2003 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit
5-30-2003 

# Ro wa n v . C omm S o c i al S ec ur it y P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : N on-P r e c e de n t i al D ocke t 02-3507

F o l lo w thi s a nd a dd it ion al w ork s at : h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2003

Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o you for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit at V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. It h as be e n a c c e pt e d for inclusion in 2003 D e c i sion s b y a n author i z e d a dmini s tr at or of V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. F or mor e infor m at ion, p le as e c on t a ct Be n j a min . C a rl s on@l a

w . v i l l a no va . e du . Re c omme nde d C it at ion
" Ro w a n v . C omm S oc i al S e c ur it y " (2003). 2003 D e cisio n s . P ape r 519. h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a

w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2003/519NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT
No. 02-3507
BRANDON L. ROWAN, Appellant

v. JO ANNE B. BARNHART, COMM ISSI ONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY App eal from th e Un ited States District Co urt for the We stern D istrict of P enns ylvania (D.C. Civi l No. 01-cv- 01680) Distri ct Judge: Honorable Gary L. Lancaste r
Submitte d Under Third Circ uit LAR 34.1(a)

May 13, 2003 Be for e: R EN DE LL , SM ITH and AL DI SE RT , Circu it Judges
.

(Fil ed: May 30, 2003 )
OPINI ON OF THE COURT
RE ND EL L, Circuit

Judge
. Thi s c as e i nvo lv es a c la im fo r s upp le men ta l s ec ur it y in co me ( SSI ) u nde r T itle XVI of the Soci al Securi ty Act. Brandon L. Rowan, t he Appellant , petiti oned the Dist rict Court to overturn the denial of her applicat ion for SSI. Upon consideration of cross-2

motions for

summary j udgment, the District Court granted t

he motion of t

he Commissioner of t

he Social Security Adminis tration ("Commissi oner"). Rowan now appeals. The Distri ct Court ha d juri sdiction under 42 U.S. C. 405(g) ( 2002). We have ju ri sdi ct io n un der

28 U. S. C. § 129 1 ( 200 2) . We wil l a ffi rm. We r ev ie w de novo the Dist rict Court' s order, but willrevers e the gra nt of
summ ary judgmen t to the Com missioner on ly if we conclud e that the A LJ's findings w ere not supported by “s ubstantial e vidence. ” Pod edw orny v. H arris , 745 F.2d 210, 217 ( 3d Cir.1984); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evi dence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonabl e mind might ac cept as a dequate. ” Ve ntura v . Shala la , 55 F.3d 900, 901 ( 3d Cir.1995) (quoti ng Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401 ( 1971)). It i s “les s than a preponderanc e of the evi dence but more t han a mere sci ntil la. ” Jesu rum v. Secretary of the Unite d States Dep't of Heal th & Human Servs ., 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir.199 5). In determi ning whether s ubstantial e vidence exi sts, “we are not permitt ed to weigh the evid enc e or sub stitute our ow n co nclu sion s fo r tha t of th e fa ct-f ind er,” th e A LJ. Burns v. Barnh art , 312 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2002) (ci ting Willi ams v. Sull ivan , 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3 d Cir.199 2)). In ord er to qu alify for S SI, a p erson mu st be “d isabled ” und er the S ocial S ecurity Act and the acc ompanying regulations. Under Titl e XVI, the Act defi nes disabili ty as “the in ability to eng age in any sub stantial g ainfu l activity by reaso n of any me dically determi nable phy sicalor mental impairment which can be expect ed to res ult i n death or3

which has las ted or ca n be expected to last for a continuous period of not l ess than 12 months.” 42 U.S. C. § 1382c(a)( 3)(A) (2002) . In determining whether a cl aimant qua lifies for SS I, the So cial S ecu rity Ad min istrati on a ppl ies a five -step test. 2 0 C .F.R . § 416 .920 ( 200 2). A t step on e, the cla iman t mus t show that he is not cu rrently eng aging in “su bsta ntial gain ful a ctivi ty,” 20 C.F .R. § 416 .920 (b), a s de fine d in the r egu latio ns. See 20 C. F. R. § 220 .1 41 ( 200 2) . At st ep two, th e cl ai mant mus t s how that

