U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1 

59–010 

" ! SENATE 

114TH CONGRESS

2d Session 

REPORT

2016

114–222 

Calendar No. 382 

AIRPORT SECURITY ENHANCEMENT AND 

OVERSIGHT ACT 

R E P O R T 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND 

TRANSPORTATION 

ON

S. 2361 

MARCH 7, 2016.—Ordered to be printed 


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(II) 

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Chairman 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi BILL NELSON, Florida 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

TED CRUZ, Texas RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

DEB FISCHER, Nebraska BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas ED MARKEY, Massachusetts 

DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska CORY BOOKER, New Jersey 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

DEAN HELLER, Nevada JOE MANCHIN, West Virginia 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado GARY PETERS, Michigan 

STEVE DAINES, Montana 

NICK ROSSI, Staff Director 

ADRIAN ARNAKIS, Deputy Staff Director 

REBECCA SEIDEL, General Counsel 

KIM LIPSKY, Democratic Staff Director 

CHRISTOPHER DAY, Democratic Deputy Staff Director 

CLINT ODOM, Democratic General Counsel 


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Calendar No. 382 

114TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! SENATE 2d Session 114–222 

AIRPORT SECURITY ENHANCEMENT AND OVERSIGHT ACT 

MARCH 7, 2016.—Ordered to be printed 

Mr. THUNE, from the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 

Transportation, submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

[To accompany S. 2361] 

The Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, to 

which was referred the bill (S. 2361) to enhance airport security, 

and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment (in the nature of a substitute) 

and recommends that the bill (as amended) do pass. 

PURPOSE OF THE BILL

The purpose of S. 2361 is to improve oversight, vetting, and 

credentialing of airport workers with access to the secure area of 

an airport, and for other purposes. 

BACKGROUND AND NEEDS

The need for enhanced oversight of airport workers with access 

to secure areas stems from findings of recent security gaps and a 

growing concern about aviation security in an environment threatened by global terrorism. A number of airport security 

vulnerabilities exposed within the last year, including missing and 

improper use of Secure Identification Display Area (SIDA) badges 

by airport and airline workers, a Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) report finding that the 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) did not identify 73 

airport workers with potential links to terrorism due to gaps in 

current interagency watchlisting policy, and the fact that the TSA 

does not exercise an appropriately rigorous oversight plan related 

to lost or missing SIDA badges, have made it clear that enhancements to airport security are needed to ensure greater public safety. 


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The Airport Security Enhancement and Oversight Act of 2015 

builds upon the bipartisan TSA oversight efforts of the Committee 

in 2015, including classified briefings and three oversight letters to 

the TSA on the improper use of SIDA badges and the TSA’s access 

to the U.S. Government’s consolidated terrorism database, known 

as the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE). Additionally, the bill would authorize activities recommended by the 

Aviation Stakeholder Advisory Committee (ASAC) for improving 

airport employee access controls, which the TSA has been slow to 

implement in some cases. 

SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS

S. 2361 would improve vetting, credentialing, and inspections of 

airport workers with access to the SIDA of an airport, and would 

increase TSA oversight responsibilities regarding airport workers 

with missing SIDA credentials and airports with chronic underperformance on badge accountability. This bill also would require 

the TSA Administrator to conduct an updated threat assessment 

regarding airport workers with SIDA credentials and the security 

measures in place to address resulting vulnerabilities in light of recent international terrorist activity, to revise the rules on 

unescorted airport access controls, to make the expiration date on 

each airport credential issued to a non-United States citizen consistent with such individual’s immigration status, and to enhance 

the eligibility requirements and disqualifying criminal offenses for 

individuals seeking or having unescorted access to a SIDA of an 

airport based on similar criteria utilized by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and other DHS programs. 

This bill also would improve airport worker vetting by requiring 

the TSA Administrator to implement the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) ‘‘Rap Back’’ service for recurrent background checks 

of SIDA badge holders, and by requiring that the TSA receive automated, real-time access to additional terrorism-related information 

in the TIDE database. Under the bill, airport operators also would 

be granted direct access to the E-Verify program and the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) automated system 

in order to determine the eligibility based on immigration status of 

individuals seeking unescorted access authority to a SIDA of an 

airport. 

