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iii

v

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

THE NEW ARAB REGIONAL ORDER: 

OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 

FOR U.S. POLICY

Gregory Aftandilian

November 2015

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and 

do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the 

Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and 

U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy full 

academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified 

information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent 

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offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for 

public release; distribution is unlimited.

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This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, 

Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be 

copyrighted.
vi

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ISBN 1-58487-707-3
vii

FOREWORD

The Middle East is facing a period of great instability and uncertainty. The region is beset with civil 

wars, sectarian conflicts between Sunnis and Shias, 

the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 

and its competition with al-Qaeda, and conflicts between countries and factions opposing and supporting the Muslim Brotherhood and like-minded Islamist 

groups. The question arises as to whether an Arab regional order can be found amidst these conflicts and, 

if so, what types of opportunities and challenges does 

it pose for U.S. interests and policies in the region?

Middle East expert Gregory Aftandilian, the author of this monograph, argues that there is, indeed, 

a new Arab regional order, but it is essentially two 

orders: one has arisen in the wake of the tumult in 

the so-called Arab Spring countries, which has led to 

conflicts between Islamist political organizations and 

their opponents; the other is a result of the Houthi 

takeover of large parts of Yemen, which has exacerbated Sunni-Shia tensions in the region.

Saudi Arabia has emerged as a leader of both the 

anti-Islamist alliance—supporting the government of 

Egypt, for example, since the ouster of the Muslim 

Brotherhood government in 2013—and of the antiShia alliance, which is marshalling a number of Arab 

states to aid Saudi military efforts in the campaign 

against the Houthis. The author indicates that, while 

these alliances present opportunities for the United 

States on one level, particularly because they include 

many long-standing U.S. friends in the region, they 

also present challenges for the United States on another level. These challenges include the danger of being 
perceived as taking sides in sectarian conflicts as well 

as in internal political disputes between secular and 

Islamist political factions.

Mr. Aftandilian cogently analyzes these alliances 

in the Arab world and offers specific policy recommendations that would serve U.S. interests in the 

region. The Strategic Studies Institute hopes the findings of this monograph will be of assistance to U.S. 

policymakers and U.S. Army officers as they deal with 

this important region of the world.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press
ix

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

GREGORY AFTANDILIAN, an independent consultant, scholar, and lecturer, is currently an associate of the Middle East Center at the University of 

Massachusetts-Lowell, an adjunct faculty member 

of Boston University and American University, and 

a Senior Fellow for the Middle East at the Center for 

National Policy in Washington, DC. He spent over 21 

years in government service, most recently on Capitol 

Hill, where he was foreign policy advisor to Congressman Chris Van Hollen (2007-08), a professional staff 

member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 

and foreign policy adviser to Senator Paul Sarbanes 

(2000-04), and foreign policy fellow to the late Senator Edward Kennedy (1999). Prior to these positions, 

Mr. Aftandilian worked for 13 years as a Middle East 

analyst at the U.S. Department of State, where he received the Department’s Superior Honor Award for 

his analyses on Egypt and the Intelligence Community’s Certificate of Distinction. His other government experience includes analytical work for the U.S. 

Department of Defense and the Library of Congress. 

He was also a research fellow at the John F. Kennedy 

School of Government at Harvard University (2006-

07) and an International Affairs Fellow at the Council 

on Foreign Relations in New York (1991-92), where he 

wrote the book, Egypt’s Bid for Arab Leadership: Implications for U.S. Policy. He is also the author of a number 

of monographs and articles dealing with Middle East 

politics and U.S. foreign policy. Mr. Aftandilian holds 

a B.A. in history from Dartmouth College, an M.A. in 

Middle Eastern studies from the University of Chicago, and an M.Sc. in international relations from the 

London School of Economics.

xi

SUMMARY

Gregory Aftandilian examines the new Arab regional order that has emerged in recent years and 

analyzes opportunities and challenges for U.S. interests in the region as a result of this order. He argues 

that the new order encompasses two main alliances. 

The first is an anti-Islamist grouping of countries and 

factions opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood and likeminded Islamist groups. This alliance emerged in the 

aftermath of the ouster of Egyptian President Mohammad Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood in July 2013. 

Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait 

showered the new Egyptian government with billions of dollars in aid because they saw the Brotherhood as a threat. This alliance has expanded to include 

secular elements in Tunisia and Libya, as well as the 

Jordanian government. 

The second alliance is an anti-Shia grouping that 

came about in the aftermath of the Houthi (a Yemeni Shia group) takeover of the Yemeni government 

and large swaths of Yemeni territory. In March 2015, 

Saudi Arabia was able to muster the support of many 

Arab Sunni countries to support its military campaign 

against the Houthis. These alliances, because they are 

led by and made up of long-standing U.S. friends in 

the region, may benefit U.S. interests on one level, but 

they also present challenges to U.S. policy on another. 

For example, if the anti-Islamist grouping redirects 

its attention to the fight against the Islamic State in 

Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which is, to some extent, 

already underway, that will be a positive development. But if this alliance continues to repress nonviolent Islamist groups, it puts the United States in the 

awkward position of being perceived as playing sides 
in these countries’ internal politics. As for supporting 

the anti-Shia alliance, the policy puts Iran on notice 

not to interfere in countries like Yemen, but it has the 

potential to harm U.S. relations with the Iraqi government, hinder the possibility of a new relationship with 

Iran if Tehran moderates its policies, and make U.S. 

human rights policy problematic if the United States 

is perceived as anti-Shia. 

Aftandilian argues that U.S. policymakers should 

continue to promote inclusivity of all nonviolent 

political groups in political systems of the regional 

countries regardless of whether they are secularist or 

Islamist, with the understanding that there are limits 

to U.S. influence in this realm. In addition, U.S. policymakers should continue to avoid taking sides as 

much as possible in Sunni-Shia conflicts and should 

use their influence with various countries to dampen 

such conflicts, as they are a main source of instability 

in the region and help extremist groups such as ISIL 

and al-Qaeda exploit these conflicts. He also recommends that the U.S. Army should assist countries in 

the region in counterterrorism training and operations where possible, but that Army personnel should 

avoid being drawn into discussions or debates about 

the Islamist-secularist and Sunni-Shia conflicts.

xii
1

THE NEW ARAB REGIONAL ORDER: 

OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 

FOR U.S. POLICY

Since the 1940s, the Arab world has witnessed 

many groupings or alliances. Some have been ideologically driven; others have been based on shared interests, sometimes in opposition to a particular regional 

or world power. These groupings or alliances have 

usually been led by a dominant Arab state, though 

often it has been opposed by its share of detractors. 

Outside powers have also tried to shape or affect these 

alliances, but with mixed results.

There is not one Arab regional order as of 2015, 

but at least two. They have arisen in part due to the 

tumultuous events in the region over the past several 

years—including the Iraq War, the rise of Iranian influence in the region, and the Arab Spring. The latter 

shook the underpinnings of state power in the region 

and led to the ouster or resignation of several authoritarian leaders, namely Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, Muammar Qadhafi of 

Libya, and Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen. The rulers of 

several other countries managed to hold on to power 

after the countries experienced a period of unrest, but, 

with the exception of Tunisia, democracy has not replaced the authoritarian systems in these countries. 

Instead, authoritarianism has returned to Egypt, while 

Libya, Syria, and Yemen are embroiled in civil war.

The two Arab regional orders today are: 1) an 

anti-Islamist grouping; and 2) an anti-Shia grouping that solidified in reaction to the Houthi takeover 

of Yemen’s capital of Sana in March 2015, but which 

extends beyond Yemen to include several Arab countries in which a Sunni-Shia conflict is apparent. 
2

That Iran took advantage of the Iraq War of 2003 

to extend its influence among the Shia of Iraq and offer ongoing assistance to various Shia groups in the 

region has made the anti-Shia grouping of Arab states 

all the more anxious.

Saudi Arabia has become the dominant player in 

these two regional orders for the following reasons: 

a) With Egypt having turned inward to deal with 

domestic upheavals since 2011, Saudi Arabia filled a 

regional leadership vacuum; 

b) It came to oppose the Muslim Brotherhood, seeing it as a threat not only to Egypt but to stability in 

the Gulf region as well; 

c) Saudi Arabia saw its northern neighbor, Iran, 

use unrest in the region—particularly in states like 

Iraq, Syria, and Yemen with significant Shia populations—as a way to extend its influence, participating 

in so-called proxy wars; 

d) Saudi Arabia’s large oil revenues have enabled 

it to exercise influence in the region, particularly in 

aiding Sunni states and Sunni elements; and, 

e) Its new king seems to believe that the United 

States is either growing wary of engagement with the 

Arab world or is hedging its bets on a new relationship with Iran, compelling Saudi Arabia to exercise 

more forceful leadership in the region.1

Because Saudi Arabia has been a long-standing ally 

of the United States, some U.S. policymakers may see 

this more active and forceful Saudi role in the region 

as a positive development. After all, the two countries 

have had a close economic and security relationship 

since the 1940s, and the United States came to the aid 

of Saudi Arabia in the 1990-91 Gulf War, when Iraqi 

forces were at Saudi Arabia’s doorstep.
3

While there are certainly some positive aspects for 

the United States from these Saudi-dominated regional groupings, there are also some negative aspects, 

because the United States and Saudi Arabia (and its 

allies) do not always see eye-to-eye on regional developments. This monograph analyzes these developments and informs U.S. policymakers about ways 

in which the new Arab regional orders present both 

opportunities and challenges for the United States. 

HISTORY OF THE ARAB REGIONAL ORDER

For a time after World War II, the Arab world was 

fixated on the idea of unity, perhaps out of a sense that 

the imperial powers, namely Britain and France, had 

robbed them of this dream at the end of World War 

I. As one prominent scholar of the period has noted: 

“Ever since the second world war, popular political 

sentiments in the Arab world have been dominated 

by urgent appeals for Arab unity, while the field of 

activity between governments and parties has been 

dominated by bitter rivalry.”2

Even before the rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser as 

Egyptian (and later Arab nationalist) leader, Egypt 

saw its main competitor in the region as Iraq, which 

was supported by Jordan, its fellow Hashemite regime to its west. To counter this Iraq-Jordan alliance, 

Egypt created a regional bloc encompassing Saudi 

Arabia and Syria. This was often called the “Triangle 

Alliance.”3 Prior to the 1958 coup in Iraq, which overthrew the monarchy, Iraq and Jordan were perceived 

as British client states. When the British created the 

so-called Baghdad Pact in 1955—which encompassed 

Britain, Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan and was indirectly supported by the United States—Egypt under 
4

Nasser took the lead in mounting Arab opposition to 

it. Although Saudi Arabia had close ties to the United 

States and supported it in the global Cold War, it sided with Egypt in this case because of its antipathy to 

Iraq and Jordan. Tribal factors may have played a role 

as well. The founder of the Saudi state, Abdel Aziz 

Ibn Saud, in the 1920s, had forced the Hashemites out 

of the Hejaz region of the Arabian Peninsula, which 

included the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina.

