA, was accused of violating Article 92 (failure to obey order or regulation) of the UCMJ. 

This issue was handled at Non-Judicial punishment. [See page 20.] 

General WEINSTEIN. I appreciate your desire to review the list of recommendations from our Airmen gathered during Air Force Global Strike Command’s Force 

Improvement Program. The attached document reflects raw inputs from the field; 

as such, several are redundant as indicated by an asterisk. This list has more the 

400 entries; the number of unique recommendations is approximately 350 as we discussed during my testimony. [See page 20.] 

[The document referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 69.] 

General WEINSTEIN. The following table shows the number of courts-martial of 

Twentieth Air Force Airmen that went to a verdict in each of the full calendar years 

following the activation of Air Force Global Strike Command on August 7, 2009. 

Also included is the rate of courts-martial per 1,000 Airmen compared with the Air 

Force rate per thousand (RPT). 

Year 20 AF CourtsMartial 

20 AF 

RPT 

Air Force 

RPT 

2010 15 2.0 2.4 

2011 38 4.9 2.4 

2012 34 4.4 2.2 

2013 28 3.6 2.3 

2014 17 2.2 1.8 

As of 21 July 2015, 9 courts-martial went to a verdict in Twentieth Air Force with 

a 1.2 RPT year-to-date. The Air Force RPT is 1.8 year-to-date. Since 25 June 2014, 

recent courts-martial include the cases of 3 officers and 10 enlisted that went to a 

verdict. As of 21 July 2015, court-martial proceedings are on-going in the case of 

1 officer and 4 enlisted. [See page 20.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JUNE 25, 2015 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Describe your access to senior leaders within the services and 

OSD to monitor implementation of the NER recommendations. 

Dr. BRUMER. My level of access to senior leadership has been excellent; all Services and DOD Components understand the high priority of the nuclear mission and 

are quick to respond to requests for information and briefings. I also have access 

to Deputy Secretary of Defense Work on a regular basis and am frequently contacted to provide updates on the progress of recommendation implementation. I 

greatly appreciate the cooperation we have received from the Services and we work 

hard to be judicious in our data requests to ensure good use of everyone’s time. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Describe the sufficiency of access and information you receive 

from the services to monitor the progress of the recommendations. 

Dr. BRUMER. The Services and DOD Components have provided and continue to 

provide a wealth of information to support metrics and analysis behind each of the 

recommendations. This data enables us to assess proposed approaches for implementation and to understand the impact of the recommendations on the core issues 

by comparing the baseline conditions to changes in metrics over time. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. What processes have been set in place to track the implementation of the recommendations? 

Dr. BRUMER. Last February, the Secretary of Defense directed OSD CAPE to 

track and assess the implementation of the Nuclear Enterprise Review recommendations and established the Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Review Group 

(NDERG) to hold senior leadership accountable. Deputy Secretary of Defense Work 

continues to chair regular meetings of the NDERG at which CAPE provides updates 

and metrics on progress made toward implementing the recommendations and addressing the underlying issues. This is supported by a three-star level Senior Oversight Group to vet issues and resolve conflicts. Additionally, my team holds bi-weekly working group level meetings attended by representatives from the Services, 

USSTRATCOM, Joint Staff, and OSD to update actions on each recommendation 

and evaluate progress through milestones and metrics. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. What are the metrics being used to track progress on recommendations, and how do they measure the health of the the nuclear enterprise? 

Dr. BRUMER. My team is tracking hundreds of unique metrics, including both 

process and outcome metrics. Process metrics help to determine whether a particular task is completed, whereas outcome metrics assess whether the cumulative 

effects of the tasks are achieving the desired intent of the recommendations and improving the overall health of the Enterprise. The goal of the outcome metrics is to 

go beyond box checking and assess the progress made to address the underlying 

issues. For those aspects of enterprise health that cannot be easily measured, such 

as morale, we are utilizing other tools like climate surveys and site visits to understand the intangibles, test hypotheses, and hear from the forces in the field on what 

they’re seeing. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. What are the Department’s end state goal and objectives for regaining healthiness within the nuclear enterprise and when does the Department 

estimate that those goals and objectives will be achieved? 

