COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Humphreys and Clements Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia

JOSEPH GOODWIN, III MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 2006-04-1 J UDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR. JULY 12, 2005 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK Charles D. Griffith, Jr., Judge Fay F. Spence, Public Defender for the City of Newport News (Office of the Public Defend er, on brief), for appellant. Deana A. Malek, Assistant At torney General (Judith Williams Jagdmann, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
The trial judge convicted Joseph Goodwin, III, for carrying a c oncealed knife in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2. Good win contends the trial judge erred be cause the knife was not prohibited by the statute. We agree and reverse the conviction.
I. The basic facts are undisputed. A police officer went to a restaurant’s parking lot to assist paramedics who were treating a ma n bleeding from a head wound. The injured man told the officer he had been hit with a 2-by-4 board. A person who apparently witnessed the attack upon the injured man pointed to Joseph Go odwin, III, standing acros s the street. When the police officer approached Goodwin, he noticed bloodstains on Goodwin’s pants. As the officer talked to Goodwin and prepared to frisk him for weapons, he asked Goodwin if he had any sharp ob jects on his person.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - Goodwin said he had a knife in his pocket, which the officer retrieved. The officer learned that Goodwin was a convicted felon and arrested him for carrying a concealed weapon in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2. The officer described the knife as follows: It’s approximately a steak knife, approximately eight to ten inches long in length, approxima tely six-inch blade, wooden handle, non-serrated. * * * * * * * The dull side is straight al l the way to the po int it’s rounded, kind of convex direction. It’s sh arp all the way to the point. The tip appears to be a litt le bit broken off. He further described the blade as having “a pr etty sharp point” and identified it when the prosecutor offered it as an exhibit. At the conclusion of the ev idence, the trial judge examin ed the knife and convicted Goodwin of possessing a c oncealed weapon in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2.
II. Code § 18.2-308.2 provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for [a convicted felon] . . . to knowingly and intentionally carry about his person, hidden fr om common observation, any weapon described in subsection A of [Code] § 18.2-308.” Pertinent to this case, Code § 18.2-308 describes “any dirk, bowie knife, switchblade knife, ballistic knife, machete, razor, . . . or . . . any weapon of like kind of those enumer ated in this subsecti on.” Thus, although the statute designates specific types of knives a nd knives “of like kind,” it “does not prohibit generally the carrying of knive s hidden from common observa tion.” Ricks v. Commonwealth , 27 Va. App. 442, 444, 499 S.E.2d 575, 576 (1998). Interpreting Code § 18.2-308(A), the Supreme Cour t held that “a pocketknife is neither a dirk, bowie knife, switchblade knife , ballistic knife, nor a weapon of like kind.” Wood v. Henry- 3 - County Public Schools , 255 Va. 85, 94-95, 495 S.E.2d 255, 261 (1998). The Court reached this conclusion by applying the following prin ciples of statutory interpretation: “Under the rule of ejusdem generis , when a particular class of persons or things is enumerated in a statute and general words follow, the general words are to be restricted in their meaning to a sense analogous to the less general, particular words. Likewise, according to the maxim noscitur a sociis (associated words) when general and specific words are grouped, the general words are limited by the specific and will be construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those things identified by the specific words.” Id. (citations omitted). Interpreting the same stat ute, we have also held that “the physical characteristics of the knife determine whether the knife is a weapon contemplated by the statute.” Ricks , 27 Va. App. at 445, 499 S.E.2d at 576. The knife entered into the reco rd was measured against a rule r; it is ten inches long, and has a blade length of five and a half inches. The officer described the knife to be a steak knife. The prosecutor