The bill also would require the TSA Administrator to develop 

and implement airport access control performance metrics and best 

practices, and expand the use of random physical inspections of airport workers with SIDA access. The TSA Administrator also would 

be directed to disseminate best practices on airport worker screening based on a review of airports that have implemented comprehensive screening, and conduct red-team, covert testing of SIDA 

access controls. 

The bill also would require the TSA Administrator to conduct a 

comprehensive review of current security directives. The purpose of 

this review would be to streamline, consolidate, or revoke security 

directives to most efficiently maximize risk reduction as necessary. 

One year after the date of enactment, the Comptroller General of 

the United States would be required to submit a report to Congress 

that assesses the progress made by the TSA in implementing the 


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oversight, credentialing, vetting, and inspection requirements 

under the bill. 

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

On December 7, 2015, S. 2361, the Airport Security Enhancement and Oversight Act was introduced by Senators Thune, Nelson, Ayotte, and Cantwell. The bill is also cosponsored by Senators 

Johnson and Klobuchar. The bill is a complementary proposal to 

H.R. 2750, the Improved Security Vetting for Aviation Workers 

Act, and H.R. 3102, the Airport Access Control Security Improvement Act, which passed the House of Representatives by voice 

votes on July 27, 2015, and on October 6, 2015, respectively. H.R. 

2750 was introduced by Representatives Katko (R–NY), Rice (D– 

NY), McCaul (R–TX), and Payne (D–NJ) in June 2015, and was ordered to be reported by the Committee on Homeland Security of 

the House of Representatives in July 2015. H.R. 3102 was introduced by Representatives Katko (R–NY), Rice (D–NY), and McCaul 

(R–TX) in July 2015, and was ordered to be reported by the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives in 

October 2015. 

No Senate hearings were held on S. 2361 in the 114th Congress. 

The Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the 

Senate however held a hearing on March 17, 2015, entitled ‘‘TSA 

Oversight and Examination of the Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request,’’ and received testimony from Melvin Carraway, Acting Administrator, Transportation Security Administration, Department 

of Homeland Security, which responded to questions about SIDA 

badges. The Committee also held a hearing on May 21, 2015, to 

consider the nomination of Peter Neffenger to be the TSA Administrator, during which the issue of misused SIDA badges was addressed. The Committee also conducted oversight on missing SIDA 

badges and airport worker vetting in the 114th Congress with a series of three letters sent to the TSA Administrator by Chairman 

Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and other Committee members. 

The TSA’s responses to these letters indicated that the TSA does 

not maintain a list of lost or missing SIDA badges, and that it rarely uses its enforcement authority to fine airports that reach a certain threshold of missing SIDA badges, prompting related provisions in S. 2361. 

In the House of Representatives in the 114th Congress, the Subcommittee on Transportation Security of the Committee on Homeland Security held a two-part hearing on airport access control entitled, ‘‘A Review of Access Control Measures at Our Nation’s Airports.’’ At part I of the hearing on February 3, 2015, the subcommittee received testimony from Mark Hatfield, Acting Deputy 

Administrator, TSA, DHS; Doug Perdue, Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 

Department of Justice; Sharon L. Pinkerton, Senior Vice President, 

Legislative and Regulatory Policy, Airlines for America; and Miguel 

Southwell, General Manager, Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport. 

At part II of the hearing on April 30, 2015, the subcommittee received testimony from Melvin J. Carraway, Acting Administrator, 

TSA, DHS; Jeanne M. Olivier, Assistant Director, Aviation Security 

and Technology, Security Operations and Programs Department, 


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the Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, testifying on behalf 

of the American Association of Airport Executives; and Steven 

Grossman, Chief Executive Officer/Executive Director, Jacksonville 

International Airport, Jacksonville Aviation Authority, testifying on 

behalf of the Airports Council International, North America. 

On June 16, 2015, the subcommittee also held a hearing entitled, 

‘‘How TSA Can Improve Aviation Worker Vetting,’’ and received 

testimony from John Roth, Inspector General, Department of 

Homeland Security; Stacey Fitzmaurice, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Transportation Security Administration, DHS; and Jennifer Grover, Director, Transportation Security and Coast Guard Issues, Homeland Security and 

Justice Team, Government Accountability Office. 

On December 9, 2015, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 

Transportation of the Senate met in open Executive Session to consider S. 2361, and ordered the bill to be reported to the Senate favorably, with a first degree amendment, by voice vote. The first degree amendment, sponsored by Senators Nelson, Blumenthal, and 

Booker, added language that would ensure there exists or is developed a waiver process for airport workers for denied SIDA credentials. 

