In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 17-1998

RODRIGO RAMOS-BRAGA,

Petitioner,

v.

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General 

of the United States,

Respondent.

____________________

Petition for Review of an Order of 

the Board of Immigration Appeals.

No. A 097-837-809

____________________

ARGUED JANUARY 24, 2018 — DECIDED MAY 21, 2018

____________________

Before BAUER, KANNE, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Rodrigo Ramos-Braga, a citizen of Brazil, petitions for review of the denial of his second motion to reopen 

proceedings on his applications for special-rule cancellation 

of removal, withholding of removal, and protection under the 

Convention Against Torture (CAT). His motion was both numerically barred and untimely filed with the Board of Immigration Appeals, but Ramos-Braga argued that these limits 
2 No. 17-1998

should be excused under the doctrine of equitable tolling for

ineffective assistance of counsel or under a statutory exception based on changed country conditions. The Board determined that neither exception applied and that the time and 

numerical limits therefore barred his motion. Because the 

Board did not abuse its discretion, we deny the petition.

I.

Ramos-Braga was raised in a neighborhood of São Paulo, 

Brazil that came to be controlled by a multi-national gang 

named the Primero Comando Capital (PCC). His father dealt 

drugs for the gang and was one of its managers, until he had 

a falling out with the gang’s leader. Starting when RamosBraga was 13, the PCC tried repeatedly to recruit him, but he 

refused to join. Unrelenting, PCC members caught RamosBraga at school and around town, physically attacked him at 

least ten times, and eventually threatened him with death. Initially, Ramos-Braga reported these attacks to Brazilian officials, but local police did nothing in response and eventually,

officers would beat him when he made reports, claiming that 

he was a suspected gang member. At age 16 he stopped reporting his PCC encounters to police because in one instance 

officers beat him until he spat blood, and he came to believe 

that the police were paid by the PCC to harm him. When Ramos-Braga was about 18 years old, PCC members offered him 

one “last chance” to join; after he refused they assaulted him 

with pipes—severely injuring him and hospitalizing him for 

two weeks. He stopped attending college and spent months 

moving between homes of his family members in other parts 

of the city and another town. When he returned to São Paulo, 

a PCC member shot him from behind, putting him back in the 

hospital for days. 
No. 17-1998 3

In January 1999, three months after being shot, RamosBraga was admitted to the United States on a student visa. He 

eventually married a U.S. citizen, but the two had a tumultuous relationship. Ramos-Braga estimated that his wife physically abused him over 100 times.

Seven years after he arrived, the Department of Homeland 

Security issued a Notice to Appear charging Ramos-Braga 

with overstaying his visa and therefore being removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B). Ramos-Braga conceded his removability and eventually sought special-rule cancellation of 

removal for battered spouses and withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) and CAT. 

While removal proceedings were pending, Ramos-Braga 

and his wife got into a fight. He was convicted of battery under Wisconsin law and, after he used a jailhouse phone to ask 

his wife not to testify, intimidation of a witness, WIS. STAT. 

§§ 940.19(1), 940.42. DHS added a charge that he was removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) for having been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude. He challenged removability on this ground.

At his removal hearing, Ramos-Braga testified about the 

beatings by PCC members and police officers. He also said 

that the gang recruited young men and that he believed he 

specifically was recruited because of something his father had 

done, but he did not know what. The IJ found Ramos-Braga 

credible but denied his applications for special-rule cancellation and withholding and ordered him removed to Brazil. 

To obtain special-rule cancellation, Ramos-Braga had to 

prove, among other things, that he had been battered by his 

wife and was not subject to certain disqualifying grounds of 
4 No. 17-1998

removability or inadmissibility. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2). The 

IJ concluded that Ramos-Braga was disqualified on two 

grounds: his convictions for battery and witness intimidation 

were crimes of moral turpitude, and he had been confined in 

excess of five years total for past convictions. See 8 U.S.C. 

§§ 1229b(b)(2)(A)(iv), 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 1182(a)(2)(B), 

1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).