Dr. BRUMER. The reviews stated the nuclear enterprise has been sustained 

through shortfalls in manning, equipment, documentation, and guidance through 

the extraordinary effort and sacrifice on the part of our Sailors, Airmen, and Marines. The end state goal and objective for the Department is to regain the margin 

that has been eroded to ensure that this unsustainable level of effort and sacrifice 

is no longer necessary. The nuclear enterprise cannot be fixed overnight; these 

issues have been decades in the making and will require years of sustained attention to be resolved. While we do hope to see significant improvement in climate and 

similar metrics in the near future, the materiel recapitalization of the nuclear triad 

will not be complete until the mid-2030s. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. What steps are being taken to institutionalize the desired oversight mechanisms within the Department to ensure the future safety, security, reliability, and vitality remains sufficient within the nuclear enterprise? 
90 

Dr. BRUMER. In addition to the Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Review Group, 

chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Services have taken steps to ensure 

greater oversight of the nuclear mission within their organizations. The Air Force 

has elevated Global Strike Command to a four-star billet and has elevated the Air 

Force Assistant Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration to 

a three-star billet, pending Congressional approval. The Navy has codified the role 

of the three-star Director, Strategic Systems Programs as the regulatory lead for the 

Navy’s Nuclear Deterrence Mission, responsible for providing guidance to its nuclear 

force and monitoring and assessing the mission. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. In regards to the personnel reliability program (PRP), one of the 

recommendations stated that the ‘‘commanders and supervisors, not the PRP monitor and medical community,’’ should be responsible for fitness-for-duty determinations. However, wouldn’t the medical community best able to determine fitness for 

duty, especially in connection with health and/or mental health issues? And how 

will the Department ensure consistent standards? 

Dr. BRUMER. CAPE’s role in the Nuclear Enterprise Review has been to track, 

monitor, and independently assess the implementation of the recommendations, conduct analysis to determine if actions are having the desired effect, and assess the 

health of the Nuclear Enterprise. The Services would best be able to address their 

specific approaches to determining fitness-for-duty, within the prescribed regulations. Fitness for duty is a whole-person concept, not just a physical health matter 

or a bureaucratic compliance function. However, we will continue to monitor the 

medical community’s involvement in the PRP process and remain vigilant to the 

risk that changes to PRP processes may have unintended consequences. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. How will you know when culture and morale problems within the 

DOD Nuclear Enterprise have improved to an acceptable standard? 

Admiral BENEDICT. Department leaders are committed to improving the morale 

of the force by changing the culture of micromanagement, enhancing training, and 

closing the gap between what leaders say and what they do. Former Secretary 

Hagel wanted to ensure that pride and professionalism in these areas are reinforced. The actions we are taking will involve changes in the organization, policies 

and culture. Other fixes will require an increase in resources allocated to the nuclear mission. The reviews had high praise for the dedication and professionalism 

of the nuclear workforce. The main concern regarding our service members is their 

morale and quality of life, not their proficiency. Navy Leadership will continue to 

monitor established morale and assessment tools coupled with increased site visits 

to monitor this area. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. What is being done to reduce the number of inspections and/or 

coordinate inspections in order to minimize mission interruption and curtail the ‘‘inspection is the mission’’ mindset? 

Admiral BENEDICT. Navy launched a ‘‘Reduce Administrative Distractions (RAD)’’ 

program to streamline or eliminate administrative processes, instructions and training that add little return on investment. RAD is about putting ‘‘Warfighting First;’’ 

eliminating distractions that inhibit effectiveness and efficiency in our fleet. It is not 

a ‘‘one time push’’ but a level of effort—a new normal where everyone is sensitive 

to eliminating distractions to reduce frustrations and strengthen effectiveness and 

efficiency. The first topics that the RAD initiative focused on were the ones that 

Sailors stated were the highest priority. It’s going on now—involvement is encouraged from the top down. The highest levels of Navy leadership are driving this 

through strategic communication. 