ESTIMATED COSTS

In accordance with paragraph 11(a) of rule XXVI of the Standing 

Rules of the Senate and section 403 of the Congressional Budget 

Act of 1974, the Committee provides the following cost estimate, 

prepared by the Congressional Budget Office: 

S. 2361—Airport Security Enhancement and Oversight Act 

S. 2361 would require the Administrator of the Transportation 

Security Administration (TSA) to undertake a variety of activities 

to improve the effectiveness of processes for screening, vetting, and 

credentialing personnel at airports, particularly individuals with 

access to secure areas. Such activities would include using riskbased models for screening airport employees based on the level of 

security of areas they access, reviewing procedures related to vetting employees and auditing airports’ issuance of credentials, 

studying opportunities to enhance security of entry and exit areas 

of secure areas of airports, and other security-related and administrative activities. The bill also would direct the agency to increase 

covert tests of security measures at secure areas of airports and require a variety of studies and reports. 

According to TSA, many of the requirements specified in S. 2361 

are largely consistent with current administrative policy. As a result, CBO estimates that any increased spending by TSA to meet 

the bill’s requirements would total less than $500,000; any such 

spending would be subject to the availability of appropriated funds. 

According to TSA, some of the analyses and reports required by the 

bill could result in changes in policies that, if implemented, might 

affect the agency’s costs in future years. Any such effects would depend on the outcome of such analyses and are not reflected in this 

estimate. 

Because enacting S. 2361 would not affect direct spending or revenues, pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply. CBO estimates that 

enacting S. 2361 would not increase net direct spending or onVerDate Sep 11 2014 23:24 Mar 08, 2016 Jkt 059010 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR222.XXX SR222

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budget deficits in any of the four consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2027. 

S. 2361 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. 

S. 2361 contains provisions related to screening personnel at airports that are similar to provisions in other bills for which CBO 

has transmitted cost estimates. In all cases, our estimates of budgetary effects of such provisions are the same. In particular: 

• On July 24, 2015, CBO transmitted a cost estimate for 

H.R. 2750, the Improved Security Vetting for Aviation Workers 

Act of 2015, as ordered reported by the House Committee on 

Homeland Security on June 25, 2015; 

• On November 4, 2015, CBO transmitted a cost estimate 

for H.R. 3102, the Airport Access Control Security Improvement Act of 2015, as passed by the House of Representatives 

on October 6, 2015; and, 

• On November 4, 2015, CBO transmitted a cost estimate 

for H.R. 3584, the Transportation Security Administration Reform and Improvement Act of 2015, as ordered reported by the 

House Committee on Homeland Security on September 30, 

2015. 

The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Megan Carroll. The estimate was approved by H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy Assistant 

Director for Budget Analysis. 

REGULATORY IMPACT

In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the Standing 

Rules of the Senate, the Committee provides the following evaluation of the regulatory impact of the legislation, as reported: 

NUMBER OF PERSONS COVERED

The bill would cover foreign and domestic air carriers and the approximately 440 U.S. airports which are currently subject to TSA 

rules and regulations on SIDA access control. The bill would also 

cover the tens of thousands of SIDA badge holders that currently 

work at U.S. airports, as well as an even greater number of total 

future SIDA badge applicants. 

ECONOMIC IMPACT

The bill would not authorize new spending by the Federal Government. Under the bill, the TSA Administrator would be required 

to conduct two rulemakings subject to notice and comment, which 

would update existing rules and regulations to which airport operators and airlines are already subject. Depending on the outcome of 

the TSA’s rulemaking updates, airport operators may be required 

to pay increased fines and undergo additional audits if they report 

certain percentages of missing SIDA badges. They also may be encouraged by the TSA to issue temporary SIDA badges to airport 

workers under limited circumstances. Airport operators may also 

be required develop a waiver process for denied SIDA credentials 

if one does not already exist. In addition, under a rule of construction in the bill, the rulemaking update related to vetting cannot be 

construed to affect existing airport worker vetting fees imposed by 

the TSA. Finally, the requirement to streamline security directives 


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under the bill may result in economic efficiencies to airport operators and air carriers. 