Ramos-Braga could receive withholding of removal in two 

ways: either under statute or under CAT. To receive withholding of removal under statute, he had to prove that it was more 

likely than not that, if he were removed, he would be persecuted in Brazil on account of his membership in a particular 

social group. See id. § 1231(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b). The IJ 

concluded that Ramos-Braga suffered past persecution but 

presented “little proof” that this persecution was on account 

of his particular social group, namely his family ties to his father. Instead, “the greater weight of the evidence support[ed] 

the conclusion that he was persecuted because he refused the 

PCC’s recruitment efforts.” To merit withholding under CAT, 

Ramos-Braga had to demonstrate that it was more likely than 

not that, if removed to Brazil, he would be tortured by or with 

the acquiescence of a public official. See 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1208.16(c)(2). The IJ determined that he did not carry his 

burden to prove that he was more likely than not to be tortured by either the police or PCC. 

Ramos-Braga, who was represented by counsel, appealed 

the denial of his applications for withholding but not the denial of special-rule cancellation. The Board affirmed the IJ’s 

decision on December 18, 2014. 

In January 2015, Ramos-Braga petitioned this court for review and moved to stay his removal. His attorney ended the 
No. 17-1998 5

representation over a fee dispute, however, and Ramos-Braga 

continued pro se, filing motions in this court and, after his petition was denied, another petition for review that was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction for having been filed more than 

30 days after the final order of removal. 

Ramos-Braga, still pro se, moved the Board to reopen proceedings on his applications for relief from removal and to reconsider its dismissal order. The Board denied his motion as 

untimely in June 2015, but he maintains he never received notice of this decision. 

Ramos-Braga filed a second pro se motion to reopen or reconsider on August 31, 2015, and at issue here is the Board’s 

denial of that motion on the grounds that it was untimely and 

successive. Ramos-Braga explained that his motion to reopen 

was late because his former attorney had promised repeatedly 

to file a timely motion, but he never did. He also said that conditions in Brazil had gotten worse since the hearing, and he 

offered evidence to that effect. A year later, in August 2016, 

Ramos-Braga retained his present attorney, who filed a supplemental brief supporting the still-pending second motion to 

reopen. Through counsel, Ramos-Braga argued that his second motion to reopen should not have been barred because 

the exceptions for equitable tolling for ineffective assistance 

of counsel and changed conditions in the country of removal 

excused his noncompliance. Regarding the first exception, Ramos-Braga said that his attorney in the original appeal to the 

Board had waived meritorious arguments for special-rule 

cancellation and withholding under CAT. 

The Board denied the second motion to reopen based on 

its conclusion that Ramos-Braga did not meet either exception. Equitable tolling could not benefit him, the Board said, 
6 No. 17-1998

because he did not file his motion as soon as possible after 

learning of his former attorney’s alleged errors, nor was he 

prejudiced by any possible error. The Board also concluded 

that he did not offer evidence of conditions in Brazil that had 

changed since the removal hearing; his evidence of “ongoing” 

PCC threats were a “continuation” of past harms he experienced in Brazil. 

II

Noncitizens can file just one motion to reopen immigration proceedings, and that motion must be submitted within 

90 days of the final order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i). These time and numerical limits are, 

however, non-jurisdictional claim-processing rules, subject to 

the doctrine of equitable tolling and statutory exceptions. 

See Mata v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 2150, 2154 (2015); Ji Cheng Ni v. 

Holder, 715 F.3d 620, 623 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii)); Pervaiz v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 488, 490 

(7th Cir. 2005). 

The question here is narrow: we must decide only whether 

the Board wrongly concluded that neither equitable tolling 

nor changed conditions excuse the limits on Ramos-Braga’s 

second motion to reopen.1 This court reviews the Board’s denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion, and an 

 1 Ramos-Braga also argues that the Board wrongly denied his motion 

to reconsider the Board’s order dismissing his original appeal. The Board 

denied this motion also for being inexcusably untimely and numerically

barred, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(A), (B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2), without

considering whether the underlying dismissal order required reconsideration. We therefore have no merits decision to review on the issue of reconsideration. 
No. 17-1998 7

abuse occurs if the decision lacks a “rational explanation, inexplicably depart[s] from established policies, or rest[s] on [either] an impermissible basis,” Marinov v. Holder, 687 F.3d 365, 

368 (7th Cir. 2012), or legal error, Habib v. Lynch, 787 F.3d 826, 

831 (7th Cir. 2015). 

