# Official Journal C 112/3 Ap

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 112 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 633 April 2020 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 112

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 633 April 2020

---

| Contents | page |
| --- | --- |
| | II   Information |
| | INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | European Commission |
| 2020/C 112/01 | Authorisation for State aid pursuant to Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union — Cases where the Commission raises no objections (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Contents

page

II   Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

2020/C 112/01

Authorisation for State aid pursuant to Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union — Cases where the Commission raises no objections (
  1
  )

1

1

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| | V   Announcements |
| --- | --- |
| | PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPETITION POLICY |
| | European Commission |
| 2020/C 112/02 | State aid – Hungary – State aid SA.48556 (2019/C) (ex 2018/N) – Regional investment aid to Samsung SDI – Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (
  1
  ) | 12 |
| 2020/C 112/03 | State aid — France – State aid SA.49414 (2019/NN) – Reform of the legal and regulatory framework applicable to gas storage in France – Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (
  1
  ) | 39 |

V   Announcements

PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPETITION POLICY

European Commission

2020/C 112/02

State aid – Hungary – State aid SA.48556 (2019/C) (ex 2018/N) – Regional investment aid to Samsung SDI – Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (
  1
  )

1

12

2020/C 112/03

State aid — France – State aid SA.49414 (2019/NN) – Reform of the legal and regulatory framework applicable to gas storage in France – Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (
  1
  )

1

39

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| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text with EEA relevance. |

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(1)   Text with EEA relevance.

1

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN

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II Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

| 3.4.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 112/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.4.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 112/1

---

Authorisation for State aid pursuant to Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Cases where the Commission raises no objections

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2020/C 112/01)

| Date of adoption of the decision | 18.02.2020 |
| --- | --- |
| Aid number | SA.55186 (2019/N) |
| Member State | Germany |
| Region | DEUTSCHLAND | — |
| Title (and/or name of the beneficiary) | Computerspieleförderung des Bundes |
| Legal basis | Förderrichtlinie ‘Computerspieleförderung des Bundes’; Bundeshaushaltsordung § 23 und § 44 |
| Type of measure | Scheme | — |
| Objective | Culture |
| Form of aid | Direct grant |
| Budget | Overall budget: EUR 200 (in millions)
  Annual budget: EUR 50 (in millions) |
| Intensity | 50 % |
| Duration (period) | until 31.12.2023 |
| Economic sectors | All economic sectors eligible to receive aid |
| Name and address of the granting authority | Bundesministerium für Verkehr und Digitale Infrastruktur |
| Invalidenstraße 44 |

Date of adoption of the decision

18.02.2020

Aid number

SA.55186 (2019/N)

Member State

Germany

Region

DEUTSCHLAND

—

Title (and/or name of the beneficiary)

Computerspieleförderung des Bundes

Legal basis

Förderrichtlinie ‘Computerspieleförderung des Bundes’; Bundeshaushaltsordung § 23 und § 44

Type of measure

Scheme

—

Objective

Culture

Form of aid

Direct grant

Budget

Overall budget: EUR 200 (in millions)

Annual budget: EUR 50 (in millions)

Intensity

50 %

Duration (period)

until 31.12.2023

Economic sectors

All economic sectors eligible to receive aid

Name and address of the granting authority

Bundesministerium für Verkehr und Digitale Infrastruktur

Invalidenstraße 44

Other information

—

The authentic text(s) of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm.

| Date of adoption of the decision | 19.02.2020 |
| --- | --- |
| Aid number | SA.55609 (2019/N) |
| Member State | United Kingdom |
| Region | — | — |
| Title (and/or name of the beneficiary) | SNH Goose Management Scheme |
| Legal basis | http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1967/86/contents |
| Type of measure | Scheme | — |
| Objective | Aid for agri-environment-climate commitments |
| Form of aid | Direct grant |
| Budget | Overall budget: GBP 120 000 (in millions)
  Annual budget: GBP 60 000 (in millions) |
| Intensity | — |
| Duration (period) | until 31.05.2021 |
| Economic sectors | All economic sectors eligible to receive aid |
| Name and address of the granting authority | Scottish Natural Heritage |
| Battleby, Redgorton, Perth PH1 3EW |

Date of adoption of the decision

19.02.2020

Aid number

SA.55609 (2019/N)

Member State

United Kingdom

Region

—

—

Title (and/or name of the beneficiary)

SNH Goose Management Scheme

Legal basis

http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1967/86/contents

Type of measure

Scheme

—

Objective

Aid for agri-environment-climate commitments

Form of aid

Direct grant

Budget

Overall budget: GBP 120 000 (in millions)

Annual budget: GBP 60 000 (in millions)

Intensity

—

Duration (period)

until 31.05.2021

Economic sectors

All economic sectors eligible to receive aid

Name and address of the granting authority

Scottish Natural Heritage

Battleby, Redgorton, Perth PH1 3EW

Other information

—

The authentic text(s) of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm.

| Date of adoption of the decision | 27.02.2020 |
| --- | --- |
| Aid number | SA.55861 (2019/N) |
| Member State | Czechia |
| Region | — | — |
| Title (and/or name of the beneficiary) | Zajištění interoperability v železniční dopravě |
| Legal basis | Zákon č. 266/1994 Sb., o dráhách, v platném znění;
  Zákon č. 218/2000 Sb., o rozpočtových pravidlech a o změně některých souvisejících zákonů (rozpočtová pravidla), v platném znění;
  Nařízení vlády č. 133/2005 Sb., o technických požadavcích na provozní a technickou propojenost evropského železničního systému, v platném znění;
  Vyhláška č. 352/2004 Sb., o provozní a technické propojenosti evropského železničního systému, v platném znění;
  Vyhláška č. 560/2006 Sb., o účasti státního rozpočtu na financování programů reprodukce majetku, v platném znění;
  Sdělení Ministerstva dopravy č. 111/2004 Sb., o výčtu železničních drah zařazených do evropského železničního systému;
  Usnesení vlády č. 558 ze dne 9. července 2014, kterým vláda schválila předložený návrh Operačního programu Doprava 2014 — 2020 (návrh operačního programu byl schválen Komisí prováděcím rozhodnutím Komise (EU) 2015/3297 ze dne 11. 5. 2015, kterým se schvalují určité prvky operačního programu ‘Doprava’ pro účely podpory z Evropského fondu pro regionální rozvoj a Fondu soudržnosti v rámci cíle Investice pro růst a zaměstnanost v České republice). |
| Type of measure | Scheme | — |
| Objective | — |
| Form of aid | Direct grant |
| Budget | Overall budget: CZK 3 400 (in millions)
  Annual budget: CZK 1 130 (in millions) |
| Intensity | 85 % |
| Duration (period) | 01.01.2020 — 31.12.2022 |
| Economic sectors | Land transport and transport via pipelines |
| Name and address of the granting authority | Ministerstvo dopravy |
| nábřeží L. Svobody 1222/12, 110 15 Praha 1 |

Date of adoption of the decision

27.02.2020

Aid number

SA.55861 (2019/N)

Member State

Czechia

Region

—

—

Title (and/or name of the beneficiary)

Zajištění interoperability v železniční dopravě

Legal basis

Zákon č. 266/1994 Sb., o dráhách, v platném znění;

Zákon č. 218/2000 Sb., o rozpočtových pravidlech a o změně některých souvisejících zákonů (rozpočtová pravidla), v platném znění;

Nařízení vlády č. 133/2005 Sb., o technických požadavcích na provozní a technickou propojenost evropského železničního systému, v platném znění;

Vyhláška č. 352/2004 Sb., o provozní a technické propojenosti evropského železničního systému, v platném znění;

Vyhláška č. 560/2006 Sb., o účasti státního rozpočtu na financování programů reprodukce majetku, v platném znění;

Sdělení Ministerstva dopravy č. 111/2004 Sb., o výčtu železničních drah zařazených do evropského železničního systému;

Usnesení vlády č. 558 ze dne 9. července 2014, kterým vláda schválila předložený návrh Operačního programu Doprava 2014 — 2020 (návrh operačního programu byl schválen Komisí prováděcím rozhodnutím Komise (EU) 2015/3297 ze dne 11. 5. 2015, kterým se schvalují určité prvky operačního programu ‘Doprava’ pro účely podpory z Evropského fondu pro regionální rozvoj a Fondu soudržnosti v rámci cíle Investice pro růst a zaměstnanost v České republice).

Type of measure

Scheme

—

Objective

—

Form of aid

Direct grant

Budget

Overall budget: CZK 3 400 (in millions)

Annual budget: CZK 1 130 (in millions)

Intensity

85 %

Duration (period)

01.01.2020 — 31.12.2022

Economic sectors

Land transport and transport via pipelines

Name and address of the granting authority

Ministerstvo dopravy

nábřeží L. Svobody 1222/12, 110 15 Praha 1

Other information

—

The authentic text(s) of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm.

| Date of adoption of the decision | 19.02.2020 |
| --- | --- |
| Aid number | SA.55889 (2019/N) |
| Member State | Germany |
| Region | — | — |
| Title (and/or name of the beneficiary) | Hamburg: AUKM- und Tierschutzverpflichtungen sowie ökologischer Landbau: Einzelfälle |
| Legal basis | — | § 46 der Haushaltsordnung der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg (LHO); |

Date of adoption of the decision

19.02.2020

Aid number

SA.55889 (2019/N)

Member State

Germany

Region

—

—

Title (and/or name of the beneficiary)

Hamburg: AUKM- und Tierschutzverpflichtungen sowie ökologischer Landbau: Einzelfälle

Legal basis

—

§ 46 der Haushaltsordnung der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg (LHO);

| — | Richtlinie der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg zur Gewährung von Fördermitteln für die Durchführung von Maßnahmen zur markt- und standortangepassten Landbewirtschaftung nach dem Agrarpolitischen Konzept 2020 — Anbau von jährlich mindestens fünf verschiedenen Hauptfruchtarten auf der Ackerfläche des Betriebes (5-gliedrige Fruchtfolge); |
| --- | --- |

—

Richtlinie der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg zur Gewährung von Fördermitteln für die Durchführung von Maßnahmen zur markt- und standortangepassten Landbewirtschaftung nach dem Agrarpolitischen Konzept 2020 — Anbau von jährlich mindestens fünf verschiedenen Hauptfruchtarten auf der Ackerfläche des Betriebes (5-gliedrige Fruchtfolge);

| — | Richtlinie der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg zur Gewährung von Fördermitteln für die Durchführung von Maßnahmen zur markt- und standortangepassten Landbewirtschaftung nach dem Agrarpolitischen Konzept 2020 — Extensive Bewirtschaftung des Dauergrünlandes; |
| --- | --- |

—

Richtlinie der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg zur Gewährung von Fördermitteln für die Durchführung von Maßnahmen zur markt- und standortangepassten Landbewirtschaftung nach dem Agrarpolitischen Konzept 2020 — Extensive Bewirtschaftung des Dauergrünlandes;

| — | Richtlinie der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg zur Gewährung von Fördermitteln für die Durchführung von Maßnahmen zur markt- und standortangepassten Landbewirtschaftung nach dem Agrarpolitischen Konzept 2020 — Anlage von Blühflächen oder Blühstreifen; |
| --- | --- |

—

Richtlinie der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg zur Gewährung von Fördermitteln für die Durchführung von Maßnahmen zur markt- und standortangepassten Landbewirtschaftung nach dem Agrarpolitischen Konzept 2020 — Anlage von Blühflächen oder Blühstreifen;

| — | Richtlinie der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg zur Gewährung von Fördermitteln für die Durchführung von Maßnahmen zur markt- und standortangepassten Landbewirtschaftung nach dem Agrarpolitischen Konzept 2020 — Sommerweidehaltung von Rindern; |
| --- | --- |

—

Richtlinie der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg zur Gewährung von Fördermitteln für die Durchführung von Maßnahmen zur markt- und standortangepassten Landbewirtschaftung nach dem Agrarpolitischen Konzept 2020 — Sommerweidehaltung von Rindern;

| — | Richtlinie der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg zur Gewährung von Fördermitteln für die Durchführung von Maßnahmen zur markt- und standortangepassten Landbewirtschaftung nach dem Agrarpolitischen Konzept 2020 — Einführung und Beibehaltung ökologischer Anbauverfahren; |
| --- | --- |

—

Richtlinie der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg zur Gewährung von Fördermitteln für die Durchführung von Maßnahmen zur markt- und standortangepassten Landbewirtschaftung nach dem Agrarpolitischen Konzept 2020 — Einführung und Beibehaltung ökologischer Anbauverfahren;

Type of measure

Scheme

—

Objective

Aid for organic farming, Aid for animal welfare commitments, Agri-environmental commitments

Form of aid

Direct grant

Budget

Overall budget: EUR 0,2162 (in millions)

Intensity

100 %

Duration (period)

until 31.12.2021

Economic sectors

Crop and animal production; hunting and related service activities

Name and address of the granting authority

| Behörde für Wirtschaft, Verkehr und Innovation |
| --- |
| Alter Steinweg 4, 20459 Hamburg |

Behörde für Wirtschaft, Verkehr und Innovation

Alter Steinweg 4, 20459 Hamburg

Other information

—

The authentic text(s) of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm.

| Date of adoption of the decision | 13.02.2020 |
| --- | --- |
| Aid number | SA.55933 (2019/N) |
| Member State | Poland |
| Region | Pomorskie | — |
| Title (and/or name of the beneficiary) | Pomorsko Mazurska Hodowla Ziemniaka Sp. z o.o. z/s w Strzekęcinie, Strzekęcino 11, 76-024 Świeszyno |
| Legal basis | art. 11 ustawy z dnia 18 grudnia 2003r. o ochronie roślin (Dz.U. z 2019r. poz. 972) |
| Type of measure | Ad hoc aid | Pomorsko Mazurska Hodowla Ziemniaka Sp. z o.o. z/s w Strzekęcinie, Strzekęcino 11, 76-024 Świeszyno |
| Objective | Aid for the costs of prevention, control and eradication of animal diseases and plant pests and aid to make good the damage caused by animal diseases and plant pests |
| Form of aid | Direct grant/ Interest rate subsidy |
| Budget | Overall budget: PLN 1,5853 (in millions)
  Annual budget: PLN 1,5853 (in millions) |
| Intensity | 100 % |
| Duration (period) | — |
| Economic sectors | All economic sectors eligible to receive aid |
| Name and address of the granting authority | Główny Inspektor Ochrony Roślin i Nasiennictwa |
| Główny Inspektorat Ochrony Roślin i Nasiennictwa, Al. Jana Pawła II 11, 00-828 Warszawa |

Date of adoption of the decision

13.02.2020

Aid number

SA.55933 (2019/N)

Member State

Poland

Region

Pomorskie

—

Title (and/or name of the beneficiary)

Pomorsko Mazurska Hodowla Ziemniaka Sp. z o.o. z/s w Strzekęcinie, Strzekęcino 11, 76-024 Świeszyno

Legal basis

art. 11 ustawy z dnia 18 grudnia 2003r. o ochronie roślin (Dz.U. z 2019r. poz. 972)

Type of measure

Ad hoc aid

Pomorsko Mazurska Hodowla Ziemniaka Sp. z o.o. z/s w Strzekęcinie, Strzekęcino 11, 76-024 Świeszyno

Objective

Aid for the costs of prevention, control and eradication of animal diseases and plant pests and aid to make good the damage caused by animal diseases and plant pests

Form of aid

Direct grant/ Interest rate subsidy

Budget

Overall budget: PLN 1,5853 (in millions)

Annual budget: PLN 1,5853 (in millions)

Intensity

100 %

Duration (period)

—

Economic sectors

All economic sectors eligible to receive aid

Name and address of the granting authority

Główny Inspektor Ochrony Roślin i Nasiennictwa

Główny Inspektorat Ochrony Roślin i Nasiennictwa, Al. Jana Pawła II 11, 00-828 Warszawa

Other information

—

The authentic text(s) of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm.

| Date of adoption of the decision | 30.01.2020 |
| --- | --- |
| Aid number | SA.55977 (2019/N) |
| Member State | Germany |
| Region | — | — |
| Title (and/or name of the beneficiary) | Richtlinie zur Förderung der Anschaffung von Elektrobussen im öffentlichen Personennahverkehr |
| Legal basis | Die Gewährung der Beihilfemaßnahme erfolgt nach Maßgabe der Richtlinie zur Förderung der Anschaffung von Elektrobussen im öffentlichen Personennahverkehr auf der Grundlage des Gesetzes über die Feststellung des Haushaltsplans für das Haushaltsjahr 2018 ff. (Haushaltsgesetz 2018 ff.), der § § 23, 44 Bundeshaushaltsordnung (BHO) und der Allgemeinen Verwaltungsvorschriften (VV-BHO) zu § § 23, 44 BHO |
| Type of measure | Scheme | — |
| Objective | Environmental protection |
| Form of aid | — |
| Budget | Overall budget: EUR 650 (in millions)
  Annual budget: EUR 108,3333 (in millions) |
| Intensity | 80 % |
| Duration (period) | 16.03.2018 — 31.12.2023 |
| Economic sectors | All economic sectors eligible to receive aid |
| Name and address of the granting authority | Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und nukleare Sicherheit (BMU) |
| Stresemannstraße 128-103, 10117 Berlin |

Date of adoption of the decision

30.01.2020

Aid number

SA.55977 (2019/N)

Member State

Germany

Region

—

—

Title (and/or name of the beneficiary)

Richtlinie zur Förderung der Anschaffung von Elektrobussen im öffentlichen Personennahverkehr

Legal basis

Die Gewährung der Beihilfemaßnahme erfolgt nach Maßgabe der Richtlinie zur Förderung der Anschaffung von Elektrobussen im öffentlichen Personennahverkehr auf der Grundlage des Gesetzes über die Feststellung des Haushaltsplans für das Haushaltsjahr 2018 ff. (Haushaltsgesetz 2018 ff.), der § § 23, 44 Bundeshaushaltsordnung (BHO) und der Allgemeinen Verwaltungsvorschriften (VV-BHO) zu § § 23, 44 BHO

Type of measure

Scheme

—

Objective

Environmental protection

Form of aid

—

Budget

Overall budget: EUR 650 (in millions)

Annual budget: EUR 108,3333 (in millions)

Intensity

80 %

Duration (period)

16.03.2018 — 31.12.2023

Economic sectors

All economic sectors eligible to receive aid

Name and address of the granting authority

Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und nukleare Sicherheit (BMU)

Stresemannstraße 128-103, 10117 Berlin

Other information

—

The authentic text(s) of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm.

| Date of adoption of the decision | 24.02.2020 |
| --- | --- |
| Aid number | SA.56250 (2020/N) |
| Member State | Romania |
| Region | Olt | Article 107(3)(a) |
| Title (and/or name of the beneficiary) | Rescue aid in favor of Complexul Energetic Oltenia |
| Legal basis | — |
| Type of measure | Individual aid | Company Complexul Energetic Oltenia SA |
| Objective | Rescuing undertakings in difficulty |
| Form of aid | Loan/ Repayable advances |
| Budget | Overall budget: RON 1 200 (in millions) |
| Intensity | % |
| Duration (period) | — |
| Economic sectors | Electric power generation; transmission and distribution |
| Name and address of the granting authority | — |
| Other information | — |

Date of adoption of the decision

24.02.2020

Aid number

SA.56250 (2020/N)

Member State

Romania

Region

Olt

Article 107(3)(a)

Title (and/or name of the beneficiary)

Rescue aid in favor of Complexul Energetic Oltenia

Legal basis

—

Type of measure

Individual aid

Company Complexul Energetic Oltenia SA

Objective

Rescuing undertakings in difficulty

Form of aid

Loan/ Repayable advances

Budget

Overall budget: RON 1 200 (in millions)

Intensity

%

Duration (period)

—

Economic sectors

Electric power generation; transmission and distribution

Name and address of the granting authority

—

Other information

—

The authentic text(s) of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm.

| Date of adoption of the decision | 19.02.2020 |
| --- | --- |
| Aid number | SA.56302 (2020/N) |
| Member State | Italy |
| Region | SARDEGNA | — |
| Title (and/or name of the beneficiary) | Aiuti agli investimenti nel settore apistico |
| Legal basis | — | L.R. 24.7.2015, n. 19 ‘Disposizioni in materia di apicoltura’ |

Date of adoption of the decision

19.02.2020

Aid number

SA.56302 (2020/N)

Member State

Italy

Region

SARDEGNA

—

Title (and/or name of the beneficiary)

Aiuti agli investimenti nel settore apistico

Legal basis

—

L.R. 24.7.2015, n. 19 ‘Disposizioni in materia di apicoltura’

| — | DGR n. 55/29 del 13.11.2018 — ‘Aiuti agli investimenti nel settore apistico. Somme programmate: euro 1 500 000 . Legge regionale 24 luglio 2015, n. 19 — Disposizioni in materia di apicoltura. Legge regionale 11 gennaio 2018, n. 2 — Bilancio di previsione triennale 2018-2020. C.d.R. 00.06.01.01 — Cap. SC06.1037’. |
| --- | --- |

—

DGR n. 55/29 del 13.11.2018 — ‘Aiuti agli investimenti nel settore apistico. Somme programmate: euro 1 500 000 . Legge regionale 24 luglio 2015, n. 19 — Disposizioni in materia di apicoltura. Legge regionale 11 gennaio 2018, n. 2 — Bilancio di previsione triennale 2018-2020. C.d.R. 00.06.01.01 — Cap. SC06.1037’.

| — | DGR n. 50/19 du 10.12.2019‘Aiuti agli investimenti nel settore apistico. Somme programmate: euro 500 000 . Legge regionale 24 luglio 2015, n. 19 e Legge regionale 6 dicembre 2019, n. 20. C.d.R. 00.06.01.01 — Cap. SC06.1037’ |
| --- | --- |

—

DGR n. 50/19 du 10.12.2019‘Aiuti agli investimenti nel settore apistico. Somme programmate: euro 500 000 . Legge regionale 24 luglio 2015, n. 19 e Legge regionale 6 dicembre 2019, n. 20. C.d.R. 00.06.01.01 — Cap. SC06.1037’

Type of measure

Scheme

—

Objective

Aid for investment in tangible assets and intangible assets on agricultural holdings linked to primary agricultural production

Form of aid

Direct grant

Budget

Overall budget: EUR 0,5 (in millions)

Intensity

60 %

Duration (period)

07.02.2019 — 31.12.2022

Economic sectors

Crop and animal production; hunting and related service activities

Name and address of the granting authority

| REGIONE AUTONOMA DELLA SARDEGNA — ASSESSORATO AGRICOLTURA |
| --- |
| Via Pessagno 4- CAGLIARI |

REGIONE AUTONOMA DELLA SARDEGNA — ASSESSORATO AGRICOLTURA

Via Pessagno 4- CAGLIARI

Other information

—

The authentic text(s) of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm.

| Date of adoption of the decision | 21.03.2020 |
| --- | --- |
| Aid number | SA.56708 (2020/N) |
| Member State | Denmark |
| Region | DANMARK | — |
| Title (and/or name of the beneficiary) | Danish guarantee scheme for SMEs affected by COVID-19 |
| Legal basis | Danish Budget Law |
| Type of measure | Scheme | — |
| Objective | Compensation of damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences |
| Form of aid | Guarantee |
| Budget | Overall budget: DKK 5 000 (in millions) |
| Intensity | — |
| Duration (period) | until 31.12.2020 |
| Economic sectors | All economic sectors eligible to receive aid |
| Name and address of the granting authority | Ministry of Industry, Business and Financial Affairs
  Slotsholmsgade 12, Copenhagen |
| Other information | — |

Date of adoption of the decision

21.03.2020

Aid number

SA.56708 (2020/N)

Member State

Denmark

Region

DANMARK

—

Title (and/or name of the beneficiary)

Danish guarantee scheme for SMEs affected by COVID-19

Legal basis

Danish Budget Law

Type of measure

Scheme

—

Objective

Compensation of damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences

Form of aid

Guarantee

Budget

Overall budget: DKK 5 000 (in millions)

Intensity

—

Duration (period)

until 31.12.2020

Economic sectors

All economic sectors eligible to receive aid

Name and address of the granting authority

Ministry of Industry, Business and Financial Affairs

Slotsholmsgade 12, Copenhagen

Other information

—

The authentic text(s) of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm.

| Date of adoption of the decision | 21.03.2020 |
| --- | --- |
| Aid number | SA.56709 (2020/N) |
| Member State | France |
| Region | — | — |
| Title (and/or name of the beneficiary) | France — COVID-19: Plan de sécurisation du financement des entreprises |
| Legal basis | — | Loi no2758 de finances rectificatives pour 2020, article 4 |

Date of adoption of the decision

21.03.2020

Aid number

SA.56709 (2020/N)

Member State

France

Region

—

—

Title (and/or name of the beneficiary)

France — COVID-19: Plan de sécurisation du financement des entreprises

Legal basis

—

Loi no2758 de finances rectificatives pour 2020, article 4

| — | Status governing the interventions of Bpifrance Financement SA |
| --- | --- |

—

Status governing the interventions of Bpifrance Financement SA

Type of measure

Scheme

—

Objective

Remedy for a serious disturbance in the economy

Form of aid

Guarantee

Budget

Overall budget: EUR 300 000 (in millions)

Intensity

Duration (period)

23.03.2020 — 31.12.2020

Economic sectors

All economic sectors eligible to receive aid

Name and address of the granting authority

| Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances |
| --- |
| 139 rue de Bercy |
| 75572 Paris Cedex 12 |

Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances

139 rue de Bercy

75572 Paris Cedex 12

Other information

—

The authentic text(s) of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm.

| Date of adoption of the decision | 22.03.2020 |
| --- | --- |
| Aid number | SA.56714 (2020/N) |
| Member State | Germany |
| Region | — | — |
| Title (and/or name of the beneficiary) | Germany — COVID-19 measures |
| Legal basis | Sonderprogramm 2020 für Investitions- und Betriebsmittelfinanzierung |
| Type of measure | Scheme | — |
| Objective | Remedy for a serious disturbance in the economy |
| Form of aid | Interest subsidy |
| Budget | — |
| Intensity | % |
| Duration (period) | 22.03.2020 — 31.12.2020 |
| Economic sectors | All economic sectors eligible to receive aid |
| Name and address of the granting authority | Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) |
| Other information | — |

Date of adoption of the decision

22.03.2020

Aid number

SA.56714 (2020/N)

Member State

Germany

Region

—

—

Title (and/or name of the beneficiary)

Germany — COVID-19 measures

Legal basis

Sonderprogramm 2020 für Investitions- und Betriebsmittelfinanzierung

Type of measure

Scheme

—

Objective

Remedy for a serious disturbance in the economy

Form of aid

Interest subsidy

Budget

—

Intensity

%

Duration (period)

22.03.2020 — 31.12.2020

Economic sectors

All economic sectors eligible to receive aid

Name and address of the granting authority

Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW)

Other information

—

The authentic text(s) of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm.

| Date of adoption of the decision | 23.03.2020 |
| --- | --- |
| Aid number | SA.56722 (2020/N) |
| Member State | Latvia |
| Region | — | — |
| Title (and/or name of the beneficiary) | COVID-19: Loan guarantee scheme and subsidied loan scheme |
| Legal basis | Decree Laws |
| Type of measure | Scheme | — |
| Objective | — |
| Form of aid | Guarantee, Soft loan |
| Budget | Overall budget: EUR 100 (in millions) |
| Intensity | % |
| Duration (period) | — |
| Economic sectors | All economic sectors eligible to receive aid |
| Name and address of the granting authority | ‘Altum’ |
| Doma laukums 4, LV-1050 Riga, Latvia |

Date of adoption of the decision

23.03.2020

Aid number

SA.56722 (2020/N)

Member State

Latvia

Region

—

—

Title (and/or name of the beneficiary)

COVID-19: Loan guarantee scheme and subsidied loan scheme

Legal basis

Decree Laws

Type of measure

Scheme

—

Objective

—

Form of aid

Guarantee, Soft loan

Budget

Overall budget: EUR 100 (in millions)

Intensity

%

Duration (period)

—

Economic sectors

All economic sectors eligible to receive aid

Name and address of the granting authority

‘Altum’

Doma laukums 4, LV-1050 Riga, Latvia

Other information

—

The authentic text(s) of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm.

| Date of adoption of the decision | 24.03.2020 |
| --- | --- |
| Aid number | SA.56790 (2020/N) |
| Member State | Germany |
| Region | — | — |
| Title (and/or name of the beneficiary) | Regelung zur vorübergehenden Gewährung geringfügiger Beihilfen im Geltungsbereich der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Zusammenhang mit dem Ausbruch von COVID-19 (‘Bundesregelung Kleinbeihilfen 2020’) |
| Legal basis | Regelung zur vorübergehenden Gewährung geringfügiger Beihilfen im Geltungsbereich der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Zusammenhang mit dem Ausbruch von COVID-19 (‘Bundesregelung Kleinbeihilfen 2020’) |
| Type of measure | Scheme | — |
| Objective | Remedy for a serious disturbance in the economy |
| Form of aid | Direct grant, Other, Repayable advances, Tax allowance, Tax base reduction, Tax deferment, Tax rate reduction — Aid under the scheme will be granted in the form of direct grants, repayable advances and tax or payment advantages. |
| Budget | Overall budget: EUR 45 000 (in millions)
  Annual budget: EUR 45 000 (in millions) |
| Intensity | 100 % |
| Duration (period) | 24.03.2020 — 31.12.2020 |
| Economic sectors | All economic sectors eligible to receive aid |
| Name and address of the granting authority | Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie |
| Scharnhorststr. 34-37 |

Date of adoption of the decision

24.03.2020

Aid number

SA.56790 (2020/N)

Member State

Germany

Region

—

—

Title (and/or name of the beneficiary)

Regelung zur vorübergehenden Gewährung geringfügiger Beihilfen im Geltungsbereich der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Zusammenhang mit dem Ausbruch von COVID-19 (‘Bundesregelung Kleinbeihilfen 2020’)

Legal basis

Regelung zur vorübergehenden Gewährung geringfügiger Beihilfen im Geltungsbereich der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Zusammenhang mit dem Ausbruch von COVID-19 (‘Bundesregelung Kleinbeihilfen 2020’)

Type of measure

Scheme

—

Objective

Remedy for a serious disturbance in the economy

Form of aid

Direct grant, Other, Repayable advances, Tax allowance, Tax base reduction, Tax deferment, Tax rate reduction — Aid under the scheme will be granted in the form of direct grants, repayable advances and tax or payment advantages.