PRIVACY

The bill would impact the personal privacy of individuals who 

apply to receive and who already possess SIDA badges for 

unescorted access to secure areas of airports. Specifically, the bill 

would require the TSA Administrator to enhance the criminal history background checks that SIDA badge applicants must already 

undergo as part of the vetting process. The bill also would subject 

SIDA badge applicants to additional checks against terrorism and 

immigration status databases, and would require all SIDA badge 

holders to undergo recurrent criminal history background checks. 

The bill would subject SIDA badge holders to expanded use of random physical inspections and covert testing, which are existing 

practices. 

PAPERWORK

The bill would not significantly increase paperwork requirements 

for private individuals or businesses. The enhanced regulatory requirements under the bill for oversight of missing airport SIDA 

badges would be enforced using information gained from existing 

audits and reporting procedures. Additionally, the TSA would be 

required to track and keep records on multiple years of airport 

audit data related to missing SIDA badges for oversight purposes. 

The updated vetting requirements under the bill would be implemented using existing background check, certification, and waiver 

processes. The bill also would require the Federal Government to 

produce eight reports (one of which is an annual report), one regular update to Congress, and a notification to Congress triggered 

by certain occurrences. 

CONGRESSIONALLY DIRECTED SPENDING

In compliance with paragraph 4(b) of rule XLIV of the Standing 

Rules of the Senate, the Committee provides that no provisions 

contained in the bill, as reported, meet the definition of congressionally directed spending items under the rule. 

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

Section 1. Short title. 

This section would designate the short title of the bill as the, 

‘‘Airport Security Enhancement and Oversight Act.’’ 

Section 2. Findings. 

This section would state findings of the Committee’s oversight efforts in the last year regarding recent lapses in security at domestic airports, including improper use of SIDA badges by airport and 

airline workers and a group of contractors indicted for participating 

in a drug smuggling ring. The findings also would highlight a DHS 

OIG report finding that the TSA did not identify 73 airport workers 

with potential links to terrorism due to gaps in current interagency 

watchlisting policy. Noted also in this section would be the finding 

that the TSA does not maintain a list of lost or missing SIDA 


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badges, and that it rarely uses its enforcement authority to fine 

airports that reach a certain threshold of missing SIDA badges. 

Section 3. Definitions. 

This section would provide relevant definitions of terms used in 

the legislation. 

Section 4. Threat assessment. 

This section would instruct the TSA Administrator to update an 

assessment to determine the level of risk posed to airport security 

by workers with access to secure areas of domestic airports in light 

of recent terrorist activity. Factors for the TSA Administrator to 

consider would include domestic and international intelligence, the 

recent security breaches at domestic and international airports, 

and the recent security improvements at domestic airports, including the implementation of recommendations made by the ASAC. 

This section also would require the TSA Administrator to report to 

Congress the results of this assessment, as well as a report on the 

implementation status of recent recommendations made by the 

ASAC to the TSA. Finally, the TSA Administrator also would be 

required to report to Congress with regular updates about the 

threat environment as new information becomes available and as 

needed. 

Section 5. Oversight. 

This section would require the TSA Administrator to update, in 

consultation with airport operators, the rules on unescorted airport 

access controls issued by the Secretary of Homeland Security. In 

updating these rules, the TSA Administrator would have to consider increased fines and oversight for airport operators that report 

missing more than five percent of credentials for unescorted access 

to any SIDA of an airport, and best practices for Category X airports (the largest airports) that report missing three percent of credentials to any SIDA of an airport. The TSA Administrator also 

would be required to consider additional audits and status checks 

for airport operators that report missing more than three percent 

of credentials, as well as a review and analysis of the prior five 

years of audits for those same airport operators to improve accountability by airports and badge holders alike. The Committee 

does not intend for the TSA Administrator to retroactively request 

five years’ worth of audit data from airports upon the date of enactment; instead, the Committee expects the TSA Administrator to 

implement this review and analysis requirement as soon as the 

data can be practically collected through existing airport audit procedures, and to build the database going forward. Finally, in updating these rules, the TSA Administrator would be required to consider increased fines and direct enforcement requirements for airport workers and their employers that fail to report within 24 

hours an employment termination or a missing credential, and termination of any airport worker that fails to report in a timely manner missing credentials. 

