# Official Journal C 365/23 S

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 365 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 6523 September 2022 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 365

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 6523 September 2022

---

| Contents | page |
| --- | --- |
| | I   Resolutions, recommendations and opinions |
| | RESOLUTIONS |
| | European Economic and Social Committee |
| | 570th plenary session of the European Economic and Social Committee – Interactio, 15.6.2022–16.6.2022 |
| 2022/C 365/01 | Resolution of the European Economic and Social Committee on Ukraine from relief to reconstruction proposals by European civil society | 1 |
| | OPINIONS |
| | European Economic and Social Committee |
| | 570th plenary session of the European Economic and Social Committee – Interactio, 15.6.2022–16.6.2022 |
| 2022/C 365/02 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on The European Furniture Industry — Its recovery towards an innovative, green and circular economy (own-initiative opinion) | 7 |

Contents

page

I   Resolutions, recommendations and opinions

RESOLUTIONS

European Economic and Social Committee

570th plenary session of the European Economic and Social Committee – Interactio, 15.6.2022–16.6.2022

2022/C 365/01

Resolution of the European Economic and Social Committee on Ukraine from relief to reconstruction proposals by European civil society

1

OPINIONS

European Economic and Social Committee

570th plenary session of the European Economic and Social Committee – Interactio, 15.6.2022–16.6.2022

2022/C 365/02

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on The European Furniture Industry — Its recovery towards an innovative, green and circular economy (own-initiative opinion)

7

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| | III   Preparatory acts |
| --- | --- |
| | European Economic and Social Committee |
| | 570th plenary session of the European Economic and Social Committee – Interactio, 15.6.2022–16.6.2022 |
| 2022/C 365/03 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on (a) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — Establishing a European Declaration on Digital rights and principles for the Digital Decade(COM(2022) 27 final) and on (b) Digital rights and principles (exploratory opinion) | 13 |
| 2022/C 365/04 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on harmonised rules on fair access to and use of data (Data Act)(COM(2022) 68 final — 2022/0047 (COD)) | 18 |
| 2022/C 365/05 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on A Chips Act for Europe(COM(2022) 45 final) | 23 |
| 2022/C 365/06 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem (Chips Act)(COM(2022) 46 final — 2022/0032 (COD)) | 34 |
| 2022/C 365/07 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe, as regards the Chips Joint Undertaking(COM(2022) 47 final — 2022/0033 (NLE)) | 40 |
| 2022/C 365/08 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on fluorinated greenhouse gases, amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 517/2014(COM(2022) 150 final — 2022/0099 (COD)) | 44 |
| 2022/C 365/09 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on substances that deplete the ozone layer and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1005/2009(COM(2022) 151 final — 2022/0100 (COD)) | 50 |
| 2022/C 365/10 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2107 laying down management, conservation and control measures applicable in the Convention area of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) and Regulation (EU) .../2022 establishing a multiannual management plan for bluefin tuna in the eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean(COM(2022) 171 final — 2022/0111(COD)) | 55 |
| 2022/C 365/11 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013 as regards a specific measure to provide exceptional temporary support under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) in response to the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine(COM(2022) 242 final — 2022/0166 (COD)) | 57 |
| 2022/C 365/12 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — Responding to state-sponsored instrumentalisation of migrants at the EU external border(JOIN(2021) 32 final) | 60 |
| 2022/C 365/13 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down rules for the exercise of the Union’s rights in the implementation and enforcement of the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the other part(COM(2022) 89 final — 2022/0068 (COD)) | 66 |

III   Preparatory acts

European Economic and Social Committee

570th plenary session of the European Economic and Social Committee – Interactio, 15.6.2022–16.6.2022

2022/C 365/03

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on (a) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — Establishing a European Declaration on Digital rights and principles for the Digital Decade(COM(2022) 27 final) and on (b) Digital rights and principles (exploratory opinion)

(COM(2022) 27 final)

13

2022/C 365/04

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on harmonised rules on fair access to and use of data (Data Act)(COM(2022) 68 final — 2022/0047 (COD))

(COM(2022) 68 final — 2022/0047 (COD))

18

2022/C 365/05

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on A Chips Act for Europe(COM(2022) 45 final)

(COM(2022) 45 final)

23

2022/C 365/06

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem (Chips Act)(COM(2022) 46 final — 2022/0032 (COD))

(COM(2022) 46 final — 2022/0032 (COD))

34

2022/C 365/07

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe, as regards the Chips Joint Undertaking(COM(2022) 47 final — 2022/0033 (NLE))

(COM(2022) 47 final — 2022/0033 (NLE))

40

2022/C 365/08

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on fluorinated greenhouse gases, amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 517/2014(COM(2022) 150 final — 2022/0099 (COD))

(COM(2022) 150 final — 2022/0099 (COD))

44

2022/C 365/09

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on substances that deplete the ozone layer and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1005/2009(COM(2022) 151 final — 2022/0100 (COD))

(COM(2022) 151 final — 2022/0100 (COD))

50

2022/C 365/10

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2107 laying down management, conservation and control measures applicable in the Convention area of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) and Regulation (EU) .../2022 establishing a multiannual management plan for bluefin tuna in the eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean(COM(2022) 171 final — 2022/0111(COD))

(COM(2022) 171 final — 2022/0111(COD))

55

2022/C 365/11

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013 as regards a specific measure to provide exceptional temporary support under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) in response to the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine(COM(2022) 242 final — 2022/0166 (COD))

(COM(2022) 242 final — 2022/0166 (COD))

57

2022/C 365/12

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — Responding to state-sponsored instrumentalisation of migrants at the EU external border(JOIN(2021) 32 final)

(JOIN(2021) 32 final)

60

2022/C 365/13

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down rules for the exercise of the Union’s rights in the implementation and enforcement of the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the other part(COM(2022) 89 final — 2022/0068 (COD))

(COM(2022) 89 final — 2022/0068 (COD))

66

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| EN | |
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EN

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I Resolutions, recommendations and opinions

RESOLUTIONS

European Economic and Social Committee

570th plenary session of the European Economic and Social Committee – Interactio, 15.6.2022–16.6.2022

| 23.9.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 365/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.9.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 365/1

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Resolution of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Ukraine from relief to reconstruction proposals by European civil society’

(2022/C 365/01)

| Legal basis | Rule 52(4) of the Rules of Procedure |
| --- | --- |
| Adopted at plenary | 16.6.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 570 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 206/2/2 |

Legal basis

Rule 52(4) of the Rules of Procedure

Adopted at plenary

16.6.2022

Plenary session No

570

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

206/2/2

| Key messages







  1. | EU Candidate status for Ukraine. The EESC calls on the European Council to grant Ukraine EU Membership candidate status at its meeting on 23-24 June 2022. Ukraine's candidate status must be granted without detriment to the ongoing accession process of the Western Balkans. The EESC is in favour of putting in place a system of gradual integration steps based on the fulfilment of the acquis communautaire. |
| --- | --- |

Key messages

1.

EU Candidate status for Ukraine. The EESC calls on the European Council to grant Ukraine EU Membership candidate status at its meeting on 23-24 June 2022. Ukraine's candidate status must be granted without detriment to the ongoing accession process of the Western Balkans. The EESC is in favour of putting in place a system of gradual integration steps based on the fulfilment of the acquis communautaire.

| 2. | European civil society stands in solidarity with Ukraine and the Ukrainian people. Civil society has reacted promptly and efficiently triggering a unique grassroots mobilisation of citizens. Humanitarian assistance has to be scaled up and should be disbursed directly supporting civil society organisations (CSOs). Specialised NGOs, together with CSOs should be genuinely involved in the programming and monitoring of EU and national humanitarian assistance. |
| --- | --- |

2.

European civil society stands in solidarity with Ukraine and the Ukrainian people. Civil society has reacted promptly and efficiently triggering a unique grassroots mobilisation of citizens. Humanitarian assistance has to be scaled up and should be disbursed directly supporting civil society organisations (CSOs). Specialised NGOs, together with CSOs should be genuinely involved in the programming and monitoring of EU and national humanitarian assistance.

| 3. | Giving refugees a perspective. The Committee calls for refugees to be granted the same rights as EU citizens when it comes to healthcare and access to the labour market (recognition of qualifications, access to the services of employment agencies, language courses, health and education systems), both of which are key to avoiding escalating poverty among the refugees. The social partners can through collective bargaining and ad hoc measures help integrate workers and prevent them from becoming subject to exploitation and social dumping. The Committee lays particular emphasis on the role of CSOs in the protection and re-integration of often forgotten vulnerable groups: unaccompanied minors, separated children and children from institutional care settings, persons with disabilities, Roma minorities and victims of sexual violence. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Giving refugees a perspective. The Committee calls for refugees to be granted the same rights as EU citizens when it comes to healthcare and access to the labour market (recognition of qualifications, access to the services of employment agencies, language courses, health and education systems), both of which are key to avoiding escalating poverty among the refugees. The social partners can through collective bargaining and ad hoc measures help integrate workers and prevent them from becoming subject to exploitation and social dumping. The Committee lays particular emphasis on the role of CSOs in the protection and re-integration of often forgotten vulnerable groups: unaccompanied minors, separated children and children from institutional care settings, persons with disabilities, Roma minorities and victims of sexual violence.

| 4. | Reconstruction. Immediate European and international financial assistance is needed to prevent the Ukrainian economy from total destruction. Financial support must be provided to support SMEs, Ukrainian farmers for the next harvest and Ukrainian civil society, including employers’ organisations and trade unions, with a view to keeping them fully operational in times of war. The reconstruction efforts must be driven by innovation. Civil society organisations need to be closely involved to make sure that rule of law reforms, the fight against corruption and the green and digital transitions can be achieved. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Reconstruction. Immediate European and international financial assistance is needed to prevent the Ukrainian economy from total destruction. Financial support must be provided to support SMEs, Ukrainian farmers for the next harvest and Ukrainian civil society, including employers’ organisations and trade unions, with a view to keeping them fully operational in times of war. The reconstruction efforts must be driven by innovation. Civil society organisations need to be closely involved to make sure that rule of law reforms, the fight against corruption and the green and digital transitions can be achieved.

| 5. | The economic outfall. The war should not undermine implementation of the green transition policies in the EU. The Committee calls on Member States and EU institutions to take the necessary measures to curb excessive commodity speculation, enhance market transparency and temporarily remove all obstacles to agricultural goods' imports in order to alleviate the food price crisis. It warns that neither the NextGenerationEU fund, its Recovery and Resilience Fund component, nor the flexibility under the current 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework are sufficient to fully cover the financial needs generated by the war in Ukraine. |
| --- | --- |

5.

The economic outfall. The war should not undermine implementation of the green transition policies in the EU. The Committee calls on Member States and EU institutions to take the necessary measures to curb excessive commodity speculation, enhance market transparency and temporarily remove all obstacles to agricultural goods' imports in order to alleviate the food price crisis. It warns that neither the NextGenerationEU fund, its Recovery and Resilience Fund component, nor the flexibility under the current 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework are sufficient to fully cover the financial needs generated by the war in Ukraine.

| 6. | The role of Civil Society. The EESC's long history and bond with Ukrainian CSOs plays an important role in keeping the channels open and enabling participation in the EU integration process. The Committee calls on the Member States to significantly step up capacity building, organisational and financial support for Ukrainian CSOs. It encourages partnerships between EU and Ukrainian youth organisations and proposes an event focusing on youth activism and its role in the future reconstruction of Ukraine. The EESC itself commits to strengthen cooperation and exchanges with Ukrainian CSOs and to continue advocating for maintaining EU solidarity and generosity vis-à-vis Ukraine. To that end, the EESC will be holding an event with Ukrainian civil society and EU civil society on 19 July in Krakow.
  At the same time, the EESC underlines that the remaining independent CSOs in Russia must not be abandoned. |
| --- | --- |

6.

The role of Civil Society. The EESC's long history and bond with Ukrainian CSOs plays an important role in keeping the channels open and enabling participation in the EU integration process. The Committee calls on the Member States to significantly step up capacity building, organisational and financial support for Ukrainian CSOs. It encourages partnerships between EU and Ukrainian youth organisations and proposes an event focusing on youth activism and its role in the future reconstruction of Ukraine. The EESC itself commits to strengthen cooperation and exchanges with Ukrainian CSOs and to continue advocating for maintaining EU solidarity and generosity vis-à-vis Ukraine. To that end, the EESC will be holding an event with Ukrainian civil society and EU civil society on 19 July in Krakow.

At the same time, the EESC underlines that the remaining independent CSOs in Russia must not be abandoned.

THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE (EESC),

| 1. | stands in solidarity with the Ukrainian people and reiterates its firm condemnation of the unjustified and unprovoked aggression against Ukraine launched by the Russian Federation under the leadership of President, Vladimir Putin, and draws attention to its previous resolution on the war in Ukraine and its economic, social and environmental impact (1) adopted on 24 March 2022; |
| --- | --- |

1.

| 2. | stresses that this tragic war on European soil, which has now been going on for almost four months, has claimed a very high death toll, including civilians, and has caused massive destruction and suffering; it has increased global poverty levels and has resulted in incalculable social, economic and environmental damage and an unprecedented wave of refugees and displaced people. Calls for respect for international humanitarian law and for the proper recording, investigation and prosecution of war crimes that are being committed in Ukrainian cities and villages by the invaders; |
| --- | --- |

2.

| 3. | calls for an immediate ceasefire by all sides, reiterates the ultimate primacy of diplomacy and stresses that the search for a peace-keeping approach and negotiation should be a priority at all levels of the political debate, while demanding the complete withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine; urges the EU to continue its assistance to Ukraine and its people, as provided since the very first day of the war; calls for detailed monitoring of the economic, social and environmental impacts of the sanctions following Russia's military aggression; |
| --- | --- |

3.

| 4. | notes that the war on the EU's eastern border goes against the history, philosophy and identity of the EU; stresses that the consequences of the war pose a threat to the EU’s values, to the freedom and rights of EU citizens and other inhabitants and to the European model of the social market economy; highlights that peace and prosperity are founding pillars of the European Union (EU) and that civil society organisations (CSOs) have played a key role over the past decades in actively promoting, contributing to and maintaining a culture of peace on the European continent; |
| --- | --- |

4.

| 5. | emphasises that the Russian Federation and its current representatives must be suspended from international bodies and organisations, starting with those aimed at maintaining peace, protecting human rights, and ensuring sustainable development and a safe environment; |
| --- | --- |

5.

On the humanitarian situation

| 6. | notes that more than 6,8 million people (2) have fled from Ukraine since Russia started the war, making this the fastest growing refugee crisis since World War II; adds that eight million people have been displaced internally within Ukraine (3) and that around a third of the population of Ukraine have thus been forced to flee their homes; |
| --- | --- |

6.

| 7. | recognises that European countries, namely Poland, Romania, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Moldova (4), have been heavily impacted by the influx of Ukrainian refugees and that these countries and especially their CSOs, have reacted promptly and efficiently, triggering an unprecedented voluntary grassroot mobilisation of citizens; |
| --- | --- |

7.

| 8. | stresses that the EU funds for humanitarian assistance must be scaled up and should be disbursed, in particular, at regional and local levels, directly supporting and involving CSOs that are active in the socio-economic integration of refugees; |
| --- | --- |

8.

| 9. | urges the Member States, the EU's regions and civil society organisations to make the most effective and rapid use possible of the options for supporting Ukrainian refugees created by the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Cohesion's Action for Refugees in Europe (CARE), proposed by the European Commission on 8 March 2022, in conjunction with the revision of the REACT-EU Regulation proposed by the Commission on 23 March 2022; stresses that this support should primarily be distributed by civil society organisations, including specialised NGOs and that civil society organisations should also be directly involved in the organising and monitoring of EU and national humanitarian assistance; |
| --- | --- |

9.

| 10. | recommends repurposing savings generated in the 2014-2020 multiannual financial framework and in the REACT EU instrument, while respecting the rule of law, so that they can be quickly and flexibly redirected to support refugees, and encourages setting up a separate fund for this purpose in case the funds currently available are insufficient for the reception and social and labour market integration of refugees, including for care services, housing, food, material aid, training programmes and public employment services; |
| --- | --- |

10.

| 11. | highlights that in the European response to the COVID-19 crisis, European citizens felt that the EU was protecting them and opening up prospects, notably through the creation of the SURE programme and NextGenerationEU (NGEU); underlines that neither the NGEU fund, its Recovery and Resilience Fund component, nor the flexibility under the current 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF) are sufficient to fully cover the financial needs generated by the war in Ukraine; notes that in terms of scale, these instruments were not designed to meet the new challenges stemming from the Russian aggression and invasion and simultaneously maintain investments in the EU’s programmes and policies, including important priorities such as the just, green and digital transitions; |
| --- | --- |

11.

| 12. | underlines that better mapping and coordination among all stakeholders involved in humanitarian and medical assistance is urgently needed to ensure that help reaches all those suffering from war quickly and efficiently; |
| --- | --- |

12.

| 13. | stresses that monitoring measures and activities must be carried out in various areas such as respect for human rights and documenting war crimes and welcomes the establishment by the European Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom of the Atrocity Crimes Advisory Group (ACA); |
| --- | --- |

13.

| 14. | stresses that access to the public healthcare system should be provided to refugees from Ukraine on the same basis as to EU citizens, as well as essential sexual and reproductive health assistance, emergency contraception and abortion and obstetric care for victims of rape; |
| --- | --- |

14.

| 15. | calls on the Commission and the Member States to pay particular attention to the situation of unaccompanied minors, separated children and children from institutional care settings from Ukraine, to ensure that their immediate needs are met, that they are properly identified and tracked and that data is shared between Member States with the aim of reuniting them with their families or later re-integrating them into Ukrainian society, while guaranteeing their protection from abuse or trafficking; |
| --- | --- |

15.

| 16. | highlights the appalling situation of persons with disabilities who are attempting to leave the war zones in Ukraine, or who are facing considerable challenges as refugees in host countries; insists that all refugees should be treated equally, irrespective of their ethnic background, nationality, or disabilities; for the latter, they should receive full assistance with establishing independent lives and should not be forced into institutions in host countries; |
| --- | --- |

16.

| 17. | stresses that participation in the labour market has a pivotal role in integration and in reducing levels of poverty; warns that refugees coming from Ukraine are at risk of becoming the least protected, of receiving the lowest pay, of working below their qualifications and of being the most vulnerable groups in the labour market, without social protection or the freedom of association and workers’ rights; in this regard, stresses the need to adequately address cases of unequal working conditions and ensure that workers enjoy the same rights as EU citizens and that they are not subject to exploitation and social dumping; calls for designing medium and long-term strategies for those Ukrainians who wish to stay in their host country, in order to fully integrate them into EU labour markets; |
| --- | --- |

17.

| 18. | underlines the critical role the social partners can play through collective bargaining and ad hoc measures and agreements to facilitate the integration of workers coming from Ukraine into the EU labour market; points out that employment agencies should support refugees with their full range of services, including counselling, preparation of applicant profiles, placement activities and offering support tools and calls on Member States to establish or support services matching refugees with potential employers; |
| --- | --- |

18.

| 19. | stresses that an essential prerequisite for the integration of refugees from Ukraine into the labour market of the host countries and the avoidance of precarious employment conditions is the recognition of qualifications, and insists on establishing efficient rules and guidelines for a swift but high-quality recognition of qualifications, access to language courses and access to education and vocational training for youth fleeing Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

19.

| 20. | stresses that all necessary steps must be taken to ensure that adults and children seeking refuge in the EU can continue their educational path and underlines that special attention must be paid at school level not only to overcoming linguistic barriers, but also to treating trauma symptoms, which could have long-term negative consequences; |
| --- | --- |

20.

| 21. | stresses that refugees from Ukraine must be granted the same access to social security systems and to social services as EU citizens; |
| --- | --- |

21.

On Ukraine’s reconstruction and EU perspective

| 22. | welcomes the establishment of an international ‘Ukraine reconstruction platform’, as provided for in the Commission's communication on ‘Ukraine Relief and Reconstruction’ and the leading role taken by the EU in mobilising international assistance to Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

22.

| 23. | calls on the European Union to provide emergency funding for SMEs in Ukraine, which should go first towards preserving these SMEs and then helping them to grow. The prevention of the total destruction of the economy in Ukraine must be another key goal of the EU’s efforts in Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

23.

| 24. | emphasises that the reconstruction of Ukraine that will take place after the war is a one-off situation that should lead to the development of a stronger civil society, and of a new economy, based on the latest green and digital technologies, and also driven by innovation; |
| --- | --- |

24.

| 25. | insists, however, that the emphasis placed on rule of law reforms, the fight against corruption and green and digital transition cannot be achieved without the genuine involvement of civil society and calls for CSOs to be closely involved in reconstruction efforts, including planning and implementing the ‘Rebuild Ukraine’ mechanism, since they are best placed to express the needs of Ukrainian citizens and to assist with follow-up on the reconstruction efforts and alignment with EU legislation; |
| --- | --- |

25.

| 26. | highlights that the conflict and its consequences should not undermine the green transition policies in the EU but rather accelerate their implementation; |
| --- | --- |

26.

| 27. | urges the Council and Parliament to consider using gas storage facilities in neighbouring third countries, which will bring added value in terms of providing security of supply, especially in Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

27.

| 28. | draws attention to the global food-price crisis exacerbated by the Ukrainian war and calls on Member States and EU institutions to take the necessary steps to curb excessive commodity speculation and to enhance market transparency; |
| --- | --- |

28.

| 29. | stresses that measures must be taken now to support Ukrainian farmers for the next harvest; furthermore, calls for the immediate temporary removal of all obstacles, both administrative and physical, to the movement of agricultural goods with a view to rapidly increasing the volume of imports to the internal EU market, and to other parts of the world such as Africa, in sectors where Ukraine can still export; calls for the urgent reopening of Ukrainian ports and for the area to be de-mined under the auspices of the UN to allow the export of agricultural produce such as corn, sunflower oil, sunflower seeds, soya beans and honey; |
| --- | --- |

29.

| 30. | calls on the European Council to grant Ukraine EU Membership candidate status at its meeting in June 2022; |
| --- | --- |

30.

| 31. | supports Ukraine's accession to the EU, based on merit and in line with agreed standards for accession to the EU; without detriment to the ongoing accession process of the Western Balkans (5), calls for cohesion policy and its financial instruments to be adapted accordingly in the coming years in order to meet the challenges of the country's post-war reconstruction; calls for a thorough analysis of the economic and social potential of integrating Ukraine into the Single Market; |
| --- | --- |

31.

| 32. | the EU, while maintaining standards for membership, can put in place gradual steps in the achievement of the acquis communautaire; underlines that, in the face of any military aggression, unity between EU Member States must remain a rule as regards enlargement policy; encourages exploring other ways for non-EU members to join Europe's economic, social and security architecture; points out, however, that such partnerships or associations should not be seen as an alternative to EU membership; |
| --- | --- |

32.

On support for civil society organisations

| 33. | highlights the role of the European Economic and Social Committee in liaising with Ukrainian CSOs and keeping channels with them open thanks to its long history of bilateral contacts between the EU and Ukrainian civil society; in this regard, underlines the achievements of well-established mechanisms, in particular the EU-Ukraine civil society platform and EU and Ukrainian domestic advisory groups, set up under the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement; calls on the EU to support the participation of Ukrainian CSOs in EU CSO networks; |
| --- | --- |

33.

| 34. | underlines the need to launch the capacity-building process for Ukrainian CSOs to enable their participation in the process of EU integration and to enable them to shape and monitor this process; |
| --- | --- |

34.

| 35. | stresses the need to enhance support for Ukrainian civil society, including employers’ organisations and trade unions, through dedicated EU funds, with a view to keeping them fully operational in times of war; warns against attempts to use the war to justify actions aimed at reducing the level of workers' rights protection and social protection, which will exacerbate the negative economic and social consequences of the war; |
| --- | --- |

35.

| 36. | highlights the role played by those European CSOs, that are active in seeking peace-keeping solutions and dealing with the various impacts of the Ukrainian crisis from the social, humanitarian, economic and political points of view; and stresses the importance of providing comprehensive support and assistance for them through EU-funded programmes specifically designed for this purpose; |
| --- | --- |

36.

| 37. | pays tribute to the contribution made by CSOs from EU Member States in providing support for Ukrainian refugees, which goes beyond the help provided by relevant public authorities and calls on the Member States to significantly step up their organisational and financial support for these organisations, including from EU funds; |
| --- | --- |

37.

| 38. | recommends including youth fleeing Ukraine in EU university exchange programmes and highlights the importance of mobilising Europe's young people, who support European values, and of strengthening their capacity; encourages partnerships between EU and Ukrainian National Youth Councils, as well as exchanges between EU and young people from Ukraine and youth organisations; cooperation could include organising an event focusing on youth activism and its role in the future reconstruction of Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

38.

| 39. | calls for support to food banks playing a crucial role in overcoming the challenges and obstacles of delivering food donations as food aid has become critical to supporting the emergency needs of the Ukrainian population and refugees from Ukraine; |
| --- | --- |

39.

| 40. | emphasises the need to continue international support for CSOs from Ukraine and other countries, which are fighting for environmental protection and acknowledges that the conflict will have serious environmental impact; |
| --- | --- |

40.

| 41. | underlines the need to enhance support for independent quality media and fact-checkers, including in the EU’s neighbourhood, as they are crucial in strengthening resilience against propaganda and disinformation; calls on the EU to implement a more forceful counter-propaganda campaign, particularly in third countries in Africa and Asia, in order to counteract the disinformation war; |
| --- | --- |

41.

| 42. | is deeply concerned about the situation of independent civil society in Russia, as well as of media and journalists providing alternative sources of information to Russian citizens in order to fight Russian propaganda; calls for EU support for those CSOs and individuals who want to continue their activities in Russia and for humanitarian visas for the civil society activists willing to leave the country; points out that a number of Russian organisations are helping Ukrainians displaced in Russia to reach the EU or the western parts of Ukraine and that these organisations need specific support to obtain visas for Ukrainian refugees willing to leave Russia; |
| --- | --- |

42.

| 43. | commits to strengthen cooperation and exchanges with Ukrainian CSOs, to continue advocating for maintaining EU solidarity and generosity vis-à-vis Ukraine and is ready to provide its expertise on consolidating social and civil dialogue to the EU and Ukrainian authorities. With that aim, the EESC will be holding an event with Ukrainian civil society and EU civil society on 19 July in Kraków. |
| --- | --- |

43.