Budget

Overall budget: EUR 45 000 (in millions)

Annual budget: EUR 45 000 (in millions)

Intensity

100 %

Duration (period)

24.03.2020 — 31.12.2020

Economic sectors

All economic sectors eligible to receive aid

Name and address of the granting authority

Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie

Scharnhorststr. 34-37

Other information

—

The authentic text(s) of the decision, from which all confidential information has been removed, can be found at:

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm.

---

V Announcements

PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPETITION POLICY

European Commission

| 3.4.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 112/12 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.4.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 112/12

---

STATE AID – HUNGARY

State aid SA.48556 (2019/C) (ex 2018/N) – Regional investment aid to Samsung SDI

Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2020/C 112/02)

By means of the letter dated 14 October 2019 reproduced in the English language on the pages following this summary, the Commission notified Hungary of its decision to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union concerning the abovementioned aid

Interested parties may submit their comments on the aid in respect of which the Commission is initiating the procedure within one month of the date of publication of this summary and the following letter, to:

| European Commission |
| --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| State Aid Greffe |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
| Fax + 32 22961242 |
| Email: Stateaidgreffe@ec.europa.eu |

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

State Aid Greffe

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Fax + 32 22961242

Email: Stateaidgreffe@ec.europa.eu

These comments will be communicated to Hungary. Confidential treatment of the identity of the interested party submitting the comments may be requested in writing, stating the reasons for the request.

TEXT OF SUMMARY

Description of the measure and the investment project

Hungary notified on 16 May 2018 regional investment aid of EUR 108 million it intends to grant to Samsung SDI Magyarország Zrt (‘Samsung SDI’) for an investment to extend the capacity of an existing establishment developed in 2016 in Göd (‘Investment 1’) to produce batteries for electric vehicles (‘EV’). The notified investment (‘Investment 2’) is located in the Central Hungarian region, an area eligible for regional aid under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, with a standard regional aid ceiling of 35 % on the basis of the Hungarian regional aid map for the period from July 2017 to 2020 (1). The recipient of aid is a fully owned subsidiary of Samsung SDI Co. Ltd. headquartered in South Korea and qualifies as a large undertaking.

Hungary considers that the investment project will rely on production processes that constitute a ‘new process innovation’ in the meaning of paragraph 15 of the RAG, because Samsung SDI intends to develop and manufacture in mass production EV battery cells using significant changes in techniques, equipment and software.

Assessment of the compatibility of the aid measures

—   Eligibility of the notified project

Following the preliminary examination, the Commission takes the view that the investment project which is carried out by a large undertaking in a c-area is — by exception — eligible for regional investment aid because it is based on a ‘new process innovation’ which brings a substantial change to the state of the art of the relevant production processes, has a significant impact on the overall production process applied by Samsung SDI in Hungary, and represents a first-time application in the sector within the EEA.

—   Compatibility of the aid measure

The common assessment principles laid down in Section 3.1 of the RAG specify that regional aid can only be approved if (1) certain minimum requirements, defined in terms of contribution of the project to regional development, appropriateness of aid and the chosen aid form, formal and substantive incentive effect of the aid, and its proportionality, are met; if (2) the aid does not lead to manifest negative effects on competition and trade; and if (3) the positive effects of the aid clearly outweigh its negative effects.

Paragraph 61 of the RAG stipulates that (substantive) incentive effect can be proven in either one of two scenarios: i.e. in the absence of aid, the investment would not be sufficiently profitable in any location (scenario 1) or that, in the absence of aid, the investment would take place in another location (scenario 2). Hungary invokes a scenario 2 situation and claims that the aid is justified by the need to compensate for a net disadvantage of EUR 173 million of the Hungarian location compared to an alternative investment location in Xi’an, China where Samsung SDI controls via a joint venture another EV battery production facility.

At this stage, the Commission is unable to conclude that the proposed aid would have the required incentive effect. In particular, the Commission notes that the EUR 173 million viability gap results essentially from a significant difference in investment costs between the alternative investment scenarios, where the investment costs into machinery and equipment are [35-50] % higher in Hungary compared to China. This significant difference has been justified by the Hungarian authorities by invoking Samsung SDI’s local sourcing policy, which requires the company to buy from local sources the equipment and machinery as well as the other inputs necessary for the investment. Based on the information available to it, the Commission considers that this claim is unrealistic and was unrealistic already at the time when the beneficiary took the final decision to invest in Hungary. This is suggested by the fact that, as presented by the Hungarian authorities, Samsung SDI’s search for local suppliers of equipment and machinery — which preceded the final investment decision — both in the European Economic Area and in China was unsuccessful, as appropriate suppliers to implement Samsung’s new process innovation could not be found. The Commission further notes that the Hungarian authorities and Samsung SDI confirmed that, from the start of the works on the notified project in September 2017 and up to May 2019, the beneficiary had not applied its alleged local sourcing policy in practice, and instead bought equipment and machinery only from South Korean suppliers. Moreover, it appears that Samsung made an exception from its invoked local sourcing policy also when implementing its first (unaided) investment in Hungary.

In view of the above, the Commission considers that a more realistic hypothesis would have been that Samsung SDI intended already at the time of the investment decision to buy the respective equipment and machinery from its existing suppliers located in South Korea, for both investment scenarios, in which case the [35-50] % investment cost difference appears to be unjustified. A recalculation of the viability gap between Hungary and China on the basis of this hypothesis shows that the EUR 173 million viability gap in favour of China would be completely wiped out and possibly even reversed, resulting in a small net overall advantage in favour of the Hungarian investment scenario.

Furthermore, the Commission notes that the machinery and equipment acquired until May 2019 for the notified investment project was not purchased directly by the recipient of aid from the actual South Korean suppliers. Instead, the Samsung SDI Group headquartered in South Korea has acted as intermediary by buying this equipment/machinery in South Korea and selling it to Samsung SDI entity in Hungary, after applying a [18-22] % mark-up to the underlying costs basis. At this stage, based on the information available to it, the Commission cannot confirm that these intragroup transactions resulted in a market conform price and did not artificially inflate the eligible costs of the Hungarian investment.

In addition, the Commission considers that three further elements raise questions as to the credibility of the Chinese investment scenario. First, as acknowledged by the legal action taken by the Commission in the World Trade Organization, China has been applying systemic practices that force foreign companies to give up sensitive technology and know-how as a precondition for doing business in China. Second, it appears that at the time of the investment decision in November 2017, South Korean EV battery producers in China were facing a particularly hostile political environment, with the result that they were in practice largely prevented from supplying the Chinese market with their products because the Chinese authorities withdrew subsidies for EVs equipped with batteries provided by the South Korean producers. Third, it appears unlikely that the aid beneficiary would have started a small cell production facility without aid in Göd (Investment 1), if it had not considered ramping up the investment at a later stage.

In view of the above, at this stage the Commission cannot exclude that the strategic considerations for investing in Hungary combined with the risks of forced transfer of technology and the hostile political climate in China towards South Korean EV battery producers would not have led the company to invest in Hungary even in the presence of the claimed viability gap.

The assessment of the proportionality of the aid amount required under Section 3.6 of the RAG can only be carried out once the incentive effect of the aid is confirmed. At this stage, it appears that no aid would be necessary to trigger the location of the investment in Hungary, as this would have happened in any event since the recalculated viability gap suggests that the Hungarian investment scenario has a small net cost advantage compared to the Chinese one, as well as important (but unquantifiable) strategic advantages as described above.

The Commission also raises doubts as to the contribution of the investment project to the regional development in the region concerned, and could not establish the appropriateness of aid, and the envisaged form of aid (direct grant), to address the specific regional handicaps of the region concerned.

Section 3.7.2 of the RAG explicitly lists a series of situations where the manifest negative effects on trade and/or competition manifestly outweigh any positive effects, and where regional aid is prohibited. However, the analysis of manifest negative effects and overall balancing of positive and negative effects is relevant only if the Commission finds that the minimum requirements described above are fulfilled.

Nevertheless, at this stage, in view of certain press reports (2), the Commission has difficulties to exclude that aid is not causal to a closure of the same or similar activity in another area in the EEA — namely the closure of battery pack production activities carried out by the Samsung SDI subsidiary located in Austria and the consequent loss of 100 jobs in the respective Austrian region — and its relocation to the target region in Hungary, which, according to paragraph 122 of the RAG, constitutes a negative effect that is unlikely to be compensated by any positive elements.

The Commission raises for the above reasons doubts as to the compatibility of the aid.

Interested parties are invited to comment on the aid, and in particular on the issues identified more in detail in the attached letter to Hungary.

TEXT OF LETTER

The Commission wishes to inform Hungary that, having examined the information supplied by your authorities on the aid measure referred to above, it has decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’).

1.   PROCEDURE

| (1) | By electronic notification registered on 16 May 2018, the Hungarian authorities notified to the Commission their intention to grant regional investment aid in favour of Samsung SDI Magyarország Zrt (hereinafter ‘Samsung SDI’). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

| (2) | By letters of 13 July 2018, 12 September 2018, 13 November 2018, 6 February 2019, and 1 April 2019 the Commission requested supplementary information which was submitted by letters registered at the Commission on 7 September 2018, 14 September 2018, 11 December 2018, 20 December 2018, 8 March 2019, and 31 May 2019. Substantial information was also provided by the Hungarian authorities during a meeting in Göd, Hungary, on 2 July 2018 at the beneficiary's premises. Further information was provided via emails on 25 and 28 January 2019. By letter of 7 December 2018, the Hungarian authorities agreed to have the present decision adopted and notified in the English language and by letter of 7 May 2019, the Hungarian authorities agreed to an extension of the deadline for the adoption of the present decision until 15 October 2019. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

2.   DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE AID MEASURE

2.1.   Objective of the aid measure

| (3) | The Hungarian authorities intend to promote regional development by providing regional aid for the extension of the capacity of an existing establishment of Samsung SDI which is producing batteries cells for electric vehicles (hereinafter ‘EV’) in Göd in Central Hungary. Göd is located in an area eligible for regional aid under Art. 107(3)(c) TFEU, with a standard regional aid ceiling of 35 % under the Hungarian regional aid map for the period from 2017 to 2020 (3) (hereinafter ‘Regional Aid Map’). |
| --- | --- |

(3)

2.2.   The beneficiary

| (4) | The recipient of the aid is Samsung SDI, a fully owned subsidiary of Samsung SDI Co. Ltd. (hereinafter ‘Samsung SDI Group’) which is headquartered in South Korea. The Samsung SDI group is a large undertaking with almost 19 000 employees globally and a turnover of about EUR 4 billion in 2016. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

| (5) | The Samsung SDI Group is involved in the manufacturing of rechargeable batteries used in the IT industry, EVs, and energy storage systems (ESS). The group is organized in three divisions: the automotive/ESS division, the battery division, and the electronic materials division. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

| (6) | Apart from Samsung SDI in Hungary, the Samsung SDI Group has three other subsidiaries in the EEA: Samsung SDI Battery Systems GmbH in Austria which is involved in the production and sale of EV battery packs, Samsung SDI Europe GmbH in Germany which offers sales and purchase support for the Samsung SDI Group in Europe, and Novaled GmbH in Germany, which manufactures and sells electronic materials. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

| (7) | In 2016, Samsung SDI set up in Göd, Hungary an EV battery plant (hereinafter ‘Investment 1’) with a maximum capacity of [100 000 — 400 000] (*1) EV battery cells per month which is equivalent to an annual capacity of [0,1-0,5] GWh. This manufacturing facility started trial production in the second quarter of 2017 and mass production in May 2018. No State aid was granted for this investment. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

| (8) | The Hungarian authorities confirmed that the beneficiary is not a company in difficulty within the meaning of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring non-financial undertakings in difficulty (4). |
| --- | --- |

(8)

2.3.   The investment project

2.3.1.   
  The notified project

| (9) | The investment project concerns the extention of the capacity of the EV battery cell production facility of an existing establishment owned by the beneficiary in Göd (hereinafter ‘Investment 2’). With the envisaged extension, Samsung SDI's production capacity in Hungary is planned to reach [3,5-8] million battery cells per month in [...], which is equivalent to an annual capacity of [17-20] GWh. Samsung SDI intends to use [50-90] % of this capacity to serve the EEA market and [10-40] % for [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

| (10) | The notified project consists of investments into equipment and machinery relating to the production of battery cells as well as the necessary facilities. Samsung SDI intends to complement the investment into cell production by additional investments into battery modules and battery packs (5) production for which no aid will be requested. The investment will be implemented in two phases as described in table 1 below. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

| (11) | Works on the investment project started on 1 December 2017, after the beneficiary had submitted the relevant aid application to the Hungarian authorities on 13 September 2017. Production started in [...] 2019 and full production should be reached in [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

| (12) | The project is expected to create 1 200 new direct jobs. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

| (13) | The Hungarian authorities consider that the project qualifies as new process innovation in the meaning of paragraph 15 of the Guidelines on regional State aid for 2014-2020 (hereinafter ‘RAG’) (6) because Samsung SDI intends to develop and manufacture in mass production EV battery cells using significant changes in techniques, equipment and software. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

| (14) | The aim of Samsung's new process innovations is to decrease the time and costs for manufacturing battery cells. The produced battery cells and some of the input materials used in the production process will be modified as a result of the implementation of the process innovations during both phases of Investment 2. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

| (15) | In a first phase of the investment, Samsung SDI will produce large metal can prismatic cells with [...] electrodes, similar to the cells produced via the unaided Investment 1 in Hungary. However, changes in the production process steps and to the electrode materials will lead to a significantly improved performance in terms of driving range, speed to charge, and cost per kWh (please see table 1). |
| --- | --- |

(15)

| (16) | In the second phase of the investment, Samsung will implement a significant innovation in the large format metal can prismatic battery cell structure approach (i.e. stacking electrodes instead of winding) which, together with further changes in process steps and input materials, will result in further improvements of the performance of the battery cells (please see table 1).

  Table 1

  Comparison of the main elements of Samsung's investment 1 & 2 in Hungary | Investment 1 | Investment 2
  (phase 1) | Investment 2
  (phase 2) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Start of mass production | May 2018 | 2019 | [...] |
| Capacity in GWh | [0,2 -0,5 ] | [17-20] by [...] |
| Product characteristics | Large format metal can prismatic battery cells with wound electrodes | Large format metal can prismatic battery cells with [...] electrodes | Large format metal can prismatic battery cells with stacked electrodes |
| — | cathode material |

(16)

Table 1

Comparison of the main elements of Samsung's investment 1 & 2 in Hungary

Investment 1

Investment 2

(phase 1)

Investment 2

(phase 2)

Start of mass production

May 2018

2019

[...]

Capacity in GWh

[0,2 -0,5 ]

[17-20] by [...]

Product characteristics

Large format metal can prismatic battery cells with wound electrodes

Large format metal can prismatic battery cells with [...] electrodes

Large format metal can prismatic battery cells with stacked electrodes

—

cathode material

[...].

[...]

[...]

| — | anode material |
| --- | --- |

—

anode material

[...]

[...]

[...]

| — | separator |
| --- | --- |

—

separator

[...]

[...]

[...]

| — | driving range (for a large car) |
| --- | --- |

—

driving range (for a large car)

[200-300] km

[450-600] km

[600-750] km

| (17) | The Hungarian authorities further explained that on the EV battery cells market there are three basic distinct cell structures (i.e. prismatic — as the ones produced by Samsung SDI in Göd under Investment 1 -, pouch and cylindrical) and that their underlying production processes are significantly different. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

| (18) | In general, the battery cell production process consists of three steps:






  — | In a first step (electrode process), the battery anode and cathode are manufactured. In this process, electrode materials are mixed with a binder material to form a slurry which is then coated on both sides of metallic foils. After coating, the active electrode materials are pressed and dried on the foil. The coated foils are reeled up again after knife slitting. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(18)

—

In a first step (electrode process), the battery anode and cathode are manufactured. In this process, electrode materials are mixed with a binder material to form a slurry which is then coated on both sides of metallic foils. After coating, the active electrode materials are pressed and dried on the foil. The coated foils are reeled up again after knife slitting.

| — | In a second step (cell assembly), the battery cell is assembled by putting together the electrodes and the other components into the cell can. |
| --- | --- |

—

In a second step (cell assembly), the battery cell is assembled by putting together the electrodes and the other components into the cell can.

| — | The third and last step (cell formation) consists essentially in at least one complete charge-discharge cycle to transform the working materials into an usable form; it includes also extensive inspection and testing activities. |
| --- | --- |

—

The third and last step (cell formation) consists essentially in at least one complete charge-discharge cycle to transform the working materials into an usable form; it includes also extensive inspection and testing activities.

| (19) | For the new production process implemented by Samsung SDI in Göd, the individual process innovations listed below — which cover all three steps described in recital (18) of this decision — are according to Hungary the most relevant ones:






  — | Electrode process integration integrates [...] core chemical engineering processes into [...] process. This process saves machine costs, reduces processing time and allows a more balanced and uniform mixing of active material. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(19)

—

Electrode process integration integrates [...] core chemical engineering processes into [...] process. This process saves machine costs, reduces processing time and allows a more balanced and uniform mixing of active material.

| — | Next-generation electrode coating relates to improvements in [...]. New features allow the achievement of a [...]. This coating technique will simultaneously [...] of Samsung SDI Group’s batteries. |
| --- | --- |

—

Next-generation electrode coating relates to improvements in [...]. New features allow the achievement of a [...]. This coating technique will simultaneously [...] of Samsung SDI Group’s batteries.

| — | The ‘stacking’ process replaces the winding technology at the heart of the battery with a much more advanced ‘stacked’ assembly method. Fundamentally revising the cell structure has required the Samsung SDI Group to invent a [...] system and [...] technology to create the stacked structure. This technology reduces [...] and therefore increases [...]. |
| --- | --- |

—

The ‘stacking’ process replaces the winding technology at the heart of the battery with a much more advanced ‘stacked’ assembly method. Fundamentally revising the cell structure has required the Samsung SDI Group to invent a [...] system and [...] technology to create the stacked structure. This technology reduces [...] and therefore increases [...].

| — | Optimizing the [...] process refers to the development of new equipment to allow[...], and to [...] the cell during the [...] process. These techniques will [...] and will control [...]. |
| --- | --- |

—

Optimizing the [...] process refers to the development of new equipment to allow[...], and to [...] the cell during the [...] process. These techniques will [...] and will control [...].

| — | [...] logistics introduces the delivery of materials through a [...] delivery system. This novel design shortens the time necessary to [...], reduces manpower needs, and, most critically, [...] in the factory. |
| --- | --- |

—

[...] logistics introduces the delivery of materials through a [...] delivery system. This novel design shortens the time necessary to [...], reduces manpower needs, and, most critically, [...] in the factory.

| — | A new [...]software and sensors increase the operating efficiency of the whole process, and provide the real time generation of [...]. These [...] enable rapid problem analysis and provide guidance on the [...] to solve arising problems. |
| --- | --- |

—

A new [...]software and sensors increase the operating efficiency of the whole process, and provide the real time generation of [...]. These [...] enable rapid problem analysis and provide guidance on the [...] to solve arising problems.

| (20) | Hungary explained that some of these novel elements will be protected by patents, but essentially the Samsung SDI Group will protect most of the new production process through blackboxing (7). The Samsung SDI Group holds one international patent covering a specific item of manufacturing equipment (8) and has filed a second one (9). The ‘stacking’ of electrodes, to be introduced by Investment 2, is still under development and testing in [...], but is planned to be applied in mass production in [...] . |
| --- | --- |

(20)

| (21) | The Hungarian authorities consider that the mentioned innovative processes and equipments will be introduced in the EV battery and accumulator production sector for the first time. They advance that the elements of the new process constitute the first-time implementation of the innovations world-wide. The Hungarian authorities have provided an expert report signed by [J.C.] [...] the UNIST Future Batteries Research Center (10). The report confirms the innovativeness of the production process to be introduced under Investment 2. Hungary considers that [J.C.] qualifies as an independent expert, despite it's links with the Samsung SDI Group. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

| (22) | In conclusion, Hungary considers that the new production process qualifies as a ‘new process innovation’ in the meaning of paragraph 15 of the RAG, as the manufacturing process and equipment are the first time implementation of innovations in the EV cell production. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

2.3.2.   
  Eligible investment costs

| (23) | The notified total eligible investment costs amount to HUF 380,628 billion, rounded (EUR 1,2 billion (11)) in nominal value, which is HUF 376,540 billion, rounded (EUR 1,187 billion, rounded) in present value (12). The eligible costs result from the cost of buildings, machinery, and equipment.

  Table 2

  Breakdown of eligible investment costs (nominal and disounted in million HUF, rounded)












  million HUF | Nominal/ discounted | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | Total |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Buildings | Nominal | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Discounted | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Plant/machinery/ equipment | Nominal | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Discounted | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Total | Nominal | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | 380 628 |
| Discounted | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | 376 540 |

(23)

Table 2

Breakdown of eligible investment costs (nominal and disounted in million HUF, rounded)

million HUF

Nominal/ discounted

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

Total

Buildings

Nominal

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Discounted

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Plant/machinery/ equipment

Nominal

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Discounted

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Total

Nominal

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

380 628

Discounted

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

376 540

Table 3

Breakdown of eligible investment costs (nominal and discounted in million EUR, rounded)

| million EUR | Nominal/ discounted | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | Total |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Buildings | Nominal | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Discounted | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Plant/machinery/ equipment | Nominal | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Discounted | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Total | Nominal | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | 1 200 |
| Discounted | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | 1 187 |

million EUR

Nominal/ discounted

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

Total

Buildings

Nominal

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Discounted

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Plant/machinery/ equipment

Nominal

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Discounted

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Total

Nominal

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

1 200

Discounted

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

1 187

| (24) | The Hungarian authorities confirmed that only new assets are accepted as eligible expenditure. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

2.4.   Form of aid, aid granting authority, and the national legal basis for granting the aid

| (25) | The notified financial support is to be given in the form of a non-refundable cash grant and constitutes individually notifiable ad hoc aid which falls outside the scope of exemption of an aid scheme which was put into effect under Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty (13) (General Block Exemption Regulation, hereinafter ‘GBER’). Its national legal basis is the Governmental Decree 210/2014 on the use of the earmarked scheme for investment promotion. The aid granting authority is the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

2.5.   Aid amount

| (26) | The notified aid is to be awarded in the form of a direct grant and amounts to HUF 34,891 billion, rounded (EUR 110 million, rounded) in nominal value and HUF 34,304 billion, rounded (EUR 108 million, rounded) in present value. The aid was planned to be paid out in annual intallments over 2019-2022 according to the following schedule.

  Table 4

  Breakdown of aid amount (nominal and discounted in million HUF, rounded)











  million HUF | Nominal/ discounted | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | Total |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Grant | Nominal | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Discounted | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Total | Nominal | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | 34 891 |
| Discounted | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | 34 304 |

(26)

Table 4

Breakdown of aid amount (nominal and discounted in million HUF, rounded)

million HUF

Nominal/ discounted

2019

2020

2021

2022

Total

Grant

Nominal

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Discounted

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Total

Nominal

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

34 891

Discounted

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

34 304

Table 5

Breakdown of aid amount (nominal and discounted in million EUR, rounded)

| million EUR | Nominal/ discounted | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | Total |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Grant | Nominal | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Discounted | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Total | Nominal | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | 110 |
| Discounted | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | 108 |

million EUR

Nominal/ discounted

2019

2020

2021

2022

Total

Grant

Nominal

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Discounted

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Total

Nominal

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

110

Discounted

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

108

2.6.   Aid intensity and cumulation with other investment aid

| (27) | On the basis of the total eligible costs of HUF 380,628 billion, rounded (EUR 1,2 billion, rounded) in nominal value, and the expenditure breakdown per year, the Commission has established that the discounted value of the total eligible expenditure is HUF 376,540 billion, rounded (EUR 1,187 billion, rounded). By applying the 35 % standard regional aid ceiling for large undertakings in Göd and the scaling-down rules (14) of paragraph 86 and 20(c) of the RAG, the Commission has calculated that the corresponding maximum total aid for the investment project is HUF 49,360 billion, roudned (EUR 155,616 million, rounded) in discounted value, equivalent to a maximum aid intensity of 13,11 %. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

| (28) | The envisaged aid of HUF 34,304 billion, rounded (EUR 108 million, rounded) in present value for proposed eligible expenditure of HUF 376,540 billion, rounded (EUR 1,187 billion, rounded) in present value corresponds to an aid intensity of 9,11 %, calculated on the basis of the proposed eligible expenditure. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

| (29) | The Hungarian authorities declare that the financial support for the notified project will not be combined with any other financial support that would be disbursed for the same eligible costs from any other local, regional, national or European Union source. |
| --- | --- |

(29)

| (30) | The Hungarian authorities confirm that neither the approved maximum aid amount in present value nor the approved aid intensity will be exceeded if the amount of eligible expenditure deviates from the estimated amount. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

2.7.   Own contribution

| (31) | Hungary confirmed that the aid beneficiary will provide a financial contribution of at least 25 % of the eligible costs, through its own resources or by external financing, in a form that is exempted of any public financial support. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

2.8.   Maintenance of the assisted activity

| (32) | The direct grant is awarded under the condition that the beneficiary will maintain the investment in the assisted region for a minimum period of five years after its completion. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

2.9.   Closure of other plants in the EEA and possible relocation

| (33) | The beneficiary has confirmed that it has not closed down (at group level) the same or similar activity in the EEA in the two years preceding the aid application and that it does not intend to close down the same or similar activity elsewhere in the EEA in the two years after the completion of the investment. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

2.10.   Hungarian arguments why the aid contributes to regional development (cohesion) objective

| (34) | The Hungarian authorities explained that the investment will contribute to the regional development of the Central-Hungary region. The Pest county, where Göd is located, had in 2016 a GDP per capita of 54 % of the EU28 average. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

| (35) | Hungary claims that the contribution to the development of this region is due to the following:






  — | The investment creates 1 200 direct jobs in an assisted area under Art. 107(3)(c) TFEU, located in the Central-Hungary region. Due to its geographical position, it is likely to attract commuters from neighbouring regions that are assisted areas under Art 107(3)(a) TFEU. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(35)

—

The investment creates 1 200 direct jobs in an assisted area under Art. 107(3)(c) TFEU, located in the Central-Hungary region. Due to its geographical position, it is likely to attract commuters from neighbouring regions that are assisted areas under Art 107(3)(a) TFEU.

| — | The investment will also lead to the creation of indirect jobs: the Hungarian authorities estimate the number of indirect jobs that will be created to exceed 200 in Hungary and additional 300 at the EU level (mainly in the chemical sector, building and civil engineering, machining). Several possible suppliers of materials and equipments are expected to also locate their investments in Hungary. The construction works will also attract more than [30-60] different construction companies and more than [800-1 100] workers are expected to work on the investment project throughout the construction phase. |
| --- | --- |

—

The investment will also lead to the creation of indirect jobs: the Hungarian authorities estimate the number of indirect jobs that will be created to exceed 200 in Hungary and additional 300 at the EU level (mainly in the chemical sector, building and civil engineering, machining). Several possible suppliers of materials and equipments are expected to also locate their investments in Hungary. The construction works will also attract more than [30-60] different construction companies and more than [800-1 100] workers are expected to work on the investment project throughout the construction phase.

| — | The beneficiary plans to offer comprehensive training to improve both the general and specific skills of its workforce. Possible future traineeships and apprenticeships are envisaged as well. |
| --- | --- |

—

The beneficiary plans to offer comprehensive training to improve both the general and specific skills of its workforce. Possible future traineeships and apprenticeships are envisaged as well.

| — | The beneficiary plans to cooperate with Hungarian higher education institutes, e.g. the Technical University of Budapest and Szent István University of Gödöllő so that knowledge spillover and technology transfers complement the investment project. |
| --- | --- |

—

The beneficiary plans to cooperate with Hungarian higher education institutes, e.g. the Technical University of Budapest and Szent István University of Gödöllő so that knowledge spillover and technology transfers complement the investment project.

| — | The planned period of economic exploitation of the notified investment exceeds the required minimum 5 years maintenance period; follow-on investments and a considerable R&D&I activity are envisaged in the region concerned. |
| --- | --- |

—

The planned period of economic exploitation of the notified investment exceeds the required minimum 5 years maintenance period; follow-on investments and a considerable R&D&I activity are envisaged in the region concerned.