This section also would allow the TSA Administrator to encourage the issuance of free, one-time, 24-hour temporary credentials 

for workers who have reported their credentials missing but not 

permanently lost, stolen, or destroyed, in a timely manner, much 


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like a hold on a credit card, until the badge is found and reactivated or the replacement of the credential is necessary. This section also would require the TSA Administrator to report to Congress each time an airport operator reports missing more than 

three percent of credentials at Category X airports and more than 

five percent of credentials at all other airports, and to submit an 

annual report on the number of violations and fines related to 

unescorted access authority to the SIDA of an airport collected in 

the preceding fiscal year. 

Section 6. Credentials. 

This section would require the TSA Administrator to issue guidance to airport operators requiring that they place an expiration 

date on each airport credential issued to a non-United States citizen commensurate with the period of time during which that nonUnited States citizen is lawfully authorized to work in the United 

States. In addition, the TSA Administrator would have to issue 

guidance for transportation security inspectors to annually review 

the procedures of airport operators for applicants seeking 

unescorted access authority to any SIDA of airports. This guidance 

should include a review of background check and employment authorization documents. 

Section 7. Vetting. 

This section would require the TSA Administrator to update and 

enhance, through a notice and comment rulemaking, the eligibility 

requirements and disqualifying criminal offenses for individuals 

seeking or having unescorted access to a SIDA of an airport. In revising these regulations, the TSA Administrator would have to consider adding to the list of disqualifying criminal offenses the offenses and criteria used by CBP and those used for the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (known as TWIC) for access 

to secure areas, with the goal of streamlining and making consistent similar airport worker requirements, where appropriate. 

This section also would require the TSA Administrator to propose 

in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking an extension of the look-back 

period for disqualifying criminal offenses and other disqualifying 

criteria from 10 to 15 years before the date of an individual’s application. The rulemaking also would require an airport or aircraft operator to certify that there is a specific need and that the individual understands the requirements for possessing a SIDA badge 

for each individual who receives unescorted access authority. 

This section would require the TSA Administrator to ensure that 

there exists or is developed a waiver process for approving the 

issuance of credentials for SIDA access for individuals who are denied a credential due to a criminal history background check. As 

part of the rulemaking update, the Committee expects the TSA Administrator to carefully weigh the costs and administrative burdens 

associated with this requirement. Consideration should be given to 

airport community preferences to retain control of the waiver process and employee group concerns about the lack of a centralized 

system. The Committee does not intend to create a significant financial burden associated with the development of such a waiver 

process at airports where one does not currently exist. 


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In addition, this section would require the TSA Administrator 

and the Director of the FBI to fully implement the Rap Back service for recurrent vetting of individuals with SIDA badges. As part 

of this program, the TSA Administrator would be required to ensure that the TSA only receives status notifications through the 

Rap Back service about disqualifying criminal offenses in accordance with regulations, and that any information received by the 

TSA through the Rap Back service is provided directly and immediately to the relevant airport and aircraft operators. The Secretary 

of Homeland Security also would be required to authorize the TSA 

Administrator to receive automated, real-time access to additional 

TIDE data and to authorize each airport operator to have direct access to the E-Verify program and the SAVE automated system to 

determine the eligibility based on immigration status of individuals 

seeking unescorted access authority to a SIDA of an airport. 

Section 8. Metrics. 

This section would require the TSA Administrator to develop and 

implement performance metrics to measure the effectiveness of security for secured areas of airports. The TSA Administrator may 

consider such factors as adherence to access point procedures, proper use of credentials, differences in access point characteristics 

across the national airport system, and other factors in developing 

these metrics. A report by the Comptroller General on the impact 

of the new performance metrics implemented in this section would 

be due to Congress two years after the date of enactment. 

Section 9. Inspections and assessments. 

This section would instruct the TSA Administrator, in consultation with ASAC, to develop best practices for unescorted access security that use intelligence, scientific algorithms, and risk-based 

factors, ensure integrity and accountability, subject airport workers 

to random physical security inspections, and appropriately manage 

the number of SIDA access points to reduce unauthorized access to 

these areas. This section also would require the TSA Administrator 

to expand the use of transportation security officers and inspectors 

to conduct enhanced, random, and unpredictable physical inspections of airport workers in each SIDA of an airport and at each 

SIDA access point. These inspections would be designed to verify 

the credentials of airport workers, determine whether airport workers possess prohibited items, and to verify whether airport workers 

are following appropriate procedures to access that SIDA of an airport. The Committee intends for this provision to be consistent 

with the TSA’s increase in SIDA inspections under existing Playbook operations, and intends not to put a significant resource burden on the TSA to conduct all random physical inspections at airports, an effort which shall remain primarily the responsibility of 

airport operators. Additionally, this section would require the TSA 

Administrator to conduct a review of airports that have implemented comprehensive or additional employee screening or perimeter security to improve airport security and, upon completion of 

the review, to identify best practices for additional access control 

and employee security at airports and to disseminate the best practices identified to airport operators. The TSA Administrator also 

would be authorized in this section to conduct a pilot program at 


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one or more airports to test and validate the identified best practices, as appropriate. 