Additionally, the Office of the Secretary of Defense updated the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) regulations to remove administrative burden, prevent inspectors from questioning medical judgments, revise rules regarding who must be on 

PRP and make PRP truly a commander’s program to ensure reliability without imposing bureaucratic red tape that harms the mission. We will make an announcement on the updated program shortly. The Joint Staff has also updated the inspection guidance to reduce the periodicity and consolidate redundant inspections. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Do you believe that this year’s budget, and the future year’s defense plan, provide adequate funds to implement the NER’s recommendations? Are 

there any particular concerns the Department has with any FY16 budget congressional marks on NER initiatives? 

Admiral BENEDICT. In addition to addressing delays in long-term SSBN maintenance, PB16 restores and maintains acceptable margin within the force by: 

• Adding over 100 people (mix of civilian and military) to improve sustainment 

and training of the ballistic missile submarine force. 

• Increasing funding to strategic weapons facility infrastructure sustainment and 

recapitalization to ensure long term health of these critical facilities. 
91 

• Increasing funding to fund R&D and operational engineering support to shore 

up the industrial base and accelerate efforts for a Trident follow-on to the already life-extended Trident II D5 missile. • Increasing the authority of the Director, Strategic Systems and Programs (SSP) 

who will become the Navy Nuclear Deterrent Mission (NNDM) Regulator, the 

central lead for oversight, in order to sharpen our operational focus. SSP will 

report directly to the Chief of Naval Operations on nuclear force readiness. • Executing a ‘‘Reduce Administrative Distractions’’ program to streamline or 

eliminate administrative processes, instructions and training that add little return on investment. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. What recommendations within the NER does your service disagree with, or require more study of, before implementation or rejection? 

Admiral BENEDICT. The Navy will work with OSD and Congress to implement rec- ommendations across the fleet to ensure safety and reliability. Navy added $464 

million in PB16 ($2.18 billion FYDP) to restore and maintain acceptable margin 

within the force. Navy is working with OSD to respond to the broad spectrum of 

recommendations while ensuring the Navy’s response addresses Navy specific 

issues. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. How will you know when culture and morale problems within the 

DOD Nuclear Enterprise have improved to an acceptable standard? 

General WEINSTEIN. Culture change within an institution takes time. This issue 

has my daily, personal attention and is a priority with my senior staff. As such, we 

continue to assess the morale of our Airmen and adjust as necessary. I, as well as 

my command chief master sergeant, visit remote work centers across our 33,600 

square mile area of responsibility, conduct online chats with Airmen and review judicial data with my staff judge advocate; these are but a few forums that help me 

and my leadership team better understand our culture. We continue to place emphasis on continuous improvement and feedback. 

Fortunately, our Airmen in 20 AF are willing to give critical feedback, even to me, 

through direct interaction, through surveys such as the Air Force Combined Mishap 

Reduction System and using feedback tools in Air Force Global Strike Command’s 

Force Improvement Program. I’m pleased to report our fielded force appreciates the 

changes we’re making; these talented, dedicated Airmen are the foundation upon 

which we’ll continue to make improvements. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. What is being done to reduce the number of inspections and/or 

coordinate inspections in order to minimize mission interruption and curtail the ‘‘inspection is the mission’’ mindset? 

General WEINSTEIN. Twentieth Air Force, along with Air Force Global Strike 

Command, has implemented the new Air Force Inspection System (AFIS) as outlined in Air Force Instruction 90–201, The Air Force Inspection System. This program operates under the philosophy that inspections are an inherent function of 

command, where inspection preparation is directly aligned with mission readiness. 

Wing personnel conduct the majority of AFIS activities to evaluate issues of interest 

to the local wing commander. Meanwhile, the Inspector General team at Air Force 

Global Strike Command provides oversight and continuous mentoring as the process 

matures. 