Brussels, 16 June 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  OJ C 290, 29.7.2022, p. 1.

1

(2)  UNHCR — 31 May.

2

(3)  UNHCR — 23 May.

3

(4)  UNHCR — 31 May.

4

(5)  Resolution of the European Economic and Social Committee on the war in Ukraine and its economic, social and environmental impact (OJ C 290, 29.7.2022, p. 1).

5

---

OPINIONS

European Economic and Social Committee

570th plenary session of the European Economic and Social Committee – Interactio, 15.6.2022–16.6.2022

| 23.9.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 365/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.9.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 365/7

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘The European Furniture Industry — Its recovery towards an innovative, green and circular economy’

(own-initiative opinion)

(2022/C 365/02)

| Rapporteur: | Anastasis YIAPANIS |
| --- | --- |
| Co-rapporteur: | Rolf GEHRING |

Rapporteur:

Anastasis YIAPANIS

Co-rapporteur:

Rolf GEHRING

| Plenary Assembly decision | 21.10.2021 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Rule 52(2) of the Rules of Procedure |
| | Own-initiative opinion |
| Section responsible | Consultative Commission on Industrial Change (CCMI) |
| Adopted in section | 13.5.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 15.6.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 570 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 207/1/2 |

Plenary Assembly decision

21.10.2021

Legal basis

Rule 52(2) of the Rules of Procedure

Own-initiative opinion

Section responsible

Consultative Commission on Industrial Change (CCMI)

Adopted in section

13.5.2022

Adopted at plenary

15.6.2022

Plenary session No

570

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

207/1/2

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | Europe has a very dynamic furniture sector with high diversity in terms of company size and work processes and also design. The sector covers the whole life cycle and provides good opportunities to embrace sustainability and transition towards circular economic models. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | European companies have to comply with strict environmental, product, health and safety regulations, which naturally raise operational costs. International competition is distorted by the government subsidies offered to external competitors and unfair practices used to gain market access, especially by economic entities from Asia. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | The EESC would like to emphasise that the right balance between economic growth, sustainability and social wellbeing is the right target for the future of the EU furniture sector. The Committee considers that businesses need a coherent intellectual property legislative framework that protects their interests and is fit for the green and digital transition. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | The EESC strongly advocates for strict compliance of all imported furniture products with EU rules, including consumer information obligations. The EESC further calls for coherent EU legislation that imposes standardised label formats for all products. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | As the industry uses many raw materials, reliable and unhindered access to high-quality resources and solid value chains are critical for the sector. Furthermore, since the demand for wood, the main raw material for the furniture industry, is constantly increasing, the EESC deems it vital to expand and modernise forest infrastructure and its sustainability, and improve skills and technologies. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | The EESC considers that the wood produced in Europe is a very important asset which should be used to generate high value-added products. The Committee believes that exports of raw wood material do not make any sense in economic terms and calls for trade-defence instruments that protect local furniture producers. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

| 1.7. | Furthermore, the Committee calls on Member States to end subsidies and other incentives for burning wood for energy and to promote the cascaded-use principle. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

| 1.8. | The EESC wishes to call for a tariff reduction or elimination for imported primary and secondary wood raw materials. Furthermore, the Committee requests that policy makers ensure that the sustainability criteria in trade agreements is enforced and that imports include verification criteria regarding working conditions, freedom of association and fair treatment of workers. The EESC urges that human rights should be part of due diligence procedures, fully respecting the ILO conventions on human and workers' rights. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

| 1.9. | The furniture sector must be a part of the New European Bauhaus (1) initiative and contribute to creating sustainable and inclusive products for the new way of living, where sustainability harmonises with lifestyle. |
| --- | --- |

1.9.

| 1.10. | The social partners agreement on the reduction of formaldehyde in panel-production is an excellent example of how voluntary social partner agreements at European level can also help to reduce health hazards. Furthermore, the Committee calls for sustainable and fully recyclable packages and is advocating for a review of European Parliament and Council Directive 94/62/EC of 20 December 1994 on Packaging and Packaging Waste (2). |
| --- | --- |

1.10.

| 1.11. | The EESC considers that a quick transition from the linear flow of materials and energy towards a circular model is needed in order to allow value recovery from products and ensure economic growth and job creation. |
| --- | --- |

1.11.

| 1.12. | The Committee deems it essential that furniture producers design their products in such a way that allows value recovery and facilitates reuse, repair, refurbishing and recycling. An extended producer responsibility scheme in the furniture sector has the potential to increase reuse and recycling capacities in the Union. Furthermore, the Committee calls for a European legislative ban on furniture in landfills in order to increase the recovery and reuse of valuable materials. |
| --- | --- |

1.12.

| 1.13. | The sector needs a highly skilled workforce and more attractiveness for the younger generation. It must strive to continuously improve working conditions, while creating training options and focusing on motivating highly skilled and digital specialists to join the industry. |
| --- | --- |

1.13.

| 1.14. | The Committee calls on European legislators to actively support transnational initiatives that increase the quality of all forms of apprenticeship in the furniture sector. A more ambitious Erasmus for apprentices would help to better transfer the rich and diverse traditions and the innovative potential of producing furniture in Europe. |
| --- | --- |

1.14.

| 1.15. | Education programmes, life-long learning initiatives and vocational educational training must be developed by actively involving the social partners, educational institutions and other relevant NGOs. Preparing the labour force for the future challenges of the sector is essential. |
| --- | --- |

1.15.

| 1.16. | The EESC calls for investments in skills, design, creativity and value chain development, and for improved access to R&D&I funding programmes for furniture producers. SMEs must be provided with adequate resources to analyse their business development in a circular, innovative and sustainable way. |
| --- | --- |

1.16.

| 1.17. | The Committee believes that creating demand for second-hand furniture and support for non-profit actors engaged in the recycling or upcycling process of used furniture can impact positively on green transition targets. |
| --- | --- |

1.17.

| 1.18. | Finally, the EESC calls for the development of a European platform that includes companies, social partners, civil society organisations, research institutes, universities and other relevant stakeholders and promotes business development in the furniture. |
| --- | --- |

1.18.

2.   Introductory comments

| 2.1. | The New Industrial Strategy for Europe (3) is focussed on the irreversible and progressive transition to a sustainable economic system which leaves no one behind, embraces digitalisation and green developments, and builds partnerships between the industry, social partners, public authorities and relevant civil society organisations. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | Europe has a dynamic furniture sector with high diversity in terms of company size and work processes. It is generally a labour intensive one, with value chains that are still local or regional, strongly dominated by SMEs and micro-companies. It employs around 1 million workers and accounts for a quarter of the total world production of furniture (4). |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.3. | The sector covers the whole life cycle: raw material, processing, use, maintenance, reuse, recycling, biomass for energy. It provides therefore good opportunities to embrace sustainability and transition towards circular economic models. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | The COVID-19 pandemic has hit the furniture sector hard, especially cross-border value chains, severely affected by the large number of restrictions to the free movement of goods and people. This has shown the importance of an integrated and well-functioning single market. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

3.   Competitivity aspects

| 3.1. | Different national regulations, standards, certification schemes and labelling requirements constitute a barrier for EU producers and bring disproportionate costs for companies. Standardisation and EU-wide harmonised rules have the potential to minimise barriers and to bring certainty and a common understanding to all players on the market. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | The recent increase in energy prices in Europe negatively impacts the competitiveness of the sector and adds to the resource availability problem and increased prices for raw materials. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.3. | Besides the overall growing competition in the international market, companies from third countries sometimes use unfair practices to gain market access, especially economic entities from Asia, which are on certain occasions subsidised by their governments. Furthermore, European companies have to comply with stricter environmental, product, health and safety regulations, which naturally raise operational costs. Low environmental standards in third countries also disadvantage European furniture products made from genuine wood The EESC considers that these aspects distort the competitiveness of local companies when competing on global markets. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

| 3.4. | Regarding the internal market, the EESC strongly advocates for strict compliance of all imported furniture products with the EU rules, including consumer information obligations such as appropriate consumer labelling. The EESC further calls for coherent EU legislation that imposes a requirement that furniture products be accompanied by information in standardised label formats, e.g. country of provenience, materials used, clear indication of all product components, product safety, durability, instructions on use, cleaning and maintenance, product warranty etc. Increased market surveillance actions that assess the quality of imported furniture have to ensure consumer information and a level playing field for local EU producers. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

| 3.5. | The EESC welcomes the Commission initiative on electronic product passports as part of the upcoming Sustainable Products Initiative (5). These tools, if well designed and harmonised, have the potential to drive the circular economy forward by carrying information on products along value chains and, inter alia, by stimulating circular demand and providing the necessary information to consumers for making informed choices. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

| 3.6. | Producers from third countries are catching up technologically, so this EU competitive advantage is losing significance. Therefore, new business models are needed that combine competitiveness with sustainability and provide market access for the local producers. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

| 3.7. | The sector is also very sensitive to the protection of intellectual property rights, especially since quality, innovation and design still represent the EU's main competitive advantages. The Committee considers that businesses need a coherent legislative framework that would protect their interests and is fit for the green and digital transition. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

| 3.8. | The EESC would like to emphasise that the right balance between economic growth, sustainability and social wellbeing is the right target for the future of the EU furniture sector in particular, and economy in general. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

4.   Access to raw materials

| 4.1. | The furniture sector uses many raw materials in the production process (such as wood, cane, leather, metal, plastic, textiles, glass, foams etc.). Reliable and unhindered access to high-quality raw materials is critical for European producers and the EESC calls for strengthened value chains that would enable the industry to flourish. The EESC further calls for appropriate consumer labelling of non-wood materials entering the European market in order to protect the European furniture industry from cheap and often non-sustainable raw materials from third countries. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

| 4.2. | Wood is one of the most readily available and naturally renewable raw materials. Demand is constantly increasing, while the price for raw materials that comply with EU rules and standards is growing and creating additional pressure. In order to address the increased demand for wood in the internal market, it is vital to expand and modernise forest infrastructure and its sustainability, and improve the skills, technologies and logistics of wood harvesters. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

| 4.3. | The Committee expresses concern in relation to the overall decreasing availability of the industry's main raw material and price increases due to its multiple use, especially for renewable energy production. The EESC considers that the furniture and woodworking industries provide far better benefits in terms of added value and employment than the direct burning of wood, and calls on Member States to end subsidies and other incentives for burning wood for energy and calls again for the ‘promotion of the cascaded-use principle (manufacturing of products, reuse, repair and recycling, valorisation of energy content)’ (6). The EESC also suggests enhancing the promotion of European wood in the internal market by increasing the visibility and use of genuine wood products and furniture. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

| 4.4. | Furthermore, subsidies offered to non-EU purchasers of wood from Europe are distorting the demand side. The EESC calls for trade-defence instruments that protect local furniture producers and is convinced that exports of raw wood material do not make any sense in economic terms. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

| 4.5. | Regarding wood imports, it is extremely important that EU trade agreements facilitate easy access to non-EU primary wood resources. In this regard, the EESC would like to call for a tariff reduction or elimination for imported primary and secondary wood raw materials. Furthermore, certification systems for imported timber from certain countries are not fully effective. The EESC requests that policy makers ensure that the sustainability criteria in trade agreements is enforced and that imports include verification criteria regarding working conditions, freedom of association and fair treatment of workers. The EESC urges that human rights should be part of due diligence procedures, fully respecting the ILO convention on human and workers' rights. This would provide for a level playing field in the market. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.

5.   Sustainability and green transition

| 5.1. | The EESC considers that the EC Communication on the New European Bauhaus represents an excellent opportunity for the furniture industry to contribute to creating sustainable and inclusive products for the new way of living, where sustainability harmonises with lifestyle. The overall transition of the sector in all its aspects will only be successful if we improve the active participation of workers and their representatives. |
| --- | --- |

5.1.

| 5.2. | The Committee notices the growing trend of consumers that are looking for environmentally friendly products which have been manufactured respecting decent working conditions. Furthermore, the furniture sector can improve its environmental impact by manufacturing more durable products and by using recycled materials or sustainable (such as oak, pine, acacia etc.) and reclaimed wood. |
| --- | --- |

5.2.

| 5.3. | The EESC calls for a coherent European legislative framework that would prohibit all products sold in the internal market from containing dangerous flame-retardants. Hazardous substances should further be replaced by, for example, water-based foams, less hazardous glues or substances containing low volatile organic compounds. The social partners agreement on the reduction of formaldehyde in panel-production is an excellent example of how voluntary social partner agreements at European level can also help to reduce health hazards stemming from hazardous substances. |
| --- | --- |

5.3.

| 5.4. | The Committee advocates also for the compulsoriness of sustainable and fully recyclable packages and calls for a review of the Directive 94/62/EC on Packaging and Packaging Waste. The EESC also considers that tax incentives could play an important role in promoting sustainability projects. |
| --- | --- |

5.4.

6.   Circularity

| 6.1. | Following the ambitions announced in the European Green Deal (7) and the Circular Economy Action Plan (8), the EU economy is showing signs of embracing circularity and fostering innovation towards sustainable new economic models. Decoupling economic growth from resource use is critical to achieving climate neutrality by 2050. |
| --- | --- |

6.1.

| 6.2. | The figures show that between 80 % and 90 % of EU furniture waste in municipal solid waste is incinerated or sent to landfill. The EESC is particularly concerned by the lack of consumer information and spare part availability, which encourages the purchase of new furniture over circularity. A European legislative ban on furniture in landfills would increase the recovery and reuse of valuable materials. |
| --- | --- |

6.2.

| 6.3. | The only solution for fighting climate change and the overburdening of Earth's natural resources is a quick transition from the linear flow of materials and energy towards a circular model. Circular economy models applied in the furniture sector have the capacity to allow value recovery from products and ensure economic growth and job creation. The EESC underlines that furniture, and especially genuine wood products, is key to storing carbon and thus contributing effectively to the fight against climate change. |
| --- | --- |

6.3.

| 6.4. | The Committee considers essential that furniture producers design their products in such a way that allows value recovery and facilitates reuse, repair, refurbishing and recycling. Manufacturing processes must focus on stimulating resource and energy efficiency and cutting down production costs. |
| --- | --- |

6.4.

| 6.5. | An extended producer responsibility scheme in the furniture sector has the potential to increase the reuse and recycling capacities in the Union, promoting incentives for producers to take into consideration the environmental impact from the design phase to the end-life of a product. |
| --- | --- |

6.5.

7.   Education, digitalisation and working conditions

| 7.1. | A recent study shows that most employees in the furniture sector do not have tertiary education level qualifications and are not acquainted with circular economy aspects (9). However, the need for a highly skilled workforce is high, and the sector is facing a continuous ageing workforce and has difficulties in appealing to the younger generation. In order to improve the attractiveness of the sector it is extremely important to continuously improve working conditions (occupational health and safety) and further training options, and focus on motivating highly skilled and digital specialists to join the furniture industry. |
| --- | --- |

7.1.

| 7.2. | Compared to other parts of the world, the cost of labour in the EU is somewhat higher, but productivity and innovation are also ahead of other regions. The EESC has already mentioned that ‘in order to increase productivity and stay ahead of competition, the sector needs workers who are trained in the latest skills and technologies’ (10). |
| --- | --- |

7.2.

| 7.3. | The Committee calls on the European legislators to actively support transnational initiatives that increase the quality of all forms of apprenticeship in the furniture sector, such as for example the concept of European Core Qualifications (11). |
| --- | --- |

7.3.

| 7.4. | Initial and further vocational education must be developed to foster skills and new sector-specific competences. They must include social partners, educational institutes and other relevant NGOs. The future of the labour force in the furniture sector is high technology and knowledge intensive jobs, based on sound social dialogue and on collective agreements with decent pay and working conditions, that can attract the younger generation. |
| --- | --- |

7.4.

| 7.5. | A more ambitious Erasmus for apprentices would also help to better transfer the rich and diverse traditions and the innovative potential of producing furniture in Europe and would equally help to improve the attractiveness of the furniture sector among young people and in society as a whole. Furthermore, the EESC recommends the promotion of validation systems supporting the mutual recognition of qualifications. |
| --- | --- |

7.5.

8.   Funding and investments

| 8.1. | European companies need access to R&D&I funding programmes that can help them scale up, become more productive and embrace circularity and new technologies. Investment is also needed in promoting circular loops, the lifespan of products, their repair or refurbishment and recycling capabilities. Furthermore, creating demand for second hand furniture and supporting non-profit actors engaged in the recycling or upcycling process of used furniture can impact positively on green transition targets. |
| --- | --- |

8.1.

| 8.2. | Funding opportunities remain one of the most significant weaknesses in a sector dominated by SMEs. It is extremely important that SMEs have adequate resources to analyse their business development in a circular, innovative and sustainable way, and they should be supported by transitional tax incentives and lower VAT rates for refurbished and remanufactured furniture. |
| --- | --- |

8.2.

| 8.3. | Superior features such as design, quality, function, durability or ergonomics for furniture products have the capacity to balance the price advantage offered by producers from low-wage countries. On top of that, innovation in material use and advanced technological production facilities provides additional competitivity leverage. Therefore, the Committee calls for investments in design, creativity, skills and value chain development. |
| --- | --- |

8.3.

| 8.4. | Finally, the EESC calls for the development of a European platform that promotes business development in the furniture industry and a precautionary assessment of the social impact of new technology. It should include companies, social partners, civil society organisations, research institutes, universities and other relevant stakeholders and provide support for the sector's growth, as does the European Circular Economy Stakeholder Platform (12), which is an excellent example in this regard. |
| --- | --- |

8.4.

Brussels, 15 June 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  New European Bauhaus Beautiful, Sustainable, Together COM/2021/573 final.

1

(2)  OJ L 365, 31.12.1994, p. 10.

2

(3)  A New Industrial Strategy for Europe COM/2020/102 final.

3

(4)  EC — Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs.

4

(5)  Sustainable Products Initiative.

5

(6)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Opportunities and challenges for a more competitive European woodworking and furniture sector’ (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 24, 28.1.2012, p. 18).

6

(7)  COM/2019/640 final.

7

(8)  COM/2020/98 final.

8

(9)  Innovation in the Furniture Industry in the era of circular economy.

9

(10)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Opportunities and challenges for a more competitive European woodworking and furniture sector’ (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 24, 28.1.2012, p. 18).

10

(11)  European Furniture Professions.

11

(12)  European Circular Economy Stakeholder Platform.

12

---

III Preparatory acts

European Economic and Social Committee

570th plenary session of the European Economic and Social Committee – Interactio, 15.6.2022–16.6.2022

| 23.9.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 365/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.9.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 365/13

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on (a) ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — Establishing a European Declaration on Digital rights and principles for the Digital Decade’

(COM(2022) 27 final)

and on (b) ‘Digital rights and principles’

(exploratory opinion)

(2022/C 365/03)

| Rapporteur: | Philip VON BROCKDORFF |
| --- | --- |
| Co-rapporteur: | Violeta JELIĆ |

Rapporteur:

Philip VON BROCKDORFF

Co-rapporteur:

Violeta JELIĆ

| Referral | (a) | European Commission, 2.5.2022 |
| --- | --- | --- |

Referral

(a)

European Commission, 2.5.2022

| (b) | Czech Presidency, 26.1.2022 |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Czech Presidency, 26.1.2022

Legal basis

| (a) | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| --- | --- |

(a)

Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

| (b) | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Single Market, Production and Consumption

Adopted in section

1.6.2022

Adopted at plenary

15.6.2022

Plenary session No

570

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

181/0/2

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The EESC refers to the strong link between the Path to the Digital Decade and the Declaration of Digital Rights and Principles, with the former placing emphasis on quantitative targets and the latter mainly on qualitative targets. The EESC believes that both are highly relevant to facilitating the digital transformation for society and the economy. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | The EESC believes that the declaration should work for sustainable development as a whole. The success of the digital transformation is a combination of economic, social and environmental benefits stemming from its contribution to greater competitiveness, prosperity, jobs, well-being and the transition to a circular and zero-emission economy, accompanied by prevention and minimisation of the undesirable risks it may carry for society. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | The EESC believes that addressing digital skills, digital infrastructure, digital business and digital public services is critical to support economic recovery and growth in Europe, while ensuring that progress is made in compliance with fundamental rights and in a human-centric and inclusive way, leaving no one behind. The EESC also recommends considering the conclusions of the Conference of the Future of Europe regarding digital transformation. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | Although intended to serve as a solid political commitment, the declaration would not affect current legal rights. The EESC believes that digital rights derive from and are defined by existing fundamental rights in that they are part of EU values and principles, where different rights and freedoms coexist and values also set limits for each other. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | The different principles and rights described in the draft declaration overlap in many respects and the mix of principles and rights makes it difficult to perceive the essence of the content. It is therefore absolutely necessary to promote the understanding of their practical meaning. This applies to businesses, workers, consumers and the population in general. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | The EU’s fundamental rights and values are essential from the point of view of both people and businesses. The declaration should therefore recognise that most of them, especially SMEs, face more or less the same challenges as people in general in adapting to the digital world. The EESC also points out the challenge of avoiding a digital divide in terms of access to public and private services by aging and rural populations. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

| 1.7. | The EESC stresses the importance of the principles of connectivity, skills and security, which are essential for people and businesses alike, as well as for overall economic and societal development. The war between Russia and Ukraine has made it even more visible, and the war has also reinforced the need to develop people’s skills and the means to recognise and combat disinformation. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

| 1.8. | The EESC emphasises the importance of measuring and monitoring the digital progress and recommends that the tools in this area should not be multiplied. The objectives of the declaration need to be measured by concrete indicators in the framework of the Path to the Digital Decade, and the annual report on the State of the Digital Decade should feed into the European Semester. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

| 1.9. | The smooth functioning and fairness of the single market play a crucial role in the digital development in the EU. The EESC therefore believes that the very essence of freedoms in the single market must be fully protected. The free flow of data and ownership of data are of increasing importance, as they not only concern the single market for data as such, but also have an intrinsic link with the markets for capital, goods and services. The principles relating to innovation and intellectual property and the freedom to conduct business should also be recognised in the declaration. |
| --- | --- |

1.9.

| 1.10. | The single market is also a springboard for the EU to expand the use of external markets and supply chains and to be an influential and powerful global player. The declaration should therefore be actively promoted in an international context using a wide range of tools, ranging from global agreements set up by the social partners in multinationals to diplomatic action and innovation cooperation, trade and investment agreements and financing conditions. |
| --- | --- |

1.10.

2.   Background

| 2.1. | At the last State of the Union address, the European Commission presented the Path to the Digital Decade (1). This plan aims to digitalise skills, infrastructure, businesses and public services in order to achieve the digital transformation of our society and economy by 2030. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | At the same time, the Commission is working to finalise the proposal for a joint declaration on digital principles by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission in order to ensure that European values and rights are taken into account in the digital space. This will allow everyone to benefit from the possibilities offered by digital technology, such as universal access to the internet, algorithms that respect fundamental rights through a regular audit of algorithms carried out by independent third parties, and a safe and reliable online environment. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.3. | To ensure that Europe moves rapidly towards the objectives of the Digital Decade, the proposed governance framework provides for a monitoring system based on the strengthened Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI), and the State of the Digital Decade report will serve as an annual assessment of the digital transformation in Europe. In particular, the report will (i) identify areas where further action is needed, (ii) analyse investment or other resource gaps and highlight the actions needed to increase the EU’s digital sovereignty and (iii) assess the implementation of relevant regulatory proposals and actions taken at EU and Member State level. The report will also provide an opportunity to take stock of the level of adherence to the digital principles that will be set out in the future declaration. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

3.   General comments

| 3.1. | The EESC considers the Path to the Digital Decade to be an important development in supporting the digital transformation in the EU, as it takes into account the accelerating trends and growing needs for digitalisation, which have also been highlighted by the pandemic. The need to close the gaps in Europe’s digital capabilities remains a concern, as does the need to take a more unified approach and invest in large-scale digital projects to reap the benefits of digitalisation. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | The EESC believes that attention to digital skills, infrastructure, businesses and public services is essential to support economic recovery and growth in Europe, which is essential for improving incomes, living standards and working conditions. Special attention should be given to the EU’s ageing and rural population to ensure they are not left behind in the digital transformation. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.3. | In addition, a successful digital transformation will put Europe at the forefront of global trends, support its competitiveness and facilitate the setting of universal standards. In addition, digital technologies are an essential cog in the wheel for the EU to achieve the sustainability objectives of its Green Deal. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

| 3.4. | The EESC welcomes the fact that the Commission and the Member States will work closely together to achieve the targets and objectives of the Digital Decade. As a first step, as soon as the Decision establishing The Path to the Digital Decade enters into force, they will jointly define forward trajectories at EU level for each of the objectives. These trajectories will make it possible to assess progress towards the goals. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

| 3.5. | The EESC recognises that it is the responsibility of the Member States to include their national trajectories in the digital strategic roadmaps, as well as the current or planned policies or instruments they intend to use. Of course, not all the objectives of the Digital Decade require the same efforts in all Member States. Indeed, some of them have made considerable progress. In addition, several objectives call for a targeted effort on the part of some Member States. The EESC recognises that the potential contribution of Member States to the achievement of targets set at EU level varies considerably in some cases, which must also be taken into account. In connection with this, the EESC calls for concrete key performance indicators at national level to monitor progress and ensure that objectives are attained. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

| 3.6. | The EESC expects these considerations to be included in the Commission’s annual progress report on the State of the Digital Decade. In this regard, it welcomes the commitment that, within five months of the publication of the report, the Commission and the Member States will cooperate closely to identify areas where progress is insufficient and agree on measures to ensure that the targets are met. Again, it will be up to the Member States to adapt their national strategic roadmaps to take account of the recommendations made in the report. It is essential that they commit to taking corrective action and/or implementing projects such as multinational projects. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

| 3.7. | The EESC also welcomes all the decision-making tools proposed to ensure that the measures taken by the Member States are sufficient to make progress towards achieving the objectives of the Digital Decade. These tools, which include peer review, Commission recommendations, possible further action at EU level, as well as targeted dialogue look very promising in terms of effectiveness, assuming of course that all recommendations are followed. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

| 3.8. | With regard to reporting, the EESC stresses the need to link the objectives of the Digital Decade to the European Semester. Digital aspects in the context of the European Semester and monitoring progress on digital transformation in the EU are of crucial importance, and the EESC supports the proposal that the annual report on the State of the Digital Decade should feed into the European Semester. The achievement of the objectives of the declaration should be monitored with concrete indicators that measure, for example, progress in vocational digital skills and skills to identify false online information, as well as reduction of the digital divide and support for people without access to online services. In this regard, aspects relating to the Recovery and Resilience Facility should also be taken into account. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

| 3.9. | The EESC reiterates its favourable position adopted in a related opinion on multinational projects which are large-scale projects supporting the EU’s digital transformation objectives. The approach of channelling coordinated investments involving at least three Member States and, where appropriate, other public or all civil society stakeholders is relevant (2). |
| --- | --- |

3.9.

| 3.10. | These projects support the productivity and resilience of the European economy and it is therefore necessary to formulate clear guidelines on how funds can be made available for multinational projects. Possible sources of funding include a combination of EU and Member State funding. On the European side, we can mention the Recovery and Resilience Facility, the Digital Europe Programme, the Connecting Europe Facility, the InvestEU Programme, Horizon Europe, the European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund. However, the contribution of Member States to multinational projects that the EESC considers essential for a more effective and coordinated European digital transformation is strongly encouraged. |
| --- | --- |

3.10.

| 3.11. | The EESC believes that the viability of multinational projects should be regularly assessed and welcomes the proposal that the Commission will advise and provide, where appropriate, relevant guidance to support the implementation of multinational projects. |
| --- | --- |

3.11.