2.11.   Hungarian arguments why the aid is appropriate

| (36) | The Hungarian authorities explain that the neediness of the area concerned is confirmed by its status as assisted area under Art. 107(3)(c) TFEU. The Central-Hungary region has benefitted in the past of a multitude of non-aid and horizontal measures which alone proved insufficient to address the regional handicaps of the area. The Pest County, where Göd is located, has remained particularly under-developed compared to the rest of the Central-Hungary region as most foreign direct investments in the region were attracted by the capital, Budapest, which is located 25 km away. In addition, because the maximum allowable aid intensity in the Pest county (at 35 %) is lower than in the neighbouring counties (50 %), the area of Göd has encountered difficulties in attracting foreign direct investments and in benefitting from EU structural funds. The Hungarian authorities have provided statistical data which show that the GDP of the Central Hungary region has been declining in recent years, relative to the EU-average (i.e. it decreased from 108 % of the EU-average in 2013 to 105 % in 2015). Furthermore, the GDP of the Pest county in 2016 represented only 80 % of the national average and 54 % of the EU average. Finally, it is estimated that the contribution of the EU structural funds to GDP growth in the Central-Hungary region is of only 1,4 % while the equivalent figure for the other Hungarian regions is 5 %. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

| (37) | The Hungarian authorities remind that according to the Commission's decision practice a direct grant constitutes an appropriate aid instrument to achieve the desired objective, which is to attract the investment to Göd (Hungary). |
| --- | --- |

(37)

2.12.   Hungarian information as to justification of incentive effect/counterfactual scenario

2.12.1.   
  Formal incentive effect requirement

| (38) | Samsung SDI submitted the formal application for aid on 13 September 2017. Works on the investment project started on 1 December 2017, i.e. after the application for aid had been introduced. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

2.12.2.   
  Counterfactual scenario

| (39) | In the notification, the Hungarian authorities invoke a scenario 2 situation in the meaning of paragraph 61 of the RAG, arguing that without aid, the investment project would have been implemented in X'ian (China), where Samsung SDI Group co-owns in a joint venture (hereinafter ‘JV’) (15) another EV battery cell production facility and sufficient free land to host an extension of the plant. Samsung SDI Group’s battery cell plant in Ulsan (South Korea) was excluded as an alternative investment location early in the decision making process due to its — compared to Hungary or China — high labour costs. A greenfield investment was also excluded due to time constraints. In line with the RAG, Hungary provided documents comparing the costs and benefits of locating the investment in Hungary and China. The comparison is done on the basis of the net present value (NPV) of the project, calculated as the difference between the positive and negative cash flows over the lifetime of the investment, discounted to their currernt value in 2017 using the cost of capital. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

| (40) | On the basis of these calculations, the Hungarian authorities claim that the Göd site has a net disadvantage of EUR 173 million measured in net present value (NPV) compared to the Xi'an site. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

Differences in investment costs

| (41) | While in Hungary Samsung SDI would have to bear the full investment costs and would enjoy the benefits of the project entirely, in China, the Samsung SDI Group would share the costs and benefits in proportion to its share (50 %) in the ownership of its JV. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

| (42) | The two counterfactual scenarios presented in the notification documents include similar investments in terms of buildings, machinery, and equipment. In particular, the Hungarian authorities confirmed that the type, capacity, and number of machinery and equipment would be identical in both investment scenarios. Despite this fact, in Hungary, the total capital investment expenditure would be significantly higher than in China (+EUR 215,3 million in present value). While the costs of buildings are slightly lower in Hungary compared to China (-EUR 22,2 million in present value) due to the fact that Samsung could use an existing building for its investment project in Göd, the costs of machinery and equipment would be significantly higher in Hungary compared to China (+EUR 237,5 million) due to a local sourcing policy invoked by Samsung SDI. Hungary claims that this local sourcing policy applies to both investment scenarios and clarifies that machinery and equipment would be bought in the EEA for the Hungarian investment and in China for the Chinese alternative investment. Beyond the initial investment costs, after some years of operation additional capital expenditures are required in order for the machinery and equipment to remain operational. These expenditures are also higher in Hungary compared to China as they are calculated as a percentage of the initial investment costs. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

| (43) | The Hungarian authorities further explained the methodology for estimating the above-mentioned investment costs. More specifically, Hungary claims that, at the planning stage, Samsung SDI Group did not ask the EEA and Chinese suppliers of machinery and equipment for detailed quotes or price offers because of the risk that confidential information — such as the specifications of the respective equipment — could be disclosed to third parties in the process. Therefore, Samsung SDI Group based its estimations of investment costs for both investment scenarios on market reports which provided country specific unit prices for labour and material costs. The investment costs were calculated relative to the equivalent costs in South Korea, with the result that the machinery and equipment costs in Hungary were estimated to be almost on par with South Korea ([97-102] %) while in China they were much lower than in South Korea ([70-75] %). |
| --- | --- |

(43)

| (44) | During the course of its preliminary examination, at which time the implementation of the investment project was already well advanced, the Commission asked Hungary to provide proof of the application of Samsung’s local sourcing policy in practice, in particular with reference to the suppliers of machinery and equipment. On 7 March and 31 May 2019, the Hungarian authorities confirmed that up to that date — when about [35-50] % of Samsung SDI’s investment was ordered with suppliers — Samsung SDI was using no EEA suppliers. Instead, the vast majority of the equipment and machinery aquired for the investment project originated, according to the Hungarian authorities, from South Korea. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

| (45) | Hungary also explained that in most cases, the machinery/equipment was first purchased from the South Korean producers by the Samsung SDI Group headquartered in South Korea and then the respective equipment was sold to Samsung SDI in Hungary, after applying a [18-22] % markup to the underlying costs basis (which consists of the acquisition price and all other costs incurred by the Group in relation to the purchase, delivery and setting up of the machinery/equipment at the Hungarian investment site). The Hungarian authorities claim that these intra-group transactions resulted in a market price and consider that the [18-22] % markup is justified by market data (16). |
| --- | --- |

(45)

| (46) | The Hungarian authorities further explained that Samsung SDI Group had to resort to using South Korean suppliers — and disregard its original plans presented in the notification documents — because their search for appropriate local suppliers did not yield the expected results. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

Outcome of the search for appropriate local suppliers of machinery and equipment in the Hungarian counterfactual scenario

| (47) | According to Hungary, Samsung’s search for EEA suppliers started as early as 2015 and was in May 2019 still on-going. Except for bilateral contacts with two EEA producers of equipment in 2015-2016, the search materialized essentially in a conference organized jointly by the Samsung SDI Group and the [...] (17), which was held on 24 February 2017 in [...] (i.e. 8 months before Samsung’s investment decision). According to Hungary, out of 24 conference participants (and 5 other companies which were contacted bilaterally by the Samsung SDI group after the conference), a majority (23) of potential EEA suppliers were dismissed on various grounds (18) before the final decision to invest in Hungary was made on 27 November 2017 (please see paragraph (62) of the present decision). After the investment decision, discussions continued with only 6 potential EEA suppliers which could only provide equipment for a small portion of Samsung’s investment in Hungary. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

| (48) | Hungary further confirmed that for Samsung’s first investment (please see paragraph (7) of the present decision), the company had not applied its local sourcing policy either. As the investment concerned a small cell manufacturing line, in order to minimize risks, Samsung decided to depart from its local sourcing policy and to rely instead on experienced South Korean suppliers of machinery and equipment. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

Outcome of the search for appropriate local suppliers of machinery and equipment in the Chinese counterfactual scenario

| (49) | According to Hungary, in China, the Samsung SDI Group had sufficient experience (19) and contacts with local suppliers and therefore there was no need — in the planning phase of the notified investment — to take specific actions to gather information on their technical capabilities and pricing of standard equipment. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

| (50) | Hungary also explained that, for the equipment and machinery used to implement the new process innovation, Samsung SDI Group did conduct technical reviews in China from 8 until 12 January 2017, when Samsung SDI Group’s engineers visited 5 local equipment manufacturers and held technical meetings with them. The conclusions of these technical reviews was that, while the Chinese producers had made significant technological improvements compared to the situation that existed 2-3 years before and had in the meantime achieved price competitiveness (as they were [5-30] % cheaper than the South Korean suppliers), they did not meet Samsung SDI Group’s requirements as regards to [...] . |
| --- | --- |

(50)

Revenues from the investment

| (51) | Hungary argues that the same customers would be served irrespective of whether the EV battery cells are produced in China or in Hungary. The expected revenues are therefore the same for both locations, as equal volumes would be produced and sold for the same prices, to supply the same geographical markets (i.e. the EEA and [...] (20)). |
| --- | --- |

(51)

Other economic viability calculations

| (52) | The economic viability calculations provided by the Hungarian authorities show that the overall production costs (calculated over a nine year period) would be higher in Hungary than in China. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

| (53) | The cost disadvantage of Hungary is mainly due to the higher cost of input materials (core materials and components), which is about [5-10] % higher in Hungary compared to China. While core materials are to be sourced from global suppliers at the same price for both locations, the remaining components are expected to be purchased locally, at higher prices in Hungary as compared to China. Inbound transport costs for core materials to Hungary would be higher than to the Chinese location as the core materials are expected to be sourced in China. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

| (54) | In the first years of operation, the Xi'an plant is assumed to yield superior efficiency due to its longer experience (21) in producing EV batteries. Therefore scrap costs will also be higher in Hungary. In the long run however, these advantages of the Xi’an scenario are expected to diminish. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

| (55) | Utility costs comprise the cost of electricity, gas, nitrogen and water consumed during the production of EV batteries, with electricity far outweighing the other utility costs. They are about [1-5] % higher in Hungary compared to China. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

| (56) | Finally, while headcount figures are identical for both locations, the estimated labour costs are about [25-40] % higher in Hungary than in China. The estimated wages are based on actual internal Samsung SDI data from the existing plants in China and Hungary. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

| (57) | Nevertheless, in certain cost categories, the Hungarian location has substantial quantifiable advantages relative to the Chinese location. In particular, outbound logistic costs in Hungary are about [45-60] % lower than in China due to the proximity of the European customers. Furthermore, in the Chinese counterfactual, the customs tariffs to be paid for final products delivered to the EEA and [...] would be significantly higher than in the Hungarian counterfactual. This is because in the latter case, no import customs would be perceived for deliveries within the EEA. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

| (58) | A terminal value at the end of the nine-year forecast period was calculated for both locations on the basis of the projected future cash-flows of the projects over a period of [10-20] years. The terminal value estimated in the notification documents is higher in Hungary than in China. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

| (59) | Finally, a major advantage of the Hungarian scenario consists in the corporate income tax payable in Hungary which is significantly lower than the amount of corporate income tax due in China. This is due to the fact that while Hungary applies a 9 % corporate income tax rate, the equivalent in China is 25 %. This advantage (22) is large enough to offset the net production costs disadvantages described in paragraphs (53) to (56) above, as well as part of the claimed investment costs disadvantages of the Hungarian scenario described in paragraph (42). |
| --- | --- |

(59)

| (60) | On the basis of the above assumptions and a discount rate of [7,7-8,2] % for China and [7,3-7,8] % for Hungary (reflecting slightly different country risks), the Hungarian authorities claim that the Göd site has a total cost disadvantage of EUR 173 million measured in net present value (NPV) compared to the Xi'an site. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

| (61) | The Hungarian authorities confirmed that an appropriate plot of land suitable for the investment was available in each location. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

2.12.3.   
  Hungarian arguments as to the proportionality of the aid

| (62) | Hungary explains that the notified aid is to compensate — partially — the claimed cost disadvantage of EUR 173 million in order to attract the investment to the assisted region. The Hungarian authorities confirmed that the Samsung SDI Group is prepared to bear the remaining cost disadvantage of EUR 65 million, as it considers that it will benefit from certain qualitative and strategic factors, such as:






  — | The geographical proximity of the Hungarian plant to the prospective clients, allowing for just-in-time delivery which will provide Samsung SDI with more flexibility in serving its customers; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(62)

—

The geographical proximity of the Hungarian plant to the prospective clients, allowing for just-in-time delivery which will provide Samsung SDI with more flexibility in serving its customers;

| — | Easier communication with customers due to time-zone proximity; |
| --- | --- |

—

Easier communication with customers due to time-zone proximity;

| — | Membership of Hungary to the European Union which reduces considerably the administrative burden associated with the delivery of EV batteries to clients; |
| --- | --- |

—

Membership of Hungary to the European Union which reduces considerably the administrative burden associated with the delivery of EV batteries to clients;

| — | Better sustainability of the Hungarian plant due to the availability of green energy for running the manufacturing facility and the higher transparency as regards the source of energy which increasingly constitutes a demand of the clients. |
| --- | --- |

—

Better sustainability of the Hungarian plant due to the availability of green energy for running the manufacturing facility and the higher transparency as regards the source of energy which increasingly constitutes a demand of the clients.

2.12.4.   
  The decision-making process

| (63) | The Hungarian authorities explained that investment opportunities in China are analysed by the Samsung SDI Group jointly with their two partners in the JV, but the Samsung SDI Group, which owns 50 % of the equity share, has the right to make the final investment decision in the JV. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

| (64) | Hungary further noted that, according to Samsung SDI Group’s decision making policy, investment decisions over EUR [...] million start with an investment initiative from the relevant [...] team”. The decision making process with respect to the notified investment project involved several steps: |
| --- | --- |

(64)

| (65) | In a first step, in May 2017, Samsung SDI's [...] team analysed the dynamics in the market for all types of electric vehicles and forecasted global and regional market demand. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

| (66) | The process continued in a second step in June 2017, when Samsung SDI [...] team analysed the short-term and long-term sales demand and, together with [...] team, set up sales targets for the EU and [...] markets, based on the existing and expected orders. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

| (67) | In a third step, in July 2017, Samsung SDI's [...] team checked the company's production capacity against the sales target and concluded that the company's production capacity was falling [...] short of the sales target for the EU and [...] markets. Therefore, the [...] team calculated the investment amount necessary to add sufficient production capacity to meet the sales target. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

| (68) | In a forth step, Samsung's [...] committee, supervised by [...], reviewed in a meeting held on 26 October 2017 the prepared materials, including the counterfactual analysis, comparing the two costs and benefits of the possible locations of the investment (X’ian and Göd), where the company already had existing EV batteries manufacturing activities. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

| (69) | In a final step, [...] of the Samsung SDI Group analyzed the proposal during a meeting held on 27 November 2017 and decided that the investment project should take place in Göd, Hungary on condition that the project would receive the State aid of EUR 108 million. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

2.13.   General provisions

| (70) | The Hungarian authorities confirmed that they will publish on a central website, or on a single website retrieving information from several websites at least the following information on the notified measure: granting authority, individual beneficiary, aid amount, and aid intensity. The information will be published after the granting decision has been taken, will be kept for at least 10 years and will be available for the general public without restrictions. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

3.   ASSESSMENT OF THE AID MEASURE AND COMPATIBILITY

3.1.   Existence of aid

| (71) | The financial support will be awarded in the form of a direct grant from the State budget. The support will thus be given by a Member State and through State resources within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

| (72) | As the support is to be granted to a single company, Samsung SDI, the measure is selective. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

| (73) | The financial support will relieve Samsung SDI from costs which it would normally have to bear itself. Therefore, the company will benefit from an economic advantage over its competitors. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

| (74) | The measure is likely to affect trade between Member States as it applies to the EV batteries manufacturing sector, where trade between Member States exists. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

| (75) | As the measure favours Samsung SDI, competition is distorted or threatened to be distorted. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

| (76) | Consequently, the Commission considers that the measure constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

3.2.   Legality of the aid measure

| (77) | If the regional investment aid amount to be granted exceeds the notification threshold laid down in Article 4(1)(a) of the GBER, the aid is not covered by the exemption provided by the same GBER, and has thus to be notified individually to the Commission. In the Göd area, the applicable threshold is EUR 26,25 million. Therefore, the planned aid measure of EUR 108 million cannot be exempted from notification. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

| (78) | In addition, according to paragraph 15 of the RAG, regional aid to investments of large undertakings in c-areas is considered compatible only if it is granted for initial investments that create new economic activities in these areas, or for the diversification of existing establishments into new products or new process innovations. Aid for these activities is individually notifiable unless it supports initial investments that create new economic activities in these areas. The resulting individual notification obligation for ‘new products’ and ‘new process innovation’ cases applies independently from the aid amount envisaged. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

| (79) | By notifying the awarding of the aid subject to Commission approval, the Hungarian authorities have respected their obligations under Article 108(3) TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

| (80) | The Hungarian authorities confirmed that aid to Samsung SDI will be granted only after the Commission's approval. |
| --- | --- |

(80)

3.3.   Assessment of the aid measure

| (81) | Having established that the notified measure constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, it is necessary to examine whether the investment project is eligible for aid and whether the measure can be found compatible with the internal market. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

| (82) | As the objective of the measure is to promote regional development in an area designated in accordance with Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, and the aid is to be granted in the period between 1 July 2014 and 31 December 2020, the basis for its assessment are the RAG. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

| (83) | In line with the provisions of the RAG, the Commission will first establish whether this investment project, which is to be undertaken by a large undertaking in a c-area (23), and which does not concern an initial investment in favour of new economic activity in the meaning of paragraph 20(i) of the RAG, can be found eligible for regional aid, as its production process is based on a new process innovation. The Commission will then verify the compatibility of the notified aid in application of the Common Assessment Principles (hereinafter ‘CAP’) laid down in the RAG. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

3.3.1.   
  Eligibility of the notified project

| (84) | The Hungarian authorities intend to grant aid to an initial investment in the form of an extension of the capacity of an existing establishment of Samsung SDI, a large undertaking, in Göd, an area eligible for regional aid pursuant to Article 107(3)(c) TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

| (85) | Paragraph 15 of the RAG reads as follows: ‘Since regional aid to large undertakings for their investments is unlikely to have an incentive effect, it cannot be regarded to be compatible with the internal market under Article 107(3)(c) of the Treaty, unless it is granted for initial investments that create new economic activities in these areas, or for the diversification of existing establishments into new products or new process innovations.’ |
| --- | --- |

(85)

| (86) | The extension of the capacity of an existing establishment of Samsung SDI constitutes an initial investment in the meaning of the RAG. In fact, an initial investment is defined in paragraph 20(h) RAG as an investment in tangible and intangible assets related to (i) the setting-up of a new establishment, (ii) the extension of the capacity of an existing establishment, (iii) the diversification of the output of an establishment into products not previously produced in the establishment, or (iv) a fundamental change in the overall production process of an existing establishment (24). The expenditure for the capacity extension initial investment is thus, according to paragraph 20(e) of the RAG, and within the limits defined in this paragraph, in principle eligible for regional aid (25). |
| --- | --- |

(86)

| (87) | However, an initial investment in the form of an extension of the capacity of an existing establishment does not qualify as an initial investment which creates new economic activities. In fact, the notion of initial investment that creates new economic activities is defined according to paragraph 20(i) as follows: (a) an investment in tangible and intangible assets related to (i) the setting up of a new establishment, or (ii) the diversification of the activity of an establishment, under the condition that the new activity is not the same or a similar activity to the activity previously performed in the establishment; or (b) the acquisition of the assets belonging to an establishment that has closed or would have closed if it had not been purchased, and is bought by an investor unrelated to the seller, under the condition that the new activity to be performed using the acquired assets is not a same or similar activity to the activity performed in the establishment prior to the acquisition. The notion of same or similar activity is defined according to paragraph 20(s) as an activity falling under the same class (four-digit numerical code) of the NACE Rev. 2 statistical classification of economic activities. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

| (88) | Therefore, an extension of the capacity of an existing establishment by a large company in a c-area can only be eligible for regional investment aid if the investment is based on a new process innovation or if it is related to the diversification of existing establishments into a new product. However, the ‘new product’ window is not applicable for the notified project as the plant is already producing EV battery cells, and as EV batteries cells are a well established product. In the present case the extension of the capacity of an existing establishment can only be considered eligible for regional investment aid if it is based on a new process innovation in the meaning of paragraph 15 of the RAG. |
| --- | --- |

(88)

| (89) | Therefore, the Commission has to establish whether the envisaged production process which Samsung SDI is introducing in its existing establishment located in the Göd, Hungary qualifies as ‘new process innovation’ in the meaning of paragraph 15 of the RAG. |
| --- | --- |

(89)

| (90) | The RAG do not provide a definition of the concept of ‘new process innovations’, nor do they lay down precise criteria for the assessment of such types of initial investment cases. The Research and Development and Innovation (RDI) chapter of the GBER sets out a definition for ‘process innovation’ (26), which could provide some guidance as to the scope of the concept. This GBER definition is based on the third edition of the Oslo Manual (27), developed jointly by Eurostat and the OECD in 2005, which provides guidelines for the collection and interpretation of data on innovation and also offers a widely accepted standard for the definition of innovation, and amongst others, of ‘process innovation’. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

| (91) | The Oslo Manual and the GBER define a process innovation as ‘the implementation of a “new” or “significantly improved” production or delivery method. This includes significant change in techniques, equipment and/or software.’ The GBER definition excludes minor changes or improvements, increases in production or service capabilities through the addition of manufacturing or logistical systems which are very similar to those already in use, ceasing to use a process, simple capital replacement or extension, changes resulting purely from changes in factor prices, customisation, localisation, regular, seasonal and other cyclical changes and trading of new or significantly improved products. |
| --- | --- |

(91)

| (92) | As the RAG require that the eligible investment should not only rely on a ‘process innovation’, but on a ‘new process innovation’ , the Commission considers that only those ‘process innovations’ which have a high degree of novelty should be considered eligible. |
| --- | --- |

(92)

| (93) | Based on the above, and in line with the precedent decision in the Hamburger Rieger case (28), the Commission decides that for an envisaged production process to qualify as a ‘new process innovation’ in the meaning of paragraph 15 of the RAG, it has to represent a substantial (fundamental) change to the state of the art of the relevant production process, and not an incremetal or routine improvement. The Commission also takes the view that the eligibility of an investment can only be confirmed if the innovative element is not limited to introducing a punctual improvement, with relevance only for a minor part of the production process, but that the change which the new process innovation introduces to the state of the art, shall have a significant impact on the overall production process. Furthermore the Commission considers that the required novelty of the process innovation is only ensured if the new innovative production process is applied for the first time in the given sector in the EEA. |
| --- | --- |

(93)

| (94) | The Commission considers that these conditions are met in the notified case for the reasons described below. |
| --- | --- |

(94)

| (95) | The Commission notes that some of the innovative elements described by the beneficiary will be patent-protected, while most of the remaining elements will be protected by blackboxing. |
| --- | --- |

(95)

| (96) | In order to assess whether the notified investment project introduces the required high degree of novelty in the respective manufacturing process, the Commission has consulted its own specialised services with expert knowledge in the field of EV batteries, who have confirmed that overall, the changes in the production process to be introduced in the notified project represent a substantial change to the state of the art of the relevant production process, and not an incremental or routine improvement (29). More specifically, the Commission considers that the information provided by the beneficiary on the process innovations introduced by Investment 2 shows that significant changes in a number of production steps will be introduced in both phases of the investment, and that these changes qualify as ‘new process innovation’: |
| --- | --- |

(96)

| (97) | As regards the condition that the envisaged production process should have a significant impact on the overall production process, the Commission considers that this condition is met as the notified investment project carries innovative elements in all three steps of the battery cell production process, as described in recital (18) and (19)(19) of the present decision. |
| --- | --- |

(97)

| (98) | As regards the ‘given sector’ in which the innovation needs to be established and applied for the first time in the EEA, the Commission notes that, as described in recital (17) of the present decision, on the market for EV Li-ion battery cells there are currently three basic cell structures — prismatic, pouch, and cylindrical cells — and multiple chemistries. Each cell design has its advantages and disadvantages and specific cost structure compared to the others. Because cells of different formats have a different internal structure and require a different assembly approach, also the processes used to manufacture them can be considered as inherently different, with several steps of the manufacturing process being specific to the cell format being manufactured. The Commission also considers that a production process implemented at mass scale differs significantly from a production process implemented at small scale or in trial tests. Therefore, the Commission considers that the ‘given sector’ in the present case is the Li-ion large metal can prismatic battery cells implemented in a mass-scale production process. |
| --- | --- |

(98)

| (99) | Concerning the requirement that the envisaged process innovation has to be applied for the first time in the given sector in the EEA, the Commission considers that this condition is met as at the end of 2017, i.e. at the time when the application for aid was submitted and investment/location decision was made by the beneficiary. To the knowledge of the Commission, at that time there existed no mass production of Li-ion prismatic batteries, and therefore no application of similar production processes at mass scale, in the EEA. Consequently, the Commission considers that Samsung's Investment 2 (both phases) relies on a production process which constitutes the first time application for mass production in the given segment in the EEA, and thus defines the state of the art in the mass production of large metal can prismatic EV battery cells. |
| --- | --- |

(99)

| (100) | Taking into account the above, as the new process of the notified investment project (i) represents a substantial change to the state of the art of the relevant production processes, (ii) has a significant impact on the overall production processes and (iii) is a first-time application in the sector within the EEA, the Commission considers that the the notified investment project is based on a ‘new process innovation’. |
| --- | --- |

(100)

| (101) | In conclusion, as the notified investment project qualifies as ‘new process innovation’ and an initial investment in the meaning of RAG, the Commission considers that it is eligible for regional aid, provided all compatibility criteria of the RAG are met. |
| --- | --- |

(101)

3.4.   Compatibility of the aid measure

| (102) | The Commission communication on state aid modernisation (30) of 8 May 2012 called for the identification and definition of common principles (hereinafter ‘CAP’) applicable to the assessment of the compatibility of all aid measures. In their section 3, the RAG define and operationalize these CAP for the purposes of regional aid. |
| --- | --- |

(102)

| (103) | The assessment under the CAP of the RAG takes place in three steps:






  — | in a first step, it is checked whether minimum requirements regarding credibility of counterfactual scenario, appropriateness, incentive effect, and proportionality of the aid and its contribution to regional development are met (see RAG, sections 3.2-3.6); |
| --- | --- | --- |

(103)

—

in a first step, it is checked whether minimum requirements regarding credibility of counterfactual scenario, appropriateness, incentive effect, and proportionality of the aid and its contribution to regional development are met (see RAG, sections 3.2-3.6);

| — | in a second step, it is verified, that the aid does not lead to manifest negative effects (blacklist) that would prohibit the granting of aid, e.g. aid exceeds the allowable maximum aid intensity ceiling, creates overcapacity in a sector in absolute decline, attracts an investment that would have gone without the aid to another region with a similar or worse off socio-economic situation, or is causal for the closure of activities elsewhere in the EEA (see RAG, section 3.7.2); |
| --- | --- |

—

in a second step, it is verified, that the aid does not lead to manifest negative effects (blacklist) that would prohibit the granting of aid, e.g. aid exceeds the allowable maximum aid intensity ceiling, creates overcapacity in a sector in absolute decline, attracts an investment that would have gone without the aid to another region with a similar or worse off socio-economic situation, or is causal for the closure of activities elsewhere in the EEA (see RAG, section 3.7.2);

| — | in a third step, for not blacklisted aid projects meeting the minimum requirements, a balancing is carried out to ensure that the contribution to regional development outweighs the negative effects on trade and competition (see RAG, sections 3.7.1 and 3.7.4) . |
| --- | --- |

—

in a third step, for not blacklisted aid projects meeting the minimum requirements, a balancing is carried out to ensure that the contribution to regional development outweighs the negative effects on trade and competition (see RAG, sections 3.7.1 and 3.7.4) .