The Saudis suspected that the Hashemites still had 

their hearts set on winning that region back some day. 

The 1956 Suez War, launched against Egypt by 

Britain, France, and Israel in the wake of Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, propelled 

Nasser into becoming a pan-Arab nationalist hero and 

leader. With the help of the United States, which was 

angered that three of its allies had conspired to invade 

Egypt, especially at a time when the Soviet Union was 

sending tanks into Hungary to crush an anti-communist rebellion, Nasser was able to turn a military defeat 

into a diplomatic victory when these forces withdrew 

from Egypt. From 1956 to 1967, Egypt was the undisputed leader of the Arab world. Nasserist movements 

and political parties emerged in many Arab capitals, 

and millions of Arabs listened to Nasser’s speeches on 

the radio. 

In 1958, with Syria in the midst of political uncertainty, a group of prominent Syrian Baathists (whose 

ideology was similar to Nasserism) flew to Cairo to 

urge a union between Egypt and Syria. Although 

scholars of this period have noted that Nasser initially 

was hesitant about the offer, he could not, as the preeminent pan-Arab leader, turn down the Baathists’ 

request. Thus, the United Arab Republic (UAR) was 

born in 1958. That same year, it looked like the UAR 
5

would be able to expand eastward in the aftermath 

of the 1958 military coup in Iraq, which overthrew 

the Hashemite monarchy and established a republic 

under another army colonel, Abdel Karim al-Qasim. 

However, after an initial flirtation, Nasser and Qasim 

became bitter enemies despite the outward similarities in their backgrounds. Perhaps it was the age-old 

rivalry between Cairo and Baghdad that doomed the 

“romance,” and the fact that Qasim did not want to be 

under Nasser’s thumb. In any event, Cairo was soon 

denouncing Qasim as a stooge of the Communists, 

who were indeed allies of Qasim against the Iraqi 

Baathists and Nasserists. As for the union between 

Egypt and Syria, it came to an end in 1961 when a 

group of Syrian military officers, with the support 

of certain conservative politicians, staged a coup in 

Damascus and sent the Egyptians home.4

Although these events illustrated that Nasser 

certainly had his share of detractors, he nonetheless 

continued to set the agenda in Arab affairs. In the 

aftermath of the breakup of the UAR, Nasser turned 

leftward in domestic and regional affairs. At home, 

he issued a number of socialist decrees that led to the 

widespread nationalization of industry. In the wider 

region, he decided to come to the aid of the Yemeni 

republican forces in 1962 after they staged a coup 

against the Yemeni monarchy, which led to a civil war 

in that country. These developments set the stage for 

a proxy war in the region, as Saudi Arabia, fearing the 

anti-monarchical and radical brand of Arab nationalism that Nasser was espousing, came to the aid of the 

Yemeni royalist forces.

Egypt soon became bogged down in Yemen, 

expending so much blood and money there—at one 

point involving as many as 55,000 Egyptian troops—
6

that the conflict was sometimes referred to as “Nasser’s Vietnam.”5

 Ironically, 4 decades later, Saudi 

Arabia and Egypt are now on the same side in a new 

Yemeni civil war. It was only in the aftermath of the 

1967 Arab-Israeli war that Nasser was able to extricate 

Egyptian forces from Yemen honorably, by claiming 

that such forces were needed to confront a “militaristic” Israel, whose forces had captured the entire Sinai 

Peninsula in the brief conflict.

The 1967 Arab defeat by Israel (which included 

heavy Egyptian losses in territory, soldiers, and military equipment) was a humiliating blow to Nasser 

and his brand of pan-Arab nationalism. Although he 

stayed on as leader of Egypt until his own death by natural causes 3 years later, he and Egypt never regained 

the mantle as preeminent leader of the Arab world. 

Nasser even compromised Egypt’s independence by 

relying heavily on the Soviet Union for military and 

political support. By the late-1960s, there were at least 

10,000 Soviet military advisers, whose presence soon 

became unpopular, in Egypt.

Nasser’s successor, Anwar Sadat, never had Nasser’s charisma in regional affairs, nor did he aspire to 

become a pan-Arab nationalist leader. His foremost 

objective, after he consolidated power at home and 

removed the threats against him, was to retrieve lost 

Egyptian lands from the Israelis. He achieved this 

through a combination of war and diplomacy, and 

by switching sides in the Cold War. Sadat and Syrian 

leader Hafez Assad effectively conspired to embark on 

a war against Israel in 1973, which caught the Israelis 

off-guard. Sadat knew that he could not defeat the Israelis but reasoned that, if he could achieve some initial 

battlefield successes, these could restore Egyptian and 

Arab pride. He also hoped to draw in the Americans, 
7

who would come to the aid of the Israelis. Although 

Sadat relied on Soviet airlifts of military supplies during the 1973 War, his goal was to convince the United 

States that it had to pressure the Israelis to stop the 

fighting and eventually start a peace process. In this 

effort, he was able to elicit the support of Saudi Arabia, which led the Arab oil embargo against the United 

States in late-1973 and early-1974.6 Through these efforts, Sadat was able to resurrect the Egyptian-SyrianSaudi “Triangle Alliance”; this grouping became the 

dominant one in the Arab world in the mid-1970s. The 

initial Arab military victories in the 1973 War, plus the 

Arab oil boycott—which led to the quadrupling of oil 

prices and the growth of Arab economic power—went 

a long way in reversing the humiliation of the 1967 

defeat and in restoring Arab pride.

But Sadat’s peace process goals, which eventually led to the Camp David Accords of 1978 and the 

Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979, also brought 

about Egypt’s ostracism in the Arab world soon after, as most Arabs saw these actions as removing 

Egypt from the Arab military equation with Israel. 

Egypt effectively went on its own, shored up by U.S. 

financial largesse. But no one Arab state was able to 

fill the leadership vacuum. Although Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, orchestrated the official Arab boycott 

of Egypt, it soon became bogged down in a bloody 

8-year war with revolutionary Iran, starting in 1980. 

Syria, which faced internal strife in the late-1970s and 

the early-1980s from the Muslim Brotherhood, decided to side with Iran in the Iran-Iraq War, which took 

it out of contention for Arab leadership. As the Arab 

Gulf States faced the threat from Iran, they generously 

funded Iraq’s war effort when that country’s revenues 

started to run out.
8

During the 1980s, Egypt, now under the presidency of Hosni Mubarak, slowly re-established relations with most of the Arab states that had broken 

diplomatic relations with it earlier. These actions 

were assisted by the fact that Egypt also had assisted 

Iraq with workers and military advice during the latter half of the Iran-Iraq War. But in 1990, when Iraq 

invaded Kuwait and Saddam Hussein sought to become the Arab world’s new strongman, Egypt started 

to exercise a leadership role again (in contrast to Iraq). 

The Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi alliance re-emerged, as all 

three countries feared Saddam Hussein’s ambitions. 

Egypt was able to use its diplomatic skills to convince 

a majority of states of the Arab League to condemn the 

Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and both Egypt and Syria 

sent troops to Saudi Arabia as part of the coalition 

forces, led by the United States, arrayed against Iraq.7

In the 1990s, in the wake of this Gulf War, Egypt 

attempted to reassert an Arab leadership role by portraying itself as a defender of the Arab nation—criticizing what it called punitive Western action against 

the Iraqi people, assisting the Palestinians in negotiations with the Israelis, criticizing Israeli actions in East 

Jerusalem and the West Bank, and calling attention to 

the Israelis’ purported nuclear arsenal in Egypt’s message that the Middle East should be free of weapons 

of mass destruction. Egypt also portrayed itself as the 

conduit through which Arab concerns could be passed 

on to Washington. Such efforts worked for a time in 

bringing more attention to Cairo, though Egypt never 

regained the role it had in the late-1950s and the 1960s 

as the preeminent Arab state.

The Iraq War of 2003 again shifted attention to 

the Arab east. Although Egypt allowed U.S. military 

planes and warships to transverse Egyptian airspace 
9

and the Suez Canal on the way to the Gulf,8 politically, 

it believed the war was a mistake. Egypt thought the 

war made the United States (and Arab countries that 

had close relations with Washington) a liability in the 

minds of many Arabs and helped to feed the al-Qaeda 

narrative that the United States was at war with Islam.

A few years later, sectarian divisions between Sunnis and Shias started to grow in the region, fueled in 

part by the Iraq War, which had replaced a Sunnidominated regime in Baghdad with a Shia one. The 

growth of these divisions was also fueled by Hezbollah’s mini-war against the Israelis in the summer of 

2006, when Sunni Arab states such as Egypt and Saudi 

Arabia initially denounced Hezbollah’s provocations, 

only to see their own populations rally to Hezbollah’s 

anti-Israel campaign. Meanwhile, Bashar Assad of 

Syria denounced Sunni leaders who had been critical 

of the Syrian-Hezbollah connection.9

From 2005 to the end of the George W. Bush administration in January 2009, several leading Arab 

states such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia faced extremists within their own countries—some of whom 

were returning fighters from the Iraq conflict—and 

a political campaign by the United States pushing a 

so-called “Freedom Agenda,” which aimed to democratize countries in the region. Mubarak came under 

sustained pressure from Washington for a time, and 

made some political concessions, such as agreeing to 

multi-candidate presidential elections. But in the end, 

he was able to fend off the pressure, effectively using Muslim Brotherhood electoral gains and a Hamas 

electoral win next door in the Palestinian territories 

to scare off Washington,10 while the Saudis effectively 

told the United States that they would pursue political 

reform on their own timetable.11
10

Then, beginning in 2011, the Arab world began to 

experience internal upheavals as a result of the Arab 

Spring. Such upheavals led to the removal of several authoritarian leaders, and were supported by the 

United States, even though the Barack Obama administration, when it first came to office, did not place democratization in the Middle East as a high priority. 