4.   Specific comments

| 4.1. | The Commission’s proposals provide a basis and an argument for the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission to draw up and sign a joint declaration. A declaration bringing together in a single document different principles related to digital transformation would, according to the EESC, be a useful reference in the context of implementing the digital compass and the Path to the Digital Decade. In the best case, this declaration would strengthen the confidence of people and businesses. This requires a clear and easily understandable text and communication. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

| 4.2. | Although political in nature and not legally binding as such, such a declaration would serve as a solid reference and guide for future policy measures. As stated in the communication, the declaration would not affect current legal rights. Therefore, any other measure based on it should take due account of existing legal and other instruments. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

| 4.3. | It is also important to strengthen a wide range of instruments and measures contributing to the implementation of the declaration. For example, it is absolutely necessary to raise awareness of the practical meaning of the principles and to promote understanding of them. This applies to businesses, workers, consumers and people in general. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

| 4.4. | It is reasonable to use existing mechanisms to monitor how the principles will be and are already being put into practice. The proposed Path to the Digital Decade governance mechanism, with its overall objectives, is the most relevant in this regard. In addition, it is useful to monitor the evolution of people’s perceptions by means of Eurobarometer surveys. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

| 4.5. | In several previous opinions, the EESC has stressed the importance of the digital transformation taking place in a human-centred, inclusive and sustainable way, and the declaration would provide an essential reference to this end. Corresponding objectives have also been included in the Path to the Digital Decade, and the EESC believed that they provide a qualitative framework for the quantitative targets set out in this document and those of the Digital Compass (3). |
| --- | --- |

4.5.

| 4.6. | The different principles and rights described in the draft declaration overlap in many respects and each of them has a variety of aspects, some of which are quite detailed. It is therefore difficult to perceive the essence of the content. The mixture of principles and rights further blurs this content. The initial set of numerical principles launched by the Commission for consultation was clearer and easier to understand and was therefore a preferable approach, while using the enriching input from consultation. |
| --- | --- |

4.6.

| 4.7. | The EESC believes that digital rights derive from and are defined by existing fundamental rights. They are part of the values and principles of the EU, which constitute a multi-level and multidimensional whole, where different rights and freedoms coexist and where values also set limits and ensure a fair balance. This is the case, for example, with the principles of freedom of expression and non-discrimination in the context of hate speech, a growing phenomenon in the online world. |
| --- | --- |

4.7.

| 4.8. | The EESC believes that digital principles should serve for everything that is meant by sustainable development. However, the principle of sustainability in the draft declaration appears to refer primarily to environmental sustainability, while the other five principles focus primarily on social sustainability. The EESC believes that sustainability should be considered in the development and use of digital technologies in two ways: by minimising the harmful impact of technologies and maximising their positive impact on the economy and society. The success of the digital transformation is therefore a combination of economic, social and environmental benefits stemming from its contribution to the creation of greater competitiveness, prosperity, jobs and well-being and the transition to a circular and zero-emission economy. |
| --- | --- |

4.8.

| 4.9. | The EU’s fundamental rights and values are essential from the point of view of both people and businesses. Most of the aspects included in the project are relevant not only for people in general, but also for entrepreneurs, including social economy enterprises, and civil society organisations. The declaration should therefore recognise that most of them, especially SMEs, face more or less the same challenges as the population in general in adapting to the digital world. |
| --- | --- |

4.9.

| 4.10. | The EESC believes that more emphasis should also be placed on enhancing the benefits of digital transformation, including economic prosperity. This underlines the importance of the principles related to connectivity, skills and security, which are essential for socioeconomic development. In addition to those proposed in the draft declaration, the principles of innovation and intellectual property and freedom to conduct a business are of great importance for businesses in the digital world and should be recognised in the declaration. |
| --- | --- |

4.10.

| 4.11. | The war between Russia and Ukraine has highlighted the importance of the proper functioning of digital connections and cybersecurity at all levels and in all sectors of society, as well as in international connections. It has also reinforced the need to develop people’s skills and the means to recognise and combat disinformation. |
| --- | --- |

4.11.

| 4.12. | The EESC has already stressed the importance of digital sovereignty as a key pillar of Europe’s economic, social and environmental development and has also stressed that this sovereignty must be based on global competitiveness and on strong cooperation between Member States. This is an essential precondition for the EU to become a benchmark on the international scene, including with regard to the reliability of digital technologies. With regard to hosting Europeans’ data, in particular, the EESC stresses the need to complete the European Gaia X cloud project, which would nurture the trust of the European population, thus promoting the flow of data (4). |
| --- | --- |

4.12.

| 4.13. | The smooth and fair functioning of the single market plays a crucial role in digital development in the EU. The EESC therefore believes that the very essence of freedoms in the single market must be fully protected. The free flow and ownership of data is becoming increasingly important, as it not only concerns the single market for data as such, but also has an intrinsic link with the markets for capital, goods and services. |
| --- | --- |

4.13.

| 4.14. | The single market is also a starting point and springboard for the EU to expand the use of external markets and supply chains and to be an influential and powerful global player. The declaration should therefore be actively promoted on the international stage. While values cannot be ‘exported’, the EU has the potential to exert global influence using a wide range of tools, from global agreements set up by social partners in multinationals to diplomatic action, innovation cooperation, trade and investment agreements and financing conditions. This applies to both bilateral and multilateral external relations. |
| --- | --- |

4.14.

Brussels, 15 June 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  COM(2021) 574 final.

1

(2)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the 2030 Policy Programme ‘Path to the Digital Decade’ (OJ C 194, 12.5.2022, p. 87).

2

(3)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the 2030 Policy Programme ‘Path to the Digital Decade’ (OJ C 194, 12.5.2022, p. 87).

3

(4)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the 2030 Policy Programme ‘Path to the Digital Decade’ (OJ C 194, 12.5.2022, p. 87).

4

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| 23.9.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 365/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.9.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 365/18

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on harmonised rules on fair access to and use of data (Data Act)’

(COM(2022) 68 final — 2022/0047 (COD))

(2022/C 365/04)

| Rapporteur: | Marinel Dănuț MURESAN |
| --- | --- |
| Co-rapporteur: | Maurizio MENSI |

Rapporteur:

Marinel Dănuț MURESAN

Co-rapporteur:

Maurizio MENSI

| Referral | European Parliament, 23.3.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| | Council, 29.3.2022 |
| Legal basis | Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Single Market, Production and Consumption |
| Adopted in section | 1.6.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 15.6.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 570 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 184/0/2 |

Referral

European Parliament, 23.3.2022

Council, 29.3.2022

Legal basis

Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Single Market, Production and Consumption

Adopted in section

1.6.2022

Adopted at plenary

15.6.2022

Plenary session No

570

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

184/0/2

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) welcomes the Data Act Regulation and highlights the need to implement it without any discrimination against people who have difficulty accessing the internet or data. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | The EESC believes that the protection of personal data, digital identity and privacy should be considered fundamental aspects of data governance directly linked to respect for human dignity and fundamental rights. Therefore, traceability, interoperability and multimodality of the various activities of the supply chains are needed to ensure a clear synergy with the Green Deal indicators and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | The EESC considers it important to guarantee respect of safety and ethical standards, multiple and sufficient conditions for data functionality, cybersecurity procedures and the proper storage of data on EU territory, on the assumption that individuals should be in control of the data they generate in accordance with the objectives of strategic autonomy and technological independence. As the administration of this huge volume of data will consume a substantial amount of energy, we recommend that the request for entities in charge of data storage to use mainly energy from renewable resources be included in the act. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | The EESC believes that ensuring fair competition and a fair distribution of costs and added value within the data supply chain including all actors is relevant and important. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | The EESC points out that the protection of citizens’ rights is at the basis of the EU’s social system and that economic competitiveness has to be guaranteed by a high level of privacy and security, the respect of safety and ethical standards, multiple and sufficient conditions for data functionality, cybersecurity procedures and the proper storage of data in EU spaces and certified locations. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | The EESC suggests enlarging the scope of the proposed regulation in order to cover all physical products that obtain, generate or collect data concerning their performance, use or environment and that are able to communicate that data via a publicly available electronic communications service. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

| 1.7. | The EESC believes that users and data recipients should have unhindered access to data which is essential to the functioning, repairing or servicing of connected products and related services. This would include all raw data and metadata but also other relevant sets of processed, refined or aggregated data. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

2.   Background

| 2.1. | The European Commission is proposing to launch the Data Act, which aims to ensure fair allocation of value obtained from data and better and more efficient use of and access to data. Regulating data access and use is a fundamental prerequisite for seizing the opportunities presented by the digital age we live in. Moreover, the proposal outlines how relevant rights are being applied, increases access to data use for consumers and businesses and ensures the accessibility of data for public institutions when required. Its aim is to unlock the value of data generated by connected objects in Europe by removing barriers to accessing data, for both private and public sector bodies, while preserving incentives to invest in data generation by ensuring balanced control over the data for its creators. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | The proposal is the last horizontal building block of the Commission’s data strategy and it integrates the overall EU digital policy acquis, including the GDPR, the PSI Directive, the Regulation on the free flow of data and ongoing negotiations on the Artificial Intelligence Act, the ePrivacy Regulation and the Digital Services Act. Finally, its objective is to create fairer allocation of value by addressing situations where data are used exclusively by a few actors. The EESC is recommending that we have a clearer definition of users as well as of categories of data along with ensuring the rights of the users. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.3. | The purpose of the proposal is to ensure fairness in the digital environment by enabling consumers and companies to have more control over their data, clarifying who can access it and on what terms; stimulate a competitive data market by ‘unlocking a wealth of industrial data’; open up opportunities for data-driven innovation; and make data more accessible to all. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | Facilitating clear and efficient synergy between cloud and edged services, safeguards against unlawful data transfer without notification by cloud service providers and developing interoperability standards for data to be reused between sectors, are objectives stated in the proposal. Another main objective is to increase the added value of the database, generated by data and data processing, as well as motivating the various actors to contribute in support of the development of the data economy. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

| 2.5. | The proposal will have broad implications for citizens, companies and public authorities alike, inside and outside the EU, and could profoundly transform the European regulatory framework for data. It aims to increase transparency and legal certainty around the sharing of data generated by the use of certain products or services, as well as operationalising rules to ensure fairness in data sharing contracts. It creates a predictable and appropriate framework for business-to-consumer and business-to-business data sharing and establishes the legal obligations for data holders in making data available. It regulates the unfair terms related to data access and use between actors on the market. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

| 2.6. | The Data Act coherently approaches non-personal data safeguards in international contexts as well as interoperability alongside reducing various barriers in the use and reuse of data. |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

3.   General comments

| 3.1. | The EESC welcomes and supports the Data Act, as it clarifies who can create value from such data and under which conditions, it ensures fairness in the allocation of data value among the actors in the data economy and in their contracts while respecting the legitimate interests of companies and individuals that invest in data products and services. Finally, the new rules empower consumers and companies by giving them a say on what can be done with the data generated by their connected products. In recent years, data-driven technologies have shown accelerated development. They are used in many economic sectors, therefore ensuring and organising adapted and appropriate access to data. Alongside the added value created by the database, the Data Act regulation is important to ensure innovative and ethical economic growth that can create opportunities for all. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | Currently, many SMEs lack access to data whose generation they have contributed to when using internet of Things (IoT) equipment or related services that they own, rent or lease. Furthermore, innovative SMEs and startups fail to create added value in the form of novel products and complementary services for the users of IoT equipment due to their inability to get hold of the data these devices churn out. This undercuts the performance of the Digital Single Market. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.3. | The legislative proposal aims to ‘maximise the value of data in the economy by ensuring that a wider range of stakeholders gain control over their data and that more data is available for innovative use’. In doing so, it considers various innovative tools to relocalise data processing services at the European level and deeply transforms existing power structures that favour large data incumbents at the expense of smaller European actors. The aim of the proposal is to invert recent market trends that have led to the consolidation of the ‘internet economy’ and generated data monopolies in various sectors, such as healthcare and the automotive industry. This continuous increase of data needs attention and regulation of the extent of unfair conditions of data use. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

| 3.4. | The proposal improves the conditions under which businesses and consumers can use cloud and edge services in the EU, as these make it easier to move data and applications from one provider to another without incurring any costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

| 3.5. | The EESC believes that further efforts must be made to consolidate the data economy and data governance. In particular, increasing and supporting data literacy is greatly needed for consolidating and developing the data economy so that people and businesses are aware and motivated to offer and provide access to their data in compliance with the relevant legal rules. This is at the basis of a sustainable data society, with the respect of fundamental rights, workers’ rights, the rules of democracy and open and inclusive rights. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

| 3.6. | The EESC welcomes the provision concerning SMEs, which are now protected against unfair contractual terms thanks to the list of unilaterally imposed contractual clauses that will be deemed or presumed to be unfair. Clauses that do not pass this ‘unfairness test’ will be not be binding on SMEs. In this regard, the Commission will develop and recommend non-binding model contractual terms, helping SMEs to negotiate fairer and balanced data sharing contracts with companies enjoying a significantly stronger bargaining position. The EU and the Member States should pay more attention to enhancing the capacity of European companies, especially SMEs and startups, to participate in and contribute to the data economy in Europe and globally. This requires more investments in education and training, research and development, and common data spaces that underpin data-based value creation. It is crucial to ensure that SMEs have the means to make use of the unfairness test and protect themselves from unfair contractual practices. Model contractual terms provided by the Commission are a necessary tool in this respect but need to be complemented with other forms of support from the competent national authorities. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

| 3.7. | The EESC believes that a more sectoral approach in the added value process, use and reuse of data is needed for better synergy with the Green Deal indicators and SDGs. Sectors that are lagging behind in integrating digital technologies should be stimulated and supported. Transparent and effective application of the regulation would be important for the traceability, interoperability and multimodality of the various activities of the supply chains, for example in the transport sector. In this regard, it would be useful to adopt specific guidelines to facilitate a uniform interpretation of the regulation among Member States. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

| 3.8. | The EESC supports the right for public institutions to access the data in case of emergency, where permitted by law. However, this should be monitored carefully in order to avoid abuses or endangering democratic values and the rule of law. Increasing resilience and ensuring fair competition while respecting human rights are factors to be taken into account in case of emergency. In general, public sector bodies are allowed to access data when necessary to protect the general interest, in a proportionate way that minimises the burden imposed on the individual or legal entities. It would be useful to support the establishment of independent trusted bodies that have the role of promoting the voluntary or mandatory sharing of data between businesses and governments from the technical, contractual, operational and financial point of view. These organisations could also act as dispute-settlement bodies. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

| 3.9. | The EESC believes that the Data Act proposal should take into account the impact on the labour market. It has to be considered that new skills and competences are lacking, especially the in the case of employees from micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. Improving working conditions, ensuring job stability and career predictability are elements that can ensure the consolidation of the data economy in the future and should be constantly taken into consideration. |
| --- | --- |

3.9.

| 3.10. | The EESC welcomes the main purpose of this proposal, which is to ensure access to the data economy and data market without discrimination as well as to offer opportunities of access for all businesses and persons, regardless of the region. Therefore, guaranteeing high-speed broadband and high-capacity networks within the EU and building multiregional internet infrastructures for gathering, use and reuse of data should be duly taken into account. |
| --- | --- |

3.10.

| 3.11. | The EESC considers the disruptive growth and increase of digital risks, together with the public and private infrastructures using digital technologies, to be important incentives for intensifying control of the proper implementation of the Data Act, especially concerning the management of data. |
| --- | --- |

3.11.

| 3.12. | The EESC believes that the protection of personal data, together with the protection of digital identity and privacy, are essential aspects of data governance directly linked to respect for human dignity and fundamental rights. For this reason, it would be important to recognise and guarantee property rights for personal data in order to enable European citizens to control the way their data are used (1). Online activities should only be monitored when there is knowledge and express consent about the further use of that data, in accordance with relevant legal rules. |
| --- | --- |

3.12.

4.   Specific comments

| 4.1. | The EESC welcomes the proposal, in line with the needs of the digital economy, to remove barriers to a well-functioning internal market for data and to promote a fair exchange by setting a harmonised framework. In this regard, it would be necessary to comply with EU security and cybersecurity rules in accordance with the objectives of EU strategic autonomy and technological independence. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

| 4.2. | Disadvantaged groups and regions which are isolated and have poor access to the internet should also be supported and assisted from the economic point of view in order to benefit from the opportunities of the data economy. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

| 4.3. | The EESC highlights the need for Member States to further improve the efforts to support companies, especially SMEs to create, consolidate and use data infrastructures, competences for employees and expertise, using EU structural funds and NextGenerationEU. Training for SMEs for digitalisation of their activities should be improved. Subventions and fiscal incentives in this regard could also be delivered by the Member States. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

| 4.4. | The data economy can not only deliver high quality job opportunities especially for youth, vulnerable groups or ‘not in education, employment, or training’ (NEETs) but also improve labour conditions. This process will contribute to reducing digital inequalities and increasing the competitiveness of the data economy at European level. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

| 4.5. | The EESC believes that ensuring fair competition in the European market between various actors and access to data is crucial. In particular, fair distribution of costs and added value within the data supply chain including all actors is relevant and important. Big companies, especially cloud service companies which concentrate a high amount of market power, should be controlled to eliminate various abuses. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.

| 4.6. | The EESC believes that investing in the managerial and operational capacity of the competent public authorities is crucial for ensuring proper implementation of the Data Act. A proper amount of financial resources should be allocated for competent authorities to guarantee an adequate level of human, technical and financial resources. |
| --- | --- |

4.6.

| 4.7. | The EESC recognises the importance of a cooperative model for establishing data management and exchange as a way of favouring micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, self-employed workers and the professions (2). |
| --- | --- |

4.7.

| 4.8. | The EESC points out that it would be important to preserve the full protection of citizens’ rights when ensuring the EU’s economic competitiveness. In particular, it would be important to guarantee a high level of privacy and security, the respect of safety and ethical standards, multiple and sufficient conditions for data functionality, cybersecurity procedures and the proper storage of data on EU territory (and owned by the EU) in spaces and certified locations. |
| --- | --- |

4.8.

| 4.9. | The EESC suggests evaluating the enlargement of the scope of the regulation in order to covers all physical products that obtain, generate or collect data concerning their performance, use or environment and that are able to communicate data via a publicly available electronic communications service. In addition to a broad spectrum of IoT equipment, this definition should also include personal computers, tablets, smartphones and other similar connected devices. |
| --- | --- |

4.9.

| 4.10. | The EESC believes that users and data recipients should have unhindered access, while respecting intellectual property rights and/or trade secrets, to all data which is essential to the functioning, repairing or servicing of connected products and related services. |
| --- | --- |

4.10.

Brussels, 15 June 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European data governance (Data Governance Act)’ (COM(2020) 767 final) (OJ C 286, 16.7.2021, p. 38).

1

(2)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European data governance (Data Governance Act)’ (COM(2020) 767 final) (OJ C 286, 16.7.2021, p. 38).

2

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| 23.9.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 365/23 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.9.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 365/23

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on “A Chips Act for Europe”’

(COM(2022) 45 final)

(2022/C 365/05)

| Rapporteur: | Heiko WILLEMS |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Heiko WILLEMS

| Referral | European Commission, 2.5.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Single Market, Production and Consumption |
| Adopted in section | 1.6.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 15.6.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 570 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 203/0/6 |

Referral

European Commission, 2.5.2022

Legal basis

Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Single Market, Production and Consumption

Adopted in section

1.6.2022

Adopted at plenary

15.6.2022

Plenary session No

570

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

203/0/6

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The EESC welcomes the European Commission’s objective of strengthening the semiconductor ecosystem, significantly increasing resilience and security of supply and reducing external dependencies. The Chips Act is a unique opportunity for all EU Member States to act together towards the goal of a stronger technological basis. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | As well as small feature sizes (< 2 nm), the needs of the customer industry and the strengths of Europe’s semiconductor industry must also be considered, particularly when it comes to power semiconductors and sensors that are significantly larger. Proficiency in smaller feature sizes is not the sole determining factor in the success of the semiconductor ecosystem. The specific requirements for microelectronics will become increasingly differentiated in the future and an ever-wider variety of chip solutions will also be needed that are disruptive and innovative, regardless of their size. The EESC therefore recommends a comprehensive approach, primarily based on an innovative semiconductor ecosystem. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | To alleviate the semiconductor shortage in the long term, access to raw materials, R & D facilities, intellectual property and technological know-how and the availability of skilled labour are important. This requires private investment and significant support from the public sector. The EESC calls on the Commission to flesh out its investment plans, especially with regard to how the investments will be financed. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | The EESC acknowledges that promoting the semiconductor industry is a key and strategic forward-looking project for the EU that will be decisive for security of supply and for the future of Europe as a centre of innovation and a place to do business. However, the economic viability of such facilities must be guaranteed, at least in the medium term, to ensure that investment from public funds is effective and sustainable. A subsidy race must be avoided and funds have to be spent efficiently without creating overcapacities and market distortions. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | The EESC is convinced that the European semiconductor ecosystem should be strengthened with a view to achieving open strategic autonomy. The semiconductor value chain is one of the most globalised. Due to the high level of international interdependence in the semiconductor market, establishing a closed value chain in every part of the world would not make economic sense. However, technology segments that are particularly vulnerable, i.e. due to geopolitical concerns or due to their strategic relevance, should receive the required support. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | This international interdependence must also be taken into account with regard to the envisaged emergency measures. As the European Commission increases Europe’s resilience, it should also strengthen international partnerships. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

| 1.7. | The EESC regrets the absence of an impact assessment. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

| 1.8. | The EESC would like to draw attention to its related opinions (1). |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

2.   General comments

| 2.1. | In an increasingly digitalised world, semiconductors are an essential component of many different economic sectors and areas of life — both for industry and consumers. The value of chips sold worldwide has steadily increased in recent years and sales are expected to increase by 11 % in 2022 (2). Moreover, the green and digital transition targets cannot be met without semiconductors. Technological progress in this area allows for cross-sector innovation along the entire value chain. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | There is also a growing geopolitical relevance of semiconductors. The semiconductor value chain is one of the most globalised. No single state has complete autonomy across the entire value creation process. Instead, there is a high level of division of labour and interdependence between nations and regions due to the high costs and complex stages of production. For this reason, the EESC firmly believes that establishing a closed value chain in every part of the world would not make economic sense. Rather, a detailed analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the European semiconductor ecosystem should serve as the starting point for a debate on how targeted investments could increase Europe’s resilience. In parallel, the European Commission should strengthen international partnerships in the semiconductor ecosystem in order to create synergies. Technology segments that are particularly vulnerable, i.e. due to geopolitical concerns or due to their strategic relevance, however, should receive the required support, financially as well as politically. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.3. | Given the increasing geopolitical tensions and bottlenecks along the semiconductor value chain, some economic regions are already making massive investments. With the CHIPS for America Act, the US plans to invest USD 52 billion between 2021 and 2026 and eliminate critical dependencies (3). China sees the semiconductor sector as key for its strategic orientation and aims to mobilise an estimated USD 150 billion by 2025 (4). Its goal is to be able to meet 70 % of its needs on its own by then. However, it remains to be seen if this goal is realistic. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | Considering the geopolitical situation, the EESC recognises the urgent need for the EU to take action in this area in order to reduce strategic and economic dependencies. In the Digital Compass (5), the Commission set the goal of ensuring that the production of cutting-edge and sustainable semiconductors in Europe accounts for at least 20 % of world production by 2030. This goal was reaffirmed in the proposal for the 2030 Policy Programme entitled ‘Path to the Digital Decade’ (6). The EESC welcomes the European Commission’s objective of strengthening the semiconductor ecosystem, significantly increasing resilience and security of supply and reducing external dependencies, and supports the goal of playing a major role in the semiconductor ecosystem worldwide. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

| 2.5. | The EESC points out that the EUR 43 billion planned for by the European Commission is not ‘fresh money’. The major chunk of the budget is already earmarked, e.g. in the Horizon Europe and the Digital Europe programme, and it will only be reallocated. The EUR 43 billion can only be reached with major private investments, that will still need to be secured. This stands in clear contrast to the USD 52 billion that have been granted by the US. At the same time, the EESC stresses the need to avoid a subsidy race and to spend money efficiently. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

| 2.6. | The EESC regrets the absence of an impact assessment on the Communication and the related proposals. |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

3.   Specific comments

| 3.1. | In this section, the EESC assesses specific aspects of the European Chips Strategy’s strategic objectives. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

3.2.   Policy-driven investment

| 3.2.1. | To achieve the Chips Strategy’s goals, the European Commission intends to mobilise around EUR 43 billion in public and private investment. This includes EUR 11 billion in public investment under the Chips for Europe Initiative. Moreover, the Commission plans to combine various measures, such as equity support, a Chips Fund worth EUR 2 billion, EIB loans, and funds from microelectronics measures in recovery and resilience plans and from national or regional funds. The Commission also mentions support for industrial research and innovation through Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEIs). In principle, the EESC supports the ambitious investment plans. However, it remains unclear how they will be financed. The EESC calls on the Commission to flesh out these plans. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.1.