3.4.1.   
  Minimum requirements

3.4.1.1.   Contribution to the regional development objective

| (104) | The RAG require the Member State to prove in concrete terms the real and sustained contribution of the aided investment to the regional development of the target region. To help Member States in this task, Section 3.2.2. of the RAG lists a number of indicators that Member States may use in order to demonstrate the regional contribution of individual investment aid notified to the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

(104)

| (105) | The Göd area is eligible for regional aid pursuant to Article 107(3)(c) of the TFEU. The Commission takes note that Hungary invokes positive regional effects of the investment (see section 2.10 of this decision). At this stage, the Commission does not exclude that the investment contributes to regional development, but is not convinced that this contribution would not take place in any event, even without the aid. In addition, the Commission doubts that the investment will have all the beneficial effects as described in the notification documents as the local sourcing policy announced there does not seem to materialize, at least not for the acquisition of machinery and equipment used in the investment project. |
| --- | --- |

(105)

| (106) | To prove the real and sustained contribution, the Member State also has to show that the viability of the project is demonstrated by a financial contribution of the aid beneficiary of at least 25 % of the eligible costs (31), provided through its own resources or by external financing, in a form that is free of any public financial support. In addition, the investment (the aided assets) has to be maintained in the area concerned for a minimum period of five years (three years for SMEs) after completion of the investment (32). The Commission notes that the beneficiary will contribute at least 25 % of the eligible costs, and commits to keep the investment for five years after completion of the project in the area concerned (see paragraphs (31) and (32) of this decision). |
| --- | --- |

(106)

| (107) | Based on paragraph (105) of this decision, the Commission has doubts, at this stage of the assessment, as to the contribution of the aid to regional development of the target region and thus to the achievement of a common objective. |
| --- | --- |

(107)

3.4.1.2.   Need for State intervention

| (108) | According to Section 3.3 of the RAG, in order to assess whether State aid is necessary to achieve the objective of common interest, it is necessary to first diagnose the problem to be addressed. State aid should be targeted towards situations where aid can bring about a material improvement that the market cannot deliver itself. |
| --- | --- |

(108)

| (109) | As established in paragraph 49 of the RAG, State intervention is considered justified for the development of the areas included in the regional aid map. The Commission notes that Göd is eligible for regional aid pursuant to Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, which is in line with Section 3.3. of the RAG. |
| --- | --- |

(109)

3.4.1.3.   Appropriateness of regional aid/the aid instrument

| (110) | According to paragraph 50 of the RAG, the notified aid measure must be an appropriate policy instrument to address the policy objective concerned; the paragraph underlines that an aid measure will not be considered compatible if other less distortive policy instruments or other less distortive types of aid instruments are available. Section 3.4 of the RAG therefore introduces a double appropriateness test. Under the first appropriateness test, the Member State has in particular to identify the bottlenecks to regional development and the specific handicaps of firms operating in the target region, and to clarify to what extent bottlenecks to regional development could also successfully be targeted by non-aid measures. Under the second appropriateness test, the Member State has to indicate why — in view of the individual merits of the case — the chosen form of regional investment aid is the best instrument to influence the investment or location decision. |
| --- | --- |

(110)

| (111) | The Hungarian authorities justify (see section 2.11 of this decision) the appropriateness of the aid with the economic situation in the Pest county. |
| --- | --- |

(111)

| (112) | The Commission notes that the neediness of the Göd area in general is confirmed by its status as a region eligible for regional aid in accordance with Article 107(3)(c) TFEU. The Commission also notes that the concerned area has benefited in the past from the implementation of non-aid and horizontal aid measures and that these have proven to be insufficient to address the regional handicaps, in particular in the Pest county. The Hungarian authorities point out that, as described in paragraph (36) of this decision, in particular the Pest County where Göd is located has remained under-developed, having reached in 2016 a GDP per capita which represented only 80 % of the national average and 54 % of the EU average. This situation appears to be due, among other factors, to difficulties in attracting investments in the area. In such an economic situation, State aid has been acknowledged by the Commission's case practice as an appropriate means to address the economic shortcomings (e.g. in the Hamburger Rieger GmbH decision (33) and in the MOL Petrolkémia Zrt decision (34) under the RAG). |
| --- | --- |

(112)

| (113) | Therefore, the Commission accepts that State aid, and regional investment aid in particular, is an appropriate form of support to achieve the cohesion objective for Göd area. |
| --- | --- |

(113)

| (114) | The aid is granted in the form of a direct grant. The Commission considers that a direct grant constitutes in principle an appropriate aid instrument to bridge viability gaps. However, the Commission has doubts as to the existence of a real viability gap between the two alternative investment locations (please see paragraph (142) of this decision). Furthermore, the Commission is not convinced that aid in the form of a grant which results in a prima facie limited additional contribution to regional development represents an appropriate form of aid to further regional development. Therefore, the Commission raises doubts whether this aid can be declared compatible as it considers that a similar contribution to regional development could possibly be achieved by other more efficient means. |
| --- | --- |

(114)

3.4.1.4.   Incentive effect

| (115) | According to section 3.5 of the RAG, regional aid can only be found compatible with the internal market if it has an incentive effect. An incentive effect is present when the aid changes the behaviour of an undertaking in a way that it engages in additional activity contributing to the development of an area which it would not have engaged in without the aid or would only have engaged in such activity in a restricted or different manner or in another location. The aid must not subsidise the costs of an activity that an undertaking would have incurred in any event and must not compensate for the normal business risk of an economic activity. |
| --- | --- |

(115)

| (116) | Paragraphs 64-65 of the RAG set out the formal incentive effect requirements, i.e. works on an individual investment can start only after submitting the application form for aid. As the beneficiary applied for aid on 13 September 2017, i.e. before start of works on the investment on 1 December 2017, this condition has been respected. |
| --- | --- |

(116)

| (117) | As there are many valid reasons for a company to locate its investment in a certain region, even without any aid being granted, the RAG requires the Commission to verify in detail that the aid is necessary to provide a substantive incentive effect for the investment. In this context — as set out in section 3.5.2 of the RAG — the Member State is required to provide a comprehensive description of the counterfactual scenario in which no aid would be granted to the beneficiary. The Commission has to verify that these scenarios are realistic and credible. According to paragraph 68 of the RAG, a counterfactual scenario is credible if it is genuine and relates to the decision-making factors at the time of the decision. |
| --- | --- |

(117)

| (118) | The RAG (see paragraph 69) requires the Member State to demonstrate to the Commission the existence of the incentive effect of the aid and to provide clear evidence that the aid effectively had an impact on the investment choice or the location choice. It thus places the burden of proof regarding the existence of an incentive effect on the Member State. |
| --- | --- |

(118)

| (119) | Paragraph 61 of the RAG stipulates that the (substantive) incentive effect can be proven in two possible scenarios: in the absence of aid the investment would not be sufficiently profitable in any location (scenario 1); in the absence of aid the investment would take place in another location (scenario 2). |
| --- | --- |

(119)

| (120) | The Commission notes that Hungary presents the incentive effect in the context of a scenario 2 situation. The Hungarian authorities justify the aid by invoking a net present value (NPV) viability gap of EUR 173 million compared to an alternative investment location in Xi’an, China where Samsung SDI controls via a joint venture another EV battery production facility. Therefore, it is claimed that the aid of EUR 108 million partly compensates for the net disadvantages and costs of EUR 173 million linked to the decision to locate the investment in Hungary as compared to China. |
| --- | --- |

(120)

| (121) | Paragraph 62 of the RAG clarifies that aid that does not ‘stimulate (additional) investment in the region concerned, ... lacks incentive effect to achieve the regional objective and cannot be approved as compatible with the internal market’. |
| --- | --- |

(121)

| (122) | Paragraph 71 of the RAG indicates that for scenario 2 — which is invoked by the Hungarian authorities in the present case — the Member State could provide the required proof of the incentive effect of the aid by providing contemporary company documents that show that a comparison has been made between the costs and benefits of locating the investment in the assisted region selected with alternative locations. For that purpose, the Member State is invited by paragraph 72 of the RAG to rely on official board documents, risk assessments, financial reports, internal business plans, expert opinions, other studies and documents that elaborate on various investment scenarios. |
| --- | --- |

(122)

| (123) | To verify the viability in a scenario 2 context, all relevant costs and revenues (35) have to be taken into account, with the exception of possible subsidies available in the alternative location, where this alternative location is in the EEA. |
| --- | --- |

(123)

| (124) | The Commission notes that the Hungarian authorities submitted the required information documenting the decision-making process of the beneficiary (at the level of the Samsung SDI Group) concerning the investment and location decision (see section 2.12.4 of this decision). The submitted documents explain the counterfactual scenario which involves two comparable investments and two locations, Göd in Hungary and X'ian in China (located outside of the EEA) (36). The documents also show that the investment and location decision was taken after the aid application was submitted to the relevant national authorities. |
| --- | --- |

(124)

| (125) | At the same time, the Commission notes that the claimed NPV gap of EUR 173 million is explained essentially by a significant difference in planned investment costs of the project in the two alternative locations: whilst the aid beneficiary would invest EUR 1,2 billion in nominal value (EUR 982 million in present value (37)) into buildings, equipment, and machinery in Hungary, the equivalent costs in China amount to only EUR [...] million in nominal value (EUR 766,7 million in present value). The difference of EUR 215,3 million (in present value) is due exclusively to the cost of machinery and equipment, which is presented in the notification to be almost [35-50] % higher in Hungary compared to China. At the same time, Hungary has a slight advantage compared to China as regards the cost of the buildings due to the availability of the building on the construction site in Göd.








  Investment costs
  (in present value, in million EUR) | China | Hungary | Difference (Hungary-China) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Buildings | [185-225] | [165-205] | -22 |
| Machinery and equipment | [540-580] | [775-815] | 237,5 |
| TOTAL | 766,7 | 982,0 | 215,3 |

(125)

Investment costs

(in present value, in million EUR)

China

Hungary

Difference (Hungary-China)

Buildings

[185-225]

[165-205]

-22

Machinery and equipment

[540-580]

[775-815]

237,5

TOTAL

766,7

982,0

215,3

Source: notification documents

| (126) | The Commission notes that the EUR 215,3 million difference in investment costs is partially offset by the remaining net advantages of the Hungarian investment (EUR 42,3 million), resulting in a final net viability gap of EUR 173 million between China and Hungary. |
| --- | --- |

(126)

| (127) | The advantages of the Hungarian scenario consist in a higher terminal value of the investment and a significantly lower payable corporate income tax in Hungary compared to China (9 % versus 25 %). Furthermore, Hungary has lower outbound logistic costs due to the proximity to the customers and significantly lower custom tarrifs paid on the final products delivered to the EEA and [...]. The disadvantages of the Hungarian scenario are represented essentially certain (lower) operating costs in China (in particular raw materials, logistics, and labour). Aside the investment costs, the advantages of the Hungarian scenario outweigh its disadvantages. |
| --- | --- |

(127)

| (128) | Since the difference in estimated investment costs is substantial and decisive for the claimed NPV gap in favour of the Chinese investment scenario, the Commission considers that its credibility is essential for proving the incentive effect of the aid, i.e. by showing that the aid is necessary to compensate for the net disadvantages and costs of locating the investment in Hungary instead of China. |
| --- | --- |

(128)

| (129) | In this context, the Commission reminds that it is required — by paragraph 71 of the RAG — to verify that the comparisons of the costs and benefits of the alternative investment scenarios have a realistic basis. Paragraph 68 of the RAG further clarifies that ‘a counterfactual is credible if it is genuine and relates to the decision-making factors prevalent at the time of the decision by the beneficiary regarding the investment’. |
| --- | --- |

(129)

| (130) | The Commission notes that the Hungarian authorities justified in the notification documents the significant difference in investment costs for equipment and machinery by invoking Samsung SDI’s local sourcing policy which requires the company to buy from local sources the equipment and machinery and the other inputs necessary for the investment (please see paragraph (42) of the present decision). At the same time, the Commission notes that Samsung SDI has not applied this policy in practice during the time passed from the beginning of the investment project on 1 December 2017 and until 31 May 2019, at least in what concerns the acquisition of equipment and machinery for the investment project under discussion (see paragraph (44) of this decision). Instead, as confirmed by the Hungarian authorities on 8 March and 31 May 2019, Samsung SDI used exclusively South Korean suppliers of machinery and equipment for its investment in Hungary. The Hungarian authorities further confirmed that the local sourcing policy was also not applied for Samsung’s first investment in Hungary (see paragraph (46) of this decision). |
| --- | --- |

(130)

| (131) | On the basis of the information provided by the Hungarian authorities on 8 March and 31 May 2019 concerning the efforts, outcomes, and timeline of the search for appropriate local suppliers for both counterfactual investment scenarios, the Commission considers at this stage that the claims of local sourcing are unrealistic, and were unrealistic already at the time of the investment decision in November 2017 and the subsequent notification of the investment project to the Commission in May 2018. In particular, the timeline of key events reproduced below indicates that Samsung SDI Group’s decision making actors should have been aware, at the time of the final investment decision, that the assumption of local sourcing of equipment/machinery was not realistic, in view of the negative conclusions of the company’s search for potential local suppliers in both investment scenarios (please see paragraph (47) to (50) of this decision), which preceeded the final investment decision. The Commission considers that a more realistic assumption — for both scenarios — would have been that Samsung would buy the respective equipment and machinery from its experienced and trusted existing suppliers from South Korea, in line with its black-boxing strategy (see footnote 5). |
| --- | --- |

(131)

Image 1

| (132) | In such a situation, where machinery and equipment is not sourced locally in either investment scenario but from South Korea for both, the Commission considers that the claimed investment costs differential between Hungary and China of EUR 237,5 million (in present value) — where the costs of machinery and equipment in Hungary are about [35-45] % higher than in China — cannot be justified. Instead, it appears more realistic that the investment cost difference between the two scenarios should be limited to the difference in transport costs for shipping the respective equipment from South Korea to Hungary as compared to China. The Hungarian authorities have estimated, in their submission of 8 March 2019, the shipping costs from South Korea to Hungary at approximately [3-8] % of the respective costs of machinery and equipment, which represents about EUR [35-45] million. Therefore, at this stage of the assessment, and based on the information available to it, the Commission considers that the investment cost difference between Hungary and China cannot be higher than EUR [35-45] million. |
| --- | --- |

(132)

| (133) | The Commission considers therefore that the viability gap presented by the Hungarian authorities in the notification documents should be recalculated on the basis of the more realistic hypothesis described above. In such a situation, the calculations in the table below show that the viability gap between the alternative investment locations would be completely wiped out and even reversed, resulting in a small net overall advantage in favour of the Hungarian investment scenario.







  Main factors affecting the viability gap
  (in present value, in million EUR) | Difference
  (Hungary-China) as presented in the notification documents | Reconstructed
  difference
  (Hungary-China) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Investment costs for buildings | -22 | -22 |
| Investment costs for machinery and equipment | 237,5 | [35-45] (maximum) |
| TOTAL investment costs | 215,3 | [13-23] (maximum) |
| Net effect of other factors on Hungary-China viability gap | 42,3 | 42,3 |
| TOTAL viability gap | -173 | [20-30] |

(133)

Main factors affecting the viability gap

(in present value, in million EUR)

Difference

(Hungary-China) as presented in the notification documents

Reconstructed

difference

(Hungary-China)

Investment costs for buildings

-22

-22

Investment costs for machinery and equipment

237,5

[35-45] (maximum)

TOTAL investment costs

215,3

[13-23] (maximum)

Net effect of other factors on Hungary-China viability gap

42,3

42,3

TOTAL viability gap

-173

[20-30]

Note: the Total viability gap is calculated by subtracting the Total investment costs from the Net effect of other factors

| (134) | Based on the analysis above, the Commission raises doubts on the credibility of the ‘local sourcing policy’, the invoked investment costs difference, and the claimed NPV gap of EUR 173 million between China and Hungary, and thus on the incentive effect of the aid of EUR 108 million that the Hungarian authorities intend to grant to Samsung SDI. |
| --- | --- |

(134)

| (135) | The Commission notes that (as described in paragraph (45) of the present decision) the machinery and equipment used so far for the notified investment project was not purchased directly by the recipient of aid from the actual South Korean suppliers. Instead, the Samsung SDI Group headquartered in South Korea has acted an an intermediary by buying this equipment/machinery in South Korea and selling it to Samsung SDI entity in Hungary, after applying a [18-22] % markup to the underlying costs basis. |
| --- | --- |

(135)

| (136) | At this stage, on the basis of the information available to it, the Commission cannot confirm that this intragroup transactions results in a market conform price and do not artificially inflate the eligible costs of the Hungarian investment. |
| --- | --- |

(136)

| (137) | The Commission considers that two further elements might raise doubts as to the credibility of the Chinese investment scenario, namely the potential risk of forced transfer of technology in China and the existing hostile political environment in China towards South Korean investors, at the time of the investment decision. |
| --- | --- |

(137)

| (138) | With regards to the first factor, the Commission notes that Samsung SDI Group claims that in the absence of aid in Hungary, it would develop a battery cell production plant for EV based on a completely new technological concept allowing production of improved generations of cells, addressing the EEA and [...] markets in a Joint Venture with a Chinese undertaking. The beneficiary explained [...] in China (38). At the same time, it has to be noted that given the particular environment foreign companies have to operate in when producing in China, the risk of forced technology transfer through legal or illegal means cannot be completely ruled out. |
| --- | --- |

(138)

| (139) | With regards to the second factor, the Commission considers that the state of the political relations between China and South Korea at the time of Samsung’s investment decision are also relevant for the assessment of the credibility of the alternative investment scenario. According to various press reports (39), it appears that at the time of the investment decision, South Korean EV battery producers in China were facing a particularly hostile economic environment due to political considerations, with the result that they were in practice largely prevented from supplying the Chinese market with their products because the Chinese authorities withdrew subsidies for EV equipped with batteries provided by the South Korean producers. |
| --- | --- |

(139)

| (140) | In view of the above, at this stage the Commission cannot exclude that the strategic considerations for investing in Hungary (please see paragraph (62) of this decision) combined with the potential risks of forced transfer of technology and the hostile investment climate in China towards South Korean EV battery producers would not have led the company to invest in Hungary even in the presence of the claimed viability gap. A further argument that raises questions as to the credibility of the Chinese counterfactual investment scenario is that it is unlikely that the aid beneficiary would have started a small cell production facility without aid in Göd (Investment 1), if it had not considered ramping up the investment at a later stage. This would imply that the intention to invest and ramp up capacity in Hungary existed already at the time when Investment 1 was pursued in 2016. |
| --- | --- |

(140)

| (141) | Considering all the factors presented above, the Commission is therefore of the preliminary view that the regional aid was not crucial for a positive location decision in favour of Hungary. |
| --- | --- |

(141)

| (142) | Therefore, at this stage, the Commission raises has doubts on the credibility of the ‘local sourcing policy’, the invoked investment costs difference, and the claimed NPV gap of EUR 173 million between China and Hungary, and thus on the incentive effect of the aid of EUR 108 million that the Hungarian authorities intend to grant to Samsung SDI. |
| --- | --- |

(142)

| (143) | In addition, the Commission raises doubts on the credibility of the Chinese counterfactual investment scenario, as it cannot exclude that a combination of factors such as the quickly expanding European market, the proximity to European customers, the risk of forced transfer of technology and the hostile political and economic climate in China, would not have constituted overriding strategic considerations that would have led the company to locate its investment in Hungary in any event, even in the absence of aid. This conclusion is supported also by the fact that Samsung SDI’s first small unaided investment in Hungary in 2016 suggests an intention to ramp up capacity later. |
| --- | --- |

(143)

| (144) | The Commission calls upon interested parties to comment on the doubts raised on the substantive incentive effect, the credibility of the calculations of the investment costs, the NPV viability gap and on the credibility of the counterfactual investment scenario. |
| --- | --- |

(144)

3.4.1.5.   Proportionality of the aid amount (40)

| (145) | According to section 3.6 of the RAG, the aid amount must be limited to the minimum needed to induce the additional investment or activity in the area concerned. Therefore the assessment of the proportionality of the aid amount can only be carried out once the incentive effect of the aid is confirmed. As a general rule, notified individual aid will be considered to be limited to the minimum, if the aid amount corresponds to the net extra costs of implementing the investment in the area concerned, compared to the counterfactual in the absence of aid. |
| --- | --- |

(145)

| (146) | For scenario 2 situations, according to paragraph 106 of the RAG, the Member State must demonstrate the proportionality on the basis of documentation such as that referred to in paragraph 72 of the RAG. |
| --- | --- |

(146)

| (147) | Pursuant to paragraph 80 of the RAG, in scenario 2 situations (location incentives), the notified aid will be considered to be limited to the minimum, if the aid amount does not exceed the difference between the net present value of the investment in the target area and the net present value in the alternative location, while taking into account all relevant costs and benefits in the NPV calculations. |
| --- | --- |

(147)

| (148) | The Commission reminds that it had expressed doubts on the credibility of the information submitted for scenario 2 and considers that the NPV gap between the two alternative investment locations is unrealistic, as it is based on the — prima facie — unrealistic hypothesis of local sourcing of machinery and equipment. Furthermore, as described in paragraph (133) of this decision, a reconstruction of the viability gap on the basis of the more realistic hypothesis of equipment/machinery being sourced from South Korea for both investment scenarios would result in the viability gap in favour of China being totally wiped and even reversed suggesting a small net overall advantage in favour of the Hungarian investment scenario. |
| --- | --- |

(148)

| (149) | Therefore, at this stage, the Commission takes the view that the aid would not be proportional as it doubts that the aid is limited to the minimum necessary to trigger the investment location in favour of Hungary. In fact, on the basis of the NPV corrections described in paragraph (133) of this decision, it appears that no aid would be required to attract the investment project to Hungary. |
| --- | --- |

(149)

3.4.1.6.   Conclusion as to the respect of the minimum requirements

| (150) | Based on its assessment, reflect in recitals (104) to (149) of this decision, the Commission is at this stage unable to confirm that all minimum requirements laid down in sections 3.2 to 3.6 of the RAG, in particular those relating to the contribution to a common objective, appropriateness, incentive effect, and proportionality of the aid are met. The Commission therefore raises doubts as to the compatibility of the aid, in particular with regards to its contribution to a common objective, its appropriateness, its incentive effect, and its proportionality. |
| --- | --- |

(150)

3.4.2.   
  Manifest negative effects on competition and trade

| (151) | The Commission reminds that the analysis of manifest negative effects is relevant only if Commission finds that the minimum requirements described in paragraph (103) of the present decision are fulfilled. Even if an aid met all minimum requirements, its compatibility could be affected by manifest negative effects on competition and trade, or an insufficient compensation of its negative effects by its positive effects. |
| --- | --- |

(151)

| (152) | Section 3.7.2 of the RAG explicitly lists a series of situations where the negative effects on trade and/or competition manifestly outweigh any positive effects, and where regional aid is prohibited. |
| --- | --- |

(152)

3.4.2.1.   Manifest negative effect on trade: The (adjusted) aid intensity ceiling is exceeded

| (153) | A manifest negative effect would exist according to paragraph 119 of the RAG where the proposed aid amount exceeds, compared to the eligible (standardised) investment expenditure (41), the maximum (adjusted) aid intensity ceiling that applies for a project of the given size, taking into account the required ‘progressive scaling down’ (42). |
| --- | --- |

(153)

| (154) | The applicable regional aid ceiling in the Göd area is 35 %. In view of the expected higher distortion of competition and trade, the maximum aid intensity for large investment projects must be scaled down using the mechanism as per paragraph 20(c) of the RAG. The planned total eligible expenditure in present value for the notified investment project is HUF 376 540 billion, rounded (EUR 1 187 billion, rounded). In application of the scaling down mechanism of paragraph 20(c), this leads to a maximum allowable aid intensity of 13,11 % Gross Grant Equivalent (GGE) for the project. The notified aid intensity of 9,11 % in this case is thus not higher than the regional aid ceilings corrected by the scaling-down mechanism. |
| --- | --- |

(154)

| (155) | Sections 3.6.1.1 and 3.6.1.2 of the RAG explain which investment costs can be taken into account as eligible costs (43). In the present case, section 3.6.1.1 applies as the eligible costs for the proposed investment aid are calculated on the basis of investment costs. The Commision notes that the eligible costs are established in line with the provisions of this section as the acquired assets will be new (44), the investment concerns an initial investment in the form of a capacity extension (45), and no leasing costs (46) and no immaterial assets (47) are taken into account. |
| --- | --- |

(155)

| (156) | Thus, the Commission notes that the eligible costs are established in accordance with the RAG. |
| --- | --- |

(156)

| (157) | As the aid intensity does not exceed the maximum allowable and is applied to eligible expenditure established in line with the relevant rules, and as the notification excludes the combination of the notified aid with other aid, the basic requirement indentified in paragraphs 107 and 119 of the RAG that the maximum aid intensities are not exceeded, is met. |
| --- | --- |

(157)

3.4.2.2.   Manifest negative effect on competition: The aid creates overcapacity in a market in absolute decline

| (158) | According to paragraph 120 of the RAG, a manifest negative effect arises also where the investment aid creates capacity in a market in absolute decline, as such aid is likely to crowd out competitors, or to prevent low cost firms from entering, and risks weakening incentives for competitors to innovate. This results in inefficient market structures which are also harmful to consumers in the long run. |
| --- | --- |

(158)

| (159) | Prima facie, the Commission has doubts as to whether the aid has incentive effect at all. If the aid has no incentive effect, it cannot lead to overcapacity, as the investment would have happened in any event. |
| --- | --- |

(159)

| (160) | If the aid had incentive effect and was limited to the minimum necessary, this verification stipulated in paragraph 120 of the RAG would be necessary only where additional capacity is created on the relevant geographic market by the aid. Where the investment would have happened in any event (‘scenario 2’) in the same geographical market, the aid — provided it is limited to the minimum necessary to change the location decision — influences only the location decision, and additional capacity would have come on the relevant geographic market independent of it. Therefore, this verification will normally be required only in Scenario 1 situations (48) or in those Scenario 2 situations where the alternative locations (i.e. the target region and the more viable region for the implementation of the project) are located in different geographic markets. |
| --- | --- |

(160)

| (161) | In order to determine whether this verification is necessary in the case at hand, the Commission has to assess and establish whether the two alternative locations are situated in different geographical markets. If the locations under consideration are in fact situated in different geographical markets, or if the Commission leaves the question open whether the two locations are situated on the same or different geographical markets, the ‘overcapacity in a declining market’ test needs to be carried out. |
| --- | --- |

(161)

| (162) | To verify whether the investment addresses a market in absolute decline — if the test is necessary — the relevant product and geographic market needs to be defined. A market is in absolute decline (49) if it shows over an appropriate reference period a negative growth rate. The average growth rate of the market concerned (apparent consumption data or sales data) is normally measured over the last three years before the start of the project or on the basis of projected growth rate in the coming three to five years. |
| --- | --- |

(162)

Product concerned

| (163) | The product concerned is normally the product covered by the investment project. However, when the project concerns an intermediate product and a significant part of the output is not sold on the market, the product concerned may be the downstream product. |
| --- | --- |

(163)

| (164) | In the case at hand, the Commission considers that the product covered by the investment project are the battery cells. These can be either sold directly to car makers, or be first assembled into battery modules and possibly also battery packs, and then sold to the car makers. |
| --- | --- |

(164)

| (165) | Given that it is the customers who decide whether Samsung SDI should supply them with battery cells or modules or packs, and given that battery cell production constitutes the most substantial part of the value added of the final product, it appears reasonable to focus on the market of battery cells only. In any event, the market for battery cells is an appropriate proxy for the downstream products of battery modules and battery packs that follow the same market trends. |
| --- | --- |

(165)

| (166) | Therefore, the Commission considers that the battery cells represent the product concerned by the investment, and will assess the competition effects of the aid at the level of the market for battery cells. The Commission adopted the same approach also in its decision on SA.47662 in the LG CHEM case. |
| --- | --- |

(166)

Relevant product market

| (167) | The Hungarian authorities explained that besides the application in the automotive industry (for electric vehicles), Li-ion battery cells can find other uses, most notably in battery energy storage systems (ESS). Battery cells for energy storage systems (ESS) can be generally manufactured, at little additional costs, in the same facility as the cells for the automotive segment, thus the capacity Samsung SDI intends to install in Hungary could be used to supply cells for the ESS market as well. However, the Hungarian authorities explained that Samsung SDI has no specific plans to this effect. The Commission notes that Samsung SDI has provided a commitment to sell a minimum of [93-96] % of the cells (that will be manufactured using the new capacities installed as a result of the implementation of the notified investment project) for automotive use exclusively, during a period of minimum 5 years after the completion of the investment project. Therefore, the Commission considers for the purpose of the state aid assessment for this decision that the relevant product market is the market for battery cells for electric vehicles (measured in GWh). |
| --- | --- |

(167)

| (168) | On this basis, the Commission verified whether the aid creates overcapacity in a market in absolute decline in this particular market. |
| --- | --- |

(168)

Relevant geographic market

| (169) | The Hungarian authorities submit that the relevant geographic market is global. Although Samsung SDI had, at the moment of the investment decision, orders only from European car makers, the beneficiary's goal was to serve also the [...] market. Furthermore, the products can be easily shipped, which constitutes an additional argument militating in favour of a global geographical market. |
| --- | --- |

(169)

| (170) | For the purpose of the present decision, the Commission decided to leave the question of the exact definition of the geographic market open, and to proceed with the assessment of two plausible markets, the EEA market and the global market (50). Thus, the Commission has to verify whether the aid creates overcapacity in a market in absolute decline at the level of the market for EV battery cells of the EEA, and at global level. |
| --- | --- |

(170)

Testing whether the aid creates overcapacity in a market in absolute decline

| (171) | The Hungarian authorities submit that the project will be carried out in a highly innovative and rapidly growing market, both in the EEA and globally. |
| --- | --- |

(171)

| (172) | On the basis of a report by the IHS (51), the Hungarian authorities argue that the global demand for EV batteries (measured in terms of total battery capacity) will increase almost threefold from 2019 to 2023. The same report presents similar exponential growth prospects for the EU market, which is expected to grow fourfold during the same period. |
| --- | --- |

(172)

| (173) | Therefore, the Commission concludes that — whatever the definition of the geographic market — the aid does not contribute to or reinforces the creation of overcapacity in a market in absolute decline, thus it does not have a manifest negative effect on competition (52). |
| --- | --- |

(173)

3.4.2.3.   Manifest negative effect on trade: Counter-cohesion effect

| (174) | Paragraph 121 of the RAG prohibits an EEA region with a lower project-specific viability to participate in ‘subsidy races’ to the detriment of equally weak or worse-off regions (53). |
| --- | --- |

(174)

| (175) | The Hungarian authorities consider that the aid beneficiary considered only one other alternative location for the investment project, namely X'ian in China, which is not in the EEA. Since the existence of an operational EV battery cells manufacturing facility represented a pre-condition for the investment site selection, and given that Samsung does not have any other EV battery cells manufacturing sites in the EEA, no other area in the EEA was considered as a feasible location (see also recital (39) of the present decision). |
| --- | --- |