In this environment, Saudi Arabia, which feared the 

Arab Spring, became a leader of the conservative status quo, sending troops (along with the United Arab 

Emirates [UAE]) to help neighboring Bahrain stave 

off demonstrations calling for political change. Saudi 

King Abdullah reportedly even had a testy phone call 

exchange with Obama, admonishing him for supporting the ouster of Mubarak of Egypt.12

Sunni-Shia divisions also affected Arab politics. 

Al-Qaeda seized upon the chaos in Iraq after the 

2003 war by taking over disaffected Sunni areas of 

the country and helping to foment a sectarian war by 

targeting Shias, playing to Sunni fears of Iran. That 

many Iraqi Shia factions had close ties with Iran did, 

in fact, enable Iran to become a prominent player in 

Iraqi politics. This new Shia assertiveness in Iraqi 

politics, plus al-Qaeda’s efforts to foment sectarian 

strife, exacerbated Sunni-Shia tensions in the region. 

Jordan’s King Abdullah, for example, warned in 2004 

of a “Shia crescent” in the region. Second, when the 

Arab Spring demonstrations in Syria broke out in 

2011 and after several months morphed into a civil 

war, this conflict took on sectarian dimensions, as the 

rebels—comprised predominantly of Sunnis—battled 

Assad’s Alawite-dominated regime (the Alawite sect 

is a branch of Shia Islam). Iran and Hezbollah both 

came to the aid of the Assad regime, while the Saudis 

and the Qataris aided the rebels. 
11

More recent developments have also helped fan 

the flames of sectarianism. When the remnants of alQaeda in Iraq moved westward into eastern Syria and 

became the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) 

and then moved eastward to take over large parts of 

Iraq in the summer of 2014, Iraq’s Shia militias, aided 

by Iran, were able to help save Baghdad from falling to 

ISIL. Many analysts believe that ISIL’s rapid advance 

into Iraq was facilitated by Iraqi Sunnis who saw this 

extremist group as a lesser evil compared to the Shiadominated Baghdad regime.13

Meanwhile, Egypt has been going through a different kind of political tumult. After Mubarak’s resignation, power in Egypt passed to the Supreme Council 

of the Armed Forces, then to the Muslim Brotherhood, 

and then back to the military under Defense Minister 

Abdel Fatah el-Sisi. Libya, after the fall of Qadhafi, has 

been awash in militias, most of which are allied with 

Libya’s rival governments—an Islamist one in Tripoli 

and a secular one in Tobruk. Yemen has also experienced political upheavals, leading to the resignation 

of long-time strongman Ali Saleh in 2012. But his vice 

president and successor, Abed Rabbu Hadi, was not 

successful in consolidating his rule, and faced an insurgency by Houthi rebels, who follow the Zaidi branch 

of Shia Islam, from the north. The Houthis took over 

the Yemeni capital and other parts of the country in 

2015, with the aid of remnants of forces loyal to Saleh. 

Suffice to say that the Middle East is now in the midst 

of one of its most unstable periods in modern history.

Because Egypt has been consumed with domestic affairs since 2011, and Syria and Iraq are both in 

chaos, leadership in the Arab world has now shifted 

to Saudi Arabia. With their deep pockets because of 

the country’s oil wealth and their more assertive mili-
12

tary posture, the Saudis have taken the lead in helping 

form at least two of the region’s major alliances. The 

Saudis know they cannot achieve what they want by 

themselves and have garnered the support of several 

countries to advance their agenda. But, as Egypt experienced in the 1950s and 1960s, leadership does not 

imply compliance by a country’s allies on all issues. 

Overextension, moreover, can become a problem, and 

differences can and do arise even among friends. The 

following section explains these new alliances.

THE NEW REGIONAL ALLIANCES 

AND THEIR DETRACTORS

The Anti-Islamist Alliance.

The political turmoil in Egypt, the Arab world’s 

most populous country, was the catalyst that initially 

led to a new grouping in that world, which is the antiIslamist alliance. This alliance cannot be described 

as strictly a secularist grouping, because there are 

countries in this alliance, like Saudi Arabia, which are 

religious states to a large degree. Nonetheless, what 

brought members of this group together was their 

antipathy to organized Islamist parties, namely, the 

Muslim Brotherhood. The alliance was again strengthened by these states’ opposition to the more extremist 

and radical group, ISIL, in the summer of 2014.

Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE were opposed to 

Egyptian president Mohammed Morsi during his year 

in power (2012-13) because they saw the Brotherhood 

as not only destabilizing to Egypt—a cornerstone 

country in the region—but also potentially bringing 

instability to their own countries through Brotherhood-affiliated organizations. Ironically, in the 1960s, 
13

when Egypt and Saudi Arabia were bitter enemies, 

Saudi Arabia gave refuge to Egyptian Muslim Brothers fleeing Nasser’s persecutions. But at some point 

over the past several years (the exact point is a subject 

of some debate among political analysts), Saudi Arabia turned against the Brotherhood, while the UAE 

has long harbored misgivings about the Islamist organization. On the other hand, Qatar, which has often 

bucked the consensus within the Gulf Cooperation 

Council (GCC) states, became Morsi and the Brotherhood’s principal Arab supporter.14

When public opposition mounted in Egypt against 

Morsi in June 2013, culminating in Sisi’s ouster of 

Morsi on July 3 and a subsequent crackdown on the 

entire Brotherhood apparatus, Saudi Arabia, UAE, 

and Kuwait supported this development and sent 

some $12 billion in aid to Egypt in the months that 

followed. This substantial assistance allowed Egypt’s 

new administration, led by temporary president and 

head of the Supreme Constitutional Court Adly Manour—though Sisi was the power behind the scene—

to weather a major political crisis. The crisis culminated in the regime’s violent dispersal of two major 

Brotherhood’s protest encampments in mid-August 

2013, causing hundreds of deaths, and the suspension 

of most U.S. military assistance in October 2013. Egypt 

felt so buoyed by this infusion of Saudi, UAE, and 

Kuwaiti aid that it even returned a couple of billion 

dollars that Qatar had sent to Egypt during the Morsi 

presidency. Over the next 2 years, total Arab Gulf aid 

pledges to Egypt may have risen to upward of $20 

billion, which dwarfed the annual U.S. assistance of 

roughly $1.5 billion ($1.3 billion in military aid and 

$200 million in economic assistance).15
14

Outside of the Egypt-Saudi Arabia-UAE-Kuwait 

grouping, this alliance has included secular factions in 

Libya (represented by the Tobruk government), secularists within Tunisia, and the Jordanian government. 

In August 2014, Egyptian and UAE warplanes even 

attacked militias of the Islamist government in Tripoli, 

Libya.16 The Tripoli government includes the Libyan 

Muslim Brotherhood organization.

Meanwhile, Tunisia’s secularists, perhaps galvanized by developments in Egypt in 2013, mounted 

their own opposition to the ruling Islamist En-Nahda 

party. After two Tunisian secular leaders (one a trade 

unionist, the other a politician) were gunned down in 

the course of 9 months, secularists in Tunisia blamed 

En-Nahda, not necessarily for the killings, but for creating what they described as a permissive environment for radical Salafi groups to operate. In the autumn of 2013, under this pressure, En-Nahda agreed 

to a timetable in which it would resign from power in 

early-2014, and accept a technocratic, caretaker government that would rule until new parliamentary and 

presidential elections were held later in 2014.17 In these 

parliamentary elections, En-Nahda came in second, 

while the secular Nidaa Tounes party came in first. After some political maneuvering, Nidaa Tounes agreed 

to take En-Nahda into the government as a junior coalition member. Meanwhile, the Nidaa Tounes leader, 

Beji Caid Essebsi, won the presidency. Although Tunisia’s political crisis between secularists and Islamists 

ended peacefully—perhaps because the leader of 

En-Nahda, Rachid Gannouchi, is a much more savvy 

and astute politician than Morsi of Egypt—Tunisia’s 

democratic success story (the only one to come out of 

the Arab Spring) has been challenged of late by two 

significant terrorist attacks against foreign tourists by 
15

individuals linked to ISIL. These attacks (one at a museum, the other at a beach resort) resulted in 60 deaths 

and caused the cancellation of major tourist bookings 

and a sharp blow to Tunisia’s fledgling economy. 

These developments have led the Tunisian president 

to declare a state of emergency in early-July 2015, giving security forces more power and limiting the right 

of public assembly.18

Post-Arab Spring Libya has taken a much different course. After the ouster and killing of long-time 

authoritarian ruler, Muammar Qadhafi, in 2011, the 

country was beset with numerous problems, chief of 

which were weak central authority and the proliferation of militias who refused to give up their arms. 

After parliamentary elections in June 2014, in which 

secularists won a plurality, two rival governments 

were established. Militias loyal to each government 

have been engaged in a series of battles. The only 

mechanism keeping these two governments afloat has 

been the decision by Libya’s Central Bank to divide 

the country’s oil revenues between them.19

The United Nations (UN), with the support of the 

European Union (EU) and the United States, has attempted to foster reconciliation talks between the two 

rival factions. In July 2015, most Libyan political factions signed a tentative agreement in Morocco, under 

UN auspices, that would make the House of Representatives in Tobruk the legislative authority and 

would call for a government of national unity encompassing these factions.20 It remains to be seen if this 

agreement will be carried out and if the international 

community is ready to send peacekeeping troops to 

the country. A complicating factor in the Libyan situation is the presence of ISIL, particularly in the central 

coastal city of Derna. While both the Tobruk and Tripoli governments consider ISIL a threat—ISIL’s brutal-
16

ity is well-known, after its adherents decapitated 21 

Egyptian Coptic Christians in early-2015 in Derna—it 

is not clear whether having a common enemy will be 

enough to bring about true national reconciliation.

As for Jordan, the monarchy weathered the Arab 

Spring and remained in control, though social and political issues continue to fester. Jordan’s King Abdullah has embraced countries in the anti-Islamist grouping, like Egypt and Libya’s Tobruk government. In 

April 2015, King Abdullah and his army’s chief of 

staff, Lieutenant General Mashal Zaben, warmly received Libya’s controversial General Haftar—allied 

to the Tobruk government—who was on a mission to 

see if Libyan forces loyal to that government would be 

able to be trained by Jordanian forces in counterterrorism and special forces operations. It is not clear what 

came out of these talks. Jordan’s official statement 

noted only that King Abdullah voiced support for 

Libya to confront “terrorist” organizations.21 The fact 

that both Jordanians and Libyans have been victims 

of ISIL attacks—in 2015, ISIL burned alive a Jordanian 

fighter pilot who was captured after an anti-ISIL mission in Syria—may help to bolster Libyan-Jordanian 

relations.