he s uff er s f ro m a “severe impairment.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(C). If the claimant fail s to make the pr oper showing at ei ther s teps one or two, he wil l be deni ed benefit s. At step three , a cl aimant may attem pt to de mo nstrate th at his dis ability mee ts or eq uals an impa irmen t listed in Ap pen dix 1 to Su bpa rt P o f Pa rt 40 4 (“ Lis ting of I mp airm ents ”). 2 0 C .F.R . § 41 6.92 0(d ). If the impa irment me ets or equals a listed im pairmen t (hereafter referred to as “Listing”), the cl aimant i s conside red dis abled and the e valu ation pro ces s en ds. Plummer v. Apfel , 186 F.3d 422, 428 ( 3d Cir.1999) . If, however, the clai mant's impairment s do not sat isfy step thr ee, the p roces s con tinues to step fo ur. A t step fo ur, the c laima nt mu st dem onstra te that he does not have s uffici ent res idual f unctiona l capaci ty to perform his past releva nt
wo rk. 20 C.F .R. § 4 16.92 0(e). R esidu al functi onal capaci ty is “what [he ] can stilldo despit e his l imit ations .” 20 C.F. R. § 416.945(a ). I f the cl aimant fai ls t o make the
necessary showing at st ep four, he will be de nied benefi ts. If he satisfi es ste p four, t he inq uiry m ove s to s tep f ive. At step fi ve, the burden shi fts t o the Commissione r to show that the clai mant can perform “other w ork.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f). “Other work” mu st4

consist of jobs that exi st i n signi ficant numbers in t

he nati onal economy that t he clai mant can perform gi ven his age, educati on, past work experienc e, and re sidualfuncti onal cap acity. Plummer , 186 F.3 d at 4 28. See g enera lly Burns , 312 F.3d at 118-19. At t

he fou rth a nd f ifth s teps , the A LJ o ften see ks a dvi sory te stim ony f rom a vo catio nal e xpe rt. Id. Ro wa n claim ed elig ibility for SS I due to me ntal he alth pro blem s. Af ter his cla im
wa s den ied, he appe aled to an A dm inistrative Law Judg e (A LJ). A t the time of h is hearing be fore the ALJ, Rowan w as 19. At t he heari ng, the ALJ heard testimony fr om Ro wa n, R ow an’ s m oth er, an d a v oca tion al ex per t, Dr . W illiam Re ed. The ALJ d eni ed Rowan ’s appe al . At st ep on e of t

he ev al uation pro ces s, the ALJ foun d th atRowan was notenga ged i n sub st antia l ga inf ul a ct ivi ty . At

st ep t wo, t

he ALJ fou nd th at Ro wa n had the fo llow ing se vere im pairm ents: fe tal alcoh ol syndro me, p osttraumatic stress disorde r, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, type II bipolar disorder, de ve lo pme nt al re ce pt iv e l an gua ge di so rd er , and d ev el opm en ta l c oordi na ti on d is or de r. At step t hree of the evaluation proces s, the ALJ also found that Rowan did not meet or equal any of t he mental hea lth l istings. Specifi call y, the ALJ found that , “[w]hil e the di agnoses of bi pol ardi so rd er , t

y pe II , A DHD, PTS D, an d f et al al co holsy ndr ome sa ti sf y th e “ A” criteria fo r Listing s 12.0 4 (reg arding affe ctive d isorde rs) and 12.06 (regar ding anxie ty related disord ers),” R ow an did not m eet the “B” Criteria for eith er listing. M ovin g on to step four , the ALJ found that Rowan had no exerti onal li mitations, but did have5

“signi ficant

non-exertional l imit ations stemming from menta l impai rments. ” As such, the ALJ determined t

hat Rowan’s res idual f

unctiona l capaci ty allowed Rowan to perform the full- range of phy sicalwork, but he must “avoid work requiring anysustai ned concentr ation or

detai led work, . . . a void multi-t asking . . . , [and] must work i n a low stre ss, s table environment , not c onducive t o change with no exce ssive production deman ds, no j udgme nt requi reme nts , a nd no d eci si on mak ing .” At step fi ve, the ALJ adopted the vocati onal expert’s de termination t hat Rowan could work as a hand packe r (medium and li ght work), and a vehicl e washer and equi pment cleane r (medium and l ight work), and a non- construction l aborer ( light work). The VE testifie d that ove r 1.2 mil lion of th ese job s ex isted natio nally. On appeal, Rowan makes thre e arguments. We will addres s them in t urn. Fi rst, he argues that “the findi ngs by t he ALJ that [he] is not

under a psy chiatric di sabil ity are not supporte d by subs tanti al evi dence.” We assume that bythis argument Rowan means that substantialevidence does not support the ALJ’s finding that Rowa n’s severe impairments, consider ed indivi dually or as a whole, did not meet or equal a ny of t