(175)

| (176) | Therefore, the Commission accepts that the aid does not risk to have a counter-cohesion effect. |
| --- | --- |

(176)

3.4.2.4.   Manifest negative effect on trade: Closure of activities elsewhere/relocation

| (177) | Pursuant to paragraph 122 of the RAG, where the beneficiary has concrete plans to close down or actually closes down the same or a similar activity in another area in the EEA and relocates that activity to the target area, if there is a causal link between the aid and the relocation, this will constitute a negative effect that is unlikely to be compensated by any positive elements. |
| --- | --- |

(177)

| (178) | The Hungarian authorities and the aid beneficiary declared (please see paragraph (33) of the present decision) that the beneficiary at group level has not closed down the same or similar activity in the EEA in the two years preceding the application for aid, and does not have any concrete plans to do so within two years after completion of the investment. |
| --- | --- |

(178)

| (179) | At the same time, the Commission notes that this commitment appears to be put into question by press reports (54) which suggest that the Samsung Group is reorganizing its activities in the EU, resulting — among others — in the relocation of the battery packs production activities of Samsung’s subsidiary located in Austria to Hungary, and a loss of 100 jobs in the respective Austrian subsidiary. |
| --- | --- |

(179)

| (180) | In view of the above, the Commission cannot exclude at this stage that the aid for investments into EV cell production in Göd (which is accompanied by additional not-aided downstream investments into battery modules and battery packs (see paragraph (10) of this decision) is not at least indirectly causal for any closure or relocation of the same or similar activity within the EEA and therefore may have a manifest negative effect on trade within the meaning of paragraph 122 of the RAG. |
| --- | --- |

(180)

3.4.2.5.   Conclusion as to the existence of manifest negative effects on competion and trade

| (181) | In light ot the assessment in recitals (151) to (180) of this decision, the Commission concludes at this stage that it cannot exclude that the aid has no manifest negative effect on competition or trade in the meaning of section 3.7.2 of the RAG as the Commission could not exclude that the measure may have a manifest negative effect on trade between Member States. |
| --- | --- |

(181)

3.4.3.   
  Balancing of positive and negative effects of the aid

| (182) | Paragraph 112 of the RAG lays down the following: ‘For the aid to be compatible, the negative effects of the measure in terms of distortion of competition and impact on trade between Member states must be limited and outweighed by the positive effects in terms of contribution to the objective of common interest. Certain situations can be identified where the negative effects manifestly outweigh any positive effects, meaning that aid cannot be found compatible with the internal market.’ |
| --- | --- |

(182)

| (183) | As explained in recital (150), the Commission cannot conclude at this point that the notified regional aid measure satisfies the minimum requirements of the RAG in view of the doubts expressed in connection with the contribution to regional development, appropriateness of the aid, the incentive effect and proportionality. |
| --- | --- |

(183)

| (184) | Furthermore, even if the measure was to meet these minimum requirements of the RAG, if the measure has manifest negative effect on competition and trade as pointed out in paragraph (181), the aid cannot be found compatible with the internal market. |
| --- | --- |

(184)

| (185) | In light of these considerations, the Commission raises doubts as to whether the positive effects of the aid outweigh their negative effects. |
| --- | --- |

(185)

3.4.4.   
  Transparency

| (186) | In view of para.II.2 of the Transparency Communication from the Commission (55) Member States must ensure the publication on a comprehensive State aid website, at national or regional level, of a full text of the approved aid scheme or the individual aid granting decision and its implementing provisions, or a link to it; the identity of the granting authority or authorities; the identity of the individual beneficiaries, the form and amount of aid granted to each beneficiary, the date of granting, the type of undertaking (SME/large company), the region in which the beneficiary is located (at NUTS level II) and the principal economic sector in which the beneficiary has its activities (at NACE group level). Such information must be published after the decision to grant the aid has been taken, must be kept for at least ten years and must be available to the general public without restrictions. Member States are not required to publish the above-mentioned information before 1 July 2016. |
| --- | --- |

(186)

| (187) | The Commission notes that the Hungarian authorities confirmed that all requirements concerning transparency set out in para.II.2 of the Transparency Communication will be respected. |
| --- | --- |

(187)

3.5.   Doubts and grounds for opening

| (188) | For the reasons set out above (see paragraphs (104) to (185) of this decision), the Commission, after a preliminary assessment of the measure, has doubts as to the conformity of the measure with the provisions of the RAG concerning the appropriateness, the incentive effect, and the proportionality of the aid, as well as its contribution to a common objective. In addition, the Commission notes that it cannot be excluded that the aid is causal for the relocation of activities from another Member State, which would constitute a manifest negative effect on trade. For all these reason, the Commission raises doubts as to the compatibility of the notified aid measure with the internal market. |
| --- | --- |

(188)

| (189) | Consequently, the Commisson is under duty to carry out all the required consultations and, therefore, to initiate the procedure under Article 108(2) of the TFEU. This will give the opportunity to third parties whose interests may be affected by the granting of aid to comment on the measure. In light of both the information submitted by the member State concerned and that provided by third parties, the Commission will assess the measure and will take its final decision. |
| --- | --- |

(189)

| (190) | The Member State and interested parties are invited to provide their comments to the opening decision all information necessary to carry out this formal investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(190)

| (191) | On the basis of the information submitted concerning the above mentioned factors, the Commission will perform a balancing exercise of the positive and the negative effects of the aid. The overall assessment of the impact of the aid will allow the Commission to take a final decision and close the formal investigation procedure. |
| --- | --- |

(191)

| (192) | In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, requests Hungary to submit its comments and to provide all such information as may help to assess the aid, within one month from the date of receipt of this letter. It requests your authorities to forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipient of the aid immediately. |
| --- | --- |

(192)

| (193) | The Commission wishes to remind Hungary that Article 108(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Eropean Union has suspensory effect, and would draw your attention to Article 14 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, which provides that all unlawful aid may be recovered from the recipient. |
| --- | --- |

(193)

| (194) | The Commission warns Hungary that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication. |
| --- | --- |

(194)

| (195) | Finally, the Commission notes that Hungary exceptionally agreed to have the present decision adopted in the English language. |
| --- | --- |

(195)

---

(1)  SA.46346 (2016/N) (OJ C 4, 6.1.2017, p. 7).

1

(2)  https://www.kleinezeitung.at/wirtschaft/5591081/Batterieproduktion_Samsung-SDI_Trotz-Millioneninvestition-werden#

2

(3)  SA.46346 (2016/N), OJ C 4 of 06.01.2017.

3

(*1)  Confidential information

*1

Confidential information

(4)  OJ C 249, 31.7.2014, p. 1–28.

4

(5)  In general, a module consists of multiple cells connected in series and/or parallel, encased in a mechanical structure. A battery pack is assembled by connecting multiple modules together in series or parallel with sensors and controllers including battery management systems and thermal management systems, and then encased in a housing structure as a final battery product designed specifically for each vehicle model.

5

(6)  OJ C 209, 23.7.2013, p. 1-45.

6

(7)  Blackboxing is an IP protection stategy which prevents disclosure of secret by limiting access to the full information regarding the potential innovation to only a few trusted employees. No patents applications are filed because already the publication of the subject of the invention to be patented is likely to provide ideas to the competitors; furthermore, it is very difficult to prove violations of patent rights regarding process innovations as this requires access to the competitors production lines. Blackboxing means in practice that specific security measures need to be applied, such as prohibiting any recording within the manufacturing facilities, blocking mobile reception within the production facilities, enforcing strict entrance and exit rules, etc.

7

(8)  Mixer freezing equipment for manufacturing slurry.

8

(9)  Secondary battery assembly equipment structure optimization (filed on 12 July 2017).

9

(10)  The Hungarian authorities explained that the UNIST Future Batteries Research Center, which opened in March 2017, is an industry-academia battery research institute belonging to the Ulsan National Institute for Science and Technology, which is a state-run university. The UNIST Future Batteries Research Center carries out joint research activities together with Samsung SDI.

10

(11)  Figures expressed in EUR are given in this decision on the basis of an exchange rate of 317,19 EUR/HUF, applicable on 16 May 2018, which is the date of the notification of the investment project to the Commission.

11

(12)  The present values in this decision are calculated on the basis of a discounting rate of 1,09 % applicable at the time of the notification. Present values are discounted to the year 2018 which represents the year of the notification.

12

(13)  OJ L 187, 26.6.2014, p. 1–78.

13

(14)  The adjusted aid amount means the maximum permissible aid amount for a large investment project, calculated according to the following formula: maximum aid amount = R x (50 + 0,50 x B + 0,34 x C), where R is the maximum aid intensity applicable in the area concerned, excluding the increased aid intensity for SMEs, B is the part of eligible costs between EUR 50 million and EUR 100 million and C is the part of eligible costs above EUR 100 million.

14

(15)  Samsung SDI-ARN Power Battery Co. Ltd (SAPB) was established in 2014 and is a three-party joint venture of Samsung SDI Group, Anging Ring New Group (a Chinese automotive parts supplier) and Xi'an Gaoke Group (a Chinese state-owned company). Samsung SDI Group owns a 50 % equity share in the JV.

15

(16)  To support these claims, the Hungarian authorities provided a short bechnmarking study analysing the financial data of other companies active in the sector, which concludes that the [18-22] % markup applied by the Samsung SDI Group falls within the markup range applied by these other comparable firms.

16

(17)  [...]

17

(18)  Uncompetitive prices and delivery times compared to the Korean suppliers, incompatible or uncompetitive technology, lack of alignment with Samsung SDI Group’s procurement strategy, etc.

18

(19)  Given its existing EV battery manufacturing facility in Xi’an (built in 2015 to produce EV batteries).

19

(20)  Samsung’s new plant is expected to use [60-90 %] of the production capacity to serve the demand of EEA clients whereas [10-40 %] is planned to be used to serve the [...] market.

20

(21)  Samsung SDI Group's Xi’an plant started manufacturing operations in October 2015.

21

(22)  Combined with the higher depreciation costs and terminal value of the investment in Hungary compared to China.

22

(23)  ‘c’ areas are areas eligible for regional aid under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU. These are considered disadvantaged areas within the European Union, but to a lesser extent than the ‘a’ areas, which are eligible for regional aid under Article 107(3)(a) TFEU.

23

(24)  According to paragraph 20(h)(b) of the RAG, an initial investment can also be ‘an acquisition of assets directly linked to an establishment provided the establishment has closed or would have closed if it had not been purchased, and is bought by an investor unrelated to the seller. The sole acquisition of shares of an undertaking does not qualify as an initial investment’.

24

(25)  Paragraph 20(e) of the RAG: ‘eligible costs’ means, for the purpose of investment aid, tangible and intagible assets related to an initial investment or wage costs.

25

(26)  According to Article 2(97) of the GBER ‘process innovation’ means the implementation of a new or significantly improved production or delivery method (including significant changes in techniques, equipment or software), excluding minor changes or improvements, increases in production or service capabilities through the addition of manufacturing or logistical systems which are very similar to those already in use, ceasing to use a process, simple capital replacement or extension, changes resulting purely from changes in factor prices, customisation, localisation, regular, seasonal and other cyclical changes and trading of new or significantly improved products.

26

(27)  http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/oslo-manual_9789264013100-en

27

(28)  Commission Decision of 13 June 2016 on the aid which Germany is planning to implement for Hamburger Rieger OJ C 323 of 2.9.2016, p. 1.

28

(29)  The Commission considers that it would be inadequate to base its assessment on the provided expert report due to close ties between the expert and Samsung SDI Group.

29

(30)  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions on EU State Aid Modernisation (SAM), COM/2012/0209 final.

30

(31)  See paragraph 38 of the RAG.

31

(32)  See paragraph 36 of the RAG.

32

(33)  OJ C 323, 02.09.2016.

33

(34)  OJ C 80, 02.03.2018.

34

(35)  See paragraph 80 of the RAG: The revenues can be neglected if they are the same in both locations.

35

(36)  Due to time constraints, the Samsung SDI Group only considered locations where it already had operational EV batteries manufacturing facilities. The only other possible location — Samsung’s battery cell plant in Ulsan, South Korea — was excluded early in the decision making process due to its high labour costs when compared to Hungary or China.

36

(37)  The present values are discounted to the year 2018 which is the year when the aid was notified to the Commission.

37

(38)  [...]

38

(39)  https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2018/05/23/Chinese-cars-with-South-Korean-batteries-turned-down-for-subsidies/3141527092277/

39

(40)  See the following section of this decision regarding conformity with the applicable aid intensity ceiling (see paragraph 81 to 86 and paragraph 107 of the RAG).

40

(41)  The standardised eligible expenditure for investment projects by large firms is described in detail in section 3.6.1.1 and 3.6.1.2 of the RAG 2014-20.

41

(42)  See paragraph 86 and 20(c) of the RAG.

42

(43)  Pursuant to paragraph 20(e) of the RAG, eligible costs means for the purpose of investment aid, tangible and intangible assets related to an initial investment or wage costs.

43

(44)  See RAG, paragraph 94.

44

(45)  Therefore the specific conditons applicable for initial investments in the form of a fundamental change of the production process of an existing establishment (see paragraph 96 of the RAG), of the diversification of an existing establishment (see paragraph 97 of the RAG), or the takeover of the assets of a establishment (see paragraph 99 of the RAG) do not apply.

45

(46)  See paragraph 98 of the RAG.

46

(47)  See paragraph 100 of the RAG.

47

(48)  See paragraph 120 of the RAG.

48

(49)  It might also be necessary to verify whether an absolute decline is not hidden behind the effects of business cycle effects on the product market concerned, or caused by other exceptional effects that would bias the results of the standard approach. Constantly sinking product prices might be an indicator for a situation of absolute decline, or simply the result of substantial and continuous technical progress allowing to reduce per unit production costs.

49

(50)  In fact, a definite definition of the geographic market is not necessary in the given case in view of the general evolution of the global and the EEA market for battery cells for EV use.

50

(51)  Information Handling Services (IHS) light vehicle production database and forecast

51

(52)  The market for battery cells for ESS shows also substantive growth, both at EEA and global level, both in value and in terms of installed ESS capacity. Therefore, a wider definition of the product market, to include cells for EV and ESS, would lead to the same result that the market is not in absolute or relative decline, and thus that the aid — independent of the definition of the geographic market as EEA or global market, has no undue negative effect on competition.

52

(53)  According to paragraph 121 of the RAG, the counter-cohesion effect resulting from aid to the detriment of a weaker or similarly weak EEA region would constitute a negative element in the overall balancing test that is unlikely to be compensated by any positive elements, because it runs counter the very rationale of regional aid.

53

(54)  https://www.kleinezeitung.at/wirtschaft/5591081/Batterieproduktion_Samsung-SDI_Trotz-Millioneninvestition-werden#

54

(55)  Communication from the Commission amending the Communications from the Commission on EU Guidelines for the application of State aid rules in relation to the rapid deployment of broadband networks, on Guidelines on regional State aid for 2014-2020, on State aid for films and other audiovisual works, on Guidelines on State aid to promote risk finance investments and on Guidelines on State aid to airports and airlines, OJ C 198, 27.6.2014, p. 30.

55

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| 3.4.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 112/39 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.4.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 112/39

---

STATE AID — FRANCE

State aid SA.49414 (2019/NN) – Reform of the legal and regulatory framework applicable to gas storage in France

Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2020/C 112/03)

By means of the letter dated 28 February 2020 reproduced in the authentic language on the pages following this summary, the Commission notified France of its decision to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union concerning the above-mentioned measure.

Interested parties may submit their comments on the measure in respect of which the Commission is initiating the procedure within one month of the date of publication of this summary and the following letter, to:

| European Commission, |
| --- |
| Directorate-General Competition |
| State Aid Greffe |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
| Fax + 32 22961242 |
| Stateaidgreffe@ec.europa.eu |

European Commission,

Directorate-General Competition

State Aid Greffe

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Fax + 32 22961242

Stateaidgreffe@ec.europa.eu

These comments will be communicated to France. Confidential treatment of the identity of the interested party submitting the comments may be requested in writing, stating the reasons for the request.

On 23 November 2017 France prenotified the Commission of a draft regulatory mechanism for the storage of natural gas.

The legal basis of the measure is the loi Hydrocarbure of 30 December 2017 which put an end to research into and exploitation of hydrocarbons and introduced various measures on energy and the environment. It entered into force on 1 January 2018. The French authorities have not set an end-date for the mechanism, but its scope will be revised at least every five years.

The regulatory mechanism was introduced without having been formally notified to or approved by the Commission.

The regulatory mechanism aims to guarantee the security of natural gas supplies in French territory. It applies to an exhaustive list, laid down by decree, of underground natural gas storage infrastructure facilities considered to be necessary to guarantee the security of natural gas supplies in France. These must be maintained in operation and their capacity is auctioned in accordance with arrangements laid down by the CRE (the French Energy Regulatory Commission). Under the regulatory mechanism, the costs of the storage operators are covered insofar as they correspond to those of an efficient operator. Their authorised revenue is determined by order of the CRE. If the revenue they receive directly from their customers is less than their authorised revenue, the storage operators receive compensation equal to the difference between those two amounts. This compensation is financed by means of a dedicated charge in the tariffs for using the transmission network collected by the transmission network operators from the gas shippers. The compensation is then paid back to the storage operators. Part of the costs associated with the storage charge are recovered from final consumers through the regulated tariffs for the sale of natural gas.

The total amount of compensation paid to the three regulated storage operators (Storengy, Géométhane and Teréga) was EUR 529 million in 2018 and EUR 540 million in 2019.

The Commission considers on a preliminary basis that the regulatory mechanism constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. As regards the legal basis for the assessment of compatibility, the Commission notes that no guidelines apply to a regulatory mechanism for gas storage designed to ensure security of supply. The Commission may declare an aid measure compatible directly under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU. However, in this case the Commission doubts at this stage whether the regulatory mechanism is proportionate for ensuring security of supply and whether it ensures that there are no negative effects on competition and trade between Member States.

More specifically, the Commission finds, first, that for the purpose of setting the storage operators’ authorised revenue the CRE allows them to obtain a return on their fixed capital. The calculation of this return involves assessing the value of the assets regulated. For this, the CRE uses the current economic costs method, starting from the gross book value of the assets in the operators’ accounts. The Commission notes, therefore, that the CRE did not get an independent economic evaluation of the market value of the assets when the regulatory mechanism was introduced, which could cast doubt on the proportionate nature of the measure.

Second, on the basis of the information available to the Commission, it is not possible to rule out the possibility that the mechanism introduces unjustified distortions of competition (i) between French natural gas suppliers and the natural gas suppliers of other Member States, (ii) between, on the one hand, gas storage operators and, on the other, LNG operators and operators of interconnectors, and (iii) between French gas storage operators and the gas storage operators of other Member States.

The Commission therefore invites France and any interested party to provide additional evidence relevant to assessing the proportionality of the measure and its impact on competition and trade between Member States.

TEXT OF LETTER

Par la présente, la Commission a l’honneur d’informer la France qu’après avoir examiné les informations fournies par vos autorités sur la mesure citée en objet, elle a décidé d’ouvrir la procédure prévue à l’article 108, paragraphe 2, du traité sur le fonctionnement de l'Union européenne.

1.   LA PROCÉDURE

| (1) | Le 23 octobre 2017, les autorités françaises ont informé la Commission européenne du projet de réforme du cadre législatif et réglementaire applicable au stockage du gaz naturel en France. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

| (2) | Le 23 novembre 2017, à des fins de sécurité juridique dans le cadre de cette réforme, les autorités françaises ont prénotifié un projet de mécanisme de régulation des infrastructures essentielles de stockage de gaz naturel. Le projet de loi correspondant était alors en cours d’examen au parlement français (1). |
| --- | --- |

(2)

| (3) | Le 22 janvier 2018, suite à l’adoption de la reforme par le parlement français, les autorités françaises ont complété leur prénotification en concluant que la mesure en cause ne constitue pas une aide au sens de l’article 107, paragraphe 1, du Traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne («TFUE») en l’absence de transfert de ressources d’État et d’affectation des échanges entre États membres. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

| (4) | Le 13 mars 2018, les autorités françaises ont transmis une note à la Commission précisant que celles-ci envisageaient de mettre en œuvre le mécanisme de régulation des revenus des opérateurs de stockage pour l’hiver 2018-2019. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

| (5) | La Commission a adressé des demandes de renseignements aux autorités françaises par rapport à ladite mesure le 29 janvier 2018, le 6 février 2018, le 21 mars 2018, le 22 juin 2018, le 3 septembre 2018, et le 1er février 2019. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

| (6) | Le gouvernement français et la Commission de régulation de l’énergie («CRE»), ont transmis leurs réponses aux questions de la Commission le 16 février 2018, le 20 février 2018, le 9 avril 2018, le 11 mai 2018, le 19 juillet 2018, le 1er août 2018, le 27 septembre 2018, et le 19 février 2019. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

| (7) | En outre, les autorités françaises ont échangé des courriels par rapport à la mesure en objet du 16 novembre 2018 au 20 décembre 2018 et du 24 au 29 mai 2019. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

| (8) | Le 29 mars 2019, la Commission et la CRE ont organisé une réunion. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

| (9) | Le 9 avril 2018, la Commission a reçu de la part d’un particulier des observations relative à la mesure en cause dénonçant la mise en œuvre d’une aide illégale par la France. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

2.   CONTEXTE GÉNÉRAL

2.1.   Le stockage de gaz en France

| (10) | Les infrastructures de stockage souterrain de gaz naturel permettent de constituer des stocks de gaz naturel reliés au réseau de transport. Elles participent à la gestion des flux sur le réseau. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

| (11) | En particulier, le stockage est, d’une part, utilisé comme un moyen d’assurer l’équilibre entre la quantité de gaz dans le réseau et la quantité de gaz consommée, par exemple en cas de rupture d’approvisionnement ou de pic de la demande lié à une vague de froid en hiver. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

| (12) | D’autre part, le stockage permet, avec les gazoducs et les compresseurs, d’assurer le service d’acheminement sur le réseau de transport, notamment en cas de congestion. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

| (13) | Les opérateurs de stockage offrent des capacités de stockage aux fournisseurs de gaz naturel présents sur des marchés de détail et de gros ainsi qu’aux gestionnaires de réseaux de transport. La propension à payer des fournisseurs de gaz naturel pour des capacités de stockage est très proche du différentiel de prix de vente du gaz naturel entre l’été et l’hiver («spread»). Le niveau de production de gaz naturel est relativement stable tout au long de l’année tandis que la consommation de gaz varie fortement selon la température. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

| (14) | En France, il existe quinze infrastructures de stockage, dont douze en fonctionnement. Les infrastructures de stockage en fonctionnement représentent 138 TWh en volume utile et 2 373 GWh/j en débit de soutirage pour un remplissage de 45 %. Les infrastructures mises en réserve représentent quant à elles 9,5 TWh en volume utile et 60 GWh/j en débit de soutirage pour un remplissage de 45 %. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

| (15) | Il existe trois opérateurs de stockage en France:






  — | Storengy, filiale à 100 % d’Engie, détient et exploite 12 sites, dont 3 mis en réserve et 9 en fonctionnement ces derniers représentant un volume utile de 102,1 TWh (soit 74 % des capacités totales du territoire); |
| --- | --- | --- |

(15)

—

Storengy, filiale à 100 % d’Engie, détient et exploite 12 sites, dont 3 mis en réserve et 9 en fonctionnement ces derniers représentant un volume utile de 102,1 TWh (soit 74 % des capacités totales du territoire);

| — | Teréga (anciennement TIGF) détenue par Snam (40,5 %), GIC (31,5 %), EDF Investissement (18 %) et Prédica (10 %), exploite 2 sites en fonctionnement représentant un volume utile de 33,1 TWh (soit 24 % des capacités totales du territoire); |
| --- | --- |

—

Teréga (anciennement TIGF) détenue par Snam (40,5 %), GIC (31,5 %), EDF Investissement (18 %) et Prédica (10 %), exploite 2 sites en fonctionnement représentant un volume utile de 33,1 TWh (soit 24 % des capacités totales du territoire);

| — | Géométhane, détenue par Storengy (50 %), CNP (49 %) et Géostock (1 %), détient un site en fonctionnement d’un volume utile de 3,3 TWh (soit 2 % des capacités totales du territoire). |
| --- | --- |

—

Géométhane, détenue par Storengy (50 %), CNP (49 %) et Géostock (1 %), détient un site en fonctionnement d’un volume utile de 3,3 TWh (soit 2 % des capacités totales du territoire).

| (16) | À partir de 2009, les variations saisonnières des prix du gaz ont diminué. Selon les autorités françaises, cela peut s’expliquer, d’une part, par le développement des installations de gaz naturel liquéfié («GNL») et le renforcement des interconnexions avec le réseau de transport des pays voisins. D’autre part, dans un contexte de pression concurrentielle croissante sur le segment de la fourniture de gaz naturel, la baisse du spread serait liée à une moindre couverture des fournisseurs de gaz naturel par rapport à de grandes pointes de froid, les fournisseurs renonçant à se couvrir contre des événements de faible probabilité afin de réduire leurs coûts. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

| (17) | Jusqu’en 2011, le spread était suffisamment élevé pour inciter les fournisseurs à souscrire la totalité des capacités de stockage de gaz. À partir de 2011, le spread est devenu insuffisant pour couvrir le prix du stockage proposé par les opérateurs (1,5 à 2 €/MWh de spread pour un prix de 6 à 7 €/MWh) (2). En conséquence, les capacités de stockage ne sont plus totalement souscrites depuis 2010-2011, trois sites ont été mis en exploitation réduite («mis en réserve») en 2014 et 2015 tandis que le taux de souscription des infrastructures de stockage en fonctionnement a atteint 63 % en 2017-2018. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

Image 2

| (18) | Selon les informations transmises par les autorités françaises, les spreads pour les années 2018 à 2021, sur la base des chiffres de 2018 de TTF (la principale place de marché européenne), sont les suivants: |
| --- | --- |

(18)

Image 3

| (19) | De plus, l’ensemble du réseau gazier français est caractérisé depuis le 1er novembre 2018 par une zone entrée-sortie unique. Selon les autorités françaises, cela permettrait de faire du marché français un marché plus liquide, moins volatif et mieux intégré au marché européen et de renforcer la sécurité d’approvisionnement de la France au travers d’une amélioration de l’accès aux différentes sources de gaz. Les fournisseurs de gaz naturel peuvent injecter du gaz naturel à n’importe quel point d’entrée du réseau et demander son soutirage à n’importe quel point de sortie. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

| (20) | Enfin, le transport transfrontalier de gaz naturel dans l’Union européenne est soumis à certaines contraintes techniques. Par exemple, en France, le gaz naturel est «odorisé» au niveau du service de transport, alors qu’en Allemagne et en Belgique, il est odorisé au niveau de la distribution. Par conséquent, le gaz naturel provenant de France, le cas échéant depuis un stockage de gaz naturel, doit être désodorisé avant de pouvoir être transporté en Allemagne ou en Belgique (5), ce qui est techniquement complexe et très coûteux. La France a toutefois mis en place des capacités de rebours «virtuelles» vers l’Allemagne et la Belgique: sur certains points, les flux dans le sens dominant (en entrée France) peuvent être réduits pour créer un flux virtuel de sortie vers les pays adjacents, en s’affranchissant ainsi des contraintes techniques. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

2.2.   Contexte législatif et réglementaire

| (21) | Pour assurer sa sécurité d’approvisionnement, dans un premier temps, la France a introduit un décret en 2014 pour renforcer les obligations des fournisseurs de gaz naturel de constituer des stocks de gaz naturel (6). |
| --- | --- |

(21)

| (22) | Dans cet ancien système, chaque année, les fournisseurs se voyaient allouer des droits de stockage en fonction du profil de consommation de leurs clients raccordés à un réseau public de distribution, dans des conditions fixées par un arrêté du ministre chargé de l'énergie. Les fournisseurs devaient ensuite détenir des stocks de gaz naturel au moins égaux à 80 % de ces droits, en volume utile et en débit de soutirage. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

| (23) | Les prix des capacités de stockage étaient librement fixés par les opérateurs de stockage et leurs revenus étaient issus uniquement de la commercialisation des capacités de stockage. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

| (24) | Or, selon les informations transmises par la France, ce système ne permettait pas d’assurer la transparence des prix des capacités de stockage. De plus, les fournisseurs n’ont pas respecté leurs obligations de stockage plusieurs années de suite. Par ailleurs, certains fournisseurs ont exercé un recours pour contester la légalité du décret de 2014 (7). |
| --- | --- |

(24)

| (25) | La France a expliqué qu’un système purement administratif de sanctions imposées aux fournisseurs en cas de non-fourniture du gaz naturel aux clients finaux présenterait un problème de faisabilité dans la mesure où l’équilibrage des marchés gaziers européens se fait sur une base quotidienne. Les mesures de délestage mises en œuvre par le gestionnaire de réseau en cas de baisse critique de la pression dans le réseau, entraîneraient des échanges de gaz subséquents qui rendent extrêmement difficile l’identification du fournisseur initialement en défaut. De la même manière, les consommateurs délestés ne sont pas nécessairement les clients du fournisseur en défaut. Dans ce contexte, la France affirme que les mesures ex ante sont préférables à des sanctions ex post. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

| (26) | Par ailleurs, l’article 33 de la directive 2009/73/CE (8) prévoit la possibilité pour un Etat membre de mettre en œuvre une régulation des infrastructures de stockage. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

| (27) | Le stockage de gaz fait également partie des mesures que les Etats Membres peuvent mettre en place pour garantir le respect des obligations découlant du règlement (UE) 2017/1938 (9), dans les conditions prévues dans ce règlement, notamment l’obligation d’assurer la sécurité de l'approvisionnement aux clients nationaux en tenant compte du fonctionnement correct et continu du marché intérieur du gaz. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

| (28) | C’est dans ce contexte que les autorités françaises ont adopté la réforme en cause. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