A. Equitable Tolling

Ramos-Braga contends that the Board wrongly refused to 

equitably toll the limits on his second motion to reopen his 

applications for special-rule cancellation and withholding of 

removal under CAT. Equitable tolling applies if the noncitizen 

demonstrates prejudice from counsel’s deficient performance

and exhibits diligence by seeking relief as soon as reasonably 

possible. See Yusev v. Sessions, 851 F.3d 763, 767 (7th Cir. 2017).

Even if we assume the Board erred in its analysis of diligence, Ramos-Braga has failed to show that he was prejudiced 

by his former attorney’s errors. Ramos-Braga argues that he 

was prejudiced by the attorney’s failures to appeal (1) the denial of his application for special-rule cancellation and (2) the 

IJ’s conclusion, in denying CAT relief, that the PCC was not 

likely to torture him with the government’s acquiescence 

upon his return to Brazil.

1. Special-Rule Cancellation

Ramos-Braga contends that his former attorney should 

have appealed the denial of special-rule cancellation and argued that he remained eligible for this relief because, contrary 

to the IJ’s conclusion, his battery conviction is not a crime involving moral turpitude. 

But Ramos-Braga overlooks the IJ’s other reason for concluding that he was ineligible for special-rule cancellation—

his confinement in excess of 5 years, see 8 U.S.C. 
8 No. 17-1998

§§ 1229b(b)(2)(A)(iv), 1182(a)(2)(B), on convictions for battery, 

witness intimidation, disorderly conduct, and multiple occasions of operating a vehicle while intoxicated. This was one 

reason the Board decided that Ramos-Braga was not prejudiced. The Board said this disqualifying ground could not be 

waived, and rested this conclusion on its statutory interpretation in Matter of Y-N-P-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 10, 17 (BIA 2012) (deciding that the only waiver applicable to special-rule cancellation is located in 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(5), which excuses certain domestic-violence convictions). Two other circuits have 

deferred to the Board’s interpretation. See Arevalo v. U.S. Att’y 

Gen., 872 F.3d 1184, 1190 (11th Cir. 2017); Garcia-Mendez v. 

Lynch, 788 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015). Ramos-Braga has 

not argued that the Board’s interpretation is unreasonable. 

Without such an argument, the petition fails to address the 

Board’s conclusion that Ramos-Braga is ineligible for specialrule cancellation, even if his battery conviction is not a crime 

involving moral turpitude.

Because Ramos-Braga would remain ineligible for specialrule cancellation even if his former attorney had raised the argument he presses now, the attorney’s omission of this argument could not have prejudiced his appeal. The Board reasonably concluded, therefore, that Ramos-Braga suffered no prejudice by his former attorney’s failure to appeal the denial of 

special-rule cancellation. 

2. Withholding under CAT

Ramos-Braga argues next that he was prejudiced in the appeal of his denied CAT application. He contends that his former attorney should have argued that the IJ failed to consider 

evidence that, if he is removed to Brazil, the PCC would torture him without intervention by public officials. In denying 
No. 17-1998 9

the second motion to reopen, the Board said this potential error could not have prejudiced Ramos-Braga because the evidence he offered, to the IJ originally and in support of reopening, could not establish that official torture or acquiescence 

was more likely than not. 

“CAT protection requires evidence that the Petitioner will 

be tortured by the government, or with the government’s acquiescence.” Lopez v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 484, 492 (7th Cir. 2016).

Acquiescence means “the public official, prior to the activity 

constituting torture, ha[d] awareness of such activity and 

thereafter breach[ed] his or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7); Lopez, 

810 F.3d at 493. We will reverse the Board’s conclusion that 

Ramos-Braga’s evidence is insufficient only if the evidence 

compels the conclusion that official acquiescence is more 

likely than not. See Orellana-Arias v. Sessions, 865 F.3d 476, 490 

(7th Cir. 2017).