This grouping of Arab states, which first came together in opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood and 

other Islamist political parties, has been strengthened 

by its common opposition to the more radical and 

extremist ISIL organization. When ISIL was only in 

eastern Syria, it was initially seen as one of several extremist groups operating in the Syrian civil war. However, when ISIL expanded its reach in the summer of 

2014 by invading Iraq and quickly taking the northern 

city of Mosul and threatening Baghdad, the region 

and the world took notice. ISIL’s brutality—such as 
17

the persecution of Yazidis and Christians, the beheadings of Western hostages, and the burning to death of 

the Jordanian pilot—all culminated in a U.S.-led effort to create a large coalition of states from the West 

and from the region to combat ISIL.22 Many European 

states were alarmed that significant numbers of disaffected Muslim youths were traveling to Syria and 

Iraq to join ISIL. Many Arab countries were alarmed 

that extremist organizations in their own countries 

were pledging allegiance to ISIL and were fearful that 

their nationals who had gone to fight in Syria and Iraq 

were now coming back to undertake terrorist attacks 

at home, after having been battle trained. A number of 

Arab countries—such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and 

Jordan—joined the United States in undertaking air 

strikes against ISIL.23

In the aftermath of the beheadings of 21 Egyptian 

Coptic Christians in Libya by ISIL in February 2015, 

Egypt, under President Sisi, attacked ISIL targets 

there by air. But Sisi also used this incident to call for 

the creation of a joint Arab military force to confront 

such extremist groups.24 He then took the idea to the 

Arab summit meeting he hosted in Sharm El-Sheikh in 

late-March 2015, and stated shortly before the meeting 

began that such a force was needed to “preserve what 

is left of stability” in the Arab world and because of 

the “great challenges” facing the region. With Saudi 

support, the Arab summit endorsed the idea of a joint 

force “in principle” and later said that it would be 

made up of 40,000 elite troops and supported by jets, 

warships, and light armor. Although contributions 

by Arab states would be voluntary, the Arab League 

Secretary General said that the proposed force “sends 

a clear message that the Arab states can agree on a 

plan to defend themselves.”25 Egypt also hosted sub-
18

sequent meetings of Arab military chief of staffs to explore this proposal further, but many analysts in the 

region have expressed doubts that such a force will 

ever come into being. The last time this idea was proposed was in 1950 in the wake of the first Arab-Israeli 

War, but nothing came of it. While several Arab states 

have attacked extremists like ISIL from the air, they 

have not wanted to send “boots on the ground.”

Despite the opposition of many Arab states to ISIL, 

the terrorist organization has been able to sell its radical brand to potential adherents, so much so that many 

extremists in the region have switched their allegiance 

from al-Qaeda to ISIL. Moreover, ISIL has established 

a so-called “Islamic Caliphate” in the heart of the Levant and has a sophisticated social media operation. 

This has helped ensure that its message gets across 

to millions of disaffected young Muslims, many of 

whom have become captivated by ISIL’s successes 

on the battlefield and its very strict interpretation of 

Islam, which is supposedly modeled on the early Islamic community of the 7th Century. Hence, it is not 

surprising that countries in the anti-Islamist grouping 

have also focused on ISIL and its affiliated groups, 

which have sprung up in the region and become major terrorist hubs. For example, the Tunisians who attacked foreign tourists at the Bardo Museum in March 

2015 and at the Sousse beach resort reportedly were 

trained by an ISIL group in Derna, Libya.26 In Egypt, 

the terrorist group operating in the Sinai Peninsula, 

Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, pledged allegiance to ISIL and 

now calls itself the “Sinai Province.” On July 1, 2015, 

this group directed a series of coordinated attacks in 

the north Sinai against regime security forces, leading to scores of deaths.27 This group has also attacked 

targets in mainland Egypt and, on July 16, 2015, even 
19

launched a successful missile attack on an Egyptian 

naval vessel off the Sinai coast.28

Who, then, are the detractors of the anti-Islamist 

group? Within the Arab world, Qatar has played this 

role by its support for the Muslim Brotherhood and 

Hamas, which grew out of the Palestinian Muslim 

Brotherhood. Outside of the Arab countries, Turkey, 

under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Islamist AKP party, is also an opponent of this alliance. 

Erdogan sharply denounced the removal of Morsi 

from power in 2013 and has given refuge to Egyptian 

Muslim Brotherhood leaders and activists, who were 

able to escape the crackdown on the organization in 

the summer of 2013. From Turkey, the Muslim Brotherhood has been able to regroup to some extent and 

to establish a media center that has broadcast anti-Sisi 

programs.29 Erdogan has also supported the Islamist 

government in Tripoli, Libya.

Although the states in the anti-Islamist grouping 

of states see eye-to-eye on most issues, there seem to 

be differences on the Syrian question, especially between Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The Saudis see the 

government of Bashar Assad as the chief problem in 

that crisis and want him to go. While the Saudis have 

opposed the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, they have 

reportedly aided Islamist groups in the Syrian civil 

war partly because such forces have been the most 

effective in fighting the Assad regime. The Saudis’ 

antipathy for Bashar Assad is partly personal, partly 

strategic, and partly religious. Regarding the first, 

the Saudis have never forgiven Bashar for insulting 

them in the wake of the Hezbollah-Israel conflict in 

2006, when Riyadh opposed Hezbollah’s claim to be 

the champion of the so-called Arab cause against Israel. Strategically, the Saudis see the Assad regime as 

an Iranian proxy and as part of a wider Sunni-Shia 
20

conflict stoked by Tehran. Since most of the victims 

of the Assad regime have been Sunnis, the Saudis see 

Assad’s Alawite-dominated regime as carrying on a 

religious war.30

Egypt, on the other hand, is fearful that a collapse 

of the Assad regime will pave the way for Islamist 

groups—including the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, 

the al-Qaeda-linked Al-Nusra Front, and even ISIL—

to take over the country, creating a radical Islamist 

regime in the heart of the Levant. Egypt’s military establishment was alarmed when then-president Morsi 

called on Egyptians in 2012 to go to Syria to fight with 

the anti-Assad rebels, fearing “blowback” by returning Egyptian fighters, some of whom have probably 

joined the extremists based in the Sinai Peninsula. 

Hence, the Egyptian leadership under Sisi sees Assad 

as the lesser of two evils and hopes for a political solution to the crisis in which Assad, or at least the Syrian 

military, is part of the solution.

These differences came to a head during the Arab 

summit meeting Egypt hosted in Sharm El-Shaikh in 

late-March 2015. At this meeting, Sisi reportedly read 

out loud a letter from Russian President Vladimir 

Putin, a backer of Assad, who advocated a political 

solution to the Syrian crisis, implying that this was 

Egypt’s policy as well. In response, then-Saudi foreign 

minister Saud al-Faisal stated, while television cameras were rolling, that the Russians “are a main part 

of the miseries that affects the Syrian people.” Not 

wanting to get into a public spat with his Saudi benefactors, Sisi thanked Saud al-Faisal for his remarks 

and then quickly changed the subject.31 However, in 

the aftermath of this controversy, a popular Egyptian 

talk show host, who is reportedly close to Sisi, said 

that “Arab oil money from Saudi Arabia and Qatar is 

also killing the Syrian people.” Not to be outdone, a 
21

Saudi journalist responded by noting that the talk 

show host’s “excesses” required action, and implied 

that the host’s message must have had the Egyptian 

regime’s approval “because it is the regime’s media.”32

Two months after these diatribes, the new Saudi 

foreign minister, Adel al-Jubeir, flew to Cairo to 

hold meetings with his Egyptian counterpart, Sameh 

Shoukry. The two diplomats did their best to downplay their differences in public, to the point that Jubeir claimed he did not know where “impressions” 

of discord between the two countries came from, and 

Shoukry said their policies on Syria “complement” 

each other. Jubeir emphasized the point that, “we are 

all seeking to remove Bashar Assad from power,” restore “peace and stability in Syria,” and “protect the 

government and military institutions” there “to beable to deal with the challenges after the Assad regime.” Shoukry said that Egypt was working with the 

Russians to convince the Syrian government to take 

part in a political process involving various factions, 

while Jubeir said that contacts with Russia aimed to 

convince Moscow to “give up on Bashar” or to exert 

efforts to convince him to “give up power.”33

In addition to their differences over Syria, Egyptian and Saudi relations were also strained over 

leaked discussions in Sisi’s Ministry of Defense that 

revealed derogatory comments about Gulf Arabs by 

some Egyptian officials. One analyst has noted that 

such leaks “have generated considerable anger among 

Egypt’s Gulf Arab allies, as has its unresponsiveness 

to their desire to see consistent economic reforms and 

greater levels of policy coordination.” Moreover, the 

ascension to power by Saudi King Salman has been 

“accompanied by a tempering of Saudi policy on the 

Muslim Brotherhood.”34 The new Saudi leadership, in 

the view of this analyst, “is less zealous in its support 
22

for Egypt’s undifferentiated and unrelenting crackdown” on the Muslim Brotherhood. Saudi and other 

Gulf Arab aid to Egypt may decrease dramatically in 

the coming years, though in a crisis, it is hard to imagine that the Saudis will allow Egypt to experience the 

severe economic distress that could threaten domestic 

stability. One of the reasons Egypt is currently helping the Saudis in the Yemeni crisis—supporting the 

Saudis’ anti-Houthi campaign—is to demonstrate the 

importance of Egypt to Saudi strategic interests. In 

essence, the Egyptians see aiding Saudi Arabia in the 

anti-Houthi struggle as an insurance policy to keep 

the Saudi assistance going.

Hence, while this anti-Islamist grouping in the 

Arab world has become one of the alliances in the region, it is not necessarily a coherent one. Part of the 

problem with this alliance relates to long-standing rivalries in the Arab world; part also has to do with tensions inherent between republican regimes and monarchies, with the latter tending to see religion as part 

of their legitimacy. Hence, while these countries—or 

more specifically, their ruling elites may share an 

antipathy toward Islamist groups like the Muslim 

Brotherhood, the monarchies (or sheikhdoms) do 

not usually subscribe to the idea of secularism that is 

prevalent among the ruling elites in so-called republican regimes like Egypt and Tunisia, and among the 

Libyan factions supporting the Tobruk government.