3.   DESCRIPTION DE LA MESURE

3.1.   Objectif du mécanisme

| (29) | Le mécanisme de régulation vise à assurer le maintien en fonctionnement des infrastructures de stockage nécessaires pour garantir la sécurité d’approvisionnement en gaz naturel du territoire français à moyen et long termes. |
| --- | --- |

(29)

| (30) | En particulier, le mécanisme de régulation vise à assurer la capacité du réseau à satisfaire la demande, notamment lors de pointes de froid, et à assurer le service d’acheminement sur le réseau de transport de gaz naturel, notamment en cas de congestion. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

3.2.   Base légale

| (31) | Le mécanisme de régulation des infrastructures essentielles de stockage de gaz naturel a été introduit dans le code de l’énergie par la loi no 2017-1839 du 30 décembre 2017 (10) («Loi Hydrocarbures»). Ces dispositions sont entrées en vigueur le 1er janvier 2018. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

| (32) | En particulier, l’article 12 de la Loi Hydrocarbures prévoit que le périmètre du mécanisme de régulation est fixé par le décret relatif à la programmation pluriannuelle de l’énergie («PPE»), mentionnée à l’article L.141-1 du code de l’énergie. La PPE est adoptée par décret, après avis de plusieurs instances consultatives, et révisée au moins tous les cinq ans pour deux périodes de cinq ans et, le cas échéant, les années restant à courir de la période pendant laquelle intervient la révision (11). |
| --- | --- |

(32)

| (33) | De plus, l’article 12 de la Loi Hydrocarbures prévoit que la CRE fixe certaines modalités du mécanisme de régulation, en particulier les modalités des enchères des capacités de stockage, les revenus autorisés des opérateurs de stockage et les modalités de le collecte de ce revenu via, la commercialisation des capacités et les tarifs d’utilisation du réseau de transport de gaz naturel puis leur reversement aux opérateurs de stockage (voir infra). |
| --- | --- |

(33)

3.3.   Fonctionnement général du mécanisme

| (34) | Le mécanisme de régulation du stockage du gaz naturel adopté en France en 2017 repose sur trois principes. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

| (35) | Premièrement, le périmètre de ce mécanisme correspond aux infrastructures de stockage souterrain qui sont nécessaires pour garantir la sécurité d'approvisionnement du territoire français à moyen et long termes (12) («les infrastructures de stockage essentielles»). La liste de ces infrastructures essentielles est fixée par le décret relatif à la programmation pluriannuel de l’énergie. Elles doivent être maintenues en fonctionnement par les opérateurs qui les exploitent (13). |
| --- | --- |

(35)

| (36) | Deuxièmement, les capacités des infrastructures de stockage essentielles sont mises aux enchères selon des modalités fixées par la CRE (14). Les enchères sont ouvertes à l’ensemble des fournisseurs, i.e. toute personne installée dans un État membre de l’UE ou dans un autre État dans le cadre d’accords internationaux disposant d’une autorisation de fourniture permettant d’intervenir sur le marché français, qu’ils soient actifs sur les marchés de fourniture de détail ou de gros. En janvier 2018, 213 acteurs français ou étrangers étaient titulaires d’une telle autorisation (15). Les recettes des enchères sont perçues par les opérateurs de stockage. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

| (37) | Troisièmement, les opérateurs des infrastructures de stockage essentielles bénéficient d’une garantie de couverture de leurs coûts dans la mesure où ceux-ci correspondent à ceux d’un opérateur efficace (16). À ce titre, ils perçoivent un revenu régulé défini par délibération de la CRE («le revenu autorisé»). Si les recettes directement perçues auprès de leurs clients sont inférieures à leur revenu autorisé, les opérateurs de stockage perçoivent une compensation égale à la différence entre leur revenu autorisé et les recettes perçues. Cette compensation est supportée par les expéditeurs de gaz en fonction de leur portefeuille de clients non interruptibles et ne s’étant pas déclarés délestables sans risque raccordés au réseau de distribution publique de gaz; elle est collectée par le gestionnaire du réseau de transport au titre d’un terme dédié au sein du tarif d’utilisation du réseau de transport (tarif ATRT), puis celle-ci est reversée aux opérateurs de stockage. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

| (38) | En revanche, si les recettes des opérateurs de stockage sont supérieures à leur revenu autorisé, les opérateurs de stockage doivent reverser le surplus au travers du tarif d’utilisation du réseau de transport. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

3.4.   Périmètre du mécanisme de régulation

| (39) | Selon les explications fournies par les autorités françaises (17), la méthode d’identification des infrastructures de stockage essentielles consiste à déterminer, d’une part, les infrastructures nécessaires pour assurer la capacité du réseau à satisfaire la demande et, d’autre part, les infrastructures nécessaires pour assurer le service d’acheminement sur le réseau de transport de gaz naturel. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

3.4.1.   Infrastructures nécessaires pour assurer la capacité du réseau à satisfaire la demande en cas de pointe de froid

| (40) | L’identification des infrastructures nécessaires pour assurer la capacité du réseau à satisfaire la demande repose sur la comparaison entre la demande de gaz naturel lors des pointes de froid et la capacité d’approvisionnement en gaz naturel notamment par le biais des interconnexions et des terminaux de GNL. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

—   Estimation de la demande de gaz naturel

| (41) | Le niveau de sécurité d’approvisionnement attendu du système gazier est fixé à l’article R. 121-4 du code de l’énergie. L’objectif est d’assurer l’approvisionnement de l’ensemble des consommateurs n'ayant pas accepté contractuellement une fourniture susceptible d'interruption dans des conditions climatiques particulièrement froides telles qu'il s'en produit statistiquement une fois tous les cinquante ans. Un travail est réalisé par les gestionnaires de réseau de transport pour évaluer le niveau de consommation correspondant pour différentes durées de pointe de froid allant de 1 à 30 jours. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

| (42) | Tout d’abord, les autorités françaises ont étudié cinq scenarios concernant l’évolution de la consommation de gaz naturel à prévoir au cours des dix prochaines années (18), hors production d’électricité. Les taux de baisse ainsi envisagés vont de - 2 % à - 18 % par rapport à l’année de référence 2012. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

| (43) | Finalement, les autorités françaises ont retenu l’hypothèse d’une diminution de 2 % de la consommation de gaz naturel, hors production d’électricité (voir graphe X ci-dessous). |
| --- | --- |

(43)

Image 4

| (44) | Ensuite, la consommation journalière moyenne en gaz naturel, hors production d’électricité, lors d’une pointe de froid, a été estimée à environ 3640 GWh/j en 2025, en excluant la consommation de gaz à bas pouvoir calorifique («gaz B»). |
| --- | --- |

(44)

Image 5

| (45) | Par ailleurs, la consommation de gaz naturel pour la production d’électricité lors d’une pointes de froid, a été estimée à 310 GWh/j. Les autorités françaises ont considéré un fonctionnement à pleine puissance des moyens de production d’électricité à partir de gaz naturel pendant les jours ouvrés. En weekend, il est en revanche retenu l’hypothèse d’un fonctionnement à 25 %. Par rapport au parc de génération actuel, la seule évolution future retenue correspond à la mise en service de la centrale à cycle combiné de Landivisiau, prévue en 2022 (voir graphe X ci-dessous). |
| --- | --- |

(45)

Image 6

| (46) | Ensuite, les autorités françaises ont également pris en compte la part interruptible de la demande de gaz naturel, c’est-à-dire les consommateurs ayant conclu un contrat d’interruptibilité avec le gestionnaire du réseau auquel il est raccordé. À cet égard, au moment de la mise en œuvre du mécanisme de régulation, des dispositifs d’interruptibilité applicables en cas de pointe de froid étaient encore en cours de définition. Dans le cadre des dispositifs d’interruptibilité, une durée maximale d’activation de 240 heures par an est envisagée. L’efficacité maximale des dispositifs d’interruptibilité est ainsi garantie pour des pointes de froid d’une durée allant jusqu’à 10 jours. Au-delà, une dilution de l’interruptibilité est à prendre en compte. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

| (47) | Ainsi, deux scenarios ont été retenus selon le développement de l’interruptibilité. Le potentiel d’interruptibilité de la consommation de gaz naturel s’élève à 138 GWh/j dans l’un et à 621 GWh/j dans l’autre. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

Image 7

| (48) | Finalement, les autorités françaises ont retenu le premier scenario, soit un potentiel d’interruptibilité de 138 GWh/j. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

| (49) | Les autorités françaises ont précisé que le délestage est une mesure de dernier recours en cas de crise d’approvisionnement, et non un mécanisme de flexibilité, dont l’efficacité dépend du respect par le consommateur de l’ordre de délestage donné par le gestionnaire de réseau dès lors qu’il n’est pas possible de procéder à un délestage automatique à distance. Or, le mécanisme de régulation des infrastructures de stockage essentielles vise à éviter des crises d’approvisionnement nécessitant le recours à des délestages. C’est pourquoi le délestage n’a pas été pris en compte dans l’estimation de la demande lors des pointes de froid. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

| (50) | De plus, il a été pris en compte que la consommation moyenne lors d’une pointe de froid de courte durée est supérieure à la consommation moyenne lors d’une pointe de froid de plus longue durée. Cet aspect est notamment mis en évidence par les températures moyennes observées lors de pointes de froid de différentes durées (cf. graphe X ci-dessous). |
| --- | --- |

(50)

Image 8

| (51) | Enfin, les autorités françaises ont pris en compte la baisse progressive de l’utilisation de gaz à bas pouvoir calorifique («gaz B»), compte tenu d’un programme de conversion, au profit du gaz à haut pouvoir calorifique («gaz H») qui représente aujourd’hui 90 % du gaz consommé en France. L’opération de conversion débute en 2018 pour s’achever au plus tard en 2028. Les autorités françaises estiment que la demande de gaz B converti en gaz H sera de 180 GWh/j en 2025. |
| --- | --- |

(51)

| (52) | Il résulte de tout ce qui précède que les autorités françaises ont estimé la demande globale de gaz naturel lors d’une pointe de froid de quatre jours en 2025 à environ 4000 GWh/j. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

—   Estimation de la capacité d’approvisionnement en gaz naturel

| (53) | Du côté de la capacité d’approvisionnement en gaz naturel, les autorités françaises ont réalisé des estimations en prenant en compte les interconnexions, l’approvisionnement en GNL via les terminaux méthaniers et la performance des stocks de gaz. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

| (54) | Premièrement, concernant les interconnexions, les estimations des capacités fermes ont été réalisées selon l’hypothèse d’une utilisation à 100 % des interconnexions. Le réseau gazier français comporte neuf interconnexions:






  — | Dunkerque qui permet d’importer du gaz H (capacité ferme de 570 GWh/j); |
| --- | --- | --- |

(54)

—

Dunkerque qui permet d’importer du gaz H (capacité ferme de 570 GWh/j);

| — | Alveringem qui permet d’exporter du gaz H (capacité ferme de 270 GWh/j); |
| --- | --- |

—

Alveringem qui permet d’exporter du gaz H (capacité ferme de 270 GWh/j);

| — | Taisnières B qui permet d’importer du gaz B (capacité ferme de 230 GWh/j); |
| --- | --- |

—

Taisnières B qui permet d’importer du gaz B (capacité ferme de 230 GWh/j);

| — | Taisnières H qui permet d’importer du gaz H (capacité ferme de 640 GWh/j); |
| --- | --- |

—

Taisnières H qui permet d’importer du gaz H (capacité ferme de 640 GWh/j);

| — | Obergailbach qui permet d’importer du gaz H (capacité ferme de 570 GWh/j); |
| --- | --- |

—

Obergailbach qui permet d’importer du gaz H (capacité ferme de 570 GWh/j);

| — | Oltingue qui permet d’exporter du gaz H (capacité ferme de 223 GWh/j). Cette interconnexion peut également être utilisée pour importer du gaz, mais seulement avec des capacités interruptibles; |
| --- | --- |

—

Oltingue qui permet d’exporter du gaz H (capacité ferme de 223 GWh/j). Cette interconnexion peut également être utilisée pour importer du gaz, mais seulement avec des capacités interruptibles;

| — | Jura qui permet d’exporter du gaz H (capacité ferme de 37 GWh/j); |
| --- | --- |

—

Jura qui permet d’exporter du gaz H (capacité ferme de 37 GWh/j);

| — | Larrau et Biriatou (regroupées sous l’appellation Pirineos) qui permettent d’exporter du gaz (capacité ferme de 165 GWh/j), ou d’en importer (capacité ferme de 225 GWh/j). |
| --- | --- |

—

Larrau et Biriatou (regroupées sous l’appellation Pirineos) qui permettent d’exporter du gaz (capacité ferme de 165 GWh/j), ou d’en importer (capacité ferme de 225 GWh/j).

| (55) | Ainsi, les capacités fermes d’interconnexion s’élèvent à 1780 GWh/j dans le sens des imports et à 425 GWh/j dans le sens des exports. Les importations nettes de gaz H par gazoducs sont estimées à 1355 GWh/j. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

| (56) | Le tableau ci-dessous a été communiqué par les autorités françaises pour expliquer les hypothèses retenues pour les interconnexions du territoire français où sont habituellement observées des importations en fonction des capacités fermes d’entrée et de sortie ainsi que des flux moyens et maximaux des trois derniers hivers. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

Image 9

| (57) | Les autorités françaises ont indiqué que le renforcement du réseau gazier et des interconnexions représenterait un coût important (19), en particulier par rapport à l’utilisation d’infrastructures de stockage existantes. En tout état de cause, ce type d’investissement ne remédierait pas aux éventuelles pénuries de gaz en cas de pointe de froid et ne serait pas disponible à moyen terme à cause des longs délais de construction. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

| (58) | Deuxièmement, s’agissant de l’approvisionnement en GNL, les quatre terminaux méthaniers français ont une capacité totale d’émission vers le réseau de 1160 GWh/j. Or, ces capacités ne peuvent être mobilisées que sous réserve de la disponibilité de GNL dans les cuves des terminaux méthaniers. Les autorités françaises ont considéré que pour un aléa, tel qu’une pointe de froid, inférieur à dix jours, seul le stock de GNL en cuve pourrait être émis. En revanche, au-delà de dix jours, des cargaisons de GNL pourraient être livrées et les terminaux méthaniers pourraient être utilisés au maximum de leur capacité. Deux scenarios ont été retenus en fonction du niveau moyen de stock de GNL observé dans les cuves soit lors de l’hiver le plus défavorable (scenario 1), soit lors de l’hiver le plus favorable (scenario 2). |
| --- | --- |

(58)

| (59) | Les deux scénarios correspondent à un niveau d’utilisation des terminaux méthaniers supérieur au niveau moyen d’utilisation au cours des sept derniers hivers. Il est néanmoins fait l’hypothèse que les fournisseurs de gaz naturel chercheraient à maximiser l’utilisation des terminaux méthaniers en cas d’occurrence d’une vague de froid extrême se produisant avec une probabilité statistique d’une fois tous les cinquante ans. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

Image 10

| (60) | La France a finalement retenu le premier scenario et a estimé le potentiel d’émissions des terminaux méthaniers à 330 GWh/j pour une pointe de froid de quatre jours. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

| (61) | Les autorités françaises ont indiqué que les terminaux de liquéfaction existants fonctionnent à un niveau proche de leur capacité maximale afin d’amortir le coût d’investissement important. De plus, la quasi-totalité des cargaisons de GNL font l’objet de contrats long terme du fait de l’intensité capitalistique de ces projets et sont donc déjà vendues avant leur production. Par ailleurs, le coût inférieur du stockage de gaz naturel sous forme gazeuse explique le faible développement du stockage de GNL au niveau mondial. Ainsi les quantités de GNL disponibles à court terme sont faibles. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

| (62) | Troisièmement, concernant la performance des stocks souterrains de gaz naturel, les autorités françaises ont expliqué que l’exploitation des nappes aquifères, qui représentent 90 % des infrastructures de stockage en France, suppose de les remplir à un niveau suffisamment haut et de les vider à un niveau suffisamment bas chaque année. De plus, le débit qu’il est possible de soutirer d’une infrastructure de stockage décroit au fur et à mesure que le stock se réduit. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

| (63) | Dans la mesure où, d’une part, au cours des neuf derniers hivers, le taux moyen de remplissage des infrastructures de stockage était de 42 % au 1er févrieret que, d’autre part, 85 % des pointes de froid observées au cours des 70 dernières années débutent avant le 5 février, les autorités françaises ont retenu comme hypothèse qu’un débit de soutirage associé à un remplissage de 45 % du volume utile est disponible sur chaque infrastructure de stockage au début d’une pointe de froid. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

| (64) | Par ailleurs, les autorités françaises ont pris en compte le stock de sécurité que les gestionnaires de réseau doivent constituer afin d’assurer la fourniture de dernier recours des services sociaux essentiels en cas de défaillance de leur fournisseur, [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

| (65) | Sur la base de l’ensemble de ces hypothèses, les autorités françaises ont identifié un besoin en infrastructures de stockage pour un débit de soutirage de 2380 GWh/j en 2025 pour un remplissage à 45 % du volume utile afin d’assurer la capacité du réseau à satisfaire la demande lors d’une pointe de froid. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

Image 11

3.4.2.   Infrastructures nécessaires pour assurer le service d’acheminement sur le réseau de transport de gaz naturel

| (66) | Les autorités françaises ont également identifié les infrastructures de stockage nécessaires pour assurer l’approvisionnement de l’ensemble du territoire compte tenu des capacités d’acheminement du réseau de transport de gaz. Elles ont pour cela étudié les différentes situations de congestions sur le réseau de transport. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

| (67) | La méthodologie utilisée consiste à:






  — | estimer la consommation pour chaque hiver futur à partir de chroniques historiques de température correspondant aux 69 hivers qui ont eu lieu entre 1948 et 2017 et en tenant compte des perspectives d’évolution de la consommation de gaz naturel, en fonction des différents scenarios mentionnés au considérants (41) à (52); |
| --- | --- | --- |

(67)

—

estimer la consommation pour chaque hiver futur à partir de chroniques historiques de température correspondant aux 69 hivers qui ont eu lieu entre 1948 et 2017 et en tenant compte des perspectives d’évolution de la consommation de gaz naturel, en fonction des différents scenarios mentionnés au considérants (41) à (52);

| — | comparer le flux de gaz qu’il serait nécessaire de pouvoir assurer à travers un front de congestion pour assurer l’approvisionnement des consommateurs et le flux de gaz qu’il est effectivement possible d’assurer via le réseau de transport. |
| --- | --- |

—

comparer le flux de gaz qu’il serait nécessaire de pouvoir assurer à travers un front de congestion pour assurer l’approvisionnement des consommateurs et le flux de gaz qu’il est effectivement possible d’assurer via le réseau de transport.

| (68) | Les GRT ont identifié deux situations de congestion du réseau de transport. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

| (69) | La première correspond à la situation actuellement observée dans un contexte de marché où les fournisseurs cherchent à maximiser les importations de gaz naturel depuis la Norvège et la Russie, actuellement les sources de gaz les plus compétitives en Europe, et à réduire les importations de gaz naturel liquéfié pour lequel des valorisations plus élevées peuvent être obtenues en Asie. Dans cette situation, quatre limites opérationnelles principales sont susceptibles d’être observées lorsque les fournisseurs cherchent à maximiser les injections de gaz naturel depuis le nord-est de la France, comme l’illustre le graphe ci-dessous. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

Image 12

| (70) | Par ailleurs, trois limites opérationnelles principales ont été identifiées dans des situations où les fournisseurs chercheraient à maximiser les flux de gaz naturel depuis le sud et l’ouest de la France (voir graphe 10 ci-dessous). Un scénario de ce type serait susceptible de survenir en cas de difficultés au niveau des approvisionnements par gazoducs depuis la Norvège ou la Russie, ainsi que dans d’éventuelles situations de forte disponibilité de gaz naturel liquéfié. Ces situations ont toutefois été considérées comme peu probables par les authorités françaises pour l’hiver 2018-2019 et ont donc été écartées dans la suite de l’analyse. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

Image 13

| (71) | Pour l’établissement des scénarios d’injection de gaz naturel, il est tenu compte du droit des fournisseurs de gaz naturel d’utiliser à pleine capacité les interconnexions de Dunkerque avec la Norvège, de Taisnières B et Taisnières H avec la Belgique et d’Obergailbach avec l’Allemagne pour réaliser des importations de gaz naturel, ainsi que la pleine capacité des interconnexions d’Oltingue et de Jura avec la Suisse et de Pirineos avec l’Espagne pour réaliser des exportations. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

| (72) | Il est tenu compte du fait que les fournisseurs de gaz naturel ont besoin de stocks de GNL pour être en mesure de couvrir la demande des consommateurs, mais que les fournisseurs n’ont aucune contrainte pour la répartition de la localisation des stocks de GNL entre les quatre terminaux méthaniers français. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

| (73) | Pour chaque scénario de consommation mentionné aux considérants (41) à (52), les autorités françaises ont étudié la répartition des injections que les fournisseurs de gaz naturel sont en mesure de demander, tout en respectant la contrainte d’injections de gaz naturel égales à la demande des consommateurs. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

| (74) | Lorsque la contrainte est atteinte, il est fait l’hypothèse que les gestionnaires de réseau de transport recourent dans un premier temps aux capacités interruptibles des interconnexions pour traiter la problématique de congestion. Sont ainsi pris en compte la possibilité d’arrêter des capacités interruptibles des interconnexions d’importation pour traiter une problématique d’excédent de gaz naturel en amont d’une congestion, ainsi que la possibilité d’arrêter des capacités interruptibles des interconnexions d’exportation pour traiter une problématique de manque de gaz naturel en aval d’une congestion. Lorsque la congestion perdure, il est noté le volume de gaz qu’il serait nécessaire de sortir des infrastructures de stockage souterrain situées en aval du front de congestion. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

| (75) | Ce travail permet d’établir les stocks souterrains de gaz naturel nécessaires en aval de chaque front de congestion afin d’être en mesure d’assurer le service d’acheminement sur le réseau de transport de gaz naturel. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

| (76) | L’application de cette méthode pour l’hiver 2018-2019, pour les principaux fronts de congestion susceptibles d’être observés lorsque les fournisseurs cherchent à maximiser les injections de gaz naturel depuis le nord-est de la France, conduit à une estimation d’un besoin de stockage souterrain avec des volumes utiles cumulés d’au moins:






  — | 16 TWh en aval du front de congestion NS4 (infrastructures de stockage d’Izaute, Lussagnet et Manosque); |
| --- | --- | --- |

(76)

—

16 TWh en aval du front de congestion NS4 (infrastructures de stockage d’Izaute, Lussagnet et Manosque);

| — | 54 TWh en aval du front de congestion NS3 (infrastructures de stockage de Céré-la-Ronde, Chemery, Izaute, Lussagnet et Manosque); |
| --- | --- |

—

54 TWh en aval du front de congestion NS3 (infrastructures de stockage de Céré-la-Ronde, Chemery, Izaute, Lussagnet et Manosque);

| — | 55 TWh en aval du front de congestion NS2 (infrastructures de stockage de Céré-la-Ronde, Chemery, Etrez, Izaute, Lussagnet, Manosque et Tersanne); |
| --- | --- |

—

55 TWh en aval du front de congestion NS2 (infrastructures de stockage de Céré-la-Ronde, Chemery, Etrez, Izaute, Lussagnet, Manosque et Tersanne);

| — | 64 TWh en aval du front de congestion NS1 (infrastructures de stockage de Beynes, Céré-la-Ronde, Chemery, Etrez, Germigny-sous-Coulomb, Gournay-sur-Aronde, Izaute, Lussagnet, Manosque, Saint-Illiers-la-Ville et Tersanne). |
| --- | --- |

—

64 TWh en aval du front de congestion NS1 (infrastructures de stockage de Beynes, Céré-la-Ronde, Chemery, Etrez, Germigny-sous-Coulomb, Gournay-sur-Aronde, Izaute, Lussagnet, Manosque, Saint-Illiers-la-Ville et Tersanne).

3.4.3.   Liste des infrastructures entrant dans le périmètre de régulation

| (77) | Les autorités françaises ont indiqué que le travail d’identification des infrastructures essentielles n’a pas pu être achevé suffisamment tôt en vue de l’hiver 2018-2019. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

| (78) | De plus, les autorités françaises ont expliqué que, pour des raisons techniques et réglementaires, la mise en réserve d’un site de stockage ainsi que le redémarrage d’un site mis en réserve requiert des délais importants, supérieurs à un an. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

| (79) | Pour ces raisons, dans un premier temps, le mécanisme de régulation a été appliqué pour l’année 2018-2019 à titre transitoire à l’ensemble des infrastructures de stockage de gaz du territoire français, jusqu’à la révision de la PPE prévue avant la fin de l’année 2018 (22). |
| --- | --- |

(79)

| (80) | Ainsi, aux termes de l’article 9 du décret no 2016-1442 du 27 octobre 2016 relatif à la PPE prise pour la période 2016-2023, ces infrastructures comprennent douze sites en exploitation (soit 137,9 TWh en volume et 2 372,5 GWh/j en débit de soutirage), trois sites mis en réserve en 2014 et 2015 (soit 9,5 TWh en volume et 60 GWh/j en débit de soutirage) et les capacités additionnelles de trois sites en développement. |
| --- | --- |

(80)

| (81) | Dans un second temps, le décret no 2018-1248 du 26 décembre 2018 a inséré un nouvel article 9-1 dans le décret 2016 selon lequel les infrastructures de stockage essentielles pour la période 2019-2023 correspondent uniquement aux douze sites en exploitation du territoire (soit 137,9 TWh en volume et 2 372,5 GWh/j en débit de soutirage). |
| --- | --- |

(81)

| (82) | La PPE étant révisée au moins tous les cinq ans, le périmètre de régulation est donc susceptible d’évoluer au titre de la prochaine révision de la PPE. À cet égard, un projet de décret relatif à la révision de la PPE pour la période 2019-2028 a été publié en janvier 2019 (23). Cependant, selon les informations à la disposition de la Commission, ce décret n’a pas encore été formellement adopté. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

3.5.   Mise aux enchères des capacités de stockage

| (83) | Selon l’article L.421-5-1 du code de l’énergie, les capacités de stockage régulées sont mises aux enchères selon des modalités fixées par la CRE. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

| (84) | En particulier, selon la délibération de la CRE du 22 février 2018, les enchères sont effectuées avec un prix de réserve nul (24). |
| --- | --- |

(84)

| (85) | Les premières enchères pour la période de stockage 2018-2019 (soit du 1er avril 2018 au 30 mars 2019) se sont déroulées du 5 au 29 mars 2018. Les capacités souscrites, y compris sur la base de contrats long terme, s’élèvent à 128,4 TWh, soit 93 % des capacités totales. Les recettes de la commercialisation des capacités s’élèvent à 68,4 millions d’euros avec un prix moyen d’adjudication de 0,53 €/MWh. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

| (86) | Les enchères pour la période 2019-2020 se sont déroulées du 13 novembre 2018 au 21 février 2019. L’ensemble des capacités proposées aux enchères ont été souscrites. Les capacités réservées pour l’hiver 2019-2020, y compris sur la base de contrats long terme, s’élèvent à 128,7 TWh en volume et 2090 GWh/j en capacité de soutirage. Les recettes de la commercialisation des capacités de stockage s’élèvent à 227 millions d’euros avec un prix moyen d’adjudication de 1,80 €/MWh. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

3.6.   Couverture du revenu autorisé des opérateurs de stockage tel que défini par la CRE

| (87) | Aux termes de l’article L.452-1 du code de l’énergie, «Les tarifs d'utilisation des réseaux de transport [...] sont établis de manière transparente et non discriminatoire afin de couvrir l'ensemble des coûts supportés par les gestionnaires des réseaux de transport et les opérateurs des infrastructures de stockage mentionnées au même article
  L. 421-3-1
  , dans la mesure où ces coûts correspondent à ceux d'opérateurs efficaces». |
| --- | --- |

(87)

| (88) | De plus, ce même article dispose que ces coûts «tiennent compte des caractéristiques du service rendu et des coûts liés à ce service» et que, s’agissant des opérateurs de stockage, ils incluent notamment «une rémunération normale des capitaux investis». |
| --- | --- |

(88)

| (89) | L’article L.452-2 du code de l’énergie donne compétence à la CRE pour fixer les «méthodes utilisées pour établir les tarifs d'utilisation des réseaux de transport de gaz naturel» et pour demander aux opérateurs de stockage de lui communiquer les éléments, notamment comptables et financiers, nécessaires à la fixation de ces tarifs. |
| --- | --- |

(89)

| (90) | Il résulte de ces dispositions que la loi donne compétence à la CRE pour fixer le revenu autorisé des opérateurs de stockage de manière à couvrir les coûts d’un opérateur efficace et d’assurer une rémunération normale des capitaux investis. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

| (91) | À partir d’octobre 2017, la CRE a consulté les parties prenantes afin d’élaborer la méthode de calcul du revenu autorisé (25). |
| --- | --- |

(91)

| (92) | Pour les années civiles 2018 et 2019, les revenus autorisés des opérateurs de stockage ont été fixés de manière ex ante par la CRE sur la base des prévisions transmises par les opérateurs, qui sont ensuite ajustées via une régularisation l’année suivante et des audits ex post (26). |
| --- | --- |

(92)

| (93) | Le revenu autorisé prévisionnel est égal à la somme des charges nettes d’exploitation prévisionnelles («CNE»), des charges de capital normatives prévisionnelles («CCN») et de l’apurement du solde du compte de régularisation des charges et des produits au titre de l’année précédente («CRCP»).