Relying on our precedent in Rodriguez-Molinero v. Lynch,

808 F.3d 1134 (7th Cir. 2015), Ramos-Braga argues that there 

is a “substantial risk” that the Brazilian government will acquiesce to his torture by the PCC if he is removed to Brazil. 

But his evidence does not compel that conclusion.

Ramos-Braga relies heavily on the violence he experienced 

at the hands of the police and the PCC when he was a teenager. Yet the fact that Ramos-Braga was beaten by police 

roughly twenty years ago does not show that he is likely to be 

tortured by officials today. See Lopez, 810 F.3d at 493 (noting 

that man who stabbed petitioner twenty-five years earlier 

may no longer seek to harm petitioner). Moreover, RamosBraga has offered nothing more than his own speculation that 
10 No. 17-1998

the police acted at the PCC’s urging when they attacked him. 

See Lhanzom v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 833, 845 (7th Cir. 2005) (reversing IJ’s decision that rested on testimony for which witness had no personal knowledge). The evidence of his beatings by the PCC in the late 1990s is similarly stale. Even if the 

Brazilian government acquiesced to that violence, its conduct 

twenty years ago is not compelling evidence of how the government would respond to such violence today.

Ramos-Braga introduced more current evidence as well. 

His strongest evidence is an affidavit from his mother. In 

2016, his mother complained to police after PCC members, allegedly acting on a vendetta against Ramos-Braga, robbed his 

grandfather at home in 2015 and threatened his mother in 

2016. According to Ramos-Braga’s mother, PCC members

stated over the internet that they “will be waiting” for RamosBraga when he returns home. Officers in one district referred 

his mother to another district, which promised to investigate 

the 2016 threats, but the investigation has not been resolved. 

Ramos-Braga takes the referral of the complaint from one office to another and the lack of resolution as evidence that the 

police are unwilling to protect his family—and, ultimately, 

him—from the PCC.

The PCC’s threats to Ramos-Braga’s family do offer support for his contention that the PCC is likely to torture him if 

he returns to Brazil. But CAT offers protection from government torture, not private conduct. Thus, Ramos-Braga cannot 

secure relief simply by showing a substantial risk that the 

PCC will torture him; he must demonstrate that there is a substantial risk that Brazilian officials will acquiesce in the torture. This is where Ramos-Braga’s claim founders. 
No. 17-1998 11

The police department’s response to the complaint lodged 

by Ramos-Braga’s mother falls far short of establishing that 

the police are indifferent to or complicit in the PCC’s threats 

to Ramos-Braga’s family. For one thing, the police promised 

to investigate—they neither ignored nor denied his mother’s 

request for help. Ramos-Braga contends that the police gave 

his mother the run-around, but the evidence does not support

that inference. Referring a complaint from one district to another is more consistent with bureaucracy than animosity, 

and the fact that the investigation is not yet resolved does not 

mean that the police are turning a blind eye to the PCC.

Again, we will only disturb the Board’s determination if 

substantial evidence on the record compels a contrary conclusion. When reviewing a claim that the government acquiesced

to torture, we have required much more evidence of official 

complicity or corruption to satisfy that standard than RamosBraga has offered. For example, in Rodriguez-Molinero, we 

granted a petition for review because the petitioner demonstrated a substantial risk that the Mexican government would 

acquiesce to, or even collaborate in, his torture by a drug cartel. 808 F.3d at 1138–1140. This conclusion was based on the 

fact that the petitioner had been previously tortured by the 

police at the behest of the drug cartel, as well as unchallenged 

expert testimony that the Mexican government is rife with 

corruption and helpless to prevent gang violence throughout 

the country. Id. at 1136–37. In Wanjiru v. Holder, 705 F.3d 258 

(7th Cir. 2013), we remanded a CAT claim because the IJ 

brushed over “extensive evidence” that police and government officials abetted and directed a gang that posed a threat 

of torture to the petitioner. Id. at 266. Indeed, the International 

Criminal Court had “confirmed charges (a step similar to 

finding probable cause)” against two senior Kenyan officials 
12 No. 17-1998

for allegedly using the gang to murder thousands of citizens. 