The Anti-Shia Alliance.

The other major grouping in the Arab world is the 

anti-Shia coalition, which came together rather decisively in March 2015 in the wake of the Houthi takeover of much of Yemen. The Houthis are members 

of the Zaidi branch of Shia Islam, whose traditional 
23

homeland is the northern part of Yemen. In September 2014, the Houthis, in the midst of the political 

chaos that had engulfed Yemen over the past several 

years, moved south and seized most of Yemen’s capital city of Sana. In the early part of 2015, the Houthis 

then took over the institutions of the Yemeni government, placed Yemeni President Hadi under house arrest, and moved further south toward the port city of 

Aden. They were aided in these moves by forces loyal 

to former Yemeni president Saleh, who had resigned 

from the presidency in 2012 amidst domestic and foreign pressure. When the Houthis appeared poised to 

take Aden, Hadi and some members of his government, who had escaped to that city, then escaped to 

Saudi Arabia.35

As a Shia group (though they differ doctrinally 

somewhat from the mainstream “Twelver” Shias of 

Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, and Lebanon), the Houthis have 

received some military and financial aid from Iran, 

including weapons and munitions, particularly after 

2011.36 Although the extent of Iranian aid is unknown 

and may be exaggerated because Yemen is flush with 

weapons from previous conflicts, the Iran-Houthi 

connection has alarmed neighboring countries, particularly Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has long been 

concerned about Shia activism in the region, but its 

worries have been heightened by developments over 

the past several years—including a resurgent Iran, the 

emergence of a Shia regime in Iraq with close ties to 

Iran, Hezbollah militancy in Lebanon, and military assistance to the Assad regime in the Syrian civil war. 

Another factor is instability in nearby Bahrain, whose 

Sunni monarchy resides over a restive Shia majority. 

This led to demonstrations for political change in 2011, 

prompting Saudi and UAE intervention on the side of 

the monarchy.
24

Saudi Arabia is a strict Islamic state that follows 

the Wahhabi school of Sunni Islam. The Wahhabi doctrine follows the puritanical teachings of its founder, 

Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who, in the 18th 

Century, sought to purify the tribes of the Najd region 

of supposedly un-Islamic behaviors and received the 

protection of and formed an alliance with Mohammad 

ibn Saud, the ancestor of today’s ruling al-Saud family.37 The alliance between the descendants of these 

two leaders has lasted to the present day and, consequently, there is a religious dimension to Saudi political and military opposition to Iranian and Shia groups 

in general, as some Wahhabi clerics consider the Shia 

heretics. The Saudis also have a significant Shia population (about 10 percent of the total population of the 

kingdom), which is concentrated in the important oilproducing region of the eastern province. The Shia of 

Saudi Arabia long have complained of discriminatory 

practices by the Saudi government, and there have 

been periodic eruptions of unrest in their area. The 

latest were in 2011-12, as some Shia staged demonstrations in line with what was happening elsewhere 

in the Arab world.38 These demonstrations were put 

down by force, and the area has been relatively quiet 

of late, but Saudi officials are always concerned about 

security in this province, and they see an Iranian hand, 

whether real or imagined, stoking the flames of unrest.

Ever since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, SaudiIranian relations have been uneasy to hostile, not 

helped by the fact that Iran’s revolutionary leader, 

Ayatollah Khomeini, called monarchy incompatible 

with Islam.39 In essence, Khomeini was saying that the 

Saudi ruling family was unfit to govern the Islamic 

holy cities of Mecca and Medina. The Saudis, in turn, 

saw revolutionary Iran as a threat, and supported Iraq 
25

with billions of dollars in aid in its bloody 8-year war 

with Iran from 1980-88.

Although by 1990, both Iran and Saudi Arabia opposed Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and his takeover 

of Kuwait, this did not mean that their own differences melted away. In particular, the Saudis continued 

to rely on the U.S. military presence in the region as 

a protector, whereas Iran saw the United States as its 

strategic enemy. 

It appears that the Iraq War of 2003 set in motion 

a series of events that led the Saudis (and some other 

Sunni Arab countries) to be even more concerned 

about Iran. Although the Saudis did not shed any tears 

when Saddam Hussein and his regime were overthrown in the wake of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, 

they came to see Iraq’s new leaders, now dominated 

by the Shia, with alarm. Some Shia groups within the 

new ruling coalition had received sanctuary and support from Iran over the years. In the aftermath of the 

war, when Iraqi Sunni insurgents battled the new Iraqi 

government and coalition forces and al-Qaeda saw an 

opportunity to exploit Sunni grievances, Iran came to 

the aid of the Shia militia groups. For a time in 2006-

07, Iraq even descended into sectarian warfare, with 

roaming bands of Sunni and Shia death squads. Under 

these circumstances, Iran’s influence grew even stronger. Hence, from the Saudi perspective, the Iraq War 

opened the floodgates in Iraq to Iranian influence. As 

a sign of their displeasure with the new situation in 

Iraq, Saudis did not send an ambassador to Baghdad 

despite many entreaties by the United States to do so.40

The rise of ISIL in the more recent period (2014-

15) has also deepened Iran’s influence in Iraq. Because 

the Iraqi army has proven to be an ineffectual fighting force, the Iraqi government has come to rely on 
26

Shia militia groups to defend Baghdad and take the 

offensive against ISIL forces. These forces have been 

aided by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards “Quds” force, 

whose commander was even in Iraq directing the military activities of some of these Shia militias against 

ISIL.41 Outside of Iraq, the Saudis see an Iranian hand 

in stoking other Shia-Sunni conflicts. In Lebanon, the 

Saudis long have been alarmed by the rise of Hezbollah (now part of the ruling coalition) and Iran’s close 

connection to this militant Shia organization. The Saudis had backed a coalition representing Sunni interests 

under the leadership of Saad Hariri, son of the former 

prime minister, Rafik Hariri, a dual Lebanese-Saudi 

national and businessman who was believed to have 

been assassinated on orders of the Syrian government 

in 2005. But that coalition was defeated in the polls by 

Hezbollah. 

Alarming still to the Saudis has been Hezbollah’s 

military support for the Assad regime in the Syrian civil 

war. Although many Hezbollah soldiers have died in 

this war, their ongoing assistance in the fight against 

Syrian rebel groups has enabled the civil war to drag 

on for years. This military support has been crucial 

to keeping the regime in power, because its Alawite 

base is small and has suffered numerous casualties. 

There have also been reports of Iranian Revolutionary 

Guard forces, and even some Iraqi Shia groups, fighting on the side of the Assad regime.42 Hence, the Saudis see an Iranian-Shia nexus from Tehran to Baghdad 

to Damascus to Beirut that needs to be opposed, in 

addition to the Shia in Bahrain as well in its the eastern province. When the Houthis went on the march 

in Yemen, the Saudis saw this nexus encircling them. 

From the Saudi perspective, the Yemen crisis was the 

last straw, because it was in their backyard.
27

In March 2015, the Saudis were able to assemble 

a coalition of Arab states to participate in this antiHouthi military campaign, dubbed Operation DECISIVE STORM. This coalition, representing Sunniruled states, included all of the GCC states except 

Oman—that is, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, 

and Bahrain—plus Egypt, Jordan, Sudan, Morocco, 

and Yemen’s exiled government.43 A statement from 

the Arab Gulf states listed previously, said that the 

operation was “in response to a request” from Yemeni 

President Hadi “to protect Yemen from the aggression 

of Houthi militias.” The statement went on to accuse 

the Houthis of being a “tool of foreign powers that 

seeks to harm the security and stability of Yemen,” a 

clear reference to Iran.44

According to various press reports, the Saudis’ military contribution to this campaign is 100 warplanes, 

plus 150,000 soldiers mobilized near the Yemeni border. The UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco, and Sudan have also been contributing warplanes, 

perhaps 85 in total, though it is unclear which countries have also been participating in airstrikes. Egypt 

reportedly has deployed four naval ships near the 

strategically important Bab el-Mandeb Strait that connects the Red Sea to the Arabian Sea, plus air assets.45

After several months of airstrikes, this coalition, 

led by Saudi Arabia, was not very successful in defeating the Houthis. The most success it had was in 

dislodging the Houthis from the airport and port of 

Aden in mid-July 2015, allowing some members of 

the Hadi government to return from Saudi Arabia to 

the city of Aden. According to various press reports, 

it appears that many of the casualties from the Saudi-led airstrikes have been Yemeni civilians, and the 

destruction meted out to infrastructure sites by the 
28

coalition air strikes has exacerbated the humanitarian 

crisis in the country.46 As the poorest country in the 

Arab world, Yemen was already in dire straits before 

this war, and is now suffering from shortages of food, 

water, and medicine. The UN has helped to arrange 

for a couple of ceasefires in order for international 

aid to be delivered to the people, but these have been 

short-lived.

This anti-Houthi or anti-Shia alliance, like the antiIslamist alliance, is not very coherent. It is likely that 

some of the Arab countries that joined this alliance 

have done so to stay in the good graces of the Saudis because of hoped-for financial rewards. Although 

many of these countries do not like the fact that Iran 

is meddling in Arab affairs and has come to the aid 

of various Shia militant groups in the region, they are 

probably not as paranoid about Iran as are the Saudis.

For example, the Egyptian and Iranian foreign 

ministers held what appeared to be a friendly meeting 

on the sidelines of the Non-aligned Movement’s gathering in April 2015.47 Egypt’s participation in the antiHouthi campaign is more motivated to protect its own 

economic interests than because of fears of Iran’s advances in the region. These economic interests include 

not only ensuring Saudi largesse, but ensuring the Bab 

el-Mandeb Strait stays open, because that waterway is 

on the route for ships going to and from the Mediterranean and the Arabian Seas via the Red Sea and Egypt’s 

Suez Canal, which generates over $5 billion in tolls a 

year for Cairo. Although Egyptian President Sisi at 

the Arab summit in Sharm El-Sheikh said that “Arab 

problems should be handled by Arabs themselves”48

—an indirect criticism of Iran—Egypt appears more 

interested in stopping ISIL and its affiliates than in 

opposing Iran and its proxies. 
29

That said, Egypt is demonstrating its commitment 

in this anti-Houthi campaign because it needs to show 

the Saudis that it can come to their aid in time of need, 

just as the Saudis helped Egypt during her time of 

need in 2013, in the wake of its problematic domestic 

situation. Egypt even prevented its airspace from being used by a Houthi delegation flying to Geneva in 

June 2015 to participate in UN-sponsored peace talks 

with the Yemeni government in exile, delaying this 

group’s arrival by a day.49 But while Egyptian officials 

have said publicly that they might consider sending 

ground troops to Yemen if asked (presumably by the 

Saudis),50 they would be extremely wary of doing so, 

given their unhappy experience in Yemen in the 1960s. 