argued the knife “i s of a like kind weapon to a dirk.” The trial judge agreed with the Commonwealth and found that the knife has a “sharp end on the bottom edge, extremely sharp on the bottom end and extreme point that would certainly cut straight through flesh if propelled with any type of force.” This is not a description of physical characteristics that is sufficient to bring the knife within the statutor y definition of prohibited knives or of a “weapon of like kind of those enumer ated” in Code § 18.2-308(A). A “dirk” is defined as “a long straight-bladed dagger formerly carried [especially] by the Scottish Highlanders[,] 2. a short sword formerly worn by British junior naval officers.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary , 642 (1981). A “bowie knife” is defined as “a large hunting knife adapted [especially] for knife-fighting and common in west ern frontier regions and having a guarded handle and a strong singl e-edge blade typically 10 to 15 inches long with its b ack straight for most of its length and then curving concavely and sometimes in a sharpened edge to the point.” Id. at 262. A “switchblade knife” is defined as “a pocketknife having the blade spring- operated so that pressure on a release catch causes it to fly open.” Id. at 2314. A “ballistic knife”- 4 - is defined as “any knife with a de tachable blade that is propelled by a spring-operated mechanism.” Code § 18.2-308(N). Wood , 255 Va. at 95 n.6, 495 S.E.2d at 261 n.6. 1
In Ricks , we held that a knife that “has the appe arance and characterist ics of an ordinary household steak knife” does not satisfy the de finition of the knives prohibited by Code § 18.2-308.2. Ricks , 27 Va. App. at 445, 499 S.E.2d at 576. I ndeed, in view of the statutory description of the knives, we not ed in Richards v. Commonwealth , 18 Va. App. 242, 246 n.2, 443 S.E.2d 177, 179 n.2 (1994), that the legislature “intend[ed] to exclude . . . innocuous household . . . knives.” Our decision in Delcid v. Commonwealth , 32 Va. App. 14, 526 S.E.2d 273 (2000), does not require a different result. It did not invol ve a common kitchen steak knife, as did Ricks and this case. Instead, the Delcid decision concerned “a butterf ly knife,” which has a blade concealed within “a two part hi nged handle” that can be “flip[ped ] . . . open, leaving the blade exposed and locked, thus creating a straight-bla ded knife.” 32 Va. App. at 17, 526 S.E.2d at 274.

1 Consistent with this de finition, we earlier had defined the terms as follows: The terms “dirk” and “bowie knif e” are not defined by the statute, nor has any appellate decision in this Commonwealth clarified the difference. We assume that the two terms have their usual meaning. A “dirk” or weapon of like kind is any stabbing weapon having two sharp edges and a point, including daggers, short swords and stilettos. A “bowie knife” or weapon of like kind is any stabbing weapon having a single sharp edge, a dull or serrated flat edge and a point, such as a hunting knife, a fishing knife or a survivalist’s knife. It is generally agreed that in using such terms, legislatures intend to exclude fr om concealed weapons statutes innocuous household and industria l knives which may be carried for legitimate purposes. Richards v. Commonwealth , 18 Va. App. 242, 246 n.2, 443 S.E.2d 177, 179 n.2 (1994). Given its ordinary meaning, a dirk is a straight-bladed double-edged kni fe, historically designed as a military weapon. Goodwin carried a single-edged steak knife. It would strain the holdings of Wood and Ricks to define a steak knife as a dirk.- 5 - In addition, the circumstances su rrounding Goodwin’s possession of the knife, a factor that Delcid mentions, id. at 18, 526 S.E.2d at 275, does not support the conclusion that it was in fact intended as a weapon. The evidence proved the in jured man was hit with a 2-by-4 board, and it does not prove Goodwin used the knife in any manner. The knife that Goodwin possessed does not fa ll within the prohibite d class of knives. True, it has a sharp point, a sharp edge, and a st urdy blade. But so do many pocketknives, which Wood held to be excluded from the coverage of th is statute. A properly maintained knife is sharp and intrinsically is capable of being used for either cutt ing or stabbing. However, as explained in Ricks and Wood , simply because a knife is sharp does not mean it is included within the statutory class prescribed by Code § 18.2-308.2. For these reasons, we reverse the conviction. Reversed.