3.3.   Strengthening research and technology leadership

| 3.3.1. | The Horizon Europe research framework programme already sets the goal of promoting next-generation technologies. The EESC strongly supports this objective. According to the European Commission, future research activities to be supported under the ‘Chips Joint Undertaking’ will help to better meet the needs of vertical industries in the future and to ensure that societal and environmental challenges are addressed. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.1.

| 3.3.2. | The Commission intends for research efforts to focus on technologies to achieve transistor sizes below 2 nm, disruptive technologies for AI, ultra low-power energy-efficient processors, novel materials, as well as heterogeneous and 3D integration of different materials, and emerging design solutions. The EESC essentially welcomes and supports this approach. Europe has a good foundation as a research centre. Generating product-specific intellectual property for the European semiconductor value chain, including based on the RISC-V open-source approach, should further improve skills in semiconductor solutions for many key sectors. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.2.

| 3.3.3. | The EESC agrees with the intention to promote the integration of key functions, sustainable energy consumption, increased computing performance and disruptive technologies such as neuromorphic and embedded chips for artificial intelligence (AI), integrated photonics, graphene and other technologies based on 2D materials. As well as small feature sizes (< 2 nm), the needs of the customer industry and the strengths of Europe’s semiconductor industry must be considered, particularly when it comes to power semiconductors and sensors that are significantly larger. While technologies such as AI, machine learning, 5G/6G and high-performance computing require chip solutions of 5 nm and under, industrial production continues to require specialised chips of much bigger feature sizes on a large scale. Europe should therefore not focus exclusively on the smallest feature sizes. The EESC firmly believes that proficiency in smaller feature sizes (< 10 nm) is not the sole determining factor in the success of the semiconductor ecosystem. On the contrary, the specific requirements for microelectronics will become increasingly differentiated in the future and an increasingly wide variety of chip solutions will be needed that are also disruptive and innovative, regardless of their size. The EESC therefore recommends a comprehensive approach, primarily based on the innovative potential for the semiconductor ecosystem. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.3.

| 3.3.4. | The EESC supports research into quantum chips and welcomes the provision of funding from Horizon Europe’s Quantum Technologies Flagship initiative. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.4.

3.4.   Leadership in design, manufacturing and packaging

| 3.4.1. | The EESC welcomes the goal to strengthen semiconductor technology and innovation capacities in the EU and to promote a vibrant and resilient semiconductor ecosystem. This comprehensive approach, which focuses not only on technology innovation stakeholders but also on supply and user industries, is to be viewed positively. The EESC stresses the need to strengthen the entire semiconductor value chain and ecosystem, since it is not just chips, but also skills in materials and processes, including packaging, that play a fundamental role in enabling new semiconductor technologies. Close cooperation between supply and demand-side stakeholders is important, with the Alliance on Processors and Semiconductor Technologies playing an advisory role, together with other stakeholders. The EESC recommends swiftly moving forward with the initiative. Ultimately, however, the actual implementation of the measures will determine whether these measures are successful and whether the expected investment is actually made. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.1.

| 3.4.2. | The European Commission is planning to create design infrastructure for integrated semiconductor technologies. All interested stakeholders, including SMEs, will have access to this infrastructure. The EESC welcomes the introduction of clear intellectual property rules, which is crucial for the success of such a platform where there is considerable investment in research. It also believes that participation and, above all, the provision of designs should be voluntary. The concept of cooperation and creation of synergies, including at international level, is very welcome. However, the actual implementation will also be crucial here. The platform can only be successful, if various stakeholders from academia, research, universities, developers and industry demonstrate a strong willingness to participate. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.2.

| 3.4.3. | The EESC welcomes the plan to create innovative pilot lines for prototypes based on existing pilot lines. It also makes sense to link them to the design infrastructure platform. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.3.

| 3.4.4. | The semiconductor industry produces a range of high-tech products that are important for many applications. This product variety is embedded in international markets. The EESC therefore stresses that any attempts to introduce certification should be based on international norms and standards. Close cooperation with manufacturers, users and international partners is important in this regard. Recently, the semiconductor industry has been at the centre of regional trade tensions and friction in the supply chain. Combined with the ambitions of emerging market players, this leads to different national and regional approaches to standardisation as well as to tensions in formal standardisation at international level when it comes to international standard-setting and the associated certification schemes. The EU should make every effort to develop market-driven standards that can be translated into international standards. To this end, cooperation both within the EU and with international partners is of the utmost importance. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.4.

| 3.4.5. | The EESC agrees with the European Commission that private investment in advanced semiconductor facilities is likely to require considerable support from the public sector. The Commission also intends to take into account whether production facilities are ‘first of a kind’ in State aid assessments under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU and states that even 100 % of a proven funding gap may be covered by public resources, if such facilities would not otherwise exist in Europe. The EESC acknowledges that promoting the semiconductor industry is a key and strategic forward-looking project for the EU that will be decisive for security of supply and for the future of Europe as a centre of innovation and a place to do business. At the same time, the EESC points out that granting significant State aid up to 100 % — financed by taxpayers — could lead to investments which are not commercially viable and could have a negative impact on the market. If the corresponding subsidy share and funds are too large and cover any economic risk, this could lead to unfair competitive conditions. The EESC also highlights the risk of costly international subsidy races, especially if the site selected for an advanced semiconductor facility is not optimal. The EESC draws attention to the European Commission’s Communication on A competition policy fit for new challenges (7), which clarifies that such aid must be subject to strong safeguards and that benefits must be shared widely and without discrimination across the European economy. The EESC recognises that the first-of-a-kind principle creates attractive framework conditions for relocations, which could also have a catalyst effect on other economic operators. Ultimately, however, the economic viability of such facilities must be guaranteed, at least in the medium term, to ensure that investment from public funds is effective. This is the only way to avoid the worst-case scenario of an underused semiconductor factory that costs millions of euros a day. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.5.

3.5.   Facilitating private investment

| 3.5.1. | The EESC welcomes the creation of the ‘Chips Fund’, particularly if it will make it easier for businesses, especially SMEs and start-ups, to obtain adequate funding. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.1.

3.6.   Addressing the acute skills shortage

| 3.6.1. | Digitalisation and technological change require continuous education and training. The EESC calls on the Commission and the Member States to address skills gaps in key digital areas in order to meet the high demand for skilled workers, both with and without university degrees, especially in STEM fields (science, technology, engineering and mathematics). This needs to begin in school. When establishing study and career guidance, the foundations for lifelong learning also need to be laid. In particular, it is also vital to structurally promote greater representation of women in the IT sector through programmes to improve digital skills. Companies should also play their part, by enabling women to improve their IT skills through a variety of digital skills programmes and training courses. Initiatives at EU level and in the Member States that aim to get more women involved in digitalisation, such as WomenTechEU (8) and SheTransformsIT (9), set good examples. Cooperation between national and European initiatives should be stepped up. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.1.

3.7.   Understanding global supply chains and anticipating future crises

| 3.7.1. | The EESC commends the strategic approach of identifying and assessing potential shortages in the semiconductor supply chain. Monitoring is an important tool for assessing and anticipating trends and events that may lead to disruptions in the supply chain. The European Commission is already conducting a stakeholder survey (10) on the semiconductor ecosystem to gather information on the current demand for chips and wafers, as well as specific business forecasts for demand in the future. This will also contribute to the third pillar of the Chips Act and to upstream emergency measures. However, the EESC calls on the Commission to keep the results of this survey strictly confidential, as answering questions regarding actual semiconductor production involves providing sensitive data and, potentially, trade secrets. It is therefore important that such surveys be voluntary and that these sensitive data be treated with the utmost confidentiality. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.1.

| 3.7.2. | The EESC thinks that the measures for dealing with disruptions are extremely far-reaching. Prioritisation of orders for critical sectors, common purchasing schemes and export controls are extensive market interventions that must be reserved for exceptional situations. Against the background of a market-based ecosystem, globalised value chains, and the high level of interdependence between different world regions, state intervention must be limited to the necessary minimum. The Commission should outline the preconditions for the envisaged measures in more detail. The EESC is also critical of the fact that the ‘Semiconductors Board’, which is to decide on the measures, will consist exclusively of representatives of the Member States and the Commission, without involving relevant market players and social partners. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.2.

3.8.   International cooperation

| 3.8.1. | Due to the global interdependence of the semiconductor ecosystem, efforts to strengthen the semiconductor industry should be coordinated internationally, for example in the G7 and G20, to support the entire semiconductor value chain and create synergies. The EESC advocates equal market access and a level playing field. This includes the reciprocal removal of barriers to investment and the prevention of new trade restrictions as retaliatory measures. Joint strategies should be developed in close coordination with industry and social partners to safeguard the semiconductor supply chain, including equipment, materials and raw materials. The development of market-driven and consensus-based European standards with the aim of translating them to the international level as well as international cooperation on standardisation are also key to achieving economies of scale that benefit end users in the form of affordable, high-quality products. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.1.

Brussels, 15 June 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem (Chips Act)’ (see page 34 of this Official Journal), Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Council Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe, as regards the Chips Joint Undertaking (see page 40 of this Official Journal) and Opinion of the Consultative Commission on Industrial Change (CCMI) on ‘A Chips Act for Europe: Implications of the European Chips Act for defence and aerospace manufacturing’ (supplementary opinion to this opinion).

1

(2)  IC Insights: https://www.icinsights.com/news/bulletins/2022-Semiconductor-Sales-To-Grow-11-After-Surging-25-In-2021/

2

(3)  Senate Passage of USICA Marks Major Step Toward Enacting Needed Semiconductor Investments — Semiconductor Industry Association (semiconductors.org).

3

(4)  A new world under construction: China and semiconductors | McKinsey.

4

(5)  COM(2021) 118.

5

(6)  COM(2021) 574.

6

(7)  COM(2021) 713 final.

7

(8)  Women TechEU (europa.eu).

8

(9)  Digitalisierung braucht mehr Frauen | SheTransformsIT

9

Digitalisierung braucht mehr Frauen

(10)  https://ec.europa.eu/growth/news/stakeholder-survey-european-chip-demand-2022-02-16_en

10

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ANNEX

Opinion of the Consultative Commission on Industrial Change (CCMI) on ‘A Chips Act for Europe: Implications of the European Chips Act for defence and aerospace manufacturing’

(supplementary opinion to INT/984)

| Rapporteur: | Maurizio MENSI |
| --- | --- |
| Co-rapporteur: | Jan PIE |

Rapporteur:

Maurizio MENSI

Co-rapporteur:

Jan PIE

| Plenary Assembly decision | 18.1.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Rule 37(2) of the Rules of Procedure |
| | Supplementary opinion |
| Section responsible | Consultative Commission on Industrial Change (CCMI) |
| Adopted in section | 13.5.2022 |

Plenary Assembly decision

18.1.2022

Legal basis

Rule 37(2) of the Rules of Procedure

Supplementary opinion

Section responsible

Consultative Commission on Industrial Change (CCMI)

Adopted in section

13.5.2022

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The EESC believes that semiconductors are at the core of modern geopolitics and technological-industrial leadership. Fostering a state-of-the-art European semiconductor ecosystem and resilient supply chains is thus vital for the EU’s strategic autonomy, technological sovereignty, resilience, and industrial competitiveness, including in the strategic defence and aerospace sectors. The EESC therefore fully supports the ambitious objectives of the European Chips Act. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | The EESC believes that more resources than currently envisaged are needed for the EU to achieve its ambitious goals in semiconductors. To make best use of its limited resources, the EU should also consider prioritising specific technologies or value chain segments and pursuing complementary efforts with like-minded partners. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | The EESC firmly believes that the European Chips Act should ensure that, in particular, defence and aerospace are supported in accordance with their strategic importance and status as critical sectors, regardless of their market size. This should be reflected in all pillars of the initiative, including by incentivising new chip designs that meet defence and aerospace-specific requirements. Specific measures would entail priority-rate access to pilot lines and the possibility to prioritise orders from critical sectors to Integrated Production facilities and EU Open Foundries outside ‘crisis mode’. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | In the EESC’s view, industrial stakeholders from the semiconductor and downstream critical sectors should be full members of the European Semiconductor Board and its subsidiary bodies, to ensure maximum coordination between policymakers and upstream and downstream market actors. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | The EESC considers that investments in both advanced and mature chips production in Europe are necessary to ensure resilient supply chains for defence and aerospace manufacturing, as well as that innovation should be supported for all semiconductor types needed by European industry. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | The EESC believes that the EU’s strategy should include specific measures to address the supply of raw materials. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

| 1.7. | The EESC considers that, to avoid a detrimental subsidy race, funding should be coordinated at the EU level as much as possible, while the State Aid control mechanism under Article 107 TFEU should be adjusted to ensure assessment predictability and coherence with other EU goals. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

| 1.8. | The EESC believes that state aid should be granted to Integrated Production facilities and EU Open Foundries that directly benefit multiple Member States, and that public support could be focused on initiatives that are closely linked to ‘green’ applications. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

| 1.9. | In the EESC’s view, data gathering for monitoring supply chains and anticipating future crises should be undertaken by a single body at EU level. |
| --- | --- |

1.9.

| 1.10. | The EESC advocates an appropriate data governance framework, covering data transparency, interoperability, sharing, access, and security. |
| --- | --- |

1.10.

| 1.11. | The EESC believes that, as strategic sectors, defence and aerospace should be prioritised for developing certification procedures and the Chips for Europe initiative could support the development of joint military-civilian standards in the context of the European Standardisation Strategy. |
| --- | --- |

1.11.

| 1.12. | The EESC considers that the European Chips Act must be coherent and clearly linked with all other EU and national policy instruments with related objectives, including the Industrial Alliance on Processors and Semiconductor Technologies, the Observatory for Critical Technologies and the European Raw Materials Alliance. |
| --- | --- |

1.12.

| 1.13. | The EESC welcomes the European Chips Act and calls for negotiations on the initiative to begin without delay, and for its swift, ambitious, effective implementation. |
| --- | --- |

1.13.

2.   Background

| 2.1. | In an increasingly digitalised world, semiconductors are an essential component of many economic sectors and areas of life. They power all digital products, enable key technologies of the future, such as AI, 5G, and cloud/edge computing, and underpin critical infrastructures that support our societies. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | Semiconductors are also vital for defence and aerospace manufacturing. The sophisticated systems that European militaries and other end-users increasingly rely on contain chips of all kinds, including many of those found in commercial products. However, whereas commercial chips production focuses on cost-efficiency at large volumes, defence and aerospace require small volumes and emphasise durability, reliability and security of information. The defence and aerospace sectors together made up around 1 % of the global chips market in 2020 (1). |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.3. | The global acceleration of the digital transformation is fuelling a booming demand for all types of semiconductors across industry sectors, which is expected to double by 2030. The outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic reinforced demand and disrupted global supply chains, and significant supply challenges have since affected every downstream industrial sector worldwide. This has led to long delivery delays, order cancellations and factory shutdowns with serious economic consequences. For example, the ratio of PMI new orders to suppliers’ delivery times for manufacturers in the euro area more than tripled between 2019 and 2021, particularly in industries that use semiconductors for production (e.g. auto, technology equipment), while motor vehicle production in the euro area felt by 18,2 % between November 2020 and March 2021 (2). |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | These developments have revealed Europe’s dependence on a small number of foreign suppliers of chips and components, and its resultant vulnerability to supply chain disruptions. In particular the Union’s defence and aerospace industry has felt this vulnerability acutely. Unable to meet rising global demand and driven by a market logic, chips manufacturers prioritise domestic markets and high-volume industries, leaving the rest underserved. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

| 2.5. | Since chips lie at the heart of our economies, supply chain disruptions pose an economic, and potentially social, challenge. However, when it comes to strategic sectors like defence and aerospace, dependence also becomes a security problem, as it endangers the delivery of defence and aerospace products in the EU. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

| 2.6. | This is highly problematic in a context of rising geopolitical tensions and weaponisation of trade and technology flows, which has made semiconductors geopolitically critical. As a result, leading economies are making intensive efforts to strengthen their production capacities and reduce their dependencies. For example, the US plans to invest USD 52 billion in its semiconductor ecosystem until 2026, China aims to have mobilised USD 150 billion to achieve 70 % self-sufficiency by 2025, and South Korea plans to mobilise up to USD 450 billion in private investment by 2030. |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

| 2.7. | Against this background, the EU must urgently reduce its dependencies, boost its competitiveness, and reinforce its security of supply for chips, by strengthening its position in the global supply chain. This goal is especially relevant for a strategic sector like defence and aerospace. At the same time, high complexity, costs and barriers-to-entry make autarchy in semiconductor production both unrealistic and undesirable. Therefore, bolstering international partnerships will be key to enhancing Europe’s security of supply. |
| --- | --- |

2.7.

| 2.8. | In the 2020 Industrial Strategy, the Commission recognised semiconductors as a strategic industrial area where European dependencies should be addressed. The 2021 Digital Compass outlined the goal of doubling Europe’s share of global production of cutting-edge and sustainable chips to 20 % by 2030. In her 2021 State of the Union speech, Commission President von der Leyen announced the European Chips Act, aimed at creating a state-of-the-art European chips ecosystem. Finally, in March 2022, the European Council reaffirmed the importance of this initiative, calling for reducing EU strategic dependencies in highly sensitive areas including semiconductors. |
| --- | --- |

2.8.

3.   General comments

3.1.   Vision

| 3.1.1. | While Europe is strong in some segments of the chips value chain (e.g. R & D, manufacturing equipment), it must strengthen its position all along the chain. Therefore, the EESC welcomes the European Commission’s aim of leveraging existing strengths to close the gap ‘from lab to fab’. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.1.

| 3.1.2. | The EESC is concerned that Europe’s strategy does not sufficiently address the topic of raw materials, which is a key dimension of security of supply and where Europe has dependencies on third countries for certain inputs (e.g. photoresist, silicon metal). The European Chips Act should feature specific measures to tackle this risk, including links to the European Raw Materials Alliance. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.2.

| 3.1.3. | The EESC fully supports the aim of boosting European production of cutting-edge and sustainable semiconductors. However, critical sectors including defence and aerospace manufacturing also need older generation chips. The EESC considers therefore that investment in both advanced and mature chips production is necessary to ensure resilient supply chains. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.3.

| 3.1.4. | The EESC firmly believes that the strong involvement of the entire ecosystem, including start-ups, scale-ups and SMEs as well as larger undertakings, is indispensable for supporting large-scale technological capacity building and innovation throughout the Union. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.4.

3.2.   Investment

| 3.2.1. | To achieve the aims of its chips strategy, the European Commission counts on around EUR 43 billion of policy-driven investment up to 2030, including EUR 11 billion of public investment under the Chips for Europe Initiative. Much greater clarity is needed, however, on the sources and amounts of financing, the usage of existing budget appropriations, and the objectives to be supported by each budget line. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.1.

| 3.2.2. | The EESC is sceptical that the amounts of public investment foreseen in the EU’s chips strategy, some of which were already earmarked for actions in microelectronics, match its level of ambition. The EU’s industrial competitors have been providing and continue to provide much greater support to their semiconductor ecosystems, which are already better positioned in the global value chain. Therefore, the EESC believes that more resources than currently envisaged are needed to achieve the ambitious initiative’s stated objectives, both in terms of market share and time frame. Cutting the administrative burden to access those resources should be viewed as a priority. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.2.

| 3.2.3. | To use its limited resources most efficiently, the EU should also consider prioritising specific technologies or value chain segments. Coordination with like-minded partners in this respect could ensure complementarities and non-duplication of effort. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.3.

| 3.2.4. | The EESC also believes that the budgetary reallocations from Horizon Europe and Digital Europe should not leave other priority areas, such as space, AI and cybersecurity, with insufficient resources to achieve their own specific objectives. Moreover, no reallocations should take place from the European Defence Fund, as this would reduce the already limited resources supporting the strategic defence sector. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.4.

3.3.   Critical sectors

| 3.3.1. | The European Chips Act recognises the importance of ‘critical sectors’, including defence and aerospace, and provides for their prioritisation in case of significant supply disruptions. The EESC welcomes this strategic approach, as it reflects the vital role of these sectors in the security and resilience of our societies. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.1.

| 3.3.2. | However, the EESC believes that the notion of ‘critical sectors’ should be reflected across all pillars of the initiative. In particular, the Chips for Europe Initiative should include specific measures to support critical sectors, including priority-rate access to pilot lines, while Integrated Production Facilities and EU Open Foundries should reserve a minimum of their total production capacity to cover demand from these sectors. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.2.

3.4.   Strategic importance of defence and aerospace

| 3.4.1. | The EESC firmly believes that the European Chips Act should ensure support for the defence and aerospace sectors in accordance with their strategic importance and their ‘critical’ status. The support should consider these sectors’ specific features, including their small market share and limited ability to influence related investments and market choices. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.1.

| 3.4.2. | Given these specificities, ensuring security of supply for these sectors requires an appropriate balance between a market-driven, volume-based approach and a strategic, criticality-based approach. This balance should be reflected, in particular, in the relative prioritisation of orders to production facilities and the allocation of products following common purchases, where defence and aerospace manufacturing would compete against much larger industries. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.2.

3.5.   Environment

| 3.5.1. | The EESC believes that the European Chips Act should be fully aligned with and support the EU’s strategic objective of a green and sustainable EU economy by 2030. To this end, research on the environmental impact of semiconductor initiatives should be strengthened, to gain an in-depth understanding of the environmental impact of the entire value chain, instead of just the performance of the final product. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.1.

| 3.5.2. | Accordingly, public support should be focused on semiconductor initiatives that are closely linked to ‘green’ applications, including by granting undertakings that develop such products better terms for public support. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.2.

3.6.   Governance

| 3.6.1. | Industry stakeholders are better placed than anyone to monitor market trends and assess potential remedies to supply disruptions. The EESC therefore firmly believes that such stakeholders, particularly from the semiconductor sector and critical sectors, should be closely involved in the governance of the chips strategy, including as full members of the Semiconductor Board and its sub-groups. Involving downstream and upstream sectors will also improve their coordination, thus enabling industry to address supply disruptions without extensive market intervention. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.1.

3.7.   Coherence

| 3.7.1. | Multiple policy instruments at the EU level already focus on chips, such as Horizon Europe, Digital Europe, the Industrial Alliance on Processors and Semiconductor Technologies, and the Observatory for Critical Technologies. The European Raw Materials Alliance also deals with related topics. To maximise overall effectiveness and efficiency, these instruments and the European Chips Act must be fully coherent and clearly linked. Coordination will be necessary between EU-level initiatives and the national projects that Member States are actively developing. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.1.

4.   Specific comments

4.1.   Strengthening research and technology leadership

| 4.1.1. | The EESC welcomes the European Commission’s intention to support next-generation technologies, such as < 2 nm transistors, disruptive AI technologies, and quantum chips. These technologies have great potential for addressing the future needs of strategic industries, including defence and aerospace, therefore it is crucial to swiftly develop and protect European IP in these areas. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.1.

| 4.1.2. | At the same time, European downstream industries, including defence and aerospace, will continue to require specialised chips of larger feature sizes. Therefore, the European Chips Act should not focus exclusively on the smallest chips but promote innovation for all needed chip types. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.2.

4.2.   Leadership in design, manufacturing and packaging

| 4.2.1. | The EESC welcomes the emphasis of the Chips for Europe initiative on close collaboration between supply and demand-side actors, and the envisaged advisory role of the Alliance on Processors and Semiconductor Technologies, that will both help ensure coherence of effort. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.1.

| 4.2.2. | The EESC firmly believes that it is particularly important for the resilience and autonomy of Europe’s defence and aerospace industry that the EU has its own capabilities to design future electronics, including for features such as cyber protection, AI capabilities, modularity and re-use. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.2.

| 4.2.3. | The EESC fully supports the creation of innovative pilot lines for prototypes. With a view to fostering synergies between commercial production and the strategically important defence and aerospace manufacturing sector, chip designs developed in this context should consider the unique requirements of these two sectors. Designs that aim to cover defence and aerospace needs should also have priority access to pilot lines. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.3.

| 4.2.4. | The EESC believes that, as strategic sectors, defence and aerospace should be prioritised for developing certification procedures. The development of standards will be pivotal. To maximise the potential for synergies, the Chips for Europe initiative could support the development of joint military-civilian standards in the European Standardisation Strategy. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.4.

4.3.   Boosting Europe’s ecosystem and ensuring the security of supply

| 4.3.1. | The EESC agrees that considerable and rapid public support will be required to incentivise the large private investments needed to reinforce Europe’s production capacity. Ensuring legal certainty and cutting to the maximum extent possible the red tape will be key in attracting these investments. It is thus essential to clearly define the criteria for designating Integrated Production facilities and EU Open Foundries and for authorising State aid, and to streamline administrative procedures. Criteria for coordinating the different support measures available should also be identified, to ensure an efficient and non-discriminatory application of State aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.1.

| 4.3.2. | The EESC welcomes the fact that the ‘first-of-a-kind’ principle provides for supporting innovation in terms not only of technology node, but also of process technology, performance, and sustainability. A complementary ‘EU-wide’ principle could be introduced to recognise facilities that directly benefit multiple states (e.g. by committing to supplying companies from several Member States on an equal footing). |
| --- | --- |

4.3.2.

| 4.3.3. | To avoid a costly subsidy race among Member States, the EESC suggests coordinating public funding at the EU level as much as possible (e.g. by making use of the Joint Undertaking and IPCEI framework and by coordinating the digital chapters of the national Recovery and Resilience Plans which are supposed to spend 20 % or 145bn EUR to the digital transformation). Adjustment in the application of the State aid control mechanism under Article 107 TFEU is also warranted to allow faster and more predictable assessment of public support. We note to this extent that, e.g., the Covid temporary Framework proved successful in ensuring timely and adequate support as well as the Guidelines on broadband support. While public support for Integrated Production facilities and EU Open Foundries can be supported up to 100 % of the funding gap, further guidance on the analysis is highly welcome. For instance, Integrated Production facilities and EU Open Foundries that also meet the EU-wide criterion could be eligible for faster aid authorisation. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.3.

| 4.3.4. | The EESC believes that, when assessing State aid, the Commission should consider additional objectives, for example promoting strategic sectors such as defence and aerospace, and ensuring coherence with EU sustainability goals. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.4.

4.4.   Addressing the acute skills shortage

| 4.4.1. | Digital skills are key for achieving Europe’s ambitions on semiconductors, and demand for them will continue to grow. The EESC therefore welcomes the focus on addressing Europe’s digital skills gaps and calls for the ambitious implementation of the foreseen relevant initiatives. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.1.