Outside the Yemen conflict, Egypt and Saudi Arabia differ on the Syrian crisis, despite their best efforts 

to paper over such divisions. Egypt sees the Syrian 

civil war not so much as a sectarian conflict, pitting 

an Iran-supported regime against Sunni rebels, but 

as a conflict between a secular government and rebel 

groups that include radical Islamists who want not 

only to transform Syria but the entire region. While 

Saudi Arabia and Qatar are on different sides of the 

anti-Islamist issue with regard to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and some other Islamist groups in 

the region, they appear to be supporting a broad array 

of rebel forces in the Syrian civil war. These include 

Islamist ones that cooperate with Al-Nusra Front, 

which is linked to al-Qaeda.51

Jordan may be closest to the Saudis in seeing the 

Houthi conflict as part of a larger Shia threat. Indeed, 

it was King Abdullah of Jordan who voiced concerns 

about what he saw as a “Shia crescent” in 2004.52

Nonetheless, with ISIL very nearby in Syria and Iraq, 

Jordan is probably more concerned about ISIL trying 

to take over Jordanian territory than he is about the 
30

Shia and Iran. There are hardly any Jordanian nationals who are Shia, the vast majority being Sunni Muslims. Although most Jordanians turned decisively 

against ISIL after the captured Jordanian pilot was 

cruelly burned alive in early-2015, King Abdullah still 

needs to worry about Sunni radicals within his own 

kingdom.

With the exception of Oman, most of the Arab Gulf 

states share Saudi Arabia’s antipathy and “paranoia” 

about Iran and Shia groups. They fear that Iran will 

continue to try to stir up their own Shia communities 

in an effort to pressure them. The Saudi and UAE intervention in the Bahrain crisis in 2011 was as much an 

anti-Shia intervention (and an act of protecting a fellow 

Sunni monarch), than it was stopping another Arab 

Spring democratization experiment. That said, Kuwait 

might be in a different position with regard to the sectarian issue, perhaps because Iran is only a few miles 

away and because Kuwait has done a better job than 

most other Arab Gulf countries in integrating its Shia 

population into its society. When an ISIL group bombed 

a Shia mosque in Kuwait in July 2015, the Kuwaiti 

government said it was an attack on the entire Kuwaiti 

nation.53

WHAT HAS BEEN THE ROLE OF THE UNITED 

STATES IN THESE ALLIANCES?

Regarding the anti-Islamist alliance, at least the issue of the Muslim Brotherhood, the United States has 

shied away from embracing it. Official U.S. policy is 

not to lump the Brotherhood together with groups 

like al-Qaeda and ISIL, and the United States has supported UN reconciliation talks between the Libyan 

Islamist government (which includes members of the 

Libyan Muslim Brotherhood) and the secular Tobruk 
31

government. In general, the United States has avoided 

taking a stand on the Islamist-secularist divide in the 

region. U.S. policy, articulated first in 1992, is to favor 

inclusivity of all nonviolent political groups, secular 

or Islamist, in these societies, and not to appear to 

be siding with secular groups just because they are 

secular.54

Such a policy has put the United States in a difficult position with regard to Egypt. Although in July 

2013 the United States initially called for the release of 

Morsi from prison and criticized the suspension of the 

Egyptian constitution—and later criticized in more 

forceful terms the violent crackdown in mid-August 

2013 of the Muslim Brotherhood protest encampments 

that led to more than 600 deaths in a single day—it 

also tried to steer a middle course by not calling Morsi’s ouster a “coup,” because that would have triggered an automatic cut-off of U.S. assistance to Egypt 

under U.S. law.55 Nonetheless, in October 2013, after 

an interagency review, the United States suspended 

most military assistance to Egypt because of these 

anti-democratic developments. This suspension of aid 

did not lead to a change of Egyptian behavior, however. The combination of Egyptian pride and generous Gulf Arab aid to Cairo contributed to the regime’s 

unrepentant policies against the Muslim Brotherhood 

as well as against some of its secular critics. In the 

spring of 2015, the United States decided that rebuilding strategic links to Cairo was paramount and fully 

restored the suspended aid.56 Despite this restoration 

of aid, the United States never adopted the Egyptian 

regime’s view that the Muslim Brotherhood is a terrorist organization, and the United States criticized 

quick trials and the meting out of capital punishment 

sentences against Brotherhood leaders and activists as 

well as other human rights violations.
32

Therefore, while the United States is a secular 

country and most U.S. policymakers are inclined to 

be personally sympathetic with Arab secularists’ fears 

of Islamist movements—even nonviolent Islamist 

ones—it has not tried to pick sides in this internal fight 

between secularists and Islamists. One can argue, 

however, that by restoring aid to the secular Sisi government, the United States is indeed taking sides. Yet, 

the decision to restore aid was not undertaken to send 

a signal about secularism versus Islamism. Instead, it 

was done primarily to rebuild trust with the government of the most populous state in the Arab world, 

which has played a pivotal role in the region and is 

facing a significant terrorism problem. If the United 

States had such a problem with nonviolent Islamists, 

it would certainly not have tried to cultivate good relations with the Morsi government during the 2012-

13 period.57 Indeed, because of these ties, the United 

States was accused by secular Egyptians of favoring 

an authoritarian Islamist regime, and because of this 

perception, U.S. standing in Egypt reached a low point 

in the summer of 2013 after Morsi was ousted.

If anything, the United States has tried to be neutral in the disputes between Islamists and secularists. 

Tunisia is a prime example. The United States maintained good relations with the Tunisian government 

when En-Nahda was the dominant party in the government but then stayed out of the way when Tunisian secularists pressured En-Nahda in the summer 

and autumn of 2013 to step down from power and 

agree to a technocratic caretaker government, new 

elections in 2014, and the drafting of a new constitution. These events all occurred peacefully for the most 

part—avoiding the violent turmoil that had engulfed 

Egypt. Although pressure from secularists compelled 

En-Nahda to give up power, En-Nahda emerged as 
33

the second strongest party in parliament and became 

a junior partner in the government. The United States 

praised Tunisia’s democratic experiment, increased 

aid to the country, and exalted its new constitution as 

the most progressive in the Arab world. Obama received the Tunisian president in the White House.58

In confronting violent Islamist extremist groups 

like al-Qaeda and ISIL, the United States has wholeheartedly embraced the alliance and has taken the 

lead, in fact, in assembling a 60-member state coalition opposed to ISIL, even appointing a U.S. Army 

general to coordinate activities in this coalition. Concerning the anti-Shia alliance this approach also has to 

be parsed out in terms of U.S. policy. Concerning the 

anti-Houthi alliance, the United States has supported 

the Saudi effort with logistical and intelligence assistance, according to press reports, and considers Hadi 

the legitimate president of Yemen. Secretary of State 

John Kerry, even in the midst of the sensitive nuclear 

negotiations with Iran, publicly warned Tehran about 

meddling in the Yemeni conflict.59 However, the chief 

U.S. concern in Yemen is preventing al-Qaeda in the 

Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and now ISIL from taking 

advantage of the instability in the country to make 

gains. Indeed, in the wake of the Houthi advances and 

the chaos that ensued in Yemen, the United States was 

compelled to withdraw its Army Special Forces units, 

which had been aiding the Yemeni counterterrorism 

effort. The United States has favored a political solution to the Yemeni crisis and thus helped to foster, with 

Omani diplomats, talks in Oman between the Houthis 

and the Hadi government.60 These talks paved the way 

for follow-up talks in Geneva, but those talks ended in 

acrimony in June 2015. The United States has also expressed concern for the growing humanitarian crisis 

in Yemen.61
34

Although the United States has supported the antiHouthi effort to some degree, it has not supported the 

broader anti-Shia grouping. First, as a practical matter, the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad is a 

U.S. ally, and the United States is doing what it can to 

shore up the Iraqi army to fight against ISIL, while acknowledging that the Shia militias have been more effective in this struggle.62 Second, with the recent, successful conclusion of the P5+1 negotiations with Iran 

over the nuclear issue, the United States is hoping that 

Iran might become a more moderate country.63 Supporting an anti-Shia stance would wreck any chances 

of a U.S.-Iranian rapproachment, which might emerge 

down the road if Iran does indeed moderate. Third, it 

would be out of character for the United States to take 

sides in a sectarian conflict, even though some Shia 

groups, like Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Shia-dominated states, like Assad’s Syria, are opposed to U.S. 

policies. Finally, there are legitimate human rights 

concerns voiced by Shia in Sunni-dominated states 

like Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. If the United States 

decided to drop those concerns merely because they 

were expressed by the Shia, it would make a mockery 

of U.S. human rights policy.

OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR THE 

UNITED STATES IN THESE ALLIANCES: 

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

Given these new Arab alliances, how should the 

United States react to them in the future? Moreover, 

what are the opportunities, challenges, and even 

downsides of these alliances for U.S. policy?
35

How Should the United States Respond 

to the Anti-Islamist Alliance?

First, with regard to the anti-Islamist grouping, 

the United States has had long-standing political, security, and economic relationships with most of these 

states. The United States should continue its relations 

with these states, as they serve many broad U.S. policy 

goals. For example, with Egypt, the U.S. decision to lift 

the suspension of the military assistance in the spring 

of 2015 has helped to restore the important U.S.-Egyptian security relationship. This is especially important, given the rise in terrorist activities in the Sinai 

and elsewhere in Egypt by the ISIL-affiliated group 

now called the “Sinai Province” but formerly known 

as Ansar Beit al-Maqdis. The coordinated attacks by 

this terrorist group on July 1, 2015, in which as many 

as 70 Egyptian soldiers and civilians were killed, and 

the temporary takeover of the town of Sheikh Zuweid 

in the Sinai by the terrorists, underscored the serious 

nature of this threat to Egyptian security.64

Moreover, the restoration of aid to Egypt may work 

to weaken the conspiracy theory prevalent among 

Egyptian secularists that the United States secretly 

made a pact with the Muslim Brotherhood before and 

during the Morsi presidency to weaken the Egyptian 

state. Although such a theory sounds far-fetched to 

American ears, it was widely believed by many secularists in Egypt. Unfortunately, the pro-government 

Egyptian press hyped up such conspiracy theories. 