Id. In Mendoza-Sanchez, 808 F.3d 1182 (7th Cir. 2015), we remanded (at the government’s request) and said that an applicant had a “strong” CAT claim because he had evidence that 

police officers in Mexico routinely collaborated with and protected a nationwide gang that had targeted him. Id. at 1184–

85. A human-rights report from the State Department detailed 

widespread corruption of Mexican police, who, at both the 

city and state level, were directly involved in the activities of 

drug organizations by “kidnapping, extort[ing], and providing protection for, or acting directly on behalf of, organized 

crime and drug traffickers.” Id. at 1184.

In each of these cases, the petitioner showed that the government is utterly indifferent or downright complicit in the 

face of violence and torture by gangs. Ramos-Braga argues 

that the PCC wields similar influence in the Brazilian government, but his evidence belies that argument. 

Ramos-Braga contends that the PCC has “infiltrated” the 

Brazilian police forces, and he offers a news article reporting 

that PCC members “may have participated” in explosives 

trainings for police officers in São Paulo. If gang members had 

infiltrated police forces, this would indeed be evidence that 

the government is unable to protect people targeted by the 

gang. See Mendoza-Sanchez, 808 F.3d at 1183, 1185. But the report Ramos-Braga offers falls well short of showing that PCC 

members are within the ranks of Brazilian police. According 

to the report, some of the explosives training courses were offered by private contractors who failed to perform background checks––possibly allowing PCC members to register 

for the course without the knowledge of the São Paulo police 

department. Evidence of a poorly planned explosives training 
No. 17-1998 13

does not demonstrate that the Brazilian police have been infiltrated by the PCC.

In fact, Ramos-Braga’s own evidence undermines his argument that officials and the PCC cooperate. The article about 

explosive trainings discloses that in 2012 the PCC frequently 

attacked police forces, and that the two sides committed 

around 200 “revenge killings” within a couple months. A 2014 

article from a Brazilian newspaper shows that Brazilian officials initiated a new operation against the PCC and detained 

members attempting to smuggle drugs out of the country. 

Other reports he offered show that police have arrested dozens of PCC members and that Brazilian authorities are in a 

“bloody struggle” to subvert the PCC. Ramos-Braga did offer 

a report from the Australian government showing that some 

Brazilian officials were corrupt as of 2012; police officers were

arrested for selling information to the PCC about investigations of the gang’s drug trafficking, while other officers extracted bribes from the PCC through kidnapping and abusing 

the family of PCC members. However, the report does not

show, as Ramos-Braga asserts, that corrupt police physically 

harmed citizens to assist the PCC.

Finally, Ramos-Braga presents news articles and a country 

report issued in 2013 by the U.S. Department of State that, 

taken together, show that police officers in Brazil “routinely”

kill criminal suspects, targeting men from the “slums.” These 

reports do not suggest police complicity with the PCC; Ramos-Braga introduces them to show that the police may target 

him because he is from the slums, and police in his hometown 

may attack him for resembling his father, a criminal. But reports that police officers target men from the slums generally
14 No. 17-1998

is not evidence that they would torture Ramos-Braga specifically. See Orellana-Arias, 865 F.3d at 490 (concluding that country reports of government’s acquiescence to violence against 

citizens was not evidence that government would acquiesce 

to torture of petitioner specifically); Lopez, 810 F.3d at 493 (deciding that petitioner, a gay man, did not show threat of violence specific to him by submitting reports that gay men have 

been victims of violence); Rashiah v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 1126, 

1133 (7th Cir. 2004) (concluding that CAT relief was unavailable to applicant who offered country report describing instances of torture but no evidence that he would be specifically targeted). Twenty years ago police officers knew RamosBraga lived in the slums and suspected he was a criminal, but 

there is no evidence that these officers remain with the force 

or that they would recognize him today. 

In sum, Ramos-Braga’s past experiences are troubling, but 

his evidence does not compel the conclusion that Brazilian officials today would torture him or permit the PCC to do so. 