he Listi ngs for mental health impairment s, and, as a res ult, the ALJ should have f ound Rowan disabled at step thre e of the e valu ation pro ces s. Rowa n fai ls to di re ct

us to war d a ny Li stin g i n s upp or t o f h is ar gum en t; th us , w e will l ook at the two Listi ngs conside red by the ALJ: List ings 12. 04 and 12.06. Listi ng 12.04 is entitled “Affecti ve Disorder s.” 20 CFR Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12. 04. The6

impairment s that

qualif y as “affecti ve disor ders” ar e “[c]har acterized bya dist urbance of mood, accompanied bya full or partial mani c or depres sive syndrome. Mood refers to a prolonged emotion that colors the whole psy chic l ife; it gene rall y i nvolves ei ther depressi on or elat

ion.” To meet Listi ng 12.04, Rowan must show that he suffers from an “affective d isorder” that me ets “[t]he required level of seve rity for these disorders [which] is met when the requi rements i n both A and B are satisfi ed, or when the requir ements in C ar e sati sfied. ” Id. Listi ng 12.06 is entitled “anxi etyrelated disor ders. ” 20 CFR Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12. 06. “In thes e disor ders anxi etyis ei ther t he predominant

disturbance or i t is experie nced if the indivi dual attempts to master sympt oms; for exampl e, confr onting t he dreaded obj ect or s ituat ion in a phobi c disor der or resi sti ng the obses sions or compulsions in obsess ive compulsi ve disor ders. ” Id. To meet L isting 12.06, Ro wan must sho w that he suffers fro m an “ anxiety related disorder” that meet s “[t] he required levelof severi ty for thes e disor ders [which] is met when the requireme nts in both A and B are satisfied, or wh en the requ irements in bo th A an d C are sati sfied. ” For both l istings, the ALJ determined that Rowan suffered from a dis order that
sa ti sf ie d part “A, ” bu t n otpart “ B.” Unde r b ot h Li stin gs, part “ B” ha s the s ame requir ements. The ALJ did not addres s part “C” of eithe r Listing and Rowan does not argue on appealthat he sati sfies part “C. ” As a resul t, whether the ALJ erred depends on whe ther substantial eviden ce supp orts the AL J’s finding that R owa n does n ot satisfy part “B .”7

Part “B” re quires that t

he affecti ve disor der or anxi etyrelated disor der that sati sfies part “A” re sult s “in at least two of the fol lowing:” 1. Marked rest

riction of activities of dai ly livi ng; or 2. Marked diffi culti es in maint aining s ocial functi oning; or 3. Marked diffi culti es in maint aining c oncentration, persi stence, or pace; or 4. Repe ated episod es of dec omp ensation, each of extend ed duration [.] 20 C FR Pt. 4 04, S ubp t. P, A pp. 1 , §§ 1 2.04 , 12.0 6. In h er writte n dec is ion , the ALJ articulated her findin gs as to each prong o f part “B” in some d etail; it i s only necessary for our purposes, however, to recit e her ult imate conclusions. As for the fi rst pr ong, the ALJ determined t

hat Rowan’s “degre e of li mitation” was “sl ight. ” As for the s econd prong, t he ALJ determined t

hat Rowan’s “degre e of li mitation” was “moderat e.” As for th e thi rd pr ong , t

he ALJ de te rmi ne d tha t R owa n’ s “ de gr ee of li mi tati on” was “o ft en .” As for the four

th prong, the ALJ determined that Rowan’s “degree of l imit ation” was “never. ” The ALJ also determined that “no treating phy sici an has menti oned findi ngs equi val ent

in s everity to th e crit eri a of a ny li st ed i mpai rmen t. ” Addi ti onal ly , the ALJ conclud ed that, taking into ac count the se verity of all of Row an’s severe a nd non -severe impairment s, no evi dence in the record “ cause[s] limi tati on of a severi ty equal t o that descri bed by any

lis ted impai rment. ” Rowa n a rg ue s tha t t

he ALJ fa il ed to co ns id erhi s p ro bl ems in th ei r t ot al it y . H e contends that, if t

he ALJ h ad, she wouldhave foun d th athe qu al ifi ed fo r SSI . The ALJ noted that there was evidence i n the rec ord that , at the ti me of the heari ng, Rowan worked
as a v olun teer w ith the f ire dep artme nt on ce a w eek, w orke d at “L ow e’s” p art-time wh ile8

atte nding school , took martialarts class es weekly , went camping, hiking, and swimming, assis ted around t