The more the United States can show that it is aiding 

the Egyptian government in its anti-terrorism campaign, the better the chances that such sentiments will 

diminish over time.
36

However, the downside of this support for the Sisi 

government is that the United States is seen by opponents of the regime as contributing to state repression. The Sisi government has not only gone after the 

Muslim Brotherhood and declared it a terrorist organization, but it has imposed harsh penalties on those 

engaged in public protests, journalists who have criticized the government, and secular activists opposed 

to the restrictions on democracy. As an example, in 

July 2015, the Sisi government wanted to impose jail 

sentences on reporters who did not follow the government’s own reporting of terrorist incidents. Only when 

the Journalists Syndicate expressed strong opposition 

to this proposed law did the government back down, 

but only partially, saying it would impose large fines 

on such journalists instead.65

The U.S. State Department’s criticisms of such antidemocratic policies notwithstanding, the fact that the 

United States has restored all aid to Egypt has given 

Egyptian dissidents the impression that the United 

States is back to its old, Mubarak-era, policies of facilitating this repression or at least looking the other way 

while gross human rights violations are occurring.

The Egyptian government’s repression of the Muslim Brotherhood has also put the United States in a political quandary with regard to this Islamist group. Unlike Egypt under Sisi, the United States has not agreed 

with the designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a 

terrorist organization, and it has even allowed a few 

Brotherhood members to visit the United States over 

the past 2 years. However, the regime’s severe crackdown on the Brotherhood, which has included the incarceration of most of its leaders, has broken up the 

top-down decisionmaking apparatus of the organization, leading some younger members to engage in violence against the regime or join up with more radical 
37

groups like the former Ansar Beit al-Maqdis. Hence, in 

a certain way, the regime’s crackdown on the Brotherhood has become a self-fulfilling prophecy, because it 

has driven at least some members of the Brotherhood 

to commit violent acts66—and violence has been the 

standard test by which the United States has generally 

judged Islamist groups as legitimate or illegitimate. In 

other words, official U.S. policy since 1992 is that the 

United States will deal with Islamist groups as long as 

those groups do not engage in violence.

It appears that U.S. officials, in private conversations with their Egyptian counterparts, have raised 

human rights concerns even while expressing support 

for Egypt’s counterterrorism campaign.67 Whether 

these expressions of concern are having any effect on 

Egyptian government behavior remains to be seen. 

President Sisi did remove Minister of Interior Mohammad Ibrahim from his post in early-2015, perhaps because of mounting domestic and international concern 

about police brutality and other human rights abuses, 

but it is not clear whether this change at the top is having any effect on actual practices on the ground.

Over the short term, the perception among Islamists 

that the United States is taking a stand in support of 

repression of their cadres does not have serious consequences for U.S. policy because it is hard to imagine 

that the Brotherhood will come back to power anytime soon. However, over the long term, the perception of the United States as tacitly or directly supporting the Sisi government in this repression may pose a 

serious risk for the United States if the Brotherhood 

comes back to power down the road. Here, the example of U.S.-Iranian relations may be illustrative. The 

U.S-supported coup against Iranian nationalist leader 

Mohammad Mossadeq in 1953, which resulted in the 
38

Shah becoming an absolute and repressive monarch, 

may have resulted in close U.S.-Iranian strategic relations for some 25 years, but it all came crashing down 

in 1979 when the Shah was overthrown. 

What about the other states and parties? In the 

Libyan civil war, the United States has supported 

the UN’s efforts to try to bring the two sides together 

through mediation. Although the Tobruk government 

is the internationally recognized government in Libya, 

the United States understands that it represents only 

part of the country. Moreover, it is important for the 

United States to pursue a policy that shows it is in favor of Libyan reconciliation with the exception of terrorist groups, some of which are now affiliated with 

ISIL. Indeed, ISIL’s presence in Derna, Libya, and its 

attacks against the interests of both the Tobruk and 

Tripoli governments gives these factions something to 

cooperate on—that is, working to rid Libya of the ISIL 

menace. An interim agreement that was concluded in 

Morocco in July 2015 under UN auspices—allowing 

the Tobruk House of Representatives to be the main 

legislative body and bringing the political factions together in a government of national unity—is probably 

the best option at this point for a long-term solution to 

the Libyan crisis. Some reports suggest that some EU 

countries might send peacekeeping troops to Libya if 

the agreement comes to fruition, and the United States 

might use drone attacks against ISIL to prevent this 

terrorist group from derailing the accord.68 Both of 

these measures would be useful, but it remains to be 

seen how the various factions will deal with the proliferation of militias in Libya. Unless this problem is 

addressed and there is a buy-in to the agreement from 

all Libyan factions except for those affiliated with 

ISIL and al-Qaeda, the agreement will remain only 

on paper.
39

Given the recent, tentative accord in Libya, it is 

important for the United States to weigh in on Egypt 

and the UAE not to undertake any airstrikes against 

factions allied to the Tripoli government, as it did in 

August of 2014. A recent U.S. decision to sell Egypt 

$100 million in sophisticated border surveillance 

equipment should help ease Egyptian concerns about 

terrorists and weapons being smuggled across the 

porous Libyan-Egyptian border, many of which have 

landed in the Sinai to the east.69 However, if Egyptian 

nationals in Libya were again the victims of ISIL’s brutality, that would constitute a different situation. Since 

the United States and its anti-ISIL coalition partners 

are themselves undertaking air strikes against ISIL in 

Syria and Iraq, the United States should support such 

strikes by Egypt if they are, indeed, against ISIL targets in Libya and not against political factions linked 

to Tripoli.

How Should the United States 

Respond to the Anti-Shia Coalition?

The United States has already given the Saudis 

intelligence and logistical support for its anti-Houthi 

campaign, and has publicly warned Iran not to exacerbate the situation in Yemen by providing the Houthis 

with weapons. But the United States has come to realize that there are liabilities to the Yemeni conflict.

First, while air strikes by the Saudis and their coalition allies may have freed parts of Aden from Houthi 

control in the summer of 2015, they have generally not 

dislodged the Houthis from the other, significant territory that it holds, including the capital city of Sana.70

Because air strikes have led to some 3,000 casualties as 
40

of July 2015, many of which have been civilians, being 

on the side of the Saudis’ hardline tactics may have 

long-term consequences for the United States, especially now that the humanitarian situation in Yemen is 

so dire. It is not in U.S. interests for the Yemeni people 

to see the United States as contributing to their hardships. U.S. policymakers should continue to counsel 

restraint on the part of the Saudis and encourage them 

to convince the Hadi government-in-exile to resume 

negotiations with the Houthis, however difficult these 

may be.

Houthi demands are not unreasonable, provided 

the Houthis retreat to the northern area of Yemen. 

These demands include a greater share of government 

revenues and an end to Salafi Sunni Muslim preachers 

proselytizing in their region.71 Although the Houthis 

have voiced anti-U.S. slogans, they are potential allies 

in the fight against ISIL and AQAP, similar to the Shia 

militias of Iraq. A political solution to the Yemeni crisis 

that would include Houthis in a governing coalition 

would be an optimal scenario if it results in a more 

stable Yemen. If stability were to return to Yemen, the 

United States would be able to reopen its embassy and 

return its Special Forces units to the country to help 

Yemeni forces in their fight against AQAP and ISIL. It 

should be remembered that AQAP has been the most 

prominent al-Qaeda affiliate, which has launched 

the most anti-U.S. plots, including those directed at 

the U.S. homeland. Although the United States has 

continued some drone strikes against AQAP, killing 

AQAP leader Nasir al-Wuhayshi in June 2015 by one 

of these strikes,72 its counterterrorism efforts would 

be much more effective if Yemen stabilizes and U.S. 

Special Forces were allowed to return.

The nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 countries, led by the United States, has inadvertently made 
41

the Saudis possibly less willing to compromise over 

such Shia groups as the Houthis. One unnamed Saudi 

diplomat told the press in the wake of this nuclear 

agreement that if sanctions against Iran are lifted, 

“Iran will try even harder to redesign the region.”73 In 

the view of such officials, the money that will accrue 

to Iran with the lifting of sanctions will embolden Tehran to pursue a more assertive foreign policy in the 

area. Hence, the Saudis may be even less inclined to 

show restraint in the proxy wars it is now engaged in 

with Iran. Although Obama, at a Camp David summit 

meeting with Arab Gulf leaders in May 2015, pledged 

additional military support to them because of their 

nervousness about a resurgent Iran, such offers of 

support are unlikely to eliminate their fears.74

When it comes to Iraq, the United States should 

continue to urge President Haider al-Abadi to make 

his government more inclusive, by bringing in more 

Sunnis, but there are limits to what the United States 

can do. The long-repressed Shia of Iraq, who make up 

almost 60 percent of the population, are unlikely to 

give back any real power to the Sunnis. Abadi, while 

more urbane than his predecessor, Nouri al-Maliki, 

comes from the same Dawa party, which is a Shia Islamist party that was ruthlessly repressed under Saddam Hussein. Abadi and his supporters, along with 

other Shia factions, will remain wary of the Sunnis 

no matter what the United States does or does not 

do. Until the Iraqi army is able to become an effective 

fighting force—and that is a large unknown—Abadi 

will continue to rely on Shia militias (and Iranian support) for his government’s defense. Therefore, over the 

short term, the United States will be seen in the region 

as supporting a Shia government in Baghdad, but this 

perception has been in place since 2003 and is not new. 
42

What the United States can do is work with the Saudis 

to try to entice some Iraqi Sunni tribes to break from 

ISIL. Even if the prospect of giving such tribes (or their 

representatives) a share of national power is unrealistic, perhaps they can be given broad autonomy and an 

equitable share of national wealth from oil revenues, 

to address at least some of their concerns about living 

under a Shia-dominated regime. 