Section 10. Covert testing. 

This section would instruct the TSA Administrator to increase 

the use of red-team, covert testing of access controls to any secure 

area of an airport, and instructs the DHS OIG to conduct red-team 

covert testing of airport access controls to the SIDA of airports. 

This section would require the TSA Administrator to submit a report on the progress in expanding the use of red-team, covert testing to Congress 90 days after enactment, and the DHS OIG to submit a report on the effectiveness of airport access controls to the 

SIDA of airports 180 days after enactment. 

Section 11. Security directives. 

This section would require the TSA Administrator to begin, and 

then annually conduct, in consultation with the appropriate regulated entities, a comprehensive review of every current security directive addressed to any regulated entity. This review would be designed to determine whether the security directives continue to be 

relevant, whether the security directives should be streamlined or 

consolidated to most efficiently maximize risk reduction, and to update, consolidate, or revoke any security directive as necessary. 

Going forward, the TSA Administrator would have to notify Congress about the extent to which each security directive issued responds to a specific threat or emergency situation, and when it is 

anticipated that it will expire. The Committee understands that 

the TSA must be able to act quickly to effectively respond to security threats and situations. Therefore, the Committee does not intend to impose on the TSA a new standard for issuing security directives; it merely intends to create a new requirement for notice 

to Congress. 

Section 12. Implementation report. 

This section would require the Comptroller General to submit a 

report to Congress that assesses the progress made by the TSA in 

implementing the oversight, credentialing, vetting, and inspection 

requirements under this Act. The report would be due one year 

after enactment. 

Section 13. Miscellaneous amendments. 

This section would include a technical amendment extending the 

term of a member of ASAC beyond two years if the TSA Administrator does not appoint a successor. Additionally, it would include 

an amendment which requires the TSA Administrator to respond 

with feedback each time the TSA receives a recommendation from 

ASAC. The feedback also would be required to include an action 

plan to implement any of the recommendations with which the 

TSA Administrator concurs or a justification for why any of the recommendations have been rejected. This feedback would be due 90 

days after the TSA Administrator receives the recommendations 

transmitted by ASAC. 


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CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW

In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing 

Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by the bill, as 

reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted 

is enclosed in black brackets, new material is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): 

TITLE 49. TRANSPORTATION 

SUBTITLE VII. AVIATION PROGRAMS

PART A. AIR COMMERCE AND SAFETY

SUBPART III. SAFETY

CHAPTER 449. SECURITY

SUBCHAPTER II. ADMINISTRATION AND PERSONNEL

§ 44946. Aviation Security Advisory Committee 

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Assistant Secretary shall establish 

within the Transportation Security Administration an aviation security advisory committee. 

(b) DUTIES.— (1) IN GENERAL.—The Assistant Secretary shall consult the 

Advisory Committee, as appropriate, on aviation security matters, including on the development, refinement, and implementation of policies, programs, rulemaking, and security directives pertaining to aviation security, while adhering to sensitive security guidelines. 

(2) RECOMMENDATIONS.— (A) IN GENERAL.—The Advisory Committee shall develop, at the request of the Assistant Secretary, recommendations for improvements to aviation security. 

(B) RECOMMENDATIONS OF SUBCOMMITTEES.—Recommendations agreed upon by the subcommittees established under this section shall be approved by the Advisory 

Committee before transmission to the Assistant Secretary. 

(3) PERIODIC REPORTS.—The Advisory Committee shall periodically submit to the Assistant Secretary— 

(A) reports on matters identified by the Assistant Secretary; and 

(B) reports on other matters identified by a majority of 

the members of the Advisory Committee. 

(4) ANNUAL REPORT.—The Advisory Committee shall submit 

to the Assistant Secretary an annual report providing information on the activities, findings, and recommendations of the 

Advisory Committee, including its subcommittees, for the preceding year. Not later than 6 months after the date that the 

Secretary receives the annual report, the Secretary shall publish a public version describing the Advisory Committee’s activities and such related matters as would be informative to 

the public consistent with the policy of section 552(b) of title 

5. 