4.5.   Understanding global supply chains and anticipating future crises

| 4.5.1. | The EESC welcomes the strategic focus on mapping and monitoring supply chains and identifying disruption risks. Certain risks are particularly relevant for the defence and aerospace sectors, including the impact on suppliers of ESG policies, EU regulations like REACH, and the foreign and export policies of foreign suppliers’ home countries (e.g. US ITAR/EAR). |
| --- | --- |

4.5.1.

| 4.5.2. | This task demands an approach that reflects the complex, cross-border nature of supply chains and ensures coherence of information. The EESC thus calls for data gathering to be undertaken centrally by a single designated body at the EU level, to which companies across the Union would report following clear and streamlined requirements. Appropriate mechanisms should be established to ensure confidentiality of sensitive information provided by industry. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.2.

| 4.5.3. | Finally, it is important to have clarity on the rules that apply in ‘crisis mode’. For example, since most chip types are used across different industries, during a global shortage, companies from multiple critical sectors will likely need access to the same products and production capacities. Clear criteria for prioritisation of orders and allocation of products following common purchases are thus necessary. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.3.

4.6.   International cooperation

| 4.6.1. | The global semiconductor ecosystem is complex, specialised and highly interdependent. As such, efforts to boost production capacity and resilience at the EU level must be coupled with cooperation with like-minded international partners. Leveraging each partner’s strengths and developing coordinated strategies will promote synergies, avoid duplication of effort, and increase efficiency along the entire value chain.
  In pursuing cooperation with partners on chips, the EU should make best use of existing fora, such as the EU-US Trade and Technology Council, with the involvement of industry stakeholders, given their expertise and role in implementing projects on the ground. |
| --- | --- |

4.6.1.

In pursuing cooperation with partners on chips, the EU should make best use of existing fora, such as the EU-US Trade and Technology Council, with the involvement of industry stakeholders, given their expertise and role in implementing projects on the ground.

Brussels, 13 May 2022.

The President of the Consultative Commission on Industrial Change

Pietro Francesco DE LOTTO

---

(1)  TechNavio, Semiconductor Market in Military and Aerospace Industry by Product and Geography — Forecast and Analysis 2021-2025, November 2021; Gartner, ‘Worldwide Semiconductor Revenue Grew 10,4 % in 2020’, Gartner Press Release, 12 April 2021.

1

Semiconductor Market in Military and Aerospace Industry by Product and Geography — Forecast and Analysis 2021-2025

Gartner Press Release

(2)  Attinasi, Maria Grazia, et al. ‘The semiconductor shortage and its implication for euro area trade, production and prices’, ECB Economic Bulletin 4/2021, April 2021.

2

ECB Economic Bulletin

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| 23.9.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 365/34 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.9.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 365/34

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem (Chips Act)’

(COM(2022) 46 final — 2022/0032 (COD))

(2022/C 365/06)

| Rapporteur: | Dirk BERGRATH |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Dirk BERGRATH

| Referral | European Parliament, 7.3.2022
  Council, 17.3.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Articles 114, 172(3), 182(1) and 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Single Market, Production and Consumption |
| Adopted in section | 1.6.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 15.6.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 570 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 205/0/5 |

Referral

European Parliament, 7.3.2022

Council, 17.3.2022

Legal basis

Articles 114, 172(3), 182(1) and 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Single Market, Production and Consumption

Adopted in section

1.6.2022

Adopted at plenary

15.6.2022

Plenary session No

570

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

205/0/5

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The plan to make European industry more resilient and to strengthen the domestic semiconductor industry is to be warmly welcomed. In particular, the aim of improving transparency and cooperation along the value chain and reducing global dependencies in the areas of design, manufacturing, packaging, testing and assembly, through targeted promotion of the industry should lie at the heart of the Chips Act. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | However, the Chips Act does not focus on the whole ecosystem to the same extent, but places firm emphasis on a semiconductor segment that will be relevant to the industry in the future but has barely come into play to date. There should be improvements in, and additional focus placed on, chip segments that are really needed in the industry. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | The Chips Act will do little to help resolve current supply chain problems, the impact of which is now being seen in the motor industry and in mechanical engineering sectors, for example. The chip segments required for existing European industries should therefore be tackled with additional and specific measures to make these segments more crisis-resilient. This will not only strengthen and support modernisation of the existing semiconductor manufacturing industry in Europe, but, through improved security of supply, also help European manufacturing industries that rely on chips. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | For example, industrial policy choices should not only be determined by the feature size of chips, but also by a targeted needs analysis carried out among industrial customers to ensure that the planned support measures are properly focused. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | Additional criteria that should be applied include the energy efficiency of chips, the type of raw materials used for their production and the most circular form of production possible. The Commission, Member States and industry should therefore jointly discuss how to diversify sources of supply and, in particular, how to improve the recycling of critical raw materials as part of an industrialised circular economy in microelectronics. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | In particular, the EU’s chips strategy should not be limited to processors, but should deal with all types of integrated circuits, including passive components and packaging materials, as well as the manufacture of machines. The ‘from the lab to the fab’ principle put forward by the Commission does not go far enough, as the value chain does not end with manufacturing. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

| 1.7. | In order to ensure that staff with the right skills are available to implement the industrial policy support measures, the Commission is proposing a number of skills development measures. However, it is noticeable that the focus is very much on highly skilled workers. This is a decisive factor if the technological leap to a ‘< 10 nm semiconductor’ segment is to succeed. Nevertheless, the approach adopted should not overlook the fact that, for the industry’s ecosystem to be more firmly anchored in Europe, it will also — and especially — be necessary to facilitate access for workers who are not classified as highly skilled. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

2.   Introduction and general comments

| 2.1. | The EU Chips Act proposes to build on Europe’s strengths and address outstanding weaknesses, to develop a thriving semiconductor ecosystem and resilient supply chain, while establishing measures to prepare for, anticipate and respond to future supply chain disruptions. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | The Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem (Chips Act) (1) accompanies the Communication on A Chips Act for Europe (2). |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

3.   General comments

3.1.   Presentation of the proposal

| 3.1.1. | The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) welcomes the proposal, in particular the fact that it tackles the need to take action to ensure supply chain security as well as transparency and cooperation all along the value chain. The Chips Act addresses security of supply as being key to the success of the green and digital transformations. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.1.

| 3.1.2. | The EESC therefore welcomes the fact that dependence on suppliers from third countries, particularly in the areas of design, manufacturing, packaging, testing and assembly, has been recognised as being a problem. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.2.

| 3.1.3. | The EESC notes that the Chips Act will do little to help resolve supply chain problems, the impact of which is now being seen in the motor industry, for example. Chips now and in the future are and will be mainly used in the motor industry, although also in the white goods and mechanical engineering sectors, i.e. in particular semiconductors with dimensions > 16 nm. This chip segment should therefore be tackled with additional and specific measures to make this segment more crisis-resilient. This will not only strengthen and support modernisation of the existing semiconductor manufacturing industry in Europe, but, through improved security of supply, also help European manufacturing industries that rely on chips. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.3.

| 3.1.4. | The EESC welcomes the objective of strengthening Europe’s market position by improving connectivity along the value chain and, in particular, by focusing on those segments that are particularly cost-intensive and risky. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.4.

| 3.1.5. | It essentially applauds the proposed measures, as well as the requirements placed on Member States and industry. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.5.

| 3.1.6. | It deplores the fact that particularly the latter stages of production mentioned above — namely packaging, testing and assembly — will not be fully covered by the Chips Act and will thus continue to be vulnerable areas in the ecosystem. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.6.

| 3.1.7. | Here, the EESC regrets that the microelectronics ecosystem is not properly covered in the Chips Act, which focuses more on the leading edge segment. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.7.

| 3.1.8. | The EESC believes that the question of feature size, in particular the nanometre number indicated, is becoming less relevant. Given that the nanometre number no longer describes a real physical dimension (3), discussions should be reopened as to whether the exclusive focus on nanometre range is still useful or whether other criteria should be used in addition, relating more to the specific needs of client industries, but also reflecting the objectives of the green and digital transformations. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.8.

| 3.1.9. | Strategy should therefore focus on what industrial requirements need to be met in the coming decades in order to maintain and enhance the competitiveness of the European industry. In particular, the strategy should not be limited to processors, but should deal with all types of integrated circuits, including passive components and packaging materials, as well as the manufacture of machines, thus covering the full extent of the ecosystem. This strategy should likewise deal with general logistics, as well as the security of supply of commodities and critical raw materials. Furthermore, given the very dynamic nature of microelectronics markets, this strategy should also be reviewed regularly in conjunction with the relevant stakeholder forums to ensure it is up to date. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.9.

| 3.1.10. | The EESC welcomes the fact that the proposal likewise focuses on semiconductor segments that will reduce energy consumption in future-oriented sectors such as the ICT sector, particularly for data centres and cloud service providers. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.10.

| 3.1.11. | The EESC welcomes the designation of integrated production facilities and open EU foundries. However, the Commission is urged to define more clearly which indicators are to be used to measure whether they ‘have a clear positive impact on the Union’s semiconductor value chain with regard to ensuring the security of supply and increasing qualified workforce’. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.11.

| 3.1.12. | The EESC also welcomes the fact that the possibility is included of revoking such a decision if it becomes clear that an application for this status has been based on false or outdated information. The Commission should ensure full oversight to secure compliance. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.12.

| 3.1.13. | The EESC essentially welcomes the fact that the designated Member State authorities are to be empowered to collect information from the industry that will enable them to obtain an overview of delivery and value creation chains, as well as of the key players therein. It would be a good idea to make such information collection uniform throughout the EU, so that businesses do not have to adjust their responses to different requirements in every Member State. This would keep red tape to a minimum. To this end, it makes sense to consider integrated production facilities and open EU foundries to be in the public interest. It also makes sense to encourage Member States to set up national support programmes and authorisation procedures. Since the information thus obtained may contain sensitive data, it is important to keep it confidential. In particular, there should be transparency as to what happens with the data requested. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.13.

| 3.1.14. | The EESC welcomes the fact that skills shortages are specifically addressed, in particular focusing on the need to make the semiconductor ecosystem more attractive to young talent and on the fact that the existing workforce in the sector has a clear need for further training and retraining in order to plug the technological gap. However, the proposed measures for the latter group do not go far enough and more targeted programmes should be put in place to safeguard employment. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.14.

| 3.1.15. | The EESC welcomes the announcement of the establishment of a European Chips Infrastructure Consortium and calls on the coordinator and the Commission to take account of representativeness in the consortium’s composition, in particular ensuring that all parts of the semiconductor ecosystem are represented. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.15.

3.2.   Responses to crisis situations: Transparency and product prioritisation as valuable instruments to support security of supply

| 3.2.1. | The EESC essentially welcomes the proposal to put together a toolbox to ensure resilience to global market fluctuations. It will help ensure transparency along the value chain and thus contribute to improved security of supply. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.1.

| 3.2.2. | In particular, the early warning system — if all players fulfil their obligations and have the necessary confidence that the information is being handled properly — will help anticipate bottlenecks in supply and allow appropriate countermeasures to be drawn up. Here, steps should be taken to ensure that reporting options exist for all sectors and players and that, in particular, appropriate mechanisms are also put in place for business and social partners. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.2.

| 3.2.3. | The possibility of prioritising strategically relevant orders in integrated production facilities and open EU foundries, as well as in production facilities which have accepted this as an option in return for State aid, can be an appropriate means of ensuring security of supply; this does, however, also mean intervening in the market. The Commission is therefore urged to define more clearly the situations in which this is appropriate and can be expected. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.3.

| 3.2.4. | In public procurement, joint procurement projects can also be a useful complement to the above and will make raw materials and final products available that may otherwise be unavailable to individual Member States, or only available to a limited extent. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.4.

| 3.2.5. | However, in addition to these mechanisms, the Commission and Member States should also think about the strategic stockpiling of both critical raw materials and certain chip types selected on the basis of transparent criteria, in order to ensure security of supply in critical areas. In view of the plethora of chip requirements and ongoing technological developments, the Commission should develop clear, transparent criteria for deciding whether and where strategic stockpiling is appropriate. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.5.

3.3.   A comprehensive risk assessment needs to take the whole ecosystem into account

| 3.3.1. | The EESC welcomes the fact that a risk assessment will be carried out for all areas in the ecosystem and the entire value chain, in particular with regard to sources of raw materials in third countries. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.1.

| 3.3.2. | However, it stresses that a solution-oriented risk assessment also implies the need for a strategically managed reduction of critical dependence, so as to make the European Union more resilient. The Commission should therefore discuss with Member States how to diversify sources of supply and, in particular, how to improve the recycling of critical raw materials as part of an industrialised circular economy in microelectronics. To this end, it will be essential to discuss how the necessary infrastructure, such as dismantling facilities, can be built up, what product requirements will be needed for a recycling industry that is as comprehensive and industrialised as possible, and which certifications are useful and practicable in order to enable the raw materials to be recycled as quickly and as fully as possible. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.2.

| 3.3.3. | The EESC likewise underlines that promoting European production facilities will help achieve the objectives of the European Green Deal. Not only will supply chains and transport routes be shortened, but investing in state-of-the-art production technologies will reduce pressure on the environment and can focus on optimal use of raw materials, as well as on the greatest possible recycling of waste and on efficient drinking water treatment. Thus, production of the latest generation of chips will not only focus on improving the energy efficiency of chips, but also on diminishing their environmental footprint. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.3.

| 3.3.4. | The EESC stresses, moreover, that promoting European production facilities will improve compliance with minimum social standards, such as those enshrined in the European Social Charter and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, and thus improve the social footprint too. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.4.

| 3.3.5. | It points out that, for European industry to achieve strategic resilience, the whole semiconductor ecosystem needs to be taken into account. The ‘from the lab to the fab’ principle put forward by the Commission does not go far enough, as the value chain does not end with manufacturing. This principle is therefore only to a limited extent suitable for making the European market more independent of global risks. If the back-end segment of the value chain is not specifically addressed, the risk of natural disasters or interrupted transport routes, which has exacerbated the current supply crisis, remains much greater. As stated by the Commission in the Chips Act, the EU’s market share in the packaging segment is only around 5 %, i.e. significantly smaller than the market share of the whole industry. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.5.

| 3.3.6. | The EESC stresses that a comprehensive view of the ecosystem, including back-end processes, also contributes to achievement of the European Green Deal. For example, from an environmental point of view, it does not make sense to keep the front-end production process in Europe, then to ship the products to third countries for testing and packaging, only to reimport them back into the EU afterwards. In addition to the environmental issues surrounding this matter, the supply chains that are extended in this way are prone to much greater risk. The right balance has to be struck here in terms of open strategic autonomy, in order for the EU to become resilient without running the risk of being decoupled from the global market. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.6.

| 3.3.7. | The EESC therefore recommends that, particularly in order to avoid undesirable geographical segmentation and concentration of certain highly profitable or cost-intensive market segments, the role of the entire supply chain should be examined more closely and, in particular, the semiconductor strategy should attach more importance to back-end processes within the EU. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.7.

| 3.3.8. | It therefore suggests looking into and placing greater focus on advanced packaging technology that can be used in Europe in a cost- and energy-efficient manner, thus ensuring the EU is more independent of global risks and market fluctuations. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.8.

3.4.   Co-financing as a valuable measure for reducing risk and costs

| 3.4.1. | The EESC welcomes the fact that State aid is to be facilitated under the above-mentioned criteria, especially if the facilities concerned would otherwise not be available in the EU or only available here to a limited extent, and if they are of particular strategic interest. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.1.

| 3.4.2. | It also welcomes the fact that, in particular, the installations concerned must also be expected to be viable in the longer-term without further State aid, as well as the fact that there will be a strong commitment to promoting innovation in the EU’s semiconductor ecosystem in the future. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.2.

| 3.4.3. | The EESC stresses that incentive effects must be measurable in practice and that co-financing of undertakings already planned must be avoided in order to ensure that the funds allocated really do have a positive effect on innovation and employment in the whole semiconductor ecosystem. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.3.

| 3.4.4. | However, the EESC would like to see additional criteria, especially in view of the required ability to plug up to 100 % of a proven funding gap. Social policy criteria, such as the attitude of the undertaking concerned to social dialogue and collective bargaining, and priority cooperation with suppliers established in the EU — but also the number of additional sustainable jobs created by the investment, as well as the quality of working conditions — should all play a role here. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.4.

| 3.4.5. | The EESC also suggests that funding not concentrate on individual segments of the semiconductor ecosystem, but — in addition to the above criteria — endeavour to ensure that financial support is evenly distributed along the value chain. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.5.

3.5.   Skills and qualification measures as additional drivers of innovation

| 3.5.1. | The EESC welcomes the fact that the Chips Act includes a focus on skills and qualifications. Targeted public investment in education and training, and essentially in skilling and reskilling, is particularly crucial for the green and digital transitions to succeed. However, it is noticeable that the focus is very much on highly skilled workers and especially on post-graduate programmes. This is undoubtedly a decisive factor if the technological leap to a ‘< 10 nm semiconductor’ segment is to succeed. Nevertheless, the approach adopted should not overlook the fact that, for the industry’s ecosystem to be more firmly anchored in Europe, it will also — and especially — be necessary to facilitate access for workers who are not deemed to be highly skilled. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.1.

| 3.5.2. | The semiconductor ecosystem must be made more attractive to employees. In addition to attractive post-graduate programmes, an approach that takes the whole education system into account is recommended. The ecosystem should be promoted in secondary education establishments, for example by revamping science curricula to address the specific needs of the ecosystem. This will enable early career planning and associated decision-making. Simplified access to high-quality, tailor-made and paid traineeships, job-shadowing and mentoring programmes in the industry, as well as up-to-date professional information opportunities, can further enhance the attractiveness of the sector. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.2.

| 3.5.3. | Finally, it is also important to train those already working in the semiconductor ecosystem to deal with new production methods and the specific requirements of the design and production of < 10 nm semiconductors, in order to allow a seamless transition to the next generation of technology. To this end, the creation of a European network of competence centres should be welcomed; care should be taken here to provide targeted measures in practice to train those already employed in the industry. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.3.

| 3.5.4. | In order to ensure that the green and digital transformations are successful, particular attention should be paid to upskilling and reskilling workers employed in industries and regions that are now undergoing structural change or will be doing so in the future. An active industrial policy should aim to take particular account of those regions affected by deindustrialisation and disproportionate outward migration of people of working age and to incentivise investment in these regions. There should also be a debate on how to combine upskilling and reskilling measures with short-time work or unemployment benefits and on how affected workers are to be offered the opportunity to retrain in this domain, possibly through transfer companies. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.4.

| 3.5.5. | Member States, for their part, should also be encouraged to set up programmes and to enshrine these in their national skills strategies. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.5.

Brussels, 15 June 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  COM(2022) 46 final.

1

(2)  COM(2022) 45 final.

2

(3)  https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=9063714.

3

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| 23.9.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 365/40 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.9.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 365/40

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe, as regards the Chips Joint Undertaking’

(COM(2022) 47 final — 2022/0033 (NLE))

(2022/C 365/07)

| Rapporteur: | Stoyan TCHOUKANOV |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Stoyan TCHOUKANOV

| Referral | Council, 16.3.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Single Market, Production and Consumption |
| Adopted in section | 1.6.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 15.6.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 570 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 207/0/5 |

Referral

Council, 16.3.2022

Legal basis

Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Single Market, Production and Consumption

Adopted in section

1.6.2022

Adopted at plenary

15.6.2022

Plenary session No

570

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

207/0/5

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | Semiconductors are at the heart of strong geopolitical interests, giving countries the conditions to be able to act (militarily, economically and industrially) and to foster digital and ecological transitions. They are essential for strategic and industrial autonomy. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | Therefore, the EESC shares the strategic objective of increasing the strength of Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem and agrees that Europe needs to attract investment to design and produce the most advanced chips, but it believes that strength would be better achieved if European researchers, engineers and the skilled workforce were encouraged to stay in Europe through, among other things, financial incentives and competitive career opportunities compared to what is offered in Asia or the USA. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | Given the urgent need to act, no impact assessment was carried out and no online public consultation was foreseen. The EESC takes this opportunity to raise some concerns about the absence of an impact assessment in the proposal. The EESC understands that a technical impact assessment of standard length would have taken too long to deliver due to the urgent situation, but the EESC believes that the Commission should have at least provided a smart matrix for dynamic simulation to help the co-legislators and civil society to foresee the potential impact of the proposal. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | The EESC’s concern about the budget allocated to the Chips Joint Undertaking is reinforced by the absence of an impact assessment, because civil society cannot form its own opinion on the rationale or methodology used by the Commission to define the budget. The Legislative Financial Statement annexed to the Chips Act is not suficient. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | The EESC believes that intellectual property is such a key element to compensate the investments and research efforts of EU innovators, while meeting the needs of implementers/users, and to make it possible to drive innovative semiconductors and create a solid state-of-the-art European chip ecosystem that it should be mentioned in the provisions of the proposal, and not only the explanatory memorandum, which has no legally binding effects. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | The proposed Chips Joint Undertaking notably aims at reducing risks and uncertainties for industry that are related to investing in research and innovation activities and new technologies by sharing risks and providing investment predictability. A US chipmaker unveiled plans to invest up to USD 88 billion across Europe as part of an ambitious expansion aimed at reducing imbalances in the global semiconductor supply chain and shows the positive reaction from the investors for the proposed EU Chips Act. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

2.   Introduction

| 2.1. | Automobiles, computers, smartphones, applications and infrastructures for health, energy, security, communication and industrial automation: in recent months, many sectors have been experiencing delays in delivery. The reason for this is a shortage of semiconductors, the very small components that equip our technological devices. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | Semiconductors are at the heart of strong geopolitical interests, giving countries the conditions to be able to act (militarily, economically and industrially) and to foster digital and ecological transitions. Russia’s war against Ukraine is likely to have many side effects in the medium to long term for the semiconductor industry, a top priority for EU digital sovereignty. The production of neon, palladium and C4F6, three materials that are crucial and irreplaceable for microchips, will be impacted by the situation. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.3. | The United States dominates the design of semiconductors and, in addition, in January 2021 the US Congress passed the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) for America Act. Asian production is concentrated particularly in Taiwan and provides around 70 % of the total production and 90 % of the most technologically advanced chips. While the current shortages are partly due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the importance of the economic competition between Washington and Beijing should not be overlooked. This context of economic competition places Taiwan at the forefront of this technological competition between the two powers. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | In this context, the aim of the proposed regulation is to jointly create a state-of-the-art European chip ecosystem, including production. It amends the current proposals to build on Europe’s strengths and address outstanding weaknesses, to develop a thriving semiconductor ecosystem and resilient supply chain, while setting measures to prepare, anticipate and respond to future supply chain disruptions. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

| 2.5. | The proposal for a Council Regulation amending Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe (‘the proposal’) complements the proposal for a Chips Act. One of the goals of the proposed Chips Act is to set up the Chips for Europe Initiative to support large-scale capacity building. The actions under the initiative will be primarily implemented through the Chips Joint Undertaking, i.e. the amended and renamed current Key Digital Technologies Joint Undertaking. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

| 2.6. | The EU budget will support the Chips for Europe Initiative with a total of up to EUR 3,3 billion, including EUR 1,65 billion via the Horizon Europe programme and EUR 1,65 billion via the Digital Europe Programme. Out of this total amount, EUR 2,875 billion will be implemented through the Chips Joint Undertaking. |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

3.   General comments

3.1.   Human capital

| 3.1.1. | The EESC notes that the objective is not to become self-sufficient, which is not an achievable target, as interdependencies remain strong in supply chains with third countries, but to speed up the process of achieving strategic autonomy, technological sovereignty and reform the global competition framework by reinforcing the common industrial policy in the EU. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.1.

| 3.1.2. | The EESC shares the strategic objective of increasing the strength of Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem and agrees that Europe needs to attract investment to design and produce the most advanced chips, but it believes that strength would be better achieved if European researchers, engineers and the skilled workforce were encouraged to stay in Europe through, among other things, financial incentives and competitive career opportunities compared to what is offered in Asia or the USA. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.2.

| 3.1.3. | One of the goals of the Chips Act package is to support large-scale capacity building through investment into cross-border research to enable the development of cutting-edge and next-generation semiconductor technologies including emphasis on start-ups and scale-ups. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.3.

| 3.1.4. | The proposal provides a focus on supporting investment into cross-border and openly accessible research, development and innovation infrastructures set up in the European Union. The EESC notes that to achieve these goals, the EU must be able to rely on human capital, on researchers, as they are the only ones who can develop the innovation potential of the EU. The EESC wonders what concrete actions are being taken to ensure that our EU researchers do not seek to emigrate outside the EU and to ensure their active role in the foreseen network of competence centres across Europe? |
| --- | --- |

3.1.4.

| 3.1.5. | Researchers and young engineers generally perceive remuneration and career progression to be better in non-EU countries. In this respect, the EESC asks the Commission to provide statistics in this regard that would make it possible to assess the trends in terms of brain-drain to other research and competence centres. A programme to speed up the process of recognition of foreign specialists may attract additional resources to the project. In effect, the objectives of the proposal will remain meaningless without researchers, engineers and a skilled workforce willing to work and stay in the EU. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.5.

3.2.   Impact assessment

| 3.2.1. | Given the urgent need to act, no impact assessment was carried out and no online public consultation was foreseen. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.1.

| 3.2.2. | The urgency cannot be denied. Since the end of 2020, manufacturers have been facing a shortage of components, particularly semiconductors. This shortage is due to a series of cumulative factors:






  — | Lockdowns related to the COVID-19 health crisis that put production on hold, causing delays in deliveries, |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.2.2.