As for Syria, what the United States can do to assuage Sunni Muslim concerns is to step up its vetting 

process of Syrian rebels and assure the Sunnis that the 

rebels are being trained not just to fight against ISIL, 

but also against the Assad regime. Such messaging 

may dispel some conspiratorial beliefs among Sunni 

Muslims that the United States is secretly cooperating 

with Iran in Syria to keep the Assad regime in place.

In the aftermath of the nuclear deal, the United 

States should take advantage of the new goodwill 

with Iran to discuss a number of regional issues that 

could, perhaps, dampen the Sunni-Shia conflicts in 

the wider area. Obama hinted at this approach at a 

news conference in July 2015, saying that Iran is one of 

several countries that should be brought into discussions to solve the Syrian crisis.75 Although the Saudis 

may see an Iranian role as disadvantaging their own 

role and interests in Syria, they may come to realize 

that fighting proxy wars indefinitely is not in their 

long-term interest, given that Iran and the Shia populations of the region are not going away. At the same 

time, it is also not in Iran’s long-term interest to fight 

proxy wars endlessly, as they are a potential drain on 

resources and limits Iran’s influence only to the Shia 

of the Arab world.

Hence, while the United States should avoid being 

seen as an anti-Shia power, it should also avoid, as 
43

much as it can, the perception that it will soon become 

an anti-Sunni power if bilateral U.S.-Iranian relations 

improve. Instead, the United States should use its new 

influence with Iran, albeit still limited, and its longstanding relations with Sunni countries like Saudi 

Arabia to try to mitigate Sunni-Shia conflicts in the region, as such conflicts are a major source of instability 

in the region today.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARMY 

Within these two Arab groupings, there are opportunities and challenges—as well as subjects to avoid 

—for the U.S. Army. Concerning the anti-Islamist alliance, particularly the alliance against violent Islamist 

groups like ISIL, states in this alliance have a strong 

need for effective counterterrorism assistance, because 

ISIL has established branches in a number of these 

countries. U.S. Army Special Forces, as was the case 

in Yemen prior to the U.S. evacuation in 2015, are best 

equipped to play this role not only in training these 

regimes’ own special forces, but in cooperating with 

them in counterterrorism operations if asked. Groups 

like ISIL and al-Qaeda are a threat not only to the 

Middle East but to other parts of the world, including 

Europe and the United States. Thus, the U.S. Army, 

in training indigenous forces, would help protect not 

only U.S. allies but the U.S. homeland as well.

Because of political sensitivities, it may make more 

sense to train friendly Arab states’ counterterrorism 

forces in third countries or in the United States, away 

from the spotlight of their own populations. Whole 

units could be transported for an extended training 

period and then brought back to their home countries 

for operations. In addition, special courses should be 
44

established at professional military educational institutions for army officers from these countries on counterterrorism techniques and the lessons learned from 

U.S. counterterrorism operations in Iraq. Such courses 

should also have a strong human rights component 

in order to impress upon these Arab military officers 

the dangers of alienating civilians in counterterrorism operations. Without the cooperation of civilians 

in areas of counterterrorist activity, it is very difficult 

for governments to obtain the real-time intelligence 

necessary to capture terrorists in their tracks.

In addition, U.S. Army officers should hold discussions with their counterparts in Arab coalition states 

about the actual needs of their national armies. Often, 

for reasons of prestige, many Arab armies want expensive military hardware to try to intimidate their 

neighbors or to build up their militaries for a potential 

conventional war. But the trends over the past decade 

indicate that the greatest threats facing these Arab 

states are terrorist insurgencies. Therefore, convincing their armies to rely more on military items suited 

for counterterrorism operations, as opposed to “bigticket” hardware items that are ill-suited for present 

needs, should be a high U.S. priority. U.S. Army officers, because of military-to-military relationships—

would be best positioned to carry out these discussions in a frank, respectful, and fruitful way.

In July 2015, the United States formally declared 

Tunisia to be a non-NATO ally. In practice, this means 

that Tunisia will be eligible for major U.S. defense 

systems and equipment,76 providing opportunities 

for U.S. Army personnel to train Tunisian army counterparts, particularly in counterterrorism operations. 

Given the terrorist threat in Tunisia—including killings at two major tourist sites between March and 
45

June 2015 that left a total of 60 dead, Tunisia needs 

as much help as possible to counter this threat, which 

has the potential to derail its democratic progress. 

At the same time, U.S. Army officers should avoid 

being drawn into discussions with their counterparts 

in the anti-Islamist alliance about groups like the Muslim Brotherhood or En-Nahda. As mentioned earlier, 

the United States has not accepted Egypt’s designation 

of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, 

and is supportive of the UN process that is trying to 

bring Libyan factions—including the Libyan Muslim 

Brotherhood—together in the form of a national unity 

government. While En-Nahda remains a junior member of the governing coalition in Tunisia, some secularists (probably including some military officers) in 

that country remain deeply suspicious of it. Although 

U.S. Army officers might hear an earful of complaints 

from their Egyptian and Tunisian counterparts about 

the “dangers” posed by such Islamist groups, it would 

be best to avoid this subject. When discussions about 

Islamist organizations come up, U.S. Army officers 

should try to steer the discussion to the more immediate and dangerous threats posed by ISIL affiiates like 

the “Sinai Province,” which continues to stage terrorist operations in that area and in other parts of Egypt.

Similarly, in terms of the anti-Shia alliance, U.S. 

Army officers should stay clear of discussions by Arab 

Sunni officers about the Shia. First, derogatory terms 

are sometimes used to describe the Shia (and vice versa for Shia officers describing Sunnis), and it would 

be unseemly and unethical for U.S. Army officers to 

participate in such discussions. After all, U.S. Army 

officers would not want anyone to malign their own 

religious beliefs. Second, participating in such discussions would also imply that the United States is tak-
46

ing sides in a sectarian conflict, which it should avoid. 

Third, as a practical matter, the United States has close 

military ties to Shia-dominated armies as in Iraq, and 

Sunni-dominated armies as in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, 

and Egypt. So, logically, it would not make sense to 

engage in such diatribes.

There are more legitimate ways U.S. Army officers 

can reassure their Sunni Arab counterparts of the anxiety many of them feel about Iran and the proxy wars 

that are part of this Shia-Sunni divide. These anxieties 

have risen in the wake of the Iran nuclear deal of July 

2015 because of the perception held by many Arab 

Gulf countries that an economically stronger Iran will 

be even more inclined to pursue mischief in the region. 

U.S. Army officers can reinforce, to their host nation 

army counterparts, the messages and pledges from 

U.S. policymakers that the United States will continue 

to remain their friend and support them militarily 

against outside threats. To reinforce these assurances, 

joint military exercises between U.S. Army officers 

and their Sunni Arab military counterparts should 

continue, and even be enhanced, to allay Sunni fears.

ENDNOTES

1. Noah Browning, “Gulf Arabs eye Obama overtures with 

suspicion in wake of Iran talks,” Reuters, April 10, 2015.

2. Malcom Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 1958-1967, London, UK: 

Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 1.

3. L. Carl Brown, ed., Diplomacy in the Middle East: International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers, New York: I. B. Tauris, 

Ltd., 2004, p. 117.

4. Malcolm Kerr, pp. 28-34.
47

5. Jesse Ferris, “Egypt’s Vietnam,” Foreign Policy, April 3, 

2015, available from foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/03/egypts-vietnamyemen-nasser-sisi/.

6. For an insightful analysis of this period, see William 

B. Quandt, Decade of Decisions, Washington, DC: Brookings 

Institution, 1977.

7. Gregory L. Aftandilian, Egypt’s Bid for Arab Leadership: Implications for U.S. Policy, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 

1993, pp. 28-31.

8. Report to the Committee on International Relations, House 

of Representatives, “Security Assistance: State and DOD Need to 

Assess How the Foreign Military Financing Program for Egypt 

Achieves U.S. Foreign Policy and Security Goals,” Washington, 

DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, April 2006, p. 17.

9. Neil Quilliam, “Bashar al-Assad Has Squandered His Father’s Foreign Policy Gains,” Chatham House, March 10, 2015, 

available from www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/17115.

10. Gregory L. Aftandilian, “Looking Forward: An Integrated 

Strategy for Supporting Democracy and Human Rights in Egypt,” 

POMED, May 2009, pp. 6-9.

11. David Ottaway, “The U.S. and Saudi Arabia since the 

1930s,” Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, August 2009, available from www.fpri.org/articles/2009/08/us-andsaudi-arabia-1930s.

12. Hugh Tomlinson, “Saudis told Obama not to humiliate 

Mubarak,” The London Times, February 10, 2011, available from 

www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/middleeast/article2905628.ece.

13. Lucy Fisher, “Why is there Sunni Arab support for ISIS 

in Iraq?” New Statesman, August 15, 2014, available from www.

newstatesman.com/international-politics/2014/08/why-there-sunniarab-support-isis-iraq.
48

14. Simeon Kerr, “Fall of Mohamed Morsi is blow to Qatari leadership,” Financial Times, July 3, 2013, available from 

www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/af5d068a-e3ef-11e2-b35b-00144feabdc0.

html#axzz3gCWLDZ1i.

15. Nicolas Parasie and Jay Soloman, “Gulf States Pledge 

Aid to Egypt, U.S. Balks,” The Wall Street Journal, March 13, 2015, 

available from www.wsj.com/articles/gulf-states-pledge-additional12-billion-in-aid-to-egypt-1426262660.

16. Patrick Kingsley, Chris Stephen, and Dan Roberts, “UAE 

and Egypt behind bombing raids against Libyan militias, say US 

officials,” The Guardian, August 26, 2014, available from www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/26/united-arab-emirates-bombing-raidslibyan-militias.

17. Anne Wolf, “Can Secular Parties Lead the New Tunisia,” 

Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 

April 2014, pp. 10-13.

18. Bouazza Ben Bouazza and Lori Hinnant, “Tunisia imposes 

state of emergency week after deadly beach attack,” The Washington Post, July 4, 2015.

19. Ulf Laessing, “Libya’s oil to flow despite struggle between rival governments,” Reuters, October 23, 2014, available 

from www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/23/us-libya-oil-idUSKCN0IC

18520141023.

20. Karim Mezran, “Is the Skhirat Agreement Libya’s First 

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51

43. Richard Spencer, “Saudi leads ten-nation Sunni coalition 

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54

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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William E. Rapp

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Author

Mr. Gregory Aftandilian

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil