### IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10
- 10
- 00202
- CV
WILLIAM CARROLL MARR OW , Appellant
v. THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

From the 54th District Court McLennan County, Texas Trial Court No. 2003
- 615
- C

MEMORANDUM OPINION

William Carroll Marrow at tempts to appeal, by restricted appeal, the trial court’s
order of withdrawal of court costs and fees from Marrow’s inmate account. 1 T EX
. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN . § 501.014(e) (Vernon Supp. 2009). The Clerk of this Court notified Marrow that we questioned our jur isdiction because it appeared there was no appealable order.

1 Courts have frequently referred to these as inmate “trust” accounts. The term “trust” has been removed from their statutory references. Act of 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 212, § 2.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1989 , amended by Act of 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 62, §§ 8.10, 19.02(8), eff. Sept. 1, 1999 (current version at T EX

. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN . § 501.014 (Vernon Supp. 2009)). They are simply inmate accounts. While there may be a custodial
r elationship between the Department and the inmate as to the money in the account, an issue not decided by us today, there is certainly no trustee/beneficiary relationship wherein the Department is burdened with all the duties of a trustee with regard to th e inmate’s money.Marrow v. State Page 2

Marrow responded that he properly filed a restricted appeal and that this Court has jurisdiction. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P . 26.1(c). We dismiss the appeal. There is no final order to be appealed. Although called an “order,” the document Marrow is seeking to have reviewed is nothing more than the notice to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice that a judgment has been rendered against Marrow and that, pursuant to the statute, the Department shoul d withdraw money
from his inmate account. T EX
. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN . § 501.014(e) (Vernon Supp. 2009). As
the statute states:
On notification by a court, the department shall withdraw from an inmate's account any amount the inmate is ordered to pay by order o f the court under this subsection. . . The department shall make a payment under this subsection as ordered by the court to either the court or the party specified in the court order. The department is not liable for withdrawing or failing to withdraw mo ney or making payments or failing to make payments under this subsection. . . .
Id . (emphasis added); see also In re Rosin , 256 S.W.3d 925, 925 (Tex. App.

— Waco 2008, C.J. Gray dissenting to request for response). When the required notice of withdrawal of money from an inmate account is sent to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, regardless of its form, the inmate has an opportunity to be heard by the trial court about the amount to be withdrawn. See
Harrell v. State , 286 S.W.3d 315, 321 (Tex. 200 9). This “opportunity” to be heard does not have to be before the notice is provided to the inmate to fulfill the minimum requirements of due process. As the Texas Supreme Court stated, “We hold an inmate is entitled to notice just as happened here (via copy of the order, or other notification, from the trial court) and an opportunity to be heard just as happened here (via motionMarrow v. State Page 3

made by the inmate [directed to the trial court])

— but neither need occur before the funds are withdrawn. Moreover, appellate r eview should be by appeal, as in analogous civil post

-

judgment enforcement actions.” Id

. Marrow has not filed anything in the trial court asking for an opportunity to be heard regarding the amount of money to be withdrawn from his inmate account. If h e has not already had the opportunity to challenge the specific amount of the judgment to be withdrawn from his account, such as by direct appeal of the original judgment, Marrow’s review of the trial court’s action will be after he has challenged the cour t’s notice/order by motion, thus giving the trial court the opportunity to correct it if it is erroneous or thereby preserve the error for appellate review. See Ramirez v. State , ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 10

- 10

- 00157

- CV, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 3837, *3

- 4 (Tex. Ap p. — Waco May 19, 2010, no pet. h.). Only when properly challenged and denied relief is there a trial court order that is final from which the inmate, Marrow, can appeal. Id . at *4. Thus, at this juncture, he has no adverse ruling for this Court to review

. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. Further, Marrow’s “Appellant’s Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion to Proceed Informa Panperis” and “Petition’s Motion for Suspension of Rule 9.3(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure” are dismissed as moot. 2 Finally, absent a specific exemption, the Clerk of the Court must collect filing fees at the time a document is presented for filing. T EX
. R. A PP
. P . 12.1(b); Appendix to T EX
.

2 Neither of these motions nor Marrow’s response to our letter questioning our jurisdiction were served on the opposing party as required by Rule 9.5 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. T EX

. R. A PP
. P

. 9.5. However, we use Rule 2 to suspend the service requirement and dispose of these motions and this appeal. See T EX

. R. A PP
. P . 2.Marrow v. State Page 4

R. A PP
. P ., Order Regarding Fees (Amended Aug. 28, 2007, eff. Sept. 1, 2007). S ee also
T EX
. R. A PP
. P . 5; 10 TH T EX
. A PP
. (W ACO ) L OC
. R. 5; T EX
. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN . § 51.207(b); § 51.941(a) (Vernon 2005); and § 51.208 (Vernon Supp. 2009). Under the circumstances, we order the Clerk to write off all unpaid fees in this procee ding. Further, the write

- off of the fees from the accounts receivable of the Court in no way eliminates or reduces the fees owed by the person against whom they are assessed.

TOM GRAY Chief Justice Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Reyna , and Justice Davis Appeal dismissed Opinion delivered and filed July 14, 2010 [CV06]