—

Lockdowns related to the COVID-19 health crisis that put production on hold, causing delays in deliveries,

| — | Climatic conditions: severe droughts in Taiwan have notably impacted the manufacture of semiconductors, which requires a lot of water, |
| --- | --- |

—

Climatic conditions: severe droughts in Taiwan have notably impacted the manufacture of semiconductors, which requires a lot of water,

| — | Increased demand for electronic equipment (computers, etc.), |
| --- | --- |

—

Increased demand for electronic equipment (computers, etc.),

| — | The rise of electric vehicles, |
| --- | --- |

—

The rise of electric vehicles,

| — | The growing interest in mining cryptocurrencies requiring graphics processors composed of semiconductors, |
| --- | --- |

—

The growing interest in mining cryptocurrencies requiring graphics processors composed of semiconductors,

| — | The deployment of 5G which requires semiconductors in peripherals, |
| --- | --- |

—

The deployment of 5G which requires semiconductors in peripherals,

| — | Plant automation, as part of industry 4.0 projects, which use semiconductors. |
| --- | --- |

—

Plant automation, as part of industry 4.0 projects, which use semiconductors.

| 3.2.3. | The EESC believes that the urgency is not the only issue, the problem is that 70 % of semiconductors are manufactured by the TSMC and Samsung Electronics. Faced with high demand, they must prioritise certain customers and building a new production plant takes two to three years (1). |
| --- | --- |

3.2.3.

| 3.2.4. | The EESC takes the opportunity to raise some concerns about the absence of an impact assessment in the proposal. In April 2021, the European Commission launched its Better Regulation Agenda with a view to ‘joining forces to make better laws’ (2). It introduces the ‘one in, one out’ approach which will become a key axis of EU policy from 2022 onwards. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.4.

| 3.2.5. | The EESC understands that a technical impact assessment of standard length would have taken too long to deliver due to the urgent situation, and would have been useless in practice, but it believes that the Commission should have at least provided a smart matrix for dynamic simulation to help the co-legislators and civil society foresee the potential impact of the proposal. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.5.

| 3.2.6. | The absence of an impact assessment has a negative consequence on the possibility of the EESC to form its own opinion on the rationale and methodology used by the Commission to define the budget of the Chips Joint Undertaking. The Legislative Financial Statement annexed to the Chips Act is not sufficient either. Civil society needs to precisely and concretely know where the financing comes from and where it goes. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.6.

3.3.   Intellectual property

| 3.3.1. | Intellectual property (IP) is a dangerously overloaded term. In the most general sense, it means any knowledge that is owned by someone. An example is a patent. The patent acknowledges the ownership of the knowledge and provides the terms of protection for it. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.1.

| 3.3.2. | However, in the semiconductor industry, the term is well understood to mean a design or verification unit that is pre-packed and available for licensing. Semiconductor IP (SIP) and design IP (DIP) are generally the same thing and often just referred to as IP, IP blocks or IP cores. It is a piece of the design, such as a processor, that has been pre-verified and can be included in someone else’s design. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.2.

| 3.3.3. | In practice, the legal and managerial effort required to negotiate licences also often exceeds the benefits of licensing IP designs. Semiconductor firms have therefore often used their IP in the form of patents. Large patent portfolios can be used both to limit competition and to improve their competitive position through cross-licensing. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.3.

| 3.3.4. | The explanatory memorandum of the proposal refers to ‘user communities with ... intellectual property (IP)’, it mentions IP users but it keeps silent on the IP rights-holder. Then, it states that ‘competence centres will facilitate open, transparent, and non-discriminatory access to and effective use of the design infrastructure and the pilot lines’. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.4.

| 3.3.5. | Therefore, the EESC wonders whether the ‘non-discriminatory access’ refers to the FRAND SEPs licensing approach. If so, the proposal should guarantee a balanced and pragmatic approach to FRAND licensing, one that focuses on increased transparency and finding a middle ground that will appropriately compensate EU innovators while meeting the needs of implementers/users and make it possible to drive innovation. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.5.

| 3.3.6. | Last but not least, the EESC believes that IP is such a key element to achieve the goals of the proposal that it should be explicitly mentioned in the provisions of the proposal and not only the explanatory memorandum, which has no legally binding effects. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.6.

Brussels, 15 June 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  Journal du Net. 2/11/2021.

1

(2)  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Better regulation: Joining forces to make better laws, COM/2021/219 final.

2

Better regulation: Joining forces to make better laws

---

| 23.9.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 365/44 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.9.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 365/44

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on fluorinated greenhouse gases, amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 517/2014’

(COM(2022) 150 final — 2022/0099 (COD))

(2022/C 365/08)

| Rapporteur: | Kęstutis KUPŠYS |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Kęstutis KUPŠYS

| Referral | European Parliament, 5.5.2022
  Council, 10.5.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 192(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Section for Agriculture, Rural Development and the Environment |
| Adopted in section | 31.5.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 15.6.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 570 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 140/1/6 |

Referral

European Parliament, 5.5.2022

Council, 10.5.2022

Legal basis

Article 192(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Section for Agriculture, Rural Development and the Environment

Adopted in section

31.5.2022

Adopted at plenary

15.6.2022

Plenary session No

570

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

140/1/6

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The revision of the F-gas Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 517/2014) (1), proposed by the Commission on 5 April 2022 (2), is a step in the right direction. The EESC sees room for more ambition, to make sure that European businesses and households are not burdened with a climate-damaging stock of equipment for decades to come, and to maintain global EU leadership in climate action by adopting best-in-class green technological solutions. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | Many hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) have considerable global warming potential (GWP). Thus, improving the Commission’s current proposal presents an additional opportunity to significantly reduce direct climate impacts by avoiding the uptake of high-GWP HFCs, and transition directly to low-GWP, F-gas-free alternatives. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | For heat pumps, room air-conditioners, chillers, and refrigeration applications alternatives with low-GWP natural refrigerants are available. The EESC is in favour of a ban on all refrigerants with a GWP > 5 after 2030 for these appliances. In the Committee’s view, a sectoral ban sends a clear message to the market, is administratively easy to implement, and faces a low risk of circumvention. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | The Committee strongly recommends combining REPower EU (3) ambition with the F-gas phase-out, aiming for refrigerants with the lowest possible GWP, especially in the field of heat pumps. The EESC believes that fears of market bottlenecks in the sector are unfounded due to the increased production capacity of the industry, which will be mostly based on natural refrigerants. The EU has a clear opportunity to make this an exemplary case in setting global green standards. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | A quota system was expected to discourage the use of high-GWP gases, but this has not sufficiently helped to change the market. It is evident that illegal trade in these gases has increased to fill the continued market demand. The Committee calls for a mechanism to increase income from quota sales. This income can be earmarked to boost customs controls at Member State level, to help with the adoption of low-GWP alternatives and to provide sufficient training to the installers of the equipment concerned. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | Addressing training needs on HFC alternatives is key. Skilled technicians, as well as qualification, certification and registration schemes are essential for promoting low-GWP natural refrigerants. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

2.   General comments

Introduction

| 2.1. | Fluorinated gases are important greenhouse gases (GHG). HFC emissions could, in the absence of a regulation, result in an increase of 0,35-0,5 oC in global mean temperature by 2100. Avoiding these emissions would have a sizeable influence on limiting global warming. Considering the near term (2050) timescale, decreasing HFC emissions would be incredibly effective in fighting the climate crisis (4). |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | Many HFCs have high global warming potential (GWP). Trifluoromethane (HFC-23) is the most potent known HFC with 14 600 GWP, i.e. a single kilogram of HFC-23 warms the planet as much as almost 15 tonnes of CO2. Concentrations of HFC-23 in the atmosphere are increasing at an alarming pace: from 21 ppt in 2008 to an all-time high 35 ppt today (5). |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.3. | Another similar gas — sulphur hexafluoride (SF6), widely used as insulation gas in switchgear — is considered the most damaging F-gas, as it has a GWP of 25 200. A typical heating and cooling device sold to a household in the EU in 2022 may contain F-gases with a GWP of more than 700, meaning that the approximately 0,5 kg of refrigerant agent contained in the unit has a CO2 footprint of 0,35 tonnes. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | Overall, F-gases are responsible for around 2,5 % of all EU GHG emissions. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

| 2.5. | Ozone depleting substances (ODS) are depleting the ozone layer and warming the climate. Some have been replaced with HFCs, that do not contribute to depleting the ozone layer, but do still contribute to climate warming. The EESC adopted the corresponding opinion (6) on the ODS regulation (7). |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

| 2.6. | The F-gas Regulation aims to reduce F-gas emissions by, inter alia, phasing down the use of HFCs in the EU. An HFC phase-down is also being implemented globally under the Montreal Protocol. The two regulations — on ODS and on F-gases — must jointly ensure that the Union complies with its obligations under the Protocol. |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

| 2.7. | The current F-gas Regulation aims to reduce the EU’s F-gas emissions by two-thirds by 2030 compared to 2014 levels. In line with the Climate Law, the new proposal will contribute to reducing emissions by at least 55 % by 2030, making Europe climate-neutral by 2050, notably through the following policy initiatives, as pointed out by the Commission:






  — | delivering higher ambition |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.7.

—

delivering higher ambition

| — | improving enforcement and implementation |
| --- | --- |

—

improving enforcement and implementation

| — | more comprehensive monitoring |
| --- | --- |

—

more comprehensive monitoring

| — | ensuring compliance with the Montreal Protocol. |
| --- | --- |

—

ensuring compliance with the Montreal Protocol.

F-gases in the context of the Green Deal

| 2.8. | The F-gas proposal lays down an ambitious HFC phase-down and includes a number of new bans on market products and equipment. This means that equipment and products with high-GWP F-gases will gradually disappear from the market. However, the Committee believes, it is extremely important to promote shifting directly to the lowest-GWP F-gas-free solution, avoiding intermediate solutions. EU markets demonstrate that this is feasible, and the EU should lead by example. |
| --- | --- |

2.8.

| 2.9. | It is imperative that the bar be raised in order to make sure that European businesses and households are not burdened with a climate-damaging stock of equipment for decades to come. It is also important to maintain global EU leadership in climate action by adopting best-in-class green technological solutions in all fields where F-gases are used. |
| --- | --- |

2.9.

| 2.10. | Phasing-out HFCs is a highly cost-effective way to contribute to meeting climate targets. According to the Evaluation Final Report of March 2022 (8), ‘emission reduction costs [...] were on average about EUR 6 per tonne of CO2 equivalent’. |
| --- | --- |

2.10.

| 2.11. | Heat pumps, room air-conditioners, chillers, and refrigeration applications are appliances and systems where alternatives with low-GWP refrigerants and natural refrigerants are available. The EESC is in favour of a ban on F-gas refrigerants for these appliances by imposing a limit of 5 GWP after 2030. In the Committee’s view, sectoral bans send a clear message to the market, are administratively easy to implement, and face a low risk of circumvention. Ad hoc exemptions could be granted where HFCs are deemed technically needed on the basis of the provisions in Article 16(4). |
| --- | --- |

2.11.

| 2.12. | For some uses, HFC substitutes are already on the market, including propane (GWP 0,02) and ammonia (GWP 0). The Committee urges boosting research spending to make use of these zero GWP solutions. |
| --- | --- |

2.12.

| 2.13. | The only sustainable policy for the EU would be the ‘green cooling’ approach that combines natural ultra-low GWP (GWP < 5) refrigerants, and energy-efficient appliances. Any kinds of F-gas blends, even low-GWP, bear challenges in operation, in particular for recycling and reclamation, and make maintenance and servicing much more complex. It should therefore be avoided. |
| --- | --- |

2.13.

| 2.14. | Existing heating and cooling systems need to be serviced and maintained, using current HFCs. The REPower EU Action Plan, which has set a target to roll out 30 million heat pumps in Europe by 2030, raised legitimate fears among stakeholders (9). According to industry representatives, the proposed new provisions under the F-gas Regulation could potentially slow down the much-needed adoption of heat pumps in Europe. |
| --- | --- |

2.14.

| 2.15. | In Committee’s view, an early prohibition of HFCs in new heat pump equipment will ensure that the heat pump roll-out is not threatened by HFC supply shortage to service existing equipment. It will help avoid locking-in large amounts of HFC banks. HFC banks require management and destruction measures; if not properly addressed, HFC leaks from equipment at the end of their service will have a devastating effect on climate. |
| --- | --- |

2.15.

| 2.16. | The market stock of high-GWP HFCs is critically dangerous: high-GWP refrigerants are widely used for maintaining existing equipment to regularly compensate for the continuous emissions (leakage rate may reach 15-20 % per year) which could be avoided thanks to technological progress. |
| --- | --- |

2.16.

| 2.17. | Therefore, the Committee strongly urges to combining REPower EU ambition with the F-gas phase-out, aiming for refrigerants with the lowest possible GWP. To put the number of heat pumps into perspective (30 million deployed gradually over seven years), global figures from the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) assessment could be used: almost 180 million heat pumps were used for heating in 2020, while the global stock increased nearly 10 % per year over the past five years. In the IEA’s Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario, the stock of installed heat pumps would reach 600 million by 2030. The EU's stake in this is fully in line with the proportion of households in the global context. |
| --- | --- |

2.17.

| 2.18. | The EESC believes that fears of market bottlenecks in the sector are unfounded, as the proposed heat pump uptake trajectory in Europe is mostly inline with the industry's production capacity expansion, which will build on the ultra low-GWP refrigerants (particularly the natural ones). The EU has a clear opportunity to make this an exemplary case in setting global green standards. |
| --- | --- |

2.18.

| 2.19. | In view of the factors described above, the EESC recommends the following to strengthen the proposal for a revision of the F-gas Regulation:






  — | further strengthening the HFC phase-down to be in line with 1,5 oC scenario of the Paris Agreement; |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.19.

—

further strengthening the HFC phase-down to be in line with 1,5 oC scenario of the Paris Agreement;

| — | banning the use of HFC-404A (with GWP of 4 728) and other high-GWP HFCs; |
| --- | --- |

—

banning the use of HFC-404A (with GWP of 4 728) and other high-GWP HFCs;

| — | reducing 150 GWP sectorial limits to the lowest possible GWP for any given technology; |
| --- | --- |

—

reducing 150 GWP sectorial limits to the lowest possible GWP for any given technology;

| — | promoting incentive schemes and public procurement for F-gas-free alternatives; |
| --- | --- |

—

promoting incentive schemes and public procurement for F-gas-free alternatives;

| — | supporting Member States in their efforts to incentivise greener solutions with very low GWP (and F-gas-free where possible). |
| --- | --- |

—

supporting Member States in their efforts to incentivise greener solutions with very low GWP (and F-gas-free where possible).

Environmental concerns

| 2.20. | In the transition to ultra-low GWP natural refrigerants or low GWP HFCs, conversions to substances like hydrofluoroolefins should be avoided due to their break down products, such as harmful trifluoroacetic acid (TFA). TFA and other poly- and perfluorinated alkyl substances (PFAS) are nicknamed ‘forever chemicals’ because they cannot be removed from the environment (10). Based on the precautionary principle, a clear link should be made to the Commission's proposed measures in its ‘zero pollution action plan’ (11). |
| --- | --- |

2.20.

| 2.21. | By phasing-down HFCs, a proper care should be taken about the substances replacing HFCs. The EESC calls for not tolerating new F-gas substitutes that simply replace the high-GWP problem with environmental issues. Instead, the Committee calls to take on responsibility to steer the transition towards truly climate and environmentally friendly F-gas-free natural alternatives. To refer to the European REACH process is not sufficient, because that process is lagging behind and will not prohibit dangerous F-gas substitutes on time. |
| --- | --- |

2.21.

Illegal trade

| 2.22. | Illegal trade in HFCs is a major issue in the EU. Although difficult to quantify, it is clear that illegal HFC trade has been occurring at significant levels. Various analyses indicate that illegal imports accounted for up to a third of the legal EU market (12). |
| --- | --- |

2.22.

| 2.23. | A quota system was expected to discourage use of high-GWP gases, but this has not sufficiently helped to change the market. It is evident that illegal trade in these gases has increased to cover the continued market demand. These dynamics reinforce the EESC’s argument for an outright ban of high-GWP gases. |
| --- | --- |

2.23.

| 2.24. | Unfortunately, illegal HFC trade has not been adequately taken into consideration in the proposal. The EESC calls for transparency and full HFC traceability throughout the supply chain. Solutions with QR-code-based markings have been proposed, and the Committee sees this as a cost-effective way to address the issue. |
| --- | --- |

2.24.

| 2.25. | The EESC believes that controls on the supply of HFCs should also be further upgraded in the field of e-commerce. The Committee calls for either a ban on the sale of F-gases in on-line marketplaces, or the introduction of mandatory certifications for undertakings selling bulk F-gases online. |
| --- | --- |

2.25.

| 2.26. | The strict control of all HFC imports and exports should be maintained, including gases for purposes that are exempt from the phase-down (e.g. for feedstocks, destruction, re-export or other exempted uses). Undertakings should have a valid registration in the F-gas Portal to avoid exempted cases being used to facilitate illegal trade. The Committee warns that list of exceptions in Article 20(4) creates a loophole in the licensing system that will certainly be targeted by illegal traders. |
| --- | --- |

2.26.

| 2.27. | To increase the efficiency of national customs authority action, the Committee asks that guidance be mandated for disposal of confiscated products, containers and equipment illegally imported into the EU, and for funding to be allocated to the Member States for its destruction, should destruction be the Member States’ chosen option. |
| --- | --- |

2.27.

| 2.28. | The fight against the illegal trading and disposal of F-gases should be aligned with the proposals in the Directive on the protection of the environment through criminal law (13), which aims to protect the environment more effectively by obliging Member States to take criminal law measures, and by fostering cross-border cooperation (14). |
| --- | --- |

2.28.

Quotas and resource allocation

| 2.29. | Thousands of new entrants have been awarded HFC quotas to import into the EU market. Many of these do not have access to infrastructure in the EU to meet the Regulation requirements to recover, recycle and reclaim the HFCs that they import. |
| --- | --- |

2.29.

| 2.30. | While the EESC welcomes new conditions for registering and receiving quota allocations, the Committee sees the potential to increase the allocation fee to better reflect real carbon prices. |
| --- | --- |

2.30.

| 2.31. | Clearly, the quota charge of EUR 3 per tonne of CO2 equivalent is too low to generate adequate income and discourage the use of HFCs in order to adopt natural refrigerants at a faster rate. |
| --- | --- |

2.31.

| 2.32. | The EESC also calls for reassessing the use of the financial resources collected from sales of quotas. |
| --- | --- |

2.32.

| 2.33. | The Committee is confident that these revenues should be earmarked for direct use for these purposes:






  — | to boost research in low-GWP alternatives, especially natural refrigerants; |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.33.

—

to boost research in low-GWP alternatives, especially natural refrigerants;

| — | to support Member State authorities in market surveillance; |
| --- | --- |

—

to support Member State authorities in market surveillance;

| — | to build skills and raise awareness, including awareness raising campaigns for final consumers; |
| --- | --- |

—

to build skills and raise awareness, including awareness raising campaigns for final consumers;

| — | to support both emergency and mid-term training for existing and future workforces. |
| --- | --- |

—

to support both emergency and mid-term training for existing and future workforces.

Training

| 2.34. | Addressing training needs on HFC alternatives is key. Skilled technicians, as well as qualification, certification and registration schemes are essential for promoting of low-GWP natural refrigerants. Certification is necessary for alternatives to F-gases, and not just for F-gases alone. The EESC calls for a mandatory competence on natural refrigerants component in certification programmes. |
| --- | --- |

2.34.

| 2.35. | Training and certification is a matter of subsidiarity and needs to fit the existing national schemes. In the proposal, Member States are given one year to update their programmes to include the alternatives, which some market actors fear is a rather short deadline. While timing is important, so too is the need for clear targets. The EESC recommends setting national plan obligations with clear KPIs, e.g. 50 % installers trained by 2025. |
| --- | --- |

2.35.

Global reach

| 2.36. | The alignment with the Montreal Protocol should take into consideration the fact that the Kigali amendment will need to be strengthened in the relatively near future in order to meet global net-zero targets. |
| --- | --- |

2.36.

| 2.37. | In this context, the EU is setting important impulses globally in the context of the Montreal Protocol. The proposal for the new European F-gas Regulation is being closely watched by all global players. The adoption of the Kigali amendment was a good first step in the right direction, however earlier and more ambitious HFC phase-down actions are needed. The EU could use its global impact through the so called ‘Brussels effect’ more efficiently. |
| --- | --- |

2.37.

| 2.38. | Therefore, the EESC sees an imminent need to initiate discussions under the Montreal Protocol to accelerate the progress of the Kigali amendment trajectory, with ambitious F-gas Regulation revision proposals at EU level serving as a lead in line with 1,5 oC scenario of the Paris Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

2.38.

Transparency and inclusion

| 2.39. | Despite the fact that the debates on F-gases are of crucial importance for several key value chains, the discussion around policy remains confined to experts’ circles. An effort should be made to expand this discussion to all stakeholders, with a wide civil society representation. The new Regulation on F-gases should mandate a consultation forum to be organised at least twice a year to be held at the EU level and in every Member State. |
| --- | --- |

2.39.

Brussels, 15 June 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  Regulation (EU) No 517/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on fluorinated greenhouse gases and repealing Regulation (EC) No 842/2006 (OJ L 150, 20.5.2014, p. 195).

1

(2)  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2022:150:FIN

2

(3)  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2022:108:FIN

3

(4)  https://acp.copernicus.org/articles/13/6083/2013/acp-13-6083-2013.pdf

4

(5)  Here, ‘ppt’ means ‘parts-per-trillion’. Data from Advanced Global Atmospheric Gases Experiment.

5

(6)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on substances that deplete the ozone layer and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1005/2009’ (see page 50 of this Official Journal).

6

(7)  Regulation (EC) No 1005/2009 on substances that deplete the ozone layer (ODS Regulation) (OJ L 286, 31.10.2009, p. 1).

7

(8)  Available here: https://ec.europa.eu/clima/system/files/2022-04/f-gas_evaluation_report_en.pdf

8

(9)  https://www.coolingpost.com/world-news/f-gas-quota-cuts-will-hit-heat-pump-ambitions/

9

(10)  See https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/publikationen/persistent-degradation-products-of-halogenated

10

(11)  COM(2021) 400 final, ‘Pathway to a Healthy Planet for All — EU Action Plan: “Towards Zero Pollution for Air, Water and Soil”’

11

(12)  See EIA (2022) report ‘Europe’s most chilling crime — the illegal trade in HFC refrigerant gases’. Available at https://eia-international.org/report/europes-most-chilling-crime/. An F-gas industry estimate available at https://www.fluorocarbons.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/EFCTC_Press-Release_EN-2.pdf

12

(13)  https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/proposal-directive-european-parliament-and-council-protection-environment-through-criminal-law-and-replacing-directive-2008-99-ec_en

13

(14)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the environment through criminal law and replacing Directive 2008/99/EC (COM(2021) 851 final — 2021/0422 (COD)) (OJ C 290, 29.7.2022, p. 143).

14

---

| 23.9.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 365/50 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.9.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 365/50

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on substances that deplete the ozone layer and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1005/2009’

(COM(2022) 151 final — 2022/0100 (COD))

(2022/C 365/09)

| Rapporteur: | Jacob PLAT |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Jacob PLAT

| Referral | European Parliament, 2.5.2022
  Council of the European Union, 10.5.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 192(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Section for Agriculture, Rural Development and the Environment |
| Adopted in section | 31.5.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 15.6.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 570 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 123/0/2 |

Referral

European Parliament, 2.5.2022

Council of the European Union, 10.5.2022

Legal basis

Article 192(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Section for Agriculture, Rural Development and the Environment

Adopted in section

31.5.2022

Adopted at plenary

15.6.2022

Plenary session No

570

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

123/0/2

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The EESC welcomes the proposal for the revision of Regulation (EC) No 1005/2009 (1), which has ensured that ozone-depleting substances (ODS) have been significantly reduced, but further reductions are possible. The few ODS that are still allowed are used in the production of other chemicals, as fire protection agents in special applications such as on board airplanes, and in laboratories for analysis. However, the now obsolete use of ODS as blowing agents in insulation foams is still relevant today as many of these foams are still in place in buildings. As they reach the end of their lifespan over the coming decades, they will be removed which could lead to emissions. Adjusting it to bring it more in line with the European Green Deal (2) and improving its structure are good initiatives. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | The EESC approves of this regulation’s consistency with the F-gas Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 517/2014) (3). It is important that the main rules of these regulations be consistent with each other (e.g. regarding custom controls, leakage rules and definitions). |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | The EESC notes from the various reports available and the evaluation carried out that the current regulation ((EC) No 1005/2009) is meeting its predefined objectives. However, it also considers it necessary to raise the level of ambition in order to meet the Green Deal objectives and simultaneously provide maximum protection for citizens against toxic, cancer-causing substances. The EESC therefore agrees with the measures in the proposal to further reduce ODS emissions. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | Good monitoring and registration are key elements to achieve a good result. The EESC is in favour of a monitoring system that is as transparent as possible and that can meet the need for expansion if necessary, for example, for new ODS not covered by the current regulation. The objective should be a universal system applicable in all Member States. However, it should also be easy to implement as a registration and monitoring system in countries outside the EU because of the pioneering role that the EU currently fulfils. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | The EESC also calls for the number of exceptions to the prohibitions to be kept to a minimum, and for derogations from the list of prohibited substances only to be possible in exceptional and necessary cases. The exempted uses should be strictly controlled in order to avoid abuse and thus a worsening of the situation. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | The EESC draws attention to the dangerous and unresolved problem of the accumulation of large amounts of ODS in old equipment and insulation foams, while at the same time no international convention regulates the management or destruction of ODS resources. The Committee calls for urgent action to introduce effective legislation in the Member States to prevent leakage of ODS in order to avoid endangering the atmospheric environment and the living conditions of the population. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

| 1.7. | Ideally, ODS management should be part of a waste management system (for control, collection, recovery and treatment) with overarching policies, legislation and regulations for specific waste streams already in place. The management of ODS in foams and other ODS banks is a huge challenge, especially for developing countries. The EU needs to demonstrate feasible solutions and an adequate legal framework. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

| 1.8. | Given the continued high level of production and use of ODS for feedstock purposes and associated emissions, which may be underestimated, the EESC is concerned that quantitative limits of ODS for feedstock use have been entirely dismissed. Narrowing feedstock exemptions under the new regulation has multiple environmental benefits. There should be a focus on environmentally friendly alternatives. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

| 1.9. | Measures to prevent by-product hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) emissions associated with ODS production should be strengthened, through additional reporting requirements. |
| --- | --- |

1.9.

| 1.10. | Measures to reduce emissions of new ODS should be put in place, including leakage reduction and requirements to recover, recycle and reclaim. |
| --- | --- |

1.10.