Thus we will not disturb the Board’s conclusion that RamosBraga offered insufficient evidence of official acquiescence.

And because Ramos-Braga’s evidence is insufficient, he was 

not prejudiced by any possible attorney error in the appeal of 

his CAT application. The Board therefore did not abuse its discretion in deciding that equitable tolling did not apply to Ramos-Braga’s second motion to reopen.

B. Changed Conditions

Ramos-Braga also contends that changed conditions in 

Brazil warrant reopening his applications for withholding of 
No. 17-1998 15

removal. 2 No time or numeric limits apply to a motion to reopen that is based on “changed circumstances arising ... in 

the country to which deportation has been ordered.” 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). For this exception to apply, Ramos-Braga 

needs evidence of a changed country condition that is “material and was not available and could not have been discovered 

or presented” at the removal hearing. See id.; Ji Cheng Ni, 

715 F.3d at 623. This court’s task is to determine whether the 

Board abused its discretion in deciding that changed country 

conditions do not excuse the limits on Ramos-Braga’s motion 

to reopen. See Kebe v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 855, 857 (7th Cir. 

2007). We conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion. 

To show that conditions in Brazil have changed, RamosBraga offered evidence that: (1) the PCC has “marked” him to 

die because the gang’s leader believes his brother and two 

cousins were killed by Ramos-Braga’s father in 1997; (2) the 

PCC has “barbarically murdered” eight of Ramos-Braga’s 

cousins, most recently in 2013; (3) the PCC has offered a reward for Ramos-Braga’s whereabouts; (4) after the PCC 

learned that Ramos-Braga might return to Brazil, they robbed 

his grandfather at home using a gun in 2015 and threatened 

his mother over the internet in 2016; (5) one police district referred his mother’s request to investigate the 2016 threats, and 

the other district promised to investigate the threats, but the 

investigation has not been resolved; and (6) Brazilian police 

 2 Ramos-Braga also incorporates into his withholding arguments his 

view that changed conditions in Brazil warrant reopening proceedings so 

that he can apply for asylum. But the Board never had an opportunity to 

consider arguments related to asylum because Ramos-Braga did not develop them in his motion to reopen at issue here. We therefore express no 

opinion on this portion of his petition.
16 No. 17-1998

have routinely committed extrajudicial killings of men from 

the slums whom they suspect to be criminals. 

1. Withholding under CAT 

Pertaining to his CAT application, Ramos-Braga argues 

that the PCC’s recent growth and threats are a changed condition that the Board “irrationally” discounted as a “continuation” of dangers that he previously experienced in Brazil. He 

relies on an out-of-circuit decision, Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 

942 (9th Cir. 2004), in which the Ninth Circuit said “changed 

circumstances will almost always relate to [an] initial claim 

.... The critical question is ... whether circumstances have 

changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not 

have a legitimate claim ... now has a well-founded” claim. Id. 

at 945. A worsening PCC threat is, however, immaterial to

whether Ramos-Braga’s CAT application must be reopened. 

As discussed above, he needed but failed to offer evidence 

that compels finding that Brazilian officials would acquiesce 

to his torture by the PCC.

Ramos-Braga also argues that the Board ignored new evidence that he would face torture directly from public officials

if he is removed to Brazil. He again points to the recent news 

articles reporting that Brazilian police have targeted men 

from the slums and criminal suspects for extrajudicial killings. He stresses that police in his hometown beat him, possibly suspecting he was a criminal because he lived in the 

slums. He says that his evidence, together, establishes a substantial likelihood that police officers will torture him. The 

Board, while considering Ramos-Braga’s argument for equitable tolling, said that the evidence he offered—initially and 

with his second motion to reopen—did not show that officials 

were more likely than not to torture him. 
No. 17-1998 17

We will reverse the Board’s conclusion that RamosBraga’s evidence is insufficient only if the evidence compels a 

contrary conclusion. See Lopez, 810 F.3d at 492–93. As explained above, the articles Ramos-Braga recently offered do 

not compel the conclusion that public officials are more likely 

than not to torture him. We have said that reports that officials 

have tortured members of a certain group do not necessarily 

demonstrate that a petitioner who belongs to that group 

would face a substantial risk of torture if removed. Bernard v. 