  Revenu autorisé = CNE + CCN + CRCP |
| --- | --- |

(93)

Revenu autorisé = CNE + CCN + CRCP

| (94) | Seules les activités entrant dans le périmètre de la régulation sont prises en compte pour le calcul de ces composantes. |
| --- | --- |

(94)

3.6.1.   Charges nettes d’exploitation

| (95) | Les charges nettes d’exploitation correspondent aux charges brutes d’exploitation (charges d’énergie, consommations externes, dépenses de personnel, impôts et taxes) d’un «opérateur efficace» après déduction des produits d’exploitation de l’opérateur (notamment production immobilisée, produits extratarifaires, gains ou pertes d’achat-vente de gaz stocké). |
| --- | --- |

(95)

| (96) | Compte tenu des courts délais de mise en œuvre de la réforme, pour la période 2018-2019, la CRE n’a pas pu déterminer si les coûts des opérateurs correspondent aux coûts d’un opérateur efficace. En conséquence, dans l’état actuel de la réglementation, les coûts pris en compte correspondent in fine aux coûts réels supportés par les opérateurs de stockage. |
| --- | --- |

(96)

| (97) | La CRE contrôle le caractère efficace et prudent des charges des opérateurs sur la base d’audits ex post, à travers le CRCP. La CRE a expliqué que le recours à de tels contrôles ex post correspond à une pratique habituelle de la CRE qu’elle utilise notamment pour le tarif de transport de gaz de GRTgaz et Teréga (27). |
| --- | --- |

(97)

3.6.2.   Charges de capital normatives

| (98) | Les CCN comprennent l’amortissement et la rémunération du capital immobilisé. Ainsi les CCN correspondent à la somme de l’amortissement de la base d’actifs régulés («BAR») et la rémunération du capital immobilisé calculée à partir du coût moyen pondéré du capital («CMPC») pour la BAR déjà mis en services et du coût de la dette s’agissant des immobilisations en cours («IEC»).

  CCN = Amortissement BAR + BAR x CMPC + IEC x coût de la dette |
| --- | --- |

(98)

CCN = Amortissement BAR + BAR x CMPC + IEC x coût de la dette

| (99) | La CRE a confirmé que cette méthode correspond à la pratique réglementaire en ce qui concerne les installations régulées sur les marchés du gaz et de l’électricité en France et en Europe occidentale (28). |
| --- | --- |

(99)

| (100) | Concernant la valorisation de la BAR dans le secteur gazier, la CRE utilise la méthode dite des «coûts courants économiques» (29). Celle-ci consiste à calculer la valeur nette économique des actifs (i) en partant de la valeur brute comptable des actifs figurant dans la comptabilité des opérateurs (coûts historiques de construction), (ii) actualisée selon l’inflation, puis (iii) dépréciée sur la durée de vie économique des actifs. |
| --- | --- |

(100)

| (101) | Les durées de vie économique retenues par la CRE pour les différentes catégories d’actifs des opérateurs sont les suivantes: |
| --- | --- |

(101)

Image 14

| (102) | S’agissant du cas particulier du «gaz coussin» (31), la CRE a rejeté la demande des opérateurs de retenir une durée d’amortissement de 250 ans qui aurait eu pour conséquence de faire supporter aux utilisateurs des charge d’amortissements déjà enregistrées dans les comptes sociaux des opérateurs avant l’entrée en vigueur du mécanisme de régulation. En effet, la CRE a pris en compte le fait que le gaz coussin, contrairement aux autres actifs des opérateurs, a été amorti par ces derniers sur des durées qui diffèrent notablement (de 25 ans à un horizon 250). La CRE a retenu, pour établir la BAR des opérateurs de stockage prise en compte à l’entrée dans la régulation (la BAR au 1er janvier 2018), un amortissement du gaz coussin assurant que la proportion d’amortissement du gaz coussin dans la BAR initiale soit cohérent avec le degré d’amortissement comptable chez chacun des trois opérateurs. Pour l’avenir, une durée d’amortissement pour le gaz coussin de 75 ans a été retenue par la CRE, ce qui correspond à trois renouvellements de concession d’exploitation de cavité souterraine de 25 ans. |
| --- | --- |

(102)

| (103) | Ainsi la BAR des opérateurs de stockage au 1er janvier 2018 a été évaluée à 3526 M€ pour Storengy, 1156 M€ pour Teréga Stockage et 189 M€ pour Géométhane. |
| --- | --- |

(103)

| (104) | Concernant le taux de rémunération du capital, la CRE a retenu la méthode du CMPC afin de permettre à l’opérateur de financer les charges d’intérêts et d’obtenir une rentabilité sur fonds propres comparable à celle qu’il pourrait obtenir pour des investissements avec des niveaux de risque comparables. La CRE a indiqué que le CMPC est une méthode communément utilisée par les régulateurs européens pour déterminer le taux de rémunération des actifs des infrastructures régulées. |
| --- | --- |

(104)

| (105) | Sur la base des études économiques et des travaux de consultants externes (32), la CRE a fixé le CMPC à 5,75 % pour les années 2018 et 2019. La CRE a expliqué qu’elle a fixé ce taux en évaluant le risque attaché aux infrastructures de stockage de gaz, notamment par comparaison avec les autres types d’infrastructures gazières (voir considérant (105)). |
| --- | --- |

(105)

| (106) | Plus précisément, en l’absence d’opérateur de stockage comparable coté en bourse, elle a pris comme taux de référence le CMPC des GRT de gaz (5,25 %, en vigueur dans le tarif ATRT6) en le majorant d’une prime de risque spécifique au stockage (à cause de la concentration des installations de stockage, du risque géologique des sous-sols et du risque de substituabilité avec les terminaux méthaniers et les interconnexions avec l’étranger). La CRE a également précisé que ce taux de rémunération est inférieur à celui accordé aux opérateurs régulés des terminaux méthaniers (7,25 %) dont l’activité est plus risquée notamment sur le plan commercial (coexistence de terminaux méthaniers régulés et non régulés, nombre de clients plus restreint). Par ailleurs, la CRE cite l’exemple du taux de rémunération de 6,5 % retenu par le régulateur italien pour le stockage de gaz. |
| --- | --- |

(106)

3.6.3.   Compte de régularisation des charges et des produits

| (107) | Le revenu autorisé est fixé par la CRE sur la base des prévisions des opérateurs concernant leurs charges et leurs recettes pour l’année suivante. |
| --- | --- |

(107)

| (108) | Etant donné que, dans l’état actuel de la réglementation, la CRE tient compte in fine des dépenses et des recettes réelles des opérateurs (voir considérant (96)), les écarts entre les charges nettes prévisionnelles et les charges nettes réalisées sont régularisés l’année suivante via le CRCP. |
| --- | --- |

(108)

| (109) | Les conséquences financières des audits conduits par la CRE sont également prises en compte à travers le CRCP (voir considérant (97)). |
| --- | --- |

(109)

3.7.   Bénéficiaires

| (110) | Les bénéficiaires de la mesure correspondent aux exploitants des infrastructures de stockage de gaz naturel qui entrent dans le champ du mécanisme de régulation. Depuis l’entrée en vigueur de la mesure, il s’agit de Storengy, Teréga et Géométhane. |
| --- | --- |

(110)

3.8.   Financement de la mesure via les tarifs d’utilisation des réseaux de transport

| (111) | Le financement du revenu autorisé des opérateurs de stockage provient, d’une part, des recettes directement perçues par les opérateurs de stockage et, d’autre part, lorsque ces recettes sont inférieures au revenu autorisé, de la compensation stockage égale à la différence entre le revenu autorisé et les recettes directement perçues.

  Compensation = revenu autorisé – recettes directement perçues |
| --- | --- |

(111)

Compensation = revenu autorisé – recettes directement perçues

| (112) | Les recettes directement perçues par les opérateurs sont issues majoritairement des enchères, mais également des éventuels contrats long terme historiques et des services additionnels. |
| --- | --- |

(112)

| (113) | La compensation stockage est recouvrée par les GRT auprès des expéditeurs de gaz au titre d’un terme dédié, le «terme stockage», au sein du tarif d’utilisation du réseau de transport (tarif ATRT) dans les conditions fixées par la CRE (voir infra). |
| --- | --- |

(113)

| (114) | À titre liminaire, il convient de préciser que, en France, il existe deux GRT, soit deux titulaires d’une autorisation d’exploitation de canalisations de transport de gaz naturel en vertu de l’article L.431-1 du code de l’énergie: GRTgaz et Teréga (anciennement TIGF). |
| --- | --- |

(114)

| (115) | GRTgaz est une société anonyme détenue à 75 % par ENGIE et à 25 % par la Société d’Infrastructures Gazière. GRTgaz, directement contrôlée par ENGIE, agit en toute indépendance vis-à-vis des autres parties de son entreprise verticalement intégrée (le groupe ENGIE) conformément au modèle de GRT indépendant, assurant la séparation effective des activités de GRT et des activités de production ou fourniture (33). |
| --- | --- |

(115)

| (116) | Comme décrit au considérant (15), Teréga est détenue à 40,5 % par Snam, à 31,5 % par GIC, à 18 % par EDF Investissement et à 10 % par Predica. Teréga vérifie également les conditions d’un GRT indépendant (34). |
| --- | --- |

(116)

3.8.1.   Fixation du terme stockage au sein des tarifs d’utilisation des réseaux de transport par la CRE

| (117) | Selon l’article L.452-1, sixième alinéa, du code de l’énergie, «Les tarifs d'utilisation des réseaux de transport de gaz naturel sont recouvrés par les gestionnaires de ces réseaux. Les gestionnaires de réseaux de transport reversent aux opérateurs de stockage souterrain de gaz naturel mentionnés à l'article L. 421-3-1 une part du montant recouvré selon des modalités fixées par la Commission de régulation de l'énergie». |
| --- | --- |

(117)

| (118) | De plus, ce même prévoit que «Les tarifs d'utilisation des réseaux de transport de gaz naturel peuvent comporter une part fixe, une part proportionnelle à la capacité souscrite et une part proportionnelle à la différence entre la capacité ferme souscrite en hiver et l'utilisation annuelle moyenne de cette capacité». |
| --- | --- |

(118)

| (119) | Selon l’article L.452-2 du code de l’énergie, «Les méthodes utilisées pour établir les tarifs d'utilisation des réseaux de transport de gaz naturel, [...] sont fixées par la Commission de régulation de l'énergie». |
| --- | --- |

(119)

| (120) | Sur la base de ces dispositions, par sa délibération no 2018-069 du 22 mars 2018 (35), la CRE a fixé les modalités de calcul du terme stockage. Celui-ci est applicable à compter du 1er avril 2018. |
| --- | --- |

(120)

Formula

| (121) | Le terme stockage payé par chaque expéditeur doit, selon la CRE, refléter la valeur «sécurité d’approvisionnement», c’est-à-dire la rémunération des stockages qui assurent en priorité l’alimentation en gaz des clients dont l’alimentation ne peut être interrompue, notamment les clients domestiques. Plus précisément, le terme stockage, exprimé en €/MWh/j/an et révisé tous les ans, au terme de la campagne annuelle d’enchères, correspond au rapport entre le montant prévisionnel de la compensation France à percevoir par l’ensemble des opérateurs de stockage et la valeur prévisionnelle de «l’assiette de compensation» de l’expéditeur en cause. |
| --- | --- |

(121)

| (122) | L’assiette de compensation correspond à la somme, à la maille France, de la modulation hivernale (36) des clients ne s’étant pas déclarés délestables sans risque et non-interruptibles raccordés aux réseaux de distribution publique de gaz de chaque expéditeur ayant souscrit des capacités fermes de livraison aux points d’interface transport distribution. |
| --- | --- |

(122)

| (123) | Ces clients correspondent aux catégories suivantes de clients raccordés aux réseaux de distribution: (i) clients domestiques, y compris les ménages résidant dans un immeuble chauffé collectivement au gaz, (ii) clients non domestiques assurant des missions d’intérêt général liées à la satisfaction des besoins essentiels de la nation et (iii) clients n’ayant pas accepté contractuellement une fourniture susceptible d’interruption, ou qui ne se sont pas déclarés délestables sans risque. |
| --- | --- |

(123)

| (124) | Dans sa délibération no 2018-069, la CRE a indiqué plusieurs raisons pour justifier l’exclusion des clients non-interruptibles raccordés au réseau de transport dans la définition de l’assiette de compensation. Tout d’abord, l’impératif de continuité économique au égard au délai contraint de mise en œuvre de la réforme justifiait de reprendre le périmètre des obligations de stockage du système antérieur du décret de 2006 applicable jusqu’en 2018 (37). Ensuite, il n’était pas possible d’identifier les clients de transport non-interruptibles au moment de la réforme car les dispositifs d’interruptibilité étaient alors toujours en cours de définition. Enfin, dans le cadre des mesures graduées du plan d’urgence gaz prévu par l’arrêté du 28 novembre 2013, les clients raccordés au réseau de transport sont délestés avant les clients raccordés au réseau de distribution, le délestage de ces derniers étant réservé aux situations les plus critiques. |
| --- | --- |

(124)

3.8.2.   Paiement du terme stockage par les expéditeurs et refacturation aux clients finals

| (125) | Concernant l’obligation de paiement du terme stockage par les expéditeurs, par sa délibération du 22 mars 2018, la CRE a introduit le terme stockage dans les tarifs ATRT en insérant de nouvelles dispositions dans sa délibération no 2018-022 du 7 février 2018 portant décision sur l’évolution du tarif d’utilisation des réseaux de transport de gaz naturel de GRTgaz et TIGF au 1er avril 2018. |
| --- | --- |

(125)

| (126) | Il résulte de cette modification que «tout expéditeur qui se voit attribuer de la capacité ferme de livraison à au moins un Point d’Interface Transport Distribution (PITD) se voit appliquer un terme tarifaire stockage fonction de la modulation hivernale de ses clients, raccordés aux réseaux de distribution publique de gaz, dans son portefeuille le 1er jour de chaque mois.». |
| --- | --- |

(126)

| (127) | La notion d’expéditeur désigne toute «personne physique ou morale qui conclut avec un GRT un contrat d’acheminement sur le réseau de transport de gaz. L’expéditeur est, selon le cas, le client éligible, le fournisseur ou leur mandataire». Un PITD est défini comme un «point physique ou notionnel d'interface entre un réseau de transport et un réseau de distribution publique». |
| --- | --- |

(127)

| (128) | De plus, il résulte des termes de l’article L.452-1, sixième alinéa, du code de l’énergie que les GRT doivent obligatoirement prélever les tarifs ATRT (voir considérant (117) «sont recouvrés»). |
| --- | --- |

(128)

| (129) | Concernant la répercussion du terme stockage sur les utilisateurs finals, dans sa réponse du 9 avril 2018, la CRE a indiqué que les expéditeurs répercuteront le terme stockage sur leurs clients finals qui entrent dans l’assiette de compensation dans la part «Transport» de leur facture. La CRE ne dispose pas de la liste des clients concernés. |
| --- | --- |

(129)

| (130) | Plus précisément, il apparait que cette répercussion n’est obligatoire qu’au titre des tarifs réglementés de vente de gaz naturel en vertu des articles L.445-3 et R.445-3 du code de l’énergie (38). Pour les offres de marché, cette répercussion relève du choix discrétionnaire du fournisseur. |
| --- | --- |

(130)

| (131) | En conclusion, le financement du mécanisme de régulation est in fine supporté par les clients non-interruptibles et ne s’étant pas déclarés délestables sans risque raccordés aux réseaux de distribution publique de gaz naturel. |
| --- | --- |

(131)

3.8.3.   Répartition des fonds collectés par les GRT entre les opérateurs de stockage selon les modalités fixées par la CRE

| (132) | Selon la délibération de la CRE relative au terme stockage, une fois collectés, les recettes du terme stockage sont reversées par les GRT aux différents opérateurs de stockage au prorata de la compensation devant être reçue (39). La fraction allouée à chaque opérateur correspond au rapport entre la compensation prévisionnelle annuelle de l’opérateur et la compensation prévisionnelle totale de l’ensemble des opérateurs des opérateurs de stockage régulés, telles que fixées par la CRE. Ces fractions sont précisées annuellement dans la délibération de la CRE portant évolution du terme stockage. |
| --- | --- |

(132)

| (133) | Pour cela, conformément à la délibération de la CRE, les GRT concluent un contrat avec chaque opérateur de stockage afin d’encadrer les modalités de la prestation de collecte et de reversement de la compensation, dont le coût est fixé par la CRE et couvert par le revenu autorisé de opérateurs. Pour l’année 2018, ce coût s’élève à 130k€ par GRT par opérateur de stockage (40). |
| --- | --- |

(133)

3.9.   Budget

| (134) | Chaque année, le montant total des compensations versées aux opérateurs régulés dépend des recettes tirées de la mise aux enchères et du revenu autorisé fixé par la CRE. Le montant des compensations versées aux trois opérateurs de stockage régulés s’élevait à 529 millions d’euros en 2018 et à 540 millions d’euros en 2019. |
| --- | --- |

(134)

Image 15

| (135) | Selon les autorités françaises, le coût global du stockage dans le cadre du système des obligations de stockage antérieur était plus élevé (6,1€/MWh en 2016 et 6,7€/MWh en 2017) que dans le cadre du mécanisme de régulation (5,6€/MWh après la réforme) (41). |
| --- | --- |

(135)

3.10.   Durée

| (136) | Les dispositions de la loi Hydrocarbures relatives au mécanisme de régulation des opérateurs de stockage sont entrées en vigueur le 1er janvier 2018. |
| --- | --- |

(136)

| (137) | Le terme stockage a été introduit dans le tarif ATRT à compter du 1er avril 2018 (42). Celui-ci est révisé annuellement par la CRE. |
| --- | --- |

(137)

| (138) | Actuellement, les autorités françaises ne prévoient pas de date pour la fin du mécanisme. En revanche, le périmètre du mécanisme est révisé tous les cinq ans à l’occasion de la révision de la PPE. |
| --- | --- |

(138)

4.   LES OBSERVATIONS D’UN CONSOMMATEUR

| (139) | Les observations reçues par la Commission le 9 avril 2018 émane d’un consommateur final de gaz naturel. Il s’estime directement affecté par le mécanisme de régulation au motif que celui-ci rende le prix du gaz naturel excessif. Le consommateur considère que le revenu autorisé des opérateurs de stockage représente au total environ 720 M€, soit plus de 3€/MWh, ce qui est environ 40 % plus cher que le stockage de gaz étranger. |
| --- | --- |

(139)

| (140) | De plus, les opérateurs étrangers seraient contraints de vendre leurs capacités de stockage au coût marginal ce qui démontre le caractère sélectif de l’avantage accordé aux trois opérateurs de stockage. En effet, ceux-ci peuvent vendre leurs capacités en-dessous de leur coût marginal et même à un prix nul à l’occasion de la mise aux enchères. Cela aurait un effet d’éviction des opérateurs étrangers au profit des opérateurs français. Cette restriction de concurrence entraînerait in fine une augmentation des prix du gaz au consommateur. |
| --- | --- |

(140)

5.   POSITION DES AUTORITES FRANÇAISES

| (141) | Les autorités françaises estiment que le mécanisme de régulation du stockage de gaz ne constitue pas une aide d’État au sens de l’article 107, paragraphe 1, du TFUE car (i) il n’est pas accordé directement ou indirectement au moyen de ressources d’État et (ii) le mécanisme de régulation n’affecte pas les échanges entre Etats membres. |
| --- | --- |

(141)

| (142) | Concernant le financement par ressources d’Etat, premièrement, la charge financière du mécanisme reposerait exclusivement sur des personnes privées, les fournisseurs de gaz naturel, que ce soit à travers la mise aux enchères des capacités ou du paiement des tarifs ATRT qui assure la couverture des coûts des opérateurs de stockage. Deuxièmement, les fonds collectés seraient affectés exclusivement au maintien en fonctionnement d’infrastructures qui permettent d’assurer le service d’acheminement sur le réseau de transport et le service de décalage de la disponibilité du gaz, en raison de l’obligation faite aux opérateurs de gaz de tenir une comptabilité séparée pour les activités entrant dans le champ du mécanisme de régulation. Or, ces services bénéficient aux fournisseurs de gaz naturel auprès desquels ces fonds ont été collectés. Troisièmement, les fonds collectés ne seraient jamais sous contrôle public. |
| --- | --- |

(142)

| (143) | Concernant l’affectation des échanges entre Etats membres, les autorités françaises estiment que le mécanisme de régulation n’affecte pas les échanges entre Etats membres dès lors le périmètre de régulation a été défini en posant l’hypothèse que les interconnexions sur lesquelles sont observées des importations sont utilisées au maximum de leurs capacités techniques (43). |
| --- | --- |

(143)

6.   APPRÉCIATION DE LA MESURE

6.1.   Aide d'État au sens de l'article 107, paragraphe 1, du TFUE

| (144) | Les aides d’État sont définies à l’article 107, paragraphe 1, du TFUE comme «les aides accordées par les États ou au moyen de ressources d'État sous quelque forme que ce soit qui faussent ou qui menacent de fausser la concurrence en favorisant certaines entreprises ou certaines productions, dans la mesure où elles affectent les échanges entre États membres». |
| --- | --- |

(144)

| (145) | La qualification d’une mesure en tant qu’aide d’État suppose que les conditions suivantes soient remplies de manière cumulative: a) la mesure doit être imputable à l'État et financée au moyen de ressources d’État; b) la mesure confère un avantage sélectif susceptible de favoriser certaines entreprises ou la production de certaines marchandises; c) la mesure doit fausser ou menacer de fausser la concurrence et être susceptible d’affecter les échanges entre États membres. |
| --- | --- |

(145)

6.1.1.   Imputabilité et financement par ressources d’État

| (146) | Pour que des avantages puissent être qualifiés d’aide au sens de l’article 107, paragraphe 1, TFUE, ils doivent, d’une part, être accordés directement ou indirectement au moyen de ressources d’État et, d’autre part, être imputables à l’État (44). |
| --- | --- |

(146)

| (147) | Concernant, en premier lieu, la condition tenant à l’imputabilité de la mesure, il convient d’examiner si les autorités publiques doivent être considérées comme ayant été impliquées dans l’adoption de cette mesure (45). |
| --- | --- |

(147)

| (148) | À cet égard, le mécanisme de régulation a été institué par une loi adoptée en 2017 (voir considérant (31) ci-dessus), son périmètre est fixé par décret (voir considérant (32)) et ses modalités sont fixées par des délibérations de la CRE, autorité administrative indépendante, dans le cadre de sa compétence prévue par la loi (voir considérant (33)). En particulier, la CRE définit les modalités de la mise aux enchères des capacités des infrastructures essentielles, fixe le revenu autorisé des opérateurs de stockage et définit la méthode de calcul du terme stockage au sein des tarifs ATRT. Le mécanisme de régulation doit donc être considéré comme imputable à l’État. |
| --- | --- |

(148)

| (149) | Concernant, en second lieu, la condition tenant à ce que l’avantage soit accordé directement ou indirectement au moyen de ressources d’État, il ressort de la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice qu’il n’est pas nécessaire d’établir, dans tous les cas, qu’il y a eu un transfert de ressources d’État pour que l’avantage accordé à une ou à plusieurs entreprises puisse être considéré comme une aide d’État, au sens de l’article 107, paragraphe 1, TFUE (46). |
| --- | --- |

(149)

| (150) | En particulier, la Cour a jugé que des fonds alimentés par des contributions obligatoires imposées par la législation de l’État, gérés et répartis conformément à cette législation, peuvent être considérés comme des ressources d’État, au sens de l’article 107, paragraphe 1, TFUE, même s’ils sont gérés par des entités distinctes de l’autorité publique (47). Le fait que ces entités soient des entités de droit public ou de droit privé n’est pas en soi décisif (48). L’élément décisif, à cet égard, est constitué par le fait que de telles entités sont mandatées par l’État pour gérer une ressource d’État, et non pas simplement tenues à une obligation d’achat au moyen de leurs ressources financières propres (49). De plus, il ressort de la jurisprudence de la Cour que les modalités de calcul de ces contributions peuvent être déterminées précisément par voie réglementaire ou par décision d’un organisme public, tel que l’autorité nationale de régulation, sans pour autant écarter la qualification de «contributions obligatoires imposées par la législation de l’État» (50). |
| --- | --- |

(150)

| (151) | Dans l’arrêt Essent Netwerk Noord (51), la mesure en cause a été qualifiée de taxe et donc de mesure impliquant une ressource d’Etat dès lors que le supplément de prix était imposé par l’Etat aux acheteurs d’électricité en vertu de la loi selon le critère objectif du nombre de kilowattheures transportés (52). La Cour a précisé, à cet égard, que la qualité du débiteur de la taxe importe peu, pour autant que la taxe porte sur le produit ou une activité nécessaire en relation avec le produit (53). |
| --- | --- |

(151)

| (152) | En l’espèce, d’une part, la couverture des coûts des opérateurs de stockage entrent dans le champ du mécanisme de régulation via les tarifs d’utilisation du réseau de transport est prévue par la loi Hydrocarbures (voir considérant (87) ci-dessus). En vertu de sa compétence prévue par la loi (voir considérant (89)), la CRE a introduit dans les tarifs ATRT un terme tarifaire qui est dédié au financement du mécanisme de régulation en cause (le terme stockage) (voir considérant (125)). Conformément à la délibération de la CRE correspondante, l’ensemble des expéditeurs qui se sont vus attribuer de la capacité ferme de livraison à au moins un PITD sont tenus de payer ce terme stockage au GRT avec qui ils ont conclu un contrat d’acheminement (voir considérant (126)). Le montant du terme stockage pour chaque expéditeur, selon la méthodologie fixée par la CRE, est fonction de la modulation hivernale de ses clients non-délestables et non-interruptibles raccordés aux réseaux de distribution publique de gaz (voir considérants (121) à (123)). Il résulte de ce qui précède que le terme stockage revêt le caractère d’une contribution obligatoire imposé par la loi aux expéditeurs dont le montant est calculé selon le critère objectif de la modulation hivernale de leurs clients sur la base de la méthodologie établie par la CRE. |
| --- | --- |

(152)

| (153) | Cette analyse est confirmée par la circonstance que le terme stockage payé par les expéditeurs doit être obligatoirement répercuté sur les consommateurs au titre des tarifs réglementés de vente de gaz naturel (voir considérants (129) et (130)). |
| --- | --- |

(153)

| (154) | D’autre part, en vertu de la loi Hydrocarbures, les GRT reversent aux opérateurs de stockage entrant dans le champ du mécanisme de régulation une part des sommes collectées au titre des tarifs ATRT selon les modalités fixées par la CRE, organisme public (voir considérant (132) ci-dessus). À cet égard, la CRE fixe la fraction versée par les GRT à chaque opérateur et le coût de la prestation de collecte et de reversement (voir considérant (133)). Ainsi, les GRT sont désignés et mandatés par la loi en vue de collecter et reverser les fonds provenant du terme stockage aux opérateurs de stockage régulés. Les fonds ne sont pas à la libre disposition des GRT dès lors que ceux-ci ne disposent d’aucun pouvoir d’appréciation quant à la détermination et à la destination de ces fonds, mais ces fonds font l’objet d’une redistribution obligatoire, dont les montants sont décidés par la CRE. |
| --- | --- |

(154)

| (155) | En conséquence, le terme stockage des tarifs ATRT qui assure le financement du mécanisme de régulation présente le caractère d’une contribution obligatoire imposée par la loi, à la fois aux expéditeurs et aux consommateurs au titre des tarifs réglementés, sous le contrôle de la CRE et les fonds provenant du terme stockage qui sont gérés et répartis par les GRT par conséquent, à titre préliminaire la Commission considère que la measure est accordée au moyen de ressources d’État.. |
| --- | --- |

(155)

6.1.2.   Avantage sélectif

| (156) | Concernant l’existence d’un avantage, selon une jurisprudence constante, sont considérées comme des aides d’État les interventions qui, sous quelque forme que ce soit, sont susceptibles de favoriser directement ou indirectement des entreprises ou qui doivent être considérées comme un avantage économique que l’entreprise bénéficiaire n’aurait pas obtenu dans des conditions normales de marché (54). |
| --- | --- |