2.   Background

| 2.1. | The Montreal Protocol (4) on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer is the landmark multilateral environmental agreement that regulates the production and consumption of nearly 100 synthetic chemicals referred to as ODS. When released into the atmosphere, those chemicals damage the stratospheric ozone layer, Earth’s protective shield that protects humans and the environment from harmful levels of ultraviolet radiation from the sun. Adopted on 15 September 1987, the Protocol is to date the only UN treaty ever that has been ratified by every country on Earth — all 198 UN Member States. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | Regulation (EC) No 1005/2009 on substances that deplete the ozone layer (ODS Regulation) is the main instrument targeting ODS in the EU. Its general objective is to prevent ODS emissions and safeguard compliance with the Protocol. The ODS Regulation was submitted for a ‘REFIT’ evaluation, which concluded that, while the Regulation was generally fit for purpose, it could be better aligned with the European Green Deal and its design could be slightly improved. In this context, the proposal aims to replace the ODS Regulation, while maintaining a strict level of control, notably to:






  1. | align the measures with the European Green Deal by mandating additional emission reductions that are feasible at proportionate costs; |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.2.

1.

align the measures with the European Green Deal by mandating additional emission reductions that are feasible at proportionate costs;

| 2. | ensure more comprehensive monitoring of ODS, including of substances that are not yet controlled; |
| --- | --- |

2.

ensure more comprehensive monitoring of ODS, including of substances that are not yet controlled;

| 3. | simplify and improve the efficiency of existing rules to reduce administrative costs; |
| --- | --- |

3.

simplify and improve the efficiency of existing rules to reduce administrative costs;

| 4. | improve clarity and coherence with other rules. |
| --- | --- |

4.

improve clarity and coherence with other rules.

| 2.3. | ODS have a global warming potential (GWP) (5) many times greater than carbon dioxide, so to combat climate change and protect the health and well-being of EU citizens it is necessary to reduce their emissions. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | The Montreal Protocol is phasing out the production and use of ODS for emissive purposes. The EU rules on ODS have always been more ambitious than the Montreal Protocol and have completely phased out ODS for emissive purposes. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

| 2.5. | Because most production, usage and trade of ODS is already prohibited, the main purpose is therefore to prevent ODS emissions from formerly legal applications in products and equipment and from other processes, e.g. feedstocks, that are exempt from the Montreal Protocol phase-out. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

| 2.6. | The proposal for the ODS Regulation is closely related to the proposal for F-gases (NAT/847 (6)). Both are greenhouse gases and contribute to global warming. The two regulations must jointly ensure that the Union complies with its obligations relating to ODS and HFCs under the Protocol. |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

| 2.7. | The proposal aims to prevent the equivalent of 180 million CO2-equivalent tonnes and 32,000 Ozone-Depleting Potential tonnes (ODP-tonnes) by 2050 through measures to recover and destroy ODS from two types of insulation foam. |
| --- | --- |

2.7.

3.   General comments

| 3.1. | The EESC firmly supports the Commission’s proposal to change the regulation on ODS with the aim to reduce emissions even further and provide incentives to use climate-friendly alternatives. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | The EESC recognises that some measures in the current regulation aimed at preventing illegal activities could be made more efficient and therefore welcomes the connection of the ODS licensing system to the EU Single Window Environment for Customs (7). The EESC recommends that such measures also apply to special customs procedures including transit and temporary storage of ODS. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.3. | The EESC acknowledges the great importance of proper monitoring in order to be able to take preventive action and make progress. Illegal trading practices can be identified and thus addressed through effective monitoring and reporting. Considering the severe environmental impacts of illegal trade in ODS, the EESC welcomes the introduction of minimum standards for maximum penalties relating to unlawful production, import and placing on the market of ODS but urges additionally the introduction of minimum penalties. The new regulation fits in well with the Commission’s proposal to review the Directive on the protection of the environment through criminal law and to replace Directive 2008/99/EC (ECD) (8). |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

| 3.4. | The EESC strongly supports measures which ensure the recovery for destruction of ODS in foams, recognising the significant climate mitigation potential for this measure as well as the opportunity for job creation and R & D in the recycling industry. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

| 3.5. | The EESC welcomes the fact that coherence with existing policy provisions in the policy area has been carefully considered. This is necessary in order to ultimately achieve the objectives of both Fit for 55 (2030) and the Green Deal (2050). |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

| 3.6. | Given that the EU is a leader in reducing ODS, the EESC suggests that the EU should also lead by example when it comes to other economies to work with the same rules, for example by restricting ODS for feedstock and process agent uses where alternatives exist. In 2020, production of controlled ODS amounted to 164 704 metric tonnes, mostly for feedstock uses within the EU. Scientists have raised concerns that reported emissions from feedstock processes are underestimated and may account globally for elevated atmospheric levels of carbon tetrachloride (CTC) and CFC-113 (9). |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

| 3.7. | The EESC assumes that the revision will not result in an excessive administrative or financial burden. The proposal is expected to deliver a number of simplification benefits to business. It is also good that the revision can only be deviated from in very exceptional cases. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

| 3.8. | In the EESC’s view, the inclusion of new ODS not yet covered by the Protocol is a good improvement. In 2020, the production of new substances, in terms of metric tonnes, was about six times higher than the production of controlled substances. It is therefore important to monitor developments in this area, including the quantities used and produced and to minimise emissions of the new gases in order to minimise their effect on the ozone layer and climate change. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

| 3.9. | The EESC welcomes the updated impact assessment, in particular regarding the main emission savings measure of insulation foam recovery and destruction. The evaluation arrangement in the proposal is necessary in order to be able to assess the results in the meantime. Experts play an important role in this respect with regard to insulation foam and developments. The administrative burden must also be considered. |
| --- | --- |

3.9.

| 3.10. | The EESC welcomes measures to clarify the role of customs authorities and market surveillance authorities in order to control the trade of ODS. This is necessary because illegal trade is still occurring (10). |
| --- | --- |

3.10.

| 3.11. | The excessive use of ODS as refrigerants and foam blowing agents in the past has led to the accumulation of large amounts of ODS, e.g. in old refrigerators, insulation foam or cylinder. E-waste containing ODS can also release other toxic, cancer-causing substances: lead, cadmium, polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB), flame retardants and many more. As neither the Montreal Protocol nor any other international environmental convention regulates the management and destruction of existing ODS banks, it is each country’s own responsibility to establish a successful ODS bank management scheme to handle this important source of emissions. For these reasons, the EESC considers it important to secure the objective of protecting the atmospheric environment by preventing leakage and release through effective management of ODS banks. |
| --- | --- |

3.11.

4.   Specific comments

| 4.1. | The production, use and trade of ODS for emissive purposes is already prohibited. The EESC therefore supports the aim of the new proposal to prevent, in particular, emissions of ODS from products and equipment in which the use of such substances was previously permitted. A significant part of this is the obligation to recover or destroy ODS in certain types of insulating foam when buildings are renovated or demolished. However, the EESC notes that more can be done to support EU adoption of more environmentally friendly alternatives to ODS feedstocks and process agents. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

| 4.2. | The revision of the regulation will help to achieve the Paris Agreement (11) objective of ideally not exceeding a 1,5 oC degree temperature increase. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

| 4.3. | The EESC welcomes the requirement for a minimum level of training for staff working with ODS. However, we hope that these minimum requirements will be the same for all Member States. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

| 4.4. | The EESC notes that significant quantities of ODS continue to be used as feedstock in chemical production, despite the availability of alternatives in certain feedstock processes. Ongoing use of HCFC-22 is of particular concern, due to the high emissions of its associated by-product, HFC-23, which has a global warming potential (GWP) of 14 600 (12). The EESC notes that narrowing feedstock exemptions under the Montreal Protocol would have multiple benefits (13), and the EU should lead by example by banning ongoing ODS use for feedstock and process agents where environmentally benign alternatives exist. This could account for 38 % of all ODS used for feedstock in the EU. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

| 4.5. | Given the concern regarding ODS feedstocks and associated emissions, the EESC recommends that the potential for the Commission to adopt implementing acts to establish maximum quantities and emission levels and a list of permitted undertakings with respect to process agents (as laid down in Article 7(3)) be extended to feedstocks, by including an equivalent provision in Article 6. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.

| 4.6. | Considering the potential HFC-23 emissions associated with HCFC-22 use, the EESC welcomes the declaration of conformity as a first step towards combating this, and calls for further measures including reporting, verification and required disclosure of the production facility of origin, proof of HFC-23 by-product abatement and traceability. |
| --- | --- |

4.6.

| 4.7. | Recognising the concern over the impact of emissions of new substances including in Annex II (e.g. the rapid increase in atmospheric concentration of dichloromethane that could substantially delay, by more than a decade, the recovery of the ozone hole (14)), the EESC recommends that measures to require recovery, recycling and reclaim (Article 20) and leakage requirements (Article 21) are also applied to Annex II gases. Further, that undertakings shall have a valid registration in the licencing system prior to the import or export of Annex II gases. |
| --- | --- |

4.7.

Brussels, 15 June 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  OJ L 286, 31.10.2009, p. 1.

1

(2)  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52019DC0640&from=EN

2

(3)  OJ L 150, 20.5.2014, p. 195.

3

(4)  https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201522/volume-1522-i-26369-english.pdf

4

(5)  The Global Warming Potential (GWP) was developed to allow comparisons of the global warming impacts of different gases. Specifically, it is a measure of how much energy the emissions of 1 tonne of a gas will absorb over a given period of time, relative to the emissions of 1 tonne of carbon dioxide (CO2).

5

Global Warming Potential

2

(6)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on fluorinated greenhouse gases, amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 517/2014’(COM(2022) 150 final — 2022/0099 (COD)) (see page 44 of this Official Journal).

6

(COM(2022) 150 final — 2022/0099 (COD))

(7)  For more information on the EU Single Window Environment for Customs see https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/eu-single-window-environment-customs_en

7

(8)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the environment through criminal law and replacing Directive 2008/99/EC’(COM(2021) 851 final — 2021/0422 (COD)) (OJ C 290, 29.7.2022, p. 143).

8

(COM(2021) 851 final — 2021/0422 (COD))

(9)  Solomon et al. 2020. Unfinished business after five decades of ozone-layer science and policy. Nature Communications 11:4272

9

(10)  https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/how-company-earned-to-%E2%82%AC1-million-illegally-trading-ten-tons-of-ozone-depleting-substances

10

(11)  https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf

11

(12)  The compound HFC-23 (Trifluoromethane or CHF3), a potent greenhouse gas with a 100-year GWP of 14 600, is generated as a by-product during the manufacture of HCFC-22 (chlorodifluoromethane or CHClF2).

12

(13)  Andersen et al. 2021. Narrowing feedstock exemptions under the Montreal Protocol has multiple environmental benefits. PNAS 2021 Vol 118 No 49. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2022668118

13

(14)  Hossaini, R., Chipperfield, M., Montzka, S. et al. The increasing threat to stratospheric ozone from dichloromethane. Nat Commun 8, 15962 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms15962

14

et al.

Nat Commun

---

| 23.9.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 365/55 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.9.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 365/55

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2107 laying down management, conservation and control measures applicable in the Convention area of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) and Regulation (EU) .../2022 establishing a multiannual management plan for bluefin tuna in the eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean’

(COM(2022) 171 final — 2022/0111(COD))

(2022/C 365/10)

| Rapporteur working alone: | Javier GARAT PÉREZ |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur working alone:

Javier GARAT PÉREZ

| Referrals | European Parliament, 2.5.2022
  Council, 23.5.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Articles 43(2) and 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Agriculture, Rural Development and Environment |
| Adopted in section | 31.5.2022 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 63/0/0 |
| Adopted at plenary | 15.6.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 570 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 211/1/4 |

Referrals

European Parliament, 2.5.2022

Council, 23.5.2022

Legal basis

Articles 43(2) and 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Agriculture, Rural Development and Environment

Adopted in section

31.5.2022

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

63/0/0

Adopted at plenary

15.6.2022

Plenary session No

570

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

211/1/4

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The EESC considers it appropriate and necessary to transpose into EU law the recommendations adopted by the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), given that the EU is a contracting party to the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas and in order to comply with the conservation and enforcement measures adopted at its annual meetings in 2006, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2021. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | The EESC believes it is essential that all contracting parties comply with the recommendations adopted by ICCAT in order to ensure a level playing field for all operators. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

2.   Gist of the Commission proposal

| 2.1. | The main aim of the proposal is for the EU to transpose into its law the new conservation and enforcement measures adopted by the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (hereinafter ICCAT) at its annual meetings in 2006, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2021, as a contracting party to the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (hereinafter the ICCAT Convention) since 14 November 1997. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | The ICCAT Convention establishes a regional framework for the conservation and management of tuna and tuna-like species in the Atlantic Ocean and adjacent waters and allows for the adoption of recommendations that are binding on the contracting parties. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.3. | The proposal amends Regulation (EU) 2017/2107 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1), which already incorporated ICCAT management, conservation and control measures, as regards measures concerning the following species: tropical tuna, northern and southern albacore, sailfish and blue and white marlin. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | It also reviews billfish data reporting, shortfin mako sharks, the health and safety of observers in ICCAT regional programmes, the responsibilities of scientific observers and updates to the ICCAT species list. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

| 2.5. | Furthermore, the proposal also amends Regulation (EU) .../2022 establishing a multiannual management plan for bluefin tuna in the eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean concerning the Farm Member State annual carryover declaration and certain caging obligations. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

| 2.6. | In order to swiftly incorporate future ICCAT recommendations into EU law, the power to adopt acts is to be delegated to the Commission with regard to the following aspects: tropical tuna capacity limitations and the reporting of its annual capacity fishing plan; the annual carryover for bigeye tuna, North and Southern Atlantic Albacore tuna and North and South Atlantic swordfish; management plans for fish-aggregating devices (FADs); the number of instrumental buoys; requirements for and prohibition of FAD periods; restrictions on the number of vessels fishing for North Atlantic Albacore; the conditions for catching and retaining shortfin mako sharks; sea turtle survival; the minimum percentage of observer coverage and percentage coverage measurement; and amending the list of ICCAT species. |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

3.   General comments

| 3.1. | The EESC deems it appropriate and necessary to incorporate into EU law the ICCAT recommendations made at its annual meetings in 2006, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2021, as the EU is a contracting party to the ICCAT Convention and such action would therefore reflect the scope of its powers and the binding nature of these recommendations. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | The EESC believes it is essential that all contracting parties comply with the recommendations adopted by ICCAT in order to ensure a level playing field for all operators. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

Brussels, 15 June 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  Regulation (EU) 2017/2107 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 November 2017 laying down management, conservation and control measures applicable in the Convention area of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), and amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1936/2001, (EC) No 1984/2003 and (EC) No 520/2007 (OJ L 315, 30.11.2017, p. 1).

1

---

| 23.9.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 365/57 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.9.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 365/57

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013 as regards a specific measure to provide exceptional temporary support under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) in response to the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine’

(COM(2022) 242 final — 2022/0166 (COD))

(2022/C 365/11)

| Rapporteur-general: | Arnold PUECH D’ALISSAC |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur-general:

Arnold PUECH D’ALISSAC

| Referrals | Council, 25.5.2022
  European Parliament, 6.6.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Articles 42, 43(3) and 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Agriculture, Rural Development and Environment |
| Adopted at plenary | 16.6.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 570 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 188/0/3 |

Referrals

Council, 25.5.2022

European Parliament, 6.6.2022

Legal basis

Articles 42, 43(3) and 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Agriculture, Rural Development and Environment

Adopted at plenary

16.6.2022

Plenary session No

570

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

188/0/3

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is seriously hurting the European Union’s agricultural and agri-food sector. The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) therefore endorses the new measure intended to provide additional aid proposed by the European Commission. The Committee feels that this measure is absolutely necessary and calls on the European institutions to lose no time in adopting it. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | The war in Ukraine has revealed the geostrategic nature of the agri-food sector and the need to ensure the EU’s food security. Consequently, measures supporting the cash-flow of farms and agri-food SMEs are imperative to ensure their economic survival during this new crisis which comes on the heels of the COVID-19 pandemic. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | However, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) is already earmarked to meet existing financing needs and mid- and long-term commitments; it should not be used to finance emergency measures. Moreover, since some Member States have already used up or committed their EAFRD funds, the EESC considers that the Commission should identify another source of financing, outside the CAP budget, so that this measure can be implemented without limiting EAFRD funds in the coming years. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | Furthermore, in view of the exceptional circumstances of the present situation and the need for a swift response, the Committee considers that the Commission should reduce the timeframe for paying out the aid and simplify the eligibility criteria for beneficiaries. |
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1.4.

2.   Gist of the Commission proposal

| 2.1. | The Commission proposes to amend Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council (1) on the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) by adding a new Article 39c with the heading ‘Exceptional temporary support to farmers and SMEs particularly affected by the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine’. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | The measure envisaged would enable the Member States to make a lump sum payment to be paid by 15 October 2023 to farmers and agri-food businesses encountering cash-flow problems due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the resulting increase in the cost of inputs (energy, fertilisers and animal feed). |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.3. | The Commission proposal reserves this exceptional financial aid for farmers and SMEs engaged in at least one of the following activities:






  — | circular economy, |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.3.

—

circular economy,

| — | nutrient management, |
| --- | --- |

—

nutrient management,

| — | efficient use of resources, |
| --- | --- |

—

efficient use of resources,

| — | environmental and climate friendly production methods. |
| --- | --- |

—

environmental and climate friendly production methods.

| 2.4. | The support envisaged is capped at EUR 15 000 per farmer and EUR 100 000 per SME. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

| 2.5. | The Member States would have the option to use available funds of up to 5 % of their EAFRD budget for the years 2021–2022, amounting to a potential budget of EUR 1,4 billion in the EU. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

3.   General comments

| 3.1. | The war in Ukraine has badly exacerbated the situation of the agricultural raw materials markets, which were in trouble even before the Russian invasion. Prices for the main agricultural inputs have doubled and even tripled compared to what they were one or two years ago. These difficulties are compounding the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | In its communication of 23 March 2022, the Commission set out a raft of exceptional measures intended to safeguard food security and enhance the resilience of food systems. However, the present situation is unprecedented and further measures are needed. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.3. | The EESC therefore welcomes the Commission proposal, which could partially relieve the cash-flow problems of farmers and SMEs who have been struggling financially since Russia invaded Ukraine. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

| 3.4. | The Commission’s proposal is a welcome additional move to boost the EU’s food security and mitigate the unprecedented rise in the cost of inputs. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

| 3.5. | The EESC supports the proposed measure, and considers that it is very important that the European institutions adopt it as swiftly as possible. |
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3.5.

| 3.6. | However, the EESC is concerned by and wishes to draw the Commission’s attention to the source of financing for this measure, the payments schedule and the eligibility criteria and danger of an excessive administrative burden on beneficiaries. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

Source of financing

| 3.7. | The EESC would like to point out that the EAFRD (2), the second pillar of the common agricultural policy, is the main instrument for financing rural development. It therefore makes a key contribution to the ecological transition of both the regions and the agricultural sector by making them more resilient to climate change, fostering innovation and nurturing farms’ competitiveness. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

| 3.8. | The EAFRD is therefore designed to provide a long-term response to the challenges facing rural areas. It will be instrumental in delivering by 2040 on the development goals set by the Commission on 30 June 2021 in its long-term vision for rural areas (3). |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

| 3.9. | Neither the EAFRD nor the CAP as a whole should be seen as an additional source of financing in the event of an emergency. The EAFRD budget is already earmarked to meet existing financing needs and commitments that must be met. |
| --- | --- |

3.9.

| 3.10. | What is more, without an accurate idea of the budgetary appropriations and funds available, the total amount of aid which might be paid out to beneficiaries is purely hypothetical. |
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3.10.

| 3.11. | The EESC therefore asks the Commission to establish how much money will actually be available and to contemplate other sources of financing which will not affect the EAFRD’s goals or its ability to achieve them. |
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3.11.

Payments schedule

| 3.12. | The Commission proposal envisages paying out the funds to beneficiaries by 15 October 2023. The EESC is concerned about this lengthy timeframe, given the current concerns about the income of farmers and producers throughout the agri-food chain. |
| --- | --- |

3.12.

| 3.13. | These businesses are experiencing serious cash-flow problems right now. Many farmers need immediate financial support to stay in business; an exceptional aid payment at the end of 2023 is not a good fit for this emergency. |
| --- | --- |

3.13.

| 3.14. | Accordingly, aid should be paid out as quickly as possible so as to enable farmers and SMEs to cope with the current increases in production costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.14.

Eligibility criteria for beneficiaries

| 3.15. | The EESC is pleased that the financial support envisaged by the Commission is primarily intended for the farmers and SMEs which have been hit hardest on the basis of objective, non-discriminatory selection criteria. |
| --- | --- |

3.15.

| 3.16. | The Commission proposal also plans to allocate aid only to beneficiaries with one or more activities in the circular economy, nutrient management, efficient use of resources or environmental friendly production methods. |
| --- | --- |

3.16.

| 3.17. | These additional criteria would undermine the main purpose of the measure: to help businesses and farmers affected by the war in Ukraine. Furthermore, EESC members consider that these criteria would have the effect of adding additional layers of complexity to the applications to be submitted by beneficiaries. |
| --- | --- |

3.17.

| 3.18. | The eligibility criteria for this emergency aid should be kept as simple as possible in order to avoid piling up red tape which would dissuade potential beneficiaries from sending an application to the competent authorities. |
| --- | --- |

3.18.

| 3.19. | The EESC considers that farmers who already receive direct aid under the CAP and are affected by the fallout of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine should automatically be eligible for the exceptional aid financed by the EAFRD. |
| --- | --- |

3.19.

| 3.20. | This would mean that the exceptional aid proposed by the Commission is in line with the new CAP’s objectives of environmental, economic and social sustainability. At the same time, this system would avoid adding further criteria breeding confusion and complexity. This is an emergency: what is needed is pragmatic solidarity with the businesses and farmers who have been hit hardest (rising production costs or collapsing markets). Support for certain sustainable practices, such as the circular economy, should first be promoted by means of specific, permanent instruments. |
| --- | --- |

3.20.

Brussels, 16 June 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 (OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 487).

1

(2)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on CAP towards 2020 (OJ C 191, 29.6.2012, p. 116).

2

(3)  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — A long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas — Towards stronger, connected, resilient and prosperous rural areas by 2040.

3

---

| 23.9.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 365/60 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.9.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 365/60

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — Responding to state-sponsored instrumentalisation of migrants at the EU external border’

(JOIN(2021) 32 final)

(2022/C 365/12)

| Rapporteur: | Stefano PALMIERI |
| --- | --- |
| Co-rapporteur: | Pietro Vittorio BARBIERI |

Rapporteur:

Stefano PALMIERI

Co-rapporteur:

Pietro Vittorio BARBIERI

| Referral | European Commission, 2.5.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Plenary Assembly decision | 18.1.2022 |
| Section responsible | External Relations |
| Adopted in section | 12.5.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 15.6.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 570 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 142/2/5 |

Referral

European Commission, 2.5.2022

Legal basis

Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Plenary Assembly decision

18.1.2022

Section responsible

External Relations

Adopted in section

12.5.2022

Adopted at plenary

15.6.2022

Plenary session No

570

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

142/2/5

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The EESC believes that the EU’s response to the instrumentalisation of migrants should be based on a common, shared and coherent migration policy. In light of the Belarus border crisis and Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the suitability of the Pact on Migration and Asylum (PMA) needs to be reviewed so as not to fragment migration policy in the face of an emergency but instead ensure that policies and the protection offered to those affected come under one single action framework and legal framework. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | The EESC believes that the instrumentalisation of migrants is potentially still a threat to the European Union as a whole, not just to the Member States involved. Thus, the EESC stresses that responses will only be effective and able to rise to the challenge if they manage to integrate the level of the initiatives (political, legislative, administrative, humanitarian) with the scope of the action (community, national, local, international) and the actors involved (institutions, civil society organisations, social partners, the public, etc.), based on the highest standards of EU and international law. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | The EESC believes it is essential for the EU to provide Member States with timely, coordinated and effective support, both in material terms (budget resources and EU agency staff) and in terms of administrative, legislative and political assistance. This will require a concerted effort on the ground and at the interinstitutional level, initiatives will need to be fully transparent and freedom of action will need to be ensured for humanitarian organisations and independent media present in the areas where the instrumentalisation of migrants takes place. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | In particular, the EESC considers it crucial to establish an integrated framework for humanitarian action that pools together the resources and structures of the national and EU institutions and agencies and ensures the involvement of the international agencies (such as the UNHCR and the International Organisation for Migration) as well as the input of NGOs and civil society. This would foster the successful coordination of the work and ensure the recognition of humanitarian actions as an instrument for reinforcing the principles of the EU. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | In this respect, the EESC considers that the full and immediate recognition of the rights of instrumentalised migrants — avoiding grey areas or situations of administrative uncertainty — is key to weakening and diffusing the threat to the security and stability of the EU and the Member States involved, on the ground, rendering attempts to instrumentalise migrants ineffective. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | The EU’s response must definitely be aimed at the sources of the flows of instrumentalised migrants, involving third countries and supporting their efforts to inform the public in a spirit of cooperation inspired by the principles of democracy and protection of human rights. This will make it possible to drain resources from state actors who encourage the instrumentalisation of migrants. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

| 1.7. | Regarding States that promote or support the instrumentalisation of migrants, the EESC is in favour of multilateral action by the EU, the international institutions and partner countries, that has the power to condemn and isolate these actions, including through the use of suitable economic and diplomatic sanctions. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

| 1.8. | The war currently being waged by the Russian Federation against Ukraine has created at least 3,9 million refugees (1), who are now being hosted mainly by neighbouring countries, as well as other EU countries, in addition to several million internally displaced people. Europe at least, has never seen a flow of this size, even in the decades following World War II. This has been dealt with swiftly by the EU, in particular through the 2001 Temporary Protection Directive (2) and the Cohesion’s Action Plan for Refugees in Europe (CARE). The EESC believes that such instruments, which are inspired by cohesion, solidarity and a shared responsibility between Member States, are key to addressing the crisis of the instrumentalisation of migrants. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

| 1.9. | The EU is currently perceived as a safe place offering asylum and protection to millions of Ukrainian citizens. However, the burden of receiving and assisting migrants in terms of capacities and resources is distributed unevenly across the Member States involved. The opening of the EU’s internal borders has so far allowed the spontaneous movement of Ukrainian refugees towards their desired destinations. However, the burden borne by neighbouring countries remains visibly disproportionate to other EU Member States. Although not on a comparable scale, the instrumentalisation of migrants on the Belarusian border and in previous instances, suggests the need for a thorough review of the mechanisms of solidarity and cooperation between the EU and Member States, in particular in terms of the redistribution of assisted migrants, which is undoubtedly necessary in crisis situations. |
| --- | --- |

1.9.

| 1.10. | The EESC also wishes to comment on the spirit of the ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council addressing situations of instrumentalisation in the field of migration and asylum’ (3). We believe that the complex mechanism that defines the legal framework and administrative procedures for dealing with the instrumentalisation of migrants neglects the scale of the interstate crisis which could unfold in such a context and which cannot be separated from the approach to be taken vis-à-vis the migrants themselves. |
| --- | --- |

1.10.

| 1.11. | The EESC believes that while ad hoc instruments are needed to manage the instrumentalisation of migrants, it is essential to also consider measures for their timely and full protection based on the directive on temporary protection, particularly in cases where the management of entries at the borders, the monitoring of secondary movements and the presumed delays or derogations for ordinary asylum procedures prove to be inefficient and counterproductive in relation to the goal of protecting instrumentalised migrants. In any event, the level of migrant protection needs to be increased in relation to the level of interstate crisis observed in the context of the instrumentalisation of migrants. |
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1.11.