he home, and was capabl e of taki ng care of hi s own hygie ne and groo ming . The AL J also n oted th at there wa s evid ence that R ow an go t along we ll with others , especi ally

his t eachers a nd people i n their twentie s and thi rti es, had bee n assess ed to hav e mo derate diffic ulty in socia l and o ccup ationa l func tioning , pays atten tion in school, and did his homework. On the other hand, there was evide nce that Rowan needed supervi sion when carryi ng out ins tructions, includi ng when doing his chor es around t he home and when shopping, coul d not maint ain a re sidence i ndependentl y, had great diffi culty in allfacets of socialfuncti oning, e special ly with people his own age, had im pa ire d c on ce nt ra tio n, h ad di ff icu lty o rg an izi ng tas ks , “a cte d u p,” ac ted un pr ed ict ab ly, sometimes r an away from home, was pl aced in spe cial educati on class es at s chool, was often “on edge, ” and someti mes acted vi olentl y. Further , Mrs. Rowan testifie d that he r
son wa s inc apa ble o f w ork ing
. Clearl y, there i s evidence supporti ng both a fi nding that Rowan is not dis abled and a find ing tha t he is dis abled . In line w ith our s tanda rd of review , how ever, w e are o nly concerned with whether the re was subst antia l evide nce supporting the ALJ’s finding t hat Rowan w as not di sabled at step t hree in t he evaluation proces s. We find that the re was “such rel evant evi dence as a r easonable mind might acc ept as ade quate” suppor ting t he AL J’s d eterm inati on, Ven tura , 55 F.3d at 901 ( citation omi tted) , and, theref ore, fi nd that sub stan tial ev iden ce s upp orte d th e de term inati on.9

Row an’s second argument on appe al is that “the ALJ’s findings that [his] testimony r egarding hi s impairments is not entirelycredibl e is not supporte d by substant ial e vidence. ” The ALJ concluded that “to the extent

that [ Rowan] alleges being total ly preclude d from work-rel ated activities, these s ubjective complai nts re garding t he
seve rity of limitatio ns ca used by the cla iman t’s imp airme nts are cons idered not fu lly credib le.” Th ere is n o req uirem ent tha t the A LJ d efer to Ro wa n’s testim ony as to his abili ty to work, as long as t he ALJ makes clear t

hat she gave Rowan’ subjecti ve views of his l imit ations “seri ous conside rati on,” M ason v. Sh alala , 994 F.2d 1058, 1067 ( 3d Cir .199 3), a nd m ade spe cific find ing s of fac t as to his c red ibility. Burns , 312 F.3d at 129 (3d Cir. 2002). Here, the ALJ sati sfied t hese requi rements and, as evident from the evidence i n the rec ord noted above , subst antia l evide nce support s the fi nding that Rowan
was no t t ota ll y d is abl ed. Moreov er, we di sag ree with Rowan’ s co nte nti on that the ALJ ignored Mrs. Rowan’s testimony r egarding he r son’s impairment s. The ALJ’s re ferences M rs. Ro wa n’s testim ony in v arious parts o f the d ecision and c learly took it into
con side ratio n. Third and fi nally , Rowan argues that “the ALJ’s findi ngs that [he] posse sses t

he resi dual functional c apacity t o perform work at a ny exertionallevel is not supporte d by subs tantial ev idenc e.” A s note d abo ve, the AL J fou nd th at Ro wa n cou ld perf orm the fu ll range of exertionallevel s, but that he must “avoid work requiri ng any s ustai ned concentr ation or

detai led work, . . . a void multi-t asking . . . , [and] must work i n a low10

stre ss, s table environment , not c onducive t o change with no exce ssive production dema nds, no jud gmen t requiremen ts, and no de cision mak ing.” Row an, how ever, provides no evidence t

hat he i s incapabl e of performi ng the ful l-r ange of exertional acti viti es. Moreover, he does not eve n chall enge the ALJ’s fi ndings as to his nonexerti onal li mitations. Basical ly , Rowan argues that his mental heal th probl ems prevent him from performing any s ubstantial ga inful a ctivi ty and that the ALJ ignored t

he evide nce s upp orting th is argu men t. We reject this conte ntion. A s we noted , there is substant ial e vidence i n the rec ord to suppor t the ALJ’s conclusi on that Rowan can per for m th e fu ll ran ge o f ex ertio nal w ork
. Ac cor din gly, w e w ill aff irm t he o rde r of the D istrict Co urt.

_________________________11

TO THE CLERK OF COU RT: Please fi le the foregoing not precedential opi nion.

/s/ M arjorie O . Ren dell Circuit Judge