(156)

| (157) | En l’espèce, le mécanisme de régulation permet aux opérateurs de stockage régulés de bénéficier d’un revenu garanti, le «revenu autorisé», fixé par la CRE de manière à garantir la couverture de leurs coûts, dans la mesure où ceux-ci correspondent aux coûts d’un opérateur efficace et une rémunération normale des capitaux investis (voir considérants (87) à (90) ci-dessus). Ce revenu autorisé est assuré par les recettes directement perçues par les opérateurs et, lorsque ces recettes sont inférieures au revenu autorisé, par la compensation stockage versée par les GRT. Ainsi, les opérateurs de stockage régulés, dont les pertes éventuelles seraient compensées, ne sont plus soumis à l’aléa inhérent aux conditions normales du marché. Par conséquent, la Commission considère à titre préliminaire que les opérateurs des infrastructures de stockage essentielles bénéficient donc d’un avantage économique. |
| --- | --- |

(157)

| (158) | Concernant la sélectivité de l’avantage, la Cour a jugé que l’appréciation de cette condition impose de déterminer si, dans le cadre d’un régime juridique donné, la mesure nationale en cause est de nature à favoriser «certaines entreprises ou certaines productions» par rapport à d’autres, qui se trouvent, au regard de l’objectif poursuivi par ledit régime, dans une situation factuelle et juridique comparable et qui subissent ainsi un traitement différencié (55). |
| --- | --- |

(158)

| (159) | En l’espèce, le mécanisme de régulation ne s’applique qu’aux infrastructures de stockage souterrain de gaz naturel considérées comme nécessaires pour garantir la sécurité d'approvisionnement du territoire français à moyen et long termes. La liste limitative de ces infrastructures essentielles est définie par décret dans le cadre de la PPE (voir considérant (35)). |
| --- | --- |

(159)

| (160) | Pour l’année 2018-2019, cette liste comprenait, à titre transitoire, l’ensemble des infrastructures de stockage du territoire français (voir considérant (77)). Dans l’état actuel de la réglementation, les infrastructures de stockage essentielles pour la période 2019-2023 correspondent à l’ensemble des infrastructures de stockage en fonctionnement du territoire français, excluant ainsi les infrastructures mises en réserve (voir considérant (81)). |
| --- | --- |

(160)

| (161) | Ainsi, sont exclus du champ d’application du mécanisme de régulation, d’une part, les opérateurs de stockage des autres Etats membres, notamment des Etats membres voisins, et, d’autre part, les exploitants d’autres instruments de flexibilité qui contribuent également à la garantie de la sécurité d’approvisionnement, tels que les exploitants de terminaux méthaniers ou les gestionnaires des interconnexions. |
| --- | --- |

(161)

| (162) | En conséquence, la mesure en cause peut favoriser certaines entreprises par rapport à d’autres, qui se trouvent, au regard de l’objectif poursuivi par ledit régime, à savoir garantir la sécurité d’approvisionnement, dans une situation factuelle et juridique comparable. Par conséquent, à ce stade de la procédure, la Commission est d’opinion que la mesure en cause octroierait ainsi donc un avantage sélectif aux opérateurs des infrastructures de stockage essentielles incluses dans la liste de la PPE. |
| --- | --- |

(162)

6.1.3.   Effet sur la concurrence et les échanges entre États membres

| (163) | Concernant l’affectation potentielle des échanges entre Etats membres, selon la jurisprudence de la Cour, la circonstance qu’un secteur économique, tel que celui de l’énergie, a fait l’objet d’une libéralisation au niveau de l’Union est de nature à caractériser une incidence réelle ou potentielle des aides sur les échanges entre les États membres (56). |
| --- | --- |

(163)

| (164) | En l’espèce, grâce à l’introduction du mécanisme de régulation, les exploitants des infrastructures de stockage essentielles du territoire français obtiendront un avantage que leurs concurrents, que ce soit des opérateurs de stockage d’autres Etats membres ou des opérateurs d’autres instruments de flexibilité tels que les exploitants de terminaux méthaniers et les gestionnaires des interconnexions. Or, le marché du gaz naturel ayant fait l’objet d’une libéralisation au niveau de l’Union (57), un éventuel avantage accordé à une entreprise dans ce secteur a le potentiel d’affecter les échanges entre les États membres. Par conséquent, après son analyse préliminaire de la mesure notifiée, la Commission considère qu’elle est susceptible d’affecter les échanges entre Etats membres. |
| --- | --- |

(164)

| (165) | Concernant l’effet sur la concurrence, la Cour a pu juger que les aides qui visent à libérer une entreprise des coûts qu’elle aurait normalement dû supporter dans le cadre de sa gestion courante ou de ses activités normales faussent en principe les conditions de concurrence (58). |
| --- | --- |

(165)

| (166) | En l’espèce, la mesure en cause vise à garantir un certain revenu aux opérateurs de stockage des infrastructures de stockage essentielles. La Commission considère à ce stade de la procédure que la mesure est susceptible de fausser la concurrence. |
| --- | --- |

(166)

6.2.   Légalité de l’aide

| (167) | Par la fixation des revenus autorisés des opérateurs de stockage à partir du 1er janvier 2018, l’organisation des premières enchères des capacités de stockage du 5 au 29 mars 2018 pour la période 2018-2019 et par l’introduction d’un terme stockage dans les tarifs ATRT à compter du 1er avril 2018, les autorités françaises ont mis en œuvre le mécanisme de régulation, qui, à titre préliminaire, constitue une aide d’Etat. |
| --- | --- |

(167)

| (168) | Étant donné que les autorités françaises n’ont pas notifié la mesure à la Commission et que la Commission n’avait donc pas pris de décision définitive concernant la mesure avant la date à laquelle les autorités françaises ont commencé à la mettre en vigueur, la Commission considère à ce stade que la France a agi en violation de l’obligation qui lui incombe en vertu de l’article 108, paragraphe 3, eu TFUE. |
| --- | --- |

(168)

6.3.   Compatibilité avec le marché intérieur

6.3.1.   Base légale pour l’appréciation de la compatibilité de la mesure

| (169) | Le mécanisme de régulation des infrastructures de stockage de gaz naturel mis en œuvre par la France vise à assurer le maintien en fonctionnement des infrastructures de stockage nécessaires pour assurer la sécurité d’approvisionnement en gaz naturel à moyen et long termes. |
| --- | --- |

(169)

| (170) | Ce type de mesure n’est pas prévue dans les lignes directrices relatives à l’environnement et à l’énergie (59), ni dans aucune autre orientation de la Commission. Il convient donc d’apprécier la compatibilité du mécanisme de régulation avec le marché intérieur directement au regard des dispositions du Traité. |
| --- | --- |

(170)

| (171) | En particulier, aux termes de l’article 107, paragraphe 3, sous c) du TFUE, les aides destinées à faciliter le développement de certaines activités ou de certaines régions économiques peuvent être considérées comme compatibles avec le marché intérieur, quand elles n'altèrent pas les conditions des échanges dans une mesure contraire à l'intérêt commun. |
| --- | --- |

(171)

| (172) | La Commission considère qu’une mesure est compatible avec le marché intérieur en vertu de l’article 107, paragraphe 3, sous c) du TFUE si elle remplit les conditions suivantes: (i) elle contribue à un objectif d’intérêt commun, ii) elle est nécessaire, (iii) elle est appropriée, (iv) elle a un effet incitatif, (v) elle est proportionnée et vi) elle ne fausse pas indûment la concurrence et les échanges entre États membres. |
| --- | --- |

(172)

| (173) | La Commission note également qu’il s’agit de la première fois que la compatibilité avec le marché intérieur d’un mécanisme de régulation du stockage de gaz est évaluée. |
| --- | --- |

(173)

| (174) | À ce stade de la procédure, la Commission doute de la compatibilité de la mesure en cause avec le marché intérieur pour les raisons développées ci-après. |
| --- | --- |

(174)

6.3.2.   Proportionnalité

| (175) | Une aide est considérée comme proportionnée lorsque son montant est limité au minimum nécessaire pour atteindre l’objectif en cause. |
| --- | --- |

(175)

| (176) | En l’espèce, dans le cadre du mécanisme de régulation, les opérateurs de stockage bénéficient d’un revenu garanti. L’appréciation de la proportionnalité du mécanisme de régulation suppose d’apprécier la proportionnalité de la méthode de calcul du revenu autorisé des opérateurs de stockage décrite aux considérants (87) à (108) ci-dessus. |
| --- | --- |

(176)

| (177) | En particulier, concernant la valorisation de la base d’actifs régulés (BAR), il résulte de la méthodologie décrite aux considérants (100) à (102), que cette valorisation est principalement fondée sur la valeur brute comptable (coûts historiques) et l’amortissement des actifs, sous réserve de l’exception du gaz coussin. |
| --- | --- |

(177)

| (178) | La Commission note que la CRE n’a donc pas procédé à une évaluation économique indépendante de la valeur de marché des actifs au moment de la mise en œuvre du mécanisme de régulation. Or, il est possible que cette évaluation aurait conduit à constater une dépréciation des infrastructures de stockage du fait de la diminution des spreads été-hiver observée depuis 2011, ce qui aurait in fine diminué le montant de la compensation perçue. |
| --- | --- |

(178)

| (179) | Par ailleurs, la Commission constate que cette méthode conduit à rémunérer des investissements réalisés avant la mise en œuvre du mécanisme de régulation lorsque les revenus des opérateurs de stockage n’étaient pas encore régulés. Or, la CRE n’a pas évalué si ces revenus ont permis aux opérateurs de stockage de couvrir leur coût initial d’investissement. Les autorités françaises n’ont donc pas démontré que la prise en compte de la valeur comptable des actifs régulés est justifiée dans les circonstances particulières du cas d’espèce. |
| --- | --- |

(179)

| (180) | Par conséquent, la Commission doute que la méthode de valorisation des actifs régulés soit proportionnée pour atteindre l’objectif de sécurité d’approvisionnement. |
| --- | --- |

(180)

6.3.3.   Prévention des effets négatifs sur la concurrence et les échanges

| (181) | La Commission considère qu’une mesure d’aide garantit la prévention des effets négatifs sur la concurrence et les échanges entre États membres lorsque les effets négatifs de l’aide sont suffisamment limités pour que l’équilibre général de la mesure soit positif. |
| --- | --- |

(181)

| (182) | En l’espèce, premièrement concernant les marchés de la fourniture de gaz, la mesure ne semble pas a priori entraîner de distorsion entre les fournisseurs gaz français et les fournisseurs d’autres États membres, dès lors que les enchères sont ouvertes à tous les fournisseurs de gaz qu’ils soient installés en France ou dans d’autres Etats membres, aux mêmes conditions (voir considérant (36) ci-dessus). Cependant, les informations à la disposition de la Commission ne permettent pas d’exclure que le mode de financement de la compensation stockage introduit des distorsions de concurrence entre les fournisseurs français et les fournisseurs d’autres Etats membres qui souscrivent des capacités de stockage en France. En effet, en pratique, ces derniers pourraient bénéficier de capacités de stockage à prix réduit sans pour autant supporter un coût comparable à celui supporté par les fournisseurs français à travers les tarifs ATRT. |
| --- | --- |

(182)

| (183) | Deuxièmement, en ce qui concerne les distorsions de concurrence avec les fournisseurs d’instruments de flexibilité alternatifs en France, les autorités françaises considèrent que les autres instruments sont des substituts imparfaits au stockage de gaz dans la mesure où elles fonctionnent dans des délais variables et peuvent être nécessaires dans situations différentes (voir considérant (58)). Par exemple, en cas de vague de froid, les capacités des terminaux méthaniers ne peuvent être mobilisées que sous réserve de la disponibilité de GNL dans les cuves. En outre, en cas de congestion du réseau, l’efficacité des terminaux de GNL dépend de leur proximité géographique aux points de consommation. De plus, les autorités françaises indiquent que la construction d’interconnexions gazières supplémentaires et le renforcement du réseau domestique de gaz ne constituent pas des alternatives totalement équivalentes au stockage, du moins à court ou à moyen terme, en raison des longs délais nécessaires à leur construction (voir considérant (57)). En outre, les coûts de la construction d’interconnexions supplémentaires et du renforcement du réseau seraient supérieurs à ceux de la mesure en cause (voir considérants (57)). |
| --- | --- |

(183)

| (184) | Par ailleurs, la France part du principe que les interconnexions existantes seront disponibles à pleine capacité pour la durée de la mesure. |
| --- | --- |

(184)

| (185) | Or, la Commission a envisagé a plusieurs reprises, sans trancher, l’existence d’un marché pertinent regroupant les infrastructures liées au transport de gaz, incluant notamment les interconnexions, le stockage de gaz, les terminaux de GNL et les infrastructures de regazéification (60). De plus, les autorités françaises ont souligné que la baisse du spread est liée au renforcement des interconnexion et à l’augmentation de la capacité des terminaux méthaniers (voir considérant (16)). En conséquence, la Commission n’est pas en mesure d’exclure l’existence de distorsions de la concurrence disproportionnées dans le marché des infrastructures liées au transport de gaz. À court et moyen termes, la mesure pourrait réduire artificiellement les incitations à utiliser les terminaux méthaniers et les interconnexions existants ainsi que leur rentabilité. À long terme, la mesure pourrait fausser les signaux d’investissement au détriment des opérateurs de GNL et des gestionnaires des interconnexions. |
| --- | --- |

(185)

| (186) | Troisièmement, la mesure pourrait également entraîner des distorsions de concurrence avec les opérateurs de stockage des autres Etats membres, en particulier les Etats membres voisins. En raison des interconnexions, ce risque est, a priori, particulièrement important pour la Belgique et l’Allemagne. |
| --- | --- |

(186)

| (187) | À court terme, les distorsions de concurrence entre les opérateurs de ces États membres apparaissent limitées par le niveau significatif du taux de souscription (par exemple, plus de 90 % en France et en Allemagne, 60 % en Belgique), sur la base de contrats long terme. Toutefois ces contrats arrivent à échéance en 2022-2023. Ainsi le mécanisme de régulation pourrait avoir une influence sur les conditions commerciales futures lors de la renégociation de ces contrats long terme à la fois en terme de prix et de taux de souscription et finalement sur la rentabilité des opérateurs de stockage des Etats membres voisins. |
| --- | --- |

(187)

| (188) | Enfin, la Commission n’a pas d’éléments suffisants pour évaluer les effets des règlementations sur l’odorisation du gaz naturel, qui est différente selon les Etat Membres, sur les échanges et la concurrence (voir considérant (20)). |
| --- | --- |

(188)

| (189) | Compte tenu de tous ces éléments, les informations actuellement à la disposition de la Commission ne lui permettent pas de conclure sur la prévention des effets négatifs non désirés sur la concurrence et les échanges entre États membres. |
| --- | --- |

(189)

Compte tenu des considérations qui précédent, la Commission invite la France, dans le cadre de la procédure de l’article 108, paragraphe 2, du traité sur le fonctionnement de l'Union européenne, à présenter ses observations et à fournir toute information utile pour l’évaluation des mesures dans un délai d’un mois à compter de la date de réception de la présente. Elle invite vos autorités à transmettre immédiatement une copie de cette lettre au bénéficiaire potentiel de l’aide.

La Commission rappelle à la France l’effet suspensif de l’article 108, paragraphe 3, du traité sur le fonctionnement de l'Union européenne et se réfère à l'article 16 du règlement (UE) 2015/1589 du Conseil qui prévoit que toute aide illégale pourra faire l’objet d’une récupération auprès de son bénéficiaire.

Par la présente, la Commission avise la France qu’elle informera les intéressés par la publication de la présente lettre et d'un résumé de celle-ci au Journal officiel de l’Union européenne. Elle informera également les intéressés dans les pays de l’AELE signataires de l’accord EEE par la publication d’une communication dans le supplément EEE du Journal officiel, ainsi que l’autorité de surveillance de l’AELE en leur envoyant une copie de la présente. Tous les intéressés susmentionnés seront invités à présenter leurs observations dans un délai d’un mois à compter de la date de cette publication.

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(1)  Projet de loi mettant fin à la recherche ainsi qu’à l’exploitation des hydrocarbures et portant diverses dispositions relatives à l’énergie et à l’environnement.

1

(2)  Rapport de l’Inspection générale des finances, du Conseil général de l’économie et du CGEDD d’avril 2017 «Stockage souterrain de gaz», p. 8.

2

(3)  Rapport de l’Inspection générale des finances, du Conseil général de l’économie et du CGEDD d’avril 2017 «Stockage souterrain de gaz», p. 9.

3

(4)  Réponse des autorités françaises du 16 février 2018.

4

(5)  À l’exception du point de sortie Alveringem, qui peut être alimenté depuis le terminal méthanier de Dunkerque ou depuis le PIR Dunkerque en gaz non-odorisé, via des canalisations raccordées en amont de la station d’odorisation.

5

via

(6)  Décret no 2014-328 du 12 mars 2014 modifiant le décret no 2006-1034 du 21 août 2006 relatif à l'accès aux stockages souterrains de gaz naturel.

6

o

o

(7)  Ce recours a été rejeté définitivement par la juridiction française compétente le 18 juillet 2018.

7

(8)  Directive 2009/73/CE du Parlement Européen et du Conseil du 13 juillet 2009 concernant des règles communes pour le marché intérieur du gaz naturel et abrogeant la directive 2003/55/CE (OJ L 211, 14.8.2009, p. 94–136).

8

(9)  Règlement (UE) 2017/1938 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 25 octobre 2017 concernant des mesures visant à garantir la sécurité de l'approvisionnement en gaz naturel et abrogeant le règlement (UE) no 994/2010 (JO L 280 du 28.10.2017, p. 1–56).

9

o

(10)  Loi no 2017-1839 du 30 décembre 2017 mettant fin à la recherche ainsi qu'à l'exploitation des hydrocarbures et portant diverses dispositions relatives à l'énergie et à l'environnement.

10

o

(11)  Article L.141-4 du code de l’énergie.

11

(12)  Article L.421-3-1 du code de l’énergie.

12

(13)  Article L.421-3-1 du code de l’énergie.

13

(14)  Article L.421-5-1 du code de l’énergie.

14

(15)  Prénotification du 22 janvier 2018.

15

(16)  Article L.452-1 du code de l’énergie.

16

(17)  Note des autorités françaises du 31 juillet 2018.

17

(18)  Deux de ces scénarios sont issus de la PPE. Ceux-ci envisagent des baisses de consommation respectives, hors production d’électricité, de - 17 % et - 13 % en 2028 par rapport à l’année de référence 2012. Les trois autres scénarios ont été élaborés par les gestionnaires des réseaux gaziers dans le cadre du bilan prévisionnel pluriannuel prévu à l’article L. 141-10 du code de l’énergie. Ils envisageant des baisses de consommation respectives, hors production d’électricité, de - 11 %, - 2 % et - 18 % en 2028 par rapport à l’année de référence 2012.

18

(19)  Par exemple, la France a estimé le coût de construction des gazoducs Arc Lyonnais, Eridan et Perche visant à faciliter le transport de gaz du Nord vers le Sud de la France à 1,6 milliards d’euros.

19

(20)  Autorités françaises sur la base de la consultation publique du 27 juillet 2017 no 2017-012 relative à la création d’une zone de marché unique du gaz en France au 1er novembre 2018 — Commission de régulation de l’énergie — 2017.

20

o

er

(21)  Autorités françaises sur la base de la consultation publique du 27 juillet 2017 no 2017-012 relative à la création d’une zone de marché unique du gaz en France au 1er novembre 2018 — Commission de régulation de l’énergie — 2017.

21

o

er

(22)  Notes des autorités françaises du 9 mai 2018.

22

(23)  https://www.ecologique-solidaire.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/2019.02.22%20Projet%20de%20décret%20PPE.pdf.

23

(24)  Délibération no 2018-039 du 22 février 2018 portant décision relative aux modalités de commercialisation des capacités de stockage dans le cadre de mise en œuvre de l’accès régulé des tiers aux stockages souterrains de gaz naturel en France.

24

o

(25)  Atelier de travail avec les acteurs du marché en octobre 2017; consultation publique en décembre 2017; table ronde avec des expéditeurs et des consommateurs; plusieurs auditions des opérateurs de stockage.

25

(26)  Délibération de la CRE no 2018-068 du 22 mars 2018 portant décision sur le tarif d’utilisation des infrastructures de stockage souterrain de gaz naturel de Storengy, TIGF et Géométhane à compter de 2018.

26

o

(27)  Réponse de la CRE du 9 avril 2018.

27

(28)  Etude de Frontier Economics de 2018 transmise par la CRE le 19 novembre 2018.

28

(29)  Comme indiqué dans la note de la CRE du 1er février 2019, cette méthode découle de la loi de finances rectificative du 28 décembre 2001 qui a institué une commission spéciale (la Commission Houri) en charge de déterminer le prix de cession, par l’État, des réseaux de transport de gaz naturel. Une méthode comparable fut également utilisée pour la valorisation des actifs des terminaux méthaniers et des opérateurs de distribution de gaz naturel.

29

er

(30)  Source: Délibération de la CRE no 2018-068 précitée.

30

o

(31)  Le «gaz coussin» désigne le gaz injecté de façon pérenne dans les réservoirs souterrains et indispensable au fonctionnement des stockages car nécessaire au maintien d’une pression minimale de stockage permettant la fourniture du volume utile avec le profil de soutirage requis (délibération de la CRE no 2018-068 précitée).

31

o

(32)  En particulier, le rapport du cabinet Compass Lexecon du 20 mars 2017 recommandait de fixer le CMPC entre 4,2 et 5,8 %.

32

(33)  Délibération de la CRE du 26 janvier 2012 portant décision de certification de la société GRTgaz; délibération no 2019-135 de la CRE du 25 juin 2019 portant décision sur le maintien de la certification de la société Teréga à la suite de trois prises de participation du groupe Crédit Agricole dans des entreprises de production d’énergie.

33

o

(34)  Délibération de la CRE du 26 janvier 2012 portant décision de certification de la société TIGF; délibération de la CRE du 4 février 2016 portant décision sur le maintien de la certification de la société TIGF à la suite de l’entrée de la société Predica dans le capital de TIGF Holding.

34

(35)  Délibération de la CRE no 2018-69 du 22 mars 2018 portant décision d’introduction d’un terme tarifaire stockage dans le tarif d’utilisation des réseaux de transport de GRTgaz et TIGF.

35

o

(36)  La «modulation hivernale» est définie par la CRE comme la différence, lorsqu’elle est positive, entre (i) la capacité souscrite ferme par chacun de ses clients sur chaque PITD et (ii) la somme de la consommation moyenne journalière de chaque client et de la part de sa capacité déclarée interruptible. Les clients s’étant déclarés délestables sans risque et les clients «contre-modulés», i.e. dont la part hiver (rapport entre la consommation du client des mois de novembre à mars inclus et sa consommation sur l’ensemble de l’année civile) est inférieure à 50 %, sont exclus de ce calcul.

36

(37)  Dans l’ancien système institué par un décret no 2006-1034, qui s’appliquait jusqu’en 2018, les obligations de stockage étaient imposées aux fournisseurs de clients ne s’étant pas déclarés délestables sans risque raccordés aux réseaux de distribution.

37

o

(38)  Article L.445-3 du code de l’énergie: «Les tarifs réglementés de vente du gaz naturel sont définis en fonction des caractéristiques intrinsèques des fournitures et des coûts liés à ces fournitures. Ils couvrent l'ensemble de ces coûts [...].»

38

Les tarifs réglementés de vente du gaz naturel sont définis en fonction des caractéristiques intrinsèques des fournitures et des coûts liés à ces fournitures. Ils couvrent l'ensemble de ces coûts [...].

Article R.445-3 du code de l’énergie: «Pour chaque fournisseur est définie une formule tarifaire qui traduit la totalité des coûts d'approvisionnement en gaz naturel. La formule tarifaire et les coûts hors approvisionnement permettent de déterminer le coût moyen de fourniture du gaz naturel, à partir duquel sont fixés les tarifs réglementés de vente de celui-ci, en fonction des modalités de desserte des clients concernés.

Pour chaque fournisseur est définie une formule tarifaire qui traduit la totalité des coûts d'approvisionnement en gaz naturel. La formule tarifaire et les coûts hors approvisionnement permettent de déterminer le coût moyen de fourniture du gaz naturel, à partir duquel sont fixés les tarifs réglementés de vente de celui-ci, en fonction des modalités de desserte des clients concernés.

Les coûts hors approvisionnement comprennent notamment: [...] 2o Les coûts d'utilisation des stockages de gaz naturel, le cas échéant».

Les coûts hors approvisionnement comprennent notamment: [...] 2o

(39)  Délibération no 2018-069 précitée (p. 7-8).

39

o

(40)  Délibération no 2018-069 précitée.

40

o

(41)  Courriel de la CRE du 16 novembre 2018.

41

(42)  Délibération no 2018-069 de la CRE du 22 mars 2018 précitée.

42

o

(43)  Prénotification du 22 janvier 2018.

43

(44)  Arrêts du 16 mai 2002, France/Commission, C 482/99, EU:C:2002:294, point 24; du 30 mai 2013, Doux Élevage et Coopérative agricole UKL-ARREE, C 677/11, EU:C:2013:348, point 27, et du 19 décembre 2013, Association Vent De Colère! e.a., C 262/12, EU:C:2013:851, point 16.

44

(45)  Arrêt du 19 décembre 2013, Association Vent De Colère! e.a., C 262/12, EU:C:2013:851, point 17 et jurisprudence citée.

45

(46)  Arrêts du 16 mai 2002, France/Commission, C-482/99, EU:C:2002:294, point 36, du 30 mai 2013, Doux Élevage et Coopérative agricole UKL-ARREE, C-677/11, EU:C:2013:348, point 34, du 28 mars 2019, Allemagne/Commission, C 405/16 P, EU:C:2019:268, point 55, et du 20 septembre 2019, FVE Holýšov I e.a. / Commission, T-217/17, EU:T:2019:633, point 105.

46

(47)  Arrêts du 2 juillet 1974, Italie/Commission, 173/73, EU:C:1974:71, point 35; du 19 décembre 2013, Association Vent De Colère! e.a., C-262/12, EU:C:2013:851, point 25, du 28 mars 2019, Allemagne/Commission, C-405/16 P, EU:C:2019:268, point 58, et du 20 septembre 2019, FVE Holýšov I e.a. / Commission, T-217/17, EU:T:2019:633, point 107.

47

(48)  Arrêt du 20 septembre 2019, FVE Holýšov I e.a. / Commission, T-217/17, EU:T:2019:633, point 126.

48

(49)  Arrêt du 28 mars 2019, Allemagne/Commission, C-405/16 P, EU:C:2019:268, point 59 et jurisprudence citée, et du 20 septembre 2019, FVE Holýšov I e.a. / Commission, T-217/17, EU:T:2019:633, point 108.

49

(50)  Arrêt du 15 mai 2019, Achema e.a, C 706/17, EU:C:2019:407, point 66.

50

(51)  Arrêt du 17 juillet 2008, Essent NEtwerk Noord BV, C 206/06, EU:C:2008:413.

51

(52)  Arrêt du 17 juillet 2008, Essent NEtwerk Noord BV, C 206/06, EU:C:2008:413, points 47 et 66.

52

(53)  Arrêt du 17 juillet 2008, Essent NEtwerk Noord BV, C 206/06, EU:C:2008:413, point 49.

53

(54)  Arrêts du 17 juillet 2008, Essent Netwerk Noord e.a., C-206/06, EU:C:2008:413, point 79, du 27 juin 2017, Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania, C-74/16, EU:C:2017:496, point 65 et, du 15 mai 2019, Achema e.a, C 706/17, EU:C:2019:407, point 74.

54

(55)  Arrêts du 14 janvier 2015, Eventech, C-518/13, EU:C:2015:9, points 53 à 55, ainsi que du 21 décembre 2016, Commission/World Duty Free Group e.a., C-20/15 P et C-21/15 P, EU:C:2016:981, point 54

55

(56)  Arrêts du 5 mars 2015, Banco Privado Português et Massa Insolvente do Banco Privado Português, C-667/13, EU:C:2015:151, point 51, du 18 mai 2017, Fondul Proprietatea, C-150/16, EU:C:2017:388, point 34, et du 15 mai 2019, Achema e.a, C 706/17, EU:C:2019:407, point 94.

56

(57)  Directive 98/30/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 22 juin 1998 concernant des règles communes pour le marché intérieur du gaz naturel, puis directive 2003/55/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 26 juin 2003 concernant des règles communes pour le marché intérieur du gaz naturel et abrogeant la directive 98/30/CE, et directive 2009/73/CE du Parlement Européen et du Conseil du 13 juillet 2009 concernant des règles communes pour le marché intérieur du gaz naturel et abrogeant la directive 2003/55/CE.

57

(58)  Arrêts du 18 mai 2017, Fondul Proprietatea, C-150/16, EU:C:2017:388, point 33 et jurisprudence citée, et arrêt du 15 mai 2019, Achema e.a, C 706/17, EU:C:2019:407, point 126.

58

(59)  Communication de la Commission — Lignes directrices concernant les aides d’État à la protection de l’environnement et à l’énergie pour la période 2014-2020, OJ C 200, 28.6.2014, p. 1–55.

59

(60)  Décision du 11 avril 2018, Total/ENGIE, M.8771, pt. 23; décision du 21 octobre 2009, RREEF FUND/ENDESA/UFG/SAGGAS, M.5649, pt. 14; décision du 14 novembre 2006, GDF/Suez, M.4180, pt. 342.

60

RREEF FUND/ENDESA/UFG/SAGGAS

GDF/Suez

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