2.   Proposal

| 2.1. | The communication highlights that the migration crisis at the EU’s external border with Belarus (Lithuania, Latvia and Poland) is a deliberate attempt to stir up a continuing and protracted crisis as part of a wider concerted effort to destabilise the European Union, putting its unity and determination to the test. This constitutes a ‘hybrid threat’ carried out through the instrumentalisation of migrants by a third country. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | Far from merely describing this specific and complex migration phenomenon, the terms ‘crisis’ and ‘threat’ which appear in this draft opinion are used to point to the relevance of political tensions and instability factors emerging from this geopolitical context. |
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2.2.

| 2.3. | Not only does this pose a threat to EU security, it has also given rise to a critical situation on the ground, especially for the migrants involved, with serious humanitarian consequences on both the Belarusian and EU sides of the border. There are numerous stories of migrants being subjected to inhumane and degrading treatment on the Belarusian side, partly as a way of putting pressure on the EU. However, the risk is increased by the migrants’ protracted stay in the area and the inaccessibility of the EU border. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | The EU has swiftly and firmly condemned the instrumentalisation of migrants and vulnerable refugees in all of the Union’s institutional fora. The resulting international action has seen the involvement of and cooperation between the EU and partner countries, particularly migrants’ countries of origin. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

| 2.5. | In the face of a new crisis, the EU has taken action to support the Member States affected, taking into account the specific responses of national governments and parliaments, in particular the state of emergency declared by the border regions. The Commission has responded by duly providing assistance with a view to ensuring consistency between national legislation and EU law. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

| 2.6. | The communication summarises the political, technical and logistical measures taken to support the affected Member States. Starting with Commissioner Johansson’s visits and the Commission’s subsequent calls to Member States, political ties have translated into different degrees and combined forms of technical support provided by EU agencies (Frontex, Europol, EASO, and emergency aid provided through the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund) at the borders. |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

| 2.7. | In terms of international action, the Commission has taken action at the highest level, particularly in relation to migrants’ countries of origin and countries of transit, improving cooperation with Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and Uzbekistan. This is crucial in bringing down the criminal migrant smuggling infrastructure that perpetuates the instrumentalisation taking place in Belarus. |
| --- | --- |

2.7.

| 2.8. | In an interstate crisis there is a high risk of a ‘fog of war’ settling, enabling the spread of disinformation, fake news and distortion of facts, combined with the political instrumentalisation of migrants. The communication draws attention to this risk on the Belarusian side of the border, in particular the risk posed by Belarusian and Russian state-controlled media. It underlines the importance and, specifically, the role of a free press, although the finding is not given the same emphasis with regard to the crisis areas on the EU side of the border. |
| --- | --- |

2.8.

| 2.9. | The Commission stresses that further funding can be given in a crisis situation, drawing upon the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) and the Border Management and Visa Instrument (BMVI). Regarding returns (assisted voluntary returns and non-voluntary returns), the communication refers to the cooperation between the Commission, Frontex and the IOM while emphasising the necessary cooperation of migrants’ countries of origin. |
| --- | --- |

2.9.

3.   Comments

Instrumentalisation of migrants and management of migration policies

| 3.1. | The EESC believes that the response to the instrumentalisation of migrants should be based on a common, shared and coherent EU migration policy framework. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.1.1. | In order to manage migration efficiently, the EU must be aware that the initiatives of a single country are never the sole trigger of migration processes (although some of these initiatives may influence the volume of migration flows — and may do so significantly –), even when the country in question instrumentalises migrants for political ends. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.1.

| 3.1.2. | When responding to very serious crises (where a third country is actively involved, or resulting from war or military action) the EU must show solidarity, particularly towards the people affected. |
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3.1.2.

| 3.1.3. | Without prejudice to the need to rescue all those whose life is in immediate danger (refugees and war victims), distinctions relating to legal status (e.g. between people who are eligible for some form of protection and other migrants) can only be made after transparent asylum procedures subject to EU law and international rules have been followed. Distinctions relating to legal status cannot be based on theoretical assumptions about the phenomenon or crisis taking place using labels such as ‘hybrid threat’, ‘instrumentalisation of migrants’, ‘economic migration’, etc. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.3.

Hybrid threats and instrumentalisation of migrants

| 3.2. | The EESC agrees with the Commission about the nature and level of the threat posed by Belarus’s instrumentalisation of migrants. The EESC recognises the threat posed to the EU by forms of ‘hybrid threat’, i.e. ‘state-sponsored instrumentalisation of people for political ends’. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.2.1. | The definition of hybrid threat also uses an alternative phrasing: threats backed by ‘a state or non-state actor’. Hybrid threats can be made by different actors and aimed at different targets (state entities, institutions, social organisations or individuals). However, although this broad reading provides a general explanation, it must be seen as distinct from the identification of situations that are relevant to the policies in question. Therefore, the EESC stresses that for the purpose of introducing subsequent legal measures and in particular for the lawful treatment of migrants and to offer them humanitarian support in emergency situations, at least one state agent has to be involved in order for actions to be classed as instrumentalisation of migrants. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.1.

| 3.2.2. | Given the valid definition of ‘hybrid threat’ stated in the communication, the EESC hopes for a multidimensional and integrated response, i.e. one that is not solely focused on international relations (between Member States, the EU and partner States) but which also fits in with the EU’s policies and efforts for the promotion of human rights, protection of migrants and right to asylum. According to the EESC, all instruments of cooperation between Member States, and EU institutions and agencies must therefore be strengthened so that crises are managed jointly. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.2.

Solidarity, coordination and joint crisis management

| 3.3. | The EESC agrees that ‘these actions represent a real and present danger to the EU’s security’ and not just for the Member States directly affected. The facts presented in the communication and the serious crisis in Ukraine have strengthened the EESC’s belief that it is necessary to build a political, legal and procedural framework for Member States and the EU Institutions to adopt a common response to crises and manage these jointly. |
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3.3.

| 3.3.1. | Thus, drawing inspiration from its opinion on the proposals for amending the regulations on managing immigration and asylum (4), the EESC believes it is crucial to continue pursuing the approach of solidarity and cooperation between Member States. The reason for this is that the situation in question is not the only one putting an increased burden on the responsibilities and difficulties faced by countries of first entry, precisely because of the importance which the Pact on Migration and Asylum (PMA) places on border control and prevention of secondary movement. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.1.

| 3.3.2. | The much hoped-for specific regulation for combating the instrumentalisation of migrants by a state should provide for systems for a solidarity-based form of responsibility-sharing between Member States, including the possibility for swift relocation procedures proportional to the severity of the crisis. |
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3.3.2.

| 3.3.3. | The traits of the crisis at the Belarusian border highlight differences but also similarities with other state strategies that seek to instrumentalise migratory movements: the central Mediterranean, the Greek-Turkish border, the Spanish-Moroccan border, the Bosnian-Croatian border, the Serbian-Hungarian border (referring to 2021 alone). The EESC believes that the EU’s response must go beyond the actions taken in previous crises. In particular, it must avoid forming a dependence on the strategic policies of third countries which are not compatible with the policies and principles of the EU. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.3.

Safeguarding and protection of migrants in a context of instrumentalisation

| 3.4. | The EESC believes that the EU’s response needs to combine actions for countering the threat with a clear awareness that, in these specific kinds of situation, the migrants involved are highly vulnerable and in need of protection, particularly in the light of an interstate crisis. |
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3.4.

| 3.4.1. | The EESC shares the concern expressed in the communication about the humanitarian crisis that has developed at Member States’ borders with Belarus. While the difficulty of acting on the Belarusian side does objectively hinder humanitarian efforts in situations of crisis and interstate conflict, this should be taken as an incentive to boost efforts to ensure that within Member State borders the humanitarian assistance offered to migrants meets the standards required under EU law and complies with established practices for supporting vulnerable individuals. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.1.

| 3.4.2. | The EESC hopes for easier access on both sides of the EU-Belarusian border, for humanitarian civil society organisations to be able to provide humanitarian aid (medical support, food aid and legal assistance). |
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3.4.2.

| 3.4.3. | In this context, the EU institutions must counter any action or representation that criminalises acts of solidarity carried out by national and international civil society, as the EESC emphasised in previous opinions (5). |
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3.4.3.

| 3.4.4. | The communication draws attention to the presence of significant secondary movements of migrants (at least in relation to the number of migrants that reached EU borders during the crisis), pointing out that joint patrols are being carried out by the border police forces of Member States that are the first entry point for migrants and that are affected by secondary movements of migrants. The EESC believes that where there is instrumentalisation of migrants, the issue of secondary movements must be addressed together with the destination Member States. At the same time, due attention must be given to the most vulnerable migrants, especially during the acute stages of the crisis, in order to prevent further risks to their safety. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.4.

| 3.4.5. | The EESC also points out the risks posed to the dignified, fair and full protection of vulnerable migrants by the widespread use of legal statuses and exemption procedures in Member States and even the EU itself, even in the context of a crisis that calls for specific responses. Any derogations from the standard procedures for reception and asylum should therefore be matched with specific safeguarding and protection measures on account of the serious risk situation, as well as preserving the principle of non-refoulement. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.5.

Combating disinformation, protecting vulnerable individuals, and the role of the media

| 3.5. | The EESC welcomes the emphasis the communication places on countering disinformation, fake news and the distortion of facts, including through targeted information campaigns in countries where migration flows originate and through effective use of electronic information and communication tools the purpose of which is to provide migrants with accurate and verifiable information (e.g. Infomigrants). |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

| 3.5.1. | At the same time, in keeping with EU values, the EESC is conscious of the importance of the free production of information and free access to facts and data that are of interest to the public. As such, when emergency measures are implemented, Member States and EU agencies must always guarantee maximum freedom of action and communication for independent media present in areas where there is instrumentalisation of migrants, while also laying down clear and transparent rules for accessing structures that host migrants and have contact with them. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.1.

| 3.5.2. | With regard to countering logistical networks for migrant smuggling present on electronic platforms and social media, the Commission, with the support of the EU agencies (ENISA), must distinguish between tools that are directly used by migrant traffickers and communication tools used between migrants; the aim of this is to distinguish responsibilities and not violate data privacy rights or compromise, either indirectly or unintentionally, the safety of migrants who are the victims of instrumentalisation. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.2.

International cooperation to combat the instrumentalisation of migrants

| 3.6. | The EESC welcomes the measures taken by the EU institutions to strengthen cooperation with the countries of origin of migrants who are victims of instrumentalisation, with the aim of showing them the risks they face and improving international cooperation on migration. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

| 3.6.1. | Such cooperation should go hand in hand with the mechanism for international cooperation on development and with migration regulation agreements. This is also in order to ensure constructive joint action between the EU and the third countries concerned. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.1.

| 3.6.2. | The establishment of any agreements and procedures with third countries must be subject to these relations respecting human rights and the international legal commitments made by those countries. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.2.

| 3.6.3. | Such cooperation would also boost the efforts of police and intelligence services to prevent and combat criminal organisations involved in smuggling while fully respecting migrants’ asylum and protection rights both in cases linked to the instrumentalisation of migrants and in general (6). |
| --- | --- |

3.6.3.

Support for Member States

| 3.7. | The EESC welcomes the support given to Member States that are under threat, in particular through the EU home affairs agencies (Frontex, EUAA, the civil protection mechanism); it believes these agencies must operate in all cases where an emergency situation is identified, following a balanced and transparent procedure (7). |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

| 3.7.1. | The EESC believes that, going forward, Member States facing such threats must be offered an appropriate level of assistance. An equally high level of protection and assistance must be given to victims of instrumentalisation, first and foremost to the most vulnerable. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.1.

| 3.7.2. | The EESC is clear that the measures put in place by Member States for both the voluntary and non-voluntary return of migrants who are not granted the right to asylum, must be implemented in emergency situations too, in full respect of basic rights and international obligations and with the support of the EU agencies. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.2.

Tools and regulations for the future management of crises

| 3.8. | The EESC emphasises that this opinion takes account of the measures being discussed and processed at the time of drafting, in particular the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council addressing situations of instrumentalisation in the field of migration and asylum. The proposal sets out rules concerning the status of migrants and the procedures for requesting asylum and international protection in such situations. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

| 3.8.1. | In this respect, the EESC hopes that the regulation will take into account the security needs of Member States and that together with them it will set out legal commitments to address the emergency and guarantee migrant protection rights based on international obligations and EU law. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.1.

| 3.8.2. | Specifically, the Commission and delegated bodies must check that laws which have been or are in the process of being adopted in Member States to tackle the current crisis and prevent future crises, respect basic rights and EU rights. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.2.

| 3.8.3. | When looking at this regulation, the EESC will closely assess the exemptions and derogations from the standard procedures for entry and asylum, the right to appeal against a refusal, procedures for returns, and the full transparency and cooperation between the Member States facing an emergency and the EU institutions and agencies. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.3.

Brussels, 15 June 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

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(1)  5 317 219 refugees in neighbouring and EU countries (figure as at 26 April 2022, source: UNHCR, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine).

1

(2)  Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 of 4 March 2022 establishing the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine within the meaning of Article 5 of Directive 2001/55/EC, and having the effect of introducing temporary protection (OJ L 71, 4.3.2022, p. 1) (Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof (OJ L 212, 7.8.2001, p. 12)).

2

(3)  See COM(2021) 890 final — 2021/0427 (COD) ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council addressing situations of instrumentalisation in the field of migration and asylum’.

3

(4)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on a new Pact on Migration and Asylum (COM(2020) 609 final) (OJ C 123, 9.4.2021, p. 15); Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on asylum and migration management and amending Council Directive 2003/109/EC and the proposed Regulation (EU) XXX/XXX [Asylum and Migration Fund] (COM(2020) 610 final — 2020/0279 (COD)) — Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council addressing situations of crisis and force majeure in the field of migration and asylum (COM(2020) 613 final — 2020/0277 (COD)) (OJ C 155, 30.4.2021, p. 58).

4

force majeure

(5)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘The protection of unaccompanied minors in Europe’ (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 429, 11.12.2020, p. 24).

5

(6)  See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — A renewed EU action plan against migrant smuggling (2021-2025) (COM(2021) 591 final].

6

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — A renewed EU action plan against migrant smuggling (2021-2025)

(7)  Upon the request of a Member State, endorsed by a subsequent Commission proposal and by a Council deliberation, and adopting mechanisms to constantly monitor and report on the situation. See COM(2021) 890 final — 2021/0427 (COD) Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council addressing situations of instrumentalisation in the field of migration and asylum.

7

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council addressing situations of instrumentalisation in the field of migration and asylum.

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| 23.9.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 365/66 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.9.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 365/66

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Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down rules for the exercise of the Union’s rights in the implementation and enforcement of the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the other part’

(COM(2022) 89 final — 2022/0068 (COD))

(2022/C 365/13)

| Rapporteur: | Jack O’CONNOR |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Jack O’CONNOR

| Referral | Council, 22.3.2022
  European Parliament, 23.3.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 43 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (1) (fisheries), Articles 91 and 100 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (transport), Articles 173, 182, 188 and 189 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Union programmes), Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (common commercial policy), Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (the Economic and Social Committee). |
| Plenary Assembly decision | 22.3.2022 |
| Section responsible | Section for External Relations |
| Adopted in section | 12.5.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 15.6.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 570 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 202/0/5 |

Referral

Council, 22.3.2022

European Parliament, 23.3.2022

Legal basis

Article 43 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (1) (fisheries), Articles 91 and 100 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (transport), Articles 173, 182, 188 and 189 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Union programmes), Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (common commercial policy), Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (the Economic and Social Committee).

Plenary Assembly decision

22.3.2022

Section responsible

Section for External Relations

Adopted in section

12.5.2022

Adopted at plenary

15.6.2022

Plenary session No

570

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

202/0/5

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The proposed Regulation empowers (2), by means of implementing acts, the EU Commission to adopt and apply certain measures for the exercise of the Union’s rights under the provisions of the Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community (3) (Withdrawal Agreement) and of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the other part (4) (Trade and Cooperation Agreement). |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | The Parties to the relevant Agreements are the United Kingdom and the Union only. The EESC therefore agrees that it is entirely appropriate that initiation of any action would lie at Union level, with recourse to comitology procedures, as set out in the proposed Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | The EESC agrees that the Union needs an agile and effective procedure in the event of the United Kingdom’s non-compliance with the Withdrawal Agreement and/or the Trade and Cooperation Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | The recourse to comitology procedures as a way to empower the Commission to adopt and apply certain measures in the event of breaches of or non-compliance with the relevant Agreements seems fully justified, and is in accordance with the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity that necessarily determine EU action. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | The EESC welcomes the proposal for a review of the Regulation five years after its entry into force, and notes that this would be in line with similar provisions in the relevant Agreements. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | In view of the above, the EESC supports the proposed Regulation. Furthermore, the EESC maintains that this is an excellent inter-institutional compromise to deal with any eventualities arising from a breach of or non-compliance with the Withdrawal Agreement and/or the Trade and Cooperation Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

2.   General comments

| 2.1. | The proposed Regulation empowers the European Commission to adopt and apply certain measures for the exercise of the Union’s rights under the provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement and the Trade and Cooperation Agreement. It is designed to facilitate a timely and effective response to any potential breach of or non-compliance with the provisions of the relevant Agreements by the United Kingdom. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | The empowerment applies to:






  — | the application of temporary measures to induce compliance and/or compensatory measures authorised by an arbitration tribunal at the request of a Party in the event of inadequate or incomplete compliance, or appropriate action in the event that the other Party does not cooperate in facilitating recourse to binding dispute settlement procedures; |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.2.

—

the application of temporary measures to induce compliance and/or compensatory measures authorised by an arbitration tribunal at the request of a Party in the event of inadequate or incomplete compliance, or appropriate action in the event that the other Party does not cooperate in facilitating recourse to binding dispute settlement procedures;

| — | remedial measures under the Withdrawal Agreement in relation to a failure to add relevant instruments of Union Law to the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland and/or under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement in relation to subsidies, road transport and fisheries; |
| --- | --- |

—

remedial measures under the Withdrawal Agreement in relation to a failure to add relevant instruments of Union Law to the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland and/or under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement in relation to subsidies, road transport and fisheries;

| — | rebalancing measures under the Withdrawal Agreement in relation to safeguard measures adopted by the UK under the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland; |
| --- | --- |

—

rebalancing measures under the Withdrawal Agreement in relation to safeguard measures adopted by the UK under the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland;

| — | rebalancing measures under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, in relation to safeguard measures which create an imbalance between rights and obligations under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement or any supplementary agreement; or specifically regarding divergences in the areas of labour and social, environmental or climate protection or subsidy control; |
| --- | --- |

—

rebalancing measures under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, in relation to safeguard measures which create an imbalance between rights and obligations under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement or any supplementary agreement; or specifically regarding divergences in the areas of labour and social, environmental or climate protection or subsidy control;

| — | countermeasures under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, in response to rebalancing measures under Article 411 of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement; |
| --- | --- |

—

countermeasures under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, in response to rebalancing measures under Article 411 of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement;

| — | safeguard measures under the Withdrawal Agreement (if the application of the IE/NI Protocol leads to serious economic, societal, or environmental difficulties that are liable to persist, or to a diversion of trade), and under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (in case of serious economic, societal, or environmental difficulties of a sectorial or regional nature that are liable to persist); |
| --- | --- |

—

safeguard measures under the Withdrawal Agreement (if the application of the IE/NI Protocol leads to serious economic, societal, or environmental difficulties that are liable to persist, or to a diversion of trade), and under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (in case of serious economic, societal, or environmental difficulties of a sectorial or regional nature that are liable to persist);

| — | suspension of obligations under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement in the event of breach or non-fulfilment of certain conditions, in particular with regard to trade in goods, air transport, road transport, fisheries or Union programmes, or if the United Kingdom fails to pay its financial contributions or introduces significant changes to certain initial conditions. |
| --- | --- |

—

suspension of obligations under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement in the event of breach or non-fulfilment of certain conditions, in particular with regard to trade in goods, air transport, road transport, fisheries or Union programmes, or if the United Kingdom fails to pay its financial contributions or introduces significant changes to certain initial conditions.

| 2.3. | These measures should also apply to any supplementary bilateral agreements to the Trade and Cooperation Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | In its decision on the conclusion of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, the Council empowered the Commission to adopt a majority of the measures listed in point 2.2 until a specific legislative act enters into force. It was envisaged that the latter would be proposed no later than 31 March 2022. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

| 2.5. | Notwithstanding the Withdrawal Agreement, the Trade and Cooperation Agreement covers a broad range of issues beyond trade in goods and services. These include investment, competition, State aid, tax transparency, air and road transport, energy and sustainability, fisheries, data protection and social security coordination. Therefore, the Trade Enforcement Regulation (5) and other existing instruments do not fully cover the scope of this new type of agreement. As a result, a new legal instrument must be adopted. The proposed Regulation would be lex specialis with regard to sectoral provisions of Union law, to the extent that these provisions govern the same subject matter. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

| 2.6. | The legal bases of the proposal are:






  — | Article 43 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (6) (fisheries); |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.6.

—

Article 43 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (6) (fisheries);

| — | Articles 91 and 100 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (7) (transport); |
| --- | --- |

—

Articles 91 and 100 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (7) (transport);

| — | Articles 173, 182, 188 and 189 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (8) (Union programmes); |
| --- | --- |

—

Articles 173, 182, 188 and 189 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (8) (Union programmes);

| — | Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (9) (common commercial policy); |
| --- | --- |

—

Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (9) (common commercial policy);

| — | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (10) (the Economic and Social Committee). |
| --- | --- |

—

Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (10) (the Economic and Social Committee).

| 2.7. | The Withdrawal Agreement and the Trade and Cooperation Agreement are the Union’s only legal instruments vis-à-vis the United Kingdom. Therefore, action under international law can only be taken by the Union. However, the proposal envisages adoption of measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union (11). The comitology system’s examination procedure would apply, as set out in Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers (12), as measures which might be adopted would almost certainly affect Member States. |
| --- | --- |

2.7.

| 2.8. | The proposal envisages a review of the Regulation five years after its entry into force. This would be in line with the similar provision in the Withdrawal Agreement and the Trade and Cooperation Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

2.8.

| 2.9. | The proposed Regulation does not cover measures within the scope of the Union’s policies in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. |
| --- | --- |

2.9.

| 2.10. | A separate legislative proposal governs the adoption of measures in the area of Euratom’s research and training programmes. |
| --- | --- |

2.10.

3.   Specific comments

| 3.1. | The proposal seeks to create a framework to enable the Union to react effectively and in a timely manner in the event of breaches or non-compliance by the United Kingdom in respect of the Withdrawal Agreement and/or the Trade and Cooperation Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | As the Agreements are EU-only, it is clear that appropriate action should be taken at that level. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.3. | Taking into account the potential implications for the Member States, as well as the requirement for optimum effectiveness, the application of the comitology system’s examination procedure is entirely logical and justified. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

| 3.4. | This is fully in accord with the principle of subsidiarity as the comitology system allows the Member States to monitor the implementing acts delegated to the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

| 3.5. | It is also worth noting that Articles 7 and 8 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 (13) allow the Commission, by way of derogation from the regular procedures, to adopt implementing acts on grounds of urgency (Article 8), or potential significant disruption of the markets in the area of agriculture (Article 7), without submitting them beforehand to the corresponding committee. This procedural bypass reinforces the Union’s ability to respond quickly to unexpected breaches of the Agreements, if necessary. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

| 3.6. | The Committee welcomes the comprehensive range of the measures set out in Article 1.2 of the proposed Regulation, as well as their limitations. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

| 3.7. | As there are no precedents for the withdrawal of a Member State, the issue of consistency with existing legislation in the policy area does not arise. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

| 3.8. | Clear criteria to govern the selection of any measures are set out in detail in Article 2.2 of the proposed Regulation. The EESC accepts that the proposed Regulation meets the requirements of proportionality and that it does not exceed what is strictly necessary to achieve the objective to ensure a swift and effective exercise of those rights in the event of any potential breach of or non-compliance with the Agreements. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

| 3.9. | The EESC does not see any need for impact assessment given the procedural nature of the proposed Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

3.9.

| 3.10. | The EESC welcomes the proposal for review of the Regulation after five years, and notes that this is appropriate as it would be in line with similar provisions in the relevant Agreements. |
| --- | --- |

3.10.

| 3.11. | In view of the above, the EESC supports the proposal. Furthermore, the EESC maintains that this is an excellent inter-institutional compromise to deal with any eventualities arising from a breach of or non-compliance with the Withdrawal Agreement and/or the TCA. |
| --- | --- |

3.11.

Brussels, 15 June 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 47).

1

(2)  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52022PC0089

2

(3)  OJ C 384 I, 12.11.2019, p. 1.

3

(4)  OJ L 149, 30.4.2021, p. 10.

4

(5)  Regulation (EU) 2021/167 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 February 2021 amending Regulation (EU) No 654/2014 concerning the exercise of the Union’s rights for the application and enforcement of international trade rules (OJ L 49, 12.2.2021, p. 1)

5

(6)  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN

6

(7)  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN

7

(8)  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN.

8

(9)  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN

9

(10)  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN.

10

(11)  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012M%2FTXT

11

(12)  OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13.

12

(13)  OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13.

13

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