The Air Force will continue to administer Nuclear Surety Inspections at regular 

intervals in accordance with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 

3263.05, Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspections. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Do you believe that this year’s budget, and the future year’s defense plan, provide adequate funds to implement the NER’s recommendations? Are 

there any particular concerns the Department has with any FY16 budget congressional marks on NER initiatives? 

General WEINSTEIN. The President’s FY16 budget and FYDP submission supports 

our ability to implement NER recommendations. 

As of 3 August 2015, not all of the defense committees fully funded the President’s 

Budget Request of $506M for the UH–1N replacement. The current helicopters employed in the missile field do not meet DOD requirements for speed, range, and payload lifting capacity to move security forces to the missile field in response to a contingency. No amount of further modifications to the UH–1N can completely bridge 

these capability shortfalls. From an operational perspective, any delay in the new 

helicopter could endanger the security of the weapon system. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. What recommendations within the NER does your service disagree with, or require more study of, before implementation or rejection? 

General WEINSTEIN. Prior to the Nuclear Enterprise Review, Air Force Global 

Strike Command conducted three studies to look at issues within the command. 

These reviews—the Commander Directed Investigation (CDI), Study of Operations 

Training and Evaluation (SOTE) and the AFGSC Force Improvement Program 
92 

(FIP)—generated approximately 350 recommendations from our front-line Airmen. 

After consideration of each recommendation, we began implementation or further 

study on the vast majority, to include restructuring the operational missile squadrons, defining a career path for missile officers and increasing professional development opportunities for all Airmen. 

Upon release of the NER, we identified over 90 percent congruence between the 

NER and these three AFGSC studies. As the commander of the operational ICBM 

force, I’m confident these varied teams of experts pinpointed our shortfalls and 

formed the basis for our continuous improvement efforts. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. How will you know when culture and morale problems within the 

DOD Nuclear Enterprise have improved to an acceptable standard? 

General CLARK. The bomber Force Improvement Program (FIP) has become a philosophy of continuous improvement within Eighth Air Force and Air Force Global 

Strike Command. We are continuously assessing the state of our organization and 

health of our personnel. Even though we are continuously assessing, the dynamic 

and nebulous nature of warfare makes it impossible for us to establish a goal that, 

once reached, will allow us to relax and stop our forward progress. We are constantly seeking to improve, constantly setting the bar higher, never being satisfied 

with the status-quo. If we stop improving we are in danger of back-sliding. Therefore, we will carry on our FIP and continue soliciting feedback from our Airmen to 

continue improving the culture and morale of Eighth Air Force. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. What is being done to reduce the number of inspections and/or 

coordinate inspections in order to minimize mission interruption and curtail the ‘‘inspection is the mission’’ mindset? 

General CLARK. Both Eighth Air Force and Air Force Global Strike Command are 

working hard to reduce the number of inspections and lessen the burden on the Airmen. Currently many IG changes are being implemented helping to streamline processes. Primarily, we are lining up inspections with the AF Inspection System 

(AFIS), putting the responsibility on the wings to self-report and we follow up. The 

AFIS provides a mechanism for senior Air Force leaders to direct a targeted, more 

detailed and thorough inspection of specific programs, organizations, or issues (AFI 

90–201, para 1.4.3). 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Do you believe that this year’s budget, and the future year’s defense plan, provide adequate funds to implement the NER’s recommendations? Are 

there any particular concerns the Department has with any FY16 budget congressional marks on NER initiatives? 

General CLARK. This question is difficult to answer from a NAF standpoint. For 

this question, an excerpt for the 3.5.14 SASC SF—Nuclear Forces Hearing must be 

referenced. ‘‘And we need, therefore, we have to have a funding hump in the next 

decade to make sure that we get our funding up to the right amount, and that could 

take around $35 billion a year, which at $35 billion a year will represent about five 

percent of our defense budget. So it’s not impossible for us to reach that, and if we 

could get to the point where we’ve modernized and in the right way, we’ll be on the 

right path. Now, of the new spending, only two percent of—of this amount is for 

the weapons modernization itself. That’s relatively inexpensive. And it’s a small 

price to pay for the nation’s ultimate insurance policy, and for an arsenal that has 

maintained great power and peace, really, for 70 years.’’ 