ø(5) FEEDBACK.—Not later than 90 days after receiving recommendations transmitted by the Advisory Committee under 

paragraph (4), the Assistant Secretary shall respond in writing 


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to the Advisory Committee with feedback on each of the recommendations, an action plan to implement any of the recommendations with which the Assistant Secretary concurs, 

and a justification for why any of the recommendations have 

been rejected.¿ 

(5) FEEDBACK.—Not later than 90 days after receiving recommendations transmitted by the Advisory Committee under 

paragraph (2) or paragraph (4), the Assistant Secretary shall 

respond in writing to the Advisory Committee with feedback on 

each of the recommendations, an action plan to implement any 

of the recommendations with which the Assistant Secretary concurs, and a justification for why any of the recommendations 

have been rejected. 

(6) CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.—Not later than 30 days 

after providing written feedback to the Advisory Committee 

under paragraph (5), the Assistant Secretary shall notify the 

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the 

Senate and the Committee on Homeland Security of the House 

of Representatives on such feedback, and provide a briefing 

upon request. 

(7) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—Prior to briefing the Committee 

on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate and 

the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives under paragraph (6), the Assistant Secretary shall 

submit to such committees a report containing information relating to the recommendations transmitted by the Advisory 

Committee in accordance with paragraph (4). 

(c) MEMBERSHIP.— (1) APPOINTMENT.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date 

of enactment of the Aviation Security Stakeholder Participation Act of 2014, the Assistant Secretary shall appoint 

the members of the Advisory Committee. 

(B) COMPOSITION.—The membership of the Advisory 

Committee shall consist of individuals representing not 

more than 34 member organizations. Each organization 

shall be represented by 1 individual (or the individual’s 

designee). 

(C) REPRESENTATION.—The membership of the Advisory 

Committee shall include representatives of air carriers, allcargo air transportation, indirect air carriers, labor organizations representing air carrier employees, labor organizations representing transportation security officers, aircraft 

manufacturers, airport operators, airport construction and 

maintenance contractors, labor organizations representing 

employees of airport construction and maintenance contractors, general aviation, privacy organizations, the travel 

industry, airport-based businesses (including minorityowned small businesses), businesses that conduct security 

screening operations at airports, aeronautical repair stations, passenger advocacy groups, the aviation security 

technology industry (including screening technology and 

biometrics), victims of terrorist acts against aviation, and 

law enforcement and security experts. 

(2) TERM OF OFFICE.— 


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13 

ø(A) TERMS.—The term of each member of the Advisory 

Committee shall be 2 years. A member of the Advisory 

Committee may be reappointed.¿ 

(A) TERMS.—The term of each member of the Advisory 

Committee shall be 2 years, but a member may continue to 

serve until the Assistant Secretary appoints a successor. A 

member of the Advisory Committee may be reappointed. 

(B) REMOVAL.—The Assistant Secretary may review the 

participation of a member of the Advisory Committee and 

remove such member for cause at any time. 

(3) PROHIBITION ON COMPENSATION.—The members of the 

Advisory Committee shall not receive pay, allowances, or benefits from the Government by reason of their service on the Advisory Committee. 

(4) MEETINGS.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—The Assistant Secretary shall require 

the Advisory Committee to meet at least semiannually and 

may convene additional meetings as necessary. 

(B) PUBLIC MEETINGS.—At least 1 of the meetings described in subparagraph (A) shall be open to the public. 

(C) ATTENDANCE.—The Advisory Committee shall maintain a record of the persons present at each meeting. 

(5) MEMBER ACCESS TO SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION.— Not later than 60 days after the date of a member’s appointment, the Assistant Secretary shall determine if there is cause 

for the member to be restricted from possessing sensitive security information. Without such cause, and upon the member 

voluntarily signing a non-disclosure agreement, the member 

may be granted access to sensitive security information that is 

relevant to the member’s advisory duties. The member shall 

protect the sensitive security information in accordance with 

part 1520 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations. 

(6) CHAIRPERSON.—A stakeholder representative on the Advisory Committee who is elected by the appointed membership 

of the Advisory Committee shall chair the Advisory Committee. 

* * * * * * * 

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asabaliauskas on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with REPORTS