Sessions, 881 F.3d 1042, 1047–48 (7th Cir. 2018). To show a risk

specific to him, Ramos-Braga needed evidence that Brazilian 

police would recognize him as part of the groups targeted for 

torture. See Lopez, 810 F.3d at 493; Rashiah, 388 F.3d at 1133. 

Yet he offered no evidence that Brazilian police today would

suspect him of crime or would know, roughly twenty years 

later, that he lived in the slums in 1998. To the extent he fears 

police torture because he would be forced to live in the slums 

if removed to Brazil, this fear of generalized violence is insufficient to establish that he in particular is more likely than not 

to be tortured. See Lozano-Zuniga v. Lynch, 832 F.3d 822, 830–

31 (7th Cir. 2016).

Because Ramos-Braga did not present evidence that conditions in Brazil have changed such that he now may have a 

CAT claim, the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying 

his motion to reopen proceedings on that form of relief.

2. Withholding under Statute

Ramos-Braga next argues that changed conditions in Brazil excuse the limits on his motion to reopen his application 

for withholding under statute, but again he is wrong. He first 

points to new evidence that the PCC’s intent to kill him stems 

from the gang leader’s desire to avenge the murders of his 
18 No. 17-1998

family members. But this motive has not changed since the 

killings of the gang leader’s family in 1997, well before the 

2014 removal hearing, and thus the motivation, though recently discovered, is not a changed condition. 

Second, Ramos-Braga argues that the PCC’s offer of a reward for his whereabouts is a changed condition, but he has 

not carried his evidentiary burden. To show that the reward 

offer is a changed condition, Ramos-Braga needed evidence 

that the offer was made after the removal hearing. See Xiu 

Zhen Lin v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 596, 596–97 (7th Cir. 2008). In his 

petition he sidesteps his burden and contends the Board speculated that the reward offer might date back to 1998. But that

is not what the Board said; it observed that the gang’s intent 

to harm him dated that far back and said that no evidence, 

including an affidavit from his mother’s neighbor who reported the reward offer, showed the offer was made after the 

removal hearing. Instead of clarifying when the reward was 

offered, Ramos-Braga says that the offer could not be from 

1998 because the neighbor learned of it through her 19-yearold son, a current PCC member who would have been an infant then. But this reasoning is flawed; the offer may have 

been old when the neighbor’s son learned of it. As difficult as 

it might have been for Ramos-Braga to gather evidence while 

detained, he has never represented that he exhaustively investigated when this offer was made.

Last, Ramos-Braga disputes the Board’s conclusion that 

recent dangers posed by the PCC are a continuation of conditions that existed before the removal hearing. Although worsening conditions in the country of removal may constitute a 

change that requires reopening, see id.; Ji Cheng Ni, 715 F.3d 

at 627; Mekhael v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 326, 327 (7th Cir. 2007), 
No. 17-1998 19

the PCC’s recent threats, robbery, and murders are immaterial to whether Ramos-Braga’s application for withholding

under statute should be reopened. The IJ denied this application not for lack of evidence of past persecution, but because

Ramos-Braga did not establish a nexus between his likely persecution by the PCC and his particular social group. Thus to 

present evidence that conditions have degenerated so that he 

now has a claim for withholding under statute, Ramos-Braga 

needed to show a change related to this nexus between the 

PCC’s persecution and his social group based on ties to his 

father. He did present newly found evidence of the PCC’s motive for harming him, but again, that motive has not changed 

since 1997.

In sum, Ramos-Braga failed to offer new, material evidence that conditions in Brazil have changed since the removal hearing. 

III

The Board did not abuse its discretion by denying RamosBraga’s second motion to reopen as numerically barred and 

untimely. Ramos-Braga neither experienced prejudice from 

his former attorney’s potential errors nor presented new, material evidence that conditions in Brazil have changed since 

the removal hearing. Accordingly, the petition for review is 

DENIED.