Mrs. HARTZLER. What recommendations within the NER does your service disagree with, or require more study of, before implementation or rejection? 

General CLARK. Eighth Air Force has no issues with the reports; however the recommendations were not implemented verbatim. Some of the recommendations were 

tailored to AFGSC and 8AF, but staying in the spirit and intent of the recommendation. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER 

Ms. SPEIER. As a follow-up to my question during the hearing, please provide our 

committee with information regarding recent or on-going court-martial cases. How 

does the number of court-martials in the 20th Air Force compare with the rest of 

the Air Force? Is it higher or lower than the average for the Air Force? 

General WEINSTEIN. The following table shows the number of courts-martial of 

Twentieth Air Force Airmen that went to a verdict in each of the full calendar years 

following the activation of Air Force Global Strike Command on August 7, 2009. 

Also included is the rate of courts-martial per 1,000 Airmen compared with the Air 

Force rate per thousand (RPT). 
93 

Year 20 AF CourtsMartial 

20 AF 

RPT 

Air Force 

RPT 

2010 15 2.0 2.4 

2011 38 4.9 2.4 

2012 34 4.4 2.2 

2013 28 3.6 2.3 

2014 17 2.2 1.8 

As of 21 July 2015, 9 courts-martial went to a verdict in Twentieth Air Force with 

a 1.2 RPT year-to-date. The Air Force RPT is 1.8 year-to-date. Since 25 June 2014, 

recent courts-martial include the cases of 3 officers and 10 enlisted that went to a 

verdict. As of 21 July 2015, court-martial proceedings are on-going in the case of 

1 officer and 4 enlisted. 

Ms. SPEIER. Please provide the committee with the studies that led to keeping a 

24-hour shift in missile silos. Please also provide the committee with any studies 

or reviews of whether there is a problem of sleep-deprivation. Have there been any 

independent reviews on the question of whether there is a problem of sleep-deprivation? 

General WEINSTEIN. Thank you for the opportunity to clarify our discussion on 

work shifts for our alert force. Two-officer crews serve 24-hour shifts in each of the 

45 Launch Control Centers; it is highly unlikely either officer would experience 

sleep-deprivation. Thanks to built-in safeguards in the Minuteman weapon system, 

and the deliberate scheduling of required tasks while on alert, one of the two officers may sleep in a sound-proof bed area within the LCC while the other monitors 

the weapon system. In short, we allow rest periods and only under rare circumstances do officers on crew not have the opportunity to rest. 

Ms. SPEIER. Please provide the committee with a copy of the RAND report ‘‘Identifying Key Workplaces Stressors Affecting the Twentieth Air Force.’’ Have the morale 

issues identified in this report been addressed in the NER recommendations or 

other on-going corrective actions? 

General WEINSTEIN. We’ve provided an electronic copy per your request. 

RAND highlighted several morale issues in this report, specifically among our 

missile field chefs. One of the first decisions I made after assuming command of 

Twentieth Air Force was to move these chefs from our operations groups to our mission support groups (our experts in food service), giving these groups a vested interest in assuring ICBM combat capability across our 33,600 square mile AOR. With 

this move we addressed a prime concern among our Airmen. 

In these groups, missile chefs now work with and for Airmen from the Services 

career field; this enables them to receive mentoring from experienced Services leaders and exposes them to other Services specialties, thus preparing them for promotion and advancement in their career field. 

Regarding other morale issues highlighted by RAND, we’ve addressed these 

through Air Force Global Strike Command’s Force Improvement Program (FIP) 

which pre-dated the NER by several months, but reflects the NER’s recommendations to change the culture of micromanagement and boost morale through incentives and career opportunities. 

[The RAND report referred to is retained in the committee files and can be viewed 

upon request or accessed online at http://cradmin.clerk.house.gov/repository/AS/ 

AS06/20150625/103680/HHRG-114-AS06-Wstate-WeinsteinUSAFJ-20150625-SD001. 

pdf.] 

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